Court Opinion

ID: 9472575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:04:16.780905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:01.238005
License: Public Domain

CORNELIA G. KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
As stated by Judge Edwards, Foti filed this action to have the award of an arbitration panel set aside. The union counterclaimed to have the award enforced. I agree that the District Court was correct in enforcing the award. I write separately to explain my reasons for concluding that the award was properly grounded in the collective bargaining agreement and that the award did not violate public policy by permitting the union to cause the employer to violate the National Labor Relations Act.1
1. Authority Under the Agreement to Enter the Award.
Foti contends that the arbitrators exceeded their authority and failed to draw the *1000essence of their decision from the collective bargaining agreement when they ordered him to accept the steward designated by the union. I agree with Judge Edwards that this contention is without merit.
Article III, Section 18 of the collective bargaining agreement provides as follows in part:
Section 18. — Stewards
A. At the discretion of the Business
Manager,
a Steward will be sent to all jobs when the job first starts. It shall be the responsibility of those listed for the placement of the Steward. Any person, Construction Manager, Prime Contractor, General Contractor, Brokerage Firm, Corporation or Company that employs Laborers directly or indirectly must accept the Steward sent out by the Business Manager, and he or his Field Representatives may visit and consult with the Steward and members on the job.
B. When there is a General Contractor or Prime Contractor, the employment of the Steward shall be their responsibility with the approval of the Business Manager.
Sis * * i: * *
E. The Steward shall not be discriminated against, nor laid off for performance of his duty as a Steward, but he shall also perform the duties as a Laborer.
G. The Steward shall be the last employee to be discharged and shall remain on the job until it is completed. The Steward shall be the last employee laid off during a temporary work shortage and shall be the first employee called back when work resumes. The Steward shall not be transferred from a job while employees remain on the job.
After considering these provisions, the arbitration panel made the following findings: 2
Under paragraph 18.A. it is clear that any Company that employs Laborers “must accept the Steward sent out by the Business Manager.” This applies to the Foti Co.
Under paragraph 18.B. the responsibility for employing a Steward in the first instance rests with the General or Prime Contractor. Once on the job, the Steward shall remain on the job “until it is completed” under paragraph 18.G. Thus, it is the finding of the arbitration panel that:
1. The Union has the right to designate a Steward.
2. Once employed, the Steward must continue to be employed until the job is completed.
3. If the General Contractor has no work available, then the employer employing the most laborers on the job must employ the Steward.
4. If the General or Prime Contractor again employs laborers on the job, the Steward shall revert to the payroll of the General or Prime Contractor.
5. As provided in paragraph 18.E., the Steward shall also perform the duties as a Laborer.
The arbitrators’ findings are a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous collective bargaining agreement. Foti contends that paragraph B unambiguously expresses the parties’ intention that a subcontractor would never be bound to employ the steward. However, this construction is not consistent with paragraph A, which provides that “[a]ny person ... that employs Laborers directly or indirectly must accept the Steward sent out by the Business Manager,” or with the clear intent, expressed in several provisions, that the steward designated by the business manager would al*1001ways be employed at every job site as long as any laborers were working.
Paragraph B, as applied to this case, is ambiguous in two respects. First, it says that the steward’s employment is the general contractor’s “responsibility,” but does not explicitly state whether this means that the general contractor must hire the steward himself, or merely that the general contractor is responsible for allocating the steward to one of various employers of laborers at the job site. The latter interpretation has some support in the history of the provision, which was drafted to avoid disputes among subcontractors as to who had to hire the steward. Second, “[w]hen there is a general contractor” may be read as meaning when there is a general contractor whose employees are performing laborer work at the site. Indeed, it is questionable that the union could require a general contractor to employ a steward when that general contractor employs no members of the laborers’ union.
Foti makes several arguments that the bargaining history supports its position, but these go to the merits of the award rather than to the arbitrators’ authority. Foti also argues that it should not have to hire the particular steward designated by the union, but this is not supported in the language of the collective bargaining agreement. The District Court was correct in finding that the award was within the arbitrators’ authority to interpret the collective bargaining agreement.
2. Violation of NLRA Section 8(b)(2)
Foti also contends that the collective bargaining agreement, as interpreted by the arbitrators, would result in a violation of NLRA § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2). The agreement may not be enforced if to do so would violate the policy of the NLRA. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 68 S.Ct. 847, 92 L.Ed. 1187 (1948); Glendale Manufacturing Co. v. Local 520 International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union, 283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir.1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950, 81 S.Ct. 1902, 6 L.Ed.2d 1243 (1961).
Section 8(b)(2) provides that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3)
Section 8(a)(3) states that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization____
