Court Opinion

ID: 9550841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:43:23.458891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:32.723221
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice
(concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion which affirms the action of the trial court rejecting plaintiff-appellant’s Exhibit I (a survey plat prepared by William Ashley and dated 1940). I further concur in the majority opinion wherein it affirms the action of the trial court in refusing to admit appellant’s Exhibit No. 2 (a survey prepared by Milton Booth in 1966). I believe that the decision of the majority in affirming the aforesaid rulings of the trial court is dispositive of the case.
The opinion of the majority, however, then proceeds to a reversal of the action of the trial court on the basis that “a land owner is a competent witness to the location of the boundaries of his own land if they are within his personal knowledge, and may testify to the same.” (Emphasis supplied) The majority opinion then correctly sets forth that a trial court, in ruling upon a motion made under Rule 41(b), may weigh the evidence. But the majority opinion then suggests that a trial court may not, however, disregard testimony which was neither contradicted, impeached nor inherently improbable.
The problem with that whole line of reasoning is that it was never presented to this court. The appellant did not in her assignments of error complain of the trial court’s failure to consider her testimony.
However, even assuming that the matter discussed by the majority opinion was properly before this court, I disagree with the premise that the plaintiff-appellant was a competent witness. The record discloses that the matters purportedly testified to by her were not within her personal knowledge. I disagree that her testimony was “neither contradicted, impeached nor inherently improbable.” Her testimony makes clear that she had no knowledge of the boundaries of her property other than hearsay from the county assessor in 1968. In 1965-66 she made no claim to the property in question. In fact she met with the defendants on the ground in question and they indicated to her the line which had been surveyed and staked out on the ground. She acquiesced in and accepted that boundary line and in the construction of the building. As she stated:
“Did you have any reason to doubt that this was your boundary line ?
“No.
“Did you have any reason to believe that this was not the line that was pointed out to you?
“No reason. If the surveyor said it, I figured it was law.”
“All of a sudden in 1968 you suddenly decided you owned this ?
“Yes. After I talked to the assessor.”
In contrast to the testimony of the plaintiff, the defendant Fountain was questioned as an adverse witness during plaintiff’s case, and he testified that, prior to the time he sold the property to Horner, he (Fountain) had the boundaries surveyed, not once, but twice. He also testified that he knew the boundaries of the property and that they were as contended by the defendants.
I further disagree with the majority’s evaluation of the testimony of witness *665Booth. In my judgment the record demonstrates that his testimony was not only impeached and inherently improbable, but was incredible. He was a licensed land surveyor who was hired by Fountain to establish the boundaries of the property in dispute herein. He furnished a survey on the basis of which the property was sold and the house located. He then appeared at trial, testifying on behalf of the plaintiff Hook. He stated that the survey he had furnished Fountain, and to which he had affixed his official seal and signature, was false and that he knew it to be false at the time. The trial judge, probably finding such testimony difficult to believe, asked the witness:
"THE COURT: * * *, do I understand clearly that you affixed your seal and signature to that map although you did not believe it truly represented a true and accurate survey of the property on the ground ?
“A. Right.”
To summarize the above, it is my judgment that even if a consideration of this aspect of the case is pertinent, the plaintiff did not establish that the boundaries of her land were within her personal knowledge. I further believe that the testimony of both the plaintiff and the witness Booth was impeached, was more than inherently improbable, and was certainly highly suspect. The appellant did not carry the burden of proof required to support her complaint or any of its elements, and the motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b) was properly granted by the trial court. I would affirm.