Court Opinion

ID: 9402179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 15:07:44.259944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.203783
License: Public Domain

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                                                   RENDERED: JUNE 15, 2023
                                                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0084-MR

JAMES A. SANDERS                                                    APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
V.               HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. COLEMAN, JUDGE
                            NO. 20-CR-00095

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                  AFFIRMING

      A jury of the Ohio Circuit Court found Appellant James A. Sanders guilty

of first-degree rape (victim under twelve years of age). The jury recommended

the statutory minimum sentence of twenty years and the trial court sentenced

Sanders in accordance with that recommendation. Sanders now appeals to

this Court as a matter of right. KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b). Following a careful

review, we affirm.

                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Sanders lived with his girlfriend Kyana Fulkerson in the mobile home of

Kyana’s parents, Nicki and Richard Fulkerson. Also living in the mobile home
were Kyana’s seventeen-year-old brother Kygun and six-year-old sister

Kaitlyn.1

      On March 21, 2020 Sanders and Kaitlyn got into an argument and

Sanders “swatted” her on the back, leaving a handprint. Kygun and Richard

then began to fight with Sanders because he hit the child. Sanders ultimately

escaped from the home through a bedroom window. Kaitlyn then informed

Nicki that Sanders had “put his winkie in her down there.” Nicki called 911

and reported both the fight and Kaitlyn’s statement. Kaitlyn was taken to the

Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC) in Henderson, Kentucky. There Dr. Jennifer

Liles conducted an interview with Kaitlyn as well as a physical examination

that revealed a “deep notch” in her hymen.

      At trial, Kaitlyn testified that Sanders had “put his wiener in me. In my

private.” She testified the incident occurred when Sanders came into her

parents’ bedroom where she was sleeping, took her to another room, and

placed her on top of him. She testified she could feel hair on Sanders and that

she urinated during the incident. Nicki also testified that Kaitlyn suffered

urinary tract infections, nightmares, and stomach pains before disclosing what

Sanders had done. Sanders testified at trial and denied Kaitlyn’s allegations.

      At trial the jury also heard a recording of Nicki’s 911 call in which Nicki

told the operator Kaitlyn said Sanders had “put his winkie in her down there.”

In the background of the 911 call Nicki can be heard asking why Kaitlyn did

not tell her about the abuse, to which Richard responded “he said he’d bust

      1   “Kaitlyn” is a pseudonym we use here to protect the privacy of the child victim.
                                             2
her ass!” Though the trial court originally excluded the 911 call as more

prejudicial than probative, it ultimately admitted the call after finding Sanders

implied during cross-examination of Nicki that the Fulkersons fabricated

Kaitlyn’s story.

      Dr. Liles testified at trial that during the CAC interview Kaitlyn told her

who had hurt her, though Dr. Liles did not tell the jury the name of the person

Kaitlyn identified. Dr. Liles also testified Kaitlyn told her “he put his thing in

me” and that the physical examination revealed a deep notch on Kaitlyn’s

hymen. Dr. Liles further testified that based upon her examination, she

reached an opinion that the likelihood Kaitlyn had suffered sexual abuse was

“very high.”

      The jury convicted Sanders of first-degree rape (victim under twelve years

of age) and recommended the statutory minimum sentence of twenty years.

The trial court entered a judgment sentencing Sanders consistent with that

recommendation. Sanders now appeals as a matter of right.

                                    ANALYSIS

      Sanders raises four issues for our review: (1) whether Dr. Liles

impermissibly vouched for Kaitlyn by opining to a “very high” likelihood Kaitlyn

was sexually abused; (2) whether Dr. Liles’ testimony that Kaitlyn identified the

perpetrator was inadmissible hearsay; (3) whether admission of Nicki’s 911 call

violated the Confrontation Clause and allowed the jury to hear inadmissible

hearsay; and (4) whether the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments

                                         3
were prosecutorial misconduct warranting reversal. We review each issue in

turn, providing additional facts as necessary.

