Court Opinion

ID: 9482552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:54:02.452688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:04.087997
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I write separately in No. 90-5536, United States v. Terry Wayne Quarles, first to concur in affirming the convictions, second to conclude we should remand for resen-tencing in United States v. Terry Wayne Quarles, based on the perceptive opinion of Chief Judge Merritt in United States v. Davern, 937 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir.1991), and, generally, to call special attention of sentencing judges to that opinion.1
Terry Wayne Quarles, who has no prior felony convictions and was only twenty-one years of age at the time of conviction, will serve twelve years and seven months without the possibility of parole under the Sentencing Guidelines as computed by the United States Probation Officer and adopted by the sentencing judge. That computation is based on Quarles being held accountable for 210.7 grams of crack found in the possession of co-defendant Brown.
In resentencing, I would first note that the district court had discretion to decide whether the mandatory minimum ten-year penalty of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) applied to Quarles. The jury only found that Quarles was guilty of conspiring to possess a “substantial quantity” of crack. Jury Instr., Tr. at 6. Thus, the jury did not make a finding as to the specific quantity of crack Quarles was guilty of conspiring to possess and distribute. The sentencing court could have found under the circumstances that the government did not prove that Quarles was guilty of conspiring to possess and distribute a sufficient amount of crack to come under the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years. See United States v. Wood, 834 F.2d 1382, 1388-90 (8th Cir.1987); United States v. Moreno, 899 F.2d 465, 473 (6th Cir.1990). But see Wood, 834 F.2d at 1390-92 (Bright, J., dissenting) (asserting that findings underlying possible sentence enhancement under § 841(b) should be made by the jury).
Whether the sentencing court decides that Quarles is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence under section 841(b) or not, given the mitigating circumstances of the jury’s inconsistent findings, the sentencing court should not be bound by the guidelines’ mechanical approach to sentencing. According to the guidelines, Quarles’s base offense level is 34 and his criminal history level is I, giving him a sentencing range of 151-181 months. However, in this case, *504the defendant was found not guilty by the jury of aiding and abetting in possession with intent to distribute the crack found on Brown. When the guidelines do not address mitigating circumstances such as this, I believe district courts would be wise to adopt the analysis of the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Davern, 937 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir.1991).
In Davern, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the sequence of sentencing steps2 prescribed by the Sentencing Commission required the district judge to sentence a drug offender based on amounts of crack actually possessed (eighty-five grams) or the greater amount an offender tried to buy (500 grams) and 1,070 grams which included plaster of paris which the undercover agent apparently passed off as cocaine. The district court “reluctantly” followed the recommendation of the probation officer to give the defendant-offender the maximum sentence under the guidelines. Davern, 937 F.2d at 1043. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that these “aggravating and mitigating circumstances” had not been taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission, and, therefore, the sentencing judge should have utilized a more flexible sentencing approach in which the district court must initially consider the facts and fix a sentence not greater than necessary as set out in the last two sentences of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).3 937 F.2d at 1051.
The Davern court stated:
The legislative history of § 3553(b) states unambiguously that the District Court should first consider whether there are facts and circumstances which make the Commission’s proposed sentencing level inappropriate. The legislative history establishes an order for considering “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” including “a pertinent aggravating or mitigating circumstance.” The District Court shall perform this function first and then decide whether to “impose a sentence outside the guidelines.” The Senate Report suggests the proper sequence. Referring to § 3553(a) and (b), the Senate Report explains:
The bill requires the judge, before imposing sentence, to consider the history and characteristics of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the 'purposes of sentencing. He is then to determine which sentencing guidelines and policy statements apply to the case. Either he may decide that the guideline recommendation appropriately reflects the offense and offender characteristics and impose sentence according to the guideline recommendation or he may conclude that the guidelines fail to reflect adequately a pertinent aggravating or mitigating circumstance and im*505pose sentence outside the guidelines. (Emphasis added.)
S.Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3235.
937 F.2d at 1046.
The Davem court added:
The nonqualitative guideline application process advocated by the Sentencing Commission, which omits the initial steps outlined by Congress designed to insure individualized sentences “not greater than necessary,” insures maximum deference by judges to the Commission’s complex code of interlocking rules that seek to mete out exact punishments for different crimes. Such a mechanical application of a complex code has the effect of delegating more sentencing responsibility to a sentencing bureaucracy — to probation officers who in turn are now trained by the Commission to apply the steps of the Applicable Instructions. It reduces the responsibility of the judge for the result, and it does not emphasize the court’s first duty under § 3553(a): to impose a “just punishment” which is “not greater than necessary to comply” with the sentencing objectives established by Congress.
Id. at 1046-47 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553, a sentencing court must first analyze whether the guidelines reflect “the pertinent aggravating or mitigating circumstances” surrounding a defendant’s crime.4 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). In this case, the jury convicted Quarles with an inconsistent verdict, acquitting him of aiding and abetting in the possession of crack, but also convicting him of conspiring to possess crack with intent to distribute.5 The guidelines do not instruct a judge how to deal with a situation where a jury has acquitted a defendant of aiding and abetting a substantive offense, but convicted the defendant of conspiring to commit the samé offense. Although a jury may convict a defendant with an inconsistent verdict, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 849 F.2d 447, 448 (9th Cir.1988), the sentencing judge should be able to take a jury’s acquittal on a similar count into consideration when sentencing a defendant. Therefore, if the sentencing judge believes that the jury’s acquittal mitigates Quarles’s conviction on conspiracy, the sentencing judge should depart from the guidelines and impose a just punishment which is “not greater than necessary” to comply with Congress’s sentencing objectives. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Moreover, sentencing courts should take into account the public interest and concern in the costs of excessive incarceration. In this case, the defendant entered prison as a twenty-one-year-old first offender, and will emerge from prison as a hardened thirty-three-year-old ex-convict. A twelve year incarceration in a federal facility costs, on average, in excess of $49.07 a day, or $17,-909 a year.6 In the opinion of this writer, excessive sentences serve no useful purpose and result in economic waste as well.7 *506Although Quarles should be punished for succumbing to the quick riches of drug dealing, he deserves a chance to rehabilitate himself for his own benefit and to become a productive citizen for the benefit of society.
Accordingly, I would remand this case to the district court for reconsideration of the sentence.

