Court Opinion

ID: 9916443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 00:02:22.688298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:27.757356
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/9/24 Kirk v. Quirino CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 GORDANA KIRK,                                                  B319379

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. BC630772)
           v.

 JESUS QUIRINO, JR.,

           Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, James A. Kaddo, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Offices of Gabor Szabo and Gabor Szabo for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
      Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, Win D. Doan and Mark
P. LaScola for Defendant and Respondent.

                             ____________________________
       Gordana Kirk sued Jesus Quirino, Jr. for damages arising
out of a collision between their two vehicles. After the jury found
Quirino not negligent and the trial court entered judgment in
Quirino’s favor, Kirk filed a motion for a new trial, which the
court denied.
       On appeal Kirk contends the judgment should be reversed
and the case remanded for a new trial because the trial court
found the jury’s verdict was inconsistent with the evidence;
polling of the jurors revealed more than one-fourth of the jurors
disagreed with the verdict; the court committed judicial
misconduct that prevented Kirk from having a fair, impartial
trial; and the verdict was not supported by the evidence and was
contrary to law. These contentions lack merit, and we affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. Kirk’s Complaint and the Jury Trial
       In 2016 Kirk filed a complaint against Quirino for damages
arising from a 2014 motor vehicle accident at the intersection of
Centinela Avenue and Inglewood Avenue in Los Angeles County.
She alleged Quirino negligently operated his vehicle, causing it to
collide with hers.
       The jury trial commenced in December 2021. Kirk testified
that, before the accident, she was traveling eastbound on
Centinela and intending to make a left turn onto Inglewood.
At the intersection with Inglewood, Centinela had no stop sign or
traffic light. Kirk stopped in the eastbound left-turn lane before
making the turn. There were three westbound lanes on
Centinela. In the two westbound lanes closest to the center of the
road, vehicles had stopped before the intersection, but the third,
curbside lane did not have a stopped vehicle. A big truck in the
westbound middle lane partially blocked Kirk’s view of the

                                 2
curbside lane. The truck and the other vehicle opposite to her
“waved [her] that it’s okay for [her] to make a left turn.” Kirk
slowly made a left turn. She focused to see if anyone was coming
as she was making her turn, but she could not see, or completely
see, her right side. Quirino’s car struck the rear right passenger
side of Kirk’s car.
       Quirino testified he was traveling westbound on Centinela
before arriving at the Inglewood intersection. He was in the
middle lane and was going 20 miles per hour when he merged to
the far right (third) lane. He traveled in the third lane for a
distance of several car lengths before the accident. As Quirino
approached Inglewood, he saw the truck, which had an elevated
body, in the middle lane. Looking under the truck, Quirino for
the first time was able “vaguely” to see Kirk’s car, which was
stopped but proceeded to move. At that time, Quirino was a
distance of only one or two car lengths from the intersection.
He believed there was nothing he could do to avoid the accident.
At the time of the collision he had his foot on the brake and had
slowed down to 10 miles per hour or less. The right front of
Quirino’s vehicle hit the right rear of Kirk’s car, and the position
of the vehicles was approximately 90 degrees to each other at the
moment of impact. After Quirino and Kirk exchanged insurance
information, Kirk told Quirino she (Kirk) was at fault for the
accident.
       Bryan Randles, an expert retained by Quirino, testified the
changes in velocity of Quirino’s and Kirk’s vehicles during the
collision were within the range of a bumper car impact at an
amusement park and testing revealed that injuries from such
impacts were relatively minor. Additional witnesses testified
about Kirk’s alleged injuries and whether they were caused by

                                 3
the accident, including medical practitioners who treated or
otherwise examined Kirk.
      2. The Verdict, the Polling of the Jurors, and the Judgment
       On December 13, 2021, the jury returned its verdict, which
the court read aloud. The first question on the special verdict
form asked whether Quirino was negligent. To that question, the
jury answered “No.” As instructed, the jury, having answered the
first question in the negative, left blank the remaining questions
on the verdict form, including the questions asking whether
Quirino’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to
Kirk and the amount of Kirk’s damages.
       The jurors were polled that same day. The clerk stated,
“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as your seat number is called,
please answer ‘Yes,’ if the answer, as read, is your true and
individual vote. ‘Question No. 1, was Jesus Quirino, Jr.
negligent? Answer: No.’ Was this your individual vote, Juror
No. 1?” Juror No. 1 responded, “Yes.”
       The clerk called each of the remaining jurors. Jurors
Nos. 2, 3, 6 and 7 stated, “Yes.” Jurors Nos. 4 and 5 stated, “No.”
Jurors Nos. 8 and 9 each initially said, “No,” but Juror No. 9 then
stated, “Yes, yes, yes. I cannot remember.” The clerk asked,
“[Y]ou voted for what the judge read, correct?” Juror No. 9
replied, “No negligence.”
       After further discussion between the clerk and the court,
the court said, “Did you vote ‘No’? . . . Did you vote ‘Yes’? Now,
I’m confused. All right. The answer of the jury—” Juror No. 8
immediately stated, “Ask—yes.” When Juror No. 9 requested the
court repeat the question, the court said the answer to the
question whether the jury found the defendant negligent had
been “No,” and the court asked, “Is that how you voted?”

