Court Opinion

ID: 9538121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:30:55.188749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:31.530632
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Chief Justice:
Appeal from a summary judgment denying a petition to set aside a release of claims incident to a car accident. Affirmed, with costs to Kingsford.
On April 26, 1971, Mrs. Carter’s and Mr. Kings ford’s cars collided in an intersection, resulting in injuries to the former. Her doctor, on the day of the event, diagnosed her injuries as a “cervical contusion” or cervical strain, strain of the left shoulder and superficial abrasions. Next day she was hospitalized and stayed there until June 6, 1971, — about 5j4 weeks. On July 14, 1971, she signed the release, after receiving $3,334.09, subject of this suit. Shortly thereafter Mrs. Carter noticed a recurrence of numbness in her arm. She was treated by her doctor until November, 1974, when she saw another doctor. She was admitted to the hospital again in January, 1975, — over four years after the accident, and about 3½ years after signing the release. During that period she was treated by her own physician and others as consultants, and finally by Dr. Van Hook, who found that at that time she had a cervical herniated disc, and during that same month she had surgery involving fusion of the C-5 and 6 discs.
This case seems to be controlled by Reynolds v. Merrill,1 which both parties urge is dispositive here.
Plaintiff Carter says the instant case “is very similar to the Reynolds case.” Defendant Kingsford says the facts in the Reynolds case “are extremely important to the disposition of the instant case,” ob*1006viously meaning “dispositive” in favor of Kingsford’s urgence that the release was binding and not subject to any claim of mutual mistake; the basis of the Reynolds case.
This author dissented in that case,2 as did Justice Callister, but the law of that case was enunciated in Reynolds as reflected in the language penned by our learned colleague Mr. Justice Ellett where he opined that the trial judge in refusing to vacate the release failed to distinguish between “an unknown injury and unknown consequences of a known injury” where “the former can be the basis of a mutual mistake, while the latter would be only a mistake of opinion.”
Irrespective of this author’s belief and contention that there was no true mutual mistake in Reynolds, and that anyway, the release was all-inclusive, the language quoted above appears to be the law of this State relating to a release signed in accident cases.
Applying such pronouncement to the facts here, we believe and hold that the release was not voidable and could be only if they present a genuine issue of fact and we think that there was not such a real, genuine issue, and that Mrs. Carter’s thesis is tenuous compensabilitywise.
In the Reynolds case the diagnosis was 1) “Traumatic bursitis of right shoulder,”3 “not disabled,” and 2) “Traumatic myositis posterior neck muscles.”4
In the instant case the diagnosis was, at the time of the accident, "a cervical strain, strain of the left shoulder and superficial abrasions,”5 according to Mrs. Carter’s doctor, who also said that the x-rays and analysis as of 1971 indicated a slight degenerative disc disease at C-5 and ó, but that at that time “there was no reason for a prognosis of any necessary or possible surgical repair.” ^ Mrs. Carter must have considered the diagnosis, and significantly stated in her own affidavit that at the time of the release she was aware of the injury, believing it was merely a severe neck strain, but was unaware of the nature or extent of her injury.
We are of the opinion that the trial judge’s memorandum decision was and is well taken and reflects the law espoused in Reynolds, as applied to the facts of this case when he says:
There can be no question that after the accident she knew and was informed that she had an injury to her neck. .
This is without a doubt a case in which a release has been given for a known neck injury, the future of which was speculative, and in the general belief that the plaintiff was recovering, but that the monies were paid for the risk of known recovery. The case is clearly distinguishable from Reynolds v. Merrill, 23 Utah 2d, 155, [, 460 P.2d 323,] where the injury was not noted and not considered in its true light at the time. ... If a release is good at all this release must be recognized. . . . Unquestionably, from Dr. Jahsman’s report to attorney Keith Henderson in the file, this is a “known injury where the result was not foreseeable” and settled on that basis. [R. 114-115]
There is nothing in the record, it would appear, that would reflect other than that at the time of the injury there were “unknown consequences of a known injury” such that there could not be an avoidance *1007of the release tinder the Reynolds v. Merrill rule.
WILKINS, J., concurs in result.

. 23 Utah 2d 155, 460 P.2d 323 (1969).

. Still considering that ease to be a departure from equitable principles and the quality and quantum of proof traditionally required in such cases, and situations to which they apply, where the release covers both known and unknown physical conditions.

. “Commonly understood as a painful inflammation of the shoulder or elbow.” (Webster’s Third International Dictionary).

. Said to be “muscular discomfort or pain from infection or an unknown cause.” (Webster’s supra.).

. Having to do with a cervical vertebra, nerve or artery. Of or relating to a neck. (Webster’s, supra.).