Court Opinion

ID: 9681526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:52:06.157031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:20.998980
License: Public Domain

Robinson, J. Appellant, Jess Askew, filed a suit in the Pulaski Chancery Court against appellee, Murdock Acceptance Corporation, asking that a certain note and mortgage be canceled on the ground that a usurious rate of interest was charged. The property covered by the mortgage is an automobile. While the cause was pending in Chancery, Murdock filed a replevin suit in the Circuit Court alleging that, under the terms of the mortgage, the Acceptance Corporation was entitled to immediate possession of the automobile so that the car could be sold to satisfy the mortgage. Askew demurred to the complaint in the Circuit Court, the demurrer alleging that the Circuit Court does not have jurisdiction for the reason that there is an action pending in Chancery between the same parties and involving the same subject matter. The demurrer asked that the complaint in the Circuit Court be dismissed, and that the automobile taken from Askew on the order of replevin issued by the Circuit Court he restored to him. The Circuit Court overruled the demurrer and Askew has appealed. The pleadings in the Chancery case were made a part of the record in the Circuit Court. This was done by stipulation. However, appellee did not stipulate that such pleadings were ' admissible hut objected on the ground that they were inadmissible in the hearing on the demurrer in the Circuit Court. The so-called demurrer should have been treated as a motion to dismiss, and when treated as such, the Chancery pleadings were admissible. The record shows that appellant Askew had filed in the Chancery Court a complaint alleging, inter alia, that he had borrowed $1,100 on his 1951 Buick automobile, motor number 63655635 (which is the same automobile involved in the replevin suit in the Circuit Court); that he was required to execute a note in the sum of $1,561.68; that he is the actual owner of the automobile; that his sister, Alice R. Askew, as a matter of accommodation signed the note and mortgage given as a security for the loan; that these facts were fully known to the defendant; and that the loan made by the Murdock Acceptance Corporation to him is usurious and void. The complaint further' made the sister, Alice R. Askew, a party defendant, and the plaintiff asks that the note and mortgage be cancelled and that the title to the car be vested in him free of all claims of the defendant. The record further shows that the plaintiff moved that he be allowed to deposit in the registry of the Chancery Court the monthly payments required by the note, and that the payments he held subject to the order of the court. Undoubtedly, Askew’s pleading called a “demurrer” should have been regarded as a motion to dismiss when viewed in the light of the evidence introduced in support of the pleading. The character and sufficiency of a pleading is to be determined, not by what it is called bv the pleader, hut by the facts which it sets up. Randolph v. Nichol, 74 Ark. 93, 84 S. W. 1037. Courts regard substance of pleadings rather than form. Teal v. Thompson, 180 Ark. 63, 20 S. W. 2d 307. The issues and the parties in both courts are the same. In the Chancery Court, Askew said he owned a certain Buick automobile; that he borrowed some money on the car, but the lender, Murdock, charged a usurious rate of interest; that the note and mortgage given to secure the loan are void and Murdock is not entitled to collect the debt. In the Circuit Court, Murdock contended that it held a valid mortgage on the Buick automobile; that the payments on the note securing the mortgage were delinquent; and asked that the Acceptance Corporation be given possession of the automobile so that it could be sold under the terms of the mortgage. (This was the very same mortgage the validity of which was at that time an issue between Murdock and Askew in the case pending in the Chancery Court.) Wilson v. Sanders, 217 Ark. 326, 230 S. W. 2d 19, is cited as sustaining’ the ruling that Murdock can maintain the action in the Circuit Court. But, in the Sanders case, the parties were not the same and the issues were not the same. Moreover, the second suit was filed in the same court where the first suit was pending. In the first suit, Wilson was plaintiff and some Improvement Districts were defendants. During the pendency of the litigation, Sanders acquired some kind of title to the property involved. The Wilson suit had been lying dormant in the Chancery Court for three years; no answer had been filed and no issue joined. There was no showing that a final determination in the suit of Wilson against the Improvement Districts would have concluded the issue between Sanders and Wilson. In the case at bar, the Chancery Court had authority to make whatever orders that were necessary to protect properly the interests of the parties during the pendency of the litigation, and a final determination of that cause could have completely settled the issue raised in the Circuit Court. Appellee also relies on Garibaldi v. Wright, 52 Ark. 416, 12 S. W. 875, as sustaining the view that the case could proceed in the Circuit Court although the automobile about which the suits were brought was the same in both cases. In the Garibaldi case, the court held that a conversion suit regarding property which was in litigation in the Chancery Court did not have to be litigated in Chancery. However, subsequent to the Garibaldi case, in Chicot Lumber Company v. Dardell, 84 Ark. 140, 104 S. W. 1100, it is held that the legal issue of conversion may be adjudicated in