Court Opinion

ID: 9726155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:34:54.509677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.950220
License: Public Domain

HOPPER, Acting P. J.
I respectfully dissent.
On the scanty record before us I am not persuaded that there was substantial evidence in the words of the statute that “[T] he facts of the crime of which such parent. . . [was] convicted are of such nature as to prove the unfitness of [the father] to have the future custody and control of the child.” Nor do I believe the clear and convincing standard of proof required in Civil Code section 232 cases has been met. It may well be that if the proceedings had been reported that affirmance would be in order. As a reviewing court, without the benefit of a reporter’s transcript, we are simply unaware of the colloquy, if any, between court and counsel and the precise evidence which was presented, all of which would assist us in determining the appeal. Considering the present state of the record I am unable to affirm.
A conclusion of law that the father’s consent is not required because he has been convicted of a felony is not sufficient grounds under the *424statute to sever the parent-child relationship. More is required. The trial court must find not only the commission of a felony but that the felony is such as is described in Civil Code section 232, subdivision (a) (4). While there may have been compliance with Civil Code section 4600 in this case, there was no finding on the issue whether the facts of the crime were of such nature as to prove the father’s unfitness. Even if the various documents be construed to satisfy the requirement of such a finding, there remains the further issue whether there is substantial evidence to support such a finding. I submit there is far from substantial evidence to support such a finding in the instant case.
A careful reading of the record in this case really shows very little, if anything, other than that the father killed the mother. The determination as to whether the facts of a particular crime were of such nature as to prove the parent’s unfitness must be made on a case-by-case basis, even where the crime is murder. (See In re James M. (1976) 65 Cal. App.3d 254, 263-266 [135 Cal.Rptr. 222]; 4 Markey, Cal. Family Law Practice and Procedure (1978) § 71.13, p. 71-18.) If the Legislature had intended to include all killings within the statute, it could have easily said so. The Legislature did not so choose. Unlike the facts in Adoption of D. S. C. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 14 [155 Cal.Rptr. 406], where the trial judge reasonably inferred that the “defendant had a propensity to violent crime, that he did not hesitate to involve family members of a tender age in crime, that he would turn to crime in the future should he find difficulty in making a living, and that he might violate parole and thus place himself in jeopardy of being taken from his family and returned to prison” (id., at p. 25), although appellant’s crime has been violent, there is no showing whatsoever of any propensity to violent crime and there is no showing about involvement of family members of a tender age or that he would find difficulty in making a living or that he might violate parole. For all that the record shows the violence here may very well have been isolated in nature. Appellant’s crime is similar to that committed by the defendant in In re James M., supra, 65 Cal.App.3d 254, a murder case. As noted in the case at bar by the probation report filed before the sentencing of the appellant on the voluntary manslaughter charge to which he pled nolo contendere, “There is a strong possibility that the act was accidental. Additionally it does not appear that the [appellant] intentionally attempted to kill his wife.” The probation officer at sentencing concluded that the defendant did need help in controlling his alcoholic problem but that he should not be sent to prison but rather should spend time in custody in jail under a work furlough program and be placed on probation under suitable *425terms and conditions. While the sentencing judge did not follow the suggestion of the probation officer, from this record I cannot conclude one way or the other the reason the sentencing judge placed the appellant in prison. The record is just simply inadequate to show substantial evidence and to meet the clear and convincing standard of proof required in Civil Code section 232 actions.
The fundamental right of parentage is clearly established in this state (In re Carmaleta B. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 [146 Cal.Rptr. 623, 579 P.2d 514]). I recognize the change of custody of a child, particularly one of tender years such as Geoffrey, may be detrimental to the best interests of the child. I also agree that the record shows Geoffrey has been well cared for and deeply loved by the grandparents. Nevertheless, the parent-child relationship cannot be severed in the absence of a statute. The only statute relied upon here was Civil Code section 232, subdivision (a) (4), and as previously indicated the evidence is inadequate to meet the statutory requirements.
