Court Opinion

ID: 9897227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:57.650004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:40.677480
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              Nov 14 2023, 8:32 am

                                                                                   CLERK
                                                                               Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                  Court of Appeals
                                                                                    and Tax Court

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
      Timothy S. Schafer                                        Michael E. Tolbert
      Timothy S. Schafer, II                                    Shelice R. Tolbert
      Todd S. Schafer                                           Candace C. Williams
      Schafer & Schafer, LLP                                    Tolbert & Tolbert
      Merrillville, Indiana                                     Gary, Indiana

                                                  IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      Daniel Shirley,                                           November 14, 2023
      Appellant-Plaintiff,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                23A-CT-204
              v.                                                Appeal from the Porter Superior
                                                                Court
      Daniel R. Shaver,                                         The Honorable Michael A. Fish,
      Appellee-Defendant.                                       Judge
                                                                Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                64D01-1703-CT-3080

                                        Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                                      Judges Pyle and Foley concur.

      Tavitas, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Daniel Shirley sued Daniel Shaver for negligence arising out of a collision in

      which Shaver rear ended Shirley’s vehicle. The jury found in favor of Shirley;
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023                             Page 1 of 17
      however, it determined that Shirley was partially at fault. Shirley appeals and

      argues: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by refusing one of Shirley’s

      proposed instructions and instructing the jury on a motorist-safety statute; and

      (2) the jury’s verdict is inadequate. We find these arguments without merit and,

      accordingly, affirm.

      Issues
[2]   Shirley raises two issues, which we reorder and restate as:

              I.       Whether the trial court abused its discretion in instructing
                       the jury.

              II.      Whether the jury’s verdict is inadequate.

      Facts
[3]   In 2013, Shirley was “T-boned” in a car accident. Tr. Vol. II p. 212. The

      vehicle that struck Shirley was traveling at approximately fifty miles per hour.

      After the accident, an ambulance transported Shirley to the hospital. Shirley

      experienced back, neck, and shoulder pain; limited range of motion in his back;

      a bruised kidney; and blood in his urine. After a short time, however, Shirley’s

      back pain disappeared, and his life went “back to normal.” Id. at 169.

[4]   This case concerns a different car accident that occurred on March 26, 2016.

      Shirley was driving along a single-lane highway in Valparaiso, Indiana. As the

      vehicle in front of Shirley slowed down to turn left, Shirley stopped his vehicle.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023            Page 2 of 17
[5]   Meanwhile, Shaver, driving behind Shirley, was “daydreaming and looking to

      the left” and rear-ended Shirley at approximately fifty miles per hour. Id. at

      146. According to Shaver, Shirley “slammed on his brakes” too late for Shaver

      to come to a stop. Id. at 154.

[6]   Shirley experienced soreness in his lower back after the accident; however, he

      did not seek medical treatment until approximately two months later when he

      went to the emergency room and complained of right lumbar back pain.

      Shirley explained to the treating physician that the pain started after the 2016

      car accident and that the pain initially “went away” but returned while Shirley

      was playing basketball with his son. Ex. Vol. IV p. 66. Shirley’s primary care

      physician ordered an MRI, which revealed a herniated disc in Shirley’s lower

      back.

[7]   Shirley was referred to the Lakeshore Bone and Joint Institute, and he began

      participating in therapy and receiving epidural steroid injections from pain

      specialist Dr. Heather Nath. Shirley’s pain improved but did not disappear,

      and his condition worsened over time. In particular, the disc continued to

      degenerate, and Shirley experienced pain in both the right and left lumbar

      regions of his back. Both Dr. Nath and the defense’s medical expert,

      orthopedic specialist Dr. Gary Klaud Miller, opined that Shirley’s condition is

      permanent.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023     Page 3 of 17
[8]    Shirley sued Shaver for negligence arising out of the 2016 car accident, and a

       jury trial was held in April 2019. That trial, however, resulted in a mistrial, and

       a second jury trial was held in November 2022.

[9]    At trial, Shirley denied slamming his brakes. Shirley also explained that he did

       not immediately seek medical treatment after the 2016 accident because he

       assumed that his pain would go away as it had after the 2013 accident.

[10]   According to Shirley, he experiences daily pain that fluctuates from “minimal”

       to “a lot worse tha[n] minimal.” Tr. Vol. II p. 180. He admitted, however, that

       he described his pain as “nominal” during the first jury trial. Id. at 230.

       Shirley’s employment has not changed, and he continues to engage in many of

       the same activities that he did before the 2016 accident, including camping and

       attending sporting events. Shirley experiences discomfort during these activities

       and must make adjustments, including using a standing desk and occasionally

       wearing a back brace.

