Court Opinion

ID: 9741578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:58:29.646705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:57:18.844643
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Article IX, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides in part as follows: “The General Assembly by law may exempt from taxation only the property of the State, units of local government and school districts and property used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, and for school, religious, cemetery!,] and charitable purposes.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 6. In conjunction with the above provision of the constitution, the legislature has passed section 15 — 40 (35 ILCS 200/15 — 40 (West 2002)), which provides: “Religious purposes, orphanages, or school and religious purposes. (a) Property used exclusively for: (1) religious purposes, or (2) school and religious purposes, or (3) orphanages qualifies for exemption as long as it is not used with a view to profit.” It is also important to note that when a statute purports to grant an exemption from taxation, the tax exemption provision is to be construed strictly against the one who asserts the claim of exemption. International College of Surgeons v. Brenza, 8 Ill. 2d 141, 145, 133 N.E.2d 269, 271-72 (1956). Likewise, as stated in People ex rel. Goodman v. University of Illinois Foundation, 388 Ill. 363, 370, 58 N.E.2d 33, 37 (1944), whenever a doubt arises, it is to be resolved against exemption and in favor of taxation. The determination of whether the property should be declared to be tax exempt as used exclusively for religious purposes is a question of fact to be determined by the ALJ. We should not assume the burden to be the fact finder. This decision is best left to the ALJ and the Department with its expertise. This court is substituting its position for that of the ALJ and the Department. The ALJ, in paragraphs 9 and 10 of her decision, sets forth the facts with respect to the use of the property. Those findings clearly support the ALJ’s and the Department’s order. It should be noted that the appellant never asked for a partial exemption. The State offered the applicant the opportunity to apply for a partial exemption and the offer was refused. The ALJ also recognized that the applicant could have applied for a partial exemption. I suggest that the applicant is still not foreclosed from filing another claim for a partial exemption. The majority gives credence to the statement in Fairview Haven, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 506 N.E.2d at 348, that the court is required “to accept the entity’s characterization of its activities and beliefs as religious as long as the characterization is in good faith.” See 349 Ill. App. 3d at 331. The statement suggests that “good faith” rather than “exclusive use” is the standard. In this state, where real property taxes are one of the primary revenue-generating resources, strict adherence to the constitutional and statutory mandate is vitally important. To erode the tax base on the standard of good faith will simply make the burden on the property taxpayer more distasteful. The judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed.