Court Opinion

ID: 9948953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 15:15:16.893439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:25.112276
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 1, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                          TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-0368-MR

BLAKE P. WALKER                                                      APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM ADAIR CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE DAVID L. WILLIAMS, SPECIAL JUDGE
                     ACTION NO. 03-CR-00008

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                 APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Blake Walker has appealed from the order of the Adair

Circuit Court denying his application to vacate and expunge his felony conviction

for the murder of his parents after he received a commutation and full

gubernatorial pardon of his life sentence in 2019. We affirm.

            For the factual and procedural background of the underlying criminal

action, we shall rely upon this Court’s 2008 opinion in Walker’s post-conviction
appeals affirming the orders denying his Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)

60.02 and Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motions:

                        When Walker was sixteen years old he shot and
                 killed his mother and father. His case was transferred
                 from juvenile court and he was indicted as an adult. The
                 Commonwealth gave notice that it intended to seek the
                 death penalty. Walker’s counsel then filed numerous
                 motions to preclude the death penalty due to his age, as
                 being in violation of the Kentucky and United States
                 Constitution, as being in violation of international law,
                 and as being disproportionate based upon the specific
                 facts of this case. . . . Following a hearing the trial court
                 denied Walker’s motions relative to the death penalty.
                 Within weeks of this hearing the Commonwealth made a
                 plea offer to Walker which he accepted. On July 10,
                 2003, Walker, based on the advice of counsel and
                 following a thorough Boykin[1] colloquy, pleaded guilty
                 to two counts of murder. He was formally sentenced on
                 August 26, 2003, to life without the possibility of parole
                 for twenty-five years.

Walker v. Commonwealth, Nos. 2006-CA-001247-MR and 2006-CA-002074-MR,

2008 WL 1991612, at *1 (Ky. App. May 9, 2008).

                 On December 6, 2019, then-Governor Bevin commuted Walker’s life

sentence and, without a request to do so, granted him a full and unconditional

pardon, thereby returning to him all rights and privileges of a citizen of the

Commonwealth.

1
    Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969).

                                                -2-
              In July 2020, Walker filed an application to vacate and expunge his

felony convictions pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 431.073 based

upon the full pardon. The Commonwealth objected due to the serious nature of the

charges, which, it stated, involved the execution-style murder of his parents. The

circuit court held a hearing via Zoom on December 18, 2020, where it heard

testimony from Walker, his uncle, his employer, his therapist, and law enforcement

officers involved with the murder investigation. Thereafter, the court ordered the

parties to brief the issue of the statutory requirement for granting expungement

when a full pardon has been granted. In his filing, Walker argued that

expungement was mandatory as long as he met the eligibility requirements and his

application was not grossly incomplete (KRS 431.073(2)) and that the circuit court

was not permitted to apply a balancing test because his felony conviction had been

fully pardoned. In response, the Commonwealth disputed Walker’s argument that

expungement was mandatory, noting the use of the permissive word “may” in KRS

431.073(5) (“The court may order the judgment vacated[.]”). And it pointed out

that while the court was not required to consider the various factors found in KRS

431.073(4)(a), the court was not prohibited from doing so when exercising its

discretion.

              The court held a second Zoom hearing on October 13, 2021, during

which the parties presented their respective legal arguments. Ultimately, the court

                                         -3-
concluded expungement was in its sound discretion and, by order entered March 4,

2022, the circuit court denied Walker’s application. This appeal now follows.

                 Our first consideration is whether the circuit court properly interpreted

KRS 431.073 in concluding that whether to grant the application based on a full

pardon was within its discretion and in using the statutory factors for applications

filed under KRS 431.073(1)(d):

                        It is well-established that interpretation of a statute
                 presents an issue of law for the Court, and our review
                 proceeds de novo. Spencer Cty. Pres., Inc. v. Beacon
                 Hill, LLC, 214 S.W.3d 327, 329 (Ky. App. 2007). When
                 interpreting an ambiguous statute, “[o]ur duty . . . is to
                 ascertain and give effect to the intent of the general
                 assembly.” Id. at 329. In so doing, words are to be
                 afforded their ordinary or plain meaning unless same
                 would lead to an absurd result. Cosby v. Commonwealth,
                 147 S.W.3d 56, 59 (Ky. 2004); Ky. Occupational Safety
                 and Health Review Comm’n v. Estill Cty. Fiscal Court,
                 503 S.W.3d 924, 929 (Ky. 2016). And, a statute is to be
                 interpreted by considering it as a whole. Cosby, 147
                 S.W.3d at 58. Our review proceeds accordingly.

Commonwealth v. Hampton, 618 S.W.3d 511, 512 (Ky. App. 2021).

