Court Opinion

ID: 9373665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:06:34.608101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.569550
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SOCIAL SECURITY                                 DOCKET NUMBER
  ADMINISTRATION,                               CB-7521-16-0001-T-1
              Petitioner,

             v.
                                                DATE: May 27, 2022
LEONARD COOPERMAN,
            Respondent.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Leonard Cooperman, Feeding Hills, Massachusetts, pro se.

      Sharese M. Reyes, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the petitioner.

      Kathryn A. Miller, Esquire, and Meeka S. Drayton, Esquire, Seattle,
        Washington, for the petitioner.

      Patrick W. Carlson, Chicago, Illinois, for the petitioner.

                                      BEFORE

                          Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                            Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

                                      FINAL ORDER

¶1        The respondent has filed a petition for review, and the Social Security
     Administration (SSA) has filed a cross petition for review of the initial decision,
     which sustained charges of neglect of duties and conduct unbecoming, concluded
     that the respondent did not make whistleblowing disclosures, found good cause
     under 5 U.S.C. § 7521 to suspend the respondent for 180 days, and denied SSA’s
     request to suspend the respondent from the date of the compla int through the
     Board’s final decision in this matter. This case was assigned to an administrative
     law judge (ALJ) for adjudication.     5 C.F.R. § 1201.140(a)(1).    We DENY the
     respondent’s petition for review and GRANT SSA’s cross petition for review.
     We MODIFY the initial decision to additionally sustain specification 15 of the
     conduct unbecoming charge, but we agree with the ALJ that SSA proved the
     neglect of duties and conduct unbecoming charges as set forth herein.           We
     FURTHER MODIFY the initial decision              to find that the respondent’s
     November 15, 2012 correspondence to the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
     constituted activity protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C) but that he did not
     prove the correspondence was a contributing factor in SSA’s decision to file the
     complaint against him. We FIND that SSA has shown good cause to remove the
     respondent. We DENY SSA’s request to suspend the respondent from the date
     the complaint was filed through the issuance date of this Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The following facts, as recited in the initial decision, are generally
     undisputed.   Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 149, Initial Decision (ID).        The
     respondent has held the position of an SSA ALJ since June 2005. ID at 7; IAF,
     Tab 96 at 20. On October 2, 2015, SSA filed a complaint that sought to remove
     the respondent based on charges of neglect of duties (8 specifications) and
     conduct unbecoming (16 specifications) and to suspend the respondent from the
     date of the complaint through the date of the Board’s final decision in this matter.
                                                                                     3

     ID at 1, 54-55; IAF, Tab 1.       The respondent raised a claim of reprisal for
     whistleblowing disclosures. ID at 2; IAF, Tab 84 at 5, 14-18. A multiple-day
     hearing was held. ID at 3; Hearing Transcripts (HTs) 1-7. The ALJ issued a
     150-page initial decision, which included 338 findings of fact. ID at 7-57. The
     ALJ sustained both charges, including 6 of 8 specifications of the neglect of
     duties charge and 12 of 16 specifications of the conduct unbecoming charge.
     ID at 58-115.      The ALJ found that the respondent did not make any
     whistleblowing disclosures. ID at 120-29. The ALJ also determined that there
     was good cause to suspend the respondent for 180 days, but he denied SSA’s
     request to suspend the respondent from the date of the complaint through the date
     of the Board’s final decision in this matter. ID at 130-44.
¶3         The respondent has filed a petition for review, SSA has filed a response,
     and the respondent has filed a reply. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1,
     20-21. On petition for review, the respondent challenges the ALJ’s decision to
     sustain specifications 1-6 of the neglect of duties charge and to sustain
     specifications 1, 3-12, and 14 of the conduct unbecoming charge.        PFR File,
     Tab 1.
¶4         SSA has filed a cross petition for review, and the respondent has filed a
     response. PFR File, Tabs 5, 15. In its cross petition for review, SSA argues it
     proved specifications 7 and 8 of the neglect of duties charge; it proved
     specifications 2, 13, and 15 of the conduct unbecoming charge ; and removal is the
     appropriate penalty. PFR File, Tab 5. SSA also reiterates its request to suspend
     the respondent from the date the complaint was filed through the Board’s final
     decision in this matter. Id. at 29-32.
¶5         The respondent also has filed a motion for oral argument , and SSA has filed
     a response. PFR File, Tabs 2, 9. The regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(a)(2)
     states that the Board “may” hear oral arguments in any case. We find that oral
     argument will not assist the Board significantly in deciding the petition for
                                                                                     4

     review and cross petition for review, and we deny the respondent’s request.
     Special Counsel v. Environmental Protection Agency, 70 M.S.P.R. 41, 49 (1996).
¶6        Additionally, the respondent has filed several motions for leave to file an
     additional pleading.   PFR File, Tabs 11, 18, 22, 24, 26, 29, 31.    The Board’s
     regulations do not provide for pleadings other than a petition for review, a cross
     petition for review, a response to a petition for review, a response to a cross
     petition for review, and a reply to a response to a petition for review. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.114(a)(5). Once the record closes on review, the Board will not accept
     any additional evidence or argument unless it is new and material.       5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.114(k). The respondent has made no such showing in his submissions.
     We therefore deny his motions.
¶7        The Association of Administrative Law Judges also has filed two separate
     requests to file an amicus curiae brief. PFR File, Tabs 34, 37. We deny these
     requests because an amicus curiae brief will not contribute materially to the
     disposition of this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.34(e). Additionally, the respondent
     has filed a motion to supplement the record.     PFR File, Tab 43.    He has not
     persuaded us that the proffered evidence, even if new, is material.      5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.114(k). We therefore deny this request.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     Standard of Review
¶8        The Board has original jurisdiction to adjudicate actions against ALJs.
     Social Security Administration v. Long, 113 M.S.P.R. 190, ¶ 12 (2010), aff’d,
     635 F.3d 526 (Fed. Cir. 2011). An agency may take an action against an ALJ
     only for “good cause,” as determined after a hearing by the Board.       5 U.S.C.
     § 7521(a).   SSA must prove good cause by preponderant evidence.            Long,
     113 M.S.P.R. 190, ¶ 12.     Congress has not defined the term “good cause” for
     purposes of section 7521.     Id.   The Board, however, has adopted a flexible
     approach in which good cause is defined according to the individual
                                                                                                     5

      circumstances of each case. Department of Labor v. Avery, 120 M.S.P.R. 150, ¶ 5
      (2013), aff’d sub nom., Berlin v. Department of Labor, 772 F.3d 890 (Fed. Cir.
      2014).

