Court Opinion

ID: 9537022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:11:29.878897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:46.167399
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
Although I concur with all but one part of the majority opinion, I nonetheless feel compelled to dissent vigorously to the rule announced in Section I thereof.
In my view, the majority has, in effect, abolished the exclusionary rule, as to every criminal defendant who enters a plea of not guilty, and elects to testify in his own defense. While I am not convinced either of the efficacy or of the wisdom of the exclusionary rule, it is, and has been, the law of the land, since first adopted for federal courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), and has been applicable in state courts since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1960) was decided.
It is true that commencing in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) and in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), the United States Supreme Court began carving out areas of exceptions to *579the rule. I do not believe, however, that the Supreme Court, by its pronouncements in Walder, or in Harris and its progeny, intended that the “impeachment” exception ultimately supersede the rule itself.
The effect of the majority opinion here is to sanction admission of evidence, previously suppressed as having been obtained in violation of defendant’s constitutional rights, for the sole purpose of establishing a defendant’s guilt. This they do under the guise of “impeaching” LeMasters’ denial of any involvement in the crime.
Impeachment, in the evidentiary context, has been traditionally defined as the adducing of proof that a witness who has testified in a cause is unworthy of credit or belief. Johnston v. Belk-McKnight Co., 188 S.C. 149, 198 S.E. 395; State v. Roybal, 33 N.M. 540, 273 P. 919; see also Tarling v. People, 69 Colo. 477, 194 P. 939 (1921), and People v. Wilkinson, 37 Colo.App. 531, 555 P.2d 1167 (1976). In this sense, impeachment evidence is limited to that which will directly and specifically disprove a witness’ statements and such evidence has been almost exclusively limited to prior inconsistent statements. See CRE 613. Admittedly, in some rare cases, evidence of an indisputable fact has been allowed as impeachment evidence where the existence of that fact totally discredits the witness’ testimony, and thus proves him unworthy of belief. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, ¿4 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980). All other evidence tending to disprove a witness’ testimony is merely rebuttal evidence and must meet the same admissibility standards as any other evidence in the case.
Proceeding from Walder, the Supreme Court in Harris, supra; Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); and more recently, United States v. Havens, supra, has permitted the admission of suppressed evidence only under a narrowly defined set of circumstances for the express purpose of impeachment. See U.S. v. Hinckley, 529 F.Supp. 520 (D.D.C.1982) and People v. Casper, 631 P.2d 1134 (Colo.App.1981).
In each case of the Harris, Hass, and Havens trilogy, the Supreme Court justified the impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule by reasoning that the interests of deterrence were served by precluding the prosecution from utilizing illegally obtained evidence in its case-in-chief as well as during the defendant’s case, unless to do so would.countenance perjury. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979), and Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.1980).
In Harris, supra, defendant was charged with selling a narcotic drug, to-wit, heroin. On his direct testimony he specifically denied selling anything to a particular police officer witness. For the purpose of impeaching that specific statement, the prosecution was allowed to introduce defendant’s previously suppressed inconsistent statement in which the defendant admitted selling two glassine bags containing baking soda to the police officer. In Hass, supra, which was also a narcotics case, defendant expressly denied, on cross-examination, any knowledge of the source of certain drugs which had been admitted into evidence. The prosecution there was permitted to introduce a previously suppressed inconsistent statement given by the defendant in which he described, in detail, the source or sources from whence the drugs came. In Havens, supra, a drug case also, defendant, on cross-examination, denied any knowledge of a T-Shirt onto which patches cut from another T-Shirt had been sewn for the purpose of carrying drugs, and likewise, denied any knowledge of, or possession of, any T-Shirt so involved. The prosecution, in that case, in order to prove the defendant’s statement was perjured, was permitted to introduce a previously suppressed T-Shirt taken from defendant’s luggage in an unlawful search, from which the patches which were sewn onto his co-defendant’s T-Shirt had been cut.
In each of these cases, previously suppressed evidence was allowed to be admitted for the limited purpose of attacking the defendant’s credibility by demonstrating the falsity of specific statements made by him, either in direct or cross-examination. *580These eases are thus clearly distinguishable from the one at bar.
In the case before us, the prosecution blatantly admits that the only testimonial statement sought to be impeached was that made by LeMasters on direct examination denying any involvement in the crime. The evidence which they sought to introduce consisted of a parka hood, a sweater, and a knife, seized from defendant’s car or home as a result of an unlawful search, and suppressed at an earlier hearing. It should be noted that the victim’s primary means of identifying her assailant was by the clothing he wore and the weapon used. LeMas-ters did not deny either ownership or possession of these items.
The district attorney, at a hearing out of the presence of the jury, expressed his theory in these words:
“So far as the hood is concerned, Judge, I think it would be proper cross-examination on my part to ask the defendant if he owns a hood that goes with that parka and to go into that area, and to have him identify the particular hood, for impeachment purposes, because on the direct examination by the defendant there has been a denial of his involvement in this crime. There has been testimony that— by Mrs. Weily that the defendant was wearing a hood on the 24th of November, and there has been a description of that hood. I think it is fair cross-examination and proper cross-examination to bring that out as relates to impeachment.
The same would go for the knife and the sweater.” (emphasis added)
Prior to returning the jury, the trial court held that under its interpretation of Havens, supra, the prosecution would be permitted to do as it had requested. Upon resumption of the trial the following colloquy occurred between the district attorney and the defendant, LeMasters, on cross-examination.
“Q. Now, Mr. LeMasters, you heard Nancy Weily testify; did you not?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And you heard her testify you were in her house on November 24, last November; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And [that] you attacked her with a knife. You heard that; didn’t you?
A. Yes. I did.
Q. And she testified that you were wearing a parka just like this. You heard that; didn’t you?
A. Yes.
Q. And you denied any involvement in this; is that correct?
A. Yes, that’s correct.
Q. That is, in fact, your parka; isn’t it? A. Yes, it is.
Q. Do you own a hood that goes with it? A. When I purchased it there was a hood with it, yes.
MR. SELL; The record should reflect I am breaking a seal on the box.
MR. RASBAND: [defense counsel] At this time I am going to object to any questions about this hood. It is my understanding that Mr. Sell was to inquire for impeachment purposes in regard to the hood. Mr. LeMasters has already testified that he had a hood that came with the jacket.
The Court: Overruled.”
This was the sole foundation laid by the prosecution for the admission of this highly prejudicial evidence. This was not an attempt to prove the. falsity of a specific statement made by the defendant, or to show him unworthy of belief, but rather it was an attempt by the prosecution to do indirectly what it could not do directly. That is, prove the guilt of the defendant, using suppressed evidence, under the guise of impeaching LeMasters’ general denial of guilt.
It is true that Havens may extend the scope of Harris and Hass, supra, to evidence elicited on cross-examination and that it indicates the exception may not require a specific statement to which the impeachment evidence is directed. It cannot, however, be said that any of these cases go so far as to permit “impeachment” of defend*581ant’s plea of not guilty or his general denial of involvement in the crime. The entire purpose of the trial is to determine guilt, or expressed in a different way, to establish the falsity of the defendant’s denial of involvement. It is for this reason that evidence tending to prove guilt, which has been previously suppressed, cannot be smuggled in under the guise of impeaching the defendant’s denial of involvement in the crime or even, as the majority asserts, his general denial that he was at the place where the crime was committed on the day in question.
Even if the prosecution had sought to impeach LeMasters’ testimony, concerning where he was on the day in question, which it did not, such evidence would in my view, of necessity, have been limited to evidence which would directly contradict his testimony that he had been at a particular place during a specific time period on the day in question.
Even the federal courts, in discussing this problem, have held that the nexus between defendant’s specific testimonial assertions on direct or cross-examination, and the contradictory evidence introduced, must be extremely close. In United States v. Mariani, 539 F.2d 915 (2nd Cir.1976) the court held, inter alia, that:
“The connection between Mariani’s statement that he ‘wouldn’t rob a bank,’ and the fact that bullets [previously suppressed] were found in his car, is far too tenuous to justify admission of this highly prejudicial evidence.”
Since the majority, in the instant case, seems determined to abolish the exclusionary rule, it is my view that it should address the issues which led to its adoption, and by which its continuance has been justified, and should not attempt to accomplish its demise by expanding a narrow exception to the extent that the rule ceases to exist.
I would reverse.