Court Opinion

ID: 9896550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 17:11:46.84978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:07.672202
License: Public Domain

J-A20009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JOHNNY COLLINS                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1712 MDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 20, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002371-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                              NOVEMBER 13, 2023

       Johnny Collins appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the

Dauphin County Court of Common pleas on October 20, 2022, following his

conviction of possession with intent to deliver crack cocaine, criminal

conspiracy to sell crack cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. We are

bound to agree with Collins that his waiver of counsel colloquy was invalid.

We therefore vacate his judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.

       The Commonwealth alleged that while serving a search warrant, police

found Collins and Marvette Anderson in a residence where four ounces of crack

cocaine and a digital scale were present. Based on these allegations, the

Commonwealth charged Collins with possession of crack cocaine with intent

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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to deliver, conspiracy with Anderson to sell crack cocaine, and possession of

drug paraphernalia in the form of the digital scale.

      Hillary Hall, Esquire, of the Dauphin County public defender’s office

initially entered her appearance on behalf of Collins. A month and a half later,

Collins filed a petition to proceed pro se, which was forwarded to Attorney Hall

as counsel of record. A few months after that filing, Collins sent a hand-written

letter to the clerk of courts, requesting that Attorney Hall not be permitted

access to any documentation related to his case. Attorney Hall subsequently

filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. Collins then filed a “Motion for Effective

Assistance of Counsel”.

      On January 28, 2022, a hearing was held on Attorney Hall’s motion to

withdraw. Regarding whether or not Collins intended to proceed pro se, the

court questioned Collins as follows:

      THE COURT: Mr. Collins, it's your desire to no longer have Ms. Hall
      as your lawyer. Is that correct, sir?

      [COLLINS]: Yeah.

      THE COURT: Did you want to proceed representing yourself?

      [COLLINS]: Well, I'm -- it was -- this is the case, man, I'm --

      …

      I'm under the impression, period, that as she said, she had filed
      a Grazier hearing motion when I was at a video with Judge Lewis.
      Now, the problem is we're not seein' eye to eye basically on the
      simplest case that it could be.

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N.T., 1/28/2022, at 3. After detailing his issues with Attorney Hall allegedly

not investigating his case properly, Collins concluded “[s]o if I'm being forced

to represent myself pro se, then I'm gonna get more done myself.” Id. at 4.

The court then stated on the record it was granting Attorney Hall’s motion to

withdraw. See id.

      However, no written order was docketed granting the petition to

withdraw. See e.g., Letter to Attorney Hall, 2/7/2022 (forward pro se filing to

Attorney Hall as counsel of record); see also Praecipe to Withdraw

Appearance, filed 2/9/2022 (indicating that trial court had granted Attorney

Hall permission to withdraw orally on 1/28/2022). Even after Attorney Hall

filed a praecipe to withdraw based on the oral statement by the court, no

subsequent order was entered withdrawing Attorney Hall’s appearance.

Rather, on March 25, 2022, the court entered an order appointing Attorney

Hall as standby counsel.

      On August 16-17, 2022, a two-day jury trial was held, during which

Collins represented himself pro se. No waiver of counsel colloquy was

conducted prior to the start of trial. During trial, the issue of whether or not

Collins needed to be re-colloquied was discussed. However, it was quickly

decided that any prior colloquy had been sufficient. See N.T., Jury Trial,

8/17/2022, at 129. Following trial, the jury found Collins guilty of all charges.

Sentencing was deferred for preparation of a presentence investigation report.

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      On October 20, 2022, Collins appeared for sentencing. Attorney Hall was

again present as standby counsel. Collins was not questioned regarding

whether or not he wished to remain pro se for sentencing. The trial court

sentenced Collins to an aggregate term of nine to eighteen years’

imprisonment. After the assistant district attorney explained Collins’s post-

sentencing and appellate rights, the court asked Collins if he wanted the public

defender’s office to handle an appeal or if he wished to continue to represent

himself. See N.T., Sentencing, 10/20/2022, at 6-7. Collins stated he wanted

a public defender to handle it. See id. at 7.

      Collins filed a counseled post-sentence motion, in which he challenged

the validity of his waiver of counsel. The trial court denied the motion. This

timely appeal followed.

      On appeal, Collins argues the trial court erred in finding he waived his

right to counsel, when the court failed to effectuate a knowing and intelligent

waiver of the right to counsel, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 121. In its opinion on

appeal, the trial court concedes that Collins never received a proper colloquy

to allow him to knowingly waive his right to counsel. See Trial Court Opinion,

2/10/23, at 5. After our independent review of the record, we agree with the

trial court that Collins is entitled to relief.

