Court Opinion

ID: 9941827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-17 07:12:39.237639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:04.653947
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed February 15, 2024

                                        In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                     __________

                                  No. 11-23-00282-CV
                                      __________

                        IN RE RICHARD SCHERER

                          Original Mandamus Proceeding

                                     OPINION
      In this mandamus proceeding, Relator, Richard Scherer, requests that we
order the Honorable Leah G. Robertson, the presiding judge of the 385th District
Court of Midland County, Texas, to vacate her order compelling him to respond to
several written discovery requests propounded to him by Real Parties in Interest,
Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. and Endeavor Petroleum, LLC (hereinafter
referred to collectively as Endeavor). For the reasons discussed below, we grant
Relator’s petition in part, and we deny it in part.
                       I. Factual and Procedural Background
      Scherer brought a suit for unlawful employment practices against Endeavor
under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). See TEX. LAB.
CODE ANN. § 21.001, et. seq (West 2021). His suit alleges that, after the retirement
of Joel Castello, Endeavor’s Manager of Business Development & Reserves, Scherer
assumed Castello’s job responsibilities but was not promoted to Castello’s position.
Scherer, who is in his late fifties, was born in Iran. He was a German citizen at birth,
and his mother was Iranian. Scherer alleges that Endeavor’s elimination of the
position formerly held by Castello constitutes discrimination based on both his age
and his national origin. See LAB. 21.051 (“An employer commits an unlawful
employment practice if because of . . . national origin, or age the employer . . . limits,
segregates, or classifies an employee . . . in a manner that would deprive or tend to
deprive an individual of any employment opportunity.”). He further alleges that his
claims of discrimination against Endeavor have resulted in the creation of a hostile
work environment that limited his interaction with his co-workers and the resources
that were available to him for the completion of his work. The record suggests that
Scherer’s employment has now been terminated.
       Scherer raises two issues in his petition, asserting that (1) the trial court abused
its discretion by ordering the discovery of various forms of information and, (2) as
a result, he is therefore entitled to mandamus relief. Scherer’s complaints concern
two requests for written discovery: Endeavor’s First Requests for Production to
Scherer and Endeavor’s First Set of Interrogatories to Scherer. After Scherer
objected to virtually all of the discovery sought in these requests, Endeavor filed a
motion to compel, which was largely granted by the trial court.1

       1
         Endeavor verbally withdrew several complaints asserted in its motion to compel at the hearing.
The trial court granted Endeavor’s motion with respect to the remaining discovery requests of which it
complained, with one exception: it limited the scope of an interrogatory that inquired about Scherer’s
criminal history.
                                                  2
                          II. Mandamus – Standard of Review
       Mandamus is an “extraordinary” remedy that is “available only in limited
circumstances.”     Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). A writ of mandamus will issue only if the trial court clearly abused its
discretion, and the relator has no adequate remedy on appeal. In re Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). With respect
to the first requirement, a trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so
arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. In re
Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam). In addition, because a trial court has no discretion in determining what
the law is or in applying it to the facts, a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to
correctly analyze or apply the law. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135; see also In
re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 294 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding).
       “If the trial court issues an erroneous order requiring the production of
privileged documents, the party claiming the privilege is left without an adequate
appellate remedy.” In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d 276, 279
(Tex. 2016); see also In re Christus Santa Rosa Healthcare Corp., 617 S.W.3d 586,
591 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, orig. proceeding). Likewise, “an order that
compels overly broad discovery is an abuse of discretion for which mandamus is the
proper remedy.” In re UPS Ground Freight, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 828, 831 (Tex. 2022)
(quoting In re Deere & Co., 299 S.W.3d 819, 820 (Tex. 2009)).
                                III. Asserting Privileges
       Expansive discovery disputes in civil cases have become increasingly
common during the last few decades, in part due to the evolution of “Rambo”
litigation tactics and other overly aggressive practices, leading to considerable

                                             3
consternation within the judiciary. 2 Such behavior has provided new meaning to the
term “adversarial process.” The case before us is no exception. Endeavor served a
discovery request on Scherer that included seventy-one categories of requested
documents. Scherer responded by serving a ninety-nine-page treatise in which he
asserted well over two hundred objections to Endeavor’s requests, along with an
extensive series of supporting citations and footnotes.
        “Parties and their attorneys are expected to cooperate in discovery and to make
any agreements reasonably necessary for the efficient disposition of the case.”
TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.2. Toward that end, prior to filing a motion to compel or a
similar discovery motion, the parties to the underlying litigation should confer and
engage in reasonable efforts to resolve their disputes without the necessity of, and
before seeking, trial court intervention. Id. In cases such as this one, which involve
wide-ranging disputes that concern dozens of voluminous written discovery
requests, it is particularly important for counsel, as the rule requires, to first confer
and engage in reasonable discussions with each other in an attempt to resolve
whatever differences exist between them, the result of which may effectuate the
efficient administration of discovery. This requirement should not be ignored, nor
should it be observed in a pro forma fashion.
        While the parties in this case may claim to have satisfied their obligations to
confer and cooperate in good faith, the record shows that they failed to follow at
least one significant process that may have streamlined the resolution of their
disputes: the process for the assertion of privilege. Id. R. 193.3. For that reason, we

        See, e.g., Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 364 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Krueger v.
        2

