Court Opinion

ID: 9381110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 21:00:38.837955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.082589
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                       For the First Circuit

No. 22-1483

              JOEL DOUGLAS; STEVEN FOWLER; JAMES LEWIS,

                       Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                 v.

                      DAVID HIRSHON; LOSU LLC,

                       Defendants, Appellees,

 BIRCH POINT STORAGE LLC; SCOTT LALUMIERE; MICHAEL LYDEN; SHAWN
LYDEN; RUSSELL OAKES; WAYNE LEWIS; ANDRE BELLUCCI; DAVID JONES;
ROBERT BURGESS; ANDROSCOGGIN SAVINGS BANK; BANGOR SAVINGS BANK;
  CAMDEN NATIONAL BANK; DAVID CLARKE; MILK STREET CAPITAL LLC;
   MECAP, LLC, d/b/a Milk Street Capital LLC; COASTAL REALTY
  CAPITAL, LLC, d/b/a Maine Capital Group, LLC; MAINE CAPITAL
GROUP, LLC; LH HOUSING, LLC; TTJR, LLC; F.O. BAILEY REAL ESTATE;
BLR CAPITAL, LLC; ERIC HOLSAPPLE; MACHIAS SAVINGS BANK; JOHN DOE
  NUMBER I; JOHN DOE NUMBER II; JOHN DOE NUMBER III; JOHN DOE
                           NUMBER IV,

                             Defendants.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

              [Hon. Jon D. Levy, U.S. District Judge]

                               Before

                     Gelpí, Lynch, and Thompson,
                           Circuit Judges.

    Robert C. Andrews for appellants.
    Marshall J. Tinkle, with whom Thompson, MacColl & Bass, LLC,
P.A. was on brief, for appellees.

                         March 21, 2023
            LYNCH, Circuit Judge.             Joel Douglas, Steven Fowler, and

James     Lewis     sued        twenty-six       defendants,          alleging         several

interrelated schemes to defraud the plaintiffs of real estate in

Maine.      Among       other    claims,     the       complaint      asserts      that,    in

connection       with    these     schemes,        a    subset     of      the    defendants

participated      in     a     conspiracy     in       violation      of    the    Racketeer

Influenced    and       Corrupt    Organizations          ("RICO")         Act,   18    U.S.C.

§§ 1961-1968, and that this conspiracy injured the plaintiffs.

            The district court dismissed the RICO conspiracy claim

against    two    of     the    defendants,        David    Hirshon        and    LOSU,    LLC

("LOSU"), and denied a motion from the plaintiffs seeking limited

discovery from Hirshon.              See Douglas v. Lalumiere, No. 20-cv-

00227, 2021 WL 4470399, at *4-5 (D. Me. Sept. 29, 2021).                                   The

plaintiffs appeal, contending that the district court erred in

(1) concluding that the complaint fails to state a RICO claim

against    Hirshon       and    LOSU,   (2)      declining       to     consider       certain

materials outside the complaint in ruling on the motion to dismiss,

and (3) denying the plaintiffs discovery.                        We find no error and

affirm the district court's well-reasoned decision.

                                            I.

            Because this appeal follows a dismissal for failure to

state a claim, "we accept as true all well-pleaded facts alleged

in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in

the pleader's favor."             Roe v. Lynch, 997 F.3d 80, 82 (1st Cir.

                                        - 3 -
2021) (quoting Lee v. Conagra Brands, Inc., 958 F.3d 70, 74 (1st

Cir. 2020)).

            The plaintiffs filed the original complaint in this

action,     which    included    thirteen     counts    against    twenty-four

defendants, on June 24, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the

District of Maine.        Neither Hirshon nor LOSU was named in this

complaint.     The plaintiffs filed the operative amended complaint

("the complaint") on September 15, 2020.               In addition to adding

new   allegations,     claims,    and   exhibits,    this   amended    pleading

introduced Hirshon and LOSU as defendants on two counts: Count IV

(a RICO conspiracy claim) and Count XVII (a state law unjust

enrichment claim).1       The RICO claim alleges that Hirshon, LOSU,

and other defendants conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) by

investing    funds    obtained    through     alleged   fraud     schemes   into

efforts to defraud additional victims. The unjust enrichment claim

asserts     that    Hirshon,    LOSU,   and    other    defendants    unjustly

benefited by defrauding Douglas and Fowler.

