Court Opinion

ID: 9407919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-10 20:00:53.558214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:40.870742
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-10994    Document: 163-1     Date Filed: 07/10/2023   Page: 1 of 22

                                                             [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-10994
                           ____________________

        JOHN D. CARSON,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        MONSANTO COMPANY,

                                                    Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cv-00237-RSB-CLR
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 21-10994        Document: 163-1         Date Filed: 07/10/2023         Page: 2 of 22

        2                         Opinion of the Court                       21-10994

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and WILSON, JORDAN,
        ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, BRANCH, GRANT, LUCK, LAGOA, BRASHER,
        ABUDU, and TJOFLAT, ∗ Circuit Judges.
        WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court,
        in which JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, BRANCH, GRANT, LUCK,
        LAGOA, BRASHER, ABUDU, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges, join.
        JORDAN, Circuit Judge, ﬁled a concurring opinion.
        WILSON, Circuit Judge, ﬁled a dissenting opinion.
        WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
               This appeal presents the question whether, under an express-
        preemption provision, a federal agency action that otherwise lacks
        the force of law preempts the requirements of state law. John Car-
        son developed cancer after decades of using the popular weedkiller
        Roundup. He sued its manufacturer, Monsanto Company, for fail-
        ing to warn him that the product can increase users’ cancer risks.
        The district court ruled that a provision of the Federal Insecticide,
        Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), expressly
        preempts some of Carson’s claims under Georgia law because the
        Environmental Protection Agency had approved a label for
        Roundup that lacked a cancer warning and the Agency classiﬁes
        Roundup’s main ingredient—glyphosate—as “not likely to be car-
        cinogenic.” Carson argues that his suit is not preempted because
        the relevant agency actions did not have the force of law, which he

        ∗ Senior Circuit Judge Tjoflat elected to participate in this decision, pursuant
        to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). Judge Jill Pryor is recused.
USCA11 Case: 21-10994     Document: 163-1      Date Filed: 07/10/2023     Page: 3 of 22

        21-10994               Opinion of the Court                         3

        characterizes as a prerequisite for express preemption. After a panel
        of this Court reversed the district court, we granted rehearing en
        banc to address whether a “force-of-law” analysis is relevant in this
        context. We conclude that this question must be answered by re-
        course to ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, and we
        remand this appeal to the panel to decide whether Carson’s suit is
        preempted.
                                I. BACKGROUND
                John Carson used Roundup on his lawn for thirty years until
        2016, when he was diagnosed with malignant ﬁbrous histiocytoma,
        a form of cancer. He sued Monsanto, Roundup’s manufacturer, in
        the district court. He alleged that Monsanto knew or should have
        known that Roundup was carcinogenic but did not warn users of
        that danger. See Greenway v. Peabody Int’l Corp., 294 S.E.2d 541, 545–
        46 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (establishing that a manufacturer must “ex-
        ercise reasonable care to inform [buyers] of its [product’s] danger-
        ous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous”
        (citation omitted)).
               Monsanto moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the
        ground that a provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
        Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), expressly preempted Carson’s
        suit and, in the alternative, that the suit was impliedly preempted
        by the Environmental Protection Agency’s previous approval of
        Roundup’s labeling and continued adherence to the reasoning for
        that decision. The Act expressly preempts a state-law pesticide rule,
        including a common-law cause of action, if it is a “requirement[]
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                   21-10994

