Court Opinion

ID: 9900313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:10:52.130303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.128056
License: Public Domain

176                  November 15, 2023               No. 594

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                           J. S.,
                  Petitioner-Respondent,
                             v.
                 Jonas Miles HUDGINS,
                  Respondent-Appellant.
              Deschutes County Circuit Court
                   22SK02899; A179952

  Michelle A. McIver, Judge.
  Submitted April 7, 2023.
  R. Brady Williams filed the brief for appellant.
  J. S. filed the brief pro se.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  HELLMAN, J.
  Reversed.
Cite as 329 Or App 176 (2023)                                                 177

           HELLMAN, J.
          Respondent appeals from the trial court’s entry of a
civil stalking protective order (SPO) against him under ORS
30.866.1 In his assignment of error, respondent contends
that the trial court erred when it determined that the stat-
utory requirements for an SPO were satisfied. Specifically,
he argues that there were not repeated contacts as required
by ORS 30.866 because the only contacts alleged—three of
his text messages—were constitutionally protected speech
under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.2 As
explained below, we reverse.
         As a preliminary matter, we note that neither party
requested de novo review and that this is not a case that
warrants such review. See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (describing dis-
cretionary de novo review); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (providing that
the court will exercise its discretion to review de novo “only
in exceptional cases”). Therefore, in conducting our review,
“ ‘we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed,
the record is legally sufficient to permit that outcome.’ ”
H. L. P. v. Jones, 309 Or App 108, 109, 481 P3d 415 (2021)
(quoting J. D. K. v. W. T. F., 276 Or App 533, 537, 369 P3d
1181 (2016)).
        During the summer of 2022, petitioner received
several text messages from respondent, his former neigh-
bor. The first message, which respondent sent on July 20
while petitioner and his wife were out of town, provided: “Is
there a moment your wife wouldn’t be murdered where she
stood leaving work tomorrow? I don’t think so. See you at
work tomorrow. Do you guys normally use diesel? We do.”
In addition to the message, respondent sent a recording of a
phone call that petitioner’s wife, DS, had made to the police
in 2020 about respondent.

    1
      In civil stalking cases, we ordinarily refer to the parties by their designa-
tion in the trial court. J. D. K. v. W. T. F., 276 Or App 533, 534 n 1, 369 P3d 1181
(2016) (so stating).
    2
      Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, provides, in relevant part,
that “[n]o law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or
restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever[.]”
178                                                          J. S. v. Hudgins

        Although respondent apologized in a subsequent
text message, he sent petitioner the following messages on
August 5:
   •    “I figured out the neighbor. Just don’t step to me again
        if you care about your life. I’m sorry because of your hos-
        tility towards me, that I assumed it was you. I should
        never have assumed that. Now that I know who it’s
        been, it makes sense. I’m going through a lot. We’re cool,
        just the next time you step to me may be the last time
        you can walk.”
   •    “Weaponizing children is illegal, right? In this state.
        How low could your community go? Obviously very low.
        Speak to your boss. I’m after you all. At work or wher-
        ever on this planet.”
         Later that month, petitioner and DS each petitioned
for individual SPOs against respondent. They relied on the
three text messages that respondent had sent to petitioner
that summer and did not allege any other contacts. During
two ex parte hearings, petitioner and DS testified that
respondent, his domestic partner, and their children had
lived across the street for several years and that respondent
had recently moved out. In support of the petitions, DS tes-
tified that in 2020 she saw an incident between respondent
and another woman at respondent’s home that “looked like
* * * domestic violence in the early stages.”3 DS explained
that she reported the incident to the police because she is
a “mandatory reporter.”4 Petitioner and DS also testified
that respondent’s domestic partner had a restraining order
against him. The trial court granted both temporary SPOs.
         At the contested hearing, DS testified that she
believed that respondent was retaliating against her fam-
ily because of her 2020 call to police. Respondent testified
that, even though he had moved out in June 2022 and the
landlord had changed the locks, he entered his former home
     3
       The evidence in the record does not explain the relationship between
respondent and the woman involved in the incident.
     4
       ORS 419B.010 provides, in part, that “[a]ny public or private official having
reasonable cause to believe that any child with whom the official comes in contact
has suffered abuse or that any person with whom the official comes in contact
has abused a child shall immediately report or cause a report to be made[.]” ORS
419B.005(6) lists the occupations that render an individual a “public or private
official.”
Cite as 329 Or App 176 (2023)                                               179

in July 2022 through an unlocked window. The trial court
granted both permanent SPOs and this appeal followed.
         Before it can issue an SPO, a trial court must find
that, among other requirements not challenged in this
appeal, a respondent engaged in at least two qualifying con-
tacts. See ORS 30.866 (requiring a petitioner to establish
that the respondent made “repeated and unwanted con-
tact”); ORS 163.730(3) (defining “contact” to include “[s]peak-
ing with the other person by any means”); ORS 163.730(7)
(defining “repeated” as “two or more times”).
           When a petition is based solely on expressive com-
munication—like verbal statements or text messages—at
least two of those communications “must rise to the level
of a threat to be considered * * * qualifying unwanted con-
tact[s].” A. M. M. v. Hoefer, 269 Or App 218, 223, 344 P3d
121 (2015). Qualifying threats are communications that
“instill[ ] in the addressee a fear of imminent and serious
personal violence from the speaker, [are] unequivocal, and
[are] objectively likely to be followed by unlawful acts.” State
v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 303, 977 P2d 379 (1999).5 In contrast,
when a petitioner alleges only “nonexpressive conduct” in
support of an SPO—like physical acts or encounters—the
Rangel standard does not apply. State v. Hejazi, 323 Or App
752, 761, 524 P3d 534 (2023); see also D. W. C. v. Carter, 261
Or App 133, 144, 323 P3d 348 (2014) (reversing the trial
court’s denial of an SPO because “there were at least two

