Court Opinion

ID: 9909734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 22:00:36.943052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:19.296156
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KAREN L. INGRAM-WILLIAMS,                       DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        SF-1221-16-0352-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: December 12, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

               THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Heather White , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Maya Soloway , Esquire, Los Angeles, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied her request for corrective action in her individual right of action (IRA)
     appeal.   Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.          Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     except as MODIFIED.        We MODIFY the initial decision to clarify that a
     performance improvement plan (PIP) may constitute a personnel action under the
     Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) and that an agency action need not be
     “formal discipline” to constitute a covered personnel action.            We further
     MODIFY the initial decision to find that the appellant’s supervisor had a strong
     motive to retaliate against her and that her second-level supervisor and the
     deciding official had some motive to retaliate against her.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        Prior to her resignation, effective March 27, 2014, the appellant was
     employed as a Nurse Supervisor with the agency’s Long Beach Healthcare
     Service. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 56. In a December 2015 complaint to
     the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and in subsequent correspondence with
     OSC, the appellant alleged that, in retaliation for her 2012 disclosures regarding
     improper hiring and management practices by her first-level supervisor and
     inadequate patient care by a physician, her supervisor excluded her from the
     hiring process, placed her on a PIP without her knowledge, gave her an
     unsatisfactory midyear performance review, detailed her, demoted her, and
     proposed her removal, which the deciding official imposed. IAF, Tab 1 at 20-36.
                                                                                         3

     In letters dated March 3, 2016, OSC notified the appellant that it had terminated
     its inquiry into her allegations and informed her of her right to seek corrective
     action from the Board. Id. at 34-36.
¶3         The appellant timely filed the instant IRA appeal, alleging that, in
     retaliation for her protected disclosures, the agency took the above actions against
     her, as reported to OSC, and that these actions forced her to resign. 2 IAF, Tab 1
     at 1-7, Tab 8 at 1-3, Tab 9 at 4-6. The appellant declined her option for a hearing.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 2.    After notifying the parties of the applicable law and their
     respective burdens of proof, IAF, Tab 8, the administrative judge issued an initial
     decision finding Board jurisdiction over the appeal but denying the appellant’s
     request for corrective action, IAF, Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID).
¶4         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, the
     agency has responded in opposition, and the appellant has submitted a reply to the
     agency’s response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 4, 6-7.

                         DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5         The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal based on whistleblower
     reprisal under the WPA, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection
     Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), if the appellant has exhausted her
     administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations of the
     following:   (1) she engaged in whistleblowing activity by making a protected
     disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), or engaged in protected activity described
     under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or
     protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take, fail
     to take, or threaten to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). 3

     2
       The deciding official imposed the proposed removal in a decision letter dated
     March 13, 2014, with an effective date of March 28, 2014, and the appellant resigned
     effective March 27, 2014. IAF, Tab 5 at 56-57, Tab 7 at 5.
     3
      Effective December 27, 2012, the WPEA expanded the grounds on which an appellant
     may file an IRA appeal with the Board. WPEA, Pub. L. No. 112-199, §§ 101(b)(1)(A),
     202, 126 Stat. 1465, 1476; see Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs , 120 M.S.P.R.
                                                                                              4

     Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001);
     Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016); see 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8). After establishing the Board’s jurisdiction in an IRA appeal, the
     appellant then must establish a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation by
     proving by preponderant evidence that she made a protected disclosure or
     engaged in protected activity that was a contributing factor in a personnel action
     taken against her. 4 Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5; see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). If
     the appellant makes out a prima facie case, the agency is given an opportunity to
     prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same
     personnel action in the absence of the protected disclosure or activity. 5 U.S.C.
     § 1221(e)(1)-(2); Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5.
¶6         In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant
     established jurisdiction over her IRA appeal by exhausting her administrative
     remedies and by making the requisite nonfrivolous allegations. ID at 1, 12. She
     further found that the appellant made one protected disclosure that was a
     629, ¶ 9 (2014). Prior to the WPEA’s enactment, an appellant could file an IRA appeal
     with the Board based on allegations of whistleblower reprisal under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8) only. See Wooten v. Department of Health and Human Services ,
     54 M.S.P.R. 143, 146 (1992), superseded by statute as stated in Carney v. Department
     of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 446, ¶ 5 (2014). Following the WPEA’s enactment,
     an appellant also may file an IRA appeal with the Board concerning alleged reprisal for
     protected activity as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), and (D). 5 U.S.C.
     § 1221(a); Hooker, 120 M.S.P.R. 629, ¶ 9. The WPEA does not apply retroactively, and
     the date of the purported retaliation, not the disclosures, is dispositive in determining
     whether pre-WPEA or post-WPEA standards apply. See Hooker, 120 M.S.P.R. 629,
     ¶¶ 13, 15. In the instant case, several of the alleged retaliatory actions occurred before,
     and several occurred after, the effective date of the WPEA. Because the appellant’s
     allegations of whistleblower reprisal all arise under section 2302(b)(8), however, the
     WPEA did not provide her any additional appeal rights. Moreover, we find that the
     WPEA’s other amendments to the WPA do not affect the outcome in this appeal. See
     WPEA §§ 101(a)(1)-104, 114. Therefore, in considering the appellant’s claims, we
     need not differentiate between the alleged retaliation occurring prior to and after the
     WPEA’s effective date. We have also reviewed the other relevant legislation enacted
     since the filing of this appeal and find that it does not impact the outcome.
     4
       Preponderance of the evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
     person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
     contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                            5