        for labeling or packaging in addition to or diﬀerent from those re-
        quired under” the Act. Id.; see Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S.
        431, 443–44 (2005). Monsanto argued that because the Environ-
        mental Protection Agency, which administers the Act, had declined
        to require a cancer warning when it registered and continued to
        approve Roundup for sale, see 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a), a Georgia-law re-
        quirement of a cancer label would be “in addition to or diﬀerent
        from” what the Act required.
                The district court agreed with Monsanto and granted judg-
        ment on the pleadings in Monsanto’s favor insofar as Carson’s suit
        relied on the lack of a cancer warning in Roundup’s label. Carson v.
        Monsanto Co., 508 F. Supp. 3d 1369 (S.D. Ga. 2020). The district
        court assumed in Carson’s favor that Monsanto failed to perform
        its duty under Georgia law “to provide adequate warnings or other
        clinically relevant information and data regarding . . . the [cancer]
        risks associated with” Roundup. Id. at 1376. But it ruled that this
        state-law requirement was expressly preempted because the Geor-
        gia requirement “would be in direct conﬂict with the EPA’s ap-
        proved label because the EPA classiﬁes [Roundup’s active ingredi-
        ent,] glyphosate[,] as ‘not likely to be carcinogenic to humans’ and
        considers glyphosate products with cancer warnings to be ‘mis-
        branded.’” Id. The parties reached a partial settlement, and Carson
        amended his complaint to abandon the claims that were not dis-
        missed.
               A panel of this Court reversed. Carson v. Monsanto Co., 51
        F.4th 1358 (11th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, op. vacated, No. 21-10994,
USCA11 Case: 21-10994      Document: 163-1      Date Filed: 07/10/2023     Page: 5 of 22

        21-10994               Opinion of the Court                          5

        2022 WL 17813843 (11th Cir. Dec. 19, 2022). It determined that
        Georgia’s common-law standard for product-safety warnings was
        less demanding than the federal prohibition against marketing
        “misbranded” pesticides. Id. at 1363 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(1)(G);
        Greenway, 294 S.E.2d at 545–46). And it held that the Agency’s ap-
        proval of Roundup labels without a cancer warning, even in the
        light of the Agency’s internal scientiﬁc conclusions about
        Roundup’s active ingredient, did not preempt the Georgia cause of
        action. Id. at 1363–65. The panel explained that because “only fed-
        eral action with the force of law has the capacity to preempt state
        law[,] . . . any preemption analysis of agency action in the [Federal
        Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act] context beyond the
        statute itself ﬁrst requires us to do a Mead analysis.” Id. at 1362. By
        “Mead analysis,” the panel referred to the question whether “the
        agency [is] able to speak with the force of law when it addresses
        ambiguity in the statute [it administers] or ﬁlls a space in the en-
        acted law.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). Be-
        cause “the EPA registration process” does not have the force of law
        under the Mead framework, the panel reasoned, the result of that
        process could not preempt Carson’s suit. Carson, 51 F.4th at 1363–
        64. The panel also rejected Monsanto’s implied-preemption theory.
        Id. at 1364 n.11.
               We granted Monsanto’s petition for rehearing en banc and
        vacated the panel opinion. Carson, 2022 WL 17813843. We in-
        structed the parties to address two questions about how a “force-
        of-law” analysis applies:
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   21-10994

               1. Can an express-preemption provision like § 136v(b)
               give preemptive eﬀect to a federal agency action that
               otherwise lacks the “force of law”? Or must a review-
               ing court determine, as a threshold matter, whether
               federal agency action has the “force of law”?
               2. How should a reviewing court identify the federal
               “requirements . . . under this subchapter” to which
               § 136v(b) refers, and what role, if any, does a “force of
               law” analysis play in that determination?
                                 II. JURISDICTION
               Although the parties do not dispute our jurisdiction, we have
        an “independent obligation to ensure that subject-matter jurisdic-
        tion exists before reaching the merits of a dispute.” Jacobson v. Fla.
        Sec’y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1245 (11th Cir. 2020). We have statu-
        tory jurisdiction because the combination of the judgment on the
        pleadings and Carson’s amendment of his complaint to remove the
        unresolved claims left nothing for the district court to adjudicate.
        See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We also have jurisdiction under Article III of
        the Constitution despite the parties’ contingent settlement agree-
        ment because this appeal is still a live controversy in which both
        parties assert adverse legal positions and have a ﬁnancial stake in
        prevailing on appeal. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
        370–71 (1982); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 318, 324–25 (2d
        Cir. 2018); Keefe v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 222,
        224 (3d Cir. 2000); Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346,
        357 n.11 (5th Cir. 2007); United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co., 302
USCA11 Case: 21-10994      Document: 163-1       Date Filed: 07/10/2023      Page: 7 of 22

