Court Opinion

ID: 9881482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-02 20:03:56.313954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:34.762829
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/2/23 P. v. Grant CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B324601

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. LA093193;
           v.                                                           Appellate Division of the
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. BR055463)
 EMERALD YVONNE GRANT,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Alan K. Schneider, Judge. Affirmed.
      David W. Scopp, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Amanda V.
Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
             _____________________________________
      Emerald Yvonne Grant appeals the judgment entered
following a jury trial in which she was convicted of simple battery
(Pen. Code,1 § 242, subd. (a)), as a lesser included offense of
battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)). The trial
court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on
probation for one year with the conditions that she perform 20
days of community labor, complete 52 anger management classes,
and pay victim restitution.
      Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and
violated her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing
to adequately investigate appellant’s allegation that a juror was
sleeping during portions of the trial and determine whether the
juror was biased against her as a result of the allegation. We
disagree and affirm.
                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND
      On February 21, 2020, in stop-and-go traffic on the 405
freeway, appellant rear-ended the car in front of her in which
Angelina Gomez DeJesus was a passenger. Following an
altercation over the exchange of insurance information between
the drivers, appellant returned to her car, got in, and closed the
driver’s side window. DeJesus followed appellant and “slapped”
appellant’s vehicle to get appellant’s attention and stop her from
leaving. DeJesus then walked around to the passenger side of
appellant’s car and told her, “I’ve got your license number.” As
DeJesus was walking back to her vehicle, appellant “came from
behind,” grabbed DeJesus by her clothing, and threw her to the
ground. DeJesus went to the emergency room a couple hours

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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after the incident with a fracture to her left elbow, which
required surgery.
       Appellant did not testify or present any evidence. But
defense counsel argued that inconsistencies in the prosecution’s
case as to how events unfolded and problems with DeJesus’s
credibility created a reasonable doubt as to whether appellant’s
conduct caused the fracture to DeJesus’s elbow.
                            DISCUSSION
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Investigating Appellant’s Allegation that a Juror Was
Sleeping During Portions of the Trial and Appellant’s
Claim that the Juror Was Biased Against Appellant as a
Result of Making the Allegation
   1. Relevant background
       At some point during trial, appellant partially stood up in
her seat and spoke to the bailiff.2 The trial court did not hear
what appellant said, and there was no indication any of the
jurors heard anything.
       Outside the presence of the jury after the prosecution
rested its case, the trial court noted that it had come to its
attention that one of the jurors had “periodically closed her eyes
during the reading of instructions and the testimony.” The court
stated, “I watched her, and it does not appear to the court that
she had been sleeping. She has had some issues that she is
dealing with. She appears to be in discomfort.” Nevertheless, the
court said it would “bring her in to make sure that she has not

      2 This incident is not recorded in the reporter’s transcript.
Accordingly, our account is based on the trial court’s discussion of
the incident with defense counsel in the context of appellant’s
motion for a mistrial.

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slept.” The bailiff added that Juror No. 2 had brought the matter
to his attention and explained that “[t]he reason why she was
closing her eyes is that she has a sunburn on her back, and it’s
uncomfortable for her so she tends to close her eyes.”
       Juror No. 2 entered the courtroom and the trial court
conducted voir dire in the presence of counsel:
       “The Court: . . . [¶] . . . I noticed during the⎯some of the
instructions and some of the testimony that you had sort of closed
your eyes a little bit, and I just want to make sure that, first of
all, everything was okay.”
       The juror responded that she had gone camping the
previous weekend and had gotten a sunburn on her back.
       “The Court: So were you sleeping or closing your eyes?
       “Juror: No. Closing my eyes because I did not put on lotion
and it hurts.
       “The Court: So you were awake the whole time?
       “Juror: Yes, I was awake.
       “The Court: That’s what I saw too. I noticed you closing
your eyes, and I didn’t say anything because it appear[ed] that
you were in discomfort and not sleeping.”
       After the juror left the courtroom, the trial court declared:
“I’m satisfied with her explanation. I looked over several
different times, and every time I looked over her eyes would open
back up, but it appeared that she was in discomfort.”
       Defense counsel did not seek to ask the juror any questions
about closing her eyes or appearing to sleep during trial. Neither
did defense counsel object to the scope of the court’s inquiry nor
ask the court to take any further action after it questioned
Juror No. 2.

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       The next day defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the
ground that appellant’s allegation “in open court” that “a juror
had been sleeping with her eyes closed,” might have biased the
juror against appellant so that the juror would have “problems
applying the burden of proof to the presumption of innocence
based upon what [the juror] could have heard.” The trial court
responded that it did not hear what appellant had said, and it did
not appear that the juror heard anything either. The court
added: “I would not like to bring it to the juror’s attention. If you
would like I could bring it to the juror’s attention and ask her,
but that would then bring it to her attention.” Defense counsel
agreed, and the court confirmed, “So you don’t want me to do
that?” Defense counsel confirmed that she did not want the court
to question the juror about whether she heard appellant’s
allegation: “Yes. That’s correct.”
       The court denied the motion for a mistrial on the ground
that appellant had not demonstrated any prejudice.
       At sentencing, appellant made an allocution, insisting that
the juror had been sleeping during the trial. The court reiterated
its finding that Juror No. 2 did not sleep during the trial. The
court explained: “I watched that person very closely. I watched
her throughout, and she was not sleeping. She said she did have
a headache,[3] and she was closing her eyes because she was in
pain. [¶] But I was very cognizant of her and watched, and she
did not sleep.”

      3 Juror No. 2 had stated she had a sunburn, not a
headache, and was in pain.

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     2. Legal principles
         Section 1089 permits a trial court to discharge a sitting
juror “ ‘if, upon good cause, the juror is “found to be unable to
perform his or her duty.” ’ ” (People v. Silveria and Travis (2020)
10 Cal.5th 195, 262.) Our Supreme Court has held that
“ ‘ “ ‘[o]nce a trial court is put on notice that good cause to
discharge a juror may exist, it is the court’s duty “to make
whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary” to determine whether
the juror should be discharged.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cowan (2010) 50
Cal.4th 401, 505–506.) The trial court’s “inquiry may consist of a
full hearing or informal questioning of the juror in the presence of
counsel. [Citation.] ‘The specific procedures to follow in
investigating an allegation of juror misconduct are generally a
matter for the trial court’s discretion.’ ” (People v. Johnsen (2021)
10 Cal.5th 1116, 1170 (Johnsen).) Indeed, “ ‘[b]oth the scope of
any investigation and the ultimate decision whether to discharge
a given juror are committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court.’ ” (People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1277
(Williams).) A full hearing is required only if “ ‘ “ ‘ “the court
possesses information which, if proven to be true, would
constitute ‘good cause’ to doubt a juror’s ability to perform his
duties.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Miranda-Guerrero (2022) 14 Cal.5th 1,
27, quoting Cowan, at p. 506.)
         Good cause to remove a juror exists when the juror is
sleeping during trial (Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1277;
People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 137; People v. Bonilla
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 350), but not when there is a “mere
suggestion of juror ‘inattention’ ” (People v. Espinoza (1992) 3
Cal.4th 806, 821; People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 289).
At the conclusion of its inquiry, a trial court may discharge a

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seated juror only if the juror’s unfitness to serve appears “ ‘in the
record as a demonstrable reality.’ ” (People v. Armstrong (2016) 1
Cal.5th 432, 450; People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 943
(Martinez).) On appeal, in assessing whether the trial court
abused its discretion on the question of juror misconduct, “ ‘ “[w]e
accept the trial court’s credibility determinations and findings on
questions of historical fact if supported by substantial
evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1194
(Linton).)
   3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
       Appellant contends that the trial court’s brief inquiry was
inadequate to determine whether Juror No. 2 had been sleeping
during crucial portions of the trial or whether the juror could be
impartial as a result of appellant’s allegation that she had been
sleeping. We disagree.
       Even before the bailiff reported that the juror had said she
closed her eyes because of an uncomfortable sunburn, and before
the trial court conducted voir dire, the court observed: “I watched
her, and it does not appear to the court that she had been
sleeping. . . . She appears to be in discomfort.” In the presence of
counsel, the trial court asked Juror No. 2 directly if she had been
sleeping during the trial. Juror No. 2 answered that she had
closed her eyes, but was awake the whole time, and did not sleep.
The court noted that the juror’s statement confirmed its own
observations that she was not sleeping but was in pain. After
Juror No. 2 left the courtroom, the trial court declared: “I’m
satisfied with her explanation. I looked over several different
times, and every time I looked over her eyes would open back up,
but it appeared that she was in discomfort.”

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       The trial court adequately investigated possible misconduct
by Juror No. 2. That inquiry⎯consisting of direct questions to
the juror and the court’s own observations of the juror’s demeanor
during trial⎯was all that was reasonably necessary to determine
if Juror No. 2 was sleeping and should be discharged. We defer
to the trial court’s credibility call. (Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at
p. 1194; see Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1170 [“On this
record, we have no basis to second-guess the trial court’s
credibility determination”].) When it comes to a sleeping juror,
the basis for a “demonstrable reality” of unfitness exists only
when “there is convincing proof the juror actually slept during
trial.” (People v. Bowers (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 722, 731.) That
standard was not met in this case. The trial court satisfied its
duty to investigate, and did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that no good cause existed to dismiss the juror. (See People v.
Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 418 [rejecting claim of inadequate
inquiry into allegation that a juror had been sleeping on the
ground that trial court had “conducted an inquiry into [juror’s]
attentiveness and satisfied itself and counsel that he was alert.
Nothing more was required”]; Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
p. 943 [in the absence of showing that juror was unable to fulfill
functions as a juror, no prejudice in trial court’s decision not to
investigate further].)
       Appellant further asserts that the court failed to
adequately investigate whether Juror No. 2 was biased against
appellant because of appellant’s allegation that the juror had
been sleeping during trial. But defense counsel expressly
declined the court’s offer to question the juror on the issue, and
there is no indication in the record that the juror even heard
appellant’s comment. Indeed, appellant fails to present any

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evidence to support her speculative claim that Juror No. 2 was
biased. We will not presume bias, and on this record, in the
absence of any suggestion of juror bias as a demonstrable reality,
we do not question the trial court’s decision not to further
investigate appellant’s claim. (See Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
p. 943.)
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     KWAN, J.*
We concur:

      CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

      HOFFSTADT, J.

      * Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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