Court Opinion

ID: 9958258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 17:01:07.921503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.419292
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1223    Document: 010111028085   Date Filed: 04/08/2024   Page: 1
                                                                      FILED
                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                     PUBLISH                      Tenth Circuit

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                   April 8, 2024

                                                              Christopher M. Wolpert
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
                                                                  Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                    No. 23-1223

  JASON VINCENT BRADLEY,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                     _________________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the District of Colorado
                     (D.C. No. 1:15-CR-00034-PAB-1)
                    _________________________________

 Jess D. Mekeel, Assistant United States Attorney (Cole Finegan, United
 States Attorney, and Kyle Brenton, Assistant United States Attorney, on the
 brief), District of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

 Eric K. Klein of Johnson & Klein, PLLC, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-
 Appellant.
                      _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                _________________________________

 ROSSMAN, Circuit Judge.
                  _________________________________

       Jason Vincent Bradley moved for a sentence reduction under 18

 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court denied the motion based on the 18
Appellate Case: 23-1223   Document: 010111028085   Date Filed: 04/08/2024   Page: 2

 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we

 affirm.

                                        I

       In April 2015, Mr. Bradley was convicted after pleading guilty to one

 count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation

 of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); two counts of possession of a controlled substance

 with the intent to distribute in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and one

 count of knowingly possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug

 trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). In January 2017,

 the district court imposed concurrent 120-month sentences on the first

 three counts and a consecutive 60-month sentence on the fourth count,

 followed by three years of supervised release to run concurrently on each

 count.

       In May 2021, Mr. Bradley filed a motion for compassionate release

 under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). R.II at 38. He sought a reduction of his

 sentence “to time-served followed by a period of supervised release with

 conditions determined appropriate by the Court.” R.II at 38. Mr. Bradley

 offered two extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate

 release. He needed to care for his minor children because his mother—the

 children’s primary caretaker—was in “seriously ill health.” R.II at 39. And

 his own health conditions—hypertension, sleep apnea, and obesity—put

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 him at increased risk of serious illness from COVID-19. The government

 opposed the motion, contending both that Mr. Bradley failed to present

 extraordinary and compelling reasons and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

 factors weighed against compassionate release.

       The district court denied relief. “Mr. Bradley represents that

 extenuating circumstances with his family, his health and the COVID-19

 pandemic demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying

 compassionate release,” the district court acknowledged. R.I at 97. But

 “[e]ven if Mr. Bradley demonstrates extraordinary and compelling reasons

 based on incapacitation of the caregiver for his minor children,” the district

 court explained, “the § 3553(a) factors do not support a sentence reduction.”

 R.I at 99.

       Mr. Bradley timely appealed. He makes two arguments, both

 challenging aspects of the district court’s inquiry under § 3553(a). First, he

 contends the district court erred by failing to consider his proffered

 extraordinary and compelling reasons for release as part of its § 3553(a)

 analysis. Second, he insists the district court mistakenly evaluated the

 § 3553(a) factors without accounting for his post-sentencing conduct and

 rehabilitation. As we explain, Mr. Bradley has waived his first argument,

 and his second argument is unavailing.

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                                       II

       “Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to modify a term

 of imprisonment once it has been imposed, but the rule of finality is subject

 to a few narrow exceptions.” Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526

 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “One such exception

 is contained in [18 U.S.C.] § 3582(c)(1).” United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d

 1035, 1041 (10th Cir. 2021).

       Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court may reduce a term of imprisonment if,

 “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that

 they are applicable, . . . it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons

 warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with

 applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The

 statute thus creates a “three-step test”: a district court must (1) “find

 whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence

 reduction”; (2) “find whether such reduction is consistent with applicable

 policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”;1 and (3) “consider

       1 Following Congress’s enactment of the First Step Act of 2018,
 § 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes motions for compassionate relief brought by
 either a defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. 18 U.S.C.
 § 3582(c)(1)(A). Until November 1, 2023, however, the relevant United
 States Sentencing Guidelines policy statement did not acknowledge
 compassionate release motions brought by defendants. See United States v.
 McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1048 (10th Cir. 2021) (noting “[t]he Sentencing
 Commission’s [then-]most recent policy statement regarding sentencing
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 any applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its

 discretion, the reduction authorized by steps one and two is warranted in

 whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” United

 States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 937–38 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting McGee, 992

 F.3d at 1042) (alterations omitted).2

       “To grant a motion for compassionate release, . . . the district court

 ‘must of course address all three steps.’” Hald, 8 F.4th at 938 (quoting

 McGee, 992 F.3d at 1043). However, “[i]f the most convenient way for the

 district court to dispose of a motion for compassionate release is to reject it

 reductions under § 3582(c)(1) was promulgated on November 1, 2018” and
 only described compassionate release motions brought by “the Director of
 the Bureau of Prisons” (citing U.S.S.G § 1B1.13)). Thus, we concluded “the
 Sentencing Commission’s [2018] policy statement is applicable only to
 motions for sentence reductions filed by the Director of the Bureau of
 Prisons, and not to motions filed directly by defendants.” McGee, 992 F.3d
 at 1050.

       However, effective November 1, 2023, the United States Sentencing
 Commission amended the Guidelines to reflect that compassionate release
 motions may be brought by either the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or
 the defendant. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a). The Sentencing Commission’s existing
 policy statement is now plainly applicable to motions for sentence
 reductions filed by either the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or a
 defendant.

       2 For motions filed directly by defendants, the statute requires them

 to have “fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the
 Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf.” 18 U.S.C.
 § 3582(c)(1)(A). Here, the parties do not dispute Mr. Bradley exhausted his
 administrative remedies before filing his motion.
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 for failure to satisfy one of the steps, we see no benefit in requiring it to

 make the useless gesture of determining whether one of the other steps is

 satisfied.” Id. at 942–43. Thus, “district courts may deny compassionate-

 release motions when any of the three prerequisites . . . is lacking and do

 not need to address the others.” McGee, 992 F.3d at 1043 (quoting United

 States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021)).

       We review a district court’s order on a motion for compassionate

 release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145,

 1147–48 (10th Cir. 2020). “A district court abuses its discretion when it

 relies on an incorrect conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of

 fact.” United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021)

 (quoting United States v. Battle, 706 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 2013)); see

 also United States v. Lopez-Avila, 665 F.3d 1216, 1219 (10th Cir. 2011) (“An

 error of law is per se an abuse of discretion.”).

                                        A

                                        1

       Mr. Bradley first contends the district court abused its discretion by

 denying relief under the § 3553(a) factors “without considering the facts

 that would justify a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons.”

 Opening Br. at 9. He acknowledges “a district court need not make a finding

 regarding extraordinary and compelling reasons in order to deny a request

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 for compassionate release.” Opening Br. at 9. But by “fail[ing] to consider

 the facts supporting extraordinary and compelling reasons for release”

 within its § 3553(a) analysis, he maintains, the district court committed

 legal error under Hald. Opening Br. at 9–10 (citing Hald, 8 F.4th at 947).

 As we explain, this argument is waived.

       Mr. Bradley’s argument proceeds from a correct understanding of the

 applicable law. Hald held district courts may dispose of a motion for

 compassionate release at any of the three statutory steps, but the opinion

 also emphasized what the panel was not holding. “[W]e are not saying that

 a court can deny compassionate-release relief on the ground that release is

 not appropriate under § 3553(a) if the court has not considered the facts

 allegedly establishing extraordinary and compelling reasons for release.”

