Court Opinion

ID: 9372927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:36.21461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.857453
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     DAVID J. LAURENZA,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        NY-0752-17-0122-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: February 3, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Tyler Patterson, Esquire, Vestal, New York, for the appellant.

           Georgette Gonzales-Snyder, Esquire, Syracuse, New York, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his removal appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed
     below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and REMAND the case to

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                     2

     the New York Field Office for further adjudication in accordance with this
     Remand Order.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was employed by the agency as an Electrician and was
     stationed in Canandaigua, New York. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 10. On
     December 2, 2016, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal based on
     misconduct charges. Id. at 23-25. On March 23, 2017, the agency issued the
     appellant a removal decision effective that same day. Id. at 26-28. Included with
     the removal notice package was a proposed settlement agreement wherein the
     agency offered to hold the removal in abeyance until September 30, 2017, and
     rescind the removal action if the appellant agreed to an immediate reassignment
     or to resign or retire from employment with the agency effective on or before
     September 30, 2017. IAF, Tab 7 at 13. The settlement agreement noted that the
     appellant’s retirement or resignation would be completely voluntary and that he
     had the opportunity to seek the advice of counsel. Id. It also noted that if the
     appellant failed to complete the necessary paperwork in a manner that would
     allow him to resign or retire by September 30, 2017, the agency would be
     permitted to immediately sustain and impose the removal action. Id. The only
     copy of the settlement agreement in the record is unsigned by either party. Id.
     at 16. Also included in the record is a report of contact dated March 23, 2017,
     noting that the appellant received the removal notice and the agency’s offer of a
     settlement agreement together that same day and that he was scheduled to inform
     the agency by March 28, 2017, of his decision on the ter ms of the settlement
     agreement. Id. at 4.
¶3        It appears from the record that the appellant did not formally notify the
     agency of his decision, but rather, on March 29, 2017, he completed the requisite
     paperwork to voluntarily retire. Id. at 17-25. The agency officially processed the
     appellant’s voluntary retirement and issued a Standard Form 50 (SF -50) reflecting
     the voluntary retirement. Id. at 28. In the remarks section of the SF-50, it is
                                                                                          3

     noted that the appellant retired after receiving written notice on March 23, 2017,
     of the agency’s final decision to remove him. Id.
¶4         On April 21, 2017, the appellant filed an appeal with the Board challenging
     the removal action.     IAF, Tab 1.     The administrative judge issued an order
     informing the appellant that the Board may not have jurisdiction over his appeal
     and laying out what he must prove to show that his retirement was involuntary. 2
     IAF, Tab 5 at 1-2.     Without holding the requested hearing, the administrative
     judge issued an initial decision that dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
     finding that the appellant’s removal was not an appealable action because ,
     although he retired the same day as the effective removal date, the agency
     rescinded the removal action prior to the filing of the Board appeal. IAF, Tab 12,
     Initial Decision (ID) at 3. The administrative judge also found that the appellant
     failed to prove, or even allege, that his retirement was involuntary. Id.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review arguing that he did not receive
     the proper jurisdictional notice regarding the specific timing of the removal
     action, the retirement, and the agency’s supposed rescission or cancellation of the
     removal action. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 6 -8 (citing Burgess v.
     Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). The
     agency has filed a response to the petition for review, and the appellant has filed
     a reply. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6         It is well established that when, as in this case, an agency decides to remove
     an employee, and the employee retires on the same date that the removal was to
     become effective, the employee does not on that account lose the right to file a

