Court Opinion

ID: 9386249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 19:03:24.918237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:04.832335
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/11/23 Minner v. Heller CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 PATRICK MINNER,                                             B312821

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. BC511769)
           v.

 JOEL HELLER et al.,

           Respondents.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Randolph Hammock and Theresa M. Traber,
Judges. Affirmed.
      Patrick Minner, in pro. per, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Spiwak & Iezza, LLP and Nick Iezza for Respondents Joel
Heller and Richard Heller.
      No appearance for Respondent Terry Smith.
                       _________________

     Patrick Minner filed this action against Washington
Motors, LLC, alleging the car dealership sold him a defective car.
In this, his second appeal, Minner challenges the trial court’s
order dismissing three individual defendants who were not
served with the summons and complaint within three years, as
required by Code of Civil Procedure section 583.250.1
       Minner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint against the three individual defendants under section
583.250; that by serving the complaint on Washington Motors he
effectively served the individual defendants; that the time he had
to serve the individual defendants was tolled because of fraud
and while his prior appeal, Minner v. Washington Motors, Inc.
(Jan. 20, 2020, B277545) [nonpub. opn.] (Minner I), was pending;
that the trial court was biased against him; and that our decision
in his prior appeal determined the service issue in his favor.
Because none of these arguments has merit, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.    Minner Files This Action Against Washington Motors
      Minner filed this action on June 17, 2013 against
Washington Motors and Carfax, Inc. Minner alleged that in June
2011 he bought a used car from Washington Motors, but that
within weeks the car experienced mechanical problems. Minner
eventually asked Washington Motors to rescind the sales contract
and refund his money, but the dealership refused.
      On September 9, 2015 the trial court granted Carfax’s
motion for summary judgment and subsequently entered
judgment in favor of Carfax. On February 29, 2016 Minner
amended his complaint to substitute Terry Smith, Richard

1    Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

                                2
Heller, and Joel Heller as Doe defendants. On April 19, 2016,
however, the trial court granted a motion by the Hellers to quash
service of the summons and struck the Doe amendments naming
them as defendants. Minner never served Smith.2 Washington
Motors remained a defendant.
       On May 24, 2016 Minner, after advising the court he had
just been released from the hospital, did not appear at the final
status conference and trial, which had been set for that date. The
trial court (Judge Debre Katz Weintraub) dismissed Minner’s
action without prejudice under section 581, subdivision (b). After
denying a motion by Minner for reconsideration, the trial court
entered judgment in favor of Washington Motors on August 11,
2016. Minner appealed from the judgment, and we reversed,
holding the trial court should have continued the trial to allow
Minner to recover after his hospitalization. We stated: “Minner’s
hospitalization interfered with his ability to prepare for trial. If
an attorney had requested a short trial continuance because he or
she was in the hospital in the days leading up to a trial, any
reasonable judicial officer would have granted that attorney
a continuance. The trial court’s refusal to extend that same
courtesy to Minner was an abuse of discretion.” (Minner I,
supra, B277545.)

        B. The Trial Court Dismisses Smith and the Hellers
     On remand the case was assigned to a different judge
(Judge Randolph Hammock), who on December 18, 2020 held a

2     According to a document filed in the trial court by counsel
for Washington Motors, Smith “moved out of state years ago” and
has not been affiliated with Washington Motors since the
dealership ceased operations in 2013.

                                 3
trial setting conference. At the hearing, the court issued an order
to show cause regarding why the court should not dismiss Smith
and the Hellers for Minner’s failure to timely serve them with the
summons and complaint. Before the hearing on the order to
show cause, however, the case was transferred to a third judge
(Judge Theresa Traber) on January 19, 2021.
       On February 16, 2021 the trial court dismissed Smith and
the Hellers. The trial court found “nothing in the record reveals
that Terry Smith was ever served with the summons and
complaint in this action [and] it has been more than three years
since the action was filed . . . . [A]ny service now would be
untimely.” Regarding the Hellers, the trial court stated that the
“April 19, 2016 ruling granting the Heller defendants’ motion to
quash invalidated [Minner’s] service on these defendants” and
that “the time for serving the Heller defendants with process in
this action expired.” The court calculated that, when the Hellers
were (defectively) served on March 3, 2016, “the period for service
under the statute” was tolled “with 106 days to spare” (based on
the June 17, 2013 filing date of the complaint). But, the court
concluded, assuming the April 19, 2016 order granting the
Hellers’ motion to quash re-started the service clock, the time to
serve the Hellers expired on August 3, 2016, which was before
the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal on August 11,
2016. The court added that, “even now, more than 7½ years since
this action was filed, [Minner] has still failed to file with the
Court any proof of service of the summons and complaint on the
Heller defendants as required.”

                                4
      The trial court entered a signed order of dismissal, and
Minner timely appealed.3 The notice of appeal states Minner is
appealing from the order of dismissal under section 583.250, as
well as “every other order ever issued in the lower court from
July 13, 2013 to February 16, 2021,” and the April 19, 2016 order
granting the motion by the Hellers to quash service of summons.

                           DISCUSSION

      A.     The Trial Court Did Not Err in Dismissing the
             Complaint Against Smith and the Hellers
             Under Section 583.250
      “Section 583.210, subdivision (a), provides that a summons
and complaint ‘shall’ be served upon a defendant within three
years after the action is commenced. Section 583.250, in turn,
provides that the action ‘shall’ be dismissed if service is not made
within the statutorily prescribed time and that the foregoing
requirements ‘are mandatory and are not subject to extension,
excuse, or exception except as expressly provided by statute.’”
(Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 748; accord, Steciw v.
Petra Geosciences, Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 806, 811.) For Doe
defendants like Smith and the Hellers, the three-year time period
runs from the date the plaintiff filed the original complaint, not
the date the plaintiff substituted in the named defendants for
Doe defendants. (See Inversiones Papaluchi S.A.S. v. Superior

3      After he filed his notice of appeal, Minner filed a motion for
clarification of the court’s February 16, 2021 order. The trial
court denied the motion as procedurally defective, untimely, and
not based on new facts or law.

                                  5
Court (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1061 [“a plaintiff has three
years from the date of filing the complaint to identify and serve a
Doe defendant”]; Higgins v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
973, 982 [“even where the filing of an amended complaint on a
Doe defendant relates back to the filing of an original complaint,
the plaintiff must nonetheless identify and serve a Doe defendant
with a summons and complaint within three years of the
commencement of the action”]; Lopa v. Superior Court (1975)
46 Cal.App.3d 382, 387 [“as to a defendant named in the original
complaint by a fictitious name the action commences for purposes
of [the predecessor to section 583.210] on the date of the filing of
the complaint”].) We review an order dismissing the defendant
for failure to serve the complaint within three years for abuse of
discretion. (See Busching v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 44,
53 [predecessor to section 583.250]; Republic Corp. v. Superior
Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1253, 1258 [same].)
       The trial court properly ruled dismissal under section
583.210 was mandatory because Minner did not serve Smith and
the Hellers with the summons and complaint within three years
after Minner filed his complaint on June 17, 2013. As of
February 16, 2021, Minner had not properly served them with
the operative complaint. That’s more than seven and a half
years.
       Minner argues service of the summons and complaint on
Washington Motors gave the Hellers notice of the lawsuit under
Civil Code section 2332. Civil Code section 2332 does not apply.
That statute states: “As against a principal, both principal and
agent are deemed to have notice of whatever either has notice of,
and ought, in good faith and the exercise of ordinary care and
diligence, to communicate to the other.” Section 2332 codifies a

