Court Opinion

ID: 9378069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 16:08:32.383162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:18.770955
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Political Prisoner #DL4686              :
(a/k/a Alton D. Brown),                 :
                    Petitioner          :
                                        :
      v.                                : No. 374 M.D. 2019
                                        :
PA. Dept. of Corrections,               :
                  Respondent            : Submitted: November 23, 2022

BEFORE:      HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
             HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE CEISLER                                               FILED: March 9, 2023

      Petitioner Political Prisoner #DL4686 (a/k/a Alton D. Brown) (Brown), is an
inmate currently incarcerated within our Commonwealth’s prison system, has filed
a petition for review (PFR) in our original jurisdiction, through which he asserts that
Respondent PA. Dept. of Corrections (DOC) has unlawfully assessed medical
treatment copays upon him. In response, DOC has filed preliminary objections, in
which it argues that we should dismiss the PFR because we lack jurisdiction to
consider Brown’s claims and, in the alternative, because Brown has failed to state a
viable claim for legal relief. Upon review, we sustain DOC’s preliminary objection
to our original jurisdiction over this matter and dismiss the PFR.
                                   I. Background
      The relevant facts, as pled by Brown in his PFR, are as follows. Brown has
been incarcerated since November 1997 and is currently held at State Correctional
Institution (SCI) – Fayette. PFR ¶1. Over the course of his incarceration, Brown has
been diagnosed with, and received treatment for, chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease; gastroesophageal reflux disease; Hepatitis C; migraine headaches; prostate
cancer, and prostatitis. Id. ¶¶5-10. As a result, DOC has charged him copays and
fees (collectively copays) to cover part of the cost of treatment, which has resulted
in DOC deducting approximately $800, in total, from Brown’s prison bank account.
Id. ¶7. Brown is of the belief that the “chronic conditions” he suffers from render
him legally exempt from copay assessments for the treatment he has received, but
all of his administrative attempts to halt or reverse DOC’s deductions from his
account have been unsuccessful, including those he has pursued through DOC’s
internal prisoner grievance process. Id. ¶¶8-15, 18-21, 25.
      As a result, Brown elected to file his PFR with our Court. Therein, he argues
that DOC’s copay assessments violate Subsections 3303(a) through (c) of the
Correctional Institution Medical Services Act, 61 Pa. C.S. § 3303(a)-(c);1 37 Pa.

      1
          These subsections read as follows:
               (a) Establishment.--The Medical Services Program is established in
               the department which shall include, but not be limited to, the
               provisions of this chapter. The program shall be a copay program
               requiring inmates to pay a fee to cover a portion of the actual costs
               of the medical services provided.
               (b) Fees.--
                       (1) The department shall develop by regulation a program
                       for inmates which includes fees for certain medical services.
                       The regulations shall provide for consistent medical services
                       guidelines by specifying the medical services which are
                       subject to fees, the fee amounts, payment procedures,
                       medical services which are not subject to fees and fees
                       applicable to medical emergencies, chronic care and
                       preexisting conditions.
                       (2) In addition to other medical services provided to the
                       inmate, an inmate may be required to pay a fee for medical
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                2
Code § 93.12(d)(16), which is part of DOC’s administrative regulations;2 Section
1.B.7. of the procedures manual contained in DC-ADM 820, which is DOC’s policy
statement regarding copayments for medical care;3 and the 2018 supplement to SCI-
Fayette’s inmate handbook. Id. ¶¶16-17, 22-30. Accordingly, he requests an order in
mandamus that directs DOC to charge him for medical care in a legally compliant
manner, as well as injunctive relief restraining DOC from charging him copays
relating to his “chronic conditions” and compelling DOC to reimburse him for the
money it previously deducted from his prison account for such copays. Id.,
Wherefore Clause.

                       services provided because of injuries the inmate inflicted
                       upon himself or another inmate.
                (c) Explanation of program.--Each inmate shall be advised of the
                medical services fees and payment procedures at the time of intake.
                An explanation of the program regulations shall be included in the
                inmate handbook.
61 Pa. C.S. § 3303(a)-(c).

       2
          This Code subsection states that DOC will not charge fees to inmate for “[m]edication
prescription subsequent to the initial medication prescription provided to an inmate for the same
illness or condition.” 37 Pa. Code § 93.12(d)(16).

       3
           This part of DC-ADM 820 states that
                The following medical services shall not result in a charge to the
                inmate:
                        ....
                       7. medical treatment for a chronic medical disease/illness
                       requiring regular return and/or continuous visits, as
                       specified by the medical provider[.]
DC-ADM 820, Procedures Manual § 1.B.7. (emphasis in original). DEP’T OF CORR., DC-ADM
004 (2009), https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/820%20Co-
Payment%20for%20Medical%20Services.pdf (last visited March 8, 2023).

                                                 3
       DOC responded to Brown’s PFR by filing preliminary objections thereto,
through which it asserts that we should dismiss the PFR for either of two reasons.
First, DOC maintains that we have neither appellate nor original jurisdiction to
consider Brown’s claims. DOC’s Br. at 7. Second, in the alternative, DOC argues
that Brown has failed to state a viable claim for legal relief, because inmates do not
have a constitutional right to free medical care while incarcerated. Id. at 8-11.
                                         II. Discussion
               In considering a demurrer, [such as those articulated by
               DOC,] we accept as true all well-pled material allegations
               in the petition, as well as all inferences reasonably
               deducible therefrom. Aviles v. Dep’t of Corr., 875 A.2d
               1209 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). However, conclusions of law
               and unjustified inferences are not so admitted. Griffin v.
               Dep’t of Corr., 862 A.2d 152 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
               In addition, courts reviewing preliminary objections may
               not only consider the facts pled in the complaint, but also
               any documents or exhibits attached to it. Lawrence v.
               Dep’t of Corr., 941 A.2d 70 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). It is not
               necessary to accept as true any averments in the complaint
               that conflict with exhibits attached to it. Id. A demurrer
               must be sustained where it is clear and free from doubt the
               law will not permit recovery under the alleged facts; any
               doubt must be resolved by a refusal to sustain the
               demurrer. Kretchmar v. Com[.], 831 A.2d 793 (Pa.
               Cmwlth. 2003).
 Allen v. Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
       We agree with DOC that we lack original jurisdiction to consider the claims
put forth by Brown in his PFR.4 It is well settled that we do not have “original

       4
         Brown does not invoke our appellate jurisdiction and, instead, states that “[t]his [PFR] is
addressed [to] the Court’s original jurisdiction[.]” PFR ¶1. As such, DOC’s preliminary objection
to our appellate jurisdiction is moot. We nevertheless note that, if Brown had sought herein to
challenge the denials of his grievances regarding the copay assessments, we would have lacked
appellate jurisdiction to consider that claim. See Weaver v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 829 A.2d 750, 751
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                 4
jurisdiction in a case not involving constitutional rights not limited by [DOC].”
Bronson, 721 A.2d at 359. In other words, “[u]nless ‘an inmate can identify a
personal or property interest . . . not limited by [DOC] regulations and which has
been affected by a final decision of [DOC]’ the decision is not an adjudication
subject to the court’s review.” Id. at 359 (quoting Lawson v. Dep’t. of Corr., 539
A.2d 69, 71 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988)).
       Brown emphatically denies that his claims are predicated upon constitutional
authority, stating that “[DOC] . . . argues constitutional claims that are not raised in
the [PFR], instead of addressing whether or not [he] is entitled to mandamus relief
based on state law, rules[,] and regulations[.]” Brown’s Br. at 6-7 (emphasis in
original). To this point, Brown contends that a number of the cases DOC relies upon
“are simply inapplicable to the facts of this case.” Id. at 7. He insists that this is true
because, in each of those cited cases, the petitioning inmate had asserted that their
constitutional right to due process had been violated in various ways, whereas he
only contends here that DOC has not adhered to the aforementioned statutory and
administrative requirements. Id. Given these unmistakably clear admissions, we are
constrained by precedent to conclude that Brown has failed to articulate a claim that
comes within the scope of our original jurisdiction.5

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (citing Bronson v. Cent. Office Review Comm., 721 A.2d 357, 358-59 (Pa.
1998) (“[T]he Commonwealth Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over inmate appeals of
decisions by intra-prison disciplinary tribunals, such as grievance and misconduct appeals.”).

       5
          We agree with Justice Wecht that, “[a] grievance process that does not preserve some
access to a court of record, however strictly circumscribed, not only is constitutionally inadequate,
but also undermines traditional notions of fairness and justice.” Benchoff v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,
185 A.3d 979, 981 (Pa. 2018) (Wecht, J., concurring). Indeed, as Justice Wecht has remarked,
               [s]ome route of access to a court of record is essential to the
               vindication of a meritorious legal claim. Any process that
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                 5
                                        III. Conclusion
       In keeping with the foregoing analysis, we sustain DOC’s preliminary
objection to our original jurisdiction and dismiss Brown’s PFR.6

                                                 ____________________________
                                                 ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision of this case.

               categorically would deny judicial review of such a claim is not
               constitutionally adequate. Internal prison grievance processes and
               the manner of their operation raise substantial concerns about the
               adequacy and fairness of adjudications taking place therein.
               ....
               Absent any type of oversight from a neutral arbiter, which may
               provide unbiased consideration of potentially viable legal claims,
               may require the observance of fundamental procedural protections,
               and may fashion appropriate legal remedies, an internal dispute
               resolution process in which the same entity is both a litigant and the
               judge allows for the resolution of claims in a manner that elevates
               institutional priorities over the rights of a claimant.
Brown v. Wetzel, 177 A.3d 200, 210 (Pa. 2018) (Wecht, J., dissenting). Despite our concerns,
though, regarding the limits that have been placed upon our jurisdictional authority to consider
claims like the ones presented in this matter, we cannot disregard the clear Supreme Court
precedent that dictates our disposition here.

       6
         Given our disposition of this matter on jurisdictional grounds, it is unnecessary for us to
address DOC’s remaining preliminary objection.

                                                 6
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Political Prisoner #DL4686            :
(a/k/a Alton D. Brown),               :
                    Petitioner        :
                                      :
      v.                              : No. 374 M.D. 2019
                                      :
PA. Dept. of Corrections,             :
                  Respondent          :

                                   ORDER

      AND NOW, this 9th day of March, 2023, it is hereby ORDERED:
      1.     Respondent PA. Dept. of Corrections’ preliminary objection to our
             original jurisdiction in this matter is SUSTAINED;
      2.     The petition for review filed by Petitioner Political Prisoner #DL4686
             (a/k/a Alton D. Brown) is DISMISSED.

                                        ____________________________
                                        ELLEN CEISLER, Judge