Court Opinion

ID: 9898288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:41.636038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:15.216791
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                         Washington State
                                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Division Two

                                                                                         August 22, 2023

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                No. 56139-5-II

                                Respondent,

        v.                                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 JOHN PAUL BECKMEYER,

                                Appellant.

       CHE, J. ⎯ Beckmeyer appeals the trial court’s ruling excluding his prior statements made

to medical providers as an abuse of discretion and violation of his right to present a defense.

Beckmeyer also appeals the trial court’s imposition of community custody supervision fees. In

August 2020 after an argument, John Beckmeyer shot multiple rounds from his trailer window,

killing James McDonald. At trial, Beckmeyer raised a self-defense claim. Beckmeyer sought to

introduce out-of-court statements he made to medical providers several weeks prior to

demonstrate his longstanding, subjective fear of McDonald. The trial court excluded the

statements as inadmissible hearsay. Following a jury trial, Beckmeyer was found guilty of one

count of second degree murder, two counts of second degree assault, and one count of fourth

degree assault. Beckmeyer’s judgment and sentence requires that he pay community custody

supervision fees.
No. 56139-5-II

       We hold that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding statements to

medical providers, and even if the trial court erred in excluding the evidence, any such abuse was

not prejudicial, (2) the trial court did not violate Beckmeyer’s right to present a defense, and

(3) the trial court erred in imposing the community custody supervision fees. We affirm

Beckmeyer’s convictions, reverse the imposition of community custody supervision fees, and

remand for the trial court to strike the community custody supervision fees from Beckmeyer’s

judgment and sentence.

                                              FACTS

       John Beckmeyer and his girlfriend, Danielle Boucher, lived together in a fifth wheel

trailer on a two-acre property owned by Beckmeyer’s sister. James McDonald and Randi

Benson, who had been in a romantic relationship for eight years, also lived on the property.

Beckmeyer’s sister was married to Benson’s grandfather. Initially, McDonald and Benson lived

in a motorhome on the property across from Beckmeyer and Boucher’s fifth wheel trailer. A

grassy area, used for barbequing, separated the motorhome and fifth wheel trailer. McDonald

and Benson later moved into the main house on the property.

       On August 26, 2020, Beckmeyer and Boucher were barbequing in the grassy area

between the fifth wheel trailer and the motorhome. McDonald and Benson joined Beckmeyer

and Boucher outside. The group was drinking alcohol and Boucher was playing music on a

Bluetooth speaker. Beckmeyer asked Boucher to turn the music down. When Boucher did not

turn the music down, Beckmeyer hit Boucher on the side of her head. McDonald confronted

Beckmeyer about hitting Boucher and the two men began yelling at each other. While Benson

consoled Boucher, Beckmeyer got up from the barbeque and returned to the fifth wheel trailer.

                                                  2
No. 56139-5-II

Although Benson heard Beckmeyer “say he was going to go get his .45,” Boucher “didn’t hear

[Beckmeyer] say anything” before he returned to the fifth wheel trailer. 3 Rep. of Proc. (RP) at

1100, 1188.

        McDonald left the barbeque area to retrieve a “double-barrel” shotgun from the main

house. 3 RP at 1188. Boucher saw McDonald return “to the barbecue area . . . [and] point the

shotgun towards [the window where Beckmeyer was] in his trailer.” 3 RP at 1132. Benson saw

McDonald returning with the shotgun “broken open,”1 but did not see McDonald load or point

the shotgun. Benson alleges that McDonald “said that he was going to defend himself.” 3 RP at

1215.

        After McDonald returned to the barbecue area, Benson saw “a black thing come out the

window of the fifth wheel [trailer].” 3 RP at 1188. Beckmeyer, who was laying on his bed

inside the fifth wheel trailer, stuck his gun outside the window and fired several shots. Benson

and Boucher ducked to the ground. Bullets struck McDonald, piercing his lungs. McDonald

died at the scene.

        The State charged Beckmeyer with one count of first degree murder, or in the alternative

one count of second degree murder, two counts of first degree assault, and one count of fourth

degree assault.

                                     I. WITNESS TESTIMONY

        At trial, witnesses testified as described above. Beckmeyer asserted that he had acted in

self-defense. Beckmeyer felt threatened by McDonald based on “[t]hings that happened in the

1
 When “broken open,” a shotgun’s chambers are exposed for loading and unloading
ammunition. 3 RP at 1156.

                                                 3
No. 56139-5-II

past.” 4 RP at 1461. Evidence of McDonald’s propensity for violence was introduced through

Boucher, Benson, and Beckmeyer’s testimony.

       Boucher testified that in 2019, following an accident concerning Beckmeyer’s dog,

McDonald pointed a BB gun at Beckmeyer’s head. Boucher described another incident six

weeks prior to the shooting when Boucher and McDonald got into an argument. Boucher could

not recall what the argument was about but remembered that at some point McDonald “picked

[Boucher] up and threw [her] on the ground.” 3 RP at 1079. Although Beckmeyer was not

present for the altercation, Boucher told Beckmeyer about what happened. Following that

incident, Boucher and Beckmeyer went to the hospital for Boucher’s injury. Boucher told the

medical provider about her living situation.

       Benson recalled the 2019 incident with Beckmeyer’s dog. Benson did not remember

McDonald pointing a BB gun at Beckmeyer, but did remember that Beckmeyer “threatened to

hurt [McDonald].” 3 RP at 1184. In describing Boucher’s altercation with McDonald, Benson

explained that Boucher “just kept getting in [McDonald’s] face and [that] he pushed [Boucher]

over.” 3 RP at 1185. Benson attributed Boucher’s injury to her having “tripped and [fallen] over

[a] stool” after McDonald pushed her. 3 RP at 1185. Benson characterized Beckmeyer and

McDonald’s relationship as sometimes “good and [that] other times it was like cats and dogs.”

3 RP at 1183.

            Following the shooting, detectives interviewed Beckmeyer. The recorded interview

was played for the jury. During the interview Beckmeyer explained that McDonald “gets really

violent” and “crazy sometimes.” 4 RP at 1343, 1348. Beckmeyer told detectives that “about two

months ago [McDonald] sent [Boucher] to the hospital” after having thrown her to the ground.

                                               4
No. 56139-5-II

4 RP at 1342. Beckmeyer described having “had troubles in the past with [McDonald],”

commenting that McDonald had “attacked [Beckmeyer] a couple times.” 4 RP at 1346. At

several points during the interview, Beckmeyer told detectives that McDonald had also attacked

Boucher and Benson. Beckmeyer explained that McDonald previously “pulled a [BB] gun on

[Beckmeyer].” 4 RP at 1372. In explaining why Beckmeyer shot McDonald, Beckmeyer

expressed being afraid for his and Boucher’s lives.

       Beckmeyer’s testimony during trial echoed his statements to the detectives. When asked

about what was going through his head prior to the shooting, Beckmeyer focused his testimony

on two prior incidents with McDonald. Beckmeyer first described his thoughts as “Oh, Jeez.

[McDonald has] pointed a gun at me before, and . . . this time [McDonald has] a real firearm.”

4 RP at 1461. Beckmeyer described the BB gun incident and the way McDonald “exploded,”

going from “calm and collective [sic] to . . . extremely mad and . . . yelling, screaming, tearing

his shirt off, throwing his glasses on the ground.” 4 RP at 1462. Beckmeyer described

McDonald’s behavior as “very threatening,” causing Beckmeyer to question whether McDonald

“was going to start throwing punches.” 4 RP at 1464. Beckmeyer further testified that five

weeks before the shooting, there had been a confrontation between Boucher and McDonald.

                                    II. EXCLUDED TESTIMONY

       Prior to the start of trial, Beckmeyer sought to admit McDonald’s prior bad acts “that

relate to Mr. Beckmeyer’s reasonable apprehension of danger.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 82.

Beckmeyer argued that “[e]vidence of McDonald’s prior bad acts [would] be introduced through

testimony of Danielle Boucher, Dr. Wulff, ARNP Doyle, the law enforcement interview of

Danielle Boucher, the law enforcement interrogation of Mr. Beckmeyer, and the testimony of

                                                 5
No. 56139-5-II

Mr. Beckmeyer.” CP at 83. Beckmeyer explained that the “reasonableness of [his] fear that he

was going to get shot and his reaction are informed by what he knew about McDonald’s specific

acts of a violent and volatile nature.” CP at 77. Beckmeyer further argued that statements “to

medical providers are independently admissible under ER 803(a)(3) & (4).” CP at 78.

