Court Opinion

ID: 9563944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:50:54.604812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:09.277696
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holland
dissenting.
With an abiding feeling that the penalty of two-year suspension is too severe, and that a milder penalty would amply satisfy the ends of justice and the purposes sought to be accomplished, I respectfully dissent from the result announced in the majority opinion.
It is not necessary to again relate the circumstances which are fully set out in the majority opinion, and respondent confessed the truth of the charges and has placed himself at the mercy of the court with respect to the discipline to be administered. This fact is worthy of much consideration. “ * * * there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth.” Luke 15:10. We are not confronted with a history of petty transgressions, but on the other hand, we must make note that we are considering what to do in the case with one deviation from the straight and narrow path during nineteen years of honorable practice without blemish on respondent’s reputation, and the violation here complained of must be considered in the light of respondent’s history of devotion to communal and charitable activities, which reveals a commendable spirit. Also, we must not overlook the filial devotion and respect to his parents and elders, seemingly a part of the traditions of his race. It is not idle nor out of place to observe the laudable fact that statistics will show that there is a smaller percentage of Jewish people brought before the bars of justice for violations of our civil and moral laws than any other race.
It is apparent that the motive for the perjured testimony was for protection of his father against a possible claim for treble damages. If this is true, it follows that he did not falsify for the purpose of financial gain for himself. No more trustworthy witnesses could have *546testified as to his unblemished character and reputation than the ten lawyers and businessmen who testified and who were unstinting in their laudable expressions as to respondent’s life and character. This testimony should be given great weight and be most impressive as it reveals a long history of honorable conduct with only the present exception.
In the dissenting opinion of one of my associates, among other things it is said that respondent was unmindful “of the Canon of Ethics governing the conduct of lawyers.” I have yet to know the lawyer who, being a zealous advocate, did not violate the following part of the Canon of Ethics: “It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his client’s innocence or in the justice of his cause.” Regardless of all this, respondent admittedly violated his oath as a witness and also the decalogue formulated by his ancestral fathers, far removed, in bearing false witness. Fortunately for respondent, as well as many of us, there are only ten commandments instead of forty; however, respondent by his transgression, was not seeking personal benefit or gain, as appears to be the case in the great majority of our disciplinary cases, and if we followed a precedent which we have, his name would be deleted from our printed reports. This was done in a much graver offense and a reprimand administered. When we consider respondent’s reasons for giving the false testimony, we would serve all purposes by a much less severe penalty than that announced in the majority opinion. To understand is to pardon. While not the rule, man’s inhumanity to man obtains ámong judges as well as other people.
Our Legislature has wisely provided probation for felonies, except first and second degree murder, and the further exception in cases where a person has been twice convicted of a felony in this state or elsewhere prior to the case at hand in which application is' made. A suspension from practice for a period of two years is a *547harsh punishment to innocent victims and is not at all comparable to reprimands that have been administered by this Court in more flagrant violations. If it be considered that the penalty serves as a deterrent, it will not reach the very few members of the bar who may be culprits at heart and go on the false premise that they are smart enough to not be caught. The great mass of members of the bar carry their code of ethics as well as their honor and loyalty to their oaths, in their heart, and conform to the principles of honor and integrity without any so-called lesson of discipline by this Court. There is no reason to crucify one transgressor as a lesson for the overwhelming majority of the members of the bar who do not need the lesson. If such a lesson is needed as a deterrent, then there had better be a general overhauling of the moral standards of the profession. An inspection of the records across the country in disciplinary proceedings reveals that the punishment ranges in many instances from a reprimand to a ninety-day suspension, and such practice by courts of high standing has obtained for decades without the processes of justice and the courts falling apart.
We do not have a history here of moral turpitude, just the opposite; however, respondent’s transgression is not to be treated too lightly. If this one deviation in nineteen years is sufficient to rock the citadels of justice, then they are in a shaky condition. The life, character, and history of this respondent should palliate the flagrancy of his delinquency and should weigh heavily in his favor as against the severe penalty of a two-year suspension. Such a penalty is a crushing blow to any attorney and few ever surmount its disastrous effects. No doubt, the fact of this pending proceeding has been grievous and the cause of great anxiety on respondent’s family, and if respondent possesses an ounce of worth, then he has already learned a lesson the hard way. Respondent being a lawyer and presumably with full knowledge of the seriousness of the offense charged and admitted, we can*548not condone the violation, however, it is my. belief and opinion that suspension from practice as an attorney at the bar of Colorado for a period of ninety days is amply sufficient.