Court Opinion

ID: 9930054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 23:14:58.266375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:58:10.037227
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                           DIVISION ONE

 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,                            No. 83873-3-I

                            Respondent,

                  v.                                 UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 JACOB DEE VERNON,

                            Appellant.

      BOWMAN, J. — Jacob Dee Vernon appeals his conviction for domestic

violence (DV) second degree rape, arguing the trial court erred by granting the

State’s GR 37 challenge to his peremptory strike of a Black juror, excluding

evidence as hearsay, and inaccurately instructing the jury. Vernon also argues

that RCW 9A.44.050(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Finally,

Vernon argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing

unconstitutionally vague conditions of community custody. We affirm.

                                         FACTS

      Vernon and M.Y. met in high school in 2011. Vernon is a white male and

M.Y. is a Black female. They dated briefly until M.Y. moved to another state in

November 2011. Three years later, M.Y. returned to Washington, and the couple

resumed their relationship in June 2014.1 Almost two months later, M.Y. moved

into Vernon’s Burien house, which they shared with his grandmother and mother,

Amber Akai. Akai’s boyfriend, Bentley Artisan, was often in the home, too.

      1
          M.Y. was 19 years old and Vernon was 18.
No. 83873-3-I/2

       Vernon and M.Y. had an unstable relationship. Vernon often broke up

with M.Y. for a “variety” of reasons and would kick her out of his home, forcing

her to stay with family. Then he would apologize and M.Y. would return. During

conflicts, Vernon sometimes told M.Y. that he would prefer to date a white person

and questioned whether their children “would be [B]lack.”

       In late 2017, M.Y. began living with her aunt in Federal Way. On

Saturday, September 9, 2018, Vernon and M.Y. got in a fight while out dancing

with M.Y.’s friend. Vernon told M.Y., “ ‘I don’t want to be with you,’ ” “ ‘You’re a

bitch,’ ” and, “ ‘It’s better if I date a white girl.’ ” Feeling embarrassed about how

he treated her in front of other people, M.Y. tried to end the relationship. But

after Vernon said he would go to therapy, M.Y. agreed to “attempt to start fresh.”

       Later that week on September 13, 2018, M.Y. planned to spend the night

at Vernon’s house. She arrived at his house in the early evening. M.Y.’s friend

Kamari Mack also came over. Vernon’s mother Akai and her boyfriend Artisan

were also home but mostly stayed in Akai’s room.

       Vernon, M.Y., and Mack drank alcohol for a couple hours and then

decided to get in the hot tub. While in the hot tub, Vernon expressed that he no

longer wanted to go to therapy, which provoked an argument. After soaking

about 30 minutes, Vernon and M.Y. left the hot tub to take a shower. M.Y.

described herself as “tipsy, especially after the hot tub.”2

       After showering, the couple dried off in Vernon’s room and got ready for

bed. M.Y. asked Vernon to rub oil on her back. As he did, he began to rub his

       2
           M.Y. testified that she had “[m]aybe two” drinks.

                                              2
No. 83873-3-I/3

erection against her. M.Y. told Vernon that she “wasn’t interested in having sex

that night.” Vernon backed off for a moment, but then continued to rub against

her. M.Y. turned around, pushed Vernon away, and told him again, “ ‘I do not

want to have sex tonight.’ ”

       Vernon grabbed M.Y. and “threw” her onto the bed. M.Y. continued to tell

Vernon to stop, but he did not. Vernon “crawled” toward her while she tried to

kick him away, “telling him to stop.” Vernon grabbed her legs and put them over

his shoulders. He then pinned her hands above her head. M.Y. continued to tell

Vernon “no” and “stop,” but Vernon ignored her and forced her to have sex.

Throughout the rape, she continued to pull away and tell Vernon to stop. After a

few minutes, M.Y. started to cry, and Vernon “began smiling at [her].” He then

stopped and moved under the bed covers.

       M.Y. got dressed and told Vernon that “he raped [her].” Vernon

responded by asking, “ ‘You’re seriously crying right now?’ ” M.Y. grabbed her

things and left. She drove about five blocks, then decided to return to Vernon’s

house to confront him. When she arrived back at his house, Vernon and Mack

were sitting in the living room, “joking” and “laughing.” M.Y. sat down with them

and after a short conversation, she said, “ ‘Rape is bad,’ ” upsetting Vernon and

prompting Mack to leave.

       After Mack left, Vernon apologized for the assault and said it would not

happen again. But then he accused M.Y. of “being dramatic and trying to start

problems.” M.Y. decided to leave again. As she left the house, Akai came into

the kitchen and overheard M.Y. tell Vernon, “ ‘You know what happened.’ ” M.Y.

                                        3
No. 83873-3-I/4

then called Akai from the car and told her about the rape.3 A few days later, she

reported the rape to Burien police.

       The State charged Vernon with one count of DV second degree rape. At

trial, Vernon tried to use a peremptory strike on juror 22, a Black man. The State

challenged the strike under GR 37. The court granted the State’s objection and

refused to strike the juror.

       Vernon testified at trial and denied raping M.Y. According to Vernon,

when M.Y. returned to his house to “confront” him, he left for about 10 minutes to

get food from Taco Bell. When he returned, Mack had left, and his mom was

coming and going from the kitchen while he and M.Y. sat in the living room

talking. Akai testified that she heard M.Y. and Vernon in the shower, and about

35 minutes later, saw M.Y. and Mack in the hallway, “talking and laughing.”

Shortly after, Vernon arrived home with Taco Bell, and he and M.Y. sat in the

living room talking while he ate the food. Artisan testified that he went to the

kitchen at about 10:15 p.m., saw M.Y. and Mack “talking and laughing,” then

Vernon arrived home with Taco Bell. On cross-examination, M.Y. testified that

she did not remember Vernon leaving to get food.

       Vernon sought to elicit testimony from Akai that on the night of the

incident, she heard M.Y. tell Vernon, “ ‘I never said you raped me, but I said stop

and you didn’t.’ ” The State objected to the testimony as hearsay and the court

excluded it.

       3
       M.Y. also told her mother, her aunt, and a friend about the rape that night.
When she got home, her friend picked her up and drove her to the hospital. M.Y.
underwent a sexual assault examination but did not tell hospital staff who raped her.

                                            4
No. 83873-3-I/5

       The court gave the jury the to-convict instruction as proposed by both

parties. The jury found Vernon guilty as charged. The trial court imposed a low-

end, standard-range, indeterminate sentence of 78 months to life and several

community custody conditions.

       Vernon appeals.

                                       ANALYSIS

       Vernon argues that the trial court erred by granting the State’s GR 37

challenge to his peremptory strike of a Black juror, excluding evidence as

hearsay, and inaccurately instructing the jury. And he argues that the second

degree rape statute, RCW 9A.44.050(1)(b), is unconstitutionally vague,

overbroad, and violates his substantive due process rights. Finally, Vernon

argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing unconstitutionally

vague conditions of community custody. We address each argument in turn.

1. GR 37

       Vernon argues the trial court erred by granting the State’s GR 37

challenge to his peremptory strike of a Black juror. We disagree.

       We review a trial court’s decision on a GR 37 challenge de novo. State v.

Omar, 12 Wn. App. 2d 747, 751, 460 P.3d 225 (2020).4 Under GR 37(c), a party

or the court “may object to the use of a peremptory challenge to raise the issue of

       4
          In State v. Tesfasilasye, 200 Wn.2d 345, 355-56, 518 P.3d 193 (2022), our
Supreme Court applied de novo review to a GR 37 challenge when “there were no
actual findings of fact and none of the trial court’s determinations apparently depended
on an assessment of credibility.” Because the parties do not assert that a different
standard applies here, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. And because we
review the decision de novo, we do not address Vernon’s arguments about procedural
error.

                                            5
No. 83873-3-I/6

improper bias.” If there is such an objection, the party exercising the challenge

must “articulate the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised.” GR

37(d). The court evaluates those reasons in light of the totality of the

circumstances, and if “an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a

factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the peremptory challenge

shall be denied.” GR 37(e). “[A]n objective observer is aware that implicit,

institutional, and unconscious biases, in addition to purposeful discrimination,

have resulted in the unfair exclusion of potential jurors in Washington.” GR 37(f).

The same standards apply whether the State or a defendant makes a GR 37

challenge to a peremptory strike. State v. Booth, 22 Wn. App. 2d 565, 572, 510

P.3d 1025 (2022).

