Court Opinion

ID: 9644598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:00:34.396451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:44.069343
License: Public Domain

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                                            PUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                             No. 21-278

        In re: WELDON W. STEWART, JR.,

                            Movant.

        On Motion for Authorization to File Successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition in the United
        States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Anderson.

        Argued: January 26, 2023                                    Decided: August 21, 2023

        Before GREGORY, HARRIS and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

        Motion denied by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Harris joins. Judge Gregory concurs in part and in the judgment.

        ARGUED: Ciara Barone, Walker Fortenberry, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA LAW
        SCHOOL, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Movant. Melody Jane Brown, OFFICE OF THE
        ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for
        Respondent. ON BRIEF: Dawinder Sidhu, HOPWOOD & SINGHAL PLLC, Potomac,
        Maryland, for Movant. Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Donald J. Zelenka, Deputy
        Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
        Columbia, South Carolina, for Respondent.
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        QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:

               A South Carolina jury convicted Weldon Stewart of voluntary manslaughter

        concerning the death of his girlfriend. Almost 20 years later—following three rounds of

        collateral litigation in state court and one 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition in federal

        court—Stewart seeks permission to file a second § 2254 petition. In that application,

        Stewart claims he now remembers that his girlfriend died by suicide. According to Stewart,

        his memory was repressed at the time of his trial and his regained memory satisfies the

        rigorous newly discovered evidence requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B), allowing

        him to file a second habeas petition. One of those requirements is that Stewart demonstrate,

        by clear and convincing evidence, that no reasonable factfinder, considering his alleged

        regained memory with the rest of the evidence, would find Stewart guilty of manslaughter.

        Because Stewart fails to meet this burden, we deny his application to file a successive

        § 2254 habeas petition.

                                                     I.

                                                     A.

               On December 6, 2000, Stewart—who was 19 at the time—called the police to report

        that he had burned the body of his 15-year-old girlfriend C.A. Responding to the call, police

        officers discovered that C.A. was dead and her body had, in fact, been burned. In 2002,

        Stewart was indicted in Marlboro County, South Carolina, for murdering C.A. and then

        burning her body. He pled guilty to desecration but went to trial on the murder charge.

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               Stewart, despite repeated inquiries from the trial court about appointing counsel,

        decided to represent himself at trial. The trial court then conducted a hearing to evaluate

        Stewart’s competency to stand trial. Relying on expert forensic psychiatrist testimony, the

        court found Stewart competent and thus allowed him to represent himself. But the court

        appointed the public defender as standby counsel for Stewart should he need or request

        assistance.

               At trial, the state’s forensic pathologist testified that C.A. died from blunt force

        trauma to the head before she was burned. He based this opinion on fractures to the skull

        and evidence of bleeding near the fractures. The evidence of bleeding, he explained,

        indicated the injuries occurred before the fire. On cross-examination, the pathologist agreed

        that the skull fracture could have resulted from a fall but said it was unlikely. He concluded

        that the skull fracture came from something hitting the victim’s skull hard or her skull

        hitting something with great force.

               The state called several police officers. The officers testified that they responded to

        a call for police aid from Stewart after he burned the body. When they arrived, Stewart told

        them about the fire. The officers testified that Stewart said he and C.A. had an argument

        that night and that she fell, went limp and made unusual sounds. Stewart also told them he

        left the victim after she started making those noises to grab a flashlight from his home. By

        the time he returned, Stewart continued, she was no longer breathing.

               Along with these statements that Stewart made to the responding officers, an officer

        testified that Stewart delivered letters to the police describing being “overcome with rage”

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        because C.A. was involved with another man. J.A. 572–73. One of the letters was admitted

        into evidence. Written in third person, it provides:

               And she saw his rage and he knew he had learned of that which had taken
               place and was sore [sic] afraid. And his heart was hardened toward her, and
               he sought to slay her. Yet she loved him still and made haste to meet him in
               the night to calm his rage. He would have her to commit fornication, but she
               would not and in his madness, he went in unto her by force. She pleaded with
               him to have his way with her, but spare her life. He would not take heed and
               struck her in the face with his right hand, and in his madness laid his hand
               upon her neck and slew her. When he saw that which he had done, it greatly
               pleased him.
                                                    ....

               He went into his house to take rest and in the seventh hour, he arose and built
               an alter so that he could make a burnt offering. And he found that which was
               for the offering caught in some bushes. And he prepared her, and in the
               eleventh hour, seven hours after the slaughter, he placed her on the alter. He
               anointed her with oil and sang and danced praises for the offering. And when
               he had done this, he looked towards the sky and stretched forth his hands.
               That he held the cloth he had taken out of the temple, and a great fire came
               down from the sky and lit the cloth. He then cried out with a loud voice and
               placed the burning cloth on the alter. As the sacrifice burnt, the smoke
               reached the sky and he knew that it was good. He was greatly pleased with
               what he had done and sang and danced and gave thanks. He sacrificed her
               that she may be forgiven for her sins.

        J.A. 573:17–74:24.

               The state also called Anthony Watson, a classmate of C.A. who was in a relationship

        with her when she died. Watson testified that Stewart called him multiple times threatening

        him. In one of these threatening phone calls, which occurred while Stewart was in jail,

        Stewart stated Watson was “next.” J.A. 421–22.

               In response, Stewart insisted C.A.’s death was accidental. He testified in detail about

        what happened on December 6, 2000. C.A., he said, snuck out of her house to meet Stewart

        for sex. Later, as he was walking C.A. home through a path in the woods, they began to

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        argue. Stewart told the jury that C.A. pulled out a box cutter and swung it at him. So,

        Stewart picked her up and started to carry her home. But according to Stewart, as he picked

        her up, he tripped and fell. He said he fell on top of C.A. Stewart recalled that she initially

        sat up, but then began calling Stewart’s name. He said her voice became low and that she

        made “strange sounds” that “didn’t sound human.” J.A. 937–38. Then Stewart testified that

        he saw blood coming from C.A.’s mouth. He knew at that point something was wrong, so

        he left to find his friend Stanton Wright.

