Court Opinion

ID: 9744272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:59:03.939181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.124675
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE DOWNING, dissenting: My review, analysis and evaluation of the record compel me to dissent. In my opinion, the evidence establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty. Under such circumstances, I subscribe to the statement of Chief Justice Burger in United States v. Hasting (1983), 461 U.S. 499, 509, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96, 106, 103 S. Ct. 1974,1980-81: “[T]he Court has consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional violations, see, e.g., Brown, supra, 411 U.S., at 230-232, 93 S. Ct., at 1569-1570; Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S. Ct. 2173, 33 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1972). The goal, as Chief Justice Traynor [of the Supreme Court of California] has noted, is ‘to conserve judicial resources by enabling appellate courts to cleanse the judicial process of prejudicial error without becoming mired in harmless error.’ [Citation.]” I The majority concludes that there was prejudicial error when defendant was denied the right to cross-examine the State’s witness, David Alonso, as to his bias or motive. Defendant, in his brief to this court, urges that the trial court “erroneously excluded all evidence of gang affiliation” and “the evidence would show that Alonso and defendant had been members of the same gang, defendant quit, and the gang threatened him with reprisal if he did not renew his activities or contribute to the gang coffers. In short, it was the defense theory that ‘this case is being put on our defendant’ by his old gang.” (Emphasis added.) At trial, before opening statements and any witnesses were heard, counsel discussed with the court whether evidence would be allowed of gang membership or gang affiliation, but no reference was made by defendant’s counsel of any alleged threats. After such on-the-record discussion, an in camera, off-the-record discussion took place between the court and counsel for defendant. Thereafter, the trial court ruled that during the trial there would be no reference to gang affiliation. The trial proceeded and amongst the State’s witnesses were Robert Burden and David Alonso. Officer Gary Bulava was called on behalf of defendant. Upon the completion of Bulava’s testimony, defense counsel renewed his request for evidence on “gang crime activity.” Thereupon, counsel proceeded to memorialize for the record a summary of the earlier in camera proceedings,1 stating: “We informed the Court that it was our theory of the defense that our client was a former gang member and that he was— and that he had quit the gang and that certain threats had been conveyed to him that if he didn’t continue to quit, that he would not be around to be father to his children one way or the other, that his family, his mother and sister, his common-law wife, have been subjected to threats and harassment and some of the people directing those threats and harassment at him were collectors and enforcers for the gang, David Alonzo, and Mario Zuniga.” My analysis of the record indicates that defendant’s trial counsel seemed to be basically talking about gang activities, and about “David Alonzo and Mario Zuniga”; he failed to make any offer of proof of what he specifically wanted to ask of, or prove by, Alonso. In fact, it is to be remembered that while Alonso was on the stand and subject to cross-examination, defense counsel did not actually try to go into this specific testimony. At most, three questions were asked of Alonso which might be interpreted as an attempt to delve into Alonso’s bias or motive, or might also be interpreted as attempting to uncover gang activity. Upon the court sustaining objections, defense counsel did not make an offer of proof or explain the reason for pursuing that testimony. After the State rested and after Officer Bulava testified for defendant, defendant’s attorney then brought up the “in camera” discussion on the record. In my opinion, defendant failed to perfect the record as to the basis for his position. His theory throughout the trial basically concerned gang activity. As I read defendant’s brief filed before this court, he did not articulate his position about bias and motive with the same interpretation and emphasis placed on it by my colleagues. Generally, where an objection to evidence has been sustained, it is proper for counsel to make an offer of proof of what he expects to prove. As has been said, in the absence of such a showing, it is impossible to determine whether there was harmful error. (Winslow v. Newlan (1867), 45 Ill. 145, 150.) The offer must consist of facts and not conclusions. (Martin v. Hertz (1906), 224 Ill. 84, 89, 79 N.E. 558.) It is recognized that in some" cases a formal offer is not necessary if counsel clearly indicates what he intends to prove. (Scaggs v. Horton (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 541, 546, 411 N.E.2d 870.) It is my position that the record here clearly fails to show specifically what defendant wanted to establish in the cross-examination of Alonso. Under such circumstances, I do not think there was prejudicial error. II As to the question regarding defendant’s impeachment of Bulava, I agree with the position taken by the majority as to the right to impeach a party’s own witness. However, even if I accept, for the purposes of argument only, that it was error to refuse defendant the right to inquire about an omission from a police report, I do not find that fact could have affected the outcome of the case in any way. Officer Bulava was not an occurrence witness. Defendant was seeking to determine if the police report indicated Burden had told Bulava he had seen defendant around the neighborhood. The critical issue in the case was the question of identification and whether defendant shot the victim. The jury saw the witnesses, heard the final arguments and found defendant guilty. Based on my review of the entire record, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that these alleged errors were not prejudicial. I fail to see the justification for a new trial in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. For these reasons, I would affirm the conviction and judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.   1The vice of off-the-record proceedings is best illustrated by the problems which were unnecessarily created in this case. In my opinion, all proceedings in criminal trials should be on-the-record.