Court Opinion

ID: 9840106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 07:09:46.175991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:33.703575
License: Public Domain

In The

                                  Court of Appeals

                     Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                                __________________

                                NO. 09-22-00373-CR
                                __________________

                         ERIK RONALD ROD, Appellant

                                           V.

                        THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

                On Appeal from the 221st District Court
                     Montgomery County, Texas
                   Trial Cause No. 21-07-09824-CR
__________________________________________________________________

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Erik Ronald Rod (Rod or Appellant) appeals his conviction for

arson. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.02(d)(2). Rod pleaded “not guilty,” but the

jury found him guilty and found that Rod used a deadly weapon—namely, fire—

during the commission of the offense. After a hearing on punishment, the jury

assessed punishment at fourteen years of confinement. Rod timely filed a notice of

appeal. In a single issue, Rod argues that the trial court erred because it did not follow

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required procedures for determining incompetency and because it failed to order a

formal competency hearing. We affirm.

                               Pertinent Background1

      Approximately eleven months after Rod was indicted and five months before

trial, Rod’s attorney filed a Motion Suggesting Incompetency and Request for

Ex[a]mination wherein he alleged, “[t]here is an issue in this cause regarding

whether Defendant is ‘competent’ to stand trial.” In the motion, the attorney

requested that Rod be examined by a psychiatrist or expert of Rod’s choosing. The

motion did not state a factual basis for the alleged “issue” regarding competency.

The motion also requested an “incompetency trial” if the trial court determined there

was evidence to support a finding of incompetence.

      On June 16, 2022, the trial court signed an order that stated, in relevant part,

              [T]he Court considered the suggestion of incompetency to stand
      trial in this cause with respect to Erik Rod, Defendant, and the Court is
      of the opinion that there is evidence to support a finding of
      incompetency and that Defendant should be examined as provided by
      Article 46B021 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
              It is, therefore, ORDERED that Dr. Wendy Elliott shall examine
      Erik Rod to determine if Erik Rod is incompetent to stand trial in this
      cause, as provided by Article 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal
      Procedure.

      1
        Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction, so we limit our discussion of the evidence at trial to the issue he raises
on appeal.
                                         2
       At a pretrial hearing that was held just prior to jury selection, Rod’s attorney

told the trial court,

       So I did want to put [] on the record that we have concerns about Mr.
       Rod’s competency. Wendy Elliott tried to evaluate him and he refused
       to talk to her. Case law and the statute is pretty clear that he is deemed
       competent if he refuses to cooperate. But we do have concerns that he
       will not cooperate.
              In addition, he is eligible for probation and he has refused to
       apply for probation.

The following exchange then occurred:

       The Court: So the other question I wanted to ask is, [your attorneys] do
       have some concerns that you had a chance to talk to -- remind me again
       --

       [Defense counsel]: Dr. Elliott.

       The Court: -- Dr. Elliott, who is a psychologist. And you didn’t want to
       talk to her and you didn’t feel comfortable --

       The Defendant: I am 100 percent of sound mind.

       The Court: Well, you seem to be. And you have always been very
       articulate. I can understand what you are saying. I think you understand
       that these are your attorneys --

       The Defendant: Yes.

       The Court: -- and the role of everybody in the courtroom.

       The Defendant: Absolutely.

       The Court: I just want to make sure. Because it if is a problem --

       The Defendant: It is not.

                                           3
      The Court: -- then we could stop and take a breath and I can let your
      attorneys talk to you about that.

      The Defendant: We are good.

      The Court: If you have any questions, let me know. Okay?

      The Defendant: Okay.

      The Court: So I will make a finding that you do appear competent. . . .

