Court Opinion

ID: 9642131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:49:17.466051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:43.327555
License: Public Domain

FINCH, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion herein. I would hold that § 71.843, RSMo 1965 Cum.Supp., V.A.M.S. (requiring Jefferson City to be a party to the construction contract and to let the contract on competitive bidding to the lowest and best bidder) is applicable, that said statutory requirement was not complied with, and that for such reason the action of the trial court should be affirmed.
The principal opinion assigns several reasons for holding that the City was not required to be a party to the construction contract or to let the same on competitive bidding as required by § 71.843. I do not agree with any of the reasons assigned, and because, in my judgment, some of the principles announced in the majority opinion are unsound and may have considerable impact, I discuss them herein at some length.
The first basis advanced in the principal opinion for upholding the lease agreement between the City and Interco is that this transaction did not involve construction by the City at all but rather was simply an installment purchase by the City of the facility “as it is erected and payments made.” This portion of the opinion is couched in language that “there is authority to support the defendants’ contention” that this was a purchase by the City of the building on an installment basis. I interpret this as a holding that this was an installment purchase, not a mere discussion of what it might have been. If it were the latter, of course, it would not provide any basis for the result reached.
Is this an installment purchase of a building by the City? I think not. A purchase by the City involves a sale by someone and requires that there be a seller as well as a buyer. Supposedly, this holding would treat the City as an installment purchaser, but nothing is said as to who would be the seller or what such seller would have to sell. It is recognized in the majority opinion that title to the real estate is to be in *303the City. Absent some specific reservation, improvements on real estate in the way of buildings or fixtures vest immediately in the owner of the real property. This is true under well-established principles of law, and the lease agreement between In-terco and the City specifically so provided. A paragraph entitled “Facility Property of Landlord” provided that work, materials, improvements, machinery and equipment would become the absolute property of the City immediately when erected or installed. There was no provision of any kind providing that title would be retained until payment was made by the City. I am unable to find a single word anywhere in either the plan submitted to the Division of Commerce and Industrial Development (sometimes referred to as Division) or in the lease between Interco and the City which even intimates that this was an installment purchase of a building by the City. All references are to construction, not purchase. If this is in fact an installment purchase, it seems clear that things were not as they seemed and that the parties at the time did not so recognize or realize. It seems to me that to hold under the facts here that this was an installment purchase by the City as it made payments on the Architect’s Certificate represents a radical change in the law of real property in this state.
The second ground relied on in the majority opinion is that “there is also authority for the proposition that in the construction of an industrial facility financed by revenue bonds the municipality may act through an agent or representative as provided in the proposed lease agreement and that statutes such as §§ 71.840 and 71.847 do not compel a construction that the municipality itself must directly construct the building or execute the building contract as a party thereto.” Again, this discussion is phrased in “there is authority to support” language, but I treat it as being intended to be a definite holding on which the majority opinion relies for the result reached. Any other treatment would classify it as mere academic discussion of what might have been.
Cases cited in support of this second proposition are Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 256 Iowa 1184, 131 N.W.2d 5, 23, and Gregory v. City of Lewisport, Ky., 369 S. W.2d 133, 135. It should be observed that in neither Iowa nor Kentucky was there any statute comparable to § 71.843. Neither state had legislation requiring that the municipality itself be a party to the contract on industrial development projects or that such contracts be awarded on competitive bidding. These cases cannot be authority for this court to ignore the explicit directions of § 71.843 that the City itself enter into the contract.1
The majority opinion cites no Missouri decision or statutory authority which recognizes or grants to a city of the third class the right to act through an agent or representative (instead of itself being a party to the contract) to build and equip an industrial plant with municipal funds. Such cities are established by authority of the state. They do not possess residuary or reserve powers. Rather, they have the authority conferred on them by statute or constitutional provision. Section 71.843 explicitly covered contracts by municipalities for construction of industrial plants. This was specifically recognized by this court in the case of Petition of Monroe City, Mo., 359 S.W.2d 706, 709, as follows: “Whenever the approved plan calls for the con*304struction, improvement or extension of facilities, the municipality is required to enter into a contract for that purpose, the same to be let on competitive bidding, after notice of the letting, etc. § 71.843.” The procedure . followed by the City did not comply with § 71.843 or with what this court said was necessary in the Monroe City case. It appears to me that the majority opinion is overruling what this court said in Monroe City without saying so.