                                4
The court, however, directed its question to the presiding juror,
whom it addressed by name. The presiding juror replied, “She
agreed with what the answer is.” The clerk asked, “She was one
of the jurors that voted for this verdict?” The presiding juror
responded, “Correct.” Neither counsel objected or asked for
further clarification with respect to the votes of Jurors Nos. 8 and
9.
       The clerk continued with the polling by asking Juror
No. 10, “[D]id you vote for this verdict?” Juror No. 10 nodded his
or her head. Juror No. 11 stated, “No.” Juror No. 12 stated,
“Yes.” At the conclusion of polling, the clerk announced the vote
was 9 to 3. The court asked, “9 to 3?” The clerk replied, “Yes.”
The court stated, “Okay.” After further discussion, the court
excused the jury. Again, neither counsel objected.
       On January 6, 2022, the court entered judgment in favor of
Quirino.
      3. Kirk’s Motion for a New Trial
       On February 3, 2022, Kirk filed a motion for a new trial
raising numerous issues. As relevant here, Kirk argued the
verdict was invalid because Jurors Nos. 4, 5, 9 and 11 believed
both parties were negligent but Juror No. 9, whom Kirk referred
to as “the decisive vote,” had been confused during voting and
polling. Kirk concurrently filed the declaration of her trial
counsel, in which her attorney averred that, according to another
juror, Juror No. 9 “in open [c]ourt did not know how she voted on
the question whether or not Defendant was negligent.” Although
acknowledging Juror No. 9 had voted that Quirino was not

                                 5
negligent, Kirk’s attorney stated Juror No. 9 had been confused
during the second day of deliberations.
       Kirk’s motion also claimed judicial misconduct. On the
judicial misconduct issue, Kirk’s attorney averred that after the
verdict and juror polling, he interviewed the jurors, who
indicated they noticed the court treated Quirino’s attorney and
him differently. They purportedly explained to him that the
court would overrule his objection to a question by Quirino’s
attorney, but would sustain Quirino’s attorney’s objection if he
asked the same question. Kirk did not file the declaration of any
juror to support the motion for a new trial.
       Quirino opposed Kirk’s motion. His opposition papers
included the declarations of the presiding juror and Juror No. 9.
The presiding juror averred the jurors had voted 9 to 3 that
Quirino was not negligent. She also stated she did not find any of
the jurors had been confused or mistaken in voting on Question
No. 1 that Quirino was not negligent. In her declaration Juror
No. 9 averred, for Question No. 1, she voted Quirino was not
negligent; she had been neither confused nor mistaken in voting
that Quirino was not negligent; and she had been able to fully
understand Question No. 1 and the jury’s deliberations on
liability. Quirino’s opposition was also accompanied by the
declaration of his trial attorney, who, on the issue of claimed
judicial misconduct, averred the court had treated both sides

                                6
equally, as shown by reporter’s transcript excerpts that he
attached to his declaration.
      As indicated by a minute order dated March 1, 2022, the
court denied Kirk’s motion for a new trial after a hearing on the
motion. Kirk filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
                          DISCUSSION
      1. Kirk Did Not Establish That the Trial Court Found the
         Verdict Inconsistent with the Evidence
       Kirk contends the trial court should have granted her
motion for a new trial because the court had found the jury’s
verdict was inconsistent with the evidence. She relies on the
March 1, 2022 minute order, which, after stating the matter was
called for a hearing and the trial court heard the attorneys’
arguments, continued, “The Motion for New Trial filed by
Gordana Kirk on 02/03/2022 is Denied. [¶] The Court finds
insufficient grounds to grant Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial.
The Court believes Plaintiff had a fair trial and finds the verdict
of the jury is inconsistent with the evidence.”
       Quirino, disputing Kirk’s contention that the trial court
had found the verdict was inconsistent with the evidence,
essentially argues the minute order contained a clerical error.1
He points out that the minute order’s statement regarding the
trial court’s finding of inconsistency directly contradicts the
minute order’s other statements and the ruling.

1     “‘The distinction between clerical error and judicial error is
“whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in
recording the judgment rendered.”’” (In re Daoud (1976)
16 Cal.3d 879, 882.)

