Court Opinion

ID: 9371924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 06:05:30.125719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:31.020472
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re D. G. J. JOHNSON, Minor.                                       February 16, 2023

                                                                     No. 361877
                                                                     Kalamazoo Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2017-000379-NA

Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and LETICA and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) (parent deserted child for 91 or more days),
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions of adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii) (failure to rectify
other conditions), and (j) (reasonable likelihood that child will be harmed if returned to the
parent).1 We reverse and remand for further proceedings because mother was not provided with
proper notice of the termination hearing.

                                 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        In August 2017, mother was arrested for aggravated/felonious assault while the child was
in her care. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) alleged that the child came
under the court’s jurisdiction because of his ongoing exposure to mother’s substance-abuse issues
and criminal behavior. The trial court ordered the emergency removal of the child and placed him
with the DHHS.

     From August to early November 2017, mother attended five hearings. Beginning in late
November 2017, mother failed to appear for hearings and maintained inconsistent and difficult
communication with the DHHS.

1
 Although the child’s father was also a respondent below, the trial court did not terminate his
parental rights.

                                                -1-
        After January 2018, mother was absent without leave from a probationary program, and,
despite providing a local address in February 2018, mother appeared to have left the state. The
parties struggled to reach mother via mail, call, text, and social media.2 In April 2018, the DHHS
filed an affidavit detailing its efforts to locate mother.

        In October 2018, mother provided an address in Nevada. Within months, court orders sent
to that address were returned as undeliverable and communication efforts failed, even as mother
filed a motion to dismiss.

       In March 2019, the DHHS filed another affidavit regarding its efforts to locate mother. In
May 2019, mother provided an address in Utah. By October 2019, the DHHS again did not know
mother’s whereabouts and filed another affidavit regarding its efforts to locate mother.

         In March 2020, the DHHS filed yet another affidavit detailing its efforts to locate mother.
In June 2020, the maternal grandmother provided contact information for mother, but mother failed
to communicate with the DHHS despite its efforts to locate her. At the end of 2020, court orders
sent to the Utah address were returned as undeliverable. A court employee emailed the caseworker
and asked for a notice of current address or an affidavit of efforts to locate the absent parent.

         During a permanency planning hearing in April 2021, the DHHS reported that despite its
efforts to contact mother, she was not participating in services and had not inquired about the child.
The DHHS recommended termination of mother’s parental rights. Additional court orders were
returned and a court employee emailed the caseworker for an updated address. On July 12, 2021,
the DHHS filed an affidavit describing the numerous efforts that it made to contact mother,
including messaging several Facebook accounts in mother’s name without response.

        In September 2021, the DHHS petitioned the trial court to terminate mother’s parental
rights. For mother’s address, the petition directed the court to its “Affidavit of Reasonable Efforts”
and there was a handwritten notation, reading “UNK” with a check mark. As to mother, the
petition alleged that she had abandoned her child, not had any contact with him since August 2018,
and had not participated in or completed any services listed in her parent-agency treatment plan.

       On October 4, 2021, the trial court issued a summons that ordered mother to appear for a
hearing to terminate her parental rights on November 5, 2021.3 That same day, a court employee
signed a motion for alternate service. It stated that “due to COVID-19, the unavailability of a
process server, court closure and social distancing, personal service is impractical.” The motion
requested the court to order service by alternate means, representing that mother’s last-known
home address was an apartment on Andover Drive in Kalamazoo and that the court employee

2
  Calling mother often proved unsuccessful because her phone was turned off or her number was
inactive. If the DHHS made contact, mother was not always forthcoming about her whereabouts
or contact information. At times, mother left threatening messages or conveyed inaccurate
information. And, even when mother’s contact information was updated, by either mother herself
or another party, mother failed to maintain contact or respond.
3
    A notice of hearing regarding the termination hearing was sent to mother’s attorney.

                                                 -2-
“believe[d]” that the “home” address provided was “correct.” The trial court granted the motion
for alternate service ex parte, finding that personal service of the summons upon mother was
impracticable or could not be achieved. The trial court further ordered that service be made by
first-class mail to the “last known address provided to the Court.” A court employee then mailed
the summons, the petition for termination of parental rights, the motion for alternate service, and
the order granting alternate service to the Andover address.

