Court Opinion

ID: 9649426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:53:10.572374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:10.692439
License: Public Domain

GLASSMAN, Justice,
with whom ROBERTS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The court ignores the general rule that courts will seek to construe contracts to give them meaning rather than to render them unenforceable. Towne v. Larson, 142 Me. 301, 305, 51 A.2d 51, 53 (1947). Furthermore, the court has examined the contract language without availing itself of evidence of how the parties themselves understood their obligations under the contract. Faced with the parties’ indifference to the contract’s uncertainties, interpretation requires greater reliance on their course of performance. Blue Rock Industries v. Raymond International, Inc., 325 A.2d 66, 73 (Me.1974); 3 Corbin on Contracts § 558 (1960). Interpretation indicated by acts of the parties is entitled to great weight. Bar Harbor and Union River Power Co. v. The Foundation Co., 129 Me. 81, 86, 149 A. 801, 803 (1930); Lewiston and Auburn R.R. Co. v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 97 Me. 261, 267, 54 A. 750, 752 (1903). Application of these principles allows enforcement of the contract to the limited extent requested by the plaintiff in this case.
Consideration of the terms that the court holds too vague for enforcement reveals that none defy reasonable interpretation. Questions concerning funding and management of the trust are not pertinent because plaintiff does not seek to establish a trust. The meaning of the term “education”— whether it encompasses college or only secondary schools and whether private or public schools were contemplated — can be ascertained from common rules of construction and from the acts of the parties. *706If a contract leaves open a key term, the law invokes the standard of reasonableness, and courts will supply the needed term. Corthell v. Summit Thread Company, 132 Me. 94, 99, 167 A. 79, 81 (1933). The Superior Court specifically found that the expenditures for which plaintiff sought reimbursement were “reasonable and appropriate to promote the education of their children.” Furthermore, the defendant made no specific objections at the time to any expenditure as unreasonable. He contributed directly to his oldest daughter’s tuition at a private college in Italy, thus it is unlikely that he understood his obligations to be limited to public or secondary schools only. Finally, the term “children” can, in this context, only be understood to mean the offspring of the parties resulting from the marriage.
Courts should not deny relief on a contract because of vagueness if the parties’ intent can be ascertained. See Goodyear v. Goodyear, 257 N.C. 374, 126 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962) (promise to buy wife “a new automobile” enforced). Here the Superior Court found that the clear intent of the parties was to provide for the education of their children and to apportion the costs according to the respective incomes of the parties. Faced with the limited dispute raised by the plaintiff’s unreimbursed expenditures, the trial court had little difficulty effectuating that purpose. I would affirm.