Court Opinion

ID: 9839378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 21:12:55.788192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:15.776080
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA23-154

                              Filed 12 September 2023

Mecklenburg County, No. 21-CVS-10398

GRAY MEDIA GROUP, INC.,

d/b/a WBTV, Plaintiff,

             v.

CITY OF CHARLOTTE, through the CITY COUNCIL, Defendant.

      Appeal by Plaintiff from Order entered 11 October 2022 by Judge Carla N.

Archie in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8

August 2023.

      Flannery | Georgalis, LLC, by Elizabeth F. Greene, and Ballard Spahr LLP,
      by Lauren P. Russell and Kaitlin M. Gurney (pro hac vice), for Plaintiff-
      Appellant.

      Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein LLP, by Daniel E. Peterson, for Defendant-
      Appellee.

      Stevens Martin Vaughn & Tadych, PLLC, by Elizabeth J. Soja and Michael J.
      Tadych, for Amici Curiae.

      RIGGS, Judge.

      “Government agencies and officials exist for the benefit of the people, and ‘an

informed citizenry [is] vital to the functioning of a democratic society.’” State

Employees Ass’n of N.C. v. N.C. Dep’t of State Treasurer, 364 N.C. 205, 210, 695 S.E.2d

91, 95 (2010) (quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242, 57 L.
                     GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                  Opinion of the Court

Ed. 2d 159, 178 (1978)). Fundamentally, “public records and public information

compiled by the agencies of North Carolina Government, or its subdivisions are the

property of the people.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1(b) (2021) (emphasis added). For that

reason, the North Carolina General Assembly provided a means for fostering

transparency and accountability in government through the Public Records Act,

which provides broad access to public records. State Employees Ass’n of N.C., 364

N.C. at 211, 695 S.E.2d at 95. The Act is intended to be liberally construed to ensure

that governmental records be open and made available to the public, subject only to

a few limited exceptions. DTH Media Corp. v. Folt, 374 N.C. 292, 300, 841 S.E.2d

251, 257–58 (2020)

      In this appeal, Gray Media, LLC (“Gray Media”) asks this Court to consider

whether records held by a third party are subject to the Public Records Act. The trial

court declared the issue moot and granted summary judgment to Defendant, City of

Charlotte (“the City”), because the City voluntarily produced the documents.

However, Gray Media requests that this Court provide declaratory relief related to

this public records request made pursuant to the Public Records Act, N.C. Gen. Stat.

§§ 132, et seq. (2021). Additionally, Gray Media appeals the trial court’s denial of

attorneys’ fees associated with its Public Records request.

      Upon review, we hold that Gray Media’s request for declaratory relief is not

moot, and the requested records are public records as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. §

132-1(a). Further, because we hold that the litigation compelled the release of the

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                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                  Opinion of the Court

documents, Gray Media is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees.        Therefore, we

remand for summary judgment in favor of Gray Media and additional factfinding to

determine the fee award pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-9(c).

                   I.   FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      In April of 2020, the City executed a one-year contract (“Contract”) with Ernst

and Young (“EY”) to advance more streamlined and effective local government

operations. The contract included two (2) one-year renewal options to extend until

March of 2023; the City exercised at least one of these renewal options and extended

the contract to March 2022.      The contract provided that the City would “have

exclusive ownership of all reports, documents, designs, ideas, materials, concepts,

plans, creative works, software, data, programming code, and other work product

developed for or provided to the City in connection with this Contract, and all patent

rights, copyrights, trade secret rights and other intellectual property rights relating

thereto (collectively the ‘Intellectual Property’).” In the same paragraph of the

contract, EY retained its ownership rights in “Preexisting IP,” which it defined as

“proprietary data, methodologies, processes, know-how, and trade services that [EY]

owns in performing services under this Contract[.]”

      The Contract also gave the City exclusive ownership of “Contract Data” defined

as: “(a) all data produced or generated under this Contract for the benefit of the City

and its customers; and (b) all data provided by, accessed through, or processed for the

City under this Contract.”    The Contract gave the City access to Contract data

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                                  Opinion of the Court

through language requiring EY to “promptly provide the Contract data to the City in

machine readable format upon the City’s request at any time while the contract is in

effect or within three years from when the contract terminates.” The Contract states

that work product, excluding confidential information of EY, shall be treated as public

records under North Carolina law. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, EY agreed

to treat Contract Data as Confidential Information and “not reproduce, copy,

duplicate, disclose, or use the Contract Data in any manner except as authorized by

the City in writing or expressly permitted by this Contract.”

      On 24 November 2020, the City and EY signed a statement of work (“SOW”)

under the Contract, which included having EY develop and deploy a survey focused

on transformative leadership and high-performing council topics for the City Council

members. In December 2020, EY deployed this survey by sending an email to each

City Council member’s work email address with a unique hyperlink to access and fill

out the survey.