       The November termination hearing date was adjourned to January 12, 2022. Notice was
mailed to mother at the Andover address.

       On January 7, 2022, the DHHS filed another affidavit, explaining its efforts to locate
mother. The affidavit stated that “[t]he current address of the absent parent is unknown and cannot
be determined after diligent efforts.”

       The January 2022 hearing date was again adjourned to April 19, 2022. Notice of the
adjournment and other documents were mailed to the Andover address.

        Although the summons, termination petition, motion for alternate service, order granting
alternate service, and one of the adjournment notices were not returned, the notice of the
January 27, 2022 adjournment and another court order were returned as undeliverable in
February 2022. A court employee then emailed the caseworker about submitting a notice of
mother’s current address or an affidavit of the efforts that had been made to locate mother.

      On April 15, 2022, the DHHS filed a notice of current address for mother, reflecting that
“mother sent the worker her current mailing address via social media messenger” on April 11.
Mother provided an address in Missouri.

        During the April 19, 2022 termination hearing, the foster-care specialist testified that days
before trial, she reached mother via social media after learning of mother’s exact profile from the
child’s father. The specialist asked for mother’s updated telephone number and address, and
whether mother would be open to meeting to go over case matters, wanted to engage in parenting
time, and if she was engaged any services. Mother provided an updated telephone number and an
in-state address4 as well as one in Missouri. Mother added that she was currently out of the state,
had unresolved criminal matters that she needed to address, and wanted to visit with the child. The
specialist immediately attempted to call mother via the number provided; however, it was out of
service. The specialist also inquired whether mother had an alternate telephone number and was
amenable to meeting via an online service, but mother did not respond. Nor did mother follow up
to arrange for contact or visitation with the child.

        Mother was not present at the termination hearing, but was represented by counsel. The
trial court found four statutory grounds to terminate mother’s parental rights were proven and that
termination was in child’s best interest.

4
    No information is contained in the record regarding the in-state address.

                                                  -3-
        Mother appeals.

                                             II. NOTICE

                                  A. PRESERVATION OF ISSUE

         Generally, “issues that are raised, addressed, and decided by the trial court are preserved
for appeal.” In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 703; 859 NW2d 208 (2014). Mother did not contest
the trial court’s decision to permit alternate service by first-class mail, and, therefore, this issue is
not preserved for appeal.

                                   B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Typically, “whether child protective proceedings complied with a respondent’s substantive
and procedural due process rights is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Id.
Additionally, issues of personal service and jurisdiction are generally reviewed de novo. In re
Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 20; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). But unpreserved issues, either constitutional
or nonconstitutional, are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. In re Pederson, 331
Mich App 445, 463; 951 NW2d 704 (2020). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three
requirements must be met: 1) the error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or
obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120,
135; 809 NW2d 412 (2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[A]n error affects substantial
rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings.” In re Utrera, 281
Mich App 1, 9; 761 NW2d 253 (2008). And reversal is only warranted when the plain error
“seriously affect[ed] the integrity, fairness, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” In re
Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 311; 964 NW2d 881 (2020).

        Issues regarding the interpretation and application of statutory provisions are reviewed de
novo. In re Beers, 325 Mich App 653, 680; 926 NW2d 832 (2018). Likewise, the interpretation
of a court rule is “a question of law that we review de novo.” In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 9. A
trial court’s factual findings, however, are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. In re
BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due
regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Id. at 296-297.

                                          C. DISCUSSION

        Mother does not challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction or the trial court’s conclusions
concerning the statutory factors or the child’s best interests leading to the termination of her
parental rights. Instead, she argues that the trial court erred by ordering the termination of her
parental rights after it failed to provide her with proper notice of the termination hearing.
According to mother, the trial court’s decision to permit alternate service by first-class mail was
not reasonably calculated to provide her notice of the termination hearing. Furthermore, mother
did not know how the trial court had obtained the Andover address where it had mailed the notice
regarding the termination hearing.