      SSA proved the neglect of duties charge.
¶9          In specifications 1 and 2 of the neglect of duties charge, SSA alleged that
      the respondent had a duty to comply with agency regulations and policy when
      issuing decisions for a closed period of disability 2 (CPOD) and he breached that
      duty in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. IAF, Tab 1 at 11. In the initial decision, the
      ALJ found that SSA proved these specifications because the respondent did not
      explain his findings of medical improvement or support his findings with medical
      evidence. ID at 60-78.
¶10         On review, the respondent asserts that, contrary to the initial decision, he
      was authorized to decide a CPOD based only on a claimant’s statement regarding
      his/her symptoms. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-17. He asserts that this contention was
      supported by the regulation that defines “medical improvement” as “‘any
      decrease in the medical severity of [a] claimant’s impairments[]’” and provides
      that “‘[a] determination that there has been a [medical improvement] must be
      based on changes (improvement) in the symptoms, signs and/or laboratory
      findings    associated     with     [the]   impairment(s).’”          Id.    at 9;   20 C.F.R.
      § 404.1594(b)(1) (emphasis in original).             He further asserts that the ALJ’s
      decision contradicted the relevant regulation and case law from the appellate
      courts and ignored SSA’s Program Operations Manual System. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 9-17.
¶11         Although the regulation uses the disjunctive “and/or,” the ALJ concluded—
      and the record reflects—that SSA’s policy required more evidence than a

      2
       A closed period of disability occurs when a claimant, who was found to be disabled and entitled
      to disability benefits, subsequently experiences medical improvement related to the ability to
      work such that the claimant can engage in substantial gainful activity, the claimant is deemed to
      be no longer disabled, and disability benefits cease. ID at 60; see 42 U.S.C. § 423(f)(1).
                                                                                                   6

      claimant’s subjective statements to find medical improvement for a CPOD.
      ID at 13, 63; HT 1 at 219-22, 243 (testimony of the Hearing Office Chief ALJ
      (CALJ), who was also the respondent’s first-line supervisor); HT 2 at 220-22,
      227-28 (testimony of the Regional CALJ, who was also the respondent’s
      second-line supervisor); HT 5 at 95-96 (testimony of the Associate CALJ),
      287-88 (testimony of the CALJ); IAF, Tab 94 at 14-15 (explaining in HALLEX
      I-2-8-25 3 that any “decision will provide the rationale for the ALJ’s findings of
      fact and conclusions of law by including . . . [a]n explanation of the finding(s) on
      each issue that leads to the ultimate conclusion, including citing and discussing
      supporting evidence” and a “discussion of the weight assigned to various pieces
      of evidence . . .”).
¶12         Moreover, the record reflects that the respondent was advised by multiple
      agency officials of SSA’s policy regarding the analysis required for CPOD
      decisions. For instance, in a September 7, 2010 email, the respondent’s first-line
      supervisor advised him “to fully rationalize any cessation, no matter what the
      claimant agrees to do.”         IAF, Tab 102 at 74 (emphasis in original).               In a
      June 2011 retraining with a senior ALJ, he was provided the following guidance:
      “[A]ny [residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment], regardless of the
      [claimant’s] agreement as to medical improvement[,] must be married to
      corresponding medical evidence.” 4         IAF, Tab 93 at 5-6 (emphasis in original).
      The senior ALJ explained that a decision “should include a discussion of medical
      improvement showing how the signs, symptoms and objective testing show
      [i]mprovement under the medical improvement standard at the time the period

      3
        The ALJ found in the initial decision that HALLEX, the Hearing Appeals and Litigation Law
      Manual, was designed to amplify and provide more specificity regarding regulations and rulings,
      it constituted written agency policy, and it was binding on ALJs. ID at 10.
      4
       An individual’s RFC is “the most [s/he] can still do despite [his/her] limitations” and
      will be assessed “based on all the relevant evidence in [the individual’s] case record.”
      20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1).
                                                                                     7

      closes.” Id. (emphasis in original). In an August 3, 2011 meeting, the respondent
      stated to an Associate CALJ that he did not “see a need to corroborate” a “lucid”
      claimant’s statement that s/he wants a CPOD, and he was advised that there still
      needed to be a second RFC assessment. IAF, Tab 105 at 48.
¶13        Most significantly, in a December 5, 2011 directive, the respondent’s
      first-line supervisor noted that the respondent’s decisions “contain analytical
      deficiencies including a lack of analysis to support a non-disability RFC and a
      lack of analysis to support a finding of medical improvement beyond the
      claimant’s agreement to a closed period. . . .”      IAF, Tab 93 at 21-22.   The
      respondent was explicitly directed to determine whether there had been medical
      improvement by comparing prior and current medical evidence and by illustrating
      any improvement in the signs, symptoms, or laboratory findings. Id. at 22. The
      respondent’s first-line supervisor subsequently advised him that he should “pick
      and cho[o]se some items from the record, aside from the claimant’s statement” to
      document medical improvement. IAF, Tab 108 at 5; see HT 1 at 241‑42, HT 2
      at 60 (testimony of the first-line supervisor).   Because the respondent was on
      notice that, during the relevant time period, SSA policy required more than a
      claimant’s statement alone to support a finding of medical improvement, and the
      respondent did not comply with SSA policy, we agree with the ALJ that SSA
      proved these specifications.
¶14        We have considered the respondent’s reliance on the U.S. Court of Appeals
      for the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Newbold v. Colvin, 718 F.3d 1257, 1263-64
      (10th Cir. 2013), which stated that a finding of medical improvement may be
      based on symptoms alone. PFR File, Tab 15 at 10-13. The respondent’s citation
      to Newbold does not warrant a different outcome because the court’s decision
      is not binding on the Board or SSA. Importantly, as pertaining to the merits of
      the charge, decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are
      controlling authority for the Board, whereas other circuit courts ’ decisions are
                                                                                             8

