Court Opinion

ID: 9953715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 18:02:47.573048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:07:25.051457
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/24 P. v. Chapman CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                                        B303437

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No. BA425361)
         v.

GREGORY T. CHAPMAN,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Curtis B. Rappe, Judge. Affirmed in part,
sentence is reversed, vacated and remanded with instructions.
      Valerie G. Wass for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Charles S.
Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    ________________________
                       INTRODUCTION

       From 2003 to 2011 Gregory Chapman and his associates
offered securities in their company, Authotecq. Authotecq held
itself out as having a successful credit card technology, and
Chapman personally authored materials selling investments in
the company that predicted hundreds of millions of dollars in
expected revenue. Authotecq attracted $11 million in
investments from individual investors. But investors did not
know Authotecq sold securities in violation of state law, actually
earned no revenue, never fully developed its technology, and
misappropriated almost all investor funds.
       For his role in Authotecq, Chapman was convicted by a jury
of 69 counts of securities fraud (Corp. Code, § 25401, subd. (b)),
68 counts of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)), and one
count of participating in a fraudulent securities scheme (Corp.
Code, § 25541).1 He was sentenced to a total of 30 years.
       Chapman raises 10 errors on appeal. While we reject
Chapman’s challenges to his conviction, we remand for
resentencing. Chapman is entitled to the benefit of newly
amended sections 654 and 1170, subdivision (b), as well as a stay
of his sentence on the fraudulent securities scheme count under
section 654. We also direct the trial court to modify the
sentencing minute orders and the abstract of judgment to correct
certain errors. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is
affirmed, but the sentence is reversed, vacated, and remanded to
the trial court.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    The Information
      On November 22, 2016 Chapman was charged by
information with 74 counts of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)),
74 counts of securities fraud (Corp. Code, § 25401, subd. (b)), and
one count of participating in a fraudulent securities scheme
(Corp. Code, § 25541). The information charged codefendants
Rogel Patawaran and James Litzinger with the same counts.
The information included three special allegations as to all
counts: (1) the defendants committed two or more related
felonies with the material element of fraud, involving a pattern of
related felony conduct and the taking of more than $500,000
(§ 186.11, subd. (a)(2)); (2) the defendants intentionally took
funds exceeding $100,000 (§ 1203.045, subd. (a)); and (3) the
defendants, in the commission of a felony, intentionally took
property in an amount exceeding $1,300,000 (§ 12022.6,
subds. (a)(3), (b)).
      Litzinger pleaded guilty to two counts and the first special
allegation, receiving an eight-year prison sentence. Chapman
and Patawaran pleaded not guilty and were tried together.

B.    The People’s Evidence at Trial
      1.    Chapman, Patawaran, and Litzinger Formed
            Authotecq
      In the 1990s Chapman, Patawaran, and Litzinger met and
founded a data security company, RGTecq. They hired salesman
Wallace Thomas to raise investments for RGTecq on a 30 to
35 percent commission. Chapman was in charge of preparing
RGTecq’s “private placement memoranda,” or “PPMs”:

                                 3
documents soliciting funds from investors by explaining how
investments will be used and projecting the company’s future
revenue. RGTecq eventually shut down after being unable to pay
its rent and its employees. Dozens of investors in RGTecq
received no return on their investment.
       In 2001 or 2002 Chapman and Patawaran decided to
launch a new company, Authotecq, focused on credit card
processing technology. Litzinger served as Authotecq’s president.
Thomas joined Authotecq as a salesperson in charge of raising
investment funds, marketing the technology, and keeping in
contact with investors. Thomas hired another salesman,
Michael Diaz, to help recruit investors.

     2.      Authotecq Sold “Stock” to Investors, Then Diverted
             Investor Funds
       Thomas and Diaz cold-called potential investors to offer
stock in Authotecq, although Authotecq was not qualified to sell
securities and neither Thomas nor Diaz were licensed to sell
securities in California. Thomas falsely told would-be investors
that merchants were already processing credit card transactions
through Authotecq and Authotecq was earning revenue from
these merchants. Thomas also falsely told potential investors
their funds were invested directly into the company. In reality,
Thomas and Diaz kept 45 percent of the funds raised as their
commission.
       Once Thomas and Diaz identified potential investors,
Litzinger mailed them an investment package, including a PPM,
and Thomas or Diaz would follow up to execute the deal. Each
investor received an Authotecq stock certificate. No investors
received any return on their investment.

                                4
      The information filed against Chapman focused on
fraudulent sales of stock to nine named victims, many retired.
The victims testified to repeated contact from Thomas and Diaz
providing updates on Authotecq’s purported finances and
progress to solicit continued investments.
      Duane Anderson, a retired financial analyst, bought stock
in Authotecq on 13 occasions between 2005 and 2010 for
approximately $90,000.
      Chuck Mills, also retired, invested six times in Authotecq
in 2010 and 2011. Mills invested $92,500.
      Richard Joyce, an optometrist, bought stock in Authotecq
12 times from 2003 to 2011. All told, Joyce invested $85,000.
      Guyla Etter first invested in Authotecq in 2004. Through
2010, Etter made five more investments for a sum of $55,000.
      Mary Jane Ludwig invested $100,000 from her retirement
account in 2007.
      Gary Ruchaber invested 11 times from 2007 to 2011.
Ruchaber’s investments totaled $430,000.
      Kenneth Hoagland, a retired sales manager, invested
$940,000 between 2008 and 2011 in 15 separate investments.
      John Orlando, a retired teacher, invested twice in 2010 for
a total of $15,000.
      Joe Baker, a retired dentist, also invested a total of $15,000
over two occasions in 2010.
      Authotecq received $11,461,117.50 in investor funds and
generated zero revenue from its product. The investor funds
were diverted into various shell companies owned by Chapman,
Chapman’s son, Patawaran, Litzinger, and others. Chapman and
his son personally received over $1.4 million in Authotecq
investor funds through Chapman’s company IQSecure and over

                                 5
$2 million in investor funds through Chapman’s company
Shadoworks. Chapman spent more than $1.8 million of investor
funds on personal expenses for “automobiles, household repairs,
medical visits, residential leases, and restaurant and
entertainment expenses.”

       3.    Authotecq Misrepresented Its Product
       Unbeknownst to investors, Authotecq’s credit card
processing technology was not viable. In 2008 Authotecq
purchased a preexisting credit card gateway company, Valetpay,
and renamed it Paysentinel.2 Only seven merchants used
Paysentinel, and even then, only occasionally. The gateway could
not process debit cards, merchants could not sign up to use the
gateway online, and the gateway could not bill merchants for
transactions. When Paysentinel sought security certification in
2009, the security assessor observed the gateway had only ever
processed 20 to 25 credit card transactions, and there was no
current traffic on the gateway—as compared to the typical
gateway traffic of 300,000 to 400,000 credit card transactions per
month.
       Authotecq did not use its investor funds to address these
deficiencies or to improve its product. After Authotecq purchased
Paysentinel, the sole software developer working on the product
was not paid regularly. After discussing the nonpayment with
Chapman, the software developer worked only 15 hours a week
and received payment up front. Paysentinel’s CEO, who

2     A credit card gateway enables a credit card transaction by
connecting a “particular merchant’s network” and “the Visa or
MasterCard network, depending on what type of [credit] card” is
used. Paysentinel was advertised as an “e-commerce gateway.”

                                6
Chapman hired to develop the gateway for the market, was also
paid irregularly and lacked the budget to effectively market the
product.

       4.    Chapman’s Role in Authotecq
       Litzinger testified that early into the Authotecq venture
Chapman prepared a written list of Chapman’s duties. In the
document, Chapman claimed ownership of the business side of
Authotecq: interviewing and hiring employees, researching
information to include in Authotecq PPMs, preparing financial
charts and graphs for the PPMs, dealing with shareholders,
raising money, and naming new products, subsidiaries, and
services. As summarized by Chapman: “Basically no one moves
or really does anything unless I do it first.” Chapman was
identified as “Chairman of the Board of Directors” in some of
Authotecq’s corporate filings with the Delaware Secretary of
State.
       Thomas testified Chapman prepared all offering materials
for Authotecq, including the PPMs, the initial investor
subscription package, and subsequent investor updates and
talking points. PPMs were issued in May 2003, May 2005, May
2007, August 2009, January 2010, August 2010, November 2011,
and February 2012. Although the PPMs generally explained
Authotecq’s “Use of Proceeds” from investments, they did not
disclose any sales commissions paid to Thomas and Diaz until the
company’s final PPM in 2012, which disclosed a 5 percent sales
commission. Each PPM stated large fundraising goals, ranging
from $2.5 million to $5 million, and reflected that almost all
investor funds would be reinvested into Authotecq. The PPMs
also reported “projected gross revenue.” For instance, the 2003

                                7
PPM asserted zero revenue in 2003 but predicted $71,641,250 in
revenue by 2008; the 2007 PPM projected 2008’s revenue at
$162,000 and revenue in 2013 at $162,000,000; and the 2012
PPM estimated revenue at $3,166,560 by 2013 and $395,820,000
by 2017.
       Litzinger testified Chapman told him the projected income
statements in the PPMs were “just made up, because all
businesses do it that way.” Litzinger eventually raised concerns
over the accuracy of the information in the PPMs, but did not
know if Chapman ever corrected the false information or added
missing material information to the documents. Chapman’s
name did not appear on the PPMs he authored, except for the
May 2005 PPM, which identified Chapman as “Senior Marketing
Consultant and Chairman of the Board” and “Business
Development Consultant (Co-Chairman of Authotecq).”
       Chapman also exercised control over Authotecq funds.
Chapman, along with Patawaran and Litzinger, approved
Thomas’ and Diaz’s 45 percent commission fee. He was a
signatory on one of Authotecq’s bank accounts. Chapman also
received Authotecq funds through his other companies,
Shadoworks and IQSecure. The funds Chapman received from
Authotecq’s accounts were meant for Chapman’s own salary and
other employees’ salaries. But Chapman did not regularly pay
other employees’ salaries, and admitted to one unpaid employee
that he had been using Authotecq funds for his son.
       Chapman was further involved in covering up the illegality
of the scheme. Chapman and Patawaran advised Thomas that,
although neither Thomas nor Diaz were licensed to sell securities
in California, they could solicit and refer investors to Litzinger.
Chapman and Patawaran asserted that Litzinger could sell

                                 8
unregistered stock in Authotecq as its president. Chapman,
Patawaran, and Litzinger also told Thomas that merchants were
already using their technology to process transactions, earning
revenue for Authotecq, and that Authotecq was likely to be sold
to another company for billions of dollars. Chapman specifically
instructed Litzinger to tell investors that the company would be
bought out, go public, repay investors from company dividends, or
buy back the investors’ stock at a profit.

      5.     The Department of Corporations Issues Authotecq a
             Desist and Refrain Order in 2006
       In 2006 the Department of Corporations3 (DOC) received
information that Authotecq was offering securities to investors
but was not qualified under state law to do so. The investigation
was handled by Michelle Lipton, a senior corporations counsel in
the DOC’s enforcement division. Lipton verified the report and
prepared a desist and refrain order (DRO) against Authotecq for
violating Corporations Code section 25110.
       The California Corporations Commissioner issued the DRO
on January 4, 2006 and served the DRO on Authotecq on
January 10. The DRO stated Authotecq, Litzinger, and Diaz “are
hereby ordered to desist and refrain from the further offer or sale
in the State of California of securities, including, but not limited
to preferred stock, unless and until qualification has been made
under said law.” The DRO was published online to protect
potential investors.

3     Now known as the Department of Business Oversight.

                                 9
      After the DRO was issued, Authotecq continued to sell
unqualified stock to investors until March 2012. Chapman,
Litzinger, and Patawaran informed Thomas of the DRO, but they
explained it resulted from a “clerical” or “paperwork” error. They
instructed Thomas to keep selling to investors; when asked,
Thomas told investors the DRO only concerned a clerical error.
Patawaran later advised Diaz to use an alias (Ken Phillips) when
selling investments to protect Authotecq.

      6.    The 2010 to 2012 Department of Corporations and
            United States Department of Justice Investigation
      On March 4, 2010 the DOC received a tip about Authotecq
through the National Telemarketing Victim Call Center
(NTVCC), a nonprofit. The tip came from Benedict Cartwright,
who worked with the NTVCC, and contained a letter from
Cartwright, the 2009 Authotecq PPM, an Authotecq letter to
investors, and a copy of the DRO. Cartwright wrote:

      “Enclosed is a packet that I received this past week
      along with several phone calls trying to get me to
      invest in AUTHOTECQ SYSTEMS, INC. Also
      enclosed is a copy of the DESIST AND REFRAIN
      ORDER from the California Department of
      Corporations. In addition to that Ken Phillips who
      was also involved with First Frame Pictures is
      recommending the offer to me.

      I will be sending you a packet on First Frame
      Pictures as soon as I get it copied. I am sending you
      this one first because I might protect someone else

                                10
      from being take [sic] to the cleaners if it proves to be
      fraud.”

       Lipton investigated Cartwright’s complaint against
Authotecq. Lipton contacted Cartwright and learned Cartwright
was called by an Authotecq salesman and given Authotecq PPMs,
but he had not invested in the company. Cartwright was unable
to remember any further information about his conversation with
the Authotecq salesman because he regularly received many such
phone calls as an employee of the NTVCC. Lipton testified at
trial that, after following up with Cartwright, she lacked evidence
“to move forward” with investigating Authotecq.
       On January 18, 2011 the NTVCC sent the DOC another tip
regarding Authotecq. This tip originated with Roger Verly, an
Authotecq investor. Lipton also contacted Verly, who confirmed
he had invested over $100,000 in Authotecq after receiving an
unsolicited phone call. Despite his complaint, Verly did not want
to cooperate with any investigation into Authotecq.
       Lipton was able to determine, however, that Verly’s
investment had been deposited into an account with City
National Bank. Lipton subpoenaed the bank records for the
account, which led to a list of potential investors who had
deposited money into the account. Lipton followed up with these
potential investors, many of whom were reluctant to cooperate.
       Lipton’s investigation resulted in a civil enforcement action
against Authotecq in March 2012. In April 2012, the matter was
referred to the U.S. Department of Justice, Special Crimes Unit.
As a result of that investigation, a warrant for Chapman’s arrest
was issued on January 8, 2015.

                                 11
C.    Chapman’s Trial Defense
      Chapman testified in his own defense. Chapman asserted
he had run successful companies in the past and was merely a
consultant for Authotecq. He testified he did not write any PPMs
for RGTecq or Authotecq. Instead, an attorney prepared the
documents and he never reviewed them. Chapman denied hiring
Thomas for Authotecq, and he denied meeting or speaking to
Diaz entirely. He further denied knowledge of or involvement in
the 45 to 50 percent commissions Authotecq paid to Thomas. As
to Authotecq funds sent to Chapman’s alleged shell companies,
Chapman explained Authotecq paid Shadoworks for marketing
materials to merchants and the right to license the credit card
processing technology Chapman and Patawaran owned.

D.    Chapman’s Convictions and Sentence
      After a nine-week trial, the jury convicted Chapman on all
counts and found the special allegations true.4
      In December 2019 the court sentenced Chapman to a total
sentence of 30 years. This sentence was composed of the upper
term of five years on count 102 for securities fraud, the base
count. The court added consecutive one-year sentences for 24 of
the remaining securities fraud counts, and a consecutive one-year
sentence on count 270, relating to selling securities using a
fraudulent scheme. The court imposed concurrent one-year
sentences on the remaining securities fraud counts. As to the

4      During trial, the trial court dismissed counts 57 to 70 on
the People’s motion because the victim on those counts was
unavailable to testify. After the verdict, the trial court dismissed
count 123 because the jury did not sign and date the verdict form
as to that count.

                                 12
grand theft counts, the court imposed the middle term of two
years on each count, but stayed the sentences pursuant to
section 654. On the enhancements, the court imposed and stayed
the upper term of five years on the section 186.11 enhancement,
and it dismissed the section 12022.6, subdivision (a),
enhancement in the interests of justice. The court ordered
restitution of $5,291,773.38.
      Chapman timely appealed.

                           DISCUSSION

       On appeal, Chapman raises 10 claims of error. As to his
convictions, Chapman argues: (1) the statute of limitations
barred his prosecution as a matter of law; (2) the jury was
improperly instructed on the statute of limitations and evidence
of an uncharged conspiracy; (3) his 63 grand theft convictions
must be consolidated into one conviction under the doctrine
articulated in People v. Bailey (1961) 55 Cal.2d 514 (Bailey);
(4) the trial court failed to instruct on the Bailey doctrine; (5) the
trial court failed to hold a second evidentiary hearing on
allegations of juror misconduct; and (6) Chapman received
ineffective assistance of counsel. Chapman also challenges his
sentence, arguing: (7) the trial court was required to stay
Chapman’s sentence on count 270 under section 654; (8) remand
is necessary for resentencing under newly enacted Assembly Bill
No. 518, which amended section 654; and (9) he is entitled to
resentencing under Senate Bill No. 567, which amended
section 1170, subdivision (b). Finally, Chapman requests
(10) correction of certain errors in the trial court’s sentencing

                                  13
minute orders and the abstract of judgment. We address each in
turn.

A.    Statute of Limitations
      Chapman first argues he was prosecuted outside the
applicable four-year statute of limitations because the DOC first
discovered his criminal conduct through Cartwright’s March 2010
complaint but the warrant for his arrest was issued in January
2015, four years and 10 months later.

       1.    Legal Background and Standard of Review
       Chapman argues, the People concede, and we agree
Chapman’s prosecution for securities fraud (Corp. Code, § 25401),
grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)), and engaging in a
fraudulent securities scheme (Corp. Code, § 25541) needed to
commence “within four years after discovery of the commission of
the offense.” (Pen. Code, §§ 801.5, 803, subd. (c).) In this context,
“discovery” of the offense is “not synonymous with actual
knowledge” of the offense. (People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d
538, 561-562 (Zamora).) Instead, the limitations period “is
triggered when either the victim or a responsible law
enforcement official learns of facts which, if investigated with
reasonable diligence, would make that person aware a crime had
occurred.” (People v. Rodriguez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 921, 930
(Rodriguez).) “‘The crucial determination is whether law
enforcement authorities or the victim had actual notice of
circumstances sufficient to make them suspicious of fraud
thereby leading them to make inquiries which might have
revealed the fraud.’” (People v. Petronella (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th
945, 957(Petronella).)

                                 14
       “The issue of when the fraud was discovered or could have
been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence
presents questions for the trier of fact to decide.” (Rodriguez,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 930.) At trial, the prosecution bears
the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
charges against the defendant were filed within the statute of
limitations. (See Zamora, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 565, fn. 27.)
“‘When an issue involving the statute of limitations has been
tried, we review the record to determine whether substantial
evidence supports the findings of the trier of fact.’” (Petronella,
supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 957.) Substantial evidence is
evidence that is “‘reasonable, credible, and of solid value.’”
(People v. Xiong (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1269.)

      2.     Substantial Evidence Supported the Jury’s Finding
             the Prosecution Against Chapman Commenced
             Within the Statute of Limitations
       In Chapman’s case, the statute of limitations issue was
submitted to the jury. In returning a general guilty verdict, the
jury impliedly determined Chapman’s prosecution was not barred
by the statute of limitations because Lipton exercised reasonable
diligence to discover the fraud through Verly’s complaint on
January 18, 2011. (See Zamora, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 565.)
       Chapman argues there was insufficient evidence
supporting the jury’s implicit finding. Specifically, Chapman
maintains “the evidence establishes the fraud was discovered on
March 4, 2010, when DOC attorney Lipton received notice of
possible fraud” from Cartwright. Chapman emphasizes that
Lipton prepared the 2006 DRO against Authotecq, Cartwright’s
letter of complaint mentioned “fraud,” and Authotecq’s offering

                                 15
materials attached to Cartwright’s complaint did not mention the
DRO. From this information, Chapman says, “a reasonable
person in Lipton’s position would have checked to see if the DRO
was still in effect, and because it was, she would have
immediately been placed on notice that persons on behalf of
Authotecq were committing securities fraud by offering to sell
securities in violation of the DRO and by omitting a material fact
from their offering materials.”
       There is substantial evidence in the record supporting the
jury’s finding the DOC did not possess knowledge of
circumstances sufficient to raise suspicion of fraud from
Cartwright’s complaint.5 Upon receiving this complaint, Lipton
duly contacted Cartwright to further investigate. Cartwright,
however, was unable to provide any additional information about
his conversation with Authotecq. Lipton testified her

5      The People argue Cartwright’s complaint did not convey
suspicion of fraud because “Cartwright had not invested any
money in Authotecq, and therefore had suffered no loss.” The
People rely on case law explaining “‘discovery of a loss by the
victim alone is insufficient to trigger the running of the
limitations period’” because “‘“discovery of a loss, without
discovery of a criminal agency, is not enough.”’” (Petronella,
supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.) Chapman responds that “it is
not necessary for the law enforcement agency to be informed of
an actual loss by a victim in order for the statute of limitations to
begin running, as long as there is notice ‘of facts sufficient to
make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of fraud.’” We need
not resolve this dispute because a completed offense proscribed
by Corporations Code section 25401 does not require “monetary
loss.” (See People v. Koenig (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 771, 798.)
Therefore, in the context of section 25401, no loss is required to
constitute a crime, much less to begin the statute of limitations.

                                 16
conversation with Cartwright did not provide her with enough “to
move forward” with the investigation. Based on these facts, there
was substantial evidence for the jury to find Lipton exercised
“reasonable diligence” but lacked facts to suspect fraud even after
following up with Cartwright. (See Rodriguez, supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 933 [holding there was substantial evidence
that theft was not “discovered” where the victims investigated
“financial discrepancies” but failed to identify crime because the
court could not “consider the evidence and make a different
inference about the outcome of [their] investigation”]; Petronella,
supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 957 [holding substantial evidence to
find fraud was not discovered where auditors noticed “‘huge red
flag[s]’” but their supervisors determined the discrepancies were
not “serious enough” to “follow up”].)
       While Cartwright mentioned Authotecq’s sales might
“prove[] to be fraud,” his complaint did not explain whether or
how Authotecq disclosed the “material fact” of the DRO in its
sales pitch, and thus did not, by itself, convey knowledge of
circumstances creating suspicion of fraud in violation of
Corporations Code section 25401. (See Corp. Code, § 25401;
cf. People v. Crossman (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 476, 479, 482
(Crossman) [holding no discovery of theft when a neighbor
reported seeing “defendant remove some boxes” from victim’s
home and “suspected defendant had taken the gold coins”
because neighbor’s statement was “nothing but speculation on
which to suspect theft”].)

                                17
       Chapman argues Lipton gained “sufficient knowledge that
a crime had been committed” from Cartwright’s complaint
because, had she investigated whether the DRO against
Authotecq was still active, she would have learned Authotecq was
still selling securities in violation of Corporations Code
section 25110. Lipton testified, however, that the DRO she
issued against Authotecq was unrelated to broader securities
fraud, and therefore she did not have any “evidence of fraud or
additional wrongdoing” to warrant further investigation. (See
Crossman, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 481 [no discovery even
though potential discoverer “could have verified” information
supporting theft].) In all events, because no actual victims of the
Authotecq scheme had been identified at the time of Cartwright’s
complaint, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding the
securities fraud was not yet discovered. (See People v. Fine
(1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1267, fn. 13 [substantial evidence
supported no discovery of section 25110 offense when state
agency was unaware that “unqualified securities had been sold
by the defendants to the victims listed in the information. While
[the agency] clearly was aware prior to that date that defendants
did not have a permit to sell securities and the victims were
aware of the fact of their purchase of the securities at the time
they were made, there was no conjunction of the victims’
knowledge with that of the [agency]”].)
       Chapman further argues Lipton could have discovered the
crimes through reasonable diligence because she was “authorized
to issue administrative subpoenas which she likely could have
used to obtain Authotecq financial records.” But Lipton did not
issue a subpoena for Authotecq’s bank records until she spoke
with victim Verly and learned where Verly had deposited his

                                18
investment. Chapman does not persuasively explain how Lipton
could have used subpoenas to uncover Authotecq’s finances using
the limited information obtained from Cartwright. (See
Crossman, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 482 [“defendant does not
suggest . . . what inquiry [the government or the victim] might
have made in the exercise of reasonable diligence which would
have led to discovery of the crime”].)

B.    Jury Instructions
      For the first time on appeal, Chapman argues the jury
received faulty instructions on the statute of limitations and on
evidence of an uncharged conspiracy. He asserts these defective
jury instructions affected his substantial rights.

       1.    Standard of Review
       “Generally, a party forfeits any challenge to a jury
instruction that was correct in law and responsive to the evidence
if the party fails to object in the trial court. [Citations.] The rule
of forfeiture does not apply, however, . . . if the instructional error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” (People v. Franco
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 719 (Franco).) “‘Ascertaining
whether claimed instructional error affected the substantial
rights of the defendant necessarily requires an examination of
the merits of the claim—at least to the extent of ascertaining
whether the asserted error would result in prejudice if error it
was.’” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087;
accord, Franco, at p. 720 [“Instructional error affects a
defendant’s substantial rights if the error was prejudicial under
the applicable standard for determining harmless error.”].) We
interpret jury instructions “to support the judgment rather than

                                  19
defeat it if they are reasonably susceptible to such
interpretation.” (People v. Laskiewicz (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d
1254, 1258.)
      “‘When we review challenges to a jury instruction as being
incorrect or incomplete, we evaluate the instructions as a whole,
not in isolation. [Citation.] “For ambiguous instructions, the test
is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury
misunderstood and misapplied the instruction.”’” (People v.
Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 544.)

      2.    The Jury Was Correctly Instructed on the Statute of
            Limitations
      Chapman argues the jury instruction on the statute of
limitations was incomplete and affected his substantial rights by
lessening the prosecution’s burden of proof. The trial court
instructed with a modified version of CALJIC No. 4.74, instead of
CALCRIM No. 3410.6

6     As modified, the instruction read:
This action was commenced on the day of January 8, 2015.
You may convict the defendant of Grand Theft, Fraud in the
Offer or Sale of a Security, or Fraudulent Securities Scheme only
if the fraud and theft was discovered or completed within four
years of the commencement of the action, whichever is later.
However, you may not convict the defendant of Grand Theft,
Fraud in the Offer or Sale of a Security, or Fraudulent Securities
Scheme if you find that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence on
the part of the alleged victim or the criminal law enforcement
authorities, the fraud and theft should have been discovered at a

                                20
      Chapman raises five defects with CALJIC No. 4.74. First,
he asserts it was deficient because it instructs that “[t]he People
have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that prosecution of this case began within the required time,” but
the instruction, does not define “preponderance of the evidence.”
Chapman admits, however, that the preponderance standard was
defined elsewhere in the instructions delivered to the jury,
specifically in CALCRIM No. 418.7 We must assess prejudice to
Chapman’s substantial rights “‘in the context of the instructions
as a whole,’” and “‘“‘we must assume that jurors are intelligent
persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury
instructions which are given.’”’” (People v. Sattiewhite (2014)
59 Cal.4th 446, 475 (Sattiewhite).) For this reason, the omission

time more than four years before the commencement of the
action.
The word “discovered,” as used in this instruction, does not mean
mere awareness of loss or misconduct; nor does mere loss or
misconduct in and of itself suggest a likelihood of fraud or theft.
“Discovered” means an awareness that there has been loss or
misconduct and that it was caused by criminal agency.
“Reasonable diligence” means the usual care exercised by the
ordinary, prudent person in the conduct of his or her affairs.
Even though the People must prove that the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, the People must only prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the fraud or theft was
discovered, as herein defined, within four years of the
commencement of the action.
7     The People further note CALCRIM No. 375, which the jury
received, also included a definition of “preponderance of the
evidence.”

                                21
of the definition from CALJIC No. 4.74 did not affect Chapman’s
substantial rights because it was cured by the definition available
in CALCRIM No. 418. (See People v. Smith (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 7, 13 [“The absence of an essential element from
one instruction may be cured by another instruction or the
instructions taken as a whole.”]; People v. Jeffries (2000)
83 Cal.App.4th 15, 22 [“‘“The fact that the necessary elements of
a jury charge are to be found in two instructions rather than in
one instruction does not, in itself, make the charge
prejudicial.”’”].)
       Second, Chapman argues “CALJIC No. 4.74 was not
modified to state that the DOC is a law enforcement agency, and
the jury was not instructed of this fact.” In the context of the
parties’ closing arguments, however, the jury was not misled.
(See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202 [reviewing
court “must consider the arguments of counsel in assessing the
probable impact of the instruction on the jury”]; accord, People v.
Kumar (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 557, 564.) Addressing the statute
of limitations in their closing arguments to the jury, Chapman’s
attorney and the prosecutor focused on Lipton’s discovery of the
fraud offenses. In closing, both attorneys stated Lipton was an
employee of the DOC, a government agency, who conducted an
investigation into the fraud. Because it was clear Lipton held a
government position enforcing the securities law, and the parties
agreed her discovery of the fraud was dispositive of the statute of
limitations issue, the jury was not misled and Chapman’s
substantial rights were not violated. (See People v. Musselwhite
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1248-1249 [holding “incomplete
instruction” was cured by defendant’s closing argument, which
“adequately informed the jury” of the issue]; accord, People v.

                                22
Quinonez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 463-466 [holding jury
instructions were adequate where closing argument clarified
definition of key term]; People v. Tatman (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1,
11 [any “remote doubt” as to sufficiency of jury instructions “was
dispelled during closing argument, when both the prosecutor and
defense counsel emphasized” the issue].)
       Third, Chapman argues CALJIC No. 4.74’s definition of
“discovered” is ambiguous and confusing. The definition reads:
“The word ‘discovered,’ as used in this instruction does not mean
mere awareness of loss or misconduct; nor does mere loss or
misconduct in and of itself suggest a likelihood of fraud or theft.
[¶] ‘Discovered’ means an awareness that there has been loss or
misconduct and that it was caused by criminal agency.”
According to Chapman, this language “conflict[s]” with the
definition provided in Zamora, supra, 18 Cal.3d at page 562:
“‘The statute commences to run . . . after one has knowledge of
facts sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of
fraud, thus putting him on inquiry.’” The definition provided by
CALJIC No. 4.74 stated a different aspect of the standard for
discovery, but was legally correct and well-supported by case law.
(See, e.g. Petronella, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 956
[“‘[D]iscovery of a loss by the victim alone is insufficient to trigger
the running of the limitations period: “Literally, . . . discovery of
a loss, without discovery of a criminal agency, is not enough.”’”];
People v. Soni (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) For this
reason, the instruction’s definition of “discovered” did not
prejudice Chapman’s substantial rights.
       Fourth, Chapman says the instruction did not specify the
jury needed to consider when each charged offense was
discovered, but instead referred to “the fraud and theft.”

                                  23
Chapman argues “because [the jury] was not instructed on the
alleged dates of the offenses it may have been prevented from
accurately determining whether any particular count was barred
by the statute of limitations.” In the context of the facts and
arguments at trial, this instruction did not affect Chapman’s
substantial rights. At trial, Chapman did not argue, for instance,
that the individual victims discovered the individual offenses at
different times. Chapman argued only that Lipton should have
discovered all offenses from Cartwright’s complaint, and as a
result, “the case shouldn’t have been here in the first place
because it was beyond the statute of limitations.” The People
maintained Lipton discovered the fraud only after Verly’s
complaint, thus all charges were brought within the statute of
limitations. Because we must “‘“assume that jurors are
intelligent”’” (Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 475), it does not
follow that the jurors would have accepted Chapman’s theory of
discovery of the offenses and also convicted Chapman on all
counts.
       Fifth, and finally, Chapman argues “[t]he most significant
deficiency in CALJIC No. 4.74 is that it does not state . . . [that]
reasonable diligence is evaluated from the perspective of the
person or law enforcement officer in the same circumstances.” It
was clear to the jury, however, that in determining whether
Lipton exercised reasonable diligence it was to consider Lipton’s
circumstances. The instruction directed jurors to consider
“reasonable diligence on the part of . . . the criminal law
enforcement authorities,” referring to the actions of the specific
individual involved in discovering the case: Lipton. Accordingly,
the jury was correctly instructed on the statute of limitations in
Chapman’s case.

                                 24
      3.     The Jury Was Also Correctly Instructed on Evidence
             of an Uncharged Conspiracy
       Chapman next challenges CALCRIM No. 416, which the
trial court used to instruct the jury on conspiracy theory liability.
“California Supreme Court decisions have ‘“long and firmly
established that an uncharged conspiracy may properly be used
to prove criminal liability for acts of a coconspirator.”’” (People v.
Smothers (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 829, 870.) In this circumstance,
the trial court may give jury instructions based on a conspiracy
theory to show liability for a substantive offense. (See ibid.)
Chapman argues the jury received a deficient instruction on
evidence of an uncharged conspiracy.
       Specifically, Chapman argues the instruction misled the
jury into convicting him on all charged offenses, “even if it found
that he only entered into a conspiracy to commit one of the
charged offenses, or a lesser number of the charged offenses.”
CALCRIM No. 416 instructs that a defendant is criminally liable
as a member of a conspiracy if “[t]he defendant intended to agree
and did agree with one or more of the [coconspirators] . . . to
commit Grand Theft, Fraud in the Offer or Sale of a Security, or
Fraudulent Securities Scheme.” (CALCRIM No. 416 [emphasis
added].) Chapman argues the conjoining “or” in the instruction
allowed the jury to hold him liable for all charged offenses, even if
the jury believed he conspired to commit just one or two of the
three categories of charges.8

8     Chapman also argues CALCRIM No. 416 allowed the jury
to convict him based on coconspirators’ acts outside the scope of
the conspiracy. Chapman concedes, however, the instruction
specifically stated “[a] member of a conspiracy is criminally

                                 25
       In the context of the whole instruction, we do not believe
the jury was misled by the language Chapman identifies. As
delivered at Chapman’s trial, CALCRIM No. 416 goes on to
instruct: “The People contend that the defendants conspired to
commit one of the following crimes: Grand Theft, Fraud in the
Offer or Sale of a Security, or Fraudulent Securities Scheme. You
may not find a defendant guilty under a conspiracy theory unless
all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant
conspired to commit at least one of these crimes, and you all
agree which crime he conspired to commit.” (CALCRIM No. 416
[emphasis added].) This portion of the instruction ensures the
jury “agree[s] unanimously the defendant is guilty of a specific
crime” articulated in the instruction and “is designed in part to
prevent the jury from amalgamating evidence of multiple
offenses.” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) We
must assume the jury understood and faithfully followed this
charge. (See People v. Barber (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 787, 799
(Barber) [“‘The crucial assumption underlying our constitutional
system of trial by jury is that jurors generally understand and
faithfully follow instructions.’”].) Further, CALCRIM No. 416
referred the jurors to the underlying instructions on the elements
of each offense charged under a conspiracy theory, emphasizing

responsible for the acts or statements of any other member of the
conspiracy done to help accomplish the goal of the conspiracy.”
There is no reasonable likelihood the jury misinterpreted this
language in the way Chapman contends. (See People v. Campos
(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1237-1238 [holding the “only
reasonable understanding” of an instruction stating a defendant
must be acquitted unless “‘the evidence proves [him] guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt’” included the negative: that a “lack of
evidence could lead to reasonable doubt”].)

                                26
the jurors must consider the “separate instructions” on those
crimes in determining the defendant’s intent to commit each
crime.
       In light of the full instruction, there was no instructional
error and no harm to Chapman’s substantial rights. (See
People v. Sandoval (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 357, 361 [“it is
improper to assess the correctness of the instruction[] . . . by
focusing exclusively on the use of ‘or’ in [a] phrase”]; People v.
Stone (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 323, 331 [“[A] jury instruction
cannot be judged on the basis of one or two phrases plucked out of
context.”].)
       Chapman next asserts the language of CALCRIM No. 416
is legally erroneous because it “allowed the jury to find [him]
guilty of the charged offenses based on a conspiracy to commit
criminal negligence.” As noted above, the jury here was
instructed with CALCRIM No. 416, authorizing liability for the
securities fraud offenses based on a conspiracy theory. The trial
court also instructed the jury on the securities fraud offenses in
Corporations Code sections 25401 and 25541.9

9     Supplemental Instruction 1 stated the elements of the
crime in section 25401 as follows:
1.    The defendant[] willfully offered for sale or sold a security
      in this state;
2.    The offer for sale or sale was made by means of an oral or
      written communication;
3.    Such oral or written communication either: [¶] a. Included
      an untrue statement of a material fact; [¶] OR [¶]
      b. Omitted to state a material fact which omission made a
      statement misleading; [¶] AND

                                 27
      Chapman argues the criminal negligence instruction
compromised his substantial rights when partnered with the
conspiracy liability instruction. In his view, sections 25401 and
25541 are crimes of strict liability, meaning there is no
requirement the defendant possess a mental state of wrongful
intent or guilty knowledge. (See People v. Sargent (1999)
19 Cal.4th 1206, 1223 [defining a strict liability offense]; People v.

