Court Opinion

ID: 9897311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:00.402505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:05.663317
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      Aug 17 2023, 9:21 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joel M. Schumm                                             Theodore E. Rokita
Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Attorney General of Indiana

                                                           Courtney Staton
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Randall D. Johnson,                                        August 17, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CR-2898
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                           Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Angela D. Davis,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           49D27-2102-F1-3732

                                 Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                            Judges Bailey and Kenworthy concur.

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2898 | August 17, 2023                            Page 1 of 11
      Case Summary
[1]   Randall Johnson appeals his convictions for two counts of child molesting,

      Level 1 felonies. Johnson appeals and argues that: (1) the trial court’s

      preliminary instruction to the jury regarding juror questions violated the jury’s

      right to determine the law pursuant to Article 1, Section 19 of the Indiana

      Constitution; and (2) the probation conditions imposed were an abuse of

      discretion. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

      Issues
[2]   Johnson raises two issues, which we restate as:

                 I.    Whether the trial court’s preliminary instruction to the
                       jury regarding juror questions violated the jury’s right to
                       determine the law pursuant to Article 1, Section 19 of the
                       Indiana Constitution.

               II.     Whether the probation conditions imposed regarding
                       contact with children were an abuse of discretion.

      Facts
[3]   Johnson began dating and living with Toryah Cole and her children in 2008 in

      Indianapolis. Cole’s children included: A.H., who was born in 2006; and D.C.

      and C.C., who are younger than A.H. Johnson molested A.H. from the time

      she was nine or ten years old until she was approximately thirteen years old.

      The molestations included Johnson inserting his tongue into A.H.’s vagina and

      anus and Johnson inserting his finger into A.H.’s vagina. In December 2020,

      when A.H. was fifteen years old, she told Cole about Johnson’s actions. Cole

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2898 | August 17, 2023            Page 2 of 11
      did not believe A.H., so A.H. told her grandmother about the molestations.

      A.H.’s grandmother notified the authorities.

[4]   In February 2021, the State charged Johnson with three counts of child

      molesting, Level 1 felonies, for performing or submitting to “other sexual

      conduct” with A.H. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 32. A jury trial was held in

      September 2021. The trial court gave the following preliminary instructions:

              During the trial, you may have questions you want to ask a
              witness. Please do not address any questions directly to a
              witness, the lawyers, or your fellow jurors, since there are rules as
              to what questions may be asked, and the answers that witnesses
              are allowed to give.

              Instead, if you have questions, please raise your hand after the
              attorneys have asked all of their questions, and before the witness
              has left the witness stand. You must put your questions in
              writing. I will review them with the attorneys, and I will
              determine whether your questions are permitted by law. If it is
              not permitted, you may not speculate as to why it was not asked,
              nor what the answer may have been.

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 122. Johnson did not object to the trial court’s

      preliminary instructions.

[5]   The jury found Johnson guilty as charged. The trial court vacated the judgment

      for Count II. On Counts I and III, the trial court sentenced Johnson to an

      aggregate sentence of thirty years with five years suspended to probation and

      imposed conditions of probation, including limitations on Johnson’s ability to

      have contact with children. Johnson now appeals.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2898 | August 17, 2023        Page 3 of 11
      Discussion and Decision
      I. Jury Instruction

[6]   Johnson first makes a novel argument that the trial court’s preliminary

      instruction to the jury regarding juror questions violated the jury’s right to

      determine the law pursuant to Article 1, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution.

      “Generally, we review jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.” Miller v.

      State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874 (Ind. 2022). “Where, as here, a defendant fails to

      object to an instruction, he waives appellate review.” Id. “[W]e may still

      review the instruction for fundamental error, a narrow exception to waiver.”

      Id. “An error is fundamental if it made a fair trial impossible or was a ‘clearly

      blatant violation[ ] of basic and elementary principles of due process’ that

      presented ‘an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’” Id. (quoting

      Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009)).

[7]   Johnson’s argument pertains to the following portion of the trial court’s

      instruction regarding jury questions: “You must put your questions in writing.

      I will review them with the attorneys, and I will determine whether your

      questions are permitted by law. If it is not permitted, you may not speculate

      as to why it was not asked, nor what the answer may have been.”

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 122 (emphasis added). According to Johnson, the

      emphasized portion of the instruction violates the jury’s right to determine the

      law pursuant to Article 1, Section 19, of the Indiana Constitution, which

      provides: “In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to

      determine the law and the facts.”

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2898 | August 17, 2023        Page 4 of 11
[8]   We first note that the instruction follows Indiana Evidence Rule 614(d), which

      provides: 1

                 A juror may be permitted to propound questions to a witness by
                 submitting them in writing to the judge. The judge will decide
                 whether to submit the questions to the witness for answer.
                 The parties may object to the questions at the time proposed or at
                 the next available opportunity when the jury is not present. Once
                 the court has ruled upon the appropriateness of the written
                 questions, it must then rule upon the objections, if any, of the
                 parties prior to submission of the questions to the witness.

