Court Opinion

ID: 9948820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 23:06:32.443632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:54.477197
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                    CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                           MARCH 7, 2024
                                                                     STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                 2024 ND 42

State of North Dakota,                                  Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Kimberly Ann Henderson,                             Defendant and Appellant

                                No. 20230253

Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial
District, the Honorable Robin A. Schmidt, Judge.

REVERSED.

Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.

Nathan K. Madden, Assistant State’s Attorney, Williston, N.D., for plaintiff
and appellee; submitted on brief.

Christopher K. Votava, Williston, N.D., for defendant and appellant; submitted
on brief.
                             State v. Henderson
                                No. 20230253

Tufte, Justice.

[¶1] Kimberly Ann Henderson appeals from a criminal judgment entered
after a jury convicted her of exploitation of a vulnerable adult and attempted
theft. She argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting several
trial exhibits because the exhibits were not properly authenticated under
N.D.R.Ev. 901 and are inadmissible hearsay lacking sufficient foundation as
records of regularly conducted activity under N.D.R.Ev. 803(6). We reverse the
judgment.

                                       I

[¶2] From August to September 2022, Henderson worked for Home Helpers,
an agency offering assistance to elderly people with chores, transportation, and
other tasks. During that time, she was assigned to Mr. and Mrs. Cooper and
gained access to their financial information. The State alleged Henderson used
the Coopers’ financial accounts to pay her own bills and make personal
purchases.

[¶3] The State charged Henderson with exploitation of an eligible adult, a
Class A Felony, under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31-07.1(2)(a), specifically alleging the
value of the funds exceeds $50,000, and criminal attempt of theft of property,
a Class B Felony, under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-05(2), for theft exceeding $10,000
but less than $50,000.

[¶4] At trial, the State presented testimony from four witnesses and
submitted thirteen exhibits, including financial documents, receipts, an
eviction notice, surveillance photos from multiple businesses, and a video of an
interview with Henderson. Henderson objected to the admissibility of 12
exhibits, namely exhibits 1–2 and 4–13. The district court overruled the
objections and admitted the exhibits. The jury convicted Henderson on both
counts. Henderson appeals.

                                       1
                                       II

[¶5] Henderson argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting
exhibits 1 and 4–13. She argues the exhibits were not properly authenticated
under N.D.R.Ev. 901 and are inadmissible hearsay not established as records
of regularly conducted activity under N.D.R.Ev. 803(6).

[¶6] “A district court has broad discretion in evidentiary matters, and we will
not overturn a district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the
court abused its discretion.” State v. Sanchez, 2023 ND 106, ¶ 5, 991 N.W.2d
71 (citing State v. Azure, 2017 ND 195, ¶ 6, 899 N.W.2d 294). “A district court
abuses its discretion in evidentiary rulings when it acts arbitrarily,
capriciously, or unreasonably, or it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” State
v. Vickerman, 2022 ND 184, ¶ 8, 981 N.W.2d 881 (citation omitted).

[¶7] “A party objecting to the introduction of evidence must state the specific
ground of objection, if the specific ground is not apparent from the context.”
State v. Thomas, 2022 ND 126, ¶ 17, 975 N.W.2d 562 (citing N.D.R.Ev.
103(a)(1)(B)). “A party must make a specific objection to evidence at the time it
is offered for admission into evidence to give the opposing party an opportunity
to argue the objection and attempt to cure the defective foundation, and to give
the trial court an opportunity to fully understand the objection and
appropriately rule on it.” Id. (quoting May v. Sprynczynatyk, 2005 ND 76, ¶ 26,
695 N.W.2d 196). “An objection indicating the specific evidence rules by
number supporting the grounds for the objection is sufficient to satisfy
N.D.R.Ev. 103(a)(1)(B).” Id.

                                      III

[¶8] Henderson argues exhibit 1, a packet of financial documents, is
inadmissible “due to lack of foundation, explanation, and that the contents of
the documents were unknown.” She cites N.D.R.Ev. 901, 1001, and 1002
regarding authentication.

[¶9] “Before documentary evidence is admissible, it must be authenticated.”
Christianson v. Henke, 2020 ND 76, ¶ 8, 941 N.W.2d 529 (citations omitted).

