Court Opinion

ID: 9954355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 22:15:48.07374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:05.803817
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                           DIVISION ONE

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                No. 84017-7-I

                            Respondent,

                  v.                                 UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 WILSON, MICHAEL LYNN,

                            Appellant.

       BOWMAN, J. — Michael Lynn Wilson appeals his convictions for several

counts of domestic violence (DV) rape of a child and child molestation. He

argues the trial court violated his right to a fair and impartial jury by allowing

biased jurors to serve on his panel, conducted an inadequate investigation into

the potential juror bias, and erroneously denied his motion for a mistrial. He also

argues that one of his community custody conditions is unconstitutionally vague.

In a statement of additional grounds for review (SAG), Wilson contends that he

received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We affirm.

                                         FACTS

       Wilson is A.W.’s father. When A.W. was 14 years old, her mother

discovered concerning messages on A.W.’s social media accounts suggesting

she was raped by another teenager. When A.W.’s mother asked her about the

messages, A.W. admitted that Wilson was the person who raped her.

       A.W.’s mother contacted the police. During a child forensic interview,

A.W. disclosed that Wilson began touching her when she was about 7 years old
No. 84017-7-I/2

and described several sexual assaults. The State charged Wilson with two

counts of first degree rape of a child, one count of second degree rape of a child,

one count of third degree rape of a child, and one count of first degree child

molestation, all with DV designations.

       The case proceeded to a five-day jury trial. On day four, juror 3 and

Wilson sat near each other at a restaurant during a lunch break and briefly

spoke. Juror 3 then returned to the jury room and told several other jurors about

the interaction. They all agreed juror 3 should disclose the encounter to the jury

coordinator and changed the subject. When the jury coordinator told the court

about the situation, it immediately separated juror 3 from the rest of the jury and

informed the parties.

       The court then questioned juror 3 about his interaction with Wilson outside

the presence of the other jurors. Juror 3 told the court that he and Wilson had an

“exchange of pleasantries” at lunch. He explained that he was sitting at a

restaurant window seat when Wilson came in, sat near him, and commented on

the music, food, and beer. That was the extent of their conversation. Juror 3

said that he did not have his juror badge displayed and that he did not

immediately recognize Wilson. The court asked juror 3 whether he shared his

exchange with the other jurors. He said he told about five other jurors in the jury

room when he returned from lunch. Juror 3 explained that he told those other

jurors that a “total strange thing” happened—that he “had lunch . . . sitting across

from the defendant” and that it was “a totally weird situation.”

                                          2
No. 84017-7-I/3

       The court sent juror 3 back to the separate room and asked counsel how

they would like to proceed. The attorneys had more questions. On further

questioning, juror 3 told the court that he neither shared the substance of the

conversation with the other jurors nor shared any of his impressions about that

conversation. Instead, juror 3 said the other jurors joked about him and Wilson

having “shared a lovely meal together, or something,” and then moved to other

topics of conversation.

       The court again excused juror 3 to the separate room to confer with the

attorneys. When juror 3 returned, the court clarified that juror 3 was seated and

eating in the restaurant when Wilson sat down and started talking to him. The

court then asked juror 3 to describe the other jurors he spoke to about the

interaction.

       The court again excused juror 3 to the separate room. It then identified

juror 7 as one of the other jurors present when juror 3 returned from lunch and

brought her into the courtroom “to determine what, if anything, was said.” Juror 7

explained that juror 3 returned from lunch and told the other jurors that he was

eating lunch at a nearby barbeque restaurant when Wilson came in. According

to juror 7, juror 3 mentioned that he and Wilson spoke, but juror 3 did not

describe the substance of their conversation. After that, juror 3 asked the other

jurors in the room whether that interaction was something he needed to disclose

to the court, and they responded “yes.” After questioning juror 7, the court found

that her and juror 3’s descriptions of the encounter were consistent and decided

not to question any other jurors.