      (emphasis added). We have held that Evidence Rule 614(d) “makes evident by

      its language that not all juror questions are proper and that a trial judge must

      determine whether the question is appropriate after hearing objections from the

      parties.” Trotter v. State, 733 N.E.2d 527, 531 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.

      A proper juror question “is one which allows the jury to understand the facts

      and discover the truth.” Id. “The trial court’s decision of whether a juror

      question is for the purpose of discovering the truth is afforded broad

      discretion.” Id. “[Q]uestions propounded by jurors are entitled to no less

      1
          The instruction also tracks the Indiana Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, which provide:

               During the trial you may have questions you want to ask a witness. Please do not address any
               questions directly to a witness, the lawyers, or your fellow jurors since there are rules as to what
               questions may be asked, and the answers that witnesses are allowed to give. Instead, if you
               have questions, please raise your hand after the attorneys have asked all of their questions, and
               before the witness has left the witness stand. You must put your questions in writing. I will
               review them with the attorneys, and I will determine whether your questions are permitted by
               law. If a question is permitted, I will ask it of the witness. If it is not permitted, you may not
               speculate why it was not asked, nor what the answer may have been.
      Instruction No. 1.2200. Juror Questions and Procedure., Ind. Pattern Crim. Jury Inst. 1.2200. Use of the
      pattern jury instructions is the “preferred practice.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 199 (Ind. 2021).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2898 | August 17, 2023                                    Page 5 of 11
       scrutiny under our rules of evidence than those propounded by parties.” Burks

       v. State, 838 N.E.2d 510, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[9]    In Bigler v. State, 602 N.E.2d 509, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied, we

       addressed the trial court’s duty to determine admissibility of evidence in the

       context of Article 1, Section 19. We held:

                  The constitutional guarantee contained in Art. 1, § 19, which
                  confers upon the jury the right to determine the law as well as the
                  facts, is not absolute, Jones v. State (1983), Ind., 449 N.E.2d 1060,
                  1065[ 2], or exclusive. Beavers v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 549, 557,
                  141 N.E.2d 118, 122. The Indiana Constitution also vests the
                  judicial powers in the Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts and such
                  other courts as the General Assembly may establish. Art. 7, § 1.
                  Under our system of jurisprudence, the judge, not the jury,
                  determines the law as to the admissibility of evidence. Pointon v.
                  State (1980), 274 Ind. 44, 408 N.E.2d 1255; Beavers, 236 Ind. at
                  557, 141 N.E.2d at 121. It is the jury’s duty to observe and
                  respect this coordinate right set forth in the Constitution, id. at
                  563, 141 N.E.2d at 124, as it is not the judge of the law at every
                  step in the proceedings. Id. at 564, 141 N.E.2d at 125. It is for
                  the jury to decide the case under the law and upon the evidence
                  which the court permits to be introduced. Espenlaub v. State
                  (1936), 210 Ind. 687, 697, 2 N.E.2d 979, 983.

[10]   In fact, our Supreme Court has long held that “‘[t]he court and not the jury

       determines the admissibility of evidence, and the foundation for the admission

       of secondary evidence is a matter alone for the court and not for the jury.’”

       Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 684 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Sprague v. State, 203

       2
           Overruled on other grounds by Seay v. State, 698 N.E.2d 732 (Ind. 1998).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2898 | August 17, 2023            Page 6 of 11
       Ind. 581, 181 N.E. 507, 512 (1932)); Espenlaub, 210 Ind. at 697, 2 N.E.2d at 983

       (“It is for the court to determine what evidence is competent and what evidence

       is not competent, and the jury has no concern of these questions. It is for the

       jury to decide the case under the law and upon the evidence which the court

       permits to be introduced.”).

[11]   In support of his argument, Johnson points to the testimony of Detective

       Stephen Guynn. Jurors asked the following questions of Detective Guynn:

       “Have you ever known a child abuse case that turned out to be a fabrication?”

       and “Did the siblings collaborate [sic] any all[e]gations.” Appellant’s App. Vol.

       II p. 153-54. A sidebar discussion of the questions between the trial court and

       counsel was not recorded, and the trial court did not ask those questions of

       Detective Guynn. Johnson contends that these questions “went to the heart of

       the defense of this case and the ultimate question the jury was required to

       determine—whether A.H. was telling the truth . . . .” Appellant’s Br. p. 13.

[12]   Under Johnson’s interpretation of Article 1, Section 19, the jury would

       determine the admissibility of evidence. The State correctly argues that: “If this

       Court were to adopt Johnson’s reasoning, then trial courts would infringe upon

       the jury’s right to determine the law any time they sustained an objection,

       excluded evidence, struck an answer from the record, or admonished a jury to

       consider only the evidence that has been presented when making their

       determination of guilt or innocence.” Appellee’s Br. pp. 14-15. We agree that

       “[s]uch an absurd result is not consistent with the purpose of Article 1, Section

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2898 | August 17, 2023       Page 7 of 11
       19.” Id. at 15. Accordingly, we do not find Johnson’s novel argument

       persuasive.

