Court Opinion

ID: 9410565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 19:06:02.189478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.519604
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JUSTIN O’NEAL,                               )
                                             )
                 Plaintiff,                  )   C.A. No. N22C-03-226 MAA
                                             )
            v.                               )
                                             )
ALLSTATE INSURANCE                           )
COMPANY, A CORPORATION,                      )
                                             )
                 Defendant.                  )

                              Submitted: June 5, 2023
                              Decided: July 21, 2023

             Upon Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment:
                              GRANTED.

                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

Daulton V. Gregory, Esquire, (Argued) of MARIN & GREGORY LLC,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Plaintiff.

Arthur D. Kuhl, Esquire, (Argued) of REGER RIZZO & DARNALL LLP, Newark,
Delaware, Attorney for Defendant.

Adams, J.

                                         1
                                 INTRODUCTION

      This case arises from an accident that occurred on May 17, 2021. A vehicle

driven by Jeremiah Pyfrom (“Pyfrom”) struck Plaintiff Justin O’Neal, a pedestrian,

at the intersection of U.S. Route 40 and Wilton Boulevard in New Castle, Delaware.

At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was crossing the eastbound lanes of U.S. Rt. 40

and Pyfrom was traveling in the right eastbound lane of Rt. 40.1 Pyfrom’s insurance

carrier tendered their full liability policy limits of $25,000.2 Plaintiff alleges that

Pyfrom, an underinsured motorist, operated his vehicle in a manner that was both

negligent and negligent per se.3 At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was covered

by an Allstate insurance policy.4

      Allstate Insurance Company (“Defendant”) denied underinsured motorist

coverage resulting in this suit for same.5 Defendant moved for summary judgment,

asserting that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Pyfrom was not negligent

and that, even if Pyfrom was negligent, his negligence was exceeded by Plaintiff’s

1
  See Compl. ¶¶ 3-4; see also infra nn. 46-56 for a detailed review of camera footage
from the accident. Joshua Aiken, one of the witnesses to the accident, had a Vava
dashboard camera device installed in his car that made a partial recording of Plaintiff
crossing the eastbound side of Rt. 40. This recording is identified as the “Dashboard
Camera footage.”
2
  Id. ¶ 8.
3
  Id. ¶¶ 13-19.
4
  Id. ¶ 11.
5
  Id. ¶ 21.
                                          2
negligence when crossing the roadway. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

                                         FACTS

    I.   Scene of the Accident

         The accident occurred on May 17, 2021, around 8:30 PM at the intersection

of Wilton Boulevard and U.S. Rt. 40 in New Castle, Delaware.6 On the westbound

side of Rt. 40 at this location, there is a triangle-shaped traffic island at the northwest

corner of the intersection. A marked crosswalk traverses across Rt. 40 from the

westbound to eastbound lanes. The westbound side of Rt. 40 has two lanes for

through traffic. The east and westbound sides of Rt. 40 are separated by a grass

partition. The eastbound side of Rt. 40 has two left-turn only lanes and two lanes

for through traffic. The left-turn only lanes on the eastbound side are controlled by

separate traffic signals from the through lanes. The speed limit for this section of

Rt. 40 is fifty miles per hour.7 When the collision occurred between Pyfrom’s vehicle

and Plaintiff, Pyfrom was driving in the right through lane of eastbound Rt. 408 and

6
  See Compl. ¶¶ 3-4
7
  Deposition of Corporal Thomas Leonardi at 13:7-11 (June 1, 2023) (hereinafter
“Leonardi Dep.”).
8
  Collision Report at 4, Complaint No. 02-21-040280 (May 17, 2021) (Ex. E to
Deposition of Thomas Leonardi) (hereinafter “Collison Report”).
                                            3
Plaintiff was running across the portion of the crosswalk that traverses the eastbound

side of Rt. 40.9

II.   Plaintiff’s Deposition Testimony10

      Plaintiff testified that he was walking along Rt. 40, toward the intersection of

Wilton Blvd. and Rt. 40.11 Plaintiff was accompanied by three of his friends.12

Plaintiff testified that he and his friends were walking along Rt. 40 and stopped at

the triangle-shaped traffic island where cars could make a right-turn off of Wilton

Blvd. onto Rt. 40.13 At Plaintiff’s deposition, defense counsel asked, “how long did

you stay on that triangle area before you started to cross?” 14 Plaintiff testified in

response, “till they said it was safe.”15 Defense counsel asked Plaintiff to identify

who “they” referred to and Plaintiff testified, “my friends. They normally help me

with crossing.”16 Plaintiff testified that when he was on the traffic island, he saw the

light for Rt. 40 eastbound through traffic turn red,17 that he saw cars coming to a stop

in the eastbound through lanes,18 and that this is when he proceeded into the

9
  Dashboard Camera footage.
10
    Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from Plaintiff’s deposition
testimony.
11
   Deposition of Justin O’Neal at 26: 7-9 (Nov. 14, 2022) (hereinafter “Pl. Dep.”).
12
   Id. at 21: 23-24.
13
   Id. at 26:1-9.
14
   Id. at 28: 11-13.
15
   Id. at 28: 14.
16
   Id. at 28: 15-17.
17
   Id. at 29: 7-15; 30: 1-3; 32: 21-24; 33: 1.
18
   Id. at 30: 5-15.
                                           4
intersection.19 Plaintiff testified that when he reached the grass divide separating the

