Court Opinion

ID: 9487121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:08:44.236126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:06.451317
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with much of the analysis and with the result reached by the majority opinion, but write separately with respect to one interpretation that the majority does not pursue. The majority states that, “the district court’s judgment in this case does not incorporate the settlement ...” But the Judgment Order by its own terms “is entered in accordance with the Settlement Agreement which has been signed by all parties ...” It is not much of a stretch to construe “entered in accordance with” as language of incorporation. In fact, in McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir.1985), an opinion the majority describes as portending (and approved by) the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994), we held that a judgment entered “pursuant to” a settlement agreement incorporated that agreement. Kokkonen is silent as to what words a district court must use to incorporate a settlement agreement, and I see no reason to depart (as the majority appears to) from our approach in McCall-Bey.
In any event, one of Lucille’s principal arguments involves interpretation of the word “reinstatement” from the settlement agreement. He says that this means he is entitled to leave and pension credits, essentially restoring his situation to what it would *550have been had he not been discharged. But the judgment does say he is to be “reinstated.” So it seems to me that the same argument as to the meaning of “reinstate” survives under any analysis.
Since I agree with the district court that “reinstate” was not intended to mean what Lucille claims it means, I agree that the City prevails and the district court should be affirmed.