Court Opinion

ID: 9536577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:02:48.601194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:47.458517
License: Public Domain

SCHWAB, C.J.
After being indicted for criminal activity in drugs, ORS 167.207, defendant moved to suppress evidence seized in his home during a search pursuant to a search warrant. The trial court granted the motion to suppress. The state appeals pursuant to ORS 138.060(3). We affirm.
The affidavit in application for the search warrant was executed by Officer Hostick. It purported to recite reports made to him by two citizen informants about suspicious items they had observed in defendant’s house. The motion to suppress contended: (1) the affidavit contained inaccurate statements about what the informants had told Officer Hostick; and (2) the affidavit failed to establish probable cause to search. An evidentiary hearing was held on the motion to suppress. Officer Hostick and the two citizen informants testified. The state conceded that one statement of fact in the affidavit was inaccurate, and the uncontradicted testimony of the citizen informants indicated that there were other inaccuracies. After the hearing the trial court entered an order that simply *496stated the motion to suppress was “granted.” There were no findings.
I
The absence of findings presents a threshold question, obliquely raised by the state. Defendant’s motion to - suppress contended the affidavit was inaccurate (a factual question) and insufficient to establish probable cause (a legal question). Ordinarily in such a situation it is incumbent upon trial courts to make findings:
“* * * [I]n a case where a motion to suppress raises more than one contention—for example, alternative factual contentions, or alternative legal contentions, or alternative factual and legal contentions—and the trial court is persuaded to grant the motion on one or more of the grounds raised, then the trial court must state the basis of its decision.” State v. Johns on/Imel, 16 Or App 560, 571, 519 P2d 1053, Sup Ct review denied (1974).
In this case, however, we have determined it is not necessary to remand for Johnson/Imel findings. After the suppression hearing, counsel filed supplemental briefs in the trial court. Defendant’s brief argued the uncontradicted evidence established his claims of inaccuracies in the affidavit. The state’s responsive brief did not argue the contrary, but merely stated:
“It is submitted to the court that when the affidavit is read as whole the inaccuracies shown have no effect on the probable cause set forth in the established affidavit * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)
We interpret this to mean that the state was conceding the factual claims regarding inaccuracies, and instead only standing on the legal question of probable cause. Under these circumstances there is only one issue pre*497sented, and while findings are desirable, they are not essential. Johnson/Imel, 16 Or App at 572.
II
Another preliminary question is: what facts can be considered in passing on the probable-cause question? We have the contents of the affidavit. There is also the transcript of the testimony taken at the suppression hearing. The state’s brief relies heavily on the suppression-hearing testimony, summarizing it in four pages of its brief under the heading, “Statement of Facts.” Defendant’s brief states that he “accepts Appellant’s [the state’s] statement of facts.”
Counsel in the trial court took a different tack. At the conclusion of the testimony during the suppression hearing, the court asked whether counsel agreed that the testimony which “enlarged upon the information in the affidavit” ■ could not be considered in determining whether there was probable caxise to search. Defense counsel responded: “Yes, just the four corners of the affidavit.” The prosecutor also agreed the evidence could not be considered “other than as to show that some of the statements may not have been entirely accurate in the affidavit.”
 We agree with the approach of the trial court and trial counsel, and disagree with the approach of the parties on appeal. The question here is whether probable cause was established before the magistrate who issued the search warrant. To decide this question we must necessarily limit the inquiry to the information that was before the magistrate, that is, the contents of the affidavit. The testimony at the suppression hearing can detract from the affidavit to the extent that it proves inaccuracies; but the testimony cannot add to the affidavit because information known *498to an affiant but not communicated to the issuing magistrate cannot be the basis of a probable-cause determination. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108, 84 S Ct 1509, 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964); State v. Dunavant, 250 Or 570, 444 P2d 1 (1968); State v. Sagner, 12 Or App 459, 506 P2d 510, Sup Ct review denied (1973); State v. Metler, 6 Or App 356, 487 P2d 1377 (1971); see also, ORS 133.545(3).
Ill
We thus turn to the contents of the affidavit in this case and the evidence of its inaccuracies.
The first three paragraphs of the affidavit recite Officer Hostick’s 21 years of experience with the Oregon State Police. Most of this information does not even remotely tend to establish probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed at defendant’s residence. The only possibly material part states:
“* * * I am also aware from my training and experience that a very common dosage unit form of dangerous drugs is in pills and tablet form and to manufacture such dosage unit a press is necessary as well as necessary ingredients (both the drugs as well as cutting agents) and glassware to mix, store and aid in the production is also necessary. I am also aware producing illegal drugs is most commonly accomplished when persons working at it are protected by gloves * *
The affidavit continues:
“4. That on this date I was informed by Eichard Lee Krotzer, South Myrtle Eoute, Box 275, Myrtle Creek, Oregon, that he was personally present in the residence located at Et. 1, Box 3927 A, Florence, Lane County, Oregon * * *. Mr. Krotzer further informed me that while he was in that residence on March 7, 1974, he observed a large metal press approximately 6' feet high with press plates 2yy in diameter in the garage partly covered *499with a tarp. While in the garage Mr. Krotzer further observed a male subject who appeared very surprised to see Mr. Krotzer and who was also eager to remove Mr. Krotzer from the area of the press as soon as possible.”
At the beginning of the suppression hearing the state conceded that the last sentence of paragraph 4 of the affidavit was false. Moreover, any inference of wrongdoing that might be drawn from the reference to the machine in defendant’s garage being “covered with a tarp” was negated by testimony that the tarp was clear plastic.
The affidavit continues:
