Court Opinion

ID: 2964850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:10.64613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:02.591203
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                For the First Circuit
                                ____________________
       No. 96-2000
                                 MANUEL T. HIDALGO,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                         v.
                     OVERSEAS CONDADO INSURANCE AGENCIES, INC.,
                                Defendant, Appellee.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
                  [Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                ____________________
            Andres  
                   Guillemard-Noble with whom   Joan  
                                                     S.  
                                                         Peters and  Nachman,
       Santiago & Guillemard were on brief for appellant.
            Jorge 
                  E. Perez 
                           Diaz with whom Pietrantoni 
                                                      Mendez 
                                                             & Alvarez was on
       brief for appellee.
                                ____________________
                                   August 11, 1997
                                ____________________
                      STAHL, 
                            Circuit Judge
                                         . Plaintiff-appellant Manuel T.

            Hidalgo appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment
            in favor of defendant-appellee Overseas Condado Insurance
            Agencies, Inc. on Hidalgo's claim for damages and equitable
            relief pursuant to the Age Discrimination and Employment Act,
            29 U.S.C. SS 621-634. Finding that plaintiff-appellant failed
            to present evidence sufficient to meet his burden of persuasion
            concerning unlawful age animus, we affirm.
                                     Background
                      On January 15, 1963, Hidalgo and two partners formed
            the Condado Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Condado"). Hidalgo
            subsequently became the sole shareholder. In September 1982,
            Hidalgo sold Condado to Royal Insurance Ltd. ("Royal"). After
            the sale, Royal retained Hidalgo as president of Condado. Some
            time later, Royal acquired Overseas Insurance Agencies, Inc.,
            and, in 1988, merged this agency with Condado to form the
            Overseas Condado Insurance Agencies, Inc. ("Overseas"). In the
            process of the merger, Royal created the Condado Division of
            Overseas and named Hidalgo president of the Division. The
            Condado Division consisted of Hidalgo, Sagrario Maiz del Toro
            (Hidalgo's secretary) and Doris Rodriguez (Hidalgo's
            assistant). Dating from the sale of Condado to Royal,
            Hidalgo's functions included promoting and servicing all of
            Condado's existing accounts and acquiring new accounts. 
                      On September 1, 1993, Hidalgo's sixty-fifth birthday,
            Hidalgo was to become eligible to retire and receive normal
                                         -3-

            benefits under Overseas' retirement plan. Approximately five
            months before this date, on March 29, 1993, Victor Rios,
            President of Royal and Chairman of Overseas, sent Hidalgo a
            letter informing him that Overseas recognized that he would
            become eligible for normal retirement benefits on September 1,
            1993, and that Overseas expected him to retire on that date
            "[i]n accordance with the company's established guidelines." 
                      After receiving this letter, Hidalgo informed Rios
            that he did not intend to retire on September 1. On July 2,
            1993, Rios sent Hidalgo another communication informing him
            that the Condado Division would cease to exist on September 1
            because Overseas planned to integrate it into its "regular
            operation." In this same communication, Rios instructed
            Hidalgo that Overseas would wait until September 1 to allow him
            to "fully qualify for . . . [his] pension plan," but that it
            did not intend to extend his employment contract after that
            date. On August 18, Hidalgo again informed Rios of his desire
            to remain as president of the Condado Division. Rios replied
            by offering Hidalgo an arrangement whereby he could function as
            an "independent producer" with his compensation based on
            commissions and bonuses. Hidalgo refused this offer. 
                      Subsequently, Hidalgo filed complaints with the Equal
            Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Department
            of Labor and Human Resources of Puerto Rico. On December 30,
            1993, the Department of Labor issued Hidalgo a Notice of Right
                                         -4-
                                          4

            to Sue. On March 10, 1994, Hidalgo filed in federal district
            court the complaint which underlies this appeal. He alleged
            that Overseas dismissed him from his job because of his age and
            requested damages and equitable relief pursuant to the Age
            Discrimination and Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. SS 621-
            634. Hidalgo also invoked the district court's supplemental
            jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367 for his state law
            claims seeking compensation for age-based discrimination, 29
            P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, S 146 (1985). 
                      On June 24, 1994, Overseas filed a Motion to Dismiss
            or for Summary Judgment. On June 20, 1996, the district court
            (Casellas, J.), treating the motion as a motion for summary
            judgment, determined that Hidalgo failed to establish one of
            the elements necessary to state a prima facie case of
            employment discrimination under the ADEA. Notwithstanding this
            determination, the court further ruled that Hidalgo failed
            either to prove that Overseas' articulated legitimate reasons
            for his dismissal were a "mere pretext" or to provide evidence
            of discriminatory animus on Overseas' behalf. The court also
            refused to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Hidalgo's state
            law claims. Consequently, the court disposed of Hidalgo's
            complaint in its entirety. This appeal ensued.
                                 Standard of Review
                                