      I.      The admission of Dr. Liles’ testimony that there was a very
              high probability Kaitlyn was sexually abused is not reversible
              error.

      Sanders first argues that by allowing Dr. Liles to opine there is a “very

high” likelihood that Kaitlyn was sexually abused, the trial court impermissibly

permitted Dr. Liles to vouch for the credibility of Kaitlyn’s allegations against

Sanders. Sanders stated a timely objection to the admission of that testimony

and thus his allegation of error is preserved. KRE2 103(a)(1); RCr3 9.22. We

generally review an allegation of nonconstitutional evidentiary error for abuse

of discretion. Mason v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 337, 339 (Ky. 2018). We

thus consider whether the trial court’s ruling was “‘arbitrary, unreasonable,

unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.’” Id. (quoting Lopez v.

Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 867, 872-73 (Ky. 2015)).

      We have long held that “a witness cannot vouch for the truthfulness of

another witness.” Hoff v. Commonwealth, 394 S.W.3d 368, 376 (Ky. 2011). In

the context of child sexual abuse cases, we have thus noted that “no expert,

including a medical doctor, can vouch for the truth of the victim’s out-of-court

statements.” Id. This prohibition extends not only to direct statements of

belief in the truthfulness of the victim’s allegations, but also to indirectly

      2   Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

      3   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
                                          4
vouching for the credibility of the victim, for example by testifying that the

victim sounded spontaneous or unrehearsed. Id.

      Though a witness therefore may not directly or indirectly vouch for the

truthfulness of a child’s sexual abuse allegations, an examining medical doctor

may testify “that the child’s injuries are consistent with sexual abuse, or

consistent with the history given by the child.” Id. at 377. The doctor may also

testify “that if he accepts the child’s statements as true, the child’s physical

injuries and history would lead him to conclude that she has been sexually

abused.” Id. A medical doctor also “may in some situations be able to give an

opinion that the child has been sexually abused” if that opinion is based “solely

on the physical evidence.” Id. at 376 & n.6. However, where the physical

evidence is inconclusive, the doctor may not give an opinion as to whether

sexual abuse has occurred. Id. at 376.

      As to statements regarding a probability that a child’s allegations of

sexual abuse are true, we have held that a physician generally cannot testify to

such a probability, for example by testifying that within reasonable medical

probability it is most likely the child’s allegations are true. Id.; see also Fowler

v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Ky. App. 2021) (“[B]y testifying that it

was ‘quite probable that the child’s story was true[,]’ [the examining doctor]

impermissibly vouched for the veracity of [the child’s] allegations.”). However, a

physician may testify that based on the “history, whether true or not, coupled

with [the physical evidence], there was a reasonable probability” that the sexual

abuse occurred. Hoff, 394 S.W.3d at 376. “The distinction is that this

                                          5
language does not profess a belief in the truth of the victim’s claims, but

instead leaves that question to the jury.” Id.

      Here, the prosecutor asked Dr. Liles “did you reach an ultimate opinion

as to, um—based on your observation and the medical exam—about sexual

abuse?” Dr. Liles responded “yes, based on her physical exam plus her

disclosure that she told me, that sexual abuse was very high.”4 As an initial

matter, we are skeptical of Sanders’ contention that Dr. Liles’ testimony

indicates she based her conclusion not only on her physical examination of

Kaitlyn, but also on Kaitlyn’s statements to her. Dr. Liles’ statement that she

based her conclusion in part on Kaitlyn’s “disclosure that she told me” could

simply have been a reference to the fact that Dr. Liles conducted the physical

examination within the context of an allegation of sexual abuse, rather than a

reference to any particular statements made by Kaitlyn. Such testimony,

relying solely on physical evidence and context rather than upon the particular

statements by a child, would not raise vouching concerns because it would be

premised not on the credibility of the child’s statements but rather upon the

results of the examination and the context in which it occurred. See id. at 376

& n.6 (noting examining physician testimony that child suffered sexual abuse

may be permissible where based solely on the physical evidence).

