Court Opinion

ID: 9927983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 17:03:48.711941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:28:22.024477
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

              JERRY WAYNE COCKHEARN, JR., Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 22-0379
                               FILED 1-30-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                        No. CR2010-007912-003
            The Honorable Howard D. Sukenic, Judge (Retired)

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson
By Karen Moody
Counsel for Appellee

Bain & Lauritano, PLC, Glendale
By Sheri M. Lauritano
Counsel for Appellant
                          STATE v. COCKHEARN
                            Decision of the Court

                       MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1            Jerry Wayne Cockhearn, Jr. appeals his convictions and
sentences for three counts each of first-degree felony murder and attempted
armed robbery and one count each of conspiracy to commit armed robbery
and conspiracy to possess marijuana for sale. For the following reasons, we
affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2             On July 28, 2010, the Chandler Police Department ("CPD")
initiated a "reversal" drug operation in which three undercover detectives
posed as drug sellers. During the transaction, a shootout erupted leaving
one detective and two buyers dead, and two other detectives wounded.
Seven defendants were charged with crimes relating to the incident:
Doarnell Jackson, Eldridge Gittens, Jerry Cockhearn, Jr., Thandika
Singleton, John Webber, Corey Royalty, and Anthony Wright. Cockhearn
and Royalty were jointly tried. Because Cockhearn challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence against him, we recite the facts in the light most
favorable to sustaining his convictions. See State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289,
293 (1989).

¶3            In 2010, the CPD narcotics unit was working with a
confidential informant ("CI") to make drug arrests. On July 27, the CI
received a call from someone that brokered drug deals ("Broker"). The
Broker said he had buyers for 500 pounds of marijuana. That night, Wright
invited Gittens to his house on Maldonado Road in south Phoenix
("Maldonado house"), where Wright and others were discussing a "drug
buy." Gittens knew Wright and many of his friends, including Cockhearn.

¶4             The next morning, the CI met the buyers near the Maldonado
house. R.T., one of the buyers, showed ("flashed") the CI a bag of money
             1

that he represented as $250,000 and asked to see a sample of the marijuana.

1      We refer to the victims by their initials.

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Gittens arrived at the Maldonado house later that morning—Wright,
Royalty, R.T., Webber, and Singleton were there.

¶5             A CPD sergeant put a team together to proceed to flash the
marijuana. Detective C.L. and Detective B.A., posing as Mexican drug
sellers, met the buyers near the Maldonado house with a bale of marijuana.
Other officers and detectives conducted surveillance and monitored the
interaction. R.T., Singleton, and Webber arrived on behalf of the buyers,
and Royalty drove separately to observe the meetup. After the marijuana
flash, the buyers agreed to go forward with the deal and insisted it be done
at the Maldonado house. That afternoon, Cockhearn and M.R., Royalty's
nephew, arrived at the Maldonado house.

¶6             Wright then told Gittens that the plan was to steal the
marijuana from the sellers. Gittens, Cockhearn, M.R., and Jackson were to
hide in a closet—all carrying firearms. R.T.—who was also armed—would
lead the sellers into the house, at which point Cockhearn and the others
would "take them down and secure the marijuana."

¶7            Detective D.B., the CI, and the Broker later met Webber and
followed him to the Maldonado house. Gittens, Jackson, Cockhearn, and
M.R. positioned themselves in the closet. But when Detective D.B. arrived,
R.T. would not produce the money and expressed concern about doing the
deal. To reassure the buyers, Detectives B.A. and C.L. drove the load
vehicle to the Maldonado house and flashed the load in the driveway to
R.T. The detectives then left. R.T. opened the closet door and told Gittens,
Jackson, Cockhearn, and M.R. that the sellers had left.

¶8           There was discussion about moving the deal to the Broker's
house, but the buyers insisted on doing the transaction at the Maldonado
house, so Detective D.B., the CI, and the Broker returned to the house.
Royalty and Wright left the Maldonado house during that time.

¶9            The sellers arrived at the Maldonado house earlier than
expected and Gittens, Jackson, Cockhearn, and M.R. were not in the closet
when Detective D.B. arrived. Gittens called Wright about the sellers
arriving before they were "staged," and Wright told him not to worry
because "[R.T.] and Jackson and those guys" would "take care of it." As
Detective D.B. walked into the front room of the house ("pool table room"),
Jackson opened a bag from a distance and flashed the money. Detective
D.B. then called in the load vehicle.

