Court Opinion

ID: 4074438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-30 04:59:51.932276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:06:12.608954
License: Public Domain

PD-1573-15
                                                PD-1573-15                                         COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                                                                                                                   AUSTIN, TEXAS
                                                                                                 Transmitted 12/4/2015 12:56:15 PM
                                                                                                    Accepted 12/4/2015 1:45:27 PM
                                                                                                                    ABEL ACOSTA
                                            NO.	
  __________________	
                                                     CLERK

       	
  
                                                           IN	
  THE	
  
	
  
                           COURT	
  OF	
  CRIMINAL	
   APPEALS	
  	
  OF	
  TEXAS	
  
               _________________________________________________________	
  
	
  
                                        DEREK	
  CLINTON	
  WARD,	
  Appellant	
  
       	
  
                                                              V.	
  
	
  
                               THE	
  STATE	
  OF	
  TEXAS,	
  Appellee	
  
               _________________________________________________________	
  
	
  
                      APPELLANT’S	
  PETITION	
  FOR	
  DISCRETIONARY	
  REVIEW	
  
              __________________________________________________________	
  
                                                                   	
  
                                  On	
  Review	
  from	
  Cause	
  No.	
  06-­‐15-­‐00110-­‐CR	
  
                    In	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  For	
  the	
  Sixth	
  District	
  at	
  Texarkana	
  
              __________________________________________________________	
  
	
  
                                    On	
  appeal	
  from	
  Cause	
  No.	
  42,433-­‐B	
  
                                           In	
  the	
  124th	
  District	
  Court	
  
                                            of	
  Gregg	
  County,	
  Texas	
  
                                 Honorable	
  Alfonso	
  Charles,	
  Judge	
  Presiding	
  
	
                                                                                                         	
  
	
  
                                                                       HOUGH-­‐LEWIS	
  (“LEW”)	
  DUNN	
  
                                                                       ATTORNEY	
  AT	
  LAW	
  
                                                                       P.O.	
  BOX	
  2226	
  
                  December 4, 2015                                     LONGVIEW,	
  TX	
  75606	
  
                                                                       Tel.	
  903-­‐757-­‐6711	
  
                                                                       Fax	
  903-­‐757-­‐6712	
  
                                                                       Email:	
  dunn@texramp.net	
  
                                                                       Counsel	
  for	
  Appellant	
  
	
  
                        APPELLANT	
  RESPECTFULLY	
  REQUESTS	
  ORAL	
  ARGUMENT	
  
                            IDENTITIES	
  OF	
  JUDGE,	
  PARTIES,	
  AND	
  COUNSEL	
  
	
  
	
           Pursuant	
  to	
  Rule	
  68.4(a),	
  Texas	
  Rules	
  of	
  Appellate	
  Procedure,	
  a	
  complete	
  list	
  
of	
  the	
  names	
  of	
  the	
  trial	
  judge,	
  all	
  parties,	
  and	
  counsel	
  are	
  as	
  follows:	
  
	
  
Trial	
  Judge:	
   	
             	
         	
           Honorable	
  Alfonso	
  Charles	
  
	
           	
       	
           	
         	
           Presiding	
  Judge,	
  124th	
  	
  District	
  Court	
  	
  
	
           	
       	
           	
         	
           Gregg	
  County,	
  Texas	
  

Attorneys	
  for	
  Appellant:	
         	
        Hough-­‐Lewis	
  (“Lew”)	
  Dunn	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Counsel	
  on	
  Petition	
  for	
  Discretionary	
  Review	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        P.O.	
  Box	
  2226	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Longview,	
  TX	
  75606	
  
	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Tim	
  Cone	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Counsel	
  on	
  Direct	
  Appeal	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        P.O.	
  Box	
  413	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Gilmer,	
  TX	
  75644	
  
	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Lance	
  R.	
  Larison	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Trial	
  Counsel	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Molly	
  Larison	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Pre-­‐Trial	
  Counsel	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        P.O.	
  Box	
  232	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Longview,	
  TX	
  75606	
  
	
  
Attorneys	
  for	
  the	
  State:	
      	
        Carl	
  Dorrough,	
  Criminal	
  District	
  Attorney	
  	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        101	
  East	
  Methvin,	
  Suite	
  333	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Longview,	
  TX	
  75606	
  
	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Christopher	
  A.	
  Parker	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Assistant	
  Criminal	
  District	
  Attorney	
  	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Trial	
  Counsel	
  
	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Zan	
  Colson	
  Brown	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        Assistant	
  Criminal	
  District	
  Attorney	
  	
  
	
    	
            	
        	
         	
        State’s	
  Counsel	
  on	
  Appeal	
  
	
  
                                                               ii	
  
	
  
                                               TABLE	
  OF	
  CONTENTS	
  
	
  
TABLE	
  OF	
  CONTENTS	
  …………………….....................................................	
                            iii	
  

INDEX	
  OF	
  AUTHORITIES	
  	
  ......................................................................	
            v	
  

STATEMENT	
  REGARDING	
  ORAL	
  ARGUMENT	
  ……………………………………	
                                                        vii	
  

STATEMENT	
  OF	
  THE	
  CASE....................................................................	
                  1	
  

STATEMENT	
  OF	
  PROCEDURAL	
  HISTORY...............................................	
  	
                         2	
  

       QUESTIONS	
  PRESENTED	
  …………….………………………………......................	
                                           2	
  

                               FIRST	
  QUESTION	
  PRESENTED	
  FOR	
  REVIEW	
  

           DID	
   THE	
   COURT	
   OF	
   APPEALS	
   ERR	
   IN	
   FINDING	
   NOTHING	
  
           FUNDAMENTALLY	
   ERROREOUS	
   IN	
   THE	
   CONDUCT	
   OF	
   THE	
   TRIAL	
  
           COURT	
  UNDER	
   ALMANZA,	
  WHEN	
  THE	
  RECORD	
  SHOWED	
  THAT	
  THE	
  
           TRIAL	
   COURT	
   ADOPTED	
   THE	
   STATE’S	
   POSITION	
   THAT	
   ECONOMIC	
  
           CONSIDERATIONS	
  CONTROLLED	
  THE	
  OUTCOME	
  OF	
  SENTENCING?	
  	
  
           	
  
                            SECOND	
  QUESTION	
  PRESENTED	
  FOR	
  REVIEW	
  
           	
  
           DID	
   THE	
   COURT	
   OF	
   APPEALS	
   ERR	
   IN	
   FAILING	
   TO	
   FIND	
   THAT	
   THE	
  
           TRIAL	
   COURT	
   HAD,	
   IN	
   ADOPTING	
   THE	
   STATE’S	
   POSITION	
   THAT	
  
           ECONOMIC	
   CONSIDERATIONS	
   CONTROLLED	
   THE	
   OUTCOME	
   OF	
  
           SENTENCING,	
   ABROGATED	
   THE	
   FOURTEENTH	
   AMENDMENT	
   DUE	
  
           PROCESS	
  AND	
  EQUAL	
  PROTECTION	
  CONCERNS	
  FOUND	
  IN	
  BEARDEN	
  
           V.	
  GEORGIA?	
  
           	
  
           	
  
           	
  
                                                          iii	
  
	
  
                 	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Reason	
  for	
  Granting	
  Review	
  
                              	
  
        In	
   reaching	
   its	
   decision,	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   failed	
   to	
   follow	
   the	
  
        precedent	
  of	
  Almanza	
  v.	
  State,	
  686	
  S.W.2d	
  157	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  1986	
  
        (op.	
   on	
   reh’g),	
   and	
   it	
   ignored	
   principles	
   of	
   Fourteenth	
   Amendment	
  
        Due	
  Process	
  and	
  Equal	
  Protection	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  that	
  underlie	
  the	
  ability	
  
        to	
  pay	
  restitution,	
  found	
  in	
  Bearden	
  v.	
  Georgia,	
  461	
  U.S.	
  660	
  (1983).	
  	
  
	
  
      ARGUMENT	
  AND	
  AUTHORITIES.................................................................	
                                                                       3	
  
      	
  
      	
  	
  	
  	
  FACTS	
  ………………………………………………………………………………………………..	
                                                                                                       4	
  
      	
  
      	
  	
  	
  	
  LEGAL	
  ANALYSIS	
  ………………………………………………………………………………..	
                                                                                                 9	
  
      	
  
      PRAYER	
  FOR	
  RELIEF...................................................................................	
                                                            19	
  
      	
  
      CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  SERVICE.........................................................................	
                                                                 20	
  
      	
  
      CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  COMPLIANCE	
  …………………………………………………………	
                                                                                                             20	
  
      	
  
	
  	
  APPENDIX	
  	
   	
  
      	
  
      Ward	
   v .	
  S tate,	
  N o.	
  0 6-­‐15-­‐00110-­‐CR	
  ( Tex.	
   A pp.	
  – 	
   T exarkana,	
  
      delivered	
   N ovember	
   1 0,	
   2 015)(Mem.	
   O p.)(not	
   d esignated	
   f or	
  
      publication)	
  
      	
  
      	
  
      	
  
      	
  
	
  
      	
  
      	
  
      	
  
      	
  
	
  
      	
  
      	
  
                                                                  iv	
  
                                                   INDEX	
  OF	
  AUTHORITIES	
  
	
  
CASES	
                                                                                                                    	
  
	
  
Almanza	
  v.	
  State,	
  686	
  S.W.2d	
  157	
  …………………………………………..	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  3,	
  4,	
  10,	
  11	
  
          (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  1984)(op.	
  on	
  reh’g)	
  
	
  
Barton	
  v.	
  State,	
  21	
  S.W.3d	
  287	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  2000)	
  ……………………………	
  	
  	
  17	
  
	
  
Bearden	
  v.	
  Georgia,	
  461	
  U.S.	
  660	
  (1983)	
  ……………………	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  3,	
  4,	
  12,	
  13,	
  14,	
  15	
  
	
  
Griffin	
  v.	
  Illinois,	
  351	
  U.S.	
  12	
  (1956)	
  ……………………………………………………..	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  13	
  
	
  
Lemos	
  v.	
  State,	
  27	
  S.W.3d	
  42	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  –	
  San	
  Antonio	
  2000,	
  pet.	
  ref’d)	
  ..	
  	
  	
  	
  17	
  
	
  
Lively	
  v.	
  State,	
  338	
  S.W.3d	
  140	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  –	
  Texarkana	
  2011,	
  no	
  pet.)	
                         14	
  

Moreno	
  v.	
  State,	
  900	
  S.W.2d	
  357	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  –	
  Texarkana	
  1995,	
  no	
  pet.)	
                                   10	
  

Miller	
  v.	
  State,	
  343	
  S.W.3d	
  499	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  –	
  Waco	
  2011,	
  pet.	
  ref’d)	
  ……	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  17	
  

Tate	
  v.	
  Short,	
  401	
  U.S.	
  395	
  (1971)	
  ……………………………………………………….	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  13	
  

Williams	
  v.	
  Illinois,	
  399	
  U.S.	
  235	
  (1970)	
  ……………………………………………..	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  13	
  

OPINIONS	
  

JM-­‐917	
  (1988)	
  ……………………………………………………………………………………	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  14	
  

STATUTES	
  

U.	
  S.	
  CONSTITUTION	
  

Fourteenth	
  Amendment	
  Due	
  Process	
  ……………	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  3,	
  4,	
  12,	
  13,	
  14,	
  15,	
  16,	
  18	
  

                                                                         v	
  
STATUTES	
  (CONT’D)	
  

U.	
  S.	
  CONSTITUTION	
  

Fourteenth	
  Amendment	
  Equal	
  Protection	
  of	
  the	
  Law	
  ….	
  	
  	
  3,	
  4,	
  12,	
  13,	
  14,	
  15,	
  
16,	
  18	
  
	
  
TEX.	
  CONST.	
  
	
  
ART.	
  1,	
  §19	
  …………………………………………………………………………………………	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  9	
  

ART.	
  1,	
  §30(b)(4)	
  …………………………………………………………………………………	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  17	
  

CODES	
  
     	
  
ART.	
  42.037(k),	
  TEX.	
  CODE	
  CRIM.	
  P.	
  ……………………………………………………..	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  17	
  
     	
  
ART.	
  42.12	
  §21(c),	
  TEX.	
  CODE	
  CRIM.	
  P.	
  …………………………………………………	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  13	
  
     	
  
TEX.	
  LABOR	
  CODE,	
  §201	
  et.	
  seq.	
  …………………………………………………	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  11	
  
	
  
TEX.	
  PENAL	
  CODE	
  §	
  31.03(e)(4)(A)	
  ………………………………………………………	
   	
                                                                             1	
  
	
  
RULES	
  
	
  
TEX.	
  R.	
  APP.	
  P.	
  33.1(a)(1)	
  and	
  (2)	
  ………………………………………………………..	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  9	
  
	
  
OTHER	
  
     	
  
MAGNA	
  CARTA,	
  Article	
  40	
  (1215)	
  ………………………………………………………	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  14	
  
	
  
     	
  
     	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
     	
  
                                                            vi	
  
                                  STATEMENT	
  REGARDING	
  ORAL	
  ARGUMENT	
  
       	
  
       	
      The	
   opinion	
   of	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   impermissibly	
   narrows	
   the	
  

       precedent	
   of	
   Almanza	
   on	
   the	
   concept	
   of	
   what	
   is	
   fundamentally	
   erroneous.	
  

       Moreover,	
   the	
   ability	
   to	
   pay	
   restitution,	
   rooted	
   in	
   concepts	
   of	
   Due	
   Process	
  

       and	
   Equal	
   Protection,	
   implicates	
   fundamental	
   rights	
   that	
   cannot	
   be	
  

       disregarded	
  and	
  set	
  aside	
  when	
  the	
  court	
  of	
  appeals	
  is	
  called	
  upon	
  to	
  review	
  

       the	
   actions	
   of	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   in	
   assessing	
   punishment.	
   The	
   opinion	
   of	
   the	
  

       court	
   of	
   appeals	
   sets	
   a	
   questionable	
   precedent	
   on	
   the	
   issues	
   of	
   judicial	
  

       impartiality	
   and	
   of	
   restitution	
   in	
   sentencing,	
   something	
   that	
   affects	
   victims	
  

       and	
  defendants	
  statewide.	
  

       	
      Oral	
  argument	
  will	
  help	
  delineate	
  those	
  concerns.	
  

       	
  
       	
  
       	
  
       	
  
       	
  
       	
  
       	
  
       	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
                                                                  vii	
  
                                                    NO.	
  __________________	
  
       	
  
                                                                         IN	
  THE	
  
	
  
                          COURT	
  OF	
  CRIMINAL	
   APPEALS	
  	
  OF	
  TEXAS	
  
              _________________________________________________________	
  
	
  
                                             DEREK	
  CLINTON	
  WARD,	
  Appellant	
  
       	
  
                                                                             V.	
  
	
  
                              THE	
  STATE	
  OF	
  TEXAS,	
  Appellee	
  
              _________________________________________________________	
  
	
  
                     APPELLANT’S	
  PETITION	
  FOR	
  DISCRETIONARY	
  REVIEW	
  
              __________________________________________________________	
  
	
  
TO	
  THE	
  HONORABLE	
  JUDGES	
  OF	
  THE	
  COURT	
  OF	
  CRIMINAL	
  APPEALS:	
  
	
  
	
      NOW	
   COMES	
   Derek	
   Clinton	
   Ward,	
   Appellant	
   in	
   this	
   matter,	
   by	
   and	
  

through	
   his	
   attorney	
   of	
   record,	
   Hough-­‐Lewis	
   Dunn,	
   and	
   pursuant	
   to	
   the	
  

provisions	
   of	
   Texas	
   Rules	
   of	
   Appellate	
   Procedure	
   66,	
   et	
   seq,	
   urges	
   this	
   Court	
  

to	
  grant	
  discretionary	
  review,	
  and	
  in	
  support	
  will	
  show	
  as	
  follows:	
  

                                                    STATEMENT	
  OF	
  THE	
  CASE	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Appellant	
   was	
   indicted	
   for	
   the	
   offense	
  of	
  theft	
  of	
  property,	
  valued	
  

at	
   an	
   amount	
   not	
   less	
   than	
   $1,500	
   but	
   no	
   more	
   than	
   $20,000,	
   namely,	
   a	
  

welding	
   machine,	
   a	
   state	
   jail	
   felony.	
   TEX.	
   PENAL	
   CODE	
   §31.03(e)(4)(A)	
  

(West	
   2012)	
   (CR	
   4).	
   	
   Appellant	
   waived	
   jury	
   trial	
   and	
   entered	
   a	
   plea	
   of	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                          1	
  
“guilty”	
   to	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   on	
   or	
   about	
   April	
   9,	
   2015	
   (RR	
   4:	
   4),	
   and	
  

thereafter	
   on	
   May	
   21,	
   2015,	
   was	
   sentenced	
   to	
   22	
   months	
   in	
   a	
   state	
   jail	
  

facility	
   (RR	
   5:	
   41)(CR	
   50).	
   Appellant	
   timely	
   filed	
   his	
   pro	
   se	
   “Notice	
   of	
  

Appeal”	
  on	
  or	
  about	
  June	
  10,	
  2015	
  (CR	
  37).	
   	
  

                               STATEMENT	
   O F	
   P ROCEDURAL	
   H ISTORY	
  

                 Petitioner	
   perfected	
   appeal	
   to	
   the	
   Sixth	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   in	
  

       Texarkana.	
   	
   	
   The	
   Sixth	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   affirmed	
   the	
   judgment	
   of	
   the	
  

       trial	
   court,	
  issuing	
  its	
  Memorandum	
  Opinion	
  in	
  Ward	
  v.	
  State,	
  No.	
  06-­‐15-­‐

       00110-­‐CR,	
   (Tex.	
   App.	
   –	
   Texarkana,	
   delivered	
   November	
   10,	
   2015)	
   (Mem.	
  

       Op.)	
  (not	
  designated	
  for	
  publication).	
  No	
   Motion	
   for	
   Rehearing	
   was	
   filed.	
  

       From	
   that	
   affirmance	
   Appellant	
  now	
  brings	
  this	
  Petition	
  for	
  Discretionary	
  

       Review.	
  

                                            GROUNDS	
  FOR	
  REVIEW	
  

                                           QUESTIONS	
  PRESENTED	
  

                               FIRST	
  QUESTION	
  PRESENTED	
  FOR	
  REVIEW	
  

              DID	
   THE	
   COURT	
   OF	
   APPEALS	
   ERR	
   IN	
   FINDING	
   NOTHING	
  
              FUNDAMENTALLY	
   ERRONEOUS	
   IN	
   THE	
   CONDUCT	
   OF	
   THE	
   TRIAL	
  
              COURT	
   UNDER	
   ALMANZA,	
   WHEN	
   THE	
   RECORD	
   SHOWED	
   THAT	
  
              THE	
   TRIAL	
   COURT	
   ADOPTED	
   THE	
   STATE’S	
   POSITION	
   THAT	
  
              ECONOMIC	
   CONSIDERATIONS	
   CONTROLLED	
   THE	
   OUTCOME	
   OF	
  
              SENTENCING?	
  	
