Court Opinion

ID: 9887628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 18:00:39.353286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:12:43.231750
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60235          Document: 00516922873             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/06/2023

               United States Court of Appeals
                    for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                                       ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                       October 6, 2023
                                        No. 22-60235                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                       ____________                                         Clerk

   Ernes Ivan Arzu-Robledo,

                                                                                  Petitioner,

                                              versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                                Respondent.
                       ______________________________

                      Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals
                                Agency No. A098 599 412
                       ______________________________

   Before Clement, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
           Petitioner Ernes Ivan Arzu-Robledo petitions for review of the Board
   of Immigration Appeals’ order upholding the denial of his motion to reopen
   and denying his motion to remand removal proceedings.1                    We DENY in
   part and DISMISS in part Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s petition for review.

           _____________________
           *
               This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
           1
            The Board treated his filing of supplemental evidence in his appeal to the Board
   as a motion to remand to the immigration judge to consider that evidence.
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                                          No. 22-60235

                                       I. Background
           A. Facts
           On January 17, 2005, Mr. Arzu-Robledo—a native and citizen of
   Honduras, who is also a Garifuna2 land rights activist—unlawfully entered
   the United States near Roma, Texas. Shortly after entry he was apprehended
   by immigration officials and processed for removal proceedings under 8
   U.S.C. § 1229. A few days later, Mr. Arzu-Robledo was personally served
   with a Notice to Appear stating that he should appear before the immigration
   court in Harlingen, Texas on February 183 to respond to the charges against
   him—inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as a noncitizen
   present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled. He
   failed to appear before the immigration court. Consequently, the court in
   2005 ordered that he be removed in absentia. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A).
           B. Procedural History
               1. Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s First Motion to Reopen
           Fourteen years later, in November 2019, Mr. Arzu-Robledo filed a
   motion to reopen with the immigration court, alleging he did not receive
   proper notice of the hearing. He also sought to reopen the proceedings so he
   could seek relief from removal based on his alleged eligibility for asylum

           _____________________
           2
               The Garifuna are a marginalized ethnic community who are “the descendants of
   former African slaves and the indigenous Arawak populations who were exiled from British
   St. Vincent Island in 1797. . . . In Honduras, the[ir] communities have maintained collective
   titles for the communal lands where they reside.” Those communal lands include “pristine
   beaches,” and the Garifuna “have increasingly faced the dispossession of their land by
   industry and private businesses,” who seek to develop the territory for “large scale
   tourism” and other projects.
           3
            In other words, unlike some cases where the Notice to Appear handed to the
   noncitizen seeking asylum does not state the date or location, this one stated both.

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   under § 208, withholding of removal under § 241(b)(3) of the Immigration
   and Nationality Act, and protection pursuant to the Convention Against
   Torture. To support relief from removal, Mr. Arzu-Robledo explained that
   because he was Garifuna, he was targeted by the gangs and persecuted in his
   home country.
          The immigration judge denied his motion to reopen. In pertinent part,
   the immigration judge reasoned that Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s motion was
   untimely because it was not filed within ninety days of the final administrative
   order of removal, and he failed to satisfy the changed country conditions
   exception to the ninety-day time limit because his evidence only established
   a continuation of discrimination against the Garifunas in Honduras. The
   immigration judge also concluded that the circumstances of the case did not
   warrant sua sponte reopening.
             2. Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s Successive Motion to Reopen
          In January 2020, Mr. Arzu-Robledo, through new counsel, filed a
   successive motion to reopen. He argued that because his initial attorney’s
   alleged ineffective assistance of counsel prevented him from sufficiently
   showing changed country conditions, the immigration judge should construe
   his successive motion to reopen as if it were his first motion. He then
   reasserted his argument that his motion to reopen should be granted so he
   could seek asylum and withholding of removal because of Honduras’s
   changed country conditions. Specifically, Mr. Arzu-Robledo contended that
   the violent repression of Honduran land right and environmental activists
   that followed the 2009 coup and the 2019 spike in targeted killings of human
   rights defenders and Garifuna activists both constituted changed country
   conditions. Likewise, he reasserted his argument that the immigration judge
   should sua sponte reopen the proceedings.