        21-10994                Opinion of the Court                           7

        F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2002); John Doe 1 v. Abbott Lab’ys, 571 F.3d 930,
        932–33 (9th Cir. 2009).
               Our dissenting colleague contends that this appeal should
        be dismissed as collusive because it lacks the “honest and actual an-
        tagonistic assertion of rights,” United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302,
        305 (1943) (citation omitted), necessary for a justiciable “Case” or
        “Controversy,” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See Dissenting Op. at 1. But
        we respectfully disagree. The stark contrast between this appeal
        and the collusive lawsuit in United States v. Johnson proves the point.
                United States v. Johnson was a no-lose proposition for a plain-
        tiﬀ, Roach, who had only a nominal role in the litigation. Roach
        used a fake name to ﬁle suit under a wartime price-control statute
        against his landlord, Johnson, at Johnson’s request. Johnson, 319 U.S.
        at 303–04. Johnson paid all of Roach’s costs. Id. “[T]he plaintiﬀ did
        not employ, pay, or even meet, the attorney who appeared of rec-
        ord in his behalf . . . .” Id. at 304. He did not even read the com-
        plaint ﬁled in his name. Id. Instead, the suit was ﬁled at Johnson’s
        instruction and maintained under his full control because he
        wanted a federal court to declare the price-control statute uncon-
        stitutional. Id. at 302–04. The Supreme Court condemned that
        abuse of the courts and required that the suit be dismissed after the
        United States intervened and presented undisputed evidence of the
        collusive nature of the suit. Id. at 304–05.
               In contrast, both parties have a real interest in the legal posi-
        tions they advance in this appeal, and nothing in the record estab-
        lishes that Monsanto controls Carson or his representation. The
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   21-10994

        district court rejected two of Carson’s claims seeking compensa-
        tion for a serious illness that he alleges Monsanto caused. He would
        have reason to appeal that judgment absent any settlement agree-
        ment. To be sure, Monsanto paid him to abandon his other claims
        and to appeal the judgment against him, but if he wins, he receives
        a larger payout than if he loses, which means that he has a stake in
        this appeal. And unlike Roach, Carson has zealously asserted his
        rights before this Court, and there is no suggestion that Monsanto
        selected or controls his counsel.
                For its part, Monsanto’s encouragement of the appeal—pos-
        sibly to create a circuit split—does not deprive us of jurisdiction. In
        the settlement, Monsanto secured the abandonment of several of
        Carson’s potentially valuable claims. And Monsanto has an interest
        in winning on appeal: it seeks the dismissal of the remaining claim
        against it and is liable for a smaller settlement payment if it prevails.
        If it loses the appeal, Monsanto will pay Carson more (and, inci-
        dentally, no circuit split will occur). Because this appeal is not col-
        lusive, we must fulﬁll our “virtually unﬂagging” “obligation to hear
        and decide cases within [our] jurisdiction.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
        Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014) (citation and
        internal quotation marks omitted).
                           III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
                “We review a judgment on the pleadings de novo.” Cannon v.
        City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). “Judg-
        ment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are no material
        facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
USCA11 Case: 21-10994      Document: 163-1        Date Filed: 07/10/2023      Page: 9 of 22

