Court Opinion

ID: 9674485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:29:45.007523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:26.786157
License: Public Domain

Conley Byrd, Justice, dissenting. I would reverse this case because the trial court forced the public defender to represent all three defendants after he, in accordance with American Bar Association Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function § 3.5(a)(1971), informed the court that, because of a confidential communication from his clients, there was a conflict of interest among them. The record with respect to the conflict issue shows the following: “MR. HALL: At this time I would like to renew that motion on the ground that one or two of the defendants may testify and, if they do, then I will not be able to cross-examine them because l have received confidential information from them. THE COURT: I don’t know why you wouldn’t. Overruled. Save your exceptions. MR. HALL: l am in a position now where I am more or less muzzled as to any cross-examination. THE COURT: You have no right to cross-examine your own witness. MR. HALL: Or to examine them. THE COURT: You have a right to examine them, but you have no right to cross-examine them. The prosecuting attorney does that. MR. HALL: If one takes the stand, somebody needs to protect the other two’s interest while that one is testifying, and I can’t do that since I have talked to each one individually. * * * THE COURT: You are overruled. Each defendant said he wants to testify, and there will be no cross-examination of these witnesses, just a direct examination by you.” The record shows that all defendants testified in their own behalf. The following took place when the defendant, Welch, testified: “DEFENDANT HOLLOWAY: Your Honor, are we allowed to make an objection? THE COURT: No, sir. Your counsel will take care of any objections. MR. HALL: Your Honor, that is what I am trying to say. I can’t cross-examine them. THE COURT: You proceed like I tell you to, Mr. Hall. You have no right to cross-examine your own witnesses anyway.” The oath administered to lawyers when they receive their license to practice law before this court requires each lawyer to affirmatively answer that “I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client. . . .” Disciplinary Rules DR 4-101 (B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by this court provides: “(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101 (C), a lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client. (2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client. (3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.” In the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense Services, we find the following with reference to the professional independence of appointed defense counsel. “1.4 Professional independence. The plan should be designed to guarantee the relationship between lawyer and client. The plan and the lawyers serving under it should be free from political influence and should be subject to judicial supervision only in the same manner and to the same extent as are lawyers in private practice. One means for assuring this independence, regardless of the type of system adopted, is to place the ultimate authority and responsibility for the operation of the plan in a board of trustees. Where an assigned counsel system is selected, it should be governed by such a board. The board should have the power to establish general policy for the operation of the plan, consistent with these standards and in keeping with the standards of professional conduct. The board should be precluded from interfering in the conduct of particular cases. Commentary a. Integrity of the professional relation A system which does not guarantee the integrity of the professional relation is fundamentally deficient in that it fails to provide counsel who have the same freedom of action as the lawyer whom the person with sufficient means can retain. Inequalitites of this nature are seriously detrimental to the fulfillment of the goals of providing counsel. They are quickly perceived by those who are being provided representation and may encourage cynicism toward the justness of the legal system and, ultimately, of society itself. Much of the dispute concerning the merits of various systems has centered on their capacity to guarantee professional independence. The study made by the Special Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the National Legal Aid Association concluded that the necessary independence could be guaranteed under any type of system, from public defender to assigned counsel, if and only if the system is properly insulated from pressures, whether they flow from an excess of benevolence or from less noble motivations. See EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED 61, 67, 71, 74-75. The importance of assuring the undivided loyalty of defense counsel to his client has been emphasized in previously adopted standards.” To sustain its illogical position that “the record must show some material basis for an alleged conflict of interest, before reversible error occurs in single representation of co-defendants,” the majority mistakenly rely upon Trotter and Harris v. State, 237 Ark. 820, 377 S.W. 2d 14 (1964); United States v. Williams, 429 F. 2d 158 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Gallagher, 437 F. 2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel Robinson v. Housewright, 525 F. 2d 988 (7th Cir. 1971); State v. Jeffrey, 163 Mont. 92, 515 P. 2d 364 (1973); and United States v. Jeffers, 520 F. 2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975). In Trotter and Harris v. State, supra, the issue was not raised in the trial court. The opinion points out that during an in camera hearing in the trial court to determine if Trotter and Harris should take the witness stand that both parties expressed their approval of appointed counsel and of his efforts during the trial. In the absence of any showing of a conflict in the record, this court properly held that there was no merit to the conflict of interest contention. In the case before us the objection was raised in the trial court and at every opportunity in keeping with the Code of Professional Conduct. In United States v. Williams, supra, upon which the majority relies, the defendants were making a post-conviction attack upon their guilty pleas. The record there shows that both defendants had escaped from the Iowa prison at the same time and that they were arrested together. When they were brought before Judge Duncan for arraignment the appointed counsel raised the possibility of a conflict of interest. In doing so appointed counsel stated: “At this time, Your Honor, I know of no conflict but I am saying that the conflict may arise in the future.” When Judge Duncan asked, “Is there anything, any statement that come from [the