                                 7
       We agree the minute order’s statement regarding the trial
court’s finding of inconsistency conflicts with the court’s ruling
and other parts of the minute order and appears to reflect a
clerical error. “A ruling by a trial court is presumed correct, and
ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance.” (Winograd v.
American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 631.)
Kirk did not designate for inclusion in the appellate record the
reporter’s transcript of the March 1, 2022 hearing on her motion
for a new trial or an agreed or settled statement regarding what
transpired at the hearing. Accordingly, she has failed to provide
an adequate record to overcome the presumption of the ruling’s
correctness and establish her contention, and the issue must be
resolved against her. (See Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
609 [the appellant “‘has the burden of providing an adequate
record’”; “‘[f]ailure to provide an adequate record on an issue
requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant]’”];
Osgood v. Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435 [“‘a record is
inadequate, and appellant defaults, if the appellant predicates
error only on the part of the record he provides the trial court,
but ignores or does not present to the appellate court portions of
the proceedings below which may provide grounds upon which
the decision of the trial court could be affirmed’”].)
      2. Kirk Failed To Prove More Than One-fourth of the Jurors
         Disagreed with the Verdict During Polling
      “When a jury is composed of 12 persons, it is sufficient if
any nine jurors arrive at each special verdict.” (Keener v. Jeld-
Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 255 (Keener), italics omitted.)
The jury’s verdict is signed by the presiding juror and given to
the clerk, who reads the verdict and asks the jury whether it is
their verdict. (Code Civ. Proc., § 618.) “Either party may require

                                8
the jury to be polled, which is done by the court or clerk, asking
each juror if it is the juror’s verdict.” (Keener, at p. 256.) “The
polling process is designed to reveal mistakes in the written
verdict, or to show ‘that one or more jurors acceded to a verdict in
the jury room but was unwilling to stand by it in open court.’”
(Ibid. [“a juror may change his or her vote at the time of
polling”].)
       Code of Civil Procedure section 618 provides in part,
“If upon inquiry or polling, more than one-fourth of the jurors
disagree [with the verdict], the jury must be sent out again, but if
no disagreement is expressed, the verdict is complete and the
jury discharged from the case.” That statutory provision
“effectively creates a ‘rebuttable presumption: If a verdict
appears complete, it is complete unless there is an affirmative
showing [during polling] to the contrary.’” (Keener, supra, 46
Cal.4th at p. 257.) Code of Civil Procedure “section 618 requires
affirmative disagreement—an utterance, statement, or some
similar active conduct—of ‘more than one fourth’ of the jurors in
order to prevent a trial court from finding the verdict to be
complete and from then discharging the jury.” (Id. at p. 259.)
“[A] juror’s mere silence at polling, brought about by the trial
court’s failure to poll the juror on one of multiple special verdict
questions, does not constitute an expressed disagreement with
the verdict under section 618.” (Ibid.)
       Kirk contends she is entitled to a new trial because polling
of the jurors revealed more than one-fourth of them disagreed
with the verdict. Specifically, she asserts that, although nine
jurors voted for the verdict in the jury room, five of the 12 jurors
expressed disagreement with the verdict in open court: Jurors

                                 9
Nos. 4, 5, 8, 9 and 11. Kirk contends that the court wrongly
determined that Jurors Nos. 8 and 9 voted in favor of the verdict.
       Kirk forfeited any contention the verdict was invalid
because of the votes of Jurors Nos. 8 and 9 by failing to raise any
such objection during polling. At the conclusion of polling, the
clerk announced the vote was 9 to 3, but Kirk’s attorney did not
object or seek to question any juror further before the court
discharged the jury. To the extent that either Juror No. 8’s or
Juror No. 9’s final vote was unclear, any ambiguity could have
been clarified had Kirk timely objected. (See, e.g., Silverhart v.
Mount Zion Hospital (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 1022, 1029 [if
appellant’s attorney “was not satisfied with the polling procedure,
or if he believed that the jury was still confused, he should have
complained immediately. . . . Since any impropriety could have
been cured if raised on time, the failure to object amounted to a
waiver of the alleged impropriety or error”]; see also Keener,
supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 263, 265-267 [“‘[a]n objection to a
defective verdict must be made before the jury is discharged’”;
approving of Silverhart and other authorities requiring timely
objection to a defective verdict before discharge of jury to avoid
forfeiture if the defect was apparent and could have been
corrected].)2
       Moreover, Kirk failed to meet her burden to demonstrate
that Jurors Nos. 8 or 9 disagreed with the verdict during polling.
Juror No. 8, when asked if she voted “No” on the first question

2     Although Kirk’s counsel orally told the court on
December 13, 2021, that Kirk “would like to make a motion
notwithstanding the verdict,” he did so only after the jury had
already been discharged and on the vague ground of “juror
misconduct,” without identifying any purported misconduct.

