Court Opinion

ID: 9371266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 21:02:17.222969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:26.539404
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/15/23 Ma v. Mt Son CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

JAWON MA,                                                  B320965

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct.
         v.                                                No. 19STCV32106)

MT SON, LLC,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from the judgment and order of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Randolph M. Hammock, Judge.
Affirmed.
      Timothy D. McGonigle for Appellant.
      Kim, Shapiro, Park & Lee, John P. Lee and Paul Park for
Respondent.
                  __________________________

     Mt Son, LLC, appeals from a judgment entered after a
bench trial in favor of Jawon Ma, in which the trial court granted
an equitable easement over Mt Son’s property for the benefit of
Ma’s adjacent property. Mt Son contends the court erred in
granting the easement—which allows Ma to use Mt Son’s
driveway to access her backyard for trash removal, gardening,
and maintenance—because the evidence at trial did not support a
finding in favor of Ma on each of the required elements for an
equitable easement. Mt Son also argues the court erred in
denying its motions to correct the statement of decision and for a
new trial. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.     The Properties1
       Ma is the owner of real property located at 1245-1247 East
Colorado Street in Glendale (Ma property). She inherited the
property from her parents, who acquired it around 1980. The
rectangular lot is approximately 50 feet wide along the street and
120 feet deep. A single building occupies the full width of the
property and is divided into two commercial units used by
tenants for retail shops and restaurants. At the back of the
property is an undeveloped yard (backyard) on which is a storage
shed and tenants’ trash bins. There is no access to the backyard
over Ma’s property except through the building and up a flight of
stairs leading to the back of the building.2

1    Our description of the properties is based on the
undisputed facts set forth in the parties’ trial briefs, and the
photographs, diagrams, and property records admitted at trial.
2      It appears from the record that the backyard is higher than
the street, so it can only be accessed by walking up a flight of
stairs.

                                2
      Mt Son owns the neighboring property on the east side of
the Ma property at 1301-1303 East Colorado Street (Mt Son
property). Mt Son acquired the property in August 2018. The lot
is approximately 50 feet wide and 190 feet deep. The property
contains a small commercial building on the street and three
residential buildings at the rear of the lot. A paved driveway
approximately 10 feet wide runs along the western perimeter of
the property—adjacent to the Ma property—which provides
access to the three residential buildings.
      In 1971 Mabel Rauch, then-owner of the Ma property, and
Vladamir Vly, then-owner of the Mt Son property, recorded an
easement agreement granting Rauch drainage access for water
flowing from the rear of the Ma property over the Mt Son
driveway. In exchange, Rauch granted an easement to Vly for
him and his tenants to use Raush’s backyard for private parking.
The agreement provided each of the easements would terminate
upon the death of the owner or sale of the property. It is
undisputed the easement agreement expired long ago.3

B.    The First Amended Complaint
      Ma filed this action against Mt Son on September 10,
2019. The operative first amended complaint (complaint)
     4

3     Ma stated in her trial brief “the previously recorded
easement dated November 15, 1971 expired over 20 years ago,”
and Mt Son’s trial brief asserted the easement agreement “has
long since terminated” because the parties to the agreement
“have long since passed away.”
4    The complaint was filed by Jawon Ma and Sang-Cheul
Kong as trustees of The Kong Family Trust dated July 7, 1986.
By the time of trial, Ma’s parents had died and the Ma property

                                3
asserted causes of action for quiet title, easement by estoppel,
easement by necessity, easement by prescription, trespass,
permanent injunction, and declaratory relief. The complaint
alleged that due to the layout of the parties’ properties, access
over the Mt Son driveway provided the only viable access to Ma’s
backyard from the public street, and an easement had been in
continuous use from 1980 until 2018, when Mt Son blocked Ma’s
access. Shortly after purchasing the Mt Son property in 2018, Mt
Son erected a wooden fence between the two properties. Mt Son
removed the fence a few months later and planted trees along the
property line that likewise blocked Ma’s access to the Mt Son
driveway. Ma alleged further the trees were planted within her
property line, constituting a trespass.
       The second cause of action was styled as a cause of action
for easement by estoppel, but it alleged the elements for an
equitable easement. Ma alleged “the [e]asement in question has
been in use for over a period of five years. [Ma has] been utilizing
the [e]asement or right of way continuously with an innocent
belief that [Ma] had a right to do so. Without provision for
ingress and egress, there is no physical or economical viable
access for necessary utility services, fire protection and
emergency services, and quiet enjoyment of the [d]ominant
[t]enement, which would cause irreparable harm. The
[e]asement would not burden [Mt Son] greatly, or at all.”
       The complaint prayed for the granting of an easement over
the Mt Son driveway and/or declaratory and injunctive relief
recognizing Ma’s legal right to use the driveway, an injunction

had been passed to Ma. As a result, the trial court granted Ma’s
request to amend the complaint to substitute herself as the
plaintiff in her individual capacity.

