Court Opinion

ID: 9741968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:04:48.009843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:27.556449
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, specially concurring: While I specially concur in the majority’s decision, I write separately to acknowledge reservations about the continued viability of the open-and-obvious doctrine in our comparative-negligence system. Whether an open and obvious danger can function to eliminate a landowner’s duty of reasonable care he owes an invitee is disputed among various states. Some jurisdictions adopting comparative-negligence principles have chosen to eliminate the doctrine (Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 422, 541 N.W.2d 742, 748 (1995); Robertson v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 117 Idaho 979, 980, 793 P.2d 211, 212 (1990)) while others have upheld it (Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., 99 Ohio St. 3d 79, 788 N.E.2d 1088 (2003) (an Ohio Supreme Court case including an excellent discussion of the continuing viability of the open-and-obvious doctrine); Groleau v. Bjornson Oil Co., 2004 ND 55, ¶¶15-24, 676 N.W.2d 763, 769-72). Our supreme court has addressed the issue of whether to abandon the doctrine in light of the operative comparative-fault principles and has, so far, declined to do so. In Ward v. K mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 146, 554 N.E.2d 223, 229 (1990), a man was injured when he left a K mart store carrying a large mirror and ran into a pole outside the store’s exit. The court held that the no-duty rule for open and obvious dangers has fallen under “harsh criticism” but rejected plaintiffs contention that the court should abandon the doctrine in light of comparative negligence. See also Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 435, 455-56, 665 N.E.2d 826, 835-36 (1996) (holding that swimmers who were injured while diving into Lake Michigan off of a concrete wall were presented with an open and obvious danger despite the park district’s recent manipulation of the bottom of the lake which made the lake much shallower in the area the swimmers were diving); but see Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d at 463-68, 665 N.E.2d at 839-41 (Harrison, J., dissenting) (arguing in support of other jurisdictions that, upon enacting comparative-fault legislation, abandoned the open-and-obvious doctrine as a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery). Recently, in Blue v. Environmental Engineering, Inc., 215 Ill. 2d 78, 101-08, 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1144-48 (2005), our supreme court also addressed the open-and-obvious doctrine’s relation to the duty analysis in a premises-liability claim. Although Blue dealt with a products-liability claim, the court spent a great deal of time discussing the open-and-obvious doctrine as it applies in premises-liability cases for purposes of comparison to the products-liability claim before the court. Because our supreme court continues to respect the open-and-obvious doctrine as an exception to defendant’s duty, I concur in the majority’s decision. However, our court may be following an analytically flawed approach to duty in premises-liability actions. Justice Harrison’s dissent in Bucheleres recognized that “[i]t is a harsh and unjust principle of law yielding results that are often cruel, if not bizarre.” Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d at 464, 665 N.E.2d at 840 (Harrison, J., dissenting). In Groleau, a North Dakota Supreme Court case, Justice Haring presents a compelling argument for the abolition of the doctrine finding it inconsistent with that state’s comparative-negligence system. Groleau, 2004 ND 55, ¶¶27-41, 676 N.W.2d at 772-76 (Maring, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Haring argues that rather than be a complete bar to recovery, the openness and obviousness of a danger should be a factor for the jury to assess in determining comparative fault. Groleau, 2004 ND 55, ¶33, 676 N.W.2d at 773 (Maring, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Both Justice Haring’s opinion and Justice Harrison’s dissent note that in a framework of comparative negligence, the open-and-obvious doctrine has no continued validity. Justice Haring finds that allowing the open and obvious dangers to function as a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery is tantamount to applying discarded principles of contributory negligence. Justice Haring recognizes that prior to enactment of comparative-fault principles, how open or how obvious the danger was irrelevant because under the common law a plaintiffs encounter with an open and obvious danger was a complete bar to recovery. Under principles of comparative fault, how open and how obvious the danger is should be considered in assessing the comparative faults of the plaintiff and the owner of the premises. Relegating the open-and-obvious doctrine to a question of fact to be weighed by the fact finder, rather than a complete bar to recovery as a matter of law, seems more consistent with our comparative-fault principles. Nonetheless, the doctrine continues to apply in Illinois, and I concur as the majority has correctly applied it in this case.