defendants] that indicates a conflict of interest?” The attorney responded, “Not at the present time.” Thus the Eighth Circuit was correct in asserting that the post-conviction conflict of interest assertion was without merit. However, such holding is not authority for saying that a conflict arising from a confidential communication to appointed counsel should be denied when the matter is brought to the attention of the court before trial. In fact the very emphasis of the court to the proposition that the motion was not made upon a confidential communication would indicate that the court would require representation by different counsel should that situation arise. In United States v. Gallagher, supra, the court had appointed separate counsel for each defendant. Subsequently, the defendants employed single counsel to represent both. When the evidence showed that one of the defendants was the dominant member of the conspiracy, the lawyer suggested to the court that he didn’t know, “whether I should let Tom Gallagher go at this time and concentrate on the lack of evidence against Neil Gallagher or whether I should concentrate on the [evidence] against Neil and pound that in front of the jury.” The court there pointed out that the existence of a conflict of interest was left to only speculation and surmise. There was no contention in that case that the conflict arose from a confidential communication. In fact, it would appear that the motion was more in the nature of a defense ploy. The majority’s reliance upon United States ex rel Robinson v. Housewright, supra, is totally misplaced. There Robinson had entered a bargained plea of guilty to murder and received a reduced sentence. He sought to raise the conflict of interest of his appointed counsel in a post-conviction hearing. However, the appointed counsel testified that he knew of no conflict of interest. In pointing out that Robinson was entitled to no relief the court stated: “. . . The record discloses that the court appointed attorney had not ascertained the presence of a disabling conflict. Nor does anything suggest that he would not have brought to the attention of the court the existence of such a conflict. . . ” [citing § 3.5(a) ABA Standards For Criminal Justice, supra.] The majority’s reliance upon State v. Jeffry, supra, is not supported by the facts there involved nor the reasoning of the Montana Court. Both defendants there were tried together and as pointed out by the court: “Both hired and retained the same counsel to represent them in all preliminary matters and at trial. Counsel was not appointed, or imposed upon either of them — he was retained by the defendants. Prior to this appeal neither of the defendants had claimed he was denied effective counsel, but now, after conviction, they each contend that since they were represented by the same counsel they each were denied their right to effective counsel.” The Montana Court first stated that in determining the conflict of interest issue, it followed the reasoning set forth in Kruchten v. Eyesman, 406 F. 2d 311 (9th Cir. 1969), which provides: “In considering the legal aspect of the conflict of interest claim, we start with the premise that if a conflict of interest actually exists the court will not weigh or determine the degree of prejudice which may result before granting relief. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942). However, until an actual conflict is shown to exist or can be reasonably foreseen an attorney may, in good faith, represent both defendants.” The reason for denying relief when the conflict issue is raised for the first time on appeal was stated by the Montana Court as follows: “. . . The whole problem directs itself ultimately on appeal to the adequacy or inadequacy of defense counsel and in the eyes of this Court such adequacy or inadequacy of counsel should not be tested by the greater sophistication of appellate counsel who did not try the case, nor should the test be made on the basis of applying different defense tactics, perhaps of doubtful efficiency, after leisurely studying the transcript of the trial. . . .” Of course in the case before us we have the statement of the Public Defender that a conflict would arise in the event the defendants took the witness stand in their own behalf. He made that statement because of confidential communications he had received from his clients. Finally the majority make much of the fact that the now Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion in United States v. Jeffers, 520 F. 2d 1256 (1976). That case does not even involve a conflict of interest arising from the representation of co-defendants. There retained counsel, Cohen of the law firm of Cohen & Thiros, represented a number of defendants termed “The Family” who were indicted for a “highly-structured and on-going narcotics distribution net work in Gary, Indiana.” On the sixth day of trial the government brought forth as a witness one James Berry. At that time Cohen informed the court that Berry had previously been represented by one of his law partners in a prior state court homicide case. Cohen admitted that his law firm did not then represent Berry, that he did not personally know Berry, and that he personally had had no confidential communication from Berry. Before concluding that no conflict of interest was shown that would effectively prevent the cross-examination of witness Berry, Judge Stevens emphasized: “. .. We also emphasize at the outset that this is not a case involving an existing personal relationship between Cohen and the witness Berry. Consequently, the numerous cases involving an on-going relationship between an adverse witness and a lawyer are inappropriate.” In a foot note following the above statement it is stated: “The courts have frequently held that the existence of such a relationship, with the inherent hesitancy of counsel to completely cross-examine a current client, creates a very real conflict of interest and requires a mistrial if the conflict is disclosed, or a new trial, if the conflict is discovered only later, see Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F. 2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1974), ...” Our own case of Shelton v. State, 254 Ark. 815, 496 S.W. 2d 419 (1973), falls in the category of the cases mentioned by Justice Stevens in the foot note, supra. The majority’s assertion that the Public Defender should tell all of his confidential communications to the trial judge to protect some of his clients could prove very embarrassing to the public defender’s other clients if the jury should become hung on the amount of punishment and leave the punishment to be fixed by the trial court. Under the majority opinion appointed counsel can never maintain inviolate the confidence of his clients. For the reasons stated I respectfully dissent. George Rose Smith and Fogleman, JJ., join in this dissent.