Court Opinion

ID: 9483221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:14:41.207732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:29.977524
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I disagree that the Board of Immigration Appeals may deport an alien on the basis of otherwise inadmissible evidence, simply because that evidence was placed into the case file by the alien’s attorney.
Deportation proceedings need not follow traditional rules of evidence, but are governed by federal statutes, executive regulations, and judicially-mandated procedural requirements. All relevant sources of law make clear that Johnson should have had the opportunity to confront the witnesses against her. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 requires that in deportation hearings “the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine witnesses against him ... and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the government.” See also 8 C.F.R. § 242.16. Similarly, we have held that hearsay statements such as the BIA affidavit cannot be relied upon if such use is not “fundamentally fair.” Cunanan v. I.N.S., 856 F.2d 1373, 1374 (9th Cir.1988); Baliza v. I.N.S., 709 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.1983). Accordingly, when the government introduces a hearsay statement and does not attempt to produce the relevant witnesses at the deportation hearing, we have not hesitated to remand to the court below with instructions that the hearsay documents cannot be relied upon unless the government attempts to produce the relevant witnesses. Cunanan at 1375; Baliza at 1234.
Neither the government nor the majority argues that the hearsay evidence used by the court in Johnson’s case is any more reliable or fair than the hearsay evidence which we, and the statute, traditionally reject. Instead, the majority rests content with the fact that the evidence in this case was introduced by Johnson’s attorney, rather than the government.
Given the facts of this case, the majority’s distinction is unpersuasive. Johnson’s attorney introduced the affidavit into the file for the limited purpose of achieving a change of venue to San Diego. This venue motion was entirely distinct from the sub*345sequent Board of Immigration Appeals proceeding, and should have been treated as such by the BIA. Indeed, the administrative regulations governing deportation proceedings recognize that information introduced into a file for one purpose should not be used for other purposes. For example, both custody proceedings and bond proceedings must be viewed as “separate and apart from any deportation hearing or proceeding.” See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 318(d). While there is no identical restriction for venue proceedings, this is likely due to the fact that venue proceedings rarely involve prejudicial evidence. This case presents the unusual instance in which a venue proceeding does involve such prejudicial evidence. Simply because this case is unusual, however, is no reason for us to depart from the spirit of the regulations, which is that evidence can be introduced for distinct and limited purposes, and that when it is it should not subsequently be available for unfettered use.
I would remand with instructions that unless the government has made a “reasonable effort to produce [ ] its hearsay declar-ant,” Cunanan at 1375, the BIA reconsider the case without reliance on the hearsay affidavit.