 Hald, 8 F.4th at 947. And Hald made clear “the facts allegedly establishing

 extraordinary and compelling reasons for release . . . . are relevant to the

 § 3553(a) analysis.” Id. at 943.3

       3 The government suggests Mr. Bradley overreads Hald. See Answer

 Br. at 16–17. But we see nothing in Hald suggesting district courts may
 deny compassionate release under § 3553(a) without considering the
 extraordinary and compelling reasons proffered by the defendant. Hald
 instructs just the opposite. That is not to say—nor does Mr. Bradley
 contend—a district court must recite magic words to show it fulfilled its
 responsibility. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, No. 20-1324, 2021 WL
 4859690, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021) (refusing to read Hald “as imposing
 a requirement that the district court expressly consider ‘the facts allegedly
 establishing extraordinary and compelling reasons for release’ in its
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       Mr. Bradley asserted two extraordinary and compelling reasons

 warranted compassionate release: the need to care for his minor children

 due to the illness of their primary caretaker and his own compromised

 health. As the government persuasively argues, “[t]he problem for Mr.

 Bradley is that he never actually asked the court to consider those facts as

 part of the § 3553(a) analysis.” Answer Br. at 13. Indeed, “completely

 absent” from the § 3553(a) portion of Mr. Bradley’s compassionate release

 motion “is any discussion of his mother’s health, his children’s care, or his

 own health, or any argument at all for how these facts should weigh into

 the § 3553(a) analysis.” Answer Br. at 13. Our review confirms as much. We

 thus conclude Mr. Bradley forfeited his argument that the district court

 committed error under Hald. See United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192,

 § 3553(a) analysis” (emphasis added) (quoting Hald, 8 F.4th at 947));
 United States v. McClaflin, 939 F.3d 1113, 1121 (10th Cir. 2019) (“With
 respect to the § 3553(a) factors, ‘[w]e do not require a ritualistic incantation
 to establish consideration of a legal issue, nor do we demand that the
 district court recite any magic words to show us that it fulfilled its
 responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed it to
 consider.’” (quoting United States v. Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1223 (10th
 Cir. 2006))); see also United States v. Slinkard, 61 F.4th 1290, 1295 (10th
 Cir. 2023) (“We do not require sentencing courts to use magic words in
 supporting the sentences they hand down.”). Even if the district court does
 not expressly state it has considered the proffered extraordinary and
 compelling reasons when denying compassionate release under § 3553(a),
 see § 3582(c)(1)(A), the record must permit the conclusion the court actually
 did so. Because Mr. Bradley waived the issue, however, we consider it no
 further here.
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 1196 (10th Cir. 2019) (“When a party fails to raise an argument below, we

 typically treat the argument as forfeited.”).

       Mr. Bradley insists, however, the argument is preserved. He says he

 “drew the district court’s attention to the need to consider the § 3553(a)

 factors” and “argue[d] the impact of the extraordinary and compelling

 circumstances on the § 3553(a) factors, such as the seriousness of the

 offense and the likelihood of recidivism.” Reply Br. at 3–4. In support of this

 contention, Mr. Bradley points us to two places in the record.4 First, Mr.

 Bradley references the conclusion section of his compassionate release

 motion, which states in full,

              The circumstances presented here are extraordinary
              and compelling. Mr. Bradley’s mother is no longer
              able to care for his children. And she no longer has
              another family member to assist her. As Mr. Bradley
              said to the Court, “Sir[,] I do not want to see my
              children get split up and put in the system for my
              mistakes.”

              If released, Mr. Bradley will become the primary
              caregiver for his children. While he will certainly

       4 “To avoid us treating a claim as forfeited or waived, an appellant’s

 opening brief must ‘cite the precise references in the record where the issue
 was raised and ruled on’ in the district court.” United States v. Leffler, 942
 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting 10th Cir. R. 28.1(A)). To that end,
 we primarily focus our analysis on the portions of the record identified by
 Mr. Bradley purporting to show he preserved this issue for appeal. See id.
 (“If an appellant fails to satisfy this requirement, we may assume the
 appellant did not preserve the issue for appeal and refuse to review the
 alleged error.”). But we also have reviewed the entire appellate record in
 considering and resolving the arguments before us.
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              find employment, his main task will be caring for
              these four minor children. He will live at his
              mother’s home along with his children, and he will
              provide assistance to his mother, as well.

              Release of Mr. Bradley under the compassionate
              release statute would not diminish the seriousness
              of the offense of conviction, but rather would fulfill
              Congress’s intent in offering courts greater
              flexibility to reduce sentences when change
              circumstances justify a second look. Here, the
              change in Mr. Bradley’s family circumstances
              warrant a reduced sentence. If the Court wishes to
              impose additional conditions of supervised release—
              such as the period of home confinement—Mr.
              Bradley would have no objection.

  R.II at 56–57 (internal citation omitted). Next, Mr. Bradley directs us to the

  final page of his reply to the government’s response in the district court.5

  Reply Br. at 4 (citing R.II at 153–536). In that filing, Mr. Bradley stated he

  “has served a very significant amount of time. His children need him—not

  in an emotional sense but in a sense that they need an adult to take care of

        5 Mr. Bradley filed nine supplements in support of his motion for
  compassionate release in the district court, which often “provide[d] the
  Court with . . . additional information” or updates about his mother’s health
  condition. See, e.g., R.II at 145.

        6 Mr. Bradley cited pages “153–53” of the appellate record in support

  of his assertion he preserved this issue for appeal. See Reply Br. at 4. It
  appears likely he meant to cite a page range, so we have interpreted this
  citation by Mr. Bradley as referring to pages 152–53 of the record. This
  reading brings into consideration all of his concluding remarks from the
  district court brief he cited.
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  them. These are extraordinary and compelling circumstances justifying

  compassionate release.” R.II at 152–53.

        We do not see how either passage supports Mr. Bradley’s contention

  that he “did argue the impact of the extraordinary and compelling

  circumstances on the § 3553(a) factors” in the district court. Reply Br. at 3–

  4. His record citations suggest he argued the existence of extraordinary and

  compelling reasons, see § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), from which Mr. Bradley could

  have formulated arguments connecting those reasons to the § 3553(a)

  factors and the district court’s obligation under Hald, see § 3582(c)(1)(A).

  Mr. Bradley did not do so.7 As the government correctly observes, “Bradley

  certainly could have made those arguments below, and he does so explicitly

  now. But including those arguments in his opening brief on appeal does not

        7 We are unpersuaded by Mr. Bradley’s apparent alternative
  argument that he could not raise this issue in the district court because “[i]t
  was not until the district court issued its order that Mr. Bradley learned [it]
  conducted a flawed analysis of the § 3553(a) factors in the context of the
  compassionate-release motion.” Reply Br. at 4. As Mr. Bradley
  acknowledges, he needed to “alert the court to the issue and seek a ruling.”
  United States v. Ansberry, 976 F.3d 1108, 1124 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting
  Harris v. Sharp, 941 F.3d 962, 979 (10th Cir. 2019)); see also Reply Br. at 4
  (acknowledging “the . . . question regarding preservation of appellate review
  is whether the district court was adequately alerted to the issue”). Mr.
  Bradley notes his motion for compassionate release was pending for “more
  than two years” and in that time, he filed nine supplements in support of
  his motion. Reply Br. at 4; Opening Br. at 3. He had ample opportunity to
  advance arguments about “the impact of the [allegedly] extraordinary and
  compelling circumstances on the § 3553(a) factors” in the district court. See
  Reply Br. at 7.
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  turn back the clock and place them properly before the district court in June

  of 2023.” Answer Br. at 14.

        Despite the forfeiture, and the government’s arguments about plain

  error, Mr. Bradley does not ask us to engage in plain error review. Instead,

  he insists “[t]he doctrine of waiver has no applicability to this case.” Reply

  Br. at 1. We disagree.

        Mr. Bradley has advanced a legal argument—whether the district

  court complied with Hald—not exempt from traditional preservation rules.

