Court Opinion

ID: 9615571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:38:27.419057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:41.666734
License: Public Domain

Sears, Presiding Justice,
concurring.
I fully concur with the majority opinion that appellant has not established his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s “golden rule” argument. I write separately, however, because I believe this Court should speak more precisely on what sort of argument constitutes a violation of the “golden rule.” Even though appellant has waived any claim of a “golden rule” violation in this particular case, I nonetheless take this opportunity to offer my thoughts on the issue.
This Court has frequently held that regardless of the nomenclature used, it is improper for a prosecutor to ask jurors to place themselves in a victim’s position.24 When such statements are made in violation of the “golden rule,” they must be carefully scrutinized in order to ensure that a defendant’s right to a fair trial has not been harmed.25 However, as held by this Court less than six months ago, a prosecutor’s violation of the “golden rule” is subject to harmless error analysis.26
*890While our appellate courts have maintained that “golden rule” arguments are improper, we have provided very little guidance as to what exactly constitutes a prohibited “golden rule” argument. As noted, we have recognized that a “golden rule” argument occurs when jurors are invited “to place themselves in the victim’s place in regard to the crimes” at issue in a trial.27 Yet our courts have issued conflicting rulings on the question of when this occurs. For example, we have held that the “golden rule” is violated where the State urges jurors to: “ask yourself [to imagine that] you are nine months pregnant and a . . . man comes in the room, puts a gold gun to your head and says lay down, I’m going to tie you up. . . .”28 We have also found a violation of the golden rule occurs where jurors are simply asked what they would have done were they in the same situation as the victim of an aggravated assault.29
On the other hand, though, our courts have refused to find a violation of the “golden rule” in what might appear to be obvious cases. For example, in a prosecution for child molestation in which the child victim testified, the State urged the jury during closing arguments to:
“[t]hink about it, how would you like to walk over here, walk up these stairs and sit in this chair and have this microphone in your face and talk to twelve grownups, twelve people you’ve never met before, about the last time you had sex. ... Is that an easy thing to do? Is that something that you would want to do? . . . [L]ook at it from the children’s eyes. The right thing to do? It ruins their lives to tell... to live through it, but look what happens to them when they tell about it. Nobody believes them.”30
Even though this argument plainly asked jurors to place themselves in the victim’s shoes, our Court of Appeals, in a full court opinion, unanimously agreed that this argument did not “fit neatly within the *891category of [the] so-called ‘golden rule’ arguments.”31 Similarly, this Court has very recently held it was not improper during closing arguments for the State to urge the jury to “be the voice of (the victim).”32 Despite the “golden rule’s” prohibition against “importuning] the jury to place itself in the position of the victim for any purpose,”33 we unanimously held in that case that the argument “was not an improper inflammation of the juror’s [sic] emotions.”34 Additionally, this Court has also held that the State does not err by urging the jury during closing arguments to “return one for [the victim].”35
The mixed signals sent by this conflicting precedent are compounded by other rulings that accord prosecutors extraordinary leeway in fashioning their closing arguments. Generally speaking, Georgia’s appellate courts have permitted the State wide latitude during closing arguments so that it can “[sum] up its case graphically and forcefully.”36 During closing argument, the State is appropriately permitted to sympathetically portray the victims of a crime.37 Moreover, prosecutors can go to extreme lengths when portraying criminal defendants in the most negative light imaginable. We have allowed the State during closing argument to compare a defendant’s actions to the Gestapo’s crimes against European Jews during World War II;38 to compare a defendant to serial killers such as Charles Manson and Jack the Ripper;39 to compare a defendant to the Viet Cong and say that his return to society would be a greater danger than the threat of communism;40 and to refer to a defendant as a brute, a beast, an animal and a mad dog who does not deserve to live.41 One noted commentator has not hesitated to characterize these rulings as permitting arguments that come very close to impinging upon a criminal defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial.42 Yet, as explained above, we purport to limit what a prosecutor may say during closing argument with the “golden rule’s” prohibition against “importun[ing] *892the jury to place itself in the position of the victim for any purpose.”43
A leading treatise instructs that:
The “[g] olden [r]ule” argument is one which, either directly or by implication, tells the jurors that . . . they should put themselves in the injured person’s place and render such a verdict as they would wish to receive were they in the [injured person’s] position.44
To my mind, a “golden rule” argument is impermissible because it asks jurors to abandon their objectivity and neutrality, put themselves in the shoes of the injured party, and then reach a verdict based upon what they imagine the victim’s subjective considerations might be if he or she were on the jury.45 It seems to me that in order to be impermissible, a “golden rule” argument must hypothetically ask the jurors to consider what verdict they would want delivered if they or a member of their family were the injured party or victim of a crime.46
Accordingly, I do not believe that a “golden rule” argument is improper merely because it invokes vivid imagery of what a victim experienced during the commission of a crime or crimes. So long as such images may be drawn from the evidence introduced at trial, they may be invoked during closing arguments to the jury. To be impermissible, a “golden rule” argument must ask jurors — either directly or by implication — to perform their duties and deliberations as if they or someone they care for were the victim or injured party. As such, the danger presented by a “golden rule” argument is its attempt to give voice to a victim’s desire (imaginary or otherwise) for retribution, revenge or vengeance. Jurors, however, should render their verdict based upon their consideration of facts submitted to them, the issues framed by the pleadings, and the legal principles at stake,47 without regard for vigilantism.
The prosecutor’s argument in this case asked the jury seven times to imagine “what it must have been like” for the victims in this case as appellant and his cohorts invaded their residence, bound and gagged them, and systematically shot them to death. The prosecutor also asked the jury to imagine “what it must have been like” for the mother of one victim, who found the bodies. The images conjured by these statements were readily discernible from the evidence of record *893and did not seek — either directly or implicitly — to have the jurors step into the victims’ shoes and imagine what the victims’ subjective considerations might be if they were on the jury. Accordingly, I do not believe that these statements, standing alone, violated the “golden rule.”
However, the prosecutor also asked rhetorically (in reference to the invasion of two of the victims’ bedroom): “Do you scream? Well, they couldn’t do that because [the perpetrators had] stuffed socks in their mouth [s]. Do you fight back? These men have guns.” With these statements — “Do you scream? Do you fight back?” — the prosecutor invited the jurors to imagine that they were the victims in this case and sought to have the jurors ask themselves what they would do in that situation. I believe this crossed the threshold of an impermissible “golden rule” argument by exhorting the jury to deliberate on the victim’s subjective considerations. It also implicitly sought to give the victims a voice on the jury as it carried out its duties. Therefore, had this issue not been waived at trial, I would conclude that this particular portion of the State’s closing argument violated the “golden rule.”
As explained above, when confronted with an improper “golden rule” argument, we employ a harmless error analysis and determine whether it is highly probable that the prosecutor’s misconduct contributed to the jury’s verdict of guilt.48 Notwithstanding appellant’s waiver of this issue, I am confident that the evidence in this case, as explained in the majority opinion, was sufficient to render harmless any error associated with the improper “golden rule” argument.