     contributing factor in her November 2012 detail, the proposed removal, and the
     removal action. ID at 12-16. The administrative judge determined, however, that
     several of the appellant’s disclosures were not protected and that the
     memorandum of counseling, the counseling program/PIP, 5 and the midyear review
     were not covered personnel actions.         Id.   She also found that, although an
     involuntary resignation may constitute a constructive removal, which is a
     personnel action under the WPA, the appellant failed to establish that her
     resignation was involuntary.      ID at 16-17.    Although the administrative judge
     found that the appellant established her prima facie case of whistleblower
     reprisal, she determined that the agency showed by clear and convincing evidence
     that it would have taken the same personnel actions in the absence of the
     disclosure and thus denied corrective action. ID at 18-20.
¶7         On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in
     finding that she made only one protected disclosure; that her resignation was
     voluntary; and that the agency met its burden of showing by clear and convincing
     evidence it would have taken the same personnel actions absent any protected
     disclosure. PFR File, Tab 4 at 13-20. In response to the agency’s opposition to
     her petition for review, the appellant reiterates these arguments and further argues
     that the administrative judge erred in finding that the counseling program/PIP and

     5
       On June 1, 2012, the appellant’s first-level supervisor presented her with a
     memorandum of counseling showing issues with her performance and placing her on a
     “Counseling Plan” to address deficiencies in her performance. IAF, Tab 13 at 12-15.
     According to the agency’s Acting Chief of Human Resources (HR Chief), there was
     some confusion about whether the appellant should have been placed on a counseling
     program (which is the appropriate improvement program for a Title 38 nonsupervisory
     employee) or on a PIP (which is the appropriate improvement program for a supervisory
     employee in an Executive Career Field position). IAF, Tab 11 at 60-61. Although the
     HR Chief stated that he informed the appellant’s supervisor that the appellant should be
     on a PIP, instead of a counseling program, he did not know if she informed the
     appellant of the need to change the counseling program to a PIP. Id. While there is no
     indication in the record that the agency took action to convert the counseling program to
     a PIP, the administrative judge and the parties referred to the June 1, 2012 “Counseling
     Plan” as a “counseling program/PIP.”
                                                                                             6

     the midyear appraisal were not covered personnel actions under the WPA. PFR
     File, Tab 7.

     The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant made only one
     protected disclosure.
¶8         A protected disclosure is a disclosure that an appellant reasonably believes
     evidences a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a
     gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
     public health or safety.      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A); Chavez v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 18 (2013). A reasonable belief exists if a
     disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to, or readily
     ascertainable by, the appellant could reasonably conclude that the agency’s
     actions evince one of the types of wrongdoing listed in section 2302(b)(8)(A).
     Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 6 Chavez, 120 M.S.P.R.
     285, ¶ 18.     The appellant need not prove that the matter disclosed actually
     established one of the listed types of wrongdoing; rather, she must show that the
     matter disclosed was one that a reasonable person in her position would have
     believed evidenced any of the situations specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A).
     Chavez, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 18.
¶9         In her correspondence with OSC, the appellant alleged that, in January or
     February 2012, she disclosed to her second-level supervisor that her supervisor
     was directly supervising her (supervisor’s) girlfriend, had hired her girlfriend’s
     daughter and friends over more qualified candidates, and had excluded the
     appellant from the hiring and interview process. IAF, Tab 1 at 20-21, 29. She
     also notified OSC that she disclosed to a supervising physician, her first- and

     6
       Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals
     for the Federal Circuit on these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to the
     All Circuit Review Act (Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510 (2017)), appellants may
     file petitions for judicial review of Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with
     any circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
     Therefore, we must consider these issues with the view that the appellant may seek
     review of this decision before any appropriate court of appeal.
                                                                                             7

