Court Opinion

ID: 9383830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 14:04:54.922225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:48.267454
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 24, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals

                            NO. 2021-CA-0346-MR

BRIAN S. TAYLOR                                                   APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE JERRY J. COX, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 14-CR-00206

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                            APPELLEE

                                OPINION
                        VACATING AND REMANDING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; EASTON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Brian S. Taylor brings this appeal from an October 13, 2020,

order of the Pulaski Circuit Court summarily denying a Kentucky Rules of

Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion to vacate his sentence of imprisonment.

We vacate and remand.

            In June of 2014, Taylor was indicted by the Pulaski County Grand

Jury upon the offenses of second-degree burglary (Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 511.030) and theft by unlawful taking over $500 (KRS 514.030). Taylor

was accused of unlawfully entering the home of his daughter and taking a

television valued over $500, which he eventually pawned.

             Pursuant to a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, Taylor entered

a guilty plea to the indicted offenses, and by a July 9, 2018, judgment, the circuit

court sentenced Taylor to a total of fifteen-years’ imprisonment, probated for a

period of five years. Subsequently, Taylor violated the terms of his probation. As

a result, the circuit court revoked Taylor’s probation and imposed the fifteen-year

sentence of imprisonment.

             On September 24, 2020, Taylor, pro se, filed an RCr 11.42 motion

seeking to vacate his fifteen-year sentence of imprisonment. In particular, Taylor

argued:

                    On or about January 13, 2014, [Taylor] removed a
             47” flat panel television from the residence where he
             lived with his son, JEREMY S. TAYLOR[,] and his
             daughter, TIFFANY M. PARRIMAN (formerly
             TIFFANY M. TAYLOR), who was the lease holder at
             the residence. The three occupants were in the process of
             moving out during this time.

                   The television was the property of Rent-A-Center,
             located at 370 S. Highway 27 in Somerset, KY and was
             rented to both [Taylor] and his daughter, whose names
             appear together on the rental agreement executed
             November 1, 2013.

                   Movant pawned the television on or about January
             13, 2014[,] at Dan’s Discount Jewelry & Pawn #47 in

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Somerset, KY for $150.00 to buy drugs. [Taylor] later
advised his daughter that he had returned home to find
the apartment door open and the television missing.

      On January 14, 2014, the following day, Mrs.
Parriman contacted local police and reported what she
believed to be a burglary at the residence. An officer
responded to the scene and spoke to all three occupants,
who reported that an unknown person had entered the
apartment and stolen the television.

       On February 26, 2014, Det. R. Jones, Badge
#1127, located the television at Dan’s Discount Jewelry
& Pawn #47 and informed Mrs. Parriman that her father,
[Taylor], had pawned it. Mrs. Parriman was
understandably upset and advised Det. Jones that she had
not consented to her father’s actions in pawning the
television.

      Following this incident, the three occupants moved
from the residence and lived elsewhere.

      ....

       Counsel advised [Taylor] that he could be found
guilty of burglary 2nd Degree because he had entered the
residence that he shared with his two adult children and
moved a television that he later pawned. . . .

      ....

       Counsel failed to review the Commonwealth’s
discovery prior to advising [Taylor] to plead guilty. The
discovery contains a copy of the rental agreement for the
television listing both [Taylor] and his daughter as the
responsible parties. The rental agreement further listed
[Taylor’s] home address at the residence, which would
have established to the Court that he not only lived at the
residence, but also that he had a lawful right to possess,

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             move, and/or transport the television, at least until the
             time he pawned it. . . .

September 24, 2020, RCr 11.42 motion at 3, 4, 6, and 7. Taylor maintained that he

would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel’s erroneous advice.

             By order entered October 13, 2020, the circuit court denied Taylor’s

RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing. The court reasoned:

                    The record establishes that the indictment
             specifically states that Tiffany Taylor [Parriman] was the
             owner of the property stolen and that it was her residence
             which was illegally entered. The Court has reviewed the
             PSI [Pre-Sentence Investigation] where [Taylor] admits
             his guilt.

