Court Opinion

ID: 9524539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:53:51.656115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:50.022176
License: Public Domain

GARRARD, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the result reached by the majority in the judgment against Michiana Brass and dissent to its reversal of the judgment against Hurwich.1
The key to our appellate review arises from the procedural fact that the trial court was not required, by timely request of the parties or otherwise, to enter special findings of fact pursuant to Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 52. As the majority recognizes, under such circumstances we are to consider the case as decided upon a general judgment, and it is our duty to affirm if the judgment is sustainable on any theory. However, in applying this principle we may not contradict (by affirming on grounds contrary to) any of the findings of fact actually entered by the trial court. Kizer v. Davis (1977), 174 Ind.App. 559, 369 N.E.2d 439; Hunter v. Milhous (1974), 159 Ind.App. 105, 305 N.E.2d 448, 459.
In this case I cannot accept the majority’s determination that the establishment of the second corporation (Michiana) amounted to no more than a change of name and therefore would not shield it from the liability of Mishawaka. The trial court expressly found that it was a duly created separate corporation. The court also found that there were “insufficient badges of fraud to establish that the subject transactions were made with intent to defraud Milwaukee Valve.”
IC 32-2-1-14 provides:
“All conveyances or assignments, in writing or otherwise, of any estate in lands, or of goods or things in action, every charge upon lands, goods or things *859in action, and all bonds, contracts, evidences of debt, judgments, decrees, made or suffered with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors or other persons of their lawful damages, forfeitures, debts or demands, shall be void as to the persons sought to be defrauded.”
The evidence clearly supports the inference that the creation of Michiana and the transfer of assets to it was done with intent to hinder and delay Milwaukee Valve, a creditor, in collecting its lawful debt. On that basis the judgment against Michiana, to the extent of Mishawaka’s assets, should be affirmed. Hunter v. Milhous, supra.
Similarly, and recognizing that the court entered no specific findings which establish the liability of Hurwich, the evidence nevertheless clearly sustains the inference that the sale and lease-back arrangement was also accomplished with intent to hinder and delay Milwaukee in the collection of its claim and judgment. Therefore, the judgment against Hurwich to the extent of the Mishawaka assets should, also, be affirmed.

. There is no dispute that the judgment against Mishawaka Brass should be affirmed.