Court Opinion

ID: 9478127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:40:54.268041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:15.406692
License: Public Domain

*643SPROUSE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. As the majority observes, this appeal does not involve the meaning of a basic rule of law. It involves instead the issue whether the rule governing materiality under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 was applied correctly by the district court when it granted Friedhaber’s motion for judgment of acquittal. I believe the district court rightly applied that well-recognized rule to correct an ill-advised prosecution, and I would affirm.
I, of course, do not quarrel with the majority’s statement that materiality has been defined in this Circuit as the “natural effect or tendency to impede, influence, or dissuade the grand jury from pursuing its investigation.” United States v. Paolicelli, 505 F.2d 971, 973 (4th Cir.1974). I likewise agree that the burden this imposes on the Government is not a heavy one. When Congress included the materiality requirement in the statute, however, it did not intend that every false statement would rise to the level of a criminal offense. In keeping with Congress’ intent, we have held that for false testimony to be punishable under § 1623, there must be a showing that the testimony had the capacity to affect the outcome of the grand jury’s investigative procedures. United States v. Flowers, 813 F.2d 1320, 1325-26; United States v. Bailey, 769 F.2d 203, 203 (4th Cir.1985) (per curiam). In my view, there was not here even a minimal showing of that capacity.
The grand jury was impaneled to investigate the origin of the funeral home fire some two years after the fire had occurred. The funeral home directors were the target of the criminal investigation and they were later indicted and convicted. Friedhaber was never even suspected of participating in the criminal acts which were undergoing grand jury scrutiny nor of any collusion with the owners. He was simply an independent workman unexpectedly involved in the web of three investigations instigated and executed at cross purposes.
Friedhaber had several opportunities to tell his story of what he observed on the day of the fire. He was interviewed by insurance company and state investigators shortly after the fire in 1984. He later was interviewed by an investigator hired by the funeral home owners in connection with their insurance claim. He also was interviewed by an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) in preparation for his testimony before the grand jury-
The jury in Friedhaber’s trial found that in his initial interview in 1984, he did not mention having smelled a pungent odor on the morning of the fire. It is undisputed that on each of the other occasions Friedha-ber stated that he had smelled the pungent odor. The Government has not charged Friedhaber with lying about whether he in fact smelled the odor, and there is no evidence in the record to support such a charge. The false testimony for which Friedhaber was convicted is his testimony to the grand jury that he told the state and insurance investigators about the odor during his 1984 interview.1 The Government’s burden was to show that Friedhaber’s false statement was capable of influencing the grand jury’s decision on the issues before *644it. Flowers, 813 F.2d at 1324; Bailey, 769 F.2d at 203.
Obviously, the grand jury was not investigating the truth or falsity of Friedhaber’s statement to the investigators — even if it was false, he had committed no crime. The grand jury was investigating arson related offenses — crimes of which Friedhaber never was suspected. That the initial interview by the state and insurance company investigators was not conducted to assist a future grand jury investigation proceeding is beyond question. Friedhaber testified that he did in fact smell the pungent odor on the morning of the fire and, of course, that testimony was uneontradicted. I simply am not persuaded that his testimony about what he told the state and insurance investigators two years earlier could reasonably be thought capable of affecting the outcome of the grand jury’s deliberations concerning whether the funeral home owners had committed arson.
Moreover, the Government’s conduct itself suggests that Friedhaber’s false statement was not material. Friedhaber informed the BATF agent shortly before the grand jury hearing the exact details of his contemplated testimony. Nevertheless, the Government chose to call Friedhaber to give that testimony, even though it could have in no way assisted in obtaining an indictment of the targets of the grand jury investigation.
The Government emphasized in their brief before this court that the BATF agent “specifically advised Friedhaber that if he lied to the grand jury, he would be subjecting himself to a charge of perjury.” In the face of the Government agent’s “advice,” Friedhaber maintained his version of the 1984 interview and his testimony resulted in the current charges being brought against him. Rather than enforcing the Government’s position, the “counseling” by the federal agent concerning the criminal problem Friedhaber might face if he stuck to his intended testimony, raises the specter that questionable pressure may have been exerted on a prospective grand jury witness. To my mind, Friedhaber’s conviction conveys one unfortunate message — it might further the self interest of a prospective grand jury witness to carefully reexamine any recollection which conflicts with a prosecutor’s theories concerning a suspected crime.
I am authorized to say that Judge WIDENER, Judge PHILLIPS, Judge ERVIN, and Judge WILKINSON join in this dissent.

. The following portions of Friedhaber’s testimony formed the basis of the Government’s case against him:
Q. Let me ask you if you gave a statement regarding what you saw and observed, to the S.B.I., and in particular, when he was with Mr. Moss, about what your activities [sic] were shortly after the fire? Do you remember talking with them, them coming and interviewing you?:
A. Yeah, sure so.
Q. And do you recall him specifically asking you whether you were aware of any odors and that you responded that there were none?
A. Yeah, I remember this.
Q. And you stated you did not notice any strange odors at the time you delivered the bill, and that you did not see anything unusual in the funeral home?
A. No, that’s not correct?
Q. That’s not what you told them?
A. No.
Q. Okay, now wasn’t that conversation tape recorded?
A. No, he was writing all the time, he wasn’t tape recording.
Q. Okay. What is incorrect about that statement?
*644A. I told him the same thing I told you, that is smelled like a pungent odor, different.
Q. You told that both to this S.B.I. officer and to Mr. Moss?
A. Yes.
Q. So, both of them would be incorrect?
A. Yes.
Q. Would they be lying?
A. I couldn’t say that.
Q. But it’s your testimony that that's not what you told them?
A. That’s not what I told them, no.
Q. You told them that you had smelled this faint odor which you couldn’t describe except for it as being something that was smouldering.
A. Un — Huh (yes).
Q. But you didn’t investigate it?
A. No.
Q. Why do you think that they would state to the contrary?
A. I really don’t know. It was late at night, dark, and he was taking notes in the car. / don’t know maybe he missed something or— questions were flying back and forth — I don’t know. But that's something that / smelled and I told the guys I did, and they didn’t write it down.