Court Opinion

ID: 9966277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 16:09:07.785225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:39.392223
License: Public Domain

J-A06006-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN RE: ADOPTION OF G.W., A               :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                    :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: FAYETTE COUNTY                :
 CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES              :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :    No. 936 WDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered August 2, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Orphans' Court at
                         No(s): 27 ADOPT 2022

 IN RE: ADOPTION OF T.W., A MINOR :            IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                  :                 PENNSYLVANIA
                                  :
 APPEAL OF: FAYETTE COUNTY        :
 CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES      :
                                  :
                                  :
                                  :
                                  :            No. 937 WDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered August 2, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Orphans' Court at
                         No(s): 28 ADOPT 2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and BECK, J.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.:                      FILED: May 6, 2024

      I respectfully dissent.   Based upon the orphans’ court’s own factual

findings—all of which are supported by evidence in the certified record

transmitted to this Court on appeal—it is apparent that, as a matter of law,

the conditions which led to the removal of G.W. and T.W. (“Children”) from

the care of C.W. (“Mother”) continued to exist at the time CYS filed the petition

to terminate Mother’s parental rights (fourteen months after Children’s
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removal from her care) and at the time of the hearing on the petition (twenty-

four months after removal).     Even accounting for our limited standard of

review and deference to the orphans’ court in termination of parental rights

cases, my review of the orphans’ court’s opinion makes clear that it conflated

the legal analysis required for a finding of termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(a)(8) with that for the other subsections of section 2511(a), thereby

applying the wrong law to its own factual findings and resulting in an

erroneous decision. Furthermore, the orphans’ court used an incorrect legal

framework to evaluate whether CYS’s evidence proved that termination best

served Children’s needs and welfare under sections 2511(a)(8).

      The learned Majority does not account for these legal errors in its

decision and determines instead that the record on appeal is incomplete,

hindering our appellate review to such an extent that this Court is constrained

to affirm. While I agree that the certified record has its flaws, if the proper

legal analysis is applied, the deficiencies in the record do not prevent this

Court from conducting appellate review. Upon conducting such a review, I

would vacate the orders denying the petitions to terminate Mother’s parental

rights and remand this case to the orphans’ court for prompt proceedings

consistent with this dissent.

      Section 2511(a) “provides eleven enumerated grounds describing

particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary termination.”

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021); see 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(a)(1)-(11). Each subsection is distinct. The petitioner only needs to

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prove one of the grounds alleged under subsection (a) in order to shift the

focus to section 2511(b), which requires the court to determine whether

termination serves the children’s developmental, physical, and emotional

needs and welfare. In re K.R., 200 A.3d 969, 979 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc).

      In the case at bar, Fayette County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”)

sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights under subsections (a)(1), (a)(2),

(a)(5), and (a)(8). The orphans’ court determined that CYS did not prove, by

clear and convincing evidence, any of these statutory grounds to terminate

Mother’s parental rights. In my view, the orphans’ court erred in its legal

analysis conducted under section 2511(a)(8).

      The relevant portions of the Adoption Act provide as follows:

      (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

                                  *    *    *

            (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
            by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
            agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
            removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
            removal or placement of the child continue to exist
            and termination of parental rights would best serve the
            needs and welfare of the child.

                                  *    *    *

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a
      parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of

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      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b) (emphasis added).

      CYS argues that it presented sufficient clear and convincing evidence

proving that Mother’s continuous difficulties with mental health, substance

abuse, housing, and the criminal justice system have prevented her from

reunifying with Children. See CYS’s Brief at 14-19. It asserts that, despite

the orphans’ court’s ultimate conclusion, the court’s own factual findings

demonstrate that CYS met its burden. See id. at 16. From CYS’s perspective,

the orphans’ court erroneously focused upon Mother’s love for her children

instead of the evidence demonstrating that Mother has unresolved issues that

have prevented reunification.

      In reviewing an agency’s challenge to the denial of its petition to

terminate a parent’s rights, particularly in a case that may have presented a

close judgment call for the orphans’ court, we abide by our Supreme Court’s

specific instructions and words of caution:

             Termination of parental rights is among the most powerful
      legal remedies that the judicial system possesses. The decision
      to sever permanently a parent’s relationship with a child is often
      bound up in complex factual scenarios involving difficult family
      dynamics and multiple service providers. Our trial courts are
      tasked with carefully considering and weighing all of the evidence
      presented at termination hearings in determining whether the
      petitioning party has met its burden of proving by clear and

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      convincing evidence that termination        meets   the   exacting
      standards outlined in the Adoption Act.

            Because trial courts are on the front lines assessing the
      credibility of witnesses and weighing competing and often
      challenging evidence, it is paramount that, in reviewing trial
      courts’ decisions in this arena, appellate courts defer to trial
      courts’ first-hand observations as they relate to factual
      determinations. In this regard, we reiterate that appellate courts
      must review such decisions for an abuse of discretion or error of
      law, and appellate courts may reverse trial courts only when
      that discretion has been breached or when the law has
      been misapplied. In other words, an appellate court should
      review the certified record to decide whether it supports the trial
      court’s order, regardless of whether the appellate court agrees
      with the result that the trial court reached.

Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1129 (Pa. 2021) (emphasis added);

see also In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 597 (Pa. 2021) (“This

Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases involving close calls,

deference to the trial court’s determination is particularly crucial.”). Stated

another way, our job is to “review the record for an abuse of discretion and

for whether evidence supports that trial court’s conclusions;” we may not

“search the record for contrary conclusions or substitute [our] judgment for

that of the trial court.” S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1124.

      With that standard in mind, I first examine whether the orphans’ court’s

factual findings are supported by the record. According to the orphans’ court,

the conditions leading to Children’s removal from Mother’s care were Mother’s

arrest and concerns about Mother’s mental health and drug and alcohol use.

Orphans’ Court Opinion (“Opinion”), 8/4/2023, at 10; see also id. at 1-2

(Findings of Fact (“F.F.”) ¶¶ 7, 10).