            The     complaint    alleges   three    interrelated     fraudulent

schemes to deprive the plaintiffs and others of real estate in

      1   The complaint does not actually list LOSU among the
defendants for Count IV, but the allegations included in support
of the claim do refer to LOSU. The district court construed the
complaint as seeking to bring a claim against LOSU, see Douglas,
2021 WL 4470399, at *3 n.3, and, in the interest of completeness,
we do so as well.

                                     - 4 -
Maine.2     At least the first two of these schemes were allegedly

spearheaded by defendant Scott Lalumiere.

            As the district court summarized, in the first alleged

scheme,

            Lalumiere, funded by various banks and private
            lenders,    fraudulently    induced    several
            vulnerable        individuals,       including
            [p]laintiffs [Douglas and Fowler], who lacked
            access to conventional credit, to enter into
            unfavorable lease/buy-back agreements. Under
            the terms of the agreements, the title of the
            victim's property would be transferred to a
            corporate entity controlled by Lalumiere with
            the victim, as the lessee, retaining a
            purchase option.     The Lalumiere-controlled
            entity   would   subsequently   mortgage   the
            property to banks and private lenders, and,
            when the entity defaulted on its loan, the
            mortgagees   foreclosed   on   the   property,
            frustrating the victim's option to purchase.

Douglas, 2021 WL 4470399, at *1.        Properties allegedly targeted in

this scheme include 75 Queen Street, Gorham, and 661 Allen Avenue,

Portland, at the time owned by plaintiffs Douglas and Fowler,

respectively, as well as 36 Settler Road, South Portland, then

owned by a nonplaintiff, Christina Davis.              The complaint asserts

that the participants in this scheme repeatedly used the mail or

wires to facilitate the fraud.

            In   the   second   alleged      scheme,    Fowler   agreed   with

Lalumiere    that   Fowler   would    perform    renovations     at   several

     2    In characterizing the complaint's allegations, we do not
express any view as to whether the complaint states a claim against
any defendant other than Hirshon or LOSU.

                                     - 5 -
properties at a discounted rate and in exchange be given the option

to purchase the properties after completing the work and the

authority to rent out the properties in the meantime.             Lalumiere

then defaulted on the properties' mortgages, preventing Fowler

from exercising his purchase option.

              In the third alleged scheme, multiple defendants agreed

to pay off a defaulted mortgage on a property owned by Lewis and

to lend him funds for improvements in exchange for his transferring

the title to the property to a corporation and making certain

payments.      Following the title transfer, those defendants refused

to make the promised loans and foreclosed on the property.

              The complaint's description of these schemes says very

little about Hirshon or LOSU.          Indeed, in their principal brief,

the   plaintiffs    describe   as   "accurate[]"     the   district   court's

statement that "[t]he [c]omplaint contains scant details regarding

Hirshon's and LOSU's participation in Lalumiere's schemes."                Id.

at *2.   The complaint alleges that Hirshon "is a person residing

in Freeport[,] Maine," and LOSU "is a Maine corporation doing

business in the State of Maine," but does not otherwise provide

any background information on Hirshon or LOSU.             For instance, the

complaint does not even identify Hirshon's occupation or LOSU's

line of business.      With respect to the RICO count, the complaint

alleges that Hirshon and LOSU "knew about the fraud committed by

the   [RICO    e]nterprise   because    of   their   participation    in   the

                                    - 6 -
transactions for 661 Allen Avenue and 75 Queen Street," and that

they, alongside other defendants, "realized the proceeds" of the

schemes.    In addition, the complaint includes as an attachment an

affidavit    dated    January   27,    2020,   sworn   out   by   Davis   (the

nonplaintiff victim of the alleged fraud involving 36 Settler Road)