               Stewart testified that he was drinking a beer and looking for cigarettes when he

        found Wright. And he claimed he told Wright about tripping and falling on C.A. Wright,

        however, previously signed a statement saying that Stewart told him that C.A. had sex with

        someone else before their encounter and did not shower before meeting him. According to

        the statement, Stewart “flipped” out when he learned this. J.A. 311.

               Stewart also relied on his statements to the authorities, the lack of evidence of a

        struggle and the testimony of witnesses that said Stewart was not violent towards C.A. And

        he pointed out that the state’s case lacked a murder weapon.

               After all the evidence was presented, the jury found Stewart guilty of the lesser

        included charge of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court sentenced Stewart to 30 years’

        imprisonment for that charge, and 9 years on the desecration of human remains charge to

        run consecutively. Later, the South Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed his direct appeal.

                                                      B.

               Stewart then began a series of collateral challenges to his conviction. In 2006, he

        sought post-conviction relief in South Carolina state court, arguing he received ineffective

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        assistance from his appellate counsel. He complained that his counsel did not effectively

        challenge the trial court’s voluntary manslaughter charge, the authentication of the letters

        the state introduced or the admission of graphic photographs of the victim’s charred

        remains. He also argued that the trial court erred by admitting Wright’s testimony over his

        hearsay objections. The state post-conviction relief (“PCR”) court rejected those claims,

        and the South Carolina Supreme Court then denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.

                 Next, in 2009, Stewart filed his first § 2254 habeas petition in federal court. In that

        petition, he claimed the trial court’s failure to include an involuntary manslaughter charge

        he proposed violated his due process rights and repeated the ineffective assistance of

        counsel claims he lodged in state PCR court. The district court dismissed the petition as a

        matter of law. First, it held that the trial court’s rejection of the jury instruction Stewart

        requested was not an unreasonable application of federal law as established by the Supreme

        Court. Second, the court held that Stewart’s appellate counsel’s failure to raise the

        ineffectiveness of trial counsel did not fall below the applicable standard of professional

        care nor was it sufficiently prejudicial under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

        (1984). Stewart appealed the district court’s order and we denied his motion for

        certification and dismissed his appeal. Stewart v. Bodison, 412 Fed. App’x. 633 (4th Cir.

        2011).

                 In 2015, Stewart went back to state trial court. He moved for a new trial, arguing a

        juror from his criminal trial failed to report a relationship with him, the pathologist who

        testified for the state at trial was not qualified and, for the first time, that he had regained

        memory that C.A. actually died by suicide. Stewart claimed in March 2014, he began

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        communicating with Lori Stewart, his then acquaintance and now wife, on the online social

        network known as Tango. According to Stewart, during their subsequent conversations,

        the memories suddenly came back to him. 1 He alleged that he remembered that on

        December 6, 2000, C.A. was depressed about the one-year anniversary of having an

        abortion. While they were in the woods, she collapsed in Stewart’s arms. Stewart recalled

        that “my mouth was on her mouth as she took her last breath; I felt her spirit leaving her

        body.” J.A. 1009.1. Stewart claimed he panicked, went to buy some gas and returned to

        burn C.A.’s body. Stewart and his counsel later abandoned this repressed memory claim.

        The state court denied relief on the two grounds that Stewart pressed. 2

               Then, in 2018, Stewart sought discovery and additional post-conviction relief before

        the state PCR court. He alleged that the state withheld the pathologist’s statements that he

        could not rule out that C.A.’s head injuries were caused by the fire rather than blunt force

        trauma. Stewart also alleged that the state failed to turn over notes from its investigators

        about the lack of any evidence of a struggle in the woods. The state PCR court rejected

               1
                 The record is unclear as to when Stewart allegedly regained his memory. At one
        point, he says it was in March 2014. At another point, he says it was in June 2014. Lori
        says it was July 1, 2014. In addition, Stewart initially told Lori his name was Ben and he
        was a real estate developer from California. He later came clean after which Stewart
        allegedly told Lori that C.A. died by suicide. Lori, a 20-plus year FBI employee, then began
        to investigate Stewart’s story. The FBI fired her after her security clearance was revoked
        due to her association with Stewart. Since Stewart was a convicted felon, that association
        presented a potential conflict of interest. According to Stewart, Lori’s attorney advised her
        that if Stewart were exonerated, that would give her the best chance of successfully
        appealing her dismissal from the FBI.

               Stewart filed the motion as to the regained memory pro se. But he was represented
               2

        by counsel when that ground was abandoned.

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        those claims, finding that neither the pathologist’s statements nor the notes were newly

        discovered. In fact, the court ruled that Stewart had the information at the time of his trial

        in 2003.

               Stewart also raised again his regained memory that C.A. died by suicide. The state

        PCR court rejected this claim as well. It held:

               That Applicant now seeks to change his story and assert that [C.A.] perished
               from suicide, and not in the fashion testified to at trial, is inconsequential.
               Whether newly-discovered evidence is material, and whether it would
               change the outcome at trial, is considered in the context of the other evidence
               presented at trial, and not in the context of the self-serving, unsupported, and
               vague “alternative facts” presented by the convicted individual long after
               trial. Given Applicant’s conspicuous lack of detail, it is evident to this Court
               that he seeks to secure a different pathological finding, and amend his
               memory to fit it, so many years beyond the original killing that the State
               would struggle to disprove him.

        J.A. 1296 (emphasis in original). And the court added, “[c]uriously and importantly,

        [Stewart] does not appear to indicate how [C.A.] allegedly killed herself, and did not offer

        any further detail at the hearing.” J.A. 1296 n.3. Thus, it concluded that the alleged new

        evidence “would not change the outcome of [the] trial.” J.A. 1296.

                                                      C.

               That brings us to Stewart’s current application for pre-authorization to file a

        successive § 2254 habeas petition. In October 2021, proceeding pro se, Stewart asserted

        that, if authorized, he will submit three claims alleging constitutional error that essentially

        track his claims the last time he sought relief in state court. Those claims are:

               (1) Newly discovered Brady violation committed by the State by concealing
               evidence establishing that the injury alleged by the State to have caused
               Victim’s death was an injury created after death.

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               (2) Newly discovered evidence establishing that the State failed to correct
               false testimony given by the State’s pathologist and that the State suppressed
               evidence proving that this testimony was false.

               (3) Newly discovered Brady violation committed by the State by withholding
               notes written by the State’s crime scene investigator detailing observations
               made by the investigator while on the scene which contradicted the State’s
               case against Stewart at trial.

        ECF No. 2.

               Stewart did not list his regained memory as a ground for filing a successive § 2254

        habeas petition. But he discussed that issue in his application. So, construing his pro se

        petition liberally, we appointed counsel to represent him and requested briefing on whether

        the recovery of his allegedly repressed memory could serve as newly discovered evidence

        permitting a successive habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).

                                                     II.

                                                     A.

               We start with some basics about successive applications for habeas relief under 28

        U.S.C. § 2254. Generally, a state prisoner is entitled to only one federal challenge. In re

        Stevens, 956 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 2020). “For any successive federal habeas application,

        [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act or ‘AEDPA’] requires a prisoner to

        meet strict procedural and substantive gate-keeping requirements before federal courts can

        reach the merits of that successive application.” Id. (citing Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S.

        930, 942–47 (2007)). Those requirements are found in 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

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               Under § 2244, a successive applicant must “move in the appropriate court of appeals

        for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C.

        § 2244(b)(3)(A). A claim “presented in a prior application” for relief under § 2254 “shall

        be dismissed.” Id. § 2244(b)(1). And even if not previously presented, a claim must be

        dismissed unless it satisfies one of two requirements. The first is for new constitutional

        rules: the applicant must show “that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law,

        made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

        unavailable.” Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A). The second addresses claims based on newly discovered

        facts and has two parts:

               (i)    the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered
                      previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
               (ii)   the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the
                      evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
                      convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
                      factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
                      offense.

        Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B).

               To obtain authorization to file a successive federal habeas claim, the petitioner need

        not convince the court he will ultimately satisfy the provision’s demands. Stevens, 956 F.3d

        at 233. He need only make a prima facie showing to pursue his requested second claim. In

        re Hubbard, 825 F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 2016). An applicant makes such a showing “[i]f

        in light of the documents submitted with the [motion for pre-filing authorization] it appears

        reasonably likely that the [motion] satisfies the stringent requirements for the filing of a

        second or successive petition.” In re Williams, 330 F.3d 277, 281 (4th Cir. 2003).

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                                                    B.

               With that background in mind, we turn to Stewart’s claim that he has recovered

        previously repressed memories about the night C.A. died. According to Stewart, his trial

        testimony that she died as a result of him accidentally falling on top of her was not true.

        Instead, he now remembers that she died by suicide. Stewart insists that his regained

        memory is newly discovered evidence that shows he is actually innocent. He further argues

        the evidence was not previously available because the trauma of seeing C.A. kill herself

        triggered a condition known as dissociative amnesia. As a result, Stewart claims he

        repressed his memory of what occurred and developed the version of the events that he

        testified about at trial.

               Stewart maintains that his new memory is consistent with other evidence from the

        trial—the fact that December 6, 2000, roughly coincided with the one-year anniversary of

        C.A. having an abortion, that she left what he calls a suicide note 3 and the absence of

        evidence of a struggle from the woods where they were last together. Further, he presented

        a report from a psychologist who stated she currently cannot rule in or rule out whether he

        suffers from dissociative amnesia, but additional testing might allow her to clarify her

        opinions. 4

               3
                 The pertinent part of the letter reads, “I feel like I want to kill myself, but why
        should I and you wouldn’t even care if I did. I can’t cope with the pain anymore. If I’m at
        the point [of] thinkin[g] about killing myself, it is not good . . . . This pain hurts so
        much . . . . [T]his pain is nothing I can handle anymore.” J.A. 1143, 1204–09.
               4
                The psychologist’s report indicates that Stewart’s counsel declined to pursue the
        evidence-based tests she recommended, opting instead for a preliminary evaluation.

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               No federal court that we know of has ever held that regained memory that was

        previously repressed constitutes newly discovered evidence for purposes of federal habeas

        relief. True, some state and federal district courts have recognized that dissociative amnesia

        exists and that individuals may have repressed memories as a result. 5 But all the cases

        Stewart cites are civil sexual assault claims where the victims used alleged repressed

        memories to argue for equitable tolling of a statute of limitation. Stewart asks us to break

        new ground.

               Aside from being novel, Stewart’s claim implicates several significant issues. The

        issues vary somewhat based on the way Stewart frames his argument that the newly

        discovered evidence of his previously repressed memory shows that he is actually innocent.

        At times, he appears to frame the newly discovered evidence as a procedural gateway for

        the consideration of the three substantive constitutional claims identified above. At other

        times, he appears to frame the newly discovered evidence as an independent substantive

        ground for habeas relief. Giving Stewart the benefit of the doubt, we will consider both

        frameworks.

               5
                See, e.g., Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 511 S.E.2d 699 (S.C.
        1999); see also Templeton v. Bishop of Charleston, No. 2:18-cv-02003-DCN, 2021 WL
        3419442 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 2021); Clark v. Edison, 881 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Mass. 2012),
        Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286 (D. Mass. 1996); Isley v. Capuchin Province, 877
        F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Doe v. Freeburg Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 70, No.
        10-cv-458-JPG, 2012 WL 3996826 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2012); Anonymous v. Vella, No.
        8:04CV269, 2006 WL 1401680 (D. Neb. May 15, 2006).
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                                                      1.

