Court Opinion

ID: 9518789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:02:07.523465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:14.325559
License: Public Domain

VAIDIK, Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I concur in the majority’s resolution of each of the issues except for its decision to affirm the trial court’s limitation of Husband’s obligation to cover a portion of Samantha’s college expenses to only the expense commensurate with the cost of an in-state, state-sponsored education.
I recognize that it rests largely within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a parent must pay for a child’s college education and the extent of that financial obligation. However, our Legislature provided guidance for this determination in Indiana Code § 31 — 16—6— 2(a)(1), which provides:
(a) The child support order or an educational support order may also include,
where appropriate:
(1) amounts for the child’s education ... at postsecondary educational institutions, taking into account:
(A) the child’s aptitude and ability;
(B) the child’s reasonable ability to contribute to educational expenses through:
*285(i) work;
(ii) obtaining loans; and
(iii) obtaining other sources of financial aid reasonably available to the child and each parent; and
(C) the ability of each parent to meet these expenses[.]
Additionally, we have repeatedly explained that “the statutory authorization for the divorce court to order either or both parents to pay sums toward their child’s college education constitutes a reasonable manner in which to enforce the expectation that most families would encourage their qualified children to pursue a college education consistent with individual family values.” Scales v. Scales, 891 N.E.2d 1116, 1119 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (citing McKay v. McKay, 644 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trnns. denied) (emphasis added). The trial court “must consider whether and to what extent the parents, if still married, would have contributed to the child’s college expenses.” Id. Under the facts of this case, I believe that the trial court should have denied Husband’s petition for modification relating to Samantha’s college expenses.
The trial court granted Husband’s petition for modification relating to Samantha’s college expenses with mention only to his significantly decreased income in 2007. Appellant’s App. p. 12-13. The court’s order makes no mention of the other factors included in Indiana Code § 31-16-6-2(a)(1). In my view, factors (B) and (C), coupled with the educational values of the Petry family, warrant a denial of Husband’s motion.
The majority focuses its discussion of this issue upon the undue hardship that it believes Husband will experience if he is required to pay 72% of Samantha’s approximate annual $36,468 college expenses. See Appellant’s App. p. 66. For several reasons, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Husband will be placed in a position of undue financial hardship if required to pay this amount.
First, I disagree with the majority’s characterization of Husband’s 2007 $195,000 income as a “Kia budget.” Op. p. 282. Husband’s nearly $200,000 income as a physician, despite its decrease from his previous $355,000 income, is a sizeable one.
Second, the majority appears to analyze the hardship that Husband would undergo if required to pay 72% of $86,000 per year for his daughters’ educations. Op. p. 281. Indeed, this is how Husband framed his financial obligation during the hearing. Appellant’s App. p. 30. However, the parties’ older daughter was in her senior year at the time of the hearing and would not require further educational financial assistance from Husband. Therefore, the future financial obligation Husband actually faced at the time of the hearing was 72% of $36,468, Samantha’s approximate annual expenses at Columbia College. To the extent that the trial court and the majority are concerned about the impact upon Husband of paying 72% of $86,000 during the 2007 academic year, I note that this should not have been a concern, since Samantha’s expenses for that year were otherwise covered by the UGMA account previously funded by Husband.
Third, and very importantly, in an effort to demonstrate to this Court how burdensome Samantha’s private college expenses would be for him, Father outlined his financial obligations in his appellate brief as follows:
[Ajfter income and withholding taxes were taken out of his pay, [Husband] was left with net income of $135,000.00. From that $135,000.00, former Husband incurred basic living expenses of $47,000.00 per year, leaving him with $88,000.00 per year. Former husband *286pays child support under the existing order of roughly $120.00 per week, which equates to $7,240.00 per year. Former Husband also pays additional money to Abby for meals not covered by her meal plan at St. John’s college in New Mexico of $1,500.00, and pays $4,800.00 per year to Samantha for voice lessons and spending money. This leaves former Husband with $54,000.00 per year, for which he must provide food, gasoline, home repairs, toiletries, haircuts, and make his mortgage payments. Divided by fifty-two weeks per yfear, the trial court had ample justification to find that former Husband was simply not in an economic position to afford to pay private college expenses for Samantha.
Appellee’s Br. p. 14-15. Thus, Husband represented to this Court that he had only $54,000 per year with which to meet his own mortgage obligations and pay for food, gasoline, and other necessities. The record clearly contradicts this claim. To the contrary, the record reflects that Husband actually has approximately $54,000 per year in disposable discretionary income, even with his decreased income. This is because the $47,000 “basic living expenses” to which he refers in his brief include his first and second mortgages, utilities, car insurance, car maintenance, and basic food expenses. Appellant’s App. p. 29-30. By his counsel’s own calculations to the trial court during the hearing, Husband does not need to pay any of these expenses from the approximately $54,000 left over after meeting his financial obligations. With all of this in mind, I contend that Husband is quite able to comfortably pay 72% of $36,468 in order to allow Samantha to attend Columbia College. Ind.Code § 31-16-6-2(a)(l)(C).
Additionally, during the hearing, Wife’s counsel represented to the trial court that Husband acquiesced in Samantha’s choice of a private college and pointed to Husband’s approval of sending the parties’ older daughter to an out-of-state private college, indicating that the decision was in line with the family’s individual educational values. Further, Wife’s counsel represented that Samantha was unable to qualify for need-based financial aid because of Husband’s high income. Appellant’s App. p. 37-38. Husband did not refute either of these claims. These factors also weigh in favor of denying Husband’s petition to modify. I.C. § 31 — 16—6—2(a)(1)(B); Scales, 891 N.E.2d at 1119.
For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s modification of Husband’s support obligation as it relates to Samantha’s college education.