Court Opinion

ID: 9849019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:33:06.380874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:57.353622
License: Public Domain

Williams, C.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The majority correctly recognizes that under Javis v Ypsilanti Bd of Ed, 393 Mich 689; 227 NW2d 543 (1975), the Court of Appeals properly found that the trial court should have given the applicable requested Standard Jury Instruction. However, while observing that "[w]e continue to believe that the Standard Jury Instructions should be utilized ... for the salutary policy reasons articulated in Javis,” the majority overrules the Javis "presumption of prejudice” rule and substitutes a "harmless error” rule. I dissent because I believe the "salutary policy . . . articulated in Javis” will not be effectuated without the Javis "presumption of prejudice” rule that the majority opinion abolishes.
Unfortunately, this case and the companion case of Moody v Pulte Homes, Inc, 423 Mich 150; 378 *338NW2d 319 (1985), present this Court with very inadequate records and arguments upon which to formulate an opinion of any kind as to whether to retain or overturn the Javis.rule.
In the instant case counsel for the defendant stated at oral argument that in Wisconsin, which does not have a "presumption of prejudice” rule, judges strictly require thé use of Standard Jury Instructions, and he believed Michigan judges would do likewise. In oral argument in the Pulte case, defense counsel opined that a rule for a "mere technical error” per se would be unfair, whereas counsel for plaintiff stated, "[I]f you don’t have a mandatory rule that will be absolutely enforced, you might as well scrap the standard instructions, because we’re very quickly going to revert to a situation where the standard instructions at the least instance will be disregarded.” No counsel referred to any statistical analysis or academic study bearing on the issue of the use of Standard Jury Instructions.
The insufficiency of the record virtually requires both the majority and me to rest our conclusions on judicial notice. The majority opinion relies on the experience of this Court for the conclusion that trial courts and attorneys make good use of the Standard Jury Instructions. I am inclined to agree that the sjis are in general use. However, the record appears to indicate only that some Standard Jury Instructions are used. The record does not indicate that all applicable and requested instructions are given. Yet GCR 1963, 516.6(2) (now MCR 2.516[D][2]) mandates that all such applicable and requested instructions be given by the court. In other words, I am not at all sure that the instant case is unique, where most of the applicable and requested Standard Instructions were given, but one was not.
*339As a consequence, on the basis of the record as herein extended by personal observation of the justices of this Court, my conclusions are as follows. First, if the GCR 1963, 516.6(2) requirement of mandatory use of Standard Jury Instructions is being observed with very few exceptions as the majority contend, then the "presumption of prejudice” sanction will be so seldom put to use that the burden of that sanction will cause very little trouble indeed. Second, if, on the other hand, the mandatory court rule would not be followed without the Javis sanction as plaintiffs counsel in Pulte contends, then it would not be good law to lose the advantage of that sanction in view of the salutary policy considerations upon which Javis is based. Therefore, on either basis, it seems that the retention of the Javis rule is commended by common sense, because there is general agreement as to the policy benefits of the rule and no evidence that much harm would occur through its continuation, whereas with its abolition the courts might well, in the words of plaintiffs counsel in Pulte, "revert to a situation where the [Standard Jury Instructions] at the least instance will be disregarded.”
So, pursuant to the common wisdom, I would follow the well-tested axiom, "If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and continue to follow the wisdom of Javis.