               A habeas petitioner may generally use alleged newly discovered evidence of actual

        innocence as a gateway for the consideration of otherwise procedurally barred claims. See

        e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 (1995) (allowing a claim of actual innocence to

        avoid the procedural bar to considering the constitutional errors of ineffective assistance of

        counsel and improper withholding of evidence by the prosecution); McQuiggin v. Perkins,

        569 U.S. 383, 396–98 (2013) (holding that evidence of actual innocence may serve as a

        gateway for a habeas petitioner to pass through the statute of limitations procedural bar to

        asserting an unconstitutional ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 6

               Even so, Stewart faces a potential statute of limitations issue. At the latest, Stewart

        claims to have regained his memory on July 1, 2014. After that, he moved for a new trial

        in the state trial court on April 6, 2015, in part due to his regained memory. But he

        abandoned that argument, and the court denied his motion on the other grounds on May

        26, 2015. Stewart raised his repressed memory again in filing for discovery and other relief

        from the state PCR court on May 25, 2018. That motion was denied on October 15, 2019,

        and his appeal of that denial was dismissed on August 8, 2020. Then, on October 10, 2021,

        over a year later, Stewart filed the motion before us today. Section 2244(d)(1)(D), imposes

        a “1-year period of limitation” from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

        or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”

        The timeline raises serious questions about Stewart’s compliance with this statute of

               6
                Our court has likewise approved this type of claim. See, e.g., Finch v. McKoy, 914
        F.3d 292, 294 (4th Cir. 2019).
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        limitations, but the parties did not address this issue in their briefs. For that reason, we

        decline to address it.

               Proceeding then to Stewart’s claim, as discussed earlier, it must be “reasonably

        likely” from the motion for pre-filing authorization that “the stringent requirements for the

        filing of a second or successive petition” will be satisfied. In re Williams, 330 F.3d at 281.

        And for a successive § 2254 petition based on newly discovered evidence, one of those

        stringent requirements is that the evidence, when viewed together with all the other

        evidence, must be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that “no

        reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28

        U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).

               In re Williams illustrates this requirement. There, a witness testified at trial that he

        saw Williams shoot at the vehicle in which the witness was a passenger—killing one

        occupant and injuring another. In re Williams, 330 F.3d 330 at 278. Years after Williams

        was convicted, he applied to file a successive habeas application under § 2244(b). Id. at

        279. In his application, Williams alleged that the witness recanted his trial testimony,

        establishing his innocence. Id. We, however, rejected the application concluding that while

        the witness’ recantation supported Williams’ assertion of innocence, it did not outweigh

        the other incriminating evidence. Id. at 283–84.

               The same is true here. To be sure, Stewart’s claim of dissociative amnesia, if

        accepted as true, provides some support for his claim of innocence. And the record contains

        other evidence that could be consistent with Stewart’s alleged memory that C.A. died by

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        suicide. For example, there was no evidence of a violent struggle between Stewart and

        C.A., and C.A. did write a note expressing suicidal thoughts near the time of her death.

               But the absence of evidence of a struggle is not inconsistent with the state’s theory

        that Stewart killed C.A. by blunt force trauma. And while C.A.’s note contained suicidal

        thoughts, it did not say she intended to kill herself.

               Also, although Stewart says he now remembers C.A. died by suicide, he has not

        provided any details. For example, he has not explained how she did it. 7 In contrast, Stewart

        provided detailed testimony at trial about how he tripped and fell on top of C.A. That sworn

        testimony, which Stewart now claims to be untrue, must be considered along with his

        alleged regained memory.

               Next, the first time this regained memory came up was to a woman he met online

        while he was in prison. This same woman is now his wife. Stewart’s own filings in the

        collateral state proceedings undermine his alleged regained memory. Stewart maintained

        in state court that Lori lost her job with the FBI based on her association with him and that

        her attorney advised the best chance at contesting the dismissal was for Stewart to be

        exonerated.

               And last, the state presented substantial evidence that Stewart killed C.A. before

        burning her. That evidence includes the pathologist’s testimony that C.A. died from blunt

        force trauma before she was burned; the letter Stewart sent to one of the police officers

               7
                Lori stated in her interview with the consulting psychologist that Stewart told her
        C.A. may have ingested a pill that caused her death. She added that Stewart told her C.A.
        asked for some water before she died, leading him to believe that she had taken a pill.
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        indicating his anger about her being in a relationship with someone else and reporting

        violent acts and/or intentions; Wright’s statement to the police that Stewart “flipped” after

        learning that she had sex with someone else before their encounter and did not shower

        afterwards; and Watson’s testimony that Stewart threated to harm him due to his

        relationship with C.A. And we cannot forget that Stewart admitted to burning C.A.’s

        remains. All this evidence undermines the plausibility of his current story.

               In sum, considering the problems with the evidence Stewart offers and the other

        evidence supporting the prosecution’s theory that he killed C.A., Stewart cannot make the

        required prima facie showing. Even considering Stewart’s testimony about his regained

        memory, we cannot conclude that it is reasonably likely to persuade a district court that no

        jury could find the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B). 8

               In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that under Hubbard, Stewart need only

        make a prima facie showing that he satisfies the requirements of § 2244. But Stewart has

        not satisfied the standard for a prima facia showing that In re Williams established.

               8
                  This analysis does not even include the likely countervailing evidence that any
        presentation of dissociative amnesia would face. For example, the medical authority
        underlying Stewart’s claim, at least at this point, seems unsettled. On the one hand, the
        American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
        338 (5th ed. text rev. 2022) includes “dissociative amnesia” as a dissociative disorder, the
        defining feature of which is “an inability to recall important autobiographical information
        that 1) should be successfully stored in memory and 2) ordinarily would be freely
        remembered [].” On the other, some medical research calls into question the accuracy and
        reliability of alleged recovered memories. See Ivan Mangiulli et al., Running Head: A
        Critical Review of Dissociative Amnesia, 10 Clinical Psych. Sci. 191 (2021) (“[R]eports of
        dissociative amnesia can be easily malingered . . . approximately 20% of violent offenders
        claim amnesia for their crimes (e.g., sexual assault, homicide[)]”) (reviewing relevant
        literature).
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                                                      2.

               Stewart also seems to argue that the newly discovered evidence of his previously

        repressed memory shows that he is actually innocent as an independent substantive ground

        for habeas relief. This argument faces the same statute of limitations issue already

        discussed. Additionally, even before considering the new evidence in the context of the

        record as a whole, Stewart’s use of this framework faces two preliminary hurdles.

                                                      a.

