Court Opinion

ID: 9573924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:00:29.010553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:40.373017
License: Public Domain

Judge Parker
dissenting.-
I respectfully dissent. Plaintiff did not assign error on the basis of defendant’s untimely plea in abatement, but rather in both his assignments plaintiff steadfastly asserted that his action is a new civil action over which the trial court had jurisdiction. “Each assignment of error shall, so far as practicable, be confined to a single issue of law; and shall state plainly, concisely and without argumentation the legal basis upon which error is assigned.” N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(1). Even though plaintiff had the benefit of an overnight recess to ferret out this issue, no suggestion was made before the trial court that defendant’s motion to dismiss was untimely and that defendant had waived her right to pursue her motion by not raising it as a plea in abatement in her answer. Not until his brief filed in this Court did plaintiff mention plea in abatement or the untimeliness of defendant’s objection. Accordingly, not having raised this basis to defeat defendant’s motion to dismiss in *49the court below or in his assignments of. error, plaintiff, in my view, has waived any right to argue the untimeliness of defendant’s motion before this Court.
Notwithstanding plaintiff’s contention that his action was a new action, the prayer for relief in his complaint shows he desired a modification as to existing custody and support arrangements. “An order of a court of this State for support of a minor child may be modified ... at any time, upon motion in the cause and a showing of changed circumstances by either party . . . .” N.C.G.S. § 50-13.7(a) (1987). Similarly, a court order for custody may be modified “upon motion in the cause.” Id. If no order for custody or support exists, an action therefor may be brought as an independent civil action. N.C.G.S. § 50-13.5(b)(l) (Supp. 1991).
The latter statute also provides:
Venue. — An action or proceeding in the courts of this State for custody and support of a minor child may be maintained in the county where the child resides or is physically present or in a county where a parent resides, except as hereinafter provided. If an action for . . . divorce . . . has been previously instituted in this State, until there has been a final judgment in such case, any action or proceeding for custody and support of the minor children of the marriage shall be joined with such action or be by motion in the cause in such action.
N.C.G.S. § 50-13.5(f) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). Construing this subsection, this Court said
[A]fter final judgment in a previously instituted action between the parents, where custody and support has not been brought to issue or determined, the custody and support issue may be determined in an independent action in another court. ... Of course, if the ¡custody and support has been brought to issue or determined in .the previously instituted action between the parents, there could be no final judgment in that case, because the issue of custody and support remains in fieri until the children have become emancipated. 27B C.J.S. 423; 27B C.J.S. 678.
In re Holt, 1 N.C. App. 108, 112, 160 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1968). This Court has also said of N.C.G.S, 50-13.5(f) that it invokes “not only venue but actually jurisdiction.” Tate v. Tate, 9 N.C. App. 681, 682, 177 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1970).. A different statute requires *50that in all divorce actions the complaint must state the name and age of any minor children of the marriage. N.C.G.S. § 50-8 (1987).
Nevertheless, jurisdiction over custody and support of a minor child does not necessarily “ ‘automatically become a concomitant of a divorce action and vest in th[e] court a continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to determine [these] matters.’ ” Rhoney v. Sigmon, 43 N.C. App. 11, 15, 257 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1979) (quoting 3 R. Lee, North Carolina Family Law § 222 (3d ed. 1963 & Supp. 1976)). Considering whether these matters had been brought to issue in an earlier action, the Court in Rhoney stated that on the record before it, no issue concerning custody or support was presented for determination by the court in the pleadings. The provisions in the judgment relating to custody and support “followed so exactly but in abbreviated form the more elaborate provisions of the prior separation agreement [as to indicate they] were contractual rather than decretal in nature.” Id. at 17-18, 257 S.E.2d at 695. In deciding the matters had not been brought to issue or determined in the previous action, the Court found guidance in Wilson v. Wilson, 11 N.C. App. 397, 181 S.E.2d 190 (1971).
In Wilson, the parties’ earlier judgment was silent as to child support and did not refer to any corresponding provision of their separation agreement. In holding custody and support had not been brought to issue or determined, the Court said, “The judgment refers to a separation agreement and an amended separation agreement but contains nothing by which any separation agreement could be identified as to date or content. Certainly, the separation agreements referred to are not incorporated in the divorce judgment.” Id. at 399, 181 S.E.2d at 191 (emphasis added).
It is generally agreed that
[contracts of parents respecting the custody and support of their children are not binding on the courts. . . . When the welfare of the child is involved, as in divorce cases, the parents cannot so bind themselves as to foreclose the court from an inquiry as to what that welfare requires. The court may, of course, recognize and enforce the agreement of the parents when, in its opinion, the agreement is for the best interest of the child.
