Court Opinion

ID: 9854031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:59:33.50335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:53.145257
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
(.dissenting).
¶ 37. I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
¶ 38. The question presented is whether parole revocation proceedings authorized by Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) can be initiated during a second term of parole based solely on the parolee's conduct during the parolee's first term of parole. To "answer" this question, the majority opinion examines case law, legislative *245history, and other statutes. None of these sources supports the majority opinion's holding. I therefore dissent.
¶ 39. The lone case-law authority, State ex rel. Cox v. DHSS, 105 Wis. 2d 378, 314 N.W.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1981), does not support the majority's holding. See majority op., ¶ 24. Cox stands for a simple proposition: When the department with jurisdiction over a probationer issues a probation violation warrant before the expiration of the probationary term, the running of that term is tolled.1 The execution of the warrant and the revocation proceedings need not occur within that probationary term, only the issuance of the warrant.2 As the court of appeals correctly noted in Cox, to require all revocation proceedings to occur within the probationary term would "effectively deprive the Department of any control over a probationer during the last months of the probationary term."3
¶ 40. Cox's holding remains a simple proposition when applied to the instant case: If the Department wants to revoke parole before the expiration of the parole term, it must initiate revocation proceedings before the expiration of the parole term.
¶ 41. Cox brings us no closer to understanding what "term of supervision" might mean. Cox neither uses the phrase "term of supervision" nor deals with a situation in which the defendant was twice placed on parole or probation and the second parole or probation term was revoked based on conduct occurring during the first term.
*246¶ 42. Legislative history does not support the majority's holding. According to the majority opinion, the drafting records indicate that Wis. Stat. § 57.072 (the precursor to Wis. Stat. § 304.072) codified Cox.4 I agree, but without more, the legislative history is no more useful than is Cox in divining the meaning of the phrase "term of supervision."
¶ 43. The drafting records provide two tea leaves for the majority opinion to contemplate; neither resolves the issue presented in this case. One handwritten note cites Cox and posits, "Probation violation warrant issued during probation period preserved revocation jurisdiction even though not executed."5 Another note in the record succinctly states what the Legislature likely gleaned from Cox: "The bill also provides a procedure for the department to preserve its probation or parole jurisdiction by taking certain action prior to the expiration of a term of supervision."6 Neither Cox, nor the legislative history codifying Cox, provides the answer to the question presented.
¶ 44. The majority opinion, like the dissent in the court of appeals, then turns to other statutes, putting significant weight on language contained in Wis. Stat. §§ 302.1K6)7 and (7)(d).8 These two statutes state that a parolee is subject to all conditions and rules of parole *247until the "expiration of [the] sentence" or until he or she is "discharge[d] by the department." These two chapter 302 statutes use the phrases "expiration of [the] sentence" and "discharge [d] by the department" rather than the phrase "term of supervision."
¶ 45. The chapter 302 provisions do not provide a mechanism for revocation of parole, probation, or extended supervision. They certainly do not tell us what "term of supervision" means; they never use the phrase. They do not tell us whether Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) allows action taken by the Department in a second term of parole to be based solely on conduct occurring during a parolee's first term of parole.
¶ 46. After reviewing the three sources upon which the majority hangs its hat, the question remains: What does "term of supervision" as used in Wis. Stat. § 304.072(3) mean, and can conduct during a term of parole lead to revocation of a second term of parole? None of the sources, separately or together, support any more than the simple proposition first stated in Cox: The Department tolls the running of a term of probation, parole, or extended supervision when it takes certain action before the expiration of that term.
¶ 47. I agree with the court of appeals that the statutory phrase "term of supervision" means exactly what it says. The text of the statute matters. When the legislature wanted to refer to "expiration of the sentence" and "discharged by the department," it used those words.
¶ 48. The Department of Corrections' jurisdiction in parole matters is limited to seeking revocation only for violations that occur during that term of supervi*248sion. This interpretation does not hinder the state in prosecuting crime and does not threaten public safety. The State can prosecute a parolee for criminal conduct committed during any period of parole, and the parolee may be subject to imprisonment. In the present case, for example, the defendant's parole violation during his first parole was prosecuted as a crime, resulting in an eighty-year sentence.
¶ 49. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 50. I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this dissent.

 State ex rel. Cox v. DHSS, 105 Wis. 2d 378, 380, 314 N.W.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1981).

 Id. at 381.

 Id.

 Majority op., ¶ 24 (citing 1983 Act 528, § 20).

 Id., ¶ 24 n.8 (citing Drafting records for 1983 Act 528).

 Id., ¶ 23 (citing Drafting Records for 1983 Act 528).

 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.11(6) reads in relevant part as follows: "Any inmate released on parole... is subject to all conditions and rules of parole until the expiration of the sentence or until he or she is discharged by the department."

 Wisconsin Stat. § 302.11(7)(d) reads in relevant part as follows: "A parolee who is subsequently released either after service of the period of time determined by the reviewing *247authority or by a grant of parole ... is subject to all conditions and rules of parole until expiration of sentence or discharge by the department."