Court Opinion

ID: 9840594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 16:04:36.807175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:36:12.459584
License: Public Domain

IN THE
            ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                           DIVISION ONE

  IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.R. and A.R.

                         No. 1 CA-JV 23-0041
                           FILED 9-19-2023

         Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                           No. JS519906
         The Honorable Sigmund G. Popko, Judge Pro Tempore

                             AFFIRMED

                             COUNSEL

Thomas A. Vierling Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Thomas A. Vierling
Counsel for Appellant Father

Stuart & Blackwell PLLC, Chandler
By Cory A. Stuart
Counsel for Appellee Mother
       IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.R. and A.R.
                       Opinion of the Court

                                  OPINION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Vice Chief
Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:

¶1           James R. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights to his children, C.R. and A.R. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            Father and Laura R. (“Mother”), who were married in 2013
and divorced in 2020, are the biological parents of C.R., born in 2015, and
A.R., born in 2017.

¶3             Viewed in the requisite “light most favorable to sustaining the
juvenile court’s order,” In re O.M., 254 Ariz. 543, 544, ¶ 3 (App. 2023), the
evidence shows that Father used illegal drugs “off and on” throughout the
marriage. When under the influence of illegal drugs, Father exhibited
“paranoia,” expressing to Mother fear that “people were hiding” in the attic
of their home or “under [the] mattress” of their bed. He could also become
physically abusive, and choked Mother on “several” occasions while under
the influence.

¶4            In March 2019, Mother filed a petition for an order of
protection against Father, alleging, inter alia, that Father “is currently using
cocaine or crystal,” “is having delusions and hallucinations,” carries “a
kitchen knife throughout the house,” and threatens that “he will blow up
[her] car” if she “leave[s] him.” The superior court issued the order of
protection (the “First OOP”) directing Father to have “no contact” with
Mother, C.R., or A.R. “except through attorneys, legal process, [or] court
hearings” and excluding Father from the family residence. Father did not
contest the First OOP. Although Father later had limited contact with the
children by telephone, he never saw them again.

¶5            In April 2019, Mother filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage. In the dissolution decree entered in February 2020, the superior
court found that “Father is ‘Seriously Mentally Ill’ by his own admission
and is presumed to be abusing drugs since he failed to submit [to] court-
ordered drug testing.” The court further found that Father “has engaged in

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       IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.R. and A.R.
                       Opinion of the Court

acts of domestic violence against” Mother. The court awarded Mother sole
legal decision-making authority for the children and granted Father no
parenting time, finding that “an award of parenting time” to Father “is not
in the best interest of the children at this time.” The court held, however,
that Father could move to modify the decree to obtain parenting time once
he took the following actions to address his mental health and substance
abuse issues:

       Father must submit two clean hair follicle tests evidencing no
       less than 6 months sobriety, attend a domestic violation
       evaluation at Sage Counseling, Inc., comply with the
       recommendations in that evaluation and submit a record
       from a mental health professional establishing mental
       stability.

Father never submitted evidence that he complied with any of these
conditions, nor did he ever seek to modify the decree to obtain parenting
time with the children.

¶6           In March 2020, police officers arrived at Mother’s home to
conduct a welfare check after Father made a baseless report that Mother
“killed the kids.” That same month, Father was arrested and jailed for
burglary. While in custody over the ensuing months, he had telephone
contact with the children “a handful of times.” Father was subsequently
convicted and sentenced to prison in September 2020.

¶7            In October 2020, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s
parental rights on grounds of abandonment, neglect, incapacity, and felony
conviction under A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(1)-(4).

¶8             The following month, Father sent Mother’s employer an
unsigned letter purportedly written by the parent of an unidentified 16-
year-old boy whom Mother was allegedly “sleeping with.” Claiming to
have “sexual photos & videos of the illegal sexual activity,” the letter’s
anonymous author threatened to sue Mother’s employer unless the
employer fired her. The letter also accused Mother, a licensed pharmacist,
of “stealing a lot of narcotic pills” and “re-selling them to underage boys.”

