Court Opinion

ID: 9819431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:25:08.403426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:23.271829
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE SLATER, specially concurring: I agree that, based on the wording of the charges in the indictment, the two theft convictions are legally inconsistent. I also agree that, under such circumstances, existing precedent appears to require reversal and a new trial on all counts. See, e.g., People v. Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d 523, 680 N.E.2d 1383 (1997); People v. Porter, 168 Ill. 2d 201, 659 N.E.2d 915 (1995). I note, however, that our supreme court reexamined the issue of inconsistent verdicts in People v. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d 122, 797 N.E.2d 640 (2003). In Jones the court explicitly overruled past precedent and held that defendants cannot challenge convictions on the sole basis that they are legally inconsistent with acquittals on other charges. Adoption of this position made Illinois law consistent with that of the United States Supreme Court. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461, 105 S. Ct. 471 (1984) (consistency of verdicts not required by Constitution). The Jones court specifically noted, however, that a different rule applies to inconsistent guilty verdicts. In such cases a trial judge is required to send the jury back to deliberate further because the court cannot usurp the jury’s function by guessing at what the jury really meant. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d at 135, 797 N.E.2d at 648. Jones cited five cases in support of the inconsistent guilty verdict rule. In each of those cases the defendants were convicted of offenses which were not only inconsistent, they were also different crimes punishable by differing sentences. See Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d 523, 680 N.E.2d 1383 (defendant convicted of aggravated discharge of a firearm and reckless conduct); Porter, 168 Ill. 2d 201, 659 N.E.2d 915 (first and second degree murder); People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218, 561 N.E.2d 674 (1990) (murder and voluntary manslaughter); People v. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d 396, 493 N.E.2d 1030 (1986) (attempted murder, armed violence and reckless conduct); People v. Almo, 108 Ill. 2d 54, 483 N.E.2d 203 (1985) (murder and voluntary manslaughter); see also People v. Hoffer, 106 Ill. 2d 186, 478 N.E.2d 335 (1985) (murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter). In such situations, it would be unfair to the defendant to simply vacate the less serious offense, and unfair to the State to vacate the other. In this case, however, the defendant was convicted of a single offense. The various subsections of the theft statute do not set forth separate offenses but rather create a single offense of theft which may be committed in a number of ways. People v. Graves, 207 Ill. 2d 478, 800 N.E.2d 790 (2003); see also People v. Marino, 44 Ill. 2d 562, 256 N.E.2d 770 (1970). The penalty for violating subsection (a)(1) is no different than that of subsection (a)(4). See generally 720 ILCS 5/16 — 1 (West 2002). Under such circumstances, I see no reason not to simply vacate one of the theft convictions instead of reversing and remanding for a new trial. Cf. People v. Lee, 344 Ill. App. 3d 851, 801 N.E.2d 969 (2003) (where statute establishes multiple methods of committing single offense, no due process violation for courts to instruct jury in the disjunctive, and jury may return general verdict without deciding which method defendant used to commit offense); People v. Siverson, 333 Ill. App. 3d 884, 776 N.E.2d 850 (2002) (no due process violation for trial court to also instruct jury regarding subsection (a)(4) of theft statute even though defendant was only charged with violating subsection (a)(1)). Nevertheless, because our supreme court in Jones recently reiterated the necessity of reversing and remanding in cases of inconsistent guilty verdicts, I concur. LYTTON, J., joins in this special concurrence.