Court Opinion

ID: 9899560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 21:04:41.026865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:38.837323
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/16/23 P. v. Ochoa CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                       B321637

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. MA075931
         v.

ROSA OCHOA,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Alan Z. Yudkowsky, Commissioner. Affirmed.
      Elizabeth K. Horowitz, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ____________________
     A jury convicted Rosa Ochoa of two counts of animal cruelty
and one count of possessing a bird for fighting, while acquitting
her of two counts of failing to care for an animal. The trial court
sentenced Ochoa to 28 months in county jail but suspended all
but six months of the sentence. Ochoa claims two issues related
to jury instructions require reversal. We affirm.
     Because an overview of the trial is unnecessary to resolve
this appeal, we proceed to the issues.
                                   I
      Ochoa claims the prosecution committed misconduct in its
rebuttal argument by misstating the law set forth in CALCRIM
No. 373, which concerns other perpetrators.
      Ochoa forfeited this issue by failing to raise it at trial. (See
People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1164 (Johnsen) [timely
and specific objection required to preserve claims of prosecutorial
misconduct].) Ochoa does not claim objecting or admonishing the
jury would have been ineffectual. (See id. at pp. 1164–1165.)
     Grasping this forfeiture, Ochoa alternatively claims her trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the
prosecution’s argument. This claim is mistaken.
     This case about animal cruelty involved unrelated claims of
cockfighting and a severely injured goat. Ochoa’s defense was
innocence: someone else had control over the area behind her
home and the injured animals found there, and she was not the
wrongdoer.
     The relevant instruction regarding other wrongdoers,
CALCRIM No. 373, provides: “The evidence shows that other
persons may have been involved in the commission of the crimes
charged against the defendant. There may be many reasons why
someone who appears to have been involved might not be a

                                  2
codefendant in this particular trial. You must not speculate
about whether those other persons have been or will be
prosecuted. Your duty is to decide whether the defendant on trial
here committed the crimes charged.”
     In her initial closing argument, the prosecutor referenced
this instruction and accurately explained it.
     During the defense argument, Ochoa’s counsel noted other
people lived on the relevant nine-acre parcel of land and kept
animals there. Counsel listed three names and Ochoa’s husband.
He invited the jury to consider whether one of these others “could
have been caring for and raising the birds that were seized
behind the Ochoa residence.”
       The prosecutor responded to this defense argument in
rebuttal and returned to CALCRIM No. 373. The prosecutor
highlighted evidence showing the animals were Ochoa’s and
stated, with our emphasis:
       “And, you know, the defense claims that the evidence does
not tie the area behind her house to her, and he asks you to
figure out if one of the other individuals involved was the owners.
I think he named Mr. Casillas, Mr. Fernandez, Mr. Quitquit, and
the defendant’s own husband, and that’s exactly what 373 asks
you not to do.”
     Ochoa challenges the italicized remark, claiming it
misdescribed the instruction and improperly told jurors they
could not consider evidence of possible third party culpability. In
Ochoa’s view, the remark imposed an erroneous limit on the
evidence the jury could consider when assessing her guilt and
misled them on their fact finding role.
       A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must
show deficient performance by counsel that prejudiced the

                                3
defense. (Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1165.) On direct
appeal, we find deficient performance only if (1) the record shows
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or
omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide
one, or (3) no satisfactory explanation could exist. (Ibid.) We
defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions and presume
counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).)
Whether to object to the prosecution’s argument is a highly
tactical decision. (Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1165.)
     Defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecution’s
rebuttal argument was rational.
     The challenged remark was brief: part of one sentence. The
remark responded to the defense argument about others at the
property and cited the relevant jury instruction.
     The prosecutor already had explained the instruction
accurately to the jury and had noted the applicable law was in
the jury instructions. The trial court read the correct instruction.
It directed the jury to follow its instructions in the event of any
conflicting comments by counsel. The court announced it would
provide jurors with copies of the instructions in the jury room.
     Defense counsel also might not have objected because he
reasonably might have interpreted the prosecutor’s remark as
consistent with the law. The instruction told the jury its “duty is
to decide whether the defendant on trial here committed the
crimes charged.” The defense had just referred to several others
who could have been responsible. In rebuttal, the prosecution
was trying to bring jurors back to the defendant and their key
task of determining whether she was guilty, not whether
neighbors also were blameworthy.

