Court Opinion

ID: 9945702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:01:16.966226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:37.975455
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2046    Document: 75    Page: 1   Filed: 02/28/2024

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                    ALEXSAM, INC.,
                    Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

          MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL
                INCORPORATED,
                 Defendant-Appellee
              ______________________

                       2022-2046
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Eastern District of New York in No. 1:15-cv-02799-ILG-
 VMS, Senior Judge Israel Leo Glasser.
                  ______________________

                Decided: February 28, 2024
                 ______________________

     HUNTER T. CARTER, Arent Fox LLP, New York, NY, ar-
 gued for plaintiff-appellant.     Also represented by
 JACQUELINE KNAPP BURT, Heninger Garrison Davis, LLC,
 Atlanta, GA; TIMOTHY C. DAVIS, W. LEE GRESHAM, III, Bir-
 mingham, AL; STEVEN RITCHESON, Insight, PLC, Marina
 del Rey, CA.

     ELIOT DAMON WILLIAMS, Baker Botts LLP, Washing-
 ton, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented
Case: 22-2046    Document: 75      Page: 2    Filed: 02/28/2024

 2                                        ALEXSAM, INC. v.
                   MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

 by MICHAEL HAWES, Houston, TX; EMILY ROSE PYCLIK,
 Austin, TX; ROBERT C. SCHEINFELD, JENNIFER COZEOLINO
 TEMPESTA, New York, NY.
             ______________________

     Before LOURIE, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
 STOLL, Circuit Judge.
     This case involves interpretation of a patent license
 agreement. The district court granted summary judgment
 dismissing AlexSam, Inc.’s lawsuit for breach of contract
 against MasterCard International Inc., holding that the
 covenant not to sue provision in the License Agreement be-
 tween AlexSam and MasterCard prohibited AlexSam’s
 claim for breach of the Agreement’s royalties provision. See
 AlexSam, Inc. v. MasterCard Int’l Inc., No. 15-CV-2799,
 2022 WL 2541433 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2022) (Summary
 Judgment Op.).
     This case illustrates the importance of carefully re-
 viewing the language in a covenant not to sue when enter-
 ing a license agreement. AlexSam reads the covenant to
 prohibit it from suing for patent infringement only, while
 MasterCard reads the covenant much more broadly to pro-
 hibit suits not just for patent infringement, but also for
 breach of contract for failure to pay royalties due under the
 contract. We conclude that MasterCard has the better in-
 terpretation given the language in the license agreement
 at issue. That said, we hold that the covenant not to sue
 does not survive the termination of the License Agreement.
 Because the License Agreement has terminated, we re-
 verse the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
 MasterCard and remand for further proceedings consistent
 with this opinion.
                         BACKGROUND
     AlexSam owns U.S. Patent Nos. 6,000,608 and
 6,189,787 (Licensed Patents), which are both titled
Case: 22-2046    Document: 75     Page: 3    Filed: 02/28/2024

 ALEXSAM, INC. v.                                            3
 MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

 “Multifunction Card System.” The patents are generally
 directed to pre-paid cards that can be used with point-of-
 sale devices. See, e.g., ’608 patent, Abstract. The patents
 expired on July 10, 2017.
     In 2005, AlexSam and MasterCard negotiated and en-
 tered into the License Agreement at issue. J.A. 212–28.1
 AlexSam granted MasterCard “a worldwide, non-exclusive,
 non-transferable . . . license under the Licensed Patents to
 process and enable others to process Licensed Transac-
 tions.” J.A. 213–14 ¶¶ 2.1, 1.3 (defining Licensed Transac-
 tions). In exchange, MasterCard agreed to pay ongoing
 royalties in the amount of “a fee per Licensed Transaction.”
 J.A. 215 ¶ 4.1.
    Relevant here, the License Agreement includes a “Cov-
 enant Not to Sue,” which reads in full:
    Alex[S]am hereby agrees and covenants to not at
    any time initiate, assert, or bring any claim (in any
    court, administrative agency, or other tribunal, an-
    ywhere in the world) against MasterCard, for any
    claim or alleged liabilities of any kind and nature,
    at law, in equity, or otherwise, known and un-
    known, suspected and unsuspected, disclosed and
    undisclosed, relating to Licensed Transactions aris-
    ing or occurring before or during the term of this
    Agreement.
 J.A. 214 ¶ 2.2 (emphases added). The License Agreement
 also includes a “Term and Termination” section which re-
 cites, in relevant part:
    [T]his Agreement shall remain in full force and ef-
    fect for the life of the Licensed Patents unless . . .