                                 4
ordering Mt Son to remove any obstructions that interfere with
Ma’s use of her property or the driveway, and economic and
special damages caused by Mt Son’s interference with Ma’s use of
the driveway.

C.     The Evidence at Trial
       A bench trial was held on December 13 and December 14,
2021. Ma testified and called as witnesses Hisajazu Ota (her
gardener), Armik Mikailian (her former property manager), and
Kevin Yoon Lai (a surveyor as an expert witness on the property
line). Mt Son called as witnesses Mkrtich (Mike) Tamrazyan (Mt
Son’s principal member and owner), Daniel Svetich (owner prior
to Tamrazyan), and Gary Davis (longtime tenant on the Mt Son
property).

      1.     Ma’s evidence
      Ma testified that from the time her parents acquired the
property in 1980, the only access to the backyard from the street
was over the Mt Son property on the east side. To the west of the
Ma property is the parking lot of an automotive parts store, with
a masonry wall separating the properties. In the rear of the
property is a brick wall between Ma’s property and the neighbor’s
property to the north. There is no alley, pathway, or rear access.
      In 1983 or 1984 Ma’s parents installed a metal fence
between Ma’s backyard and the Mt Son property after receiving
complaints from the owner of the Mt Son property that one of
Ma’s tenants was using the Mt Son driveway to park a vehicle in
Ma’s backyard. The fence remained at the time of trial. It had a
pedestrian gate opening to the Mt Son driveway to enable use by
Ma’s tenants of the Mt Son driveway to move trash, receive
deliveries, or for other purposes. Prior to October 2018, Ma’s

                                5
tenants used the gate and the Mt Son driveway to take their
trash bins out to Colorado Street once per week for trash pickup
(or twice per week in the case of restaurant tenants). Ma’s
gardeners also used the driveway “a few times a year” to drop off
equipment and remove yard debris, and construction and
maintenance workers occasionally used the driveway to deliver
supplies to the Ma property.
       Ma was aware the Mt Son property changed ownership in
2018, and in October 2018 Mt Son as the new owner, without
notifying Ma, installed a wooden fence immediately in front of
her gate, blocking access to the Mt Son driveway. Around
January 2019, without notice, the wooden fence was removed and
replaced with a row of trees that similarly blocked Ma’s gate and
her access to the Mt Son driveway.5
       Ma described her tenants’ use of the Mt Son driveway. A
pawn shop had been a tenant since 1992 and used the gate and
driveway. Ma could not recall if the upholstery store that was a
tenant starting in 1984 used the gate to access the driveway. But
Ma observed a shoe store that leased the property after the
upholstery store use the gate once a week to move boxes in and
out of the back area. In addition, a gift shop that was a tenant
for five to seven years used the gate. Ma explained the tenants
would bring their trash bins through the gate and down the
driveway to the street. The city trash trucks did not use the
driveway to pick up the tenants’ trash. The court then inquired,
“The driveway is not necessary for the trash people to drive up
and pick it up?” Ma responded, “No.”

5     Photographs admitted at trial show a row of bushy trees
planted in a hedgerow along the property line in front of the
metal fence and gate.

                                6
       Mikailian testified he began managing the Ma property
around 2015 because the Ma family was living in another state.
Around October 2018 Mikailian observed that Mt Son had
erected a wooden fence in front of the Ma gate. Mikailian
approached a person he believed to be the owner of the Mt Son
property and complained that the fence blocked access for trash
removal.6 Mt Son removed the fence “fairly quickly” but then
planted the trees blocking the gate.
       Mikailian received complaints from Ma’s tenants, most
significantly from Matias Restaurant. The restaurant had signed
a three-year lease in October 2018 and opened shortly before the
gate was blocked. The restaurant representatives complained
they were unable to move their trash bins from the backyard to
the street. In December 2019 Matias terminated its lease with
two years remaining and withheld rent due to Ma’s asserted
failure to maintain the premises. The termination notice
admitted at trial stated Ma breached the lease agreement
because she “allowed the construction of a barrier that was not
there when [the restaurant] signed the lease agreement. This
barrier is interfering with [restaurant] business and is impeding
on its employees’ access to the common areas, including the
dumpsters in the back of the facilities. [¶] As a result, . . .
employees are forced to walk the trash through the restaurant on
a daily basis in front of customers. Aside from being extremely
unsightly, this creates a serious health hazard . . . . [¶]
Additionally, the barrier is blocking the gardener’s access. As a
result, the gardener is forced to walk through the restaurant and
up a flight of stairs, with all of his equipment. . . . This is a direct
violation of . . . the lease agreement because it impedes with . . .

6     Tamrazyan denied Mikailian ever spoke with him.

                                   7
use and access to the common areas. Again, you can see how this
type of unsanitary conduct creates a hazardous risk for patrons of
the restaurant.” The restaurant space was vacant for at least six
months after termination by Matias, which had been paying
about $3,000 in monthly rent. The current tenant is a karate
studio, but the restaurant fixtures remain unused on the site.
      Ota testified he provided gardening services at the Ma
property since the early-to-mid 1980s. He typically visited the
property four to six times a year to clear weeds and leaves. Prior
to the time Mt Son planted the trees, Ota would use his vehicle
on the Mt Son driveway to unload equipment and pick up waste.
No one ever told him not to use the driveway. Since Mt Son
blocked the driveway, Ota’s crew had been parking in the
automotive store parking lot on the other side of the Ma property,
and his workers “backed the truck [on the] other side of the
property, and . . . jump[ed] over the wall and toss[ed] the trash to
the truck.” Ota changed the schedule “because it’s a hassle to go
there.”
      Lai, the surveyor, opined the center of the trunks of the
trees planted by Mt Son were on the Ma property, approximately
three inches from the Mt Son property line.

       2.    Mt Son’s evidence
       Tamrayzan owns Mt Son and was personally involved in
purchasing the property. Tamrayzan testified that before the
purchase, he noticed a reference to a 1971 drainage easement in
the title report, investigated the matter, and determined the
easement “didn’t affect the property” because the parties to the
agreement had died. Part of the reason he purchased the
property was because he understood there was no easement.
However, on cross-examination Tamrayzan admitted the seller

                                 8
(Svetich) told him the “other side” was using the driveway.
Tamrayzan stated he initially erected the wooden fence after
buying the property because he was considering installing a
daycare and wanted to prevent people on the Ma property from
seeing the children, but he took the fence down because it was
ugly and he decided not to go forward with the daycare. He then
planted trees to make the property look nicer, although he
admitted he also planted the trees to block Ma’s gate.
      Tamrazyan stated in describing the impact of Ma’s use of
the driveway that his primary concern was liability if one of Ma’s
tenants or the gardener tripped and fell on the driveway, or one
of them was hit by a vehicle. The court inquired, “So there’s
nothing about the movement of the trash cans that cause you any
convenience or concern, except for the liability aspect, that
someone could get hurt, trip and fall; correct?” Tamrazyan
answered, “Correct.” With respect to tenant complaints,
Tamrayzyan stated, “I’ll leave that to them to say.” Tamrazyan
also opposed an easement over his property because he might in
the future decide to proceed with his plan to install a daycare,
and the property might not be code compliant if he could not
block off the driveway.
      Svetich testified his father purchased the Mt Son property
in the late 1970s. Svetich owned the property from 1994 until
2018 and lived there from 2000 to 2010. During that time he
observed the tenant businesses on the Ma property carry their
trash out through the front door of the building because each of
the tenants had only one bin. After a restaurant leased space on
the Ma property, one of the Mt Son tenants complained the
restaurant owner parked in the tenant’s spot on the Mt Son
property during lunch, and Svetich posted a sign that parking
was prohibited. Svetich testified he did not want the fence to be

                                9
removed because it would cause the Ma property tenants to use
the driveway to access parking in the rear of the Ma property.
Svetich added that he believed the businesses on the Ma property
failed because of lack of parking, not problems with moving their
trash.
       When he sold the property to Mt Son, Svetich did not
disclose an unrecorded easement favoring the Ma property
because “there were no claims. There [were] never any issues
about the gate being there or the gate.” In response to
questioning by the court, Svetich explained Tamrazyan already
owned commercial and residential property on the same block,
and Svetich understood Tamrazyan already had access to the
property and could see what was taking place. He testified,
“Mike [Tamrazyan] knew that [the restaurants] used the gate for
trash. . . .” Asked by the court how Mt Son knew this, Svetich
responded, “because they saw what was happening, and they saw
the gate. They knew it was there. They knew it wasn’t there . . .
for show. And the trash barrels were lined up . . . inside the
vacant lot.”
       Davis testified he lived in one of the residential units on the
Mt Son property for at least 25 years, 10 of them in retirement.
He had a good view of the driveway from his unit. The only
people Davis ever saw access the Mt Son driveway from the Ma
property were employees of a restaurant that operated for about
a year in 2017. The restaurant employees used the driveway to
remove trash and blocked the driveway with a pickup truck “a
couple of times” to drop off propane and supplies. Davis
complained to Svetich and to the restaurant operator, but the
restaurant closed down shortly thereafter. Davis testified
“nobody else used that driveway to take their trash down,” and to
his knowledge, the Ma gardeners did not use the driveway.

