Court Opinion

ID: 9402923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-19 10:08:36.504014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:03.194964
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-23-00046-CR
     ___________________________

        ADAN CHAVEZ, Appellant

                      V.

    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

   On Appeal from the 89th District Court
           Wichita County, Texas
    Trial Court No. DC89-CR2023-0003

  Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.
     Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
                                       OPINION

       In this habeas case, Appellant Adan Chavez challenges the trial court’s refusal

to lower his $1 million bail for his pending murder charge. 1 The State argues that

Chavez’s excessive-bail challenge is not cognizable on pretrial habeas because federal

authorities have issued a warrant for his arrest, so even if Chavez posts bail for his

murder charge, he will be transferred to federal custody rather than immediately

released. And regardless, the State contends, the $1 million bail is justified given the

gravity of Chavez’s offense, the threat he poses to the community, his criminal

history, his prior failures to appear, and his out-of-town ties.

       We disagree with the State on both fronts. First, Chavez’s federal warrant does

not undermine the cognizability of his excessive-bail challenge because, whether or

not another jurisdiction seeks to detain him, habeas relief could result in his

immediate release from Wichita County’s unlawful confinement or restraint. And

second, although the statutory bail considerations support a reasonably high bail in

this case, the record before us does not contain sufficient evidence to demonstrate

that a bail of $1 million is necessary to satisfy the government’s legitimate interests.

Accordingly, we will reverse.

       The State contends that Chavez is also charged with deadly conduct, but the
       1

case before us involves the bail set on only the murder charge.

                                             2
                                   I. Background

      The details of Chavez’s alleged offense are confined to two probable-cause

affidavits that accompanied his arrest warrants.2       According to those affidavits,

Chavez shot a man—Jorge Gonzalez—in front of a Dollar Saver store in the last of a

series of confrontations between Chavez and Gonzalez that day.

      In the morning, Chavez had been involved in a fight with Gonzalez. One of

the two probable-cause affidavits indicated that the fight involved two of Gonzalez’s

brothers as well, and based on the address listed for the fight, it appears to have taken

place down the street from the Gonzalezes’ home. When the police talked to the

Gonzalez brothers later that morning, they were told that Chavez had warned that he

would come back with a gun. One of the brothers also showed the officers text

messages that had allegedly come from Chavez threatening harm.3 And, a few hours

      2
        The State relied on these affidavits to recite the details of Chavez’s alleged
offense for purposes of the habeas proceeding below, so we are similarly limited. See
Ex parte Anunobi, 278 S.W.3d 425, 426 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.)
(“Our consideration of this appeal is limited to the record before us.”); Ex Parte
Johnson, No. 01-91-00864-CR, 1991 WL 273264, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Dec. 19, 1991, no writ) (not designated for publication) (“Our review on appeal
is limited to the record properly before us, and assertions in the brief that are
unsupported by the record will not be accepted as fact.”).
      3
        The text messages are not in the record so it is unclear what they said, how
many there were, or when they were received. One of the two probable-cause
affidavits summarized the content of the text messages as “making threats to harm
the Gonzalez brothers.”

                                           3
after talking with the police, the Gonzalez brothers returned home to find that their

residence had been shot at multiple times.

      This led up to the final confrontation of the day at a nearby Dollar Saver store

where Chavez and Gonzalez first exchanged words in the parking lot. When Chavez

proceeded to get out of the truck he was in, he pulled a rifle out of a cooler in the

truck’s bed, and Gonzalez told him to put down the gun and fight him. Instead,

Chavez pulled the trigger and shot Gonzalez multiple times. Then Chavez climbed

back into the truck and fled. Gonzalez died at the scene.

      The police subsequently received a tip regarding Chavez’s location, and when

they executed a search warrant, they found a rifle that a crime lab traced back to the

murder. 4 The rifle was also traced to the shooting at the Gonzalezes’ home earlier in

the day. Based on this evidence, the police obtained warrants to arrest Chavez for

murder and for deadly conduct.

      Chavez was subsequently indicted for murder, and his bail was set at $1 million.

He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing that his bail was excessive. See

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 11.01, .23.

      In the brief habeas hearing that followed, only one witness testified: Chavez’s

mother. A primary focus of her testimony was Chavez’s inability to afford the

      4
       One of the probable-cause affidavits listed the address where law enforcement
found the murder weapon, but it was not Chavez’s home address, and the affidavit
did not clarify how Chavez was connected to the address.

                                             4
$1 million bail. She explained that Chavez’s girlfriend 5—who was the mother of his

infant daughter and with whom he lived—had spoken to a bondsman, and the

bondsman required ten percent of the bail amount. Chavez’s mother stated that

neither she nor Chavez’s girlfriend could afford to pay ten percent of $1 million, i.e.,

$100,000. The family had “talked about pitching in, everybody, [Chavez’s] sisters and

[mother] . . . and his baby mother as well,” and the most they could afford to pay was

$8,000—ten percent of an $80,000 bail.6 When asked about Chavez’s possessions, his

mother stated that Chavez did not own a home and did not own a vehicle.