¶10          Jackson wanted to see the marijuana again so Detective D.B.
led him back to the load vehicle. Detective D.B. returned inside the house

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and walked toward the pool table room where the money bag was located.
As soon as he crossed the threshold, Jackson brought "a rifle up to [his]
head." Detective D.B. turned, yelled, and reached for his firearm as he ran
back to where Detectives B.A. and C.L. were located. Detective B.A. saw a
"wall" of men approaching with guns, and a shootout erupted.

¶11           When the shooting stopped, all three detectives had been hit.
Detective C.L. did not survive. Of the buyers, R.T., died of a gunshot
wound to the torso and M.R. had been shot in the thigh and was bleeding
heavily. Jackson, Cockhearn, Gittens, and M.R. fled the house. Gittens
escaped on foot, and Cockhearn drove off in a car with Jackson and M.R.
Police arrived about one minute after the shooting began. As police arrived,
one of the detectives stopped the car carrying Cockhearn, Jackson, and M.R.
Cockhearn and Jackson were taken into custody, but M.R. died at the scene.

¶12          Officers retrieved the bag of money at the Maldonado house.
It contained bundles of genuine $1 bills sandwiched between counterfeit
$100 bills.

¶13            The State initially charged Cockhearn with three counts of
attempted armed robbery (Detectives B.A., C.L., and D.B.), three counts of
first-degree felony murder (R.T., M.R., and Detective C.L.), and one count
each of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, conspiracy to sell marijuana,
conspiracy to possess marijuana for sale, attempted sale of marijuana, and
sale or transportation of marijuana. The superior court dismissed three of
the marijuana charges, and the jury convicted Cockhearn of the other
counts after 30 days of trial during which the State introduced more than
13,000 exhibits.

¶14          The court sentenced Cockhearn to concurrent and
consecutive prison terms that amount, in the aggregate, to life
imprisonment with the possibility of release after 38 years. Cockhearn
timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1),
13-4031, and 13-4033(A).

                                DISCUSSION

I.     Challenge For Cause.

¶15            Cockhearn argues the court abused its discretion by refusing
to strike Juror 18 for cause due to his prior work history with the Maricopa
County Attorney's Office ("MCAO"). We review a court's decision on a
motion to strike a juror for cause for an abuse of discretion. State v. Colorado,

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                          STATE v. COCKHEARN
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256 Ariz. 97, 102–03, ¶ 23 (App. 2023); State v. Fournier, 256 Ariz. 33, 37–38,
¶¶ 8–9 (App. 2023).

¶16             A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by
an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24. A court
must excuse a prospective juror "if there is a reasonable ground to believe"
the juror "cannot render a fair and impartial verdict," Ariz. R. Crim. P.
18.4(b), including if the juror is "biased or prejudiced in favor of or against
either of the parties," A.R.S. § 21-211(4). Accordingly, the court must strike
a juror who expresses "serious misgivings about his ability" to be fair and
impartial, State v. Smith, 182 Ariz. 113, 115 (App. 1995), but need not remove
a juror who "ultimately assures the court that he can be objective," State v.
Reasoner, 154 Ariz. 377, 384 (App. 1987). The court must consider the
totality of a juror's conduct and answers, and the party challenging a juror
for cause "has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict." Ariz. R. Crim. P.
18.5(h); see State v. Naranjo, 234 Ariz. 233, 239, ¶ 12 (2014) ("Trial judges are
in the best position to 'assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the
individuals who compose it.'" (quoting Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9
(2007))).

¶17              In a questionnaire completed before jury selection, Juror 18
stated that he had interned at the MCAO. During jury selection, the State
asked Juror 18 if there was "anything about that experience from working
at the County Attorney's Office that . . . would impact your ability to
serve . . . as a juror?" Juror 18 replied, "No." Later, out of the presence of
other prospective jurors, Cockhearn asked Juror 18 several follow-up
questions concerning his internship at the MCAO. In response, Juror 18
stated he was a summer intern in 2008 and 2009. Juror 18 explained that he
interned with the homicide unit and sat as "second chair" on one of the cases
and "questioned" witnesses. In moving to strike Juror 18 for cause,
Cockhearn argued that interning at the MCAO was "evidence of bias or
prejudice" and noted that Juror 18 "participated in handling an actual
homicide trial" during his internship. Cockhearn did not present any other
arguments for striking Juror 18. The court denied the motion, concluding
that Cockhearn had not shown "why [Juror 18] should be struck for cause
when the standard is fair and impartial" and that Juror 18 "evidenced no
inability to be a fair and impartial juror" nor "illustrate[d] any bias or
prejudice."