      persuasive, but not controlling, authority.      Fairall v. Veterans Administration,
      33 M.S.P.R. 33, 39, aff’d, 844 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Additionally, the ALJ
      made findings of fact that SSA ALJs have a duty to comply with the Social
      Security Act, regulations, rulings, agency policies, HALLEX, and Acquiescence
      Rulings. 5 ID at 10-11. There is no evidence that SSA issued an Acquiescence
      Ruling after Newbold, and thus, SSA and its ALJs did not have to follow the
      court’s decision.
¶15         Finally, we have considered the respondent’s contention that Program
      Operations Manual System provision 28010.015(A)(2) controls this issue because
      it advises adjudicators that improvement in symptoms alone, without associated
      changes in signs or laboratory findings, “may support” a medical improvement
      determination. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15-17. This argument is unavailing. Notably,
      the ALJ relied on the testimony of various SSA officials and found that the
      Operations Manual is not a prime source of policy at the Office of Disability
      Adjudication Review (ODAR) because it sets forth internal policies for
      proceedings at the district office level, not for hearing operations. ID at 10-11.
      The respondent’s reference to Draper v. Colvin, 779 F.3d 556 (8th Cir. 2015)—
      which affirmed a district court decision that deferred to an Operations Manual
      provision regarding liens, adjustments and recoveries, and transfers of assets—
      does not warrant a different outcome because SSA did not issue an Acquiescence
      Ruling as to that matter. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-17.
¶16         In his reply brief, the respondent contends that he complied with the
      position description that was in place until December 2013, which authorized him
      to “take[] into account all applicable Federal, State, and foreign law [s], statutes,

      5
        An Acquiescence Ruling is issued when a circuit court has issued a decision contrary
      to SSA policy but SSA agrees to acquiesce to the circuit law. HT 1 at 202 (testimony
      of the first-line supervisor); HT 3 at 78 (testimony of the second-line supervisor); HT 4
      at 225-29 (testimony of the CALJ); HT 5 at 65-66 (testimony of the Associate CALJ);
      IAF, Tab 93 at 12-13; 20 C.F.R. § 404.985.
                                                                                         9

      regulations, rulings, and decisions of the Federal court.” 6      PFR File, Tab 21
      at 14-15 (emphasis in original); IAF, Tab 93 at 62-67. The respondent argues
      that, until this date, he could “expressly . . . take Federal court decisions from
      whatever jurisdiction into account, and after that date[,] [he] was not prohibited
      from doing so as long as the Federal Court decision did not conflict with [SSA]
      policy.” PFR File, Tab 21 at 15. This argument is unavailing. Indeed, in the
      absence of any evidence that SSA issued an Acquiescence Ruling regarding
      Newbold, Draper, or any circuit court decision that was inconsistent with SSA
      policy, such decisions could not constitute “applicable” decisions, as described in
      the earlier position description.
¶17         In specifications 3 and 4, SSA alleged that the respondent had a duty to
      “make a complete record of hearings proceedings,” and he breached this duty in
      fiscal years 2013 and 2014. IAF, Tab 1 at 11. In the initial decision, the ALJ
      relied on the relevant regulations, HALLEX I-2-6-40, a June 2011 retraining, an
      August 3, 2011 meeting with the respondent, a September 1, 2011 memorandum
      to all ALJs from the CALJ, a December 5, 2011 directive, and testimony
      regarding hearing records from five of the respondent’s cases; the ALJ concluded
      that SSA proved that the respondent had a duty to make a complete record, which
      included a summary of the content and conclusion of any off-the-record
      discussions, and the respondent failed to do so. ID at 14-15, 78-83; IAF, Tab 93
      at 7, 21-23, Tab 94 at 10-11. On review, the respondent challenges, among other
      things, the ALJ’s reliance on testimony regarding a “focused review” of only five
      of his hundreds of cases and the December 5, 2011 directive. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 18-19. He further asserts that neither the ALJ nor SSA adequately defined the
      requirement that he “adequately summarize” any off-the-record discussions, and
      thus, SSA’s action violates his due process rights.     Id. We disagree. Rather,

      6
       The revised position description did not include such language. IAF, Tab 1 at 15-21;
      HT 4 at 213 (testimony of the CALJ); ID at 9 n.6.
                                                                                          10

      consistent with HALLEX I-2-6-40, 7 the December 5, 2011 directive instructed the
      respondent to “summarize on the record, all off-the-record discussions concerning
      amending claims involving CPODs, as well as any other discussions relevant to
      the issues in a claimant’s case.” IAF, Tab 93 at 23. The respondent, who has
      advanced degrees and was an ALJ for nearly 10 years, ID at 7; HT 6 at 202
      (testimony of the respondent), should have no difficulty understanding SSA’s
      requirement that he summarize such off-the-record discussions. Moreover, we
      are not persuaded that SSA’s review of a small portion of the respondent’s cases
      warrants a different outcome.      We therefore discern no error with the ALJ’s
      conclusion that SSA proved specifications 3-4.
¶18         In specifications 5 and 6 of the neglect of duties charge, SSA alleged that
      the respondent had a duty to safeguard personally identifiable information (PII),
      and he breached this duty in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. IAF, Tab 1 at 11. On
      review, the respondent contends that, either in late 2014 or early 2015, his
      first-line supervisor directed him to stop sending PII to unsecured partners, and
      he complied with that request. PFR File, Tab 1 at 20; HT 6 at 261-62 (testimony
      of the respondent).      As support for his contention that he should not be
      disciplined for this misconduct, the respondent discusses Adamek v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 13 M.S.P.R. 224, 226 (1982), in which the Board barred an agency from
      taking an adverse action against an employee when it already had imposed a
      disciplinary action because of the employee’s misconduct. PFR File, Tab 1 at 21.
      The respondent recognizes that his first-line supervisor’s counseling regarding PII
      did not constitute a disciplinary or an adverse action, but he argues that the
      Board’s reasoning in Adamek should be extended to cases in which the underlying
      behavior “has been previously and amicably addressed, discussed, and resolved”

