Court Opinion

ID: 9899268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 16:11:00.657617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:15.243443
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Trujillo, 2023-Ohio-4125.]

                                COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                               EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                                              No. 112442
                 v.                                  :

JOSE TRUJILLO,                                       :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                :

                                 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 9, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-22-671261-A

                                               Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, Kevin Bringman, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Susan J. Moran, for appellant.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

                 Defendant-appellant Jose Trujillo appeals from his judgment of

conviction, which was rendered after a jury found him guilty of 21 counts relative to

sexual abuse of four victims — W.C., A.O., J.T., and A.C. — over an approximate 12-
year period. After a careful review of the facts and pertinent law, we affirm Trujillo’s

convictions and remand for nunc pro tunc correction of the sentencing entry.

      Procedural History

             Trujillo was indicted in June 2022 in a 31-count indictment. The

charges consisted of rape, kidnapping, pandering obscenity involving a minor, gross

sexual imposition, and sexual battery. There were also seven sexually violent

predator specifications; Trujillo waived his right to a jury on the specifications and

they were tried to the bench. The case was randomly assigned to a common pleas

judge, and she presided over the case through, and including, the trial.

             After the case was pretried, the state offered Trujillo the following plea

deal: enter a guilty plea to eight counts, be designated a Tier III sex offender, and

recommend an agreed sentence of 20 to 25 years to the trial court. Trujillo declined

the plea deal, and the case proceeded to trial.

             The state presented numerous witnesses, including the four victims. At

the close of the state’s case, the defense made a Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of

acquittal. As a result of discussion on the defense’s motion, the state dismissed five

counts and the trial court dismissed three counts.1 Two witnesses testified for the

defense, including Trujillo, and at the close of its case it renewed its Crim.R. 29

motion for judgment of acquittal. The motion was denied.

      1 The dismissed counts were two counts of rape relative to victim A.O.; the sole

count of pandering obscenity involving a minor; two counts of gross sexual imposition
relative to victim W.C.; two counts of rape relative to W.C.; and one count of kidnapping
relative to W.C.
             The case was submitted to the jury on the remaining 23 counts. After

its deliberations, the jury found Trujillo guilty on 21 counts and not guilty on two

counts. The trial court found Trujillo not guilty on the seven sexually violent

predator specifications.

             At the time of sentencing, which occurred in January 2023, the original

judge was in a different seat on the common pleas bench and a new judge had taken

over the original judge’s docket and, thus, Trujillo was sentenced by the new judge.

            The state filed a sentencing memorandum in which it recommended

that Trujillo serve the rest of his life in prison. The state’s harshest recommendation

was relative to Count 6, rape against victim A.O.; on that count the state

recommended life with the possibility of parole after 15 years.        The state also

recommended that all counts run consecutively.

             The trial court sentenced Trujillo to life without parole on Count 6, rape

of victim A.O., and maximum, consecutive sentences on the remaining counts.

Trial Testimony

             The trial testimony established that the four victims were between the

ages of five and 15 during the commission of the crimes, which spanned an

approximate 12-year period. Two of the victims — A.O. and W.C. — were Trujillo’s

stepdaughters; their mother is Trujillo’s ex-wife (referred to as “mother” or “ex-

wife”). Another victim — J.T.— is Trujillo’s biological daughter; J.T. also shares the

same mother as A.O. and W.C. The final victim — A.C. — is Trujillo’s former sister-

in-law (ex-wife/mother’s sister; maternal aunt to other victims).
Testimony Relative to Victim W.C., Trujillo’s Stepdaughter

              W.C., who was born in 1994, testified that her mother and her

biological father’s relationship ended when she was young. Soon after the end of her

parents’ relationship, Trujillo moved in with W.C.’s family in a Wade Avenue house.

A.O. lived in the house as well. W.C., A.O., their mother, and Trujillo resided on the

second floor of the house, while other family members (her maternal grandparents

and maternal aunts and uncles) occupied the first floor of the house.

             W.C. testified to sexual encounters she had with Trujillo while living at

the Wade Avenue house. The first incident that was the subject of the within

indictment occurred when W.C. was five years old. Trujillo told W.C. to come into

her mother’s room and take her clothes off. According to W.C., Trujillo touched her

inner thighs, licked her vagina, and asked her if she liked it. W.C. testified she was

scared and did not know how to respond to Trujillo.