       Under the objective observer standard, we take a rational view of the

totality of the circumstances. Booth, 22 Wn. App. 2d at 572. We evaluate the

reasons given to justify the challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances

to understand whether the striking party’s reasons for exercising the strike could

have masked either a conscious or unconscious decision based on race. Id. at

572-73. Under GR 37(g), some circumstances we consider are

              (i) the number and types of questions posed to the
       prospective juror, which may include consideration of whether the
       party exercising the peremptory challenge failed to question the
       prospective juror about the alleged concern or the types of
       questions asked about it;

              (ii) whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge
       asked significantly more questions or different questions of the
       potential juror against whom the peremptory challenge was used in
       contrast to other jurors;

                                          6
No. 83873-3-I/7

             (iii) whether other prospective jurors provided similar
      answers but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that
      party;

            (iv) whether a reason might be disproportionately
      associated with a race or ethnicity; and

            (v) whether the party has used peremptory challenges
      disproportionately against a given race or ethnicity, in the present
      case or in past cases.

      Here, during voir dire, Vernon’s attorney questioned juror 22, a former

prosecuting attorney:

              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Good morning. I see that you’ve
      never served on a jury, but you certainly have some experience in
      the criminal justice system. Is that right?
              JUROR 22: That is true. Professional experience, to be
      clear.
              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Professional, of course. What
      are some of the things that you look at in your capacity as an
      attorney to evaluate people’s credibility?
              JUROR 22: The facts. Look at the information that’s
      presented, and the logic behind it as well. If one thing is true, then
      that means that several other things along the line have to be true
      as well. So, I look at the facts and the information and take the
      information that’s presented, compare it to the objective information
      to the extent that we have it.
              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: When you’re evaluating
      credibility, do you also consider the bias or motivations of one or
      the other of the parties?
              JUROR 22: If it’s made clear. I think it’s part of the
      evaluation process, sure.
              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And how many versions of the
      truth are there? Kind of an interesting question, but how many
      versions of the actual truth exist?
              JUROR 22: In my mind, there’s one, but there’s many
      perspectives that could bear on how we arrive on that one piece of
      the truth.
              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Explain that a little bit more.
              JUROR 22: If everyone has their own perspective in terms
      of how they see things, — and this is from my experience. But in
      terms of what actually happened and what the truth is, there’s only
      one truth. Sometimes we may not get to it. Sometimes we may get
      close to it. But you look at different people’s perspectives and then

                                        7
No. 83873-3-I/8

       as jurors it would be our job to determine what the actual facts are
       as to what occurred.
              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So would you agree with the
       statement that there may be one truth but there may be more than
       one perception of that truth?
              JUROR 22: Agreed.

       After voir dire, three Black jurors remained subject to peremptory strikes.5

The court allowed Vernon to strike juror 8 first, a Black juror and former police

officer suffering from anxiety. As his fourth strike, Vernon asked to excuse juror

22. The State objected under GR 37. Vernon’s attorney explained that he

personally knew the juror for over 25 years and sought to excuse him because

juror 22 was a former prosecutor and city attorney. He argued that juror 22

would favor the State’s evidence and influence the other jurors. The court upheld

the State’s GR 37 challenge.

       The trial court did not err by granting the State’s GR 37 objection to

striking juror 22. Vernon did not ask juror 22 about whether his experience as a

former prosecutor would affect his ability to serve as an impartial juror. And two

of Vernon’s first four strikes suggested a pattern of eliminating Black jurors.6

Viewed in context of the accusation that a white defendant raped his Black

girlfriend, especially where race played a role in the dynamics of their

relationship, an objective observer could conclude that race contributed to

Vernon’s use of the peremptory strike.

       5
           The court allowed each side eight peremptory strikes.
       6
         The record also shows Vernon asked to strike juror 30, the third Black juror in
the venire. The trial court upheld the State’s GR 37 challenge and denied Vernon’s
peremptory strike. Vernon does not challenge that decision on appeal.

                                             8
No. 83873-3-I/9

2. Hearsay Evidence

       Vernon argues that the trial court erred by excluding as hearsay Akai’s

testimony that she overheard M.Y. tell him, “ ‘I never said you raped me, but I

said stop and you didn’t.’ ” According to Vernon, the statement was admissible

as an excited utterance.7

       We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.