      On 2 March 2021, WBTV reporter David Hodges, an employee of Gray Media,

requested and received the contract and SOW as part of a public information request

made pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-6. Mr. Hodges followed up on the same day,

requesting the EY survey form and City Council member responses.             The City

immediately denied his request via email saying that “[w]e are not in possession of

those surveys and EY used those surveys solely for the purpose of developing their

recommendations.” The City clarified its stance on 9 March 2021 in a letter stating

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                                  Opinion of the Court

the City Attorney’s Office had “determined that documents that are solely in EY’s

possession are not subject to the Public Records Law.” During April and May, the

parties exchanged correspondence on the topic of whether the survey and responses

were public records subject to disclosure. On 1 June 2021, the City sent Gray Media

the final report that EY developed based in part on the survey information; however,

the final report did not include the survey or survey responses.

        Gray Media filed a complaint and petition for writ of mandamus on 29 June

2021. The City responded with a motion to dismiss, motion to strike, and request for

a protective order on 27 August 2021. After a hearing on the issues, the trial court

entered an order on 12 November 2021 granted the City’s motion to dismiss in part

and denied the motion in part; the trial court also directed Gray Media to amend its

complaint in accordance with the order.

        Gray Media filed an amended complaint on 23 November 2021 requesting

relief declaring the documents were public records and a writ of mandamus requiring

the City to comply with the Public Record Act. The City responded to the amended

complaint on 24 January 2022 arguing inter alia that the requested records were not

public records. As part of the discovery process following the amendment of the

complaint, the City served EY with a subpoena duces tecum on 27 May 2022

requesting that EY produce the survey questions and responses no later than 3 June

2022.    The City extended this deadline to 10 June 2022 in exchange for EY’s

agreement to accept service by email. Nine working days later, EY timely produced

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                                  Opinion of the Court

the requested material to the City on 10 June 2022; the City turned the survey

questions and responses over to Gray Media on the same day. During oral argument

on appeal, the City confirmed that this subpoena duces tecum was the first time the

City requested the survey and responses from EY.

      Prior to the production of the requested survey and responses, Gray Media filed

a motion for summary judgment in April 2022. After production of the survey and

responses, the City filed a motion for summary judgment in July 2022.

      The trial court held a hearing on 18 August 2022 on the motions for summary

judgment and entered an order on 11 October 2022 granting the City’s motion for

summary judgment and denying Gray Media’s motion for summary judgment. The

trial court found that:

             (i) there is no genuine issue of material fact precluding
             entry of summary judgment; (ii) no genuine present
             controversy exists between the parties; (iii) as the
             Defendant has produced the records, Plaintiff’s request for
             declaratory and injunctive relief is moot; (iv) there is no
             applicable exception to the mootness doctrine because
             while there is reasonable possibility that the Plaintiff may
             be subjected to the same action again, such action is
             capable of being fully litigated at that time.

Further, the trial court denied Gray Media’s motion for attorneys’ fees. Gray Media

timely appealed the order on 7 November 2022.

                                II.   ANALYSIS

A. The Issue Is Not Moot

      The trial court found that because the City had produced the requested records,

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                                  Opinion of the Court

the issue was moot and granted summary judgment for the City. On appeal Gray

Media argues its request for a declaratory judgment that the requested documents

are public records is not moot and is, in fact, “ripe for judicial review.”     In the

alternative, Gray Media argues, even if the issue is moot, the issue is capable of

repetition but evading review and, therefore, an exception to the doctrine of mootness.

The City argues that this request for declaratory judgment is moot because, if

rendered, such judgment could not have any practical effect on the existing

controversy. We hold that the issue is not moot.

   1. Standard of Review

      While the trial court granted summary judgment based upon a finding of

mootness, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that “the proper procedure for

a court to take upon a determination that a case has become moot is dismissal of the

action rather than entry of summary judgment.” Roberts v. Madison County Realtors

Assn., 344 N.C. 394, 399, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996). The issue of whether a trial

court properly dismissed a case as moot is reviewed de novo. Alexander v. N.C. State

Bd. of Elections, 281 N.C. App. 495, 499, 869 S.E.2d 765, 769 (2022) appeal dismissed,

review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 880 S.E.2d 689-90 (2022). “Under a de novo review, the

court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of

the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294

(2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

   2. Plaintiff’s Request for Declaratory Judgment Is Not Moot

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                                   Opinion of the Court

      Actions filed under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§

1-253–267 (2021), are subject to traditional mootness analysis. Citizens Addressing

Reassignment & Educ., Inc. v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., 182 N.C. App. 241, 246, 641

S.E.2d 824, 827 (2007). This is the case because “jurisdiction does not extend to

questions that are altogether moot.” Calabria v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 198 N.C.

App. 550, 554, 680 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2009) (quoting Pearson v. Martin, 319 N.C. 449,

451, 355 S.E.2d 496, 498 (1987). Mootness arises “[w]henever, during the course of

litigation it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions

originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue.” News and

Observer Publishing Co. v. Coble, 128 N.C. App. 307, 309–10, 494 S.E.2d 784, 786

aff’d, 349 N.C. 350, 507 S.E.2d 272 (1998) (quoting In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147,

250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978)). Understood another way, a case is considered moot when

a “determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any

practical effect on the existing controversy.” Lange v. Lange, 357 N.C. 645, 647, 588

S.E.2d 877, 879 (2003) (internal citation omitted).

