Court Opinion

ID: 9369505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 22:03:19.740532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:15.591018
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 211420-U

                                                                                 THIRD DIVISION
                                                                                  February 8, 2023

                                           No. 1-21-1420

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                            IN THE
                                 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                   FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                      )   Appeal from the Circuit Court of
                                                           )   Cook County.
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                             )
                                                           )
 v.                                                        )   No. 16 CR 16097
                                                           )
 GUILLERMO ROMERO,                                         )
                                                           )   Honorable Thomas Joseph Hennelly,
           Defendant-Appellant.                            )   Judge, presiding.

       JUSTICE DEBRA B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
       Presiding Justice McBride and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1     Held: Defendant’s sentence is not an unconstitutional de facto life sentence, it does not
             violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution, and it is not
             excessive. One of defendant’s murder convictions must be vacated pursuant to the
             one act, one crime rule. Affirmed as modified.

¶2     Following a jury trial, defendant Guillermo Romero was convicted of two counts of first-

degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Tonriche1 Weathersby, Jr. The trial court

sentenced defendant to 64½ years’ imprisonment, comprising a 39½-year sentence for the murder

       1
            The victim’s name in the record is also spelled “Tonrichie” and “Tonthrichie.”
No. 1-21-1420

and a 25-year add-on for having discharged a firearm that proximately caused the victim’s death.

On appeal, defendant contends that his sentence is (1) an unconstitutional de facto life sentence

pursuant to both the eighth amendment of the federal constitution and the proportionate penalties

clause of the state constitution or (2) otherwise excessive. Defendant further contends that his

mittimus must be corrected to reflect only one murder conviction. We affirm as modified.

¶3                                       BACKGROUND

¶4     The State charged defendant with six counts of first-degree murder in connection with the

shooting death of Tonriche Weathersby, Jr. On June 10, 2019, however, the trial court entered an

order indicating that the State nol-prossed counts I through IV. Counts V and VI both alleged that

defendant shot and killed the victim while armed with a firearm. Whereas count V alleged that

defendant committed the offense “intentionally or knowingly,” count VI alleged that defendant

committed the offense “knowing that such act created a strong probability of death ***.”

¶5     Defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence. We will therefore limit our

discussion of the evidence adduced at trial. Daniel Smith testified that, on September 17, 2016,

he was a “party promoter,” and he—along with an individual he knew as “Mickeyfoo”—actively

promoted a party in the area of West 58th Street and South Maplewood Avenue in Chicago. Daniel

added that for this party, he included the notice, “No weapons. Security will do pat-downs.”

¶6     Daniel then stated that, just before midnight at the time of the party, he heard a bottle break

in the living room area. Daniel went there and saw the victim and the victim’s brother fighting

with “four other Mexicans,” including defendant. Daniel said the fight was a “fistfight” initially

and the fight ended in a bedroom. At that point, Daniel saw an individual pull out a gun, “aim it

with two hands,” and shoot the victim in the chest. Daniel saw the gun fire and heard “two to

three” shots. Daniel heard the victim tell his brother that he had been shot before collapsing.

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No. 1-21-1420

Defendant then ran out the front door. Daniel identified defendant in-court as the shooter and

stated that he was three or four feet from defendant at the time of the shooting. Daniel then left

the area but later returned to speak to police. A few days after the shooting, Daniel identified

defendant in a photo array as the person who shot and killed the victim.

¶7     Mikiel Smith then testified that, at the time of the shooting, he worked as a party promoter

and was also known by the nickname “Mickeyfoo.” Mikiel stated that he promoted a party at a

house in the area of 58th and Maplewood on September 17, 2016. Mikiel saw an individual named

Alexsander [sic] Ramirez come to the party with three other males, including defendant, whom

Mikiel identified in court. At around midnight, Mikiel was outside of the house at the bottom of

the porch and heard some women complaining that there was a fight. Mikiel started to go into the

house but heard two gunshots come from inside of the house, so he immediately left the porch area

to allow partygoers to leave. Once the entrance was clear, Mikiel ran in and saw the victim, whom

he did not know, lying on the floor unresponsive. Mikiel later spoke to police and subsequently

identified defendant in a photo array as one of the partygoers.

¶8     Darrius Richardson testified that he was the victim’s brother and went with him to the

house party at 5840 South Maplewood Avenue on September 17, 2016. Richardson said that, at

around midnight, he saw his brother get struck with a beer bottle. Richardson noted that neither

he nor his brother were “having problems with” anyone at the party and that neither of them were

armed. Richardson could not see who struck his brother with the bottle and added that he did not

recall anyone saying something before then. After the bottle broke over his brother’s head, a fight

broke out and he rushed over to defend his brother and then himself against four to five Hispanic

males. Richardson said someone then pushed him from behind, and he fell. When Richardson got

back up, he saw defendant aim a gun at his brother and then shoot. Richardson was about ten feet

                                                 3
No. 1-21-1420

from the shooter and identified defendant in court as the person who shot his brother. Richardson

confirmed that there was no verbal exchange between defendant and his brother or him before the

shooting, and defendant said nothing immediately after the shooting. Richardson recalled that his

brother told him that he was shot and then collapsed as Richardson tried to carry him to the car.

Richardson did not see where defendant went after the shooting. Richardson spoke to police when

they arrived and subsequently identified defendant in a photo array.

¶9     Evidence technicians found two spent cartridge casings that were later found to have been

fired from the same gun. The State then rested, and defendant elected not to present any evidence.

¶ 10   Following closing arguments and deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of first-

degree murder. The jury further found that defendant personally discharged a firearm that

proximately caused the victim’s death. The trial court entered judgment on the convictions and

continued the matter for sentencing.

¶ 11   On February 27, 2020, defendant’s sentencing hearing began. The court acknowledged

receipt of defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI), which was dated July 11, 2019. The

PSI indicated that defendant described his childhood as “normal,” where all of his needs were met,

and that he was not neglected. Defendant further stated that he was raised by his mother and had

a good relationship with her and his two older sisters, but that he did not have any kind of

relationship with his father, who was then living in Mexico. Defendant further stated that he

dropped out of high school before finishing his freshman year because he did not like school, but

he denied using alcohol at any time. Defendant, however, admitted that he had an “active

affiliation” with the “Two-Six” street gang. In addition, defendant declined to provide his version

of the offense and did not complain that he was unable to waive his right to a jury trial.

                                                 4
No. 1-21-1420

¶ 12   After defense counsel noted various corrections to the PSI, the State informed the court

that its witnesses were unavailable at that time, so the court allowed Dr. Joan Leska to testify first

on behalf of the defense as an expert in the field of forensic psychology. Dr. Leska testified that

she had been a clinical psychologist for 28 years and that she had evaluated defendant for

“mitigation” and wrote a report detailing her evaluation that was dated February 3, 2020.

¶ 13   Dr. Leska stated that she met with defendant three times for a total of 8½ hours, reviewed

his arrest records, as well as two pending criminal cases that arose after his murder conviction

while he was incarcerated. Dr. Leska administered various tests, including a general intelligence

test, a personality assessment inventory, and a traumatic stress inventory. Dr. Leska also spoke

with defendant’s older half-sister, Jennifer Aguilar, and his paternal aunt, Adele Barrera.

¶ 14   Dr. Leska testified that defendant had a sixth-grade reading ability and his IQ score was

between 70 and 79, which she stated would place defendant in the “borderline” range. Dr. Leska

noted, however, that defendant’s “innate intelligence” was probably higher that what the test

indicated because he had “very little *** formal education.” Defendant’s results from his

“Personality Assessment Inventory” test suggested that defendant’s profile was similar to people

who feel “very socially isolated” without many interpersonal relationships and a history of

“negative relationships.” The results from the final test, the “Trauma Symptom Inventory,”

showed that defendant had suffered trauma and neglect early and throughout his life, beginning

with the “abandonment of his parents” in that (1) defendant’s father moved to Mexico when

defendant was two and only intermittently saw defendant and (2) his mother had various

“struggles” resulting in defendant living with his aunt as a child. Dr. Leska agreed that these

results were consistent with the interviews she conducted with defendant’s family members.

                                                  5
No. 1-21-1420

¶ 15   Dr. Leska further stated that defendant’s “significant neglect and *** abandonment,” as

well as the lack of safety and security made him “very vulnerable to the pull to a gang that he saw

as a family.” When asked whether, since her interviews with defendant at the Cook County jail,

defendant still had a pull toward a gang, Dr. Leska responded, “Of course,” noting that defendant

had not received sufficient “time or resources or *** help to make any changes.” Dr. Leska was

asked whether defendant could receive rehabilitative treatment at the Cook County Department of

Corrections. Dr. Leska responded, “No. Those kind [sic] of rehabilitative resources would be

found in prison.” Dr. Leska opined that, within a reasonable degree of certainty and based upon

his “low average” intellectual functioning, defendant nonetheless had the ability to learn and had

“rehabilitative capacity.”

¶ 16   On cross-examination, Dr. Leska stated that she charged defense counsel $300 per hour

and spent 40 hours on her evaluation and subsequent opinion. Dr. Leska explained that, although

defendant was “two weeks shy” of his 18th birthday at the time of the offense, “[a] person’s brain

development really isn’t fully developed until the age of 25.” When the State asked whether she

was aware that a PSI on defendant had been prepared, Dr. Leska responded, “No, I was not aware

of it. I assumed that. That seems to be always the case.” Dr. Leska conceded that she did not

review any PSI. When asked whether it would surprise her to learn that defendant described

having a “normal and respectful relationship” with his mother, Dr. Leska answered, “He may

have.” She admitted that she would be surprised to know that, during the interview for his PSI,

defendant said that he had “a normal childhood and that all of his needs were met.” Dr. Leska

agreed with the State’s comment that “[a] lot” of the information regarding defendant’s childhood

came from his paternal aunt. Dr. Leska further stated that, although she concluded that defendant

had feelings of isolation, she failed to discuss defendant’s one-year relationship with a girlfriend

                                                 6
No. 1-21-1420

despite defendant mentioning it and characterizing it as a “very good relationship.” Dr. Leska

confirmed that defendant never told her that he wanted to get alcohol or drug treatment or that he

would like to “meet with a mental health professional long term.”

¶ 17    Dr. Leska was aware that, since defendant’s conviction on June 12, 2019, he was charged

with “mob action” for an incident in prison on July 18, 2019, in which defendant was alleged to

have stabbed another inmate. Dr. Leska, however, conceded that she (1) did not read any police

reports regarding the incident, (2) was unaware that there was a video of the incident, and (3) did

not discuss this “extremely violent offense” with defendant. When the State asked Dr. Leska

“whether or not more violence in the jail affects [defendant’s] capacity to be rehabilitated,” she

merely responded, “No.” Dr. Leska further confirmed that, when she met with defendant in

January 2020, defendant had been involved in another stabbing-related mob action the prior

November, but defendant did not stab the victim and was “just a participant in that beating.” Dr.

Leska, however, said that she was unaware of the specifics of the incident and did not discuss it

with defendant. Dr. Leska explained that there was no test to predict dangerousness “20 years

down the road,” but admitted that dangerousness “years down the road” was an important factor

to determine whether someone can be rehabilitated.

¶ 18    Dr. Leska said she was aware that defendant was still a “very active” member of the “Two

Six” gang in jail and was surprised to see new tattoos on defendant’s face that he told her were

“gang signs.” Dr. Leska, however, disputed that this meant defendant was informing others that

he was still affiliated with the gang; instead, she said, “it’s for his identification that he is.”

¶ 19    On redirect examination, defense counsel asked Dr. Leska why she did not interview

defendant’s mother. In response, Dr. Leska explained that defendant’s mother “does not speak

English and I didn’t think that she would understand some of what I would say” and that she

                                                    7
No. 1-21-1420

thought defendant’s paternal aunt was “very credible.” Dr. Leska further stated that defendant’s

two “jail cases” did not change her opinion because there has not been any “intervention” and that

gang affiliation is “kind of survival” there. When asked whether there was any intervention

available at the jail, Dr. Leska stated that it had a “high school,” but his other charges would

preclude him from participating.

