Court Opinion

ID: 9412009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 18:11:13.489997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:24.359484
License: Public Domain

J-A27038-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  FREDERICK T. FRY, INDIVIDUALLY               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
  ESTATE OF JEAN ANN FRY                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :   No. 50 MDA 2022
                                               :
  MONTROSE MINUTE MEN, INC.                    :

               Appeal from the Order Entered December 8, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County
                      Civil Division at No(s): 2020-00487

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                      FILED: JULY 28, 2023

       Frederick T. Fry, individually and as administrator of the estate of Jean

Ann Fry, appeals from the order granting summary judgment in favor of

Montrose Minute Men, Inc. (“Minute Men”). On appeal, Fry presents seven

issues, all of which touch upon his underlying contention that the lower court

erred in its summary judgment determination. After an extensive review of

the record, we disagree and affirm.

       As background,

       [o]n January 15, 2019, the [“]Minute Men crew[”] was dispatched
       to the Fry residence for a complaint of dizziness which required
       lifting assistance. The crew arrived about a half hour after [Jean
       Ann Fry, the] [d]ecedent fell. The crew consisted of Shawn
       Frampton, a paramedic, and Amy Johnson, the emergency

____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A27038-22

     medical technician (EMT). Decedent was still on the floor in the
     kitchen when Frampton and Johnson entered the house. Decedent
     was conscious, alert, and oriented and reported no neck pain or
     dizziness to Frampton. Frampton palpated [d]ecedent’s neck and
     back before lifting her. Fry pulled a dining room chair over and
     Frampton and Johnson lifted [d]ecedent onto the chair. Decedent
     refused to be transported to the hospital so Frampton sent
     Johnson out to the ambulance to bring in refusal paperwork and a
     heart monitor. A minute later, [d]ecedent’s eyes rolled back in her
     head and she became semi-responsive and then unresponsive.
     Frampton felt for a pulse and when he found no pulse, he moved
     her to the floor and started CPR on [d]ecedent. Johnson came
     back into the house and Frampton sent her back out to the
     ambulance to call for assistance because [d]ecedent was in
     cardiac arrest. A second crew from the Minute Men was
     dispatched. Johnson came back into the residence with equipment
     and helped Frampton with compressions. Frampton tried to start
     an intravenous line (IV) but was unsuccessful. He then
     successfully placed an intraosseous device (IO) in order to
     administer epinephrine to [d]ecedent. Two members of the Hop
     Bottom Hose Company were dispatched and arrived eight minutes
     later. The additional dispatched members of the Montrose Minute
     Men arrived, including James Krupinski and Robert Getz, and
     assisted with CPR then helped moved [d]ecedent to a backboard
     to transfer her to the ambulance. In the ambulance, Frampton and
     Getz continued performing CPR and Frampton administered
     additional doses of [e]pinephrine. Frampton tried to intubate
     [d]ecedent but there was [a] “peanut butter” like substance in her
     airway which he tried to suction out. He was unsuccessful. They
     arrived at the hospital and CPR was continued. Decedent was
     pronounced dead approximately 15 minutes later.

            Fry stated that Frampton and Johnson arrived to his
     residence about a half hour after [d]ecedent fell. Decedent was
     still on the floor in the kitchen and Fry brought a chair from the
     dining room into the kitchen and Frampton and Johnson lifted
     [d]ecedent into the chair. Decedent said she did not want to go to
     the hospital and Frampton informed Fry that they could not make
     her go to the hospital. Decedent started to slur her words and
     went unconscious. Decedent was moved from the chair to the floor
     and Frampton started performing chest compressions. Johnson
     was sent outside. A second crew arrived. They took [d]ecedent to
     the hospital and Fry followed in his own vehicle. At the hospital,
     Fry was told that [d]ecedent had died. Fry called the coroner after

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     he received the death certificate because the coroner did not list
     the cause of death as an accident. Fry asked the coroner to change
     the death certificate because Fry believed [d]ecedent’s fall was
     the cause of her death.