  

	
                                                                                                                            2	
  
                           SECOND	
  QUESTION	
  PRESENTED	
  FOR	
  REVIEW	
  
       	
  
       DID	
  THE	
  COURT	
  OF	
  APPEALS	
  ERR	
  IN	
  FAILING	
  TO	
  FIND	
  THAT	
  THE	
  
       TRIAL	
   COURT	
   HAD,	
   IN	
   ADOPTING	
   THE	
   STATE’S	
   POSITION	
   THAT	
  
       ECONOMIC	
   CONSIDERATIONS	
   CONTROLLED	
   THE	
   OUTCOME	
   OF	
  
       SENTENCING,	
  ABROGATED	
  THE	
  FOURTEENTH	
  AMENDMENT	
  DUE	
  
       PROCESS	
   AND	
   EQUAL	
   PROTECTION	
   CONCERNS	
   FOUND	
   IN	
  
       BEARDEN	
  V.	
  GEORGIA?	
  
	
  
                 	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Reason	
  for	
  Granting	
  Review	
  
                      	
  
       In	
   reaching	
   its	
   decision,	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   failed	
   to	
   follow	
   the	
  
       precedent	
   of	
   Almanza	
   v.	
   State,	
   686	
   S.W.2d	
   157	
   (Tex.	
   Crim.	
   App.	
  
       1986	
   (op.	
   on	
   reh’g),	
   and	
   it	
   ignored	
   principles	
   of	
   Fourteenth	
  
       Amendment	
   Due	
   Process	
   and	
   Equal	
   Protection	
   of	
   the	
   Law	
   that	
  
       underlie	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  pay	
  restitution,	
  found	
  in	
  Bearden	
  v.	
  Georgia,	
  
       461	
  U.S.	
  660	
  (1983).	
  	
  
	
  
                                    ARGUMENT	
  AND	
  AUTHORITIES	
  

                                 	
  QUESTIONS	
  PRESENTED	
  FOR	
  REVIEW	
  

                             FIRST	
  QUESTION	
  PRESENTED	
  FOR	
  REVIEW	
  

       DID	
   THE	
   COURT	
   OF	
   APPEALS	
   ERR	
   IN	
   FINDING	
   NOTHING	
  
       FUNDAMENTALLY	
   ERROREOUS	
   IN	
   THE	
   CONDUCT	
   OF	
   THE	
   TRIAL	
  
       COURT	
   UNDER	
   ALMANZA,	
   WHEN	
   THE	
   RECORD	
   SHOWED	
   THAT	
  
       THE	
   TRIAL	
   COURT	
   ADOPTED	
   THE	
   STATE’S	
   POSITION	
   THAT	
  
       ECONOMIC	
   CONSIDERATIONS	
   CONTROLLED	
   THE	
   OUTCOME	
   OF	
  
       SENTENCING?	
  	
  
       	
  
       	
  
       	
  
       	
  	
  
       	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                 3	
  
                                       SECOND	
  QUESTION	
  PRESENTED	
  FOR	
  REVIEW	
  
                 	
  
                 DID	
  THE	
  COURT	
  OF	
  APPEALS	
  ERR	
  IN	
  FAILING	
  TO	
  FIND	
  THAT	
  THE	
  
                 TRIAL	
   COURT	
   HAD,	
   IN	
   ADOPTING	
   THE	
   STATE’S	
   POSITION	
   THAT	
  
                 ECONOMIC	
   CONSIDERATIONS	
   CONTROLLED	
   THE	
   OUTCOME	
   OF	
  
                 SENTENCING,	
  ABROGATED	
  THE	
  FOURTEENTH	
  AMENDMENT	
  DUE	
  
                 PROCESS	
   AND	
   EQUAL	
   PROTECTION	
   CONCERNS	
   FOUND	
   IN	
  
                 BEARDEN	
  V.	
  GEORGIA?	
  
	
  
                          	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Reason	
  for	
  Granting	
  Review	
  
                                       	
  
                 In	
   reaching	
   its	
   decision,	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   failed	
   to	
   follow	
   the	
  
                 precedent	
   of	
   Almanza	
   v.	
   State,	
   686	
   S.W.2d	
   157	
   (Tex.	
   Crim.	
   App.	
  
                 1986	
   (op.	
   on	
   reh’g),	
   and	
   it	
   ignored	
   principles	
   of	
   Fourteenth	
  
                 Amendment	
   Due	
   Process	
   and	
   Equal	
   Protection	
   of	
   the	
   Law	
   that	
  
                 underlie	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  pay	
  restitution,	
  found	
  in	
  Bearden	
  v.	
  Georgia,	
  
                 461	
  U.S.	
  660	
  (1983).	
  	
  
	
  
           [Appellant	
  will	
  address	
  both	
  the	
  First	
  and	
  Second	
  Questions	
  here.]	
  
	
  
	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  The	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  opinion	
  sets	
  out	
  the	
  facts	
  in	
  its	
  opinion.	
  	
  Ward	
  

v.	
   State,	
   No.	
   06-­‐15-­‐00110-­‐CR,	
   (Tex.	
   App.	
   –	
   Texarkana,	
   delivered	
  

November	
  10,	
  2015)	
  (Mem.	
  Op.)	
  (not	
  designated	
  for	
  publication).	
  

	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  FACTS	
                                                                                                                                            	
  	
  	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Briefly	
  summarizing	
  the	
  record,	
  however:	
  Appellant	
  pleaded	
  guilty	
  

to	
   the	
   indictment	
   of	
   theft	
   of	
   a	
   welding	
   machine	
   (RR	
   4:	
   4).	
   The	
  

controversy	
  was	
  confirmed	
  at	
  the	
  sentencing	
  hearing	
  where	
  the	
  victim	
  

(Appellant’s	
  former	
  employer),	
  one	
  Newberry	
  (RR	
  5:	
  5),	
  testified	
  about	
  	
  

alleged	
   (but	
   unsubstantiated)	
   charges	
   to	
   credit	
   cards	
   (RR	
   5:	
   6),	
   and	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                                                  4	
  
Appellant’s	
  taking	
  and	
  pawning	
  of	
  a	
  welding	
  machine	
  (RR	
  5:	
  7-­‐8);	
  also	
  

how	
   Newberry	
   withheld	
   Appellant’s	
   paycheck	
   in	
   connection	
   with	
   his	
  

allegations	
  about	
  the	
  credit	
  card	
  abuse	
  (RR	
  5:	
  12).	
  	
  

	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Appellant	
   testified	
   that,	
   though	
   he	
   had	
   worked	
   for	
   nine	
   months,	
  

he	
   had	
   recently	
   been	
   laid	
   off	
   with	
   the	
   turn-­‐down	
   in	
   the	
   oil	
   industry	
   (RR	
  

5,	
   13-­‐14);	
   had	
   filed	
   for	
   unemployment	
   (RR	
   5:	
   14-­‐15);	
   had	
   dependents	
  

he	
  was	
  trying	
  to	
  support	
  (RR	
  5:	
  15-­‐16);	
  had	
  been	
  through	
  some	
  physical	
  

as	
   well	
   as	
   mental	
   difficulties	
   since	
   the	
   date	
   of	
   the	
   offense	
   back	
   in	
  

September	
   2012	
   (RR	
   5:	
   18-­‐19).	
   Appellant	
   stated	
   that	
   he	
   took	
   the	
  

welding	
   machine	
   because	
   he	
   was	
   “sore	
   about”	
   how	
   Newberry	
   had	
  

withheld	
   his	
   wages	
   in	
   the	
   controversy	
   over	
   the	
   alleged	
   credit	
   card	
  

charges,	
   something	
   he	
   denied	
   doing	
   (RR	
   5:	
   22-­‐23).	
   	
   	
   Appellant,	
   with	
   the	
  

help	
   of	
   his	
   mother,	
   had	
   brought	
   $1,000	
   to	
   court	
   that	
   day	
   to	
   be	
   paid	
  

toward	
   restitution	
   (RR	
   5:	
   27).	
   Under	
   questioning	
   from	
   the	
   trial	
   court,	
  

Appellant	
   stated	
   that	
   he	
   had	
   lost	
   his	
   job	
   on	
   April	
   11,	
   2015,	
   about	
   40	
  

days	
  before	
  he	
  came	
  to	
  that	
  session	
  of	
  court	
  for	
  sentencing	
  on	
  May	
  21	
  ,	
  

but	
  had	
  filed	
  for	
  unemployment	
  benefits	
  (RR	
  5:	
  28).	
  Age	
  36,	
  he	
  had	
  had	
  

four	
  spinal	
  surgeries	
  in	
  his	
  young	
  life	
  (RR	
  5:	
  17).	
  	
