Court Opinion

ID: 9655896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:24:43.829539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:23.057619
License: Public Domain

Newton, District Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion entered in this cause. I am in agreement with the statement of facts set forth in the majority opinion but not with the conclusions of fact and applicable law drawn therefrom.
The undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff’s tractor stalled on the highway due to a jamming of the gears; and that plaintiff lost no time in attempting to make repairs. Under such circumstances no negligence could be attributed to him due to stopping on the highway. The primary issue in this case as shown by the pleadings and the evidence was the question of visibility of plaintiff’s unlighted vehicle. I am in agreement with the following statement found in the majority opinion: “The evidence relating to whether or not the accident happened before or after a half hour after sunset, the extent of the darkness, and the extent of visibility on the highway was conflicting.” The record also shows and it necessarily follows that the evidence' regarding discerní - bility of the unlighted farm equipment on the highway was also conflicting. Under such circumstances a jury *140question on this issue was definitely presented, and it being the determining issue in the case it would appear that the court must necessarily instruct thereon. The majority opinion states the general rule that: “Generally it is negligence, as a matter of law, for a motorist to drive so- fast on a highway at night that he cannot stop in time to avoid collision with an object within the area lighted by his headlights.” It further states that: “Where the general rule does not apply as a matter of law, the determination of negligence is for the jury * * I agree with these statements, but I emphatically dissent from the statement that in this case “the exception involving visibility of the object clearly applied rather than the general rule.” After conceding that the evidence on the factors affecting visibility of the object were conflicting, the majority opinion apparently arrives at the conclusion that the evidence justifies a finding as a matter of law that the general rule did not apply. The conclusion so arrived at is clearly contradictory of the facts conceded to have been established, and apparently this is the basis for the statement contained in the majority opinion to the effect that it is not error to refuse a requested instruction if the legal principles therein announced are either incorrectly stated or inapplicable to the issues involved. Obviously the majority opinion bases this statement on a conclusion that the facts concededly contradictory did not present a jury question regarding the visibility of plaintiff’s unlighted vehicle, and cites in justification thereof certain statements of two witnesses, while completely disregarding other contradictory testimony. In other words on the basis of the findings set forth in the majority opinion no jury question was presented, but a verdict should have been directed against the plaintiff as a matter of law, again notwithstanding that it is conceded that the facts involving visibility were contradictory.
The instruction requested by plaintiff on the general rule correctly stated the legal proposition involved, and, *141if as pointed out, the evidence was sufficient to present an issue on the question it should have been given. Again I point out that this question of “visibility” was the determining issue in this case. The mere fact that plaintiff’s requested instruction did not also present a request for an instruction on the exceptions to the general rule is no justification for refusing the instruction. There is no law of this state that requires a litigant requesting an instruction to present any other than the ones in which he himself is interested. If other instructions are required it is up to the opposing litigant to request them or for the court to supply them.
The failure to instruct on the single most important issue in this case scarcely meets with the following requirement: “ ‘The purpose of instructions is to furnish guidance to the jury in their deliberations, and to aid them in arriving at a proper verdict; and, with this end in view, they should state clearly and concisely the issues of fact and the principles of law which are necessary to enable them to accomplish the purpose desired.’ ” Fulmer v. State, 178 Neb. 20, 131 N. W. 2d 657. The question of visibility being the determining issue in the case, the jury was entitled to have the law pertaining thereto set before it in proper instructions, and this necessitated an instruction on the general rule and also on the exceptions thereto; yet nowhere in the instructions given are these rules of law set forth.
The rejection of the requested instruction and the failure to instruct on the principles mentioned was clearly error. Refusal to give an instruction applicable to facts in evidence not covered by other instructions is error. First National Bank v. Carson, 30 Neb. 104, 46 N. W. 276; Guinard v. Knapp-Stout & Co., 95 Wis. 482, 70 N. W. 671; People v. Jacks, 76 Mich. 218, 42 N. W. 1134. It is error to refuse an instruction warranted by the testimony, and which contains a correct statement of the law of the case, the principles of which have not been covered by the charge of the court. Powder River Live *142Stock Co. v. Lamb, 38 Neb. 339, 56 N. W. 1019; Boice v. Palmer, 55 Neb. 389, 75 N. W. 849; First National Bank v. Carson, supra; Hyndshaw v. Mills, 108 Neb. 250, 187 N. W. 780; Pearse v. Loup River Public Power Dist., 137 Neb. 611, 290 N. W. 474; Fulmer v. State, supra.
It is tíre duty of the court to submit to the jury all material issues presented by the pleadings which find support in the evidence. Jarosh v. Van Meter, 171 Neb. 61, 105 N. W. 2d 531, 82 A. L. R. 2d 714; Enterprise Co., Inc. v. Sanitary District No. One, 176 Neb. 271, 125 N. W. 2d 712; Stillwell v. Schmoker, 175 Neb. 595, 122 N. W. 2d 538.
The’ decisions of this court are replete with statements to the effect that if a litigant desires a more specific instruction on any subject other than that given by the trial court, he must make request therefor. In this case such request was made, and assuming for the moment that the instructions given by the court sufficiently covered the determining feature of “visibility” of plaintiff’s vehicle in the absence of a request for a more specific instruction, it was nevertheless error to refuse the more specific instruction when requested. “When instructions are requested by either party to a suit, which correctly state the law upon the issues presented by the pleadings and the evidence received during the trial, it is: error to refuse them, unless the points are fairly covered by other instructions given by the court on its own motion.” Simcho v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co., 150 Neb. 634, 35 N. W. 2d 501. See, also, Strubble v. Village of DeWitt, 81 Neb. 504, 116 N. W. 154. “If the statements of the charge to the jury upon material matters are general, an explanatory instruction which is pertinent and applicable to the situation should be given if requested. It is error to refuse an instruction warranted by the law and the evidence not covered by other instructions given.” Snyder v. Lincoln, 153 Neb. 611, 45 N. W. 2d 749. See, also, Crosby v. Ritchey, 56 Neb. 336, 76 N. W. 895. In rejecting the request for a more specific instruction *143which was made by plaintiff, this court has laid down a new rule to the effect that it is entirely discretionary with the trial court whether or not a more specific instruction should be given upon request therefor, and in effect is saying to litigants that it is. a waste of time to make application for such specific instructions.