Court Opinion

ID: 9711670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:36:26.142452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:06.572126
License: Public Domain

Adams; J.
(dissenting). I do not agree with the conclusion that the plaintiff, under the. circumstances outlined in this case, is not covered by the workmen’s compensation act,* as amended by PA 1949, No 284, or that such coverage, if provided in that act, would make the pertinent provisions thereof unconstitutional.
The statute, as amended, defines an employee for the purposes of the act as “every person in the service of another, under any contract of hire, * * * including any person insured for whom and to the extent premiums are paid based on * * * profits.”
“Profit” is defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed) as:
“The share of the employing classes in the distribution of the products of industry, as distinct from wages * * * and rent.” (Emphasis is citation, not added.) '
Working members of a partnership are specifically mentioned as an included group in another part of the same definition and were so included prior to the amendment of 1949. Quite obviously, therefore, the amendment was not intended to refer to that group. There remains only one other group of persons who could be in the service of another and earn profits. Such persons would be independent contractors. In this amendment of the workmen’s compensation act, the legislature has clearly and unequivocally stated that independent contractors in the service of another shall be covered by the act when premiums are *541paid for such insurance and it takes no judicial fiat to determine that fact.
Further, such provision for coverage of independent contractors under the specific conditions set forth does not render the amendment unconstitutional as being outside the scope of the title of the workmen’s compensation act. We are here concerned with a statutory definition of an employee, not one taken from common law nor from the dictionary.
“It is within the legislative power to define the sense in which words are employed in a statute.” 50 Am Jur, p 253, § 261.
“A statutory definition supersedes the commonly accepted, dictionai'y, or judicial definition. Where an act passed by the legislature embodies a definition, it is binding on the courts.” 50 Am Jur, p 254, § 262.
“These later cases demonstrate that it is within the power of the legislative department to define a corporatioh, and if an association falls within such definition the courts will give force to such definition irrespective of whether the association is one organized under statutory authority or not.” Hemphill v. Orloff, 238 Mich 508, 519 (58 ALR 507).
This Court has approved of the inclusion of the working members of a partnership within the definition of “employee” as used in the act. Gallie v. Detroit Auto Accessory Co., 224 Mich 703. Approved, also, are the provisions of section 10, pt 1, of the workmen’s compensation act which makes the principal contractor liable for compensation to any injured employee of a subcontractor. In neither situation does the common-law relationship of employer-employee exist between the person or entity for whom the service is performed and the person who renders that service.
*542In passing upon the right to compensation of an injured working partner, it has been said:
“Prior to PA 1921, No 173 (CLS 1922, § 5429 [see CLS 1940, § 8413, Stat Ann 1944 Cum Supp § 17.147]), working members of a partnership receiving wages, irrespective of profits, were not employees within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation law, hut by virtue'of the above act such partners were given the status of employees for the purpose of compensation.” Auten v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 310 Mich 453.
The amendment of the definition of “employee” to include independent contractors in the service of another upon whose profits premiums are paid is a reasonable extension of the scope of the workmen’s compensation act and is germane to its purposes.
“The rule is that what is germane to the subject as expressed in the title is within its scope. It is germane to the title of the act to define the terms as used in the act. That is what section 49 does, extending the definition beyond the scope of that of the dictionary, perhaps, hut, nevertheless, defining it. If it has misdefined one of those words according to the dictionary, would the act to that extent be unconstitutional? If so, every act that, defines a word must stay strictly with the dictionary or define that word also in the title, which has never been done so far as we are aware: For example, in the very act in question, C. L. sections 4377-4383 define various words; including employer and employee. The legislature has a right to do this, and thereby declare the sense in which the words are used both in the title and in the rest of the act. If it be claimed that this will permit the legislature to avoid the beneficence of this section of the Constitution by adopting absurd and unreasonable definitions, the answers are 2: First, we have no right to assume that the legislature will he unreasonable; and, second, the question is not before us because the present defini*543tion is reasonable.” Industrial Commission v. Continental Investment Co., 78 Colo 399 (242 P 49).
The order of the commission should be affirmed.
Bushnell, J., concurred with Adams, J.

 CL 1948, § 411.1 et seg. (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.141 et seg.).