Court Opinion

ID: 9894200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 20:04:04.980108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:59.868309
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/31/23 P. v. Allen CA2/1
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                          DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         B312097

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. BA460946)
           v.

 MARJON ALLEN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      Appeal from judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Kathleen Kennedy, Judge. Affirmed.
      The Law Office of J. Blacknell and Kellen I. Davis for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                             ______________________________
       In August 2017, surveillance camera footage captured
an individual exit his vehicle and fatally shoot Kevin Williams
(Williams) and Dewayne Childs (Childs) as they walked near
1019 East 84th Place in Los Angeles, California.
       Detectives could not determine the shooter’s identity from
the footage alone, and they located no eyewitnesses to the crime.
The shooter’s vehicle, however, was distinctive, and detectives
obtained additional surveillance footage that captured the vehicle
driving toward the scene of the shooting and subsequently fleeing.
With the exception of the driver’s hand on the steering wheel,
the additional surveillance footage did not capture any images of
the driver. But the footage and the murder vehicle’s distinctive
characteristics nonetheless permitted detectives to determine that
Erin Baylor (Baylor) owned the vehicle.
       Through subsequent investigation, detectives learned that
Baylor’s boyfriend, appellant Marjon Allen (Allen), had regular
access to Baylor’s car. In addition, Allen’s Facebook records,
tattoos, and other evidence suggested he was an active member
of the Rolling 30s Crips gang. And tattoos on the body of victim
Williams suggested that he was a member of the rival Rolling 20s
Bloods gang. Finally, with assistance from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), detectives obtained an analysis of the location
of Allen’s cell phone on the date of the shooting. The analysis
placed Allen’s phone within the range of a surveillance camera
that captured Baylor’s vehicle fleeing the scene approximately five
minutes after the shooting.
       Based on this evidence, the District Attorney’s Office charged
Allen with the murders of Williams and Childs. The charging
document included allegations that Allen committed the murders
for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of Penal

                                    2
Code section 186.22, subdivision (b).1 The jury convicted Allen
on both murder counts, but found “not true” the gang enhancement
allegations. The trial court imposed a sentence of 150 years to life.
       Allen now asks us to reverse his convictions, advancing
four arguments. First, Assembly Bill No. 333’s (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) amendments to section 186.22 render certain gang-related
evidence introduced at trial inadmissible. Second, the trial court
improperly admitted the report documenting the FBI’s cellular
site analysis because the agent who prepared the report did not
testify at trial. Third, the prosecution failed to introduce sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s verdicts. Fourth, the trial court erred
in denying Allen’s section 1118.1 motion for a judgment of acquittal.
And fifth, the court erroneously denied Allen’s motion for a new
trial.
       We conclude, however, that Allen is not entitled to relief.
Allen fails to demonstrate any prejudice from the admission of the
challenged gang and cell site analysis evidence. And while we agree
the evidence of Allen’s guilt was not overwhelming, we find that
the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to permit a rational
trier of fact to return guilty verdicts. Finally, we are unpersuaded
by Allen’s arguments challenging the trial court’s denial of his
section 1118.1 and new trial motions, as they depend largely on the
same arguments he raises concerning the admissibility of the gang
and cell site evidence, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence as a
whole.
       Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

      1 All subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

                                      3
   FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
      A.    The Shooting
      On August 17, 2017, at approximately 1:32 p.m., a
surveillance camera captured footage of a gray or silver sedan
approaching Childs and Williams as they walked along East
84th Place in Los Angeles, California. The car stopped near
1019 East 84th Place, and the driver exited the vehicle and
opened fire, striking and killing both men. Law enforcement
did not locate any eyewitnesses who observed the shooting. A
subsequent autopsy confirmed that Childs died from a gunshot
wound to the back, and Williams died from a gunshot wound to
the chest.

      B.    The Trial
       On September 6, 2017, authorities arrested Allen and his
girlfriend of three years, Baylor, in connection with the shooting.
The District Attorney’s Office subsequently charged Allen3 with
two counts of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) (counts 1 and 2) and one
count of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1))
(count 3). The information alleged further that Allen had used
a firearm in committing the murders (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)),
and that all three alleged crimes were “committed for the benefit
of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street
gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in
criminal conduct by gang members” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).

      2 We summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
      3 The District Attorney’s Office did not charge Baylor in
connection with the shooting.

                                      4
       At the September 2019 trial in the case, the prosecution
presented several categories of evidence rebutting Allen’s
contention that detectives has misidentified him as the shooter,
including: (1) surveillance footage and eyewitness testimony
identifying Baylor’s silver Toyota Corolla as the murder vehicle,
(2) testimony and Facebook records establishing Allen’s regular
access to Baylor’s car, (3) testimony and Facebook records
suggesting Allen’s membership and active involvement in the
Rolling 30s Crips gang, as well as testimony indicating that
victim Williams was a member of the rival Rolling 20s Bloods
gang, and (4) cell site analysis (a) placing Allen’s cell phone within
the range of a surveillance camera 1.5 miles from the crime scene
approximately five minutes after the shooting, and (b) suggesting
that Allen’s phone continued traveling west—in the same direction
as Baylor’s vehicle—after the shooting.
       The defense focused its trial presentation on two categories
of evidence produced by the prosecution: (1) eyewitness testimony
and photographic evidence describing the person driving Baylor’s
car on the day of the murders as “light-skinned,” and (2) DNA
evidence obtained from a lip balm recovered from the scene of the
shooting that did not match Allen’s DNA, but did match another,
unidentified male.