      7
        HALLEX I-2-6-40 states, “If a question arises during the course of a hearing that
      is not relevant to the issues in the claimant’s case, the ALJ may decide to discuss and
      resolve it off-the-record. However, the ALJ must summarize on the record the content
      and conclusion of any off-the-record discussion.” IAF, Tab 94 at 10-11.
                                                                                           11

      between the agency and employee, and the behavior was not repeated.                  Id.
      (emphasis in original).    We are not persuaded that it is appropriate to extend
      Adamek’s reasoning to a case such as this when there was no prior adverse action.
      See, e.g., Tawadrous v. Department of the Treasury, 477 F. App’x 735, 738 (Fed.
      Cir. 2012) (declining to extend Adamek to a situation when the agency rescinded
      the June 2010 removal before there was a judgment on the merits and provided
      the appellant with back pay and finding that the prior rescinded action “presents
      no obstacle to Treasury’s November 2010 effort to remove [him] on the same
      charges”). 8 Because the respondent does not dispute that he failed to safeguard
      PII as described during the timeframe identified in the complaint, we affirm the
      ALJ’s decision to sustain specifications 5-6 of the neglect of duties charge. ID
      at 100-02.
¶19         In specifications 7 and 8 of the neglect of duties charge, SSA alleged that
      the respondent had a “duty to act in a fair and impartial manner” and that he
      breached this duty in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. IAF, Tab 1 at 11. SSA relied
      on several emails between the respondent and various claimants’ representatives
      to support these specifications.      IAF, Tab 111 at 29, 68-69.         In the initial
      decision, the ALJ found that the respondent had a duty to act in a fair and
      impartial manner and that the respondent knew of this duty, but SSA did not
      prove that he failed to act in a fair and impartial manner because, among other
      things, the CALJ could not point to any cases in which a claimant received a more
      favorable outcome based on the identity of the claimant’s representative.            ID
      at 16, 94. In its cross petition for review, SSA argues, among other things, that
      the ALJ took “an unreasonably circumscribed view” of the respondent’s duty of
      impartiality, arguing that this duty extended beyond his interaction with claimants
      and beyond his conduct during hearings. PFR File, Tab 5 at 23-26. We need not

      8
        The Board may follow a nonprecedential decision of the Federal Circuit when, as h ere,
      it finds its reasoning persuasive.   LeMaster v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      123 M.S.P.R. 453, ¶ 11 n.5 (2016).
                                                                                          12

      resolve this issue on review because, even if we affirmed the ALJ’s decision not
      to sustain these specifications, we would still sustain the neglect of duties charge
      based on our decision to affirm the ALJ’s finding that SSA has proven
      specifications 1-6 by preponderant evidence. See Burroughs v. Department of the
      Army, 918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding that when more than one event
      or factual specification supports a single charge proof of one or more, b ut not all,
      of the supporting specifications is sufficient to sustain the charge).

      SSA proved the conduct unbecoming charge. 9
¶20         In the complaint, SSA alleged that the respondent engaged in various
      “improper communication[s]” with several claimants’ representatives, which
      constituted conduct unbecoming.        IAF, Tab 1 at 11-12.      The ALJ sustained
      specifications 1, 3-12, and 14 of the conduct unbecoming charge and the charge
      itself. ID at 95-115. Both the respondent and SSA challenge the ALJ’s findings
      regarding the specifications.
¶21         Regarding specifications 1, 3-12, and 14, the respondent contends that the
      ALJ erred by imposing discipline for his “collegial” and “flattering” language in
      correspondence with counsel. PFR File, Tab 1 at 22. He asserts that SSA is not
      represented at hearings and, because the only parties appearing before him are the
      claimant and his/her representative, collegial ALJ-counsel relations are an
      “essential lubricant” that allows the judicial gears to turn efficiently. Id. at 23.
      He also asserts that the ALJ applied a “broad and standardless” rule ; the ALJ
      overlooked the “cardinal principle” that one who alleges bias must overcome a
      presumption of honesty and integrity; and a reasonable person with knowledge of
      the relevant facts would not find that the communications create an appearance
      that the law or these standards have been violated . Id. at 22-26. These arguments
      are unavailing.

      9
        SSA does not challenge the ALJ’s conclusion that it did not prove specification 16 of
      the conduct unbecoming charge. ID at 110-11; PFR File, Tab 5 at 22 n.11. We
      therefore affirm the ALJ’s finding in this regard.
                                                                                            13

¶22         The Board has described conduct unbecoming an ALJ as “conduct which
      was improper, unsuitable, or detracting from one’s character or reputation.”
      Long, 113 M.S.P.R. 190, ¶ 42. The Board also has held that an agency has proven
      a charge of conduct unbecoming if it proves that the employee violated one of the
      14 general   principles    contained   in   5 C.F.R.    § 2635.101(b).       Schifano v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 70 M.S.P.R. 275, 281 (1996). The ALJ relied on
      the regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(8), (b)(14) in his analysis of these
      specifications. 10 ID at 95-97. We discern no error with the analytical framework
      used by the ALJ.
¶23         We also affirm the ALJ’s finding that SSA proved that the communications
      described in specifications 1, 3-12, and 14 constituted conduct unbecoming
      because they give the appearance of a lack of impartiality.           For example, in
      specification 1, the respondent, in agreeing to a CPOD, told the claimant’s
      representative that “the fact that it’s you as [the claimant’s] attorney doesn’t hurt
      matters,” and that the claimant’s representative was “one of the best attorneys it
      has been [his] privilege to know.” IAF, Tab 1 at 11, 40. He also said that she
      “practice[d] law the way [he] used to, realistically, energetically, and efficiently,”
      commenting “What’s not to like about you?” Id. at 40. In specification 3, the
      respondent told the claimant’s representative, “I just wanted to make sure
      your ___ was covered[.] I protect my lawyers (at least those, like you, whom I
      like).”   Id. at 42.      In specification 4, the respondent told the claimant’s
      representative that the respondent’s “discretion has a floor and a ceiling, and [the
      representative] always get[s] the ceiling, but to resolve this case without a