[13]   Moreover, we note that the trial court also instructed the jury: “Under the

       Constitution of Indiana, you have the right to determine both the law and the

       facts. The Court’s instructions are your best source in determining the law.”

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 107. “In reviewing a particular instruction for

       fundamental error, we need not reverse unless the instructions as a whole—the

       jury charge—misled the jury on the applicable law.” Batchelor v. State, 119

       N.E.3d 550, 559 (Ind. 2019). The instructions as a whole properly informed the

       jury of its constitutional duties under Article 1, Section 19, and did not mislead

       the jury. We conclude that Johnson has failed to demonstrate fundamental

       error in the trial court’s instruction to the jury regarding juror questions.

       II. Probation Conditions

[14]   Next, Johnson argues that the probation conditions imposed by the trial court

       were erroneous. “Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in fashioning defendants’

       probation conditions.” Weida v. State, 94 N.E.3d 682, 687 (Ind. 2018). “We

       will not disturb a court’s probation order absent an abuse of that discretion.”

       Id. “A court abuses its discretion when the probation conditions imposed are

       not reasonably related to rehabilitating the defendant and protecting the

       public.” Id.

[15]   The trial court imposed the following probation conditions:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2898 | August 17, 2023         Page 8 of 11
               24. You shall have no contact with any person under the age of
               16 unless you receive Court approval or successfully complete a
               court-approved sex offender treatment program, pursuant to IC
               35-38-2-2.4. Contact includes face-to-face, telephonic, written,
               electronic, or any indirect contact via third parties.

               25. Applies only to “sexually violent predator” as defined by IC 35-38-1-
               7.5 or an “offender against children” as defined by IC 35-42-4-11. You
               shall have no unsupervised contact or contact with a person less
               than sixteen (16) years of age. *Permitted as a condition by IC
               35-38-2-2.2(b)(1).

               26. Applies only to “sexually violent predator” as defined IC 35-38-1-7.5
               or an “offender against children” as defined in IC 35-42-4-11. The
               court finds that it is in the best interests of the child that you shall
               have no unsupervised contact or contact with your child or
               stepchild who is less than 16 years of age. *Permitted as
               condition by IC 35-38-2-2.2(b)(2).

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 24 (emphasis in original).

[16]   Johnson contends that the trial court did not make a “best interests” finding

       regarding D.C. and C.C. and that Cole, D.C., and C.C. support having contact

       with Johnson. Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-2.2(b), however, provides:

               As a condition of probation for a sex offender who is a sexually
               violent predator under IC 35-38-1-7.5 or an offender against
               children under IC 35-42-4-11, the court may:

                        (1) subject to subdivision (2), prohibit the sex offender
                        from having any:

                                 (A) unsupervised contact; or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2898 | August 17, 2023            Page 9 of 11
                                 (B) contact;

                        with a person less than sixteen (16) years of age; and

                        (2) if the court finds it is in the best interests of the child,
                        prohibit the sex offender from having any:

                                 (A) unsupervised contact; or

                                 (B) contact;

                        with a child or stepchild of the sex offender, if the child
                        or stepchild is less than sixteen (16) years of age.

       (emphasis added). Regardless of the children’s view of Johnson as a father

       figure, Cole and Johnson were not married, and D.C. and C.C. are not

       Johnson’s stepchildren. Accordingly, Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-2.2(b)(2) is

       inapplicable here. The trial court, thus, was not required to make a “best

       interests” finding.

[17]   Johnson also cites Frank v. State, 192 N.E.3d 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans.

       denied, for the proposition that we should reverse this probation condition to

       allow Johnson to have contact with D.C. and C.C. We do not find Frank

       persuasive here. In Frank, the defendant was convicted of molesting an

       unrelated thirteen-year-old girl that he met through Snapchat. On appeal,

       where the parents of the children supported contact, we allowed “an exception

       for contact between Frank and his daughter, nephews, and nieces while Frank

       is in the DOC.” Frank, 192 N.E.3d at 908.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2898 | August 17, 2023                 Page 10 of 11
[18]   Here, however, Johnson wants contact with the siblings of his victim. Another

       probation condition, which Johnson does not challenge, provides:

               20. You shall have no contact with your victim or victim’s
               family unless approved in advance by your probation officer and
               treatment provider for the benefit of the victim. Contact includes
               face-to-face, telephonic, written, electronic, or any indirect
               contact via third parties.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 23 (emphasis added). Johnson’s molestation of

       A.H. created a family rift that is ongoing. Continued contact between Johnson

       and A.H.’s siblings is unlikely to help heal that family rift. Under these

       circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting

       Johnson’s contact with D.C. and C.C.

       Conclusion
[19]   The trial court’s instructions to the jury regarding juror questions did not violate

       Johnson’s rights under Article 1, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution, and

       the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing probation conditions

       limiting Johnson’s contact with children. Accordingly, we affirm.

[20]   Affirmed.

       Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2898 | August 17, 2023      Page 11 of 11