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      The record reflects that G.W. (age eight at the time of the hearing) and

T.W. (age four at the time of the hearing), are the ninth and tenth of Mother’s

children.   Mother has not raised Children’s eight older siblings.   Six were

adopted and two were raised by a relative. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 5/11-

12/2023, at 179. A month prior to Children’s removal, Westmoreland County

Children’s Bureau (“WCCB”) received a report alleging that Mother was using

methamphetamine. CYS Exhibit 3 (Dependency Adjudication Order). Mother

initially refused to cooperate with WCCB’s investigation by submitting urine

screens. Id.

      On May 14, 2021, Mother was arrested after she attempted to break

into a house while under the influence and accompanied by Children, who

were then ages six and two. N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 13-14. As a result, the

Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County (“juvenile court”) removed

Children from Mother’s care and placed them in WCCB’s legal custody.

Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 1 (F.F. ¶ 7). Children have been in the same foster

home since three days after their initial removal. Id. (F.F. ¶ 9).

      Following her arrest, Mother was incarcerated and her conditions of

bond prohibited contact with Children. WCCB filed a petition to adjudicate

Children dependent under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301–6375. The

agency had concerns about Mother’s mental health based upon Mother’s

“erratic behavior.”     CYS Exhibit 3 (Dependency Adjudication Order).

Additionally, Mother tested positive for benzodiazepines on an agency drug

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screen, and Mother was “impaired” during the incident that led to Children’s

removal, which was especially concerning because Mother had a lengthy

history of substance abuse. Id. In fact, CYS had previously placed Children

with their paternal grandmother for a month in October 2020, because of

Mother’s and G.W.’s father’s impairment from drugs and alcohol. Id. The

juvenile court in Westmoreland County adjudicated Children dependent on

July 9, 2021.

      Mother was released from incarceration in or around late July 2021.

Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 2 (F.F. ¶ 11); N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 13-14. Shortly

thereafter, she “report[ed] for a mental health evaluation in August 2021, and

she attended [four] out of [five] sessions.”   Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 2 (F.F.

¶ 14); N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 17. Around the same time, Mother called WCCB

and made “nonsensical statements saying that [T.W.] was a robot,” that

Children’s foster parents were selling T.W.’s organs, and that she wanted

Children removed from the foster parents’ home. Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 2

(F.F. ¶ 15); N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 20, 31.     Mother began mental health

treatment in October 2021. Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 4 (F.F. ¶ 30); N.T., 5/11-

12/2023, at 137. She was not cooperative with drug screens, participating in

only five out of twenty-seven screens. Of those five, she tested positive for

alcohol on two occasions. Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 2 (F.F. ¶ 13); N.T., 5/11-

12/2023, at 16-18. Mother obtained her own housing in Fayette County and

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WCCB transferred the case to CYS in December 2021. Opinion, 8/4/2023, at

2(F.F. ¶ 16); N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 19-20.

       Shortly     after   the   case    transfer,   Mother   tested   positive   for

methamphetamines on December 21, 2021. Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 3 (F.F.

¶ 28); N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 133-34. She subsequently underwent two drug

and alcohol assessments, neither of which indicated that she needed

treatment.       However, according to the orphans’ court’s findings of fact,

“Mother … failed to provide honest information relative to her drug and/or

alcohol use,” refused to sign a release to permit CYS to provide information to

the evaluator, and “reported that she had been ‘clean’ since 2014, despite the

fact that Mother tested positive for methamphetamines on [a] December 21,

2021 drug screen.” Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 3-4 (F.F. ¶¶ 28, 32); N.T., 5/11-

12/2023, at 134-38, 247.1            After undergoing the updated assessments

requested by CYS, Mother tested positive twice, once for TCA2 and once for

alcohol. Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 3 (F.F. ¶¶ 18-19); N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 38.

She also refused or was unavailable for screens. Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 3 (F.F.

¶ 18); N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 38. Mother received mental health treatment

____________________________________________

1 Later, the orphans’ court stated that it was “indeterminable whether Mother
was completely honest during the drug and alcohol evaluations,” despite
entering findings of fact indicating that Mother was indeed not honest during
her evaluations. Compare Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 9 with id. at 3-4 (F.F.
¶¶ 28, 32).

2 “TCA” is not identified in the record, but possibly stands for tricyclic
antidepressants.

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from October 2021 until March 2022, but refused “medication management

for her diagnosis of schizophrenia” and stopped going to treatment. Opinion,

8/4/2023, at 4 (F.F. ¶¶ 30-31); N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 137, 167, 178-79,

238.

       Caseworker “Jennifer Guseman testified credibly that despite Mother’s

negative drug screens, Mother’s behaviors continued to be very ‘erratic’, and

it was indeterminable whether Mother’s behaviors resulted from impairment

or mental health issues.” Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 3 (F.F. ¶¶ 29); N.T., 5/11-

12/2023, at 136. For example, at a May 17, 2022 supervised visit at her

home, Mother “reeked of alcohol,” “appeared to be impaired,” “slurred words,”

and “was nodding off while playing on the floor with [C]hildren.” Opinion,

8/4/2023, at 2 (F.F. ¶¶ 19); N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 42-43. When the service

provider supervising the visit and administering the drug screen told Mother

that her screen was positive for TCA, “Mother became very upset and threw

the cup with urine toward the caseworker.”    Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 2 (F.F.

¶¶ 19); N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 42-43.

       Mother was arrested and charged with harassment in connection with

the urine-throwing incident in May 2022. N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 163, 203.

That same month, she was arrested again and charged with theft of an ankle

monitor and escape from the ankle monitor. Id. at 234. Unable to make bail,

she was re-incarcerated in the Fayette County Jail while awaiting trial.

Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 5 (F.F. ¶ 51); N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 234. While she

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was in jail, Mother began attending Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”) and

Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”), and she visited with Children via short Zoom

sessions. Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 4-5 (F.F. ¶¶ 34, 35); N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at

213, 236.

       Meanwhile, on July 15, 2022, which was sixteen months after Children

entered foster care, CYS filed the petition to terminate Mother’s parental

rights.

