Court Opinion

ID: 9564864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:10:00.592582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:11.937527
License: Public Domain

Gregory, Justice
(dissenting) :
I respectfully disagree with the sanction imposed by the majority. Both the Panel and the Executive Committee unanimously recommended private reprimand as the appropriate sanction. I concur in their recommendation.

The Cullen Case

Respondent advised Ms. Cullen at their first conference in May 1975 of the importance of her physician’s final report. Notwithstanding this advice, Ms. Cullen did not inform respondent until May 1976 that she had been released by her physician in January 1976. Shortly after receiving this information from Ms. Cullen respondent wrote the physician requesting a copy of the physician’s final report. The report had not been received from the physician by October 1976, when Ms. Cullen discharged respondent and secured alternate counsel.
Ms. Cullen’s newly employed counsel brought suit in December 1976 and negotiated a favorable settlement in May 1977.
*420Respondent refrained from bringing suit so that he could have the benefit of Ms. Cullen’s physician’s final report. This was not unreasonable.
Respondent’s neglect in this matter consists mainly of his failure to communicate with his client.
The Panel report characterizes respondent’s representation of Ms. Cullen as “involving an extreme degree of procrastination” which “did not amount to refusal to proceed with representation as claimed in the Complaint.” The Executive Committee voted unanimously to accept this characterization of respondent's conduct. I agree with the Panel and the Executive Committee that procrastination not amounting to refusal to proceed with representation amounts to neglect within the meaning of DR6-101(A) (3) and merits a private, not a public, reprimand.

The Lula P. Broome Case

While I agree with the majority that respondent failed to perform his duty to prosecute Ms. Broome’s case, I also agree with the Panel and the Executive Committee that respondent’s failure to act did not amount to a refusal to act. As with the Cullen case, this is an instance of procrastination amounting to neglect within the meaning of DR6-101(A) (3) and merits a private reprimand.
The record reflects that respondent made monetary advances to Ms. Broome during a time when she was in acute financial need. These funds were used by Ms. Broome to pay her electric bill, to purchase oil for heating, to make house payments and for other necessaries. A secretary in respondent’s office also advanced personal funds to Ms. Broome on two occasions. I agree with the Panel and the Executive Committee that “the advancement of funds while in conflict with DR5-103(B) was not in a manner which was offensive to the spirit and reason for the rule.”
I would remand to the Executive Committee for imposition of a private reprimand.
Rhodes, J., concurs.