      His mother also described his family ties to Wichita County—she, his five

sisters, three children, and long-term girlfriend all lived there. She confirmed that if

Chavez were released from all government custody, he would live at home with his

girlfriend and their daughter. Chavez was 24 years old at the time of the habeas

hearing, and he had worked for a company in the roofing industry since he was a

      5
        Although Chavez’s mother testified that the woman he lived with was not his
wife, Chavez’s unsworn declarations of his indigency indicated that he lived with his
“wife.”
      6
        Chavez filed two separate unsworn declarations of his indigency in very
different handwriting and with very different signatures. One of the declarations
indicated that he did not have a job and that the income earned by all of the adults in
his household was “NA.” The other declaration stated that he worked as a roofer,
that he earned about $1,000 per week, and that the adults in his household earned a
total of $6,000 per month. The State did not offer either document into evidence at
the habeas hearing, nor does it mention the documents on appeal. Regardless, the
record indicates that Chavez was declared indigent and appointed counsel.

                                           5
teenager. Although Chavez’s mother had not spoken to his boss, she predicted that

he would be able to resume work upon his release.

      She also assured the court that Chavez would submit to bail conditions and

that she and Chavez’s girlfriend would report any violations to the court. Although

Chavez did not have a car, his mother stated that she, Chavez’s girlfriend, and his five

sisters could help transport him to any court settings. Many of his sisters were in the

courtroom—presumably to support him—during the habeas hearing.

      The State cross-examined Chavez’s mother, and it used her testimony to

successfully offer a series of exhibits: the probable-cause affidavits detailing the

alleged murder, photos of the victim and murder weapon, the medical examiner’s

cause-of-death report, an email printout of Chavez’s criminal history, court

documents related to Chavez’s pending federal-court charge, and jail disciplinary

reports, to name a few. Chavez’s mother had limited (if any) knowledge of the

information contained in these exhibits, so most of the documents went unexplained

apart from the State’s description of them when it offered them into evidence.

      But the State did elicit some testimony from Chavez’s mother on topics within

her knowledge. Chavez’s mother confirmed that he often worked out of town, that

he had a conviction for assault family violence, and that he had a pending federal

charge for transporting illegal aliens while in the San Antonio area.         She also

acknowledged that there was a hold on his detention—what the federal records listed

as a “no bail warrant”—related to Chavez’s federal charge. [Capitalization altered.]

                                           6
She explained that Chavez wanted to post bail on his murder charge so he could go to

San Antonio and take care of the federal case.

      At the end of the hearing, the State emphasized that “the gravity of this crime

[wa]s extremely concerning to the safety of th[e] community,” and it argued that

Chavez’s “travel with work . . . [and] smuggling of illegal aliens” created a “concern

[as] to what connections he might have to the border or to moving around within the

State of Texas itself.” The trial court agreed, concluding that the $1 million bail was

not excessive “in light of the flight risk situation if he were released and the fact that

he is charged with a very serious charge.” It denied habeas relief.

                                   II. Cognizability

      The State argues that Chavez’s federal warrant undermines the cognizability of

his excessive-bail challenge. According to the State, because “a resolution of Chavez’s

habeas-corpus application in his favor cannot result in his immediate release, . . . his

claim is not cognizable,” and this appeal should be dismissed.7

A.    Dismissal

      As an initial matter, dismissal is not the appropriate remedy for the State’s

cognizability complaint. Although cognizability is “a threshold issue that should be

addressed before the merits of the claim may be resolved,” Ex parte Ellis, 309 S.W.3d

      7
       The State previously raised this argument in a motion to dismiss the appeal,
but we denied the motion. It now urges the court to reconsider the issue.

                                            7
71, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), it is distinct from jurisdiction.8 Ex parte McCullough,

966 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). “Certain claims may not be cognizable

on habeas corpus, i.e., they may not be proper grounds for habeas corpus relief,” but

“if the district court denies relief, regardless of the underlying claims for the relief

sought, the applicant may appeal,” and “[t]he [c]ourt of [a]ppeals ha[s] jurisdiction.”

Id.; see Ex parte Blakely, No. 02-19-00426-CR, 2020 WL 719430, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Feb. 13, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Ex

parte Headrick, 997 S.W.2d 348, 350 n.8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (op.

on remand).     So even if we agreed with the State that Chavez’s excessive-bail

challenge is not cognizable, “the proper disposition of this case [would be] to affirm

the trial court’s order denying relief, as opposed to dismissing.” Headrick, 997 S.W.2d

at 350 n.8.

B.     Immediate Release

       Regardless, we do not agree with the State that Chavez’s excessive-bail

challenge is not cognizable. It is true that, generally, “[a] pretrial writ application is

not appropriate when resolution of the question presented, even if resolved in favor

of the applicant [i.e., defendant], would not result in immediate release.” Ex parte

Couch, 629 S.W.3d 217, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617,

       Although the State has not expressly stated that the alleged lack of
       8

cognizability robs this court of jurisdiction, that appears to be the logic behind its
dismissal argument.

