Court Opinion

ID: 9411173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 21:02:02.532003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:05.117331
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10435   Document: 46-1     Date Filed: 07/25/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                  In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                        No. 22-10435 & No. 22-10437
                         ____________________

        SABAL TRAIL TRANSMISSION, LLC,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        3.921 ACRES OF LAND IN LAKE COUNTY FLORIDA,
        UNKNOWN OWNERS,

                                                           Defendants,

        SUNDERMAN GROVES, INC,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                         ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10435

                   Appeals from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL
                             ____________________

        Before BRANCH, GRANT, Circuit Judges, and HINKLE,* District
        Judge.
        PER CURIAM:
               The Natural Gas Act authorizes private entities who have
        received a certificate of public convenience and necessity to acquire
        property “by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.” 15
        U.S.C. § 717f(h). Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC, invoked this
        power of eminent domain to acquire easements to build a pipeline
        on land owned by Sunderman Groves, Inc. In the condemnation
        proceeding, the district court determined that the Act incorporates
        state eminent domain law, and it consequently applied Florida law
        to grant attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest to
        Sunderman Groves. Sabal Trail appeals these awards, arguing that
        the district court should have applied federal law instead.
               After this panel heard oral argument, a different panel of our
        Court decided a nearly identical case that arose out of Sabal Trail’s
        use of the eminent domain power to build this same pipeline. See
        Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land, 59 F.4th 1158,

        * The Honorable    Robert L. Hinkle, United States District Judge for the
        Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        22-10435              Opinion of the Court                       3

        1160–62 (11th Cir. 2023). That panel determined that proceedings
        under § 717f(h) must look to state law to determine the measure of
        compensation. Id. at 1175.
               It is “firmly established” that “each succeeding panel is
        bound by the holding of the first panel to address an issue of law,
        unless and until that holding is overruled en banc, or by the
        Supreme Court.” United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th
        Cir. 1993). This Court’s prior construction of the Natural Gas Act
        is now the law in this Circuit, and it conclusively resolves this
        appeal. We therefore AFFIRM the district court.
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        22-10435                 GRANT, J., Concurring                             1

        GRANT, Circuit Judge, concurring:
              I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to
        respectfully express my disagreement with two other cases—one
        old and one new.
               Decades back, our predecessor court held in Georgia Power
        Co. v. Sanders that the Federal Power Act incorporates state-law
        standards of compensation for eminent domain proceedings. 617
        F.2d 1112, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). 1 Section 21 of that Act
        delegates “the exercise of the right of eminent domain” to private
        licensees building dams. 16 U.S.C. § 814. More recently, this Court
        was asked to interpret a different statute with the same language.
        The panel in Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land
        concluded that Georgia Power requires us to use the same state-law
        rules—this time for pipeline construction under the Natural Gas
        Act. 59 F.4th 1158, 1175 (11th Cir. 2023) (hereinafter referred to as
        Thomas, the name of one of the landowners in that proceeding); 15
        U.S.C. § 717f(h).
               Like at least one member of that panel, I think Georgia Power
        was wrongly decided. See 59 F.4th at 1175 (Jordan, J., concurring).
        But unlike the panel, I do not think that our prior-panel precedent
        rule required us to extend Georgia Power’s incorrect reasoning
        about the Federal Power Act to the Natural Gas Act. See id. at

        1 All published cases of the former Fifth Circuit decided before the close of

        business on September 30, 1981, are precedent in this Circuit. See Bonner v.
        City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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        2                         GRANT, J., Concurring                      22-10435

        1168–69. I write to emphasize that, when facing similar
        interpretive questions about other statutes, we should not
        overread or further extend these two precedents—the
        compensation standards of the Fifth Amendment apply to private
        delegations of the federal eminent domain power unless Congress
        says otherwise. 2
                                               I.
               The Federal Power Act authorizes private licensees to
        condemn property “by the exercise of the right of eminent
        domain.” 16 U.S.C. § 814. At a glance, that phrase might not seem
        to specify a standard of compensation. But with a closer look at
        eminent domain law, the standard becomes clear: when Congress
        delegates “the exercise of the right of eminent domain” without
        specifying more, it is granting the original landowners the
        compensation that is required by the Fifth Amendment.
              The Fifth Amendment requires “just compensation”
        whenever the federal government exercises the power of eminent
        domain. U.S. Const. amend. V. And a whole body of caselaw has
        developed explaining exactly what “just compensation” means.

