Court Opinion

ID: 9786543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:57:42.340934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:46.278253
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, J.,
with whom WATT, C.J. joins, dissenting.
¶ 1 I agree with the majority that we may not, at this stage of the appellate proceedings, take notice of and make a determination of fact on whether the defendant, Pablo Torres (Torres), has been returned to custody and whether, consequently, Thomas Bouldin (bondsman) or the intervenor/appellant, Ranger Insurance Company (surety), may be entitled to have the bond forfeiture set aside on that basis.1 Nevertheless, because the *588record before this Court is sufficient to determine that the bondsman did everything legally within his power to see that Torres was returned to custody before forfeiture and because discretion was abused, I would reverse and remand with instructions to set aside the bond forfeiture. Therefore, I dissent.
I.
¶ 2 SUFFICIENT FACTS MAY BE GLEANED FROM THE STATEMENTS AND ADMISSION OF COUNSEL, THE HEARING TRANSCRIPT, COMMENTS OF THE TRL-AL JUDGE AND FROM THE WRITTEN ORDER REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE FORFEITURE TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF GOOD CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO RETURN THE DEFENDANT TO CUSTODY PURSUANT TO 59 SUPP.2002 § 1332(C)(5).
¶ 3 Title 59 0.8. Supp.2002 § 1832(0)(B) 2 provides that the trial court has discretion to vacate an order of forfeiture and exonerate bond where good cause is shown for: 1) the defendant's failure to appear; or 2) the bondsman's failure to return the defendant to custody within ninety days. The majority refuses to take notice of record documents demonstrating the bondsman's good faith efforts because they were not introduced as evidence at the hearing on the motion to set aside the bond forfeiture or to consider the statements of counsel concerning the facts surrounding the bondsman's attempt to return Torres to custody.
¶ 4 Admissions of one's attorney in the line of duty are generally binding.3 Schedule A of the response to the petition in error, filed on November 26, 2001, submitted by the Tulsa County Assistant District Attorney provides in pertinent part:
"... After receiving information from the bondsman that the defendant had fled to Mexico the Tulsa County District Attorney requested that the United States Attorney file a federal charge of Uniform Flight to Avoid Prosecution which was filed. A decision to make such a request is discretionary with the District Attorney and the filing of such a charge is discretionary with the United States Attorney...."
By making this statement in a pleading filed before this Court, the Assistant District Attorney essentially admits the bondsman requested his office to contact the United States Attorney for assistance in returning Torres to Oklahoma through the filing of a federal charge of Uniform Flight to Avoid Prosecution.
¶ 5 When parties are regularly before a trial court and their respective attorneys make formal arguments, those arguments may be sufficient to sustain or reverse a judgment even without the introduction of evidence to support agreements and admissions.4 Additionally, the failure to contest *589a material fact may operate to cure an otherwise deficient record.5 Furthermore, statements of counsel, made deliberately and intelligently, constitute a high species of evidence and may operate to lessen the quantum of proof required of an opposing party.6
¶ 6 The Assistant District Attorney did not contest the fact that the bondsman asked for assistance from his office in requesting issuance of the federal warrant. Rather, in argument at the hearing to set aside the bond forfeiture on September 14, 2001, the Assistant District Attorney referred to the federal warrant and to the fact that it may not have been issued in a timely manner.7
¶ 7 When the trial court clearly takes cognizance of an item, although not officially entered into the appellate record, this Court will do likewise.8 The bondsman's assertion-that notice of Torres' exact whereabouts came from a letter dated April 80, 2001, and written by Torres' children's great aunt-is supported by a letter which the trial court acknowledged.9
¶ 8 Facts not disputed by the record must be regarded as supporting the trial court's judgment.10 However, where not impeached or contradicted, recitals of the trial court's judgment are presumed to be true and correct and act as prima facie proof of the facts stated therein.11 The order, filed by the trial court on October 15, 2001, provides in pertinent part:
"... 4. Mr. Bouldin believes the defendant has fled to Mexico where he is a citizen.
Mr. Torres is not a citizen of the United States.
5. Mr. Bouldin requested that the Tulsa County District Attorney apply to the United States Attorney for a federal charge of Uniform Flight to Avoid Prosecution against Mr. Torres.
6. In August 2001, the Tulsa County District Attorney requested the Uniform Flight charge which was approved by the United States Attorney...."
