Court Opinion

ID: 9745280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:45:50.498505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:58.679846
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GORDON, specially concurring: I am in full agreement that the failure of the court to bar the expert or in the alternative, extend the date of trial, constitutes an abuse of discretion, requiring reversal, a determination which I find to be well warranted under the facts as presented. (See Ashford v. Ziemann (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 353, 459 N.E.2d 940 (six factors to be considered in determining abuse of discretion under Rule 219(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 219(c)) include surprise to adverse party, prejudicial effect, diligence, nature of testimony, timeliness of objection and good faith of preferring party).) These “Ashford” factors were considered by our supreme court to be appropriate to Rule 220 (134 Ill. 2d R. 220) violations in Barth v. Reagan (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 399, 564 N.E.2d 1196. I am not persuaded, however, that there is a manifestly greater need to rigidify the range of the trial judge’s discretion in sanctioning the failure to make a timely disclosure of an expert under Rule 220 than there is with respect to other aspects of discovery of equal significance or gravity which are embraced under Rule 219(c). Our supreme court in Barth v. Reagan (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 399, 564 N.E.2d 1196, has expressly abstained from addressing the divergence between the cases maintaining linkage between Rules 220 and 219(c) and those which would eliminate the discretionary latitude which such linkage provides stating, “While plaintiff correctly notes the conflict on this issue among the appellate districts, we refuse to address an issue which the record indicates will lead to exactly the same result whether the trial judge had exercised discretion under Rule 220 or not.” Barth, 139 Ill. 2d at 420. I am, however, persuaded that in no event should the court be denied necessary latitude of discretion to accommodate to a technical but otherwise harmless failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 220. Such inflexibility would lead to unnecessary and sometimes catastrophic hardship to the litigants. To rely upon the application of a harmless error standard would not suffice because it would impose a burden on a trial judge to breach a mandatory rule to achieve a more just result. Accordingly, the matter must be left as it is currently, within the sound “discretion” of the trial judge. See Kosinski v. Inland Steel Co. (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 1017.