Court Opinion

ID: 9793330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:46:08.020041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:31.046629
License: Public Domain

BROUSSARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
  I concur in part I of the majority opinion, which holds that the trial court properly instructed the jury on the crime of attempted robbery. I join also in part II, which overturns the common law doctrine that a standing crop cannot be the subject of larceny or robbery. Finally, I agree in principle with part IV of the majority opinion; a statute codifying the common law felony-murder rule would not violate the state or federal Constitutions by conclusively presuming malice.
In part III of their opinion, however, the majority pile “inference on inference” (ante, p. 472, fn. 19) to reach the conclusion that Penal Code section 189 codifies the common law rule that a killing during the commission of a felony is considered to be murder without requiring proof of malice. The majority’s account of the history of section 189, however, persuades me to a contrary conclusion.
As the majority explain, as of 1872 California had two felony-murder statutes: former section 25, which codified the common law felony-murder rule; and former section 21, which fixed the degree of the murder. The *5031872 Penal Code reenacted section 21 (now renumbered as § 189) but omitted section 25.
We do not know why the Legislature failed to reenact section 25. (It seems fanciful to attempt to trace that failure to a mistaken comment by the Code Commissioners in their discussion of an arson statute.) It is possible that the Legislature intended to reenact the common law felony-murder rule and failed through inadvertence or oversight. But the fact remains that the Legislature did not reenact that rule, but retained only the statute which fixed the degree of the murder.
I do not believe the language of section 189, the degree-fixing statute, can reasonably be construed to encompass the common law felony-murder rule. As the majority carefully explain, the language of section 189 derives from former section 21 and similar enactments in other states—enactments clearly intended to serve solely the function of distinguishing between first and second degree murder. The current wording of section 189 reflects this limited purpose.1 It does not refer to a killing to perpetrate a felony—the subject of the common law rule—but to a “murder” to perpetrate six specific felonies.2 In fixing the degree of the murder, moreover, section 189 includes not only murders in perpetration of the listed felonies, but also those committed by explosive, poison, lying in wait, or torture. A killing committed by such means, however, is not murder without proof of malice. (People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177, 182-184 [93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193].) There is no reasonable way to read the language of section 189 to make killings in perpetration of the six listed felonies murder without proof of malice, but to require malice for all other killings described in that section.
I conclude that the felony-murder rule remains judge-created and judge-preserved common law. It is therefore within the power of this court to overturn that rule. (See People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 347 [149 Cal.Rptr. 275, 583 P.2d 1318].) If we were to consider that matter, we *504would have to recognize that numerous decisions of this court have upheld and applied that rule. (See, e.g., People v. Cantrell (1973) 8 Cal.3d 672, 688 [105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256]; People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 387-388 [99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793].) (Some, written without the guidance of the majority’s historical analysis, have mistakenly assumed the rule was statutory.) The Legislature has undoubtedly relied on those decisions in considering and enacting other penal legislation. This long-continued pattern of judicial precedent and legislative reliance would weigh heavily against repudiation of the felony-murder rule, serving to offset the logical weakness of that rule and the occasional inequities it brings about. But the majority’s conclusion that the felony-murder rule is statutory moots that issue.
I dissent also to part V of the majority opinion. The statutory punishment of life imprisonment with possibility of parole is not constitutionally disproportionate to the crime of first degree murder. Neither is it excessive under the circumstances of this particular murder.
The defendant before us planned the robbery and recruited other youths to help him. The would-be robbers expected to meet armed resistance, planned to overcome that resistance, and armed themselves accordingly. When defendant, as he must have anticipated, met the armed guard he had encountered on two previous forays, defendant shot the guard nine times. Although defendant claims he shot impulsively and from panic, the same may well be true of many adult murderers. On this record, defendant is equally culpable as the typical adult felony-murder defendant—perhaps more so, since defendant was the instigator of the robbery and knew he would probably have to use his weapon to consummate the robbery.
The state, of course, does not have to punish every defendant to the maximum extent permitted by the Constitution. It may decide that certain defendants are good prospects for rehabilitation, and that severe punishment would interfere with that goal. The defendant before us may be one who would benefit from a rehabilitative commitment. But the decision whether to create rehabilitative programs, and who should be eligible for commitment under those programs, is essentially a legislative decision. So long as the Legislature does not punish disproportionately to the gravity of the crime and the culpability of the offender, its refusal to extend lenient treatment or to offer rehabilitative programs to those convicted of first degree murder does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. I would therefore affirm the judgment against defendant.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 6, 1983. Richardson, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Section 189 reads as follows: “All murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive device or explosive, knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under Section 288, is murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murders are of the second degree. ...”

Under the majority’s construction of section 189, “the second degree felony-murder rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine without any express basis in the Penal Code . . . .” (Ante, p. 472, fn. 19.) Both the common law felony-murder rule and former section 25, however, provided that all killings to perpetrate a felony were murder, without distinguishing the degree of the murder. If the second degree felony-murder rule has been a judge-made rule since 1872, it follows that the 1872 Legislature did not fully codify the common law rule.