       Ultimately, Mother was convicted of harassment in the urine-throwing

case. According to Mother, two weeks before the termination hearings, she

was sentenced to ninety-eight days in prison, which was ordered to run

consecutive to her criminal trespass sentence stemming from the incident that

brought Children into care. N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 233.

       Mother remained incarcerated at the Fayette County Jail at the time of

the May 2023 hearings on CYS’s petitions. Her release date was uncertain,

as she still had to transfer to a state correctional institute to complete her

sentences in the criminal trespass and harassment cases.3        Id. at 234.

Because she had been incarcerated waiting for trial in the ankle monitor case

for almost a year, Mother anticipated a filing by her lawyer asserting her

____________________________________________

3 According to Mother, her minimum release date for the trespass conviction

had passed in February 2023, and her maximum release date was a year
away. N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 243. Mother had filed a petition for post-
conviction relief on the trespass conviction that was still pending before the
trial court judge. Id. at 235.

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speedy trial rights if the Commonwealth did not bring her to trial within the

following month. Id. Nonetheless, at the time of the termination hearing,

these criminal charges also remained pending, preventing her from serving

her sentences in her other two cases and from working on her maintenance

of sobriety outside of jail or prison.

      As indicated by the above citations, my review of the record reveals that

the orphans’ court’s findings of fact are supported by the evidence included in

the certified record before this Court on appeal. Because the factual findings

supported by the record, I now turn to a determination of whether the

orphans’ court’s legal conclusions are “the result of an error of law or an abuse

of discretion.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. 2012).

      In finding that CYS failed to meet its burden of proving termination

under section 2511(a)(8), the orphans’ court offered the following analysis:

            The child has been removed from Mother, and [twelve] or
      more months have elapsed from the removal; however, clear and
      convincing evidence has not been presented that the conditions
      which led to the removal continue to exist and termination would
      best serve the needs and welfare of [Children].

            Mother’s conduct in this case certainly has been bizarre at
      times and unacceptable. A few of the most blatant examples
      include Mother greeting caseworkers without being properly
      clothed and making remarks to caseworkers of a sexual nature.
      At one time, Mother left a disturbing voicemail to a Westmoreland
      County caseworker about her child being a “robot,” and the foster
      parents were selling her organs. These incidents, although
      disturbing, do not appear to be the norm, and do not evidence
      that Mother cannot or will not remedy the conditions which caused
      the removal.

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             Mother clearly loves [Children], and this is best evidenced
      by Mother’s consistent visitation with [Children]. Despite her
      incarceration, Mother has consistently visited, and she has
      requested additional visitation time. For the past year, Mother
      has been limited in her ability due to her incarceration. She has
      utilized the resources available to her while incarcerated, and she
      demonstrates the desire to remedy the conditions which
      led to the removal of [Children].

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 10-11 (emphasis added).

      The orphans’ court elaborated upon its analysis in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)

statement in lieu of opinion, indicating that its

      findings of fact do include that Mother’s compliance has not always
      been perfect with respect to the goals set for her by Fayette
      [County] CYS. However, the findings of fact also include that
      Mother has consistently demonstrated that she wishes to
      maintain her parental relationship with, and to care for, her
      children. The length of time a child is in foster care, in itself, is
      not determinative of whether a biological parent’s rights should be
      terminated, nor is less-than-stellar compliance by that parent.
      Here, in fact, after permanency review hearings in October 2022,
      January 2023 and April 2023 hearings, [the juvenile court]
      consistently found that Mother was at least minimally compliant
      with her Family Service Plan. Further, after the January 2023 and
      April 2023 hearings, [the juvenile court] found that Mother was as
      compliant as she could be, given her incarceration.            After
      consideration for the factors that [CYS] highlights as evidence of
      Mother’s unsuitability and the factors that demonstrate Mother’s
      dedication to maintaining her parental relationship with her
      children, there was not sufficient evidence to support termination
      of Mother’s parental rights.

Orphans’ Court Statement in Lieu of Opinion (“Statement”), 9/6/2023, at 2-3

(numbering supplied; italicized emphasis in original; bolded emphasis added).

      In accordance with the statutory language, the correct (a)(8) analysis

requires a determination of whether: (1) twelve months have elapsed since

the juvenile court removed the child from the parent’s care; (2) the conditions

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that led to the removal continue to exist; and (3) terminating the parent’s

rights serves the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008-

09 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).                Despite the orphans’ court’s accurate

recounting of the elements of subsection (a)(8), it is evident from the face of

the opinions that it used an incorrect legal standard to evaluate CYS’s petition

under this subsection.

       The    orphans’     court   intermingles      cases   addressing   a   parent’s

incarceration under subsection (a)(1) when analyzing whether CYS met its

burden to prove grounds under other subsections, including subsection

(a)(8).4 Although factual matters under the Adoption Act do not always neatly

fit into legal boxes, our Supreme Court has emphasized time and again that

we must hew closely to the statutory language. See, e.g., In re K.T., 296

A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023) (analyzing the “pivotal language” of the statute);

S.P., 47 A.3d at 827-28 (cautioning this Court to avoid “improperly quoting”

caselaw applying a different subsection because the statutory grounds are

distinct and cannot be conflated).

       Here, the orphans’ court’s conclusions of law focus almost exclusively

on caselaw applying subsection (a)(1). See Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 7

____________________________________________

4   CYS exacerbates this by presenting a very disjointed argument that
intermixes allegations of error under all the subsections with a heavy
emphasis upon caselaw focused upon subsection (a)(1). See CYS’s Brief at
10-19. This does not hamper our review, however, as we review pure
questions of law pursuant to a de novo standard. Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d
1085, 1104 (Pa. 2023).

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(Conclusions of Law, ¶¶ 2-4).        In its section 2511(a)(8) analysis, it

emphasized the limitations imposed by incarceration, Mother’s earnestness in

visiting Children over Zoom, and Mother’s “utiliz[ation of] the resources

available to her while incarcerated.” Id. Further, in reaching its findings, the

orphans’ court appears to have operated under an assumption that it legally

could not recognize Mother’s incarceration as part of the conditions that

continued to exist, particularly because Mother did what she could to comply

with her goals from prison.    However, this analysis perpetuates the error

observed by our Supreme Court in S.P.—applying cases analyzing parental

abandonment under section 2511(a)(1) to other subsections without critically

engaging with the language of the statute.

