Court Opinion

ID: 9852652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:34:19.696407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:31.714087
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion for two reasons. First, in my opinion this action is barred by the doctrine of "sovereign immunity,” and secondly, assuming the action is not so barred there has been no constitutionally impermissible impairment of the obligation of appellees’ contracts.
1. The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been embedded in the law of this state throughout its entire history, though judicially created and nurtured until recent years. Since it was a creature of the courts and could have been abrogated by the courts, this court and the Court of Appeals in opinions over the past 15 years have severely criticized the doctrine and urged legislative action on the question. Pursuant to such prodding, the General Assembly in 1973 submitted an amendment to the Constitution which was ratified by the electorate in 1974. Code Ann. § 2-3710. This amendment authorizes the General Assembly to create a State Court of Claims to try and dispose of cases "involving claims for injury or damage” against the state and concludes that "[njothing contained herein shall constitute a waiver of the immunity of the state from suit, but such sovereign immunity is expressly reserved except to the extent of any waiver of immunity provided in this Constitution and such waiver or qualification of immunity as is now or may hereafter be provided by act of the General Assembly.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from this language of the Constitution that the immunity applies to contracts as well as torts, the word "injury” being usually applied to a claim arising in *766tort and the word "damage” being usually applied to a claim based on a contract. The word "suit” is all-inclusive and applicable to any type of action.
This court has had occasion to review the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the light of this amendment. In Azizi v. Board of Regents, University System, 233 Ga. 487 (212 SE2d 627) (1975) we said, "Because of the adoption of this constitutional amendment, and it is now effective as a part of our Constitution, we hold that the immunity rule as it has heretofore existed in this state cannot be abrogated or modified by this court. The immunity rule now has constitutional status, and solutions to the inequitable problems that it has posed and continues to pose must now be effected by the General Assembly.” We further stated that the "Changes in the immunity rule, and the extent of such changes and in what circumstances, are now solely within the domain of the General Assembly of Georgia.” The holding in Azizi was relied upon and followed in Revels v. Tift County, 235 Ga. 333 (1975).
In other words, it is an entirely new ball game as far as the doctrine of sovereign immunity is concerned. The General Assembly has not as yet created a State Court of Claims nor has it said what changes and the "extent of such changes and in what circumstances” shall be made in the rule. What we do know, and what this court has said in Azizi and Revels, supra, is that the doctrine now has constitutional status, and applies, in my opinion, to any "suit” involving claims for "injury” or "damage” against the state unless and until there is a waiver by Act of the General Assembly. At the present time there is simply no rational basis for making a distinction between a suit in tort and a suit in contract. Therefore the holding in Regents, University System v. Blanton, 49 Ga. App. 602 (176 SE 673) (1933) is no longer viable. Likewise, other opinions of the courts of this state dealing with the judicial application of the rule prior to the 1974 amendment are not applicable to claims against the state arising since the 1974 amendment.
The state in this situation has not seen "fit to disrobe itself of its sovereignty.” See Georgia Military Institute v. Simpson, 31 Ga. 273, 277 (1860). Since the General *767Assembly has taken no action which would allow or sanction an action such as is here involved, the doctrine of sovereign immunity as clearly expressed in the Constitution must be followed. The action is thus barred and the trial court erred in not so holding.
Since this dissent was written the majority opinion has been materially revised with reference to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The original opinion held that since the Regents had authority to "contract” there was implied waiver of this immunity whereas the revised opinion goes back to a 1785 Act of the General Assembly as authority to show an express waiver of sovereign immunity. At least the majority has correctly concluded that the General Assembly can only waive sovereign immunity by a clear-cut positive expression of its intention to do so.
However, it is still my opinion that the majority has failed in its historical approach to show that Regents has been expressly stripped of its sovereign immunity. To me it is completely ludicrous to hold that the General Assembly in 1785 (when it created a private corporation to operate the University of Georgia) expressly intended to waive the sovereign immunity of the Board of Regents some 190 years later. It is indeed strange that this discovery has just been made by this court despite myriad prior cases involving Regents and its predecessors on the question of sovereign immunity. If such an express waiver can be gleaned from the language in the 1785 Act giving the trustees authority to "plead and be impleaded,” then such waiver must be applied to all suits including torts and contracts. Yet the appellate courts of this state have clearly and consistently held that the Board of Regents was immune from tort actions. See Perry & Crider v. Regents, University System, 127 Ga. App. 42 (1) (192 SE2d 518) (1972); Azizi v. Board of Regents, 132 Ga. App. 384 (208 SE2d 153) (1974), cert. dismissed, and Azizi v. Board of Regents, University System, 233 Ga. 487 (212 SE2d 627) (1975). For the majority to be consistent in its reasoning this line of cases would have to be overruled. To do so, however, would be in utter conflict with what we said in Azizi, supra, to the effect that after the 1974 Amendment the "immunity *768rule as it has heretofore existed in this State cannot be abrogated or modified by this court.”
We point out these conflicts to emphasize the highly technical and unsound reasoning the majority has used to justify the result which has been reached. The court has abandoned the sound position it took in Azizi, supra, and has sunken deeper into the Serbonian bog of sovereign immunity.
2. The constitutional proscription against laws which impair the obligation of contracts is not completely inflexible. A well recognized exception to this rule is whether the exercise of the police power for the general welfare is placed above the interference or impairment of private contracts. See 16 CJS 1284, 1286, Constitutional Law, § 281.
"[W]here the police power is exercised 'for an end which is in fact public,’ contracts must yield to the accomplishment of that end.” Veix v. Sixth Ward Building &c. Assn., 310 U. S. 32, 41 (1940).
During the depression of the thirties, Minnesota passed an Act restricting the rights of a mortgagor to foreclose his contract in the event of default, clearly impairing the obligation of such contracts. This statute was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in Home Building &c. Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934) where it was said, ". . . the State also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. It does not matter that legislation appropriate to the end 'has the result of modifying or abrogating the contracts already in effect.’ ” P. 434.
This court can take notice that this nation is in the midst of its worst depression since that time. A look at cities such as New York and nations such as Italy, England and Australia convinces us of the holocaust that can result from continuous and unbridled deficit spending. Wisely, our Constitution clearly prohibits such spending on the part of the state. Art. VII, Sec. IX, Par. II of the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1945 (Code Ann. § 2-6202). It was clear in July of 1975 that the General Assembly had exceeded this constitutional authority by passing the General Appropriations Act of 1975, which included some $56,000,000 for raises for state *769employees. On the basis of figures then available this court would have held such Act clearly unconstitutional. The Governor and the General Assembly, being aware of this constitutional infirmity, called a special session in order to amend the Act so as to conform to the constitutional mandate. Such action was clearly an exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the people of Georgia and was necessary to safeguard the vital interests of the people. The contract clause in the Constitution must be construed in harmony with the reserved power of the state to safeguard these vital interests.
Those who enter into contracts with the State of Georgia or its agencies do so with knowledge of this paramount and overriding interest of the public welfare. Under such conditions as they existed in July 1975, and continue to exist, the Governor and the General Assembly had no alternative but to amend the Act so as to bring it within the constitutional mandate against deficit spending. Any less action or no action at all would have amounted to a dereliction of the duties imposed upon them.
Under all the circumstances I am convinced that any impairment of the obligation of the appellees’ contracts must yield to the laws and Constitution of this State which mandated the action on the part of the appellants in the vital interests and general welfare of the people of Georgia.
I respectfully dissent.