Court Opinion

ID: 9751827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:08:27.035948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:00.281502
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR,
Concurring.
The majority’s rationale in overturning the PCRA court’s award of a new trial is grounded largely on a finding of insufficient prejudice to support it. See Majority Opinion, at 442-44, 448-51, 980 A.2d at 559-60, 563-64. Although I join *479the majority’s ultimate holding, my approach is substantially different as concerns the details of the prejudice evaluation.
This case was obviously a difficult one for the Commonwealth to investigate and prosecute. None of the immediate fact witnesses was forthcoming with police-most lied repeatedly to the investigating officers. See, e.g., N.T., May 23, 1996, at 1425 (reflecting the district attorney’s remark to the jury, “make no mistake here, I told you up front when I talked to you about what our case was going to be, all these people lied initially to the police”).1 The Commonwealth admitted a serious misidentification by several of its witnesses, since those individuals had testified Appellant’s brother, Charles Small, was at the scene of the killing, but the district attorney conceded late in the trial that Charles Small was not present. See N.T., May 23, 1996, at 1424 (reflecting the prosecutor’s remark: “Now Charles Small, up front, no mistake, be clear, is a mistaken identity.”). The investigative records are replete with rumor, innuendo, and hearsay statements implicating numerous parties, including the brother of Commonwealth witness Lawrence Tucker, who committed suicide a few months after Ms. Smith was killed, see, e.g., N.T., May 16, 1996, at 313; N.T., July 26, 2004, at 31; an individual named Kevin McClatchey, who was later shot and killed by Appellant’s codefendant, James Frye, see N.T., May 16,1996, at 494; N.T., May 17, 1996, at 735; and another individual named Mitch Trivitt, who allegedly confessed to the killing of Cheryl Smith, see N.T., July 26, 2004, at 154. The investigation persisted for more than a decade before sufficient information was obtained to support arrests. The only actual eyewitness to the crimes to provide testimony, Tucker, had been charged by the Commonwealth as a participant, and the prosecutor conceded Tucker also lied to police. See id. at 1427 (reflecting the prosecutor’s statement that: “Mr. Tucker is not anyone’s favorite person, but the Commonwealth takes the people who are witnesses to crimes as they get them. Pleas bargains are *480a part of life[;] ... [i]t’s ability, in argument, that it makes people lie to get a deal [sic].”). There was no physical evidence connecting Appellant to the killing.
Against this backdrop, the PCRA court found several instances of deficient stewardship on the part of Appellant’s trial counsel and a reasonable probability of a different verdict had constitutionally adequate representation been provided, or, in other words, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict. See generally Strickland, v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Although the PCRA judge was not the trial judge, significantly, the court highlighted similar findings in parallel post-conviction proceedings initiated by Appellant’s co-defendant, James Frey, which were adjudicated by the trial judge. Notably, this Court continues to recognize the PCRA and trial courts’ superior point of vantage and to accord deference to supported factual determinations. See Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 597 Pa. 648, 677 & n. 10, 952 A.2d 640, 657 & n. 10 (2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364, 395, 909 A.2d 775, 794 (2006) (Cappy, J., concurring)).
In my view, recognition of the above background is necessary to a balanced and directed prejudice assessment. I also believe there is fuller, essential context relative to the individual claims accepted by the PCRA court.
With regard to Issue 1(A) (ineffectiveness for failure to interview and produce Darick Sofi and Robert Elzey), the majority reasons that, even accepting Tucker’s statement as a confession and assuming full impeachment of his testimony, the verdict could not have been different. See Majority Opinion, at 443, 980 A.2d at 560. In support of its conclusion, the majority recounts that, on direct appeal, this Court concluded in its sufficiency review that Small’s “numerous statements admitting to the killing and forensic evidence” also supported the verdict. See id. at 443, 980 A.2d at 560. The majority reasons, in any event, the Commonwealth’s theory was never that Appellant acted alone; thus, the jurors’ disbelief of Tucker would not have undermined the Common*481wealth’s theory of the case. See id. Further, the majority observes that Tucker’s credibility “had been assaulted to the nth degree already.” Id.2