         Section 2511(a)(1) provides “grounds for termination if the parent

‘evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child, or has

refused or failed to perform parental duties’ for a period of at least six

months.” S.P., 47 A.3d at 827-28 (quoting 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)). In In

re McCray’s Adoption, 331 A.2d 652 (Pa. 1975), which interpreted an earlier

statute akin to subsection (a)(1), our Supreme Court observed that a parent

“has an affirmative duty to love, protect and support his child and to make an

effort to maintain communication and association with that child,” but that

incarceration made “performance of this duty ‘more difficult.’” S.P., 47 A.3d

at 828 (quoting McCray, 331 A.2d at 665). The McCray Court determined

that a

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      parent’s absence and/or failure to support [a child] due to
      incarceration is not conclusive on the issue of abandonment.
      Nevertheless, we are not willing to completely toll a parent’s
      responsibilities during his or her incarceration. Rather, we must
      inquire whether the parent has utilized those resources at his or
      her command while in prison in continuing a close relationship
      with the child. Where the parent does not exercise reasonable
      firmness in declining to yield to obstacles, his other rights may be
      forfeited.

S.P., 47 A.3d at 828 (quoting McCray, 331 A.2d at 665).

      The S.P. Court recognized that this Court often quoted this passage

from McCray and its progeny to support its erroneous “assertion that

incarceration alone cannot be grounds for termination under any provision of

[section] 2511(a).” S.P., 47 A.3d at 828. Instead, the S.P. Court determined

that “incarceration neither compels nor precludes termination.” Id. The Court

held that “incarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be

determinative” of the elements of section 2511(a)(2). Id. Although section

2511(a)(8) was inapplicable in S.P. for different reasons, the Court noted that

a majority of Justices in In re R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2011) (plurality),

agreed that a parent’s incarceration can be a factor in an orphans’ court’s

decision to terminate parental rights under several of the enumerated

grounds, including whether the conditions leading to removal continued to

exist pursuant to subsection (a)(8). S.P., 47 A.3d at 829-30, nn. 8-9.

      Additionally, in the instant case, the orphans’ court opined that Mother

demonstrated the desire “to remedy the conditions which led to [Children’s]

removal,” as well as her wish “to maintain her parental relationship with, and

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to care for, her children.”        Statement, 9/6/2023, at 3.     But unlike other

subsections of the termination statute,5 a parent’s “willingness or ability to

remedy the conditions” that led to the children’s removal is not pertinent to

the legal determination required under subsection (a)(8). In re Adoption of

R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 511 (Pa. Super. 2006); see also In re I.J., 972 A.2d

5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009) (holding that the orphans’ court erred by “improperly

conflat[ing] the statutory requirements of subsections (a)(2) and (a)(5) with

those of subsection (a)(8)”).

       The orphans’ court opined that Mother’s “bizarre,” “unacceptable,” and

“disturbing” behavior did not “appear to be the norm” and did “not evidence

that Mother cannot or will not remedy the conditions which caused the

removal.”      Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 10.           Additionally, the orphans’ court

emphasized its findings in the dependency matter that Mother “was at least

minimally compliant with her Family Service Plan” since October 2022 and

that she “was as compliant as she could be, given her incarceration.” Id. at

____________________________________________

5  Compare, e.g., 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) (directing courts to examine the
parent’s conduct for evidence of intent to relinquish parental claim, or refusal
or failure to perform parental duties), and (a)(2) (directing courts to consider
whether certain parental incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied by the parent), and (a)(5) (directing courts to determine
whether the parent cannot or will not remedy the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and
whether services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely
to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child
within a reasonable period of time), with (a)(8) (directing courts to decide
whether the conditions that led to the placement or removal of the children
continue to exist).

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3. Importantly, nowhere does the orphans’ court conclude that Mother has

remedied the conditions which led to Children’s removal, as the law is clear

that a finding that a parent “was making progress toward remedying the

conditions,” is legally insufficient to preclude termination under (a)(8). R.J.S.,

901 A.2d at 511; see also C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1006-08 (affirming termination

of parental rights under (a)(8) even though parent made “substantial

progress” and was sober in prison; that the parent was incarcerated for drug

offenses demonstrated that her “drug related issues continued to impact” her

child and parent’s “ability to care” for her child).      “The relevant inquiry

regarding the second prong of section 2511(a)(8) is whether the conditions

that led to removal have been remedied and thus whether reunification of

parent and child is imminent at the time of the hearing.” In re M.E., 283

A.3d 820, 832 (Pa. Super. 2022) (cleaned up; emphasis added); see also

Matter of Adoption of L.C.J.W., 311 A.3d 41, 51 (Pa. Super 2024)

(specifying that the pertinent issue “is whether, after a full year of services,

[the parent] had remedied the conditions such that she was presently able to

resume care and custody of her children”).

      The orphans’ court compounded its legal errors by arriving at a

conclusion that was manifestly unreasonable when viewed in combination with

its own factual findings. Applied to the proper legal framework, the orphans’

court’s findings demonstrate that the conditions leading to Children’s removal

from Mother’s care continue to exist. As found by the orphans’ court, Children

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were placed in foster care because of Mother’s arrest and incarceration, her

substance abuse, and her mental health. After two years, Mother once again

was unable to care for Children because of a second incarceration. Mother’s

only sustained period of sobriety occurred in the confined environment of

prison. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008. Even if the orphans’ court was not

convinced that Mother’s mental health was a barrier to reunification, according

to the court’s own findings, Mother’s substance abuse, which intertwined with

her sustained involvement with the criminal justice system and repeated

incarcerations, persisted.

      By virtue of the orphans’ court’s own findings, this is not a situation

where the children were about to be reunified and the parent’s incarceration

was a mere temporary setback. Mother had not even achieved unsupervised

visitation prior to entering prison for a second time. Mother relapsed several

times after she was released from her initial incarceration. While relapses

may be expected by a person struggling with overcoming addiction, her

relapses plus her second incarceration prevented her from gaining any traction

towards reunification. Even assuming, arguendo, that Mother was released

immediately after the hearing, she would need time to demonstrate that she

could sustain her sobriety in the world. See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008. (“While

it appears that [m]other has managed to remain drug-free in the confines of

incarceration, whether she can maintain that status among the external

pressures of the outside world remains to be proven.”).

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      This Court has recognized “that the application of section 2511(a)(8)

may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward

resolving the problems that had led to the removal of her children.” R.J.S.,

901 A.2d at 513.

      However, by allowing for termination when the conditions that led
      to removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the statute
      implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
      while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to
      assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not
      subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and
      stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.
      Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates
      only a short period of time, to wit [eighteen] months, in which to
      complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child
      who has been placed in foster care.

Id.

      In my opinion, the intermingling of legal standards by the orphans’

court has led the Majority astray in its review of this matter. The Majority

determines that it is “constrained to affirm” the denial of the petition because

      the record on appeal lacks evidence to prove, clearly and
      convincingly, that Mother has failed to address and fulfill her
      mental health or drug and alcohol goals under either the [WCCB]
      or [CYS] service plans. Specifically, CYS has not provided this
      Court with sufficient documentation to satisfy its burden to
      terminate Mother’s parental rights under subsection 2511(a).

Maj. Op. at 22. The Majority laments the absence of the following “missing

documents,” see id. at 22, some of which the Majority identifies as “critical,”

see id. at 16:

         •   Referrals alleging physical abuse of Children by Mother in April
             and June 2021 and WCCB reports deeming such allegations to be
             unfounded, id. at 3 n.7;

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         •   “Transcript from May 18, 2021 shelter care hearing that was
             referenced in [WCCB’s dependency petition],” id. at 16;

         •   Permanency review hearing orders from Westmoreland and
             Fayette Counties; id. at 22;

         •   Any mental health or drug and alcohol evaluations and
             recommendations regarding Mother from Westmoreland County,
             id.;

         •   Psychiatric evaluations performed by Dr. Franks on Mother; id. at
             21 n.23, 22;

         •   “SPHS’ mental health evaluation          of   Mother   (containing
             schizophrenia diagnosis),” id.; and

         •   “Mother’s criminal record,” id.

      I applaud and greatly respect my learned colleagues’ desire to conduct

a diligent review of the record in this very serious matter. As an appellate

court, however, our role in this case is not to decide whether CYS satisfied its

burden of proof at the hearing; instead, we must decide whether the orphans’

court abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law in deciding that CYS did

not. It is true that as part of such review, we must determine whether the

trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record. But we are not the

finders of fact, and we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the orphans’

court. See S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123-24. Moreover, neither the orphans’

court nor this Court may substitute our judgment for that of the dependency

court on the same factual issue. See Matter of Adoption of M.A.B., 166

A.3d 434, 446 (Pa. Super. 2017). The question we must consider is whether

there was evidence of record admitted at the termination hearing to support

                                     - 20 -
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the orphans’ court findings, S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1129, and not, as the

Majority implicitly suggests, whether there was documentation presented at

the hearing to bolster the testimony that the orphans’ court found to be

credible.

      For example, the Majority’s identification of “critical documents”

includes a transcript from a May 18, 2021 shelter care hearing referenced in

the WCCB’s dependency petition.        I disagree that the omission of this

transcript impairs our review based upon its mere mention in the dependency

petition.   The focus of the termination proceeding “is whether CYS has

satisfactorily borne its statutory burden for termination under section 2511;

not to review the previous juvenile court proceedings.” In re J.A.S., 820 A.2d

774, 781 (Pa. Super. 2003) (cleaned up). The jurisdiction of the orphans’

court to terminate parental rights “is derived from a different statute” and the

purpose of the proceedings under the Juvenile Act and the Adoption Act are

“wholly distinct.” Id.

      The record reflects that CYS introduced the dependency petition

alongside the juvenile court’s dependency adjudication order without objection

in the termination matter. But a dependency petition, similar to a complaint,

simply contains unproven allegations that an agency presents to the juvenile

court for adjudication. In my view, it carries little evidentiary weight other

than showing consistency between an agency’s concerns at the time of the

initial dependency hearing and the termination testimony. The adjudication

order contained factual findings by the juvenile court that were consistent with

                                     - 21 -
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the testimony of WCCB’s caseworker. Compare CYS Exhibit 3 (Adjudication

Order) with N.T., 5/16-17/2023, at 12-34. Thus, we have sufficient evidence

to ensure that the orphans’ court’s finding as to the basis for Children’s

removal is supported by the record.

      By way of further example, the Majority observes that “CYS’[s] appellate

brief and its witnesses at the termination hearing repeatedly reference”

various documents external to the agency regarding Mother’s mental health

and drug and alcohol evaluations and treatment. Majority Opinion at 23. The

Majority contends that the absence of these documents significantly hinders

our appellate review. Id. Again, I disagree. This Court does not make factual

findings or judge the witnesses’ credibility. I recognize that the decree must

be based upon competent evidence, and to the extent that CYS introduced Dr.

Franks’ recommendation to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it

constituted hearsay. But Mother did not object to the testimony regarding

statements by external service providers, and the testimony was admitted and

considered by the orphans’ court.     Accord Com. ex rel. Robinson by

Robinson v. Robinson, 478 A.2d 800, 805 (Pa. 1984) (holding that this

Court erred by sua sponte raising evidentiary concerns in a child custody case

where “no litigant has questioned the authenticity and adequacy of the reports

or complained of their admission and consideration”); cf. generally In re

A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 1157 (Pa. 2018) (vacating decree terminating parental

rights because decree was based upon en masse introduction of 167 exhibits

with multiple layers of hearsay over parent’s hearsay objection).

                                    - 22 -
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       The orphans’ court made findings regarding these specific matters based

upon the witnesses’ testimony, which, again, came in without objection.

Moreover, no one disputes the content of the providers’ recommendations,

except for Mother’s disagreement about her mental health diagnoses.

Compare N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 240-43 (Mother denying that SPHS, her

former mental health provider, diagnosed her with schizophrenia or that she

refused medication), with id. at 137 (CYS caseworker Jennifer Guseman

testifying that Mother signed a release permitting CYS to speak to SPHS and

that SPHS informed Guseman that Mother was diagnosed with schizophrenia

in 2018 and refused medication management). The orphans’ court resolved

the factual dispute in CYS’s favor, stating in its findings of fact that Mother

was diagnosed with schizophrenia.6 Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 4 (F.F. ¶ 30). As

there was no objection raised by Mother before the orphans’ court (nor any

argument raised on appeal before this Court) concerning the absence of these

reports, it is improper for this Court to sua sponte find that CYS’s failure to

present these reports before the orphans’ court precluded a finding that it

satisfied its burden of proving the standards for termination of parental rights

under section 2511(a)(8).

       The Majority is also concerned that the “record is nearly devoid of any

information speaking to Mother’s compliance level with her service plan
____________________________________________

6  The orphans’ court nonetheless discounted Mother’s mental health as a
factor in its ultimate decision. This conclusion is of no moment as it relates to
this Court’s review given the continuing presence of the other conditions that
led to Children’s removal, as found by the orphans’ court.

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objectives from the date her first plan was ordered in Westmoreland County

until the case was transferred to Fayette County.”         Majority Opinion at 23

n.27.    Once again, I am constrained to disagree with my learned colleagues

that this information was required to be included in the certified record before

this Court. The record includes the testimony of WCCB caseworker supervisor

Molly Clayton, which is competent evidence as to Mother’s compliance with

offered services.

        Although the juvenile court orders can be helpful in establishing the

elements of sections 2511(a), nothing in the Adoption Act requires

introduction of the orders.7 The Majority also states that “record evidence

indicates that Mother had, or almost had, almost achieved her goals prior to

the case being transferred.”         Id. at 24.    But even if Mother was making

progress on her goals in Westmoreland County, she did not achieve

reunification during that time, she had a positive screen shortly after her move

to Fayette County, and she did not sustain the progress over time. Moreover,

as discussed at length above, if the conditions that led to Children’s removal
____________________________________________

7  The juvenile court is required by statute to assess both compliance and
progress at each permanency review hearing, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(2)-
(3), but some juvenile courts neglect this task. At any rate, while the juvenile
court’s assessment of a parent’s compliance with a permanency plan is a
relevant metric, in my view, the more important and telling metric is the
juvenile court’s assessment of the parent’s progress toward alleviating the
circumstances that necessitated the original placement. Simply because a
parent is cooperative with services does not mean that the parent internalizes
the lessons learned, changes the concerning behavior, or is able to fix the
problems that led to a child’s removal. Likewise, although rare, a parent
deemed noncompliant with their agency-directed and court-ordered services
may be able to make the necessary progress on their own.

                                          - 24 -
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continue to exist, and reunification is not imminent, Mother’s progress early

in the case simply is not a relevant consideration when assessing the elements

of termination under section 2511(a)(8).

      I share the Majority’s desire for a more robust record in these cases.

Termination of parental rights is not a technicality that occurs automatically

after children are in foster care for a set number of months. No matter how

much familiarity the parties, witnesses, and orphans’ court have with the facts

from the dependency matter, an agency-petitioner should always support its

petition to terminate parental rights with a clear presentation of evidence that

is derived from firsthand sources (to the extent possible) and that is tightly

focused on the precise statutory elements at hand. But given our appellate

role, the orphans’ court’s factual findings, the evidence presented at the

hearing, and the legal elements that must be proven, I conclude that we have

enough in the record before us to perform our appellate review.

      That the orphans’ court erred by finding that the conditions that led to

Children’s removal continued to exist is not the end of the matter. Section

(a)(8) also requires a determination of whether “termination of parental rights

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).

Although section 2511(a) generally focuses on the behavior of the parent, the

third prong of section 2511(a)(8) specifically “accounts for the needs of the

child.” C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008-09. Similar to section 2511(a)(5), which

contains an identical needs and welfare prong, the third prong of section

2511(a)(8) “is not a mere formality flowing from the existence of the

                                     - 25 -
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preceding [two] elements enumerated in the statute.” See In re P.A.B., 570

A.2d 522, 525 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding that the orphans’ court committed

an error of law by implying that satisfaction of the preceding four prongs of

section 2511(a)(5) required the conclusion that termination would best serve

the children’s needs and welfare without considering the needs and welfare

prong as a discrete consideration). Further, and in a similar fashion, under

section 2511(b), the orphans’ court must “give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).         This Court has generally followed the same legal

framework to assess the third prong of subsection (a)(8) and subsection (b).8
____________________________________________

8 Because the orphans’ court determined that CYS failed to prove grounds to

terminate Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(a), it did not proceed
to section 2511(b). The orphans’ court, however, determined that CYS did
not prove that termination served Childrens’ needs and welfare pursuant to
section 2511(a)(8).

      Section 2511 refers to the child’s “needs and welfare” three times: twice
as the final prong of two of the thirteen provisions listing the “grounds” for
termination of parental rights in subsection (a), and once in subsection (b),
which is applicable to all petitions, regardless of the particular grounds upon
which the petitioner relies. Compare 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), (8) (including
as the final element that “termination of the parental rights would best serve
the needs and welfare of the child”) with id. § 2511(b) (specifying that “[t]he
court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child”).

