Court Opinion

ID: 9467809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:57:13.975612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:32.506374
License: Public Domain

K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The Secretary’s decision in this case is so inadequate and unsubstantiated that I am dismayed by the majority’s affirmance. The Secretary has exhibited a complete disregard of the procedural standards adopted by this Court, all under the guise of an administrative table purportedly designed to save time and money. In this case, the table undoubtedly saved time and money, but unfortunately did so at Frady’s expense.
Frady has now been through, the administrative process twice. The first decision concluded — in language which can be charitably characterized as vague — that Frady was not precluded from pursuing “any substantial gainful activity .... ” This decision was properly reversed because of the Secretary’s failure to make specific vocational findings to consider Frady’s subjective complaints.
Regrettably, the Secretary did little better on the second attempt. The administrative law judge found that Frady was an individual of advanced age, possessed a limited education (7th grade), “was unable to perform some of the heavier work he had previously performed,” and was physically capable of performing sedentary work. As for Frady’s residual skills, the Secretary found:
“(10) The claimant’s previous employment (especially as owner of a tree service and right-of-way contractor) imparted skills that were transferable on or before March 31,1975 to work other than that he had previously performed.”
*146Regarding the jobs which Frady could perform, the Secretary stated:
“(12) The claimant’s non-exertional limitations did not significantly affect his maximum sustained work capability for sedentary work (on or prior to March 31, 1975), and therefore, considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity within the framework of the above rules, the claimant is also found ‘not disabled’ on or before March 31, 1975.”
Though the ALJ made no finding regarding the availability of these “jobs,” the Appeals Board stated that their availability was administratively noticed in the Regulations.
On appeal to the district court, the magistrate found that the Secretary’s conclusion that Frady’s skills were transferable was totally unsupported by the evidence. He noted that the Secretary gave no consideration to the “vocational adjustments required in terms of tools, work processes, work settings, or industry.” However, the magistrate’s finding was rejected by the district court.
This Court has long required the Secretary to make specific findings regarding a particular claimant’s skills. Taylor v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1975). Here, the Secretary blithely concluded that Frady’s experience as the “owner of a tree service and right-of-way contractor” imparted transferable skills. While these labels sound impressive, we are left to guess at the precise nature of those skills. Indeed, Frady testified that he had “some” managerial and administrative duties; again, the exact nature of these duties was never developed on the record. To the contrary, the substance of Frady’s testimony shows that he spent practically all of his time in the field, walking along power company right-of-ways to see how much work needed to be done and how it was progressing. These are the very activities which Frady was found to be presently incapable of performing because of his disability. The actual supervision of the workers was done by foremen. The reports, time sheets, payrolls and other paperwork were performed by secretaries and accountants. In short, the record compels the conclusion that Frady’s experience imparted only skills which he could no longer perform.
Having failed to enumerate Frady’s skills, the Secretary next fails to specify the jobs to which these “skills” are transferable. In Smith v. Califano, 592 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1979) we held that the Secretary must set forth the specific jobs which the claimant can perform, especially when the claimant is advanced in years and requires continuous medication. In Smith, the administrative law judge concluded that “certainly there are thousands of jobs [the claimant] could perform not requiring these activities.” Id. at 1236. Here, however, the majority has permitted the Secretary to find that Frady can perform “sedentary work,” a conclusion which is demonstrably meaningless in this context.1 Needless to say, without an enumeration of specific jobs we cannot evaluate on appeal whether such jobs are available in the economy.
In the final analysis, this decision is a perfect example of the mechanical application of administrative regulations without concern for the fundamental concepts of disability evaluation. Regardless of the regulations, the Secretary is obligated to set forth the claimant’s specific skills, the specific jobs for which the claimant qualifies, the availability of those jobs, and the basis for each such finding. In many cases these obligations will require the use of vocational experts, especially when a claimant’s skills are somewhat illusory, as in the case of Frady. The Secretary did not begin to meet this burden, even after a second attempt. Accordingly, I would reverse the Secretary’s decision.

. In addition to the exertional limitations noted by the majority, p. 144, n.l, the Regulations describe “sedentary work” as encompassing “the skilled, semi-skilled, professional, administrative, technical, clerical, and benchwork classifications.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513, Rule 201.00, Subpart P, App. 2. Such a vast and all-encompassing description is clearly insufficient under our decision in Smith.