Court Opinion

ID: 9674615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:31:45.537473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:41.566223
License: Public Domain

GOODWYN, Justice
(dissenting).
The question in this case concerns the amendment on January 3, 1962, of part of a decree rendered on January 14, 1960, granting appellee (wife) a divorce from appellant and providing for the disposition of property. The property provision was the part amended.
As to the property, the original decree provided as follows:
“It is also further ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Cpurt that the property jointly owned by the above parties shall be partitioned and divided equally between the above parties and that after said property has been partitioned the respective parties shall transfer . to _ each other [sic] appro*229priate deed the right, title and interest in and to said property.
H» *K
“The Court retains jurisdiction of this cause for the purpose of making such other or future orders or decrees as to the property settlement and custody and support of the said minor children as to the Court may seem proper, and as changed conditions may require.”
The amendment struck from the decree the first of the above two paragraphs and substituted therefor a provision that certain described real property “be sold at public or private sale” and the proceeds therefrom paid into the office of the register “to be disposed of by the Court.” There appears to be no question that there is no jointly owned property and that title to the property ordered sold is in the husband alone.
On January 31, 1962, appellant filed a motion to set aside the decree of January 3, 1962. This motion was overruled on May 15, 1962. Thereupon, appellant appealed from the decrees of January 3, 1962, and May 15, 1962, and also has filed here a petition for mandamus to set aside said decrees in event it should be held that they are not appealable.
My view is that the decrees appealed from will not support the appeal; that the appeal should be dismissed; that the trial court had jurisdiction to render the amendatory decree; and that the petition for mandamus should be denied.
Equity decrees may be so framed as to be partly final and partly interlocutory. Newton v. Ware, 271 Ala. 444, 450, 124 So.2d 664; Ex parte Sparks, 254 Ala. 595, 597, 49 So.2d 296; Wood v. City of Birmingham, 247 Ala. 15, 22 So.2d 331; Scholes v. Kibbe, 222 Ala. 587, 133 So. 286. In my opinion, the part of the decree of January 14, 1960, providing for disposition of property was interlocutory, as was also the decree amendatory thereof. A fortiori, the decree overruling the motion to set aside the amendatory decree was also interlocutory. “If there is a decree directing further proceedings under the direction of the court in order to make the final decree effective, such decree is interlocutory and remains within the control of the court because as to such decree and further proceedings thereunder the cause remains in fieri.” Newton v. Ware, supra. Here, the trial court expressly retained jurisdiction “for the purpose of making such other or future orders or decrees as to the property settlement.” Such interlocutory decrees are not appealable. They are reviewable on appeal from a final decree. As said in O’Rear v. O’Rear, 227 Ala. 403, 406, 150 So. 502:
“In so far as the first decree is not final, but interlocutory, it is subject to modification or change, and rulings in respect to matters of an interlocutory nature are reviewable by appeal from the last final decree. McCalley v. Finney, 198 Ala. 462, 73 So. 639; Scholes v. Kibbe, 222 Ala. 587, 133 So. 286; Adams v. Sayre, 76 Ala. 509.”
From Moore v. Hawk, 270 Ala. 684, 686, 121 So.2d 904, is the following apt statement:
“ * * * As we have often said, there can be more than one appeal from a decree in the equity court. And where something is left in fieri which calls for a further order of the court the court has jurisdiction to enter a decree thereon. * * * ”
In Ex parte Green, 221 Ala. 298, 300, 129 So. 72, it is said that “interlocutory judgments and decrees remain in fieri until final judgment is entered, and in the meantime the court may open, amend, or vacate them, as the facts justify (Pinkard v. Allen, 75 Ala. 73; Hurt v. Hurt, 157 Ala. 126, 137, 47 So. 260; Chancery Rule 82; 34 Corpus Juris, 216.”
If the court was without jurisdiction to render the amendatory decree, such decree is void and mandamus is the appropriate remedy. Ex parte State, ex rel, *230Mitchell, 271 Ala. 203, 207, 123 So.2d 209; Ex parte Sharp, 259 Ala. 652, 655, 68 So.2d 545; Ex parte Myers, 246 Ala. 460, 461, 21 So.2d 113; State ex rel. Davis v. Curtis, 210 Ala. 1, 4, 97 So. 291. It is my opinion, however, that the trial court had jurisdiction to render the amendatory decree, that said decree is not void, and that mandamus will not lie. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal and deny the petition for mandamus.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.