Court Opinion

ID: 9553431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:29:35.42649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:05.686501
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part) — I concur in the majority opinion with respect to the reversal of the contempt convictions on self-incrimination grounds. This reversal involves only the individuals and not the Mead Education Association. However, I must dissent from the majority’s analysis of the impact that the voiding of an injunction has upon a conviction of contempt for violating that injunction. I do not believe the majority has correctly applied existing law to this question, but more fundamentally, I am concerned with what the law on the subject of contempt should he rather than what it is.
The school district sought and obtained a superior court order enjoining the Mead Education Association and school district employees from striking. Subsequently, the superior court determined that the injunction had been violated and, therefore, found the Mead Education Association and certain employees in contempt for violation of the injunction. Thereafter, the injunction was found to be invalid in Mead School Dist. v. Mead Educ. Ass’n, 85 Wn.2d 140, 530 P.2d 302 (1975). The association and the employees are here in this court questioning the validity of the order of contempt.
*289The majority states that, under existing law, if a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the parties, a party cannot be held in contempt for failure to obey an injunction issued by such court. The majority concedes that in Mead School Dist. we held that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the parties for failure of the plaintiff to follow the mandates of the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971. It follows that, under existing law, the injunction was void and incapable of supporting a contempt conviction. See, e.g., Pearce v. Pearce, 37 Wn.2d 918, 226 P.2d 895 (1951); State ex. rel. Evans v. Winder, 14 Wash. 114, 44 P. 125 (1896); State ex rel. Boardman v. Ball, 5 Wash. 387, 31 P. 975 (1892).
The majority has attempted to distinguish the instant case from the above decisions and to thereby narrow the instances in which it is justifiable to refuse to abide by an illegal injunction granted without jurisdiction. Thus, it seems to me the majority is forging new law in this jurisdiction and its direction is precisely the opposite of what it should he.
Aside from the question of jurisdiction discussed above, I am convinced that a contempt order should have no higher or greater validity than the injunction upon which it is based. When an injunction is voided or subsequently determined to be erroneous by a decision of this court, as the old saying goes “the tail should follow the dog” and a contempt order should accordingly be set aside.
I fully understand the traditional philosophical and legal underpinnings of the majority’s general approach, viz., a contempt order relates back to the time the injunction was in full force and effect and should have a legal existence independent of and beyond a subsequent setting aside of the underlying injunction. Central to this reasoning is the consideration that a violation of an injunction is an affront inimical to or subversive of the dignity of the court and that a violation of the injunction should accordingly be punished by contempt and, in the instant case, a fine. I *290think this is misplaced emphasis regarding the dignity of the court, and it seems relevant to ask why the courts should harbor grudges in this manner in such cases. By the laws of nature, water cannot rise above its source. The contempt power, if not for reasons of natural law, at least for. commonsensical reasons should not be elevated to a higher order of things simply as a dubious prophylaxis for a dubious affront to the dignity of the court. Since the injunction has been set aside and is of no effect, any contempt orders based upon it should also be set aside and given no legal effect, the so-called dignity of the court and any weight of authority to the contrary notwithstanding.
Rosellini and Hunter, JJ., concur with Finley, J.
Petition for rehearing denied July 9, 1975.