Court Opinion

ID: 9890620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 18:04:17.5802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:38.640774
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/13/23 P. v. Gallardo CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                            B322375

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                     (Los Angeles County
                                                        Super. Ct. No. LA048566)
          v.

 CARLOS LEONEL GALLARDO,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alan Schneider, Judge. Affirmed.
      Tanya Dellaca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Pithey, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Michael Keller and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                          ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
       Defendant and appellant Carlos Leonel Gallardo was
convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder in
2008. Gallardo now appeals from an order denying his petition
for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95.1 The trial
court concluded that Gallardo had not made a prima facie
showing of eligibility for resentencing because he was convicted
as a perpetrator or direct aider and abettor who acted with
express malice. Gallardo contends the trial court erred because
an ambiguity in the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict
him on a theory of imputed malice. We disagree and affirm the
denial of Gallardo’s petition for resentencing.
                          BACKGROUND
The underlying offense
       We take our statement of the evidence underlying
Gallardo’s crime from the Court of Appeal opinion affirming his
judgment of conviction. (People v. Gallardo (Mar. 1, 2012,
B228628) [nonpub. opn.] (Gallardo).)2

1     All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
      Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We therefore refer to the law formerly codified at section 1170.95
as section 1172.6 for the remainder of this opinion.

2      We have taken judicial notice of records from Gallardo,
namely, the reporter’s transcript on appeal, which includes the
reporter’s transcript of the trial.
       We refer to the factual background from Gallardo “for
background purposes and to provide context for the parties’
arguments.” (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978,
fn. 2.) We do not rely on the facts in Gallardo to review the trial

                                 2
       On March 13, 2005, “[a]t approximately 1:00 a.m., a group
of 10 to 20 men and women arrived at the Gentleman’s Players
Club in Sun Valley in two vehicles, a Hummer limousine and a
white Escalade (hereinafter the ‘Hummer group’). . . . [¶] At
roughly the same time, appellant Gallardo arrived in his white
convertible Mustang, accompanied by four or five men.” The two
groups argued outside the club “over the girls,” and tensions
continued to rise between them inside the club.
       Around 3:30 a.m., the two groups left the club. “Some
members of the Hummer group were getting into the Hummer,
while others were standing next to the vehicles and talking. [¶]
Meanwhile, Gallardo and his companions entered his Mustang.
Gallardo drove out of the club’s lot, parked at the edge of the
driveway, stepped out of the car, opened the Mustang’s trunk,
and appeared to search for something inside.” The security
guards testified it looked like “Gallardo put something from the
trunk in his waistband.”
       “Gallardo reentered the Mustang and drove to the middle of
the street. He caused the Mustang to ‘burn rubber,’ apparently
by holding the brake while simultaneously pressing the gas
pedal. The Mustang’s engine was loud and the tires smoked and
kicked up gravel from the street.” Shots were fired from the
Mustang. As Gallardo drove away, a security guard “heard
‘return fire’ coming ‘[f]rom the vicinity of the Escalade.’ ”
       Francisco Herrera Jr., who had been standing in the street,
was shot and killed. “The trajectory of the bullet was consistent
with a standing victim being shot by a person seated in a
vehicle.”

court’s determination of his eligibility for resentencing at the
prima facie stage. (Id. at p. 988.)

                                  3
Gallardo’s conviction, sentence, and direct appeal
       Gallardo’s first trial in 2007 resulted in a hung jury and
was declared a mistrial. Gallardo was re-tried in 2008.
       The jury found Gallardo guilty of the second degree murder
of Francisco Herrera (§ 187, subd. (a)); the attempted murder of
John Doe (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)); possession of a firearm by a
felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)); and shooting from a motor
vehicle (former § 12034, subd. (c)). The jury found the allegation
that Gallardo personally and intentionally discharged the firearm
not true with respect to the murder, attempted murder, and
shooting from a motor vehicle offenses. The jury also found not
true the allegation that Gallardo’s attempted murder of John Doe
was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The jury was not
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
the felony murder rule.
       The trial court sentenced Gallardo to 72 years to life, plus
20 years. A different panel of this court affirmed Gallardo’s
convictions on appeal in 2012. (Gallardo, supra, B228628.)
Gallardo’s petition for resentencing
       Gallardo filed a petition for resentencing in March 2022.
The petition consists of a preprinted form on which Gallardo
checked boxes indicating he was convicted of murder and
attempted murder following a trial and “could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes
made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”3

3     Gallardo did not specify in his petition whether he was
seeking to be resentenced on his second degree murder
conviction, his attempted murder conviction, or both. On appeal,
Gallardo argues the trial court erred in denying his petition for
resentencing only as to his second degree murder conviction.

