Court Opinion

ID: 9885251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 05:07:20.456416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:59.472768
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                      UNPUBLISHED
In re A. B. COOKSON, Minor.                                           October 5, 2023

                                                                      No. 364097
                                                                      Livingston Circuit Court
                                                                      Family Division
                                                                      LC No. 2019-016076-NA

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and JANSEN and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent-mother appeals as of right the November 15, 2022 order terminating her
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to the
adjudication continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable
likelihood of harm if returned to parent). We reverse and remand.

                                  I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       On December 10, 2019, petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), petitioned the court to remove AC and two of his half-siblings, LN and JH,1 from
mother’s care. The petition, which alleged improper supervision and medical neglect as grounds
for taking jurisdiction, was filed after a Children’s Protective Services (CPS) investigation
revealed, among other things, that JH had significant untreated burns when respondent dropped
him off for parenting time with his father. Mother waived a finding of probable cause at the
preliminary hearing and the court authorized the petition.2 AC was placed in a licensed foster care
home and mother was provided supervised parenting time.

1
 LN and JH were placed with their legal fathers. The supplemental petition did not involve LN
and JH.
2
  Respondent initially identified BC as the child’s putative father, but DNA testing later confirmed
that BC was not AC’s biological father. Further DNA testing identified another man as AC’s
biological father. That man declined to establish himself as AC’s legal father.

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        In February 2020, mother entered a plea to the allegations in an amended petition. The
amended petition stated that mother was evicted from her home in Livingston County in October
2019 and moved to Alger County to reside with her mother and stepfather, both of whom were on
the Central Registry. Mother left AC in their care when she returned to Livingston County.
Regarding JH’s injuries, the amended petition indicated that JH had significant burns to his right
forearm, right bicep, left fingertips, middle finger, and index finger when mother dropped him off
with his father. Mother told JH’s father that JH had pulled a cup of hot chocolate off of a table
and spilled it on himself and that she had taken JH for medical treatment of the burns in Alger
County. However, when JH’s father took him to the emergency room, a doctor noted that JH’s
multiple burns appeared to have taken place on different occasions and that the more serious arm
and bicep burns could have been from a scalding water incident. The doctor noted that the situation
was “indicative of neglect due to a lack of supervision of such a young child by this mother of
such a young child having access to hurt himself in this way.” The petition indicated that mother
later admitted to CPS staff that she had never taken JH for medical care for the burns on multiple
occasions. Instead, she followed the advice of her mother, a former nurse, and treated the burns
with diaper rash ointment.

        Mother also admitted that she had a prior CPS history, including contact with CPS on
March 13, 2013, when LN was born positive for marijuana. Her history also included CPS contact
on September 22, 2016, for “smoking marijuana around the children and abusing Adderall,” and
on April 17, 2018, when she tested positive for marijuana while pregnant with JH. The petition
also noted that JH’s meconium was positive for marijuana and opiates, and that mother had been
prescribed opiates by hospital staff. The court accepted mother’s plea and exercised jurisdiction
over AC.

       At the initial disposition hearing, a caseworker noted that AC suffered from significant
behavioral issues and recommended an early childhood assessment and a trauma assessment be
conducted. The court adopted DHHS’s recommendations in the case service plan (CSP) and
ordered mother to comply with and benefit from the CSP, which included a psychological
evaluation, a substance abuse evaluation, drug and alcohol testing eight times per month, obtaining
and maintaining legal safe and appropriate housing, obtaining and maintaining a legal source of
income, and parenting education services.

       Mother initially complied with the CSP. By the first review hearing in June 2020, she had
completed a psychological evaluation with Dr. Douglas Ruben. Dr. Ruben determined that mother
had parental competency. He diagnosed mother with social anxiety disorder, mild cannabis use
disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. He recommended therapy to achieve the goals of
anxiety management, relapse prevention, reduction of perfectionism, and enhanced child
management steps. He opined that mother remained at high risk of cannabis recidivism until
anxiety management skills were taught and practiced regularly. Mother also completed a
substance abuse assessment. She reported that she had a history of ongoing cannabis use “usually
characterized by weekly use or problematic use even if used sporadically” and indicated that she
had never maintained continuous abstinence from alcohol and drugs for a period of even two
weeks. The assessor recommended twice-weekly alcohol and drug screens for a minimum of three
months so that mother could prove that she was able to abstain from alcohol and nonprescribed
drugs. The assessor also recommended that mother complete a substance and mental health

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outpatient program to assist in maintaining her recovery and provide behavioral therapy, as well
as a weekly support group.

