Court Opinion

ID: 2963446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:09:51.161225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:41.406129
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          June 5, 1995          [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2113 

                                STANLEY J. MALEK, JR.,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                        DEPUTY SHERIFF DAVID KNIGHTLY, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                    [Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                          Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

            Stanley J. Malek, Jr. on brief pro se.
            _____________________
            Richard L. Barry, Jr. on brief for appellees.
            _____________________

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                      Per Curiam.   Plaintiff-appellant Stanley J.  Malek
                      __________

            appeals  from  the  dismissal  of his  amended  civil  rights

            complaint  for failure  to  state a  claim.   We  affirm  the

            dismissal of  appellant's  federal  claims,  but  modify  the

            dismissal  of appellant's  state law  claims to  reflect that

            their dismissal  is without prejudice to  their being renewed

            in state court.  

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                      On April  7, 1994,  appellant filed a  complaint in

            the  district  court.    As amended,  the  complaint  alleges

            violations of  42  U.S.C.     1983,  1985, and  1986  against

            deputy  sheriffs  David  Knightly and  Francis  Cote, Sheriff

            Robert  Garvey,  Hampshire County  Sheriff's  Department, and

            Hampshire County Sheriff's, Inc.   The amended complaint also

            includes a variety of state common law claims.

                      Stripped to its  essentials, the complaint  alleges

            that on February 23, 1994, at approximately 8:00 a.m., deputy

            sheriffs  Knightly and  Cote came onto  appellant's property,

            entered  his  home without  his  consent,  and arrested  him.

            Knightly and Cote then transported appellant to jail.  On the

            way there, the deputy sheriffs showed appellant a "purported"

            capias.    After  being held  for  a  short  period of  time,

            appellant  was released  and given  a court  date to  return.

            Thereafter, appellant sent notices regarding this incident to

            the Hampshire County Commissioners, the chairman of the Board

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            of  Commissioners,  and appellee  Sheriff Garvey.   Appellant

            received no response to these notices.  

                      Based on these  facts, appellant alleged violations

            of  his rights  to due  process of  law and  to be  free from

            unreasonable searches and seizures  under the Fourth,  Fifth,

            Ninth,  and  Fourteenth  Amendments.     He  also  alleged  a

            conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights in violation of

            42 U.S.C.   1983,  1985, and 1986.  Finally, he alleged state

            law  claims  for  false imprisonment,  trespass,  defamation,

            invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy.   On May 31, 1994,

            defendants-appellees  filed a  motion to dismiss  the amended

            complaint  for  failure to  state a  claim.   The  two deputy

            sheriffs and the  sheriff also asserted  a defense of  quasi-

            judicial  immunity.   In support  of the  motion to  dismiss,

            appellees submitted copies of various court documents.  These

            documents included a copy of a capias issued by Ware District

            Court commanding appellant's arrest for contempt based on his

            failure  to  appear  in  court for  a  supplementary  process

            hearing.  Appellant responded by moving  to strike the motion

            to dismiss.  On  August 25, 1994, the district  court allowed

            the  motion to dismiss as to all claims.  Judgment entered on

            August  26,  1994.    Appellant  filed  a  timely  motion for

            reconsideration, which was denied.  This appeal ensued.

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                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

                                          I.
                                          _

                      Appellate review of a motion to dismiss is de novo.
                                                                 __ ____

            See, e.g., Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 30 F.3d  11,
            ___  ____  _________    _______________________

            12  (1st Cir. 1994).  The standard for assessing the adequacy

            of a  civil rights claim  is whether,  accepting the  factual

            averments in the  complaint as true,  and construing them  in

            the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the pleading shows

            any fact which could  entitle the plaintiff to relief.   See,
                                                                     ___

            e.g., Leatherman  v. Tarrant County  Narcotics Intelligence &
            ____  __________     ________________________________________

            Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1161-63 (1993); Gooley v.
            _________________                                   ______

            Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.  1988).  Because
            _______________

            appellant  is pro  se, we  read his  complaint with  an extra
                          ___  __

            degree  of solicitude.  Rodi  v. Ventetuolo, 941  F.2d 22, 23
                                    ____     __________

            (1st  Cir. 1991).    We  are  free to  affirm  on  any  basis

            supported by the  record.  See Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1,
                                       ___ _________    ____

            7 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993).

