Court Opinion

ID: 9391794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 13:07:09.352547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:13.241088
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Elliot, 2023-Ohio-1459.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                   FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                              HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                              :   APPEAL NO. C-220339
                                                 TRIAL NO. B-2105828
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                  :
                                                    O P I N I O N.
    vs.                                      :

 JAMES ELLIOTT,                              :

        Defendant-Appellant.                 :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 3, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Keith Sauter,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Bryan R. Perkins, for Defendant-Appellant.
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

KINSLEY, Judge.

       {¶1}    Defendant-appellant James Elliott appeals from the trial court’s

judgment revoking his community control and imposing a sentence of 18 months’

imprisonment.

       {¶2}   Elliott argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding him guilty

of a community-control violation where there was not sufficient evidence to find that

he violated the terms and conditions of his community control. He additionally

challenges the sentence imposed for the violation, arguing that the trial court erred by

imposing an 18-month prison sentence for a technical violation on a felony of the

fourth degree, and that the court failed to strictly comply with the statutory

notification requirements in R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) when imposing sentence. Finding

Elliott’s arguments to be without merit, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                         Factual and Procedural Background

       {¶3}   In February of 2022, Elliott pled guilty to burglary, a fourth-degree

felony in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B). The trial court sentenced Elliott to a three-year

period of community control. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court made the

following statements concerning the imposition of community control:

       I’m going to place you on community control, but you are going to go in

       and you’re going to stay in the Justice Center and complete the Men’s

       Extended Treatment Program.

       Once you are released from the Men’s Extended Treatment Program,

       only if you successfully complete it—if you don’t, I’m just going to send

       you to prison if you come back here on a violation because you haven’t

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               OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

done what you’re supposed to do in the program—once you’re released

on probation, I’m going to recommend MDO probation for you.

And I want probation to refer you to the halfway house at the Talbert

House program so they can get you into transitional housing.

So you’re going from the jail and you’re going to go into supervised

housing from the jail on to MDO probation.

I want you to follow through with any recommended mental health

treatment and/or drug treatment once you’re released from the Justice

Center, and you’ll be subject to random drug and alcohol screens once

you’re released as well.

I’m going to order restitution, I believe in the amount of $225.

                                *   *   *

You are to stay away from the Hubers and their property. You’re not to

have any contact with them, and you’re not to go near their home ever

again.

                                *   *   *

Like I said, this is a felony of the fourth degree. It carries anywhere

between nine—I’m sorry—six and 18 months at the Ohio Department of

Corrections.

So if you come back on any violation, especially one where you’re not

fully participating in the programming that’s been recommended for

you, you’re just going to go do the time at the Ohio Department of

Corrections.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶4}   The sentencing entry reflected the information that the trial court

informed Elliott of at the sentencing hearing, including the advisement that if he

violated the terms or conditions of his community control, he would be sentenced to a

period of six to 18 months in prison.

       {¶5}   In April of 2022, a community-control-sanction violation was filed

against Elliott. The violation alleged that he failed to comply with the court-ordered

Men’s Extended Treatment Program. Elliott pled no contest to the community-control

violation, and the trial court found him guilty. The court’s sentencing entry stated that

Elliott was restored to community control under the same conditions that had

previously been imposed. It additionally stated that Elliott would be sentenced to a

period of six to 18 months in prison if he again violated the terms and conditions of

his community control.

       {¶6}   In June of 2022, another community-control-sanction violation was

filed against Elliott, alleging that he failed to report to probation for his initial

interview after being released from the Justice Center, failed to pay restitution, and

failed to comply with court-ordered treatment. At a hearing on the violation, Elliott

pled guilty. The trial court sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment.

                           Guilty Plea Precludes Challenge

       {¶7}   In his first assignment of error, Elliott argues that the trial court erred

in finding him guilty of a community-control violation because the record did not

contain substantial evidence to support that finding. Because a community-control-

revocation hearing is not a criminal trial, the state must present substantial evidence

of the violation, rather than prove that the terms of community control were violated

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Day, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210503, 2022-

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Ohio-1954, ¶ 10. We review a trial court’s decision to revoke community control for

an abuse of discretion. Id.

       {¶8}   As set forth above, Elliott pled guilty to the community-control

violation. As such, he cannot now argue that there was not a sufficient basis in the

record to find him guilty of the violation. “A defendant may elect to forgo a hearing on

the merits of the alleged community control violations and admit to the violations.”

