Court Opinion

ID: 9691508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:36:21.633884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:21.675355
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON DENIAL OF MOTION FOR REHEARING
Along with its motion for rehearing, the State has filed a motion asking to supplement the record with the resetting docket notices signed by Kelly and/or his attorney during the pendency of this case. The State’s purpose is to show that Kelly’s attorney was not present in court on three dates: September 27, 2001; November 13, 2001; and December 17, 2001. We grant the State’s motion to supplement the record.
In its motion for rehearing, the State asserts that we substituted our judgment for the trial court’s in assessing the “reason for delay” Barker factor. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. The State argues the trial court relied on three circumstances as *242justifying the delay: (1) trial counsel’s absence from three pre-trial court appearances; (2) ongoing plea negotiations that were hampered by trial counsel’s absence; and (3) the prosecutor’s trial of one jail case after February 27, 2002.
The State first argues that defense counsel’s absences from court hindered plea negotiations and should be weighed against Kelly. The State is correct that good-faith plea negotiations provide a valid reason for delay and should not be weighed against the prosecution in a speedy trial analysis. State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818, 824 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). However, although the prosecutor testified during the speedy trial hearing, he did not testify that plea negotiations were ongoing or that negotiations were hampered by defense counsel’s absence. Further, the State cites no authority for its proposition that defense counsel’s absence from court for pre-trial appearances on days that the accused personally appeared is a reason for delay that weighs against the accused.
Moreover, as pointed out by Kelly in his response to the motion for rehearing, until December 6, 2001, when the State obtained test results of the seized contraband, the State was not ready to go to trial. Kelly filed a motion on September 21, 2001 that requested physical inspection of the seized evidence and asserted a good-faith belief he had been “overcharged.” Laboratory testing proved a state-jail felony amount instead of a second-degree felony amount. Thus, even if during the speedy trial hearing the State had raised defense counsel’s absences and hindering of plea negotiations as a reason for the delay, at best only one of the absences (December 17, 2001) occurred after December 6, 2001. Until the test results were back, any plea negotiations would have centered on the “overcharged” second-degree felony, not the state jail felony to which Kelly ultimately pleaded.
Similarly, the State raises as a ground for rehearing that the prosecutor testified he tried a jail case after February 27, 2002 rather than this case, since Kelly was out on bond. However, the prosecutor did not testify that the reason he was not ready for trial in this case was a crowded docket generally or specifically that the jail case delayed the State’s trial of Kelly’s case. Significantly, the prosecutor’s testimony did not reveal how long the jail case took to try.
Thus, instead of demonstrating that we substituted our judgment for the trial court’s, the State asks that we substitute the arguments it makes in its motion for rehearing for the arguments it made to the trial court. We decline to do so.
Finally, the State argues in its motion for rehearing that the “reason for delay” factor should not weigh “heavily” against the State. It cites Dragoo:
When a court assesses the second Barker factor, “the reason the government assigns to justify the delay,” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531, “different weights should be assigned to different reasons,” ibid. Moreover, some reasons are valid and “serve to justify appropriate delay.” Ibid. Here, the State offered the trial court no reason to justify the 3-1/2 year delay between appellant’s arrest and trial. Consequently, this factor, too, weighs in favor of finding a violation of the speedy trial right. Contrary to the court of appeals’ assertion, however, this factor does not weigh heavily in favor of such a finding. In the absence of an assigned reason for the delay, a court may presume neither a deliberate attempt on the part of the State to prejudice the defense nor a valid reason for the delay. Accord: United States v. Macino, 486 F.2d 750, *243753 (7th Cir.1973); Boseman v. State, 263 Ga. 730, 438 S.E.2d 626, 629 (Ga.1994).
Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314. However, at the hearing on Kelly’s speedy trial motion, the State did assign reasons for parts of the delay: the trial court’s responsibility for setting cases on the docket, the absence of laboratory test results analyzing the seized drugs, and a continuance due to the training requirements of one of its witnesses. Accordingly, our discussion in the opinion analyzes each of the State’s reasons and assigns an appropriate weight.
Finally, the State argues that the seventeen-month delay in this case is shorter than any of the delays found in the cases cited in our opinion. As we noted in our opinion, however, no single factor is decisive. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
We supplement the record as requested. As supplemented, we deny the State’s motion for rehearing.