westbound and eastbound lanes on Rt. 40 that he did not look to his right to see if

there were any oncoming vehicles.20

      Plaintiff testified that he did not remember any cars being stopped in the left-

turn only lanes on the eastbound side of Rt. 4021 and that he did not notice that the

eastbound through lanes had green lights when he entered that side of Rt. 40.22 Two

of Plaintiff’s friends told him he was going to get hit, but his testimony regarding

his location when this warning occurred varies.23 At one point Plaintiff testified that

he had reached the right side of the left turn lanes and started running;24 later in his

deposition he testifies that he was between the left and right through lanes.25

      Plaintiff testified that a car in the left through lane swerved in front of him and

avoided striking him. The driver of this vehicle was later identified as Joshua

19
   Id. at 33: 4-6.
20
   Id. at 40: 20-24; 41: 1-3.
21
   Id. at 31: 4-6. Compare Pl. Dep. at 31: 4-6 with nn. 64-65 and accompanying text.
Vivek Rehil (“Rehil”), a witness interviewed by Corporal Leonardi, stated that he
was sitting stationary on eastbound Rt. 40 in the left-turn only lane at a red left-turn
signal and that the traffic light for the eastbound through lanes had a green light.
Collision Report at 4. Rehil stated that Plaintiff crossed diagonally through the
intersection across Rt. 40. Id.
22
   Id. at 68: 24; 69: 1-3.
23
   Id. at 33: 19-21.
24
   Id. at 33: 15-24; 34: 1-7.
25
   Id. at 39: 1-8.
                                           5
Aiken.26 The vehicle driving in the right through lane struck him.27 The driver of

the vehicle that struck Plaintiff was later identified as Pyfrom’s.28 Plaintiff described

the moment before the collision as follows: “the light was red and I started walking.

From what I see, out of nowhere it just turned green on me. And then I tried to take

off on the road to get through it. Like it was red, and then it was green when I was

halfway through. Like I was in the middle, and I just ran.”29 Plaintiff testified that

he did not look for oncoming traffic before entering into the through lanes because

when his friends told him to run he just ran.30 Plaintiff did not see that there were

vehicles in both eastbound lanes approaching the intersection. 31 Plaintiff testified

that the two vehicles that approached him in the two through lanes had the right of

way.32

26
   See infra nn. 34-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of Joshua Aiken’s
testimony.
27
   Id. at 36: 5-10.
28
   Id. ¶ 4.
29
   Pl. Dep. at 21:23-24; 22:1-7.
30
   Id. at 36: 22-24.
31
   Id. at 36: 15-18.
32
   Pl. Dep. at 71: 2-5.
                                           6
III.   Witness Joshua Aiken’s Deposition Testimony33

       Joshua Aiken (“Aiken”) was driving in the left eastbound through lane on Rt.

40 when the accident occurred.34 Aiken’s vehicle contained a Vava brand dashboard

camera device that made a partial recording of Plaintiff crossing the eastbound side

of Rt. 40.35 This footage is discussed in detail in the proceeding subsection. Aiken

testified that as he was approaching the intersection, the lights for eastbound through

traffic had been green for “easily 15 seconds.”36          When asked whether he

remembered it turning from red to green he testified that “it was green the whole

time” and that he never saw it any other color than green.37 Aiken testified that he

had no warning that Plaintiff was going to run out in front of him.38 Aiken recalled

“seeing him [Plaintiff] cross the highway from the other side . . . he [Plaintiff]

disappeared in front of the two black cars, and then he flashed in front of me as he

tried to run across.”39 The “two black cars” Aiken referenced were stopped in the

two left-turn only lanes.40 Aiken also testified that, from his view, his vehicle would

33
   Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from Joshua Aiken’s deposition
testimony.
34
    Deposition of Joshua Aiken at 5: 14-23 (Nov. 14, 2022) (hereinafter “Aiken
Dep.”).
35
   Id. at 7: 2-5.
36
   Id. at 19: 7.
37
   Id. at 19: 10-18.
38
   Id. at 20: 2-5.
39
   Id. at 16: 7-19.
40
   Dashboard Camera footage.
                                          7
have blocked Pyfrom’s view, who was proceeding in the adjacent right lane and

slightly behind Aiken’s vehicle.41 Aiken estimated he was about two car lengths

away from Plaintiff when Plaintiff began to enter Aiken’s lane and that it felt like

half a second elapsed between the time he saw Plaintiff and when Aiken swerved to

avoid hitting Plaintiff.42 Aiken testified that his vehicle would have likely struck

Plaintiff if he had not swerved.43 Both Aiken and Pyfrom returned to the scene

shortly after the accident.44

IV.   Dashboard Camera Footage45

      At the time of the accident, Aiken had installed in his vehicle a Vava brand

dashboard camera, which had forward-facing and rear-facing cameras.46 Aiken’s

dashboard camera made a clear, real-time audiovisual recording of his vehicle

driving through the intersection during the accident between Plaintiff and Pyfrom.47