        21-10994                Opinion of the Court                            9

        matter of law.” Id. We accept the factual allegations in the com-
        plaint as true. Id.
                                  IV. DISCUSSION
                “Express preemption arises when the text of a federal statute
        explicitly manifests Congress’s intent to displace state law.” MSP Re-
        covery Claims, Series LLC v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 60 F.4th 1314, 1321
        (11th Cir. 2023) (alterations adopted) (citation omitted); see U.S.
        CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the
        United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof[,] . . . shall
        be the supreme Law of the Land[,] . . . any Thing in the Constitu-
        tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). Ex-
        press preemption turns primarily on “the language of the pre-emp-
        tion statute and the statutory framework surrounding it.” Med-
        tronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996) (citation and internal quo-
        tation marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds by Puerto
        Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 579 U.S. 115 (2016). Where Con-
        gress has enacted an express-preemption provision, we identify the
        state law that it preempts according to ordinary principles of statu-
        tory interpretation, and no presumption against preemption ap-
        plies. See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 579 U.S. at 125.
                 Under the Act, a “State shall not impose or continue in eﬀect
        any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or diﬀer-
        ent from those required under” the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). So if a
        state-law rule is a requirement for labeling or packaging a pesticide,
        it is preempted unless “fully consistent,” Bates, 544 U.S. at 452, with
        the “requirements for labeling or packaging . . . required under”
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         10                     Opinion of the Court                  21-10994

         the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). The parties agree that Carson’s suit re-
         lies on a Georgia “requirement[] for labeling or packaging.” See
         Bates, 544 U.S. at 443 (holding that a common-law duty can consti-
         tute a “requirement[]” of state law displaced by section 136v(b)).
                 The remaining question is whether Carson’s suit depends on
         a state-law rule that is “in addition to or diﬀerent from” the “re-
         quirements . . . required under” the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). The
         parties dispute whether the Agency’s decision to register Roundup
         as an approved pesticide without a cancer warning, along with the
         Agency’s repeated scientiﬁc conclusions about its active ingredient,
         glyphosate, establish that the “requirements . . . required under”
         the Act do not include a warning about Roundup’s cancer risks.
         This question must be answered by recourse to the ordinary prin-
         ciples of statutory interpretation. See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 579
         U.S. at 125.
                Whether the Agency has acted with the force of law with
         respect to Roundup’s lack of a cancer warning is relevant to express
         preemption only if the speciﬁc “language of [section 136v(b)] and
         the statutory framework surrounding it” require that inquiry. See
         Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486 (citation and internal quotation marks
         omitted). A “force-of-law” inquiry assesses whether an agency ac-
         tion falls within the scope of the agency’s “congressionally dele-
         gated authority.” Cf. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S.
         Ct. 1668, 1679 (2019). That inquiry is usually irrelevant where Con-
         gress has enacted an express-preemption provision, which
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         21-10994                Opinion of the Court                         11

         necessarily has the force of law as a “Law[] of the United States . . .
         made in Pursuance” of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
         2.
                  Carson’s argument that the Supremacy Clause of the Con-
         stitution, id., mandates a force-of-law analysis when interpreting
         any express-preemption provision relies on inapposite implied-
         preemption decisions. In the case of implied preemption, a force-
         of-law inquiry is necessary to establish whether “it would have been
         impossible for [the defendant] to comply with the state-law duty
         . . . without violating federal law.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 563
         (2009). A conﬂict between a state-law rule that has the force of law
         and a federal agency rule that does not have the force of law is not
         the type of conﬂict between state and federal legal obligations that
         the Supremacy Clause addresses. But this reasoning does not ex-
         tend to express-preemption cases, where, as we have explained, the
         meaning of the express-preemption provision—not conﬂicting fed-
         eral and state legal obligations—triggers preemption.
                Within the limits of its enumerated constitutional powers,
         see U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8–9, Congress may deﬁne the body of law
         that an express provision preempts. Our role when confronted
         with an express-preemption provision is to apply the text that em-
         bodies Congress’s decision. And we leave for the panel’s considera-
         tion Carson’s argument that section 136v(b)’s reference to “require-
         ments” compels a force-of-law inquiry as a matter of statutory in-
         terpretation. We express no opinion on the answer to that ques-
         tion.
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         12                   Opinion of the Court             21-10994

