Court Opinion

ID: 9486648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:55:02.894007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:50.884043
License: Public Domain

ROVNER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the court’s holding as to the 1811 positions. I am concerned about the government’s reliance on Dr. Morrissey’s letter to establish that Mr. Fedro posed a danger to others (see R. 146 at 31, 51-52, 54, 60, 62), given Dr. Morrissey’s subsequent testimony qualifying the opinion set forth in his letter. R. 145 at 19-21, 24. The government’s failure to present expert testimony of its own on this point is all the more troubling in view of the apparent position of the Office of Personnel Management and the physicians it consulted that any risk of infection Mr. Fedro posed to others was slight. R. 81 at 26-29, 33.1 I agree nonetheless that Mr. Fedro failed to establish an appropriate evi-dentiary basis for the admission of Mr. Ne-ville’s testimony on this point, and without it the record is not so one-sided that we may disturb the jury’s verdict."
I cannot, however, join the majority in holding as a matter of law that the government had no duty to find a new position for an employee who, like Mr. Fedro, became unable to perform the essential functions of his former position due to a disability. Given the broad obligations imposed on federal employers by the terms of the Rehabilitation Act as well as the implementing regulations, I believe it was incumbent upon the Marshal’s Service to at least consider reassigning Mr. Fedro to a different position as a reasonable accommodation.
The majority proceeds from the premise that “[w]hen Mr. Fedro’s request for placement in a full-time 1810 position was denied, the law provided that ‘reasonable accommodation’ generally did not include transfer or reassignment to a different position when an employee was no longer capable of performing the essential functions of his or her old job.” Ante at 1395 (emphasis in original). The majority cites School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n. 19, 107 *1398S.Ct. 1123, 1131 n. 19, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987), as support for this proposition, together with a number of appellate decisions which have construed Arline similarly. Ante at 1395. Arline did state in dicta that “[employers] are not required to find another job for an employee who is not qualified for the job he or she was doing_” 480 U.S. at 289 n. 19, 107 S.Ct. at 1131 n. 19. But I believe it incorrect to extract from Arline a rule that federal employers need not consider reassignment to a different position. The plaintiff in Arline was a state employee who filed suit under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a provision that is noticeably lacking in the affirmative obligations imposed on federal employers. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410-11, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2369, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979). In contrast, Mr. Fedro is a federal employee who has sued under a separate section of the Act that affords him substantially greater rights.
Under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, federal agencies owe their disabled employees more than a simple duty of nondiscrimination; they bear an affirmative obligation to meet the special needs of disabled employees and thus to broaden their employment opportunities. See 29 U.S.C. § 791(b); Davis, 442 U.S. at 410-11, 99 S.Ct. at 2369; Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1194, 1196 (7th Cir.1992); Hall v. United States Postal Service, 857 F.2d 1073, 1077, 1080 (6th Cir.1988); Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir.1985); Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1277-78, 1280 (8th Cir.1985); Shirrey v. Devine, 670 F.2d 1188, 1201 (D.C.Cir.1982); Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 301-02, 306 (5th Cir.1981). Indeed, Congress expected the federal government to “become a model employer of handicapped individuals.” 29 C.F.R. § 1613.-703 (1989).2 Noting the greater burden that section 501 imposes on federal employers, the Supreme Court has recognized that, in contrast to other employers, federal agencies may be required to make changes that are “substantial” or that require “fundamental alteration” in order to accommodate the disabled. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 n. 20, 105 S.Ct. 712, 720 n. 20, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985) (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 410, 411 n. 10, 413, 99 S.Ct. 2369, 2369-70 n. 10, 2370).3 We must therefore take care to avoid rote application of the cases interpreting section 504 when it is a federal agency rather than a state or private employer being sued. See Kathryn W. Tate, Thé Federal Employer’s Duties Under the Rehabilitation Act: Does Reasonable Accommodation or Affirmative Action Include Reassignment?, 67 Texas L.Rev. 781, 800-02, 836 (1989); see also Jeffrey O. Cooper, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans With Disabilities Act, 139 U.PaL.Rev. 1423, 1438-40 (1991).
