Court Opinion

ID: 9730569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:15:59.945286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:07.494529
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). I join the dissent of Justice William A. Bablitch and also write separately.
The majority's construction of sec. 767.245(6), Stats. 1983-84, results in two standards for modifying visitation. Modification under subsec. (6), as construed by the majority, permits modification in the event of out-of-state *539moves unless alternative visitation schemes would significantly harm the children's relationship with their father. Section 767.245(2),1 however, permits modifications of visitation only "whenever modification would serve the best interest of the child." The court's construction of sub-sec. (6) makes modifications of visitation substantially easier when the custodial parent leaves the state than in situations governed by subsec. (2). I believe that this distinction is irrational and unwarranted. I would construe the statute to permit a modification of visitation, even when the custodial parent desires to leave the state, only when a modification would serve the best interest of the child. I believe the standards in sec. 767.245(2) and (6) are functionally equivalent. Because the circuit court effectively applied the correct standard and the record supports the court's exercise of discretion, I would affirm the court's decision.
The majority concludes that the circuit court erred by applying an improper test for determining whether to permit the custodial parent to move from Wisconsin. The circuit court required the custodial parent to "satisfy the Court that the children's best interests would not be impaired by their removal from the state under the circumstance^] in this case." The majority construes this test to be the same as that applied in Fritschler v. Fritschler, 60 Wis. 2d 283, 288, 208 N.W.2d 336 (1973), in which this court defined the test for permitting out-of-state moves to be:
*540"[T]he majority of cases on this point support the rule that if a parent who has custody of a child has good reason for living in another state, the courts will permit the removal providing such course of conduct is consistent with the best interests of the child."
The majority considers this test to be inapplicable because it is inconsistent with sec. 767.245(6), Stats. 1983-84, which became effective May 18, 1984. That statute permits relocation unless it is against the best interest of the child. The majority does not specifically state how the two tests differ, and I do not believe that there is any practical difference.
First, the majority erroneously construes sec. 767.245(6), Stats., as imposing a burden of persuasion on the noncustodial parent to prove that a move is against the best interests of the children. The majority bases this conclusion on the fact that the noncustodial parent must bring a motion objecting to a proposed move under subsec. (6). The court construes this as making the noncustodial parent the party using the judicial process to advance a position.
In fact, if the noncustodial parent objects, then the custodial parent cannot leave the stqte without the permission of the court. The custodial parent, therefore, is in the position of needing judicial assistance to advance a change in the status quo. The custodial parent is the one who is disturbing the balance of the original court order of custody and visitation and, thus, the burden of persuasion would rest on the custodial parent under the reasoning of the majority. This is consistent with the allocation of the burden of proof in other modification of visitation cases under sec. 767.245(2), Stats. I do not believe the legislature intended to allocate the burden differently depending only upon whether the modification involved an interstate move. Requiring the noncustodial parent to object to a move is simply a means of giving that person a *541choice as to whether to require the custodial parent to justify an out-of-state move and an accompanying modification of visitation.
The majority also errs by construing sec. 767.245(6), Stats., as creating a test that is substantively distinct from the Fritschler test. Under Fritschler, the custodial parent must prove that an out-of-state move is consistent with the best interests of the children. By contrast, the majority construes sec. 767.245(6) as permitting out-of-state moves unless there is proof that alternative visitation schedules would "harm" the relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent. The majority considers this test to be different than the best interests of the children test.
I cannot subscribe to the view that the legislature intended the phrase "against the best interest of the child" to permit only consideration of whether alternative visitation schedules would be harmful to the parent-child relationship. This interpretation of sec. 767.245(6), Stats., permits the modification of visitation without any overall consideration of the best interests of the children. Because sec. 767.245(2) requires that modifications of visitation in other contexts serve the best interests of the children, the majority's construction of sec. 767.245(6) makes it easier to modify visitation when an out-of-state move is involved than when an in-state modification is sought. I do not believe the legislature intended such an irrational distinction. Instead, I believe that the legislature, by prohibiting moves which are against the best interest of the child, meant to permit only those moves that serve the best interest of the child. In other words, the two standards in secs. 767.245(2) and (6) are functional equivalents. I base this conclusion in part on the rule of statutory construction providing that statutes which are in pari materia should be harmonized where possible and not interpreted to indicate a contradictory legislative in*542tent if that can be avoided. State v. Wachsmuth, 73 Wis. 2d 318, 325-26, 243 N.W.2d 410 (1976).
The majority recognizes an artificial distinction between the phrase "consistent with the best interest of the child" and the phrase "against the best interest of the child." I believe that in order to be "consistent with the best interest of the child," a proposed modification may not be against such best interest. The majority errs in distinguishing the two phrases because it apparently construes "consistent with the best interest" to mean that a positive improvement of the child's circumstances is required. This court, however, has never conditioned out-of-state moves on such a showing when applying the best interest test. A careful reading of the decisions criticized by the majority, including Fritschler, shows that the court balanced the harm caused by disrupting an established visitation schedule against the advantages of the proposed move.
Because I believe that the instability in a child's life caused by changing visitation can be against the best interest of the child, consideration of the advantages of a proposed move is essential in order for such a move ever to be consistent with the best interest of the child. The majority prohibits consideration of the advantages of a move because it apparently believes that changes in visitation do not adversely affect the best interest of the child if alternative visitation is possible. Although I agree that changes in visitation are not as disruptive as changes in custody, see Bahr v. Galonski, 80 Wis. 2d 72, 80, 257 N.W.2d 869 (1977), it does not follow that changes in visitation are without effect. Such changes can create instability. I believe some consideration is necessary to protect against this instability, and the best interest test serves that purpose. Of course, it is a less rigorous standard than used in the custody transfer context because of the lesser disruption. See In re Marriage of Millikin v. Millikin, 115 *543Wis. 2d 16, 22-23, 339 N.W.2d 573 (1983). It does prevent visitation modification, however, without some countervailing advantage.
I am sensitive to the legitimate need for custodial parents to relocate out of state. We live in a society that sometimes requires mobility. However, requiring a custodial parent to show that the best interest of a child will be as well served after a move as before does not mean that moves will always be prohibited. The majority fails to note that Peterson v. Peterson, 13 Wis. 2d 26, 108 N.W.2d 126 (1961) and Whitman v. Whitman, 28 Wis. 2d 50, 135 N.W.2d 835 (1965), cases relied upon in Fritschler, both permitted out-of-state moves. The best interest test, therefore does not bar moves, but it does require that a move be for a good reason and not be detrimental to the children. Whitman, 28 Wis. 2d at 59. I believe that this is the least we can ask of a custodial parent, and I believe that this is the same test established in secs. 767.245(2) and (6), Stats.
My refusal to adopt the strained reasoning of the majority, which distinguishes between "consistent with the best interest" and "against the best interest," is supported by the irrationality of the distinction. Under the court's construction, it is easier to modify visitation by moving out of state than it is to otherwise modify visitation. The majority offers no logical justification for this result, and indeed, I can think of none. Because the majority's construction of sec. 767.245(6) renders the statute irrational and arbitrary, I believe the construction raises constitutional questions about the validity of the statute. Thus, the rule of statutory construction that favors interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional infirmities supports my interpretation of secs. 767.245(2) and (6) as establishing functionally equivalent tests for visitation modifications. See State v. Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 172, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983).
*544I would affirm the circuit court's decision because the court correctly applied the best interest test and because the court did not abuse its discretion. The court stated the test it applied to be whether the children's best interests would be impaired. This test, construed by the majority to be different than the "against the best interest" test, clearly reveals the semantic gymnastics employed by the court to find an error of law. I believe the circuit court applied a correct test. Our review of the court's decision, therefore, is whether the court abused its discretion. I agree with the court of appeals that the record does not establish such an abuse of discretion.
The record does not show any advantage from the move that is not speculative at best. The custodial parent testified that she wanted to move to Peoria because she had friends and the possibility of a job there and because she thought it was less expensive to live in Peoria. These reasons lack any certain benefit to the children. The reasons might be sufficient but for the countervailing instability caused by the need to modify visitation. Moreover, the noncustodial parent testified that the move would make the exercise of equivalent visitation financially impossible. The majority ignores this fact when stating that alternative visitation should be adopted. The disruption in the established visitation schedule, even if alternatives are possible, is itself harmful to the children. The circuit court properly exercised its discretion, therefore, in determining that the speculative justifications for the proposed move did not outweigh the disadvantage caused by the resulting disruption and instability.
The majority exceeds the proper role of this court when it concludes that changes in visitation have no negative effect on children. Implicit in the court's conclusion is the factual finding that all visitation schedules are equivalent. Thus, the court cavalierly directs the circuit court to simply change the visitation schedule. I do not *545believe there is any factual basis in this record to support such a proposition. Experts certainly do not agree whether frequent visitation is equivalent to infrequent but longer visitation. I think that such an abstract argument is fruitless and should not be resolved by this court. The best visitation schedule for any divorced family must be determined on a case-by-case basis after considering, among other factors, the nature of the existing relationship between the noncustodial parent and children. Here, the circuit court considered the existing relationship to be important when compared to the speculative reasons for disrupting that relationship. This is a decision that is especially appropriate for the circuit court's discretion. Whether this court would reach the same result in the first instance is not dispositive. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion and its decision should be affirmed.
Although I disagree with the majority's construction of sec. 767.245(6), Stats., I could not join the opinion even if I accepted the court's statutory interpretation. First, I do not believe that the amended statute is applicable to this case because it became effective after commencement of this proceeding. The custodial parent commenced this proceeding for permission to move on February 15, 1984, and the statute became effective May 18,1984. Contrary to the majority's statement that the noncustodial parent initiated this action, the custodial parent actually commenced it. Moreover, because the majority construes sec. 767.245(6) to effect a substantive change in the law, the statute cannot be applied retroactively. See Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 17-18, 308 N.W.2d 403 (1981). Whatever the proper construction of the statute, therefore, it does not apply to this case. The noncustodial parent's concession in this court that the statute does apply is not legally binding. The majority does not find the new statute applied by legal analysis, but rather, so holds due to the agreement of the parties. Majority opinion n. 3.
*546I also cannot accept the majority's resolution of this case on the merits. The court announces a major change in the applicable law which was never addressed by the parties or the circuit court. Nonetheless, the court makes a factual determination that the proposed move is not against the best interest of the children. This court cannot make factual determinations, especially when the real issue was not tried before the circuit court. Under the majority's reasoning, the court should remand this case to the circuit court for a new hearing and application of the appropriate standard. See sec. 751.06, Stats.
In summary, the majority construes sec. 767.245(6), Stats., so as to make it a virtual nullity. The court permits out-of-state moves unless no alternative visitation is possible. This permissive standard would not prevent any move. If all visitation schedules are considered equal, then some minimal alternative will always be possible. The legislature could not have intended to permit such easy modification, especially when modification in other situations must serve the best interest of the child.
I would construe sec. 767.245(6), Stats., to require consideration of whether a proposed move will have an effect on visitation. If there is no effect, then the move should be permitted. On the other hand, if there is an effect on visitation, then the move must be consistent with the best interest of the child. I believe the circuit court applied this test and properly exercised its discretion. I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals and, therefore, also the circuit court.
I am authorized to state that Mr. JUSTICE LOUIS J. CECI joins this dissenting opinion.

 Section 767.245(2), Stats., provides as follows:
"767.245 Visitation. . . .
" (2) The court may modify an order granting or denying visitation rights whenever modification would serve the best interest of the child; but the court shall not terminate a parent's visitation rights unless it finds that the visitation would endanger the child's physical, mental or emotional health."