Pelican Prod. Corp., No. CIV-87-2385-A (W.D. Okla. Feb 24, 1989) (Hon. Wayne E. Alley) (order
denying motion to dismiss) (“If there is a hell to which disputatious, uncivil, vituperative lawyers go, let it
be one in which the damned are eternally locked in discovery disputes with other lawyers of equally
repugnant attributes.”).
                                                      4
believe it is important to review the necessary process for asserting privileges before
we proceed further.
      If a party believes that some of the materials that are responsive to a discovery
request are subject to a privilege, the party may withhold the materials.
Id. R. 193.3(a). However, in its response to the request, the withholding party must
(1) indicate that materials have been withheld, (2) describe the request to which the
material relates, and (3) describe the privilege asserted. Id. A statement asserting a
privilege should not be made unless specific, responsive material is protected by the
privilege. Id. R. 193, cmt. 3. The responding party may then submit a request to the
withholding party and seek a privilege log, which describes the materials that are
withheld and the privilege that applies to each withheld item or group of items. Id. R.
193.3(b).
      It is improper to raise an objection to a discovery request on the grounds that
it calls for the production of material that is privileged. Id. R. 193.2(f); In re
Monsanto Co., 998 S.W.2d 917, 924 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, orig. proceeding);
see also In re Christus Health Se. Tex., 167 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2005, orig. proceeding) (“Although St. Mary should not have objected on the basis
of privilege, this was not fatal to its privilege assertion.”). There is a significant
distinction between raising objections and asserting privileges. However, a party
that erroneously asserts an objection in that instance does not necessarily waive any
applicable privilege. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.2(f). Instead, the withholding party is
under an obligation to comply with the procedures for withholding privileged
documents once the error is brought to their attention. Id.
      When Rule 193 is properly followed, a party requesting documents that may
be privileged should then have a general idea about the nature of the documents, if
any, that are the subject of the parties’ dispute well before the matter is brought to

                                          5
the trial court’s attention. See id. R. 193.2(b). Access to this information will
hopefully serve to narrow the scope of the parties’ dispute. Additionally, the process
may help the parties avoid a situation where judicial resources, not to mention the
parties’ time and expenses, are unnecessarily consumed and exhausted in
hypothetical disputes over the existence of a privilege that, in reality, does not apply
to any existing documents.
      With the foregoing principles in mind, we now turn to the matters in dispute.
                          IV. Disputed Discovery Requests
      A. Income Tax Returns
      Endeavor’s sixth request for production seeks “[a]ll federal and state income
tax returns of [Scherer], including all schedules [and] W-2 and 1099 forms, for the
years 2018 through the present.”
      Scherer objected to this request on the grounds that his income tax returns are
“subject to a qualified privilege,” but his response did not follow the procedure for
asserting privileges as described in Rule 193.3(b). Likewise, there is no indication
that Endeavor attempted to point out this error to Scherer or otherwise request that
he comply with the correct procedure for asserting privileges. See id. R. 193.3.
      It is well-settled that the discovery of federal income tax returns is treated
differently from other financial information because federal income tax returns are
private, and the protection of that privacy is determined to be of constitutional
importance. Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1962); In re Brewer
Leasing, Inc., 255 S.W.3d 708, 714 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, orig.
proceeding); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ramirez, 824 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex.
1992) (“Our opinion in this case is guided by our reluctance to allow uncontrolled
and unnecessary discovery of federal income tax returns.”). Thus, the discovery of
federal income tax returns is permissible only when they are both relevant and

                                           6
material to the issues in the case. Hall v. Lawlis, 907 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1995);
In re House of Yahweh, 266 S.W.3d 668, 674 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, orig.
proceeding). As we have said, “[t]ax returns are not material or relevant if the same
information can be obtained from other sources, such as a financial statement.”
House of Yahweh, 266 S.W.3d at 674. Furthermore, unlike other forms of discovery,
the burden is on the party seeking the discovery of the tax returns to show that they
are both relevant and material. Hall, 907 S.W.2d at 495; House of Yahweh, 266
S.W.3d at 674; Brewer Leasing, 255 S.W.3d at 713–14; El Centro del Barrio, Inc. v.
Barlow, 894 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ).
      Endeavor maintains that it is entitled to discover Scherer’s federal income tax
returns because they are relevant to Scherer’s claims for loss of compensation, as
well as his efforts to mitigate damages. Endeavor also points out that Scherer has a
“side consulting business” and that he has likely earned income from this business.
In response, Scherer has indicated that he is willing to produce other documents that
show the nature of his income, including any forms that are related to income that is
reported on his income tax returns (e.g., any W-2, 1099, and K-1 forms).
      Because Scherer has improperly objected to this request, rather than following
the procedures described in Rule 193.3, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
overruling the “objection.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.2(f); In re Monsanto Co., 998
S.W.2d at 924; In re Christus Health Se. Tex., 167 S.W.3d at 599. However, by only
objecting, Scherer has not waived his right to assert a qualified privilege. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 193.2(f). As such, Scherer may still properly assert the necessary privilege(s)
using the procedures described in Rule 193. Once he has done so, the parties can
proceed to resolve any remaining disputes.
      Additionally, the trial court and the parties should be mindful that, once any
of the documents in dispute have been identified, Endeavor will carry the burden to