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          In February 2020, the immigration judge denied Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s
   successive motion to reopen. It reasoned that it did not need to consider Mr.
   Arzu-Robledo’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim because he still failed
   to show changed country conditions. Specifically, because he did not submit
   evidence of Honduras’s conditions at the time of his 2005 removal order, the
   immigration judge could not compare the country’s conditions at the time of
   the order and its conditions thereafter. Instead, the immigration judge
   concluded that Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s evidence, again, only showed an
   incremental change or continuing trend of violence in Honduras. The
   immigration judge further concluded it would not exercise its discretionary
   authority to sua sponte reopen Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s proceedings since this
   authority is not intended to circumvent regulations.
             3. Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s Appeal to the Board and Instant Petition
          Mr. Arzu-Robledo appealed the immigration judge’s decision to the
   Board. He argued that the immigration judge erred in concluding he did not
   show changed country conditions because the evidence of the military coup
   in 2009 and massive spike in the killings of human rights defenders in 2019
   were material changes. He further argued that the immigration judge erred
   when it declined to use its discretionary authority to sua sponte reopen the
   proceedings.   Lastly, Mr. Arzu-Robledo supplemented the evidence in
   support of his successive motion to reopen and further argued that the Board
   should remand the case in light of our intervening decision in Inestroza-
   Antonelli v. Barr, 954 F.3d 817 (5th Cir. 2020).
          The Board affirmed the denial of Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s appeal. As
   relevant here, it concluded that Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s successive motion to
   reopen was both time and number barred because he failed to show changed
   country conditions. Specifically, the Board agreed with the immigration
   judge that because Mr. Arzu-Robledo did not present sufficient evidence of

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   Honduran country conditions in 2005, the immigration judge could not
   engage in a comparative analysis to determine whether any change in
   conditions was material. The Board further noted that even if it took
   administrative notice of the 2005 State Department Human Rights Report,
   which Mr. Arzu-Robledo failed to submit to the immigration judge, that
   report and the fact that Mr. Arzu-Robledo was attacked and tortured in 2004
   for protecting land merely establish “the continuation of a centuries long-
   trend.” The Board similarly denied his motion to remand, rejected his
   comparison to Inestroza-Antonelli, and declined to reopen or remand
   pursuant to its sua sponte authority. This timely petition followed.
                    II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
          We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review final
   orders of removal, including “decisions refusing to reopen or reconsider such
   orders.” Mejia v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mata
   v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 147–48 (2015)).
          We review the denial of a motion to reopen and a motion to remand
   “under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”             Barrios-
   Cantarero v. Holder, 772 F.3d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted);
   Suate-Orellana v. Barr, 979 F.3d 1056, 1062 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation
   omitted). The Board abuses its discretion when it issues a decision that is
   “capricious, racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or
   otherwise so irrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any
   perceptible rational approach.” Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.
   2005) (quotation omitted). The Board’s conclusions of law are reviewed de
   novo, and its factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. Barrios-
   Cantarero, 772 F.3d at 1021. Generally, we lack jurisdiction to consider the
   Board’s denial of sua sponte relief, Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d
   246, 249 (5th Cir. 2004) overruled on other grounds by Mata, 576 U.S. at 149–

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   50), although we have jurisdiction to consider constitutional questions and
   the legal authority for the Board in that context. See Mejia, 913 F.3d at 490;
   Rodriguez-Saragosa v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2018).
           Generally, we have authority to review only the Board’s decision, but
   “we may also review the [immigration judge]’s decision when it has some
   impact on the B[oard]’s decision, as when the B[oard] has adopted all or part
   of the [immigration judge]’s reasoning.” Enriquez-Gutierrez v. Holder, 612
   F.3d 400, 407 (5th Cir. 2010). Moreover, we “may usually only affirm the
   B[oard] on the basis of its stated rationale.” Id.
                                    III. Discussion
           Mr. Arzu-Robledo raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the Board
   abused its discretion in denying his successive motion to reopen; (2) whether
   the Board erred in failing to remand the case; and (3) whether the Board erred
   in failing to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen his case. Each issue is
   addressed below, but none warrant reversal.4
               A. Successive Motion to Reopen
           There are two obvious statutory impediments to Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s
   successive motion to reopen—the time and number limitations. Deep v. Barr,
   967 F.3d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining “an alien may generally file
   only one motion to reopen his removal proceeding and that motion must be
   filed within [ninety] days of the final order of removal”); see also 8 U.S.C.
   § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i). To overcome these hurdles, he contends that the
   number limitation should be equitably tolled because of his initial attorney’s

           _____________________
           4
              Because the Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Mr. Arzu-
   Robledo failed to show changed country conditions, we need not and do not consider
   whether the Board erred in finding that Mr. Arzu-Robledo failed to show the requisite due
   diligence in pursuing the discretionary relief of asylum.

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   ineffective assistance of counsel and that he satisfies the changed country
   conditions exception to the time limitation. Regardless of the merit of Mr.
   Arzu-Robledo’s equitable tolling claim, we agree with the Board that he has
   failed to show changed country conditions.5
               1. Changed Country Conditions
           Mr. Arzu-Robledo contends that the Board abused its discretion when
   it assessed changed country conditions because it concluded his evidence of
   the 2009 coup and post-2019 worsening conditions showed merely an
   incremental change or a continued trend. We disagree.
           To be subject to the exception to the ninety-day time limitation, Mr.
   Arzu-Robledo’s motion must be based “on changed country conditions
   arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been
   ordered,” and he must submit evidence that is material, was not available,
   and “would not have been discovered or presented at the previous
   proceeding.” Nunez v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2018) (per
   curiam) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)). This is a heavy burden as it
   requires Mr. Arzu-Robledo to make “a meaningful comparison between the
   conditions at the time of the removal hearing and the conditions at the time
   the alien filed h[is] motion to reopen.” Id.
           The Board agreed with the immigration judge that Mr. Arzu-Robledo
   did not present sufficient evidence of Honduran country conditions in 2005

           _____________________
           5
             While the ninety-day time limitation for a motion to reopen is subject to the
   changed country conditions exception, Ramos-Lopez v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir.
   2016), the number bar is not. Djie v. Garland, 39 F.4th 280, 284 (5th Cir. 2022). Mr. Arzu-
   Robledo argues equitable tolling to address this. Given the Board’s decision on the merits,
   we do not and need not address this issue. See Maradia v. Garland, 18 F.4th 458, 462 n.6
   (5th Cir. 2021) (explaining the time and number bars are non-jurisdictional, claims-
   processing rules).

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   and therefore he could not satisfy his burden of showing a change in country
   conditions.6 The immigration judge’s finding on this point has support in the
   record. Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s successive motion to reopen focused on the
   governmental and economic changes after the 2009 coup that
   disenfranchised environmental activists as well as the 2019 increase in
   targeted killings of human rights defenders. This left the immigration judge
   to infer as to Honduras’s conditions in 2005.7 Moreover, he did not submit
   the 2005 State Department Report in his successive motion to reopen, which
   the Board had to take administrative notice of on appeal in order to have a
   baseline against which it could adequately compare country conditions.8 It
   therefore cannot be said that Mr. Arzu-Robledo carried his “heavy burden”
   of “making a meaningful comparison between the conditions at the time of
   the removal hearing” and the conditions at the time of his successive motion
   to reopen when he effectively left that burden to the immigration judge and
   the Board. See Nunez, 882 F.3d at 509.
           Based on this record, we cannot say that the Board’s order affirming
   the immigration judge’s decision was “utterly without foundation in the

