Court Opinion

ID: 9874309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 22:03:34.800814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:23:47.424141
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/26/23
                      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                              DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                             A163458, A163800
 v.
 BRUCE PETERSON,                             (Contra Costa County
                                             Super. Ct. No. 52006922)
         Defendant and Appellant.

       Defendant Bruce Peterson was convicted of stalking a politician and
the politician’s family. (Pen. Code, § 646.9; further undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.) The conviction was based on:
(1) Peterson’s odd comments to the politician’s wife at an open house event
for a school bond issue; (2) his reposting on Facebook of a publicly available
photo of the politician’s family along with comments mentioning the open
house event and the politician’s children; and (3) his mailing of a rambling
letter — criticizing local politics and containing a check made payable to
“anyone who is not corrupt” — to the politician’s wife. We reverse. On the
specific facts of this case, we conclude a reasonable listener would not have
found Peterson’s speech or speech-related acts a true threat of violence.
                               BACKGROUND
       In February 2020, Lafayette City Councilmember and former Lafayette
Mayor, Cameron Lee Burks, and his wife, Julia Ackley, hosted an open house
event in their home in support of a school bond measure. The invitation

                                       1
stated Burks was “hosting this event as an individual resident of Lafayette
and a father of school-aged children.” Peterson attended and had an “odd”
and “stilted” conversation with Ackley, during which he noted it had been 22
days since her birthday. Unaware her birthday was publicly available on her
Facebook page, she felt “unnerved,” “uncomfortable,” and a “little freaked
out.” Her “spider-sense” that something was amiss was triggered by his odd
behavior and appearance; she described him as wearing a shirt with
“children’s handprints all over it” and a pink fanny pack.
      In March 2020, Peterson reposted on his Facebook page a photo from
Ackley’s public Facebook page. The photo depicted Ackley, and Burks and
Ackley’s two daughters. Peterson’s post stated, “A politician’s family. I have
never met the younger 2 girls.” In the comments, Peterson wondered “where
[Burks and Ackley] hid the girls” during the open house event. He mused,
“They live near Burton Valley School. Considering the politician, Cameron
Burks, has a different name than his wife, I wonder what their daughters’
last name is?” He also described Burks as “one of the Mayor’s [Sic.] who
abdicated his throne. But remained in power, on the Lafayette, Ca. City
Council.” One of Burks’s colleagues sent him a screenshot of Peterson’s
Facebook post. Burks was “alarmed” and “immediately felt” Peterson “could
be a threat” to his wife and daughters. But Ackley acknowledged the photo
reposted by Peterson was publicly available on her Facebook page, as was her
birthdate and other pictures of Burks and her daughters.1
      In April 2020, Ackley received a “confusing” letter and check in the
mail from Peterson. Written on the front of the check was, “Pay to order of
anyone who is not corrupt.” On the back of the check was written, “Thanks

      1 Ackley thought she made her Facebook page private after the March

incident, but it remained publicly available as of April 2021.

                                       2
for hosting the event on February 3rd, 2020. I do not recall your two
daughters’ names. Are they [. . .] and [. . .] or Molly and Harry?” Molly and
Harry are the names of Ackley’s parents, but she acknowledged the names
and photos of her parents were publicly available at the time.
      The letter was addressed to “Julia, 2 unnamed daughters, and their
unnamed pets.” The rambling letter was a screed against local politics. For
example, Peterson said he had “a long list of liars,” and Burks’s Facebook
“tells me that many of the: duplicitous, diabolical, lying, liars from hell, are
his friends. Oh! They lied about me. They did not lie about him.” He
continued, “BTW. I have despised the Lafayette Police Department, since
1966. Before any of you were born. Wow! I’ve merely despised Lafayette
Little League’s: nasty, totalitarian jerks, since around 1998? How does a
father of 2 daughters, live with himself, being a puppet for those totalitarian,
nasty jerks from hell? They are above all laws, in this corrupt, little city.”
      Although Ackley thought the letter “didn’t make a lot of sense” and
“was written in a confusing manner,” she was “really scared” it mentioned
her by name, as well as the names of her daughters, and her parents. She
also felt “helpless . . . to protect” her children. The idea that something could
happen to her children filled her with a “sense of insecurity” and “doom.” For
his part, Burks felt “sick to [his] stomach” and “fearful” when he read the
letter.
      The defense called several witnesses who testified that, although
Peterson was distrustful of the government and politicians, he was not
violent. They described him as an “unusual” person who was prone to rants
and hyperbolic speech — like when he said he “could have strangled the foul
creature,” referring to a former city supervisor — but there was “[a]bsolutely
no follow-through or violence of any kind.”

                                        3
      After a jury trial, Peterson was convicted of stalking and sentenced to
two years of probation, with one year of home confinement.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Section 646.9, subdivision (a) provides: “Any person who . . . willfully
and maliciously harasses another person and who makes a credible threat
with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or
the safety of his or her immediate family is guilty of the crime of stalking.”2
Thus, the prosecution had to prove Peterson (1) harassed Burks and Ackley,
(2) made a credible threat, and (3) did so with the intent to place them in
reasonable fear for their safety or the safety of their immediate family. (See
People v. Ewing (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 199, 210; see also People v. Carron
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1238.)
      A person “ ‘harasses’ ” when he or she “engages in a knowing and
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms,
annoys, torments, or terrorizes the person, and that serves no legitimate
purpose.” (§ 646.9, subd. (e).) A “ ‘course of conduct’ ” means “two or more
acts occurring over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of
purpose.” (Id., subd. (f).) And a “ ‘credible threat’ ” is defined as “a verbal or
written threat, including that performed through the use of an electronic
communication device, or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a
combination of verbal, written, or electronically communicated statements
and conduct, made with the intent to place the person that is the target of the
threat in reasonable fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her
family, and made with the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to
cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or

      2 Section 646.9 also criminalizes the willful, malicious, and repeated

following of another person, but the prosecution did not argue that theory.

                                         4
her safety or the safety of his or her family. It is not necessary to prove that
the defendant had the intent to actually carry out the threat.” (Id., subd. (g).)
The definitions of “ ‘course of conduct’ ” and “ ‘credible threat’ ” expressly
exclude “[c]onstitutionally protected activity” from their ambit. (Id.,
subds. (f), (g).) But “true threats” of violence are unprotected by the First
Amendment. (Counterman v. Colorado (2023) __U.S.__ 143 S.Ct. 2106, 2111;
U.S. Const., 1st Amend. (First Amendment).) The question here is whether
Peterson engaged in constitutionally protected activities, thus precluding his
stalking conviction as a matter of law. We conclude the answer is yes.
      We begin with the standard of review. The Attorney General invokes
the rule that “[c]laims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a
judgment are generally reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.”
(In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630 (George T.).) But Peterson
correctly notes that, when a challenged finding implicates the First
Amendment, the reviewing court conducts an independent review of the
record as an added safeguard against infringement of constitutional rights.
(George T., at p. 632.) Independent review, “which ‘assigns to judges a
constitutional responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of
fact,’ . . . ‘is a rule of federal constitutional law. It is necessary ‘because the
reaches of the First Amendment are ultimately defined by facts it is held to
embrace’ and an appellate court must decide ‘whether a given course of
conduct falls on the near or far side of the line of constitutional protection.’ ”
(George T., at pp. 631–632, citations omitted.) The Attorney General
contends George T. requires independent review only for criminal threat
convictions (§ 422), not stalking. Citing People v. Borrelli (2000)
77 Cal.App.4th 703, 716–717, the Attorney General contends section 646.9

                                          5
is different because, unlike section 422, it “ ‘does not regulate the content of
speech insomuch as the manner in which the communication is made. . . .
The aim and effect of this statute are not to suppress speech, but to protect
individuals in the exercise and enjoyment of their constitutional rights from
invasive, oppressive conduct that infringes on those rights.’ ” 3
      Under the facts of this case, we believe Peterson has the better
argument. Peterson’s stalking conviction rested entirely on his speech — his
remarks to Ackley at the open house event, his Facebook post and comments,
and the letter and check — and its dissemination — the acts of posting on
Facebook and mailing the letter. Moreover, the speech and its dissemination
unquestionably occurred in a First Amendment context, concerning a school
bond measure, local politics, and criticism of a politician. (George T., supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 632; People v. Smolkin (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 183, 189
[applying independent review and concluding “as a matter of law, a
‘reasonable listener’ would not have understood [defendant’s] letter to be a
true threat”]; In re Curtis S. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 758, 762 [independently
reviewing sufficiency of evidence for disturbing another by loud and
unreasonable noise].) Thus, we independently review the conviction under
the George T. standard.

      3 Section 422 provides in part as follows: “Any person who willfully

threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily
injury . . . , with the specific intent that the statement, . . . is to be taken as a
threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face
and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened,
a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat,
and thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or
her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety, shall be punished
by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed one year, or by
imprisonment in the state prison.”

