Court Opinion

ID: 9697968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:38:26.067304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:37.460959
License: Public Domain

Boylan,
Chief Judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, specially assigned, filed the following dissenting opinion:
I cannot concur in the Court’s opinion and I feel the reasons for dissenting should be briefly stated.
I feel that in cases of specific performance it is only necessary to make those persons parties who were parties or privies to the contract. Miller, Equity Procedure, sec. 64; Crook v. Brown, 11 Md. 158; 81 C. J. S. sec. 118 (b). In the *149Crook case, the Court stated: “There is a rule, however, applicable here, about which there can be no dispute, and that is, that a person ought not to be made a defendant against whom no decree can be passed.” (Page 172.) And in the case of Wright v. Santa Clara Ass’n, 12 Md. 443, Judge Le-Grand, speaking for the Court, said: “We do not discover, on an examination of the record in this case, that John B. Gray has any interest whatever in the question litigated between the parties to this suit, and inasmuch as no relief is prayed against him he was not a necessary party.” (Page 449.) Kerr v. Watts, 6 Wheat. 550, 559, 5 L. Ed. 328; Lanford v. Moore, 145 Md. 420, 423, 125 A. 686, 688.
The decree of the Chancellor did nothing more than require the Edgells to release their chattel mortgage. The Newark Trust Company was not required by the decree to do anything or to refrain from doing anything. As no decree was passed against the Newark Trust Company it has no standing to contest the decree. French v. Shoemaker, 81 U. S. 314, 20 L. Ed. 852; Preston v. Poe, 116 Md. 1, 81 A. 178; In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 125 A. 177.
The decree of the lower Court did not settle any dispute between the Newark Trust Company and the Edgells concerning the marshaling of assets (some $900.00 remaining in the hands of Charles E. Wheeler, Assignee, in No. 3411 Chancery, which proceedings are not before this Court), and I do not see how the affirmance by this Court of the decree of the Chancellor has determined the question.
Prior to the institution of the proceedings for specific performance, which is the case now before this Court, the Newark Trust Company instituted an action against the Edgells (No. 3393 Chancery) praying the mortgage of the Edgells on the Blakeney real estate be determined to be an inferior lien to the lien of the Newark Trust Company under its judgment. The question was not determined because the proceedings were abandoned upon the failure of the Newark Trust Company to amend after a demurrer had been sustained. Upon the failure to amend the bill could have been dismissed. McNiece v. Eliason, 78 Md. 168, 175, 27 A. 940; Alley v. Nott, 111 U. S. 472, 475, 4 S. Ct. 495, 28 L. Ed. *150491. The ruling of the Chancellor is not before the Court, but his action, in sustaining the demurrer could have been based upon the fact that the common debtor was an indispensable party defendant. 55 C. J. S. Marshaling, sec. 24, page 977; Steele Lumber Co. v. Laurens Lumber Co., 98 Ga. 329, 24 S. E. 755. In the opinion of the Court it is stated: “Any right which Newark might have to insist upon marshaling of assets in the foreclosure proceeding, and we express no opinion on that point, depends upon the continued existence of the lien of the second chattel mortgage held by the Edgells.” I do not believe that that statement, as applied to the facts in this case, is correct. In 55 C. J. S. Marshaling, sec. 11, at page 970, the text reads: “The release of one of his securities by the paramount creditor operates to postpone his claim only to the extent of the value of the property released; in other words, the release of the singly charged fund operates pro tanto as a release of the doubly charged fund from the lien of the paramount encumbrance, if the circumstances are such as to make that course just, and if the releasing creditor acts with full knowledge of the facts.”
The opinion of the Court makes reference to “trade” •creditors. The Court apparently presumed that the sale to .Howell and Lord was done in compliance with the sales in bulk act (Article 83, sec. 97). As I read that section the vendor must give to the purchaser a written statement of all •of the creditors of the vendor. I do not understand that the vendor must give only a statement of his “trade” creditors. The Sales in Bulk Act does not limit the rights of creditors to those who have claims for merchandise accounts. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Thomas, 133 Md. 270, 105 A. 174. By the use of the word “trade” creditors I am apprehensive that some confusion might arise.
There is one other matter that occurs to me as not authorized by our practice or by law and that is the filing of the “further stipulation of fact.” It was considered by the Chancellor and also by the Court of Appeals. The Newark Trust Company informed the Court that it did not desire to be present to cross-examine witnesses produced by the other *151party but rested its case solely on the Court’s adverse ruling on its demurrer to the second amended bill. Such a statement of counsel would not authorize, in my judgment, the remaining parties to stipulate facts, but would require them to produce witnesses to testify concerning the facts. An agreed statement of facts must be agreed to by all the parties. United States Trust Co. v. New Mexico, 183 U. S. 535, 22 S. Ct. 172, 46 L. Ed. 315; Reddick v. Pulaski County, 14 Ind. App. 598, 41 N. E. 834, 43 N. E. 238.
It is my judgment that the demurrer to the second amended bill of complaint should have been sustained. In the second place, I do not find that the Newark Trust Company is bound by the decree and they had no right to appeal from the decree of the Chancellor.