State v. McCoy, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2020-CA-13, 2021-Ohio-456, ¶ 35, quoting

State v. Norman, 2d Dist. Clark Nos. 2017-CA-40 and 2017-CA-41, 2018-Ohio-993, ¶

16-20. As this court has held, “if the defendant opts to enter a guilty or a no-contest

plea to the community-control violation, the need for an evidentiary hearing is

obviated.” State v. Alexander, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-070021, 2007-Ohio-5457, ¶

3. Having pled guilty to the violation as alleged, Elliott eliminated the need for the

state to present evidence of the violation, and he cannot now challenge the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting it.

       {¶9}   We accordingly hold that the trial court did not err in finding Elliott

guilty of a community-control violation, and we overrule the first assignment of error.

                        Technical v. Nontechnical Violations

       {¶10} In his second assignment of error, Elliott argues that the trial court

erred by imposing an 18-month prison sentence as a community-control-violation

sanction on a felony of the fourth degree.

       {¶11} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a), we may modify or vacate a

defendant’s sentence only if we clearly and convincingly find that the record does not

support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes (specifically division (B) or

(D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I)

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code) or that the sentence is contrary to law. State

v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 22-23; State v.

White, 2013-Ohio-4225, 997 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 5 (1st Dist.).

       {¶12} Elliott contends that because his community-control violation was a

technical violation, and because the offense that he was convicted of was a felony of

the fourth degree, the trial court was not permitted to impose a maximum sentence.

He relies on R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii), which provides:

       If the prison term is imposed for any technical violation of the

       conditions of a community control sanction imposed for a felony of the

       fourth degree that is not an offense of violence and is not a sexually

       oriented offense, the prison term shall not exceed one hundred eighty

       days, provided that if the remaining period of the community control at

       the time of the violation or the remaining period of the reserved prison

       sentence at that time is less than one hundred eighty days, the prison

       term shall not exceed the length of the remaining period of community

       control or the remaining period of the reserved prison sentence.

       {¶13} The validity of Elliott’s argument hinges on whether the community-

control violation to which he pled guilty is properly classified as a technical or non-

technical violation. In State v. Nelson, 162 Ohio St.3d 338, 2020-Ohio-3690, 165

N.E.3d 1110, the court discussed the distinction between these two types of violations.

It explained that a determination as to whether a violation is technical or nontechnical

does not depend on whether the conduct underlying the violation is criminal. Id. at ¶

26. At the time that Nelson was decided, R.C. 2929.15 did not define the term

“technical violation.” Id. at ¶ 18. In the absence of a statutory definition, the court

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

explained that a violation would be considered technical when “the condition violated

is akin to ‘an administrative requirement facilitating community control supervision.’

” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Davis, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2017-11-156, 2018-Ohio-

2672, ¶ 18. In contrast, a nontechnical violation is one that “concerns a condition of

community control that was ‘specifically tailored to address’ matters related to the

defendant’s misconduct or if it can be deemed a ‘substantive rehabilitative

requirement which addressed a significant factor contributing to’ the defendant’s

misconduct.” Id., quoting Davis at ¶ 17-18.

       {¶14} As noted by the Third District in State v. Crose, 3d Dist. Crawford No.

3-22-34, 2023-Ohio-880, ¶ 12, the General Assembly has since amended R.C. 2929.15

to define the term “technical violation.” Pursuant to R.C. 2929.15(E), a technical

violation:

       [M]eans a violation of the conditions of a community control sanction

       imposed for a felony of the fifth degree, or for a felony of the fourth

       degree that is not an offense of violence and is not a sexually oriented

       offense, and to which neither of the following applies:

       (1) The violation consists of a new criminal offense that is a felony or

       that is a misdemeanor other than a minor misdemeanor, and the

       violation is committed while under the community control sanction.

       (2) The violation consists of or includes the offender’s articulated or

       demonstrated refusal to participate in the community control sanction

       imposed on the offender or any of its conditions, and the refusal

       demonstrates to the court that the offender has abandoned the objects

       of the community control sanction or condition.

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                         OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

        {¶15} Here, Elliott was found guilty of violating his community control for

failing to comply with court-ordered treatment (the Men’s Extended Treatment

Program), failing to pay restitution, and failing to report to his probation officer after

being released from the Justice Center.

