Court Opinion

ID: 9776916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:48:43.380181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:44.762740
License: Public Domain

DAVIS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. The opinion of the majority is in direct conflict with the following decisions: Monk v. Danna, Tex.Civ.App., 110 S.W.2d 84, wr. dis., and Stanford v. Brooks, Tex.Civ.App., 298 S.W.2d 268.
In Monk v. Danna, supra, 110 S.W.2d at page 86, the following statement, applicable to this case, is found:
“ * * * However, as contended by appellees, the doctrine has so often been announced in this state and by courts the country over, as not to admit of further debate, that, where the owner of a tract of land subdivides it and sells distinct parcels thereof to separate grantees, imposing restrictions upon its use pursuant to a general plan of development or improvement, such restrictions may be enforced by any grantee against any other grantee, either upon the theory that there is a mutuality of covenant and consideration, or upon the ground that mutual negative equitable easements are created. Where parcels are sold with reference to such a uniform plan to persons having notice thereof, the grantees may enforce the restrictions within this rule, irrespective of the order of the several conveyances, and irrespective of whether the covenants run with the land.” (Citing cases.)
In addition to the foregoing reason for dissenting, I wish to point out that Lake Cherokee and the City of Longview have taken the position in this case which is *543not only contrary to the record, but would result in considerable embarrassment between them and other persons similarly situated as Massengill and Jones. Lake Cherokee acquired the property involved in this suit by a deed from B. L. Thornton and wife. The defendants offered that deed in evidence, which proved Lake Cherokee’s title and they are bound by every statement and recitation in that deed. Lock v. Morris, Tex.Civ.App., 287 S.W.2d 500, wr. ref., n. r. e., and authorities therein cited. In that deed Thornton only reserved the right to select a campsite, which he did. That campsite was later divided into three lots, two of which are involved in this lawsuit. If Lake Cherokee does not own the lot occupied by Jones, it does not own the lot occupied by Massengill. Under the position taken by Lake Cherokee in this case, Massengill could build an open-type toilet at the water’s edge, facing it away from the water, and there is not anything that either Lake Cherokee or the City of Longview could do by virtue of their contract. Lake Cherokee has taken a position inconsistent with the deed which they offered in evidence.
Further, the evidence in this case does show that a lease was executed and mailed by Lake Cherokee to Jones, although their secretary did testify that they made no record of the lease other than the notation that it was mailed. The fact that Jones paid the rentals on the lease from the time the secretary of Lake Cherokee testified that he mailed the lease to Jones until the date of the trial is evidence that Jones had a lease.
In view of the inconsistent position taken by Lake Cherokee relative to the ownership of the property involved in this suit, which position is inconsistent with the deed itself, the case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial because it could result in much litigation between Lake Cherokee and many others similarly situated around the Lake. The record shows that many persons from whom property was acquired for the construction of Lake Cherokee were given the privilege of reserving a campsite on the Lake. The record does not show how many different property owners land was acquired from, but it does show that there are some 1,500 lots for campsites around the Lake.
The judgment should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.