        2 The problem’s importance is underscored by Georgia Power’s influence in

        other circuits. Two other circuits have copied its flawed analysis when
        interpreting the Natural Gas Act. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., LLC v. Permanent
        Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237, 241, 246–55 (3d Cir. 2019); Columbia Gas
        Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Easement, 962 F.2d 1192, 1197–
        99 (6th Cir. 1992). And the Second Circuit has applied the Georgia Power
        framework to the Rail Passenger Service Act. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
        Two Parcels of Land, 822 F.2d 1261, 1265–67 (2d Cir. 1987).
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        22-10435                  GRANT, J., Concurring                              3

        For example, “indirect costs to the property owner caused by the
        taking of his land are generally not part of the just compensation to
        which he is constitutionally entitled.” United States v. Bodcaw Co.,
        440 U.S. 202, 203 (1979). As a result, “attorneys’ fees and expenses
        are not embraced within just compensation.” Id. (alteration
        adopted and quotation omitted).
               For better or worse, this Fifth Amendment “just
        compensation” standard is less generous than what some States
        offer when they exercise their own eminent domain power. To
        take the same example, the Florida Constitution—unlike the Fifth
        Amendment—provides that the condemner must pay the original
        property owner’s attorneys’ fees. Joseph B. Doerr Tr. v. Cent. Fla.
        Expressway Auth., 177 So. 3d 1209, 1215 (Fla. 2015). But state laws
        in no way limit the federal eminent domain power; they “do not,
        and could not, affect questions of substantive right—such as the
        measure of compensation—grounded upon the Constitution of the
        United States.” United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 380 (1943).
             Congress, of course, can always choose to provide more
        compensation than the Fifth Amendment requires—“just
        compensation” is a floor, not a ceiling. 3 Congress can even choose

        3 The facts of this case demonstrate why, as a matter of policy, Congress might

        want to do just that. Sunderman Groves’s attorneys’ fees and costs were over
        $150,000 greater than the jury award for the easements. And the jury award
        for the easements was over $250,000 more than Sabal Trail originally offered.
        In other words, without attorneys’ fees and costs, Sunderman Groves would
        have faced an undesirable choice: (1) entering litigation that ultimately cost
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        4                        GRANT, J., Concurring                   22-10435

        to copy state law standards of compensation. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.
        § 532 (requiring “just compensation” to be “ascertained and paid
        according to the laws of [the] State” when the power of eminent
        domain is invoked to build interstate bridges). But any
        compensation beyond the Fifth Amendment is “a matter of
        legislative grace rather than constitutional command.” Bodcaw,
        440 U.S. at 204.
                Those same rules apply when a federal statute authorizes
        private parties to exercise the right of eminent domain on behalf of
        the federal government. “For as long as the eminent domain
        power has been exercised by the United States, it has also been
        delegated to private parties.” PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 141
        S. Ct. 2244, 2255 (2021). And whether the federal government itself
        or a private licensee is exercising the federal eminent domain
        power, the power is the same. See id. at 2257.
               Putting all of this together: when a federal statute authorizes
        “the exercise of the right of eminent domain,” without saying
        more, the statute authorizes only the compensation required by
        the Fifth Amendment—regardless of whether the United States or
        a private licensee exercises that power. Courts can only require
        additional compensation when the text shows that Congress
        granted it. See Bodcaw, 440 U.S. at 204.

        more money than it was worth or (2) taking a dramatically underpriced offer
        for the easements. That might not violate the Fifth Amendment, but it still
        raises serious fairness concerns.
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        22-10435               GRANT, J., Concurring                         5

               Georgia Power took a completely different approach when
        interpreting the Federal Power Act. It said that the statute’s text
        did “not specify” whether state or federal law governed the
        question of compensation, which left the Court to “the task of
        interstitial federal lawmaking.” Ga. Power, 617 F.2d at 1115. So the
        Court made federal common law. There was no question that the
        source of the eminent domain power was federal, and that the
        statute required a federal rule of decision. See id. But though
        Georgia Power stylized its analysis as preferring state substantive law
        to federal common law, it actually supplemented a federal statute
        with a new common-law rule: it replaced the compensation
        standard Congress set for a private delegation of the federal eminent
        domain power with standards from state laws that limited the state
        governments’ exercise of the state eminent domain power. See id.
        at 1115–16, 1124.
                By imposing state rules where federal law already provided
        a standard, Georgia Power improperly expanded federal common
        law. That assertion of judicial authority is justified only when a
        federal court is “compelled to consider federal questions which
        cannot be answered from federal statutes alone.” City of Milwaukee
        v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981) (quotation omitted). Such
        instances are “few and restricted”—essentially limited to cases in
        which a statute lacks a necessary rule of decision. Tex. Indus., Inc.
        v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981) (quotation
        omitted); City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 314. Even then, federal
        common law is appropriate only where it is “necessary to protect
        uniquely federal interests” or where Congress itself has authorized
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        6                      GRANT, J., Concurring               22-10435

