Court Opinion

ID: 9570634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:24:49.626783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:11.650093
License: Public Domain

VOLLACK, Justice,
dissenting:
The majority opinion concludes that because the trial court applied the correct test and weighed the relevant factors, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the prejudice caused by the unreasonable delay warranted dismissal of the charges. I do not believe the trial court applied the correct test and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The majority cites People v. Hutchinson, 192 Colo. 204, 557 P.2d 376 (1976), for the proposition that:
[A] point can be reached where the delay is so great that the prejudice to the defendant caused by it — due to faded memories of parties and witnesses, loss of contact with witnesses, and loss of documents — becomes so great that due process and fundamental fairness require that the charges be dismissed.
Majority op. at 375. The majority also cites People ex rel. Coca v. District Court, 187 Colo. 280, 530 P.2d 958 (1975), for certain key factors which we have recognized as applicable to an inquiry into whether delay in arresting a defendant warrants dismissal. I do not disagree with the partial statement of law contained in either one of the authorities cited by the majority. However, in People v. Hutchinson, we also held that “[a] showing of specific prejudice is required.” 192 Colo, at 206, 557 P.2d at 377 (emphasis added). We also stated that “mere conjecture by the trial court” was an insufficient basis to find actual prejudice, by the delay in arrest. Id. (emphasis added). We did state in Hutchinson, however, that an allegation that a potential key defense witness might no longer be available to testify because of a “purposeful” delay by the state, “if true, might be sufficiently prejudicial to the defendant to require dismissal of his charges.” Id. at 206-07, 557 P.2d at 377 (emphasis added).
The majority opinion correctly notes that “the trial court concluded that the delay was not purposeful and that the prosecution did have a strong case.” Majority op. at 375. Thus, the “purposeful” element we set forth in Hutchinson has not been satisfied. More important, however, is the requirement of “specific prejudice.” The trial court stated in its findings pertaining to the unavailability of certain witnesses, that “[tjheir absence might in fact affect the defense’s ability both to prepare for trial and to present defenses at trial.” (Emphasis added.) The court undermines its own conjecture by finding that “I agree with the statement of the district attorney that it doesn’t sound as if the testimony of those witnesses would be persuasive to the Court as far as defense.” The trial court also found:
[t]he transaction occurred between the two of them [the defendant and the police officer] and the informant was not present. Although the Defendant may be prejudiced in her inability to raise certain defenses as they relate to Count 2, because of the absence of the informant and because of the people’s lack of *377reasonable effort to maintain contact with the informant, beeuase [sic] that informant has a more peripheral involvement as to Count No. 2, he is not an eye or ear witness and is not centrally involved with the setting up or the carrying out of the transaction....
(Emphasis added.)
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the trial court did not apply the correct test or weigh the relevant factors, and that count two of the information filed against the defendant should be reinstated.