Court Opinion

ID: 9964974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 15:01:21.929804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:50.955026
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2207     Document: 48    Page: 1   Filed: 05/01/2024

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                   ______________________

                INTELLECTUAL TECH LLC,
                     Plaintiff-Appellant

                             v.

      ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION,
                Defendant-Appellee
              ______________________

                         2022-2207
                   ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Western District of Texas in No. 6:19-cv-00628-ADA, Judge
 Alan D. Albright.
                   ______________________

                    Decided: May 1, 2024
                   ______________________

     JAMES PERKINS, Cole Schotz P.C., Dallas, TX, argued
 for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by TIMOTHY J.H.
 CRADDOCK, GARY SORDEN.

    WILLIAM R. PETERSON, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP,
 Houston, TX, argued for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
 sented by KARON NICOLE FOWLER, JAMES JOHN KRITSAS,
 AMANDA SCOTT WILLIAMSON, Chicago, IL; BRENT A.
 HAWKINS, San Francisco, CA.
                 ______________________

   Before PROST, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-2207    Document: 48      Page: 2    Filed: 05/01/2024

 2                                 INTELLECTUAL TECH LLC v.
                           ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

 PROST, Circuit Judge.
     Intellectual Tech LLC (“IT”) appeals from a decision of
 the United States District Court for the Western District of
 Texas dismissing all its claims against Zebra Technologies
 Corporation (“Zebra”) for lack of constitutional standing.
 Intell. Tech LLC v. Zebra Techs. Corp., No. 6:19-cv-628,
 2022 WL 1608014 (W.D. Tex. May 20, 2022) (“Opinion”).
 For the reasons below, we reverse and remand.
                         BACKGROUND
     In 2019, IT asserted U.S. Patent No. 7,233,247 (“the
 ’247 patent”) against Zebra. J.A. 67. The complaint al-
 leged, among other things, that IT “is the owner and as-
 signee” of the ’247 patent. Compl., Intell. Tech LLC v.
 Zebra Techs. Corp., No. 6:19-cv-628 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 22,
 2019), ECF No. 1 ¶ 7. Zebra first moved to dismiss the
 complaint for lack of standing, and the district court denied
 the motion. J.A. 300. Subsequently, Zebra moved for sum-
 mary judgment of no subject-matter jurisdiction based on
 IT’s purported lack of constitutional and statutory stand-
 ing. J.A. 309. The district court considered this a renewed
 motion to dismiss, granted the motion based on its deter-
 mination that IT lacked constitutional standing, and dis-
 missed all claims without prejudice. Opinion, 2022 WL
 1608014.
     IT is the wholly owned subsidiary of OnAsset Intelli-
 gence, Inc. (“OnAsset”). Rule 7.1 Corporate Disclosure
 Statement, Intell. Tech LLC v. Zebra Techs. Corp., No.
 6:19-cv-628, (W.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2019), ECF No. 2. Here,
 the history of OnAsset’s agreements with a lender, Main
 Street Capital Corporation (“Main Street”), provides im-
 portant background regarding IT’s creation and its legal
 interest in the ’247 patent. We first outline these agree-
 ments and then describe the underlying district court deci-
 sion.
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 INTELLECTUAL TECH LLC v.                                   3
 ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

                               I
      In 2011, OnAsset granted Main Street a security inter-
 est in its patents—including the ’247 patent, which was as-
 signed to OnAsset at the time—as part of a loan agreement.
 J.A. 229–39 (2011 Patent and Trademark Security Agree-
 ment); J.A. 477–89 (Security Agreement); J.A. 399–466
 (Loan Agreement). The terms gave Main Street certain
 rights that it could exercise upon OnAsset’s default of the
 loan. In 2013, Main Street notified OnAsset that it was in
 default. J.A. 510–12.
     Subsequently, in 2017, OnAsset and Main Street en-
 tered into a forbearance agreement. J.A. 162. At the same
 time, IT was formed as OnAsset’s subsidiary, and OnAsset
 assigned the ’247 patent to IT. J.A. 283–85; J.A. 184. In
 turn, IT entered into a joinder agreement to the loan agree-
 ment between OnAsset and Main Street. J.A. 211. And IT
 entered into its own patent and trademark security agree-
 ment with Main Street, granting Main Street a security in-
 terest in the ’247 patent like OnAsset had. J.A. 249 (2017
 Patent and Trademark Security Agreement). However, by
 2018, IT had defaulted as well. Opinion, 2022 WL
 1608014, at *3, *4 n.2.
      IT agrees with the district court’s assessment that the
 2011 and 2017 patent and trademark security agreements
 have “mirrored” terms. See Appellant’s Br. 11 n.1 (citing
 Opinion, 2022 WL 1608014, at *3). As a result, Main
 Street’s default rights at the time the complaint was filed
 in 2019 were the same whether assessed based on OnAs-
 set’s 2013 default (where IT’s assignment from OnAsset
 was subject to these rights) or IT’s own 2018 default. We
 follow the parties’ and district court’s convention of citing
 the 2011 agreement throughout.
     Turning to the pertinent provisions, section 4 of the pa-
 tent and trademark security agreement provides:
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 4                                 INTELLECTUAL TECH LLC v.
                           ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

