Court Opinion

ID: 9734141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:26:18.091083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.942400
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1618, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 714 (1966), there is reference to nonphysical intimidation which is “destructive of human dignity.” Miranda presents the following example taken from Professor Sutherland’s article, Crime and Confession, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 27, 37 (1965):
“ ‘Suppose a well-to-do testatrix, says she intends to will her property to Elizabeth. John and James want her to bequeath it to them instead. They capture the testatrix, put her in a carefully designed room, out of touch with everyone but themselves and their convenient “witnesses,” keep her secluded there for hours while they make insistent demands, weary her with contradictions of her assertions that she wants to leave her money to Elizabeth, and finally induce her to execute the will in their favor. Assume that John and James are deeply and correctly convinced that Elizabeth is unworthy and will make base use of the property if she gets her hands on it, whereas John and James have the noblest and most righteous intentions. Would any judge of probate accept the will so procured as the “voluntary” act of the testatrix?’ ”
To consider the execution of the will in the above example voluntary would be even more absurd if the testatrix had been asked to hold her grandchild — “crying, jumping and in need of a diaper change” — on her lap while she signed.
The Miranda court expressed concern over such an “interrogation atmosphere” and the toll it takes on individual liberties. Id. at 455-456, 86 S.Ct. at 1617-18, 16 L.Ed.2d at 712-713. Employing crying babies with “smelly diapers” (see majority opinion) further fouls the air and hastens the asphyxiation of the accused’s constitutional rights.
*203The appellant’s confession was not a voluntary confession.