Court Opinion

ID: 9636404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:27:04.353415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:45.153944
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing.
Complaint is made in the petition for rehearing that we did not specifically pass upon appellant’s second contention, namely, that in any way appellant was entitled to a $40,000 exemption under Section 811(g) of the Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev. Code, § 811(g). The statement in the petition for rehearing that two of the policies totaling $45,000 were payable originally to pamed beneficiaries is not supported by the record. The Tax Court specifically found that the executors, administrators and assigns of the-insured were originally named beneficiaries in all of the five policies, and that thereafter on “June 17, 1936, the sister and brother of the insured were named beneficiaries, share and share alike, in the first two policies, in the total amount of $45,000,” and that thereafter, on “July 20, 1937, the executors, administrators and assigns of the insured were again named beneficiaries of the policies.” It thus appears that at the time the policies were issued, the designated beneficiaries in all of them were the executors, administrators and assigns of the insured, and that this was their status at the time they were assigned to the trust.
Whether any of the insurance under these circumstances was exempt was considered by the Second Circuit in Vanderlip v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 152. While appellant seeks to distinguish this case from the Vanderlip case on tlie' facts, a careful analysis will show that there is no substantial difference in the factual situation of the two cases. The fact that for a short time the beneficiaries of the two policies which appellant seeks to have exempted to the extent of $40,000 were changed from the insured’s personal representatives to the brother and sister is of no consequence, especially so since the beneficiaries were again changed to the executor, administrator and assigns of the insured, and while in that condition were then assigned to the trust. It is not necessary for the purpose of the petition for rehearing to analyze the reasoning of the Second Circuit in the Vanderlip case in detail. It is sufficient for this purpose to say that we agree with the reasonirig of the Second Circuit in that case, and that in our opinion the principles enunciated therein apply with equal force here.
The petition for rehearing is accordingly denied.