  

	
  

	
                                                                                                                                         5	
  
	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  At	
   that	
   point	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   questioned	
   Appellant,	
   and	
   had	
   this	
  

comment	
  about	
  Appellant’s	
  filing	
  for	
  unemployment:	
  “And	
  so	
  knowing	
  

that	
   the	
   State’s	
   recommendation	
   is	
   going	
   to	
   be	
   two	
   years	
   	
   State	
   Jail,	
  

you	
   decide	
   instead	
   of	
   finding	
   a	
   job	
   to	
   collect	
   restitution,	
   that	
   you’re	
  

going	
  to	
  take	
  a	
  vacation	
  for	
  a	
  month	
  and	
  a	
  half”	
  (RR	
  5:	
  	
  28).	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Finally,	
   Mrs.	
   Linda	
   Lee	
   (Appellant’s	
   mother)	
   testified	
   (RR	
   5:	
   31	
   ff).	
  

She	
  spoke	
  about	
  the	
  efforts	
  Appellant	
  had	
  made	
  to	
  turn	
  his	
  life	
  around	
  

and	
  accept	
  his	
  responsibilities	
  to	
  his	
  dependents	
  and	
  to	
  try	
  to	
  come	
  up	
  

with	
  restitution,	
  but	
  that	
  his	
  chances	
  for	
  employment	
  in	
  the	
  oil	
  industry	
  

had	
   been	
   affected	
   by	
   the	
   downturn;	
   that	
   she	
   had,	
   through	
   her	
  

employment,	
  the	
  expectation	
  of	
  having	
  the	
  entire	
  amount	
  of	
  restitution	
  

available	
  within	
  the	
  next	
  month	
  (RR	
  5:	
  32-­‐33).	
  

	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  At	
   instances	
   during	
   the	
   proceedings,	
   the	
   State	
   made	
   statements	
  

that	
   tied	
   its	
   recommendation	
   for	
   probation	
   to	
   a	
   specific	
   amount	
   of	
  

money	
  to	
  be	
  paid	
  in	
  restitution.	
  There	
  is	
  this,	
  from	
  the	
  hearing	
  on	
  the	
  

guilty	
   plea	
   of	
   April	
   9,	
   2015,	
   in	
   anticipation	
   of	
   the	
   date	
   set	
   for	
  

sentencing:	
  

	
  

	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                  6	
  
STATE:	
  	
  	
  And,	
  Your	
  Honor,	
  in	
  this	
  case,	
  Mr.	
  Larison	
  and	
  I	
  have	
  spoken,	
  as	
  

well	
   as	
   with	
   the	
   victim,	
   Mr.	
   Newberry,	
   there’s	
   an	
   expectation	
   that	
   a	
  

certain	
  figure	
  will	
  be	
  brought	
  to	
  court	
  that	
  date.	
  And	
  that	
  is	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  

what	
  our	
  agreement	
  or	
  future	
  agreement	
  is	
  based	
  upon,	
  Your	
  Honor.	
  

(RR	
  4:	
  12)	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  See	
   also:	
   RR	
   5:	
   9,	
   where	
   State’s	
   counsel,	
   in	
   questioning	
  

Newberry	
   says:	
   “…we	
   would	
   either	
   accept	
   the	
   restitution	
   and	
   reach	
   a	
  

plea	
   agreement	
   for	
   probation	
   or	
   the	
   State	
   was	
   going	
   to	
   ask	
   for	
   two	
  

years	
  in	
  State	
  Jail.”	
  	
  	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Then	
   in	
   cross-­‐examining	
   Appellant	
   (RR	
   5:	
   24),	
   there	
   was	
   this	
  

exchange	
  with	
  State’s	
  counsel:	
  

STATE:	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  What	
  did	
  you	
  understand	
  the	
  State	
  was	
  going	
  to	
  do	
  at	
  
this	
  hearing?	
  
	
  
APPELLANT:	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  That	
  the	
  sentence	
  would	
  be	
  given.	
  
	
  
STATE:	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   If	
   you	
   brought	
   the	
   money,	
   the	
   restitution	
   owed	
   on	
   the	
  
case,	
  the	
  State	
  was	
  going	
  to	
  agree	
  to	
  probation;	
  is	
  that	
  correct?	
  
	
  
APPELLANT:	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Yes,	
  sir.	
  
	
  
STATE:	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  If	
  you	
  didn’t	
  bring	
  the	
  money,	
  what	
  was	
  the	
  State	
  going	
  
to	
  recommend?	
  
	
  
APPELLANT:	
   	
   	
   	
   Well,	
   the	
   Judge	
   –	
   from	
   my	
   understanding,	
   the	
   Judge	
  
would	
  then	
  have	
  it	
  either	
  which	
  way,	
  probation	
  or	
  –	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                             7	
  
STATE:	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  You	
  knew	
  the	
  State	
  would	
  be	
  asking	
  for	
  prison,	
  right?	
  I	
  
don’t	
  know	
  if	
  you	
  remember	
  it	
  or	
  not?	
  
	
  
APPELLANT:	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  I	
  don’t.	
  
	
  
STATE:	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   You	
   understood	
   that	
   was	
   definitely	
   what	
   you	
   were	
  
facing,	
   what	
   you	
   were	
   risking?	
   You	
   were	
   facing	
   jail	
   time	
   if	
   you	
   didn’t	
  
bring	
  the	
  restitution,	
  you	
  know	
  that,	
  right?	
  
	
  
APPELLANT:	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  I	
  knew	
  that	
  was	
  a	
  possibility.	
  
	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  At	
  the	
  guilty	
  plea	
  hearing	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  at	
  first	
  stated	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  

not	
  bound	
  by	
  any	
  such	
  agreements,	
  but	
  then	
  went	
  on	
  to	
  state:	
  “Now,	
  if	
  

you	
   do	
   bring	
   the	
   restitution,	
   then	
   that	
   may	
   put	
   this	
   in	
   a	
   different	
  

situation.”	
  (RR	
  4:	
  13).	
  	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  At	
  the	
  sentencing	
  hearing,	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  stated	
  (referring	
  to	
  the	
  

guilty	
   plea):	
   “The	
   plea	
   was	
   based	
   on	
   some	
   possibilities	
   including	
  

restitution	
  where	
  the	
  State	
  would	
  have	
  a	
  different	
  offer.”	
  (RR	
  5:	
  4).	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  When	
   it	
   came	
   time	
   to	
   assess	
   a	
   sentence,	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   stated:	
  

“When	
   you	
   pled	
   guilty	
   on	
   April	
   the	
   9th,	
   you	
   knew	
   what	
   the	
   State’s	
  

recommendation	
   was.	
   You	
   knew	
   that	
   your	
   obligation	
   under	
   that	
  

recommendation	
  was	
  to	
  come	
  to	
  Court	
  today	
  with	
  $3,750	
  and	
  the	
  State	
  

would	
  recommend	
  a	
  probated	
  sentence.	
  You	
  personally	
  came	
  to	
  Court	
  

with	
   zero	
   dollars.”	
   (RR	
   5:	
   39).	
   The	
   trial	
   court	
   went	
   on	
   to	
   say:	
   “I	
   promise	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                             8	
  
you	
  if	
  you	
  had	
  gone	
  out	
  and	
  flipped	
  burgers	
  and	
  showed	
  me	
  you	
  were	
  

working,	
  I	
  would	
  make	
  a	
  different	
  decision	
  than	
  I’m	
  about	
  to	
  make.	
  But	
  

you	
   didn’t.	
   No,	
   rest	
   my	
   back.	
   I’m	
   going	
   to	
   see	
   how	
   much	
  

unemployment	
   pays	
   me	
   instead	
   of	
   going	
   out	
   and	
   working.	
   That’s	
   the	
  

problem	
  with	
  today’s	
  society.	
  We	
  have	
  a	
  lot	
  of	
  people	
  who	
  are	
  willing	
  

to	
  see	
  what	
  the	
  government	
  is	
  going	
  to	
  pay	
  them	
  instead	
  of	
  working”	
  

(RR	
  5:	
  41).	
  	
  

	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  LEGAL	
  ANALYSIS	
  

                 On	
  appeal	
  Appellant’s	
  sole	
  point	
  was	
  this:	
  that	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  did	
  not	
  

act	
  as	
  a	
  neutral	
  and	
  detached	
  fact	
  finder,	
  taking	
  on	
  the	
  role	
  of	
  prosecutor,	
  

thereby	
   violating	
   Fourteenth	
   Amendment	
   Due	
   Process	
   and	
   Texas	
   Due	
  

Course	
  of	
  the	
  Law,	
  TEX.	
  CONST.	
  ART.	
  1	
  §19.	
  

                 	
  The	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   reached	
   two	
   conclusions	
   essential	
   to	
   its	
  

determination	
  of	
  the	
  appeal:	
  	
  

	
               First,	
   it	
   determined	
   that	
   the	
   issue	
   raised	
   by	
   Appellant	
   was	
   not	
  

preserved	
   by	
   objection	
   and	
   a	
   ruling	
   at	
   trial	
   ,	
   as	
   required	
   by	
   TEX.	
   R.	
   APP.	
   P.	
  

33.1(a)(1)	
  and	
  (2)	
  (Opinion,	
  p.	
  6).	
  	
  

	
               Second,	
   it	
   held	
   that	
   the	
   conduct	
   of	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   was	
   not	
   such	
   that	
   it	
  

would	
   have	
   qualified	
   as	
   “fundamentally	
   erroneous”	
   under	
   the	
   standards	
  

	
                                                                                                                                               9	
  
found	
   in	
   Almanza	
   v.	
   State,	
   686	
   S.W.2d	
   157	
   (Tex.	
   Crim.	
   App.	
   1984)(op.	
   on	
  

reh’g)	
  (Opinion,	
  pp.6-­‐7).	
  	