Saldivar v. Momah, 145 Wn. App. 365, 394, 186 P.3d 1117 (2008). A trial court

abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on

untenable grounds. Id. A decision is “manifestly unreasonable” if it “falls ‘outside

the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal

standard.’ ” State v. Dye, 178 Wn.2d 541, 548, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013) (quoting In

re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).

“ ‘[E]videntiary error is grounds for reversal only if it results in prejudice.’ ”

Bengtsson v. Sunnyworld Int’l, Inc., 14 Wn. App. 2d 91, 99, 469 P.3d 339 (2020)

(quoting City of Seattle v. Pearson, 192 Wn. App. 802, 817, 369 P.3d 194

(2016)).

       “Hearsay” is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the

matter asserted.” ER 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by

rule or statute. ER 802. Statements made as an excited utterance are one such

       7
         Vernon also argues for the first time on appeal that the statement was
admissible “to complete the picture and offer evidence from others that contradicted
M.Y.’s testimony about her own hearsay.” Because Vernon did not argue admissibility
on that basis below, we do not address the claim on appeal. See State v. Scott, 110
Wn.2d 682, 685, 757 P.2d 492 (1988) (citing RAP 2.5(a) giving appellate court discretion
to refuse to review any claim of error not raised below).

                                            9
No. 83873-3-I/10

exception to the hearsay rule. ER 803(a)(2). The proponent of excited utterance

evidence must satisfy three closely connected requirements that (1) a startling

event occurred, (2) the declarant made the statement while under the stress of

excitement of the startling event, and (3) the statement related to the startling

event. State v. Young, 160 Wn.2d 799, 806, 161 P.3d 967 (2007); ER 803(a)(2).

       The excited utterance exception presumes that “ ‘under certain external

circumstances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be

produced which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control.’ ” State v.

Briscoeray, 95 Wn. App. 167, 173, 974 P.2d 912 (1999) (quoting State v. Chapin,

118 Wn.2d 681, 686, 826 P.2d 194 (1992)). So, often, the key determination is

whether the statement “was made while the declarant was still under the

influence of the event to the extent that the statement could not be the result of

fabrication, intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or judgment.” State v.

Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561, 597, 23 P.3d 1046 (2001). A delayed statement is not

necessarily precluded as an excited utterance if the witness made the statement

while still under the continued stress of the incident. See State v. Thomas, 150

Wn.2d 821, 854-55, 83 P.3d 970 (2004) (statement made one and a half hours

after startling event admissible as excited utterance), abrogated on other grounds

by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177

(2004). So, while we look to the time between the startling event and the

utterance, we also consider “any other factors that indicate whether the witness

had an opportunity to reflect on the event and fabricate a story about it.”

Briscoeray, 95 Wn. App. at 174.

                                         10
No. 83873-3-I/11

       Whether a declarant was still under the influence of an event at the time

they made statements about it is a preliminary finding of fact for the trial judge.

ER 104(a); State v. Bache, 146 Wn. App. 897, 903, 193 P.3d 198 (2008). We

review that decision for substantial evidence. Bache, 146 Wn. App. at 903.

Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational

person of the finding’s truth. State v. Stewart, 12 Wn. App. 2d 236, 240, 457

P.3d 1213 (2020).

       Here, the trial court found:

       [Defense] counsel’s attempting to bring [M.Y.’s statement] under
       excited utterance, but you’ve had two witnesses testify[,] “I came
       out. [M.Y.] was talking with [Mack]. They were laughing and joking
       in the kitchen.” [Vernon] was getting something at Taco [Bell], then
       comes back. Where’s the excited utterance when this time period
       goes by? I mean, your witnesses are testifying that there’s this
       jovial conversation happening while somebody else is going off to
       get food and coming back. That falls completely outside the
       parameters of excited utterance.

