Court Opinion

ID: 9686067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:24:43.560328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:14.126541
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
(concurring). I agree that Allen M. and Patricia M. have not shown that § 48.415(7), STATS., is unconstitutional as to them. As I understand it, we leave for another day other possible scenarios not implicated by this case. Thus, for example, § 48.415(7) provides that it is a ground for termination of parental rights if the child's parents are "closer than 2nd cousin[s]" by "adoption." That is not the case here. There are also other scenarios that are not presented by this case. See, e.g., In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6-7 (N.Y. 1953) (upholding for the purposes of the administration of a woman's estate, the validity of her marriage to her uncle "by the half blood" even though the marriage was incestuous under New York law because it was valid under a religious-practice excep*324tion to a similar ban on incestuous marriages in Rhode Island, where the parties were married).
I also believe it appropriate to explain why the legislature requires a concurrent, ipso facto, finding of parental unfitness whenever a jury (or judge sitting as a fact-finder) decides that grounds for termination exist (what the majority calls "factual unfitness"), and why a determination of what the majority calls "actual unfitness" at the time of the proceeding is nothing more than a factor used to determine whether termination is in the child's best interests.
Under the current statutory scheme, a finding that grounds for termination exist shifts the focus to whether termination is in the child's best interest. Stated another way, a finding that the parent is "unfit" under § 48.424(4), Stats., is sufficient to trigger the best-interest phase of the hearing — actual parental "unfitness" at the time of the proceeding is not a prerequisite to termination. Section 48.424(4) provides: "If grounds for the termination of parental rights are found by the court or jury, the court shall find the parent unfit."1
In In the Interest of J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981), the supreme court was faced with a constitutional challenge to the termination-of-parental rights statute as it then existed. The circuit court was then, as it is now, empowered but not required to terminate a person's parental rights if the statutory grounds for termination existed — essentially substantial and significant abandonment or neglect of the child (grounds similar to those now found in § 48.415(1) & (6), Stats.). See J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d at 130-131, 306 N.W.2d at 52-53. This was a two-step process: 1) the *325fact-finder decided whether there were grounds to terminate; 2) the circuit court decided whether termination was appropriate. J.L.W. engrafted on the statute a third step not provided for by the legislature: the parent had to be "unfit"— at the time of proceeding. Id., 102 Wis. 2d at 132-136, 136, 306 N.W.2d at 53-55, 55. As described by commentators, J.L.W. "overturned an order terminating an unwed mother's parental rights on the ground that the lower court had not made a specific finding that she was unfit, even though a finding of unfitness was not required under either Wisconsin statutes or case law at the time." Stephen W. Hayes & Michael J. Morse, Adoption and Termination Proceedings in Wisconsin: Straining the Wisdom of Solomon, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 439, 474 (1983).2
Under the current statutory scheme, termination is also a two-step process: 1) the fact-finder decides whether there are grounds to terminate, § 48.424(1), *326STATS.; and 2) the circuit court decides whether termination is appropriate, § 48.427(2). As in the statute considered by J.L.W., the current provision, § 48.426(2), Stats., provides that "[t]he best interests of the child shall be the prevailing factor considered by the court in determining" whether termination of parental rights is appropriate. See J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d at 131, 306 N.W.2d at 52.
The third step engrafted by J.L.W. (parental unfitness at the time of proceeding) has been trumped by the simple expedient of legislatively directing the trial court to "find the parent unfit" if the fact-finder determines that any of the grounds for termination exist. Section 48.424(4), Stats. In B.L.J. v. Polk County Dept. of Social Services, 163 Wis. 2d 90, 470 N.W.2d 914 (1991), the supreme court rejected a contention that the legislature had circumvented the decision in J.L. W. by linguistic legerdemain: "The legislature has in effect put a 'spin' on the word 'unfit' by giving the court the discretion to dismiss a petition if the circuit court 'finds that the evidence does not warrant the termination of parental rights.'" Id., 163 Wis. 2d at 109-110, 470 N.W.2d at 922-923. But the circuit court had that discretion under the J.L.W. version of the statute as well.
There seems to be no substantive difference between the statute in J.L.W., which permitted the circuit court to terminate parental rights (once grounds for termination were proved) if that was in the child's best interests, and the current statute, which was considered by B.L.J., and which also permits the circuit court to terminate parental rights (once grounds for termination are proved) if that is in the child's best interests. Simply put, the legislature has made it clear that a finding that a parent is unfit at the time of proceeding is not a prerequisite to the termination of *327that parent's rights, and the supreme court's latest word is that constitutional principles do not require otherwise.

 This provision was added by 1987 Wis. Act 383, § 16m.

 The supreme court made it clear that the unfitness was to be gauged at the time of the proceeding by its use of the present tense "is": "We hold that, except under unusual circumstances like those presented in Quilloin [u. Walcott, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)], the due process protections of the State and Federal Constitutions prohibit the termination of a natural parent's rights, unless the parent is unfit." In the Interest of J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 136, 306 N.W.2d 46, 55 (1981) (emphasis added). Moreover, a parent found to have abandoned or neglected his or her child is obviously an "unfit" parent at the time of the abandonment or neglect, and an additional finding of unfitness would be unnecessary if it was to be an assessment of the parent's past behavior with respect to the child. See also R.D.K. v. Sheboygan Cty. Social Services Dept., 105 Wis. 2d 91, 102, 312 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Ct. App. 1981) ("It is evident, then, that a finding of unfitness is a determination that further contact between parent and child will be seriously detrimental to the child.") (Interpreting J.L.W.', emphasis added.).