Court Opinion

ID: 9927416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-27 00:09:43.570696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:30.671898
License: Public Domain

01/26/2024
                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                                AT JACKSON
                      Assigned on Briefs September 1, 2023

                HENRI ETTA BROOKS V. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                   Appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission
        No. 0546-GL-XX-XXXXXXX-001    James A. Hamilton, III, Commissioner

                               No. W2022-01340-COA-R3-CV

The Claims Commissioner dismissed the claimant’s claim due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Discerning no error, we affirm.

       Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Claims Commission
                                        Affirmed

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY,
C.J., and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., joined.

Van Davis Turner, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Henri Etta Brooks.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, Andrée Blumstein, Solicitor General,
and Eric W. Donica, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                            OPINION

                             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Henri Etta Brooks (“Claimant”) filed a pro se claim for damages against the State
of Tennessee (“the State”) on February 7, 2022,1 alleging injuries including “stolen
identity, stolen heritage, pain/suffering, relationship issues, [and] stolen biological family.”
Claimant alleged that, on February 3, 1949, while in the hospital and under the effects of
“childbirth sedation,” her sixteen-year-old biological mother was approached by a
representative of the Tennessee Children’s Home Society (“TCHS”) regarding
surrendering Claimant for adoption. Claimant asserted that the Executive Director of
TCHS operated a “black market for selling babies” and received as much as $1,000,000.00
for selling babies through fraudulent means. Claimant further alleged that the State
   1
     The claim was transferred to the Claims Commission on April 27, 2022, and Claimant filed a formal
complaint for damages with the Claims Commission on May 11, 2022.
provided $60,000.00 per year to TCHS and that the Executive Director of TCHS was a
State employee. According to Claimant’s allegations, her maternal grandparents attempted
to retrieve Claimant from TCHS but were denied the opportunity to retrieve her. Claimant
maintained that she was “abducted” from her birth mother and that the State is liable for
various acts of “common law negligence” and “gross negligence” related to the
circumstances surrounding her adoption, including the State’s failure to investigate TCHS
and its Executive Director. She also asserted that her claim “arises out of intentional torts
and negligence of the State of Tennessee through its employee, [the Executive Director of
TCHS].”

        The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the claim was barred by the
applicable statute of limitations because it was filed approximately seventy-three years
after the events in question. Alternatively, the State argued that the Claims Commission
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 1) the claim arose before the State’s waiver of
sovereign immunity; 2) the claim was based on acts of non-State employees; 3) the claim
was based on intentional, criminal, or self-enriching acts of State employees; and/or 4) the
claim was based on regulatory activities of the State. In response, Claimant asserted that
the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations and that the Claims Commission retained
jurisdiction because State employees negligently allowed a “baby stealing and selling
operation to continue although there were complaints.”

      The Claims Commissioner entered an order granting the State’s motion to dismiss
on August 25, 2022, reasoning as follows:

       The allegations asserted against [the Executive Director of TCHS] are for
       willful, malicious or criminal acts or for acts done for personal gain. Even if
       each alleged act against [the Executive Director] was proven to be true,
       Claimant would be barred from any recovery by Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-
       207(d) which explicitly states “the state will not be liable for willful,
       malicious or criminal acts by state employees, or for acts on the part of state
       employees done for personal gain.” The acts of [the Executive Director], as
       described in the Complaint, were clearly willful, malicious and done for
       personal gain.

The Claims Commissioner held the statute of limitations issue was pretermitted. Ms.
Brooks appeals.

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Appellate review of the decisions of individual claims commissioners and decisions
of the Claims Commission are governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-403(a)(1). Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(d) requires
this Court to review the factual findings of the Claims Commission de novo with a

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presumption of correctness. “The presumption must be honored unless this court finds that
the evidence preponderates against those findings.” Herron v. State, No. W2020-01731-
COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 7205663, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2022) (citing Beare Co.
v. State, 814 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tenn. 1991)). Under Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d), we review
questions of law de novo without a presumption of correctness.

                                        ANALYSIS

       When considering whether a claim should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1), our Supreme Court has explained the
review process as follows:

             A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction falls within
      the purview of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1). Challenges to a court’s subject
      matter jurisdiction call into question the court’s “lawful authority to
      adjudicate a controversy brought before it,” Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33
      S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000), and, therefore, should be viewed as a
      threshold inquiry. Schmidt v. Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, 2008-CA-00416-
      SCT (¶ 13), 18 So.3d 814, 821 (Miss. 2009). Whenever subject matter
      jurisdiction is challenged, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that
      the court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. See Staats v. McKinnon,
      206 S.W.3d 532, 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); 1 Lawrence A. Pivnick,
      TENNESSEE CIRCUIT COURT PRACTICE § 3:2 (2011 ed.) (“Pivnick”).

             Litigants may take issue with a court’s subject matter jurisdiction
      using either a facial challenge or a factual challenge. See, e.g., Schutte v.
      Johnson, 337 S.W.3d 767, 769-70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010); Staats v.
      McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d at 542. A facial challenge is a challenge to the
      complaint itself. See Schutte v. Johnson, 337 S.W.3d at 769. Thus, when a
      defendant asserts a facial challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
      the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are presumed to be true.
      See, e.g., Staats v. McKinnon, 206 S.W.3d at 542-43.

Redwing v. Cath. Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 445-46 (Tenn. 2012)
(footnotes omitted). Here, the State has mounted a facial challenge to the claim; thus, we
proceed with our review assuming all of the factual allegations in the claim to be true.
Smith v. Tenn. Nat’l Guard, 551 S.W.3d 702, 708 (Tenn. 2018).

       The concept of sovereign immunity is integral to our review of this case. “The
sovereign State of Tennessee is immune from lawsuits ‘“except as it consents to be sued.”’”
Id. (quoting Stewart v. State, 33 S.W.3d 785, 790 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Brewington v.
Brewington, 387 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tenn. 1965))). “Exercising its constitutional
prerogative to allow suits against the State, the General Assembly in 1984 enacted a

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comprehensive procedure for the filing, prosecution, and disposition of monetary claims
against the State.” Mullins v. State, 320 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2010). Specifically,
the legislature created the Tennessee Claims Commission, which consists of one
commissioner from each grand division of the State, to hear and determine all monetary
claims against the State. Id.; see Tenn. Code §§ 9-8-301(a), -307. Tennessee Code
Annotated section 9-8-307(a) specifies the causes of action that may be brought against the
State and adjudicated by the Claims Commission. See Ku v. State, 104 S.W.3d 870, 875
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307, specifically
subsections (a)(2)-(3) and (d)-(e), places subject matter, temporal, and financial limits on
claims.

       Ms. Brooks’s complaint asserts that the Claims Commission has jurisdiction of her
case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) (“Negligent care, custody and control
of persons”).2 She alleges two causes of action. First, she asserts a claim for child abduction
by Georgia Tann, whom Ms. Brooks alleges is a state employee.3 Taking this allegation as
true, we note that the State of Tennessee is not “liable for willful, malicious, or criminal
acts by state employees, or for acts on the part of state employees done for personal gain.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(d). Therefore, Ms. Brooks’s first claim must fail.

      Ms. Brooks’s second cause of action is based on negligence, either by act or
omission, of state agents. She makes the following assertions of negligence:

        a. In negligently failing to timely investigate the accounts of the black
           market for babies.

        b. In negligently failing to ensure and maintain proper guidance, policies,
           and procedures for its employees, and agencies, specifically the
           Tennessee Children’s Home Society.

        c. In negligently failing to hold accountable its employees and agencies in
           the expenditure of tax payer funds.

