Court Opinion

ID: 9564084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:54:11.551194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:13.496354
License: Public Domain

Justice Martin
dissenting.
I must dissent. The majority, without citing a single case in point, has held for the first time that a general release executed by one party and ratified by the opposing party does not bar the opposing party from pursuing claims against the party that executed the release. This is contrary to Keith v. Glenn, 262 N.C. 284, 136 S.E. 2d 665 (1964); Bradford v. Kelly, 260 N.C. 382, 132 S.E. 2d 886 (1963); Cannon v. Parker, 249 N.C. 279, 106 S.E. 2d 229 (1958); Houghton v. Harris, 243 N.C. 92, 89 S.E. 2d 860 (1955); Snyder v. Oil Co., 235 N.C. 119, 68 S.E. 2d 805 (1952).
T. A. Loving Company executed a “release in full” that
for the sole consideration One hundred thirty six thousand, four hundred forty five & 29/100 Dollars, to it in hand paid by Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. and Bolton Corp. have released and discharged, and by these presents do for itself and its successors and assigns, release and forever discharge the said Bolton Corporation and their representatives, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. and all other persons, firms or corporations from all claims, demands, damages, actions, or causes of action, on account of damage to property, The Central Library, Chapel Hill, N.C. which occurred on or about the 14th day of April, 1983, by reason of water pipe breaking and of and for all claims or demands whatsoever in law or in equity, which it and its successors can, shall or may have by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever prior to the date hereof. Subject to carpet warranty stated in Aetna’s letter of 12/2/83 to T. A. Loving Company and general warranties stated in Aetna’s letter of 9/8/83 to T. A. Loving *631Company, both of which are incorporated into and made a part of this release.
It is Understood and Agreed that this is a full and final release of all claims of every nature and kind whatsoever, and releases claims that are known and unknown, suspected and unsuspected.
It is Further Understood and Agreed that any party hereby released admits no liability to the undersigned or any others, shall not be estopped or otherwise barred from asserting, and expressly reserves the right to assert any claim or cause of action such party may have against the undersigned or any others.
Thereafter, in this litigation, Loving Company filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff, and to that counterclaim the plaintiff filed a reply in which Bolton ratified the release in full by pleading: “As a further reply to the counterclaim asserted by defendant, plaintiff alleges and says that any recovery sought is barred by the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, settlement and release.”
The settled law in North Carolina is that when a plaintiff pleads settlement and release as a bar to a defendant’s counterclaim, the pleading constitutes a ratification of the settlement and bars both plaintiffs and defendant’s actions. Keith v. Glenn, 262 N.C. 284, 136 S.E. 2d 665 (and cases cited above).
The majority strains to hold that although plaintiff ratified the accord and satisfaction represented by the release, it did not ratify all of the terms of the release. Plaintiff did not limit its ratification in the reply. To interpret the reply and the release as meaning that the defendant can’t sue the plaintiff but plaintiff can sue defendant is illogical and certainly not the intent of the parties. Plaintiff was not required to ratify the release. It is clear to me that it was the full, stated intent of the parties that all claims were released. If plaintiff had not ratified the release and become a party to the accord and satisfaction, then it could have exercised the remedies set out in the release instrument.
The majority states that unless we allow the plaintiff to maintain this action in spite of the release, it would be “legally impossible for parties to settle only one aspect of a multi-faceted *632dispute.” I am sure that the majority realizes that a party can release another party by a specific release rather than by a release in full. In fact, the release in question excepts from the general release claims under a warranty as to the carpet and as to certain other warranties “stated in Aetna’s letter of 9/8/83.” The parties could have easily prevented this controversy by simply stating in the release in question that it was only a release of the water damage claim resulting from the broken water pipe, thus making the release a specific release and avoiding the consequences of the ratification of a general release. While it is true that the cases cited in the Court of Appeals opinion deal with causes of actions arising from automobile collisions, the analysis of the principle which bars the plaintiff in such actions is not based upon tort law but upon the contractual law of accord and satisfaction based upon the ratification of a general release. Bradford v. Kelly, 260 N.C. 382, 132 S.E. 2d 886.
Under the principles of contract, I find that plaintiff, by its ratification of the general release, has joined in the accord and satisfaction between plaintiff and defendant, and neither plaintiff nor the defendant may sue on the basis of any claims which may have arisen prior to the date of the execution of the general release.
Justice MITCHELL joins in this dissenting opinion.