                                         3
No. 84017-7-I/4

       Based on juror 3’s responses, the court decided to excuse him from the

panel. But after questioning juror 7, the court found that it did not appear the

other jurors were prejudiced. Wilson moved for a mistrial, which the trial court

denied. It found that “Wilson created this situation” because he “approached this

juror.” The court concluded, “The remedy at this point is to remove the juror who

has had this conversation with Mr. Wilson.”

       The jury convicted Wilson on all but one count of DV first degree rape of a

child. The court sentenced Wilson to a concurrent, standard range,

indeterminate sentence of 280 months to life followed by a lifetime of community

custody. One of Wilson’s community custody conditions precludes him from

dating women or forming relationships “with families who have minor children, as

directed by the supervising Community Corrections Officer [(CCO)].”

       Wilson appeals.

                                       ANALYSIS

       Wilson argues the trial court violated his right to a fair and impartial jury,

conducted an inadequate investigation into potential juror bias, and erroneously

denied his motion for a mistrial. He also argues that one of his community

custody conditions is unconstitutionally vague. In a SAG, Wilson contends that

he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.1

       1
         Wilson also appealed the trial court’s imposition of the victim penalty
assessment (VPA). On January 29, 2024, we granted Wilson’s motion to supplement
the record with the trial court’s order granting his motion to waive the VPA. That issue is
now moot, so we do not address it.

                                             4
No. 84017-7-I/5

1. Constitutional Right to a Fair Jury

       Wilson argues that the trial court deprived him of his right to a fair trial by

leaving biased jurors on his jury. We disagree.

       The federal and state constitutions guarantee an accused person the right

to due process and to a trial before a fair and impartial jury. U.S. CONST.

amends. VI, XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 21, 22. “This right exists throughout the

entire trial process and is safeguarded in part by statutes and rules that require

the trial judge to dismiss biased jurors.” State v. Sassen Van Elsloo, 191 Wn.2d

798, 807, 425 P.3d 807 (2018). The trial court must dismiss jurors for actual or

implied bias. See Kuhn v. Schnall, 155 Wn. App. 560, 574, 228 P.3d 828 (2010).

We review a trial court’s decision to discharge a juror for abuse of discretion.

State v. DePaz, 165 Wn.2d 842, 858, 204 P.3d 217 (2009). A court abuses its

discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable

grounds. Id.

       “Actual bias” is

       the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference
       to the action, or to either party, which satisfies the court that the
       challenged person cannot try the issue impartially and without
       prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging.

RCW 4.44.170(2).2 The party challenging the juror for actual bias generally must

prove that (1) the juror “has formed or expressed” a biased opinion and that (2)

“from all the circumstances, . . . the juror cannot disregard such opinion and try

the issue impartially.” RCW 4.44.190. “Implied bias” requires showing the

       2
          RCW 4.44.170 applies to potential jurors. But our Supreme Court adopted this
definition of “actual bias” for empaneled jurors as well. Sassen Van Elsloo, 191 Wn.2d
at 807-08.

                                           5
No. 84017-7-I/6

existence of facts that “in judgment of law disqualifies the juror.”3 RCW

4.44.170(1); Kuhn, 155 Wn. App. at 574.

       Citing Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1984), Wilson argues that

several jurors on his panel were biased after their interaction with juror 3. In

Willie, the Fifth Circuit held that “[a] juror is presumed to be biased when he or

she is apprised of such inherently prejudicial facts about the defendant that the

court deems it highly unlikely that the juror can exercise independent judgment.”

737 F.2d at 1379. As an example, the Willie court pointed to Leonard v. United

States, 378 U.S. 544, 84 S. Ct. 1696, 12 L. Ed. 2d 1028 (1964). Id.

