Court Opinion

ID: 9626933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:28:21.311053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:36.511436
License: Public Domain

EAKIN, J.,
dissenting:
The purpose of the terroristic threats- statute is to prevent “the psychological distress that follows from an invasion of another’s sense of personal security.” Commonwealth v. Tizer, 454 Pa.Super. 1, 684 A.2d 597, 600 (1996). When considering whether personal security has been invaded, the victim’s perception of the threat is relevant; security in this context is the perception of safety, which *723is not diminished by uncommunicated threats.
However, the goal of a PFA order is different: it is cessation of abuse. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108. To achieve this goal, this order unambiguously says “don’t threaten the victim,” but Baker clearly threatened to kill her.1 As the proper goal of this order was to stop Baker from making abusive statements, it matters not whether it was made in her presence or communicated to her. That is, the Crimes Code deals with punishment for the conduct’s consequence to the victim, (invading her security), while the PFA act aims at stopping the conduct itself. Given these distinct goals, the focus in this contempt proceeding must be on what Baker said, not who heard him say it. To prohibit only threats communicated to the victim renders the PFA order redundant; who needs a court order to say “Don’t violate the Crimes Code?”
I join in dissent.

. Baker said he was going to "kill this bitch.” The suggestion anyone would be uncertain whether this falls within a prohibition of "threatening” her is a claim befitting a presidential spin doctor,