Court Opinion

ID: 9377315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 16:10:25.373416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:13.407847
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
PUBLISHED

            Present: Judges Humphreys, AtLee and Raphael
            Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

            SHAQUAWN DEMONTE WARREN
                                                                                OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 0533-22-1                                 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
                                                                               MARCH 7, 2023
            COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                           FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
                                         Stephen J. Telfeyan, Judge

                           Kelsey Bulger, Senior Assistant Public Defender (Virginia Indigent
                           Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

                           William K. Hamilton, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                           Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                   Shaquawn Demonte Warren appeals his conviction by a jury in the City of Chesapeake

            Circuit Court of misdemeanor driving under the influence (“DUI”), in violation of Code

            § 18.2-266. Warren argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in striking a potential juror for

            cause, and in granting the Commonwealth’s motion in limine which prevented Warren from

            presenting a necessity defense.

                                                     BACKGROUND

                   Just after 1:00 a.m. on January 27, 2020, Virginia State Police Trooper Ryan Dougherty

            was stationed at the top of the southbound Monitor-Merrimac Bridge-Tunnel when he observed a

            vehicle traveling extremely fast compared to the other vehicles passing the same point. Trooper

            Dougherty drove his vehicle to catch up to the speeding vehicle, which he determined was

            traveling 96 miles per hour in a 60 mile-per-hour zone. Trooper Dougherty turned on his

            emergency equipment to initiate a traffic stop, and the vehicle stopped abruptly.
       Trooper Dougherty approached the vehicle and upon talking to Warren detected the

strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from his person. Warren had glassy eyes, and he was

speaking very fast. “He was frantic.” Warren told Trooper Dougherty that he was traveling to

Portsmouth from Newport News because his cousin had been shot. Trooper Dougherty asked

Warren to move to the rear of the vehicle so he could perform field sobriety tests. Warren

exhibited multiple clues of impairment. Consequently, Trooper Dougherty placed Warren under

arrest and called a relative of Warren’s to retrieve his vehicle and firearm. Trooper Dougherty

transported Warren to the Chesapeake City Jail where he used the intoxilyzer machine to

perform a breath test. The test results showed Warren’s blood alcohol content was 0.12. On

August 13, 2020, the general district court found Warren guilty of driving under the influence of

alcohol in violation of Code § 18.2-266. Warren appealed to the circuit court.

                                         I. Jury Selection

       The parties appeared for trial on March 4, 2022. Warren pleaded not guilty and asked for

a jury trial. At a bench conference prior to juror voir dire, counsel and the court conversed about

the list of prospective jurors. Specifically, they discussed that the Virginia Criminal Information

Network (“VCIN”) records showed that prospective juror Andre Fields had been twice convicted

of felony DUI, in 2004 and in 2006. This raised the question of whether Fields was qualified to

serve as a juror under Code § 8.01-338. The VCIN did not indicate that Fields’s rights had been

restored, and the Commonwealth stated that typically the VCIN does indicate if one’s rights are

restored. Defense counsel asked that they voir dire Fields on the matter, rather than

automatically remove him from the panel.

       During voir dire of the jury pool Fields offered that he had been convicted of felony DUI.

Upon individual voir dire defense counsel asked Fields if his rights had been restored in the

Commonwealth of Virginia. Fields replied that they had been restored “[w]hen President Obama

                                               -2-
ran the second time.” Then he indicated that he was initially denied restoration of rights but

“[a]fter the election, they approved it,” and his rights were restored. Fields testified that he had

not been called to serve on a jury since his rights were restored, but he had voted in local and

federal elections without a problem. He said that Virginia’s governor granted his restoration of

rights, but he could not recall the name of the governor. Fields gave his full name and date of

birth and said that he had never changed his name.

       Defense counsel objected to the Commonwealth’s motion to strike Fields for cause. He

argued that he believed Fields was telling the truth about his rights restoration. He stressed that

Fields would not have been able to vote if his rights were not restored. He also stated that he had

known the VCIN to not reflect rights restoration in the past. The circuit court replied, “I think

he’s telling the truth. I think he may be a little confused, though. I’m not sure what happened,

but he’s talking about the president. It’s clearly state court convictions.” The circuit court judge

checked the Governor’s website for any record of his rights restoration, but Fields’s name did not

appear with his social security number and date of birth. The circuit court ultimately struck

Fields for cause because based on the VCIN report and the testimony Fields did not meet the

requirements of Code § 8.01-338. The court stated, “It does not appear that he is eligible under

the statute to sit. Obviously, we’re not trying this case as to whether he’s, you know, telling us

correctly or not, but what’s in front of me right now, [in] my opinion, he’s not eligible to serve

on this jury.”

                                        II. Motion in limine

       After voir dire of the jury pool concluded, the Commonwealth brought a motion in limine

to prevent Warren from eliciting testimony to prove the affirmative defense of necessity. The

Commonwealth asserted, “it would be highly inappropriate, irrelevant, and not probative of any

fact at issue with this DUI case.” First, the Commonwealth argued at length that a necessity

                                                -3-
defense is not applicable to a DUI charge because there is no mens rea requirement for DUI.

Second, the Commonwealth said that if the court finds the defense of necessity could be applied

to Code § 18.2-266, then the question becomes whether the evidence could satisfy the elements

of the necessity defense. The Commonwealth argued that Warren’s evidence would not be

legally sufficient to meet the elements of a necessity defense.

       Defense counsel argued that Virginia case law supports that a necessity defense is

available to a defendant charged with DUI. He emphasized that the remaining issues are issues

of fact and credibility for the jury to decide at trial. Defense counsel then submitted a proffer of

evidence for Warren’s necessity defense:

               Mr. Warren, on this particular night in question, was just arriving
               at home in Newport News. He had been out with his cousin. He
               arrived home. He got into bed. He was falling asleep when he got
               a phone call from his cousin’s girlfriend, who told him that the
               cousin he just dropped off at his grandmother’s house, had been
               shot, and was dying of a wound in front of his grandmother’s
               home. Mr. Warren got in his car and drove back to Portsmouth,
               because he had the belief—and we would be arguing a reasonable
               belief—that given the situation, given that there was an active
               shooting, it would take an ambulance quite a while to get to that
               scene to take his cousin to the hospital to receive medical
               treatment. A cousin, who later that evening, died from that
               gunshot wound.

                       So we’d be arguing that Mr. Warren was on his way—it
               was the middle of the night. He was unaware of whether there
               were other family members awake. He was unaware of anything
               else going on that could have helped his cousin get medical help,
               but he knew that he had a vehicle. He had a license. He didn’t
               believe that he was intoxicated, and he believed that getting there
               to help his cousin might have saved his life. As a result, Mr.
               Warren holds the belief that because he was prevented from getting
               there in time, that his cousin died, because the ambulance did not
               arrive fast enough to provide adequate medical care for a gunshot
               wound that was to the shoulder, but between the time of the
               gunshot and the arrival of the ambulance and medical services is
               such that his cousin passed away. So we’d be eliciting testimony
               from Mr. Warren, as well as his aunt, the aunt of this cousin, as
               well, that this cousin died, that this cousin had been shot, and that

                                                -4-
               Mr. Warren had a reasonable belief that he needed to get there to
               provide aid.

       After a recess, the circuit court asked defense counsel if he wanted to add anything to his

proffered evidence or bring anything else to the court’s attention. Defense counsel replied that

there was nothing else. The circuit court recited the elements of the necessity defense and found,

“I don’t think the proffered facts meet the threshold.” The court granted the Commonwealth’s

motion in limine, adding, “based on the facts that were proffered, the issue becomes, among

other things, relevance, in the sense that the elements to establish the necessity just haven’t been

proffered.”