. Although the Sixth Circuit has decided to rehear the Davem case en banc, I still find the reasoning of Chief Judge Merritt’s opinion persuasive.

. Davem described the sequence as follows:
(1) find "applicable offense guideline section," (2) find the "base offense level,” (3) adjust offense level for characteristics of victim and role of defendant, (4) adjust offense level by grouping counts, including uncharged or unconvicted "relevant conduct,” (5) adjust offense level for “acceptance of responsibility,” (6) adjust for criminal history of defendant, (7) apply sentencing grid for imprisonment, (8) apply sentencing rules on fines, restitution, probation and parole, (9) adjust result for "departures."
937 F.2d at 1043 n. 2.

. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) reads:
Application of guidelines in imposing a sentence. — The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. In determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission. In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, the court shall impose an appropriate sentence, having due regard for the purposes set forth in subsection (a)(2). In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline in the case of an offense other than a petty offense, the court shall also have due regard for the relationship of the sentence imposed to sentences prescribed by guidelines applicable to similar offenses and offenders, and to the applicable policy statements of the Sentencing Commission.

. There are many mitigating or aggravating circumstances that do not warrant departure from the guidelines. The district court must decide which factors are serious enough to justify departure from the normal sentencing range. E.g., United States v. Aloi, 773 F.Supp. 55, 69. (N.D.Ohio 1991) (applying Davem analysis and holding that defendant’s military service record and various family problems do not justify departure from the guidelines).

. Technically, the verdicts were not inconsistent because a conviction for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 does not require proof of an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; the statute only requires that the defendant entered into an agreement with at least one other person and that the agreement had as its objective a violation of the law. United States v. Foote, 898 F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 112, 112 L.Ed.2d 81 (1990). A conviction for aiding and abetting requires some proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 664. However, the jury’s finding of not guilty on the aiding and abetting count mitigates Quarles's culpability in the conspiracy, and the sentencing judge should be able to take this finding of a lower level of guilt into consideration.

. Letter from J. Michael Quinlan, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C., to Honorable Myron H. Bright, United States Senior Circuit Judge (Aug. 5, 1991) (on file with dissenter).

. The United States incarcerates more than one million people, a larger share of its population than any other nation, according to the Sentenc*506ing Project, a non-profit research organization. United States Leads in Imprisonment, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 6, 1991, at 6E.