Court Opinion

ID: 9846129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:35:21.414319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:33.762749
License: Public Domain

TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge,
concurring in the result.
I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant. However, unlike the majority, I believe the trial court’s decision is supported more by the language of the applicable insurance policies than by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21 and Hoover. Therefore, I write separately to distinguish the reasoning behind my conclusion.
Because the words used in an insurance company’s policy are chosen by the insurance company itself, “any ambiguity or uncertainty as to their meaning must be resolved in favor of the policyholder, or the beneficiary, and against the company.” Trust Co. v. Insurance Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970). “However, ambiguity in the terms of an insurance policy is not established by the mere fact that the plaintiff makes a claim based upon a construction of its language which the company asserts is not its meaning.” Id. Instead, ambiguity exists only where, in the opinion of the court, the language of the policy is “fairly and reasonably susceptible to” differing interpretations by the parties. Id. Where there is no ambiguity in a policy’s language, courts “must enforce the contract as the parties have made it[,] and [courts] may not, under the guise of interpreting an ambiguous provision, remake the contract and impose *686liability upon the company which it did not assume and for which the policyholder did not pay.” Id.
In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Herndon, 79 N.C. App. 365, 339 S.E.2d 472 (1986), this Court reviewed two policy clauses similar to those in the instant case. Noting that “[Recovery under both policies is clearly limited to ‘the highest applicable limit of liability under any one policy,’ ” we concluded there was “no ambiguity in the language used” in the policies, and we held that the defendants were not allowed to “stack” uninsured motorist compensation claims. Id. at 368, 339 S.E.2d at 474.
In the instant case, the policy of plaintiffs parents with defendant reads as follows:
If this policy and any other auto insurance policy issued to you apply to the same accident, the maximum payable for injuries to you or a family member caused by an underinsured motor vehicle shall be the sum of the highest limit of liability for this coverage under each such policy.
(emphasis in original). According to the record, plaintiffs own policy with Integon contained the same provision. I conclude the plain and unambiguous language of both policies clearly limits the total under-insured motorist coverage to the “highest applicable limit of liability” for underinsured motorist coverage under each policy.
Plaintiffs Integon policy offered him $30,000 in underinsured motorist coverage, while his parent’s policy with defendant offered him $50,000 in underinsured motorist coverage. Accordingly, defendant was only responsible for underinsured motorist coverage up to $50,000, the “highest applicable limit of liability” under the two policies. Hernandez’s policy paid plaintiff $25,000 for his personal injuries, while plaintiff’s own Integon policy paid plaintiff $5,000 in underinsured motorist coverage. Therefore, under the unambiguous terms of the insurance policies, defendant was liable only for the $20,000 necessary to bring the total amount paid to plaintiff to $50,000, and plaintiff was not entitled to stack underinsured motorist coverage limits under the two policies.
For the reasons discussed above, I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment.