Court Opinion

ID: 9537012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:11:17.7121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:45.046932
License: Public Domain

Herd, J.,
dissenting: I disagree with the majority. As indicated in Thornton v. Shore, 232 Kan. 394, 654 P.2d 475 (1982), I would reverse the trial court.
As the majority correctly notes, this case is governed by K.S.A. 8-1506. That statute gives the driver of an “authorized emergency vehicle” certain privileges when “in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law.”. These privileges include running red lights or stop signs, exceeding the speed limit, and disregarding regulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions. Subsection (c) of the statute allows the privileges only when the vehicle is “making use of an audible signal” and “visual signals.” Subsection (d), in turn, states:
“The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of reckless disregard for the safety of others.”
Thus, the privileges provided in K.S.A. 8-1506 are limited. To avail oneself of the privileges a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle must give warning with flashing lights and siren. Even with the warnings, however, the driver must operate the vehicle with due regard for the safety of all persons. The majority holds whenever a high speed chase results in a collision between the person pursued and a third party, the pursuing officer has, as a matter of law, met the “due regard” standard of K.S.A. 8-1506(d) by merely turning on the warning signals. I disagree. Due regard and due care are questions of fact and should remain so. There are numerous scenarios where an accident is caused by one not a party to the collision. It is a question of causation.
There is a fundamental flaw in the majority opinion. It states, “The uncontroverted facts must be set forth in detail.” What follows is not “detail” but a general outline of the facts. The lack *755of factual detail is caused by the limited nature of the record. The record in this case consists of appellant Thornton’s • interrogatories to appellee Shore, a “reconstruction” of the accident prepared for the appellant by Thomas E. Mulinazzi, P.E., and fifty pages of testimony from the preliminary hearing of Donald Bender. The facts were not fully developed, permitting this matter to come here from an entry of summary judgment in favor of Officer Shore. As such, I remind the court in considering a motion for summary judgment, the party against whom the motion is directed is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences- and doubts that may be drawn from the facts under consideration. Farmers State Bank & Trust Co. of Hays v. City of Yates Center, 229 Kan. 330, 341-42, 624 P.2d 971 (1981).
“Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Panhandle Agri-Service, Inc. v. Becker, 231 Kan. 291, 295, 644 P.2d 413 (1982).
“Ordinarily a motion for summary judgment should not be sustained so long as pretrial discovery remains incomplete.” Citizens State Bank v. Gilmore, 226 Kan. 662, 664, 603 P.2d 605 (1979). It is only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that the granting of summary judgment may be proper even though discovery is incomplete. Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 217 Kan. 223, 229, 535 P.2d 873 (1975).
The central issue in this case is whether Officer Shore operated his vehicle with due regard for the safety of all persons. As the majority notes, the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle meets this standard when, under the facts and circumstances of the case (which include the privileges and immunities outlined in K.S.A. 8-1506), he acts as a “reasonably careful driver.” Shawnee Township Fire District v. Morgan, 221 Kan. 271, 279, 559 P.2d 1141 (1977). The majority has answered that question in the case at bar as a matter of law.
Whether the acts of a person meet the standard of due care under the circumstances is a question of fact. In a case such as this it is the trial court’s duty to present the jury with the yardstick by which to measure the officer’s conduct. It is then the function of the jury to determine whether the officer’s conduct meets that standard. See 57 Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence § 75, p. 426. *756In Lee v. City of Omaha, 209 Neb. 345, 307 N.W.2d 800 (1981), the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized the nature of the question involved in these types of cases. There the decedent was killed when the automobile he was driving was struck by a van which was being pursued at high speeds by officers of the Omaha Police Department. Suit was later filed against the City - of Omaha and the officers involved. After a trial to the court the officers were found not guilty of negligence. After analysis of a Nebraska statute similar to K.S.A. 8-1506, the Supreme Court affirmed. In doing so, however, the court noted: “A police officer pursuing a traffic violator is required to observe the care which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in the discharge of official duties of a like nature under like circumstances.” 209 Neb. 345, Syl. ¶ 4. Hammon v. Pedigo, 173 Neb. 787, 799, 115 N.W.2d 222 (1962). The question of whether this duty was breached, the court stated, is “to be decided by the finder of fact.” 209 Neb. at 350.
As previously noted, summary judgment should not be granted so long as there remains a genuine issue of material fact. The question of whether Officer Shore breached his duty established under K.S.A. 8-1506(d) is obviously material. The determination of whether the issue is genuine, however, cannot be made until discovery is complete. Since high speed chases usually end in a collision it is important to determine if the infraction of the law was such a threat to the public to justify a chase. Could the lawbreaker have been apprehended by another technique, such as a roadblock? What is the proximity of the chase route to heavy traffic or congested areas? What is the width of the streets through which Bender was pursued? Were there cars parked along those streets? What was the visibility at each intersection? What is the terrain on the chase route? Would a reasonably prudent officer have handled the situation the same way? Can we say conducting a 70 mile-per-hour chase through the heart of a city to apprehend a minor traffic offender is giving due regard for the safety of others? These are only a few of the relevant questions left unanswered by the meager record. These questions cannot be resolved by looking only at Officer Shore’s testimony from Bender’s preliminary hearing. This is not a proper case for summary judgment.
The effect of the majority’s holding will be that anytime a high *757speed chase precipitates a collision in which the pursuing officer does not actually collide, the officer is immune from liability. The majority ignores the conduct of the pursuing officer (which, after all, is the focus of K.S.A. 8-1506[d]), to lay down a blanket rule. I have no doubt the pursuing officer in most collisions from a high speed chase has met the due regard standard of care set by the legislature. But the rule set by the majority overlooks those occasions when the pursuing officer breaches his statutory duty and causes an accident. This rule amounts to a major invasion of the province of the factfinder to determine causation and subverts an accepted method of dispute resolution which has served the public well.
Even though a police officer’s job entails heavy burdens and pressures as a protector of the public, he should not be excused from using due care in furnishing that protection. Most officers exercise their duties with restraint and respect for the rights of others, but for the few who, under the stress of the job, are not careful standards are needed. K.S.A. 8-1506(d) is the precautionary standard set by the legislature. In his famous dissent to Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 72 L.Ed. 944, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928), Justice Brandéis explained the reasons for such precautions:
“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
I would reverse the trial court and remand the case for trial.