                               V. CONCLUSION
                We REMAND this appeal to the panel for the resolution of
         all remaining issues.
USCA11 Case: 21-10994      Document: 163-1      Date Filed: 07/10/2023     Page: 13 of 22

         21-10994               JORDAN, J., Concurring                       1

         JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
                I join the Court’s opinion, but write separately with some
         additional thoughts as to why this appeal presents a proper “case
         or controversy” within the meaning of Article III.
                 After the district court dismissed Mr. Carson’s failure-to-
         warn claim on federal preemption grounds, the parties entered into
         a settlement agreement that set up, and provided the contours of,
         Mr. Carson’s appeal. For the sum of $100,000, Mr. Carson would
         dismiss his other claims with prejudice and institute an appeal of
         the district court’s preemption ruling (and only the preemption rul-
         ing). If he lost the appeal, he could keep the $100,000. But if he
         won the appeal, Monsanto would pay him an additional sum—
         more than double the original amount—as a ﬁnal resolution of the
         failure-to-warn claim. If Mr. Carson did not pursue his appeal, he
         would have to pay Monsanto back $99,900.
                In some ways, the parties’ settlement is similar to the typical
         “high-low” agreement seen in civil cases at the trial court level—
         before the jury has reached a verdict, the parties agree that if the
         plaintiﬀ loses, the defendant will nevertheless pay him or her a cer-
         tain minimum amount (the “low” ﬂoor), and if the plaintiﬀ wins,
         the payment will be capped at a higher maximum amount no mat-
         ter how large the verdict is (the “high” ceiling). See generally J.J.
         Prescott, Kathryn E. Spier, & Albert Yoon, Trial and Settlement: A
         Study of High-Low Agreements, 57 J. L. & Econ. 699, 700 (2014) (“A
         high-low agreement is a contract in which a defendant agrees to
         pay the plaintiﬀ a minimum recovery in return for the plaintiﬀ’s
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         2                     JORDAN, J., Concurring                21-10994

         agreement to accept a maximum amount regardless of the out-
         come of the trial.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
         ted). If Mr. Carson loses the preemption ﬁght on appeal, he re-
         ceives $100,000. If he wins, he gets substantially more.
                Under Supreme Court precedent, the agreement between
         Mr. Carson and Monsanto does not make the appeal moot. The
         agreement generally liquidates the damages sought by Mr. Carson
         depending on the outcome of the appeal but does not resolve the
         parties’ legal dispute about preemption. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
         U.S. 731, 743–44 (1982); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
         370–71 (1982).
                 The agreement is, however, a bit peculiar. As noted, it basi-
         cally forces Mr. Carson to ﬁle and pursue an appeal of the preemp-
         tion ruling in order to receive the $100,000. And it prevents him
         from appealing any other issues. It seems to me that Monsanto—
         the prevailing party below—is the “driving force” behind the appeal
         in an eﬀort to create a circuit split on the matter of preemption. I
         can therefore see why Judge Wilson is concerned. Cf. James E.
         Pfander & David R. Pekarek Krohn, Interlocutory Review by Agree-
         ment of the Parties: A Preliminary Analysis, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1043,
         1085 (2011) (“In cases in which the parties enter into settlement
         agreements, conditionally resolving their dispute subject to the ap-
         pellate court’s resolution of an outstanding issue, justiciability is-
         sues might appear especially acute.”). Nevertheless, I conclude that
         there is no “case or controversy” problem under Article III.
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         21-10994               JORDAN, J., Concurring                        3

