Court Opinion

ID: 9908578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-10 08:10:29.705785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:16.074608
License: Public Domain

Reversed and Remanded and Memorandum Opinion filed December 5, 2023.

                                    In The

                   Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-22-00390-CR

                       RICHARD DOTSON, Appellant

                                      V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 177th District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. 1192825

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

      The Court of Criminal Appeals granted appellant an out-of-time appeal
because his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not challenging
appellant’s sentence as illegal. Ex parte Dotson, 663 S.W.3d 99, 99 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2022) (per curiam). Appellant contends that his punishment for a state jail
felony—possession of a controlled substance—was improperly enhanced when the
State failed to allege proper convictions to support the jury’s finding. The State
agrees appellant is entitled to a new punishment hearing, and so do we.1

I.     Background

       The State indicted appellant for the state jail felony of possession of a
controlled substance. Regarding enhancements, the State alleged:

              Before the commission of the offense alleged above, (hereafter
       styled the primary offense), on SEPTEMBER 15, 1992, in Cause No.
       0626016, in the 176TH DISTRICT COURT of HARRIS County,
       Texas, the Defendant was convicted of the felony of BURGLARY OF
       A BUILDING.
              Before the commission of the primary offense, and after the
       conviction in Cause No. 0626016 was final, the Defendant committed
       the felony of DELIVERY OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE and
       was finally convicted of that offense on JANUARY 9, 1998, in Cause
       No. 0771802, in the 351ST DISTRICT COURT of HARRIS County,
       Texas.

After a jury found appellant guilty, he pleaded true to these enhancements. The
court admitted evidence of appellant’s stipulation to sixteen prior convictions and
various judgments of convictions. Three of these convictions were felonies: (1) a
conviction in 1992 for burglary of a building committed in February 1992 (the first
conviction alleged for enhancement); (2) a conviction in 1990 for burglary of a
motor vehicle committed in July 1990; and (3) a conviction in 1980 for aggravated
robbery committed in May 1980.

       The trial court instructed the jury “you are to find ‘true’ the allegations of
Enhancement Paragraph One and Enhancement Paragraph Two of the indictment.”
The court instructed the jury to assess punishment at confinement in the

       1
        Although the State confesses error, this court is not bound by it and “must still
independently examine the error confessed.” Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 286 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010).

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institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) for not
less than two years nor more than twenty years, the range applicable to a second
degree felony. The jury found the allegations true and assessed punishment at
confinement in the TDCJ for eighteen years.

       Appellant appealed his conviction but did not challenge his sentence as
illegal.   See Dotson v. State, No. 14-09-00213-CR, 2010 WL 1661930 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 27, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). Appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, contending
that “appellate counsel was ineffective because she failed to raise an illegal
sentence claim based on the improper use of enhancements.” Ex parte Dotson, 663
S.W.3d 99, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (per curiam). A divided court granted relief
for appellant to file an out-of-time appeal. Id.

II.    Illegal Sentence

       We agree with the parties that appellant’s sentence is illegal due to
insufficient evidence to support enhancement to a second degree felony.

       The punishment range for a state jail felony is confinement for 180 days to
two years. Tex. Penal Code § 12.35(a). The punishment range for a second degree
felony is confinement for two to twenty years. Id. § 12.33(a).

       To enhance appellant’s punishment to the range for a second degree felony,
under the enhancement statute applicable to this case, the State was required to
prove that appellant had been “previously finally convicted of two felonies, and the
second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the
first previous conviction having become final.” See Act of May 29, 1995, 74th
Leg., R.S., ch. 318, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws, 2734, 2734–35 (codified as
amended at Tex. Penal Code § 12.425(b)). In 2001, the Court of Criminal Appeals

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held that the two felonies used for enhancement to the punishment level of a
second degree felony, under this statute, could not be state jail felonies. See
Campbell v. State, 49 S.W.3d 874, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).2

       The conviction alleged in the second enhancement paragraph—the 1998
conviction for possession of a controlled substance—was a state jail felony. Thus,
it could not be used to enhance appellant’s sentence. See Ex parte Dotson, 663
S.W.3d at 99; see also Campbell, 49 S.W.3d at 875.

