Court Opinion

ID: 9756551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:37:51.995273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:25.617353
License: Public Domain

OPINION
Opinion by
ALMA L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice.
United Services Automobile Association (“USAA”) appeals the trial court’s judgment awarding damages to James Steven Brite in an employment discrimination lawsuit. USAA presents eleven issues on appeal, contending: (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction over Brite’s claims; (2) the trial court erred in submitting question number one to the jury because it contained an improper instruction or a biased and inaccurate statement of law; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to include an instruction in the jury charge on USAA’s affirmative defense to punitive damages; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that Brite was laid off due to age; (5) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding that USAA would not have made the same decision to lay off Brite even if age had not been a motivating factor; (6) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the back pay award; (7) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the finding that USAA acted with malice; (8) the trial court erred in awarding front pay; (9) the evidence is insufficient to support the award of attorney’s fees; (10) the trial court erred in excluding the EEOC’s predetermination letter; and (11) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of bonuses and raises received by USAA executives. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
■ USAA is a financial services business that provides an extensive range of insurance and financial products through its family of services. Brite worked for USAA for almost 24 years, from 1977 to 2001. He worked his way through the ranks of USAA, beginning as an adjuster trainee and eventually advancing to Investigation Manager overseeing the Central Region.
In mid-2001, USAA underwent a corporate restructuring. During the restructuring process, approximately 1400 positions were eliminated, affecting a variety of departments within USAA across the United States. Brite’s department, the claims security unit (“CSU”), was affected by the restructuring. ' Brite was informed of his layoff on or about July 30, 2001, with the explanation that his position was being eliminated.
Prior to restructuring, the CSU was comprised of several managers, six of whom were based in San Antonio. The managers based in San Antonio were Brite, Central Region; Frank Thomson, Northeast Region; Wayne McNeely, Shared Services; B.J. Russell, Quality Assurance; Andy Diaz, Administrative and Jack Dever, Administrative. Other regional managers were: Robert Midzuno, Western Region, in Sacramento; Barry Bennet, Mountain States Region, in Colorado Springs; Norm Tupper, Mid-Atlantic, in Norfolk, Virginia; and Richard Swann, Southeast Region, in Tampa. Pete Galassi and Donna Augusyniak were branch managers, based in California and New Jersey, respectively.
When Brite was laid off, the branch manager positions were eliminated, as were the quality assurance and administrative posts. After the restructuring, only the seven positions with regional manager responsibilities remained. Brite was discharged, Thomson moved from the Northeast to Central Region, and Dever moved from the Administrative position to the *571Northeast Region position. McNeely remained in Shared Services.
Brite filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Texas Commission on Human Rights. The EEOC investigated Brite’s charge, and sent Brite a predetermination letter informing Brite that the EEOC intended to issue a determination that there was no evidence of discrimination. Brite requested, and received, notice of right to sue from the EEOC and notice of right to file a civil action from TCHR.
Brite filed suit against USAA for employment discrimination within sixty days. USAA filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction, claiming that the amount in controversy at the time of trial would exceed the maximum jurisdictional limit of the court, and that Brite was engaging in an obvious fraudulent and bad faith maneuver to confer jurisdiction on the court. The trial court denied USAA’s plea. The case was then removed to federal court, where Brite voluntarily non-suited all claims giving rise to federal jurisdiction and the case was remanded to state court. USAA filed a special exception and a second Plea to the Jurisdiction, which was denied.
Following a trial on the merits, a jury returned a verdict finding that USAA had discriminated against Brite because of his age. The jury awarded Brite $188,406.89 in back pay and $1,100,000.00 in punitive damages. The trial court granted a remit-titur, reducing the punitive damages to $800,000.00. The trial court also awarded Brite $350,000.00 in front pay and $129,387.50 in attorney’s fees.
Jurisdiction
County Courts at Law generally have statutorily prescribed jurisdiction in civil cases where the amount “in controversy exceeds $500, but does not exceed $100,000, excluding interest, statutory or punitive damages and penalties, and attorney’s fees and costs.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 25.0003(c) (Vernon 2004). The plaintiff has the burden to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court has jurisdiction over the suit. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993). “The plaintiffs allegations in the petition of the amount in controversy control for jurisdictional purposes unless the party challenging jurisdiction pleads and proves that the plaintiffs allegations of the amount in controversy were made fraudulently for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction.” Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 n. 4 (Tex.2004).
Brite’s original petition did not specify the amount of damages he was seeking. Rather, Brite sought “damages in a sum exceeding the minimum jurisdictional limits of the [county court],” including (i) “wage payments, vacation pay, bonuses and all other compensation due Plaintiff that accrued at the time of the filing of [the] Petition” and (ii) “a further sum representing the present value of unaccrued wage payments, vacation pay, bonuses and all other compensation due Plaintiff for the period following the date of judgment, calculated as of the date of judgment for the losses that Plaintiff has to sustain in the future.” Even if damages are not specifically identified at the time a petition is filed, or if a plaintiffs damages increase beyond the court’s jurisdictional limit through the passage of time, the court will continue to have jurisdiction. Cont’l Coffee Prod. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex.1996); Peek v. Equip. Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex.1989).
USAA argues, however, that the trial court never lawfully acquired jurisdiction over Brite’s case because:
*5721. Brite’s Original Petition asserted only that “the amount in.controversy exceeds the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court” without an allegation that the amount in controversy was within the trial court’s maximum jurisdiction, and
2. The amount in controversy exceeded the statutorily prescribed maximum limit of the trial court at the time the lawsuit was filed.
