Court Opinion

ID: 9791129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:06:23.170073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:33.960656
License: Public Domain

LUSK, J.,
dissenting.
The first assignment of error, in my judgment, involves the right of cross-examination. "Where there is a question of impeachment of a witness (not a party) a foundation must be laid and that cannot be done (as was attempted in this case) by exhibiting to a witness a writing which the witness neither made nor approved: State v. Goodager, 56 Or 198, 202-203, 106 P 638, 108 P 185. See, also, State v. Brake, 99 Or 310, 332, 195 P 583. Where there is no writing such as the statute contemplates and it is desired to impeach the witness by evidence of prior inconsistent statements, “the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of times, places and persons present, and he shall be asked whether he made the statements, and if so, allowed to explain them.” ORS 45.610.
This was never done. It does not follow, however, simply from the fact that a proper foundation for im*308peachment was not laid, that the court ruled correctly in declining to permit the record of the telephone conversation to be played out of the presence of the jury. I think that the majority has taken too narrow a view of the plaintiff’s offer of proof. When what was said is viewed in its entirety it seems to me that counsel for plaintiff proposed that the record be played in her presence so that she could testify as to whether the voice was hers. Counsel for the plaintiff told the court just that when he said in answer to the court’s question as to whether he had someone to authenticate the recording: “I don’t have Mr. Goodman here, however, I believe that Mrs. Marks will be able to identify her own voice and in the event she is not able to identify it, that the jury could identify her voice from having heard her on the witness stand.”
In my opinion the court should have permitted the record to be played out of the presence of the jury in accordance with this offer, and if the witness should have testified that it was her voice and her statements were accurately recorded, then, if those statements were competent evidence, the record should have been played in the presence of the jury. The right of cross-examination surely should go this far. And, of course, if anything in the recorded statement was inconsistent with the witness’ testimony on the trial it would serve the purpose of impeachment to the extent of such inconsistency.
If, however, the witness in these circumstances should deny that it was a recording of her voice or should deny that statements of hers had been correctly recorded, then, there being no evidence whatever as to the circumstances of the recording or the accuracy of the instrument, I should suppose that the record *309should not be played in the presence of the jury. The mere fact, however, that a part of the offer of proof went beyond what the plaintiff was entitled to should not deprive him of the benefit of that which could properly be allowed.
For the foregoing reasons I dissent from that part of the opinion of the court which holds that the trial court did not err in rejecting the offer of proof.
Mr. Justice O’Connell concurs in the foregoing dissent.