                                          7
demonstrate that the production of other documents that would indicate Scherer’s
taxable income would be insufficient. See Hall, 907 S.W.2d at 495. Scherer’s
general claim for loss of compensation, as well as Endeavor’s need for discovery
that relates to the “side consulting business” do not satisfy that burden.3
        B. Medical/Mental Health Treatment Information
        Scherer maintains that the trial court has improperly ordered him to produce
a list of medical providers in response to interrogatory no. 8 and to produce “medical
records” in response to request for production nos. 7 and 24.
        Under Rules 509 and 510 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, a patient such as
Scherer may assert a privilege to refuse to disclose confidential communications that
relate to their medical or mental health treatment, as well as the records that are
generated by the patient’s treating health care providers. TEX. R. EVID. 509(c),
510(b). These rules also contain a provision known as the patient-litigant exception,
which applies when a party relies on the patient’s “physical, mental, or emotional
condition” as part of an asserted claim or defense. TEX. R. EVID. 509(e)(4),
510(d)(5). Even then, however, this exception is applicable only when the patient’s
“condition” plays a significant role in the claim or defense that is asserted. In R.K. v.
Ramirez, the supreme court held that the patient-litigant exception is not applicable
“if the patient’s condition is merely an evidentiary or intermediate issue of fact,
rather than an ‘ultimate’ issue for a claim or defense.” 887 S.W.2d 836, 842 (Tex.
1994) (emphasis added). Likewise, it is not applicable “if the condition is merely
tangential to a claim rather than ‘central’ to it.” Id. (emphasis added).

        3
         Endeavor also complains that Scherer has not produced other income-related documents during
the period in which he was employed by Endeavor. However, Scherer does not complain about the trial
court’s order compelling him to produce other income-related documents, such as W-2s and 1099s.
Therefore, we do not address or dispose of any ongoing disputes that may relate to the production of such
documents.
                                                   8
       “Courts applying R.K. have consistently found that a claim for mental
anguish will not, standing alone, make a plaintiff’s mental or emotional condition a
part of their claim.” In re Whipple, 373 S.W.3d 119, 123 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2012, orig. proceeding); In re Toyota Motor Corp., 191 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2006, orig. proceeding) (“A claim for mental anguish or emotional
distress will not, standing alone, make a plaintiff’s mental or emotional condition a
part of the plaintiff’s claim.”); see also Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 751
(Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding) (one’s mental condition is not at issue merely because
a party pleads for mental anguish damages). Thus, a “routine allegation of mental
anguish does not place a party’s mental condition in controversy.” Whipple, 373
S.W.3d at 124; see also In re Barnes, 655 S.W.3d 658, 672 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2022, orig. proceeding) (a routine allegation of mental anguish in a personal injury
case did not waive the privilege).
      In this case, Endeavor has narrowly tailored its discovery requests for medical
information. Interrogatory no. 8 asks Scherer to identify each health care provider
that Scherer has consulted or that has treated Scherer “as a result of the ailments
[he] claim[s] to have suffered as a result of [Endeavor’s] alleged conduct”
(emphasis added). Likewise, request for production no. 7 seeks “[d]ocuments which
support your claim for damages,” including “medical records and bills reflecting the
injuries or damages asserted” (emphasis added). In the same way, request for
production no. 24 requests the production of medical records that show the treatment
for each “illness, disability, injury, ailment or pain, whether physical,
psychological[,] or psychiatric” which Scherer claims “to have suffered as a result
of [Endeavor’s] alleged conduct” (emphasis added). Each request makes it clear
that medical information is sought only if it is indicative of Scherer’s treatment for
conditions, if any, which he claims to have suffered as a result of Endeavor’s

                                          9
conduct. Thus, if Scherer is not asserting a claim here regarding a particular physical
or mental condition for which he has received treatment, then no information could
be sought or would need to be produced.
      Scherer objected to interrogatory no. 8 on the grounds that it sought
information in violation of Rules 509 and 510 of the Texas Rules of Evidence. He
then indicated that he was amenable to producing a list of health care providers that
he had seen “because of [Endeavor’s] conduct,” effectively acknowledging that he
is required to identify providers whose treatment falls within the patient-litigant
exception. However, even then, Scherer adds that he will only do so “if he intends
to use any such person as a witness or use any such person’s records as evidence.”
Based on this statement, and subject to his objections, Scherer responds to the
interrogatory itself with the words “[n]ot applicable.” The cumulative effect of this
limitation and response is to create an ambiguity as to whether Scherer has received
no treatment at all “as a result of the ailments [he] claim[s] to have suffered as a
result of [Endeavor’s] alleged conduct” or whether he is, in fact, making such a
claim, and merely has no intention of presenting any medical witnesses at trial.
      Scherer’s response is insufficient in at least two respects. First, Scherer
improperly objected to the interrogatory on the basis that a privilege applies. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.2(f). Second, Scherer arbitrarily limited his response to health
care providers that he only intends to present as witnesses. Rules 509 and 510 do
not limit the patient-litigant exception to the manner which Scherer advances here.
      Given the conditional nature of Endeavor’s request, and because Scherer
improperly asserted an objection based on privilege, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Scherer to respond to interrogatory no. 8.
However, on remand, both the trial court and the parties should be mindful that
Scherer’s answer of “[n]ot applicable” may be sufficient, if Scherer clearly indicates

                                          10
that he is making no claim in this case that he has received any treatment as a result
of a medical or mental health condition that would satisfy the patient-litigant
exception. See TEX. R. EVID. 509(e)(4), 510(d)(5).
       In responding to request for production nos. 7(f) and 24, Scherer again failed
to follow the procedure for asserting privileges that is described in Rule 193.3(b).
Instead, Scherer improperly objected to these requests on the grounds that they
sought information that was protected by the physician-patient and mental-health-
information privileges in Rules 509 and 510. There is also no indication that
Endeavor requested compliance with Rule 193.3(b) in connection with these
requests.
       We likewise conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it overruled Scherer’s improper objections to these requests.                         See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 193.2(f). Additionally, as was the case with interrogatory no. 8, we construe
these requests for production as seeking only those records that are discoverable
under the patient-litigant exception. As such, we do not believe that the trial court
abused its discretion when it ordered Scherer to respond to these requests. Again,
however, we note that if Scherer unequivocally responds that he has received no
treatment as a result of any physical or mental health conditions that are a result of
Endeavor’s conduct, he may respond to these requests by so indicating. 4
       C. “Witness Interviews”
       Endeavor propounded three written discovery requests that relate to Scherer’s
communications with witnesses and/or to statements that were made by witnesses

