Court Opinion

ID: 9492414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:40:46.353428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:17.769910
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Had Frank Keistler simply written to the governmental hiring authorities and advocated the hiring of someone other than Mr. Tarpley, there would be no doubt that his action would be protected under the First Amendment. See Vickery v. Jones, 100 F.3d 1334, 1344 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1197, 117 S.Ct. 1553, 137 L.Ed.2d 701 (1997). Indeed, had Frank Keistler orchestrated a massive letter writing campaign among his fellow party members to pressure governmental hiring authorities to take on someone other than Mr. Tarpley, his advocacy would be protected under the First Amendment by extending the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 1 to § 1983 actions such as this one. See, e.g., Eaton v. Newport Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 292 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 957, 113 S.Ct. 2459, 124 L.Ed.2d 674 (1993).
As my colleagues point out, however, neither of these factual predicates can be accepted as true for the purpose of deciding whether the district court should have granted summary judgment on this record. Rather, as my colleagues also note, the record, as presently constituted, contains sufficient evidence to permit a jury to conclude that Mr. Keistler and other party officials actually conspired with representatives of the Governor’s office to define and limit the pool of candidates to fill the temporary vacancy. Indeed, as my colleagues suggest, the record, as presently constituted, will support a jury determination that state officials, as part of that conspiracy, simply rubber-stamped the selections of the party officials. If a jury accepted this version of the evidence, as we must accept it now for purposes of deciding the correctness of this summary judgment ruling, the First Amendment would provide no protection for Mr. Keist-ler’s participation in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive a citizen of his freedom of association. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).
My colleagues’ analysis attempts to avoid this stark reality by “balancing” (see ante at p. 795) Mr. Keistler’s First Amendment rights against those of Mr. Tarpley. That balancing is resolved, according to my colleagues, by determining that Mr. Keistler’s freedom trumps that of Mr. Tarpley. This is the appropriate balance, my colleagues urge, because Mr. Keistler is exercising the “paradigmatic” First Amendment right to petition the government. (See ante at p. 795.)
*798This favoring of Mr. Keistler’s rights over Mr. Tarpley’s rights is premised on two considerations that cannot be supported. First, favoring the rights of Mr. Keistler is based on my colleagues’ characterization of Mr. Keistler’s activity as “[m]aking suggestions about whom to hire.” (See ante at p. 795.) Several pages earlier, however, my colleagues forthrightly admit that, as the record now comes to us, a jury would be justified in determining that Mr. Keistler did much more than advocate that a certain person be hired; rather, he conspired with state officials to ensure that only those he recommended would constitute the viable pool of candidates. (See ante at p. 793.) Secondly, my colleagues’ favoring of Mr. Keistler is premised on an implicit denigration of the freedom of association asserted by Mr. Tarpley and confirmed by the long line of Supreme Court decisions cited by my colleagues in the opening paragraph of the opinion. Mr. Tarpley’s right to associate is “circumscribed” (see ante at p. 796), my colleagues assert, because he belongs to the losing party while Mr. Keistler belongs to the prevailing one. This analysis stands in stark contradiction to the holdings of the Supreme Court that conditioning public employment on political loyalty severely restricts political belief and association.
My colleagues characterize those who bring lawsuits such as this one as “well-meaning ... citizens” who are trying to “rid the state of an age-old rite.” (See ante at p. 789.) In reality, however, Mr. Tarpley and others who seek vindication of the right to serve their state without the endorsement of the prevailing political leadership are seeking something far more important — the vindication of a right of freedom of association recognized by the highest court in the Land as part of our First Amendment freedom. My colleagues note that an individual may seek redress against a conspiracy by private citizens and state officials to deprive that individual of any other civil right. They leave unanswered a crucial question: Why should the associational right, an integral part of First Amendment protections and yet, according to my colleagues, treated with massive resistance in many quarters within our jurisdiction (see ante at p. 789-90), be protected any less vigorously by this court? After today’s decision, this question will haunt the jurisprudence of this circuit.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. See United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-44, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961).