Court Opinion

ID: 9696647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:53:51.870031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:24.796426
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(concurring in affirmance). I concur in affirmance.
I view the evidence, as did the chancellor before whom it was introduced, as preponderating persuasively in favor of plaintiff’s claim that his animal should have been destroyed for humanitarian reasons. Nonetheless, I do not believe we would be warranted on this record in finding defendant liable under its policy for its refusal to consent to the animal’s destruction. Such liability arises, under the terms of the policy here involved, quoted in Justice Kelly’s opinion, only upon persuasive proof, lacking here, that defendant’s refusal of consent was arbitrary or unreasonable.
Just as we would be unwarranted in saying, as I read Justice Kelly’s opinion to infer, that defendant had an absolute right to grant or withhold its •consent under the terms of the policy, so we would *415be -unwarranted in saying' that defendant' should have given its consent because we happen to be persuaded from the evidence that the animal’s destruction was necessary for humanitarian reasons. The policy language supports neither proposition. Its proper interpretation requires only that defendant exercise its judgment in good faith in determining whether to grant its consent to such destruction. Having exercised such judgment in good faith, whatever its decision, defendant has fulfilled its obligation and the fact that others reasonably may have reached a different decision cannot affect its liability. What was said in Wilson v. Hartford Livestock Ins. Co. (CCA 5, 1952), 193 F2d 752, 756, concerning a similar policy clause, is equally apt here:
“We remark that we find in the language of the policy no basis for holding that the insurer subjected itself to liability in case a jury should find it made a mistake in judgment in evaluating and determining ‘humane consideration.’ The existence of such consideration necessarily involves to a high degree the exercise of judgment upon a matter as to which reasonable minds might well differ.”
For the foregoing reasons only, I concur in affirmance.
Smith, J., concurred with Souris, J.