                                            8
619 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). And this oft-recited rule is frequently left at that,

occasionally specifying what the defendant must be released from, but rarely

specifying from whom he must be released. See, e.g., Ex parte Hammons, 631 S.W.3d

715, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (reciting rule without specifying from whom or

what); accord Couch, 629 S.W.3d at 217; Ex parte Ingram, 533 S.W.3d 887, 892, 894 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017); Ex parte Perry, 483 S.W.3d 884, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

(plurality op.); Ex parte Doster, 303 S.W.3d 720, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Weise, 55

S.W.3d at 619; Headrick v. State, 988 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also

Blakely, 2020 WL 719430, at *3–4 (specifying from what—release “from illegal

confinement or restraint”—but not from whom); Ex parte Taylor, No. 03-16-00689-

CR, 2017 WL 4898989, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 26, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (similar, specifying from what—release from “the

restraint on his liberty imposed by the pending criminal charges”—but not from

whom); Green v. State, 999 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d)

(similar, specifying from what—release “from confinement”—but not from whom).

The State appears to understand the unspoken portion of this rule to require a

defendant’s immediate release from government confinement generally, including

confinement by other jurisdictions. 9

      9
       To the extent that the State limits the concept of immediate release to a
defendant’s discharge from physical custody, this too is erroneous. “[C]onfinement”
and “restraint” encompass not only “the actual, corporeal and forcible detention of a
person, but . . . [also] any coercive measures . . . whereby one person exercises a

                                          9
       But in this context, the concept of immediate release refers to a defendant’s

release from the illegal confinement or restraint imposed by a specific authority—not

his ability to walk the streets generally.

       “The writ of habeas corpus is intended to be applicable to . . . cases of

confinement and restraint[] where there is no lawful right in the person exercising the

power, or where, though the power in fact exists, it is exercised [by that person] in a

manner or degree not sanctioned by law.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.23

(emphasis added). The defendant’s habeas petition is required to identify “by whom”

he is “illegally restrained in his liberty,” naming the person, “or if unknown,

designating and describing them.” Id. art. 11.14(1). So the question is whether “the

person exercising the power” does so lawfully.        Id. art. 11.23.   The fact that

jurisdiction A may have lawful power to confine the defendant for crime X does not

control over the person of another[] and [either] detains him within certain limits” or
“subject[s] him to the general authority and power of the person.” Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. arts. 11.21, .22; see also Ex parte Smith, 178 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005) (recognizing that a defendant may challenge “conditions attached to bail”
via a pretrial writ); Ex Parte Martinez, No. 02-15-00353-CR, 2015 WL 9598924, at *2
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 31, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (“A person who is subject to the conditions of a bond is restrained in his
liberty, and that restraint must be reasonable.”); cf. Ex parte Watkins, 73 S.W.3d 264,
274 & n.40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (discussing cognizability of collateral estoppel
when sudden-passion issue had already been litigated and explaining that immediate-
release requirement did not apply, but noting that “in a legal sense, [appellant was]
seeking ‘immediate release’ from a second degree punishment for attempted murder
or a first degree punishment for attempted capital murder”).

                                             10
allow jurisdiction B to exceed the scope of its independent power in confining the

person for crime Y.

      And that is precisely the situation here. Chavez is subject to two different

confinements by two different jurisdictions with two different legal grounds for

asserting power. If Wichita County is exercising power over Chavez in an illegal

manner—if it has denied him a reasonable bail for his murder charge—then he is

entitled to immediate release from Wichita County’s illegal confinement or restraint.

See id. The State has not cited, 10 nor have we found, any case law to support the idea

that a defendant’s excessive-bail complaint loses cognizability merely because another

jurisdiction asserts separate authority to confine or restrain him for a separate

reason.11

      10
         The cases cited by the State—Bishai and Ares—are distinguishable because
(1) neither case involved an excessive-bail challenge; and (2) in those cases, the
defendants were subject to detention by only one jurisdiction. Ex parte Bishai, Nos.
09-21-00158-CR to 09-21-00163-CR, 2021 WL 5498211, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Nov. 24, 2021) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding claim
not cognizable when defendant disputed facial validity of statutes but challenged only
six of ten indictments), pet. dism’d, Nos. PD-0935-21 to PDF-0940-21, 2022 WL
698178 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2022); Ex parte Ares, No. 13-17-00638-CR, 2019 WL
4493698, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 19, 2019, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding in pari materia claim not cognizable
when defendant was charged with two counts and one did not present in pari materia
issue on its face).
      11
        To hold otherwise would effectively permit a county’s illegal pretrial
confinement of a defendant based on a federal jurisdiction’s separate assertion of
authority. The county—relying on its potentially illegitimate, independent basis for
the defendant’s confinement—would not be required to transfer the defendant to the
federal jurisdiction, thus hindering the defendant from challenging his federal

