Court Opinion

ID: 9939551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:09:41.611472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:24.461731
License: Public Domain

J-A25027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  WILLIAM SCHOFIELD                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1389 WDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 18, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-04-CR-0001620-2020

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                        FILED: February 9, 2024

       William Schofield appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after

a jury found him guilty of multiple sex offenses. He challenges the trial court’s

denial of his motion to exclude expert testimony from the forensic interviewer

and claims that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Upon

review, we affirm.

       This case arises out of the sexual assault of a seven-year-old girl, N.B.,

by Schofield, her father. For the first six years of N.B.’s life, Schofield had a

minimal relationship with her. In the year leading up to the assault, Schofield

started having contact with N.B. once a week, usually by phone.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A25027-23

       On April 28, 2020, Schofield contacted N.B.’s mother and asked if N.B.

could have a sleepover at his house; she agreed. N.B. spent the night at her

father’s for the first time. Schofield’s girlfriend and her daughter were also

there. Schofield slept in the bedroom with his daughter that night.

       A couple weeks later, N.B. had extreme vaginal discomfort. Her mother

attributed it to laundry detergent, fabric sheets, or improper hygiene. On June

26, 2020, N.B. told her cousin that Schofield had sexually assaulted her when

she stayed overnight at his house. N.B.’s mother took her to the hospital

where testing revealed that she had chlamydia.

       Schofield was arrested and charged with multiple offenses.

       Prior to trial, Schofield filed a motion in limine to exclude the expert

testimony of Jo Ellen Bowman, a forensic interviewer in the field of child sexual

assault victim behavior.       The Commonwealth indicated that it intended to

present Bowman at trial to give her opinion regarding the dynamics that may

impact the disclosure of abuse and child reporting behaviors. Schofield argued

that her testimony was not sufficiently scientifically supported and did not

satisfy the Frye1 standard. Therefore, he claimed that Bowman should not be

permitted to testify. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Schofield’s

motion.

____________________________________________

1 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

                                           -2-
J-A25027-23

       On January 10, 2022, Schofield’s case proceeded to trial.       The jury

deadlocked, and the court declared a mistrial. Two counts against Schofield

were dismissed at that time.

       The case was retried on May 13, 2022. The jury convicted Schofield on

the remaining counts including statutory sexual assault (victim under 16 and

perpetrator 11 years older), rape of a child, involuntary sexual intercourse

with a child, unlawful contact with a minor, incest of a minor--complainant

under 13, aggravated indecent assault--complainant under 13, indecent

assault of person less than 13, and endangering the welfare of a child--parent

or guardian.2 The court sentenced Schofield to an aggregate sentence of 21-

42 years’ incarceration, with a consecutive 3 year term of probation. Schofield

filed a post-sentence motion, which the court denied.3

       Schofield filed this timely appeal. Schofield and the trial court complied

with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

       Schofield raises three issues for our review:

       1. Was it error to deny [Schofield’s] pretrial motion in limine
       regarding the testimony of the Commonwealth's expert witness Jo
       Ellen Bowman?

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3122.1(b), 3121(c), 3121(d), 6318(a)(1), 4202(b)(1),
3125(a)(7), 3126(a)(7), and 4304(a).

3Schofield requested additional time to file a supplemental post-sentence
motion, which the court granted, but did not file one.

                                           -3-
J-A25027-23

       2. Was it error to deny [Schofield’s] motion for new trial based
       upon the weight of the evidence?

       3. Did the lower court err cumulatively?

Schofield’s Brief at 3 (excessive capitalization omitted).

       In his first issue, Schofield claims that the trial court erred in two

respects when it denied his motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony

of Bowman.4 First, Schofield maintains that the court erred in determining

that Bowman’s proposed testimony satisfied Frye because her conclusions,

rather than the methodology used to reach those conclusions, were widely

accepted. Schofield’s Brief at 21. Second, Schofield maintains that the court

erred when it stated that did not set forth “articulable grounds to believe that

an expert witness had not applied accepted scientific methodology in a

conventional fashion in reaching his or her conclusions.” Id. at 17. Schofield

contends that Bowman’s testimony failed to satisfy Frye and should not have

been admitted.       Additionally, Schofield argues that the admission of this

evidence was not harmless error. Id. at 22-23.      We disagree.

       This Court reviews the denial of a motion in limine to preclude the

admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.            Commonwealth v.

Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2018).               The “[a]dmission of

evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed

only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.”

Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 357 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc)

____________________________________________

4 We have reordered these arguments for ease of disposition.

                                           -4-
J-A25027-23

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth

v. Hoover, 107 A.3d 723, 729 (Pa. 2014) (noting that an appellate court

applies an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the denial

of a motion in limine).       “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of

judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied,

or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record,

discretion is abused.” Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 772-73 (Pa.

2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

       Expert testimony is permitted in all trials “when it involves explanations

and inferences not within the range of ordinary training[,] knowledge,

intelligence and experience.” Id. at 788. Expert testimony is governed

generally by Rule 702 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. 5

____________________________________________

5 Rule 702, entitled “Testimony by Expert Witnesses,” provides as follows:

       A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
       experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
       opinion or otherwise if:

       (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
       knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson;

       (b) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
       knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
       to determine a fact in issue; and

       (c) the expert's methodology is generally accepted in the relevant
       field.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -5-
J-A25027-23

       To determine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, Pennsylvania

employs the Frye standard, which is incorporated into Rule 702.6 Grady v.

Frito–Lay Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Pa. 2003).            Frye permits novel

scientific evidence to be admitted at trial “if the methodology that underlies

the evidence has general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.”

Walker, 92 A.3d at 789 (citation omitted).

       In seeking to exclude scientific evidence, that party has the burden to

first demonstrate that the expert's testimony is based on novel scientific

evidence. Scientific evidence is “novel” when “there is a legitimate dispute

regarding the reliability of the expert's conclusions.” Commonwealth v.

Safka, 95 A.3d 304, 307 (Pa. Super. 2014) (emphasis added) (citation and

quotation omitted). A reasonably broad meaning should be ascribed to the

term “novel.” Betz v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 53 (Pa. 2012). It

does not necessarily relate to the newness of the science or technology used

in developing the conclusions. Safka, 95 A.3d at 308.

       Once it is established that the scientific evidence in question is novel,

the burden then shifts to the party offering the evidence. “[T]he proponent

of the scientific evidence must show that the expert's methodology has

general acceptance in the relevant scientific community despite the legitimate
____________________________________________

Pa.R.E. 702.

6 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first adopted the Frye standard in
Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1977).

                                           -6-
J-A25027-23

dispute.”    Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1091 (Pa. 2017);

Commonwealth v. Powell, 171 A.3d 294, 308 (Pa. Super. 2017) (explaining

the shift in burdens).

       A trial court is not required to conduct a Frye hearing every time a party

seeks to introduce scientific evidence. “Rather, a hearing is warranted only

when the trial court has articulable grounds to believe that an expert

witness has not applied accepted scientific methodology in a conventional

fashion in reaching his or her conclusions.”             Jacoby, 170 A.3d at 1091

(emphasis added).

       Here, the trial court found that Schofield did not demonstrate that

Bowman’s conclusions were based on novel science. Schofield presented no

evidence, such as research or articles, to demonstrate that the foundation of

Bowman’s conclusions or the conclusions themselves were disputed or that

other schools of thought existed.7             N.T., 11/10/21, at 107-108.   Instead,

Schofield focused on how various factors could impact Bowman’s conclusions,

which goes to the persuasiveness of her opinions, and the methodology

underlying Bowman’s intended testimony. Id. at 39, 41, 93-94. None of the

questions pertained to the validity of the science used to reach these

conclusions. Consequently, after Bowman testified, the court stated: “I can’t

____________________________________________

7 Based upon our review of the record, we observe that Bowman’s testimony

indicated the contrary. Id. at 60-61, 65-66.

                                           -7-
J-A25027-23

find that there is any, that there is anything that legitimately disputes the

reliability of [Bowman’s] conclusions . . . .” N.T., 11/10/21, at 107-109.

       Additionally, the trial court cited Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d

594 (Pa. Super. 2018) in support of its determination. Trial Court Opinion,

1/31/23, at 36. In Cramer, the Commonwealth sought to present expert

testimony regarding victim behaviors and dynamics involving sexual assault

like the testimony in this case. The defendant filed a motion in limine claiming

that this testimony was based on “human behavioral sciences of psychology,

human development, and science,” and that the Commonwealth was required

to prove that such conclusions were based on generally accepted scientific

methodology in the relevant scientific community. The trial court denied the

defendant’s request for a Frye hearing.          On appeal this Court affirmed,

concluding that the proposed expert testimony was not based on novel

scientific evidence.

       For these reasons, Schofield failed to satisfy Frye’s threshold step of

establishing the expert’s testimony involved novel science. Therefore, the trial

court did not have “articulable grounds” to consider Bowman’s methodology.8

____________________________________________

8 Notwithstanding this, the court found that Bowman’s methodology for
arriving at her conclusions was generally accepted in the relevant field. See
N.T., 11/10/21, at 109.

                                           -8-
J-A25027-23

      Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Schofield’s motion in limine and admitting the expert testimony of

Bowman. Schofield’s first issue merits no relief.

      In his second issue, Schofield claims that the trial court erred by denying

his motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. Specifically,

Schofield argues that the medical evidence showed that neither he, nor his

various sexual partners, had chlamydia during the relevant time frame.

According to Schofield, this evidence strongly disfavored any determination

that he was the one who gave N.B. chlamydia, and, therefore, the weight of

the evidence indicated he was not the one who assaulted N.B. Schofield’s

Brief at 23-24. Schofield, therefore, claims he is entitled to a new trial.

      The trial court maintains that this issue is waived because Schofield only

claimed generally in his Rule 1925(b) statement that the verdict was against

the weight of the evidence without specifying a reason. Trial Court Opinion,

1/31/23, at 25, 27. As such, the court claims the statement was too vague

to enable it to identify the issue raised on appeal and address it. Id. at 27.

We agree.

      “[A] concise statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify

the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise

Statement at all.” Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686–87 (Pa.

Super. 2001). To preserve a challenge to either the sufficiency or weight of

the evidence on appeal, an appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement must state

with specificity the elements or verdicts for which the appellant alleges that

                                      -9-
J-A25027-23

the evidence was insufficient or against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1248-49 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(finding waiver of appellant's weight challenge where the Pa.R.A.P. 1925

statement was too vague to permit the court to identify which verdicts were

contrary to the weight of the evidence, and the specific reasons why the

verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence)). This is so even where

the trial court issued an opinion addressing the substance of the claim.

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 224 A.3d 682, 700 (Pa. 2020).

          Here, Schofield did not specify in his concise statement which of his

convictions he believed were against the weight of the evidence. Additionally,

he did not specify why the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.

And, although the trial court addressed what it thought Schofield’s argument

was--issues relating to the credibility of N.B.--the court was unable to address

the specific issue Schofield raised on appeal regarding the medical evidence.

This is a clear example of why this rule must be strictly enforced.            We,

therefore, find that this issue is waived. Schofield’s second issue warrants no

relief.

          In his third issue, Schofield claims that, although the errors herein may

be considered harmless individually, the cumulative effect of these errors is

prejudicial. As we have concluded that the trial court did not err regarding

Schofield’s first issue and that Schofield waived his second issue, his third

issue likewise warrants no relief. See Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d

                                        - 10 -
J-A25027-23

1, 56 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted) (“[N]o number of failed claims may

collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so individually.”).

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 02/09/2024

                                       - 11 -