      second-level supervisors, and the Office of the Inspector General that another
      physician had poor clinical practices that placed patients at risk. Id. at 21, 23.
¶10         In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
      first disclosure, that her supervisor was directly supervising her girlfriend, was
      not protected because, in actuality, the supervisor did not directly supervise her
      girlfriend.   ID at 12.   The administrative judge concluded that the chain of
      command was known to, or was reasonably ascertainable by, the appellant and
      that a disinterested observer could not reasonably conclude that this evinced one
      of the categories of wrongdoing specified in section 2302(b)(8)(A).            Id.   The
      administrative   judge    also   found   probative   the   fact   that   the   appellant
      acknowledged in a September 2013 affidavit that she knew that her supervisor did
      not directly supervise her girlfriend but believed instead that her supervisor
      “directly affects” the girlfriend.   Id. The administrative judge concluded that,
      even if the appellant believed that her supervisor “affected” her girlfriend’s
      employment, such a vague allegation was insufficient for a disinterested observer
      to conclude that there was wrongdoing. ID at 12-13.
¶11         On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in
      relying on a September 2013 affidavit as evidence that the appellant knew that her
      supervisor did not directly supervise her girlfriend. PFR File, Tab 4 at 13-14,
      Tab 7 at 4-5.    We agree that the appellant’s September 2013 affidavit is not
      dispositive on the question of what the appellant knew when she made the
      disclosures in 2012. However, the administrative judge did not rely solely on the
      appellant’s statement in the affidavit in finding that this first disclosure was not
      protected. Rather, as noted above, she also found that the fact that her supervisor
      did not directly supervise her girlfriend was information readily ascertainable by
      the appellant. ID at 12. The appellant has not challenged this finding on review,
      and we discern no basis to disturb it. Insofar as the appellant believed that the
      supervisor was able to “affect” her girlfriend’s employment, we agree with the
      administrative judge’s finding that this allegation of wrongdoing is too vague to
                                                                                          8

      constitute a protected disclosure because the appellant has not alleged with
      specificity that her supervisor gave her girlfriend preferential treatment.        ID
      at 12-13; see Ayers v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶¶ 23-24 (2015);
      see also Rzucidlo v. Department of the Army , 101 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 13 (2006)
      (explaining that, to be protected, disclosures must be specific and detailed, not
      vague allegations of wrongdoing regarding broad or imprecise matters).
¶12        The appellant also appears to argue that the administrative judge erred in
      finding that this disclosure was not protected because she alleged that her
      supervisor granted her girlfriend preferential treatment by, for example, hiring her
      girlfriend’s daughter and her friends over more qualified applicants. PFR File,
      Tab 4 at 14.    The administrative judge found, however, that the disclosure
      regarding improper hiring practices was protected. ID at 13. Specifically, she
      found that a disinterested observer, with knowledge of the essential facts known
      to and readily ascertainable by the appellant, could reasonably conclude that
      hiring less qualified candidates who are friends or family members of a friend is,
      at a minimum, an abuse of authority and potentially a violation of a law, rule, or
      regulation. Id. We discern no basis to disturb this determination. 7
¶13        In light of the foregoing, we agree with the administrative judge’s finding
      that the appellant established by preponderant evidence that she made one
      protected disclosure evidencing an abuse of discretion or a violation of law, rule,
      or regulation when, in January or February 2012, she informed her second-level
      supervisor that her first-level supervisor hired less-qualified candidates who were
      friends or family of her girlfriend over more qualified candidates. ID at 15.

      7
        The administrative judge concluded that the appellant’s disclosures that she was
      excluded from the interview process and that a physician had unspecified poor clinical
      practices were not protected. ID at 14-15. The appellant has not challenged these
      findings on review, PFR File, Tabs 4, 7, and we find no basis to disturb them. See
      Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to
      disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a
      whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions).
                                                                                            9

      The administrative judge correctly determined that the counseling program/PIP
      and midyear review are not personnel actions under the WPA, but we MODIFY
      the initial decision to clarify and supplement the analysis.
¶14         As noted above, the WPA, as amended, prohibits an agency from taking,
      failing to take, or threatening to take a personnel action against an employee
      because of any protected disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). A “personnel action”
      is defined in this context as, among other things, a disciplinary or corrective
      action, a detail or reassignment, or a performance evaluation under 5 U.S.C.
      chapter 43 or under Title 38. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).
¶15         In the instant case, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
      detail, proposed removal, and removal constituted personnel actions within the
      meaning of the WPA. 8       ID at 15-16.     She further found, however, that the
      memorandum of counseling, counseling program, PIP, and midyear review were
      not “formal discipline” and, therefore, did not constitute personnel actions under
      the WPA. ID at 16. On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge
      erred in finding that the counseling program/PIP and midyear review were not
      covered personnel actions. PFR File, Tab 7 at 6-7.
¶16         As the appellant correctly points out on review, the Board has held that a
      PIP and equivalent opportunity-to-improve programs involve a threatened
      personnel action, such as a reduction in grade or removal, and thus are personnel
      actions under the WPA.      Harris v. Department of Transportation, 96 M.S.P.R.
      487, ¶ 7 (2004); Gonzales v. Department of Housing and Urban Development ,
      64 M.S.P.R. 314, 319 (1994). Therefore, we modify the initial decision to clarify
      that a PIP may constitute a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). ID
      at 16. Further, we modify the initial decision to clarify that an agency action
      need not constitute “formal discipline” to be deemed a personnel action under the
      WPA. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). Nonetheless, as discussed below, we find
      8
        The administrative judge also found that the appellant established that her protected
      disclosures were a contributing factor in these personnel actions by virtue of the
      knowledge/timing test. ID at 15-16. The parties do not challenge this finding on
      review, and we discern no basis to disturb it. See Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 105-06.
                                                                                         10

