Court Opinion

ID: 9453871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:26:45.546915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:50.647104
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge
(dissenting) :
Despite the aberration of my joining in Williamson on its second round here, 5 Cir., 1965, 340 F.2d 612, I am now more than ever convinced of the soundness of my special concurrence in the reversal of the original conviction in Williamson v. United States, 5 Cir., 1962, 311 F.2d 441, 445. The great United States government is using one of the oldest, basest, and most telling devices to put the finger of guilt on a suspect — thirty pieces of silver. It bargains for proof by a contingent fee, receipt of which, to the certain knowledge of those who accept such commissions, is dependent upon successful prosecution leading to conviction.
James Jones (a convicted moonshiner out on probation) was bought by the Government for the princely sum of ten dollars a day, gasoline expenses, and the promise of a reward, to contact major violators in the whiskey business in a wide seven-state area. On completion of the terms of his employment he was paid $350, prior to Moore’s trial. Under his engagement with the United States, Jones went to work for Moore and helped construct the stills which formed the basis of this conspiracy. I cannot improve on this contingent-fee-informer’s characterization of his employment. The grammar is bad, the syntax faulty, but the message is clear. “[0]n this here particular case that I am working, that I, when I was working, when we were working conspiracy on Bobby Moore, now I made ten dollars a day, and after that I completed the conspiracy, my reward were three hundred fifty dollars.”
But this witness-for-hire did not cease there. Most, if not all, of the Government witnesses were obtained through information surreptitiously supplied by Jones. He was the key man. He made the case. He did both by what he said was said and what he said he saw. He did it also by identifying and describing the role of all the other Government witnesses.
The Court concludes that Moore cannot now complain because his counsel— faced with a Hobson’s choice — rejected the offer. I agree the Trial Court cannot be put in error because a chance was given to object to the testimony of the informer whose credibility meant money in his pocket. I likewise agree with the judgment of his lawyer — he had no choice.
The error is not that of the Trial Judge or of the trial attorney — but of the Government for engaging in this revolting conduct, infected as it is with the dangers inherent in paying an admittedly weak individual, contingent upon his production of evidence. It is unimportant whether the “reward” is paid before or after trial — it is paid depending on the procurement of evidence. It is a pure euphemism to say, as the Government does, that Jones was not hired to make a case on Moore but that he was a sort of non-civil service worker in the cause of moonshine prevention. His mission was not to earn money by the sweat of his brow. He was “working conspiracy” and when he “completed the conspiracy” the Nation showed its gratitude.
The Court’s holding now forms a water-tight basis for the Government to continue the use of this obnoxious contingent fee arrangement. If he objects the court must exclude the testimony. But when he does so the Government can resist by making a Williamson justification, 311 F.2d at 444, and that lowers the bars.
Government ought not do such things. Citizens ought not be put to that choice.
I would réverse.