Court Opinion

ID: 9965686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 12:02:18.81418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:33.975584
License: Public Domain

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             Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

            ECKER, J., with whom ROBINSON, C. J., and MUL-
         LINS, J., join, dissenting. As a matter of good govern-
         ment, I have no quarrel with the majority’s conclusion
         that the result it reaches today advances a legitimate
         and even praiseworthy public policy. If a residential
         landlord who pays the utility bill for a multiunit apart-
         ment building desires to recoup those expenses from
         its tenants,1 I may agree that enlightened public policy
         should require the landlord to do so by imposing ‘‘con-
         sistent and predictable payments [on each tenant] each
         month’’ rather than charging the tenants variable
         monthly amounts that will increase when other tenants
         ‘‘use more utilities than anticipated each month . . . .’’
         After all, a tenant in one unit has no control over the
         use of utilities by other tenants in other units, and it
         seems sensible to me that tenants with parsimonious
         habits in this respect should not suffer financial uncer-
         tainty each month due to the unpredictable behavior
         of other tenants who may have more extravagant usage
         habits. But we are construing a statute, not enacting
         one. The most basic principles of statutory construction
         prohibit us from substituting our own policy prefer-
         ences, however commendable, for the policy choices
         made by the legislature. The public policy that the
         majority identifies as dispositive in this case is nowhere
         to be found in the statute under construction, General
         Statutes § 16-262e (c).
           The manifest legislative objective of § 16-262e,
         reflected in every one of its provisions, is to protect
         tenants by preventing utility companies from shutting
         off service to a residential building when the landlord
            1
              For the sake of simplicity, I use the words ‘‘landlord’’ and ‘‘tenant’’
         throughout this opinion to refer to the relevant actors. The actual terms
         in General Statutes § 16-262e are ‘‘owner, agent, lessor or manager’’ and
         ‘‘occupant,’’ respectively. The words I use are not perfectly synonymous
         with the statutory terms, but any technical differences have no relevance
         to the present case.
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         Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

       fails to pay a utility bill for which it is liable. Nothing in
       the statute contains any suggestion, express or implied,
       that the legislature intended either to prohibit a landlord
       from recovering its utility expenses from its tenants or,
       alternatively, to regulate the recoupment methodology
       used by the landlord to recover those expenses. The
       statute, in short, is aimed at solving the problems that
       arise when landlords do not pay their utility bills; it has
       nothing to say about the issues that may arise when
       landlords fulfill their obligations to pay those bills,
       which is the scenario involved in the present case.
          As will become apparent, the plain language of § 16-
       262e, the structure of the statute, and its relationship
       to other statutes all lead to the conclusion that § 16-
       262e does not regulate the means by which a landlord
       may recoup its utility costs from its tenants. Indeed,
       even the majority acknowledges, as it must, that a land-
       lord’s recoupment of utility costs from the tenant is
       proper under the statute. What the majority fails to
       acknowledge is that the line it draws between permissi-
       ble and impermissible methods of recoupment is
       nowhere to be found in the statute or the public policy
       animating its enactment. The public policy that the
       majority reads into the statute may be a good one, but
       it is not our role to promulgate that policy. I respect-
       fully dissent.
                                         I
          I agree with the majority that the proper construction
       of § 16-262e is a question of law over which our review
       is plenary. Analysis of the statute must begin with its
       language and relationship to other statutes. See General
       Statutes § 1-2z.
         The majority focuses its attention on the language in
       § 16-262e (c) providing that a landlord ‘‘shall be liable’’
       for the costs of utilities, ‘‘except for any service fur-
       nished to any dwelling unit of the building on an individ-
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                 Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

