Court Opinion

ID: 9540593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:18:04.11782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:03.838223
License: Public Domain

LALLY-GREEN, J.,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 Because I would conclude that the trial court’s instruction was not coercive, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s well-reasoned opinion. The majority reasons that the trial court’s instruction was improper in light of its wording and in light of the court’s knowledge of the jury’s division. I believe that, under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court’s supplemental instruction pursuant to Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971), was within the bounds of the law. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment of sentence.
¶ 2 In Spencer, our Supreme Court set forth the proper standards for a supplemental charge to a deadlocked jury:
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction which informs the jury: (i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto; (ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment; (iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors; (iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change his *561opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and (v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict, (b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as provided in subsection (a).
Id. at 305, n. 7. The Spencer Court rejected the traditional Allen1 charge that had been employed in the federal courts for many decades. Our Supreme Court found the traditional Allen charge problematic in that its language appears to be directed specifically at minority jurors. The guidelines set forth in Spencer allow a trial court to issue a supplemental charge that is not directed specifically at minority jurors. See also, Commonwealth v. P.L.S., 2006 PA Super 20 (February 2, 2006).
¶ 3 In Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988), discussed in detail in the majority opinion, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the following charge was not directed at minority jurors:
Ladies and Gentlemen, as I instructed you earlier if the jury is unable to unanimously agree on a recommendation the Court shall impose the sentence of Life Imprisonment without benefit of Probation, Parole, or Suspension of Sentence.
When you enter the jury room it is your duty to consult with one another to consider each other’s views and to discuss the evidence with the objective of reaching a just verdict if you can do so without violence to that individual judgment.
Each of you must decide the case for yourself but only after discussion and impartial consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You are not advocates for one side or the other. Do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and to change your opinion if you are convinced you are wrong but do not surrender your honest belief as to the weight and effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
Id. at 235, 108 S.Ct. 546.
¶ 4 I would conclude that the trial court’s charge is consistent with the guidelines set forth in Spencer. The trial court simply informed the jurors that they should listen to one another and use their best efforts to resolve the case, if possible, without sacrificing their own deep beliefs. The trial judge did not direct his comments to the minority jurors. Furthermore, the charge at issue in Lowenfeld is strikingly similar to the charge at issue in the instant matter. The trial judge instructed the jury not to “stand on ego,” but further not to “surrender deeply-held beliefs.. .because that’s not right.” N.T., 2/11/05, at 88-90. The trial judge further charged: “But you are serving the system and the community in an effort to reach a verdict if you can fairly do so.” Id. (emphasis added). In my view, there is little substantive difference between the instant charge and the charge at issue in Lowen-feld. I do not believe that the trial court’s supplemental charge was directed at minority jurors.
¶ 5 Moreover, I am not persuaded that the jury’s unsolicited disclosure of its division warrants a new trial. Several federal circuit courts have determined that a jury’s unsolicited disclosure of its division does not preclude a trial judge from giving an otherwise unobjectionable charge. See, *562e.g., United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir.1989); Butler v. United States, 254 F.2d 875 (5th Cir.1958); Bowen v. United States, 153 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.1946). The Bowen Court reasoned that an appropriate supplemental charge may serve to avoid the time and expense of a re-trial, especially since there is no guarantee that a retrial will produce a less divided jury. Bowen, 153 F.2d at 752. The Court concluded that unsolicited information from the jury is not sufficient in and of itself to warrant a retrial. Id. Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit in Norton concluded that the trial court’s supplemental instruction was permissible in that it was not “an exhortation of the minority to reexamine its views in deference to the majority....” Norton, 867 F.2d at 1366. These cases argue persuasively that a trial judge’s knowledge of the jury’s division is simply one factor to be considered in determining the legality of a supplemental charge.
¶ 6 The majority relies upon United States v. Sae-Chua, 725 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.1984), as persuasive authority for its disposition of this matter. In Sae-Chua, as well as in the instant matter, the judge was aware of the minority juror’s identity. Likewise, the juror was aware that the judge knew the juror’s identity. While I agree with the majority that these are significant factors to be considered in determining whether a supplemental charge coerced a verdict, I do not believe they are sufficient to warrant a reversal in the instant matter. That the trial judge did not inquire as to the jury’s division should, in my view, carry significant weight. In addition, I believe that an appellate court should be wary of speculating that the psychological effect of a Spencer charge was to coerce minority jurors to surrender to the majority view, especially where the explicit terms of the charge comply fully with the Spencer guidelines. The trial judge gave an instruction that, in my view, complies m all respects with Spencer. Therefore, I do not agree that Appellant is entitled to a new trial.
¶ 7 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896).