Court Opinion

ID: 9791052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:04:22.651297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:33.628210
License: Public Domain

WARD, J.
I dissent.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion insofar as it contemplates further action by the trial court with respect to the right of the American Research Bureau to share in the incompetent’s estate. Merely striking the order directing the payment of $4,000 to the American Research Bureau would correctly dispose of the present matter.
With respect to the holding that, “Where the services of an ‘heir hunter’ actually confer a benefit upon an incompetent, a contract will be implied in law for the payment by the incompetent of the reasonable value of the services rendered,” I agree that such is the prevailing law assuming that such services are “necessary for his support.” (Civ. Code, § 38.) The cases cited in support of this rule are based upon facts indicating that the services must be for stable necessities and of substantial benefit. In determining the applicability of said rule a showing must be made that the services rendered the incompetent meet these requirements.
Prior to the appearance of the bureau, the incompetent was living under the custodial care and expense of the state. His guardian now pays the state for his care, board and lodging. So far as he is concerned, he receives $10 per month for “in*15(Mentals” out of the partial distribution of $10,000, which dwindled immediately to $3,282.55 as is stated in the majority opinion. Unlike Estate of Doyle, 126 Cal.App. 646 [14 P.2d 909], where a payment was made to an attorney who endeavored to restore one to legal competency, in this case the “incompetent” is permitted to remain in a state asylum. The majority opinion does not hold that the $10 per month out of a $10,000 partial distribution is a “benefit” or “necessary for his support.” (Civ. Code, § 38.)
The incompetent, O’Donnell, has evidently been declared an incompetent based upon a charge of inebriety. Whether inebriety renders a person’s mind unsound, either temporarily or permanently, is a question of fact. (14 Cal.Jur., p. 335, § 2.) This fact may be a proper phase of examination by the trial court.
It is suggested in the majority opinion that when all of the facts in the case are brought before the trial court “it may find that the agreement between Mrs. Dunham and the bureau was one in which, as in Estate of Butler, supra (29 Cal.2d 644, 650 [177 P.2d 16, 171 A.L.R. 343]) there was ‘integrated in the consideration therefor . . . the parties’ understanding that [the bureau] would manage what legal proceedings were undertaken’ in the Estate of Ryker and the Guardianship of O’Donnell. ... If the bureau assumed or agreed to assume control of the proceedings, then the entire arrangement, under the ruling of the Butler case, would be contrary to public policy. The court, on the further trial of this matter, should examine all the facts and circumstances to see if that is the situation.” The majority opinion fails to consider that the present record reveals an agreement within the prohibition of Estate of Butler, 29 Cal.2d 644 [177 P.2d 16,171 A.L.R. 343],
This is not an appeal in which evidence has been introduced by opposing litigants. There is no record from which conflicting inferences may be drawn. The preponderance of the evidence need not be weighed. Estate of Butler, supra, does not hold that the practice of law by an “heir hunter” must be proved to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt. It is sufficient that the practice be such as may be reasonably declared to be “contrary to public policy.” (See Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6060 et seq.; Smallberg v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 113 [297 P. 916] ; People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531 [209 P. 363]; 9 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp. §8, p. 335; *16State Bar of California v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 323 [278 P. 432]; People v. Sipper, 61 Cal.App.2d Supp. 844 [142 P.2d 960]; People v. Ring, 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768 [70 P.2d 281] ; Utz v. State Bar, 21 Cal.2d 100 [130 P.2d 377].) The record here shows with unerring accuracy, or, in other words, without any doubt, that in this ease the American Research Bureau was practicing law as that term is used in Estate of Butler, supra, and that the entire arrangement between the bureau and the incompetent was contrary to public policy.