and recorded with the county registry of deeds, regarding the

transactions involving 36 Settler Road.           In the affidavit, Davis

states "[o]n information and belief" that, after Davis entered a

lease/buy-back agreement with a Lalumiere-controlled corporation

in 2012, the corporation granted a mortgage on the property to

LOSU in March 2019, and that "LOSU . . . had actual notice" of

Davis's lease/buy-back agreement when it accepted the mortgage.

Outside of these statements, the complaint does not describe the

nature,     timing,   or   extent     of   Hirshon's   or    LOSU's   alleged

participation in the schemes.3

            Various subgroups of defendants filed separate motions

to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6).          Hirshon and LOSU jointly filed such

a motion on November 23, 2020, arguing, inter alia, that the

     3    A paragraph supporting the unjust enrichment claim
alleges: "LOSU[,] . . . Hirshon, . . . and [other defendants]
extraction [sic] of equity from the homes at 661 Allen Avenue and
57 [sic] Queen Street when . . . Douglas and . . . Fowler paid the
underlying obligations on the property unjustly enriched the
organization . . . ." On appeal, the plaintiffs do not cite this
allegation or argue that it clarifies Hirshon's or LOSU's alleged
participation in the schemes for purposes of the RICO claim.

                                      - 7 -
complaint fails to plausibly allege that they knowingly joined any

RICO       conspiracy   or    that    they    received   any       benefit     from    the

plaintiffs, as necessary to state an unjust enrichment claim.

                 The plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the

motion      to    dismiss    that    relied   heavily    on    a    set   of   attached

documents not referenced in or attached to the complaint.                             They

never moved to amend the complaint to incorporate these documents.

On the same day, the plaintiffs also filed a motion seeking limited

discovery from Hirshon before the court ruled on the motion to

dismiss, asserting that such discovery would allow them to cure

any deficiencies in their pleading.              Hirshon opposed this motion.4

                 The district court granted the motion to dismiss and

denied the motion for limited discovery in a written opinion issued

September 29, 2021.           See Douglas, 2021 WL 4470399, at *4-5.                    It

reasoned that the complaint fails to plausibly allege either that

Hirshon or LOSU knowingly joined a RICO conspiracy or that the

plaintiffs conferred any benefit on Hirshon or LOSU, as necessary

to state a claim for unjust enrichment under Maine law.                         See id.

at *3-4, *4 n.5.            The court also concluded that the complaint's

       4  A magistrate judge denied the discovery motion without
prejudice and recommended that the district court consider it
alongside the motion to dismiss. After further briefing on the
issue from both sides, the district court construed the magistrate
judge's order denying the motion as "a deferral of action on the
motion," and addressed the merits of the discovery and dismissal
motions together. Douglas, 2021 WL 4470399, at *1 n.2.

                                         - 8 -
allegations   fall   too   far   short   of   the   plausibility   and

particularity requirements of Rules 8 and 9(b) to justify any

discovery under this court's precedents.      See id. at *5.

          Hirshon and LOSU then moved for final judgment on the

plaintiffs' claims against them under Rule 54(b).        The district

court granted the motion,5 see Douglas v. Lalumiere, No. 20-cv-

00227, 2022 WL 2047698, at *3 (D. Me. June 7, 2022), and this

timely appeal followed.

                                 II.

          The plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in

(1) holding that the complaint fails to plausibly allege that

Hirshon or LOSU knowingly joined a RICO conspiracy, (2) declining

to consider documents outside the complaint in ruling on the motion

to dismiss the RICO claim, and (3) denying the motion for limited

discovery with respect to the RICO allegations.6      We address, and

reject, each argument in turn.

     5    The plaintiffs opposed the motion for final judgment,
but on appeal they do not mount any challenge to the district
court's decision to grant the motion independent of their
challenges to its decision to deny discovery and dismiss their
claims.

     6    The plaintiffs do not address their unjust enrichment
claim on appeal, thereby waiving any argument with respect to that
count. See, e.g., United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st
Cir. 1990).

                                 - 9 -
                                 A.

           We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim de novo.    E.g., Legal Sea Foods, LLC

v. Strathmore Ins. Co., 36 F.4th 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2022).         The

complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).     "A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged."     Id.   Although "[w]e 'accept

as true the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations' and

'draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party,'"

Cheng v. Neumann, 51 F.4th 438, 443 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting McKee

v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2017)), we do not credit

"'conclusory legal allegations' [or] factual allegations that are

'too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of

relief from the realm of mere conjecture,'" Legal Sea Foods, 36

F.4th at 33 (citation omitted) (first quoting Cardigan Mountain

Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2015); and then

quoting SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010) (en

banc)).7

     7    The  district  court   reasoned  that,  because  the
plaintiffs' RICO claims are based on alleged predicate acts of

                               - 10 -
          The criminal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962, "prohibits

certain conduct involving a 'pattern of racketeering activity.'"

Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453 (2006) (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 1962).     Racketeering activity is defined "to include

a host of so-called predicate acts," including acts that would be

indictable as mail or wire fraud.     Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem.

Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647 (2008); see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (defining

"racketeering activity"); id. §§ 1341, 1343 (defining mail and

wire fraud).    Subsection (a) of § 1962 provides:

          It shall be unlawful for any person who has
          received any income derived, directly or
          indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering
          activity . . . to use or invest, directly or
          indirectly, any part of such income, or the
          proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
          interest in, or the establishment or operation
          of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
          activities of which affect, interstate or
          foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).     Subsection (d) makes it "unlawful for any

person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection

(a)."     Id.    §   1962(d).    In      order   "[t]o   prove   a   RICO

conspiracy . . . , the [plaintiff] must show that 'the defendant

mail and wire fraud, their complaint "must [also] satisfy the
[heightened] particularity requirements of Rule 9(b)." Douglas,
2021 WL 4470399, at *3 (quoting Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886,
889 (1st Cir. 1997)). Under that standard, the complaint "must
state the time, place and content of the alleged mail and wire
communications perpetrating that fraud." Ahmed, 118 F.3d at 889.
Because the complaint fails to meet even the ordinary plausibility
standard, we need not separately address issues related to Rule 9.

                                - 11 -
knowingly      joined    the     conspiracy,         agreeing    with   one    or   more

coconspirators to further [the] endeavor, which, if completed,

would     satisfy       all    the    elements        of   a    substantive        [RICO]

offense.'"       United States v. Velazquez-Fontanez, 6 F.4th 205, 212

(1st    Cir.    2021)    (third       and    fourth    alterations      in    original)

(internal      quotation      marks    omitted)       (quoting    United      States    v.

Rodríguez-Torres, 939 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2019)).                            The RICO

statute's civil component, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, provides a cause of

action to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by

reason of a violation of [the criminal RICO provisions]."                              18

U.S.C. § 1964(c).

               Count IV of the complaint asserts that Hirshon and LOSU,

together with numerous other defendants, participated in a RICO

conspiracy to violate § 1962(a) by investing funds obtained through

the alleged fraud schemes into efforts to defraud additional

victims.       To state a claim on this count with respect to Hirshon

and LOSU, the complaint must plausibly allege, among other things,

that they knowingly joined the purported RICO conspiracy.                              See

Velazquez-Fontanez, 6 F.4th at 212.                   We agree with the district

court that the complaint fails to do so.