            Frampton ha[d] 20 years’ experience as a paramedic. The
     Fry call came in at 9:39 p.m. as an “Alpha” or low priority call,
     and he and Johnson were dispatched at 9:44 p.m. Frampton
     agreed that protocols apply to all emergency medical service
     (EMS) calls and if you do not follow protocol and obtain a history
     or perform a physical examination, you do not know how to treat
     the patient. He agreed that the physical exam is documented.
     Initial treatment for cardiac arrest is CPR. Frampton agreed that
     he did not have a cardiac monitor or equipment to place an IV at
     the time of the cardiac arrest. Frampton also agreed that for
     cardiac arrest, per protocol, epinephrine is generally given every
     three to five minutes. He agreed that the documentation indicates
     that he gave epinephrine at ten-minute intervals. It took him 12
     minutes to administer the first dose of epinephrine because he
     was performing CPR and trying to initiate the unsuccessful IV and
     subsequent successful IO. He did not call medical command
     because there is no cell phone coverage or sufficient radio
     coverage in Hop Bottom where the Fry residence is located.
     Frampton conceded that he did not try to use his phone but from
     past experience, he knows there is no cell coverage in that area.

           Johnson explained that on January 15, 2019, she was an
     EMT for the Minute Men who was paid a $20 stipend to do a shift
     which covered her fuel and meal cost. She explained that cardiac
     arrest was a high priority condition and protocol indicates
     administration of oxygen, treatment and immediate transport to
     [an] appropriate medical facility. Performance of a focused, head-
     to-toe, physical exam is [necessary] and that exam should be
     documented unless it is trumped by something else. If the patient
     goes into cardiac arrest, that becomes the focus.

           Robert Getz explained that he was a paid EMT for the Minute
     Men but at the time of the incident on January 15, 2019, he was
     responding as a volunteer because it was an off-duty or a second
     duty call.

           James Krupinski has been an EMT since 1986. He was
     operations manager for the Minute Men on January 15, 2019. He
     ran the day-to-day operations and was responsible for payroll,

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     taxes and bills and he did the hiring and firing of personnel. The
     Minute Men has a combination of paid employees and volunteers.
     The Minute Men does in-house training of EMTs outside of the
     required continuing education credits. The training is available
     through the regional office and could be two to six times a year.
     The Minute Men have policies and procedures that the EMTs and
     paramedics are expected to follow for documentation and patient
     care and all EMTs must follow the statewide basic life support
     (BLS) protocols and paramedics must follow the statewide
     advanced life support (ALS) protocols. Krupinski does not know if
     medical command was contacted at the time of the Fry call.
     Contact is usually made by cellphone but there is no cellphone
     coverage in Hop Bottom and radio coverage is uncertain in certain
     areas of Susquehanna County.

            Fry provided the report of Kimberly D. Freeman who is a
     physician[,] board-certified in emergency medicine and
     emergency medical services. Dr. Freeman indicated that
     [d]ecedent had a history of hypertension, atrial fibrillation and had
     a breast biopsy the day before the incident. Following [d]ecedent’s
     death, no autopsy was performed and the cause of death was
     listed as myocardial infraction, atrial fibrillation and hypertension.
     She believed that Frampton and Johnson breached the standard
     of care which caused and/or increased the risk of death of
     [d]ecedent in the following ways: 1) Frampton moved [d]ecedent
     to a chair without a documented medical exam; 2) Frampton did
     not document use of a “pit crew” for CPR after additional crew
     members arrived; 3) Frampton and Johnson did not bring
     equipment into the Fry home which delayed optimal initiation of
     resuscitation; 4) [r]hythm and pulse checks every two minutes
     were not documented; 5) Frampton attempted an IV as [a] first
     attempt for vascular access rather than [a] tibial IO which is
     required     per    ALS    protocol;      6)      ETCO2    was     not
     observed/documented as required by ALS protocol; 7)
     consideration/documentation of reversible causes of cardiac
     arrest was not done; 8) epinephrine was administered at 10
     minute intervals when ALS protocol calls for administration every
     3-5 minutes; 9) airway placement times were not documented
     and a secondary/rescue airway option was not considered
     following failed attempts to intubate; 10) reasons for deviation
     from protocol were not documented as required; and 11) there
     was a failure to contact medical command as required before
     transport and/or when 20-40 minutes of ALS unsuccessful
     resuscitative efforts had been completed. Dr. Freeman offered the