4.    At the time they made the offer or sale, the defendant[]
      either: [¶] a. knew the falsity or misleading nature of a
      statement or the materiality of an omission; [¶] OR
      [¶] b. was criminally negligent in failing to acquire such
      knowledge. [¶] “Criminally negligent” means conduct that
      is more than ordinary negligence. Ordinary negligence is
      the failure to exercise reasonable care. Criminal negligence
      refers to a negligent act which is aggravated, reckless, or
      flagrant and which is a gross departure from what would be
      conduct of an ordinary prudent and careful person under
      the circumstances.
      Supplemental Instruction 2 stated the elements of the
crime in section 25541:
1.    That a security was offered for sale or sold in this state;
2.    In connection with the offer or sale of the security the
      defendants, directly or indirectly, did one of the following:
      [¶] a. Willfully employed a device, scheme or artifice to
      defraud; [¶] OR [¶] b. Engaged in an act, practice or course
      of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
      deceit on any person. AND
3.    That the person did so with the specific intent to defraud or
      was criminally negligent.
Supplemental Instruction 2 included the same definition of
“criminally negligent” as Supplemental Instruction 1.

                                 28
Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 519 (Simon).) He notes that
conspiracy is a crime of specific intent requiring the defendant’s
intent to achieve a resulting harm. (See People v. Atkins (2001)
25 Cal.4th 76, 86; People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 457.)
Because one cannot conspire to commit a crime without intent to
commit the crime, Chapman argues he was convicted of securities
fraud on a contradictory and legally faulty theory of conspiracy.
Chapman cites homicide cases where courts have held it is legally
impossible to conspire to commit implied malice murder because
conspiracy to commit murder requires specific intent to kill and
implied malice murder does not. (See, e.g., People v. Swain
(1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 607.)
       We are unpersuaded. Our Supreme Court has held
section 25401 is not a strict liability offense but a crime of
general intent requiring “mens rea or guilty knowledge.”
(People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 976.) The Court
interpreted section 25401 to require the defendant’s “knowledge
of the falsity or misleading nature of a statement or of the
materiality of an omission, or criminal negligence in failing to
investigate and discover them.” (Simon, supra, 9 Cal.4th at
p. 522.)
       Further, People v. Koenig (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 771
(Koenig) squarely rejected Chapman’s argument. Koenig
considered whether a defendant could be convicted of
section 24501 offenses on a theory of conspiracy liability. (Id. at
p. 794.) Koenig observed the actus reus of section 25401, offering
and selling securities, must be willful, not negligent. (Id. at
p. 795.) The court explained that, in the context of section 24501,
criminal negligence was “an alternative way of proving the
knowledge element”—not the actus reus. (Id. at p. 796.) For this

                                29
reason, the court disagreed that section 24501 liability on a
conspiracy theory amounted to conspiracy to commit negligence.
(Id. at p. 795.) The court rejected any comparison between
implied malice murder and securities fraud. (Id. at p. 798.)
       Chapman asserts Koenig “reached the wrong conclusion”
because securities fraud “can be established by negligent
conduct.” But as explained by the high court, section 24501
plainly incorporates “a requirement that the conduct be ‘willful.’”
(Simon, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 507; see Corp. Code, §§ 25401,
25540.) Section 25541 incorporates the same requirement. (See
Corp. Code, §§ 25540, 25541.) For this reason, the trial court did
not err by instructing the jury on conspiracy theory liability for
the securities fraud charges.

C.    Consolidation of Grand Theft Counts Under Bailey
      For the first time on appeal, Chapman argues his
conviction on 74 separate counts of grand theft should have been
consolidated into just one count of grand theft—or, alternatively,
one count of grand theft for each victim—under Bailey, supra,
55 Cal.2d 514. Because Chapman’s offenses involved multiple
victims, and substantial evidence supports Chapman acted
pursuant to multiple impulses and plans for each victim, we
determine this argument is unmeritorious.

      1.    Legal Background and Standard of Review
      Bailey decided that when “as part of a single plan a
defendant makes false representations and receives various sums
from the victim[,] the receipts may be cumulated to constitute but
one offense of grand theft.” (Bailey, supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 518.)
Bailey provided a test for “determining if there were separate

                                30
offenses or one offense”: “whether the evidence discloses one
general intent or separate and distinct intents.” (Id. at p. 519.)
The defendant in Bailey made a misrepresentation when
applying for welfare benefits, then continued to collect an excess
of welfare payments for years.10 (Id. at pp. 515-516.)
       “Whether multiple takings are committed pursuant to one
intention, one general impulse, and one plan is a question of fact
for the jury based on the particular circumstances of each case.
[Citations.] As with all factual questions, on appeal we must
review the record to determine whether there is substantial
evidence to support a finding that the defendant harbored
multiple objectives.” (People v. Jaska (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th
971, 983-984 (Jaska).) At trial, Chapman’s counsel did not
request, and the trial court did not offer a Bailey instruction. The
jury thus made no finding on whether Chapman committed the
theft pursuant to one intent or separate and distinct intents. In
this circumstance, “[t]he Bailey doctrine applies as a matter of
law only in the absence of any evidence from which the jury could

10     People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733 (Whitmer) limited
Bailey, holding “a defendant may be convicted of multiple counts
of grand theft based on separate and distinct acts of theft, even if
committed pursuant to a single overarching scheme.” (Id. at
p. 741.) Whitmer recognized, however, this new interpretation
could not constitutionally apply to defendants who “‘could not
have foreseen’” the change in the law “‘at the time of the alleged
criminal conduct.’” (Id. at p. 742.) Whitmer was decided in 2014,
after the Authotecq scheme concluded in 2011. Accordingly, the
rule clarified in Whitmer does not apply to Chapman, so we apply
Bailey. (See People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1, 13-14
[applying Bailey rule, not Whitmer rule, because Whitmer does
not apply to crimes committed during the time the Bailey
doctrine remained valid].)

                                 31
have reasonably inferred that the defendant acted pursuant to
more than one intention, one general impulse, or one plan.” (Id.
at p. 984.) In other words, if in the case before us there is any
evidence from which the jury could have inferred more than one
intention, general impulse, or plan, the doctrine does not apply.

      2.     Chapman Is Not Entitled to Consolidation of the
             Counts Into a Single Theft Conviction
       The trial evidence does not establish as a matter of law
that Chapman committed all 74 grand theft counts against
different victims with “one intention, one general impulse, or one
plan.” (Jaska, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 984.) “In deciding
whether a defendant commits a series of thefts pursuant to a
single intent or plan, we do not use a single, broad objective of
stealing property. A defendant who steals from multiple victims
over a lengthy crime spree may have a single objective of
obtaining as much money or property as possible. However, he
has still committed multiple offenses.” (People v. Mitchell (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 442, 456.) In this vein, Bailey’s application has
“generally been limited to thefts involving a single victim”
(People v. Tabb (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1149) because
“Bailey itself implies aggregation may occur only when the
offense was committed against one victim” (In re David D. (1997)
52 Cal.App.4th 304, 309). Here, Chapman’s offenses involved
multiple victims over the course of eight years. For this reason
alone, the evidence does not establish as a matter of law that
Chapman acted pursuant to one intention, general impulse, or
plan. (See People v. Reid (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 822, 834 [Bailey
did not apply where the defendant stole “the property of separate
victims” on a single occasion]; People v. Butler (2012)

                                32
212 Cal.App.4th 404, 413, 430 [same, where the defendant
defrauded “more than 100 victims” and the defendant “took a new
commission” from each victim]; People v. Garcia (1990)
224 Cal.App.3d 297, 308 [same, where defendant sold fraudulent
bonds to multiple victims].)

     3.      Chapman Is Also Not Entitled to Consolidation of the
             Counts Into One Conviction for Each Victim
       Similarly, the evidence does not establish as a matter of
law that Chapman pursued thefts against each individual victim
pursuant to one single intention, impulse, or plan. The evidence
showed, over the eight-year course of the offenses, that Chapman
developed new fraudulent investment materials and increasingly
exaggerated business projections for Authotecq—including eight
different PPMs. Authotecq’s salespeople repeatedly contacted
investors with these new materials to solicit more investments.
Defrauded investors, including Etter, Anderson, Mills, and Joyce,
testified these new projections and representations induced them
to invest various sums repeatedly over many months and years.
On these facts, Bailey does not support aggregation of the
offenses as a matter of law. (Compare Bailey, supra, 55 Cal.2d at
pp. 515-516, 519-520 [aggregating theft offenses where the
defendant made one misrepresentation in an application for
welfare benefits, resulting in regular overpayments], with Jaska,
supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 984-985 [holding Bailey does not
apply where defendant “stole various sums of money in an
opportunistic manner” and “committed numerous fraudulent acts
over a four-year period” against a single victim].)