               As the district court observed, the complaint "contains

scant details regarding Hirshon's and LOSU's participation" in the

alleged conspiracy.           Douglas, 2021 WL 4470399, at *2.               On appeal,

the     plaintiffs      direct       our     attention     essentially        to    three

                                            - 12 -
statements in the complaint or its exhibits. First, in a paragraph

describing the alleged "role[s]" of various defendants in the

purported conspiracy, the complaint states that "LOSU LLC, David

Hirshon, [and other defendants] realized the proceeds [of the real

estate transactions]."       Second, the complaint states that Hirshon

and LOSU "knew about the fraud committed by the [RICO e]nterprise

because of their participation in the transactions for 661 Allen

Avenue and 75 Queen Street."          Third, the Davis affidavit attached

to the complaint states "[o]n information and belief" that a

corporation controlled by Lalumiere granted a mortgage on the

property at 36 Settler Road to LOSU in March 2019 and that

"LOSU . . . had actual notice" of Davis's lease/buy-back agreement

with that corporation at that time.

           The conclusory assertion that Hirshon and LOSU "knew

about the fraud . . . because of their participation in the

transactions for 661 Allen Avenue and 75 Queen Street" is "too

meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of relief

from the realm of mere conjecture."            Legal Sea Foods, 36 F.4th at

33 (quoting Tambone, 597 F.3d at 442).             The complaint alleges a

complex   series    of   transactions,     many   of   which   --   such    as   a

titleholder's      taking   out   a    mortgage   on   a   property    --    are

unremarkable.      No inference can reasonably be drawn from the mere

                                      - 13 -
fact       of   these   transactions   that    those   involved   knowingly

participated in fraud.8

                Stripping out this conclusory statement, the remaining

allegations against Hirshon and LOSU assert that they in some

unspecified way participated in transactions involving 661 Allen

Avenue and 75 Queen Street; that they in some unspecified way

benefitted financially from Lalumiere's transactions; and that

LOSU acquired a mortgage on a different property, 36 Settler Road,

from a corporation controlled by Lalumiere while having notice

that the corporation had entered into a lease/buy-back agreement

with Davis. These sparse allegations fall well short of "plausibly

narrat[ing] a claim for relief."              Schatz v. Republican State

Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012).         We cannot "draw

[a] reasonable inference that the defendant[s are] liable for the

misconduct alleged."          Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.         None of the

allegations is remotely inconsistent with the conclusion that

Hirshon and LOSU are ordinary lenders or providers of services

       8  The plaintiffs contend that it was sufficient for them
simply to allege knowledge on the part of Hirshon and LOSU without
supporting facts because Rule 9 allows plaintiffs to plead
"knowledge . . . generally." But the Supreme Court has made clear
that "'generally' is a relative term," and that, "[i]n the context
of Rule 9, it is to be compared to the particularity requirement
applicable to fraud or mistake." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)).       It "excuses a party from pleading
[knowledge] under an elevated pleading standard," but it does not
allow a party to rest on conclusory allegations that do not satisfy
the basic plausibility standard. Id.; see id. at 686-87; Schatz v.
Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2012).

                                   - 14 -
related to real estate transactions that operate in the area of

Maine where the alleged fraud took place.                    "The plausibility

standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully."      Id.   (quoting      Twombly,    550     U.S.   at    556).     The

plaintiffs have not met this standard.

            Because the plaintiffs' allegations do not support a

reasonable inference that Hirshon or LOSU knowingly joined the

alleged RICO conspiracy, the district court properly concluded

that the complaint fails to state a claim against these defendants.

                                        B.

            The plaintiffs argue that, even if the complaint itself

fails to state a claim, the district court erred by refusing, when

ruling on    Hirshon and LOSU's         motion to dismiss,             to consider

additional    documents    attached      to     the   plaintiffs'       memorandum

opposing the motion.      They contend that these attachments -- which

were not attached to or referenced in the complaint, and which

include, for example, mortgage documents related to the properties

involved in the alleged fraud schemes, ostensibly retrieved from

county registries of deeds -- fill any gaps in the complaint's

allegations.      The    district     court     refused     to   consider      these

documents    because    they   were    not     included    in    the   plaintiffs'

complaint.     Douglas, 2021 WL 4470399, at *4.

