Court Opinion

ID: 9792027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:22:10.251707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.275821
License: Public Domain

BUTTLER, P. J.,
dissenting.
Because I believe that a “stop” occurred when the officer asked defendant for the registration for his automobile and that the stop was not supported by a reasonable suspicion that defendant or his passenger had committed a crime, I dissent.
There is no problem with regard to the officer’s checking with defendant to “see if everything is all right”; that was appropriate under the circumstances. Neither is there a problem with the officer’s asking defendant for his driver’s license after defendant reminded the officer that he had arrested him previously for driving while his license was suspended. However, after defendant produced his license, the *423officer had no authority, as the state conceded at oral argument, or reason to ask for the automobile registration.
When the officer asked defendant to produce the registration, the situation ceased to involve mere conversation. The officer was exercising his authority as a police officer in a manner that would make a person in defendant’s position reasonably believe that he had to comply. State v. Penney, 87 Or App 357, 742 P2d 660 (1987). The officer’s conduct turned the conversation into a stop by restraining defendant’s liberty. ORS 131.605(5). The stop was not supported by a reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime. ORS 131.615; see State v. Warner, 284 Or 147, 585 P2d 681 (1978). Accordingly, all of the evidence that was acquired or seized after the invalid stop should have been suppressed.
It is clear that, to the extent that the police may engage in what has been described as a “community caretaker” function, that function may not be used as a “Trojan Horse” to gather evidence of otherwise unsuspected criminal conduct. See State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 759 P2d 1054 (1988). That is what happened here.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.