       The case proceeded to trial before the jury. The Commonwealth presented its case

through the testimony of Trooper Dougherty, whose testimony established the facts of January

27, 2020, as stated above. Warren then testified as the only witness for his case. The jury found

Warren guilty of DUI, first offense. The circuit court sentenced Warren to nine months’

incarceration, with nine months suspended, and a $1,000 fine, with $500 suspended. Warren

filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                            ANALYSIS

                                    I. Striking Juror for Cause

       Warren argues that the circuit court erred in striking prospective juror Fields for cause.

“The striking of any individual potential juror for cause, however, is committed to the sound

discretion of the trial court.” Townsend v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 325, 329 (2005). “As an

appellate court, we must defer to a trial court’s ruling on the issue of whether to retain or excuse

a prospective juror for cause and that ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been

manifest error amounting to an abuse of discretion.” Barrett v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 823,

826 (2001). “An abuse of discretion occurs only when ‘reasonable jurists’ could not disagree as

to the proper decision.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 104, 111 (2013). “This
                                                -5-
principle necessarily implies that, for some decisions, conscientious jurists could reach different

conclusions based on exactly the same facts—yet still remain entirely reasonable.” Id. (quoting

Hamad v. Hamad, 61 Va. App. 593, 607 (2013)).

       Code § 8.01-338 provides that persons convicted of a felony shall be disqualified from

serving as jurors.1 However, Virginia’s Constitution provides, “[t]he Governor shall have power

to . . . remove political disabilities consequent upon conviction for offenses committed prior or

subsequent to the adoption of this Constitution . . . .” Va. Const. art. V, § 12. The circuit court

may excuse unqualified jurors on its own motion or upon a party’s challenge, Rule 3A:14(b), and

“a venireman must be excluded if the trial court entertains a reasonable doubt as to his

qualifications,” Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 256, 258 (1983).

       Warren argues that the circuit court made an erroneous legal conclusion in striking Fields

for cause, asserting that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Fields was statutorily

disqualified under Code § 8.01-338. Warren argued that Fields’s testimony that his rights were

restored was credible and compelling. However, viewing the record in light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, Reeves v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 650, 660-61 (2004), the evidence

showed that Fields was twice convicted of felony DUI. The VCIN record reflected these

convictions and did not show that his rights had been restored. When the court accessed the

Governor’s website for any clarifying information on Fields’s rights restoration, the website did

not show records matching Fields’s name, which he testified had never changed.

       1
          The only Virginia case touching upon disqualification of jurors pursuant to Code
§ 8.01-338 is Mighty v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 495 (1993). In that case, post-trial
discovery revealed that two convicted felons served on the appellant’s jury. Id. at 496. This
Court affirmed the appellant’s conviction because “[n]o evidence was presented to the [circuit]
court to suggest that the two jurors’ legal disability as felons would ‘probably cause injustice’ to
Mighty,” as required by Code § 8.01-352(B). Id. at 498. Our decision in Mighty was ultimately
based on application of Code § 8.01-352, which does not apply in the present case. Thus, Mighty
is inapposite here.
                                                 -6-
        Warren points out that the circuit court affirmatively stated regarding Fields’s testimony,

“I think he’s telling the truth.” However, “we will not ‘fix upon isolated statements of the trial

judge taken out of the full context in which they were made, and use them as a predicate for

holding the law has been misapplied.’” Groves v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 57, 62 (2007).

After stating its initial observation regarding Fields’s truthfulness, the circuit court continued to

deliberate—the circuit court also stated that Fields “may be a little confused,” and then, “I’m not

sure what happened.”