                 First, it seems to me that there is “an actual controversy,”
         and that there remain “adverse interests.” Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251,
         255 (1850). Mr. Carson has always maintained that his failure-to-
         warn claim is not preempted. In the normal course of events, one
         would expect a personal-injury plaintiﬀ in his position to appeal if
         his state-law tort claim was dismissed on federal preemption
         grounds. So the agreement’s requirement that Mr. Carson appeal
         in order to secure the $100,000, while admittedly odd, is not con-
         stitutionally problematic. Things would be diﬀerent if Monsanto
         tried to control (or limit) the precise legal theories or arguments
         that Mr. Carson could present on appeal regarding preemption. See
         Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer, & David
         L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Fed-
         eral System 96 (7th ed. 2015) (“In principle it is easy to see why an
         important constitutional issue should not be determined in a pro-
         ceeding in which one nominal party has dominated the conduct of
         the other.”). But that is not what is going on here. And although
         the Supreme Court “has not spoken expansively on what makes
         parties legally adverse,” William K. Kelley, The Constitutional Di-
         lemma of Litigation Under the Independent Counsel System, 83 Minn. L.
         Rev. 1197, 1212 (1999), I think there is suﬃcient adversity. Mr. Car-
         son maintains that he suﬀered harm due to Monsanto’s conduct
         and continues to seek damages for his alleged injuries—damages
         which will increase if he is successful on appeal. Monsanto, for its
         part, seeks to defend the victory it secured in the district court on
         the failure-to-warn claim, and wants to limit its ultimate exposure
         to Mr. Carson.
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         4                      JORDAN, J., Concurring                  21-10994

                 Second, to the extent that the settlement agreement consti-
         tutes Monsanto’s strategy for trying to create a circuit split, that is
         also not fatal under Article III. Individual, institutional, and corpo-
         rate litigants sometimes engage in certain conduct in order to tee
         up test cases on novel questions of law. As long as Article III justi-
         ciability concerns are satisﬁed, the federal courts have the authority
         to decide such test cases. See, e.g., Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 204
         (1958) (allowing challenge to state laws requiring segregated seat-
         ing on public buses: “That the appellant may have boarded this par-
         ticular bus for the purpose of instituting this litigation is not signif-
         icant.”); Ralph C. Chandler, Richard A. Enslen, & Peter G.
         Renstrom, Constitutional Law Deskbook § 8:106 (Aug. 2022 up-
         date) (“Test cases have often been used to raise certain issues and
         satisfy the demands of the standing requirement.”).
                 Third, some of our sister circuits have adjudicated appeals
         involving similar settlement agreements without ﬁnding any Arti-
         cle III problems. See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 322,
         324–25 (2d Cir. 2018); John Doe I v. Abbot Laboratories, 571 F.3d 930,
         932–33 (9th Cir. 2009); Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d
         346, 357 n.11 (5th Cir. 2007); Keefe v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
         203 F.3d 218, 200, 222–24 (3d Cir. 2000). Their decisions make sense
         to me, and I ﬁnd them persuasive. “As long as the parties have an
         adequate ﬁnancial incentive to pursue their opposing views of the
         issue on appeal, continued litigation at the appellate court level
         does not appear to threaten the requirement of adversary presen-
         tation.” Pfander & Krohn, Interlocutory Review by Agreement of the
         Parties, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1088.
USCA11 Case: 21-10994         Document: 163-1          Date Filed: 07/10/2023         Page: 17 of 22

         21-10994                   WILSON, J., Dissenting                               1

         WILSON, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:
                 The majority provides a thorough and well-reasoned analy-
         sis of the force-of-law issues in this appeal. However, I believe that
         the parties’ settlement agreement abuses this court’s process, so
         this appeal should be dismissed as non-justiciable. The Monsanto
         Company, which prevailed below, paid $100,000 to Carson, not to
         resolve this litigation, but to ensure it reached our court. 1 The
         agreement required—not merely permitted—Carson to file a notice
         of appeal challenging the district court’s preemption decision. It
         required—not merely permitted—Carson to fully prosecute this ap-
         peal or face forfeiture of nearly the entire $100,000 payment. This
         agreement usurped Carson’s role as master of his own appeal and
         placed the course of this litigation “under the domination of” Mon-
         santo, depriving it of an “‘honest and actual antagonistic assertion
         of rights’ to be adjudicated.” United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302,
         305 (1943). Because this case lacks the “indispensable” adversarial
         character necessary for our jurisdiction, it is our duty to dismiss this
         appeal. Id. Since we do not, I respectfully dissent.
                This court’s power under the Constitution is limited to ac-
         tual cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see Arizonans for
         Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997). And we are obligated to
         ensure that the case or controversy remains “extant at all stages of
         review.” Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 67; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena,

