Court Opinion

ID: 9390044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 19:02:55.313473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:31.276800
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/26/23 Walker v. Jones CA2/4
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
            SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                   DIVISION FOUR

 RICHARD WALKER,                                                   B306560

         Respondent,                                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No. 18CMFL00763)
         v.

 MICHELLE JONES,

         Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
 Angeles County, Armando Duron, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
      Law Offices of Anne Dowden Saxton, Anne Dowden Saxton
 and Travis Poteat, for Appellant.
      Law Office of Margaret Reyes and Margaret Reyes for
 Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

       Richard Walker and Michelle Jones resolved a marital
dissolution proceeding by entering into a stipulated judgment.
After entry of the stipulated judgment, a dispute arose regarding
the net proceeds from the sale of their family home (the
property). The stipulated judgment provided the net proceeds
from the sale would be divided equally. During the sale
transaction, however, it was discovered there were several
outstanding liens on the property. As relevant to this appeal,
Jones contended a lien on the property for a debt she owed to the
Employment Development Department in the amount of
$14,128.58 (the EDD debt) was a community property debt, and
therefore, the debt should be paid equally by the parties from the
proceeds of the sale. Walker countered the EDD debt was Jones’s
separate property debt; thus, he argued, it was improper for the
community to pay the debt from the proceeds of the sale. The
trial court agreed with Walker, and ordered Jones to reimburse
Walker for half of the EDD debt. Jones’s sole contention on
appeal is the trial court erred by finding the EDD debt was
Jones’s separate property. Because Jones failed to meet her
burden on appeal to affirmatively demonstrate error, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Jones and Walker were married on December 29, 2015 and
separated on September 10, 2018. The parties entered into a
settlement agreement, which was entered as a judgment of the
court on October 30, 2019 (the stipulated judgment). Regarding
the sale of the property, the stipulated judgment provided as
follows: the net proceeds from the sale of the property will be
divided equally; each party will pay half of the delinquent

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property taxes (to be paid from proceeds of the sale of the
property); and Jones shall pay the delinquent mortgage (except
one-third or up to $3,000 to be paid from Walker’s share of the
home proceeds). It further provided: “If either party fails to
cooperate in the listing or sale of the property then the aggrieved
party may on Ex Parte request the Court Clerk to sign any
necessary documents.”
       The following month, Jones filed an ex parte request for
order based on Walker’s failure to sign closing documents for
the sale of the property. In response, Walker filed a declaration
explaining he is not opposed to the sale of the property, but based
on his position that the EDD debt is Jones’s separate property, he
does not want “[Escrow] to pay to the lienholders monies that is
meant to be community propert[y] . . . especially since [Jones]
neither disclose[d] [n]or took responsibility [for] paying for these
debts.” After a hearing, the court requested Walker sign the
closing documents so the sale of the property would go through
and the EDD debt would be paid from the proceeds of the sale.1
The court explained: “[T]he problem is that if this sale does not go
through, then I expect the buyers will sue you. So the only way to
mitigate the damages . . . is to allow the sale to go through at this
time and figure out what it is, if anything, that your former wife
owes you from this.”
       After the sale of the property closed, on January 8, 2020,
the trial court held a hearing on an accounting of the proceeds
from the sale. As relevant here, the trial court held: “[T]he [EDD]

1     The court asked Walker whether he was willing to sign the
closing documents, or whether Walker wanted the court to order
the clerk to sign the documents. Walker responded that he would
sign.

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debt was disclosed, but it was specifically disclosed [by Jones] as
[her] separate property debt [¶] . . .[¶] It was specifically listed on
page 4 of the schedule of assets . . . . It was not alleged to have
been a community property debt. It was disclosed as a separate
property, [Jones’s] separate property . . . . So she disclosed it, yes,
but as her separate property and, therefore, the court finds that
the debt was all [Jones’s] debt, and she owes [Walker] $7,064.29
which represents half of that debt.”2 On February 21, 2020, the
trial court signed a “Findings and Order after Hearing” (the
FOAH) reflecting its ruling. Jones appeals from the FOAH.

                           DISCUSSION

      As a threshold matter, we first address Walker’s contention
that this appeal should be dismissed based on a technical defect
in the notice of appeal. In her opening brief, Jones’s counsel
concedes she “inadvertently checked the wrong box” on the notice
of appeal by checking the box for an “order or judgment under
Code of Civil Procedure, § 904.1(a)(3)-(13)” rather than checking
the box for an order after judgment. The notice of appeal correctly

2     We deny Jones’s motion to augment the record to include
the Schedule of Assets and Debts (referenced by the trial court)
and her motion to file it under seal. The form states: “THIS
FORM SHOULD NOT BE FILED WITH THE COURT.” The
only relevant portion of this document on appeal is where Jones
marked her EDD debt as her separate property. Neither party
contests the trial court’s finding that Jones disclosed the EDD
debt as her separate property. She did so by placing the letter “R”
(meaning Respondent) next to the line on that schedule
referencing the EDD debt. Thus, it is unnecessary to file the
document. We also deny as unnecessary her motion to augment
the record to include her Declaration of Disclosure and Income
and Expense Declaration.