            1.    Evidence identifying Baylor’s car as the
                  murder vehicle
      The prosecution introduced several surveillance videos
obtained from cameras at five different addresses. One video
captured the shooter’s vehicle approximately half a mile from the
crime scene in the minutes prior to the murders, and another video
captured the shooting itself. The remaining videos captured the
vehicle driving away from the scene of the shooting, eventually
heading west. The shooter is visible, but not identifiable, in the

                                      5
video of the murders. In one other video, the driver’s hand is visible
on the car’s steering wheel. None of the remaining surveillance
videos captured an image of the driver.
       The gray or silver sedan in the surveillance footage had
several distinctive features: (1) an uber sticker and a vehicle
service sticker placed prominently in the lower right portion of
the front windshield, (2) very dark, tinted windows, (3) visible
damage to the front passenger door, and (4) paper license plates.
Baylor testified at trial that these features all matched her own
2017 silver Toyota Corolla.
       In addition, the prosecution offered testimony from two
eyewitnesses, Jonathan E.4 and Cherri Davis, who observed the
sedan driving away from the scene of the shooting. Jonathan E.
testified that the car was a “newer model” white Toyota Corolla—
a description that (with the exception of color) matched Baylor’s
vehicle. Jonathan testified further that he “was only able to see
the figure of the driver,” did not observe the driver’s race, ethnicity,
or hair color, and did not observe a passenger in the car.
       Cherri Davis (also known as Cherri Brown) testified that she
was walking south on Wadsworth Avenue just north of 84th Place
when she heard gunshots. She then saw a “grayish[,] brownish . . .
newer car” come out of an alley and head south toward 85th Street.
She testified further that both victims lived in the neighborhood
where she had observed the car, that she had attended high school
with Williams, and that Childs was one of her best friends.
       A field interview card prepared by Officer Ramon Lomeli—
one of the first officers to respond to the crime scene—reflected that,

      4 Because Jonathan E. was 15 years old at the time he
testified, the record identifies him only by his first name and the
first initial of his last name.

                                      6
on the date of the shooting a “Terry Brown” stated that the
driver of the suspect vehicle was “a possible male Hispanic.”
In addition, the day following the shooting, Davis told detectives
in a recorded interview that she had seen the vehicle’s driver and,
while she “didn’t know if he was Mexican or Black[,] . . . [h]e was
light[-]skinned.” At trial, however, Davis denied making any such
statements.

            2.    Testimony concerning access to Baylor’s
                  vehicle
       The prosecution also presented several pieces of evidence
concerning Allen’s access to Baylor’s car.
       Detective Gabriel Ruiz, one of the lead detectives on the case,
testified that when he first interviewed Baylor, she told him that
she and Allen were the only people who drove her car. She made
this statement before Detective Ruiz had disclosed to her that he
was conducting a murder investigation.
       At trial, however, Baylor testified that people in addition to
Allen had access to her car, including her mother, her sister, and
her female cousin. She testified further that her sister’s boyfriend
and her cousin’s boyfriend “probably” drove the car “like once or
twice.”
       Baylor initially testified that she believed she had driven
herself to work in Culver City on the day of the murders—implying
that her car necessarily must have been in Culver City, far from
the murder scene, at the time of the shooting. But when the deputy
district attorney presented her with a Facebook post indicating she
had been in Compton (also a significant distance from the murder
scene) on the date of the shooting, she testified that the Facebook
post was accurate.
       Finally, the prosecution introduced three additional pieces
of evidence concerning Allen’s access to Baylor’s car: (1) a traffic

                                     7
citation issued to Allen while he was driving the car on June 13,
2017 (approximately two months before the shooting), (2) multiple
messages sent from Allen’s Facebook account to other Facebook
users between May and June 2017 in which the user of Allen’s
account states he is driving a “ ‘gray Toyota,’ ” and (3) a photograph
of Allen posted on Facebook standing next to a silver Toyota Corolla
with paper license plates.