¶9             Father also sent letters to Mother from jail in which he called
her “sick,” a “whore,” and a “bitch.” Accusing her of “stealing narcotics”
from her employer, Father warned, “Your gonna be going to jail soon [sic].”
On one occasion he sent Mother a postcard demanding that she bring the
children to jail to visit him, warning,

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       IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.R. and A.R.
                       Opinion of the Court

       I ain’t playen!! You either are gona bring my kids to come see
       me or my parents are gona take you pharmacy license away
       bitch!!! [sic]

¶10           In January 2021, almost a year after the First OOP expired,
Mother applied for and obtained a second order of protection (the “Second
OOP”), which prohibited Father from contacting Mother but made no
reference to the children. Father never contested the Second OOP. Father
was released from prison in November 2021. In January 2022, Mother
applied for and obtained a third order of protection (the “Third OOP”)
which, like the First OOP, barred Father from contacting Mother or the
children “except through attorneys, legal process, [or] court hearings.”
Father never contested the Third OOP.

¶11           After a four-day trial throughout September and November
2022, the court terminated Father’s parental rights as to C.R. and A.R. on
abandonment grounds. Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

¶12            A parent’s right to custody and control of his or her child,
though fundamental, is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-12 (2000). The parental relationship may be
terminated if the juvenile court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, at
least one statutory ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) and
further finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the
child’s best interest. Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474,
¶ 13 (2022). We view evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the
juvenile court’s findings, see Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz.
205, 207, ¶ 2 (App. 2008), and we will affirm an order terminating parental
rights absent an abuse of discretion, Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

              A.     Statutory Grounds for Termination

¶13           Abandonment of a child occurs when a parent fails to
“provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child,
including providing normal supervision.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). To establish
abandonment, the evidence must show that the parent has made only
“minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child.” Id. “Failure
to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause
for a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of
abandonment.” Id.

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       IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.R. and A.R.
                       Opinion of the Court

¶14           Father challenges the juvenile court’s finding of
abandonment, arguing that “[a]lthough it has been in excess of six months
since [he] had contact with the children, it is with just cause.” He explains
that Mother “block[ed] him from communicating” with the children by
“obtain[ing] orders of protection” and complains that she “refused to bring
the children to the jail or prison for visits with him.” Because “Mother
actively sought to prevent contact between Father and the children on
multiple fronts,” Father contends, his lack of contact with the children does
not support a finding of abandonment.

¶15            The well-established principle that “a parent who has
persistently and substantially restricted the other parent’s interaction with
their child” may not then rely on the other parent’s “limited involvement
with the child” to “prove abandonment,” Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz.
292, 293, ¶ 1 (App. 2013), applies only if the parent wrongfully restricts the
other parent’s access to the child. In Calvin B., for example, this Court
reversed a finding that the father “abandoned” his children because the
mother had “violated” the parenting time provisions of their dissolution
decree “by refusing to allow” him to exercise his court-ordered parenting
time. Calvin B., 232 Ariz. at 294, 297, ¶¶ 2, 24; accord Anthony O. v. Nora R.,
2 CA-JV 2022-0016, 2022 WL 2348526, at *4, ¶ 14 (Ariz. App. June 29, 2022)
(mem. decision) (affirming termination of incarcerated father’s rights to his
children in part because, “[e]ven crediting” father’s allegation that mother
did not inform him of her new address and phone number after she and the
children moved, “nothing in the record supports an allegation that she
undertook those action[s] to evade him”).

¶16             Here, by contrast, no evidence shows that Mother ever
blocked Father’s contact with the children in violation of any court order.
On the contrary, the parties’ dissolution decree expressly denied Father any
parenting time. Although the decree authorized Father to seek an award of
parenting time after completing specified steps to address his substance
abuse and mental health issues, he did not complete those steps, nor did he
otherwise seek to modify the decree. The record supports the juvenile
court’s determination that “Father’s own failure to comply with the family
court decree,” rather than anything Mother did or didn’t do, “is the reason
Father does not have a parent-child relationship” with the children. See
Christopher M. v. Aubrey R., 2 CA-JV 2021-0122, 2022 WL 95468, at *1-2, ¶¶
1, 6, 13 (Ariz. App. Jan. 10, 2022) (mem. decision) (affirming termination of
father’s rights on abandonment grounds in part because father did not
exercise his court-ordered supervised parenting time; rejecting father’s
argument that he exercised no parenting time because he objected to the

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       IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.R. and A.R.
                       Opinion of the Court

supervision requirement, the court noted that father never sought “to
modify the parenting-time order” to remove the supervision requirement).