               First, as the state points out, Stewart did not list his regained memory as a

        substantive ground for relief. As noted above, he outlined three specific grounds that

        largely followed the grounds he pursued in his last state court proceeding. None of those

        grounds mention anything about regained memory or repressed memory. True, later in his

        application, Stewart discusses his repressed memory and regaining it. But, according to the

        state, that discussion is not framed as a substantive ground for relief but rather as a reason

        for us to overlook the procedural bars that would otherwise preclude the three grounds he

        specified in his habeas relief petition. So, for Stewart to prevail, we must look past his

        failure to list newly discovered evidence based on repressed memory as a specific ground

        for habeas relief.

                                                      b.

               Second, § 2244 requires that for a successive petition based on newly discovered

        evidence, “but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the

        applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). Stewart initially

        asserts that his recovered memory indicates he is actually innocent, and that it is a

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        constitutional error to imprison an innocent person. The problem with that argument,

        however, is that neither the Supreme Court nor our court has ever permitted federal habeas

        relief on a claim of actual innocence “based on newly discovered evidence . . . absent an

        independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal

        proceeding.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993). 9 In fact, some courts, reading

               9
                 This remains true 30 years after Herrera. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald,
        911 F.3d 723, 798 (4th Cir. 2018) (emphasizing that the defendant “faced a daunting
        burden in establishing his eligibility for relief because of his actual innocence, in that the
        Supreme Court has never come across any prisoner who could make the extraordinarily
        high threshold showing for such an assumed right” (internal citations and quotations
        omitted)); see also Cosey v. Lilley, 62 F.4th 74, 86 n.11 (2d Cir. 2023) (stating “that a
        freestanding innocence claim would be subject to a more demanding standard than the
        Schlup gateway standard”); Cal v. Garnett, 991 F.3d 843, 850–51 (7th Cir. 2021)
        (emphasizing that “the Supreme Court has never held that actual innocence claims,
        standing alone—separate and apart from any constitutional error—could support habeas
        relief” and that the Seventh Circuit has not acknowledged such); In re Dailey, 949 F.3d
        553, 557 (11th Cir. 2020) (assuming, but not deciding, that a freestanding actual innocence
        is viable, and holding the petitioner would be unable to satisfy the standard for actual
        innocence set forth in Herrera); Farrar v. Raemisch, 924 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 2019)
        (“[A]ctual innocence does not constitute a freestanding basis for habeas relief.”); Bruce v
        Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that the
        threshold showing for any freestanding actual innocence claim “would necessarily be
        extraordinarily high”); Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 816 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that
        if the freestanding actual innocence claim exists, it would require more than the Schlup
        gateway standard); Jones v. Taylor, 763 F.3d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that
        although the freestanding actual innocence claim may exist, “[w]e have not resolved
        whether a freestanding actual innocence claim is cognizable in a federal habeas corpus
        proceeding in the non-capital context”); Hodgson v. Warren, 622 F.3d 591, 601 (6th Cir.
        2010) (holding that a freestanding claim of actual innocence is not cognizable on habeas
        review in a non-capital case); Pierce v. Lumpkin, No. 19-40830, 2021 WL 1235454, at *1
        (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2021) (per curiam) (holding that “a freestanding claim of actual
        innocence is not cognizable on federal habeas review”); Johnson v. Roden, No. 16-1419,
        2017 WL 4773221, at *2 (1st Cir. Sept. 14, 2017) (noting that the Supreme Court has not
        resolved whether a freestanding claim of actual innocence may entitle a prisoner to habeas
        relief);but see People v. Coleman, 996 N.E.2d 617, 634 (Ill. 2013) (holding that although
        the Supreme Court has not clarified whether a freestanding actual innocence claim is

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        the text to require a constitutional violation separate from the claim of innocence,

        characterize § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s requirements as an “actual innocence plus” standard.

        See, e.g., In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 823 (11th Cir. 2009). As to this argument, we would

        have to find a constitutional error not previously recognized in the § 2244 context.

               Stewart alternatively insists that the state violated the due process clause of the

        Fourteenth Amendment by prosecuting him in 2003 while he suffered from dissociative

        amnesia. According to Stewart, this due process violation satisfies § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)’s

        constitutional error requirement. Citing the Supreme Court’s Dusky v. United States, 362

        U.S. 402 (1960), decision, he argues that due process requires that a defendant have

        “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

        understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the

        proceedings against him.” Id. at 402. Because of his condition, Stewart contends that he

        did not have a factual understanding of the events that took place on December 6, 2000.

        As a result, he could not testify or advise standby counsel that the victim did not die as a

        result of his falling on the victim or striking her, but that she died by suicide. And Stewart

        argues our decisions in United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286 (4th Cir. 1995), and United

        States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d. 110 (4th Cir. 1964) (en banc), permit evaluations of a criminal

        defendant’s competency post-trial.

               But those cases are different from Stewart’s. In Kendrick, we vacated a district

        court’s denial of a § 2255 petition that alleged the defendant was incompetent at the time

        cognizable in federal habeas, the claim is cognizable based on the Illinois Constitution as
        a violation of state due process).
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        of his trial and remanded for a competency hearing. 331 F.2d at 111. There was no

        indication that competency was raised or addressed by the trial court. Id. at 111–12. And

        our decision to vacate the district court’s denial was based on the evidence relied on by the

        district court, not the issues presented here. Id. at 112–13. In contrast, the state trial court

        in Stewart’s case conducted an unchallenged competency hearing immediately before trial.

        Despite that, Stewart claims the due process clause affords him another bite at the apple,

        over 20 years later.

               In Mason, we reversed a district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a

        hearing on a retroactive determination of his competency made after he was convicted but

        before both the forfeiture phase of his trial and his sentencing. 52 F.3d at 1287. That is a

        far cry from Stewart’s claim that due process requires a court to revisit Stewart’s

        competency almost 20 years after the conclusion of the underlying trial and sentencing

        when the trial court found him competent after an unchallenged pre-trial hearing. Here, the

        state trial court held a competency hearing in which expert forensic psychiatrists opined

        and the court concluded that Stewart was competent prior to the trial. What’s more, Stewart

        does not challenge that determination. Instead, he insists that is not enough. He argues the

        trial court’s competency determination back in 2003 does not establish competency once

        and for all time. This argument for constitutional error would also involve an extension of

        current law. 10

               10
                 The state raises yet another preliminary issue that applies to both Stewart’s
        procedural and substantive arguments. In Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022), the
        Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) prohibits a federal habeas court from

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                                                     c.