            3.    Gang-related evidence
       In support of its theory that Allen committed the shooting
due to a gang rivalry, as well as to prove the gang enhancement
allegations charged, the prosecution introduced several categories
of gang-related evidence at trial.
       First, the prosecution presented evidence concerning the
rivalry between the Crips and Bloods gangs, including a map and
testimony regarding their respective territories. Officer Daniel
Hoops, the prosecution’s expert on the Rolling 20s Bloods gang,
testified that the Rolling 30s Crips feud with the Rolling 20s Bloods,
and that the rivalry has resulted in “several assaults[,] shootings,
as well as homicides.” Officer Eli Huacuja, an expert on the
Rolling 30s Crips gang, testified that the Rolling 30s Crips also
feud with the Swan Bloods because they are another Bloods gang.
He testified further that the shooting here occurred within the
Swan Bloods’ territory.
       Second, the prosecution offered evidence supporting Allen’s
active membership in the Rolling 30s Crips gang and his desire to
harm members of rival Bloods gangs. Officer Huacuja opined that
Allen was a member of the Rolling 30s Crips gang. He testified
that when he met Allen in May 2017, Allen was in the presence
of “three other Rolling 30[s] [Crips] gang members.” He testified
further that Martin Luther King Park in Los Angeles is a regular

                                     8
Rolling 30s Crips “hangout,” and Baylor, Allen’s girlfriend, testified
that she and Allen sometimes spent time at that park.
       Officer Huacuja also testified that Allen’s tattoos—including
the clover tattoo on Allen’s neck—demonstrated his membership in
the Rolling 30s Crips gang, as did a number of photographs posted
to Facebook showing Allen making gang signs. And he opined that
photographs showing Allen wearing a Minnesota Twins baseball
cap bearing a “TC” logo were consistent with his gang membership
because “TC” stands not only for “Twin City,” but also “Thirty
Crips.”
       Finally, Officer Huacuja testified concerning the meaning of
gang-related abbreviations and terminology used in posts on Allen’s
Facebook account. He explained that references to “BK” on Allen’s
Facebook page stood for “Blood Killer.” “DG,” he explained—an
abbreviation that appeared in many of Allen’s posts—referred to
“Dirt Gang,” a group within the Rolling 30s Crips gang. And Officer
Huacuja testified that the “Oak PARC[s]” in the following Facebook
post from Allen’s account referred to the Northern California-based
Oak Park Bloods gang:
       “Ima catch one of these oak PARC[s] . . . . and beat the shit
out of ’em. [I]t’s not a fuccing game.”5
       Third, the deputy district attorney offered evidence
supporting that Williams was a member of the rival Rolling
20s Bloods gang. Officer Hoops testified that victim Williams’s
tattoos—including the “2” and “0” on his right and left shins—were
consistent with membership in the Rolling 20s Bloods. Officer

      5 The prosecution also introduced a post made by Allen’s
Facebook account four hours after the “Oak Park” post in which
the user of the account writes, “ ‘o[n ]m[y ]w[ay] 2k Sacramento.’ ”

                                     9
Huacuja also opined that Williams was a Rolling 20s Bloods gang
member based on his tattoos.
       Fourth, and finally, the prosecution introduced evidence
specific to proving the gang enhancements charged under
section 186.22. To establish that the Rollings 30s Crips met the
definition of a criminal street gang, the prosecution offered two
prior convictions—one for possession of a firearm by a felon and
one for robbery—of individuals that Officer Huacuja testified were
Rolling 30s Crips gang members. Officer Huacuja opined further
that a crime similar to the one committed here “would be committed
for the benefit of a criminal street gang with the specific intent to
further, promote or assist in criminal conduct by gang members.”

            4.    Cell site analysis evidence
       The prosecution introduced at trial AT&T’s call detail
records for Allen’s phone number—i.e., records of the date, time,
and duration of phone calls and texts to and from his phone, as
well as information concerning the location of the specific cell tower
utilized to complete each call or text.
       The prosecution also introduced a four-page report prepared
by FBI Special Agent Michael Easter, a member of the FBI’s
Cellular Analysis Survey Team (CAST). The report contained a
cover page, a one-page summary of the methodology Agent Easter
used in analyzing the call detail records, another page consisting
of two graphics depicting examples of cell towers and their “sector
orientations,” and a one-page map reflecting Agent Easter’s
conclusions concerning the approximate location of Allen’s cell
phone following the shooting.
       The map indicated that, at approximately 1:37 p.m.—five
minutes after the shooting—Allen’s phone connected with a cell
tower located approximately twelve streets to the west of the

                                     10
crime scene. This connection coincided with surveillance video
that captured Baylor’s vehicle driving west, away from the scene
of the shooting, at approximately 1:37 p.m. The map also reflected
the approximate location of Allen’s phone (even further west from
the crime scene) when his phone made additional calls at 1:54 p.m.
and 1:58 p.m.
       Because Agent Easter had a scheduling conflict, Special
Agent Meredith Sparano—another FBI CAST agent—testified
concerning the call detail records. She stated that she personally
analyzed the records, with a particular emphasis on calls placed
between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. on the date of the shooting. She
testified further that she conducted her own analysis of the data
and conclusions in Agent Easter’s report, and that she agreed with
the report’s conclusions: “I conducted my own peer review [of the
report] using a different mapping software to ensure that it came
up with the same conclusions.”
       Using the graphics in Agent Easter’s report as
demonstratives, she explained that call detail records identify
the “azimuth, or sector,” of the cell tower through which a logged
call connects: “So your sector—there’s typically three sectors
of a tower—are 120 degrees. That’s going to be the center point.
And 60 degrees off of those will be your pie wedge to what side
of the tower that cell phone is going.” She explained further
that, based on the call detail records, “[a]t 1:37:25 p.m., [Allen’s
phone] . . . hit on cell tower with a cell I.D. of 4271 on an Eastern-
facing sector. That was an azimuth of 100. So the user of that
phone was in the vicinity of the coverage area for the eastern
facing sector of that tower. Then at 1:54 p.m. and 1:58 p.m., cell
site activations were in the Northern facing sector. That was a
350-degree azimuth for cell I.D. 24683.”