                                      - 15 -
          In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim, "a court ordinarily may only consider facts alleged in the

complaint and exhibits attached thereto, or else convert the motion

into one for summary judgment."9       Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714

F.3d 29, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).         "Under certain

'narrow exceptions'" -- including for "documents the authenticity

of which are not disputed by the parties" and "official public

records" -- "some extrinsic documents may be considered without

converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment."

Id. at 36 (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.

1993)).   The plaintiffs argue that            the attachments to their

memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss fall into these "narrow

exceptions."

          This   court   has   not   decided    the   standard   of   review

applicable to a district court's refusal to consider documents

external to a complaint in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, see

id. at 36 n.5 (declining to decide whether review is de novo or

for abuse of discretion); Lab. Rels. Div. of Constr. Indus. of

Mass., Inc. v. Healey, 844 F.3d 318, 331 (1st Cir. 2016) (same),

but the plaintiffs concede that an abuse of discretion standard

applies, so we proceed on that assumption, cf. Davis v. HSBC Bank

     9    The plaintiffs do not argue that the district court
should have converted the motion into one for summary judgment in
order to consider the attachments.

                                 - 16 -
Nev., N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that a

"district court's decision to incorporate by reference documents

into [a] complaint shall be reviewed for an abuse of discretion").

We note also that the plaintiffs do not develop any argument or

cite any authority holding that considering external documents is

mandatory    --   rather   than   within    the   district   court's

discretion -- if those documents fall into one of the "narrow

exceptions" the plaintiffs invoke.     Cf., e.g., Healey, 844 F.3d at

331 (explaining that a court "may" consider external documents

within the exceptions); Freeman, 714 F.3d at 36 (same); cf. also

Davis, 691 F.3d at 1159 ("Our relevant case law has recognized

consistently that [a] district court may, but is not required to

incorporate documents by reference.").

            We see no abuse of discretion in the district court's

refusal to consider the attachments.        The plaintiffs did not

articulate to the district court any reason why it could or should

consider the attachments in ruling on the motion to dismiss.     Cf.

Diulus v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 823 F. App'x 843,

847 (11th Cir. 2020) (unpublished decision) (finding no abuse of

discretion where district court did not take judicial notice of

materials sua sponte); River Farm Realty Tr. v. Farm Fam. Cas.

Ins. Co., 943 F.3d 27, 41 n.21 (1st Cir. 2019) (treating argument

not made to district court as waived).        The plaintiffs do not

dispute Hirshon and LOSU's observation that, in litigating the

                              - 17 -
motion before the district court, they did not cite the exceptions

on which they now rely.       Their opposition memorandum simply noted

that various exhibits were attached, and cited those attachments

without any discussion of why doing so would be permissible.10

Precedent emphasizes that the exceptions the plaintiffs seek to

invoke are "narrow," and the district court did not abuse its

discretion by declining to maneuver the attachments into those

exceptions without assistance from the plaintiffs.              Freeman, 714

F.3d at 36 (quoting Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3); see id. at 37

(treating as waived any argument that a document fit into the

"narrow   exceptions"    because   the     party   advancing    the   document

failed to make such an argument).

           Further,     the   plaintiffs    have   offered     no   persuasive

reason why the attachments could not have been submitted with the

complaint or included in a proposed amended complaint.                    See

Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass'n, 958 F.3d 470, 483 (6th Cir.

2020) ("If plaintiffs believe that they need to supplement their

complaint with additional facts to withstand . . . a motion to

     10   The district court heard oral argument on the motion to
dismiss; the record does not contain any transcript of this
argument, but the plaintiffs do not claim to have raised the
exceptions they now invoke during that proceeding. The plaintiffs
did assert in a footnote in their memorandum opposing Hirshon and
LOSU's motion for final judgment that the district court could
have considered one of the attachments as a public record. But
this memorandum was filed after the district court ruled on the
motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs did not move the district
court to reconsider the dismissal.