       Although a comprehensive statutory analysis and historical overview of
the statute and cases interpreting the statute is beyond the scope of this
dissent, I would be remiss not to note that the “needs and welfare” language
in the subsection (a)(5) and (a)(8) grounds provisions is similar, but not
identical, to the language in subsection (b). Despite the General Assembly’s
directive for courts to interpret statutes in a manner that does not render any
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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This means that courts must consider the matter from each child’s

perspective, placing the child’s “developmental, physical, and emotional needs

and welfare above concerns for the parent.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105-06. Our

Supreme Court has cautioned that “the law regarding termination of parental

rights should not be applied mechanically but instead always with an eye to

____________________________________________

provision superfluous and that gives effect to each provision, see 1 Pa.C.S.
§§ 1921(a), 1922(2), appellate courts largely have ignored the language
differences and have not engaged in a full statutory analysis to discern the
General Assembly’s intent of including multiple provisions addressing the
child’s needs and welfare (likely because the issue has not been squarely
presented for consideration on appeal). Instead, this Court has interpreted
the needs and welfare analyses required under subsections (a)(8) and (b) to
utilize the same legal standards and to be based upon the same evidence.
See C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008-09 (although recognizing that subsections
(a)(8) and (b) “are distinct” and finding “we must address [s]ection 2511(a)
before reaching [s]ection 2511(b),” holding that both subsections “direct us
to evaluate the ‘needs and welfare of the child,’” and concluding, in discussion
of both subsections, that the child’s needs and welfare were best served by
terminating her mother’s rights because she does not share a parent-child
bond with her mother, she shares a parent-child bond with her foster mother,
removal from her foster mother would be detrimental to the child, and
adoption by foster mother would allow her to experience permanence in
situation where the court determined that reunification was not imminent);
see also M.A.B., 166 A.3d at 448 (combining discussion of the children’s
needs and welfare pursuant to subsection (a)(8) and subsection (b) because
the “third element of [s]ection 2511(a)(8) requires that the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt
conduct an analysis similar to that required under [s]ection 2511(b)”); accord
R.I.S., 36 A.3d at 579 n.3 (plurality) (Baer, J., concurring) (noting the
similarity between the last prong of section 2511(a)(8) and section 2511(b));

       Because there is no advocacy on this issue before us, and because
C.L.G. is an en banc decision that is binding upon this panel, I must follow
this Court’s prior decisions that use the same legal analysis for subsections
(a)(8) and (b). And pursuant to our existing case law, both needs and welfare
inquiries require courts to analyze the termination decision from the child’s
perspective and to prioritize the child’s needs and welfare over that of the
parent.

                                          - 27 -
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the best interests and the needs and welfare of the particular children

involved.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 268-69 (Pa. 2013). The party seeking

termination bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence,

that termination of parental rights serves a child’s needs and welfare. K.T.,

296 A.3d at 1105-06.

       When determining whether the petitioner met its burden to prove that

termination serves a child’s needs and welfare, the orphans’ court must

consider, at a minimum, the factors delineated by our Supreme Court in K.T.,

all of which are of “‘primary’ importance in the [s]ection 2511(b) analysis” and

“may    contribute   equally   to   the   determination   of   a   child’s   specific

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” Id. at 1109.

       The orphans’ court must determine whether the parent and child share

an emotional bond and assess whether the bond is “necessary and beneficial”

to the child, such that “maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental,

physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” Id. If a bond exists, the court

must ascertain the effect upon the child of severing the bond. Id. Because

the severing of any parent-child bond may be emotionally painful for a child,

the orphans’ court cannot preclude termination based solely on evidence of an

“adverse” or “detrimental” impact to the child.      Id. at 1110-11.         Instead,

focusing upon the “child’s development, and mental and emotional health,”

the orphans’ court should assess whether severing the bond “is the kind of

loss that would predictably cause extreme emotional consequences or

significant, irreparable harm” to the child. Id.

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       The parent-child bond, however, is “but one part of the overall

subsection (b) analysis.” The orphans’ court must also consider:

       the child’s need for permanency and length of time in foster care
       consistent with [the Juvenile Act,] 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(9) and
       [the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act], 42 U.S.C. §§
       675(5)(C), (E); whether the child is in a preadoptive home and
       bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets
       the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs,
       including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and
       stability.

Id.

       When conducting “a full subsection (b) analysis focused upon the child,”

the orphans’ court has “discretion to place appropriate weight on each factor

present in the record.” Id. at 1113. However, when “weighing the difficult

factors discussed above, courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever

in mind. Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at

269.

       Here, the orphans’ court found that CYS failed to present clear and

convincing evidence that termination would best serve the needs and welfare

of Children pursuant to subsection (a)(8).     Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 10.    In

support, the orphans’ court reasoned that Mother loves Children, which is best

evidenced by her consistent visitation, including while incarcerated. Id. at

11. The court also focused upon Mother’s desire to parent and her efforts.

See id. at 10-11; see also Statement, 9/6/2023, at 2-3.

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      CYS argues that the orphans’ court erred in this conclusion, as our law

provides that “a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone,

do not prevent termination of parental rights,” and Children have the superior

right at this point “to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [their] potential

in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” CYS’s Brief at 18-19 (quoting

Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010); In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847,

856 (Pa. Super. 2004)).

      Once again, despite our deference to the orphans’ court and our

stringent standard of review, I conclude that the orphans’ court erred by using

an incorrect legal standard to assess Childrens’ needs and welfare under the

third prong of subsection (a)(8).      A parent’s efforts and some progress

towards reunification is irrelevant to, and cannot form the basis of, a needs

and welfare analysis under subsection (a)(8). In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 12 (Pa.

Super. 2009). Furthermore, like the orphans’ court in K.T., the orphans’ court

here erroneously truncated its analysis once it determined there was a

“connection” between Mother and Children. See Opinion, 8/23/2023, at 10-

11; see also id. at 5 (F.F. ¶¶ 42-43). “[A]n emotional bond with a parent is

legally insufficient to preclude termination of parental rights without

determining whether such bond is necessary and beneficial to the child and

weighing the other factors present in the record.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1114-15.

That Mother loves Children and was “dedicate[ed] to maintaining her parental

relationship with her children,” see Statement, 9/6/2023, at 3, is insufficient

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because children have myriad needs beyond love.          See Z.P., 994 A.2d at

1121.

        The main flaw in the orphans’ court’s analysis is its examination of the

termination decision solely from Mother’s perspective as opposed to

Children’s. The orphans’ court reliance on the “connection” between Mother

and Children failed to even consider whether the same was true from

Children’s perspective. A parent-child bond is more than a shared biological

connection or a parent’s or child’s affection towards the other; instead, it is a

“bilateral relationship.” In re K.K.R.-S, 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008).

The court emphasized Mother’s love towards Children, but, despite ample

evidence in the record, made no mention of Children’s feelings towards Mother

or the effect that Mother’s behavior and struggles have had upon Children.

        For example, while finding that Mother has consistently visited with

Children, the orphans’ court failed to note that for the past year, such visits

occurred electronically over Zoom. Opinion, 8/23/2023, at 4-5 (F.F. ¶¶ 38,

42). Even Mother recognized that her ability to connect with Children from

jail was strained except when Children’s foster mother participated in the call

to provide relevant information about their daily lives and interests. See N.T.,

5/11-12/2023, at 214, 231-32. The counselor at the jail described the Zoom

visits as “very rocky” and difficult for Children to engage in but getting better.

Id. at 190, 197.

        The orphans’ court’s reference to the “connection” between Mother and

Children is the term used by the CYS caseworker when describing their

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relationship. Id. at 147. Crucially, the orphans’ court failed to mention the

caseworker’s caveated testimony that Children’s connection with Mother is not

always healthy. Id. at 147, 162. The caseworker explained that Mother does

not take Childrens’ feelings into consideration or allows her own feelings to

predominate, which causes G.W., in particular, to shut down. See id. at 162-

63. The orphans’ court was not required to find the caseworker’s testimony

credible or convincing, but its failure to mention the caveats to her testimony

or to analyze whether Children have a “necessary and beneficial” bond with

Mother was legally erroneous. K.T., 296 A.3d at 1115.

      The orphans’ court determined that Children have “a bond with foster

mother/father, in that [Children have] been placed in their home since May

17, 2021, and [Children] identify with the foster mom/dad as [their] family.”

Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 4 (F.F. ¶ 41). The evidence indicates that Children are

very bonded to each other and to their foster parents, who they have been

with since 2021.    N.T., 5/11-12/2023, at 180.      While Children know that

Mother is their parent, they look to their foster parents for “the typical parent

connection” of guidance, safety, and structure.       Id. at 178.     The court

neglected entirely to discuss Childrens’ need for security, safety, and structure

in its needs and welfare analysis. Furthermore, while it is true that time in

care does not pre-ordain the outcome (as the orphans’ court blithely noted),

it is a factor that the orphans’ court must consider, which the orphans’ court

did not do. See K.T., 263 A.3d at 1110-11.

      Curiously, the court made the following “finding of fact”:

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      Considering the connection between [Children] and Mother, there
      was no testimony offered whatsoever to show that this connection
      can be severed without irreparable harm to [Children]; nor was it
      proven that the trauma caused by breaking the connection is
      outweighed by the benefit of moving the child toward a permanent
      home.

Opinion, 8/4/2023, at 5 (F.F. ¶ 43). To say that CYS produced “no testimony

whatsoever to show that this connection can be severed without irreparable

harm to Children” without discussing the evidence CYS did produce is

incongruent with the record and the law. While the petitioner presents the

evidence and bears the burden of proof, it is up to the court to “evaluate

whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare” and the “impact of severance to determine if it

will pose more than an adverse or detrimental impact.” See K.T., 296 A.3d

at 1110-11.

      Based upon the orphans’ court’s truncated analysis, it seems as if the

orphans’ court was looking for a CYS witness to recite “magic words” instead

of conducting its own evaluation of the evidence before it.      Accord id. at

1114. Orphans’ courts are free to find the petitioner’s evidence unconvincing

or incredible, or to weigh a child’s necessary and beneficial bond more than

the other factors announced in K.T. But the court’s failure, as here, to discuss

the evidence CYS produced and to analyze it within the needs and welfare

framework is legal error. Instead, as in K.T., the orphans’ court in the case

at bar gave no indication that it weighed the “subsection (b) considerations of

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foster parent bond, preadoptive home, and need for permanency” in its

analysis “despite the fact the record included relevant evidence.”   Id.

      In addition to the caseworker’s testimony regarding the health of their

connection to Mother, evidence was admitted that showed Children’s reactions

towards Mother. The record reflects that G.W., the oldest child, “disconnects”

around Mother. Id. at 88-89, 147. G.W. does not want to participate in some

of the visits, shuts down around Mother, and sometimes will not acknowledge

her when she speaks to him. Id. at 162-63, 172-73. Normally, he is a “wild,

loud, crazy kiddo” who enjoys engaging in activities in the foster home, but

around Mother, G.W. is “somber.” Id. at 147. The caseworker explained that

G.W. has never expressed a desire to be with Mother.              Id. at 168.

Additionally, the record reflects that G.W. is in need of trauma therapy. He is

starting to disclose trauma from his past, but he typically shuts down and will

not discuss specifics. Id. at 168. He has told the caseworker, however, that

he is “always afraid” because someone touched him inappropriately in the past

(prior to his placement in this foster home). Id. at 173.

      T.W., the younger child, who has spent half her life with Mother and half

her life with her foster parents, seems more torn between them. Id. at 169.

T.W., however, has demonstrated fear when Mother has outbursts, such as

when Mother was “very upset” about T.W.’s finger being pinched in the door

by G.W. and ran into the courtroom holding T.W.’s finger and accusing the

foster parents of abuse. Id. at 169, 172.

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      Given Children’s young ages, Children’s time out of Mother’s care, the

maintenance of the relationship only by supervised visits and fifteen-minute

Zoom calls, Children’s relationship with their foster parents, their need for

permanency and stability, and the effect of Mother’s behaviors upon Children,

the record in this case facially supports a conclusion that terminating Mother’s

rights serves Childrens’ needs and welfare under a comprehensive needs and

welfare analysis. Nevertheless, our standard of review does not permit us to

make factual findings from the cold record without the benefit of the orphans’

court’s longitudinal knowledge and firsthand credibility determinations. See

I.J., 972 A.2d at 13. Thus, I would remand the case to the orphans’ court for

it to conduct a comprehensive needs and welfare analysis under the proper

legal standard. Id.

      Based on the foregoing, I would vacate the orders denying CYS’s

petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Children and remand for

prompt proceedings consistent with this dissent. Accordingly, I respectfully

dissent.

DATE: 05/06/2024

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