Court Opinion

ID: 9609084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:22:15.875544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:52.192119
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Vice Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Unless, like Alice, we have tumbled into Wonderland, law and common sense tell us *198that we cannot sustain a statute that requires victims to sue before they are injured. Nevertheless, the majority of this court today upholds just such a statute. So remarkable a result deserves careful analysis.
The facts are quite simple. The machine in question allegedly was defective and unreasonably dangerous for lack of safety guards. First sold in the summer of 1971, it had a useful economic life of over forty years. Bryant’s injury occurred a little more than twelve years from the date of sale. As a result, the manufacturer contends that Bryant’s strict liability claim is barred by the provisions of A.R.S. § 12-551. That statute, in conjunction with §§ 12-681 and 12-542, modifies the tort statute of limitations so that “no product liability action may be commenced and prosecuted if the cause of action accrues more than twelve years after the product was first sold,” unless the action is brought upon theories of negligence or express warranty. The court describes this as a “statute of repose.” Op. at 195, 751 P.2d at 511. That euphemism certainly sounds better than facing the more difficult question — whether our constitution permits the legislature to effectively bar an action for damages by requiring that it be filed before the injury occurs.
To state the issue is to answer it. The majority errs first by ignoring settled Arizona law which requires it to hold the statute unconstitutional under art. 18, § 6. Next, the majority again departs from Arizona precedent by applying the wrong standard of review to the equal protection challenge. Finally, the majority even misapplies the rational basis analysis in attempting to save the so-called “statute of repose” from its constitutional flaws.
THE ABROGATION CLAUSE
Unless the “cause of action” is based upon negligence or breach of express warranty, A.R.S. § 12-551 prohibits the prosecution of product liability actions filed more than twelve years after the product is “first sold.” Because Bryant’s injury occurred more than twelve years after sale, the statute bars his strict liability claim before it could have been filed. We have held that such statutes effectively abrogate the right of action. Barrio v. San Manuel Division Hospital for Magma Copper Co., 143 Ariz. 101, 692 P.2d 280 (1984). Article 18, § 6 of our constitution prevents the legislature from abrogating “the right of action to recover damages for injuries.” The majority concludes, however, that the “doctrine of strict products liability” is not protected because it “did not exist at common law when our constitution ... was adopted in 1912.” Op. at 195, 751 P.2d at 511.1
True, the “doctrine” of strict liability for injuries caused by a product was first recognized by this court in the 1960’s. See op. at 195, 751 P.2d at 511. That historical fact is interesting, but totally irrelevant. Article 18, § 6 was not enacted to protect particular doctrines, theories or “causes of action.” The text of the constitution protects a broader concept — “the right of action to recover damages for injuries.” Art. 18, § 6 (emphasis added). Depending on privity, the right of action to recover damages for injuries caused by defective products was recognized at common law long before Arizona became a territory. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109, 154 Eng.Rep. 402 (1842). While not universally applied to product liability cases until recent times, theories of strict and even absolute liability were recognized in tort law well before 1912. See, e.g., Rylands v. Fletcher, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd, 3 L.R.-E. & I.App. 330 (1868); *199PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 534 et seq. (5th ed. 1984). All that has happened since 1912 is the logical application of Rylands v. Fletcher’s strict liability theory to the right to bring a product liability action.
The important point is that an action to recover damages caused by products was among the rights recognized long before the constitutional convention of 1910. By inquiring, instead, when any specific “doctrine” (op. at 195, 751 P.2d at 511), theory or “cause of action” (op. at 195, 751 P.2d at 511) was first recognized, the majority introduces a pernicious note of hairsplitting into a fundamental constitutional protection. Article 18, § 6 protects the broad concept of a “right of action” — a remedy for a wrong recognized at the time we became a state. This court has unanimously recognized the principle; the majority implicitly acknowledges it when it cites Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 9, 730 P.2d 186 (1986), for the proposition that art. 18, § 6 “extends to all actions recognized at common law at the time of the article’s adoption.” Op. at 195, 751 P.2d at 511. Boswell is explicit on the distinction between “right of action” and specific tort theories. It holds that art. 18, § 6 protection is not limited to the specific causes of action, doctrines or theories of 1912:
[It] was intended to take the right to seek justice out of executive and legislative control, preserving the ability to invoke judicial remedies for those wrongs traditionally recognized at common law.
Boswell, 152 Ariz. at 17, 730 P.2d at 194 (emphasis added). Thus, the constitutional protection
is not limited to those elements and concepts of particular [rights of] actions which were defined in our pre-statehood caselaw. Article 18, § 6 protects the right of people to seek “remedy by due course of law ”____ The law must allow for evolution of common law actions to reflect today’s needs and knowledge. Any other rule would allow those “long dead” to dictate solutions to problems of which they could not have been aware.
Id. at 17-18, 730 P.2d at 194-95 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).
OTHER AUTHORITY
Not only does the majority misapply Arizona caselaw, it ignores the only case on point from a state with a provision virtually identical to ours. The wording of the first phrase in art. 18, § 6 of our constitution is evidently a direct borrowing from art. 23, § 7 of the Oklahoma Constitution of 1907.2 The Oklahoma provision prohibits legislative abrogation of “the right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death.” The Oklahoma Supreme Court considered the meaning of “right of action” under this clause of the Oklahoma Constitution in Roberts v. Merrill, 386 P.2d 780 (Okla.1963). At issue was the constitutionality of a statute precluding the recovery of worker’s death benefits if the period between the injury and resultant death exceeded five years. The court rejected the contention that the protection of art. 23, § 7 was limited to negligence actions, the *200only wrongful death theory recognized before statehood. It held that the constitution protected the entire right of action, including theories and causes which had evolved since adoption of the constitution.
It suffices to say that ... the Constitution now, as before, absolutely prohibits the abrogation of the “right of action to recover damages for injuries”____ The “right of action” — a term far from synonymous with “cause of action”— means the right to effectively pursue an available remedy in a suitable forum, whether successfully or not____ The existence of a cause of action would not be meaningful without an adequate opportunity for its pursuit. That opportunity stands constitutionally protected. While by its terms art. 23, § 7 creates no cause of action ..., it continues, with like force and effect as before, to prohibit the legislature from erecting barriers to its effective prosecution, whatever the forum or remedy may be.
Id. at 785-86 (last two emphases in original; citations omitted).
Roberts is important not only for its sound reasoning, but also because it construes the parent constitutional clause to our art. 18, § 6. See, e.g., Faires v. Frohmiller, 49 Ariz. 366, 372, 67 P.2d 470, 472 (1937) (where Arizona constitutional provision was based on similar provisions in constitutions of other states, judicial decisions from those other states on interpretation of the adopted provision are “very persuasive”). Of course, having ignored the Roberts case, the majority cannot be criticized for failing to apply the Frohmiller doctrine.
The majority opinion, however, may be justly criticized for ignoring the great weight of authority from other jurisdictions.' At least thirty-seven states have constitutional “open court” provisions guaranteeing the right of access to the courts. See McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AMER.U.L. REV. 579, 615 n. 218 (1981). Courts across the nation have repeatedly recognized that Arizona’s abrogation clause “is more rigid and specific in establishing an individual’s constitutional right to recover damages for injuries” than open court provisions in other states. See, e.g., Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 677 (Utah 1985); Boswell, 152 Ariz. at 17 n. 18, 730 P.2d at 194 n. 18. Despite dealing with less specific, “weaker” open court clauses, the great majority of other state courts have held product liability statutes of repose unconstitutional. See Comment, Product Liability Statutes of Repose as Conflicting with State Constitutions: The Plaintiffs are Winning, 26 ARIZ.L.REV. 363 (1984). Federal courts construing the Arizona Constitution have reached similar results. See, e.g., Davis v. Dow Chemical Corp., 819 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.1987) (application of Arizona wrongful death statute to bar action by survivors of victim killed by defective product would violate Arizona Constitution’s abrogation clause).
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Bryant also challenges § 12-551 on the grounds that it violates the equal protection clause of the state and federal constitutions. A strict scrutiny analysis must be applied if the statute affects a “fundamental right.” Op. at 196, 751 P.2d at 512. The majority holds, however, that the statute affects no fundamental right because plaintiff can still sue in negligence and therefore has not been denied access to the courts.
That analysis misses the point. Access to the courts is not the only fundamental right threatened by this statute of repose. Rights are fundamental, as the majority acknowledges, when they are “explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.” Op. at 195-196, 751 P.2d at 511-512, citing San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1297, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). The “right of action to recover damages for injuries” is explicitly guaranteed by art. 18, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution and is, therefore, a fundamental right for Arizona citizens. At the very least, the statute in question regulates that fundamental right and compels this court to employ a strict scrutiny analysis. Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 78-79, 688 P.2d 961, 970-71 (1984).
