Court Opinion

ID: 9650061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:22:20.141775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:17.714622
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, Chief Judge.
This case involves a challenge on Fifth Amendment self-incrimination grounds to the constitutionality of a civil contempt order entered by a Juvenile Court directing the mother of a juvenile “to produce him before the court or to reveal his exact whereabouts.” 1
*394I
Maurice M., the infant son of Jacqueline Bouknight, was admitted to the hospital on January 23, 1987, with a broken leg; he was then three months old. Because of the nature of Maurice’s injuries, and the presence of old, partially healed fractures, the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (DSS) obtained an authorization on February 11, 1987 to provide shelter care for the child and he was placed in foster care. DSS also filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (Division of Juvenile Causes), seeking a determination that Maurice was a child in need of assistance (CINA) under the provisions of Maryland Code (1984), § 3-801(e) et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The petition recited Maurice’s history of injuries, the mother’s history of emotional problems, her own former status as a CINA, the fact that she was seen to throw Maurice into his crib during his second hospitalization, that she was verbally abusive to the physicians and social workers, and that the father had just been released from prison for drug violations. At a hearing on May 19, 1987, Maurice, Jacqueline, and DSS, each represented by counsel, stipulated to the essential facts as set forth in the petition and agreed to continue Maurice under the Shelter Care Order. On July 17, 1987, this order was modified and physical custody of Maurice was returned to Jacqueline.
At a hearing on August 18, 1987, Maurice was found to be a CINA. The parties agreed that Maurice would remain in Jacqueline’s custody but would be placed under an Order of Protective Supervision to DSS and a DSS aide was assigned to assist Jacqueline with parenting skills. Under this order, Jacqueline agreed to “cooperate” with DSS, and to refrain from physically punishing Maurice.
By petition filed on April 18, 1988, DSS represented that Jacqueline had failed to cooperate with DSS and that she refused to provide a current address or to inform DSS of Maurice’s whereabouts. The petition also recited that Maurice’s father had been shot to death the previous month and that Jacqueline now had a history of drug use. DSS also *395filed a Motion for Contempt against Jacqueline, alleging that DSS representatives had made a home visit on April 7, 1988, but were told by Jacqueline that Maurice “was in the care of an aunt; however, she refused to identify the aunt or provide the whereabouts of the child.” 2
On April 20, 1988, at a hearing before a Juvenile Master, at which Jacqueline declined to appear, DSS cited Jacqueline’s failure to comply with the Order of Protective Supervision and was awarded custody of Maurice. On the same day, the court (Angeletti, J.) held a hearing on the contempt motion; neither Maurice nor Jacqueline appeared at the hearing although each was represented by counsel. DSS suggested to the court that it was dealing with a “very serious abuse case” because of Maurice’s prior history of injuries, and he might even be dead. The court stated its belief that the child may be “in some jeopardy because of the actions of the mother in refusing to bring him in.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered Jacqueline to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for failure to produce Maurice in court.
Jacqueline was subsequently arrested and brought before the court on April 27, 1988. At that hearing, the court (Mitchell, J.) engaged Jacqueline in a colloquy in the presence of her attorney. It asked her “the whereabouts of ... Maurice.” In response, Jacqueline said that he was with her sister Barbara at a designated address in Dallas, Texas. Jacqueline’s statement was not given under oath and no Fifth Amendment objection to the court’s inquiry was entered on Jacqueline’s behalf.
An immediate police investigation revealed that Jacqueline’s sister had not seen Maurice. On April 28, 1988, Judge Mitchell found Jacqueline in contempt “for failing to pro*396duce [Maurice] before the court or to reveal his exact whereabouts.” The order specified that Jacqueline be jailed until she purged herself of the contempt by (1) producing Maurice before the court, or (2) revealing to the court his exact whereabouts, or (3) by providing “information” about Maurice to the police, or DSS, or the court.
The court also conducted a hearing on the same day it entered its civil contempt order. At the hearing, Jacqueline’s counsel told the court that Jacqueline “absolutely insists” that the child was with her sister in Texas. Counsel also told the court that Jacqueline’s opportunity to purge herself was not a constitutional one “if her purging herself may involve admitting to a crime of some sort.” The court, in response, said that Jacqueline was not being asked “to admit to anything”; that Jacqueline was not being asked “what has happened to the child or whether she committed any act that in anyway harmed the child”; and that the only thing that is required is that she produce Maurice. The court added that Jacqueline could purge herself of the contempt “through the means of a proper address, person, or location for the child,” i.e., by simply indicating to her counsel, “to anyone at the jail, or anyone in authority, including this Court, that information.”
At yet another hearing on May 18 before Judge Mitchell, Jacqueline moved to strike the contempt order on Fifth Amendment grounds. She claimed that the substance of the contempt “is that [Jacqueline] must verbally or physically produce statements or evidence that may tend to incriminate her.” The court rejected the argument, concluding that it had jurisdiction to require disclosure of “the whereabouts of the minor child” and, in doing so, Jacqueline was not required to speak.
On May 26, 1988, a further hearing was granted on the Fifth Amendment issue. Jacqueline contended that to purge herself of the contempt she must “give testimony or speak” in violation of her self-incrimination privilege; that “the product of her mind has to yield the whereabouts of Maurice[;] ... she has to speak to someone, ... to order *397some agent, through his mind, through his lips to produce Maurice.” The court once again stated its view that its order to produce Maurice required only that Jacqueline perform an act — that no testimony need be given. It said that the contempt order was issued “not because she refuses to testify ... [but] because she has failed to abide by the Order of this Court, mainly the production of Maurice.”
Jacqueline appealed. We granted certiorari prior to decision by the intermediate appellate court to consider the important issue raised in the case.
II
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination extends “to compelling answers by parties or witnesses in civil litigation.” Whitaker v. Prince George’s County, 307 Md. 368, 385, 514 A.2d 4 (1986). It “protects a witness from being required to make disclosure, otherwise compellable in the trial court’s contempt power, which could incriminate him in a later criminal prosecution.” Id. at 385, 514 A.2d 4. See also In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 516 A.2d 976 (1986). The privilege “is confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). To sustain the privilege, “it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered, might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.” Id. at 486-87, 71 S.Ct. at 818. The protection of the Fifth Amendment “not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction ... but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute” the suspected offender. Id. at 486, 71 S.Ct. at 818. The privilege must be accorded a liberal construction in favor of the right that it was intended to secure. Id. See also Ellison v. State, 310 Md. 244, 528 A.2d 1271 (1987).
*398It is the historic function of the Fifth Amendment to protect an individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1252, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944). In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Court held that the privilege protects an accused “only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.” Id. at 761, 86 S.Ct. at 1830. The Court said that the protection of the privilege “reaches an accused’s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one’s papers.” Id. at 763-64, 86 S.Ct. at 1832.
The question in Schmerber was whether the involuntary withdrawal of blood and the use of the analysis in a drunken driving prosecution infringed the Fifth Amendment privilege. In concluding that it did not, the Court emphasized that the privilege “is a bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony,’ but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate [the privilege].” Id. at 764, 86 S.Ct. at 1832. Citing prior precedents, the Court said that the privilege “offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.” Id. Quoting from Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53, 31 S.Ct. 2, 6, 54 L.Ed. 1021 (1910), the Court observed, id. 384 U.S. at 763, 86 S.Ct. at 1832, that the privilege against self-incrimination protects an individual from being a witness against himself; it is a prohibition “of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications [from an accused], not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.” Stated in other terms, “our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual pro*399duce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1620, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976), involved a summons directing an attorney to produce documents of a client; the question was whether the documents were constitutionally immune from summons in the hands of the client and retained that immunity in the hands of the attorney. The Court concluded that the client’s Fifth Amendment privilege was not violated by enforcing the summons against the lawyer since the client was not thereby compelled to be a witness against himself. It said that the constitutional privilege “does not independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating.” Id. at 408, 96 S.Ct. at 1579 (emphasis in original). The Fifth Amendment, the Court emphasized, protects against “ ‘compelled self-incrimination, not [the disclosure of] private information.’ ” Id. at 401, 96 S.Ct. at 1576, quoting from United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233, n. 7, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2167, n. 7, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). It observed that it is the extortion of the information from the accused that offends our sense of justice. Id. 425 U.S. at 398, 96 S.Ct. at 1574-75. However, it continued, while a party is privileged from producing evidence, the party has no privilege from its production. Id. at 399, 96 S.Ct. at 1575.