                                 6
general agency principle; it has nothing to do with serving a
summons and complaint. And even if it did, the time to make an
argument based on that statute was in 2016 in opposition to the
Hellers’ motion to quash (or on appeal from the trial court’s order
granting that motion, which did occur).
       Minner suggests he did not have to serve the Hellers while
the appeal in Minner I was pending. Section 583.240, subdivision
(b), excludes the time the “prosecution of the action or
proceedings in the action was stayed and the stay affected
service.” That provision, however, did not apply because,
although Minner’s action against Washington Motors was stayed
for three and a half years (from September 8, 2016 to March 27,
2020) while the first appeal was pending, his action against other
defendants was not stayed (i.e., the stay created by the ultimately
successful appeal from the judgment in favor of Washington
Motors did not affect Minner’s obligation to serve the complaint
on the other defendants). (See Hedwall v. PCMV, LLC (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 564, 580, fn. 11 [“the automatic stay does not
suspend trial court proceedings on the remaining components of
the litigation, for example, claims against other parties . . . not
resolved by the judgment or order under appeal”]; Williams v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 84, 101
[section 583.420, subdivision (b), does not apply where the
“suspension of proceedings . . . does not affect service of
process”].) And even if it did apply, the three-year period expired
before the court entered the judgment (on August 11, 2016) from
which Minner (on September 8, 2016) appealed. In addition,
although section 583.240, subdivision (c), which excludes the time
spent litigating the “validity of service,” applied during the time
the parties were litigating the Hellers’ motion to quash, that was

                                7
less than a month (from March 23, 2016 to April 19, 2016).
Excluding that month does not change the result.
       Citing a statute of limitations case, Regents of University of
California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, Minner
argues in his reply brief the time to serve the Hellers with the
complaint under section 583.210 was tolled because of their
fraudulent concealment. Even assuming fraudulent concealment
is a ground for excluding the time within which the plaintiff must
serve a defendant,4 Minner has not shown any fraud on the part
of the Hellers or Washington Motors. He argues only that “over
the past 10 years [the Hellers have] attempted every
underhanded method imaginable in order to prolong this matter.”
Not making it easy for a plaintiff to serve and prosecute a civil
action is not fraud.
       Nor is there merit to Minner’s conclusory assertion the trial
court exhibited racial bias or animosity toward him because
“courts are disgruntled because [he] is a pro se [litigant] or
because he is of African descent.” There is nothing in the record
to support these allegations, and Minner admits that on this

4      Section 583.240 lists four “conditions” during which the
time the plaintiff has to serve the defendant is excluded. Fraud
by the defendant is not one of them. (See Watts v. Crawford,
supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 745 [“[s]ection 583.240 provides . . . for the
tolling of the three-year period under a number of specified
circumstances”]; Inversiones Papaluchi S.A.S. v. Superior Court,
supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1061-1062 [while the “Legislature
has articulated four conditions that toll the time for service” in
section 583.240, those “conditions ‘must be construed strictly
against the plaintiff’”]; see also Crane v. Dolihite (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 772, 792.)

                                  8
claim “he can only speculate.” (See Guardianship of Baby Boy M.
(1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 254, 278 [reviewing court will not “impute
judicial misconduct upon the mere speculation of the parties”
where “nothing in the record suggests that the court’s decision
was prompted by improper or retaliatory designs”]; see also
People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 364 [courts “‘“presume
the honesty and integrity of those serving as judges”’”].) Even the
court’s prior erroneous dismissal of Minner’s case, which was by a
different judge and which we reversed, does not reflect any bias.
(See Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014)
224 Cal.App.4th 665, 674 [“mere fact that the trial court issued
rulings adverse to [the appellant] on several matters in this case,
even assuming one or more of those rulings were erroneous, does
not indicate an appearance of bias, much less demonstrate actual
bias”]; Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219 [a “judge necessarily makes and
expresses determinations in favor of and against parties,” and not
“every statement a judge makes to explain his or her reasons for
ruling against a party constitutes evidence of judicial bias”].)
       Minner also argues our decision in Minner I reversed the
orders granting the Hellers’ motion to quash and Carfax’s motion
for summary judgment and brought all defendants back into the
case. Although Minner claims that in Minner I he “appealed and
asked for review of every discovery order issued” and that we
“reviewed, agreed, and ruled in [his] favor,” that is not what
happened. The issue in Minner I was limited to whether the trial
court abused its discretion in dismissing the case against
Washington Motors for Minner’s failure to appear at trial. We
agreed with Minner that the court erred in dismissing his
complaint against Washington Motors, but that was all. We did

                                9
not review, consider, or express any opinion on the prior orders
granting motions by other defendants. (See Ellis v. Ellis (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 837, 846 [“‘Our jurisdiction is “limited in scope to
the notice of appeal and the judgment [or order] appealed
from.”’”]; Conservatorship of Edde (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 883,
890 [reviewing court’s “analysis is limited only to review of the
order” identified in the notice of appeal].)
      Because Minner failed to serve the Hellers within three
years, and neither tolling under section 583.240 nor our decision
in Minner I excused his failure to serve them, dismissal under
section 583.250 was mandatory. The trial court did not err in
doing what the statute requires. (See Board of Supervisors v.
Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 830, 845 [“In general civil
actions, service of summons must be made within three years. . . .
Failure to do so results in a mandatory dismissal of the action”].) 5

      B.    Minner Cannot Challenge the Trial Court’s 2016
            Order Granting the Hellers’ Motion To Quash
      As stated, Minner’s notice of appeal states he is appealing
from, among other things, the trial court’s April 19, 2016 order
granting the Hellers’ motion to quash service of summons.
Minner’s attempt to appeal from that order, however, is

5      On September 8, 2021 Washington Motors filed a notice of
stay of proceedings because it had filed for bankruptcy. Contrary
to Minner’s argument, this notice did not remove Washington
Motors from the case; it only stayed the case against Washington
Motors. (See Strobel v. Johnson & Johnson (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 796, 829 [bankruptcy filing in federal court
automatically stays a state action pending against the debtor].)
Minner has all the rights and remedies of a creditor in his
position in the bankruptcy proceeding.

                                 10
untimely. An order granting a motion to quash is appealable.
(§ 904.1, subd. (a)(3); see Humphrey v. Bewley (2021)
69 Cal.App.5th 571, 577 [“[T]he statute is unambiguous. It states
flatly that an order granting a motion to quash service of
summons is appealable.”].) The trial court entered that order
almost five years ago, and we lack jurisdiction to review it now.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a) [where there is no notice of
entry of the judgment or order, the appellant must file a notice of
appeal on or before 180 days after entry of judgment or order];
see also Marshall v. Webster (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 275, 279 [“The
time for appealing a judgment is jurisdictional; once the deadline
expires, the appellate court has no power to entertain the appeal.
. . . Thus, ‘an aggrieved party must file a timely appeal or forever
lose the opportunity to obtain appellate review.’”].)
       Minner’s notice of appeal also states he is seeking review of
“every other order ever issued in the lower court from July 13,
2013 to February 16, 2021.” Although we liberally construe a
notice of appeal (K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School District
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 882; In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70,
75); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2)), Minner’s notice of
appeal, even liberally construed, does not include any orders
other than the February 16, 2021 order dismissing the complaint
against Smith and the Hellers. “[I]t is well ‘beyond liberal
construction’ to view an appeal from one order as an appeal from
a ‘further and different order.’ . . . ‘Despite the rule favoring
liberal interpretation of notices of appeal, a notice of appeal will
not be considered adequate if it completely omits any reference to
the judgment being appealed.’ [Citation.] ‘The rule favoring
appealability in cases of ambiguity cannot apply where there is a
clear intention to appeal from only . . . one of two separate

                                11
appealable judgments or orders.’” (Baker v. Castaldi (2015)
235 Cal.App.4th 218, 225-226; see Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 154, 173 [“[t]he policy of liberally construing a
notice of appeal in favor of its sufficiency . . . does not apply if the
notice is so specific it cannot be read as reaching a judgment or
order not mentioned at all”].)

                           DISPOSITION

      The order of dismissal is affirmed. The Hellers are to
recover their costs on appeal.

                                        SEGAL, J.

             We concur:

                   PERLUSS, P. J.

                   FEUER, J.

                                   12