Court Opinion

ID: 2964680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:29:26.119988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:08.620405
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1895

                                 LUIS VARGAS-BADILLO,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                          v.

                             ANDRES DIAZ-TORRES, ET AL.,

                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                   [Hon. Daniel R. Dom nguez, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                _____________________

               Peter  John Porrata,  with whom  Law Offices  of Peter  John
               ___________________              ___________________________
          Porrata was on brief for appellant.
          _______
               Sylvia    Roger-Stefani,   Assistant    Solicitor   General,
               _______________________
          Department of  Justice,  with whom  Carlos  Lugo-Fiol,  Solicitor
                                              _________________
          General and Edda Serrano-Blasini,  Deputy Solicitor General, were
                      ____________________
          on brief for appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                     May 30, 1997
                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.  Luis Vargas-Badillo ("Vargas")
                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. 
                               ___________

          brought this damages suit  under 42 U.S.C.   1983,  claiming that

          he was illegally arrested and subjected to excessive force by the

          defendants, two Puerto Rico police officers.1  The district court

          found that the defendants were entitled to  qualified immunity on

          the unlawful arrest claim,  and granted their motion for  summary

          judgment.   The court also determined that Vargas failed to state

          a  proper  claim  of excessive  force.    Vargas  appeals on  the

          unlawful arrest claim,  arguing that there was  no probable cause

          to support his warrantless arrest.2  We affirm.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                    In the summary judgment context, we review all material

          facts in genuine dispute  in the light most favorable to the non-

          movant, here Vargas.   Serrano-Cruz v. DFI Puerto Rico,  109 F.3d
                                 ____________    _______________

          23, 24 (1st Cir. 1997).  Vargas was one of three men who  were in

          a  Puerto Rico  Aqueducts  and Sewers  Administration truck  that

          collided   with   a  car   driven  by   Minerva  Delgado-Gonz lez

          ("Delgado").  After the collision, which took place at night on a

          hilly road, Vargas, Delgado, and Vargas' two colleagues agreed to

          meet at a nearby police station to report the accident.

                              
          ____________________

          1  Vargas initially named as defendants an unnamed supervisor and
          Ismael Betancourt,  the superintendent of the  Puerto Rico Police
          Department.  The actions against these two other defendants  were
          dismissed through partial judgments, at which point the remaining
          defendant officers filed their summary judgment motion.

          2   On  appeal, Vargas  does not  challenge the  district court's
          determination  regarding  his  failure  to  state  a   cognizable
          excessive force claim. 

                                         -2-

                    At the  police station, the defendant  police officers,

          Andr s  D az-Torres and  Andr s Maldonado-Castro,  questioned the

          four  persons.   Delgado told  the officers  that Vargas  was the

          driver of  the truck -- a  fact that Vargas disputes  -- and that

          she thought  that he and the  other men smelled of  alcohol.  She

          also stated that the men had shiny eyes and staggered a bit.

                    When  the   officers  sought  out  Vargas  for  further

          questioning,  he   was  outside  the  police   station,  drinking

          something from a plastic cup.  After the officers asked  to speak

          with him, he threw down his  cup, entered the station, and  began

          smoking a cigarette.   When the officers  ordered him to put  out

          the cigarette, Vargas  stubbed it out with his  shoe on the floor

          of the police station.   Officer D az then told Vargas to dispose

          of  the cigarette in  a trash can.   Vargas denies  being rude or

          aggressive toward  the officers, although he does not deny having

          taken these particular actions.  

                    Immediately  thereafter,  the  police  officers  placed

          Vargas under arrest  for driving under the  influence of alcohol,

          under Section 5-801 of  the Puerto Rico Vehicle and  Traffic Law.

          P.R.  Laws  Ann. tit.  9,    1041 et  seq.   They  handcuffed and
                                            ________

          searched him before transporting him to a police station that had

          a working breathalyzer.   After the breathalyzer test indicated a

          blood alcohol level of zero percent, Vargas was released.  Vargas

          was  subsequently charged on a count of reckless driving based on

          the  same incident   -- a criminal charge  which was dropped once

          Vargas' insureragreed to payfor the damagescaused by theaccident.

