Court Opinion

ID: 9702638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:19:57.946919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:40.121297
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I dissent on Issue I.
As noted in the conference opinion, eviden-tiary rulings of the trial court are to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Zens v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pac. R.R. Co., 479 N.W.2d 155, 159 (S.D.1991) (citations omitted). See State v. Christopherson, 482 N.W.2d 298, 300 (S.D.1992). This court has long held that the test utilized in review of matters “involving judicial discretion is Vhether we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could reasonably have reached that *930conclusion.’” Myron v. Coil, 82 S.D. 180, 185, 143 N.W.2d 738, 740 (1966) (emphasis added) (quoting F.M. Slagle & Co. v. Bushnell, 70 S.D. 250, 254, 16 N.W.2d 914, 916 (1944)). See In re Guardianship of Jacobsen, 482 N.W.2d 634, 636 (S.D.1992); Christopherson, 482 N.W.2d at 300. It is my opinion that the trial judge in this case “could reasonably have reached [the] conclusion” that evidence of the Plaintiffs’ other profitable investments with Jones could properly be excluded.
The Plaintiffs’ action was brought as a result of the Baldwin and NRM investments with Jones. These were the transactions that were at issue in this case. Jones’ proffered evidence purporting to show a “complete picture” of all the Plaintiffs’ financial dealings with Jones was irrelevant as to the particular transactions at issue. The conduct of Jones at other times during the entire history of financial dealings with the Plaintiffs has no bearing on Jones’ conduct as to the Baldwin and NRM transactions. Even if Jones dealt honestly and non-fraudulently in dozens of other transactions, this does not excuse or mitigate deceitful and fraudulent conduct as to other investment transactions •with these Plaintiffs. It has been stated that, “In assessing exemplary damages, the trier of fact should consider ... all the circumstances attending the particular occurrence [.] ” 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 807 (1988) (emphasis added). The “particular occurrences” in this case were the Baldwin and NRM transactions. The jury was aware that the Plaintiffs had a history of other transactions with Jones, and that the Plaintiffs were not complaining about those investments.
The jury had before it all the evidence needed to reach a proper verdict. I cannot find that the trial judge abused his discretion on this evidentiary ruling. Thus, I dissent on this issue.
As to the other issues, I concur in the writing.
HENDERSON, Retired Justice, joins my special writing.