Court Opinion

ID: 9381356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 19:03:48.607486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.865940
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 221056-U
                                               No. 1-22-1056
                                                                                          Third Division
                                                                                         March 22, 2023

     NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
     limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

     ______________________________________________________________________________

                                         IN THE
                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                     FIRST DISTRICT
     ______________________________________________________________________________

                                                    )
     TSUJIORKA WALKER,                              )   Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                                    )   of Cook County.
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
                                                    )   No. 20 L 1335
     v.                                             )
                                                    )   The Honorable
     LAKESHA STEWARD,                               )   Clare E. McWilliams,
                                                    )   Judge Presiding.
           Defendant-Appellant.                     )
                                                    )
     ______________________________________________________________________________

                  JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court.
                  Justices Ellis and Navarro concurred in the judgment.

                                                 ORDER

¶1         Held: The trial court erred in barring the testimony of defendant’s expert witness, where
                 the expert should have been permitted to testify as to plaintiff’s blood alcohol level
                 and the effects of alcohol consumption generally.

¶2         While driving her automobile, defendant Lakesha Steward struck plaintiff Tsujiorka

       Walker, who was riding a motorcycle, causing him injuries. Plaintiff filed suit and, in the

       course of discovery, defendant took the evidence deposition of a toxicologist, who opined that

       plaintiff’s blood alcohol level was over the legal limit at the time of the incident and that such
     No. 1-22-1056

        a blood alcohol level would likely have contributed to his injuries. Prior to trial, however,

        plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude the doctor’s testimony, which was granted. Since

        there was no other evidence as to plaintiff’s intoxication presented during trial, the trial court

        declined to give jury instructions on intoxication or on contributory negligence. The jury found

        in plaintiff’s favor, awarding him over $800,000. Defendant now appeals and, for the reasons

        that follow, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

¶3                                          BACKGROUND

¶4          On May 23, 2015, after visiting a restaurant on Indiana Avenue in Riverdale, defendant

        returned to her vehicle, which was parked in a southbound parking lane along Indiana Avenue.

        Defendant, wishing to travel northbound, made a U-turn from the parking lane into the

        northbound lane of Indiana Avenue. When doing so, however, she collided with plaintiff, who

        was on a motorcycle. The collision rendered plaintiff unconscious and caused him serious

        injuries, including a week spent in a coma.

¶5          Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging that she had negligently operated her vehicle,

        causing the accident. In her answer, defendant denied causing plaintiff’s injuries and raised a

        number of affirmative defenses, including allegations that plaintiff did not exercise a

        reasonable degree of care in operating his vehicle and that plaintiff was operating his vehicle

        while under the influence of alcohol. The matter proceeded to discovery and, eventually, to a

        jury trial.

¶6          As part of discovery, defendant disclosed Dr. Jerrold Leiken as a controlled expert witness

        under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(f)(3) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), and he testified in an evidence

                                                      2
     No. 1-22-1056

         deposition. 1 At the beginning of the deposition, plaintiff’s counsel stated that he had a standing

         objection to Dr. Leiken’s testimony, and that plaintiff was participating in the deposition

         “subject to any motions in limine I may bring.” Dr. Leiken testified that he is a physician who

         specializes in medical toxicology and that he was retained by defendant to perform an

         independent medical review of plaintiff’s medical records stemming from the accident. 2 Dr.

