Court Opinion

ID: 9594662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:31:42.130448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:24.148406
License: Public Domain

Willis, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s exposition of the principles governing jury selection. However, I disagree with its application of those principles to the facts of this case.
Jurors are not required to be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a case on which they sit. Nor are we concerned with a possible misapprehension of law. Jurors are not expected to be learned in legal maxims. We are concerned with [their] state of mind.
Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 300, 227 S.E.2d 734, 736 (1976) (citations omitted).
Upon appellate review, we must give deference to the trial court’s decision whether to exclude or retain a prospective *627juror because the trial court “sees and hears the juror;” accordingly, the trial court’s decision will be disturbed only upon a showing of manifest error.
Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 475, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389 (1994).
Horvath, undergoing interrogation in the open courtroom, was plainly confused as to legal issues and terminology. As he put it, he “misspoke.” After explaining the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, the trial court asked Horvath whether he could judge the case according to those principles. Horvath replied, “I think I could.” In Weeks, the Supreme Court held such an undertaking to be sufficient. 248 Va. at 475, 450 S.E.2d at 389. However, the trial court did not stop at that. It pressed Horvath for a specific commitment as to whether he would “abide by the law of the case.” Horvath replied, “I would.” Nothing could be more unequivocal.
The trial court heard more than Horvath’s literal answers, as reported in the written record. It also heard his inflection and observed his demeanor, factors unavailable for our consideration. It found Horvath to be impartial and competent to serve. I perceive no manifest error in that determination.