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states, however, that Jones is appealing from an order dated
February 21, 2020. Walker does not argue any other order was
filed on that date. Nor does he argue he was prejudiced by the
error. We therefore liberally construe the notice to apply to the
FOAH. (See, e.g., Norco Delivery Service, Inc. v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 955, 960-961 [“It is
axiomatic that notices of appeal will be liberally construed to
implement the strong public policy favoring the hearing of
appeals on the merits. [Citation.] This policy is especially vital
where the faulty notice of appeal engenders no prejudice and
causes no confusion concerning the scope of the appeal”].)
       Turning to the merits of the appeal, Jones contends the
trial court erred by finding the EDD debt was Jones’s separate
property because (1) the EDD debt was incurred primarily during
marriage; and (2) there was no writing indicating a clear and
unambiguous intent to transform the community debt into
Jones’s separate debt. These arguments miss the point, however.
As discussed above, the trial court based its finding regarding the
characterization of the EDD debt on the fact Jones specifically
disclosed the debt as her separate property before entering into
the settlement agreement. Relying on this disclosure, the
stipulated judgment makes no mention of the EDD debt. Under
Family Code section 2556, a “party may file a postjudgment
motion or order to show cause in the proceeding in order to obtain
adjudication of any community estate asset or liability omitted or
not adjudicated by the judgment.” Thus, under Family Code
section 2556, Jones could have: (1) argued the EDD debt was not
adjudicated; and (2) submitted evidence demonstrating the debt
was community property despite her designation of the debt as
separate property. So far as we can determine on the record

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before us, however, Jones failed to do so. We therefore conclude
the trial court did not err by finding the EDD debt was Jones’s
separate property based on Jones’s own admission in her
schedule of assets and debts, and the absence of any documentary
evidence to the contrary. (See People v. Sanghera (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573 [“Perhaps the most fundamental rule of
appellate law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is
presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to
affirmatively demonstrate error”].)
       We reject Jones’s argument that there was “ample evidence
and testimony” demonstrating her disclosure of the EDD debt as
her separate property was “possib[ly]” a “scrivener’s error.” The
only evidence Jones presented in the trial court was her
testimony that a portion of the debt was incurred during
marriage3 and that she wrote the years “2015-2017” next to the
EDD debt on the schedule of assets and debt form. Jones failed to
direct us to – and we could not locate – any documentary
evidence in the record (i.e., an EDD statement) showing the dates
she incurred the EDD debt. Thus, even assuming Jones’s
designation of the EDD debt was a “scrivener’s error,” Jones
failed to present evidence from which the trial court could
determine which portion of the debt was incurred during
marriage. Moreover, the record is devoid of evidence regarding
whether the community received the benefit of the overpayment
from the EDD. (See In re Marriage of Bell (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th
300, 310 [finding the money wife paid to her employer to settle an
action arising out of her embezzlement of funds from her
employer during marriage was community property debt where

3     Jones testified the “overpayment” from the EDD began in
2015, before she was married, and continued until 2017.

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“there was uncontradicted testimony that the community
received the benefit of the embezzlement” and “it was clear that
all the embezzled funds had been put to community, and not
separate, use”].) Jones, therefore, has not demonstrated the trial
court erred by finding the EDD debt was her separate property.
(People v. Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573.)
       Finally, we reject Jones’s argument that Walker expressly
waived reimbursement of the EDD debt in the stipulated
judgment. The stipulated judgment provides various waivers
under the heading “WAIVERS AND RELEASES,” including
“[c]laims from Petitioner to Respondent or from Respondent
to Petitioner in connection with the division of community
property . . . .” As noted above, the EDD debt was not mentioned
in the stipulated judgment, and Jones disclosed the debt as her
separate property. Jones did not argue the EDD debt was
community property until after the parties entered into the
stipulated judgment. Walker could not, therefore, have waived
his right to counter an argument made by Jones for the first time
after entry of the stipulated judgment.
       Accordingly, we conclude that, on this record, the trial
court did not err by finding the EDD debt was Jones’s separate
property debt. Because the EDD debt was paid from the
community proceeds of the sale of the property, the court
properly ordered Jones to reimburse Walker for half of the EDD
debt.

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                         DISPOSITION

     The order is affirmed. Walker is awarded his costs on
appeal.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORT

                                              CURREY, Acting P.J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

DAUM, J.*

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.

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