Court Opinion

ID: 9394140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 14:13:57.96795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.561414
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 37

                  SUPREME COURT            OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2019AP2383-CR

COMPLETE TITLE:        State of Wisconsin,
                                 Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
                       Daimon Von Jackson, Jr.,
                                 Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

                         REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                         Reported at 400 Wis. 2d 542, 970 N.W.2d 571
                                    (2022 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:         May 12, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         November 29, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Racine
   JUDGE:              Mark F. Nielsen & Faye M. Flancher

JUSTICES:
Per curiam. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring
opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined and in which HAGEDORN,
J., joined except for ¶3. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which DALLET, J., joined.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Melinda A. Swartz and the Law Office of Melinda Swartz,
LLC, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Melinda A. Swartz.

       For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Lisa E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral
argument by Lisa E.F. Kumfer, assistant attorney general.
                                                                           2023 WI 37
                                                                  NOTICE
                                                    This opinion is subject to further
                                                    editing and modification.   The final
                                                    version will appear in the bound
                                                    volume of the official reports.
No.   2019AP2383-CR
(L.C. No.   2014CF1721)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                              :            IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

            Plaintiff-Respondent,                                      FILED
      v.                                                          MAY 12, 2023
Daimon Von Jackson, Jr.,                                             Sheila T. Reiff
                                                                  Clerk of Supreme Court
            Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                    Dismissed as

improvidently granted.

      ¶1    PER CURIAM.       Daimon Von Jackson, Jr. petitioned for

review of a court of appeals decision that affirmed a circuit

court   order    denying     his   postconviction         motion,     in    which     he

argued,     among    other    things,    that       his    trial      counsel       was

ineffective.        State v. Jackson, No. 2019AP2383-CR, unpublished

slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2021).                    After reviewing the

record and the briefs, and after hearing oral arguments, we

conclude that this matter should be dismissed as improvidently

granted.
                                                 No.   2019AP2383-CR

    By the Court.——The review of the decision of the court of

appeals is dismissed as improvidently granted.

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      ¶2     REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.                   (concurring).           I agree

with this court's decision to dismiss the petition for review as

improvidently granted.             I write in concurrence only to respond

to    the    dissent,      which      insinuates         that    by      dismissing       the

petition, this court maintains a miscarriage of justice.                                  Not

so.    The dissent also inaccurately portrays this court's recent

history regarding dismissed petitions.

      ¶3     Lobbing an alarming accusation, the dissent declares:

"[w]ithout a decision in this case, we leave a conviction intact

without     examining        the      circumstances        that       led   to     what    a

[dissenting] judge of the court of appeals referred to as a

failure     of     both   the    court     and     the    entire      justice     system."

Dissent,     ¶24     (citing       State      v.    Jackson,       No. 2019AP2383-CR,

unpublished        slip   op.,     ¶88   (Reilly,        J.,    dissenting)).          This

statement        underrates     the    work   of    the    three-judge        panel    that

heard the appeal.            After a thorough review, two of those three

judges voted to affirm the decision made by the circuit court

judge.      As noted in the majority opinion, the dissenting judge
largely raised issues neither presented to the circuit court nor

argued      on     appeal.         Jackson,        No. 2019AP2383-CR,            ¶50   n.23

(majority op.).           The majority criticized the dissenting judge's

"advocacy," reiterating the uncontroversial axiom that the court

of appeals is not a defense attorney.                    Id.     Damion Von Jackson's

right to an appeal was fully satisfied when the court of appeals

addressed the arguments he actually made.                       Just because a single

judge at one point in this case's procedural history "perceived"

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a "failure" of the justice system does not entitle Jackson to

further review.       See dissent, ¶24.

       ¶4     The dissent also makes the unsupported assertion that

"[a]n examination of recent dismissals as improvidently granted

reveals a largely inconsistent practice with regard to whether

this court provides any explanation for its dismissals."                     Id.,

¶15.        The dissent's own examples illustrate its error.                  The

dissent states:

            For examples of dismissals without explanation,
       see Slamka[    v. Gen. Heating and Air Conditioning
       Inc., 2022 WI 68], 404 Wis. 2d 586[, 980 N.W.2d 957];
       Cobb v. King, 2022 WI 59, 403 Wis. 2d 198, 976
       N.W.2d 410; Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., 2021 WI 41,
       396 Wis. 2d 773, 958 N.W.2d 530; State v. Kloss, 2020
       WI 26, 390 Wis. 2d 685, 939 N.W.2d 564; Waukesha
       County v. J.J.H., 2020 WI 22, 390 Wis. 2d 531, 939
       N.W.2d 49; Halbman v. Barrock, 2017 WI 91, 378
       Wis. 2d 17, 902 N.W.2d 248.

            In   contrast,   for  examples   of   explanations
       provided by the court for a dismissal as improvidently
       granted, see Smith v. Anderson, 2017 WI 43, 374
       Wis. 2d 715, 893 N.W.2d 790; Michael J. Waldvogel
       Trucking, LLC v. LIRC, 2012 WI 28, 339 Wis. 2d 248,
       810 N.W.2d 811; Nedvidek v. Kuipers, 2009 WI 44, 317
       Wis. 2d 340, 766 N.W.2d 205; State v. Welda, 2009 WI
       35, 317 Wis. 2d 87, 765 N.W.2d 555; State v. Gajewski,
       2009 WI 22, 316 Wis. 2d 1, 762 N.W.2d 104; State v.
       Townsend, 2007 WI 31, 299 Wis. 2d 672, 728 N.W.2d 342.
Id., ¶15 n.2.             The year in each citation is telling.               The

dissent cites five cases from the most recent five years in

which no explanation was offered.                The dissent's sampling does

not include a sixth case in which this court did the same during

this period.       See State v. Lee, 2022 WI 32, ¶1, 401 Wis. 2d 593,

973 N.W.2d 764 (per curiam).             In contrast, the dissent cites a
single      case   from    the   past   decade   containing     an   explanation.

                                          2
                                                       No.   2019AP2383-CR.rgb

Notably, two justices did not participate in that case, which

may explain why it is an outlier.1          Smith, 374 Wis. 2d 715, ¶10.

The remainder of the cases cited in which this court offered an

explanation are from more than a decade ago, and one case is

from 2007——about 16 years ago.

    ¶5    Far     from      establishing      a     "largely inconsistent

practice," the dissent's thorough examination of these "recent"

examples establishes a no-explanation trend.           Dissent, ¶15.      The

dissent quibbles over the definition of "recent," characterizing

my concept of what is recent as too limited.           Id., ¶15 n.1.      The

irony, of course, is that this writing simply applies the very

definition of "recent" the dissent uses.           The dissent's "recent"

examples show the opposite of the point the dissent is trying to

make.    The dissent may lament the no-explanation trend, but

calling the court's practice "inconsistent" flies in the face of

the facts.

    ¶6    This court's recent practice is in accord with the

traditional approach.        When courts of last resort           dismiss a
petition, they customarily do not explain why, although courts

have at times exercised their discretion to make exceptions to

this practice on a case by case basis.            5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate

Review   § 347   (updated    Feb.   2023)     ("Ordinarily,     no   opinion

    1  As I have previously explained, "[c]itizens of the state
deserve to have the entire supreme court decide all cases unless
extreme circumstances require otherwise."   Wis. Judicial Comm'n
v. Woldt, 2021 WI 73, ¶56 n.2, 398 Wis. 2d 482, 961 N.W.2d 854
(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring/dissenting) (quoting
State v. Herrmann, 2015 WI 84, ¶154, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867
N.W.2d 772 (Ziegler, J., concurring)).

                                    3
                                                                          No.   2019AP2383-CR.rgb

accompanies the dismissal of a . . . [petition] as improvidently

granted.        However, the Court may issue an opinion per curiam

defending the dismissal, especially where the Court wants to

refute      the    arguments          of    some    justices        dissenting          from    the

dismissal."); see also Rice v. Sioux City Mem'l Park Cemetery,

349    U.S. 70,        77     (1955)       ("We   have     taken     this       opportunity      to

explain . . . [why              the    petition          is   being        dismissed],         when

normally, for obvious reasons in view of our volume of business,

no    opinion      accompanies         dismissal         of   a    writ    as    improvidently

granted[.]").            The United States Supreme Court, for example,

typically dismisses a petition in a mere one-sentence order.