In support of its first argument, USAA relies on Nix v. Nix for the proposition that the allegation that “the amount in controversy exceeds the minimum jurisdictional limits of this Court” does not confer jurisdiction on the County Court at Law, as there is no indication that the amount in controversy did not exceed the maximum limit of its jurisdiction. See Nix v. Nix, 797 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). The Corpus Christi court furnished no authority for this proposition. See id. At least one Texas court has noted the lack of authority supporting the holding in Nix, and has held that an allegation of damages in excess of the minimal jurisdictional limit was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Big Bend Motor Inn, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 542, 546 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
Furthermore, the Texas Supreme Court in Peek v. Equip. Serv. Co., recognized the allegation made in Brite’s pleading would be sufficient to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction by stating, “What they did not plead, however, was the amount of damages sought, either by properly alleging that damages exceeded the minimum jurisdictional levels of the court, see Tex.R. Civ. P. 47(b), or by alleging a sum certain.” 779 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Tex.1989) (emphasis added). More recently, in Bland Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, the Texas Supreme Court appears to have recognized the sufficiency of Brite’s allegation by stating, “The plaintiffs allegation of damages in excess of jurisdictional limits suffices to show the amount in controversy, even if damages cannot ultimately be proved at all.” 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex.2000). Accordingly, USAA’s first challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction based on Brite’s pleading allegation fails.
We next turn to USAA’s contention that the amount in controversy exceeded the statutorily prescribed maximum limit of the trial court at the time the lawsuit was filed. In this case, Brite’s pleadings would be determinative unless USAA “specifically alleged that the amount was pleaded merely as a sham for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining jurisdiction or [USAA] can readily establish that the amount in controversy is [not within the jurisdictional limitations].” Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 554. USAA pled that Brite was engaging in fraudulent and bad faith maneuvering in order to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. Under these circumstances, Brite’s allegations continue to control unless USAA, as the party challenging jurisdiction, proves that Brite’s allegations of the amount in controversy were made fraudulently for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224 n. 4 (2004).
Because USAA challenged the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider the evidence submitted by the parties to resolve the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 227. If the evidence creates a fact question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder. Id. at 227-28. The trial court may rule on the jurisdictional issue as a matter of law only if the evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue. Id. “Because a plaintiff is not required to *573prove his damages in order to support jurisdiction, the issue is not whether there is a fact question as to the actual amount of his damages; the issue is whether there is a fact question as to whether the actual amount of his damages is within the court’s jurisdictional limit.” Retzlaff v. Deshay, No. 14-03-00833-CV, 2004 WL 2163173, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 28, 2004, no pet.).
In this case, the evidence was disputed. USAA sought to support its contention regarding the front pay and back pay damage amounts with the affidavit of Bruce A. Tingle, the Director of Compensation for USAA. Brite refuted Tingle’s back pay calculation by arguing that Tingle’s affidavit supported Brite’s contention that at the time the original petition was filed, the back pay amount only totaled approximately $85,000.00, and the trial court did not lose jurisdiction because the amount of the back pay increased due to the passage of time. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d at 449.
To recover front pay, a plaintiff must show that reinstatement is not feasible as a remedy. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Davis, 979 S.W.2d 30, 45 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied). The court must determine whether front pay is allowed; the jury determines the amount. Id. Numerous factors affect whether any front pay will be awarded and, if awarded, the amount of the front pay award. See Cox & Smith, Inc. v. Cook, 974 S.W.2d 217, 227-28 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (awarding front pay after determining reinstatement was feasible, plaintiff mitigated damages, and negative effect of termination would last five years); City of Austin v. Gifford, 824 S.W.2d 735, 743 (TexApp.-Austin 1992, no pet.) (awarding an amount of front pay to be paid each week subject to reinstatement for a maximum of five years). The effect of these various factors is apparent in both the amount of front pay awarded by the trial court and USAA’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the award on appeal. The trial court reduced both the number of years for which it awarded front pay and the amount of the front pay awarded each year from the amount requested. In addition, USAA argues on appeal that no front pay should have been awarded because Brite failed to mitigate his damages. Finally, the trial court was required to factor in evidence that USAA had offered Brite another position within days of his termination.
Under the unique posture of this case, with the evidence disputed regarding whether front pay should even be awarded, we hold that the original petition invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction. The fact that the trial court later determined that reinstatement was not feasible and awarded an amount of front pay that exceeded the jurisdictional limits does not defeat the jurisdiction invoked in Brite’s original petition. At the time the original petition was filed, there was a fact question as to whether the actual amount of Brite’s damages was within the jurisdictional limit.1 Retzlaff, 2004 WL 2163173, *574at *2. Accordingly, USAA failed to prove that the amount Brite pled was merely a sham for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining jurisdiction, and USAA could not readily establish that the amount in controversy was not within the jurisdictional limits. See Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 554.
Sufficiency of Evidence
In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we must view the evidence in a light to support the disputed finding and disregard evidence and inferences to the contrary. Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex.2001). If more than a scintilla of evidence supports the challenged finding, the no-evidence challenge must fail. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex.1999). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence supporting the finding as a whole rises to a level that would allow reasonable and fair-minded individuals to differ in their conclusions. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Earner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997).
When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we consider and weigh all the evidence and set aside a verdict only if the jury’s finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986). We cannot reverse merely because we conclude that a preponderance of the evidence supports the opposing answer, nor can we substitute our opinion for that of the trier of fact and determine that we would have reached a different conclusion. Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.1988). The fact finder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and resolves any inconsistencies in the testimony.
McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex.1986).

