Court Opinion

ID: 9577575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:36:12.656949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:50.377619
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
(concurring)—I agree with the majority that the transporting of highly volatile and flammable substances upon the public highways in commercial quantities and for commercial purposes is an activity which carries with it such a great risk of harm to defenseless users of the highway, if it is not kept contained, that the common-law principles of strict liability should apply. In my opinion, a good reason to apply these principles, which is not mentioned in the majority opinion, is that the commercial transporter can spread the loss among his customers—who benefit from this1 extrahazardous use of the highways. Also, if the defect which caused the substance to escape was one of manufacture, the owner is in the best position to hold the manufacturer to account.
I think the opinion should make clear, however, that the owner of the vehicle will be held strictly liable only for damages caused when the flammable or explosive substance is allowed to escape without the apparent intervention of any outside force beyond the control of the manufacturer, the owner, or the operator of the vehicle hauling it. I do not think the majority means to suggest that if another vehicle, negligently driven, collided with the truck in question, the truck owner would be held liable for the damage. But where, as here, there was no outside force which caused the trailer to become detached from the truck, the rule of strict liability should apply.
It also is my opinion that the legislature has expressed an intent that owners and operators of vehicles carrying trail*461ers should be required to keep them under control, and that intent can be found in the statutes cited in the majority opinion. Thus the application of the common-law principles of strict liability is in accord with the manifest legislative view of the matter.
It also should be remarked, I think, that there was in this case no evidence that the alleged negligence of the deceased, in driving faster than the posted speed, was in any sense a proximate cause of the tragedy which befell her. There was no showing that, had she been proceeding at the legal rate of speed, she could have stopped her vehicle in time to avoid being enveloped in the flames or that the gasoline would not have ignited. Thus we are not confronted in this case with a question whether contributory negligence might under some circumstances be a defense to an action of this kind. It should be understood that the court does not pass upon that question at this time.
Hamilton, C.J., Finley, J., and Ryan, J. Pro Tern., concur with Rosellini, J.