Court Opinion

ID: 9919199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 18:02:46.977056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:10.496692
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/17/24 P. v. Murphy CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                                  C098048

           v.                                                                    (Super. Ct. No. 17FE016652)

 LADARIUS DAVON MURPHY,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury convicted defendant Ladarius Davon Murphy of attempted murder and
unlawfully discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle. The jury found that in
committing the crimes, defendant intentionally and personally fired a gun causing great
bodily injury. The trial court sentenced defendant to a determinate prison term of seven
years plus an indeterminate term of 25 years to life.

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       Defendant now contends that in connection with the attempted murder count, the
trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on the lesser included offense of assault with a
firearm.1 Finding no merit in the contention, we will affirm the judgment.
                                      BACKGROUND
       Defendant’s first jury trial resulted in a mistrial. In the second trial, the People
presented evidence that Calvin Barron drove defendant and G.G. to G.G.’s school to
engage with rival gang members. When they saw rival gang members, defendant fired
multiple shots at them from the moving vehicle. Z.C. was shot in the arm and stomach.
Defendant later posted on social media about the shooting.
       Defendant’s defense was that he was not the shooter and was not involved in the
attempted murder. Given defendant’s theory of the case, the trial court declined to
instruct on attempted voluntary manslaughter, and no other lesser included instruction
was requested.
       The jury convicted defendant of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a),
664)2 and unlawfully discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle (§ 26100, subd. (c)).
The jury found that in committing the crimes, defendant intentionally and personally
fired a gun causing great bodily injury. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced
defendant to an aggregate prison term of seven years plus 25 years to life.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends that in connection with the attempted murder count, the trial
court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on the lesser included offense of assault with a

1 In a footnote, defendant also suggests we should amend the abstract of judgment to
reflect that the trial court struck a $300 restitution fine and a $300 parole revocation fine.
The record does not establish that those fines were struck, but in any event, we need not
address the purported contention because it was not presented in compliance with rules
8.360(a) and 8.204(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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firearm. We review defendant’s claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Parker
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 66; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733.)
       A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on all necessarily included offenses
supported by the evidence. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 148-149,
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7.)
A lesser offense is included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of the
greater offense or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading include all the
elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed without also
committing the lesser. (People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 244; People v. Birks
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117.)
       It is well established, however, that assault with a firearm is not a lesser included
offense of attempted murder. (See, e.g., People v. Parks (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.)
It is also well settled that “enhancements may not be considered as part of an accusatory
pleading for purposes of identifying lesser included offenses.” (People v. Sloan (2007)
42 Cal.4th 110, 114 (Sloan) [applying multiple conviction rule], citing People v. Wolcott
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 96, 100-101 (Wolcott) [no sua sponte duty to instruct on assault with
a deadly weapon as a lesser included offense of robbery, notwithstanding the firearm use
enhancement].) Therefore, assault with a firearm does not become a lesser included
offense of attempted murder when the accusatory pleading includes firearm enhancement
allegations. (Wolcott, at pp. 96, 100-101; People v. Alarcon (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 432,
436-439 (Alarcon) [assault with a firearm not a lesser offense of attempted murder with
firearm enhancement]; People v. Bragg (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1398 [same].)
       Defendant nevertheless argues that Wolcott, supra, 34 Cal.3d 92 must be
overturned. He claims it is inconsistent with Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S.
466 and its reasoning is flawed and against public policy.
       It is not our place, of course, to overturn a California Supreme Court decision.
Moreover, Apprendi established that an enhancement allegation is the functional

