Court Opinion

ID: 7819390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:48:29.497157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:41.865759
License: Public Domain

J. Fred Jones, Justice, dissenting. I do not agree with the majority opinion in this case. I would reverse the judgment in favor of Leverette. In the first place, when Leverette entered into the written lease with Cason on March 1, 1971, he did so with his eyes wide open to the unlawful detention action then pending between Cason and White. White’s written lease with Cason terminated on December 30, 1970, but he was still in possession of the land on March 1, 1971, and Leverette was bound to have known that the contest between Cason and White was for a determination of whether White had rented the land for 1971, or whether Cason was entitled to immediate possession. Leverette agreed to pay rent npt in dollars and cents but in bushels of rice and soybeans whether he planted or raised anything on the leased land or not. It is my view that Leverette practically invited such damages as he may have sustained in this case and that he should bear at least some of the consequences of his own actions. That, however, is not the basis of my dissent. It is my view that Leverette simply failed to prove the damages awarded him by competent evidence in a case of this kind. He based his damages on what he said his profits would have amounted to from the Cason land had it been available to him on March 1, 1971. It is my view that evidence as to prospective profits from annual crops not raised on leased lands is entirely too speculative and uncertain to constitute competent and admissible evidence in measuring damages for breach of contract for the lease or rental of such lands. In arriving at the profits he would have made on the Cason land, it is true, as pointed out by the majority, Leverette did itemize, without benefit of records, his cost of making a crop on other lands he farmed. That is one of the difficulties I find in the admissibility of such evidence. It could be totally self-serving and immune to successful challenge. If the market price of rice should go down and the market price of soybeans should increase during the crop year, there would be nothing to prevent such tenant out of possession from testifying he intended to plant all the land in soybeans and collect his damages on that basis. As I view the majority opinion, it would open the door to proof of prospective profits from the highest and best use of land intended by the tenant as the measure of damages for breach of a farm lease. I would still adhere to the principle announced as early as 1883 in the case of Rose v. Wynn, 42 Ark. 257. In that case Rose leased a hotel to Wynn but was unable to deliver possession because a tenant was holding over under a former lease and was successfully resisting eviction under a retention bond. In proof of damages Wynn offered evidence as to the difference he paid for boarding his family and what it would have cost to live in the hotel had possession been delivered to him. In rejecting this evidence as too conjectural and uncertain this court said: “The books agree that in an action by a lessee against a lessor for damages for refusal or failure to deliver possession of the demised premises the general rule for the measure of damages is the difference between.; the rent reserved and the value of the .premises for the term. If the value of the premises for the term is no greater than the rent which tenant has agreed to pay, then the latter is not substantially injured, and can in general recover only nominal damages, though the landlord without just cause refused to give possession. But if the value of the premises is greater than the rent to be paid, the lessee is entitled to the benefit of his contract, and this will ordinarily consist of the difference between the two amounts. Adair v. Boyle, 20 Iowa 242; Trull v. Granger, 4 Selden, (New York Court of Appeals), 115; 3 Sutherland on Damages, 150; Green v. Williams, 45 Ill. 206; Dean v. Roesler, 1 Hilton 422. It seems, also, from the current of adjudications, that if other damages have resulted as the direct and necessary or natural consequence of the defendant’s breach of the contract, these are also recoverable. For example, if plaintiff in good faith, and relying on the contract, has made preparation to take possession, and these have been rendered useless by the defendant’s refusal to comply with his contract, the authorities hold that there may be a recovery for the loss thus sustained.” (My emphasis). I do not contend that in no case can loss of future profits from leased premises be recovered as an element of damages for breach of the lease, but the key words of distinction are those I have emphasized in the above quote from Rose v. Wynn. In McElvaney v. Smith, 76 Ark. 468, 88 S.W. 981, we said: “When a landlord unlawfully evicts a tenant from the premises, the tenant is entitled to recover as damages whatever loss results to him as a direct and natural consequence of the wrongful act of the landlord. If the rental value of the place from which he is evicted is greater than the price he agreed to pay, he may recover this excess and, in addition thereto, any other loss directly caused by the eviction, such as the expense of removal to another place.” (My emphasis). In Thomas v. Croom, 102 Ark. 108, 143 S.W. 88, the pertinent facts were almost identical to those in the case at bar and in that case we said: “The measure of damages for the breach of this implied covenant for possession is the difference between the rental value of the demised premises and the rental price named in the lease, together with such special damages as have necessarily resulted from such breach. * * * The probable profits to a lessee from the cultivation of demised land is not the true measure of his damages resulting from the breach of a covenant for possession, and can not be considered in determining the amount of such damages.” In Reeves v. Romines, 132 Ark. 599, 201 S.W. 822, Reeves rented land from Romines and was enjoined from cultivating the land in an action brought by Esmonds to whom the land had already been rented for the particular crop year involved. Reeves sued for $600 damages based on the profits he would have made from crops on the land. On the basis of McElvaney v. Smith and Thomas v. Croom, supra, we affirmed the trial court in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint. As already stated, I do not contend that lost profits may not be considered in any case for breach of contract for the lease of land or buildings, but I do contend that such lost profits must be ascertainable and result as a direct and natural consequence of the wrongful act and must be proven by evidence free of speculation and conjecture. For example, in the operation of a soda fountain future monthly profits may reasonably be estimated on past monthly profits. Black v. Hogsett, 145 Ark. 178, 224 S.W. 439. In an egg ranch or a dairy operation, it would appear that daily or monthly profits could be easily and accurately ascertained by simple daily records and such profits could reasonably be projected into the future with some degree of accuracy; but it is my view, that the profits to be derived from rice and soybean farming are an entirely different matter. It is my view that there are so many hazards and variables controlling the profits any one individual will derive from rice and soybean farming, or from any other annual field crop production, it would be next to impossible to predict, with any degree of accuracy, the profits he would have made from land he did not plant or cultivate, and to prove the amount of such profits without speculation and conjecture. It is my opinion that the profits Mr. Leverette said he did make on the lands he did farm should not have been accepted in evidence as to profits he would have made on other lands he did not plant or cultivate; and I would reverse the judgment in favor of Leverette and remand for a new trial as to any actual damages, including special damages, he may have sustained as the direct and natural consequence of any wrongful acts of Cason.