Court Opinion

ID: 9707690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:18:33.484585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:36.915815
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, P.J.
(dissenting). I dissent because I am unable to agree with the majority’s finding that the act of bringing construction equipment on the property of the original plaintiffs, the Stoddards, establishes that Iacobelli Construction, the instant plaintiff, intended to injure the Stoddards’ property. The record clearly shows that this is a disputed issue of fact which should not be resolved on this appeal.
The majority correctly recognizes that the issue is whether the underlying trial established that the injury was intentional. Upon considering the summary judgment motion in the instant case, the trial judge did not believe that the underlying trial established that the injury was intentional:
'The Court: Do you read that as intentionally going on the property is the same thing as intentionally causing the damage? Because if I recall, the jury found that the act was intentional of going on the property, *269but I don’t believe they made any finding of fact that the damages were intentional.
"[Defense Counsel]: I don’t believe it could be any other finding other than their actions did result in an intentional damage.
"The Court: The intention was the trespass, really, intentionally going on the property. You’re not being asked to pay for intentionally going on the property, but for the damages that resulted therefrom.”
The record also shows that there may have been an agreement between the Stoddards and Iacobelli Construction Company to continue with the construction work. Iacobelli continued with this work while it thought that this agreement was being reduced to writing. Unfortunately, this agreement was not reduced to writing and Iacobelli was found guilty of trespass for bringing the equipment on the land to accomplish this work. After considering this evidence, the trial judge found:
"[I] believe that the jurors’ findings of an intentional trespass are not the same as intentionally inflicted damages; that the policy, as it refers to an occurrence, is an accident. An accident can be one that includes negligence. And the only thing that the transcript indicates down below that there was negligence involved. The trespass was intentional.”
The majority’s reliance on Group Ins Co of Michigan v Morelli, 111 Mich App 510; 314 NW2d 672 (1981), and Kermans v Pendleton, 62 Mich App 576; 233 NW2d 658 (1975), is misplaced. In Kermans, supra, this Court found that a bartender who intentionally shot at a patron intended to injure him. This Court noted that the trial judge in that case found:
"There was no allegation of self-defense or accident *270on behalf of the Principal Defendant, and this Court has no difficulty in determining that where there is no allegation of provocation, negligence or accident, that the pointing of a firearm at another human being and discharging same is of itself an intentional act, and one whereby the actual result could be anticipated, and thus outside the scope of the instant policy.” Kermans, supra, p 580. (Citations omitted.)
The instant case is distinguishable since there is a clear allegation that lacobelli continued with the construction work under the mistaken impression that the agreement with the Stoddards was being reduced to writing. I find it hard to believe that a construction company intends to injure property owners by performing work the owners agreed to have done. Morelli, supra, like Kermans, supra, involved an unprovoked assault. I would not equate the construction company’s actions with an unprovoked assault. In fact it appears that the Stoddards encouraged Iacobelli’s actions by orally consenting to have the work performed.
While the facts of the instant case show that plaintiff intended to do the work the Stoddards later complained of, there is certainly a factual dispute as to whether plaintiff intended to injure the Stoddards. Certainly, the Stoddards were not injured if they gave permission for the continuance of this work pending finalization of a written agreement. The mere fact that lacobelli moved construction equipment on the Stoddards’ property does not establish an intent to injure the property. Construction work is usually performed with the intent to improve property. I would remand this case for a hearing to determine if the injury was accidental. If it was, Western Casualty should be required to reimburse lacobelli for the damages paid to the Stoddards.