      The Public Records Act specifically authorizes requesting parties that have

been denied access to records to initiate judicial action, including seeking declaratory

judgment. Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Services Corp., 350 N.C. 449, 461, 515

S.E.2d 675, 684 (1999) (noting a declaratory judgment action represents one of

several legal methods by which questions of public access to courts and their records

are most frequently and successfully raised). A declaratory judgment should be

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                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                   Opinion of the Court

granted when it will: (1) “serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal

relations at issue, and (2) [] terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty,

insecurity and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Augur v. Augur, 356 N.C.

582, 588, 573 S.E.2d 125, 130 (2002). Declaratory judgments should not be made “in

the abstract, i.e. without definite concrete application to a particular state of facts

which the court can by the declaration control and relieve and thereby settle the

controversy.” Id. The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is “to settle and

afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other

legal relations.” Insurance Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C. 285, 287, 134 S.E.2d 654, 657

(1964) (internal citations omitted). Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, any person

whose rights are affected by a statute may request a determination of rights arising

out of the statute, and our trial courts have the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory

judgment to define rights, status, and other legal relations, even if other relief is or

could be claimed. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-253. See Insurance Co., 261 N.C. at 287, 134

S.E.2d at 656-57 (recognizing that trial courts have jurisdiction to render a

declaratory judgment when there is a genuine controversy as to legal rights and

liabilities related to, inter alia, contracts, and statutes). The North Carolina Supreme

Court has emphasized that the Declaratory Judgment Act should be liberally

construed and administered. Id at 287, 134 S.E.2d at 657.

      Here, Gray Media asked the trial court to declare Gray Media’s right, and by

extension, the public’s right, to access the survey and survey responses. Specifically,

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                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                  Opinion of the Court

Gray Media asked the trial court to confirm that the documents are public records as

defined in N.C. Gen. Stat § 132-1(a) even if the documents are solely in the possession

of a third party. The City only turned over the requested documents to Gray Media

after Gray Media filed for summary judgment but before the summary judgment

hearing, without conceding that the records were public records when they were in

the possession of EY. Indeed, the City still vigorously contends that the requested

documents were not public records when in EY’s physical possession.

      Because the trial court did not reach the merits of the declaratory judgment

action and thus did not afford the precise relief request by Gray Media—that the

Court declare that the records were public records even when solely in the physical

possession of EY, the issue is not moot. Where there is still outstanding requested

relief that could alter the legal relationship between the parties and have a practical

effect on the dispute between the parties, the case is not moot. Cf. In re Hamilton,

220 N.C. App. 350, 353, 725 S.E.2d 393, 396 (2012) (“Whenever, during the course of

litigation it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions

originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue, the case should

be dismissed, for courts will not entertain or proceed with a cause merely to determine

abstract propositions of law.”)

      One need not look further than the terms of the Contract to identify the

practical import of this declaration of rights under the Public Records Act. The

disclosed survey and the responses are a small piece in a much larger contract

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                     GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                   Opinion of the Court

between the City and EY; the surveys represented only $46,500 of a multi-year

Contract between the City and EY with a total value not to exceed $400,000. It is

reasonable to anticipate that EY gathered additional information under this Contract

that was created by City Officials utilizing hyperlinks or other cloud technology that

remains solely in EY’s physical possession. A declaratory judgment on the merits has

the practical implication of defining the public’s right to access records created by a

public official but possessed solely by a third party (and this specific third party, EY,

given how much work may still be done under the Contract) and would remove any

uncertainty on that issue. Lide v. Mears, 231 N.C. 111, 117–18, 56 S.E.2d 404, 409

(1949) (“The [Declaratory Judgment] Act recognizes the need of society ‘for officially

stabilizing legal relations by adjudicating disputes before they have ripened into

violence and destruction of the status quo.’”). Therefore, we hold that this issue is not

moot.

   3. Applicable exception to the doctrine of mootness

        While we hold that the issue in this matter is not moot, we also note, in the

alternative, that we would reach the merits of this case because of an exception to the

doctrine of mootness. Although the general rule is that an appeal presenting a

question that has become moot will be dismissed, a court may consider moot cases

falling within one of several limited exceptions to the doctrine. Anderson v. N.C. State

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                        GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                         Opinion of the Court

Bd. of Elections, 248 N.C. App. 1, 7, 788 S.E.2d 179, 184 (2016).1 One such exception

is that this Court may consider otherwise-moot issues capable of repetition but

evading review. In re Jackson, 84 N.C. App. 167, 171, 352 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1987)

(citing Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 23 L.Ed.2d 1, 4 (1969)). For an issue to be

capable of repetition yet evading review, the challenged action must (1) have a

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there

is a reasonable expectation that the complaining party would be subject to the same

action again. Boney Publishers, Inc. v. Burlington City Council, 151 N.C. App. 651,

654, 566 S.E.2d 701, 703-04 (2002) (citing Crumpler v. Thornburg, 92 N.C. App. 719,

723, 375 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1989)).            The controversy in this matter satisfies both

elements for an issue to be capable of repetition yet evading review.

