Court Opinion

ID: 9906388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 21:03:36.436609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:20.483505
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 210474-U
                                             No. 1-21-0474
                                     Order filed December 1, 2023
                                                                                          Sixth Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                                IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                           FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                             )   Appeal from the
                                                                  )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                    )   Cook County.
                                                                  )
     v.                                                           )   No. 99 CR 1111
                                                                  )
 LERATIO SMITH,                                                   )   Honorable
                                                                  )   Thomas J. Byrne,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                   )   Judge, presiding.

           JUSTICE C.A. Walker delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice Oden Johnson and Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1        Held: We affirm the circuit court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction
                petition because defendant failed to show cause for not raising his proportionate
                penalties claim in an earlier collateral proceeding.

¶2        Defendant Leratio Smith appeals the circuit court’s order denying his motion for leave to

file a successive petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.

(West 2020)). On appeal, he contends he set forth a meritorious claim that his sentence violated

the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) because
No. 1-21-0474

his de facto life sentence of 60 years in prison, imposed for offenses he committed at the age of

22, failed to reflect his youth, immaturity, and “learning disability.” Smith asserts that he

demonstrated cause for failing to raise that claim in previous postconviction petitions because

those petitions pre-dated Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its progeny. We affirm.

¶3                                          I. BACKGROUND

¶4      Smith and codefendant Charles Taylor were charged by indictment with first degree

murder, armed robbery, and attempted armed robbery, premised on an incident in Chicago on

December 4, 1998.1 Following a 2003 jury trial, Smith was found guilty of first degree murder,

armed robbery, and attempted armed robbery. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 60

years for first degree murder, 20 years for armed robbery, and 8 years for attempted armed robbery.

The supreme court subsequently vacated the attempted armed robbery conviction and affirmed the

first degree murder and armed robbery convictions. People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1 (2009).

¶5      The State’s evidence at trial showed that on December 4, 1998, at about 11:45 p.m., outside

a bar on the 3500 block of North Elston Avenue in Chicago, Smith held Tony Colon at gunpoint,

brought Colon inside the bar, and ordered everyone to the floor. He told the bartender to open the

cash register. Colon and Smith struggled over a cell phone and argued over whether Smith’s

firearm was a BB gun or a “real” firearm. Smith then shot Colon in the chest, took money from

the bar, and left.

¶6      Smith’s girlfriend, Michelle Boyd, testified that Smith told her he traveled to the bar in a

vehicle with Taylor, robbed the bar, and shot someone, but “didn’t mean to shoot that man.” Boyd

        1
            Smith and Taylor were tried simultaneously but in severed trials.

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No. 1-21-0474

confirmed that she had reviewed surveillance footage from the bar and believed Smith was the

gunman depicted in the footage, as she recognized his voice and clothing.

¶7      The day after the shooting, Smith was arrested. Multiple eyewitnesses identified Smith

both in a lineup and subsequently at trial. At the police station, after a detective told him several

witnesses identified him, Smith admitted that he committed the robbery and shot a man at the bar.

Smith provided an inculpatory, court-reported statement, which was read into the record. In the

statement, Smith stated that he and Taylor were driving around as Smith intended to rob someone.

Smith wanted to “make some money” for his child’s Christmas and did not plan to hurt anyone.

Smith admitted to holding Colon at gunpoint, robbing the bar, and shooting Colon.

¶8      Smith testified that he remained in the vehicle while Taylor crossed the street, put his arm

around the back of a man’s neck, and entered the bar with the man. Smith heard a gunshot a minute

or two later. Taylor left the bar, put a firearm into his waistband, and entered the driver’s side of

the vehicle. After driving away from the scene, Taylor told Smith he got in a fight at the bar and

shot someone. The next day, Smith reported to police that his license plate was stolen because

“they will be coming” for him if someone saw his vehicle after what had happened the previous

night. When Smith went outside, the police arrested him. At the police station, officers beat Smith

and held a firearm to his head until he confessed.

¶9      On October 23, 2003, the jury found Smith guilty of first degree murder, armed robbery,

and attempted armed robbery.

¶ 10    Smith’s sentencing hearing commenced on February 24, 2004, and concluded on May 26,

2004.

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No. 1-21-0474

¶ 11    Smith’s presentence investigation report (PSI) reflected that he was 22 years old at the time

of the offenses and 27 years old when the report was prepared. Smith was not married and had an

eight-year-old child with Boyd. He stopped attending high school his junior year because he “lost

interest.” No juvenile convictions were reflected in the PSI, but he was convicted of armed robbery

in 2000.

