Court Opinion

ID: 9859538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:58:14.562412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:20.790319
License: Public Domain

*244Dissenting Opinion
Givan, J.
The majority opinion is incorrect in its contention that the grand jury has no jurisdiction to inquire further when it is ascertained that the person under investigation is under eighteen years of age, and that the only action the grand jury could have taken when ascertaining the age of the relators was to refer the matter to the Marion County Juvenile Court and that they were without jurisdiction to proceed to return indictments against the relators.
The majority opinion states that the Marion County Criminal Court lacked jurisdiction even to transfer this cause to the Respondent Court based upon the fact that the grand jury knew the relators to be minors at the time the indictment was returned stating that such an indictment is a nullity. However, faced with the express language of the statute the majority is forced to observe that if the grand jury “inadvertently” indicts a minor, then the Court has jurisdiction and the transfer statutes would become applicable. Thus the majority has injected an entirely new concept into the law of jurisdiction in holding that the grand jury and the criminal court have jurisdiction when they were ignorant of the age of the person indicted or charged by affidavit, but that they are totally without jurisdiction if they know the age. Never before has this or any other Court to our knowledge ever held that jurisdiction may exist by reason of ignorance of a fact, but be non-existent when the fact is known to exist.
The matter of the jurisdiction of Juvenile Courts and of the handling of minor children who have committed acts of delinquency are matters which are purely statutory.
We, therefore, must turn to the specific language of the Indiana statutes which are pertinent to the questions presented. The statutes concerning the duties of the grand jury do not confine that body’s activities to the activities of adults. Section 9-824, Burns’ Indiana Statutes, requires the grand jury to inquire into, among other things, “violations of the *245criminal laws of this state generally, of which the court has jurisdiction.”
It will be noted from the above language that it is the violations of the criminal laws that the grand jury is to investigate. Certainly an act, even though committed by a minor, may be a violation of a criminal law even though because of the age of the child it may be considered to be an act of delinquincy rather than a crime.
The majority opinion also quotes the language from the statute above quoted and in so doing underscores the words, “of which the court has jurisdiction,” and thus draws the conclusions that the grand jury has no jurisdiction to return an indictment because the criminal court has no original jurisdiction to try the juvenile. In so doing the majority is ignoring the plain import of the language of the statute for the statute refers to the violation of criminal statutes over which the court has jurisdiction and does not attempt at that point to define the various circumstances under which the same court has no jurisdiction to try the individual who may have perpetrated such a violation. As an example, a criminal court has no jurisdiction to try a person who is insane regardless of the fact that he may have violated a criminal law. Yet the court does have jurisdiction to commit such person to a mental institution. To extend the reasoning in the majority opinion in this case to the situation of the insane defendant would be to say that the grand jury had no jurisdiction to return an indictment against a person whom they knew to be insane.
An examination of the juvenile court statutes reveals that the legislature anticipated two separate methods by which a juvenile court would obtain jurisdiction over the person of a delinquent child. The statute reads as follows:
“When jurisdiction shall have been obtained by the ‘court’ in the case of any child, such child shall continue under the jurisdiction of the court until he becomes twenty-one [21] years of age unless discharged prior thereto or is *246committed to a correctional or other state institution. A person subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under this act may be brought before it by either of the following means and no other:
“(a) By petition praying that the person be adjudged delinquent or dependent or neglected;
“(b) Certification and transfer from any other court before which any such person is brought charged with the commission of a crime. Provided, That upon discharge of a dependent or neglected child from a state psychiatric hospital or school for the mentally retarded, the committing court shall resume jurisdiction over such child. [Acts 1945, ch. 356, § 7, p. 1724; 1963, ch. 340, § 1, p. 850.]» § 9-3207, Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann., (1968 Cum. Supp.)
Subparagraph (b) above quoted clearly indicates that the legislature anticipated that a child under the age of eighteen years could be charged with a crime and brought before a court which did not have juvenile jurisdiction.
