Court Opinion

ID: 9451216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:10:14.894937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:37.087363
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge,
dissented.
Opinion
PER CURIAM:
Appellant was convicted of the purchase and attempted resale of heroin, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a). Bail pending appeal was denied by the District Court, and the issue of Appellant’s release on bail is now before this court.
Bail pending appeal is discretionary with the court — it is a very different question from bail before trial when an accused has the benefit of the presumption of innocence. In exercising this discretion in a case where the movant has a substantial criminal record a court is bound — as a matter of common sense — to consider the likelihood of his repeating his criminal activity if released on bail. Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662, 7 L.Ed.2d 769, (1962) (Mr. Justice Douglas as Circuit Justice); D.C.Cir.R. 33(f) (6). The compulsive, habitual aspects of the addict-peddler make this inquiry especially relevant in a case such as this.
While Appellant is an addict and the sentencing court recommended he be sent to the Public Health Service Hospital at Lexington, Ky., which has facilities for treating narcotics addiction, the record shows beyond question that he is also a dealer in narcotics.1 He was convicted of the purchase and attempted resale of narcotics; on his person at the time of arrest were six grams of capsules containing 35% heroin and having a market value of approximately $750. This is obviously a far stronger and larger dosage of heroin than most addicts can take over any short period although there was some testimony from Appellant indicating it represents only a week’s supply for him. Appellant also testified that he bought narcotics mainly for his personal use. Even assuming Appellant has a $750-a-week habit, the possibility of sales by him is obvious, given possession of this quantity and the clear record of prior selling activities. The very transaction that led to Appellant’s arrest was a convincing demonstration of his willingness and ability to traffic in narcotics.2
*860The nature of this offense, his two previous narcotics convictions, at least one and apparently two parole violations, suggest the likelihood that Appellant will return to the established patterns of behavior during the pend-ency of the appeal. In fact, during trial bail was revoked by the District Court when he learned that Appellant was selling stolen goods to finance his habit. In light of past performance it is not reasonable for society’s — and Appellant’s — protection, that we assume Appellant, if released on bail, will overnight cease to be an addict or that he will confine himself to legitimate activities to finance his addiction. If narcotics traffic is a social and health hazard, then every narcotics dealer is a danger to society; the fact that the cause of his peddling of narcotics is related in part to his addiction is irrelevant. We cannot share the view that there should be one rule of law for important suppliers and another for the less successful ones such as Appellant seems to be.
Remand to the District Court is not necessary. The function of this court on a bail application pending appeal, as envisaged by Rule 33, is not merely appellate but includes the duty to make an independent determination of all relevant factors. See Bandy v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 197, 5 L.Ed.2d 218 (1960) (Mr. Justice Douglas as Circuit Justice). Appellant’s prior record and the nature of his offense are before this court. Determining whether he will sell again if released on bond and evaluating the danger to society represented by narcotics sales are matters of our sound judgment and discretion, the exercise of which would not be aided by remand for a factual hearing, unlike the situation in United States v. Hansell, 109 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1940). There is no dispute as to the facts. No one contests that Appellant has offered to take treatment for his addiction if released on bail or that he may be able to resume his employment. But there are enough doubts as to the success of such treatment for this man to make release on bail ill-advised. We note, furthermore, that Appellant was employed at the time of his arrest for the sale for which he has been convicted. Remand for findings by the District Court would be meaningless and cannot be a substitute for the exercise of judgment and discretion that is required in this type of case. If there are other factors that should have been considered, Appellant should have presented them here, pursuant to Rule 33(f) (5). This is not to say that motions for bail should not be made first to the District Court, but rather that discretion on such a motion is not limited to the District Judge. Nor need the District Judge make explicit findings in denying bail as a basis for appeal.3 Fed.R.Crim.P. 38(c) provides that application to this court need only show that the appellant did not receive in the District Court the relief to which he considers himself entitled. Motion for bail denied.

. We can take judicial notice of the fact that most “street peddlers” are themselves addicts whose habit is exploited by others.

. While the other counts of the indictment against Appellant were placed on the inactive calendar pending appeal of this conviction, they allege two previous heroin sales by Appellant, Furthermore, a con*860viction for the sale of narcotics in 1960 was reversed by this court on the ground that in that particular factual situation evidence of yet another sale by Appellant was not admissible to rebut a defense of entrapment. The opinion indicates that by that time Appellant had also incurred three convictions for larceny. Hansford v. United States, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 359, 303 F.2d 219 (1962). There is abundant basis, thus, for concluding that Appellant is at the very least an occasional dealer and that the particular transaction for wbicb he now stands convicted was not a transitory aberration of an otherwise harmless person.

. The Bail Reform Bill, referred to in Note 8 of the dissent, has not passed the House. If and when it becomes law, we will be faced with the problem of its interpretation. As the Bill is now written, however, it is by no means clear that it requires reasons of the District Judge when bail pending appeal is denied as here.