Court Opinion

ID: 9536631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:03:44.279452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:53.355987
License: Public Domain

BRYSON, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent for the following reasons. The defendant was found guilty by a jury verdict of robbery in the first degree. ORS 164.415.
The facts are undisputed. On October 1, 1973, at 5:45 p.m. the defendant and her two companions, Doreen Johnson and Carla Wallalutam, picked up a hitchhiker, Carson Jones, on Burnside Street in Portland and drove to a dead-end road. Jones testified that defendant pulled a knife on him, Carla pointed what appeared to be a gun at him, and Doreen commanded him to disrobe and hand over his money. Jones gave them his money, removed his clothes, and got out of the car. He noted the car license number and called the police.
Shortly thereafter, at 6:30 p.m. on the same day, the defendant and her two companions picked up three other hitchhikers, Jody, Linda and Tina, all 14-year-old girls. They drove to a parking lot where the teenage *301girls were threatened and robbed. Tina jumped out of the ear and escaped, and one of defendant’s companions accused Jody of helping in the escape and threatened to kill her. Jody was cut on the hand, arm, and neck. They then drove to a park near Sandy, Oregon, and ordered the two remaining girls to remove their clothes, step out of the car, and lie face down on the ground. The girls ran to a nearby trailer house, and a resident thereof drove them to the Sandy police station.
The evidence discloses that defendant was acquitted of the robbery of the three teenage girls. At defendant’s trial in the case at bar, evidence of the subsequent crime involving the three teenage girls was admitted over defendant’s objection. The defendant then took the stand and testified that she was in the car on October 1 when the three girls were robbed. She then testified :
“Q Did yon tell the girls [her companions] to stop in that case? [Involving the three teenage girls]
“A No.
“Q Why not?
“A Because I thought they weren’t going to listen to me.
“Q Have you been tried on those charges?
“A Yes.
“Q Were yon found guilty or not guilty?
“A Not guilty.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The District Attorney objected at this point. The trial judge properly asked defense counsel why this evidence had been put in the record. Counsel stated:
“Your Honor, some of the evidence as to whether *302or not—On the second incident, was introduced to show, I believe, whether or not Emma Smith was an accomplice in this case. The not guilty verdict does not necessarily show this, but it tends to show something of what all the facts in the other case brought out.”
Conference was held outside of the presence of the jury and when the jury returned to the courtroom, the court instructed the jury:
“Ladies and G-entlemen of the Jury, any reference to another trial and a different case is improper. Any reference to the outcome of another trial in a different case is irrelevant to the questions of fact which are to be decided by you in this case. It will be your responsibility in this case to decide this case upon the law as I instruct you and upon the evidence which is produced in this case.”
Viewed in the light of the circumstances and the heat of the trial, it is apparent that the trial court was instructing the jury to disregard all of the prior quoted testimony and further, the jury had already heard the defendant state that she had been found not guilty of the specific charge involving the three minor girls.
I agree with the majority opinion that the defendant should have been allowed to testify that she had been acquitted on the charge involving the three minor girls. In fact, she did so testify. In State v. McLean, 255 Or 464, 468 P2d 521 (1970), a similar error was committed by the trial judge in not allowing the defendant to testify that he had been acquitted in a previous trial which had been referred to during the testimony. In McLean the court resorted to the “harmless error” statute, ORS 138.230, and the provisions of Art VII (Amended), § 3, of the Constitution of Ore*303gon, which was adopted in 1910 and provides, among other things:
“If the supreme court shall be of opinion, after consideration of all the matters thus submitted, that the judgment of the court appealed from was such as should have been rendered in the case, such judgment shall be affirmed, notwithstanding any error committed during the trial; * * (Emphasis added.)
In McLean this court affirmed the trial court in spite of the error, and Justice McAllister, in his concurring opinion, stated:
“I agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in refusing to let defendant testify that he had been acquitted of the charge on which he was being held in Rocky Butte Jail. State v. Leahy, 243 Iowa 959, 54 NW2d 447 (1952); Nolan v. State, 213 Md 298, 131 A2d 851 (1957). I would affirm the judgment under the authority vested in this court by Article VII, Section 3, of the Oregon Constitution. State v. Cahill, 208 Or 538, 575-583, 293 P2d 169, 298 P2d 214 (1956).”
I believe that this is the result that should be reached in the present case. The defendant does not dispute the facts which overwhelmingly prove her guilt. The error, if any, in instructing the jury to disregard defendant’s testimony that she had been acquitted had no bearing on the evidence which established that defendant committed the crime of robbery for which she was indicted. See State of Oregon v. Cahill, 208 Or 538, 577, 293 P2d 169, 298 P2d 214 (1956).
The Court of Appeals reached the same result and affirmed the trial court. I would affirm the Court of Appeals.