                                4
The petition did not recite any additional facts relating to the
underlying convictions. At Gallardo’s request, the trial court
appointed counsel to represent him.
       The People opposed the petition, arguing Gallardo’s
conviction was not eligible for resentencing because the jury was
not instructed on any theories of imputed malice and found
Gallardo acted with actual malice. The People also argued the
court could rely on the opinion from Gallardo’s direct appeal to
make determinations of eligibility at the prima facie stage.
       Gallardo filed a reply in support of his petition, contending
that the trial court could not rely on facts in the prior appellate
opinion or engage in factfinding to determine whether Gallardo
acted with actual malice. Gallardo argued that his petition was
“facially valid” because he “alleged that a charging document was
filed permitting the prosecution to proceed on both his murder
and attempted murder convictions based on theories that make
him illegible[sic] for resentencing relief . . . .”
       In July 2022, the trial court denied Gallardo’s petition for
failing to establish a prima facie case for relief. The court
specifically stated that it was not considering the facts in the
opinion from Gallardo’s direct appeal and made its decision after
reviewing the jury instructions. The court found that because no
natural and probable consequences or felony murder instruction
was given, Gallardo had been convicted of second degree murder
and attempted murder “either as a perpetrator or a direct aider
and abettor,” and not pursuant to any theory under which malice
was imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime.
Gallardo timely appealed.

                                 5
                            DISCUSSION
I.     Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775 and Section 1172.6
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine
as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and limited
the scope of the felony murder rule. (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 707–708 (Strong); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957 (Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843
(Gentile).) The bill amended section 188 by adding the
requirement that, except as stated in section 189, subdivision (e),
“in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall
act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 775) expanded Senate Bill 1437’s mandate in part by
eliminating criminal liability for convictions for attempted
murder obtained pursuant to the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
       These amendments have eliminated imputed malice
liability for second degree murder and attempted murder.
(People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566, 575 (Lopez); People v.
Montes (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1008.) The amendments also
eliminated aider and abettor liability for crimes committed by the
actual perpetrator “that were not intended but were reasonably
foreseeable,” which were previously actionable under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. (People v. Pacheco (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 118, 123 (Pacheco); People v. Sanchez (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 191, 196.) But a principal in a murder, including an
aider or abettor, can still be criminally liable if he or she
personally possesses malice aforethought, whether express or

                                 6
implied. (People v. Silva (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 632, 639–640;
People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595–596 (Offley)
[Senate Bill 1437 did not “alter the law regarding the criminal
liability of direct aiders and abettors of murder because such
persons necessarily ‘know and share the murderous intent of the
actual perpetrator’ ”].)
       Senate Bills 1437 and 775 created a procedure, now
codified at section 1172.6, in which a person convicted of a
qualifying offense under the former law may seek resentencing if
he or she could no longer be convicted of those offenses under
amended section 188. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959;
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A defendant commences the
procedure by filing a petition containing a declaration that,
among other things, he or she could not presently be convicted of
murder under the current law. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) In relevant part, the statute requires the court, “[a]fter
the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings,” to “hold
a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall
issue an order to show cause. If the court declines to make an
order to show cause, it shall provide a statement fully setting
forth its reasons for doing so.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
II.    Prima Facie Stage and Standard of Review
       At the prima facie stage, “ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) “While the trial court may look at the record
of conviction . . . to determine whether a petitioner has made a

                                 7
prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry
under subdivision (c) is limited.” (Ibid.) Courts may not reject
the petitioner’s allegations “ ‘on credibility grounds’ ” or engage in
“ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ ” (Id. at pp. 971, 972.) Rather, “[t]he record should be
consulted at the prima facie stage only to determine ‘readily
ascertainable facts,’ such as the crime of conviction and findings
on enhancements.” (People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798,
815; see, e.g., People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 54–56
(Harden) [considering jury instructions and verdicts to determine
whether defendant made prima facie showing of eligibility];
People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 106 (Ervin)
[considering sentencing enhancements, jury instructions, closing
arguments, and verdicts at prima facie stage].)
        A petitioner fails to make a prima facie showing for relief
“if the record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no
factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations,
that (1) the petitioner was the actual killer, or (2) the petitioner
was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or
assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first
degree, (3) the petitioner was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, or (4) the petitioner acted with malice aforethought that was
not imputed based solely on participation in a crime.” (People v.
Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.) The trial court’s denial of a
resentencing petition at the prima facie stage “ ‘is a purely legal
conclusion,’ ” which appellate courts review de novo. (Ervin,
supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 101.)