         Leiken testified that plaintiff’s records provided that plaintiff had a serum alcohol level of 149

         milligrams per deciliter, which translated to a blood alcohol level of 0.126, approximately one

         and a half times the legal limit of 0.08. Dr. Leiken noted that the records provided that

         plaintiff’s blood was drawn slightly over an hour after the accident and opined, to a reasonable

         degree of medical and scientific certainty, that plaintiff’s blood alcohol level at the time of the

         accident would have been approximately the same. Dr. Leiken further opined that, at the time

         of the accident, plaintiff “was significantly alcohol intoxicated,” based on plaintiff’s medical

         records, which indicated that plaintiff had admitted to drinking alcohol that day, plaintiff’s

         blood alcohol level, and the “known effects” of alcohol, especially in a “complicated safety-

         sensitive position[ ]” such as operating a motorcycle. Finally, Dr. Leiken opined that plaintiff

         “was at increased risk for being involved in a motorcycle motor vehicle accident and thus

         impaired due to significant alcohol intoxication” and that, to a reasonable degree of medical

         toxicological certainty, plaintiff’s alcohol consumption was a contributing factor to the

         accident.

¶7           On cross-examination, Dr. Leiken testified that he was unaware of the speed of either

         plaintiff’s motorcycle or defendant’s vehicle prior to the collision, and did not have an opinion

             1
               We note that the transcript from the evidence deposition was purportedly attached to plaintiff’s
     motion in limine to bar Dr. Leiken’s testimony, as well as defendant’s posttrial motion for a new trial.
             2
               Plaintiff’s medical records are not included in the record on appeal.
                                                          3
     No. 1-22-1056

         as to whether the collision was unavoidable regardless of whether there was alcohol present in

         plaintiff’s system. Dr. Leiken further testified that he was unaware of plaintiff’s conduct

         leading up to the collision, other than the notation in plaintiff’s medical report that he had

         consumed alcohol that day. Dr. Leiken admitted that, as plaintiff was comatose when he arrived

         at the hospital, he was unaware of the source of information as to plaintiff’s medical history.

         Dr. Leiken also testified that he was unaware of the hospital’s policies regarding calibration of

         the device utilized to test plaintiff’s blood serum, nor was he aware of the chain of custody of

         the blood sample once it was drawn, although he testified that it appeared routine clinical

         practices were followed.

¶8           Prior to trial, plaintiff filed a motion in limine to bar any evidence as to plaintiff’s blood

         alcohol level, including the testimony of Dr. Leiken. 3 Relying on the case of Petraski v. Thedos

         (Petraski II), 2011 IL App (1st) 103218, plaintiff claimed that, where there is no evidence as

         to speeding or other erratic behavior or evidence corroborating a finding of impairment beyond

         a blood sample, a toxicologist’s opinion that a person is intoxicated is inadmissible. Here,

         plaintiff argued that there was no evidence that he had been drinking alcohol or that he had any

         impairment of his mental or physical abilities. Plaintiff further argued that Dr. Leiken admitted

         in his deposition that he had no information as to what plaintiff consumed, if anything, or how

         much he consumed. Dr. Leiken also was not able to testify as to how plaintiff was acting prior

         to the accident. Plaintiff claimed that Dr. Leiken relied only on an “unreliable blood alcohol

         test” without evidence of chain of custody or proper calibration and which was taken after

         plaintiff had been given medications containing ethanol.

             3
              We note that, while the motion cites numerous exhibits, those exhibits are not included in the
     record on appeal.
                                                         4
       No. 1-22-1056

¶9           After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion in limine, barring Dr. Leiken’s testimony.

          At the hearing, plaintiff’s counsel argued that “the thrust of the case is Petraski. This is

          Petraski.” Counsel claimed that, under Petraski II, where there was a “single piece of paper”

          showing an elevated blood alcohol level, but no evidence of a corollary between the incident

          and alcohol, evidence of alcohol was inadmissible. Counsel argued that here, where there was

          a “chain of custody issue” with respect to the test and Dr. Leiken admittedly did not have any

          knowledge of plaintiff’s conduct prior to the collision, Petraski II required that Dr. Leiken’s

          testimony be barred. In response, defense counsel noted that there were two Petraski cases and

          that the two cases made a distinction between intoxication and impairment as a result of

          intoxication—the first (Petraski v. Thedos, 382 Ill. App. 3d 22 (2008) (Petraski I)) found that

          evidence of an individual’s blood alcohol level was admissible as probative of the issue of

          intoxication, while the second found that an expert could not opine as to an individual’s

          impairment based on intoxication unless there was more than simply a blood alcohol reading.