            1.  We note that Hidalgo did not appeal the dismissal of the
            state law claims he stated in his complaint.
                                         -5-
                                          5

                      "[O]ur review of a grant of summary judgment is  de
            novo, [and] we, like the district court, are obliged to review
            the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
            and to draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's
            favor."  LeBlanc v. Great 
                                      Am. 
                                          Ins. 
                                               Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st
            Cir. 1993). "'An inference is reasonable only if it can be
            drawn from the evidence without resort to speculation.'"
            Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, 
                                       Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 672 (1st Cir.
            1996) (quoting Frieze v. Boatmen's 
                                                Bank 
                                                     of 
                                                        Boston, 950 F.2d
            538, 541 (8th Cir. 1991)). The district court's award of
            summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings,
            depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
            file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no
            genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
            is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
            56(c). "[T]o defeat a properly supported motion for summary
            judgment, the nonmoving party must establish a trial-worthy
            issue by presenting 'enough competent evidence to enable a
            finding favorable to the nonmoving party.'" 
                                                       LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at
            842 (quoting Goldman v. First 
                                          Nat'l 
                                                Bank 
                                                     of 
                                                        Boston, 985 F.2d
            1113, 1116 (1st Cir. 1993)). "An appellate panel is not
            restricted to the district court's reasoning but can affirm a
            summary judgment on any independently sufficient ground."
            Mesnick v. General 
                                Elec. 
                                      Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.
            1991).
                                         -6-
                                          6

                                     Discussion
                      Hidalgo makes two primary arguments.    He first
            argues that the district court erred in determining that he
            failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination
            under the ADEA. He then contends that the district court
            improperly concluded that he did not prove that Overseas'
            reasons for dismissing him were pretextual and that Overseas'
            actions derived from discriminatory animus. We address these
            contentions in turn.
                      In an ADEA discrimination action, the plaintiff bears
            the ultimate "'burden of proving that his years were the
            determinative factor in his discharge, that is, that he would
            not have been fired but for his age.'"    Mesnick v.  General
            Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Freeman
            v. Package 
                       Mach. 
                             Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1335 (1st Cir. 1988)).
            "[W]hen there is little overt evidence of age discrimination,
            the case usually follows the ritualized burden-shifting
            paradigm" set forth in McDonnell 
                                             Douglas 
                                                     Corp. v. Green, 411
            U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 842. Pursuant to
            McDonnell  
                      Douglas, a plaintiff must present a prima facie
                                
            2.  Interspersed with these two arguments, in addition to being
            designated in a separate section of his brief, is Hidalgo's
            argument that the district court committed reversible error
            because it viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the
            nonmoving party, namely Overseas. Instead of analyzing this
            assertion independently, we address it in the context of our
            analysis of Hidalgo's two primary contentions concerning the
            district court's disposition of his ADEA claim. 
                                         -7-
                                          7

            "showing of certain standardized elements suggestive of
            possible discrimination."  Id. 
                      In this circuit, McDonnell Douglas' burden shifting
            paradigm assumes a slightly different form in age
            discrimination cases depending on whether or not the dismissal
            represented part of a reduction in force. If the plaintiff was
            not dismissed as part of a reduction in force, the plaintiff
            establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating the following:
            "(1) [he] was at least forty years of age, (2) [he] met the
            employer's legitimate job performance expectations, (3) [he]
            experienced adverse employment action, and (4) [he] was
            replaced by a person with roughly equivalent job
            qualifications."  Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1117. With respect to
            the fourth element necessary to establish a prima facie case in
            a nonreduction in force scenario, "[i]t is enough for [the]
            plaintiff to show that the employer sought some form of
            replacement performance, which would demonstrate its 'continued
            need for the same services and skills.'" 
                                                    Kale v. 
                                                            Combined Ins.
            Co. of Am.
                     , 861 F.2d 746, 760 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting 
                                                                  Loeb v.
            Textron,  
                     Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 (1st Cir. 1979));      see
            Keisling v. 
                       SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc.
                                                  , 19 F.3d 755, 760 (1st
            Cir. 1994); 
                       Vega v. 
                               Kodak Caribbean, Ltd.
                                                   , 3 F.3d 476, 479 (1st
            Cir. 1993). "A replacement need not be sought from outside the
            company, of course, nor need he be designated formally as
                                         -8-
                                          8

            such."  Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1013 n.11; see Keisling, 19 F.3d at
            760. 
                      If the employer dismissed the plaintiff as part of a
            reduction in force, the plaintiff "need not show replacement by
            someone with equivalent job qualifications. Instead, to
            satisfy element (4), the plaintiff may demonstrate either that
            'the employer did not treat age neutrally or that younger
            persons were retained in the same position.'" LeBlanc, 6 F.3d
            at 842 (quoting Hebert v.  Mohawk 
                                              Rubber 
                                                     Co., 872 F.2d 1104,
            1111 (1st Cir. 1989)).
                      The district court granted summary judgment in
            Overseas' favor because it found that Hidalgo had failed to
            make out a prima facie case of age discrimination. Although
                                
            3.  In his opposition to Overseas' summary judgment motion and
            his surreply to Overseas' response to his opposition, Hidalgo
            argued that his termination was not part of a reduction in
            force; he failed even to articulate an argument addressing the
            potentiality that his dismissal was part of a reduction in
            force. In his appellate brief, Hidalgo, for the first time,
            insists that even if his dismissal occurred as part of a
            reduction in force scenario, Overseas did not treat age
            neutrally. "It is well established that this court will not
            consider an argument presented for the first time on appeal."
            Villafane-Neriz v. 
                              F.D.I.C., 75 F.3d 727, 734 (1st Cir. 1996);
            see Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 531 (1st Cir.
            1993); Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 666 (1st Cir. 1987).
            Because Hidalgo did not address the argument that his
            termination constituted a reduction in force before the
            district court, we will not consider his reduction of force
            arguments on appeal.  See Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595
            F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir. 1979) (indicating that exceptions to
            the general rule proscribing the assertion of arguments for the
            first time on appeal exist only "'in horrendous cases where a
            gross miscarriage of justice would occur'") (quoting   Newark
            Morning Ledger Co.
                              v. 
                                 United States
                                              , 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir.
            1976)). 
                                         -9-
                                          9

            the court regarded this case as presenting a reduction in force
            scenario, it considered whether Hidalgo's claim had merit under
            the law governing a non-reduction in force scenario as well.
            The district court concluded specifically that Overseas did not
            have a continuing need for someone of Hidalgo's skills, that
            Hidalgo failed to establish that Overseas did not treat age
            neutrally, and that Overseas did not retain younger persons in
            the same position. The court further ruled that Hidalgo failed
            to "properly show he was 'replaced by a person with roughly
            equivalent job qualifications.'" 
                      "While it is not clear to us that the court erred in
            this regard, we prefer--because the question is so close--to
            assume for present purposes that . . . [Hidalgo] did establish
            a prima facie case within the McDonnell Douglas formulation."
            LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 844; 
                                   see 
                                      Pages-Cahue v. 
                                                     Iberia Lineas Aereas
            de Espana
                    , 82 F.3d 533, 537 (1st Cir. 1996) (assuming, without
            concluding, that plaintiff established a prima facie case
            because doing so did not alter the ultimate outcome); Udo v.
            Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1995) (same); 
                                                        Mesnick, 950 F.2d
            at 825 n.7 (same). Hidalgo lacks direct evidence that Overseas
            terminated him because of his age, and the parties do not
            dispute that he satisfied the first three of the four elements
                                        -10-
                                         10

            necessary to establish a prima facie case under     McDonnell
            Douglas. 
                      With respect to the fourth element at issue in this
            case, Hidalgo presented, and the district court accepted,
            evidence that subsequent to his dismissal, Overseas assigned
            certain accounts for which Hidalgo had been responsible to
            other Overseas employees who handled them in addition to the
            work they performed prior to his dismissal. Hidalgo also
            submitted evidence that subsequent to his termination Overseas
            informed certain of his former accounts of its desire to
            "continue servicing" them "as heretofore." It seems plausible,
            viewing Hidalgo's evidence concerning the servicing of his
            accounts by other Overseas employees after September 1, 1993
            and Overseas' communications to at least one of his former
            accounts in the light most favorable to him,  see LeBlanc, 6
            F.3d at 841, that Overseas had a "'continued need for the same
            services and skills'" that Hidalgo offered before his
            termination, Kale, 861 F.2d at 760 (quoting Loeb, 600 F.2d at
            1013); see also Keisling, 19 F.3d at 760 (quoting  Loeb, 600
            F.2d at 1013).  Specifically, like the plaintiffs in    Loeb,
                                
