Court Opinion

ID: 9372777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:29.883928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.454762
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                       MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                       2022 MSPB 22
                             Docket No. DC-0752-17-0281-I-1

                                     Franklin Martin,
                                         Appellant,
                                              v.
                              United States Postal Service,
                                          Agency.
                                        July 20, 2022

           Franklin Martin, Durham, North Carolina, pro se.

           Brandon L. Truman, Charlotte, North Carolina, for the agency.

                                          BEFORE

                              Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                               Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                  OPINION AND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his constructive suspension appeal for lack of jurisdiction .   For the
     reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,
     REVERSE the initial decision, FIND that the Board has jurisdictio n over this
     appeal, REVERSE the appellant’s constructive suspension, and FIND that he
     established his affirmative defense of disability discrimination.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant, a preference-eligible Window Clerk, left work after suffering
     an anxiety attack that triggered an asthma attack on December 15, 2016. Initial
                                                                                       2

     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2, Tab 8 at 11, Tab 14 at 13, Tab 20, Hearing
     Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony of the appellant). Ac cording to the appellant, he
     saw his primary care physician at her first availability on January 11, 2017, and
     then saw his clinical psychologist, for further evaluation and clearance to return
     to work. IAF, Tab 12 at 3; HCD (testimony of the appellant).          The appellant
     believed, and the agency agreed, that he was required to submit medical
     documentation to the agency and receive the agency’s permission prior to
     returning to work. IAF, Tab 14 at 41; HCD (testimony of the appellant). On
     January 12, 2017, his psychologist faxed a note to the agency’s Occupational
     Health Nurse Administrator (OHNA) stating that the appellant’s health episode
     on December 15, 2016, was psychological in nature and that he had sufficiently
     recovered to return to work with no restrictions. IAF, Tab 4 at 11-12, Tab 14
     at 39.    After not hearing anything from the agency regarding his clearance to
     return to work, the appellant reported to his duty station on January 26, 2017, but
     a supervisor told him that he had to leave because he had not been cleared to
     return to work. IAF, Tab 1 at 6; HCD (testimony of the appellant).
¶3            On January 27, 2017, the appellant filed the instant Board appeal, alleging
     that the agency had constructively suspended him following an absence for
     medical reasons and discriminated against him on the basis of disability. IAF,
     Tab 1, Tab 11 at 2. On February 9, 2017, he received a February 6, 2017 letter
     from his station manager informing him that his psychologist’s return-to-work
     letter was deficient because it did not state whether the appellant was a threat to
     himself or others.      IAF, Tab 8 at 3, 15.      In a letter to the agency dated
     February 13, 2017, the appellant’s psychologist stated that the appellant was not a
     threat to himself or others. IAF, Tab 14 at 43.
¶4            The agency “concede[d]” that the Board had jurisdiction over this appeal,
     indicated that it would pay the appellant back pay and benefits, and moved that
     the appeal be stayed pending the payment of back pa y and benefits, which would
     render the appeal moot. IAF, Tab 9. The administrative judge issued an order
                                                                                           3

     advising the parties that the appeal would not be rendered moot by such payments
     because   the   appellant   had   raised   an   affirmative   defense   of   disabilit y
     discrimination and might be entitled to additional damages if he prevailed. IAF,
     Tab 11 at 3. In its prehearing submissions, the agency indicated that it returned
     the appellant to work and that it intended to provide him back pay for the period
     from January 12 through March 20, 2017. IAF, Tab 13 at 7, 20.
¶5         After holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision finding that, notwithstanding the agency’s conceding
     jurisdiction, the Board lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the appellant
     failed to show that his absence from work was involuntary. IAF, Tab 21, Initial
     Decision (ID). In so finding, the administrative judge explained that the agency
     had a reasonable basis for requesting documentation reg arding whether the
     appellant was a danger to himself or others because the station manager knew that
     his absence was related to a psychological condition, he engaged in an altercation
     with his supervisor before leaving work on December 15, 2016, and he previously
     was reassigned to his current duty station because he could not work with a
     particular supervisor. ID at 27. She further found that the agency timely notified
     the appellant of the requirement to provide the additional medical documentation
     and that, although the agency’s delay in returning the appellant to work was
     regrettable, it was not wrongful.     ID at 28-32.     Because she found that the
     appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over his appeal, she did not reach the
     appellant’s disability discrimination affirmative defense but noted that she would
     have found that he failed to establish it. ID at 32 n.2.
¶6         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision and has
     submitted, for the first time on review, a sworn statement from a coworker
     attesting that she, not the appellant, had a disagreement with the appellant’s
     supervisor on December 15, 2016. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 12.
     The agency has responded in opposition to the petition for review. PFR File,
     Tab 3.
                                                                                         4