At the outset it may be well to note that for the purpose of convenience the American Research Bureau may be appropriately and advisedly referred to as an “heir chaser.” It appears from the statement of its attorney of record on appeal that the “bureau” is in the business of “hunting heirs.” During the oral argument on appeal the question arose relative to the method of fixing 40 per cent as a “fee.” The attorney replied in substance that it was necessary to fix reasonably large fees so that the heirs who were found should pay for the losses incurred in the search for heirs who were not located by the bureau. Respondent’s brief contains the statement that the “American Research Bureau [is] licensed by the State of California as a private investigator and in the business of finding missing heirs.” (Emphasis added.)
A license to act as an investigator does not permit the practice of law. Howe v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 222 [298 P. 25], holds that the fact that the West Coast Claims Bureau possessed a license to act as an insurance adjuster did not make its business of making contracts with injured persons to take all the steps necessary to collect their claims lawful. (See Townsend v. State Bar, 210 Cal. 362 [291 P. 837]; Shaw v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 52 [297 P. 532].) Such “ambulance chasing” is analogous to that of “heir chasing.” (Estate of Butler, supra, p. 648.) A corporation may not engage in the practice of law by hiring attorneys to do the legal work. The same rule applies to individuals and associations. (People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531 [209 P. 363].) If the “heir chaser,” “for compensation controls, directs or influences” (Howe v. State Bar, supra, p. 230) the conduct of the probate proceedings or an “heir’s” actions in an estate, it “amounts to ‘commercial exploitation’ of the legal profession and is contrary to public policy.” (Estate of Butler, supra, p. 647.)
The majority opinion criticizes the form of the report of the guardian and suggests that the attorney was representing conflicting interests. I am not interested personally or offici*17ally with the activities of the attorney except to the extent that his actions or statements prove that the “heir chaser” was practicing law and that such practice was against public policy. (Estate of Butler, supra.) If it may be adjudged as practicing law when the “heir chaser” openly without any effort of hiding the facts, submits the matter upon the interpretation that may be placed upon a written instrument, for a greater reason it should be condemned when it is necessary to resort to an examination of circumstantial evidence submerged in a plan or device to evade the rule set forth in such cases as Estate of Butler, supra, Estate of Reilly, 81 Cal.App.2d 564 [184 P.2d 922] ; Estate of Seery, 81 Cal.App.2d 971 [184 P.2d 626], and In re Lynch’s Estate, 154 Misc. 260 [276 N.Y.S. 939].)
The only witness who testified in the present proceeding appears as (1) attorney for the administratrix in the Estate of Ryker, deceased, and (2) as attorney for the guardian in the Estate of O’Donnell, an incompetent, and (3) as attorney for the “heir chaser” in the presentation of the purported contract. His narration is set forth at length as follows: 1 ‘ This case is similar to the last one. The incompetent was confined to Talmage for many years. A lady died here who developed to be his half-sister. There is no record amongst her effects as to her relatives, and my client, the American Research Bureau, discovered the half-sister of this decedent, procured a contract from her at the rate of 40 %. The half-sister inherits one-half of the estate, and the incompetent brother, who was discovered after the signing of the lady in Bakersfield, gets one-half. She signed up on the basis of 40% with the idea that she would ask the Court, she being the guardian of her brother, that the Court make the same allowance with reference to the incompetent. There has been distributed to him already by partial distribution the sum of $10,000. The estate has not been closed because of litigation to the title of property, but he has already received $10,000, and there should be an allowance of the same rate of fee as the sister paid. I have a letter from her urging that the Court make that allowance.” (Emphasis added.) At a subsequent hearing the same attorney testified: “I am the attorney for the guardian in this matter, which is of the guardianship of Prank H. O’Donnell, who was committed to the Mendocino State Hospital some years ago as an intemperate. His time expired and he desired to stay on. He has been transferred to DeWitt *18General Hospital at Auburn, and is there at the present time, and apparently intends to stay there. He had two sisters; I am not sure whether full or half, but they were Hazel Ryker and May F. Dunham. Hazel Ryker died last year without any apparent relatives, or any records as to her family. We located this sister, Mrs. Dunham, living in a small town out of Bakersfield-” (Emphasis added.) Whereupon the witness was interrupted by the deputy attorney general with the question: “Who is ‘we’?” (Emphasis added.) The witness replied: “The American Research Bureau.” (Emphasis added.) Later the attorney testified that he was not the attorney “in this matter, but I was brought in-at their recommendation.” (Emphasis added.) He testified that the “incompetent . . . was discovered after” the sister Mrs. Dun-ham signed. His next statement is that “She signed up on the basis . . . she being the guardian of her brother, that she would recommend to the Court that the same allowance be made with reference to the incompetent. ’ ’ (Emphasis added.)