    1 The License Agreement was amended in 2006 and

 2007. J.A. 229–32. These amendments do not affect our
 interpretation of the covenant not to sue.
Case: 22-2046     Document: 75      Page: 4    Filed: 02/28/2024

 4                                        ALEXSAM, INC. v.
                   MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

     (iv) either party breaches any material provision of
     this Agreement, including but not limited to Sec-
     tions 4 [consideration, including royalties], 5 (last
     sentence only), 6, 8, 9, 11 and 18 and the other
     party gives written notice of such breach and the
     alleged breaching party fails to cure such breach
     within 30 days of its receipt of such notice, in which
     case the non-breaching party shall have the right
     to terminate the Agreement by giving a termina-
     tion notice within sixty (60) days following the re-
     ceipt of such written notice of breach. . . . The
     provisions of paragraphs 4 [royalties] (but only as
     to activities prior to the termination date), 8-10, 12,
     14 and 15 shall survive termination of this Agree-
     ment.
 J.A. 219–21 ¶ 7 (emphases added).
      In May 2015, AlexSam filed suit against MasterCard
 for breach of contract in the U.S. District Court for the
 Eastern District of New York. J.A. 204–10. Specifically,
 AlexSam claimed that MasterCard “has under-reported
 the number of ‘Licensed Transactions,’” has not paid
 AlexSam for each “Licensed Transactions,” and has there-
 fore “substantially breached material provisions of the Li-
 cense Agreement.” J.A. 208. Mastercard raised several
 affirmative defenses and counterclaims.
      Separately, on March 10, 2017, MasterCard petitioned
 for covered business method (CBM) review of the Licensed
 Patents. AlexSam opposed institution, arguing that Mas-
 terCard lacked standing under 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a),
 which states: “A petitioner may not file with the Office a
 petition to institute a covered business method patent re-
 view of the patent unless the petitioner . . . has been sued
 for infringement of the patent or has been charged with in-
 fringement under that patent.” Specifically, AlexSam ar-
 gued that it had not sued MasterCard for patent
Case: 22-2046     Document: 75      Page: 5    Filed: 02/28/2024

 ALEXSAM, INC. v.                                             5
 MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

 infringement and, moreover, that the covenant not to sue
 prevented it from doing so.
      The Board denied institution, determining that Mas-
 terCard lacked standing to bring the CBM review. See
 MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. AlexSam, Inc., No. CBM2017-
 00041, 2017 WL 4221401 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 21, 2017) (CBM
 Decision). 2 It concluded that “the broad language of the
 covenant not to sue provision in the License Agreement re-
 moves any imminent possibility that Patent Owner could
 bring an infringement action against Petitioner,” id. at *5,
 and that they “need not, and do not, address the question
 of whether [AlexSam’s] breach of contract claim in the New
 York Action itself violates the covenant not to sue,” id. at *5
 n.3.
     MasterCard then moved for summary judgment in the
 district court, arguing that AlexSam’s assertions to the
 Board about the covenant not to sue judicially estopped
 AlexSam from asserting its breach of contract claims in the
 district court. The district court agreed with MasterCard
 and dismissed AlexSam’s complaint with prejudice.
 AlexSam, Inc. v. MasterCard Int’l Inc., No. 15-CV-2799,
 2020 WL 3286785 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2020). We reversed.
 AlexSam, Inc. v. MasterCard Int’l Inc., No. 2021-1785,
 2022 WL 621374, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 3, 2022) (AlexSam
 I).
     In AlexSam I, we held that the district court abused its
 discretion in crediting AlexSam with a position it never ac-
 tually took before the Board, which led the district court to
 incorrectly determine that judicial estoppel prevented

