Court Opinion

ID: 9556113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 06:09:40.387321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:27.778167
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion Filed August 14, 2023

                                    S  In The
                              Court of Appeals
                       Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-23-00110-CV

                      IN THE INTEREST OF N.J., A CHILD

                  On Appeal from the 305th Judicial District Court
                               Dallas County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. JC-21-00655-X

                            DISSENTING OPINION

                     Before Justices Reichek, Nowell, and Garcia
                        Dissenting Opinion by Justice Garcia

      I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the evidence is legally

insufficient to support the trial judge’s endangerment finding under Family Code

§ 161.001(b)(1)(E). I would overrule both of Father’s issues and affirm the judgment

of termination.

A.    Endangerment

      1.     Applicable Law

      The trial judge found by clear and convincing evidence that Father’s acts and

omissions endangered N.J., meaning that he jeopardized her well-being or exposed

her to loss or injury. See In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021). Our role is
limited to determining whether that finding was reasonable. See id. We must defer

to the trial judge’s credibility determinations, assume that she resolved all disputed

facts in favor of her finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all

evidence contrary to her finding that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved

or found incredible. See id.

      An endangerment finding must be based on a voluntary, deliberate, and

conscious course of conduct by the parent; a single act or omission will not suffice.

In re R.B., No. 05-21-00043-CV, 2021 WL 2943927, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas July

9, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Importantly for this case, endangerment can be proved by acts and omissions

occurring (1) inside or outside the child’s presence, (2) before or after the child’s

birth, and (3) before or after the child’s removal. See id. at *8–9. “A parent’s conduct

that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the child’s

physical and emotional well-being.” Id. at *9.

      Thus, a parent’s failure to complete court-ordered services can be evidence of

child endangerment, both because it can lead to termination of the parent–child

relationship and because it can indicate that past endangering conduct remains

unaddressed and is likely to continue in the future. See In re T.J., No. 05-22-00954-

CV, 2023 WL 1988838, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem.

op.). Similarly, a parent’s criminal conduct may support an endangerment finding

because it exposes the child to the possibility that the parent may be imprisoned and

                                          –2–
the child may be left alone. See Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.,

312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

      2.    Application of the Law to the Facts

      Under our deferential standard of review, I would conclude that the trial judge

could reasonably find the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:

      •     N.J.’s mother voluntarily surrendered N.J. for adoption and
            never attempted to regain custody.

      •     During this case, N.J. was placed with Father’s mother, T.M., but
            after about a month she returned N.J. to the Department’s
            custody.

      •     When a caseworker went to pick N.J. up from T.M.’s care, Father
            prevented T.M. from signing an affidavit, created a threatening
            atmosphere, and prompted the caseworker to press her “panic
            button” and summon the police. During this episode, the
            caseworker lost track of N.J., and Father told the caseworker that
            she could leave because N.J. “was gone anyway.” However,
            before the caseworker left, she saw N.J. again when Father
            “c[a]me back in with her.”

      •     During this case, Father became angry during a virtual family
            group conference about N.J.’s placement and said that he did not
            want N.J. to be placed with anyone in his family. Father’s sister,
            Q.P., had been considered as a possible placement for N.J., but
            after the conference Q.P. removed herself from consideration.

      •     Father was repeatedly arrested during the years 2009 to 2022.
            Four of the charges involved assault. He was arrested for
            assaulting his father during the pendency of this case, he was in
            jail during the week of trial, and he was out of jail on bond during
            the trial.

      •     Although no direct evidence was presented that Father was
            convicted of any of these charges, he testified that half of the
            charges raised by the State were dropped. The trial judge could
            reasonably infer from this testimony that the other half were not

                                        –3–
             dropped, i.e., they were still pending or ended in convictions or
             deferred-adjudication orders.

      •      Father did not complete court-ordered anger-management
             services or individual-counseling services. He was terminated
             from court-ordered services for noncompliance.

      Considering the evidence as a whole, I would conclude that the trial judge’s

endangerment finding was reasonable. The evidence supported a finding that T.M.,

Q.P., and N.J.’s mother were not willing to take custody of her. The trial judge could

reasonably conclude that Father’s long history of arrests, including a recent arrest

for assaulting his father, and his incarceration during the week of trial endangered

N.J.’s physical and emotional well-being by exposing N.J. to the possibility that

Father would be imprisoned and unable to care for N.J. Likewise, his failure to

complete court-ordered services endangered N.J. by threatening Father’s ability to

be reunited with N.J. and thus continuing a situation of instability and uncertainty

for N.J.

