Court Opinion

ID: 9942858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 22:03:13.198435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:46.330362
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/21/24 P. v. Parsons CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H049411
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 Super. Ct. No. C2007064)

           v.

 JASON THOMAS PARSONS,

           Defendant and Appellant.
         Appellant Jason Thomas Parsons was convicted by jury trial of four counts of
robbery and a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury also
found true allegations of four prior strike convictions and two prior serious felony
convictions. The trial court sentenced Parsons to an aggregate term of 100 years to life
consecutive to 50 years in state prison.
         On appeal, Parsons argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting a
police officer to testify that tattoos visible in one surveillance video matched tattoos
visible in another surveillance video. Parsons contends that this was inadmissible
opinion evidence and that it violated his due process rights. Parsons also challenges the
testimony of a firearms expert. He argues that the trial court erred by allowing the expert
to testify that the bullet casing from one of the crime scenes matched the bullet casing
from a recovered firearm, and that the expert’s opinion was definitive. He also argues
that the method used by the expert to reach his conclusion is no longer generally accepted
by the scientific community, and therefore it should have been excluded entirely.
       We find no error with respect to the lay opinion testimony about the tattoos. With
respect to the firearms expert testimony, we need not determine whether the trial court
erred in any respect; even if error is assumed, it is harmless under the applicable standard.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.
                                     I. BACKGROUND
       A. Factual Background
              1. Prosecution’s Case
                     a. Taco Bell Robbery
       On May 2, 2020, around 11:39 p.m., a man entered a closed Taco Bell restaurant
through a back door that an employee had propped open to take out the garbage. The
man entered the office, where the manager had been putting money in the safe. The man
was wearing a mask, black beanie, black hoodie, and ripped blue jeans. He appeared to
be Caucasian and was “[m]aybe a little taller” than the manager, who was five feet seven
inches tall. The man ordered the manager at gunpoint to open the safe. The manager
replied that she could not open the locked safe but offered him all the money in the cash
register tills that were in the office. After taking the money, the man left.
                     b. Pizza My Heart Robbery
       On May 6, 2020, around 4:20 p.m., a man entered a Pizza My Heart restaurant and
was approached by an employee. The man pulled out a gun and asked the employee to
hand him money. The employee saw the man pull the slide on the gun, which was about
18 inches away from him, to load a bullet into the chamber. The employee ran to the
back of the store to hide, but returned after the man turned his gun on another employee.
The employee opened the safe and the register, and the man took the contents of both.
       The man wore a brimmed hat, gray long-sleeved shirt, gray pants, and black shoes
with white soles. He was also wearing a medical mask with a filter. The employee did
not recall seeing any tattoos or scars and could only see the man’s forehead. From what
the employee saw, the man “looked to be Black.” Prior to the robbery, surveillance

                                              2
footage outside the restaurant captured the man exiting the driver’s side door of a black
sedan.
                      c. Popeye’s Chicken Robbery
         Around 6:00 p.m. on May 6, 2020, a man wearing a mask and a hat entered a
Popeye’s Chicken1 restaurant. The manager could see that the man was White, with
brown hair, and had light-colored eyes. The manager estimated the man was
“[p]robably” 5 foot 8 inches or 5 foot 9 inches tall. The man pointed a gun at the manger
and demanded that she open the cash register. The man jumped over the counter,
approached the manager, and again demanded that she open the cash register. She
eventually opened the register; the man took the entire cash till and left the restaurant.
                      d. Apatzingan Market Robbery
         On May 8, 2020, around 1:20 p.m., a man with light-colored eyes wearing a
bandana, green sweatshirt, and khaki or brownish-colored pants entered an Apatzingan
Market with a gun. The man pointed the gun at a cashier and ordered her to open the
register. The cashier replied that she did not have a code to open the register and could
only open it when a customer made a purchase. The man asked again, and the cashier
reiterated that she was unable to open it. The man then went behind the cashier and held
the gun to her back. A customer then approached the register to purchase beer. The man
then went behind the customer and took the beer, and the cashier ran towards the office.
         The manager saw the cashier running, exited his office, and saw a man with a
mask and beer going towards the office. The man took out a gun and pointed it at the
manager. The manager moved to the side to get out of the way, but the man grabbed the
manager and directed him to come to the office. The beer slipped and the bottles broke,
causing the manager to slip and fall blocking the entrance to the office. The man went in

         The manager testified that she worked at “Popeye’s Chicken.” Although the
         1

correct name of the restaurant appears to be “Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen,” we shall use
“Popeye’s Chicken” or “Popeye’s” since that it how it is referred to in the record.

