Court Opinion

ID: 9394734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 13:12:43.274269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:02.235585
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Ortiz, Chaney and Senior Judge Haley
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Richmond, Virginia

              JENNIFER DARNELL PROCTOR
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.      Record No. 0702-22-2                                      JUDGE DANIEL E. ORTIZ
                                                                                    MAY 16, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MECKLENBURG COUNTY
                                                 S. Anderson Nelson, Judge

                               Gregory A. Ullom (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for
                               appellant.

                               Jason D. Reed, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                               Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                      A jury convicted Jennifer Darnell Proctor of felony destruction of property. The trial court

              later granted Proctor’s motion to reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor. On appeal, Proctor

              contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction, arguing that the Commonwealth

              failed to sufficiently prove that she was the perpetrator. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s

              judgment.

                                                         BACKGROUND

                      “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

              light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Poole v. Commonwealth,

              73 Va. App. 357, 360 (2021) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018)). In

              doing so, we discard any of appellant’s conflicting evidence, and regard as true all credible evidence

                      *
                          This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that

evidence. Gerald, 295 Va. at 473.

        In March of 2019, Gary Cook, a CWA Cable TV, Inc. (CWA) technician, worked on a

damaged cable pedestal on three separate occasions. CWA customers in the area had experienced a

series of cable outages stemming from a damaged pedestal located on an easement running through

Proctor’s property. On March 15, Cook went to the area to repair the pedestal. While Cook

attempted to work on the pedestal, Proctor told him that if he repaired it, she would “tear it out.”

Cook returned to Proctor’s property on March 18 because the pedestal had been damaged again.

Proctor was present and appeared, according to Cook, “very belligerent and rude.” She told Cook

that if he “fixed it she was going to tear it down again.” In fact, Proctor attempted to pull out wires

as Cook worked on the pedestal. Cook left without repairing the device and returned the next day to

move the pedestal off Proctor’s property. Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Office Corporal Clayton

investigated the incident and photographed the damaged pedestal and cables.

        Proctor denied damaging the pedestal, explaining that she merely attempted to move the

cables so that she could remove trees and increase the number of parking spaces on her property.

She admitted that she spoke with a CWA employee on March 18, but she denied that she was

present during the March 15 repair.

        The trial court denied Proctor’s motions to strike. Although the jury convicted her of felony

destruction of property, the trial court later reduced the charge to a misdemeanor. Proctor appeals.

                                             ANALYSIS

        “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 327 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask

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itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting

Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “Rather, the relevant question is, upon

review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

(quoting Pijor, 294 Va. at 512). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the

reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ

from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69

Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 273, 288 (2017)).

       “If any person unlawfully destroys, defaces, damages, or removes without the intent to

steal any property, real or personal, not his own . . . he is guilty of (i) a Class 1 misdemeanor if

the value of or damage to the property . . . is less than $1,000.” Code § 18.2-137. Proctor argues

that the evidence fails to establish that she was the individual who damaged the cable pedestal.

“At trial, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the identity of the accused as the

perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cuffee v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 353, 364 (2013)

(quoting Blevins v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 412, 423 (2003)). On appeal, we review the

trier of fact’s determination regarding the identity of the criminal actor in the context of “the

totality of the circumstances.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 507, 523 (2002) (quoting

Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 249 (1992)).

       As with any element of an offense, identity may be proven by direct or circumstantial

evidence. Crawley v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 372, 375 (1999). “Circumstantial evidence

is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently

convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Holloway v.

Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 658, 665 (2011) (quoting Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31,

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53 (1983)). “Circumstantial evidence is not viewed in isolation.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v.

Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 (2003)). “While no single piece of evidence may be sufficient, the

combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in itself, may

lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.” Pick v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 651,

668 (2021) (quoting Finney v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 83, 89 (2009)).

        The evidence established that local CWA customers experienced repeated service

interruptions. The cable pedestal was located on an easement on Proctor’s property. Cook went

to the pedestal on March 15 and discovered that it had been tampered with. Cook repaired the

pedestal but had to return only days later because the pedestal had been damaged again. When

Cook tried to repair it the second time, Proctor confronted him. During that encounter, Proctor

angrily pulled the wires leading to the unit and stated she would destroy the pedestal “again” if

he repaired it.

        Proctor admitted that she wanted to relocate the unit so she could remove trees and

increase the parking spaces on her property, suggesting she had a motive to damage the unit.

The evidence demonstrated that Proctor “had motive, opportunity, and means, and the

circumstantial evidence ‘point[ed] to [her] as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Hodges v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 735, 785 (2005) (quoting Cantrell v. Commonwealth,

229 Va. 387, 398 (1985)). Thus, the record sufficiently supports the jury’s conclusion that

Proctor intentionally damaged CWA property.

                                             CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, we find that the evidence was sufficient to prove Proctor’s

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and we affirm her conviction.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

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