Court Opinion

ID: 9743046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:24:39.993697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:38.848991
License: Public Domain

*513Brickley, J.
(concurring). I agree with Justice Boyle that a fair and common-sense reading of MCL 780.653; MSA 28.1259(3) reveals that the statute is fulfilled if the "personal knowledge” requirement is satisfied by the affidavit and "so long as the information is reliable or the informant is credible.” I also think this latter part of the statutory standard is equivalent to the constitutional standard of Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108; 84 S Ct 1509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964), as it has been recently interpreted by Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983).
I do not agree, however, that that standard has been met in this case. The statute requires that an affidavit relating hearsay contain "affirmative allegations that the person spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein,” but does not require such "affirmative allegations” with regard to the magistrate’s finding that the affidavit contained "reliable information from a credible person.” However, in this case, there is no information whatsoever, outside of the four corners of the informant’s allegations, from which his credibility or the reliability of the information he supplied can even be inferred. There is no question that the information, if reliable (and that can be supplied by either some extrinsic validation of some of the information by the affiant or by some assertion by the affiant of the informant’s credibility), would supply more than the requisite probable cause.
Because I think neither the constitutional nor the statutory requirements were met, I concur with the suppression of the evidence resulting from the use of the search warrant.
Boyle, J. I dissent.
The Michigan statute, MCL 780.653; MSA *51428.1259(3), on which Justice Levin relies for his conclusion, was first enacted as 1966 PA 189, two years after the decision in Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108; 84 S Ct 1509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964). I find it highly unlikely that the statute was intended to expand Aguilar. I conclude that it is more likely that it was intended to codify the concepts articulated therein.
The fundamental issue in every search warrant case is whether probable cause to believe that the evidence is in the place to be searched has been shown. Since it is the neutral and detached magistrate who must make this decision, not the affiant, the affidavit must allege facts which permit that determination to be made. Giordenello v United States, 357 US 480; 78 S Ct 1245; 2 L Ed 2d 1503 (1958). An affidavit which indicates that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein identifies the source of the affiant’s belief. Id. The rule of Aguilar was simply that "[although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, Jones v United States, 362 US 257 [80 S Ct 725; 4 L Ed 2d 697 (1960)], [in such cases] the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the [evidence was] where he claimed [it was], and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant . . . was 'credible’ or his information 'reliable.’ ” 378 US 114 (emphasis added; citations omitted). The requirement was not that the unnamed person be shown to be credible as that term is used in a courtroom, but rather was a requirement that the affiant show the magistrate why the information was believable.
Informant credibility or reliability is thus a *515vehicle for demonstrating to the magistrate why the affiant believes the evidence is in the place for which the warrant is sought. I believe a commonsense interpretation of the statute is as follows: it authorizes a warrant to issue on the basis of hearsay information from an unnamed person so long as the information is reliable or the informant is credible, provided that the affidavit in such case contains allegations that the unnamed person spoke with personal knowledge.
For example, where the information provided was that an unnamed informer had previously provided correct information on 200 occasions, this information would be both credible and reliable. The construction of the statute advanced by Justice Levin would require that in every case, whether named or unnamed, proof of the informant’s credibility must be shown. This construction would take us to the quite remarkable conclusion, that if one of the justices provided the police with information that he or she had received a series of threatening phone calls and expected to receive another, a magistrate would not be warranted in issuing a warrant unless the affiant officer also provided proof that the justice is credible and that the information is reliable. It would also prevent issuance of a search warrant where the affiant is communicating incriminating statements made to him by a third party. If the communication is, "I will have the drugs at my home tonight,” this is surely reliable information, but I doubt that the speaker could be independently shown to be a credible person.
To the extent that the statute is ambiguous, I can see no basis for construing it in a manner which would require a greater showing than any decision of the United States Supreme Court has *516ever suggested, particularly where it will produce such anomalous results.
Applying this analysis to the facts of the warrant in the instant case, in light of the ultimate issue, that is, has the affiant demonstrated why he believes the information will be where he says it is and is it reasonable to so believe, I conclude first that the affidavit does contain allegations that the provider of the information spoke with personal knowledge. He was the recipient of the phone calls and heard the conversations. Second, the combination of the name of the informant, his long-term relationship with Sherbine, the number of calls received, and the fact that they had become increasingly detailed in regard to the murder of LeRoy Crenshaw (a murder for which defendant had been once convicted, and was then awaiting retrial)1 were such as to permit a reasonably prudent person to conclude that a phone call from Sherbine would probably include reference to the murder.
Finally, even were I to conclude that the statute should be read as requiring a third requirement, I would not conclude that suppression is required. The affidavit meets the test set forth in Aguilar, supra, or Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983).
I cannot conceive of a reason why we should apply the exclusionary rule to the supposed violation of a statute where the affidavit would pass constitutional muster under either Const 1963, art 1, § 11, or US Const, Am IV, see People v Nash, 418 Mich 196; 341 NW2d 439 (1983).
Ryan, J., concurred with Boyle, J.

 These facts were not presented in the affidavit.