Court Opinion

ID: 9882453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:10:02.78269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:20.575397
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Nationstar Mtge., L.L.C. v. Anderson, 2023-Ohio-3186.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, DBA                           :
 MR. COOPER                                             :
                                                        :    C.A. No. 29716
           Appellee                                     :
                                                        :    Trial Court Case No. 2020 CV 01004
 v.                                                     :
                                                        :    (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
 ANDREW S. ANDERSON, et al.                             :    Court)
                                                        :
           Appellant                                    :

                                                ...........

                                                OPINION

                                    Rendered on September 8, 2023

                                                ...........

JOHN A. FISCHER, Attorney for Appellant

JAMES W. SANDY, Attorney for Appellee

                                              .............

LEWIS, J.

           {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Andrew S. Anderson (“Anderson”) appeals from a

judgment of foreclosure entered by the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court. For

the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

      I.      Facts and Course of Proceedings
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       {¶ 2} On November 24, 1999, Anderson and Loraine K. Anderson (“Lorraine”),

husband and wife, 1 signed an open-end, 20-year mortgage agreement with Security

National Mortgage Banc, LLC, relating to property located at 2143 Ottello Avenue in

Dayton, Ohio. Pursuant to the mortgage and accompanying note, the Andersons were

obligated to pay the principal sum of $44,500 in monthly installments with any remaining

debt becoming due in full on December 1, 2019.

       {¶ 3} On February 25, 2020, Plaintiff-Appellee Nationstar Mortgage LLC, dba Mr.

Cooper (“Nationstar”), commenced an action for foreclosure against the Andersons in the

Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County. According to the complaint, Nationstar

was the current mortgagee of the November 24, 1999 mortgage pursuant to a series of

assignments, and the Andersons had defaulted in payment on the mortgage. Attached

to the complaint were copies of the original note and mortgage, the assignments of the

mortgage, and a preliminary judicial report. Nationstar requested judgment in the sum

of $7,390.59, plus interest at the rate of 7.875% per annum from February 1, 2018.

Nationstar also requested that the subject property at Ottello Avenue be appraised,

advertised, and sold according to law. The Andersons filed an answer denying the

allegations in the complaint.

       {¶ 4} In September 2020, the trial court issued an order staying the proceedings

because of the foreclosure moratorium on federally-backed mortgage loans. The stay

was lifted a year later. On October 25, 2021, Nationstar filed an amended complaint,

adding unknown spouses of the Andersons, who had divorced. The Andersons filed

1
 We refer to Anderson’s former wife by her first name to avoid confusion, due to their
shared last name.
                                                                                            -3-

separate answers to the amended complaint. In her answer, Loraine explained that she

and Anderson had divorced in 2013, and the divorce decree made Anderson solely

responsible for the mortgage on the Ottello property.

         {¶ 5} On December 27, 2021, Nationstar filed a motion for summary judgment on

its amended complaint. Anderson filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion, but

Loraine did not file any opposition to the motion. On January 9, 2023, the trial court

granted Nationstar’s motion for summary judgment and issued a final judgment entry and

decree of foreclosure. The court awarded $7,390.59, plus interest thereon at the rate of

7.875% per annum from February 1, 2018. The trial court stated that unless this sum

and the costs of the action were fully paid within three days of the judgment entry, the

equity of redemption and dower of all the defendants in and to the premises shall be

foreclosed and said premises sold.

         {¶ 6} Anderson filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of foreclosure.

   II.      The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment to Nationstar

         {¶ 7} Anderson’s sole assignment of error states:

               THE    TRIAL    COURT      ERRED     BY    GRANTING       SUMMARY

         JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE.

         {¶ 8} Anderson contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment

to Nationstar for the following reasons: (1) Nationstar lacked standing to bring the suit in

foreclosure, because it failed to show an unbroken chain of title from the original

mortgagee to the present; (2) Nationstar failed to prove the amount due on the loan,
                                                                                          -4-

because it did not show all the payments made since the original date of the loan; and (3)

Nationstar failed to properly support its motion for summary judgment with specific

citations to the documents attached to its motion for summary judgment.

       {¶ 9} Nationstar disagrees with Anderson’s contentions. According to Nationstar,

not only was it an assignee of the mortgage at the time the foreclosure action was filed,

but it also was a holder of the note on the mortgage. Appellee’s Brief, p. 8. Nationstar

states that it showed a complete, unbroken chain of assignments from 1999 to the

present.   Further, Nationstar argues that Anderson lacks standing to challenge the

validity of the assignments of the mortgage. Id. Regarding the amount due on the loan,

Nationstar contends that a plaintiff is not required to provide a complete payment history

to receive summary judgment in a foreclosure action. Id. Rather, an affidavit stating a

loan is in default is sufficient, especially “where a borrower does not present controverting

evidence and does not dispute their failure to pay[.]” Id. at 10. Finally, Nationstar states

that it properly supported its motion for summary judgment, and the trial court did not

have to “rummage through” the record to find support for the motion. Id. at 11.

