Court Opinion

ID: 9837026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:16:03.290427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.926449
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Judge
(concurring in the result):
I concur in the result as to Issue I, finding any error to be harmless.
I agree that the standard of review is whether the judge abused his discretion in giving the “deliberate avoidance” of knowledge instruction. However, “deliberate” is a misnomer. One may avoid knowledge intentionally, recklessly, or negligently. See § 2.02(7), ALI Model Penal Code, reprinted in ALI Model Penal Code and Commentaries 227 (1985) (“When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.”).
Neither our case law nor other federal case law is as clear as the majority indicates. See generally Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 Tex. L.Rev. 1351 (1992); Frans J. Yon Kaenel, Willful Blindness: A Permissible Substitute for Actual Knowledge Under the Money Laundering Control Act?, 71 Wash. U.L.Q. 1189 (1993); Jonathan L. Marcus, Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 Yale L.J. 2231 (1993). Whether there exists this avoidance of knowledge under any of these standards depends on the reliability of the evidence presented.
We need not resolve the question of whether the circumstantial evidence in this case does or does not establish either a deliberate or reckless avoidance of knowledge. Urine testing of appellant established an amphetamine concentration of 2454 nanograms per milliliter, and 10573 nanograms per milliliter of methamphetamine. Additionally, appellant testified that, after he took two pills from a bottle labeled “No-Doz,” he felt peppy, his hands shook, and he could not sleep that morning. A stipulation of fact established that the high concentration of methamphetamine found in appellant’s urine could not be explained by a single ingestion 4 days prior to the urinalysis. Thus, there is ample *270evidence to reject the testimony set forth by appellant as to the two pills coming out of a “No-Doz” bottle. Under such circumstances, appellant demonstrated at least a reckless disregard as to what kind of pills he consumed.
I agree that, given the facts in this case, if there was error, it was harmless.