Court Opinion

ID: 9592449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:14:21.070967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:37.667396
License: Public Domain

De MUNIZ, J.,
dissenting.
Just over one year ago, considering the same statutes and the same legislative history now examined by the majority, we held, in Tektronix, Inc. v. Nazari, 117 Or App 409, 844 P2d 258 (1992), on recon 120 Or App 590, 853 P2d 315, rev den 318 Or 27 (1993), that by enacting ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), the legislature intended to adopt the major contributing cause standard of proof with respect to any claim for benefits or disability related to a preexisting condition. More recently, in Gray v. SAIF, 121 Or App 217, 854 P2d 1008 (1993), relying on Nazari, we held that ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) applies to a claim for an aggravation. The majority’s new inclination aside, there is nothing in either the statutes or the legislative history that warrants a change in the holdings of those two cases.
ORS 656.005(7)(a) defines “compensable injury.” It provides, in part:
“A ‘compensable injury’ is an accidental injury, or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances, arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death; an injury is accidental if the result is an accident, whether or not due to accidental means, if it is established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, subject to the following limitations:
“(A) No injury or disease is compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury unless the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the consequential condition.
“(B) If a compensable injury combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, the resultant condition is compensable only to the extent the compensable injury is and remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.”
*176Until 1990, when subparagraphs (A) and (B) were added requiring application of the “major contributing cause” standard of proof in the two circumstances described, the standard by which a claimant was required to prove that an injury “aris[es] out of’ the employment was understood to be the “material contributing cause” standard. In Olson v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 222 Or 407, 352 P2d 1096 (1960), the Supreme Court said:
“Reduced to its simplest form ‘arising out of as used in the act means the work or labor being performed was a causal factor in producing the injury suffered by the workman. * * * It need not be the sole cause, but is sufficient if the labor being performed in the employment is a material, contributing cause which leads to the unfortunate result.” 222 Or at 414. (Citations omitted.)
That case is regarded as having established “material contributing cause” as the standard of proof of medical causation applicable to original injury claims.
ORS 656.273(1) provides, in part:
“After the last award or arrangement of compensation, an injured worker is entitled to additional compensation, including medical services, for worsened conditions resulting from the original injury. A worsened condition resulting from the original injury is established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. However, if the major contributing cause of the worsened condition is an injury not occurring within the course and scope of employment, the worsening is not compensable.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The emphasized language was added by the 1990 legislature. Like the pre-1990 version of ORS 656.005(7), the pre-1990 version of ORS 656.273(1) made no reference to the standard by which a claimant must show that the worsened condition “results from” the original injury, but it too has been interpreted to require a “material contributing cause” standard of proof. In fact, the cases reveal that the “material contributing cause” standard for proof of aggravation claims was derived directly from the cases describing the standard of proof applicable to original claims. In Lemons v. Compensation Department, 2 Or App 128, 467 P2d 128 (1970), citing without discussion Olson v. State Ind. Acc. Com., supra, we adopted the material contributing cause standard as the *177standard applicable to proof of aggravation claims. In Standley v. SAIF, 8 Or App 429, 495 P2d 283 (1972), we cited Lemons for the same rule.
In Grable v. Weyerhaeuser Company, 291 Or 387, 631 P2d 768 (1981), the Supreme Court considered an aggravation claim in which the claimant’s compensable injury became worse after an off-the-job injury. The court grappled with the question of medical proof of aggravation claims generally. It noted that Olson had involved an original claim for injury and that our opinions in Lemons and Standley had applied the Olson “material contributing cause” standard of proof to aggravation claims. The court considered Professor Larson’s analytical approach to medical proof of aggravation claims, 1 Larson Workmen’s Compensation Law, 3-348, § 13.00 (1978), which focused on whether the subsequent injury was an “independent intervening cause” of the claimant’s need for treatment or disability. The court said that, although that approach appeared to apply a standard of proof different from the material contributing cause standard, the difference was only superficial, because the two differently phrased tests were, essentially, the converse of each other and lead to the same result. The court said:
“We conclude that if the claimant establishes that the compensable injury is a ‘material contributing cause’ of his worsened condition, he has thereby necessarily established that the worsened condition is not the result of an ‘independent, intervening’ nonindustrial cause. We hold that an employer is required to pay worker’s compensation benefits for worsening of a worker’s condition where the worsening is the result of both a compensable on-the-job back injury and a subsequent off-the-job injury to the same part of the body if the worker established that the on-the-job injury is a material contributing cause of the worsened condition.” 291 Or at 401.
Thus, Grable provided an independent rationale for application of the material contributing cause standard of proof in the context of aggravation claims generally. See also Peterson v. Eugene F. Burrill Lumber, 294 Or 537, 542, 660 P2d 1058 (1983).
In 1990, the legislature added subparagraphs (A) and (B) to ORS 656.005(7)(a), thus requiring, in those two specific *178circumstances, that the claimant show that the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the condition for which compensation is sought. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) provides:
“If a compensable injury combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, the resultant condition is compensable only to the extent the compensable injury is and remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.”
Subparagraph (B) would appear to be directly applicable to the facts of this case, as it is conceded that claimant’s current need for surgery is the result of a combination of his preexisting disc disease and his compensable injury.
The legislature made other changes as well. It amended ORS 656.273(1) to add its last two lines:
“After the last award or arrangement of compensation, an injured worker is entitled to additional compensation, including medical services, for worsened conditions resulting from the original injury. A worsened condition resulting from the original injury is established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. However, if the major contributing cause of the worsened condition is an injury not occurring within the course and scope of employment, the worsening is not compensable.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The emphasized language overrules the Supreme Court’s holding in Grable. A worsened condition is no longer compensable if its major contributing cause is a subsequent off-the-job injury, even if the compensable on-the-job injury is a material contributing cause of the worsening.
