Court Opinion

ID: 9778876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:24:32.476173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:15.180909
License: Public Domain

HOLLINGSWORTH, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that defendants are not entitled to have a jury determine the fact issue as to which of the defendants has a claim against plaintiffs (which fact issue, of course, depends upon whether the injuries received by Bert Galloway in June, 1951, did or did not result in his death). My dissent is substantially for the reason stated by Coil, C., in the divisional opinion as follows: ‘ ‘ The fact that the question of whether plaintiffs are entitled to have the defendants interplead may or may not be, in the first instance, a question involving an equitable issue, does not prevent the issues among the parties, after they have inter-pleaded, from being determined by a jury. ’ ’
In view of the reasons assigned in the majority opinion for a contrary conclusion, I deem it desirable to more fully state my position.
The majority opinion holds, as I understand, that because plain- ■ tiffs.’ pleading was entitled a “bill in the nature of a bill of inter-pleader” and purported “to state an action in equity and prays affirmative relief which only a court in equity' has jurisdiction to | grant”, therefore, defendants are not entitled to. a jury trial “in this 1 proceeding”. It seems clear to me that the foregoing fails to distinguish “this proceeding” from the essentially separate “proceedings” to follow upon the determination that defendants are required to interplead. “This proceeding” may be equitable in nature, although its designation as a “bill in the nature of a bill of inter-pleader” and the fact that its prayer sought further equitable relief, would not necessarily convert a purely statutory right into an equitable right. But conceding for present purposes that “this proceeding” was equitable, the fact remains that the only essential purpose of “this proceeding” was to determine whether defendants should be required to interplead pursuant to the provisions of RSMo 1949, § 507.060, Y.A.M.S. Now, the mere fact that pláintiffs’ pleading sought some further relief, even assuming that this further relief could be granted only by a court of equity, surely does not mean that any “further equitable relief” need be granted. In an equity suit,-, the court grants only the relief which appears meet and proper under all the evidence; the court need not grant relief simply because a plaintiff asks for it. The decisive question piust always be, to what relief are plaintiffs entitled under the evidence Í It seems abundantly' *179clear to me that the only relief which need be granted and the only relief to which plaintiffs are entitled under Section 507.060 and the evidence is a judgment that the defendants interplead their actions. Whether or not that relief be called ‘ ‘ equitable relief ’ ’ is wholly unimportant. If it is equitable relief, then equity has fulfilled its sole essential function by adjudging the basic issue that defendants be required to interplead. The “equity” jurisdiction is then at an end if the chancellor decides that such relief is all the plaintiffs should have. What proceedings thereafter occur depend not in the slightest upon whether “this proceeding” (the petition for interpleader) was or was not equitable. Whether defendants are entitled to a jury trial in “this proceeding” is not the question. The question is whether after “this proceeding” (the adjudication that defendants inter-plead) has ended, defendants may have a jury determine [27] whether Bert Galloway’s injuries did or did not result in his death. The answer to this question has no connection with whether the ended proceeding was or was not equitable; it depends solely upon whether the issue is or is not a fact issue. Clearly, it is a fact issue which a jury should determine.
Furthermore, even if it be conceded that the trial chancellor had jurisdiction and the judicial power to require the parties to try the disputed fact issue to the court without a jury, certainly this should never be done unless there is some principle of right and justice which compels that requirement. There is no principle of which I am aware that would compel a court, after having determined the one essential “equitable issue”, to say that every other connected issue is thereby also equitable and that therefore the denial of a jury trial is compelled.
Thus far, I have assumed that plaintiffs’ original pleading made the proceeding “equitable” in the first instance. But, I cannot agree that this proceeding was ever an equitable proceeding. It is a statutory proceeding. There is nothing in the statute (§ 507.060) which prohibits the issues arising after the order of interpleader from being determined by a jury. All the court should do is to determine whether defendants be required to interplead. If they should and are ordered to do so, the fact issues arising thereafter should be determined by a jury.
I would reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to enter a judgment requiring defendants to interplead their entire cases; directing that (in the absence of an agreement to waive a jury) the fact issue of whether Bert Galloway’s injuries resulted in his death should be determined by a jury; and further directing that if it appears that prejudice would result to the successful party as to that issue by proceeding to have the same jury determine liability and, if so, damages, that a separate jury trial as to those issues be had.