Court Opinion

ID: 9394674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 12:07:28.261952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:01.581561
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                     NO. 03-21-00262-CR

                                Gary Lynn Denson, Appellant

                                                v.

                                 The State of Texas, Appellee

             FROM THE 26TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
      NO. 19-1371-K26, THE HONORABLE DONNA GAYLE KING, JUDGE PRESIDING

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

               Appellant Gary Lynn Denson was convicted by a jury of indecency with a child

by sexual contact—enhanced by a prior conviction for the same offense—and sentenced by the

trial court to statutorily-mandated life imprisonment. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 21.11 (codifying

offense of indecency with child), 12.42(c)(2)(B)(ii) (providing that defendant convicted of

indecency with child by sexual contact “shall be punished by imprisonment in the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice for life” if previously convicted of offense under Section 21.11).

In a single issue on appeal, Denson contends that the trial court erred by admitting

extraneous-offense evidence in violation of Texas Rule of Evidence 403. See Tex. R. Evid. 403

(allowing trial court to exclude relevant evidence if its “probative value is substantially

outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence”). We will affirm the trial court’s judgment

of conviction.

                                        BACKGROUND

                 Denson was charged by indictment with indecency with a child, C.W., 1 by sexual

contact. At trial, the State called a fingerprint-identification expert; a sexual assault nurse

examiner (SANE); C.W.’s sister, M.A.; a forensic interviewer; Georgetown Police Department

Detective Ruben Vasquez; C.W.’s caretaker, Beverly Bratton; and C.W. as witnesses. The

State’s exhibits included the indictment, judgment form, and Texas Department of Criminal

Justice (TDCJ) records from Denson’s 2008 conviction for indecency with a child by sexual

contact; his TDCJ booking report and fingerprint card; and C.W.’s sexual assault forensic

examination (SAFE) report. The defense called Denson’s stepdaughter, Barbra Ellis, and wife,

Melva, as witnesses and offered into evidence photographs of Denson’s home.

                 Before trial, a hearing was held pursuant to Section 2-a of Article 38.37 of the

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure on the admissibility of the extraneous-offense evidence.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37, § 2-a(2) (requiring hearing before evidence can be

admitted under Article 38.37 to determine if evidence likely to be admitted at trial “will be

adequate to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the separate offense

beyond a reasonable doubt”). The defense objected under Rule 403, arguing that the remoteness

of the extraneous offense and the defense’s inability to contextualize it would result in

juror confusion and unfair prejudice.     The trial court overruled the objection and admitted

the evidence.

       1 Because the complainant is a minor, we will refer to her by her initials in the interest of
privacy. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3).
                                                 2
               At trial, the State’s fingerprint-identification expert, Williamson County Sheriff’s

Office Deputy Colby Hughey, testified that she had fingerprinted Denson the morning of trial,

that his thumbprint matched the defendant’s thumbprint on the 2008 judgment form, and that it

was her opinion that Denson was the same individual identified in the indictment, judgment

form, and TDCJ records. She testified that the indictment for the 2008 conviction charged

Denson with indecency with a child on August 16, 1998, in Williamson County.                   On

cross-examination, she testified that she had not been involved in the investigation of the 1998

offense. She also testified that it appeared from the exhibits that Denson had been placed on

probation in 1998 but that his probation had been revoked and his guilt adjudicated in 2008.

               Rebecca Broussard, a SANE, testified that she conducted a SAFE of C.W. on

May 9, 2019, when C.W. was 10 years old. She testified that C.W. identified Denson, who C.W.

referred to as “Uncle Gary,” as her assailant and stated that she was there because “her uncle has

been touching her in inappropriate ways.” Broussard testified that C.W. also stated that Denson

had been “touching [her] vagina and [her] butt” over her clothing. Broussard testified that C.W.

did not report being in pain but that she noticed generalized redness on C.W.’s genitalia,

indicating that “something had irritated her in the past.” Broussard also testified that although

she asked C.W. about her sexual history, Broussard did not indicate an answer on her report.

She testified that Bratton, who had brought C.W. to the appointment, told her that C.W. did not

want to be around Denson. On cross-examination, Broussard testified that she had not collected

samples for DNA testing because the alleged abuse had occurred more than five days prior, that

she did not ask C.W. whether there had been other instances of abuse, and that C.W. had not

volunteered any further instances.

