Court Opinion

ID: 9927396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 22:03:02.948536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:50.760251
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2024 IL App (3d) 230629-U

                                 Order filed January 25, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2024

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                        )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                         )       of the 13th Judicial Circuit,
                                                        )       La Salle County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                        )       Appeal No. 3-23-0629
             v.                                         )       Circuit No. 23-CF-398
                                                        )
      ANGEL R. MARTINEZ,                                )       Honorable
                                                        )       Cynthia M. Raccuglia,
             Defendant-Appellant.                       )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment.
            Presiding Justice McDade dissented.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  ORDER

¶1          Held: The court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s petition to deny pretrial
                  release.

¶2          On November 6, 2023, defendant, Angel R. Martinez, was charged with unlawful

     possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver (Class X) (720 ILCS 646/55(a)(1) (West

     2022)). The State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release, alleging defendant was charged

     with a nonprobationable felony, and her release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any
     person, persons, or the community under section 110-6.1(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure

     of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2022)).

¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4           The factual basis provided that agents of the Trident Drug Task Force executed a search

     warrant on defendant’s residence where they located defendant and a substance that tested positive

     for methamphetamine. “The amount, digital scale, and previous buy out of the residence are all

     indicative of an intent to deliver.” The pretrial investigation report indicated that defendant lived

     at the residence with her boyfriend, his friend, and the friend’s daughter. A risk assessment

     indicated that she was a Level 4 risk (with Level 6 being the highest level risk). Defendant had

     other pending cases for possession of methamphetamine, driving on a suspended license, retail

     theft, and resisting a peace officer. She was on bond at the time. She also had convictions in Florida

     for burglary, grand theft, dealing or trafficking in stolen property, and false verification of

     ownership in 2019.

¶5          A hearing was held on the petition on November 6, 2023. The State provided the factual

     basis, noting that there was “a large amount of methamphetamine which has somewhat infested

     the community,” and “the amount was clear that it was for sale.” The State indicated that defendant

     had an extensive criminal history stating, “Seems like wherever she’s gone, there’s been some

     trouble.” She had a felony out of Mississippi for contempt of court. The State noted that in

     defendant’s currently pending cases “we have some failure to appears.” Defense counsel indicated

     that defendant was living at the residence with her boyfriend, her name was not on the search

     warrant, and “there’s no actual evidence that she had any idea or any involvement with selling

     narcotics.” Counsel argued it was defendant’s boyfriend who was engaged in the sale of the drugs.

                                                       2
     Counsel noted that there was no violence alleged. Counsel further indicated that defendant’s sister

     could drive her to court.

¶6           The court granted the State’s petition finding the State met its burden by clear and

     convincing evidence. In doing so, the court noted defendant’s criminal history, the volume of drugs

     charged, and the fact that defendant was on bond at the time. The court’s written order included a

     check-the-box form and further stated that the court granted the petition for the reasons stated on

     the record.

¶7                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶8           On appeal, defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in granting the petition

     to detain. She challenges each of the court’s findings as well as the court’s written order. We

     consider factual findings for the manifest weight of the evidence, but the ultimate decision to grant

     or deny the State’s petition to detain is considered for an abuse of discretion. People v. Trottier,

     2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. Under either standard, we consider whether the court’s

     determination is arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.; see also People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382,

     ¶ 19.

¶9           Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be denied

     in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a verified

     petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the burden of

     proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that

     defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant poses a real and present threat to any

     person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate this

     threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(e). When determining a defendant’s dangerousness and the

                                                      3
       conditions of release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can consider.

       Id. §§ 110-6.1(g), 110-5.