       The finding is supported by substantial evidence. Akai and Artisan both

testified that they saw M.Y. and Mack laughing together after the rape. And they

recalled that at some point, Vernon left to get Taco Bell. After Vernon returned,

Mack left, and the witnesses testified that Vernon ate the food while he and M.Y.

sat in the living room talking. Akai testified that M.Y. then became

“confrontational,” and she heard M.Y. say, “ ‘I never said you raped me, but I said

stop and you didn’t.’ ”

       Vernon argues that M.Y.’s own testimony shows she was still experiencing

stress from the rape at the time she allegedly made the statement. While M.Y.

did testify that she was still “shock[ed]” and upset after the encounter with

                                         11
No. 83873-3-I/12

Vernon, the evidence also shows she drove for five blocks before choosing to

return to Vernon’s house to confront him. In any event, we do not reweigh the

evidence on appeal and will uphold the trial court’s factual determinations so long

as they are supported by substantial evidence. See State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d

420, 451-53, 387 P.3d 650 (“Although we cannot say that every reasonable

judge would necessarily make the same decisions as the court did here, we

cannot reweigh the evidence on review,” and the trial court did not err in finding

substantial and compelling reasons to impose an exceptional sentence

downward.), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 995, 138 S. Ct. 467, 199 L. Ed. 2d 355

(2017).

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit Akai’s

hearsay testimony.

3. Jury Instructions

       Vernon argues that the trial court provided the jury an inaccurate to-

convict instruction. According to Vernon, the instruction’s wording left room for

the jury to convict him even if it concluded M.Y. initiated sexual intercourse by

force. The State argues that Vernon invited any error. We agree with the State.

       The invited error doctrine precludes a criminal defendant from seeking

appellate review of an error he helped create. State v. Mercado, 181 Wn. App.

624, 629-30, 326 P.3d 154 (2014). Under the doctrine, we will not review a

party’s assertion of error to which the party affirmatively assented, materially

contributed, or benefited from at trial. Id. at 630. We apply the doctrine when the

defendant proposed a jury instruction or agreed to its wording. State v. Winings,

                                         12
No. 83873-3-I/13

126 Wn. App. 75, 89, 107 P.3d 141 (2005). The doctrine applies even to

manifest constitutional errors that would otherwise be reviewable for the first time

on appeal under RAP 2.5. State v. Elmore, 139 Wn.2d 250, 280, 985 P.2d 289

(1999) (citing State v. Henderson, 114 Wn.2d 867, 869-70, 792 P.2d 514 (1990)).

We apply the invited error doctrine strictly, sometimes with harsh results. See,

e.g., State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 546-47, 973 P.2d 1049 (1999) (even though

it was a standard pattern instruction at the time, invited error doctrine prohibited

review of legally erroneous jury instruction because defendant proposed it).

       Before trial, Vernon proposed the following to-convict jury instruction:

             To convict the defendant of the crime of rape in the second
       degree, each of the following three elements of the crime must be
       proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
             (1) That on or about September 13, 2018 the defendant
                 engaged in sexual intercourse with [M.Y.];
             (2) That the sexual intercourse occurred by forcible
                 compulsion; and
             (3) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.

       The State proposed an identical instruction, and the court agreed to give

the instruction to the jury. Vernon now argues that the instruction’s passive voice

suggested the State needed to prove only that sexual intercourse occurred by

forcible compulsion, “whether he was the one who used force or not.” And the

second degree rape statute requires that the State prove Vernon was the person

who used force. See RCW 9A.44.050(1)(a) (“A person is guilty of rape in the

second degree when, under circumstances not constituting rape in the first

degree, the person engages in sexual intercourse with another person . . . [b]y

forcible compulsion.”). Because Vernon proposed the instruction from which he

now complains, his challenge is barred as invited error.

                                         13
No. 83873-3-I/14

       Vernon tries to sidestep the invited error doctrine by reframing the issue

as a violation of his due process rights. According to Vernon, he was “convicted

of conduct that does not constitute a crime in . . . Washington — having

[consensual] sexual intercourse that occurred by forcible compulsion.” In support

of his argument, Vernon relies on In re Personal Restraint of Hinton, 152 Wn.2d

853, 100 P.3d 801 (2004), and Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 121 S. Ct. 712, 148

L. Ed. 2d 629 (2001).

       In Hinton, our Supreme Court invalidated the petitioners’ convictions for

second degree murder, determining they were “convicted of crimes under a

statute that, as construed in Andress, did not criminalize their conduct as second

degree felony murder.” 152 Wn.2d at 859-60; see In re Pers. Restraint of

Andress, 147 Wn.2d 602, 615-16, 56 P.3d 981 (2002) (holding assault cannot

serve as the predicate crime to convict a defendant of second degree felony

murder under former RCW 9A.32.050(1)(b) (1976)). In Fiore, the United States

Supreme Court held that under the due process clause, a state cannot convict a

defendant for conduct that its criminal statute, as later interpreted by the state’s

highest court, did not prohibit. 531 U.S. at 228-29. The Court noted that under

the circumstances in Fiore, the State’s failure to prove all the elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt violated due process. Id.