        the courts to “formulate substantive rules of decision.” Tex. Indus.,
        451 U.S. at 640–41 (quotation omitted).
               Here, the Federal Power Act does not lack a rule of
        decision—it provides one. Section 21 of the statute authorizes “the
        exercise of the right of eminent domain,” a power that is defined
        by the Fifth Amendment. 16 U.S.C. § 814; see Miller, 317 U.S. at
        380; Bodcaw, 440 U.S. at 203. The Act thus has no “gaps” requiring
        interstitial lawmaking, and it offers no indication that Congress
        meant for federal courts to build out compensation standards.
        Even so, the Georgia Power Court supplemented the Act with
        federal common law, and thus granted more compensation than
        authorized by Congress or required by the Constitution.
               Georgia Power also undermined Congress’s ability to delegate
        the eminent domain power. Though it acknowledged other cases
        had concluded that federal law determines “just compensation,” it
        said those cases were different because they involved the United
        States exercising condemnation authority itself rather than
        delegating that authority to a private party. Ga. Power, 617 F.2d at
        1119–20, 1119 n.9 (citing, e.g., Miller, 317 U.S. at 380). But that
        distinction has no basis—the choice of how to exercise the eminent
        domain power and what additional compensation to provide
        belongs to Congress alone. Accord Thomas, 59 F.4th at 1175 (Jordan,
        J., concurring); Ga. Power, 617 F.2d at 1129 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
               In short, the Federal Power Act should have been
        interpreted to authorize only the compensation required by the
        Fifth Amendment—nothing in the Act suggests Congress intended
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        22-10435               GRANT, J., Concurring                        7

        to grant more compensation than that. “[I]t is for Congress, not
        federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied
        as a matter of federal law.” City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317.
        Georgia Power was wrong to hold otherwise.
                                         II.
               Like the Federal Power Act, the Natural Gas Act authorizes
        private licensees to acquire property “by the exercise of the right of
        eminent domain.” 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). And like the Federal Power
        Act, the Natural Gas Act provides no indication that Congress
        intended to authorize additional compensation. See id. So—like
        the Federal Power Act—the Natural Gas Act should be read as
        providing no more compensation than is required by the Fifth
        Amendment.
               But that was not this Court’s holding in Thomas. There, the
        panel held that the Natural Gas Act incorporates state law
        standards of compensation. 59 F.4th at 1175. In doing so, it
        extended Georgia Power’s error—an error that previously affected
        only a single law. In explaining its holding, the panel said that the
        prior-panel precedent rule required it to analyze the Natural Gas
        Act under the Georgia Power framework. Id. at 1164–65, 1168–69.
               I disagree. The prior-panel precedent rule requires this
        Court to follow Georgia Power’s construction of Section 21 of the
        Federal Power Act—the statute at issue in that case. But it does
        not require us to extend that case’s reasoning to a new statute. No
        doubt, there are many similarities between the Federal Power Act
        and the Natural Gas Act—first among them a delegation to private
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        8                      GRANT, J., Concurring                 22-10435

        parties of “the exercise of the right of eminent domain.” Compare
        16 U.S.C. § 814, with 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). But similar (or even
        identical) language is not enough. “[S]tare decisis doesn’t apply to
        statutory interpretation unless the statute being interpreted is the
        same one that was being interpreted in the earlier case.” Bourdon
        v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 940 F.3d 537, 548 (11th Cir. 2019)
        (quoting Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 343
        (2016)). So when an earlier case construes a statute under a
        misguided methodology, it does not require future panels to apply
        that same incorrect methodology to all similar statutes.
                To be sure, the prior-panel precedent rule is a crucial part of
        our Circuit’s jurisprudence. “It promotes predictability of
        decisions and stability of the law, it helps keep the precedential
        peace among the judges of this Court, and it allows us to move on
        once an issue has been decided.” Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 496
        F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2007) (E. Carnes, J., concurring). But it
        is not unlimited—indeed, our deference to prior panels can only be
        absolute because it is narrow. And we “have pointed out many
        times that regardless of what a court says in its opinion, the
        decision can hold nothing beyond the facts of that case.” Edwards
        v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010). A panel has the
        authority to bind this Circuit on the legal question before it, but
        not to dictate the answer to a different legal question.
              There is, moreover, “a difference between following a
        precedent and extending a precedent.” Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 210
        F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000). We should be especially careful
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        22-10435               GRANT, J., Concurring                       9

        to remain within the limits of the prior-panel precedent rule when
        dealing with “moribund” precedents whose “reasoning has been
        undermined by later decisions.” Id. And if a discredited precedent
        does not directly control, we need not extend that decision—“by
        even a micron.” Id. That principle should give us further pause
        about expanding Georgia Power’s reach. After all, in the years since
        Georgia Power, the Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished
        against energetic federal common lawmaking. See, e.g., Rodriguez
        v. FDIC, 140 S. Ct. 713, 717 (2020); City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at
        315–17; Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 640–41.
               In sum, no matter how similar the Federal Power Act and
        the Natural Gas Act may be, they are different statutes. A court’s
        construction of one does not bind future courts on the
        interpretation of the other. By holding otherwise, Thomas went
        beyond the limits of our prior-panel precedent rule and needlessly
        extended old reasoning to a new context.
                                   *     *      *
               Thomas requires that we affirm the district court’s reading of
        the Natural Gas Act. But its consequences reach no further. Just
        as Georgia Power binds future courts’ interpretation of only the
        Federal Power Act, Thomas binds future courts’ interpretation of
        only the Natural Gas Act. Should this Circuit encounter other
        statutes delegating the federal eminent domain power—with
        nothing more—we should apply the Fifth Amendment rather than
        follow Georgia Power’s methodology.