                 We shall first set out the applicable portions of the 2019 version of

KRS 431.073 in effect when Walker filed his petition:2

                 (1) Any person who has been:

                         (a) Convicted of a Class D felony violation
                         of [list of statutes omitted];

2
    The latest version went into effect on June 29, 2023.

                                                  -4-
      (b) Convicted of a series of Class D felony
      violations of one (1) or more statutes
      enumerated in subsection (1)(a) of this
      section arising from a single incident;

      (c) Granted a full pardon; or

      (d) Convicted of a Class D felony, or an
      offense prior to January 1, 1975 which was
      punishable by not more than five (5) years’
      incarceration, which was not a violation of
      KRS 189A.010, 508.032, or 519.055, abuse
      of public office, a sex offense, or an offense
      committed against a child, and did not result
      in serious bodily injury or death; or of a
      series of felony offenses eligible under this
      paragraph;

may file with the court in which he or she was convicted
an application to have the judgment vacated. The
application shall be filed as a motion in the original
criminal case. The person shall be informed of the right
at the time of adjudication.

(2) (a) A verified application to have the
     judgment vacated under this section shall be
     filed no sooner than five (5) years after the
     completion of the person’s sentence, or five
     (5) years after the successful completion of
     the person’s probation or parole, whichever
     occurs later.

      (b) Upon the payment of the filing fee and
      the filing of the application, the Circuit
      Court clerk shall serve a notice of filing
      upon the office of the Commonwealth’s
      attorney or county attorney that prosecuted
      the case and the county attorney of the
      county where the judgment was entered.
      The office of the Commonwealth’s attorney

                           -5-
      or county attorney that prosecuted the case
      shall file a response within sixty (60) days
      after being served with the notice of filing.
      That time period may be extended for good
      cause, but the hearing on the application to
      vacate the judgment shall occur no later than
      one hundred twenty (120) days following
      the filing of the application. The inability to
      determine the location of the crime victim
      shall constitute good cause for an extension
      of time. No hearing upon the merits of the
      application shall be scheduled until the
      Commonwealth’s response has been filed, or
      if no response is received, no later than one
      hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of
      the application.

      (c) In any case in which the Commonwealth
      objects that the application is grossly
      incomplete, the court shall order the person
      or agency originating the application to
      supplement the application.

(3) Upon the filing of the Commonwealth’s response to
an application, or if no response is received, no later than
one hundred twenty (120) days after the filing of the
application, the court shall set a date for a hearing and the
Circuit Court clerk shall notify the office of the
Commonwealth’s attorney or county attorney that
prosecuted the case. The office of the Commonwealth’s
attorney or county attorney that prosecuted the case shall
notify the victim of the crime, if there was an identified
victim. The Commonwealth’s attorney or county
attorney shall be authorized to obtain without payment of
any fee information from the Transportation Cabinet
regarding the crime victim’s address on file regarding
any vehicle operator’s license issued to that person.

(4)   (a) In an application pursuant to subsection

                             -6-
(1)(d) of this section, upon the filing of the
Commonwealth’s response objecting to the
vacating of a judgment and expungement of
a record, the court shall schedule a hearing
within one hundred twenty (120) days of the
Commonwealth’s response. The prosecutor
shall specify in the objection the reasons for
believing a denial of the application is
justified. At the hearing at which the
applicant or his or her attorney must be
present, the applicant must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that:

      1. Vacating the judgment and
      expunging the record is
      consistent with the welfare and
      safety of the public;

      2. The action is supported by
      his or her behavior since the
      conviction or convictions, as
      evidenced that he or she has
      been active in rehabilitative
      activities in prison and is living
      a law-abiding life since release;

      3. The vacation and
      expungement is warranted by
      the interests of justice; and

      4. Any other matter deemed
      appropriate or necessary by the
      court to make a determination
      regarding the petition for
      expungement is met.

(b) At the hearing, the applicant may testify
as to the specific adverse consequences he
or she may be subject to if the application is
denied. The court may hear testimony of

                     -7-
      witnesses and any other matter the court
      deems proper and relevant to its
      determination regarding the application.
      The Commonwealth may present proof of
      any extraordinary circumstances that exist to
      deny the application. A victim of any
      offense listed in the application shall have
      an opportunity to be heard at any hearing
      held under this section.

      (c) If the court determines that
      circumstances warrant vacation and
      expungement and that the harm otherwise
      resulting to the applicant clearly outweighs
      the public interest in the criminal history
      record information being publicly available,
      then the original conviction or convictions
      shall be vacated and the records shall be
      expunged. The order of expungement shall
      not preclude a prosecutor’s office from
      retaining a nonpublic record for law
      enforcement purposes only.

(5) The court may order the judgment vacated, and if the
judgment is vacated the court shall dismiss with
prejudice any charges which are eligible for
expungement under subsection (1) of this section or KRS
431.076 or 431.078, and, upon full payment of the fee in
subsection (11) of this section, order expunged all
records in the custody of the court and any records in the
custody of any other agency or official, including law
enforcement records, if the court finds that:

      (a) The person had not, after [June 27,
      2019], had a felony conviction vacated and
      the record expunged pursuant to this section;

      (b) The person had not in the five (5) years
      prior to the filing of the application to have

                            -8-
                    the judgment vacated been convicted of a
                    felony or a misdemeanor;

                    (c) No proceeding concerning a felony or
                    misdemeanor is pending or being instituted
                    against the person; and

                    (d) For an application pursuant to subsection
                    (1)(d) of this section, the person has been
                    rehabilitated and poses no significant threat
                    of recidivism.