                                 4
       In short, defense counsel may have determined that
objecting to the prosecutor’s passing rebuttal remark was
pointless, unnecessary, or improper. The choice not to object was
reasonable. (See Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1018 [whether
objections should be made is within counsel’s discretion and
rarely implicates ineffective assistance of counsel].)
       Because Ochoa has not established deficient performance
by her trial counsel, we need not reach the issue of prejudice.
                                  II
       Ochoa argues her trial counsel also provided ineffective
assistance by failing to request optional cautionary language with
CALCRIM No. 358, which concerns certain out of court
statements made by a defendant. Once again, Ochoa has failed
to establish deficient performance, so we do not assess prejudice.
       The trial court admitted several statements by Ochoa.
       Sergeant Edgar Chavarria testified about statements
Ochoa made when sheriffs executed a search warrant and
discovered injured roosters and an injured goat behind Ochoa’s
house. Chavarria is a certified Spanish speaker who spoke with
Ochoa in Spanish.
       Chavarria facilitated a recorded interview with Ochoa in
Spanish and provided English translation. The jury saw the
video recording of this interview and had a transcript of it.
       In the interview, Ochoa identified her property as “only the
house” yet admitted her chickens and goats were behind the
house. Ochoa circled this area on a map and then answered some
questions about her roosters. Chavarria noted in English, “she’s
not too specifically clear” about the roosters but “every animal
that is behind her residence, uh, belongs to her.” Chavarria
testified the area Ochoa identified behind her house as hers was

                                5
enclosed by fencing. Ochoa confirmed in the interview that she
had the roosters since they were small, but she did not know if
they were fighting roosters. She admitted her goat was injured
when she got it eight months before, she had tried to treat the
goat, but she did not take it to a veterinarian. The lower part of
the goat’s leg was necrotic and missing; but Ochoa maintained
her goat was fine, as it had just given birth.
       Chavarria had other conversations with Ochoa during the
multi-day search operation at the property, conversations that
were not recorded. He testified Ochoa said she did not fight the
roosters, hers were not fighting roosters, and she had never been
to a cockfight. She also said she and her husband breed “them”
and her husband sends “some of them” to Mexico.
       The jury also saw Ochoa’s written statement. Ochoa had
signed an animal relinquishment form—which was in English
and Spanish—relinquishing about 40 game birds and two goats
(a mother and her newborn kid). Ochoa told Chavarria and
another sergeant that she owned these animals, so this other
sergeant put an “X” in the box stating Ochoa was the legal owner
of the animals.
       At trial, Ochoa claimed she could only read a little Spanish
and did not read the form before signing it. Ochoa testified,
among other things, that she rented her home and the front yard
but not the back area, and she never used this area. She did not
raise fighting birds, did not sell them, and was unaware of the
goat needing medical attention. She denied making some of the
unrecorded statements to Chavarria and owning the injured
animals.
       Going back to the instruction on defendant statements,
CALCRIM No. 358 provides, and the trial court instructed:

                                 6
       “You have heard evidence that the defendant made
oral statements before the trial. You must decide whether
the defendant made any of these statements, in whole or in
part. If you decide that the defendant made such
statements, consider the statements, along with all the
other evidence, in reaching your verdict. It is up to you to
decide how much importance to give to the statements.”
       The form instruction has the following language in
brackets: “Consider with caution any statement made by (the/a)
defendant tending to show (his/her) guilt unless the statement
was written or otherwise recorded.” This is the optional
cautionary language.
       The trial court did not provide this language. The record
does not disclose why counsel did not request it. In Ochoa’s view,
there was no downside and only upside in adding this language,
as Ochoa’s unrecorded statement was “clearly detrimental” and
essentially an admission of guilt that she bred fighting birds.
Also, there was no harm in focusing the jury on Ochoa’s recorded
statement, which was partly exculpatory.
       The cautionary instruction aids the jury in determining
whether an admission in fact was made. (People v. Diaz (2015)
60 Cal.4th 1176, 1185 (Diaz).) It is not required absent a request
for it. (Id. at p. 1189.) As our Supreme Court has recognized,
“[t]he cautionary instruction does not reflect a legal principle
with which jurors would be unfamiliar absent the instruction,
and the defendant may not always want the instruction to be
given.” (Ibid.)
       “The cautionary instruction is concerned with the
reliability and credibility of the witness who testifies about the
defendant’s statements.” (Diaz, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1187.)

                                7
Here, defense counsel reasonably could have concluded there was
little utility and perhaps some risk in drawing further attention
to the credibility of the officer who testified about Ochoa’s
unrecorded statements. Chavarria was a 20-year law
enforcement veteran with no apparent reason to lie or to frame
Ochoa. This portion of Chavarria’s testimony was brief and
blended with testimony about Ochoa’s recorded statements.
       Counsel alternatively and reasonably might have
determined requesting the cautionary language worked to
Ochoa’s disadvantage, given Ochoa’s unrecorded statements
included denying her birds were fighting birds and arguably
admitting she bred and shipped only non-fighting roosters.
       Counsel similarly and reasonably could have viewed the
recorded interview as more harmful to Ochoa’s case. But the
optional warning in CALCRIM No. 358 would not reach Ochoa’s
recorded statement.
       Not requesting the optional language was a rational
tactical choice.
                                   III
       Finally, Ochoa urges us to find cumulative error, arguing
the combined effect of the two missteps here rendered her trial
fundamentally unfair. Ochoa has demonstrated neither multiple
trial errors nor an unfair trial. (See People v. Poletti (2015) 240
Cal.App.4th 1191, 1216 [appellate court reverses a judgment
under the cumulative error doctrine if there is a reasonable
possibility the jury would have reached a more favorable result
absent a combination of errors].)
///

                                 8
                       DISPOSITION
     We affirm the judgment.

                                     WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

                               9