                                         -3-

                    The  district court  granted  summary  judgment on  the

          basis  of qualified  immunity.    In  so  holding,  it  made  two

          findings:   that  the defendants  were presented  with sufficient

          evidence to establish probable cause for Vargas' arrest, and that

          although the particular warrantless arrest violated a Puerto Rico

          statute, it did not violate any clearly established federal law.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

                    We   review  the  district   court's  summary  judgment

          determination de  novo.  Ionics,  Inc. v. Elmwood  Sensors, Inc.,
                        __  ____   _____________    ______________________

          110 F.3d 184, 185 (1st Cir. 1997).

                    A.  The Qualified Immunity Standard 
                    A.  The Qualified Immunity Standard

                    The  doctrine  of   qualified  immunity  provides  that

          "government  officials performing  discretionary functions .  . .

          are  shielded from liability  for civil damages  insofar as their

          conduct  does  not  violate   clearly  established  statutory  or

          constitutional  rights of  which a  reasonable person  would have

          known."    Harlow  v.  Fitzgerald,  457  U.S.  800,  818  (1982).
                     ______      __________

          Defendant police officers are shielded if either of the following
                                                    ______

          holds: if  the federal  law  allegedly violated  was not  clearly

          established  at  the time  of the  alleged  violation, or  if, at

          summary judgment,  there is no  genuine dispute of  material fact

          that  would prevent a finding  that the defendants' actions, with

          regard  to applying  or following  such clearly  established law,

          were objectively reasonable.   See Stella v. Kelley, 63  F.3d 71,
                                         ___ ______    ______

          73  (1st Cir. 1995).  In effect, qualified immunity protects "all

                                         -4-

          but the plainly  incompetent or those  who knowingly violate  the

          law."  Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
                 ______    ______

                    This appeal presents two distinct legal issues.  First,

          we  must determine whether the  warrantless arrest of a suspected

          misdemeanant,  where  the  misdemeanor   did  not  occur  in  the

          officers'  presence,  would  have  violated  clearly  established

          federal  law  as of  December 1990.    Second, we  must determine

          whether the officers acted in conformity with clearly established

          law under an objective reasonableness standard.

                    B.  The Clearly Established Law
                    B.  The Clearly Established Law

                    It  is not disputed that at the time of Vargas' arrest,

          clearly  established  Fourth  Amendment  law  required  that  the

          defendants have  probable cause  to  support Vargas'  warrantless

          arrest.  See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).  Whether there
                   ___ ____    ____

          were adequate  grounds for making a  probable cause determination

          is addressed in the  next section.  However, Vargas  also appears

          to  contend  that  the   officers  violated  a  rule  prohibiting

          warrantless arrests  for misdemeanors  that do  not occur  in the

          presence  of  the arresting  officers.   We  must  thus determine

          whether such a rule was a clearly established part of federal law

          in December 1990, when Vargas' arrest occurred.

                    Vargas correctly points out that in Puerto Rico, such a

          rule exists.    Rule 11  of  the Puerto  Rico  Rules of  Criminal

          Procedure provides  that a  warrantless arrest for  a misdemeanor

          offense is only permitted where the arresting officer has grounds

          to  believe that the  misdemeanor was committed  in his presence,

                                         -5-

          whereas  no such  presence  requirement  governs the  warrantless

          arrest of felons.   See P.R.  Laws Ann. tit.  34, App. II,  R. 11
                              ___

          (1991).   Driving under the influence of alcohol is a misdemeanor

          in Puerto  Rico.   See  P.R. Laws  Ann. tit.  9,    1042  (1976).
                             ___

          Regardless of  whether the  arresting officers violated  Rule 11,

          Vargas  can  offer no  support for  the  proposition that,  as of

          December  1990,  this  provision had  a  clear  basis in  federal
                                                                    _______

          constitutional or statutory  law.  "Mere violations of  state law

          do not, of course, create constitutional claims."  Roy v. City of
                                                             ___    _______

          Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517, 1522 (1st Cir. 1983).  
          _______

                    To  date, neither  the Supreme  Court nor  this circuit

          ever  has held  that the  Fourth Amendment  prohibits warrantless

          arrests  for  misdemeanors  not  committed  in  the  presence  of

          arresting  officers.     Into   this  silent  past,   a  "clearly

          established right"  cannot be retrojected.   Moreover, cases from

          sister circuits addressing  this very issue  have arrived at  the

          opposite conclusion.  See,  e.g., Pyles v. Raisor, 60  F.3d 1211,
                                ___   ____  _____    ______

          1215 (6th Cir. 1995) (arrestee  cannot recover under section 1983

          on  ground  that  officers  violated  state  law  prohibition  of

          warrantless arrests for  misdemeanors not committed  in officers'

          presence);  Barry  v. Fowler, 902 F.2d  770, 772 (9th  Cir. 1990)
                      _____     ______

          (same);  Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d  368, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1974)
                   ______    _______

          (same);   see  also  Vargas-Badillo v.  D az-Torres, Opinion  and
                    _________  ______________     ___________

          Order  of  May 24,  1996, at  12-17  (D.P.R. 1996)  (providing an

          illuminating discussion of the questionable constitutional status

          of  this longstanding  rule).   Thus, we  conclude that  the only

                                         -6-

          clearly   established   federal  right   implicated   in  Vargas'

          warrantless  arrest in  December  1990 was  his Fourth  Amendment

          right not to be arrested without probable cause.