                                     11
         Based on her analysis, Agent Sparano ultimately concluded
that the call detail records were “consistent with a person [in
possession of Allen’s phone] driving west past the 110 [freeway]
and Manchester at 1:37 [p.m.]”—i.e., the location of the security
camera 1.5 miles from the shooting that captured Baylor’s car at
approximately 1:37 p.m. She concluded further that the call detail
records were consistent with that same person “then continuing to
drive west to an area closer to Manchester and Van Ness and then
making a call there at 1:54 p.m.” Finally, Agent Sparano concluded
that the cell site analysis was inconsistent with Allen’s phone being
in his residence at the time of the 1:37 p.m. call: “It would not be
consistent. So that address[, 1121 East 113th Street,] is actually
about five miles southwest of [the relevant cell] tower location.”
         Agent Sparano conceded, however, that sector identifications,
including those in Agent Easter’s map, “just . . . show
approximations.” She explained that, in selecting a tower for
connection, “our phone is trying to select the clearest, strongest
signal,” and “typically that’s going to be the tower that it’s closest
to . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . however that’s not always the case due to
natural landscapes, if there’s buildings that are shooting up.”
But even if a phone does not connect to the tower closest to it,
Agent Sparano testified that in a dense urban environment like
Los Angeles, she would not expect “a cell phone to connect with a
cell tower that was a couple miles away where there were multiple
cell towers in between that tower and the phone.”
         On cross-examination, Agent Sparano agreed that the
1:37 p.m. call from Allen’s phone did not appear to have connected
to the cell phone tower (represented by a blue dot on Agent Easter’s
map) closest to the surveillance camera that captured video of
Baylor’s car at approximately 1:37 p.m.

                                     12
            5.    DNA Evidence
       Detectives recovered 9-millimeter shell casings,6 a lip balm,
and a matchbook from the scene of the shooting. They attempted
to test each item for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, but
none contained a DNA sample sufficient to permit analysis by the
Los Angeles Police Department’s laboratory.
       One of the investigating detectives, however, theorized that
the lip balm might have fallen from the shooter’s car when he exited
the vehicle. Detectives therefore sent the lip balm to an outside
lab for DNA testing using a more sensitive technique. The outside
lab was able to perform a DNA analysis and concluded that Allen’s
DNA was not present in the lip balm. Instead, the DNA retrieved
from the lip balm was consistent with an unidentified male.
       The defense argued at trial that this DNA analysis eliminated
Allen as a potential suspect. The prosecution responded by
introducing footage from the body camera of one of the officers who
responded to the scene of the shooting. Detective Ruiz testified
that the footage captured an unidentified male picking up from the
gutter and then tossing into the scene an item that might have been
the lip balm. The deputy district attorney then argued in closing
that “the placement of [the] lip balm is . . . not even consistent with
having been dropped by the shooter.” “I think that for whatever
reason, before the police got there this guy sees this lip balm in the
gutter. Picks it up. Walks back across the street and then realizes

      6 Detectives never recovered the murder weapon.    And
a National Integrated Ballistic Information Network analysis
indicated that the shell casings recovered from the scene did not
match those recovered from any other shooting or homicide.
The prosecution, however, did introduce a photograph of Allen
holding a gun that Detective Ruiz testified appeared to be either
a 9-millimeter or .40-caliber Beretta firearm.

                                     13
a minute later ‘maybe I shouldn’t have done that.’ Then he throws
it back down on the ground. And that’s how it ends up there.”

            6.    Evidence Concerning the Shooter’s Skin
                  Color
       As noted, ante, Cherri Davis told detectives in a recorded
interview the day after the shooting that the vehicle’s driver was
a “light-skinned” Mexican or Black male. The defense emphasized
this evidence at trial, arguing that Allen was not “light-skinned”
and therefore could not have been the shooter: “Now, it’s very clear,
and you can see it for yourself; Mr. Marjon Davis, first of all, he
is not an Hispanic. I am an Hispanic. Okay. And he is not light-
skinned.”
       In response, the prosecution introduced a still photograph
from the surveillance video that captured the driver’s hand.
Detective Ruiz testified that “the skin tone [of] the driver’s hand
[in the photograph] appear[ed] to be consistent with . . . Allen[’s]”
skin tone. He conceded, however, that others might have a
different opinion of the driver’s skin tone.
       The defense therefore presented in its case-in-chief Baylor’s
testimony that, in her opinion, the hand in the photograph “look[ed]
like a light-skinned person.”