The device simultaneously captures the road in front of and behind the vehicle and

41
   Id. at 20: 11-15.
42
   Id. at 21: 6-20.
43
   Id. at 22: 4-9.
44
   Id. at 23: 13.
45
    Unless otherwise noted, this subsection is derived from a viewing of the
Dashboard Camera footage. Exhibit C to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
also contains still frames of the video. The Dashboard Camera footage was not filed
contemporaneously with the motion. Upon the Court’s request, Defendant supplied
an electronic version of the video after the Court heard argument on the motion.
46
   Aiken Dep. at 7.
47
   Dashboard Camera footage; see Aiken Dep. at 7: 2-5.
                                         8
records at thirty frames per second.48 The forward-facing video faces through the

front windshield of the vehicle.49 The rear-facing camera faces through the rear

windshield of the vehicle.50 This technology records videos in discrete segments

that the owner can download and save from the corresponding application.51 The

camera records the driver’s speed in miles per hour.52 The bottom left of the

recording shows the driver’s current speed, the date, and time of day.53 The

recording under review begins approximately one second before the accident and is

thirty-six seconds in length.       The date at the beginning of the recording is

“2021/5/17” and the time is “8:30:34 PM.” The rate of speed at the beginning of the

video is “43 mph.”

      At the beginning of the video, Aiken’s vehicle is driving in the left eastbound

lane on Rt. 40, approaching the intersection with Wilton Blvd. The first frame of

the video clearly shows that one car is stopped in each of the left-turn only lanes on

eastbound Rt. 40. The time at the beginning of the video is recorded as “8:30:34

PM” and the time when Aiken’s vehicle reaches the intersection is recorded as

“8:30:34 PM,” indicating that less than one second elapsed. At the start of the video,

48
   Expert report at 6.
49
   Id.
50
   Id.
51
   Aiken Dep. at 12: 24; 13: 1-6.
52
   Id.
53
   Id.
                                           9
Aiken’s vehicle is driving at forty-three miles per hour and by the time he reaches

the intersection, the recorded speed is forty-four miles per hour. Defendant’s expert,

Abraham Warfel, calculated that Aiken’s vehicle traveled a distance of

approximately fifty feet from the start of the video to the moment the vehicle reached

the crosswalk.54

       From the beginning of the recording, the traffic signals for the left-turn-only

lanes are red and the two traffic signals immediately to the right which regulate the

east bound lanes are green. At the beginning of the video, a pedestrian wearing a

white shirt, later identified as Plaintiff, is depicted directly beneath the right left-turn

only signal crossing over the right left-turn only lane. As Aiken’s vehicle reaches

the intersection, his vehicle quickly swerves to the left. By the time Aiken’s vehicle

reaches the intersection, it appears that Plaintiff is approximately midway between

the eastbound lanes. After Aiken’s vehicle has swerved to the left and Plaintiff is

no longer visible in the frame, there is an audible thud. The remainder of the video

shows Aiken and Pyfrom’s vehicles pulling over to the right shoulder of the road,

and Pyfrom exiting his vehicle.55 The rear-facing video footage shows a car with its

54
   Expert report at 8. Defendant’s expert calculated the distance between the location
of Aiken’s vehicle at the start of the video to the crosswalk applying the following
mathematical formula: distance = velocity x time. Id. Defendant’s expert estimated
that Aiken’s vehicle was approximately fifty feet from the intersection at the
beginning of the recording. Id. The Court does not rely on the expert report for its
decision; it is merely cited for context. See infra n. 69.
55
   Aiken Dep. at 23: 6-12.
                                            10
headlights on in the right eastbound lane behind Aiken’s vehicle. This vehicle is

later identified as Pyfrom’s vehicle.56

V.    Collision Report and Corporal Thomas Leonardi’s Deposition

      Corporal Thomas Leonardi (“Leonardi”) of the Delaware State Police arrived

at the scene shortly after the accident and made a Collision Report.57 The report lists

three witnesses: Joshua Aiken, Vivek Rehil (“Rehil”), a witness whose vehicle was

idling in the left-turn only lane of westbound Rt. 40, and Skylar Ellingsworth

(“Ellingsworth”), one of Plaintiff’s friends who was walking with him.58 Leonardi

testified that Pyfrom said he was traveling at approximately forty-five miles per hour

in the right eastbound lane of Rt. 40 and that he had a green light. 59 Aiken told

Leonardi that he was traveling in the left eastbound lane on Rt. 40, that he was

traveling about forty-five miles per hour, and that he observed Pyfrom’s vehicle to

the right traveling at approximately the same rate of speed.60 Aiken indicated to

Leonardi that he successfully swerved to avoid striking Plaintiff, but that Pyfrom’s