¶17            Contrary to Father’s allegation, nothing suggests that Mother
obtained the orders of protection against him wrongfully. Mother sought
and obtained the First OOP during the parties’ marriage due to Father’s
threats, acts of violence, and erratic behavior, and she obtained the Second
OOP and the Third OOP after Father sent harassing letters from jail to
Mother and her employer. See Michael M. v. Deborah M., 2 CA-JV 2017-0136,
2018 WL 259208, at *3, ¶ 10 (Ariz. App. Jan. 2, 2018) (mem. decision)
(affirming finding of abandonment and rejecting father’s argument that
mother “impeded his ability to contact” the parties’ child by obtaining
order of protection because father’s “own conduct . . . made it necessary for
the court to impose the very safety measures that restricted his contact with
his daughter”).

¶18            And if Father believed that Mother obtained the orders of
protection wrongfully, he could have requested a hearing to contest them.
See Ariz. R. Protective Ord. P. 38. He did not. Alternatively, Father could
have sought to modify the orders of protection to remove the prohibition
on contact with the children. Again, he did not, and his inaction supports
the finding of abandonment. See Michael M., 2018 WL 259208 at *3, ¶ 9
(rejecting father’s argument that mother blocked his access to the parties’
child by obtaining order of protection in part because father “essentially
made no effort to modify the protective orders to obtain visits with
[child]”).

¶19            Admittedly, Mother did not facilitate Father’s phone contact
with the children. She acknowledged at trial that she did not accept all of
his calls from jail because “[h]e wasn’t very nice to [her]” when they spoke.
When asked if she affirmatively blocked his phone number while he was in
jail, Mother conceded that she might have. And after Father was sentenced
to prison, Mother never applied to the Arizona Department of Corrections
to be an “approved contact” so that Father would be permitted to call her
phone to speak to the children from prison. Mother’s failure to facilitate
Father’s phone contact with the children during his incarceration was not
wrongful, however, because her actions were consistent with the decree,
which denied Father parenting time until he took steps to address his
mental health and substance abuse issues.

¶20          Moreover, Father’s attempts to blame Mother for his failure
to maintain a relationship with the children overlooks the principle that a
“parent must act persistently” to foster and maintain the parent-child

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       IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.R. and A.R.
                       Opinion of the Court

relationship despite obstacles that may arise. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 250,
¶ 22. Even if Mother could be said to have interfered with Father’s
relationship with the children, he nonetheless had an obligation to act
persistently to maintain his relationship with them. See id.; see also Steven M.
v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 254 Ariz. 426, 430, ¶ 12 (App. 2023) (“When a parent
cannot exercise traditional methods to bond with the children, he must act
persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must
vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary.”) (cleaned up). The
record shows that Father made no such efforts. Although Father told a
social worker before trial that he sent the children letters and photos while
incarcerated, at trial he admitted that he did not. While Father attempted to
excuse his failure to write letters to the children by testifying that he “had
no way of doing so while [he] was in custody,” the court was not required
to credit this rather flimsy excuse. An incarcerated inmate can still send
letters by mail, as Father himself demonstrated when he mailed harassing
letters from jail to Mother and her employer.

¶21            The record also supports the court’s determination that Father
“has provided minimal or no financial support” for the children. Mother
testified that Father never paid any child support. Father testified that he
paid Mother $30 on one occasion and that, on another occasion, he gave
$500 to his mother, Terri R., to pass along to Mother for the children’s
support. Terri R., however, denied that her son ever gave her money to
provide to Mother for child support. Even crediting Father’s testimony, the
amount of child support he claims to have paid in the two and a half years
since entry of the February 2020 decree is a mere fraction of the $387-per-
month that he was ordered to pay.

¶22           In short, Father could have maintained his relationship with
the children in a variety of ways, but wholly failed to do so. His failure to
“act persistently” to maintain his relationship with the children, see Steven
M., 254 Ariz. at 430, ¶ 12, supports the court’s finding of abandonment.

              B.     Best Interests

¶23           “[S]tanding alone,” a finding of abandonment “does not
permit termination of parental rights.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-
500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 4 (1990). Instead, the court must also find termination
would be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Father challenges
the court’s “best interests” determination, arguing that his “relationship
with the children” could be “further nurtured and developed if he
maintains his parental rights.”