      We nonetheless acknowledge that Dr. Liles’ testimony may also

reasonably be construed as a statement that she based her conclusion on both

      4 While Dr. Liles’ response did not employee words such as “likelihood” or
“probability,” the Commonwealth acknowledges the testimony implied the likelihood of
sexual abuse was very high even if Dr. Liles did not use such words.
                                         6
the physical evidence and Kaitlyn’s statements, and therefore proceed to

consider Sanders’ contention that such testimony constituted impermissible

vouching. Dr. Liles’ testimony—or at least the ambiguity in that testimony—

may have led the jury to believe she expressed an opinion as to a probability

that Kaitlyn’s statements were true, thereby indicating a belief in the truth of

those statements. The testimony includes no limiting language disavowing any

particular belief regarding the credibility of Kaitlyn’s claims or indicating that

that question was left to the jury. Accordingly, to the extent Dr. Liles’

testimony (or the ambiguity therein) could have led the jury to believe she

expressed a belief in the credibility of Kaitlyn’s statements, it violated the rule

against vouching.

      However, any such error warrants reversal only if it was not harmless.

RCr 9.24.

      “[A] nonconstitutional evidentiary error may be deemed harmless if
      the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment
      was not substantially swayed by the error.” “The inquiry is not
      simply ‘whether there was enough [evidence] to support the result,
      apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so,
      whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is
      left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.”

Mason, 559 S.W.3d at 339-40 (quoting Murray v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d

398, 404 (Ky. 2013)). We conclude that any error here was at most harmless.

Although Dr. Liles testified there was a very high probability Kaitlyn suffered

sexual abuse, Sanders’ counsel followed up that testimony on cross-

examination by asking Dr. Liles “you can’t state with any certainty” what

caused Kaitlyn’s injury. Dr. Liles acknowledged she could not do so. Thus, Dr.

                                         7
Liles’ subsequent acknowledgement that she could not testify with certainty to

the cause of Kaitlyn’s injury tended to make harmless any implication in her

earlier testimony that she found Kaitlyn’s allegations credible. Accordingly,

because Dr. Liles’ statement—even if erroneous—was rendered harmless by her

later testimony, the statement did not sway the judgment and any error in its

admission was at most harmless and does not warrant reversal.

      II.    The admission of Dr. Liles’ testimony that Kaitlyn told her
             who abused her is not error.

      Sanders next argues error occurred when Dr. Liles provided hearsay

testimony that Kaitlyn told her who had hurt her. Sanders acknowledges he

did not object to this testimony at trial and thus requests palpable error review

given that his allegation of error is unpreserved. We therefore review his

argument under that standard.

      Our Rules of Evidence exclude as hearsay only statements, “other than

one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” KRE 801(c). Here, Dr.

Liles testified at trial that Kaitlyn told her who had hurt her. Kaitlyn’s

statement to Dr. Liles regarding who hurt her was not offered to prove the truth

of the matter asserted. That is, it was not offered to prove that Kaitlyn

identified her abuser to Dr. Liles. The testimony therefore did not constitute

hearsay and its admission was not error.

      We further note that while Dr. Liles said Kaitlyn told her who hurt her,

she did not explicitly or implicitly indicate to the jury the identity of the person

Kaitlyn named. Nor was Dr. Liles’ written report, which may have included the
                                         8
identity of the person named by Kaitlyn, provided to the jury. Thus, because

Dr. Liles’ testimony was not hearsay and did not name the perpetrator

identified by Kaitlyn, we find no error in the admission of that testimony.

      III.   Admission of the 911 call at trial did not violate the
             Confrontation Clause and the 911 call was not hearsay.

      Sanders next argues the trial court’s admission of a recording of Nicki’s

911 call violated the Confrontation Clause. Sanders did not present this

argument to the trial court and his allegation of error on this ground is

unpreserved. Sanders requests palpable error review and we therefore

consider his argument under that standard.

      The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.”5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Admission of a

witness’s out-of-court testimonial statement violates this Clause unless the

witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a “prior opportunity for

cross-examination.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. A corollary of this rule is that if

the witness is available for cross-examination, the admission of the out-of-

court statement does not violate the Confrontation Clause.6 Edmonds v.