         ually metered or billed basis for the exclusive use of
         the occupants of that dwelling unit . . . .’’ The majority
         seems to find this language to be ambiguous because
         it is unclear whether the landlord’s statutory liability
         prohibits the landlord from recouping its utility costs
         from tenants utilizing the ‘‘ratio utility billing’’ (RUB)
         method, whereby the landlord pays the utility service
         provider directly and thereafter bills its tenants individ-
         ually for their estimated proportionate share of the total
         payment under the terms of the rental agreement. In
         light of this perceived ambiguity, the majority deems it
         necessary to consult the legislative history and public
         policy underlying the statute. Using as its springboard
         the premise that § 16-262e is a remedial statute that
         must be construed broadly, the majority concludes that
         a landlord may not recover its utility expenses from its
         tenants under RUB because, in the majority’s words,
         the statute prohibits tenants from being ‘‘held liable to
         anyone for the cost of a utility that he or she has not
         exclusively used.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
            The majority’s broad construction of § 16-262e (c) is
         inconsistent with the plain and unambiguous language
         of the statute, the larger statutory scheme established
         by the legislature in § 16-262e, and the relevant provi-
         sions of title 47a of the General Statutes governing
         landlord-tenant relations. It also is internally inconsis-
         tent with the majority’s own conclusion that a landlord
         is not prohibited from recovering its utility expenses
         from a tenant using the so-called ‘‘building in’’ method
         of cost recovery.2 The reality is that, so long as the
         landlord pays its utility bills, nothing in our statutes
         prevents the landlord from recovering those utility costs
         from its tenants under the terms of a rental agreement,
            ‘‘Building in’’ is a recoupment method under which the landlord estimates
             2

         monthly utility costs in advance and then, without separately itemizing or
         identifying those costs, incorporates them into the total amount of rent due
         under the terms of the rental agreement.
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         Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

       regardless of whether the charges are calculated using
       the RUB method, the ‘‘building in’’ method, or some
       other method of recoupment that is not prohibited
       by law.
          Section 16-262e contains eight subsections, (a)
       through (h), and, before more closely examining the
       text of subsection (c), the central provision at issue, it
       is useful to review the whole statute to better under-
       stand its manifest purpose and scope. Subsection (a)
       sets forth the most fundamental prohibition in the stat-
       ute, which provides that the utility company ‘‘shall not
       terminate [utility] service for nonpayment of a delin-
       quent account owed to such company’’ by the landlord.
       General Statutes § 16-262e (a). This provision applies
       to the termination of services for any ‘‘residential dwell-
       ing’’ in a building not occupied exclusively by its owner
       when the utility company ‘‘has actual or constructive
       knowledge that the occupants of such dwelling are not
       the individuals to whom the [utility] company . . . usu-
       ally sends its bills . . . .’’ General Statutes § 16-262e
       (a). In other words, if the utility bill is sent to the
       landlord, service to the tenants may not be terminated
       as a result of the landlord’s failure to pay the bill.
          Subsection (a) contains a single exception, which
       permits termination of such services when the utility
       company ‘‘(1) . . . makes a good faith effort to notify
       the occupants of such building of the proposed termina-
       tion by the means most practicable under the circum-
       stances and best designed to provide actual notice; and
       (2) . . . provides an opportunity, where practicable,
       for such occupants to receive service in their own
       names without any liability for the amount due while
       service was billed directly to the lessor, owner, agent
       or manager and without the necessity for a security
       deposit; provided, if it is not practicable for such occu-
       pants to receive service in their own names, the [utility]
       company . . . shall not terminate service to such resi-
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             Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

         dential dwelling but may pursue the remedy provided
         in sections 16-262f and 16-262t.’’3 General Statutes § 16-
         262e (a). Upon due notice, service to the building may
         be terminated if the tenants are given an opportunity
         to receive service in their own names and it is practica-
         ble to provide service by that method.
            The remainder of the statute fills in the details. Sub-
         section (b) specifies that, if service was erroneously
         terminated under subsection (a) because of a mistaken
         understanding about who gets billed, the utility com-
         pany must reinstate service upon learning that the ten-
         ants ‘‘are not the individuals to whom it usually sends
         its bills . . . .’’ General Statutes § 16-262e (b). Subsec-
         tion (c), which I will discuss in more detail in part II
         of this opinion, provides the way to determine whether
         the landlord or tenant is liable to the utility company for
         payment—the landlord is responsible for such payment,
         unless the utility ‘‘service [is] furnished to any dwelling
         unit of the building on an individually metered or billed
         basis for the exclusive use of the occupants of that
         dwelling unit . . . .’’ General Statutes § 16-262e (c).
         Subsection (c) also provides that, if the landlord ‘‘fails
         to pay’’ for utilities when it is required to do so, the
         tenants may arrange to receive service in their own
         names and ‘‘may deduct, in accordance with the provi-
         sions of subsection (d) of this section, a reasonable
         estimate of the cost of any portion of such service which
         is for the use of occupants of dwelling units other than
         such occupant’s dwelling unit.’’ General Statutes § 16-
         262e (c).
           3
             General Statutes § 16-262f (a) (1) permits the utility company to ‘‘petition
         the Superior Court or a judge thereof, for appointment of a receiver of the
         rents or payments for use and occupancy or common expenses . . . for
         any dwelling for which the owner, agent, lessor or manager is in default.’’
         Accord General Statutes § 16-262t (a) (1) (water companies). The utility
         company can recover its expenses, any arrearages, and reasonable fees and
         costs from the money held by the receiver. See General Statutes § 16-262f
         (a) (4); see also General Statutes § 12-262t (a) (5).
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         Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

           Subsection (d) provides that payments made by a
       tenant to the utility company pursuant to subsection
       (a) or (c) of the statute (i.e., payments made by the
       tenant to the utility company for services that are the
       landlord’s obligation to pay) may be deducted by the
       tenant ‘‘from any sum of rent or payment for use and
       occupancy due and owing or to become due and owing
       to the’’ landlord. General Statutes § 16-262e (d). Subsec-
       tion (e) requires the utility company to provide notice
       to each tenant of their right to deduct from rent the
       amount of any utility payments made by the tenant to
       a utility company in the event that a landlord’s failure
       to pay its utility bills requires a tenant to arrange for
       service in their own name pursuant to subsection (a).
       See General Statutes § 16-262e (e). Subsection (f) pro-
       hibits a landlord from increasing rent ‘‘in order to collect
       all or part of that amount lawfully deducted by the
       occupant pursuant to this section.’’ General Statutes
       § 16-262e (f). Subsection (g) requires a landlord to pro-
       vide utility companies access to meters located on the
       premises. See General Statutes § 16-262e (g). Finally,
       subsection (h) provides that nothing in the statute ‘‘shall
       be construed to prevent’’ a utility company or tenant
       ‘‘from pursuing any other action or remedy at law or
       equity that it may have against the’’ landlord. General
       Statutes § 16-262e (h).
          It is obvious that § 16-262e has nothing to say about
       a landlord’s ability to recover its duly paid utility costs
       from its tenants. The statute is concerned with land-
       lords who do not pay their utility bills, not with land-
       lords who do pay their utility bills and thereafter seek
       to recoup those expenses from the tenants who receive
       the utility service. It is for this reason that the statute
       is focused on two things: (1) the landlord’s obligation
       to pay the utility company, and (2) the utility company’s
       affirmative obligation to facilitate the tenants’ efforts
       to avoid termination of services resulting from the land-
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             Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

         lord’s nonpayment. The statute thus requires landlords
         to pay the utility bills (unless separately metered or
         billed) and imposes consequences if it fails to do so.4
         The obligations of the utility company are also central to
         the statutory scheme—the utility company is prohibited
         from terminating utility services for nonpayment except
         as specified, and it is required in various ways to accom-
         modate the needs of tenants whose landlords fail to
         pay their utility bills. By contrast, the statute refers not
         at all to the rights of a landlord to recover its utility
         costs when the landlord does pay its utility bills, which
         is the only issue presented in this case.
            4
              Section 16-262e (c) permits tenants to engage in self-help by arranging
         to receive utility service in their own names and deducting the estimated
         amount of other tenants’ utility expenses from the rental payments owed
         to the landlord. This is an exceptional remedy because landlords and tenants
         alike generally are forbidden from engaging in self-help in the event of an
         alleged breach of a duty owed by one to the other. See, e.g., General Statutes
         §§ 47a-12, 47a-14h, 47a-15, 47a-15a and 47a-43. In particular, a tenant nor-
         mally may not unilaterally decide to withhold rent, or any part thereof, on
         the basis of an allegation that the landlord has failed to perform legal duties
         owed to the tenant. See General Statutes § 47a-14h (a) and (h). Thus, a
         tenant who claims a right to rent abatement based on substandard dwelling
         conditions generally is limited to the remedies available in § 47a-14h, which
         requires the aggrieved tenant to institute an action in the Superior Court
         and to pay the full amount of rent with the clerk of the court while that
         action is pending. See General Statutes § 47a-14h (a) and (h). I am aware
         of only two exceptions in title 47a to the general prohibition against tenants
         engaging in self-help, one of which is similar to § 16-262e, in that it permits
         the tenant to procure essential services if the landlord breaches its obligation
         to do so and allows the tenant to deduct the cost of those services from
         the rent. See General Statutes § 47a-13 (a) (1) (‘‘[i]f the landlord is required
         to supply heat, running water, hot water, electricity, gas or other essential
         service, and if the landlord fails to supply such essential service and the
         failure is not caused by conditions beyond the landlord’s control, the tenant
         may give notice to the landlord specifying the breach and may elect to . . .
         procure reasonable amounts of heat, hot water, running water, electric, gas
         or other essential service during the period of the landlord’s noncompliance
         and deduct the actual and reasonable cost of such service from the rent’’).
         The other exception permits a tenant to cease making rental payments if
         the dwelling is ‘‘damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty to an extent
         that enjoyment of the dwelling unit is substantially impaired’’ due to no
         fault of the tenant. General Statutes § 47a-14 (a).
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         Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

