Court Opinion

ID: 9748836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:15:04.048055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:29.635232
License: Public Domain

Neal, Judge, concurring. I concur in affirming this case. However, I write separately because the Commission and appellant have cited Wheeler Construction Co. v. Armstrong, 73 Ark. App. 146, 41 S.W.3d 822 (2001), and I feel an analysis consistent with Wheeler is necessary for a fair resolution of the issue. Wheeler provides that where an employee suffers a scheduled injury, he may receive temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits if he establishes (1) that he is still in his healing period, or (2) he has failed to return to work, whichever occurs first. Here, appellant does not dispute whether the appellee has suffered a scheduled injury. The healing period is that period for healing of an injury which continues until the claimant is as far restored as the permanent character of the injury will permit. Wentz v. Service Master, 75 Ark. App. 296, 57 S.W.3d 753 (2001). The determination of when the healing period has ended is a factual determination for the Commission, which is affirmed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Emerson Electric v. Gaston, 75 Ark. App. 232, 58 S.W.3d 848 (2001). Dr. Duke Harris noted that if appellee’s range of motion did not improve, appel-lee would require arthroscopic surgery. Furthermore, appellee testified that he’s “limping all the time and can’t bend [his] knee.” Therefore, I agree with the majority’s holding that there was substantial evidence that appellee was still in his healing period. Having shown that he was still in his healing period, appellee must next show that he has not returned to work. Appellee testified that he continued to work after his accident. Upon injuring his leg, appellee reported his injury to the plant manager; and the manager’s remedy was to simply put iodine on the injury. Appel-lee testified that in the days following his accident his leg “kept getting stiffer and stiffer.” As his leg worsened, appellee informed his superior. He stated that on one occasion his superior complained that he was not working fast enough, and that he responded “I can’t go any faster .... My knee, I can’t walk hardly.” His superior responded that they might have to send him to the doctor. Thus, appellee continued to work despite his injury because his employer failed to provide him reasonable and necessary medical treatment. The majority holds, and I agree, that “no reasonable construction of the term ‘return to work’ would permit an employer to coerce an injured worker to abandon his claim to temporary disability benefits by denying him reasonable and necessary medical treatment for an admittedly compensable injury.” Appellee also testified that since his accident, he has performed several tasks around his farm. In order to perform these tasks, appellee had to work slower than his normal pace and required the assistance of a neighbor. The Commission found that this did not constitute a return to work, and I agree. Moreover, I agree that if while in his healing period an employee is unable to perform remunerative labor without pain or discomfort, then he is temporarily totally disabled. See Pyles v. Triple F. Feeds of Texas Inc., 270 Ark. 729, 606 S.W.2d 146 (Ark. App. 1980). I believe there was substantial evidence to support a finding that appellee had not returned to work; thus, the requirements of Wheeler were satisfied.