Court Opinion

ID: 9367319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 16:02:02.345411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:59.360144
License: Public Domain

20-2009
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                               BIA
                                                                         Poczter, IJ
                                                                      A208 617 318
                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 31st day of January, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
 9            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
10            EUNICE C. LEE,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   RANJIT SINGH,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                      v.                                  20-2009
18                                                          NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                    Deepti Vithal, Richmond Hill, NY.
25
26   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
27                                      Attorney General; Jonathan
28                                      Robbins, Senior Litigation
 1                                 Counsel; Yanal H. Yousef, Trial
 2                                 Attorney, Office of Immigration
 3                                 Litigation, United States
 4                                 Department of Justice, Washington,
 5                                 DC.

 6       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

8    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

9    is DENIED.

10       Petitioner Ranjit Singh, a native and citizen of India,

11   seeks review of a May 29, 2020 decision of the BIA affirming

12   a March 6, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

13   denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal,

14   and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

15   In re Ranjit Singh, No. A208 617 318 (B.I.A. May 29, 2020),

16   aff’g No. A208 617 318 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Mar. 6, 2018).               We

17   assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

18   procedural history.

19       We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions

20   “for the sake of completeness.”                    Wangchuck v. Dep’t of

21   Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).                We review

22   factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of

23   law de novo.        Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513

24   (2d Cir.   2009);    see   also   8       U.S.C.    § 1252(b)(4)(B)   (“The

                                           2
 1   administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

 2   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

 3   contrary.”).

 4   Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Relief

 5         The agency found that Singh suffered persecution when

 6   workers for the Prakash Singh Badal Party (“Badal”) and

 7   Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”) twice attacked him in 2015

 8   because of his membership in the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar

 9   Party (“Mann Party”).          Having established past persecution,

10   Singh was entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear

11   and likelihood of future persecution as required for asylum

12   and   withholding       of   removal.       8 C.F.R.   §§ 1208.13(b)(1),

13   1208.16(b)(1).      Nevertheless, the government may rebut this

14   presumption of future persecution if it establishes by a

15   “preponderance of the evidence” that the applicant can “avoid

16   future persecution by relocating to another part of the

17   applicant’s country of nationality . . . , and under all the

18   circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant

19   to    do   so.”     8    C.F.R.    § 1208.13(b)(1);      see   also   id.

20   § 1208.16(b)(1)(stating standard for rebutting presumption in

21   withholding context).

22         The agency did not err in concluding that Singh could

                                             3
 1   avoid future persecution by relocating from his home state of

 2   Punjab to another part of India.                    In his application and

 3   testimony, Singh asserted that he believed that he could not

 4   safely live anywhere in India because the BJP controls the

 5   national government, government officials would refuse to

 6   help Mann Party workers, and the BJP would be able to find,

 7   attack, and kill him.             But the documentary evidence reflects

 8   that     India     is     a     vast   country      with   a   population     of

 9   approximately 1.2 billion that lacks a central-registration

10   system that would enable officials to locate an individual

11   either within or outside his state.                  Further, Singh did not

12   articulate a reason that his former persecutors (who were

13   local party workers, not the police or other government

14   officials) would attempt to locate him in another area of

15   India,    given     his       position   in   the    party,    which   was   not

16   prominent.        Cf. Jagdeep Singh v. Garland, 11 F. 4th 106,

17   115–16 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that “persecut[ion] by members

18   of a political party — even one that is in power nationally

19   or . . . aligned with a party in power nationally — does not

20   establish        that     the     applicant      was   persecuted      by    the

21   government,” and the agency is not “required to attribute an

22   attack by members of a regional party in Punjab to the

                                              4
 1   national government of India”).         Although a human rights

 2   organization reported vigilante violence against religious

 3   minorities and government critics, it did not identify abuses

 4   of Mann Party members, and it went on to identify Muslims as

 5   the primary focus of attacks on minority religious groups.

 6   Likewise, a U.S. State Department report did not identify

 7   abuses of Mann Party members as a concern; it further noted

 8   that Indian law provides for freedom of internal movement,

 9   and the government generally respected that right.

10       Having    found   that   Singh   could   avoid   persecution   by

11   relocating to any state outside of Punjab, the agency was not

12   required to identify a more specific place where Singh could

13   relocate.    See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) (requiring the

14   government to show relocation to “another part” of the country

15   is reasonable), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B) (same); Matter of M-Z-M-

16   R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 28, 33 n.5 (B.I.A. 2012) (requiring the

17   government to show there is an area for safe relocation, but

18   concluding burden can be met by showing that conditions

19   outside of the home region “were not such that the applicant

20   would have a well-founded fear”).

21       Further, the record does not compel the conclusion that

22   relocation would be unreasonable under the circumstances.