                               33
        4.   Failure To Instruct on Bailey
        Chapman also contends the trial court had a duty to
instruct the jury on Bailey. Because Chapman did not request
any instruction at trial, and the Bailey doctrine was inconsistent
with Chapman’s trial defense, the trial court had no duty to
instruct on Bailey. “Generally, the trial court is required to
instruct the jury on the general principles of law that are closely
and openly connected with the evidence and that are necessary to
the jury’s understanding of the case.” (Barber, supra,
55 Cal.App.5th at p. 799.) The trial court’s sua sponte duty to
instruct the jury on a particular defense is “limited, arising ‘only
if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if
there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the
defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the
case.’”11 (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195.) “‘[T]his
limitation on the duty of the trial court is necessary not only
because it would be unduly burdensome to require more of trial
judges, but also because of the potential prejudice to defendants if
instructions were given on defenses inconsistent with the theory
relied upon.’” (People v. Watts (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 80, 84.)

11    Chapman asserts the court had an absolute sua sponte
duty to instruct on Bailey because it “is more closely related to
the elements of an offense for which the trial court must sua
sponte correctly instruct the jury . . . than an affirmative defense
the defendant must request.” We disagree. As Whitmer
demonstrates, Bailey is a judge-made doctrine generally raised as
a defense. (See Whitmer, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 736-743.)

                                34
      Chapman’s defense at trial asserted his complete lack of
involvement in the Authotecq fraud. Chapman testified he did
not prepare any of the misleading PPMs, he lacked knowledge of
and control over the significant commissions earned by Authotecq
salespeople, and he received payments from Authotecq through
his companies Shadoworks and IQSecure for legitimate purposes.
An instruction on the Bailey doctrine, directing the jury to
determine whether Chapman committed the thefts with a single
intent or plan, would have conflicted with Chapman’s defense
that he did not participate in the Authotecq thefts whatsoever.
(See People v. Jo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1169 [holding
affirmative defense instruction conflicted with defendant’s
defense because it “required defendant to acknowledge, if only
inferentially, the existence of facts which she otherwise denied”];
People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 425 [holding affirmative
defense instruction on mistake of fact would conflict with
defendant’s defense that he was entirely innocent].) Accordingly,
there was no error.

D.    Alleged Juror Misconduct
      Chapman argues the trial court should have held a second
evidentiary hearing to investigate alleged juror misconduct.

      1.    Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
      In October 2018, two months after Chapman’s conviction,
Chapman filed a petition alleging juror misconduct and seeking
disclosure of juror identification information, pursuant to
section 237, subdivision (b). Chapman alleged an alternate juror
had overheard two jurors stating, “they believed defendant
CHAPMAN was guilty of the alleged crime, absent any evidence

                                35
the defense put forth.” He further alleged that another,
unidentified juror stated “her God compelled her to punish
Defendant Chapman irrespective of any defense” because a
defrauded victim had testified he blamed Wallace Thomas,
Chapman’s co-conspirator, for the death of the victim’s wife.
       The trial court determined Chapman’s petition presented a
prima facie showing of good cause to disclose the jurors’
identification information. The court ordered disclosure of the
identifying information of Alternate Juror No. 3, the juror behind
the allegations of misconduct, and it further ordered Alternate
Juror No. 3 to appear at an evidentiary hearing. The trial court
invited all jurors in the case to be heard on the matter, and at
least five other jurors submitted declarations in response to the
allegations.
       At the hearing, Alternate Juror No. 3 testified to the
allegations in the petition. Alternate Juror No. 3 also raised new
allegations: At the end of the trial, Alternate Juror No. 3 heard a
third juror loudly question the credibility of a witness before jury
deliberation began, based on the juror’s experience serving in the
military. Additionally, Alternate Juror No. 3 testified that after
the verdict, a juror told him she felt other jurors “bullied her into
giving her answer because they said that English was not her
first language and that she didn’t understand what she was
talking about.”
       Alternate Juror No. 3 then testified to his interactions with
the other jurors and with Chapman’s defense team. Based on a
post-verdict conversation by the courthouse elevator with the
other jurors and the defense team, Alternate Juror No. 3 testified
he believed Thomas, an accomplice of Chapman and prosecution
witness, “could have lied on the stand” because he had “served

                                 36
his time and got out, and that a part of him getting out was to
testify during this trial.” He admitted to sending text messages
saying, “I agree [Thomas] is probably already back in Mexico”
and “[a] lot of info we didn’t have came out and I think it could
have been helpful during the case, like how [Thomas] isn’t going
back to jail for three years. He's already served his sentence and
served less than a year. The prosecution couldn’t come after him
since he’s served [the sentence], and he basically said anything
on the stand.”12
       Alternate Juror No. 3 also admitted to giving a list of the
jurors’ contact information to Chapman’s defense team without
their knowledge or permission, and to lying to other jurors when
they confronted him about releasing their personal information.
He further admitted to arguing with two of the jurors who
confronted him. Alternate Juror No. 3 told one of those jurors:
“Now that you and [other juror] have pissed me off, I will talk to
the [defense] attorneys. I didn’t before and I didn’t share the list,
but since I am being accused of something I didn’t do, I will be
singing like a canary to the attorneys.”
       Finally, Alternate Juror No. 3 acknowledged he disagreed
“strongly” with the jury verdict and “did not personally feel that
one of the two defendants was guilty for every single count.”
When asked why he did not come forward earlier with the alleged
misconduct that happened during the trial, Alternate Juror No. 3
stated he “didn’t know” and questioned “who am I to say if I am
to come up to a judge or not to say ‘This is what’s going on.’”

12    Under the terms of his plea agreement, Thomas testified
for the prosecution and received a reduced sentence of three
years. The agreement provided he must testify truthfully, or he
faced greater sentencing exposure of up to 88 years.

                                 37
Alternate Juror No. 3 denied being contacted by a prosecution
investigator about his allegations of misconduct, while admitting
he turned over juror contact information to and discussed the
misconduct with the defense team.
       After hearing testimony from Alternate Juror No. 3, the
trial court concluded there was no good cause to disclose juror
information for other jurors. The court expressly based its
decision on Alternate Juror No. 3’s lack of credibility. The court
remarked: “I am making a credibility call, and motivation is
important to credibility. And I think [Alternate Juror No. 3’s]
motivation started out there at the elevator where he heard these
things; whether he heard it directly from the defense or whether
they said it to the other jurors and they repeated it while he was
out of earshot. I think that highly affects his credibility and
motivation.” The court further found, “I didn’t find him that
credible from the witness stand. He kept volunteering stuff. He
wouldn’t answer the questions directly.” The court finally noted
the declarations from the other jurors did not support Alternate
Juror No. 3’s testimony on any “critical” points.

       2.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       The identification information of jurors in a criminal case is
sealed after delivery of the verdict. (Code Civ. Proc., § 237,
subd. (a)(2).) After trial, a defendant may “petition the court for
access to personal juror identifying information within the court’s
records necessary for the defendant to communicate with jurors
for the purpose of developing a motion for new trial or any other
lawful purpose.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 206, subd. (g).) If the
petition sets forth a prima facie showing of “good cause,” and
there is no compelling interest against disclosure, the trial court

                                 38
“shall set the matter for hearing” to determine whether good
cause exists to release the jurors’ information. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 237, subd. (b).)
       In this context, good cause requires “‘a sufficient showing to
support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred.’”
(People v. Cook (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 341, 345 (Cook).)
Additionally, the alleged misconduct must be “‘of such a character
as is likely to have influenced the verdict improperly.’” (See
People v. Jefflo (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1322; accord,
Zamora, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1089.) “Good cause does not
exist where the allegations of jury misconduct are speculative,
conclusory, vague, or unsupported.” (Cook, at p. 346.) We review
the trial court’s denial of a section 237 petition for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Santos (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 965, 978.)

      3.     The Trial Court’s Credibility Determination Is Amply
             Supported
       Chapman argues “[t]he court lacked a sufficient basis to
conclude that [Alternate Juror No. 3] was not credible.” He
asserts this alternate juror was “a very professional, educated
guy” and it “seems highly unlikely that such an individual would
commit perjury.” Chapman also says Alternate Juror No. 3 was
credible because he admitted he had personally committed
misconduct by discussing the case with other jurors during the
trial.
       “The power to judge the credibility of witnesses and to
resolve conflicts in the testimony is vested in the trial court, and
its findings of fact, express or implied, must be upheld if
supported by substantial evidence.” (In re Carpenter (1995)
9 Cal.4th 634, 646 [assessing claim of juror misconduct]; accord,

                                 39
People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 581.) Here, the trial
court’s credibility determination was supported by substantial
evidence. Alternate Juror No. 3 testified he believed the jury
verdict was incorrect and Thomas had lied on the stand. (See
People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1462-1464
[substantial evidence for adverse credibility determination
because juror who alleged misconduct believed the defendant’s
sentence was not a fair punishment].) After hearing the
testimony, the court also observed Alternate Juror No. 3
“wouldn’t answer the questions directly” and “kept volunteering
stuff,” undermining his credibility. (See People v. Peterson (2020)
10 Cal.5th 409, 473 [upholding adverse credibility finding where
juror’s “hesitation . . . before issuing a denial [of misconduct] was
‘the longest pause I’ve ever seen’”]; accord, People v. Williams
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1262 [emphasizing credibility
determinations are based “‘on firsthand observations unavailable
to us on appeal’”].) On the whole, there was ample evidence
supporting the trial court’s finding Alternate Juror No. 3 was not
credible. (See People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 175
[upholding report of juror misconduct as credible where juror did
not “‘lie[]’” and was “forthcoming and detailed in his account”].)

      4.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By
            Denying a Second Evidentiary Hearing
      Chapman argues the trial court should have held a second
evidentiary hearing based on the declarations submitted by other
jurors. He points to statements in the declarations of Juror No. 1
and Juror No. 4, asserting “at least one of the jurors may have
prejudged the case” or tried to discuss the case during trial, and
“toward the end of trial two jurors had discussed appellant being

                                 40
guilty, even though another juror characterized the exchange
between the two jurors as joking around.”
      There was no abuse of discretion. Although two jurors
made light of the situation by saying they should find Chapman
and Patawaran guilty to end their service on the jury, the trial
court expressly considered these comments and concluded there
was no misconduct. (See Zamora, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1088 [affirming no good cause to disclose juror information
where juror stated in jest, “‘let’s just find him guilty so we can get
this over with’”]; People v. Diaz (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1239,
1244 [“Our Supreme Court has warned that petitions to access
confidential juror records ‘“should not be used as a ‘fishing
expedition’ to search for possible misconduct.”’”].)13

E.     Staying the Sentence on Count 270 Under Section 654
       Citing section 654’s prohibition on multiple punishments,
Chapman argues the trial court should have stayed his sentence
on the fraudulent securities scheme count, count 270, because it
amounts to multiple punishment for the same conduct underlying
the 69 securities fraud counts. Although Chapman did not assert
this claim of error in the trial court, “a section 654 claim is not
waived by failing to object” in the trial court. (People v. Hester
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.) This is because “a court acts in
excess of its jurisdiction and imposes an unauthorized sentence

13     Chapman also argues that “[i]f this Court finds any of the
issues raised . . . forfeited due to any act or omission of
appellant’s trial counsel,” we should consider whether he received
effective assistance of counsel. Because we considered
Chapman’s arguments on the merits, we need not address this
argument.

                                 41
when it fails to stay execution of a sentence under section 654.”
(Ibid.)

       1.    Relevant Law and Standard of Review
       As relevant here, section 654, subdivision (a), provides:
“An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished
under more than one provision.” “The statutory purpose
underlying section 654 ‘is to ensure that a defendant’s
punishment will be commensurate with his culpability.’”
(People v. Kelly (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 886, 904.) To this end,
“[s]ection 654 precludes multiple punishment for a single act or
indivisible course of conduct punishable under more than one
criminal statute.” (People v. Cleveland (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
263, 267.) “Whether a course of conduct is divisible and therefore
gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654
depends on the ‘intent and objective’ of the actor.” (Ibid.) “If all
of the crimes were merely incidental to, or were the means of
accomplishing or facilitating one objective, a defendant may be
punished only once.” (People v. Perry (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th
1521, 1525 (Perry).) On the other hand, if a defendant “‘harbored
“multiple criminal objectives,” which were independent of and not
merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each
statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, “even
though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an
otherwise indivisible course of conduct.”’” (People v. Kenefick
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 114, 125 (Kenefick).)

                                42
       “The defendant’s intent and objective are factual questions
for the trial court.” (People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112,
162.) “A trial court’s implied finding that a defendant harbored a
separate intent and objective for each offense will be upheld on
appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence.” (People v.
Blake (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 509, 512.) “‘We review the court’s
determination of [a defendant’s] “separate intents” for sufficient
evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment, and presume
in support of the court’s conclusion the existence of every fact the
trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’”
(People v. Andra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 638, 640-641.)

      2.     Section 654 Requires Staying Chapman’s Sentence on
             Count 270, Because Substantial Evidence Does Not
             Support That Chapman Harbored Multiple Criminal
             Objectives
      We conclude Chapman’s convictions for securities fraud
and participating in a fraudulent securities scheme did not entail
multiple criminal objectives, and thus the trial court should have
stayed Chapman’s sentence on the fraudulent securities scheme
count.
      Chapman was sentenced on 69 counts of securities fraud
under Corporations Code section 25401, which provides: “It is
unlawful for any person to offer or sell a security in this state, or
to buy or offer to buy a security in this state, by means of any
written or oral communication that includes an untrue statement
of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which the statements were made, not misleading.”

                                 43
       Chapman was also sentenced on one count (count 270) of
using a scheme to defraud under Corporations Code
section 25541. Subdivision (a) of that section authorizes
conviction of “[a]ny person who willfully employs, directly or
indirectly, any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud in connection
with the offer, purchase, or sale of any security or willfully
engages, directly or indirectly, in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person in connection with the offer, purchase, or sale of
any security.”
       Chapman argues his convictions for securities fraud and
using a scheme to defraud involved the same course of conduct
and shared the same objective: “obtaining monetary investments
in securities from the alleged victims.”
       The People contend Chapman engaged in two separate
courses of conduct based on separate criminal objectives. As to
count 270, the People assert Chapman “r[an] a scheme to defraud
investors” by “forming, incorporating, and running Authotecq,”
“hiring employees, drafting PPMs, acquiring Valetpay and
rebranding it Paysentinel, and setting up additional corporations,
IQSecure and Shadoworks, into which he funneled his money.”
The People describe count 270 as “directed to appellant’s leading
role in creating the infrastructure that allowed for the individual
instances of securities fraud to take place.” As to the
69 securities fraud counts, the People assert “these counts were
directed to the individual fraudulent sales of Authotecq securities
to the individual victims . . . that took place on different and
specific dates. And the objective of those individual instances of
securities fraud was not to run a securities scheme but to fund
the company . . . by taking money from the victims.”

                                44
       Substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s
implied finding that Chapman harbored multiple criminal
objectives and acted in two separate courses of conduct between
the securities fraud and fraudulent securities scheme counts.
While the People assert that the sales to investors were simply
“to fund the company,” the securities scheme aimed to “defraud
investors,” this argument presents a distinction without a
difference. Instead, the evidence shows that Chapman had one
criminal objective: to steal from investors through the sale of
worthless securities. First, the fraudulent securities scheme
count and the securities fraud counts shared the same timeframe
(August 7, 2003 to July 20, 2011) and the same alleged conduct.
       Further, the evidence shows Chapman’s activities running
the securities scheme were “the means of accomplishing or
facilitating” the securities fraud. (See Perry, supra,
154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525.) Chapman’s actions running
Authotecq—drafting misleading PPMs, failing to develop the
purported technology, and draining investor funds into his
personal accounts—were the very means by which he defrauded
the individual investors. (See Kenefick, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th
at p. 125 [staying forgery sentence under section 654 where
defendant forged deed to sell a fraudulent investment, because
“the forgeries were preliminary steps in the plan to steal
[victim’s] money” and “simply the means by which [defendant]
accomplished her theft”]; Burris v. Superior Court (1974)
43 Cal.App.3d 530, 535 [applying § 654 where “it is readily
apparent that his principal objective . . . was to unlawfully obtain
money from the county (grand theft), with the unlawful practice
of law and perjury being incidental to and in furtherance of this
objective”].)

                                 45
       Indeed, where the defendant has also been convicted of
securities fraud under Corporations Code section 25401, courts
have stayed the sentence on fraudulent securities scheme counts.
(See, e.g., Koenig, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 815 [“If defendant,
as charged in count 2, ‘employed a device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,’ . . . it was through the offer and sale of [company’s]
securities to investor victims. Thus, the essence of count 2 was
the same as that underlying the section 25401 counts. Indeed,
punishment on count 2 . . . was stayed under Penal Code
section 654.”]; People v. Smith (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 986, 988-
989, 1001.)

F.     Resentencing Under Assembly Bill No. 518
       Chapman argues, the People concede, and we agree he is
entitled to resentencing under Assembly Bill No. 518, which went
into effect on January 1, 2022. Assembly Bill No. 518 amended
section 654, subdivision (a), to read: “An act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may
be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall
the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.”
       “Previously, where Penal Code section 654 applied, the
sentencing court was required to impose the sentence that
‘provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment’ and stay
execution of the other term. [Citation.] As amended by Assembly
Bill 518, Penal Code section 654 now provides the trial court with
discretion to impose and execute the sentence of either term,
which could result in the trial court imposing and executing the
shorter sentence rather than the longer sentence.” (People v.
Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379 (Mani).) Chapman requests
remand for the trial court to consider whether to impose a shorter

                                46
sentence by staying the sentence on the securities fraud counts
and imposing the sentence on the grand theft counts.
       Because Assembly Bill No. 518 imparted new discretion to
impose a lower sentence, under the rule of In re Estrada (1965)
63 Cal.2d 740, it is ameliorative legislation that applies
retroactively to all cases not final when it took effect on
January 1, 2022. (See People v. Fugit (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 981,
995-996; People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 45; Mani,
supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 379.) Accordingly, we remand to the
trial court to reconsider Chapman’s sentence in light of Assembly
Bill No. 518.