                                                3
               M.A., who is approximately 16 years older than C.W., testified about the family’s

structure and dynamics. She took care of C.W. and their brother V.W. when they were younger

because of their mother’s unstable and transient lifestyle. C.W.’s father is the brother of Melva,

Denson’s wife; in other words, Denson is C.W.’s uncle-in-law. Prior to the alleged offense,

C.W. and V.W. spent time at Denson’s house “all the time, . . . mostly on the weekends” when

their mother “would go over there and hang out.” Approximately seven years before trial, M.A.,

C.W., V.W., and their mother moved into a farmhouse in Jarrell, Texas, with Rob Mills, their

mother’s ex-boyfriend. Beverly Bratton is a family friend who “became more family than

friend.” She was like a grandmother to C.W. and V.W. and would frequently take them on trips

and care for them during holidays.

               M.A. also testified about the outcry C.W. made to her during Easter week 2019.

M.A., who had moved to West Virginia in 2017, was visiting C.W. and V.W. at the farmhouse.

Their mother left for Louisiana on Wednesday night. On Thursday, M.A. took C.W. to the park,

and C.W. asked her if she could tell her something.         C.W. stated that Denson had been

“touching” her and indicated that the touching had been to her vagina. M.A. testified that C.W.

stated that the touching had occurred at the farmhouse and that Denson “wasn’t just trying to be

nice” or to put his hand on her leg. When asked if she had told their mother, C.W. stated that she

had not because their mother “might not believe [her]”; C.W. had earlier lied about doing her

homework and about their family owning RVs and boats: “just typical little kid lies.”

               M.A. told C.W. to tell their mother, but C.W. instead told a cousin. Nevertheless,

the accusation was eventually relayed to their mother, who called M.A. and was very

“aggressive” and upset with both M.A. and C.W. Their mother never came back from Louisiana,

and M.A. returned to West Virginia without calling the police. On cross-examination, M.A.

                                                4
testified that their mother had an alcohol problem and was very manipulative, that there was

violence between their mother and C.W. and V.W.’s father, and that Bratton provided a

“steadier, more enjoyable experience for” C.W. and V.W. M.A. testified that C.W. did not state

that anything happened at Denson’s house in her outcry. She also testified that, when making the

outcry, C.W. looked at her, was a little hesitant, and did not discuss the alleged abuse in “very

clinical terms.”

               Katherine Schroeder, formerly a forensic interviewer, testified that she

interviewed C.W. on May 9, 2019. She testified that C.W. disclosed that she was sexually

abused and that her disclosures were “consistent with what law enforcement had told [Schroeder]

that [C.W.] said.”

               Detective Ruben Vasquez testified that he began investigating C.W.’s allegations

after receiving a Child Protective Services (CPS) referral and that he scheduled both the SAFE

and forensic interview. He testified that, as part of his investigation, he spoke with Bratton, the

CPS investigator, Denson, and M.A. and reviewed the interview video, SAFE report, and

medical records. He also testified that the evidence he discovered through his investigation was

“consistent with [his] understanding of the outcry of sexual abuse” by C.W.                    On

cross-examination, he testified that he did not investigate the farmhouse, visit Denson’s house, or

speak with Melva, other residents of Denson’s house, or C.W.’s mother.

               Bratton testified that she lives with her husband, C.W., and V.W. She testified

that she met C.W.’s mother when she was pregnant with C.W. and that she largely cared for

C.W. until she was a year and a half old. She testified that Mills called her around Easter 2019

and that she “immediately” picked up C.W. and V.W. from the farmhouse. She testified that

C.W. told her what had happened, that she called 911 and CPS, and that she took C.W. to her

                                                5
forensic interview. She testified that C.W. and V.W. stayed with her following C.W.’s outcry

but that their parents came to get them “a couple of months later.” She testified that their mother

then returned to Louisiana and that their father abandoned them four or five months later, after

which they returned to live with her. She also testified that C.W. does not speak with her mom

and has no contact with her father. She testified that, before the outcry, she would pick C.W. up

from Denson’s house “at least half the time,” that C.W.’s father was there “for a long time,” and

that C.W.’s mother would be there “every time.”

               C.W., who was 12 years old at the time of trial, testified that she used to visit

Denson and Melva at their house “[i]n between a little bit and a lot,” sometimes with her mother

or father, and that she and V.W. would sleep on the living room floor or in the bedroom across

from Denson and Melva’s room. She testified that although she couldn’t remember exactly what

she told M.A. at the park, she “knew that it wasn’t right” and “didn’t want it to happen

anymore.” She testified that she knew her mother would not believe her.

               C.W. also testified about the alleged abuse. She could not remember a specific

instance but testified that “one time it was out at the farm that [she] used to live at . . . and then

other times it was at [Denson’s] house.” Denson would touch her in the living room, generally

when she and V.W. were sleeping on the floor. He would touch her at night “[i]n her front

private spot,” which she uses to go to the restroom, “and [her] lower body.” He would always

touch her over her clothing. When drunk, he would also try to force her to kiss him on the lips,

and at least once when she was watching TV with his grandchildren and V.W.