*201As the majority acknowledges, under a strict scrutiny analysis a regulatory statute may be upheld only if there is a “compelling state interest to be served and the regulation is necessary to achieve the legislative objective.” Op. at 196, 751 P.2d at 512, citing San Antonio Independent School Dist., supra, and Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen’s Foundation, 130 Ariz. 550, 555, 637 P.2d 1053, 1058 (1981). Assuming, as the majority does, that the state interest served by the statute in question was the insurance “crisis” of 1977, which supposedly produced a compelling need to reduce product liability insurance rates (op. at 197, 751 P.2d at 513), this record falls far short of showing that the statutory regulation in question was “necessary” to that “compelling interest.”
RATIONAL BASIS
In fact, neither the record nor the majority’s opinion even demonstrates how the statute is rationally related to that interest. It is here that the majority makes its penultimate error. Having erroneously applied the lesser, rational basis test, the majority seeks to find a rational connection between the classifications created by the statute and its objectives. Op. at 197, 751 P.2d at 513. We are told that courts accept “the legislative determination of relevancy so long as it is reasonable, even though it may be disputed, debatable or opposed by strong contrary argument.” Id. (citations omitted). No doubt this is true, but to what does the majority refer? The opinion fails to inform us of any legislative determination of relevance. A search of the legislative history on this statute reveals neither a legislative determination of relevancy nor a specific legislative consideration of the subject. See Minutes of Meeting, Committee on Commerce, March 20, 1978.
It is true, nevertheless, that we may uphold the statute where some rational basis between the regulation and state objectives can be ascertained from the facts before the court. See, e.g., Uhlmann v. Wren, 97 Ariz. 366, 388, 401 P.2d 113, 128 (1965). On this issue, with no record at all before it, the majority holds that our legislature “could have reasonably concluded” that a statute of repose would ameliorate “the perceived crisis of rising product liability insurance rates” and promote “new product development.” Op. at 197, 751 P.2d at 513.
Lacking facts to support this factual conclusion, the court instead sustains its holding by citing Davis v. Whiting Corp., 66 Or.App. 541, 674 P.2d 1194 (1984). Rather than supporting the proposition, Davis illustrates its flaws. While the Oregon court of appeals did find a rational basis, it dealt with an Oregon statute that did much more than grant manufacturers protection from strict liability theories; instead, it completely abolished the right of action for damages caused by defective products unless the action was brought within eight years from the date of sale. Id. at 543, 674 P.2d at 1195. This is drastic medicine indeed, but unavailable in Arizona under art. 18, § 6. Barrio, supra.
While it is possible to conclude that an absolute bar to any product liability action might reduce premiums, it is impossible to see any rational basis for believing that abolition of one theory among several will reduce premiums. Nothing in the legislative record supports such a conclusion. See Minutes of March 20, 1978, supra.3 *202Nothing presented to us in the briefs of counsel or cited in the majority opinion touches upon the question. So far as we know, the experience of other states does not justify such a conclusion. It is certainly not supported by history, because the statute in question has been in effect for eleven years without any reduction in Arizona’s product liability premiums. If Arizona rates are significantly below those charged in our sister states, neither counsel nor the majority has bothered to inform us that the millenium has arrived. If “new product development” in Arizona has been promoted by this statute, so that we may now disband our industrial development boards and the like, that fact has certainly not become public knowledge.
Simply put, the majority’s conclusion that the statute will alleviate rising product liability insurance rates is merely unfounded speculation. There is a difference between “rational basis” and “basic rationalization.” The equal protection clause does not permit us to destroy the rights of a class or group of Arizona citizens for some ephemeral, unsupported hope.
