Court Opinion

ID: 9722682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:44:51.569518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:38.691105
License: Public Domain

ARDAIZ, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in parts I, II, and III of the majority opinion. I respectfully dissent from the reasoning and con*521elusion of part IV, i.e., that a Penal Code section 12022.11 “on bail” enhancement is exempt from section 1170.1, subdivision (g)’s double-the-base-term limitation.
Preliminarily, a brief review of section 1170.1, subdivision (g) clearly reveals that the Legislature did not explicitly exempt “on bail” enhancements from the operation of the double-the-base-term limitation.2 the major-The conclusion of the majority rests solely upon the theory that the provisions of California Constitution article I, section 28, subdivision (f) (hereafter article I, section 28(f)) supersede any statutory restriction for prior felony convictions and that the “on bail” enhancement of section 12022.1 is, in essence, a “prior felony conviction” enhancement for purposes of analysis of the applicability of the double-the-base-term limitation. Consequently, this is the only argument I need consider.
The gist of the majority’s argument is that since the conviction and imposition of sentence for the “primary offense” (§ 12022.1) must take place “prior” to the implementation of punishment for the “on bail” enhancement, the enhancement is a form of “prior felony conviction.” In support of this argument, the majority relies upon our Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Prather (1990) 50 Cal.3d 428 [267 Cal.Rptr. 605, 787 P.2d 1012]. For reasons to be stated, the premise is incorrect.
Enacted in 1982 as part of Proposition 8, article I, section 28(f), provides: “Any prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding, whether adult or juvenile, shall be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding. When a prior felony conviction is an element of any felony offense, it shall be proven to the trier of fact in open court.” In People v. Prather, supra, 50 Cal.3d 428, 440, our Supreme Court held that article I, section 28(f) bars application of the double-the-base-term limitation to section 667.5, subdivision (b) “prior prison term” enhancements.
The court rejected the argument that a prior prison term enhancement is not based on a prior felony conviction within the meaning of article I, section 28(f). This “hypertechnical reading of Proposition 8 . . . ignores the underlying purposes of both that provision and section 667.5(b), namely, to *522provide increased terms of imprisonment for recidivist felony offenders. [Citations.]” (People v. Prather, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 439-440.) The court reasoned: “We think it clear that section 667.5(b) is aimed primarily at the underlying felony conviction, and only secondarily, and as an indicium of the felony’s seriousness, at the prior prison term. That is, we believe section 667.5(b), fairly read, merely provides a special sentence enhancement for that particular subset of ‘prior felony convictions’ that were deemed serious enough by earlier sentencing courts to warrant actual imprisonment .... Accordingly, we hold that the broad mandate of article I, section 28, subdivision (f), concerning the use of ‘any prior felony convictions’ for enhancement purposes, necessarily includes the lesser category of enhancements based on prior felony convictions for which imprisonment was imposed.” (Id. at p. 440, italics in original.)
In People v. Shivers (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 847 [226 Cal.Rptr. 293], we held that section 667.5, subdivision (b) did not authorize an enhancement of sentence where the “prior prison term” was for a crime committed after the crime for which the defendant was presently being sentenced. Noting that the legislative purpose of enhancement for prior convictions was to deter recidivism, we found that “[t]he purpose of deterring recidivism would not be effectuated by enhancing a present offense by an offense not yet committed.” (Id., at p. 850.)
In People v. Rojas (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 795 [253 Cal.Rptr. 786], the court reached a similar result in construing section 667, subdivision (a), itself a part of Proposition 8. That statute provides a five-year enhancement for “any person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony.” The court held “that, to be subject to the five-year enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a), a defendant’s prior serious felony conviction must have occurred before the commission of the present offense.” (Id., at p. 802.) Relying in part on People v. Shivers, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d 847, the court reasoned: “Similarly here, the purpose of deterring recidivism would not be furthered by imposing enhanced punishment on a person who was not previously convicted of a serious felony before the commission of the present offense.” (People v. Rojas, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 801.)
Rojas also relied on People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480], where our Supreme Court held: “We find merit in defendant’s contention that the ‘prior felony conviction[s]’ described in subdivision (c) of section 190.3 are limited to those entered before commission of the capital crime. California courts have consistently so *523interpreted statutes which call for harsher penal treatment on the basis of ‘prior convictions.’ [Citations.] The presumed rationale of such laws is that an offender undeterred by his prior brushes with the law deserves more severe criminal treatment. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 201, italics in original.) Or as stated in Rojas, “it is difficult to envision how one can ‘relapse’ into criminal behavior within the meaning of an habitual criminal statute before one’s prior conduct has been adjudicated as criminal and resulted in punishment.” (People v. Rojas, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 799.)
