Court Opinion

ID: 9622499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:18:43.048742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:17.452730
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because the definition of “criminal offense against a victim who is a minor” found in OCGA § 42-1-12 (a) (9) is unconstitutionally over-inclusive, I respectfully dissent to Division 2 of the majority opinion and to the affirmance of the trial court’s ruling.
In May 2000, 18-year-old Jake Rainer and three acquaintances arranged to buy drugs from the 17-year-old victim, planning to take her money and drugs after picking her up at an agreed-upon location. The victim got into the car to complete the transaction and they drove away. Stopping in what they thought was a secluded area, the men attempted to take the victim’s purse and push her out of the car. There was a struggle, and the victim remained inside. The men drove to a second location, where they left the victim after gaining *680possession of the purse. Witness identifications led to the arrest of the four men. In May 2001, Rainer pled guilty to false imprisonment and robbery, and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment with five years to serve and the remainder on probation. Rainer served the five years and it was not until he had been on probation for a year that he was informed for the first time that he would be required to register as a sex offender for these crimes.
Decided March 15, 2010.
Ann M. Fitz, for appellant.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Joseph J. Drolet, Senior *681Assistant Attorney General, Paige E. Boorman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
*680The majority concludes that it is rational to require non-parental false imprisoners of minors to register as sex offenders in order to “protect[ ] children from those who would harm them.” Op. at 678. But the statutory scheme creating the sex offender registry seeks to protect children not from all harm, but from harm by those who have committed certain designated offenses. See OCGA § 42-1-12 (a) (9), (10). Non-parental kidnapping and false imprisonment are the only two such offenses that are not inherently sexual in nature and, although a sexual offense may occur during a kidnapping or a false imprisonment, such conduct would clearly be covered by other provisions of the statute. See OCGA § 42-1-12 (a) (9) (A) (iii)-(vii); 42-1-12 (a) (9) (B) (iii)-(xi); 42-1-12 (a) (10) (A) (i), (iv)-(xix). Thus, the inclusion of kidnapping and false imprisonment in the statutory scheme serves merely to sweep within its purview those, such as Rainer, who should not be characterized as “sexual offenders.”
The record contains a Department of Justice study, relied upon by the trial court, which indicates that 46 percent of non-parental abductions of minors also involve a sexual assault. A statutory scheme that treats all such kidnappings and false imprisonments as sexual offenses, creating an “error rate” of over 50 percent, is clearly not rational. Although registration as a sex offender may not be considered a punishment, see Smith v. Doe, 538 U. S. 84, 93 (II) (123 SC 1140, 155 LE2d 164) (2003), it is no mere administrative formality or minor inconvenience. Registration limits where the offender can live, work, and congregate, OCGA § 42-1-15, and is not a requirement that should be imposed cavalierly.
I am a parent. I am a grandparent. I care about the children of this State. But I am also obligated to care about the constitutional rights of all those affected by its laws. For this reason, I must dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham joins in this dissent.