At issue in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 104 S.Ct. 1237, 79 L.Ed.2d 552 (1984) (Doe I) was whether, and to what extent, the Fifth Amendment privilege applied to concededly incriminating business records of a sole proprietorship. There, the sole proprietor was ordered by a grand jury subpoena to produce his business records. The Court recognized that a subpoena that demands production of voluntarily prepared documents does not compel oral testimony nor require the subpoenaed party to restate or affirm *400the contents of the documents. Id. at 610-11, 104 S.Ct. at 1241. Quoting from Fisher, supra, 425 U.S. at 409-10, 96 S.Ct. at 1580-81, it observed that merely because records on their face might be incriminating would not violate the privilege since the privilege protects only against being incriminated by the individual’s own compelled testimonial communications. Id. 465 U.S. at 611, 104 S.Ct. at 1241. The Court said, however, that while the contents of the records may not be privileged, the act of producing the documents may be because the individual may thereby be compelled “to perform an act that may have testimonial aspects and an incriminating effect.” Id. at 612, 104 S.Ct. at 1242. This may be so, the Court explained, because compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the demanded records, their possession or control by the party under subpoena, as well as the authenticity of the records. Id. at 613, 104 S.Ct. at 1242. Noting the factual determination of the trial judge that “the act of producing the documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination,” id. at 613-14, 104 S.Ct. at 1242, the Court, declining to overrule that factual determination, held that the act of producing the documents was privileged. Id. at 617, 104 S.Ct. at 1244-45.
In Doe v. United States, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2341, 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988) (Doe II), a court order compelled the defendant, the target of a grand jury investigation, to execute consent forms authorizing foreign banks to disclose records of his accounts, without identifying the accounts or acknowledging their existence. The defendant claimed that the compelled execution of the consent forms had “independent testimonial significance” that infringed his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 108 S.Ct. at 2345. In concluding that the privilege was not thereby violated, the Court reviewed its earlier Fisher and Doe I cases, stating that there the issue “was whether the act of producing subpoenaed documents, not itself the making of a statement, might nonetheless have some protected testimonial aspects.” Id. at 2347. In those cases, the Court *401concluded “that the act of production could constitute protected testimonial communication because it might entail implicit statements of fact: by producing documents in compliance with a subpoena, the witness would admit that the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and were authentic.” Id. at 2347. It said that the constitutional privilege “applies to acts that imply assertions of fact.” Id. at 2347. The Doe II Court said that “to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information [because] [o]nly then is a person compelled to be a 'witness’ against himself.” Id. at 2347. This understanding, the Court said, was most clearly revealed in those cases in which it had held “that certain acts, though incriminating, are not within the privilege, citing Schmerber, supra (suspect may be compelled to furnish a blood sample); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967) (providing a handwriting exemplar); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973) (providing a voice exemplar); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (to stand in a lineup); and Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021 (1910) (to wear particular clothing). As to these, it said that the privilege was not implicated because the suspect was not required to disclose any knowledge he might have or to speak his guilt. The privilege may be asserted “only to resist compelled explicit or implicit disclosures of incriminating information.” Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2348. Thus, the Court held that the defendant’s execution of the consent form was without testimonial significance “because neither the form, nor its execution, communicates any factual assertion, implicit or explicit, or conveys any information to the Government.” Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2350. It said that the form did not identify any particular bank, did not acknowledge that an account was in existence, or that it was controlled by the defendant. And assuming that such an account did exist, the form did not indicate whether information relating to the defendant was present at the *402bank. Therefore, the Court explained that it was for the Government to locate that evidence by its independent labors. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the defendant’s “compelled act of executing the form has no testimonial significance” because by signing the form, the defendant “makes no statement, explicit or implicit, regarding the existence of a foreign bank account or his control over any such account [n]or would his execution of the form admit the authenticity of any records produced by the bank.” Id.