56
   Plaintiff does not dispute that the vehicle identified in the rear camera footage is
Pyfrom’s vehicle. In the approximate one second that elapses from the beginning of
the rear camera footage, the distance between the two vehicles decreases. Expert
report at 11. Based on the lapse of time and decrease in distance between the vehicle,
Defendant’s expert infers that Pyfrom’s vehicle was travelling at approximately
forty-eight miles per hour as it approached the crosswalk. Id.
57
   Collision Report.
58
   Id.
59
   Id.; Leonardi Dep. at 12: 23-24; 13.
60
   Collision Report; Leonardi Dep. at 15: 14-19.
                                          11
vehicle struck Plaintiff.61 Ellingsworth indicated to Leonardi that Plaintiff crossed

eastbound Rt. 40 diagonally outside of the crosswalk and was struck by a vehicle.62

Ellingsworth also indicated that she “attempted to tell [Plaintiff] to stop but he did

not listen to her.”63 Rehil stated his car was stopped in one of the left-turn only lanes

on eastbound Rt. 40, and that the left turn lanes of traffic had the red arrow signal.64

Rehil stated that the traffic lights for through traffic on eastbound Rt. 40 had the

green signal and that Plaintiff crossed diagonally through the intersection across Rt.

40.65

        Leonardi testified that he did not think the light for eastbound through traffic

had switched from red to green when Plaintiff was already in the crosswalk because

“traffic was already moving at 45 miles an hour” according to witness statements

and that he presumed they would be traveling at a lower speed if the light had been

red.66 Leonardi cited Plaintiff for not carrying a light on a roadway and crossing

outside of a crosswalk.67

61
   Collision Report; Leonardi Dep. at 15: 22-24. Leonardi testified that Pyfrom did
not violate any rules of the road (Leonardi Dep. at 18: 8-9) and that Plaintiff had the
duty to yield to oncoming traffic (Leonardi Dep. at 20: 4-5).
62
   Collision Report; Leonardi Dep. at 15: 1-6.
63
   Collision Report; see also Leonardi Dep. at 15: 9-11.
64
   Collision Report; Leonardi Dep. at 13: 1-4.
65
   Leonardi Dep. at 14: 5-8, 16-17.
66
   Leonardi Dep. at 23: 19-24; 24: 3-9.
67
   ;Collision Report Leonardi Dep. at 18: 22-24.
                                           12
VI.   Defendant’s Accident Reconstruction Expert Report

      Defendant hired an accident reconstruction expert, Abraham Warfel, to

investigate the collision and draw conclusions to a reasonable degree of probability

as to what occurred. Warfel’s report is attached as Exhibit E to the motion for

summary judgment.68 Plaintiff filed a Daubert motion to exclude Defendant’s

Expert’s testimony at trial.69

                       CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

      Plaintiff alleges that Pyfrom’s operation of his vehicle constitutes common

law negligence and negligence per se.70 With respect to Plaintiff’s claim of common

law negligence, Plaintiff alleges Pyfrom drove in a manner that was unreasonable,

inattentive, and careless; that Pyfrom failed to exercise and maintain proper control

of his vehicle,71 and that his conduct created a sudden emergency.72 With respect to

Plaintiff’s claim of negligence per se, Plaintiff alleges Pyfrom violated the following

68
    O’Neal v. Allstate Ins. Co., C.A. No. N22C-03-226 (MAA), Adams, J.,
Transaction ID 69147676 (Feb. 14, 2023).
69
    O’Neal v. Allstate Ins. Co., C.A. No. N22C-03-226 (MAA), Adams, J.,
Transaction ID 70146599 (June 6, 2023). As discussed herein, the Court is granting
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. This decision does not rely on the
expert’s report. Even in the absence of the expert report, Defendant has shown that
there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff’s negligence exceeded
Pyfrom’s. This decision is a final resolution of Plaintiff’s claim and moots the
pending Daubert motion.
70
   Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15-18.
71
   Id. ¶ 18.
72
   Id.
                                          13
sections of Title 21: § 4144 (Drivers to exercise due care), § 4175(a) (reckless

driving), and § 4176(a) and (b) (careless and inattentive driving).73 Defendant

asserts in its motion that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff’s

negligence exceeded any negligence on the part of Pyfrom.74

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

      To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must

demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.75 When considering a motion for summary judgment,

the Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.76

“If a defendant, as the moving party, can establish that there is no genuine issue of

material fact, and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the burden

will shift to the plaintiff to show the existence of specific facts to support the

plaintiff's claim.”77 “Where the moving party produces an affidavit or other evidence

sufficient under Superior Court Civil Rule 56 in support of its motion and the burden

73
   In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges Pyfrom was negligent per se for violating 21
Del. C. §§ 4175 and 4176. Plaintiff also alleges that Pyfrom violated 21 Del. C. §
4144 in his response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
74
   Def. Mot. Summ. J. at 3-6.
75
   Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979).
76
   Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979).
77
   Singletary v. American Indep. Ins. Co., 2011 WL 607017, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan.
31, 2011).
                                          14
shifts, then the non-moving party may not rest on its own pleadings, but must provide

evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial.”78

      “Not all disputes of fact will defeat a motion for summary judgment.”79 If the

moving party manages to shift the burden, the nonmoving party must establish a

genuine issue of material fact.80 “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in

support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on

which the jury reasonably could find for the plaintiff.’”81 A genuine issue of material

fact arises when “any rational trier of fact could infer that [the plaintiff has] proven

the elements of prima facie case by clear and convincing evidence.”82

      As a general matter, “negligence cases are not susceptible to summary

judgment”83 because the movant must “show not only that there are no conflicts in

the factual contentions of the parties[,] but[,] that, also, the only reasonable

inference[s] to be drawn from the uncontested facts are adverse to the plaintiff.”84

