Court Opinion

ID: 9525455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:03:52.276878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:48.638224
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, with whom MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI joins, dissenting: Mr. Justice Kluczynski and I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the appellate court. Section 5 — 6—4(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005—6—4(c)) provides that in the hearing held on a petition charging violation of the conditions of probation, “ [t] he State has the burden of going forward with the evidence and proving the violation by the preponderance of the evidence. The evidence shall be presented in open court with the right of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.” We have held that “The consequences of a determination that the probation order has been violated are so serious that the appellate courts have surrounded the defendant at a revocation hearing with many of the same due-process safeguards that are accorded to a defendant at a trial to determine his guilt. [Citations.] Since the results of a probation revocation may be a deprivation of liberty and, consequently, as serious as the original determination of guilt, we agree with the holdings of these cases that due process of law requires that a defendant charged with having violated his probation be entitled to a conscientious judicial determination of the charge according to accepted and well recognized procedural methods.” People v. Pier, 51 Ill. 2d 96, 99-100; see also People v. Beard, 59 Ill. 2d 220, 224. Where proof of a defendant’s prior conviction has been relevant, this court has consistently required that proof of such conviction be made by an authenticated or certified copy of the record (People v. Wheeler, 5 Ill. 2d 474; People v. Stewart, 23 Ill. 2d 161), and that in addition to the identity of names appearing from the record of the earlier conviction, proof must be made of the identity of the person (People v. Casey, 399 Ill. 374; People v. Stewart, 23 Ill. 2d 161). In Stewart, quoting from Casey, the court said: “ ‘We can perceive of no reason why the crucial fact of establishing the identity of the defendant with the former convictions should not be proved with the same certainty which the law requires as to the substantive offense. We are dealing with the degree of proof required to establish a fact which, if proved, inflicts a penalty of additional years upon a defendant. It would be contrary to the law of what is right and just in a criminal action to hold that the enhanced penalty could be inflicted in the face of an uncertainty as to whether defendant was the same person as the one described in the records offered to prove the former conviction. *** It will be observed that the statute gives the authenticated copy of the record of conviction prima facie effect as evidence, but there is the further question as to the defendant being identified as the person previously convicted. Undoubtedly in civil cases the rule is that identity of names raises a presumption that the person named and the one referred to in the previous record is one and the same person. (Clifford v. Pioneer Fire-Proofing Co., 232 Ill. 150; Filkins v. O'Sullivan, 79 Ill. 524.) In the trial of a criminal case, the record of a prior conviction of an infamous crime may be introduced for impeachment purposes. In such case proof of such conviction need not be made beyond a reasonable doubt and the presumption arising from the identity of names will be sufficient. (People v. Buford, 396 Ill. 158; People v. Lawson, 331 Ill. 380.) In a prosecution under the Habitual Criminal Act, the defendant is clothed with the presumption of innocence and, as has been pointed out, this applies to the fact of his former conviction which, if proved, enhances the penalty. The mere proof of a record containing identity of name with that of the defendant on trial is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence where the enhancement of the penalty depends upon the proof of such fact.’ 399 Ill. at 378-380.” 23 Ill. 2d 161, 163-64. The majority, citing from numerous sources, none of which supports its conclusion, holds that these time-honored procedures do not “provide any necessary or useful safeguards to the defendants in cases such as this where the fact that the prior conviction had occurred has never been denied.” (65 Ill. 2d at 164.) The fact of no denial is completely irrelevant; this was not a proceeding where issues were framed by allegations and denials, here “the State has the burden of going forward with the evidence and proving the violation by the preponderance of the evidence” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005—6—4(c)). The majority seems to find the requirement that proof of prior convictions be made by record and proof of identity “incompatible with considerations of judicial economy and efficiency essential to the disposition of present-day caseloads.” (65 Ill. 2d at 164.) I am wholly in agreement that litigation should be handled with dispatch, but a defendant incarcerated as the result of a judgment entered in haste and without requirement of proper proof will find little solace in the knowledge that his case was expeditiously processed. As a practical matter it would have taken several minutes to make proper proof of the prior conviction. The “record” of which the trial court took “judicial notice” is not contained in the record on appeal, but the colloquy between court and counsel (65 Ill. 2d at 160) suggests that the entry relied upon is “line 2, sheet 8.” In quoting this colloquy the majority found it necessary to twice insert “¡>zc] ”, which is indicative of the reliability which may be attributed to the “adjudicative facts” which the majority holds may be judicially noticed.