Court Opinion

ID: 9665477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:49:21.777704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:15.936335
License: Public Domain

TYSON, Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the opinion in this cause prepared by our distinguished Presiding Judge.
To me, appellant’s counsel’s request that he be allowed to bring in, and indeed use, another stenographer, who was in fact present in court for the purpose of transcribing the closing argument, raises the question of a denial of due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Without question, Title 13, Section 262, Code of Alabama 1940, does not require the court reporter to take down stenographic notes of the complete closing argument of counsel. Walker v. State, 291 Ala. 766, 287 So.2d 923; Lyons v. State, 53 Ala.App. 111, 298 So.2d 42.
It is only when there is an objection by counsel to such argument, and the essence of this argument specifically stated and brought to the attention of the trial *604court by proper objection, and such overruled, that the court reporter should transcribe same and include in the record on appeal. McClary v. State, 291 Ala. 481, 282 So.2d 384; Browder v. State, 54 Ala.App. 369, 308 So.2d 729, cert. denied 293 Ala. 746, 308 So.2d 735.
The issue here presented, however, transcends these matters. This constitutes a refusal on the part of the trial court to permit a record to be made by a qualified reporter. There is no contention here, or showing, that such would have interfered with the orderly process of trial, or, indeed, in any way infringe upon the court’s right to maintain order within the courtroom. See Renfroe v. State, 49 Ala.App. 713, 275 So.2d 692, and authorities therein cited.
Here, counsel was merely seeking to have, in an orderly manner, a complete record of the argument made in order to have a basis for asserting his contentions in the trial court. Such refusal, in my judgment, constitutes a denial of the appellant’s right to be heard effectively through counsel of his choice. As such, this was a denial of the appellant’s day in court within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
I, therefore, join in the reversal and remandment of this cause.
CATES, P. J., and HARRIS, DeCARLO and BOOKOUT, JJ., concur in the above opinion.