Court Opinion

ID: 9759515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:18:53.601707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:02.567167
License: Public Domain

DUNCAN, Judge,
concurring.
Writing for the Court, Judge White states: “the defense may successfully challenge for cause a ‘venireman who is unable to reconsider guilt evidence in the particular context of special issues.’ Certainly the venireman who cannot distinguish between an ‘intentional’ and ‘deliberate’ killing will have substantial difficulty in this regard.” (P. 629). I agree with Judge White’s observation.
Since the effective date of § 19.03, Tex. Penal Code (1974) and Art. 37.071, V.A.C. C.P. in 1974 this Court has been inundated with appeals in which there was obvious confusion among the judges, lawyers and jurors as to how “intentionally” could be different than “deliberately.” The reason for this confusion is that there is only a vague, almost indiscernible, difference in the practical, everyday use of the words. When vagueness in an indispensable, statutory component of the criminal trial process inexorably produces such continuous confusion the entire process is verging on violating a defendant’s right to due course of law under Art. I § 19 of the Texas Constitution.
Judge Clinton stated in his dissenting opinion in Russell v. State, 665 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Clinton, J. Dissenting) that “ ‘[deliberately’ is neither the linguistic nor connotative equivalent of ‘intentionally.’ ” Id. at 784 Judge Clinton is correct. However, the words are denotatively equivalent. That is, they similarly point out or refer to essentially the same thing: the state of mind that accompanies one’s conduct. This is particularly evident when one *631recognizes that authoritative reference sources use deliberately as a synonym for intentionally, and vice-versa. See: A.F. Sisson, Sisson’s Synonyms (Parker Publishing Co., Inc.: West Nyack, N.Y., 1969), p. 176 and 178; J.R. Rodale, The Synonym Finder (Rodale Books, Inc.: Emmaus, Pennsylvania, 1977), p. 260 and 620.
It has been observed that:
[a] word is vague if the things habitually characterized by it are not sharply distinguished from those things which are habitually denied characterization — with the consequence that for some things falling within its range of application the use of the word is indeterminate.
Ernest Nagel, “Some Reflections on the Use of Language in the Natural Sciences,” in Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 51.
In the case of the words “deliberately” and “intentionally” the denotative distinction of the words is, as a practical matter, indistinguishable. The thing (state of mind) that is “habitually characterized ...,” Id., by the words is the same. But in the punishment phase of the capital murder trial when “deliberately” is not to be used in its normally accepted context there is no express guidance as to how it is to be “sharply distinguished ...,” Id., from intentional. Such vagueness in words that are part of the statutory procedural foundation of society’s exercising the death penalty is unacceptable.
In Williams v. State, 674 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) Judge Davis points out that “[w]hile a majority of the court does not agree, four judges, W.C. Davis, Clinton, Teague, and Miller do agree that upon timely request by a capital murder defendant or the State, that party is entitled to have the jury ...,” Id. at 322, fn. 6, given an instructive definition of “deliberately.” Judge Davis continues by quoting the definition of “deliberately” that was suggested by Judge Clinton in his dissenting opinion in Russell v. State, supra:
(1) as employed in the first special issue, the word “deliberately” has a meaning different and distinct from the word “intentionally,” as that word was previously defined in the charge on guilt, and
(2) instead, as employed in the first special issue, the word “deliberately” means a manner of doing an act characterized by or resulting from careful and thorough consideration; characterized by awareness of the consequences; willful, slow, unhurried, and steady as though allowing time for a decision. Id. at 787.
Based upon the foregoing observations, it is my opinion that the absence of a definition of “deliberately” during the punishment phase of a capital murder trial does nothing to further the administration of justice in that it invariably causes confusion among the judges, lawyers and jurors. Therefore, in the future (trials that commence after the date of this opinion) I would suggest that upon request by either the State or the defendant that trial judges give the jury an appropriate definition of “deliberately” that they are to use in answering the first special issue under Art. 37.071(b)(1).
With these additional comments I join Judge White’s majority opinion.
CLINTON, J., joins.