                                  8
III.  The Record of Conviction Conclusively Establishes
      that Gallardo Was Convicted of Second Degree
      Murder Under a Theory of Express Malice
      Because Senate Bill 1437 eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a basis for murder liability, an
aider and abettor can no longer be held liable for unintentional
deaths that occurred during the commission of a crime. (Pacheco,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 124.) However, Senate Bills 1437 and
775 did not eliminate “direct” aiding and abetting liability, which
requires that the accomplice “necessarily ‘know and share the
murderous intent of the actual perpetrator.’ ” (Offley, supra, 48
Cal.App.5th at p. 596; People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
576, 590 [“the direct aider and abettor must have the same
mental state as the actual perpetrator of the charged crime”].)
Accordingly, to establish a prima facie showing of relief under
section 1172.6, a petitioner must establish he was convicted on a
now invalid theory of imputed malice.
      In Gallardo’s case, the trial court did not instruct the jury
regarding any theories of imputed malice. The prosecutor in
closing argued that “when [Gallardo] acted, he had a state of
mind called malice aforethought,” explained that the jury could
find Gallardo either acted “with express specific intent to kill” or
with conscious disregard for human life, and explicitly endorsed
the theory that Gallardo acted with the specific intent to kill.
      Gallardo contends that even in the absence of any specific
instruction on theories of imputed malice, an ambiguity in the
jury instructions made it possible the jury convicted him of
second degree murder by imputing malice to him. Specifically,
Gallardo argues the definition of aider and abettor in CALJIC
No. 3.01 does not adequately explain that to convict a defendant

                                 9
of aiding and abetting an implied malice murder, a jury must find
the defendant acted with conscious disregard for life.4
       Gallardo relies on People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
972 (Langi) for this argument. Langi was one of four people who
physically assaulted a victim during a robbery. (Id. at pp. 975–
976.) The victim died after falling during the attack and hitting
his head. (Id. at p. 975.) The jury was instructed on first degree
felony murder and direct aiding and abetting and ultimately
convicted Langi of second degree murder. (Id. at pp. 977.) The
trial court denied Langi’s petition for resentencing at the prima
facie stage. (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed, finding the jury
could have convicted Langi as an aider and abettor, and CALJIC
No. 3.01 did not adequately explain that to be convicted of aiding
and abetting second degree implied malice murder, Langi had to
“have acted with the mental state of implied malice.” (Id. at
p. 983.) In other words, the aiding and abetting instruction did
not specifically explain that the accomplice must have
“ ‘knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the [life-
endangering] act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission
of the act, [and] knowledge that the act is dangerous to human
life, and . . . conscious disregard for human life.’ ” (Ibid.) The
court concluded this deficiency in CALJIC No. 3.01 allowed for
the possibility that the jury found Langi guilty of aiding and
abetting second degree murder by imputing to him the implied

4      CALJIC No. 3.01 states: “A person aids and abets the
[commission] [or] [attempted commission] of a crime when he or
she: [¶] (1) [w]ith knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, and [¶] (2) [w]ith the intent or purpose of committing
or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and
[¶] (3) [b]y act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates
the commission of the crime.”

                                10
malice of the actual killer, even in the absence of an instruction
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id. at
pp. 982, 984.)
       Here, however, the jury found Gallardo guilty of both
second degree murder and attempted murder. The court
instructed the jury that to find Gallardo liable for attempted
murder as a direct aider and abettor, it must find that he shared
the express malice of the person who committed the act. The
court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.66, which provides
that to prove attempted murder, the People must establish “[a]
direct but ineffectual act was done by one person towards killing
another human being” and that “[t]he person committing the act
harbored express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent to
kill unlawfully another human being.” (Italics added.) While in
Langi, nothing in the record of conviction resolved any ambiguity
created by CALJIC No. 3.01, here the jury’s findings that
Gallardo was guilty of both second degree murder and attempted
murder arising from the same shooting establishes the jury found
Gallardo himself acted with express malice.
       The decision in People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539
(Coley) is instructive. In Coley, two victims were walking along
the highway when shots were fired from a car occupied by Coley
and three other occupants, killing one of the victims. (Id. at
p. 542.) The prosecution proceeded on a theory that Coley was
the driver and another occupant was the shooter. (Ibid.) The
jury was instructed on first degree murder, second degree
murder, and attempted murder, among other offenses, but not
felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(Ibid.) The jury found Coley guilty of second degree murder and
attempted murder. (Ibid.) In the appeal from an order denying

