Court Opinion

ID: 9352078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 20:06:52.405514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:52.369722
License: Public Domain

J-A24018-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 NICHOLAS ALEXANDER FORMAN                :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 2476 EDA 2021

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 19, 2021
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002241-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                        FILED JANUARY 4, 2023

      Nicholas Alexander Forman appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas on August 19,

2021, following his conviction for first-degree murder. After careful review, we

affirm.

      Forman’s convictions stem from the beating and strangulation death of

his girlfriend after a night out watching the Super Bowl on February 2, 2020.

Forman was subsequently charged with first and third degree murder. Both

charges were held for court after a preliminary hearing. In April 2021, Forman

filed pretrial motions to suppress evidence which were denied.

      A four-day jury trial was held between August 16, 2021 and August 19,

2021. The trial court summarized the extensive trial testimony as follows:

      On February 3, 2020, at approximately 11:10 a.m., [Forman]
      arrived at the emergency department of Pottstown Hospital in an
J-A24018-22

     Uber with the victim, []. (N.T., Trial by Jury - Day 1, 8/ 16/21, pp
     61 - 62). Marques Harmon, a security officer at the hospital, went
     outside to assist, and there he saw that the victim in the backseat
     of the vehicle was unresponsive and had multiple injuries. Id. at
     62 - 64. Mr. Harmon went immediately to get additional
     assistance. Id. at 65. Several nurses came to help and began to
     administer CPR. Id. at 66. The victim was taken by gurney inside
     for further treatment. Id.

     [Forman] stayed at the hospital, and upon Mr. Harmon's
     suggestion, [Forman] followed him into a conference room, a
     room for families of a critically injured patient. Id. at 69 - 70.
     Once there, [Forman] offered an explanation for the victim's
     condition. Id. at 71. [Forman] told Mr. Harmon that the victim
     had been in a physical fight with several females that she had a
     verbal altercation with earlier that night, when they had been at
     P.J. Whelihan's celebrating the Super Bowl. Id. at 71 - 73.

     Breanna Coyle, an emergency room nurse at Pottstown Hospital,
     responded to Mr. Harmon's call for assistance. Id. at 84, 86. She
     described the victim as lifeless, without a pulse. Id. at 87. She
     observed [] the victim's condition as disheveled, with bruising on
     her face and around her neck, and her clothes were covered with
     debris. Id. at 87 - 88. When she started CPR, she noticed the
     victim's body was very cold. Id. at 88. Once back in the
     emergency room, Nurse Coyle saw bruising on the victim's
     extremities, scratches and bruising on her arms, dried blood and
     vomit on her face, swelling to her jaw, and bruising and swelling
     about the neck. Id. at 90 - 97. Nurse Coyle described the steps
     the emergency room personnel took in an attempt to resuscitate
     the victim. The nurse never saw any signs of life, no pulse, no
     respiration, and no consciousness. Id. at 98 - 99.

     Jolene Gaus, an emergency room nurse at Pottstown Hospital
     assisted Nurse Coyle with CPR. Id. at 102. She also observed that
     the victim's condition was lifeless and cold upon her arrival to the
     hospital. Id. at 103. There was no pulse or respiration, she was
     very cold, her lips were blue, and presented with multiple bruising
     and facial injury trauma. Id. at 104.

     Julie Rich, a nurse practitioner at Pottstown Hospital, also ran
     outside to assist both nurses Coyle and Gaus. Id. at 121. In the
     emergency room, advanced forms of life support were provided to
     the victim, but they were unable to get the victim's heart beating

                                    -2-
J-A24018-22

     or the victim breathing on her own. Id. at 124. She testified that
     the victim presented as disheveled and with evidence of trauma
     about her neck and face. Id. at 123, 124 - 125. In particular,
     there were circumferential marks around her neck. Id. at 125.
     Nurse Rich notified the police that this might potentially be a
     crime. Id. at 126.

     Nurse Coyle, Nurse Gaus, and Diane Marie Craig, an emergency
     room technician, all of whom observed [Forman]’s demeanor,
     described him as calm during the initial resuscitation efforts. Id.
     at 99, 106 - 107, 114. Nurse Rich described [Forman]’s affect as
     flat, devoid of emotion. Id. at 128.

