Court Opinion

ID: 9513297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:33:57.314649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:48.730923
License: Public Domain

NEUMANN, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶30] Because the majority opinion is inconsistent within itself, and relies on Professor Larson in an area of his treatise that is also inconsistent, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 31] The majority opinion claims to have adopted a “true intentional tort” exception to North Dakota’s Workers Compensation Act. However, in doing so, the majority contradicts itself. First, it cites jurisdictions that have adopted a “true intentional tort” exception, stating “[t]hese courts allow an employee to pursue a civil cause of action only if the employer intended the act and intended an injury.” (Emphasis added.) The majority further points out that many courts in adopting the “true intentional tort” exception relied on AethuR LaRson, Larson’s Workers Compensation Law, Vol. 6, § 68.13 (1997). According to the majority, Professor Larson’s treatise suggests “an intentional tort exception should require nothing short of a ‘genuine intentional injury.’ ” This definition is what the majority claims “reflects the underlying purpose of the exclusivity of workers’ compensation in North Dakota and conforms to that compensation policy.”
[¶ 32] The majority then defines “true intentional injury” as: “An employer is deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had knowledge an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge.” Here lies the inconsistency. The majority claims to have adopted a “true intentional tort” exception, and then defines a true intentional tort as something that is in fact a strict version of the “substantial certainty” test the majority claims to reject.
[¶33] While I agree we should adopt an intentional tort exception that would enable an employee to recover when the employer had knowledge an injury was certain (or substantially certain) to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge, such a standard is not a “true intentional tort” test. A “true *211intentional tort” test requires the employer to have intended the consequences. Schlenk, 268 N.W.2d at 471.8
[¶34] In footnote 7, the majority, in an attempt to support its newly adopted definition of “true intentional tort,” relies on Beau-champ, an opinion that rejects the “true intentional tort” theory of Larson, and adopts a “substantial certainty” test. Beauchamp, 398 N.W.2d at 893. The Beauchamp case did discuss Arthur Larson’s Treatise and its attempt to include the fact of the Film Recovery case within its definition of a “true intentional tort.” Id. at 892-93. The Beau-champ case discussed Film Recovery: “The facts in this case are a good example of the type of employer conduct that would seem to meet the substantial certainty as well as a substantial likelihood of harm standard. It is questionable, however, whether even this outrageous conduct would constitute a ‘true intentional tort.’ ” Id., at 893. I agree.
[¶ 35] A second flaw in the majority opinion is that under the standard articulated there still remains a question of fact as to whether the accident was certain to occur; yet, the majority “finds” that Joshua has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim.
[¶ 36] This case was appealed from summary judgment. Summary judgment under Rule 56 NDRCivP, is a procedural device for promptly disposing of a controversy. Johansen v. Anderson, 555 N.W.2d 588, 591 (N.D.1996). It is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact, or if the law is such that resolution of the factual dispute will not alter the result. Id. To determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, a court may examine the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, interrogatories, and inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. A court must then “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Sternberger v. City of Williston, 556 N.W.2d 288, 289 (N.D.1996).
[¶37] I believe Joshua has alleged sufficient facts to withstand a motion for summary judgment under the standard articulated by the majority today, at least on the current state of the record presented to the trial court. As the majority points out, Joshua supported his case by directing the court to the OSHA investigation, which determined Valdak’s actions were willful violations of safety provisions.
[¶ 38] The majority specifically notes: (1) Valdak’s management knew the interlock was inoperative and did not repair it because it would shut them down for about an hour and a half; (2) the affidavit of Steven Akerlind revealed he told Valdak’s manager the extractor should not be used in its present condition because it was substantially certain to injure someone; (3) there was a warning on the extractor not to insert hands in the basket; (4) Valdak’s management warned employees that if they put their arm in the machine, they could lose it; and, (5) Valdak had no previous OSHA violations and no one had previously been injured using the machine.
[¶ 39] Somehow, the majority “finds” this is not enough to state a claim. However, the warnings listed above invoke a comparison of fault between Joshua and Valdak. The lack of previous OSHA violations and no previous injuries weighs in favor of Valdak, but this is countered by the affidavit by Akerlind stating he warned Valdak about the certainty of an accident occurring.
[¶40] Construing all of the evidence in a light most favorable to Joshua, the non-moving party, I believe reasonable minds could differ as to whether Valdak knew Zimmerman’s injury was certain to follow from a failure to repair the extractor. On the current state of the record, a question of fact exists regarding whether an intentional tort was committed.9 Such a question of fact, under the standard for Rule 56, precludes summary judgment. I would reverse and *212remand for' further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
' [¶ 41] MESCHKE, J., concurs.

. The court in Schlenk discussed the adoption of an exception "where the circumstances involve an actual intent to injure, such as in the case of an intentional assault and battery, or where the negligence is so gross as to be equivalent to an actual intent to injure.” Id.

. See, e.g. Woodson, 407 S.E.2d at 231, which held a material issue of fact existed as to whether the employer knew the trenching operation at issue was substantially certain to cause serious injury.