      After the State presented its case-in-chief but before the State rested, the

defendant’s attorney asked to address the court off the record. After a discussion at

the bench, the trial court stated,

             So we are outside the presence of the jury. It has been brought to
      my attention that the original order that I signed on behalf of the
      Defense when they requested that I appoint a psychologist on the issue
      of incompetency made some finding.
             And so I am going to -- with the permission of both sides, I am
      going to withdraw that order and I am going to instruct the clerk -- she
      is not present in the courtroom -- but I will instruct her to withdraw that.
             You know, I do have to say on the record that Mr. Rod does
      appear to be aware and know who his attorneys are. He knows who I
      am. He knows what the charge is. He seems to be aware of the severity
      of the case and seems to know what he is doing. And so I am going to
      make a finding that he does appear to be competent.
             Also I am going to make a finding that I think he still has the
      right to refuse to speak to a psychologist. He has that absolute right.
      And he has refused to talk to the psychologist that I appointed to assist
      Defense.
             And I know that you-all have requested of your client that he
      cooperate with Dr. Elliott and that he assist you in the defense that way.
      But he is not willing and does not want to pursue that. And so he has
      that absolute right.
             So I will make a finding that he does appear to be competent
      today -- and yesterday. He seems to be thoughtful. He is taking notes

                                           4
      and he is assisting in questioning the witnesses and he has not shown
      any problems to me in the court.
             ...
             It is an interesting thing because he also made the decision not to
      file an application for probation, which is also his right.
             You know, I have had defendants back when I was practicing
      law that made that choice because they just did not want to be on
      probation. It only happened a couple of times, but I have seen it happen.
      And, you know, you have to basically advocate for your client but also
      be mindful that he gets to make decisions.

      After the State rested, the defense called no witnesses and rested. The jury

found Rod guilty as charged in the indictment and found that Rod used a deadly

weapon in committing the offense. After a hearing on punishment, the jury assessed

punishment at fourteen years of confinement. Rod timely filed a notice of appeal.

                                        Issue

      In a single issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by not following

statutory procedures for determining incompetency and by not ordering a formal

competency hearing. According to Appellant, the trial court “should have found

some evidence of incompetency[]” because a doctor was ordered to evaluate him

and because “there were findings on issues of incompetency.” Appellant cites to the

trial court’s order of June 16, 2022, wherein the trial court ordered Rod to submit to

an examination by Dr. Wendy Elliott, even though the trial court withdrew and

vacated that order. Appellant also alleges in his appellate brief that the trial court

“made comments” about the appellant not cooperating with his counsel and getting

                                          5
agitated with his attorneys at other court appearances.2 In addition, Appellant argues

that it was not logical that he did chose not to apply for probation because, if he was

found guilty, he would not be able to move, and Appellant suggests the refusal to

apply for probation shows that he did not understand the potential consequences of

that decision. According to Appellant, these instances of his behavior constitute

more than a scintilla of evidence of incompetency that requires a formal hearing.

                      Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      We review the trial court’s decision regarding whether to conduct a

competency hearing under an abuse of discretion standard of review. Moore v. State,

999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Under this standard, we do not

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, but we determine whether the trial

court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420,

426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), superseded by statute on other grounds, Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(c-1), as stated in Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676,

692 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

      “[A] defendant is presumed competent and bears the ultimate burden of

proving incompetence to stand trial[.]” Clark v. State, 592 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d). That said, “Article 46B places certain

      2
        The appellant’s brief does not contain any record references to support this
contention.
                                         6
responsibilities on the trial court to inquire into the matter independently and force

the parties to litigate the issue, if necessary.” Id.; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

arts. 46B.003(b), 46B.004(a), 46B.005(a). “A criminal defendant who is

incompetent may not be put to trial without violating due process.” Turner, 422

S.W.3d at 688. The Legislature has adopted the constitutional standard for making

competency determinations. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 46B.003, 46B.004,

46B.005. Incompetency to stand trial is shown if the defendant does not have:

“(1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable

degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding

of the proceedings against the person.” Id. art. 46B.003(a).

