Court Opinion

ID: 9742810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:20:49.014962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:20:14.675008
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, concurring in part and dissenting in part: The State and the defendant agree that defendant is entitled to one additional day’s credit on his sentence. It is clear a mistake was made by the trial court in determining the proper credit. The parties agree it was a mistake. The credit should be given. The majority is saying go back and file a section 2 — 1401 motion. See 735 ILCS 5/2—1401 (West 1994). Is this judicial economy? The defendant’s claim is rejected on the basis that the claim has been waived. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Why would a defendant ever knowingly give up a day of credit? Donnelly, Curtis and Steskal are cited but distinguished because there was no agreement by the defendant as to the proper credit. Also distinguished is Woodard, because the record was silent as to section 110 — 14 credit. The record in Woodard may have been silent on the credit issue in the trial court but that is not the basis for the supreme court’s holding. The supreme court in Woodard makes it clear that the credit should be granted. Woodard did not involve a person’s freedom. In Woodard, the issue was the $5 credit under section 110 — 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which provides in part: "shall be allowed a credit *** upon application of the defendant.” 725 ILCS 5/110—14 (West 1994); Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 440, 677 N.E.2d at 938. The applicable provision in this case, section 5 — 8—7(b) of the Correctional Code, states in part: "[t]he offender shall be given credit *** at the rate specified in Section 3 — 6—3 of this Code.” 730 ILCS 5/5—8—7(b) (West 1994). The court stated regardless of the failure of the defendant to apply, he was entitled to the credit. The Woodard court stated, "[t]he plain language of section 110 — 14 and its amendments also carries no indication that application at the trial level is a statutory precondition to the right to any credit.” Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 448, 677 N.E.2d at 941. Certainly in determining credit for time served, the defendant does not have to make any application. Section 5 — 8—7 of the Correctional Code does not require that the credit be determined at the time of the sentencing. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—7 (West 1994). Again, as Woodard states: "judicial discretion is not involved in a decision to allow the credit.” Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 453, 677 N.E.2d at 944. " 'Granting the credit is a simple ministerial act that will promote judicial economy by ending any further proceedings over the matter.’ ” Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d at 456-57, 677 N.E.2d at 945, quoting People v. Scott, 277 Ill. App. 3d 565, 566, 660 N.E.2d 1316, 1316-17 (1996). It is interesting to note that the supreme court in Woodard cited four cases from this district dealing with the mandatory credit in section 5 — 8—7(b) of the Correctional Code. In People v. Sizemore, 226 Ill. App. 3d 956, 590 N.E.2d 520 (1992), the presentence report showed the dates defendant was entitled to credit for time served. This court, citing Donnelly, stated the issue of credit was not waived. In Donnelly, we stated: "Section 5 — 8—7(b) of the Code is absolute, and there is no room for discretion. Credit must be given, and computation of the credit is basically an administrative function, but sentencing itself is a judicial function. The credit time is usually shown in the 'Judgment and Sentence,’ and is part of the 'Mittimus for State Penal Institutions.’ This document is often dated, as in the present case, some days after the sentencing hearing and may not be seen by the defendant. It is, however, a part of the record on appeal. Because of the statutory right to the credit, we hold that the error in computing the credit is not waived by failure of the defendant in this case to call the error to the trial court’s attention.” Donnelly, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 779, 589 N.E.2d at 980. In People v. Bates, 179 Ill. App. 3d 705, 709, 534 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (1989), in a postconviction setting on credit for time served, this court did adopt waiver, "where it could have been raised in the trial court or on direct appeal but was not.” Also in People v. Beech, 202 Ill. App. 3d 576, 580, 560 N.E.2d 395, 398 (1990), citing Bates, 179 Ill. App. 3d 705, 534 N.E.2d 1019, this court again stated such an issue can be raised on direct appeal. Woodard did not make the defendant’s right to the $5 credit dependent upon any lack of agreement in the trial court. The majority makes an exception to the right to credit as an issue on appeal if defendant makes some tacit agreement in the trial court. Certainly a day’s credit for time served is as important to a defendant as the $5 credit dealt with in Woodard. In this case waiver is based upon the litany between the prosecutor, the defendant’s attorney and the court. That colloquy, because of its brevity, is worthy of repeating from the record in its entirety: "THE COURT: *** He’s to receive credit against that sentence for all time heretofore served in custody, which I believe the parties stipulated is 118 days. [Prosecutor]: Judge, that’s an error. It’s now 120 days. THE COURT: Is that accurate, [defense counsel]? [Defense counsel]: That’s two days to be added, Judge. THE COURT: We’ll make that 120 days.” Neither the parties nor the court had the benefit of a presentence report. This record is not sufficient to bar a defendant from presenting this issue on appeal. The supreme court has recently remanded several cases pursuant to Woodard. People v. Watson, 173 Ill. 2d 544 (1997); People v. Hillsman, 173 Ill. 2d 534 (1997); People v. Taylor, 173 Ill. 2d 543 (1997); People v. Brazelton, 173 Ill. 2d 530 (1997); and People v. Harris, 173 Ill. 2d 534 (1997). These supreme court orders, since Woodard, dealing with the credit issue, are a clear indication that defendant should be granted 121 days’ credit. As to the Rule 604(d) issue, the majority sua sponte finds waiver. The State does not argue waiver, suggesting the State has waived the issue of waiver. I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.