     Dr. Jeremy Zwillenberg, an emergency room doctor at Pottstown
     Hospital, treated the victim back in the trauma bay. Id. at 135.
     He described the life resuscitating efforts they employed but
     despite these efforts they were unable to rewarm the victim or
     restart her heart. Id. at 136 - 139.

     Detective Heather Long, a Pottstown Police Department detective,
     responded to the hospital for an unresponsive female. Id. at 150
     -151. She responded with a fellow officer, Sergeant Thomas
     Leahan. Id. at 151. After initially reviewing hospital surveillance
     video, she went into the conference room where [Forman] was
     waiting. Id. at 154. She asked [Forman] for his consent to search
     his cell phone and provided a consent to search form to him, which
     she explained. Id. [Forman] consented, he signed the form, and
     provided the detective with the passcode. Id.

     Detective Long, knowing that [Forman] arrived to the hospital in
     an Uber, went to the Uber application on his phone and found his
     previous trip history. Id. at 156. She also reviewed the videos and
     photographs on his cell phone, and she found a photograph of the
     victim lying face down on a floor, with her clothes disheveled. Id.
     at 156 - 157. There was also a video of [Forman], taken several
     hours later. Id. at 157. The following morning there was a
     photograph of the victim seat-belted in the back of the Uber. Id.
     The cell phone was later turned over to the Pennsylvania State
     Police to download it forensically. Id. at 161.

     Detective Sergeant Thomas Leahan learned that the victim's
     boyfriend was in the consultation room with another officer,
     Officer Nikolaus Stoltzfus. Id. Detective Leahan proceeded to the
     consultation room to speak with [Forman]. Id. [Forman] told him

                                    -3-
J-A24018-22

     that he and the victim had gone to P.J. Whelihan's for the Super
     Bowl, where she got into an altercation with three females. Id. at
     165. He further told the sergeant that the victim gave the females
     his address so they could meet up at his house to fight, and that
     she did in fact fight with them. Id. at 165 - 166. [Forman] stated
     that after they fought, he carried the victim into his apartment
     and that he fell asleep at 6:00 a.m. Id. at 166. When he woke up
     at 9:45 a.m. he realized that she was having trouble breathing
     and called for an Uber to take them to the hospital. Id. at 166.
     [Forman] never asked about the victim's condition. Id. at 167. His
     demeanor was calm, cool, and collected. Id.

     Officer Nikolaus Stoltzfus, an officer with the Pottstown Police
     Department, also responded to Pottstown Hospital for a call of a
     suspicious person, that a person was brought to the hospital
     already deceased, and to investigate. (N.T, Trial by Jury- Day 2,
     8/17/21, p. 9 - 10). Officer Stoltzfus made contact with [Forman]
     in the conference room. Id. at 12. He asked [Forman] what had
     brought him to the hospital that day. Id. at 12 - 13. [Forman]
     stated that he had been at P.J. Whelihan's to watch the Super
     Bowl the night before. Id. at 13. While there, the victim got into
     an altercation with three females. Id. [Forman] also told the
     officer that the victim remained in contact with these women, and
     when they arrived at his house, the females arrived there and
     wanted to fight her. Id. [Forman] stated that when they fought,
     he went inside. Id. Sometime later, [Forman] went back outside
     and he found the victim laying on the ground. Id. at 13 - 14. He
     helped victim into his house and put her to bed. Id. at 14.
     [Forman] said that he woke up at 6:30 a.m., and that she was
     breathing. At around 9:45 he realized that there was something
     wrong with her and that is when he called an Uber to go to the
     hospital. Id. [Forman]’s demeanor was calm while speaking with
     the officer. Id. [Forman] never asked about the victim's condition.
     Id.

     Next the Commonwealth called several employees from P.J.
     Whelihan's who worked on the night of the Super Bowl, February
     2, 2020. In particular, Ashley LePerson, a server at P.J.
     Whelihan's, testified that [Forman] and the victim sat down for
     food and drinks at about 6:30 p.m. Id. at 18, 19, 20 - 21, 23, 25.
     She testified that their behavior seemed normal, and that she did
     not observe anyone talking to the victim. Id. at 27. This testimony
     was echoed by Anthony Dadario, a bartender at P.J. Whelihan's,
     that their behavior was normal and that no one came up to them.

                                    -4-
J-A24018-22

     Id. at 37. Further, Ciara Kehoe, another bartender, noted that
     [Forman] and the victim closed out their tab at 10:03 p.m., and
     that she did not see anyone approach them that night. Id. at 46.
     Finally, Maxine Dobson, the general manager at P.J. Whelihan's
     testified. Id. at 49. She reviewed the surveillance footage from
     the cameras. Id. at 51. She found nothing of significance. Id. And
     when she spoke to her staff, nobody told her that there was any
     sort of altercation. Id. at 52.

     Daniel Persing, an Uber driver, drove [Forman] and the victim
     home from P.J. Whelihan's. Id. at 59 - 60, 61. Right before a pit
     stop to Quick Mart, Mr. Persing remembered that the victim
     received a text message, and [Forman] asked her about it. Id. at
     63. The victim tried to dismiss his question, but [Forman]
     continued to ask about the text message about three or four times
     prior to Quick Mart. Id. at 63 - 64. [Forman]’s demeanor was very
     calm, but persistent. Id. at 64. After the Quick Mart, [Forman]
     continued to ask the victim about the text message. Id. at 65. At
     some point [Forman] said, [“]I don't know if I want you to come
     F'ing home with me,[“] and the victim responded, [“]Cut it out,
     you're scaring me.[“] Id. at 66. Mr. Persing testified that he had
     a gut feeling that [Forman] wasn't going to let the conversation
     go, and after [Forman] and the victim exited the vehicle, he pulled
     over, put down the window and listened to see if things would
     calm down. Id. at 68 - 69, 71. For about five minutes he heard
     yelling and arms flailing, and then things calmed down. Id. at 72.
     Once it was quiet, Mr. Persing assumed they worked it out and left
     the area. Id. at 73 - 74.

     A neighbor of [Forman], Brady Reese, testified. On February 2,
     2020, he arrived home around 11:00 p.m. Id. at 84 - 85. He
     originally heard loud talking coming from across the street. Id. at
     85. He saw a woman on the lawn. She seemed to be walking
     around stumbling and mumbling to herself. Id. at 86, 91. Mr.
     Reese thought she heard the woman say, [“]Help.[“] Id. at 86.
     When he got halfway towards her, he asked the male that was
     with her if everything was alright, and he said, [“]She's fine[“] and
     [“]she's just drunk, everything's okay.[“] Id. It also appeared to
     him that the woman gave a thumbs up signal, so Mr. Reese walked
     back home. Id. He did see the couple walking side by side down
     the street. Id. at 88.

     At around 2:30 a.m., in the early morning hours of February 3,
     2020, Morgan Young, [Forman]’s on-and-off girlfriend, arrived at

                                     -5-
J-A24018-22

     [Forman]’s house. Id. at 97, 98 - 99. When she got there she
     texted him, and he came out to her car. Id. at 99 - 100. They sat
     in the backseat for about an hour. Id. at 100, 101. Ms. Young
     testified that [Forman]’s demeanor was calm and that he seemed
     his normal self. Id. at 102. Ms. Young further testified that she
     knew [Forman] and the victim were in a relationship and that the
     victim was inside his house. Id. at 102 - 103. [Forman] had told
     her that the victim fell in the middle of the street, he tucked her
     in bed, that she was unconscious but still breathing. Id. at 103.

     Later in the day, [Forman] called an Uber and was driven to the
     district court in Limerick. Id. at 117 - 120. At the district Court
     was Corporal Scott Reynolds of the Upper Providence Township
     Police Department, who was working there that day. Id. at 122 -
     123, 125. Corporal Reynolds testified that he interacted with
     [Forman] for about 15 minutes, and that his demeanor was
     pleasant and courteous. Id. at 128. [Forman] went by Uber back
     to his residence. Id. at 133 - 135.

     At about 11:15 a.m. on February 3, 2020, another Uber driver []
     drove [Forman] and the victim to the hospital. Id. at 141 - 142,
     145, 151.

