Court Opinion

ID: 9560552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:51:07.442148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:13.083492
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. This court cannot properly affirm the trial court in the case sub judice unless we first overrule the case of Evans Implement Co. v. Thomas Industries, 117 Ga. App. 279 (160 SE2d 462) in which the opinion was written by Judge Hall, concurred in by Judges Bell and Quillian in 1968. Under the rule of stare decisis we are bound by this precedent. See Fidelity-Phenix Co. v. Mauldin, 123 Ga. App. 108, 111 (179 SE2d 525); Croker v. Smith, 225 Ga. 529, 531 (169 SE2d 787); McCurry v. McCurry, 223 Ga. 334, 335 (155 SE2d 378).
The Evans case, as does the case sub judice, deals with the "Statute of Frauds” provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, where the plaintiff’s claim is not enforceable because not signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought (Code Ann. § 109A-2—201 (1); Ga. L. 1962, pp. 156, 176); and where in order to overcome this deficiency, the seller resorts to Code Ann. § 109A-2—201 (1, 2), supra, and sends to the purchaser a "writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties” which is "signed by the party.” (Emphasis supplied.) If the purchaser receives such signed writing and does not make objection thereto within ten (10) days, he is bound as if he himself had signed the original contract of sale.
In the Evans case, supra, this court held plaintiff’s invoice unenforceable because not signed by the seller or pur*709chaser. The majority opinion seeks to brush this opinion aside with the following statement: "Evans Implement Co. . . . [supra] . . . does not require a different result, for it does not appear from that case that the seller’s name appeared on the invoice or that there was any other symbol adopted by the seller with intention to authenticate.” (Emphasis supplied.)* The files of the Evans case, supra, are still in custody of the clerk of this court, and reveal that the majority opinion is incorrect, for that the seller’s name does appear on the invoice, and there was a symbol adopted by the seller with intention to authenticate. We are setting forth next a photo-copy of the invoice in the Evans case.
Let it be noted that "Thomas Industries Inc. of Sheboygan, Wise.” is set forth on the statement, and a very picturesque and attractive symbol appears above that name with the letters T and I encircled by "Thomas Industries,” all forming a perfect circle. The account is properly itemized, with invoice numbers, dates, etc., and shows a balance of $5,061.75. It is billed to "Evans Implement Company, 611 North Avenue, N. W., Atlanta, Georgia.” But with all of these trappings, this court held it still was insufficient because it was not signed. How then, can this court affirm the judgment of the trial court in the case sub judice, without overruling the Evans case?
Upon further consideration, the majority opinion, obviously recognizing that the Evans case supra, must be explained before reaching the decision it has reached, now says the Evans case is obiter, because: (1) there the defendant did not raise the issue of Statute of Frauds by pleading or objection to the evidence; (2) there was no consideration or discussion of the seller’s name on the invoice serving as signature by intention in the Evans case, and (3) that the Evans transaction was "vastly different” from the case sub judice.

*710

*711But, in this premise the majority commits serious error and is badly wrong. The holding in Evans, supra, was not obiter dictum. See Rivers v. Brown, 200 Ga. 49, 52 (36 SE2d 429); Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513 (167 SE2d 697); and especially footnote at bottom of p. 519 by Judge Eberhardt. Further, the Evans case did give consideration to the seller’s name on the invoice serving as a signature by intention, by positively holding that it "was not signed by the sender so as to be sufficient against the sender and enforceable unless written notice of objections to its contents is given within 10 days after it is received.” This was a positive assertion that the sender (seller) had not placed his name on the invoice in such fashion that it could be accounted as the seller’s signature. Finally, as to the attempt to avoid the force of the holding in the Evans case by stating that "the type of transaction in that case was vastly different from that with which we deal here”—that attack on the Evans case is too broad and general to warrant serious comment. No specific differences are pointed out. All cases have some differences, such as the names of the parties, the date of the transaction, the county where the transaction took place; the name of the court. Here, both cases involved an unsigned invoice and the principle of law is the same in both cases. I repeat that under the rule of stare decisis, this court should follow its own decision in the Evans case, or should overrule it.
I, therefore, dissent.

Note: The quoted language was in the majority opinion as originally prepared, but after this dissent was written, it was deleted.