Court Opinion

ID: 9475567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:31:19.275445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:47.393910
License: Public Domain

FAGG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
After reviewing Missouri law, the district court rejected Stephens’ arguments and sustained ADG’s motion to dismiss based on the two-year statute of limitations. The court indicated that the facts stated in the complaint demonstrate Stephens was not hindered or otherwise prevented from bringing this suit at an earlier time. Consequently, the district court concluded that under Missouri law this action was time-barred.
In reaching its decision to reverse, this court focuses on some loose language in the district court’s opinion. Nevertheless, the district court’s bottom line is clear: Under Missouri law, the pleaded facts do not state a claim on which relief can be granted. When state law is unclear, we give substantial deference to the interpretation of the federal district court sitting in the state forum unless that interpretation is “ ‘fundamentally deficient in analysis or otherwise lacking in reasoned authority.’ ” Dabney v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 761 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir.) (quoting Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Burlington N.R.R., 707 F.2d 1002, 1003 (8th Cir.1983)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 233, 88 L.Ed.2d 232 (1985). Here, this court indicates that the district court faced an issue of first impression under Missouri law. See ante at 813. Thus, the rule of substantial deference is applicable. See Tharalson v. Pfizer Genetics, Inc., 728 F.2d 1108, 1111 (8th Cir.1984).
Based on Missouri law the district court determined that ADG’s actions, as stated by Stephens, were not improper acts and were not sufficient to estop ADG from asserting the statute of limitations defense. Because I cannot conclude the district court’s interpretation of Missouri law is unreasonable, I would affirm that court’s judgment.