                                 10
D.     The Order and Judgment
       Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court
instructed the parties to file closing briefs in lieu of argument.
The court advised counsel the trial was under eight hours and
the court would not issue a written statement of decision. The
court clarified it might write an “informal” decision, but the
matter would be deemed submitted after Ma filed her rebuttal
trial brief, or if she did not file a rebuttal brief, on January 7,
2022. Neither party requested a statement of decision.
       In its closing brief, Mt Son “admit[ed] [Ma] acquired a
limited non-exclusive use easement over [Mt Son’s] property.”
(Capitalization omitted.) However, Mt Son stated the easement
was by prescription: “[I]t does appear that for at least 5 years
that one or more tenants of [Ma’s] property took their trash out
the back door, across the rear yard, across a portion of [the Mt
Son property] and pushed or pulled a trash barrel up and/or down
the driveway to the curb for the City trash truck to pick up the
trash on Tuesdays and possibly Thursday. . . . That evidence
may have been weak, . . . [but] [Mt Son] will nevertheless admit
to this fact mainly because the alleged use apparently occurred
decades ago and [Mt Son] is unable to refute [Ma’s] limited non-
exclusive use of an asphalt driveway about 10 feet in width,
approximately 45 feet in length, limited to trash hauling by foot
traffic, no more than two days a week, . . . moving trash cans up
and down the driveway, for a few minutes in each direction.” Mt
Son also admitted the trees it planted encroached on the Ma
property. Mt Son proposed the trial court grant a prescriptive
easement allowing Ma to use the driveway for biweekly
movement of the trash bins, that Ma indemnify Mt Son for use of
the easement, and that Mt Son would pay $2,000 to remove the
encroaching trees.

                                11
       On January 12, 2022 the trial court issued an Informal
Statement of Decision. As stated in the order, because the trial
time consumed fewer than eight hours and no party requested a
formal statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure
section 632,7 the court did not issue a statement of decision, and
the informal decision was the final order of the court. The court
made findings Ma and her tenants utilized the Mt Son driveway
without paying compensation since at least the mid-1980s to
move trash bins to the street, for temporary parking, and for
access for gardeners, construction, and maintenance personnel.
The court found these uses were initially allowed under an
express easement executed by the former owners of the
properties, but it was undisputed the express easement had
expired.
       The trial court found Ma failed to meet her burden of proof
for entitlement to an easement by necessity because “[t]he simple
fact is that [Ma] can utilize other reasonable means to dispose of
any trash. It is certainly more convenient for [Ma] to utilize the
driveway for such a task, but it is not ‘necessary,’ as a matter of
law. The same is true with the gardening.” Ma also failed to
meet her burden of proof for entitlement to a prescriptive

7      Section 632 provides in part, “The court shall issue a
statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its
decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial
upon the request of any party appearing at the trial. The
request must be made within 10 days after the court announces a
tentative decision unless the trial is concluded within one
calendar day or in less than eight hours over more than one day
in which event the request must be made prior to the submission
of the matter for decision.” All further statutory references are to
the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                12
easement because “there was no ‘hostile’ intent by [Ma] (nor by
her tenants, etc), for the many years they actually utilized the
driveway prior to [Mt Son] purchasing it.” Ma’s use was with the
“clear consent (or perhaps ‘non-objection’) of the then-owner of
the subject driveway property.”
      However, Ma met her burden to demonstrate an equitable
easement: “Given the totality of the circumstances it is fair and
equitable that [Ma] be allowed to utilize the driveway at issue for
the purposes it has actually been utilized for many previous
decades. There is no ‘undue’ prejudice against [Mt Son] for such
a reasonable and limited use under the applicable ‘relative
hardship’ test.” The court also found Ma had shown Mt Son
trespassed on her property by planting the trees, but the trespass
was de minimis, and Ma failed to prove any entitlement to
damages on any theory against Mt Son.
      The court issued an injunction requiring Mt Son to remove
the trees blocking access to Ma’s gate and to allow reasonable
access over the driveway “in a manner which was consistent with
the previous use, e.g., trash can access to and from the [Ma
property] to the street, as reasonably needed, as well as
reasonable access for any gardener and or maintenance workers
to the back yard.” Ma’s use of the driveway would be without
compensation to Mt Son and would last for 25 years from the
date of the order. Ma was ordered to indemnify and hold Mt Son
harmless from any damages Mt Son might incur as a result of
use by Ma or her tenants and agents of the driveway.
      On January 31, 2022 the trial court entered a judgment
incorporating by reference the findings of the January 12 order
and expressly restating the terms of the order.

