Court Opinion

ID: 9632887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:27:02.81196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:29.716325
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (Specially concurring). I specially concur. A. Mention of “the insurance company” in a doctor’s report does not warrant a mistrial. In the course of the cross-examination of defendant’s psychiatrist, plaintiff read a portion of a report” of a non-witness doctor which included the following: “She felt that she was pressed into getting an attorney, but even this relationship was marred by a great deal of lack of trust on her part where she felt her attorney was siding with the insurance company and employing a variety of delaying tactics.” [Emphasis added.] Defendant objected to the question and moved for a mistrial at the close of the day’s proceedings. The court was not prepared to rule upon defendant’s motion. The following morning after argument, the court stated that it would consider the motion as taken under advisement. Thereafter, the trial proceeded and ended. The trial court never ruled on defendant’s objection to the question or his motion for a mistrial. Defendant abandoned his motion. Upon what basis defendant’s motion can be raised in this appeal has not been shown. Even though we assume the trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, defendant failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion. Transwestern Pipe Line Company v. Yandell, 69 N.M. 448, 460, 367 P.2d 938 (1961) says: ... A motion to declare a mistrial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and is reviewable only for an abuse thereof, [citation omitted.] The trial judge is in a much better position to know whether a miscarriage of justice has taken place and his opinion is entitled to great weight in the absence of a clearly erroneous decision. We find no abuse of discretion by the court in overruling the motion for mistrial. Defendant did not state this rule or discuss it. There was no abuse of discretion. Plaintiff’s and defendant’s lawyer each possessed copies of the doctor’s report for several months and were thoroughly familiar with its contents. If defendant wanted to test the use by plaintiff of that portion of the report which included “the insurance company,” a motion in limine should have been filed. Proper v. Mowry, 90 N.M. 710, 568 P.2d 236 (Ct.App.1977). The issue would have been decided and an order entered. If adverse to defendant, error in the appeal would have been proper. Defendant used the doctor’s report. It would be reasonable for defendant to believe that plaintiff would also use it. Anticipation of its use by plaintiff should have warned defendant to seek a resolution before trial, not during trial. To catch a district judge off guard requires a shot from the hip to resolve the issue. This method of procedure fosters reversible error. It does not lessen it. If defendant was seriously concerned about “the insurance company” being harmful because of its effect upon the jury, he could have requested UJI Civ. 2.8 which reads: Whether a party is insured has no bearing whatsoever on any issue that you must decide. You must refrain from any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance. Defendant did not want to focus upon this issue. But the failure to request the instruction is at least an indication that defendant was not worried. To me, it means that defendant only sought, but failed to discover another point to raise in the appeal. I am convinced that the juror of today, who has the above instruction before him during deliberations, will not violate his oath of office and disregard the admonition of the court. It appears in the instant case that plaintiff and defendant are represented by the same insurance company. For my views of what constitutes reversible error in the mention of an insurance company; see, Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423, 533 P.2d 703 (Ct.App.1976), Sutin, J., dissenting in part. Defendant was not entitled to a mistrial. B. “Res ipsa loquitur” instruction is erroneous but not prejudicially. Over objection of defendant, the court submitted UJI Civ. 16.23 on “res ipsa loquitur.” It reads: The plaintiff relies in part upon the doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur” which is a Latin phrase and means “the thing speaks for itself”. In order for the jury to find the defendant negligent under this doctrine, the plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions: 1. that the injury and damages to plaintiff were proximately caused by a horse, which was under the exclusive control and management of the defendant; [defendant concedes this proposition.] 2. that the event causing the injury and damages to the plaintiff was a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence on the part of the person in control of the instrumentality. [at issue.] If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, then the law permits you to infer that the defendant was negligent and that the injury and damages proximately resulted from such negligence. If, on the other hand, you find that any one of the propositions have not been proved, or if you find, notwithstanding the proof of these propositions, that- the defendant used ordinary care for the safety of others in his control and management of the horse, then plaintiff cannot recover under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. [Emphasis added.] When stated simply, this instruction reads: Plaintiff relies in part upon the doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur.” Plaintiff must prove two essential propositions to establish defendant’s negligence. ****** If you find that each of these propositions has been proved, then you may conclude that defendant was negligent and that the injury and damage proximately resulted from such negligence. If on the other hand, you find that one of the propositions has not been proven, plaintiff cannot recover. Also, plaintiff cannot recover, although he has proven the two propositions, if you find that the defendant used ordinary care for the safety of others. It is important to explain the meaning and effect of this instruction: (1) The jury is told that “The plaintiff relies in part upon the doctrine of ‘res ipsa loquitur.’ ” Plaintiff does not rely on res ipsa alone. Under UJI Civ. 3.2, on statement of the issues, the jury was also told that plaintiff relied upon three “claimed acts of negligence.” During its deliberations, the jury could consider both res ipsa and “claimed acts of negligence.” (2) The jury is told that if plaintiff proves the two essential propositions, irrespective of the three “claimed acts of negligence,” it can also find the defendant otherwise negligent, and conclude that the injury and damage proximately resulted from such negligence. The jury is not told that plaintiff can recover. (3) However, even though plaintiff proves the two essential propositions which establish defendant’s negligence and proximate cause, the jury is told that “plaintiff cannot recover” if the jury finds that defendant exercised “ordinary care for the safety of others.” I cannot reconcile a jury finding defendant to be both negligent and careful at the same time on the same subject matter. This portion of the instruction is erroneous, but it strongly favors defendant. Regardless of what plaintiff proves, plaintiff cannot recover under res ipsa if the mental attitude of the jury favors an animal owner. (4)The submission of this instruction was not reversible error. When the verdict of the jury was returned in plaintiff’s favor did the jury rely upon res ipsa, the three “claimed acts of negligence” or both? Only the jury knows. In a jury trial in which a general verdict is returned, the manner in which the jury discharged its functions is for us an unknowable. No one but the jurors know the effect of the res ipsa instruction on their verdict. To learn the knowledge of the jury is to request, in addition to the general verdict, interrogatories which direct the jury to find the basis upon which it arrived at its verdict. Maxwell v. Santa Fe Public Schools, 87 N.M. 383, 534 P.2d 307 (Ct.App.1975), Sutin, J., specially concurring. Inasmuch as we do not know whether the jury relied on res ipsa loquitur, one of three “claimed acts of negligence,” or both, we cannot arbitrarily say that the jury relied upon res ipsa loquitur. To seek a reversal, the burden is on defendant to show that the submission of the instruction was prejudicial error, i. e., that it substantially affected his right so as to result in a miscarriage of justice. Kight v. Butscher, 90 N.M. 386, 564 P.2d 189 (Ct.App.1977), Sutin, J., dissenting. It must have some effect upon the final result of the trial. State Highway Commission v. Beets, 88 S.D. 536, 224 N.W.2d 567 (1974). To establish prejudicial error, defendant must show that his rights were affected because the jury actually relied upon res ipsa. This cannot be done. Defendant failed to lift the burden. Prejudicial error cannot be established. C. Res ipsa loquitur was properly submitted. Defendant argues that based upon the record, it is not possible to say that the event that caused plaintiff’s injuries was a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence on the part of defendant. Terry v. Dunlap, 84 N.M. 86, 499 P.2d 1008 (Ct.App.1972) held that there was no basis for an instruction on the theory of res ipsa loquitur where there was no evidence that any animal, including a yearling, had ever escaped onto a highway via a cattle-guard which was owned and controlled by the State Highway Department, not defendant. If defendant owned and controlled the cattleguard, must plaintiff prove that prior to the accident one or more animals had escaped onto the