      When a defendant seeks to waive the right to counsel, the trial court

must conduct on the record a full and complete waiver colloquy to determine

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whether the defendant's waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See

Commonwealth v. Brazil, 701 A.2d 216, 219 (Pa. 1997).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 121 outlines the requirements

for a valid waiver-of-counsel colloquy. It states, in pertinent part:

      (2) To ensure that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel
      is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the judge or issuing
      authority, at a minimum, shall elicit the following information from
      the defendant:

            (a) that the defendant understands that he ... has the right
            to be represented by counsel, and the right to have free
            counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent;

            (b) that the defendant understands the nature of the
            charges against the defendant and the elements of each of
            those charges;

            (c) that the defendant is aware of the permissible range of
            sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged;

            (d) that the defendant understands that if he ... waives the
            right to counsel, the defendant will still be bound by all the
            normal rules of procedure and that counsel would be familiar
            with these rules;

            (e) that the defendant understands that there are possible
            defenses to these charges that counsel might be aware of,
            and if these defenses are not raised at trial, they may be
            lost permanently; and

            (f) that the defendant understands that, in addition to
            defenses, the defendant has many rights that, if not timely
            asserted, may be lost permanently; and that if errors occur
            and are not timely objected to, or otherwise timely raised
            by the defendant, these errors may be lost permanently.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2). A court's failure to conduct a valid colloquy before

allowing a defendant to proceed pro se constitutes reversible error. See

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Commonwealth v. Murphy, 214 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Additionally, where the court fails to conduct a waiver of counsel colloquy, a

defendant's alleged waiver of counsel is ineffective, even if the court has

appointed standby counsel. See Brazil, 701 A.2d at 219.

      Our review of the record indicates that a valid waiver of counsel colloquy

never occurred in this matter. In addition, our review reveals the trial court

did not perform any waiver-of-counsel colloquies at the subsequent hearings

on Collins’s suppression motion, habeas corpus motion, or motion to compel

discovery.

      During the voir dire hearing, the court asked Collins if he still desired to

proceed pro se. See N.T., Voir Dire, 8/11/2022, at 2. Collins indicated it was

still his wish to represent himself. See id. The court then asked Collins if he

was aware of the charges against him, stated the maximum sentence for each

offense charged. See id. at 2-3. Finally, the court asked Collins if he was

aware of the facts being alleged, without actually stating any of the facts. See

id. at 4. Collins responded affirmatively and the court immediately proceeded

with the hearing. See id. No further waiver-of-counsel colloquy took place

during the two-day jury trial or at sentencing.

      The Commonwealth argues the colloquy on Collins’s right to represent

himself   was   “sufficient”.   Appellee’s   Brief,   at   10.   In   doing   so,   the

Commonwealth states that a colloquy is a “mere procedural device.” Id. The

Commonwealth finds the colloquy was sufficient because Collins “clearly

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understood” his rights; did not waive any rights, defenses, or issues; waived

his right to counsel through his conduct “as demonstrated through the entirety

of the pretrial and trial proceedings”; and had extremely competent and

experienced backup counsel who would not have let any rights or defenses

lapse. See id. at 10-13.

      These arguments would only be relevant under a totality of the

circumstances analysis, which, as the Commonwealth concedes, is not the

proper test for determining compliance with Rule 121. See id. at 9; see also

Brazil, 701 A.2d at 218 (disavowing the totality of the circumstances analysis

in a waiver-of-counsel analysis). Instead, the law in this area considers only

compliance with the mandated procedures; an effective waiver of counsel

must include a colloquy that contains an inquiry into the six areas listed in

Rule 121, conducted on the record. Accordingly, while a waiver colloquy may

be “mere procedural device” in other areas of the law, this is an incorrect

statement of law regarding the proper waiver-of-counsel analysis in criminal

proceedings. Our law is clear that the colloquy is required before a criminal

defendant can knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to

counsel. See Commonwealth v. Clyburn, 42 A.3d 296, 300-301 (Pa. Super.

2012) (“Failure to conduct a thorough, on-the-record colloquy before allowing

a defendant to proceed to trial pro se constitutes reversible error.” (citation

omitted)).

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      We conclude the trial court committed reversible error on January 28,

2022, and at each subsequent proceeding, by allowing Collins to proceed

under his own representation without first conducting thorough on-the-record

colloquies to determine whether Collins understood the consequence of

proceeding pro se and knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his

right to counsel. Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate Collins’s judgment

of sentence and remand for a new trial.

      Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/13/2023

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