Court Opinion

ID: 9592212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:11:44.267994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:01.037965
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Day
dissenting:
I disent, at least from that portion of the majority opinion denying plaintiff in error an instruction and verdicts on involuntary manslaughter. He will be referred to herein as either Daniels or defendant.
Daniels is in this unique situation: The Attorney Gen*199eral representing the People of the State of Colorado, has confessed error in this case and has admitted that insofar as Daniels is concerned the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser offense of manslaughter and should have submitted verdicts to the jury on that charge.
The majority opinion does not take care of the case in the posture it is presented by the parties to the litigation.
One of the very necessary propositions in consideration of this writ of error is that the defendant was deprived of an instruction and a verdict embracing his theory of the case. We have said a defendant is always entitled to instructions —• yes and verdicts, too — on his theory of the case. Hernandez v. People, 156 Colo. 23, 396 P.2d 952; Johnson v. People, 145 Colo. 314, 358 P.2d 873; Payne v. People, 110 Colo. 236, 132 P.2d 441.
Daniels did not seriously dispute any of the evidence against him except that pertaining to intoxication. He denied that he was inebriated. However, so overwhelming was the balance of the evidence that one could hardly expect a clear-cut decision based on intoxication or non-intoxication. That issue was easily beclouded. As a matter of fact, nowhere in the instructions was the jury told that if they found he was not intoxicated or if on this subject they entertained a reasonable doubt, they were compelled to acquit him. Of course he did not ask for any such instruction, but instead asked for consideration of the lesser offense because of the fact that his testimony, if believed, did not exonerate him of the death he caused as the facts hereinafter delineated will show.
The evidence established that shortly before the accident in which the defendant was involved, one Carter (who was killed in the accident which formed the basis of the charge against Daniels) had parked his truck at the curb immediately to the rear of another truck which had a flat tire and which Carter was called to repair. The deceased was in the process of repairing the tire *200on the second truck when the collision occurred. Defendant Daniels ran into the rear of the Carter truck and propelled it forward, pinning Carter between the two trucks and causing his death.
Immediately, prior to the accident Daniels was observed by witnesses driving in an obviously erratic manner. He was seen driving in “spurts,” weaving between the lines of traffic, and he had struck the curbing on several occasions before finally striking the parked truck. Subsequent to the collision Daniels was observed lying in the front seat of his automobile, and witnesses testified that his face was flushed, his eyes bloodshot, and his breath alcoholic, and that, in their opinion, he was in an intoxicated condition. There was some testimony from some of the witnesses that his speech was confused and slurred.
Daniels, in explaining his erratic driving and his striking of the curbing, admitted that he had slept only two hours the night before; that he had had two shots of whiskey shortly before the accident; and that he was ■driving to his brother’s home for sleep. He explained that he fell asleep at the wheel and was awakened when he hit the curb, that he continued to drive on, and that he fell asleep again or “blacked out” when the accident occurred.
Various sobriety tests involving physical dexterity, balance and coordination were administered by police officers who stated that in their opinion he demonstrated that he was intoxicated. A “'breathalyzer” test was given to the defendant, which, according to expert opinion, indicated blood alchohol at a level which would produce intoxication. Several exhibits were identified, offered and received in evidence pertaining to the results of the “breathalyzer” tests.
Daniels, who took the stand, testified that his driving ability was not impaired by the two shots of whiskey and that he performed all of the sobriety tests satisfactorily.
*201With such a strong case of wilful and wanton conduct from eye witnesses who observed Daniels’ erratic driving, the court gave the jury instruction No. 8 as follows:
“You are instructed that the mere happening of an accident does not raise any presumption of the guilt of the defendant.
“For negligence of any type to exist you must first find that the defendant owed a duty to the deceased to act with care.
“Criminal negligence is such a failure to observe the standard of conduct of an ordinarily careful and prudent person under the conditions and circumstances, that the actor’s conduct partakes of a reckless disregard of life and a wilful disregard of the safety of others; such conduct is the equivalent of the intentional doing of an act with knowledge that substantial harm will result and with a wanton and reckless disregard of the probable consequences of said act.”
Thus we see that the court does not have before it a case predicated upon simple negligence, and the Attorney General aptly pointed this out in the following summation:
“* * * involuntary manslaughter is, at least as far as this case is concerned, a lesser offense of causing a homicide while operating a vehicle under the influence. We have also shown that an essential element of the crime charged, that the defendant was under the influence, was in dispute. Without going into unnecessary detail we believe that defendant’s conduct, that is driving in an erratic manner, causing another driver to leave the road, striking an obviously visable vehicle from behind, and, if defendant’s version is accepted, continuing to drive after once falling asleep at the wheel, are evidence of defendant’s gross and wanton disregard for the rights and safety of others. These acts lead to the conclusion that the defendant realized the dangers involved in his conduct, but deliberately avoided all precaution to prevent the disaster. We, therefore, believe *202that there was ample evidence upon which defendant could have been convicted of the crime of involuntary manslaughter.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Conduct requisite for conviction of involuntary manslaughter has been defined by this court as a reckless and wanton failure to exercise the care and caution that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under similar circumstances such as to indicate a reckless and wanton disregard for the safety of others. Trujillo v. People, 133 Colo. 186, 292 P.2d 980; Bennett v. People, 155 Colo. 101, 392 P.2d 657.
Thus, in this case, at least, all of the elements of involuntary manslaughter, absent proof of intoxication or if upon this question there was a reasonable doubt, are present. When the majority opinion says, “prosecution under C.R.S. 1963, 40-2-10, may be predicated on only negligent or careless driving, i.e., ordinary or simple negligence, as opposed to gross or criminal negligence.” such has no reference to this case or the manner in which it was prosecuted or the manner in which the jury was charged.
An authoritative discussion on lesser included offenses is to be found in 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 872 (1962-63) wherein it is stated that among the four functions of the “included offense doctrine” one is that “* * * it entitles the accused on trial for the greater offense to a jury instruction on lesser included offenses which are supported by the evidence.” (Emphasis supplied.) The article elaborates on page 906:
“Often an instruction on a lesser included offense will be justified, not because the offense is included, but rather because: (1) it is supported by the evidence; (2) it is of the same approximate gravity and type as the offense charged; and (3) the defendant is likely to be found guilty of the charged offense in the absence of such an instruction. * * *”
The article then goes on to state, on page 908, that: “Inasmuch as the prosecutor selects the offense with *203which he will charge the defendant, and the statutory-penal scheme is primarily prosecution-oriented, the defendant should be permitted to obtain instruction upon an uncharged offense supported by the evidence only when there is danger that without it he will be convicted without convincing evidence on the charged offense.”
A reading of this record indicates undisputed evidence that: 1. Daniels was driving the car and that a collision occurred between his automobile and the truck; 2. that the decedent Carter’s death was caused directly and proximately by the accident, in which he was crushed between the truck he was working on and his own truck; 3. that Daniels was operating the automobile in an erratic manner as previously described, and his conduct proximately caused the accident.
Thus with a man dead as a result of a mishap it was highly unlikely that defendant could win an acquittal at the hands of the jury, irrespective of the doubtful evidence concerning his intoxication. It is because of this very fact that the jury should have been given some choice of verdict on defendant’s theory of the case — that his fatigue, long hours without sleep and subsequent drowsiness was the explanation for his erratic and grossly negligent driving.
In my view Daniels, even under the majority opinion, is entitled to a new trial so that the issues as they are now being framed under the majority opinion can be clearly defined and carefully placed before the jury advising them that the statute is so narrow that they cannot convict under any circumstances unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that the one charged is intoxicated.