             In the present case, the circuit court recognized that Walker filed his

motion under KRS 431.073(1)(c), meaning that KRS 431.073(4)(a) did not apply

to him as that subsection only pertained to applications filed under KRS

431.073(1)(d). This Court addressed the interplay of these subsections in

Hampton, 618 S.W.3d at 514, noting that the additional requirements found in

KRS 431.073(4) “are stricter than the requirements for individuals seeking

expungement under KRS 431.073(1)(a)-(c)” and that “a more expansive class of

individuals would be eligible to apply for expungement under KRS

431.073(1)(d).” Here, despite being stricter requirements, the circuit court opted to

consider these factors, stating:

                    None of these findings are required, however,
             according to the plain language of the statute, when the
             person applying for expungement has been granted an
             unconditional pardon. Because there is no explicit
             statutory standard other than what is stated above, this
             Court has elected to use the provisions of KRS
             431.07[3](4) as guidelines in evaluating this request,
             even though their application is not mandated. It is

                                         -9-
             important to point out that nothing in KRS 431.073
             prohibits this Court from considering such factors when
             exercising its discretion in ruling on the expungement.
             Such factors would seem to be important to the Court in
             considering a petition for expungement and in exercising
             the Court’s discretion in issuing a ruling on an
             expungement petition.

             Walker argues that the General Assembly intended expungement to be

a pro forma process for applications made under KRS 431.073(1)(a)-(c) and that

the circuit court violated the separation of powers doctrine by considering the

factors in KRS 431.073(4). We disagree with both arguments. KRS 431.073(5)

provides that the circuit court “may order the judgment vacated,” indicating the

permissive nature of the decision rather than a mandatory one based upon the

general statutory definitions set forth in KRS 446.010. Subsection (26) defines the

word “may” as permissive while subsection (39) defines “shall” as mandatory. See

also Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 171, 136 S. Ct.

1969, 1977, 195 L. Ed. 2d 334 (2016) (“Unlike the word ‘may,’ which implies

discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement.”). The General

Assembly would not have used discretionary language if it had intended the

process to be pro forma.

             As to the separation of powers argument, while the statute requires a

court to consider the factors in applications filed under KRS 431.073(1)(d),

addressing Class D felony convictions, nowhere does it prohibit a court from

                                        -10-
considering those or any other factors when exercising its discretion under the

other three subsections. The circuit court did not amend or rewrite the statute in

choosing to consider these factors, and it did so solely to provide a basis for its

decision. And, in our view, these are exactly the type of factors a court would

want to consider in exercising its discretion as they broadly address the protection

of the general public, the interests of justice, and the applicant’s behavior post-

conviction. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not commit any error in its

interpretation of KRS 431.073 or in its consideration of the criteria for applications

filed under KRS 431.073(1)(d).

             For our second consideration, and based upon our holding above, we

must now determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying

Walker’s application. “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s

decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). We find

no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s decision.

             The circuit court weighed the evidence presented in the application

and at the hearing, and it appropriately considered the KRS 431.073(4)(a) factors

in exercising its discretion as well as the balancing test set forth in KRS

431.073(4)(c) (“the harm otherwise resulting to the applicant clearly outweighs the

                                         -11-
public interest in the criminal history record information being publicly

available”):

                      This Court is in agreement with Walker that his
               behavior since the convictions [has] shown him to be
               nothing other than a law-abiding citizen. However, this
               Court has more serious concerns regarding whether
               vacating the judgment and expunging the record is
               consistent with the welfare and safety of the public and
               the interests of justice. Walker was convicted of felony
               Murder of both of his parents. Although these[] felonies
               are eligible for expungement pursuant to KRS
               431.073(1)(c), this Court believes the seriousness of the
               offenses would not justify expungement from [] Walker’s
               record. Expungement is not warranted by the interests of
               justice in this case. Although pardoned, Walker was
               convicted of very serious crimes. Any harm to him by
               having these convictions on his record does not outweigh
               the public interest in the criminal history record being
               publicly available.

We recognize that the circuit court could very well have reached the opposite

conclusion and given greater weight to Walker’s good behavior since his

conviction and, later, his pardon. However, it chose to give greater weight to the

seriousness of Walker’s crime, and it determined that the public had a greater

interest in having access to his criminal record. We find no abuse of discretion.

               For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Adair Circuit Court

denying Walker’s application for expungement is affirmed.

               ALL CONCUR.

                                          -12-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

J. Vincent Aprile II      Daniel Cameron
Louisville, Kentucky      Attorney General of Kentucky

                          Kristin L. Conder
                          Assistant Attorney General
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                        -13-