¶ 12    In aggravation, the State called assistant state’s attorney Nancy Nazarian, who read Smith’s

statement given at the police station. The State also called Colon’s mother and his wife, who each

read a victim impact statement in court. The State entered a certified copy of Smith’s 2000

conviction for armed robbery.

¶ 13    In mitigation, Smith called his mother, who testified that Smith had issues in school, had

difficulty reading, and had been enrolled in special education courses due to a learning disability.

Smith was shot when he was 15 years old. His sister has severe cerebral palsy, and Smith “did it

all” in helping to take care of her.

¶ 14    Richard Ybarra, the licensed clinical social worker who prepared Smith’s mitigation report,

testified that despite Smith’s “presumed efforts,” Smith’s academic performance was “abysmal.”

Due to his consistent academic struggles, Smith underwent psychological testing early in

elementary school and was diagnosed with a “severe” learning disability. The schools that Smith

attended attempted to ameliorate the issue but were unsuccessful.

¶ 15    Ybarra testified that several individuals he spoke with pointed out that Smith was gullible,

easy to manipulate, and easy to influence. Ybarra’s “suspicion” was that Smith had difficulty

processing verbal information, and that his learning disability affected his ability to make split-

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No. 1-21-0474

second decisions. Ybarra was “absolutely convinced” that Smith’s diagnosed learning disability

“may have impinged on his ability to *** function.”

¶ 16   On cross-examination, Ybarra confirmed that the report he completed did not describe

Smith’s learning disability as severe. His report stated that Smith adapts well to classroom

situations and gets along well with peers and authority figures. The report also reflected that Smith

had “problems” with auditory processing, visual processing, and visual memory.

¶ 17   In allocution, Smith apologized to Colon’s family and stated that he made a mistake by

choosing “the wrong friend,” which caused him to be “here.” He wished he could take “you all”

back to that night, but he could not. He concluded by stating, “whatever happens today, it is my

fault saying it happened.”

¶ 18   The trial court sentenced Smith to 60 years in prison for first degree murder, a concurrent

term of 20 years for armed robbery, and a consecutive term of 8 years for attempted armed robbery.

The court stated it had reviewed the PSI, the mitigation report, and listened to the testimony of the

witnesses in aggravation and mitigation. The court found the death penalty inappropriate and found

natural life inappropriate because Smith only had one armed robbery in his background.

¶ 19   The court noted Smith denied committing the crime. The court stated Smith should have

“let that man go” and “[a]ll he had to do was wait,” but he instead “chose to drag in another player

into the bar to have somebody else to take money from.” Smith struggled with Colon, and someone

in the bar continuously told Smith, “ ‘Don’t shoot him.’ ” Nonetheless, Smith deliberately shot

Colon in the chest.

¶ 20   The court found that Ybarra was “less than a credible witness.” Contrary to Ybarra’s

testimony, the court did not think Smith had any issue spontaneously processing information.

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No. 1-21-0474

While the court believed Smith was learning disabled, the court did not know “what that means”

and “certainly” could not take Ybarra’s assessment regarding “what it means.” The court stated

that Smith “chose to get in the car, drive around looking for prey,” and did so out of “simple greed

and a desire” to take something from someone else.

¶ 21      On direct appeal, we affirmed, but modified Smith’s attempted armed robbery sentence to

run concurrently with the other sentences. People v. Smith, 372 Ill. App. 3d 762 (2007). The Illinois

Supreme Court vacated Smith’s conviction for attempted armed robbery and affirmed his murder

and armed robbery convictions. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d at 29.

¶ 22      On December 18, 2007, Smith filed a pro se postconviction petition, which the circuit court

summarily dismissed. On appeal, we allowed Smith’s counsel to withdraw and affirmed. People

v. Smith, No. 1-08-3653 (2009) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule

23(c)).

¶ 23      On February 5, 2010, Smith filed a pro se motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition, which the circuit court denied. Smith did not appeal that denial.

¶ 24      On January 23, 2020, Smith filed the instant pro se motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition with an attached successive postconviction petition, requesting a new

sentencing hearing. 2 He alleged, in relevant part, that his de facto life sentence of 60 years in prison

for an offense he committed at 22 years old violated the eighth amendment to the United States

Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois

          2
          On June 17, 2021, Smith filed another pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition, which the circuit court denied. On appeal, we allowed Smith’s counsel to withdraw and affirmed.
People v. Smith, No. 1-22-0498 (2023) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
23(c)).