Beckmeyer asserted that evidence of McDonald’s propensity for violence is “offered to establish

that [Beckmeyer] reasonably feared McDonald because of what [Beckmeyer] knew at the time.”

CP at 78.

       The trial court ruled that certain prior bad acts would be admissible. Although

McDonald’s assault of Boucher, attempted assault of Beckmeyer, and assault of Beckmeyer with

a BB gun were admissible bad acts, the trial court declined “to try to describe . . . what evidence

[would] be admissible to show those acts.” 1 RP at 265.

       During trial, Beckmeyer sought to introduce statements made to third parties and medical

providers. Specifically, Beckmeyer sought to introduce his and Boucher’s statements about their

relationship with McDonald to nurse Christine Doyle and doctor Laura Wulff. Doyle co-

managed Boucher’s care and primarily focused on Boucher’s “struggles with alcohol abuse.”

4 RP at 1602. On July 14, 2020, Boucher, accompanied by Beckmeyer, sought treatment from

Doyle. In her progress notes, Doyle noted that

       [Boucher] presents with tailbone pain x5 days.
       She states she got into a fight with her roommate [McDonald] and was body
       slammed into the ground.

       About 5 days ago [Boucher] got into a physical altercation with her roommate.
       Not feeling safe at home. [Boucher] has been distancing herself from housemate.
       Her partner, [Beckmeyer], states he has also experienced violence from his step-
       nieces boyfriend ([McDonald]). Both [Beckmeyer and Boucher] have been living
       in a motel for two days. [Beckmeyer’s] sister passed from cancer and they were
       living in her house without issue until [McDonald] started living there. They don’t

                                                 6
No. 56139-5-II

       want to get a retraining (sic) order or contact the police. They are just going to
       stay away. [Boucher] is waiting to get into a detox program in NJ - Wednesday
       she will hear if she can get in. The[n] she plans to travel to NJ to be with her aunt.

CP at 132.

       Next, Beckmeyer sought to introduce testimony through Wulff, Beckmeyer’s primary

care provider. Although Wulff saw Beckmeyer for his “blood pressure, some psych concerns,

[and] depression,” Wulff primarily treated Beckmeyer’s chronic pain following his neck and

back surgeries. 4 RP at 1591. On July 16, 2020, Beckmeyer met with Wulff “for a follow up

chronic pain visit.” CP at 133. In her progress notes, Wulff noted

       Patient states that his pain overall is unchanged on his current regimen of
       Tramadol . . . . Functional goal he is working on: walking. Niece’s boyfriend
       [McDonald] has a temper and has been abusive to other people living on the
       property (such as [Boucher]); [Beckmeyer and Boucher] have been staying in a
       motel.

CP at 133. Wulff made notes concerning Beckmeyer’s medication regimen and post-surgery

recovery progress. CP at 133. Wulff’s report also captured Beckmeyer’s statements concerning

his living condition, noting that

       [Beckmeyer] continues to report poor social situation and chaotic home life.
       Lives in a run-down 5th wheel w/o running water on sister’s land; sister has died
       so house now occupied by [Benson/McDonald]. . . .
       Tries to care for [Boucher] (alcoholic).

CP at 133.

       In seeking to introduce these statements made to Doyle and Wulff, Beckmeyer argued

that the statements “are non-hearsay, or alternatively, admissible under exceptions to the hearsay

rule.” CP at 233. The State argued that “a doctor coming in to testify about some out-of-court

statement is hearsay in this context.” 3 RP at 1261. The State further argued that exclusion of

the statements did not “prevent the defendant from presenting a defense in terms of his state of

                                                 7
No. 56139-5-II

mind as to self-defense because the jury’s actually heard the evidence that’s relevant on the issue

of self-defense.” 3 RP at 1261-62.

        The trial court concluded that Beckmeyer’s statements to medical providers were “not

related to medical diagnosis or anything.” 3 RP at 1265. The trial court explained that although

the underlying incidents “could be relevant to reasonable fear, . . . the proper evidence of that

coming in . . . is a different issue.” 3 RP at 1266.