               To prevail under this independent substantive ground framework, Stewart must

        clear those hurdles. But for our purposes today, we need not decide whether Stewart has

        done so. Even assuming, without deciding, that he has, this claim also fails for the same

        reasons discussed in Part II, B, 1 above. Considering the evidence Stewart offered in his

        motion, along with the other evidence in the record, it is not reasonably likely that no

        reasonable factfinder “would find [Stewart] guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C.

        § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).

                                                    III.

               Stewart’s motion for authorization to file a successive § 2254 motion for federal

        habeas relief is,

                                                                                          DENIED.

        conducting evidentiary hearings or otherwise considering evidence not developed in state
        court based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel. Id. at 1734. But
        that provision provides an exception if the claim is based on “a factual predicate that could
        not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C.
        § 2254(e)(2). Stewart argues that in applying this provision, we look to the time of
        Stewart’s trial or his first habeas petition. At both times, he continues, his memory that
        C.A. died by suicide was repressed and thus could not have been discovered. But even
        accepting Stewart’s claim about repressed and regained memory, he recovered his memory
        in 2014 and pressed the argument that he now remembers C.A. died by suicide in both his
        2015 and 2019 collateral state proceedings. So the state argues that we are limited to the
        record from his state proceedings. Because Stewart’s application fails for other reasons, we
        need not resolve this question.
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        GREGORY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:

               I agree with my friends in the majority that Stewart cannot satisfy the demands of

        28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Given the record evidence pointing to his guilt, it is unlikely that

        Stewart can “establish by clear and convincing evidence that . . . no reasonable factfinder

        would have found” him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). I write

        separately, however, to highlight which threshold § 2244(b)(2) requirements Stewart can

        satisfy, and to emphasize that today’s decision should not foreclose all future § 2244(b)

        petitions premised on a theory of dissociative amnesia.

                                                     I.

               Almost twenty years ago, the state of South Carolina tried Weldon Stewart for the

        killing of his girlfriend, C.A., when Stewart and C.A. both were teenagers. When police

        responded to Stewart’s 911 call reporting C.A.’s death, they described Stewart’s demeanor

        as “out of it,” “afraid and confused.” Pet. Br. App. A at 43. The state argued that Stewart

        killed C.A. in a fit of rage over C.A.’s romantic infidelity. Stewart, representing himself

        at trial, claimed that C.A. died after she fell from his arms. He admitted to burning her

        body, perhaps in a panicked or confused state, after her death. Apparently disbelieving

        Stewart’s story, a jury convicted him of voluntary manslaughter and for the desecration of

        C.A.’s remains. A judge sentenced Stewart to thirty-nine years in prison.

               Nearly ten years ago, Stewart informed a psychologist that he had been mistaken

        about the tragic events of C.A.’s death. She did not die from falling as he thought. Instead,

        Stewart explained, C.A. took her own life after struggling with depression stemming from

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        an abortion, which she underwent at just fourteen years old.             Stewart now seeks

        postconviction relief based on this development. The discrepancy in his memory, Stewart

        argues, may have been caused by a state of dissociative amnesia triggered by the trauma of

        C.A.’s death. Stewart sought post-conviction relief in state court on this basis, but the court

        rejected this argument as Stewart’s attempt to “amend his memory.” J.A. 1296. And now

        that his application for pre-authorization to file a successive habeas petition is before this

        Court, the majority embraces similar skepticism in denying Stewart that opportunity.

               In this case, I share the majority’s doubts that Stewart’s new explanation can

        undermine the strong evidence inculpating him in C.A.’s death. Stewart’s new explanation

        cannot, for example, refute the pathologist who persuasively concluded that a fracture in

        C.A.’s skull likely came from a blunt instrument striking it.            Nor does Stewart’s

        recollection of grief from witnessing C.A. take her own life explain his decision to burn

        her body. And just how did she do it? Did she ingest a pill as he claims? To my mind,

        these questions and the countervailing evidence prove fatal to Stewart’s application.

                                                      II.

               Nevertheless, whatever misgivings I have about Stewart’s case do not vitiate writ

        large any claim of mental incapacity by criminal defendants who suffer from dissociative

        amnesia.   Dissociative amnesia is “the inability to recall important autobiographical

        information, usually of a traumatic or stressful nature, that is inconsistent with ordinary

        forgetting.” American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental

        Disorders 298 (5th ed. Rev. 2013). It has been described as a “transient condition” that

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        lasts for a “few minutes” and “lifts spontaneously.” See Zacher v. Graham, No. 6:14-CV-

        06027(MAT), 2016 WL 368086, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2016). Such a condition may

        well be unusual, but “[i]t is clearly within the realm of all human experience to expect that

        a person would react to a traumatic event and that such reactions would not be consistent

        or predictable in all persons.” People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 404 (Mich. 1990).

               A proper dissociative amnesia diagnosis may support a successive habeas petition.

        Before filing those petitions, a prisoner must first “move in the appropriate court of appeals

        for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”           28 U.S.C.

        § 2244(b)(3)(A). A court of appeals will grant such authorization only in limited, statutorily

        prescribed circumstances. That is, “[l]eave may be granted only if the proposed habeas petition

        contains at least one claim that (a) rests on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

        by the Supreme Court, or (b) rests on a previously undiscoverable factual basis that would

        demonstrate the applicant's innocence by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Williams, 444

        F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)). These gatekeeping provisions

        attempt to balance the grave importance of the constitutional right to habeas corpus against the

        burden successive petitions place on the federal judicial system. See Felker v. Turpin, 518

        U.S. 651, 664 (1996); H.R. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“[AEDPA]

        incorporates reforms to curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus.”).

               The court of appeals has a limited role in this regard, however.             To receive

        authorization, an applicant need only “adequately alleg[e]” each element of the relevant

        § 2244(b)(2) provision to merit authorization. In re Williams, 330 F.3d 277, 282 (2003).