                                              3
a different direction for a moment, then came back and fired his gun at the manager,
missing him. The man left. Police later found and recovered a shell casing from inside
the office.
                     e. Isaac Sandoval’s Arrest and Testimony
       An employee at the Popeye’s restaurant provided police with a partial license plate
of the suspect vehicle, which police matched to a black Toyota Camry belonging to Isaac
Sandoval. Sandoval was arrested. He initially denied involvement in any of the four
robberies, but later identified Parsons as the perpetrator after police confronted him about
the surveillance footage. Sandoval told police that Parsons drove his car, while Sandoval
sat in the passenger seat during the robberies. Sandoval provided nonpublic information
concerning the robberies, including that Parsons entered the Taco Bell restaurant through
a back door that had been propped open.
       Sandoval testified against Parsons at trial. He stated that he pleaded guilty to
charges related to the robberies and agreed to testify against Parsons in order to avoid a
life sentence. Sandoval first met Parsons as a teenager in Juvenile Hall. They
reconnected in May 2019 at a homeless shelter. At some point, Parsons moved into a
storage facility.
       On the day of the Taco Bell robbery, Parsons asked to borrow Sandoval’s car, a
2012 black Toyota Camry. Sandoval picked Parsons up at his storage facility, and
Parsons then drove. After running an errand, the two “started talking about trying to find
a place to rob.” Around 11:00 p.m., Parsons, who was still driving, “decided on the Taco
Bell and [Sandoval] went along with it.” Parsons parked the car in front of the store.
Parsons and Sandoval saw an employee prop open a back door. Parsons put on a mask
and ran inside through that door. He returned about five minutes later with several tills of
money. After handing Sandoval the money, Parsons drove the two away. The two
eventually went back to Parsons’s storage unit.

                                             4
       On May 6, 2020, Parsons and Sandoval met in the early afternoon. Sandoval
again picked up Parsons, with Parsons then driving. Parsons drove because he did not
trust Sandoval to drive because Sandoval sometimes had blurry vision from high blood
pressure.2 At some point, Parsons decided to rob the Pizza My Heart restaurant because
he knew the location and said it would be a good spot. Parsons parked in the back of the
restaurant and went inside. Parsons was wearing gloves, a face mask, and a fishing hat.
Parsons returned to the car less than 10 minutes later carrying tills and a small cardboard
box with cash inside. Parsons got back into the driver’s seat, and they drove to Parsons’s
girlfriend’s house. At Parson’s direction, Sandoval removed the cash from the tills and
tossed the empty tills out of the window.
       Parsons stopped at his girlfriend’s house while Sandoval remained in the car.
After about 20 minutes, Parsons returned and drove the car to the Popeye’s, which was
about 10 minutes away. Parsons, wearing a mask and the same outfit as the Pizza My
Heart robbery, entered the Popeye’s after waiting for some people to leave. Sandoval
could not see what was happening in the restaurant. Minutes later, a number of
employees ran out of the restaurant, and then Parsons walked back towards the car
carrying two or three tills. The two went directly to Parsons’s storage unit and counted
the money. Parsons then exited the car, and Sandoval left.
       On May 8, 2020, Parsons drove a newly purchased car to Sandoval’s house. After
hanging out for a while, Parsons said he wanted to do some errands and laundry. Parsons
wanted to take Sandoval’s car. The two went to Parsons’s storage unit, first stopping at a
7-Eleven along the way to purchase food and coffee. They then went to the laundromat.
Sandoval began to feel very sick and made an appointment for emergency dialysis.
However, Sandoval did not make it to the appointment, as Parsons “started talking about
finding a place to rob” instead.