          Thus, defense counsel claimed that “the blood alcohol reading is sufficient and admissible to

          go to the jury and goes more toward weight than admissibility.” Defense counsel also claimed

          that plaintiff’s challenges as to the chain of custody were inapplicable to a civil case.

¶ 10         The trial court inquired of plaintiff’s counsel whether Petraski II superseded Petraski I

          such that it was “essentially wiped out,” and counsel indicated that it had. Defense counsel

          disagreed, arguing that “my reading of Petraski 1, the blood alcohol comes in; my reading of

          Petraski 2 is that *** the opinion stating the blood alcohol resulted in impairment of the party

          is not admissible unless you show corroboration.” The trial court responded that the distinction

          seemed confusing and that “I’m looking at Petraski 2 here, the 2011 case, and I think what

          they’re also saying is you’re not able to take this blood alcohol level in a vacuum without

                                                        5
       No. 1-22-1056

           corroborating evidence.” The trial court asked whether the defense had any such corroborating

           information, and counsel indicated that defendant would be testifying about her observations

           of plaintiff’s conduct.4 Plaintiff’s counsel argued that even if defendant testified, that would

           be irrelevant to the issue at hand, as “what he did and what he used to formulate his opinion”

           was at issue, and Dr. Leiken admittedly did not rely on any information about the parties’

           conduct in formulating his opinion. Counsel concluded: “This is Petraski exactly. Maybe even

           stronger than Petraski.”

¶ 11           After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court indicated that it had the opportunity to

           review both Petraski cases and “I do agree with the plaintiffs here. This motion is granted.”

           Defense counsel clarified whether this ruling meant that there would be no evidence of alcohol

           in the case, and the trial court stated, “[n]ot based on what I’ve heard,” as the only evidence of

           alcohol came from plaintiff’s medical records. Defense counsel added that there was also the

           interpretation of those records by Dr. Leiken, who would testify as to the effects of that level

           of intoxication and “I don’t see how that’s not probative somehow to the plaintiff’s

           contributory negligence in light of the Illinois IPI jury instructions.” The trial court responded:

           “Well, I’m looking at Petraski and I believe I’m following it and it’s quite textbook and it

           channels this case. So you’ve made your record and that’s the court’s ruling.”

¶ 12           The record on appeal contains no transcript from the trial proceedings, as no court reporter

           was present. Instead, the parties have submitted a bystander’s report, which has been certified

           by the trial court as an accurate report of the proceedings, as permitted by Illinois Supreme

               4
                 We note that defendant ultimately did not testify about plaintiff’s conduct and instead testified
       that she did not approach him after the accident.
                                                             6
       No. 1-22-1056

          Court Rule 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). Accordingly, our knowledge of the trial proceedings is

          limited to the information provided in the bystander’s report.

¶ 13         According to the bystander’s report, a number of witnesses testified at trial, including the

          following occurrence witnesses. Defendant testified that she had parked her vehicle (a Cadillac

          SUV) outside a restaurant, where she was picking up an order. After receiving her order, she

          returned to her vehicle, looked in her rearview and sideview mirrors to ensure the road was

          clear, then left the parking spot, making a U-turn. As she was making her turn, she “heard a

          loud boom”; she did not observe plaintiff or his motorcycle before the collision. The impact

          damaged her vehicle’s door, preventing her from opening the door. Defendant observed

          plaintiff lying on the ground and a woman approached him and spoke to him. When the police

          arrived on the scene, defendant told them that the collision occurred while she was attempting

          to make a U-turn and that it was “an honest mistake.”