         1 The parties were granted leave to file their settlement agreement under seal
         in this court. Because it remains under seal, I reference only the publicly avail-
         able facts regarding it.
USCA11 Case: 21-10994        Document: 163-1         Date Filed: 07/10/2023       Page: 18 of 22

         2                         WILSON, J., Dissenting                   21-10994

         FGJ-21-01-MIA, 58 F.4th 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2023) (“We are obli-
         gated to review our appellate jurisdiction sua sponte ‘whenever ju-
         risdiction may be lacking.’”). In addition to traditional standing and
         mootness concerns, we must be watchful of “friendly,” “feigned,”
         and “collusive” lawsuits that lack the necessary adversarial charac-
         ter. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968).
                Recall that the district court entered judgment on the plead-
         ings against Carson on his failure-to-warn theory, holding that it
         was preempted by 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), but did not rule on Carson’s
         design defect and negligence theories. At that point, Monsanto and
         Carson entered—what they describe as—a “high-low” settlement
         agreement. The public details of the agreement consist of the fol-
         lowing: (1) Carson filed a consent motion to amend his complaint,
         removing the design defect and negligence theories and leaving
         only the failure-to-warn theory; (2) Carson promised to file a notice
         of appeal regarding the failure-to-warn theory and to fully pursue
         that appeal in this court; (3) In return, Monsanto paid Carson
         $100,000 up-front and promised him a significant—but confiden-
         tial—additional sum if Carson obtains a favorable ruling in this ap-
         peal; and (4) If Carson elects to dismiss this appeal or otherwise fails
         to fully prosecute it, he must pay $99,900 of the $100,000 back to
         Monsanto. 2

         2 The $100 discrepancy is because the agreement allocates $100 of the $100,000

         as consideration for the confidentiality of the agreement.
USCA11 Case: 21-10994      Document: 163-1      Date Filed: 07/10/2023      Page: 19 of 22

         21-10994               WILSON, J., Dissenting                        3

                 Agreements such as this raise troubling questions about
         both the adversariness of the parties and whether the judiciary can
         provide meaningful relief to the parties after their agreement to
         settle. Despite Monsanto’s arguments, this agreement is unlike the
         so-called “high-low” arrangements the Supreme Court approved in
         Havens Realty Corporation v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) and Nixon
         v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). In Havens, the parties agreed after
         the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, but before the Supreme
         Court granted certiorari, that the respondents-plaintiffs would re-
         ceive $400 if they prevailed before the Supreme Court and $0 if
         they did not. Havens, 455 U.S. at 370–71. The Court held the case
         was not moot because the settlement agreement was contingent
         on the final approval of the district court, and because it “would
         merely liquidate [petitioners’] damages.” Id. at 371. In Nixon, the
         petitioner paid the respondent $142,000 and promised a further
         $28,000 if respondent was successful on appeal. Nixon, 457 U.S. at
         743–44. Similar to Havens, the agreement was entered into after
         the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but before the Supreme
         Court granted certiorari. Id. And again, it was the petitioner—the
         losing party below—who promised to pay more money if the op-
         posing party prevailed on appeal, in effect liquidating their dam-
         ages. Id. at 744.
                Here, Monsanto—the prevailing party below—is the one
         paying for this appeal. It is Monsanto who is driving this appeal
         forward. Rather than an honest attempt to liquidate damages and
         avoid the uncertainty of further litigation, this arrangement seeks
         to create it. This agreement appears to be nothing more than an
USCA11 Case: 21-10994         Document: 163-1         Date Filed: 07/10/2023         Page: 20 of 22

