Court Opinion

ID: 9738402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:52:12.980336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.901734
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
As recognized by the Majority, Storms' lawsuit and claim is for breach of an employment contract. The duty to defend is determined solely by the nature of the complaint filed in the lawsuit. Transamerica Ins. Services v. Kopko, 570 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind.1991); United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Caplin, 656 N.E.2d 1159 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), reh. denied, trans. pending. The Majority readily admits that the bodily injury provision of the policy which covers occurrences does not even remotely apply to allegations in Storms' complaint. Their sole reliance is upon the endorsement which is the personal injury provision of the policy and relates solely to specified offenses.
I dissent for this reason:
The Majority embraces the assumption that the endorsement or personal injury provision provides broad coverage. It does not. Storms' complaint for breach of contract was not covered in the bodily injury provision of the policy because it did not describe an occurrence. In like manner, Storms' complaint for breach of an employment contract does not describe an offense as defined by the policy. The nature of the claim as alleged in the complaint is obviously not covered; therefore, there is no duty to defend.2 Transamerica, supra, at 1285. Also see Fidelity and Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Everett I. Brown Co., L.P., 25 F.3d 484, 489 (7th Cir.1994), reh. denied; City of Jasper, Ind. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 987 F.2d 453, 456 (7th Cir.1993).
The injury covered by the personal injury provision is one:
. of the following offenses committed in the conduct of the named insured's business.
Group A-false arrest, detention or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution.
Group B-the publication or utterance of a libel or slander or of other defamatory or disparaging material, or a publication or utterance in violation of an individual's right of privacy.
An examination of Storms' complaint immediately excludes any offenses under "Group A". "Group B" covers the offense of defamation as pointed out by the Majority, but there is absolutely no allegation in Storms' complaint alleging 1) a defamatory statement to a third party or 2) that the statement is false-two very important allegations for a defamatory or libel cause of action.3 This void in Storms' complaint underscores the nature of his complaint which is an action for breach of contract. If the principle of ejus-dem generis is applied, it is obvious that a breach of contract action is not included in "Group B" coverage as well as "Group A" coverage. See Martin v. Brunzelle, 699 F.Supp. 167 (N.D.Ill.1988);
The personal injury provision by its own specific language limits coverage to well defined offenses None of the allegations in Storms' complaint support a theory of defamation or any other offense specifically de-seribed in the personal injury provision. The nature of a claim is a question of law to be determined by the court. This is especially true when the court is asked to compare the factual allegations in a complaint with the limited liability language in an endorsement. County of Columbia v. Continental Ins. Co. *637et al., 189 A.D.2d 391, 595 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1993), appeal denied. Also see Interco Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 808 F.2d 682, 684-685 (8th Cir.1987).
Without any allegations in Storms' complaint that would indicate a theory of coverage under the personal injury provision, there is no duty to defend. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

. Near the end of the Majority Opinion, the Majority points to this language in Storms' complaint as being applicable: "In his complaint, Storms alleges that he was harmed by the defendants' allegations of 'neglect of duty and incompetency' and that the defendants continued to deliberately [sic] and willfully cause him harm by harrassing [sic] him and embarrassing him and subjecting him to ridicule and humiliation of others." Supp. Record at 12, 14. It is immediately apparent that harassment, embarrassment, and humiliation are not offenses covered by the personal injury provision. American and Foreign Insurance Company v. Church Schools in the Diocese of Virginia, 645 F.Supp 628 (E.D.Va.1986).

. To maintain an action for defamation, a plaintiff must show a communication with four elements: (1) defamatory imputation; (2) malice; (3) publication; and (4) damages. Schrader v. Eli Lilly and Co., 639 N.E.2d 258, 261 (Ind.1994), reh. denied.