    5
      We note that, although we have consistently applied Rangel in the civil
stalking context, see, e.g., S. L. L. v. MacDonald, 267 Or App 628, 630, 340
P3d 773 (2014), neither we nor the Supreme Court has undertaken a complete
analysis under Article I, section 8, to determine if the stringent narrowing
construction that the Supreme Court gave to the criminal stalking statute at
issue in Rangel is necessary to prevent overbroad application of ORS 30.866. See
Delgado v. Souders, 334 Or 122, 142, 142 n 11, 46 P3d 729 (2002) (declining to
analyze Article I, section 8, overbreadth challenge to ORS 30.866 based on the
respondent’s concession that Rangel disposed of that claim, respondent’s failure
to raise different arguments from Rangel, and the fact that the civil and criminal
statutes contained some identical elements, but also noting that the two statutes
differ in several respects); but see Hanzo v. deParrie, 152 Or App 525, 542, 953
P2d 1130 (1998) (applying Court of Appeals’ different narrowing construction of
the criminal stalking statute set out in State v. Rangel, 146 Or App 571, 934 P2d
1128 (1997), aff’d, 328 Or 294, 977 P2d 279 (1999), which focused on the intent of
the speaker rather than the effect on the addressee, to the civil stalking statute
based on the “material similarities”).
180                                                         J. S. v. Hudgins

qualifying contacts that were nonexpressive that would
cause objectively reasonable alarm”).6
        Under that legal framework, we determine that the
evidence was insufficient to establish two qualifying con-
tacts under ORS 30.866 because two of respondent’s three
messages did not constitute threats under Rangel and no
other contacts were alleged.
         The circumstances surrounding the first text mes-
sage indicate that any threatened violence was neither
imminent nor “objectively likely to be followed by unlawful
acts.” Even though the message unequivocally detailed seri-
ous personal violence—DS’s murder at her workplace the
next day—an imminent threat must convey that serious
personal violence is “impending,” “near at hand,” or “men-
acingly near.” See Hejazi, 323 Or App at 757. However, peti-
tioner testified that he and DS were out of the state when he
received the message and the record lacks evidence about
when DS planned to return to work, when the couple would
have returned to Oregon, or whether respondent knew
where they were. Because respondent threatened to harm
DS at her Oregon workplace when she was, in fact, out of the
state, the record is insufficient to support a determination
that serious personal violence to petitioner or DS was “men-
acingly near.” See id.
         Relatedly, the record is insufficient to establish
that the first text message “instill[ed] an objectively reason-
able fear that respondent had the ability to carry out any
threatened harm.” See N. M. G. v. McGinnis, 277 Or App
679, 687, 374 P3d 941 (2016). To be sure, petitioner’s tes-
timony supports a determination that he experienced sub-
jective fear of violence from the text message. However, the
record contains insufficient evidence that it was objectively
reasonable to fear that respondent could have carried out
his threat. As petitioner’s testimony confirmed, even the
police “understood that we were obviously in no way in
    6
      Although we observe that respondent accompanied the first text message
with a recording of DS’s 2020 call to the police and that DS testified that respon-
dent was retaliating against her because of that call, which she made as a man-
datory reporter, the legal analysis remains the same even for persons who seek
SPOs as a result of the performance of their statutory duties.
Cite as 329 Or App 176 (2023)                              181

bodily harm at that point because he had no access to us.”
Because the record lacks evidence that respondent would
have been able to find petitioner or DS at the time he made
the threat, it was not objectively reasonable for a person in
petitioner’s situation to fear that respondent could carry out
the threatened violence. See id. at 682, 687-88 (concluding
that the respondent’s text message to the petitioner that he
had found her house and that she had “one last chance” was
insufficient to create objectively reasonable fear because
he was at the wrong house, the petitioner was out of town
when she received the message, and she testified that there
was “no way for him to find [her]”). Consequently, we con-
clude the first text message is not a qualifying threat under
Rangel.
          For similar reasons, when viewing the second mes-
sage in the light most favorable to petitioner, we conclude
that it does not satisfy the Rangel standard because it did
not threaten imminent harm. Respondent’s second message,
which he sent more than two weeks after the first message,
stated that petitioner should not “step to” respondent again
because it “may be the last time [petitioner] can walk.”
Although “a threat can be silent as to timeframe while none-
theless implying that the harm is moments away,” State v. C. S.,
275 Or App 126, 133, 365 P3d 535 (2015), the contingent
nature of respondent’s statement undercuts its imminency.
See S. L. L. v. MacDonald, 267 Or App 628, 632, 340 P3d 773
(2014) (explaining that a statement was contingent and not
imminent because the threatened “harm would occur only
if [the] petitioner acted in a specified, voluntary manner”).
Therefore, we conclude that the second text message does
not constitute a threat under Rangel.
         Here, two of the three text messages on which peti-
tioner relied do not qualify as threats under Rangel. Because
those messages were constitutionally protected speech, they
“can be relevant as context for other, nonexpressive contacts”
but cannot qualify as unwanted “contacts” for the purposes
of an SPO. See M. F. v. Baker, 325 Or App 787, 790, 530 P3d
142 (2023). Accordingly, we express no opinion as to whether
respondent’s third text message to petitioner that he was
“after you all” satisfies the Rangel standard because even if
182                                           J. S. v. Hudgins

it did, ORS 30.866 requires evidence of “two or more” con-
tacts. On this record, the trial court erred when it issued the
SPO against respondent.
        Reversed.