      that the appellant was not placed on a covered PIP or an equivalent program and
      agree with the administrative judge’s finding that, under the circumstances
      present here, the counseling program/PIP and midyear review are not personnel
      actions under the WPA.
¶17        In King v. Department of Health and Human Services, 133 F.3d 1450,
      1452-53 (Fed. Cir. 1998), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held
      that, unlike a performance evaluation, a progress report is not a personnel action
      under the WPA. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(viii). The court explained that not
      every agency action is a personnel action under the WPA and that, to constitute a
      personnel action, an action must have practical consequences for an employee.
      King, 133 F.3d at 1453. In distinguishing a progress report from a performance
      evaluation, the court found that “a performance evaluation is formal, judgmental,
      consequential,   and   retrospective,   while   a   progress   report   is   informal,
      collaborative, non-consequential, and somewhat prospective in nature, providing
      an opportunity for future improvement.” Id. at 1452. Thus, the court explained,
      “while a performance evaluation judges the quality of past work, a progress report
      gives an employer the chance to communicate with and guide the future
      performance of its employees by clarifying how well each employee has been
      meeting existing goals during a performance period to date.” Id.
¶18        Here, we find that the appellant’s midyear review is akin to the progress
      review addressed in King. During her midyear review meeting, the appellant’s
      supervisor provided her a progress review indicating that her performance needed
      improvement to be fully successful or better in fiscal year 2012 and also provided
      a memorandum of counseling, which identified performance issues and set forth
      her expectations. IAF, Tab 11 at 111, Tab 13 at 12-15. The appellant did not
      receive an official rating during her midyear review, and the documents given to
      her did not reference any disciplinary or corrective action. Id. For these reasons,
      the midyear review, like the progress report in King, was an informal and
      prospective attempt to improve the appellant’s future performance, did not have
                                                                                          11

      practical consequences for her, and was not a personnel action.             See King,
      133 F.3d at 1452-53.
¶19         As noted above, the Board has found that a PIP and equivalent
      opportunity-to-improve programs are personnel actions under the WPA because
      they constitute a threat of a personnel action. Gonzales, 64 M.S.P.R. at 319; see
      Harris, 96 M.S.P.R. 487, ¶ 7. However, Congress did not intend for the WPA to
      create an IRA appeal for every interim comment made in the workplace, written
      or otherwise, about the need for improvement, and not all general statements
      setting forth performance expectations and the consequences of failing to meet
      those expectations or counseling measures directed at particular employees
      constitute threats to take a personnel action. Koch v. Securities and Exchange
      Commission, 48 F. App’x 778, 787 (Fed. Cir. 2002); 9 see King, 133 F.3d at 1453.
      The line between a counseling measure and a threat is not a bright one, and the
      distinction between the two is very fact dependent. Koch, 48 F. App’x at 787.
¶20         Here, as noted above, there is an outstanding question about whether the
      appellant should have been placed on a counseling program or a PIP and about
      whether the agency converted the counseling program to a PIP.            IAF, Tab 11
      at 61. Nonetheless, the nature of the action determines the Board’s jurisdiction,
      not the agency’s characterization of it. Czarkowski v. Department of the Navy,
      87 M.S.P.R. 107, ¶ 20 (2000). Therefore, even if the improvement program was
      not a “PIP,” it still may constitute a personnel action under the WPA. Id.
¶21         Regulations promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management provide
      that a tenured Federal employee is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to
      demonstrate acceptable performance pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 432.104 before an
      agency may propose her removal or a reduction in grade based on unacceptable
      performance.    5 C.F.R. § 432.105(a).     Section 432.104 requires, among other
      things, that the agency notify the employee of the critical elements for which her
      9
        The Board may rely on an unpublished Federal Circuit decision when, as here, it finds
      the court’s reasoning persuasive. Mauldin v. U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 513,
      ¶ 12 (2011).
                                                                                         12

      performance is unacceptable, identify the standards that must be attained to
      demonstrate acceptable performance, and inform her that, unless her performance
      in the critical element improves and is sustained at an acceptable level, she may
      be reduced in grade or removed. 5 C.F.R. § 432.104. Citing this section, the
      Board has held that a PIP, by definition, involves a threatened personnel action—
      namely a reduction in grade or a removal—and, therefore, is a covered personnel
      action. Gonzales, 64 M.S.P.R. at 319.
¶22          In the instant case, the appellant’s supervisor gave her a memorandum of
      counseling titled “Counseling Program [ ] May 2012,” which contained a list of
      “issues” with her performance, such as competencies that had not been updated or
      information that had not been secured on specific dates. IAF, Tab 13 at 12-15.
      Each issue was accompanied by a “Qualification Standard,” such as, for example,
      “[i]ntegrity,” “[q]uality of [c]are,” and “[p]atient safety.” Id. Some of the issues
      were    accompanied    by   an   “Expectation,”    such   as   “[c]onversations   are
      professional” and “[c]onfidential information is secured.” Id. At the end of the
      memorandum, the appellant and her supervisor signed beneath the following
      statement: “We have reviewed each issue and the expectation is that you will
      communicate to me how you will rectify each deficiency.                This will be
      incorporated into the Counseling Plan that I am placing you on and I will continue
      to be available to assist as it is imperative that you correct the issues identified.”
      Id. at 15. According to the appellant’s supervisor, she and the appellant agreed to
      meet weekly; however, because the supervisor refused to let the appellant record
      the meetings or bring a witness from human resources, the appellant did not
      attend any meetings after June 8, 2012. IAF, Tab 11 at 51.
¶23          Unlike a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance
      pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 432.104, the counseling program at issue here did not
      inform the appellant that she was failing in a critical element, identify standards
      that must be attained, or threaten her with a reduction in grade or removal should
      she fail to achieve and maintain acceptable performance. IAF, Tab 13 at 12-15.
                                                                                        13