                                       2
Authentication requires evidence sufficient to support a finding that an item
of evidence is what the proponent claims it is. N.D.R.Ev. 901(a); see also State
v. Hirschkorn, 2020 ND 268, ¶ 9, 952 N.W.2d 225. Rule 901(b)(1) and (4),
N.D.R.Ev., provides examples of authentication, including testimony of a
witness with knowledge “that an item is what it is claimed to be,” and
“appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.”
Hirschkorn, at ¶ 9; see also State v. Thompson, 2010 ND 10, ¶¶ 21-22, 777
N.W.2d 617. “[T]he proponent of offered evidence need not rule out all
possibilities inconsistent with authenticity or conclusively prove that evidence
is what it purports to be; rather, the proponent must provide proof sufficient
for a reasonable juror to find the evidence is what it purports to be.” Thompson,
at ¶ 21 (citations omitted).

[¶10] The State offered several financial documents as a single item of
evidence marked exhibit 1 during a detective’s testimony. He explained: “[Mr.
Cooper] gave me some Gate City banking documents. There was some copies
of some checks and other documents from the bank, showing what money was
all missing from his account that he couldn’t account for.” The detective
testified exhibit 1 fairly and accurately represented the documents provided by
Mr. Cooper. The State moved to admit the exhibits. Henderson objected:

      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would object, Your Honor. We don’t have
      foundation. There’s been no explanation of exactly what they are,
      the contents of a large part of them. I don’t know if we want to
      discuss this outside the presence of the jury, maybe, but I do object
      to this exhibit coming in, Your Honor.

      THE COURT: Any response?

      [THE STATE]: Your Honor, this witness met with the victim at the
      law enforcement center. The documents, as far as a chain-of-
      custody issue is concerned, they came directly from the victim, who
      had already done the heavy lifting, obtaining the records from his
      banking institution and forwarding it to law enforcement for
      investigation. There’s no prohibition on — with regard to a
      foundational — the foundational argument raised by opposing

                                       3
      counsel with regard to the transition from Mr. Cooper to law
      enforcement.

      THE COURT: Overruled. I’m receiving Exhibit 1.

Later, outside the presence of the jury, the discussion continued:

      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That, to my understanding, is a packet of
      all of the checks, all of the affidavits of forgery; they weren’t all
      testified to by either his banker or Mr. Cooper. So part of that was
      the personal knowledge. It wasn’t just a small document of, oh, this
      is what I got for his personal knowledge, it was there was a lot that
      hadn’t been testified to.

      THE COURT: I’m glad you brought that up because I think that
      your objection goes more to weight and credibility than it does . . .
      foundation, but I didn’t want to say that in front of the jury.

[¶11] Henderson argued the detective lacked personal knowledge of the
contents of the documents—whereas, the banker or Mr. Cooper would have had
the personal knowledge for foundation. The detective testified the documents
were the same financial documents he received from Mr. Cooper. He described
the documents as “some copies of some checks and other documents from the
bank, showing what money was all missing from his account[.]” The court
found this sufficient foundation, finding Henderson’s argument goes to the
weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. We disagree.

[¶12] Exhibit 1 contains affidavits of forgery, signed by Mr. Cooper and
submitted to his bank, but they were offered through the detective assigned to
the case. These documents were not authenticated by a witness with
knowledge that these documents are what they purport be. The record lacks
any information authenticating the contents of the documents admitted as
exhibit 1. Henderson’s objection is the only information on the record—“a
packet of all of the checks, all of the affidavits of forgery”—but that is not
evidence. Our review of the packet labeled as exhibit 1 shows 29 pages,
including affidavits of forgery declared by Mr. Cooper and photographs
underlying the alleged checks created as forgeries. The testimony does not
describe the “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other

                                       4
distinctive characteristics of the item.” The detective’s testimony that “those
documents fairly and accurately represent the documents that were provided
to [him] by Mr. Cooper” does not cure the foundational defects. The district
court misapplied N.D.R.Ev. 901 and abused its discretion by admitting exhibit
1.

[¶13] A similar exchange occurred when the State offered exhibit 4, documents
from the Hair Society Institute, which the State called an “invoice”:

      [The detective:] Yes, I asked them if they had copies of those
      checks.
      [The State:] Okay. Did they provide — did a representative from
      the Hair Society provide you with any documentation as it relates
      to this investigation?
      A Yes. They had copies of both the checks that were passed on
      behalf of Ms. Henderson, and a copy of her North Dakota driver’s
      license.
      Q Okay. Would you recognize the documentation that was supplied
      to you by the Hair Society if you were to see it again?
      A Yes, Sir.
      ....
      Q Okay. That document that I just handed to you, the front cover
      page indicates that it is from the Hair Society Institute.
      A Yes, Sir.
      Q Is that correct? Okay. And I want to direct your attention to the
      name underneath — there’s a name underneath the heading of the
      Hair Society Institute —
      A Correct.
      Q — for the account holder at Hair Society. Who’s [sic] name is on
      that?
      A It’s Kimberly Henderson.