                                   III. VERDICT AND SENTENCING

        Following a jury trial, Beckmeyer was found guilty of one count of second degree murder

of McDonald, two counts of second degree assault of Boucher and Benson, and one count of

fourth degree assault of Boucher. The jury returned special verdicts finding that Beckmeyer’s

assault against Boucher involved domestic violence against an intimate partner. The jury also

returned special verdicts finding that Beckmeyer used a firearm in the commission of the second

degree murder and in both counts of second degree assault. The trial court sentenced Beckmeyer

to 347 months of confinement, 36 months of community custody, and ordered Beckmeyer to pay

legal financial obligations (LFOs) comprised of mandatory fees, community custody supervision

fees, and restitution.

        Beckmeyer appeals.

                                            ANALYSIS

                                      I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        A trial court determines “whether evidence is relevant and admissible.” State v.

Jennings, 199 Wn.2d 53, 59, 502 P.3d 1255 (2022). This court reviews “the trial court’s rulings

for abuse of discretion.” Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 59. A trial court abuses its discretion where

                                                  8
No. 56139-5-II

“‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’” Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at

59 (quoting State v. Atesbeha, 142 Wn.2d 904, 914, 16 P.3d 626 (2001).

       In determining whether a trial court erred in excluding evidence in violation of a

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, this court engages in a “two-step

review process.” State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 797, 453 P.3d 696 (2019). This court first

reviews “the trial court’s individual evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.” Id. Where a

“‘trial court abused its discretion in making an evidentiary ruling, and the ruling was prejudicial

to the defendant,’” our inquiry ends. Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 59 (quoting affirmingly State v.

Jennings, 14 Wn. App. 2d 779, 800-01, 474 P.3d 599 (2020)) (Melnick, J., concurring)).

However, where “‘the abuse of discretion constituted harmless error’” or where a court’s

evidentiary rulings do not constitute abuse of discretion, this court next “consider[s] de novo

whether the exclusion of evidence violated the defendant’s constitutional right to present a

defense.” Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 58-59 (quoting Jennings, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 800-01 (2020)).

                 II. REVIEW OF EVIDENTIARY RULINGS FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION

A.     Hearsay

       Hearsay evidence is not admissible except as provided by the rules of evidence, other

court rules, or by statute. ER 802. Under ER 801(c), “hearsay” is an out-of-court statement

“offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Determining whether “an out-of-

court statement is hearsay depends on the purpose for which the statement is offered.” State v.

Duarte Vela, 200 Wn. App. 306, 319, 402 P.3d 281 (2017).

                                                 9
No. 56139-5-II

       1. ER 803(a)(4)—Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment

       Beckmeyer argues that the “trial court erred when it excluded testimony regarding [his

prior] statements to medical providers” because the statements “were pertinent to treatment” and

admissible under ER 803(a)(4). Br. of Appellant at 21, 33. We disagree.

       ER 803(a)(4) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for statements “made for purposes

of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms,

pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof

insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” A statement is reasonably pertinent to

diagnosis or treatment where “(1) the declarant’s motive in making the statement is to promote

treatment and (2) the medical professional reasonably relied on the statement for purposes of

treatment.” State v. Williams, 137 Wn. App. 736, 746, 154 P.3d 322 (2007).

       However, statements made for the purpose of a medical diagnosis or treatment that

identify the perpetrator of a crime are not admissible under ER 803(a)(4). State v. Ashcraft, 71

Wn. App. 444, 456, 859 P.2d 60 (1993). But in domestic violence situations, “a declarant’s

statement disclosing the identity of a closely-related perpetrator is admissible under ER 803(a)(4)

because part of reasonable treatment and therapy is to prevent recurrence and future injury.”

Williams, 137 Wn. App. at 746.

       Here, the trial court properly excluded Beckmeyer’s statements to medical providers,

Doyle and Wulff, on the basis that the statements were “not related to medical diagnosis.” 3 RP

at 1265. First, Beckmeyer’s statement to Doyle during Boucher’s appointment that Beckmeyer

had experienced violence from McDonald did not promote or relate to Boucher’s injury and

Doyle’s treatment or diagnosis of Boucher. Beckmeyer was not Doyle’s patient, nor was he

                                                 10
No. 56139-5-II

seeking treatment from Doyle. Doyle, was treating Boucher for a tailbone injury. Boucher had

already explained to Doyle how Boucher sustained the injury in an altercation with McDonald.

Beckmeyer’s statement did not describe Boucher’s “medical history, or past or present

symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external

source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” ER 803(a)(4).

Beckmeyer’s statement that he also experienced violence from McDonald provided no

information that Doyle could reasonably rely on in diagnosing or treating Boucher’s tailbone

injury.

          Next, although Beckmeyer was seeking treatment from Wulff, his statements about

McDonald were not pertinent to his treatment or diagnosis. Wulff, Beckmeyer’s primary care

provider, met with Beckmeyer “for a follow up chronic pain visit” following his neck and back

surgeries. CP at 133. Wulff’s report notes that Beckmeyer stated McDonald “has a temper and

has been abusive to other people living on the property (such as [Boucher]); [Beckmeyer and

Boucher] have been staying in a motel.” CP at 133. Wulff’s progress report also notes that

Beckmeyer “continues to report poor social situation and chaotic home life.” CP at 133.

          Beckmeyer does not explain how these statements to Wulff concern Beckmeyer’s

medical history, a past or present symptom, pain, or sensation relevant to Wullf’s treatment of

Beckmeyer’s chronic pain following his neck and back surgeries. Whether McDonald had a

temper is unrelated to Beckmeyer’s treatment or diagnosis. Beckmeyer’s statement that

McDonald has been abusive to others on the property does not implicate Beckmeyer’s treatment

or diagnosis. In the absence of a relevant link between Beckmeyer’s chronic pain and

Beckmeyer’s statement about McDonald’s temper towards other people, Beckmeyer’s statement

                                                11
No. 56139-5-II

to Wulff was unrelated to his diagnosis and treatment. Also, Beckmeyer does not explain how or

if Wulff relied on Beckmeyer’s statements in providing treatment.

       Furthermore, although Beckmeyer, Boucher, Benson, and McDonald lived on the same

property, Beckmeyer did not share a residence with McDonald. Beckmeyer was not in any

intimate relationship with McDonald nor was he related to McDonald. Therefore, the trial

court’s decision to exclude Beckmeyer’s statements to Doyle and Wulff under ER 803(a)(4) is

not an abuse of discretion.

       2. ER 803(a)(3)—Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition

       Beckmeyer argues that his statements to Wulff, that McDonald had a temper and has

been abusive to others living on the property, were also admissible under ER 803(a)(3) as

“‘statements of the declarant’s then existing state of mind.’” Br. of Appellant at 35 (quoting ER

803(a)(3)). Beckmeyer posits that the statements were relevant to a jury’s full understanding of

Beckmeyer’s state of mind regarding Beckmeyer’s ongoing fear of McDonald. We disagree that

the statements were admissible under ER 803(a)(3).

       Under ER 803(a)(3), a “statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion,

sensation, or physical condition . . . , but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove

the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or

terms of declarant’s will,” is not excluded by the hearsay rule. The use of “‘then’ in the term

‘then-existing’ refers to the time the statement was made, not the earlier time the statement

describes.” State v. Sanchez-Guillen, 135 Wn. App. 636, 646, 145 P.3d 406 (2006). A statement

“discussing the conduct of another person that may have created the declarant’s state of mind [is]

                                                 12
No. 56139-5-II

inadmissible under ER 803(a)(3).” State v. Sublett, 156 Wn. App. 160, 199, 231 P.3d 231

(2010).

          Here, Beckmeyer’s statement to Wulff that McDonald “has a temper and has been

abusive to other people living on the property” is not a statement of Beckmeyer’s then existing

state of mind. CP at 133. Beckmeyer’s statement describes McDonald’s past conduct.

Furthermore, Beckmeyer’s statement does not pertain to his own state of mind but rather

describes McDonald’s past interactions with others. Accordingly, Beckmeyer’s statement to

Wulff is not a statement of his then existing state of mind.

          Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Beckmeyer’s statement to

Wulff under ER 803(a)(3).

B.        Self-Defense—State of Mind Evidence

          Alternatively, Beckmeyer argues that his statements to Doyle and Wulff were not

hearsay, i.e., offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but were instead offered to show

Beckmeyer’s state of mind and longstanding fear of McDonald. We disagree because even if the

statements were relevant to Beckmeyer’s state of mind, there is no prejudice as the statements

were cumulative.

