Court Opinion

ID: 9632897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:27:39.980314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:05.432014
License: Public Domain

PETERSON, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I concur with part two of the majority opinion, concur in the result of part one, and join Denecke, C. J., in his dissent as to part 3.1 write separately, however, to express my concern over the growth of the “substantial compliance” rule with which part one of the majority opinion is concerned.
The majority cites an Indiana decision, Beneficial Finance Co. v. Wegmiller Bender Lbr. Co.,_Ind App_, 402 NE2d 41 (1980), for the proposition that a lien was valid, even though the requirements of the statute had not been met, because there was “substantial compliance” with the statute. The Indiana court held that whether there has been “substantial compliance” is determined by these elements: (1) “the degree of noncompliance with the letter of the statute,” (2) the “policy” which underlies the statute, and (3) the prejudice which may have resulted to other interested parties. 402 NE2d at 45.
The majority opinion will be cited for the proposition that Oregon procedural statutes no longer require literal compliance; that substantial compliance is sufficient if the three elements set forth above exist. Lawyers, in advising their clients, and trial judges, in applying the law, no longer can rely on the clear meaning of procedural statutes; they must look to see whether there has been “substantial compliance” in light of the three enumerated factors.
*439I do not advocate slavish adherence to precedent, nor do I disagree with the principle that statutes should not be followed literally if the result is absurd or unreasonable. I am increasingly concerned, however, with the inability of competent lawyers, after careful study, to tell their clients what is the law; with the complaints of trial judges that appellate courts are forever “changing the goal posts”; and most importantly, with the growing frustration of people, rich and poor, uneducated and educated, to conduct their affairs with a measure of confidence that what they are doing is within the law.
The principle of certainty and stability is not without weight in the balance. Certainty achieves fairness to those who rely upon the law, efficiency in following precedent, continuity and equality in treating similar cases equally.1 Security of expectation is an important consideration, and is the price paid in many cases in which the banner of “substantial compliance” is raised.2
I concur in the result in part one of the majority opinion because that is the law, based upon the Oregon precedents cited in the majority opinion. But we should not make further incursions to achieve results deemed to be *440desirable, at the expense of the rule that clear and unambiguous statutes should be applied according to their terms, unless an absurd result is reached thereby. See dissenting opinion in Brown v. Portland School Dist. #1 291 Or 77, 98, 628 P2d 1183 (1981).

 See M. Bayles, On Legal Reform: Legal Stability and Legislative Questions, 65 Ky L J 631, 637 (1976-77).

“In our society, and particularly as concerns larger commercial, industrial and property interests, lawyers&emdash;legal counselors&emdash;are the principal agents for the engineering of expectations. The counselor in his law office is the retailer of the legal system for those who know when to turn to him, and can afford to consult him, to make it as sure as such things can be that the expectations arising from contracts, settlements, wills, negotiations and transactions will, in the course of time, be realized in fact.. . . Office counseling for the poor lacks the drama of a criminal defense or a consumers’ class action, but the need is great and the opportunities for service hardly yet tapped. Who knows, perhaps there will not be too many lawyers after all.
“For, make no mistake about it, security of expectations is not just a rich man’s value. It can be even more important to a poor person or a person of moderate means. If I have twenty substantial property or contractual interests, and one goes sour on me, I may be angered or inconvenienced, but I am not impoverished. But if I have only one or two more humble expectations&emdash;a pension, seniority in my job, the promise of a small legacy, an assurance of child support payments, or a low-rent long-term lease on my apartment&emdash;disappointment of that expectation can be disastrous.” H. Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 Colum L Rev 1023,1027 (1974).