              W.C. recounted another incident that occurred in the Wade Avenue

house. W.C. testified that Trujillo was in the living room and a pornographic

program was on the television. Trujillo bent W.C. over the couch and vaginally

raped her. W.C. testified that it hurt and that she was scared because Trujillo told

her not to say anything to anyone or he would hurt her.

              W.C. went on to testify that she and her family moved to a house near

West 18th Street and Starkweather. She recalled that while living at that house,

sometime around June 2002, Trujillo raped her again. W.C. told her biological

father about the incident. The father took W.C. to the hospital and filed a complaint
with the police. W.C. did not tell the police about the other incidents at that time.

Neither the hospital visit nor the police complaint generated further investigation.

W.C.’s mother learned of the allegations and had a meeting with W.C. and Trujillo

to find out what was going on. W.C. did not reveal any of the incidents because she

was afraid of Trujillo and the threats he made.

              W.C. and her family eventually moved to another house on Wade

Avenue. W.C. testified that at the second Wade Avenue house there was an occasion

in 2007, when W.C. was 13-years old, where W.C.’s boyfriend was at the house and

Trujillo allowed W.C. and the boyfriend to drink beer; one of W.C.’s uncles joined in

as well. W.C. testified that she blacked out and when she woke up Trujillo was on

top of her, raping her. She passed out again and when she woke up, she did not have

a bra on, which was unusual because she always wore one to bed. W.C. testified that

she knew something had happened to her. W.C. told her mother, who later took her

to the hospital.

              Thereafter, W.C.’s mother kicked Trujillo out of the house.         The

mother testified that she broke up with Trujillo and asked him to leave because he

was not paying the mortgage; she denied that the break-up had anything to do with

W.C.’s allegations.

              A police report was also filed at that time in 2007. W.C. told the police

that she had voluntarily taken Tylenol P.M.; she did not tell them that she had been

drinking alcohol. The investigating detective did not pursue the matter. W.C. also

told the treating nurse in the emergency room that she had taken Tylenol P.M. and
later woke up in the dark with Trujillo on top of her. W.C. also told the nurse that

she fell back asleep and when she woke up, she did not have her bra on. W.C.

declined a rape-kit examination.

              W.C. admitted that she has difficulty with placing events in time. She

explained that she has memories of incidents with Trujillo but is not always sure

when exactly they occurred.

Testimony of Victim A.O., Trujillo’s Stepdaughter

              A.O. explained that she has difficulty remembering the chronological

order of Trujillo’s abuse, both because of the passage of time and the associated

trauma. She has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).

              A.O. testified that she did not know her biological father, who died

when she was about two years old. She believed that her mother and Trujillo began

dating when she was a few months old.

              The first incident with Trujillo that A.O. testified to occurred when she

was seven or eight years old (approximately in 2005) in a house they were living in

on West 46th Street. A.O. testified that she was on the toilet and Trujillo came in

the bathroom and forced her to perform oral sex on him. She described that Trujillo

put his hands on the back of her head using so much force that his penis hit the back

of her throat, causing her to bleed. According to A.O., she spit blood in the sink, and

Trujillo continued even after that. A.O. testified about how scared she was.
              A.O. also testified about an incident where victim J.T. (Trujillo’s

biological daughter) saw A.O. being raped by Trujillo. A.O. could not recall if the

rape was vaginal or anal.

              Further, A.O. described incidents that occurred at the second Wade

Avenue house. In one incident, Trujillo pulled her in the hallway, put his hands on

her neck, and forced her to perform oral sex on him. In another incident, Trujillo

raped her in her mother’s bedroom. A.O. also described an incident that occurred

in a house on Vega Avenue, in which Trujillo bent her over a piece of furniture and

raped her from behind. A.O. described that during the rape in the house on Vega

Avenue, she and Trujillo heard a noise that caused Trujillo to become scared. It

turned out that the noise they heard was a raccoon outside.

              The final incident A.O. described occurred at Trujillo’s house, after his

relationship with A.O.’s mother had ended. She testified that Trujillo’s biological

daughter, J.T., wanted to go to his house and she went with J.T. because she felt she

needed to protect J.T. A.O. testified that she was sleeping on a mattress on the floor

when Trujillo came in and forced her to have sex with him. A.O. was approximately

ten years old at the time.

              A.O. testified that she had tried to tell her mother and grandmother

about Trujillo’s abuse, but they did not believe her. A.O. described that her mother

would call a meeting, at which Trujillo would be present, to discuss A.O.’s

allegations; Trujillo maintained that A.O. was lying and A.O. was scared of Trujillo.
A.O. also testified that she told a teacher about the abuse when she was in the fourth

grade, but nothing happened as a result.