      10
         The regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(8) states that employees “shall act
      impartially and not give preferential treatment to any private organization or
      individual.” Subsection 2635.101(b)(14) states that employees “shall endeavor to avoid
      any actions creating the appearance that they are violating the law or the ethical
      standards set forth in this part.” Subsection 2635.101(b)(14) further advises that
      “[w]hether particular circumstances create an appearance that the law o r these standards
      have been violated shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person with
      knowledge of the relevant facts.”
                                                                                         14

      hearing would require [the respondent] to ascend to the stratosphere!” Id. at 43.
      In a follow-up email, the respondent also stated that he was “flatt ered” to
      consider himself one of the claimant’s representative’s “friends.” Id. On their
      face, the emails described in specifications 1, 3-4 give the appearance of a lack of
      impartiality. We affirm the ALJ’s decision to sustain these specifications.
¶24         The respondent further asserts that specifications 5-10, involving email
      correspondence with the same claimant’s representative, do not warrant the
      conclusion that these communications created an appearance of impropriety. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 24. We are not persuaded by these arguments. Rather, we find that
      a reasonable person would conclude that each of these communications was
      improper and/or created an appearance of preferential treatment. For example, in
      the email described in specification 5, the respondent made improper comments
      about claimants’ cases.    IAF, Tab 1 at 12, 46-47.      In the email described in
      specification 6, the respondent states, “Just to show you the amount of good will
      you’ve banked, I set aside a decision I was writing to attend to your email.” Id.
      at 12, 47. In the email described in specification 7, the respondent states, “It’s
      always a treat to have a lawyer of your ability and dedication to work with.” Id.
      at 12, 49. In the email described in specification 8, the respondent discussed an
      arbitration hearing that he (the respondent) was involved in, referred to an
      Associate CALJ as the “Chicago hit man,” and called him an “anti-judge
      bureaucrat.” Id. at 12, 52. The respondent also stated in this email that he would
      treat attorneys like the recipient differently than other attorneys.        Id. at 53
      (“When I have attorneys like you to deal with, I will be the same open, inquiring
      person I have always been, and encourage free-wheeling debate and discussion
      like we’ve always had. Where I have attorneys I don’t know before me, I’ll ask
      no questions other than that of the [vocational expert] . . . .”). In specification 9,
      the respondent made an inappropriate remark about a juvenile claimant to the
      claimant’s representative and invited the representative to contact him over the
      weekend on his personal email account. Id. at 12, 54, 56. In specification 10, the
                                                                                       15

      respondent explicitly acknowledged that his disposition would result in the
      claimant’s representative receiving a fee for his work in that matter, and he noted
      the “effort” that the representative put into the case. Id. at 12, 63. We discern no
      error with the ALJ’s analysis of specifications 5-10 or his conclusion that each of
      these emails gave the appearance of a lack of impartiality and constituted conduct
      unbecoming. ID at 100-05.
¶25        In the email described in specification 11, the respondent told the
      claimant’s representative, “if you are telling me as an officer of the court and my
      friend that the claimant did indeed undergo a fusion in October 2013,” then he
      would decide the case based on her representation. IAF, Tab 1 at 12, 65. In the
      email described in      specification 12,   the respondent told the claimant’s
      representative that she was “one of a group (fairly small group) of attorneys who
      may always contact [him], bidden or unbidden” and that he “respect[ed] [her]
      immensely, and value[d] [her] input consistently.” Id. at 12, 68. We agree that
      both of these emails are evidence of conduct unbecoming, and we affirm the
      ALJ’s analysis of these specifications. ID at 105-07.
¶26        In the email described in specification 14, the respondent used his personal
      email address and told the claimant’s representative, among other things, that the
      representative reminded him of himself and that he (the respondent) was “never
      fortunate enough to have the opportunity to appear before a Judge with whom
      [he] could have these types of ‘out of court’ dialogues” regarding a particular
      matter. IAF, Tab 1 at 12, 74-79. We agree with the ALJ that this communication
      constituted conduct unbecoming. ID at 108-09.
¶27        On review, the respondent contends that the ALJ erred because one who
      alleges bias must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 24-25.    Although this is an accurate proposition of law, see, e.g.,
      Oliver v. Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980), SSA did not
      allege in the conduct unbecoming specifications—and the ALJ did not find—that
      the respondent was biased in favor of or against the claimants whose
                                                                                     16

      representatives were communicating with the respondent.            Moreover, the
      respondent even acknowledged that the communications described in the conduct
      unbecoming specifications are “capable of being interpreted nefariously.”
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 26 (emphasis in original). For these reasons, we agree with
      the ALJ’s decision to sustain specifications 1, 3-12, and 14.
¶28         Turning to SSA’s cross petition for review, we agree with SSA that the ALJ
      should have sustained specification 15 of the conduct unbecoming charge.
      PFR File, Tab 5 at 28-29. In this specification, SSA alleged that the respondent
      forwarded an email to a claimant’s representative with the subject line “[the
      CALJ] just violated federal law and thumbed nose at U[.]S[.] Supreme Court .”
      IAF, Tab 1 at 12, 80-82.           The forwarded email, from a colleague of the
      respondent, called the CALJ a “complete idiot” and included a bulletin which
      allegedly “orders SSA ALJs to violate federal law.” Id. at 80-82. In the initial
      decision, the ALJ found unpersuasive SSA’s argument that the respondent’s
      decision to forward the email to a claimant’s representative would undermine
      public confidence in SSA; however, he did not provide any explanation for his
      decision or cite to any legal authority or the CALJ’s testimony regarding the
      effect of the respondent’s distribution of this email.    ID at 109-10; PFR File,
      Tab 5 at 28-29. We disagree with the ALJ’s assessment of this email. Rather, the
      respondent’s decision to forward to a claimant’s representative an internal SSA
      email with commentary that was critical of the CALJ and discussed “inside
      baseball” topics creates an appearance of a lack of impartiality and constitutes
      conduct unbecoming. HT 5 at 279-80 (testimony of the CALJ). We modify the
      initial decision in this regard.
¶29         We have considered SSA’s arguments regarding specification 13 of the
      conduct unbecoming charge wherein SSA charged that the respondent expressed
      concern for a favored attorney’s receiving a fee in a case she was handling before
      him and suggested how she might go about securing that fee. PFR File, Tab 5
      at 27-28; IAF, Tab 1 at 12, 70-73.       We have also considered SSA’s argument
                                                                                           17

      regarding specification 2 wherein the agency charged that the respondent’s
      decision to use a claimant’s full name and another claimant’s last name in an
      August 31, 2012 email to a claimant’s representative constituted improper
      transmission of PII and, therefore, conduct unbecoming.              PFR File, Tab 5
      at 26-27. However, we need not resolve either of these issues because we find
      that SSA proved the conduct unbecoming charge based on our decision to affirm
      the ALJ’s decision to sustain specifications 1, 3-12, and 14, and our separate
      decision to sustain specification 15. See Burroughs, 918 F.2d at 172.