          Under RCW 9A.16.050, homicide is justifiable when it is committed in “the lawful

defense of the slayer . . . when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of

the person slain to . . . do some great personal injury to the slayer . . . and there is imminent

danger of such design being accomplished.” A successful self-defense claim requires “‘evidence

that (1) the defendant subjectively feared that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily

harm; (2) this belief was objectively reasonable; [and] (3) the defendant exercised no greater

                                                  13
No. 56139-5-II

force than was reasonably necessary.’” State v. Werner, 170 Wn.2d 333, 337, 241 P.3d 410

(2010) (quoting State v. Callahan, 87 Wn. App. 925, 929, 943 P.2d 676 (1997)).

       In evaluating a self-defense claim, the “vital question is the reasonableness of the

defendant’s apprehension of danger, and his good faith in acting upon such apprehension.” State

v. Ellis, 30 Wash. 369, 373, 70 Pac. 963 (1902). Accordingly, the “jury are entitled to stand as

nearly as practicable in the shoes of defendant, and from this point of view determine the

character of the act.” Id. Evidence demonstrating “a victim’s propensity toward violence that is

known by the defendant is relevant to a claim of self-defense ‘because such testimony tends to

show the state of mind of the defendant . . . and to indicate whether he, at that time, had reason to

fear bodily harm.’” Duarte Vela, 200 Wn. App. at 319 (quoting State v. Cloud, 7 Wn. App. 211,

218, 498 P.2d 907 (1972)). Evidence “that the defendant was aware of specific acts of violence

committed by the victim” is “admissible as justifying forceful acts of the defendant in self-

defense.” State v. Walker, 13 Wn. App. 545, 549, 536 P.2d 657 (1975).

       Although relevant evidence is generally admissible, relevant evidence “may be excluded

if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of

the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” ER 402, 403.

       Here, Beckmeyer attempted to introduce his statements to Doyle and Wulff for the

purpose of demonstrating the reasonableness of his fear concerning McDonald. Even assuming

without deciding that the statements were relevant to Beckmeyer’s state of mind and fear of

McDonald, the trial court’s ruling excluding the statements was not prejudicial because the

evidence was cumulative. See Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 59-60.

                                                 14
No. 56139-5-II

       Evidence that Beckmeyer was familiar with McDonald’s temper and violent behavior

along with the fact Beckmeyer and Boucher were staying in a motel was introduced through

several other witnesses, including Beckmeyer himself. First, Boucher testified that McDonald

had previously “barge[d] into the [couple’s] fifth wheel in a rage,” “screaming at [Beckmeyer]”

while pointing a BB gun at Beckmeyer’s head. 3 RP at 1125. Boucher further testified that

McDonald had picked her up and thrown her to the ground during an argument and that she had

told Beckmeyer about the incident. Benson’s testimony explained that Beckmeyer and

McDonald’s relationship was good sometimes, “and [that] other times it was like cats and dogs.”

3 RP at 1183.

       Additionally, the jury listened to Beckmeyer’s interview with detectives following the

shooting. During the interview, Beckmeyer explained that two months prior to the shooting,

McDonald had “beaten up” Boucher and “sent her to the hospital.” 4 RP at 1342. Beckmeyer

described McDonald as “really violent” and capable of getting “really crazy sometimes.” 4 RP

at 1343, 1348. Beckmeyer explained that he has “had troubles in the past with [McDonald],”

and that McDonald had “attacked [Beckmeyer] a couple times.” 4 RP at 1346. Beckmeyer

reiterated his allegation, stating McDonald has “already beat on me once. And he’s beat up on

his girlfriend. And he’s already beat my girlfriend.” 4 RP at 1354. Beckmeyer also told

detectives that McDonald had previously gone “crazy” and “pulled [a] BB gun on [Beckmeyer].”

4 RP at 1372. After learning about McDonald’s death, Beckmeyer acknowledged that

McDonald was a “good guy” but that “he used to have big anger problems.” 4 RP 1412.

Beckmeyer explained that he “was afraid because . . . [McDonald] attacked [Beckmeyer’s]

girlfriend, bruised her tail bone bad,” and left “a huge bruise” on her arm. 4 RP at 1412.

