Court Opinion

ID: 9629595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:45:54.9985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:54.376716
License: Public Domain

ORIE MELVIN, J.,
dissenting:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s holding that a defendant’s prior *469adjudications of delinquency may not be treated as predicate convictions under Pennsylvania’s “three strikes” legislation, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 (the Statute). I find the Majority’s analysis flawed in that it improperly distinguishes binding precedent. The Majority errs in failing to abide by our Supreme Court’s interpretation in Commonwealth v. Baker, 531 Pa. 541, 614 A.2d 663 (1992) of the term “conviction” under the Juvenile Act in the context of sentence enhancement. Instead, the Majority engages in its own interpretation based upon the alleged plain meaning of the phrase “convicted of a crime of violence” as it appears in the recidivist statute, and the term “conviction of crime” as it appears in the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6354(a). In so doing the Majority creates irrelevant factual distinctions, which impedes the application of stare decisis. As an intermediate appellate court “[i]t is not our prerogative to apply different methods of analysis where the Supreme Court has made clear which particular analysis it believes should be applied to a particular situation.” Preiser v. Rosenzweig, 418 Pa.Super. 341, 614 A.2d 303, 306-307 (1992), appeal granted, 535 Pa. 637, 631 A.2d 1009 (1993), affirmed, 538 Pa. 139, 646 A.2d 1166 (1994).
¶ 2 I believe the use of juvenile adjudications as prior convictions is consistent with both the purpose of § 9714 and our Supreme Court’s holding in Baker, supra. I find illogical the Majority’s conclusion that the application of the Baker decision to § 9714(a)(2) of the Statute would expand this provision beyond the scope intended by the legislature and would violate the express language of the Juvenile Act. The Majority points to differences in the fact-finding process that precede sentencing under the death penalty statute versus the “three strikes” statute. The Majority notes that “[w]hile the jury may determine that a single prior conviction (or adjudication) constitutes ‘a significant history’ under subsection (d)(9), it is also vested with discretion to find that one or even several such occurrences is not ‘significant.’ ” Majority Opinion at 464. This is a distinction without a difference. The Supreme Court’s decision in Baker was not dependent upon the discretion afforded jurors in the factfinding process. The jury was not given discretion in determining whether or not a juvenile adjudication was a conviction; the Baker Court clearly held that it was as a matter of law. It matters not whether the sentence enhancement to be applied is discretionary or mandatory. Rather, Baker dictates that for sentence enhancement purposes a juvenile adjudication is to be considered the equivalent of a conviction.
¶ 3 Applying a discretionary versus mandatory sentencing dichotomy cannot vitiate the effect given by our Supreme Court to juvenile adjudications pursuant to § 6354 of the Juvenile Act. The Baker Court unequivocally finds juvenile adjudications are synonymous with convictions for the purpose of applying aggravating circumstance (d)(9) of § 9711 of the Death Penalty statute. In this context I can discern no substantive difference between the operation of § 9711 and § 9714. Both have mandatory as well as discretionary sentencing elements. For instance, when the jury in a death penalty case finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances the statute mandates the imposition of a death sentence. § 9711(c)(l)(iv). Thus, conceivably a jury could find that based solely upon a defendant’s felony juvenile adjudications § 9711(d)(9) is applicable, mandating death. Likewise, when the court under § 9714(a)(2) finds two or more convictions involving crimes of violence, this provision of the Sentencing Code mandates a minimum sentence of twenty-five years and further gives the court discretion to impose a life sentence.
¶ 4 Since a jury may treat juvenile adjudications as convictions under § 9711(d)(9), so should a judge be able to apply the same treatment under § 9714. I find it would be illogical to permit the use of *470juvenile adjudications to establish a defendant’s “history of felony convictions” and thereby subject a defendant to the most severe penalty of death, and then preclude their use to establish prior convictions for crimes of violence under § 9714, which imposes a less severe penalty. Consequently, the Baker decision does not stand for the proposition that juvenile adjudications may only be taken into consideration as a factor when imposing a discretionary sentence.
¶ 5 Moreover, both provisions are concerned with enhancing the penalty for recidivists. As this Court noted in Commonwealth v. Krum, 367 Pa.Super. 511, 533 A.2d 134 (1987) in reference to the prior version of § 6354(b)(1):
the legislature has specifically provided that prior juvenile adjudications of delinquency may be used “in dispositional proceedings after conviction of a felony. ...” Thus, “[i]t is clearly the intent of the Legislature that a child who continues his pattern of serious and violent anti-social activity into adulthood should not receive the benefit of a cloak of immunity regarding that behavior, when it is relevant to predicting future behavior and the public safety is at risk.”
Krum at 139 (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 333 Pa.Super. 179, 481 A.2d 1365, 1366 (1984)). Accordingly, the Majority’s holding is at odds with the purpose of recidivist legislation in general and specifically § 9714, “to deter violent criminal acts by imposing harsher penalties on those [be they adults or juveniles] who commit repeated crimes of violence.” Commonwealth v. Eddings, 721 A.2d 1095, 1100 (Pa.Super.1998).
¶ 6 Our Supreme Court has also acknowledged that § 9714 “serve[s] the legitimate public policy of segregating from society those persons with propensities to commit crime, who by their repeated criminal acts demonstrate their unwillingness or inability to be rehabilitated.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 528 Pa. 380, 385, 598 A.2d 268, 271 (1991). We need not be reminded of the student killings at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado to recognize the savagery of which juveniles are capable. The danger posed to society by those who have a history of violent crime is the same whether the prior violent behavior was committed as an adult or a juvenile. Perhaps, as the Commonwealth notes “[t]he inability to learn from one’s conduct is even more egregious in the instance of the child repeat offender, since ... the very structure of the juvenile system is aimed at rehabilitation, treatment, and reformation.” Commonwealth’s brief at 22. Thus, by continuing to engage in violent conduct upon reaching majority, they are clearly demonstrating their inability to be rehabilitated.
¶ 7 Additionally, I dispute the Majority’s contention this Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Rudd, 366 Pa.Super. 473, 531 A.2d 515 (1987) lends support to its position. In Rudd, a panel of this Court, prior to our Supreme Court’s decision in Baker, held that an adjudication of delinquency for a DUI could not be employed as a previous conviction for the purpose of imposing the enhanced sentencing provisions of § 3731(e) of the Vehicle Code. Three years later Rudd was effectively overruled when § 3731(e) was amended to specifically include juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses necessitating the enhancement of the offender’s sentence.1 The Majority finds dispositive the fact that when the legislature subsequently amended § 9714 in 1995 it “makes no reference in any context, to adjudications of delinquency.” Majority opinion at 465.
¶ 8 To the contrary, the legislature’s response to the decision in Rudd supports application of the rule in Baker. The Majority fails to consider that Rudd was nev*471er appealed to the Supreme Court, and thus our highest appellate court did not have occasion to construe whether previous convictions included juvenile adjudications until 1992 when it decided Baker. Since Baker was decided after the 1990 amendment of § 3731(e) and prior to the 1995 amendment of § 9714, the fact that § 9714 makes no reference to juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses could be indicative of the legislature’s recognition that the matter was already decided. Therefore, the legislature may have deemed it unnecessary to specifically include language concerning juvenile adjudications.2
¶ 9 Moreover, despite the facial appeal of the Majority’s argument concerning the legislative history of § 9714 as reflecting the General Assembly’s intent to apply § 9714 only to adult convictions, I note that as an intermediate appellate court we are not at liberty to engage in a reexamination of the effect to be given to juvenile adjudications in the sentencing context once our Supreme Court has spoken on the subject. Preiser, supra.
Where the Supreme Court has spoken on a particular subject, it is our obligation, as an intermediate appellate court, to follow and apply that decision so as to establish some measure of predictability and stability in our case law. In the absence of a legally relevant distinction between the facts of a previous case and the case before us, we are obliged to follow the dictates of the Supreme Court’s decision in the prior case. Resolving cases by attempting to create irrelevant, factual distinctions impedes the application of stare decisis, the principal function of which is to imbue the judicial system with some measure of predictability and stability, and places the development of the law in a constant, uncertain state of flux such that neither practitioners nor trial judges can, with any degree of predictability, determine the proper application of the law to each new case involving similar facts that comes before them. It is also not our prerogative to apply different methods of analysis where the Supreme Court has made clear which particular analysis it believes should be applied to a particular situation.
Id. at 306-307 (quoting Malinder v. Jenkins Elevator & Machine Co., 371 Pa.Super. 414, 538 A.2d 509, 513 (1988)). Having found no legally relevant distinction, Baker’s interpretation of the effect to be given to juvenile adjudications should control.
¶ 10 I further find the majority’s reb-anee upon remarks offered by the legislation’s proponents to be misplaced. The proponents are not saying anything about whether or not juvenile adjudications should be considered as prior convictions of crimes of violence. The unstated assumption in all the examples is that § 9714 does not apply until a defendant is tried and convicted as an adult. It is only at this point that the sentencing court looks to the defendant’s prior history of “convictions” for crimes of violence, be they committed while a juvenile or after reaching majority. Application of § 9714 is clearly not an option available to a judge under the Juvenile Act when considering the appropriate dispositional order after an adjudication of delinquency. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6352 (Disposition of delinquent child). Thus, the proponents’ references to “adult criminals” or “adult offenders” is merely in recognition of the immutable fact that § 9714 applies only after being convicted in adult court. It does not matter whether that conviction occurs when the defendant is age 15 or 50, so long as the defendant was tried as an adult then § 9714 is applicable. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. See Act of May 30, 1990, P.L. 173, No. 42, § 15; 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(eXl)(ii),(iii),(iv), and (2).

. Additionally, the legislature's 1995 amendment of § 6354(b) to include exception number (4) could be viewed as the codification of the holding in Commonwealth v. Baker, supra.