Court Opinion

ID: 9693272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:33:52.76991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:43.860052
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring in reversal). I agree with Mr. Justice Kelly’s verdict. The decedent’s mother, if in fact wholly or partially dependent on her son for support when he came to his death, is (with the widow and minor children) an eligible beneficiary of the cause of action which by defendants’ admission arose at the son’s death. Any “next of kin,” i.e., blood relative, is a rightful beneficiary in such case provided he or she is shown to have been dependent in fact or law on the decedent when death occurred and is a member of the statutory “class” from which, in the variant circumstances of succession, the inheritor or inheritors of the personal estate of one dying intestate are selected. Consequently, our unitedly-viewed statutory provisions — of 1939 — departed for good reason from that which obtained in Michigan prior to their effective date (see In re Venneman’s Estate, 286 Mich 368). They similarly vary from statutory provisons common to many other States.*
There is more to be said, however. My Brother reaches the conclusion to which I give assent exelu*35sively through interpretation of the so-called death act of 1939 (PA 1939, No 297, approved June 20, 1939 [CL 1948, § 691.581 et seq. (Stat Ann 1955 Cum Supp §27.711 et seg.)]); whereas I arrive at the same destination by interpreting sections 1 and 2 of the mentioned death act, and sections 114 and 115 of chapter 2 of the probate code (PA 1939, No 288, approved June 20, 1939 [CL 1948, §§ 702.114, 702.-115 (Stat Ann 1943 Rev §§27.3178 [184], 27.3178 [185])]), in array together. These statutes “must receive such a construction as will render each consistent with the other.”*
It must be faced and then confessed that the mentioned enactments, if separately viewed, are fraught with patent as well as latent ambiguities. For instance, and in the case of probate^approved adjustment of a cause for wrongful, death of an infant survived by parents, or of a wife survived solely by spouse, how can the probate court distribute proceeds under said section 115, subd 4, to “dependents of the decedent” absent new and flexible interpretation — assisted by said section 2 — of the word “dependents”? Correspondingly, where suit is commenced followed by entry of judgment for an amount representing loss of the decedent’s services, does the circuit judge recommend distribution of the recovered amount to “dependents” of the deceased? That questions of such nature are apt to arise in conjunction with this case is to suggest that something remedially new is before us; that earlier decisions of this Court are of little aid; that the absence of similar legislation in other States calls for thought afresh as we proceed to construe these allied stat*36utes, and that we proceed on safe ground only by looking at them as unitary.
That which follows will, of course, apply only to the type of case before us — that of death of an adult male survived by a dependent widow, dependent minor children, and a dependent mother.
. First: Said section 2 directs that the amount recovered in circuit, for pecuniary injury, “shall be distributed to the surviving spouse and next of kin who suffered such pecuniary injury and in proportion thereto.” Said section 115, having directed that the amount so recovered “shall Tie distributed in such manner, to such persons, and in such amounts as hereinafter set forth,” and having provided for notice and hearing precedent to the distribution each act (death act and probate code) calls for, requires the probate court to:
“Enter an order distributing such proceeds only to those persons who were dependents of the decedent and in such amounts as to said court shall seem fair and equitable considering the relative damages sustained by each of such dependents by reason of the decedent’s wrongful death.”
So far no interpretive difficulty appears. “Next of kin who suffered such pecuniary injury” (the mother as dependent blood relative qualifies here), and “dependents of the decedent” (she was a dependent of the decedent if the allegations of paragraph 3 of her petition for intervention are established), concordantly make up the legislative purpose preambled above. Defendants point, however, to the proviso of section 2 of the mentioned death act:
“That such person or persons entitled to such damages shall be of that class who, by law would be entitled to inherit the personal property of the deceased had he died intestate
*37and assert that the mother is thereby disqualified as a beneficiary because, a widow and minor children having survived the decedent, she is not an heir of the decedent’s personalty.
That the contention would gather prima facie force had the proviso been left by the legislature to stand alone is not to be denied. While counsel do not brief it as such, their point in actuality is addressed to previously-mentioned rules known in other States, by which beneficiaries are divided into alternative classes, consisting of primary, secondary and deferred groups. The contention loses impact here, however, for reasons peculiar to our mentioned •enactments of 1939. As in Poff v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 327 US 399, 401 (66 S Ct 603, 90 L ed 749, 162 ALR 700, 702), “The emphasis on dependency suggests that congress (in our case the legislature) granted the right of recovery to such next of kin as were dependent on the deceased.”* In short, and if there be abrasion — which we need not decide— between the quoted proviso of section 2, and the command of section 115 (that distribution be made to “dependents of the decedent”'), the latter must prevail in order that the 2 statutes accomplish that which we have found — and stated above — to be the emphasized purpose of the legislature. This means that the mother’s timely petition for leave to intervene should have been granted and that the appealed order denying such petition must be reversed.
By way of parenthetical conclusion it is not amiss to note that Bricker v. Green, 313 Mich 218 (163 *38ALR 697), stands precursive of broad rather than narrow interpretation of questions of eligibility arising under this legislation of 1939, particularly where actual dependency is shown. In that case it was shown that the decedent, a mother survived by her husband and 10 dependent children, came to demise by wrongful act. The surviving husband, having been contributorily negligent,* was ineligible and, hence, renounced claim as one of the beneficiaries of the cause of action. The defendant insisted (see counterstated question 6, p 225 of report) that the action failed for want of “a person suffering pecuniary loss” and relied, in part, on authority supporting the rule stated in 17 C J, Death, § 61, p 1215:
“The fact that a beneficiary of a prior class is precluded from recovery by reason of some defense available against him does not authorize prosecution of the action for the benefit of persons in a subsequent class.”
Reviewing the question posed by counterstated question 6, this Court ruled that the testimony showing actual partial support of the children by the mother disclosed that they “suffered pecuniary loss by reason of her untimely death.” While the writer of the opinion did not elaborate (excepting as presently noted), the briefs show that said section 115, subd 4, was pressed upon the court as indicative of legislative intent that proven dependency in fact, of any next of kin, renders such dependent or dependents eligible regardless of presence or absence of other rightful beneficiaries. The writer did note, without reference to said section 115, that “Under the (death) act as now amended the distribution of the damages awarded is determined by the probate judge.” (p 227 of report.)
*39Second: Having determined that the. mother was and now is entitled to suborclinately intervene in the pending suit,* certain procedural .questions remain for disposition considering summary action taken in circuit following denial of the petition for intervention. The order of denial was entered and filed January 16, 1956. Ten days later the court entered a consent judgment in favor of the plaintiff fiduciary and against the defendants, in the sum of $30,000. On the same date the court executed a certificate under said section 2 designating the widow and the decedent’s 2 minor children as sole distributees.† Judgment was satisfied of record February 6th.
In the meantime counsel had prepared application for leave to review the order of January 16th. The required concise statement was presented for settlement, on notice given counsel January 26th, and a hearing on settlement was conducted by Judge Stein-bacher January 30th. Such hearing was adjourned for briefs to be filed respectively February 14th and February 29th. The question counsel did brief, presently mentioned, was not decided until March 23, 1956.
We intimate no criticism of the delay in settlement of concise statement. The judge was confronted with briefed and ultimately overruled objection of defendants that jurisdiction to settle such statement had been lost due to nonsettlement within 20 days following date of the order sought to be appealed. Nevertheless, the fact that the court plunged ahead with entry of judgment — ex parte so far as the mother was concerned — , when the mother’s timely proceeding to appeal the order of Jan-*40nary 16th was pending, renders it necessary that proper directions be issued under section 1 (g) of Court Rule No 72 (1945).
An order will enter in circuit granting the mother’s petition for intervention’ and directing that the declaration be amended so that same include the substance of her present allegation of dependency. The consent judgment and the certificate* will be set aside and the cause will proceed, either to trial or judicially approved adjustment, as interested parties may be advised and the court shall approve or reject. In event new proceedings, designed to adjust before trial are pursued in circuit, the court will take testimony and determine the mother’s allegation of dependency. In such event,, and if the mother’s allegation of dependency is sustained, the court will appraise settlement worth of the declared and admitted cause anew with particular attention to protection of the interests of the minor beneficiaries.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings as directed. Costs to appellant, taxable against defendants.
Smith, Edwards and Voelker, JJ., concurred-with Black, J. ’ ■ -

