Court Opinion

ID: 9716355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:35:14.165304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:44.219268
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Spaeth, J.:
While I agree that the policy in question here might be differently worded, I do not see any reasonable in*119terpretation under which appellee could recover more than $10,000.
Paragraph Four under the heading “Conditions” reads as follows: “Two or More Automobiles. When two or more automobiles are insured hereunder, the terms of this policy shall apply separately to each, but an automobile and a trailer attached thereto shall be held to be one automobile as respects limits of liability under the Liability Coverage of this policy. . . .” This simply means that instead of two policies being written, one for each of two automobiles owned by the same person, one policy is written to cover both of them, but it will apply, not just “to each,” but “separately to each;” i.e., to each as if the other did not exist. No reasonable gloss contrary to this one is proffered by appellee.
Under the heading “Limits of Liability,” the fol-loAving paragraph appears: “The limit of liability for Uninsured Motorists Coverage stated in the declarations as applicable to ‘each person’ is the limit of the Company’s liability for all damages, including damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily injury sustained by one person as the result of any one accident and, subject to the above provisions .respecting each person, the limit of liability stated in the declarations as applicable to ‘each accident’ is the total limit of the Company’s liability for all damages, including damages for care or loss of services, because of bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as the result of any one accident.” This is clear enough; it says that “each person,” i.e., any one person, is limited to one stated amount for any single accident. If more than one person is involved in one accident, the ceiling of coverage for all of them combined is that which is stated for each accident.” Again, no contrary gloss is proffered. The schedules attached to the policy pro*120vide that the maximum for “each person” is $10,000, and that for “each accident” the ceiling is $20,000. I cannot imagine how these paragraphs can be read to imply that any one person would ever get more than $10,000 for any one accident in either one of the policyholder’s cars. He could hardly be in more than one of the cars during a single collision. See “Limitation of Amount of Coverage Under Automobile Liability Policy As Affected By Fact That Policy Covers More Than One Vehicle,” 37 A.L.R. 3d 1263 (1971) (collecting cases in which the separability clause was held sufficient to limit liability to the amount expressly stated in the policy).
Appellee should bear the burden of demonstrating some ambiguity. She should not be able to declare that one exists and then leave it to the court to find it. I, for one, cannot find it. “The conclusion is inescapable that courts have sometimes invented ambiguity where none existed, then resolved the invented ambiguity contrary to the plainly expressed terms of the contract document. To extend the principle of resolving ambiguities against the draftsman in this fictional way not only causes confusion and uncertainty about the effective scope of judicial regulation of contract terms but also creates an impression of unprincipled judicial prejudice against insurers.” Keeton, Insurance Law §6.3 (a) at 356 (1971).
The order should be reversed.
Jacobs and Cercone, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.