Court Opinion

ID: 9536767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:06:50.815801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:14.120001
License: Public Domain

*427SCHWAB, pro tempore J.,
dissenting.
I cannot concur with, that portion of the majority opinion which holds that evidence that a group of boys was seen seven blocks away running in a direction away from the north end of the overpass, without anything further to connect them to the incident in question, was relevant and thus admissible.
The only conceivable purpose of this testimony was to influence the jury to believe that the piece of concrete which injured the plaintiff did not fall as a result of negligence on the part of the defendant, but, rather, was thrown by one of the boys seen running.
The following excerpts from the appellant’s brief cogently demonstrate the irrelevance of this evidence for the purpose for which it was introduced:
“What ‘light’ does an observation made seven blocks away throw on the issue of how a piece of concrete fell from the overpass 1 There was no evidence to connect one event with the other. Without some connective tissue between them, there was no more ‘rational relationship’ than there was between plaintiff’s accident and any other person or thing that might co-incidentally have been observed somewhere in the general area. There is nothing in the received evidence which according to the common course of events made probable that the ‘running boys’ had thrown a rock thru plaintiff’s windshield * # #
“A close analog is contained in the negligence cases where it is sought to introduce evidence of defendant’s speed at a point removed from the scene. The objectionable features of that sort of evidence are that it has a strong tendency to distract and mislead and, also, it is not proof of the only issue it could bear on. Ramp v. Osborne, 115 Or 672, 677, 239 P 112 (1925). Where the eonnec*428tion between the speed, the distance and the tortious event properly can come in. Yates v. Stading, 219 Or 464, 475, 347 P2d 839 (1959). Only if there is other connecting evidence is it properly admissible. May v. Mack, 225 Or 278, 356 P2d 1060 (1960); Shoopman v. Long, 252 Or 341, 449 P2d 439 (1969). In the instant case, the connecting evidence is non-existent. The reason for exclusion, moreover, is even stronger. In the speed cases the person about whom remote evidence of conduct is sought to be introduced is himself ‘connected’ with the accident. The ‘running boys’ are utterly unconnected. Evidence of their conduct should not have been received.”
The majority opinion concedes that if the action had been against the boys for throwing the piece of concrete, the evidence offered would not have justified the submission of the case to the jury.
What the majority opinion therefore holds is that evidence of the identity of a tortfeasor which is not sufficient to create a jury question as to claimant’s right to damages is sufficient proof of identity to defeat the claimant’s right to damages.
For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.
Sloan and Howell, JJ., join in this dissent.