Court Opinion

ID: 9854224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:03:28.5115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:58.989918
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I write separately because I believe the majority’s interpretation of OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a) (3) violates Georgia’s rules of statutory construction.
Regardless of how the federal courts or the courts of other states have interpreted the language found in OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a) (3), Georgia courts must look first to their own direct instructions with regard to statutory interpretation. “In all interpretations of statutes, *542the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter.” OCGA § 1-3-1 (b). “[Jjudicial construction is necessary only when a statute is ambiguous; in fact, when the language of a statute is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden. [Cit.]” Fleming v. State, 271 Ga. 587, 589 (523 SE2d 315) (1999). We may not resort to judicial construction by means of comments to a federal statute, and cases interpreting those comments, when our own statute is unambiguous.
Here, the term “dishonesty” is a word in common use and with a meaning known to all. Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (2nd ed.) defines it as “the quality of being dishonest; dishonest behavior; deceiving, stealing, etc.” The word is not limited to untruthfulness under oath, but includes such matters as fraud and theft. Clearly, one who has been convicted of defrauding a client or of stealing another’s checkbook and writing checks from it is guilty of “dishonesty.” And one who “receives, disposes of, or retains stolen property which he knows or should know was stolen,” OCGA § 16-8-7 (a), has committed an act commonly acknowledged to be “dishonest.” The meaning of “dishonesty’ is clear and unambiguous. “Courts of last resort must frequently construe the language of a statute, but such courts may not substitute by judicial interpretation language of their own for the clear, unambiguous language of the statute, so as to change the meaning.” Frazier v. Southern R. Co., 200 Ga. 590, 593 (2) (37 SE2d 774) (1946).
Moreover, we cannot ignore the inclusion of the term “making a false statement” with the term “dishonesty’ as a disjunctive, allowing impeachment if the crime “involved dishonesty or making a false statement.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a) (3). “It is a well-established principle that a statute must be viewed so as to make all its parts harmonize and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part. It is not presumed that the legislature intended that any part would be without meaning. [Cit.]” Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, 235 Ga. 201, 203 (219 SE2d 115) (1975). The majority’s proposed interpretation of “dishonesty’ makes that word redundant and meaningless, and “[i]t is contrary to the generally accepted principles for construing statutes to ‘read out’ any part of the statute as ‘mere surplusage’ unless there is a clear reason for doing so. [Cits.]” Porter v. Food Giant, 198 Ga. App. 736, 738 (1) (402 SE2d 766) (1991). Had the General Assembly intended to limit the term “dishonesty’ to failing to testify truthfully in court, it would be a redundant and unnecessary term, given the inclusion of “making a false statement.”
For these reasons, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion in Division 3 that the definition of “dishonesty’ in OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a) (3) does not include theft by receiving stolen property. Therefore, *543in my view, the trial court did not err in admitting Adams’s prior conviction for misdemeanor theft by receiving.
Decided March 27, 2007.
David J. Walker, for appellant.
Jewel C. Scott, District Attorney, Anece Baxter White, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.