Court Opinion

ID: 9855844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:32:02.267527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:12.844822
License: Public Domain

HALLEY, Justice.
I dissent in this case because I think the action is premature. The assessing ordinance has not been passed. There is no question but that there is property in this paving district that will be greatly benefited by the proposed paving district. It is difficult for me to see that an improved street would not benefit all the property in the district, at least to a certain extent. It is to be presumed that the assessing authority would do their job properly. Under Section 108, 11 0.S.1951, the plaintiffs would have fifteen days after the publication of the ordinance levying assessments to bring this action.
In Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. City of Tulsa, 113 Okl. 21, 238 P. 452, 458, we said:
«* * * The matter of determining the benefits being, as we have seen, a legislative matter, and having been determined by the legislative branch of the city government, and there being no constitutional rights thereby impaired, the courts will not disturb the legislative determination."
The plaintiffs' petition was not filed in the time required by Section 86, 11 0.S.1951, and is too late if this suit is to challenge the sufficiency of Resolution No. 2, Street Improvement District No. 91. See Riedt v. City of McAlester, Okl., 262 P.2d 152.
Under Article X, Section 7 of our Constitution the City of Lawton had the right to levy an assessment because it is a local improvement.
Never before that I am able to find has this Court said that the inclusion of property in an improvement district constitutes a taking or damaging of property under Sections 23 and 24 of Article II of our Constitution and such a holding is not justified.
The passage of the assessing ordinance must of necessity come before the questions here can be properly answered and any effort to do it before is clearly out of time.
I dissent.