I differ substantially with the majority’s assessment. As reflected above, there were substantial reasons to question the credibility of all of the Commonwealth’s fact witnesses, who, as reported to the jurors by the district attorney, had all lied to police and withheld their relied-upon testimony for up to a decade. The majority’s recounting of this Court’s sufficiency review on direct appeal is not persuasive, as sufficiency review is very different a review of the prejudicial impact of particular items of evidence. The majority’s vague reference to “forensic evidence” also provides little support, since the only forensic evidence identified in the trial record is the testimony that the cause of death was head trauma and the manner of death was a homicide. Notably, such evidence does not serve as direct evidence of Appellant’s involvement. Cf. Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402, 444, 951 A.2d 1110, 1135 (2008) (“[T]he issue at trial was not the physical location of the victim’s wounds, but rather who fired the shots in the first instance, a question that the referenced [forensic] report cannot answer.”).
Appellant’s trial counsel and the trial judge believed Elzey and Sofi to be important witnesses. See, e.g., N.T., July 21, 2004, at 98; Commonwealth v. Frey, No. 2819 CA 1995, slip op. at 27 (C.P. York May 16, 2001) (“Because Tucker’s testimony was so crucial to the Commonwealth case against the Petitioner, the testimony which would have been presented by Sofi and Elzey to impeach Tucker would have been very helpful to Petitioner’s case.”). The district attorney also viewed them as significant, as demonstrated by his highlighting of Sofi’s and Elzey’s absence as witnesses to the Common*482wealth’s advantage at trial. See N.T., May 23, 1996, at 1429 (“Did we hear from Elzey? Did we hear from Sofi? Of course not.”). Furthermore, trial counsel offered no strategic reason for failing to make timely and reasonable efforts to secure the witnesses’ appearance at trial. See, e.g., N.T., July 22,2004, at 368.
The majority’s assertion that Tucker was cross-examined to the “nth degree” can be regarded only as hyperbole, since Appellant’s trial counsel conceded traditional lines of cross-examination were omitted without strategic justification. See, e.g., N.T., July 22, 2004, at 372. Additionally, in arguments to the jury, the district attorney ably bolstered Tucker’s testimony with “truth verifiers” gleaned from the other evidence. See, e.g., N.T., May 23, 1996, at 1445. This powerful strategy, however, might have been seriously undermined with credited evidence that Tucker himself perpetrated, or at least participated in, the killing.
The majority is correct in its reasoning that a conclusion by jurors that Tucker participated in the killing would not have excluded the possibility of Appellant’s own involvement. It is difficult to disagree with the trial judge’s assessment, however, that such a finding would have seriously undermined Tucker’s important testimony concerning the circumstances of the killing.3 In this regard, it may have yielded a reasonable doubt on the part of jurors concerning, at a minimum, the degree of Appellant’s participation in the actual killing, and thus, potentially made the difference between a verdict of first-and second-degree murder. Therefore, I believe the trial judge’s finding of prejudice in the Frey post-conviction proceedings, as well as that of the PCRA court in Appellant’s post-conviction case, has facial appeal.
Nevertheless, there is also a fuller context to be considered regarding Elzey’s and Sofi’s statements themselves. In this regard, in describing the PCRA court’s role in post-conviction matters, this Court has emphasized the importance of reasoned assessments of credibility and developed reasoning. *483See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 233, 732 A.2d 1167, 1181 (1999) (directing a post-conviction court to “render its own, independent findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning [witness] credibility and the impact, if any, upon the truth-determining process which can be discerned from such testimony.”); Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 293-94, 744 A.2d 717, 737-38 (2000) (highlighting the importance of credibility findings on the part of a PCRA court). What is striking, to me, from a review of the PCRA court’s opinion (and the trial court’s opinion in Frey) is the absence of any express evaluation of credibility on the part of Elzey and Sofi. While ordinarily the Court should defer to the fact-finder in terms of credibility matters, where, as here, it does not appear that any probing evaluation was made, less deference is due. Moreover, this Court has clarified that the appellate review of ineffectiveness matters is ultimately de novo. See Commonwealth v. Rios, 591 Pa. 583, 618, 920 A.2d 790, 810 (2007).
There are multiple circumstances strongly suggesting untrustworthiness on the parts of Elzey and Sofi. First, their various statements are internally and externally inconsistent. For example, Elzey gave a tape-recorded statement in May 1995 containing significant detail. This included assertions that Lawrence Tucker repeatedly bragged that he and his brother had killed a girl, and that his brother committed suicide soon thereafter due to his feelings of guilt. See N.T., July 28, 2004, Exhibit D-3, at 2-3, 12. When he testified at Frey’s post-conviction hearing, however, Elzey omitted this significant sequence of events in its entirety. See N.T., October 10, 2000 (Frey), at 11 (“All I know is that [Tucker] said that he wasn’t selling any drugs, because the police were questioning him [about a homicide].”).4 In Soil’s tape-record*484ed statement and his testimony at the Frey