Court Opinion

ID: 9655796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:22:14.402025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:22.063333
License: Public Domain

Bushnell, J.
{dissenting). The important question is whether Coates was denied the protection of the Constitutional guaranties of due process. (Mich Const 1908, art 2, § 16; US Const, Am 14, § 1.)
An examination of the circumstances of the case and the acts of the police, prosecutor, examining magistrate and trial judge, as disclosed in the opinion proposed by Mr. Justice Sharpe, shows that the constitutional rights of Coates were not protected by the administrative and judicial officers concerned.
The views of the writer in this respect were expressed in People v. Crandell, 270 Mich 124, 130. Although in that case Crandell was only 15 years old and in the instant case Coates was a man 25 years *79old, with a bad record, those views are, nevertheless, applicable here.
As said in Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 US 660 (70 SCt 910, 94 L ed 1188):
“It is now settled that as to its administration of criminal justice, a State’s duty to provide counsel, so far as the United States Constitution imposes it, is hut one aspect of the comprehending guaranty of the due process clause of a fair hearing on an accusation, including adequate opportunity to meet it.”
In that case the question of the “disregard of fundamental fairness in the imposition of punishment” was posed. Here, the same question is posed.
The court further said in the Quichsall Case:
“At least ‘when a crime subject to capital punishment is not involved, each case depends on its own facts.’ * * * To invalidate a plea of guilty the prisoner must establish that ‘for want of benefit of counsel an ingredient of unfairness actively operated in the process that resulted in his confinement.’ * * * Petitioner’s claim that the consequences of his plea of guilty had been misrepresented was disbelieved by the tribunal especially qualified to sit in judgment upon its credibility.”
In the Quicksall Case here, 322 Mich 351, 359, we said:
“In determining whether one convicted of crime has been denied his constitutional rights in the manner above indicated, it is necessary in each instance to give careful consideration to the factual background of the particular case.”
The “factual background” of the instant case is comprehensively presented in the opinion proposed by my Brother Sharpe. Even a cursory reading of it requires the conclusion that judicial proceedings begun sometime after midnight and completed about *805:30 in the morning, do not satisfy the requirement of what we term “due process of law.”
Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Sacher v. United States, 343 US 1, 28 (72 S Ct 451, 96 L ed 717):
“Time out of mind this court has reversed convictions for the most heinous offenses, even though no doubt about the guilt of the defendants was entertained. It reversed because the mode by which guilt was established disregarded those standards of procedure which are so precious and so important for our society.”
In a concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 US 123 (71 S Ct 624, 95 L ed 817) he said in part at page 162:
“The requirement of ‘due process’ is not a fair-weather or timid assurance. It must be respected in periods of calm and in times of trouble; it protects aliens as well as citizens. But ‘due process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization, ‘due process’ cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly between the individual and government, ‘due process’ is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess. Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.”
*81See authorities cited in the dissenting opinion in People v. Crandell, 270 Mich 124, beginning at page 130; People v. DeMeerleer, 313 Mich 548, reversed on certiorari in DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 US 663 (67 S Ct 596, 91 L ed 584) and authorities therein cited. See, also, In the Matter of Sarah Way, 41 Mich 299.
The judgment and sentence should be set aside and a new trial ordered.
Adams, J., concurred with Bushnell, J.