The law is also clear that the trial court may properly consider the past criminal activities in deciding whether a natural parent has rendered himself an unfit parent for the future by commission of a felony. (Adoption of D. S. C., supra, 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 26.) Thus, the court could properly consider the fact that the appellant had an arrest record for alcoholic offenses. However, the record which we do have also notes an eight-year period of nonarrests for alcohol related offenses. Nowhere is there even a scintilla of evidence that appellant (in an intoxicated condition or otherwise) ever abused the child (or any children). The trial court also referred to the fact that the appellant was not supporting Geoffrey and that Geoffrey was being supported by public welfare. The trial judge then found that all of those factors are indicative of serious personality flaws and emotional instability. It is not clear from this record as to whether the factors which the trial court felt were indicative of personality flaws and emotional instability such as failure to provide for the support of his child are being used to find that the facts of the crime came within Civil Code section 232, subdivision (a) (4). I do not believe that the fact the child was on welfare and was not supported by appellant has any bearing whatsoever on whether the facts of appellant’s crime fall within the statute. The fact of child support through welfare and the facts of this particular crime are simply unconnected in any way. In sum, there was simply insufficient evidence in the trial court to show that the statute applied insofar as the facts of the crime *426are concerned. Consequently, the judgment should be reversed with directions to conduct a further hearing at which a reporter would be present.
In addition, I note that at the hearing the child was not represented by counsel. In In re Richard E. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 349, 354 [146 Cal.Rptr. 604, 579 P.2d 495], the California Supreme Court held that “appointment of counsel is.. .required in the absence of an affirmative showing the minor’s interests would otherwise be protected.. . . [I]n absence of a showing on the issue of the need for independent counsel for a minor, failure to appoint constitutes error.” Richard E. tells us (id., at p. 355) that when there is no showing on the issue of the need for separate counsel there is no basis upon which the court could exercise its discretion not to appoint counsel. Pursuant to Richard E. separate counsel should be appointed at the commencement of proceedings absent an immediate showing upon which the court can exercise its discretion against making an appointment.
There is no showing in the record in the instant case on the issue of separate counsel for the child. Accordingly, failure to appoint separate counsel for Geoffrey constituted error. Under Richard E. failure to appoint counsel for a minor in a freedom from parental custody and control proceeding does not require reversal in the absence of a miscarriage of justice. Where, as here, emotions are high on both sides, the appointed counsel conceivably might have presented testimony favorable to severance or nonseverance and assisted the court. I have some difficulty in understanding how the record in the ordinary case would ever show what independent counsel might have done for a minor (see In re Jacqueline H. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 808, 814 [156 Cal.Rptr. 765]), but in any event I would interpret the language and holding in Richard E., supra, page 355 of 21 Cal.3d, that “There is nothing in the record of the instant proceeding suggesting the minor was prejudiced because he was not represented by independent counsel.. . . [11] The record discloses and [appellant] suggests nothing which independent counsel for the minor might have done to better protect [the child’s] interests” to be referring to a case where the proceedings have been fully reported. Since there was no reporter in this case I believe that reversal is compelled. (Cf. In re Mary B. (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 816, 820-821 [98 Cal.Rptr. 178].) No explanation has been offered for there not having been a reporter present in this case except reference to it not being the custom in the county unless requested. While I sympathize *427with reducing costs of government, it is certainly penny-wise and pound-foolish to not have a reporter in cases of this nature. The fact that no one raised the issue of a reporter at the trial level should not deter our consideration thereof as a matter of simple justice.
A minor in juvenile court is statutorily entitled to have the proceedings reported. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 677; see In re Steven B. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 1, 8 [157 Cal. Rptr. 510, 598 P.2d 480].) Interested parties to a termination of parental custody should likewise be so entitled and deserve no less. When the court orders parental custody terminated under Civil Code section 232, the trial court should advise the parent of the right to appeal and to a free transcript, if indigent (In re Jacqueline H. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 170, 179 [145 Cal.Rptr. 548, 577 P.2d 683]). Such advice is valueless if there was no court reporter. Termination of parental custody severs all legal relationship between the parent and child. Such a proceeding is simply too important to a parent, the child, others interested in the welfare of the child and society in general to allow such a proceeding without the matter being reported.
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial court to appoint counsel for the minor and to conduct a hearing at which the proceedings are fully reported and resolve the issue of whether the facts of the crime of which appellant was convicted are of such nature as to prove the unfitness of appellant to have the future custody and control of the child, and make appropriate findings thereon.