        {¶16} Both the failure to pay restitution and to comply with court-ordered

treatment were nontechnical violations. Each requirement was tailored to address

Elliott’s misconduct. The restitution was imposed to compensate the victims of

Elliott’s burglary offense for the harm he caused to their property.                        And the

requirement that Elliott complete the Men’s Extended Treatment Program was

imposed to address the trial court’s concerns about Elliott’s mental-health and drug

addiction.1 See State v. Castner, 163 Ohio St.3d 19, 2020-Ohio-4950, 167 N.E.3d 939,

¶ 16 (failure to complete a drug-treatment program was a nontechnical violation);

State v. Yauger, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111734, 2023-Ohio-815, ¶ 31 (failure to pay

restitution was a nontechnical violation because it was tailored to address concerns for

families who suffered from the defendant’s conduct and because the requiring of

restitution is rehabilitative).

        {¶17} Elliott’s failure to report to his probation officer, on the other hand, was

a technical violation. He was required to do so to “facilitate[] community control

supervision.” See Nelson, 162 Ohio St.3d 338, 2020-Ohio-3690, 165 N.E.3d 1110, at ¶

1Elliott alleges that he was confused as to whether he was required to complete the Men’s Extended
Treatment Program in lieu of or in addition to serving 180 days in the Justice Center. He further
alleges that his failure to complete the Men’s Extended Treatment Program was not his fault, as he
was not transferred to the program during his stay in the Justice Center. After reviewing the record,
we are empathetic to Elliott’s confusion, as the instructions from the trial court were less than clear
as to whether Elliott was required to complete both 180 days in jail and the Men’s Extended
Treatment Program or if was only required to compete the program if it occurred during his 180-
day jail stay. Nevertheless, because Elliott pleaded guilty to the failure to complete the Men’s
Extended Treatment Program despite his confusion, the trial court acted appropriately in
sentencing him to this admitted violation.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

26. And the failure to report to probation fits within the definition of a technical

violation in R.C. 2929.15(E).

       {¶18} Because the prison term imposed on Elliott was for both technical and

nontechnical violations, the trial court was not limited to imposing the 180-day period

for technical violations set forth in R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii). The second assignment

of error is accordingly overruled.

                                     R.C. 2929.19(B)(4)

       {¶19} In his third assignment of error, Elliott argues that the trial court erred

by imposing a prison sentence without strictly complying with the statutory

notification requirements in R.C. 2929.19(B)(4).

       {¶20} R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) contains notifications that the trial court must give

to an offender when sentencing the offender to a period of community control. It

provides that:

       If the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a

       community control sanction should be imposed and the court is not

       prohibited from imposing a community control sanction, the court shall

       impose a community control sanction.          The court shall notify the

       offender that, if the conditions of the sanction are violated, if the

       offender commits a violation of any law, or if the offender leaves this

       state without the permission of the court or the offender’s probation

       officer, the court may impose a longer time under the same sanction,

       may impose a more restrictive sanction, or may impose a prison term

       on the offender and shall indicate the range from which the prison term

       may be imposed as a sanction for the violation, which shall be the range

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       of prison terms for the offense that is specified pursuant to section

       2929.14 of the Revised Code and as described in section 2929.15 of the

       Revised Code.

R.C. 2929.19(B)(4).

       {¶21} At Elliott’s initial sentencing hearing when the trial court first sentenced

him to a period of community control, the trial court informed Elliott of the following:

       Like I said, this is a felony of the fourth degree. It carries anywhere

       between nine—I’m sorry—six and 18 months at the Ohio Department of

       Corrections. So if you come back on any violation, especially one where

       you’re not fully participating in the programming that’s been

       recommended for you, you’re just going to go do the time at the Ohio

       Department of Corrections. Do you understand?

       {¶22} The trial court complied with the requirement in R.C. 2929.19(B)(4)

that it inform Elliott of the range from which a prison term could be imposed for a

violation of community control. But it failed to inform Elliott that, if he were to violate

his community control, commit a violation of any law, or leave the state without

permission from the court or his probation officer, the court could impose a longer

time under the same community-control sanction, impose a more restrictive

community-control sanction, or impose a prison term.

       {¶23} Upon Elliott’s first community-control violation, where upon the trial

court continued him on the same community-control sanctions that were initially

imposed, the court did not cure the defect regarding these notifications. It again only

informed Elliott that he would “go to the Ohio Department of Corrections” for a future

violation.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶24} As recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court, “[t]he notification

requirement in R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) is meant to put the offender on notice of the specific

prison term he or she faces if a violation of the conditions occurs.”2 State v. Fraley,

105 Ohio St.3d 13, 2004-Ohio-7110, 821 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 17. The notification provided

by the trial court complied with this recognized purpose. Nonetheless, the trial court

indisputably failed to comply with the remaining notification requirements in R.C.