¶18           On appeal, Cockhearn claims that his charges arose from
events that occurred around the time that Juror 18 interned at the MCAO
and argues that the "judge failed to question [Juror 18] sufficiently" and "to

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properly vet" Juror 18 regarding his relationships with the attorneys,
officers, professionals, and staff members at the MCAO. Cockhearn also
argues that Juror 18's "inside knowledge into the homicide unit" potentially
caused Cockhearn to "have an unfair trial," and that Juror 18 may not have
been impartial. But the court noted that Juror 18 interned at the MCAO
before the events of the case arose and asked all prospective jurors if they
knew any members of the MCAO, to which all jurors had "no response[s],"
including Juror 18. And even if Juror 18 knew a member of the MCAO, it
would not have automatically barred him from serving on the jury, State v.
Acuna Valenzuela, 245 Ariz. 197, 210, ¶ 32 (2018), unless he was "related by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree" or "biased or prejudiced
in favor of or against either of the parties," A.R.S. § 21-211(3)–(4). To that
point, when asked by the State whether his experience interning at the
MCAO would impact his ability to serve as a juror, Juror 18 stated that it
would not. And nothing in the record suggests that Juror 18 was related to
or had an affinity for any party or members of the MCAO. Further, in
response to a question from the State about whether Juror 18 had any "ill
feelings" toward defense attorneys, Juror 18 responded, "[a]bsolutely not. I
had a wonderful defense attorney talk to my group once and explain
exactly the importance of a defense attorney."

¶19             Citing McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464
U.S. 548 (1984), Cockhearn further argues that "the appropriate standard for
determining juror bias is whether the juror's partiality would prevent a fair
and impartial trial" but fails to show how Juror 18's alleged partiality
prevented him from having a fair and impartial trial. Unlike the juror in
McDonough Power Equipment, Juror 18 disclosed his internship at the
MCAO, indicated that his experience there would not impact his ability to
serve as a juror, and disclaimed any "ill feelings" towards defense attorneys.
Contra 464 U.S. at 554 (noting "demonstrated bias" in voir dire responses
"may result in a juror being excused for cause" while "hints of bias" may not
be sufficient).

¶20             In denying Cockhearn's motion, the court concluded that
Juror 18 did not "illustrate any bias or prejudice" because "[the court's] notes
would have reflected it." We defer to the court's findings as it was ideally
situated to observe Juror 18's responses and demeanor. Acuna Valenzuela,
245 Ariz. at 210, ¶ 30. And despite Cockhearn's contrary arguments, the
court was not required to strike Juror 18 merely because he interned at the
MCAO before the events in question and over a decade before trial. See State
v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 139, 141, ¶¶ 37, 48 (2000) (stating that any prejudice
"will not be presumed but must appear affirmatively from the record");
State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 13 (1997) (finding no presumption that potential

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                          STATE v. COCKHEARN
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jurors would be biased having served on a jury that convicted in a similar
type of case or having had personal experiences with violent crime). Thus,
the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cockhearn's motion to
strike Juror 18 for cause. See State v. Jimenez, 255 Ariz. 550, 554, ¶¶ 10, 13
(App. 2023) (noting the court acted within its broad discretion in finding
the juror's assurances of impartiality credible notwithstanding the juror's
law enforcement experience).

II.    Peremptory Challenges.

¶21           Cockhearn argues Arizona's removal of peremptory
challenges violated his right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. See Ariz.
R. Crim. P. 18.4 (abolishing peremptory challenges in jury selection,
effective January 1, 2022).

¶22           Although we generally review constitutional issues de novo,
State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351, 360, ¶ 27 (2009), because there is no indication
that Cockhearn raised this issue before the superior court, we review for
fundamental error, State v. Larin, 233 Ariz. 202, 208, ¶ 14 (App. 2013) (failing
to raise an issue below "waives the right to seek relief for all but
fundamental, prejudicial error"). "The defendant must establish error
occurred that was fundamental in nature and resulted in prejudice." Id.
Cockhearn fails to cite supporting authority,2 provide record citations to