Whether Age Was a Motivating Factor and Award of Attornegs Fees

USAA argues that there is no evidence supporting the jury’s finding that age was a motivating factor in USAA’s decision to lay off Brite, and that because of this, the award of attorneys fees to Brite was erroneous. The jury was presented with undisputed evidence that Brite, age 52, had been working at USAA for twenty-four years when he was terminated. USAA argues that Thomson, who assumed the Central Region manager position, was older than Brite and that Brite’s supervisors did not know the ages of employees when they made layoff decisions. Conflicting evidence, however, was presented that Brite had been informed the reason he was terminated was the elimination of his position. The jury was presented with evidence that Dever, the employee who assumed Thomson’s position upon Brite’s termination, was seven years younger than Brite. Brite presented evidence that Dever possessed far less investigative experience and very little employment management experience. The jury also had before it evidence that the youngest managers in the unit, who had only recently been promoted to their managerial posts, were retained. Further, the jury heard evidence that Kevin Casey, who participated in deciding which managers to layoff, identified two managers approximately nine years younger than Brite as a “new manager” and a “new manager ... key player for the future.”
This evidence, taken as a whole, could easily allow fair-minded people to reach differing conclusions. Therefore, the *575jury’s apparent conclusion that Brite was replaced by a younger person and/or that younger persons were treated more favorably and that the reason provided by USAA for terminating Brite was both false and discriminatory is supported by legally sufficient evidence. Because the jury’s conclusion is supported by the evidence, USAA’s argument that Brite should not have been awarded attorney’s fees also fails.

