Court Opinion

ID: 9491992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:29:34.992851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:03.193816
License: Public Domain

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Neither constitutional due process nor Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 requires the result reached by the majority in this case. In addition, even if Rule 32 could be interpreted as requiring disclosure to the Defendant of the information contained in the letters, the sentencing judge’s discussion of the letters at sentencing fulfilled this requirement and thus his failure to disclose them in their entirety was harmless error.
The Sentencing Reform Act provides for judicial review of sentences , only in limited circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) provides that a defendant may appeal if the sentence:
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
*396(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; or
(3) is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline range to the extent that the sentence includes a greater fine or term of imprisonment, probation, or supervised release than the maximum established in the guideline range, or includes a more limiting condition of probation or supervised release under section 3563(b)(6) or (b)(ll) than the maximum established in the guideline range; or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing, guideline and is plainly unreasonable.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(a) (West Supp.1998). The only subsection potentially applicable to this appeal is an allegation that the Defendant’s sentence was imposed in violation of law. In an unpublished opinion, we have previously set forth examples of sentences imposed in violation of law:
[W]e can clearly review a sentence within the guideline range that, for example, exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for the offense. Additionally, we can review sentences within the guidelines that allegedly violate the Constitution .... Thus, if a district judge explicitly stated that he was sentencing the defendant to the highest sentence within the correct guideline because the defendant was black, or female, we would clearly be able to review the sentence.
United States v. Blanton, No. 90-5533, 1990 WL 197832, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 1990) (unpublished); accord United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 409 n. 4 (6th Cir.1992). In Nichols, we found that where a defendant alleged that the sentencing judge violated his Fourth Amendment rights by considering evidence obtained in violation of those rights to arrive at defendant’s sentence, the defendant properly set forth an appealable issue under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Id. at 409. Therefore, because Defendant in the instant case alleges that the sentencing judge’s consideration of the letters without first disclosing them violates Fed. R.Crim. P. 32 and/or due process, the issue is ap-pealable.
First, I must distinguish between the majority’s explicit holding in this case, i.e., that the sentencing court violated Rule 32 in failing to turn over the letters or a summary of their contents to the probation officer, and a more broad assertion, not explicitly relied upon by the majority, that the actions violated constitutional due process. This Court has recognized that sometimes certain actions may constitute a technical violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but may not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See United States v. Mandell, 905 F.2d 970, 973-74 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Fry, 831 F.2d 664, 667-68 (6th Cir.1987).
In Mandell, we addressed a district court’s violation of Rule 32(c)(3)(D) in failing to make findings as to alleged factual inaccuracies in the defendant’s presen-tence investigation report. 905 F.2d at 973. We noted that in order to state a due process violation, the defendant “must raise grave doubt as to the veracity of the information and show that the court relied on that false information in determining the sentence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While adhering to the technical violation versus due process violation distinction, however, we noted that it may be necessary to remand for resen-tencing even for a technical violation of the rule. Id. at 974.
Therefore, I must again emphasize that it is Rule 32, and not constitutional due process, that provides the basis for the majority’s decision. In fact, due process does not compel the result in this case. See Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991) (refusing to address whether due process requires that a court notify parties of its intention to sua sponte depart upward from the sentencing guidelines, instead relying on a technical violation of Rule 32); United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 19 & *397n. 17 (1st Cir.1991) (noting that Bums does not rely on due process, citing Rule 32 advisory committee notes (1966): “It is not a denial of due process of law for a court in sentencing to rely on a report of a presentence investigation without disclosing such report to the defendant or giving him an opportunity to rebut it.”); United States v. Curran, 926 F.2d 59, 62 (1st Cir.1991) (recognizing that there is no judicial precedent holding that the Due Process Clause requires disclosure of all information relied upon by the sentencing court; noting that such a requirement would appeal’ to be irreconcilable with Rule 32(c)(8) which authorizes nondisclosure of certain information); see also Burns, 501 U.S. at 146-56, 111 S.Ct. 2182 (Souter, J., dissenting) (offering a cogent analysis of why due process would not compel the result reached by the majority in this case).