                                         II
          In light of the foregoing statutory framework, the
       meaning of subsection (c) could not be more clear.
       Subsection (c) provides that ‘‘[t]he owner, agent, lessor
       or manager of a residential dwelling shall be liable for
       the costs of all electricity, gas, water or heating fuel
       furnished by a public service company, electric sup-
       plier, municipal utility or heating fuel dealer to the build-
       ing, except for any service furnished to any dwelling
       unit of the building on an individually metered or billed
       basis for the exclusive use of the occupants of that
       dwelling unit, provided an owner, agent, lessor or man-
       ager shall be liable for service provided on an individu-
       ally metered or billed basis pursuant to subsection (g)
       of this section from ten days after the date of written
       request by the company, supplier, utility or dealer if
       the company, supplier, utility or dealer is denied access
       to its individual meters or other facilities located on
       the premises of the building. Such owner, agent, lessor
       or manager shall only be liable when such owner, agent,
       lessor or manager controls access to such individual
       meters to which access is denied. If service is not pro-
       vided on an individually metered or billed basis and the
       owner, agent, lessor or manager fails to pay for such
       service, any occupant who receives service in his own
       name may deduct, in accordance with the provisions
       of subsection (d) of this section, a reasonable estimate
       of the cost of any portion of such service which is for
       the use of occupants of dwelling units other than such
       occupant’s dwelling unit.’’ (Emphasis added.) General
       Statutes § 16-262e (c).
           The meaning of this language is unmistakable. It pro-
       vides that a landlord who does not individually meter
       or bill utilities for a tenant’s exclusive use ‘‘shall be
       liable’’ for the costs of the building’s utility expenses.
       General Statutes § 16-262e (c). The meaning of the term
       ‘‘liable’’ in this context is plain and unambiguous: the
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              Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

         landlord is legally responsible to pay for the cost of
         utility services provided to residential dwellings that
         are billed using a master meter. To whom is the landlord
         liable? The answer is equally clear: the landlord is liable
         to the utility company. In this regard, I perceive no
         ambiguity in the statute whatsoever. Logic dictates that
         the liability could not run to anyone else but the utility
         company because the service is provided by the utility
         company and the debt is owed to the utility company.
         The statute contains no suggestion of any other possibil-
         ity. Indeed, as I previously discussed, the entire statute
         is directed to one end, which is to prevent the utility
         company from terminating service to tenants as a result
         of the landlord’s failure to pay its bills. The risk of
         termination arises only when the utility company is
         not paid, and it therefore makes perfect sense that the
         liability at issue is the obligation to pay the utility
         company.
            The majority contends that the term ‘‘liable’’ is ambig-
         uous because § 16-262e (c) creates an exception to the
         landlord’s liability when a tenant’s utilities are serviced
         on an individually metered or billed basis, and the
         majority therefore finds it unclear whether the tenant’s
         liability is owed to the utility company or the landlord.
         From this premise, the majority concludes that the stat-
         ute is ambiguous ‘‘[b]ecause the language of the statute
         and the dictionary definitions of ’liable’ do not specify
         to whom a tenant would have to be liable to violate
         the statute . . . .’’ (Emphasis in original.) I am unable
         to make sense of this argument. The fact that the tenant
         may be liable to the utility company under specified
         circumstances (i.e., when the unit is individually
         metered or billed) gives rise to no ambiguity about the
         identity of the obligee, that is, the entity to whom the
         liability runs. Whether the liable party is the landlord
         or the tenant, the payment obligation referred to in § 16-
         262e (c) unequivocally is the obligation owed to the
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             Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