2       Cockhearn cites a law review note that discusses Arizona's
elimination of peremptory strikes. See Criminal Procedure – Jury Selection –
Arizona Supreme Court Abolishes Peremptory Strikes in Jury Selection. – Order
Amending Rules 18.4 and 18.5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule 47(e)
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, No. R-21-0020 (Ariz. 2021), 135 Harv. L. Rev.
2243, 2244 (2022). But the note does not support his argument that
eliminating peremptory strikes violates constitutional rights. See id. at
2243–44, 2248–50 (acknowledging that the Arizona Supreme Court was
within its authority to eliminate peremptory strikes and calling the decision
"laudable" and "bold" but arguing that the supreme court should have made
expanded voir dire mandatory rather than permissive). The lack of citation
to any other authority is unsurprising. See Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 152
(2009) ("States may withhold peremptory challenges 'altogether without
impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial.'"
(quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992))); Ross v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 81, 88 (1988) (rejecting "the notion that the loss of a peremptory
challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial
jury"); State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, 196, ¶ 21 (2003) (adopting the
principles set forth in Ross v. Oklahoma).

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                          STATE v. COCKHEARN
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show he raised the issue before the superior court, or demonstrate how the
elimination of peremptory strikes prejudiced his defense. Therefore, he
waives this argument. See id.; Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62
(App. 2009) (finding jury-selection issue waived because the appellant "did
not . . . consider the jury selection worthy of an argument supported by
authority in his opening brief").

III.   Pretrial Motion.

¶23          Cockhearn argues the court erred in refusing to allow him to
interview a potential witness prior to ruling on a pretrial motion. We
disagree.

¶24           The "court has broad discretion over discovery matters, and
we will not disturb its rulings on those matters absent an abuse of that
discretion." State v. Fields, 196 Ariz. 580, 582, ¶ 4 (App. 1999). Although the
court is in the best position to rule on discovery matters, it "abuses its
discretion when it misapplies the law or predicates its decision upon
irrational bases." Blazek v. Superior Court, 177 Ariz. 535, 537 (App. 1994).

¶25            In October 2021, Cockhearn submitted various disclosure
requests, one of which included investigation records regarding a detective
serving as a case agent for the State. The State disclosed copies of the
reports and declarations concerning the detective and later filed a motion
in limine to preclude any mention of the detective's involvement in a 2020
case referenced in its disclosures. Cockhearn then requested a limited
interview with the detective regarding the 2020 case followed by a
substantive case interview. In response, the State provided there was
"nothing further to disclose" regarding the detective and objected to a
"limited" interview but provided that the detective would be available for
a full interview. But Cockhearn insisted on a "bifurcated interview" as he
did not have time to prepare for a full interview and objected to the State's
motion in limine.

¶26           After argument, the court acknowledged Cockhearn's
concern about the detective's "reputation or character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness" and request for a limited interview. But the court noted
that interviewing the detective about the State's disclosures would lead to
a "rabbit hole" and create "non-issues that are going to delay things" as the
detective made no arrests nor submitted any charges in the 2020 case and
"just made suggestions" about the evidence in that case. Cockhearn further
argued that he needed to conduct a limited interview because the
individuals who issued the reports never interviewed the detective. The

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                          STATE v. COCKHEARN
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court denied Cockhearn's request for a limited interview but allowed
Cockhearn to conduct a full interview and further concluded that
Cockhearn may cross-examine the detective regarding an earlier 2012
ruling and a recording that related to his character for truthfulness and bias.

¶27           Relying on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Cockhearn
argues that because the court did not allow him "to interview the witness
as to potentially new Brady material," his "constitutional right to confront
the evidence against [him] and present an effective defense" was violated.
Cockhearn also argues that the court violated his constitutional "right to
meaningful cross-examination on Brady issues" when it limited the
cross-examination of the witness to evidence bearing on the witness's
character for truthfulness and bias.

¶28           There are three components to a due process violation based
on the suppression of evidence: (1) the evidence is favorable to the accused,
(2) the prosecution suppressed the evidence, and (3) the evidence is
"material" in that it resulted in prejudice. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). "The question is not whether the
defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict
with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).

¶29            The record confirms that the State had "nothing further to
disclose" regarding the detective, and aside from the limited interview,
Cockhearn does not argue that the State failed to make any other
disclosures regarding the detective. Cockhearn's argument that the denial
of his request to conduct a limited interview suppressed "potentially new
Brady material" is mere speculation. See State v. Acinelli, 191 Ariz. 66, 71
(App. 1997) (finding that "the defendant failed to demonstrate materiality"
as his claims of finding impeachment evidence in government personnel
files were "mere speculation" (quoting United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625,
631 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1020 (1984))). When the court asked
whether the limited interview would lead to evidence probative of the
detective's character, Cockhearn responded that it would help to "make the
proper argument within the scope of what we have available to us." And
when the court later asked what more could be discovered that was not
already in the disclosed reports, Cockhearn indicated that the answer "goes
back to the cautious need for an interview." Without providing more,
Cockhearn fails to show that the State suppressed any evidence or that he
suffered prejudice based on the court's denial of a limited interview. See id.
("A due process standard which is satisfied by mere speculation would

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                           STATE v. COCKHEARN
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convert Brady into a discovery device and impose an undue burden upon
the . . . court." (quoting Navarro, 737 F.2d at 631)); cf. State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz.
520, 527–28 (1985) (finding that an untimely disclosure was not a Brady
violation as "the defendant could not have suffered any prejudice" because
"the evidence was never presented at trial").