      We modify the initial decision to find that the respondent’s November 15, 2012
      letter to OIG constituted protected activity, but he did not prove that the protected
      activity was a contributing factor in SSA’s decision to file a complaint
      against him.
¶30         As noted above, in the initial decision, the ALJ determined that the
      respondent did not prove that he made any whistleblowing disclosures. 11
      ID at 115-29. In particular, the ALJ found that the respondent’s November 15,
      2012 letter to OIG 12 did not constitute a protected disclosure because, among
      other things, his allegations of “mismanagement” did not rise to the level of
      “gross mismanagement” under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 13             ID at 121-23; IAF,

      11
         Neither party challenges the ALJ’s analysis of the respondent’s claim of reprisal for
      whistleblowing as an affirmative defense or his finding that the respondent did not
      make any whistleblowing disclosures. ID at 115-29. Except as modified to discuss the
      respondent’s November 15, 2012 correspondence to OIG, we affirm the initial decision
      in this regard.
      12
         In this letter, the respondent reported two instances of “serious mismanagement.”
      IAF, Tab 95 at 39-40. He described how counsel for a disability claimant in one case
      filed a motion to recuse and how counsel for a disability claimant in another case
      complained about him to ODAR management. Id. at 40. He further described how SSA
      sought to take disciplinary action against him during an October 25, 2012 interview, but
      his first-line supervisor, who was present during the meeting, failed to listen to the
      complete version of the hearings in those matters. Id.
      13
         During the pendency of this appeal, the National Defense Authorization Act for
      Fiscal Year 2018 (NDAA), Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, was signed into law on
      December 12, 2017. Section 1097 of the NDAA amended various provisions of title 5
                                                                                          18

      Tab 95 at 39-40. Although not explicitly raised by the respondent on review, we
      modify the initial decision to address this finding.
¶31         Under the law in effect at the time SSA filed this complaint in
      October 2015, 14 an employee may establish a prima facie case of retaliation for
      whistleblowing disclosures and/or protected activity by proving by preponderant
      evidence 15 that: (1) he made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)
      or engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
      (C), or (D); and (2) the whistleblowing disclosure or protected activity was a
      contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take a personnel action against
      him. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Alarid v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600,
      ¶ 12 (2015); Webb v. Department of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 6 (2015).
      If the employee makes both of these showings by preponderant evidence, the
      burden of persuasion shifts to the agency to prove by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected
      activity. Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 14.
¶32         It   appears   that   the   ALJ    analyzed      this   claim   under   5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8)(B)(ii), which states that it is a prohibited personnel practice (PPP) to
      take a personnel action against an employee because of “any disclosure . . . to the
      Inspector General . . . of information which the employee . . . reasonably believes
      evidences . . . gross mismanagement.”        The ALJ’s reliance on this statutory
      provision was in error.     We need not remand the appeal, though, because the

      of the U.S. Code. Our disposition of this matter would be the same under both pre ‑ and
      post-NDAA law.
      14
         Although the respondent’s correspondence to OIG predated the December 27, 2012
      effective date of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), Pub.
      L. No. 112-199, § 202, 126 Stat. 1465, the Board may consider the provisions of the
      WPEA because SSA’s complaint was filed after that date, Carney v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 446, ¶ 2 n.1 (2014).
      15
         Preponderant evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
      considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
      fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                          19

      record is fully developed on this issue.            Instead, we conclude that the
      respondent’s    claim    is    more      appropriately    analyzed    under   5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(C), which states that it is a PPP to take an action against an
      employee because that employee “disclos[ed] information to the Inspector
      General . . . of an agency . . . in accordance with applicable provisions of law.”
      The respondent’s November 15, 2012 letter satisfies the criteria under section
      2302(b)(9)(C) and constitutes protected activity.         See, e.g., Special Counsel v.
      Hathaway, 49 M.S.P.R. 595, 612 (1991) (finding that section 2302(b)(9)(C)
      covers employee disclosures to OIG that do not meet the precise terms of the
      actions described in section 2302(b)(8)), recons. denied, 52 M.S.P.R. 375, aff’d,
      981 F.2d 1237 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
¶33          We must next determine whether the respondent’s November 15, 2012 letter
      to OIG was a contributing factor in SSA’s decision to file the complaint against
      him.    One way of proving that the respondent’s protected activity was a
      contributing factor in the personnel action is the “knowledge/timing test.” Alarid,
      122 M.S.P.R.    600,    ¶ 13   (citing    Shibuya v.     Department   of   Agriculture,
      119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 22 (2013)). The knowledge/timing test allows an employee
      to demonstrate that the protected activity was a contributing factor in a personnel
      action through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the official taking
      the personnel action knew of the protected activity and that the personnel action
      occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude
      that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action.
      Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 13; see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). The ALJ found—and
      the respondent does not contest—that the CALJ who signed the complaint was not
      aware of the respondent’s November 15, 2012 letter to OIG when she authorized
      the filing of the complaint in this matter.        ID at 53.     Thus, the knowledge
      component of the knowledge/timing test is not satisfied.
¶34          There are, however, other ways to satisfy contributing factor, such as
      evidence pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking
                                                                                       20

      the action, whether the protected activity was personally directed at the proposing
      or deciding officials, and whether these individuals had a desire or motive to
      retaliate   against   the   respondent.   Dorney v.   Department   of   the   Army,
      117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15 (2012); Powers v. Department of the Navy, 69 M.S.P.R.
      150, 156 (1995).      As noted above, there is strong evidence to support SSA’s
      charges.    The November 15, 2012 letter identified the respondent’s first-line
      supervisor by name and criticized ODAR’s region one management, IAF, Tab 95
      at 39-40, but there is no evidence that the respondent’s first-line supervisor, or
      anyone in ODAR region one management, had any knowledge of the respondent’s
      November 15, 2012 letter to OIG prior to the complaint being filed or that any of
      these individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate against the respondent. E.g.,
      HT 1 at 281 (testimony of the respondent’s first-line supervisor); HT 2 at 277
      (testimony of the respondent’s second-line supervisor).         Finally, we have
      considered whether the CALJ had constructive knowledge of the respondent’s
      OIG letter, Bradley v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 15
      (2016), but we are not aware of any evidence in this regard.
¶35         Because we have found that the respondent failed to prove that his protected
      activity was a contributing factor in SSA’s decision to file the complaint seeking
      to remove him, it is unnecessary to determine whether SSA proved by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have filed the complaint in the absence of the
      respondent’s protected activity. See Clarke v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 19 n.10 (2014), aff’d, 623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