                                          11
      Indeed, the Court of Criminal Appeals has acknowledged that a defendant is

entitled to bail even when he is subject to confinement or restraint by another

jurisdiction. See Castaneda v. State, 138 S.W.3d 304, 306–07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).12

The bail acts “as a way [for the defendant] to exercise what little control may be

available to [him] in determining the order of disposition of the pending charges”:

      If the principal wishes to first dispose of charges in jurisdiction A but is
      in the custody of jurisdiction B, posting bond in jurisdiction B will cause
      the principal’s transfer to jurisdiction A. If, after transfer of the principal
      to jurisdiction A, the surety surrenders the bond in jurisdiction B,
      jurisdiction B will file a detainer for the principal in jurisdiction A.
      Thereafter, when the charges in jurisdiction A are resolved, the principal
      will be returned to jurisdiction B.

Id.

      This is not to say, of course, that Chavez is entitled to be released to the street

upon posting the required bail for his murder charge. Again, the question before us is

whether he is entitled to release from Wichita County’s unlawful confinement or

restraint. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 11.21, .23. If Chavez posts the

detention. Yet, the county’s pretrial detention would be rendered non-cognizable
based on the authority of the federal jurisdiction—the very jurisdiction that the
county declines to transfer the defendant to. Cf. Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 619–20
(reasoning that “an applicant may use pretrial writs to assert his or her constitutional
protections with respect to . . . bail” in part because “these protections would be
effectively undermined if these issues were not cognizable”).
      12
        In Castaneda, the Court of Criminal Appeals was addressing a different issue:
whether a bail bondsman is liable when its principals are transferred to federal
authorities and subsequently fail to appear in state court. 138 S.W.3d at 306–11.
Nonetheless, the court’s opinion is instructive regarding bail’s operation when a
defendant is subject to confinement by multiple jurisdictions.

                                            12
required bail, “[t]he sheriff [must do] as the law requires and . . . release[] the principal

from the custody of [that] County and set him at liberty as to [that] County.”

Castaneda, 138 S.W.3d at 310. But “[t]hat is all the sheriff can legally do[—]he has no

authority to accept a surety bond on a detainer filed by another jurisdiction,” and he is

not required to “release the principal to the street” if another jurisdiction has an

outstanding warrant that requires the defendant’s transfer. Id.

       Here, then, Chavez’s excessive-bail challenge could in fact result in his

immediate release from the confinement or restraint of the person unlawfully

exercising its power: Wichita County. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.23; see

also Castaneda, 138 S.W.3d at 306–07, 309–10. Whether he will be freed from other

jurisdictions’ restraints and immediately released “to the street” is not the test. Cf. In

re Wiles, No. 08-18-00177-CR, 2019 WL 1810756, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Apr. 24,

2019, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication) (holding trial court erred by

issuing bail order that directed sheriff to ignore ICE detainer and noting that, while

the sheriff “was required, upon receipt of the personal bond, to release [the

defendant] from the custody of El Paso County and set him at liberty as to El Paso

County, he could not release him to the street because it would violate the duty [to

honor ICE detainers] imposed on him by Article 2.251”). Chavez’s excessive-bail

challenge is cognizable in this habeas proceeding.

                                             13
                                     II. Excessive Bail

         Turning to the merits of his habeas petition, we address Chavez’s contention

that his $1 million bail is excessive.

A.       Governing Law and Standard of Review

         “In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is

the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S. Ct.

2095, 2105 (1987); Ex parte Hanson, No. 02-22-00045-CR, 2022 WL 1496533, at *1

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 12, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (quoting Salerno). Our federal and state constitutions reflect this norm by,

among other things, prohibiting the imposition of “[e]xcessive bail.” U.S. Const.

amend. VIII; Tex. Const. art. I, § 13; see Tex. Const. art. I, § 11.

         Bail is excessive if it is “in an amount greater than is reasonably necessary to

satisfy the government’s legitimate interests.”        Hanson, 2022 WL 1496533, at *1

(quoting Ex Parte Peyton, No. 02-16-00029-CR, 2016 WL 2586698, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth May 5, 2016) (mem. op., not designated for publication), pet. dism’d, No.

PD-0677-16, 2017 WL 1089960 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 22, 2017) (not designated for

publication)). The government’s primary interest, and bail’s primary purpose, is to

provide a reasonable assurance of the defendant’s presence at trial. Id.; see Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.01; Ex parte Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. Crim. App.

1977).

                                              14
       In setting bail, a trial court is “governed by the Constitution and the following”

statutory guidelines:

       1.    Bail and any conditions of bail shall be sufficient to give
       reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with.

       2.    The power to require bail is not to be used to make bail an
       instrument of oppression.

       3.     The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which the
       offense was committed are to be considered, including whether the
       offense: (A) is an offense involving violence as defined by Article 17.03;
       or (B) involves violence directed against a peace officer.

