Court Opinion

ID: 9630870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:23:16.582939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:45.500568
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge,

concurring

Although I agree with the ultimate result reached by my colleagues in this case, I write separately because I would take a different approach to reach this outcome. We all agree that, even assuming the search of James Whitted’s cabin was non-routine, reasonable suspicion existed to support the search. I would affirm the District Court’s refusal to suppress on this limited basis and thereby avoid the unnecessary resolution of a constitutional issue of first impression. I thus concur respectfully with the judgment of the majority.
“It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.” Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295, 25 S. Ct. 243, 49 L. Ed. 482 (1905). Such restraint is well-established and recognized universally. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 305, 102 S. Ct. 2442, 73 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1982) (“It is this Court’s settled policy to avoid unnecessary decisions of constitutional issues.”).
The most often-cited enunciation of this concept comes from Justice Brandéis’ famous concurrence in Askwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 466, 80 L. Ed. 688 (1936), where he summarized certain prudential principle that the Supreme Court “developed ... for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction . . . .” Id. at 346 (Brandéis, J., concurring). Under this “series of rules,” the Court “has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.” Id. One such rule was that “[t]he Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it . . . .” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We have recognized that this “Askwander principle [] calls for the avoidance of ruling on federal constitutional matters in advance of the necessity of deciding them, to postpone judicial review where it would be *1099premature.”13 Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 413 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
Powerful considerations, both theoretical and practical, underpin this concept. See New Jersey Payphone Assoc, v. Town of West New York, 299 F.3d 235, 249 (3d Cir. 2002) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The rationales behind the doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions except as a last resort are grounded in fundamental constitutional principles — the great gravity and delicacy of judicial review, separation of powers, the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication, the case or controversy requirement, and principles of federalism.”) (quotation marks omitted). Just a few examples will suffice here. First, and most simply, the rule avoids wasting scarce judicial resources. Second, “[t]he concern that unnecessary decisions be avoided has its most important justification in the prospect that unnecessary decisions may be wrong decisions.” 13 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and PROCEDURE § 3531.3 (3d ed. 2000). Third, our adversary system requires litigants to present — as squarely as possible — the narrow and exact question to be decided. This is because “specific facts stimulate more comprehensive and accurate adjudication than the flights of fancy. The concrete circumstances presented by a plaintiff who has suffered actual injury may illuminate the abstract issues, and help establish the limits of the decision for future cases.” Id. In fact, “[t]he simplest theoretical perspective on standing draws directly from our tradition that unnecessary judicial decisions should be avoided.” Id.; see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 159 L. Ed. 2d 98 *1100(2004) (observing that standing rules are consistent with the principles that commit courts to pass on constitutional questions only when necessary).
The prudential principle set forth by Justice Brandéis applies here and should control our analysis of this case. The parties do not dispute that the search of Whitted’s cabin took place at a border. Therefore, the very best Whitted can hope for is that the border search here is held to be “non-routine,” in which case we would examine the Government’s search for reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1985) (holding that “detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope of a routine customs search and inspection,” is constitutional only if supported by reasonable suspicion); United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that drilling into metal frame of trailer when traveler was stopped at a checkpoint was a non-routine search requiring reasonable suspicion); United States v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that abdominal x-ray of suspected drug courier required reasonable suspicion).
My colleagues and I all agree that the totality of the circumstances here did create reasonable suspicion that Whitted was engaged in narcotics smuggling. He was traveling alone on a cruise ship. That ship traveled to narcotics source countries. Whitted had purchased his single ticket in cash, shortly before the ship departed. He had two prior convictions for drug trafficking. He had recently visited countries associated with narcotics production. The authorities in Puerto Rico found his behavior suspicious. All of this certainly amounts to a “particularized and objective basis” to believe Whitted might be smuggling drugs. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002) (quotation marks omitted). The District Court analyzed these facts correctly in denying Whitted’s suppression motion.
Because we need not resolve a constitutional issue of first impression to affirm this result, I would not reach the issue. Instead, I would hold simply that, even assuming the necessity of reasonable suspicion, Whitted’s appeal would fail nonetheless.

 This prudential rule of constitutional interpretation is related — but not identical — to the concept of constitutional avoidance. The latter applies “[wjhere an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems . . . .” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 99 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1988). In such cases, “the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Id.; see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 78, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 137 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1997) (“Federal courts, when confronting a challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute, follow a ‘cardinal principle’: They ‘will first ascertain whether a construction ... is fairly possible’ that will contain the statute within constitutional bounds.”) (quoting Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 348) (Brandeis, J., concurring); United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 567 n.7 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing concept); United States v. Ali, 508 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that constitutional avoidance “applies to statutory interpretation only where there is doubt whether an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems”) (quotation marks omitted).