Court Opinion

ID: 9633569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:52:38.906718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:37.508699
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
(concurring in the result) — The majority opinion paints with a brush slightly wider than I would use. I agree, therefore, only in the result reached by the majority opinion, for I seem to sense a veiled conclusion that since there is a hiatus in the statute, it becomes the function of the judiciary to fill the void. I challenge the validity of this thesis.
My thoughts are so well expressed in a recent address of Mr. Justice Harlan of the United States Supreme Court that I quote extensively from his remarks.1
“One of the current notions that holds subtle capacity for serious mischief is a view of the judicial function that seems increasingly coming into vogue. This is that all deficiencies in our society which have failed of correction by *62other means should find a cure in the courts. The principal theme of these remarks will be to challenge the validity of . . . an urge for quick and uncompromising panaceas for things that call for reform. I venture to say at the outset that this view of the cosmic place of the judiciary is not only inconsistent with the principles of American democratic society but ultimately threatens the integrity of the judicial system itself.
“. . . some well-meaning people apparently believe that the judicial rather than the political process is more likely to breed better solutions of pressing or thorny problems. This is a compliment to the judiciary but untrue to democratic principle. That point of view is some times difficult for judges to resist for it carries ostensibly authentic judicial hallmarks — -the function of statutory construction and the power of judicial review. If the Congress or a state legislature has passed an inadequate statute why should it not be revised by judicial construction? If the statute is one that is manifestly unwise, harsh, or out-of-date, why should it not be abrogated by the exercise of the power of judicial review? . . .
“The objections to such alluring but deceptive plausibil-ities are more deepseated than might appear at first blush. For in the end what would eventuate would be a substantial transfer of legislative power to the courts. A function more illsuited to judges can hardly be imagined, situated as they are, and should be, aloof from the political arena and beholden to no one for their conscientious conduct. Such a course would also denigrate the legislative process, since it would tend to relieve legislators from having to account to the electorate. The outcome would inevitably be a lessening, on the one hand, of judicial independence and, on the other, of legislative responsibility, thus polluting the blood stream of. our system of government. We should be on guard against any such deliberate or unwitting folly.
“The late Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn once observed that ‘one of the greatest statéments that was ever made by anybody was: “Just a minute.” ’ ... A judicial decision which is founded simply on the impulse that ‘something should be done’ or which looks no further than to the ‘justice’ or ‘injustice’ of a particular case is not likely to have lasting influence. . . . Our scheme of ordered liberty is based, like the common law, on enlightened and uniformly applied legal principle, not on ad hoc notions of what is right or wrong in a particular case. The stability *63and flexibility that our constitutional system at once possesses is largely due to our having carried over into constitutional adjudication the common-law approach to legal development.”
I cannot agree with the statement in the majority opinion that
“. . . We cannot assume that so gross an outrage to the rights and dignity of the people of this state will ever be repeated, . . .
It is not our function to make or deny such an assumption. A repeat performance of that which has happened is always a possibility. “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
Nor can I agree with the rationale of the dissent. If used as judicial precedent it might well place a premium upon incompetence and malfeasance.
My concurrence in the result is based upon this: The factual impossibility of the Secretary of State to comply with the statutes does not, ipso facto, render the constitutional provision nugatory.
In 1912, when Amendment 7 was adopted, there were those who opposed legislation by initiative and referendum. A careful reading of the entire amendment discloses a particularity of method that leaves no doubt about the purpose and intent of the proponents of the system. The amendment was not to become an unenforceable provision of the constitution (illustrated by Const. Art. 2, § 3), dependent upon the whim of the legislature. It provides that the Secretary of State
“. . . shall he guided hy the general laws in submitting the same [initiative or referendum measures] to the people until additional legislation shall especially provide therefor. This section is self-executing, but legislation may be enacted especially to facilitate its operation. . . . ” (Italics mine.)
The efficacy of Amendment 7 does not depend upon its implementation by the legislature. As the trial court said: “The statutes are effective only insofar as they facilitate the action of the self-executing constitutional provisions.”
*64The factual pattern of the instant case is bizarre and fantastic. We are in the same position this court would have been in had the legislature refused to pass implementing legislation.
The reasons advanced by the Secretary of State in support of his certification are, I believe, sufficient in the instant case to support the trial court’s conclusion; but the decision is sui generis and should not, to my mind, be considered as judicial precedent necessarily applicable to an analogous situation.
Hill, J., concurs with Weaver, J.

Address delivered at the American Bar Center August 13, 1963. Published in 86 New Jersey Law Journal 505 (September 19, 1963); 49 American Bar Association Journal 943 (No. 10; October, 1963).