¶ 10           We find the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the petition. First, defendant

       argues the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident that

       she committed the offenses charged. Specifically, defendant points to her boyfriend as the

       perpetrator. However, both defendant and her boyfriend lived at the residence, and defendant was

       present when the house was searched. Defendant had also been recently charged with possession

       of methamphetamine, which tends to discredit the argument that she did not know about the drugs

       and connects her to the methamphetamine. Second, defendant was a danger to the community,

       based on the sale of the drugs. She also had a criminal history and was on bond at the time of the

       offense. While defendant argues that the order should be vacated because the court inadvertently

       checked the box for willful flight, our review of the record shows that the court did not check such

       a box. Third, defendant contends that the court erred in finding that there were no conditions to

       mitigate any threat she posed. Defendant clearly had an issue following orders of the court. She

       was on bond at the time, and the evidence indicated that she had failed to appear in court and had

       previously been held in contempt of court. Moreover, home monitoring would not have prevented

       the offense in this case. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s

       petition.

¶ 11           Lastly, defendant argues the court failed to make the necessary written findings. We have

       already considered this issue in People v. Hodge, 2024 IL App (3d) 230543. In Hodge, we noted

       that the point of such written findings was to facilitate appellate review and “where the transcript

       and order of the court ‘provide an equal opportunity to review the validity of the finding on appeal,’

                                                         4
       it is sufficient.” Id. ¶ 11 (quoting In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364, 375 (2005)). We adopt this

       reasoning here and find that the written order of the court was sufficient.

¶ 12                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 13          The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed.

¶ 14          Affirmed.

¶ 15          PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting:

¶ 16          I dissent from the decision of the majority affirming the circuit court’s grant of the State’s

       petition to deny pretrial release for this defendant.

¶ 17          At issue in this case is not defendant’s guilt or innocence of the charged offense. The

       question here is what conditions, if any, would allow this defendant to be released into the

       community until her trial by mitigating any real danger she poses to individual persons or to the

       community and/or inhibiting any risk of flight to avoid prosecution. As has apparently become

       commonplace in these hearings in the circuit court, the State in this case presented no evidence at

       all regarding the third element of section 110-6.1(e). Rather, the State provided support for the

       first two elements and then merely tendered an unsupported legal conclusion on the third element.

       Even assuming that the State met its burden of proof on the second element, it does not

       automatically follow that the third element has also been proven. The legislature has specifically

       required that the State prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that “no conditions could mitigate

       this threat or risk of flight.” Id. § 110-6.1(e). Even though it is not the defendant’s burden to show

       that conditions exist that mitigate any threat that he or she poses under the statute, one can easily

       see why defendants raise specific conditions at these hearings, in defense of any supposed risk

       they pose—the circuit courts have been allowing the State to completely bypass the legislatively

                                                          5
       required burden of proof it has on the third element. Defendants have essentially been forced to

       carry the burden of disproving a presumption that does not exist under the statute.

¶ 18          I am mindful of the circuit courts’ time-strapped dockets and the difficulties associated

       with the legislature requiring more for bond hearings than was previously required. But courts

       must adapt when the legislature requires us to do so. The “old way of doing things” simply no

       longer suffices for bond hearings. The State cannot be allowed to ignore its statutorily mandated

       burden on the third element, especially when the statutory scheme carries an explicit presumption

       in favor of release. See 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a) (West 2022).

¶ 19          I emphasize that I am not commenting at all on whether conditions do exist that could

       mitigate the threat allegedly posed by the defendant in this case. Perhaps there are none. But the

       statute puts the burden of proving that no such conditions exist squarely on the State. When the

       State provides no evidence on that issue at the hearing and the circuit court denies pretrial release

       anyway, a decision by a reviewing court that affirms the circuit court’s decision is inconsistent

       with the statutory scheme’s explicit requirements and purpose and is therefore incorrect, no matter

       how dangerous or violent the particular defendant may in fact be.

¶ 20          Under the circumstances of this case, I would hold that because the State failed to meet its

       burden on the third element of section 110-6.1(e), the circuit court abused its discretion when it

       granted the State’s motion to deny pretrial release. Its decision must be reversed and the matter

       remanded for a statutorily compliant hearing.

                                                        6