[11]   The jury viewed video depositions of Drs. Nath and Miller. Dr. Nath attributed

       Shirley’s injury to the 2016 accident. Dr. Miller, however, opined that Shirley

       had a preexisting degenerative disc condition and that the 2013 car accident

       also contributed to Shirley’s injury. Dr. Miller noted that no MRI showed the

       status of Shirley’s back prior to the 2016 accident.

[12]   During closing arguments, Shirley’s counsel asked the jury to award $5 million

       based on Shirley’s pain and suffering and potential, future medical expenses,

       which included the possibility of surgery. Defense counsel argued that Shaver

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023      Page 4 of 17
       was not wholly responsible for Shirley’s injuries and urged the jury to award no

       more than Shirley’s current medical expenses, which totaled $15,623.61 at the

       time. On rebuttal, Shirley’s counsel stated that “this case isn’t really about

       medical bills.” Tr. Vol. III p. 115.

[13]   The jury found in Shirley’s favor; however, it found Shirley twenty-percent at

       fault and Shaver eighty-percent at fault. The jury determined that Shirley’s

       damages totaled $8,300, which it reduced to $6,640 based on Shirley’s share of

       the fault. 1 Shirley now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
       I. Abuse of Discretion—Jury Instructions

[14]   We first address Shirley’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in

       instructing the jury. We afford our trial courts “‘considerable discretion’” when

       engaging in this crucial role. Ind. State Police v. Estate of Damore, 194 N.E.3d

       1147, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Humphrey v. Tuck, 151 N.E.3d 1203,

       1207 (Ind. 2020)), trans. denied. When a party challenges the trial court’s

       decision to give or refuse a jury instruction, we consider the following:

                  (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether
                  there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the
                  instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the tendered
                  instruction is covered by other instructions which are given.

       1
           Shirley filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023           Page 5 of 17
               Reversal arises only if the appellant demonstrates that the
               instruction error prejudices his substantial rights.

       Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015) (internal citations and

       quotation marks omitted). The first consideration is a legal question, which we

       review de novo, whereas the other two are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

       Humphrey, 151 N.E.3d at 1207.

       A. Apportionment Instruction

[15]   In Final Instruction No. 20, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

               A person’s conduct is legally responsible for causing an injury if:

                        (1) the injury would not have occurred without the
                        conduct, and

                        (2) the injury was a natural, probable, and foreseeable
                        result of the conduct.

               This is called a “responsible cause.”

               There can be more than one responsible cause for an injury.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 133. The instruction closely follows Indiana Model

       Civil Jury Instruction 301.

[16]   Additionally, the trial court provided a comparative fault instruction, which

       instructed the jury to “apportion the fault” between the parties and that the

       apportionment must “total 100 percent.” Id. at 146. The trial court also

       instructed the jury that it could not hold Shaver liable to the extent that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023          Page 6 of 17
       Shirley’s damages were caused solely by a preexisting condition or the 2013

       accident.

[17]   Shirley argues that, instead of delivering Final Instruction No. 20, the trial court

       should have instructed the jury based on his proposed instruction, which

       contained the same language as the trial court’s instruction but added the

       following additional language:

               Where a logical basis can be found for some rough practical
               apportionment between responsible causes, it may be made.
               However, where no such basis can be found and the division is
               purely arbitrary, there is no practical course except to hold the
               defendant liable for the entire injury, notwithstanding the fact
               that other causes have contributed to it.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 171. Shirley drew this language, with some

       changes, from Dunn v. Cadiente, 516 N.E.2d 52, 56 (Ind. 1987). At trial, Shirley

       argued that his proposed instruction should be given to provide the jury with an

       “idea of how to handle the situation when there is more than one responsible . .

       . cause.” Tr. Vol. III p. 17. The trial court refused the instruction. On appeal,

       Shirley argues that, without this language, the jury was not instructed on “how

       to handle the situation where [the jury] can’t determine what is pre-existing and

       what is aggravated or caused by the crash[.]” Appellant’s Br. p. 27.

[18]   In Dunn, the patient sued his physician for medical malpractice, and he

       appealed the judgment of $24,065 as inadequate. 516 N.E.2d at 53. In

       discussing the patient’s preexisting condition, our Supreme Court stated the

       following:
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023        Page 7 of 17
               To the extent that there may have been conflicting evidence
               regarding the extent to which all of [the patient’s] injuries and
               losses were causally related to [the physician’s] conduct or the
               congenital anomaly, the question may be viewed as one of
               apportionment of damages. Upon this issue, Prosser favors the
               following approach:

                        Where a logical basis can be found for some rough
                        practical apportionment, which limits a defendant’s
                        liability to that part of the harm which he has in fact
                        caused, it may be expected that the division will be
                        made. Where no such basis can be found and any
                        division must be purely arbitrary, there is no
                        practical course except to hold the defendant for
                        the entire loss, notwithstanding the fact that other
                        causes have contributed to it.

               Prosser, [Law of Torts, 4th Edition], p. 314. . . . Viewing the
               evidence favorable to the judgment, we find it does not
               inescapably lead to the conclusion that apportionment is
               impossible. Thus the trial court did not err in failing to award
               damages for all of the injuries and losses claimed by [the patient].

       Id. at 56 (emphasis added).

[19]   We find Dunn distinguishable, and we conclude that the trial court properly

       refused the proposed instruction. The proposed instruction does not correctly

       state the law because it contradicts Indiana’s Comparative Fault Act.

[20]   The Comparative Fault Act provides, in relevant part:

               (b) The court, unless all the parties agree otherwise, shall instruct
               the jury to determine its verdict in the following manner:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023        Page 8 of 17
                        (1) The jury shall determine the percentage of fault of the
                            claimant, of the defendant, and of any person who is
                            a nonparty. . . . In assessing percentage of fault, the
                            jury shall consider the fault of all persons who caused
                            or contributed to cause the alleged injury, death, or
                            damage to property, tangible or intangible . . . .

                                                            *****

       Ind. Code § 34-51-2-7(b) (emphasis added); see also Sedam v. 2JR Pizza

       Enterprises, LLC, 84 N.E.3d 1174, 1178-79 (Ind. 2017) (“The Comparative Fault

       Act provides that the jury must apportion fault to those ‘who caused or

       contributed to cause the alleged injury[.]’”) (quoting Ind. Code § 34-51-2-

       8(b)(1)) (emphasis added). The term “fault” “includes unreasonable

       assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent, incurred

       risk, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages.” Ind.

       Code § 34-6-2-45(b).

[21]   Here, the jury’s role was to determine the extent to which Shirley suffered harm

       that was not due solely to a preexisting condition or the 2013 accident. The

       jury was then permitted to consider whether Shirley was at fault for his sudden

       stop before the 2016 accident and for failing to timely seek medical treatment.

       If the jury found Shirley partially at fault for his injuries, the plain language of

       the Comparative Fault Act required the jury to then apportion fault between

       Shirley and Shaver accordingly. The proposed instruction, however, would

       permit the jury to refrain from apportioning fault and to instead hold Shaver

       responsible for the entirety of Shirley’s damages. See Hainey v. Zink, 394 N.E.2d

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023        Page 9 of 17
       238, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (“[T]he trial court may not, by contradictory

       instructions, leave the jury with the task of determining which of the two

       instructions to follow or what rule of law to apply.” (citing Deckard v. Adams,

       203 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. 1965); Childs v. Rayburn, 346 N.E.2d 655, 663 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 1976))).

[22]   It is true that the proposed instruction is drawn, with minor modifications, from

       Dunn. Indiana courts, however, have long held that “‘certain language or

       expression’ used by an appellate court ‘to reach its final conclusion’ is ‘not

       [necessarily] proper language for instructions to a jury.’” Batchelor v. State, 119

       N.E.3d 550, 563 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Ludy v. State, 784 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind.

       2003)) (brackets in original). That is the case here.

[23]   A close review of Dunn confirms the impropriety of using its apportionment

       language as a jury instruction in comparative fault cases. To begin, the

       language appears to be dicta. The Indiana Supreme Court ultimately held in

       Dunn that apportionment was not impossible and that the trial court properly

       declined to hold the physician liable for the full extent of the patient’s injuries.

       516 N.E.2d at 56. The situation where an apportionment could not be made,

       thus, was not before the Court. See Sw. Allen Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Fort

       Wayne, 142 N.E.3d 946, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (statements that are not

       necessary in the determination of the issues presented are dicta and are not

       binding), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023        Page 10 of 17
[24]   Additionally, a review of Professor William L. Prosser’s discussion of

       apportionment—upon which Dunn relied—further confirms our doubts about a

       Dunn-based apportionment instruction in comparative fault cases. Professor

       Prosser envisioned, as scenarios where apportionment would be impossible,

       when two defendants, “struggling for a single gun, succeed in shooting the

       plaintiff” or two defendants pollute a stream with oil that ignites and “burns the

       plaintiff’s barn.” Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Edition, p. 314. The Comparative

       Fault Act, however, “abrogates the old rule of joint and several liability in suits

       to which the Act applies.” Ind. Dep’t of Ins. v. Everhart, 960 N.E.2d 129, 138

       (Ind. 2012).

[25]   Most significantly, Dunn was a medical malpractice case to which the

       Comparative Fault Act does not apply. See Cavens v. Zaberdac, 849 N.E.2d 526,

       530 (Ind. 2006) (citing Ind. Code § 34-51-2-1). Whatever the validity of a Dunn-

       based apportionment instruction, it does not correctly state the law in a case

       such as this where the Comparative Fault Act applies. Accordingly, the trial

       court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the proposed instruction. 2

       B. Instruction on Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24

[26]   In Final Instruction No. 18, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

       2
         In explaining why it refused the proposed instruction, the trial court noted that it was not part of the pattern
       instruction. Though we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the instruction,
       the mere fact that a proposed instruction does not follow a pattern instruction is not a proper basis to refuse
       it. See Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 199 (Ind. 2021) (“[W]hile it is ‘preferred practice’ to use pattern jury
       instructions, we do not require it.”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023                                Page 11 of 17
               When the events in this case happened, Indiana Code § 9-21-8-24
               provided, in part, as follows: “A person may not:

                        (1) slow down or stop a vehicle;

                        (2) turn a vehicle from a direct course upon a highway; or

                        (3) change from one (1) traffic lane to another; unless the
                        movement can be made with reasonable safety.”

               If you decide from the greater weight of the evidence that a
               person violated Indiana Code § 9-21-8-24, and that the violation
               was not excused, then you must decide that person was
               negligent.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 131.

[27]   At the time the events took place, the full text of Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-

       24 provided:

               A person may not:

                        (1) slow down or stop a vehicle;

                        (2) turn a vehicle from a direct course upon a highway; or

                        (3) change from one (1) traffic lane to another;

               unless the movement can be made with reasonable safety.
               Before making a movement described in this section, a person
               shall give a clearly audible signal by sounding the horn if any
               pedestrian may be affected by the movement and give an
               appropriate stop or turn signal in the manner provided

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023           Page 12 of 17
                  in sections 27 through 28 of this chapter if any other vehicle
                  may be affected by the movement.

       Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24 (1991) (emphasis added). 3

[28]   At trial, Shirley objected to the instruction and argued that “[t]he purpose of

       [Indiana Code § 9-21-8-24] is signaling,” which he contended was not at issue

       in the case. Tr. Vol. III p. 25. Shirley argued, as he does on appeal, that the

       instruction was irrelevant and, because it omitted the second half of Indiana

       Code Section 9-21-8-24, it was also misleading.

[29]   The trial court overruled Shirley’s objection to the instruction. The trial court

       stated that Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24 required safe movement of a vehicle

       “generally speaking” and was not merely a signaling statute. Tr. Vol. III p. 31.

       The trial court then explained that, based on the evidence that Shirley came to a

       “sudden stop,” the statute applied and the instruction thereon was proper. Id.

[30]   We conclude that the trial court was within its discretion to deliver the

       instruction as it did. First, Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24 was clearly relevant.

       Shaver presented evidence that Shirley came to a sudden stop, which is relevant

       to the statute’s requirement that no person “slow down or stop a vehicle” unless

       the movement can be made with reasonable safety. Ind. Code § 9-21-8-24(1).

       3
           The statute has since been amended, although the pertinent language remains the same.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023                        Page 13 of 17
       Though Shirley denied coming to a sudden stop, that evidentiary conflict was

       for the jury to decide.

[31]   Shirley argues that the statute is merely a “signaling instruction” and “has no

       application to a driver that has the right of way.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 28-29. He

       relies on Burge v. Teter, 808 N.E.2d 124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), which we find

       distinguishable. In that case, the Teters were turning from the left lane as the

       left-lane traffic light was green. Id. at 127. While the Teters were in the

       intersection, the light changed to yellow, and Burge, who was travelling in the

       opposite direction, struck the Teters’ vehicle. Id. The Teters sued, and the jury

       found in their favor.

[32]   On appeal, Burge argued that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing his

       proposed instruction on Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24. A panel of this Court

       disagreed and held that “the language of Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24

       indicates that it does not apply to a driver who has the right-of-way pursuant to

       a traffic signal.” Id. at 131.

[33]   Nothing in Burge suggests that Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24 is merely a

       signaling statute. The Court’s use of the words “traffic signal” in that case

       referred to the traffic light, not the turn signals or horn of a vehicle. Moreover,

       whether Shirley had the right of way is irrelevant here—the issue is whether

       Shirley’s alleged sudden stop contributed to the rear-end collision.