      C.    Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant
            to Section 1118.1
      At the close of evidence, defense counsel moved for a
judgment of acquittal for insufficient evidence, pursuant to
section 1118.1.7 Although the trial court expressed its view

      7 Section 1118.1 provides, in relevant part:  “In a case tried
before a jury, the court on motion of the defendant or on its own
motion, at the close of the evidence on either side and before the

                                     14
that the “case [was] difficult,” it ultimately concluded that the
prosecution had submitted sufficient evidence to permit the
jury to consider the case.

      D.    Jury Questions and Verdicts
       During deliberations, the jury made several requests,
including additional clarification concerning the definition of
reasonable doubt. The jury also requested readback of testimony
concerning the Swan Bloods gang, “BK” (i.e., “Blood Killer”) tattoos,
and the date of Officer Huacuja’s prior encounter with Allen.
       On October 7, 2019, the jury returned guilty verdicts on
all counts charged. It concluded further that the firearm use
enhancements were true, but found the gang enhancement
allegations “not true.”

      E.    Defense Motion for a New Trial
       Following his conviction, Allen retained new counsel and
filed a new trial motion. Of relevance here, Allen argued in
the new trial motion that (1) Agent Easter’s report constituted
inadmissible hearsay, (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the report, and (3) the court
and jury impermissibly resolved the circumstantial evidence
concerning Allen’s alleged presence in the murder vehicle in
favor of guilt, notwithstanding that a reasonable explanation
of the circumstantial evidence pointed to Allen’s innocence. In
addition, at the hearing on the motion, defense counsel noted—

case is submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the entry
of a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged
in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then before the court is
insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on
appeal.” (§ 1118.1.)

                                     15
and the court acknowledged—that Allen had prominent tattoos
on his hands and arms. Defense counsel argued that this
demonstrated that Allen was not the shooter because the driver’s
hand captured in the still photograph taken from the surveillance
footage bore no such tattoos.
        The court carefully considered Allen’s arguments, even
taking a recess to retrieve the trial exhibit showing the driver’s
hand. Ultimately, however, the court denied Allen’s motion for
a new trial, explaining in relevant part:
        “[O]ne has to keep in mind that this [photograph] is like a
freeze frame from the surveillance video, and . . . [¶] . . . I agree
with the People that it’s not a great photograph in terms of its
clarity. And I don’t think it either conclusively shows that it was
the defendant or conclusively shows that it was not the defendant
who was the individual that is driving the car here.
        “The issue of the cell phone evidence—there was no objection.
And the court does not interpose its own objections[.] . . . [¶] . . .
[¶] . . . And . . . I am not convinced that [People v. Sanchez (2016)
63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez)] says that an expert that testifies cannot
use an exhibit that someone else created as part of their testimony
when the witness [who] is examined about the opinions says that
she’s formed her own opinions. [¶] And there was full cross-
examination about the opinions. . . .
        “[¶] . . . [¶]
        “And I also feel there was and is sufficient evidence, based
upon the trial record, to support the jury’s verdict in this case.
[¶] . . . [¶] And so I am going to deny the motion for new trial at
this time, respectfully.”

                                     16
      F.    Sentencing
        The trial court sentenced Allen to a prison term of 150 years
to life on the two murder counts. The court also imposed, and
then stayed, a three-year sentence in connection with the felon in
possession of a firearm count.
        Allen timely appealed.

                            DISCUSSION
       Allen mounts five challenges to his convictions, arguing:
(1) Assembly Bill No. 333’s amendments to section 186.22 render
certain gang evidence in his case inadmissible, (2) the trial court
improperly admitted Agent Easter’s cell site analysis report
through Agent Sparano, (3) the prosecution failed to introduce
sufficient evidence at trial to support the verdicts, (4) the court
erred in denying his section 1118.1 motion for a judgment of
acquittal, and (5) the court erroneously denied his motion for a
new trial.

      A.    Allen Demonstrates No Prejudice from the Alleged
            Error in Admitting Certain Gang Evidence
        Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) provides for an enhanced
sentence for “[a] defendant who commits a felony ‘for the benefit
of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang,
with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal
conduct by gang members.’ ” (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
657, 664 (Sek), quoting § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
       Assembly Bill No. 333, which took effect on January 1, 2022—
after the conclusion of Allen’s trial—“amended section 186.22 to
impose new substantive and procedural requirements for gang
allegations.” (Sek, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 665.) “Most notably,
the law defined ‘to benefit, promote, further, or assist’ as ‘to provide
a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit

                                      17
is more than reputational. Examples of a common benefit that
are more than reputational may include, but are not limited to,
financial gain or motivation, retaliation, targeting a perceived or
actual gang rival, or intimidation or silencing of a potential current
or previous witness or informant.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
       “In addition, the law created a stricter requirement for proof
of ‘a pattern of criminal gang activity,’ which is necessary to prove
that the group with which the defendant is associated is indeed
a criminal street gang. [Citation.] Previously, the prosecution
needed to prove only that those associated with the gang had
committed at least two offenses from a list of predicate crimes on
separate occasions within three years of one another. [Citation.]
Under the . . . amended law, the offense with which the defendant
is currently charged cannot be used as one of the two predicate
offenses. [Citation.] In addition, both predicate offenses must have
been committed ‘within three years of the date the current offense
is alleged to have been committed,’ by gang ‘members,’ and must
have been for the ‘common[ ] benefit[ ] [of] a criminal street gang.’
[Citation.] Finally, under Assembly Bill No. 333, the defendant
may request a bifurcated trial, in which the defendant is first tried
for the underlying offense, and only upon conviction is tried for any
gang enhancements.” (Sek, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 665.)
       Allen contends Assembly Bill No. 333 applies retroactively to
his case and renders inadmissible: (1) evidence of the two predicate
crimes committed by other Rolling 30s Crips gang members,
(2) Officer Huacuja’s testimony that a gang member would commit
a crime like the shooting at issue to provide a reputational benefit
to the gang, and (3) Officer Huacuja’s testimony that he previously
had “stopped [Allen] with gang members in gang territory.” He
urges that the erroneous admission of this evidence caused the jury

                                     18
to view him “in a prejudicial light” and “to resolve all doubts in
favor of finding him guilty.”
      Allen ignores, however, that the prosecution properly
introduced at trial other, more damaging gang evidence directly
relevant to proving Allen’s motive and intent. (See People v.
Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1132 [Assembly Bill No. 333’s
amendments do not limit the “introduction of gang evidence in a
bifurcated proceeding where the gang evidence is relevant to the
underlying charges”].) This evidence included voluminous Facebook
records—containing what appear to be Allen’s own statements—
strongly suggesting that Allen was an active member of the Rolling
30s Crips gang who sought to harm members of rival Bloods gangs;
testimony that Allen’s tattoos were consistent with membership in
the Rolling 30s Crips; testimony that the territory of the Rolling 30s
Crips and the Rolling 20s Bloods bordered one another, and that the
gangs were engaged in a violent rivalry; and testimony that victim
Williams’s tattoos demonstrated his membership in the Rolling 20s
Bloods gang.
      By contrast, the gang evidence Allen now challenges on
appeal was less damaging. The predicate crimes committed by
other Rolling 30s Crips gang members—possession of a firearm by
a felon and robbery—were far less inflammatory than the murders
with which Allen was charged. Officer Huacuja’s testimony
concerning the reputational benefit a gang purportedly accrues
when its members commit crimes was relatively brief and not
incendiary. And the testimony concerning Allen’s association with
other Rolling 30s Crips gang members was not inflammatory; it
merely provided further evidence of his membership in the gang—
an issue directly relevant to Allen’s motive and intent with respect
to the shooting. The facts here therefore are distinguishable from
those in the cases on which Allen relies for his prejudice argument.

                                    19
(See, e.g., People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 227–228
[reversing convictions where the prosecution introduced “extremely
inflammatory gang evidence . . . which had no connection to [the
charged] crimes”].)
       Accordingly—even assuming that Assembly Bill No. 333
now would require the trial court to exclude the challenged gang
evidence or to relegate it to the gang enhancement phase of a
bifurcated trial8—we are not persuaded that the categories of gang
evidence Allen identifies rendered his trial fundamentally unfair,
or that it is reasonably probable that Allen would have obtained a
more favorable result in the absence of the evidence. (See People v.
Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1209 [explaining that if gang evidence
does not render trial fundamentally unfair, prejudice is evaluated
under standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818].)9

      B.    Allen Fails To Demonstrate Prejudice From His
            Counsel’s Failure To Object to the Admission of
            Agent Easter’s Report
      Relying on Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th 665, and related
authority, Allen next contends that the trial court erred in
admitting Agent Easter’s report because it constituted testimonial
hearsay, and its admission through Agent Sparano violated his
rights under the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause. (See
Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686 [“When any expert relates to

      8 For purposes of our analysis, we assume, without deciding,
that the portions of Assembly Bill No. 333 on which Allen relies
apply retroactively.
      9 In light of our conclusion, we necessarily reject Allen’s
related contention that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object to the gang evidence.

                                     20
the jury case-specific out-of-court statements, and treats the content
of those statements as true and accurate to support the expert’s
opinion, the statements are hearsay. It cannot logically be
maintained that the statements are not being admitted for their
truth. If the case is one in which a prosecution expert seeks to
relate testimonial hearsay, there is a confrontation clause violation
unless (1) there is a showing of unavailability and (2) the defendant
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination, or forfeited that
right by wrongdoing”].)
       Allen does not dispute, however, that his counsel failed
to object to the admission of the report at trial. Accordingly, we
conclude that Allen has forfeited this argument on appeal. (See
Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a) [“[a] verdict or finding shall not be set
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed,
by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless: . . . [¶]
[t]here appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude
or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated
as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion”];
People v. Stevens (2015) 62 Cal.4th 325, 333 [“the failure to object
to the admission of expert testimony or hearsay at trial forfeits an
appellate claim that such evidence was improperly admitted”].)
       Alternatively, Allen urges that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the report’s admission.
Even assuming, however, that his counsel erred in failing to object,
Allen has failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice.
       To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant
“must establish his counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the
trial would have been different.” (People v. Mesa (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 1000, 1007 (Mesa), citing Strickland v. Washington

