Court Opinion

ID: 9635955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:11:02.725221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:12.488154
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges AtLee, Causey and Callins

              KALEB S. NICOL
                                                                                MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.      Record No. 1281-22-1                                          PER CURIAM
                                                                                   AUGUST 22, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
                                               Michael A. Gaten, Judge

                               (Charles E. Haden, on brief), for appellant.

                               (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Angelique Rogers, Assistant
                               Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                      Following his guilty pleas under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the trial

              court convicted Kaleb S. Nicol of voluntary manslaughter and shooting in the commission of a

              felony. The trial court sentenced him to 15 years’ incarceration with 5 years suspended. On appeal,

              Nicol challenges the validity of his Alford pleas and argues that the trial court abused its discretion

              in its imposition of sentence. After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel

              unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.”

              Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a).

                      *
                          This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                                         BACKGROUND1

       In October 2019, a grand jury indicted Nicol for second-degree murder, use of a firearm in

the commission of a felony, three counts of maliciously shooting into an occupied dwelling,

conspiracy to commit murder, and shooting in the commission of a felony. In exchange for Nicol’s

Alford pleas to an amended indictment of voluntary manslaughter and shooting in the commission

of a felony,2 the Commonwealth agreed to nolle prosequi the remaining indictments.

       The trial court conducted a plea colloquy with Nicol including confirming that Nicol had

discussed the charges and possible defenses with his attorney and that he fully understood the

elements the Commonwealth was required to prove,3 that he understood his right to plead not guilty

and to be tried by a jury, and that, other than the charges the Commonwealth would nolle prosequi,

no one had induced his pleas by threat or promise. Nicol also confirmed that he had sufficient time

to discuss his case with counsel and did not require any additional time before entering his pleas.

Nicol acknowledged that he was “entering these Alford pleas freely and voluntarily.”

       1
          On appeal, we recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the
prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires that we “discard the
evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the
credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”
Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).
       2
         The joint appendix does not contain the amended indictment for voluntary
manslaughter. See Rule 5A:25(c)(1) (requiring that an appendix include “the basic initial
pleading[s] (as finally amended)”). Because the details of the amended indictment are
memorialized in a March 2022 conviction order included in the joint appendix, omission of the
amended indictment does not preclude us from addressing the merits of the assignments of error.
See Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 520 (2008) (explaining that, in applying Rule 5A:20(e),
the Court “should . . . consider whether any failure to strictly adhere to the [statutory]
requirements . . . is insignificant, thus allowing the court to address the merits of a question
presented”).
       3
         Nicol’s counsel also averred that he had reviewed an Alford plea of guilty form with
Nicol before the plea hearing.
                                               -2-
        Nicol’s counsel proffered his version of events, to help bolster the record that he was

entering “an Alford plea and not just a straight plea.” Counsel repeatedly attacked the credibility of

the Commonwealth’s evidence and suggested that another individual—one of Nicol’s friends—was

the shooter. Significantly, Nicol’s counsel represented that he had discussed with Nicol “all the

pros and cons” and that he could not “give guarantees to anyone” because the Commonwealth

“ha[d] a case” and Nicol’s counsel did not “know what a jury would do.”

        After the proffers, the trial court resumed the plea colloquy with Nicol. Nicol confirmed

that he was entering his Alford pleas “because of the evidence” the Commonwealth had proffered,

and—although he disagreed with some of the evidence—he acknowledged his understanding that if

a judge or jury “believed the Commonwealth’s version,” he could be convicted. Nicol also

acknowledged that his counsel had advised him of the statutory minimum and maximum

punishments for the offenses, and of the fact that the trial court was not required to follow the

sentencing guidelines. Nicol confirmed that he was “entirely satisfied with the services” of his

counsel and understood all of the trial court’s questions; he declined the opportunity to ask

questions of the court. The trial court found that Nicol’s Alford pleas were made “knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily.” Based on the pleas and the proffered evidence, the trial court

convicted Nicol of voluntary manslaughter and shooting in the commission of a felony.

        In his sentencing memorandum, Nicol asked for a sentence “near” the low end of the

adjusted guidelines range of “[n]o [i]ncarceration” based on his plea and “expression of [r]emorse.”4

Nicol allocated 20 pages of his memo to attacking the credibility of certain witnesses, including his

friends present at the shooting. Nicol also signaled that he acted in self-defense, claiming that the

        4
         The discretionary sentencing guidelines recommended a range of 2 years and 4 months at
the low end, a midpoint of 4 years and 5 months, and a high end of 5 years and 11 months.
                                               -3-
victim “and his friends were the aggressors.” Finally, Nicol attached to the memorandum numerous

letters of support.

        At sentencing, the prosecutor acknowledged that the Commonwealth’s witnesses would

“have issues in front of a jury.” Nevertheless, the Commonwealth contended that the statutory

maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment was appropriate under all the circumstances of the

case.

        In response to Nicol’s continued challenge to the credibility of the Commonwealth’s

evidence, the trial court noted to Nicol that his Alford pleas had the same legal effect as guilty pleas.

The trial judge explained that if he doubted the credibility of the evidence, “the proper thing” to do

would have been to “vacate the Alford plea[s]” rather than give Nicol “a really light sentence.”5

Nicol asked the trial court to keep its sentence in the “area” of probation.

        During his allocution, Nicol read a letter he wrote to the trial court. He expressed his regret

over the events of May 12, 2019, acknowledging that the shooting had “only caused pain and

suffering to a lot of people.” He stated that he empathized with the victim’s mother’s pain and that

he “did not have any problems with anyone” associated with the confrontation that led to the

victim’s death. Being incarcerated had forced him to “wake up and realize many of the things [he]

took for granted.” He averred that he was not the person the Commonwealth “made [him] seem to

be” and that he was committed to making the experience “a learning experience.” He shared that he

had read several self-help books while he was incarcerated.

        In pronouncing sentence, the trial court emphasized that the issue was the “appropriate

sentence for a killing” that was the consequence of “the heat of passion without malice

        5
          After additional argument from Nicol challenging the witnesses’ credibility, the trial judge
reiterated that the court’s role was to engage in a sentencing analysis for voluntary manslaughter
because, although Nicol maintained his innocence, he had agreed that the evidence was sufficient to
support a conviction.
                                                   -4-
aforethought.” It would be unfair, the trial court noted, for Nicol to plead guilty to manslaughter

and then “imply actual innocence” so “the sentence c[ould] go even lower.” Likewise, it would be

unfair for the Commonwealth to agree to an Alford plea to voluntary manslaughter and then

“back-door” a murder on Nicol. The trial court further noted that it was not persuaded by

“testimony about the weight of the evidence.”

        The trial court expressed its intent to “give value and dignity to the [victim’s] life” but also

“do justice for” Nicol. The trial court considered the character letters and other documents

supporting Nicol. After considering all the evidence, the court found that although the sentencing

guidelines “adequately consider[ed] the facts and circumstances” of the charges, they did not

adequately reflect the victim’s youth and “how much life [he] had left in front of him.” The trial

court deviated upward from the guidelines range and sentenced Nicol to ten years’ incarceration for

voluntary manslaughter, the maximum allowable sentence under Code § 18.2-10, and five years, all

suspended, for shooting in the commission of a felony. Nicol now appeals.

                                              ANALYSIS

                                             I. Alford Pleas

        Nicol contends that the trial court erred by accepting his Alford pleas because he did not

enter them intelligently and voluntarily. He argues that “the record failed to establish” that he “was

given notice of the elements of” the offenses or “what the Commonwealth must prove before [he]

could be” convicted. He further contends that the trial court failed to inform him of the rights he

was waiving by pleading guilty under Alford. Specifically, Nicol argues that the trial court did not

ask whether Nicol, among other things, waived his right against self-incrimination and his right to

confront his accusers. Nicol also argues that he was not “made aware of the various collateral

consequences of his Alford pleas of guilty,” including the loss of his rights to vote and to possess a

firearm and disqualification of certain public benefits and occupational licenses. Relying on Padilla

                                                  -5-
v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), Nicol suggests that the trial court’s failure to advise him of those

collateral consequences rendered his pleas invalid.

        Additionally, Nicol contends that his trial counsel’s challenges to the Commonwealth’s

proffer at the plea colloquy, in the sentencing memorandum, and at the sentencing hearing “were

inconsistent with Alford pleas and appeared to be attempts to negate or disavow” those pleas. Nicol

acknowledges that he did not move to withdraw his pleas or otherwise preserve his argument for

appellate review but asks that we address his argument under the “good cause” and “ends of

justice” exceptions to Rule 5A:18.

        “Under Rule 5A:18, no trial court’s ruling will be ‘a basis for reversal unless an objection

was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to

enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.’” Holman v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 283,

297 (2023). “Appellants generally waive their right to appeal if they do not specifically and

timely state their objections.” Id. “The purpose of this contemporaneous objection requirement

is to allow the trial court a fair opportunity to resolve the issue at trial, thereby preventing

unnecessary appeals and retrials.” Id. at 298 (quoting Creamer v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App.

