Court Opinion

ID: 9706074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:30:56.252922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:23.330040
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
ELDRIDGE, J.,
in which BELL, C.J., joins.
Today, the majority adopts, for the first time in Maryland history, an obscure English rule relating to when a particular age is reached. Specifically, the majority affirms the holding of the Court of Special Appeals that, “for the purpose of determining when the disability of infancy is removed within the meaning of § 5-201 [of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article], ‘the disability is removed the day prior to the anniversary of the person’s birth, and the limitations period expires the' day prior to the anniversary of the person’s birth,’ ” quoting Mason v. Board of Education of Baltimore County, 143 Md.App. 507, 508, 795 A.2d 211, 211 (2002).1 As this holding defies the commonsense approach of the time computation statute enacted by the Maryland Legislature, and a Rule of this Court, both of which have been broadly applied by this Court until today, I respectfully dissent.
The general rule for the computation of time in Maryland is set forth in Maryland Rule 1-203 and in Article 1, § 36, of the Maryland Code (1957, 2001 RepLVol., 2002 Supp.).2 Noting *517that “[t]hese provisions represent a codification of the English common law,” the majority explains the general rule as follows: “ ‘the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not included’ and ‘[t]he last day of the period so computed is included.’ ”
The majority cautions, however, that “[sjince the Seventeenth Century ... the common law has recognized an exception to this general rule.” The majority explains the so-called “coming of age” exception as follows (emphasis added):
*518“In computing a person’s age, the day upon which that person was born is included, and she therefore reaches her next year in age at the first moment of the day prior to the anniversary date of her birth.”
Under this coming of age exception, the petitioner became one year old on April 3, 1980. By extension, the majority reasons that Ms. Mason attained her year of majority on April 3, 1997, which was the day before her 18th birthday. Therefore, as § 5-201 required the petitioner to file her action “within ... three years ... after the date the disability was removed,” the majority contends that “[ujnder our statutory method of computation, April 3, 1997, the date of removal of the disability, was not included in the three year period. See ... Art. 1, § 36. Thus, the statute of limitations began to run on April 4, 1997 and ended April 3, 2000.”
The majority’s technique for calculating the end of the petitioner’s tolling period shows the inconsistency in the majority’s methodology. One the one hand, the majority begins by applying the coming of age common law exception, thus having the petitioner reach her age of majority on April 3, 1997. Later, however, when calculating the end of the tolling period, the majority reverts to the general statutory rule, excluding the day of the “event” (here, the removal of the disability) and including the last day of the period in question (here, the tolling period).
The majority then explains that, “[t]he coming of age rule is the product of a legal fiction, adopted by the law for the sake of expediency and uniformity of interpretation, in the absence of contradictory statutory language.” (Emphasis added.) Two significant points arise from this statement: First, it is rather doubtful that the adoption of an exception to a general rule, which is only applied in certain instances, will bring “uniformity.” The majority concedes that there exist a vast number of instances in which the General Assembly has specifically abrogated the coming of age exception by statute.3 *519Given the numerous statutory exceptions to the common law exception, and the fact that a statutory general rule to the contrary exists, I do not know how the adoption of the common law coming of age exception will lead to “uniformity of interpretation.” Rather, such a procedure for the calculation of age is certain to spawn confusion.4
Second, in Maryland, there exists clear statutory language adopting the general rule and not the coming of age exception. Although the majority acknowledges that Rule 1-203 and Art. 1, § 36, set forth a statutory general rule for the computation of time, the majority avoids discussing the effect of such a later enactment on a prior common law exception to a common law rule. I agree with the majority that “[t]his State adopted the common law of England in Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”5 Nevertheless, as the majority indi*520cates, both the general rule and the coming of age exception stem from the English common law.
Furthermore, under Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights, the Legislature may “reviste] ... amend[ ] ... or repeal” the common law, as it has chosen to do with respect to the computation of time in Art. 1, § 36. As this Court stated in Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361, 378 (1872), “[i]t is true the common law of England has been adopted by the people of this State, but only so far as it could be made to fit and adjust itself to our local circumstances and peculiar institutions.”6 In Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 341-342, 396 A.2d 1054, 1073 (1979), we explained:
“What this means is that the common law is subject to change.
“It may be changed by legislative act as Art. 5 of the Declaration of Rights expressly provides. See State v. Canova, 278 Md. 483, 486, 365 A.2d 988 (1976); Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354 (1934); Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 468, 487-488 (1864); Coomes v. Clements, 4 H. & J. 480, 481. It may also be changed by judicial decision. Chase, C. J., in his opinion in Buchanan, observed: ‘Whether particular parts of the common law are applicable to our local circumstances and situation, and our general code of laws and jurisprudence, is a question that comes within the province of the Courts of justice, and is to be decided by them.’ 5 H. & J. at 365-366.”
*521Thus, had the General Assembly not enacted Art. 1, § 36, and had this Court not promulgated Rule 1-203, this Court would still be at the liberty to adhere to the general common law rule, rather than the common law coming of age exception. In short, nothing mandates the result reached in the majority opinion.
The majority advances a mathematical reason for adopting the coming of age exception, that is, the “fiction” that a day has no fractions. Nonetheless, the statutory general rule no more recognizes fractions of days than does the majority’s coming of age exception. Both methods deal in whole days; the only difference concerns the day on which counting begins. Thus, the parade of horribles suggested by the majority as a result of recognizing fractions of days, see Parker v. State, 61 Md.App. 35, 484 A.2d 1020 (1984), is inapplicable under either principle.7
Next, relying upon the “equitable justification for the coming of age rule,” the majority claims that
“the rule is necessary to protect individuals who would be harmed by the law’s refusal to recognize fractions of days. * * * By allowing a person to age on the day preceding the anniversary of [his or her] birth, it is ensured that the person will not lose part of [his or her] adulthood to a legal fiction.”
In this case, however, application of the coming of age exception leads to an unfavorable result for the beneficiary of the statute to which the exception is being applied. In other words, unlike a statute of limitations which principally benefits the defendant by delimiting a definite period of time, a tolling statute is enacted solely for the benefit of the plaintiff. Application of the coming of age exception to the tolling statute would hinder the beneficial purpose of that statute. Even though the exception affects only one day in a three year *522period, the effect is draconian: complete loss of the plaintiffs cause of action. Moreover, the tolling provisions at issue in the instant case should be viewed in tandem with provisions relating to the disability of a minor to sue in his or her own name.
In conclusion, the majority’s approach in calculating the petitioner’s tolling period harkens an often-quoted lament by Voltaire: “Common sense is not so common.” I see little difference in a statute that is based on an individual reaching the “age of 18” and one based on an individual who has reached his or her “18th birthday,” and I doubt that the vast majority of people would see any difference.
Chief Judge BELL joins this dissenting opinion.

