Court Opinion

ID: 9423400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:07:33.680248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:43.955327
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stewart,
whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Harlan join,
dissenting.
The system used by California for handling indigent appeals was described by the California Supreme Court in In re Nash, 61 Cal. 2d 491, 495, 393 P. 2d 405, 408:
“We believe that the requirement of the Douglas case [372 U. S. 353] is met . . . when, as in this case, oounsel is appointed to represent the defendant on appeal, thoroughly studies the record, consults with the defendant and trial counsel, and conscientiously concludes that there are no meritorious *746grounds of appeal. If thereafter the appellate court is satisfied from its own review of the record in the .light of any points raised by the defendant personally that counsel’s assessment of the record is correct, it need not appoint another counsel to represent thé defendant on appeal and may properly decide the appeal without oral argument.” (Emphasis added.)
The Court today holds this procedure unconstitutional, and imposes upon appointed counsel who wishes to withdraw from a case he deems “wholly frivolous” the requirement of filing “a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” But if the record did present any such'“arguable” issues, the appeal would not be frivolous and counsel would not have filed a “no-merit” letter in the first place.*
The quixotic requirement imposed by the Court can be explained, I think, only upon the cynical assumption that an appointed lawyer’s professional representation to an appellate court in a “no-m'erit” letter is not to be trusted. That is an assumption to which I cannot subscribe. I *747cannot believe that lawyers appointed to represent indigents are so likely to be lacking in diligence, competence, or professional honesty. Certainly there was no suggestion in the present case that the petitioner’s counsel was either incompetent or unethical.
But even if I could join in this degrading appraisal of the in forma pauperis bar, it escapes me how the procedure that the Court commands is constitutionally superior to the system now followed in California. The fundamental error in the Court’s opinion, it seems forme, is its implicit assertion that there can be but a single inflexible answer to the difficult problem of how to accord equal protection to indigent appellants in each of the 50 States.
Believing that' the procedure under which Anders’, appeal was considered was free of constitutional error, I would affirm the judgment.

The Court concedes as much when it states such a brief should be filed only when counsel believes the case to be “wholly frivolous” and then goes on to hold “if [the California appellate court] finds any of the legal points arguable-on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must . . . afford the indigent the assistance of counsel .. . .” Ante, p. 744. (Emphasis added.)
Even accepting the Court’s requirement, one would have to perceive an “arguable” issue in Anders’ case in order to remand it for a new appeal. The most that all of the courts and lawyers who have examined his case have.turned up is a claim that the prosecutor commented on his silence at trial. But Anders’ conviction was affirmed by the California District Court of Appeal six years before Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, was decided. Our later decision in Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, was based on the premise that prior to Griffin the practice of commenting on the defendant’s silence was well established and thus did not raise an “arguable” issue. Cf. O’Connor v. Ohio, 385 U. S. 92.