185, 195 (2015)).

        “On appeal, we may consider issues not raised below only if they fall into an exception to

Rule 5A:18.” Id. (citing Merritt v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 452, 459-60 (2018)). “The first

exception, good cause, may be invoked only when ‘an appellant did not have the opportunity to

object to a ruling in the trial court.’” Id. (quoting Perry v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 655, 667

(2011)). “[H]owever, when an appellant ‘had the opportunity to object but elected not to do so,’

the exception does not apply.” Perry, 58 Va. App. at 667 (quoting Luck v. Commonwealth, 32

Va. App. 827, 834 (2000)).

                                                  -6-
        The trial court accepted Nicol’s Alford pleas on March 28, 2022, and entered final

judgment on July 28, 2022. Thus, Nicol had four months to withdraw his Alford pleas before

entry of a final judgment, but he did not do so. Nothing in the record suggests that Nicol was

prevented from filing a motion to withdraw, and he did not do so even after the trial court, at the

sentencing hearing, referenced the possibility of vacating the Alford pleas. Nicol consistently

maintained his innocence yet pleaded guilty under Alford apparently to stave off the risk of a

lengthy sentence.6 Accordingly, the good cause exception does not apply. Nicol had ample

opportunity to alert the trial court to the relief he sought, and he failed to do so.7

        “The ‘ends of justice’ exception to Rule 5A:18 is ‘narrow and is to be used sparingly.’”

Melick v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 122, 146 (2018) (quoting Pearce v. Commonwealth, 53

Va. App. 113, 123 (2008)). Whether to apply the ends-of-justice exception involves two

questions: “(1) whether there is error as contended by the appellant; and (2) whether the failure

to apply the ends of justice provision would result in a grave injustice.” Commonwealth v. Bass,

292 Va. 19, 27 (2016) (quoting Gheorghiu v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 678, 689 (2010)).

        “The burden of establishing a manifest injustice is a heavy one, and it rests with the

appellant.” Holt v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 199, 210 (2016) (en banc) (quoting Brittle v.

Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 505, 514 (2009)). “In order to avail oneself of the exception, a

defendant must affirmatively show that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not that a

        6
        Combined, the indicted charges presented a potential sentencing exposure of 88 years.
See Code §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-22, 18.2-32, 18.2-53, 18.2-53.1, 18.2-279.
        7
         Nicol “submits that he did not become aware of his inadequate understanding of the
charges and their elements until after the . . . sentencing hearing, by which time he had no
opportunity to object to the unknowing, unintelligent, and consequently involuntary nature of the
pleas he had entered to the charges against him.” That Nicol later changed his mind about his
pleas does not speak to whether he, at the appropriate time, was presented with an opportunity to
object. The opportunity was available, and he elected not to object. See Perry, 58 Va. App. at
667.
                                                   -7-
miscarriage might have occurred.” Melick, 69 Va. App. at 146 (emphasis omitted and added)

(quoting Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 221 (1997)). Further, to demonstrate that

a miscarriage of justice has occurred, “[i]t is never enough for the defendant to merely assert a

winning argument on the merits—for if that were enough[,] procedural default ‘would never

apply, except when it does not matter.’” Winslow v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 539, 546

(2013) (quoting Alford v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 706, 710 (2010)).

       Instead, application of the exception requires “a defendant to present not only a winning

argument on appeal but also one demonstrating that the trial court’s error results in a ‘grave

injustice’ or a wholly inexcusable ‘denial of essential rights.’” Id. at 546-47 (quoting Brittle, 54

Va. App. at 513). The ends-of-justice exception “requires proof of an error that was ‘clear,

substantial and material.’” West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 338 (2004) (quoting

Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 132 (1989)). That is, “[w]e must determine whether

the error clearly had an effect upon the outcome of the case.” Phoung v. Commonwealth, 15

Va. App. 457, 464 (1992) (quoting Brown, 8 Va. App. at 131).

       “A plea of guilty constitutes a ‘self-supplied conviction.’” Allen v. Commonwealth, 27

Va. App. 726, 730 (1998) (quoting Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 196 (1969)). Such a “plea . . . is

constitutionally valid only to the extent it is ‘voluntary’ and ‘intelligent.’” Bousley v. United

States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).

