Court Opinion

ID: 9617445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:55:23.55131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:09.452493
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice,
dissenting:
In view of the long-established principle that while a defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial, he must be accorded a fair trial, I dissent from the majority decision affirming this case, being of the opinion that the appellant’s right to a fair trial was abridged. See State v. Stewart, 278 S. C. 296, 295 S. E. (2d) 627 (1982).
The record sets forth pertinent facts which are omitted from the majority opinion. Appellant James Russell Cain and Kenneth Dale Threatte were each charged with two counts of murder and two counts of armed robbery arising from an incident which occurred on January 25, 1986. The Solicitor’s Office notified Threatte and Cain of its intention to seek the death penalty against both of them. On October 2,1986, the trial court conducted a joint pretrial hearing and disposed of several motions, including a Brady motion and a motion for evidence favorable to the defendants (an open file). Threatte’s lawyer was present and had an opportunity to participate in the proceedings. However, he did not make any motions and his participation at the hearings appears restrained. The Solicitor’s Office informed appellant by a letter dated October 16, 1986, that his case would not be consolidated with Threatte’s and that appellant’s trial would begin on November 17,1986. Threatte testified for the state at appellant’s trial.
While the jury was deliberating during the sentencing phase of appellant’s trial, his mother, Patsy Cain Evans, *512entered a plea and received a fifty-year sentence for conspiracy to commit murder, two counts of accessory after the fact of murder, and one count of accessory before the fact of armed robbery arising from the same crimes for which appellant was sentenced to death.
During a civil term of court on the Monday following appellant’s Tuesday night death sentence and the court’s Thanksgiving recess, Threatte pled guilty to one count of murder. The solicitor dismissed one count of murder and two counts of armed robbery against Threatte.
GUILT PHASE {BRADY MOTION)
Plea bargaining is recognized as a legitimate exercise of a prosecutor’s discretion; and it is not unusual for prosecutors to make independent plea agreements with co-defendants. When such an agreement is entered into, the accomplice usually receives some consideration in exchange for truthful testimony during the co-accomplice’s trial. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. (2d) 104 (1972); United States v. Boley, 730 F. (2d) 1326, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 1984). However, the United States Constitution imposes restrictions on plea agreements. Under the Due Process Clause, prosecutors have a duty to provide an accused with all favorable evidence, including any plea agreement involving testifying accomplices, which is material to either guilt or punishment. United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. (2d) 481 (1985); Giglio v. United States, supra; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. (2d) 215 (1963). See also State v. Hinson, 293 S. C. 406, 361 S. E. (2d) 120 (1987).
In the instant case, the solicitor failed to disclose his assurance to Threatte’s counsel that he “would do everything that he could to see that” Threatte was not imprisoned in the same facility as appellant and another convict.1 The majority distinguishes this case from State v. Hinson, 293 S. C. 406, 361 S. E. (2d) 120 (1987), on the basis of the time elapsing between the testimony and the solicitor’s nolle prosequi of the charges. The time factor alone is not deter*513minative of the issue. Rather, the test should be whether, when considered together with all other surrounding circumstances, the events which transpired lead to the logical conclusion that an undisclosed plea agreement or a prior tacit understanding existed which infers a lack of adventitiousness in the solicitor’s actions and inured to the benefit of the testifying codefendant. See State v. Hinson, 361 S. E. (2d) at 121-22.
The majority goes further and states that assuming this assurance was given to Threatte, nondisclosure would not mandate reversal because there is no reasonable probability that disclosure would have changed the result of the guilt phase of appellant’s trial. In view of the facts of this case, the jury’s problem with duress, the jury’s aggravating circumstances finding, the solicitor’s pretrial assurance to Threatte and subsequent acceptance of a guilty plea with reduced sentencing exposure for Threatte, I disagree with the majority’s holding. In my view, the solicitor’s acceptance of a guilty plea from the only eyewitness would have created a reasonable probability that the results of the guilt phase and certainly the sentencing phase of appellant’s trial would have been changed. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Texas, _ U. S. _, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 1797, 100 L. Ed. (2d) 284 (1988). As I read South Carolina’s capital sentencing scheme, a defendant in a death penalty case is entitled to every reasonable doubt; and, particularly during the sentencing phase of the trial, to have the triers of the fact fully advised and cognizant of the culpability, responsibility and potential bias of all witnesses.
Due process guarantees a defendant the right to a fair trial, and any evidence tending to impinge upon that right should be subject to disclosure and scrutiny by a jury. Under the facts of this case, Threatte’s testimony is so tainted or presumptively unreliable that a new trial is mandated. United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375.1 find the assurance was material to both phases of appellant’s trial and should have been disclosed. Therefore, I should reverse and remand this case for a new trial.
SENTENCING PHASE
First, the trial court’s charge on the statutory mitigating circumstances was erroneous, and this case lacks the requi*514site clear statutory aggravating circumstance finding by the jury for imposition of the death penalty.