Requiring Foti to lay off one union member in order to hire the steward designated by the business manager would be discrimination in tenure of employment. Even transferring an employee to another job site is discrimination in a condition of employment. Section 8(a)(3) applies not only to the fact of union membership but also to discrimination based on the level of the employee’s activity in the union. Radio Officers’ Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-42, 74 S.Ct. 323, 335-337, 98 L.Ed. 455 (1954); Teamsters Local 20 v. NLRB, 610 F.2d 991 (D.C.Cir.1979). In Radio Officers’, the Court held that “[t]he policy of the [NLR] Act is to insulate employees’ jobs from their organizational rights,” and that the Act was “designed to allow employees to ... be good, bad, or indifferent members [of the union].” 347 U.S. at 40, 74 S.Ct. at 335.
More than discrimination is required to establish a violation of section 8(b)(2), however. There must also be a motive to encourage or discourage union activity. Such motive need not be proved by explicit evidence; it may be inferred where the natural consequence of the employer’s action was encouragement or discouragement. 347 U.S. at 44-45, 74 S.Ct. at 337-338.
The Supreme Court considered the question of when an illegitimate motive may be inferred in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 87 S.Ct. 1792, 18 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1967). In that case, the employer was accused of discriminating against striking employees, but claimed a business motive. *1002The Court held that if the employer could show that “a substantial and legitimate business end is served,” 388 U.S. at 34, 87 S.Ct. at 1798, the employer’s motive was prima facie lawful and an illegitimate motive had to be proven affirmatively. Otherwise, the bad motive could be inferred.
The Second and Eighth Circuits have applied this “substantial and legitimate” justification standard to a union’s placement of a steward. NLRB v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir.1976); PaintSmiths, Inc. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir.1980).3
The District Court tried de novo the issue of whether there was “substantial and legitimate” justification for the placement of the particular steward.4 It found that the selection of a steward from outside the employer’s work force had substantial purpose. The temporary nature of employment of persons in the construction industry makes them particularly dependent on the good will of the employer. The court found that Foti maintains a nucleus of eight to thirteen or fourteen laborers that are the last to be laid off and that Foti has sole discretion as to whether and which will be laid off. Because of this dependence it is difficult, the District Judge found, for a Foti employee to have the independence necessary to be a good steward. The court pointed to evidence of numerous jurisdictional disputes in which other crafts or trades may have performed laborer work and to unsafe working conditions as reasons that the union needed an aggressive steward. The District Court specifically found that employee dependence existed among Foti’s employees and that therefore the union had a substantial purpose in appointing a steward outside Foti’s regular work force. The finding that Foti’s employees were dependent is a finding of fact. It is not clearly erroneous. Whether this reason is substantial is a mixed question of law and fact. I agree with the District Court that it is a substantial reason. The union as an entity has an interest in keeping all laborer work for members of the union. A particular union member who regularly works for an employer may have little interest in jeopardizing a good relationship with the employer on whom he or she is dependent for continued employment to assure some unidentified member of the union a job as a laborer.
*1003The need for an independent steward to enforce safety regulations contributes only marginally to the substantial reason for the union’s insistence on naming the steward. Here every employee’s self-interest in safety makes it unlikely a steward would acquiesce in safety violations.
The District Court made no express finding one way or the other as to whether the union’s reason of naming the steward was also a legitimate reason.5 Whether the reason is legitimate is a question of law.
Enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement for the benefit of all union members by insisting that all laborer work be done by members of the laborers’ union as opposed to bricklayers’ helpers, carpenters’ helpers or others is a legitimate union purpose. It does not benefit favored union members. It does not discriminate against “passive” or independent union members as opposed to “more active” or “good” union members. The union here has established that a legitimate business end is served. Under the teaching of Great Dane, Foti was thus required to affirmatively prove that the union instead had an illegitimate motive. This it failed to do.
The instant case is distinguishable from NLRB v. Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir.1976). There the collective bargaining agreement provided for super-seniority for stewards not only in layoff and recall but for the allocation of numerous and significant on-the-job benefits, such as the choice of the most lucrative delivery routes. The NLRB sought enforcement of its order requiring the union to cease and desist from enforcing the super-seniority clause because it spurred ambitious workers to be “good, enthusiastic unionist[s].” The Second Circuit, relying upon Radio Officers’, held that: “For the union to employ job-related benefits to maintain its own organization would, thus, fly in the face of this statutory purpose [“to insulate employees’ jobs from their organizational rights”].” 531 F.2d at 1167 (footnote omitted). The Second Circuit noted that the union had not introduced any evidence to rebut the Board’s reasonable conclusion that union activism would be a factor in choosing union stewards.
The court noted that:
The General Counsel did not challenge that portion of the “super-seniority” provisions protecting stewards from layoff because, in his opinion, that preference had a legitimate and substantial justification: a union may find itself powerless to supply any real representation if it is unable to maintain the same steward continuously on the job. Obviously, this justification does not apply to the on-the-job benefits accorded the steward. The validity of the layoff “super-seniority” provisions is, we note, not before us.
Radio Officers’, 531 F.2d at 1166 n. 1, Because the union had not shown that it could not get capable workers to become stewards without the super-seniority benefits of choosing routes, the court held it had not met its burden of proof. Here the union did show why it could not recruit a stewart .from among Foti’s employees who could perform satisfactorily.
Accordingly, I would affirm the District Court.

