Court Opinion

ID: 9366713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 19:00:37.933533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:54.641453
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60199        Document: 00516625785             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/27/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                                                                 FILED
                                                                           January 27, 2023
                                      No. 22-60199
                                                                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                    Summary Calendar                             Clerk

   Gadi Dusengimana,

                                                                                  Petitioner,

                                            versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                                Respondent.

                          Petition for Review of an Order of the
                              Board of Immigration Appeals
                                Agency No. A097 076 489

   Before Barksdale, Higginson, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Gadi Dusengimana, a native of Rwanda and citizen of Burundi,
   petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissing
   his appeal from an order of the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying his
   applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
   Convention Against Torture. Although Dusengimana waived his right to

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60199       Document: 00516625785          Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/27/2023

                                     No. 22-60199

   appeal the IJ’s decision, he subsequently, through new counsel, filed an
   appeal, maintaining, inter alia, his waiver was invalid. The BIA determined
   Dusengimana knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal; and, in
   reaching that decision, noted that he failed to comply with the procedural
   requirements necessary to present a claim for ineffective assistance of
   counsel (IAC), and that there was no evidence his former counsel provided
   inaccurate advice.
            The BIA’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence; its
   conclusions of law, de novo. Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442, 444 (5th
   Cir. 2001). The IJ’s ruling is reviewed only to the extent it affected the BIA’s
   decision. Singh v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2018).
            The substantial-evidence standard applies to findings that a waiver
   was made knowingly and intelligently. E.g., Kohwarien v. Holder, 635 F.3d
   174, 178–79 (5th Cir. 2011). Under this standard, “[petitioner] must show
   that the evidence was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
   conclude against it”. Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS, 78 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir.
   1996).
            Dusengimana contends his waiver was induced by misleading and
   incorrect advice from the IJ and his former counsel, making it invalid. He
   additionally maintains the BIA deprived him of the opportunity to present
   this challenge by rendering its decision without first allowing him to file a
   brief.
            Although the IJ incorrectly predicted how long the BIA would take to
   rule on Dusengimana’s appeal, the IJ prefaced that this prediction was based
   on his experience and that he could not be certain. And, the IJ’s statement
   that Dusengimana would remain detained while his appeal to the BIA was
   pending was also incorrect; he was released about one month after the IJ’s
   ruling. While Dusengimana contends it was pursuant to a nationwide

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                                     No. 22-60199

   injunction from a California district court, the record is unclear what caused
   his release. That injunction was reversed prior to the IJ’s ruling. Therefore,
   even assuming the IJ was aware of the injunction, Dusengimana fails to show
   the IJ’s statement was misleading at the time of his waiver, and he does not
   provide authority supporting his waiver was rendered unknowing or
   unintelligent merely because the IJ’s statement ended up being incorrect.
   E.g., Kohwarien, 635 F.3d at 179 (“[A]lthough the record suggest[ed] some
   initial confusion . . . the evidence [was not] so compelling that no reasonable
   fact finder could conclude . . . that [petitioner’s] waiver was valid”. (citation
   omitted)); see Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 16 F.4th 613, 618 (9th
   Cir. 2021) (reversing injunction which, due to COVID-19 concerns, imposed,
   inter alia, “procedures expressly designed to result in the release of
   substantial numbers of detainees from ICE custody”).
          The IJ repeatedly emphasized the waiver decision was solely
   Dusengimana’s to make and encouraged him to consult with his attorney,
   which he did. After this consultation, his attorney stated Dusengimana
   waived his right to appeal; and she was satisfied this decision was made
   knowingly and intelligently. As noted by the BIA, there is no evidence
   counsel provided incorrect advice. Accordingly, under the above-discussed
   substantial-evidence standard, the record does not compel finding the waiver
   invalid.
          Upon reaching its determination, supported by substantial evidence,
   that the waiver was valid, the BIA was entitled to summarily dismiss
   Dusengimana’s appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(G) (BIA “may summarily
   dismiss any appeal . . . [that is] barred by an affirmative waiver of the right of
   appeal that is clear on the record”).
          As part of its basis for upholding the waiver, the BIA’s conclusion that
   Dusengimana failed to meet the procedures required to pursue his IAC claim

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   is a legal question, reviewed de novo. E.g., Hernandez-Ortez v. Holder, 741
   F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2014).
          When presenting an IAC claim in removal proceedings, an alien must
   “(1) provide an affidavit attesting the relevant facts, including a statement of
   the terms of the attorney-client agreement; (2) inform counsel of the
   allegations and allow counsel an opportunity to respond; [and] (3) file or
   explain why a grievance has not been filed against the offending attorney”.
   Mai v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 2006).
          In attempting to prove he has now met the requisite procedures,
   Dusengimana points to exhibits attached to his motion for reconsideration
   filed in the BIA when he filed the petition at hand. Because that evidence
   presented with that motion was not presented to the BIA when it considered
   his appeal which is the subject of this petition, it is not part of the record
   before us; therefore, we cannot consider it. E.g., Hernandez-Ortiz, 741 F.3d
   at 647 (This court “cannot consider” evidence of compliance with IAC
   procedures which “was not presented to the BIA”.); see 8 U.S.C. §
   1252(b)(4)(A) (providing that “the court of appeals shall decide the petition
   only on the administrative record on which the order of removal is based”);
   Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 390 n.15 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[E]ven if not
   jurisdictionally barred, it would be imprudent to preempt established
   administrative procedures and decide [petitioner’s] claim on an incomplete
   record”.).
          DENIED.

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