                                         ANALYSIS
¶7        A preference-eligible Postal Service employee who has completed more
     than 1 year of current continuous service, like the appellant, may appeal a
     suspension, or a constructive suspension, of more than 14 days to the Board.
     5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1)(B)(ii), 7512(2), 7513(d); see Rosario-Fabregas v. Merit
     Systems Protection Board, 833 F.3d 1342, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (recognizing
     the Board’s jurisdiction over constructive suspensions of more than 14 days) ;
     IAF, Tab 4 at 9. Although various fact patterns may give rise to an appealable
     constructive suspension, all constructive suspension claims are premised on the
     proposition that an absence that appears to be voluntary actually is not.
     Rosario-Fabregas v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 468, ¶ 8 (2015),
     aff’d, 833 F.3d 1342. To demonstrate that the absence was not voluntary and is
     an actionable constructive suspension, an appellant must show the following:
     (1) he lacked a meaningful choice in the matter; and (2) it was the agency’s
     wrongful actions that deprived him of that choice. Id. This analysis extends to
     situations in which the agency prevented the appellant’s return to work after an
     initially voluntary leave of absence. Id.
¶8        The appellant must prove jurisdiction in a constructive adverse action
     appeal by preponderant evidence. 1 Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R.
     294, ¶ 8 (2014). The jurisdictional issue in such appeals is often dispositive. Id.
     That is, if the appellant fails to meet his burden of establishing by preponderant
     evidence that he was constructively suspended, the appeal will be dismissed
     because the Board lacks jurisdiction over appeals of employees’ voluntary
     actions. Id. Because such constructive suspensions are often effected without

     1
      A preponderance of the evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
     person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
     contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                       5

      notice, however, if the appellant establishes jurisdiction, the Board will reverse
      the agency’s action on due process grounds without proceeding to the merits. Id.
¶9         Here, once the appellant submitted a medical note on January 12, 2017,
      releasing him to return to work without restrictions, the agency’s decision not to
      permit him to return deprived him of a meaningful choice in the matter.       See
      Romero v. U.S. Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 606, ¶ 9 (2014). Thus, the appellant
      satisfied the first prong of the constructive suspension test. The administrative
      judge found, however, that he failed to prove that his ab sence resulted from the
      agency’s wrongful actions. ID at 26-32.
¶10        As explained by our reviewing court, “[w]hen an employee voluntarily
      takes leave, an agency may properly refuse to allow the employee to resume
      working if the employee does not satisfy the agency’s conditions for returning to
      work.” Rosario-Fabregas, 833 F.3d at 1347. The employee’s resulting absence
      is not a constructive suspension. Id. If, however, the agency’s conditions for
      returning to work are wrongful, then the employee’s absence following the
      agency’s refusal to allow him to return to work may be deemed a constructive
      suspension. See Rosario-Fabregas, 122 M.S.P.R. 468, ¶ 8.
¶11        The Board adjudicates claims of disability discrimination raised in
      connection with an otherwise appealable action under the substantive standards of
      section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act. The standards under the Americans wit h
      Disabilities Act (ADA), as amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act
      Amendments Act of 2008, have been incorporated by reference into the
      Rehabilitation Act and the Board applies them to determine whether there has
      been a Rehabilitation Act violation. 29 U.S.C. § 791(f); Miller v. Department of
      the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 13 n.3 (2014). The ADA significantly restricts the
      medical inquiries that an agency may make of an employee .           Archerda v.
      Department of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 29 & n.6 (2014). Under the ADA,
      an agency may require a medical examination or make a medical inquiry
      regarding whether an employee “is an individual with a disability or as to the
                                                                                           6