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     following opinion:

        [Decedent] suffered a cardiac arrest in the presence of
        Paramedic Frampton and EMT Johnson of the Montrose
        Minute Men when they responded to her residence for a fall.
        The resuscitation that ensued was compromised by the fact
        that the equipment was not brought into the house, delaying
        optimal resuscitation due to the lack of rescuers at her side
        and the lack of equipment to perform resuscitation.
        Thereafter, the wrong initial vascular access was used, the
        wrong epinephrine dosing interval was used, pulse and
        rhythm checkers were not performed every two minutes,
        and reversible causes were not considered. In addition,
        airway management by unsuccessful intubation attempts
        required CPR interruption rather than using a rescue device,
        and airway management was not documented adequately.
        Finally, ETCO2 was never documented and Medical
        Command was not contacted before transport as is required
        by protocol. … In conclusion, within a reasonable degree of
        medical certainty, all of the foregoing deviated from the
        standard of care in EMS care and increased the risk of harm
        and ultimately death of [decedent].

     Fry also provided the report of William G. McDonald, PhD, FACPE,
     NR-Paramedic. McDonald believed that the following actions were
     outside of the standard of care: 1) the crew failed to bring in
     diagnostic or treatment equipment when responding to a call for
     possible fainting; 2) [d]ecedent was placed in a chair prior to
     performance of an initial assessment; 3) rhythm checks were not
     performed every two minutes per protocol; 4) CPR pit crew
     approach was not documented; 5) Frampton attempted an IV line
     before attempting an IO when protocol directs to attempt an IO
     first; 6) while several attempts as endotracheal intubation were
     documented, Frampton did not document any attempt to remove
     the peanut butter in the airway manually or with finger sweeps;
     7) Frampton did not document the use or attempted use of an
     alternative airway device; 8) Frampton failed to administer
     epinephrine every 3-5 minutes as directed in Protocol 3031A; 9)
     Frampton did not document any attempt to call medical command
     either by radio or phone prior to moving or transporting the
     patient. McDonald then offered the following opinion:

          The EMS crew from the Montrose Minute Men should
        have initially carried their equipment with them into the Fry

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       home regardless of the call type. In this case, the call type
       (per the CAD) was fainting. This should have prompted the
       crew to think about possible medical conditions that could
       have possibly taken place. If the crew carried the equipment
       in and performed a thorough initial assessment, (checking
       the airway, breathing and circulations) initial vital signs, an
       EKG, SPO2 reading, and blood glucose level they would have
       determined whether [decedent] was stable enough to be
       moved into a sitting position in a chair. Once [decedent]
       suffered the cardiac arrest, she was place[d] on the floor.
       CPR was initiated, however, protocol 3031A I/O placement
       was not properly followed, requirements of [e]phinephrine
       every 3-5 minutes was neglected, there were three failed
       endotracheal intubation attempts, and no attempts to use
       alternate airway or manually clear the airway. These
       treatments were all outside the standard of care and
       recklessness. … It is my opinion with a reasonable degree of
       professional certainty that the EMS crew that responded to
       assist [decedent] acted in a reckless manner and breached
       the standard of care in addition to the Pennsylvania
       Statewide BLS Protocol 201 and the Pennsylvania Statewide
       ALS protocols … by not entering the location with proper
       diagnostic and treatment equipment and failing to perform
       an initial assessment before moving [decedent] as directed
       in 3031A.

     The Minute Men proved the report of Howard K. Mell who is a
     physician[,] board-certified in emergency medicine and
     emergency medical services. Dr. Mell disagreed with the opinions
     of Dr[s]. Freeman and McDonald that there was a deviation from
     the standard of care when the first responders failed to bring in
     equipment, explaining that the Minute Men were “not dispatched
     to provide medical service in this case, they were dispatched to
     help [decedent] up off the floor.” Dr. Mell disputed the opinions
     that moving [d]ecedent to a chair prior to performing an initial
     assessment was a breach of the standard of care, explaining that
     Frampton had palpated [d]ecedent’s spine and spoke with her
     before assisting her to the chair. Dr. Mell also disputed the
     opinions that Frampton violated protocol by attempting an IV prior
     to attempting an IO; violated protocol by not obtaining an ETCO2
     measurement; and, violated protocol by not considering reversible
     causes of cardiac arrest. Dr. Mell stated that the timing of the
     epinephrine doses does not represent a breach of the standard of
     care. He further opined that Frampton did not violate the standard

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      of care by not considering the use of an advanced airway after
      failed intubation attempts. As for the conclusion by Dr[s].
      Freeman and McDonald that Frampton violated the standard of
      care and protocols by not contacting medical command, Dr. Mell
      indicated that because contact with medical command was
      impossible due to the location, the crew had no choice but to
      transport [d]ecedent to the hospital. Finally, Dr. Mell disagreed
      with the opinions of Dr[s]. Freeman and McDonald that lack of
      documentation was a violation of the standard of care. He offered
      the following opinion:

         I can confidently state with medical certainty that: 1. The
         responding Montrose Minute Men (Paramedic Shawn
         Frampton, EMT Amy Johnson, EMT James Krupinski, and
         EMT Robert Getz) did not violate the standard of care
         expected of EMS providers during their treatment of
         [decedent] on January 15, 2019. The actions or inactions of
         Montrose Minute Men EMS [p]roviders did not lend, in any
         way, to the injuries suffered by the [decedent]; and 3. While
         tragic, the events that occurred were an almost immutable
         chain of events set into motion by a combination of
         [decedent’s] pre-existing conditions, and her suffering a
         cardiac arrest geographically distant to an advanced medical
         center, and were possibly complicated by the fall she
         suffered immediately prior to her cardiac arrest. The EMS
         providers on the scene responded admirably to a very
         difficult situation.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/8/21, at 3-11 (footnotes and record citations omitted)

(some alterations in original).

      Fry filed the present action on May 12, 2020. Predicated on his

contention that the Minute Men’s actions were causally or contributorily

related to his seventy-one-year-old wife’s death, Fry’s complaint sought

damages against that entity, alleging wrongful death, a survival action, a claim

for gross negligence/recklessness, a claim for corporate liability as to

negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, and a claim for negligent infliction

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of emotional distress. Eventually, after preliminary objections, which, inter

alia, involved the striking of Fry’s negligent hiring and retention claims (but

not negligent supervision), Minute Men filed an answer to Fry’s complaint on

December 15, 2020.

      Approximately eight months later, on August 30, 2021, the Minute Men

filed a motion for summary judgment, principally asserting that Fry has shown

no evidence of gross negligence or willful misconduct, which correspondingly

meant, as a matter of law, Fry could not recover damages. The Minute Men

also presented ancillary arguments contesting: (1) Fry’s claim for punitive

damages; (2) Fry’s negligent supervision claim; and (3) Fry’s negligent

infliction of emotional distress claim. Much like the rationale underpinning the

Minute Men’s chief contention, those additional arguments challenged Fry’s

ability to prove the elements of each cause of action based on the evidentiary

record that had been amassed. The motion followed months of discovery,

which specifically involved the taking of depositions and the exchanging of

expert reports. Ultimately, after oral argument, the court granted the Minute

Men’s motion for summary judgment as to all claims contained in Fry’s

complaint.

      Resultantly, Fry filed a timely notice of appeal from the lower court’s

determination. Thereafter, the relevant parties complied with their respective

obligations under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, and as such,

this matter is ripe for review.

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      On appeal, Fry presents seven issues for this Court’s review:

      1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of
         law in its interpretation of the standard for granting summary
         judgment?

      2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor
         of the Minute Men on the issue of gross negligence where
         genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether there was
         an extreme departure from its standard of care?

      3. Did the trial court err in finding that the actions and omissions
         of Shawn Frampton and Amy Johnson failed to rise to the level
         of gross negligence where the record is replete with genuine
         issues of material fact?