       utility company. This point is obvious not only from
       the statutory text, but also upon examination of the
       statute as a whole, the manifest purpose of which is
       to ensure that the landlord’s failure to pay the utility
       company does not result in the termination of service
       to the tenants.5

         Nor can the majority import ambiguity from the fact
       that § 16-262e (c) permits a tenant, in the event a land-
       lord fails to meet its utility payment obligations, to pay
       the utility company directly and then to deduct from
       rent ‘‘a reasonable estimate of the cost of any portion
       of such service which is for the use of occupants of
       dwelling units other than such occupant’s dwelling
       unit.’’ Nothing in this provision creates any ambiguity
       about what the statute means when it provides that the
       landlord ‘‘shall be liable’’ for utility costs billed on a
       master meter, or about whether the statute permits a
       landlord to recoup its duly paid utility costs from its
       tenants. The provision serves only to support the con-
       clusion that the payor may recoup the costs spent on
       behalf of others who benefit from the utility service,
       which is precisely what landlords do when they recoup
         5
           Indeed, careful examination reveals that not one word in the statute
       imposes liability on the tenant. Section 16-262e (c) provides that a landlord
       ‘‘shall be liable’’ and, in certain circumstances ‘‘shall only be liable,’’ but it
       does not use the term ‘‘liable’’ in connection with tenants. No doubt, the
       tenant is liable for his or her own exclusive utility usage when that usage
       is individually metered or billed. But, unlike the provisions addressing the
       landlord’s obligations, which expressly impose liability on the landlord, the
       statute does not expressly impose liability on the tenant. The reason it does
       not do so is that the statute is not concerned with the tenant’s failure to
       meet his or her payment obligations; the tenant’s nonpayment does not
       result in the evil addressed by the statute, which is termination of service
       to all tenants as a result of the landlord’s failure to pay its liabilities. Subsec-
       tion (h), which refers only to the right of recovery against the landlord,
       illustrates this point. See General Statutes § 16-262e (h) (‘‘[n]othing in this
       section shall be construed to prevent the company, electric supplier, munici-
       pal utility, heating fuel dealer or occupant from pursuing any other action
       or remedy at law or equity that it may have against the’’ landlord).
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               Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

          their utility costs using either the ‘‘building in’’ or
          RUB methodology.