               She testified that after she told M.A. about the abuse, they went to the farmhouse

where C.W. was picked up by Bratton. She testified that she and V.W. then went to live with

their father, but he abandoned them, and they were again taken to live with Bratton. On

                                                  6
cross-examination, she testified that Melva’s daughter, Barbra Ellis, lived with Denson and

Melva; that the living room was next to the back door, kitchen, and bedroom hallway; and that

she heard her mother call her a “little liar” on a phone call between her mother and Bratton.

               Ellis testified that she considers Denson to be her father and that she and three of

her sons live in Denson’s house. She testified that when children visited the house, they would

stay in the back bedroom with their parents but that sometimes kids would fall asleep in the

living room on movie nights. She testified that during Easter weekend 2019, C.W. and V.W.

were visiting, and C.W.’s mother was “missing.” She testified that she thought of C.W. as a

niece and that C.W., despite feeling comfortable confiding in her, never reported being afraid of

Denson nor anything sexual or inappropriate happening to her.

               Ellis also testified about C.W.’s and Denson’s relationship. She never observed

anything inappropriate between Denson and any child in the house, including C.W. She likewise

never observed anything inappropriate between Denson and a child at the farmhouse in Jarrell.

She never saw Denson lavishing any extra attention on C.W., seeking to be alone with her,

separating her from the other children, being overly physical or demonstrative with her, or

disciplining her differently. Ellis testified that she does not believe C.W. to be truthful.

               On cross-examination, Ellis testified that Denson is her father as far as she is

concerned, that she loves him, and that she does not want anything bad to happen to him. She

testified that she slept in a different part of the house from C.W. and V.W. but that their parents

were usually with them. She testified that C.W. and V.W. only slept in the living room if they

fell asleep during a movie, in which case they would be moved to a bedroom. She also testified

that she has been aware of Denson’s prior conviction for indecency with a child since she was

                                                  7
12 years old but had still chosen to live in his house with her three young children. On redirect,

she testified that she would not lie for Denson and that no one spoke with her about the case.

               Melva testified that she had been married to Denson for nine years and that Ellis

and her three children live with them “on a permanent basis.” She testified that C.W. and V.W.

last visited her house the day before Easter 2019; that they would sleep in the living room on a

pallet, the couch, or a recliner; and that, at night, “usually by at least 11 o’clock all the kids were

laying down” in the living room. She testified that the adults would gather at night in the garage,

which is about 12 to 14 steps from the living room and from which they could hear “what was

happening in [the] whole house” because the door between the garage and kitchen would be left

open. She testified that C.W. and V.W. would go to sleep before the adults, that the adults all

went to sleep around the same time, that Denson was never alone with the children in the house,

and that she was aware that he had previously been “charged with” indecency.

               Like Ellis, Melva testified about C.W.’s and Denson’s relationship, observing that

she never saw Denson pay inappropriate attention to C.W. or another child, be overly physical

with C.W., try to isolate or spend time alone with C.W., or give C.W. special treatment or

punishment. She testified that C.W. and Denson did not have a particularly “close bond” and

that none of the children seemed afraid of Denson or reported inappropriate physical contact.

She likewise testified that, when they were at the farmhouse, Denson did not spend time with the

children and instead played cards inside with the other adults.

               On cross-examination, she testified that she knew Denson’s history but wanted to

give him a second chance. After being read the indictment for the 1998 offense, she testified that

she was aware of the allegations, that J.D.—the child whom Denson had been charged with

abusing—was his son, and that she understood that “that’s basically the same thing he’s charged

                                                  8
with in this case involving [C.W.]” She also testified that she had not been “around for [the

previous conviction],” had not “participate[d] in that process,” and had only obtained

information about it from Denson, his family, and J.D.

               She testified that she loves Denson, that she does not want him to get into trouble,

and that she wants him to come back home to her. She testified that she does not know exactly

what C.W. alleged and that she could “somewhat” understand why C.W. would not confide in

her. Regarding Denson’s movements at night, she testified that she would know if someone got

up at night because she is a light sleeper, that Denson would get up to use the bathroom, that he

did not go to the kitchen to her knowledge, but that she “do[es]n’t know exactly everything” and

would agree that there are things that could happen in the house of which she may not be aware.

Lastly, she testified that C.W. “gained something”—a stable home—by making the allegations

against Denson and that she thinks that C.W. “was looking for better.”

               The jury found Denson guilty of indecency with a child by sexual contact.

Following a hearing on punishment at which he pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph

alleging a prior conviction for the 1998 offense, the trial court sentenced him to the

statutorily-mandated term of life imprisonment. This appeal followed.

