Court Opinion

ID: 9695939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:31:40.990082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:17.510518
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring:
I join in the order vacating the judgment of sentence and discharging appellant, for I agree with the majority that nonchaku sticks are not “offensive weapons” within § 908 of the Crimes Code, Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, 18 Pa.C.S. § 908. I wish, however, to note a reservation.
The majority cites Commonwealth v. Ponds, 236 Pa.Super. 107, 345 A.2d 253 (1975), and Commonwealth v. Gatto, 236 Pa.Super. 92, 344 A.2d 566 (1975), for the proposition that “it is unnecessary to prove an intent to employ the weapon criminally in order to convict for possession of an offensive weapon.” at 482. Since the majority concludes, correctly, that nunchaku sticks are not “offensive weapon [s],” this proposition is irrelevant: as appellant did not possess “an offensive weapon”, the question never arises whether it is necessary to prove “an intent to employ the weapon criminally.”
Appellant has argued that § 908 is unconstitutional. His argument may be summarized as follows. § 908(a) prohibits possession of an offensive weapon. § 908(b), however, provides:
It is a defense . . . for the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he possessed or *438dealt with the weapon solely as a curio or in a dramatic performance, or that he possessed it briefly in consequence of having found it or taken it from an aggressor, or under circumstances similarly negativing any intent or likelihood that the weapon would be used unlawfully.
According to appellant, this provision unconstitutionally imposes on him the burden of disproving mens rea. See generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
§ 908(b) does seem, at least arguably, to assume a defendant with mens rea, for it allows a defendant to exculpate himself by proof “negativing any intent [on the defendant’s pari]” to use the weapon “unlawfully.” Query: If this is so, does § 908(b) import mens rea into § 908(a)? Suppose, for example, that the defendant is charged under § 908(a) with possession of a hand grenade. If he defends under § 908(b) by saying that he possessed it “solely as a curio,” is he, or is he not, saying that he possessed it without mens real If he is saying that he possessed it without mens rea, a rather curious situation is created: A defendant guilty under § 908(a), which under Ponds and Gatto does not require proof of mens rea, may exculpate himself by proving under § 908(b) that he did not have mens rea, in other words, that he did not have what the Commonwealth was not required to prove he had.
Here, we need not struggle with the problems suggested by this possible anomaly. Since we have concluded that § 908 is inapplicable, we never reach the question whether it is constitutional. In another case, however, we probably will reach that question. When we do, we may find it necessary to reconsider Ponds and Gatto. The reservation I wish to note now is that I do not think our reconsideration should be made more difficult by repeated, unnecessary citation of Ponds and Gatto, *439which suggests (except as to Judge HOFFMAN, who dissented in Ponds) that we are sure they were correctly decided. I, at least, am not sure.
HOFFMAN, J., joins in this opinion as well as the majority.