Court Opinion

ID: 9889732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 14:04:03.54068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:20.922333
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed October 11, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                       Nos. 3D22-453 & 3D22-1468
                  Lower Tribunal Nos. 14-30864 & 22-6957
                            ________________

                      Adeena Weiss, etc., et al.,
                                 Appellants,

                                     vs.

                            BI 27, LLC, et al.,
                                 Appellees.

     Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Migna
Sanchez-Llorens, and Alan Fine, Judges.

     Torricella Law, PLLC, and Maurice J. Baumgarten, for appellants.

     Carlton Fields, P.A., and Christopher W. Smart (Tampa), and Dean A.
Morande (West Pam Beach), for appellees.

Before EMAS, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.

     MILLER, J.
      In these consolidated appeals, appellants, Adeena Weiss-Ortiz,

individually and derivatively on behalf of Towers of Blue Lagoon, Inc., Towers

of Blue Lagoon 1, Inc., Towers of Blue Lagoon 2, Inc. (collectively, the

“Tower Entities”), and Intercontinental Investment Bankers, challenge final

orders adversely adjudicating their quiet title claims against two mortgagees,

appellees BI 27, LLC and TIG Rompsen US Master Mortgage LP.1 The trial

court found that section 48.23(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2020), shielded the

mortgagees from suit.       Finding that material factual issues precluded

application of the statute, we reverse.

                                  Background

      This is a heavily litigated intra-family dispute that traces its origin to the

death of Weiss-Ortiz’s father, Jack Weiss, a prominent attorney. The parties

are not strangers to the court. See Ortiz v. Weiss, 227 So. 3d 689 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2017); Ortiz v. Weiss, 282 So. 3d 949 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019); Weiss v.

Weiss, 317 So. 3d 167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).

      Weiss-Ortiz filed suit in the instant case against her mother, Caroline

Weiss, along with the Estate of Jack Weiss and Towers of Blue Lagoon (1),

seeking to quiet title to three parcels of real property located near the Miami

1
  A third case, 3D22-2136, remains pending in this court. It has been
consolidated with this appeal for record purposes only.

                                         2
International Airport (the “Tower Properties”).    She alleged that Weiss

fraudulently divested her of the property through the creation of sham

corporations. Shortly thereafter, she recorded a notice of lis pendens with

the clerk of courts.

      Six iterations of the complaint followed. In the first two complaints,

Weiss-Ortiz alleged that she owned the Tower Properties because she and

her sister each owned fifty percent of the corporate shares in the Tower

Entities. She further alleged that her mother fraudulently quitclaimed the

Tower Properties, first to the Caroline Weiss Life Estate and then to the

newly created sham entities bearing substantially similar names to the Tower

Entities.

      Weiss moved to discharge the lis pendens, or alternatively, to require

the posting of an adequate bond. The trial court conducted an evidentiary

hearing and set a $2 million bond. Weiss-Ortiz failed to pay the bond, and

the trial court formally discharged the lis pendens. Fifteen days later, Weiss

mortgaged the Tower Properties in exchange for a $5 million loan from Elite

Construction Management, LLC.

      Weiss-Ortiz then filed a second amended complaint, adding derivative

claims on behalf of the Tower Entities and Intercontinental Investment

Bankers, Inc. and adding 7 at Blue Lagoon (2), LLC and Elite as defendants.

                                      3
This time, she appended to the complaint recorded deeds demonstrating the

Tower Entities’ ownership of the Tower Properties. She also attached a

myriad of other documents including corporate meeting minutes, a

shareholders’ agreement, a resignation announcement, and a recorded

disclaimer of property interest purportedly executed by Weiss.

     On February 10, 2017, Elite assigned the mortgage to Riviera

Management Services, S.A., formerly known as Toruna Management, Inc.

On December 19, 2017, Riviera assigned the mortgage to BI 27, LLC. On

March 20, 2020, BI 27 assigned the mortgage to TIG Rompsen US Master

Mortgage. The same day, Weiss remortgaged the Tower Properties in

exchange for a $21.3 million dollar loan from TIG. The loan documents were

signed by Weiss in her capacity as “manager” of the 7 at Blue Lagoon (1)

and 7 at Blue Lagoon (2).

     Meanwhile, Weiss-Ortiz and the Tower Entities amended their

complaint to add a claim, first against Toruna Management, Inc. and then

against BI 27. In the sixth amended complaint, they alleged that BI 27’s

mortgage was “not supported by consideration” and Elite approved the

original loan despite having actual knowledge that Weiss was neither the

owner of the property nor otherwise authorized to execute the mortgage.

                                     4
      Weiss-Ortiz then sought to amend the complaint again to add TIG as

a defendant. The trial court denied the request, and Weiss-Ortiz and the

Tower Entities filed a separate suit against TIG, along with another notice of

lis pendens.

      BI 27 moved for a partial final summary judgment on the sixth amended

complaint. It argued it was entitled to a final judgment pursuant to section

48.23(1)(b)2., Florida Statutes, because it acquired its lien after the trial court

discharged the original lis pendens.

      Weiss-Ortiz and the Tower Entities opposed the summary judgment on

a multitude of grounds, among them that the application of the statute was

not yet ripe for resolution because the later-recorded deeds were procured

by fraud and therefore void. The trial court granted the motion, and, in the

companion case, TIG successfully moved for dismissal and discharge of the

lis pendens on res judicata grounds. This appeal followed.