                                10
regarding Quirino’s negligence, initially stated “No.” However,
on further inquiry Juror No. 8 indicated agreement with the
verdict, stating, “Ask—yes.” A reasonable interpretation of the
record is that Juror No. 8 had initially been confused by the
question and upon further inquiry indicated assent to the verdict
during polling. (See, e.g., Keener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 263
[“‘all reasonable inferences must be indulged on appeal to
support, rather than to defeat, the jury’s verdict and the
judgment thereon’”].) Kirk did not argue in her motion for a new
trial that Juror No. 8 had disagreed with the verdict, instead
limiting her argument at that time to Jurors Nos. 4, 5, 9 and 11.
        Kirk also failed to establish Juror No. 9 affirmatively
disagreed with the verdict during polling. As with Juror No. 8,
Juror No. 9 initially answered “No” to the first polling question
regarding Quirino’s negligence. Nevertheless, Juror No. 9
immediately retracted that response and indicated she believed
Quirino was not negligent, and Juror No. 9 did not correct the
presiding juror when the presiding juror told the court Juror No.
9 had voted for the verdict. Although Kirk contends the verdict
should be invalidated because the presiding juror and not Juror
No. 9 stated Juror No. 9’s answer during polling, Kirk failed to
object on that ground before the jury was discharged.
      3. Kirk Failed To Establish Prejudicial Misconduct by the
         Trial Court
       Kirk contends the trial court committed judicial misconduct
depriving her of a fair, impartial trial. She alleges that the court
(1) interfered with her counsel’s effective representation of her
through erroneous evidentiary and other rulings; (2) made
negative comments about her attorney’s use of the English
language, indicating bias on the basis of ethnicity and national

                                11
origin; (3) made disparaging comments about her attorney and
her attorney’s performance; (4) posed its own objections and
interfered with Kirk’s attorney’s examination of Quirino;
(5) found Quirino had not admitted fault without allowing the
jury to hear Quirino’s deposition testimony on the issue; and
(6) stated its intent to report Kirk’s counsel to the State Bar. As
we explain, these allegations largely rest on a misleading
summary of what occurred during the trial and omit material
context.
       “‘“Although the trial court has both the duty and the
discretion to control the conduct of the trial [citation], the court
‘commits misconduct if it persistently makes discourteous and
disparaging remarks to [a party’s] counsel so as to discredit the
[party] or create the impression it is allying itself with the
[opposing party]’ [citation]. Nevertheless, ‘[i]t is well within [a
trial court’s] discretion to rebuke an attorney, sometimes harshly,
when that attorney asks inappropriate questions, ignores the
court’s instructions, or otherwise engages in improper or delaying
behavior.’”’” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1078;
accord, Arave v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
(2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 525, 536 (Arave).) “It is extremely difficult
to establish judicial misconduct has risen to the level that
requires a new trial.” (Arave, at p. 536.)
       We review assertions of judicial misconduct “on the basis of
the entire record.” (People v. Williams (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 191,
202; see Wilson v. Kopp (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 198, 207
[explaining, in rejecting plaintiff’s contention “that the trial judge
was guilty of prejudicial misconduct warranting a reversal,” that
“[w]e have read the entire record” and “believe it demonstrates
that plaintiff received a fair trial, and that the remarks and

                                 12
actions of the trial judge of which complaint is made could not
possibly have affected the verdict”].) “‘“[O]ur role . . . is not to
determine whether the trial judge’s conduct left something to be
desired, or even whether some comments would have been better
left unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether the judge’s
behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the party] a fair, as
opposed to a perfect, trial.”’” (Arave, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 536-537; see Williams, at p. 202 [“[i]f we determine there was
misconduct, we then assess whether the misconduct prejudiced
[the appellant] such that reversal is warranted”]; see also People
v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 914 [“the propriety and prejudicial
effect of a particular comment are judged by both its content and
the circumstances surrounding it”].)
       With limited exceptions, the general rule is that “a specific
and timely objection to judicial misconduct is required to preserve
the claim for appellate review.” (People v. Seumanu (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1293, 1320.)
         (a) Allegedly erroneous rulings
       To support her assertion of judicial bias based on the
court’s interference with her counsel’s effective representation,
Kirk alleges the court made erroneous rulings on evidentiary and
related matters. We reject her contention that erroneous rulings
established judicial bias. (See, e.g., Brown v. American Bicycle
Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 674 [rejecting claim of
judicial bias based on the contention that “the trial judge made
several erroneous legal rulings. The mere fact that the trial court
issued rulings adverse to Brown on several matters in this case,
even assuming one or more of those rulings were erroneous, does
not indicate an appearance of bias, much less demonstrate actual
bias”]; see also People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 405

