Court Opinion

ID: 9559067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:21:50.550146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:45.960756
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Doyle
dissenting:
I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority that the district court lacked jurisdiction and that the rule to show cause should be made absolute. My difference with the majority opinion stems from my interpretation of the statute .that a motion for new trial may properly be filed following the rendition of a judgment of the county court. On this premise the respondent Lull satisfied the requirements of C.R.S. 1953, 37-6-11, which provides that the appeal from the county court must be made within 10 days after the judgment is “rendered.” The reasons for my conclusions are as follows:
First, I am opposed to dismissals on procedural grounds resulting in forfeiture of substantial rights unless the jurisdictional requirement is plainly set forth and is clearly shown to have been violated.
Second, the statute in question is ambiguous and requires most careful and strict construction in order to arrive at the majority result. It is, of course, open to the construction which the majority give it in that it does not specifically authorize the filing of a motion for a new trial. At the same time, it is also open to the construction that a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 can be filed in the absence of an express prohibition in the statute. This construction is just as logical as that which has been adopted. This ambiguity makes the majority decision the more unfair. There should be warning of the existence of jurisdictional problems so as to avoid entrapment of the innocent and unwary. There is only one authoritative decision on the question which is being *543decided and that is Charles v. Sprott, 75 Colo. 90, 224 Pac. 222, opinion by Mr. Justice Denison (which is now being overruled). It involved exactly the same fact situation and the ruling was contrary to the position which is being taken by the Court today. The Court said: •
“ * * * This judgment was rendered December 19, 1922. Within the statutory five days plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial which was heard and overruled January 10, 1923, and on the 16th plaintiff filed his bond on appeal to the district court. The appeal was dismissed on the ground that it had not been ‘made’ within ten days after the judgment as required by statute. This was an error. The plaintiff'in error claims that the judgment was one of nonsuit, and that upon süch a judgment he was required to move for a new trial before he could appeal at all (C.L. §§ 5776 and 5777), and that within ten days from the overruling of his motion he perfected his appeal. Be that as it may, it is immaterial. He had a right to move for a new trial and did so.’ The motion suspended the judgment, so that it became final only when the motion was overruled, January 10th (Bates v. Woodward, 66 Colo. 555, 185 Pac. 351; Kinney v. Yeolin Bros. Co., 74 Colo. 295, 220 Pac. 998), and the appeal was perfected within ten days thereafter. * * * ”
• The views of Justice Denison on matters of procedure have always commanded respect and the respondent herein had a perfect right to rely upon our continued adherence to this decision.
The authority relied upon by the majority, namely, Niles v. Shinkle, 119 Colo. 458, 204 P. (2d) 1077, does not support their conclusion. That case holds that jurisdiction was lost as a result of the failure of the litigant to file his motion for new trial within 10 days or within the extended period fixed by the county court. Impliedly, at least, it recognizes that the motion for new trial is proper procedure in the county court even though an appeal to the district court is contemplated.
*544Third, the majority opinion amounts to promulgation of a new rule of procedure. If this new rule were to be given prospective5 effect only, its unfairness would be less palpable. When, however, such a new rule is promulgated incident to a case, it results in hardship not only to the litigants whose rights are forfeited but also to other litigants who have in good faith followed the procedure of filing motions for new trial in the belief that they were proceeding properly. If the statute ought to be implemented in this manner, the court should in fact promulgate a new rule along the line of the decision.
Fourth, there is bound to be great confusion as a result of the majority opinion since it authorizes a motion for a new trial if' review by writ of error to this Court is contemplated, whereas the motion for new trial is not allowed (unless by express authorization of the county court) where an appeal to the district court is intended. What orders should a county court enter in order to protect a litigant who desires to file such a motion? This kind of complexity is out of harmony with present day procedural philosophy.
Fifth, it is desirable, as a matter of policy, to allow a motion for new trial or for rehearing in order to give the county court an opportunity to re-evaluate and reconsider its judgment, and it is desirable that such a motion serve to stay proceedings. Thus a labored effort to eliminate such motions is not in order. The only reason of policy that the majority opinion promotes is that of convincing the bar that the rules will be enforced. I doubt that it will be effective in this respect.
For the reasons expressed, I respectfully dissent from the views contained in the majority opinion.