Court Opinion

ID: 9428022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:22:35.506145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:11.204080
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Brennan,
dissenting.
Respondents have a constitutionally protected property interest in their “ ‘legitimate entitlement to continued residency at the home of [their] choice absent specific cause for transfer.’ ” Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F. 2d 280, 286 (CA3 1978) (Adams, J., concurring), quoting Klein v. Calif ano, 586 F. 2d 250, 258 (CA3 1978). The statutory and regulatory scheme gives a patient the right to choose any qualified nursing home. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395a and 1396a (a) (23) (1976 ed., Supp. II). Once a patient has chosen a facility, the scheme carefully protects against undesired transfers by limiting the circumstances under which a home may transfer patients. 42 CFR § 442.311 (c) (1979). And a qualified nursing home, which must have met detailed federal requirements to gain certification, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395x (j) (1976 ed. and Supp. II) and 1396a (a) (28), cannot be decertified unless the Government can show good cause. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395cc (b) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. II). Thus the scheme is designed to enable a patient to stay in the chosen home unless there is a specific reason to justify a transfer.
Respondent patients chose a home which was, at the time, qualified. They moved into the home reasonably expecting that they would not be forced to move unless, for some sufficient reason, the home became unsuitable for them. The Government’s disqualification of the home is, of course, one such reason. Respondents have no right to receive benefits if they choose to live in an unqualified home. That does not mean, however, that they have no right to be heard on the question whether the home is qualified — the answer to which will determine whether they must move to another home and suffer the allegedly great ills encompassed by the term “transfer trauma.” See ante, at 784-785, n. 16. The Government’s *806action in withdrawing the home’s certification deprives them of the expectation of continued residency created by the statutes and regulations. Under our precedents, they are certainly “entitled ... to the benefits of appropriate procedures” in connection with the decertification. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 490 (1980); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972).*
The requirements of due process, to be sure, are flexible and are meant to be practical. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972). Here, the provider is entitled to formal proceedings in connection with the disqualification of the home. To the extent that patients want to remain in a home, their interests very nearly coincide with the home’s own interests. The patients can count on the home to argue that it should not be disqualified. Nevertheless, the patients have some interests which are separate from the interests of the provider, and they could contribute some information relevant to the decertification decision if they were given an opportunity. See ante, at 784, n. 15. There is no indication that the patients have been accorded any opportunity to present their views on decertification. Because they were accorded no procedural protection, I dissent.

 It is no answer to say that respondents’ only right is to stay in a qualified home, ante, at 785, because whether the home is qualified is precisely the issue to be determined. Nor is it. an answer to say that respondents are third parties not “directly” affected by the governmental action. Ante, at 786-788. As the Court admits, the regulatory scheme operates for the direct benefit of the patients, ante, at 789-790, n. 22, and it generates expectations and reliance just as deserving of protection as other statutory entitlements.