Court Opinion

ID: 9588817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:39:02.758202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:16.556852
License: Public Domain

Gunter, Justice,
dissenting.
A preliminary hearing for an arrested and imprisoned person who has not been indicted by a grand jury is a right afforded by statute in Georgia’s criminal procedure. A preliminary hearing is a "critical stage” in our system of criminal procedure, and an accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing. State v. Houston, 234 Ga. 721 (218 SE2d 13) *64(1975).
The conduct by the state of a preliminary hearing for an imprisoned indigent without affording him assistance of counsel violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and also violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. My view is that the conduct of a preliminary hearing at which the indigent is unrepresented by counsel is harmful error per se. The violation of this Sixth Amendment and Equal Protection right cannot, in my opinion, be held by the courts to be harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt when a criminal trial and conviction followed the denial of this right, and the trial court that conducted the trial was apprised of the alleged violation before the commencement of the criminal trial.
In this case respondent contended before the beginning of his criminal trial that he had been denied assistance of counsel at the preliminary hearing. When this issue was raised I think the trial court should have immediately granted a preliminary hearing to the respondent at which he would be represented by counsel before joining issue and proceeding with the criminal trial of the respondent. I am unwilling to hold that the denial of counsel is ever harmless error when the error can be so easily rectified before beginning the trial.
It is also my view that the entry of a plea to an indictment or accusation, without calling to the attention of the trial court alleged constitutional violations that occurred before the entry of the plea, constitutes a waiver of pre-trial, violations, if at the time of joining issue the trial judge determines that such waiver is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made by the accused party.
Since I do not believe that the failure to afford counsel to an indigent at a critical stage in criminal proceedings can be harmless error, if the convicting court was made cognizant of the failure before beginning the criminal trial, I would reverse the conviction in this case, direct the trial court to grant a preliminary hearing with the assistance of counsel, and direct the court to thereafter proceed with a new criminal trial of the respondent.
It follows that I would reverse the judgment of the *65Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with my view expressed herein.
I respectfully dissent.