¶30           Further, the detective never testified so Cockhearn did not
suffer any prejudice from the court's cross-examination limitations. Bracy,
145 Ariz. at 527–28. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Cockhearn's request for a limited interview before granting the State's
motion in limine and limiting cross-examination to the evidence in its
ruling.

IV.    Sufficiency of Evidence.

¶31           Cockhearn argues the "State presented insufficient evidence
for any reasonable trier of fact to find adequate and sufficient evidence to
support a conviction." Specifically, Cockhearn argues that the State failed
to "tie" him to (1) the crime as an accomplice with regards to the felony
murder convictions; (2) "the firefight in the house during the drug deal that
resulted in the three deaths"; and (3) the "alleged planned offenses with the
requisite knowledge and intent."

¶32           Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law we review de
novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). In considering the
sufficiency of the evidence, we view all facts in favor of the verdict and
resolve all evidentiary conflicts against the defendant. State v. Pena, 235
Ariz. 277, 279, ¶ 5 (2014). Our review is confined to determining whether
there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Id. "Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such proof that reasonable
persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116,
134, ¶ 65 (2006) (cleaned up). If reasonable people "could differ as to
whether the evidence establishes a fact in issue, that evidence is
substantial." State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432 (1984). Further, in
conducting our review, we compare the evidence "against the statutorily
required elements of the offense," State v. Brock, 248 Ariz. 583, 592, ¶ 22
(App. 2020) (quoting State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, 505, ¶ 8 (App. 2005)), and
do not "reweigh the evidence to decide if [we] would reach the same
conclusions as the trier of fact," State v. Barger, 167 Ariz. 563, 568 (App. 1990).
Substantial evidence may be direct or circumstantial. Pena, 209 Ariz. at 505,
¶ 7.

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¶33            A defendant acts as an accomplice if the defendant has "the
intent to promote or facilitate the commission of an offense" and either
"[s]olicits or commands another person to commit the offense," "[a]ids,
counsels, agrees to aid or attempts to aid another person in planning or
committing an offense," or "[p]rovides means or opportunity to another
person to commit the offense." A.R.S. § 13-301. A defendant is criminally
responsible for the conduct of another if the defendant "is an accomplice of
such other person in the commission of an offense including any offense
that is a natural and probable or reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
offense for which the person was an accomplice." A.R.S. § 13-303(A)(3). A
defendant is guilty of attempt to commit armed robbery if the defendant
acts as an accomplice to one who attempts, while armed with a deadly
weapon or simulated deadly weapon, to take the property of another from
his person or immediate presence and against his will by threatening or
using force against such other person. A.R.S. §§ 13-1001(A)(2), -
1902(A), -1904(A)(1). A defendant is guilty of first-degree felony murder if
"in the course of and in furtherance of" the attempt to commit armed
robbery, the defendant's confederate "or another person causes the death of
any person." A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2). "A death is 'in furtherance' of an
underlying offense if the death resulted from any action taken to facilitate
the accomplishment of the felony." State v. Herrera, 176 Ariz. 21, 29 (1993).
"The only intent required for felony murder is the intent required to commit
the underlying felony." State v. Rios, 217 Ariz. 249, 251, ¶ 8 (App. 2007).

¶34             Substantial evidence supports the verdicts for attempted
armed robbery and felony murder. Cockhearn did not just agree to the plan
to commit armed robbery; he also acted as an accomplice to the men tasked
with carrying out the crime—R.T., Jackson, Royalty, Gittens, and M.R. The
evidence shows that Cockhearn aided his confederates in committing the
offense by arming himself and hiding in a closet under the stairs with
Gittens, M.R., and Jackson with the intent to commit armed robbery. Even
after R.T. let them out of the closet to wait, Cockhearn remained at the house
until the sellers returned and eventually went to the pool table room where
Jackson later pulled out a weapon. Three people died "in the course of and
in furtherance of" the attempted armed robbery because those deaths
directly resulted from Jackson pointing a rifle at Detective D.B. to steal the
marijuana. A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2); see State v. Howes, 109 Ariz. 255, 257
(1973) ("We have . . . held that a person engaged in the commission of the
crime of robbery which calls into action defensive forces against him the
activity of which results in the death of a human being is guilty of murder
in the first degree."). And because the only intent required for felony
murder is the intent required to commit the underlying felony, there is

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substantial evidence to support Cockhearn's felony murder convictions.
See Rios, 217 Ariz. at 251, ¶ 8.