      4. Did the trial court err in granting immunity under the
         Emergency Medical Services System Act ([EMSSA]), see Act of
         August 18, 2009, P.L. 308, as amended, 35 Pa.C.S. § 8101 et
         seq., as genuine issues of material fact exist as to the extreme
         departure from the standard of care constituting gross
         negligence from the Minute Men and its agents?

      5. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment as to Fry’s
         punitive damages claim without reviewing the merits when
         genuine issues of material fact exist as to the gross negligence
         of the Minute Men, precluding it from immunity under the
         [EMSSA]?

      6. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment as to Fry’s
         negligent supervision claim without reviewing the merits when
         genuine issues of material fact exist as to the gross negligence
         of the Minute Men, thereby precluding it from immunity under
         the [EMSSA]?

      7. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment as to Fry’s
         negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, as there are
         genuine issues of material fact as to the Minute Men’s gross
         negligence?

See Appellant’s Brief, at 12-13.

      All of Fry’s claims allege that the trial court’s grant of summary

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judgment was inappropriate. Correspondingly, we note that our standard of

review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo, and our

scope of review is plenary. See Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, 32 A.3d 687,

692 (Pa. 2011); American Southern Insurance Co. v. Halbert, 203 A.3d

223, 226 (Pa. Super. 2019). A grant of summary judgment in favor of a

defendant is appropriate only where the material facts are undisputed and,

additionally, that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those

undisputed facts or, conversely, where, after discovery, the plaintiff has failed

to produce evidence of facts essential to his cause of action against that

defendant. See Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2; Kibler v. Blue Knob Recreation, Inc.,

184 A.3d 974, 978–79 (Pa. Super. 2018); Criswell v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,

115 A.3d 906, 909 (Pa. Super. 2015). To determine whether there is a genuine

dispute of a material fact that precludes summary judgment or whether the

plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to support a cause of action, we must

view the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the non-moving

party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact

must be resolved against the defendant movant. Criswell, 115 A.3d at 908-

09; Petrina v. Allied Glove Corp., 46 A.3d 795, 798 (Pa. Super. 2012). Even

though summary judgment cannot be granted against a plaintiff based on the

credibility of oral testimony other than the plaintiff's admissions, oral

testimony of witnesses other than the plaintiff may be considered in

determining whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence of the

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essential elements of his cause of action. See Winwood v. Bregman, 788

A.2d 983, 985 (Pa. Super. 2001).

      The lower court found that the claims in Fry’s complaint all sounded in

negligence, with those claims being asserted against both the Minute Men, as

an entity, and its agents, those who rendered medical services on Fry’s wife.

Fry, therefore, was required to prove that the Minute Men and/or its agents

owed him or his wife a duty of care, that the Minute Men and/or its agents

breached that duty, that there was a causal relationship between that breach

of duty and his or her injury, and that Fry or his wife suffered actual loss. See

Koziar v. Rayner, 200 A.3d 513, 518-19 (Pa. Super. 2018); Collins v.

Philadelphia Suburban Development Corp., 179 A.3d 69, 73 (Pa. Super.

2018). The determination as to whether a duty exists is a question of law.

See Walters v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 187 A.3d 214, 221-22 (Pa.

2018); Baumbach v. Lafayette College, 272 A.3d 83, 89 (Pa. Super. 2022).

      The court found that Shawn Frampton and Amy Johnson, acting in their

capacities as paramedic and EMT, respectively, did not demonstrate gross

negligence or willful misconduct on January 15, 2019. As such, they, and by

extension the Minute Men, were absolved of any potential liability given the

language of the EMSSA. The EMSSA states that “[n]o EMS agency, EMS

agency medical director or EMS provider who in good faith attempts to render

or facilitate emergency medical care authorized by this chapter shall be liable

for civil damages as a result of an act or omission, absent a showing of gross

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negligence or willful misconduct.” 35 Pa.C.S. § 8151(2). In defining “gross

negligence,” this Court has interpreted the phrase to be liability that is

“premised on facts indicating more egregiously deviant conduct than ordinary

carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference.” Bloom v. Dubois

Regional Medical Center, 597 A.2d 671, 679 (Pa. Super. 1991). Specifically,

“[t]he behavior of the defendant must be flagrant, grossly deviating from the

ordinary standard of care.” Id. While, generally, it is for a jury to decide

whether an act or failure to act constitutes gross negligence, such a

determination “may be removed from consideration by a jury and decided as

a matter of law only where the case is entirely free from doubt and there is

no possibility that a reasonable jury could find gross negligence.” Feleccia v.

Lackawanna College, 215 A.3d 3, 20 n.12 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted).

      The court summarized Fry’s two expert reports:

      Dr[s]. Freeman and McDonald believed that the actions of the
      Minute Men crew in failing to carry equipment into the Fry home,
      failing to perform an initial assessment prior to moving [d]ecedent
      to a chair, failing to follow protocol for IO placement, failing to
      administer epinephrine every three to five minutes, and failing to
      use an alternate airway or manually clear the airway after three
      failed intubation attempts were deviations from the standard of
      care.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/8/21, at 14 (footnote omitted). However, the court

concluded that “[e]ven viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Fry,

[it did] not find that the actions of Frampton and Johnson alleged to be grossly

negligent were flagrant, grossly deviating from the standard of care or an

extreme departure from ordinary care.” Id. The court continued:

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             The crew’s failure to bring in diagnostic equipment when
      they arrived at the Fry residence hardly rises to an extreme
      departure from the standard of care or shows a conscious,
      voluntary omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty. At most,
      the failure of the crew to bring equipment when they first arrived
      at the Fry home may – or may not – rise to a level of ordinary
      negligence. And while it is undisputed that Frampton did not
      document whether he performed an initial assessment of
      [d]ecedent prior to moving her to a chair, it is unclear that
      Frampton failed to perform any assessment of [d]ecedent. As
      indicated by Dr. Mell, it is highly unusual for an EMS provider to
      specifically list their assessment. Furthermore, if Frampton had
      failed to perform an initial evaluation of [d]ecedent, failure to
      perform this assessment does not rise to the level of gross
      negligence. Additionally, insertion of an IO after a failed attempt
      at insertion of an IV and failing to use an alternate airway or
      manually clear the airway after three failed intubation attempts
      do not rise to the level required to establish gross negligence on
      the part of the Minute Men crew. Even if these actions were
      deviations from the standard of care, they do not demonstrate a
      significant departure from how a reasonably careful person would
      act under similar circumstances. Finally, it is undisputed that the
      epinephrine dosing, as documented, was not in line with
      [s]tatewide protocols as to timing. Nevertheless, while it is
      possibly that the epinephrine dosage timing might – or might not
      – be sufficient to establish ordinary negligence, it does not reach
      the level of gross negligence. In other words, there is no
      suggestion that Frampton acted in reckless disregard of the
      consequences or acted with substantially more than ordinary
      carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference when
      administering the epinephrine to [d]ecedent while also performing
      CPR.

Id., at 15-16 (footnote omitted).

      Beyond finding no indicia of gross negligence, the court also determined

that Fry failed to present evidence of willful misconduct by the Minute Men or

its agents, and in so finding, Fry was therefore prohibited from an alternative

basis to surmount the EMSSA’s immunity. See 35 Pa.C.S. § 8151(2); see

also Trial Court Opinion, 12/8/21, at 16. The court concluded that the Minute

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Men’s immunity under the EMSSA foreclosed Fry from punitive damages and

prevented any likelihood of recovery as to his negligent infliction of emotional

distress claim. See id., at 17-18.

      All seven of Fry’s arguments are premised on challenging the court’s

immunity finding. Fry contends that he “established [the Minute Men’s] gross

negligence through thorough and well-supported expert reports.” Appellant’s

Brief, at 44. Specifically, “Dr. McDonald meticulously outlined, in his eleven …

page report, how the actions and omissions of the Montrose Minute Men were

both reckless, beyond the ordinary standard of care, and in conscious

disregard for the care and life of the decedent.” Id. Fry also states that Dr.

Freeman’s report establishes materially the same. See id., at 45.

      Distilled down, Fry argues that his expert reports, by themselves, create

inherent issues of fact that are necessary for jury adjudication. However, other

than citing two pieces of “authority,” one from this Court and another from a

trial-court level decision, even accepting everything contained within his

expert reports as true, Fry has failed to show that the Minute Men, or its

agents, engaged in any kind of behavior that could be considered grossly

negligent or willful misconduct.

      Fry relies on the aforementioned Bloom decision to baldly insinuate that

the facts underpinning that case are applicable here. Bloom, which was an

appeal taken at the pleadings stage of trial and involved a suicide attempt by

one of the plaintiffs, resulted in a finding that the complaint pleaded facts

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sufficient to possibly allow for a finding of gross negligence. See 597 A.2d at

679. In particular, “[t]he complaint alleged that the defendants, who held

themselves out as competent to provide psychiatric treatment to one on the

position of [one of the plaintiffs], completely failed to diagnose her mental

condition and treat her in a manner that would protect her from serious

physical harm.” Id. The complaint “further averred that upon admission the

defendants were informed of [one of the plaintiff’s] mental disorder and

nevertheless failed to take adequate precautions to assure her safety.” Id.

Bloom cautioned, though, that “it [was] not certain whether the plaintiffs can

develop evidence that will demonstrate that the defendants’ failure was

flagrant enough to be characterized as a gross deviation from the applicable

standard of care.” Id. While both Bloom and the present matter involve

circumstances of a medical nature, Fry has not shown Bloom to have any

direct applicability; the fact of the matter is that there were wholly different

conditions present when the Minute Men rendered aid on the decedent and,

importantly, Bloom features a disposition at the pleadings stage.

      Fry’s proceeding citation to Clifford v. Community Medical Center is

equally, if not more, inapposite. See 59 Pa. D. & C. 5th 399 (Lacka. Co. 2016).

To start, Fry only describes this case in two sentences. From these two

sentences, Fry frames that trial court’s conclusion, which was responsive to a

motion for summary judgment, as holding that “the physicians should have

known that abruptly changing patient’s medication could have been an

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aggravating factor of the suicide itself.” Appellant’s Brief, at 50. Even

accepting Fry’s recounting of the court’s legal analysis, Clifford involved a

suicidal decedent that had been evaluated by several medical professionals in

a clinical setting.

      It is unclear what persuasive value Fry is attempting to extract from this

case. Although he attempts to bridge the gap between Clifford and the

present matter by stating that the Minute Men were “fully aware of the

protocols required to administer proper and appropriate emergency services

and care to decedent[,]” id., as best can be discerned, the court’s opinion in

Clifford did not imply that cognizance of protocols and, by implication, that

the failure to administer ‘proper and appropriate’ emergency services

inherently, or as a matter of law, constitutes gross negligence. Moreover, we

emphasize that Clifford is not precedential.

      The rest of Fry’s brief is dedicated to record citations and conclusory

averments attempting to establish that the Minute Men’s actions were grossly

negligent. In particular, Fry suggests, or reiterates his belief, that the Minute

Men’s agents did not follow the required protocols, did not perform an initial

assessment of the decedent, did not clear the decedent’s airway prior to

performing CPR, and did not administer epinephrine at the correct interval.

See id., at 50-52. However, we are constrained by Fry’s total lack of support

tending to show that liability stemming from any of the Minute Men or its

agents’ actions have been: (1) found by a jury or appellate court under similar

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or analogous circumstances to constitute gross negligence or willful

misconduct; or (2) able to conceptually survive a motion for summary

judgment. Without evidence of either, even reviewing the record in a light

most favorable to Fry, there is no indication that there is a triable issue of

material fact that would ultimately allow him to recover on any of the claims

asserted in his complaint.

      Without any materially significant issues for a jury to resolve and, too,

through the court’s determination that the Minute Men and its agents were

shielded from civil liability as none of their actions constituted gross negligence

or willful misconduct, we affirm the lower court’s order granting summary

judgment.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/28/2023

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