       4.    The ability to make bail shall be considered, and proof may be
       taken on this point.

       5.    The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense, law
       enforcement, and the community shall be considered.

       6.    The criminal history record information for the
       defendant . . . shall be considered, including any acts of family violence,
       other pending criminal charges, and any instances in which the
       defendant failed to appear in court following release on bail.

       7.     The citizenship status of the defendant shall be considered.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(a) (indentation altered). The Court of Criminal

Appeals has identified other factors to be considered as well, including the

defendant’s work record, his family ties, and his length of residency. See Ex parte

Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849–50 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981) (listing many

factors reflected in the current version of Article 17.15).

       We review a trial court’s bail determination for an abuse of discretion, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision. Ex parte Gomez,

                                            15
624 S.W.3d 573, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We will not disturb the decision if it is

within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Hanson, 2022 WL 1496533, at *2. The

defendant has the burden to show that it is not within that zone. Id.; see Gomez, 624

S.W.3d at 576.

B.     Analysis

       Chavez carried his burden here. Although many of the bail considerations

weigh against him, the record before us does not support a determination that a

$1 million bail is necessary to satisfy the government’s legitimate interests.

       1.     Nature of the Offense and Potential Sentence

       The nature of the defendant’s alleged offense and the length of his potential

sentence are the “primary factors” we consider in evaluating a bail decision. Hanson,

2022 WL 1496533, at *2 (quoting Ex parte Hunt, 138 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2004, pets. ref’d)); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(a)(3); Rubac,

611 S.W.2d at 849. Here, these factors weigh in favor of a reasonably high bail.

       Chavez is charged with a violent, public murder—a first-degree felony. See

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b), (c). Although the State represents that he is charged

with third-degree-felony deadly conduct as well—for shooting at the Gonzalezes’

home on the day of the murder—nothing in the record indicates that Chavez has

been indicted for that offense.13 See id. § 22.05(b), (e). Even so, the facts underlying

       The record reflects that Chavez was arrested for deadly conduct, but it does
       13

not show that he was indicted for that offense.

                                            16
the purported deadly conduct charge are part of the circumstances of Chavez’s

murder charge, and with or without a separate indictment for deadly conduct, those

factual allegations are weighty.

       Chavez himself acknowledges that he faces “a serious charge.” If convicted of

murder, his punishment will range from five years to 99 years or life in prison. See id.

§ 12.32(a).   And the prospect of a potentially lifelong sentence heightens “the

importance of setting bail sufficiently high to secure [Chavez’s] appearance at trial.”

Ex parte Rotter, No. 02-21-00016-CR, 2021 WL 2006313, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth May 20, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming

$750,000 bail for murder); see Ex parte Scott, 122 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2003, no pet.) (recognizing that “the accused’s reaction to the prospect of a

lengthy sentence might be to not appear”).

       These factors weigh in favor of a reasonably high bail amount. See Hanson,

2022 WL 1496533, at *3–4 (concluding similarly in review of $1 million murder bail).

       2.     Safety Risk

       The “future safety of a victim of the alleged offense, law enforcement, and the

community shall [also] be considered” in the bail analysis. Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

Ann. art. 17.15(a)(5).

       The allegation that Chavez committed a violent murder certainly raises a

generalized concern for the community’s safety. See Hanson, 2022 WL 1496533, at *4

(acknowledging that defendant’s commission of alleged murder raised generalized

                                          17
safety concern). But the State offered very little evidence that Chavez presents an

identifiable threat to specific Wichita County residents or that the threat is ongoing.

Cf. id. (noting lack of evidence that defendant posed identifiable threat to specific

community members). There was no testimony offered on this subject at the habeas

hearing.

       On appeal, the State points out that one of the probable-cause affidavits

described Chavez as having fought with, shot at, and threatened the three “Gonzalez

brothers”—not just the victim, Jorge Gonzalez. Yet, these affidavit references were

not mentioned, much less elaborated upon, in the trial court hearing. Cf. Ex parte

Cook, No. 02-18-00537-CR, 2019 WL 2323643, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May

31, 2019, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding

$750,000 bail excessive in murder case and noting that, “[o]ther than the

circumstances of the charged murder and burglary offenses, the hearing did not

develop additional evidence . . . that [the defendant] was a danger to the community”).

And while the failure to highlight these affidavit references does not preclude

consideration of them on appeal, there was no evidence of the whereabouts of the

victim’s two brothers nor any evidence that bail conditions would be insufficient to

protect those brothers. In fact, there was no discussion of any safety-related bail

conditions at all.

       Although the release of an accused murderer creates a generalized safety

concern, on this record we hold that the scant evidence that Chavez poses an

                                          18
identifiable threat is insufficiently related to Chavez’s $1 million bail. See Hanson, 2022

WL 1496533, at *4–5 (concluding similarly when evidence did not show that murder

defendant with $1 million bail posed an identifiable threat); Ex parte Taylor, No. 02-20-

00010-CR, 2020 WL 1963788, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 23, 2020, no

pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that aggravated

robbery offense raised safety concerns but that bail conditions protected the

community and holding $500,000 bail excessive).

