Court Opinion

ID: 9839111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 18:04:31.492761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:56.581667
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/11/23 In re C.C. CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 IN RE C.C., et al.,                                           2d Juv. No. B325453
                                                                (Cons. w/ B326879)
 Persons Coming Under The                                  (Super. Ct. Nos. 21JV00408,
 Juvenile Court Law.                                               21JV00409)
 _____________________________                               (Santa Barbara County)

 SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
 SERVICES,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

 A.C., et al.,
   Defendants and Appellants.

      A.C. (father) and M.C. (mother) appeal the juvenile court’s
order terminating their parental rights to their minor child C.C.
with a permanent plan of adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code,1
§ 366.26.)2 Father and mother’s sole contention is that Santa
Barbara County Child Welfare Services (CWS) and the juvenile
court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C.S. § 1901 et seq.) and
related California law (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2).3 We affirm.
            FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Father and mother are the natural parents of C.C., born in
February 2019. On December 8, 2021, CWS took C.C. into
custody under a protective custody warrant. On December 30,
2021, C.C. was ordered detained pursuant to a section 300
petition alleging among other things that both parents had
mental health issues that prevented them from properly caring
for C.C. The detention report stated that when a social worker
had asked father about C.C.’s potential Indian heritage, father
replied that two of his grandparents were “one hundred percent
Native.” At the detention hearing, mother stated that she had no
Indian ancestry. The maternal grandmother confirmed the
mother’s statements. Father told the court there was “a

      1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.
      2 The juvenile court also terminated parental rights to

mother’s minor child P.A. Although mother’s notice of appeal
refers to both C.C. and P.A., her brief merely joins in the
arguments raised in father’s briefs regarding the termination of
rights as to C.C.
      3 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same

for consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such
as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In
re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

                                2
possibility” that C.C. was a member or eligible for membership in
a Pueblo Indian tribe because “my great, great grandfather, they
were full blown Pueblo. My grandfather’s father was Pueblo.”
Father also offered “I remember they were telling me it was like
Kansas, in that area.” The court replied “you have indicated
Pueblo, so the Department will have to follow through on that on
and see what additional information can be obtained.”
      On January 18, 2022, the social worker asked father to
provide any additional information he had regarding C.C.’s
potential Indian heritage. Father replied that “his grandfather,
[C.B.], is a quarter Pueblo Indian” and that “his great
grandparents were full Pueblo Indian but he did not know their
names.” Father acknowledged, however, that “this information
had not been verified.”
      In a February 3, 2022 addendum to the jurisdiction and
disposition report, the social worker reported that during a
January 18 telephone conversation he had asked father to
provide any additional information he had about C.C.’s paternal
relatives. Father told the social worker “that he has chosen not
to maintain connections with his relatives and did not want to
provide information.” After the social worker explained “the
importance of maintaining family connections for [C.C.],” father
replied that he wanted to speak with “a close friend” of his before
agreeing to provide any contact information for his relatives.
Father then “arranged to text [the social worker] contact
information for relatives and close friends.” Father never texted
the social worker any such information and further attempts to
contact him were unsuccessful.
      CWS also reported that on January 18, 2022, the social
worker conducted an internet search for father’s relatives and
found names and addresses for nine relatives. Those relatives