E.g., In re Grand Jury, 598 U.S. __, 143 S. Ct. 543 (2023) (per

curiam).        The dissent does not suggest this case warrants an

exception         to    our     practice;          it    argues      explanations         should

accompany all dismissals.

       ¶7     In       decrying       our    custom,       the     dissent       examines       its

possible     underlying          rationales         only      in   passing        and    only   in

response     to        the    concerns       raised      in   this    writing.            As    the
proponent of discarding a customary practice, the dissent bears

the    burden      of        examining      why    the     practice        exists       and    then

explaining why it should be rejected:

       In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from
       deforming them, there is one plain and simple
       principle; a principle which will probably be called a
       paradox.    There exists in such a case a certain
       institution or law; let us say, for the sake of
       simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road.
       The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it
       and says, "I don't see the use of this; let us clear
       it away."     To which the more intelligent type of
       reformer will do well to answer:    "If you don't see
       the use of it, I certainly won't let you clear it
                                  4
                                                                 No.    2019AP2383-CR.rgb

     away.   Go away and think.   Then, when you can come
     back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may
     allow you to destroy it."
G.K. Chesterton, The Thing:                Why I am Catholic 27 (Dodd, Mead

and Co. 1930); cf. Bartlett v. Evers, 2020 WI 68, ¶203, 393

Wis. 2d 172, 945 N.W.2d 685 (Kelly, J., concurring/dissenting)

(explaining the purpose of precedent is "[t]o remind us that

those who came before were diligent and capable in their work,

and that in doubtful matters it is best to leave settled things

settled    unless       there    is   a    clear      and    present      need     to     do

otherwise").

     ¶8        Perhaps the tradition should be discarded; however, a

cursory dissent in which "recent" history is misused to support

a   preconceived           outcome    is    insufficient         to      justify        that

conclusion.          The tradition may serve many purposes, including

the preservation of limited judicial resources.                          See Rice, 349

U.S. at 77.          For example, if this court determines the lower

court reached the correct outcome, further review can be a waste

of time.       Lee, 401 Wis. 2d 593, ¶2 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J.,

concurring).         Under that circumstance, this court may conclude

further review would not only waste judicial resources but also

cause     an    unwarranted      delay     in     a   case's     final     resolution.

Additionally,        the    tradition      may    stem    from    the    principle        of

judicial restraint.           If this court declines to decide an issue,

explaining the avoidance could inadvertently create persuasive

authority on the issue, thereby nonsensically undermining the

very decision not to decide it.
     ¶9        The   dissent    attempts         to   dispel     these    concerns        by

suggesting       a    single-sentence       order        dismissing      the     petition
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                                                                   No.    2019AP2383-CR.rgb

because its resolution "will not lead to any further development

of   the   law[.]"          Dissent,       ¶15    n.1       (quoting         Slamka,        404

Wis. 2d 586,    ¶5    (Ann    Walsh       Bradley,      J.,    concurring)).               The

dissent claims this minimal explanation would neither consume

judicial   resources        nor    decide      any    issue        but       would    foster

transparency.        This    proposal      presupposes         a   majority          of    this

court in a particular case would agree on why a petition should

be dismissed.    Often, no such majority exists.                         If two or three

justices   dissent     from       the    dismissal,     forming          a    majority       on

rationale may be challenging.               Some justices may disagree with

the majority's reasoning, leading to separate writings, which in

turn may prompt other justices to write separately in response.

A broadly-worded order without a specific reason for dismissal

facilitates joinder.          The issue of judicial resources is more

complicated than the dissent implies.

     ¶10   The dissent does not recognize that merely declaring a

petition lacks law-developing potential is itself a holding with

law-developing potential.               Even if not binding, it hints this
court would not distinguish or overrule an existing precedent.

Perhaps such a dismissal should not be read that way, but this

court's decisions are often misconstrued.                      Cf. Trump v. Evers,

No. 2020AP1971-OA,      unpublished         order,      4     (Wis.      Dec.    3,       2020)

(Roggensack, C.J., dissenting) ("I also am concerned that the

public will misunderstand what our denial of the petition means.

Occasionally,   members       of    the    public     seem      to       believe      that    a

denial of . . . a case signals that the petition's allegations
are either false or not serious.                 Nothing could be further from

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                                                           No.   2019AP2383-CR.rgb

the truth."); O'Bright v. Lynch, No. 2020AP1761-OA, unpublished

order, 2 (Wis. Oct. 29, 2020) (Roggensack, C.J., concurring) ("I

write separately to clarify that our denial of the petition for

an original action should not be construed as an endorsement to

disregard Wisconsinites' fundamental right to vote.").

      ¶11    Finally, it is unclear whether the dissent's proposal

would     actually   give    the   public    more   than    an    order   simply

declaring the case dismissed.              Without some explanation as to

why the court's review of the case would not develop any law,

the   conclusory     order    recommended     by    the   dissent    would    not

promote transparency.2

      ¶12    I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE

KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence and that Justice BRIAN

HAGEDORN joins this concurrence except for ¶3.

      2The dissent also states, "[this court] dismisses a case
that it at one point in time thought worthy of our review,"
castigating this court's supposed "about-face."    Dissent, ¶15.
The dissent does not acknowledge that a petition for review
needs only three votes (less than a majority of the full court)
to be granted. Wis. S. Ct. IOP III.B.1 (Feb. 28, 2023).

                                       7
                                                                      No.   2019AP2383-CR.awb

      ¶13    ANN       WALSH      BRADLEY,       J.     (dissenting).                I     write

separately for two reasons.               First, as I have stated previously,

I believe that this court should explain to the litigants and

the public the reason for a dismissal as improvidently granted.

At   the    very       least,    the    court     should       give    the    litigants        a

reasoned     justification          for    leaving       the    questions       unanswered

given that they have expended substantial effort and resources

to argue this case before us.

      ¶14    Second, in my view, the issues in this case are worthy

of this court's review.                Although the degree of law development

is   limited,      Judge       Reilly's     dissent     in     the    court     of       appeals

raises substantial questions about whether Daimon Von Jackson

received     constitutionally             adequate       representation          and        even

refers to this case as a "fail[ure]" of the "entire justice

system."     State v. Jackson, No. 2019AP2383-CR, unpublished slip

op., ¶88 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2021) (Reilly, J., dissenting).

Because I believe we should address the issues presented, I

respectfully dissent.
                                             I

      ¶15    The       court     disposes    of       this    case     as    improvidently

granted     in     a    terse,    two-sentence          per    curiam       opinion.          It

dismisses a case that it at one point in time thought worthy of

our review, offering no insight for either these litigants or

future litigants as to the court's rationale for its about-face.

An   examination        of     recent   dismissals       as     improvidently            granted

                                             1
                                              No.   2019AP2383-CR.awb

reveals a largely inconsistent practice1 with regard to whether

this court provides any explanation for its dismissal.2

     ¶16   The result of this inconsistent practice is a lack of

guidance for potential litigants and the public, as well as an

     1 The concurrence asserts that there has been the emergence
of a "no-explanation trend" over the past five years such that
it should now be the accepted practice of the court.
Concurrence, ¶5.     Regardless of whether an examination of
"recent" history encompasses a shorter or longer trajectory, the
court five years ago (without explanation) stopped offering
explanations.    Such a change does not transform an alleged
"custom" into an entrenched practice entitled to the patina of
precedential weight. See id., ¶7.

     Further, the rationales offered by the concurrence for
adhering to this purported new "tradition" of offering no
explanation are easily dispatched.    The preservation of scarce
judicial resources and the inadvertent resolution of an issue
are certainly worthy of consideration.     But a single sentence
stating that a "review should be deemed improvidently granted
because the issue for which we took this case will not lead to
any further development of the law," as I have offered in the
past, neither consumes a great deal of resources nor decides any
issue in controversy.     See Slamka v. Gen. Heating and Air
Conditioning Inc., 2022 WI 68, ¶5, 404 Wis. 2d 586, 980
N.W.2d 957 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring).
     2 For examples of dismissals without explanation, see
Slamka, 404 Wis. 2d 586; Cobb v. King, 2022 WI 59, 403
Wis. 2d 198, 976 N.W.2d 410; Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., 2021
WI 41, 396 Wis. 2d 773, 958 N.W.2d 530; State v. Kloss, 2020 WI
26, 390 Wis. 2d 685, 939 N.W.2d 564; Waukesha County v. J.J.H.,
2020 WI 22, 390 Wis. 2d 531, 939 N.W.2d 49; Halbman v. Barrock,
2017 WI 91, 378 Wis. 2d 17, 902 N.W.2d 248.

     In contrast, for examples of explanations provided by the
court for a dismissal as improvidently granted, see Smith v.
Anderson, 2017 WI 43, 374 Wis. 2d 715, 893 N.W.2d 790; Michael
J. Waldvogel Trucking, LLC v. LIRC, 2012 WI 28, 339 Wis. 2d 248,
810   N.W.2d 811;  Nedvidek  v.   Kuipers,  2009   WI  44,   317
Wis. 2d 340, 766 N.W.2d 205; State v. Welda, 2009 WI 35, 317
Wis. 2d 87, 765 N.W.2d 555; State v. Gajewski, 2009 WI 22, 316
Wis. 2d 1, 762 N.W.2d 104; State v. Townsend, 2007 WI 31, 299
Wis. 2d 672, 728 N.W.2d 342.

                                2
                                                          No.     2019AP2383-CR.awb

effective negation of the numerous hours of work and sums of

money spent seeking a decision on the merits.               Because there is

a strong public policy rationale behind providing reasons for a

dismissal as improvidently granted, the court's general practice

should be to provide an explanation for such a dismissal.                      Its

"we don't have to tell you, so we won't" approach serves only to

undermine transparency and accountability, while compounding the

alleged systemic failures in this case.

                                      II

     ¶17   I not only take issue with the majority's lack of

explanation   of    its   decision,    but    I    also   disagree      with    the

decision itself.      The issues raised in this case revolve around

whether Jackson's fourth trial counsel, Attorney Scott Anderson,

was constitutionally ineffective.3           Jackson asserts that Attorney

Anderson was ineffective for failing to communicate a plea offer

to him, and for failing to meet with him as trial approached.

Jackson    also    contends   that    the    circuit      court     should     have

followed up to ensure that his attorney had met with him.
     ¶18   Jackson     pleaded   guilty       to    second-degree        reckless

homicide as a result of an incident where the victim was killed

during a robbery.      The plea was not as party to a crime (PTAC).

See Wis. Stat. § 939.05 (2013-14).4          This piece of information is

     3 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)
(setting forth that a defendant must demonstrate both deficient
performance and prejudice to be successful on a claim of
ineffective assistance).
     4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated.

                                      3
                                                                      No.       2019AP2383-CR.awb

important for two reasons.                    First, a previous plea offer, which

the prosecutor said would remain open until the date of trial,

included       a    plea    as        PTAC.     Second,          Jackson       has     maintained

throughout the case that he was not the shooter, but was merely

a    lookout       for     the    robbery      that       resulted        in    the        shooting.

Jackson argues that he would have been treated more favorably at

sentencing if he pleaded as PTAC, which would have allowed him

to    credibly      assert       that    he    was    the       lookout    rather          than   the

shooter.

       ¶19     The record contains evidence supporting the claim that

Jackson was the lookout.                 Most compelling is that an eyewitness

described          the     clothes       the     two       assailants           were       wearing.

Surveillance video from a casino shows that later on the day of

the homicide, Jackson and two other men were gambling.                                      The two

other men were wearing the clothes the eyewitness described, and

Jackson was not.             Further, a co-defendant's fingerprints were

found on the gun magazine.

       ¶20     Attorney      Anderson certainly made some mistakes, and
although the State did not agree that Anderson's representation

was    constitutionally           deficient,         it    conceded       at        oral   argument

that mistakes were made.                 This court apparently agreed with such

an    assessment         when     it     imposed       discipline         on        Anderson      for

violations of the rules of professional conduct in the course of

his    representation            of    Jackson.           See    Matter        of    Disciplinary

Proceedings Against Anderson, 2020 WI 82, 394 Wis. 2d 190, 950

N.W.2d 191.

                                                4
                                                                   No.   2019AP2383-CR.awb

    ¶21        Although our precedent indicates that a violation of

the rules of professional conduct does not necessarily mean that

counsel was constitutionally ineffective, State v. Cooper, 2019

WI 73, ¶¶21-22, 387 Wis. 2d 439, 929 Wis. 2d 192, Judge Reilly's

dissent       in    the       court   of   appeals   gives    me    enough          pause   to

conclude that we should review the issues presented in this

case.     The sheer number and magnitude of the alleged errors

contribute to a lack of confidence in the outcome that should be

addressed by this court.

    ¶22        For example, Judge Reilly concluded that Jackson was

"coerced into becoming the 'shooter'" due to constitutionally

ineffective         representation,        the    State's    breach      of     a   pretrial

offer for Jackson to plead as PTAC, and the circuit court's

defective plea colloquy.                   Jackson, No. 2019AP2383-CR, at ¶62

(Reilly, J., dissenting).                  The mistakes Judge Reilly observed

were recounted in a litany of errors:

              "A     'reasonably          competent    attorney'              would     have

               corrected the circuit court at both the final pretrial
               hearing and the trial/plea date that Jackson was not

               facing forty-six years in prison on an armed robbery

               charge if he went to trial."                  Id., ¶63 (Reilly, J.,

               dissenting) (footnote omitted).

              "A reasonably competent attorney would have challenged

               the State's breach of its plea offer."                    Id.

              "A reasonably competent attorney would have understood

               that       a    second-degree      reckless    homicide          charge      is

                                              5
                                                                        No.      2019AP2383-CR.awb

              materially different from a charge of second-degree

              reckless homicide as a party to the crime."                             Id.

             "A reasonably competent attorney would have provided

              his client with a pretrial offer and discussed the

              offer with his client prior to the day of trial."                               Id.

             "A reasonably competent attorney would have met with

              and prepared both his client and witnesses prior to

              the trial date."               Id.

             "A reasonably competent attorney would have procured,

              produced, and argued evidence that Jackson was not the

              'shooter'          but       was   blocks     away    when      Bobby    Henderson

              shot Carter."            Id.

      ¶23     In         Judge             Reilly's         view,          the        "objective

facts . . . show that Jackson was the lookout rather than the

shooter."          Id.,        ¶64.         It    is   true    that     that       there    is    no

difference     in        the    level       of    felony      or   permissible        sentencing

range for a conviction as a principal as opposed to a conviction

as   PTAC.         See    Wis.    Stat.          §§ 939.05(2),      940.06.           But   "[f]or
anyone to suggest that a judge at sentencing would treat a cold-

blooded killer the same as a 'lookout' is sorely lacking in the

understanding        of        what    a    judge      at   sentencing        is    tasked    with

doing."        Jackson,          No.        2019AP2383-CR,         at   ¶81        (Reilly,      J.,

dissenting).

      ¶24     Jackson seeks from this court a remand to the circuit

court for additional fact-finding.                            This court should decide

whether he is entitled to this remedy.                             Without a decision in
this case, we leave a conviction intact without examining the

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                                                        No.    2019AP2383-CR.awb

circumstances that led to what a judge of the court of appeals

referred   to   as   a   failure   of   both   the   court    and   the   entire

justice system.      See id., ¶88 (Reilly, J., dissenting).               Such a

perceived "failure" should surely be worthy of our review.

    ¶25    For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

    ¶26    I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA FRANK

DALLET joins this dissent.

                                        7
    No.   2019AP2383-CR.awb

1