Court Opinion

ID: 9859752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:34:36.599141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:04:51.225906
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Arterburn, C.J.
I dissent from the majority in these cases which holds that the Court may not tax costs which include the expenses of preparing for trial, retaining expert witnesses and employing attorneys, where the plaintiff dismisses the proceedings, seemingly without justification.
In these cases the State brought condemnation actions for highway purposes. It filed exceptions to the reports of the appraisers, thus compelling the defendant-landowners to incur the expense of employing attorneys and expert witnesses. In Holder (971 S 280), the day before the jury trial was scheduled to begin, the State withdrew its exceptions and sought a dismissal over the defendant’s objections. Thereupon, the court taxed as costs against the Plaintiff five hundred dollars ($500) for attorney fees and one hundred dollars ($100) for professional witnesses and other incidental expenses in preparing for trial. A similar procedure based on nearly *341identical facts was followed in Rentchler (1071 S 295). I think these awards are in accordance with Rule TR. 41 (A) (2) which reads in part as follows:
“. . . an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.” (emphasis added)
As it is applicable to condemnation cases, as well as general civil litigation, this Rule may be employed to implement the Constitutional clause which specifically requires just compensation when land is taken for public use. Article I, § 21 of the Indiana Constitution reads as follows:
“No man’s particular services shall be demanded, without just compensation. No man’s property shall be taken by law, without just compensation; nor, except in case of the State, without such compensation first assessed and tendered.” (emphasis added)
In my opinion, the Indiana Constitution means what it says. “Just compensation” is making one whole for what is taken from him by the State’s action. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co. v. Gerhardt (1961), 241 Ind. 389, 397, 172 N. E. 2d 204, 207; County of Los Angeles v. Ortiz (1971), 17 Cal. App. 3d 164, 94 Cal. Rptr. 550, 554, reversed 6 Cal. 3d 141, 98 Cal. Rptr. 454, 490 P. 2d 1142; Dade County v. Brigham (Fla. 1950), 47 So. 2d 602, 604.
I acknowledge that under the common law, costs or attorney fees were generally not recoverable as part of the damages in a lawsuit even where the unequal position or oppressive conduct of one of the parties caused a recognition of loss by the other. See 3 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, ch. 24 at 399 (1768). In many instances, however, statutes were enacted to provide for the award of attorney and expert witness fees to the prevailing party as a means of protecting parties with meritorious claims or defenses. See eg. 8 & 9 VICTORIE, ch. 18, at 141, §§ 51, 52 at 152-53 (Statutes at *342Large 1845) (condemnation procedures). In fact, England lias traditionally been more generous in granting such items, in practically ali litigation, to the successful litigant as part of the costs of the action. See 30 Halsbury’s, LAWS OF ENGLAND, Practice and Procedure, pt. 2, § 6, ¶ 793 et. seq., at 419 (1959), and see especially Id., ¶¶ 807-09 at 428-31. This country, on the other hand, has been hesitant to sever the ties of antiquity even though many courts have cried out against the injustice of failing to fully compensate condemnees incurring substantial expense in defending themselves or their property. See United States v. Lee (5th Cir. 1966), 360 F. 2d 449; County of Los Angeles v. Ortiz (1971), 17 Cal. App. 3d 164, 94 Cal. Rptr. 550 reversed 6 Cal. 3d 141, 98 Cal. Rptr. 454, 490 P. 2d 1142; New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Bayonne Barrel and Drum Co. (Law Div. 1970), 110 N. J. Super. 506, 266 A. 2d 164; Dade County v. Brigham (Fla. 1950), 47 So. 2d 602; For the general rule see Annot., 26 A. L. R. 2d 1295 and NICHOL’S EMINENT DOMAIN §14.249 [4].
In this appeal, we are confronted with neither the common law principle nor questions of “pure” statutory interpretation. Instead, we are faced with a constitutional provision directly applicable to this very case — a proceeding in which land is taken for public use. This constitutional provision is self executing in providing full recompense for loss. Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co. v. Gerhardt (1961), 241 Ind. 389, 397, 172 N. E. 2d 204, 207; Dade County v. Renedo (Fla. 1962), 147 S. 2d 313, 316 (concurring opinion of Hobson, J.); See eg. Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. (1940), 217 Ind. 93, 114, 26 N. E. 2d 399, 407; Carroll v. Green (1897), 148 Ind. 362, 364, 47 N. E. 223, 224; Compare Bd. of Comm’rs. of Hamilton County v. Blue Ribbon Ice Cream and Milk Corp. (1952), 231 Ind. 436, 440, 109 N. E. 2d 88, 90, (tender requirements of IND. CONST., art. I, § 21 not self executing). All statutes and rules inconsistent therewith *343must yield. Kinnaird v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 506, 513, 242 N. E. 2d 500, 504; Rice v. State (1855), 7 Ind. 332, 334. Therefore, IC 32-11-1-10 [Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 3-1709 (1968 Repl.)] which states:
“The costs of the proceedings shall be paid by_ the plaintiff, except that in case of contest, the additional costs thereby caused shall be paid as the court shall adjudge.”