      Likewise, although the appellant’s supervisor advised her that her performance
      needed to improve to be considered fully successful or better for fiscal year 2012
      and informed her of specific areas that needed improvement, she did not threaten
      any disciplinary action. Id. at 15; IAF, Tab 11 at 50-51, 111. Rather, as in other
      cases wherein the Board has found no threatened personnel action, the agency
      here merely counseled the appellant regarding performance deficiencies and
      advised her of the need for improvement. See Reeves v. Department of the Army,
      101 M.S.P.R. 337, ¶ 11 n.* (2005) (finding that an appellant failed to raise a
      nonfrivolous allegation that a memorandum of counseling was a personnel action
      when the memorandum informed him of performance deficiencies and required
      corrective actions, but did not threaten to take disciplinary action), disagreed with
      on other grounds in Delgado v. Merit Systems Protection Board , 880 F.3d 913
      (7th Cir. 2018); Special Counsel v. Spears, 75 M.S.P.R. 639, 669 (1997) (finding
      that a “mid point” counseling memorandum informing an employee that she was
      failing two of her critical elements was part of a process designed to assist her to
      bring her performance to an acceptable level, rather than a threatened personnel
      action). Therefore, we find that the counseling program and related documents
      here do not constitute the threat of a personnel action under the WPA.

      The administrative judge correctly determined that the appellant’s resignation
      was voluntary and did not constitute a personnel action under the WPA.
¶24         Although a decision to resign or retire is presumed to be voluntary and
      outside the Board’s jurisdiction, Putnam v. Department of Homeland Security,
      121 M.S.P.R. 532, ¶ 21 (2014), an involuntary resignation or retirement may
      constitute an appealable personnel action in an IRA appeal, Colbert v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶ 12 (2014). An appellant
      may overcome the presumption of voluntariness by showing that her resignation
      was the product of misinformation or deception by the agency, or of coercive acts
      by the agency, such as intolerable working conditions or the unjustified threat of
      an adverse action. SanSoucie v. Department of Agriculture, 116 M.S.P.R. 149,
                                                                                     14

      ¶ 14 (2011). To establish involuntariness on the basis of coercion, an appellant
      must show that the agency effectively imposed the terms of her resignation, that
      she had no realistic alternative but to resign, and that her resignation was the
      result of improper acts by the agency.    Staats v. U.S. Postal Service, 99 F.3d
      1120, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
¶25        Here, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s general allegations
      that her supervisor subjected her to a hostile work environment were insufficient
      to establish that the agency coerced her resignation or that the agency knew that
      the reasons for its action could not be substantiated. ID at 17. On review, the
      appellant challenges these findings, arguing that she was forced to resign after
      enduring “several years of retaliatory and baseless performance-based personnel
      actions” and a work environment that was so “intolerable” that she could not
      attend meetings with her supervisor “for fear of retaliation.” PFR File, Tab 4
      at 15. We find, however, that these vague and unsupported contentions on review
      provide no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s well-reasoned finding. See
      Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 105-06. In any event, we have reviewed the record and
      agree with the administrative judge’s finding that, although the appellant
      expressed feelings of stress and believed that she was being treated unfairly, she
      failed to show that she was subjected to intolerable working conditions that would
      have compelled a reasonable person in her position to resign. ID at 17; see Miller
      v. Department of Defense, 85 M.S.P.R. 310, ¶ 32 (2000) (holding that an
      employee is not guaranteed a stress-free working environment and that
      dissatisfaction with work assignments, a feeling of being unfairly criticized, or
      difficult or unpleasant working conditions generally are not so intolerable as to
      compel a reasonable person to resign).
¶26        The administrative judge also found that the appellant did not identify any
      misinformation or deception on the agency’s part that would establish that her
      resignation was involuntary. ID at 17. On review, the appellant challenges this
      finding, arguing that her supervisor’s actions “demonstrated an element of
                                                                                           15