       Vernon’s reliance on Hinton and Fiore is misplaced. He does not

challenge the sufficiency of the elements of the second degree rape statute.

Instead, he argues that the language in his proposed to-convict jury instruction

                                         14
No. 83873-3-I/15

leaves room for the jury to convict him based on facts that do not amount to a

crime. Invited error precludes his challenge.

4. Constitutionally of Second Degree Rape Statute

       Vernon argues that RCW 9A.44.050(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague and

overbroad. We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v.

Watson, 160 Wn.2d 1, 5, 154 P.3d 909 (2007). We presume a statute is

constitutional, and the party challenging a statute has the heavy burden of

proving it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Coria, 120

Wn.2d 156, 163, 839 P.2d 890 (1992).

       A. Vagueness

       The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution require that statutes afford citizens a fair warning of

prohibited conduct. State v. Murray, 190 Wn.2d 727, 736, 416 P.3d 1225 (2018).

A party challenging a statute as vague must show that either (1) the statute does

not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people

can understand what conduct is proscribed, or (2) the statute does not provide

ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement. Coria,

120 Wn.2d at 163.

       A statute “is ‘void for vagueness if it is framed in terms so vague that

persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ

as to its application.’ ” City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wn.2d 22, 26, 759 P.2d 366

(1988) (quoting O’Day v. King County, 109 Wn.2d 796, 810, 749 P.2d 142

(1988)). But a statute is not unconstitutionally vague just because it fails to

                                         15
No. 83873-3-I/16

define some terms. In re Pers. Restraint of Troupe, 4 Wn. App. 2d 715, 723, 423

P.3d 878 (2018). We attribute to those terms their plain and ordinary dictionary

definitions, looking to the entire enactment’s context. Id.

       Nor do we require “impossible standards of specificity.” Eze, 111 Wn.2d

at 26. That is, “a statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a person

cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point at which his actions would

be classified as prohibited conduct.” Id. at 27. If persons “ ‘of ordinary

intelligence can understand a penal statute, notwithstanding some possible areas

of disagreement, it is not wanting in certainty.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Maciolek,

101 Wn.2d 259, 265, 676 P.2d 996 (1984)). For a statute to be unconstitutionally

vague, its terms must be so loose and obscure that no one can apply them

clearly in any context. State v. Alphonse, 147 Wn. App. 891, 907, 197 P.3d 1211

(2008).

       Our first step in resolving a vagueness challenge is to determine whether

we review the statute facially or as applied to the facts of a particular case. City

of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 181-82, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). A

defendant whose conduct is clearly prohibited cannot be the one to facially

challenge a statute. State v. Duncalf, 177 Wn.2d 289, 297, 300 P.3d 352 (2013)

(citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18-19, 130 S. Ct. 2705,

177 L. Ed. 2d 355 (2010)). But a defendant challenging a statute that impacts

their right to free speech can bring a facial challenge because both the federal

and Washington constitutions protect the right to free speech. State v. Mireles,

16 Wn. App. 2d 641, 649, 482 P.3d 942 (2021); U.S. CONST. amend. I; WASH.

                                         16
No. 83873-3-I/17

CONST. art. I, § 5. If a statute does not involve First Amendment rights, then we

evaluate a vagueness challenge by examining the statute as applied to the

particular facts of the case.8 Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 182.

       Vernon brings a facial challenge to the second degree rape statute. Citing

several cases that “recognize the importance of a person’s ability to make their

own decisions regarding private, sexual matters,” he argues that the First

Amendment protects his “right to use very mild force in a private sexual

relationship.” But none of the cases cited by Vernon support his argument that

the First Amendment protected his conduct here. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539

U.S. 558, 578-79, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003) (right to consensual

sexual activity in the home protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due

process clause); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693-94, 97 S. Ct.