       4
          Endeavor’s requests for production also included a request for Scherer to provide an executed
“Authorization for Disclosure of Protected Health Information Psychotherapy Notes.” Scherer complains
that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to produce such an authorization. We will
address this complaint below, in connection with Scherer’s argument that he should not be required to
produce the requested authorizations.
                                                     11
either to him or to a member of his litigation team. Among other things, Scherer
objected to these requests on the grounds that they sought “work product.” The trial
court overruled Scherer’s objections and ordered him to respond to each of the items
in question. In his petition for mandamus, Scherer maintains that the trial court
abused its discretion because these requests seek documents that are protected by the
work product privilege.
      The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure no longer contain a blanket exemption
from discovery that explicitly applies to “witness statements.”           See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 192, cmt. 9. Indeed, all statements that are signed or otherwise adopted by a
person with knowledge of relevant facts, as well as all such stenographic,
mechanical, or electrical recordings of oral statements, are within the scope of
permissible discovery, subject to the assertion of any relevant privilege, and certain
other limitations, which are not applicable here. Id. R. 192.3(h); R. 192, cmt. 9.
      For example, notes taken during a conversation or interview with a witness or
a person with knowledge of relevant facts do not constitute a “witness statement”
for purposes of Rule 192. Id. R. 192.3(h). Nevertheless, and regardless of whether
they are properly understood to be “witness statements,” such notes may still be
subject to protection under the work product privilege (or conceivably some other
applicable privilege). See id. R. 192.5; R. 192, cmt. 9. “Work product” is defined
in relevant part as “material prepared or mental impressions developed in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a party or a party’s representatives.”
Id. R. 192.5(a)(1). Thus, when claiming that material or information constitutes
work product, a party is asserting a privilege under Rule 193. Id. R. 192.5(d).
      Interrogatory no. 6 seeks the name of each “agent, servant, or employee” of
Endeavor with which Scherer has communicated concerning the “subject matter of
this lawsuit.” It also seeks an indication of whether any such conversation was

                                          12
verbal or written. However, it does not seek any information about the contents of
such communications, nor does it require the disclosure of any mental impressions
regarding such conversations, if any.      Scherer did not provide a response to
interrogatory no. 6, even in a limited form.
      In his response to Endeavor’s motion to compel, Scherer argued that, because
it would require disclosing the names of any witnesses that were interviewed by
Scherer or his attorneys in preparation for litigation or trial, interrogatory no. 6
necessarily sought the disclosure of mental impressions regarding which witnesses
he or his attorneys consider to be important. While the interrogatory may result in
the incidental disclosure of mental impressions regarding the relative importance of
potential witnesses, not every conversation between Scherer and an employee, agent,
or servant of Endeavor regarding Scherer’s suit would necessarily indicate an effort
to identify and interview “witnesses.” As such, it is conceivable that Scherer has
engaged in conversations with employees, agents, or servants of Endeavor that are
not encompassed by or within the scope of his objection.
      Furthermore, Scherer’s use of an objection to assert a privilege is, again,
improper under Rule 193.2(f), and Scherer does not argue in his petition for
mandamus that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted any of the other
objections to interrogatory no. 6. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it overruled Scherer’s “objection” to producing privileged
information and ordered Scherer to respond to interrogatory no. 6.
      On remand, Scherer is not prohibited from asserting the work product
privilege in connection with interrogatory no. 6 if he utilizes the procedures in
Rule 193.3. However, if he does so, he should be mindful that he should not assert
the privilege unless there are one or more specific witness contacts to which the

                                         13
privilege applies.5 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193, cmt. 3. He should also be prepared, on
request, to provide a privilege log to opposing counsel so that any disputes over the
production of the requested information can be properly addressed and possibly
resolved. Id. R. 193.3(b).
        Scherer also alleges that request for production nos. 8 and 9 seek information
that constitutes work product. Request for production no. 8 seeks “[a]ny statements,
whether written, typed, recorded, or otherwise that [Scherer] or any person on [his]
behalf has taken or received from any current or former employee of [Endeavor],
including [Scherer’s] former co-workers and supervisors.” Request for production
no. 9 seeks documents that “reflect communications” between current or former
employees of Endeavor, and which discuss or reference Scherer, his employment
with Endeavor, or any other facts set out in his pleadings.
        Again, Scherer improperly objected to each of these requests on the basis of
the work product privilege, arguing that they “seem” to include “notes of witness
interviews.” Likewise, although Scherer lodged several other objections to these
requests, Scherer’s petition for mandamus does not argue that the trial court abused
its discretion when it overruled such objections. As such, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in that regard. If Scherer has any “notes of witness interviews” that he
seeks to withhold from discovery under the work product privilege, Scherer may
assert the work product privilege and withhold production under Rule 193.3.
Endeavor may then pursue appropriate relief based on the procedures outlined in the
same rule.