At that time, Henderson objected:

      Your Honor, I’m going to kind of repeat the objection that I’ve kind
      of been running. This, as it’s coming through, I think could be
      considered hearsay, as it’s statements from someone who’s not here
      to testify, trying to prove that she had this account. And I, I guess,
      preemptively object to this document being considered or
      admitted.

                                        5
[¶14] Outside the presence of the jury, Henderson elaborated on the objection
to exhibit 4, the documents from the Hair Society Institute, as well as all the
proposed exhibits the State anticipated entering, under Rules 901, 1001, and
1002, N.D.R.Ev., explaining the detective “doesn’t have personal knowledge of
their systems to create any of these documents, whether it’s these exhibits or
the other proposed exhibits, receipts, cameras, photos, videos, things like that.
We don’t have any personal knowledge on his part.”

[¶15] The testimony does not specifically describe the contents of exhibit 4.
Our examination of exhibit 4 shows the exhibit includes more than just an
“invoice” as described by the State. The exhibit includes the Institute’s
enrollment agreement with Henderson, a history of payments, and a notice of
insufficient funds and returned checks. The testimony does not tend to show
the documents are what they purport to be. The testimony lacks authentication
under Rule 901, N.D.R.Ev. The district court abused its discretion by admitting
exhibit 4 without proper authentication.

                                      IV

[¶16] Henderson also argued that many of the proposed exhibits, including
exhibit 4, are inadmissible hearsay under N.D.R.Ev. 801. The State argued the
exhibits are either receipts or business records admissible under Rule 803(6),
N.D.R.Ev., as records of an act or event kept in the course of regularly
conducted activity. The State argued the exhibits are authenticated either by
the detective as “another qualified witness” or by compliance with Rule 902(11)
or (12), N.D.R.Ev. Henderson responded further that the detective was not a
qualified witness because he did not have personal knowledge whether the
exhibits are an original or whether the exhibits reflect regularly conducted
activity.

[¶17] The district court overruled the objection and received exhibit 4, stating,
“I don’t think the rules of evidence require us to divorce ourselves from
commonsense, which is that receipts are kept in the course of business.”
Henderson then indicated the statement “same objection” would be used to
preserve the issue for other exhibits.

                                       6
[¶18] “Both N.D.C.C. § 31-08-01 and N.D.R.Ev. 803(6) provide an exception to
the hearsay rule for records of regularly conducted business activity.” Pizza
Corner, Inc. v. C.F.L. Transp., Inc., 2010 ND 243, ¶ 9, 792 N.W.2d 911. The
district court admitted these exhibits under Rule 803(6) of the North Dakota
Rules of Evidence, which provides a hearsay exception for:

      A record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if:
            (A) the record was made at or near the time by, or from
            information transmitted by, someone with knowledge;
            (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly
            conducted activity of a business, organization,
            occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;
            (C) making the record was a regular practice of that
            activity;
            (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of
            the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a
            certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12);
            and
            (E) the opponent does not show that the source of
            information or the method or circumstances of
            preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

N.D.R.Ev. 803(6). Because North Dakota adopted N.D.R.Ev. 803 from
Fed.R.Evid. 803, we consider federal precedent persuasive. Pizza Corner, Inc.,
2010 ND 243, ¶ 9.

[¶19] “Rule 803(6) does not require that an employee from the company that
created the record provide the foundation for a business record.” Command
Ctr., Inc. v. Renewable Res., LLC, 2021 ND 59, ¶ 32, 956 N.W.2d 755.

            Under N.D.R.Ev. 803(6), the foundation for admission of a
      business record can also be established using a qualified witness,
      and a qualified witness is someone who can explain the record
      keeping system of the business. The term qualified witness is
      generally given a very broad interpretation. The witness need only
      have enough familiarity with the record-keeping system of the
      business in question to explain how the record came into existence
      in the ordinary course of business. Courts have further held that a
      witness from one company can provide the foundation for a record

                                        7
      created by a third party if that company integrated the record into
      its own records and relied on it, and if the record meets the other
      requirements of Rule 803(6).