        “Since the [circuit] court observes the venireman, its finding is entitled to great weight

and will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifest error exists.” Calhoun, 226 Va. at 258-59;

see also Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 400 (2006) (“[T]he trial judge has the

opportunity, which we lack, to observe and evaluate the apparent sincerity, conscientiousness,

intelligence, and demeanor of prospective jurors first hand.” (quoting Pope v. Commonwealth,

234 Va. 114, 123-24 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015 (1988))). Fields’s testimony was

equivocal as he could not name the governor who he claimed restored his rights, nor the date

when they were supposedly restored; he only referenced that his rights were restored after

President Obama was elected the second time. The circuit court acknowledged that Fields was

not trying to mislead the circuit court in his voir dire testimony and that Fields believed his rights

were restored. However, the circuit court ultimately was not satisfied with the evidence before it

to prove that Fields was qualified to serve as a juror according to Code § 8.01-338. The fact of

Fields’s two felony convictions coupled with the lack of clear evidence that his rights had been

subsequently restored support the circuit court’s “reasonable doubt as to [Fields’s]

qualifications” to serve as a juror. Calhoun, 226 Va. at 258. Consequently, we find no abuse of

discretion in the circuit court’s decision to strike Fields for cause.

                                                 -7-
                                       II. Necessity Defense

        The circuit court excluded evidence pertaining to Warren’s proposed necessity defense

based on “relevance, in the sense that the elements to establish the necessity just haven’t been

proffered.” Warren argues on brief that he proffered sufficient facts to meet the elements of the

defense. At oral argument, Warren argued that the law does not require him to proffer evidence

on each element of the necessity defense to establish that the evidence is relevant and should go

to the jury.

        “Generally, we review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence using an

abuse of discretion standard and, on appeal, will not disturb a trial court’s decision to admit

evidence absent a finding of abuse of that discretion.” Avent v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175,

197 (2010). “Applying this standard, ‘we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial

court. Rather, we consider only whether the record fairly supports the trial court’s action.’”

Satterwhite v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 557, 563 (2010) (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth,

278 Va. 602, 620 (2009)). “The abuse-of-discretion standard includes review to determine that

the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.” Coffman v. Commonwealth, 67

Va. App. 163, 166-67 (2017) (quoting Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 260 (2008)).

        “It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that evidence which is not relevant is not

admissible.” Perry v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 502, 509 (2013) (quoting McMillan v.

Commonwealth, 277 Va. 11, 22 (2009)). “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any

tendency to make the existence of any fact in issue more probable or less probable than it would

be without the evidence.” Va. R. Evid. 2:401. “For evidence to be admissible it must relate and

be confined to the matters in issue and tend to prove an offense or be pertinent thereto.”

McMillan, 277 Va. at 22 (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 721, 723 (1982)). “While

evidence may be relevant in that it tends to establish the proposition for which it was offered, in

                                                -8-
order to be admissible, it must also be material,” that is “tend[ing] to prove a matter that is

properly at issue in the case.” Commonwealth v. Proffitt, 292 Va. 626, 634-35 (2016) (quoting

Brugh v. Jones, 265 Va. 136, 139 (2003)). “Indeed, this materiality requirement is built into

Rule 2:401’s language, which states that the evidence must be probative of a ‘fact in issue.’” Id.

“The proponent of the evidence bears the burden of establishing[,] by a preponderance of the

evidence, the facts necessary to support its admissibility.” Perry, 61 Va. App. at 509 (alteration

in original) (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 753, adopted upon reh’g en

banc, 45 Va. App. 811 (2005)). “The proponent also bears the burden of meeting other

foundational requirements to the satisfaction of the trial judge and of opposing any objections

raised regarding the admissibility of the evidence.” Creamer v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App.

185, 194 (2015) (holding that the circuit court did not err in excluding a witness’s testimony

because appellant’s proffer of the testimony at trial failed to establish its relevance); see also

Jones v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 70, 88-89 (2019) (holding that appellant “never laid a

sufficient foundation for self-defense,” rendering moot his argument that the circuit court erred

by excluding proffered evidence of the victim’s statements and prior bad acts offered to prove

self-defense).