       {¶ 10} Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when (1) no genuine

issue as to any material fact exists, (2) the party moving for summary judgment is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the

nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion that is adverse to the

nonmoving party. On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party carries an initial

burden of identifying specific facts in the record that demonstrate its entitlement to

summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264
                                                                                        -5-

(1996).   If the moving party fails to meet this burden, summary judgment is not

appropriate; if the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party has the reciprocal

burden to point to evidence of specific facts in the record demonstrating the existence of

a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 293. Summary judgment is appropriate

if the nonmoving party fails to meet this burden. Id. “We review decisions granting

summary judgment de novo, which means that we apply the same standards as the trial

court.” (Citations omitted.) GNFH, Inc. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 172 Ohio App.3d 127, 2007-

Ohio-2722, 873 N.E.2d 345, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.).

      {¶ 11} When a mortgagor defaults, a mortgagee “may elect among separate and

independent remedies to collect the debt secured by a mortgage.” (Citations omitted.)

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Holden, 147 Ohio St.3d 85, 2016-Ohio-4603, 60 N.E.3d

1243, ¶ 21.   These remedies include: (1) suits seeking personal judgments against

mortgagors to recover amounts due on promissory notes, without resorting to the

mortgaged property; (2) actions to enforce mortgages, which are for the mortgagee's

excusive benefit and for those claiming under the mortgagee; and (3) “based on the

property interest created by the mortgagor's default on the mortgage, the mortgagee may

bring a foreclosure action to cut off the mortgagor's right of redemption, determine the

existence and extent of the mortgage lien, and have the mortgaged property sold for its

satisfaction.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 22-24.

      {¶ 12} The case before us involves the third remedy, which is a foreclosure action

asking that the property be sold.       However, a “ ‘foreclosure proceeding is the

enforcement of a debt obligation,’ * * * and the debt is established by the note.” Id. at
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¶ 27, quoting Wilborn v. Bank One Corp., 121 Ohio St.3d 546, 2009-Ohio-306, 906 N.E.2d

396, ¶ 17. In Holden, the court concluded that a bank could proceed in foreclosure

against a debtor who had been discharged from any obligation on a promissory note in

bankruptcy proceedings, so long as the bank could prove that “it is the party entitled to

enforce the note—regardless of whether it can obtain a personal judgment on it against

the [obligors].” Holden at ¶ 27.

       {¶ 13} “ ‘To properly support a motion for summary judgment in a foreclosure

action, a plaintiff must present evidentiary-quality materials showing: (1) the movant is the

holder of the note and mortgage, or is a party entitled to enforce the instrument; (2) if the

movant is not the original mortgagee, the chain of assignments and transfers; (3) the

mortgagor is in default; (4) all conditions precedent have been met; and (5) the amount

of principal and interest due.’ ” (Citations omitted.) JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v.

Massey, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25459, 2013-Ohio-5620, ¶ 20.

       {¶ 14} Anderson first takes issue with Nationstar’s proof that it is the current

mortgagee. According to Anderson, Nationstar failed to establish an unbroken chain of

title between it and the original mortgagee. Further, Anderson contends that this failure

means that Nationstar lacked standing to pursue the foreclosure action.

       {¶ 15} A party commencing litigation must have standing to sue to invoke the

jurisdiction of the common pleas court. Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald,

134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 38. “To have standing, a

plaintiff must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and have suffered

some concrete injury that is capable of resolution by the court.” (Citations omitted.)
                                                                                       -7-

Bank of Am., N.A. v. Adams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101056, 2015-Ohio-675, ¶ 7.

      {¶ 16} Attached to Nationstar’s complaint and to its motion for summary judgment

are copies of the assignments of the November 24, 1999 mortgage. First, the mortgage

was assigned by Security National Mortgage Banc, LLC to Flagstar Bank, FSB, on

November 24, 1999. Then, Flagstar Bank, FSB assigned the mortgage to Fannie Mae,

or Federal National Mortgage Association, in care of Chase Mortgage Company, on July

26, 2000.   Federal National Mortgage Association then assigned the mortgage to

JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association on April 22, 2015. Next, JPMorgan Chase

Bank, National Association assigned the mortgage to Federal National Mortgage

Association on January 20, 2016.      Finally, on February 4, 2020, Federal National

Mortgage Association, through Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, its attorney-in-fact, assigned

the mortgage to Nationstar Mortgage LLC D/B/A Mr. Cooper. All these assignments

were recorded in the Montgomery County Recorder’s Office.

      {¶ 17} The February 4, 2020 mortgage assignment to Nationstar was recorded in

the Montgomery County Recorder's Office before this foreclosure case was filed.