                                                15
No. 56139-5-II

       Finally, Beckmeyer’s own testimony, provides evidence of his state of mind. Counsel

specifically asked what was going through Beckmeyer’s mind when he saw McDonald

approaching with a shotgun. Beckmeyer explained that he thought “Oh, Jeez. [McDonald has]

pointed a gun at me before, and then I go this time [McDonald has] a real firearm.” 4 RP at

1461. Beckmeyer explained that McDonald had pointed a BB gun at him “a year or so prior.”

4 RP at 1462. When asked whether “there [had] been other instances in which [McDonald]

ha[d] been threatening to [Beckmeyer] or [Boucher],” Beckmeyer explained that he was aware of

the incident between Boucher and McDonald. 4 RP at 1464.

       Even if Beckmeyer’s statements to Doyle and Wulff may have been relevant to show his

state of mind, such evidence was cumulative. The substance of the excluded evidence contained

in Beckmeyer’s statements to Doyle and Wulff was admitted through Boucher, Benson, and

Beckmeyer’s testimony. Accordingly, even if Beckmeyer’s statements to Doyle and Wulff were

relevant to show Beckmeyer’s state of mind, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

excluding those statements because the statements were cumulative evidence.

       Under Jennings, when “‘the trial court abused its discretion in making an evidentiary

ruling, and the ruling was prejudicial to the defendant, we would avoid the constitutional issue

altogether.’” 199 Wn.2d at 59 (quoting Jennings, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 800-01 (Melnick, J.,

concurring)). However, where, the trial court’s abuse of discretion is harmless or where, the trial

court does not abuse its discretion, then we proceed to consider the constitutional issue.

Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 59. Here, even if the excluded statements were relevant to Beckmeyer’s

state of mind, the trial court’s exclusion of the statements was not prejudicial because the

                                                16
No. 56139-5-II

excluded statements were cumulative; therefore, we now turn to Beckmeyer’s Sixth Amendment

argument.

                        III. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE

       Beckmeyer argues that “the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence deprived [him] of his

right to present a complete defense, and [that] the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Br. of Appellant at 38. Beckmeyer contends that the evidence was relevant and that “the

State cannot demonstrate the evidence was ‘so prejudicial as to disrupt the fairness of the fact-

finding process.’” Br. of Appellant at 39. The State argues that Beckmeyer “was not denied his

right to present a complete defense and any such denial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

because the evidence was cumulative to other admissible evidence.” Br. of Resp’t at 28. We

agree with the State.

       A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense. U.S. CONST. amend.

VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. However, this right is not absolute and may “‘in appropriate

cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process’ . . . including

the exclusion of evidence considered irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible.” State v. Giles, 196

Wn. App. 745, 756-57, 385 P.3d 204 (2016) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,

295, 93 S. Ct. 1038. 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973). Under the Constitution, judges may “‘exclude

evidence that is repetitive . . ., only marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of harassment,

prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues.’” Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 63 (quoting Holmes v. South

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326-27, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 164 L. Ed. 2d. 503 (2006)).

       Where “evidence is relevant, the reviewing court must weigh the defendant’s right to

produce relevant evidence against the State’s interest in limiting the prejudicial effects of that

                                                 17
No. 56139-5-II

evidence to determine if excluding the evidence violates the defendant’s constitutional rights.”

Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 63. Evidence demonstrating “a victim’s violent actions may be

admissible to show the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the crime and to indicate whether

he had reason to fear bodily harm.” State v. Burnam, 4 Wn. App. 2d 368, 376, 421 P.3d 977

(2018). There is “a distinction between evidence that merely bolsters credibility and evidence

that is necessary to present a defense.” Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 66-67.

       A violation of an individual’s right to present a defense is “subject to constitutional

harmless error review.” State v. Orn, 197 Wn.2d 343, 359, 482 P.3d 913 (2021). An error is

harmless where the State proves “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached

the same verdict without the error.’” Id. (quoting Romero-Ochoa, 193 Wn.2d 341, 347, 440 P.3d

994 (2019)).

       As discussed above, testimony concerning Beckmeyer’s knowledge of McDonald’s

history of violence was introduced through Boucher, Benson, and Beckmeyer’s testimony, as

well as Beckmeyer’s recorded statements to detectives. Beckmeyer testified that he had

knowledge of Boucher’s interaction with McDonald and of her resulting injury. Beckmeyer

explained to the jury that the couple stayed in a hotel after Benson’s injury. Beckmeyer further

testified that a year prior to the shooting, McDonald had pointed a BB gun at Beckmeyer.