      deception in failing to notify Appellant of any performance deficiencies.” PFR
      File, Tab 4 at 15. Even if this assertion were true, it would provide no basis to
      find that the appellant’s resignation was involuntary based on deception.             A
      resignation will be considered involuntary if an employee materially relies on an
      agency’s misinformation or deception to her detriment. Morrison v. Department
      of the Navy, 122 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶ 7 (2015). Here, however, the appellant has not
      alleged, and the record does not reflect, that she relied on any misinformation
      from the agency or deceptive act on the part of the agency in deciding to submit
      her resignation.     Therefore, we agree with the administrative judge that the
      appellant has not shown that her resignation was involuntary based on deception
      or misinformation.
¶27         The appellant further argues on review that the administrative judge “erred
      in finding that Appellant’s removal was not involuntary because ‘[she] was
      offered as settlement a Last Chance Agreement in lieu of removal, which she
      rejected.” ID at 17; PFR File, Tab 7 at 6. The appellant, however, misapprehends
      the administrative judge’s finding.      In the initial decision, the administrative
      judge noted that the appellant was offered a last chance settlement agreement in
      lieu of removal but found that the appellant’s choice between unpleasant
      alternatives did not make her decision to resign involuntary. ID at 17. We agree.
¶28         The doctrine of coerced involuntariness is “a narrow one” and does not
      apply if the employee resigns or retires because she “does not want to accept
      [measures] that the agency is authorized to adopt, even if those measures make
      continuation in the job so unpleasant . . . that [s]he feels that [s]he has no realistic
      option but to leave.” Staats, 99 F.3d at 1124. “[T]he fact than an employee is
      faced with an unpleasant situation or that [her] choice is limited to two
      unattractive options does not make [her] decision any less voluntary.” Id. Here,
      it appears that the appellant was faced with one of several unpleasant alternatives
      —namely, being removed from her position, accepting or negotiating the agency’s
      proffered last chance settlement agreement, or resigning—and she chose to resign.
                                                                                       16

      As the administrative judge correctly determined, the appellant’s choice between
      these unpleasant alternatives did not render her ultimate choice to resign
      involuntary. Id.; Lawson v. U.S. Postal Service, 68 M.S.P.R. 345, 350 (1995)
      (finding that the fact that the appellant’s choice was limited to accepting an
      assignment, facing an adverse action for refusing the assignment, or applying for
      retirement did not render his ultimate decision to retire involuntary).
¶29         Finally, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to show that
      her resignation was involuntary on the basis of the unjustified threat of removal.
      ID at 17. On review, the appellant appears to challenge this finding, arguing that
      the agency subjected her to “baseless performance-based personnel actions.” PFR
      File, Tab 4 at 15. When an employee is faced with the choice between resigning
      or being subjected to an adverse action, the resulting resignation cannot be
      considered involuntary unless she shows that the agency lacked reasonable
      grounds for taking or threatening to take the adverse action.         See Terban v.
      Department of Energy, 216 F.3d 1021, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2000).               Here, the
      administrative judge found that the appellant’s mere disagreement with the
      agency’s reasons for its actions failed to show that the agency lacked reasonable
      grounds for taking an action. ID at 17. The appellant’s conclusory assertion on
      review that the performance-based actions were “baseless” provides no basis to
      disturb this finding. See Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 105-06.

      The administrative judge correctly found that the agency proved by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have detailed the appellant and sustained her
      proposed removal in the absence of her protected disclosures, but we MODIFY
      the initial decision to clarify and supplement the analysis.
¶30         When, as here, an appellant shows by preponderant evidence that she made
      a protected disclosure and that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the
      agency’s decision to take a personnel action against her, the Board will order
      corrective action unless the agency shows by clear and convincing evidence that it
                                                                                          17

      would have taken the personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowing. 10
      5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); Chavez, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 28. In determining whether
      an agency has shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken
      the personnel action absent the protected activity, the Board will consider all of
      the relevant factors, including the following (“Carr factors”): (1) The strength of
      the agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of
      any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in
      the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against
      employees who did not engage in such protected activity, but who are otherwise
      similarly situated. Soto v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 11;
      see also Carr v. Social Security Administration , 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
      1999). The Board does not view these factors as discrete elements, each of which
      the agency must prove by clear and convincing evidence, but rather weighs these
      factors together to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing as a
      whole. Alarid v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 14 (2015). The
      Board must consider all the evidence, including evidence that detracts from the
      conclusion that the agency met its burden. Whitmore v. Department of Labor,
      680 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 14.
¶31         As noted above, the first covered personnel action at issue in this appeal is
      the appellant’s detail.     On November 14, 2012, the appellant’s supervisor
      temporarily assigned her to a nonsupervisory position in the Nursing Education
      Service “to complete special projects, pending review of [her] performance and
      how [she] discharged [her] duties.” IAF, Tab 7 at 19. The second personnel
      action at issue in this appeal is the removal action. On January 13, 2014, the
      appellant’s supervisor proposed her removal based on the following charges:
      (A) Failure to Perform Supervisory Duties (supported by 12 specifications);
      (B) Providing Inaccurate Information (supported by three specifications);
      10
        Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof that produces in the
      mind of the trier of fact a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established.
      5 C.F.R. § 1209.4(e).
                                                                                             18

