Court Opinion

ID: 9714846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:47:04.666191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:29.006170
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
While I agree with the majority that Professor Smith's testimony on hedonic damages was improper under Indiana law and should have been excluded, I believe its admission was harmless error not necessitating reversal. As I view it, the issue is not whether the testimony was improper, but rather, given that it was improper, whether we can say it produced a verdict tainted by excessive intangible damages.
As the majority correctly states, damages in a wrongful death action are limited to the pecuniary losses of the decedent's survivors. Andis v. Hawkins (1986), Ind.App., 489 N.E.2d 78, trans. denied. These losses include the intangible losses of love, care, and affection to surviving spouses and children, as well as the loss of training and guidance to minor children. Id. at 82. These intangible losses, as Southlake and Brock agreed, are not proper subjects for expert testimony. Questions of love and affection are matters within the common experience of jurors, and few people, if any, can be said to possess enough specialized knowledge in such matters to give testimony cloaked with the title of "expert." See Summers v. State (1986), Ind.App., 495 N.E.2d 799, 802, trans. denied.1
The record reveals several items that refute the idea the verdict was tainted. The evidence showed Brock's damages resulting from Mrs. Brock's lost wages and the value of her household services were approximately $500,000. Record at 390, 895, 405. Quite reasonably, this was the figure Southlake suggested would make a fair award. Record at 171. Just as reasonably, Brock added in the intangible losses of love, affection, and services, and requested $2.5 million. Record at 164. The experts then had their opportunity to comment, but both refused. Professor Smith said the decision on the amount of intangible losses was "something for [the jury] to do reaching into their own experience and their own hearts based on their own judgments." Record at 419. Southlake's expert agreed that intangible losses were not amenable to precise expert evaluation, Record at 477, but also agreed no amount of money could compensate for the loss of a dearly loved spouse. Record at 512. Finally, there was a good deal of testimony concerning the happiness of the Brocks' *687marriage, the sadness of the loss,2 and the loving, nurturing nature of the relationship between the children and their deceased mother. Record at 180, 582-84, 614.
Thus, the majority's analysis, correct in the abstract, runs headlong into three hard and fast rules applicable to the facts of this case. First, we will not reverse an award of damages that is within the scope of the evidence before the jury. Persinger v. Lucas (1987), Ind.App., 512 N.E.2d 865, 868. Second, we will not deem a damages award excessive unless it is affirmatively shown to be the result of "prejudice, passion, partiality, corruption, or some other improper element." Id. Third, the jury is free to reject the testimony of an expert witness. Ferdinand - Furniture - Co., - Inc. v. Anderson (1980), Ind.App., 399 N.E.2d 799, 807.
In my opinion, the $1.5 million award here was within the scope of the evidence, given the intangible portion of the damages proved. Moreover, Southlake has not shown the jury was improperly influenced by Professor Smith's testimony; South-lake's argument proves nothing more than that the testimony on hedonic damages was improper. Especially compelling, however, is the third rule. Southlake's trial counsel advised the jury it was free to disregard the testimony of both experts, and to reach its own valuation of damages. Record at 622.3 This is exactly what the jury did: it rejected the plaintiff's $2.5 million and the defendant's $500,000 and awarded $1.5 million. I do not think Southlake should be heard now to complain that the jury did as Southlake requested, and for this and the other reasons I have discussed, I would let the verdict stand.4
My decision to let the verdict stand is not altered by Instruction No. 7 for the simple reason that when all the instructions are read together, they clearly inform the jury of the plaintiff's duty to prove each element of the case by a preponderance of the evidence. Record at 628-80. We must review instructions as a whole and in harmony with one another. Wielgus v. Lopez (1988), Ind.App., 525 N.E.2d 1272. If an instruction is deemed to be erroneous, we will nonetheless not find reversible error if, in light of all the instructions given, the erroneous instruction could not have misled the jury. Spratt v. Alsup (1984), Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 1059.
Here, the jury could not have been misled. Even if Instruction No. 7 was erroneous, the other instructions concerning the plaintiff's burden of proof render any error harmless.
I dissent and vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. - That love and affection are matters within the common experience of juries does not automatically preclude the use of expert testimony. I4. Love, affection, and the value of familial relationships, though, are so well ingrained in all of us that the use of expert testimony on these questions strikes me as especially inappropriate.

. Mrs. Brock was killed on her 18th wedding anniversary. She and Mr. Brock had plans to go out that evening. Record at 589.

. The judge also instructed the jury that it was free to disregard the experts' testimony. Record at 632.

. I agree with the majority that Southlake should have been allowed to cross-examine Professor Smith on the subject of annuities. It follows from my main conclusion, however, that the refusal to allow cross-examination on this subject was also harmless error. Additionally, I am not persuaded Southlake considered the annuity subject of great importance prior to the writing of its appellate brief since counsel for Southlake did not question Southlake's own expert on the subject of annuities.