                                13
E.     Mt Son’s Posttrial Motions
       On January 27, 2022, shortly before entry of the judgment,
Mt Son (represented by new counsel) filed a motion to correct the
statement of decision (§ 634), for a new trial (§ 657), or to reopen
the evidence (§ 662) (motion to correct). Mt Son argued the
January 12 order was a defective statement of decision because
Ma failed to prove, and the trial court failed to make sufficient
findings, as to the three required elements for an award of an
equitable easement. In the alternative, the court should order a
new trial or allow presentation of additional evidence. Mt Son
also argued it never authorized its former attorney to file a
closing brief in which it agreed Ma was entitled to a prescriptive
easement to use the driveway.
       On February 7, 2022 Mt Son filed a notice of intent to move
for a new trial (§§ 657 & 659) and to vacate the judgment (§ 663)
(new trial motion), acknowledging the previous motion had been
“partially mooted by the subsequent entry of judgment.” In its
motion and supporting memorandum, Mt Son again argued Ma
failed to prove and the trial court failed adequately to address the
three elements required to establish an equitable easement.
       After a hearing, on April 5, 2022 the trial court denied
Mt Son’s motions.8 The court found no formal statement of
decision was required, requested, or issued, and Mt Son was
therefore not entitled to modification of the order (for lack of
sufficient findings). With respect to the new trial motion, the
court ruled “any legal arguments now being proffered by [Mt Son]
[have] been waived by its failure to make such legal arguments at

8     The trial court’s April 5, 2022 minute order refers only to
the January 27, 2022 motion to correct, not the new trial motion.
However, the court’s order substantively addressed both motions.

                                14
the time of trial. Neither [Mt Son’s] Trial Brief, nor [its] Closing
Brief, even mentioned or even discussed the issue” of an equitable
easement. Even if Mt Son had not waived the issue, the court
would have reached the same conclusion because its “informal
findings make all of the necessary findings for that specific
requested relief, or the required findings may be reasonably
implied.” Moreover, to the extent the required findings for an
equitable easement were not implied, the court could now
“reasonably make such findings based upon the evidence at the
trial.” The court found “little, if any, of the equitable factors in
favor of [Mt Son],” but “[t]he overwhelming equities for the
awarded relief [were] in favor of [Ma].” Moreover, the reasons
Mt. Son gave “for its actions and its need to block access (e.g., to
build a pre-school) or for its ‘prejudice’ [were] not credible.”
       Mt Son timely appealed from the judgment and the April 5,
2022 order.

                          DISCUSSION

A.    Governing Law and Standard of Review
      “In appropriate cases in which the requirements for
traditional easements are not present, California courts have
exercised their equity powers to fashion protective interests in
land belonging to another, sometimes referring to such an
interest as an ‘equitable easement.’” (Tashakori v. Lakis (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1008 (Tashakori); accord, Hirshfield v.
Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 765 (Hirshfield) [“in a
proper case, the courts may exercise their equity powers to
affirmatively fashion an interest in the owner’s land which will

                                15
protect the encroacher’s use”]; see Romero v. Shih (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 326, 355 (Romero) [same].)
       Three elements must be present to justify creation of an
equitable easement. First, the party requesting the easement
must use the property innocently, “‘[t]hat is, his or her
encroachment must not be willful or negligent.’” (Tashakori,
supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1009.) Second, the party opposing
the easement must not suffer irreparable harm by the creation of
the easement. (Ibid.) Third, the hardship of denying the
easement “‘“must be greatly disproportionate to the hardship”’” of
allowing the easement. (Ibid.; accord, Hirshfield, supra,
91 Cal.App.4th at p. 759.)
       “Unless all three elements are established, a court lacks
discretion to grant an equitable easement.” (Romero, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 356; accord, Ranch at the Falls LLC v.
O’Neal (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 155, 184 [trial court abused its
discretion by failing to consider whether plaintiff’s conduct was
innocent where evidence showed plaintiff did not establish
innocent use]; Shoen v. Zacarias (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 16, 21
[plaintiff must establish all three elements and cannot pursue “a
more open-ended and free-floating inquiry into which party will
make better use of the encroached-upon land, which values it
more, and which will derive a greater benefit from its use”].)
       We review a trial court’s decision to grant an equitable
easement for an abuse of discretion. (Nellie Gail Ranch Owners
Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal. App.5th 982, 1005-1006; accord,
Tashakori, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1008 [“When reviewing a
trial court’s exercise of its equity powers to fashion an equitable
easement, we will overturn the decision only if we find that the
court abused its discretion.”]; Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at
p. 771.) This standard “includes a substantial evidence

                                16
component: ‘We defer to the trial court’s factual findings so long
as they are supported by substantial evidence, and determine
whether, under those facts, the court abused its discretion. If
there is no evidence to support the court’s findings, then an abuse
of discretion has occurred.’” (Nellie Gail Ranch Owners, at
p. 1006.) If “substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
expressed and implied factual findings . . . our analysis ends; we
may not substitute our deductions for those of the trial court.”
(Ibid.)