¶35            Cockhearn also argues the State failed to "tie" him to the
firefight in the house during the drug deal that resulted in the three deaths.
Cockhearn claims that neither Detective D.B. nor Detective B.A. testified
that Cockhearn was present in the house during the firefight or involved in
the drug deal. His argument is unconvincing. In Arizona, "the jury is
tasked with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of the
witnesses." State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, 341, ¶ 109 (2022) (cleaned up). And
"one witness, if relevant and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction."
State v. Montano, 121 Ariz. 147, 149 (App. 1978). Gittens not only testified
that Cockhearn planned to hide in the closet while armed to "secure the
marijuana," but that he tested a drug bale to ensure it was marijuana and
then moved into the pool table room where Jackson pointed a rifle at
Detective D.B. Although Detective B.A. did not use the defendants' names
when describing the drug deal, his description of Jackson matched Gittens's
description and indicated that all the "Black males" with Jackson were
armed as they approached him and Detective C.L. Detective D.B. described
similar events.

¶36            In addition to Gittens's testimony, other evidence created a
cohesive portrait of Cockhearn's criminal involvement. Viewing the
totality of admissible evidence, including Cockhearn's attempt to drive
away with Jackson, M.R., and multiple guns, a reasonable person could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Cockhearn committed the charged crimes.
See State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, 494, ¶¶ 26–28 (1999) (finding sufficient
evidence to sustain a guilty verdict based on "a web of suspicious
circumstances tight enough that a reasonable person could conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant was the perpetrator").

¶37            Cockhearn does not specifically argue that there was
insufficient evidence to support his convictions of conspiracy to commit
armed robbery or conspiracy to possess marijuana for sale. Rather, he
argues that the State generally failed to link him to "the events and the
alleged planned offenses with the requisite knowledge and intent" and that
the State failed to present evidence that he "communicated with any of the
co-conspirators," was involved in the initial planning or negotiations, or
participated in the drug sale.

¶38          A defendant is guilty of conspiracy to commit armed robbery
if the defendant intends to promote or aid the commission of armed
robbery, the defendant agrees with one or more persons that one of them

                                      12
                          STATE v. COCKHEARN
                            Decision of the Court

or another person will commit armed robbery, and one of the conspirators
commits an overt act in furtherance of the armed robbery. A.R.S. §§
13-1003(A), -1904(A). Evidence was presented that Cockhearn agreed with,
and participated in, the plan to rob the sellers of marijuana by (1) hiding in
the closet with other armed buyers to take down the sellers; (2) remaining
at the house after the sellers got "spooked"; and (3) moving to the pool table
room when the sellers arrived. Detective D.B. also testified that he saw
Cockhearn in the pool table room with Jackson, who later pointed a rifle at
him. Cockhearn's intent to aid in the commission of the armed robbery and
any planning or communication Cockhearn had with his co-conspirators
beforehand can be inferred from him being at the house where the buyers
planned to rob the sellers. Viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining
the conviction, there was substantial evidence that Cockhearn committed
conspiracy to commit armed robbery.

¶39            A defendant is guilty of conspiracy to possess marijuana for
sale if the defendant intends to promote or aid the possession of marijuana
for sale, the defendant agrees with one or more persons that one of them or
another person will commit possession of marijuana for sale, and one of the
conspirators commits an overt act in furtherance of the offense. A.R.S. §§
13-1003(A), -3405(A)(2). As described above, the evidence shows that
Cockhearn agreed with others to commit a plan to steal 500 pounds of
marijuana when he met the other buyers at the house earlier that day. See
State v. Harrison, 111 Ariz. 508, 510 (1975) (recognizing intent to sell can be
inferred from large quantities and the nature of its packaging). Such
evidence is sufficient to establish that Cockhearn committed conspiracy to
possess marijuana for sale.

                              CONCLUSION

¶40           We affirm Cockhearn's convictions and sentences.

                            AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                            FILED: AA

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