In its discussion of this second proposition, the majority opinion states that “in the present case the Division of Commerce and Industrial Development has determined that the safeguards and supervision retained by the City under the plan submitted and approved are sufficient to satisfy the public interest.” Apparently, the opinion is accepting the contention advanced by defendants in their briefs that § 71.843 should be construed to apply only when the plan submitted to and approved by the Division provides that the construction contracts are to be let by the City. The theory of defendants is that under § 71.813 the City submitted a plan to the Division for approval and it called for construction by Interco. Now, say defendants, that approved plan is to be carried out by the City pursuant to § 71.840 when it has received funds for that purpose. The net effect of this contention is to place in the Division the right to determine whether compliance with § 71.843 by a city is required. Counsel so conceded in oral argument. I cannot agree that the language of the statute is subject to this interpretation. Section 71.843 does not say that compliance with it shall be necessary if, and only if, the approved plan so provides or the Division requires. Instead, it states specifically that whenever the approved plan calls for construction, “the municipality shall enter into a contract for the purpose” thereof. The section requires publication of notice of the letting of contracts and states that “all contracts shall be let on competitive bidding to the lowest and best bidder.” How could the language be more definite and specific ? There is not the slightest intimation that the Division is vested with authority in approving a plan to require or waive compliance by the City with § 71.843.
As a matter of fact, I find no language in the plan submitted to the Division or in the attached lease between Interco and the City which would indicate to the Division that there would be no advertisement for bids or that contracts would not be let on the basis of competitive bidding. In the very first paragraph of the application by Jefferson City to the Division of Commerce and Industrial Development the City applies “for approval of the Project for industrial development herein described, to be carried out pursuant to Sections 71.790 to 71.850, 1965 Supplement to Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1959.” Those section numbers include § 71.843 and at least by inference the language of the application would indicate an intention to comply with § 71.843. Certainly, there was nothing to indicate an intention not to comply. It is true that the lease itself, which was attached to the application, contained a provision that Interco would construct the building and improvements, entering into contracts with contractors which would be approved in writing by the City. Nowhere, however, was there any statement or intimation that these would be privately negotiated contracts, not advertised, and not let on competitive bidding. I find no basis for concluding that the Division of Commerce approved anl arrangement whereby contracts were to be privately negotiated. There was no such explanation in the plan submitted to the Division nor is there anything in the letter of approval by the Division which so provided.
Even if such provision had been included in the plan and had been approved by the Division, I am of the opinion that such action would not have been authorized under §§ 71.790 through 71.850, inclusive. Those statutes did not give the Division authority to excuse compliance with § 71.843 by the City.
*305The main reliance of the principal opinion seems to be on the thesis that § 71.843, at least as it applies to industrial plants financed with revenue bonds, is unconstitutional. This whole issue of constitutionality is raised sua sponte in the majority opinion. None of the briefs filed on behalf of defendants assert or urge that § 71.-843 is unconstitutional. Interwoven in this argument are contentions that (1) § 71.843 is completely out of harmony with the character and attributes of revenue bonds, (2) the City, by being a party to the construction contract, risks a general obligation and is in danger of violating the debt limitations imposed by §§ 26(a) and 26(b) of Art. VI of the Missouri Constitution, and (3) the provisions of § 27 of Art. VI of the Constitution are self-executing and § 71.843 would narrow or embarrass those self-executing provisions and for that reason is unconstitutional.
I cannot agree that there is incompatibility in financing a project with revenue bonds and requiring the City itself to contract for construction on the basis of competitive bids, or that such procedure “would be contrary to the central purpose of permitting the issuance of this kind of bonds.”
The difference in revenue and general obligation bonds is not in how contracts are awarded or who is the contracting party, but rather in the source of funds from which the bonds are retired. General obligation bonds are payable out of tax revenues and general funds. They are general obligations of the city or other issuing agency. Revenue bonds are payable solely and exclusively from revenue received from the project and are not debts or general obligations of the city or issuing agency. Section 71.820 specifically so provided with reference to the bonds here involved, and § 27 of Art. VI of the Missouri Constitution likewise so provides.
