Court Opinion

ID: 9793454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:48:11.099379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:09.511275
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, J.,
dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, J., joins.
Like Justice Golden, I would affirm the order granting summary judgment that was entered in this ease. I join in the dissenting opinion that Justice Golden has authored, but I have some additional views with respect to this case.
To paraphrase an old adage, the question in this appeal is which came first, the dumpster or the snow. The majority opinion correctly notes that Wyoming law requires the Selbys to demonstrate that Conquistador “created or aggravated the hazard.” The majority then vacillates between creation of “a condition conducive to the accumulation of ice” and aggravation of “the accumulation of ice around the dumpster” by virtue of its location. The record appears to be silent as to whether any change in the location of the dumpster was made subsequent to the snowfall. The manager’s explanation that he could not maneuver his riding tractor into the critical area strongly suggests that the dumpster was not moved following the snowfall.
I cannot perceive how the placement of the dumpster could be said to have created the hazard. To hold that it did would be nothing more than application of the discredited “but for” rule so frequently rejected by this Court. Kopriva v. Union Pac. R. Co., 592 P.2d 711, 712-13 (Wyo.1979); Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 10, 200 P. 791, 793 (1921).
The only available prong of the rule relating to unnatural accumulation of ice or snow would depend upon some act by Conquistador after the snowfall that had the effect of aggravating the hazard resulting from the natural accumulation. I submit that unless the record demonstrates some subsequent act by Conquistador to aggravate the hazard that occurred because of the snowfall, it owed no duty to the Selbys. The Selbys never pointed to anything in the record that demonstrates such conduct, but, in fact, argued in their brief that the disputed issues of fact included questions of the placement of the dumpster and allowing cars to park too closely to it. The essence of this argument is the rejected “but for” rule.
I would affirm the trial court in this case.