     2 The Board issued a nearly identical decision for the

 ’608 patent. See MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. AlexSam, Inc.,
 No. CBM2017-00042,        2017 WL     4221130    (P.T.A.B.
 Sept. 21, 2017). For brevity, we only cite to the decision
 denying institution for the ’787 patent.
Case: 22-2046     Document: 75      Page: 6    Filed: 02/28/2024

 6                                        ALEXSAM, INC. v.
                   MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

 AlexSam from pursuing its breach of contract claims. Id.
 We did not opine on whether the “broadly worded covenant
 not to sue ‘prohibits a claim for royalties under the license
 agreement,’” and we remanded for the district court to de-
 termine whether the covenant not to sue prohibits a claim
 for royalties, a question of contract interpretation. Id. at *5
 & n.3.
     MasterCard again moved to dismiss for lack of subject-
 matter jurisdiction and judgment on the pleadings, and for
 summary judgment. Summary Judgment Op., 2022 WL
 2541433, at *1. The district court granted MasterCard’s
 motion for summary judgment, holding that the broadly
 worded covenant not to sue bars AlexSam’s claim for un-
 paid royalties. Id. at *3.
    AlexSam appeals.          We have jurisdiction under
 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
                           DISCUSSION
     We review a district court’s grant of summary judg-
 ment under the law of the regional circuit, here, the Second
 Circuit. See Unwired Planet, LLC v. Apple Inc., 829 F.3d
 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Second Circuit reviews a
 grant of summary judgment de novo. McBride v. BIC Con-
 sumer Prods. Mfg. Co., Inc., 583 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009).
     “In a contract dispute[,] a motion for summary judg-
 ment may be granted only where the agreement’s language
 is unambiguous and conveys a definite meaning.” Sayers
 v. Rochester Tel. Corp. Supplemental Mgmt. Pension Plan,
 7 F.3d 1091, 1094 (2d Cir. 1993). The Second Circuit views
 its task as determining whether a clause is ambiguous
 when read in the context of the entire agreement. Id.
 at 1095. Determining whether writing is ambiguous is a
 question of law that we review de novo. See id. at 1094.
     In our view, the plain language of the covenant is ex-
 tremely broad and covers AlexSam’s suit to recover royal-
 ties for Licensed Transactions under ¶ 4.1 of the
Case: 22-2046    Document: 75      Page: 7    Filed: 02/28/2024

 ALEXSAM, INC. v.                                           7
 MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

 Agreement. AlexSam agreed to not “at any time” bring
 “any claim (in any court . . . anywhere in the world) against
 MasterCard, for any claim or alleged liabilities of any kind
 and nature” whether known or unknown “relating to Li-
 censed Transactions arising or occurring before or during
 the term of this Agreement.” J.A. 214 ¶ 2.2. This language
 is not limited to suits for patent infringement.
     AlexSam asserts that, when read in light of other sec-
 tions of the License Agreement, the covenant not to sue
 cannot be understood to bar a suit for breach for nonpay-
 ment of royalties. Relatedly, AlexSam faults the district
 court for reading the covenant in isolation without consid-
 ering the remainder of the License Agreement. Specifi-
 cally, AlexSam asserts that the district court’s
 interpretation of the covenant not to sue renders the re-
 quirement that MasterCard pay a fee per Covered Trans-
 action superfluous because AlexSam has no recourse when
 MasterCard fails to pay. Continuing, AlexSam contends
 that interpretating the covenant to only bar patent in-
 fringement suits is the only reading that “would preserve
 the clear intent of the parties as expressed in the License
 Agreement taken as a whole” and not render the agree-
 ment illusory. Appellant’s Br. 21.
     We are not persuaded. The language of the covenant
 not to sue does not even mention patent infringement.
 Moreover, we read the agreement as providing an alterna-
 tive option that would allow AlexSam to first terminate the
 agreement, which would then terminate the covenant not
 to sue, allowing AlexSam to sue for breach of contract
 based on MasterCard’s nonpayment of royalties during the
 term of the agreement. Accordingly, we do not agree with
 AlexSam’s argument that the district court’s interpretation
 of the covenant not to sue renders the royalty payment re-
 quirement or any other provisions of the License Agree-
 ment illusory.
Case: 22-2046     Document: 75      Page: 8    Filed: 02/28/2024