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No. 1-21-0474

Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) under Miller and its progeny. Smith referenced more

recent “brain research” reflecting that the brain of young adults continues to develop into their

mid-20s. He claimed other research showed “young offenders are often unable to make and act

upon proper autonomous judgments,” are “particularly susceptible to peer pressure,” and will

“commit conduct promoted by others that they would not normally commit on their own.”

¶ 25   Smith also asserted that People v. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580, and its progeny

extended the protections of Miller to “young adults,” and, thus, the protections of Miller applied

to him because he was a young adult at the time of the offense. However, the trial court failed to

consider mitigating evidence regarding his youth. Smith also claimed the court failed to consider

his “immaturity and state of mind, even after it was a fact that [he] has a slow learning disability.”

Smith further claimed his 60-year sentence shocked the moral sense of the community, as he was

sent to prison for the remainder of his life with no chance to rehabilitate himself into a “useful

member of society.”

¶ 26   Smith asserted he had cause for not raising his sentencing claim earlier because, until

House was decided in 2015, only a juvenile could challenge a de facto life sentence based on the

principles of Miller. Smith claimed he was prejudiced because he received an unconstitutional de

facto life sentence. Smith attached to his motion, inter alia, portions of transcripts of prior

proceedings, including testimony addressing his learning disability, and a 2016 Newsweek

Magazine article titled “Neuroscience Is Changing the Debate Over What Role Age Should Play

in the Courts.”

¶ 27   On January 25, 2021, the circuit court dismissed Smith’s motion for leave to file a

successive postconviction petition. The court found, in relevant part, that the protections of Miller

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No. 1-21-0474

only applied to minors under the age of 18, but Smith was 22 years old when he committed the

offenses. The court also noted that the Illinois Supreme Court had vacated the holding in House

(see People v. House, No. 122134 (Ill. Nov. 28, 2018) (supervisory order)). Nonetheless, the court

stated House did not apply to Smith because the House ruling, unlike here, was largely premised

on the fact that the defendant was convicted under a theory of accountability and received a

mandatory life sentence.

¶ 28                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 29   On appeal, Smith asserts that the circuit court erred in denying leave to file a successive

postconviction petition because he was “an immature emerging adult with a learning disability” at

the time of the offenses and received a de facto life sentence in violation of the proportionate

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to him. He claims that his de facto life

sentence failed to reflect his youth, immaturity, and “learning disability.”

¶ 30   The Act provides a three-stage method for persons under criminal sentence to “assert that

their convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States

Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or both.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009).

Generally, the Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition, and section 122-3

of the Act provides that any claim of a substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the

original or an amended petition is waived. People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 449 (2001); 725

ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2020). However, the procedural bar against successive proceedings will be

relaxed on either of two grounds: (1) “where the petitioner can establish cause and prejudice for

the failure to assert a postconviction claim in an earlier proceeding”; or (2) “where the petitioner

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No. 1-21-0474

asserts a fundamental miscarriage of justice based on actual innocence.” People v. Robinson, 2020

IL 123849, ¶ 42. Here, Smith asserts that he satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test.

¶ 31    The cause-and-prejudice test for a successive petition involves a higher standard than the

first-stage frivolous and patently without merit standard. People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35.

The defendant must establish cause “by identifying an objective factor that impeded his or her

ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings.” 725 ILCS

5/122-1(f)(1) (West 2020). The defendant establishes prejudice “by demonstrating that the claim

not raised during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting

conviction or sentence violated due process.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)(2) (West 2020).

¶ 32    Both elements of the cause-and-prejudice test must be met to “overcome section 122-3’s

waiver provision or to establish fundamental fairness for relaxing the res judicata doctrine.”

People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 47. The circuit court should deny leave to file a successive

petition “when it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation submitted

by the petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petitioner fail as a matter of law or where the

successive petition with supporting documentation is insufficient to justify further proceedings.”

Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. We review de novo the denial of a motion for leave to file a

successive postconviction petition. People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 27.

¶ 33    The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual

punishments. U.S. Const., amend. VIII. The proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois

Constitution states that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the

offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art.

I, § 11. A sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause where “ ‘the punishment for the

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No. 1-21-0474

offense is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense

of the community.’ ” People v. Robinson, 2021 IL App (1st) 192289, ¶ 46 (quoting People v.

Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002)). The eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause

are not synonymous. People v. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶¶ 36-40.

¶ 34   The United States Supreme Court in Miller held that the eighth amendment to the United

States Constitution “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility

of parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.

¶ 35   The Illinois Supreme Court has extended Miller to apply to de facto life sentences imposed

on juveniles, defined as prison sentences over 40 years (People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-

42). Our supreme court has also found that Miller protections under the eighth amendment are not

implicated in cases of a defendant aged 18 or over, as the age of 18 “marks the present line between

juveniles and adults.” People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 54-61. For purposes of an as-applied

proportionate penalties challenge, an “emerging adult” a defendant between the ages of 18 and 19

years old is not categorically foreclosed from raising such a challenge to a life sentence premised

on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87.

Whether a sentence is constitutional is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v.

Taylor, 2015 IL 117267, ¶ 11.

¶ 36   Here, raising exclusively an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge to his 60-year

prison sentence, Smith asserts that he was entitled to the protections set forth in Miller and its

progeny because his brain development at 22 years old was the equivalent to that of an adolescent

at the time of the offenses. He contends that he satisfied the cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice

test because Miller and the cases adopting Miller’s protections were decided after he filed his

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No. 1-21-0474

initial 2007 petition and subsequent 2010 petition. He asserts that he was prejudiced because the

trial court imposed a de facto life sentence on him without the benefit of the “legal and scientific

understanding of youthful offenders whose brains are still developing.”

¶ 37   After this case was fully briefed, our supreme court decided People v. Clark, 2023 IL

127273, which affirmed the denial of the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition raising a new proportionate penalties challenge under Miller principles to

his 90-year prison sentence for an offense he commented at age 24. Id. ¶¶ 85, 99. The court found

that “ ‘Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth amendment does not

provide cause for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause’ in a

successive postconviction petition.” Id. ¶ 92 (quoting People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74).

¶ 38   The supreme court explained that, prior to Miller, Illinois courts “have long held that the

proportionate penalties clause required the circuit court to take into account the defendant’s ‘youth’

and ‘mentality’ in fashioning an appropriate sentence.” Id. The court further explained that the

defendant had the “essential legal tools” to raise his proportionate penalties claim when filing his

previous postconviction petitions. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 93; see also People v.

Maldonado, 240 Ill. App. 3d 470, 485-86 (1992). The court held that citing the Miller line of cases

does not satisfy the cause prong of the cause-and-prejudice test for raising a proportionate penalties

claim in a successive postconviction petition, “as Miller’s unavailability does nothing to explain

why [the] defendant neglected to raise the proportionate penalties clause claim in his prior

postconviction proceedings.” Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 94.

¶ 39   Even more recently, our supreme court decided People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, which

concerned two consolidated appeals involving defendants who were 19 years old at the time of

their respective offenses and had claimed that Miller provided cause for raising new constitutional

                                                - 11 -
No. 1-21-0474

challenges to their sentences in a successive postconviction petition. Id. ¶¶ 1, 36. The court

clarified that, because Miller does not “directly apply to young adults,” it does not provide cause

for a young adult to raise a claim under either the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois

Constitution or the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 38, 40. The court

held that Miller did not provide cause for the defendants to file their proposed successive

postconviction petitions. Id. ¶ 44.

¶ 40   As was the case in Clark and Moore, Smith was over 18 years old at the time he committed

the offenses. In fact, he was 22 years old. Although Smith argues that the trial court should have

considered his status as an “emerging adult” in sentencing him, Smith failed to raise a

proportionate penalties claim in any prior collateral challenge. Both Clark and Moore specifically

hold that young adults cannot establish cause for a proportionate penalties challenge under the

cause-and-prejudice test based on the type of Miller unavailability claim Smith raises here. Thus,

we are compelled to reach the same result, finding that Smith cannot demonstrate cause for

purposes of the cause-and-prejudice test for leave to file a successive postconviction petition

premised on a Miller-type proportionate penalties claim. See People v. Vidaurri, 2023 IL App (1st)

200857, ¶ 75 (finding that, based on Clark, the defendant could not establish cause for filing a

successive postconviction petition raising a Miller-type proportionate penalties claim).

Accordingly, the circuit court properly denied Smith’s motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition.

¶ 41   Based on our finding that Smith failed to show cause, we need not address the issue of

whether Smith made a showing of prejudice. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42.

¶ 42                                  III. CONCLUSION

¶ 43   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

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No. 1-21-0474

¶ 44   Affirmed.

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