Court Opinion

ID: 9656351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:47:03.849156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:31.975182
License: Public Domain

Mackenzie, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. This Court may determine whether the board’s ultimate legal conclusions are correct, but we are bound by the board’s findings as to underlying evidentiary facts. Howard v Detroit, 377 Mich 102, 105-106; 139 NW2d 677 (1966). Injuries sustained while going to and from work are compensable where there is a sufficient nexus between the employment and the injury so that it may be said that the injury was a circumstance of the employment. Stark v L E Myers Co, 58 Mich App 439, 442-443; 228 NW2d 411 (1975), lv den 394 Mich 814 (1975). The board’s determination as to whether there was a sufficient nexus is an ultimate legal conclusion which this Court may review. Stover v Midwest Tank & Fabrication Co, Inc, 87 Mich App 452, 458; 275 NW2d 15 (1978).
However, in Stark, supra, the Court listed four considerations relevant to such an ultimate legal conclusion, including whether the employer paid for or furnished the employee’s transportation. The. board’s determination of whether the employer paid for or furnished the employee’s transportation is not an ultimate legal conclusion but a finding as to an underlying evidentiary fact.
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury was employment-related. Aquilina v General Motors Corp, 403 Mich 206, 210-211; 267 NW2d 923 (1978). The board has wide discretion in ascribing weight and credibility to evidence and in drawing inferences from circumstances. Fergus v Chrysler Corp (After Remand), 67 Mich App 106, 112; 240 NW2d 286 (1976), lv den 406 Mich 870 (1979), Coates v Continental Motors Corp, 373 Mich 461, 467; 130 *698NW2d 34 (1964). The board is not compelled to draw an inference favorable to plaintiff merely because the only evidence in the record would permit the board to draw such an inference. Fergus, supra, 112-113.
The crucial testimony here was as follows:
”Q. And, you and Mr. Vella and some other fellows went from Detroit to Adrain every day to work on the railroad?
"A. Yes, to work on the railroad.
"Q. Okay. How did you get back and forth to work?
"A. The foreman would pick us up in a company truck from our home to the job and from the job to our home.”
The board found:
"In this case, the only evidence offered on consideration #1, above, is that plaintiff testified the foreman drove him in a company truck. But, was this with defendant's] acquiescence, express or implied; how often did it occur; who paid for gasoline; did the other passengers use their own vehicles on other days?
"In sum, plaintiff has presented insufficient evidence from which even inferences might be drawn to take this case out of the general rule, or put it into the 'evolving new rule’.”
While, as the majority notes, the testimony indicates that the foreman drove plaintiff and his coemployees to and from work every day in a company-owned vehicle, there was no direct evidence indicating that the foreman’s actions were authorized or acquiesced in by the company. The board declined to draw such an inference from the testimony. The testimony permitted but did not compel the board to draw such an inference.
I would affirm.