       Appellant concedes, however, that the State “could have used other prior
convictions from Appellant’s criminal history to enhance the punishment range to
that of either a third-degree or second-degree felony.” Sometimes a variance
between a conviction alleged for enhancement and the conviction proven during
the punishment trial can be immaterial. If the defendant has not been prejudicially
surprised by the variance, the evidence is not legally insufficient, and the sentence
is legal. See, e.g., Freda v. State, 704 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)
(evidence of enhancement was sufficient when the State alleged a prior conviction
for bank robbery but proved at trial a prior conviction for conspiracy to commit
bank robbery). In determining whether there is a material variance, we look to
appellant’s 1990 and 1980 felony convictions as potential convictions that could,
along with his 1992 felony conviction, support the enhancement of appellant’s
punishment to the range of a second degree felony. Appellant has not argued that
he was prejudicially surprised by the State’s failure to plead one of these two other
prior felony convictions. See id.; cf. Ex parte Parrott, 396 S.W.3d 531, 533, 538
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (habeas applicant failed to show harm from an illegal
sentence based on State’s improper use of a prior state jail felony to enhance his
       2
        The Legislature later amended the statute to include this limitation expressly. See Tex.
Penal Code § 12.425(b) (providing for enhancement if the defendant has “previously been finally
convicted of two felonies other than a state jail felony punishable under Section 12.35(a)”).

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punishment range when other uncontested evidence established that his criminal
history supported the range of punishment within which he was sentenced).

       However, nothing in this record indicates when his 1990 or 1980 conviction
became final, which would be necessary to support the trial court’s judgment under
the applicable enhancement statute. See Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch.
318, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws, 2734, 2734–35 (date of the offense for the second
conviction must be subsequent to the earlier conviction becoming final); cf. Ex
parte Miller, 330 S.W.3d 610, 624 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (regarding similar
statute governing enhancement of felony with prior felony convictions, the State
must “prove this chronological sequence of events: (1) the first conviction became
final; (2) the offense leading to a later conviction is committed; (3) the later
conviction becomes final; [and] (4) the offense for which the defendant presently
stands accused is committed” (quotation omitted)).

       In deciding to grant appellant habeas relief, the Court of Criminal Appeals
relied on Ex parte Miller, which granted habeas relief when Miller’s appellate
counsel failed to challenge a sentence that had been enhanced with a conviction for
which the State failed to prove when an offense was committed. See Ex parte
Dotson, 663 S.W.3d at 100 (citing Ex parte Miller, 330 S.W.3d 610). Miller’s
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a “lead pipe cinch” or “sure-
fire winner” point of error, for which he would have prevailed on appeal. Ex parte
Miller, 330 S.W.3d at 624–25 (“[I]f appellate counsel fails to raise a claim that has
indisputable merit under well-settled law and would necessarily result in reversible
error, appellate counsel is ineffective for failing to raise it.”).

       Because the State failed to prove when the 1990 or 1980 conviction became
final—a requirement to enhance appellant’s sentence—the evidence is legally
insufficient to support enhancement, and the sentence must be reversed and

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remanded for a new punishment hearing. See Jordan v. State, 256 S.W.3d 286,
292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also Ex parte Miller, 330 S.W.3d at 624–26.

III.   Remedy

       Appellant asks this court to remand for a new punishment hearing “within
the state jail felony punishment range.” Appellant cites no authority to limit his
new punishment hearing to the range for an unenhanced state jail felony, and we
find none.

       “[S]ufficiency of the evidence with regard to a conviction and sufficiency
with regard to a prior conviction alleged for enhancement purposes involve very
different considerations.” Jordan, 256 S.W.3d at 292. For example, when a
reviewing court determines the State’s evidence is insufficient to prove an
enhancement, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the use of the enhancement
conviction during a retrial on punishment. Id. Additionally, the State is not
required to plead enhancement allegations in a charging instrument; nor is the State
required to give notice before trial. Ex parte Parrott, 396 S.W.3d at 537 (holding
that the applicant was not entitled to a new punishment hearing based on an
improper enhancement when the State provided notice and proof of other
enhancement convictions during the habeas proceeding; “The State’s response to
his application provided him notice of the State’s intent to support the propriety of
his sentence with his other prior convictions.”).

       We find no authority that would prohibit the State from properly alleging
and proving appellant’s prior felony convictions for enhancement upon retrial in
this case. See Ex parte Dotson, 663 S.W.3d at 101 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (“[I]f
appellate counsel had raised the issue on appeal and obtained a reversal, the only
remedy would have been a new sentencing hearing at which the State could then

                                          6
offer the eligible prior convictions for enhancement, affording the exact same
punishment range available at the original trial.”).

      Thus, appellant’s first issue is sustained in part. His sentence is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.29(b), Jordan, 256 S.W.3d at 293.

                                        /s/       Ken Wise
                                                  Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Zimmerer, and Spain.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

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