Court Opinion

ID: 9717951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:13:22.97583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:56.224831
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: I dissent. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that the court below improperly restricted defense counsel’s cross-examination of witnesses at the evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s post-conviction petition. Accordingly, I would consider here the remaining issues raised by the defendant in the present appeal. The defendant was convicted of murder and, in a bench proceeding, sentenced to death. Our focus in this appeal from the denial of the defendant’s post-conviction petition is on the defendant’s allegations that the trial judge, in several ex parte conversations with the defendant’s trial counsel, had assured counsel that he would impose a sentence of imprisonment rather than death. After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction judge rejected this claim, concluding that the trial judge had not made the promise alleged by the defendant. The majority concludes that the post-conviction court improperly restricted defense counsel’s cross-examination of the trial judge, Judge Richard Samuels, and his court reporter, Shirley Thompson. I do not agree. Defense counsel conducted a full and thorough cross-examination of both witnesses. Nonetheless, the defendant complains that the post-conviction court improperly sustained objections to the following areas of inquiry: Judge Samuels’ initial and subsequent silence when confronted with the allegations in the post-conviction petition, the judge’s failure to meet with the defendant’s post-conviction counsel to discuss the case prior to the hearing on the petition, the judge’s recollection of his conversations with the defendant’s trial attorneys, and the judge’s familiarity with a subsequently adopted circuit rule concerning ex parte contacts. In addition, the defendant contends that the post-conviction court erred in refusing to permit counsel to question Judge Samuels’ former court reporter, Shirley Thompson, regarding ex parte meetings by the judge with other attorneys. The admission of evidence is generally reserved to the trial judge’s discretion (People v. Hayes (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 89, 130), and a judge hearing a post-conviction matter enjoys “wide discretion as to the type of evidence he may receive in ruling on the allegations of the petition” (People v. Humphrey (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 88, 91). A review of the record in this case demonstrates that the subjects described above were fully aired on direct examination of the two witnesses or were irrelevant or only marginally relevant in the present case. Accordingly, I do not believe that the post-conviction judge abused his discretion or committed reversible error in sustaining any of the State’s objections to these inquiries. The post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in limiting counsel’s questions regarding Judge Samuels’ reaction to the allegations contained in the post-conviction petition, and the judge’s supposed failure to deny making the alleged promises. As the testimony revealed, when initially confronted in court with the defendant’s allegations, Judge Samuels promptly recused himself from the post-conviction proceeding, obviously realizing that his recollection would be of vital importance in this case; that certainly was not the forum in which any comments by the judge would have been appropriate. Under these circumstances, I fail to see how evidence of Judge Samuels’ supposed silence, then or later, in the face of the allegations in the post-conviction petition would have been helpful to the defendant in establishing his claim. Nor did the post-conviction court err in sustaining objections to questions about Judge Samuels’ failure to meet with defense counsel to discuss the case. This was a topic that had been adequately explored on direct examination. At that time, Judge Samuels explained that the press of family matters, which he described in detail, had occupied his time and had prevented him from meeting with counsel. I do not believe that the defendant was prejudiced by the court’s ruling here. The post-conviction court also did not err in sustaining objections to questions regarding Judge Samuels’ recollection of his conversations with the defendant’s trial attorneys. In a far-ranging examination of Judge Samuels, defense counsel made repeated inquiries regarding the alleged conversations involving the judge and the defendant’s trial attorneys. The post-conviction court properly sustained an objection to a question that was repetitious and argumentative, and properly sustained objections to questions that were not directly relevant to the defendant’s claim. As a final matter, the post-conviction court acted within its discretion in sustaining objections to questions about Judge Samuels’ awareness of a subsequently adopted circuit rule concerning ex parte contacts with attorneys. I do not believe that testimony concerning the witness’ familiarity or lack of familiarity with the local rule, adopted after the defendant’s trial and sentencing hearing, would have aided the post-conviction court’s understanding of these issues. The post-conviction court also acted within its discretion in sustaining certain objections to the defendant’s cross-examination of Judge Samuels’ former court reporter, Shirley Thompson. Counsel sought to question this witness about her recollection of the substance of Judge Samuels’ ex parte conversations with lawyers other than the defendant’s two trial attorneys. The post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in limiting this inquiry, given the tangential relevance of Judge Samuels’ conversations with other attorneys to the defendant’s claims concerning the judge’s contacts with trial counsel. In sum, defense counsel was allowed to conduct a full and thorough cross-examination of Judge Samuels and his court reporter. A review of the record in this case shows that the post-conviction judge did not commit reversible error in the modest and warranted restrictions he placed on the defendant’s questioning of these two witnesses. (See People v. Harris (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 113, 145.) Finding no reversible error in the post-conviction court’s rulings on these matters, I would consider now the remaining issues raised by the defendant in the present appeal.