      3.     Criminal History

      A court setting bail must also consider “[t]he criminal history record

information for the defendant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(a)(6). A

defendant’s criminal history can suggest that the defendant would be a danger to the

public if released on bail. Hanson, 2022 WL 1496533, at *4; cf. Peyton, 2016 WL

2586698, at *5 (considering criminal history as part of safety analysis).

      Chavez’s criminal history shows just one prior conviction: a misdemeanor

assault family violence offense. The habeas record contains little evidence related to

the details or circumstances of this offense—the record shows only that it occurred in

2016 and that he pleaded guilty to the offense. Chavez’s mother testified that the

offense involved the mother of Chavez’s seven-year-old son. She commented that

Chavez “didn’t put a hand on her or anything” but that “she just called the police on

                                            19
him.”14 Apart from this commentary and the entry on Chavez’s criminal record, there

is no other evidence regarding what occurred. Cf. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

17.15(a)(6) (requiring consideration of a defendant’s criminal history “including any

acts of family violence”).

      This was Chavez’s only prior conviction;15 he had no prior felony convictions.

See Hanson, 2022 WL 1496533, at *4 (weighing criminal history in favor of a lower bail

amount when defendant charged with murder had a prior DWI conviction, a DWI

arrest, and an arrest for theft of property); Peyton, 2016 WL 2586698, at *5–6 (holding

$1 million bail excessive where defendant was charged with solicitation to commit

capital murder but had no prior felony convictions).

      Of course, Chavez still has a pending federal charge for intrastate transport of

illegal aliens. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(a)(6) (requiring consideration

of “other pending criminal charges”); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (providing

criminal punishment for a person who, “knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact

that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law,

transports, or moves . . . such alien within the United States . . . in furtherance of such

violation of law”). According to the probable-cause affidavit that accompanied this

      14
        Earlier in the hearing, Chavez’s mother had testified that Chavez did not see
his seven-year-old son because he and the son’s mother “had issues.”

       Chavez also had a prior arrest for misdemeanor marijuana possession in 2019.
      15

The State does not contend that this arrest presents an ongoing safety threat to the
community.

                                            20
charge, Chavez told Border Patrol agents that he had been working on a job in San

Antonio and had joined a co-worker on a visit to the co-worker’s family in Uvalde. A

group of illegal aliens approached him outside his Uvalde motel and offered to pay for

his gas in exchange for a ride to San Antonio. He claimed that he “was just trying to

be a good guy and give them a ride and they were all headed in the same direction

anyway,” so he allowed the men to ride in the backseat and bed of the pickup truck he

was driving. There is no evidence that Chavez helped the illegal aliens cross the

border into the United States, nor is there any evidence that his actions involved

violence.

       While Chavez’s criminal history does not paint him in a favorable light, it does

not indicate that he poses such a significant ongoing safety threat as to require a

$1 million bail. See Hanson, 2022 WL 1496533, at *4 (holding criminal history did not

reflect danger to public when defendant had one prior conviction for DWI and two

prior arrests for DWI and theft); Ex parte Piceno, No. 02-13-00421-CR, 2014 WL

2611191, at *1, *5–6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 12, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (holding $500,000 bail excessive for sexual assault of a

child despite “significant criminal history” including juvenile adjudications for

terroristic threat and two burglaries of a habitation).

       4.     Bail Compliance

       Chavez’s past behavior while on bail does raise a concern. The trial court was

required to consider “any instances in which the defendant failed to appear in court

                                            21
following release on bail,” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(a)(6), and the State

argues that Chavez has failed to appear on two prior occasions.

       The first of the two occasions occurred during Chavez’s assault family violence

case. The court data associated with that case indicates that Chavez “absconded” a

few months before he pleaded guilty, but details were not provided. The evidence

regarding this incident was confined to a single line buried in Chavez’s criminal

history report, stating “PROVISION[:] ABSCONDED.”                  No other useful

information about the incident was elicited at the hearing.

       The second of the two bail-compliance incidents relates to Chavez’s pending

federal-court charge. Chavez’s mother testified that “[h]e told [her] he was calling,

reporting in” on his federal charge. The State refuted this by offering a police

dispatch log as evidence that, on the day Chavez was arrested for murder, the United

States Marshals Service informed the Wichita Falls Police Department that it had an

active “no bail warrant” for Chavez’s arrest due to his failure to report.

[Capitalization altered.] But again, there was no other relevant information provided

regarding this bail violation.

