Court Opinion

ID: 9681633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:53:37.186935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:34.948380
License: Public Domain

Opinion on Petition to Reheae
Me. Special Justice W. J. Smith.
The appellant, David M. Pack, Commissioner, Department of Insurance and Banking filed his petition for a rehearing, contending that he is aggrieved by so much of the opinion of the Court filed May 4,1970, as remanded the case to the present Commissioner of the Department of Insurance and Banking to prepare and file his reasons *469for disapproving the rate filing involved herein and seeking a dismissal of the case at the cost of appellee.
Petitioner further insists “that in a broad or simple appeal the entire case is opened up and the appellate court determines such a case as though the case had been originally instituted in said court and pronounces a final decree, if proper. See Gibson's Suits in Chancery, sec. 1334.”
Counsel overlook the fact that the action of the Commissioner was brought to the circuit court by the common law writ of certiorari, and appealed to this Court, from an adverse ruling by the trial court. As stated in our original opinion on May 4, 1970, the common law writ does not bring up for determination any question except the question (1) whether the Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction, (2) has acted illegally, arbitrarily or fraudulently. T.C.A. sec. 27-801; Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Public Utility Comm., 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233; Boyd v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 205 Tenn. 658, 330 S.W.2d 13; Reddoch v. Smith, 214 Tenn. 213, 223, 379 S.W.2d 641; Bragg v. Boyd, 193 Tenn. 507, 246 S.W.2d 575; Boyce v. Williams, 215 Tenn. 704, 389 S.W.2d 272; State ex rel. McMorrow v. Hunt, 137 Tenn. 243,192 S.W. 931.
In McGee v. State, 207 Tenn. 431, 340 S.W.2d 904, the Court in speaking of the common law writ of certiorari had this to say:
“The Court's supervisory jurisdiction by certiorari must not be confused with its ordinary appellate jurisdiction. Nor must the distinction be overlooked between common-law writ of certiorari, now put in form of a statute (T.C.A. sec. 27-801) and the statutory *470writ, or certiorari in lien of an appeal (T.C.A. sec. 27-802). State ex rel. McMorrow v. Hunt, 137 Tenn. 243 251, 192 S.W. 931, 933; Helton v. State, 194 Tenn. 299, 301, 305, 250 S.W.2d 540, 541, 542; Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission, 195 Tenn. 593, 600, 604, 261 S.W.2d 233.
“The common-law writ of certiorari, the writ here sought, may be granted ‘in all cases where an inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred, or is acting illegally, when, in the judgment of the Court, there is no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy/ (T.C.A. sec. 27-801)/’
In remanding the case we followed the holding of the Court in Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Tennessee Public Service Commission, 202 Tenn. 465, 474, 304 S.W.2d 640, 644, in which case it was held that:
“ ‘The general rule is that the courts, even in the absence of statute, have such power where it is necessary to effectuate the demands of justice, * * *’.
And:
“ 'There is nothing in the principles governing judicial review of administrative acts which precludes the courts from, giving an administrative body an opportunity to meet objections to its order by correcting irregularities in procedure, or supplying deficiencies in its record, or making additional findings where these are necessary, or supplying findings validly made in the place of those attacked as invalid. ’ ”
And:
*471“ ‘If a board or commission has failed to make an essential finding and the record on review is insufficient to provide the basis for a final determination, the proper procedure for the court is to remaud the case for further proceedings before the board.’ (Emphasis supplied)
“Each of these statements are supported by good authority which we have examined.” * * *
It is further contended by the Commissioner, Milton P. Rice, that he was appointed Commissioner of the Department of Insurance and Banking on September 5, 1969, “and he has no express, legal authority, under T.C.A. sec. 56-603, to amend or modify former Commissioner David M. Pack, the petitioner’s final ruling denying this filing after a hearing and upon remand by the trial court. Any ruling by Commissioner Rice upon this remand would, in addition have to. be made by him without the benefit of the procedure set forth in T.C.A. sec. 56-603, and should not be required by this Honorable Court. ’ ’
This is simply a re-argument of matters considered in the argument on the hearing. The record revealed that David M. Pack in his answer filed in the trial court stated that he vacated the office of Commissioner on September 3, 1969, and was on the same date appointed Attorney General and Reporter of the State of Tennessee. That on September 5, 1969, Milton P. Rice wais appointed Commissioner of the Department of Insurance and Banking and he had no express legal authority to decide the question proposed by the Court. (See page 4 of the opinion of the Court)
*472The record shows that Commissioner Pack held a hearing on the filing on May 5, 1969’, consisting of the testimony of witnesses and large volumes, of statistical data submitted by the Insurance Companies, a transcript of which was filed with the petition for certiorari and is a part of the record in the case.
The statute, sec. 8-2901 provides:
“In all cases in which it. is not otherwise expressly provided, when any office is vacated, all books, papers, property, and money belonging or appertaining to such office, shall, on demand, be delivered over to the qualified succes s or ’’’ * *
T.C.A. sec. 56-109 provides for the appointment of deputies, the employment of actuaries, with such assistants as may be deemed necessary by the Commissioner for the efficient administration of the duties of the office. (T.O.A. sec. 56-110)
The general rule is that where provision is made by statute for the appointment of deputies, such deputies may discharge all duties, of the office. Southern Ry. Co. v. Hamilton County, 24 Tenn.App. 32, 138 S.W.2d 770.
The record does not show that the entire office personnel of the Commissioner was vacated when Commissioner Pack resigned. All of the testimony, data, etc., had on the hearing on May 5, 1969 are available for use by the present Commissioner.
We find the petition for a rehearing without merit, and the same is denied.
Dyer, Chief Justice, Creson, Justice, and Jenkins, Special Justice, concur.
McC’anless, Justice, not participating.