        Mother’s drug and alcohol testing was paused in March 2020 because of the COVID-19
pandemic. The record indicates that mother was informed that testing would resume on June 1,
2020, but she failed to appear for testing on that date. She was told to call the notification system
daily to see if she was required to test. A caseworker reported that mother obtained a two-bedroom
home and that a home study had been completed. Mother also completed an online parenting class
in April 2020. Dr. Ruben was providing individual counseling for respondent. The court gave
DHHS discretion to allow unsupervised parenting time if mother was drug and alcohol testing and
screening negative.

        Mother’s compliance with the court’s order for drug and alcohol testing was minimal.
When she did test, the screens were often positive for marijuana. DHHS’s continued concern from
the outset of the case was that mother’s marijuana use contributed to her lack of supervision of AC
and his siblings, and so substance abuse was identified as a barrier to reunification. Despite
constant admonition from the court of the need for testing to demonstrate that AC would not be
harmed if returned to her care, mother failed to comply.

        In July 2021, DHHS filed a supplemental petition seeking to terminate mother’s parental
rights to AC. Because of various delays, a hearing on the supplemental petition did not begin until
June 17, 2022. In the meantime, mother continued to be inconsistent with calling the daily
notification system for testing. She continued to test positive for marijuana when she did test. She
was dishonest with Dr. Ruben about her missed tests and her marijuana use, expressing to Dr.
Ruben that DHHS approved the use of marijuana at a low dose and that DHHS was “very flexible”
with her testing schedule. In November 2021, mother stopped attending counseling with Dr.
Ruben. The supportive visitation program that was supervising in-home parenting time reported
that mother was prepared for visits, engaged, and nurturing during the visits. It also reported that
the home smelled of marijuana, although mother was not observed using marijuana during the
visits.

       At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court found clear and convincing
evidence that statutory grounds existed to terminate mother’s parental rights under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). The trial court also determined that petitioner established by
a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights was in AC’s best interests.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

                                  A. STATUTORY GROUNDS

       Mother first argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding, by clear and convincing
evidence, that statutory grounds for termination existed. We agree.

        “This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and ultimate
determinations on the statutory grounds for termination.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709;
846 NW2d 61 (2014). “A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it,
we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Schadler, 315
Mich App 406, 408; 890 NW2d 676 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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        Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), a trial court may terminate a respondent’s parental rights
if “182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order” and “[t]he
conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that
the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” “This
statutory ground exists when the conditions that brought the [child] into foster care continue to
exist despite time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of services[.]”
White, 303 Mich App at 710 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A parent’s failure to resolve
substance abuse issues that negatively affect his ability to parent or cause a risk of harm to a child
can establish sufficient grounds for termination. In re Richardson, 329 Mich App 232, 253-256;
961 NW2d 499 (2019). See also In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 244-245; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).

        In this case, the initial disposition order was entered on March 9, 2020, and mother’s
parental rights were terminated on November 15, 2022. Thus, far more than 182 days elapsed
since the initial disposition order was entered. The conditions that led to adjudication, as reflected
in mother’s admissions to the allegations in the amended petition, were, in part, neglect due to lack
of parental supervision, failure to provide JH with proper medical care for the burns, and lack of
housing. Substance abuse was identified as a potential reason for mother’s failure to properly
supervise AB and his siblings, and this lack of parental supervision was also identified as a barrier
to safe parenting.

        In determining that termination was warranted under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), the trial
court focused on mother’s failure to fully adhere to the CSP and follow the recommendations from
the psychological evaluation and substance abuse assessment, particularly the recommendations
for drug and alcohol testing and for mental health and substance abuse counseling. The court
found that mother did not benefit from counseling, noting that she engaged in counseling for a
period of time, but did not attend any sessions from November 30, 2021 until June 7, 2022. The
court found that the timing of her reengagement in counseling was suspect because the termination
hearing was scheduled to begin 10 days later. The court also had concerns about statements that
mother allegedly made to Dr. Ruben about her use of edibles and her drug testing requirements,
and Dr. Ruben’s belief that the statements were indicative of her failure to take responsibility for
her actions.