     On February 3, 2020, Trooper Matthew Taubenberger of the
     Pennsylvania State Police - Criminal Investigative Unit was called
     to assist with the investigation. Id. at 167. At about 2:00 p.m.,
     he went to [Forman]’s residence where he observed a clump of
     hair in the middle of the roadway immediately outside. Id. at 167
     - 168. He photographed it and collected the hair. Id. at 168. Later
     that day, the trooper also photographed [Forman]’s injury to his
     right hand. Id. at 174 - 175.

     Sergeant Thomas Falcon, the supervisor of the Criminal
     Investigative Unit of the Pennsylvania State Police, was also
     involved in the investigation. Id. at 179 - 180. On February 3,
     2020, Sergeant Falcon along with Trooper Sanzick, the lead
     investigator, responded to the Pottstown Hospital[] emergency
     department. Id. at 180. There he met with Detective Wittenberger
     and detectives Long and Leahan. Id. He was provided with two
     cell phones and the victim's clothing, which he secured and took
     back to the Skippack barracks. Id. at 181.

     The following day, on February 4, 2020, Sergeant Falcon was
     working with Sergeant Ryan Burza, and together they returned to

                                    -6-
J-A24018-22

     the area of 937 Hamilton Road in Collegeville to do a neighborhood
     canvas. Id. at 184. In front of [Forman]’s residence, on the front
     lawn, the sergeant noticed that the lawn was torn up, and that
     there were mud and chunks of grass leading toward the driveway
     at 937 Hamilton, up and over the driveway. Id. at 188. He also
     found a bracelet, a beaded bracelet, spelling out the [victim’s first
     name]. Id. at 189.

     Trooper Todd Wright of the Pennsylvania State Police - Forensics
     Unit, testified. Id. at 191. As a part of the investigation on
     February 3, 2020, he went to 937 Hamilton Road and after a
     search warrant was secured, he executed a search of the
     premises. Id. at 194, 195. He found a clump of hair between the
     storm door and entrance door. Id. at 197.

     A full raw data extraction was performed by Nicholas Devine of
     the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office - Special
     Services Unit. Id. at 234 - 235. The raw data was converted into
     readable format. Id. at 239. Trooper Brad Furlong of the
     Pennsylvania State Police - Criminal Investigation Unit testified
     that he reviewed 500 videos and images from [Forman]’s phone.
     Id. at 256. In one of the videos, it depicts [the victim] taken
     outdoors, she's on the ground. Id. at 261. The date that video
     was created was February 2, 2020 at 11:58 p.m.

     Erica Williams, M.D, a forensic pathologist for the Montgomery
     County Coroner's Office, was accepted as an expert in forensic
     pathology. (N.T., Trial by Jury- Day 3, 8/ 18/21, pp. 130 -131,
     134). Dr. Williams performed an autopsy on the victim's body on
     February 4, 2020. Id. at 137. The doctor's external examination
     showed evidence that the victim had been strangled and beaten.
     Id. at 139 - 142. There was a constellation of injuries indicating
     strangulation. Id. at 142. There was also evidence of other blunt
     force trauma to the face and head, which the doctor detailed at
     trial. Id. at 143, 144 - 145. Dr. Williams removed the brain and
     prepared it for review by the neuropathologist, Dr. Emery. Id. at
     145, 146.

     Lyndsey A. Emery, M.D., the current assistant medical examiner
     for the City of Philadelphia, does private consultation work for
     Montgomery County. (N.T., Trial by Jury- Day 4, 8/ 19/21, p. 7).
     She was accepted as an expert in neuropathology. Id. at 11. She
     was brought into this case to specifically examine the victim's
     brain. Id. at 12 - 13. Dr. Emery testified that the victim's brain

                                     -7-
J-A24018-22

     weight was above average, which is an indicator of edema,
     swelling. Id. at 16. Her external examination of the brain revealed
     that it was swollen, the wrinkles in the brain look flatter. Id. at
     23. In addition, she testified that there was bleeding into the
     subarachnoid space, the space between the actual brain and the
     covering that lays right on top of the brain. Id. There was
     hemorrhaging into that space on both sides of the brain, the
     cerebral hemispheres. Id. Next, Dr. Emery did a dissection of the
     brain. Id. at 24. After that dissection, she noted there were
     contusions of the brain of both cerebral hemispheres. Id. The
     victim also had hemorrhaging into a part of her brain called the
     pons, part of the brain stem. Id. at 25. Dr. Emery explained that
     that particular hemorrhage is called a Duret hemorrhage, and is
     frequently seen in blunt trauma. Id. The bilateral contusions on
     her brain suggest that there was some sort of blunt impact trauma
     or blunt impact injury. Id. at 25 - 26. She determined that based
     upon the distribution of injuries, there were multiple bilateral
     impact sites. Id. at 26. As far as the pons hemorrhages, the doctor
     has seen them very frequently in brains that have been injured by
     blunt trauma. Id. at 26 - 27.