B.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Grant of
      an Equitable Easement
      Mt Son contends no evidence was presented at trial to
establish the first and third required elements for granting an
equitable easement.9 Substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s findings on these elements.

       1.     Innocent intent
       With respect to the first element, “the encroaching party’s
innocent intent is ‘paramount’—if the encroaching party is
‘willful, deliberate, or even negligent in his or her trespass, the
court will enjoin the encroachment.’” (Romero, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 357; accord, Hirshfield, supra,
91 Cal.App.4th at p. 769.) As the Supreme Court has explained,
“[t]o be willful the [encroaching party] must not only know that
he is [traveling] on the [property owner’s] land, but act without a

9      Mt Son concedes in its reply brief the evidence does not
show Mt Son would suffer irreparable harm from the imposition
of the easement, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its
discretion in finding the second element was satisfied.

                                17
good faith belief that he has a right to do so.” (Brown Derby
Hollywood Corp. v. Hatton (1964) 61 Cal.2d 855, 859.) An
encroaching party can act intentionally and “yet be innocent if he
acted in good faith. Moreover, [the property owner] could have
induced [the encroaching party’s] good faith belief without
expressly consenting.” (Id. at pp. 859-860 [reversing judgment
denying injunction to remove building extension and remanding
for trial court to take additional evidence of innocence where
evidence at trial on whether plaintiff acted in good faith was
conflicting and court failed to make good faith finding].)
       The trial court found Ma and her tenants had been using
the Mt Son driveway since at least the mid-1980s for trash
removal, gardening, and maintenance, and their use was with the
“clear consent (or perhaps ‘non-objection’) of the then-owner of
the subject driveway property.” The court rejected Ma’s claim for
a prescriptive easement because “there was no ‘hostile’ intent by
[Ma] (nor by her tenants, etc), for the many years they actually
utilized the driveway prior to [Mt Son] purchasing it.” These
findings were tantamount to a finding Ma’s use was innocent
rather than “willful or negligent.”10 And they were supported by
substantial evidence. In addition to Ma’s longstanding use of the
Mt Son driveway, Ma testified her parents installed the metal
fence and gate between the Ma and Mt Son properties in 1983 or
1984 because Svetich (or perhaps his father) complained that
Ma’s tenants were using the driveway to park their cars in the
backyard of the Ma property. Although Svetich disputed that the
gate was in continuous use over thirty-five years, he admitted the
restaurant tenants used the gate to remove trash as early as

10    It is undisputed Ma and her tenants did not use the
driveway after Mt Son erected the wooden fence and trees.

                               18
2017, and he acknowledged Ma’s use of the gate and driveway
would have been conspicuous to anyone in the area because “they
saw the gate” and knew it was not there “for show.” Further,
Ma’s tenants stored their trash cans on the vacant lot in the
backyard of Ma’s property.
      Absent from the record is any evidence, including from
Svetich (whose family owned the Mt Son property from the late
1970s) or Davis (who lived on the property for 25 years), that
anyone ever told Ma’s family, the gardener, or the tenants that
they did not have a right to use the Mt Son driveway to access
Ma’s backyard through the gate. Likewise, Ota, who worked on
the Ma property since the mid-1980s, testified no one ever said
anything to him.
      Mt Son argues that Ma’s trespass was willful because Ma
admitted a recorded easement had allowed access to the Mt. Son
property, and the easement had long since expired, yet Ma
continued to use the property as if she still had the legal right to
do so. Mt Son’s argument is not supported by the record. First,
there was no evidence Ma or her family were aware of the 1971
easement, which on its own terms would have expired when
Rauch sold the property. Second, even if Ma had constructive
knowledge of the 1971 easement as a recorded document, the
easement only granted Rauch use of the driveway for drainage,
not passage for trash bin removal, maintenance, and gardening.
Third, even if the express easement had authorized such uses—
as the trial court appears to have found (albeit incorrectly)—the
fact Ma’s family and tenants continued to use the driveway for
38 years after expiration of the easement (from 1980 to 2018)
without any objection from the owners of the Mt Son property
undermines any inference Ma should have been aware use of the
driveway was prohibited by the easement’s expiration.