  Elaborating	
  further,	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  cited	
  to	
  

Moreno	
   v.	
   State,	
   900	
   S.W.2d	
   357,	
   359	
   (Tex.	
   App.	
   –	
   Texarkana	
   1995,	
   no	
   pet.)	
  

for	
  the	
  proposition	
  that	
  the	
  lack	
  of	
  an	
  objection	
  (and	
  ruling	
  thereon)	
  is	
  not	
  

necessary	
  for	
  appellate	
  review	
  if	
  the	
  alleged	
  conduct	
  of	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  was	
  

“so	
  harmful	
  that	
  the	
  defendant	
  was	
  denied	
  a	
  fair	
  trial”	
  (Opinion,	
  p.	
  7).	
  The	
  

Court	
  of	
  Appeals,	
  using	
  that	
  as	
  a	
  standard,	
  found	
  that	
  the	
  comments	
  of	
  the	
  

trial	
  court	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  at	
  bar	
  “were	
  neither	
  egregiously	
  harmful	
  nor	
  did	
  they	
  

operate	
  to	
  deny	
  Ward	
  a	
  fair	
  trial”	
  (id.).	
  After	
  a	
  review	
  of	
  the	
  evidence	
  from	
  

the	
  sentencing	
  hearing,	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  concluded	
  that	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  

did	
  not	
  abandon	
  its	
  role	
  and	
  act	
  as	
  advocate	
  for	
  the	
  State	
  (Opinion,	
  p.	
  8).	
  

	
        However,	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   failed	
   to	
   delve	
   into	
   the	
   overriding	
  

concerns,	
   both	
   from	
   the	
   State	
   and	
   also	
   the	
   trial	
   court,	
   with	
   the	
   economic	
  

considerations	
   that	
   dominated	
   the	
   direction	
   and	
   outcome	
   of	
   the	
   sentencing	
  

hearing.	
  Indeed,	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  did,	
  in	
  fact,	
  abandon	
  its	
  neutral	
  and	
  detached	
  

role,	
  and	
  justified	
  its	
  sentencing	
  on	
  the	
  very	
  economic	
  posture	
  that	
  the	
  State	
  

had	
  made	
  its	
  hallmark	
  for	
  either	
  probation	
  or	
  jail	
  time.	
  	
  

	
  

	
                                                                                                                           10	
  
             Contrary	
   to	
   allowable	
   conduct	
   of	
   filing	
   for	
   unemployment	
   benefits,	
  

something	
   sanctioned	
   and	
   encouraged	
   under	
   State	
   law	
   (see,	
   TEX.	
   LABOR	
  

CODE,	
   201	
   et	
   seq.),	
   	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   viewed	
   that	
   as	
   somehow	
   akin	
   to	
   “taking	
   a	
  

vacation”,	
   concluding	
   with	
   the	
   following	
   remark:	
   “That’s	
   the	
   problem	
   with	
  

today’s	
   society.	
   We	
   have	
   a	
   lot	
   of	
   people	
   who	
   are	
   willing	
   to	
   see	
   what	
   the	
  

government	
  is	
  going	
  to	
  pay	
  them	
  instead	
  of	
  working.”	
  	
  The	
  sum	
  total	
  of	
  that	
  

sort	
   of	
   rhetoric	
   and	
   its	
   disregard	
   for	
   a	
   legitimate	
   resource	
   for	
   those	
   who	
   are	
  

unemployed,	
  the	
  orientation	
  of	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  adopting	
  the	
  State’s	
  stance	
  on	
  

how	
   the	
   sentencing	
   turned	
   on	
   the	
   question	
   of	
   economics:	
   in	
   its	
   totality	
   it	
  

qualifies	
  as	
  Almanza	
  fundamental	
  error.	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Both	
   the	
   State	
   and	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   based	
   the	
   possibility	
   of	
  

probation	
   in	
   this	
   case	
   on	
   economic	
   considerations,	
   without	
   regard	
   to	
  

the	
   financial	
   circumstances	
   of	
   Appellant.	
   Each	
   of	
   them	
   said	
   that	
  

probation	
   was	
   dependent	
   on	
   restitution	
   being	
   paid	
   by	
   Appellant.	
   The	
  

trial	
   court	
   denounced	
   Appellant	
   for	
   filing	
   for	
   unemployment	
  

compensation,	
   though	
   such	
   a	
   step	
   is	
   certainly	
   approved	
   of	
   by	
   the	
  

Legislature	
  as	
  an	
  appropriate	
  remedy	
  for	
  joblessness	
  by	
  the	
  statutes	
  of	
  

our	
  State.	
  See,	
  TEX.	
  LABOR	
  CODE,	
  201	
  et	
  seq.	
  By	
  so	
  doing,	
  fundamental	
  

	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                            11	
  
	
  Fourteenth	
   Amendment	
   Due	
   Process	
   and	
   Equal	
   Protection	
  

considerations	
   were	
   ignored,	
   resulting	
   in	
   fundamental	
   error.	
   That	
   error	
  

was	
  compounded	
  by	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  nowhere	
  in	
  Newberry’s	
  testimony	
  did	
  

he	
   offer	
   a	
   figure	
   on	
   the	
   amount	
   of	
   restitution,	
   as	
   promised	
   earlier	
   by	
  

the	
  State.	
  

	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Economic	
   considerations	
   underlie	
   the	
   process	
   of	
   determining	
  

whether	
  or	
  not	
  a	
  defendant	
  has	
  complied	
  with	
  the	
  terms	
  of	
  probation.	
  The	
  

lead	
  case	
  is	
  Bearden	
  v.	
  Georgia,	
  461	
  U.S.	
  660	
  (1983).	
  There	
  the	
  U.S.	
  Supreme	
  

Court	
   held	
   that,	
   “if	
   the	
   State	
   determines	
   a	
   fine	
   or	
   restitution	
   to	
   be	
   the	
  

appropriate	
   and	
   adequate	
   penalty	
   for	
   the	
   crime,	
   it	
   may	
   not	
   thereafter	
  

imprison	
  a	
  person	
  solely	
  because	
  he	
  lacked	
  the	
  resources	
  to	
  pay	
  it.”	
  Id.,	
  at	
  

667-­‐68.	
  And	
  then	
  further:	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  “Only	
   if	
   alternate	
   measures	
   are	
   not	
   adequate	
   to	
   meet	
   the	
   State’s	
  

interests	
   in	
   punishment	
   and	
   deterrence	
   may	
   the	
   court	
   imprison	
   a	
  

probationer	
  who	
  has	
  made	
  bona	
  fide	
  efforts	
  to	
  pay.	
  To	
  do	
  otherwise	
  would	
  

deprive	
   the	
   probationer	
   of	
   his	
   conditional	
   freedom	
   because,	
   through	
   no	
  

fault	
   of	
   his	
   own,	
   he	
   cannot	
   pay	
   the	
   fine.	
   Such	
   a	
   deprivation	
   would	
   be	
  

contrary	
   to	
   the	
   fundamental	
   fairness	
   required	
   by	
   the	
   Fourteenth	
  

Amendment.”	
  Id.,	
  at	
  672-­‐73.	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                        12	
  
	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  In	
  Bearden	
  v.	
  Georgia,	
  the	
  Supreme	
  Court	
  was	
  not	
  writing	
  on	
  a	
  blank	
  

slate	
   on	
   the	
   issue	
   of	
   how	
   economic	
   considerations	
   can	
   impinge	
   upon	
   the	
  

Due	
  Process	
  and	
  Equal	
  Protection	
  rights	
  of	
  a	
  defendant.	
  Precedents	
  included	
  

Williams	
   v.	
   Illinois,	
   399	
   U.S.	
   235	
   (1970)	
   (holding:	
   State	
   cannot	
   subject	
   a	
  

certain	
   class	
   of	
   convicted	
   defendants	
   to	
   a	
   period	
   of	
   imprisonment	
   beyond	
  

the	
   statutory	
   maximum	
   solely	
   because	
   they	
   are	
   too	
   poor	
   to	
   pay	
   the	
   fine)	
  

and	
  Tate	
  v.	
  Short,	
  401	
  U.S.	
  395	
  (1971)	
  (holding:	
  State	
  cannot	
  convert	
  a	
  fine	
  

imposed	
   fine-­‐only	
   statute	
   into	
   a	
   jail	
   term	
   solely	
   because	
   the	
   defendant	
   is	
  

indigent	
   and	
   cannot	
   immediately	
   pay	
   the	
   fine	
   in	
   full).	
   See	
   also,	
   Griffin	
   v.	
  

Illinois,	
  351	
  U.S.	
  12	
  (1956)	
  (holding:	
  State	
  could	
  not	
  deny	
  appellate	
  review	
  to	
  

those	
   who	
   were	
   indigent	
   but	
   grant	
   it	
   to	
   those	
   who	
   could	
   afford	
   a	
   trial	
  

transcript).	
   Writing	
   for	
   the	
   majority,	
   Justice	
   O’Connor	
   found	
   that	
   “Due	
  

Process	
   and	
   equal	
   protection	
   principles	
   converge	
   in	
   the	
   Court’s	
   analysis	
   in	
  

these	
  cases”	
  Bearden	
  v.	
  Georgia,	
  at	
  665.	
  

	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Those	
  constitutional	
  principles	
  are	
  codified	
  in	
  ART.	
  42.12	
  §21(c),	
  TEX.	
  