. In addition to its substantive arguments, Foti also complains that the Arbitration Act does not confer jurisdiction to enforce arbitration awards arising out of collective bargaining agreements, and thus that the District Court was without jurisdiction to consider the union’s counterclaim. There is presently a division among the circuits on the question of whether the Arbitration Act may apply to disputes arising from collective bargaining agreements. In Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 327, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir.1954), this Court explicitly held that, despite the provision excepting employment contracts from the Act, it did apply to collective bargaining agreements. In a more recent case, this Court has held that the Arbitration Act applies to collective bargaining agreements, at least to the extent of providing procedural requirements for arbitration. See Chattanooga Mailers Union v. Chattanooga News-Free Press Co., 524 F.2d 1305 (6th Cir. 1975). Jurisdiction of the counterclaim under the Arbitration Act was therefore proper.
Foti next argues that the requirement of section 9 of the Arbitration Act, that a court may confirm an arbitration award only if the parties have agreed that arbitration awards may be enforced in court, was not satisfied here because the agreement did not specifically provide that arbitration awards may be entered as court judgments. The collective bargaining agreement does provide that the arbitrators’ award "shall be final and binding upon” the parties. Courts have uniformly held that such language is sufficient to permit enforcement under the Arbitration Act. See Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Newspapers, Inc., 639 F.2d 386, 389-90 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 838, 102 S.Ct. 144, 70 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981) and cases cited therein.

. The arbitrators made no finding as to whether Demshar and Foti were joint venturers. Their award was clearly not based on any special relationship between Demshar and Foti other than the relationship between contractor and subcontractor. The existence of a joint venture is therefore not before us for review.

. Judge Edwards holds that "[t]he problem of displacement [of the union member replaced by the steward] was created by Foti, not the union.” Judge Edwards reasons that since Foti had notice before it began work on the project that the union would designate a particular steward, yet proceeded to staff its work force, only Foti is to blame for having to lay off a union member.
This reasoning is based on a factual premise— that Foti had notice of the union’s demand before it hired its laborers — that was not found by either the District Court or the arbitration panel, and is not argued by the parties. More importantly, even if this factual premise is true a substantial and legitimate purpose must still be found or the arbitration award cannot be enforced. Whether Foti or the union is to blame is irrelevant to the analysis.
If the collective bargaining agreement required Foti to leave room for the steward and Foti had complied, the union would have violated § 8(b)(2) nonetheless by enforcing that agreement, unless it had a substantial and legitimate purpose for doing so. Section 8(a)(3) covers discrimination “in regard to hire or tenure of employment.” (Emphasis added.) The fact remains that Foti did not leave room for the steward, and enforcement of the arbitration award resulted in discrimination in tenure of employment in favor of the steward and against another union member. In either scenario Foti would discriminate in favor of a union member because of the level of his union allegiance.
If Foti had voluntarily acquiesced in hiring the outside steward, with no compulsion by the union, Foti would have violated § 8(a)(3) directly by discriminating in hire, tenure, or conditions of employment unless it had a substantial and legitimate business reason for doing so. Discrimination that encourages union activity violates the NLRA whether caused by the union (§ 8(b)(2)) or by the employer (§ 8(a)(3)). An arbitration award resulting in a violation of the NLRA by. Foti is no more enforceable than is an award resulting in a violation by the union.
Accordingly, the arbitration award is not enforceable unless there is a substantial and legitimate purpose for requiring an outside steward. Absent such a purpose, the arbitration award infringes employees’ organizational rights without respect to whether the displacement problem was caused by Foti or the union.

. The arbitrators declined to pass upon this issue.

. The District Court did not make any such finding because it found instead that "Foti concedes that the Union has a legitimate purpose in appointing a steward on any job on which |Foti] employs laborers" (quoting from Foti’s brief) (emphasis and brackets in original). However, the purpose at issue here is the union’s purpose in requiring that a steward from outside Foti's regular work force be hired. Foti’s concession was limited to the union’s purpose in appointing a steward.