            4.  The parties do not dispute that Hidalgo was at least forty
            years of age, that he met Overseas' legitimate job performance
            expectations, and that he experienced adverse employment
            action.
            5.  We find 
                       Loeb, 
                             Kale, and 
                                      Keisling particularly persuasive in
            this context because they constituted nonreduction of force
            cases. Despite Overseas' contention and the district court's
            ruling that this case actually entailed a reduction of force,
                                        -11-
                                         11

            Kale, and  Keisling, Hidalgo may well have met his burden
            concerning the fourth element necessary to establish a prima
            facie case under   McDonnell  
                                         Douglas through evidence that
            Hidalgo's "'job functions were absorbed by several different
            employees of defendant.'" Kale, 861 F.2d at 760 (quoting 
                                                                    Loeb,
            600 F.2d at 1013); 
                              see 
                                  Keisling, 19 F.3d at 760. We recognize
                                
            we afford Hidalgo the benefit of the doubt for purposes of
            argument and thus treat this as a nonreduction of force case.
            6.  In his Unsworn Declaration Under Penalty of Perjury, Rios
            stated that "[n]obody performs the services that [Hidalgo] . .
            . was performing or assumed his job responsibilities, as there
            is no continued need for an individual of Mr. Hidalgo's skills
            or who could provide the services he provided." This assertion
            does not jibe with Rios' subsequent admission that certain
            accounts for which Hidalgo had responsibility prior to his
            termination "were assigned to other Overseas[] employees who
            handle[d] them in addition to the work they performed before
            the Condado [D]ivision was eliminated." Moreover, Hidalgo
            presented testimony from employees of his former accounts
            indicating that subsequent to his termination, Overseas
            employees contacted them concerning these accounts. The fact
            that certain of Hidalgo's former accounts were "handled" by
            several other Overseas employees subsequent to his termination
            would seem to satisfy the 
                                    McDonnell Douglas
                                                     ' fourth requirement
            for establishing a prima facie ADEA claim, at least as
            interpreted in Loeb, Kale, and  Keisling. We recognize that
            LeBlanc stated specifically that "[a] discharged employee 'is
            not replaced when another employee is assigned to perform the
            plaintiff's duties in addition to other duties, or when the
            work is redistributed among other existing employees already
            performing related work.' Rather, '[a] person is replaced only
            when another employee is hired or reassigned to perform
            plaintiff's duties.'"    LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 846 (internal
            citations omitted) (quoting Barnes v. Gencorp 
                                                          Inc., 896 F.2d
            1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990)); see Pages-Cahue v. Iberia Lineas
            Aereas 
                   de 
                      Espana, 82 F.3d 533, 536 (1st Cir. 1996) (same).
            LeBlanc, 
                    Barnes and 
                               Pages-Cahue, however, constituted reduction
            of force cases, and, thus, the analytical construct they set
            forth with respect to McDonnell 
                                            Douglas' fourth element does
            not appear as persuasive as that of 
                                              Loeb, 
                                                    Kale, and 
                                                              Keisling in
            a nonreduction of force scenario.
                                        -12-
                                         12

            that this evidence is not overwhelming; however, as in 
                                                                 LeBlanc,
            see 6 F.3d at 844, we assume, without concluding, that Hidalgo
            has satisfied 
                         McDonnell Douglas
                                          ' fourth element, mindful of the
            fact that "'the burden of making out a prima facie case is 'not
            onerous.'"  Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 823 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting
            Texas Dep't
                        
                        of Community Affairs
                                             v. 
                                               Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
            (1981)).
                      "Establishment of the prescribed prima facie case
            creates a presumption that the employer engaged in
            impermissible age discrimination."   LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 842.
            Once a plaintiff has presented a prima facie case of
            discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant "to rebut
            the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that
            the plaintiff was rejected . . . for a legitimate,
            nondiscriminatory reason."  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. "The
            employer's burden at this stage is one of production; the
            burden of persuasion remains plaintiff's at all times."
            Lawrence v. Northrop 
                                 Corp., 980 F.2d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 1992).
            The parties in this case do not dispute that Overseas met its
            burden of production and offered non-discriminatory rationale
            for its decision to terminate Hidalgo.
                      In rebutting Hidalgo's claim of age discrimination,
            Overseas advanced two nondiscriminatory reasons for its
            actions. First, Overseas indicated that it decided to
            eliminate the Condado Division, and thus terminate Hidalgo's
                                        -13-
                                         13