     4. Debtor’s Use of the Patents and Trademarks.
     Debtor shall be permitted to control and manage
     the Patents and Trademarks, including the right to
     exclude others from making, using or selling items
     covered by the Patents and Trademarks and any
     licenses thereunder, in the same manner and with
     the same effect as if this Agreement had not been
     entered into, so long as no Default exists.
 J.A. 232.
    In the event of a default, section 6 provides options that
 Main Street can elect to exercise:
     6. Remedies. While a Default exists, Secured
     Party may, at its option, take any or all of the fol-
     lowing actions:
         (a) Secured Party may exercise any or all
         remedies available under the Loan Agree-
         ment.
         (b) Secured Party may sell, assign, trans-
         fer, pledge, encumber or otherwise dispose
         of the Patents and Trademarks.
         (c) Secured Party may enforce the Patents
         and Trademarks and any licenses thereun-
         der, and if Secured Party shall commence
         any suit for such enforcement, Debtor
         shall, at the request of Secured Party, do
         any and all lawful acts and execute any and
         all proper documents required by Secured
         Party in aid of such enforcement.
 J.A. 232.
     In turn, section 3(j) provides mechanisms for Main
 Street to exercise its rights. Specifically, it states:
     3. Representations, Warranties and Agreements.
     Debtor represents, warrants and agrees as follows:
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 ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

    ...
          (j) Power of Attorney. To facilitate Se-
          cured Party’s taking action under subsec-
          tion (i) and exercising its rights under
          Section 6, Debtor hereby irrevocably ap-
          points (which appointment is coupled with
          an interest) Secured Party, or its delegate,
          as the attorney-in-fact of Debtor with the
          right (but not the duty) from time to time
          while a Default exists to create, prepare,
          complete, execute, deliver, endorse or file,
          in the name and on behalf of Debtor, any
          and all instruments, documents, applica-
          tions, financing statements, and other
          agreements and writings required to be ob-
          tained, executed, delivered or endorsed by
          Debtor under this Section 3, or, necessary
          for Secured Party, while a Default exists, to
          enforce or use the Patents or Trademarks
          or to grant or issue any exclusive or non-
          exclusive license under the Patents or
          Trademarks to any third party, or to sell,
          assign, transfer, pledge, encumber or oth-
          erwise transfer title in or dispose of the Pa-
          tents or Trademarks to any third party.
          Debtor hereby ratifies all that such attor-
          ney shall lawfully do or cause to be done by
          virtue hereof.     The power of attorney
          granted herein shall terminate upon the
          termination of the Loan Agreement as pro-
          vided therein and the payment and perfor-
          mance of all Obligations.
 J.A. 230–32 (emphasis in original). Zebra has not pointed
 to evidence that Main Street has elected to exercise any
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 6                                  INTELLECTUAL TECH LLC v.
                            ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

 rights under section 6 or taken any action as attorney in
 fact under section 3(j). 1
                               II
      Zebra moved to dismiss for lack of standing under Fed-
 eral Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(c). The dis-
 trict court denied the motion, concluding that IT “is the
 rightful owner of the ’247 patent, retains the right to en-
 force that patent, and thus has constitutional and statu-
 tory standing to bring a patent infringement suit against
 Zebra.” J.A. 300.
     Zebra renewed its standing arguments in the form of a
 motion for summary judgment for lack of subject-matter
 jurisdiction. Zebra primarily argued that OnAsset’s initial
 default in 2013 triggered an immediate transfer of exclu-
 sionary rights to Main Street such that OnAsset had no ex-
 clusionary rights to assign IT as of the 2017 assignment
 agreements. J.A. 316.
      The district court rejected this primary argument, con-
 cluding that default gave Main Street the right “to enforce,
 ‘sell, assign, transfer, pledge, encumber or otherwise dis-
 pose of’ the ’247 patent,” but it did not “automatically divest
 OnAsset of title to the ’247 patent.” Opinion, 2022 WL
 1608014, at *3 (quoting J.A. 232 (2011 Patent and Trade-
 mark Security Agreement, section 6)). Nonetheless, the
 district court granted Zebra’s motion as to constitutional
 standing—which the court restyled as a renewed motion

