Court Opinion

ID: 9641354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:29:43.937237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:36.802215
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge
(concurring).
Though I agree with the result reached in this cause, I feel compelled to state why, in light of the questions raised by the two dissents.
Judge Morrison states that the fact that the utilities were registered in appellant’s name distinguishes this case from Culmore v. State, 447 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), and he dissents for that reason. Consider the facts in Culmore, compared to the present cause:
The defendant and four other people were found in the den of a residence and marihuana and a pipe were found in a bedroom. There was testimony that there was a strong odor of marihuana in the bedroom and in the den. Further, a packet of cigarette papers was found in the accused’s pocket, and the accused testified that he had never rolled his own cigarettes, but smoked only ready rolled cigarettes. He testified he had never seen these cigarette papers allegedly taken from his person.
I find it inconceivable and inconsistent to reverse the Culmore case, an even stronger fact situation, and affirm the present case. The facts in this cause have been set out twice already, but I would add: *342the trailer house in question had two bedrooms ; there were “other persons” staying there, but it was never shown how many; and appellant was never shown to be occupying this “back” bedroom in which the narcotics were found.
To hold appellant culpable because the utilities were in his name, and he had "what appeared to be needle marks” on one arm, of completely undetermined age, would be contrary to the prior position taken by this Court. I quote from Collini v. State, cited by the majority:
“The evidence presented by the State must affirmatively link the person accused of possession to the narcotic which he is alleged to have possessed. . This affirmative link is established by showing additional independent facts and circumstances which may indicate the accused’s knowledge of the narcotic as well as his control over such.” (Citations omitted)
Such independent facts and circumstances are lacking in this present cause. There was no testimony that appellant made any attempt to escape; there was no testimony that he made any motion or furtive movement or gesture toward the room where the heroin was found; there is no evidence of any incriminating res gestae statements made by this accused.
As for Judge Douglas’ dissent, his concern seems to be that we are laying down an entirely new rule in possession cases. I disagree. Certainly, each case will have to continue to be examined on its individual merits. Our holding today represents no sweeping change, and should not be a cause for alarm among prosecutors. To answer Judge Douglas’ rhetorical question as to what this holding amounts to, one might conversely ask, “Would an af-firmance amount to a holding that a person will be found in possession of narcotics when the drugs are found in a residence where he has registered the utilities, but the narcotics are not on his person, not in proximity to him or in the same room, and when four other persons are present and an unknown number of other persons stay at that residence?” The question should answer itself.
I refer again to the Culmore case, in which Judge Douglas concurred in finding the evidence insufficient:
“A conviction on circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained if the circumstances proven do not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the accused; and proof amounting only to a strong suspicion or mere probability is insufficient.”
Culmore v. State, supra, at page 916.
I agree that the evidence is insufficient here to convict the appellant. My only regret is that it took four written opinions to arrive at what should have been an easily obtainable result.