                      A. Necessity Defense Challenged at Motion in limine

       In the circuit court, the Commonwealth raised a pre-trial motion to object to Warren’s

presentation of evidence to establish a necessity defense. Rule 3A:9(b)(2) provides that “any

defense or objection that is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be

raised by motion before trial.” “A motion before trial raising defenses or objections must be

determined before the trial unless the court orders that it be deferred for determination at the trial

of the general issue.” Rule 3A:9(b)(4). Thus, motions in limine are often used in Virginia courts

for the Commonwealth to object to evidence that a defendant may seek to introduce as part of his

                                                 -9-
defense. See, e.g., Long v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 537, 541 (1996) (affirming circuit court

ruling at motion in limine that necessity defense was not available because it was abrogated by

the habitual offender statute and refusal to admit evidence relating to the defense was not error).

Virginia’s criminal procedure does not require a defendant to make a prima facie showing of a

necessity defense to present evidence of the defense to the jury, as is the requirement to present

evidence of an affirmative defense of insanity. See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 120,

126 (2007) (“To present evidence of insanity to the fact finder, an accused must first make a

prima facie showing that his evidence meets the requirements of the affirmative defense.” (citing

White v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 619, 629 (2006))). To be sure, “[w]hether duress [or

necessity] is established is a factual issue that is usually determined by the jury, and the trial

court rarely rules on the defense as a matter of law.” Ronald J. Bacigal & Corinna Barrett Lain,

Virginia Practice Series, Va. Prac. Criminal Procedure § 17:33 Defenses—Duress and necessity

(2022-2023 ed.). “However, where there is insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support

an element of the affirmative defense, the defendant can be precluded from presenting any

evidence of duress [or necessity] to the jury . . . .” Id. (quoting United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d

618, 621 (4th Cir. 1994)).

       In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), the United States Supreme Court

reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and held that

respondents failed to present sufficient evidence of duress or necessity to submit the defense

evidence to the jury. 444 U.S. at 417. In respondent Cogdell’s trial, which was severed from

and tried after the other three respondents’ trial, Cogdell was precluded from presenting his

evidence of duress or necessity to the jury because the district court found he lacked evidence on

one element of his defense (namely, that he attempted to surrender to authorities after the alleged

necessity ended). Id. at 399-400. The Supreme Court concluded that its holding was not in

                                                - 10 -
derogation of the jury as the judge of credibility. Id. at 416. Rather, “it is a testament to the

importance of trial by jury and the need to husband the resources necessary for that process by

limiting evidence in a trial to that directed at the elements of the crime or at affirmative

defenses.” Id. “If, as we here hold, an affirmative defense consists of several elements and

testimony supporting one element is insufficient to sustain it even if believed, the trial court and

jury need not be burdened with testimony supporting other elements of the defense.” Id.; see

also United States v. Portillo-Vega, 478 F.3d 1194, 1197, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2007) (following

Bailey in affirming that district court properly exercised its “gate-keeping responsibilities” by

precluding appellant’s duress defense when his pre-trial proffer was insufficient to carry his

burden on all the elements of the defense); Sarno, 24 F.3d at 622 (“The district court, having

correctly determined that Sarno’s evidence could not support the element of timely surrender,

properly excluded any testimony at trial as to the duress defense.”); United States v.

Montgomery, 772 F.2d 733, 736 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming district court’s judgment in

excluding evidence offered to establish the affirmative defense of necessity, finding proffer on

lack of alternatives insufficient); United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 430, 434 (9th Cir. 1985)

(affirming district court’s decision to reject the necessity defense and evidence offered in support

during motion in limine because offer of proof was insufficient as a matter of law to support the

defense). These cases align with “[t]he accepted theory of jury trial,” which “requires that there

be submitted to the jury only matters in dispute as to which reasonable men could differ, and that

in resolving the dispute the jury shall hear only legal evidence.” Edmund M. Morgan, Functions

of Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 165,

186 (Dec. 1929). Thus, the circuit court did not err in requiring Warren to lay a foundation for

the testimony he intended to present to the jury by proffering evidence on each element of the

                                                - 11 -
necessity defense at the motion in limine.2 The question then becomes whether Warren’s

proffered evidence supported a necessity defense.