¶ 20   The trial court then questioned Dr. Leska. The court noted that there were gangs in the

county jail as well as the Department of Corrections and asked whether there would be a difference

between the two settings. Dr. Leska stated, “I think that the Department of Corrections offers other

resources, counseling, school, group therapy. So I think there are resources that aren’t available

at Cook County Jail.” When asked whether there was an indication that defendant wanted to

engage in any of those resources, Dr. Leska recounted that defendant “seemed to be rethinking

*** his gang involvement.” The court asked whether that was valid in light of his two charged

offenses while incarcerated. Dr. Leska reiterated that defendant’s only sense of family “came from

these people,” and she disagreed that she was being optimistic. She stated her belief that more

“stability and structure and *** safety” would enable defendant to engage with these programs.

The court finally asked whether her opinion on his rehabilitation would change if defendant chose

not to utilize the resources. Dr. Leska said, “*** if he doesn’t utilize the resources, I’m not sure

how helpful they could be. ***. Secondly, the testing did not indicate that this was an incorrigible

person, ***.”    Dr. Leska, however, immediately stated that, although she did not test for

incorrigibility, it was nevertheless “not indicated” on the testing she did administer. Following

Dr. Leska’s testimony, the cause was continued.

                                                 8
No. 1-21-1420

¶ 21   At a hearing on September 30, 2020, the court stated that the initial PSI became “somewhat

dated” and ordered a second PSI to be prepared, which was filed with the court.2 The court noted

that in this second PSI, defendant now stated that he denied committing the murder and that he

“felt pressured to do a jury trial” despite his desire for a bench trial. The court construed this as a

pro se postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102

Ill. 2d 181 (1984). The cause was then continued multiple times due to the pandemic.

¶ 22   On June 25, 2021, the court rejected defendant’s putative claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel under Krankel. 3 The court ordered another PSI and continued the matter “to complete the

sentencing hearing and proceed to sentencing.”

¶ 23   Defendant’s updated PSI (his third) was filed with the court on August 18, 2021. This PSI

indicated that defendant again claimed that he did not commit the offense; instead, defendant stated

that there was “an altercation that led to a shooting, but [defendant] did not know the offender or

victim.” Defendant further reiterated his claim that his attorney pressured him into having a jury

trial instead of a bench trial. This PSI was otherwise substantially the same as his initial PSI.

¶ 24   On September 16, 2021, defendant’s sentencing hearing resumed. The victim’s father read

his victim impact statement to the court, stating that life for his family had been a struggle without

the victim. The victim’s father asked that defendant not receive any leniency and should instead

receive “the harshest penalty available.” The State then read two additional victim impact

statements from the victim’s grandmother and aunt, respectively. The grandmother’s statement

expressed “unbearable” pain at the victim’s death and described the victim as “a kind child that

would have left you alone before ever hurting you in any[ ]way.” The statement of the victim’s

       2
           As the State notes, the PSI ordered on September 30, 2020, is not a part of the record.
       3
           Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s denial here.
                                                  9
No. 1-21-1420

aunt also confirmed that the victim’s death caused great pain, and the aunt asked that the court

sentence defendant to life imprisonment because defendant showed no remorse.

¶ 25   The State then presented its argument in aggravation, noting that defendant, whose

nickname “Balas” meant “bullets,” committed the offense seven days prior to his 18th birthday.

The State argued that there was “overwhelming aggravation” warranting a “substantial” sentence.

Defense counsel asked that the trial court consider Dr. Leska’s testimony regarding defendant’s

trauma and neglect. The defense also asked the court to refrain from imposing a “substantially

high” sentence. Defendant elected not to make a statement in allocution. The court then continued

the matter to review the testimony and arguments.

¶ 26   On October 15, 2021, the trial court announced its findings. The court first stated that it

considered the trial evidence, the PSI, aggravating and mitigating evidence (including the victim

impact statements), statutory mitigating and aggravating factors, “the financial impact on [sic]

incarceration,” and the arguments of counsel. The court further noted that defendant declined to

provide a statement in allocution. The court also considered “defendant’s criminal background,

the testimony of the expert in mitigation[,] and the case law in Miller v. Alabama and the Illinois

case of People v. Buffer.”

¶ 27   The trial court then noted that, although Dr. Leska described a “troubled, unstable

childhood,” she could not explain or respond on cross-examination that her description was

“contradicted by the defendant’s own statement through the [PSI].” The court further stated that

it was “particularly aggravating” that defendant had been sentenced to probation for “unlawful use

of a firearm” in December 2015 and then committed this shooting in December 2016. The court

also explained, “despite what Dr. Leska may have opined, *** prior to this arrest and conviction,

[defendant] was directed to participate in a program that would enhance him and make him a

                                                10
No. 1-21-1420

beneficial or fruitful member of society, and he chose not to do so.” The court further observed

that, while incarcerated in the Cook County jail awaiting trial on the charges at issue in this case,

defendant was charged with mob action and attempted murder. On the attempted murder charge,

the court noted that there was a video recording of defendant using a weapon and causing bodily

harm to another inmate.

¶ 28   The trial court then discussed the testimony of Dr. Leska in greater detail. The court

recounted that, when she opined that defendant had the potential for rehabilitation, the court

questioned why defendant’s rehabilitative potential would be any different in the Department of

Corrections compared to the county jail, if defendant had not “availed himself of any benefits or

any assistance or any programs [there].” The court recalled that Dr. Leska distinguished between

the county jail and the Department of Corrections despite the court pointing out that there are gangs

and other “influences” in both settings. The court summarized her testimony that the Department

of Corrections offered other resources and programs, such as counseling, school, group therapy,

that she believed were unavailable at the county jail.

¶ 29   The court then expressed its disagreement with Dr. Leska’s testimony and noted that there

were “several” programs at the county jail. The court explained, “, I see *** on a regular basis,

people similarly situated as [defendant] come before me ***, and they present to me all kinds of

awards, diplomas, certificates, etc., things that they have done to better themselves ***.” The

court said it believed opportunities for defendant were present at the county jail and noted that

defendant had by that time already spent “a long time” in jail. The court then made the following

observations: “And what did Mr. Romero do? Instead of availing himself in [sic] programs, he

committed crimes. He committed crimes affiliated with his gang, which *** seems to be the area

that [defendant] was gravitating to.” The court added that defendant had obtained additional “gang

                                                 11
No. 1-21-1420

tattoos” to show his gang affiliation, in what the court’s view was to “show his pride in being a

member of the Two-Six street gang.”

¶ 30   The court then stated that, since defendant was “barely” under the age of 18 at the time of

the offense, it was evaluating the various mitigating factors pursuant to section 5-4.5-105 of the

Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2020)). The court found that,

regarding the first factor, Dr. Leska stated that defendant was intelligent and could “learn and ***

benefit,” so defendant suffered from no developmental disability. As to the second factor,

regarding peer pressure and outside influences, the court found that his street gang membership

was “sort of an influence,” which the court believed defendant “wears with pride” to the extent

that his nickname, translated into English, means bullets.

¶ 31   Turning to the third factor, defendant’s background and home environment, the court noted

that there was a conflict because defendant stated that he suffered no neglect, abuse, or trauma,

whereas Dr. Leska believed there was after speaking with his family. Nonetheless, the court

commented that there was no history of intervention by any public agency or the police department.

¶ 32   The court then turned to the seventh factor and found that, based upon its “observation

throughout the trial,” defendant was able to meaningfully participate in his defense. The eighth

factor concerned defendant’s prior juvenile history. The court reiterated that, at the time of the

offense, defendant had been on probation for a gun-possession offense.

¶ 33   The ninth factor, which the court stated was “any other information the Court finds relevant

in relying on, including an expression of remorse,” weighed against defendant because, according

to the court, “There’s been no expression of remorse in this record at all by the defendant. In

fact[,] throughout these proceedings he has not shown one iota of contrition or sorrow or any

compassion at all for the person that he brutally murdered in cold blood, no feeling whatsoever.”

                                                12
No. 1-21-1420

¶ 34   The court then returned to the remaining three factors:            defendant’s potential for

rehabilitation, the circumstances of the offense, and his degree of participation in the offense. The

court stated that it had already noted that defendant had been on probation for a gun-related

conviction and “decided he was not going to comply with Judge Mendoza’s order and get

school[ing] to better himself.” The court then found that the evidence indicated that defendant

planned and directed the offense when he “put the bullets into that gun” and concealed it on his

person, “knowing full well that he was going through some sort of screening at this party in which

they were going to search for weapons.” The court added that defendant knew that, after

concealing the gun and bringing it into the party, the other people at the party would have been

unarmed. The court stated that defendant’s act of shooting an unarmed individual was “[a]n act

of cowardice and *** depravity.” The court reiterated that defendant was involved in two offenses

while incarcerated, one of which involved him stabbing another inmate. The court found Dr.

Leska’s opinion “very naive” and concluded, “[I]f you look at this objectively, you look at what

he did before the crime, during the crime and after the crime, there is nothing in this record that

indicates that there is one single shred of rehabilitative fiber in [defendant’s] body.” The court

found that, instead, defendant was “on his way to a long life of crime.” The court further found

that defendant’s conduct established that he was “permanently incorrigible and *** irreparable.”

The court said it could not find “any basis at all” for rehabilitation.

¶ 35   The court then addressed defendant, stating, “It’s time for you *** to be held responsible

for your decisions; your decisions when you were put on juvenile probation, your decision when

you committed this first-degree murder, your decision when you decided to enhance and embrace,

exacerbate the gang life in Cook County Jail.” The court then sentenced defendant to 39½ years

for the first-degree murder conviction. With respect to the firearm add-on, the court noted that the

                                                  13
No. 1-21-1420

jury found that defendant had personally discharged a firearm proximately causing the death of

the victim during the commission of the first-degree murder. After stating that it was “mindful of

the necessary findings and restrictions of juvenile sentencing” in Miller v. Alabama and People v.

Buffer, the court said that its failure to include the firearm add-on to defendant’s sentence “would

be definitely in the face of the legislative intent.” The court then stated as follows:

                       “This society and this city is undergoing an assault through

                firearm crimes. It’s outrageous what is happening. And that is why

                the legislature enacted the firearm enhancement provisions for

                purposes like this. And for me not to sentence him for committing

                a first-degree murder when he personally was the one who

                discharged a firearm, I do not think that would be following what

                the intent of the legislature is to eradicate this cancer and this

                pervasive gun violence that has beset our city.”

After reiterating that it was “mindful of the findings and restrictions” in Miller v. Alabama and

People v. Buffer, the court sentenced defendant under the firearm enhancement to an additional 25

years, to be served consecutively to his 39½-year first-degree murder sentence.

¶ 36   Defendant subsequently filed a motion to reconsider sentence. Defendant argued, inter

alia, that the trial court failed to “properly balance any aggravation presented with the mitigation

evidence presented by the defendant,” noting that Dr. Leska testified that he had the ability to learn

and rehabilitative capacity. Defendant further argued that his sentence was excessive “in view of

the facts of this case” as well as his background. Defendant also argued that there was no evidence

that he was “among the rarest of juvenile offenders whose crime reflects permanent incorrigibility”

and that the State had not proven that he was “totally irredeemable and unable to be rehabilitated.”

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No. 1-21-1420

Finally, defendant noted that he was under the age of 18 at the time of the offense and that the

court failed to consider additional mitigating factors pursuant to section 5-4.5-105 of the Code,

characterizing his sentence as a de facto life sentence. The court denied defendant’s motion.

¶ 37   This appeal follows.

¶ 38                                        ANALYSIS

¶ 39                                   Defendant’s Sentence

¶ 40   On appeal, defendant contends that his 64½-year sentence of imprisonment is an

unconstitutional de facto life sentence as applied to him under the eighth amendment and the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution. Defendant argues that the trial court did

not “meaningfully” consider his “youth and its attendant circumstances,” his education level,

intellectual functioning, impoverished upbringing, and lack of parental guidance.              In the

alternative, defendant contends that his sentence is excessive. Defendant asks that we either reduce

his sentence or remand the matter for resentencing.

