Court Opinion

ID: 9702005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:48:44.839559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:31.997280
License: Public Domain

MONTEMURO, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s analysis of this case. It is beyond dispute that Robert Costigan (“Costigan”) was disbarred by this Court, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Costigan, 526 Pa. 16, 584 A.2d 296 (1990), based upon certain criminal convictions which resulted from his participation in the administration of an estate.1 The disbarment was ordered on December 26, 1990 and made retroactive to the date of suspension, July 13, 1984.
Costigan is now seeking reinstatement.2 Consistently, from the initiation of the criminal charges, throughout conviction, numerous appeals and the subsequent disciplinary proceedings, Costigan has denied criminal culpability, admitting only that his actions constituted a serious lack of judgment. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel argues that Costigan’s continued refusal to accept responsibility for his conviction, vis-a-vis, to admit wrongdoing, would have a detrimental effect on the administration of justice, and therefore, precludes reinstatement.
Referring to a similar Massachusetts case, In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 429 (1975), the majority agrees with the Massachusetts court’s analysis that “a rule requiring admis*471sion of guilt and repentance creates a cruel quandary: [the convicted attorney who believes himself to be innocent] may stand mute and lose his opportunity [for reinstatement]; or he may cast aside his hard-retained scruples and, paradoxically, commit what he regards as perjury to prove his worthiness to practice law....” Id. 333 N.E.2d at 437. As such, the majority concludes that admission of guilt cannot serve as a condition or prerequisite to reinstatement.
Having made that determination, the majority proceeds to recount the facts of Costigan’s criminal conviction and then questions whether on the basis of those facts, the applicant has met his burden of establishing his moral qualifications, competency and learning in the law as required by Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3)(i). The majority concludes that he has not, particularly because “[h]e finds nothing -wrong with his actions in the estate matter, and instead blames his clients for any wrongdoing. This failure to acknowledge his own wrongdoing disqualifies him from readmission.... ” With the same breath, therefore, the majority determines that admission of guilt is not required for reinstatement, but denies Costigan’s petition, nonetheless, because of his failure to admit wrongdoing. I believe that the majority’s conclusions are inconsistent.
In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Keller, 509 Pa. 573, 506 A.2d 872 (1986), we addressed the requirements necessary to seek reinstatement. As the majority correctly notes, Keller requires us to first examine the nature of the conduct which resulted in disbarment in order to determine if the conduct was itself so egregious that it would forever bar readmission. If not, we must then proceed to consider whether the petitioner has sufficiently carried the burden of proof to establish his fitness to practice law as required by Pa.R.D.E. 218(e)(3)(i).
Addressing that two-prong test, I agree with the majority that the misconduct which initially resulted in Costigan’s disbarment does not automatically act to bar consideration of his petition for reinstatement. The majority’s analysis of the second prong is with what I disagree.
*472Our Rule, Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3)(i), clearly requires the petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is fit to resume the practice of law and that he has sufficiently rehabilitated so that if the privilege is once again bestowed upon him, his resumption of practice will not be detrimental to the integrity of the bar nor to the administration of justice. In making that determination, the majority focuses on the facts which led to disbarment and Costigan’s continued denial of criminal culpability, whereas, I believe it is necessary to review all of the evidence presented to the Board.
While I recognize that we are not bound by the findings of the Disciplinary Board, see Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zdrok, 538 Pa. 41, 44-45, 645 A.2d 830, 832 (1994), I note that we often defer to those findings and recommendations. Id. Indeed, it is the evidence which was presented to the Board which will guide us in determining if Costigan has carried his burden.
Such evidence, as found by the Board, did, of course, include the facts and circumstances of Costigan’s disbarment. However, the evidence also included testimony from ten witnesses, all of whom testified to Costigan’s reputation for honesty and integrity within the legal community. (Report and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board at 3-4). Moreover, Costigan testified that in addition to working as a paralegal in the law offices of Michael Stack, Esquire, he also made an effort to keep abreast of the latest developments in the law by reading the advance sheets and The Legal Intelligencer. In fact, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel does not dispute that Costigan is sufficiently learned in the law to resume practice. (N.T. 7/13/93 at 92).
Furthermore, my thorough review of the record reveals, and perhaps, most importantly, that Costigan has attended various continuing legal education seminars, including two lectures on legal ethics, (N.T. 7/13/93 at 51), and that these seminars have helped him gain a better understanding of his ethical responsibilities. (N.T. 7/13/93 at 74). Specifically, I believe that the following exchange is particularly instructive:
*473Q: Has this experience led you to have gotten for yourself any self-protective attitudes or practices that you will employ if readmitted in the practice of law?
A: Oh, I think absolutely. Absolutely.
Q: Can you expand on that?
A: Well, it’s very difficult to pick a particular situation, because I don’t know what will occur, but I do know — I think the tenure of the times is different, too. Back ten years ago, the lawyer was primarily obligated to protect his client. And I think, having attended some of the ethic seminars, that that’s not quite as true today as it was then.
I think that the — the lawyer today has enunciated, at least in these seminars, is — has a greater duty to the court or to society in general then just to his client. I think — I think that that has been a change that has occurred not only just with me. I think that’s the way the system is evolving.
(N.T. 7/13/93 at 50-51). Costigan also testified that his actions which resulted in the criminal convictions reflected a serious lack of judgment on his part (N.T. 7/13/93 at 67) and that from the experience that he has been through, his perception of lawyers’ obligations has changed. (N.T. 7/13/93 at 73-74).
After hearing all of the evidence, the Board recommended that reinstatement was appropriate. In so concluding, the Board noted that “all of [Costigan’s] witnesses testified that reinstating [Costigan] into the bar would not harm the standing, reputation or integrity of it, and that several emphasized that they would welcome his return.” (Report and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board at 11).
In another reinstatement case, we described the reinstatement process as follows:
A reinstatement proceeding is a searching inquiry into a lawyer’s present professional and moral fitness to resume the practice of law. The object of concern is not solely the transgressions which gave rise to the lawyer’s suspension or disbarment, but rather, the nature and extent of the rehabil*474itative efforts he has made since the time the sanctions were imposed, and the degree of success achieved in the rehabilitative process.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court, 468 Pa. 382, 385-386, 363 A.2d 779, 780-781 (1976) (footnote omitted).
Consequently, I believe that Costigan established by clear and convincing evidence that he is fit to resume the practice of law and that his resumption would not be detrimental to the administration of justice. Therefore, I dissent and would accept the Board’s recommendation for reinstatement.

. Costigan was found guilty of two counts of theft by deception, two counts of theft by failure to make required disposition of funds received, two counts of theft, one count of criminal conspiracy, and one count of aiding in the consummation of crime.

. Pa.R.D.E. 218 [Reinstatement] provides that after a petition for reinstatement is filed with the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court, the petition is scheduled for a hearing, at which the petitioner
shall have the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that such person has the moral qualifications, competency and learning in the law required for admission to practice law in this Commonwealth and that the resumption of the practice of law within the Commonwealth by such person will be neither detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice nor subversive of the public interest.
Pa.R.D.E. 218(c)(3)(i).