Court Opinion

ID: 9492453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:41:33.473656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:18.768221
License: Public Domain

T.G. NELSON, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
In this case, we encounter an existing circuit split. Although Yogi Berra enjoined us, “when you come to a fork in the road, take it,” I believe we have chosen the wrong path here.
Sentencing guideline § 2G2.2 provides for enhancements to sentences of persons convicted of receiving, transporting, shipping or advertising materials involving the sexual exploitation of minors. According to the guideline, a sentence can be enhanced “[i]f the offense involved distribution.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(2). Application Note 1 provides that: “‘Distribution’ includes any act related to distribution for pecuniary gain, including production, transportation, and possession with intent to distribute.” Id. comment, (n.l). The majority accepts the reasoning of United States v. Black, 116 F.3d 198, 202-03 (7th Cir.1997), to conclude that “distribution,” as it is used in Section 2G2.2(b)(2), requires an element of pecuniary gain. I believe that this unwarrantedly restricts the reach of the guideline and therefore concur only in the result reached in Part II.A of the opinion.
Because this road has had previous traffic on it, I do not need to blaze a new trail. Rather, I believe the analysis of the Second Circuit in United States v. Lorge, 166 F.3d 516 (2d Cir.1999), articulates the correct interpretation of Section 2Gl.l(b)(2). In Lorge, the court explained that:
The language of the Guidelines makes clear that the definition of “distribution” in Section 2G2.2(b)(2) is not limited by Application Note 1 thereof to acts for “pecuniary gain.” Because Section 1B1.1 states that the term “includes” is not exhaustive, the language of Application Note 1 ... is most easily read as intended to avoid an overly narrow reading of distribution that excluded acts ancillary to sales, such as transportation. Moreover, the structure of Section 2G2.2 also supports the inference *968that a motive of pecuniary gain need not be shown. Subsection (b)(2) provides for an enhancement “[i]f the offense involved distribution.” The ordinary meaning of distribution involves an act or series of acts without regard to the actor’s motive. Application Note 1, which provides, inter alia, that the term distribution “includes any act related to distribution for pecuniary gain,” makes clear that when the profit motive is present, not only “distributions,” as the term is commonly understood, but also “any act” related thereto, “including production, transportation, and possession with intent to distribute,” suffices to sustain the enhancement.
... Moreover, the fact that Section 2G2.2(b)(2) cross-references the table in Section 2F1.1 setting forth incremental offense-level enhancements based on the amount of monetary loss does not support appellant’s argument.... The purpose of the reference to the table in Section 2F1.1 is clearly to provide for increased distribution enhancements tied to the value of the distributed material, not to modify the meaning of the term “distribution.”
Id. at 518-19 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Hibbler, 159 F.3d 233, 237-38 (6th Cir.1998) (“[T]he enhancement provided for in § 2G2.2(b)(2) is not limited to instances involving distribution for pecuniary gain.”); United States v. Canada, 110 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir.1997) (“ ‘[Distribution’ for the sake of the guideline is meant to be inclusive of pecuniary gain purposes, but not exclusive of all other purposes.”).
Contrary to the dissent, application of the enhancement to any and all trades of child pornography is not suspect or contrary to the guidelines. The sentencing guidelines distinguish between receiving and distributing child pornography. Hibbler, 159 F.3d at 238. The baseline offense covers the receipt and possession of child pornography. However, if a defendant has distributed child pornography, a five-level sentence increase is imposed. If a defendant has distributed child pornography with a value greater than $70,000, incremental enhancements are imposed in relation to the value of the child pornography distributed. “The guidelines, therefore, mandate a continuum of punishment correlated to the value of the distributed materials.” Id.
Notably, Section 2G3.1, the sentencing guideline for the similar, but lesser offense of “importing, mailing, or transporting obscene matter” also includes a five-level increase; but specifically for an act related to distribution for pecuniary gain. Section 2G3.1 states that “[i]f the offense involved an act related to distribution for pecuniary gain, increase the number of levels from the table in § 2F1.1 corresponding to the retail value of the material, but in no event less than 5 levels.” IJ.S.S.G. § 2G3.1(b)(l) (emphasis added). In contrast, Section 2G2.2, for child pornography, applies if the offense merely “involved distribution.” This is clearly broader language. Thus, mere distribution of child pornography results in a five-level enhancement, whereas distribution of pornography that does not include depictions of children must be for pecuniary gain in order to result in a five-level increase. This distinction is logical. To interpret Section 2G2.2(b)(2) to require pecuniary gain negates a clear choice to give heavier sentences to those who engage in child pornography offenses.
Thus, I do not believe that the enhancement for distribution under Section 2G2.2(b)(2) is limited to those circumstances where the Government can show that the act was for pecuniary gain. While the majority has reached the correct endpoint in finding that the enhancement of Laney’s sentence was not clearly erroneous, it has taken a path which limits the intended and proper reach of the guideline. As such, I concur only in the result reached in Part II.A of the opinion.