       First, there is a reasonable likelihood that these same parties will find

themselves in this same dispute in the future. The trial court acknowledged that

there is a reasonable possibility that the Plaintiff may be subjected to the same action

again if it requested similar information. The City conceded at oral argument that

this is a scenario that could occur in the future. Additionally, with the ever-increasing

       1 See e.g., Shell Island Homeowners Ass’n v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 286, 293, 517 S.E.2d

401, 405 (1999) (noting that voluntary cessation of a challenged action does not deprive a court of
jurisdiction to determine the legality of the practice); N.C. State Bar v. Randolph, 325 N.C. 699, 701,
386 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1989) (per curiam) (concerning the public duty exception); Crumpler v.
Thornburg, 92 N.C. App. 719, 723, 375 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1989) (explaining “capable of repetition, yet
evading review” exception); In re Hatley, 291 N.C. 693, 694, 231 S.E.2d 633, 634 (1977) (recognizing
exception where there exists “collateral legal consequences of an adverse nature”); Simeon v. Hardin,
339 N.C. 358, 370, 451 S.E.2d 858, 867 (1994) (noting appeal was reviewable where the claims of
unnamed class members are not mooted by the termination of the class representative’s claim).

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                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                   Opinion of the Court

role that online data storage plays in our modern world, more governmental agencies

are storing data and records using cloud-based technology, often to aid in compliance

with public records laws by allowing easier access to the public. D’Onfro, Danielle,

The New Bailments, 97 Wash. L. Rev. 97, 99 (2022); David A. Lawrence, Public

Records Law 94-5 (2nd ed. 2009).        This Court has held that where there is a

“reasonable likelihood that defendants . . . could repeat the conduct, which is at issue

here, subjecting the plaintiff to the same action,” this Court should consider the issues

raised on appeal as an exception to the mootness doctrine. Boney Publishers, 151

N.C. App. at 654, 566 S.E.2d at 705. We note, though, that for an issue to be capable

of repetition, it is not necessary that a future dispute involve the exact same parties

and circumstances. See In re Jackson, 84 N.C. App. at 171, 352 S.E.2d at 452

(explaining the issue was capable of repetition yet evading review because it is not

improbable that the Board of Education or other local school boards will be repeatedly

subject to similar orders). Here, given the City’s position that the Public Records Act

does not apply to documents in the physical custody of a third party and Gray Media’s

interest in timely news coverage of city government activity, it is likely that these

parties will end up in our courts again.

      Second, the challenged action has a duration too short to be fully litigated prior

to cessation or expiration. The trial court stated, and the City argues on appeal, that

the statutory procedure for expedited hearings allows for timely review. N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 132-9. However, the City omits the fact that in future challenges, it can

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                                    Opinion of the Court

exercise its ownership rights, demand production from the third party, and turn the

documents over to the requesting party long after the initial request but before the

hearing date, thereby frustrating the intent of the Public Record Act, while still

evading review. In re Jackson, 84 N.C. App. at 171, 352 S.E.2d at 452 (holding that

a case involving the school system’s right to suspend students for misconduct was

capable of repetition yet evading review because a suspension could never be longer

than the balance of the school year.) Cf. Womack Newspapers, Inc. v. Town of Kitty

Hawk, 181 N.C. App. 1, 9, 639 S.E.2d 96, 102 (2007) (recognizing that the “capable of

repetition yet evading review” mootness exception was not applicable where the

governmental entity attempting to withhold the documents was the appealing party,

and in the future, that entity could simply withhold the disputed documents and

avoid mootness).

      Thus, although the controversy is not moot, we are, alternatively, justified in

exercising our discretion to consider the question because the issue is capable of

repetition yet evading review. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of Gray Media’s

request for declaratory judgment.

B. The Requested Documents Are Public Records and the City Had an
   Obligation to Produce the Documents Promptly.

      At the center of this dispute is whether the requested documents are, in fact,

public records subject to public disclosure when they were solely held by a third party.

Put another way, can a government agency place public records solely in the

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                                   Opinion of the Court

possession of a third party or otherwise ensure that only the third party has

immediate access to what would undoubtedly be public records if in the possession of

the government agency and then assert that the documents are not subject to

disclosure under the Public Records Act? We hold that it cannot.

      We first consider the plain language of the statute and statutory exceptions to

ascertain whether the requested records are public records under the statute.

Second, we consider the City’s argument regarding whether physical possession is a

statutory requirement of the Public Records Act. Finally, we evaluate whether the

test established in Womack for documents held by a third party is applicable to the

facts of this case. Ultimately, we hold that under the plain language of the statute,

the requested documents are public records not subject to any exception. The Public

Records Act does not require actual possession as a requirement for disclosure.