                                   - 18 -
dismiss[], they have a readily available tool: a motion to amend

the complaint under Rule 15."); Zomolosky v. Kullman, 640 F. App'x

212, 218 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished decision) (finding no

abuse of discretion where district court declined to take judicial

notice of SEC filings that plaintiff had been "free to include" in

complaint).    The plaintiffs respond that "[t]he [complaint] was

lengthy and already had numerous attachments without trying to

anticipate how it might be defended."        But while a complaint need

not anticipate every possible defense a defendant might raise,

see, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211-12 (2007), it "must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face'" as to each

defendant, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570).   The district court merely held the plaintiffs to that

burden, and we follow its lead.      See Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc.

v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008) (explaining

that, in reviewing a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), this court

"review[s]    only   those   documents    actually   considered   by   the

district court . . . unless we are persuaded that [the district

court] erred in declining to consider the proffered documents").

                                   C.

          In the end, this appeal turns on whether the district

court abused its discretion by denying "limited discovery" against

Hirshon before dismissing the plaintiffs' claims.         This court has

                                 - 19 -
identified two circumstances in which a district court considering

a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) might appropriately permit

limited discovery.     This case does not fall into either category.

           First, a line of cases beginning with New England Data

Services, Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286 (1st Cir. 1987), recognizes

that, where a complaint "specifically set[s] out a general scheme

to defraud" but (1) the complaint falls short of pleading a claim

with the heightened particularity required by Rule 9(b) and (2)

the missing information is "peculiarly within [the] defendants'

knowledge," a district court may have discretion to allow the

plaintiffs limited discovery to uncover the missing details.               Id.

at 292; see id. at 290-92.      In Becher, for example, the complaint,

which alleged a RICO claim based on predicate acts of mail and

wire fraud, was deficient only because it did not set forth in

detail the "time, place[,] and content" of the underlying mailings

or wirings.    Id. at 291; see id. at 290-92; see also N. Bridge

Assocs.,   Inc.   v.   Boldt,   274   F.3d   38,   43-44   (1st   Cir.   2001)

(discussing Becher).      This court has never applied Becher in a

case, like this one, where the complaint fell short not only of

Rule 9(b)'s heightened particularity requirements but also of the

ordinary plausibility standard.          See Home Orthopedics Corp. v.

Rodríguez, 781 F.3d 521, 532 (1st Cir. 2015) (rejecting application

of Becher where complaint did not meet plausibility standard);

Boldt, 274 F.3d at 43-44 (similar).          Because "it is not simply the

                                  - 20 -
details [the plaintiffs] lack, but the substance of a RICO claim,"

Boldt, 274 F.3d at 44, Becher discovery is unwarranted.

          Second, this court held in Menard v. CSX Transportation,

Inc., 698 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2012), that limited discovery may be

appropriate where "a plausible claim may be indicated [by the

plaintiff's allegations,] . . . 'information needed [to flesh out

the allegations before trial] may be in the control of [the]

defendants,'" and "modest discovery may provide the missing link."

Id. at 45 (third alteration in original) (quoting Pruell v. Caritas

Christi, 678 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2012)).   The plaintiff in Menard

alleged that he had been injured twice while trespassing in a

railyard operated by the defendant -- first by having his foot

crushed by a moving segment of track, then by being hit by a

train -- and that the defendant's employees had failed to prevent

the second injury despite being aware of the first.      See id. at

41-42, 44.   This court explained that, although the plaintiff had

not provided detailed allegations about the defendant's employees'

activities, "one might not expect precise recollection from a man

badly injured by a switched track and shortly thereafter hit and

dragged under [a] train."   Id. at 45.   Critically, the plaintiff

had made general allegations about those employees on "information

and belief" and described his own actions, and the defendant was

better positioned to supply the missing information than was the

plaintiff.   Id. at 41-42, 44-45.