¶ 14         Plaintiff testified that he had no memory of what he was doing on the date of the accident

          and did not remember where he was coming from or where he was going at the time of the

          collision. As a result of the collision, plaintiff was rendered unconscious and was in a coma for

          approximately a week. His injuries included memory loss, a displaced left humerus fracture

          which required surgery, traumatic brain injury with brain contusions and hemorrhages, a scalp

          laceration, abrasions, and a skull fracture.

¶ 15         Witnesses Ashley Harris and Diana Hawkins were outside the restaurant near their vehicles

          at the time of the accident. Harris testified that the accident occurred in the evening, but that

          the street was well-lit. Both witnesses observed defendant’s vehicle make a U-turn from her

          parking spot and collide with plaintiff’s motorcycle. Harris testified that plaintiff was not

          driving unusually and was not speeding, and further testified that at the time defendant

                                                         7
       No. 1-22-1056

          attempted the U-turn, plaintiff’s motorcycle was “already very close, and it was so tight that a

          U-turn could not be made safely.” Harris exited her vehicle and stayed at the scene until police

          arrived, while Hawkins called 911, then remained with plaintiff and attempted to speak to him

          until paramedics arrived.

¶ 16         Riverdale police officer Tara Powers testified that she responded to a call at the restaurant

          and, when she arrived, observed the scene of a traffic collision that had occurred between a

          motorcycle and a vehicle. Plaintiff, the motorcycle driver, was on the ground and unconscious,

          and paramedics were dispatched. Powers spoke to defendant, and defendant admitted that the

          accident was her fault and was caused by her attempting a U-turn. Powers testified that “her

          investigation found no indication that the motorcycle driver acted improperly.”

¶ 17         After the close of testimony, the trial court held a jury instruction conference. Defendant

          sought instructions on the issue of contributory negligence, but the trial court refused the

          instructions as there was no testimony regarding negligence on the part of plaintiff at any time

          during the trial. The jury found in favor of plaintiff, awarding him $827,868, and the trial court

          entered judgment on the verdict. Defendant filed a posttrial motion, which was denied, and this

          appeal follows.

¶ 18                                            ANALYSIS

¶ 19         On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred in barring Dr. Leiken’s testimony and

          further erred in denying her request to instruct the jury on the issue of contributory negligence.

          As an initial matter, we note that the record on appeal indicates that, six weeks after the filing

          of defendant’s notice of appeal, plaintiff filed a motion for prejudgment interest pursuant to

          section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2022)).

          Accordingly, we briefly address our jurisdiction to consider the instant appeal in light of the

                                                        8
       No. 1-22-1056

           subsequent motion filed by plaintiff.5 See Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance

           Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009) (“A reviewing court must ascertain its jurisdiction before

           proceeding in a cause of action, regardless of whether either party has raised the issue.”); A.M.

           Realty Western L.L.C. v. MSMC Realty, L.L.C., 2016 IL App (1st) 151087, ¶ 67 (“Although

           neither party raises the issue of jurisdiction, an appellate court has an independent duty to

           consider whether or not it has jurisdiction to hear an appeal.”).

¶ 20           Generally, we have jurisdiction to consider only final judgments. Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff.

           Feb. 1, 1994). There are exceptions to this rule; however, our supreme court has made clear

           that “[t]he law is well established that unless specifically authorized by the rules of this court,

           the appellate court has no jurisdiction to review judgments, orders or decrees which are not

           final.” Department of Central Management Services v. American Federation of State, County

           & Municipal Employees, 182 Ill. 2d 234, 238 (1998). A pending claim for prejudgment interest

           typically renders a judgment nonfinal unless the trial court makes a finding under Illinois

           Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) that there is no just reason for delaying either

           enforcement or appeal or both. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Wetzel, 98 Ill. App. 3d

           243, 249-50 (1981); Rago Machine Products, Inc. v. Shields Technologies, Inc., 233 Ill. App.

           3d 140, 145 (1992).

¶ 21           In this case, however, the trial court’s order entering judgment on the jury’s verdict

           disposed of all pending matters, as plaintiff admittedly had not made a request for prejudgment

           interest in his complaint. Instead, in his motion for prejudgment interest, plaintiff claims that

           section 2-1303 imposes a mandatory award of prejudgment interest and requests an order

              We discuss plaintiff’s motion solely for the purposes of analyzing our jurisdiction and make no
               5

       comment as to the propriety of plaintiff’s motion or its merits, as it is not before us on this appeal.
                                                          9
       No. 1-22-1056

          awarding such interest pursuant to the statute. Our supreme court has held that a request for

          interest under section 2-1303 which is made after a notice of appeal is filed constitutes a matter

          collateral to the judgment, and is not part of the judgment itself. See General Motors Corp. v.

          Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 175 (2011) (discussing postjudgment interest under section 2-1303).

          We therefore find that we have jurisdiction to consider the instant appeal, and proceed to the

          merits of the parties’ arguments.

¶ 22                                      Dr. Leiken’s Testimony

¶ 23         Defendant’s primary argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in barring Dr. Leiken’s

          testimony as to plaintiff’s alcohol consumption and its likely effects. The decision of whether

          to admit expert testimony is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not

          be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2003). A

          trial court abuses its discretion “only where no reasonable person could have agreed with the

          trial court’s decision.” Werner v. Nebal, 377 Ill. App. 3d 447, 454 (2007) (citing Lawler v.

          MacDuff, 335 Ill. App. 3d 144, 147 (2002)).

¶ 24         Defendant first contends that plaintiff has waived any objection to Dr. Leiken’s testimony,

          as the issues raised in plaintiff’s motion in limine were not first raised during Dr. Leiken’s

          evidence deposition. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 211(c), “[g]rounds of objection to the

          competency of [a] deponent or admissibility of testimony which might have been corrected

          during the taking of the deposition are waived by failure to make them at that time.” Otherwise,

          “objections to the competency of the deponent or admissibility of testimony may be made

          when the testimony is offered in evidence.” Id. Here, plaintiff claims that his attorney did, in

          fact, object during Dr. Leiken’s testimony and, moreover, the issues with Dr. Leiken’s

          testimony were not ones which “might have been corrected during the taking of the deposition”

                                                       10
       No. 1-22-1056

          (id.) so objection at the time was not necessary in any event. See Somers v. Quinn, 373 Ill.

          App. 3d 87, 97 (2007) (an objection is not required where the party would be “powerless to

          remedy” the defect in the expert’s testimony during the deposition).

¶ 25         In his motion in limine to bar Dr. Leiken’s testimony, plaintiff claimed that there were

          foundational issues with the testimony, as a blood sample was insufficient to establish

          intoxication without corroborating evidence of impairment, which Dr. Leiken admittedly did

          not consider. Plaintiff further claimed that Dr. Leiken was unable to establish that the blood

          was accurately tested, as he had no knowledge of the hospital’s methods for drawing the blood,

          whether the hospital’s equipment was properly calibrated, or the chain of custody of the blood

          sample. Finally, plaintiff claimed that the blood sample was “[c]ontaminated,” as plaintiff was

          injected with drugs containing ethanol prior to the test.

¶ 26         Our review of the record does establish that several of these issues were, in fact, raised

          during Dr. Leiken’s deposition. For instance, plaintiff’s counsel questioned Dr. Leiken

          extensively as to his knowledge of the hospital’s procedures and the chain of custody of the

          blood sample. Plaintiff’s counsel also questioned Dr. Leiken as to his knowledge of plaintiff’s

          actions prior to the accident, including whether plaintiff’s conduct demonstrated impairment.

          Challenges to his testimony based on those issues were therefore properly raised. We agree

          with defendant, however, that plaintiff’s counsel never questioned Dr. Leiken as to the effect

          of the drugs that plaintiff was administered prior to the test. Dr. Leiken could certainly have

          testified on that subject during his deposition and, therefore, counsel’s failure to object at the

          time of the deposition results in the waiver of this issue. See Lundell v. Citrano, 129 Ill. App.

          3d 390, 598 (1984) (affirming trial court’s finding of waiver where the lack of foundation for

                                                       11
       No. 1-22-1056

          the expert’s testimony was evident at the time of the deposition and the plaintiff should have

          been afforded a chance to remedy the defect).

¶ 27          Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in barring Dr. Leiken’s testimony based

          on its interpretation of Petraski II. Despite the fact that plaintiff raised several challenges to

          Dr. Leiken’s testimony, as detailed above, the trial court’s decision to bar his testimony had a

          single basis: its interpretation of Petraski II, which it found to be “quite textbook” in holding

          that an expert’s testimony should be barred if there is no corroboration of intoxication. The

          trial court in this case was explicit in stating that it was following Petraski II, which it found

          “channels this case.” Accordingly, we begin our analysis with an in-depth discussion of

          Petraski II and its application to the case at bar.

¶ 28          The litigation at issue in Petraski II was first considered by this court in Petraski I, 382 Ill.

          App. 3d 22. In that case, the plaintiff was injured when she turned her vehicle into the path of

          a speeding police vehicle driven by the defendant. Id. at 23. A jury rendered a verdict in favor

          of the plaintiff, which was reduced by 25% based on her contributory negligence. Id. The issue

          on appeal in Petraski I was whether expert testimony as to the plaintiff’s consumption of

          alcohol should have been admitted. Id. In a discovery deposition, used as an offer of proof in

          response to the plaintiff’s motion in limine to bar such evidence, the defendant’s expert testified

          that a test of the plaintiff’s blood following the accident revealed an elevated blood alcohol

          level and that her blood alcohol level would have been above 0.08 at the time of the accident.

          Id. at 25. The expert, however, also testified that he did not know when the plaintiff began or

          stopped drinking alcohol, what she drank or ate, or how much she drank. Id. at 26. The expert

          opined that the plaintiff’s blood alcohol level would have affected her depth perception,

          peripheral vision, and ability to assess speeds, as well as her judgment of risk-taking behavior.

                                                         12
       No. 1-22-1056

          Id. He was unable to opine whether the plaintiff’s blood alcohol level caused or contributed to

          the accident, but opined that the plaintiff’s blood alcohol level of 0.116 would impair a person’s

          ability to operate a vehicle safely for “ ‘an overwhelming majority of the population.’ ” Id. The

          trial court barred the expert’s testimony, finding it to be too speculative to be admissible, and

          also finding that the prejudicial effect of the testimony outweighed its probative value. Id.

¶ 29          On appeal, this court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court had

          abused its discretion in excluding the testimony. Id. at 33. We first noted that “ ‘[e]vidence of

          a plaintiff’s intoxication is relevant to the extent that it affects the care that he takes for his own

          safety and is therefore admissible as a circumstance to be weighed by the trier of fact in its

          determination of the issue of due care.’ ” Id. at 27 (quoting Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill. App.

          3d 134, 140 (1991)). We additionally noted that the expert opined that the plaintiff’s blood

          alcohol level was above 0.08, which gives rise to a statutory presumption that a person is under

          the influence of alcohol. Id. (citing 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(b)(3) (West 2000)). We thus found

          that alcohol-consumption evidence was relevant to the issue of the plaintiff’s contributory

          negligence, as the jury could have used the expert’s testimony as an explanation for her

          conduct. Id. at 28.

¶ 30          We rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the evidence was irrelevant due to the expert’s

          inability to opine as to the plaintiff’s actual impairment. Id. at 27-28. The plaintiff claimed that,

          since the expert could not quantify the level of her impairment, nor could he render an opinion

          as to whether alcohol caused or contributed to the accident, his testimony would lead only to

          speculation without any supporting evidence that the consumption caused impairment. Id. We

          disagreed, noting that the cases relied on by the plaintiff were cases in which the only evidence

          of intoxication was evidence of the consumption of alcohol; in the plaintiff’s case, however,

                                                          13
       No. 1-22-1056

          there was a blood alcohol level sufficiently high to support a statutory presumption that she

          was under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 28. We also rejected the plaintiff’s contention that

          the expert’s testimony was unreliable, finding that he had provided a factual basis for his

          opinion in explaining his analysis of the blood test results. Id. at 31.

¶ 31          We further found that expert testimony that the plaintiff’s blood alcohol level created a

          presumption of intoxication was “extremely probative of whether she was partially at fault for

          the accident.” Id. at 32. By contrast, we found an “insubstantial risk” of unfair prejudice. Id. at

          33. Accordingly, we reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id.

¶ 32          The events of the new trial gave rise to the subsequent opinion in Petraski II.6 During the

          new trial, evidence of the plaintiff’s alcohol consumption was presented to the jury through

          the testimony of the defendant’s expert—coincidentally, the same Dr. Leiken whose testimony

          is at issue in the instant appeal. Petraski II, 2011 IL App (1st) 103218, ¶¶ 81-85. Dr. Leiken

          testified that, at the time of the accident, the plaintiff’s blood alcohol level would have been

          between 0.109 and 0.144, and further testified to the effects of alcohol in the average person,

          including reduced depth perception, impaired judgment, lack of coordination, and increased

          reaction time. Id. ¶ 84. Unlike the defendant’s expert in the first trial, Dr. Leiken also

          specifically testified that the plaintiff was intoxicated and impaired at the time of the accident,

          and that her alcohol consumption had, in fact affected the plaintiff on the night of the accident.

          Id. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Leiken testified that he was unable to quantify the

          plaintiff’s level of impairment and that he was not aware of any specific facts regarding the

          plaintiff’s actions on the night of the accident. Id. ¶ 85. At the close of the trial, the jury returned

          a verdict in favor of the defendant. Id. ¶ 90. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which

              6
                  We note that Petraski II was decided by a different panel of justices than Petraski I.
                                                             14
       No. 1-22-1056

          the trial court granted, finding that it had erred in several of its rulings, including the allowance

          of evidence regarding the plaintiff’s blood alcohol content. Id.

¶ 33          On appeal, this court affirmed the trial court’s grant of a new trial. Id. ¶ 94. With respect

          to the issue of blood alcohol evidence, we found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

          in determining that Dr. Leiken’s testimony should not have been admitted. Id. ¶ 125. We first

          noted that, based on our holding in Petraski I, the trial court permitted Dr. Leiken to testify to

          his opinions as to the plaintiff’s blood alcohol content. Id. ¶ 111. Dr. Leiken testified that the

          plaintiff’s blood alcohol level was above 0.08 and testified to the effects of intoxication on the

          average person, “but then went on to attribute those effects to [the plaintiff’s] actual conduct.”

          Id. It was only the testimony as to the plaintiff’s actual level of impairment which the trial

          court later found problematic. Id. ¶ 116. We could not find that it was an abuse of discretion

          for the trial court to reach this result, as there was no proper basis for Dr. Leiken’s opinion,

          since he did not take into account any specific information about the plaintiff personally or

          about the events leading up to the accident. Id. ¶¶ 124-25. We noted that the trial court

          acknowledged that an expert could reasonably opine that a specific plaintiff may have been

          impaired based on “unusually high levels of intoxication,” but that the plaintiff’s blood alcohol

          level in the case before it was much lower. Id. ¶ 123. Accordingly, we concluded that “[w]e

          cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that it had erred in allowing

          Dr. Leiken to testify that [the plaintiff] was in fact intoxicated and impaired.” Id. ¶ 148.