Although there is nothing in the statements of the District Attorney or in documents recognized by the trial court demonstrating the exact date upon which the bondsman requested that the District Attorney seek a federal warrant to ensure Torres' return to custody, there is nothing in the transcript of the hearing which contradicts the bondsman's claim that the original request was made shortly after the great aunt advised him of Torres whereabouts in late April. Nevertheless, it is clear from the trial court's recitation of the facts that the Tulsa County District Attorney's office did not make the request until some four months later.
¶ 9 The following can be gleaned from statements and admission of counsel, the hearing transcript, comments of the trial judge and from the written order: 1) Torres was a Mexican national who fled the United States; 2) the bondsman got notice of Torres' whereabouts from his childrens' great aunt; 3) onee he had notice, in April, the bondsman requested that the District Attorney's Office assist in obtaining a federal warrant for Torres' return to the United States; and 4) the *590District Attorney's Office did not request such a warrant until August-well outside the ninety-day limit when the bond could have been exonerated simply by Torres' return. These facts are sufficient to demonstrate good cause for the bondsman's failure to effect Torres' return pursuant to 59 0.8. Supp.2002 § 1332(C)(5).12
II.
¶ 10INDICATIONS TO A BONDSMAN THAT THE ONLY WAY TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD CAUSE UNDER 59 0.8. Supp.2002 § 1332(C)(5) SUFFICIENT TO SET ASIDE A BOND FORFEITURE IS TO RESORT TO ILLEGAL ACTS IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. '
{11 In bail forfeiture proceedings, we overturn a trial court's ruling only when an abuse of discretion has occurred resulting in a decision against reason and evidence.13 The majority makes much of the fact that the bondsman in State v. Vaughn, 2000 OK 63, 11 P.3d 211, presented better evidence of his efforts at producing the defendant than did the bondsman here and that those efforts were found insufficient to demonstrate a showing of good cause to vacate the bond forfeiture. I agree with that assessment. What the majority does not reveal is that I, and three of my colleagues, were dissenters to Vaughn. Therefore, four members of the Court would have found the evidence sufficient for a demonstration of good cause. I would overrule Vaughn. Nevertheless, there is one proposition for which Vaughn stands with which I agree-the deferential abuse of discretion standard does not relieve this Court's duty to review the discretion exercised.14
¶ 12 Here, the facts demonstrate that the bondsman did everything within his power to have Torres returned to the United States through legal channels. Nevertheless, it appears from statements of the trial court that the only way the bondsman could have satisfactorily demonstrated good cause for not having returned Torres would have been to have used illegal means in an attempt to effectuate the return.
¶ 13 When counsel attempted to explain that the bondsman felt he had to use legal means for the return, the trial court inquired as to why he felt so limited.15 When an explanation was offered indicating that the only legal way to return Torres was through the issuance of a warrant, the trial court suggested he could have chosen to bribe officials of the Mexican government.16 Even if made facetiously, the statement implied that only an illegal act would have been acceptable evidence of good cause for the reinstatement of the forfeited bond.
¶ 14 Where a bondsman demonstrates that all legal steps have been taken to return a defendant for appearance before the trial court, good cause within the meaning of 59 O.S. Supp.2002 § 1832(C)(5) 17 is demonstrated. Even with such a showing, the trial court may, pursuant to the statute, exercise its discretion and deny relief. However, a *591trial court abuses its discretion when it signals to a bondsman that the only way to demonstrate good cause sufficient to set aside a bond forfeiture is by resorting to illegal measures.
CONCLUSION
¶ 15 There is little doubt that the attorneys here could have made review of the instant cause a less weighty undertaking by better perfecting the evidentiary record. It is also understood that our trial courts are burdened with a heavy workload and that the failure of a defendant to appear as scheduled makes those duties more challenging. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence in the statements and admission of counsel, the hearing transcript, the comments of the trial judge and from the written order to allow review of the good cause issue. Furthermore, we may not avoid our responsibility to review discretionary acts and to disavow judicial comments leading individuals to conclude that the only way to obtain relief is by resorting to illegal means. Therefore, with the record available and the evidence of discretionary abuse, I would reverse and remand with instructions to set the bond forfeiture aside.