     1   After the complaint was filed, IT, OnAsset, and
 Main Street entered into an amended forbearance agree-
 ment that extended the forbearance date to the end of 2022.
 J.A. 557. However, because this does not alter the consti-
 tutional standing analysis as of the complaint’s filing date,
 we need not assess the impact of forbearance on Main
 Street’s rights. See Paradise Creations, Inc. v. UV Sales,
 Inc., 315 F.3d 1304, 1309–10 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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 ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

 under Rule 12(b)(1)—because, in its view, the fact that
 “Zebra could obtain a license on the [’247] patent from Main
 Street” deprived IT of all its exclusionary rights. Id. at *7.
 The district court acknowledged that one way to read sec-
 tion 6 of the agreement was that it did not give Main Street
 a right to license, but the district court seemed to conclude
 that Main Street’s ability to assign, and Zebra’s theoretical
 ability to obtain title from such an assignment, had the
 same impact on the standing analysis as Main Street hav-
 ing “an unconditional right to license.” Id. at *7 n.4. The
 court stated that it was “follow[ing] [two district court]
 Uniloc opinions, and their extension of [the Federal Circuit
 decision in] WiAV, to find a lack of constitutional standing.”
 Id. at *7 (citing WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d
 1257, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,
 No. C 18-00358, 2020 WL 7122617 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2020);
 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, LLC, No. CV 17-
 1658, 2020 WL 7771219 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2020)).
      Next, the court rejected “IT[’s] request[] that it be af-
 forded the opportunity to cure any defects in constitutional
 standing by joining Main Street or substituting it under
 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 or 20.” Id. at *8. The
 court reasoned that the standing defect existed at the time
 of filing and was therefore incurable. Id. Finally, the court
 found it unnecessary to reach Zebra’s arguments related to
 statutory standing in light of the Article III (i.e., constitu-
 tional) determination. Id. The court dismissed all of IT’s
 claims without prejudice. Id.
     IT moved for reconsideration. J.A. 581–82. The court
 denied IT’s motion, largely reiterating the reasoning it out-
 lined in its initial decision. Intell. Tech LLC v. Zebra Techs.
 Corp., No. 6:19-cv-628, 2022 WL 3088572 (W.D. Tex. Aug.
 3, 2022). The court summarized its understanding of the
 relevant law as follows: “a patent title holder can deprive
 itself of exclusionary rights by vesting a third party with a
 right to assign or sublicense the patent (even if the third
 party never exercises those rights).” Id. at *2. The court
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 8                                 INTELLECTUAL TECH LLC v.
                           ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

 acknowledged that “IT may be correct that it is more accu-
 rate to say that, on default, Main Street has an unfettered
 right to license and/or assign the ’247 patent in IT’s name.”
 Id. at *3 (emphasis in original). However, the court consid-
 ered its analysis “completely unaffected by this” purported
 agency-based distinction. Id.
     IT timely appealed. J.A. 611. We have jurisdiction un-
 der 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
                         DISCUSSION
                               I
     Article III standing determinations are reviewed de
 novo. Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 625 F.3d
 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Standing requires: (1) an in-
 jury in fact; (2) traceability; and (3) redressability. Lujan
 v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). The only
 meaningful dispute raised by the circumstances here re-
 lates to the injury-in-fact requirement. 2 An injury in fact
 is an “actual or imminent” “concrete and particularized”
 “invasion of a legally protected interest.” Id. at 560. This
 requirement is mandatory at the inception of the lawsuit
 and carries through the case, requiring the plaintiff to
 prove it “with the manner and degree of evidence required
 at the successive stages of the litigation.” Id. at 561.
     The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a le-
 gal issue, and we review the district court’s interpretation
 de novo. Gonzalez v. Denning, 394 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir.
 2004). It is undisputed that Texas law applies to the