       2
           Sandoval was also suffering from kidney failure requiring frequent dialysis.

                                               5
       After finishing the laundry, they drove to a “Mexican market” across the street
from the laundromat. Parsons was wearing a hat, gloves, and a mask. Parsons went
inside. Less than 10 minutes later, Parsons returned. Sandoval noticed Parsons was not
holding anything, which he thought was strange. After Parsons sat in the driver’s seat, he
told Sandoval that “people in there . . . they fought back at him” and that he did not get
anything. Parsons said “that he was mad. That he let out a round. He fired his gun in
there.” Sandoval was in disbelief. They returned to Sandoval’s house, and Sandoval left
to receive dialysis treatment. Sandoval was arrested while at treatment.
                     f. Police Investigation
       Todd Wellman of the San Jose Police Department, a robbery detective, was
assigned to investigate the four robberies. Wellman received a partial license plate match
from a witness at the Popeye’s robbery and was able to identify Sandoval’s car that day.
Following Sandoval’s arrest and interview, Wellman obtained surveillance footage from
7-Eleven and Parsons’s storage facility. Surveillance video from the 7-Eleven showed a
man whom Wellman, based on tattoos visible in the video, identified as Parsons. Video
from the storage facility showed that on March 2, 2020, around 5:15 p.m., Sandoval’s
black Toyota Camry dropped off Parsons outside an individual storage unit. Parsons was
wearing ripped blue jeans and black shoes with white soles. Video from the same facility
on March 3, 2020, around 12:43 a.m., showed Sandoval and Parsons. Parsons was
wearing an outfit similar to the suspect of the Taco Bell robbery, which had occurred
about an hour earlier: black hoodie, ripped blue jeans, and black shoes with white soles.
       Police obtained and executed a search warrant for Parsons’s storage unit. Inside
the facility was a black BMW and an additional space that had been fashioned into a
living area. Police recovered a black Springfield XD semiautomatic handgun. Brian
Karp, an expert in firearm and toolmark analysis, examined a .40-caliber shell recovered
from the market robbery and compared it with a .40-caliber shell recovered from a test-

                                               6
fired round. He concluded that the shell casing found at the market matched the test-fired
shell casing, and opined that the recovered shell was fired from Parsons’s gun.3
       A DNA sample was recovered from the trigger of the gun, and it was determined
that at least three individuals contributed to the DNA found. Sandoval was excluded
from the mixture; Parsons was included as a possible contributor. Assuming three
contributors, the likelihood of this particular DNA mixture “is at least ten times greater”
if Parsons and “two unknown individuals are contributors, than if three unknown
individuals are contributors.”
       As part of the investigation, Wellman obtained call detail records for Parsons’s
and Sandoval’s cell phones. Cell phone location data showed that Parsons’s and
Sandoval’s cell phones were near the Taco Bell prior to the robbery. The location data
also showed that in the hours prior to the Pizza My Heart robbery, both cell phones were
on the move and both continued to connect to towers in the same approximate locations.
Around the time of the Pizza My Heart robbery, Sandoval’s and Parsons’s cell phones
connected to a tower near the restaurant. Around the time of the Popeye’s robbery, both
cell phones connected to towers near that restaurant. Finally, 23 minutes prior to the
Apatzingan Market robbery, Parsons’s cell phone connected to a tower about two miles
away from the market. Immediately prior to the robbery, Sandoval’s cell phone
connected to a tower less than a half-mile from the market. After the robbery, location
data showed both cell phones connected to two towers at the same location.
       Wellman testified that Parsons was recorded in phone calls with prison inmates.
In a call on April 6, 2020, Parsons stated, “ ‘I didn’t go start hitting licks like
immediately.’ ” Wellman testified that the phrase “ ‘hitting licks’ ” means ”[d]oing
robberies.” After the inmate on the call said, “ ‘It’s kind of hard to hit fucking houses,
too, ‘cause all the people at home’ ” (presumably referring to the pandemic shutdown),

       3
           Karp’s testimony will be discussed in greater detail in the Discussion section.

                                               7
Parsons responded, “ ‘Oh, yeah, everybody’s at home. Nah, but restaurants, all of them
are closed; so, like, everything is drive-through.’ ” Parsons added that he planned to
“ ‘just walk up there and lay that shit down.’ ”
       In other calls, Parsons discussed trying to purchase a handgun. On May 2, 2020,
Parsons reported successfully purchasing a .40-caliber gun in Sacramento, a trip that was
confirmed by Parsons’s cell phone location data and Sandoval’s testimony. On May 8,
2020, Parsons reported that he “had to ping one off” that day after someone “tried to
charge” Parsons, apparently referring to firing off a round at Apatzingan Market. Parsons
also reported being “uniformed up as a skier,” apparently in reference to being dressed
like a skier with a ski jacket, ski hat, and glasses.
       2. Defense Case
       Parsons testified on his own behalf and denied committing the robberies.
In recounting his background, he explained that he had spent time in prison related to
burglary convictions when he returned to the San Jose area in 2009 and met Sandoval at a
homeless shelter. Sandoval was an active Sureño gang member at the time. Parsons had
dropped out of the Norteño street gang while in prison. Parsons reported working
numerous jobs, and in early 2020, after the COVID-19 pandemic shutdown began, he
began stealing catalytic converters.
       Parsons testified that in April 2020, he began buying and selling guns, which were
“a hot commodity in San Jose . . . .” He explained that when he discussed the possibility
of committing robberies in the recorded calls, he was doing so “jokingly,” and that his
intention was to only suggest how someone else might want to commit robberies.
       Parsons testified that on May 2, 2020, he and Sandoval went to Sacramento to
purchase two .40-caliber Springfield XDs, one of which was for Sandoval. After the trip,
Parsons and Sandoval parted ways, and Parsons stayed at his storage facility to work on
his car. Sandoval returned later that day, and in surveillance footage from 5:15 p.m.,

                                                8
could be seen wearing a mask that Parsons said was similar to the one seen in the
Popeye’s surveillance video. Parsons said he never discussed robbing restaurants.
       The two left together, with Parsons wearing light blue jeans and a gray shirt, but
not a black beanie and black hoodie as depicted in the Taco Bell robbery video. A friend
of Sandoval’s joined them, and eventually Parsons was dropped off so he could run
errands. Parsons tried to contact Sandoval to pick him up but was unsuccessful. Around
11:15 p.m., he contacted his girlfriend who came and picked him up. Parsons went to his
girlfriend’s house, then returned to his storage unit around midnight. Sandoval and a
“Southerner friend” arrived at his storage unit around 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. Parsons learned
that they may have hopped the fence in view of the security camera. After viewing the
security video showing someone leaving Sandoval’s car and hopping the fence, Parsons
denied it was him. Parsons explained he “wouldn’t hop the fence” in view of the
cameras.
       Parsons did not recall what he did on May 6, 2020, the day of the Pizza My Heart
and Popeye’s robberies. Parsons explained that he had been a tattoo artist for about nine
years and having examined the tattoos seen in the Popeye’s surveillance video, he opined
that it did not match his tattoo. He also recognized the bandana, or as he called it “a
tubular smock,” seen in the Popeye’s surveillance video as belonging to Sandoval.
       On May 8, 2020, Sandoval went to Parsons’s storage unit. Parsons acknowledged
going to 7-Eleven with another friend, not Sandoval, and he recognized himself in the
surveillance video. Sandoval stayed at the storage unit. After going to 7-Eleven, Parsons
said he went back to his storage unit and then went to do laundry. When Parsons
returned, Sandoval had invited two of his friends, so Parsons asked him to leave. Later,
Sandoval called Parsons and said he needed help. Sandoval had a friend who wanted to
trade guns with Parsons or have Parsons buy the friend’s gun. Parsons declined,
believing that the gun had been used to shoot someone. Parsons denied going to

                                             9
Apatzingan Market, participating in a robbery there, or ever wearing clothing similar to
that depicted in the surveillance video.
       Later that day, Parsons visited Sandoval and got into an altercation with
Sandoval’s neighbor, who was wearing clothing similar to that seen in the Apatzingan
Market robbery surveillance video. During the altercation, the neighbor grabbed toward
something in his pocket, which Parsons presumed was a weapon, and so Parsons hit him,
knocking him out. Parsons left, and texted Sandoval to tell him, “I’m not going to hang
out with you anymore.”
       Speaking to the May 8, 2020, recorded phone call, Parsons explained that when he
used the phrase, “ ‘[p]ing one off,’ ” he meant a “knockout punch” to the neighbor, not
firing a gun. The reference to being “ ‘a skier’ ” meant that he “skied out of there” after
delivering the knockout punch.
       Parsons said he was about six feet, or six feet one inches tall, weighed 185 pounds,
and had brown eyes. When Parsons was arrested, his wallet contained “a little over 200”
dollars, mostly in $20 bills. The money did not come from a robbery, but rather from
Parsons’s “state tax refund or unemployment or stimulus” or from one of his girlfriends.
He later clarified “it was probably [his] California tax refund” and confirmed he received
a direct deposit of $475 from the Franchise Tax Board on May 8.
       B. Procedural Background
       In June 2020, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed an information
charging Parsons with robbery (counts 1-4; Pen. Code., § 212.5)4 and with being a felon
in possession of a firearm (count 5; § 29800, subd. (a)(1)). It was alleged, for counts 1
through 3, that Parsons personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and for count 4,
that Parsons intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). It was also

