Court Opinion

ID: 9653335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:44:37.065302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:57.915095
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority takes the view that an intent to commit theft is inconsistent with the commission of theft. Based upon this novel idea, the majority finds the written stipulation of appellant to have been rendered a nullity.
The stipulation recites:
“I do judicially confess that on the 31 day of January, 1975 in Dallas County, Texas! I did with the intent to commit theft, enter a habitation which was not open to the public, without the effective consent of Robert E. Kimbrel, the owner, as charged in the indictment.” (Emphasis supplied)
*349Common sense should tell us that entering a habitation intending to commit theft, as stipulated by appellant, does not preclude carrying out the theft, as charged in the indictment. In Potts v. State, 571 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), this Court upheld a conviction based upon a written stipulation which failed to recite an essential element of the crime charged in the indictment. The crime was theft; the judicial admission failed to state that the property was “taken without the owner’s effective consent.” The stipulation in the present case recites that the appellant entered a habitation not open to the public without the effective consent of the owner as charged in the indictment. This Court should follow Potts and find the stipulation sufficient to support a plea of guilty.
But even if we consider the written stipulation a nullity, appellant’s oral judicial confession is sufficient to support the finding of guilt. Henderson v. State, 519 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). In open court, appellant’s own counsel elicited the following testimony:
“Q. You’ve gone over that indictment with me, have you not?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. We have read it?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And is it true and correct?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And how do you wish to plead to that indictment?
“A. Guilty.
“Q. Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty and for no other reason?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Has anybody promised you anything, threatened you or forced you, or coerced you in an effort to induce you to plead guilty this morning?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. So, again, you’re saying you’re doing that of your own free will and accord?
“A. Yes, sir.
ti * * *
“THE COURT: Mr. Dinnery, have you understood everything that has gone on here?
“DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.” (Emphasis supplied)
The majority cites Drain v. State, 465 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), to support its contention that this testimony was “merely an additional admonishment by [defense] counsel.” But the defendant in Drain never testified to having read the indictment nor to having knowledge of its contents.1 In the instant case, appellant testified that he had not only read the indictment but also had gone over it with his counsel. Appellant further testified that the indictment was true and correct. Nothing in that testimony is contradicted by appellant’s written stipulation. The trial court heard sufficient evidence to support appellant’s plea of guilty.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Before the court en banc.

. Drain’s testimony was as follows:
“Q. Your name is Dyon Weslie Drain?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And you heard me make several waivers for you, and did I have the right to make those waivers for you?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And are you guilty of this charge and are you pleading guilty because you are guilty and for no other reason?
“A. Yes, sir.”