     The brain also showed evidence of a left uncal herniation, which
     is a space that a swollen brain can herniate through when the
     brain is sufficiently swollen. Id. at 28 - 29. Dr. Emery opined that
     once you are at that state of herniation, it's very difficult to
     survive, and that this injury is almost entirely lethal. Id. at 29.
     She explained that the herniation is a consequence of those blunt
     injuries. Id. at 29 - 30. The blunt injury happens, there's
     hemorrhage in the subarachnoid space, there are bruises of the
     brain which results in brain swelling, and that brain swelling is
     what causes the herniation. Id. at 30. In sum, the doctor found
     bilateral subarachnoid hemorrhages, bilateral contusions, direct-
     type hemorrhages of the pons, and ultimately impending left uncal
     herniation. Id. Finally, based on the hypoxic ischemic changes
     that the doctor saw microscopically, she was able to determine
     that the survival interval for the victim was less than 12 hours.
     Id. at 32 - 33.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/31/2022, at 2-12.

     At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Forman guilty of first-degree

murder. The trial court sentenced Forman the same day to a term of life

                                     -8-
J-A24018-22

imprisonment. Forman filed a timely post-sentence motion which was denied.1

This timely appeal followed.

       Forman raises the following three issues on appeal:

       1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Forman]’s motion to
       suppress the contents of his cell phone where he was illegally
       detained when he gave consent to search it, which was not
       voluntary, and the scope of the search exceeded that to which he
       consented?

       …

       2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying
       [Forman]’s motion for a mistrial after the victim’s family, in the
       presence of the jury, had a prejudicial emotional reaction to a key
       piece of evidence, which deprived [Forman] of a fair trial?

       …

       3. Whether there was sufficient evidence presented at [] trial to
       sustain the guilty verdict for first degree murder where [Forman]
       acted with malice but without the specific intent to kill the victim?

Appellant’s Brief, at 7-8.2

       In his first issue, Forman challenges the denial of his motion to suppress

evidence gained from the search of his cell phone.

____________________________________________

1 The order denying the post-sentence motion was dated August 30, 2021,
and indicates it was sent to all parties on that date. However, for reasons that
are unclear from the record, the order was not docketed as filed until
November 9, 2021.

2 Forman had raised an additional issue in his amended 1925(b) concise
statement relating to the failure to instruct the jury on a charge of voluntary
manslaughter. See Petition to Amend Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
Statement, 12/22/2021, at 2. While this issue was addressed by the trial court
in its opinion, Forman specifically abandoned this issue on appeal. See
Appellant’s Brief, at 7, FN 1. Therefore, we will not address it.

                                           -9-
J-A24018-22

      Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s
      denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are
      supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
      from those facts are correct. When reviewing the ruling of the
      suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the
      prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as
      remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
      a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the
      suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse
      only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007) (citations

omitted). “In appeals from suppression orders, our scope of review is limited

to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v.

Caple, 121 A.3d 511, 517 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

      “It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass

on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.

The suppression court is free to believe all, some or none of the evidence

presented at the suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 823

A.2d 180, 183 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted).

      Forman argues the contents of his cell phone should have been

suppressed because (1) he was illegally detained when he gave consent to

search his cell phone, (2) his consent to the search was not voluntary, and (3)

the scope of the search exceeded that to which he consented. We find these

claims are either waived or meritless.

      First, Forman argues suppression should have been granted because he

was illegally detained when he gave consent to search his cell phone. Before

addressing the merits of this claim, we must determine whether it is waived.

                                    - 10 -
J-A24018-22

Our Supreme Court has held that when a trial court directs an appellant to file

a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, any issues not raised

in such a statement will be waived. See Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d

306, 308 (Pa. 1998).

       In his 1925(b) concise statement, Forman argued that he did not make

a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights regarding the search of his cell

phone where he was not apprised of his Miranda3 rights. See Petition to

Amend Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, at 2.

       In contrast, Forman argues on appeal that the trial court erred in

denying the motion to suppress the contents of his cell phone where he was

illegally detained. The question of whether a detention is legally justifiable is

distinct and separate from the question whether a suspect is actually detained.

Notably, while the lack of a Miranda warning is the main point of the claim

framed in the concise statement, and accordingly the trial court analyzed the

claim as such in its opinion, Miranda is not mentioned at all in the portion of

Forman’s appellate brief devoted to this claim. See Appellant’s Brief, at 37-

40.4 Further, Forman’s appellate argument focuses on the issue of whether he

was subjected to a detention, but does not develop any argument to support

his claim that the alleged detention was illegal. While Forman makes a passing

____________________________________________

3   See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

4Miranda is only discussed once in the entire appellate brief in relation to a
separate argument. See id. at 42-43.

                                          - 11 -
J-A24018-22

mention of the requirement of probable cause to support “a seizure[,]” he

does not provide any analysis of the distinction between a custodial detention

and an investigative detention. Nor does he provide any attempt to apply the

standard of probable cause to the circumstances of this case. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2003).

Similarly, the trial court’s opinion on appeal focuses solely on defending its

finding that Forman “was not restrained in any way.” Trial Court Opinion,

1/31/22, at 18. The trial court did not provide any analysis of whether the

police were entitled to detain Forman.

         Because the distinct issue of whether Forman’s detention was legal was

not raised in the concise statement, the issue on appeal is waived. Lord, 719

A.2d at 308.

         Next, Forman argues his consent to the search of his phone was not

voluntary. Specifically, Forman concedes that he gave consent to search his

phone, but contends the consent was not voluntary as he claims he was “in

custody at the time he gave consent to search his phone.” Appellant’s Brief,

at 41.

         “A search warrant is not required where a person with the proper

authority     unequivocally   and   specifically   consents   to   the   search.”

Commonwealth v. Acosta, 815 A.2d 1078, 1083 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “To establish a valid

consensual search, the Commonwealth must first prove that the consent was

                                      - 12 -
J-A24018-22

given during a legal police interaction.” Commonwealth v. Bell, 871 A.2d

267, 273 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

      Here, Detective Leahan indicated that when he asked to look at

Forman’s phone, he did not consider Forman a suspect. See N.T., Pre-Trial

Motions Via Video Conference, 5/24/2021, at 32. Rather, he was proceeding

according to Forman’s claim that the victim had been involved in a fight with

three other women. See id. Police never told Forman he could not leave nor

made any other show of force towards Forman. See id. at 39-40. The

suppression court found this testimony to be credible. See id. at 145. As we

cannot re-weigh the evidence on appeal, this evidence was sufficient to

establish that Forman was not in custody when he gave his consent to the

search of his cell phone.

      But this does not end our analysis, as Forman also challenges the

suppression court’s conclusion that his consent was voluntary pursuant to the

totality of the circumstances. “To establish a voluntary consensual search, the

Commonwealth must prove that a consent is the product of an essentially free

and unconstrained choice - not the result of duress or coercion, express or

implied, or a will overborne - under the totality of the circumstances.”

Commonwealth v. Randolph, 151 A.3d 170, 179 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

      At the suppression hearing, Detective Leahan testified that after arriving

at the ER, he proceeded to the family consultation room where he came in

                                    - 13 -
J-A24018-22

contact with Forman. See N.T., Pre-Trial Motions Via Video Conference,

5/24/2021, at 25. Forman had two cell phones with him at the time, and

identified one as the victim’s and one as his own. See id. at 25-26. Detective

Leahan took custody of the victim’s phone. See id. at 26. Detective Leahan

asked Forman if he would provide consent to search his phone, to which

Forman verbally agreed, without hesitation, and without any questions. See

id. at 27.

      Detective Long testified that she was called into the family consultation

room to obtain consent from Forman. See id. at 36. Detective Long provided

Forman with a consent form, which she filled out in his presence, read over

and explained the form, and asked if Forman had any questions. See id. at

38. Forman did not have any questions and signed the consent form. See id.

Without any prompting, Forman then volunteered his passcode and wrote the

passcode on the bottom of the form. See id. at 38-39. No weapons were

brandished, Forman was never told he could not leave, nor did he ask to end

the interview, and his egress was never blocked. See id. at 39. At no point

was Forman restrained in any manner. See id. at 40.

