Court Opinion

ID: 9385701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 20:03:57.57354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:03.827715
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2023 IL App (3d) 210598-U

                                    Order filed April 7, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                               THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                      )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                       )      of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
                                                      )      Whiteside County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
                                                      )      Appeal No. 3-21-0598
             v.                                       )      Circuit No. 17-CF-143
                                                      )
      JESSE A. BONS,                                  )      Honorable
                                                      )      Stanley B. Steines,
             Defendant-Appellant.                     )      Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Hettel and Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  ORDER

¶1          Held: The trial court’s summary dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition did not
                  violate the procedural requirements of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
                  Affirmed.

¶2          Defendant, Jesse A. Bons, appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for

     relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)). For

     the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

¶3                                             I. BACKGROUND
¶4           Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of one count of predatory criminal

     sexual assault of a child and sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment. We affirmed his conviction

     and sentence on direct appeal. People v. Bons, 2021 IL App (3d) 180464. On September 16,

     2021, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition under the Act, alleging that he was

     deprived of a fair trial where the trial court admitted evidence of his and the victim’s chlamydia

     diagnosis at trial. On December 2, 2021, the trial court made the following docket entry:

                    “D’s Pro Se Petition for Post Conviction Relief is examined. The issue raised was

            already addressed by the Appellate Court on direct appeal. D’s Petition for Post

            Conviction relief is denied at the first stage review as it fails to raise a gist of a

            constitutional claim. Motion for Appointment of counsel is moot. Clerk instructed to

            forward a copy of minute entry to SAO and D. Clerk instructed to file and forward copy

            of Notice of rights for Appeal to D.”

¶5          Defendant timely appealed.

¶6                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶7          On appeal, defendant argues that “[t]he circuit court’s summary dismissal of [his] pro se

     post-conviction petition should be reversed and the case remanded for second-stage post-

     conviction proceedings where the circuit court failed to enter a final written judgment order

     within 90 days of the filing and docketing of the petition.” We apply a de novo standard of

     review to a first-stage summary dismissal of a postconviction petition. People v. Coleman, 183

     Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).

¶8          Defendant specifies two grounds for reversal. First, he contends that the docket entry was

     not a “written order” entered within 90 days as contemplated by sections 122-2.1(a) and (a)(2) of

     the Act. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a) (West 2020) (“Within 90 days after the filing and docketing

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       of each petition, the court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this

       Section.”); 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2020) (requiring a “written order”). Second,

       defendant contends that, even if the docket entry were a written order as contemplated by

       sections 122-2.1(a) and (a)(2), the docket entry did not otherwise comply with section 122-

       2.1(a)(2)’s provision that the court enter a “written order, specifying the findings of fact and

       conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision.” See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2020).

       A review of Illinois jurisprudence reflects that both arguments have been rejected, as set forth

       below.

¶9              As to the first argument, we note that the docket entry was in fact entered within the 90-

       day time period and was copied and forwarded to defendant, along with a copy of his appeal

       rights. This satisfied the Act’s written order requirement. See People v. Cooper, 2015 IL App

       (1st) 132971, ¶¶ 7, 14. In Cooper, the appellate court considered the summary dismissal of a

       postconviction petition, where no written order was issued, but the trial court’s decision was

       reflected on the docket entry or “half-sheet,” and notice of the decision was sent to the defendant.

       The appellate court concluded, “[A] written order of summary dismissal is not required. Instead,

       a court summarily dismisses a postconviction petition when its decision is entered of record.” Id.

       ¶ 14 (citing People v. Perez, 2014 IL 115927, ¶¶ 15, 29 (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 272 (eff. Nov. 1,

       1990))).

¶ 10            Just as in Cooper, here, the trial court reached a decision, within 90 days, to dismiss

       defendant’s petition, and that decision was clearly communicated to the clerk of the court and

       spread of record, as documented by the docket entry pronouncing, “D’s Petition for Post

       Conviction relief is denied at the first stage review as it fails to raise a gist of a constitutional

       claim.” That this was a decision entered of record is further supported where the record reflects

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       that a copy of the minute order was sent to defendant apprising him of the “Order by minute

       entry dismissing Defendant’s Pro Se petition for Post-Conviction Relief, a copy of the minute

       order is enclosed herewith.” Simply put, the docket entry here complied with the written order

       requirement of sections 122-2.1(a) and (a)(2) of the Act.

¶ 11           Defendant’s second argument, that the docket entry order did not otherwise comply with

       section 122-2.1(a)(2)’s provision that the court enter a “written order, specifying the findings of

       fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision[,]” is equally unavailing. See 725

       ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2020). Initially, we disagree with defendant’s argument that the

       language of the docket entry failed to specify the findings of fact and conclusions of law in

       support of its judgment. The docket entry pronounces, “The issue raised was already addressed

       by the Appellate Court on direct appeal. D’s Petition for Post Conviction relief is denied at the

       first stage review as it fails to raise a gist of a constitutional claim.” This language explains to

       defendant in clear and straightforward terms that his petition was denied because his argument

       had already been rejected by this court in defendant’s direct appeal.

¶ 12           Furthermore, we observe that, even where a court order dismisses a petition as frivolous

       or patently without merit but does not otherwise specify the reasons for doing so, such is not a

       basis to reverse. In interpreting the Act’s requirement that the court “shall dismiss the petition in

       a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law[,]” our supreme court has

       held that “shall” directs the court to dismiss the petition and not to specify the reasons for doing

       so. People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 81-82 (1988).

¶ 13           Moreover, the Porter court found the “shall” requirement in section 122-2.1(a)(2) to be

       directory and not mandatory. Id. Finally, we decline any suggestion that the supreme court’s

       decision in Perez, 2014 IL 115927, overruled Porter. In Perez, the court considered only whether

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       a written order dismissing a defendant’s postconviction petition was timely, where it was not

       filed with the clerk until after the 90-day period. Id. ¶ 29. The Perez court never referenced

       Porter nor addressed the written order or specificity requirements of section 122-2.1(a)(2). See

       People v. Ranft, 2023 IL App (1st) 210300-U, ¶¶ 30-31 (though Perez held that an oral

       pronouncement alone was insufficient under section 122-2.1(a)(2), it did not supersede Porter’s

       holding that the written order and specificity requirements were directory.). Accordingly, the

       postconviction petition was properly dismissed.

¶ 14                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 15          The judgment of the circuit court of Whiteside County is affirmed.

¶ 16          Affirmed.

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