                                      5
 1   See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(ii)(version in effect until

 2   Nov. 8, 2018). 1    In determining whether internal relocation

 3   is reasonable, the IJ considers any relevant factors, which

 4   may include “whether the applicant would face other serious

 5   harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil

 6   strife   within    the   country;   administrative,   economic,   or

 7   judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social

 8   and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and

 9   social and familial ties.”     8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(3)(version

10   in effect until Nov. 8, 2017), 1208.16(b)(3) (version in

11   effect until Jan. 10, 2021).        As Singh argues, the IJ did not

12   specifically address whether his Sikh religious identity or

13   Punjabi language rendered relocation unreasonable, and the

14   BIA did not supplement the IJ’s decision on this point. 2         But

     1Section 1208.13(b)(3)(ii) has since been amended to place
     the burden on the petitioner to rebut a presumption that
     internal relocation would not be reasonable in cases like
     Singh’s where the persecutor is a non-governmental entity.
     Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible
     Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80274, 80281
     (Dec. 11, 2020). However, because the IJ adjudicated Singh’s
     case prior to that amendment, we apply the older version of
     the regulation, which did not contain this presumption of
     reasonableness.   See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(ii) (version
     in effect until Nov. 8, 2018).
     2 Contrary  to Singh’s argument, the IJ made a finding
     regarding the likelihood of harm based on his political
     expression as a Mann Party supporter. There are no grounds

                                         6
 1   while the agency’s findings are limited on these issues, the

 2   record does not compel the conclusion that relocation would

3    be   unreasonable     because    there    is     no   evidence     of

4    discrimination on these grounds in the country reports.           See

5    Jagdeep Singh, 11 F.4th at 117 (finding on largely similar

6    facts   that   petitioner’s   “evidence   d[id]    not   compel   the

 7   conclusion that it would be unreasonable to expect him to

 8   relocate internally to avoid future persecution”); Hui Lin

 9   Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Our case

10   law has already approved the BIA’s consideration and use of

11   State Department country reports.”).           Further, while Singh

12   submitted evidence of abuse of Sikhs and members of Sikh

13   political groups, those incidents occurred in Punjab.         There

14   is no reason to conclude that the IJ failed to consider the

15   evidence, and the agency is not required to “expressly parse

16   or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of

17   evidence offered by the petitioner.”      Zhi Yun Gao v. Mukasey,

18   508 F.3d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 2007); see Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t

19   of Just., 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e presume

     to conclude that the IJ assumed that Singh would not continue
     that expression upon relocation, and there is no reason that
     the IJ should have repeated the finding in the reasonableness
     analysis.
                                   7
 1   that an IJ has taken into account all of the evidence before

 2   him, unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise.”).

 3          On this record, the agency reasonably concluded that the

 4   government rebutted the presumption of future persecution as

 5   required for asylum and withholding of removal by showing

 6   that    Singh   could    safely      and    reasonably   relocate.        See

 7   8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (ii); Surinder Singh, 435

 8   F.3d at 219.      The agency’s finding was also dispositive of

 9   CAT relief because it prevented Singh from establishing the

10   requisite       likelihood      of     torture.          See    8     C.F.R.

11   § 1208.16(c)(3);        Lecaj   v.    Holder,    616   F.3d    111,   119–20

12   (2d Cir.    2010)       (holding     that     where    record    does     not

13   demonstrate chance of persecution required for asylum, it

14   “necessarily fails to demonstrate” the likelihood of harm for

15   CAT relief).

16   Humanitarian Asylum

17          Finally, while Singh argues that the BIA erred in finding

18   his humanitarian asylum claim waived because he demonstrated

19   eligibility for that form of relief, he does not dispute that

20   he raised that issue for the first time in his brief to the

21   BIA.     The BIA therefore was not required to consider this

22   unexhausted claim, and we cannot consider it now.                       See 8

                                           8
 1   C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (version in effect until Jan. 15,

 2   2021) (“[T]he [BIA] will not engage in factfinding during the

 3   course of deciding an appeal.           A party asserting that the

 4   [BIA]   cannot   properly     resolve   an    appeal    without   further

 5   factfinding must file a motion for remand.”); Prabhudial v.

 6   Holder, 780 F.3d 553, 555 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that “where

 7   the agency properly applies its own waiver rule and refuses

 8   to consider the merits of an argument that was not raised

 9   before the IJ, we will not permit an end run around those

10   discretionary agency procedures by addressing the argument

11   for   the   first   time in    a   petition    for     judicial   review”

12   (alterations omitted)); Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 480

13   F.3d 104, 122 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e may consider only those

14   issues that formed the basis for [the BIA’s] decision.”).

15         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

16   DENIED.     All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

17   stays VACATED.

18                                      FOR THE COURT:
19                                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
20                                      Clerk of Court

                                         9