Court Opinion

ID: 9691328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:25:48.681426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:16.965411
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. Although the State must carry the burden of disproving the necessity defense beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant has the burden of generating a fact question on the defense. State v. Walton, 311 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Iowa 1981); State v. Reese, 272 N.W.2d 863, 867 (Iowa 1978). See State v. Miller, 313 N.W.2d 460, 462 (S.D.1981). If all the requirements of the defense are not addressed in *22the defendant’s evidence, the trial court is not obligated to submit that issue to the trier of fact. See United States v. Jackson, 838 F.2d 301, 302 (8th Cir.1988); Walton, 311 N.W.2d at 115 (citing United States v. Campbell, 609 F.2d 922, 924 (8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1282, 63 L.Ed.2d 604 (1980)). Appellant’s evidence in this case not only fails to generate a fact question on necessity, but also affirmatively discloses that the defense was not available to him.
“The rationale of the [necessity] defense ... lies in the social advantage gained when the defendant chooses the lesser of two evils and thus, by bringing about the lesser harm, avoids the greater harm.” W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 50, at 385 (1972). In analyzing cases where the defendant was not personally at fault in creating the situation calling for the necessity to choose between two evils, the following factors should be taken into consideration: (1) the harm avoided, (2) the harm done, (3) the defendant’s intention to avoid the greater harm, (4) the relative value of the harm avoided and the harm done, and (5) optional courses of action and the imminence of harm. Id. at 385-88.
The situations in which the necessity defense applies are limited and depend on the lack of a legal alternative to committing a criminal act. Generally, the defense of necessity does not apply except in an emergency — when the threatened harm is immediate or the threatened disaster is imminent. In People v. Patrick, 126 Cal.App.3d 952, 179 Cal.Rptr 276 (1981), the court stated:
... [Although the exact confines of the necessity defense remain clouded, a well-established central element involves the emergency nature of the situation, i.e., the imminence of the greater harm which the illegal act seeks to prevent. ... The commission of a crime cannot be countenanced where there exists the possibility of some alternate means to alleviate the threatened greater harm.
Id. 179 Cal.Rptr. at 281-82 (citations omitted). The defense, therefore, excuses criminal conduct only if such conduct is justified by a need to avoid imminent peril and there is insufficient time to notify the proper authorities. Walton, 311 N.W.2d at 115; Reese, 272 N.W.2d at 867-68; State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 201, 183 N.W.2d 541, 544 (1971). See also W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra at 388. See generally Wharton’s Criminal Law § 88 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1978).
Additionally, it is not sufficient to show that the defendant, in committing an illegal act, merely believed he was avoiding a harm or an evil. The defendant must show that the belief was objectively reasonable. Good intentions alone will not excuse a crime. “ ‘The question that must be resolved [in the necessity defense] involves looking to all the choices available to the defendant and then determining whether the act ... was the only viable and reasonable choice available.’ ” People v. Beach, 194 Cal.App.3d 955, 972, 240 Cal.Rptr. 50, 59 (1987) (emphasis in original) (quoting People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 827, 118 Cal.Rptr. 110, 112 (1974).
In the present case, the pendency of the child custody hearing constituted appellant’s legal alternative to child stealing. This hearing was scheduled to occur within a week’s time of when appellant took Anthony Jr. When the date came for that hearing, appellant had already fled the state with the child. He did not appear at the scheduled custody hearing, nor did he make any attempt to obtain legal custody of the child.
Furthermore, there is no indication in the record that appellant made any attempts to report this matter to the proper authorities after attaining a position of safety from the alleged peril. Instead, he deliberately evaded the authorities for over three months until he was apprehended by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Cleveland, Ohio. During that time, he was able to elude the authorities in at least three states. In light of these circumstances, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing evidence relating to appellant’s necessity defense.