Court Opinion

ID: 9630143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:02:32.243413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:32.091819
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Watkins, J.:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority for a reason I consider fundamental in the construction placed on sections 1201 and 1211 of The Vehicle Code, 75 PS sections 731 and 741. The obvious purpose of section 1201, as amended, was to prevent harassment of motor vehicle operators upon the highways of this Commonwealth and to require peace officers to file information charging violations of the summary provisions of The Vehicle Code before the nearest available magistrate where the violation occurred. In my view, the legislature plainly intended informations to be lodged before the nearest available magistrate from the place where the arrest was made.
*399The Act of 1923, June 14, P. L. 718, section 25, which preceded the present code provided that all such informations “shall be made before a mayor, burgess, magistrate, alderman, or justice of the peace, within the county wherein the offense is alleged to have occurred.” The plain intendment of this section, as incorporated in the present code, means that the information must be brought before the nearest available magistrate from the place where the violation is alleged or charged against the motor vehicle operator involved. This means the place of arrest.
The construction placed upon this section by the majority merely tends to confuse, not clarify, the duty placed upon peace officers in lodging informations against violators. Under the majority view, for example, since the test if the place where the overloading of the truck took place, it is clearly possible for a truck to be overloaded in Erie County, proceed upon the highways of this Commonwealth to Philadelphia County, and there picked up by a peace officer in that county who had followed him. If the logic of the majority is to prevail, such peace officer can return the violator to Erie County and lodge an information against the violator before the nearest available magistrate in Erie County rather than in Philadelphia County. Such absurd result was never contemplated by the legislature.
The manifest intention of the legislature in prescribing certain maximum weights which may be lawfully carried upon the highways of this Commonwealth was to protect the highways from premature erosion and destruction. If, therefore, any truck was apprehended and suspected of being overweight and in violation of The Vehicle Code, under section 6 of the Act of 1955, June 30, P. L. 225, 75 PS §454, it must be weighed at a weighing station within two miles of *400the place of apprehension or, if none be available within such distance, it must be weighed by portable scales brought to the scene of the alleged violation. It is clear, therefore, that if such a vehicle is found to be overweight and in violation of the code, such information must be brought before the nearest available magistrate at the place of apprehension or arrest.
Section 1211 of the code provides, inter alia, that “Whenever an arrest is made upon view . . . the officer making the arrest shall forthwith take the defendant before the nearest available magistrate . . . where the alleged offense occurred.” Section 903, 75 PS §453, provides that “For the enforcement of this section all peace officers shall have the power to arrest on view for violation of any of the provisions of this section.” If, therefore, an officer has the right to arrest on view, it is this arrest which precedes the filing of the information and the nearest available magistrate is ascertained from this point. If upon checking the weight, such vehicle is found to be overweight, regardless of where the weighing took place, the offense was committed at the place where the arrest took place. To hold, however, that a magistrate, in the instant case, in such boroughs or townships through which such vehicle passed would all have concurrent jurisdiction over the offense is to fly in the face of the contrary intention expressed by the legislature and, in effect, nullify its plain mandate. The object of the legislature was to prevent overloaded vehicles to travel upon the highways generally and not within the prescribed boundaries of the various municipalities. The penalty provided for violation of the statute under consideration is a very substantial fine, which fine is payable to the municipality wherein the information is lodged and conviction had. The temptation for collusive action between peace officers and certain township au*401thorities is greatly increased under the interpretation of the statute as given in the majority opinion. It is clear that the legislature never intended this to be so. If the intention of the legislature is that which is proclaimed for it by the majority opinion, why was it at all necessary to enact sections 1201 and 1211 of the code? Obviously, the legislature intended that such violations be taken to the nearest available magistrate from the place where the arrest or apprehension was made.
I would therefore reverse the summary conviction.
Gunther, J., joins in this dissent.