                              - 21 -
            Later cases have read Menard as indicating that "'some

latitude    may    be   appropriate'     in    applying    the   plausibility

standard" and authorizing discovery where "a material part of the

information needed is likely to be within the defendant's control,"

and that "the plausibility inquiry properly takes into account

whether discovery can reasonably be expected to fill any holes in

the pleader's case."       García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d

100, 104 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Menard, 698 F.3d at 45); accord

Saldivar v. Racine, 818 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2016).

            The complaint in this case falls well short of justifying

discovery under Menard.          As explained above, the complaint does

not come close to plausibly alleging that Hirshon or LOSU knowingly

joined a RICO conspiracy.          It supplies virtually no information

about the nature, timing, or extent of their alleged participation

in the conspiracy.      Nor does the complaint give shape to its claims

through allegations made on information and belief, as in Menard.

See   698   F.3d   at   44-45;    see   also   Saldivar,   818   F.3d   at   23

(discussing Menard).      Given the near-total lack of information, we

cannot say that "a plausible claim may be indicated" by the

complaint or that there is information likely to be under the

defendants' control that would "provide the missing link." Menard,

698 F.3d at 45.     As the district court correctly concluded, there

is simply too wide a "gap between the allegations in the complaint

                                    - 22 -
and a plausible claim" for discovery to be appropriate.                   Saldivar,

818 F.3d at 23.

             We     reject     the     plaintiffs'    contention         that,    in

considering the motion for limited discovery, the district court

should     have    looked    beyond    the   complaint      and   considered     the

attachments to the memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss.

Cases following both Becher and Menard have focused specifically

on the allegations contained in the complaint (or a proposed

amended complaint).          See, e.g., Boldt, 274 F.3d at 44 (examining

"allegations"        in     "complaint"      in   holding      Becher     discovery

unwarranted); Becher, 829 F.2d at 292 (focusing on "the strength

of [the] plaintiff's allegations" in the complaint); Parker v.

Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing Menard, 698 F.3d

at   45)    (assessing       whether    allegations      in    proposed    amended

complaint     were    sufficiently        plausible   to      permit    discovery);

García-Catalán,        734    F.3d     at    104-05   (examining        "what    the

[plaintiff] . . . set forth in her complaint" when applying

Menard).     This focus makes good sense, as both Becher and Menard

concerned the plaintiff's compliance with pleading requirements.

See Becher, 829 F.2d at 292 (examining compliance with Rule 9(b));

Menard, 698 F.3d at 45 (examining compliance with plausibility

standard).        Nor does this approach impose an unreasonable burden

on the plaintiffs, who were free to seek to amend their complaint

to include the attachments but failed to do so.                   Cf. Bates, 958

                                       - 23 -
F.3d at 483 (explaining that a plaintiff can "readily" supplement

a complaint through a motion to amend).           The district court

properly considered the material before it with respect to the

motion to dismiss when ruling on the plaintiffs' discovery motion.

           We also reject the plaintiffs' argument that a plaintiff

confronted with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is entitled to discovery

unless the record shows that "there is no means of pleading the

claim well."   On the contrary, this court has emphasized that the

burden is on the plaintiff to "allege[] 'enough fact[s] to raise

a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' of

[an]   actionable   [claim]."    Parker,   935   F.3d   at   18   (second

alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see

also Boldt, 274 F.3d at 44 (explaining that Becher discovery is

appropriate only where the complaint's allegations "render[] it

likely" that discovery would uncover necessary details).             This

burden reflects the fact that "[o]ne of the main goals of the

plausibility standard is the avoidance of unnecessary discovery."

Ríos-Campbell v. U.S. Dep't of Com., 927 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.

2019) (quoting Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 46 (1st

Cir. 2012)); see Schatz, 669 F.3d at 56.    The plaintiffs' approach

would undermine that goal by requiring discovery in a broad set of

cases where the pleadings offer no reason to think discovery is

worthwhile.

                                - 24 -
         The   district   court    properly   denied   the   plaintiffs'

motion for limited discovery.

                                  III.

         For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                                - 25 -