Court Opinion

ID: 9962450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 17:01:16.4956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:54.191258
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 23 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ESSA CAMARA,                                    No. 22-1292
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A077-820-701
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                      Argued and Submitted March 27, 2024
                              Seattle, Washington

Before: WARDLAW, W. FLETCHER, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

      Essa Camara, a native and citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing

his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his Petition to Remove

Conditions on Residence (Form I-751) and ordering him removed. We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      “We review factual findings, including adverse credibility decisions, under

the deferential substantial evidence standard.” Ai Jun Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088,

1091 (9th Cir. 2014). Under that standard, we must accept the findings “unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4); see Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 365 (2021). We have “no

bright-line rule under which some number of inconsistencies requires sustaining or

rejecting an adverse credibility determination,” and we instead employ a totality-

of-the-circumstances approach. Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1142 (9th

Cir. 2022) (quoting Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en

banc)). The substantial evidence standard also governs the Board’s finding that a

petitioner’s marriage was not bona fide at the time the petitioner and his spouse

married. Smolniakova v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2005). We

review de novo whether immigration officers’ conduct “was sufficiently egregious

to require application of the exclusionary rule.” Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d

1441, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994).

      1. Camara challenges the agency’s conclusion that he and his witnesses,

including his wife, Safeta Rajic, did not testify credibly. When making credibility

determinations, an immigration judge should “consider[] the totality of the

circumstances, and all relevant factors.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C). Here, both the

immigration judge and the Board accurately noted material inconsistencies in the

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testimony of Camara, Rajic, and Rajic’s daughter. Camara’s and Rajic’s testimony

as to when they started living together was contradictory, as was testimony

concerning the periods of their separation and cohabitation. A driver’s license and

license plate search, along with lease documents, suggested that the two did not

live together at all. Given those inconsistencies and considering the totality of the

circumstances, see Barseghyan, 39 F.4th at 1142, substantial evidence supports the

agency’s adverse credibility determination.

      2. Camara insists that the immigration judge did not sufficiently justify her

determination that his marriage was not genuine. But Camara’s and Rajic’s lack of

credibility supports the conclusion that their marriage “was entered into for the

purpose of procuring [Camara]’s admission as an immigrant.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i); see also Oropeza-Wong v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1135, 1148

(9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that inconsistencies in evidence support the

determination that an alien’s marriage is not bona fide). And their inconsistent

testimony about cohabitation and general lack of knowledge about each other

suggest that they “did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were

married.” Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975). We disagree with

Camara’s contention that the immigration judge erred in identifying events or

inconsistencies occurring after the spouses married as relevant to the bona fide

marriage inquiry. We have recognized that although “evidence of separation,

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standing alone, cannot support a finding that a marriage was not bona fide when it

was entered,” “the time and extent of separation, combined with other facts and

circumstances, can and have adequately supported the conclusion that a marriage

was not bona fide.” Id. at 1202. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s

determination that Camara’s marriage was not bona fide.

       3. Camara argues that the immigration judge and the Board erred in denying

his motion to suppress certain evidence, including Rajic’s 2008 confession that her

marriage to Camara was a sham. Generally, the exclusionary rule does not apply in

immigration proceedings, although an exception exists for evidence obtained

through an “egregious” Fourth Amendment violation. Martinez-Medina v. Holder,

673 F.3d 1029, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 2011) (as amended). Here, there was no such

violation. Circumstances that “might indicate a seizure” include “the threatening

presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical

touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice

indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” United

States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). None of those factors was present

in this case.

       Furthermore, the two United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

officers who entered Rajic’s apartment testified that they followed their regular

procedures, including receiving consent to enter and asking for a written statement.

                                        4                                   22-1292
Both officers also testified that they neither threatened nor pressured Rajic or her

daughter in any way. The officers supplied the only testimony about the visit that

was found to be credible. We conclude that there was no egregious Fourth

Amendment violation and affirm the denial of Camara’s suppression motion.1

      4. Camara also argues that the immigration judge and the Board violated his

due process rights in “applying too low a standard of proof” and in “prejudicially”

placing the burden of proof on him instead of the government when denying his

Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence. To prevail on a due process

challenge in the context of removal proceedings, Camara “must show error and

substantial prejudice. A showing of prejudice is essentially a demonstration that

the alleged violation affected the outcome of the proceedings[.]” Larita-Martinez

v. INS, 220 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241,

1246 (9th Cir. 2000)). Here, both the immigration judge and the Board identified

and applied the correct standard and burden of proof. The immigration judge, for

example, explained that “after considering the totality of the evidence, the court

finds that the DHS met its burden proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,

1
  Camara argues that the immigration judge erred in denying his motion to
suppress as untimely. Although the immigration judge described the motion as
untimely, the immigration judge’s written decision reflects that the motion was
denied on the merits. On appeal, the Board affirmed the immigration judge’s denial
of the motion strictly on the merits and did not reach the timeliness issue. We
therefore need not consider whether the immigration judge erred in describing the
motion as untimely.

                                         5                                   22-1292
that [Camara]’s marriage was not entered into in good faith.” Because there was no

error affecting the outcome of Camara’s proceedings, there was no due process

violation.

      5. Finally, Camara argues that the immigration judge erred in failing to

advise him that he was eligible for a fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(1)(H)(i)(I). That provision grants a waiver to people who were

wrongfully admitted to the country due to a misrepresentation, but only when they

fulfill certain requirements—including, most importantly, having a citizen relative.

Camara does not meet this requirement. To the extent he suggests that Rajic, as his

spouse, is such a relative, he is wrong. See Matter of Matti, 19 I. & N. Dec. 43, 44–

46 (B.I.A. 1984) (holding that an alien cannot claim a fraud waiver based on a

marriage that has been found not to be bona fide).

      PETITION DENIED.

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