                                 3
included the paternal grandfather A.C., Jr.; the paternal
grandmother D.C.; and the paternal great-grandfather A.C. CWS
mailed general inquiry letters to all nine individuals but none of
them responded.
       On February 10, 2022, the juvenile court sustained the
section 300 petition and granted both parents reunification
services and supervised visitation. At the conclusion of the six-
month review hearing, services were terminated for both parents
and the matter was set for a section 366.26 permanency planning
hearing.
       In its section 366.26 report, CWS urged the court to find
that ICWA did not apply. CWS documented the extensive efforts
it had made to inquire into C.C.’s potential Pueblo ancestry.
CWS attached return receipts indicating that in August 2022 an
“ICWA inquiry with family tree” had been sent to 18 separate
Indian tribes, including all Pueblo tribes as well as multiple
additional tribes of which CWS became aware while investigating
tribes in Kansas. Seventeen tribes sent responses indicating that
C.C. was neither a member nor eligible for membership; the
remaining tribe did not respond. On October 7, 2022, CWS
mailed an ICWA inquiry with family tree to two additional tribes.
       CWS also documented the multiple phone calls it had made
to tribes and agencies in its efforts to locate Pueblo tribes in
Kansas, and noted that father had refused to provide any contact
information for his relatives. When the social worker was finally
able to make contact with father on November 29, he provided
the names and birthdates of paternal grandfather A.C., the
paternal grandmother D.C., and the paternal great-grandfather
C.B.
       At the conclusion of the section 366.26 hearing, the court
terminated parental rights with a permanent plan of adoption

                                4
and found that ICWA did not apply. After counsel for CWS
pointed out that neither parent had submitted the ICWA-0202
form, both forms were completed and filed with the court.
                            DISCUSSION
       Father and mother contend the order terminating their
parental rights must be reversed and the matter remanded to the
juvenile court because the court failed to comply with the inquiry
requirements of ICWA and section 224.2. We are not persuaded.
       We generally review ICWA findings for substantial
evidence. (In re J.K. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 498, 504.). “Because
the material facts at issue are undisputed, “‘we review
independently whether ICWA requirements have been
satisfied.”’” (Ibid.)
       ICWA defines an “‘Indian child’” as “any unmarried person
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an
Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25
U.S.C.S. § 1903(4) & (8); § 224.1, subd. (a).) The juvenile court
and county welfare department have an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child subject to dependency
proceedings is or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a); Cal.
Rules of Court, rules 5.481(a) & 5.668(c).)
       “‘The continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may
be an Indian child “can be divided into three phases: the initial
duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to
provide formal ICWA notice.”’” (In re Antonio R. (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 421, 429.) The duty to inquire begins with the initial
contact and obligates the juvenile court and the child services
agency to ask the child, parents, extended family members, and
others who have an interest in the child, whether the child is, or
may be, an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).)

                                5
       The duty of further inquiry is triggered if the child services
agency or the juvenile court has “reason to believe that an Indian
child is involved in a proceeding.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) The
Legislature defined “reason to believe” as having “information
suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a
member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) When the “reason to believe” threshold is
reached, the requisite further inquiry includes interviewing the
parents and extended family members, contacting the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) and State Department of Social Services
(SDSS) for assistance in identifying the tribes in which the child
may be a member or eligible for membership, and contacting the
tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to
have information regarding the child’s membership status or
eligibility. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C).)
       CWS contends it had no duty to conduct an initial inquiry
of extended family members regarding C.C.’s potential Indian
heritage because the child was detained under a protective
custody warrant pursuant to section 340, and section 224.2,
subdivision (b) only applies when a child is taken into temporary
custody pursuant to section 306. (See In re Robert F. (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 492, 497, 500, 504 (Robert F.); see also In re Ja.O.
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 672, 677-681 (Ja.O.) We need not decide
whether we agree with Robert F. and Ja.O. because even if there
was no duty of initial inquiry, father’s assertion of Pueblo
heritage gave rise to a reason to believe the child may be an
Indian child and thus triggered the duty to conduct a further
inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C).)4

      4 We also note that the juvenile court in this case did not

purport to issue a protective custody order pursuant to section

                                  6
       We conclude, however, that the further inquiry
requirements of section 224.2, subdivision (e) were satisfied here.
In arguing to the contrary, father and mother claim that CWS
was required to locate C.C.’s paternal great-great-grandfather
C.B., the individual through whom he claimed C.C. had Pueblo
heritage. They also complain that CWS should have made ICWA
inquiries of the nine paternal relatives it identified in an online
database.
       Father, however, refused to provide contact information
regarding his relatives. “Where . . . a parent largely fails . . . to
provide names and contact information for extended family
members, [CWS’s] ability to conduct an exhaustive ICWA inquiry
necessarily is constrained.” (In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
1068, 1082, interpreting § 224.2, subd. (b).) “[W]e cannot ask
[CWS] to intuit the names of unidentified family members or to
interview individuals for whom no contact information has been
provided.” (Ibid.)
       CWS sent general inquiry letters to the nine paternal
relatives it had identified, which included the paternal
grandfather A.C., Jr., the paternal grandmother D.C., and the
paternal great-grandfather A.C. None of those relatives,
however, responded to CWS’s inquiry. Moreover, father told the
social worker he would not provide any contact information for

340. Rather, the order was issued “pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code § 306 and/or § 309.” The social worker applied
for a protective custody warrant under both sections 306 and 340,
but the court’s order makes clear that the warrant was not issued
pursuant to section 340. The order is prepared on a form that
contains a section for warrants issued pursuant to sections 306
and 309, and another for warrants issued pursuant to section
340. The box corresponding to sections 306 and 309 is checked,
while the box corresponding to section 340 is left blank.

                                  7
his relatives and further attempts to obtain such information
from him were unsuccessful. Under the circumstances, the
juvenile court did not err in finding that CWS had made
reasonable efforts to contact and make inquiries of C.C.’s
paternal relatives regarding the child’s possible Indian heritage.
       We also reject father and mother’s contention that CWS
failed to provide the identified tribes with all available
information to determine whether C.C. might be a member or
eligible for membership. The record demonstrates that CWS
made extensive efforts to investigate C.C.’s potential Pueblo
heritage and sent an “ICWA inquiry with family tree” to 20
separate Indian tribes, including all Pueblo tribes. Although
father and mother note that the family tree is not included in the
record on appeal, it is reasonable to infer that the family tree
included all of the information CWS had regarding C.C.’s
paternal relatives, which included the paternal grandfather A.C.,
Jr., the paternal great-grandparents A.C. and D.C., and the
paternal great-great-grandfather C.B. The social worker also
made multiple phone calls to the tribes and agencies in its efforts
to locate Pueblo tribes in Kansas, and noted that father had
refused to provide any contact information for his relatives.
       Although father and mother also note that father belatedly
provided the names and birthdates of C.C.’s paternal great-
grandparents A.C. and D.C. and the paternal great-great-
grandfather C.B, the names of these individuals were already
known to CWS and were thus presumably included in the family
tree that was sent to the tribes. Moreover, none of the tribes
subsequently informed CWS that they had been given
insufficient information to determine whether C.C. was a
member of the tribe or eligible for membership, nor did they
assert that their conclusions might be different if additional

                                 8
information about C.C.’s paternal relatives had been provided.
There is thus no basis for us to conclude that CWS failed to
satisfy its duty of further inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision
(e).
      Finally, we reject father and mother’s claim that the
juvenile court erred in failing to ensure that both parents
completed and filed the ICWA-020 form either at the initial
hearing in the matter or when they first appeared in court.
Although the forms were not filed until the section 366.36
hearing, father and mother fail to demonstrate they suffered any
prejudice as a result of the delay. Father’s ICWA-020 form
identified New Mexico rather than Kansas as location of C.C.’s
potential Pueblo heritage, but CWS sent the ICWA inquiry and
family tree to the Pueblo tribes in both states. Accordingly, any
error arising from the delayed filing of the ICWA-020 is
harmless.
                           DISPOSITION
      The judgment (order terminating parental rights) is
affirmed.
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     CODY, J.

We concur:

      YEGAN, Acting P.J.             BALTODANO, J.

                                 9
                   Gustavo Lavayen, Judge
            Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
               ______________________________

      Jacques Alexander Love, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant A.C.
      Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant M.C.
      Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Lisa A. Rothstein,
Senior Deputy Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.