Court Opinion

ID: 9475591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:31:59.593146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:48.253278
License: Public Domain

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The application form before the court reasonably evidences the insured’s awareness of and rejection of her right to optional no-fault coverages. Therefore, I think the form substantially complies with the requirements of O.C.G.A. sec. 33-34-5(b).
Strict adherence to the terms of O.C.G.A. sec. 33-34-5(b) is not required.1 Georgia’s state supreme court has held that the requirements of O.C.G.A. sec. 33-34-5(b) are satisfied by “substantial compliance” therewith. Substantial compliance is inherently a flexible standard. Needless to say, Georgia’s high court could have adopted a more particularized standard; but it chose not to do so. Consequently, federal courts called upon to apply Georgia law must be on guard against developing their own overly particularized test for Georgia. To the extent that the majority sees separate spaces to be checked for rejection of optional coverages as essential, I fear they have actually developed a standard that is more particularized than Georgia’s highest court has stated is proper.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nixon, 252 Ga. 469, 314 S.E.2d 215 (1984), and the other cases cited by the majority exemplify substantial compliance; they do not define the limits of substantial compliance. *1497As noted in Nixon and later cases, the “substantial compliance” test was first stated in a special concurrence by Chief Justice Hill in Nalley v. Select Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 722, 723, 313 S.E.2d 465, 465-66 (1983). See Tolison v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 253 Ga. 97, 99, 317 S.E.2d 185, 187 (1984); Nixon at 470, 314 S.E.2d at 217. In Nalley, the application form that Chief Justice Hill concluded materially complied with statutory requirements had no separate spaces to be checked for rejection of optional coverages.
Our court has previously said that an application form is in substantial compliance with the demands of O.C.G.A. sec. 33-34-5(b) “if it reasonably evidences the insured’s awareness of and rejection of his right to optional no-fault coverages.” See State Auto Mutual Ins. Co. v. Horne, 794 F.2d 621, 623 (11th Cir.1986). The meaning of our words seems materially similar to that of O.C.G.A. sec. 33-34-5(c), which provides that all named insureds in policies existing on March 1, 1975, “be given an opportunity to accept or reject, in writing, the optional coverages required to be offered under this Code section.”2 In discussing that language of subsection (c), the Supreme Court of Georgia stated unequivocally, “The fact that we have stated that a block to be checked for each option is adequate does not mean that such blocks are required.” United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Ansley, 254 Ga. 647, 649, 333 S.E.2d 579, 581 (1985) (form revealed knowing waiver of PIP benefits). Ansley shows that Georgia’s highest court recognizes that an insured can, in fact, knowingly reject the right to optional no-fault coverages even if there are no separate spaces to accept or reject each optional coverage.3 Consequently, the absence of separate blocks or spaces on forms seems less important to Georgia’s supreme court than the majority in this case believes.
In its original size, the blank form in this case (Appendix I) is not hard to read due to print size or to layout. I agree that it is not as straightforward as the application in Nixon. See Douglas v. Jefferson-Pilot Fire & Casualty Co., 175 Ga.App. 457, 459, 333 S.E.2d 634, 638 (1985). Still, Nixon’s form is no procrustean bed for substantial compliance. Furthermore, I view the present form as very much better than the application form in Tolison v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 253 Ga. 97, 317 S.E.2d 185. In Tolison the form’s layout was far more jumbled, and the box concerned with PIP coverage was much less prominent than in the case here. See Associated Indem. Corp. v. Sermons, 175 Ga.App. 513, 517, 333 S.E.2d 902, 909 (1985). Of course, the form in Tolison was found not to be in substantial compliance; it seems significant, however, that two justices found even the form in Tolison to be in substantial compliance with O.C.G.A. sec. 33-34-5(b). See Tolison, 253 Ga. at 102, 317 S.E.2d at 189 (Marshall and Welt-ner, JJ., dissenting).
*1498If read with reasonable care, an insured confronted with the pertinent form in this case would appreciate that she could have more coverage if she chose to do so. Likewise, a reasonable insured signing the form as it was marked here would know, or should know, that she was rejecting greater coverages. Thus, the form reasonably evidences the insured’s awareness of and rejection in writing of her right to optional no-fault coverage; and the form is in substantial compliance. See generally State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Horne, 794 F.2d 621 (11th Cir.1986).
Of course, our duty is to decide this case as we think the Supreme Court of Georgia would decide it. To do so, we ought to apply their announced standard and not apply one of our own making. I realize that wiiat the Supreme Court of Georgia would really decide in this case is, given the status of Georgia’s case law, unknowable. Accordingly, I admit doubt as to the correctness of my conclusion; but I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. While it is plain that O.C.G.A. sec. 33-34-5(b) requires "separate spaces ... for each of the optional coverages," it is not clear that it requires a separate space to be checked for acceptance and a separate space to be checked for rejection of each coverage. The application in this case provides a separate space for each optional coverage; Georgia’s state supreme court has never required more. The form here, therefore, may not only substantially comply, but also literally comply with the statute in respect to the spaces that are required.

. Subsection (b) of the statute applies to all insurance policies issued after the effective date of the statute, March 1, 1975. Subsection (c) applies to policies already in existence on that date. Wiard v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 698, 310 S.E.2d 221 (1983); cf. Nalley v. Select Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 722, 313 S.E.2d 465 (1983).

. In footnote 2 of the court’s opinion, my colleagues attempt to rebut my dissent by citing Enfinger v. International Indem. Co., 253 Ga. 185, 317 S.E.2d 816, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018, 105 S.Ct. 433, 83 L.Ed.2d 360 (1984) and Rosser v. International Indem. Co., 173 Ga.App. 342, 326 S.E.2d 543 (1985). Those cases only hold that after March 1', 1975, applications for insurance that comply not at all with O.C.G.A. sec. 33-34-35(b) cannot be salvaged by later sending to the insured a totally separate form upon which the insured can reject or accept optional insurance coverages, even though such a practice might be adequate under O.C.G.A. sec. 33-34-35(c). These cases have nothing to do with deciding the question of whether a particular application form substantially complies with O.C.G.A. sec. 33-34-35(b).
In its opinion, the court questions the significance of United Servs. Auto. Ass’n. v. Ansley, 254 Ga. 647, 333 S.E.2d 578 (1985). If the test for "substantial compliance” under 33-34-34(b) is whether the application evidences awareness of and rejection of optional coverages, Ansley seems important for it shows that such awareness and rejection can be evidenced, in fact, without the necessity of separate spaces to be checked for rejection of optional coverages.