Court Opinion

ID: 9561736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:14:54.737428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:19.378659
License: Public Domain

STOWERS, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. Section 52-1-19 of the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act is clear and unambiguous. In pertinent part it states: As used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act * * * “injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment” * * * shall not include injuries to any workman occurring while on his way to assume the duties of his employment or after leaving such duties, the proximate cause of which is not the employer’s negligence. NMSA 1978, § 52-1-19 (Cum.Supp.1986) (emphasis added). The district court specifically found that plaintiff-employee, Dupper, (Dupper) had not established that her injury was due to any negligence on the part of defendant-employer, J.C. Penney Company, Inc. (Penney). This finding is supported by substantial evidence. The record indicates that Dupper left the sidewalk provided for by Penney for ingress and egress to the premise, that Penney routinely inspected the “pop-up” sprinkler system, and that Penney employed a groundkeeper who was on site five days a week. Additionally, there was no evidence that the sprinkler was defective prior to the incident with Dupper or that the malfunction resulted from a prior condition which Penney failed to properly repair. Obviously this evidence falls far short of establishing negligence as a matter of law. Pursuant to the clear language of Section 52-1-19, New Mexico has consistently disallowed recovery in cases where employees have been coming or going from their employment. See, e.g., McDonald v. Artesia Gen. Hosp., 73 N.M. 188, 386 P.2d 708 (1963); Romero v. S.S. Kresge Co., 95 N.M. 484, 623 P.2d 998 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 593, 624 P.2d 535 (1981); Hayes v. Ampex Corp., 85 N.M. 444, 512 P.2d 1280 (Ct.App.1973). Since Dupper failed to prove that her injuries were proximately caused by Penney’s negligence, and since it is uncontradicted that Dupper’s injuries occurred after she left the duties of her employment with Penney, she is not protected by the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act. The language of the statute is clear. There is no room for interpretation. The first rule of statutory construction is that the courts must ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intentions. Legislative intent is to be determined primarily from the language used in the statute as a whole. When the words used are Dree from ambiguity and doubt, no other means of interpretation should be resorted to. State v. Sinyard, 100 N.M. 694, 696, 675 P.2d 426, 428 (Ct.App.1983), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 689, 675 P.2d 421 (1984). A statute must be read and given effect as it is written by the Legislature, not as the court may think it should be or would have been written if the Legislature had envisaged all the problems and complications which might arise in the course of its administration * * * * Courts must take the act as they find it and construe it according to the plain meaning of the language employed. If the act is to be given a different effect, in this respect, it must be by an act of the Legislature. Burch v. Foy, 62 N.M. 219, 223, 308 P.2d 199, 203 (1957). These principles of statutory construction were reaffirmed in the case of Perea v. Baca, 94 N.M. 624, 614 P.2d 541 (1980), wherein the Court stated: “[i]f a change in the statute is necessary or proper, that is a task for the Legislature.” Id. at 627, 614 P.2d at 544. In the case of Taylor v. Delgarno Transp., Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983), this Court explained: “New Mexico’s Workmen’s Compensation statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the workman. However, provisions of the Act may not be disregarded in the name of a liberal construction.” Id. at 141, 667 P.2d at 448 (citations omitted). See also Varos v. Union Oil Co., 101 N.M. 713, 688 P.2d 31 (Ct.App.1984). No degree of statutory interpretation, no matter how liberal, can alter the language of Section 52-1-19 which prohibits workmen’s compensation recovery for employees coming or going from their employment, unless the injuries were proximately caused by the employer’s negligence. Interpreting Section 52-1-19 to include a “parking lot” exception is neither warranted nor justified. Until such time as this Court holds Section 52-1-19 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act unconstitutional, it is the law of the state of New Mexico and should apply to the facts of this case. For the above reasons, I dissent.