Court Opinion

ID: 9665944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:00:11.629138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:20.872262
License: Public Domain

CORNELIUS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I believe the evidence shows as a matter of law that MidTexas Pipeline Company made a bona fide effort to agree with Wilbert 0. Dernehl on the amount of damages for the easement it sought to condemn. See Cusack Ranch Corp. v. Mid-Texas Pipeline Co., 71 S.W.3d 395 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet. h.). The Cusack Ranch case is on all fours with the case here.
The majority opinion says that MidTex-as never made Dernehl an offer for the easement it later sought in condemnation. That statement is inaccurate. The summary judgment evidence shows that Mid-Texas never sought to condemn anything but an easement for a thirty-inch pipeline to transport natural gas. MidTexas’ initial offer, dated May 19, 1995, offered Dernehl $11,333.00. In its initial letter offers to the landowners, MidTexas stated that the easement sought to be purchased was “a 50-foot permanent easement for one 30 inch pipeline used to transport natural gas.”1 That is exactly what, and only what, MidTexas later sought to acquire by eminent domain. Summary judgment evidence shows that MidTexas never sought to condemn any property or right other than a fifty-foot easement for a thirty-inch natural gas pipeline.
It is true that MidTexas’ initial letter offer to purchase the easement had attached to it a right-of-way agreement form that contained provisions for warranty of title, a right to assign the easement, and an authorization for MidTexas to transport other substances through the pipeline. MidTexas made it clear, however, that the terms of the right-of-way form were negotiable. MidTexas’ summary judgment affidavits and deposition testimony also state that the terms of the right-of-way form were always negotiable,2 and the letter offer makes the form of the right-of-way agreement subject to the landowner’s acceptance.
Dernehl never objected, before condemnation proceedings were instituted, about the terms of the right-of-way form, but only made a counter-offer to MidTexas of $120,000.00 for the easement. MidTexas had engaged an independent real estate appraiser who appraised the value of the easement at $5,883.64. MidTexas, howev*860er, initially offered $11,383.00, nearly twice the appraised value. After Dernehl demanded $120,000.00, MidTexas made another offer of $13,331.00, which was more than twice the amount awarded by the special commissioners for the easement, which was $6,000.00.
Even if the extra ownership incidents set out in the right-of-way form could be considered property rights in MidTexas’ offer to purchase, MidTexas’ offers still included the property ultimately condemned, i.e., the easement for a thirty-inch pipeline to transport natural gas. Mid-Texas offered $13,331.00 for the natural gas pipeline easement and the incidental rights. Having offered a reasonable sum for all of the rights, the offer necessarily included the natural gas pipeline easement, because the greater includes the lesser. In the negotiations, Dernehl never objected to the terms of the right-of-way agreement, and he never made a counter-offer for just the natural gas pipeline easement without the extra incidents. Nor did he request that MidTexas make an offer for the natural gas pipeline only. See Cusack Ranch Corp. v. MidTexas Pipeline Co., 71 S.W.3d 395.
Dernehl asserts in his brief that Mid-Texas threatened and intimidated him by including in its initial offer the incidental rights set out in the right-of-way form, and by telling him that if he did not voluntarily sell the easement and the other incidental rights, MidTexas would take the matter to condemnation. There is absolutely no summary judgment evidence to support any allegation of threats or intimidation. A pipeline company has a perfect right to try to purchase an easement granting a larger interest, and then later decide to condemn only a lesser interest. A reasonable offer to purchase the greater estate necessarily serves as a reasonable offer for the lesser estate because the greater includes the lesser. And the company has a perfect right to advise the landowner that if they cannot agree on damages, it will seek to acquire the easement by eminent domain. See Marburger v. Seminole Pipeline Co., 957 S.W.2d 82 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).
If MidTexas had sought to purchase only the natural gas pipeline and negotiated for it, and then filed condemnation proceedings to acquire greater rights than it had tried to purchase, the marjority opinion would be correct because the landowner would not have been offered a reasonable price or negotiation for the property actually sought in condemnation. But that is the opposite of what occurred here.
The purpose of the unable-to-agree requirement of the statute is to avoid litigation and prevent needless appeals when the matter of price might have been settled by the parties. This purpose should not be thwarted by a hypertechnical interpretation of the requirement. See Cusack Ranch Corp. v. MidTexas Pipeline Co., 71 S.W.3d 395. The majority in this case, by holding that an offer for the property to be condemned, together with certain incidental rights, does not also constitute an offer for the lesser property to be condemned, honors hypertechnicality to the ultimate. This is especially true where, as here, the parties’ respective offers are so far apart it is obvious they will not be able to agree. See id.
Even if it can be considered that the offer for the easement, plus the additional ownership incidents, did not constitute an offer for the easement actually condemned, the summary judgment evidence shows as a matter of law that MidTexas made a bona fide attempt to agree with the landowners under the principles announced in the Cusack case. As the court stated in the opinion in that case, “the fact that MidTexas’ final offer contained those [ad*861ditional] terms is not, alone, enough to negate the other evidence showing that MidTexas engaged in a good faith attempt to agree with Cusack regarding the amount of damages.” Id. at at 400.
If the summary judgment evidence does not establish as a matter of law that Mid-Texas made a good faith attempt to agree, then it certainly raises a fact question on that issue. Consequently, at the least, the summary judgment dismissing MidTexas’ suit should be reversed and remanded for trial, as the Eastland Court of Appeals did under almost identical circumstances in Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 37 S.W.3d 133 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2001, pet. denied).
For the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgment and render judgment as prayed for by MidTexas in its motion for partial summary judgment. In the alternative, I would remand the matter to the trial court for a factual determination of the unable-to-agree requirement.

. MidTexas’ final offer to Dernehl is in the record, but its initial offer of May 19, 1995 is not in the record. The final offer, however, refers to the initial offer, and I assume that the initial letter offer contains the same statement as the initial letter offer to the other landowners in the companion cases that concern the same pipeline. For example, the letter to Roy Wright, one of the landowners, is in the record in a companion case. It contains the statement about MidTexas seeking to purchase a pipeline for natural gas and it appears that MidTexas used the same form of initial offer and final offer for all landowners involved in this taking because the final offers all use the same language, and are identical except for the amounts of money offered.

. Dernehl's summary judgment supporting affidavit posits that some of the right-of-way form terms were actually not negotiable, but at best this would raise a fact issue.