There would be no purpose in promising to ask the court to fix a stipulated amount as “fee” to the bureau if her brother was competent, in which event he could speak for himself. The only purpose of such a promise would be if the brother was incompetent. It does not require that an inference be drawn to prove this fact, as it appears in the testimony of the attorney that when Mrs. Dunham was located she was informed that her brother was an inmate of one of the state hospitals. This information was given to Mrs. Dunham “shortly before May 9, 1946,” less than 11 days after Mrs. Ryker’s death. It was at that time that Mrs. Dunham agreed with the “bureau” that she would make the “fee” recommendation. Subsequently she was appointed guardian. The attorney representing her as guardian was recommended by the bureau. Thereafter she was appointed administratrix. The attorney representing her as administratrix is the same attorney who represented her as guardian. The purported contract is upon a contingent basis. If $100,000 more or less should be recovered for the Hazel Ryker estate, the “heir chaser, ’ ’ subject to the approval of the probate court, will be compensated upon a 40 per cent basis upon each subsequent distribution according to the contention of the attorney. The “bureau’s” attitude appears from the statement of the attorney that “It is not a question of how much work was to be performed, but the fact that these people went in on a percentage basis and located these individuals. ’ ’
*19As further evidence that the “heir chaser” has assumed complete control of this litigation through its selected attorney, the following appears: The guardian did not sign the “Guardian’s First Account and Report” except in the form “By . . . Her Attorney.” The report is verified by the same attorney. The “Supplement to the Guardian’s First Account and Report,” which was requested by the probate judge as a means of showing the services performed, were reasonably worth the 40 per cent requested contains the following statement that Mrs. Dunham, the guardian, believes the amount “to be fair and equitable because of various factors, including that without the aid of American Research Bureau neither she nor the incompetent would have received any part of the estate of Hazel Ryker, deceased, and because said American Research Bureau performed the services purely upon a contingent basis, all at its own cost and expense.” (Emphasis added.) This “guardian’s” unverified report is also signed by the attorney as attorney for the guardian.
The “heir chaser,” through the selection of the attorney to direct Mrs. Dunham personally in her affairs of the estate and to control her in her actions as guardian of the incompetent, as demonstrated by his actions and the agreements with Mrs. Dunham, held the reins of litigation. If not identical in facts, this case is identical in results with Estate of Butler, supra, wherein the Supreme Court declared (p. 647) that the “heir hunter” had assumed “complete control of litigation instituted on behalf of the beneficiaries.”
In the present case the results are as follows: Mrs. Dunham has received $10,000, $4,000 of which (40%) has been paid to the controller of the litigation. The incompetent has received $10,000, $4,000 of which through the efforts of the attorney and the guardian was marked for the treasury of the “heir chaser.” In brief, from the $20,000 partial distribution the half-sister of Hazel Ryker received $6,000; the estate of the incompetent, according to the present plan, will receive $6,000, and the controller of the litigation, $8,000. This is only on the first distribution. If respondent’s position is correct, the same ratio of apportionment will be maintained in future distributions or increased on the basis of attorney fees for extraordinary services in determining title to property claimed by the estate of Ryker. In addition to the $4,000 to be received by the “heir chaser,” the guardian was instructed to pay $1,960 to Mendocino State Hospital and $40 per month *20“until further order” to DeWitt State Hospital and $10 per month for the incompetent’s personal account; $200 to the guardian for services; $300 to the attorney for services up to March 13, 1947 and $257.45 to reimburse the attorney for money advanced. It is not my intention to indicate that the amounts— except to the “heir chaser” —are improper, but they are listed to show that at the end of one month the incompetent’s $10,000 estate would be decreased by a sum in excess of 66 per cent.
