Court Opinion

ID: 9541071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:22:26.435972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:29.489844
License: Public Domain

*523Lynch, J.
(dissenting). It is undisputed that the search warrant used in this case to seize highly probative evidence linking the defendant to the murder of Sandra Boulware was formally defective. At issue in this appeal is the question whether the failure of the issuing magistrate to include in a search warrant, issued on probable cause, a list of the items to be seized or to incorporate such a list by reference to the police affidavit necessitates the application of the exclusionary rule where the search and seizure is limited to the items described in the affidavit. This court has concluded that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court mandate suppression of this evidence. Supra at 489, 509. I believe, however, that the majority’s conclusion represents a misreading of the relevant Supreme Court precedent and that its application of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate on the facts in this case. Accordingly, I dissent. I believe that a careful exploration of the purposes behind both the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which the police and judge inadvertently violated here, and the exclusionary rule demonstrates that the trial judge’s admission of this evidence was proper on these facts.
The Supreme Court has noted that the particularity requirement was included in the Fourth Amendment to protect citizens from the general warrants and writs of assistance that were commonly used by the British against the colonists. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-627 (1886). These general warrants granted British officers unbridled discretion to search the place and belongings of the colonists and placed “the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.” Id. at 625. See also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195-196 (1927). The particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is directed at this specific evil. It requires that those searches that are deemed necessary should be as limited as possible: “[T]he problem is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). Also, evi*524dence seized under a general warrant is unlikely to be supported by probable cause. Specificity in the warrant limits the potential for such abuse. Id.
In the present case none of the evils associated with searches under such warrants occurred. At all times, Detective O’Malley and his colleagues conducted their search for evidence in a manner that scrupulously adhered to the limits that were specified in the affidavit and that they believed in good faith the judge had authorized. The police searched only in the places particularly described in the warrant and they seized only the relevant murder evidence described in Detective O’Malley’s affidavit. They neither assumed nor exercised any discretion in the search. The police officers sought prompt judicial approval for their search warrant and searched no further than specified in the affidavit. No “rummaging” among the defendant’s belongings occurred. In the face of the dedication shown by these police officers to the spirit and purposes of the Fourth Amendment, abstract fears of “general warrants” and “writs of assistance” are completely misplaced.
More importantly, even conceding that the detective’s carrying the affidavit on his person rather than attaching it to the warrant rendered the warrant formally defective, I believe that application of the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence seized brings about too harsh a result. The plurality opinion correctly points out that the substantial, and perhaps only, justification for the exclusionary rule relied upon by a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court is the goal of deterring unconstitutional conduct by the police and other law enforcement personnel. Supra at 502. The plurality opinion also recognizes the existence of factors in this case which, in my opinion, militate against the application of the exclusionary rule. That opinion acknowledges that the police conducted the search in a good faith belief, reasonably held, that the search was lawful and authorized by the warrant issued by the judge; the defect in the warrant was not harmful to the defendant in the circumstances of the actual search; the search was conducted *525in the same way and with the same results as it would have been conducted if the warrant had not been defective; the error in the warrant consisted of the judge’s failure, negligently but in good faith, to strike out certain clearly inapplicable words printed on the blank form and to attach to it (or to incorporate by reference to the affidavit) a list of the items to be seized; the Supreme Court has not applied the exclusionary rule to a judge’s error in such circumstances; there may be reasonable distinctions between police misconduct and the errors of magistrates; the judge’s conduct was neutral and detached; he did not undertake the role of the police and become concerned with ferreting out crime; the exclusionary rule is not well tailored toward deterring judicial misconduct since the suppression of a particular piece of evidence may not be as effective a disincentive to a neutral judge as it would be to the police; the defendant was not prejudiced by the magistrate’s error; and various members of the Supreme Court have made statements critical of the application of the exclusionary rule in particular circumstances (not unlike those found to exist here). Supra at 503-506. The majority nevertheless concluded that the exclusionary rule requires the suppression of the evidence seized. I believe that the factors summarized above, which three members of this court apparently agree are of significance, compel the conclusion that the evidence seized at 42 Deckard Street need not be suppressed under the United States or the Massachusetts Constitution.
The Supreme Court has noted with concern that “[ejach time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). Frequently the evidence sought to be excluded is “the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976). Consequently, “[application of the [exclusionary] rule . . . deflects the *526truthfinding process and often frees the guilty. The [resulting] disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice. Thus, although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity in part through the nurturing of respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice.” Id. at 490-491.
To minimize the social cost resulting from the indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has held that this judicially made rule is not coextensive with the Fourth Amendment. Stone v. Powell, supra at 486, 488-489. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-348 (1974). Rather than applying the exclusionary rule reflexively, the Court has stated that judges should weigh the value of deterrence of police misconduct gained in applying the rule against the “further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.” Stone v. Powell, supra, quoting from Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969).
Thus, it is clear that the policies underlying the exclusionary rule are not absolute and they must be evaluated in light of competing considerations: “As with any remedial device, the application of the [exclusionary] rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” Calandra, supra at 348. Here, application of the exclusionary rule will serve no beneficial purpose. Police misconduct will not be deterred because none occurred. The human error committed by the judge harmed no rights of the defendant, as nothing beyond the evidence listed in the affidavit was searched for or seized. By contrast, application of the exclusionary rule *527will result in the very substantial harm of withdrawing highly probative evidence from the trier of fact.
In discussing the need for applying the exclusionary rule under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court has cautioned that before we penalize official misconduct we must consider whether the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974). I can perceive no valid and useful purpose for applying the exclusionary rule to the good faith search and seizure performed by the police here, albeit under a defective warrant. The failure of the judge or the police to attach the affidavit to the revised warrant form was merely a harmless error, but under the majority’s holding the consequences are Draconian: for want of a staple, highly probative evidence is lost. Such dedication to rigid formality is commanded neither by the Constitution nor by logic. I respectfully dissent.