Court Opinion

ID: 9719873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:07:29.733655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:10.746406
License: Public Domain

*23Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant Wildfong is not liable as an owner under the owner liability statute. MCL 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1).
It has been suggested that the statute cannot logically apply to a situation in which the owner of the vehicle is also the driver of the vehicle. I agree with the Court of Appeals majority in Haberl v Rose,1 that the plain language of the statute clearly indicates otherwise. As the Haberl panel noted:
Although the owner liability statute may have been enacted to create liability for a non-driving owner and prior cases have apparently assumed that limited application, there is no language in the statute warranting this conclusion.2 Indeed, the beginning of the statute explicitly preserves the common-law liability available against the owner.
Hence, we conclude that the owner liability statute applies here even though the owner of the automobile was also the negligent driver. MCL 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1); see also Berry v Kipf, 160 Mich App 326, 328-329; 407 *24NW2d 648 (1987). Under common law, of course, an owner of a motor vehicle does not escape liability simply because the owner was driving. Also, our Supreme Court has held that the statute extended and complemented the common law with regard to liability. Frazier v Rumisek, 358 Mich 455, 457; 100 NW2d 442 (1960). It would be an anomalous result indeed if this statute, created to expand a plaintiff’s right of recovery, was employed instead as a bar to that recovery. This analysis compels the conclusion that the statute applies to the fact pattern presented in this case. [Haberl, supra at 260-261.]
Contrary to the majority’s view, the Legislature has not formulated a clear statutory framework for determining the extent of governmental immunity in a case arising from a motor vehicle accident. When enacting new legislation, the Legislature surely attempts a smooth integration of new law with the existing statutory framework. However, it cannot foresee every permutation in the interplay between separately enacted provisions.
I agree with the Court of Appeals majority in Haberl: A denial of liability under the circumstances of this case occasions an anomalous result that frustrates the Legislature’s intent to provide redress for automobile negligence.
A hypothetical example illustrates this point. Assume, under the majority’s reading of the statutory framework, that Mr. Wildfong (or Ms. Haberl) had been driving a vehicle owned by another government employee, rather than his own, when the accident occurred. The private owner of that vehicle would be responsible for the driver’s mere negligence under the owner liability statute. However, Mr. Wildfong is not responsible for the same negligence when driving his own vehicle. I see no rational basis for the distinction. Moreover, I decline to draw the distinction *25absent a more clear expression by the Legislature that such was its intention.
Instead, I agree with the Court of Appeals majority in Haberl and in this case that a finding of liability achieves the intent and purpose of the owner liability statute.
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the governmental immunity statute2 is a more specific act than the owner liability statute. The governmental immunity statute applies to all types of negligent behavior. The owner liability statute specifically refers to negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
I would rule, also, that a finding of liability is in tune with the purpose of the governmental immunity statute, providing for governmental liability in negligence cases involving state-owned vehicles. See Haberl, supra at 262. The majority’s decision frustrates the Legislature’s clear intent to hold automobile owners, both private actors and government agencies, liable for the negligence of the drivers of their owned vehicles. Moreover, in the interest of avoiding liability, it will discourage government agencies from providing motor vehicles to their employees for government work.
Perhaps the Legislature should create immunity for a government employee driving his automobile in the course of government business. But it has not done so. I decline to act in its stead. Rather, I would hold that defendant Wildfong is liable for his negligence under the owner liability statute.

 The dissent assumes for purposes of analysis that the civil liability statute applies where the owner and the driver are the same person, a conclusion we find compelled by the plain language of the statute. See also Trommater [v Michigan, 112 Mich App 459; 316 NW2d 459 (1982)]. However, in dicta and in factual situations different from this one, other writers have assumed that the legislative intent underlying the statute was to impose liability on owners for negligent operation by permissive third-party users only, essentially a negligent entrustment theory. Moore v Palmer, 350 Mich 363; 86 NW2d 585 (1957); Stapleton v Independent Brewing Co, 198 Mich 170; 164 NW 520 (1917); [North v] Kolomyjec [199 Mich App 724, 725-726; 502 NW2d 765 (1993)]. Although the legislative intent behind the enactment of this statute may have been to create liability where none previously existed for a nondriving owner of a vehicle, the statutory language is not so limiting. It applies by its own terms to create owner liability for “any injury occasioned by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle . . . .” MCL 257.401(1); MSA 9.2101(1) (emphasis added).

 225 Mich App 254; 570 NW2d 664 (1997).

 MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107).