Section 71.840 provides that, “When funds have been received by the municipality for the carrying out of the project, the municipality shall purchase, construct, extend or improve the facilities as provided by the plan.” The City, pursuant to that section, would sell bonds and have the money on hand in the construction account before awarding the construction contract. This would be true whether the bonds authorized and sold were revenue or general obligation bonds, or a combination of the two. Those are the funds which the Division would have approved and the voters authorized as the funds for use in constructing the facility. Consequently, it would make no difference in the advertisement for bids and the execution of contracts whether the funds had come from one type of bond or the other. There is, no inconsistency or incompatibility between the City itself awarding the construction contracts based on competitive bidding and the type of bond which produced the funds then on hand in the construction fund for use in paying for said construction.
Likewise, I cannot agree that the City would risk a general obligation or be in danger of violation of §§ 26(a) and 26(b) of Art. VI of the Missouri Constitution by directly contracting for the construction of industrial plants to be financed by revenue bonds. The principal opinion contends that this risk exists if the bond proceeds were from revenue bonds but not if they were from general obligation bonds. It is interesting to note, as previously mentioned, that this proposition is raised sua sponte in the principal opinion and is not urged by the defendants. In that connection, the brief of the defendants (appellants) filed in this court when this case was reargued, states as follows: “Appellants doubt if there is a distinction between construction contracts to be paid out of the proceeds of general obligation bonds and those to be paid out of the proceeds of revenue bonds. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution prohibits a city from incurring any indebtedness in excess of funds on hand and Appellants believe such limitation applies to all construction contracts. Such restriction does not apply if bond proceeds are available to pay the *306■contracts. If, however, the obligation incurred by the construction contract should ■exceed the bond proceeds the contract would be void, at least to the extent of the ■excess, and the City’s general credit would not be affected regardless of the nature of the bonds.” This position was reiterated in oral argument. Thus, even the defendants do not agree with this portion of the principal opinion.
The principal opinion, in presenting this matter of the possibility of the City incurring a general obligation and possibly violating §§ 26(a) and 26(b) of Art. VI of the Constitution, sets up a straw man which it then attacks. The opinion says: “If we construe § 71.843 as requiring the City in the case of a revenue bond project to enter into the usual construction contract without limitation as to the funds from which the agreed contract price will be paid, one of two things will happen.” This statement starts on the false premise that the construction contract should or would so provide and that the statute so requires. This is not the case. I do not think that we may assume that the City would enter into a contract which would undertake to create a general obligation instead of an obligation to pay from the revenue bond proceeds. The plan submitted by the City to the Division called for construction from revenue bond proceeds. Section 71.803 requires that the application include a “statement of the source of funds to be expended for the project.” Pursuant thereto, the City submitted an application which included the following:
“3. Source of Funds to be Expended for the Project. The source of funds to be expended for the project will be the proceeds of $8,500,000 principal amount of industrial revenue bonds to be issued pursuant to the statute aforesaid and Section 27 of Article VI of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945, as amended August 17, 1965. The bonds will mature over approximately a 25-year period.”
The voters of the City approved construction from industrial revenue bonds in the amount of $8,500,000, as shown by the proposal quoted in the majority opinion. The plan and the proposed lease specifically provided that Interco would pay any costs above those taken care of by the proceeds of the $8,500,000 revenue bond issue and would hold the City harmless therefrom.
Where is there any basis for assuming that the construction contract entered into by the City would obligate the City beyond what the plan provided? Section 71.843 refers to a contract to carry out the approved plan. It is perfectly logical and consistent with § 71.843 that the City, in calling for construction bids, would provide in its proposed contract and specifications that the project would be financed and paid for by the proceeds oi the $8,500,000 in revenue bonds, that estimates as approved by the architect would be paid by the fiscal agent out of that fund, and that any costs in excess of those taken care of by the amount in that fund would be paid by Interco, pursuant to the contract between it and the City. The contract would provide that the City would have no obligation beyond the construction fund derived from the sale of the bonds. Under these circumstances, there simply would be no occasion for the City to incur a general obligation or to risk violation of §§ 26(a) or 26(b) of Art. VI of the Constitution. I would see no obstacle to having Interco be an additional party to the construction contract, if desired, obligating it to do what the proposed lease did, namely, to agree to pay any costs over and above those taken care of by the revenue bond proceeds and holding the City harmless from such additional costs.
The same argument regarding exposure to additional liability, advanced in the principal opinion with respect to revenue bonds, could be advanced if general obligation bonds were being used, if it be assumed that the City, in contracting for the facility, would not limit its obligation to the receipts of the bonds approved by the voters and approved in a plan submitted to the Division. *307Actually, the City, in that instance, undoubtedly also would limit its obligation to funds in the construction fund and would provide that any additional cost would be paid for by Interco, pursuant to the contract between Interco and the City.
The principal opinion relies on the case of Sager v. City of Stanberry, 336 Mo. 213, 78 S.W.2d 431, and earlier cases cited therein. Actually, that case supports the position taken in this dissent. I will not lengthen this opinion by reviewing the facts. Those interested may read the case where it is reported. The opinion does include the following pertinent statement, 1. c. 438: “The special fund doctrine is recognized in this state, i. e., that a city does not create an indebtedness within the contemplation of the constitutional proviso by obtaining or purchasing property which is to be paid for solely and exclusively from a special fund derived from the income of the property with no liability on the part of the city to pay such purchase price or any part thereof directly or indirectly with funds raised by taxation or from a fund which must be replenished by funds raised by taxation. State ex rel. City of Hannibal v. Smith (Mo.Sup.) 335 Mo. 825, 74 S.W.2d 367; Bell v. City of Fayette, 325 Mo. 75, 28 S.W.2d 356; Hight v. City of Harrisonville, supra; Hagler v. City of Salem, supra.”
The “special fund doctrine” was not applied in that case because the city by its contract had obligated itself to supplement the special fund from general or other revenues and the purchase, therefore, was not to be made with income coming exclusively from the property.
In the case of Grossman v. Public Water Supply Dist. No. 1 of Clay County, 339 Mo. 344, 96 S.W.2d 701, 706, this court again said: “It has been held repeatedly in this state that the constitutional limitation imposed by section 12, article 10 of the Missouri Constitution on the indebtedness a political corporation may incur, contemplates a debt which must be paid directly or indirectly by resort to taxation. State ex rel. Smith v. City of Neosho, 203 Mo. 40, 82, 101 S.W. 99, 109; Bell v. City of Fayette, 325 Mo. 75, 91, 28 S.W.2d 356, 361; Hight v. City of Harrisonville, 328 Mo. 549, 558, 41 S.W.2d 155, 158; Hagler v. City of Salem, 333 Mo. 330, 336, 62 S.W.2d 751, 754; State ex rel. City of Hannibal v. Smith, 335 Mo. 825, 833, 74 S.W.2d 367, 371; Sager v. City of Stanberry, 336 Mo. 213, 227, 78 S.W.2d 431, 438.” 2
The court then went on to say, 1. c. 706: “It is likewise well established that the ‘special fund doctrine’ prevails in Missouri, and that an indebtedness of a city or other like political corporation payable only out of income derived from the property purchased is not a debt within the meaning of the above provision of the Constitution. State ex rel. City of Excelsior Springs v. Smith, 336 Mo. 1104, 1112, 82 S.W.2d 37, 40; State ex rel. City of Hannibal v. Smith, supra, 335 Mo. 825, loc. cit. 834, 74 S.W.2d 367, loc. cit. 371.”
In my judgment, requiring the City in this instance to be a party to the construction contract and to advertise and award contracts on a competitive basis to the lowest and best bidder does not violate §§ 26(a) and 26(b) of Art. VI of the Constitution. The “special fund doctrine” cases provide further support for'that conclusion.
Finally, the principal opinion concludes that § 71.843 is unconstitutional as being in derogation of the City’s constitutional rights under what the opinion states are self-executing provisions of § 27 of Art. VI of the Constitution. This conclusion is based on the proposition that § 27 conferred on the City the “right to issue and sell revenue bonds ‘for the purpose of paying all or part of the cost of purchasing [or] constructing’ the facilities specified.” These rights, says the majority, were determined to be self-*308enforcing in State ex rel. City of Fulton v. Smith, 355 Mo. 27, 194 S.W.2d 302, 304.
It is true that in the Fulton case this court in 1946 held that the new § 27 of Art. VI of the 1945 Constitution was self-executing. At that time, however, the section covered only “revenue producing water, gas or electric light works, heating or power plants, or airports.”