*51Where such agreement is conducive to the general welfare of the child, it will be respected, and it may be incorporated into the decree and enforced, although the power of the court subsequently to modify the decree as to the custody of the children is not thereby abridged.
Courts retain a continuing power to modify orders for the custody and support of minor children. The orders may be changed upon a substantial change of circumstances. The power of the court is not affected by virtue of the fact that the decree incorporated a stipulation of the parents respecting custody. Provisions approved by the court in its decree are not contractual in nature but are in effect an adjudication of custody and support by the court.
2 R. Lee, North Carolina Family Law § 151 (4th ed. 1980).
In the present case, plaintiff alleged and defendant admitted that the parties’ separation agreement, which dealt with custody and support of their minor child, was incorporated into their divorce judgment from the New Hanover court. Under Wilson and Rhoney, therefore, custody and support were brought to issue and determined. Under section 50-13.5(f), Tate, Wilson and Rhoney, custody and support became concomitant parts of the New Hanover court’s jurisdiction over the parties’ divorce action. Under section 50-13.5(f), Tate, and Holt, the issues of custody and support remained in fieri in the New Hanover court.
In Broyhill v. Broyhill, 81 N.C. App. 147, 343 S.E.2d 605 (1986), this Court considered the application of section 5043.5(f) to a motion in the cause requesting a modification of child support. In that case, final judgments in the parties’ divorce and child support actions were entered in 1976 in Buncombe County. Plaintiff, who was awarded custody of the parties’ minor children, moved to Mecklenburg County but later filed in Buncombe County both a motion in the cause and a motion for change of venue to Mecklen-burg. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for change of venue. Id. at 148, 343 S.E.2d at 606.
On appeal defendant argued the trial court should not have transferred venue. This Court stated
*52In cases dealing with custody and support of minor children there is no truly “final” judgment until the children are emancipated. Kennedy v. Surratt, 29 N.C. App. 404, 224 S.E.2d 215 (1976). Accordingly, the court of original venue was thought to retain that venue during the entire period of custody and support. The holding in Tate is that a party cannot seek modification of a child support order in a court other than that in which it was entered where there has been no change of venue by the court. Tate does not hold, however, and we find no authority which does hold, that the court which entered the order cannot transfer venue to another court for the convenience of witnesses and parties and the best interest of the child. In this age of increased mobility and frequent changes of residence, it is unrealistic to assume that divorced parents will always remain in the county in which their judgment of divorce was entered, or in which an order of custody and support was entered. For the convenience of witnesses and parties and because it may be in the best interests of justice and the parties, we hold that the court of original venue may, in its discretion, transfer the venue of an ongoing action for custody or support to a more appropriate county. Accordingly, the order of the trial court transferring venue in this motion in the cause from Buncombe County to Mecklenburg County is
Affirmed.
Id. at 149, 343 S.E.2d at 606-607.
Under section 5043.7(a), a party desiring modification of an existing custody or support order must file a motion in the cause. Under Broyhill a party desiring modification may file with the court of original jurisdiction and venue a motion in the cause and a motion for change of venue; whether to grant a change of venue is solely within the discretion of the court. As plaintiff did not file the required motions in the appropriate court, the trial court, in my view, did not err in dismissing the action.
The confusion created by Snyder v. Snyder, 18 N.C. App. 658, 197 S.E.2d 802 (1973), is manifest by the inconsistency in the two sentences of the last paragraph which read:
“It is not a question of jurisdiction, which cannot be waived or conferred by consent, but it is a question of a prior pending action and this can be waived by failure to raise it. Hawkins *53v. Hughes, 87 N.C. 115 (1882). Under the statute, the District Court held in Wake County had jurisdiction and the prior acquired jurisdiction in Mecklenburg County was waived by the parties.
Id. at 660, 197 S.E.2d at 804 (emphasis added). The discussion of Snyder in Rhoney relied on by plaintiff is dictum, as the Court in Rhoney had already determined that custody of the child was not at issue in the divorce action in Burke County.
As a practical matter the procedure outlined in Broyhill is a salutary one. Some uniform procedure is necessary to assure that files containing orders modifying child custody provisions will not be located in clerks’ offices across the state, thereby creating a real possibility that the judge before whom the matter is pending may not be made aware of a prior order. Since change in circumstances is the key factor in determining whether to modify child custody and support, access to the prior record is beneficial. Moreover, the potential for abuse by either party in child custody and support cases, which can sometimes become highly emotional, inflammatory situations, is readily apparent.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to affirm.