Court Opinion

ID: 9744384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:01:45.209412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.875502
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority attributes to the phrasing of the statute a clarity which I believe is absent. The statute is poorly drafted and, as observed by the majority, is subject to differing constructions. See Op. at 1064-1065.
For example, one might argue, with more than a degree of merit, that if the evidence is totally lacking with regard to whether the weapon was loaded or unloaded, a jury could not convict of an A misdemeanor because the “unloaded” element of the offense has not been established. This leads to a conclusion that the statute in fact makes the matter of an unloaded firearm an affirmative defense upon which the defendant bears the burden of proof.
Subject to the above caveat, I agree that it is not necessary for the State to prove that the firearm was loaded in order to obtain a D felony conviction.
I respectfully dissent, however, from the affirmance of the three separate and distinct convictions. Here there was no evidence, as was present in Armstrong v. State, 742 N.E.2d 972, 976-977 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) that .there were “three separate and distinct pointings of a firearm rather than one continuous action.”
To the contrary, as noted by the majority, the evidence disclosed that Brown pointed his gun “at the people in Camp*1067bell’s car,” that he was “pointing [the gun] at all of us,” and that he “pointed [the gun] at all three of us ” by waving it. Op. at 1066 (emphasis supplied).
I would reverse and remand with instructions to vacate two of the three convictions.