Court Opinion

ID: 9862803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:12:01.95142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:34:49.633088
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Presiding Judge.
This is a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding brought under Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P.
*511The record reflects that applicant was convicted in El Paso County on October 6, 1977 of the offense of robbery. Punishment, enhanced by allegation and proof of a prior 1969 Colorado robbery conviction, was assessed by the jury at fifty (50) years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections. On direct appeal applicant’s robbery conviction was affirmed on May 21, 1980, by this court in Cashman v. State, 598 S.W.2d 885 (an unpublished per curiam opinion).
Applicant filed his post-conviction habeas corpus application in the convicting court, who found the allegations in the application to be without merit, and forwarded the record to this court with a recommendation that relief be denied.
Applicant’s sole contention in his habeas application is that the prior robbery conviction obtained on January 9, 1969, in the Second Judicial District Court of Denver County, Colorado in Cause No. 59770, and used for enhancement of punishment in his 1977 Texas robbery conviction, has now been set aside and vacated by a Colorado court on January 19, 1983, and that he is entitled to release from confinement by virtue of his Texas conviction.
On July 13, 1983, this court, with two judges dissenting, granted the relief prayed, and remanded to the trial court noting that since punishment had been assessed by a jury he was entitled to a new trial.
On October 19, 1983, the State’s motion for leave to file a motion for rehearing was granted,1 and on November 9, 1983, this court withdrew its opinion of July 13, 1983, and ordered an evidentiary hearing by the trial court on the issue or issues involved, including actions of applicant’s counsel regarding validity of the Colorado conviction. The trial court conducted the evidentiary hearing.
The record reflects that at the time of applicant’s Texas trial he entered a plea of “true” to the indictment’s allegations as to the prior conviction. After the court sustained an objection to a reference in the Colorado pen packet as to “escape,” applicant offered no further objection to the pen packet. A fingerprint expert testified that applicant’s known prints were identical with those in the pen packet. An assistant district attorney testified and explained what the pen packet was. The motion for new trial did not complain of the use of the prior conviction for enhancement, and no ground of error concerning the same was raised on appeal.
At the evidentiary hearing applicant’s court-appointed attorney at his 1977 Texas trial testified that he had seen the pen packet and had discussed with applicant his prior Colorado conviction in which applicant had entered a plea of guilty, and that as a matter of strategy he and applicant agreed applicant should enter a plea of “true” at the penalty stage of the trial. Counsel testified that neither from his discussion with the applicant nor from the “papers” did he suspect or have any questions about the validity of the prior Colorado conviction.
Applicant testified his counsel did discuss the prior conviction with him, and he told counsel of a second Colorado conviction, and that counsel inquired if he had an attorney representing him in each case. He admitted he had counsel in each case, but in the second conviction (not the one used for enhancement) he had only a “stand-up” attorney, meaning the attorney only talked to him shortly before his guilty plea. He acknowledged that his Texas counsel had asked if that conviction was “any good” and that he replied, “I guess so, I don’t really know.” He did not request counsel to make an investigation of the Colorado convictions.
Applicant stated that after confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections he wrote the present judge of the convicting court in Colorado, informing her he was confined in Texas for 50 years as a result of a Texas conviction where a prior Colora*512do conviction (which he had already served) had been used to enhance his punishment. He related the judge appointed him an attorney to represent him on “habeas corpus” in Colorado, that such attorney filed a motion to vacate and set aside the judgment in Cause No. 59770, and that the judge after a hearing granted the motion. Applicant stated he was never returned to Colorado for any proceedings.
The record reflects that Colorado counsel filed a motion to vacate the judgment in Cause No. 59770 on the basis that applicant’s guilty plea in 1968 was not intelligently and knowingly entered, that there was no factual basis shown to support the plea, and applicant was denied the effective assistance of counsel. A brief filed in support of said motion was based on the first contention urged in the motion.
On January 19, 1983 the Colorado District Court, County of Denver, granted the motion to vacate the judgment in Cause No. 59770. The order did not specify the basis for the court’s action.
Applicant contends that since the prior Colorado conviction was set aside some five years or so after his Texas conviction the latter conviction must now also fall entitling him to the habeas corpus relief prayed for. The State takes the position that applicant failed to object to the introduction to evidence of his prior Colorado conviction at the time of his Texas trial for robbery, and that by failing to object he waived any right he had to challenge the use of the said Colorado conviction.
In Hill v. State, 633 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (Opinion on Rehearing), this court held that the failure to object at trial to introduction of proof of an allegedly infirm prior conviction precludes a defendant from thereafter attacking the conviction in which the prior conviction was utilized, overruling Smith v. State, 486 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Judge Clinton, who wrote the panel opinion on original submission, concurred on the ground that the majority had established a new policy, and thus he would accept the new policy. See and cf. Mendiola v. Estelle, 635 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.1981).
The State argues that the policy only recently adopted in Hill should not be departed from. See Ex parte Ridley, 658 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), citing Hill with approval.2
We adhere to Hill and hold that under the circumstances here presented applicant’s contention is without merit.
The relief prayed for is denied.

. The State’s motion noted that the Colorado court order vacating the judgment of conviction was general and vague and failed to specific any basis for setting vacating the judgment.

. See Ex parte White, 659 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.Cr. App.1983), in which Hill was distinguished in situations where the charging instruments were void and never invoked the court’s jurisdiction.