        5
          We do not comment on whether Scherer can be required to disclose the identity of witnesses that
he or his attorneys have interviewed. Instead, we believe that such an issue is best resolved after the general
nature of the alleged witness interview/statement dilemma has been disclosed pursuant to the procedures
described in Rule 193.3. We do note, however, that a party must disclose the identity of any person that it
intends to present as a witness at trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(d).
                                                      14
      D. Calculation of Non-Economic Damages
      In interrogatory no. 4, Endeavor sought a description of each element of
damages sought by Scherer, along with the amount claimed by him for each element,
and “the manner in which [Scherer] calculated the amounts claimed.” Scherer
complains that the trial court abused its discretion to the extent this request orders
him to provide “calculations” of his non-economic damages.
      Because they are a measure of non-pecuniary harm, non-economic damages
are not amenable to calculation with “precise mathematical precision.” Anderson v.
Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 618 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d
878, 887 (Tex. 2017)). For that reason, our mandatory disclosure rules indicate that
the parties should provide “the amount and any method of calculating economic
damages” (emphasis added), but do not require a similar disclosure obligation for
non-economic damages.       TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2(b).      However, non-economic
damages may sometimes be the subject of less-than-precise calculations. For
example, when establishing a rational basis for the award of mental anguish, a party
may offer evidence suggesting a quantifiable amount of damages. Gregory v.
Chohan, 670 S.W.3d 546, 560–61 (Tex. 2023). In that instance, a party might ask a
jury to consider “the potential financial consequences of severe emotional trauma.”
Id.
      Endeavor’s briefing seems to assume that, because non-economic damages
must have a “rational basis,” all such damages are subject to some form of
calculation. See id. Although the distinction may not always be clear, we do not
believe that all non-economic damages can necessarily be expressed in the form of
verifiable calculations. On that basis, we conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion when it ordered Scherer to provide calculations of his non-economic
losses without qualification. On remand, the trial court may order Scherer to provide

                                         15
calculations of his non-economic losses only to the extent that such calculations are
verifiable and possible.
      E. E-mail and Social Media Accounts
      Interrogatory no. 7 contains the following request:
      List all email addresses you have used during the last five years and
      provide all web addresses for any on-line content with which you are
      associated, including, without limitation, social media websites (e.g.,
      Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Snapchat, TikTok).
Scherer maintains that this request exceeds the scope of permissible discovery. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a).
      Under Rule 192.3(a), a party is allowed to discover matters that are relevant
to the subject matter of the litigation. Furthermore, “[i]t is not a ground for objection
that the information sought will be inadmissible at trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id.
Thus, while the scope of discovery is broad, “it is nevertheless confined by the
subject matter of the case and reasonable expectations of obtaining information that
will aid [in the] resolution of the dispute.” Id. R. 192, cmt. 1. For this reason,
discovery requests must be “reasonably tailored” to seek the disclosure or production
of only relevant matters. In re USAA Gen. Indem. Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 793 (Tex.
2021) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003)
(orig. proceeding)); In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998) (orig.
proceeding); In re Germania Select Ins. Co., No. 11-20-00176-CV, 2020 WL
5741595, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 25, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
      Based on these principles, requests for social media posts that are not limited
in time or scope can be overly broad and therefore improper. See In re Christus
Health Se. Tex., 399 S.W.3d 343, 348 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, orig.
proceeding). Furthermore, requests for social media posts which are limited in time

                                           16
or scope, but which bear no restriction as to the requested subject matter are properly
denied. In re Indeco Sales, Inc., No. 09-14-00405-CV, 2014 WL 5490943, at *2
(Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 30, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (the trial court
reasonably concluded that a request was overly broad when it required a party to
“produce every post, message or chat conversation authored, sent, or received by
her, no matter how mundane or remote, regardless of the topic, content, or subject,
includ[ing] everything anyone sent or posted to her account.”).
      Endeavor characterizes its request as merely seeking “a list of email addresses
and social media accounts.” This characterization is incorrect. Instead, the request
seeks the “web addresses” for all online content with which Scherer is associated,
including social media websites. That is, it effectively seeks a list of every web page
and any piece of information generated by or associated with Scherer that has been
posted within the last five years, without any limitation as to its scope or content.
Among other things, it obligates Scherer and/or his attorneys to identify the uniform
resource locator of every piece of social media content in which Scherer is “tagged,”
mentioned, or otherwise involved, no matter how remote such involvement may be.
See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186,
1188 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (a user accesses an individual web page by entering its uniform
resource locator—or “URL”—in an internet browser). Under these circumstances,
we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Scherer to
respond to interrogatory no. 7 in its current form.
      F. Forms of Income
      Request for production no. 22 seeks “documents that reflect or evidence any
or all income” earned by Scherer during the four-year period preceding the end of
his employment. Endeavor listed several specific categories of documents that are
included within this request. They included pension payments, disability income,

                                          17
“insurance proceeds,” inheritances, workers’ compensation, and unemployment
compensation. Scherer objected to this request on the grounds that it exceeds the
scope of permissible discovery. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(a). However, he agreed
to produce several income-related documents, including, among other things,
various IRS forms that would show his sources of income, payroll documents
showing post-termination income, and documents sufficient to show any
unemployment benefits or workers’ compensation benefits received.
      An employee that asserts a claim under the TCHRA may recover back pay as
a form of equitable relief. LAB. § 21.258. The measure of such damages is the
amount of money the employee would have earned had they not been terminated,
less the sum the employee did earn after termination. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp. v.
Barousse, 365 S.W.3d 46, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied);
Shear Cuts, Inc. v. Littlejohn, 141 S.W.3d 264, 271 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004,
no pet.); Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of El Paso, Inc. v. Flores, 951 S.W.2d
542, 547 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no writ). Likewise, the TCHRA provides that
“[i]nterim earnings, workers’ compensation benefits, and unemployment
compensation benefits received operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.”
LAB. § 21.258(c).
      The measure of damages articulated in Barousse, Littlejohn, and Flores, as
well as the Labor Code’s description of allowable reductions, indicate that offsets
are limited to earned income or forms of income that serve as a substitute for earned
income during the claimant’s periods of disability or unemployment. Back pay
damages are not reduced or limited by other forms of income. Thus, for example,
401k benefits paid to a claimant cannot serve as the basis for an offset. Stanley
Stores, Inc. v. Chavana, 909 S.W.2d 554, 563 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
1995, writ denied). Likewise, income received from inheritance, property and