              B. Applying the Proffered Evidence to the Necessity Defense Elements

       When we review a circuit court’s refusal to give a proffered jury instruction, “the

appropriate standard of review requires that we view the evidence with respect to the refused

instruction in the light most favorable to the defendant.” Byers v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App.

174, 182 (2001) (quoting Seegars v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 641, 643 (1994)). Given the

procedural posture of this case, we are not addressing the circuit court’s refusal to give a jury

instruction; however, we likewise “are concerned with [appellant’s] version of the events

surrounding the crime[] and not a determination of its truthfulness.” Arnold v. Commonwealth,

37 Va. App. 781, 787 (2002) (alterations in original); see also Portillo-Vega, 478 F.3d at 1197

(viewing evidence favorable to the defendant when reviewing district court’s decision precluding

duress defense upon government’s motion in limine).

       We note that in ruling upon the admissibility of the evidence, the circuit court may not

weigh the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given their testimony, as these are

“questions exclusively within the province of a jury.” Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370,

373 (1985).

                But precisely because a defendant is entitled to have the credibility
                of his testimony, or that of witnesses called on his behalf, judged
                by the jury, it is essential that the testimony given or proffered
                meet a minimum standard as to each element of the defense so

       2
          “As to evidence excluded, Virginia’s Rules of Evidence require that the proponent
‘ma[k]e known’ ‘the substance of the evidence . . . to the court by proffer.’” Creamer, 64
Va. App. at 195 (alterations in original) (quoting Va. R. Evid. 2:103(a)(2)). “‘[M]any trial issues
are resolved with proffered evidence, . . . [and] counsel and the trial court must ensure [that such]
proffers contain all of the information necessary’ to achieve two purposes: to allow the trial court
a fair opportunity ‘to resolve the issue at trial’ and ‘to provide a sufficient record for . . . review
[on appeal].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Albert v. Albert, 38 Va. App. 284, 290 n.1
(2002)).
                                                  - 12 -
               that, if a jury finds it to be true, it would support an affirmative
               defense—here that of duress or necessity.

Bailey, 444 U.S. at 415.

       “The defense of necessity traditionally addresses the dilemma created when physical

forces beyond the actor’s control render ‘illegal conduct the lesser of two evils.’” Buckley v. City

of Falls Church, 7 Va. App. 32, 33 (1988) (quoting Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410). The rationale of

the defense is that “for reasons of social policy, it is better that the defendant, faced with a choice

of evils, choose to do the lesser evil (violate the criminal law) in order to avoid the greater evil”

threatened by the imminent harm. Sam v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 312, 323 (1991) (quoting

1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law 614 (1986)) (discussing rationale of the

defense of duress).

               The essential elements of this defense include: (1) a reasonable
               belief that the action was necessary to avoid an imminent
               threatened harm; (2) a lack of other adequate means to avoid the
               threatened harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship that may be
               reasonably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance
               of the harm.

Buckley, 7 Va. App. at 33 (citing United States v. Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101, 102 (4th Cir. 1979)).