G.   Resentencing Under Senate Bill No. 567
     Chapman also argues he is entitled to resentencing under
Senate Bill No. 567.

      1.     Legal Background and Standard of Review
      Senate Bill No. 567, effective January 1, 2022, amended
section 1170, subdivision (b), to limit the discretion of sentencing
courts. (People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1108
(Zabelle).) At the time Chapman was sentenced, former
section 1170, subdivision (b), authorized the sentencing court to
impose an upper, middle, or lower term sentence within its
discretion, considering the “interests of justice.” (People v. Lopez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 464 (Lopez), quoting former
section 1170, subd. (b).)
      Senate Bill No. 567 significantly altered this sentencing
scheme. Under the new section 1170, subdivision (b), the middle
term is the presumptive sentence, unless “there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the

                                 47
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term.”
(§ 1170, subds. (b)(1)-(2).) The facts underlying any aggravating
circumstances must be “stipulated to by the defendant” or “have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
       Chapman contends, the People concede, and we agree
Senate Bill No. 567 is ameliorative legislation that applies
retroactively to Chapman’s case. (See Zabelle, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1108; People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
394, 403, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655; Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 464.) Chapman and the People disagree,
however, whether remand is warranted for resentencing.
       The Courts of Appeal have disagreed on the standard of
review for sentencing error in light of the amendments to
section 1170, subdivision (b), and our Supreme Court has taken
up the issue. (See People v. Lynch (May 27, 2022, C094174)
[nonpub. opn.], review granted Aug. 10, 2022, S274942.) Until
the Supreme Court provides further guidance, we follow the
approach in Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pages 1111 to 1112,
and Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at pages 465 to 467.
       Under Zabelle and Lopez, we consider first whether it is
reasonably probable that the jury would have found each
aggravating fact not true. (See Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1112; Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 466.) We may uphold
the trial court’s consideration of an aggravating fact if we
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have
found the fact true beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Zabelle, at
p. 1111 [applying the Chapman standard for assessing
constitutional error, based on Sixth Amendment right to jury

                               48
trial14].) Second, we consider whether “the trial court would have
exercised its discretion to impose the upper term” based on the
aggravating factors properly before the court. (Lopez, at p. 467
[emphasis omitted]; accord, Zabelle at p. 1112 [applying Watson
standard for state law error under section 117015].)

       2.    Chapman’s Sentencing
       Prior to Chapman’s sentencing, the prosecution submitted
six aggravating circumstances in support of an upper-term
sentence: (1) the crime involved acts disclosing a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, or callousness; (2) the victims were
particularly vulnerable; (3) appellant induced others to
participate in the commission of the crime or occupied a position
of leadership or dominance of other participants; (4) the manner
in which the crime was carried out indicates planning,
sophistication, or professionalism; (5) the crime involved an
attempted or actual taking or damage of great monetary value;
and (6) Chapman took advantage of a position of trust or
confidence to commit the offense.
       The probation department also submitted a pre-sentencing
report. Their report endorsed aggravating factors (2), (4), (5), and
(6). The probation report also identified one circumstance in
mitigation: that Chapman had no prior significant record of
criminal conduct.

14    Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.
15    People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.

                                49
       At sentencing, the trial court exercised its discretion to
impose the upper term of five years on the base count, count 102,
and the upper term of five years on the enhancement under
section 186.11, subdivision (a)(2). The court stayed, but did not
strike, Chapman’s sentence on the section 186.11 enhancement,
reasoning Chapman’s “substantive sentences” “adequately
carried out” punishment for “the amount and the extent of the
fraud here.” In support of the upper-term sentence, the court
cited the “criminal sophistication, planning and professionalism”
involved; Chapman’s taking advantage of his “position of trust
and confidence”; the “significant period of time” over which the
crimes took place; and “the amount of the loss” by the victims.
Chapman did not stipulate to these aggravating factors, nor did
the jury find them beyond a reasonable doubt.

     3.       Chapman Is Entitled to Resentencing Under
              Amended Section 1170, Subdivision (b), Because the
              Sentencing Error Was Not Harmless
       Chapman asserts resentencing is necessary because the
jury did not make specific findings on any of the aggravating
factors relied on by the court, nor did Chapman stipulate to such
facts. Chapman also argues that, although the jury found he took
more than $500,000 pursuant to the section 186.11 sentencing
enhancement, the sentencing court could not rely on this finding
to impose an upper-term sentence relating to the taking of “great
monetary value.” For these reasons, Chapman urges that the
trial court’s violation of the amended section 1170 is not
harmless.

                               50
       We agree with Chapman. First, we cannot conclude the
jury would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt all the
aggravating facts relied on by the sentencing court. (See Zabelle,
supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1111-1112; Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 466.) Although the trial court believed
Chapman committed the offenses by “taking advantage of a
position of trust and confidence,” the evidence showed Chapman
had almost no direct contact with investors and his name only
appeared on Authotecq offering materials once. Indeed, several
Authotecq investors testified they did not know who Chapman
was. As to Chapman’s “criminal sophistication, planning and
professionalism” and the taking of “great monetary value,” these
factors are somewhat “subjective” and it is “‘difficult for a
reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue
been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the
facts in the same manner as did the trial court.’” (People v. Lewis
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1139, review granted May 17, 2023,
S279147; see People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 840
[“Many of the aggravating circumstances . . . require an imprecise
quantitative or comparative evaluation of the facts,” including
“whether the crime ‘involved . . . [a] taking or damage of great
monetary value.”].)
       Finally, we agree with Chapman that the court could not
properly consider the jury’s finding, pursuant to the
section 186.11 enhancement, that Chapman took more than
$500,000 as a basis for finding Chapman took “great monetary
value.” Under section 1170, subdivision (b)(5), the trial court
“may not impose an upper term by using the fact of any
enhancement upon which sentence is imposed under any
provision of law.” Rule 4.420(g) of the California Rules of Court

                                51
clarifies that “a fact charged and found as an enhancement may
be used as a reason for imposing a particular term only if the
court has discretion to strike the punishment for the
enhancement and does so.” The trial court stayed Chapman’s
sentence on the section 186.11 enhancement, but did not strike
the enhancement.
       Moving to the second step of the harmless error analysis,
we also cannot conclude the trial court would have imposed the
same upper-term sentence without the full slate of aggravating
factors it utilized. This is true even if we assume the jury would
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Chapman stole “great
monetary value” or exercised “criminal sophistication.” (See
People v. Butler (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 953, 962, review granted
May 31, 2023, S279633 [resentencing warranted even assuming
all aggravating factors but one were permissible].) As in Zabelle,
“[t]he trial court gave no particular weight to any of its listed
aggravating circumstances. Nor did it indicate whether its
decision to impose the upper term was (or was not) a close call.”
(Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1115; see Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 468 [remanding for resentencing where “the
court relied on a long list of aggravating factors in selecting the
upper term” but “offered no indication that it would have selected
an upper term sentence even if only a single aggravating factor or
some subset of permissible factors were present”].)
       In sum, resentencing is necessary “to allow the trial court
the opportunity to exercise its discretion to make its sentencing
choice in light of the recent amendments to section 1170.” (Lopez,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 468.)

                                52
H.     Amending Clerical Errors in the Sentencing Minute Orders
       and Abstract of Judgment
       The parties agree that correction of certain clerical errors
in the abstract of judgment and the sentencing minute orders is
warranted. We also agree. If the record reflects clerical errors in
the abstract of judgment, “an appellate court. . . ‘may correct such
errors on its own motion or upon the application of the parties.’”
(People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 187-188 [collecting
cases].)
       Accordingly, the clerk of the superior court is directed to
amend the abstract of judgment and sentencing minute orders as
follows: Count 102 shall replace count 105 as the base term of
the sentence. Count 123, a dismissed charge, shall be stricken
from the abstract and the sentencing minute orders. The
abstract shall reflect a concurrent three-year sentence pursuant
to count 93, a stayed three-year sentence on count 201, and a
concurrent three-year sentence on count 202. The abstract’s
description of counts 74 and 93 shall be amended to “fraud in the
offer or sale of a security,” the description of count 186 to “fraud
in the offer of a security,” and the description of count 269 as
“fraud in the offer of a security.” The abstract shall be further
amended to list the statutory provision of all security fraud
counts as “CC 25401-25540(b),” the provision for count 269 as
“CC 25401,” and the provision for count 270 as “CC 25541.”

                         DISPOSITION

      The judgment of conviction is affirmed. We reverse and
vacate the sentence, and remand with directions to the trial court
to resentence Chapman pursuant to amended section 1170,

                                53
subdivision (b), amended section 654, and any other applicable
ameliorative legislation. We also direct the trial court to stay
Chapman’s sentence on count 270 pursuant to section 654, and to
modify the sentencing minute orders and the abstract of
judgment as indicated in the opinion.

                                    MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

     SEGAL, Acting P. J.

     FEUER, J.

                               54