                                    21
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686–687.) “ ‘ “The burden of sustaining a
charge of inadequate or ineffective representation is upon the
defendant. The proof . . . must be a demonstrable reality and not
a speculative matter.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Mesa, supra, at
p. 1007.)
        “In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
it is not necessary to determine ‘ “whether counsel’s performance
was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack
of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course
should be followed.” ’ [Citations.] It is not sufficient to show the
alleged errors may have had some conceivable effect on the trial’s
outcome; the defendant must demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability’
that absent the errors the result would have been different.
[Citations].” (Mesa, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008.)
        Here, Allen contends that the map in Agent Easter’s report
was “mislead[ing]” and prejudicial because (1) the report “suggests
that [its] color-coded areas create a firm geographic area in which
a phone must be if using a particular cell tower” (italics added), and
(2) “it made the crime scene and the [location of the surveillance
camera that captured video of Baylor’s] car [at 1:37 p.m.] seem very
close together and within [the relevant cell] tower’s coverage area.”
        Had his trial counsel objected to the report, Allen urges, “the
cell phone evidence would have consisted [only] of Agent Sparano’s
testimony,” which he argues was “far from compelling on its own.”
He contends that, unlike the close proximity allegedly suggested
by the map in Agent Easter’s report, Agent Sparano could opine
only that Allen’s phone was approximately 1.5 miles from the crime
scene near the time of the shooting. In addition, Allen argues that
Agent Sparano’s testimony that a phone typically connects to the

                                     22
closest cell tower conflicted with Agent Easter’s report because his
map showed that Allen’s phone did not connect to the tower closest
to the surveillance camera that captured video of Baylor’s car at
approximately 1:37 p.m.
       The record, however, belies Allen’s contentions that Agent
Easter’s report was misleading or conflicted with Agent Sparano’s
testimony. First, Agent Easter’s report stated expressly that its
analysis “illustrate[s] an approximate location of the target cell
phone when it initiated contact with the network.” (Italics added.)
This is consistent with Agent Sparano’s testimony that she could
opine only as to the approximate location of Allen’s phone. Second,
Agent Easter’s map contains a legend indicating its scale, and it
appears accurately to reflect the distance between the crime scene
and the surveillance camera that captured video of Baylor’s car
at approximately 1:37 p.m. Third, Agent Sparano’s testimony that
a phone typically connects to the nearest cell tower did not conflict
with the map in Agent Easter’s report. Agent Sparano expressly
testified that it is “not always the case” that a phone connects to the
nearest tower “due to natural landscapes, if there’s buildings that
are shooting up.” And she testified—based on her own, independent
analysis—she agreed with the visual depictions in Agent Easter’s
map.
       Accordingly, we conclude that Agent Sparano’s testimony
was entirely consistent with the contents of Agent Easter’s report.
Thus, even had Allen’s counsel successfully moved to exclude the
report at trial, the jury still would have heard persuasive cell site
analysis testimony placing Allen within 1.5 miles of the crime scene
approximately five minutes following the shooting. Although we
agree with Allen that the map in Agent Easter’s report may have
assisted the jury in evaluating the cell site analysis evidence, we
are not convinced that there is “a ‘reasonable probability’ that

                                     23
absent” admission of Agent Easter’s report “the result” of Allen’s
trial “would have been different.” (Mesa, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1008.)

      C.    Sufficient Evidence Supports the Verdicts
      We also are unpersuaded by Allen’s contention we must
overturn his convictions because the prosecution introduced
insufficient evidence at trial identifying him as the shooter.
      “When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we ask ‘ “whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” ’ [Citations.] Because the sufficiency of the
evidence is ultimately a legal question, we must examine the record
independently for ‘ “substantial evidence—that is, evidence which
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value” ’ that would support a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Banks (2015) 61
Cal.4th 788, 804.)
      The prosecution’s case consisted of four key categories of
evidence: (1) evidence reflecting Allen’s membership in the Rolling
30s Crips gang, including his tattoos and statements from his
Facebook page suggesting his desire to commit violence against
members of rival Bloods gangs, (2) evidence indicating that
victim Williams was a member of the rival Rolling 20s Bloods
gang, (3) surveillance camera footage and eyewitness testimony
identifying Baylor’s car as the murder vehicle, along with
testimony, Facebook posts, and a traffic citation demonstrating
that Allen regularly had access to Baylor’s car, and (4) cellular
site analysis evidence suggesting that Allen’s phone was within
1.5 miles of the murder scene at approximately 1:37 p.m., five