                           STANDARD OF REVIEW

      Our standard of review is de novo because this is an appeal from an

order granting summary judgment that implicates an issue of statutory

construction.    814 Prop. Holdings, LLC v. New Birth Baptist Church

Cathedral of Faith Int’l, Inc., 344 So. 3d 535, 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).

                                   ANALYSIS

                                        5
      Two well-entrenched sources of law guide our resolution of this appeal.

The first, the lis pendens statute, codified in section 48.23, Florida Statutes,

“defines the notice of lis pendens, addresses the applicability of the notice

and the extent to which the notice bars claims and other interests, prescribes

the life of the notice, and provides for renewals and the discharge of the

notice when appropriate.” The Florida Bar, James H. McCarty, Jr., Florida

Real Property Litigation ch. 11 Notice of Lis Pendens § 1 Introduction (10th

ed. 2021). The second is the unyielding legal principle that fraud in the

execution renders an instrument affecting the title to real property void.

      A notice of lis pendens serves the dual purpose of protecting “future

purchasers or encumbrancers of the property from becoming ‘embroiled’ in

the dispute, and . . . the plaintiff from ‘intervening liens that could impair any

property rights claimed.’” Fischer v. Fischer, 873 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2004) (quoting Chiusolo v. Kennedy, 614 So. 2d 491, 492 (Fla.1993)).

Although the doctrine of lis pendens traces its origins to civil common law,

De Pass v. Chitty, 105 So. 148, 149 (Fla. 1925), in Florida, a lis pendens “is

wholly statutory and includes matters well beyond simply maintaining the

status quo.” Adhin v. First Horizon Home Loans, 44 So. 3d 1245, 1252 (Fla.

5th DCA 2010). Section 48.23(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2019), the lis pendens

statute, provides, in pertinent part:

                                        6
     1. An action that is filed for specific performance or that is not
        based on a duly recorded instrument has no effect, except as
        between the parties to the proceeding, on the title to, or on
        any lien upon, the real or personal property unless a notice of
        lis pendens has been recorded and has not expired or been
        withdrawn or discharged.

     2. Any person acquiring for value an interest in, or lien upon, the
        real or personal property during the pendency of an action
        described in subparagraph 1., other than a party to the
        proceeding or the legal successor by operation of law . . . shall
        take such interest or lien exempt from all claims against the
        property that were filed in such action by the party who failed
        to record a notice of lis pendens or whose notice expired or
        was withdrawn or discharged, and from any judgment entered
        in the proceeding . . . as if such person had no actual or
        constructive notice of the proceeding or of the claims made
        therein or the documents forming the causes of action against
        the property in the proceeding.

     This court has determined that these provisions do not apply to actions

founded upon a duly recorded written instrument. See U.S. Bank Nat’l. Ass’n

v. Bevans, 138 So. 3d 1185, 1188 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). In such cases, the

proponent of the claim maintains a lis pendens as a matter of right.

     Invoking our decision in 100 Lincoln Rd SB, LLC v. Daxan 26 (FL),

LLC, 180 So. 3d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), Weiss-Ortiz and the Tower Entities

contend the second amended complaint and its progeny were founded upon

duly recorded written instruments. Thus, they argue, they maintained a lis

pendens as a matter of right. We agree that the relevant pleadings sought

a declaration of ownership based upon the assertedly superior deeds and

                                      7
accompanying documents. Although the law in this arena is far from a model

of clarity, Weiss-Ortiz and the Tower Entities persuasively argue that, under

these circumstances, any relief afforded to them under the relevant

complaints would have necessarily been “based upon, arising from, growing

out of, or resting upon” the recorded documents. Avalon Assocs. of Del. Ltd.

v. Avalon Park Assocs., Inc., 760 So. 2d 1132, 1135 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

      Further, casting aside the fact that section 48.23(1)(b) strictly insulates

nonparties and both BI 27 and TIG acquired interests from Elite, a party-

defendant to the lawsuit, this dispute involves a claim to, as distinguished

from a claim against, the Tower Properties. Weiss-Ortiz and the Tower

Entities did not seek a declaration as to the priority of the competing liens of

rival creditors. Instead, they asserted that the series of deeds conveying

ownership, first to Weiss and then the newly created entities, were

fraudulently executed and Elite was essentially a bad faith mortgagee. This

claim was factually supported by a voluminous submission filed in opposition

to summary judgment. Of course, BI 27 sharply disputed the allegations.

      Under Florida law, a deed procured by fraud in the execution is void.

See McCoy v. Love, 382 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1979). Equally axiomatic is

that a forged mortgage is a legal nullity. Jamnadas v. Singh, 731 So. 2d 69,

70 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).       Consequently, “[a] forged deed provides no

                                       8
protection to those claiming under it.” Sabawi v. Carpentier, 778 So. 2d

1091, 1092–93 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (citing McCoy, 382 So. 2d at 648)); see

also CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Porter, 261 So. 3d 739, 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

      Against these principles, we conclude the dueling summary judgment

allegations created material and triable factual issues.   Accordingly, we

reverse and remand the orders under review for further proceedings not

inconsistent herewith.

     Reversed and remanded.

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