         Regarding her failure to address her substance abuse issues, the court observed that mother
testified that she was not addressing substance abuse in counseling because she did not have a
substance abuse problem. The court opined that this showed a lack of insight and failure to benefit
from services, particularly given that mother admitted during her plea to a history of substance
abuse and continued to use marijuana in violation of court order and her CSP. The court could not
determine whether mother was sober because she missed a significant number of drug screens.
The court found that mother’s explanation for her failure to test as ordered lacked credibility, and
that her choice not to prioritize testing was made despite her awareness that testing was an
important component of the reunification process. The court further found that mother’s

       use of marijuana is problematic as there is significant concerns it has and will
       continue to impair [her] parenting ability. [Mother] has a history of using marijuana
       while [AC] and his siblings were in her care. During that time, they were subjected
       to unsafe parenting, improper supervision, and neglect. [Mother] was aware her
       ongoing use of marijuana was a concern for DHHS, the LGAL, and the Court

                                                 -4-
       relating to her ability to act as a safe and appropriate parent. While [mother]
       claimed her use of marijuana was related to pain, she did not obtain a medical
       marijuana card nor establish that marijuana was recommended to her by a physician
       with whom she has a bona fide doctor/patient relationship. [Mother] testified that
       she recently obtained a card, but has not provided the card or corresponding
       documentation from the prescribing physician to the Court or parties. The fact that
       recreational marijuana is now a legal substance in Michigan does not prevent it
       from being considered as a factor in a decision to terminate parental rights. The
       Court continues to maintain significant concerns not only regarding [mother]’s use
       of marijuana, but the detrimental impact of that use on her ability to act as a safe,
       present, and stable caregiver for [AC].

               These concerns are further compounded by [mother]’s own testimony that
       her brain does not function in such a way as to deal with issues outside what is
       needed for her basic daily survival. The Court is hard-pressed to see how ongoing
       and at times daily use of marijuana does not have a negative impact on [mother’s]
       cognitive functioning, especially when considering Dr. Ruben’s diagnosis of a
       cannabis use disorder. [AC]’s special needs require heightened supervision and
       behavioral management from a caregiver who is stable and clear-minded. Despite
       [mother]’s claims that she will do anything for him, the evidence actually reflects
       she has continued to prioritize her own needs and substance use over doing what is
       necessary to achieve reunification.

        The court also found that mother failed to rectify her lack of parenting skills. The court
noted that during the early stages of the case, DHHS was given discretion to allow unsupervised
parenting time, but parenting time was returned to supervised because of mother’s failure to
comply with court orders and her CSP. The court found that mother missed visits with AC
throughout the case. The court believed that the missed visits showed mother’s failure to prioritize
AC and the work necessary to improve her parenting skills. It noted that a caseworker testified
that mother successfully completed the Orchard supportive visitation program, but that a concern
existed because she did not continue to demonstrate those skills at later visits.

       With respect to housing, the court found:

               The conditions relating to inappropriate housing have also yet to be
       rectified. While [mother] does currently maintain housing, [a caseworker] testified
       that [AC]’s room is not appropriate as it is covered in cat feces, urine, and vomit.
       [Mother] reported she will be able to clean and fix the cat issue, however, no
       evidence has been presented to demonstrate she has done so. [The caseworker]
       indicated that once the issue is corrected, another home inspection would need to
       be completed to determine the appropriateness of this housing.

        The court found that there was no reasonable expectation that mother would be able to
rectify these conditions within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. AC had been in
foster care since December 2019. The court found that in the more than two years since disposition
respondent

                                                -5-
       demonstrates inconsistent engagement and lack of benefit from services. She failed
       to attend the majority of her drug/alcohol screens and tested positive on nearly all
       of them she did complete. [Mother] stopped attending sessions with Dr. Ruben
       from November 2021 until June 2022 and re-engaged less than two weeks prior to
       the start of the termination hearing. She missed parenting time due to being
       incarcerated and for vacation. The evidence clearly shows that despite well over
       two years to engage in services, [mother] made very little progress in doing so.
       [AC] is just six[3] years old and in great need of permanency and stability.
       [Mother]’s credibility is questionable given her statements to Dr. Ruben and failure
       to take responsibility for the reasons [AC] came into care. It is clear [mother] is
       unlikely to rectify these conditions within a reasonable time, if at all. Accordingly,
       petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence a sufficient basis to
       terminate [respondent’s] parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).

        Despite all of this evidence, the trial court overlooked that mother did make steps toward
complying with the CSP. Mother successfully completed the Orchard’s Children Program and
maintained employment. Regarding parenting time, mother’s visitation coaches reported that
mother was encouraging, nurturing, and engaged in play with AC in a positive manner. She
appeared to be adept at managing her behavior, implementing a safety plan, and helping AC
develop self-esteem and a sense of independence. All of these factors suggest that mother was
entirely able and willing to rectify the barriers to her reunification with AC. Regarding housing,
there was an issue with AC’s bedroom being unsuitable for him due to the presence of cat feces,
vomit, and urine, but mother indicated that she would fix this problem. In all other respects,
mother’s housing was safe and adequate for children, and there was no evidence presented to
suggest that the room could not be cleaned and reassessed for appropriateness in a short amount
of time. Regarding employment, there was no dispute that mother made efforts to maintain
employment throughout the proceedings, consistent with the terms of the CSP.

        Above all, the trial court’s concern about reunification appeared to focus on respondent’s
unwillingness to regularly submit to drug testing or to stop using marijuana. Mother reported that
she uses marijuana for medical reasons, including rheumatoid arthritis. Although the trial court
disliked mother’s use of marijuana, there is no concrete evidence that her marijuana use actually
interfered with her ability to parent AC or properly care for him. To the contrary, the evidence
overwhelmingly indicates that there were no significant concerns about marijuana use during
mother’s parenting time visits and plenty of evidence that mother appropriately cared for AC
during those visits. The trial court’s overemphasis on mother’s marijuana consumption led it to
ignore that there was not a demonstrated risk of harm to AC caused by her use of marijuana. Trial
courts must remember that “[c]hild protective proceedings are not criminal proceedings,” and
unlike criminal proceedings, the “purpose of child protective proceedings is the protection of the
child,” not to determine the parent’s guilt or innocence. In re Brock, 442 Mich. 101, 107-108, 499
NW2d 752 (1993) (emphasis added). Indeed, “[t]he juvenile code is intended to protect children
from unfit homes rather than to punish their parents.” Id. at 108. Additionally, it must be noted

3
  The trial court misstated AC’s age; AC was eight years old when the trial court issued its ruling
terminating mother’s parental rights.

                                                -6-
that the termination of mother’s parental rights was founded in the doctrine of anticipatory neglect,
due to the improper supervision and medical neglect of AC’s half-siblings. Although it was
suggested that mother’s marijuana use was related to these issues, the record does not fully
substantiate this presumption. In the absence of such evidence, “[d]rug use alone . . . cannot justify
termination solely through operation of the doctrine of anticipatory neglect.” In re LaFrance
Minors, 329 Mich App 713, 731; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). Mother has made positive steps toward
reunification, and there is no demonstrated risk of harm from her use of marijuana. Accordingly,
we conclude that the trial court erred by finding that clear and convincing evidence existed to
support terminating mother’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).

        The same is true when it comes to the trial court’s findings under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g)
and (j). There is no evidence that mother’s use of marijuana interfered with her ability to parent
AC, suggesting that clear and convincing evidence did not exist to support terminating her parental
rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). More importantly, there is no evidence that mother currently
presents a risk of harm to AC if he were to be returned to her care. Mother made great strides
toward learning how to appropriately parent and care for AC, and she has maintained appropriate
housing and employment. Furthermore, we reiterate that there is no evidence that mother’s
marijuana use presents a current risk of harm to AC. Accordingly, we conclude that there was not
clear and convincing evidence to support terminating mother’s parental rights under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). The trial court clearly erred by finding otherwise.