     2  Zebra does present a cursory redressability argu-
 ment based on IT’s ability to sufficiently prove its damages
 model. Appellee’s Br. 25. Because this is an argument
 about IT’s ability to prove substantive elements of its
 claims instead of a jurisdictional argument, we reject it
 without further discussion.
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 ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

 agreements at issue here. See Appellant’s Br. 8; Appellee’s
 Br. 8. Under Texas law, contracts are read as a whole to
 give meaning to the parties’ intent as expressed in the writ-
 ing, and an agreement is considered ambiguous only where
 the language of the contract is subject to two or more rea-
 sonable interpretations or meanings. Gonzalez, 394 F.3d
 at 392; see also Frost Nat’l Bank v. L&F Distribs., Ltd., 165
 S.W.3d 310, 312 (Tex. 2005) (concluding that an agreement
 is not ambiguous where, “after the pertinent rules of con-
 struction are applied, the contract can be given a definite
 or certain legal meaning”).
                              II
     The only question before us is whether IT demon-
 strated the irreducible constitutional minimum of an in-
 jury in fact. All that requires here is that IT retained an
 exclusionary right—i.e., infringement would amount to an
 invasion of IT’s legally protected interest. Under the only
 reasonable reading of the patent and trademark security
 agreement, IT still retained at least one exclusionary right,
 even in view of the rights Main Street gained upon default.
     Before going further, it is perhaps just as important to
 frame what is not at issue on appeal here. We need not
 determine whether IT’s legal interest in the ’247 patent
 was sufficient to meet the “patentee” requirement of
 35 U.S.C. § 281, an issue the district court did not reach.
 This court has clarified, in light of the Supreme Court’s
 opinion in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
 Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), that § 281 is not a
 jurisdictional requirement. See Lone Star Silicon Innova-
 tions LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1235 (Fed.
 Cir. 2019) (“Lexmark is irreconcilable with our earlier au-
 thority treating § 281 as a jurisdictional requirement.”);
 Schwendimann v. Arkwright Advanced Coating, Inc., 959
 F.3d 1065, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[Lone Star] recognized
 that intervening Supreme Court precedent made clear that
 our earlier decisions treating the prerequisites of the
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 10                                INTELLECTUAL TECH LLC v.
                           ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

 Patent Act as jurisdictional were wrong.”). Further, we
 have acknowledged that the § 281 inquiry (sometimes
 called statutory standing in our cases, particularly before
 Lexmark) and the injury-in-fact inquiry (for constitutional
 standing) are distinct. Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1234–35
 (“[A]lthough Lone Star does not possess all substantial
 rights in the asserted patents [to satisfy § 281] its allega-
 tions still satisfy Article III.”); Univ. of S. Fla. Rsch.
 Found., Inc. v. Fujifilm Med. Sys. U.S.A., Inc., 19 F.4th
 1315, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“[W]e hold [the plaintiff] fails
 to meet the statutory requirements of § 281 but does meet
 the requirements of constitutional standing.”). In general,
 the question for the injury-in-fact threshold is whether a
 party has an exclusionary right. Univ. of S. Fla. Rsch.
 Found., 19 F.4th at 1323.
      Prior to our case law’s acknowledgement of this juris-
 dictional and substantive distinction, many of this court’s
 opinions had improperly melded the injury-in-fact inquiry
 with the § 281 inquiry—often performing a combined anal-
 ysis of the two simultaneously. The lack of delineation be-
 tween these two separate legal questions in prior opinions
 may have caused some of the uncertainty the district court
 grappled with here. However, the implications illustrate
 why the distinction is critical. Article III standing is a ju-
 risdictional requirement, which is incurable if absent at
 the initiation of suit. See Paradise Creations, 315 F.3d at
 1309–10; Abraxis, 625 F.3d at 1366 n.2. Further, for Arti-
 cle III purposes, “[a]t least one plaintiff must have standing
 to seek each form of relief requested in the complaint.”
 Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 439
 (2017). The issue of whether the statutory requirements of
 § 281 are met, on the other hand, is not jurisdictional and
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 ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

 a defect is curable by joinder. Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1235–
 36. 3
     We now turn to the only question on appeal, whether
 IT had an exclusionary right in the ’247 patent when the
 complaint was filed. The answer is a clear yes.
      Zebra argues that Main Street’s ability to license the
 ’247 patent pursuant to section 3(j) of the agreement de-
 prived IT of all exclusionary rights. Zebra makes two ar-
 guments related to licensing: (1) Main Street had the
 exclusive ability to license upon default, which deprived IT
 of all exclusionary rights, Appellee’s Br. 29–32; and
 (2) even if both Main Street and IT had the ability to license
 upon default, Main Street’s non-exclusive ability to do so
 still divested IT of all exclusionary rights, id. at 17–29.
     First, based on our assessment of the patent and trade-
 mark security agreement as a whole, we reject Zebra’s ar-
 gument that the agreement granted Main Street exclusive
 licensing rights upon default. Nothing in the agreement
 indicates that, without further action by Main Street, the
 mere triggering of Main Street’s options under section 6