In view of the broad mandate federal employers have been given to set an example in the employment of disabled individuals, the majority's narrow construction of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation is unwarranted. The regulation in effect at the time Mr. Fedro sought re-employment provided that “[reasonable accommodation may include, but shall not be limited to: ... (2) *1399[j]ob restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modification of examinations, the provision of readers and interpreters, and other similar actions.” 29 C.F.R. § 1613.-704(b) (1989). As the majority acknowledges, the regulation has since been modified to expressly include reassignment within its scope. Ante at 1896, n. 5.4 But nothing in the prior regulation rules out reassignment to a different position; indeed, that option is in perfect company with the alternatives of restructuring and. part-time work that are expressly mentioned in that regulation. As the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has pointed out, “It may well be the case that reassignment is eminently more reasonable and less onerous from an agency’s perspective than job restructuring or any other action that is specifically listed in § 1613.704(b).” Ignacio v. United States Postal Service, Pet. No. 03840005, Fed.Equal Opportunity Rptr. ¶ 843159, at XII-84-264 (EEOC Sept. 4, 1984);5 see also Rhone v. United States Dep’t of Army, 665 F.Supp. 734, 744-45 (E.D.Mo.1987); Tate, The Federal Employer’s Duties Under the Rehabilitation Act, 67 Texas L.Rev. at 820-21.
The majority’s holding thus brings us into direct conflict with the EEOC, which, in construing the same version of the regulation that we apply today, held that reassignment is among the options that a federal employer must consider to accommodate a disabled employee:
The Commission ... finds that the list provided in [§ 1613.704(b)] includes the enumerated suggestions as illustrative “but shall not be limited” to this itemization. The Commission also finds the reasonable accommodation must be a logical adjustment made to a job and/or work environment that enables a qualified handicapped person to perform.... As such, the list of possible means of accommodation is infinite and can only be determined on a case-by-case basis!
Additionally, it is important to consider both the legislative history and Congressional mandates of the Rehabilitation Act on [f]ederal agencies. The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act shows that Congress expected and fully intended that the [federal government was to be a model employer of the handicapped, -taking affirmative action to hire and promote the disabled. S.Rep. No. 93-318, 93d Cong.,2d Sess., at 49 (1973), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1973, p. 2076. See also, 29 *1400C.F.R. § 1613.703. The Rehabilitation Act requires all government agencies of the executive branch and the Postal Service to establish comprehensive affirmative action plans for hiring, placing, and advancing handicapped individuals. ([EJmphasis added). By the 1978 amendments to the Act, Congress made it clear that non-discrimination against the handicapped was an “obligation” on the part of the [federal government, not a “gratuity.” Shirey v. Devine, 670 F.2d 1188 (D.C.Cir.1982)....
Considering the construction of § 1613.-702(f) and § 1613.704(b), as well as the relevant legislative background and resulting case law, the Commission concludes that our regulations are to be read consistently and broadly with the intended purpose of providing equal opportunities for handicapped individuals....
Reassignment as a means of reasonable accommodation is consistent with the ease law. The Rehabilitation Act “impose[s] a duty upon federal agencies to structure their procedures and programs so as to ensure that handicapped individuals are afforded equal opportunity in both job assignment and promotion.” Ryan v. F.D.I.C., 565 F.2d 762 (D.C.Cir.1977). In another case, the same court found that the federal employer failed to make adequate affirmative reassignment efforts for a handicapped employee. Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265 (D.C.Cir.1977) (emphasis added). The obligation of the federal employer is not merely the employment of a handicapped person but an appropriate placement of such an employee. In other words, the federal employer has a continuing obligation to the handicapped employee after hiring him.
... [T]he Commission’s decisions have [also] consistently held that reassignment is a means of reasonably accommodating handicapped individuals. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to excluding from consideration what might be the easiest, least costly, and most reasonable accommodation a federal employer could provide.