                                         DISCUSSION

               In his sole issue on appeal, Denson contends that the trial court erred by admitting

evidence of his prior conviction for indecency with a child by sexual contact in violation of Rule

403. Specifically, he argues that, although the evidence was probative, its remoteness and

inherently prejudicial nature, as well as the defense’s inability to “contextualize” the offense,

rendered it inadmissible.

                                                9
               We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Dabney v. State,

492 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). An abuse of discretion does not occur unless the

trial court acts “arbitrarily or unreasonably” or “without reference to any guiding rules and

principles.” State v. Hill, 499 S.W.3d 853, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Montgomery

v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). In other words, we may not reverse the

trial court’s ruling unless the “decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.”

Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Henley, 493 S.W.3d at

83 (“Before a reviewing court may reverse the trial court’s decision, ‘it must find the trial court’s

ruling was so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable people might

disagree.’” (quoting Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008))).              An

evidentiary ruling will be upheld if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.

Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 93 (citing De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009)).

               Section 2(b) of Article 38.37 provides in relevant part that in a trial for indecency

with a child by sexual contact, evidence of separate sexual offenses committed against a child

other than the complainant is admissible “for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters,

including the character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the character of

the defendant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37, §§ 1, 2; Perez v. State, 562 S.W.3d 676, 685

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d). Although extraneous-offense evidence is admissible

under Section 2(b) “[n]otwithstanding Rules 404 and 405” of the Texas Rules of Evidence, the

trial court must still, upon proper objection or request, conduct a Rule 403 balancing test.

See Hitt v. State, 53 S.W.3d 697, 706 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref’d); Deggs v. State,

                                                 10
646 S.W.3d 916, 925 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, pet. ref’d) (citing Price v. State, 594 S.W.3d 674,

680 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.)).           Thus, the trial court may exclude otherwise

admissible evidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or

more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,

or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 403.

               “Probative value” means more than relevance; rather, it “refers to the inherent

probative force of an item of evidence—that is, how strongly it serves to make more or

less probable the existence of a fact of consequence to the litigation—coupled with

the proponent’s need for that item of evidence.” Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “Unfair prejudice” refers to a “tendency to suggest decision on an

improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Id.; see Inthalangsy

v. State, 634 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Rule 403 favors the admission of

relevant evidence and carries a presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than

prejudicial. Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Gallo v. State,

239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Under the Rule, trial courts have “considerable

freedom in evaluating proffered evidence’s probative value in relation to its prejudicial effect,”

and there should be “a corresponding reluctance on the part of an appellate court to reverse trial

court decisions which admit or exclude evidence.” Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 378.

               In conducting a Rule 403 analysis, the trial court must balance the claimed

probative force of the proffered evidence along with the proponent’s need for the evidence

against:

       (1) any tendency of the evidence to suggest that the case would be decided on an
       improper basis; (2) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury

                                               11
       from the main issues; (3) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight
       by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the
       evidence; and (4) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an
       inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted.

Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 93 (citing Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42). These factors may

blend together in practice. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 642.

Inherent Probative Value

               Because evidence of prior sexual abuse of children is “‘especially probative of

[a defendant’s] propensity to sexually assault children,’ the Rule 403 balancing test normally will

not favor the exclusion of evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual assaults of children.” Alvarez

v. State, 491 S.W.3d 362, 371 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (quoting Belcher

v. State, 474 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.)); see Deggs, 646 S.W.3d at 925

(“[E]vidence of a separate sexual offense against a child admitted under Article 38.37, Section

2(b) is probative of a defendant’s character or propensity to commit sexual assaults on

children.”); Caston v. State, 549 S.W.3d 601, 612 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.)

(“[E]vidence that a defendant has sexually abused another child is relevant to whether the

defendant sexually abused the child-complainant in the charged case.”).

               Denson argues that the probative value of evidence of his prior conviction is

lessened by the conviction’s “extreme remoteness” because it occurred approximately twenty

years before the charged offense and twenty-two years before the underlying trial. We consider

remoteness in determining whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Harty v. State, 552 S.W.3d 928, 935 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (citing Newton v. State, 301 S.W.3d 315, 320 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009,

pet. ref’d)). A substantial gap in time between the extraneous offense and the charged offense
                                                12
will weaken the probative value of the extraneous-offense evidence “because, logically, the

passage of time allows things and people to change.” Gaytan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 218, 226–27

(Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref’d); see Perez, 562 S.W.3d at 690. However, remoteness is

“but one aspect of an offense’s probativeness” and alone “is not sufficient to render an

extraneous offense excludable under Rule 403.” Gaytan, 331 S.W.3d at 226–27. Moreover,

similarities between the extraneous offense and charged offense may offset any loss of probative

value resulting from the extraneous offense’s remoteness.         See, e.g., Robisheaux v. State,

483 S.W.3d 205, 220 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. ref’d) (concluding that although remoteness

of extraneous offenses “undermined their probative value,” trial court could have reasonably

determined that “remarkable similarities” between extraneous offenses and charged offense

“strengthened the probative value of the evidence,” such that first factor was therefore “neutral”

or “at most . . . somewhat favors exclusion” (quoting Gaytan, 331 S.W.3d at 227)).