       4
           All statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.

                                               10
alleged that Parsons had six prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12,
subd. (c)) and three prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
       In November 2020, the jury convicted Parsons on all counts and found true the
firearm allegations. Following a bifurcated proceeding on the prior-conviction
allegations, the jury found true the prior strike and prior serious felony convictions.
       In August 2021, the court sentenced Parsons to an aggregate term of 100 years to
life, consisting of consecutive terms of 25 years to life on counts 1-4. As to counts 1
through 3, the court imposed three 10-year terms for the firearm enhancements, and for
count 4, the court imposed a 20-year term for the intentional discharge enhancement, all
running consecutive to the 100-year term. For count 5, the court imposed a concurrent
term of six years in state prison.
       In September 2021, Parsons timely appealed.
                                      II. DISCUSSION
       A. Tattoo Testimony
       Parsons argues that the trial court erred by permitting Wellman to compare the
tattoos seen in a photograph of Parsons with still images taken from the 7-Eleven and
Popeye’s surveillance videos. Parsons contends that such evidence was inadmissible
opinion evidence and its use violated his due process rights. For the reasons stated
below, we disagree.
              1. Background
       Prior to trial, Parsons moved in limine to exclude Wellman’s opinion that
Parsons’s tattoos matched those of the person seen in the Popeye’s surveillance video.
Parsons argued that the expected testimony consisted of improper lay opinion. The trial
court ruled that the testimony was proper lay opinion, and therefore was admissible.
       At trial, Wellman testified that he recognized Parsons in the 7-Eleven surveillance
video based in part on the tattoos visible on his back, neck, and left arm. Wellman also
testified that he recognized Parsons from the Popeye’s surveillance video. Wellman

                                             11
explained that after Parsons’s arrest and interview, photographs of Parsons’s tattoos were
taken. Wellman compared the visible portion of the robber’s tattoos in the Popeye’s
video with the photograph of Parsons taken after his arrest and stated that there was a
match between the letters. Wellman explained the types of letters involved and why, in
his opinion, there was a match. Wellman then compared the visible tattoos from the 7-
Eleven surveillance video with the Popeye’s surveillance video, and again noted
“matching points” in the lettering.
              2. Analysis
       Courts “have long upheld admission of testimony identifying defendants in
surveillance footage or photographs.” (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 601
(Leon).) “A lay witness may offer opinion testimony if it is rationally based on the
witness’s perception and helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony.
[Citation.] ‘[T]he identity of a person is a proper subject of nonexpert opinion . . . .’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.) We review the trial court’s ruling allowing Wellman’s testimony for
an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 600.)
       In Leon, our high court held that an officer’s identification of the defendant in
surveillance videos of two robberies was proper lay opinion testimony. (Leon, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 600.) The officer in Leon testified that he was “ ‘very’ familiar with [the]
defendant’s appearance,” having arrested him and from later seeing him “nearly 10
times.” (Id. at p. 601.) The officer also observed that the jacket that the defendant wore
during his arrest had similar features as the one worn by an individual in one of the
videos. (Ibid.) The Leon court held the officer’s familiarity and personal knowledge of
the defendant’s appearance “around the time of the crimes,” combined with the fact that
his testimony “aided the jury,” meant that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the lay opinion testimony. (Ibid.)
       As in Leon, in this case, Wellman interviewed Parsons after his arrest, reviewed
photos taken of Parsons after his arrest, and reviewed the surveillance videos. His

                                              12
description of similarities between Parsons’s tattoos and those seen on the person in each
of the surveillance videos aided the jury in identifying those similarities. Because
Wellman’s “testimony was based on his relevant personal knowledge and aided the jury,”
it was the proper subject of lay opinion testimony and “the court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting it.” (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 601; accord, People v. Mixon
(1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 118, 128-130 [trial court properly admitted officer’s lay opinion
testimony identifying defendant in surveillance photographs].)
       Parsons contends it was improper for the trial court to admit Wellman’s
comparison of the tattoo seen in the 7-Eleven video with the partially visible tattoo seen
in the Popeye’s surveillance video because the testimony did not require personal
knowledge or familiarity with Parsons’s appearance. We disagree with the premise of
this argument as it misapprehends the standard for permitting lay opinion testimony.
That standard requires that the testimony be based on personal knowledge and that it aid
the jury. Here, although Wellman was not required to have personal knowledge of
Parsons’s appearance to make observations between the partially visible tattoos seen in
the two surveillance videos, his testimony nevertheless relied on his familiarity with
Parsons’s tattoos and in that way his testimony aided the jury. It also explained to the
jury how Wellman came to conclude that the surveillance video confirmed Parsons’s
presence at the Popeye’s robbery. (See People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1254
(Virgil) [noting identification testimony was “helpful for the jury to understand how [the
detective] came to suspect” the defendant’s involvement].) The testimony was therefore
admissible.
       Finally, even assuming the trial court erred, Parsons cannot show prejudice.
Generally, the admission of evidence in violation of state law, such as the Evidence
Code, is reversible only upon a showing that it is “reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.”
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) Here, assuming error, the error

