Court Opinion

ID: 9773869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:01:39.210292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:58.624050
License: Public Domain

*284DISSENTING OPINION
BY KELLY, J.:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s omission of an explicit mens rea instruction from the jury charge was harmless error.1 As the majority notes, the bribery statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4701, does not contain an express mens rea requirement; thus, the default culpability requirement set forth in section 802(c) applies. See Commonwealth v. Parmar, 551 Pa. 318, 710 A.2d 1083, 1088 (1998).
It is well-settled that when reviewing the adequacy of a jury instruction, we must consider the charge in its entirety to determine if it is fair and complete. The trial court has broad discretion in phrasing the charge and the instruction will not be found in error if, taken as a whole, it adequately and accurately set forth the applicable law.
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 600 Pa. 1, 963 A.2d 409, 430 (2009). Additionally, “under the harmless error doctrine, the judgment of sentence will be affirmed in spite of the error only where the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Commonwealth v. Bullock, 590 Pa. 480, 913 A.2d 207, 218 (2006).
In Commonwealth v. Woosnam, 819 A.2d 1198 (Pa.Super.2003), the defendant was convicted by a jury of accidents involving death or personal injury,2 which does not contain an express mens rea requirement. Id. at 1204. This Court held that the mens rea requirement of negligence, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(4) applied, and that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on that requirement was reversible error, warranting the grant of a new trial. Id. at 1207.
Instantly, because the default culpability requirement of section 302(c) applies to the bribery statute, Appellant was entitled to an instruction concerning whether he acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. The record indicates that, after the jury began deliberations, it twice asked the court to repeat the definition of bribery. (N.T. Trial, 11/20/07, at 243-44, 248). After the second clarification, Appellant’s counsel argued that the jury may have been confused by the lack of a culpability requirement in the definition of bribery given by the court. (Id, at 258). Thus, I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the culpability requirement did not contribute to the verdict. See Bullock, supra. For this reason, I would vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.
Because I would remand for a new trial, I would not reach the first issue, whether the evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant’s guilt.

. Appellant preserved his jury instruction claim by objecting to the trial court's instruction, in compliance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(B). Although the objection was not transcribed, the trial court confirmed that it was raised at sidebar. (See Trial Ct. Op., 2/2/09, at 2 n. 2).

. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3742.