Court Opinion

ID: 9857195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 13:56:32.21724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:08.066761
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
My concern is with appellant’s Assignment of Error where he, in essence, challenges the jurisdiction of the particular trial judge. I am in disagreement with the determination of this issue as reached by the majority opinion, and I believe it should be specifically noted that the trial court did accept the appellant’s June 6,1974, letter as a motion, and accordingly did enter an order denying it. It is true that the appellant, attempting to be his own attorney, did not make his disqualification attempt in *128affidavit form, as required by the statute then in effect. I.C. § 1-1801(4). Shortly thereafter, the statute was apparently observed to be unnecessarily stringent and has been rewritten so as to require only that a notice of disqualification be made. Rule 40(d), I.R.C.P.
Appellant’s letter contained but two sentences, one requesting the trial judge to disqualify himself, and a second stating his belief that it would be “of a prejudicial matter if you were to remain on the bench in this case.” I would hold that such a letter from a party appearing pro se constitutes substantial compliance with the former statute and it is the present rule.
The trial court was apparently of the same opinion. He was clearly treating the letter as a notice of disqualification when he denied the request in this language:
“Contested motions having been submitted prior to receipt of this request, your request is not timely and is therefore denied.”
The trial court did not deny the motion on the basis that it was not in affidavit form. Had he taken this view, he would have so advised the appellant, and appellant could have then sworn to the letter before a notary. On appeal this Court should review the reasoning of the trial court in denying the motion.
The record does not show any contested motions. Appellant, in initiating the instant proceedings, being then without benefit of counsel, made a motion to proceed in propria persona, dated April 1, 1974. Under date of 11 April 1974, the State of Idaho moved for an order enlarging its time in which to answer or respond after it received certain documents, the preparation of which was also moved for. This motion was accompanied with a notice that it would be called on for hearing May 3, 1974, at the Kootenai County courtroom in Coeur d’Alene.
Appellant responded with a motion which had for its purpose only to insure to him his claimed right to be present at such court proceedings noticed up for May 3. Appellant filed an amended petition on April 15, 1974.
No motions were argued on May 3, the trial judge having entered an order on the 19th of April, 1974, enlarging the time as requested by the State.
These proceedings did not constitute the submission of a contested matter to the trial judge. Neither party had raised any objection to the other party’s motions, there was no argument on the motions, and the order entered was in essence an ex parte order, and properly made under the then state of the record.
It seems clear to me the trial court here, in a commendable exercise of judicial discretion, considering the circumstances attendant to appellant’s attempt to make a disqualification, i. e., a lay person with the additional handicap of being in confinement, properly considered the letter sufficient, but erroneously concluded that there was any contest being waged in the motions which were in the file, and which were not to be argued until 14 days later.
Moreover, I am influenced by the language in Farrow v. U. S., 1976, - F.2d -, apparently pending on rehearing in the Ninth Circuit, wherein Judge Koelsch, in a situation which is somewhat similar to this, stated:
“There are a number of reasons for this requirement which derive from the fundamental precept that judges, like the convicts they sentence, are human beings. For example, when the sentencing judge rules on the § 2255 claim or resentences the petitioner, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the extent to which his untested recollection of the original sentencing proceeding may subconsciously or otherwise influence his new determination. Moreover, when a judge has undergone the unsettling process of assessing the punishment of another, it seems entirely plausible that he might attach some emotional commitment to the ‘correctness’ of his initial determination. This natural human tendency to reduce the dissonance created in choosing one of several alternatives by *129thereafter persuading oneself that the chosen alternative is the correct one has been recognized and measured by psychologists. In addition, the possibility exists that the reimposition of the same sentence — supposedly without consideration of the priors — may in some circumstances be a veiled punishment for challenging the original sentence. Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). The mere existence of possibilities such as these subtly dissipates the appearance of fairness of the § 2255 or resentencing proceeding, and the requirement of a different judge, in our view, does much to restore that appearance.” (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at-.
I would reverse and remand for proceedings before a different trial judge.