      (C) Failure to Follow Instructions (supported by five specifications); (D) Careless
      Workmanship (supported by four specifications); and (E) Inappropriate Conduct
      (supported by two specifications). Id. at 8-13. On March 13, 2014, the deciding
      official imposed the removal, sustaining the charges and all but four of the
      specifications. Id. at 5-6.
¶32         The administrative judge weighed the Carr factors and concluded that the
      agency met its burden of showing that it would have detailed and removed the
      appellant absent her protected disclosure.          ID at 18-20.      In reaching this
      conclusion, the administrative judge found that, although the appellant’s
      supervisor had “some motive” to retaliate against her and there was no evidence
      that the agency treated similarly situated nonwhistleblowers in a similar manner,
      the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of the detail and the removal
      outweighed the other factors. Id. She further found that the appellant failed to
      identify any motive to retaliate on the part of her second-level supervisor or the
      deciding official. ID at 18, 20.
¶33         On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to
      consider countervailing evidence—namely, the fact that her alleged performance
      deficiencies arose immediately after her supervisor learned of her disclosures.
      PFR File, Tab 4 at 15-18. We disagree that the administrative judge failed to
      consider the chronology of events. To the contrary, as noted above, she found
      that the appellant established that her disclosures were a contributing factor in the
      personnel actions by virtue of the knowledge/timing test. 11 ID at 15-16. Once the
      11
        On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in finding that her
      supervisor became aware of her disclosure regarding improper hiring in 2013. PFR
      File, Tab 4 at 17. The appellant asserts that this error is material because, contrary to
      the administrative judge’s finding, her “alleged performance problems did not predate
      her protected disclosure or [her supervisor’s] learning about her protected disclosure.”
      Id. Although the administrative judge noted that the appellant’s supervisor submitted a
      sworn declaration stating that she became aware of the appellant’s disclosure “when
      there was an EEO investigation into the matter, which would be sometime in 2013,” she
      nonetheless found that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel actions.
      ID at 13, 15-16. Therefore, any error regarding the date the appellant’s supervisor
      learned of the appellant’s protected disclosure did not affect the appellant’s substantive
                                                                                              19

      burden shifts to the agency to show by clear and convincing evidence that it
      would have taken the same personnel actions in the absence of the disclosures,
      however, the temporal proximity between the disclosures and the personnel
      actions is not dispositive. Rather, as stated above, the Board generally weighs the
      Carr factors to determine whether the agency has met its burden by clear and
      convincing evidence. See Chavez, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 28.
¶34         The appellant also argues that the administrative judge erred in finding that
      the agency’s evidence in support of the removal action was strong because she
      received a fully successful rating on her detail and rebutted all of the charges in
      her reply to the proposed removal, and because most of the specifications in
      Charge D (careless workmanship) could not be true. PFR File, Tab 4 at 18-19,
      Tab 7 at 8 (citing IAF, Tab 11 at 230-40). We have considered these arguments
      but find that they provide no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s
      well-reasoned determination that the agency had strong evidence to support the
      removal action. ID at 18-20; see Ray v. Department of the Army, 97 M.S.P.R.
      101, ¶ 28 (2004) (finding that, even though some specifications were not
      sustained, the agency had strong evidence to support its decision to remove the
      appellant when, among other things, several specifications involved providing
      false information and several specifications were supported by documentary
      evidence or sworn statements), aff’d, 176 F. App’x 110 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Table).
      As noted in the initial decision, the agency premised the appellant’s removal on
      numerous instances of misconduct and provided supporting emails, reports of
      contact, timecard exceptions, schedules, and declarations signed under penalty of
      perjury. ID at 18-20; IAF, Tab 11 at 40-45, 47-57, 121-228. Moreover, even if
      we did not consider the specifications underlying Charge D, we find that the
      sustained specifications in Charges A, B, C, and E constitute strong evidence that

      rights. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984)
      (holding that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights
      provides no basis for reversing an initial decision).
                                                                                               20

      the appellant committed serious misconduct as to warrant removal. IAF, Tab 7
      at 8-11.
¶35         The appellant next challenges the administrative judge’s findings that her
      supervisor’s motive to retaliate was outweighed by the strength of the agency’s
      evidence and that the deciding official and her second-level supervisor had no
      motive to retaliate.    PFR File, Tab 4 at 19-20, Tab 7 at 8-9.             Although the
      administrative judge found that the appellant’s supervisor had only “some
      motive” to retaliate, we modify the initial decision to find that she had a strong
      motive to retaliate based on the appellant’s protected disclosure accusing her of
      improper hiring practices. See Ayers, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 29 (finding that, based
      on the appellant’s disclosure that her supervisor was harassing her, the appellant’s
      supervisor had a clear and strong motive to retaliate). Furthermore, we modify
      the initial decision to find that, although the appellant did not identify a motive
      on the part of her second-level supervisor, he may have had a retaliatory motive
      because he supervised the appellant’s supervisor and, therefore, the appellant’s
      criticisms of her reflected on his capacity as a manager. Id.             In addition, we
      modify the initial decision to find that the strong motive to retaliate on the part of
      the appellant’s supervisor, the proposing official, may be imputed to the deciding
      official.   See Chambers v. Department of the Interior, 116 M.S.P.R. 17, ¶ 58
      (2011). However, even assuming that the deciding official and the second-level
      supervisor knew of the appellant’s disclosures, we find weak evidence of a
      retaliatory motive on their part. 12      See Runstrom v. Department of Veterans
      12
         In a declaration signed under penalty of perjury, the deciding official attested that she
      had no knowledge of the appellant’s disclosures. IAF, Tab 11 at 108-09. Although the
      appellant’s second-level supervisor stated in a declaration signed under penalty of
      perjury that he did not recall that the appellant disclosed to him concerns regarding her
      supervisor’s improper hiring practices, id. at 42, the administrative judge found that his
      lack of recollection was insufficient to rebut the appellant’s more specific claim that she
      made the disclosures to him in January or February 2012, ID at 13. In any event,
      although the appellant’s second-level supervisor agreed with her supervisor’s decision
      to place her on a counseling program, id. at 43, and made two changes to the appellant’s
      temporary assignment, IAF, Tab 7 at 15, 17, he did not take or direct either of the
      personnel actions at issue in this appeal.
                                                                                             21

      Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 169, ¶ 15 (2016).           Further, there is not much of a
      professional motive to retaliate on the part of the agency.                 Robinson v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 923 F.3d 1004, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
¶36         Regarding the third Carr factor, the administrative judge found no evidence
      showing that the agency took similar actions against similarly situated
      nonwhistleblowers.      ID at 20.    The parties do not challenge this finding on
      review. PFR File, Tabs 4, 6-7. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the record and
      agree that the agency has failed to provide any information or evidence regarding
      its treatment of similarly situated nonwhistleblowers for the purposes of a
      Carr-factor analysis.    IAF, Tabs 5, 7, 11, 13; PFR File, Tab 6.          Although the
      administrative judge did not explicitly state how the absence of any evidence
      regarding Carr factor three weighed into her Carr-factor analysis, she appeared to
      find that it weighed against the agency to some degree. ID at 20. We agree that,
      under the circumstances present here, the agency’s failure to produce any
      evidence regarding Carr factor three weighs slightly against it. 13 See Whitmore,
      680 F.3d at 1374 (stating that an agency is required to come forward with “all
      reasonably pertinent evidence relating to Carr factor three” and that “[f]ailure to
      do so may be at the agency’s peril”); see also Miller v. Department of Justice,
      842 F.3d 1252, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

      13
         The appellant argues, for the first time on review, that the agency failed to rebut her
      assertions of disparate treatment. PFR File, Tab 4 at 20. In particular, she argues that
      she informed the deciding official in her reply to the proposed removal that “timecards
      are known to be a universal problem for all supervisors and that she was being held to a
      different standard and punished more harshly than other supervisors.” Id. Generally,
      the Board will not consider an argument raised for the first time on review absent a
      showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite
      the party’s due diligence. Banks v. Department of the Air Force , 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271
      (1980). Here, the appellant has provided no explanation for her failure to raise this
      argument below, and we find no reason to consider it for the first time on review. Even
      if we were to consider it, however, the appellant has failed to provide any information
      regarding the identity or whistleblower status of these alleged other supervisors, and we
      therefore find that her vague allegations would not alter our analysis of the Carr
      factors.
                                                                                      22

¶37        Nonetheless, we agree with the administrative judge that the strength of the
      agency’s evidence in support of the detail and the removal outweighs the other
      Carr factors.   ID at 18-20.   As noted in the initial decision, the counseling
      program/PIP review notes reflect numerous problems with the appellant’s
      performance. ID at 18; IAF, Tab 13 at 12-15. However, the appellant failed to
      make a good faith effort to improve her performance and refused to attend the
      counseling program meetings in June, July, or August 2012 because her
      supervisor did not allow her to record the meetings or have a human resources
      witness. 14 IAF, Tab 11 at 92, 174-75. She has not alleged that she was entitled to
      record the meetings or to have a witness, nor has she alleged that she feared for
      her personal safety or another reasonable basis for her decision not to attend the
      meetings without a recording or a witness.          Moreover, the memorandum
      informing her of the temporary assignment stated that her priority during the
      detail was to complete performance appraisals and proficiencies that were
      overdue, as well as proficiencies that were due in coming months. IAF, Tab 7
      at 19. The appellant has not disputed the agency’s assertion that she was behind
      on these duties. Furthermore, as discussed above, the sustained specifications in
      Charges A, B, C, and E constitute strong evidence to support the agency’s
      removal action. IAF, Tab 7 at 8-11.
¶38        Considering the record as a whole, we agree with the administrative judge’s
      finding that the agency has shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would
      have taken the same personnel actions in the absence of the appellant’s protected
      disclosure. ID at 18-20.

      14
        According to the appellant, she was on medical leave between September and
      November 2012. IAF, Tab 11 at 92.
                                                                                       23

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 15
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.       5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:

15
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   24

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
                                                                                25

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     26

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 16   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

16
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       27

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Jennifer Everling
                                     Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.