¶ 41                               The Eighth Amendment Claim

¶ 42   The eighth amendment, applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,

(Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)), prohibits, inter alia, the imposition of “cruel and

unusual punishments” (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV), which include those that are

“disproportionate” to the offense (Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010)). With respect to

juveniles, the United States Supreme Court has held that the eighth amendment prohibits

(1) capital sentences for juveniles who commit murder (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79

(2005)), (2) mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses (Graham,

560 U.S. at 82), and (3) mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit murder (Miller v.

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012)). The Supreme Court later explained that, under Miller, life

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No. 1-21-1420

imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional for “juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the

transient immaturity of youth”; that is, “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose

crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208-09 (2016).

Our supreme court further held that sentencing a juvenile to a mandatory term of years that is the

functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole (i.e., a de facto life sentence) violates

the eighth amendment. People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9.

¶ 43    Our supreme court extended Miller and Montgomery, holding that the eighth amendment

also requires a judge to consider a juvenile defendant’s youth and attendant characteristics before

imposing a discretionary sentence of life in prison. See People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40.4

Among the factors a court should consider are the following: (1) the juvenile defendant’s

chronological age at the time of the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity,

impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family

and home environment; (3) the juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and

any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant’s

        4
          Recently, our supreme court commented that the holding in Holman was
“questionable” in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Mississippi, 593
U.S. –––, –––, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2021) (rejecting an argument that the “sentencer
must make a finding of permanent incorrigibility” prior to imposing a discretionary life
sentence without parole). People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶¶ 40-41. This comment
appears to be dicta, however, because the question presented to the Dorsey court did
not concern the sufficiency (or necessity) of a trial court’s fact findings prior to
imposing a de facto life sentence. See id. ¶ 49 (“In the case now before us, the parties
disagree on the effect the availability of day-for-day, good-conduct credit has on the
question of whether a de facto life sentence without the possibility of parole has been
imposed.”). Since Holman has not been expressly overruled, we are bound to still
follow it. See Kaull v. Kaull, 2014 IL App (2d) 130175, ¶ 55 (“Trial and appellate
courts are bound by the supreme court and have no authority to overrule the supreme
court or modify its decisions.”) (citing Angelini v. Snow, 58 Ill. App. 3d 116, 119
(1978)).
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No. 1-21-1420

incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and his incapacity

to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the juvenile defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation. Id. ¶ 46.

¶ 44   Section 5-4.5.105(a) of the Code requires a trial court to consider the following mitigating

factors before sentencing a defendant who committed an offense before the age of 18:

                        “(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at

                the time of the offense, including the ability to consider risks and

                consequences of behavior, and the presence of cognitive or

                developmental disability, or both, if any;

                        (2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure,

                including peer pressure, familial pressure, or negative influences;

                        (3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and

                social background, including any history of parental neglect,

                physical abuse, or other childhood trauma;

                        (4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of

                rehabilitation, or both;

                        (5) the circumstances of the offense;

                        (6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in

                the offense, including the level of planning by the defendant before

                the offense;

                        (7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate

                in his or her defense;

                        (8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history; and

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No. 1-21-1420

                       (9) any other information the court finds relevant and

                reliable, including an expression of remorse, if appropriate.” 730

                ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020).

This final factor, however, precludes a court from considering a defendant’s lack of an expression

of remorse as an aggravating factor if the defendant, “on advice of counsel chooses not to make a

statement.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a)(9) (West 2020).

¶ 45   In addition, section 5-4.5-105(b), in pertinent part, allows a trial court the discretion to

“decline to impose any otherwise applicable sentencing enhancement based upon firearm ***

possession with personal discharge that proximately causes *** death to another person.” 730

ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b) (West 2020). We review de novo whether a sentence is constitutional.

People v. Taylor, 2015 IL 117267, ¶ 11.

¶ 46   At the outset, we reject the State’s argument that defendant has forfeited this claim of error.

Defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence argued in favor of resentencing because, in part, he

was not “among the rarest of juvenile offenders whose crime reflects permanent incorrigibility”

and that the State had not proven that he was “totally irredeemable and unable to be rehabilitated.”

These terms are found repeatedly in the United States Supreme Court’s eighth amendment

jurisprudence. See, e.g., Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 (noting “the great difficulty” in distinguishing

between a juvenile offender whose crime reflects “unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the

rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ ” (Emphasis added.)) (quoting

Roper, 543 U.S. at 573); id. at 478 (stating that mandatory life imprisonment without parole

“disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.”

(Emphasis added.)); Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209 (“Miller did bar life without parole, however,

for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.”

                                                 18
No. 1-21-1420

(Emphases added.)); Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 (“Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as

juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of

their lives.” (Emphasis added.)); see also Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46 (“Under Miller and

Montgomery, a juvenile defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, but only

if the trial court determines that the defendant’s conduct showed irretrievable depravity, permanent

incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility of rehabilitation.” (Emphases

added.)). Although we recognize that defendant did not explicitly cite Miller or the eighth

amendment to the federal constitution in his motion, defendant’s statements are hardly cryptic.

The State’s claim of forfeiture is therefore unpersuasive. We now turn to defendant’s claim.

¶ 47   As noted above, defendant contends that the trial court imposed a sentence in violation of

the eighth amendment. Specifically, defendant argues that, although the court here “acknowledged

its awareness of the statute,” it nevertheless did not “meaningfully” apply the statutory factors in

section 5-4.5-105(a) before imposing sentence. Defendant further complains that the trial court

erroneously rejected Dr. Leska’s expert opinion that defendant was not permanently incorrigible

or beyond rehabilitation, adding that the state produced no witnesses or evidence to contradict her

opinion. Finally, he argues that the court’s “intense and highly skeptical questioning of Dr. Leska

*** suggested a bias or predetermination” with respect to defendant’s rehabilitative potential.

¶ 48   Defendant’s contention of error is unavailing. First, defendant’s argument that the trial

court did not provide meaningful consideration to his youth and the attendant circumstances is

belied by the record: The trial court’s findings at the sentencing hearing span approximately 14

pages of the report of proceedings, refer repeatedly to defendant’s age as well as his individual

circumstances, and reflect a meticulous examination of each of the statutory factors. We have

already detailed the court’s discussion of those factors supra, so we need not repeat them here. To

                                                19
No. 1-21-1420

the extent that defendant is inviting this court to reweigh the mitigation evidence, it is an invitation

we must decline. See People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 214-15 (2010) (holding that it is “an

improper exercise of the powers of a reviewing court” for the appellate court to substitute its own

judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed the sentencing factors

differently) (citing People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991)).