[34]   Additionally, because signaling was irrelevant to this case, we fail to see how

       the trial court’s omission of the second half of Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023      Page 14 of 17
       prejudiced Shirley. The trial court was within its discretion to tailor the

       instruction to “conform to the facts of the case.” See Burdick v. Romano, 148

       N.E.3d 335, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (holding that trial court did not abuse its

       discretion by omitting certain language from statute in jury instruction when

       only a portion of the statute was relevant to plaintiff’s complaint), trans. denied.

       Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion either by

       failing to instruct the jury on the proposed instruction or by instructing the jury

       on only the relevant portion of Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-24.

       II. Inadequate Damages Award

[35]   Lastly, Shirley argues that the jury’s damages award was inadequate and that

       we must remand for a new trial. We are not persuaded.

[36]   “[J]uries are afforded a great deal of discretion in assessing damage awards.”

       Best Formed Plastics, LLC v. Shoun, 51 N.E.3d 345, 353 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)

       (citing Ritter v. Stanton, 745 N.E.2d 828, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied),

       trans. denied. As this Court has explained:

               [W]hen reviewing a claim that an award of damages is
               inadequate, we will neither reweigh evidence, nor judge the
               credibility of the witnesses. We consider only the evidence
               favorable to the award. Additionally, we must not reverse a
               damage award so long as the damages fall within the scope of the
               evidence. The finder of fact is in the best position to assess
               damages.

       DeGood Dimensional Concepts, Inc. v. Wilder, 135 N.E.3d 625, 634 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2019) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied; accord Renner v. Shepard-Bazant,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023       Page 15 of 17
       172 N.E.3d 1208, 1212 (Ind. 2021). A new trial, however, is warranted where

       “‘the damages awarded are so small as to indicate that the jury . . . considered

       some improper element.’” Sherman v. Kluba, 734 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2000) (quoting Hudson v. Dave McIntire Chevrolet, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 179, 182

       (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)), trans. denied.

[37]   Here, the evidence indicated that Shirley’s pain fluctuated and was often mild.

       Shirley was able to engage in many of the same activities that he did before the

       2016 accident so long as he made adjustments. Additionally, the jury was

       properly instructed that it could not hold Shaver responsible to the extent that

       Shirley’s injuries were caused solely by a preexisting condition or the 2013

       accident. The jury determined that Shirley’s damages totaled $8,300, which it

       reduced to $6,640 based on Shirley’s share of the fault.

[38]   Shirley argues that the damages award is inadequate because it is less than

       Shirley’s medical bills, which totaled $15,623.61 at the time of trial. Shirley

       further argues that the jury must have awarded a low verdict because defense

       counsel invited the jury to consider the fact that Shirley was insured and that

       Shaver would have to pay the verdict personally. 4

       4
         Shirley directs us to two remarks made by defense counsel at trial. On cross examination, defense counsel
       asked Shirley how a “sleep study” in which he participated was paid for, and Shirley objected, which the trial
       court sustained. Tr. Vol. II p. 220. During closing arguments, defense counsel stated that Shaver had a right
       to investigate the claim against him and that Shaver was not required to merely “show up and open up the
       checkbook.” Tr. Vol. III p. 98. Shirley objected, and the objection was overruled. Read in context, we are
       not persuaded that these passing statements invited the jury to consider improper bases in reaching its verdict.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023                              Page 16 of 17
[39]   This Court is not quick to infer that a jury based its decision on improper

       grounds, and we will not do so here. Husainy v. Granite Mgmt., LLC, 132 N.E.3d

       486, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“We will not deem a verdict to be the result of

       improper considerations, unless it cannot be explained on any other reasonable

       ground.” (quotation omitted)). Here, recovering Shirley’s existing medical

       expenses was hardly a focus of Shirley’s theory of damages. Shirley focused on

       recovering for pain and suffering and potential, future medical expenses.

       Indeed, in a motion in limine made before trial, Shirley indicated that he was

       “waiving [his] claim for medical bills, thus making the medical bills and their

       amount irrelevant.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 66. Similarly, neither Shirley’s

       insurance nor Shaver’s financial responsibility for the judgment were anything

       close to focal points at trial. Rather, the defense argued that Shirley’s injuries

       were due to a preexisting condition and earlier car accident, for which Shaver

       was not responsible, and that Shirley’s pain was not severe. The jury’s verdict

       is consistent with this theory. We will not reweigh the evidence. Accordingly,

       we affirm the jury’s verdict.

       Conclusion
[40]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury, and the jury’s

       verdict does not warrant a new trial. Accordingly, we affirm.

[41]   Affirmed.

       Pyle, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-204 | November 14, 2023      Page 17 of 17