Court Opinion

ID: 9657141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:15:35.96971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:41.307316
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
(dissenting). I cannot join my colleagues.
Recently, I signed an opinion, Reynolds v. Board of County Road Commissioners of Clare County (1971), 34 Mich App 460, the total thrust of which was that “notice” statutes require not only proof of noncompliance, but also proof of prejudice by reason of such noncompliance.
I did so because the majority opinions of this Court, undisturbed by the Supreme Court, and indeed those of the Supreme Court itself, seem to reflect this view.
If I was right in so doing, whatever my personal judicial view, then in this case I must dissent.
The stipulation of facts herein recites:
“ * * * investigation conducted by Retail Credit located owner, driver, and passenger Moody, but not able to obtain any statements * # # .” (Emphasis supplied.)
My question obviously is, if the three parties were in fact located but refused to give statements, how is the passage of time alone supposed to have affected their willingness to make them? Why would they have been more inclined to have made statements sooner? The allegation is to me conclusionary and valueless as to prejudice.
The other two involved persons were found to be (1) in military service and stationed in California and (2) the other “working somewhere near Lapeer, address unknown.” Lapeer is not so distant from Ann Arbor, nor so populous that locating a person *292working “somewhere near there” should be given up as hopeless without even trying. Neither is it a Herculean task to check out the whereabouts of a member of the armed forces known to be stationed in California. The foregoing allegations establish no more prejudice than did the other first quoted.
If noncompliance with notice requirements to political subdivision of government, and indeed to the state itself, are to be excused, absent a showing of prejudice, how do these innocuous statements establishing at best a perfunctory mercantile retail credit investigation establish prejudice against an insurer which has been paid a premium to do in part exactly what it did not do in this case?
I cannot agree with the learned trial judge nor with my associates that any prejudice whatsoever was established.
I do not quarrel with the general proposition that the trial court, sitting as the trier of facts, will not be reversed on his findings of fact unless his findings are clearly erroneous. But where there is no fact issue, as in my view there is none here, the question becomes one of law. There were no facts before the court on which to make a factual finding. As a matter of law, there was no showing of prejudice— only delay — and certainly nonprejudicial delay at best.
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.