Court Opinion

ID: 9633559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:52:22.501202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:37.348716
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
The majority opinion discloses on its face that the reversal of the trial court’s judgment imposing the death penalty pursuant to jury verdict is not based on an affirmative finding that the entire record, including the evidence, preponderates in establishing that there has heen a miscarriage of justice; i.e., that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached in the absence of the retroactively declared error. Accordingly, this ease is not controlled by our decision in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal. 2d 631, 653 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33].
No doubt is suggested as to defendant’s guilt: With a brick he crushed the skull of 82-year-old Marie Chapman for the purpose of robbery. The determination of guilt is affirmed and I concur in such affirmance. I must dissent from the reversal of the penalty judgment.
The facts stated in argument by the prosecutor as to the possibility of parole for a person sentenced to so-called life imprisonment, and as to the power of the trial judge or Governor relative to reduction of sentence or pardon, are not questioned as to substantial accuracy- Those facts are matters of common knowledge, at least to members of criminal ease jury panels. It has generally been recognized that juries do not and should not operate in a mental vacuum; that they, of course, are familiar with such facts; but that no undue emphasis should be placed on such facts in argument. That is to say, we have recognized that jurors should be persons of common intelligence but that nothing should be said by way of argument or instruction which would tend materially to *216minimize the responsibility of a juror or the seriousness of his task.
In People v. Linden (1959) 52 Cal.2d 1, 27 [31] [238 P.2d 397] we said “A jury should approach the tasks of finding facts and exercising discretion as to choice of penalty with appreciation that their duties are serious and that they are accountable for their decisions, not with the feeling that they are making mere tentative determinations which the courts can correct. The jury have no concern with and should not be informed of the automatic appeal where judgment of death is imposed, and of course they should not be misinformed (as they inferentially were [in Linden]) concerning this court’s powers.” We denounced argument by a prosecutor which “improperly diminishes the jury’s recognition of their duties and responsibilities and powers” but in the light of the entire record found that the Constitution’s requirement for reversal had not been established. In the ease now at bench, as the majority state, the prosecutor told the jury that they “should not rely on the judge or Governor to disturb the verdict in any way.” In the circumstances of this case no reasonable basis appears to me for concluding that the jurors did not perform their full duty with appreciation of the solemnity and responsibility of their proper function.
Upon the record now before us, and for all of the reasons stated in my concurring and dissenting opinion in People v. Hines (1964) ante, p. 175 [37 Cal.Rptr. 622, 390 P.2d 398], I find no constitutional empowerment to this court to do other than affirm the judgment in its entirety- Accordingly, I would so affirm.
MeComb, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied April 22, 1964. Schauer, J., and MeComb, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.