      nature or severity of the disability” only when such inquiry or examination “is
      shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.”              42 U.S.C.
      § 12112(d)(4)(A). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
      promulgated regulations implementing this statutory provision and issued
      enforcement guidance addressing the ADA’s limitations on disability-related
      inquiries   and   medical    examinations     during    employment.           29 C.F.R.
      §§ 1630.13(b), 1630.14(c); EEOC Enforcement Guidance:             Disability-Related
      Inquiries   and   Medical   Examinations     of   Employees     under   the     [ADA],
      Notice 915.002, 2000 WL 33407181 (July 27, 2000) (Enforcement Guidance).
      The Board generally defers to the EEOC on issues of substantive discrimination
      law, and we find that it is appropriate to do so here. See Evans v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 107 M.S.P.R. 484, ¶ 9 (2007).
¶12         Ordinarily, a disability-related inquiry or medical examination may be
      “job-related and consistent with business necessity” if an employer “has a
      reasonable belief, based on objective evidence, that: (1) an employee’s ability to
      perform essential job functions will be impaired by a medical condition; or (2) an
      employee will pose a direct threat due to a medical condition.”               Archerda,
      121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 30 (quoting Watkins v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
      No. 01981800, 2001 WL 1097442, at *2 (Aug. 29, 2001)); Enforcement
      Guidance, 2000 WL 33407181, at *6.            The agency’s Employee and Labor
      Relations Manual (ELM) incorporates this standard.              Specifically, ELM,
      section 865.1 provides that the agency can require employees returning from
      medically related absences to submit documentation to clear their return to work
      when it “has a reasonable belief, based upon reliable and objective information”
      that the employee may be unable to perform the essential functions of his position
      or may present a “direct threat to the health or safety of [himself] or othe rs due to
      that medical condition.” IAF, Tab 14 at 7, 33-34. It is the agency’s burden to
      show that its disability-related inquiries and requests for examination are
                                                                                          7

      job-related and consistent with business necessity. Archerda, 121 M.S.P.R. 314,
      ¶ 31.
¶13           Here, the agency did not allege that the appellant could not perform his
      essential job functions but argued that the station manager acted within her
      discretion under ELM, section 865.1, to require language regarding whether the
      appellant was a risk to himself or others because his absence was related to a
      mental health condition. IAF, Tab 13 at 6-7, Tab 14 at 5-8. In addition, the
      station manager testified that she requested the additional information because
      she heard that the appellant engaged in a “back-and-forth” with his supervisor
      just before he left work on December 15, 2016, and because she was aware that
      he could not work with a particular supervisor at another facility.           HCD
      (testimony of the station manager). The administrative judge found that these
      reasons were sufficient to provide the agency with a reasonable basis to require
      the appellant to submit medical documentation containing the direct threat
      language. ID at 27. The appellant challenges these findings on review, arguing
      that he did not engage in an altercation before departing work on December 15,
      2016, and that there was no evidence that he posed a direct threat to himself or
      others. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2‑5. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the
      appellant that the agency did not have a reasonable basis to request additional
      medical information and that the administrative judge erred in finding otherwise.
¶14           “Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or
      safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by
      reasonable accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); see Archerda, 121 M.S.P.R.
      314, ¶ 30. The Board has found that an agency had a reasonable belief that the
      employee presented a “direct threat” when he submitted a psychiatrist’s note less
      than 5 months earlier stating that he had experienced “aggressive episodes.”
      Rosario-Fabregas, 122 M.S.P.R. 468, ¶ 17. The EEOC has concluded that an
      agency had a reasonable belief that an employee presented a direct threat t o
      herself when she exhibited specific behavioral changes following an accident,
                                                                                        8

      including violent outbursts and unsafe actions. O’Malley v. U.S. Postal Service,
      EEOC Appeal No. 01994945, 2002 WL 31232360, at *4-*5 (Sept. 26, 2002).
      Further, an example in the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance states that an agency
      could require medical documentation based on a reasonable belief that the
      employee posed a direct threat due to a medical condition when, prior to a period
      of absence for psychiatric treatment, the employee threatened several of his
      coworkers and was disciplined.      Enforcement Guidance, 2000 WL 33407181,
      at *14. On the other hand, the Board and EEOC have found that an agency did
      not have a reasonable belief that an employee presented a direct threat due to a
      medical condition when there was no evidence in the record that he was
      physically violent or posed a significant risk of doing substantial harm.
      Archerda, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 32; see Clark v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC
      Appeal No. 01992682, 2001 WL 1526433, at *3-*4 (Nov. 20, 2001).
¶15        Here, as noted above, the first reason cited by the agency in support of its
      decision to require the appellant to provide medical documentation containing the
      direct threat language was because his absence was related to a mental health
      condition. IAF, Tab 14 at 7-8. The station manager testified that she required the
      appellant to provide such documentation because the OHNA advised her that the
      January 12, 2017 letter indicated that his condition was psychological in nature.
      HCD (testimony of the station manager). The OHNA and a postmaster testified
      that the agency requires any employee whose absence from work is related to a
      mental health condition to provide a medical note specifically addressing whether
      he is a risk to himself or others before he may be returned to work.          HCD
      (testimonies of the OHNA and postmaster). The mere fact that an employee’s
      absence is related to a mental health condition, however, does not constitute
      objective and reliable evidence establishing, or even suggesting, that he is l ikely
      to be violent or do harm. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the [ADA] and
      Psychiatric Disabilities, Notice 915.002, 1997 WL 34622315, *13-*14 (Mar. 25,
      1997) (explaining that a determination of whether an individual with a psychiatric
                                                                                         9

      condition poses a direct threat must be based on “specific behavior” rather than
      solely on the individual’s treatment for a psychiatric disability). Therefore, we
      find that the agency’s reliance on the fact that the appellant’s absence was related
      to a mental health condition was not an acceptable basis to require additional
      medical     documentation   under   the     Rehabilitation   Act.   See   Archerda,
      121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 30; IAF, Tab 14 at 33-34.
¶16         The station manager also testified that she required the appellant to submit
      additional medical documentation containing the direct threat language because
      she was aware from the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP)
      Forms CA-17 submitted by the appellant each month that he could not work at
      another facility with a particular supervisor.      HCD (testimony of the station
      manager).     The record contains a copy of one OWCP Duty Status Report ,
      Form CA-17, signed by the appellant’s psychologist in January 2017, indicating
      that the appellant was diagnosed with an anxiety disorder, which OWCP accepted
      as a workplace injury with a date of injury of January 19, 2005. IAF, Tab 4 at 13.
      The form also indicates that the appellant was advised to resume work on
      April 23, 2012, and states the following:
             As described in previous CA-17 Forms submitted, [the appellant]
             may return to his [position] full time, providing that [he] does not
             work for, is not supervised by, and his work is neither directly nor
             indirectly influenced by [the supervisor] (The person I believe is
             primarily responsible for [his] work injury).
      Id.   It is unclear from the record when the appellant experienced difficulties
      working with this particular supervisor or the circumstances surrounding those
      difficulties, although it appears to have been around the beginning of 2005. Id.
      Nevertheless, we find that the station manager’s knowledge that the appellant had
      unspecified difficulties with a particular supervisor and that working with her
      contributed to his anxiety disorder does not constitute objective evidence
      establishing, or even suggesting, that he is likely to be violent or do harm.
      Therefore, we find that the agency has not shown that its relian ce on the
                                                                                            10

      appellant’s difficulties with a particular supervisor a number of years earlier was
      an acceptable basis to require additional medical documentation under the
      Rehabilitation Act. See Archerda, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 30; IAF, Tab 14 at 33-34.
¶17         Lastly, the station manager testified that she required the appellant to
      provide the direct threat information in his return-to-work letter because she
      heard that he was involved in an altercation with his supervisor before he left
      work on December 15, 2016.             HCD (testimony of the station manager).
      Specifically, she testified that, although she had “no idea exactly what happened”
      because she was not there, the supervisor told her that he instructed the appellant
      to work at a different window, the appellant refused, and there was a “back-and-
      forth.” Id. The EEOC has held that a workplace argument in which an employee
      pushed her chest into a coworker’s chest did not provide the agency a reasonable
      basis to believe that the employee posed a direct threat to herself or others, even
      though her conduct may have been improper. Snowden v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120083032, 2011 WL 4343908, at *5 (Sept. 9, 2011).
      Here, the “back-and-forth” alleged by the station manager describes a mere verbal
      disagreement between the appellant and his supervisor, without any suggestion
      that the appellant behaved in a threatening or violent manner. 2 HCD (testimony
      of the station manager). Therefore, we find that this was an improper basis to
      require the appellant to submit additional medical information under the
      Rehabilitation Act. See Archerda, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 30; IAF, Tab 14 at 33-34.
¶18         In light of the foregoing, we find that the agency violated the Rehabilitation
      Act when it refused to permit the appellant to return to work and ordered him to

      2
        Because the statement that the appellant submitted on review from his coworker is
      unnecessary for us to reach our conclusion here, we do not consider it. Russo v.
      Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (explaining that the Board will
      not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of
      sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision); PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 13.
                                                                                          11