            position as president of the Division, because the Division had
            become unprofitable since 1990. Second, according to Overseas,
            "various insurance agents and brokers who placed policies with
            Royal were complaining that the Condado Division, and
            particularly Mr. Hidalgo, was interfering with some of its
            [sic] clients. These actions affected Royal's business
            relationship with these independent brokers and agents, some of
            which were among the largest in Puerto Rico and responsible for
            a substantial part of Royal's business."
                      "'If the defendant carries the burden of production,
            the presumption raised by the prima facie cases is rebutted,'
            and 'drops from the case.'"  St. 
                                             Mary's 
                                                    Honor 
                                                          Ctr. v.  Hicks,
            509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993) (internal citations omitted) (quoting
            Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, 255 n.10). The plaintiff then
            "retains the burden of persuasion." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
            "In the context of a summary judgment proceeding,       Hicks
            requires that, once the employer has advanced a legitimate,
            nondiscriminatory basis for its adverse employment decision,
            the plaintiff, before becoming entitled to bring the case
            before the trier of fact, must show evidence sufficient for the
            factfinder reasonably to conclude that the employer's decision
            to discharge him . . . was wrongfully based on age." LeBlanc,
            6 F.3d at 843; see Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515 ("[A] reason cannot
                                
            7.  The Hicks decision, unlike this decision, derived from an
            appeal of a bench trial.
                                        -14-
                                         14

            be proved to be 'a pretext  for discrimination' unless it is
            shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination
            was the real reason."); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
            Co., 896 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[W]hen, as here, the
            employer has articulated a presumptively legitimate reason for
            discharging an employee, the latter must elucidate specific
            facts which would enable a jury to find that the reason given
            was not only a sham, but a sham intended to cover up the
            employer's real motive: age discrimination.");  Mesnick, 950
            F.2d at 825 ("[I]n a case where the first two steps of the
            McDonnell   
                        Douglas pavane have been satisfactorily
            choreographed, a plaintiff must offer 
                                                some minimally sufficient
            evidence, direct or indirect, both of pretext and of the
            employer's discriminatory animus to prevail in the face of a
            properly drawn Rule 56 motion.") (emphasis added);  see  also
            Sanchez v. Puerto 
                              Rico 
                                    Oil 
                                        Co., 37 F.3d 712, 720 (1st Cir.
            1994); 
                  Woods v. 
                           Friction Materials, Inc.
                                                   , 30 F.3d 255, 260 (1st
            Cir. 1994). Thus, Hidalgo "now must . . . demonstrate that the
            proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment
            decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of
            persuading the court that . . . [the plaintiff] has been the
            victim of intentional discrimination."  Burdine, 450 U.S. at
            256; see Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 515. 
                      At this stage, "the 
                                         facts that comprised plaintiff's
            prima facie case may be considered, but the inference of
                                        -15-
                                         15

            discrimination originally attributable to those facts no longer
            pertains."  Sanchez, 37 F.3d at 720. "Direct or indirect
            evidence of discriminatory motive may do, but 'the evidence as
            a whole . . . must be sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to
            infer that the employer's decision was motivated by age
            animus.'"  Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1117 (quoting Connell v. Bank
            of Boston
                    , 924 F.2d 1169, 1172 n.3 (1st Cir. 1991)), 
                                                                quoted 
                                                                       in
            LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 843. "Thus, the plaintiff cannot avert
            summary judgment if the record is devoid of adequate direct or
            circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus on the part of
            the employer."  LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 843.
                        Hidalgo offered circumstantial evidence to
            demonstrate both that Overseas' stated reasons for his
            termination was pretextual and that it was pretext for
            discriminatory age animus. While we find that Hidalgo failed
            to produce evidence sufficient to meet his ultimate burden of
            persuasion, 
                       see 
                           Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, we present Hidalgo's
            evidence in detail in light of his contention that the district
            court failed to consider this evidence in the light most
            favorable to his claim. In his Unsworn Declaration Upon
            Penalty of Perjury, Hidalgo indicated that between 1984 and
            1986, the net underwriting profit for the Condado Division
            climbed from $249,803.00 to $422,826.00. Hidalgo did not
            present figures for the period after 1988, when the Overseas
            and Condado operations merged, because, according to Hidalgo,
                                        -16-
                                         16

