Court Opinion

ID: 9618065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:06:03.724807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:23.807421
License: Public Domain

WYNN, Judge,
concurring in the result.
I agree with the majority that Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the order here affects a substantial right that would be lost without immediate review. I write separately because I believe it is not necessary for this Court to determine whether Defendant’s prior statements are entitled to First Amendment protection. See Anderson v. Assimos, 356 N.C. 415, 416, 572 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002) (“[T]he courts of this State will avoid constitutional questions, even if properly presented, where a case may be resolved on other grounds.”).
“[W]hen First Amendment rights are threatened or impaired by an interlocutory order, immediate appeal is appropriate.” Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 270, 643 S.E.2d 566, 569-70 (2007). Cases that have allowed immediate appeal of an interlocutory order on the basis *207of alleged violations of the First Amendment generally involve ongoing prejudice to that right. See Sherrill v. Amerada Hess Corp., 130 N.C. App. 711, 719, 504 S.E.2d 802, 807 (1998) (preliminary gag order); Kaplan v. Prolife Action League of Greensboro, 111 N.C. App. 1, 15, 431 S.E.2d 828, 834 (preliminary injunction against protest), appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 175, 436 S.E.2d 379 (1993), and cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1253, 129 L. Ed. 2d 894 (1994).
An exception exists where a party distinctly contends that the trial court misapplied a constitutional standard. Priest v. Sobeck, 153 N.C. App. 662, 670, 571 S.E.2d 75, 81 (2002) (Greene, J., dissenting) (misapplication of the proper standard would have a chilling effect on First Amendment rights), rev’dfor reasons stated in dissent, 357 N.C. 159, 579 S.E.2d 250 (2003); see also Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 169 N.C. App. 572, 577, 611 S.E.2d 175, 178 (2005) (noting that Priest dissent did not consider whether substantial right would be lost absent immediate appeal). The case relied upon by the majority is in this line. See Neill Grading & Const. Co. v. Lingafelt, 168 N.C. App. 36, 47, 606 S.E.2d 734, 741 (“[W]e examine whether misapplication of the ‘negligence’ standard of fault for a defendant’s speech . . . would have a chilling effect on defendant’s rights ....”), disc. review improvidently allowed, 360 N.C. 172, 622 S.E.2d 490 (2005).
Neither of these circumstances appears in this case. Defendant does not allege that the trial court misapplied a constitutional standard. Rather, Defendant argues that “[t]he pendency of this libel suit has the very chilling effect recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court and will operate in a similar fashion to a gag order or prior restraint.” Be that as it may, the trial court issued no injunction or any other order that could operate like a prior restraint. Indeed, the alleged defamatory statements were published in 2006 and 2007, and nothing prevents Defendant from continuing to exercise to the fullest her First Amendment rights. Consequently, “there is nothing here to suggest an immediate loss of these rights.” Boyce, 169 N.C. App. at 577, 611 S.E.2d at 178. I therefore concur in the dismissal of this appeal.