Court Opinion

ID: 9452352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:38:06.940758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:10.850548
License: Public Domain

FORMAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I am in agreement with the opinion of Judge Seitz insofar as it holds that Agent Sams’s surveillance of the appellant’s garage was a reasonable police practice. However, I also believe that the subsequent entry and observation by Agent Sams were consonant with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
It was from a prone position at the edge of the driveway that Agent Sams was able to see a man in the garage removing objects from the car and later to smell the odor of moonshine liquor and to hear the gurgling sound of liquid being poured. He had personal knowledge of appellant’s prior record of liquor violations; he was in possession of information from a reliable informer that the appellant was involved in yet more violations. Although he could not visually identify the person moving about in the garage as the same person about whom he had the information, he was justified in so inferring from the facts that he had just seen the appellant go into the driveway in an automobile and that this was known to him to be appellant’s home and garage. He recognized the automobile being used by the appellant as belonging to another liquor law violator. These facts constituted probable cause for Agent Sams’s belief that a felony was being committed in his presence.1
With the appellant in unobstructed access to Agent Sams and dealing in mobile commodities with the means of ready transportation at hand, Agent Sams was justified in making immediate entry to arrest in accordance with his authority granted by 26 U.S.C. § 7608(b) (2) (B). His entry peaceable and his presence lawful, “the observation of what was then. *804and there immediately apparent could not in itself be a wrong.” 2
It appears, however, that no formal arrest was made. This was due, of course, for the most part to Mr. Sterling’s assault on Agent Sams. In these circumstances the lack of a formal arrest does not negative the District Court’s finding that Agent Sams entered for the purpose of arrest. Moreover, the last item relating to liquor violations in the affidavit was Agent Sams’ identification of Mr. Sterling as the man whom he saw pouring liquid from the containers. This identification occurred during Agent Sams’s approach to the garage at a distance of five or six yards, before any conversation took place and before Agent Sams might have been required to place the appellant under formal arrest.3 During a short exchange that took place when Agent Sams first arrived a few feet from the entrance to the garage, he saw the containers lying at the appellant’s feet which was the basis for the description of the containers as being “light colored.” These observations, however, were made as a natural result of Agent Sams’s presence, which was in turn justified by probable cause existing independently of any subsequent observations.4 Finally, the facts concerning Mr. Sterling’s assault on Agent Sams, pertinent to the issuance of the warrant only to the extent that they inferentially showed Mr. Sterling’s guilty reactions, cannot be deemed evidence obtained through an illegal search of premises, when indeed the officer was lawfully present there. This is simply not a case where an officer entered ostensibly to arrest but actually to search for evidence to obtain cause for arrest.5
The information supporting the affidavit was obtained by constitutionally reasonable activity. It follows that the warrant was validly issued and the motion to suppress was properly denied. Hence, I find it unnecessary to explore the validity of the search warrant on the assumption that the entry and subsequent observations were illegal.
Because Agent Sams’s presence was lawful, and the evidence shows that the appellant was made aware of his official capacity, I am in agreement with Judge Seitz’s conclusion that there is no arguable basis upon which the assault of Agent Sams may be defended.

. United States v. Price, 345 F.2d 256 (2 Cir.), cert. den. 382 U.S. 949, 86 S.Ct. 404, 15 L.Ed.2d 357 (1965); see United States v. Draper, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). The grounds for such belief were patently more compelling than those in United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295 (4 Cir. 1964), cited by appellant, where it does not appear that the agents had prior reliable information as to the defendants’ involvement, nor did their observation reveal facts as unambiguous as those involved here. This is not a marginal case in which the agent should have deferred to the judgment of a magistrate. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13. L.Ed.2d 684 (1965), citing United States v. Jones, 362 U.S. 257, 270, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1961).

. United States v. Horton, 328 F.2d 132, 135 (3 Cir. 1963).

. A recapitulation of Agent Sams’s testimony discloses that he left his standpoint fifteen yards from the garage and walked toward the appellant. At a point five or six yards up the driveway toward the garage, he recognized the man therein as the appellant. While Agent Sams walked closer to the garage, the following exchange ensued:
Agent Sams: “Hello, Ernie.”
Mr. Sterling: “Who is it?”
Agent Sams: “It’s Stanley, the federal man.”
Agent Sams stopped a few feet from the entrance to the garage. Mr. Sterling stood slightly inside the garage and above the bottles, which were gurgling into the ground. This conversation occurred:
Agent Sams: “What are you doing?”
Mr. Sterling: “I’m not doing anything.” Agent Sams: “Ernie, I can smell the moonshine.”
Mr. Sterling: “Oh, it’s nothing.”
It was during the foregoing conversation that Agent Sams saw six or seven light colored plastic gallon containers at Mr. Sterling’s feet and that liquid was pouring from two of them into an opening in the floor. Thus Agent Sams continued :
“Well, Ernie, I see you have moonshine there.”
Mr. Sterling: “No, I don’t have anything.”
Surprised at seeing the liquid running into the floor, Agent Sams, still. standing in the driveway, leaned forward, taking his eyes off Mr. Sterling but not entering the garage. Mr. Sterling then struck Agent Sams, knocking him to the ground. Agent Sams arose but was struck again, rendered momentarily unconscious, during which time Mr. Sterling drove off in the automobile.

. See Holt v. Simpson, 340 F.2d 853 (7 Cir. 1965).

. See generally, Annotation, 89 A.L.R.2d 715 (1963).