Court Opinion

ID: 9688162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:36:23.995423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:35.500031
License: Public Domain

T. G. Kavanagh, J.
(dissenting). On November *57820, 1964, plaintiffs were injured when their car, after hitting a tree that had fallen across the road, careened off the road into a drainage ditch and struck another tree.
On September 9, 1966, plaintiffs instituted suit against the Saginaw County Drain Commissioner and the Walravens.
On June 26, 1972, an order was entered adding as a defendant, the Board of County Road Commissioners. On August 8, 1972, the first amended complaint was filed and served on defendant road commissioners on August 11, 1972. The default of defendant road commissioners was entered on September 5, 1972 for failure to plead within 20 days.
The road commissioners moved to set aside the default and after a hearing the trial court issued an order setting aside the default on the condition that the road commissioners plead to the merits and not plead the statute of limitations defenses.
The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal, but we granted leave to consider the single question of the propriety of the trial court’s conditional order.
GCR 1963, 520.4 provides in part:
"Any order setting aside such default shall be conditioned upon the party against whom the default was taken paying the taxable costs incurred by the other party in reliance upon the default, except as prescribed in sub-rule 526.8. Other conditions may be imposed as the court deems proper. "(Emphasis added.)
The plaintiffs maintain that since the road commissioners did not present a reasonable excuse for the failure to comply with the requirements which created the default, they were not entitled to have the default set aside, and accordingly cannot complain about any reasonable condition the court might impose for granting their petition.
*579The defendant road commissioners assert that the conditions here — that they waive affirmative defenses based on any statute of limitation — are unreasonable. They cite, as authority for the proposition that it is an abuse of discretion to require such waiver, the cases of Beecher v Wayne Circuit Judges, 70 Mich 363; 38 NW 322 (1888); Detroit v Wayne Circuit Judge, 112 Mich 317; 70 NW 894 (1897); and Clark v Beckenstein, 210 Mich 323; 177 NW 960, (1920).
Of these cases, Detroit and Clark are concerned with setting aside defaults and Beecher is concerned with the amendment of pleadings.
In Detroit v Wayne Circuit Judge, supra, the Court said at 319:
"The court having determined that the city of Detroit had the right to máte defense to the action, we think it was not within his discretion to limit its defense in the manner set forth.”
It cited neither authority nor reason for its holding, and no reason to support it appears to us. That holding has been cited only in Clark, supra, and even there, as we read Clark, was not followed.
While Beecher, supra, was concerned with attaching conditions to the allowance of a motion for permission to amend pleadings, and its positions as authority on that question has been greatly weakened if not destroyed by overrulement sub silentio in Ben P Fyke & Sons v Gunter Co, 390 Mich 649; 213 NW2d 134 (1973), it nevertheless set forth a standard to be used in determining the propriety of imposing conditions on the grant of a motion.
In Beecher, the Court said at 369:
"The inquiry for the court, when a motion for an *580amendment is made, should be, is it in the furtherance of justice to allow it? Will it better permit the party to present his case or make his defense upon the merits? And ought he now to be permitted to make such a case or such a defense? And this statute in determining this question should be construed liberally. This being judicially determined, the court may impose just and reasonable terms as a condition precedent to the amendment.”
In an area where it is contemplated that conditions may be imposed, this establishes an appropriate standard for imposing them. It seems to be the standard used by the Federal courts in testing discretion exercised under Rules 55(c) and 60(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were the model for our GCR 1963, 520.4. See Bridoux v Eastern Airlines, Inc, 93 US App DC 369; 214 F2d 207 (1954). Also see 3 ALR Fed 956 and the cases cited therein.
This appears to be the standard used by the trial judge here. In his opinion explaining his ruling, after concluding the affidavit of facts was defective, Judge Armstrong said:
"The Board of Road Commissioners goes on to point out that it also wants to raise as meritorious defenses the two year and three year statutes of limitations pertaining to tort actions against the Board of Road Commissioners and to tort actions generally. The Board of Road Commissioners is saying that the Plaintiffs are in default of filing their action against the Board of Road Commissioners within the two year and three year statutes of limitations. The plaintiffs claim that had it not been for the now unconstitutional sixty day limitation for the giving of notice of intent to file suit against the Board of Road Commissioners and the plaintiffs’ ignorance of that requirement, that they would have filed their action against the Board of Road Commissioners before the expiration of the two year limitation statute for such actions.
*581"So now we have a situation where the plaintiffs were in default and where the defendant Board of Road Commissioners is now also in default. Both the plaintiffs and said defendants now are asking the Court to permit them to raise meritorious defenses against each other. If the default of the Board of Road Commissioners is set aside without conditions imposed upon their defense, they will be in the unique position of now being able to raise the prior default of the plaintiffs in failing to file an action within the statutes of limitations and the plaintiffs will no longer have the advantage or the benefit of the defendant Board of Road Commissioners’ present default. In view of the defaults of both parties it would seem that such a result would be neither equitable nor just insofar as plaintiffs are concerned. Any old default through ignorance on the part of the plaintiffs is certainly no greater a default then [sic] the present default of the defendant Board of Road Commissioners, particularly in view of their inadequate affidavit of facts and affidavit of merits.”
We do not regard the considerations which moved the majority of us in Fyke, supra, as controlling here. GCR 1963, 118 does not provide for the imposition of conditions. GCR 1963, 520.4 does. This difference is deliberate.
Amendment of pleadings is for the most part intended to assure accuracy and completeness in the presentation of the whole controversy on its merits. No good purpose occurs to us to warrant imposing conditions for allowing it.
Default rules are intended to keep a case moving to conclusion and the rule provides for the imposition of costs and other conditions as sanctions to make the rules effective. GCR 1963, 520.4.
We think the true intent of GCR 1963, 520.4 and the better practice is to commit the matter to the discretion of the trial judge. Unless a reviewing court can say that the judge abused his discretion *582by imposing a wholly arbitrary and unreasonable condition, the trial judge’s decision should stand.
In this case the trial judge concluded that since each of the parties in turn had failed to meet an arbitrarily established deadline for pleading neither should be entitled to take advantage of the other’s delinquency, but rather both should try the case on its merits. We cannot say that this is an arbitrary or unreasonable attitude, and accordingly we hold that he did not abuse his discretion in establishing the condition for the setting aside of the defendant’s default.
Affirmed with costs to plaintiffs.
Williams, J., concurred with T. G. Kavanagh, J.
J. W. Fitzgerald, J., did not sit in this case.