Court Opinion

ID: 9773187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:39:07.464394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:50.658188
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant filed his notice of appeal May 3, 1988. On original submission, this court abated appellant’s appeal to allow appellant to cross-examine the prosecutor regarding his use of peremptory challenges pursuant to Williams v. State, 767 S.W.2d 872 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, pet. ref’d), and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The cause was reinstated April 4, 1990. Our opinion issued May 25, 1990. Simultaneous with the filing of his motion for rehearing on June 11, 1990, appellant filed his motion to supplement the record after submission. By his motion to supplement, appellant seeks to now place into the record the statement of facts of the voir dire proceedings that was prepared and filed as an exhibit during the Batson hearing in this case. The import of the requested supplementation is to cure appellant’s waived Batson error. In our opinion following abatement, this court held that a Batson complaint cannot be reviewed in the absence of a transcription of the complete voir dire examination. Guilder v. State, 794 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.App.—allas 1990, n.w.h.). Hence, on motion for rehearing, appellant now urges this court to consider the Batson issue raised in his original and post-abatement briefs.
In this regard, we note the proper and legitimate function of a motion for rehearing. The function of a motion for rehearing is to present to the court the errors of law which have been committed by the court, in the opinion of the movant, together with such argument, authorities, and statements from the record which may, in the opinion of such movant, support the motion. K & S Interests v. Texas Am. Bank/Dallas, 749 S.W.2d 887, 891 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied) (on motion for reh’g); Dewey v. American Nat’l Bank, 382 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (on motion for reh’g), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 821, 86 S.Ct. 49, 15 L.Ed.2d 67 (1965). We recognize that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 55(b) and (c) grants this court wide discretion to supplement the transcript or statement of facts so as to include omitted *772matter. K & S Interests, 749 S.W.2d at 891; see Archer v. Storm Nursery, Inc., 512 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1974, no writ) (on motion for reh’g) (citing to repealed rules 428 and 429 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure). However, such discretion should not be exercised, in the absence of some unusual circumstance, so as to permit new material to be filed after the appellate court has written its opinion and rendered its judgment. Such action would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of Rules 54(b) (setting forth the appellate timetable) and 50(d) (placing the burden on appellant to see that a sufficient record is presented to show error requiring reversal) and would interfere with the orderly administration of justice. See K & S Interests, 749 S.W.2d at 891-92 (quoting from Archer, 512 S.W.2d at 85 [citing to repealed rules 386 and 413 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure]).
Appellant evidently seeks to establish some unusual circumstances in his motion to supplement the record. There is no affidavit attached. We offer the following excerpt from appellant’s motion to supplement:
[DJuring the second Batson hearing conducted on 20 March 1989, a transcript of the voir dire proceedings was admitted into evidence. The supplemental Statement of Facts that was forwarded to this Court reflects that the transcription of the voir dire proceedings (D/E No. 1) was retained by the trial court and not forwarded to this Court with the supplemental Statement of Facts. The undersigned attorney was unaware of the fact that the transcription of the voir dire proceedings had not been forwarded to this Court as an exhibit.
In his Designation for Materials to be Included in the Transcript (filed on 3 May 1988) the Appellant had requested that all testimony admitted before the trial court be included in the record. It is apparent that the record has not been properly prepared and the transcription of the supplemental Statement of Facts is necessary for this Court to resolve the Batson issues.
Thus, appellant maintains that his attorney was “unaware” that the voir dire transcription was not before this court at submission. Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53(k) it is the appellant’s duty to cause the statement of facts to be filed with the clerk of the Court of Appeals. Further, under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 50(d) the burden is on the appellant, or other party seeking review, to see that a sufficient record is presented to show error requiring reversal. In the present case, appellant has done neither. Indeed, this is a situation in which an appellant simply did not do something that he should always do — check to make sure the record in this court is complete. Therefore, we conclude that appellant has failed to meet his burden under rule 50(d) and his duty under rule 53(k). We decline to treat an appellant’s failure to meet his burden under rule 50(d) and his failure to meet his duty under rule 53(k) as “some unusual circumstance.” Consequently, we deny appellant’s motion to supplement the record.
In our original opinion after abatement, we overruled appellant’s second supplemental point of error wherein appellant contended that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defense attorney to examine the prosecutor’s notes during cross-examination of the prosecutor. See Guilder, at 766-767. In connection with our disposition of this point, we are aware of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ recent decision in Salazar v. State, 795 S.W.2d 187 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). We note the following distinction between the present case and Salazar. Salazar involves admission into evidence of a writing used to refresh memory under rule 611 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence. The present case involves production of asserted statements of a witness (the prosecutor) under rule 614 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence. We quote appellant’s brief:
Rule 614, Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, provides that a statement of a witness shall be tendered to the opposing party when such statement “relates to the subject matter concerning which the witness has testified.” In Marquez v. *773State, 757 S.W.2d 101 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1988, pet. ref'd) the Court stated: “Under the provisions of Rule 614 if the requested statement is in the possession of the State, the trial court, on timely request by the accused must order the attorney for the State to produce such statement if it relates to the subject matter to which the witness testified.” Id. at 103. The ruling of the trial court violated the provisions of Rule 614, supra.
However, nowhere in his brief does appellant tell us that the prosecutor-witness used his notes to refresh his memory for the purposes of testifying. Indeed, appellant nowhere raises the admissibility of the prosecutor’s notes under rule 611. Hence, we distinguish the present case from Salazar. Consequently, we adhere to our original determination that the prosecutor’s notes at issue in the present case do not constitute a “statement” within the meaning of rule 614.
We overrule appellant’s motion for rehearing.