                                13
[“‘“[a] trial court’s numerous rulings against a party—even when
erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially
when they are subject to review”’”].)
        Kirk’s attorney submitted a declaration stating that the
jurors noticed the court had treated her attorney differently from
Quirino’s attorney when ruling on evidentiary objections, but
Kirk did not submit the declaration of any juror saying so or
provide any example of such unequal treatment observed by the
jury. Moreover, Kirk failed to provide reasoned argument with
citations to the record and authority showing the court erred in
any such ruling. She has thus forfeited her contention of judicial
bias based on any such error.3 (See, e.g., United Grand Corp. v.
Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146 [“‘[i]n
order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis and citation to the record’”; concluding appellant
forfeited many of its claims of error after failing to comply with
that requirement]; Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a
point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument
and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived”].) In any

3     Different handling of an objection to the exact same
question may not necessarily constitute error. For instance,
Kirk’s attorney throughout the trial asked leading questions on
direct examination—questions that may not have been
objectionable as leading had they been asked on cross-
examination by Quirino’s attorney. (See Evid. Code, § 767.) The
record is replete with leading questions by Kirk’s attorney on
direct examination.

                                14
event, the record contains numerous examples of the court ruling
against Quirino on evidentiary matters.
       Kirk contends the trial court improperly refused to switch
to the correct video source to allow her counsel to display
admitted evidence to the jury during closing argument. However,
Kirk’s attorney did not ask the court to do so, and forfeited the
argument by failing to raise any objection in the trial court. (See
People v. Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1320.)
       Kirk asserts the court committed judicial misconduct when
it did not allow her attorney to draw on a document to
demonstrate the position of the vehicles at the moment of
collision. The record, however, shows that outside of the jury’s
presence Kirk’s counsel indicated his intent to draw on a
document during his opening statement; Quirino’s counsel
objected; and the court stated it had ordered the parties to meet
and confer and disclose the documents they intended to use
during opening statements. It ruled Kirk’s counsel, having
provided Quirino’s counsel inadequate notice and failed to comply
with the court’s requirement, could not alter the document.
Kirk did not raise that ruling in the trial court as a basis for her
judicial misconduct claim and she fails in her appellate briefing
to provide reasoned argument with citations to authority showing
how the ruling was improper. Accordingly, she has forfeited it as
a basis for finding judicial misconduct.
       Kirk contends the trial court erred in instructing her
counsel not to “disparage” Quirino’s witness Dr. Philip Yuan after
Kirk’s counsel had argued to the jury that the doctor was “selling
his credibility” and “violating his Socratic [sic] oath.” Again Kirk
fails to provide adequate context for the trial court’s instruction.
Specifically, Kirk omits that her counsel had earlier argued to the

                                15
jury that Quirino’s witnesses were “whores”: “This is what they
call the . . . —excuse my French—the war of the whores. [¶] . . .
[¶] The problem is the whores are only on that side. They hire
them to kill [Kirk’s] case. They give them a lot of money to testify
. . . .”
         The trial court, in admonishing Kirk’s attorney against
disparaging witnesses, stated, “I mean, once before you used
what you thought was a French word.” The court’s instruction to
counsel to avoid further disparagement of witnesses was an
appropriate exercise of the court’s discretion to ensure orderly
proceedings and safeguard the dignity of the courtroom.
         Finally, Kirk fails to establish prejudice resulted from the
allegedly erroneous rulings. Many of the rulings at issue related
to evidence about causation and damages. For example, she
contends the court improperly allowed defense expert Randles to
testify on direct examination about the causation of Kirk’s
claimed medical injuries and improperly limited Kirk’s counsel’s
cross-examination on that issue. Even if the court had erred in
its rulings regarding evidence of causation and damages,
however, it would have been immaterial: The jury never
addressed those elements because it found Quirino not negligent.
         (b) Ethnic or national origin bias
      Kirk’s contention of ethnic or national origin bias by the
court is also meritless. Kirk never identifies her ethnicity or
national origin or her attorney’s ethnicity or national origin. Nor
does she cite anything in the record identifying that information
or suggesting that the trial court was aware of it.
      Kirk argues the court demonstrated bias when it made
negative comments about her attorney’s English language use.
She relies on the court’s statement, “I don’t appreciate your use of

                                 16
the improper use of the English language.” As with her earlier
arguments, Kirk takes that statement out of context.
      Kirk’s counsel had argued that a particular passage in
Quirino’s deposition transcript contained an admission of liability
by Quirino. (Notably, Kirk neither set forth the contents of that
passage nor included a copy of the transcript pages containing it
as part of the record in the trial court or on appeal.) The court
apparently disagreed that the passage constituted an admission,
and stated to counsel: “Do you remember what I said about the
way you play with words? I don’t see a question here that he
answered as admitting that he caused the accident. I don’t see
those words here, and I don’t appreciate your use of the improper
use of the English language. You’re drawing a conclusion from
your questions. That’s your conclusion in your mind.” Read in
context, the court’s statement about improper English language
use was in response to what it had determined was Kirk’s
attorney’s misleading characterization of Quirino’s deposition
testimony, rather than bias. (See People v. Chatman (2006)
38 Cal.4th 344, 364 [“‘“[w]e of course presume the honesty and
integrity of those serving as judges”’”].)
      Kirk’s bias argument also relies on statements that the
court made when sustaining objections to her counsel’s questions,
during which the court explained why the questions were
improper. For example, Kirk points to the court’s explanation
regarding leading questions: “Not ‘Do you see,’ that’s leading.
The proper way to ask the question is, ‘What does that picture
show you or depict?’” Kirk further relies on the following
statements to Kirk’s attorney during voir dire: “How much time
do you need? But I’m going to hold you to cogent, reasonable
questions.” Nothing in those statements suggests bias on the

                                17
basis of ethnicity or national origin. (See Guardianship of Baby
Boy M. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 254, 278 [“we decline to impute
judicial misconduct upon the mere speculation of the parties”].)
         (c) Disparaging comments
      Kirk contends judicial bias was shown by the court’s
disparaging comments about her attorney and her attorney’s
performance. For example, in her appellate brief she contends
the court, on December 8, 2021, disparaged her attorney by
apologizing to the jury for “his ‘poor performance.’” The cited
portion of the transcript, however, shows the court actually
stated “this poor performance,” not Kirk’s attorney’s performance.
A reasonable interpretation of the record is that the court was
merely expressing its frustration at the trial’s slow pace, which
the court blamed on both parties.
      The day before, Kirk’s attorney had told the court
Dr. George Rappard, who was to testify as Kirk’s witness on the
morning of December 8, “has a very tight schedule, a lot of
surgery,” and “charges $1500 an hour.” The court emphasized its
desire for an efficient trial, stating it did not wish to have “dead
time because we worked hard to get this jury to sit still. From
day one, I’ve been saying I don’t want to have dark time.”
      On the morning of December 8, before the jury entered the
courtroom, the court stated Dr. Rappard would testify at
10:30 a.m. and told Quirino’s attorney “not to argue with” the
court. Expressing frustration with Quirino’s attorney for failing
to provide a simple “yes” or “no” answer to a question, the court
asked him, “Can you ever answer a question directly?”; stated he

                                18
had asked Quirino’s attorney “a simple question” but “g[o]t a
lecture”; and told him, “Thanks for ruining my morning.”
       Although the court’s frustration continued in the jury’s
presence, it was directed at both parties. After the jury entered,
Kirk’s attorney called Quirino as the first witness to testify that
morning. When her counsel stated his intent to ask Quirino
questions, the court told her attorney not to “give . . . lectures” or
say what he intended to do and instead to “[j]ust go on with the
business.” When Quirino was on the witness stand and
responded with a narrative to a question that required only a
“yes” or “no” answer, the court expressed frustration toward
Quirino. Later, when Quirino provided a concise, nonnarrative
response, the court stated to Quirino, “See how easy it is?” Before
excusing the jury for a 15-minute morning recess at 10:14 a.m.,
and with Dr. Rappard scheduled to testify at 10:30 a.m., the court
told the jury, “I’m sorry about this poor performance. I’m just as
frustrated.”4
       Under the circumstances, the court’s statement about poor
performance reasonably referred to its frustration with the
inability by all the participants in the trial to ensure Quirino’s
testimony would conclude by 10:30 a.m. The court’s impatience
in the jury’s presence with the pace of trial directed at both
parties did not constitute misconduct that was prejudicial.
Although the court made additional pointed comments to Kirk’s
counsel about the repetitive nature of his questions after the jury
had left the courtroom, those comments also did not constitute
prejudicial misconduct. (See, e.g., People v. Peoples (2016)