                                                  -4-
         In its appellate brief, the DHHS represented that mother provided the Andover address to
the court when she filed a petition for a personal protection order (PPO) on September 15, 2021.5
The PPO petition was filed by a woman who had the same first and last name as mother; however,
it also reflected a different date of birth than mother’s and the facts recited described a scenario
inconsistent with mother’s circumstances. On our motion, we directed appellate counsel for the
DHHS to address whether mother had provided the Andover address to the court, and, if not,
whether plain error occurred.6 During oral argument, the DHHS conceded that the Andover
address was not mother’s, plain error occurred, and reversal was required. We agree.

         Parents have fundamental due-process rights in termination of parental rights proceedings.
In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 403; 852 NW2d 524 (2014). Due process in civil cases require
notice of the nature of proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. In re Mayfield, 198 Mich App
226, 231; 497 NW2d 578 (1993). Consequently, statutes requiring notice to parents must be
strictly construed. Id.

        MCR 3.920(G) provides that “[a]fter a party’s first appearance before the court, subsequent
notice of the proceedings and pleadings shall be served on that party or, if the party has an attorney,
on the attorney for the party as provided in subrule (D), except that a summons must be served for
trial or termination hearing as provided in subrule (B).” (Emphasis added.) In turn,
MCR 3.920(B)(4) states:

       (a) Except as provided in subrule (B)(4)(b), a summons required under
       subrule (B)(2) must be served by delivering the summons to the party personally.
       (b) If the court finds, on the basis of testimony or a motion and affidavit, that
       personal service of the summons is impracticable or cannot be achieved, the court
       may by ex parte order direct that it be served in any manner reasonably calculated
       to give notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, including
       publication.

MCR 3.920(B)(2)(b) requires a summons in a child protective proceeding “must be served on any
respondent” and that “[a] parent without physical custody must be notified by service as provided
in subrule (D), unless the whereabouts of the parent remain unknown after a diligent inquiry.”
When, however, a trial court fails to meet the requirements of MCR 3.920(B)(4)(b) before ordering
substituted service, a trial court’s jurisdiction is not endangered so long as the trial court followed
the requirements of MCL 712A.13. See In re SZ, 262 Mich App 560, 567; 686 NW2d 520 (2004).
Under MCL 712A.13, service of a summons may be accomplished by personal service unless the
judge is satisfied that such service is impracticable. If so, the judge “may order service by
registered mail addressed to [the party’s] last known addresses, or by publication thereof, or both,
as [the court] may direct.” Id. Consequently, although MCR 3.920(B)(4)(b) requires a trial court
to base its decision for substituted service on testimony or a motion and affidavit, MCL 712A.13

5
 We presume that DHHS asks us to take judicial notice of the PPO petition because it was not
part of the record below. See MRE 201.
6
  In re D G J Johnson, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 1, 2023
(Docket No. 361877).

                                                 -5-
does not attempt to specify, limit, or otherwise define the evidence upon which a trial court can
rely when determining whether personal service is impracticable. In re SZ, 262 Mich App at 566.
To summarize, there are no specific requirements concerning what types of evidence a trial court
must consider or the form in which the evidence must be received so long as the trial court adheres
to the statutory requirement that the court be satisfied that it is impracticable to serve the summons
or the notice personally. See id. at 566-569.

        The lower court record amply supported the trial court’s conclusion that personal service
was impracticable. But the record also revealed that the trial court did not direct that mother be
served at one of her last known prior addresses or by publication. Instead, service meant for mother
was sent to an address belonging to a woman, who shared mother’s first and last name, but not her
birthday or her circumstances. The first-class mail notice provided was not reasonably calculated
to notify mother that the court was holding a hearing to decide whether it would terminate her
parental rights.7 This error was plain. It affected mother’s substantial rights. And reversal is
required because the failure to provide the requisite notice seriously affected the integrity, fairness,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

        Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.

                                                               /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
                                                               /s/ Anica Letica
                                                               /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

7
  The adjournment orders were mailed to the Andover address as well, and the adjournment order
for the April hearing date was returned.

                                                  -6-