Court Opinion

ID: 9950331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 19:04:46.083199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:37.439454
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/24 Gooden v. Astrix Technology CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

TONI A. GOODEN,                                          B326835

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                       (Los Angeles County
                                                         Super. Ct. No. 21STCV45436)
         v.

ASTRIX TECHNOLOGY, LLC,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Maren E. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.

     DTO Law, Justin T. Goodwin, Erik P. Mortensen and
Marisol Ramirez for Defendant and Appellant.

      Bibiyan Law Group, David D. Bibiyan and Henry G. Glitz
for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                 _______________________
      Defendant and appellant Astrix Technology, LLC (Astrix),
appeals the trial court’s order denying its motion to compel
arbitration. We find no error and affirm the order.

                         BACKGROUND
      There are two agreements involving Astrix and plaintiff
and respondent Toni Gooden concerning Gooden’s employment
claims: an April 30, 2021 contingent worker agreement to which
Astrix, Gooden, and Gilead Sciences, Inc. (Gilead), are parties;
and a May 11, 2021 employment agreement, involving only
Astrix and Gooden.
      Astrix is a company that places contingent workers in
science-based companies. Gooden was hired by Astrix for a
temporary assignment at Kite Pharma, Inc. (Kite), a Gilead
subsidiary. Before beginning the assignment, Gooden was
required to sign Gilead’s contingent worker agreement that
included binding arbitration for disputes involving a “Worker and
Gilead or their related parties.” The agreement was attached to
an email sent to Gooden. Astrix contends Gooden signed the
agreement via DocuSign on April 30, 2021.
Gooden’s lawsuit against Astrix
      Gooden’s employment with Astrix lasted until October
2021. Subsequently she sued Astrix and others for various Labor
Code violations. The claims were brought on behalf of Gooden
and a putative class. After dismissing the other defendants from
her suit, Gooden filed a first amended complaint solely against
Astrix.
      Astrix filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the
April 30, 2021 contingent worker agreement. Astrix admitted it
lacked a copy signed by Gooden and, instead, offered a form
agreement and testimony from individuals who stated they had

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searched for a signed copy without success. Gooden challenged
this evidence and claimed she never signed the contingent worker
agreement and further argued the May 11, 2021 employment
agreement with Astrix superseded any other agreement. The
employment agreement does not mention arbitration and
includes an integration clause asserting it to be the entire
agreement between the parties that supersedes all prior
agreements.
      The trial court denied Astrix’s motion to compel arbitration,
finding Astrix failed to establish the existence of a valid
agreement to arbitrate. It also determined the subsequent
employment agreement superseded any prior agreement.
      Astrix filed a timely notice of appeal.

                 CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
      Astrix challenges the order on three grounds: the trial court
erred by excluding secondary evidence of the arbitration
agreement; arbitration could be compelled based on agency
principles and equitable estoppel; and it was error to conclude the
subsequent employment agreement superseded the prior
arbitration agreement.

                          DISCUSSION
I.     Applicable law and standard of review
       “Generally, the standard of review applicable to the denial
of a petition to compel arbitration is determined by the issues
presented on appeal [citation]. To the extent the denial relies on a
pertinent factual finding, we review that finding for the existence
of substantial evidence. [Citation.] In contrast, to the extent the
denial relies on a determination of law, we review the trial court’s

                                 3
resolution of that determination de novo.” (Bautista v. Fantasy
Activewear, Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 650, 655.)
       Finally, when an order denying a motion to compel
arbitration is based on the trial court’s finding that the petitioner
failed to carry its burden of proof, the reviewing court must
determine whether that finding was erroneous as a matter of law.
(Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
1111, 1121 (Trinity).) “‘“Specifically, the question becomes
whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and
unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave
no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.’”’” (Ibid.)
II.    The employment agreement supersedes the earlier
       agreement to arbitrate
       Astrix argues it was error to find the employment
agreement superseded the agreement to arbitrate contained in
the contingent worker agreement. We disagree.
       A.    The employment agreement is the final and
             complete expression of Gooden’s employment
             with Astrix
       “‘“The basic goal of contract interpretation is to give effect
to the parties’ mutual intent at the time of contracting.
[Citations.] When a contract is reduced to writing, the parties’
intention is determined from the writing alone, if possible.
[Citation.]” [Citation.] “The words of a contract are to be
understood in their ordinary and popular sense . . . .”’” (Grey v.
American Management Services (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 803, 806-
807 (Grey).)
       “The court determines whether the parties intended the
contract to be a final and complete expression of their agreement.
[Citation.] ‘The crucial issue in determining whether there has

