Court Opinion

ID: 9737032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:13:30.108529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.074155
License: Public Domain

LAZAR, J., pro tem.*
I dissent from the opinion of the court insofar as it undertakes to justify inferences of knowledge, dominion and control necessary to a finding of possession of the marijuana found under the house and would reverse the judgment of conviction.
Preliminarily, I agree with the holding of the majority opinion that there was no error in refusal of the instruction requested by the defendant. I also agree that the defendant did not make out a case of prejudicial misconduct in the technical sense with respect to the remarks of the district attorney in his opening statement to the jury. On the other hand, under the close circumstances of this case I consider the statement unjustified and prejudicial and deserving of some comment.
The remark of the district attorney upon opening statement was: “At some point during the course of the trial the testimony will show that Mr. Haynes and Miss Anderson have had several children together, just to show their relationship between the two defendants. ’ ’
In the framework of the minimum evidence produced against defendant Haynes, the statement was highly damaging in suggesting a meretricious relationship between the parties and a willingness upon the part of Haynes to ignore prevailing social standards. The statement and anticipatory evidence would have relevance only to establish that defendant was in a husband-like relationship to his codefendant which would help in providing the inferences to prove possession. If this purpose were not served the relationship between the parties was immaterial. The statement as made focused the attention of the jury upon implied immoral conduct of the parties, not the inferences to be drawn from it in support of the People’s case.
It is correct that defendant argued to the jury the People’s failure to offer evidence in support of the statement and made no assignment of error until the argument on motion for new trial. With no evidence before it on the question of good or *1069bad faith (the trial district attorney was not present on the new trial argument), the trial court found no intentional bad faith and said of the district attorney: “It was his hope that that could be proved, or would be proved, and he didn't know how the case would develop.” [Italics supplied.] I agree with defendant that this particular area was one in which the district attorney should be held to know whether he would be able to provide evidence in support of his statement. It does not appear why evidence was not produced in support of the statement made to the jury.
As stated in People v. Carr, 163 Cal.App.2d 568, 575 [329 P.2d 746]: “The purpose of the opening statement of the prosecuting attorney is to outline the state’s evidence against the one accused of crime and to inform the jury what the People intend to prove. Generally the failure to make such proof during the trial does not indicate prejudice, particularly in the absence of showing of bad faith. However it is the substance and implication of a statement or the effect of an act which really define what the law recognizes as prejudicial misconduct. [Citation.] Whereas in the case at bar the unwarranted statement might not alone have prejudiced the defendants, the cumulative effect on the jury of this and other unjustified comments of the deputy district attorney justifies a contrary conclusion particularly in view of the state of the evidence. ’’ [Italics supplied.]
The crucial question, however, is whether the jury’s implied findings of the elements essential to proof of possession of marijuana for purposes of sale are supported by sufficient evidence. In the instant ease substantial evidence must be found in inferences reasonably drawn from the limited direct facts present in the record.
The facts recited in the majority opinion are more lengthy than significant. In particular the facts up to the entry of the police officers would appear of no incriminatory value whatsoever. The haste with which the entry was effected precludes a valid inference of refusal, even of opportunity, to open the door; the testimony of “rapid movement” is worthless. Rapid movement of what? A door? Of air? A tricycle? A child? There is no such thing as “rapid movement” in the abstract, yet “the sound of movement” is the sole evidentiary description given to the jury. From whence, then, a valid inference that defendant “engaged in some movement indicative of an effort to hide or destroy evidence?” By the same token the evidence provides no support for an inference *1070of a consciousness of guilt. The factual situation and principles involved in People v. Hood, 150 Cal.App.2d 197 [309 P.2d 856], cited in the opinion of the court, bear no relation to the question of valid or invalid inferences in the framework of testimony relating to the forcible entry into the house.