                                         II.
                                         __

                      Appellant  argues that his amended complaint should

            not have been dismissed because it states a valid claim under

              1983 for violation  of his constitutional right to  be free

            from unreasonable searches and  seizures.1  In particular, he

            contends that a capias is not a warrant, and that he stated a

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Appellant  does not raise on appeal  the dismissal of his
            claims   under  42  U.S.C.      1985,  1986,  and  they  are,
            therefore, deemed waived.  

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            claim  against deputy  sheriffs Knightly  and Cote  under the

            Fourth Amendment based on their unconsented to entry into his

            home  without a warrant.  Appellant also contends that he has

            stated a claim against Sheriff Garvey, in his individual  and

            official  capacity, based  on Garvey's  failure  to reprimand

            Knightly  and Cote  after  appellant sent  him three  notices

            about the February 23, 1994 incident.  

            A.  Deputy Sheriffs Knightly and Cote

                      Appellees urge, and the district court  found, that

            deputy  sheriffs Knightly  and  Cote are  entitled to  quasi-

            judicial  immunity  because they  were  executing a  facially

            valid warrant. See Forte v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
                           ___ _____    ________

            1991).    Appellant responds  that  the  defense of  absolute

            immunity must fail because the deputies exceeded legal bounds

            in  executing the  warrant.   See Martin  v. Board  of County
                                          ___ ______     ________________

            Comm'rs, 909 F.2d  402, 405 (10th  Cir. 1990) ("[A]  judicial
            _______

            warrant  contains an implicit directive that the arrest . . .

            be carried out in  a lawful manner.").   We need not  resolve

            the  issue whether  absolute immunity  protects  Knightly and

            Cote, however, because we  find that, in any event,  they are

            entitled to qualified  immunity since they did  not violate a

            "clearly established"  right.  See Harlow  v. Fitzgerald, 457
                                           ___ ______     __________

            U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that qualified immunity shields

            public  officials  performing  discretionary  functions  from

            liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

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            violate  clearly  established rights  of  which  a reasonable

            person should have known).

                      In Payton  v. New  York, 445  U.S. 573  (1980), the
                         ______     _________

            Supreme Court  held that  the Fourth Amendment  prohibits the

            police from effecting a  warrantless and nonconsensual  entry

            into  a  suspect's home  in order  to  make a  routine felony

            arrest.   However, the Court also held that a criminal arrest

            warrant  alone was sufficient  to authorize the  entry into a

            person's home to effect his arrest.  Payton, 445 U.S. at 602-
                                                 ______

            03; see also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 214 n.7
                ________ ________    _____________

            (1981)   (discussing  Payton).     Contrary   to  appellant's
                                  ______

            suggestion, the deputy  sheriffs who entered his  home had an

            arrest warrant.  The issue, as we see it, is  whether a bench

            warrant  for   civil  contempt  authorizes  entry   into  the

            arrestee's home to effect the arrest.  

                      This  latter issue has received surprisingly little

            discussion   in  the  case   law,  and   we  have   found  no

            Massachusetts or  federal cases  directly on point.   Because

            the  issue  was inadequately  briefed, we  do not  resolve it

            here.  Given the dearth  of relevant case law, we cannot  say

            that  Knightly or  Cote  (or more  precisely, an  objectively

            reasonably police  office in  their position) knew  or should

            have known  that  their actions  violated appellant's  Fourth

            Amendment rights, if, in fact, they did.  See Wiley v. Doory,
                                                      ___ _____    _____

            14 F.3d 993, 995 (4th Cir. 1994) (Powell, J.) (observing that

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            in determining whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation

            of a  clearly established  right, "`the proper  focus is  not

            upon the right at its most  general or abstract level, but at

            the level of  its application to  the specific conduct  being

            challenged.'") (quoting  Pritchett v.  Alford, 973 F.2d  307,
                                     _________     ______

            312 (4th Cir. 1992)). 

            B.  Sheriff Garvey

                      Appellant failed to  state a claim against  Sheriff

            Garvey  even  if  we  assume,  arguendo,  that  his  deputies
                                           ________

            violated a federally  protected right.   A supervisor may  be

            liable only  on the basis of  his own acts or  omissions, and

            there must  be an  affirmative link between  the supervisor's

            action or inaction and the street level misconduct.  Bowen v.
                                                                 _____

            City  of  Manchester,  966  F.2d  13,  20  (1st  Cir.  1992);
            ____________________

            Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir.
            ___________________    _________

            1989).    In the  instant  case, appellant  attempts  to hold

            Sheriff  Garvey  liable based  on  his  failure to  reprimand

            deputy  sheriffs  Knightly  and  Cote for  their  actions  on

            February 23, 1994.   However, the failure of a  supervisor to

            discipline his  subordinates following  a single  instance of

            "misconduct"  is insufficient  for a  finding of  supervisory

            liability because  the failure to act cannot  have caused the

            violation.  See Febus-Rodriguez v. Batencourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d
                        ___ _______________    _________________

            87, 93 (1st Cir. 1994) (no liability where supervisor was not

            provided with  requisite notice of behavior  which was likely

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            to  result in constitutional violation).  We add that, in any

            event,  Sheriff Garvey would also be entitled to a defense of

            qualified immunity.

                      Appellant's  claim  against Sheriff  Garvey  in his

            official capacity  also fails.  An  official-capacity suit is

            actually a suit against the entity of which the officer is an

            agent.   Kentucky v.  Graham, 473 U.S.  159, 165 (1985).   To
                     ________     ______

            establish  municipal  liability under    1983,  the plaintiff

            must show  that municipal  employees were acting  pursuant to

            some official policy or custom of the city when they violated

            the  plaintiff's rights.   Oklahoma City v.  Tuttle, 471 U.S.
                                       _____________     ______

            808, 810 (1985);  Monell v. Department of  Social Servs., 436
                              ______    ____________________________

            U.S. 658,  694 (1978).  Because the issue was not briefed, we

            pass  the question  whether  Sheriff Garvey,  in the  instant

            case,  should be considered an  agent of the  state (in which

            case Eleventh  Amendment immunity  applies) or of  the county

            (in  which  case  it does  not).    We  will assume,  without

            deciding, that  Sheriff Garvey should be  considered a county

            agent.   Even so, appellant's claim fails because he does not

            allege  that  deputy  sheriffs  Knightly and  Cote  acted  in

            conformity with official county policy, or that their actions

            were  caused  by Sheriff  Garvey's  acquiescence  in previous

            "misconduct."  

                                         III.
                                         ___

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                      Because we affirm the district court's dismissal of

            appellant's federal  claims, we find that  the district court

            did  not abuse  its discretion  in dismissing  the state  law

            claims.   United Mine Workers  of America v.  Gibbs, 383 U.S.
                      _______________________________     _____

            715, 726 (1966).   We modify the  dismissal of the  state law

            claims, however, to the extent that they were  dismissed with

            prejudice.  Appellant should  not be barred by reason  of the

            impotence of his federal claims from bringing  his common law

            claims before a state tribunal. 

                      We have carefully considered  appellant's remaining

            arguments and find them to be without merit.  Accordingly, we

            affirm  the dismissal  of appellant's  claims but  modify the

            judgment  to  reflect that  the  state  claims are  dismissed

            without prejudice to their renewal in state court.

                      Affirmed as modified.
                      ____________________

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