      Each case is unique, but we affirmed a termination order on somewhat similar

facts in In re L.E.H., No. 05-18-00903-CV, 2018 WL 6839565 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Dec. 31, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). In that case, two children were removed from

their mother’s custody after a referral for negligent supervision and drug use by their

mother; the children’s father was in jail at the time because his relationship with the

mother had become violent. Id. at *1, *2. After his release during the pendency of

the case, the father visited the children only once, and he was jailed again during the

case for drug possession. Id. at *1. Although the evidence did not make the father’s
                                         –4–
incarceration history entirely clear, we concluded that the evidence that the father

endangered the children was sufficient because the father’s “continued criminality

contributed to the neglectful and unstable environment in which the boys had lived,”

in addition to the evidence regarding the father’s drug possession and violence

towards the mother. Id. at *5. In the instant case, Father’s criminal history is not

entirely clear either, but his long history of arrests, including arrests for assault

offenses, is probative evidence that he endangered N.J.’s well-being by making it

likely that he would be unable to care for her. Additionally, Father endangered N.J.’s

well-being by failing to complete his court-ordered services and by his angry

outbursts during events pertinent to this case.

      Moreover, the majority’s attempt to distinguish our L.E.H. opinion is

unpersuasive. The majority emphasizes that the father in L.E.H. definitely served

time in prison, while the evidence in this case did not establish that Father served

any “terms of incarceration.” The majority also considers Father’s assaultive

behavior in this case distinguishable from that in L.E.H. because, while the trial court

could reasonably infer violence by Father against a family member, it did not involve

the child’s mother like the violence in L.E.H. did. These distinctions ignore the main

point of L.E.H.: criminal conduct and violations of court orders are endangering to

a child even if the child is not immediately threatened by the conduct because that

conduct can cause instability and uncertainty in the child’s life, can lead to

termination of the parent–child relationship, and can indicate that past endangering

                                          –5–
conduct remains unaddressed and is likely to continue in the future. See In re T.J.,

2023 WL 1988838, at *9. But the majority would require a different result because

the parents in these cases had different criminal histories and did not comply with

the court-ordered plans in different ways.

       Giving due deference to the trial judge, and following our holding in L.E.H.,

I would conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support

the endangerment finding.

B.     Best Interest

       I would also conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to

support the trial judge’s finding that terminating Father’s parental rights to N.J. was

in N.J.’s best interest.

       Some factors relevant to the best-interest determination include (1) the child’s

age and vulnerabilities; (2) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct

by the child’s family; (3) whether the child’s family is willing and able to seek,

accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate an

appropriate agency’s close supervision; (4) whether the child’s family demonstrates

adequate parenting skills; (5) the child’s physical and emotional needs; (6) any

emotional and physical dangers to the child; and (7) the parties’ plans for the child

and the stability of the home or proposed placement. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 263.307(b); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

                                          –6–
      The evidence in this case was legally and factually sufficient to support the

finding that N.J.’s best interest would be served by terminating Father’s parental

rights. N.J. was only one year old at the time of trial, and thus she was very

vulnerable and in need of protection. Father’s arrest history supports a conclusion

that he has a history of committing assaultive conduct. Some evidence supports the

premise that Father was not willing to complete court-ordered services or to

cooperate with Department supervision during this case. The CPS supervisor on the

case testified that Father would “be aggressive and yell” whenever something was

not going his way. There is also evidence that N.J. has special needs in the form of

developmental delays for speech.

      Additionally, a Department caseworker testified that N.J.’s foster parents

were good at making sure that N.J.’s needs were met and her appointments were

kept. She also testified that the Department believed that the foster parents could

provide a safe environment for N.J. in the future. And she testified that N.J. was in

a “Foster to Adopt” foster home. Father, on the other hand, testified that his mother

would take care of N.J. while Father’s sister was working, and at other times his

sister would help be a primary caregiver for N.J., and he would help out any way he

could. But the trial judge was in the best position to judge Father’s credibility, and

she was entitled to discount his testimony, particularly in light of other evidence that

tended to show that Father’s mother and sister were not eager to raise N.J.

                                          –7–
      In sum, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial judge’s best-interest

finding.

                                     *    *     *

      I would overrule both of Father’s issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.

                                              /Dennise Garcia/
                                              DENNISE GARCIA
                                              JUSTICE

230110DF.P05

                                         –8–