Determining how much, if any, negligence should be attributed to each party

78
   Taylor v. Green Acre Farm, Inc., 2018 WL 2128663, at *1 (Del. Super. May 7,
2018); Salah & Pecci Leasing Co., Inc. v. GBC Christina Landing, LLC, 2008 WL
2690283, at *2 (Del. Super. June 5, 2008).
79
   In re Asbestos Litigation, 2012 WL 1413673, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 2, 2012)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
80
   Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56.
81
   Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
82
   Cerebus Intl. LTD. v. Apollo Mgmt., L.P., 794 A.2d 1141, 1149 (Del. 2002).
83
   Durnan v. Butler, 2004 WL 1790117, at *5 (Del. Super. July 21, 2004).
84
   Lugaro v. Guercio, 2022 WL 1112288, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 12, 2022) (quoting
Buchanan v. TD Bank, N.A., 2016 WL 3621102, at *2 (Del. Super. June 28, 2016)).
                                          15
pursuant to Delaware’s comparative negligence statute “almost always presents a

question of fact for the jury.”85 Delaware courts have, however, on rare occasion

decided issues of comparative negligence as a matter of law after the plaintiff’s

presentation of their case at trial.86 This case, because of the undisputed and clear

video footage of the accident, is one of those rare cases where summary judgment is

appropriate.

                                     ANALYSIS

      For Plaintiff to succeed on his claim of common law negligence, he must make

a prima facie showing of duty, breach, proximate causation, and damages.87 To

establish negligence per se, Plaintiff must establish that “a standard of conduct exists

to protect the class of which plaintiff is a member; defendant is required to conform

to that standard of conduct; and the defendant did not so conform.” 88 Pursuant to

85
   Pagano v. Stradley, 2017 WL 2691189, at *2 (Del. Super. June 21, 2017) (quoting
Helm v. 206 Massachusetts Avenue, LLC, 107 A.3d 1074, 1081 (Del. 2014)) (citing
Trievel v. Sabo, 714 A.2d 742, 745 (Del. 1998)).
86
   See e.g. Hudson v. Old Guard Ins. Co., 3 A.3d 246, 250 (Del. 2010); Trievel, 714
A.2d at 745.
87
   Hudson, 3 A.3d at 250.
88
   McCain v. Council on Real Estate Appraisers, 2009 WL 1515594, at *3 (Del.
Super. May 29, 2009); see also Tydings v. Loewenstein, 505 A.2d 443, 446 (Del.
1986). Some decisions list four elements for negligence per se: “(1) that the statute
was ‘enacted for the safety of others;’ (2) that a causal connection exists between the
statutory violations and the injury, and that Plaintiff was ‘a member of the class of
persons the statute set out to protect;’ (3) that the statute set forth ‘a standard of
conduct which was designed to avoid the harm’ suffered; and (4) that the defendant
violated the statute ‘by failing to comply with that standard of conduct.’”
Cunningham v. Kentmere Rehabilitation and Healthcare Center, Inc., 2021 WL
                                          16
established Delaware law, “a violation of a statute or ordinance enacted for the safety

of others is negligence per se.”89

      Defendant makes two primary assertions in its motion for summary judgment:

(1) that Pyfrom did not breach his duty to operate his vehicle in a reasonable and

prudent manner; and (2) that Plaintiff was negligent when he entered into the

eastbound lanes of Rt. 40 in front of oncoming traffic. Defendant argues that

Plaintiff’s claim is therefore barred by Delaware’s modified comparative negligence

statute.90 This motion, therefore, presents two complimentary questions: (1) Was

Plaintiff acting negligently when he entered into the eastbound portion of the

crosswalk and, if so, did his negligence exceed that of Pyfrom’s? (2) Was Pyfrom

negligent in operating his vehicle when he entered into the Wilton Blvd-Rt. 40

intersection, striking Plaintiff and, if so, did Pyfrom’s negligence exceed that of

Plaintiff’s?

      The parties argue that the following factual question is dispositive of

Defendant’s motion: was the traffic signal for through traffic on eastbound Rt. 40

red or green at the moment when Plaintiff entered the eastbound side of Rt. 40?

Plaintiff alleges that the light was red, giving him the right of way at the moment he

1157991, at *4 (Del. Super. Mar. 25, 2021) (quoting NVF Co. v. Garrett Snuff Mills,
Inc., 2002 WL 130536, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 30, 2002)).
89
   Chan Young Lee v. Choice Hotels Intern., Inc., 992 A.2d 1236 (TABLE), 2010
WL 1730674, at *3 (Del. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
90
   10 Del. C. § 8132.
                                          17
entered and that when it turned green midway through, any vehicles in the eastbound

lanes had a duty to yield the right of way to him.91 Defendant alleges that, before

Plaintiff entered the eastbound side of Rt. 40, the light was green and that, therefore,

Plaintiff was never lawfully on that portion of the crosswalk and crossed the

eastbound lanes against the traffic signal in front of oncoming traffic. Thankfully,

Aiken’s dashcam video footage erases any dispute of fact and guides the Court’s

decision here.

I.    Delaware’s Modified Comparative Negligence Statute

      Pursuant to Delaware’s modified comparative negligence statute, for

negligence actions which result in death or injury, a plaintiff’s contributory

negligence shall not bar recovery “where such negligence was not greater than the

negligence of the defendant” . . . “but any damages awarded shall be diminished in

proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.”92 If, however, the

plaintiff’s contributory negligence is 51% or greater, a plaintiff is barred completely

91
   Plaintiff also argues in his response to the motion that he had the right of way
pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 4142(a) because “[t]here were no crosswalk signs or
pedestrian traffic-control signals” and Plaintiff was “halfway across the crosswalk.”
Pl. Resp. to Mot. Summ. J. at 4. Plaintiff’s assertion is incorrect. This statute only
applies “[w]hen traffic-control signals are not in place or not in operation or when
the operator of a vehicle is making a turn at an intersection.” 21 Del. C. § 4142(a).
Neither of these conditions were present in this case. Traffic control signals were in
place and in operation at the time of the accident and Pyfrom was proceeding straight
ahead in the eastbound lane.
92
   10 Del. C. § 8132.
                                          18
from recovering.93 Excepting those rare circumstances where injury occurs in the

absence of either party’s negligence, it logically follows that where one party has

committed no negligence, the party’s negligence is exceeded by the other party’s

negligence.

II.   Duties of Pedestrians and Operators of Motor Vehicles

      Pedestrians are required to obey traffic control devices94 and shall not

“suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a

vehicle which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.” 95 Pedestrians are

prohibited from walking on any motorway beyond “the corporate limits of any city

or town” without a “light or reflector type device during the period of time from

sunset to sunrise and at any other time when there is not sufficient light to render

clearly visible any person or vehicle on the highway.”96

      Drivers are required to drive at a reasonable speed,”97 “exercise due care to

avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon any roadway and shall give warning by

93
   Helm v. 206 Massachusetts Avenue, LLC, 107 A.3d 1074, 1079 (Del. 2014) (citing
Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094, 1098 (Del.1991)).
94
   21 Del. C. § 4141(b). Section 4141(b) specifies that pedestrians are subject to
traffic control devices listed in § 4108: “Whenever traffic is controlled by official
traffic-control signals showing different colored circular lights” . . . “such lights . . .
shall . . . apply to drivers of vehicles, operators of bicycles and pedestrians.” Id.
(emphasis added).
95
   Id. § 4142(b).
96
   Id. § 4148.
97
   Hudson v. Old Guard Ins. Co., 3 A.3d 246, 250 (Del. 2010) (internal citations
omitted).
                                            19
sounding the horn when necessary.”98 In those cases aptly identified as “dart out”

cases, where a pedestrian or cyclist suddenly enters the roadway with minimal or no

warning,99 “Delaware applies the common law rule that no one has a duty to

anticipate another’s negligence.       Rather, we hold individuals responsible for

reasonably foreseeable events . . .”100 “Motorists . . . need not slow down in

anticipation    of   danger     that     has    not   yet   become      apparent.”101

“Dart out” cases, where an individuals commits an act that is not reasonably

foreseeable, often results in an unavoidable accident. “An unavoidable accident is

one which was not caused in any degree by the want of care or skill which the law

requires of one under the circumstances of the particular case. This does not

necessarily mean that such an accident must have been physically impossible under

the circumstances for defendant to have prevented, but only that defendant exercise

care and prudence which the law holds every person bound to exercise.”102

III.   Plaintiff’s negligence exceeded Pyfrom’s negligence.

       For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of

material fact that Plaintiff’s negligence exceeded that of Pyfrom’s, and that

98
   21 Del. C. § 4144.
99
    See, e.g., Hudson, 3 A.3d at 248-250; Dietz v. Mead, 160 A.2d 372, 373 (Del.
1960).
100
    Hudson, 3 A.3d at 250 (internal citations omitted).
101
    Id. at 251.
102
    Dietz, 160 A.2d at 375 (internal citations omitted); see Prosser on Torts, § 29.
                                           20
Plaintiff’s claim is therefore barred by Delaware’s modified comparative negligence

statute. The Court relies primarily on the dashboard camera footage as it is sufficient

to establish the parties’ comparative negligence. This decision does not rely on the

expert report.

            A. The dashboard camera footage establishes the light was green.

      The fact that the parties take opposing views on the color of the light does not

present a genuine issue of material fact to defeat Defendant’s motion. The dashboard

camera footage and testimony establishes there is no genuine issue of material fact,

in fact there can be no dispute at all, that the light was green for eastbound through

traffic when Plaintiff entered the intersection and that he was therefore negligent in

doing so.

       Plaintiff’s testimony that the light was red is contradicted by the weight of

the evidence Defendant submitted; most importantly, the dashboard camera footage.

