Court Opinion

ID: 9748449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:02:03.577725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:22.203450
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
BENDER, J.:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent. The Majority would circumvent the trial judge’s rightful discretion in imposing sentence on the basis of characterizations the record does not sustain. As a direct result, the Majority’s ruling works a grievous injustice for the sake of expanding a plea practice not properly applicable to this case. Moreover, the Majority’s suggestion that, upon remand, the defendant must be committed to the prison term originally at issue despite the trial judge’s imposition of a different sentence is wholly unprecedented and poses troubling questions of due process and double jeopardy.
¶ 2 Initially, the Majority overlooks the compelling reasons cited by the trial judge in support of his sentence and conflates the reasons for the trial judge’s ruling with elements of the argument of counsel. Majority Op. at 1271. What this record makes clear — and the trial court relied on in imposing sentence — is that the defendant is mentally retarded, his tested I.Q. ranging between 50 and 60. Order, 4/4/06, at 1. He cannot read or write, N.T., Guilty Plea, 1/27/06, at 2-8, and given the extraordinary measures taken by both counsel and the trial judge to reduce the abstractions of the plea process to the simplest possible expression, is obviously unable to understand matters of any complexity. Moreover, he did not plead guilty to a crime of violence and the Commonwealth made no offer of proof suggesting violent conduct. Consequently, the trial judge reached a conclusion, in the proper exercise of his discretion, to make a downward departure from the Commonwealth’s sentencing recommendation.1 In support of this decision, the judge emphasized not counsel’s argument that the sexual contact at issue was consensual, but that the defendant was simply too vulnerable to be consigned to the predations of the county jail:
I considered the facts that have been agreed to in this matter, and the reports from Dr. Rotenberg. I believe that the actions of the defendant were totally and wholly inappropriate. I don’t believe that incarceration is an appropriate punishment, and, in fact, may lead to worse situations, quite frankly. If this defendant is incarcerated, he will be a victim, there is no question in my mind, unless he was kept in solitary confinement, *1273which is also an inappropriate punishment.
N.T., Sentencing, 4/4/06, at 10. In his sentencing order, the judge amplified his concerns as follows:
[T]he Defendant having been sentenced in the mitigated range, this Court notes the following reasons for its departure: Offender is of limited intelligence, having an IQ of only 50-60, thus creating a substantial risk of victimization if incarcerated. Defendant does not have the mental means to defend himself or possibly even report abuse if incarcerated. Further, the guidelines are inappropriate under the circumstances of this case, offender lacked capacity for judgment during crime, offender is good candidate for rehabilitation, offender has no prior adult record or minor adult record, offender has not been incarcerated before, offender waived a jury trial and offender is young. The offender lacked capacity to understand the seriousness of the consensual sexual behavior.
Order, 4/4/06, at 1. I am deeply troubled that the Majority should so blithely disregard these most compelling observations. Moreover, it strikes me as grievously unjust that a trial judge’s exercise of discretion, based upon elements of personal observation and interaction at the very core of our individualized sentencing process, should be swept aside in the interest of preserving for the Commonwealth the supposed “benefit of its bargain” when the bargain is itself less than clear. See Op. at 1271.
¶ 3 Accordingly, I find the Majority’s ruling vastly overbroad, as it effectively divests the trial judge of the discretion allowed by the Sentencing Code in all but the most clearly “open” pleas, where the Commonwealth and the defendant have agreed to no more than the charges pled and the record leaves not a shred of doubt about that limitation. Such a holding here is inappropriate; despite the Majority’s insistence that “the parties’ plea bargain involved a specific sentence, not merely a ‘sentencing recommendation,’ ” Op. at 1270 (original emphasis), the record suggests an understanding by the court and the Commonwealth that the parties had merely reached an agreement for a reduction in charges with a sentence recommendation to be measured against standard sentencing factors — which the Commonwealth enumerated on the record. As described by the Commonwealth: “This is a charge agreement as the Court can see from the Information as well as the ■sentencing agreement if the Court should choose to accept it.” N.T., Guilty Plea, 1/27/06, at 9. Although the trial judge explained the terms of the “sentencing agreement” to the defendant, see id., he elaborated that the court was not bound by the plea agreement as a whole, stating “I do not have to follow it if I don’t think it’s appropriate.” Id. at 10. Subject to that caveat, which elicited no objection from the Commonwealth, the court accepted Parsons’ plea. Id. at 12. Significantly, the court then ordered a PSI report and deferred sentencing for its completion. Id. at 12-13.
