Court Opinion

ID: 9863290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:21:39.902175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:40:45.631114
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Defendant’s earnest motion has been carefully studied. In it he urges we erred in affirming the judgment for several reasons. These will be briefly mentioned. The first is because the affirmance was not upon the basis of the jury’s findings. The transcript reflects that plaintiffs filed motion for judgment upon the basis of the verdict. The court granted this motion and rendered judgment for plaintiffs. In reaching the conclusion to affirm this judgment, we believed the findings of the jury were immaterial. In addition to detailed allegations of adverse possession in paragraphs 3 through 7 of the First Amended Original Petition, it was alleged in the latter part of Par. 8 following, facts which would support prior possession and since prior possession was established as a matter of law by plaintiffs, the judgment below was upheld. Defendant says because the court submitted the issue of prior possession conditionally upon findings that no ground of adverse possession existed in favor of plaintiffs, plaintiffs waived the issue of prior possession. This, we think, is the rule as to an issue of disputed fact. But this does not apply to one conclusively established. Rule 279, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Goodwin v. Southtex Land Sales, Tex.Civ.App., 243 S.W.2d 721.
Defendant asserts that because plaintiffs attempted to prove their record title back to the sovereignty of the soil, and having failed, they cannot rely upon prior possession. - If the record title was their only foundation for recovery we would sustain defendant. But, besides the formal allegations of Trespass to try title, and pleas of adverse possession, separate allegations supporting the theory of prior possession were asserted. Where plaintiff relies on more than one ground of recovery, failure to connect his title with the title out of the state is not fatal. Buvens v. Brown (Tex.Com.App.), 290 S.W. 1086 (1089); Dean v. Grogan-Cochran Lumber Co., Tex.Civ.App., 58 S.W.2d 552.
*488Defendant asserts that in attempting to prove their record title, plaintiffs showed this title to the land was in George Donalson. It is reasoned from this that plaintiffs recognized title as being in Don-alson and so doing cannot recover, citing this court’s holding in Cuniff v. Bernard Corp., Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 577. Plaintiffs did show record title to this land was in Donalson. But it cannot he said from that that plaintiffs recognized Donalson’s ownership. Since 1913, as pointed out in the original opinion, plaintiffs and their predecessor, T. W. Smith, who died in 1936, have exercised dominion over the land and have claimed it as their own. No contrary claim was asserted until defendant’s claim was made. It was said in Magee v. Paul, 110 Tex. 470, 221 S.W. 254, at p. 256:
“Since it is not consistent with human experience for one really owning property of value to assert no claim thereto, but to acquiesce for a long period of time in an unfounded, hostile claim, the rule is sound which permits the inference that an apparent owner has parted with his title from evidence, first, of a long-asserted and open claim, adverse to that of the apparent owner; second, of nonclaim by the apparent owner; and third, of acquiescence by the apparent owner in the adverse claim.”
It is presumed that plaintiffs having prior possession have acquired outstanding title of third party. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Wilcoxon, Tex.Civ.App., 70 S.W.2d 218 (W.R.).
The motion for rehearing is overruled.