post-conviction hearing, he indicated the conversation encompassing Lawrence Tucker’s admission occurred somewhere between York and Hanover, see id. at 21; N.T., July 28, 2004, Exhibit D-2, at 4, but Elzey told police and testified it took place in the Littlestown area, see N.T., July 28, 2004, Exhibit D-3, at 6; N.T., Frey at 13.5 Moreover, the remote location of the Cheryl Smith killing near the Maryland border is also far outside any direct route between York, Hanover, and/or Littlestown. Sofi testified at Appellant’s post-conviction hearing that the conversation took place while riding “back home” from drinking, see N.T., July 26, 2004, at 14, but he had indicated in his tape-recorded statements that it occurred while the group was traveling toward a bar in Hanover. See N.T., July 28, 2004, at Exhibit D-2, at 4. Sofi indicated in his tape-recorded statement that he could not remember whether Tucker said the trio was near the location of the killing when he made his incriminating remark, see id. at 5 (“But I can’t remember if he said here, or if he just was stating that, I iced this chick.”), but at the Frey and Small post-conviction hearings Sofi said Tucker indicated that the trio was near the location of the killing. See N.T., July 26, 2004, at 14 (“[Tucker] said this is where I iced this chick.”); N.T., October 10, 2000 (Frey), at 21 (same). Additionally, at the time of his tape-recorded statement Elzey was incarcerated, and he unabashedly sought to negotiate his release from prison. See D-3, at 18 (“I don’t have a problem with testifying but I would want to be out of the prison environment before I would agree to do that[.]”). Sofi’s criminal history at the time of his taped interview is unknown, but he was in a drug and alcohol rehabilitation center at the time of his testimony in the Frey post-conviction matter, see N.T., October 10, 2000, at 20, and was a state prisoner at the time of his post-conviction testimony in the present case. See N.T., July 26, 2004, at 20.
Although, again, I believe matters of credibility are best left to the post-conviction courts, recent decisions of this Court suggest that the appellate courts may resolve those matters in *485cases where the lack of credibility seems facially apparent. See, e.g., Gibson, 597 Pa. at 450 n. 20, 951 A.2d at 1139 n. 20 (explaining that “a majority of the Court has sanctioned the dismissal of claims which might involve credibility in light of implausibility and based on conclusions drawn from the existing record.” (citing Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 556-57, 913 A.2d 220, 251-52 (2006), and Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119, 154-57, 855 A.2d 726, 748 (2004))). Thus, although one approach would be to remand to the PCRA court to conduct an express credibility assessment in light of the above discrepancies,61 am satisfied that, under prevailing law, the substantial inconsistencies in Elzey’s and Soil’s statements, coupled with other credibility impairments including their motivations, would have substantially diminished any potential impact of their testimony at Appellant’s trial. For these reasons, I ultimately concur in the majority’s finding of a lack of sufficient prejudice.
My approach to various other of Appellant’s claims is also distinct from that of the majority. On the issue of marital privilege (Issue 1(B)), while I support the majority’s analysis solely in light of the testimony of Appellant’s admissions in the presence of Junior Carper, see Majority Opinion, at 446-47, 980 A.2d at 562,7 1 differ with its discrete analysis concerning the private conversation between Appellant and his wife. See id. at 446-47, 980 A.2d at 562. In my view, the circumstances of that conversation, viewed independently, would appear to support the PCRA court’s finding of a confidential nature.8 I *486find Issue 11(A), involving trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness for failing to impeach Tucker with his crimen falsi convictions, see Majority Opinion, at 451-53, 980 A.2d at 565-66, to present a closer question than the majority portrays.9 I have previously set forth my position, connected with Issue II(L), regarding the correct application of Commonwealth v. Lassiter, 554 Pa. 586, 722 A.2d 657 (1998), in cases preceding the issuance of such decision. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 581 Pa. 57, 93 n. 4, 863 A.2d 505, 526-27 n. 4 (2004) (Saylor, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe that there is any *487retroactivity concern regarding Lassiter, since it merely represents a plain-text reading of a substantive provision of statutory law that was in place at the time of [the ajppellant’s trial.”). I am aligned with the majority’s discussion concerning Appellant’s waiver of mitigation (Issue II(I)) based upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 477, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 1942, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007), and the majority decisions of this Court in Commonwealth v. Michael, 562 Pa. 356, 367-68, 755 A.2d 1274, 1280 (2000), and Commonwealth v. Marinetti, 570 Pa. 622, 654-56, 810 A.2d 1257, 1275-76 (2002). On this point, I note only that I previously held a different view as reflected in my responsive opinions in Michael and Marinetti.