Thus, to withstand scrutiny on appeal, the record must contain “an affirmative showing that [the

guilty plea] was intelligent and voluntary.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). As

such, Rule 3A:8(b)(1) “requires that prior to accepting a defendant’s plea, the trial court must

determine if the defendant is aware of his constitutional rights, the nature of the charges against

him, and whether the plea is intelligently and voluntarily made, all of which must appear on the

                                                -8-
record.” Zigta v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 149, 157 (2002) (citing Sisk v. Commonwealth, 3

Va. App. 459, 463 (1986)).

       This record demonstrates that the trial court conducted a thorough plea colloquy with

Nicol, in which Nicol confirmed that he had discussed the charges and their elements with his

attorney. Nicol acknowledged he understood what “the Commonwealth must prove” before he

could be found guilty. He further confirmed that his attorney “advised [him] of the minimum

and maximum punishments allowed by law for these charges.” In addition, Nicol confirmed that

he understood that he was waiving his right to plead not guilty and to a jury trial. Nicol

confirmed that no one had made any threats or promises, other than the nolle prosequied charges,

to induce his Alford pleas. Counsel averred that he had reviewed the charges, the evidence, and

the “pros and cons” of proceeding to trial or entering the Alford pleas. Counsel also averred that

he had provided Nicol with an Alford plea of guilty form, and “reviewed th[at] particular . . .

form with him,” and desired to “put that on the record.”

       No authority requires that the trial court review each specific element of each offense for

Nicol’s Alford pleas to be valid, and we are unpersuaded by his contrary argument. “A circuit

court may not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first determining that the plea is made . . . with

an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.” Rule 3A:8(b)(1)

(emphasis added); see also Rule 7C:6; Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976) (holding

that a defendant must receive “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him” for a plea

to be voluntary (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941))). Here,

Nicol confirmed that he understood the charges against him and what the Commonwealth had to

prove for the trial court to find him guilty of those charges. After affirming the same, and after

hearing the Commonwealth’s proffer, Nicol elected to plead guilty under Alford. Thus, he was

                                                 -9-
aware of the nature of his charges and, while he maintained his innocence, understood that a rational

trier of fact could convict him based on the Commonwealth’s evidence.8

       Nicol relies on Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), for the proposition that a

“defendant must be given notice of the essential elements of the crime and of the range of

possible penalties.” However, Nicol’s reliance on Henderson is misplaced. In Henderson, the

plea colloquy featured no discussion of the elements of the offense, nor an “indication that the

nature of the offense had ever been discussed with [the appellant],” and failed to establish that

appellant had even a rudimentary understanding of the crime with which he was charged. 426

U.S. at 643 (emphasis added). Further, the trial court specifically “found as a fact that the

element of intent was not explained to [the appellant].” Id. at 647. Thus, the colloquy was

insufficient. Id. at 646-47. Here, the trial court made no such finding. To the contrary, the trial

court asked Nicol if he “fully” understood his charges and the elements that the Commonwealth

would need to prove for him to be found guilty. Nicol responded affirmatively. It was not error,

under Henderson, for the trial court to accept Nicol’s answer on its face. See id.

       Nicol also argues that his Alford pleas were not knowing and voluntary because the

record does not demonstrate that he was advised of various “collateral consequences” of his

pleas. This argument lacks merit. “For a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, a defendant

must be made aware of all the direct, but not the collateral, consequences of his plea.” Brown v.

Commonwealth, 297 Va. 295, 302 (2019) (quoting Meyer v. Branker, 506 F.3d 358, 367-68 (4th

Cir. 2007)). “Courts reason that the lone concern is the case in which the plea is entered. Future

or contemplated, but uncertain, consequences are irrelevant to the validity of the guilty plea.” Id.

       8
         We reject Nicol’s assertion that trial counsel’s “lengthy” arguments that Nicol was
innocent at the plea colloquy, in the sentencing memorandum, and at the sentencing hearing
“were inconsistent with Alford pleas and appeared to be attempts to negate or disavow” the pleas.
To the contrary, the entire purpose of an Alford plea is to allow the defendant to maintain his
innocence while availing himself of the benefits of pleading guilty. See Alford, 400 U.S. 25.
                                                - 10 -
(quoting People v. Williams, 721 N.E.2d 539, 544 (Ill. 1999)). Indeed, a “trial court is not

required to discuss every nuance of the law regarding a defendant’s plea in order to render a

guilty plea voluntary and knowing.” Zigta, 38 Va. App. at 154.9

       Finally, Nicol argues that the plea colloquy was deficient because the trial court did not

ask questions 18 and 19 from the “Suggested Questions to Be Put by the Court to an Accused

Who Has Pleaded Guilty,” found in an appendix to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

See Va. Sup. Ct. R. Pt. 3A, App. Form 6. The questions query whether a defendant understands

that, “by pleading guilty/no contest,” they are waiving “basic rights,” including to a jury trial,

against self-incrimination, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to present a defense on

their own behalf. Because the trial court did not ask both questions verbatim Nicol argues that

“the record thus failed to establish that [his] Alford pleas were knowingly and intelligently

entered into.” We disagree.