                                 19
      Ranch at the Falls LLC v. O’Neal, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th
155, relied on by Mt Son, is distinguishable. In that case, the
Court of Appeal held the trial court abused its discretion in
granting a ranch owner an equitable easement over private
streets in a housing subdivision as an alternate route for large
trucks accessing her ranch instead of using a dilapidated bridge
because the court did not consider the evidence showing the
ranch owner’s lack of innocence, including that she knew when
she purchased the ranch that the primary access was in
disrepair, the private subdivision streets had not yet been built,
and she first started having trucks access her property only after
she discovered a viable secondary route. (Id. at pp. 184-186.)
Here, there is no evidence Ma at any time had reason to doubt
she was entitled to use the Mt. Son driveway to access her
backyard for trash bin removal, maintenance, and gardening.

      2.     Relative hardships
      As to the third element for an equitable easement, the trial
court found “[t]here is no ‘undue’ prejudice against [Mt Son] for
such a reasonable and limited use under the applicable ‘relative
hardship’ test,” citing to Hirshfield, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 749 at
page 759. As discussed, this test requires that the benefit of the
easement “‘“must be greatly disproportionate to the hardship”’”
imposed on the servient property. (Tashakori, supra,
196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1009; accord, Romero, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 358-359; Hirshfield, at p. 759.)
      Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding the
hardship Ma would experience from losing access to the Mt Son
driveway would be greatly disproportionate to the harm Mt Son
would suffer from her use. With respect to removal of the trash
bins, Mikailian testified he received complaints from Ma’s

                                20
tenants about having to carry trash bins once or twice a week up
a flight of stairs and through the business interiors for curbside
removal. And Matias cited the need for its employees to drag
trash bins through its restaurant as a ground for terminating its
restaurant lease. With respect to yard work, Ota testified that
since Mt Son blocked access to the driveway, his employees had
been parking their vehicles in the automotive store parking lot on
the east side of the Ma property, jumping over the wall, and
tossing the yard waste over the wall. Further, he was rethinking
his service to the property “because it’s a hassle to go there.”
       By contrast, the only hardship identified by Mt Son was its
potential premises liability from use of the driveway by Ma, her
tenants, and her employees, which the court mitigated by
requiring Ma to indemnify Mt Son and hold it harmless as part of
the equitable easement. Tamrazyan suggested he might in the
future want to place a daycare on the Mt Son property, and “[i]t
might not fall into the codes” if Ma had driveway access. But
Tamrazyan testified he changed his mind about the daycare after
he blocked Ma’s gate, and there was no evidence the easement
was incompatible with use of the Mt Son property for a daycare.
Moreover, in the April 5, 2022 order denying a new trial, the trial
court stated it found Tamrazyan’s testimony regarding a daycare
“not credible.”11 We defer to the trial court’s credibility finding.
       Tashakori, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th 1003 and Linthicum v.
Butterfield (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 259 (Linthicum), both

11    The trial court also stated in its April 5, 2021 order that “if
there is a future material change of circumstances which would
warrant a modification or termination of the equitable easement
awarded by this court, [Mt Son] is free to seek such relief, as
allowed by law.”

                                 21
involving landlocked properties, are directly on point. In
Tashakori, the Court of Appeal held the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding purchasers of an undeveloped lot an
equitable easement over a shared road on a neighbor’s property,
after the trial court found the plaintiffs purchased the lot with
the innocent (but mistaken) belief an easement to the public road
existed, and the defendants “would suffer virtually no harm at
all” from the plaintiffs’ use of the shared driveway, and the
plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed if they were denied the
only means to access the property. (Tashakori. at p. 1010.)
Similarly, in Linthicum the court held the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in granting an equitable easement allowing a
landlocked parcel to use a roadway over the neighbor’s property
where the roadway did not substantially interfere with the
neighbor’s right to use and develop his own land, and the
neighbor’s testimony to the contrary was not credible.
(Linthicum, at p. 267.)
       More recently, in Romero, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th 326, our
colleagues in Division Eight affirmed a trial court order granting
an equitable easement to a property owner whose property
encroached upon the neighbors’ property by nearly eight feet—
including part of the neighbor’s driveway and a wall—due to an
unrecorded lot line adjustment made decades earlier. The trial
court found the encroaching party’s hardships greatly outweighed
the harm the neighbor suffered from the encroachment because
without an easement, the encroaching party’s driveway would be
narrower than the municipal code allowed, and large vehicles
would not be able to use the driveway, reducing the property’s
value by $133,000, whereas the encroachment diminished the
value of the servient property by $67,000 to $71,000. (Id. at
p. 359.)