      provide additional medical documentation that was not job-related or consistent
      with business necessity. See, e.g., Snowden, 2011 WL 4343908, at *5 (finding
      that the agency violated the Rehabilitation Act when it o rdered the complainant to
      undergo a fitness-for-duty examination without proving it reasonably believed she
      was a direct threat or could not perform her essential job functions ). Because the
      agency’s actions were wrongful, the agency constructively suspen ded the
      appellant when it refused to permit him to return to work, and the Board has
      jurisdiction over this appeal.    See Rosario-Fabregas, 122 M.S.P.R. 468, ¶ 8.
      Because the appellant did not receive due process for this constructive
      suspension, the action must be reversed.       See Abbott, 121 M.S.P.R. 294, ¶ 8.
      Furthermore, because the agency violated the Rehabilitation Act, we find that the
      appellant has established his disability discrimination claim. 3          See Evans,
      107 M.S.P.R. 484, ¶ 16 (finding that the agency violated the Rehabilitation Act
      when it asked a potential employee to disclose the medications he was taking
      prior to extending a job offer to him and that this violation constituted
      discrimination based on disability); Clark, 2001 WL 1526433, at *3-*5 (finding
      that the agency discriminated against the employee by requiring him to undergo a
      fitness-for-duty examination without showing that such examination was
      job-related or consistent with business necessity in violation of the Rehabilitation
      Act).
¶19           On review, the appellant reasserts his claims that the agency subjected him
      to status-based disability discrimination and failed to accommodate his medical
      conditions of anxiety disorder and asthma.       PFR File, Tab 1 at 6 -8, 10.      The
      administrative judge found that the Board lacks jurisdiction over these claims

      3
        The ADA’s restrictions on disability-related inquiries and medical examinations apply
      to individuals both with and without disabilities. Archerda, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 31.
      Therefore, the appellant is protected by these restrictions regardless of whether he
      qualifies as disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
                                                                                            12

      and, alternatively, that the appellant failed to prove them. ID at 32 n.2. In light
      of our finding that the appellant proved Board jurisdiction over his constructive
      suspension, the Board has jurisdiction over these claims. However, we find it
      unnecessary to separately address them.        We already have found the agency’s
      actions discriminatory, and therefore wrongful, based on its improper medical
      inquiry. Under the particular facts of this case, we discern no basis on which the
      appellant could seek additional damages for these claims, and thus decline to
      address these other theories of liability. See Cerge v. Department of Homeland
      Security, EEOC Request No. 0520080093, 2008 WL 559447, *2 (Feb. 20, 2008)
      (explaining that compensatory damages were available to a complainant who was
      sent to a fitness-for-duty examination that was not job-related or consistent with
      business necessity). Because we have found in the appellant’s favor on the issues
      of the constructive suspension and disability discrimination, we need not address
      the appellant’s remaining allegations of error by the administrative judge. 4 See
      Coltrane v. Department of the Army, 25 M.S.P.R. 397, 403 n.9 (1984).

                                              ORDER
¶20         We ORDER the agency to cancel the appellant’s constructive suspension
      effective January 12 through March 20, 2017. See Kerr v. National Endowment
      for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984).         The agency must complete this
      action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision.
¶21         We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Back Pay Act and/or Postal

      4
        To the extent that, for the first time on review, the appellant asserts that the agency
      violated his return-to-work rights under 5 C.F.R. § 825.214, PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10, we
      decline to consider this new argument on review, Banks v. Department of the Air Force,
      4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980) (explaining that the Board generally will not consider an
      argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is
      based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due
      diligence).
                                                                                          13

      Service Regulations, as appropriate, no later than 60 calendar days after the date
      of this decision.   We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the
      agency’s efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due,
      and to provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out
      the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest
      due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the
      undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶22         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writ ing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶23         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the da tes and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶24         For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
      are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
      documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
      Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
      made within the 60-day period set forth above.
¶25         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 ( 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.113).
                                                                               14

                       NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT
                   REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                       ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at title 5 of
the United States Code (U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g).       The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1202.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

                       NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT
                   REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                       COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your compensatory
damages, including pecuniary losses, future pecuniary losses, and nonpecuniary
losses, such as emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss
of enjoyment of life. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at
42 U.S.C. § 1981a.     The regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201,
1201.202, and 1201.204. If you believe you meet these requirements, you must
file a motion for compensatory damages WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF
THE DATE OF THIS DECISION. You must file your motion with the office that
issued the initial decision on your appeal.
                                                                                       15

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:

5
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                    16

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
                                                                                17

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     18

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or a ny court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           19

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as
ordered by the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts .
1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise
information describing what to do in accordance with decision.
2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
    a. Employee name and social security number.
   b. Detailed explanation of request.
    c. Valid agency accounting.
   d. Authorized signature (Table 63)
    e. If interest is to be included.
    f. Check mailing address.
   g. Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
   h. Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to
be collected. (if applicable)
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement. (if applicable)
2. Copies of SF-50's (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and
amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address
to return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of
the type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual
Leave to be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay
Period and required data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump
Sum Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
   a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
   b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
   c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.