  A contrary holding would suggest district courts have an independent

  obligation to anticipate and address arguments not raised by counsel. To be

  sure, “[t]he ultimate responsibility for the effective working of the

  adversary system rests with the judge.” United States v. Chavez, 976 F.3d

  1178, 1199 n.14 (10th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). But a judge is not an

  advocate. Rather, the adversarial system “rel[ies] on the parties to frame

  the issues for decision and assign[s] to courts the role of neutral arbiters of

  matters the parties present.” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590

  U.S. 371, 375 (2020) (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243

  (2008)) (reaffirming principle of party presentation).8

        8 Mr. Bradley also says he “preserved this issue by filing his Motion

  for Compassionate Release, Replies, and Supplements [to the motion].”
  Opening Br. at 7. He seems to suggest district courts know what their
  obligations are when adjudicating motions for compassionate release, and
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        Mr. Bradley did not present in district court the argument he now

  says compels reversal, and he does not seek plain error review. “When an

  appellant fails to preserve an issue and also fails to make a plain-error

  argument on appeal, we ordinarily deem the issue waived (rather than

  merely forfeited) and decline to review the issue at all—for plain error or

  otherwise.” Leffler, 942 F.3d at 1196; see also United States v. Wright, 848

  F.3d 1274, 1281 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e have repeatedly declined to consider

  arguments under the plain-error standard when the defendant fails to

  argue plain error.”). This general rule applies—and controls—in Mr.

  Bradley’s case. See United States v. Lamirand, 669 F.3d 1091, 1098 (10th

  Cir. 2012) (“Mr. Lamirand has not asked us to review his late-blooming

  those obligations are triggered when a motion is filed. This argument
  misunderstands the law.

        It is true “[w]e traditionally presume, absent some indication in the
  record suggesting otherwise, that ‘[t]rial judges are presumed to know the
  law and apply it in making their decisions.’” United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas,
  477 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Russel, 109
  F.3d 1503, 1512 (10th Cir. 1997)). But this background norm should be read
  in harmony with well-settled preservation doctrine. “[A] party does not
  preserve an issue merely . . . by presenting the issue to the district court in
  a vague and ambiguous manner . . . [or] by making a fleeting contention
  before the district court.” Ansberry, 976 F.3d at 1125 (quoting U.S. Aviation
  Underwriters, Inc. v. Pilatus Bus. Aircraft, Ltd., 582 F.3d 1131, 1142 (10th
  Cir. 2009)). Rather, in order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party needs
  “to alert the court to the issue and seek a ruling.” Id. at 1124 (quoting
  Harris, 941 F.3d at 979). Here, we cannot say simply filing a motion for
  compassionate release preserved the specific appellate issue Mr. Bradley
  now advances under Hald.
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  argument for plain error. Accordingly, we decline to do so and will not

  definitively opine on the merits of this argument.”).

                                         B

        Mr. Bradley next contends the district court abused its discretion by

  failing to consider the impact of his “postsentencing conduct and

  rehabilitation”   on    whether   he   is   an   appropriate    candidate     for

  compassionate release. Opening Br. at 14. We are not persuaded.

        “[A] district court adjudicating a motion under the First Step Act may

  consider other intervening changes of law (such as changes to the

  Sentencing Guidelines) or changes of fact (such as behavior in prison) in

  adjudicating a First Step Act motion.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S.

  481, 486–87 (2022). “Because district courts are always obligated to

  consider nonfrivolous arguments presented by the parties, the First Step

  Act requires district courts to consider intervening changes when parties

  raise them.” Id. at 487. Even so, “the First Step Act does not compel courts

  to exercise their discretion to reduce any sentence based on those

  arguments.” Id.

        The parties do not dispute that Mr. Bradley placed his post-

  sentencing rehabilitation before the district court. In his motion for

  compassionate release, Mr. Bradley asserted,

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               Mr. Bradley has had the time to break old patterns,
               get education, and learn new skills. He has been
               incarcerated for six and a half years. During that
               time, he has been working from day one and has also
               gained certificates in many courses. Due to his
               behavior, in a short time, Mr. Bradley progressed
               from the most secure level of custody . . . down to the
               prison camp, where he enjoyed significant freedom.
               During his time [of incarceration], Mr. Bradley has
               received no discipline for violent or antisocial
               behavior. . . . Additionally, it cannot be ignored that
               Mr. Bradley at almost 40 years old presents a far
               lesser risk of recidivism than he did even at 34.

