Court Opinion

ID: 9580811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:09:13.042611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:32.941984
License: Public Domain

ANDREWS, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
In order to recover for injuries suffered in a slip-and-fall, an invitee plaintiff must show that despite her exercise of ordinary care, the defendant owner had superior knowledge of the hazard resulting from conditions under that defendant’s control. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 748-749 (2) (b) (493 SE2d 403) (1997).
Notwithstanding [a] Robinson analysis, a claim involving a static defect differs from other slip and fall cases in that when a person has successfully negotiated an alleged dangerous condition on a previous occasion, that person is presumed to have equal knowledge of it and cannot recover for a subsequent injury resulting therefrom.
(Punctuation omitted.) Trans-Vaughn Dev. Corp. v. Cummings, 273 Ga. App. 505, 508 (615 SE2d 579) (2005); see also Febuary v. Averitt Properties, 242 Ga. App. 137, 139 (528 SE2d 880) (2000). When a plaintiff offers only “speculation or conjecture” concerning the cause of her fall, or when “the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to grant summary judgment.” Shadburn v. Whitlow, 243 Ga. App. 555, 557 (533 SE2d 765) (2000).
Rutherford’s affidavit testimony concerning her state of distraction is both inadmissible and irrelevant. Her affidavit directly contradicts her deposition testimony that she did not know why she fell. In the absence of any reasonable explanation for this contradiction, see Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27, 28 (1) *706(343 SE2d 680) (1986), this Court is obliged to resolve it against her as a matter of law. Hallberg v. Flat Creek Animal Clinic, 225 Ga. App. 212, 214-215 (1) (483 SE2d 671) (1997) (disregarding plaintiffs affidavit testimony that she fell because a ramp leading out of a veterinary clinic was too steep as well as her explanation that she was nervous at the time the deposition was taken, and affirming a grant of summary judgment to defendants). And evidence of distraetion cannot be relevant where a plaintiff has “actual knowledge of the hazard before the alleged distraction.” Delk v. QuikTrip Corp., 258 Ga. App. 140, 142 (572 SE2d 676) (2002) (affirming grant of summary judgment despite plaintiffs testimony that she was distracted).
Decided November 24, 2009
Reconsideration denied Deoember 16, 2009.
Robert C. Koski, for appellant.
Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, Robert W Stannard, for appellee.
There is no evidence before us that Rutherford gained entrance to the store except by means of the same ramp she fell down on exiting. Since it is undisputed that Rutherford negotiated that ramp successfully on entering the store, she is presumed to have had equal knowledge of any hazard associated with it as she exited. See Delk, supra, 258 Ga. App. 140, 142 (affirming grant of summary judgment where plaintiff had successfully negotiated path including raised gas tank storage cover on her way into store). Even assuming that the ramp violated one or more building codes, moreover, Robinson cannot recover because she does not know what caused her fall. See Trans-Vaughn Dev. Corp., 273 Ga. App. at 510 (even in the face of a dispute over a stairway’s lack of landing or handrails, plaintiffs equal knowledge of hazard posed by it precluded recovery).
For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.