       In Leonard, two juries convicted the defendant in two separate trials of

forging endorsements on government checks and of transporting a forged

instrument in interstate commerce. 378 U.S. at 544. The jury in the first case

“announced its guilty verdict in open court in the presence of the jury panel from

which the jurors who were to try the second case . . . were selected.” Id. The

jury in the second case then found the defendant guilty. Id. The Supreme Court

       3
         RCW 4.44.180 lists the four bases that support a finding of implied bias:
               (1) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either
       party.
               (2) Standing in the relation of guardian and ward, attorney and
       client, master and servant or landlord and tenant, to a party; or being a
       member of the family of, or a partner in business with, or in the
       employment for wages, of a party, or being surety or bail in the action
       called for trial, or otherwise, for a party.
               (3) Having served as a juror on a previous trial in the same action,
       or in another action between the same parties for the same cause of
       action, or in a criminal action by the state against either party, upon
       substantially the same facts or transaction.
               (4) Interest on the part of the juror in the event of the action, or the
       principal question involved therein, excepting always, the interest of the
       juror as a member or citizen of the county or municipal corporation.

                                              6
No. 84017-7-I/7

concluded that the jurors in the second case were biased and reversed. Id. at

545.

       But a court “will not readily presume that a juror is biased solely on the

basis that he or she has been exposed to prejudicial information about the

defendant outside the courtroom.” Willie, 737 F.2d at 1379. In Willie, four jurors

heard the prosecutor in a codefendant’s trial explain that in Louisiana, all persons

involved in the commission of a crime, “whether or not they directly committed

the act constituting the offense, are held liable as principals.” Id. at 1377. They

also heard the codefendant’s attorney explain his theory of defense that turned

out to be antagonistic to the defense Willie advanced. Id. at 1380. Even so, the

Fifth Circuit concluded that because the jurors did not hear any facts or evidence

from the other trial, the information the four jurors heard was not inherently

prejudicial such that it could infer bias. Id. at 1380-81.

       Wilson argues that juror 3’s disclosure of their interaction at lunch

apprised several jurors of facts so inherently prejudicial that they likely “could

[not] exercise independent judgment.” According to Wilson, those jurors likely

believed that he “had wrongfully spoken to—or worse, tampered with—a member

of the jury.” But the record does not support that characterization.

       Juror 3 did not inform the other jurors of any fact about Wilson, only that

they had spoken. He did not relay who initiated the conversation, the substance

of the conversation, or any of his impressions about the conversation. Juror 7

confirmed juror 3’s description of the event. Wilson fails to show that the jurors

                                          7
No. 84017-7-I/8

learned any fact about him so inherently prejudicial that they could not exercise

independent judgment in deciding his case.

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion by leaving the other jurors on

Wilson’s jury panel.

2. Trial Court’s Investigation

       Wilson argues that the court did not sufficiently investigate the irregularity

with juror 3 because it “did not inquire whether the remaining jurors harbored any

bias or prejudice against [him].” We disagree.

       We review a trial court’s investigation of jury irregularities for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Elmore, 155 Wn.2d 758, 773-74, 123 P.3d 72 (2005). A

discretionary decision is based on untenable grounds or made for untenable

reasons if it rests on facts unsupported in the record. DePaz, 165 Wn.2d at 858.

       RCW 2.36.110 and CrR 6.5 govern discharge and excusal of an

empaneled juror. Sassen Van Elsloo, 191 Wn.2d at 807. RCW 2.36.110

imposes on the judge a duty to excuse any empaneled juror who, in the opinion

of the judge, has shown unfitness to continue on the jury “by reason of bias,

prejudice, indifference, inattention or any physical or mental defect or by reason

of conduct or practices incompatible with proper and efficient jury service.” Id. at

809. And CrR 6.5 requires the court to discharge any empaneled juror who it

finds unable to perform their duties and to appoint an alternate juror. Id.

“Together, the statute and the rule ‘place a continuous obligation on the trial court

to excuse any juror who is unfit and unable to perform [their] duties.’ ” Id.