Finally, the test used in Womack is not applicable because the documents at issue in

this case were created by public officials.

   1. The Documents Are Public Records Under the Plain Language of the
      Statute

      The principles governing statutory construction are well established: when the

language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial

construction, and courts must give the statute its plain meaning. News and Observer

v. State, 312 N.C. 276, 282, 322 S.E.2d 133, 137 (1984). In the construction of any

statute, “words must be given their common and ordinary meaning, nothing else

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                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                  Opinion of the Court

appearing.” In re Clayton-Marcus Co., 286 N.C. 215, 219, 210 S.E.2d 199, 202-03

(1974).   The goal of statutory construction is to effectuate the purpose of the

legislature in enacting the statute. DTH Media Corp., 374 N.C. at 299, 841 S.E.2d at

257.

       Here, the General Assembly specifically defined a public record as a document,

regardless of physical form, made or received by a public official:

             all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, photographs,
             films, sound recordings, magnetic or other tapes, electronic
             data-processing records, artifacts, or other documentary
             material, regardless of physical form or characteristics,
             made or received pursuant to law or ordinance in
             connection with the transaction of public business by any
             agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions.
             Agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions
             shall mean and include every public office, public officer or
             official (State or local, elected or appointed), institution,
             board, commission, bureau, council, department, authority
             or other unit of government of the State or of any county,
             unit, special district or other political subdivision of
             government.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1(a) (emphasis added).

       The parties agree that the survey and survey responses are not physical

documents; rather, they are electronic records created through the City Council

member’s use of a hyperlink to create a record on EY’s servers. The City contends

that it is of legal significance that Council members were never emailed these surveys

as, for example, an attachment to an email.          Rather, because they were sent

hyperlinks to EY webspace, we should not view the responses, developed by Council

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                                   Opinion of the Court

members in their governmental capacity, on taxpayer-funded time, as public records.

At oral argument, the City conceded that if the issue was an email stored on a third-

party server, the record would be a public record.

      To accept the argument that a hyperlinked survey instead of an attached

survey removes the document from the universe of public records requires us to read

the statutory language much too narrowly. Such a reading would defeat the purpose

of the statute, creating a clear path to hide huge swaths of governmental work from

public scrutiny. Instead, we note that the statute includes broad language including

“all documents . . . electronic data-processing records . . . regardless of physical form

or characteristics.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1(a) (emphasis added). Further, the Public

Records Act has been repeatedly interpreted to provide liberal access to public

records. Virmani, 350 N.C. at 462, 515 S.E.2d at 685. See also News and Observer

Publishing Co. v. Poole, 330 N.C. 465, 475, 412 S.E.2d 7, 13 (1992) (recognizing that

“[b]y enacting the Public Records Act, the legislature intended to provide that, as a

general rule, the public would have liberal access to public records.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).      Therefore, we decline to adopt the City’s narrow

interpretation that a hyperlink to EY webspace does not constitute a “document or

electronic data processing record.”

      Having determined that the survey responses are public records under the

Public Records Act, we turn to the City’s arguments that the requested documents

fall under an exception to disclosure because a portion of the information may be the

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                                   Opinion of the Court

propriety information of EY.     In the Public Records Act, the General Assembly

identified specific exceptions to general access for inspection or disclosure. N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 132-1.1–1.14.    However, those exceptions and exemptions to the Public

Records Act must be construed narrowly. See News and Observer Publishing Co., 330

N.C. at 486, 412 S.E.2d at 19 (holding that in the absence of clear statutory exemption

or exception, documents falling within the definition of “public records” in the Public

Records Act must be made available for public inspection).

      Here, the City does not cite any specific statutory exception and only asserts

that third-party EY may consider the records to be EY’s Pre-existing IP, which, under

the contract terms, EY owns. However, EY disclosed both the survey and the survey

responses to the City without making a claim that any of the requested survey

questions or responses contained Pre-existing IP.         EY did mark the documents

disclosed under the subpoena as “Confidential,” however, the Contract mandates that

EY treat all contract data as confidential.

      Even assuming arguendo that some information was confidential as defined in

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1.2(1), which the City does not argue, the Public Records Act

specifically addresses the issue of confidential information comingled with

nonconfidential information and prohibits the denial of a request to inspect, examine,

or obtain public records on the ground that confidential information is commingled

with the non-confidential information. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-6(c). If it is necessary

to separate confidential information from nonconfidential information, the burden is

                                          - 18 -
                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                   Opinion of the Court

upon the public agency to arrange such separation and to assume the cost of

separation. Id. See Ochsner v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 268 N.C. App. 391, 400, 835

S.E.2d 491, 498 (2019) (recognizing that denial of access to public records is improper

on the basis that the public record contains nonpublic information).

      Therefore, we hold that the documents created using the hyperlinked survey

and solely held by a third party are public records subject to disclosure and that, on

the facts here, no confidentiality arguments prevent disclosure.

