Court Opinion

ID: 9641131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:23:48.886656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:35.324064
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
“Our prior opinions [under former penal codes] on the meaning of ‘deadly weapon’ do and should have instructional significance under the new Penal Code.” Mosley v. State, 545 S.W.2d 144, 145-146 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Turner v. State, 664 S.W.2d 86, at 89-90 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
Under former penal codes an accepted definition of “deadly weapon” was “one which, from the manner of its use, is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.” Miller v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 182, 143 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1940); Harris v. State, 72 Tex.Cr.R. 491, 162 S.W. 1150 (1914); Hardy v. State, 36 Tex.Cr.R. 400, 37 S.W. 434 (1896); see Branch’s Criminal Law § 83 and 4 Branch’s Annotated Penal Code (2d Ed.1956) 134, § 1754; see also 1 Texas Annotated Penal Statutes (Branch’s 3rd Ed.1974) 27, § 1.07(11).
In applying that definition, however, the Court fully settled the proposition that “the instrument or weapon used to strike with is not “per se a deadly weapon, nor is it the law that, if death results, therefore the conclusion is that the weapon used was a deadly weapon.” Hilliard v. State, 87 Tex.Cr.R. 15, 218 S.W. 1052, 1053 (1920), and cases and authorities cited therein. In such cases of homicide courts focused on the demonstrated intent of the accused. Crow v. State, 55 Tex.Cr.R. 200, 116 S.W. 52, at 53-54 (1909) (intent of accused is often very strong and controlling fact).
In this cause the “deadly weapon” is alleged to be “an unknown object used by the defendant;” a medical examiner testified that whatever object was used, whether it was a hand, a shoe or something else, put a pressure on the neck that caused the hemorrhage that asphyxiated the body of deceased. Mixon v. State, 781 S.W.2d 345, at 347 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 1989).
Thus the court of appeals said, “In other words, the object, in the manner of its use by the appellant, caused the complainant’s death.” Ibid. According to decisions of *109the Court cited above, that fact alone is not sufficient. However, appellant made a judicial confession that he did “intend to cause serious bodily injury to [complainant] and did cause [her death] by intentionally and knowingly committing an act clearly dangerous to human life, namely, by strangling [her with an unknown object].” Those admitted facts demonstrate his intent and, coupled with the medical testimony, satisfactorily support a deadly weapon finding.
Therefore, I join the judgment of the Court.*

 Like the court of appeals, "[I] find no case that has specifically dealt with the issue of an absent, unidentified deadly weapon!,]" Mixon, supra, at 346, and I share some of the concerns expressed by Judge Teague in his dissenting opinion. Particularly, because decisions of this Court have now made probable (if not obligatory) an affirmative finding in every case where any "thing” is used to cause the death of an individual, the Legislature will save the Judicial Department inordinate amounts of time and effort by simply adding "murder” to offenses enumerated in Article 42.12, § 3g(a)(l), V.A.C.C.P.