. Maryland Code (1998, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 5-201(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states in part as follows:
"§ 5-201. Persons under a disability.
“(a) Extension of time. — When a cause of action subject to a limitation ... accrues in favor of a minor ... that person shall file his action within the lesser of three years or the applicable period of limitations after the date the disability is removed.”

. Maryland Rule l-203(a) provides in pertinent part (emphasis added): "Rule 1-203. Time.
"(a) Computation of time after an act, event, or default. In computing any period of time prescribed by these rules, by rule or order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not included. If the period of time allowed is more than seven days, *517intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays are counted; * * * The last day of the period so computed is included unless:
(1) it is a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday; or
(2) the act to be done is the filing of a paper in court and the office of the clerk of that court on the last day of the period is not open, or is closed 1’or a part of the day, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, holiday, or a day on which the office is not open during its regular hours.”
See also Rule 2-311 (2003) (addressing timely filings of pleadings and motions in the circuit court and stating that Rule 1-203 is the applicable rule for the computation of time); Rule 3-311 (2003) (addressing timely filings of pleadings and motions in the district court and advising that Rule 1-203 is the applicable rule for the computation of time); and Rule 6-106 (2003) (addressing the computation of time in the settlement of decedents’ estates. The rule states, “[a]ny period of time prescribed by rule, order of court, or any applicable statute shall be computed in accordance with Rule 1-203”).
Article 1, § 36, dovetails with Rule 1-203. That section provides in relevant part (emphasis added):
“ § 36. How computed.
“In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default, after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. Ihe last day of the period so computed is to be included unless: (1) It is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day, which is neither a Sunday or a holiday; or, (2) the act to be done is the filing of some paper in court and the office of the clerk of said court on said last day of the period is not open, or is closed for a part of a day, in which event, the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday, Saturday, a legal holiday, or a day on which the said office is not open the entire day during ordinary business hours. When the period of time allowed is more than seven days, intermediate Sundays and holidays shall be considered as other days....’’

. In addition to these instances in the Maryland Code, such invalidations may exist in the local codes for the twenty-four Maryland subdivi*519sions, as well as in the various municipal codes. Much will depend on the wording in the codes: if the code states "age of 18,” the coming of age exception will apply, but if the code states "18th birthday,” the statutory general rule applies.

. For example, notwithstanding the general rule for the computation of time set forth in Art. 1, § 36, the majority opinion mandates that, unless the Legislature specifically excepts to the operation of the coming of age exception, then a person is old enough to purchase alcoholic beverages on the day prior to his or her 21st birthday and a person is subject to prosecution as an adult on the day before his or her 18th birthday. The potential reach of the majority opinion extends to such varied matters as: whether a minor will be subject to the jurisdiction of a juvenile court or a regular court of law; when a person may obtain a driver’s license; when a person may purchase tobacco products or alcoholic beverages; who will choose the guardian of a minor; and in matters relating to trusts and estates, insurance, state pension benefits, etc.

. Article 5(a) of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides in pertinent part (emphasis added):
"Article 5. Common law and statutes of England applicable; trial by jury; property derived under charter granted to Lord Baltimore.
"(a) That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England ... and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity; ... subject, nevertheless, to *520the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State."

. We have repeated that statement on a number of occasions, see, e.g., Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 389, 330 A.2d 176, 180 (1974); McGraw v. State, 234 Md. 273, 275-276, 199 A.2d 229, 230-231, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 862, 85 S.Ct. 124, 13 L.Ed.2d 64 (1964); Lickle v. Boone, 187 Md. 579, 582, 51 A.2d 162, 163 (1947); State v. President of Bank, 6 G. & J. 205, 225-226 (1834); Dashiell v. Attorney General, 5 H. & J. 392, 401 (1822); State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 358 (1821).

. In Parker v. State, 61 Md.App. 35, 484 A.2d 1020 (1984), the defendant argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to try him as an adult because, even though he was convicted on his 18th birthday, his conviction came three hours before the time that he was bom eighteen years earlier.