¶ 4 The Majority appraises this scenario merely by noting that the requests for deferred sentencing and a pre-sentence investigation were made by Parsons’ counsel. Op., at 1264. Unfortunately, the Majority fails to acknowledge the complete failure of the Commonwealth to oppose either request or assert that if, in fact, a binding agreement on the sentence existed, a PSI report was completely unnecessary. Moreover, the Commonwealth compounded the matter when, at the subsequent sentencing hearing, it detailed the appropriate ranges under the Sentencing Guidelines, the offense gravity score, and the defendant’s prior record score of zero. *1274N.T., Sentencing, 4/4/06, at 3. After review of elements of the PSI report on the record, the prosecutor then went on to request imposition of the “agreed” sentence pursuant to the “sentencing agreement,” as distinct from the “charging agreement.” Id. at 4-5. The following discussion by the prosecutor, offered over two months after the trial judge had accepted Parsons’ plea, is plainly a recommendation for sentencing:
In order that the victim in this case will have to avoid reliving, through testimony, the trauma of what the defendant subjected her to we believe this is, in fact, a very generous plea offer for this young man; both the charge agreement and the sentencing agreement the Commonwealth isn’t looking for Megan’s Law convictions and certainly isn’t pursuing state incarceration. I would ask the court to note that throughout, despite the long time which this case has been pending, the victim has not had to testify. The defendant waived his preliminary hearing and time passed before the defendant could file a pretrial and he took the guilty plea prior to trial so she didn’t have to testify then.
In light of the input of the victim, the background of this defendant, which I have been made aware of from Dr. Ro-tenberg’s report, I believe this is an appropriate disposition for the Defendant. We ask that you accept and adopt the plea agreement, Your Honor.
Id. at 5. In my opinion, this excerpt leaves little room for debate. The prosecutor, in tone, tenor, and plain language recognized the non-binding nature of the sentence he was recommending. Thus, what the Commonwealth described as a “charging agreement” and “sentencing agreement” appears as an open plea with sentencing recommendation. The Commonwealth’s discussion of the PSI report, its detailed recitation of the Guidelines sentencing ranges, and related scores, and its request that the trial judge “accept and adopt the plea agreement” two months after the court had accepted Parson’s plea simply make no sense otherwise. Moreover, to the extent the Commonwealth was entitled to the benefit of any bargain, the prosecutor’s own language establishes that it received that benefit in having avoided a trial and spared the victim the need to appear in court. Although the Commonwealth was quick to adjust its position when the trial judge elected not to impose jail time, see id. at 11, the fact remains that the Commonwealth’s own presentation established a framework for the exercise of judicial discretion to accept or reject a recommended sentence. On this point our Supreme Court has provided precise direction which, given the Majority’s determination to the contrary, bears repetition here:
In the process of negotiating a guilty plea, the prosecutor may make promises to the defendant, for instance recommending a maximum sentence for the crimes committed. Although the prosecutor is bound to act in accordance with those promises, this “in no way binds the presiding judge to the terms of the agreement.” Commonwealth v. Zuber, 466 Pa. 453, 353 A.2d 441, 444, n. 4 (1976); see also Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 442 Pa. 524, 277 A.2d 341, 343 (1971) (noting that under a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant “knew that he could not count on the court being bound by the recommendation [of sentence]”). In fact, the presiding judge can still sentence the defendant to any term allowed under the Sentencing Code, provided that the defendant has the chance to withdraw his guilty plea if the judge’s sentence is not in accordance with his negotiated agreement. Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A).
*1275Commonwealth v. Wallace, 582 Pa. 234, 870 A.2d 838, 843 n. 5 (2005) (emphasis added)2. Thus, the trial court did not err in imposing sentence based on standard sentencing factors notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s belatedly revised “expectations.” See Op. at 1269. Contrary to the Majority’s conclusion, the trial judge did not unilaterally “alter” a binding plea agreement but exercised his discretion on the basis of an incoherent presentation by the Commonwealth. Accordingly, I find no error in the trial judge’s ruling or the sentence he imposed.
¶ 5 Finally, I find it necessary to address the Majority’s suggestion that, upon remand, “a viable alternative resolution of this case would be, as the Commonwealth requests, to vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for imposition of the sentence pursuant to the plea bargain.” Op. at 1271. Such a resolution is depen-dant, of course, upon an interpretation of the record that I do not accept. To the extent that the Majority’s decision will impose it, however, I find another alternative equally viable. The defendant may file a post sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea on the basis of the manifest injustice which, in my view is arguably present. If, at a hearing, the requisite threshold is met, the trial court may choose to grant such a motion and allow the defendant to go to trial at the conclusion of which, if the defendant is convicted, the trial judge will have full discretion in sentencing.
¶ 6 “A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice when it is entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.” Commonwealth v. Pantalion, 957 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Pa.Super.2008). As in all such matters, the trial court may find the plea infirm if the record of the guilty plea colloquy betrays an error in the information provided that is material to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty. See id. at 1272; see also Commonwealth v. Alston, 387 Pa.Super. 393, 564 A.2d 235, 237 (1989). Of course not every mistake or inadequacy in the guilty plea colloquy is material to a defendant’s decision to tender his plea; indeed, the bulk of our decisions on the subject indicates that most such errors are wholly immaterial. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Yager, 454 Pa.Super. 428, 685 A.2d 1000, 1005-06 (1996). This Court has acknowledged, however, that an error may be material if information provided by the judge prior to the defendant’s entry of his plea impeded the defendant’s ability to assess the length of the sentence to be imposed as a result of the plea. See Alston, 564 A.2d at 237. Accordingly, in Alston, we found the defendant’s plea infirm and deemed manifest injustice shown where the trial judge informed the defendant that he would be subject to forty-eight hours minimum imprisonment when in fact, as a second-time offender, the defendant was subject to a minimum term of thirty days. See id. (“Because appellee was misinformed as to the potential sentence he would receive, we must conclude that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily tendered.”).
¶ 7 In my view, this case raises a concern similar to that demonstrated in Alston. Although the trial court did not promise the defendant a shorter term than *1276allowed by law, he suggested an ability to impose a sentence other then the one agreed if he accepted the defendant’s plea. After the judge explained the recommended term of incarceration to the defendant and obtained his assent that he understood and agreed to that term, the court followed immediately with a disclaimer:
THE COURT: Do you understand that I was not involved in the negotiation of this plea agreement and that this is an agreement between you and your attorney and the Commonwealth through the Assistant District Attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you understand that I am not bound by the plea agreement? In other words, I do not have to follow it if I don’t think it’s appropriate?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
N.T., Guilty Plea, 1/27/06, at 10.
¶ 8 Assuming, as the Majority holds, that the “agreement” in question was a fully negotiated binding plea agreement, the trial judge’s suggestion to the defendant that he was not bound to impose the agreed sentence is simply erroneous. Although the judge was not bound to accept the defendant’s plea, if he accepted it in the presence of a fully negotiated plea agreement, he was not then able to disavow the sentence and impose another. Given this “advice,” I find it unsurprising that the defendant would appear in court for sentencing urging imposition of a lighter sentence. In its lack of complete clarity, the colloquy created a “perfect storm” of circumstances that effectively allowed the defendant to tender a plea of guilty and then appeal to the trial judge to exercise leniency. In my view, the fact that both the defendant and the trial court then acted accordingly, exercising prerogatives the Majority finds they did not have, raises a substantial question of the extent to which the defendant, having ostensibly relied on an incorrect recitation by the court, can be said to have acted in a fully voluntary fashion. Because I believe that this issue remains unresolved on the record before us, I would conclude that imposition of the “agreed” sentence is no more viable than the option of post sentence plea withdraw. I would conclude accordingly that should the Majority persist in vacating the judgment of sentence imposed, it must remand subject to the defendant’s right to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial.
¶ 9 Because the Majority declines this course, I must respectfully dissent.

. Despite the Majority’s insistence that the parties reached a binding plea agreement from which the trial court purportedly could not depart, the record is in fact unclear. As I will discuss, supra, the record suggests the court’s understanding and that of both counsel that the term of the sentence to be imposed was indeed a recommendation.

. Although the Majority attempts to dismiss Wallace as a case decided in the context of revocation of parole or probation, see Op. at 1270, n. 6, the Court's delineation of sentencing alternatives available to a trial court following entry of a negotiated plea is not limited to probation violators. By its own terms, the Court’s discussion addresses entry of negotiated pleas pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A), a rule that has no application to probation revocation, but by its plain language governs the withdrawal of pleas of guilty or nolo contendere before sentencing.