       The State contends, though, that these bail-compliance incidents reflect “a

demonstrated incapability of following rules and norms” that has continued

throughout Chavez’s time in jail. It points to the three jailhouse infractions that

Chavez has been disciplined for—using another inmate’s tablet access, breaking his

identification card, and throwing a chess piece in a detention officer’s direction—and

                                          22
warns that these demonstrate “his inability to abide by bail conditions.” But once

again, the record provides relatively little detail regarding these incidents. The jail

reports documenting Chavez’s infractions summarize his objectionable conduct in no

more than three sentences each. And while we do not condone the violation of jail

rules, it is a stretch to equate using another inmate’s tablet access, breaking an

identification card, or throwing a chess piece with a complete inability to comply with

court-imposed bail conditions on which one’s money and freedom are contingent. Cf.

Ex parte Sanderson, No. 02-21-00053-CR, 2021 WL 2843830, at *2, *4 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth July 8, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting

that misbehavior weighed against lowering bail when jail incidents “included twice

exposing his genitals to prison staff, once inciting a riot, and cursing and threatening

to kill a staff member”).

      Nonetheless, as with the last two factors—Chavez’s safety risk and criminal

history—his prior failures to appear and jailhouse infractions do not weigh in his

favor. See Ex parte Sells, No. 02-20-00143-CR, 2020 WL 7639574, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Dec. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting

that defendant’s prior convictions for failing to appear “are no doubt concerning

when considering that the intent of bail is to secure his appearance at trial”). The

question remains, however, given the limited evidence regarding these compliance

issues, whether the evidence supports the setting of bail in the amount of $1 million.

                                          23
      5.     Community Ties

      Chavez’s family ties weigh in his favor and indicate that he is likely to stay in

Wichita County. See Taylor, 2020 WL 1963788, at *6 (“The point of looking at a

defendant’s community and family ties is to assay the likelihood that he will appear for

trial.”); Peyton, 2016 WL 2586698, at *5 (noting that defendant’s community ties gave

him an incentive to stay despite pending charges); see also Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849

(listing family ties as bail consideration). Chavez’s children live there, his girlfriend

(and the mother of one of his children) lives there, his mother lives there, and his five

sisters live there.   Chavez’s mother testified that he had worked for a roofing

company “since he was like 15[ or] 16,” and she predicted that he could resume work

upon his release.     See Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849 (listing work record as bail

consideration). And the State’s own records reflect that Chavez is a United States

citizen who was born in Texas. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(a)(7)

(stating that “[t]he citizenship status of the defendant shall be considered” in bail

determination).

      Nonetheless, the State argues that Chavez has “significant out-of-town ties.” It

notes that his father’s family lives in Mexico, that in the past he has traveled for work,

and that he is accused of smuggling illegal aliens. But the record is devoid of evidence

supporting the State’s contention that these facts constitute “significant out-of-town

ties.” See Cook, 2019 WL 2323643, at *4 (holding that community ties weighed in

favor of reduced bail because “[d]espite the State’s argument . . . that [the murder

                                           24
defendant] had significant community ties outside of Wichita County, the evidence

d[id] not support that position”).

      Chavez’s mother testified that he “doesn’t really see” his family in Mexico and

that “[h]e was little the last time [h]e went [there].” While the trial court was not

required to believe her testimony, see Ex parte Parker, No. 02-23-00029-CR, 2023 WL

2926556, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 13, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication); Ex parte Kienlen, No. 02-22-00154-CR, 2022 WL

15053326, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 27, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication), there was no evidence to contradict her either.

      As for his traveling out of town, the record contains no evidence that through

Chavez’s out-of-town work trips he forged “significant” connections elsewhere. Cf.

Cook, 2019 WL 2323643, at *4 (concluding that murder defendant’s “[f]ive months of

work in another locale in Texas [were] insufficient to raise serious concerns that [he]

w[ould] abscond as argued [by the State] on appeal”). And Chavez’s mother testified

that, if he were required to stay in Wichita County, he would not take any out-of-town

roofing jobs.

      Regarding the federal charge, Chavez is accused of intrastate transport of illegal

aliens. There is no evidence that this incident supplied Chavez with foreign smuggling

connections that could assist him in fleeing.

      Thus, Chavez’s deep family ties to Wichita County weigh in favor of a lower

bail amount.

                                           25
       6.     Ability to Make Bail

       This brings us to the final relevant consideration: “[t]he [defendant’s] ability to

make bail.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(a)(4). Although this factor is not

dispositive, it is important. Bail must not be so high as to be “an instrument of

oppression.” Id. art. 17.15(a)(2). It is considered oppressive if it is set in an amount

higher than the defendant can afford for the purpose of forcing him to remain

incarcerated. Hanson, 2022 WL 1496533, at *6.

       To prove that a bail amount is beyond what the defendant can afford, the

defendant must establish that “his and his family’s funds have been exhausted,” Ex

parte Robles, 612 S.W.3d 142, 148 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.); see

Ex parte Ramirez-Hernandez, 642 S.W.3d 907, 920 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no

pet.), that he has made an attempt to furnish bail in the set amount, see Ex parte Dueitt,

529 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Ex parte Williams, 467 S.W.2d 433, 434

(Tex. Crim. App. 1971), or that there is an “enormous gap between what bail [the

defendant can] . . . afford[] and what bail the trial court actually set,” Hanson, 2022 WL

1496533, at *6–7 (quoting Ex parte Estrada, 640 S.W.3d 246, 255 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d)). Chavez did this.