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equivalent of a greater crime for purposes that do not encompass the accusatory pleading
test. (Alarcon, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 437.) Apprendi does not require us to “treat
penalty allegations as if they were actual elements of offenses for all purposes under state
law.” (Porter v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125, 137 [enhancements should not be
considered in defining necessarily included offenses for double jeopardy protection,
Apprendi notwithstanding]; People v. Izaguirre (2007) 42 Cal.4th 126, 128-129
[enhancement allegations may not be considered in defining necessarily included
offenses for the multiple conviction rule, Apprendi notwithstanding]; Sloan, supra,
42 Cal.4th at pp. 122-123 [same].) We decline to depart from the long-established rule
that enhancement allegations are not considered in defining lesser included offenses.
(Wolcott, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 96, 100-101.)
       But defendant further argues that the equal protection clause requires courts to
treat enhancement allegations as elements of an offense when applying the accusatory
pleading test. He reasons that a defendant charged with a crime is similarly situated to a
defendant charged with a crime and an enhancement, but only the former is entitled to a
lesser included offense instruction.
       “The concept of equal treatment under the laws means that persons similarly
situated regarding the legitimate purpose of the law should receive like treatment.
[Citation.] ‘ “The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection
clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more
similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.” [Citations.] This initial inquiry is not
whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether they are similarly
situated for purposes of the law challenged.” ’ ” (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th
399, 408.)
       Defendant does not establish that the state has adopted a classification that affects
similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. People v. Wolfe (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th
673 (Wolfe) is instructive. There, the defendant, while driving under the influence, killed

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a pedestrian, and was charged with murder on an implied malice theory. (Id. at p. 677.)
The defendant requested that the jury be instructed on involuntary or vehicular
manslaughter as lesser included offenses. (Id. at p. 685.) The trial court denied the
request because involuntary and vehicular manslaughter were not lesser included
offenses. (Id. at pp. 685-686.) On appeal from a murder conviction, the defendant
argued the jury’s all-or-nothing choice between murder and acquittal violated her right to
equal protection. According to the defendant, if she had committed a homicide by a
means other than a vehicle, an instruction on a lesser included offense would have been
given and the jury would have had a choice between murder, manslaughter, and acquittal.
(Id. at p. 686.) But the court in Wolfe said the defendant’s argument was based on a
faulty premise. (Id. at p. 687.) Not all defendants accused of implied malice murder by
means other than a vehicle are entitled to a lesser included offense instruction. For
example, no such instruction is required when unsupported by the evidence. (Ibid.) In
such a case, a jury is presented with the same all-or-nothing choice, regardless of the
instrumentality of the crime. (Id. at p. 688.) Thus, the defendant failed to establish the
threshold requirement of disparate treatment. (Ibid.)
       The same is true here. A lesser included offense instruction may be given only
when there is substantial evidence in support of it. Not all defendants who are charged
with attempted murder, but not enhancements, are entitled to lesser included offense
instructions. Defendant has not established disparate treatment. (Wolfe, supra,
20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 687-688.)
       Moreover, a person who commits attempted murder by means of an
instrumentality other than a firearm is not similarly situated to a person who commits
attempted murder by means of a firearm. There is a rational basis for treating gun use
differently. The Legislature could reasonably find such persons present a greater danger
to society. (See Wolfe, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 688-690 [there is no fundamental
right to lesser included offense instructions and there was a rational basis for the charging

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scheme].) As recognized in Wolfe, “ ‘neither the existence of two identical criminal
statutes prescribing different levels of punishments, nor the exercise of a prosecutor’s
discretion in charging under one such statute and not the other, violates equal protection
principles.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘[N]umerous factors properly may enter into a prosecutor’s
decision to charge under one statute and not another . . . and so long as there is no
showing that a defendant “has been singled out deliberately for prosecution on the basis
of some invidious criterion,” . . . the defendant cannot make out an equal protection
violation.’ ” (Id. at pp. 689-690, citing People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 838-
839.)
        Defendant’s equal protection argument lacks merit. (Wolfe, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th
at p. 690.)
                                      DISPOSITION
        The judgment is affirmed.

                                                     /S/
                                                  MAURO, J.

We concur:

    /S/
EARL, P. J.

    /S/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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