Court Opinion

ID: 9890617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 18:04:16.585259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:38.455128
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/13/23 P. v. Kalim CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080634

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCD282330)

 AZHAR AHMED KALIM,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David M. Rubin, Judge. Affirmed.
         Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Michael J. Patty, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION1
      A jury convicted Azhar Ahmed Kalim of four counts of forcible sexual

penetration (Pen. Code,2 § 289, subd. (a)(1); counts 1−4); one count of sexual

battery by restraint (§ 243.4, subd. (a); count 5);3 and one count of
misdemeanor sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1); count 7), committed
against a single victim.
      Forcible sexual penetration is punishable by three, six, or eight years.
(§ 289, subd. (a)(1).) When a defendant has been convicted of multiple
offenses, the sentencing judge has discretion to impose the sentence on each
concurrently or consecutively, unless another statute mandates consecutive
terms. (§ 669, subd. (a); People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585, 592 [“[s]ection
669 authorizes the court to decide whether sentences should run concurrently
or consecutively”].) When imposed consecutively, the mandatory minimum
term on a subordinate felony count is one-third the middle term, unless a
more specific statute applies. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a); People v. Williams (2004)
34 Cal.4th 397, 402.)
      Here, the sentencing court found section 667.6, subdivision (d) (section
667.6(d)), applied to its decision. Section 667.6(d) mandates the court to
impose “[a] full, separate, and consecutive term” for certain sex offenses,
including forcible sexual penetration, if they “involve the same victim on
separate occasions.” (§ 667.6, subds. (d)(1) and (e)(8).) “In determining

1    We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California
Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.

2     All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3     The jury acquitted Kalim of another count of sexual battery by
restraint (§ 243.4, subd. (a); count 6) of the same victim.

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whether crimes against a single victim were committed on separate
occasions,” the statute requires the court to consider “whether, between the
commission of one sex crime and another, the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to reflect upon [his] actions and nevertheless resumed sexually
assaultive behavior.” (§ 667.6, subd. (d)(2).)
        Based on the trial evidence, the sentencing court (which presided at the
trial) found Kalim “did have adequate time and [a] reasonable opportunity to
reflect on his actions” because the victim had asked him to stop, he
acknowledged her repeated requests to stop, and “[t]here was an actual real
break and opportunity” between the sexually assaultive behavior underlying
counts 1 to 3. Having found the offenses in those counts were committed on
separate occasions within the meaning of section 667.6(d), the court
concluded “full, separate, and consecutive” terms were mandatory. (§ 667.6,
subd. (d)(1).)
        Accordingly, the trial court selected one of the forcible sexual
penetration convictions (count 1) as the principal count and imposed the
middle term of six years. It imposed consecutive full middle terms of six
years each for two more forcible sexual penetration convictions (counts 2 and
3). (§ 667.6, subd. (d)(1) and (3).) It imposed concurrent terms of six years on
the remaining forcible sexual penetration conviction (count 4) and three years
on the sexual battery by restraint conviction (count 5). Additionally, the
court imposed a 180-day consecutive sentence for the misdemeanor sexual
battery conviction (count 7). Kalim’s total sentence was 18 years and 180
days.
        On appeal, Kalim raises one claim of error: the imposition of fully
consecutive sentences on counts 2 and 3 without a jury finding that the
offenses were committed against the same victim on separate occasions

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violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Apprendi v. New
Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 and Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 99.
He argues the fact that an act occurs on a “ ‘separate occasion’ ” under section
667.6(d) is a fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence on counts
2 and 3 from two years (one-third the middle term of six years under section
1170.1, subdivision (a)) to six years. (Boldface omitted.) He asserts that fact
must be found by a jury, not a judge, under Alleyne, at pages 111−112.
      This argument has been rejected by the California Supreme Court. In
People v. Catarino (2023) 14 Cal.5th 748 (Catarino), decided after Kalim filed
his opening brief on appeal, the Court considered the question “whether
section 667.6(d), in requiring that a sentencing court impose ‘full, separate,
and consecutive term[s]’ for certain sex crimes if it finds certain facts,
complies with the Sixth Amendment.” (Id. at p. 750.) It held “that it does:
the rule of Apprendi and Alleyne does not apply to section 667.6(d) under the
rationale of [Oregon v. Ice (2009) 555 U.S. 160 (Ice)].” (Catarino, at p. 750.)
      In Ice, the United States Supreme Court held “ ‘ “the Sixth
Amendment’s restriction on judge-found facts” is “inapplicable” when a trial
judge makes factual findings necessary to the imposition of consecutive
terms.’ ” (Catarino, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 755, quoting People v. Scott (2015)
61 Cal.4th 363, 405, quoting Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 170.) The Oregon
sentencing scheme at issue in Ice “provided that ‘sentences shall run
concurrently unless the judge finds statutorily described facts.’ [Citation.]
The high court held that such judicial factfinding does not violate Apprendi”
because historically, “ ‘the jury played no role in the decision to impose
sentences consecutively or concurrently.’ [Citation.] Instead, judges
traditionally had ‘unfettered discretion’ to decided ‘whether sentences for
discrete offenses shall be served consecutively or concurrently.’ [Citation.]

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Thus, the high court reasoned, the ‘core concerns’ underlying Apprendi⎯
‘encroachment . . . by the judge upon facts historically found by the jury’ and
‘threat to the jury’s domain as a bulwark at trial between the State and the
accused’⎯are not implicated by ‘legislative reforms regarding the imposition
of multiple sentences.’ [Citation.] States may, consistent with the Sixth
Amendment, enact legislation to ‘constrain judges’ discretion by requiring
them to find certain facts before imposing consecutive, rather than
concurrent, sentences.’ ” (Catarino, at pp. 755−756 [discussing Ice].)
      Like Kalim, the defendant in Catarino argued “that sentencing him
under section 667.6(d) ‘without having submitted to the jury the question of
whether each of [his] offenses was committed on a “separate occasion” denied
[him] his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial’ under Apprendi and Alleyne”
because “the separate occasions finding required that his [subordinate]
counts ‘carry a full term, rather than the term that would otherwise apply
under’ the determinate sentencing law, it increased the minimum term for
each of those offenses.” (Catarino, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 751.) The
California Supreme Court rejected the argument. It concluded that “[r]ather
than set or change the term authorized on an individual count as the statute
in Alleyne did, section 667.6(d) requires that the term already authorized
[citation] be meted out as a full term. Under the high court’s reasoning in
Ice, section 667.6(d) does not define or alter the term for any particular
offense in a manner that invades the historical province of the jury.”
(Catarino, at p. 756.) Thus “[b]ecause section 667.6(d) falls within the
rationale of Ice, its operation does not violate the rule of Apprendi and
Alleyne.” (Catarino, at p. 757.)
      Catarino forecloses Kalim’s claim on appeal. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 454.) We affirm the judgment.

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                             DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.

                                           DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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