As these authorities make clear, the distinguishing feature of an enhancement based on a prior conviction is that the defendant receives greater punishment for committing a new offense after his conviction of the earlier offense. The “on bail” enhancement authorized by section 12022.1 operates in an entirely different manner. The defendant receives greater punishment not because his new felony, the “secondary offense,” followed his conviction of an earlier felony, the “primary offense.” Rather, he receives greater punishment because his new felony followed his release from custody on the earlier crime. While the fact of ultimate conviction on the primary offense is a precondition to imposition of the two-year enhancement, the timing of the conviction is entirely irrelevant. Section 12022.1 expressly addresses, inter alia, the situation where conviction and sentencing on the secondary offense precede conviction on the primary offense. (§ 12022.1, subd.(2)(d).)
The elements of the “on bail” enhancement are that the person was released from custody on a primary offense and committed a secondary offense while at liberty. A conviction for the primary offense is not an element of the “on bail” enhancement. While a felony conviction and sentence must precede, i.e., occur “prior to” actual imposition of the “on bail” enhancement penalty, this fact does not mean the enhancement is based on a prior felony conviction. Rather, imposition of punishment for the enhancement requires a felony conviction and imposition of sentence for the primary offense. While the conviction and imposition of punishment for the primary offense must take place “prior” to the imposition of punishment for the enhancement, this condition precedent to punishment does not render the enhancement a prior felony conviction.3 A petition for review filed A true finding does not require that the defendant has suffered a prior felony conviction. The majority uses the word “prior” in a literal sense blind to its conventional use.
The majority’s reliance on People v. Warinner (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1352 [247 Cal.Rptr. 197] is misplaced. Warinner states: “The legislative *524intent of section 12022.1 was to punish recidivists with additional penalties. The increased penalties here are due to Warinner’s status as a repeat offender and arise as an incident of the subsequent offense. [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 1356, italics in original.) While article I, section 28(f), also seeks to punish recidivism, it does not follow that section 12022. l’s “on bail” enhancement is based on prior felony convictions. The statutes deal with two different types of recidivists. Section 12022.1 punishes a person who commits a new felony while released from custody on an earlier felony of which he ultimately is convicted; enhancements based on prior felony convictions punish persons who commit new crimes only after conviction of earlier felonies.
The majority also relies upon language in People v. Tassell (1984) 36 Cal.3d 77, 90 [201 Cal.Rptr. 567, 679 P.2d 1], wherein our Supreme Court cited to section 12022.1 as an example of the category of enhancements for “prior convictions” listed in section 1170.1 that go to the nature or status of the offender, as opposed to another class of enhancements which go to the nature of the offense.4 This discussion was in the context of an opinion holding that priors that go to the nature of the offender, to wit, the priors pleaded and proven in Tassell under sections 667.5, subdivision (b) and 667.6, subdivision (a), do not attach to a particular count and therefore can only be used once as a component of an aggregate term. The majority’s statement that this characterization of section 12022.1 “is something more than dictum” is not persuasive. The passing reference to section 12022.1, taken in context, was illustrative of a category of enhancements which plainly go to the specific nature of the offender. Tassell did not discuss whether, nor did it hold that, enhancements imposed pursuant to section 12022.1 are enhancements based on prior felony convictions.
In sum, the majority’s premise that the “on bail” enhancement is based on “prior felony convictions” rests on an unprecedented, unsupportable interpretation of this term of art that flies in the face of long-accepted usage. “[W]here the language of a statute uses terms that have been judicially construed, a strong presumption exists that the terms have been used in the precise manner which the courts have placed upon them. This principle also *525applies to legislation added by initiative, . . (People v. Rojas, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 799.) Indeed, the materials placed before the voters when they enacted Proposition 8 referred to convictions that existed in the past, before the new criminal conduct occurred. (See People v. Prather, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 436.) For these reasons, I dissent.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 4, 1991.

 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

 While another court has concluded the Legislature’s failure to specifically exempt section 12022.1 from the double-the-base-term limitation of section 1170.1 was not a drafting oversight (People v. Weatheroy  (Cal.App.), the majority opinion does not address this issue.

 The same conclusion was reached in People v. Weatheroy  (Cal.App.). A petition for review filed September 5, 1990, in Weatheroy is pending.

“Section 1170.1 refers to two kinds of enhancements: (1) those which go to the nature of the offender; and (2) those which go to the nature of the offense. Enhancements for prior convictions—authorized by sections 667.5, 667.6 and 12022.1—are of the first sort. The second kind of enhancements—those which arise from the circumstances of the crime—are typified by sections 12022.5 and 12022.7: was a firearm used or was great bodily injury inflicted? Enhancements of the second kind enhance the several counts; those of the first kind, by contrast, have nothing to do with particular counts but, since they are related to the offender, are added only once as a step in arriving at the aggregate sentence.” (People v. Tassell, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 90.)