       “One who voluntarily and intelligently pleads guilty waives important constitutional

rights,” Allen, 27 Va. App. at 730, among which “are the privilege against compulsory

self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers,” Jones v.

Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 503, 510 (1999) (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243; Dowell v.

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1145, 1148-49 (1991), aff’d en banc, 14 Va. App. 58 (1992)). “In

order to ensure these rights are adequately protected, the trial court must determine whether a

defendant’s decision to waive them by pleading guilty ‘represents a voluntary and intelligent

choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’” Id. at 511 (emphasis

       9
         Nicol also uses Padilla to suggest that the failure to advise him of those collateral
consequences rendered his pleas invalid. Nicol is mistaken as to Padilla’s import. In Padilla, the
Supreme Court considered whether, to satisfy the Sixth Amendment, a trial attorney must advise
her client if a criminal plea “carries a risk of deportation.” 559 U.S. at 374. Nicol has presented
no evidence or argument suggesting that he would be subject to deportation as a consequence of
his convictions.
                                                  - 11 -
added) (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 31). “Moreover, the presumption against the waiver of

constitutional rights forbids the relinquishment of those rights by mere silence.” Allen, 27

Va. App. at 731. Cf. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 (“We cannot presume a waiver of these three

important federal rights from a silent record.”). Instead, “[f]or this waiver to be valid under the

Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right

or privilege.’” McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.

458, 464 (1938)). To fulfill these requirements, trial courts need not read from a fixed script or

conform to a single liturgy. Indeed, satisfying the Constitution’s guarantees does not require a

“specific monition as to the several constitutional rights waived by entry of the plea.” Wade v.

Coiner, 468 F.2d 1059, 1060 (4th Cir. 1972).

       Nicol fails to show that the trial court erred in accepting his pleas, much less that there

was a miscarriage of justice sufficient to satisfy the ends-of-justice exception. To the contrary,

the record shows that Nicol entered the pleas with, among other things, an understanding of the

charges and the elements the Commonwealth would need to prove to secure a conviction,

including the recitation of a very detailed proffer by the Commonwealth. Significantly, Nicol

also acknowledged that in pleading guilty under Alford he was waiving his right to a jury trial as

well as his right to plead not guilty, that he had discussed defenses with counsel, and that the

Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt. In addition, Nicol’s

counsel volunteered for the record that he had reviewed an Alford plea of guilty form with Nicol.

The considerable breadth of the plea colloquy, when combined with these other salient facts,

defeats Nicol’s argument that his pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily.

       Accordingly, no exception to Rule 5A:18 applies here.

                                               - 12 -
                                           II. Sentencing

       “We review the trial court’s sentence for abuse of discretion.” Scott v. Commonwealth,

58 Va. App. 35, 46 (2011). “[W]hen a statute prescribes a maximum imprisonment penalty and

the sentence does not exceed that maximum, the sentence will not be overturned as being an

abuse of discretion.” Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564 (2016) (quoting Alston

v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 771-72 (2007)).

       Nicol argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering his mitigating

evidence—specifically, his youth and his “many good and redeeming qualities,” as evinced by

the numerous character letters he submitted. But the record shows that the trial court considered

the letters as well as Nicol’s age. It was within the trial court’s purview to weigh the mitigating

circumstances Nicol presented. Keselica v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36 (2000).

       Under settled principles, we may consider only whether the sentence fell outside the

permissible statutory range. See Minh Duy Du, 292 Va. at 564; Smith v. Commonwealth, 26

Va. App. 620, 626 (1998); Valentine v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 334, 339 (1994). “It lies

within the province of the legislature to define and classify crimes and to determine the

punishments for those crimes.” DePriest v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 754, 764 (2000). The

record establishes that the trial court carefully weighed the evidence before it and pronounced

what it determined to be the proper and individualized sentence that the facts and circumstances

warranted. “[O]nce it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the

statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.” Thomason v. Commonwealth,

69 Va. App. 89, 99 (2018) (quoting Minh Duy Du, 292 Va. at 565). Nicol was sentenced within

the statutory ranges set by the legislature. See Code §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-35, 18.2-53. Thus, our

review is complete.

                                               - 13 -
                                  CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                     Affirmed.

                                       - 14 -