     3    Issues of joinder are also not before us on appeal.
 Because the district court concluded that IT lacked consti-
 tutional standing, it did not assess IT’s proposed joinder of
 Main Street under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 or
 20. Opinion, 2022 WL 1608014, at *8. In light of our de-
 termination that IT does have constitutional standing, is-
 sues of joinder can, if necessary, be addressed on remand.
 See Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1236–39. We also note that fol-
 lowing the dismissal here, Main Street, OnAsset, and IT
 filed suit as co-plaintiffs. Intell. Tech LLC v. Zebra Techs.
 Corp., No. 6:22-cv-00788 (W.D. Tex.). That case is cur-
 rently stayed pending this appeal. Order Staying Case, In-
 tell. Tech LLC v. Zebra Techs. Corp., No. 6:22-cv-788 (W.D.
 Tex. Jan. 9, 2023), ECF No. 48.
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 and mechanisms under section 3(j) automatically deprived
 IT of all its rights under section 4. Because we reject this
 exclusive-rights argument based on our interpretation of
 the agreement alone, we need not assess whether IT would
 have constitutional standing under that reading of the
 agreement.
     Next, we conclude that IT retained exclusionary rights
 even though Main Street had the non-exclusive ability to
 license the ’247 patent. 4 A patent owner has exclusionary
 rights sufficient to meet the injury-in-fact requirement
 even where, without more, it grants another party the abil-
 ity to license. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility
 LLC, 52 F.4th 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (observing but
 not holding that “[p]atent owners and licensees do not have
 identical patent rights, and patent owners arguably do not
 lack standing simply because they granted a license that
 gave another party the right to sublicense the patent to an
 alleged infringer”); see also id. at 1351 (Lourie, J., addi-
 tional views) (“The grant of a non-exclusive license with the
 right to sublicense, as here, gives the licensee the right to
 sublicense others. But the patentee still retains the right
 to sue unlicensed infringers.”). 5

      4   We need not address the parties’ dispute about the
 agency-based implications of the attorney-in-fact provision
 in section 3(j) because our conclusion is the same even if,
 upon default, Main Street could grant licenses on behalf of
 itself. At oral argument in this court, Zebra stated that it
 was not relying on the attorney-in-fact provision as a
 ground independent of the section 6 and 3(j) provisions.
 Oral Arg. at 11:55–12:02, No. 22-2207, https://oralargu-
 ments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=22-2207_0403202
 4.mp3.
     5    In Uniloc, the district court concluded that a
 lender’s ability to sublicense upon default deprived the pa-
 tent owner of standing, and this court affirmed the no-
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 ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

     Zebra relies heavily on this court’s opinion in WiAV, as
 the district court did in its opinion, to support its argument
 that Main Street’s non-exclusive ability to license stripped
 IT of all exclusionary rights. However, WiAV is not instruc-
 tive here.
     In WiAV, the court asked whether the plaintiff was an
 exclusive licensee (an entity that received an exclusionary
 right as part of a license) or bare licensee (an entity that
 received only “a promise from the patentee that the pa-
 tentee will not sue the licensee for practicing the patented
 invention”). 631 F.3d at 1265. And, even through that
 lens, which is distinct from the situation at issue here, the
 court still rejected the notion that “the licensee must be the
 only party with the ability to license the patent” in order to
 constitute an exclusive licensee. Id. at 1266 (emphasis in
 original). There, in order to assess whether the plaintiff’s
 license included the rights to exclude the alleged infringer,
 the court assessed whether the alleged infringer possessed
 or was capable of “obtaining[] a license of those rights from
 any other party.” Id. at 1266–67. Ultimately, the court
 determined that WiAV’s sole ability to practice and subli-
 cense within its licensed subfield was sufficient to demon-
 strate that its license had conferred an exclusionary right
 and, as a result, infringement within that subfield
 amounted to an injury in fact. Id. at 1267.
     The licensee-versus-patentee distinction between
 WiAV and this case is critical. A patent owner has exclu-
 sionary rights as a baseline matter unless it has