Furthermore, Beckmeyer testified that in the moments before the shooting, his thoughts focused

on McDonald’s prior violent acts. The jury also heard Beckmeyer’s recorded statements to

detectives that included Beckmeyer reciting these incidents multiple times during the interview.

Moreover, Boucher and Benson’s testimony confirmed these incidents between Beckmeyer and

                                                18
No. 56139-5-II

McDonald. Accordingly, Beckmeyer had the opportunity to present his theory of the case and

present evidence relating to his longstanding subjective fear of McDonald.

        Statements made by Beckmeyer to Doyle and Wulff are cumulative as they were

introduced numerous times through Boucher, Benson, and Beckmeyer’s testimony, as well as

Beckmeyer’s recorded statement to detectives. Rather than provide new evidence for the jury’s

consideration, Doyle and Wulff’s testimony would only serve to bolster Beckmeyer’s credibility

concerning his longstanding fear of McDonald. Given the cumulative nature of the evidence,

Beckmeyer’s ability to testify and present his theory of the case, the trial court did not err in

excluding Beckmeyer’s statements made to Doyle and Wulff.

        Furthermore, even if the trial court erred in excluding statements made to Doyle and

Wulff, we are assured beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same

verdict without the error. The general statements that Beckmeyer made to Doyle and Wulff were

introduced through witnesses who gave detailed accounts of the incidents between McDonald

and Beckmeyer. Thus, the jury would not have reached a different verdict had they been able to

consider the excluded evidence.

        Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not deny Beckmeyer his right to present

a complete defense and even if it did, any such denial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

                           IV. COMMUNITY CUSTODY SUPERVISION FEES

        Beckmeyer argues that his “community custody supervision fee should be stricken [from

his judgment and sentence] because it is a discretionary legal financial obligation, which the trial

court intended to waive.” Br. of Appellant at 43. Beckmeyer further argues that “[i]n the

alternative, defense counsel was ineffective for failing to alert the court that . . . the written

                                                   19
No. 56139-5-II

judgment and sentence did not waive the fee[s].” Br. of Appellant at 48. The State concedes

that this “court should strike the Community Custody Supervision fee.” Br. of Resp’t at 35. We

agree.

         Under former RCW 9.94A.703(2)(d) (2018), a trial court could waive community

custody supervision fees. In 2022, the legislature amended RCW 9.94A.703(2) and removed

subsection (d). See SECOND SUBSTITUTE H.B. 1818, 67th Leg., Reg., Sess. (Wash. 2022). The

amended statute does not provide for the imposition of community custody supervision fees.

RCW 9.94A.703. Costs imposed under former RCW 9.94A.703(2)(d) were not final until the

termination of all appeals. State v. Wemhoff, 24 Wn. App. 2d 198, 202, 519 P.3d 297 (2022).

The cost statute “in effect at the conclusion of a defendant’s appeal appl[ies] to a defendant’s

case.” Id.

         Here, the trial court imposed community custody supervision fees after expressing an

intent to only impose mandatory LFOs. In its oral sentencing, the trial court ordered that the

LFOs be “basically just the mandatory minimum.” 6 RP at 2204. However, Beckmeyer’s

judgment and sentence requires that he “pay supervision fees as determined by DOC.” CP at

442. In light of amended RCW 9.94A.703(2) and the record’s suggestion that the trial court

intended to waive discretionary LFOs under former RCW 9.94A.703(2)(d), we reverse the

imposition of the community custody supervision fee and remand to the trial court to strike the

community custody supervision fees from Beckmeyer’s judgment and sentence.

                                         CONCLUSION

         We hold that the trial court did not err in excluding statements by Beckmeyer to Doyle

and Wulff because the statements were inadmissible hearsay and cumulative. We further hold

                                                 20
No. 56139-5-II

that the trial court did not violate Beckmeyer’s right to present a defense, but the trial court

improperly imposed the community custody supervision fee. Consequently, we affirm

Beckmeyer’s convictions, reverse the imposition of community custody supervision fees, and

remand for the trial court to strike the community custody supervision fees.

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                       Che, J.
 We concur:

 Lee, P.J.

 Price, J.

                                                  21