Court Opinion

ID: 9631343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:34:51.589425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:01.741485
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent, and in doing so join the well-reasoned, indeed irrefutable, opinion of Justice Kaufman.
I write separately merely to express incredulity that the judiciary would undertake to interfere with the manifest duty of the appropriate administrative agency as that duty is mandated by the Legislature. It is paradoxical that this court, which should be insisting on strict compliance with environmental requirements, abjectly stamps its approval on a total evasion of societal protection.
We should keep in mind the animating purpose of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). In a broad declaration of policy, the Legislature found that “[t]he maintenance of a quality environment for the people of this state now and in the future is a matter of statewide concern.” (Id., § 21000, subd. (a).) It declared, “It is the intent of the Legislature that all agencies of the state government which regulate activities of private individuals, corporations, and public agencies which are found to affect the quality of the environment, shall regulate such activities so that major consideration is given to preventing environmental damage . . . .” (Id., § 21000, subd. (g).) Consistent with these broad objectives, we have held that CEQA must “be interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.” (Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259 [104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049].)
The Public Utilities Commission (hereafter PUC) has appeared to faithfully fulfill the responsibility imposed upon it as an agency of state government which has regulatory functions. There is a strong presumption favoring the validity of a PUC order. (Toward Utility Rate Normalization v. Public Utilities Com. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 529, 537 [149 Cal.Rptr. 692, 585 P.2d 491].) Indeed, by statutory command, the scope of our review of a PUC decision is limited; it “shall not be extended further than to determine whether the commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a *385determination of whether the order or decision under review violates any right of the petitioner under the Constitution of the United States or of this State.” (Pub. Util. Code, § 1757; City and County of San Francisco v. Public Utilities Com. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 523, 530 [217 Cal.Rptr. 43, 703 P.2d 381].) In general, therefore, if commission findings are supported by any evidence, they may not be set aside. (Yucaipa Water Co. No. 1 v. Public Utilities Com. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 823, 828 [9 Cal.Rptr. 239, 357 P.2d 295]; see also 8 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Constitutional Law, § 913, pp. 463-464.) There is ample evidence in this case.
Nearly two decades ago this court made it clear in Friends of Mammoth, supra, that we “will not countenance abuse” of the requirements of CEQA, particularly “in view of the clearly expressed legislative intent to preserve and enhance the quality of the environment.” (Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 271.) We also emphasized that an environmental impact report is mandated not only when a proposed project will have a significant environmental effect, but also when it may or could have such an effect.
The majority have in effect turned the clock back to pre-CEQA anything-goes days. Only the future will reveal the impact on and damage to the sensitive environment of the Napa Valley that their unfortunate opinion may cause.
Broussard, J., concurred.