              A cousin of A.O.’s mother testified about a 2006 incident regarding

A.O. At the time, A.O. was at the house of the cousin’s grandmother and was

sleeping. A.O. had a teddy bear and appeared to be having a nightmare. She was

“humping” the teddy bear and was yelling “Jose [Trujillo], please stop.” When A.O.

woke up, she told the cousin and the cousin’s grandmother about what had been

happening. A.O. also told them that Trujillo had threatened to kill her and her

sisters if she told anyone. The cousin and the cousin’s grandmother reported what

A.O. told them to children and family services.

              A.O. testified that she reported the abuse after she turned 18 with the

help of an uncle. She met with a detective with the Cleveland police, who encouraged

her to journal, and she followed his advice. Some of the entries had been triggered

by a nightmare she had. A.O. testified that she did not journal all the occurrences of

sexual abuse. A.O. further testified that, prior to meeting with the detective, she had

been seeing a therapist who helped her construct a timeline of the abuse.

Testimony Relative to Victim J.T., Trujillo’s Biological Daughter

              J.T. testified to two incidents when Trujillo attempted to rape her. The

first incident occurred when she was five years old, and she was in the front room of

their house. She testified that Trujillo bent her over the arm of an old sofa and tried

to anally penetrate her; he was unsuccessful because she was “too tight.”
               The second incident occurred when J.T. was seven years old and

similar to the first, involved Trujillo bending her over furniture. This time they were

in the basement and Trujillo put some type of lotion on J.T.’s anus before trying to

penetrate her. This attempt also failed, but J.T. remembered the pressure as Trujillo

tried.

               J.T. corroborated A.O.’s testimony about her (J.T.) seeing Trujillo

rape A.O. J.T. testified that she felt she could not say anything to him or get him to

stop and Trujillo told her to leave.

               J.T. testified that she and A.O. went to their grandmother to disclose

Trujillo’s abuse. Their grandmother brought Trujillo into the meeting. J.T. testified

that she felt bad for Trujillo — he is her father, and he was crying. Because she felt

bad for Trujillo, J.T. recanted the allegations and told her grandmother that A.O.

was lying.

              J.T. admitted that she wanted to live with Trujillo, and she would often

visit him. She also admitted that she told the police in 2007 that she had not been

sexually abused, and that in a 2009 interview with a case worker from children and

family services, she said that A.O. lies a lot.

Testimony Relative to A.C., the Mother’s Sister and Aunt to other
Victims

               A.C. was one of the maternal relatives who lived on the first floor of

the first Wade Avenue house. A.C. testified that one day Trujillo told her to come

to the second floor because he wanted to show her some new furniture the family
had got. A.C. went, and once there, Trujillo grabbed her waist and kissed her.

According to A.C., Trujillo repeatedly asked her for sexual favors and harassed her

to skip school to meet up with him. A.C. eventually gave in, and left school early to

meet Trujillo; she testified that she knew she was meeting him for sex. She met him

and they had sex in his car. A.C. was 13 years old at the time.

              A.C. testified to another incident at the first Wade Avenue house,

when she was in an upstairs bedroom and Trujillo came in and said, “[Y]our sister

is gone, give me some.” A.C. said “no” but Trujillo got on top of her, held her hand

down, and raped her.

              A.C. testified about another time Trujillo raped her. A.C. needed new

clothing. Trujillo told A.C. that if she “gave him some,” which she understood to

mean sex, he would get her mother to take her shopping for new clothes. A.C.

ignored Trujillo’s request but her mother ended up taking her new clothes shopping.

After, Trujillo asked A.C., “[S]o are you going to give me some?” A.C. was at the foot

of her bed. Trujillo pushed her onto the bed and vaginally raped her.

Testimony of the Investigating Detective

              The investigating detective interviewed all four victims and all four

identified Trujillo as their abuser. During W.C.’s interview, she did not mention that

there had been any drinking, or Tylenol P.M., relative to the 2007 incident. W.C.

also did not tell the detective that her boyfriend and uncle were present.
The Defense Witnesses

              The defense presented two witnesses: a former case worker who had

been involved with the family and Trujillo. The former case worker testified that her

involvement with the Trujillo family began in 2007. She interviewed the three

sibling victims, their mother, and Trujillo in one-on-one interviews. W.C. was the

only one of them who disclosed any abuse. As a result of those interviews, the case

worker did not feel there was any need to remove the children, in part, because they

were not struggling in school or displaying other trauma responses.

              The case worker interviewed the victims again in 2009. She testified

that the victims were upset, but they did not want to talk to her. The case worker

learned that the victims were upset because their mother came to school and told

them not to say anything. The case worker talked to the three sibling victims again

and A.O. and J.T. disclosed prior abuse by Trujillo. However, the case worker did

not take action again.

              Trujillo testified that he was frequently in Puerto Rico during the

times of the alleged crimes. He testified that he always cooperated with the police

and children and family services and had never been told that he needed to modify

his living arrangements vis-à-vis the victims. Trujillo testified that he maintained a

relationship with J.T., his biological daughter, even after he and his ex-wife broke

up. Trujillo denied all the allegations against him.
Assignments of Error

      I.     The Sentencing Court erred in imposing Consecutive Sentences
             that were not supported by the record.

      II.    Trial counsel prejudiced Mr. Trujillo by not objecting to the
             change in judge for Mr. Trujillo’s sentencing.

      III.   The trial court erred in considering whether Mr. Trujillo
             displayed remorse as part of its sentencing decision.

      IV.    The cumulative effect of multiple errors at sentencing, even if not
             enough individually, collectively rise to a denial of due process.

      V.     Mr. Trujillo was denied a fair trial and his right to due process
             when the prosecution unfairly attacked the defense’s case and
             called the defendant a “child rapist.”

      VI.    The State did not meet its burden of production as to Counts 4,
             6, and 7, and the trial court erred in not granting the Rule 29
             motion as to these counts.

      VII.   The verdict as to Counts 4, 6, and 7 were against the manifest
             weight of the evidence.

      VIII. The trial court erred in not granting the Rule 29 motion as to the
            entire case.

      IX.    The verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Law and Analysis

Sentencing Issues

              In his first four assignments of error, Trujillo challenges various

aspects of the sentencing portion of the case and his actual sentence. We consider

the challenges in turn.

              In his first assignment of error, Trujillo contends that the consecutive

sentences were not supported by the record. Under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court
may order prison terms to be served consecutively if it finds “the consecutive service

is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and

that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the

offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public.” Further, the

court must also find any of the following:

      (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
          the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
          imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the
          Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

      (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one
          or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of
          the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no
          single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any
          of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the
          offender’s conduct.

      (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
          consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
          future crime by the offender.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

              A defendant can challenge consecutive sentences on appeal in two

ways. First, the defendant can argue that consecutive sentences are contrary to law

because the court failed to make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). See

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b); State v. Reindl, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 109806, 109807,

and 109808, 2021-Ohio-2586, ¶ 13; State v. Nia, 2014-Ohio-2527, 15 N.E.3d 892,

¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Second, the defendant can argue that the record “clearly and

convincingly” does not support the court’s findings made pursuant to

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). See R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a); Reindl at id. In addressing this
assignment of error, we review the record and consider whether it does not support

the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings. State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion

No. 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5 (lead opinion) (“[T]he trial court’s findings must be upheld

unless those findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.”),

¶ 27 (Fischer, J., concurring in judgment only) (“[T]he appellate court could not find

that the record does not support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings

* * *.”) and ¶ 73 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“De novo review of the record * * * is in

fact what the statute requires.”).

              The trial court here made the following findings in imposing

consecutive sentences:

      Pursuant to [R.C.] 2929.14, this Court does find that a consecutive term
      is necessary to protect the public from future crime. It’s also necessary
      to punish. It’s not disproportionate to the 20 years of this conduct and
      the danger that pose to the public, and your history – I’m sorry, at least
      two of the offenses committed as part of one or more course of conduct
      was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the
      offenses adequately reflects the seriousness of your conduct.

      I’ll note that your attorney mentioned that you don’t have a long
      criminal history, but the criminal history within these 20 years as
      established by the verdict of the jury demonstrates that consecutive
      terms are necessary to protect the public from future crime by you. I’m
      running all terms consecutive to one another.

Tr. 2480-2481.

              According to Trujillo, although “threadbare,” the trial court made the

statutorily mandated findings for the imposition of consecutive terms. He contends,

however, that the findings are not supported by the record.
              Upon review, we find that the trial court’s findings were supported by

the record. In regard to the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), that

“at least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses

of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so

committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses

committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the

seriousness of the offender’s conduct,” the record demonstrates that Trujillo

committed repeated sexual assaults for years against child victims. All of the victims

suffered trauma as a result of Trujillo’s conduct; A.O. specifically was diagnosed with

PTSD.