         4                         WILSON, J., Dissenting                      21-10994

         attempt by Monsanto to seek a favorable appellate decision in con-
         flict with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hardeman v. Monsanto Com-
         pany, 997 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn
         claims not preempted by 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)). 3
                  Further, this agreement is unlike the agreements described
         in the decisions collected in Judge Jordan’s concurrence. Jordan
         Concurring Op. at 4. None of those cases involved a situation
         where the prevailing party paid the losing party to file the appeal
         and fully prosecute it. See Linde v. Arab Bank PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 322
         (2d Cir. 2018) (noting appeal brought by defendant after losing at
         trial); John Doe 1 v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2009)
         (noting appeal brought by defendant after losing motion to dis-
         miss); Keefe v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 222 (3d
         Cir. 2000) (noting appeal brought by defendant after losing partial
         summary judgment); Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d

         3 See Oral Argument at 14:40–14:58, Carson v. Monsanto Co., No. 21-10994 (June

         13, 2023) (en banc), https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-record-
         ings.
                 Judge Wilson: “Why would Monsanto pay you, your client, $100,000
                 in exchange for filing the appeal and then give you more money if you
                 win, if for any reason other than to create a circuit split?”
                 Counsel for Carson: “I cannot think of a reason.”
         Monsanto’s parent company, Bayer AG, has stated its intention of seeking a
         circuit split to facilitate Supreme Court review of the preemption issues in this
         case.     See Five-Point Plan to Close the Roundup™ Litigation, BAYER,
         https://www.bayer.com/en/roundup-litigation-five-point-plan
         [https://perma.cc/6YT2-DSNU] (archived on June 15, 2023).
USCA11 Case: 21-10994      Document: 163-1      Date Filed: 07/10/2023      Page: 21 of 22

         21-10994               WILSON, J., Dissenting                        5

         346, 350 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting appeal brought by both parties un-
         der 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) certification procedure after defendant’s mo-
         tion to dismiss was denied). I would agree that an honest attempt
         to liquidate damages in an agreement that “represent[s] the parties’
         efforts reasonably to estimate the plaintiffs’ ability ultimately to
         procure the ‘relief upon which the suit was originally premised,’”
         Linde, 882 F.3d at 325, is valid under the Supreme Court’s prece-
         dents. But respectfully, I think the particular terms of this agree-
         ment do not meet that standard.
                 Finally, the promised payment contingent on the outcome
         of this appeal does not solve the problem. Cf. Moore v. Harper, 600
         U.S. ---, ---; No. 21-1271 (2023) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (slip op. at
         16) (“But as should be obvious, such a trigger provision cannot be
         the entire basis of an Article III case or controversy.”). Carson’s
         claims in this case were resolved by the settlement agreement be-
         fore this appeal was filed. He was paid to drop two of his claims,
         and even if he prevails on this appeal, the parties have already
         agreed to dismiss his failure-to-warn claims on remand. This liti-
         gation continues before this court only due to the friendly and col-
         lusive nature of the settlement agreement which paid Carson to file
         this appeal and requires him to maintain it.
                                    *      *       *
                Unquestionably, parties are free to strategize around when
         and which decision they will appeal in order to make an “honest
         and actual antagonistic assertion of [their] rights.” Johnson, 319 U.S.
         at 305. However, in my view, when a victorious, deep-pocketed
USCA11 Case: 21-10994     Document: 163-1      Date Filed: 07/10/2023     Page: 22 of 22

         6                     WILSON, J., Dissenting               21-10994

         party pays his adversary to file an appeal, the manufactured contro-
         versy that results “tarnishes the integrity of the judicial process.”
         Id. In situations like this, to guard ourselves against ruling on hy-
         pothetical controversies and the temptation to issue advisory opin-
         ions, the Supreme Court instructs that we should dismiss this ap-
         peal. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 100; Johnson, 319 U.S. at 305.
                On remand, I urge the panel to scrutinize the agreement in
         this case and assure itself that a live case or controversy remains
         extant. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.