Court Opinion

ID: 9952717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 16:11:15.181322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:06.114675
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of
Appeals.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-41547

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

      Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

AUSTIN MURPHY OLDFIELD,

      Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE METROPOLITAN COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Renee Torres, Metropolitan Court Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Crowley & Gribble, P.C.
Joseph J. Gribble
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOGARDUS, Judge.

{1}   Defendant appeals the metropolitan court’s judgment and sentence, by which
Defendant was found guilty of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (DWI)
based on his refusal to submit to a breath test. Unpersuaded that Defendant’s docketing
statement demonstrated error, we issued a notice proposing to summarily affirm
Defendant’s conviction. Defendant has responded with a memorandum opposing our
proposed affirmance. After due consideration, we remain unpersuaded and affirm.
{2}      Defendant’s response maintains that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction and that it was fundamental error to admit his statements when he was not
provided Miranda warnings. In response to our proposal to affirm the sufficiency of the
evidence, Defendant contends that the district court erred by considering the following
evidence as indications of impairment by alcohol: the manner in which Defendant pulled
over, the officer’s observation that Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes, Defendant’s
poor decisions to drive at night with depth perception problems and without insurance or
registration documents, and Defendant’s refusal to submit to field sobriety tests (FSTs)
and a breath test. [MIO 3-5] We are not persuaded that the inferences the district court
drew from the evidence were unreasonable, particularly in light of the evidence that
Defendant’s vehicle smelled strongly of alcohol and Defendant admitting to drinking
alcohol five minutes before driving. See State v. Storey, 2018-NMCA-009, ¶ 40, 410
P.3d 256 (“New Mexico courts repeatedly have relied on evidence of refusal to consent
to breath . . . alcohol tests to support convictions for driving while under the influence of
alcohol.”); McKay v. Davis, 1982-NMSC-122, ¶¶ 3, 14, 16-18, 99 N.M. 29, 653 P.2d 860
(explaining that it is well established that evidence of consciousness of guilt—such as
flight, avoiding arrest, and refusing to take a breath test—is admissible and relevant,
and nothing in our constitutional, statutory, or relevancy law suggests otherwise); State
v. Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-109, ¶ 9, 131 N.M. 355, 36 P.3d 446 (“The [s]tate can use
evidence of a driver’s refusal to consent to the field sobriety testing to create an
inference of the driver’s consciousness of guilt.”).

{3}    Furthermore, when evidence is “subject to conflicting interpretations and
inferences, the trial court as the fact[‐]finder [is] empowered to weigh the evidence,
determine the credibility of the witnesses, and resolve any conflicts in the evidence.”
State v. Goss, 1991-NMCA-003, ¶ 20, 111 N.M. 530, 807 P.2d 228. On appeal, “we
resolve all disputed facts in favor of the [prevailing party], indulge all reasonable
inferences in support of the verdict, and disregard all evidence and inferences to the
contrary.” State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829.

{4}    We remain persuaded that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s
conviction for aggravated DWI. See State v. Loya, 2011-NMCA-077, ¶¶ 18-20, 150 N.M.
373, 258 P.3d 1165 (holding that sufficient evidence supported a conviction for
aggravated DWI where the defendant drove with bloodshot, watery eyes, had slurred
speech and an odor of alcohol, the defendant admitted to drinking three hours earlier,
and the defendant refused to submit to chemical testing).

{5}    We are also not persuaded that Defendant has established fundamental error in
the admission of Defendant’s statements that he asserts were given without Miranda
warnings. [MIO 6-9] Neither of Defendant’s filings in this Court provide us with sufficient
information to determine whether his statements resulted from a custodial interrogation
and neither filing describes the officer’s questions and Defendant’s statements in a
manner that would allow us to determine whether his right against self-incrimination or
any other right was violated. See State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, ¶ 60, 123 N.M.
778, 945 P.2d 996 (noting that Miranda holds that the United States Constitution
requires advice to an accused that the defendant has the right to remain silent as a
condition of using incriminating statements made by the defendant in a custodial
interrogation); State v. Wilson, 2007-NMCA-111, ¶ 11, 142 N.M. 737, 169 P.3d 1184
(“[I]n routine traffic stops where the individual is not free to leave but also not ‘in
custody’ pursuant to Miranda,” the inquiry is “whether a defendant’s freedom of action
has been restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.”). Where a party fails
to comply with Rule 12-208 NMRA by not providing this Court with all the facts material
to the issues raised on appeal, we cannot grant relief on the grounds asserted. State v.
Chamberlain, 1989-NMCA-082, ¶ 11, 109 N.M. 173, 783 P.2d 483.

{6}  For the reasons stated above and in our notice, we affirm the metropolitan court’s
judgment and sentence.

{7}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

WE CONCUR:

ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

SHAMMARA A. HENDERSON, Judge