Court Opinion

ID: 9551532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:54:49.347994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:05.380787
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Justice
(dissenting).
It is my conclusion that the Industrial Commission erred in the award entered in this proceeding and the proceeding should be reversed.
Briefly, the record reflects that there were two medical experts called by the parties. The claimant called Dr. C. E. Groom, a licensed physician who specialized in urology. He testified that the claimant had sustained a permanent partial disability, i. e. the total loss of function of claimant’s right kidney, which according to the indemnity schedule of I.C. § 72-313 1 in his opinion was equivalent to seventy-five per cent (75%) of the loss of one leg at the hip. This rating would have entitled the claimant to receive a total of 135 weeks of compensation. He also testified that he was familiar with a publication of the American Medical Association Journal, Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (1971), according to which the loss of one kidney is rated as equivalent to ten per cent (10%) loss of a whole man, which under the Idaho schedule for permanent partial disability would entitle claimant only to forty weeks of compensation. Dr. Groom further testified that he was aware of the discrepancy between the two ratings and that he disagreed with the rating contained in the Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment in this regard.
Dr. Gerald Hecker testified on behalf of the respondents. He testified that he was a physician and also a specialist in urology. He frankly testified that he did not consider himself qualified to rate the degree of permanent disability of the claimant in this case, but that from his consultation of the Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (1971), he would rate appellant’s disability for the loss of function of a kidney as equivalent to ten per cent of the whole man, which would entitle claimant to only forty weeks of compensation.
The majority opinion holds that the testimony of Dr. Hecker was competent, substantial evidence and sustains the board’s award of forty weeks compensation to claimant for loss of function of his kidney. The majority opinion reaches this holding based on its conclusion that the Industrial Commission is not governed by the same rules of evidence as the courts. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the legislature in creating the commission intended the proceedings before it should be as summary, economical and simple as the rules of equity would allow. It is with this conclusion that I must part company with the majority opinion. The provisions of I.C. § 72-601 and the language used by this court in Duggan v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 92 Idaho 262, 263, 441 P.2d 172 (1968), have reference solely to the procedural aspects (as opposed to the evidentiary rules) of the Industrial Commission. In Duggan v. Potlatch Forest, Inc., supra, the question before the court was simply whether the defendants had been afforded due process when their side of the controversy had not been heard by the Industrial Accident Board when it entered an order for temporary disability and for medical and hospital expenses without notice to the defendants during a continuance. There was no issue before the court in that case concerning the admissibility of evidence.
It is my conclusion that the legislature in stating “[pjrocess and procedure under this law shall be as summary and simple as reasonably may be and as far as possible in accordance with the rules of equity” (I.C. § 72-601, enacted S.L.1917, Ch. 81, § 48) solely had reference to procedural aspects of the workmen’s compensation law. This identical language was employed by the legislature when it reenacted the workmen’s compensation law in 1971. I.C. § 72-708 (S.L.1971, Ch. 124, § 3).
At the time of the adoption of the new workmen’s compensation law in 1971, it is only fair to assume that the legislature was cognizant not only of the language of In *74re Black, 58 Idaho 803, 80 P.2d 24 (1938), which indicated that the Industrial Accident Board was bound by the same rules of evidence as the courts, but also that the legislature was knowledgeable of the controversy in other jurisdictions as to what rules of evidence should be applicable to such commissions. 3 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 79.00 et seq. The author of that work states: “more than half of the statutes provide that common-law and statutory rules of evidence shall not apply to compensation proceedings.” 3 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 79.30, p. 171. Even those states which enacted such statutes and admitted evidence which would not be admissible in courts still required a “residuum” of evidence that would be considered competent by common-law standards. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916); American Cas. Co. v. Wilson, 99 Ga.App. 219, 108 S.E.2d 137 (1959); Hackford v. Industrial Comm’n, 11 Utah 2d 312, 358 P.2d 899 (1961); 3 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 79.30, p. 172. See also, Annot: Workmen’s Compensation: Use of Medical Books or Treatises as Independent Evidence, 17 A.L.R.3d 993 (1968).
Had the legislature intended any change in the law as to evidentiary standards to govern the Commission, certainly it would have spelled it out in the 1971 statute. It is my conclusion that the Industrial Commission erred in basing the award in this case on what was stated in “Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (1971),” to be the equivalent disability for the loss of function of a kidney.
By relying on this type of evidence, the Commission is in this case placing the claimant in a distinctly unfair position. He presented his expert witness who testified as to what he believed would be a fair evaluation of the claimant’s permanent injury, and this witness was offered to the surety for full cross-examination. By the same token, cross-examination of the surety’s witness expert was a completely futile effort insofar as his rating of claimant’s disability is concerned, for that witness’s conclusion was based solely on the statement in the “Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.” Claimant thus had no opportunity to cross-examine into the validity of the conclusions based thereon. See Davis v. Arkansas Best Freight System, 239 Ark. 632, 393 S.W.2d 237 (1965).
Notwithstanding that it is recognized that the commission itself had a copy of such Guides available for its perusal, this does not eliminate the necessity that awards by the commission shall be based on “substantial competent evidence.” (I.C. § 72-609[a]).
The award of the Industrial Commission should be reversed and remanded with directions to enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and an award based on the unrefuted testimony of appellant’s expert witness.

. Unless otherwise specified, all references to the Idaho Code refer to the pre-1971 statutes.