                    [Taylor] testified under oath that he committed the
             offenses of 2nd Degree Burglary and felony theft.
             [Taylor] did not express dissatisfaction with his counsel.
             [Taylor] gave sworn testimony that he was guilty and had
             no complaints. Additionally, the plea deal gave [Taylor]
             significantly less time than if he had gone to trial; the
             entirety of the sentence was probated for 5 (five) years.

                   Since the record conclusively refutes the claim that
             counsel was ineffective, this court denies an evidentiary
             hearing. Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452
             (Ky. 2001).

October 13, 2020, Order Overruling at 1. This appeal follows.

             Taylor contends that the circuit court erred by summarily denying is

RCr 11.42 motion to vacate his sentence of imprisonment because of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Taylor alleges that he resided with his daughter at her

residence on January 13, 2014, when he removed the television therefrom. Taylor

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also claims that both he and his daughter had rented the television from a Rent-A-

Center. As he resided at his daughter’s residence and had leased the television,

Taylor argues that he could not have committed the offense of second-degree

burglary. Thus, Taylor claims that trial counsel was deficient for advising Taylor

otherwise and that absent same, he would not have pleaded guilty to second-degree

burglary but would have insisted upon going to trial. As his allegations were not

refuted upon the record, Taylor alleges he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing

and appointment of counsel.

             To prevail upon ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant

must demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that such

deficient performance resulted in prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984). To establish prejudice in a guilty plea case, a defendant must

show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52, 59 (1985). And, an evidentiary hearing is required if there are allegations

that cannot be conclusively resolved upon the face of the record. Fraser v.

Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001).

             Burglary in the second degree is codified in KRS 511.030; it provides:

             (1) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree
             when, with the intent to commit a crime, he or she
             knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling.

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Under KRS 511.030(1), a person must enter or remain unlawfully in a dwelling to

commit second-degree burglary. Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 920, 922

(Ky. App. 2001). Relevant herein, it has been observed that “burglary is not

committed by . . . invited guests who enter buildings under privilege even though

they have intention to commit crime while there.” Id.

             In this case, Taylor attached the affidavit of Shirley Leslie to his RCr

11.42 motion. Leslie is Taylor’s mother. In her affidavit, Leslie states that Taylor

“did reside with his daughter and his son at 269 White Oak Circle Apt. A6,

Somerset, KY 42501 on January 13, 2014.” Leslie’s Affidavit at 1. According to

the indictment, the offense of second-degree burglary took place on January 13,

2014, and in the house of Taylor’s daughter, Tiffany Taylor. Additionally, Taylor

attached a document entitled Rental Purchase Disclosures to his RCr 11.42 motion.

Therein, the lessor is identified as Rent-A-Center, and the consumers are identified

as Brian Taylor and Tiffany Taylor with the following address – 269 White Oak

Cir. #6, Somerset, Ky, 42501-4248.

             Considering the above, it is clear that Taylor has raised a material

issue that cannot be resolved upon examination of the record. If Taylor did, in

fact, reside with his daughter and had permission to be in her apartment, Taylor

could not have committed second-degree burglary, and any advice by trial counsel

to the contrary would constitute deficient performance. See Fletcher, 59 S.W.3d at

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922; see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011). Moreover, such

deficient performance may be considered prejudicial as a reasonable probability

exists that but for trial counsel’s deficient performance, Taylor would not have

pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary but would have gone to trial. See Hill,

474 U.S. at 59.

             For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Pulaski Circuit Court’s order

summarily denying Taylor’s RCr 11.42 motion and remand for an evidentiary

hearing and appointment of counsel.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Andrea Reed                               Daniel Cameron
Assistant Public Advocate                 Attorney General of Kentucky
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky                       Christopher Henry
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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