Court Opinion

ID: 9753786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:28:35.779587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:42.172003
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, President Judge,
concurring:
I agree completely with the holding here today and the analysis employed in reaching that result. I write separately only to amplify a concern of the trial court regarding the proper components of a jury charge on first-degree murder.
The courts of this Commonwealth, this Court being no exception, have long used the words “malice” and “malicious” in describing the specific intent necessary to support a first-degree murder conviction. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Cross, 508 Pa. 322, 496 A.2d 1144 (1985); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 490 Pa. 421, 416 A.2d 1007 (1980); Commonwealth v. Person, 345 Pa.Super. 341, 498 A.2d 432 (1985) (Opinion by Cirillo, J.)
To be convicted of murder in the third-degree, the defendant must have acted with malice. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 506 Pa. 460, 485 A.2d 1097 (1984). Herein lies a potential source of confusion for the courts, and more importantly, for jurors. Malice is a technical term, a mens rea in and of itself, as it relates to third-degree murder. At the same time, however, the word malice is used as an *196adjective in describing the specific intent which supports a conviction of murder in the first-degree.
As amended in 1974, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502 dictates that first-degree murder is an intentional killing; malice is nowhere mentioned as a requisite element. Surely, this is because an intentional killing is necessarily malicious. In my view, when a jury is being instructed on the meaning of first-degree murder, use of the word “malice” should be avoided entirely, lest during deliberations the distinction between first and third-degree murder becomes blurred. The trial court should simply borrow from the statute itself, explaining that an intentional killing is that which is the result of poison, lying in wait, or any other willful, deliberate, premeditated act.
In the present case, there is no indication that the jury was actually confused on this point. Hence, I join in today’s holding.