One final thought. There must come a time when legal doctrine and rhetoric are required to withstand the tests of history and common sense. The framers of our constitution repeatedly expressed the most profound concern for the plight of accident victims. See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 79-81 n. 9, 688 P.2d 961, 971-73 n. 9 (1984) (detailed review of constitutional debates relating to protection of accident victims). Our constitutional delegates abolished the fellow servant doctrine, made contributory negligence a question solely for the jury, barred the legislature from reducing the damages recoverable for death or injury, mandated the institution of a comprehensive workers’ compensation scheme and, finally, declared that the legislature would never be permitted to abrogate the right to seek judicial recovery of damages for personal injuries.4 Obviously, compensation for injuries was a fundamental tenet of the delegates of our convention. Id. This was not just a matter of humanitarian concern but a method of enabling the people of this state to control their own destiny by having access to the courts — the one place where ordinary people might find protection from the powers of vested interests. See, e.g., J.W. BYRKIT, FORGING THE COPPER COLLAR: ARIZONA’S LABOR-MANAGEMENT WAR OF 1901-1921 (1982).
Wherever the distinguished delegates may be, they must surely be scratching their heads — the majority opinion simply defies the history, spirit, intent and language of our state constitution by permitting the legislature to make incremental erosions of our most basic rights and to destroy every inch of progress made since 1912. As Justice Cardozo observed,
We take a false and one-sided view of history when we ignore its dynamic aspects. The year books can teach us how a principle or a rule had its beginnings. They cannot teach us that what was the beginning shall also be the end.
B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 104-05 (1924). Hopefully today’s majority decision is only a temporary step backward in our enforcement of the Arizona Constitution.
GORDON, C.J., concurs in the dissent.

. As pointed out in Barrio, 143 Ariz. at 104-07, 692 P.2d at 283-86, the legislature, of course, has authority to regulate damage actions. As far as art. 18, § 6 is concerned, the real issue argued in this case was whether eliminating strict liability theories, thus relegating plaintiffs to negligence and express warranty theories long after the manufacture of the product, left plaintiffs with reasonable alternatives or created an insurmountable barrier that violated art. 18, § 6. Id. This question, which goes to the heart of the case, is also ignored in the majority opinion and therefore will not be pursued further in this dissent. But see Rubino v. DeFretias, 638 F.Supp. 182 (D.Ariz.1986) (under abrogation clause, legislature could not eliminate battery action against doctor even though an alternate theory of malpractice was available).

. Okla. Const, art. 23, § 7 (1907) states in full: The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.
The Oklahoma provision is presented in the same form in which it is printed in the COMPILED LAWS OF OKLAHOMA (1909) at page • 136. This would have been the format available to our convention delegates. The only major difference between this provision and our abrogation clause is the limitation to injuries resulting in death. As originally presented to our convention by delegate Cunniff, our abrogation clause stated:
The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall never be subject to statutory limitations.
JOURNALS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ARIZONA, morning session, Dec. 5, 1910, at 567 (C. Cronin, ed. 1925) (emphasis added). On that same page in the JOURNALS, there is a reference to the Oklahoma Constitution, as our delegates finalized the various protections that would go into art. 18 of our constitution. The form of the clause offered by delegate Cunniff and the nearby reference to the Oklahoma Constitution strongly suggest the source of art. 18, § 6. The word "recoverable” was apparently switched to "recovered" as a stylistic modification.

. These minutes establish only that Mr. Jones, a lawyer representing the American Insurance Association, discussed the bill and answered questions. Mr. Jones’s expertise, if any, in rate making is not known to this author and is not established by the record. No relevant studies, statistics or data seem to have been cited to the Committee. No one has cited any to this court. So far as we know, none exist. It is hardly self-evident that premiums will be reduced if one very small class of plaintiffs is required to sue in negligence instead of strict liability. All this statute accomplishes is to place obstacles in the path of a select group of tort victims trying to recover damages from a particular group of defendants. The avowed public purpose is a reduction of insurance premiums for the benefit of all our citizens. In reality, the legislation discriminates against one small segment of our population by granting special benefits to another. This result plainly violates the text of our state constitution, which explicitly prohibits “special or exclusive" legislation. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 13 (equal privileges and immunities) and art. 4, pt. 2, § 19(13) (barring the grant of "any special or exclusive privileges [or] immunities” to "any corporation, association, or *202individual") (emphasis added). The majority offers no reason or rationale for ignoring our state constitution,

. See Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 31 (damages for death or personal injuries); art. 6, § 1 (judicial power); art. 18, § 3 (prohibition against contractual immunity of employer from liability for negligence), § 4 (abolition of fellow servant doctrine), § 5 (contributory negligence and assumption of risk always fact questions for the jury), § 6 (recovery of damages for injuries), § 7 (mandating passage of employer’s liability law), § 8 (mandating passage of workers’ compensation law).