Ignacio, Fed.Equal Opportunity Rptr. ¶ 843159, at XII-4-264-65. Accord Ellis v. United States Postal Service, 37 M.S.P.R. 503, 508-09 (M.S.P.B.1988). See also United States Office of Personnel Management, Handbook on Reasonable Accommodation, OPM Doc. 720-A, at 10 (March 1980) (listing reassignment and retraining as possibilities to be considered when an employee becomes disabled); Rhone, 665 F.Supp. at 743-44. Surprisingly, few courts have acknowledged the EEOC’s position, and those that have done so have tended to pay it little heed. See, e.g., Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 468 (4th Cir.1987) (collecting eases); Black v. Frank, 730 F.Supp. 1087, 1091 (S.D.Ala.1990); Dancy v. Kline, 639 F.Supp. 1076, 1079, 1080-81 (N.D.Ill.1986); but see Coley v. Secretary of Army, 689 F.Supp. 519, 522-23 (D.Md.1987); Rhone, 665 F.Supp. at 744-45. Yet, in view of the fact that the Commission is charged with enforcing both the regulation and section 501, its interpretation is entitled to substantial deference. E.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1046, 1060, 117 L.Ed.2d 239 (1992); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Hanson v. Espy, 8 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir.1993).
I am also not persuaded that converting one or more of the part-time 1810 positions into a full-time position is an accommodation unrelated to Mr. Fedro’s disability and thus beyond the relief available to him under the Rehabilitation Act. See ante at 1396. Certainly it is true, as the majority points out, that Mr. Fedro is physically capable of working part-time, and in that sense the creation of a full-time position is not in and of itself necessary to accommodate his disability. Id. But to whatever extent the majority’s distinction between accommodations necessitated by the employee’s disability and those due solely to the employee’s personal preferences may be valid iii other contexts, it should not be dispositive here. Of course Mr. Fedro wishes to work full-time. His former position was, after all, full-time; indeed, he would willingly return to that very position but for his employer’s determination that his seropo-sitivity for hepatitis-B poses too much of a risk to others. Naturally, in seeking reassignment, he prefers another full-time job. And “prefers” may be putting it too mildly. In the real world, few among us can afford to *1401work part-time; fewer still can afford to move half way across the country for a part-time position. Thus, it is understandable that Mr. Fedro turned down the one part-time 1810 position in Virginia that he was offered. Viewed in a practical context, his proposal to create a full-time 1810 position is simply an effort to find a position equivalent to the one he was forced to give up due to his disability.
Recalling once again the federal employer’s affirmative obligation to expand the employment opportunities available to its disabled employees, I believe Mr. Fedro’s request is in keeping with both the letter and the spirit of the Rehabilitation Act. The regulation (in both its prior and current form) identifies both job restructuring and the creation of part-time positions as examples of reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(b)(2) (1989); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(c)(2)(n) (1993). Creating a full-time position from existing part-time positions is in keeping with these examples. No doubt there are significant ramifications to the creation of a full-time position, but are they different in kind from those which attend making a full-time position part-time (which in turn creates another part-time position that someone else must fill) or restructuring a particular position (which will require redistribution of job responsibilities among other employees)? The record does not in any way suggest that they are; on the contrary, what information we have about the proffered testimony of Mr. Weigert and Ms. McWhirter on this point suggests that there is no structural reason why the part-time 1810 positions could not be consolidated into a full-time slot, and that the Marshal’s Service has simply never explored the feasibility of doing so. R. 60 at 10-11,14, 23; R. 146 at 29.6 Ultimately, we can only speculate on that question, because the district court did not permit Mr. Fedro to take discovery or present evidence on this point.7 I believe he should at least have been permitted that opportunity.
The unfortunate result of this case is that someone who is able and willing to return to work cannot. In refusing even to explore the possibility of fashioning a full-time position for Mr. Fedro from the existing part-time positions, the government has not, I fear, been the model employer of the disabled that the statute requires it to be. Nor am I sure that we have done justice to the aspirations of the Rehabilitation Act in relieving the government of any obligation to consider this possibility and precluding Mr. Fedro from attempting to prove its feasibility. See Tate, The Federal Employer’s Duties Under the Rehabilitation Act, 67 Texas L.Rev. at 808 (“[W]hen a court concludes that the plaintiff is not entitled to accommodation without requiring the employer to demonstrate how accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the agency, it is unclear whether it has accorded the plaintiff his rights under the Act.”) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 804-06. With respect, I must therefore dissent from this portion of the court’s opinion.

. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir.1985), which explains that the determination of whether the employment of a disabled individual would pose an unacceptable risk of harm requires the employer to "gather all relevant information regarding the applicant's work history and medical history, and independently assess both the probability and severity of potential injury.” The court went on to caution that “[t]he application of this standard requires a strong factual foundation in order to establish that an applicant’s handicap precludes safe employment.” Id. (emphasis supplied); see also id. at 1425 (concurring opinion).

. See also 124 Cong.Rec. 30347 (Sept. 20, 1978) (statement of Sen. Cranston) ("The legislative history of ... section 501 illustrates that with respect to the employment of handicapped individuals, Congress expected [that] the Federal Government should be a leader.”).

. In keeping with the government's unique obligation to the disabled, section 505(a)(1) of the Rehabilitation Act authorizes a court to "fashion[ ] an equitable or affirmative action remedyL] ... tak[ing] into account the reasonableness of the cost of any necessary work place accommodation, and the availability of alternatives therefor or other appropriate relief in order to achieve an equitable and appropriate remedy.” 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(l). See Kathryn W, Tate, The Federal Employer’s Duties Under the Rehabilitation Act: Does Reasonable Accommodation or Affirmative Action Include Reassignment?, 67 Texas L.Rev. 781, 812-13 (1989) ("The statute invites a court considering a remedy to choose from among various options and allows it to use the cost of accommodation as one component in that choice. The statute does not direct a court to deny a remedy simply because the court views accommodation as too costly. By calling for 'an equitable and appropriate remedy' at one point and for 'an equitable or affirmative action remedy’ at another, section 505(a)(1) anticipates that a court will sometimes need to search for a remedy beyond mere accommodation.”) (footnotes omitted).

. As the majority points out, under the new regulation, the requirement that an agency "shall offer to reassign the individual to a funded vacant position” extends only to positions "located in the same commuting area.” Ante at 1395 n. 5. However, 1 am not as confident as the majority that this limitation would necessarily relieve the Marshal's Service of any obligation to consider Mr. Fedro for positions beyond the commuting area of his current residence in Wisconsin. See id.
The Marshal's Service has apparently considered Mr. Fedro for positions outside of his commuting area as a matter of routine procedure (R. 146 at 9-10), and as the majority acknowledges, an employer “ ‘cannot deny an employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably available under the employer's existing policy.'" Ante at 1395, quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at 289 n. 19, 107 S.Ct. at 1131 n. 19. Thus, if an agency routinely considers reassignment opportunities beyond the immediate commuting area for employees who for any reason can no longer remain in their current job or location, then it would seem obligated to do the same for an employee who becomes disabled. Indeed, the commentary accompanying the new regulation makes clear that although an agency must actually reassign a disabled employee only when the conditions of the regulation are met, it bears an obligation to at least consider reassignment even when they are not. See 57 Fed.Reg. 12634, 12637-38 (1992). In other words, the agency’s absolute duty to reassign the employee to a vacant funded position within the same commuting area does not rule out an obligation to reassign the employee to another position outside of that area, so long as it as reasonably feasible.

. The decision of the EEOC was affirmed by a special panel of the Merit Systems Protection Board that was created to resolve disputes emanating from the overlapping jurisdictions of the EEOC and the MSPB. Ignacio v. United States Postal Service, 30 M.S.P.R. 471 (M.S.P.B. Special Panel 1986). See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(d)(6)(A). "Since the Ignacio special panel decision, the MSPB has regularly remanded cases for reconsideration of the availability of 'accommodation when the presiding official has not ascertained whether the employer has considered reassignment." Tate, The Federal Employer’s Duties Under the Rehabilitation Act, 67 Texas L.Rev. at 841 n. 305 (collecting cases).

. Because all that Mr. Fedro proposes is to restructure the 1810 positions already in existence so as to create a full-time position, he is not asking his employer to invent a wholly new job just for him, a measure that I agree might exceed the government’s obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. See ante at 1395; Rhone, 665 F.Supp. at 746 n. 22.

. The district court suggested that the Marshal’s Service may wish to staff all 1810 positions on a part-time basis in order to avoid an obligation to pay benefits that would accrue to full-time employees, thereby saving tax dollars. R. 145 at 31. The irony, of course, is that whatever it might cost the government to make an 1810 position full-time, it is almost certainly less than the worker's compensation benefits Mr. Fedro receives (seventy-five percent of his former salary) while he awaits reemployment. See ante at 1396.