 See, e.g., McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 383 (477 SE2d 814) (1996).

 McClain v. State, 267 Ga. at 383.

 Carr v. State, 275 Ga. 185, 186 (563 SE2d 850) (2002). See also Greene v. State, 266 Ga. 439, 446-447 (469 SE2d 129) (1996), rev’d on other grounds, 519 U. S. 145 (117 SC 578, 136 LE2d 507) (1997); Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777, 785 (450 SE2d 680) (1994); Green v. *890State, 249 Ga. App. 546, 554 (547 SE2d 569) (2001); Richards v. State, 232 Ga. App. 584 (502 SE2d 519) (1998); Home v. State, 192 Ga. App. 528, 529 (385 SE2d 704) (1989).

 Richards, 232 Ga. App. at 588. See McClain v. State, 267 Ga. at 383 (describing a “golden rule” argument as “[a]ny argument, regardless of nomenclature, which importunes the jury to place itself in the position of the victim for any purpose.”); Home v. State, 192 Ga. App. at 529 (“in a classic ‘golden rule argument’jurors are invited to place themselves in the victim’s place in regard to the crime itself”).

 Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. at 785; see Green v. State, 249 Ga. App. at 553 (“golden rule” violated where State urges jurors to “[i]magine you are in your bed laying [sic] there and all of a sudden(,) here is someone with a knife to your throat, ripping your clothes off, having sex with you,” etc.).

 Greene, 266 Ga. at 446.

 Home, 192 Ga. App. at 528-529.

 Id., 192 Ga. App. at 529.

 Carr v. State, 275 Ga. at 186.

 McClain v. State, 267 Ga. at 383.

 Carr, 275 Ga. at 186.

 Wellons v. State, 266 Ga. 77, 85 (463 SE2d 868) (1995).

 23A CJS, Criminal Law, § 1257, p. 149.

 See 23A CJS, Criminal Law, § 1270 (c), p. 173.

 Forehand v. State, 235 Ga. 295 (219 SE2d 378) (1975); see United States v. Frost, 77 F3d 1319 (11th Cir. 1996).

 Ward v. State, 262 Ga. 293, 297 (417 SE2d 130) (1992); see Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 841 (524 SE2d 490) (1999).

 Martin v. State, 223 Ga. 649, 650 (157 SE2d 458) (1967).

 Miller v. State, 226 Ga. 730, 731 (177 SE2d 253) (1970), vacated on other grounds, 229 Ga. 731 (194 SE2d 410) (1972); see Berryhill v. State, 235 Ga. 549, 552 (221 SE2d 185) (1975); Bruce v. State, 142 Ga. App. 211, 215 (235 SE2d 606) (1977).

 Daniel, Georgia Criminal Trial Practice, § 23-6, p. 737.

 McClain v. State, 267 Ga. at 383.

 75A AmJur2d, Trial, § 650, p. 260.

 Id.

 Id.

 See Daniel, Georgia Criminal Trial Practice, § 25-1, p. 775.

 See note 26, supra, and accompanying text.