Court Opinion

ID: 9712733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:58:57.637129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.026259
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Buchanan, P.J.
I concur, but for different reasons from those stated by the majority.
I find it unnecessary to reach the question of whether the police officer was qualified as an expert because, in the absence of legislation requiring the use of seat belts, no evidence should have been admitted as to the so-called “seat belt defense”.
Courts have taken a variety of approaches to the propriety of the “seat belt defense.”
In the absence of a statutory requirement most courts are reluctant to hold that non-use of seat belts is negligence as a matter of law. Kavanagh v. Butorac (1966), 140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824; Kunze v. Stang (N.D, 1971), 191 *39N.W.2d 526; Bertsch v. Spears (1969), 20 Ohio App.2d 137, 252 N.E.2d 194. Only a few courts have gone so far as to find a common law duty to use seat belts so that the trier of fact may determine that failure to use them constitutes contributory negligence. Truman v. Vargas (1969), 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal Rep. 373; Bentzler v. Braun (1967), 34 Wis.2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626.1
A growing minority of courts have determined that although failure to use seat belts does not constitute contributory negligence, evidence of non-use can properly be considered as to mitigation of damages or avoidable consequences. Henderson v. U.S. (10th Cir. 1970), 429 F.2d 588; Benner v. Interstate Container Corp. (E.D. Pa. 2/8/77), 73 F. Supp. 502; Pritts v. Lowery Trucking Co. (W.D. Pa. 1975), 400 F. Supp. 867; Glover v. Daniels (D.C. Miss. 1970), 310 F. Supp. 750; Mount v. McClellan (1968), 91 Ill. App.2d 1, 234 N.E.2d 329; Josel v. Rossi (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 1091, 288 N.E.2d 677; Spier v. Barker (1974), 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164; Estate of Abrams v. Woods (1970), 64 Misc.2d 1093, 316 N.Y.S.2d 750; Sonnier v. Ramsey (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), 424 S.W.2d 684.
Such a theory seems, in effect, to impose liability for non-use of seat belts under the guise of failure to mitigate damages for an act (omission) that occurred prior to the event, which is inconsistent with mitigation which occurs after the event.
While the law on this subject is in a state of transition, the majority of courts considering the question reject the non-use of seat belts as a factor in the determination of liability or damages. Woods v. Smith (N.D. Fla. 1969), 296 F. *40Supp. 1128; Robinson v. Bone (D.C. Ore. 1968), 285 F. Supp. 423; Moore v. Fisher (1973), 31 Colo. App. 425, 505 P.2d 383; Clark v. State (1970), 28 Conn. Supp. 398, 264 A.2d 366; Lipscomb v. Diamiani (Del. 1967), 226 A.2d 914; Brown v. Kendrick (Fla. 1966), 192 So.2d 49; Lawrence v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co. (La. 1968), 213 So.2d 784; Romankewiz v. Black (1969), 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606; Miller v. Haynes (Mo. 1970), 454 S.W.2d 293; Miller v. Miller (1968), 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65; Roberts v. Bohn (1971), 26 Ohio App.2d 50, 269 N.E.2d 53; Genger v. Campbell (1970), 256 Ore. 67, 469 P.2d 776; Robinson v. Lewis (1969), 254 Ore. 52, 457 P.2d 483.
The rationale usually is that there is no common law duty to wear seat belts and no duty will be imposed absent a statutory requirement . . . and the defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him.
Indiana has a statute requiring all new vehicles to be equipped with seat belts :
Required equipment.
Sec. 1. It is unlawful for any person to buy, sell, lease, trade or transfer from or to Indiana residents at retail an automobile which is manufactured or assembled commencing with the 1964 models, unless such automobile is equipped with safety belts installed for use in the front seat thereof. (Formerly: Acts 1963, c. 130, s. 1). IC 9-8-7-1.
Observe the statute merely requires that automobiles be equipped with seat belts and is silent as to their use, required or otherwise, by passengers.
Having gone this far, it is the prerogative of the Legislature to determine if non-use of seat belts is a basis for liability. As the court explained in Lipscomb v. Diamiani, supra at 916:
The life and death area with which we are dealing is peculiarly suited for the legislative exploration and development.
•§• H» H»
*41“It may be that after further research by various safety committees, the law may be changed to require the use of seat belts and to affix some element of negligence for failure to use same. This is not the law today and it is not within the province of this court to legislate on the subject, regardless of what might be the thinking of the individual members of this court.”
# * *
The question of automobile safety is comprehensively considered in the Delaware statutory law. It is a vital and continuing concern to the Legislature. There can be little question but that the legislative forum is a better one to explore the area than the isolated courtroom. The Courts, as guardians of law, can do no greater disservice than fail to recognize the full role of the other branches of government. (emphasis supplied)
So, this court should not drift into the uncharted waters of judicial legislation. Until the Legislature acts we should follow the majority rule rejecting the non-use of seat belts as a basis of liability (contributory negligence) or mitigation of damages.
Thus I conclude that any evidence of non-use of seat belts should have been excluded.
Note. — Reported at 362 N.E.2d 184.

. Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc. (7th Cir. 1971), 441 F.2d 1344, a federal case interpreting Indiana law, held the giving of an instruction that failure to wear a seat belt is contributory negligence was not error, because the wearing of seat belts is suffiicently involved in the exercise of reasonable care as to be an issue of common law negligence in Indiana under proper circumstances.
This court is not bound by federal interpretation of Indiana law. McFarland v. Phend and Brown, Inc. (1974), 161 Ind. App. 695, 317 N.E.2d 460.