            Overseas failed to make these figures available upon his
            request. Yet, he did state in his Unsworn Declaration that
            Overseas underestimated the profitability of the Condado
            Division since 1990. Hidalgo contends that Overseas' failure
            to provide the figures concerning the profitability of the
            Condado Division, combined with his testimony concerning
            additional profits stemming from the Division, suffices to
            demonstrate pretext on Overseas' part. 
                      Hidalgo also submitted two communications from his
            supervisor, Ramon Lozada, dated April 10, 1991 and January 16,
            1993, as proof of Overseas' enthusiasm for Hidalgo's work as
            president of the Condado Division and its belief that his
            prospects with Overseas were excellent. In addition, Hidalgo
            declared in his Unsworn Declaration that as a member of the
            Overseas Board of Directors, he was present at a March 25, 1993
            meeting during which the alleged unprofitability of the Condado
            Division was never discussed. Hidalgo also stated in his
            Unsworn Declaration that it was not until he informed Overseas
            that he did not intend to retire on September 1 that Overseas
            informed him that his termination constituted part of a plan to
            eliminate the Condado Division effective September 1. 
                      Hidalgo offered evidence that immediately after his
            dismissal and the elimination of the Condado Division,
            Rodriguez on several occasions performed some of the tasks that
            she previously had performed as his assistant. According to
                                        -17-
                                         17

            Hidalgo, this activity, considered in conjunction with the fact
            that certain accounts for which he previously was responsible
            remained with Overseas and were attended to by other Overseas
            employees after his dismissal, demonstrated that the Condado
            Division "continued to function as before, albeit under a
            different name." Hidalgo insists that this evidence
            "combine[d] to prove that defendant's alleged reason, a
            decision to close the Condado Division, was a sham, masking
            defendant's illegal age discrimination." 
                      Hidalgo finally maintains that Overseas never
            informed him of the alleged complaints of brokers and agents
            concerning his interference with their business. Instead,
            Hidalgo offered an evaluation of his work that Lozada prepared
            on January 16, 1993 (slightly more than two months before Rios
            informed him that Overseas expected him to retire effective
            September 1) in which he received the best possible ratings in
            all categories, including the category labeled: "How
            successful is he in getting along with people in his day-to-day
            work relationships?" In fact, the evaluation indicated that he
            "stands out as being among the best . . . known" and that he
            "will qualify for advancement beyond the next higher job
            classification or level of responsibility." Hidalgo insists
            that this evidence "raises a genuine issue of fact as to
                                        -18-
                                         18

            whether age discrimination motivated the retirement or the
            dismissal decision of defendant."
                      We doubt that the evidence that Hidalgo submitted,
            taken in the light most favorable to his claim, 
                                                           see 
                                                               LeBlanc, 6
            F.3d at 841, demonstrates that Overseas' asserted reasons for
            dismissing him were pretextual, see Lehman v. Prudential Ins.
            Co.  
                of  
                    Am., 74 F.3d 323, 330 (1st Cir. 1996). We note,
            however, that Hidalgo cites  Mulero-Rodriguez to support his
            pretext argument.  In    Mulero-Rodriguez, the plaintiff, a
            director of the defendant corporation, stated in his deposition
            testimony that the defendant never informed him of its
            dissatisfaction with his ability to assure an inventory level
                                
            8.  Overseas argues that much of the evidence Hidalgo submits
            to demonstrate pretext and age-based animus fails to comply
            with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) and thus should
            not be considered on appeal. Overseas also contends that much
            of this evidence was untimely presented to the district court.
            Given the ultimate disposition of this appeal, we deem it
            unnecessary to address these arguments. We assume for the sake
            of argument, without concluding, that the evidence Hidalgo
            submitted satisfies the minimum requirements of Rule 56(e).
            9.  In addition to Mulero-Rodriguez, Hidalgo cites Hebert and
            Woodman v. 
                      Haemonetics Corp.
                                       , 51 F.3d 1087 (1st Cir. 1995), to
            support his contention that the evidence he submitted sufficed
            to demonstrate a material issue of fact concerning pretext. In
            these cases, however, the evidence that the plaintiffs
            submitted to demonstrate pretext was far more extensive and far
            more persuasive than the evidence Hidalgo presents in this
            instance.  See Woodman, 51 F.3d at 1093 (discussing not only
            performance evaluations but also defendant's admission of
            disfavoring older employers as creating a reasonable inference
            of pretext for intentional age discrimination);  Hebert, 872
            F.2d at 1115 (listing employer's failure to inform plaintiff of
            adverse feedback on his work as only one of many pieces of
            circumstantial evidence that the plaintiff submitted in
            addition to statistical evidence). 
                                        -19-
                                         19