              The trial court’s finding that the consecutive terms were necessary to

protect the public and were not disproportionate to the danger Trujillo posed was

also supported by the record. We acknowledge that the trial court stated that

Trujillo carried on his abuse for 20 years, while the record indicates that it was an

approximate 12-year span. Regardless of the trial court’s statement, the victims’

statements at the sentencing hearing demonstrated how the years of abuse,

spanning over a decade, impacted, and continues to impact, their lives.

              Trujillo insinuates that the sentence is not supported by the record

because it was more than the state offered in its plea bargain and recommended in

its sentencing memorandum. We find no merit to Trujillo’s insinuation.

              It is true that a trial court may not punish a defendant who exercises

his or her right to a trial. State v. O’Dell, 45 Ohio St.3d 140, 147, 543 N.E.2d 1220
(1989). A trial court must avoid creating the appearance it enhanced a defendant’s

sentence because he or she elected to go to trial. State v. Morris, 159 Ohio App.3d

775, 2005-Ohio-962, 825 N.E.2d 637, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.). However, impropriety will

not be presumed by the mere fact the sentence imposed after trial is greater than the

sentence offered by the state at plea negotiations.      State v. Mayle, 7th Dist.

No. 04CA808, 2005-Ohio-1346, ¶ 46. Here, the sentencing judge was not the same

judge who presided over the trial. Thus, the sentencing judge had no incentive

whatsoever to “punish” Trujillo for exercising his right to a trial. And although the

sentencing judge was not the judge who presided over the trial, the record reflects

that she spent time reviewing the case, meeting with the attorneys, and considering

relevant documents (such as the presentence-investigation report and sexual

offender evaluation) prior to sentencing.

              Further, there are legitimate reasons why a trial court may sentence a

defendant more harshly after a trial on the merits than it may have after a guilty

plea. First, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the propriety of offering

lenient sentences in exchange for a guilty plea. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S.

212, 221-224, 99 S.Ct. 492, 58 L.Ed.2d 466 (1978). The court has explained that it

is proper to offer a more lenient sentence in exchange for a guilty plea because a

defendant’s acknowledgement of guilt has shown a willingness to assume

responsibility for his or her conduct and has taken the first step toward

rehabilitation. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d

747 (1970).
              Second, a trial court knows more details about the facts of the case

and its impact upon the victims after a trial on the merits than it would after a guilty

plea. United States v. Derrick, 519 F.2d 1, 4 (6th Cir.1975). This “more real and

accurate appraisal of the circumstances which brought the defendant to the bar of

justice” will “almost inevitably * * * affect the judge’s consideration of what penalty

appears most appropriate.” Id. Thus, the fact that the sentence imposed after trial

is greater than the sentence the state offered to recommend in exchange for a guilty

plea does not demonstrate that the trial court acted improperly.

              Similarly, although the issue of a state’s recommended sentence most

often arises in instances where there has been a guilty plea, there nonetheless is no

requirement that a trial court follow the state’s sentencing recommendation after a

trial. The trial court is free to deviate from the state’s recommendation, upward or

downward, so long as the sentence is within the bounds of the law.

              We do note, however, that the sentencing entry states that Trujillo’s

consecutive terms amount to 81 years, when the actual number is 141 years. The

entry states each count and the total sentence for each count. The total adds up to

141 years in prison consecutive to a life sentence. We remand for the issuance of a

nunc pro entry stating the correct sentence.

              The first assignment of error is overruled.

              In his second assignment of error, Trujillo contends that his trial

counsel was ineffective for not requesting that the case proceed before the original
judge for the purpose of sentencing since she was the judge who presided over the

trial.

              In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been

different. State v. Jenkins, 2018-Ohio-483, 106 N.E.3d 216, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674

(1984). The defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test in order to prove

ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109083,

2020-Ohio-4138, ¶ 28, citing Strickland at 687.

              Under Ohio law, “every properly licensed attorney is presumed to be

competent.” State v. Knight, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109302, 2021-Ohio-3674, ¶ 47,

citing State v. Black, 2019-Ohio-4977, 149 N.E.3d 1132, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.), citing State

v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 477 N.E.2d 1128 (1985).            Therefore, when

“evaluating counsel’s performance on a claim of ineffective assistance counsel, the

court must give great deference to counsel’s performance and ‘indulge a strong

presumption’ that counsel’s performance ‘falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.’” Knight at id., quoting Strickland at 689.

              Trujillo cites Crim.R. 25 in support of his contention that his counsel

was ineffective for not seeking a transfer of the case to the original judge’s docket.

