Court Opinion

ID: 9753969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:36:21.58449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:45.766158
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, J.

dissenting:

In my view, when an extrajudicial identification of a photograph, which cannot be confirmed by a subsequent personal identification and which is not otherwise corroborated, is the only evidence linking an accused with the commission of the crime charged, then the evidence is insufficient for a conviction under the constitutional standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
Here, the defendant was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon and daytime housebreaking. The only evidence introduced at trial which tended to link the accused with the commission of the crimes was the testimony of a police officer that the victims (husband, aged 80, and wife, aged 77) had, several hours after the crimes were committed, each identified, from a sampling of six, a photograph of the accused as a picture of the perpetrator.
The victims, however, were unable ever to identify in person the accused as the perpetrator, even though they had an *186opportunity to do so less than five months later at a hearing on a motion to suppress, which was held on the same day as the trial. It should be noted also that the victims failed to identify the accused in person despite the fact that they had observed the perpetrator, in bright daylight, for half an hour. Furthermore, as previously stated, there was no other evidence of any persuasive merit introduced which would have linked the defendant to the crimes. Finally, there was evidence introduced to show that defendant was at a different location at the time of the commission of the crimes; defendant’s father testified that, his son had been at home.
As the majority opinion correctly indicates, the standard of proof which must be met in order to sustain a conviction was set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at 319, and applied by us in State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 240, 424 A.2d 720 (1981): .
"[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
This standard is a corollary to the mandate of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), that due process prohibits a criminal conviction in all cases "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”
I do not believe that a conviction can stand when the sole evidence presented is testimony by a third party as to an extrajudicial identification of a photograph when that identification cannot be confirmed in person, and when no other evidence is offered which in any way independently corroborates the State’s contention that the accused is indeed the perpetrator.1 A rational trier of fact could not, on *187the basis of that one item of evidence, find beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who committed the crime.2 Thus, the conviction should be reversed on the standards set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, supra, and In re Winship, supra.
The principle which should govern this type of case was succinctly set forth by Justice Traynor, writing for the Court in People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 631, 354 P.2d 865 (1960):
"An extra-judicial identification that cannot be confirmed by an identification at the trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the crime.”
The majority declines to follow the Gould principle and discusses approvingly Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 381 N.E.2d 582 (1978), which also rejected the Gould rule. However, the majority overlooks the fact that Vitello was decided before Jackson v. Virginia, and, at a time when the applicable due process requirement was only that a defendant could not be convicted when there was no evidence against him. Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960). And, in the words of Chief Justice Warren, even "a mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a 'no evidence’ standard.” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1686, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964), quoted in Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at 320.
An extrajudicial photographic identification, when the witness is unable to make a personal identification, is, at best, marginally probative. But such evidence is no more than that "modicum” necessary to satisfy the "no evidence” standard of Thompson v. Louisville, supra. Thus, the Massachusetts Court had no need to discuss Supreme Court cases since the due process standard applicable at the time was met. Under Thompson v. Louisville there was no *188constitutional problem with basing a conviction on a mere scintilla of evidence.
Of course, Jackson v. Virginia has raised the standard of Thompson v. Louisville. Under the due process clause, a mere modicum of evidence is not a sufficient basis for conviction. Rather the evidence presented must be probative enough to remove any reasonable doubt which a reasonable finder of fact might have. This was not the standard applicable at the time of the Vitello decision, and, therefore, I believe that the majority places entirely too much emphasis on that case.
In sum, when the only evidence introduced to connect a defendant with a crime is testimony of a third party that the victims made an extrajudicial identification of a photograph of the accused, and claimed that it looked like the perpetrator, then there is necessarily a reasonable doubt whether the accused committed the crime, and his conviction should not be permitted to stand.
Judges Cole and Davidson have authorized me to state that they concur with the views expressed herein.

. There was no controversy as to whether the crimes had been committed; this had apparently been conceded. The only issue was whether the accused was the perpetrator. It was in reference to this single issue at trial that the State offered its solitary "proof’ — the extrajudicial photographic identification.

. The majority first discusses whether the evidence in question was even admissible and concludes that it was. I agree with the majority on this point.