                                            13
could not have been prejudicial given Parsons’s cross-examination of Wellman, his own
testimony, and the jury instructions. Parsons thoroughly cross-examined Wellman on the
tattoo identification, challenging Wellman’s conclusions and pointing to areas of
potential dissimilarity. Parsons, testifying on his behalf, also described differences in the
tattoos, which contrasted sharply with Wellman’s opinion. (See People v. Bradley (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 67, 84 [the defendants had “ample opportunity” to cross-examine
witnesses who provided lay opinion testimony, “dispelling any possible prejudice”].)
Moreover, because the relevant photographs and surveillance videos were shown to the
jury, “jurors could make up their own minds about whether the person shown was [the]
defendant.” (Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 601; see also Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at
p. 1254 [“The jury was, of course, free to draw its own conclusion”].)
       In addition, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 333, which told the
jury to evaluate lay witness opinion testimony, considering “the extent of the witness’s
opportunity to perceive the matters on which his or her opinion is based, the reasons the
witness gave for any opinion, and the facts or information on which the witness relied in
forming that opinion.” The court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 226,
telling the jury that “[y]ou alone, must judge the credibility or believability of the
witnesses. In deciding whether the testimony is true and accurate, use your common
sense and experience. You must judge the testimony of each witness by the same
standards, setting aside any bias or prejudice you may have.” The instruction added,
“[y]ou may believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony. Consider the testimony
of each witness and decide how much of it you believe.” We presume the jury
understood and followed the instructions the court gave under CALCRIM Nos. 226 and
333. (People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 566, fn. 9; People v. Gray (2005) 37
Cal.4th 168, 217.)
       Finally, Parsons asserts that there was federal constitutional error. However, “the
admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process

                                              14
violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37
Cal.4th 428, 439 (Partida).) “Absent fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting
evidence is subject to the traditional Watson test.” (Ibid.) Given Parsons’ opportunity to
cross-examine and testify on his own behalf, as well as the jury instructions, we conclude
that Wellman’s testimony comparing the tattoos seen in the surveillance videos to
Parsons’s tattoos did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.
       B. Firearm and Toolmark Evidence
       Parsons argues that Karp’s expert testimony concerning toolmark comparison
should have been excluded. He contends that the trial court erred by abandoning its
gatekeeping role. He also contends that the testimony should have been excluded
because toolmark comparison is no longer accepted in the pertinent scientific community.
              1. Background
                     a. Motion in Limine
       Parsons moved in limine to exclude expert testimony on firearms toolmark
comparison, arguing that “the methodology of firearms toolmark pattern matching is not
based on reliable principles and methods, and thus, lacks foundational validity.” He
therefore argued that under People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly), the method no
longer enjoyed sufficient acceptance in the relevant scientific community and was thus
inadmissible.5
       Parsons pointed to three recent reports criticizing the scientific validity of
toolmark pattern matching: (1) National Research Council of the National Academies,

       5
         “Until 1993, this rule was generally known in this state as the Kelly-Frye rule
because this court in Kelly had relied on the reasoning of a federal appellate court
decision, Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923) . . . , 293 F. 1013 (Frye). In 1993, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded
Frye (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579, 587 . . . ), and
our state law rule is now referred to simply as the Kelly test or rule. [Citation.]” (People
v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 544-545 (Bolden).)

                                              15
Ballistic Imaging (2008); (2) National Research Council of the National Academies,
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009); and
(3) President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Forensic Science in
Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods (2016).
Relying on these reports, Parsons argued that firearms toolmark comparison evidence
was no longer generally accepted as reliable, the bases for the expert opinion were based
on conjecture and speculation, and the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.
       The court denied the motion. The court stated, “this type of evidence has been
admissible in court for decades.” The court agreed with the prosecution that, under
People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401 (Cowan), toolmark comparison evidence was not
subject to the Kelly framework. The court acknowledged the reports cited by Parsons but
likened it to a situation that happens in “virtually any other discipline [where] there are
opposing experts.” In that instance, the court added, the jury gets to decide “whether to
believe one or the other or neither.”
                     b. Expert Witness Testimony at Trial
       At trial, Karp testified as an expert in the fields of firearm analysis and toolmark
analysis. Karp explained that, in Parsons’s case, he received a single .40-caliber shell
casing as well as a .40-caliber Springfield XD handgun, and he was asked to compare the
shell casing with the recovered firearm. In order to compare the firearm with the
recovered shell casing, Karp generated a known specimen by taking shell casings from
11 test firings and creating silicone casts from each of the 11 shell casings. Karp then
viewed the silicone casts under a microscope, first looking for class characteristics such
as caliber or shape of the firing pin. Such characteristics are not necessarily unique to a
specific firearm but are used by Karp to “sort” the shell casings. Karp then looked to see
if the recovered shell casing matches any of the class characteristics of the test shell
casings: “If so, continue on. If not, you can stop.” In Parsons’s case, Karp found no