(quoting State v. Jorden, 103 Wn. App. 221, 227, 11 P.3d 866 (2000)).

                                          8
No. 84017-7-I/9

       But a trial court “has significant discretion to determine what investigation

is necessary on a claim of juror misconduct.” Turner v. Stime, 153 Wn. App. 581,

587, 222 P.3d 1243 (2009); Elmore, 155 Wn.2d at 773. That discretion includes

determining the scope and manner of investigation most appropriate in a

particular case. Elmore, 155 Wn.2d at 773-75. There is no “mandatory format.”

Jorden, 103 Wn. App. at 229. That is because we recognize that the trial court is

“ ‘uniquely situated’ ” to make credibility determinations that arise in investigating

juror issues. Elmore, 155 Wn.2d at 778 (quoting United States v. Abbell, 271

F.3d 1286, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001)).

       Here, the court immediately separated juror 3 from the other jurors and

asked the parties how they would like to proceed. The court then questioned

juror 3 about his interaction with Wilson outside the presence of the other jurors.

After initial questioning and argument by counsel, the court brought juror 3 back

into the courtroom to determine the scope and substance of what he told the

other jurors. Throughout the questioning by the court and the attorneys, juror 3

repeatedly said he told the other jurors that he spoke with Wilson but did not

disclose the substance of what they talked about or his impressions about the

interaction. The court then brought juror 7 into the courtroom for questioning

outside the presence of the other jurors. The court asked juror 7 broad, open-

ended questions such as whether “there [was] anything that occurred over the

lunch hour that you need to report to the Court.” Juror 7 confirmed juror 3’s

recitation of the incident. The court determined that because juror 7’s information

                                          9
No. 84017-7-I/10

was “absolutely consistent” with what juror 3 said, it saw no need to poll more

jurors.

          The court’s investigation sufficiently determined that juror 3 did not relay

any prejudicial information to the other jurors. The procedure did not amount to

an abuse of discretion.

3. Motion for Mistrial

          Wilson argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial.

Again, we disagree.

          We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Jungers, 125 Wn. App. 895, 902, 106 P.3d 827 (2005). A

trial court has broad discretion to rule on irregularities during a trial. State v.

Wade, 186 Wn. App. 749, 773, 346 P.3d 838 (2015). The trial court is in the best

position to determine whether a trial irregularity caused prejudice. Id.

          The court should grant a mistrial “ ‘only when the defendant has been so

prejudiced that nothing short of a new trial can insure that the defendant will be

tried fairly.’ ” Wade, 186 Wn. App. at 773 (quoting State v. Mak, 105 Wn.2d 692,

701, 718 P.2d 407 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hill, 123

Wn.2d 641, 870 P.2d 313 (1994)). Ultimately, we will reverse the trial court only

if there is a substantial likelihood the trial irregularity affected the jury’s verdict.

Id. In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion

for a mistrial, we examine (1) the seriousness of the irregularity, (2) whether the

statement was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence, and (3) whether

the court could have cured the irregularity with an instruction. Id.

                                            10
No. 84017-7-I/11

       An irregularity is serious when it could “materially affect the outcome of the

trial.” See State v. Hopson, 113 Wn.2d 273, 286, 778 P.2d 1014 (1989). Courts

have found irregularities to be serious where, for example, a party intentionally

violates a pretrial order or where the jury hears inherently prejudicial inadmissible

testimony. See State v. Gamble, 168 Wn.2d 161, 178, 225 P.3d 973 (2010);

State v. Escalona, 49 Wn. App. 251, 255-56, 742 P.2d 190 (1987).