Award of Back Pay and Punitive Damages

USAA also argues that there is no evidence supporting the jury’s award of back pay or punitive damages. USAA challenges the award of back pay to Brite on a theory that Brite failed to mitigate his damages. USAA argues that Brite cannot recover back pay after February 2002, because he abandoned efforts to find comparable employment. Brite testified that after having no success finding satisfactory, comparable employment, he devoted full-time days to researching and trading stocks to generate income. Not making money in the stock market is not a sign of lack of effort. Professional money managers were also losing money in the market conditions that existed in the time period between Brite’s dismissal and the trial. Brite’s testimony, which was apparently accepted by the jury, shows an attempt to mitigate; therefore, the award of back pay is not defeated by USAA’s argument of lack of mitigation.
USAA argues that the jury’s award of punitive damages is in error because the evidence does not support a finding that USAA discriminated against Brite “with malice or with reckless indifference.” The jury was instructed that “malice” means “a specific intent by USAA to cause substantial injury” or “an act or omission by USAA ... of which USAA had actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeded with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.” Alternatively, USAA argues that the award of punitive damages is excessive.
Brite was nearing the age of retirement. He had worked for USAA for twenty-four years. USAA was aware of these facts. USAA was also aware that by laying off people before they reached the age of retirement eligibility at 55, it would save considerable costs in the areas of medical and other ongoing retiree benefits. USAA presented evidence concerning the restructuring process and the concern USAA had for its employees. However, the jury also heard evidence from executives that they were unaware of their own salaries or the amounts of their bonuses. This could certainly have called the veracity of the testimony into question. Additionally, the jury learned that within days of his termination, USAA offered Brite another lesser position—which it could have transferred Brite into immediately, but chose not to, further supporting the theory that USAA could save on the costs associated with higher paid, long-term employees and retirees.
Given the less than forthcoming answers concerning salary bonus numbers, and USAA’s reasoning for terminating Brite, the jury was within its power to question the veracity of USAA’s evidence, and to conclude that USAA acted with malice.

Award of Front Pay

USAA asserts that the trial court’s award of front pay is erroneous because there is no evidence that Brite was discriminated against on the basis of age, and because Brite failed to mitigate his damages.
The evidence shows that at the time of his dismissal, Brite was 52 and intended to work at USAA until he turned 65. Brite *576had been employed at USAA for twenty-four years at the time of his termination. His performance evaluations were above average and he had earned significant recognition for his work.
The court awarded front pay for 7 years, to age 62, rather than to age 65. Additionally, while the court agreed that Brite’s former salary was $95,824.56, it awarded only $50,000 per year in front pay. The court reduced the value of Brite’s salary and benefit package to reflect what Brite should be expected to earn in San Antonio under current market conditions, with the $50,000 per year award designed to make up the difference.
The purpose of front pay as an equitable remedy is to make a person whole who has suffered employment discrimination, and when reinstatement is not a feasible option. Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., Inc., 865 F.2d 1461, 1469 (1989); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Davis, 979 S.W.2d 30, 45 (Tex.App.Austin 1988, pet. denied). Based on the considerations listed in its order, the trial court’s award of front pay is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence and we so hold.