 8                                        ALEXSAM, INC. v.
                   MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

      To elaborate, the License Agreement includes a section
 titled “Term and Termination,” which states that the
 agreement “shall remain in full force and effect for the life
 of the Licensed Patents unless . . . (iv) either party
 breaches any material provision of this Agreement, includ-
 ing but not limited to Sections 4 [duty to pay royalties for
 Licensed Transactions] . . . and the other party gives writ-
 ten notice of such breach and the alleged breaching party
 fails to cure such breach within 30 days of its receipt of such
 notice, in which case the non-breaching party shall have
 the right to terminate the Agreement by giving a termina-
 tion notice within sixty (60) days following the receipt of
 such written notice of breach.” J.A. 219–20 ¶ 7(emphasis
 added). The License Agreement states that certain sec-
 tions “shall survive termination” of the agreement, and for
 paragraph 4, dealing with royalties to Licensed Transac-
 tions, the duty to pay royalties survives “only as to activi-
 ties prior to the termination date.” J.A. 221 ¶ 7. In other
 words, the duty to pay royalties for Licensed Transactions
 during the life of the agreement does not go away with the
 termination of the agreement. On the other hand, the cov-
 enant not to sue is not listed as a provision that survives
 termination of the License Agreement. Thus, the covenant
 not to sue terminates with the License Agreement, leaving
 AlexSam free to “bring a[] claim . . . relating to Licensed
 Transactions.” J.A. 214 ¶ 2.2. While we understand that
 this requirement to terminate the License Agreement prior
 to bringing suit for breach of contract has some drawbacks,
 it is the procedure that AlexSam agreed to.
     Citing Colton v. New York Hospital, 385 N.Y.S.2d 65,
 66 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1976) (Colton I), AlexSam further
 argues that, under New York law, a covenant not to sue
 does not bar suit; rather, if breached, it may give rise to a
 damages remedy. The Colton I case cited by AlexSam ex-
 plains: “A covenant not to sue is not a release since it is
 not a present abandonment of a right or claim, but merely
 an agreement not to enforce an existing cause of action. . . .
Case: 22-2046    Document: 75     Page: 9    Filed: 02/28/2024

 ALEXSAM, INC. v.                                          9
 MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

 Thus, the party possessing the right of action is not pre-
 cluded thereby from thereafter bringing suit . . . .”
 385 N.Y.S.2d at 66. But, contrary to AlexSam’s suggestion,
 this case is consistent with our reading of the covenant not
 to sue and termination provisions in the License Agree-
 ment; AlexSam agreed to not “bring a[] claim . . . relating
 to Licensed Transactions,” but once the License Agreement
 terminates, so too does the covenant.
     AlexSam next asserts that under New York law, a cov-
 enant not to sue “must be strictly construed against the
 party asserting it . . . [and] its wording must be clear and
 unequivocal.” Appellant’s Br. 20–21 (alteration in original)
 (emphasis omitted) (quoting LG Elecs. Inc. v. Saint Law-
 rence Commc’ns, LCC, No. 18-CV-11082, 2019 WL
 1595861, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2019)). Here, we view
 the words of the covenant (and how it interacts with the
 rest of the provisions in the agreement) as clear and une-
 quivocal, even if the result is in some ways harsh.
      Finally, AlexSam asserts that the covenant terminated
 with the License Agreement more than five years ago when
 the patents expired and hence cannot bar the present suit
 for breach of contract for failure to pay royalties prior to
 the expiration of the License Agreement. MasterCard
 counters that that covenant itself includes the words “at
 any time,” thus barring AlexSam from bringing a claim for
 Licensed Transactions in perpetuity. See J.A. 214 ¶ 2.2
 (“Alex[S]am hereby agrees and covenants to not at any time
 initiate, assert, or bring any claim . . . against Master-
 Card . . . relating to Licensed Transactions arising or oc-
 curring before or during the term of this Agreement.”
 (emphasis added)). We disagree that the covenant bars
 AlexSam in perpetuity. Instead, we read the termination
 clause to provide that the covenant not to sue terminates
 with the termination of the License Agreement. As such,
 we think the most reasonable interpretation (and, indeed,
 the only one that makes sense in light of AlexSam’s “illu-
 sory contract” argument above) is that the entire covenant
Case: 22-2046    Document: 75     Page: 10    Filed: 02/28/2024