¶ 34          In the case at bar, we agree with the trial court that Petraski II “channels this case,” as it

          involves very similar testimony by the same expert. We cannot agree, however, with the trial

          court’s interpretation of that case, nor with the interpretation suggested by plaintiff’s counsel.

          As a trial court’s misapprehension of the law constitutes an abuse of discretion, we must

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       No. 1-22-1056

          therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. See Macknin v. Macknin, 404 Ill. App. 3d 520,

          530 (2010) (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)) (a circuit court abuses its

          discretion when it makes an error of law); Cable America, Inc. v. Pace Electronics, Inc., 396

          Ill. App. 3d 15, 24 (2009) (same); Engel v. Loyfman, 383 Ill. App. 3d 191, 197-98 (2008)

          (same); Najas Cortes v. Orion Securities, Inc., 362 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1047 (2005) (same).

¶ 35         During the motion in limine hearing, the trial court indicated that its interpretation of

          Petraski II was that “you’re not able to take this blood alcohol level in a vacuum without

          corroborating evidence.” Petraski II did not hold, however, that expert testimony as to blood

          alcohol level required corroborating evidence to be admissible. Indeed, we specifically noted

          that the only issue as to Dr. Leiken’s testimony was his testimony about the plaintiff’s actual

          impairment or intoxication, as there was no evidence concerning the plaintiff’s conduct or the

          events preceding the accident. See Petraski II, 2011 IL App (1st) 103218, ¶ 116 (“the trial

          court did not rule that it had erred in admitting the entirety of Dr. Leiken’s testimony, only that

          part of his testimony where Leiken opined that [the plaintiff] was in fact intoxicated and

          impaired”). We reach a similar result here—to the extent that Dr. Leiken opined that plaintiff

          was actually intoxicated or impaired, such opinions were properly barred.

¶ 36         Dr. Leiken’s testimony, however, was not limited to opining that plaintiff was actually

          intoxicated or impaired. Dr. Leiken also testified as to plaintiff’s blood alcohol level of 0.126

          and to the effects of alcohol consumption generally. Under the Illinois Vehicle Code, where

          an individual has a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or more, “it shall be presumed that the person

          was under the influence of alcohol.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(b)(3) (West 2020); see also Petraski

          I, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 27. This presumption may be overcome by evidence rebutting the

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       No. 1-22-1056

          presumption. Cairns v. Hansen, 170 Ill. App. 3d 505, 511 (1988); People v. Morris, 394 Ill.

          App. 3d 678, 682 (2009).

¶ 37         Dr. Leiken’s testimony in the instant case is identical to the testimony that we found should

          have been admitted in Petraski I, an opinion which we reaffirmed in Petraski II. By barring

          Dr. Leiken’s testimony as a whole, then, the trial court prevented the jury from hearing

          evidence that should have been admitted. As we noted in Petraski I, “[w]e believe expert

          testimony that [plaintiff’s] blood-alcohol level created a presumption of intoxication was

          extremely probative of whether [he] was partially at fault for the accident.” Petraski I, 382 Ill.

          App. 3d at 32. We therefore reverse and remand this case for a new trial, in which evidence of

          plaintiff’s blood alcohol level should be admitted.

¶ 38                                          Jury Instructions

¶ 39         Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in denying her request to instruct the jury

          on the issue of contributory negligence. The trial court’s decision was based on its

          determination that such an instruction was not warranted, as there was no evidence as to

          plaintiff’s negligence. Given our determination that evidence of plaintiff’s alcohol

          consumption should have been admitted and warrants a new trial, we have no need to consider

          this argument.

¶ 40                                          CONCLUSION

¶ 41         For the reasons set forth above, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in barring

          the entirety of Dr. Leiken’s testimony. While his testimony as to plaintiff’s actual intoxication

          or impairment was properly excluded, his testimony as to plaintiff’s blood alcohol level and

          the effects of alcohol consumption generally should have been admitted.

¶ 42         Reversed and remanded.

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