Crim.R. 25 governs “disability of a judge.” It provides in part that, “[i]f for any
reason the judge before whom the defendant has been tried is unable to perform the

duties of the court after a verdict or finding of guilt, another judge designated by the

administrative judge * * * may perform those duties.” Crim.R. 25(B). We note that

the original judge was not disabled as to her judicial responsibilities. Rather, she no

longer served in the seat with the docket of Trujillo’s case; the new judge took over

her docket.

               The rule further provides that if a new judge is assigned to the case

post-trial and he or she “is satisfied that he [or she] cannot perform those duties

because he [or she] did not preside at the trial, he [or she] may in his discretion grant

a new trial.” Id. There is no indication in the record that the new judge was unable

to perform her duties as the sentencing judge.           To the contrary, the record

demonstrates that, prior to sentencing, she meet with counsel on “a few occasions,”

and reviewed documents including a presentence-investigation report, sentencing

memorandums, and a sexual offender evaluation. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96102, 2011-Ohio-5253, ¶ 28 (visiting judge who was

appointed for sentencing took appropriate steps to ensure the judge had sufficient

information prior to sentencing defendant, by watching video of the subject robbery,

reading the presentence-investigative report, and listening to the arguments of the

prosecutor, defense counsel, and defendant prior to imposing sentence.).

               Further, we note that a judge is presumed to be unbiased and

unprejudiced in the matters over which he or she presides. In re Disqualification of

Olivito, 74 Ohio St.3d 1261, 1263, 657 N.E.2d 1361 (1994). Moreover, there was no
reasonable probability that a transfer motion would have been granted by the judge.

Regardless, we work under a presumption that counsel’s failure to seek a transfer of

the case was a sound tactical decision that we will not second-guess. State v. Carter,

72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1995).

              The second assignment of error is overruled.

               In his third assignment of error, Trujillo contends that the trial court

improperly considered his lack of remorse in sentencing him. According to Trujillo,

the trial court held his supposed lack of remorse against him in sentencing him.

              Defense counsel stated that Trujillo had a low recidivism score, to

which the trial court responded: “[I]f a person expresses genuine remorse, that

shows a lesser likelihood of recidivism. I haven’t heard from your client, but I’ll give

whatever he says the weight that deserves.” Under R.C. 2929.12(E)(5), the trial

court was required to consider whether Trujillo displayed genuine remorse as a

factor in assessing whether he was not likely to commit future crimes. Trujillo’s

counsel told the court that Trujillo maintained his innocence and asked the court

not to hold that against him. There is nothing in the record indicating that the trial

court improperly considered remorse; that is, there is no indication that the court

used it as an aggravated factor in sentencing Trujillo.

               The third assignment of error is overruled.

              For his fourth assignment of error, Trujillo contends that the

cumulative effect of the trial court’s sentencing errors violated his due process rights.
              “The doctrine of cumulative error allows a conviction to be reversed if

the cumulative effect of errors, deemed separately harmless, deprived the defendant

of his right to a fair trial.” State v. Johnson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170354, 2019-

Ohio-3877, ¶ 57. “The doctrine of cumulative error is inapplicable where there are

not multiple instances of harmless error.” Id. Because we have not found multiple

instances of error, the cumulative-error doctrine is inapplicable. Trujillo’s fourth

assignment of error is overruled.

Prosecutorial Misconduct

              In his fifth assignment of error, Trujillo contends that the assistant

prosecutor engaged in misconduct during the trial. Specifically, Trujillo maintains

that the state unfairly attacked the defense’s case and inflamed the jury during its

rebuttal closing argument.

              The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the prosecutor’s

“‘remarks were improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial

rights of the defendant.’” State v. Hessler, 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 125, 734 N.E.2d 1237

(2000), quoting State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984). “To

demonstrate prejudice in this context, ‘defendant must show that the improper

remarks or questions were so prejudicial that the outcome of the trial would clearly

have been otherwise had they not occurred.’” State v. Obermiller, 147 Ohio St.3d

175, 2016-Ohio-1594, 63 N.E.3d 93, ¶ 105, quoting State v. Collier, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 78960, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4663 (Oct. 18, 2001).
              Prosecutorial misconduct is not grounds for reversal unless the

defendant has been denied a fair trial due to the prosecutor’s prejudicial remarks.