      The trial court found the detectives’ testimony credible and accordingly

found the consent was voluntary. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion

and find Forman’s somewhat scattered argument does not persuade us

otherwise. Accordingly, Forman fails to demonstrate that his consent was not

voluntarily given.

                                    - 14 -
J-A24018-22

      Finally, Forman argues the scope of the search exceeded that to which

he consented. Specifically, Forman contends that even if his consent was

voluntary, he believed he was only giving consent for the sole purpose of the

detectives trying to get in contact with the victim’s family.

      Again, before addressing the merits of this claim, we must determine

whether it is waived. “[A]ppellate review of an order denying suppression is

limited to examination of the precise basis under which suppression initially

was sought; no new theories of relief may be considered on appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272–73 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      Although the burden in suppression matters is on the Commonwealth to

establish “that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the

defendant's rights,” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(D), that burden is triggered only when

the defendant “state[s] specifically and with particularity the evidence sought

to be suppressed, the grounds for suppression, and the facts and events in

support thereof.” Commonwealth v. McDonald, 881 A.2d 858, 860 (Pa.

Super. 2005). “Bald statements or boilerplate allegations of illegally obtained

evidence are insufficient to trigger the Commonwealth's burden of going

forward and proving that a search was legal.” McDonald, 881 A.2d at 860;

see also Commonwealth v. Quaid, 871 A.2d 246, 249 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(“[W]hen a motion to suppress is not specific in asserting the evidence

believed to have been unlawfully obtained and/or the basis for the

                                     - 15 -
J-A24018-22

unlawfulness, the defendant cannot complain if the Commonwealth fails to

address the legality of the evidence the defendant wishes to contest.”).

      Here, Forman included a blanket statement in his suppression motion,

merely stating “the scope of said search was overly broad”. Omnibus Pre-Trial

Motion, 4/23/2021, at 2. Forman failed to include any other support for this

bald allegation, nor cite to any facts in support of this claim. Further, when

the Commonwealth and the trial court asked Forman to state, with specificity

and particularity, his basis for requesting suppression on the record at the

commencement of the suppression hearing, Forman did not raise such an

argument. Nor did he develop this basis for suppression at any point during

the remainder of the suppression hearing.

      We find the burden of proof never shifted to the Commonwealth on this

issue. Similar to the defendant in McDonald, Forman simply made a bald

allegation, which he then failed to pursue in any meaningful way. As we find

Forman abandoned his request, we conclude Forman waived this claim for our

review. See id. at 860.

      In his second issue on appeal, Forman contends the trial court abused

its discretion by denying Forman’s motion for a mistrial. Specifically, he argues

he was deprived of a fair trial after the victim’s family, in the presence of the

jury, had a prejudicial emotional reaction to a key piece of evidence.

      Our Supreme Court has explained:

      A trial court is required to grant a mistrial only where the alleged
      prejudicial event may reasonably be said to have deprived the

                                     - 16 -
J-A24018-22

      defendant of a fair and impartial trial. It is well-settled that the
      review of a trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial is limited
      to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.

      An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if
      in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or
      the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result
      of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will ... discretion is abused. A
      trial court may grant a mistrial only where the incident upon which
      the motion is based is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect
      is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury
      from weighing and rendering a true verdict. A mistrial is not
      necessary where cautionary instructions are adequate to
      overcome prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Fortenbaugh, 69 A.3d 191, 193 (Pa. 2013) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

      Here, on the second day of trial, the Commonwealth entered a video

into evidence that was taken from Forman’s phone, just before midnight on

February 2, 2020. The 14-second video depicts the victim laying outside on

the grass, seemingly unconscious, with visible blood and injuries on her face.

During the video, Forman can be heard saying “This is what a cheating liar

gets,” and additionally using vulgar language to describe the victim’s

character. Right after the video started playing before the jury, the victim’s

family began to cry and “wail loudly” in the courtroom. N.T., Trial By Jury -

Day 2, 8/17/2021, at 263. In response, the court had to clear both the family

and the jurors out of the courtroom. Outside the presence of the jury,

Forman’s counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court denied. Instead, the

court, by agreement of defense counsel, gave a curative instruction to the

jury. See id. at 265-268.