highway via a cattleguard to establish that the event is “of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence”? If so, I disagree. Akin v. Berkshire, 85 N.M. 425, 512 P.2d 1261 (Ct.App.1973) relies on Terry. The court said: The evidence submitted on this point can be summarized in one sentence: Defendants’ cow was on highway 41 where it was struck by plaintiffs’ automobile. Our decision can likewise be stated in one sentence: Plaintiff has not sustained his burden of proof on the first element of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The only evidence in this case is that cows might get out of a fenced pasture if chased by men or animals; that cows have been known to jump fences; and that they will do just about anything you would expect them not to do. Thus, the only evidence is that this accident is of the kind which occurs in the absence of negligence. [Id. 426, 512 P.2d 1261.] If so, I disagree. Carrillo v. Hoyl, 85 N.M. 751, 517 P.2d 73 (Ct.App.1973) follows Akin. I disagree. It is far more important to balance injury, damage and death by persons using the highway against injury or death of an animal. Mitchell v. Ridgway, 77 N.M. 249, 251, 421 P.2d 778 (1966) said: Modern highways and vehicular traffic in New Mexico with livestock permitted to roam at large presents an intolerable situation .... We hold that it is for the trier of facts to determine whether the owner of the animal has used reasonable care to restrain his livestock. If it was intolerable in 1966, it can be considered tragic in 1981. The resolution of this problem rests in the judicial approach of the courts. If the court favors the protection of the animal owner, Terry, Akin and Carrillo should remain the law of New Mexico. If the court favors the protection of the public, Terry, Akin and Carrillo should be overruled. In my opinion, the general public should be protected because Mitchell is controlling, not Terry, Akin or Carrillo. I favor the rule which holds that an unattended animal on the highway is sufficient evidence to allow the jury to infer negligence on the part of those whose duty it is to restrain the animal because unattended animals do not escape their enclosure unless someone is negligent, a conclusion which is supported by an abundance of authority. Nuclear Corporation of America v. Lang, 480 F.2d 990 (8th Cir. 1973); O’Connor v. Black, 80 Idaho 96, 326 P.2d 376 (1958); Mercer v. Byrons, 200 F.2d 284 (1st Cir. 1952); Bender v. Welsh, 344 Pa. 392, 25 A.2d 182 (1942); Vaclavicek v. Olejarz, 61 N.J. 581, 297 A.2d 3 (1972). The basic reason for the rule was stated in Bender, supra, as follows: [H]orses which are properly confined ordinarily do not escape. Hence the presence of an unattended horse on the highway is sufficient evidence to allow the jury to infer negligence on the part of those whose duty it was to restrain him, and this has been held in a number of cases .... [Citations omitted.] [Id. 25 A.2d 184.] The court quoted the following from one of the cases cited: “Under any but exceptional circumstances, the exercise of ordinary care will serve to keep unattended animals in their proper inclosures. In these days of rapid automobile transportation, the extreme hazard to drivers and passengers of animals straying unattended on the roads at night cannot be overestimated. The driver is placed in a well-nigh helpless position because of the tendency of an animal to spring out of darkness in front of a car when blinded or hypnotized by its headlights. Against this contingency, drivers should be protected, by having our roads clear of such obstructions, and every owner of live stock should make an earnest endeavor to so control their movements with due care that the lives of others may not be thereby endangered.” [Id. 25 A.2d 184.] Bender enlarges on the intolerable concept stated in Mitchell. The characteristics of the horse were known only to defendant. The method of escape of defendant’s horse based upon defendant’s testimony and that of his daughter, is unknown. None of the other horses had ever escaped. Any evidence of the method of escape of the horse, if any, is ordinarily known only to defendant, not plaintiff. Plaintiff had no reasonable method of determining the method of escape. All that plaintiff could discover was the corral and its fencing. If the fencing of a corral is relied upon to contain a horse, the fencing must be shown to have been one that a reasonable man would believe to be adequate to that end. Vaclavicek, supra. Substantial evidence established that the fencing was not adequate to contain the horse. This was the negligence of defendant. If the corral has been adequate to contain the horse, “the event causing the injury and damages to the plaintiff was of a kind which ordinarily does not occur.” Res ipsa loquitur was properly submitted to the jury. On the other issues raised by defendant, I concur with Judge Lopez.