2010, 52 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1977) (minors’ privacy rights in accessing contraceptives

constitutionally protected); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480, 484-85,

85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965) (prosecuting physicians for educating

married persons about “the means of preventing conception” violates

constitutional rights to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 537-38, 541,

       8
          Citing two United States Supreme Court cases, Vernon argues this long-
standing rule no longer applies to vagueness challenges. See Johnson v. United States,
576 U.S. 591, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015); Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S.
148, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 200 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2018). But the Ninth Circuit clarified that
“Johnson and Dimaya did not alter the general rule that a defendant whose conduct is
clearly prohibited cannot be the one to make a facial vagueness challenge to a statute.”
Kashem v. Barr, 941 F.3d 358, 376 (9th Cir. 2019). And our Supreme Court continues
to apply the rule. See State v. Fraser, 199 Wn.2d 465, 484, 509 P.3d 282 (2022) (when
a “statute does not implicate First Amendment rights, [it] ‘must be evaluated in light of
the particular facts of each case’ ”) (quoting State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 117, 857
P.2d 270 (1993)).

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No. 83873-3-I/18

62 S. Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942) (fundamental right to marriage and

procreation protected under equal protection and due process clauses).

       Because Vernon cites no persuasive authority that he engaged in conduct

protected under the First Amendment, we decline to address his facial challenge

to RCW 9A.44.050(1)(b).

       Vernon also fails to show that the second degree rape statute is

unconstitutional as applied to the facts of his case. RCW 9A.44.050(1)(a)

prohibits engaging “in sexual intercourse with another person . . . [b]y forcible

compulsion.” RCW 9A.44.010(3) defines “forcible compulsion” as “physical force

which overcomes resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person

in fear of death or physical injury to herself or himself or another person, or in

fear that she or he or another person will be kidnapped.”

       Vernon argues that RCW 9A.44.010(3) is vague because it focuses on the

victim’s “level of resistance to mild force.” He asserts that he could be “convicted

and imprisoned for a highly stigmatizing crime” for engaging in consensual

forcible sex without knowing that he had crossed this “subjective” line. But the

facts here do not support finding that Vernon engaged in consensual sex.

       M.Y. testified that Vernon forced sexual intercourse with her after she

clearly told him at least twice that she did “not want to have sex.” Despite her

refusals, Vernon shoved M.Y. onto the bed, got on top of her, forced her legs

over his shoulders, held her hands above her head, and forced sexual

intercourse. M.Y. tried to push Vernon away, told him “no” and “stop,” kicked at

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No. 83873-3-I/19

him, and repeated her objections throughout the rape. An ordinary person in

Vernon’s position would know that M.Y. was resisting sexual intercourse.

       Vernon fails to show that RCW 9A.44.050(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague

as applied to the facts of his case.

       B. Overbreadth

       Vernon argues that the second degree rape statute is overbroad because

“it sweeps within it constitutionally protected sexual behavior without a necessity

of finding of lack of consent and without a mens rea requirement.”

       Our overbreadth analysis under article I, section 5 of the Washington

Constitution follows that of the First Amendment to the federal constitution.

Mireles, 16 Wn. App. 2d at 649. A statute is overbroad under the Washington

and federal constitutions if it unlawfully prohibits a substantial amount of

protected speech. Id. In determining whether a statute is overbroad, we first

consider whether the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally

protected speech. Id. If so, we then determine whether the constitution allows

regulation of the protected speech. Id.

       But while the doctrine of overbreadth has been accorded standing

because of the “ ‘chilling effect’ ” that a statute might have on the right to free

speech, the doctrine is not applied in contexts other than those relating to the

First Amendment. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 168, 92 S. Ct.

1965, 32 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1972). As discussed above, Vernon fails to show that

the First Amendment protected his conduct. So, we decline to address his

overbreadth challenge.

                                          19
No. 83873-3-I/20

5. Community Custody Conditions

       Vernon argues that several of his community custody conditions are

unconstitutionally vague. We disagree.