                                          6
      We note, however, that independent review is different from de novo
review; we do not make an entirely “ ‘original appraisal’ ” of the evidence.
(George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 634.) Rather, we defer to the credibility
determinations of the trier of fact, who was “in a superior position to observe
the demeanor of witnesses.” (Ibid.) Moreover, we independently review only
factual findings implicating the First Amendment, such as a finding that the
communication at issue was a true threat and therefore unprotected by the
First Amendment. (George T., at p. 634.) In sum, we generally review for
sufficiency of the evidence under the substantial evidence standard, but
independently determine whether Peterson’s expressive conduct was
protected by the First Amendment or was a true threat.
      “The First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive
conduct as well as to actual speech.” (Virginia v. Black (2003) 538 U.S. 343,
358 (Black).) Yet its protections “are not absolute, and we have long
recognized that the government may regulate certain categories of expression
consistent with the Constitution.” (Ibid.) As relevant here, the First
Amendment “permits a State to ban a ‘true threat.’ ” (Black, at p. 359.)
“ ‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” (Ibid.) In People
v. Lowery (2011) 52 Cal.4th 419, 427 (Lowery), the California Supreme Court
followed Black in construing a statute relating to threats of violence against a
crime witness or victim “as applying only to those threatening statements
that a reasonable listener would understand, in light of the context and
surrounding circumstances, to constitute a true threat, namely, ‘a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence’ [citation],
rather than an expression of jest or frustration.” (Lowery, at p. 427.)

                                       7
      As noted, we independently examine the record to determine whether
“the speech at issue is an unprotected true threat.” (George T., supra,
33 Cal.4th at pp. 632–633.) And because the material facts are not in
dispute, we make an independent legal determination regarding whether a
reasonable person would understand Peterson’s remarks to Ackley, his
Facebook post and comments, and the letter and check he mailed to Ackley as
constituting a “ ‘ serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence’ ” in “light of the context and surrounding circumstances.” (Lowery,
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 427.)
      We conclude, as a matter of law, that a reasonable person would not
understand Peterson’s speech and its dissemination, whether considered
separately or cumulatively, to be a true threat. (George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th
at pp. 637–638.) To be sure, Peterson’s comment to Ackley about the exact
number of days that had passed since her birthday was odd, and she was no
doubt unnerved by his remark given her unawareness that her birthday was
publicly available on her Facebook page. But Peterson’s mere reference to
her birthday — leaving aside that anyone could find the information on
Ackley’s Facebook page — could hardly be seen as a “ ‘serious expression of
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence.’ ” (Lowery, supra, 52 Cal.4th
at p. 427.) Peterson’s remark does not rise to that level; eccentricity and
being off-putting is not a criminal offense.
      Peterson’s Facebook post and comments fare no better. As noted, he
reposted a photo of Ackley, and Burks and Ackley’s daughters — a photo that
was publicly available on Ackley’s Facebook page. Peterson’s post stated, “[a]
politician’s family,” and in the comments to the post, he questioned the
absence of the children at the open house event. He also wondered about the
children’s last name given that their parents did not have the same last name

                                        8
as one another. And he described Burks as having “abdicated his throne” as
mayor but remaining on the city council. Peterson’s comments about the
whereabouts and last names of the children were no doubt upsetting and
even alarming to Burks and Ackley. But context is critical. The post and
comments were made in the context of the school bond measure Burks and
Ackley supported as parents of “school-aged children.” Moreover, language in
the political arena “is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact.” (Watts v.
U.S. (1969) 394 U.S. 705, 708.) Despite the unsettling and even disturbing
nature of Peterson’s post and comments, the school bond measure at the
center of Peterson’s speech was unquestionably a matter of public interest.
(Black, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 358 [“The hallmark of the protection of free
speech is to allow ‘free trade in ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming
majority of people might find distasteful or discomforting.”].)
      Viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances (Lowery, supra,
52 Cal.4th at p. 427), Peterson’s Facebook post and comments did not
constitute a true threat and they could not reasonably be interpreted as such.
References to Burks and Ackley’s daughters were surely discomfiting, but a
reasonable person would not think, as the Attorney General suggests, that
they reflected efforts “to learn about, locate, and contact Burks’s teenage
daughters.” Direct threats of violence are not necessary, but something more
than the mere mention of the children was required. (E.g., People v. Falck
(1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 287, 298 [defendant’s desire to spend eternity with
victim, coupled with his stated proficiency with a rifle, and gift of black roses
suggested murder-suicide]; In re Ernesto H. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 298, 303–
304, 313 [statement, “ ‘Yell at me again and see what happens,’ ” along with a
step toward victim and threatening stance was a true threat]; People v.
Halgren (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1232 [statements that victim “would be

