Court Opinion

ID: 9763413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:44:32.016204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:42.485146
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
BIERY, Justice.
John Hancock’s motion for rehearing invites this court to reexamine its disposition of this summary judgment proceeding in light of John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Esparza, 286 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1955, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In *435Esparza, the insured permitted his insurance to lapse for non-payment of a premium, and thereafter, the insurer submitted to him an application for reinstatement. Id. at 696. When filling out the form, the insured stated: (1) he was in sound health, (2) during the period of his default in paying the premium he had not suffered from any disease or had symptoms of such, and (3) he had not consulted or been treated by a physician or other practitioner. In fact, he had been to seven doctors and was under daily treatment for cancer of the bone, hands, arms and chest; two months and two days after he made the statements, the insured died of cancer. Id.
The insurer brought suit to cancel the policy alleging fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at 695-96. Trial was to a jury, which found that the insured’s misrepresentations were not intentionally made. Id. at 696. On appeal, the insurer argued its motion to disregard the jury answers on intent and for judgment non obstante vere-dicto should have been granted because the uncontradicted evidence was that the false statements were intentionally made. Es-parza, 286 S.W.2d at 696. This court reviewed the record “for any evidence” supporting the jury answers on lack of intent, but determined:
The motion for judgment non obstante veredicto should have been granted. We conclude, in any event, the finding that there was no intent to deceive is against the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence.
Id. at 696, 697. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and rendered canceling the policy. Id. at 697.
Unlike the plaintiff in Esparza, the insured in this case has not had the benefit of a jury trial.1 The law in Texas is well settled that summary judgment is a harsh remedy which must be strictly construed. Bryant v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1990, writ denied), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126, 111 S.Ct. 1090, 112 L.Ed.2d 1194 (1991). This is because a summary proceeding is “not a conventional trial, but an exception to the usual and traditional formal procedure whereby witnesses are heard in open court and documentary proof is offered and received into evidence.” Richards v. Allen, 402 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tex.1966). A summary judgment should not amount to a trial by deposition or affidavit, or be resolved by weighing the relative strength of the conflicting facts and inferences. Gaines v. Hamman, 163 Tex. 618, 626, 358 S.W.2d 557, 562-63 (Tex.1962). Stated another way:
[A]s originally introduced into the common-law system, summary proceedings were not available in cases ... which in their very nature tend, in justice to all parties, to require the full development of all the facts on a jury trial, including examination in court of all available witnesses, whether friendly, impartial, or adverse. It [is not] the purpose of the rule “to provide a substitute for existing methods in the trial of issues of fact or to furnish a way for anticipatory determination of questions of law.”
Pattison v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 292 S.W.2d 694, 699 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1956, writ ref d n.r.e.) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
For these reasons, the presumptions and burden of proof that are applicable to a conventional trial are immaterial to the burdens faced by the movant and non-movant in a summary judgment proceeding. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. City of Dallas, 623 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex.1981); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 774 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1087, 111 S.Ct. 963, 112 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1991) (presumption of validity usually afforded governmental decisions cannot be used to affirmatively sustain movant’s summary judgment burden when attacking constitutionality of zoning ordinances); see generally Timothy Patton, Summary Judgments in Texas § 1.02 (1992). For example, the burden on a defendant/movant seeking summary judgment on a plaintiff’s cause of action is not the same burden the defendant must satisfy to obtain an instructed *436verdict in a trial on the merits. See Lesbrookton, Inc. v. Jackson, 796 S.W.2d 276, 285-86 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1990, writ denied) (while absence of evidence on one element of plaintiff’s fraud claim might entitle defendant to instructed verdict, it would not entitle defendant to summary judgment); Flores v. H.E. Butt Stores, Inc., 791 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied) (motion for summary judgment incorrect to extent based on “no evidence” directed verdict standard). While the defendant is entitled to an instructed verdict if the plaintiff fails to introduce evidence on one element of his case, the defendant is not entitled to a summary judgment based on the failure of the plaintiff to sustain the burden it would have at a trial on the merits. See State v. Seventeen Thousand and No/100 Dollars U.S. Currency, 809 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (discussing distinction between plaintiffs failure to raise fact issue and defendant’s conclusively disproving plaintiff’s claim). Even if the defendant’s motion for summary judgment represents proof demonstrating the plaintiff will likely lose by a directed verdict at trial, the defendant is not entitled to a summary judgment based on the weakness of the plaintiff’s claims. Jones v. General Elec. Co., 543 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Stated another way, the defendant in state court is not entitled to a summary judgment merely because there is “no evidence” to support the plaintiff’s allegations. See id; see also Gibbs v. General Motors, Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.1970) (question on appeal is whether summary judgment proof establishes as a matter of law no genuine issue of material fact exists, not whether proof raises fact issue). In federal practice, however, a defendant moving for summary judgment may discharge his burden by showing that there is no evidence to support one or more elements of the plaintiff’s case. International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Intercontinental Mfg. Co., 812 F.2d 219, 222 (5th Cir.1987); see generally Timothy Patton, Summary Judgments in Texas § 5.03[2][c] 5.03[2][c] (1992).2
In addition to this general cautionary approach to summary judgments, Texas courts have recognized that even greater care should be taken when considering summary judgment motions in select categories of litigation. As discussed in our original opinion, “summary judgment has rarely been viewed as appropriate when the issue is inherently one for a jury or judge, as in cases involving intent, reliance, uncertainty, unliquidated damages, and discretion.” Timothy Patton, Summary Judgments in Texas § 1.02 (1992) (emphasis added); see also El Paso Assocs., Ltd. v. J.R. Thurman & Co., 786 S.W.2d 17, 21 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1990, no writ); Dan Lawson & Assocs. v. Miller, 742 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1987, no writ); *437Moeller v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 610 S.W.2d 857, 862 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Kolb v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 585 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Based on the foregoing analysis, John Hancock’s motion for rehearing is denied.

. If John Hancock suffers an adverse verdict in this case, Esparza may then have an effect.

. In Casso v. Brand, the Texas Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that state law places, or should place, the identical burden which is placed on the non-movant in a federal summary proceeding stating:
Summary judgments in federal courts are based on different assumptions, with different purposes, than summary judgments in Texas. In the federal system, "[sjummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’ Thus, federal courts place responsibilities on both movants and non-movants in the summary judgment process....”
Texas law, of course, is different. While the language of our rule is similar, our interpretation of that language is not. We use summary judgments merely "to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses,” and we never shift the burden of proof to the non-movant unless and until the movant has "establish[edj his entitlement to a summary judgment on the issues expressly presented to the trial court by conclusively proving all essential elements of his cause of action or defense as a matter of law.”
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Moreover, we see no overriding policy reasons for modifying our summary judgment standards under the common law. While some commentators have urged us to adopt the current federal approach to summary judgments generally, we believe our own procedure eliminates patently unmeritorious cases while giving due regard for the right to a jury determination of disputed fact questions.
776 S.W.2d 551, 555-57 (Tex.1989) (citations omitted).