Court Opinion

ID: 9529459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:50:59.741082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:47.269731
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting: Although the majority opinion reflects much thought, I disagree with its analysis of the cause/condition dichotomy — the distinction between the cause of an injury and a mere condition that allows an injury to occur. Because I believe that the parking of the truck in this case constituted merely a condition that allowed the injury to occur, I respectfully dissent. Although the cause/condition dichotomy has been strongly criticized (see Duncan, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 204, 478 N.E.2d at 615 (1985) (“the distinction between cause and condition is now almost entirely discredited”)), the Supreme Court of Illinois has nonetheless recently reaffirmed it. In Thompson, 154 Ill. 2d at 383, 609 N.E.2d at 294, the supreme court wrote the following: “If a defendant’s negligence does nothing more than furnish a condition by which injury is made possible, that negligence is not the proximate cause of injury.” In Thompson, the plaintiffs argued that the county was negligent in failing to warn motorists adequately of a curve on the road where the automobile accident occurred, and they presented expert testimony to support that contention. Thompson, 154 Ill. 2d at 380, 609 N.E.2d at 292. The evidence in Thompson also showed that the driver of the car in which plaintiffs decedent was a passenger was drunk and driving at an excessive rate of speed. Indeed, the driver was ultimately convicted of reckless homicide and sent to prison. On these facts, the supreme court concluded that the driver’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident and that the condition of the road provided nothing more than the location where the driver’s negligence came to fruition. Thompson, 154 Ill. 2d at 383, 609 N.E.2d at 294. The majority opinion attempts to distinguish Thompson on the ground that the cause/condition dichotomy “is not a rigid formula” and that resolving this distinction “is a fact-specific analysis of several factors always considered when determining proximate cause.” 299 Ill. App. 3d at 758-59. However, I find the majority opinion’s efforts unavailing, particularly in light of prior case law that applied the cause/condition dichotomy to parked vehicles and concluded that the presence of those vehicles constituted a condition, not a cause. The first such case is Walker, 315 Ill. App. at 555, 43 N.E.2d at 413-14, where defendant’s truck was parked on a major thoroughfare in Marion, Illinois, near a “No Parking” sign. The truck had a trailer attached on which a 30-foot-long telephone pole was loaded. The truck and the trailer together were about 34 feet long, and the pole extended another 13 feet over the back of the trailer. The truck was parked several feet from the nearest intersection. Walker, 315 Ill. App. at 555-56, 43 N.E.2d at 413-14. Two automobiles collided on the street where the truck was parked, and the plaintiff (who was in one of the cars) claimed that the other driver could not see him because of the telephone company truck. The appellate court concluded that the parked truck was not the proximate cause of the accident and reversed. “[A]t that particular time, [the telephone company truck] did nothing more than furnish a condition by which the injury to the plaintiff was made possible.” Walker, 315 Ill. App. at 562, 43 N.E.2d at 416. The second case is Baker, 321 Ill. App. at 143, 52 N.E.2d at 284, in which the defendant company parked its gasoline truck on a city street to unload gasoline into underground storage tanks at a filling station. While the truck was so parked, a small child came from behind the truck and was struck by a passing car. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint, and the appellate court affirmed. In so holding, the court explained that if a negligent act or omission does nothing more than furnish a condition making an injury possible, and such condition, by the subsequent independent act of a third person, causes an injury, the two acts are not concurrent and the existence of the condition is not the proximate cause of the injury. The Baker court concluded as follows: “[The defendant’s] truck was not in motion, but was parked ***. Its position upon the street was obvious to all persons, and a condition necessary to be reckoned with by the traveling public.” Baker, 321 Ill. App. at 143-44, 52 N.E.2d at 284-85. The majority opinion attempts to distinguish Walker and Baker, but I find those efforts unpersuasive. Further, I think imposing potentially millions of dollars of liability upon motorists who park their cars illegally is questionable policy. A familiar sight in every city is the United Parcel Service or Federal Express truck, typically parked illegally with its hazard lights on, indicating that the driver will return soon. One also frequently sees other vehicles frequently illegally parked when they are involved in delivering pizzas, or picking up or dropping off children at after-school activities. Such vehicles are commonly parked, however temporarily, in no-parking zones along busy streets. Ticket and fine those drivers if we must, but this court ought not take it upon itself to decide that such illegal parking subjects these motorists to millions of dollars of civil liability.