Court Opinion

ID: 9701849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:40:31.675063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:30.135895
License: Public Domain

*130HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
The Commonwealth, appellant in the instant case, raises only one contention, that “the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for a new trial where the search held illegal by the trial court merely provided information which accelerated appellee's inevitable arrest.” The Majority reverses the lower court’s order granting a new trial and remands for sentencing. I dissent.
Appellee was arrested in Philadelphia on May 25, 1975, and charged with rape1 and burglary.2 On October 31,1975, the lower court denied appellee’s pretrial motion to suppress a post-arrest statement. A jury found appellee guilty of both charges on November 7, 1975. Appellee subsequently filed post-verdict motions. On December 30,1975, the lower court denied appellee’s motion in arrest of judgment, but granted his motion for a new trial. After filing a Rule 1100(c) petition, Rule 1100, Pa.R.Crim.P., 19 P.S.Appendix,3 the Commonwealth filed the instant appeal.
I accept the Majority’s factual history of the instant case, but summarize briefly: first, the rape victim gave the police a sketchy description of her assailant; another woman in the apartment complex told the police that “John” from apartment A-6 had requested admittance into her apartment around the time of the rape; and an anonymous caller told the police that “John” who committed the rape, was then in apartment A-6. Second, based on that information, police attempted peaceful entry into apartment A-6, but when no one responded, they broke into the apartment. Once in the apartment, the police found a private phone directory which indicated appellee’s name and included a listing for appellee’s mother’s phone. Appellee’s mother responded to the police phone call and told them that her son was asleep in her apartment. Third, the police took appellee to Philadel*131phia’s West Detective Division where he waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement.4
The lower court granted appellee a new trial because it believed that the search of appellee’s apartment was illegal. Therefore, the court did not reach the issue of whether the police had probable cause to arrest the appellee prior to the illegal search. The search was illegal because it was conducted without a warrant; thus, the court did not have to decide the issue of probable cause. It concluded that the statement was the product of the illegal entry into the apartment.
The Majority concludes that the lower court erred in holding that the statement was the product of the illegal entry. As the Majority states, a Fourth Amendment violation is only the first step in determining whether evidence must be suppressed. The evidence need not be suppressed if obtained “by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). See also, Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 471 Pa. 577, 370 A.2d 1172 (1977); Betrand Appeal, 451 Pa. 381, 303 A.2d 486 (1973). The Court concludes that because the information discovered by the police in the apartment only hastened appellee’s arrest, it did not cause appellee to confess. See Leek v. Maryland, 353 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1965); Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 293 A.2d 33 (1972).
The Majority does not reach the more difficult question of whether the police had probable cause to arrest in the first instance. As his Statement of Questions indicates, appellee has raised that argument in his brief before this Court: “Did the Court err in granting the Appellee’s Motion for a new trial where the confession used to convict him was the consequence of an arrest that was not the result of probable cause or pursuant to an arrest warrant?”
*132Initially, we must be aware of two cornerstone principles of appellate review: (1) “On appeal, it is the judgment or order itself which is the subject of review, not the reasons given by the court below in support of its action.” Commonwealth v. Marks, 442 Pa. 208, 210, 275 A.2d 81, 82 (1971). Thus, “ . . .we may affirm the judgment of the lower court where it is correct on any legal ground or theory disclosed by the record, regardless of the reason or theory adopted by the trial court.” Lambert v. Pittsburgh Bridge and Iron Works, 227 Pa.Super. 50, 56, 323 A.2d 107, 110 (1974). See also, Commonwealth v. Whitehouse, 222 Pa.Super. 127, 292 A.2d 469 (1972) (opinion by WATKINS, J., now P. J.); 2 P.L.E. Appeals § 339. (2) In reviewing the record, we must read the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Ballinger v. Howell Mfg. Co., 407 Pa. 319, 180 A.2d 555 (1962); Lambert v. Pittsburgh Bridge and Iron Works, supra.
Those principles would apparently dictate that we address the issue of probable cause before we could reverse the lower court. If we were to conclude that the police lacked probable cause, we would then have to determine whether the illegal arrest (not the illegal search) would require suppression of appellee’s statement, thereby dictating the grant of a new trial and mandating that we affirm the lower court’s order.
However, the Majority holds that the issue of whether the police had probable cause at the time of the arrest is not properly before us because appellee’s pretrial application did not raise the specific ground that the police lacked probable cause to arrest. The Court relies on Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 464 Pa. 117, 124, 346 A.2d 48, 52 (1975), in finding that appellee has waived the claim now raised:
“Appellate Courts render a disservice to judicial economy and the efficient operation of our court system where they freely accept issues that could have and should have been first presented to the courts below for their consideration.
*133[S]uch a procedure . . . deprives the reviewing court of the benefit of the reasoning of the lower court on the issues at hand . . .. Where the parties below were not aware that a particular issue is being raised, it [is] quite likely that testimony germane to that issue would be overlooked or believed unnecessary and consequently not presented.” I am unpersuaded by the Court’s reliance on Mitchell: Mitchell held that a Futch5 claim could not be raised for the first time on appeal when the only issue raised below was whether the appellant’s confession was voluntary. It is obvious that the record developed at the pretrial hearing will be significantly different in each instance. Further, although there is some broad language in Mitchell, the Supreme Court has indicated that Mitchell is not intended to have the broad reach which the Majority urges. See Commonwealth v. Polof, 238 Pa.Super. 565, 362 A.2d 427 (1976), rev’d and remanded, 248 Pa. 26, 374 A.2d 1299 (1976). Finally, I believe that the interests underlying the waiver doctrine have been protected in the instant litigation: Strict application of that doctrine “ . . . ensures the making of a complete record in that testimony and other germane evidence on the issue will be received. An attorney’s diligent preparation is rewarded, and he is precluded from relying on an appellate court to bail out his poor performance at trial.” Commonwealth v. Polof, 238 Pa.Super. at 576, 362 A.2d at 433 (dissenting opinion by HOFFMAN, J.).
In the instant case, the Commonwealth was obviously on notice that the legality of appellee’s arrest was in issue. It had the burden of going forward with evidence at the suppression hearing. Reasonable preparation dictated that the Commonwealth present evidence which showed that it had acted legally. Further, a review of the suppression hearing in the instant case indicates that the Commonwealth did just that — it attempted to elicit a full account of the pre-arrest evidence gathered by the police.
*134Thus, I believe that we should reach the question concerning the legality of appellee’s arrest. Further, I think that the case law is clear that the Commonwealth lacked probable cause to arrest the appellee. See Commonwealth v. Garvin, supra; Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 239 Pa.Super. 175, 361 A.2d 724 (1975). Once we conclude that the arrest was illegal, there is no question that the statement would properly be suppressed. Commonwealth v. Barnett, 471 Pa. 34, 369 A.2d 1180 (1977); Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 461 Pa. 407, 336 A.2d 603 (1975); Commonwealth v. Cephas, 447 Pa. 500, 291 A.2d 106 (1972).
Therefore, I would affirm the order of the lower court.
CERCONE, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The Crimes Code, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1; 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121.

. The Crimes Code, supra; 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502.

. See Commonwealth v. O’Shea, 465 Pa. 491, 350 A.2d 872 (1976).

. Appellee attempted to exculpate himself by saying that he broke into the apartment to introduce himself to the victim and that she then consented to have intercourse.

. Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).