      5 This provision of the Federal Constitution applies to both federal and state
prosecutions. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).

      6  The out-of-court statement may of course separately be inadmissible hearsay.
Whether introduction of an out-of-court statement violates our hearsay rules however
is a separate and distinct consideration from whether its introduction would violate the
Confrontation Clause. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (noting that
out-of-court statements not within the scope of the Confrontation Clause nonetheless
remain “subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence.”).
                                           9
Commonwealth, 433 S.W.3d 309, 315 (Ky. 2014) (“[A] confrontation violation

can only occur if the defendant is unable to cross-examine the declarant.”).

      Here, the recording of the 911 call included both out-of-court statements

by Nicki and Nicki’s repetition of out-of-court statements by Kaitlyn. However,

Nicki and Kaitlyn both testified at trial and thus were available for cross-

examination by Sanders.7 Thus, even assuming without deciding that the out-

of-court statements by Nicki and Kaitlyn were testimonial,8 their introduction

did not violate the Confrontation Clause.

      Sanders also argues the recording of the 911 call was inadmissible

hearsay. Sanders stated a timely objection to admission of the recording on

hearsay grounds. As such, this allegation of error is preserved and we review

the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. KRE 103(a)(1); Mason, 559

S.W.3d at 341.

      7  In his brief, Sanders also references Richard’s statement in the background of
the 911 call that Kaitlyn did not report the abuse earlier because Sanders said “he’d
bust her ass.” However Sanders offers no argument that the jury hearing that statement
violated the Confrontation Clause or warrants reversal, and we therefore do not consider
that issue.

      8 The Confrontation Clause does not bar admission of nontestimonial out-of-
court statements. Davis, 547 U.S. at 821 (noting that a nontestimonial statement “is
not subject to the Confrontation Clause”). It is certainly arguable the out-of-court
statements were nontestimonial given that the evident purpose of Nicki’s 911 call was
to obtain police assistance following the emergency created by the fight between her
family members and Sanders. See id. at 822-23 & n.2 (holding that statements to 911
operators are nontestimonial when made “under circumstances objectively indicating
that the primary purpose . . . is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency.”). We need not resolve whether the statements were nontestimonial however
given our conclusion that no Confrontation Clause violation occurred in any event
because Nicki and Kaitlyn were available for cross-examination at trial.
                                          10
      We conclude the recording of the 911 call was not hearsay. An out-of-

court statement is hearsay and therefore inadmissible under KRE 802 only if it

is “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” KRE 801(c).

Thus, a statement offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the

matter asserted is not hearsay. Harris v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 117, 125

(Ky. 2012) (“Only those [statements] that are offered to prove the truth of the

matter asserted can be considered hearsay.”); Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962

S.W.2d 845, 855 (Ky. 1997) (holding statement was not hearsay because it

“was offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but only to prove

when the statement was made.”).

      Here, the trial court admitted the 911 call on the Commonwealth’s

motion after defense counsel questioned Nicki about the call and the fact that

she first mentioned the fight and only thereafter mentioned Kaitlyn’s rape

allegation. The call thus was not admitted for the purpose of demonstrating

either that Sanders had raped Kaitlyn or that Kaitlyn had told her mother

Sanders had done so. Rather, the call was admitted to demonstrate the

context of Nicki’s reporting of that allegation to law enforcement. Thus,

because the call was not admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted but

rather for another purpose, it was not hearsay.

      We further note that even if the 911 call had been inadmissible hearsay,

its admission would be at most harmless error. While Nicki said during the

911 call that Kaitlyn said Sanders had raped her, Kaitlyn herself testified to the

same thing at trial. What Nicki said on the 911 call did not go into any further

                                       11
detail and was merely cumulative of what Kaitlyn herself said at trial. There is

thus no basis to conclude the result at trial was substantially swayed by the

jury’s hearing of the 911 call recording. In a similar vein, the 911 call also was

not more prejudicial than probative given that the jury in any event heard

Kaitlyn make the same statement at trial that Nicki referenced in the 911 call.

As such, introduction of the 911 call recording at trial does not warrant

reversal.

      IV.       No prosecutorial misconduct occurred.

      Finally, Sanders also argues he was denied a fair trial when the

prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.

More particularly, Sanders notes that in closing arguments, the prosecutor

referred to him as a “coward,” stated he had engaged in “cowardly acts,” and

said he did not have the courage to tell the truth. Sanders also alleges error in

a statement by the prosecutor that “[t]he presumption of innocence is gone

because I believe the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that he is

guilty.” Sanders contends error also occurred when, after reciting Dr. Liles’

qualifications, the prosecutor told the jury if it wanted to believe the defense

over Dr. Liles, “I don’t know what to tell you.” Finally, Sanders argues the

prosecutor improperly vouched for Kaitlyn when he told the jury that minor

differences in Kaitlyn’s stories at CAC and at trial showed she was not coached,

that she was consistent about the important details, and that she did not make

up her story because a six-year-old was not going to make up the kind of story

Kaitlyn told.

                                        12
      “Prosecutorial misconduct is ‘a prosecutor’s improper or illegal act

involving an attempt to persuade the jury to wrongly convict a defendant or

assess an unjustified punishment.’ It ‘may result from a variety of acts,

including improper questioning and improper closing argument.’”

Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d 731, 740 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Noakes

v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 116, 121 (Ky. 2011)) (citations omitted).

      Though Sanders acknowledges his other allegations of prosecutorial

misconduct are unpreserved, he asserts he preserved his argument that error

occurred when the prosecutor referred to him as a “coward” during closing

arguments. We disagree. Sanders immediately objected to the comment and

the trial court sustained the objection. However, because Sanders did not

thereafter request either an admonition or mistrial, he did not preserve the

allegation of error for consideration here. Leger v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d

745, 752 (Ky. 2013) (finding defendant’s allegation of error as to prosecutor’s

comments during closing argument unpreserved “because ‘[m]erely voicing an

objection, without a request for a mistrial or at least for an admonition, is not

sufficient to establish error once the objection is sustained.’” (quoting Hayes v.

Commonwealth, 698 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1985))).

      Because Sanders’ remaining allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are

unpreserved, we will reverse only if the conduct was both flagrant and

constitutes palpable error resulting in manifest injustice. RCr 10.26;

Matheney, 191 S.W.3d at 606, 607 n.4. To determine if the misconduct is

flagrant, we consider “(1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to

                                        13
prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether

they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the

strength of the evidence against the accused.” Mayo v. Commonwealth, 322

S.W.3d 41, 56 (Ky. 2010) (quoting Hannah v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 509,

518 (Ky. 2010)). Where, as here, a defendant alleges prosecutorial misconduct

during closing arguments, we consider the “closing arguments ‘as a whole’ and

keep in mind the wide latitude we allow parties during closing arguments.”

Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.3d 310, 331 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Miller v.

Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 704 (Ky. 2009)).

      We perceive no error in the prosecutor’s statement that the “presumption

of innocence” was gone given the context in which the statement was made.

The prosecutor stated:

      There’s a presumption of innocence which just means that he’s
      presumed to be innocent unless you’re satisfied by all the
      evidence—that the indictment is not any evidence—but if you’re
      satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence presented you
      will find him guilty. If not you will find him not guilty. In this case
      that presumption of innocence is gone because you’ve received the
      evidence and I believe that evidence shows beyond a reasonable
      doubt that he’s guilty. But he is presumed innocent unless you’re
      satisfied by the evidence and the evidence alone.

The prosecutor’s statement that the “presumption of innocence was gone” was

merely his statement of his belief that the evidence showed Sanders was guilty,

which he followed with a summation of the evidence leading him to that

conclusion. There is nothing improper in such argument. Dickerson, 485

S.W.3d at 332 (“[T]his Court has consistently held it is proper for prosecutors

to express personal opinions about defendants’ guilt that are based on the

                                        14
evidence in the case.”); see also Shavers v. Commonwealth, No. 2001-SC-0232-

MR, 2003 WL 21990214, at *7 (Ky. Aug. 21, 2003) (finding no error in

prosecutor closing argument statement that “it was time to ‘strip [Appellant] of

this presumption of innocence.’”).

      Sanders further contends prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the

prosecutor told the jury “I don’t know what to tell you” if they did not believe

Dr. Liles’ testimony. Again, we discern no error. Though Sanders contends

this statement suggested defense counsel was misleading the jury and placed

the burden of proof on Sanders, we fail to see any such implications in the

statement. Moreover, the statement was made after defense counsel attacked

the qualifications of Dr. Liles in her closing statement and thus was a proper

response to that attack by the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell,

165 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Ky. 2005) (“This Court has repeatedly held that a

prosecutor is permitted wide latitude during closing arguments and is entitled

to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, as well as respond to matters

raised by the defense.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

      Sanders’ final argument is that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for

Kaitlyn’s credibility when he stated in closing argument that 1) inconsistencies

in Kaitlyn’s story demonstrated she was not coached, 2) Kaitlyn was consistent

as to the significant details, and 3) Kaitlyn was not making up her story and a

six-year-old would not do so. Prosecutors “may not personally vouch for the

credibility of a witness.” Towe v. Commonwealth, 617 S.W.3d 355, 363 (Ky.

2021). “Improper vouching occurs when the prosecutor inserts the

                                        15
prosecutor’s own personal belief to shore up the credibility of a witness.” Id.

Such vouching may involve “either blunt comments, such as, ‘I think [the

witness] was candid. I think he is honest,’ or comments that imply the

prosecutor has special knowledge of facts not in front of the jury or of the

credibility and truthfulness of witnesses and their testimony.’” Id. (quoting

Hall v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.3d 7, 18 (Ky. 2018)).

      Notably, however, “a prosecutor may rebut any attack on the credibility

of a witness made in the defense’s closing arguments.” Id. Here, the defense’s

closing argument spent considerable time attacking the credibility of Kaitlyn’s

allegations. Over the course of this ten-minute attack, defense counsel argued

that Kaitlyn was “all over the place” and that her story was “nonsensical,”

inconsistent, and revealed the mind of a child making up a story as she went

along. Defense counsel also suggested the details provided by Kaitlyn were not

physically possible and that her story was motivated by her family’s hatred of

Sanders. Defense counsel further told the jury Kaitlyn had previously made

another false sexual abuse allegation.

      The prosecutor’s closing argument appropriately responded to this line of

argument and did not impermissibly extend into personal statements of belief

in Kaitlyn’s story or suggestions implying a special knowledge of the facts or of

Kaitlyn’s credibility. His statements that Kaitlyn was generally consistent and

that any inconsistencies merely indicated a lack of coaching directly responded

to the defense’s contention that Kaitlyn was inconsistent. Similarly, his

statements that Kaitlyn did not make up her story were directly responsive to

                                         16
the defense’s statements in closing argument that she did make up the story.

Moreover, he premised his statement that Kaitlyn was not making up her story

on the nature of her injury and her familiarity with facts she was unlikely to

know absent sexual abuse. Thus, because the prosecutor did not personally

express belief in Kaitlyn’s allegations but rather appropriately responded to the

defense’s closing argument by pointing to inferences the jury should draw from

the evidence, his closing argument was not prosecutorial misconduct. See

Lewis v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d 26, 39 (Ky. 2015) (finding no

prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument statements in which “the

Commonwealth’s attorney did not state whether she personally believed or

disbelieved any witness. She simply set forth inferences that the jury should

draw from the evidence.”). We therefore also conclude the prosecution’s closing

argument does not warrant reversal.

                                 CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the

Ohio Circuit Court.

      All sitting. All concur.

                                       17
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Julia Karol Pearson
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Mark Daniel Barry
Assistant Attorney General

                               18