Court Opinion

ID: 9646307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:56:36.713365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:37.068793
License: Public Domain

Oh Petition to Rehear.
SWEPSTON, J.
Counsel for Early Dockery has filed an earnest petition to rehear. The gist of it appears in what he denominates the “Prologue” which is as follows:
“Briefly, Early Dockery says (1) that he did charge fraud in his petition for writ of error coram nobis; (2) that John Thomas, Jr. has attempted to perpetrate a fraud on the Court which should be adjusted by this Honorable Court; (3) because this case is a Chancery case and is to be adjusted on Chancery rules and according to Chancery Buies, the defense to a writ of error coram nobis is a motion to dismiss, which with assignments of error on behalf of the petitioner is heard according to rules of the Chancery cases with proof; (4) because there are no bill of exceptions preserved by John Thomas, Jr., and justified to before the Chancellor; (5) because clearly *702provision should be made by tbis Honorable Court for permission of Early Dockery to amend bis petition to meet the demurrer, as this is mandatory according to the statute, Code of Tennessee of 1932, Sections 8786, 10414, 10416 and 10468, as well as Crowder v. Turner, 43 Tenn. 551.”
Counsel’s position is seen to be that, although be did not charge fraud eo nomine, be did allege facts amounting to fraud.
It is of course unnecessary to use the label of fraud, if the facts averred amount to a charge of same. Reference to our opinion filed June 15, 1950 will disclose that the petition for the writ of error coram nobis charged in substance that John Thomas, Jr., obtained the decree pro confesso on. false evidence, that is, the false averment that he had paid Dockery the $600.00, when in truth Thomas knew he had not paid.
"We think this contention overlooks the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud, which is fully discussed in Keith v. Alger, 114 Tenn. 1, at page 27 et seq., 85 S. W. 71, where the bill in equity in the State Court sought to set aside a judgment at law obtained in the Federal Court allegedly through fraud.
Extrinsic fraud is said to consist of conduct or occurrences extrinsic or collateral to the issues examined and determined in the action, such as inducing the opposite party by false representations to him or his attorney to stay away from court, or keeping him in ignorance of the suit, or fraudulent conduct of counsel for the successful party whereby the opposite party is deceived, and other examples suggested on page 4 of our original opinion. [232 S. W. (2d) 597.]
On the other hand false or forged documents and perjured testimony are intrinsic evidence; they are a part of *703the internal chain composing the process of adjudication, the allegation, the evidence and the decree, as illustrated in Gibson page 546 by the concentric circles.
Under the ruling of the Keith case and by the weight of authority a judgment that has become final in the full sense of res adjudicata may not be set aside on allegation and proof of the falsity of the internal evidence, on which it was procured. See discussion in Noll v. Chattanooga Company, Tenn. Ch. App., 38 S. W. 287, 290; Sharp v. Kennedy, 13 Tenn. App. 170, 176.
The reason for the rule is that litigation must he brought to a close; it would never terminate if each party successively could reopen the last judgment by charging false evidence.
It becomes obvious that the original petition for the writ in this case alleged only intrinsic or internal fraud and such is not sufficient to obtain a writ of error coram nobis; yet even if the fraud had been extrinsic, the petition is deficient in failing to allege tKe petitioner was without fault in the matter.
This answers counsel (1) and (2). Number (3) is answered by the discussion in note 47, page 1051 of Gibson. Objection may be taken by demurrer as well as by motion to dismiss, where the writ is sought by bill in equity. Numbers (4) and (5) are covered in the original opinion. The judgment became final by the lapse of the term on the arrival of the new term on the first Monday in April, so that there could be no amendment unless first the decree be set aside by writ of error coram nobis.
The petition to rehear must be overruled.
Anderson, P. J., and Baptist, J., concur.