                                         18
casualty insurance payments, and pensions are not relevant to the measure of
damages. Cf. Littlejohn, 141 S.W.3d at 271; see LAB. § 21.258(c). 6
        Although relevant documents were included within the scope of request for
production no. 22, the request also sought documentation for unearned income,
which is not relevant to the damage claims that have been asserted by Scherer.
Likewise, Endeavor failed to demonstrate how the discovery of unearned income
could otherwise lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.                             See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 192.3(a). As such, the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered
Scherer to produce documents in response to request for production no. 22.
        G. Documents “Supporting” Claims
        Endeavor also served a series of requests for production that asked Scherer to
produce documents “support[ing]” or “substantiat[ing]” various claims that are set
out in Scherer’s pleadings. The requests at issue include the following:
        Document Request 55: Documents that support or otherwise
        substantiate your allegation that “Endeavor violated and is violating the
        TCHRA by discriminating against [Scherer] by using his age as a
        motivating factor in connection with compensation, terms, conditions,
        or privileges of employment.”

        Document Request 56: Documents that support or otherwise
        substantiate your allegation that "Endeavor violated and is violating the
        TCHRA by limiting, segregating, or classifying [Scherer] for
        employment in a manner that tends to deprive [Scherer] of employment
        opportunities – or adversely effects [Scherer’s] status as an employee.”

        Document Request 57: Documents that support or otherwise
        substantiate your allegation that “Endeavor caused harm to [Scherer]
        and is continuing to cause harm to [Scherer].”

        6
         Scherer argues that allowable offsets for back pay are necessarily limited to the three categories
that are described in Section 21.258(c): interim earnings, workers’ compensation, and unemployment
benefits. We do not comment on whether forms of earned income that are outside the scope of these three
categories limit the claimant’s recovery of back pay.
                                                    19
      Document Request 58: Documents that support or otherwise
      substantiate your allegation that “Endeavor violated and is violating the
      TCHRA by discriminating against [Scherer] by using [Scherer’s]
      national origin as a motivating factor in connection with compensation,
      terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”

      Document Request 59: Documents that support or otherwise
      substantiate your allegation that “Endeavor violated and is violating the
      TCHRA by limiting, segregating, or classifying [Scherer] for
      employment in a manner that tends to deprive [Scherer] of employment
      opportunities – or adversely affects [Scherer’s] status as an employee.”

      Document Request 60: Documents that support or otherwise
      substantiate your allegation that “Endeavor caused harm to [Scherer].”
      Document Request 61: Documents that support or otherwise
      substantiate your allegation that “Endeavor violated and is violating the
      TCHRA by retaliating or discriminating against [Scherer] for opposing
      a discriminatory practice, making or filing a charge of discrimination,
      assisting, or participating in any manner in an investigation or
      proceedings.”

      Document Request 67: Documents that support or otherwise
      substantiate your allegation that “Endeavor engaged in discriminatory
      and retaliatory practices wit [sic] malice or with reckless indifference
      to the state-protected rights of its employees, including [Scherer].”
These requests are improper. Although a requesting party is entitled to discover the
factual basis for another party’s contentions, a requesting party may not simply
demand that an opposing party marshal its evidence in support of a particular
contention. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(j); R. 192, cmt. 5. Likewise, requests for the
production of documents must describe the documents that are sought with
“reasonable particularity.” Id. R. 196.1(b).
      In Loftin v. Martin, the supreme court considered whether it was proper for an
injured worker to request that an insurance carrier produce all documents that
supported its allegation that the Industrial Accident Board (IAB) had rendered an

                                         20
award that was contrary to the undisputed evidence. 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex.
1989). After noting that requests under the rules of civil procedure “must be specific,
must establish materiality, and must recite precisely what is wanted,” the court held
that the request for documents in support of the carrier’s allegation regarding the
IAB award failed to “identify any particular class or type of documents” and that,
instead, it was “merely a request . . . to generally peruse all evidence” that the carrier
might have. Id. (quoting Steely and Gayle, Operation of the Discovery Rules,
2 HOUSTON L. REV. 222, 223 (1964)); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.1(b) (A request
for production must “describe with reasonable particularity each item and category”
of documents that must be produced.).
      Since Loftin, Texas courts have consistently held that requests that demand
the production of all evidence in support of a party’s allegations are beyond the
scope of permissible discovery. See, e.g., In re Master Flo Valve Inc., 485 S.W.3d
207, 218 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding) (a request for
“all documents, communications, tangible or intangible evidence relating in any way
to defendants’ claims, defenses, or alleged damages” was overly broad); In re TIG
Ins. Co., 172 S.W.3d 160, 168 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, orig. proceeding) (a
series of requests seeking all documents that support an insurer’s decision to deny a
claim were improper under Loftin). The comments to our rules of civil procedure
likewise note that “a party may object to a request for ‘all documents relevant to the
lawsuit’ as [being] overly broad and not in compliance with the rule requiring
specific requests for documents and [may] refuse to comply with it entirely.”
TEX. R. CIV. P. 193, cmt. 2. Indeed, requests of this nature may be so vague that the
responding party is “unlikely to know what documents are required to be produced.”
TIG, 172 S.W.3d at 168.

