Court Opinion

ID: 9590844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:58:43.537991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:45.548169
License: Public Domain

Felton, J.,
dissenting. The evidence established that the Co-op Cab Company operated on what is commonly called the “lick system,” whereby the company rented to the driver a cab equipped with a two-way radio for a sum of $6.50 per twelve hours. In addition to the rent the driver had to furnish his own gasoline. The driver kept all the fares he collected and did not have to account to the company for such fares. The claimant testified that the drivers were required to buy gasoline from the company while other drivers testified that drivers were not required to purchase company gasoline. As to the operation of the cabs, it was shown that the company maintained a telephone switchboard, and when a request for a cab was received over the switchboard, a cab was notified of the request via radio by the dispatcher. It was attempted to be shown by the claimant’s testimony that the company controlled the time, manner, and method of the driver’s operation of the cab so as to render the driver an employee of the company. The claimant testified: “Q. All right, you say when you had a radio call you were forced to answer that call? A. Yes, sir. Q. They made you? A. Yes, sir. You could either make the call or they would park your cab, either one. . . Q. Who told you when to go to work and when to quit? A. The manager of the company, Mr. John Landers. . . Q. How long did you take for your lunch? A. It varied from time to time. I wouldn’t say no certain length of time. Q. As I understand when you got ready you stopped for supper? A. Stopped for supper when I went home after I got off from work. Q. All right. Now for your other meals then while you were paying your twelve hour rental lick if you wanted to get a meal did you stop when you wanted to? A. Yes, sir, check out of service. Q. Was there any definite length of time that you could take out? A. No, sir. . . Q. If you wanted to take a cab out of service an hour ahead of time could you do it? A. I don’t guess you would want to take it out of service an hour ahead of time. Q. I asked you if you wanted to take it out an hour ahead of time could you check out? A. Yes, sir, you can check out. Q. Then *209you were not forced to keep the cab in continuous operation during the entire twelve hours were you?' A. It is left up to the driver, I guess. Q. And he can knock off when he wants to just so he pays that $6.50? A. And the gas. Q. It is turned over to you with a full tank of gas, is that right? A. Yes, sir. Q. And when you turn it back in you fill the tank up for the next driver? A. Yes, sir. Q. And if you want to you can knock off after serving six, eight or ten hours, just so long as you pay your money and fill the tank up? A. Yes, sir.” There was testimony by the company’s general office manager and other company drivers that a driver was not required to purchase gasoline from the company; that they did not have to respond to the company’s radio calls, that they did not have to report out of service; and that they were free to come and go as they pleased. The evidence also disclosed that if a driver did not take in enough fares to cover the rental charge and the gasoline, the driver had to pay for the same out of his own pocket. Witnesses for the company testified: “Q. In the event that they notify you that a passenger is waiting and you fail to answer the call what disciplinary action will they take? A. Well, you will have to have some excuse for that. You are supposed to make a call if you are given it. Q. Then there is disciplinary action in a case of that type? A. Well, that question could be answered a couple of ways maybe. If you get out there and call a cab and they give me your call on the radio, well, I am supposed to make that call to keep you from waiting, see, because if I don’t make it then you have got to go and call another cab. Q. Then they do have some disciplinary action they take in a case of that kind? A. They would naturally have to have, yes, sir.”
While the claimant testified that his actions in operating the cab were controlled by the company, he also testified that he could “knock off” any time he wanted to. The claimant’s testimony was contradictory and must be construed against him. So construing his testimony—he could quit for the day any time he wished whether the company wanted him to or not, and could work at his pleasure. I think that the evidence demanded a finding that the claimant’s time, manner, and method of operating his rented cab were not controlled by the company so as *210to render him an employee of the company within the meaning of Code § 114-101: The only reasonable inference from the evidence is that the only disciplinary action the company could take when a driver refused to pick up a passenger when the request was relayed by radio would be to refuse to rent a cab to that driver thereafter. This refusal thereafter to rent a cab would not amount to a control of the time, manner, and method of the operation of the cab by the company.
The claimant relies on the case of Redwine v. Wilkes, 83 Ga. App. 645 (64 S. E. 2d, 101), wherein the facts were somewhat similar to those in the instant case. The court there held that an employer-employee relationship existed under the terms of the Unemployment Compensation Act. A different criterion is used in that act in determining employer-employee relationships from that used in the application of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The former act establishes its own standard for determining the relationship (Code, Ann. Supp., § 54-657 (h) (6)), whereas the relationship under the latter act is determined by common-law principles. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Clark, 58 Ga. App. 115, 121 (197 S. E. 650). In passing the Unemployment Compensation Act, the General Assembly declared the public policy of the State in relation to the application of the act which greatly liberalized such application. Code (Ann. Supp.), § 54-602. It was stated in Young v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 63 Ga. App. 130, 137 (10 S. E. 2d, 412): “It is immaterial whether the parties come within the relation of master and servant or independent contractors. The act itself fixes the status of their employment which brings them within the terms of the act, and renders the employer liable for the contributions required by the act.” The court there further stated: “As stated by the Supreme Court of Washington in McDermott v. State, 196 Wash. 261 (82 Pac. 2d, 568), in construing an act similar to the Georgia act, ‘It is unnecessary to determine whether the common-law relation of master and servant exists between respondent and the barbers and other operatives in his shop, because the parties are brought within the purview of the unemployment-compensation act by a definition more inclusive than that of master and servant.’ ” Therefore, facts may exist which would render a relationship *211one of employer-employee under the provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Act, but which would be insufficient to establish such a relationship under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Construing the claimant’s testimony most strongly against him, the undisputed facts show that the claimant came to work when he wished, quit work when he wished, and kept all his fares, and show that the company only received the rental charge of the cab plus whatever profit it made from the sale of gasoline to the drivers, and show that if the amount of the fares received by the drivers was less than the rental charge and the cost of gasoline, the drivers bore the loss. I think that these facts are inconsistent with the relationship of employer and employee.