CODE	
   CRIM.	
   P.,	
   where	
   probation	
   revocation	
   is	
   prohibited	
   for	
   failure	
   to	
   pay	
  

money,	
  and	
  where	
  the	
  burden	
  of	
  proof	
  is	
  on	
  the	
  State	
  to	
  prove	
  the	
  ability	
  to	
  

pay,	
  coupled	
  	
  with	
  a	
  failure	
  to	
  pay.	
  	
  

	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  It	
   has	
   been	
   held	
   that	
   even	
   a	
   plea	
   of	
   “true”	
   to	
   an	
   allegation	
   for	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                         13	
  
revocation	
   does	
   not	
   waive	
   a	
   Bearden	
   v.	
   Georgia	
   violation.	
   	
   See,	
   Lively	
   v.	
  

State,	
  338	
  S.W.3d	
  140,	
  145	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  –	
  Texarkana	
  2011,	
  no	
  pet.).	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Appellant	
   contends	
   that	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   committed	
   a	
   two-­‐fold	
  

failure:	
   first	
   it	
   failed	
   to	
   see	
   that	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   did	
   abandon	
   its	
   neutral	
  

position	
   when	
   it	
   made	
   economic	
   considerations	
   the	
   overriding	
   basis	
   upon	
  

which	
   it	
   determined	
   sentence	
   and,	
   second,	
   	
   it	
   failed	
   to	
   recognize	
   a	
  

nonwaivable	
   right	
   at	
   issue:	
   namely,	
   that	
   a	
   person’s	
   freedom	
   is	
   not	
  

dependent	
  upon	
  whether	
  or	
  not	
  a	
  person	
  can	
  pay	
  money.	
  That	
  is	
  the	
  core	
  

consideration	
  in	
  Bearden	
  v.	
  Georgia,	
  embedded	
  in	
  Fourteenth	
  Amendment	
  

Due	
  Process	
  considerations,	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  in	
  the	
  Equal	
  Protection	
  Clause.	
   Id.,	
   at	
  

665.	
   Going	
   back	
   for	
   centuries,	
   there	
   is	
   a	
   principle	
   of	
   English	
   law	
   found	
   in	
  

MAGNA	
  CARTA,	
  Article	
  40	
  (2015):	
  “To	
  no	
  one	
  will	
  we	
  sell,	
  to	
  no	
  one	
  deny	
  or	
  

delay	
  right	
  or	
  justice.”1	
  	
  In	
  an	
  opinion	
  holding	
  unconstitutional	
  a	
  statute	
  that	
  

imposed	
  a	
  $10	
  fee	
  for	
  the	
  dismissal	
  of	
  a	
  charge	
  of	
  failure	
  to	
  maintain	
  proof	
  

of	
   financial	
   responsibility	
   for	
   those	
   who	
   were	
   innocent	
   of	
   the	
   offense,	
  

Attorney	
  General	
  Mattox	
  cited	
  to	
  MAGNA	
  CARTA,	
  Article	
  40,	
  saying	
  that	
  the	
  

statute	
  was	
  “contrary	
  to	
  our	
  notions	
  of	
  due	
  process	
  and	
  the	
  law	
  of	
  the	
  land	
  

since	
  Magna	
  Carta.”	
  TEX.	
  ATT’Y	
  GEN.	
  OP.	
  NO.	
  JM-­‐917	
  (1988).	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1	
  	
  “Nulli	
  vendemus,	
  nulli	
  negabimus	
  aut	
  differemus	
  rectum	
  aut	
  justiciam.”	
  	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 14	
  
	
        Admittedly,	
  Bearden	
  v.	
  Georgia	
  was	
  a	
  case	
  that	
  focused	
  on	
  probation	
  

revocation.	
  The	
  case	
  held	
  that,	
  in	
  determining	
  a	
  defendant’s	
  initial	
  sentence,	
  

the	
  trial	
  court	
  is	
  not	
  bound	
  by	
  the	
  economic	
  status	
  of	
  a	
  defendant	
  and	
  may	
  

impose	
  the	
  maximum	
  penalty.	
   Id.,	
  at	
  670.	
  However,	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  at	
  bar,	
  both	
  

the	
   trial	
   court	
   and	
   the	
   State	
   made	
   the	
   payment	
   (and	
   lack	
   of	
   payment)	
   of	
  

restitution,	
   as	
   well	
   as	
   the	
   legitimate	
   seeking	
   of	
   unemployment	
   benefits	
  

(both	
   economic	
   factors)	
   the	
   determining	
   consideration	
   in	
   that	
   initial	
  

sentence	
  of	
  imprisonment,	
  rather	
  than	
  probation.	
  	
  

	
        Therein	
  lies	
  the	
  constitutional	
  issue	
  before	
  this	
  Honorable	
  Court,	
  the	
  

issue	
  that	
  was	
  overlooked	
  and	
  disregarded	
  by	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals.	
  	
  

	
        As	
  a	
  corollary	
  to	
  the	
  Fourteenth	
  Amendment	
  Due	
  Process	
  and	
  Equal	
  

Protection	
   of	
   the	
   Law	
   issues	
   raised	
   in	
   Bearden	
   v.	
   Georgia,	
   there	
   is	
   this	
  

additional	
  fundamental	
  concern	
  at	
  work	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  at	
  bar:	
  

	
        Where	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   accepts	
   the	
   State’s	
   position	
   on	
   punishment,	
  

deciding	
  to	
  withhold	
  consideration	
  of	
  probation	
  from	
  a	
  defendant	
  because	
  

he	
  has	
  not	
  brought	
  with	
  him	
  funds	
  that	
  the	
  said	
  court	
  has	
  deemed	
  sufficient	
  

for	
   restitution,	
   and	
   when	
   it	
   disparages	
   and	
   holds	
   against	
   a	
   defendant	
   his	
  

reliance	
  upon	
  legitimate	
  economic	
  support	
  approved	
  by	
  State	
  law,	
  then	
  	
  

	
                                                                                                                        15	
  
the	
  decision	
  has	
  run	
  afoul	
  of	
  Fourteenth	
  Amendment	
  Due	
  Process	
  and	
  Equal	
  

Protection	
  of	
  the	
  Law.	
  Punishment	
  no	
  longer	
  is	
  meted	
  out	
  depending	
  on	
  the	
  

facts	
   of	
   the	
   offense,	
   but	
   on	
   the	
   economic	
   ability	
   of	
   the	
   offender	
   to	
   pay	
  

money.	
   That	
   certainly	
   runs	
   counter	
   to	
   Fourteenth	
   Amendment	
   Equal	
  

Protection	
   considerations,	
   since	
   an	
   offender	
   who	
   can	
   pay	
   the	
   restitution	
  

gets	
  probation,	
  but	
  one	
  who	
  does	
  not	
  -­‐-­‐	
  one	
  who	
  is	
  compelled	
  to	
  rely	
  upon	
  

State	
   assistance	
   to	
   live	
   -­‐-­‐	
   gets	
   incarcerated.	
   It	
   has	
   all	
   the	
   earmarks	
   of	
  

dispensing	
  justice	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  economic	
  circumstances	
  of	
  the	
  offender.	
  	
  

	
        Compounding	
   that	
   error	
   was	
   the	
   fact	
   that,	
   nowhere	
   in	
   the	
   record	
  

during	
   the	
   hearing	
   on	
   punishment	
   did	
   Newberry	
   testify	
   as	
   to	
   the	
   value	
   of	
  

the	
   welding	
   machine.	
   The	
   trial	
   court	
   referred	
   to	
   the	
   sum	
   of	
   $3,750,	
   but	
   that	
  

is	
   nowhere	
   in	
   the	
   record	
   from	
   the	
   sentencing	
   hearing,	
   as	
   promised	
   by	
   the	
  

State	
  at	
  the	
  conclusion	
  of	
  the	
  guilty	
  plea	
  (RR	
  4:	
  12).	
  The	
  figure	
  of	
  $3,250	
  is	
  

mentioned	
  in	
  a	
  police	
  report	
  as	
  the	
  value	
  of	
  the	
  welding	
  machine	
  (RR	
  6:	
  7);	
  

and	
  in	
  that	
  same	
  report	
  the	
  figure	
  of	
  $250.00	
  is	
  placed	
  on	
  a	
  pair	
  of	
  cables	
  

(RR	
   6:	
   7).	
   However,	
   at	
   the	
   low	
   end	
   of	
   valuation,	
   the	
   machine	
   was	
   pawned	
  

for	
   $425.00	
   (RR	
   6:	
   9);	
   on	
   that	
   same	
   page	
   Newberry	
   gave	
   a	
   value	
   on	
   the	
  

machine	
   of	
   $3,500.	
   Id.	
   Then	
   in	
   another	
   report	
   (Call	
   Sheet	
   Report	
   dated	
  

	
                                                                                                                             16	
  
12/29/2012)	
  Newberry	
  reported	
  (on	
  the	
  high	
  end	
  of	
  valuation)	
  that	
  he	
  had	
  

“about	
  6-­‐10,000	
  dollars	
  worth	
  of	
  equipment”	
  stolen	
  (RR	
  6:	
  14).	
  

	
                        ART.	
   42.037(k),	
   TEX.	
   CODE	
   CRIM.	
   P.,	
   places	
   the	
   burden	
   of	
   proving	
   the	
  

amount	
   of	
   restitution	
   on	
   the	
   State.	
   The	
   statute	
   says,	
   in	
   relevant	
   part:	
   “The	
  

burden	
  of	
  demonstrating	
  the	
  amount	
  of	
  the	
  loss	
  sustained	
  by	
  a	
  victim	
  as	
  a	
  

result	
   of	
   the	
   offense	
   is	
   on	
   the	
   prosecuting	
   attorney.”	
   The	
   Judgment	
   recites	
  

an	
  amount	
  of	
  restitution	
  as	
  $3,750,	
  payable	
  to	
  the	
  victim	
  Newberry,	
  but	
  does	
  

not	
   say	
   how	
   or	
   when	
   that	
   amount	
   must	
   be	
   paid	
   (CR	
   50-­‐51).	
   See,	
   Miller	
   v.	
  