                                        9
sorry she had been rude to him,” “she would pay for her rudeness,” and he
was going to “ ‘fix her’ ” or “ ‘fix this’ ” were threats].) Nothing in Peterson’s
comments or their dissemination suggested even an implied threat to the
children’s safety. (George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 637–638.)
      Finally, there is the letter Peterson mailed to Ackley, in which he
opined “100% of the politicians and their administrators, who are supposed to
represent me, are corrupt.” The enclosed check was made payable to “anyone
who is not corrupt,” and on the back of the check was written, “Thanks for
hosting the event on February 3rd, 2020. I do not recall your two daughters’
names. Are they [. . .] and [. . .] or Molly and Harry?” The Attorney General
concedes the letter and check “criticized Burks’s political activities” and were
intended “to influence Burks politically.” To the extent the Attorney General
contends the act of mailing the letter itself constituted a threat, we disagree.
The context surrounding the mailing of the letter “fail[s] to show that, as a
threat, it was sufficiently unequivocal to convey” an intent to commit an act
of unlawful violence. (George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 637–638.) The
Attorney General also insists the “subtext” of these communications was
that, because of his “anger about Burks’s political involvement,” Peterson
“was trying to learn about, locate, and contact Burks’s teenage daughters.”
We can discern no such “subtext.” This case is different from People v. Lopez
(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 436 and People v. Pineda (2022) 13 Cal.5th 186, cited
by the Attorney General.
      In Lopez, the defendant engaged in a years-long campaign of letters,
emails, packages, and in-person visits to the victim, all with inappropriate
and unwanted romantic overtones. (People v. Lopez, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 438–445.) Affirming the stalking conviction, the court held an
invitation for the victim to meet the defendant for “cleansing or healing

                                         10
ceremonies at the labyrinth, dressed in white, conjured images of undefined
rituals that would be understood by a reasonable person” as ominous in light
of persistent, unwanted contacts. (Id. at pp. 453–455.) This is unlike
Peterson’s two references to the children, neither of which conveyed an
inappropriate or threatening undertone.
      Similarly inapt is Pineda, which involved a defendant who repeatedly
called another inmate “a rat” and incited other inmates to join him in
chanting “ ‘Benji is a rat.’ ” (People v. Pineda, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 248–
249.) Given that it is well understood snitches are “ ‘widely reviled within
the correctional system,’ ” Pineda held that even though the defendant did
not expressly declare that he or someone else would harm Benji, “ ‘rigid
adherence to the literal meaning of a communication without regard to its
reasonable connotations derived from its ambience would render [threat
statutes] powerless against the ingenuity of threateners who can instill in the
victim’s mind as clear an apprehension of impending injury by an implied
menace as by a literal threat.’ ” (Id. at p. 249.) No such threats — veiled or
otherwise — can be found here.
      Also instructive is U.S. v. Lincoln (9th Cir. 2005) 403 F.3d 703. There,
the imprisoned defendant attempted to send a letter to the President stating
he would die soon because “ ‘they’ ” promised he would, apparently referring
to followers of Osama Bin Laden. (Id. at pp. 705–706.) The Ninth Circuit
held it was unconstitutional to convict the defendant of threatening the
President because the letter was not a “true threat.” (Id. at p. 706.) The
court relied on the absence of a literal threat in the letter, reasoning it “does
not connote anything that it does not literally say. To the contrary, it
literally says what it means, that President Bush will die because ‘they’ said
he will. The fact that [defendant] stated six months earlier that he planned

                                        11
to shoot the President does not give new meaning to [defendant’s] statement
that Bin Laden or Al Qaeda will kill the President.” (Id. at p. 707.)
Similarly, in determining whether Peterson’s letter and check constituted a
true threat, we look at what those documents literally said — which was that
politicians were corrupt. The Attorney General’s “subtext” argument lacks
evidentiary or even circumstantial support.
      Having independently examined the record, we conclude Peterson’s
speech acts were constitutionally protected activities; thus, there is
insufficient evidence his conduct violated section 649.9, and we reverse his
conviction. In light of our conclusion, we need not address Peterson’s other
claims. We note, however, that Peterson also argues the trial court
prejudicially erred in responding to a jury question during deliberations, and
the Attorney General agrees and concedes reversal is required.4
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is reversed.

      4   The jury asked, “Does a credible threat to one’s safety have to only be
a physical threat, or can it be nonphysical in nature as well?” Ultimately, the
trial court referred the jury to the given CALCRIM No. 1301 instruction on
stalking and further explained a “ ‘credible threat’ can be explicit or implied.
It includes a threat of causing an injury or some harm to the person, or the
immediate family of the named victim.” The Attorney General acknowledges
it “is reasonably likely that the jury understood” the court’s answer as
sweeping in conduct that does not constitute a true threat.

                                       12
                                 _________________________
                                 Rodríguez, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P. J.

_________________________
Fujisaki, J.

A163458 & A163800

                            13
Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Charles B. Burch

Counsel:

Marc J. Zilversmit for Defendant and Appellant.

ACLU Foundation of Northern California, Hannah Kieschnick and Chessie
Thacher as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share and
Katie L. Stowe, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                     14