       Here, the irregularity involved information jurors heard outside the

confines of the trial. As explained above, the information did not prejudice

Wilson. In any event, the trial court instructed the jury that it must decide the

case solely on the evidence presented in the courtroom. We presume the jury

follows the court’s instructions. State v. Anderson, 153 Wn. App. 417, 428-29,

220 P.3d 1273 (2009).4

       The trial court did not err by denying Wilson’s motion for a mistrial.5

4. Community Custody Condition

       Wilson argues that his community custody condition that he not “form

relationships with families who have minor children, as directed by the

supervising [CCO],” is unconstitutionally vague.6 We disagree.

       4
          Wilson argues that the release of juror 3 without further explanation suggested
to the jury that Wilson disobeyed the trial court’s instructions. But Wilson offers no
compelling explanation as to why that is so. Particularly when juror 3 did not tell the
jurors that Wilson initiated the contact.
       5
         The State argues that we should affirm the trial court because Wilson created
his own grounds for a mistrial by approaching juror 3 first. Because we conclude Wilson
suffered no prejudice from the irregularity, we need not reach that issue.
       6
          The State at first conceded this issue. After the State’s concession, our
Supreme Court decided In re Personal Restraint of Ansell, 1 Wn.3d 882, 533 P.3d 875
(2023). Following oral argument, the State filed a statement of additional authorities,
identifying Ansell and urging us to reject Wilson’s argument. Wilson did not respond.

                                           11
No. 84017-7-I/12

       We generally review a court’s imposition of crime-related prohibitions for

an abuse of discretion. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201

(2007). But we review de novo whether the court had any authority to impose

the condition. In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell, 1 Wn.3d 882, 892, 533 P.3d 875

(2023); Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d at 110. Due process under both the state and

federal constitutions requires that citizens have fair warning of proscribed

conduct. Ansell, 1 Wn.3d at 893.

       “A legal prohibition, such as a community custody condition, is
       unconstitutionally vague if (1) it does not sufficiently define the
       proscribed conduct so an ordinary person can understand the
       prohibition or (2) it does not provide sufficiently ascertainable
       standards to protect against arbitrary enforcement.”

Id. (quoting State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d 672, 677, 416 P.3d 712 (2018)).

       When deciding a vagueness challenge, we consider the terms in the

context in which they are used. Ansell, 1 Wn.3d at 893. We read community

custody conditions “ ‘in a commonsense fashion in the context of the judgment

and sentence, and related documents that will be available to [the CCO].’ ” Id. at

8987 (quoting State v. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d 740, 748, 487 P.3d 893 (2021)).

Under the vagueness doctrine, community custody conditions need not be

drafted with such precision that a person is able to “ ‘predict with complete

certainty the exact point at which [their] actions would be classified as prohibited

conduct.’ ” Id. at 8938 (quoting Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677). Instead, “ ‘[i]f persons

of ordinary intelligence can understand what the [condition] proscribes,

       7
           Alteration in original.
       8
           Alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted.

                                               12
No. 84017-7-I/13

notwithstanding some possible areas of disagreement, the [condition] is

sufficiently definite.’ ” Id.9 (quoting City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171,

179, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)).

       Our Supreme Court recently considered a vagueness challenge to a

similar community custody term in Ansell. In that case, the defendant and his

wife were part of a babysitting group with two other families in their

neighborhood. Ansell, 1 Wn.3d at 887. Ansell molested the children he babysat.

Id. at 887-88. He pleaded guilty to three counts of child molestation and the

court sentenced him to an indeterminate sentence. Id. at 888. After serving the

minimum term of incarceration, the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board found

him eligible for community custody. Id. One of Ansell’s community custody

conditions provided, “ ‘You must not form relationships with persons/families with

minor children without first disclosing your sex offender status and having this

relationship approved by your CCO.’ ” Id. at 889.

       In a personal restraint petition, Ansell challenged the constitutionality of

that condition. Ansell, 1 Wn.3d at 888-89. We found the condition

unconstitutionally vague. Id. But our Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 892.