    2
      Although Ms. Brooks mentions jurisdiction under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act provision,
Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(S), the matter was not actually pled as a Criminal Injuries Compensation
Act action. No written documentation of expenses was submitted and no information was included in the
complaint to establish that the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-13-108(a) were satisfied. Neither the
Claims Commission nor the parties treated this as a Criminal Injuries Compensation Act claim and,
therefore, neither will this Court.
    3
     Ms. Brooks also alleges that Georgia Tann was the Executive Director of the Tennessee Children’s
Home Society–Memphis branch, and that the Tennessee Children’s Home Society was a non-profit
corporation.
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      d. In negligently failing to establish, implement, and monitor programs,
         policies, and practices of its child serving agencies and employees,
         specifically the Tennessee Children’s Home Society.

      e. In negligently failing to establish, implement, and monitor programs,
         policies, and practices of its child serving agencies, specifically the
         Tennessee Children’s Home Society.

      f. In negligently failing to provide oversight of the financial affairs of its
         child serving agencies, specifically the Tennessee Children’s Home
         Society-- Memphis branch.

      g. In negligently failing to hold its employees accountable for unauthorized
         acts, specifically Tennessee Children’s Home Society.

      h. In negligently failing to establish protocols of care for the health and
         safety of children in the custody of the Tennessee Children’s Home
         Society.

      i. Georgia Tann, M. Hindman and other members of Tann’s baby abduction
         network committed the foregoing acts while in the scope and furtherance
         of their employment, and the acquiescence of their employer, the State of
         Tennessee. Therefore, the State of Tennessee is individually, vicariously,
         jointly, and severally liable for the intentional aforesaid acts of Georgia
         Tann, May Hindman and other employees of the State of Tennessee,
         specifically the Tennessee Children’s Home Society.

      j. In negligently failing to act upon notice from reputable sources such as
         Probate Judge Bates, who in 1946 wrote a seven page letter to William
         Shoaf, then Commissioner of Public Welfare under Governor Jim
         McCord, Bates requested a complete, thorough, and unbiased
         investigation of the Memphis branch of the Tennessee Children’s Home
         Society.

      k. In negligently failing to investigate and hold Georgia Tann accountable
         upon notice from newspaper accounts of her activities, the Child Welfare
         League, and Judge Bates, all prior to 1949.

In her response to the State’s motion to dismiss, Ms. Brooks summed up her complaint
against the State very well by stating:

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       In the instant matter, state employees negligently and recklessly allowed for
       Georgia Tann’s black matter [sic] baby stealing and selling operation to
       continue although there were complaints. As a result of the State’s omissions,
       Claimant was unlawfully and illegally taken from her biological mother and
       placed into the care and custody of another family.

        The acts and omissions described by Ms. Brooks are not included in the subjects for
which she can sue the State of Tennessee pursuant to the Claims Commission Act because
the act specifically excludes “negligence committed by the state in the course of performing
licensing or regulatory activities.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(2). Ms. Brooks’s second
claim must also fail.

       Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(3) places a temporal limit on claims
against the State: “It is the intent of the general assembly that the claims commission shall
only hear claims arising on or after January 1, 1985. All claims arising prior to January 1,
1985, are to be governed by the law as it was prior to that date.” Ms. Brooks maintains
that her claim arose on or about April 23, 2021, when she received her adoption records
and that she could not have known that she had a cause of action earlier. Thus, she seeks
to take advantage of the discovery rule to extend the time for filing. The discovery rule,
however, addresses when a statute of limitations begins to run. Robinson v. Baptist Mem’l
Hosp., 464 S.W.3d 599, 607-08 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). The discovery rule has no
application in this case because Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(3) does not establish a
statute of limitations for filing a claim in the Claims Commission. Rather, it limits the
cases the Claims Commission may hear to those that have arisen on or after January 1,
1985. Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(3), therefore, establishes another bar
to Ms. Brooks’s claims.

       We affirm the Claims Commissioner’s decision to dismiss the claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

                                       CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the Claims Commission is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are
assessed against the appellant, Henri Etta Brooks, for which execution may issue if
necessary.

                                                   _/s/ Andy D. Bennett_______________
                                                   ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

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