      We find that there is good cause to remove the respondent.
¶36         The ALJ correctly noted that, in evaluating the penalty in an original
      jurisdiction case under 5 U.S.C. § 7521, the Board looks to the factors articulated
      in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981).            ID
      at 130; Long, 113 M.S.P.R. 190, ¶ 47. In the initial decision, the ALJ evaluated
      the Douglas factors, finding, among other things, that the sustained misconduct
      was “serious, and . . . repeated notwithstanding clear notice and guidance” from
                                                                                         21

      SSA, and the misconduct merited a “substantial” penalty.               ID at 130-43.
      However, the ALJ concluded that a 180-day suspension was a reasonable penalty.
      ID at 143-44. On cross petition for review, SSA asserts that the ALJ improperly
      considered the following penalty factors as mitigating factors:                (1) the
      respondent’s past work record; (2) the consistency of the penalty; (3) the
      notoriety of the offense; (4) the respondent’s potential for rehabilitation; and
      (5) the availability of alternative sanctions.      PFR File, Tab 5 at 11-22; ID
      at 143-44.
¶37         We disagree with SSA’s arguments regarding the ALJ’s evaluation of the
      respondent’s past work record.       SSA challenges the ALJ’s finding that the
      respondent’s productivity and intelligence were mitigating factors, and it asserts
      that the ALJ ignored the fact that SSA referred the respondent to the OIG for
      investigation in 2013. PFR File, Tab 5 at 12-15; ID at 133-39, 141. In the initial
      decision, the ALJ cited the testimony of others regarding the respondent’s
      productivity and intelligence and found that the respondent had a positive work
      ethic and was viewed as intelligent and fair by representatives who appeared
      before him. ID at 141-43. SSA argues that the respondent’s high productivity is
      illusory given his failure to abide by agency policy, PFR File, Tab 5 at 12-13, but
      this fact, even if true, does not warrant a different outcome. The ALJ also noted,
      among other things, that SSA received numerous complaints against the
      respondent, and his supervisor estimated that 80% of his workload in dealing with
      complaints against ALJs involved complaints submitted against the respondent.
      ID at 141.   It therefore appears that the ALJ identified the relevant evidence
      regarding this factor. Even if the ALJ did not discuss the OIG referral in his
      analysis of the particular penalty factor, he discussed it in his findings of fact. ID
      at 26-27. Additionally, the ALJ’s failure to mention all of the evidence of record
      does not mean that he did not consider it in reaching his decision. Marques v.
      Department of Health & Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984), aff’d,
      776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
                                                                                         22

¶38         However, we agree with SSA’s argument that the ALJ did not properly
      evaluate the notoriety of the respondent’s offense. PFR File, Tab 5 at 12-15. The
      ALJ acknowledged that a district court decision in Betancourt v. Astrue,
      824 F.Supp.2d 211 (D. Mass. 2011), discussed the respondent’s failure to
      memorialize off-the-record conversations, ID at 142, but the ALJ was not
      persuaded by SSA’s speculation that claimants and their representatives were
      aware of the respondent’s misconduct, and he concluded that the evidence did not
      show that the misconduct was notorious or adversely impacted SSA’s reputation.
      Id. Yet, as the ALJ noted just paragraphs earlier in his decision, that very same
      handling of off-the-record conversations admonished in Betancourt had been the
      subject of numerous complaints since at least 2010, resulting in the
      aforementioned testimony from the first-line supervisor that 80% of his workload
      in dealing with complaints against ALJs involved complaints submitted against
      the respondent. ID at 140-41. We therefore agree with SSA that, as an ALJ, the
      respondent held a prominent, visible, and public position that is subject to
      scrutiny, perhaps more so than many other types of agency officials who do not
      routinely interact with the public, and that his misconduct, even if not technically
      notorious, did reflect negatively on SSA’s reputation.
¶39         We also are persuaded that the ALJ erred in his analysis of the consistency
      of the penalty, the respondent’s potential for rehabilitation, and the availability of
      alternative sanctions. For instance, regarding the consistency of the penalty with
      those imposed upon other employees for the same or similar off enses, we agree
      with SSA that the ALJ took a narrow view of this factor by failing to mention any
      of the misconduct relating to the conduct unbecoming charge. PFR File, Tab 5
      at 16; ID at 142.   Importantly, the CALJ testified that she sought removal of
      another ALJ for only “neglect of duty for failure to follow Agency policy,” the
      appeal of which was then pending, and she stated that the respondent’s
      misconduct was “very, very rare.”       HT 5 at 291-92 (testimony of the CALJ).
                                                                                     23

      Given the unusual nature of the sustained misconduct, we find that the absence of
      comparator evidence is not a mitigating factor.
¶40         Regarding the respondent’s potential for rehabilitation, the ALJ considered
      the fact that the respondent improved his practices regarding PII and also began
      memorializing “more” of the content of his off-the-record conversations and
      communications. ID at 139, 143. Although the degree to which the respondent
      may have improved his efforts to memorialize his off -the-record conversations is
      unclear, PFR File, Tab 5 at 19, the ALJ properly considered such evidence in his
      assessment of the respondent’s potential for rehabilitation.   However, the ALJ
      also cited to the respondent’s brief that he was “‘able and willing’ to adjust his
      behavior” to support the conclusion that he had a potential for rehabilitation.
      ID at 139 (citing IAF, Tab 112 at 73). Statements of a party’s representative in a
      pleading do not constitute evidence, Hendricks v. Department of the Navy,
      69 M.S.P.R. 163, 168 (1995), and it was error for the ALJ to rely on the
      representative’s statements in this regard. 16 We find that there is not a strong
      potential for rehabilitation here, particularly given the respondent’s failure to
      comply with SSA policy regarding CPOD decisions and his numerous improper
      communications with claimants’ representatives that gave the appearance of a
      lack of impartiality.    Indeed, as the ALJ found, the respondent “persistently
      challenged and resisted [SSA] direction, maintaining that [SSA’s] policies were
      incorrect and that [his] practices were justified.” ID at 133. Moreover, regarding
      his communications with claimants’ representatives, there is no evidence
      whatsoever that he improved his communications or judgment in this regard; thus,
      we find that there is little potential for rehabilitation.
¶41         Finally, regarding the adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions,
      the ALJ noted that the respondent previously had not been sanctioned in
      connection with the sustained misconduct, and he concluded that the record
      16
        Although the respondent is pro se on review, PFR File, Tab 7, he was represented
      during the proceedings below, IAF, Tabs 5, 112.
                                                                                       24