        Thus, the court of appeals serves essentially a box-checking function, see James v. Walsh,

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        308 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir. 2002), considering only if the petitioner has made a “prima

        facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of [§ 2244(b)],”

        § 2244(b)(3)(C). In other words, a petitioner may receive authorization after presenting “a

        sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller exploration by the district court.”

        Williams, 330 F.3d at 281 (quoting Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468, 469–70 (7th

        Cir. 1997)) (emphasis added). And “[i]f in light of the documents submitted with the

        application it appears reasonably likely that the application satisfies the stringent

        requirements for the filing of a second or successive petition, we shall grant the

        application.” Bennett, 119 F.3d at 469–70.

               Successful petitioners under § 2244(b)(2)(B) must establish three elements. The claim

        must be based on new evidence that “could not have been discovered previously through the

        exercise of due diligence.” § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). Next, “the claim must describe constitutional

        error.” Williams, 330 F.3d at 282; see § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). Finally, the new evidence, “if

        proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, [must be] sufficient to establish by

        clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

        would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).

        Memories recovered from a previous state of amnesia may satisfy each of these elements.

        But in my opinion, Stewart can only make a prima facie case for the first two elements.

                                                     A.

               First, recovered memories may qualify as new evidence which “could not have been

        discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.” § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). Taking

        all of an amnesic defendant’s alleged recovered memories as true, no measure of diligence

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        would have allowed him to previously “discover” his memories. That is because these

        repressed memories are usually recovered, if at all, “as a result of therapy or spontaneously

        . . . months, years, [or] even decades later.” Clifford S. Fishman & Anne Toomey

        McKenna, Jones on Evidence § 56:22 (7th ed. 2023).

               Stewart’s case presents an example. The record reflects that he is no stranger to

        traumatic or scarring life events. As a child, Stewart was the brunt of severe bullying,

        which included being “jumped” by ten to fifteen other kids and “almost drowned by

        neighborhood bullies.” Opening Br. at 17. At just fifteen years of age, he witnessed his

        then-girlfriend “force[] herself into an abortion . . . by drinking cast[o]r oil.” J.A. 616. She

        then had the “baby out on the floor and took pictures of it and sent it to” Stewart. Id.

               Stewart’s battle continued throughout his teenage years. At the request of his

        current counsel, a doctor interviewed Stewart in a series of psychological evaluations in

        May 2022 “to explore his likelihood of meeting criteria for dissociative amnesia.” Pet. Br.

        App. A at 1. The report indicates that while Stewart was employed at a Burger King

        restaurant, he discovered the remains of a partial fetus in a trash can. Stewart’s mother

        also met with the same doctor and reported that following the near drowning by bullies,

        Stewart’s shocking encounter with the partial fetus, and C.A.’s death, he became “distant”

        after each event and “went into a state like nothing happened.” Id. at 13. Even more,

        following his incarceration, Stewart informed the doctor that while he was on suicide

        watch, he faced repeated periods of “black outs.” Id. at 47.

               These life events and Stewart’s mental capacity to dissociate from such tragedy

        strongly support his claim that he suffered from dissociative amnesia at the time of C.A.’s

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        death and at his trial. These painful experiences plausibly trigger Stewart’s mental state

        into a “fight or flight” response, forcing his brain to retreat into somewhat of a coping

        mechanism to shield his mind from these traumatic incidents. He has therefore made a

        prima facie case that his newly recovered memories of C.A.’s death “could not have been

        discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence.” § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i).

               It is important not to assume that every habeas petitioner claiming such incapacity is

        doing so in a bad faith attempt to relitigate his case. Such an assumption would ignore the

        nuances of human experience and mental health—and would do a great disservice to all

        criminal defendants suffering from mental incapacities, which can directly impact their

        competency to stand trial and ability to assist in their defense. Humans are not carbon copies;

        the way we manage stress, grief, and trauma is as different and unique as our fingerprints.

                                                      B.

               Second, a petitioner’s dissociative amnesia diagnosis could demonstrate that it was

        constitutional error to subject that person to trial, whether or not the diagnosis was known

        at the time. Stewart argues that when he was tried, he was suffering from the effects of

        dissociative amnesia, which caused him to repress his memories of C.A.’s death. Trying a

        criminal defendant who is plagued by such a condition is commensurate to trying an

        incompetent defendant and is untenable under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

               The promises of the Sixth Amendment—to receive a fair trial, to confront state

        witnesses, to aid in one’s own defense, and to be represented by effective counsel—depend

        on a criminal defendant’s competency to stand trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Indiana

        v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 169–70 (2008). The competency requirement is “a by-product

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        of the ban against trials in absentia,” as “the mentally incompetent defendant, though

        physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend

        himself.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (citation omitted). Thus, only a

        defendant with the “present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of

        rational understanding [and] . . . a rational as well as factual understanding of the

        proceedings against him” may be tried. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)

        (per curiam). In other words, “[t]he accused must be able to perform the functions which

        are essential to the fairness and accuracy of a criminal proceeding.” Wilson v. United

        States, 391 F.2d 460, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Nationwide, courts have been skeptical when faced with amnesia-based claims.

        Some fear that if such arguments were widely accepted, bad faith claims of false memory

        could function as an automatic and unlimited “do-over” card for convicted defendants. See

        United States v. Stevens, 461 F.2d 317, 320–21 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Knohl, 379

        F.2d 427, 436 (2d Cir. 1967).         Categorically excluding amnesia as a basis for

        incompetency, however, produces its own problems. For one, it could lead to “anomalous

        results.” Wilson, 391 F.2d at 463. An amnesic defendant who cannot recollect the alleged

        crime is unable to effectively confront witnesses, aid in his own defense, or consult with

        his attorneys. He is just as prejudiced as a defendant who lacks the mental faculties to do

        the same yet is provided none of the same protections.