That section of the statute referring to the transfer of cases from other courts to the juvenile court reads as follows:
“If a complaint or charge of a criminal or quasi-criminal nature is made or pending against any person in any other court, and, it shall be ascertained that said person was under the age of eighteen [18] years at the time the offense is alleged to have been committed, it shall be the duty of such court to transfer such case immediately, together with all the papers, documents and testimony connected therewith, to the juvenile court, excepting, however, cases against children over sixteen [16] years of age charged with violation of any of the traffic laws of the state or of any traffic ordinances of a subdivision of the state, and further excepting cases against children charged with a violation of law, which if, committed by an adult, would be a capital offense. The court making such transfer shall order the child to be taken forthwith to the place of detention designated by the juvenile court or to the court itself, or release such child in the custody of some suitable person to appear before the juvenile court at a time designated. The juvenile court shall thereupon proceed to hear and dispose of such case in the same manner as if it had been instituted in that court in the first instance. [Acts 1945, ch. 356, § 13, p. 1724.] ’’ § 9-3213, Bums’ Ind. Stat. Ann.
*247From an examination of the foregoing statutes, including sections not above quoted, we find no restriction on the grand jury with regard to the age of offenders concerning the investigation of the violation of criminal laws.
That portion of the statute giving exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile court and requiring other courts with criminal jurisdiction to transfer the juvenile cases to the juvenile court is a transfer of the jurisdiction of the person and thus a limitation on the court’s right to try the juvenile for a crime without first sending the matter of the Juvenile Court. There is no prohibition against the charging of a juvenile in criminal court either by affidavit or indictment. In fact, as disclosed by the foregoing quoted language, such practice is specifically anticipated.
In arriving at their conclusion that the grand jury has no jurisdiction to indict when the offender is known to be a minor, the majority has relied heavily upon the fact that juvenile matters are considered to be civil in nature. They concede that the grand jury could investigate the events, but could not indict, presumably because the charge would be civil in nature. While we readily concede that the charge is civil in nature under our law, we agree with the language contained in the recent Supreme Court of the United States opinion in the case of In Re Gault [1967], 387 U. S. 149, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 558, 87 Sup. Ct. 1428, which reads as follows:
“It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all statements by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to ‘criminal’ involvement. In the first place, juvenile proceedings to determine ‘delinquency,’ which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as ‘criminal’ for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the ‘civil’ label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings____”
Although we have properly for the protection of the minor *248deemed these proceedings to be civil in nature in order that the child will have no criminal record, we are not justified in closing our eyes to the fact that his act is, in fact, a violation of a criminal statute over which the criminal court has full jurisdiction. It is only the jurisdiction over the individual that is vested in the juvenile court. As above shown our statutes contemplate that the charge may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction either by indictment or affidavit, and if so brought in a court other than a court of juvenile jurisdiction, transfer to juvenile court is required.
I would, therefore, hold that the Marion County Grand Jury had full jurisdiction to make inquiry into the alleged acts of the relators notwithstanding their age and to return indictments against them. The Honorable John T. Davis, Judge of the Marion County Criminal Court, Division 1, acted promptly and properly under the statute when he immediately ordered the causes transferred to the Juvenile Court. The Judge of Juvenile Court upon receiving the transfer of the causes had full jurisdiction to treat the indictments as informations in his court and to proceed to dispose of the cases either in his own court or by a waiver of any or all of the cases to the Marion County Criminal Court under the statute. I would hold that the actions of the Marion County Grand Jury, the Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County and the Judge of the Criminal Court, Division 1, are all proper in this matter, and The Honorable Harold N. Fields, Judge of the Juvenile Court of Marion County, respondent herein, had full jurisdiction to proceed.
I would, therefore, deny the petition for the writ.
Arterburn, J., concurs in dissent.
Note.—Reported in 247 N. E. 2d 53.