Court Opinion

ID: 9894747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-02 19:01:12.546751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:32.207466
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13281   Document: 12-1    Date Filed: 11/02/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-13281
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       TAVARES LENARD FARRINGTON,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       OFFICER DIAH,
       LIEUTENANT M. BROWN,
       OFFICER CHAMBERS,
       OFFICER WISE,
       ASSISTANT WARDEN MERENO, et al.,

                                                Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13281          Document: 12-1         Date Filed: 11/02/2023           Page: 2 of 5

       2                           Opinion of the Court                        22-13281

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Georgia
                       D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-02697-VMC
                             ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Tavares Lenard Farrington, a federal prisoner proceeding
       pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his civil
       rights complaint brought against federal prison officials under
       Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
       403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which he alleged an excessive use of force in
       violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and retaliation for filing
       an earlier lawsuit. 1 After review, 2 we affirm.
             We conclude Farrington’s appeal fails for two reasons. First,
       Farrington failed to object or otherwise respond to the magistrate

       1 Farrington appeals only the dismissal of his Eighth Amendment excessive use

       of force claim. Accordingly, he has abandoned any argument as to his retalia-
       tion claim. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir.) (en banc),
       cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022); Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d
       678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating an appellant must clearly and specifically iden-
       tify any issue he wants the appellate court to address in his brief ).
       2 A district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim under

       § 1915A(b)(1) is reviewed de novo, taking the allegations in the complaint as
       true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). While pro se plead-
       ings are liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than those
       drafted by attorneys, they still must suggest some factual basis for a claim.
       Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015).
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       22-13281                  Opinion of the Court                                3

       judge’s recommendation that the excessive force claim in his com-
       plaint be dismissed in light of the Supreme Court’s suggestion, in
       Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793 (2022), that Bivens did not extend to
       include excessive force claims arising under the Eighth Amend-
       ment. The district court adopted this finding as the grounds for its
       dismissal, and Farrington does not argue on appeal that this was
       plain error or a manifest injustice, and thus he cannot challenge the
       issue on appeal. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc.,
       996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating when a magistrate
       judge provides notice and a party fails to object to the findings in
       the report and recommendation and those findings are adopted by
       the district court, the party may not challenge them on appeal in
       the absence of plain error or manifest injustice).
              Even if we deem Farrington to have implicitly preserved his
       arguments, we conclude the district court did not err in dismissing
       Farrington’s claim. The Supreme Court has stated the expansion
       of Bivens beyond the three specific contexts in which it has already
       been applied 3 is “disfavored.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857
       (2017). A case presents a new Bivens context when it is different in
       a meaningful way from the previous Bivens cases decided by the
       Supreme Court. Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1803. While the Supreme

       3 While Bivens involved a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme

       Court has allowed a Bivens action alleging gender discrimination under the
       Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392; Davis v.
       Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979). It has also recognized a Bivens action for
       deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs under the Eighth
       Amendment. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                    22-13281

       Court previously recognized a Bivens action under the Eighth
       Amendment in the context of a prison official’s deliberate indiffer-
       ence to a prisoner’s serious medical needs, an excessive force claim
       under the Eighth Amendment raises a new context, as the alleged
       official actions in each case differ significantly. See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct.
       at 1859-60 (stating a case may differ in a meaningful way where
       there are differences in the constitutional right at issue; the gener-
       ality or specificity of the official action; the statutory or other legal
       mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disrup-
       tive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other
       branches; or the presence of potential special factors that the previ-
       ous Bivens cases did not consider).
              Farrington’s argument the remedies provided by the BOP’s
       grievance process and the FTCA are insufficient is also meritless, as
       an alternative process need not provide a plaintiff complete relief
       in order to weigh against the extension of Bivens. See Alvarez v. U.S.
       Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 818 F.3d 1194, 1206 (11th Cir. 2016)
       (stating if a court finds an existing process already provides the
       plaintiff with sufficient protection, it does not recognize a Bivens
       remedy, and the alternative processes need not provide the plaintiff
       complete relief). Congress specifically considered the issue of pris-
       oner abuse in the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, ulti-
       mately providing an alternative remedy pathway that did not pro-
       vide for standalone damages against federal employees. See Ziglar,
       137 S. Ct. at 1865 (stating legislative action suggesting Congress
       does not want a damages remedy is itself a factor counselling hesi-
       tation). Ultimately, Congress’s prior examination of the issue and
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       22-13281              Opinion of the Court                       5

       creation of alternative remedy pathways counsels against recogniz-
       ing a Bivens action under these allegations. Accordingly, we affirm
       the district court’s dismissal.
             AFFIRMED.