Court Opinion

ID: 9522114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:18:08.1221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:18.774141
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
¶ 39. concurring. While this Court has demonstrated time and again that it is no slave to the principle of stare decisis, it has also recognized that mere disagreement with how a case was decided — particular one of relatively recent vintage — is not a sufficient basis to deviate from a policy essential to certainty, stability, and predictability in the law. See State v. Berini, 167 Vt. 565, 566, 701 A.2d 1055, 1056 (1997) (mem.) (“While not slavish adherents to stare decisis, we generally require more than mere disagreement to overturn a decision, particularly one of such recent vintage.” (citation omitted)). The dissenting judge may consider Mullin v. Phelps, 162 Vt. 250, 647 A.2d 714 (1994), to have been decided “in error,” post, ¶ 46, but to advocate its reversal solely because he remains unpersuaded by its reasoning is to invite an endless cycle of decision and reversal should the next Court consider the abandonment of Mullin to have been “in error,” and the Court after that to conclude otherwise. The folly of such an approach is self-evident. Indeed, it is telling here that none of the parties to this appeal has even challenged Mullin, thus rendering the point of the dissent even more elusive and inconsequential.
¶ 40. Furthermore, all of the substantive arguments advanced by the dissent were fully considered in Mullin, and nothing new or persuasive is offered here to undermine its holding. Thus, the dissent claims that no governmental or constitutional interest warrants application of the clear-and-convincing standard of proof in a private custody case regardless of whether the court’s visitation order results in a de facto termination of parental rights. As discussed at length in Mullin, however, decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and others strongly suggest that preservation of a noncustodial parent’s visitation rights in any context is a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring clear and convincing evidence before it may be terminated in its entirety. *472162 Vt. at 265-67, 647 A.2d at 723-24; see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that parent’s right to raise child may be terminated only upon clear and convincing proof that the child was neglected); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) (concluding that failure to give noncustodial parent notice of adoption proceeding violated due process); see also Hoversten v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 200 (Ct. App. 1999) (reaffirming principles that parent’s right to visitation in custody dispute is “so basic to the human equation as to be considered a fundamental right” and that “[i]nterference with that right should only be justified by some compelling necessity” (quotations omitted)); McAlister v. Shaver, 633 So. 2d 494, 496 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that noncustodial parent involved in custody dispute has constitutionally protected inherent right to meaningful relationship with his children); Johntonny v. Malliski, 588 N.E.2d 200, 201 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (holding that “noncustodial parent’s right of visitation with his children is a natural right and should be denied only under extraordinary circumstances” and .by “clear and convincing evidence” (quotation omitted)).
¶ 41. The dissent also asserts that, unlike state-sponsored termination proceedings, a custody dispute poses no potential imbalance in the competing parties’ resources that might result in a higher risk of error. As we explained in Mullin, however, “[t]he accused parent . . . may face a former spouse who will do or say anything to obtain custody or to prevent the other spouse from obtaining custody,” so that the risk of error is no less, and in some cases may even exceed, that in a governmental proceeding. 162 Vt. at 266, 647 A.2d at 723. We noted, moreover, that the risk of error may be substantial in a custody dispute, due in part to the often imprecise nature of sexual abuse allegations and the absence of procedural protections otherwise available in state-sponsored termination proceedings, such as assigned counsel and separate adjudicative stages. Id. at 266-67, 647 A.2d at 723-24.
¶ 42. The dissent also claims that there is no sound basis to “privilege” one party over another in a custody dispute and further that the Mullin rule results in rulings contrary to the best interests of the child. Post, ¶ 52. Again, we carefully considered and rejected these claims in Mullin. “In the final analysis,” we explained, it is the significant “interests of both parents — the potential loss of parent-child contact and the *473countervailing concern for the children’s safety,” that dictate the minimum standard of proof tolerated by due process and that virtually compel the higher standard. 162 Vt. at 267, 647 A.2d at 724. And while the latter interest may be protected in many cases by requiring closely supervised visitation, the accused parent “should not be required to share equally the risk that the court ruled wrongly in deciding whether to terminate parent-child contact.” Id. As for the state’s paramount interest in protecting the welfare of the child, the dissent cites no evidence whatsoever to support its bare assertion that Mullin has operated to the detriment of children in general, or that a remand in this case for consideration of a supervised visitation structure would be contrary to the child’s best interests.
¶ 43. As Justice Cardozo insightfully instructed, “when a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment.” B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 150 (1921). This case presents precisely the opposite scenario. Nothing has appeared over the last seventeen years indicating even remotely that Mullin has undermined the public welfare, wrought individual injustice, or impeded the administration of justice. Indeed, not one cogent reason has been produced to abandon a precedent grounded in fundamental due process and the compelling state interest in preserving the relational interests between parents and children. The dissent’s call to “reconsider the wisdom” of Mullin, post, ¶ 53, thus rings distinctly hollow.
¶ 44. I am authorized to state that Justice Dooley joins this concurrence.