Court Opinion

ID: 9460713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:58:23.441968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:44.955668
License: Public Domain

CHOY, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
While I concur in the majority opinion as to Jackie Harris’ appeal, I feel it unnecessary that Powell v. Hocker, 453 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1971) be overruled in the process. The two cases are horses of different colors.
True, the juvenile offenders in both Powell and Harris were without counsel at their respective state certification proceedings, but the similarities between the cases end there.

Retroactivity of Kent

In Harris the California juvenile court did conduct a hearing in accordance with state statute before determining that Harris should be tried as an adult. Ante at page 577. • But in Powell, certification for adult trial was admittedly made without any semblance of the “full investigation” mandated by the Nevada statute. Powell v. Sheriff, Clark County, 85 Nev. 684, 687, 462 P.2d 756, 758 (1969).
In Harris, the California Supreme Court expressly found that retroactive application of Kent would be devastating as to California. 67 Cal.2d at 879, 64 Cal.Rptr. at 321-322, 434 P.2d at 617-618. The record in Powell contains no similar finding as to Nevada and the briefs contain no such claim.
Harris’ certification hearing occurred in 1940, twenty-six years before Kent was pronounced. Powell’s non-hearing was in 1966, three weeks after Kent.
While the three criteria of Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) negate retroactivity of Kent as applied by my Brother Barnes in Harris, those tests do not compel the same result in Powell because of the factual differences between the two cases above set forth.

Waiver by Guilty Plea

We held in Powell, 453 F.2d at 656, that the failure of the Nevada juvenile court to comply with the Nevada statute in certifying the juvenile for trial as an adult, conferred no jurisdiction over Powell in the adult criminal court. We also quoted from a prior holding of this court, Thomas v. United States, 290 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1961) that: “When a defendant voluntarily and knowingly pleads guilty at his trial this constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defenses . . .” (emphasis supplied).
In Harris there having been compliance with the California hearing statute before the certification of Harris for adult trial, the superior court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the juvenile. Harris’ subsequent guilty plea with advice and aid of counsel may thus be held to have waived failure of the state to provide him counsel in the juvenile court proceeding. But in Powell, the adult criminal court acquired no jurisdiction over the juvenile and so Powell’s guilty plea waived nothing- — the court could not even accept the plea.
*581Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) which held that a guilty plea waives the claim of deprivation of petitioner’s constitutional right because Negroes were excluded from the grand jury which indicted him, does not apply to Powell, but does to Harris. Likewise as to the Brady trilogy1 all of which held that a guilty plea waives certain constitutional defects; and likewise also as to the three cases of this court cited with Tollett in the majority opinion.2 In none of those cases was there lack of jurisdiction in the court accepting the plea of guilty.

. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970).

. Sanders v. Craven, 488 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1973); Mann v. Smith, 488 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1973); Wallace v. Heinze, 351 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 954, 86 S.Ct. 1574, 16 L.Ed.2d 550 (1966).

. At the time of the Kent decision, there was some doubt that the requirement of counsel it announced was of constitutional dimension. The decision in Kent was based on a statute applicable to the District of Columbia, but the statute w'as “read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel.” (383 U.S. at 557.) In re Gault, holding inter alia that due process requires that a minor be represented by counsel in proceedings to determine delinquency that may result in commitment to an institution, clarified the Kent decision : “Just as in Kent ... we indicated . . . that the assistance of counsel is essential for purposes of waiver proceedings, so we hold now that it is equally essential for the determination of delinquency. ...” (387 U.S. at 36.) The case at bench, accordingly, raises the question of the retroactivity of both Kent and portions of the decision in Gault.