               To avoid that unfairness, I would adopt the D.C. Circuit’s functional approach it

        adopted in Wilson. That is, I would hold that a defendant’s amnesia may amount to

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        incompetence when it renders the trial unfair. In considering a trial’s fairness, the Wilson

        court suggests the following factors:

               (1) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant’s ability to
                   consult with and assist his lawyer. (2) The extent to which the amnesia
                   affected the defendant’s ability to testify in his own behalf. (3) The extent
                   to which the evidence in suit could be extrinsically reconstructed in view
                   of the defendant’s amnesia. . . . (4) The extent to which the Government
                   assisted the defendant and his counsel in that reconstruction. (5) The
                   strength of the prosecution’s case. Most important here will be whether
                   the Government’s case is such as to negate all reasonable hypotheses of
                   innocence. If there is any substantial possibility that the accused could,
                   but for his amnesia, establish an alibi or other defense, it should be
                   presumed that he would have been able to do so. (6) Any other facts and
                   circumstances which would indicate whether or not the defendant had a
                   fair trial.

        Id. (citation omitted); see also Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899)

        (remanding for further proceedings to determine if defendant’s impaired memory affected

        his ability to make “a rational defense” and the “fundamental right of the court to try the

        main issue,” guilty or not guilty).

               Applying the Wilson factors here, Stewart’s allegations amount to the kind of

        amnesia which would render a trial unfair, and as a result, unconstitutional. First, Stewart’s

        amnesia suppressed his memory of the only facts in contention at trial: the manner and

        circumstances of C.A.’s death. Therefore, Stewart’s ability to effectively consult with

        counsel or offer testimony on the most relevant facts in his case was entirely foreclosed.

        Second, the prosecution’s evidence was scarce.            In fact, it rested almost solely on

        statements and writings made by Stewart during the time frame he would have been

        deluded by his amnesia. Third, because Stewart was the sole eyewitness to C.A.’s death,

        the case turned on his credibility. There was no extrinsic evidence on which Stewart could

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        build his case. And we must recognize that because Stewart was allowed to proceed pro

        se he was additionally foreclosed from a skillful defense, which may have overcome the

        hurdles his amnesia presented.

               To perform the § 2244 box-checking inquiry, we may presume the petitioner’s

        allegations are true absent reason to think otherwise. * Here, we have no reason to

        disbelieve Stewart. In support of his application, Stewart provided this Court with a

        psychologist’s opinion. While the psychologist explained that she could not definitively

        diagnose Stewart without being present for a dissociative episode, she did find that Stewart

        has a recorded, corroborated history of amnesic episodes, making subsequent episodes

        highly likely, and that Stewart’s reported behavior following C.A.’s death was consistent

        with symptoms of dissociative amnesia. Pet. Br. App. A at 46–47. She concludes “it is

        highly probable that [Stewart] was suffering from traumatic shock following the death of

        C.A.,” id. at 43, and it is “very possible” he repressed his memory of the event, id. at 49.

        Admittedly, a finding of “very possible” does not instill the utmost confidence; however,

        a more definite finding is neither necessary to show a prima facie case, see St. Hubert, 918

        F.3d at 1204 (Martin, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), nor is it reachable

        without further factual proceedings.

               *
                 This presumption is a result of the prima facie standard we must apply. “A ‘prima
        facie’ showing is nothing more than a showing ‘[s]ufficient to establish a fact or raise a
        presumption unless disproved or rebutted; based on what seems to be true on first
        examination, even though it may later be proved to be untrue.’” United States v. St. Hubert,
        918 F.3d 1174, 1204 (11th Cir. 2019) (Martin, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
        banc) (citing Prima Facie, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).
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               Thus, we are faced with a narrow question: based on Stewart’s allegations of

        dissociative amnesia, was he competent to stand trial? I think not. If a dissociative state as

        described by Stewart is proven true, it would have tainted his trial in almost every respect.

        A conviction resulting from such a trial contravenes the most fundamental guarantee of the

        Sixth Amendment: a defendant’s right to receive a fair trial. As a result, I find that Stewart

        has adequately alleged that he was tried while incompetent which resulted in a constitutional

        violation, satisfying the second element under § 2244(b)(2)(B).

                                                      C.

               Stewart’s claim stumbles at the final step in the § 2244(b)(2)(B) analysis—whether

        the allegations adequately show “that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

        would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). Here,

        “a court must make its § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) [] determination—unbounded by the rules of

        admissibility that would govern at trial—based on all the evidence, including that . . . ha[s]

        become available only after the trial.” United States v. MacDonald, 641 F.3d 596, 612 (4th

        Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted). This “inquiry requires the federal court to assess

        how reasonable jurors would react to the overall, newly supplemented record,” given that

        the “claim involves evidence [that] the trial jury did not have before it.” Id. at 613 (quoting

        House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 519 (2006)).

               As the majority underscores, the government presented “substantial evidence”

        demonstrating that Stewart killed C.A. before burning her remains. Ante at 15. Specifically,

        they point to “the pathologist’s testimony that [C.A.] died from blunt force trauma before

        she was burned,” “the letter Stewart sent to one of the police officers indicating his anger

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        about her being in a relationship with someone else and reporting violent acts and/or

        intentions,” “Wright’s statement to the police that Stewart ‘flipped’ after learning that she

        had sex with someone else before their encounter and did not shower afterwards,” “Watson’s

        testimony that Stewart threated to harm him due to his relationship with [C.A.],” and

        “Stewart admitt[ing] to burning [C.A.’s] remains.” Ante at 15–16. While I might quibble

        with just how “substantial” some of this evidence is, I ultimately agree with the majority that

        Stewart cannot overcome key facts that suggest his guilt—even with his claim of recovered

        memories. Stewart’s recovered memories are just too vague. Thus, I do not believe that

        Stewart can clear this hurdle to establish a prima facie case.

                                                      III.

               At least in the courts, dissociative amnesia is a nuanced and novel mental condition.

        My purpose in writing separately is solely to comment on the importance of understanding

        and engaging with the impact of mental health on criminal defendants. In a different case,

        where the recovered memories were stronger and the evidence at trial weaker, I might reach

        a different conclusion. And it is my hope that my colleagues in the majority would too. In

        the end, however, I agree that Stewart has not established a prima facie case for every

        element of § 2244(b)(2)(B), so his application does not “warrant a fuller exploration by the

        district court.” Bennett, 119 F.3d at 469.

               For these reasons, I concur in part and concur in the judgment of the majority’s

        opinion.

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