In 1960 the people amended § 27 of Art. VI by inserting a provision for revenue bonds for manufacturing and industrial plants. At the same election the people adopted § 23(a) of Art. VI, authorizing general obligation bonds for manufacturing and industrial plants. The general assembly, at the following session, enacted an enabling act, Laws 1961, p. 189, now known as §§ 71.790 to 71.850, applicable both to general obligation and revenue bonds for manufacturing and industrial plants. An emergency clause was included.
In the case of State of Missouri ex rel. City of Charleston v. Holman, Mo., 355 S.W.2d 946, this court was asked to mandamus the state auditor to register general obligation bonds issued by the City of Charleston to erect an industrial plant, pursuant to § 23(a). This court held that § 23(a) was not self-enforcing and that enabling legislation was necessary. It further held that the enabling act passed by the legislature in 1961 was not an emergency measure and hence the act was not yet effective when Charleston proceeded to authorize general obligation bonds. Accordingly, the bonds were held to be invalid.
Monroe City also acted at about the same time to issue industrial bonds, but it sought to issue both general obligation bonds under § 23(a) and revenue bonds under § 27. It, too, acted prior to the effective date of the enabling act unless it constituted an emergency measure. When the case of Petition of Monroe City, Mo., 359 S.W.2d 706, reached this court, the Charleston case already had been decided. Accordingly, Monroe City conceded that its general obligation bonds were not properly authorized and that since the enabling act was not an emergency measure, it was not yet effective when the city authorized issuance of the bonds. It contended, however, that the revenue bonds were valid on the theory that § 27 was self-executing under the decision in the Fulton case. However, this court held that the new portion of § 27 relating to industrial projects was not self-executing and that the Monroe City revenue bonds were invalid because they antedated the effective date of the enabling act.
In the Monroe City opinion, 1. c. 710, Judge Leedy recognized that in Fulton this court “held § 27, Article VI of the Constitution, as originally adopted in 1945, to be self-executing.” (Emphasis by Judge Leedy.) He referred to the fact that the original § 27 applied only to municipally owned utilities and airports. He then proceeded, 1. c. 711, to state: “So much for the situation and state of the applicable law as of the time of the decision in the City of Fulton case. Since then the constitutional and statutory changes hereinabove pointed out have been made by which a wholly new concept of municipal governmental function has been introduced into the body of our law. We are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the mere expanding of § 27 by the simple device of wedging (so to speak) words embodying such new concept into or between provisions previously interpreted as being self-executing does not compel that same interpretation as to the new matter so inserted. Nor are we willing to say that it should be so interpreted, this for the reason that this innovation by way of municipal financing of industrial projects is so new and untried, its possibilities so sweeping, and its operation and potentialities so utterly uncertain (and great) as to imperatively require statutory charting of its course. This was recognized by the Legislature in passing the enabling act, and at least tacitly by the City of Monroe City in taking all steps requisite to the validity of the bonds pursuant to the enabling act, and relying thereon in the trial court; nor was it ever *309contended in the trial court that the provisions of § 27, as amended, were self-executing. We are of the opinion that the new provisions of said section (under Amendment No. 4) are not self-executing, and require legislation to carry them into effect, quite as much as did § 23(a), as held in the Charleston case.” (Emphasis added.)
I am of the opinion that the majority opinion clearly overlooks what this court held in Monroe City when it now asserts that “unchanged by the amendments are those parts of § 27 which empower the cities to issue and sell revenue bonds to pay the cost of purchasing and constructing the several projects.” That statement is true with respect to utilities and airports, but it is not true with respect to industrial projects. Monroe City expressly and clearly holds to the contrary. I find inescapable the conclusion that the majority opinion overrules Monroe City without saying so.
The majority opinion would hold that with reference to industrial projects, § 27 is self-executing insofar as it authorizes the City on a four-sevenths vote to issue and sell revenue bonds for the purpose of purchasing, constructing, extending or improving industrial plants. If that is true, one necessarily would ask what it is that is left which is not self-executing? If § 27, without enabling legislation, authorizes a city to issue and sell the bonds and then spend the money and obtain an industrial plant, it is permitted to do the entire operation, and there is nothing left on which the doctrine of the Monroe City case could operate. If § 27 does so authorize the City, then what about the constitutionality of the sections of the enabling act which require submission of the plan to the Division for approval? Such a position necessarily is in direct conflict with what this court held in Monroe City. Apparently, the majority opinion seeks to limit the ruling of Monroe City to the words actually inserted following the number 2 and before the number 3 in § 27, but that would be wholly meaningless and is not what the opinion in Monroe City said or meant. When § 27 was amended in 1960, what the people really added by that amendment was a provision that any city, town or village by a vote of four-sevenths could issue and sell its revenue bonds for the purpose of paying all or part of the cost of purchasing, constructing, extending or improving plants for manufacturing and industrial purposes, to be owned exclusively by the municipality, and that the cost of operation and maintenance and the principal and interest of the bonds were to be payable solely from revenues received from operation of the plant. This is what Monroe City held to be not self-executing. That being true, the legislature had the right to adopt the enabling act and very properly inserted § 71.843 in that act.
