Court Opinion

ID: 9535963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:52:06.580635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:24.055418
License: Public Domain

JACKSON, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from the majority decision to remand this case to the trial court for further findings. The right to assistance of counsel is “personal in nature and may be waived by a competent accused if the waiver is ‘knowingly and intelligently’ made.” State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987) (citations omitted). It follows that an accused’s “decision to defend himself is a waiver of the right to assistance of counsel.” Id. The trial court determines whether this waiver is “knowingly and intelligently” made. Id.
Appellate review of a trial court’s determination can be made by examining the record. See id. at 188 (even absent a colloquy appellate court will look at any evidence in the record showing awareness of the risks of proceeding pro se); State v. Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1986) *639(per curiam) (“record evidence supports the ruling of the trial court and the review of the district court that defendant waived his right to assistance of counsel”); State v. Dominguez, 564 P.2d 768, 770 (Utah 1977) (“[a] review of the transcript ... shows defendant was fully advised of his right to counsel and of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without the aid of an attorney”); State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 733 (Utah App.1991) (record reflects that trial court considered critical facts in self-representation determination). Because the record in this case clearly supports the trial court’s ruling that defendant’s waiver of counsel and decision to represent himself was not knowingly and intelligently made, there is no need to remand for further findings and the trial court’s ruling must be affirmed.
A decision to waive counsel is knowingly and intelligently made if the defendant is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187; Hamilton, 732 P.2d at 507; Dominguez, 564 P.2d at 769. The record must show that defendant “knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541; accord Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187; Hamilton, 732 P.2d at 507; Dominguez, 564 P.2d at 769. When reviewing the record, this court must consider “the total circumstances of the individual case including background, experience and the conduct of the accused.” Drobel, 815 P.2d at 733 (quoting United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 958 (10th Cir.1987)).
The main opinion sets forth certain facts from the record that are relied upon to conclude the defendant made a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of his right to counsel. However, the record contains additional material facts, set forth below, which need to be included in the analysis. My review of the defendant’s background, experience and conduct in this record convinces me that the defendant could not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. His requests to waive his right were based on a complete misunderstanding of and distrust of the American legal system, in tandem with a narcissistic personality disorder. Accordingly, the defendant could not understand the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and did not know what he was doing.
In Drobel, this court noted that “competence to stand trial, by itself, ‘does not automatically enable an accused to waive the constitutional right to assistance of counsel and to conduct his or her own defense.’ ” Drobel, 815 P.2d at 734 (quoting State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1988)). However, an “expert’s assessments of ... competence to stand trial are also relevant to the question of whether [one is] able to knowingly and intelligently choose to represent himself.” Drobel, 815 P.2d at 734. The trial judge referred the question of the defendant’s competence to stand trial to Dr. Michael D. DeCaria, a clinical psychologist. In a June 6, 1991 evaluation report, Dr. DeCaria concluded that after several sessions with the defendant:
Dr. Bakalov has virtually no understanding of the American legal system. In spite of my patient and repeated explanations to him, he was unable to attach even rudimentary meaning to such terms as preliminary hearing, pretrial motion, Circuit Court, District Court, burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, presumption of innocence, jury selection, a jury of his peers, and trial.
Dr. DeCaria also testified of these conclusions in court. At the July 9, 1991 hearing, Dr. Bakalov stated, in answer to the trial court’s exhaustive questioning of his reasons for wanting to waive his right to a jury trial, that “[i]t’s much more easy for me to convince one person than try to convince eight people.” Clearly Dr. Baka-lov did not understand even the basic tenet of American Jurisprudence, that one is innocent until proven guilty. Moreover, his response shows that he did not understand the requirement of a “unanimous” verdict. He did not understand that he would only need to raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of one of eight jurors to successfully defend against the charges. Accordingly, *640he did not understand the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
The record shows defendant’s complete lack of trust in the American judicial system. In a May 21, 1991 letter to Judge Lewis, he stated: “I wish to represent myself and to reduce the risk of intentional inaccuracies [sic] and omission of evidence.” He further stated regarding his defense counsel, “I have seriously suspicious that they are no independent and work under the direction of ... my ... sponsor.... [H]e is doing his utmost to retain me in custody and/or to extradite me to the U.S.S.R. or Bulgaria.” The defendant believed the public defenders benefit if their clients receive “small sentences.” Further, he thought that juries are functionaries of the state. Finally, he believed there was an overall conspiracy in the judicial system to convict him. Having three fundamental misdirected beliefs concerning our system, he wanted to “go it alone.”
Dr. DeCaria’s evaluation and corresponding testimony stated further:
[I]t is reasonable to conclude that Dr. Bakalov’s behavior can be interpreted as the reaction of a Bulgarian citizen so steeped in the isolation and national consciousness of Bulgarian politics that he is unable to accurately perceive the process of the American judicial system. In other words, he can only make sense of the American judicial system based on his experiences in Bulgaria, and he lacks the requisite experience and education to see how American justice is different from Bulgaria’s.
In the defendant’s mind there were no advantages to assistance of counsel. Thus, he could not understand the disadvantages of self-representation.
Not only did the defendant misunderstand and distrust the legal system, but he suffered from a personality disorder that made it difficult for him to view his misper-ceptions in any other way. Dr. DeCaria stated that the defendant’s “behavior can be described as narcissistic personality disorder. He believes in the absolute accuracy of his own perceptions.... ”
After reviewing Dr. Bakalov’s background, experience, and conduct, it is clear that he does not even recognize the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, let alone understand them. His waiver of counsel was not made with “eyes open,” but with eyes clouded by the misunderstanding and distrust developed over many years of living in a communist culture. The record demonstrates that the defendant did not know what he was doing when he requested that his right to counsel be waived. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial judge’s decision to provide assistance of counsel and not accept his waiver.