Court Opinion

ID: 9720434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:30:41.328985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:18.170313
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, J.
I concur in the result solely under the compulsion of language in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal. 3d 413 [143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, 96 A.L.R.3d 1]. I must confess, however, that the result makes no practical sense to me. There is a fundamental flaw in the law governing product liability in California—a flaw which I am hopeful will be remedied by our newly constituted Supreme Court.
The flaw is that under the prevailing concept, no consideration is given to the voluntary choice by a plaintiff to use a product which by its very nature is dangerous but highly utilitarian.
There is on the market today a wide variety of products, for example, chainsaws, “weedeaters” and other power tools which when used in their ordinary and expected manner can produce serious injuries. They have exposed blades which, when they strike some object or bind on a particular item, “kick back” and cause injury.
People voluntarily use these items knowing of their danger because they are useful for a particular job. Why should not that voluntary choice be an ingredient in determining liability for an injury resulting from such use?
*1064Here, plaintiffs husband purchased this motorcycle because he apparently liked its design and appearance. He knew full well at the time that the rear wheel was exposed. If that exposure was of importance to him, he could have chosen another brand or purchased some other covering for the wheel.
Further, when plaintiff took her seat on the motorcycle, she knew that her feet were close to the exposed wheel. There was nothing secret about the fact that certain actions by herself or others could cause her foot to strike the wheel. Plaintiff accepted the configuration of the motorcycle and voluntarily elected to ride with her feet in that precarious position. Her foot was forced into the wheel by the negligence of another driver. Thus, the true cause of the injury was the combination of that driver’s negligence and the plaintiffs position on the motorcycle.
Under these circumstances, why should the manufacturer of a popular and mechanically sound product be forced to justify its failure to install the various items, the existence of which Justice Gates says “is a matter of general knowledge and their potential effectiveness in preventing the sort of accident which occurred here is patent.” Their absence was as patent to the plaintiff as to anybody else.
As I see it, if a manufacturer does everything necessary to make the machine function properly for the purpose for which it is designed, if the machine is without any latent defect, and if its functioning creates no danger or peril that is not known to the user, then the manufacturer has satisfied what the law ought to demand.
The concept of “socializing” the loss, which is at the heart of the present approach to product liability, is plainly and simply wrong. Unfortunately, as an intermediate appellate court, we are stuck with it. For this reason alone I concur in the result.