. Title 59 0.8. Supp.2003 § 1327(C) provides:
"When a defendant does appear before the court as required by law and enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, is sentenced or a deferred sentence is granted as provided for in Section 991¢ of Title 22 of the Oklahoma Stat*588utes, in such event the undertaking and bondsman and insurer shall be exonerated from further liability."
Because the amended statute is substantially similar to its predecessor, the current statute is quoted. It should be noted that the Legislature has used the mandatory term "shall" when referring to the exoneration of liability. Use of "shall" is normally considered a mandate equivalent to the term "must," requiring interpretation as a command. United States of America acting through the Farmers Home Admin. v. Hobbs, 1996 OK 77, 921 P.2d 338, 342; Heirsh-berg v. Slater, 1992 OK 84, 833 P.2d 269, 275; Fuller v. Odom, 1987 OK 64, 741 P.2d 449, 452.

. Title 59 0.$.2002 Supp. § 1332(C)(5) provides:
''The court may, in its discretion, vacate the order of forfeiture and exonerate the bond where good cause has been shown for: a. the defendant's failure to appear, or b. the bondsman's failure to return the defendant to custody within ninety (90) days."
Because the current version of the statute is identical to its predecessor, the 2002 amended statute is quoted.

. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Nath, see note 10, infra. See also, State ex rel. Macy v. Board of County Comm'rs, 1999 OK. 53, ¶ 3, 986 P.2d 1130; Halliburton Oil Producing Co. v. Grothaus, 1998 OK 110, ¶ 11, 981 P.2d 1244; Norman v. Trison Development Corp., 1992 OK 67, ¶ 2, 832 P.2d 6; Reeves v. Agee, 1989 OK 25, ¶15, 769 P.2d 745; Silver v. Slusher, 1988 OK 53, ¶ 6, 770 P.2d 878, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817, 110 S.Ct. 70, 107 L.Ed.2d 37 (1989).

. Dutton v. Dutton, 1923 OK 1075, ¶ 0, 223 P. 149.

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Busch, 1998 OK 103, ¶ 8, 976 P.2d 38.

. American-First Title & Trust Co. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Coffeyville, 1965 OK 116, ¶ 32, 415 P.2d 930.

. Transcript of proceedings, September 14, 2001, statement of Assistant District Attorney Fred J. Morgan providing in pertinent part at p. 11:
"... It's rare to see a flight warrant requested in a case that's not a homicide. In fact this is one of the first cases I can remember that was not a homicide case involving a flight warrant. Their concern that this request was not honored timely, I would say to the Court that it's not something that can be put together overnight...."

. United States Mortgage v. Laubach, 2003 OK 67, ¶ 35, 73 P.3d 887.

. Transcript of proceedings, September 14, 2001, statement of the court providing in pertinent part at p. 8:
"... THE COURT: Letters from the grandmother from Chickasha in the court file...."

. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Nath, 1992 OK 129, ¶ 10, 839 P.2d 1336; Davidson v. Gregory, 1989 OK. 87, ¶ 11, 780 P.2d 679.

. Schuman's v. Missy Dress Co., 1935 OK 471, ¶ 0, 44 P.2d 862.

. Title 59 O.S. Supp.2002 § 1332(C)(5), see note 2, supra.

. State v. Vaughn, 2000 OK 63, ¶ 25, 11 P.3d 211.

. Id.

. Transcript of proceedings, September 14, 2001, providing in pertinent part at p. 5:
"... This case was somewhat different because the defendant was a Mexican citizen who had gone back to Mexico. He was living at his mother's house in Zacatecas, Mexico, and was located by the bondsman and at that point in time had to, in his opinion anyway, had to do it through legal channels, and was told this is the way to do it.
THE COURT: Why? ..."

. Transcript of proceedings, September 14, 2001, providing in pertinent part at p. 10:
"... In this instance, his choice was to follow the regulations as set out by the Mexican government, which would include or at least request cooperation with the Tulsa County District Attorney's Office and the U.S. Attorney's Office here, without which he could not return this gentleman to custody. It would have been an impossibility without himself breaking the law, possibly international law. THE COURT: Possibly he could have given the Federales $1,000 and expedited the whole thing too, you know.. .."

. Title 59 O.S. Supp.2002 § 1332(C)(5), see note 2, supra.