             There is additional evidence demonstrating that the
          statute is unambiguous as it relates to the ability of a
          landlord to recover its duly paid utility expenses from
          its tenants. Landlord-tenant relations are governed pri-
          marily by title 47a of the General Statutes, and it is
          unthinkable that the legislature would include in title
          16 a provision prohibiting recoupment without simulta-
          neously ensuring that such a provision is fully consis-
          tent with the bedrock terms of landlord-tenant law set
          forth in title 47a. See, e.g., State v. Bemer, 339 Conn.
          528, 541, 262 A.3d 1 (2021) (‘‘[t]he legislature is always
          presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent
          body of law . . . [so that] [i]n determining the meaning
          of a statute . . . we look not only at the provision at
          issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to
          ensure the coherency of our construction’’ (internal
          quotation marks omitted)). General Statutes § 47a-3
          provides that ‘‘[a] landlord and a tenant may include in
          a rental agreement terms and conditions not prohibited
          by law, including rent, term of the agreement and other
          provisions governing the rights and obligations of the
          parties.’’ General Statutes (Supp. 2024) § 47a-46 then
          lists the terms that are prohibited in any rental agree-
          ment. Relevant to the present case is § 47a-4 (a) (10),
          which provides that ‘‘[a] rental agreement shall not pro-
          vide that the tenant . . . agrees to pay a heat or utilities
          surcharge if heat or utilities is included in the rental
          agreement.’’ The only plausible construction of this pro-
          vision is that a landlord is permitted to include a provi-
          sion in the rental agreement that operates to recover
          its utility costs from its tenants, so long as the landlord
          does not add a surcharge. No one in the present case
            6
              Hereinafter, all references to § 47a-4 are to the version of that statute
          in the 2024 supplement to the General Statutes.
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       claims that the RUB recoupment method constitutes a
       surcharge under § 47a-4 (a) (10).
          In fact, it is undisputed that utility costs can be
       included as a part of rent or charged as a separate item
       under the rental agreement. General Statutes (Supp.
       2024) § 47a-1 (h) defines ‘‘[r]ent’’ as ‘‘all periodic pay-
       ments to be made to the landlord under the rental agree-
       ment.’’ Consistent with this definition, Connecticut law
       permits private parties to include in their rental agree-
       ment the tenant’s obligation to pay the cost of utilities,
       as well as other costs incidental to the maintenance
       and ownership of the property. See Presidential Vil-
       lage, LLC v. Perkins, 332 Conn. 45, 59, 209 A.3d 616
       (2019) (recognizing that private parties, unlike land-
       lords receiving subsidies from federal Department of
       Housing and Urban Development, are ‘‘free to define
       ’rent’ as they see fit’’); Elliott Enterprises, LLC v. Goo-
       dale, 166 Conn. App. 461, 463–64, 142 A.3d 335 (2016)
       (defining rent to include ‘‘FIXED MINIMUM MONTHLY
       RENTAL . . . together with the TENANTS’ pro-rata
       share of . . . UTILITIES’’ (emphasis omitted; footnote
       omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)).
          Despite all of this, the majority concludes that peri-
       odic payments to the landlord under the rental agree-
       ment using the RUB methodology are utility payments
       prohibited by statute, rather than payments to cover
       the landlord’s utility costs, because the monthly
       amounts are not ‘‘consistent and predictable’’ in
       advance. But nothing in Connecticut law imposes these
       requirements if the rental agreement provides other-
       wise. See General Statutes § 47a-3. Landlords and ten-
       ants are permitted to include in their rental agreement
       any terms and conditions on which they agree, so long
       as those terms and conditions are ‘‘not prohibited by law
       . . . .’’ General Statutes § 47a-3. The RUB recoupment
       method is not prohibited by title 47a or § 16-262e. It is
       that simple.
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               Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

             It is also self-evident that RUB does not require a
          tenant to pay the costs attributable to other tenants’
          utility consumption any more than does the ‘‘building
          in’’ method deemed acceptable by the majority. To the
          contrary, the ‘‘building in’’ method likely results in less
          accurate cost calculations because it is based on histori-
          cal data rather than actual current utility costs. More-
          over, the ‘‘building in’’ approach provides landlords with
          an incentive to overestimate their monthly utility costs
          to safeguard against the possibility that they will be
          required to absorb the cost of unexpected increases in
          utility prices or usage. Although neither method allo-
          cates utility costs among tenants strictly on the basis
          of actual, exclusive usage per tenant, that is a feature
          common to both methods and plainly cannot be used
          to justify deeming one method lawful and the other
          legally prohibited.
             For the foregoing reasons, it is clear to me that § 16-
          262e (c) plainly and unambiguously does not prohibit
          a landlord from recouping its utility costs via the RUB
          methodology. Although the statute ‘‘is remedial in
          nature and must be construed broadly to that end . . .
          [w]e are not free . . . to create ambiguity when none
          exists; in other words, we cannot accomplish a result
          that is contrary to the intent of the legislature as
          expressed in the [statute’s] plain language.’’ (Internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Vincent v. New Haven, 285
          Conn. 778, 792, 941 A.2d 932 (2008); see also State v.
          Orr, 291 Conn. 642, 654, 969 A.2d 750 (2009) (‘‘our case
          law is clear that ambiguity exists only if the statutory
          language at issue is susceptible to more than one plausi-
          ble interpretation’’). Stated another way, a reviewing
          court cannot ‘‘torture words to import ambiguity [when]
          the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity
          . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Honulik v.
          Greenwich, 293 Conn. 698, 710, 980 A.2d 880 (2009).
          The language of § 16-262e leaves no room for ambiguity,
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         Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

       and the majority’s expansive construction of the statute
       is unwarranted.

