Court Opinion

ID: 9469497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:41:49.348086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:24.773635
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I would affirm Judge Shadur’s very careful decision in the district court based upon his appropriate findings of fact. See 527 F.Supp. 637. It seems to me that he applied the correct balancing test and properly resolved the question before him in favor of the plaintiffs. I add only a few comments concerning the majority’s disposition of this case.
In my view the effective foreclosure of the plaintiffs from interscholastic basketball — their schools’ only interscholastic sport — is a significant, if not severe, burden and deprivation. It ill behooves the Illinois High School Association (“IHSA”), dedicated as it is to interscholastic sport, to argue here that “mere” exclusion from basketball is only a de minimis burden on these plaintiffs’ religious practice. By putting the plaintiffs to a choice between “the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise public program,” Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 716, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1431, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981), IHSA’s no-headwear rule has imposed a significant, albeit indirect, burden on religion. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1794, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963).
I cannot accept the majority’s suggestion that the application of the no-headwear rule in the instant case creates a “nonexistent burden on religious observance.” Ante, at 1035. On its face the IHSA rule is quite clear: no headwear is allowed except headbands. IHSA’s interpretation of the rule has been similarly broad and unyielding. On February 19, 1981, IHSA requested an interpretation of the no-headwear rule from the National Federation of State High School Associations (the “Federation”), which drafted the rule. IHSA, which has consistently felt itself obliged to accept the Federation’s rule interpretations, posed the following question: “Would rule 2-2 allow skull caps to be worn if they were not attached by bobby pins or other types of clips which could be judged as hazardous?” The Federation’s response leaves no doubt about the rule’s application to yarmulkes: “No. Since headwear, other than a headband, is illegal the method of attachment is not a concern. If the rules were changed to allow players to wear skull caps, the manner in which they would be attached, or the type of attachment, would be a concern.” (Emphasis supplied). Although IHSA’s inquiry may have been directed to the potential hazards associated with bobby pins and clips in contrast to yarmulkes, the conclusive and unambiguous ruling by the Federation was that all headwear, other than headbands, is illegal regardless of the method of attachment. In view of this evidence demonstrating the inflexible position of IHSA, I am unable to say that the plaintiffs alleged a nonexistent burden when they proposed and were denied an exception to the no-headwear rule for yarmulkes secured by bobby pins.
*1038Of course, the plaintiffs are not entitled to an exemption from the prohibition of headwear simply because their religious practice is burdened by the rule. As the Supreme Court has recently observed:
The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest. However, it is still true that “[t]he essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order . .. can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, [406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972)].
Thomas, supra, 450 U.S. at 718, 101 S.Ct. at 1434. See also United States v. Lee, - U.S. -, -, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1055, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982). Unfortunately, the majority seems to have overlooked these principles when it placed the burden of accommodation on the plaintiffs rather than on IHSA. This may well be the more efficient solution but it does not in my view represent the prevailing law. I thus see no point in remanding this case to require the plaintiffs to initiate the process of accommodation which it is IHSA’s responsibility to pursue.
In weighing IHSA’s interest in refusing the plaintiffs an exemption from the noheadwear rule, I am not prepared to second-guess Judge Shadur’s thorough evaluation of the alleged safety hazards of yarmulkes and bobby pins, an evaluation based in part on a questionnaire broadly circulated nationally to high school athletic coaches and officials. I am certainly sympathetic to the majority’s observation that “[t]he state need not await disaster to regulate safety .. .. ” Ante, at 1034. But prophylactic measures that burden the free exercise of religion must be justified by something more substantial than speculative assertions of potential injury. As the majority concedes, the record of this case after full trial discloses not even a single instance of a basketball player slipping on or being injured by either a yarmulke or its functional equivalent, a soft barrette (soft barrettes were until the commencement of this litigation permitted under the Federation’s rules). In my opinion, this unsubstantiated concern for safety falls woefully short of justifying the rule’s burden on the religious practices of the plaintiffs.
I also note that I am not as eager as the majority to condemn Judge Shadur’s quite realistic estimate that a narrowly based high school bureaucracy (even given its good intentions) might be less sensitive to religious liberty values than a popularly elected legislature. To the extent that he actually based his decision on this point, I think Judge Shadur has merely pointed out the political realities.
It may of course be possible that a suitable compromise of this dispute can be reached on the basis of the majority’s disposition, and the plaintiffs’ clear right in the exercise of their religion may eventually be vindicated. Because I believe that remanding this ease and requiring the plaintiffs to take additional affirmative action is both unnecessary and inappropriate, I respectfully dissent from today’s decision.