Court Opinion

ID: 9634801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:24:37.566553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:10.786736
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Judge PELLEGRINI.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that a Harrisburg International Airport (Airport) police officer employed by the Department of Transportation (DOT)1 was authorized to make an extraterritorial arrest or request an individual to submit to chemical testing under suspicion of driving under the influence when the stop was made outside Airport property-
Our Supreme Court remanded this matter to us to clarify our jurisprudence concerning the consequence, in a license suspension proceeding, of a determination that the underlying police-citizen encounter occurred outside the officer’s territorial jurisdiction, including how the encounter should be analyzed for the purposes of the Implied Consent Law, as well as the relevancy, if any, of the processes and protections available in criminal proceedings. See McKinley v. Department of Transportation, 564 Pa. 565, 769 A.2d 1153 (2001). Whether a license suspension based upon a licensee’s refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test requested by a police officer who has stopped the licensee’s vehicle outside the officer’s territorial jurisdiction has been previously considered on two occasions by this court resulting in conflicting outcomes.
First, in Kuzneski v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 98 Pa.Cmwlth. 595, 511 A.2d 951 (1986), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 514 Pa. 620, 521 A.2d 934 (1987), we held that although the police officer was outside his jurisdictional limitations, because he was, in fact, a police officer as defined in Section 102 of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 102, his arrest of the licensee and request for chemical testing properly supported the subsequent suspension of the licensee’s driving privileges. More recently, though, in Horton v. Department of Transportation, 694 A.2d 1 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), we held that where a police officer was outside of his jurisdiction, he was not authorized to arrest the licensee for driving under the influence, and the licensee’s refusal to submit to chemical testing could not be used to suspend his license. In doing so, we relied on Commonwealth v. Savage, 403 Pa.Super. 446, 589 A.2d 696 (1991), where the Superior Court held that suppression of evidence was appropriate where a police officer failed to comply with his statutorily mandated jurisdiction, stating, “[h]ad the officer complied with the above statutory mandate, appellee [Savage] would never have been stopped and arrested and was, therefore, truly prejudiced by the noncompliance.” Id. at 700.
The majority holds that in determining whether a request for chemical testing was proper, what was important was that the driver was factually placed under arrest and that whether the officer was authorized by law to make the arrest was a legal determination not relevant in a license suspension case. Concluding that because Corporal Laurence Miller (Corporal Miller) was a police officer, in fact, with the *1004powers of arrest, the majority adopts our holding in Kuzneski.
However, in resolving the conflict between Horton and Kuzneski, I am persuaded that Horton sets forth the better position. An extra-territorial arrest is not improper based on a defect in whether the officer had probable cause to make the arrest, but goes to the basic authority of a limited jurisdiction officer to make such an arrest where, as here, there was more than probable cause to do so. The General Assembly was quite specific in providing where these officers had jurisdiction — only on Airport property — and did not authorize them to make “fresh pursuit” arrests, again indicating that it did not want them to make any extra-territorial arrests. Because a limited jurisdiction police officer does not have the authority to arrest an individual off-premises and is not covered by “fresh pursuit,” he is also without jurisdiction to request an individual to submit to chemical testing.
Moreover, as we held in Horton, where an officer is not authorized to arrest an individual for driving under the influence, any refusal to submit to chemical testing was inconsequential. Therefore, because Corporal Miller was not authorized to arrest McKinley or to request he submit to chemical testing, his refusal cannot support a license suspension.2
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. In 1998, ownership, control and management responsibility for the Harrisburg International Airport was transferred to the Susquehanna Area Regional Airport Authority.

. As to whether an extra-territorial aspect of an arrest warrants the remedy of suppression, the majority relies on our Supreme Court's decision in Department of Transportation v. Wysocki, 517 Pa. 175, 535 A.2d 77 (1987), wherein it held that the legality of the underlying arrest was not applicable in a license suspension proceeding because no proof of conviction was required. However, that case is distinguishable because in Wysocki, the Court addressed whether a roadblock conducted by state troopers was constitutional; the licensee did not challenge whether the police officers had the authority to arrest him for driving under the influence or request him to submit to chemical testing.