The existence of joint and constructive possession of the commercial quantities of marijuana found beneath the house is a key requirement to finding defendant guilty. Essential to this factor is a showing of joint occupancy of the house. People v. Poe, 164 Cal.App.2d 514 [330 P.2d 681], involved two people in a hotel room, with capsules of heroin on a dresser, the defendant standing nearby under the influence of narcotics and having “in effect admitted to the officers that she was in possession of the narcotics.” (P. 516) People v. MacArthur, 126 Cal.App.2d 232 [271 P.2d 914], was concerned with a situation of a man and woman living together in an apartment “for some time” and the narcotic upon which the prosecution was based was found in the apartment with a number of highly incriminatory circumstances, all of which was held sufficient to warrant an inference of joint possession of the heroin in the codefendant’s vanity box. People v. Williams, 121 Cal.App.2d 679 [263 P.2d 853], involved joint occupancy of a small hotel room for several days with the narcotic in plain sight on a table.1
A succinct statement of the rules to be taken into account in relation to a charge of unlawful possession of narcotics is set forth in People v. Roberts, 228 Cal.App.2d 722, at pages 726-727 [39 Cal.Rptr. 843]: “It is a well settled proposition of law that in a prosecution for unlawful possession of narcotics the People must prove that the accused exercised dominion and control over the drug with knowledge both of its presence and of its narcotic character. [Citations.] These elements may be established by circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence. [Citations.] Though proof of opportunity of access to a place where narcotics are found, without more, will not support a finding of unlawful possession, the fact that other persons had access to the premises in which the narcotic was found does not negative a finding of joint possession and control. [Citations.] Exclusive possession of the premises is not required, nor is physical possession of the drug. [Citation.] Constructive possession is *1071sufficient and possession by any person when the defendant has an immediate right to exercise dominion and control over the narcotic will support a conviction. [Citations.] However, ‘Mere presence at the scene of the crime standing alone is not sufficient to justify a finding of guilt. ’ [Citation.] ’ ’
In People v. Redrick, 55 Cal.2d 282 [10 Cal.Rptr. 823, 359 P.2d 255], the court made summary reference to a number of eases in the courts of appeal in which possession or non-possession had been ruled, commenting, as between the two lists of cases: “As might be expected, no sharp line can be drawn to distinguish the congeries of facts which will and that which will not constitute sufficient evidence of a defendant’s knowledge of the presence of a narcotic in a place to which he had access, but not exclusive access, and over which he had some control, but not exclusive control.” [P. 287.]
People v. Stanford, 176 Cal.App.2d 388, in a situation bearing some factual relation to this case, sets forth the rule, at page 390 [1 Cal.Rptr. 425], in these words: “To justify a conviction of unlawful possession of narcotics, the prosecution must prove actual or constructive possession of the contraband by the accused and knowledge of its presence and narcotic character. [Citations.] These essential facts may, of course, be established by circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] ”
The same case correlates the requisite possession with the necessity of proving dominion and control. “. . . Coleman’s presence in the bathroom neither establishes his possession of the contraband nor justifies an inference to that effect. It does not show that the narcotics in question were under his dominion and control.” [P. 391.]
People v. Tabizon, 166 Cal.App.2d 271 [332 P.2d 697], and People v. Hancock, 156 Cal.App.2d 305 [319 P.2d 731], are referred to in Stanford, supra, as instances in which mere presence where narcotics were present was insufficient to establish possession. Bach of those eases was stronger for the People than Stanford or the case at bench.
The majority opinion cites People v. Anders, 167 Cal.App. 2d 65 [333 P.2d 854], in support of the proposition that knowledge of the presence of narcotics on the premises may be inferred from the presence of narcotics debris in the clothing of a joint occupant. The statement in Anders, supra, at page 68, is that: “It is also the rule that the actual finding of the narcotics in Anders’ clothing and in the automobile owned by him was sufficient to warrant an inference of knowledge *1072thereof, on his part.” That is not the equivalent of saying that narcotics debris found in the clothes of a man who on the occasion of arrest is present in a “TV room” in a home in which the evidence is only of transient presence justifies an inference of knowledge of a commercial quantity of marijuana under the house and accessible only by an outside “crawl hole.” People v. Cahill, 163 Cal.App.2d 15 [328 P.2d 995], is equally inapplicable factually as it involved a manila sack of marijuana found under the bed occupied by the defendant. People v. Magdaleno, 158 Cal.App.2d 48 [322 P.2d 89], cited to the validity of an inference of selling narcotics because of money in the possession of an unemployed accused likewise involved facts unhelpful as a guide to the present ease.
Challenging the sufficiency of the evidence places one in the always difficult position of establishing a negative. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the prosecution of the defendant is based upon the commercial quantity of marijuana found beneath the house, as recognized by the district attorney’s statement to the court that “obviously the officers wouldn’t have arrested them until they found this stuff underneath the house.” No fact is present which would justify an inference of defendant’s knowledge of the marijuana beneath the house or of his right of dominion and control over it. “ [S]uspieion is not evidence; it merely raises a possibility and that is not sufficient basis for an inference of fact. [Citing cases.]” (People v. Tatge, 219 Cal.App.2d 430, 435 [33 Cal.Rptr. 323].) See People v. Tidmore, 218 Cal.App.2d 716, 720 [32 Cal.Rptr. 444].
- The evidence supports inferences that the defendant and codefendant were friends, even close friends; that defendant felt free to use the address of the house as a reference point (the address on the cleaning tag); that defendant had handled marijuana; that defendant felt concern for persons or property, or both, in the house; nothing more.
The comparative insufficiency of the evidence may be tested by matters on which it was silent: defendant’s physical and nervous state at the time of entry; who owned or rented the house; how frequently defendant was about the premises; where defendant kept his extra clothing and other personal belongings; where defendant maintained residence; parentage of the children; whether defendant was, within an appropriate period, the only visitor or one of many. None of these matters, which might have supported the inferences to incriminate defendant, was touched upon.
*1073One may concede the basic propriety and general application of the principles stated in People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678 [104 P.2d 778], cited in the majority opinion; nevertheless : “ ‘ Implicit in our duty to determine the legal sufficiency of evidence to sustain a verdict is our obligation, in a proper ease, to appraise the sufficiency and effect of admitted or otherwise indubitably established facts as precluding or overcoming, as a matter of law, inconsistent inferences sought to be derived from weak and inconclusive sources.” [Citing cases.]” (People v. Hall, 62 Cal.2d 104, 110 [41 Cal.Rptr. 284 396 P.2d 700].)
In my opinion the following language from People v. Alkow, 97 CalApp.2d 797, 802-803 [218 P.2d 607], is keenly apposite to the circumstances of the instant case: “Evidence which merely creates a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused does not shift the burden of proof and impose upon him the duty of overcoming the suspicion. . . . Too much was left to speculation and conjecture on the part of the jury when satisfactory proof was available. As a consequence we are not only faced with a difficult problem concerning a particular case but also a grave question as to our duty as a reviewing court in the establishment of a precedent. The review of a judgment in a criminal case is a heavy responsibility at best, and we are unwilling to overlook trial practices which create serious problems on appeal which could easily have been avoided.
“It is the right of every reviewing court to insist that in the trial of a criminal case the evidence of the People should be the best that is obtainable. The limitation of jurisdiction on appeal to questions of law implies that the facts which are determinative of the question of guilt will be as firmly established as possible in the trial court and that reliance will not be placed upon the ability of jurors to choose between conflicting inferences when evidence is available to prove material facts. Therefore, as far as possible, uncertainty should be removed from the case. When presentation of the evidence is unnecessarily incomplete, and the crucial facts of the ease are left to inference, the tendency will be to relax the requirement that guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and place emphasis upon mere suspicion. We have such a record in the present case. The deficiencies of the evidence of the People would have required the jurors to determine upon the basis of probabilities whether a disclosure of further facts would have tended to prove guilt or innocence. We do not believe the *1074evidence was legally sufficient to establish guilt or to warrant the jury in determining beyond a reasonable doubt, by inference from the evidence, that the essential facts which the People did not undertake to put in evidence would have cured the insufficiency. ’ ’
I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied October 25, 1967. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

No case has been disclosed in which constructive possession based on joint occupancy has been approved under conditions as physically remote as those in this case.