       As part of any term of community custody, a sentencing court may order

an offender to comply with crime-related prohibitions. RCW 9.94A.703(3)(f). A

crime-related condition “prohibit[s] conduct that directly relates to the

circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been convicted.” RCW

9.94A.030(10). We review a trial court’s imposition of crime-related conditions of

community custody for abuse of discretion. State v. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 644,

656, 364 P.3d 830 (2015). A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if it

imposes an unlawfully vague condition that curtails constitutional rights. State v.

Padilla, 190 Wn.2d 672, 677, 416 P.3d 712 (2018).

       A community custody condition is unconstitutionally vague if “(1) it does

not sufficiently define the proscribed conduct so an ordinary person can

understand the prohibition or (2) it does not provide sufficiently ascertainable

standards to protect against arbitrary enforcement.” Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677.

When considering the meaning of a community custody condition, “the terms are

not considered in a ‘vacuum,’ rather, they are considered in the context in which

they are used.” State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 754, 193 P.3d 678 (2008)

(quoting Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 180). “ ‘[I]f persons of ordinary intelligence can

understand what the [law] proscribes, notwithstanding some possible areas of

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No. 83873-3-I/21

disagreement, the [law] is sufficiently definite.’ ” State v. Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d

671, 679, 425 P.3d 847 (2018)9 (quoting Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 179).

       Here, the trial court ordered that Vernon shall:

       4. Within 30 days of release from confinement (or sentencing, if no
          confinement is ordered) obtain a sexual deviancy evaluation with
          a State certified therapist approved by your Community
          Corrections Officer (CCO) and follow all recommendations of the
          evaluator. . . .
       5. Inform the supervising CCO and sexual deviancy treatment
          provider of any dating relationship. Disclose sex offender status
          prior to any sexual contact. Sexual contact in a relationship is
          prohibited until the treatment provider approves of such.

       Vernon argues that the condition to “[d]isclose sex offender status prior to

any sexual contact” is vague because it does not specify to whom he must

disclose. He suggests that it is unclear whether the condition requires him to

disclose his sex offender status to his CCO or a sexual partner. But a person of

ordinary intelligence would understand that the condition is meant to warn

potential partners of the risks he may pose. Vernon’s CCO is already aware of

Vernon’s sex offender status. So, the condition clearly requires Vernon to

disclose his sex offender status to persons with whom he intends to engage in

sexual contact.

       Vernon also argues that the term “sex offender status” is vague. He says

it does “not make it clear whether [he] is to disclose his registration status, the

conviction, or the nature of the facts that gave rise to the conviction.” But the

plain language of the condition requires that Vernon disclose his status as a sex

offender. A “sex offense” is “[a] felony that is a violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW,”

       9
           Second and third alterations in original.

                                              21
No. 83873-3-I/22

which includes rape in the second degree. RCW 9.94A.030(47)(a)(i); RCW

9A.44.050(2). So, a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that “sex

offender status” means being a convicted felony sex offender.

       Finally, Vernon argues that the language “[s]exual contact in a relationship

is prohibited until the treatment provider approves of such” is vague because

Vernon may not have a treatment provider. But Vernon’s challenge is not ripe for

review.

       Community custody conditions are ripe for review on direct appeal “ ‘if the

issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and

the challenged action is final.’ ” Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 751 (quoting First United

Methodist Church of Seattle v. Hr’g Exam’r for Seattle Landmarks Pres. Bd., 129

Wn.2d 238, 255-56, 916 P.2d 374 (1996) (Dolliver, J., dissenting)). “The court

must also consider ‘the hardship to the parties of withholding court

consideration.’ ” Id. (quoting First United, 129 Wn.2d at 255). Vernon’s

challenge requires further factual development—a sexual deviancy evaluation

that will determine whether he will have a treatment provider from whom to seek

approval. And deferring consideration of Vernon’s argument until that time does

not create an undue hardship. So, we do not address his challenge to this

condition.

       In sum, the trial court did not err by granting the State’s GR 37 challenge

to his peremptory strike of a Black juror, excluding evidence as hearsay, and

giving the parties’ proposed to-convict jury instruction. And Vernon fails to show

that RCW 9A.44.050(1)(d) is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad or that the

                                        22
No. 83873-3-I/23

trial court’s conditions of community custody are unconstitutionally vague. We

affirm.

WE CONCUR:

                                       23