   2. Actual Possession Is Not a Requirement of the Public Records Act

      On appeal, the City argues that it did not have actual possession of the records

or “substantial control” over EY to demand the records. The City also argues that it

does not have an obligation to retrieve records from its contractors or consultants to

comply with the Public Records Act. Finally, the City argues that this Court’s holding

in State Employee Ass’n of N.C., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of State Treasurer creates a

possession requirement for documents to be considered public records. 364 N.C. 205,

214, 695 S.E.2d 91, 97 (2010). Therefore, the City argues, it did not have an obligation

to disclose the records. We disagree.

      The Public Records Act provides a procedure to inspect, review or copy

documents in the custodian’s custody by requesting access from the custodian of the

public records. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-6 (emphasis added). Custody is defined as “care

and control of a thing or person for inspection, preservation, or security.” Custody,

Black Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Because custody encompasses control of a

                                          - 19 -
                        GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                         Opinion of the Court

thing, actual or constructive possession is sufficient to meet the requirement for

custody. See Fordham v. Eason, 351 N.C. 151, 155, 521 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1999)

(“Constructive possession is a legal fiction existing when there is no actual possession,

but there is title granting an immediate right to actual possession.”)2

       Notably, the phrase “actual possession” does not appear in the section. Adding

the words “actual possession” into the statute would add new substantive language

that meaningfully alters the statute’s scope, and we may not “insert words not used

in the relevant statutory language during the statutory construction process.” Midrex

Techs., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t. of Revenue, 369 N.C. 250, 258, 794 S.E.2d 785, 792 (2016)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

       When the issue of whether the custodian has custody of a record is disputed, it

is the role of the court to ensure that public records are properly shared with the

public—it is not the role of the state agencies to self-regulate compliance with the

Public Records Act. In State Employees Ass’n of N.C., the North Carolina Supreme

Court said:

       2 We find it informative that other states with similar public records acts have held that the

public’s right to access public records should not depend on where the records are physically located
at the time of the request. See Evertson v. City of Kimball, 767 N.W.2d 751, 759 (Neb. 2009) (“The
public’s right of access should not depend on where the requested records are physically located.”);
Tribune Review v. Westmoreland Hous. Auth., 833 A.2d 112, 118 (Pa. 2003) (recognizing that the lack
of possession of existing writing by the public entity at the time of the request is not, by itself,
determinative of the question of whether the writing is a public record subject to disclosure); NCAA v.
Associated Press, 18 So.3d 1201, 1207 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2009) (explaining that the term “received” in
the Florida Public Records Act refers not only to a situation “in which a public agent takes physical
delivery of a document but also to one in which a public agent uses documents residing on a remote
computer” for public business).

                                                - 20 -
                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                  Opinion of the Court

             The final determination of possession or custody of the
             public records requested is not properly conducted by the
             state agency itself. The approach that the state agency has
             the burden of compliance, subject to judicial oversight, is
             entirely consistent with the policy rationale underpinning
             the Public Records Act, which strongly favors the release of
             public records to increase transparency in government.
             Judicial review of a state agency’s compliance with a
             request, prior to the categorical dismissal of this type of
             complaint, is critical to ensuring that, as noted above,
             public records and information remain the property of the
             people of North Carolina. Otherwise, the state agency
             would be permitted to police its own compliance with the
             Public Records Act, a practice not likely to promote these
             important policy goals.

364 N.C. 205, 214, 695 S.E.2d 91, 97 (2010) (emphasis added). Therefore, any dispute

regarding whether the City was properly in possession or custody of the documents is

one that only our courts can resolve.

      In this case, the Contract is unequivocal that the surveys and responses—i.e.,

Contract data as defined in the Contract—are exclusively owned by the City. The

contractual language plainly indicates that EY must “promptly provide the Contract

data to the City in machine-readable format upon the City’s request at any time while

the contract is in effect or within three years from when the contract terminates.”

Therefore, the City maintained custody through constructive possession of the

records and was required under the Public Records Act to have exercised its right to

demand the records from EY when Gray Media made the public records request.

      Accordingly, we hold that the City had custody of the records by virtue of its

constructive possession of the records and that physical, actual custody is not a

                                         - 21 -
                        GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                         Opinion of the Court

requirement of the statute. The City was obligated to request the document from EY

to comply with the public records request made by Gray Media.3

   3. Womack Is Not Applicable

       The City argues that the two-part analysis that this Court used in Womack,

181 N.C. App. at 12, 639 S.E.2d at 104, should be applied in this case to support the

City’s argument that it has no obligation to retrieve documents from contractors or

consultants to comply with the Public Records Act. 4 However, a careful reading of

the case that established the two-part analysis, Durham Herald Co., Inc., clarifies

that this analysis applies to “records made by contractors and subcontractors

(contractors) of the Authority, kept by the contractors and not actually received by the

Authority.” Durham Herald Co. v. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgmt. Auth., 110

N.C. App. 607, 610–11, 430 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1993) (emphasis added). This Womack

analysis is not applicable here because the requested records were not made by

contractors.