 American Jurisprudence gives us the general design of statutes to which allusion is made (16 Am Jur, Death, § 107, pp 76, 77) :
“§ 107. Preferred Glasses of Beneficiaries. — According to the provisions of many wrongful death statutes, the persons for whose benefit the action may be maintained are divided into classes based upon their natural dependency upon the deceased; these classes are virtually exclusive — that is, the right of action inures for the benefit of the first preferred class, if there are in existence any beneficiaries belonging to that class, and, if there are none, then to the class next in line of preference. In other words, the nonexistence of the preferred beneficiaries is essential to a right of action in behalf of the other benefieiaries. Generally, tho surviving spouse and children are the first preferred; then follow the next of kin or the parents and next of kin.”

 The purpose of the legislature, where statutes in pari materia are involved, is to be ascertained by reading all such statutes as one. People, ex rel. Hughes, v. May, 3 Mich 598; Palmer v. State Land Office Board, 304 Mich 628; Reed v. Secretary of State, 327 Mich 108; Michigan Good Roads Federation v. State Board of Canvassers, 333 Mich 352; Van Antwerp v. State, 334 Mich 593.

 In the Poff Case the supreme court considered and overruled contention that the Federal employers’ liability act ([April 22, 1908] 35 Stat 65, ch 149, 45 USCA, § 51) denied eligibility to a dependent cousin of the deeedent. By citation of Poff we do not infer that the Federal act duplicates, in substance or otherwise, presently considered sections 1, 2 and 1Í5. We do find, as the court did in Poff, that the legislative emphasis on dependency is controlling. See reference to Poff in In re Hopps’ Estate, 324 Mich 256, 260.

 See annotation, “Contributory negligence of beneficiary as affecting action under death or survival statute,” 2 ALR2d 785.

 This is not to say that the mother is entitled to become a contending party plaintiff. It is to say that she has pursued the only procedural means by which her claimed benefactivo status could be brought to attention of the court for timely consideration.

 The judgment and certificate are eaeh dated January 26. They were not filed, however, until February 1.

 The eireuit court certificate, called for by said section 2, is advisory rather than mandatory. The sole exception, provided in said section 115, subd 4, is the requirement that the probate court follow the certificate “in the absence of written objections thereto filed by any interested party.” As far as identity of distributee beneficiaries and proportions payable to them are concerned, the probate court (subject to the noted exception) decides such matters as original questions. This was ordained, probably, to insure uniformity of distributive rights and results whether the cause be adjusted in probate — pursuant to section 114 of said chapter 2 without institution of suit — or determined by judgment in eireuit. -