               As Denson acknowledges, “the prior offense for which he was charged and

eventually convicted was the same as the present charge and involved similar facts.” During the

pretrial evidentiary hearing, defense counsel went further, arguing that the extraneous offense

was “not just any old prior” but was “a prior for the exact same type [of] offense” and involved

“the exact [same] scenario.” Both indictments alleged that Denson touched the genitals of a

child under 17 with the intent to arouse or satisfy his sexual desire. Both offenses allegedly

occurred in Williamson County. And both complainants were children with whom Denson had a

familial relationship. During the trial, Melva testified that she understood that the allegations in

the 1998 indictment were “basically the same thing [Denson is] charged with in this case.”

               Although we have previously noted that time gaps of approximately 12 and

14 years between an extraneous offense and a charged offense “reduced the probative force of

                                                13
the evidence of [the] extraneous offense[],” we and our sister courts have also found similar, and

longer, gaps to be offset by similarities between the two offenses. Id. at 219–20; see also

Newton, 301 S.W.3d at 320 (determining that inherent probative value of remote but similar

extraneous offense weighed “slightly in favor of admissibility” despite 25-year gap between

extraneous offense and charged offense); Gaytan, 331 S.W.3d at 227 (finding that first

Gigliobianco factor at most “somewhat” favored exclusion because although extraneous-offense

testimony concerned “extremely remote events” occurring 24 and 28 years before charged

offense, it was “remarkably similar” to complainant’s, and trial court could have reasonably

found that its inherent probative force was “significantly bolstered”); Deggs, 646 S.W.3d at 925

(finding that first factor weighed “strongly in favor of admission” even though extraneous

offense allegedly occurred more than 20 years before trial); Dies v. State, 649 S.W.3d 273, 286

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, pet. ref’d) (finding that first factor weighed strongly in favor of

admission and that extraneous-offense evidence was probative of defendant’s character or

propensity “to commit indecent acts with children around complainant’s age” even though

extraneous offense occurred approximately 19 years before trial and 12 years before abuse of

complainant); cf. Perez, 562 S.W.3d at 690–91 (finding that similarities between extraneous

offense and charged offense did not outweigh remoteness of extraneous-offense evidence and

lack of intervening misconduct where extraneous offense occurred more than 50 years before

trial). Thus, although Denson’s prior conviction is extremely remote, and the State offered no

evidence of intervening misconduct, the close similarities between that conviction and the

charged offense lead us to conclude that the first factor is neutral or weighs at most somewhat in

favor of exclusion. See Robisheaux, 483 S.W.3d at 220; Gaytan, 331 S.W.3d at 226–27.

                                               14
State’s Need for the Evidence

              With respect to the second factor, Denson argues that the State’s need for

evidence of his prior conviction was low and that Robisheaux—a case on which the State relies

to support its asserted need for the evidence—is distinguishable.      The State responds that

Robisheaux is similar and that it needed the extraneous-offense evidence to prove that Denson

acted with the requisite intent and because the case largely amounted to Denson’s word

against C.W.’s.

              In Robisheaux, we noted that defense counsel “repeatedly urged in his opening

statement and in his cross-examination of [the complainant] that there was no physical evidence

demonstrating that any sexual offense occurred and that her claims about sexual abuse were

based on her ‘testimony alone.’”        483 S.W.3d at 220.       We also noted that in his

cross-examination of the complainant, counsel insinuated that she may have fabricated the

allegations by referencing her prior suicide attempt, her past mental-health treatment, and her

marijuana use. Id. Lastly, we observed that although the State presented medical reports and

other witnesses, that evidence merely repeated statements made by the complainant and that,

therefore, without the extraneous-offense evidence, “‘the State’s case would have basically come

down to’ [the complainant’s] word against Robisheaux’s.” Id. (quoting Gaytan, 331 S.W.3d

at 227).

              Denson contends that the present case is distinguishable because the State did not

claim in its opening that the case would be a “swearing match”; defense counsel did not tell the

jury that Denson had offered to take a polygraph or to submit to DNA testing; C.W. was 10 and

made a spontaneous outcry whereas the complainant in Robisheaux was 14 and made an outcry

in response to questioning; and C.W. testified about more than her initial outcry, alleging

                                              15
additional details of the abuse and further bad acts by Denson. He concludes that C.W.’s

credibility was therefore greater than the Robisheaux complainant’s and that the State had less

need of the extraneous-offense evidence.