equity where the Chancery Court has properly taken jurisdiction for any purpose. The principle that the Chancery Court, having taken jurisdiction for any purpose, will completely settle the rights of the parties in the subject matter of the controversy is so firmly established that it needs no citations of authority. However, a few of the cases so holding are: McDonald v. Shaw, 92 Ark. 15, 121 S. W. 935, 28 L. R. A., N. S. 657; Jarratt v. Langston, 99 Ark. 438, 138 S. W. 1003; Galloway v. Darby, 105 Ark. 558, 151 S. W. 1014, 44 L. R. A., N. S. 782; School District No. 36 v. Gladish, 111 Ark. 329, 163 S. W. 1194; Hall v. Huff, 114 Ark. 206, 169 S. W. 792. Also, damages may be allowed. Evans v. Pettus, 112 Ark. 572, 166 S. W. 955. Undoubtedly, the Chancery Court had jurisdiction to completely settle the rights of the parties. It being determined beyond any question that the Chancery Court had such jurisdiction, the question that necessarily follows is: did the Circuit Court commit error in assuming jurisdiction in the circumstances'? The appellee cites authorities on the subject of abatement as sustaining the view that the Circuit Court case is not abated by reason of the pendency of the action in Chancery. This is not a question of abatement, but one of comity between courts. In 14 Am. Jur. 435, it is said: “It is a familiar principle .that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction of the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of process. If interference may come from one side, it may from the other also, and what is begun may be reciprocated indefinitely.” On page 438 of the same volume, it is said: “It simply demands as a matter of necessity, and therefore of comity, that when the object of the action requires the control ami dominion of the property involved in the litigation, that court ivhich first acquires possession, or that dominion which is equivalent, draw to itself the exclusive right to dispose of it for the purposes of its jurisdiction In 14 Am. Jur. 439, it is said: “ Where the pendency of a suit in one court is relied on to defeat a second suit in another court of concurrent jurisdiction, the identity of the parties, of the case made, and of the relief sought should be such that if the first suit had been decided it could be pleaded in bar as a former adjudication. ’ ’ That is exactly the situation we have here. If Askew had prevailed in the Chancery case on his allegation of usury, it could have been pleaded as a complete defense in the Circuit Court in the suit filed there by Murdock. In 21 C. J. S. 745, it is said: “Where two actions between the same parties on the same subject, and to test the same rights, are brought in different courts having concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction, its power being adequate to the administration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction and may dispose of the whole controversy, and no court of coordinate power is at liberty to interfere with its action. This rule rests on comity and the necessity of avoiding conflict in the execution of judgments by independent courts, and is a necessary one because any other rule would unavoidably lead to perpetual collision and be productive of most calamitous results. ’ ’ Among the authorities for the text, C. J. S. cites the following cases: Wasson, Bank Commissioner v. Dodge, Chancellor, 192 Ark. 728, 94 S. W. 2d 720; Moore v. Price, 189 Ark. 117, 70 S. W. 2d 563; Davis v. Lawhon, 186 Ark. 51, 52 S. W. 2d 887; Wright v. LeCroy, 184 Ark. 837, 44 S. W. 2d 355; Vaughan v. Hill, 154 Ark. 528, 242 S. W. 826. These cases clearly point out that Circuit Courts and Chancery Courts are of equal dignity, and in cases where there is concurrent jurisdiction, the court that first acquires jurisdiction has the right and jurisdiction to conduct the matter to an end without interference by another court of equal dignity. And, in Dunbar v. Bourland, 88 Ark. 153, 114 S. W. 467, Mr. Justice Hart said: “While these remedies are concurrent, it must not be understood that concurrent remedies may be pursued concurrently. Mr. Works say: ‘Where two or more courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the one which first takes cognizance of a cause has the exclusive right to entertain and exercise such jurisdiction, to the final determination of the action and the enforcement of its judgment or decree.’ Works on Courts and Their Jurisdiction, § 17. “Mr. Bailey says: ‘In the distribution of powers among courts it frequently happens that jurisdiction of the same subject-matter is given to different courts. Conflict and confusion would inevitably result unless some rule was adopted to prevent or avoid it. Therefore it has been wisely and uniformly determined that whichever court, of those having jurisdiction, first obtains jurisdiction, or, as is sometimes said, possession of the cause, will retain throughout, to the exclusion of another; and this jurisdiction extends to the execution of the judgment.’ 1 Bailey on Jurisdiction, § 77. “The Supreme Court of the United States says that this proposition is firmly established. ‘When a State court and a court of the United States may each take jurisdiction of a matter, the tribunal where jurisdiction first attaches holds it, to the exclusion of the other, until its duty is fully performed, and the jurisdiction involved is exhausted; and this rule applies alike in both civil and criminal cases.’ Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148.” Beversed, with directions to issue orders not inconsistent herewith. Mr. Justice Holt dissents; Mr. Justice G-eorge Bose Smith concurs. Chief Justice Seamster not participating.