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differences in class characteristics that would exclude the recovered shell casing from
having been fired from the Springfield XD handgun.
       Karp then described some of the individual characteristics that he examines, which
“are unique to each firearm.” As a firearm is produced, the tools used to “cut all the
different components of the firearm” wear and each tools’ surface changes “as it’s
making one gun to the next gun to the next gun because of the metal-on-metal
interaction.” This interaction creates “unique surfaces on the firearm.” Karp explained
that these features transfer over to ammunition “because the ammunition is softer than the
firearm parts.” Karp then explained that he uses a stereomicroscope to “evaluate
individual detail, individual characteristics side by side,” to look for “correspondence.”
Karp then “document[s] it . . . the totality of it” so that he “can then render a conclusion
based on how much–what I see, essentially.” Karp elaborated that from “shot-to-shot,”
even from the same firearm, there is always some variation. However, in his evaluation,
Karp said he is “looking for a level of agreement.” He added, “I expect to see some
disagreement in a shot-to-shot variation when I compare, but that’s not what I’m focusing
on. I’m focusing on whether or not there’s enough agreement for me to make a
conclusion that this is the responsible firearm or not.”
       Karp acknowledged the criticisms of the science of firearms analysis, and that
ultimately his opinion is a subjective one. But, he added, his opinion “is grounded in
scientific analysis for the last 100 years, the exchange of information amongst our
community,” as well as his “extensive training” and “the 17 years of work” that he has
done to “validate the science.”
       Based on his analysis of the class and individual characteristics, Karp opined that
the Springfield XD found in Parsons’s storage unit fired the .40-caliber shell casing found
at the Apatzingan Market. As to certainty, Karp said, “my conclusion is a definitive
conclusion, but it can be argued that its’s not an absolute conclusion.” He continued,
“and the reason why is that I can’t have the ability to look at every single firearm in the

                                             17
world, but based on my training and experience, the community’s training and
experience, and shared information, my casework, and all of the validity studies that have
been done over the last 100 years, it’s not credible for me to believe that the level of
agreement that I’m using to make my conclusion would ever be seen on any other firearm
if I had had the opportunity to look at every other firearm in the world.” Karp concluded,
“And so for me, although we say it’s a practical exclusion of all other firearms in the
world, for the record, it’s not an absolute, because I cannot look at every other gun. But
being said, if I did, it’s not credible to me to believe that any other gun in the world
would have these kinds of similar markings at this level for me to render this conclusion;
so I’m very comfortable in my conclusion.”
              3. Legal Principles
       “Under Kelly, the proponent of evidence derived from a new scientific technique
must establish that: (1) the reliability of the new technique has gained general acceptance
in the relevant scientific community, (2) the expert testifying to that effect is qualified to
give an opinion on the subject, and (3) the correct scientific procedures were used.”
(People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 445.) “When the continuing admissibility of
scientific evidence is at issue, rather than it being the proponent’s burden to show the
technique is generally accepted by the scientific community, the burden shifts to the
opposing party to produce new evidence showing it no longer is. [Citation.] Appellate
review of a trial court’s determination regarding a scientific technique’s general
acceptance is de novo.” (People v. Azcona (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 504, 511 (Azcona).)
       Additionally, “[t]rial judges have a critical gatekeeping function when it comes to
expert testimony beyond merely determining whether the expert may testify at all.
Expert evidence that does not require a Kelly analysis must still be admissible under
Evidence Code section 801, which mandates it be ‘of a type that reasonably may be relied
upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject.’ (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b);
[citation.]) Further, under Evidence Code sections 801, subdivision (b), and 802, the