“One principle remains constant in modern cases considering the defense of necessity: if there is

‘a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, “a chance both to refuse to do the criminal

act and also to avoid the threatened harm,”’ the defense is not available.” Id. at 34 (quoting

Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410).3

       Assuming without deciding that Warren’s proffered evidence supports the first and third

elements, the necessity defense fails because Warren proffered no evidence to support the second

element: a lack of other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm. See Sam, 13 Va. App. at

       3
          There is no distinction “between a threat of harm directed against the defendant and a
threat of harm against members of the defendant’s family.” Sam, 13 Va. App. at 323.
                                               - 13 -
327 (holding “jury could not have reasonably found” that appellant “reasonably believed his

participation in the crime was the only reasonable opportunity he had to prevent his family from

being harmed”). At best, Warren proffered that he thought it would take an ambulance a long

time to get to his cousin. Taking this statement as true, there is still no evidence that reasonable

and legal alternatives were unavailable to Warren. “[W]here admissibility is challenged, the

litigant must provide a proffer that is sufficiently detailed to give the trial judge a fair opportunity

to resolve the issue correctly and contemporaneously.” Creamer, 64 Va. App. at 199 n.7

(emphasis added). Warren did not proffer any evidence that he called 911 or anyone else to help

his cousin and found them unavailable. See Edmond v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 301, 308 (2016)

(noting Court of Appeals’s consideration that appellant claiming duress defense could have

called the police instead of taking possession of the firearm); Waller v. Commonwealth, 52

Va. App. 571, 578 (2008) (finding appellant did not lack other adequate means to avoid the

threatened harm because he did not call the police, among other considerations), rev’d on other

grounds, 278 Va. 731 (2009); United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1164 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The

most obvious legal remedy that Gant failed to pursue was simply to call the police.”).

Furthermore, he did not proffer that he called other family members to help his cousin; nor that

he attempted to get someone else to drive him to his cousin to avoid his driving under the

influence. “That these other alternatives may have been thought by [Warren] to be less effective

or less efficient does not justify criminal action to accomplish [his] purposes.” Buckley, 7

Va. App. at 34-35. We are sympathetic to Warren’s desire to be with his fatally wounded

cousin. Nevertheless, his claimed unawareness of other adequate means to get aid to his cousin

does not satisfy the requirement that no other adequate means were available to aid his cousin.4

        Warren asserted at oral argument that the circuit court’s rationale for finding the
        4

evidence not relevant was that the proffered testimony was not credible. After reviewing the

                                                 - 14 -
       We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Warren’s

proffered evidence because it lacked relevance. His evidence was only relevant to the necessity

defense, and such evidence became immaterial to the case when he failed to proffer minimal

evidence as to each element of the defense.5 See, e.g., Claytor v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App.

644, 656 (2013) (“Because Claytor’s affirmative defense is without legal basis, the trial court did

not err in granting the Commonwealth’s motion to suppress evidence related solely to that

affirmative defense.”).

                                         CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

record, we do not find that the circuit court weighed the credibility of Warren’s proffered
testimony when it found “the elements to establish the necessity just haven’t been proffered.”
We note that the circuit court, before making this finding, asked defense counsel twice if there
was more evidence he could proffer to establish his necessity defense. Defense counsel had
nothing more to offer, stating, “Everything that we could get in, I think, through testimony has
been mentioned on the record.”
       5
          The Commonwealth argued at its motion in limine that a necessity defense cannot apply
to a charge of DUI, because “there is no mens rea requirement for DUI.” Warren replied that the
necessity defense is available to a DUI charge because in the DUI statute, Code § 18.2-266, there
is no language abrogating the common law defense of necessity, citing Humphrey v.
Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 36, 45 (2001), and Long, 23 Va. App. at 544. The circuit court
specifically declined to address the legal question of whether the necessity defense is available to
a DUI charge.
        On appeal, the Commonwealth did not brief this issue, relying instead on its argument
that Warren’s proffered evidence failed to support a necessity defense. Warren maintains that
the necessity defense may apply to Code § 18.2-266. Because we find that the circuit court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding Warren’s proffered evidence on the grounds that it did not
satisfy the elements of the necessity defense, we need not decide whether the circuit court erred
in not addressing the legal question of whether a necessity defense may apply to a DUI charge.
See Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 (2017) (deciding case on the “best and narrowest
grounds available”).
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