State,	
   343	
   S.W.3d	
   499,	
   502	
   (Tex.	
   App.	
   –	
   Waco	
   2011,	
   pet.	
   ref’d),	
   where	
   the	
  

reviewing	
   court	
   held	
   that	
   the	
   amount	
   of	
   restitution	
   must	
   be	
   just	
   and	
  

supported	
   by	
   a	
   factual	
   basis	
   within	
   the	
   record.	
   The	
   State	
   did	
   not	
   elicit	
  

testimony	
  from	
  Newberry	
  at	
  the	
  sentencing	
  hearing.	
  The	
  evidence	
  from	
  the	
  

State’s	
   exhibits	
   was,	
   at	
   best,	
   ambiguous.	
   See	
   also,	
   Barton	
   v.	
   State,	
   21	
   S.W.3d	
  

287	
  (Tex.	
  Crim.	
  App.	
  2000);	
  Lemos	
  v.	
  State,	
  27	
  S.W.3d	
  42,	
  45	
  (Tex.	
  App.	
  –	
  San	
  

Antonio	
  2000,	
  pet.	
  ref’d).2	
  	
  

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2	
  Victim’s	
  right	
  to	
  restitution:	
  	
  see,	
  TEX.	
  CONST.	
  ART.	
  1,	
  §30(b)(4).	
  

	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 17	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Appellant,	
  with	
  the	
  assistance	
  of	
  his	
  mother,	
  had	
  brought	
  some	
  money	
  

to	
  court:	
  $1,000.	
  In	
  the	
  opinion	
  of	
  the	
  State	
  and	
  of	
  the	
  trial	
  court,	
  it	
  fell	
  short.	
  

So	
  the	
  principle	
  at	
  work	
  was	
  this:	
  either	
  bring	
  all	
  the	
  money	
  or	
  go	
  to	
  prison.	
  	
  

	
             The	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   failed	
   to	
   grasp	
   the	
   fundamental,	
   nonwaivable,	
  

issue	
  at	
  work	
  in	
  the	
  appeal	
  in	
  its	
  consideration	
  of	
  whether	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  had	
  

erred	
   in	
   its	
   determination	
   of	
   punishment,	
   namely,	
   that	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
  

departed	
  from	
  its	
  neutral	
  and	
  detached	
  role,	
  adopting	
  instead	
  the	
  position	
  of	
  

the	
  State	
  toward	
  punishment,	
  thereby	
  imposing	
  an	
  unconstitutional	
  burden	
  

of	
  financial	
  means	
  upon	
  Appellant	
  in	
  deciding	
  his	
  sentence.	
  That	
  burden	
  ran	
  

afoul	
   of	
   Fourteenth	
   Amendment	
   	
   Due	
   Process	
   and	
   Equal	
   Protection	
   of	
   the	
  

Law.	
  	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
                                                                                                                                          18	
  
                                                                                                                     PRAYER	
  FOR	
  RELIEF	
  

	
                        WHEREFORE,	
  PREMISES	
  CONSIDERED,	
  Derek	
  Clinton	
  Ward,	
  Appellant,	
  

prays	
   that	
   the	
   Honorable	
   Court	
   of	
   Criminal	
   Appeals	
   will	
   grant	
   discretionary	
  

review	
   and,	
   after	
   full	
   briefing	
   on	
   the	
   merits,	
   issue	
   an	
   opinion	
   reversing	
   the	
  

Court	
   of	
   Appeals’	
   judgment	
   and	
   remand	
   for	
   further	
   proceedings	
   consistent	
  

with	
  the	
  Court’s	
  opinion.	
  

                                                                                                                                  Respectfully	
  submitted,	
  

	
                                            	
                                           	
                                           	
                                            	
                                           /S/	
  Hough-­‐Lewis	
  Dunn	
  
        	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
                                                                                                         HOUGH-­‐LEWIS	
  (“LEW”)	
  DUNN	
  
        	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
                                                                                                         TEXAS	
  STATE	
  BAR	
  NO.	
  02644600	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  201	
  E.	
  METHVIN	
  STREET,	
  SUITE	
  102	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  P.O.	
  BOX	
  2226	
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   LONGVIEW,	
  TX	
  75606	
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   903-­‐757-­‐6711	
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   903-­‐757-­‐6712	
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   dunn@texramp.net	
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          	
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   ATTORNEY	
  FOR	
  APPELLANT	
  

                                                                                                                                                              	
  
                                                                                                                                                              	
  
                                                                                                                                                              	
  
                                                                                                                                                              	
  
                                                                                                                                                              	
  
                                                                                                                                                              	
  
                                                                                                                                                              	
  
                                                                                                                                                              	
  
                                                                                                                                                              	
  
                                                                                                                                                              	
  
	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        19	
  
                                    CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  COMPLIANCE	
  
	
  
         This	
  petition	
  complies	
  with	
  the	
  typeface	
  requirements	
  of	
  TEX.	
  R.	
  APP.	
  

P.	
   9.4(e),	
   because	
   it	
   has	
   been	
   prepared	
   in	
   a	
   conventional	
   typeface	
   no	
  

smaller	
   than	
   14-­‐point	
   for	
   text	
   and	
   12-­‐point	
   for	
   footnotes.	
   This	
   document	
  

complies	
  with	
  the	
  word-­‐count	
  limitations	
  of	
  TEX.	
  R.	
  APP.	
  P.	
  9.4(i)	
  because	
  it	
  

contains	
   3,702	
   words,	
   excluding	
   the	
   parts	
   exempted	
   by	
   TEX.	
   R.	
   APP.	
   P.	
  

9.4(i)(1).	
  

	
       	
        	
        	
        	
        	
        /S/	
  Hough-­‐Lewis	
  Dunn	
  
	
  

                                       CERTIFICATE	
  OF	
  SERVICE	
  

	
       I	
   certify	
   the	
   foregoing	
   Petition	
   for	
   Discretionary	
   Review	
   was	
   served	
  

upon	
  the	
  State	
  of	
  Texas	
  by	
  sending	
  a	
  true	
  and	
  correct	
  copy	
  to	
  the	
  Criminal	
  

District	
   Attorney	
   of	
   Gregg	
   County	
   and	
   the	
   State	
   Prosecuting	
   Attorney	
   via	
  

mail	
   to:	
   Hon.	
   Zan	
   Colson	
   Brown,	
   Assistant	
   Criminal	
   District	
   Attorney	
   for	
  

Gregg	
  County,	
  101	
  E.	
  Methvin	
  St.	
  Suite	
  333,	
  Longview,	
  TX	
  75601,	
  and	
  Hon.	
  

Lisa	
   C.	
   McMinn,	
   State	
   Prosecuting	
   Attorney,	
   P.O.	
   Box	
   13046,	
   Austin,	
   TX	
  

78711-­‐3046	
  on	
  the	
  4th	
  day	
  of	
  December	
  2015.	
  

	
       	
        	
        	
        	
        	
        /S/	
  Hough-­‐Lewis	
  Dunn	
  
	
  

         	
  

	
                                                                                                                  20	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
       APPENDIX	
  
                    In The
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                  No. 06-15-00110-CR

         DEREK CLINTON WARD, Appellant

                           V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

        On Appeal from the 124th District Court
                Gregg County, Texas
              Trial Court No. 42433-B

      Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
       Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION
         After Derek Clinton Ward entered an open plea of guilty to the state jail felony of theft of

property valued at $1,500.00 or more but less than $20,000.00,1 the trial court sentenced Ward to

twenty-two months’ incarceration. Ward has appealed, arguing that the trial court abandoned its

duty to remain impartial in the sentencing process. We reject this argument and affirm the trial

court’s judgment and sentence.

I.       Procedural Background

         Ward entered an open plea of guilty to the charged offense of theft April 9, 2015,2 and

returned for sentencing on May 21, 2015. It appears that although Ward had entered an open plea,

there was something of an informal agreement between Ward and the State wherein the State

would recommend that Ward would avoid incarceration if he appeared at the sentencing hearing

with $3,750.00 in restitution. However, when Ward appeared at the sentencing hearing, he did not

have the $3,750.00 in restitution; the only money proffered on his behalf was $1,000.00 brought

by Ward’s mother. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced Ward to twenty-two months’

incarceration in a state jail facility.

1
 Act of May 24, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 399, § 1, sec. 31.03, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 929–30 (amended 1975,
1977, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2015) (current version
at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (West Supp. 2015)).
2
 The theft charge arose because Ward had taken an expensive welding machine from his then-employer. Initially, the
employer was being reimbursed by withholding at least a portion of Ward’s paycheck. However, the employer then
indicated that Ward had also committed significant credit card abuse against the employer, and the informal repayment
plan was abandoned. The credit card abuse case was not thereafter pursued due to problems with the loss of evidence,
and Ward denied his culpability.