must be interpreted to conform with the constitutional provision. This is true even though “costs” in another context might be more limited. See eg. State v. Troxler (1930), 202 Ind. 268, 173 N. E. 321; Hutts v. Martin (1893), 134 Ind. 587, 33 N. E. 676; State ex rel. Friedman v. Freiberg (1919), 70 Ind. App. 1, 122 N. E. 771. The same conformity in interpretation must exist in Rule TR. 41 (A) (2) which allows dismissal only upon “terms and conditions as the court deems proper.” The policy of this Rule is to avoid harassment and we have, prima facie, such a situation here. Moreover, it appears that this Rule is only fair and just. It does not compel taxation of attorney fees in every case, but only in the discretion of the court.
To be realistic about this question, where exceptions to the appraisers report are filed by the condemnor, the landowner is confronted with the burden of establishing the value of his property. To do so, he frequently must retain counsel and expert witnesses, a fact of life recognized by this court in Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co. v. Gerhardt (1961), 241 Ind. 389, 397, 172 N. E. 2d 204, 207. The Florida Supreme Court has quoted with approval the comments of a trial judge in this respect:
“The courts should not be blind to the realities of the condemnation process. . . . The [trial] Court sees that the County is armed with engineering testimony, engineering data, charts and drawings prepared by expert draftsmen.
The [trial] court sees that the County produces appraisers, expert witnesses relating to value, usually more *344than one in number, whose elaborate statement of their qualifications, training, experience and clientele indicate a painstaking and elaborate appraisal by them calling for an expenditure by the County of fees to such experts and appraisers which are commensurate therewith, and customary for like services of such persons. A lay defendant whose property is to be taken is called upon to defend against such preparation and expert testimony of the County. It is unreasonable to say that such a defendant must suffer a disadvantage of being unable to meet this array of able, expert evidence, unless he shall pay for the same out of his own pocket.”
Repeated in Dade County v. Brigham (Fla. 1950), 47 So. 2d 602, 604.
While it is of great significance, the general inequality of resources is not the only justification for recognizing a court’s discretion to allow non-statutory litigation costs. It should be understood that a condemnee occupies a far different status than the typical defendant wrongdoer in ordinary civil litigation. He does not necessarily desire to dispose of the property which prior to the state’s interest, he has held innocently. See County of Los Angeles v. Ortiz (1971), 6 Cal. 3d 141, 147, 98 Cal. Rptr. 454, 458, 490 P. 2d 1142, 1146. Moreover, it has been maintained that forcing the landowner to assume litigation costs to prove his claim, in effect, extracts from him more than his proportionate share of the expense of public improvements. Id. Finally, I would note that even if the denial of litigation costs was originally warranted in those jurisdictions which have rejected allowance, changed circumstances have made continued adherence archaic. See New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Bayonne Barrel and Drum Co. (Law Div. 1970), 110 N. J. Super. 506, 511, 266 A. 2d 164, 166. At an earlier point in our history the valuation of land was a relatively uncomplicated endeavor, not necessarily beyond the competence of laymen. Today, however, the inquiry is much more complex. Consideration must be given to a multitude of factors, the full explanation of which *345virtually mandates the employment of expert assistance. For an example of the impact of technology upon eminent domain proceedings, see my opinion, Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Co. v. Gerhardt (1961), 241 Ind. 389, 402, 172 N. E. 2d 204, 210.