      A trial court employs a two-step process in making competency

determinations before it may ultimately conclude that a defendant is incompetent to

stand trial. Boyett v. State, 545 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The first

step is an informal inquiry, and the second step is a formal competency trial. Id. An

informal inquiry is called for upon a “‘suggestion’” from any credible source that

the defendant may be incompetent. Id. (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

46B.004(a), (c), (c-1)). To move to the next step, a formal inquiry, there must be

“‘some evidence from any source that would support a finding that the defendant

may be incompetent to stand trial.’” Id. (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

46B.004(c)). The “‘suggestion’” of incompetency required to trigger the mandatory

                                          7
informal inquiry can be made by either party or the trial court may sua sponte suggest

that a defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

46B.004(a). A suggestion of incompetence “may consist solely of a representation

from any credible source[.]” Id. art. 46B.004(c-1).

      The Court of Criminal Appeals examined the application of the two-step

process in Boyett, explaining that during the informal inquiry, if “some evidence” of

incompetency is presented, then the trial court must order a psychiatric or

psychological competency examination, and except for certain exceptions, it must

thereafter hold a formal competency hearing. Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563 (citing Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 46B.005(a), (b), 46B.021(b)). No specific formal

procedure must be followed by the trial court in making the informal inquiry. George

v. State, 446 S.W.3d 490, 501 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d).

During the informal inquiry, a court should focus on whether there is “some

evidence” of incompetency to stand trial. Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563 (citing Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(c)).

      The constitutional standard for competency to stand trial asks whether the

defendant has a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable

degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual

understanding of the proceedings against him. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

46B.003(a); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); Turner, 422 S.W.3d

                                          8
at 689. During the informal inquiry, a trial court must consider only evidence of

incompetency, and it must not weigh evidence of competency against the evidence

of incompetency. Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 564. At the informal inquiry stage, “‘the

standard for requiring a formal competency trial is not a particularly onerous one—

whether putting aside the evidence of competency, there is more than a scintilla of

evidence that would support a rational finding of fact that the accused is incompetent

to stand trial.’” Id. at 564 (quoting Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 696). Some evidence must

be presented at the informal inquiry stage to show that a defendant’s mental illness

is the source of his inability to participate in his own defense. Id. There must be

“‘some evidence from which it may rationally be inferred not only 1) that the

defendant suffers some degree of debilitating mental illness, and that 2) he

obstinately refuses to cooperate with counsel to his own apparent detriment, but also

that 3) his mental illness is what fuels his obstinacy.’” Id. (quoting Turner, 422

S.W.3d at 696) (emphasis original). It is not enough to present evidence of either a

defendant’s mental illness alone or refusal to cooperate with counsel—rather, there

must be some evidence indicating that the defendant’s refusal to rationally engage

with counsel is caused by mental illness. Id.

                                      Analysis

      Starting with the first step of the analysis required by article 46B.004, we look

at whether there was a “suggestion” of incompetency from any credible source. See

                                          9
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(a); Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563. If there was

such a suggestion, then the trial court was required to conduct an informal inquiry.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(a); Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563. The

suggestion may be made by motion. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(a).

      Here, prior to trial, defense counsel filed a “Motion Suggesti[ng]

Incompetency and Request for Ex[a]mination” alleging “[t]here is an issue in this

cause regarding whether Defendant is ‘competent’ to stand trial[.]” The record

reflects that the trial court signed an Order (which was later withdrawn and vacated

by the trial court) stating that it had considered the suggestion of incompetency, and

the trial court ordered Dr. Wendy Elliott to examine the defendant to determine if he

was competent to stand trial and ordered the defendant to submit to an examination

by Dr. Elliott.

      The record reflects that Rod refused to be examined by Dr. Elliott. When

questioned about why he had refused the examination, Rod told the trial court he

refused because he was “100 percent of sound mind.”3 No report from nor testimony

by Dr. Elliott appears in the record. During the pretrial the defense attorney notified

      3
        The Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination applies
to an examination to determine whether a defendant is competent to stand trial. See
generally Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). And “[an] expert’s opinion on the
defendant’s competency or incompetency may not be based solely on the
defendant’s refusal to communicate during the examination.” See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 46B.025(a-1).
                                        10
the trial judge that Rod had refused to be examined by Dr. Elliott and Rod had

refused to apply for probation.

      [Defense Attorney]: So I did want to put that on the record that we have
      concerns about Mr. Rod’s competency. Wendy Elliott tried to evaluate
      him and he refused to talk to her. Case law and the statute is pretty clear
      that he is deemed competent if he refuses to cooperate. But we do have
      concerns that he will not cooperate.
             In addition, he is eligible for probation and he has refused to
      apply for probation.

When questioned by the trial court about his decision to refuse to be examined by

Dr. Elliott and to decline probation, Rod confirmed he had refused the examination,

he refused to apply for probation, and that he understood his attorneys, as well as the

role of everyone else in the courtroom. The trial court made a finding that Rod was

competent, and the trial court withdrew its previous Order of June 16, 2022. The

previous Order is stamped “vacated.” 4

      On appeal, Appellant has not identified any evidence in the record showing

that he suffered “some degree of debilitating mental illness” and we find no evidence

in the record that such mental illness caused him an inability to consult with his

attorneys or to have a factual understanding of the proceedings. See Boyett, 545

S.W.3d at 563-64 (citing Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 696). Therefore, there was no

evidence before the trial court “‘from which it may rationally be inferred not only

      4
          Appellant does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred by vacating this
Order.
                                           11
1) that the defendant suffers some degree of debilitating mental illness, and that 2) he

obstinately refuses to cooperate with counsel to his own apparent detriment, but also

that 3) his mental illness is what fuels his obstinacy.’” See id. at 564 (quoting Turner,

422 S.W.3d at 696) (emphasis original). Without such evidence, the trial court was

not required to order a competency trial. See id. So, we conclude that the trial court

did not err by failing to order a competency trial. See id.

       Appellant’s attorney also argues that Rod’s decision stating he did not want

to apply for probation was “not logical[,]” and he contends that decision is some

evidence of incompetency because it reflects that Rod did not understand the

potential consequences of his decision. Even assuming that Appellant’s decision

could be characterized as illogical, Appellant cites no authority to support his

argument that an “illogical” decision is some evidence of incompetency and

sufficient to require a competency trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring an

appellate brief to cite to relevant authority). In addition, the record reflects that, when

the trial court questioned Rod about his decision not to apply for probation, Rod

stated, “I am not calling every single day to drug test. I am not doing this. It is going

to limit what I can and can’t do. It is going to bind me in one place. And maybe I

might want to leave in a year.” The trial court explained the consequences of not

applying for probation would mean if he was convicted, the sentence would include

jail time and he could not ask for probation, and Rod responded, “Yes, ma’am.” The

                                            12
trial court further stated it had observed other defendants decide not to apply for

probation because it is expensive, and they would rather “just serve their time.”

Therefore, we reject Appellant’s argument that his decision not to apply for

probation was some evidence of incompetency. We also reject Appellant’s argument

that the trial court’s comments from other hearings where the trial court may have

stated that Rod had been “agitated or angry” with his attorneys was sufficient

evidence to require a formal competency trial. Simply because a defendant is

agitated or angry at his attorney, does not mean he is incompetent to stand trial. See,

e.g., Lindsey v. State, 544 S.W.3d 14, 23, 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018,

pet. ref’d) (finding that a defendant’s disruptiveness and distrust of his attorneys

were not probative of competence to stand trial); George, 446 S.W.3d at 501

(“[D]isruptive courtroom conduct and a general failure to cooperate are not

probative of incompetence to stand trial.”); Criswell v. State, 278 S.W.3d 455, 458-

59 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (a defendant’s disagreement or

dissatisfaction with counsel is not probative of competence to stand trial). We

overrule Appellant’s issue.

      Having overruled Appellant’s issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                          13
      AFFIRMED.

                                                LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                     Justice

Submitted on July 17, 2023
Opinion Delivered September 13, 2023
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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