There is no inconsistency between the requirements of § 71.843 and the provisions of § 27 of Art. VI of the Constitution. I think it is fair to say that the State of Missouri has a rather well defined policy of requiring that contracts (whether for construction or purchase) by the state or its agencies or subdivisions are to be awarded by the contracting agency on the basis of competitive bids submitted in response to published notice. Section 71.843 simply applies that procedure in the case of construction of industrial plants. This court said in City of Hannibal v. Winchester, Mo., 391 S.W. 2d 279, 286: “On matters of state policy or interest * * * the legislature may act, so long as it does not interfere with the constitutional method of annexation or enact laws inconsistent with it.” That same principle would authorize § 71.843. If, as the majority indicates, this procedure is not to be applicable, and the City should contract through some agent or representative instead of directly, without any requirement of notice or competitive bidding, it seems clear that the door is opened so as to make possible those things which the policy of open competitive bidding is designed to avoid.
The result I would reach does not mean that the City could not build an industrial plant for Interco financed by revenue bonds. *310It means simply that the City in so doing must comply with § 71.843. This should present no obstacles. As a matter of fact, it is common knowledge that Jefferson City has approved revenue bonds under § 27 for another industrial plant and has announced that the City will advertise for competitive bids as provided in § 8.250 (thereby following § 71.843).
There is no occasion to consider the other questions raised by plaintiffs because I would affirm based on failure of the defendants to comply with § 71.843.
I cannot conclude this opinion without expressing apprehension about possible effects of the majority opinion. I have mentioned the fact that it leaves cities free to contract privately through agents without the necessity for advertisement or competitive bidding. I call attention to § 91.170, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., which authorizes first, second, third and fourth class cities to construct waterworks, issuing revenue bonds for that purpose when authorized by a four-sevenths vote. The statute provides that work is to be let by the city on competitive bids to the lowest and best bidder. If, as the majority holds, revenue bonds are incompatible with direct contracting by the city, and if the city risks violation by such procedure of constitutional limitations on debt, or at least risks general obligations when not authorized by the people, it would appear that this court would be compelled to hold § 91.170 unconstitutional and that the cities could not follow that procedure but would have to act through representatives. Our state colleges and universities, for years, have been building dormitories and cafeterias with the proceeds of revenue bonds. These contracts are let by the institutions themselves on competitive bidding. These institutions also are restricted by constitutional limitations on becoming indebted beyond uncommitted funds available during the current year except for revenue bonds authorized by the statute. If utilization of direct contracting by these institutions is incompatible with revenue bond attributes, and if by contracting directly the institutions incur or risk incurring general obligations over and beyond the obligation to pay with the proceeds of the revenue bond issues, then it would appear that the majority opinion casts doubt on the propriety of this procedure by these institutions. It is true that the majority opinion states it is limited to the precise factual situation here involved, but the opinion does announce several definite and far-reaching principles of the law which I have discussed and which I would assume the court would be expected to apply consistently in other factual situations as and when presented.

. The opinion also cites 63 C. J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1148, p. 814, as supporting a statement that-“ordinarily a statute requiring competitive bidding on public improvements is applicable only to contracts whereby the city itself assumes an obligation or indebtedness.” The text of C.J.S. does not say that ordinarily this is the rule. Rather, it states that it has been so held, citing two Utah cases. The note 36.5 in the pocket part, referred to in the opinion, does not support the position taken. In any event, these citations do not provide a basis, in my judgment, for circumventing the clear and precise directions of § 71.843.

. Sec. 12, Art. 10 of the Constitution of 1875, referred to in the above quotation, was the predecessor of §§ 26(a) and 26(b) of Art. VI of the Missouri Constitution of 1945.