               Denson’s reading of Robisheaux misconstrues the import of our analysis in that

case. As we explained in Robisheaux when discussing a constitutional challenge to Section 2(b),

there are important policy concerns that justify the admission of propensity evidence in child

sexual abuse cases. Id. at 212. The Legislature has acknowledged that “because of the nature of

child sex offenses, there is typically very little evidence to assist prosecutors with proving their

cases,” and “the primary piece of evidence in most child sexual abuse cases is a traumatized

child.” Bradshaw v. State, 466 S.W.3d 875, 884 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d)

(quoting S. Comm. on Crim. Just., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 12, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013)); see

Jenkins v. State, 993 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, pet. ref’d) (stating that “[t]he

special circumstances surrounding the sexual assault of a child victim outweigh normal concerns

associated with evidence of extraneous acts”). The Court of Criminal Appeals elaborated in

Hammer v. State:

       Trials involving sexual assault may raise particular evidentiary and constitutional
       concerns because the credibility of both the complainant and defendant is a
       central, often dispositive, issue. Sexual assault cases are frequently “he said, she
       said” trials in which the jury must reach a unanimous verdict based solely upon
       two diametrically different versions of an event, unaided by any physical,
       scientific, or other corroborative evidence. Thus, the Rules of Evidence,
       especially Rule 403, should be used sparingly to exclude relevant, otherwise
       admissible evidence that might bear upon the credibility of either the defendant or
       complainant in such “he said, she said” cases. And Texas law, as well as the
       federal constitution, requires great latitude when the evidence deals with a
       witness’s specific bias, motive, or interest to testify in a particular fashion.

296 S.W.3d 555, 561–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

                                                16
               The present case is no exception. Similar to Robisheaux, the State’s case here

included almost no physical evidence. Besides Denson’s prior conviction, the State focused

solely on C.W.’s testimony and on various statements made by C.W. to M.A., the SANE, and the

forensic interviewer. While the State did not declare in its opening that the case would amount

to a “swearing match,” it explained that the jury would hear “across all of those [witnesses] the

consistency of [C.W.] when she recounted those events, and, yes, one last time [they were] going

to hear it from her herself here in the courtroom.” As in Robisheaux, many of the State’s

non-complainant witnesses served merely to corroborate C.W.’s statements. In its closing, the

State summarized its case as, “If you believe [C.W.], [Denson] did it.” Indeed, in his own

closing, Denson emphasized the lack of evidence other than C.W.’s testimony and statements by

asserting that the State was relying exclusively on the extraneous-offense evidence:

       [D]id [the State] start out that with their closing statement? He’s done this before.
       This is the evidence you need right here. Of course our case is weak. It involved
       kids. There’s not a lot of witnesses. There’s not going to be a lot of evidence.
       Boy, that Officer Vasquez, he sure did a crummy job, but you don’t need that.
       You’ve got this. He’s done it before. That’s it. That’s all you need.

However, the argument points to precisely why the State’s need for extraneous-offense evidence

in child sexual cases is heightened and why propensity evidence is admissible in such cases.

               Similarly, Denson’s case, like Robisheaux’s, rested principally on a defensive

theory of fabrication. In his opening, Denson’s attorney asked the jury to consider C.W.’s

allegations in the context of, “[H]ow did this all happen, supposedly, in a tight, limited space

when there were all these adults, all these kids, some feet away, some inches away? How did

this behavior occur repeatedly and nobody else saw it, heard it, reported it?” He questioned Ellis

and Melva about the lack of observed inappropriate behavior between Denson and C.W., asked

                                                17
Ellis whether she believed C.W. to be truthful, and asked Melva about how C.W.’s life had

improved since making the allegations. Although he stated repeatedly during his closing that

C.W.’s credibility was not at issue, much of his argument appeared calculated to undermine that

credibility. He suggested that Bratton had influenced the wording of C.W.’s outcry, stated that

he saw a “scenario” in which C.W. had made the allegations to “get to [Bratton] and start leading

that good life that she has now,” noted that Ellis had testified that C.W. was untruthful, argued

“there [was] no opportunity, credible opportunity, to commit this crime as alleged,” and related a

story in which he falsely remembered being attacked by a dog as a child, explaining, “I’m afraid

of German Shepherds because of something that did not happen to me, but I still feel it. It is still

real to me.” As the State’s attorney noted in rebuttal, “It was an awful lot of words to avoid

saying that [C.W.] is lying.”

