Court Opinion

ID: 9697450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:17:01.278398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:32.619430
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring:
We agree with the majority that the police officers’ search was valid but base that conclusion, under the facts of this case, on the doctrine of the moveable area of control and not, as the majority has done, on the protective sweep doctrine.
We concur with the majority’s opinion that when police officers are executing an arrest they are permitted to conduct a brief search of the premises in which the arrest takes place for the limited purpose of apprehending others who *357may threaten the officers’ safety, provided that the officers have reason to believe that other dangerous persons are present. We disagree, however, that the facts in this case justify a “protective sweep” of the premises based on reasonable suspicion of other dangerous persons.
Since all warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable violations of the Fourth Amendment, only where the government has obtained a valid consent, or has sustained the heavy burden of demonstrating exigent circumstances, may a warrantless search stand. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970). Among the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement are searches growing out of the hot pursuit of fleeing felons, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). Another delineated exception is the search incident to arrest, at which time arresting officers may search the person and area within reach of the suspect, in the interest of preserving the safety of those making the arrest. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Commonwealth v. Bess, 476 Pa. 364, 382 A.2d 1212 (1978). When police officers have a lawful right to be on a scene, they may lawfully seize objects of an incriminating character, which are in plain view. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Commonwealth v. Seip, 285 Pa.Super. 551, 428 A.2d 183 (1981).
The doctrine of “protective sweep” (also known as the protective walk-through, or fan-out), essentially a search of a private residence for people, not evidence, expands the well-established limits of Chimel for two basic purposes: one is to ascertain whether other persons are present who might endanger the safety of arresting officers; the other is the “evidentiary sweep” to determine whether other persons are present who might remove or destroy evidence believed to be located in the residence. In the instant case we are concerned only with the former.
Our analysis begins with an inquiry into whether the search of Henkel’s house was conducted because police offi*358cers could reasonably justify the intrusion into the residential privacy that the Fourth Amendment protects. In this approach we follow the majority of state and federal courts which had identified a standard of justification in passing on the validity of a protective sweep.1 The usual standard is the one defined by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) for “stop and frisk,” i.e. a “reasonable suspicion” based on “specific and articulable facts.” We are also guided by the test set out in Bess, supra; i.e. does the arresting officer reasonably believe that the arrestee might still obtain weapons from another area and attempt to use them.
The Commonwealth here maintains that the protective sweep was justified by the heinous nature of the crime and the dangerous propensities of the suspect; by a reasonable belief that confederates of the arrestee were present; by a fear (based on the accused’s past record) that bombs or explosives were in the house; and also on the basis of Henkel’s own actions and words at the time of the arrest. We examine each of these contentions.
The Supreme Court has recently addressed the question of whether the search of a homicide scene should be recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement. The Arizona Supreme Court had ruled that the warrantless search of an apartment where a police officer was murdered was constitutionally permissible:
“We hold a reasonable, warrantless search of the scene of a homicide—or of a serious personal injury with likelihood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play—does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution where the law enforcement officers were legally on the premises in the first instance.... For the search to be reasonable, the purpose must be limited to determining the circumstances of death and the scope *359must not exceed that purpose. The search must also begin within a reasonable period following the time when the officials first learn of the murder (or potential murder).” State v. Mincey, 115 Ariz. 472 at 482, 566 P.2d 273 at 283.
The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion joined by eight justices, holding that even the exigency of a murder committed on premises did not justify a warrantless search.
[T]he State points to the vital public interest in the prompt investigation of the extremely serious crime of murder. No one can doubt the importance of this goal. But the public interest in the investigation of other serious crimes is comparable. If the warrantless search of a homicide scene is reasonable, why not the warrantless search of the scene of a rape, robbery, or a burglary? “No consideration relevant to the Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational limitation” of such a doctrine. Chimel v. California, supra, 395 U.S. at 766, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2041, 23 L.Ed.2d 685.
Moreover, the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, [403 U.S.] at 481, 91 S.Ct. 2022 [2045], 29 L.Ed.2d 564. The investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person’s home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law.
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). In light of Mincey, the heinousness of a crime committed elsewhere cannot be used to justify the search of a suspected murderer’s residence.
The Commonwealth argues that Henkel’s tendency to use confederates justified the sweep. Since the search for other dangerous persons reasonably believed to be on premises is the essential purpose of the protective sweep, this element of the case requires careful scrutiny. Police surveillance of Henkel’s residence for about three days prior to the arrest *360failed to note anyone but Henkel entering or leaving the house. (R.136-9, 248, 379-83, 413-21). No one but Henkel was sighted through the windows, and no noises were heard from other rooms (R. 151-2). The arresting police officers, when questioned during the trial, admitted that they did not believe there were other persons in the house at the time that they entered. (R.239, 344-5, 375). Appellee had, in the past, lived at another address with accomplices, but the record shows that at the time in question Henkel’s principal co-conspirator lived in California (R.ll-12, 28, 121, 271-2). Henkel had been seen with another individual who had a criminal record shortly before the arrest, but that person was known to live elsewhere in Pittsburgh (R.74). Showing that an arrestee has lived with confederates in the past (at other residences), or that some confederates in the crime have not yet been apprehended, does not lead to the reasonable conclusion that dangerous accomplices are expected to be found in the home, when direct observation and reliable information leads to the opposite conclusion.
The Commonwealth argues also that appellee’s past record of criminal use of bombs and explosives justified the sweep. A bomb dog accompanied the arresting team of eight or nine men, but was not used in the cursory sweep of the second floor, nor in the subsequent search conducted under the auspices of a warrant. It appears, therefore, that the fear of bombs was not, in fact, the underlying rationale of the residential sweep.
We turn now to the particular behavior of arrestee Henkel when he was being taken into custody. At the time the police were executing the arrest, Henkel resisted their orders to lie on the floor and attempted to use the stairs to the second floor, purportedly for the purpose of using the bathroom. This behavior led the officers to suspect that he was trying to lay hands on a weapon, or to effect an escape by means of an exit to an adjoining second floor residence. In this connection we note that courts have conceived of a “moveable area of control”, extending the search incident to arrest in those instances in which the arrestee is moving to other parts of the premises, usually to the bedroom in order *361to dress. When movement is necessary, or made at the behest of the arrestee, courts have unanimously upheld the search of those areas into which the arrestee is to move, including closets in the rooms that are entered.2 United States v. Smith, 565 F.2d 292 (4th Cir.1977); United States v. Manarite, 314 F.Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y.1970), aff’d 448 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 947, 92 S.Ct. 298, 30 L.Ed.2d 264 (1971).
Under those circumstances where police executing an arrest reasonably believe there are other persons on premises who might endanger their safety, we agree that Pennsylvania law should permit a cursory sweep in the interest of protecting officers engaged in the hazardous work of law enforcement. On the facts of this case, however, we reject the use of the protective sweep doctrine to justify the search, since there was no reason to believe that there were persons on the second floor of the house. However, since Henkel himself was attempting to reach the second floor, we uphold the sweep on the basis of the “moveable area of control.” Accordingly, we find that the police lawfully and constitutionally retrieved the .9 mm. weapon that was partially exposed under a second floor bed, and we reverse the lower court.

. Standards, and other aspects of the protective sweep doctrine, are discussed in Kelder and Statman, The Protective Sweep Doctrine; Recurrent questions regarding the propriety of searches conducted contemporaneously with an arrest on or near private premises, 30 Syracuse Law Rev. 973 (1979).

. Ringel, Searches and Seizures, Arrests and Confessions (2d ed. 1981), 12.5(c).