      did not show that removal, rather than a lesser sanction, would be more effective
      to deter the respondent or others from engaging in similar conduct. ID at 143. In
      its cross petition for review, SSA argues, in pertinent part, that the lack of prior
      discipline does not make removal inappropriate in this case.      PFR File, Tab 5
      at 20 (noting that, in cases such as Long, 113 M.S.P.R. 190, and Social Security
      Administration v. Steverson, 111 M.S.P.R. 649 (2009), the Board has found good
      cause to remove an ALJ even in the absence of prior discipline ).         Here, the
      respondent received the December 5, 2011 directive, which advised him that
      failure to follow the directive may lead to disciplinary action. IAF, Tab 93 at 23.
      Moreover, the ALJ made the following findings: (1) SSA referred the respondent
      to OIG in October 2013; (2) OIG conducted an investigation; (3) it was ODAR’s
      practice to hold in abeyance any administrative actions against an employee once
      an OIG referral has been made; and (4) prior to the OIG referral SSA had been
      working on potential discipline for the respondent. ID at 26-27. Thus, the fact
      that SSA took no action against the respondent from the time of its October 2013
      referral to OIG until after it received the OIG reports in December 2014 and
      February 2015, ID at 27, does not, under these circumstances, make this
      factor mitigating.
¶42         We agree with the ALJ’s analysis of the nature and seriousness of the
      misconduct, which is the most significant Douglas factor, and his conclusion that
      the respondent’s misconduct was “serious,” “repeated,” “directly pertain[ed] to
      [his] responsibilities as an ALJ,” “negatively impact[ed] the legal sufficiency and
      defensibility of his [CPOD] decisions,” “directly affect[ed] [the respondent’s]
      obligation to provide claimants with a full, due process hearing,” and “reflected
      poorly on the ALJ position.”      ID at 131-32, 143; Murry v. General Services
      Administration, 93 M.S.P.R. 554, ¶ 8 (2003), aff’d, 97 F. App’x 319 (Fed. Cir.
      2004).   We also agree with the ALJ that the sustained misconduct warrants a
      “substantial” penalty. ID at 143. Although a 180-day suspension is a significant
      penalty, Colon v. Department of the Navy, 58 M.S.P.R. 190, 204 (1993), we find
                                                                                      25

      that, given the serious and repeated nature of the misconduct, the Douglas factors
      discussed herein, and the ALJ’s assessment of the remaining factors, SSA has
      proven good cause to remove the respondent. See, e.g., Steverson, 111 M.S.P.R.
      649, ¶¶ 2-3, 6-12, 19-21 (finding good cause to remove the respondent ALJ based
      on charges of conduct unbecoming, lack of candor, misuse of Government
      equipment, and failure to follow agency policy).

      We deny SSA’s request to suspend the respondent from the date the complaint
      was filed through the Board’s final decision.
¶43        SSA argued in its complaint that the respondent’s neglect of duties and
      conduct unbecoming “fundamentally undermines public confidence” in t he
      agency’s adjudicatory process, and, therefore, good cause exists to suspend him
      from the date of the October 2, 2015 complaint through the Board’s final decision
      in this matter. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, 12-13. In the initial decision, the ALJ noted that
      SSA cited no authority to support its request for a retroactive suspension , and he
      rejected SSA’s request in this regard. ID at 144. In its cross petition for review,
      SSA challenges the ALJ’s conclusion, emphasizing that, because Congress
      has not defined the term “suspension” in 5 U.S.C. § 7521, the Board can give it
      meaning. PFR File, Tab 5 at 29-32.
¶44        Other than citing to section 7521, SSA provides no legal basis for its
      request; rather, SSA only appears to focus on policy arguments. Id. We are not
      persuaded by SSA’s arguments.        Importantly, section 7521(a) advises that an
      agency may not take an action against an ALJ until the Board “establish[es] and
      determine[s]” that the agency has made a showing of good cause.           5 U.S.C.
      § 7521(a); see, e.g., Social Security Administration v. Boham, 38 M.S.P.R. 540,
      546-47 (1988) (finding that SSA proved good cause to discipline the respondent
      ALJ based on his refusal to comply with reasonable orders concerning case
      scheduling and authorizing SSA to suspend him for a period up to 75 days), aff’d,
      883 F.2d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Table). SSA is essentially asking the Board to
      approve a time-served suspension.       However, the Board has held that the
                                                                                           26

      imposition of a time-served suspension is arbitrary.          Milligan v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 106 M.S.P.R. 414, ¶ 13 (2007); see Greenstreet v. Social Security
      Administration, 543 F.3d 705, 709 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he length of a suspension
      is arbitrary when it is based solely on the suspended employee’s ‘time served’
      awaiting decision.”). We are not persuaded that it is appropriate to interpret the
      statute at 5 U.S.C. § 7521 as authorizing a time-served or retroactive suspension,
      and we deny SSA’s request.

                                             ORDER
¶45         We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments, but we find them
      unpersuasive. The Board authorizes the petitioner to remove the respondent for
      good cause shown, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7521.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 17
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Sys tems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
      the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
      regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wis h to seek review of
      this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
      claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
      within the applicable time limit may result in the dismis sal of your case by your
      chosen forum.

      17
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        27

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                28

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court ‑appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     29

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice describe d in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 18   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

18
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of compet ent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                30

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.