The defendant’s act of executing the form was, therefore, not compelled to obtain any knowledge which he possessed in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Com. v. Hughes, 380 Mass. 583, 404 N.E.2d 1239 (1980), concluded that a court order directing the defendant in a criminal case to produce a designated gun suspected of having been used in the commission of the offense violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege. There, the defendant, charged with assault with a handgun, refused to comply with the order that he produce the weapon or show present inability to do so. The gun had been legally registered to the defendant; the prosecution wanted it for ballistics testing. After recognizing that the defendant, without uttering a sound, could comply with the order by producing the weapon, the court nevertheless held that the defendant’s producing the revolver would have sufficient testimonial aspects to initiate Fifth Amendment consideration. After reviewing Schmerber and Fisher, it recognized two kinds of “testimonial assertions” that were implied in the production of the gun, i.e., (1) a tacit admission of the existence and location of the weapon in the hands of the possessor and (2) implicit authentication that the weapon was that required to be produced by the order. Id. 404 N.E.2d at 1243. In finding that the defendant’s privilege had been infringed, the court said, id. at 1244, that “[i]f the defendant should produce the revolver, he would be making implicitly a statement about its existence, location and control” which would be used to prove his possession and control of the weapon after the *403alleged crime was committed. The identical result was reached on markedly similar facts in Goldsmith v. Superior Court In & For Shasta, 152 Cal.App.3d 78, 199 Cal.Rptr. 366 (1984).
United States v. Campos-Serrano, 430 F.2d 173 (7th Cir.1970) involved a criminal charge of knowing possession of a forged alien registration card. There, because the defendant had been coerced into producing the card during a custodial interrogation, the court found a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, reasoning that the defendant’s act of compelled production implicitly admitted the card’s existence, location, and the defendant’s control over it. The court said: “An individual should not be compelled to produce the crime itself.” Id. at 176. In State v. Dennis, 16 Wash.App. 417, 558 P.2d 297 (1976), the defendant was convicted of possessing cocaine. The police coerced the defendant into producing bags of the illegal drug. The court found a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege because the act of production virtually admitted the defendant’s control. In State v. Alexander, 281 N.W.2d 349 (Minn.1979), the court reversed a contempt adjudication which had been based on the defendant’s failure to produce film which allegedly was possessed in violation of a criminal obscenity statute. The court concluded that the act of production was tantamount to an admission of the defendant’s control or possession of the film.
Ill
As earlier observed, Maurice is a CINA whose custody has been awarded to the DSS. In response to the court’s directive that Bouknight release Maurice to DSS, she has refused to do so, insisting that he is with her sister in Texas, information which has proven to be incorrect. The State readily acknowledges that it is fearful that Maurice has been criminally abused or possibly is dead. In the circumstances, as disclosed by the record, the State concedes that Bouknight has a reasonable apprehension that she will be prosecuted if, in complying with the court’s *404order, she produces Maurice in court or otherwise discloses his whereabouts to the authorities.
The State is, of course, mandated to protect Maurice as a CINA under the Juvenile Causes Act, Code (1984 Repl.Vol.) § 4-101, et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. That it does not know of Maurice’s present whereabouts is equally clear. To purge the contempt order and thereby free herself from imprisonment, Bouknight must impart information to someone sufficient to permit Maurice to be produced in court, or provide information of his present whereabouts. Should she do so, Bouknight will necessarily admit a measure of continuing control and dominion over Maurice’s person. In these circumstances, if the information discloses that Maurice is now dead, or has been subject to criminal abuse, as the prosecution candidly fears, suspicion concededly would focus on Bouknight as the criminal agent. By disclosing the demanded information, therefore, Bouknight would, in the event a crime had been committed upon Maurice’s person, be incriminating herself by, in effect, disclosing the corpus delicti itself under compulsion of the court’s order.3
In the circumstances of this case, the compelled act of producing Maurice in court, although not requiring Bouknight to utter a sound, or compelling her to verbally disclose Maurice’s whereabouts, is implicitly at the least a testimonial communication within the contemplation of the Fifth Amendment privilege, as explicated by the controlling case law. Either by the act of producing Maurice in court, or verbally disclosing his whereabouts, Bouknight is compelled to communicate facts. We therefore find that the court’s contempt order is, in its entirety, violative of Bouknight’s Fifth Amendment privilege and must be vacated.
*405(A)
In so concluding, we have considered the State’s argument that Bouknight waived her Fifth Amendment privilege by providing information to the court as to Maurice’s presence at a designated address in Texas. When she made the statement to the court, Bouknight was not a witness and she was not under oath. Although represented by counsel at the time, the record does not disclose that Bouknight was informed by counsel or the court of her right to remain silent in the face of the court’s inquiry. Moreover, Bouknight’s inaccurate information concerning Maurice’s whereabouts was not directly incriminating; indeed, it was likely intended to exculpate her from further inquiry by the court.
Waiver of a constitutional protection is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). It is difficult to establish and cannot be inferred from a silent record. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525-26, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2189-90, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). To be valid, the waiver must be made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. Miranda v. Arizona, supra; Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 245, 322 A.2d 211 (1974). However, forfeiture of the Fifth Amendment privilege may be inferred from a course of conduct without any inquiry into intent. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 428, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1142-43, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274 (2d Cir.1981). The Supreme Court has held that an “individual under compulsion to make disclosures as a witness who reveal[s] information instead of claiming the privilege [loses] the benefit of the privilege.” Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653, 96 S.Ct. 1178, 1181, 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976). See also United States v. Korel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10, 90 S.Ct. 763, 766-70, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970); Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 144, 88 A.2d 556 (1952). Thus, if a witness “discloses his criminal connections, he is not permitted to stop, but must go on and make a full disclosure.” Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597, 16 *406S.Ct. 644, 647, 40 L.Ed. 819 (1896). But the loss of such a basic constitutional guarantee is not to be lightly inferred. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 196, 75 S.Ct. 687, 691, 99 L.Ed. 997 (1955); Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150, 69 S.Ct. 1000, 1007, 93 L.Ed. 1264 (1949). A statement will not preclude a refusal to make further disclosures on Fifth Amendment grounds unless it directly inculpates the witness and the witness could reasonably be expected to know that he might have waived the privilege. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438, 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951); United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228 (8th Cir.1986); Klein v. Harris, supra.
On the record before us, it is manifest that Bouknight’s Fifth Amendment privilege remains intact and that her unsworn, nonincriminatory statement to the court was simply a lie. See United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 241 (8th Cir.1986); Klein v. Harris, supra, 667 F.2d at 288; Balderas Cortez v. State, 735 S.W.2d 294, 303 (Tex. App.Dallas 1987).
(B)
The State argues that if the Fifth Amendment applies, and the privilege has not been waived, the public right to protect its children, as manifested by the Juvenile Causes Act, outweighs Bouknight’s constitutional right against self-incrimination.4 Consequently, we are urged to strike the balance between Bouknight’s right to silence, and the court’s obligation to protect Maurice, in favor of the child. To do otherwise, it is said, would strip the Juvenile Court of its ability to protect any child suspected of being abused. The State points out that the court’s action in holding Bouknight in contempt followed the statutory prescription of § 3-814(c) of the Courts Article that if a parent “fails to *407bring the child before the court when requested ... [,] [it] may proceed against the parent, for contempt.” On Maurice’s behalf, his counsel says that virtually every CINA case involves some allegation of abuse or neglect which is potentially subject to criminal indictment; and that to apply the constraints of the Fifth Amendment in such cases is to afford the parent “carte blanche to conceal any negative information about the child’s status despite explicit court orders to cooperate with agency officials.” It is further suggested that in areas where, as here, the scope of state involvement is so extensive and that all citizens are expected to accept some risk of self-incrimination, individuals can be compelled to provide incriminating information, citing by way of example mandated production of tax records, securities filings, and other potentially incriminating vital records. Reliance is placed principally upon California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 1535, 29 L.Ed.2d 9 (1971) and United States v. Flores, 753 F.2d 1499 (9th Cir.1985).
