Court Opinion

ID: 9542502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:35:04.202391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:08.136258
License: Public Domain

Judge RULAND
dissenting.
Because I believe the majority’s interpretation violates the plain meaning of the 1990 amendments to the foreclosure statutes, I respectfully dissent. See Colo. Sess. Laws 1990, ch. 275, § 38-38-101, et seq., at 1653.
To begin, the majority fails to address the specific language of § 38-38-701, C.R.S.1998, which defines the scope and application of article 38. As pertinent here, that section provides:
(1) Except as otherwise provided for in subsection (2) of this section [not applicable here], the provisions of this article shall apply:
(a) To proceedings for the foreclosure of deeds of trust through the public trustee ... and
(b) In the case of proceedings and actions for enforcement or foreclosure of any other types of liens upon real property and in the case of sales by virtue of execution and levy, where the particular proceeding or action under which the sale is performed is commenced on or after October 1, 1990 .... (emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that the seller in an installment land contract retains a lien against the subject property to be enforced in the event of default by the purchaser. Hence, the applicable provisions of article 38 apply to land installment contracts.
Contrary to the majority’s view, this interpretation is confirmed in the plain language of § 38-38-305, C.R.S.1998. While this provision is contained in part 3 which is captioned “Redemption,” the language of the provision is not so restricted. Section 38-38-305(2), C.R.S.1998, provides:
For the purposes of this article, an installment land contract vendor of property shall be considered as a lienor for the unpaid portion of the purchase price, ... and shall be subject to all requirements in this article with respect to lienors; but such installment land contract vendor shall not be considered as an owner as to any portion of such property, (emphasis supplied)
While the title given to a statute can be an aid in statutory construction, it does not control the plain language of the text. See Cooper v. First Interstate Bank, 756 P.2d 1017 (Colo.App.1988). And here, by its express language this provision applies to article 38 and not just the redemptive rights under Part III.
To the extent the provisions of article 38 conflict with the Forcible Entry and Detainer statute, § 13-40-104(1)(i), C.R.S.1998, under fundamental rules of statutory construction, the later 1990 provisions of the foreclosure act control. See Gorman v. Tucker, 961 P.2d 1126 (Colo.1998) (to the extent that there is a conflict between two statutes, the last in time controls); § 2-4-206, C.R.S.1998.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the changes in the treatment of land installment contracts required by the express language of the statutes leads to undesirable results. First, the uniform treatment of purchasers under land installment contracts with mortgagers and borrowers under deeds of trust eliminates any guess-work as to when a foreclosure proceeding may or may not be required, thus incorporating the elements of fairness in each type of transaction. Conversely, the burden is not placed upon the purchaser under an installment contract to file expensive and protracted litigation in order to enforce rights given to mortgagors or other borrowers by the foreclosure statutes. In the same manner, in an economic setting where real estate values increase dramatically on an annual basis, a purchaser is not deprived of his or her equity position simply because finan*687cial resources are not available to retain counsel and file litigation.
' Finally, I am unable to conceive why the General Assembly would conclude to grant a statutory right of cure to mortgagors and borrowers under a deed of trust for nonpayment of money, but deny that same right to purchasers under land installment contracts. If, as the majority implies, this type of transaction is designed for those with fewer resources, the grant of that right takes on even greater importance.
Accordingly,, because I fully agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the applicable statutes, I would affirm its judgment.