Court Opinion

ID: 9737036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:13:37.723083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.097323
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court misapplied the law in suppressing the statements at issue here (132 Ill. 2d at 494). Accordingly, I must dissent. The majority decides that by initiating conversation with the police officer about the Fayette Service Co-op burglary, defendant completely waived his previously invoked right to counsel, including his right to have counsel present during police interrogation pertaining to crimes unrelated to the Fayette Service Co-op burglary. (132 Ill. 2d at 495.) The majority concludes: “Logic would suggest that if the virtue of a bright line rule — the ease of application — supports cutting off all interrogation when an accused requests counsel, then the virtue of a bright line rule would permit interrogation as to any offense after a waiver. *** The rationale supporting the requirement that all questions cease once an accused has requested counsel, as noted above, is that the accused considers himself unable to deal with custodial interrogation without counsel. If an accused waives the right to counsel, it would appear that he no longer considers himself incapable of dealing with the pressures of custodial interrogation. Therefore, following a waiver of the right to counsel, the defendant may be interrogated as to any offense, unless he has indicated his waiver is a limited one.” (132 Ill. 2d at 495.) The problem with this “logic” is that it ignores the United States Supreme Court’s long-standing recognition that an individual’s invocation of his or her right to counsel is to be viewed in an entirely different light than an individual’s relinquishment of this right. (See Connecticut v. Barrett (1987), 479 U.S. 523, 93 L. Ed. 2d 920, 107 S. Ct. 828; Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602.) By failing to recognize this crucial distinction, the majority is comparing apples to oranges. In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 707, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, the Supreme Court explained that if there is any indication by an individual that he or she wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, the individual cannot be questioned further. The Court has further stated that any request for counsel must be given “ ‘a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation.’ ” (Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 928, 107 S. Ct. at 832, quoting Michigan v. Jackson (1986), 475 U.S. 625, 633, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631, 640, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 1409.) Accordingly, “a court must presume that an individual has invoked the full extent of his or her constitutional right to counsel.” United States ex rel. Espinoza v. Fairman (7th Cir. 1987), 813 F.2d 117, 123. In contrast to the presumption which favors construing invocations of the right of counsel broadly, the Supreme Court has long recognized that courts must “ ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ ” of the right to counsel. (Emphasis added.) (Jackson, 475 U.S. at 633, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 640, 106 S. Ct. at 1409, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023; see also Brewer v. Williams (1977), 430 U.S. 387, 404, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 439, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1242.) Under this approach, “[djoubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim.” (Jackson, 475 U.S. at 633, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 640, 106 S. Ct. at 1409.) Although Jackson, Brewer and Johnson involve the sixth amendment right to counsel, the Supreme Court has indicated that the principles set forth in those cases are also applicable in assessing questions pertaining to waiver of the fifth amendment right to counsel. See Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 928, 107 S. Ct. at 832; Espinoza, 813 F.2d at 123. As is apparent from the language of these decisions, the waiver of the right to counsel.should be viewed in a fundamentally different manner than the invocation of the right to counsel. Where it is not clear whether an individual has invoked his or her right to counsel, it must be presumed that the right was invoked to its fullest extent. (Espinoza, 813 F.2d at 123.) However, where a waiver has allegedly occurred, the alleged waiver must be narrowly construed and every reasonable presumption against waiver must be indulged. (Jackson, 475 U.S. at 633, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 640, 106 S. Ct. at 1409.) A review of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miranda demonstrates why the two are treated differently. The decision in Miranda was a response to the Court’s recognition that, frequently, the purpose of custodial interrogation is “to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner.” (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 714, 86 S. Ct. at 1619.) The Court explained in great detail the types of practices which had been used to accomplish this purpose. (See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-57, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 707-13, 86 S. Ct. at 1612-19.) The use of such practices placed the individual being interrogated in a helpless position vis-a-vis the interrogator. (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455-58, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 712-14, 86 S. Ct. at 1617-19.) To rectify this inequity, the Court fashioned the now well-established Miranda rule. It follows from the Court’s recognition of the special vulnerability of individuals in custody (individuals who may not understand the implications of statements they might make), that any statement made by the individual evincing a desire for counsel should be viewed as an invocation of the individual’s full right to counsel. It similarly follows that any waiver by the same vulnerable individual should be construed narrowly. In both instances, the presumptions act to protect the vulnerable individual from the coercive power of custodial interrogation, precisely what the Court intended to accomplish in fashioning its Miranda rule. In light of the differences between an invocation and a waiver of the right to counsel enunciated by the Supreme Court, it is incorrect to simply assume, as the majority does, that, even where there has been a full invocation of the right to counsel, any knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel (unless the waiver is specifically limited by the individual) opens the door to unfettered custodial interrogation. Instead, I believe that a different approach is called for where the State seeks to use statements made by an individual in a situation such as the one in this case. Under such an approach, once an individual has invoked his or her right to counsel, the State would be required to prove that the individual knowingly and intelligently relinquished his or her right to counsel for all future interrogation, including the right to counsel during interrogation pertaining to unrelated crimes. (See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 724, 86 S. Ct. at 1628.) In deciding whether the State has met its burden, a court must “ ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ ” (Jackson, 475 U.S. at 633, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 640, 106 S. Ct. at 1409, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 1466, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023), and “[d]oubts must be resolved in favor of protecting” the defendant’s right to counsel (Jackson, 475 U.S. at 633, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 640, 106 S. Ct. at 1409). Such an approach, unlike the one set forth in the majority opinion, gives full play to the differences that the Supreme Court has recognized exist between an invocation and a waiver of the right to counsel. Under the approach outlined above, I would find that defendant did not waive his right to have counsel present during the police officer’s interrogation regarding the Fayco Enterprises burglary. Nothing in the record supports any inference that defendant intended to waive this right. All that the record shows is that defendant volunteered statements denying his involvement in the Fayette Service Co-op burglary. (132 Ill. 2d at 491-92.) While this fact certainly supports the inference that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right pertaining to the Fayette Service Co-op burglary, it does not support an inference that defendant intended to totally waive his right to counsel during interrogation about other crimes. Viewing the evidence in this case in light of the presumption that favors the preservation of the right of counsel where at all possible, I would find that defendant only waived his right to counsel for interrogation regarding the Fayette Service Co-op burglary and that he did not waive his previously invoked right to counsel for interrogation regarding the Fayco Enterprises burglary. Absent such a waiver, it was improper for the police to interrogate defendant about the Fayco Enterprises burglary. (See Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386-87, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884-85.) Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s order suppressing defendant’s statements. JUSTICE STAMOS joins in this dissent.