2929.15(B)(5).

       {¶25} In State v. Colburne, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27553, 2015-Ohio-4348, the

Ninth Appellate District considered a similar omission by the trial court when

notifying the defendant about community control. The trial court in Colburne told the

defendant about the prisons terms it would impose for a community-control violation,

but “it did not otherwise inform Mr. Colburne of the statutorily required notifications

under R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). The trial court did not notify Mr. Colburne that violating

the conditions of community control, violating another law, or leaving the state

without permission could result in additional sanctions, including the prison terms

outlined by the trial court.” Id. at ¶ 29. The Ninth District held that the notifications

provided were insufficient to comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). Id. It recognized that

all required notifications had been included in the sentencing entry, but held that was

not sufficient to comply with the notification requirement because the notification had

to take place at the sentencing hearing. Id. Because Colburne had not yet violated

community control, the court determined that a remand for resentencing was an

appropriate remedy. Id.

2 Former R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) has been renumbered and is the equivalent of current R.C.
2929.19(B)(4).

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶26} The Sixth District considered the impact of the same omission by the

trial court in State v. Jones, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-03-1321, 2005-Ohio-5736. In Jones,

the trial court notified the offender of the specific prison term that would be imposed

if community control were violated, but it failed to notify him that the prison term

could also be imposed if he committed a violation of any law or left the state without

permission of his probation officer. Id. at ¶ 14. The appellate court held that the trial

court failed to comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(5), and it remanded for the trial court to

provide the required notifications. Id. at ¶ 14-15.

       {¶27} In State v. Robinson, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2004 CA 21, 2005-Ohio-

3879, the court reached a different outcome when considering a similar omission by

the trial court. In Robinson, the trial court informed the defendant of the possibility

of the imposition of a prison term if he were to violate community control, and it

provided the length of the prison term. But it “did not expressly inform Robinson of

the provisions relating to more lengthy or restrictive community control sanctions at

the sentencing hearing.” Id. at ¶ 8. The Second District held that although the trial

court failed to comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(5), Robinson had suffered no prejudice

because:

       The trial court informed Robinson about the most significant

       consequence of a community control violation: the possibility of

       imprisonment and its term. It is very unlikely that information about

       less serious consequences would have had an impact on Robinson’s

       behavior if the threat of prison did not persuade him to comply with the

       terms of community control.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

        More importantly, when Robinson was found to have committed his

        first community control violation in September 2003, the court

        imposed a more restrictive term of community control -- one of the

        options about which he had not been informed at the sentencing

        hearing. If he was prejudiced at all, it was by the imposition of this

        sanction about which he had not been previously informed. However,

        Robinson did not object to or appeal from that judgment.

Id. at ¶ 10-11. The court held that Robinson waived any error related to the trial court’s

failure to comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(5), stating that:

        In our view, it would be illogical to permit Robinson to challenge, at this

        juncture, the trial court’s failure to inform him in 2002 that he might

        face more restrictive or more lengthy community control sanctions for

        a violation. When he was sentenced to more restrictive sanctions in

        2003, he did not object to the imposition of that sanction in the trial

        court or on appeal. That would have been the time to raise the alleged

        error. We will not vacate his sentence now, when the court has imposed

        a prison sentence, the possibility of which he had been fully informed.

        Thus, Robinson has waived the alleged error related to R.C.

        2929.19(B)(5).

Id. at ¶ 12.

        {¶28} The case at bar is more analogous to Robinson than to Colburne or

Jones. In the latter two cases, the appellants appealed from the initial imposition of

community control, before any violation had occurred, whereas Elliott and Robinson

appealed from the sentence imposed following a community-control violation. Like

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the offender in Robinson, Elliott failed to appeal when the trial court continued him

on community control after his violation. If Elliott were to have suffered any prejudice,

it would have been at that point, when the trial court imposed a continuation of

community control, a sanction of which he had not been previously informed.

       {¶29} The trial court imposed a sentence from the sentencing range it

informed Elliott he faced if he were to commit a community-control violation. We

hold that Elliott suffered no prejudice from the trial court’s failure to provide the

additional notifications in R.C. 2929.15(B)(4).

       {¶30} Elliott’s third assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the

trial court is, accordingly, affirmed.

                                                                      Judgment affirmed.

BERGERON, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

Please note:
       The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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