Court Opinion

ID: 9537206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:14:12.257069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:11.862672
License: Public Domain

HODGES, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from this Court’s pronouncement that, by virtue of the partial settlement and promises to settle the remainder of the claim, the 90 day period of 51 O.S.1981 § 157 was tolled and the six month limitation period of 51 O.S. 1981 § 156(C) was never triggered. This decision ignores the unequivocal mandate of 51 O.S.1981 § 157. In pertinent part, Section 157 precisely states:
“A claim is denied if the political subdivision fails to approve the claim in its entirety within ninety (90) days, unless the interested parties have reached a settlement before the expiration of that period.” (Emphasis added).
*460This phrase controls the disposition of the case now before the Court. As I perceive it, the case turns on the word “entirety.” In my opinion “entirety” means “entirety.” This Court has generally held a clear and unambiguous statute is given a literal construction and the statute is accorded the meaning as expressed by the language therein employed. Matter of Phillips Petroleum Co., 652 P.2d 283, 285 (Okla.1982). Accordingly, under the clear, plain language of Section 157,1 am impelled to hold inviolate its literal meaning. Because the school district failed to deny, approve or settle the claim in its entirety within 90 days after receiving the filing of the claim, I would find the claim deemed denied upon the expiration of the 90 day period.
Although a partial settlement was reached as to the claim for property damages within the 90 day period, and the parties were purportedly engaged in ongoing negotiations to reach a settlement concerning the remainder of the claim, a settlement was not “reached” concerning the entire claim within the 90 day period. Regardless of the actions taken by appellees after the six month limitation period of Section 156(C) had run, and despite any negotiations or possibilities of settlement of the remainder of the claim within the 90 day period, appellants’ claim was deemed denied by operation of law upon the expiration of the 90 day period. Inasmuch as the entire claim had not been denied, approved or settled in its entirety within the 90 day period, this Court is powerless to toll the claim which is deemed denied by mandate of our legislature.
This Court has previously given 51 O.S. 1981 §§ 156(C) and 157 a strict construction in the context of the filing requirement and the statute of limitations. My interpretation of these sections is consistent with this Court’s pronouncement in Neal v. Blackwell, 670 P.2d 587 (Okla.1983). There we rejected the contention that strict compliance with the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act was not required when the county failed to notify the claimant in writing of approval or denial of the claim within 90 days after receiving notice of the claim. Similarly, in the case of Lucas v. Ind. Public School Dist. No. 35, 674 P.2d 1131 (Okla.1983), this Court held where there is no approval of the claim by the political subdivision within 90 days, the six month limitation of Section 156(C) is activated. Appellants refer to Reirdon v. Wilburton Board of Education, 611 P.2d 239 (Okla.1980), for the proposition that strict compliance with the statutes is not necessary as long as there is substantial compliance. Reirdon involves substantial compliance with the notice requirement of 51 O.S.1981 § 156(B); whereas, the case before us deals with the filing requirement and statute of limitations. Our interpretation of Sections 156 and 157 in Neal, supra, and Lucas, supra, is not a liberal one. I believe we should give no other interpretation of these statutes than what is apparent on their face. Today’s decision is contrary to the plain language of Sections 156(C) and 157.
Appellants notified the school district of their claim on July 13, 1982, thereby making October 12, 1982, the date the claim was denied by operation of law and the dispositive date in which the Section 156(C) statute of limitations began to run. Accordingly, appellants’ claim was barred by the statute of limitations on April 12, 1983. Appellants filed their suit on July 7, 1983, well outside the applicable statute of limitations. I, therefore, would affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the suit against the school district.
For these reasons I must dissent from the opinion of the Court.