Court Opinion

ID: 9601978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:51:00.717908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:34.113015
License: Public Domain

RUSSELL, J.,
dissenting.
A Virginia jury bears an awesome responsibility in a criminal case. After discharging a jury’s usual duty of determining guilt or innocence, it must, if it has found the defendant guilty, fix the punishment to be imposed by the court in the same deliberation, without further evidence or instructions. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 481, 158 S.E.2d 725 (1968).1 The range of its options in determining punishment is often very wide. In this case, the jury might have imposed any sentence from five to forty years, in addition to a fine. Code §18.2-248. This task must usually be addressed without any evidence as to the defendant’s prior behavior, personal traits, health, educational level, job prospects, family ties, and social relationships. The jury is given no information as to the effect or availability of probation, parole, time allowances for good behavior, suspended sentences, rehabilitative programs, or pardons. Hinton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 492, 247 S.E.2d 704 (1978). Unless the defendant chooses to testify, the jury will probably have to fix his punishment without knowing whether he had a serious past criminal record, or had led an exemplary life. A judge would weigh most of these factors very carefully before imposing sentence in a non-jury case. See Code §19.2-299.
If the jury asks about these matters, as it often does, it is told to impose such sentence as it finds justified by the evidence, and not to concern itself with what might happen afterwards.2 The theory of our unitary jury trial is that the jury is to sentence the offense *726rather than the offender. The factors mentioned above, relating to the defendant’s personal life, are taken into account by the trial judge and the executive branch of government in the defendant’s later treatment, but are not the jury’s concern.3
How, then, is the jury to choose the appropriate punishment in a case such as this? Would five, ten, or forty years be appropriate? The answer can only be found in weighing the comparative seriousness of the offense, as disclosed by the evidence. In an armed robbery case, for instance, punishable by imprisonment from five years to life (Code §18.2-58), the jury should consider whether the defendant’s weapon was loaded with live ammunition, or blanks, or was unloaded, or was in fact a toy pistol. The degree of potential danger to victims and bystanders should make a substantial difference in the relative severity of punishment.
The logical extension of the majority’s view would deprive the jury of the most significant evidence bearing upon its sentence decision. Is the jury not to know whether the robber’s gun was loaded? The mere inclusion of LSD within Schedule I by Code §54-524.84:4 hardly ends the inquiry. That schedule also contains heroin, hashish oil, and until 1979, contained marijuana.4
New would argue that all of the drugs in Schedule I are equal in their dangerousness. If they were, there would be little purpose in the wide range of penalties provided by the General Assembly. The relative peril to the community presented by the drug itself, along with the quantity involved and the relative age and sophistication of the victims, should all be considered by the jury in determining the appropriate sentence.
*727The chemist’s testimony may have been hyperbolic, partly inaccurate, or flatly untrue. If so, the remedies of cross-examination, contradiction by opposing evidence, and closing argument are always available. They have served the truth-determining process well for centuries, and may be relied upon here.
I think the trial judge correctly admitted the evidence as to the effect of LSD on the body, and would affirm.
THOMPSON, J., joins in dissent.

 For a discussion of jury sentencing in Virginia, see Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 Va. L. Rev. 968 (1967).

 Instruction No. 4 of VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS — CRIMINAL I-25 (Supp. #2, 1981) states: “If you find the defendant guilty, you should impose such punishment as you feel is just under the evidence and within the instructions of the Court. You are not to concern yourselves with what may happen afterwards.”

 It may well be argued that the jury’s role now differs markedly from that envisioned by the General Assembly which first instituted jury sentencing for felonies in 1796. Va. Rev. Code, ch. 200, §15, at 357 (1803). The census of 1790 reveals that Richmond, then the largest population center, had 878 free white males over 16 years of age. (Jury service was limited to such of these as were over 21 years of age, a group even less numerous.) Alexandria follows, with 734, then Petersburg, with 583. Considering the small size of the communities from which juries were drawn, and the difficulty and infrequency of travel in the 18th century, the framers of this legislation could well have expected the jurors to have intimate personal knowledge of each defendant’s circumstances and past record, and to take this into account in fixing punishment. Today, it is highly unlikely that such well-informed jurors would be encountered, particularly in urban areas. Those who appear will usually be excused, either by strikes or by challenges for cause.

 It also contains peyote, which the Supreme Court of California held, in People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964), may not constitutionally be denied to Indians who use it for allegedly religious purposes.