Court Opinion

ID: 9832250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:45:30.814355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:44.770242
License: Public Domain

On Motions for Rehearing and to Certify.
In view of our holding that the relief sought by the Bank is in fact mandatory and not restrictive, and that therefore the Supreme Court only has jurisdiction of the controversy under Art. 1735, R.C.S., the Bank now'urges for the first time (in addition to assignments upon which its appeal was, based and which we overruled) that Art. 1735, in so far as the jurisdiction therein conferred upon the Supreme Court is exclusive, is unconstitutional, in that it thereby “diminishes the full and plenary jurisdiction of the District Court to grant a writ of mandate and mandatory writs of injunction” conferred upon that court by Art. V, Sec. 8, of the State Constitution, Vernon’s Ann. St. We are also asked to certify this question to the Supreme Court.
We will consider briefly this question. It has not been adjudicated in any previous decision, so far as we have been able to find.
In addition to the Tengg case, the exclusive feature of the article has been enforced in two other cases, Lane v. Mayfield, Tex.Civ.App., 158 S.W. 223, by the Dallas court, and Wertheimer v. Walker, Tex.Civ.App., 96 S.W.2d 831, by this court. In none of these three cases was the constitutional question raised, or writ of error sought.
That question was raised in the following two cases: Kaufman County v. McGaughey, 3 Tex.Civ.App. 655, 21 S.W. 261, error refused, Judge Key, then (1893) Associate Justice of this court, writing; and Daniel v. Richcreek, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 935, no writ of error sought. In neither of these cases was the question necessary to the decision. In the McGaughey case [3 Tex.Civ.App. 655, 21 S.*629W. 262], the opinion on this point reads: ■“There is much force in this contention, but it is not deemed necessary to pass upon the constitutionality of this statute, because, in our opinion, it has no application to the facts of this case.”
The Richcreek case was an appeal from an interlocutory order appointing a receiver of the unexpended balance of the “Texas Racing Commission Jockey Fund,” which had been deposited' by the Commission in the treasury suspense account. The order also directed the treasurer to deliver the fund to the receiver. The order was set aside on several grounds, among them that the receivership was premature in that the status of the fund had not been determined, following on this point Ex parte Stephens, 100 Tex. 107, 94 S.W. 327. The precise constitutional question we have here, which was squarely raised and elaborately briefed, was thus referred to in the opinion [118 S.W.2d 938]: “This question appears to be one of first impression. It was not raised in any of the above cited cases [Tengg and Wertheimer. cases- and Crowell v. Terrell, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W. 252, error refused].” No opinion was ex-r pressed upon the question.
In Hughes v. McDonald, Tex.Civ.App., 122 S.W.2d 366, 367, 369, this court said: “In Daniel v. Richcreek, Tex.Civ.App., 118 S.W.2d 935, the constitutionality of Art. 1735, in so far as the jurisdiction therein conferred upon the Supreme Court was.exclusive, was challenged on the ground that it curtailed the constitutionally conferred jurisdiction of the district , court. The point was not essential to a proper disposition of that case and was therefore not ■decided. The point was not raised in prior ■decisions, the validity of the statute being .assumed, and only its application being adjudicated. All parties concede the validity of the statute; and our decision, for the purposes of this case, is predicated upon that concession.”
The original jurisdiction conferred upon -the Supreme Court in Art. 1735 derives its constitutional sanction from that portion of Art. V, Sec. 3, reading: “The Legislature may confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue writs of quo war-ranto and mandamus in such cases as may be specified, except as against the Govern- or of the State.”
The portion of Art. V, § 8, here involved, reads: “ * * * said court and the judges thereof, shall have power to issue writs of * * * mandamus, * * * and all writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction.”
This language is general, unlimited, and, if it stood alone, might be regarded as exclusive. The legislative authority conferred in Art. V, § 3, on the other hand, is specific : limited to “specified” cases. The Legislature must determine if and what cases of the general character (quo war-ranto or mandamus) may be tried originally in the Supreme Court; and while no limitations upon the legislative discretion are prescribed, it may be assumed that some reasonable basis must exist for conferring this extraordinary jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court in the cases “specified.” See Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28 S.W.2d 515, 70 A.L.R. 1484, for discussion and authorities. To this extent, perhaps, the legislative discretion is subject to judicial review. There is nothing in the wording of Art. V, § 3, whether considered alone, or in conjunction with Art. V, § 8, that militates against authority to make exclusive the jurisdiction therein authorized to be conferred in such particular “specified” cases as the Legislature may deem appropriate or advisable. And certainly many cogent considerations might be advanced for limiting in the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases seeking to compel the performance of asserted official duties by “officers of the executive departments of the’ government of this State.” The writ had been so used in district court cases from the earliest times. See Hughes case, above, and the limitation of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court was enacted after long experience of district court jurisdiction. Art. 1735 and its predecessors in this regard (Art. 5732, R.C.S.1911 and Art. 4861, R.C.S.1895) was originally passed in 1881 (Acts 1881, p. 7, Sec. 4). During these years the' validity of its exclusive feature has been rarely challenged, and then only in cases where its involvement was unessential; and this feature has been uniformly enforced whenever appropriately invoked; and correctly so we think and hold, even had the constitutional question been raised.
Upon the motion to certify this question to the Supreme Court: Jurisdiction of this court of this case is not final and the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction may be invoked by writ of error. Absent (as here) some special reason which would *630seem to demand that procedure, the long-established policy of this court is not to certify. Ladd v. Yett, Tex.Civ.App., 273 S.W. 1006.
Both motions are overruled.
Motions overruled.