Court Opinion

ID: 9472182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:52:14.229561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:47.569721
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge
concurring.
In holding that the petitioner is entitled to a remand on his habeas petition on the issue of whether the guilty plea was knowingly and intelligently made, I concur with the majority. I write separately to express my view that the petitioner’s challenge to the effectiveness of the assistance of counsel received by petitioner may not, necessarily, be without merit. That too, it seems to me, should be the subject of an evidentiary hearing in order to ascertain whether the petitioner adequately waived his right to counsel. If it is true, as petitioner contends, that he did object to going to trial without counsel, and to being tried without counsel, he was entitled to the level of assistance required by McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) and Bradbury v. Wainright, 658 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied 456 U.S. 992, 102 S.Ct. 2275, 73 L.Ed.2d 1288 (1982).
While the majority opinion does not discuss the waiver issue, it does emphasize that the record contains no request for the appointment of counsel or affidavit of indigency or motions for further continuance. Such references, comprised as they are of negatives, are insufficient to show an affirmative, knowing and intelligent waiver of a right as important as the right to counsel. This is so since we must entertain “every reasonable presumption against the waiver of this fundamental constitutional right.” U.S. v. Johnson, 659 F.2d 415, 416 (4th Cir.1981). For this reason, I would include this issue for exploration at the remand hearing.