                                           21
        Here, Endeavor attempts to distinguish its approach from Loftin by pointing
out that, rather than serving Scherer with a single, global request for “all evidence,”
it has served a series of requests on Scherer, each of which asks for the disclosure
and production of evidence that supports a particularized aspect of his allegations.
Endeavor argues that Loftin does not foreclose this approach. In support of its
argument, Endeavor relies on Davis v. Pate, 915 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg 1996, no writ). In Davis, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held
that a series of requests were appropriate when they asked for “any and all
documents” that evidenced various, particular aspects of a plaintiff’s claims. Id. at
79. The Davis court reasoned that, while Loftin involved a request for “all evidence
that supports an opposing party’s allegations,” some of the requests made by the
Davis defendant were acceptable because they specified “a particular aspect or
element” of claims that had already been brought. Id. We respectfully disagree with
the holding in Davis for three reasons.
        First, Davis predates the comprehensive 1999 amendments to the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure, which made numerous and significant modifications to the rules
for discovery. Among other things, the revised discovery rules include a comment
to Rule 192 which notes that, although the factual contentions of a party are
discoverable, the rule does not require “a marshalling of evidence.” TEX. R.
CIV. P. 192.3(j); R. 192.3, cmt. 5. 7 The holding in Davis permits discovery requests
that call on the parties served with such requests to marshal documentary evidence.
As such, Davis is no longer applicable in light of the 1999 amendments.

        7
         The notes and comments to the 1999 revisions are not merely advisory, but “are intended to inform
the construction and application of these rules by both courts and practitioners.” Order of Final Approval
of Revisions to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 98-9196 (Tex. Nov. 9, 1998),
reprinted in 61 TEX. BAR J. 1140 (1998); Nathan L. Hecht & Robert H. Pemberton, A Guide to the 1999
Texas Discovery Rules Revisions (Nov. 11, 1998), http://adrr.com/law1/rules.htm; see also In re Am. State
Bank to Obtain Testimony of Wade, No. 07-03-0483-CV, 2005 WL 1967262, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Aug. 16, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
                                                     22
      Second, while we agree with Davis that a single request for all documents in
support of a party’s allegations is overly broad and burdensome, we do not interpret
the Loftin request to fit within that category. To the contrary, the disputed request
for production in Loftin was rejected even though it specified a “particular aspect or
element” of the claims that were made by the insurance carrier. See Davis, 915
S.W.2d at 79; see also Loftin, 776 S.W.2d at 147–48. Specifically, the court in Loftin
rejected a request for “all evidence” of the carrier’s contention that the IAB had
rendered an improper award. Loftin, 776 S.W.2d at 148. As such, we believe that
the court in Davis did not distinguish the facts before it from the facts and
circumstances in Loftin.
      Finally, by allowing a party to survey every significant claim of its opponent
by systematically seeking “all documents” that support each asserted claim, the
holding in Davis readily provides a means by which civil litigants may continue to
effectively issue a comprehensive call for an opponent to produce “all evidence.”
Davis, 915 S.W.2d at 77–79. We do not believe that this result is an intended
consequence or outcome under Loftin or our rules of civil procedure. See TIG, 172
S.W.3d at 167–68 (a series of requests that essentially required the insurance carrier
“to produce all documents supporting its contentions” that justified its denial of a
claim was not reasonably specific).
      We conclude that, regardless of whether they are global or particularized,
requests for production that seek all evidence (or documents) that support an
opposing party’s allegations fail to describe the requested documents with
“reasonable particularity,” as required by Rule 196.1(b) and Loftin. Likewise,
because such requests require a party to marshal its evidence, they exceed the
permissible scope of discovery under the rules. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3, cmt. 5. As

                                         23
such, the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Scherer to respond to
request for production nos. 55 through 61 and 67.
      H. Attorney-Client Agreement
      Request for production no. 68 sought “[Scherer’s] contract with [his]
attorneys, including a description of any fee agreement, related to [Scherer’s] claim
of attorney’s fees.” Scherer lodged several objections to this request, including an
objection based on the attorney-client privilege. Nevertheless, Scherer agreed to
produce a redacted copy of his fee agreement which only showed the agreed upon
fee and the fact that the agreement existed.
      The attorney-client privilege protects, among other things, communications
between the client and the attorney. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A). However, the
privilege can be waived when it is used offensively. Republic Ins. Co. v. Davis, 856
S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993). For example, attorney billing records are generally
discoverable when a party asserts a claim for attorneys’ fees. See In re Nat’l Lloyds
Ins. Co., 532 S.W.3d 794, 813 (Tex. 2017) (“Attorney-billing information may be
discoverable by virtue of the opposing party designating its counsel as a testifying
expert.”).
      Similar to other discovery objections asserted by him, Scherer’s response does
not assert the attorney-client privilege by using the procedure described in
Rule 193.3(a). See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3(a). However, in this instance, Scherer is
entitled to withhold privileged communications with his attorney without asserting
the privilege in his response. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.3(c) (a party need not comply
with Rule 193.3(a) or (b) and may withhold a privileged communication to or from
an attorney if the communication was made after consulting with the attorney and if
it concerns the litigation in which the discovery is requested).