Whether USAA Would Have Made the Same Decision

By answering “No” to Question No. 2 of the jury charge, the jury rejected USAA’s affirmative defense that it would have selected Brite for layoff even if age had not been a motivating factor. USAA contends that the jury’s finding is unsupported and contrary to the evidence. Question No. 2 queried, “Would USAA have laid off James Steven Brite even if age had not been a motivating factor?”
For a party to successfully attack the sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it has the burden of proof, the party must demonstrate that the evidence establishes all vital facts in support of its contentions as a matter of law. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex.2001); Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989). In determining whether a proposition contrary to the verdict has been established as a matter of law, we examine the record first for evidence that supports the jury’s finding, while ignoring all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690. Only if there is no evidence to support the finding, will we examine the entire record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law. Id. We will sustain the issue only if the contrary proposition is conclusively established. Dow, 46 S.W.3d at 241. There is also authority, however, that a jury’s failure to find a given fact does not need to be supported by legally sufficient evidence because the jury may believe or disbelieve any witness it chooses, including witnesses presented by the party having the burden of proof. Templeton v. Dreiss, 961 S.W.2d 645, 669 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 34 St. Mary's L.J. 1,165-66 (2002).
Testimony, such as that concerning Brite’s many commendations, his many years of experience, and his above average evaluations, coupled with testimony of the retention of younger, less experienced managers provides some evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that USAA would not have dismissed Brite without age as a motivating factor. Therefore, there is no reason to examine the record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law.
However, even if there were no evidence to support the jury’s finding, the record does not conclusively establish that USAA would have dismissed Brite despite his *577age. USAA offers the explanation that Dever, who USAA contends did not replace Brite, was retained because of his financial skills. This, however, does not conclusively establish as a matter of law that Brite would have been laid off despite his age.
Jury Instructions
Question No. 12
USAA contends that the trial court erred in submitting Question No. 1 to the jury because it improperly instructed the jury on the liability issue and it contained a biased and inaccurate statement of the law and therefore faded to fairly present the disputed issue for the jury’s determination. An incorrect jury instruction is grounds for reversal only if it probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Quantum Chemical Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.Bd 473, 480 (Tex.2001). To determine whether the instruction probably caused an improper judgment, we examine the entire record. Id.
Reading the entire charge — in the context of the live pleadings and the evidence presented — the jury could not have found that USAA unlawfully terminated Brite without concluding that “in addition” to proving the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination, the jury believed that “USAA’s explanation for terminating Mr. Brite [was] false.” The instruction does not appear to have caused an improper judgment.
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require that the trial court submit instructions and definitions “as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 277 (Vernon 2004). A proper instruction assists the jury, accurately states the law, and finds support in the pleadings and evidence. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Middleton, 982 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). The trial court has great discretion in submitting the jury charge, so long as the charge properly submits the disputed issues that control the disposition of the case. Villegas v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 120 S.W.Bd 26, 37-38 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 277 (Vernon 2004). The ultimate question in this case was whether USAA unlawfully terminated Brite because of his age. Argument of counsel asked that question, the testimonial and documentary evidence presented asked that question, and the charge reflected the same question.
*578USAA further argues that asking the jury to find the facts as they pertain to proving a prima facie case of age discrimination equates to instructing the jury on the shifting burdens of production and proof embodied in the McDonnell Douglas framework. The McDonnell Douglas framework simplifies the basic allocation of burdens in a case alleging discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). There is no mention in the court’s charge, however, of McDonnell Douglas, the shifting burdens of production and proof, or any of the legalistic terminology associated with the framework. The charge assisted the jury in finding the facts pertaining to a prima facie case of age discrimination, it accurately stated the law, and it found support in the pleadings and the evidence.