                                    24
minutes after the shooting, and then continued to travel west,
in the same direction as Baylor’s car.
       This evidence established that Allen had both a motive and
an opportunity to commit the shooting. Accordingly—although
we agree with Allen that the evidence of his guilt was not
overwhelming—we conclude that the prosecution offered sufficient
evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to convict him. We reject
Allen’s various arguments to the contrary.
       First, Allen contends that we should disregard the gang
evidence because it was inadmissible. We are unpersuaded by this
argument for the reasons set forth in the Discussion ante, part A.
       Second, although Allen concedes the prosecution
“persuasively prove[d] . . . Baylor’s car was used in the shooting”
and that Allen had regular access to the car, he urges that
this evidence is not “dispositive in proving [his guilt] beyond
a reasonable doubt.” But the prosecution need not support its
case with a single piece of dispositive evidence. Instead, it may—
as it did here—establish a defendant’s guilt by introducing a variety
of evidence that suggests culpability when considered as a whole.
       Third, Allen argues that the cellular site analysis evidence
“is entitled to no weight” because it is consistent with someone
else having driven the car immediately following the shooting. In
particular, he argues that (1) at 1:37 p.m., his phone did not connect
to the cell tower closest to the alleged location of Baylor’s car at
that time, and (2) although his phone was traveling west between
1:37 p.m. and 1:54 p.m., the surveillance camera evidence failed
to prove conclusively that Baylor’s car continued to travel west
during that time frame. He argues further that “[a]t minimum,
the evidence creates two reasonable conclusions . . . which
mandated that the jury adopt the conclusion that supported a
finding of innocence.” Agent Sparano’s testimony, however, offered

                                    25
a reasonable explanation concerning why a phone might not connect
to the closest cell tower, and the available surveillance video
evidence suggested that Baylor’s car was traveling west. We
therefore are not persuaded that the circumstantial evidence
identifying Allen as the driver of the murder vehicle—which
included not only the cell site analysis, but substantial testimony
and documentary evidence establishing Allen’s regular access to
Baylor’s car—gives rise to a reasonable conclusion supporting his
innocence.
       Fourth and finally, Allen urges that the DNA evidence,
as well as evidence establishing the shooter was “light-skinned,”
should exonerate him. But like the trial court, we find the DNA
evidence of little utility. There simply is insufficient evidence of the
provenance of the lip balm recovered from the crime scene to render
it relevant.
       We find the evidence concerning the driver’s skin color
similarly inconclusive. Only one eyewitness, Cherri Davis,
purportedly saw the driver’s skin color on the day of the shooting.
Although Davis initially told detectives that she believed the driver
was “light-skinned,” she denied making such a statement when she
testified at trial.
       Apart from Davis’s testimony, the only direct evidence of the
driver’s skin color comes from a still photograph of the driver’s hand
taken from one of the surveillance videos. Detective Ruiz testified
that, in his opinion, the photograph depicted a hand consistent with
Allen’s skin color, although he conceded that others might have a
different opinion. By contrast, Baylor testified that she viewed the
photograph as depicting someone “light-skinned.” At most, this
evidence establishes that the driver’s skin tone was susceptible to
multiple interpretations. We therefore are not persuaded that this

                                     26
evidence undercuts the sufficiency of the remaining evidence
supporting Allen’s guilt.
      Accordingly, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports
the verdicts.

      D.    The Trial Court Properly Denied Allen’s Motion
            for a Judgment of Acquittal
       “An appellate court reviews the denial of a section 1118.1
motion [for a judgment of acquittal for insufficient evidence] under
the standard employed in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a conviction.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186,
1215.)
        In arguing the trial court improperly denied his
section 1118.1 motion, Allen largely repeats the arguments he
makes challenging the reliability of the cell site analysis evidence
and the sufficiency of the remaining trial evidence on appeal.
For the reasons set forth in the Discussion ante, parts B and C,
we conclude that the trial court properly denied Allen’s motion
for a judgment of acquittal.

      E.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Allen’s
            Motion for a New Trial
      Finally, Allen urges that we must reverse the trial court’s
denial of his new trial motion because the court (1) failed to conduct
the proper analysis in determining whether Agent Easter’s report
was testimonial hearsay, (2) erred in finding that [Allen’s] trial
counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the admission of
Agent Easter’s report, and (3) erred in disregarding evidence that
the driver of the murder vehicle was “light-skinned.”
      Applying de novo review, we find each of Allen’s contentions
unpersuasive. (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1262 [an
appellate court reviews denial of a motion for a new trial de novo].)

                                     27
We reject Allen’s first two contentions for the reasons set forth in
the Discussion ante, part B. And we reject Allen’s final contention
because it simply is not supported by the record. The trial court
expressly considered the evidence suggesting the driver was
“light-skinned” in ruling on the new trial motion; indeed, the court
retrieved the relevant trial exhibit during argument so that it could
again examine the photograph of the driver’s hand. After carefully
considering the evidence, it concluded—as do we—that it was not
dispositive.
       Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying
Allen’s motion for a new trial.

                                     28
                        DISPOSITION
     The April 28, 2021 judgment is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                        ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                CHANEY, J.

                WEINGART, J.

                                  29