“5. That on this date I was informed by Jerrine Carolee Dietz of 43 Oak Street, Florence, Lane County, Oregon, that she was also personally present in the above described residence on this date and that while in that residence she observed in the garage of the residence a press which she has described as the same as Mr. Krotzer of above. She also informed me that at this same time she entered the residence and observed in the kitchen on the cabinet by a pantry door a pair of rubber gloves, and in the pantry she observed numerous glass equipment which she described as beekers [sic], jars and other glassware which in my experience and training describes glassware which is most commonly used in the storage and manufacture and mixing of illegal dangerous drugs. She further informed me that she observed containers of powdered materials which from her description are consistant [sic] with proved forms of material which would be used for manufacturing, cutting and mixing dangerous drugs in preperation [sic] for their product as dosage units. She further informed me that the house itself had an overpowering peculiar odor which as a lay person she was unable to identify as anything within here [sic] exper*500ienee. She also observed in the residence a set of balance scales.”
At the hearing Officer Hostick testified that the kind of glassware Mrs. Dietz had described to him was not “most commonly used” in the manufacture of illegal drugs, contrary to his statement in the affidavit.
The affidavit continues:
“6. That I am further informed by both of the above mentioned people that they lease that residence to the individual Mr. Krotzer saw in the garage and that they have been informed by the individual renting the premises that he is planning to move out in a very short period of time.”
At the hearing Mrs. Dietz testified that defendant had not told her that he was planning to move shortly; in fact, that she had never talked to defendant in her life. Mr. Krotzer testified that he had asked defendant to vacate the premises in three days and defendant had agreed that he would. Thus, as to allegations of statements made by defendant to Mrs. Dietz, paragraph 6 of the affidavit was false, and as to allegations of statements made by defendant to Mr. Krotzer, paragraph 6 was at least misleading.
The material allegations of the affidavit conclude:
“7. These two above named individuals also informed me that blankets have been hung in the house and garage to cover the windows.”
At the hearing the uncontradicted evidence was that defendant had rented the premises without drapes; that he had placed blankets on two of the many windows in the house; and that several other windows remained uncovered. Again, the affidavit is overstated to the extent of attempting to create an unwarranted implication of wrongdoing.
*501As we read State v. McManus, 267 Or 238, 251-52, 517 P2d 250 (1973), the test is: could the magistrate, relying only on the accurate parts of the affidavit and disregarding the inaccurate parts, have independently determined there was probable cause to search defendant’s house?①
The accurate statements of fact in the affidavit here boil down to this:
(1) There is a “metal press approximately 6' high with press plates 2y2 in diameter” in defendant’s garage. The affidavit implies, without directly stating, that Officer Ilostiek believes such a machine could be used to press illegal drugs into pill form.
(2) There are beakers, “jars and other glassware” in defendant’s kitchen/pantry. These items are not further described. Officer Hostick states that in his experience such glassware is most commonly used to manufacture illegal drugs, although this is conceded at the hearing to be an exaggeration.
*502(3) There are containers “of powdered materials” in defendant’s kitchen/pantry. These items are not further described. Officer Hostick states that the description of these items furnished him, but not repeated in the affidavit, leads him to believe they are “consistent” with materials used to manufacture illegal drugs.
(4) There are rubber gloves in defendant’s kitchen, and odors characterized only as peculiar, and a set of balance scales in some other undisclosed location in the house.
These facts do not establish probable cause to search. All that is shown is that there is a machine in defendant’s garage, and undescribed glassware, undescribed “powdered materials” and rubber gloves in defendant’s kitchen/pantry. This is as consistent with lawful conduct as it is with unlawful conduct. We do not think the statements that “ingredients” and “glassware” are necessary to manufacture illegal drugs add a thing. These statements are truisms. We would be willing to take judicial notice of the fact that ingredients are necessary to manufacture drugs even if this were not stated in the affidavit.
The purpose of the warrant requirement is to enable a detached magistrate, rather than the police, to determine whether there is probable cause to invade the privacy of a citizen’s home. State v. Tacker, 241 Or 597, 407 P2d 851, 10 ALR3d 355 (1965). In order for the magistrate to discharge this duty, rather than rubber-stamp a decision already made by the police, an affidavit must state facts that enable the magistrate to independently determine there is a well-warranted suspicion that evidence of crime will be found in the place sought to be searched.
*503Here Officer Hostick thought—correctly, we know from hindsight—that a machine, glassware and “powdered materials” such as had been described to him indicated a drug manufacturing operation. But the officer did not even repeat in his affidavit the descriptions he had previously received. Nor were there sufficient other facts alleged in the affidavit to permit a magistrate to independently determine that there was probable cause to search. Reduced to its simplest terms, the affidavit states that Officer Hos-tick believes there is probable cause to search. This is insufficient.
Affirmed.

ORS 133.693 provides the procedures for challenging “the good faith, accuracy and truthfulness of the affiant with respect to the evidence presented to establish probable cause for search or seizure.” Subsection (5) of that statute reads:
“The court shall determine whether, under applicable law, any inaccuracy, untruthfulness or lack of good faith requires suppression.”
Subsection (5) was added by amendment to the text of ORS 133.693 as proposed by the Criminal Law Revision Commission. Minutes, House Judiciary Committee, 4-5, May 29, 1973. The author of the amendment, Representative Hampton, explained the purpose of the amendment was
“* * * * †0 ciarify that the legal standard for suppression * * * [because of inaccuracies] was to be left to case law. It would avoid the contention that any inaccuracy would automatically invalidate the warrant.” Minutes, supra at 5.
State v. McManus, 267 Or 238, 517 P2d 250- (1973), was decided after ORS 133.693(5) was passed, but before it went into effect. We nevertheless assume that McManus is part of the “case law” that the legislature contemplated would guide the application of ORS 133.693(5).