 standing judgment based only on collateral estoppel as a
 result of an earlier unappealed loss on the issue by Uniloc.
 52 F.4th at 1345. The reasoning of the district court’s
 standing determination in Uniloc has not been endorsed by
 this court.
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 transferred all exclusionary rights away. 6 In contrast, a
 licensee ordinarily obtains freedom from suit but does not
 necessarily obtain an interest in preventing others from
 practicing the patent. As a result, in the licensee context,
 questions about other entities’ ability to license can provide
 a reasonable proxy for understanding the extent of rights a
 licensee received as part of the license—i.e., whether the
 license granted exclusionary rights or mere freedom from
 suit. Those same questions do not provide a reasonable
 proxy for understanding whether a patent owner retains at
 least one exclusionary right or whether it has transferred
 all exclusionary rights away. As Judge Lourie explained in
 his additional views in Uniloc, the issue of patent owner’s
 exclusionary rights is “incorrectly dealt with . . . as one of
 determining what is an exclusive license.” 52 F.4th at 1351
 (Lourie, J., additional views).
      We need not enumerate the exclusionary rights af-
 forded by a patent or fully define their scope here. Instead,
 it is sufficient to conclude that Main Street and IT’s shared
 ability to license while a default existed did not divest IT,
 the patent owner, of all exclusionary rights. Cases that
 have evaluated a patent owner’s rights support this conclu-
 sion. For example, in Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Op-
 tics, Inc., this court concluded that the patent owner had
 not transferred away all of its rights where the rights it
 granted to a third party, including an unfettered right to
 sublicense (among many other rights), were given “for only
 a limited portion of the patent term.” 434 F.3d 1336, 1342–
 43 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci.
 Rsch. v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
 2010) (concluding that the patent owner had not trans-
 ferred away all rights, even under an exclusive license with

      6  Because there is no dispute that OnAsset had all
 rights in the ’247 patent before its loan agreement with
 Main Street, the patent owner framing is apt here.
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 rights to sublicense, where the patent owner retained the
 right to sue). Further, in the context of patent co-owners,
 which share exclusionary rights, we have concluded that
 an individual co-owner has Article III standing. See Anten-
 naSys, Inc. v. AQYR Techs., Inc., 976 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed.
 Cir. 2020). In sum, IT still suffers an injury in fact from
 infringement even if IT and Main Street can both license
 the patent.
     In addition to its arguments about licensing, Zebra also
 argues that the clause in section 6 of the patent and trade-
 mark security agreement that granted Main Street the op-
 tion to “sell, assign, transfer, pledge, encumber or
 otherwise dispose of the” ’247 patent, J.A. 232, divested IT
 of all exclusionary rights. We disagree on this point as
 well.
      Main Street’s unexercised option to assign—whether to
 itself or to others—was not a present divestment of IT’s ex-
 clusionary rights. Zebra’s arguments treat Main Street’s
 option to assign as equivalent to the ultimate ability to li-
 cense under WiAV. Whatever role another entity’s ability
 to license has in the Article III inquiry for a patent owner,
 it is clear that assignment must be evaluated based on the
 actual transfer of rights, not mere ability. See Abraxis, 625
 F.3d at 1364–65 (evaluating whether rights transferred au-
 tomatically or were set to transfer at some point in the fu-
 ture); Cent. Admixture Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Advanced
 Cardiac Sols., P.C., 482 F.3d 1347, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir.
 2007) (holding that the plaintiff had Article III standing
 even where the government had “discretionary authority to
 take title” to the asserted patent because the government
 “ha[d] shown no interest” in doing so (emphasis in origi-
 nal)). The district court correctly determined that IT was
 not automatically divested of title upon default. However,
 it incorrectly concluded that Main Street’s option to assign
 presently divested IT of all other legal interests in the ’247
 patent. The exclusionary rights that IT would have lost
 upon Main Street’s foreclosure or assignment to another
Case: 22-2207     Document: 48    Page: 16    Filed: 05/01/2024

 16                                INTELLECTUAL TECH LLC v.
                           ZEBRA TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

 party must be evaluated in the same way the court evalu-
 ated title—based on the actual state of rights instead of
 their hypothetical redistribution at some unspecified point
 in the future. Because Main Street did not exercise any
 options under section 6, IT was not presently divested of all
 exclusionary rights.
                        CONCLUSION
     Main Street’s default rights under the patent and
 trademark security agreement did not deprive IT of all ex-
 clusionary rights. Thus, the district court incorrectly de-
 termined that IT could not demonstrate that infringement
 of the ’247 patent amounted to an injury in fact. Because
 IT has constitutional standing, we reverse and remand.
                REVERSED AND REMANDED
                            COSTS
 Costs to IT.