Taken together, the changes to ORS 656.005(7)(a) and ORS 656.273(1) reflect an apparent legislative intention that a condition not be compensated if its primary cause is not work related. If there is a pre-existing condition involved, it is no longer enough for the claimant to show that the work is the material contributing cause. As we said in Tektronix, Inc. v. Nazari, supra, the legislative history shows that, by enacting ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), the legislature intended that, anytime a claimant’s current condition is the result of a combination of a compensable injury and a preexisting condition, the claimant must show that the compensable injury, rather than the preexisting condition, is the major contributing cause. *179More recently, in Gray v. SAIF, supra, relying on Nazari, we applied that same rule in the context of an aggravation claim involving a worsened condition caused by a combination of a compensable injury and a preexisting disease. That is the circumstance here.
The majority takes issue with my reliance on Nazari, contending that that case is not relevant here, because our holding in Nazari was limited to the question of whether ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) is applicable in the context of an “initial claim.” How quickly the majority forgets. It is true that the difficult question presented by Nazari was not whether ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) was applicable in the context of an aggravation claim or in any other circumstance when there had been a previously accepted claim: We said in Nazari that the statute was obviously applicable in those circumstances.1 The difficult question in Nazari was whether, in the light of the statute’s apparent assumption of the existence of a compensable injury, ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) could ever be applicable in the context of an initial claim. In holding that the statute applied in the context of an initial claim, we referred to the legislative history, which we concluded showed that the objective of the legislature “was to adopt the major contributing cause standard of proof with respect to any claim for benefits or disability related to a preexisting, noncompensable condition.” 120 Or App at 590.
Because Nazari did not involve an aggravation claim, the majority is correct that it is not direct authority for the result in this case. However, our comments in Nazari regarding the legislature’s intent certainly lent support to our opinion in Gray v. SAIF, supra, which expressly holds that ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) is applicable in the context of an aggravation claim. The relevant facts of Gray were similar to those here. The claimant experienced a back strain at work, which the employer accepted as compensable. The claimant’s doctor later diagnosed a preexisting degenerative condition. The *180claimant sought to be compensated for surgery for the preexisting condition. We held that the claim was not compensable as an initial claim or as an aggravation claim, because the claimant had not satisfied the “major contributing cause” standard of proof set out in ORS 655.005(7)(a)(B).
The majority is of the view that there is no indication that the legislature intended to change a claimant’s burden of proof with regard to aggravation claims. We would agree, were it not for the words of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B). Even without an express reference to ORS 656.273, those words aptly indicate that the major contributing cause standard is intended to apply in the context of an aggravation claim involving a preexisting condition. We are remiss in our duty to interpret the statute according to its plain language in ignoring the very words chosen by the legislature.
The majority surmises that, in the light of the fact that the legislature made some changes to ORS 656.273(1) in 1990, had it sought to change the claimant’s burden of proof in an aggravation claim, it would have made additional changes to the statute similar to those made to ORS 656.005(7). I think it more likely that the legislature made no additional changes to ORS 656.273, because it believed that the changes made to ORS 656.005(7) encompassed aggravation claims.
Contrary to the majority’s view, the application of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) to aggravation claims would not lead to an absurdity. If there is no preexisting condition, then the standard of proof in an aggravation claim, as in an initial claim, would be the material contributing cause standard. If there is a preexisting condition that contributes to the worsening, then the claimant must show, as in an initial claim, that the work is the major contributing cause of the worsened condition. In either case, if a subsequent off-the-job injury contributes to the worsened condition, then the employer would be able to show that the subsequent injury is its major contributing cause. Fernandez v. M & M Reforestation, 124 Or App 38, 860 P2d 898 (1993). There is no illogic to the way the statutes work together. They simply deal with different potential aspects of a claim and may or may not be relevant to a particular case.
*181As I interpret the statutes, if a claimant has previously established, in the context of an original claim, that because of the effects of the employment, a preexisting condition is itself compensable, then there would be no need for the claimant to reprove the relationship between the employment and the preexisting condition in a later aggravation claim. The preexisting condition, once shown to be compensable, remains compensable.2 Here, claimant’s preexisting condition was noted in the medical reports at the time of the original claim, and he has perhaps received medical treatment and compensation for the effects that the compensable injury had on the preexisting condition; however, the preexisting condition itself is not compensable, nor is it claimed to be. It is that preexisting condition that has worsened and for which claimant now seeks compensation. If claimant’s 1987 injury bears any relationship to his current disc condition, it is only to the extent that it combines with the preexisting condition. I would hold that ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) is applicable and that claimant must show that the initial compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the worsened condition. I would hold that substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that he has not met that burden.
Richardson, C. J., and Rossman and Leeson, JJ., join in this dissent.

“When the claimant has an injury that has been determined to be compensable under [the material contributing cause] standard of medical causation, the words of subparagraph (B) are easily understood: A condition resulting from a combination of the injury and a preexisting condition is compensable only if the compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment of the ‘resultant condition.’ ” 120 Or App at 592.

 Similarly, a claim for medical treatment of a compensable condition is compensable if the compensable condition remains the material contributing cause of the need for treatment. See, e.g., Beck v. James River Corp., 124 Or App 484, 488, 863 P2d 526 (1993), rev den 318 Or 478 (1994).