Court Opinion

ID: 9558846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:17:51.970188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:37.938633
License: Public Domain

Judge MARQUEZ
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I agree with Part I and III of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent from Part II concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Westminster the opportunity to add an expert to replace John Reins.
A trial court has a wide range of discretionary devices available to it in enforcing proper pre-trial procedure and discovery. Advance Loan Co. v. Degi, 30 Colo.App. 551, 496 P.2d 325 (1972).
Trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether to allow the late endorsement of witnesses. C.KA v. M.S., 695 P.2d 785 (Colo.App.1984). But the late endorsement of a witness has been held to be an abuse of discretion. Daniels v. Rapco Foam, Inc., 762 P.2d 717 (Colo.1988).
C.R.C.P. 16 provides that a party’s disclosure certificate may be supplemented only as provided in that rule. Thus, under C.R.C.P. 16(b), a party may supplement a disclosure certificate no later than 80 days prior to trial.
Trial in this matter was scheduled to begin April 29, 1991. The record indicates Westminster filed its disclosure certificate on September 25, 1990, listing John Reins, a licensed professional engineer, to testify concerning the nature and extent of damages to the structure of the building. The motion of MOA, Inc., to disqualify Reins was granted by order dated December 31, 1990.
Although supplemental disclosure statements pursuant to C.R.C.P. 16, were due February 8,1991, Westminster chose to file a motion to clarify the order and for additional time to designate expert witnesses to replace Reins. Westminster then filed a supplemental disclosure certificate on February 11, 1991, adding claims, issues, and damages which allegedly were not known at the time the disclosure certificate was filed as well as listing four new experts.
In its supplemental disclosure certificate, Westminster identified a registered architect to testify concerning masonry wall installation and rainwater penetration indicating that the expert had been named as an expert due to the disqualification of Reins to testify as an expert on this issue. The substance of the expert’s opinions was to be provided at some future date.
Westminster also stated that it was unable at that time, pending the court’s order on outstanding motions, to designate additional experts in the areas of site drainage and water source and structural and mechanical system distress due to soils movement. It did, however, also list an expert on the HVAC system, a licensed professional engi*143neer to testify concerning a water source, and a certified public accountant.
In addition, although Westminster had reports dating to March, August, and October 1989, from other experts who had studied the structural problems of the building, it chose not to list those experts. Rather, it indicated that as of February 11, 1991, it could not designate additional experts in the areas of structural distress due to soils movement.
In my view, Westminster offers no compelling justification for its failure to certify witnesses from these firms promptly after the court’s December 31, 1990, order disqualifying Reins or for its continued belief, after the order, that Reins’ disqualification would be reversed. See Daniels v. Rapco Foam, Inc., supra (late endorsement of an expert witness denied in the absence of an explanation for the party’s failure to use expert witness previously endorsed).
I would thus conclude that no reversible error was committed in not allowing late certification of new expert witnesses. Accordingly I would affirm the judgment in favor of MOA and reverse and remand for new trial as to Carrier/Parker.