Recognizing that community custody terms “ ‘are not considered in a

“vacuum,” ’ ” the court noted that Ansell’s judgment and sentence showed that he

received three child molestation convictions, that the substance of the board’s

release decision showed he offended against “the children of friends and

neighbors,” and that his other community custody conditions prevented him from

       9
           Alterations in original.

                                         13
No. 84017-7-I/14

dating people who have children and from contacting minors without a

chaperone. Id. at 89810 (quoting State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 754, 193 P.3d

678 (2008)). Read in context, the information showed that “the condition relates

to preventing Ansell from accessing children based on his relationship with their

parents, as he did with the children he molested.” Id. So, the condition provides

sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Id.

       The Ansell court also concluded that in context, “an ordinary person could

understand that [the] condition . . . is aimed at preventing easy access to

children, which is a possibility in any relationship,” and “prohibits Ansell from

accessing children through friendly relationships, business relationships,

neighborly relationships, and the like.” 1 Wn.3d at 899. It concluded that though

broad, the condition is not unconstitutionally vague. Id.

       Wilson’s community custody condition prohibits him from forming

relationships “with families who have minor children as directed by the

supervising [CCO].” As in Ansell, read in the context of his offense and other

community custody conditions, this condition is not unconstitutionally vague. The

jury convicted Wilson of several sex crimes against his daughter. A.W. testified

that Wilson would assault her even when her siblings and mother were present in

the home. And Wilson is subject to other terms of community custody aimed at

preventing access to children. He cannot date people who have children or

“initiate or prolong contact with minor children without the presence of an adult

who is knowledgeable of the offense and has been approved by the supervising

       10
            Internal quotation marks omitted.

                                                14
No. 84017-7-I/15

[CCO].” He must “[s]tay out of areas where children’s activities regularly occur or

are occurring” and cannot “remain overnight in a residence where minor children

live or are spending the night.”

       Read in context, Wilson’s community custody condition is specific enough

to prevent arbitrary enforcement, and an ordinary person would understand that

the condition aims to prevent easy access to children—a possibility in any

relationship. The condition is not unconstitutionally vague.

5. SAG

       Finally, in a SAG, Wilson argues that he received ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel because his attorney failed to raise certain issues on appeal.

Specifically, Wilson argues his appellate lawyer should have argued that RCW

9A.44.020(1) is unconstitutional because it “allow[s] the [S]tate to exceed its

competent jurisdiction.”

       The exercise of independent judgment in deciding which issues may be

the basis of a successful appeal is at the heart of the attorney’s role in our legal

process. In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 123 Wn.2d 296, 313-14, 868 P.2d 835

(1994). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for

failing to raise an issue, a defendant must show the merit of the legal issue that

counsel failed to raise and demonstrate actual prejudice. Id. at 314.

       Under RCW 9A.44.020(1), to convict a person of any sex crime, “it shall

not be necessary that the testimony of the alleged victim be corroborated.”11

Wilson argues that this statute violates equal protection and due process rights

       11
            The trial court did not provide such an instruction to the jury.

                                               15
No. 84017-7-I/16

because it compels defendants “to plead guilty or face life in prison at trial” and

renders all pretrial challenges “moot” or “frivolous.”12 He also argues that the

statute prevents judges on direct review from making “determinations on the

inefficiency of the [S]tate’s evidence,” rendering direct appeals unconstitutionally

unfair. But Wilson does not support his broad claims with legal authority or

analysis. So, we cannot determine whether his arguments have merit or that he

was actually prejudiced. Lord, 123 Wn.2d at 314. We reject Wilson’s claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

       In sum, the trial court did not violate Wilson’s right to a fair and impartial

jury by allowing biased jurors to serve on his jury, it did not conduct an

inadequate investigation into the jurors’ possible bias or erroneously deny him a

mistrial, his community custody condition that he not form relationships with

families who have minor children as directed by his CCO is not unconstitutionally

vague, and he does not support his SAG arguments with legal authority or

analysis. We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

       12
            Capitalization omitted.

                                          16