       The surveys were received by the City Council members on 11 December 2020

       3 The City’s argument that Gray Media was required to request the documents directly from

EY is in painful tension with the terms of the Contract. The Contract specifically requires that EY
“will not reproduce, copy, duplicate, disclose, or use the Contract Data in any manner except as
authorized by the City in writing or expressly permitted by the Contract.” (Emphasis added). The City
may not pass off the burden of complying with the Public Records Act to a third party, and it cannot
credibly advance an argument that a requesting party should go to a third party when it knows that
the third party would be contractually prevented from replying to such a request.
        4 The two-part test requires, first, a determination of whether the contractor is an “‘[a]gency

of North Carolina government or its subdivisions’; then, if a contractor is found to be an agency,
inquiring whether its records are ‘public records’ that were ‘made or received pursuant to law or
ordinance in connection with the transaction of public business . . . .’” Womack Newspapers, 181 N.C.
App. at 12, 639 S.E.2d at 104.

                                                - 22 -
                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                   Opinion of the Court

when the email with the unique hyperlink to the survey was sent to the Council

members’ email accounts. The survey responses were created by the City Council

members, who are public officials. As discussed supra, when the Council member

received the email with the unique hyperlink, accessed the hyperlink, and began

filling out the survey, the records were public records subject to disclosure under the

Public Records Act. News Reporter Co., Inc. v. Columbus Cty., 184 N.C. App. 512,

514, 646 S.E.2d 390, 392 (2007) (holding that a letter written by a county employee

and received by the County Board in connection with its decision to hire a medical

director was a public record).

      Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment

for the City. Records created or received by a government entity, even when stored

or held by a third party, are subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act and

the government agency must exercise its right to possession of the records to allow

the requestor to inspect or examine the records. We reverse the order of the trial

court and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of Gray Media.

C. Plaintiff Is Entitled to Attorneys’ Fees for Compelling Production.

      Finally, Gray Media argues it substantially prevailed in compelling the

production of the records and, therefore, is entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 132-9.    The City argues that Gray Media should not be awarded

attorneys’ fees for two reasons: (1) Gray Media did not substantially prevail in

compelling the disclosure of public records, and (2) the City acted in reasonable

                                          - 23 -
                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                   Opinion of the Court

reliance on opinions from this Court including Womack and Durham Herald. We hold

that Gray Media did substantially prevail in compelling disclosure and the City did

not act in reasonable reliance on Womack and Durham Herald.

      North Carolina General Statute § 132-9 requires the award of attorneys’ fees

to a party whose litigation efforts substantially compel the disclosure of public

records. The statute, however, directs a denial of a fee award if the losing party relied

on established precedent, specifically:

             The court may not assess attorneys’ fees against the
             governmental body or governmental unit if the court finds
             that the governmental body or governmental unit acted in
             reasonable reliance on any of the following:
             (1) A judgment or an order of a court applicable to the
             governmental unit or governmental body.
             (2) The published opinion of an appellate court, an order of
             the North Carolina Business Court, or a final order of the
             Trial Division of the General Court of Justice.
             (3) A written opinion, decision, or letter of the Attorney
             General.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-9.

      The General Assembly modified the Public Records Act in 2010 to award

attorneys’ fees to the party that “substantially prevails” rather than simply the

prevailing party. 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 638, 660 ch. 169, sec. 132-9. The parties do

not provide caselaw and we have not found North Carolina caselaw interpreting what

“substantially prevails” means under this statute. “Because the actual words of the

legislature are the clearest manifestation of its intent, we give every word of the

statute effect, presuming that the legislature carefully chose each word used.” N.C.

                                          - 24 -
                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                   Opinion of the Court

Dep’t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 201, 675 S.E.2d 641, 649 (2009). “[I]n

effectuating legislative intent, it is our duty to give effect to the words actually used

in a statute and not to delete words[.]” Lunsford v. Mills, 367 N.C. 618, 623, 766

S.E.2d 297, 301 (2014). Thus, we understand that by adding the word substantially

to the language of the statute, the Legislature expanded the class of parties entitled

to attorneys’ fees under the Public Records Act. This expansion includes entitling to

attorneys’ fees parties that may not receive all requested relief but do obtain relief,

such as that resulting from the change in position of the opposing party during the

litigation.

       Here, Gray Media pursued production of the requested document under the

Public Records Act and, when that was not successful, through statutorily-authorized

litigation. Gray Media and the City exchanged correspondence on this public records

request for three months between March and May of 2021. After almost four months

of negotiation after the initial records request, Gray Media filed the complaint under

the Public Records Act. Even after the complaint was filed, the City did not request

the documents from EY until after Gray Media filed for summary judgment on 19

April 2022.    Because the City only moved to obtain the documents, which it

contractually owned, sixteen months after the original request, after litigation was

commenced, and, indeed, after Gray Media sought summary judgment in its favor,

this sequence of events compels a conclusion that Gray Media’s actions substantially

precipitated the ultimate disclosure of the records.