The Court gives great weight to the dashboard camera evidence because it does not

present those perennial issues of reliability, accuracy, and potential bias of evidence

that depends upon a person’s memory, like testimony and sworn statements. The

dashboard camera recording provides an objective contemporaneous recording of

the scene the moment before Pyfrom’s vehicle struck Plaintiff.103

103
   The Court notes Plaintiff has not contested that Aiken, the operator of the vehicle
which contained the dashboard camera, was in any way motivated or biased in favor
of Pyfrom and/or against Plaintiff. Plaintiff has also not contested that the video was
                                          21
      At the beginning of the recording, Plaintiff has already crossed over the

median and is crossing through the right left-turn only lane.      As stated above, the

dashboard camera device records the rate of speed in miles per hour, and also

indicates the time of day to the nearest second. As reviewed above, the beginning

of the recording shows that the light is green and that Aiken’s vehicle is travelling

at forty-three miles per hour. Less than one second elapses between the beginning

of the recording and the moment when Aiken’s vehicle reaches the crosswalk. There

is no need to rely on the Expert’s calculation of the distance between Aiken’s vehicle

at the beginning of the recording and the intersection to determine that his vehicle

was no more than a few car lengths from the intersection. The rear-facing camera

in Aiken’s vehicle shows that Pyfrom’s vehicle is approximately one to two car

lengths behind and to the right of Aiken’s vehicle. To summarize, Aiken’s and

Pyfrom’s vehicles were traveling at around forty-three miles per hour at a short

distance from the intersection.

      The Court finds that Plaintiff’s version of events does not create a genuine

issue of material fact as to when the light turned green. Plaintiff’s position speculates

in any way altered to prejudice Plaintiff’s interests in this action. During a chance
encounter between Aiken and Plaintiff that occurred at Aiken’s workplace at which
time they learned of each other’s involvement in the accident, Aiken voluntarily
provided the Dashboard Camera footage to Plaintiff. Aiken Dep. at 10: 11-24; 11:
23-24; 12: 6-7. In addition, after a thorough review of the evidence in this case, the
Court finds no evidence to undermine the authenticity or reliability of this video.
                                           22
a high degree of negligence on the part both Aiken and Pyfrom devoid of support.

Aside from Plaintiff’s own testimony, his position finds no support from the balance

of the record and is contradicted by it. To defeat Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, Plaintiff would have had to present credible evidence supporting his

assertion that the light was red when he entered the intersection. Plaintiff has not

done so. On the other hand, Defendant has provided substantial evidence to establish

that the light was green when Plaintiff entered the intersection. For example, aside

from the dashboard camera footage, Aiken testified that the light for eastbound

through traffic was green for approximately fifteen seconds prior to his vehicle

reaching the intersection.104

         Because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the light was green

when Plaintiff entered the intersection, it follows that when Plaintiff entered into the

crosswalk on the eastbound side of Rt. 40 directly in front of oncoming traffic that

this was negligent and in violation of 21 Del. C. §§ 4141(b) and 4142(b). Plaintiff

was also negligent for crossing Rt. 40 after night fall without carrying a light or

reflector type device, in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4148.105 The accident occurred at

8:30 at night in the month of May and the camera footage clearly shows that Plaintiff

104
      Aiken Dep. at 19: 7.
105
      See supra n. 96 and accompanying text.
                                          23
was on the roadway after nightfall.106 Corporal Leonardi cited Plaintiff for violating

this statute.107 Plaintiff has not contested that he violated this statute.

          B. Plaintiff’s action created an unavoidable accident not caused by
             any negligence of Pyfrom’s.

      This case falls within the category of “dart out” cases which result in

unavoidable accidents. Plaintiff attempted to run across the eastbound through lanes

of Rt. 40, which has a posted speed limit of fifty miles per hour, directly in front of

oncoming traffic, after night fall, without a light or reflector device. Based on

Pyfrom’s rate of speed and approximate distance from the intersection at the moment

when Plaintiff attempted to run across, approximately one second elapsed, leaving

Pyfrom inadequate time to react and avoid a collision.108 This was not a reasonably

foreseeable event and resulted in an unavoidable accident not caused by any “want

of care or skill” on the part of Pyfrom.109 Pyfrom had no reason to expect that a

reasonable adult would enter the roadway directly in front of his vehicle110 and had

no time to slow down in anticipation of the danger.111

106
    See generally Dashboard Camera footage.
107
    Collision Report; Leonardi Dep. at 18: 22-24.
108
    See Collision Report at 4 (“he [Pyfrom] attempted to avoid collision but he was
unable to avoid collision.”).
109
    See Dietz v. Mead, 160 A.2d 372, 375 (Del. 1960) (internal citations omitted).
110
    See Hudson v. Old Guard Ins. Co., 3 A.3d 246, 250-251 (Del. 2010).
111
    See id. at 251.
                                            24
      Plaintiff asserts that Pyfrom must have been negligent because Aiken, unlike

Pyfrom, successfully swerved to avoid Plaintiff. The fact that it may have been

theoretically possible for Pyfrom to avoid the accident, however, does not mean that

he was negligent.112 For an accident to qualify as unavoidable, it need not have been

“physically impossible” to avoid.113 If Pyfrom was unable to avoid the collision

while exercising the care and prudence of a reasonable person, the accident was

unavoidable.114 The fact that Aiken nearly missed striking Plaintiff does not bear on

the question of Pyfrom’s negligence. Plaintiff has raised no other fact indicating

Pyfrom was negligent.