Id. at ¶ 33 (cleaned up).

[¶20] Although it is common knowledge that receipts are generally kept in the
course of business, Rule 803(6)(D), N.D.R.Ev., requires the conditions
underlying the exception in Rule 803(6), including that the records are kept in
the regular course of business, be shown by testimony of the custodian or
another qualified witness, or by certification under Rule 902, N.D.R.Ev.
“Receipts” are not listed as a self-authenticating document under N.D.R.Ev.
902, nor did the State comply with Rule 902(11) or (12) to make the receipts
self-authenticating documents. Further, the detective did not testify regarding
how the documents came into existence. The testimony did not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 803(6)(D), N.D.R.Ev.

[¶21] For this same reason the receipts admitted without foundation,
including exhibit 7 – a Jiffy Lube receipt, exhibit 8 – a Rent-A-Center receipt,
exhibit 10 – Walmart receipts, exhibit 12 – an Ace Hardware receipt, and
exhibit 13 – Verizon Wireless receipts, were inadmissible hearsay. Therefore,
the district court abused its discretion by admitting exhibits 4, 7, 8, 10, 12 and
13.

[¶22] Henderson objected to the admission of exhibit 5, Progressive Insurance
documents. The State introduced the exhibit:

      A This is the cover sheet from Progressive auto, Progressive
      insurance for two policies that belong —
      Q And is it your testimony that you spoke with the representative
      from Progressive with regard to this investigation?
      A Yes.
      ....
      A Yes. They sent both binders for the policies, which were this
      thick. They had to FedEx them. So this is the condensed version.
      Q I want to draw your attention to page number 2 —
      A Sure.

                                        8
      Q — in that document, if you will. Page 2 of that document
      indicates there were three payments made on policies; is that
      correct?
      A I’m seeing — yes, correct. There’s three. Well, I’m actually seeing
      four.

Henderson objected with the “same objections.”

[¶23] An examination of exhibit 5 shows that the documents contain the
condensed insurance policy information, including insurance holder
information and a history of transactions. The detective testified the
documents were not in the form in which he had received them because the
company sent them in binders, and the exhibit does not contain all the
documents from the binders. The documents lack sufficient authentication.
The detective did not explain how these documents came into existence in the
ordinary course of business, nor does the record contain an affidavit by which
they may be self-authenticating under N.D.R.Ev. Rule 902(11) or (12). The
district court misapplied the law, and abused its discretion by admitting
exhibit 5.

[¶24] Similarly, exhibit 6, Credit Acceptance internal records, and exhibit 9,
the rental agreement contract, are more than just receipts, and require further
authentication and further explanation regarding how the record came into
existence in the ordinary course of business and compliance with Rules 902(11)
or (12), N.D.R.Ev. The district court misapplied the law by finding the
testimony regarding these exhibits conformed with Rule 803(6)(D), N.D.R.Ev.
The district court abused its discretion by admitting exhibits 6 and 9.

                                       V

[¶25] We next consider whether these evidentiary errors are harmless.
Sanchez, 2023 ND 106, ¶ 12. “If evidence was admitted in error, this Court will
consider the entire record and decide in light of all the evidence whether the
error was so prejudicial the defendant’s rights were affected and a different
decision would have occurred absent the error.” Id. (citations omitted).
“Erroneously admitted evidence which is cumulative to other properly

                                       9
admitted evidence is not prejudicial, does not affect substantial rights of the
parties, and accordingly, is harmless error.” Id. (citations omitted).

[¶26] We cannot say these errors are harmless. The State charged Henderson
with exploitation of an eligible adult under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31-07.1(2)(a),
requiring the State to prove the value of funds allegedly exploited exceed
$50,000. The State further charged Henderson with criminal attempt of theft
of property under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-05(2), requiring the State to prove the
theft exceeded $10,000. Exhibits 1, 3-10, 12, and 13 are financial documents
calculating the total value of the alleged exploitation and theft, without which
the State cannot meet its burden. Furthermore, the aggregate errors amount
to a substantial injustice affecting Henderson’s rights. Given the pervasive
errors admitting exhibits without proper authentication or as inadmissible
hearsay, and considering a set value was alleged in each count, the judgment
must be reversed.

[¶27] We need not address Henderson’s objections to other exhibits because
they are unnecessary to our decision.

                                      VI

[¶28] We reverse the judgment.

[¶29] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

                                      10