                    C.  Objective Reasonableness and Probable Cause
                    C.  Objective Reasonableness and Probable Cause

                    We next assess whether the second part of the qualified

          immunity  standard,  requiring  that  the officers  acted  in  an

          objectively reasonable  fashion in  light of clearly  established

          law,  was  met.   Here, that  assessment  turns on  the officers'

          determination of probable cause.

                      In   cases   applying   this   [qualified
                      immunity] standard to  police arrests  in
                      this  circuit,  an  arrest challenged  as
                      unsupported by probable  cause is  deemed
                      "'objectively reasonable'"  unless "there
                      clearly was no probable cause at the time
                      the arrest was made."

          Topp v. Wolkowski, 994 F.2d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Floyd
          ____    _________                                           _____

          v. Farrell, 765 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1985)).  In the instant case,
             _______

          the  evidence  giving rise  to probable  cause to  believe Vargas

          drove  under the influence of alcohol was far from substantial --

          and yet  we cannot say that  there clearly was  no probable cause

          from  the point of view  of reasonable persons  standing in these

          police officers'  shoes.  See Farrell, 765  F.2d at 5 ("Despite a
                                    ___ _______

          finding of no probable cause at a later hearing, a police officer

          should not be found liable under    1983 for a warrantless arrest

          because the presence of probable cause was merely questionable at

          the  time of arrest."); Briggs v. Malley,  748 F.2d 715, 719 (1st
                                  ______    ______

          Cir. 1984).

                                         -7-

                    The Fourth  Amendment requirement of probable  cause to

          perform a warrantless arrest turns on "whether at that moment the

          facts and  circumstances within [the officers']  knowledge and of

          which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient

          to warrant a  prudent man  in believing that  the petitioner  had

          committed  or was committing an offense."   Beck, 379 U.S. at 91;
                                                      ____

          see also United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1023 (1st Cir.
          ________ _____________    ________

          1987)  (quoting  Beck).   Here,  the  following undisputed  facts
                           ____

          could,  at the very least, have led reasonable police officers to

          believe that they were obeying the probable cause requirement  in

          proceeding to  arrest Vargas for  driving under the  influence of

          alcohol.    The  officers   were  informed  by  Delgado,  whether

          correctly  or  incorrectly, that  Vargas  was the  driver  of the

          truck.   Delgado also informed the defendants that Vargas and the

          other men smelled  of alcohol  and had glassy  eyes.   Reasonable

          police  officers  could  further  believe  that  Vargas'  actions

          suggested insolence,  and  were thus  the  kind of  actions  that

          correlate with drunkenness.    

                    It is worth emphasizing  that in the qualified immunity

          context, we  need not  adjudge whether  these facts  were legally

          sufficient  grounds  for  this  warrantless  arrest.3    We  only

          conclude that  the  undisputed  facts in  this  case  preclude  a
                              
          ____________________

          3    The evidence  suggesting that  an  arrest was  necessary was
          frankly not  very strong  in this  case.   We are concerned,  for
          example, that in light of Vargas' cooperation with the police and
          voluntary decision to report to the police station, the police so
          quickly  chose the option of arrest  and handcuffing, rather than
          some  less severe means to  the end of  giving him a breathalyzer
          test.

                                         -8-

          finding that there  was clearly  no probable cause,  or that  "no

          reasonably competent  officer would  have found  probable cause."

          Prokey v.  Watkins, 942  F.2d 67,  72 n.4 (1st  Cir. 1991).   The
          ______     _______

          reports and observations suggesting  that Vargas had been driving

          while  intoxicated were sufficient  to satisfy  the rule  in this

          circuit  that questionable  calls on  matters of  probable cause,

          such as  the one in this case, are protected through the doctrine

          of qualified immunity.  Cf. Rivera  v. Murphy, 979 F.2d 259, 263-
                                  ___ ______     _______

          64 (1st  Cir. 1992)  (denying qualified immunity  where arresting

          officer provided  "no facts to support his  legal conclusion that

          he had  probable cause").   This  kind of  discretionary judgment

          call, made  routinely by peace  officers, must be  protected from

          the  chilling   effect  of  personal  liability.     Our  binding

          precedents addressing  qualified  immunity strike  the  difficult

          balance between chilling effective law enforcement and protecting

          individual  liberties by reviewing allegedly unlawful warrantless

          arrests to determine whether there was clearly no probable cause,

          and we  follow these precedents today.  See, e.g., Topp, 994 F.2d
                                                  ___  ____  ____

          at 48.

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    For the foregoing reasons,  the district court's  grant

          of summary judgment to the defendants is affirmed.
                                                   affirmed
                                                   ________

                                         -9-