Court Opinion

ID: 9647199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:26:09.941862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:46.410690
License: Public Domain

LEVY, Justice,
dissenting.
I briefly dissent because of a different perspective as to the constitutional right to a jury trial. Tex. Const, art. I, sec. 15.
While I agree with the majority that the appellants were — at best — dilatory in seeking a trial by jury, and that a right to a trial by jury is not absolute, the unpalatable facts remain that in the instant case, the jury fee was first paid by a party on September 20, 1984, once again on November 6, 1984, by another party, and that the case did not go to trial until January 15, 1985, approximately four months after the first demand for a jury trial had been made. In view of the time interval and the unmistakable clarity of the nature of the demand, and the repeated demands, for a jury trial, it seems a fair conclusion that the trial court’s denial of this valuable constitutional right was an abuse of discretion. I simply cannot agree that, under the circumstances of this case, a constitutional right should be subordinated to a procedural rule that was being strained, but not violated, by the appellants.
Rule 216 of our Rules of Civil Procedure requires an application (and fee) for a jury trial to be filed “not less than ten days in advance” of the date set for trial. Four months in advance, then, should certainly be enough. A decent respect for the constitutional dimensions of the right to a jury trial should mandate that trial court procedures, certifications, local rules, and conveniences accommodate themselves to the primacy of the constitutional right, not the reverse. See Tackett v. Proffitt, 695 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, no writ); Hardy v. Port City Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 693 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ). Sometime during the four month interval, the case should have been judicially transferred to the jury docket, and it could have been done without inconvenience or delay to the court’s docket or prejudice to any party.
I would sustain appellants’ first point of error, reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand this cause for trial.