Court Opinion

ID: 9580068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:01:33.688633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:00.563289
License: Public Domain

ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
HUNTLEY, Justice.
The Petition for Rehearing by respondents asserts several objections to the above and foregoing opinion, upon two of which we comment.
First, the objection is raised, apparently picking up on a statement in the dissent of Justice Bakes, that our opinion goes beyond the standard of review established in Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986) and Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979). Such is an incorrect characterization of the majority opinion.
Our earlier opinion adopts the standard of Quick v. Crane without expanding it in any respect whatsoever, that is, that the standard is whether the trial court concludes that the award of the jury was the product of passion or prejudice. The references in Quick to “shock the conscience” and “unconscionable,” which we approved of in our earlier opinion, are as follows:
“Frequent characterizations have included the idea that the disparity must ‘shock the conscience’ of the trial judge or lead him to conclude that it would be ‘unconscionable’ to let the damage award stand as the jury set it.” Quick, 100 Idaho 620, 727 P.2d 1197-98.
These references do not establish any new standard or test, but merely are suggestions of measuring sticks the trial court might utilize in determining whether the disparity in award is the result of passion or prejudice.
Secondly, respondents urge error in our treatment of the issue of Sanchez’ alienage status, asserting that our decision herein is contrary to that required by Patino v. Griggs & Anderson Farms, 97 Idaho 251, 542 P.2d 1170 (1975).
We stand with our original opinion for two reasons. First, the issue would undoubtedly be moot in the event of a new trial since the passage into law on November 5,1986, of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Public Law 99-603. Secondly, the passage of that Act would make submission of the alienage status to a jury for consideration of future earning capacity even more speculative than it would have been prior to the passage of that Act.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provides for a legalization program for undocumented aliens who entered this country prior to 1982.
Mr. Sanchez had been working in this country for six years prior to the subject accident which, coincidentally, occurred in 1982.
At most, in the overall context of this case, the failure to permit testimony and consideration of the alienage status in regard to damages was harmless error. Particularly so since this matter is being sent back to the district court to reconsider the granting of a new trial or denying a new trial conditioned on the plaintiff accepting a remittitur.
DONALDSON, J., concurs.