Contrary to Anderson’s argument, the record establishes an unbroken chain of

assignments from the first mortgagee to Nationstar. Anderson attempts to raise doubt

regarding the chain of title by noting a difference in address in the Flagstar entity and

raising a question about whether the Chase Bank entities were the same across different

assignments. But the assignments in the record before us show an unbroken chain of

title from each assignment to the next. The very minor address differences noted by

Anderson were insufficient, by themselves, to create a genuine issue of material fact
                                                                                           -8-

regarding standing, especially where Anderson did not present any evidence that any of

these entities were not what they appeared to be on the face of the recorded documents.

Further, we note that Anderson lacks standing to challenge the validity of the assignments

of the mortgage, because Anderson was not a party to the assignments. The Eighth

District has explained that the reason for this conclusion is that the assignments do not

alter the borrower's obligations under the note or mortgage. Bank of New York Mellon

Trust Co. v. Unger, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97315, 2012-Ohio-1950, ¶ 35. Accord Bank

of New York Mellon v. Clancy, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25823, 2014-Ohio-1975, ¶ 33.

      {¶ 18} Nationstar contends that the fact it established that it was the mortgagee

was sufficient to confer standing, because “a plaintiff has standing to foreclose when it

establishes an interest in the note or mortgage at the time it commenced the lawsuit.”

Appellee’s Brief, p. 6. For this proposition, Nationstar cites to our previous decision in

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. TIC Acropolis, LLC, 2d Dist. Greene Nos. 2015-CA-32, 2015-

CA-33, 2016-Ohio-142, and the Eighth District’s decision in CitiMortgage, Inc. v.

Patterson, 2012-Ohio-5894, 984 N.E.2d 392 (8th Dist.). While Nationstar’s citations are

accurate, these decisions were issued before the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in

Holden, 147 Ohio St.3d 85, 2016-Ohio-4603, 60 N.E.3d 1243, at ¶ 21, which called into

question whether a mortgagee has standing to obtain a judgment in foreclosure without

also proving it is a party entitled to enforce the note. As the Holden Court explained:

             But Schwartzwald did not define what documents are necessary to

      establish standing. We stated, based on those facts, “[B]ecause [the bank]

      failed to establish an interest in the note or mortgage at the time it filed suit,
                                                                                          -9-

      it had no standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court.” Id.

      at ¶ 28.

             Parties and courts have seized upon that “failed to establish an

      interest in the note or mortgage” statement in Schwartzwald as establishing

      that a plaintiff in a foreclosure action must have an interest in either the note

      or the mortgage at the time of filing in order to establish standing.

      However, the “or” statement in Schwartzwald was a description of the

      particular facts in that case rather than a statement about the requisites of

      standing. The only issue before the court in that case was “whether a lack

      of standing at the commencement of a foreclosure action filed in a common

      pleas court may be cured by obtaining an assignment of a note and

      mortgage sufficient to establish standing prior to the entry of judgment.” Id.

      at ¶ 19. The bank had conceded that “there [was] no evidence that it had

      suffered any injury at the time it commenced [the] foreclosure action,” id.

      at ¶ 28; the bank had neither the note nor the mortgage at the time of filing,

      so this court never considered whether possession of only one of the two

      documents would be sufficient to confer standing on the bank.

Holden at ¶ 30-31. The Holden Court then concluded that “[t]o achieve judgment on its

foreclosure claim, Deutsche Bank needed to prove that it was the party entitled to enforce

the note.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 33.

      {¶ 19} The Holden decision suggests that a party must establish an interest in both

the mortgage and the note to gain a judgment on a foreclosure claim. Therefore, we will
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address the issue of whether Nationstar was a party entitled to enforce the note.

       {¶ 20} In the present case, there appears to be no dispute that the promissory note

was a negotiable instrument. Under R.C. 1303.31(A), the parties entitled to enforce a

negotiable instrument are: “(1) The holder of the instrument; (2) A nonholder in

possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder; (3) A person not in

possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to section

1303.38 or division (D) of section 1303.58 of the Revised Code.” “Holder” is defined as

”(a) The person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer

or to an identified person that is the person in possession; (b) The person in possession

of a negotiable tangible document of title if the goods are deliverable either to bearer or

to the order of the person in possession; or (c) The person in control of a negotiable

electronic document of title.” R.C. 1301.201(B)(21).

       {¶ 21} In its motion for summary judgment, Nationstar stated, “In the present case,

Plaintiff was a person entitled to enforce the promissory note at the time the Complaint

was filed, and remains a person entitled to enforce the promissory note to date.”