. Some of the witnesses had gone so far as to fabricate diversionary tales implicating others in the killing. See, e.g., N.T., May 16, 1996, at 293, 325-26 (testimony of Mary Trish Knight); id. at 359, 380 (testimony of Michelle Starling).

. The majority adds some commentary critical of second-guessing strategy after a trial is over. See Majority Opinion, at 442-43, 980 A.2d at 559-60. The commentaiy seems somewhat inapt to the present circumstances, since no reasonable strategy was offered for failing to call Sofi and Elzey; indeed, trial counsel testified it was their intent to present these witnesses but they failed to do so. See N.T., July 21, 2004, at 92, 95, 98, 100-01. Moreover, the majority’s holding is not predicated upon a reasonable strategy inquiry; rather, the disposition *482rests solely on a prejudice assessment. See Majority Opinion, at 443, 980 A.2d at 560.

. In this testimony, Tucker obviously shifted direct responsibility for the killing to Appellant and Frey. See, e.g., N.T., May 17, 1996, at 647.

. Elzey did testify to a later statement by Tucker (after the time of his tape-recorded statement) in which Tucker accused him of “snitching” and indicated, "We’ll let bygones be bygones, because I got off from it anyway, and the other guys got shafted.” N.T., October 20, 2000 (Frey), at 15. The Frey PCRA court, however, determined that the latter statement was not relevant, presumably because it was not information available at the time of Appellant’s trial, and struck it from the record. See id.

. Littlestown is not between York and Hanover, but rather, is well beyond such route.

. Such an approach would highlight the obligation of the PCRA courts to undertake a more developed assessment in the first instance. While I am very cognizant of the PCRA courts' limited resources, those courts are charged with accomplishing an essential function in capital post-conviction matters which cannot be duplicated at the appellate level. Thus, their full and appropriate review is required to assure compliance of death sentences with prevailing constitutional norms.

. As the majority notes, the Commonwealth conceded the conversations in the presence of Charles Smith concerned a different event. See Majority Opinion, at 447 n.5, 980 A.2d at 562 n.5. Thus, the majority’s conclusion that evidence of those conversations is cumulative of the evidence of Appellant’s admission to his then-wife, see Majority Opinion, at 446-47, 980 A.2d at 562, is inapt.

. In this regard, it seems to me remarks between spouses about incriminating matters made in a private settling suggest confidentiality. *486Indeed, this Court had previously applied a presumption of confidentiality to private marital communications, consistent with the approach of a number of other jurisdictions. See Commonwealth v. Hancharik, 534 Pa. 435, 442, 633 A.2d 1074, 1078 (1993) ("Communications between husbands and wives are presumed to be confidential, and the party opposing application of the rule disqualifying such testimony bears the burden of overcoming this presumption.”); accord 3 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 11:44 (15th ed. 2008) (“A communication between a married couple is presumed to be confidential ... unless evidence exists to the contrary.”). The evidence of Appellant's admission in the presence of Junior Carper, however, tends to undermine the conclusion that the information was intended to remain in confidence between Appellant and his wife.

. In crediting this claim in Frey’s post-conviction proceeding, the PCRA judge, who was the trial judge, indicated as follows:
One of the most effective ways to impeach a witness's credibility is by bringing to the jury’s attention that witness’s inability to testify truthfully, by questioning the witness about his prior convictions. Trial counsel did try to impeach Tucker by implying that he had a self-serving motive for testifying and by showing that Tucker had a decreased ability to remember because of his use of alcohol and drugs on the night of the crime. However, because of Tucker’s pivotal role in this case as the only witness who placed [codefendant Frey] at the scene of the crime and because the only evidence that the Commonwealth had in this case was circumstantial evidence offered through the testimony of witnesses, trial counsel's failure to properly impeach Tucker without a reasonable basis for this omission prejudiced [Frey’s] case and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Frey, No. 2819 CA 1995, slip op. at 17-18. Again, I would acknowledge the facial appeal of this reasoning, albeit I ultimately agree with the majority that the record evidence of Tucker's admitted dishonesty, as well as his disclosed motivation to secure favorable treatment relative to the Cheryl Smith murder, served similar purposes at trial. I also agree the Commonwealth’s case against Appellant was stronger than the prosecution against Frey, given the more consistent testimony of fact witnesses concerning Appellant's presence at the scene of the killing.