      To the contrary, all of the evidence points to the conclusion that Pyfrom was

driving in compliance with 21 Del. C. § 4144. Pyfrom was driving below the posted

speed limit115 in the middle of his lane of travel as a reasonable and prudent person

would under the circumstances. The witnesses to the accident—Ellingsworth, Rehil,

and Aiken— all of whom made contemporaneous statements to Corporal Leonardi,

did not implicate Pyfrom in any manner.116 Neither Plaintiff nor any witness asserts

112
    Id.
113
    Dietz v. Mead, 160 A.2d 372, 375 (Del. 1960).
114
    Id.
115
     Dashboard Camera footage; Collision Report (Pyfrom stated he was driving
approximately forty-five miles per hour and was not cited for any traffic citations.);
Aiken Dep. at 17: 17-18 (Q: “Could tell whether that other vehicle [Pyfrom’s
vehicle] was staying with you, going faster, or slower?” A: “He was matching my
speed.”).
116
    See generally Collision Report at 4.
                                         25
that Pyfrom was driving in excess of the speed limit and there is no evidence of

same. Aiken also testified that he estimated Pyfrom’s vehicle to be driving at the

same approximate rate of speed as his own, which was about forty-three miles per

hour.117 Leonardi testified that Pyfrom did not violate any rules of the road.118

       Moreover, Plaintiff has not raised any facts to rebut Defendant’s contention

that Pyfrom’s view of Plaintiff was occluded before Plaintiff entered Pyfrom’s lane

of travel. The front-facing camera footage shows that Plaintiff entered into the

eastbound through lanes in front of the two cars idling in the left-turn only lanes, at

least partially occluding him from view of vehicles approaching the intersection in

the eastbound lanes.119       The rear-facing camera footage along with Aiken’s

testimony, establishes that Aiken’s vehicle would have at least partially occluded

Pyfrom’s view of Plaintiff as he crossed from the left to right eastbound through

lanes, leaving Pyfrom with even less time than Aiken, if any, to avoid a collision

with Plaintiff.120

       The facts of this case are similar to those in Trievel v. Sabo.121 In Trievel, the

plaintiff, a bicyclist, attempted to cross Rt. 1 North, a busy four-lane highway, where

117
    Supra n. 115 and accompanying text.
118
    Leonardi Dep. at 18: 8-9.
119
    Dashboard Camera footage; Aiken Dep. at 18: 19-21. Aiken testified that Plaintiff
“disappeared behind” the two cars stopped in the left-turn only lanes before suddenly
entering into his lane. Id.
120
    Dashboard Camera footage; Aiken Dep. at 20: 11-15.
121
    714 A.2d 742 (Del. 1998).
                                           26
it intersected with Rt. 273.122 There was a blinking yellow traffic signal at this
                                                      123
intersection for vehicles traveling on Rt. 1 North.         The Plaintiff entered into the

intersection directly in front of an oncoming truck, which struck her, resulting in her

death.124 The defendant moved for a judgment of law after the plaintiff presented

her case in chief.125 The trial court granted the motion, which was affirmed on

appeal.126 The Supreme Court of Delaware found that Trievel was one of those rare

cases where the trial court could find that the plaintiff’s negligence exceeded that of

the defendant’s as a matter of law.127

       As in Trievel, where the plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout or take

adequate care for her own safety when crossing into a busy four-lane highway, here,

Plaintiff similarly failed to maintain a proper lookout or take timely notice of the

traffic signals when he entered into the eastbound through lanes, directly in front of

Aiken’s and Pyfrom’s vehicles.128 “Faced with plainly visible oncoming traffic that

presented a visible hazard to pedestrians[,]” Plaintiff, like the cyclist in Trievel, “was

under an affirmative obligation to see and appreciate the hazard and to proceed in a

122
    Id. at 743.
123
    Id.
124
    Id.
125
    Id. at 744.
126
    Id. at 743.
127
    Id. at 745.
128
    Id.
                                           27
careful and intelligent manner.”129 Although the trial court in Trievel had the benefit

of considering plaintiff’s case in chief, there was no video evidence of the moment

before the accident or testimony from the plaintiff-victim as there is here. As

detailed above, the dashboard camera evidence is critical to establishing that there is

no genuine issue of material fact Plaintiff was negligent and that Pyfrom was not.

                                       CONCLUSION

            The Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Plaintiff

was negligent when he crossed into the eastbound side of Rt. 40 and that Pyfrom

was not acting in a negligent manner when operating his vehicle. Because Plaintiff’s

negligence exceeds that of Pyfrom’s, his action is barred by 10 Del. C. § 8132 and

Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claim for uninsured motorist

benefits is DENIED.

            IT IS SO ORDERED.

129
      Id.
                                              28