Court Opinion

ID: 9449869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:26:01.801731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:01.412169
License: Public Domain

POPE, Circuit Judge.
I concur in Judge TUTTLE’S opinion. I also wish to add that in my view the record sufficiently discloses evidence which would warrant the jury in finding that Hendrix aided and abetted Sykes, one of the persons who drove from Mobile to Pascagoula with the checks in Hendrix’s automobile, in cashing a check in Pascagoula. In so doing he caused the check to be transported in interstate commerce in violation of § 2314 of Title 18 U.S.C. in the manner described in Pereira *977v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 363, 98 L.Ed. 435.1
It is true, as noted in the opinion, that the witness Corlew first, with some hesitation, identified Hendrix as the man who presented the check which he cashed, and later, when returned to the stand by defense counsel, stated that Sykes was the man who presented the check. This was after a recess when Corlew had had a look at Sykes. At this time he stated that he had been in error in his former identification of Hendrix. This does not mean, as suggested in the dissenting opinion that, “One statement offsets the other and neither should be given any testimonial value.”
The dissent cites Wigmore § 1018 to support the quoted statement. I am unable to find anything in Wigmore to support such a view. In that section Wig-more simply argues for his position that where a witness is impeached by proof of a prior contradictory statement, such prior contradictory statement should have affirmative testimonial value, a position which he proceeds to state is universally rejected by the courts. His discussion in § 1018, as I read it, does not touch any question before us. On the other hand, in § 1017, footnote 2, he states what I understand to be the universal rule in respect to cases of self-contradiction, “It is likewise an error to regard the self-contradiction artificially as ‘nullifying’ the opposite statement.” 2
I think that the case of United States v. Gardner, 7 Cir., 171 F.2d 753, is not apposite here. What was said in that case was unnecessary to the decision, was pure dictum, and predicated on a supposed analogy with the case of a stolen motor vehicle recovered before it crossed the state line; that is to say, a case where there was no transportation in interstate commerce. Such was not the case here.
It is true that Corlew had sent the check to his own bank in Pascagoula which refused to accept it; and he had doubts whether the check was good even while his employee was going to the bank with the check. Corlew’s account of his mental attitude with respect to the ultimate payment of the check is not at all points entirely consistent; but he did send it to Mobile and he testified as follows : “Q. You sent it to Mobile to see if it was good? A. Yes, hoping it was.” This the jury had the right to believe and the proof that Sykes “caused” the check to be transported to Mobile within the meaning of the Pereira case, supra, is not affected by the fact that Corlew had his fingers crossed when he sent it through.

. “When Pereira delivered the check, drawn on an out-of-state bank, to the El Paso bank for collection, he ‘caused’ it to be transported in interstate commerce.”

. The rule is stated in 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 627, p. 640, as follows: “§ 627. In General — Proof that a witness has made statements inconsistent with, or contradictory of, his testimony is proper to be considered as bearing on his credibility, and may justify disbelief of his testimony; but such proof is only evidence tending to impeach the witness, and it does not require that his testimony be rejected.”