                                          24
      In determining whether a waiver of the attorney-client privilege has occurred,
the trial court must consider the following factors: (1) whether the party asserting
the privilege is seeking affirmative relief, (2) whether the privileged information
sought is such that, if believed by the finder of fact, in all probability it would be
outcome determinative of the cause of action asserted, and (3) whether disclosure of
the confidential communication is the only means by which the aggrieved party may
obtain the requested information. Republic, 856 S.W.2d at 163. In this instance, it
is clear that—by seeking attorneys’ fees—Scherer is asserting a claim for affirmative
relief. As such, the first element of the Republic test is satisfied. Id.
      With respect to the second element, the resolution of Scherer’s claim for
attorneys’ fees will be based on the lodestar method articulated in Rohrmoos
Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 497–502 (Tex. 2019).
Under the lodestar method, a base award is calculated by multiplying the reasonable
number of hours worked by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 498. As such, any hourly
rate to which the attorney and client have agreed may be relevant to the
determination of whether the hourly rate used in the calculation of fees is reasonable.
However, “mere relevance” is not sufficient to justify disclosure. Republic, 856
S.W.2d at 163. Instead, it is normally incumbent upon the party seeking the
discovery of the fee agreement to prove that the agreement would in all probability
be “outcome determinative.” Id.
      Here, Scherer has agreed to produce the portion of his fee agreement that
establishes the nature of the fee sought. We presume that the materials he has
voluntarily produced include a disclosure of whether the fee is a contingency
arrangement and the terms of the contingency, or whether the fee sought is based on
an hourly rate, and—if the fee is based on an hourly rate—the particular rate(s) that
will be charged. We are unaware of any other information from the agreement that

                                           25
would be relevant to a lodestar calculation of attorneys’ fees, nor does Endeavor
argue that the agreement is relevant for any other reason. Therefore, because Scherer
has already agreed to produce any portions of his fee agreement that are relevant to
a lodestar calculation of his fees, the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered
Scherer to produce the unredacted fee agreement in its entirety.
       I. Authorizations
       Finally, Endeavor’s requests for production include a request for Scherer to
provide an executed “Authorization for Disclosure of Protected Health Information
Psychotherapy Notes”; the request indicates that a copy of a proposed authorization
is attached to the request (request for production no. 24). Additionally, Endeavor
requested an “executed Authorization for Release of Employment Records” (request
for production no. 25). 8
       In its motion to compel, Endeavor sought an order requiring Scherer to sign
and thereafter provide the requested authorizations. Scherer complains that, by
ordering him to respond to the requests for production that contained requests for
“executed authorizations,” the trial court has essentially ordered him to sign the
authorizations in question in the form proposed by Endeavor. However, a request
for production may not require Scherer to create and produce documents that do not
already exist. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(b) (“A person is required to produce a document
or tangible thing that is within the person’s possession, custody, or control.”); In re
Preventative Pest Control Houston, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 455, 460 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, orig. proceeding) (“Under Rule 192.3(b), one cannot be
forced to create a document that does not exist solely to comply with a request for
production.”); In re Guzman, 19 S.W.3d 522, 524–25 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

       8
         We have not had an opportunity to examine the proposed authorizations because they are not
included in the record before us.
                                               26
Edinburg 2000, orig. proceeding) (the trial court cannot order the production of
executed authorizations that do not exist, solely to comply with a request for
production). Thus, a party cannot be required to create a document to satisfy a
document request. Here, the trial court’s order, which required Scherer to respond
to a request for production, is not an order to execute the authorizations that
Endeavor seeks. Rather, although the intent of the order may have been otherwise,
it merely requires Scherer to produce such authorizations if they already exist.
      We recently held that a trial court may, under appropriate circumstances, order
a party to execute an authorization. In re Rius Rentals, LLC, No. 11-21-00211-CV,
2021 WL 5115548, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Nov. 4, 2021, orig. proceeding)
(“authorizations for the release of records related to a party may be an efficient
means to obtain records that are in the possession of a third party, particularly if that
third party requires such authorizations in order to avoid potential claims.”).
However, because authorizations are not listed as a form of permissible discovery
under Rule 192.1, we concluded in Rius, as we do today, that the trial court may only
compel the production of an executed authorization based on its finding that good
cause exists to modify the procedures set forth in our rules of discovery. Id. at *4;
see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 191.1 (“the procedures . . . set forth in the rules pertaining
to discovery may be modified in any suit . . . by court order for good cause”). In this
case, the trial court did not explicitly or implicitly find that there was good cause to
permit the use of authorizations as a form of permissible discovery. Despite this,
other discovery tools exist for Endeavor to utilize to obtain the desired information
that it would otherwise seek if signed authorizations were or were not produced.
      We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered
Scherer to respond to request for production nos. 24 and 25. However, if executed
authorizations do not exist, Scherer need only respond by indicating that no

                                           27
documents can be identified that are responsive to these requests.           TEX. R.
CIV. P. 196.2(b)(4). Likewise, if Endeavor seeks to compel Scherer to execute such
authorizations in the future, it should seek an order for good cause under Rule 192.1.
                               V. This Court’s Ruling
        We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus, in part, and direct
the trial court to modify its order, consistent with this opinion, with respect to
interrogatory nos. 4 and 7, and request for production nos. 22, 55 through 61, 67,
and 68. Mandamus will issue only if Judge Robertson fails to act by February 29,
2024.

                                               W. STACY TROTTER
                                               JUSTICE

February 15, 2024
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

                                          28