  R.II at 50 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nor do the

  parties dispute that under Concepcion, the district court had to consider the

  intervening changes of fact raised by Mr. Bradley. See Concepcion, 597 U.S.

  at 487. The only issue, then, is whether the district court actually did so.

        Mr. Bradley contends the district court “analyz[ed] the § 3553(a)

  factors as frozen at the time of the 2015 sentencing.” Opening Br. at 13; see

  § 3582(c)(1)(A). In his view, the district court “did not consider the

  significant mitigation” since the original sentencing, such as his age, more

  than eight years of sobriety, his exemplary conduct while incarcerated, his

  “rapid progression to a low custody level in the Bureau of Prisons,” and his

  “consistent work” while incarcerated. Opening Br. at 13. The record shows

  otherwise.

        Contrary to Mr. Bradley’s assertions, the district court did not simply

  conclude “because the [original] sentence was appropriate in 2015, it

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  necessarily remained appropriate in 2023.” See Reply Br. at 8. Rather, the

  district court carefully considered the post-sentencing changes of fact

  marshalled by Mr. Bradley in his compassionate release motion. “Although

  [Mr. Bradley] argues that he ‘has had the time to break old patterns,’” the

  district court reasoned, “[t]here is no indication that Mr. Bradley would not

  recidivate if his sentence was reduced by more than four years,” particularly

  because “his previous convictions did not alter his behavior.” R.I at 100.

  Likewise, the district court rejected Mr. Bradley’s argument “that, because

  he has spent a long time in prison, his sentence already reflects respect for

  the law and just punishment for the offense.” R.I at 100. While “[i]t is true

  that seven years served is a significant amount of time,” the court found the

  time served was only a “relatively short” portion of his “lengthy sentence.”

  R.I at 100. Moreover, “the length of the sentence already served [does not]

  automatically demonstrate[] respect for the law and just punishment.” R.I

  at 100. Otherwise, “anyone who serves a significant amount of time in

  prison could be eligible for compassionate release regardless of his crimes

  simply because he has served part of a long sentence.”9 R.I at 100.

        9  Mr. Bradley contends this statement by the district court
  erroneously holds “compassionate release can never be appropriate if the
  original sentence was supported by the § 3553(a) factors,” rendering
  § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) “a virtual nullity.” Opening Br. at 15. But as the
  government correctly observes, “[t]he court ruled no such thing.” Answer
  Br. at 20. The district court simply held the length of the sentence already
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        These findings by the district court respond directly to Mr. Bradley’s

  contention that he had time to break old patterns in his then-six-and-a-half

  years of incarceration, as demonstrated by his conduct while incarcerated.

  See R.II at 50. On this record, therefore, we are satisfied the district court’s

  analysis included the “intervening changes of law or fact” raised by Mr.

  Bradley, specifically, the “evidence of [Mr. Bradley’s] rehabilitation since

  his . . . sentencing.” Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 493, 500.

        Mr. Bradley emphasized several facts to show his lower risk of

  recidivism. And he is correct that the district court did not individually

  address each fact in its order denying the compassionate release motion.

  But “[p]roviding a reason for [a] decision is an entirely different proposition

  than addressing every argument set forth by a defendant.” United States v.

  Verdin-Garcia, 824 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2016). “While providing a

  rationale for the court’s decision certainly aids in appellate review, we find

  no basis to impose upon the district court a requirement to address every

  nonfrivolous, material argument raised by the defendant.” Id. Here, it is

  apparent the district court did not accept Mr. Bradley’s arguments, not that

  it failed to consider them.

  served does not on its own demonstrate respect for the law and just
  punishment. R.I at 100.
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                                       III

        The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

                                        18