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       IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.R. and A.R.
                       Opinion of the Court

¶24            Termination may be in a child’s best interests if either “the
child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of
the relationship.” JS-500274, 167 Ariz. at 5. In determining whether the child
will benefit from termination, a court must consider “the totality of the
circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination,” Alma S.
v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 1 (2018), including whether the
“current placement meets the child’s needs,” whether the child is
adoptable, and whether an adoption plan is in place, Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn
F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3-4, ¶ 12 (2016). Other relevant considerations include the
child’s “interest in stability and security,” id. at 4, ¶ 15 (citation omitted),
and the parent’s “rehabilitation efforts,” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 15.

¶25           The undisputed evidence shows that the children’s needs are
being met in Mother’s care. Moreover, Mother testified that termination
would be in the children’s best interest because Father is “very unstable”
and his “unsafe behavior” poses a risk to the children. He has “been in and
out” of “rehabs” and jail “multiple times,” she stated, and experiences
“hallucinations and delusions” when using illegal drugs. Her testimony on
this point was corroborated by Father’s mother, who admitted at trial that
Father “gets paranoid” when he “does drugs.”

¶26            Father’s argument that the juvenile court failed to “consider
the degree to which” he could “further nurture[] and develop[]” his
relationship with the children overlooks the fact that, at present, he has no
relationship with them at all. When Father left the marital residence in
March 2019, the older child was three and the younger was eighteen months
old. They have not seen Father since and have only spoken to him by phone
“a handful of times.” Social worker Gail Olson, who conducted a social
study of the family, testified that C.R. and A.R. “do not really know their
father and there is no bond between them.” Olson further warned that
reintroducing Father into their lives would be “traumatic” for them. This
evidence is more than enough to support the court’s finding that
termination would be in the children’s best interest. See Steven M., 254 Ariz.
at 431, ¶ 16 (holding that testimony “that termination would provide the
children with a sense of stability and safety,” that the children’s placement
was “meeting their needs,” that “the children did not think of Father as
their father,” and that “forcing contact . . . could traumatize the children,”
taken together, “supports the juvenile court’s best interests finding”).

¶27           Father has made no sustained effort to confront and address
his mental health and substance abuse issues. Indeed, at times he has
denied that those issues even exist. Although he admitted during the
dissolution proceedings that he has a “Seriously Mentally Ill” diagnosis, he

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        IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.R. and A.R.
                        Opinion of the Court

denied it at the termination trial, insisting instead, “I have anxiety disorders
and that’s it.” Likewise, although Father testified at the termination trial
that he completed an “intensive addiction treatment” program in June 2022,
he simultaneously denied having “any drug problem.” He acknowledged
participating in “several” residential drug treatment programs over the last
few years, but claimed that he did so only because he was “homeless.” He
entered “rehab,” he explained, “just to seek shelter because it’s hot in
Arizona.”

¶28            Although, as Father correctly asserts, “[n]o evidence was
presented” that “an adoptive parent” was “waiting to adopt the children if
Father’s parental rights were terminated,” a prospective adoption need not
be shown to establish that a child would benefit from termination. And
Father’s assertion in his opening brief that even “a bad parent is better than
no parent” at all presents a false choice. The issue here is not whether C.R.
and A.R. would be better off with a bad parent or none at all, but whether
the children, who are well cared-for by a loving and capable parent, are
better off having a second parent in their lives who is erratic, unstable, and
has failed to effectively address longstanding substance abuse and mental
health issues. The record supports the juvenile court’s determination that,
“given Father’s lack of sincere efforts to truly seek help and rehabilitation,”
termination would benefit the children “in terms of security and stability”
in that “Mother would be able to . . . parent them without having to take
into account Father’s erratic behavior.” As the court correctly observed, the
“law does not require [the children] to wait forever until Father
demonstrates sincere efforts to get and accept the help he needs to engage
in a true parenting role.” See Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282,
287, ¶ 17 (App. 2016) (“[C]hildren should not be forced to wait for their
parent to grow up.”) (citation omitted). Father has shown no error in the
court’s finding that termination is in the best interests of C.R. and A.R.

                                 CONCLUSION

¶29            For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                            AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                            FILED: AA

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