                               22
C.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting
       an Equitable Easement Without Compensation
       Mt Son argues the granting of an equitable easement
without compensation was itself inequitable. “‘It is true that
when the trial court creates an easement by denying an
injunction, the plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to damages.’”
(Tashakori, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1014; accord, Linthicum,
supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 268; see Christensen v. Tucker
(1952) 4 Cal.App.2d 554, 559 [a court can on equitable grounds
deny a plaintiff’s claim to enjoin an encroachment and instead
compel the plaintiff to accept damages].)
       “However, ‘[t]he trial court cannot award damages in the
abstract.’” (Tashakori, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1014 [trial
court did not err in failing to award damages for use of equitable
easement where the servient property owners “had not
demonstrated that their property would suffer any diminishment
in value as a result of permitting the [plaintiffs] to access Lot 18
via the driveway that was already being used by several other
neighbors to access their property.”]; accord, Linthicum supra,
175 Cal.App.4th at p. 268 [trial court did not err in failing to
award damages where the court found not credible the servient
property owner’s testimony that the easement over his roadway
would prevent any development of his property and reduce the
property’s value by $900,000].)
       Mt Son did not seek compensation at trial or in any briefs it
filed prior to entry of judgment (other than the indemnity
agreement). Nor did Mt Son present evidence of the reduced
value of its property due to the easement, which simply restored
uses of the driveway that had been ongoing for at least 38 years
without compensation. And Tamrazyan’s testimony he might one

                                23
day want to install a daycare that might not be code compliant
with an easement was speculative.

D.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Mt
       Son’s Posttrial Motions
       Mt Son’s posttrial motions were based on its contention Ma
failed to present evidence supporting the three required elements
for an equitable easement and the trial court failed to make
findings on the elements. As discussed, although the January 12,
2022 order did not expressly refer to the innocence factor, the
court made findings that Ma did not have a “hostile” intent in
using the property, she had for many years used the driveway,
and Mt Son had never objected to her use. Further, substantial
evidence supported these findings. With respect to the third
element, the court directly addressed the parties’ relative
hardships, which finding was also supported by substantial
evidence. Thus, the court did not err or abuse its discretion in
denying Mt Son’s motions.12

12     With respect to Mt Son’s motion for a new trial, we review
denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion, although we
review the court’s factual findings for substantial evidence.
(Minnegren v. Nozar (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 500, 514, fn. 7; see
People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 524 [“We will not disturb
a trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial unless ‘a
“manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion”’ clearly
appears.”].) Likewise, “[t]he denial of a motion to reopen a case
for further evidence ‘rests upon the sound discretion of the trial
court.’ [Citation.] ‘That discretion should not be overturned on
appeal absent a clear showing of abuse.’” (Austin B. v. Escondido
Union School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 886; accord,
Sanchez v. Bay General Hospital (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 776, 793.)

                               24
       Mt Son contends the trial court erred in finding in its
April 5, 2022 order that “any legal arguments now proffered by
[Mt Son] ha[ve] been waived by its failure to make such legal
arguments at the time of the trial.” Mt Son argues the issue was
not forfeited because the elements of an equitable easement were
raised by Ma, if not Mt Son, earlier in the action, and in any
event, a party need not preserve an objection that a judgment is
unsupported by substantial evidence. We agree the trial court
erred. Mt Son’s failure to address equitable easement in his
closing brief did not forfeit its challenge to the judgment on the
grounds that the court misapplied the law and the evidence did
not support the judgment. (See § 663, subd. 1 [a judgment may
be set aside and vacated based on an “[i]ncorrect or erroneous
legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported
by the facts” provided it materially affects the substantial rights
of the party].)
       However, the trial court’s error in finding forfeiture was
harmless because the court found in the alternative that “to the
extent there has been no waiver of the argument,” the court’s
decision would have been unchanged because all the requisite
findings on the elements of an equitable easement could be

When a party seeks to vacate a judgment under section 663 as
legally erroneous, we review the judgment independently because
the court’s initial decision “was either right or wrong.” (Hoffman-
Haag v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 10, 15.)

                                25
reasonably implied from the court’s findings, and the evidence at
trial was sufficient for the court to grant an equitable easement.
As discussed, we agree with these findings.

                         DISPOSITION

      The judgment and the order denying the posttrial motions
are affirmed. Ma is entitled to recover her costs on appeal.

                                          FEUER, J.
We concur:

      PERLUSS, P. J.

      SEGAL, J.

                                26