          Finally, even if I were to conclude that the statute is
       ambiguous and therefore agree that it is proper to resort
       to extratextual evidence of legislative intent, I would
       arrive at the same result. The legislative history reflects
       that § 16-262e was intended to impose liability on the
       landlord for utility services delivered to a multiunit
       apartment building with a master meter and thereby
       prevent the utility company from terminating service
       due to the landlord’s failure to timely pay the utility
       bill. It was contemplated that landlords paying such
       utility costs could and would recoup those costs from
       their tenants by charging higher or additional rent. For
       example, Attorney Raphael L. Podolsky of the Legal
       Services Training and Advocacy Project, one of the
       drafters of the bill, testified that, ‘‘[i]f, for whatever
       reason, the building is so constructed [so as to make
       individual metering impracticable], or the [master]
       metering system is so arranged, you can’t [individually
       meter each unit], then that [utility service payment]
       becomes a landlord responsibility. The landlord
       [builds] the costs to that into the rent, so for example
       . . . where there’s a central furnace in a [multifamily]
       building, the landlord would pay for the heat, and he
       would obviously include heat in the rent. The rent is
       going to be higher in that kind of a building.’’ (Empha-
       sis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings,
       Energy and Public Utilities, Pt. 1, 1984 Sess., p. 387.
       Podolosky further explained that the statute ‘‘does not
       in any way preclude a property owner from charging
       a tenant for heat or other utilities.’’ (Emphasis added.)
       Id., 459. Thus, the legislature did not intend to bar land-
       lords from recovering their utility costs by billing ten-
       ants for a reasonable estimate of their individual utility
       usage, regardless of whether that estimate is arrived at
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                Northland Investment Corp. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

          by using the RUB method, the ‘‘building in’’ method, or
          some other recoupment method.
             I recognize that there may be sound public policy
          reasons to prohibit or limit a landlord’s use of the RUB
          recoupment method. As the majority points out, RUB
          does not result in ‘‘consistent and predictable payments
          each month and places the risk that the tenants may
          use more utilities than anticipated each month’’ on a
          tenant who ‘‘has no control over the utility usage of
          other units within the building . . . .’’ However, it is
          up to the legislature, not the courts, to determine
          whether to bar the use of the RUB recoupment method
          or to impose statutory protections restricting its imple-
          mentation. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-1314.01
          and 33-2107 (2021); Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 8-212.4
          (c) and (d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023); Minn. Stat. Ann.
          § 504B.215 (2a) (West 2023); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-8-20
          (F) (Cum. Supp. 2015); Or. Rev. Stat. § 90.562 (2023);
          Va. Code Ann. § 55.1-1212 (D) (2022).7 See generally
          Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 636,
          659, 224 A.3d 147 (2020) (observing that ‘‘the primary
          responsibility for formulating public policy must remain
          with the legislature’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
          ted)); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.,
          279 Conn. 207, 216, 901 A.2d 673 (2006) (‘‘It is axiomatic
          that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to accom-
          plish a particular result. That is a function of the legisla-
          ture.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
                For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
            7
               The majority notes that ‘‘several states have legislation that explicitly
          permits the use of RUB’’ and ‘‘provide numerous protections for tenants.’’
          It appears, however, that several states, such as California, Georgia, Indiana,
          Illinois, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Washington, do not have statutes that
          expressly permit or limit the use of RUB, but landlords in those states
          employ the RUB methodology to recoup their utility costs from tenants.
          See National Conference of State Legislatures, Utility Submetering (last
          updated January 15, 2016), available at https://www.ncsl.org/energy/utility-
          submetering (last visited April 29, 2024); see also Synergy Utility Billing, Our
          Services: RUBS Billing, available at https://www.synergyutilitybilling.com/
          services/rubs-billing/ (last visited April 29, 2024).