¶ 49    Regarding Dr. Leska’s testimony, it is well established that a trial court may “accept or

reject expert testimony in whole or in part and need not accept the opinion of one expert even

where that expert’s testimony is not contradicted by the testimony of another expert.” People v.

Jones, 2017 IL App (1st) 143403, ¶ 27 (citing People v. Tara, 367 Ill. App. 3d 479, 489 (2006)).

Here, although Dr. Leska was aware that, while defendant was incarcerated pending trial in the

present case, he stabbed another inmate and later participated in a separate “mob action” (resulting

in two additional charges against him), she nonetheless failed to review police reports or footage

of—or ask defendant about—either of these two violent incidents.

¶ 50    In addition, although Dr. Leska opined that defendant had suffered abuse and neglect as a

child based primarily upon an interview with defendant’s aunt (but not his mother or sister), she

admitted that she was unaware but “assume[d]” that defendant’s PSI had been prepared because

that “seem[s] to be always the case.” As discussed, defendant’s PSI contained his statement that

he had a good relationship with his mother and sisters, was never abused or neglected, and had a

normal childhood in which “all of his needs were met.” The court also observed that there had

been no “public agency” or police involvement in defendant’s childhood family life. Furthermore,

she asserted that defendant had feelings of isolation and failed to discuss defendant’s relationship

with a girlfriend even after defendant mentioned it and described it as “very good.”

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No. 1-21-1420

¶ 51   Finally, Dr. Leska seemingly explained away defendant’s violent offenses while in jail by

stating that he lacked sufficient time or resources to “make any changes” and that those types of

“rehabilitative resources” were only in the state prison system and not the county jail. In response

to the court’s question, she reiterated her belief that “the Department of Corrections offers other

resources, counseling, school, group therapy *** that aren’t available at Cook County Jail.” A

cursory search of the sheriff’s department website, however, would have revealed multiple

programs available at the Cook County jail, including substance abuse, mental health, educational,

and religious programs, as well as yoga and chess. 5 Dr. Leska testified that she charged the defense

approximately $12,000 for this expert opinion. The facts of this case strongly suggest that she

blithely ignored information that would contradict her opinion. As such, the court had ample

grounds to reject it. See Jones, 2017 IL App (1st) 143403, ¶ 27.

¶ 52   Nonetheless, defendant asserts that there was “no sound basis” for the court to reject Dr.

Leska’s opinion and relies upon People v. Kando, 397 Ill. App. 3d 165 (2009), in support of his

claim. Defendant’s reliance upon Kando, however, is misplaced. In that case, the court (with one

justice dissenting) reversed the trial court’s finding of guilty but mentally ill and remanded the

matter for further proceedings. Id. at 211-12. In particular, the Kando court noted, “it is undisputed

*** that the incident for which defendant was charged [namely, stabbing his neighbor] was

conceived and took place in the grip of a psychotic delusion[:] *** to eliminate Satan pursuant to

a commandment from God.” Id. at 196. The court further stated that the two expert opinions

considered “relevant authorities” and information concerning the defendant, and they did not

       5
           See Rehabilitative Programs, https://www.cookcountysheriff.org/departments/cook-
county-department-of-corrections/programs-and-services/sheriffs-rehabilitative-programs/ (last
visited January 6, 2023).
                                                 21
No. 1-21-1420

“ignore[] information which was contrary to their opinion[s].” Id. at 197. Both experts also

testified that they “thoroughly” reviewed all available information on the defendant’s condition,

including police reports. Id. at 198. The court also stated that both experts’ credibility was further

bolstered because they were employed by the Forensic Clinical Services of the Cook County

circuit court “and therefore examined defendant pursuant to court orders. Neither expert was hired

by defendant to examine him and then provide an opinion at trial.” Id.

¶ 53   Here, by contrast, there is no evidence in the record that a religious delusion motivated

defendant to shoot the victim, and as noted above, the expert in this case, Dr. Leska—who was

hired by defendant and not the court—freely admitted that she failed to review defendant’s

multiple PSIs, which contained information about his upbringing that was contrary to her opinion,

unlike the experts in Kando. See id. Defendant’s reliance upon Kando is therefore unavailing.

¶ 54                            The Proportionate Penalties Claim

¶ 55   Defendant next contends that his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the

Illinois constitution as applied to him. Defendant argues that the trial court “overlooked the

substantial mitigating evidence” and disregarded the constitutional objective of restoring

defendant to useful citizenship. Defendant adds that the court’s imposition of the 25-year firearm

enhancement was based “solely on retribution and deterrence” without regard to defendant’s youth

and the circumstances thereof. Defendant quotes the court’s statement that “society” and the city

are “undergoing an assault through firearm crimes.” Defendant notes that the deterrent effect of

sentences is weaker with minors than adults, and he argues that, “at a minimum,” this court should

vacate the 25-year firearm enhancement. The State responds that this claim is forfeited.

¶ 56   The proportionate penalties clause of the state constitution provides in relevant part that

“All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the

                                                 22
No. 1-21-1420

objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. A sentence

violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is “cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate

to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481,

487 (2005). We may determine whether a sentence shocks the moral sense of the community by

considering both objective evidence and “the community’s changing standard of moral decency.”

People v. Hernandez, 382 Ill. App. 3d 726, 727 (2008). As noted above, our review as to the

constitutionality of a sentence is de novo. Taylor, 2015 IL 117267, ¶ 11.

¶ 57   In this case, defendant’s contention is an as-applied challenge. Specifically, defendant

argues that the trial court improperly “overlooked the substantial mitigating evidence,” disregarded

the constitutional objective of restoring defendant to useful citizenship, and imposed the firearm

add-on solely on the basis of retribution and deterrence. The State responds that defendant has

forfeited this claim for failure to raise it at sentencing or in his postsentencing motion.

¶ 58   Although the defendant raised his challenge for the first time on appeal, he has not forfeited

review. Our supreme court has held that a defendant ordinarily must present an as-applied

challenge to the trial court to create “a sufficiently developed record.”          Holman, 2017 IL

120655, ¶29. That court, however, noted that there is a “very narrow exception” to that rule for

an as-applied Miller claim where the record is already sufficiently developed for appellate review.

Id. ¶¶ 29-32 (citing People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115585, ¶¶ 32, 43). The court further explained that

“[l]ike the Miller claim in Davis, the Miller claim in this case does not require factual development.

All of the facts and circumstances to decide the defendant’s claim—that his sentencing hearing

did not comply with Miller—are already in the record.” Id. ¶ 32.

¶ 59   The issue presently before this court falls into the narrow Davis exception referred to in

Holman: whether the trial court improperly disregarded mitigating evidence and misapplied the

                                                  23
No. 1-21-1420

Miller factors. In addition, the record here is sufficiently developed for us to determine whether

defendant’s proportionate penalties claim has merit. See id.; cf. People v. Harris, 2018 IL

121932, ¶¶ 43-44 (distinguishing Holman because “the defendant in Holman fell squarely under

Miller because he was a juvenile when his crime was committed. The critical determinations were

purely legal issues *** [and] [t]he only other issue was determining from the ‘cold record’ whether

the trial court adequately considered the Miller factors at the original sentencing hearing.”). The

State’s response that defendant has forfeited this claim is thus unavailing.

¶ 60   On the merits, defendant’s sentence, although not the statutory minimum, was nonetheless

well within the sentencing range. We note that defendant must serve the entire 64½-year sentence

without the possibility of good-conduct credit (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(1)(i) (West 2020)).

Nonetheless, the facts of this case are particularly egregious. The victim, in an unprovoked attack,

was struck over the head with a glass bottle. The victim and his brother then had to defend

themselves from four or five unknown Hispanic males with whom they had no prior dispute. After

the victim’s brother was pushed to the floor and the victim had to defend himself alone, defendant

shot the unarmed victim twice in the chest, killing him. Defendant was not involved in the fight

and had concealed the weapon to evade protective pat-down searches at the party. At the time of

this offense, defendant had been on probation for a prior juvenile adjudication for possession of a

weapon. Subsequent to this offense (i.e., while incarcerated awaiting trial for the victim’s

shooting), defendant stabbed another inmate and later participated in a separate “mob action”

beating of yet another inmate. On these facts, defendant’s 64½-year sentence is not “cruel,

degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the

community.” Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 487. On this basis alone, defendant’s claim fails.

                                                 24
No. 1-21-1420

¶ 61   Additionally, we reject defendant’s argument that the trial court disregarded the mitigating

evidence. Setting aside whether a trial court’s failure to consider mitigating evidence at sentencing

can support a state constitutional challenge under the proportionate penalties clause (see People v.

LaPointe, 2018 IL App (2d) 160903, ¶ 61), the trial court stated in its lengthy findings that it had

considered, inter alia, defendant’s PSI, the evidence in aggravation and mitigation, statutory

factors in aggravation and mitigation, as well as the trial evidence. Moreover, it is well established

that a trial court is not required to expressly outline its reasoning for sentencing, and absent some

affirmative indication to the contrary (other than the sentence itself), we must presume that the

court considered all mitigating factors on the record. People v. Perkins, 408 Ill. App. 3d 752, 762-

63 (2011). Defendant’s claim is therefore without merit.

¶ 62   Finally, we reject defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in imposing the firearm

add-on solely on the basis of retribution and deterrence based upon its comments regarding gun

violence generally and the purported legislative intent underlying the firearm add-on. The

comments defendant complains about were limited to a single paragraph among over a dozen

pages of findings at sentencing. To determine whether a sentence is improper, we may not merely

focus “on a few words or statements of the trial court”; rather, we must consider “the entire record

as a whole.” People v. Ward, 113 Ill. 2d 516, 526-27 (1986). Therefore, viewing the record of the

trial court’s findings at sentencing as a whole, it is not reasonable to characterize the sentence as

one based solely upon retribution and deterrence. Accordingly, defendant’s argument fails.

¶ 63                               The Excessive Sentence Claim

¶ 64   Defendant alternatively contends that his sentence is excessive given his young age and

“the absence of evidence that he was permanently incorrigible.” Defendant relies upon the same

arguments he made supra regarding his constitutional challenges to his sentence.

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No. 1-21-1420

¶ 65    “It is well settled that the trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence

[citation], and the trial court’s sentencing decision is entitled to great deference.” People v. Stacey,

193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). The circuit court is afforded such deference because it “has the

opportunity to weigh such factors as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral

character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” Id. We may not substitute our judgment

for that of the circuit court merely because we would have weighed the sentencing factors in a

different manner. Id. As we have already mentioned, a trial court need not explain its rationale

for a particular sentence, and unless a defendant can show “some affirmative indication to the

contrary (other than the sentence itself),” we will presume that the court considered all mitigating

factors on the record. Perkins, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 762-63.

¶ 66    This court may set aside a sentence only when the trial court abuses its discretion. People

v. Velez, 388 Ill. App. 3d 493, 514 (2009). An abuse of discretion exists “only where the trial

court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, such that no reasonable person would take

the view adopted by the trial court.” People v. Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d 342, 429 (2010) (citing People

v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 182 (2003)). In addition, “a sentence within the statutory limits will

only constitute an abuse of discretion if ‘it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the

offense.’ ” People v. Martin, 2012 IL App (1st) 093506, ¶ 47 (quoting People v. Jackson, 375 Ill.

