Court Opinion

ID: 9775290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:53:19.898981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:24.713167
License: Public Domain

OSBORN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. No court in this State has ever held that an occupier of premises is charged with constructive knowledge of a foreign substance on a floor where, as the majority opinion concludes, “there is no evidence of the length of time that the [foreign] substance had been on the floor, * *
In 1949, Justice Norvell, writing for the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals in H. E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Johnson, 226 S.W.2d 501 (writ ref’d n.r.e.), said that in order to establish liability against the defendant operator of a store in a slip and fall case, it was necessary to show:
1. That the defendant put the foreign substance upon the floor, or,
2. That the defendant knew the foreign substance was on the floor and wil-fully or negligently failed to remove it, or
3. That the foreign substance had been upon the floor for such a period of time that it would have been discovered and removed by the defendant, had the defendant exercised ordinary care.
That same or similar language has been used on many occasions to reflect the applicable law in slip and fall cases. See: O’Neal v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 328 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Giles, 354 S.W.2d 410 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Hall v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 360 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Furr’s Super Market, Inc. v. Jernigan, 380 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1964, no writ). Up to now, this Court has also applied that same rule. Food way, Inc. v. Lopez, 480 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1972, no writ); Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Arellano, 492 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Whitfield v. Furr’s, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1973, no writ); Furr’s, Inc. v. Leyva, 553 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Furr’s, Inc. v. Quijano, 571 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1978, no writ); Furr’s, Inc. v. Sígala, 608 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1980, no writ).
Likewise, it has never been the law of this State that the mere presence of water upon the floor of a store is sufficient to establish liability against the store owner. Furr’s, Inc. v. Martin, 296 S.W.2d 607 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1956, no writ); H. E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Kirkwood, 384 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1964, no writ); F. W. Woolworth Company v. Bell, 291 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1961, cert. denied 368 U.S. 915, 82 S.Ct. 194, 7 L.Ed.2d 131).
The decision in Coffee v. F. W. Woolworth Company, 536 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.1976), is not applicable to the facts in this case. First of all, the claimant in that case did not slip and fall on a foreign substance on the floor. But, even if the “gondola” could be considered a foreign substance, it was one which was placed upon the premises by the store owner and therefore it had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition which was created by the presence of the gondola. In the Sígala case, supra, this Court followed the holding in JET. E. B. Foods, Inc. v. Moore, 599 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ), to the effect that the presence of a store employee in the immediate vicinity of the loca*283tion where the invitee fell is not sufficient to establish liability. Some five months later, the Court now does an about face and concludes that the presence of the store employees in close proximity to the point of fall is sufficient to establish liability.
Finally, the majority opinion totally fails to recognize and discuss the issue of whether the foreign substance had been on the floor for such a period of time that it not only would have been discovered, but that it also would have been removed by the Defendant in the exercise of ordinary care. If there is no proof as to the length of time the foreign substance had been on the floor, how can there be a determination that in the exercise of ordinary care the substance should have been both discovered and removed prior to Mrs. Garrett’s fall? See: Dissenting Opinion, Kimbell, Inc. v. Hernandez, 572 S.W.2d 784 at 786-7 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1978, no writ).
Without having made any effort to establish what, if any, knowledge those employees near the fall may have had concerning this accident, it appears the evidence has not been fully developed and the case should be remanded for another hearing. But, I dissent from the decision which affirms the order of the trial Court.