Court Opinion

ID: 9852198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:26:33.781462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.173170
License: Public Domain

Miller, J.,
dissenting:
State v. Jones, 204 Kan. 719, 466 P. 2d 283, is somewhat.similar to the case at hand. Jones was convicted of the statutory rape of a seven-year-old girl. The state’s evidence included the testimony of the victim; statements the victim made to her grandmother, which were held admissible under K.S.A. 60-460 (a); and the testimony of the attending physician, who examined the victim when she was first brought to the hospital, and who attended her *87for approximately one month during her hospitalization. There was irrefutable evidence that a heinous offense had been committed against the person of this small child, and ample testimony to connect Jones with and to convict him of that offense. Jones was sentenced to imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 21 years.
Contrasting that record with this, it is shocking that here we have no medical testimony and no corroborating evidence whatsoever to establish (1) that a crime was committed or (2) that Fisher committed it. The victim sustained no physical harm. Fisher was sentenced to be imprisoned for a minimum of 5 years and a maximum of life. His conviction and sentence were based solely on what a small child once said — and now denies.
Where the only evidence offered by the state to prove that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it is hearsay testimony, admissible only by virtue of K.S.A. 60-460 (a), such evidence, standing alone, is insufficient in my judgment to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It does not form the basis for that reasonable inference of guilt necessary upon appellate review. See State v. Hornbeak, 221 Kan. 397, 559 P. 2d 385, Syl. 9.
What the majority holds, in effect, is this: if one citizen tells a peace officer that another has committed a crime, and later retracts the charge, the peace officer’s testimony of the initial conversation with the complaining witness is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt — though there is' not one whit of supporting evidence to suggest, let alone prove, that a crime has been committed or that the accused committed it. This is a dangerous precedent and I cannot give countenance to it.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
ScHROEDERand Owsley, JJ., join in the foregoing dissent.