Affirmative Defense Instruction

In Kolstead v. Am. Dental Ass’n, the United States Supreme Court established an affirmative defense to punitive damages in employment discrimination cases, stating that “in the punitive damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where the decisions are contrary to the employer’s good faith efforts to comply with Title VII.” 527 U.S. 526, 528, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999). USAA argues that the trial court erred in refusing to include an instruction on USAA’s affirmative defense to punitive damages.
A proper instruction assists the jury, accurately states the law, and finds support in the pleadings and evidence. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Middleton, 982 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). While USAA did plead the affirmative defense, the trial court determined that the evidence adduced at trial did not support an Instruction on the affirmative defense. The trial court indicated that one constant and underlying theme permeating the evidence was that everyone was “just following orders.” Considerable testimony was presented that the decision for termination ultimately rested with Breslin and Casey. USAA argued that instructions were given by human resources personnel that the terminations be fair and non-discriminatory. However, those responsible for terminating Brite were acting within the scope and course of their employment. The trial court determined that there was no plausible way to take their conduct outside the scope of their job duties.
To constitute a reversible charge error, the trial court must have abused its discretion. See Tex. Dep’t of Human Serv. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex.1990). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles, or in other words, acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to include an instruction on the affirmative defense. The trial court found that evidence was not presented to support the inclusion of the instruction. The charge to the jury should include questions, instructions, and definitions raised by the pleadings and evidence. Tex.R. Civ. P. 278; see also Triplex Communications, Inc. v. Riley, 900 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex.1995) (indicating that “[i]f an issue is properly pleaded and is supported by some evidence, a litigant is entitled to have controlling questions submitted to the jury”). If the evidence adduced at trial is not sufficient to raise a particular instruction, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude that instruction.
*579EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
Questions concerning the admission and exclusion of evidence are determined by the trial court, whose ruling will not’ be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion; therefore, we review USAA’s tenth and eleventh issues under an abuse of discretion standard. City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 758 (Tex.1995). A determination of whether an abuse of discretion occurred is not whether the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court’s action; rather, the test is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles, or in other words, acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985).
In its tenth issue, USAA contends the trial court erred in excluding the predetermination letter to Brite from the EEOC, informing Brite that the EEOC intended to issue a determination that there was no evidence of discrimination. USAA argues that the trial court’s determination that the prejudicial nature of the predetermination letter outweighed its probative value was an abuse of discretion.
The trial court noted that the proffered document was an interim determination— not a final report from the EEOC. The trial court had before it cases which addressed the admissibility of a final EEOC determination—but not a predetermination letter. Therefore, the court properly exercised its discretion in concluding the probative value of the predetermination letter, because of its very nature of not being a final determination, was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature.
In its eleventh issue, USAA complains of the admission of evidence concerning the bonuses and raises of USAA executives from the time of restructuring to the time of trial. USAA objected to the admission of this evidence on the grounds that the evidence was irrelevant, confidential, and inflammatory. Over objections, the trial court admitted the evidence.
USAA argues that evidence regarding raises and bonuses received by USAA employees is not probative of Brite’s age discrimination claim, and is, therefore, irrelevant. USAA contends that evidence of employees receiving raises and bonuses does not have a tendency to make Brite’s claim that he was selected for layoff due to his age any more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. USAA asserts that evidence of employee raises and bonuses is irrelevant and prejudicial.
“Relevant evidence” is that evidence which has a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without evidence. Tex.R. Evid. 401. The test for relevancy is satisfied if there is directly, or by inference, some logical conclusion between the fact offered and the fact to be proven. Boswell v. Brazos Elec. Power Co-op., 910 S.W.2d 593, 601 n. 3 (Tex.App.Ft. Worth 1995). In this case, the trial court determined that evidence concerning how much pay had increased since 2001 and evidence concerning lower pay of younger persons was relevant. The trial court did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and did not abuse its discretion.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Dissenting opinion by SARAH B. DUNCAN, Justice.

. The dissenting opinion asserts that Brite "pleaded himself out of court” by the prayer for relief in his Second Amended Petition which stated that "[tjhe maximum amount claimed for all damages listed above is $1.6 million.” The dissenting opinion contends that the speculative nature of the front pay damages does not affect the jurisdictional issue because “the question is not what a plaintiff will recover or is likely to recover, it is what the plaintiff seeks to recover.” However, as previously stated, the issue for jurisdictional purposes "is whether there is a fact question as to whether the actual amount of [Brite's] damages is within the court’s jurisdictional limits.” Rezlaff, 2004 WL 2163173, at *2. The speculative nature of the front pay damages in view of all of the factors that must *574be taken into consideration in determining whether to award front pay raises a fact question as to whether Brite’s damages were within the court’s jurisdictional limits. As a result, the trial court did not err in resolving the jurisdictional issue.

. Question 1 of the charge read:
Was age a motivating factor in USAA’s decision to discharge Steven Brite?
A "motivating factor” in an employment decision is a reason for making the decision at the time it was made. There may be more than one motivating factor for an employment decision.
Mr. Brite may prove age was a motivating factor for his discharge by showing:
1) that he was within the protected group;
2) he was discharged;
3) he was qualified to assume a position at the time of discharge; and
4) he was replaced by someone outside the protected class; someone younger replaced him or was treated more favorably; or he was otherwise discharged because of his age.
In addition to the foregoing, if you determine USAA's explanation for terminating Mr. Brite is false, you may, but are not required to, conclude that USAA unlawfully terminated him because of age.
An employer commits an unlawful employment practice, if because of age the employer discharges an individual or discriminates in any other manner against the individual. Discrimination because of age or on the basis of age applies to discrimination against an individual 40 years of age or older. This is a protected group.
Answer "Yes” or "No.”