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7, citing Affidavit in Support of Summary

Judgment, ¶ 8. Attached to the motion for summary judgment was the affidavit of Britney

Fisher, an employee of Nationstar with the title of Document Execution Associate. She

averred that “Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of the original

promissory note, which is part of the Mortgage Loan (‘the Note’).” Affidavit in Support of

Summary Judgment, ¶ 7. She also averred that “Nationstar Mortgage LLC, dba Mr.

Cooper was a person entitled to enforce the promissory note at the time the Complaint
                                                                                           -11-

was filed, and remains a person entitled to enforce the promissory note to date.” Id. at

¶ 8.

       {¶ 22} Fisher did not state in her affidavit the precise facts on which she relied in

making her averment that Nationstar was a party entitled to enforce the note.              For

example, she did not aver that Nationstar was the holder of the note or that Nationstar

was a nonholder in possession of the instrument who had the rights of a holder. While

she averred that she attached a true and accurate copy of the original note to her affidavit,

it is unclear whether that meant she and Nationstar had possession of the original note

or just obtained a true and accurate “copy” of the note by other means.             However,

Anderson failed to raise any objection to Fisher’s affidavit on this basis and did not

contend that Nationstar lacked standing due to a failure to prove it was a party entitled to

enforce the note. Further, he did not submit any evidence in opposition to the motion for

summary judgment that contradicted the averments made in Fisher’s affidavit. As a

result, we must conclude that Anderson waived any argument related to whether

Nationstar was a party entitled to enforce the note and did not satisfy his reciprocal

summary judgment burden of pointing to specific facts in the record demonstrating the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Therefore, the trial court did not err

in finding that Nationstar had standing to bring this foreclosure action.

       {¶ 23} Anderson also contends that Nationstar failed to prove the amount due on

the loan, because Nationstar failed to show all the payments made since the original date

of the loan. But courts have consistently held that “[t]here is no requirement that a

plaintiff provide a complete ‘payment history’ in order to establish its entitlement to
                                                                                            -12-

summary judgment in a foreclosure action.”         (Citations omitted.)    Morequity, Inc. v.

Gombita, 2018-Ohio-4860, 125 N.E.3d 300, ¶ 44 (8th Dist.). Rather, “ ‘[a]n affidavit

stating that the plaintiff is the owner of the note and mortgage and that the loan is in

default generally is sufficient to permit a trial court to enter summary judgment and order

foreclosure, unless there is evidence that controverts the averments.’ ” Wells Fargo Fin.

Ohio 1, Inc. v. Robinson, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2016-CA-23, 2017-Ohio-2888, ¶ 17,

quoting JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2014-CA-27,

2015-Ohio-1939, ¶ 10.

       {¶ 24} Nationstar submitted an affidavit, along with a payment history, which

showed a balance due of $7,708.76 as of February 2018. The records going forward

showed the last payment of $512.31 was made on the loan on March 11, 2019. This

payment reduced the outstanding balance to $7,390.59, which was the amount of the

judgment awarded to Nationstar. This satisfied Nationstar’s summary judgment burden.

Anderson then had the burden of coming forward with evidence contesting the amount

due or the fact that he had defaulted on the mortgage. He did not do so. Therefore, the

trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Nationstar.

       {¶ 25} Finally, Anderson contends that Nationstar failed to include citations in its

motion for summary judgment to specific parts of the record. According to Anderson,

Nationstar failed to cite to the affidavit attached to its motion, failed to cite the documents

authenticated by the affidavit, and failed to show how these documents supported

Nationstar’s claim to summary judgment. Anderson argues that it is not the court’s job

to search Nationstar’s filing to “ferret out” the basis for its claim. Appellant’s Brief, p. 8.
                                                                                         -13-

We do not agree with Anderson’s characterization of Nationstar’s motion for summary

judgment.

          {¶ 26} Nationstar attached to its motion for summary judgment an affidavit from

one of its employees who had personal knowledge of and reviewed Nationstar’s business

records. Attached to her affidavit were the documents that demonstrated the unbroken

chain of title from the original mortgagee to Nationstar. Further, attached to her affidavit

was the payment history on the loan from February 2018 to September 2021. In total,

there were under 40 pages of documents attached to Nationstar’s motion for summary

judgment.      While Nationstar could have done a better job of walking the trial court

through the various assignments and the payment history, we do not believe this was a

situation where the movant failed to meet its initial burden of showing an absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Rather, Nationstar laid out its argument and attached

relevant, evidentiary support for its argument. Anderson then had the burden of pointing

to evidence of specific facts in the record demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue

of material fact for trial. Anderson did not meet his reciprocal burden. Therefore, the

trial court did not err in granting judgment to Nationstar.

          {¶ 27} The sole assignment of error is overruled.

   III.      Conclusion

          {¶ 28} Having overruled Anderson’s sole assignment of error, the judgment of the

trial court will be affirmed.

                                       .............
                                       -14-

WELBAUM, P.J. and EPLEY, J., concur.