       Chavez offered evidence that there is an “enormous gap between what

bail . . . [he could] afford[] and what bail the trial court actually set.” Id. at *7 (quoting

Estrada, 640 S.W.3d at 255). His mother testified that posting the $1 million bail

requires paying $100,000 to the bondsman, and that even if she, his sisters, and his

                                             26
girlfriend pool their resources, the most they can afford is $8,000. The evidence

shows that Chavez has no vehicle he can sell or house he can mortgage to gather

additional funds. Cf. Peyton, 2016 WL 2586698, at *4 (noting defendant’s inability to

satisfy $1 million bail when, among other things, he did not own a house or

operational vehicle). And the current bail amount is more than ten times the bail

amount that the evidence indicates Chavez and his family can afford. Cf. Ludwig v.

State, 812 S.W.2d 323, 324–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding $1 million aggregate

bail excessive for two alleged murders and one alleged capital murder when evidence

showed that defendant’s family could “scrape together, at best, $10,000” and bail set

by court required “ten times th[at] amount”); Cook, 2019 WL 2323643, at *4 (holding

$750,000 bail excessive in murder case and noting that the defendant’s “family was

having difficulty putting together the funds to secure [his] release when his bail was

set at $100,000 and had no hope after the amount was raised to $ 750,000”). This is

an enormous gap, and it weighs in favor of a lower bail amount. 16

      16
         The State analogizes this case to Parker, in which we affirmed two $1.5 million
bails. See Parker, 2023 WL 2926556, at *1–4. But there, the defendant was “accused
of stealing potentially millions of dollars” and using the money to purchase items of
personal property. Id. at *3–4. The money was unaccounted for, the defendant’s
business entities had ambiguous finances and assets, and the entities owned valuable
equipment. Id. at *1–2, *4. Plus, Parker’s wife stated that the couple received
between $10,000 and $15,000 per month in royalties. Id. at *2–4. Based on this
evidence, we held that the trial court had a reasonable basis “to believe that [the
defendant] may have been capable of paying the [two $1.5 million] bail amounts.” Id.
at *4. Here, there is no evidence that Chavez has any obscure business assets, that he
receives any royalty income, that he owns any real property, or that he has stolen large

                                          27
C.    Summary

      Generally, absent exceptional circumstances, a $1 million bail for a single, non-

capital offense is worrisome. See Kienlen, 2022 WL 15053326, at *10 (noting that a

cumulative bail of $1.435 million would be worrisome but that defendant failed to

prove it excessive); Hanson, 2022 WL 1496533, at *1–7 (reversing $1 million bail for

murder). This is particularly true when, as here, the defendant has offered evidence of

an “enormous gap” between the $1 million bail and the amount he can afford to pay.

Hanson, 2022 WL 1496533, at *7; see Ludwig, 812 S.W.2d at 324–25.

      Although Chavez is accused of a violent offense with a potentially lifelong

sentence, although he has some criminal history, and although he has apparently failed

to appear on two prior occasions, he has deep family ties to Wichita County, and

there is scant evidence that he presents an ongoing or identifiable safety threat. His

mother testified that he would comply with—and that she and Chavez’s girlfriend

would make sure he complied with—any bail conditions imposed upon him, and such

conditions could help mitigate the flight risk and generalized safety concerns shown

by the limited evidence at the habeas hearing.

      While the record supports a reasonably high bail amount, the key word is

“reasonably.” Cf. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Tex. Const. art. I, § 13. And on this

record, there is insufficient evidence that a $1 million bail is reasonably necessary to

sums of money. Rather, the undisputed evidence shows that the $1 million bail is far
beyond what he or his family can afford.

                                          28
protect the State’s legitimate interests and to secure Chavez’s presence at trial. See

Peyton, 2016 WL 2586698, at *6 (reversing $1 million bail for solicitation of capital

murder because, “[a]lthough the nature of the offense and the circumstances

surrounding it [we]re severe,” $1 million was “an amount greater than necessary to

ensure [the defendant’s] appearance”).

                                   III. Conclusion

      Because Chavez has a right to be free from excessive bail, because his assertion

of this right is cognizable despite the federal warrant for his arrest, and because, on

this record, the amount of his current $1 million bail is excessive, we reverse the trial

court’s order denying habeas relief. We remand the case to the trial court to set a

reasonable bail and to determine what bail conditions should be imposed.17

                                                      /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                                      Bonnie Sudderth
                                                      Chief Justice

Publish

Delivered: June 15, 2023

      17
        On remand, the trial court may allow the parties an opportunity to present
additional evidence or argument.

                                           29