4     At the time, Kirk’s attorney had yet to inform the court he
was finished examining Quirino.

                                 19
62 Cal.4th 718, 789 [“[d]espite Judge Platt’s failure to comport
himself in the manner required by our Code of Judicial Ethics,
his misconduct was limited to hearings outside the presence of
the jury and thus did not result in a probability of actual bias”].)
       Kirk contends the court disparaged her attorney and thus
demonstrated bias by stating, “[W]e keep on playing this game.
I don’t want to play games.” The court’s comment was in
response to Kirk’s counsel asking essentially the same question
for which the court had already sustained an objection. Again,
while courts should refrain from expressing irritation at counsel
in the presence of the jury, this comment was not misconduct
warranting reversal. (See People v. Ramirez, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 1078; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 79 [“the court’s
occasional impatience with repetitious or vague foundational
questions did not convey a judicial bias”]; see also Ramirez, at
p. 1082 [“‘instances of friction . . . “are virtually inevitable in a
long trial”’”]; People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 482 [“[a] trial
court’s ‘frustration and irritation at counsel’s repeated efforts’ to
violate evidentiary rules can be viewed as ‘“friction between court
and counsel, [that] while not desirable, [is] virtually inevitable in
a long trial”’”].)
       Kirk sets forth additional examples that she contends
demonstrate judicial misconduct. As with the examples above,
Kirk fails to establish the court’s comments were prejudicial, and
the record contains numerous instances in which Quirino’s
counsel received similar treatment by the court in the jury’s
presence. Although the trial court’s conduct to both counsel at
times “left something to be desired” and some of its comments
“would have been better left unsaid” (Arave, supra,

                                  20
19 Cal.App.5th at p. 537), we conclude Kirk failed to establish
prejudicial misconduct warranting a new trial.
         (d) Posing objections and interfering with examination
      Kirk contends the court committed misconduct by posing
its own objections to her attorney’s questions and interfering with
Kirk’s attorney’s witness examinations. However, the examples
in Kirk’s brief demonstrate the impropriety of her counsel’s
questions. For example, Kirk’s attorney asked Dr. Yuan, “Do you
experience that, Doctor, when you examine somebody, and you’re
about to touch them and you’re touching them at a—at an area
where it is painful for them, and you tell them that you’re about
to touch them, and what they say—they cringe, even before you
touch them, anticipating the pain—have you ever experienced
that with patients?” Quirino’s attorney objected. The court
stated, “That’s irrelevant and immaterial. I’m posing my own
objection. Where are you going with this?”
      The court was even-handed in limiting inefficient questions
by both counsel. For example, when the court perceived that
Quirino’s attorney was conducting an inefficient examination of a
witness, the court objected stating, “Counsel, where are we going?
Do you want to go to Hawaii?”
      Kirk’s contention that the court improperly interfered with
her attorney’s cross-examination of Quirino is also unavailing.
Under questioning by Kirk’s counsel, Quirino initially referred to
the accident at having occurred at the wrong location, the “cross
streets La Cienega Boulevard and Inglewood—North Inglewood.”
Kirk’s attorney asked, “And La Cienega?” When Quirino replied,
“Correct,” the court stated, “Incorrect.” Kirk’s attorney said, “I’m
sorry?” The court asked, “Did you hear what you said?” and
repeated, “La Cienega.” Kirk’s attorney told the court he

                                21
intended to refresh Quirino’s memory. The court asked, “Did this
accident happen on Inglewood and La Cienega?” Kirk’s attorney
stated, “No, it happened on Centinela.” Quirino said,
“Centinela.” The court stated, “I thought I was losing my mind.
Nice to know.” Quirino said, “Yeah, Centinela and Inglewood.”
       Contrary to Kirk’s assertion, the portion of the transcript
on which she relies merely shows the court’s attempt to clarify
testimony and prevent misunderstanding; it does not
demonstrate judicial misconduct. That the accident occurred at
the intersection of Inglewood and Centinela, not La Cienega, had
been undisputed by the parties, as shown by their proposed
statement of the case and told by the court to the prospective
jurors, without objection, prior to voir dire. (See People v.
Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 780 [“‘[t]he court may make
any comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of
any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper
determination of the cause,’” citing Article VI, section 10 of the
California Constitution]; People v. Carlucci (1979) 23 Cal.3d 249,
256 [trial court is authorized to “‘participate in the examination
of witnesses whenever he believes that he may fairly aid in
eliciting the truth, in preventing misunderstanding, in clarifying
the testimony or covering omissions, in allowing a witness his
right of explanation, and in eliciting facts material to a just
determination of the cause’”]; Evid. Code, § 775 [“[t]he court, on
its own motion or on the motion of any party, may call witnesses
and interrogate them the same as if they had been produced by a
party to the action”].) Moreover, although Kirk asserts that the
court’s participation had prevented her counsel from effectively
impeaching Quirino, she fails to show prejudice: Quirino had
misspoken about an undisputed and uncontroversial topic.