In addition, the plain language of Rule 32 does not support the majority’s reasoning. Rule 32 addresses two types of information: information that must be in the presentence report (Rule 32(b)(4)) and information that must be excluded from the presentence report (Rule 32(b)(5)). Although the majority argues that this implies that the sentencing judge cannot consider other information, the Rule does not directly so state. Other courts faced with situations similar to that before us in this case have straightforwardly recognized that Rule 32 does not explicitly govern the result in these cases. See Curran, 926 F.2d at 63 (recognizing that Rule 32 does not apply to letters sent to the court, and therefore relying on the court’s supervisory powers to require disclosure to the defendant); United States v. Louis, 814 F.2d 852, 858 (2d Cir.1987) (relying on fairness and “the rationale behind Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)” to require disclosure to defendant of outside information and an opportunity to respond). .
Even if we find that Rule 32 implicitly requires that all information upon which the sentencing judge intends to rely which does not fall within the Rule 32(b)(5) exception must be in the presentence report or disclosed to the defendant in some form, the judge must be given the discretion to decide whether the information falls within Rule 32(b)(5). The majority’s reasoning may lead us to later cases where we are asked to review whether the sentencing judge abused his discretion in determining that the information falls within the exception. In addition, the judge may have to discern whether any letters purportedly written on behalf of the defendant, ie., from his family, friends, or counselors, may also contain information which should be disclosed to the defendant for some reason. This would inject unneeded oversight into the sentencing process.
Finally, even assuming that Rule 32 compels disclosure to the defendant of all information upon which the judge intends to rely in sentencing, case law indicates that the rule was complied with' in this case. As we noted in United States v. Patrick, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bums “left open the possibility that the notice requirement might be met simply by notice at the [sentencing] hearing.” Patrick, 988 F.2d 641, 646 n. 7 (citing Burns, 501 U.S. at 139 n. 6, 111 S.Ct. 2182)1; cf. United States v. Corace, 146 F.3d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that when a “defendant challenges only the court’s failure to give such notice — -but neither the facts contained in the communication nor any factual inferences to be drawn *398from it — reversal is not warranted”). Although we found error in the judge’s failure to notify defendant that he was considering the testimony of another defendant from that defendant’s sentencing hearing, we found the error to be harmless, partially based on the fact that defendant’s counsel made only minimal argument to rebut the information, did not ask for a continuance, and seemed to have no other argument to counter the outside information. Id. at 649.
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Burger also noted that any notice requirement created by Rule 32 can be fulfilled by notifying defendant of the outside letters at the sentencing hearing. 964 F.2d 1065, 1073 (10th Cir.1992). In Burger, in order to calculate the restitution amount, the probation officer and the court relied on a letter sent to them; however, the court did not mention the letter at sentencing and thus, the defendant knew nothing about it. Id. at 1072. Although the court found a violation of Rule 32, it noted that the defendant was not necessarily entitled to a hearing to challenge the truthfulness of the allegations. Id. at 1073. In simply ordering resentencing, the court noted that, “Rule 32 requires only that each of the parties be given ‘an opportunity to comment upon the probation officer’s determination and on other matters relating to the appropriate sentence.’ ... Whether a defendant is also entitled to a hearing is within the discretion of the sentencing court.” Id.
Our discussion in Patrick, taken in conjunction with the language in Bums and Burger, suggests that any nebulous notice requirement which exists in this case, as a result of Rule 32 or the spirit of due process, was fulfilled by the district court’s description of the letters at the sentencing hearing. There was no plain error here. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

. The Supreme Court noted in Bums:
Because the question of timing of the reasonable notice required by Rule 32 is not before us, we express no opinion on that issue. Rather, we leave it to the lower courts, which, of course, remain free to adopt appropriate procedures by local rule. See Guidelines § 6A1.2, and official commentary ("Courts should adopt procedures to provide for ... the narrowing and resolution, where feasible, of issues in dispute in advance of the sentencing hearing”). See also n. 3, supra (listing local rules established to govern resolution of objections to findings in presentence report).
Burns, 501 U.S. at 139 n. 6, 111 S.Ct. 2182.