Court Opinion

ID: 9367430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 19:02:21.464463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:59.708534
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/31/23 P. v. Seaton CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

  THE PEOPLE,                                                         B312805

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. NA115193)
           v.

  LEON SEATON,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura Laesecke, Judge. Remanded for
resentencing.
      Susan Morrow Maxwell, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   _________________________
      After a jury found Leon Seaton guilty of first degree
burglary, the trial court found that he had two prior strike
convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law, struck
one of the strikes, and sentenced him to the upper term, doubled
based on the remaining strike. Seaton now appeals, contending
that remand is required based on recent amendments to Penal
Code1 section 1170 and that there are other sentencing errors.
We agree that remand for resentencing is required.
                         BACKGROUND
       On the morning of August 27, 2020, Caitlyn Lindgren
heard a loud bang come from the front of her house. Looking out,
she saw someone in her storage shed. Lindgren called 911.
Responding police officers found Seaton on a neighbor’s property
and arrested him. Seaton was charged with first degree
burglary, person present (§ 459), and a jury found him guilty as
charged.
       On May 4, 2021, the trial court held a court trial on two
prior strike convictions that had been alleged under the Three
Strikes law against Seaton. The prosecutor moved to dismiss the
prior strikes based on their age and per a directive of the District
Attorney’s Office, but the trial court declined to dismiss them.
The People proceeded to prove them by submitting two packets of
certified prison records, i.e., 969b packets.2 The first packet
stated that Seaton had suffered a first degree burglary conviction
(§ 459) on October 12, 1999. The second packet showed that

1     All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2     Certified prison records submitted under section 969b are
often referred to as 969b packets. (See, e.g., People v. Gibson
(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1153.)

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Seaton had a conviction for first degree robbery (§ 211) on
December 14, 2005. In response to this evidence, defense counsel
argued that the documents were insufficient to prove the prior
strikes. The trial court found that Seaton had suffered the
robbery conviction, stating it recognized the judge and the deputy
district attorney involved in that conviction and Seaton’s
photograph. As to the burglary conviction, the trial court said it
recognized the judge and Seaton’s photograph. The trial court
accordingly found that the People had proven the prior strike
convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.
       Moving to sentencing, the trial court said it would not
sentence Seaton to a life term because he did not have a weapon,
so it struck the 1999 prior strike under People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. Noting that Seaton had not
resisted arrest, the trial court also declined to impose the five-
year prior (§ 667, subd. (a)). The trial court then sentenced
Seaton to the high term of six years, doubled due to the
remaining strike, to 12 years in prison.
                         DISCUSSION
       Seaton contends that remand is necessary so that the trial
court can reconsider his sentence under newly amended section
1170. Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 (2020–2021
Reg. Sess.) amended section 1170 to provide that a trial court
may impose the upper term only “when there are circumstances
in aggravation of the crime” that justify imposing a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the defendant has
stipulated to the facts underlying those circumstances or those
facts have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by
the trier of fact. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); see generally People v.
Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 464–465.) Newly amended

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section 1170, subdivision (b), thus makes the middle term the
presumptive term.3 Here, the trial court imposed the upper term
of six years for the burglary conviction. The People agree, as do
we, that Senate Bill No. 567 applies retroactively to Seaton and
that remand is necessary for reconsideration of the sentence
under section 1170. (See, e.g., People v. Flores (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039 [People properly conceded Senate Bill
No. 567 is retroactive].)
       Because we are remanding for resentencing, Seaton’s
remaining contentions are largely moot. (See People v. Ramirez
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 55, 64 [on remand for resentencing, trial
court may reconsider entire sentence and modify any aspect of
it].) Thus, as to Seaton’s contention that the trial court abused
its discretion by refusing to strike his 2005 prior strike
conviction, Seaton may refile any Romero motion he deems
necessary on remand.
       To guide the trial court on remand, although the trial court
will have the option of imposing the five-year enhancement under
section 667, subdivision (a), should the trial court again decide
not to impose the enhancement, then it should be stricken and
not stayed. (See generally People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th
355, 364 [enhancement should be imposed or stricken, not stayed,
under section 1385].)
       Further, for the purposes of calculating custody credits, a
defendant convicted of a felony is entitled to credit for all days in

3      Although not relevant here, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
provides that the lower term shall be the presumptive term if the
trial court finds that any specified factors were a “contributing
factor” to the crime’s commission and aggravating circumstances
do not outweigh mitigating ones.

                                  4
custody, beginning with the day of arrest and continuing to the
day of sentencing. (§ 2900.5; People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 42, 48.) The trial court gave Seaton only 250 days of
actual days in custody. However, he is entitled to 251 days of
actual custody credits from his August 27, 2020 arrest to the May
4, 2021 sentencing hearing. Any recalculation of actual custody
credits should account for the 251 days of actual days in custody
during that period.
        Finally, as to Seaton’s contention there was insufficient
evidence that he suffered the 1999 first degree burglary
conviction, we recognize that the trial court on remand could
reconsider whether to strike that conviction. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely in the extreme that the trial court would do so, given the
trial court’s unequivocal statements that it did not “intend to
strike Mr. Seaton out” and that, as it had told counsel during
trial, “my intent was not to give Mr. Seaton a life sentence.” We
therefore decline to reach the sufficiency of the evidence issue
because it is theoretical and speculative on this record that the
trial court will do anything but strike the 1999 burglary
conviction. (See generally Wilson v. L.A. County Civil Service
Com. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450, 453 [courts do not decide moot
or purely academic questions or abstract propositions].) We also
note that even where an appellate court reverses a true finding
on a strike allegation for insufficient evidence, the allegation may
be retried. (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 259.)
Therefore, even if we agreed with Seaton, the allegation could be
retried on remand.

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                         DISPOSITION
      The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for
resentencing. The judgment of conviction is otherwise affirmed.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                           EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

                        LAVIN, J.

                        RICHARDSON (ANNE K.), J.*

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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