                               22
         (e) Quirino’s alleged admission of fault
       At the trial Kirk’s attorney asked Quirino whether it was
true that, during his deposition, Quirino had admitted he was at
fault for the accident. Quirino’s counsel objected. In sustaining
the objection, the court instructed Kirk’s attorney, “If that’s what
he admitted at his deposition, read it.” Kirk’s attorney declined
to read the relevant deposition excerpt into the record.
       Kirk asserts the court, by finding Quirino had not admitted
fault without allowing the jury to hear Quirino’s deposition
testimony on the issue, committed misconduct and violated her
state constitutional right to have the jury determine every
material issue presented by the evidence. But the court did not
preclude Kirk from reading the deposition to the jury; it only
determined that Kirk’s counsel’s question was improper for
mischaracterizing Quirino’s deposition testimony. Kirk’s counsel
persisted in attempting to describe the deposition as an
admission without asking proper questions. In any event,
because Kirk failed to include in the record the excerpt of
Quirino’s deposition transcript on which her argument relies, she
has provided an inadequate record to review the claim of
prejudicial misconduct. (See, e.g., Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A.
Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348 [“[f]ailure to
provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be
resolved against appellant”; “principle stems from the well-
established rule of appellate review that a judgment or order is
presumed correct and the appellant has the burden of
demonstrating prejudicial error”]; see also Baker v. Children’s
Hospital Medical Center (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1057, 1060
[“the reviewing court presumes the judgment of the trial court is

                                 23
correct and indulges all presumptions to support a judgment on
matters as to which the record is silent”].)
         (f) Report to the State Bar
       Kirk contends the court committed misconduct when it told
her attorney, “[I]f you’re going to insist on arguing with me, I will
report you to the State Bar for making an accusation that you
cannot back up. I don’t want to do that.”5 While such a
statement made in front of the jury may indeed amount to
misconduct, Kirk omits from her brief that the court’s statement
was made outside the presence of the jury. Kirk failed to
establish the court’s statements outside the jury’s presence
constituted prejudicial misconduct. (See People v. Silveria and
Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 323-325 [no judicial bias or
misconduct when the judge, outside the jury’s presence,
reprimanded counsel and, in an effort to control what it perceived
to be inappropriate conduct by the attorney, told him it would
hold him in contempt if he did not sit down]; People v. Peoples,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 789 [“[d]espite Judge Platt’s failure to
comport himself in the manner required by our Code of Judicial
Ethics, his misconduct was limited to hearings outside the

5     The accusation to which the court referred was one that it
perceived Kirk’s attorney had improperly made against a
witness. Kirk’s attorney argued with the court on that issue.

                                 24
presence of the jury and thus did not result in a probability of
actual bias”].)
      4. Kirk Failed To Establish the Evidence Compelled a
         Finding in Her Favor as a Matter of Law and Forfeited
         Her Remaining Arguments
      Kirk contends the jury’s verdict that Quirino was not
negligent was not supported by the evidence. Her contention is
flawed.
      As the plaintiff, Kirk had the burden of proof on her
negligence claim against Quirino. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001)
26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205.) When, as here, “‘“the trier of fact has
expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden
of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals,”’
generally ‘“the question for a reviewing court becomes whether
the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a
matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes
whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and
unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave
no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.’”’” (Phipps v. Copeland Corp. LLC (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 319, 333; accord, SwiftAir, LLC v. Southwest
Airlines Co. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 46, 59 [affirming judgment in
an appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of posttrial motions,
including a motion for new trial].) Kirk failed to meet this
burden. To the contrary, her argument that the evidence
compelled a finding of Quirino’s negligence relied on evidence
that was contradicted or impeached during trial, and Kirk
pointed out those contradictions in her brief.
      Elsewhere in her appellate briefing, Kirk raises additional,
conclusory contentions without providing cogent argument, legal

                                 25
analysis, or citations to the record or authority and has therefore
forfeited the arguments. For example, she alleges that the court
erred in instructing the jury by paraphrasing the jury
instructions. However, she cites only an excerpt of the record
during jury selection (and does not cite the record showing the
instructions given to the empaneled jury), and she fails to provide
reasoned argument with citations to authority showing why the
language used by the court during jury selection was incorrect or
prejudicial. Similarly, in part of a heading of her opening
appellate brief, Kirk contends that the jury’s verdict was contrary
to law—specifically, Vehicle Code section 21801, subdivision (a).
She fails, however, to support that conclusory assertion with any
reasoned argument or legal analysis.
                         DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Quirino is to recover his costs on
appeal.

                                     EVENSON, J.
      We concur:

            SEGAL, Acting P. J.

            MARTINEZ, J.


      Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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