Court Opinion

ID: 9795691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:36:00.898156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:31:53.504003
License: Public Domain

McHUGH, Judge
(dissenting in part):
¶ 23 While I concur in Part I of the majority's opinion regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, I respectfully dissent from Part I1, which addresses prosecutorial misconduct.
¶ 24 As the majority correctly notes, Utah courts have established a two-part test to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct has occurred. " 'Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when the prosecutor's comments call the jurors' attention to matters not proper for their consideration and when the comments have a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the jury by significantly influencing its verdict.'" State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264, ¶18, 167 P.3d 516 (quoting State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, ¶18, 8 P.3d 1025). Additionally, the prejudice must be "such that there is a reasonable likelihood the jury would have reached a more favorable result absent the comments." Reed, 2000 UT 68, 1 18, 8 P.3d 1025. Unlike the majority, however, I would hold that Defendant has satisfied his burden in meeting this two-prong test.
¶ 25 First, the prosecutor called the jurors' attention to matters not proper for their consideration. - During closing arguments, the prosecutor relied on information not admitted into evidence and implied both that Defendant had stolen software licenses and that Myers could not have legally consented to Defendant taking the computer because of that software. See generally State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ¶¶ 23-24, 999 P.2d 7 (holding that it is inappropriate to make a claim to the jury during closing arguments when "no evidence ha[ls] been presented during trial to support it"). Further, the charge against the Defendant related to theft of the computer, making any reference to theft of software irrelevant. Such tactics have been rejected in Utah. See State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ¶ 29, 992 P.2d 951 (finding "[the prosecutor far exceeded appropriate prosecutorial zeal and seriously corrupted the integrity of the truth-finding function of the trial" when he referenced conduct of the defendant that did not in any way relate to the charges); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 348-49 (Utah 1998) (holding that encouraging the jury to determine its verdict based upon evidence outside the record jeopardizes a defendant's rights). Therefore, I would conclude that the prosecutor's references to the software during closing argument exceeded appropriate pros-ecutorial zeal.
¶1 26 Second, I would hold that the prosecutor's comments had a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the jury and significantly in-' fluencing the verdict. "'[Ilf proof of [the] defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial. " State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, ¶ 54, 174 P.3d 628 (quoting State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984)). Such strong proof of guilt is not present here. Although I agree that the evidence survives a highly deferential review of its sufficiency, it was by no means overwhelming. The evidence of criminal intent was particularly thin, creating a close case with a long jury deliberation. Indeed, those deliberations were interrupted twice by further instructions from the trial court encouraging the jury to reach a verdict. Like the majority, I do not view the length of deliberations alone as enough to hold that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying the Defendant's motion to arrest judgment. Rather, viewing those deliberations in the context of this case, I am convinced that there is a reasonable likelihood that the prosecutor's comments preju*682diced the jury by significantly influencing its verdict. See Reed, 2000 UT 68, 118, 8 P.3d 1025. Consequently, I would reverse on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct.
¶27 In sum, I agree that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, but I respectfully dissent on both the existence of prosecutorial misconduct and its prejudicial effect.