                                     - 17 -
J-A24018-22

      The curative instruction issued by the trial court was direct, unequivocal,

and strong, informing the jury that they were not to consider the emotional

outburst, and was sufficient to expunge any taint and assure a fair trial. Under

the circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial

court's determination that a mistrial was not warranted.

      In his third and final issue, Forman argues the evidence was insufficient

to support his conviction for first degree murder. We are constrained to

conclude Forman’s sufficiency claim is waived, as his Rule 1925(b) statement

did not adequately identify the errors that he intended to challenge on appeal.

      It is well-established that any issue not raised in a Rule 1925(b)

statement will be deemed waived for appellate review. See Lord, at 309.

Further, an appellant’s concise statement must identify the errors with

sufficient specificity for the trial court to identify and address the issues the

appellant wishes to raise on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (requiring a

Rule 1925(b) statement to “concisely identify each error that the appellant

intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the

judge”). A Rule 1925(b) concise statement that is too vague can result in

waiver of issues on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683,

686-687 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“a [c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to

allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional

equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all”).

      If [an appellant] wants to preserve a claim that the evidence was
      insufficient, then the 1925(b) statement needs to specify the

                                      - 18 -
J-A24018-22

      element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient.
      This Court can then analyze the element or elements on appeal.
      [Where a] 1925(b) statement [ ] does not specify the allegedly
      unproven elements[,] ... the sufficiency issue is waived [on
      appeal].

Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254, 260 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted). Further, waiver applies even where the trial court addresses the

issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion and where the Commonwealth does not

object to the defective Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth v.

Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“The Commonwealth's

failure and the presence of a trial court opinion are of no moment to our

analysis because we apply Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) in a predictable, uniform fashion,

not in a selective manner dependent on an appellee's argument or a trial

court's choice to address an unpreserved claim.”) (citations omitted); see

also Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 1072 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      Here, Forman’s Rule 1925(b) statement simply includes a blanket

statement, declaring the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first

degree murder. See Petition to Amend Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

Statement, 12/22/2021, at 2. The statement fails to “specify the element or

elements upon which the evidence was insufficient” to support Forman’s

conviction. As a result, we must conclude Forman’s sufficiency of the evidence

claim is waived on appeal. See Williams, 959 A.2d at 1257-1258.

                                    - 19 -
J-A24018-22

       Even if Forman had properly preserved this issue in his 1925(b)

Statement, it would merit no relief.5 Forman concedes that he acted with

malice, but argues the evidence was insufficient to prove that he acted with

the specific intent to kill, a necessary element of a first degree murder

conviction. However, Forman’s argument fails to acknowledge that specific

intent to kill can be proven if the defendant knowingly applies deadly force to

the person of another. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 662 A.2d 621, 629

(Pa. 1995) (citation omitted). “Death caused by strangulation is sufficient to

infer the specific intent required for a conviction of first degree murder.” Id.

(citations omitted).

       Here, the record contains evidence that Forman had an argument with

the victim and beat and strangled her until she became unresponsive. Forman

____________________________________________

5 Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
to determine whether, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict
winner, the evidence at trial and all reasonable inferences therefrom are
sufficient for the trier of fact to find that each element of the crimes charged
is established beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Dale, 836
A.2d 150, 152 (Pa. Super. 2003). “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden
of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657,
661 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

“[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence.” Id. (citation omitted). “As an
appellate court, we do not assess credibility nor do we assign weight to any
of the testimony of record.” Commonwealth v. Kinney, 863 A.2d 581, 584
(Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Thus, we will not disturb the verdict
“unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances.” Bruce,
916 A.2d at 661 (citation omitted).

                                          - 20 -
J-A24018-22

then left the victim unresponsive in his home for a full night and subsequent

morning before finally taking the victim to the hospital. Viewed in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, the evidence was

sufficient for the jury to infer that Forman strangled the victim with the specific

intent to kill her. See id. Accordingly, Forman’s third and final issue fails, and

we affirm the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/04/2023

                                      - 21 -