. Respondent contends that if the contract was void because of transgressing public policy, the heir hunter still would be entitled to recover upon a quantum meruit, citing Trumbo v. Bank of Berkeley, 77 Cal.App.2d 704 [176 P.2d 376]. The Trumbo case recognizes the general rule which is controlling in the present matter, namely, that the law does not imply a promise to pay for services which are illegal or against public policy. (Restatement of the Law, Contracts, § 598, com. c.) The facts of that case were such that this court ruled as follows (p. 710) : “. . . it would be most unjust and inequitable to allow the promoters to take the benefits of respondent’s efforts, all of which were legal, and then to be allowed to escape all liability on the ground that the consideration they agreed to furnish was illegal. The proper rule, amply supported by authority, is thus stated in 27 California Jurisprudence page 210, section 17: ‘... if the services rendered under a void contract by one party thereto were not intrinsically illegal and the other party fails voluntarily to perform on his part, the former may recover as upon a quantum meruit for what the latter actually received in value, though no recovery can be had upon the contract. ’ ” In the present case the services rendered by the American Research Bureau constitute the unlawful practice of the law and are contrary to public policy. For such intrinsically illegal services no quantum meruit recovery is allowed. (Estate of Butler, supra.)
The Estate of Cohen, 66 Cal.App.2d 450 [152 P.2d 485] is relied upon by the attorney and the “heir chaser” in support of their position. The judicial views as expressed in Estate of Cohen, when such conclusions are based upon facts as stated in that opinion, must be approved. In that case decedent died in 1938. A genealogist after considerable work located a sister of decedent approximately 28 months later and obtained from her an assignment of 30 per cent of whatever
*21amount might be recovered in consideration of revealing to the sister the funds and assets which she subsequently obtained. The assignment was duly filed with the county clerk of the county in which the probate proceedings were pending in accordance with the provisions of Probate Code, sections 530, 530.1. (See present Prob. Code, § 1021.1.) In the Estate of Cohen, the record does not disclose that any arrangements were made by the designated genealogist or “heir hunter,” with an heir, devisee or legatee on the subject of arrangements to select an attorney for the heir. There, negotiations with the “heir hunter” were conducted by the heir’s two adult sons and an attorney of her own selection. This court stated at pages 456-457 that “the evidence definitely shows that prior to and at the time of the execution of the assignment he not only informed those acting for appellant that he could not select a lawyer for her, but that he expressly refused so to do; furthermore the record shows that throughout the probate proceedings appellant was represented in and out of this state by attorneys of her own selection.” In the Cohen case the agreement offered to the court for approval was made a part of the record; it was not invalid “as being repugnant to good morals and against public policy ...” The distinction made in Estate of Butler, supra, p. 649, with respect to Estate of Cohen applies with equal force to the present ease. The purpose of the Probate Code sections is to protect heirs from professional “heir chasers.” (Estate of Lund, 65 Cal.App.2d 151 [150 P.2d 211].) The legal principles set forth in Estate of Butler, supra, are indeed guideposts leading to safety zones for the protection of “heirs” from “heir chasers.”
The frame designed by the “heir chaser” does not fit the picture developed from the filed record and the evidence. No question is raised other than the propriety of the $4,000 “fee. ” That item should be stricken from the probate court’s order.
Petitions for a rehearing or for a modification were denied May 12, 1948, and additional opinions filed.*
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 10, 1948. Schauer, J., voted for a hearing.

The opinions are printed post, p. 816.