While the potential of recovering attorney and witness fees should be recognized, they need not be awarded in every condemnation action. Instead, the propriety of allowance should be based upon the facts and circumstances of each case as determined by the trial court in its exercise of sound discretion. This may include an inquiry as to:
“whether such fees must be included in the award in order to insure the “just compensation” contemplated by the Constitution. In order to realize the market value of his holding, a property owner, compelled to litigate with the state as to the value, may well be required to incur substantial financial obligations for professional services calculated to realize his constitutionally guaranteed right. To require payment for such out of the award is not proper since the compensation contemplated by the Constitution is thus reduced by the amount of the expenses incurred. Hence it must be first determined whether or not the defendant was compelled to litigate. The answer to the query [may lie] in the reasonableness of the prelitigation offer made by the condemnor judged in the light of the ultimate determination of the trier of fact as to the value. If the offer was substantially equivalent to the award, litigation was not compelled and it would not be reasonable to permit the recovery of these items of expense. On the other hand, if the offer was so disproportionately low that recourse to litigation and the incurring of this expense was compelled to achieve just compensation the opposite result should obtain.”
County of Los Angeles v. Ortiz (Cal. App. 1971), 17 Cal. App. 3d 164, 94 Cal. Rptr. 550, 554-55 (emphasis added), reversed 6 Cal. 3d 141, 98 Cal. Rptr. 454, 490 P. 2d 1142.
I feel the phrase “compelled to litigate” is the key to any determination that attorney and expert witness fees would be appropriate. An inadequate tender is certainly a significant factor to be considered. Without the possibility of recom*346pense, the landowner must consider all the costs of litigation in determining whether he will accept a lower valuation than that to which he may be entitled. However, the ultimate verdict need not be dispositive of the issues and should not be the only measure of whether litigation costs should be granted. Another factor would be whether the condemnor engaged in dilatory procedural tactics, keeping the landowner in uncertainty for years as to the final disposition of his property and how he may use it in the meantime. Moreover, bad faith or oppressive conduct by either party such as that used by the state in this case, is most relevant in determining if the trial court should exercise its discretion.
As judges, we are not unaware of the abuse of condemnation proceedings by a state by long drawn out litigation and delays. In New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Bayonne Barrel and Drum Co. (Law Div. 1970), 110 N. J. Super. 506, 266 A. 2d 164, the state originally tendered $397,036 for the defendant’s property. After trial by jury, however, the condemnee was awarded damages of $2,767,000, seven times the original offer. Counsel and expert witness fees were, I feel, properly allowed as a means of making the condemnee whole despite the absence of express statutory authority. The trial judge reasoned that since the agency grossly misjudged the value of the property, extended litigation was forced upon defendant landowner and, under such circumstances, just compensation mandated the allowance of litigation costs. Id. at 167.
Another instance of administrative arrogance is United States v. Lee (5th Cir. 1966), 360 F. 2d 449, where the Corps of Engineers alleged that the property sought consisted of only 1151.56 acres, determined by using a plainimeter rather than the recognized metes and bounds method. Defendant protested that the actual acreage was greater and requested an official measurement. This demand was refused by the Corps who informed the condemnee that he would have to furnish his own survey at his own expense. The results of *347defendant’s privately endowed survey revealed that the property in fact contained 1182.06 acres. This disparity resulted in an increased award of $6,800, based upon a fixed amount per acre. The costs of the survey were granted in accordance with the Court’s analysis of both the just compensation and the due process clauses:
“When the Government decides to ascertain the actual acreage being taken by means other than a survey on the ground, and the condemnee is put to the expense of showing the correct acreage being taken, it would be a violation of the Constitution to make him bear the cost of such survey, especially when the Government is put on notice that the acreage they claim to be taking is less than what is actually being condemned. To hold otherwise would be to deprive a landowner of his property without due process of law.
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If the Appellees’ land had not been condemned, there would have been no need for the survey on the ground involved here. There is no question that if the survey had not been made, the Government would not have stipulated that the amount of acres actually being condemned was 1181.06, and part of the property of the landowners would have been taken without just compensation or due process of law.” Id., at 452.
The above two cases are similar to the suits now before us. Here the state sought Mr. Holder’s and Mr. Rentchler’s property. Independent appraisers found the value to be $8,335.90 as to Holder and $3,397.15 as to Rentchler. Instead of accepting those determinations, the government filed objections and proceeded to play cat and mouse with the condemnees. Belatedly realizing that insistence upon lesser amounts would be futile, the state withdrew its objections. To preserve their claims in the meantime, however, the condemnees were forced to retain counsel and an appraiser. Their fees are substantial, approximately 8 per cent of the property’s apparent true value as to Holder and 12 per cent as to Rentchler, but seemingly reasonable. Under these circumstances, if Holder and Rentchler are not allowed to recover *348these expenses, can it honestly be contended that they have received just compensation under the Constitution? I think not.
Hunter, J., concurs.