The issue in Byers was whether the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was infringed by an essentially regulatory California statute which requires the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident to stop and give his name and address. The Court’s plurality opinion said that “tension” exists between the State’s demand for disclosures that may have an incriminating potential and the protection of the right against self-incrimination. Id. 402 U.S. at 427, 91 S.Ct. at 1537. These must be resolved, it said, “in terms of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the other.” Id. It said that an organized society imposes many burdens on its constituents; it requires the filing of tax returns, that producers and distributors of consumer goods file informational reports on the manufacturing processes and the content of products, on the wages, hours, and working conditions of employees. It recognized that securities filings require informational reports and that industries must report periodically the volume and content of pollutants discharged into our waters *408and atmosphere. Id. at 427-28, 91 S.Ct. at 1537-38. It noted that in each of these instances “there is some possibility of prosecution ... for criminal offenses disclosed by or deriving from the information that the law compels a person to supply.” Id. at 428, 91 S.Ct. at 1537. But, the plurality continued, the mere possibility of incrimination, rather than a substantial possibility, is insufficient to defeat the strong policy in favor of a statutory reporting requirement. Id. It said that disclosure with respect to automobile accidents did not entail a substantial risk of self-incrimination; that the California statute was not intended to facilitate criminal prosecutions but to promote satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents; and that consequently the self-incrimination privilege was not violated by the reporting requirement.
United States v. Flores, supra, involved a statutory reporting requirement that written notice be given to a carrier whenever firearms were being shipped to an unlicensed person. The Court found no violation of the defendant’s right against self-incrimination by reason of the reporting requirement. While recognizing that “the privilege against self-incrimination ... may only be limited for the most substantial of reasons,” id. at 1500, the Court said that the Fifth Amendment
“does not always demand substantial undercutting of valid and essential government regulation when the means to effect that regulation necessarily include disclosure of information which could lead to self-incrimination.”
Id. at 1501 (emphasis in original).
In so holding, the Court pointed out that the statute was “directed at a universe of people,” and did not operate in an area of activity “permeated with criminal statutes or direeted at a group of persons inherently suspect of criminal activity.” Id.
We think these cases are inapposite to the matter now before us. The State readily acknowledges that Bouknight’s risk of incriminating herself is a substantial one, *409encompassing, among other possible crimes, the felony of child abuse and even murder. While it may be argued that the Juvenile Causes Act absolutely requires that Bouknight produce Maurice in court or provide information as to his location, and thus bears some kinship to a statutory reporting requirement, we simply are unable in the circumstances to, in effect, totally expunge Bouknight’s Fifth Amendment rights where the risk of prosecution is so substantial. Assuming, arguendo, that there may be causes in which a balancing test is appropriate to determine the existence of the Fifth Amendment privilege, we conclude that the case before us is not one of them. We accord the privilege a liberal construction, as we must, in favor of the right that it was intended to secure. Hoffman v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. at 486, 71 S.Ct. at 818. While we must vacate the civil contempt order in this case, we recognize that Bouknight’s conduct may be criminally punishable under § 3-831 of the Courts Article.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO ORDER JACQUELINE BOUKNIGHT RELEASED FROM CUSTODY. MANDATE TO ISSUE FORTHWITH; COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.

. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
"[N]or shall [any person] he compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself____”
This provision is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1490, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).
Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is in pari materia with the Fifth Amendment provision. See Richardson v. State, 285 Md. 261, 265, 401 A.2d 1021 (1979) and Ellison v. State 310 Md. 244, 259-260, n. 4, 528 A.2d 1271 (1987).

. There was evidence that DSS representatives had not seen Maurice since September 4, 1987; that the DSS aide’s efforts to see Maurice were thwarted by Jacqueline’s statements that the child was not at home; and that Jacqueline had told police that Maurice was in the care of an aunt, but that the aunt had denied seeing Maurice.

. Section 3-831 of the Courts Article suggests that Bouknight’s refusal to relinquish Maurice’s custody to DSS is itself a crime, punishable by imprisonment up to three years.

. This question was not raised or considered at the trial. Under Md. Rule 8-131, we may nevertheless, in our discretion, decide the question for the guidance of the circuit court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.