Court Opinion

ID: 9520368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:37:57.12299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:03.507200
License: Public Domain

Simmons, C. J.,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result.
My disagreement with the opinion goes not to the conclusion but to the use of the quotation from 48 C. J. S., Judges, § 71, p. 1038. It is the foundation for syllabus point five of the court.
The quote goes to criminal liability of a judge for his acts.
Judge McFarland is not here charged with a crime or crimes, but with acts which we have defined as criminal contempts. As to them we have held: “A proceeding for contempt is sui generis and summary in its nature. It partakes of some of the elements of both civil and criminal proceedings but, strictly speaking, it is neither. It belongs to a class of proceedings inherent in the court and deemed essential to its existence.” State *263ex rel. Beck v. Lush, 168 Neb. 367, 95 N. W. 2d 695, 72 A. L. R. 2d 426.
Beginning at least with State v. DeWolfe, 67 Neb. 321, 93 N. W. 746, in an opinion by Sullivan, C. J., with intervening decisions down to Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 104 N. W. 2d 227, in an opinion by Carter, J., we have consistently held: “In this state all public offenses are statutory, and no person can be punished for any act or omission which is not made penal by the plain import of a properly enacted statute.”
We are not here dealing with a criminal case.
If Judge McFarland is here punishable, it is because he is liable for a criminal contempt and not because he has committed a crime. “Judges are liable for con-tempts committed by them; * * *.” 17 C. J. S., Contempt, § 35, p. 50.
I would apply a rule of law applicable to the facts of this case and the nature of this action. By the use of a citation which goes to criminal law, by inference Judge McFarland is found guilty of the commission of a crime. Judge McFarland was neither charged with, tried for, nor found guilty of a crime.