 10                                       ALEXSAM, INC. v.
                   MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

 not to sue (including the language “at any time”) expires
 with the expiration of the License Agreement. Stated dif-
 ferently, we interpret the language “at any time” to not
 mean in perpetuity, but rather “at any time” means at any
 time during the term of the License Agreement. This is
 consistent with Colton I, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 66, ensures that
 the consideration (i.e., payment of royalties) in exchange
 for the license was not illusory, and is consistent with Mas-
 terCard’s contention that AlexSam’s recourse for nonpay-
 ment of royalties (i.e., filing suit for breach of contract)
 required AlexSam to first terminate the License Agree-
 ment.
      MasterCard next argues that even if the covenant ter-
 minates with the License Agreement after expiration of the
 patents, AlexSam represented to the PTO that the cove-
 nant not to sue barred a patent infringement suit even af-
 ter expiration of the patents and this representation bars
 AlexSam from now arguing otherwise. But as explained
 below, the parties never discussed the impact of expiration
 of the patents on the term of the covenant not to sue during
 the CBM proceedings before the PTO. Nor did AlexSam
 cite or otherwise rely on the “at any time” language to sug-
 gest that the covenant not to sue exists forever. Rather,
 review of the CBM submissions suggests that AlexSam was
 responding to a different, more specific argument pre-
 sented by MasterCard.
     In March 2017, MasterCard petitioned the PTAB for
 CBM review of AlexSam’s patents. On appeal now, Mas-
 terCard cites AlexSam’s statements made to convince the
 PTO to deny institution of the CBM after the Licensed Pa-
 tents (and the License Agreement) expired on July 10,
 2017. Appellee’s Br. 37 (citing J.A. 1628–31). The PTAB
 had asked for supplemental briefing on “the effect of the
 covenant not to sue provision on Petitioner’s standing
Case: 22-2046    Document: 75       Page: 11    Filed: 02/28/2024

 ALEXSAM, INC. v.                                              11
 MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

 under 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a).” 3 CBM Decision, 2017 WL
 4221401, at *5. MasterCard told the PTO that the cove-
 nant not to sue was void as a result of AlexSam’s filing of
 this lawsuit. In response, on August 30, 2017, after expi-
 ration of the patents, AlexSam stated:
     The payment of royalties is Petitioner’s obligation
     under the License Agreement – not a condition of
     the [covenant not to sue]. Petitioner’s intentional,
     and admitted, refusal to pay royalties it owes sup-
     ports a claim for breach, not patent infringement.
     Further, the [covenant not to sue] provides no ex-
     plicit means for its revocation. . . . The facts do not
     support the conclusion that the [covenant not to
     sue] was, or could be, revoked by the filing of Pa-
     tent Owner’s breach of contract claim.
                              ...
     Petitioner has not been sued for infringement and
     the [covenant not to sue] is further evidence that
     Patent Owner cannot sue Petitioner, who is a licen-
     see, for infringement.
 J.A. 1629–30 (emphasis omitted). AlexSam did not specif-
 ically quote or mention the “at any time” language, alt-
 hough it did argue that the covenant “provides no explicit
 means for its revocation.” J.A. 1629.
     The PTAB subsequently held:
     We also find no basis to conclude that the covenant
     was, or could be, revoked based on Petitioner’s

     3 As noted above, 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a) states:   “A peti-
 tioner may not file with the Office a petition to institute a
 covered business method patent review of the patent un-
 less the petitioner . . . has been sued for infringement of the
 patent or has been charged with infringement under that
 patent.”
Case: 22-2046    Document: 75      Page: 12    Filed: 02/28/2024

 12                                       ALEXSAM, INC. v.
                   MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

      alleged breach and Patent Owner’s filing of the
      breach of contract claim in the New York Action.
      The covenant prohibits Patent Owner from bring-
      ing an infringement claim for Licensed Transac-
      tions at “any time,” which would include now or at
      any point in the future.
 CBM Decision, 2017 WL 4221401, at *6 (emphasis omit-
 ted).
      The doctrine of judicial estoppel serves to prevent liti-
 gants from asserting claims in a court proceeding that are
 directly contrary to or inconsistent with a prior statement
 made in a previous proceeding. See New Hampshire
 v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001) (outlining several
 factors to inform the decision of whether to apply judicial
 estoppel). The Second Circuit has explained that judicial
 estoppel “is properly invoked where: (1) a party’s later po-
 sition is clearly inconsistent with its earlier position, and
 (2) the party’s former position has been adopted in some
 way by the court in an earlier proceeding.” Ashmore v. CGI
 Grp., Inc., 923 F.3d 260, 272 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing New
 Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750–51). Also, the Second Circuit
 “often, but not always, require[s] a showing that the party
 asserting the two inconsistent positions would derive an
 unfair advantage against the party seeking estoppel.” Id.
 (citing New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751).
     Contrary to MasterCard’s assertion, we view
 AlexSam’s current position as not directly contrary to or
 inconsistent with its statements made to the PTO regard-
 ing the covenant not to sue. Here, review of the supple-
 mental briefs and the PTAB’s decision shows that the issue
 there was whether the filing of this breach of contract ac-
 tion rendered the covenant not to sue void. That is the is-
 sue on which AlexSam spoke and the issue on which the
 PTAB ruled. That the PTAB relied on the “at any time”
 language to reach its conclusion does not mean that
 AlexSam argued as much.
Case: 22-2046    Document: 75     Page: 13   Filed: 02/28/2024

 ALEXSAM, INC. v.                                         13
 MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

      This mirrors, and is consistent with, our decision in
 AlexSam I. There, MasterCard also argued that AlexSam
 took inconsistent positions. See AlexSam I, 2022 WL
 621374, at *1. And it argued inconsistency based on a sin-
 gle sentence (without context) in AlexSam’s supplemental
 briefing before the Board—the same section of the supple-
 mental briefing that MasterCard invokes in this appeal.
 Compare AlexSam I, 2022 WL 621374, at *4–5, with Appel-
 lee’s Br. at 37 (citing J.A. 1628–31). Like our decision in
 AlexSam I, we analyze whether judicial estoppel applies
 not by analyzing an isolated sentence or section of a brief,
 but by considering the context, bearing in mind not only
 the arguments made but also what the arguments were in
 response to. In doing so here, we view AlexSam as main-
 taining consistent positions in its arguments before the
 Board and its arguments before the district court.
     Finally, MasterCard argues that we should hold that
 AlexSam lacked standing at the time that it filed suit in
 this case, asserting that “even if the [covenant not to sue]
 expired with the patents in 2017, because Alex[S]am’s com-
 plaint was filed in 2015 when the [covenant] was alive un-
 der Alex[S]am’s interpretation, Alex[S]am’s suit for
 royalties was precluded.” Appellee’s Br. 36. MasterCard
 argues that we should dismiss AlexSam’s complaint for
 failure to state a claim for the same reasons. Appellee’s
 Br. 38–39. We do not reach these issues, which were not
 addressed by the district court, and instead remand for the
 district court to address one or both in the first instance.
                        CONCLUSION
     We have considered MasterCard’s remaining argu-
 ments and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons above,
 we reverse the district court’s summary judgment, which
 hinged on whether the covenant barred AlexSam’s claim
 for breach of the agreement’s royalty provision. Because
 we hold that the covenant not to sue terminated when the
 License Agreement terminated, thus allowing AlexSam to
Case: 22-2046     Document: 75     Page: 14     Filed: 02/28/2024

 14                                       ALEXSAM, INC. v.
                   MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED

 sue for failure to pay royalties prior to that time, we reverse
 and remand.
                REVERSED AND REMANDED
                             COSTS
 No costs.