            necessary for the smooth operation of the business.   See 98
            F.3d at 675. The plaintiff also indicated that the defendant
            failed to produce "business records in any way reflecting a
            shortage [of inventory] or lost sales or income based thereon."
            Id. Considering only this evidence, the 
                                                   Mulero-Rodriguez court
            determined, "giving credence to [the plaintiff's] . . .
            testimony," that the issue of pretext "should be left to the
            factfinders."  Id.
                      Much like the plaintiff in 
                                                Mulero-Rodriguez, Hidalgo
            testified in his Unsworn Declaration both that Overseas never
            informed him of the alleged complaints against him and that
            Overseas failed to produce any business records supporting its
            allegation of the Condado Division's unprofitability. While we
            doubt that these similarities suffice to demonstrate pretext on
            Overseas' part, we recognize that this is a close call and,
            therefore, we assume, without deciding, that Hidalgo
            established pretext. See 
                                     Udo, 54 F.3d at 13 (assuming 
                                                                 arguendo
            that employer's action was pretextual). We thus "turn directly
            to the question of whether [Hidalgo] . . . can show that the
            real reason [for his dismissal] was age discrimination."  Id.
            at 676.
                      In this case, "even if [Hidalgo] . . . fashioned a
            triable issue as to pretext, there was . . . no 'significantly
            probative' evidence to show that the pretext masked age
            discrimination." Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 9 (quoting 
                                                                 Anderson
                                        -20-
                                         20

            v. 
              Liberty Lobby, Inc.
                                 , 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). Hidalgo
            offered no evidence that reasonably could be construed to
            indicate that Overseas intended to discriminate against him
            because of his age. None of Hidalgo's evidence concerning
            either the profitability of the Condado Division or Overseas'
            failure to inform him of the alleged complaints against him by
            brokers and agents points to any     age  
                                                      related  
                                                               animus on
            Overseas' behalf. Similarly, the evidence concerning the
            ongoing servicing of Hidalgo's former accounts by Overseas
            employees, including Rodriguez's work on these accounts, and
            Overseas' apparent satisfaction with his performance, though
            perhaps indicative of pretext on Overseas' part, does not
            evidence any 
                        age-based discriminatory intent
                                                       . As we previously
            have stated, "[t]he 'ADEA does not stop a company from
            discharging an employee for any reason (fair or unfair) or for
            no reason, so long as the decision to fire does not stem from
            the person's age.' Courts may not sit as super personnel
            departments, assessing the merits--or even the rationality--of
            employers' nondiscriminatory business decisions." 
                                                             Mesnick, 950
            F.2d at 825 (internal citations omitted) (quoting 
                                                             Freeman, 865
            F.2d at 1341).
                      The only circumstantial evidence that Hidalgo sets
            forth bearing upon Overseas' regard for his age comprises the
            memorandum Rios sent to him on March 29, 1993 informing him
            that Overseas, "[i]n accordance with the company's established
                                        -21-
                                         21

            guidelines . . . fully expect[ed]" him to retire when he became
            eligible for normal retirement benefits on September 1, 1993.
            Hidalgo makes much of this letter in light of the Royal
            Retirement Plan's provision that despite the fact that Royal
            employees' "Normal Retirement Date" was the first day of the
            month after they turned sixty-five, if an employee "decide[d]
            to continue working past [his] . . . Normal Retirement Date,
            [he could] . . . do so." 
                      This evidence does not "raise a genuine issue of fact
            as to whether discrimination motivated the adverse employment
            action."  Olivera v. Nestle 
                                        P.R., 
                                              Inc., 922 F.2d 43, 50 (1st
            Cir. 1990). The reasonable inference, 
                                                 see 
                                                     Mulero-Rodriguez, 98
            F.3d at 672, deriving from this evidence is that Overseas
            expected its employees to retire when they became eligible for
            normal retirement benefits at the age of sixty-five. The Royal
            Retirement Plan indicates that the normal retirement date for
            Overseas employees falls at or near their sixty-fifth birthday.
            Overseas' March 29 letter to Hidalgo indicated its expectation
            that Hidalgo would retire on or near his Normal Retirement
            Date. We thus do not believe that the March 29 letter
            constituted "'significantly probative,'" 
                                                   Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d
            at 9 (quoting  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50), "probative,"
            Sanchez, 37 F.3d at 720, "adequate," 
                                                Mulero-Rodriguez, 98 F.3d
            at 673, "sufficient,"   LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 849, or even
            "minimally sufficient," Vega, 3 F.3d at 479, circumstantial
                                        -22-
                                         22

            evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find discriminatory
            animus on Overseas' part,     see  Lehman, 74 F.3d at 330
            (concluding that the plaintiff's "evidence, taken at its best,
            was insufficient to show that . . . [the defendant] was
            motivated by age discrimination"); 
                                              see 
                                                  also 
                                                       LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at
            846-49; 
                   Goldman, 985 F.2d at 119-21; 
                                                Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 826;
            Menard v. 
                     First Sec. Servs. Corp.
                                            , 848 F.2d 281, 289 (1st Cir.
            1988). In our view, the fact that Overseas expected Hidalgo to
            retire when he became eligible for his normal retirement
            benefits would not permit a jury determination that Overseas
            was motivated by age animus when it decided to dismiss Hidalgo.
            See Udo, 54 F.3d at 14 (finding letter employer sent to
            employee informing him that employer expected him to retire
            when he turned sixty-five did not evidence age animus on
            employer's behalf). 
                      When considered in the context of the record evidence
            as a whole,  see  Connell, 924 F.2d at 1172 n.3;    see  also
            Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1119 ("[T]he totality of the circumstances
            must permit a reasonable inference that the employer's
            justification for the challenged action was pretext for age
            discrimination."), viewed in the light most favorable to
            Hidalgo, see LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 841, the March 29 letter and
            the Royal Retirement Plan still would not suffice to allow a
            jury reasonably to find that Overseas exhibited age-based
            animus in this case. Overseas sent Hidalgo the letter
                                        -23-
                                         23

            concerning its expectation that he retire on his Normal
            Retirement Date more than five months prior to his sixty-fifth
            birthday and repeatedly declared its intention to take no
            action that would interfere with his ability to qualify for
            normal retirement benefits. On July 2, 1993, Overseas
            explained to Hidalgo its independent business decision to
            eliminate the Condado Division effective September 1, 1993,
            which accommodated the full vesting of his pension plan.
            Despite its decision to eliminate the Condado Division, on
            August 19, 1993, Overseas offered to employ Hidalgo as an
            independent producer, with compensation based on commission and
            bonuses. Hidalgo rejected these offers, and, on September 1,
            Overseas implemented the plan it had enunciated to Hidalgo on
            July 2 to eliminate the Condado Division as a separate entity.
                      Contrary to Hidalgo's assertions, we believe the only
            inference that the evidence in the record supports, without
            improper speculation on our part, is that Overseas simply timed
            its elimination of the Condado Division to dovetail with
            Hidalgo's Normal Retirement Date. This would be entirely
            appropriate.  See Goldman, 985 F.2d at 1118 n.4 ("[A] 'mere
            showing that the employer's articulated reason may shield
            another (possibly nondiscriminatory) reason does not create a
            dispute of material fact' sufficient to withstand summary
            judgment."); 
                        Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 825; 
                                                 see 
                                                     also 
                                                          Udo, 54 F.3d at
            14 (finding letter expressing employer's expectation that
                                        -24-
                                         24

            employee would retire at age sixty-five insufficient evidence
            of discriminatory age animus to withstand summary judgment
            where employer subsequently articulated nondiscriminatory
            rationale for dismissing employee). 
                      As we previously have noted, "the material creating
            the factual dispute must herald the existence of 'definite,
            competent evidence' fortifying the plaintiff's version of the
            truth. Optimistic conjecture . . . or hopeful surmise will not
            suffice."  Vega, 3 F.3d at 479 (internal citations omitted)
            (quoting Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 822). In this case, Hidalgo's
            arguments "are based largely upon . . . improbable inferences[]
            and unsupported speculation," 
                                         LeBlanc, 6 F.3d at 849, and thus
            fall short. In light of the evidence in the record, viewed in
            the light most favorable to Hidalgo, we do not believe that a
            trier of fact could conclude that Overseas unlawfully
            discriminated against Hidalgo. We thus affirm the district
            court's award of summary judgment in favor of Overseas.
                      Costs to Appellee.
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                                         25