Court Opinion

ID: 9930779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 17:08:32.533849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:22.342299
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
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Appeals.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-41482

CHAVEZ LAW OFFICES, P.A.,

      Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ENRIQUE “KIKI” VIGIL, former
Sheriff of Doña Ana County; BOARD
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF
DOÑA ANA COUNTY; JULIA BROWN,
former County Manager of Doña Ana
County, in her individual capacity; and
FERNANDO MACIAS, former County
Manager of Doña Ana County, in his
individual capacity,

      Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY
Casey B. Fitch, District Court Judge

Chavez Law Offices, LLC
Gene N. Chavez
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Mynatt Martinez Springer, P.C.
Blaine T. Mynatt
Las Cruces, NM

for Appellees

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

HANISEE, Judge.
{1}    Plaintiff appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendant Board of County Commissioners of Doña Ana County (the County) as well
as the order denying his motion for reconsideration. We issued a calendar notice
proposing to affirm. Plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition, which we have duly
considered. Unpersuaded, we affirm.

{2}    Our calendar notice proposed to affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that a genuine issue of
material fact existed. [CN 4] Specifically, we stated that Plaintiff had failed to present
evidence that a contract existed between himself and the County because he did not
dispute any of the facts set forth by the County regarding the process by which a
contract is executed and approved and that contracts not executed through that process
are invalid. [CN 4] In addition, we stated that despite Plaintiff’s affidavits from the sheriff
and the sheriff’s assistant, they did not appear to establish that a contract was ever
actually agreed on or approved by the County. [CN 5]

{3}     In his memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff continues to argue that he presented
“both testimony at the hearing and in the form of affidavit to establish that an agreement
was entered, the agreement was authorized, legal services were performed and
payment was promised, but ultimately never paid.” [MIO 3] Plaintiff, however, has still
not provided us with any facts to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact.
Rather, he makes conclusory statements that summary judgment is not proper “if there
is any question of fact” and that he presented evidence in the form of testimony and
affidavits. [MIO 3 (emphasis omitted)] Plaintiff has not provided any more facts,
argument, or authority to demonstrate that the contract he alleges existed was created
through the County’s procurement process such that a genuine issue of material fact
exists. See Roth v. Thompson, 1992-NMSC-011, ¶ 17, 113 N.M. 331, 825 P.2d 1241
(“The movant need only make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to summary
judgment. Upon the movant making a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the party
opposing the motion to demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts which
would require trial on the merits.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that
Plaintiff has not met his burden to demonstrate that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. See Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶
24, 124 N.M. 754, 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary
calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly
point out errors in fact or law.”).

{4}     Plaintiff also continues to assert that he presented evidence through live
testimony and affidavits that the contract was breached and that he brought his claims
within the statute of limitations period. [MIO 5] Specifically, he argues that two
representatives of the County—the sheriff and the sheriff’s assistant—testified that “they
assured . . . Plaintiff of payment, as of their last day in office in December[] 2018.” [MIO
6] Plaintiff asserts that December 31, 2018, was the controlling date as that was the
date the contract was breached. [MIO 6] However, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that
either the sheriff or the sheriff’s assistant were authorized to enter into a contract with
Plaintiff on behalf of the County so as to establish that a valid contract existed, and that
was later breached. Accordingly, we remain unpersuaded that there was a valid
contract, and conclude that Plaintiff has not met his burden in overcoming summary
judgment. See id.

{5}    To the extent that Plaintiff continues to argue against the application of collateral
estoppel, we remain unpersuaded. Plaintiff asserts that in the prior lawsuit against
Defendant Vigil there was one outstanding issue regarding whether Defendant Vigil was
acting within the course and scope of his employment as sheriff, which should preclude
summary judgment. [MIO 7] He argues that the district court “should have adjudicated
the issue of course and scope of the actions of [the sheriff].” [MIO 7] However, Plaintiff
has failed to demonstrate that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate this
issue in the prior suit against Defendant Vigil. See Shovelin v. Cent. N.M. Elec. Co-op.,
Inc., 1993-NMSC-015, ¶ 10, 115 N.M. 293, 850 P.2d 996 (explaining that “[i]f the
movant introduces sufficient evidence to meet all elements of this test, the [district] court
must then determine whether the party against whom estoppel is asserted had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior litigation”). As such, we remain
unpersuaded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the
County.

{6}     Finally, Plaintiff continues to assert that the New Mexico Tort Claims Act
(NMTCA), NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-1 to -30 (1976, as amended through 2020), applies and
“requires a county to provide a defense, including attorney[] fees, for public employees
when liability is sought for torts or any violation of property rights or rights secured by
federal or New Mexico law allegedly committed by the employee acting within the scope
of his duties.” [MIO 7 (emphasis omitted)] Section 41-4-4(B). Plaintiff maintains that he
“sought damages in addition to contract and not limited to only contract.” [MIO 7]
However, Plaintiff has not explained what these additional damages are and has not
provided any new facts, argument or authority regarding what alleged tort occurred in
this case that would bring it under the NMTCA such that Section 41-4-4(B) would apply.
As such, we remain unpersuaded that the district court erred in denying Plaintiff’s
motion to amend his complaint.

{7}     For reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and herein, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County.

{8}    IT IS SO ORDERED.

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Chief Judge

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge