Court Opinion

ID: 9380520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 14:01:34.023561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:25.585069
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12447    Document: 15-1     Date Filed: 03/20/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12447
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       RODERICK CORLION PEARSON,
       a.k.a Bullet,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Alabama
                 D.C. Docket No. 2:07-cr-00072-RDP-SGC-1
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       2                         Opinion of the Court                     22-12447

                              ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Roderick Pearson appeals the District Court for the North-
       ern District of Alabama’s denial of his pro se motion for plain error
       review, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion when
       it dismissed his motion that requested a recalculation of his sen-
       tence under the Sentencing Guidelines and resentencing under the
       First Step Act. 1
                                             I.
              A federal grand jury indicted Roderick Pearson on two
       counts of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a),
       (d) (Counts 1 and 3); two counts of brandishing a firearm during
       and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
       924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Counts 2 and 4); and one count of possessing a fire-
       arm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Pear-
       son pleaded guilty to Counts 3, 4, and 5, and a jury found him guilty
       of Counts 1 and 2. The District Court sentenced him to a total of
       564 months’ imprisonment which included concurrent sentences
       of 180 months for each of Counts 1, 3, and 5, a consecutive term of
       84 months’ imprisonment on Count 2, and a consecutive term of

       1 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (the “First Step
       Act”).
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       22-12447                  Opinion of the Court                               3

       300 months’ imprisonment on Count 4. Pearson appealed his con-
       viction, and this Court affirmed. In 2009, Pearson filed a pro se
       habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the District Court
       denied. 2
               In April 2022, Pearson filed a motion in the District Court
       for plain error review under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). He argued that
       the District Court plainly erred under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) when
       it calculated his criminal history. Pearson then argued that, assum-
       ing he was correct in his first argument, the District Court erred in
       “stacking” his sentence, and the District Court should resentence
       him without the stacked sentences pursuant to § 403(a) of the First
       Step Act. The District Court denied Pearson’s motion. This timely
       appeal followed.
                                             II.
               We review de novo whether a district court has jurisdiction
       to modify a defendant’s sentence. United States v. Phillips, 597
       F.3d 1190, 1194 n.9 (11th Cir. 2010). We liberally construe pro se
       filings. Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2020).
       Additionally, pro se filings should be liberally construed to afford

       2 Between the denial of Pearson’s initial § 2255 motion in 2009 and his filing
       of the present pro se motion for plain error review in 2022, various other pro-
       ceedings in this case have occurred. These include a second pro se § 2255 mo-
       tion, a new judgment, an appeal of that new judgment, and various motions
       to reduce his sentence. None of these motions and proceedings are relevant
       to the matter currently before this Court.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12447

       review on any “legally justifiable base.” Sanders v. United States,
       113 F.3d 184, 187 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted).
               We review the denial of an eligible defendant’s request for a
       reduced sentence under the First Step Act for abuse of the district
       court’s “broad discretion.” See Concepcion v. United States, 142 S.
       Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022). “A district court abuses its discretion when
       it applies an incorrect legal standard or makes a clear error of judg-
       ment.” United States v. Stevens, 997 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir.
       2021). We may affirm for any reason supported by the record.
       United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008).
              Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 details the standard
       for harmless and plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52. It notes that “[a]
       plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even
       though it was not brought to the court’s attention.” Fed. R. Crim.
       P. 52(b).
               District courts lack inherent authority to modify a term of
       imprisonment but may do so to the extent that a statute expressly
       permits. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B); see also Phillips, 597 F.3d at
       1194–95. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a district court may modify a
       defendant’s sentence if: (1) the Bureau of Prisons or the defendant
       files a motion and the defendant meets additional conditions; (2) a
       statute or Rule 35 of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure expressly
       permits the modification; or (3) the defendant was sentenced based
       on a guidelines range that the Sentencing Commission later low-
       ered and other requirements are met. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Un-
       der Rule 35, a court may modify a sentence within 14 days after
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       22-12447                  Opinion of the Court                               5

       sentencing to correct an “arithmetical, technical, or other error.”
       Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a).
              Prior to the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contained a
       “stacking” provision where, in the case of a second or subsequent
       conviction under § 924(c), a defendant was to be “sentenced to a
       term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.” 18 U.S.C.
       § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2017). Section 403(a) of the First Step Act
       amended this language so that the 25-year mandatory minimum
       on a second § 924(c) violation only applies if the first § 924(c) con-
       viction has become final. First Step Act § 403(a). However, § 403
       does not apply retroactively. See id. § 403(b). 3
               A second or successive § 2255 motion requires prior author-
       ization from this Court, which may only be granted if the motion
       contains a claim involving newly discovered evidence demonstrat-
       ing factual innocence or a new rule of constitutional law made ret-
       roactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. 28
       U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h). If a prisoner files a successive mo-
       tion to vacate without first receiving prior authorization, then the
       district court is without jurisdiction to consider the motion. See id.

       3 Section 403(b) reads: “This section, and the amendments made by this sec-
       tion, shall apply to any offense that was committed before the date of enact-
       ment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such
       date of enactment.” First Step Act § 403(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5221–22. We have
       held that a sentence is “imposed” for First Step Act purposes when it is pro-
       nounced in the district court. United States v. Smith, 967 F.3d 1196, 1212–13
       (11th Cir. 2020).
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       6                        Opinion of the Court                   22-12447

       § 2244(b)(3)(A); Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th
       Cir. 2003).
              Here, the District Court properly denied relief because Pear-
       son failed to demonstrate eligibility for a sentence modification un-
       der the First Step Act, as the Act’s “stacking” provisions do not ap-
       ply retroactively. 4 Pearson’s Sentencing Guidelines calculation ar-
       gument does not provide a basis for First Step Act relief. Even if
       the District Court had construed his Sentencing Guidelines argu-
       ment as a challenge to his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, it would
       have lacked jurisdiction over the motion, as it would have been a
       successive motion filed without authorization.
              AFFIRMED.

       4 Pearson was resentenced, and his new sentence was imposed on October 10,
       2017. The First Step Act was enacted in 2018, which means the stacking
       amendment would not apply to his sentence.