State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 266, 473 N.E.2d 768 (1984). A reviewing court

“will not deem a trial unfair if, in the context of the entire trial, it appears beyond a

reasonable doubt that the jury would have found the defendant guilty even without

the improper comments.” State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2007-05-133,

2008-Ohio-2499, ¶ 9. Further, in regard to closing remarks, the prosecution is

entitled to a degree of latitude. State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 13-14, 470 N.E.2d

883 (1984).

               Statements that may “inflame the passions and prejudice of the jury”

are deemed improper because they wrongly “invite the jury to judge the case upon

standards or grounds other than” those upon which it is obligated to decide the case,

namely, the law and the evidence. State v. Cunningham, 178 Ohio App.3d 558,

2008-Ohio-5164, 899 N.E.2d 171, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Draughn, 76 Ohio

App.3d 664, 671, 602 N.E.2d 790 (5th Dist.1992). However, isolated comments by

a prosecutor are not to be taken out of context and given their most damaging

meaning. State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St 3d 195, 204, 661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996).

               Trujillo complains that the following statement by the assistant

prosecutor during closing argument vilified defense counsel:

      So yes, there’s no physical injuries and Dr. [defense counsel] wants you
      to believe that, well, if she’s being raped, there’s got to be physical
      injuries, right? She’s not a doctor, all right?
      She is in no position to tell you that because W.C. 30 days later was not
      bruised or physically injured, she cannot be raped, all right? So put that
      where it belongs, not in the deliberation room.

Tr. 2276.

              Initially, we note that the defense did not object to the state’s

argument. Failure to object waives all but plain error. State v. Davis, 62 Ohio St.3d

326, 337, 581 N.E.2d 1362 (1991). “Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to

be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to

prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372

N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

              The above-quoted statement made by the assistant prosecutor does

not rise to the level of plain error. Although the assistant prosecutor was critical of

defense counsel’s argument, the assistant prosecutor merely argued to the jury why

defense counsel’s argument should not be persuasive and why the absence of certain

evidence was not fatal to the state’s case.

              The second statement made by the assistant prosecuting attorney that

Trujillo contends constituted misconduct was as follows:

      Now I’m going to ask you today to take that power that you have under
      your oath and do what many have failed to do, to protect [the victims],
      to hold [Trujillo] accountable and by your verdict call him what he is, a
      child rapist and guilty.

Tr. 2295.

              Again, there was no objection and therefore our review is limited to

plain error. In regard to the comment that people or the system failed the victims,
that comment was reasonably based on the evidence. Although police reports had

been filed, the victims had been taken to the hospital, and one victim testified that

she informed a teacher when she was in the fourth grade, no deeper investigation

ensued until years later. And in regard to the assistant prosecuting attorney calling

Trujillo a “child rapist,” that isolated comment did not deprive him of a fair trial.

              The trial court instructed the jury that closing argument is just that —

argument — and not evidence. Juries are presumed to follow the instructions they

are given. See State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d

229, ¶ 157. Indeed, the record demonstrates that the jury did follow the trial court’s

instructions and it was not inflamed by the assistant prosecuting attorney’s

statement. Specifically, during its deliberations, the jury posed three questions for

the court to answer, and ultimately, they acquitted Trujillo on two counts.

              The fifth assignment of error is overruled.

              Trujillo poses a sufficiency challenge in his sixth assignment of error.

He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the rape counts relative to

victim A.O. because it failed to establish that there was penetration. Further, Trujillo

contends in his eighth assignment of error that the evidence was insufficient as to

all the other remaining counts. We disagree with both contentions.

              The test for sufficiency of the evidence requires a determination of

whether the prosecution met its burden of production at trial. State v. Bowden,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92266, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 12. An appellate court’s function

when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to
examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if

believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543, 2001-Ohio-112, 747

N.E.2d 765. “‘The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v.

Walker, 150 Ohio St. 3d 409, 2016-Ohio-8295, 82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶ 12, quoting State

v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

              R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), governing rape, provides, “[N]o person shall

engage in sexual conduct with another, who is not the spouse of the offender, and

whose age at the time of the sexual conduct was less than thirteen years of age.”

Sexual conduct is defined as “vaginal intercourse, anal intercourse, fellatio, and

cunnilingus between persons.” R.C. 2907.01(A).

              According to Trujillo, A.O.’s testimony was insufficient to establish

rape because she did not specify whether the penetration was vaginal or anal. This

court has held that that is inconsequential, stating, “[W]e can identify no legal rule

which entitles a criminal defendant to know exactly which of his criminal acts led

the jury to a finding of guilt. * * * Either vaginal or anal penetration would have

satisfied the elements of ‘sexual conduct’ necessary for a rape conviction * * *.” State

v. Fulkerson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83566, 2004-Ohio-3114, ¶ 30; see also State

v. Shafer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79758, 2002-Ohio-6632, ¶ 29 (“The [rape] statute

simply does not require, as appellant asserts, that a specific finding be made as to
the type of rape. Consequently, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct

the jury [t]hat it must make such a specific finding.”).