                                                         2
        During the hearing on punishment, Ward related that he had become unemployed in the

days immediately following the early April plea hearing, his job as an oil-field drilling hand having

been eliminated during the downturn in the oil market. Ward (then thirty-six years old) testified

that he elected to seek unemployment benefits rather than pursue employment. He went on to

relate that he had had four back surgeries over the years and told the court about the physically

demanding nature of his career choice. In doing so, Ward stated,

        [I]t was kind of nice to just let my back have a rest for a minute anyways. Working
        on a drilling rig when you’re 36 years old and had as many spinal surgeries that I
        have had takes a toll on your body. I kind of looked at it as just taking a second off
        and giving my body a little rest.

Ward testified that in the weeks between losing his job and the sentencing hearing, he had applied

for unemployment benefits, but that a few days before the hearing, he had been notified that he

failed to include certain information with his application and that he was waiting for paperwork to

be sent to him. He also said that although he had obtained job applications, he had not submitted

them to prospective employers. He said he only took ibuprofen for his back pain, after successfully

battling addiction to prescription pain medication. As for the job from which he had been laid off,

he was “absolutely” eligible to be re-hired, and he already had “the paperwork” establishing that

eligibility.

        After the parties’ examination of Ward drew to a close, the trial court asked him several

questions. During this exchange, the trial court referred to the time intervening between Ward’s

plea hearing and the sentencing hearing as a “vacation.” Although Ward did not object to that

characterization at the time the trial court uttered it, Ward now objects to it on appeal. For the

context in which this was said, we quote some of the trial court’s statements as made during Ward’s
                                                  3
sentencing hearing. After verifying the date that Ward had been terminated from his last job, the

trial court said, “And so knowing that the State’s recommendation is going to be two years state

jail, you decide instead of finding a job to collect restitution, that you’re going to take a vacation

for a month and a half.” Ward responded by protesting that the condition of his back had been the

reason for not seeking employment.3 The trial court then asked Ward why he should receive a

suspended sentence. Ward answered, “Because I’ll stick to the probation, complete the probation

and give you no reason for feeling like I did anything unjust, sir.”

        Ward then called his mother (a loan officer for a mortgage company) to testify. She

indicated that she was able and willing to pay $1,000.00 toward Ward’s restitution at that time and

that she could pay the remaining portion of the restitution on June 15, less than a month away.

        After a short recess, the trial court accepted Ward’s guilty plea and found him guilty as

charged of theft of property valued at $1,500.00 or more, but less than $20,000.00. The court then

described to Ward the factors taken into account in deciding the proper sentence:

               I have to decide if you deserve State Jail time, or do you deserve a shot at
        probation?

                When you pled guilty on April 9th, you knew what the State’s
        recommendation was. You knew that your obligation under that recommendation
        was to come to Court today with $3,750 and the State would recommend a probated
        sentence.

                 You personally came to Court with zero dollars.

3
 During this exchange, it was developed that Ward’s driver’s license had been re-activated after paying “some fees
from a D.W.I.” The trial court also asked Ward about a DWI charge from Shelby County, and Ward responded that
that case had been dismissed. Ward admitted to the State that he had been charged with arson and assault/family
violence (these charges arising from one incident with Ward’s girlfriend), but claimed that the State had dropped the
arson allegation while continuing prosecution of the assault case.
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              The factors I have to consider or send somebody to prison include their
       criminal history, obviously. If I was to consider just your criminal history, my
       decision is pretty easy. I would send you to prison, but I look at other factors, also.

              I look at changes that they may have made, when the criminal history was.
       I look at several factors. Criminal history does vote against you. Your felony
       offense was long ago, so that helps you some.

                I looked at the facts and circumstances of the offense.

               I can’t really consider much on the credit card abuse allegations, just
       because of the lack of proof before me. I do consider the statements you made to
       Investigator Mitchell and other factors.

                Here’s where it really comes down to my decision that I’m going to make
       today.

               You pled guilty on April the 9th knowing that your part of the obligation
       was $3,750. You say you lost your job April 10th or 11th. Instead of going out
       and finding a new job whether it’s flipping burgers at McDonald’s for minimum
       wage or anything else, you testified that you wanted to take a month-and-a-half
       vacation to rest your back. It’s not until recently, the last few days that you’ve even
       filed for unemployment. You come in here today and expect me to grant you
       probation. You expect me to grant you probation, and, say, well, I’m hoping that
       my mom’s $1,000 is enough to bail me out. It’s not this time.

               I promise you if you had gone out and flipped burgers and showed me you
       were working, I would make a different decision than I’m about to make. But you
       didn’t. No, rest my back. I’m going to see how much unemployment pays me
       instead of going out and working. That’s the problem with today’s society. We
       have a lot of people who are willing to see what the government is going to pay
       them instead of working.

              It’s not going to work here. 22 months State Jail. I will give you credit for
       time served.

Ward argues that the trial court abandoned its duty to remain a neutral and detached fact-finder;

Ward complains of the trial court’s use of the term “vacation” to describe the period between his

being laid off and the sentencing hearing. Ward further points to the trial court’s statement that he

                                                 5
would be unlikely to grant Ward much relief when the court was called upon to consider whether

any of Ward’s sentence would be reduced as a result of diligent participation in applicable

programs while incarcerated.4

II.     Failure to Preserve Argument

        As previously mentioned, Ward lodged no objection to the trial court’s use of the word

“vacation” or any of the court’s other statements at any time during the sentencing hearing (not

while the trial court was questioning Ward, during the statement he gave in explaining his

reasoning for the sentence that was announced, or during any other part of the hearing). In almost

every circumstance, in order to preserve a complaint for our review, a party must first present to

the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the desired

ruling if not apparent from the context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). Further, the trial court must

have ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly, or the complaining

party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2).

        Although Ward attempts to invoke due process claims in his assertion that the trial court

abandoned his role as judge for that of prosecutor, Ward offers no explanation or argument as to

why we should address this unpreserved issue. In a somewhat similar situation, we observed that

un-objected to “remarks and conduct of the [trial] court may not be subsequently challenged unless

they are fundamentally erroneous.” Moreno v. State, 900 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

1995, no pet.) (citing Brewer v, State, 572 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978)).

4
 This was apparently a reference to Article 42.12, Section 15(h)(5) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 15(h)(5) (West Supp. 2014).
                                                       6
In such a situation, we used the egregious harm standard from Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157

(Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g), to determine if fundamental error had occurred. The alleged

error must be “so harmful that the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” Moreno, 900

S.W.2d at 359. If we were to look at Ward’s brief in the most generous light possible, we might

say that he has claimed fundamental (or plain) error, i.e., the kind that obviates the need to preserve

it at the time of trial. An appellate court may, in criminal cases, “tak[e] ‘notice of fundamental

errors affecting substantial rights although they were not’ brought to the attention of the [trial]

court.” Boler v. State, 177 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d)

(quoting Jasper v. State, 61 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). “No objection is required

when the error is so egregious that it rises to constitutional dimensions.” Id. (citing Jasper, 61

S.W.3d at 421).

       The trial court’s comments were neither egregiously harmful nor did they operate to deny

Ward a fair and impartial trial. Certainly, the comments did not rise to the status of a complaint

of constitutional dimension. Read in context, the trial court was commenting on Ward’s behavior

between the time of the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing. When he took Ward’s plea of

guilty, the trial court admonished him of the full range of punishment, including a probated

sentence with community supervision. Based on comments by the court and the State at the two

hearings, it is clear that some informal agreement had been reached to the effect that if Ward

brought the full restitution amount to the sentencing hearing, the State would recommend a

probated sentence. However, if there was no such restitution, then there would be no such

recommendation. At the plea hearing, the trial court warned Ward that it was not bound by any

                                                  7
plea negotiations the parties might have, but also told Ward, “[I]f you do bring the restitution, then

that may put this in a different situation. But right now it is an open plea, so you have certain

obligations you need to meet.” When testimony developed at the sentencing hearing that Ward

had worked most of his adult life in the oil-field business but made a conscious decision not to

seek employment just days after the plea hearing (even after the discussions which had evidently

taken place regarding leniency if Ward were to make restitution), the trial court was left to draw

conclusions about Ward’s suitability for community supervision and regarding Ward’s

commitment to fulfill potential obligations.

       The sentencing hearing occurred before the trial court, so there was no jury that could have

been confused or influenced by the court’s characterization of how Ward spent his time between

the hearings. See Moreno, 900 S.W.2d at 359. It also does not appear that the trial court abandoned

its role and acted as an advocate for the State. See id. The trial court’s decision process should

not be hindered by a constraint on its ability to explain the rationale behind its decision. The

fairness of the proceedings was not impugned. Even if error had occurred, it would not have been

in the nature of plain or fundamental error. Accordingly, absent such error, it was incumbent upon

Ward to preserve these issues for our review. We overrule Ward’s point of error.

                                                  8
      We affirm the trial court’s judgment and sentence.

                                           Bailey C. Moseley
                                           Justice

Date Submitted:     November 9, 2015
Date Decided:       November 10, 2015

Do Not Publish

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                                Court of Appeals
                         Sixth Appellate District of Texas

                                   JUDGMENT

 Derek Clinton Ward, Appellant                         Appeal from the 124th District Court of
                                                       Gregg County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 42433-B).
 No. 06-15-00110-CR         v.                         Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice
                                                       Moseley, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice
 The State of Texas, Appellee                          Burgess participating.

       As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court
below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
       We note that the appellant, Derek Clinton Ward, has adequately indicated his inability to
pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

                                                      RENDERED NOVEMBER 10, 2015
                                                      BY ORDER OF THE COURT
                                                      JOSH R. MORRISS, III
                                                      CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:
Debra K. Autrey, Clerk