               Because there was minimal physical evidence and no eyewitness testimony, the

State had to rebut the defensive theory of fabrication, and the State’s ability to prove intent was

complicated by the nature of the case, the State’s need for the extraneous-offense evidence was

considerable. See Gaytan, 331 S.W.3d at 227 (finding factor “weighs strongly in favor of

admission” where, without extraneous-offense evidence, State’s case would have “basically

come down to [the complainant’s] word against [the defendant’s],” there was no physical

evidence or eyewitness testimony supporting complainant’s allegations, and several of State’s

witnesses “essentially simply repeated what [the complainant] had told them”); Newton,

301 S.W.3d at 320 (finding that trial court could have reasonably concluded that State’s need for

evidence was “considerable” because there were no corroborating eyewitnesses or physical

evidence, and State had to rebut defensive theory of fabrication); Price, 594 S.W.3d at 681

(same); see also Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 381 (observing that due to “the inherent

                                                18
circumstantial nature of the evidence tending to prove that appellant committed the charged

offenses with the intent to sexually arouse himself” in case involving improper touching with

hand, “[t]he manner appellant acted around his own children was the only proof of appellant’s

possible sexual motive if the touching did in fact occur”; noting that “it would have been

reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the young girls would not be able to relate that

appellant’s touching their vaginal areas was done with the specific intent to cause his sexual

arousal”; and acknowledging that “[w]ithout some evidence of appellant’s motives, the

possibility that any touching was done innocently exists as an outstanding hypotheses”). The

second factor weighs strongly in favor of admission.

Tendency of Evidence to Suggest Decision on an Improper Basis

               Evidence of Denson’s prior conviction may have tended to suggest a decision on

an improper basis because sexual misconduct involving children is inherently inflammatory and

prejudicial.   See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641 (stating that evidence might encourage

decision on improper basis if it arouses jury’s sympathy or hostility “without regard to the

logical probative force of the evidence”); Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013) (recognizing that “sexually related bad acts and misconduct involving children are

inherently inflammatory”); Gaytan, 331 S.W.3d at 227–28 (observing that extraneous-offense

evidence had tendency to suggest verdict on improper basis “because of the inherently

inflammatory and prejudicial nature of crimes of a sexual nature committed against children”

(quoting Newton, 301 S.W.3d at 320)). Yet Rule 403 does not allow a trial court to exclude

otherwise relevant evidence that is merely prejudicial; rather, the Rule protects defendants

against unfair prejudice. See Pawlak, 420 S.W.3d at 811; Wishert v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317, 334

                                               19
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d). Moreover, potential prejudice may be mitigated if the

extraneous act is no more serious than the allegation forming the basis for the indictment.

Robisheaux, 483 S.W.3d at 220.

               Although the basis for Denson’s prior conviction is closely similar to that of the

charged offense, the conviction involved indecent sexual contact with his son and was therefore

likely more inflammatory. Accordingly, the third factor somewhat favors exclusion.

Tendency of Evidence to Confuse or Distract Jury

               Confusion of the issues “refers to a tendency to confuse or distract the jury from

the main issues in the case.” Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641 (citing S. Goode, et al., Texas

Practice: Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence § 403.2 at 165 (3d ed. 2002)). Misleading the

jury “refers to a tendency of an item of evidence to be given undue weight by the jury on other

than emotional grounds.” Id. (citing Goode, et al., Texas Practice: Guide to the Texas Rules of

Evidence § 403.2 at 164).

               Testimony concerning Denson’s prior conviction was straightforward, non-

technical, and directly relevant to the jury’s determination of guilt for the charged offense. See

Tex. R. Evid. 401 (providing that evidence is relevant if it makes material fact more or less

probable); Robisheaux, 483 S.W.3d at 220–21; Gaytan, 331 S.W.3d at 228. Although Denson

argues that “[t]he jury would think that ‘[he] had done it before so he must have done it again,’”

propensity evidence is admissible and probative under Section (2) of Article 38.37. See Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37, § 2(b) (providing that evidence of separate child sexual offenses is

admissible “for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including the character of the

defendant and acts performed in conformity with the character of the defendant”) (emphasis

                                               20
added); Alvarez, 491 S.W.3d at 371; see Deggs, 646 S.W.3d at 925. Moreover, the trial court

mitigated any tendency of the extraneous-offense evidence to confuse or distract by instructing

the jury that it should only find Denson guilty if it believed that the elements of the charged

offense had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that it could only consider the evidence

“in determining its bearing on relevant matters” if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that

Denson had committed the prior offense. See Deggs, 646 S.W.3d at 926–27 (determining that

trial court’s instructions “mitigated the tendency of the extraneous-offense evidence to confuse

or distract the jury from the main issue at trial” and “redirected the jury to the main issues in the

case”). The jury is presumed to have followed the court’s instructions. Resendiz v. State,

112 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). For these reasons, the fourth factor weighs in

favor of admission.

Tendency of Evidence to Be Given Undue Weight by Jury

               This factor concerns “a tendency of an item of evidence to be given undue weight

by the jury on other than emotional grounds. For example, ‘scientific’ evidence might mislead a

jury that is not properly equipped to judge the probative force of the evidence.” Gigliobianco,

210 S.W.3d at 641 (internal citation omitted); see Gaytan, 331 S.W.3d at 228. Here, the

evidence was not scientific or technical and pertained to matters including victim credibility that

could be easily comprehended by laypeople.            See Gaytan, 331 S.W.3d at 228; Deggs,

646 S.W.3d at 927. This factor weighs in favor of admission.

Likelihood that Evidence Will Be Too Time-Consuming or Repetitive

               This factor concerns whether “the jury would be distracted from consideration of

the charged offense.” State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We

                                                 21
consider only time spent developing the evidence and exclude jury argument and hearings

outside the presence of the jury. See Dennis v. State, 178 S.W.3d 172, 181 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d).

                Although Denson is correct that multiple witnesses testified about his prior

conviction, testimony concerning the extraneous offense only amounted to approximately

20 pages out of an approximately 479-page trial transcript. Cf. Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504,

520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (factor weighed in favor of admission where extraneous-offense

testimony amounted to “less than one-fifth” of trial testimony).                  Moreover, the

extraneous-offense testimony of Deputy Hughey, Ellis, and Melva was largely unrepetitive.

Hughey testified about the contents of the conviction documents; Ellis testified that she was

aware of Denson’s conviction but chose to live in his house with her young children; and Melva

testified that she was aware of the conviction and allegations, that she understood that the prior

offense was “basically the same thing” charged in this case, that she had learned of the

conviction from Denson’s family and son, and that she was not “around for [the prior

conviction]” and did not “participate in that process.” This factor therefore weighs in favor

of admission.

Inability to Contextualize Evidence

                Although not one of the Gigliobianco factors, Denson argues that he was also

prejudiced by his inability to “contextualize” his prior conviction. During the pretrial hearing on

the extraneous-offense evidence, defense counsel explained that were the evidence to be

admitted, Denson would be unable to get into the reasons for his probation revocation, why he

                                                22
pleaded guilty, or purported “family testimonial evidence” that his son wished to recant

following the trial. Similarly, counsel argued in closing:

       There’s a lot more words here no one was going to explain to you, that this
       happened in 1998. He was placed on community supervision in 1999, but the
       judgment is from 2008. Do you have any explanation for any of that? No, you do
       not until I went to the fingerprint lady to try to explain to y’all what this was. In
       big, bad, tough Williamson County he committed this offense and got probation.
       Do we know why? We don’t know. How did he do on probation? We don’t
       know. What was his probation like? We don’t know. Did they call a court
       officer to explain it, a probation officer, a clerk who works here for the
       government and can explain what all this means? No, they did not. They don’t
       want to explain it because you don’t need to know that stuff. Just focus on the
       nasty details. He’s done this before, ladies and gentlemen. That’s all you need to
       know in this case. Did they bring a witness from this era to talk about the details
       of this case? No, they did not. Sufficient to just pay no mind to that. It’s just
       nasty from a go, and that should be enough evidence for y’all. You don’t need
       more than that.

               Denson does not assert—nor does the record indicate—that he was in any way

prohibited from presenting evidence concerning his prior conviction. Although he states that to

do so he would have had to waive his Fifth Amendment rights and testify, that decision was his

to make. Moreover, the context that Denson states that he was prevented from developing does

not appear to concern the admissibility of the extraneous-offense evidence under Rule 403 or

Gigliobianco. He has offered no authority in support of the proposition that the State’s failure to

present certain testimony about an extraneous offense is prejudicial under the Rule. We find that

his argument is without basis in law and is therefore without merit.

Summary of Factors

               In summation, the first Gigliobianco factor is neutral or weighs at most somewhat

in favor of exclusion; the second strongly favors admission; the third somewhat favors exclusion;

and the fourth, fifth, and sixth weigh in favor of admission. Given our standard of review and

                                                23
the Court of Criminal Appeals’ warning to be cautious in excluding relevant evidence under Rule

403 in such cases, see Hammer, 296 S.W.3d at 568, we cannot say that the trial court abused its

discretion by admitting evidence of Denson’s prior conviction for indecency with a child by

contact, see Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 82–83. His single issue is overruled.

                                        CONCLUSION

              Having overruled Denson’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment of conviction.

                                            __________________________________________
                                            Edward Smith, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Smith and Jones*

Affirmed

Filed: May 12, 2023

Do Not Publish

*Before J. Woodfin Jones, Chief Justice (Retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by
assignment. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.003(b).

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