App. 3d 796, 800 (2007)).

¶ 67    In this case, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, which has a sentencing range

of 20 to 60 years’ imprisonment. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2016) (first-degree murder

sentence of 20 to 60 years). In addition, the jury found that defendant personally discharged a

firearm that proximately caused the victim’s death, which then results—for juveniles who commit

this offense—in a discretionary additional term of 25 years to natural life imprisonment. See 730

                                                  26
No. 1-21-1420

ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2016) (25 years to natural life add-on for personal discharge of a

firearm proximately causing death); but see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(c) (West 2016) (firearm add-

on discretionary if defendant is under 18 at the time of the offense). Defendant’s 64½-year

sentence falls within the statutory range for that offense, so we may not set aside the sentence

unless it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. See Martin, 2012 IL App (1st)

093506, ¶ 47. Defendant, however, argues that the sentence is nonetheless improper and reiterates

that this is due to his youth and the absence of evidence that he was permanently incorrigible.

¶ 68   Defendant’s contention is without merit. We have already detailed the trial court’s lengthy

findings at sentencing and need only summarize them here: The evidence at trial established that

defendant shot the unarmed victim twice in the chest after the victim got into a fight with

defendant’s fellow gang members (but not defendant) after the victim was struck over the head

with a bottle in an unprovoked attack. On these abbreviated facts, defendant’s sentence was not

manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. See id. Finally, we note that section 5-

4.5-115(b) of the Code provides in relevant part as follows: “A person under 21 years of age at

the time of the commission of first-degree murder who is sentenced on or after June 1, 2019 ***

shall be eligible for parole *** after serving 20 years or more of his *** sentence ***.” 730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2020). Defendant here was one week shy of his 18th birthday and sentenced

after June 1, 2019. By the very terms of the statute, he is eligible for parole after 20 years.

¶ 69   Defendant’s argument that he is entitled to a reduced sentence because of his age and the

purported lack of evidence of incorrigibility seems to be an invitation for this court to reweigh the

mitigation evidence. It is, however, an invitation we must decline. See Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209.

After having reviewed the evidence and the trial court’s detailed findings at defendant’s sentencing

hearing, we cannot hold that the court’s consideration of the mitigating evidence was arbitrary,

                                                 27
No. 1-21-1420

fanciful, or unreasonable, such that no reasonable person would take its view. See Ramsey, 239

Ill. 2d at 429. As such, it did not abuse its discretion. See Velez, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 514. We must

therefore conclude that defendant’s sentence was proper because it was neither greatly at variance

with the spirit and purpose of the law nor manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.

Martin, 2012 IL App (1st) 093506, ¶ 47. Defendant’s claim of error is thus unavailing.

¶ 70   Moreover, defendant’s citation in his reply brief to People v. Hill, 2022 IL App (1st)

171739-B, does not alter our holding. In Hill, the defendant was convicted in 1998 of two counts

of first-degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder, which he committed at age

15, and he was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison to run consecutively with a 30-year

sentence for the attempted murder. Id. ¶ 1. The defendant subsequently filed a postconviction

petition challenging, inter alia, his life sentence as unconstitutional. Id. The parties agreed that

his mandatory life sentence violated Miller. Id.

¶ 71   On remand, two corrections officers testified at the resentencing hearing that the defendant

was “a model inmate,” and his prison records indicated that he held multiple jobs requiring “the

trust of officers.” Id. ¶ 19. The trial court further described the defendant’s behavior in prison as

“ ‘close to exemplary’ ” and “ ‘at least as good as anyone else’s that I’ve ever seen that has been

in that long, quite frankly.’ ” Id. ¶ 20. The court then resentenced the defendant to two concurrent

terms of 54 years for first degree murder to run consecutively with a 6-year sentence for attempted

murder. Id. ¶ 1. The defendant appealed, arguing his new sentences still violated Miller and its

progeny. Id. This court agreed and remanded for a new resentencing hearing. Id. ¶ 4.

¶ 72   Here, however, defendant did not have an “exemplary” record while incarcerated, unlike

the defendant in Hill. Defendant acknowledges this distinction but discounts this fact in arguing

that the Hill defendant’s “behavior and progress was decades in the making” after having spent

                                                 28
No. 1-21-1420

“over 20 years” in prison. This is precisely what makes Hill distinguishable: the defendant there

established his rehabilitative potential, whereas defendant here stabbed one inmate and

participated in the beating of another in the very short time he was incarcerated pending trial. In

addition, two corrections officers testified at the resentencing hearing that the defendant was “a

model inmate,” and his prison records indicated several jobs that required the officers’ trust.

Id. ¶ 19. Clearly, defendant here did not benefit from testimony that he was a “model inmate” or

that he had prison jobs requiring trust on the part of the officers. Hill is therefore unpersuasive.

¶ 73                                   Defendant’s Mittimus

¶ 74   Finally, defendant contends, and the State agrees, that the mittimus erroneously shows that

defendant was convicted of two counts of murder. We agree with the parties. If only one person

has been murdered, there can be only one conviction for murder. People v. Fuller, 205 Ill. 2d 308,

346 (2002). Under the one-act, one-crime rule, we must uphold the conviction for the most

culpable murder charge and vacate the other less culpable charge. Id. (citing People v. Kuntu, 196

Ill. 2d 105, 130 (2001)). Intentional murder has a more culpable mental state than knowing murder.

Id. at 346-47. Here, both count V (intentional murder) and count VI (knowing murder) alleged

defendant committed first-degree murder when he “shot and killed [the victim] while armed with

a firearm.” Defendant’s one physical act of shooting the victim was the basis of both convictions.

We therefore vacate the conviction for knowing murder, count VI of the indictment.

¶ 75                                      CONCLUSION

¶ 76   Defendant’s sentence is not an unconstitutional de facto life sentence in violation of the

eighth amendment or the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution, and it is not

otherwise excessive. We vacate one of defendant’s murder convictions, however, pursuant to the

one act, one crime rule. Accordingly, we affirm as modified the judgment of the circuit court.

                                                 29
No. 1-21-1420

¶ 77   Affirmed as modified.

                               30