               In all three incidents that formed the rape charges relative to A.O.,

A.O. testified that Trujillo penetrated her. That testimony was sufficient to sustain

the rape convictions. The sixth assignment of error is overruled.

              In regard to the other counts, Trujillo contends that the evidence was

insufficient because (1) the family frequently moved and therefore it was difficult for

the victims to tell where certain incidents occurred and (2) the victims were children

at the time of the acts and struggled with their memories.

               Trujillo’s contention mainly relates to the victims’ credibility.

Credibility issues go to manifest weight, not sufficiency, of the evidence. State v.

Hale, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107646, 2019-Ohio-3276, ¶ 87. To the extent that

Trujillo’s contention relates to the timeframe of when the incidents occurred, the

timeframe of the offenses was not an essential element of the crimes charged and,

therefore, was not subject to consideration during a motion to dismiss. State v.

Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 171, 478 N.E.2d 781 (1985).              “The State’s only

responsibility is to present proof of offenses alleged in the indictment, reasonably

within the time frame alleged.” State v. Bogan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84468,

2005-Ohio-3412, ¶ 10, citing State v. Shafer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79758, 2002-

Ohio-6632, ¶ 17-18.

               In light of the above, the eighth assignment of error is overruled.
              Relative to the counts regarding the rape of A.O., Trujillo contends in

his seventh assignment of error that the convictions are against the manifest weight

of the evidence. In his ninth assignment of error, Trujillo contends that the

remaining convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

              “To evaluate a claim that a jury verdict is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable

inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving

conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order a new

trial.” State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, 114 N.E.3d 1092, ¶ 168,

citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

Reversing a conviction based upon the weight of the evidence should occur “‘only in

the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’”

Thompkins at id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717

(1st Dist.1983).

              Trujillo’s weight-of-the-evidence claim relative to A.O. is based on her

lack of specificity as to whether the rape was vaginal or anal. First, as already

discussed, there is no requirement for that specificity. Second, to the extent that the

lack of specificity on that point relates to her credibility, the factfinder was in the

best position to weigh that. This weighing of witness credibility is best left to the

factfinder, who observed the demeanor of the witnesses and has a more holistic view

of the evidence. State v. Thompson, 127 Ohio App.3d 511, 529, 713 N.E.2d 456 (8th
Dist.1998) (“The fact-finder * * * occupies a superior position in determining

credibility. The fact-finder can hear and see as well as observe the body language,

evaluate voice inflections, observe hand gestures, perceive the interplay between the

witness and the examiner, and watch the witness’s reaction to exhibits and the like.

Determining credibility from a sterile transcript is a Herculean endeavor.          A

reviewing court must, therefore, accord due deference to the credibility

determinations made by the fact-finder.”).

               We do not find that the jury lost its way and created a manifest

injustice by believing A.O. about the rapes. A.O. testified about the sexual assaults

Trujillo inflicted on her. She also added other details about the incidents, such as

the time they heard a noise, which they discovered was a raccoon, lending support

to her credibility.

               The seventh assignment of error is overruled.

               As relates to the remaining counts, Trujillo contends that the

convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence because of (1) the

inconsistencies of witnesses’ testimony, (2) issues with the victims’ memories, and

(3) the absence of physical signs of abuse. Again, the inconsistencies went to

credibility, which was for the factfinder to determine. Defense counsel vigorously

cross-examined the victims on inconsistencies and the jury did not find reasonable

doubt. We find nothing incredible about its decision.

               Further, while the victims’ memory issues may have influenced their

ability to recall all specific details, it did not prevent them from testifying to the
sexual abuse Trujillo inflicted on them. And regarding the lack of physical evidence,

“[t]here is no requirement that a rape victim’s testimony be corroborated as a

condition precedent to conviction.”     State v. Blachowski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 107616, 2019-Ohio-2331, ¶ 41, citing State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 92714, 2010-Ohio-70, ¶ 32.

              Upon review, this is not the exceptional case that requires reversal of

the convictions. Therefore, the ninth assignment of error is overruled.

              Convictions affirmed; case remanded for nunc pro tunc correction of

sentencing entry.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR