Court Opinion

ID: 9959504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 19:15:57.335063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:33.001058
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        APRIL 11, 2024
                                                               In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                              WA State Court of Appeals Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                         )
                                             )         No. 38688-1-III
                     Respondent,             )
                                             )
       v.                                    )
                                             )
MITCHELL EUGENE CRANE,                       )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                             )
                     Appellant.              )
       COONEY, J. — At the conclusion of a jury trial, Mitchell Crane was convicted of

two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm. He appeals one of the two convictions,

arguing the State failed to prove he had dominion and control over the firearm and that he

knowingly possessed the firearm. Mr. Crane also challenges the trial court’s calculation

of his offender score. Specifically, Mr. Crane asserts his 2015 convictions for second

degree assault and felony harassment constitute the same criminal conduct, as do his

recent convictions for possession of an unlawful firearm and unlawful possession of a

firearm. We affirm the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction and remand for the

trial court to resentence Mr. Crane under a corrected offender score.
No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

                                    BACKGROUND

      Mr. Crane lived in rural Finley, Washington. Mr. Crane was prohibited from

possessing firearms due to a previous conviction for a “serious offense.” Rep. of Proc.1

(RP) at 263; RCW 9.41.040. In July 2021, Mr. Crane was dating his neighbor, Sonja

Rogers. Although Mr. Crane’s home was one driveway over from Ms. Rogers’ home, he

had been residing with her for a few months.

      In the early hours of July 20, 2021, police were called to Mr. Crane’s property due

to a disturbance involving Mr. Crane allegedly discharging a firearm in Ms. Rogers’

direction. Law enforcement officers responded, searched Mr. Crane’s home, and

discovered a 9mm handgun in the bathroom off his bedroom. Officers obtained a warrant

to search Ms. Rogers’ home for “other possibly affiliated or involved firearms.” RP at

214. During that search, a loaded Mossberg .12-gauge shotgun was discovered next to

the bed Ms. Rogers and Mr. Crane shared. The shotgun was found near an envelope

labeled “Mitch.” Ex. 15. Also found in Ms. Rogers’ residence was a 9mm handgun case

that bore a serial number identical to that found on the handgun discovered in Mr.

Crane’s home. Mr. Crane was charged with second degree assault and two counts of

unlawful possession of a firearm.

      1
         Unless otherwise noted, “RP” refers to the consecutively paginated verbatim
report of proceedings of a three-day trial beginning October 25, 2021.

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No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

       A jury trial was held in October 2021. Benton County Sheriff’s Deputy Bruce

Surplus testified he photographed the shotgun found in Ms. Rogers’ bedroom as well as

the envelope labeled “Mitch” at the end of the bed, near the shotgun. RP at 219, 239-40.

       Ms. Rogers testified that Mr. Crane lived one driveway over from her but that he

was living with her on the date of the incident and had been for a few months. She

testified that she “thought she saw [a gun]” on Mr. Crane’s side of the bed and that “[i]t

was long enough for me to barely see the tip of it over the end⎯edge of the bed. His side

of the bed I didn’t need to go to.” RP at 160. Ms. Rogers also testified that she only

owned one gun, “a .38 special.” RP at 159. She stated she had hunted in the past, but

had not hunted since sometime before 1995. She also testified she cared about Mr. Crane

and delayed calling the police initially after he fired shots at her because she “didn’t want

to get him in trouble.” RP at 158.

       Mr. Crane’s son, Andrew Crane,2 claimed ownership of the shotgun and testified

that he had loaned it to Ms. Rogers so she could “go bird hunting.” RP at 275. Andrew

also testified that the gun was unloaded when he loaned it to Ms. Rogers.

       On October 27, 2021, a jury acquitted Mr. Crane of second degree assault but

found him guilty of both counts of unlawful possession of a firearm. Two days later, on

October 29, a second jury found Mr. Crane guilty of 29 counts of unlawful possession of

       2
           Andrew Crane is referred to by his first name for clarity.

                                               3
No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

a firearm, one count of possession of an unlawful firearm, and one count of witness

intimidation. These additional convictions arose from a Department of Fish and Wildlife

raid of Mr. Crane’s property due to poaching allegations. See State v. Crane, No. 38687-

2-III (argued Mar. 4, 2024). During the search, officers found a multitude of guns in both

Mr. Crane’s home and a shop on his property. One of the firearms found was a short-

barrel shotgun.

         A joint sentencing was held on both cases on January 5, 2022. At sentencing, the

parties agreed that all of Mr. Crane’s unlawful possession of a firearm convictions for the

guns found in his home were the same criminal conduct and therefore counted as a single

point in Mr. Crane’s offender score. Likewise, the parties agreed the guns found in the

shop were the same criminal conduct and counted as 1 point in Mr. Crane’s offender

score.

         The parties disagreed about whether Mr. Crane’s conviction for possession of an

unlawful firearm and his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, both relating to

the short-barrel shotgun, were the same criminal conduct. The State argued that the two

offenses had different criminal intent and were therefore not the same criminal conduct.

         The court accepted the parties’ agreement that the unlawful possession of a

firearm convictions for the guns found in the home were the same criminal conduct and

that the firearms found in the shop were the same criminal conduct. However, the court

found that the convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of an

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No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

unlawful firearm were not the same criminal conduct and, for purposes of calculating Mr.

Crane’s offender score, counted the convictions separately.

       The State did not submit the judgment and sentence for Mr. Crane’s convictions

from 2015 for second degree assault and felony harassment, but the court counted each

conviction as a separate point in Mr. Crane’s offender score. The court sentenced Mr.

Crane pursuant to an offender score of 7. Mr. Crane appealed.

       After Mr. Crane’s opening brief was filed with this court, we granted the State’s

motion to supplement the record pursuant to RAP 9.11. Comm’r’s Ruling, State v.

Crane, No. 38688-1-III (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2023) (on file with court). The superior

court was ordered to take additional evidence regarding Mr. Crane’s 2015 convictions

and decide whether they constituted the same criminal conduct. Id. at 8.

       Before the trial court, the State submitted Mr. Crane’s 2015 statement of defendant

on plea of guilty and his judgment and sentence for the assault and harassment

convictions. The State conceded that “it would be a mistake to say that [Mr. Crane’s

2015 convictions are] not . . . the same criminal conduct.” RP (July 18, 2023) at 18.

However, the State contended Mr. Crane’s argument that the two convictions constituted

the same criminal conduct was untimely as his convictions for those crimes were over a

year old.

       The trial court agreed that Mr. Crane’s 2015 convictions involved the same

criminal conduct under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). However, the trial court elected to “defer

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No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

to the Court of Appeals” on whether Mr. Crane should be allowed to raise “a collateral

attack . . . at this point.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 70. Thus, the court declined to alter Mr.

Crane’s offender score.

                                         ANALYSIS

       SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

       Mr. Crane argues there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the

unlawful possession of a firearm charge related to the shotgun found in Ms. Rogers’

house. We disagree.

       The sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law we review de novo. State v.

Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016). “The test for determining the

sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). “A

claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all inferences that can

reasonably be drawn from it.” State v. DeVries, 149 Wn.2d 842, 849, 72 P.3d 748

(2003). “[I]nferences based on circumstantial evidence must be reasonable and cannot be

based on speculation.” State v. Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d 1, 16, 309 P.3d 318 (2013).

       The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution requires the State prove every element of an alleged crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368

                                              6
No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

(1970). If, at trial, the State fails to present sufficient evidence to support the elements

of the crime, double jeopardy prohibits a retrial. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11,

98 S. Ct. 2141, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978). The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth

Amendment does not afford the State a second opportunity to supply evidence in a

second trial that it failed to muster in the first. Id.

       A person is guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree if the

person owns, has in his possession, or has in his control, any firearm after being

previously convicted of any serious offense. RCW 9.41.040(1)(a). Possession may be

actual or constructive. State v. Staley, 123 Wn.2d 794, 798, 872 P.2d 502 (1994).

       Mr. Crane argues the State did not present evidence that he possessed the firearm.

Actual possession is established when “[a] person actually possesses something that is in

his or her physical custody.” State v. Davis, 182 Wn.2d 222, 227, 340 P.3d 820 (2014).

On the other hand, a person “constructively possesses something that is not in his or her

physical custody but is still within his or her ‘dominion and control.’” Id. “This control

need not be exclusive, but the State must show more than mere proximity.” State v.

Raleigh, 157 Wn. App. 728, 737, 238 P.3d 1211 (2010).

       Here, the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Crane had

dominion and control over the premises where the shotgun was located. The State also

presented sufficient evidence to show Mr. Crane was in constructive possession of the

shotgun. The evidence revealed that the Mossberg .12-gauge shotgun was found near an

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No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

envelope labeled “Mitch,” a derivative of Mr. Crane’s first name. Ex. 15. Also located

in Ms. Rogers’ home was other property belonging to Mr. Crane, a 9mm handgun case

that bore the same serial number as the serial number on the 9mm handgun found in Mr.

Crane’s home. Further, Ms. Rogers testified that Mr. Crane was living with her on the

day the shotgun was found by the police. She also testified that she “thought she saw [a

gun]” on Mr. Crane’s side of the bed and that “it was long enough for me to barely see

the tip of it over the end⎯edge of the bed. His side of the bed I didn’t need to go to.”

RP at 160. Ms. Rogers denied owning the shotgun found on Mr. Crane’s side of the bed.

She also testified that she did not call the police immediately upon seeing Mr. Crane fire

shots outside the house because she “didn’t want to get him in trouble” and that she does

“care about [h]im.” RP at 158.

       Though Mr. Crane’s son claimed he owned the shotgun and had previously loaned

it to Ms. Rogers, his testimony could have been deemed by the jury to not be credible.

Andrew testified he loaned the shotgun to Ms. Rogers “[be]cause she told me she wanted

to go bird hunting.” RP at 274-75. However, Ms. Rogers testified she had not hunted

since before at least 1995 and never mentioned the shotgun being loaned to her. Andrew

also testified that he loaned the shotgun to Ms. Rogers unloaded; however, the shotgun

was loaded when it was found by police. Because Ms. Rogers testified she was only

marginally aware of the shotgun, the jury could have inferred that Mr. Crane was the one

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No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

who loaded it, or that Andrew was untruthful when he testified about it being unloaded

when loaned to her.

       In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as well as

resolving all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the

State, a rational trier of fact could have found Mr. Crane guilty of this charge beyond a

reasonable doubt. A reasonable fact finder could have concluded that Mr. Crane

constructively possessed the firearm.

       SAME CRIMINAL CONDUCT (POSSESSION OF AN UNLAWFUL FIREARM AND
       UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A FIREARM)

       Mr. Crane argues that his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm and

possession of an unlawful firearm, from State v. Crane, No. 38687-2-III, encompassed

the same criminal conduct and should have been counted as one point. We disagree.

       Determinations of same criminal conduct are reviewed for abuse of discretion or

misapplication of the law. State v. Aldana Graciano, 176 Wn.2d 531, 536-37, 295 P.3d

219 (2013). Because a finding of “same criminal conduct” favors Mr. Crane, he has the

burden to prove the possession of the unlawful firearm and the unlawful possession of a

firearm were the same criminal conduct. Id. at 539.

       A determination of “same criminal conduct” at sentencing alters the offender

score that is calculated by adding up the number of points for each prior offense.

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No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a)(i). For purposes of an offender score calculation, current offenses

are treated as prior convictions. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a).

       For sentencing purposes, if a court finds that “some or all of the current offenses

encompass the same criminal conduct then those current offenses shall be counted as one

crime.” Id. For multiple crimes to be treated as the “same criminal conduct,” the crimes

must have (1) been committed at the same time and place, (2) involved the same victim,

and (3) involved the same objective criminal intent. Id.

       Here, the trial court found that Mr. Crane’s convictions for unlawful possession of

a firearm and possession of an unlawful firearm were not the same criminal conduct.

Consequently, the trial court added 2 points to Mr. Crane’s offender score, 1 point for

each of the two convictions.

       In State v. Hatt, Division One of this court held that Mr. Hatt’s convictions for

unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of an unlawful firearm had the same

objective intent⎯“to possess the firearm.” 11 Wn. App. 2d 113, 143, 452 P.3d 577

(2019). Thus, the two offenses encompassed the same criminal conduct. Id. In doing so,

the court analyzed State v. Dunaway, 109 Wn.2d 207, 743 P.2d 1237, 749 P.2d 160

(1988), which “directed courts to ‘focus on the extent to which the criminal intent, as

objectively viewed, changed from one crime to the next’” for purposes of analyzing the

third factor of the same criminal conduct analysis. Hatt, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 142. The

Hatt court recognized that the Supreme Court in Dunaway “did not interpret objective

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No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

criminal intent to be equivalent to statutory intent, stating that ‘counts with identical

mental elements, if committed for different purposes, would not be considered the same

criminal conduct.’” Id. at 143 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dunaway, 109

Wn.2d at 215).

       However, the court in Hatt viewed State v. Chenoweth, 185 Wn.2d 218, 370

P.3d 6 (2016), as departing from Dunaway’s analysis. 11 Wn. App. 2d at 143. The Hatt

court recognized that in Chenoweth “the court compared the statutory criminal intent

requirements of [rape of a child and incest] to determine that ‘[t]he intent to have sex

with someone related to you differs from the intent to have sex with a child.’” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Chenoweth, 185 Wn.2d at 223). The court in Hatt

nevertheless believed the Dunaway framework was applicable. Id.

       More recently, in State v. Westwood, the Supreme Court explained that Chenoweth

and Dunaway are “not inconsistent and neither overrules the other.” 2 Wn.3d 157, 166,

534 P.3d 1162 (2023). The court reiterated that “[t]he statutory intent is relevant in

determining whether the objective intent prong is satisfied. Looking to any other source

of intent has the potential to lean too closely to the subjective analysis that we have

always rejected.” Id. at 167. The court further clarified that “when same criminal intent

is satisfied, in cases where we determined the crimes did encompass the same criminal

conduct, there was a connection in the statutory definitions, with the statutory intent

element of the crimes being either identical or very similar.” Id.

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No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

       Here, to convict Mr. Crane of possession of an unlawful firearm, the State had to

prove Mr. Crane “knowingly possessed a short-barreled shotgun” and that Mr. Crane

“had knowledge of the characteristics that make the gun unlawful.” State v. Crane,

No. 38687-2-III; CP at 34; RCW 9.41.190(1). On the other hand, to prove Mr. Crane

unlawfully possessed the short-barrel shotgun, the State only had to prove Mr. Crane

“knowingly owned a firearm or knowingly had a firearm in his possession” having been

previously “convicted of a serious offense.” CP at 38; RCW 9.91.040(1)(a).

       We agree with the holding in Hatt that the overarching intent of both crimes is “to

possess the firearm.” 11 Wn. App. 2d at 143. However, that does not conclude our

analysis. “If the objective intent for the offenses were the same or similar, courts can

then look at whether the crimes furthered each other and were part of the same scheme or

plan.” Westwood, 2 Wn.3d at 168.

       The objective intent of the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm is simply to

possess a firearm. Possession of an unlawful firearm has a different criminal intent⎯to

possess a firearm more dangerous and easier to conceal than a legal firearm.

Consequently, the two crimes do not have the same objective criminal intent and are not

the same criminal conduct.

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion or misapply the law in finding that the

unlawful possession of a firearm and possession of an unlawful firearm were not the

same criminal conduct.

                                             12
No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

       SAME CRIMINAL CONDUCT (2015 ASSAULT AND HARASSMENT)

       Mr. Crane argues, and the State concedes, that his 2015 convictions for assault and

harassment constituted the same criminal conduct. We accept the agreement and remand

for resentencing with a corrected offender score.

       Below, the State recognized that “it would be a mistake to say that [Mr. Crane’s

2015 convictions are] not . . . the same criminal conduct.” RP (July 18, 2023) at 18.

However, the State contended that Mr. Crane’s argument that the two convictions

constituted the same criminal conduct was untimely as his convictions were over a year

old.

       The trial court made “a finding that I’m held to the standard of the statement on a

plea of guilty on Case Number 15-1-00192-06” and attributed 1 point for each conviction

toward Mr. Crane’s offender score rather than counting both as a single point. Id. at 33.

The trial court, in its findings, recognized that the crimes had the same victim, occurred at

the same time and place, and had the same objective criminal intent. The court

concluded the crimes involved the same criminal conduct. However, the trial court

declined to count them as 1 point and instead elected to “defer to the Court of Appeals

the issue of whether the defendant should be allowed to raise a collateral attack on cause

number 15-1-00192-6 at this point.” CP at 70. The two offenses should have been

counted as 1 point.

       RCW 9.94A.525 reads:

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No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

            (5)(a) In the case of multiple prior convictions, for the purpose of
       computing the offender score, count all convictions separately, except:
               (i) Prior offenses which were found, under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a), to
       encompass the same criminal conduct, shall be counted as one offense, the
       offense that yields the highest offender score. The current sentencing court
       shall determine with respect to other prior adult offenses for which
       sentences were served concurrently or prior juvenile offenses for which
       sentences were served consecutively, whether those offenses shall be
       counted as one offense or as separate offenses using the “same criminal
       conduct” analysis found in RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a), and if the court finds
       that they shall be counted as one offense, then the offense that yields the
       highest offender score shall be used. The current sentencing court may
       presume that such other prior offenses were not the same criminal conduct
       from sentences imposed on separate dates, or in separate counties or
       jurisdictions, or in separate complaints, indictments, or informations.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, the current sentencing court must make its own determination

of whether prior offenses constitute the same criminal conduct. State v. Johnson, 180

Wn. App. 92, 101, 320 P.3d 197 (2014). The fact that Mr. Crane’s prior 2015

convictions were over a year old has no bearing on the analysis.

       The court correctly concluded that Mr. Crane’s two 2015 convictions were the

same criminal conduct and it should have therefore counted them as one point. Remand

for resentencing is necessary.

                                     CONCLUSION

       We affirm Mr. Crane’s conviction for unlawfully possessing the Mossberg .12-

gauge short-barrel shotgun, affirm the trial court’s finding that possession of an unlawful

firearm conviction and the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction are not the same

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No. 38688-1-III
State v. Crane

criminal conduct, and, based on Mr. Crane’s 2015 convictions encompassing the same

criminal conduct, remand for resentencing with an offender score of 6.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                             Cooney, J.
WE CONCUR:

Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.

Fearing, J.

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