           _____________________
           6
             The fact that Mr. Arzu-Robledo did not present sufficient evidence of Honduran
   country conditions in 2005 also differentiates this case from Inestroza-Antonelli v. Barr,
   where the petitioner did “introduce[] a great deal of evidence concerning conditions as
   they existed at the time of her removal hearing and how they significantly differed from [the
   country’s] current conditions.” 954 F.3d 813, 817 (5th Cir. 2020).
           7
            Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s focus on the events in 2009 and 2019 ignores the fact that
   the country’s conditions can go up and down—e.g., Honduras’s conditions in 2005 might
   be the same as or similar to the conditions in 2009 even if the conditions in 2006 or 2007
   improved from 2005 and were much better than those in 2009.
           8
             The Board also concluded that even if it considered this information, it did not
   show a sufficient change in country conditions. We cannot find that to be an abuse of
   discretion.

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   evidence [n]or can we say that the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.”
   Id. at 510 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
          B. Motion to Remand
          Mr. Arzu-Robledo contends the Board abused its discretion in
   denying his motion to remand because it arbitrarily ignored supplemental
   evidence that was material and previously unavailable. Again, we disagree.
          “A motion to remand for new evidence shall not be granted unless it
   appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was
   not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former
   hearing.” Suate-Orellana, 979 F.3d at 1062 (quotation omitted). Mr. Arzu-
   Robledo takes issue with the Board’s interpretation of the phrase “former
   hearing.” He contends that this phrase refers to his 2005 removal hearing,
   not the timing of his successive motion to reopen in the immigration court as
   the Board concluded. Therefore, according to Mr. Arzu-Robledo, the Board
   abused its discretion in ignoring his expert report.
          We need not decide this issue because what he points to does not show
   that the supplemental evidence is material. See also Nguhlefeh Njilefac v.
   Garland, 992 F.3d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 2021) (addressing whether there is any
   “realistic possibility” that the Board would have granted the motion
   (quotation omitted)). With respect to other new evidence, as the Board
   noted, Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s supplemental evidence consisted of news articles
   and documents that were “relevant in assessing contemporary country
   conditions,” but not material to determine the 2005 baseline. The expert
   report suffers from the same fatal flaw. As such, the Board acted within its
   discretion in finding that Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s supplemental evidence did not
   warrant remand. See Suate-Orellana, 979 F.3d at 1063 (upholding the denial
   of a motion to remand where the new evidence “suffered from the same
   shortcoming” as the previous evidence).

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           C. Sua Sponte Reopening
           Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s final contention is that the Board erred in
   denying his request for sua sponte relief because it did not fully consider the
   facts and circumstances that supported his request.9 He acknowledges that
   we generally do not have jurisdiction to review such claims but contends that,
   per our decision in Zamora-Garcia v. I.N.S., 737 F.2d 488, 491 (5th Cir.
   1984), the Board must “actually consider the facts and circumstances”
   relevant to a discretionary claim.
           While we do not dispute the general proposition that we generally
   review the Board’s decision “procedurally to ensure that the complaining
   alien has received full and fair consideration of all circumstances that give rise
   to his or her claims,” Abdel-Masieh v. I.N.S., 73 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 1996)
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), we do dispute that we have
   jurisdiction to direct the Board on what it should say when denying a request
   for sua sponte relief, see Gonzalez-Cantu v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 302, 306 (5th
   Cir. 2017); see also Djie v. Garland, 39 F.4th 280, 288 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (citing Qorane v. Barr, 919 F.3d 904, 911 (5th Cir. 2019) (“We’ve long held
   that Congress gave us no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of ‘sua
   sponte’ reopening.”)). Accordingly, we dismiss this argument.
                                     IV. Conclusion
           For the reasons set forth above, we DENY in part and DISMISS in
   part Mr. Arzu-Robledo’s petition for review.

           _____________________
           9
                 This argument ignores that the Board’s opinion previously discussed, and
   therefore considered, all of the facts well before denying sua sponte relief and also provided
   a justification for its denial.

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