Court Opinion

ID: 9352046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 19:01:30.472072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:49.043121
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/4/23 P. v. Mitchell CA5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F081153
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. SC052002A)
                    v.

    RICKY MARSDEN MITCHELL,                                                               OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Michael G.
Bush, Judge.
         Mark Alan Hart, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B.
Bernstein, Erin Doering, Eric L. Christoffersen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Hill, P. J., Poochigian, J. and Detjen, J.
                                    INTRODUCTION
       Petitioner Ricky Marsden Mitchell petitioned the superior court, pursuant to
former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6) of the Penal Code,1 for resentencing on his
conviction for first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). The superior court summarily
denied the petition at the prima facie stage.
       On appeal, petitioner asserts he established a prima facie claim for resentencing,
and the court therefore erred in denying the petition without issuing an order to show
cause or holding an evidentiary hearing. In this regard, he argues his admission of a
burglary special circumstance, which required him to admit he was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life (§ 190.2,
subds. (a)(17), (d)), does not preclude relief because it was made prior to our Supreme
Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).
       In our original opinion we held the petition was properly denied because
petitioner’s admission of the burglary special circumstance rendered petitioner ineligible
for resentencing on count 1 as a matter of law. (People v. Mitchell (Oct. 20, 2021,
F081153) [nonpub. opn.].)
       Petitioner petitioned the California Supreme Court for review (S271888). The
state high court granted review and ultimately transferred the matter to us with directions
to vacate our opinion and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698 (Strong). Pursuant to the California Supreme Court’s order, we vacated our
prior opinion and afforded the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefing. The
parties now agree the superior court’s order must be reversed and the matter remanded
for further proceedings.

       1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Former section
1170.95 recently was renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the current section 1172.6 in this opinion.

                                                2.
       In light of Strong, we will reverse the superior court’s order denying the petition
and remand with directions for the court to issue an order to show cause.
                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       The facts underlying the offenses are not relevant to our determination, and we
therefore summarize them only briefly to provide context for the parties’ arguments.2
(See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       On October 5, 1992, Verlin Mitchell3 was found lying face down, bound, and dead
on his bed from multiple gunshot wounds to the head and a broken neck caused by either
a blow to the head with an object or by being “stomped on.” The residence appeared to
have been ransacked and both his vehicles were missing. Petitioner, Mike G., Charles O.,
and Larry F.4 were stopped that afternoon in New Mexico in one of Verlin’s vehicles and
arrested. Two firearms were found in the vehicle. Each of the individuals made
incriminating statements. Relevant here, petitioner told police that Mike planned the
burglary and murder, hit Verlin on the head and neck with an ax, and then shot Verlin.
Charles told police that petitioner and Mike were both armed, and Mike shot Verlin twice
after being urged to do so by petitioner. Mike told police that petitioner was armed,

       2  We deny petitioner’s November 18, 2020 request for judicial notice of the record
in his prior appeal, People v. Mitchell, F020913. (See People v. Sanders (2003) 31
Cal.4th 318, 323, fn. 1 [declining to take judicial notice of documents that were not
before the trial court]; see also People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1171, fn. 3
[judicial notice cannot be taken of any matter that is irrelevant].)
        Our factual summary is derived from records contained in the record on appeal in
the instant case, specifically a summary of police reports contained in the probation
officer’s report. The parties previously stipulated that the police reports provided part of
the factual basis for the plea.
       3Although petitioner and the decedent share the same last name, they do not
appear to be related. To avoid confusion, we refer to Verlin by his first name. No
disrespect is intended.
       4Mike, Charles, and Larry were minors at the time of the offense. Charles and
Larry are brothers.

                                             3.
directed the others to restrain Verlin, and told Mike he had to shoot Verlin or petitioner
would kill Mike’s parents. Larry’s statements were generally consistent with the others,
although he was unsure who killed the victim.
       On November 13, 1992, the Kern County District Attorney charged petitioner with
premeditated murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), with the special circumstance that the
murder was committed during the commission or attempted commission of a burglary
(§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(VII)); two counts of residential burglary (former § 460.1;
counts 2 & 5); and two counts of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); counts 3
& 4). As to count 1, the People also alleged petitioner personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and a principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
       On September 29, 1993, petitioner entered a plea of no contest to count 1, and
admitted the burglary special circumstance. The parties stipulated that petitioner was not
the shooter in the murder. The remaining counts and allegations were dismissed.
       On November 29, 1993, the court sentenced petitioner on count 1 to a term of life
without the possibility of parole.
       On February 7, 2019, petitioner, in propria persona, filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. In the form petition, petitioner stated that a
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against him that allowed him to be
prosecuted under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine; he pled guilty or no contest to first or second degree murder; and
he could not now be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes made
to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. He further averred that he was not the
actual killer, did not act with an intent to kill, and was not a major participant in the
underlying felony or did not act with reckless indifference to human life in the course of
the crime.
       The court appointed counsel to represent petitioner.

                                              4.
       On March 5, 2019, the People filed an opposition to the petition and a motion to
dismiss the petition, both arguing section 1172.6 is unconstitutional.5 On March 29,
2019, the People filed an opposition on the merits to petitioner’s petition, arguing that the
facts, as testified to at the preliminary hearing, demonstrated petitioner was a major
participant in the crime and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
       On May 15, 2019, petitioner’s counsel was relieved due to a conflict of interest
and new counsel was appointed.
       On September 19, 2019, the People filed a motion to dismiss the petition arguing
that the facts, as testified to at the preliminary hearing, demonstrated petitioner was a
major participant in the crime and acted with reckless indifference to human life, and
additionally aided and abetted in the murder with the intent to kill. The People also
argued petitioner’s admission of the burglary-murder special circumstance constituted an
admission that his conviction did not fall within the provisions of section 1172.6.
       On April 14, 2020, petitioner filed a reply, arguing that the record did not rebut his
assertion that he is entitled to relief and the court could not resolve whether petitioner
was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life without
resolving factual questions at an evidentiary hearing.
       On April 17, 2020, the People filed a reply to petitioner’s reply, arguing once
again that the special circumstance admission rendered petitioner ineligible for relief.
       On May 11, 2020, the court denied the petition in a minute order without
providing a statement of reasons.
       This timely appeal followed.

       5   The motion was fully briefed and eventually denied by the court.

                                              5.
                                        DISCUSSION
I.     Applicable Law
       Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) “to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine . . . to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see § 189, subd. (e); accord, Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 707-
708.) Senate Bill No. 1437 also added former section 1170.95, now renumbered as
section 1172.6, which provides a procedure for persons convicted of felony murder to
seek vacatur of the conviction and resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); accord, Strong, at
p. 708.)
       Under section 1172.6, an offender seeking resentencing must first file a petition in
the sentencing court, and the sentencing court must determine whether the petitioner has
made a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)-(c);
accord, Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) If the sentencing court determines the
petitioner has made such a showing, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold
a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c),
(d)(1).) At this evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       To demonstrate prejudice from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition before the
issuance of an order to show cause, the petitioner must show it is reasonably probable
that, absent error, his or her petition would not have been summarily denied without an
evidentiary hearing. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972-974; see People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

                                               6.
II.    Analysis
       Petitioner argues he made a prima facie claim for resentencing and the court
therefore erred in denying his petition at the prima facie stage. The People initially
argued the petition was properly denied because petitioner’s admission of the burglary
special circumstance established petitioner was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, disqualifying factors pursuant
to section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3) and section 189, subdivision (e).
       While this appeal was pending, our Supreme Court issued its opinion in Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th 698. Therein, the high court held that a special circumstance finding
entered pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) prior to the court’s decisions in
Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 and Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 did not preclude a section
1172.6 petitioner from making a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief.6 (Strong, at
p. 703.)
       Strong is dispositive of this case. Petitioner admitted the special circumstance
allegation prior to the decisions in Banks and Clark, and the admission therefore is not
preclusive on prima facie review of the petition under section 1172.6. (Strong, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 703.) The petition was facially sufficient and alleged the essential facts
necessary for relief under section 1172.6. Because the People have presented no other
basis to deny the petition at the prima facie stage, the order denying the petition must be
reversed and the matter remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause and, to
the extent necessary, conduct an evidentiary hearing under subdivision (d) of section
1172.6. We express no opinion on the ultimate resolution of the petition.

       6Banks and Clark “substantially clarified the law” regarding “what it means to be
a major participant and . . . to act with reckless indifference to human life.” (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 706-707.)

                                             7.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The May 11, 2020 order denying the petition is reversed and the matter remanded
with directions to issue an order to show cause and, to the extent necessary, to hold an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

                                             8.