Court Opinion

ID: 9657300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:19:26.397587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:43.034860
License: Public Domain

Shanahan, J.,
concurring.
The majority opinion apparently accepts the premise urged by the defendant, namely, “Beverly Enterprises Inc.” and “Beverly Enterprises - Nebraska, Inc.,” are separate and distinct corporate entities. The defendant’s premise is incorrect. There is no corporate entity “Beverly Enterprises Inc.” If there were, I would be compelled to dissent from the majority opinion because changing the name of the judgment debtor *706would constitute a substantive rather than merely a technical change. As observed in Critz Buick, Inc. v. Aliotta, 145 Ga. App. 805, 806, 245 S.E.2d 56, 57 (1978):
In its order denying the motion to set aside, the trial court amended the original judgment entered against “Critz Buick, Inc.” nunc pro tunc to change the name of the defendant to “Dale Critz, Inc.” Consequently, by amending the judgment in this manner, the trial court in effect substituted another party as the defendant over which it obviously had never acquired any jurisdiction---It was error to amend the judgment in this respect----
The statute which the majority employs to validate the amendment in the present case, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-852 (Reissue 1985), has long been held inapplicable to amendments which would substantially change a claim or defense. See, West Town Homeowners Assn. v. Schneider, 215 Neb. 905, 341 N.W.2d 588 (1983); Meyer v. Sandhills Beef, Inc., 211 Neb. 388, 318 N.W.2d 863 (1982); Stungis v. Union Packing Co. of Omaha, Inc., 196 Neb. 126, 241 N.W.2d 660 (1976). An amendment which purports to substitute one named corporate defendant for another would substantially change the claim and, thus, would not be permitted under § 25-852. Such amendatory substitution, especially when accomplished after judgment has been rendered, would also deprive the newly named corporate defendant of an opportunity to defend the suit and would constitute a denial of the due process accorded by the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. See, U.S. Const, amends. VandXIV; Neb. Const, art. I, § 3.
The amendment in the present case does not substitute one legal entity for another. Rather, it merely clarifies the name of the corporate defendant. Because “Beverly Enterprises Inc.” is not a legal entity, the agent for Beverly Enterprises - Nebraska, Inc., could not have been misled into believing that “another entity was meant to be served.” Cigan v. St. Regis House Hotel, 72 Ill. App. 3d 884, 887, 391 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1979). Upon receiving notice of the claim, Anderson, as agent for Beverly Enterprises - Nebraska, Inc., could not have reasonably believed that the claim was directed to Beverly Enterprises, as “Beverly Enterprises” was not named as defendant in the claim. *707Therefore, the error was merely a misnomer rather than a material error in the identity of the party-defendant. The decision of the district court should be affirmed for that reason.