                               11
his resentencing petition, Coley relied on Langi to argue the jury
could have imputed implied malice to him to find that he aided
and abetted second degree murder. (Coley, at pp. 546–547.) The
court rejected Coley’s argument, reasoning that the record of
conviction showed he “was convicted of murder based on his
aiding and abetting of the same shooting that gave rise to the
attempted murder conviction.” (Id. at p. 547.) As such, “by
finding [Coley] guilty of attempted murder, the jury necessarily
found he had personally harbored intent to kill or express malice
when he aided and abetted the second degree murder.” (Ibid.)
      Here, as in Coley, Gallardo was involved in a shooting from
a motor vehicle resulting in a fatality. The record of conviction
showed he was convicted of second degree murder based on his
aiding and abetting of the same shooting that gave rise to his
attempted murder conviction. The jury was instructed that it
must find Gallardo “harbored express malice aforethought,
namely, a specific intent to kill” to convict Gallardo of attempted
murder. It received no instruction on any theories of imputed
malice. The jury returned a verdict finding Gallardo guilty of
attempted murder and second degree murder. Thus, as in Coley,
the jury’s finding of express malice for purposes of Gallardo’s
attempted murder conviction indicates it necessarily found he
acted with express malice in aiding and abetting the second
degree murder.
      Gallardo does not distinguish Coley from this case or
disagree with its conclusion. Instead, he contends the trial court
could not apply the Coley reasoning here without engaging in
improper factfinding. Not so. The record of conviction includes
jury verdicts, jury instructions, and closing arguments. (Harden,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 54–56; Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th

                                12
at p. 106; Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 576–577 & fn. 7
[finding the record conclusively established petitioner was guilty
of first degree felony murder based in part on the “undisputed”
evidence, including “both sides’ closing arguments,” that showed
the murder occurred during a robbery].)
       A review of the record of conviction alone reveals Gallardo
was convicted of attempted murder and second degree murder
based on his direct aiding and abetting of the same shooting—a
single incident where shots were fired from Gallardo’s Mustang
toward members of the Hummer group outside the club. In their
closing arguments, both defense counsel and the prosecutor
referred to a single shooting as the incident underlying all
charges against Gallardo. The People argued to the jury that it
could find Gallardo guilty of murder “because he shot the gun”
multiple times, and that the “direct but ineffectual act” for
purposes of attempted murder “would be shooting the gun.”
Gallardo’s counsel did not dispute this characterization of the
underlying incident, stating explicitly during closing that he was
“[n]ot telling [the jury] that the shots weren’t fired from the
Mustang,” only that “we don’t know who fired the shots . . . .”
There was no reference to a second shooting or other incident
giving rise to different bases for the charges of murder and
attempted murder. Accordingly, the parties’ closing arguments
identified only one action by Gallardo as “aiding and abetting”
the shooting. The prosecution’s aiding and abetting theory
involved Gallardo taking the gun from the trunk of his car,
“hand[ing] the gun” to “one of the other guys in the car” who
ultimately committed the shooting. Gallardo’s counsel similarly
summarized the prosecution’s aiding and abetting theory:

                                13
“[Gallardo] must have gone to the trunk. He must have gotten
the gun. He must have given the gun to someone else.”
       Because the convictions resulted from the same act—a
single shooting incident using the gun Gallardo provided—the
jury’s finding of express malice for Gallardo’s attempted murder
conviction applies to the second degree murder conviction as well.
(See People v. Young (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 891, 910 [finding that
because the requisite mens rea for first degree murder was
express malice, “the jury necessarily found express malice on the
attempted murders committed as part of a single, indivisible
transaction”].)5 The trial court did not have to weigh conflicting
evidence, engage in factfinding, make credibility determinations,
or otherwise exercise discretion to arrive at this conclusion.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal. 5th at pp. 971–972.) Moreover, Gallardo
has not proposed that he would introduce any evidence to show
the convictions did not arise from the same act, and Gallardo
cannot use the process in section 1172.6 to “relitigate issues
already decided.” (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 549.)
       Because Gallardo cannot show he was convicted of second
degree murder under a theory of imputed malice based solely on
his participation in the crime, his petition fails to make a prima
facie showing of his eligibility for resentencing under

5      As explained by the court of appeal in People v. Moles
(1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 611, “were a defendant to shoot two men
during a single incident, one of whom died, the basic criminal
elements of the act, the shooting and the mental state, would be
the same as to each simultaneous shooting; the fact of death
would be but a manifestation of the seriousness of the result, not
of the actor’s mental state when the act was committed.” (Id. at
p. 616, italics added.)

                                14
section 1172.6 as a matter of law. We affirm the trial court’s
denial of Gallardo’s petition.
                          DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                          ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                  EDMON, P. J.

                  LAVIN, J.

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