       B. THE MICHIGAN REGULATION AND TAXATION OF MARIHUANA ACT

         Related to her statutory-basis argument, mother next argues that the trial court violated the
Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA), MCL 333.27951 et seq., by
requiring her to cease using marijuana throughout the proceedings, and by relying on her marijuana
use when terminating her parental rights. We disagree with the argument that the trial court was
not permitted to address mother’s marijuana use in making its ruling, but ultimately conclude that
the trial court reached the incorrect result by overemphasizing the role that mother’s marijuana use
played in her ability to parent AC.

         The MRTMA provides, in pertinent part: “A person shall not be denied custody of or
visitation with a minor for conduct that is permitted by this act, unless the person’s behavior is
such that it creates an unreasonable danger to the minor that can be clearly articulated and
substantiated.” MCL 333.27955(3). The plain language of this statute confirms that if a person’s
use of marijuana creates an unreasonable danger to a minor “that can be clearly articulated and
substantiated,” the person can be “denied custody of or visitation with a minor.” This conclusion
is consistent with this Court’s consideration of an analogous issue, namely, a parent’s alcohol use
in child protective proceedings. Although alcohol use is legal for persons over 21 years of age,
the abuse of alcohol can be grounds for termination of parental rights. See, e.g., In re Powers, 244
Mich App 111, 119; 624 NW2d 472 (2000). The relevant inquiry is whether use of the substance
will have a negative effect on a parent’s ability to parent, or will cause a risk of harm to the child.
Richardson, 329 Mich App at 252.

        Substance abuse was identified as a barrier to reunification. Mother admitted that she had
a CPS history involving marijuana use. She was diagnosed with mild cannabis use disorder, and
one of the goals from her psychological evaluation was relapse prevention. Additionally, mother’s

                                                 -7-
substance abuse assessment recommended drug and alcohol testing to prove that she was able to
abstain from alcohol and nonprescription drugs. The trial court severely faulted mother for
declining drug testing and overwhelmingly relied on mother’s marijuana use in terminating her
parental rights. The trial court pointed to the fact that AC’s half-sibling suffered serious burns on
more than one occasion while in mother’s care, and that mother did not seek medical attention for
the burns. It was effectively presumed that mother’s marijuana use was directly related to the
improper supervision. However, substance abuse was not identified as a ground for taking
jurisdiction in the petition in this case, and no direct causal link between mother’s marijuana use
and the improper supervision of AC and his siblings was ever established. Instead, the trial court
appeared to object to all marijuana use, and overemphasized the effect that mother’s marijuana
usage might have on her ability to parent AC in an attempt to link it to the original grounds laid
out in the petition, including improper supervision and medical neglect. But in doing so, the court
never “clearly articulated and substantiated” that mother’s marijuana use created an “unreasonable
danger” to AC, MCL 333.27955(3), particularly given that mother’s parenting time visits with AC
were overwhelmingly positive and Dr. Ruben concluded that mother had parental competency.
Thus, although the trial court did not violate the MRTMA by considering mother’s marijuana use
in determining whether termination was appropriate, its conclusion that marijuana use was related
to the issues that brought AC into care was speculative, and its findings were insufficient to support
the conclusion that marijuana use presented a barrier to her reunification with AC. Accordingly,
the order terminating mother’s parental rights must be reversed.4

                                        III. CONCLUSION

       Mother has successfully shown that the trial court erred by finding that statutory grounds
supported the termination of her parental rights and that termination was in AC’s best interests.
Furthermore, although the trial court did not violate the MRTMA by considering mother’s
marijuana use in making its statutory-bases determination, we again reiterate that it ultimately
reached the incorrect result by overemphasizing the role that marijuana played in mother’s ability
to properly parent AC.

        We reverse and remand for reinstatement of mother’s parental rights to AC. We do not
retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
                                                              /s/ Michelle M. Rick

4
  In light of our decision on the statutory grounds, we find it unnecessary to address mother’s
additional argument that termination of her parental rights was not in AC’s best interests. Were
we to address the issue in full, however, we would conclude that the trial court erred in finding
that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in AC’s best interests. Our conclusion on this
point is founded on much of the same reasoning supporting our analysis of whether there existed
statutory grounds for termination in this case.

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