                                              18
court must act as a gatekeeper to ensure the opinions offered by an expert are not ‘based
on reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies.’ [Citation.] ‘This
means that a court may inquire into, not only the type of material on which an expert
relies, but also whether that material actually supports the expert’s reasoning. “A court
may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered.” ’ [Citation.] A trial court’s decision regarding the permissible scope
of an expert’s opinion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Azcona, supra, 58
Cal.App.5th at p. 513, quoting Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern
California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 771.)
              4. Analysis
       Relying on the concurring opinion in Azcona, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pages 518
to 529, Parsons argues Karp’s testimony was inadmissible under Kelly. The Attorney
General relies on Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th 401, for the proposition that toolmark
testimony is not required to meet the Kelly standard for new scientific methods. In
Cowan, the Court held Kelly did not apply to the expert’s testimony partly because that
expert’s method—visual comparison of markings on bullets recovered from the victim’s
body with a silicone rubber cast of the gun’s interior barrel—was not “ ‘so foreign to
everyday experience as to be unusually difficult for laypersons to evaluate.’ [Citation].”
(Cowan, at p. 470.) In Azcona, the concurrence distinguished the Azcona expert’s
testimony from the testimony considered in Cowan because the expert in Azcona’s trial
used a different method and his testimony went beyond a mere visual comparison of the
markings. The expert in Azcona offered statistical estimates of the chances that random
chance would result in a false match due to similar markings on bullets fired from two
different guns. (Azcona, at p. 526.) The concurrence opined that such testimony required
scientific methods and statistical analyses that go beyond the common experience and
knowledge of laypersons, thereby implicating the Kelly standard. (Ibid.) Applying Kelly,
the concurrence maintained that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony because

                                            19
the NRC and PCAST reports reflected a change in the attitude of the scientific
community towards the reliability of the methods commonly used in firearm toolmark
analysis.
       Unlike in Azcona, the expert here expressly declined to offer any statistical or
quantitative estimates of the chances he may have erroneously concluded the cartridges
were fired from the same gun; he instead admitted his conclusion was “ultimately
subjective.” However, he further testified that while his conclusion was not “absolute”
because he could not examine every gun in existence, his conclusion was “definitive”
based on his experience and training.
       While by its own terms, that testimony goes beyond the common experience of
laypersons, we need not determine whether the trial court erred by admitting the firearm
evidence under Kelly, or whether it abandoned its gatekeeping role under Evidence Code
sections 801 and 802. “The erroneous admission of expert testimony only warrants
reversal if ‘it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party
would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (People v. Prieto (2003) 30
Cal.4th 226, 247 (Prieto), quoting Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
       The evidence of Parsons’s guilt was strong even without Karp’s testimony.
Sandoval, Parsons’s accomplice, identified Parsons as the perpetrator of the robberies.
His account, moreover, was independently corroborated by other evidence. For instance,
he recounted details such as how Parsons entered the Taco Bell. Parsons was captured on
video wearing an outfit similar to the Taco Bell robber. Sandoval’s description of
Parsons’s outfit for the Pizza My Heart robbery generally correlated with what was
captured by surveillance video. Parsons was also captured discussing his intent to buy a
gun to use in a robbery, and also recorded stating he “had to ping one off” on the day of
the Apatzingan Market robbery. Further, cell phone location data corroborated the
prosecution case that Parsons was present at and participated in the robberies. Thus, even
if we assume that the trial court erred by admitting Karp’s testimony in part or in whole,

                                             20
the error was harmless because it was not reasonably probable that Parsons would have
received a more favorable verdict absent the error.6
       In addition, the jury’s verdicts on other counts confirm the harmlessness of any
possible error. The evidence at trial, particularly Sandoval’s testimony implicating
Parsons as the perpetrator, essentially required the jury to make a credibility
determination. In convicting Parsons of the robberies in counts 1, 2, and 3, the jury
necessarily believed Sandoval’s version of events. Karp’s testimony was relevant only to
establishing Parsons’s guilt on count 4, involving the Apatzingan Market robbery from
which the shell casing was recovered. Thus, even assuming error in the admission of
Karp’s testimony, it is not reasonably probable Parsons would have received a more
favorable verdict in the absence of the expert firearm testimony.
       Finally, Parsons’s claim of cumulative error fails because there are no errors to
accumulate. We determined there was no error with regard to Wellman’s testimony, and
with respect to Karp’s testimony, we assumed error but found no prejudice under the
applicable standard. Thus, there is “no prejudicial error to accumulate.” (People v.
Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 818.)
                                     III. DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

       6
         Parsons suggests that the higher standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 18, applies here. However, it is well established that errors of state law, including
the Evidence Code and particularly the erroneous admission of expert testimony, warrant
the Watson standard. (Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 247.) Parsons does not persuasively
establish that this case warrants departure from the general rule.

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                                  _______________________________
                                   Greenwood, P. J.

 WE CONCUR:

_______________________________
  Grover, J.

_______________________________
  Danner, J.

H049411
The People v. Parsons