Court Opinion

ID: 9689870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:49:01.543589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:52.606648
License: Public Domain

BLATZ, Chief Justice
(concurring).
While I concur with the majority’s holding that our precedent supports the trial court’s ultimate decision to exclude Gillam from the courtroom, I write separately to emphasize that the majority’s opinion should not be construed to stand for the proposition that cooperation with a medical accommodation is necessary in order to have physical access to the courtroom. According to the record, the jail physician recommended that Gillam spend a limited time per day in his wheelchair. The district court concluded that providing a hospital bed for Gillam’s use in the courtroom was a reasonable accommodation of Gil-lam’s medical needs. A bed would allow Gillam to lie prone and rest so as to not aggravate his wounds, and still allow Gil-lam to be present for the trial. On review of the record, the offering of the bed was a reasonable accommodation. However, it is the reasonableness of what followed that is at issue.
From the outset, Gillam protested the judge’s requirement that he use the bed while in the courtroom. On two of the three occasions that Gillam was excluded from the courtroom, use of the hospital bed was the basis for the exclusion. One *455instance in particular, which occurred during jury selection, highlights this connection between Gillam’s personal choice not to use the hospital bed and the district court’s initial decision to exclude Gillam from the proceedings. When Gillam’s counsel confirmed Gillam’s refusal to use the hospital bed, the court, having already' stated that “[i]f he’s going to be in the courtroom, he’s going to be in the bed,” indicated that Gillam would not be allowed to remain in the courtroom. Gillam then clearly and quite eloquently articulated his concerns regarding his use of the bed in open court:
I’m willing to comply with the courts as far as doing the right thing as far as this trial, but as far as the bed issue goes, I just feel like I will be put on display. I feel like this is — -you’re turning your courtroom into a freak show. I almost feel like people in the side show people when people are paraded in to see that they are different than everybody else.
I just kind of want the same opportunity as anybody else to sit at counsel table, to be able to reach over, maybe whisper to my attorney if some things was not right or — and I just think that that’s — that’s very unfair that I have to lay in that bed. And I just think that— to be truthful with you, Your Honor, it’s kind of — I’m not — not comfortable with doing that. * * *
So I’m asking you, I’m begging you all at this point to let me be the person I am, set at the counsel table with my lawyer, and go through this trial without building a side show and without being here to amuse you all for you all to laugh or to amuse other peoples who are coming here to look at me. I’m not going to be a part of it. If that means that you all want to just — if you think that you’re going to strip me of the last thing I got, and that is dignity, believe it or not, if you think possibly you’re going to strip me of doing that, no. So if you all got to go ahead without me, that’s fine. But I — I want to strongly urge Your Honor, tell you all that that is wrong. That is definitely wrong.
I’m not asking for nothing special here. I’m just asking for the right to sit at the counsel table like anybody else would, whoever did this. * * * I just want the right to kind of do what everybody else would do in that situation. And I don’t want to be looked at as a freak by lying in that bed and having peoples parade in and out of your courtroom and having you to have your courtroom as a side show and I’m on display here. I don’t think that’s right.
So if we can’t overcome that, then I’m willing to go back to the cell and I’m willing not to come back to this trial and not — I’m hoping that’s not the case. I’m hoping I can look at my accusers * * *, and I’m hoping I can challenge whatever they say against me. If that can’t be done, I go back to the cell and you all can do this up however you all want to do it.
In responding that “unless you’ve had a change of heart about using the bed, you are excused,” the district court clearly elevated the jail physician’s medical recommendation and the concern for moving the process along in an efficient manner above Gillam’s right to be present. It was at this point that Gillam became belligerent, swore, and made obscene gestures to all present in the courtroom. While this inappropriate behavior warrants removal, the court had already made the decision to exclude Gillam from the courtroom for that day because he refused to use the hospital bed. This is not a cause and effect relationship we can condone.
The accommodation of providing a hospital bed was reasonable. It was unrea*456sonable for the judge to link Gillam’s right to be present with the use of the bed. The court could simply have provided a bed in the courtroom. If and when Gillam needed to use it, the bed would be available. If Gillam continued in his refusal to use the bed, the court could have put Gillam on notice that any additional medical attention resulting from his refusal to use the accommodation would not stop the trial. In other words, Gillam was free to sit in his wheelchair at counsel table or to use the bed during trial, but the trial would not be interrupted or delayed as a result of his unwillingness to follow medical advice.
As it was, Gillam did not waiver in his unwillingness to use the bed and therefore was removed from the courtroom on two occasions during jury selection. The irony of forcing someone out of the courtroom because of a concern that he will not be able to physically manage a lengthy trial and remain present is only made more absurd by the court’s later allowance of Gillam’s participation in the trial by interactive television while he sat in the wheelchair.
In summary, providing a reasonable accommodation is different than mandating its use in order to gain access to the courtroom. While I am troubled by what occurred, I join the majority opinion because it was Gillam’s disruptive behavior unrelated to the bed that eventually excluded him from the courtroom for the remainder of his trial. Gillam was allowed to return to the courtroom in his wheelchair for opening arguments. His disruption of the proceedings at that point, and not his refusal to use the bed, ultimately barred his presence at his trial. Had use of the bed been his absolute keys to the courtroom, a different result would be required.