Court Opinion

ID: 9618530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:13:28.800437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:31.892530
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
As pointed out in the main opinion, the easement that is the subject of this litigation consists of a public roadway only, the underlying fee remaining in the plaintiff.1 As further observed by the majority opinion, jurisdictions have split widely over the question of whether or not utility power lines erected along a roadway, the dedication of which granted an easement only in the public, constitute an additional servitude and entitle the underlying fee owner to additional compensation. The view adopted by a majority of the Court is shared by a handful of jurisdictions only.2 Another view holds that such power lines are permitted only where their purpose directly relates to the use of the roadway itself (i. e., lighting, streetcar power, etc.).3 A few jurisdictions hold to the idea that power lines pose no additional servitude on a public easement by dedication where the roadway is located in an urban environment, but do pose such an additional servitude where the roadway is in a rural environment.4 Two jurisdictions combine the last two views, weighing both the location of the roadway and the purpose of the overhead lines in determining whether or not their installation constitutes an additional servitude.5 Finally, some jurisdictions adopt the view that power lines are, by definition, an additional servitude upon a roadway in which the public has a right-of-way by easement only.6
Under all but the first of the foregoing five tests, the placement of defendants’ utility lines on the roadway in question constitutes an additional servitude upon the easement held by the public therein. The roadway lies in a rural section of Iron County. The purpose of the lines bears no relationship to the use of the roadway itself. Under such circumstances, the vague test applied by the main opinion, employing concepts of the advancement of civilization, and proper and consistent uses of highways in light of human progress, seems severely to compromise the rights of landowners willing to provide gratuitously for vehicular traffic over their property. Any private roadway dedicated for use as a public thoroughfare thus becomes a pathway for whatever use a county authority, in its sole discretion, deems fit to impose, regardless of the detriment to adjacent landowners. Little imagination is required to summon up possible uses which would be severely detrimental, if not completely destructive1, of surrounding farm land; uses which, according to the majority view, could be imposed without the necessity of any compensation whatsoever.
*329The very nature of the dedication which took place in the instant case seems to dictate the adoption of a view contrary to that of the majority of the Court. The road was dedicated to the public use, not by an express assertion of intent on the part of adjacent landowners, but by user, in accordance with Utah statutory law.7 While such abandonment and use creates, under Utah law, an implied dedication to the public, it is nonetheless, as recognized both by the parties and by the trial court,8 in the nature of a prescriptive right only. This Court has unanimously ruled as follows:
... [T]he extent of an easement acquired by prescription is measured and limited by the use made during the prescriptive period ... [Wjhile the owner of the dominant estate may enjoy to the fullest extent the rights conferred by his easement, he may not alter its character so as to further burden or increase the restriction upon the servient estate.9
It would be inexplicably inconsistent to state that, where prescriptive rights are obtained in the form of a regular easement, the owner of the dominant estate is bound by the use which established the easement, while, where prescriptive rights are established by statutory implied dedication, the owner of the dominant estate is confined only to uses consistent with the progress of civilization.
For the foregoing reasons, I would rule that the placement of utility lines along the roadway in question constitutes an additional servitude, not comprehended within the estate held by the county on behalf of the public at the time of its attempted grant of a franchise to defendant Cal-Pac. As such, the attempted franchise grant was void, and the presence of the utility lines on plaintiff’s property entitles him to relief. As no finding was made below regarding the amount by which plaintiff is damaged due to defendants’ actions, I would remand for further proceedings in ascertainment thereof.
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HALL, J.

. See footnote 2, main opinion.

. See, e. g., Alabama Power Co. v. Christian, 216 Ala. 160, 112 So. 763 (1927); United States v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 318 U.S. 206, 63 S.Ct. 534, 87 L.Ed. 716 (1943); State v. Board of Commissioners, 28 Wash.2d 891, 184 P.2d 577 (1947); and cases cited in the majority opinion.

. See, e. g., Gurnsey v. Northern California Power Co., 160 Cal. 699, 117 P. 906 (1911); Thompson v. Orange & Rockland Electric Co., 254 N.Y. 366, 173 N.E. 224 (1930); Goddard v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 104 Ill.App. 526 (1902); Johnson v. City of Chattanooga, 183 Tenn. 123, 191 S.W.2d 175 (1945).

. See, e. g., Cathey v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 193 Ark. 92, 97 S.W.2d 624 (1936); Anderson v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 2 Pa.D.&C.2d 709, 67 York Leg.Rec. 157 (1954).

. See Callen v. Columbus Edison Electric Light Co., 66 Ohio 166, 64 N.E. 141 (1902); Loeber v. Butte General Electric Co., 16 Montana 1, 39 P. 912 (1895).

. See, e. g., Donalson v. Georgia Power & Light Co., 175 Ga. 462, 165 S.E. 440 (1932); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Dileo, La.App., 79 So.2d 150 (1955); Koslosky v. Texas Electric Service Co., Tex.Civ.App., 213 S.W.2d 853 (1948).

. U.C.A., 1953, 27-12-89.

. The trial court’s finding of fact no. 2 reads as follows: “... [T]he County of Iron has acquired a right-of-way by prescriptive use for roadway purposes over the south end of the above-described property in excess of 33 feet, and being specifically from the south boundary of said property north to the place where the fence on said right-of-way is now located. The rights of Iron County to set easement are strictly prescriptive in nature.”

.McBride v. McBride, Utah, 581 P.2d 996 (1978).