     2
       The order also addressed the agency’s contention that the appellant already had made
     a binding election of remedies to proceed with his challenge of the removal when he
     filed an equal employment opportunity case. IAF, Tab 6 at 6-7, Tab 5 at 1. The
     administrative judge did not address this issue any further in any capacity beyond this
     initial order.
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     Board appeal contesting the decided removal.          5 U.S.C. § 7701(j); Mays v.
     Department of Transportation, 27 F.3d 1577, 1579-81 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Williams
     v. Department of Health & Human Services, 112 M.S.P.R. 628, ¶ 7 (2009).
     Further, in such a case, the Board need not address whether the appellant’s
     retirement was involuntary. Williams, 112 M.S.P.R. 628, ¶ 7. In examining the
     merits of the adverse action, if the agency is unable to support its removal
     decision, then the appellant is entitled to all the relief he could receive if he could
     show that his retirement was coerced. Scalese v. Department of the Air Force,
     68 M.S.P.R. 247, 249 (1995). If the agency can show that it properly decided the
     removal, then an involuntary retirement claim would be mooted.                      Id.
     Notwithstanding these general principles, the Board nonetheless lacks jurisdiction
     over a removal appeal if the agency cancels or rescinds the removal action before
     the appeal is filed with the Board.       Taber v. Department of the Air Force,
     112 M.S.P.R. 124, ¶ 8 (2009). In such a case, an appellant may still argue that
     his retirement was involuntary. Id., ¶ 10.
¶7         In the instant case, the administrative judge appears to have assumed that
     the agency rescinded or canceled the removal action and proceeded to frame this
     case as one addressing whether the appellant’s retirement was involuntary. ID
     at 2-3; IAF, Tab 5 at 1-2. We find that the administrative judge erred in this
     regard. First, the appellant did not claim in his appeal that his retirement was
     involuntary. IAF, Tab 1 at 3. Second, the assumption that the agency rescinded
     or canceled the removal action is not supported by any documentary evidence in
     the record. The administrative judge appears to have relied on the fact that the
     appellant’s removal was never processed and that the agency never issued an
     SF-50 recording the removal, instead issuing an SF-50 recording a voluntary
     retirement. ID at 2-3. However, the Board has held that although the issuance of
     an SF-50 is the customary determination for a personnel action, it does not effect
     the personnel action.    Toyens v. Department of Justice, 58 M.S.P.R. 634, 637
     (1993). The Board in Toyens further stated that, rather than the issuance of an
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     SF-50, it is the decision notice approved by an individual with the proper
     authority that effects the personnel action. Id. Thus, we find that the absence of
     a removal SF-50 is of no consequence here and is not dispositive of whether the
     agency actually removed the appellant.      Additionally, the appellant does not
     appear to challenge the deciding official’s authority to issue the decision, and our
     review of the record shows that he had such authority.         IAF, Tab 6 at 28.
     Therefore, we find that the removal was effected when the deciding official
     issued the removal decision.
¶8        Further, even if the administrative judge assumed that the terms of the
     settlement agreement resulted in some type of a constructive cancellation or
     rescission of the removal decision due to the appellant’s retirement, the record is
     unclear as to whether the parties ever agreed to the terms of the settlement of fer
     because the only settlement-related document contained in the record is unsigned
     by either party. IAF, Tab 7 at 16. Notably, the agency has not argued that the
     appellant agreed to the terms, but only that he took the necessary steps to
     effectuate a voluntary retirement. IAF, Tab 4 at 4, Tab 6 at 5-7. Based on the
     foregoing, we find that the administrative judge erred in concluding that the
     agency cancelled or rescinded the removal action. Consequently, we also find
     that she erred in reaching the involuntary resignation analysis because there is no
     evidence that the agency cancelled or rescinded the removal action. See Taber,
     112 M.S.P.R. 124, ¶¶ 8, 10.
¶9        The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has made clear that “an
     employee, stigmatized with an adverse final decision reflected in [his]
     government employment record, may challenge the final removal decision while
     also opting to retire.” Mays, 27 F.3d at 1580. More specifically, the Board has
     held that, even when an agency processes the retirement request and not the
     removal action, and when such retirement documentation explicitly references the
     removal action, the Board retains jurisdiction over that action. Anderson v. Small
     Business Administration, 78 M.S.P.R. 518, 520-22 (1998); Scalese, 68 M.S.P.R.
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      at 248-49. Here, despite the absence of a removal SF-50 and given the specific
      remarks on the appellant’s retirement SF-50 referencing the removal decision, we
      find that the Board has jurisdiction over the appellant’s adverse action appeal.
      Mays, 27 F.3d at 1579-81. 3

                                            ORDER
¶10        For the reasons discussed above, we REVERSE the initial decision and
      remand this case to the New York Field Office for further adjudication in
      accordance with this Remand Order. Pursuant to Scalese, the issue of whether the
      appellant’s retirement was involuntary need not be addressed on remand.
      68 M.S.P.R. at 249.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                     /s/ for
                                                 Jennifer Everling
                                                 Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      3
        Because we have determined that the Board has jurisdiction over the appellant’s
      removal, we need not address the Burgess notice argument contained in his petition for
      review.