Capital punishment has been a feature of American jurisprudence since the framing of our Constitution. For many years the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that the Constitution imposed some limits on capital punishment. The first major assault on the arbitrariness and capriciousness of capital punishment was not manifested until the Supreme Court’s decision in McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 91 S. C. Ct. 1454, 28 L. Ed. (2d) 711 (1971). Even though McGautha rejected the arguments that were applicable to every capital punishment proceeding then used in the United States, the Court addressed a number of these arguments in its opinion. First, the court addressed and rejected the argument that leaving the capital punishment sentencing issue to the unguided discretion of the jury invited arbitrary determinations which were fundamentally unfair. Second, the Court rejected the argument that limiting testimony and evidence admissible only on the issue of guilt deprived an accused of a reasonable opportunity to a fair hearing in a death penalty case.. See McGautha v. California, supra; see also P. Low, J. Jeffries, Jr., and R. Bonnie, CRIMINAL LAW at 783-84 (1981).
In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. (2d) 346 (1972), the Court reversed its course. The arguments the Court initially rejected in McGautha were the very ones used to justify the invalidation of every state’s capital punishment provisions. In response to Furman v. Georgia, supra, South Carolina adopted a death penalty statute that provided for bifurcated proceedings in which consideration of specified aggravating and mitigating circumstances was required before a sentence of death could be imposed. See S. C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a), (b) (1985). See also State v. Thompson, 278 S. C. 1, 292 S. E. (2d) 581, cert. denied, 456 U. S. 938, 102 S. Ct. 1996, 72 L. Ed. (2d) 458 (1982); State v. Shaw, 273 S. C. 194, 255 S. E. (2d) 799, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 957, 100 S. Ct. 437, 62 L. Ed. (2d) 329 (1979); State v. Rumsey, 267 S. C. 236, 226 S. E. (2d) 894 (1976). South Carolina’s current statutory scheme overcomes the fundamental constitutional deficiencies found in Furman v. Georgia, su*515pra,2 by reducing the likelihood that a sentencing body would impose a death sentence capriciously. See State v. South, 285 S. C. 529, 331 S. E. (2d) 775, cert. denied, 474 U. S. 888, 106 S. Ct. 209, 88 L. Ed. (2d) 178 (1985). In short, our Death Penalty Act statutes do not leave capital sentencing to the unguided discretion of a jury.
The majority’s affirmation of this case exhibits a willingness to circumvent Furman and our state’s reformulated death penalty statutes by upholding the sentence of death in spite of an error infested sentencing proceeding which resulted in an arbitrary and capricious determination. Imposition of the death penalty in this instance cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The trial court erred in submitting the following statutory aggravating circumstance to the jury:
The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person. (Emphasis added.)
S. C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(6) (1985). A literal reading of the statute shows that it contains two statutory aggravating circumstances and is intended to make both the principal and the agent in a murder eligible for the death penalty. In a case where the evidence shows that the defendant was a principal, then the first part of the provision should be submitted. On the other hand, if there is evidence proving he was an agent or employee, the second part of the provision should be submitted. Id. The use of the disjunctive conjunction “or”3 indicates that the evidence must show appellant is either principal or agent, not both.
The death sentence verdicts rendered against appellant are based upon the jury’s written finding that “the offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another.” These findings *516reflect that the jury erroneously determined beyond a doubt that appellant “caused or directed another to commit murder.” The record contains no evidence to show that appellant caused another person to commit murder. Thus, it was error to submit this aggravating circumstance to the jury, and it was error for the jury to make such a finding. Despite the majority’s claim of no constitutional infirmity in this instance, they cannot ascertain whether the jury based its findings on the erroneously submitted alternative. Because of the ambiguous jury findings, imposition of the death penalty is certainly infirm since the jury’s discretion was unguided or misguided, resulting in the likelihood of an arbitrary and unfair decision. See Furman v. Georgia, supra. See also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 77 L. Ed. (2d) 235 (1983).
Second, the majority contravenes the prophylactic rule of charging a jury regarding a statutory mitigating circumstance. Section 16-3-20(C)(b)(2) sets forth the following as a mitigating circumstance:
The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance.
S. C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(2) (1985). Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to charge this mitigating circumstance. The record clearly shows that this statutory mitigating circumstance request was supported by the evidence. For instance, evidence was presented at trial showing appellant had been abused, neglected and dominated by his mother. Furthermore, it is uncontradicted that appellant’s mother conceived the murder scheme and directed its execution. Even the majority admits that there was ample evidence illustrating the deplorable conditions under which appellant was reared, but reasoned “no evidence existed to show that [he] acted under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance ...”
The trial court has the duty to review all statutory mitigating circumstances and instruct the jury on any which are supported by the evidence. State v. Bellamy, 293 S. C. 103, 359 S. E. (2d) 63 (1987); State v. Pierce, 289 S. C. 430, 346 S. E. (2d) 707 (1986). In deciding whether a statutory mitigating circumstance is supported by the evidence, the trial court is *517concerned only with the existence of evidence and not its weight. State v. Bellamy, supra. The reasoning of the majority necessitates that a defendant meet a specific unarticulated evidentiary burden in order to establish the existence of a mitigating circumstance at the time of the commission of a crime. Section 16-3-20(C)(b) does not place any such burden on a capital defendant in order to receive a statutory mitigating circumstance charge. See, e.g., State v. Patrick, 289 S. C. 301, 308, 345 S. E. (2d) 481 (1986).
It is my opinion that the existence of evidence of neglect, abuse and domination of appellant by his mother supported the requested charge. State v. Pierce, supra.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand this case for a new trial.

 In my opinion, the solicitor’s “assurance” raises the implication that he would withdraw his plans to seek the death penalty against Threatte.

 “Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 189, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L. Ed. (2d) 859 (1976).

 According to Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1987), “or” is used as a function word to indicate an alternative.