Court Opinion

ID: 9595212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:37:07.688479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:50.865474
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. The confusion in our review of this case results from the failure of the nunc pro tunc order to clearly identify the clerical error that it intends to correct. The order does, however, expressly state that the trial court granted its leave to file the third party complaint on June 29, 1987. Mickelson argues on appeal that the minute entry of the clerk stating that the June 29th hearing was continued was erroneous in that the motion was granted that day and the hearing was not continued. In other words, the minute entry following the June 29th hearing was the error the trial court intended to correct with the nunc pro tunc order.
The majority, on the other hand, accepts the minute entry as true and focuses on whether the second hearing ever occurred or whether the trial court ever made the decision indicated in the order. Since the majority concludes that the second hearing should have occurred, it searches for, but does not find, any clerical errors in conjunction with the second hearing. The majority does not find a clerical error, however, because there was no second hearing, nor was one required, because the motion for leave was in fact granted on June 29th as indicated in the nunc pro tunc order.
It is of significant note that Zions does not argue that the hearing was in fact continued or that a decision was in fact never made on the motion. Zions relies *745solely upon the same erroneous minute entry and the record’s subsequent silence as to a second hearing for the proposition that the decision was not made on June 29th.1 Furthermore, the record does provide a basis for concluding that leave was in fact granted on June 29th. Zions filed its answer to the third party complaint on July 2nd, only three days after the nunc pro tunc order stated that leave was granted. It is reasonable to conclude that a party as experienced in litigation as Zions would not have filed an answer to a “proposed” third party complaint before it became effective. I would therefore accept the representation made by the nunc pro tunc order that leave was in fact granted on June 29th.
Even if there was a question as to whether leave had been granted on June 29th, Zions, by filing an answer that did not assert that defense, consented to the filing and thereby waived that defense under Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken, 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983) (defenses which have not been raised by the answer or by proper motion may not be raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment). Since the answer was filed within the statutory period, as determined by the trial court, the third party complaint was timely filed against Zions. Inasmuch as a foreclosure action was properly initiated against one of the parties in interest, the remaining parties could be included under the relation back doctrine as recently announced by the Utah Supreme Court in Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990).
I would therefore uphold Mickelson’s mechanic’s lien as being timely filed.

. The fact that there is no record of a second hearing is consistent with and supports the con-elusion that there was, in fact, no second hearing.