                                          - 25 -
                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                  Opinion of the Court

      Additionally, this result finds support in the statutory definition of

“substantially prevails” in the Federal Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), which

uses similar language to determine when an award of attorneys’ fee is appropriate.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(E)(ii) (2018). Under FOIA, “substantially prevails” is defined by

statute as obtaining relief through either a judicial order, an enforceable written

agreement, a consent decree, or a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the

agency if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial. Id. Federal courts have held

that an important factor in determining whether a plaintiff has substantially

prevailed is whether litigation was reasonably necessary to induce the agency to

release the information. See, e.g., Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,

641 F.3d 521, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (recognizing that the OPEN Government Act of

2007 redefined “substantially prevailing” to include obtaining relief through a

voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency if the complaint’s claim was

not insubstantial; substantially prevailing does not require winning court-ordered

relief on the merits of the FOIA claim); Batton v. I.R.S., 718 F.3d 522, 526 (5th Cir.

2013) (holding appellant “substantially prevailed” when the IRS only began

producing documents one year after the initial request and after the appellant filed

a lawsuit); Cf. Weishaupt-Smith v. Town of Banner Elk, 264 N.C. App. 618, 623, 826

S.E.2d 734, 738 (2019) (recognizing that although this Court is not bound by federal

caselaw, we may find its analysis and holdings persuasive in interpreting analogous

federal rules).

                                         - 26 -
                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                  Opinion of the Court

      Finding that Gray Media successfully compelled the disclosure of the records,

we turn our attention to whether the City reasonably relied upon Womack or Durham

Herald in its denial of the Public Records Request. Section 132-9 of the Public

Records Acts provides the trial court “may not assess attorneys’ fees against the

governmental body or governmental unit if the court finds that the governmental

body or governmental unit acted in reasonable reliance on . . . [a] “published opinion

of an appellate court . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-9. In the hearing for summary

judgment, the City claimed that it relied upon the two-part test in Womack, arguing

that because EY was not a government agency, the City was not obligated to produce

documents.

      Because neither Durham Herald nor Womack stand for the City’s proposition

that documents created by City Council members but held by third parties are not

subject to the Public Records Act, the City could not have reasonably relied on either

Durham Herald or Womack for the purposes of avoiding attorneys’ fees. As discussed

supra, the two-prong test used in Womack came from Durham Herald and specifically

applied to documents created by a third party that have not been received by the

government agency. Durham Herald, 110 N.C. App. at 610–11, 430 S.E.2d at 444

(“This case presents a question of first impression here—whether records made by

contractors and subcontractors (contractors) of the Authority, kept by the contractors

and not actually received by the Authority are public records, as defined under [N.C.

Gen. Stat.] § 132–1, requiring disclosure under North Carolina’s public records law.”

                                         - 27 -
                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                  Opinion of the Court

(emphasis added)). Womack held that because the result in Durham Herald that the

requested documents were not public records turned on the specificity of the North

Carolina Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act, its logic was unpersuasive in that later

case. Womack, 181 N.C. App. at 12, 639 S.E.2d at 103.

      Here, it is undisputed that the email with the hyperlink was received by the

City Council members and the City Council members created the survey responses

in the course of City business. While the City needed to request the survey responses

from EY, the City was obliged to do so under the plain language of the statute and

was not excused from that obligation by any decision from our appellate courts. We

do not suggest that the City acted in bad faith by arguing that Womack and Durham

Herald supports their position, but an erroneous legal interpretation of those cases

cannot excuse a governmental entity from its financial obligations to parties

authorized to claim attorneys’ fees by statute. Significantly, in Womack, this Court

signaled that it would reject the precise argument offered by the City here, noting

that “permitting [a public agency] to place documents such as these in the hands of a

so-called independent contractor in order to escape the public records requirements[]”

would allow government agencies to skirt the public records disclosure requirement

and shield records from public scrutiny. Womack, 181 N.C. App. at 14, 639 S.E.2d at

105. That same admonition applies equally here—public records are “the property of

the people.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1(b).

      Therefore, we hold that attorneys’ fees are warranted and remand for an award

                                           - 28 -
                    GRAY MEDIA GRP., INC. V. CITY OF CHARLOTTE

                                    Opinion of the Court

of attorneys’ fees with the amount to be determined by the trial court.

                             III.     CONCLUSION

      We hold that the question of whether the records held solely by EY as part of

the contract between the City and EY are subject to the Public Record Act is not moot.

Accordingly, we reverse the order of summary judgment in favor of the City. We

remand for entry of an order granting summary judgment in favor of Gray Media

declaring the documents created by City Council members and stored on EY servers

to be public records subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act. We further

remand for entry of an award of attorneys’ fees to Gray Media, with the amount to be

determined by the trial court after further hearing.

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      Judges ZACHARY and COLLINS concur.

                                           - 29 -