                                 4
been an integration is whether the parties intended their writing
to serve as the exclusive embodiment of their agreement. The
instrument itself may help to resolve that issue.’ [Citation.] The
existence of an integration clause is a key factor in divining that
intent. [Citation.] ‘This type of clause has been held conclusive on
the issue of integration, so that parol evidence to show that the
parties did not intend the writing to constitute the sole
agreement will be excluded.’” (Grey, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at
p. 807.)
       For example, when a provision states the contract is the
entire agreement between the parties and supersedes all prior
understandings, it means the parties intended the contract to be
the final and exclusive embodiment of their agreement. (Grey,
supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at pp. 807-808.)
       Here, the employment agreement was intended to express
the parties’ understanding of the terms of Gooden’s employment.
Gooden received the document as part of an “on-boarding”
package from Astrix. The details of her work, compensation,
benefits, and termination of employment were included. There
was also a noncompete clause, details on the parties’ rights to use
litigation, and a waiver of the statute of limitations.
       Section 17 of the agreement included the following: “This
Agreement and any riders hereto (if any) shall constitute the
entire agreement between the parties. This Agreement
supersedes any statements, agreements, or representations made
prior to or contemporaneously herewith. Any amendments or
modifications must be in writing to be effective.”
       Thus establishing the agreement was the entire agreement
between the parties and superseded any prior statements,
agreements, or representations. It is conclusive on the issue of
integration and shows Astrix and Gooden intended the

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employment agreement to serve as the exclusive embodiment of
their agreement on their relationship.
      B.     The earlier agreement to arbitrate was
             superseded as to Astrix
      A final, integrated contract “may not be contradicted by
evidence of a prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral
agreement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1856, subd. (a).) The parol
evidence rule “generally prohibits the introduction of extrinsic
evidence—oral or written—to vary or contradict the terms of an
integrated written instrument.” (EPA Real Estate Partnership v.
Kang (1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 171, 175 (EPA Real Estate).)
      Here, the employment contract was the final and exclusive
embodiment of Astrix and Gooden’s agreement, superseding all
prior agreements, including the contingent worker agreement. As
a result, Astrix was precluded from using extrinsic evidence to
vary the terms of the employment agreement by adding an
agreement to arbitrate any claims Gooden may have against
Astrix.
      C.     Only Astrix’s and Gooden’s obligations were
             superseded
      Astrix argues the employment agreement between Astrix
and Gooden cannot supersede the prior agreement among Astrix,
Gooden, and Gilead. However, that is not what occurred. The
employment agreement did not supersede the entire contingent
worker agreement. Instead, the employment agreement
superseded only the promises Astrix and Gooden made to each
other within the contingent worker agreement.
      Astrix offers no legal authority to support its position
parties cannot use a later agreement to supersede their
obligations to each other. Freedom of contract is an important
principle in California law. (Eminence Healthcare, Inc. v. Centuri

                                6
Health Ventures, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 869, 880 [“The policy
favoring arbitration does not override the parties’ freedom of
contract.”]) As a result, Astrix and Gooden have the freedom to
contract away rights or obligations they had to each other under
the contingent worker agreement, including the right to arbitrate
employment disputes.
       Section 17 of the employment agreement clearly states it is
the entire agreement between Astrix and Gooden. It did not alter
any obligations either of them had with Gilead contained in the
contingent worker agreement. The employment agreement
superseded only the obligations Astrix and Gooden had to each
other.
       Furthermore, an agreement to arbitrate is particularly
capable of being separated from a prior agreement and
superseded by a subsequent agreement, as arbitration
agreements must be viewed as “‘“separable”’ from other portions
of a contract.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp.
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 416.) Being viewed as “separable,” the
agreement to arbitrate could be superseded without affecting the
rest of the contingent worker agreement.
       D.    Agency and equitable estoppel arguments not
             applicable
       Astrix argues it should still be able to enforce the
agreement to arbitrate through its status as an agent of Gilead or
under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Astrix offers no legal
authority for this claim to obtain via a contract that expressly
agreed was superseded by a subsequent agreement.
       Instead, Astrix relies on authority holding that a
nonsignatory may obtain the benefits of arbitration as an agent of
a signatory. (Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc. (1975) 44
Cal.App.3d 999, 1004.) Or a nonsignatory may compel arbitration

                                7
when a signatory’s claims arise out of and are related directly to
the written agreement containing the arbitration clause. (Garcia
v. Pexco, LLC (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 782, 786.) The facts in
Garcia involve a similar employment relationship. An employee
of a staffing agency was assigned to work for Pexco, LLC. When
the employee made Labor Code claims against Pexco, LLC, these
claims were subject to arbitration because, even though Pexco,
LLC, did not sign an arbitration agreement, the employee’s
claims were “intimately founded in and intertwined with” the
employee’s employment contract with the staffing agency that
contained binding arbitration provisions. (Id. at pp. 787-788.)
       This authority is inapposite as they identify principles for
situations when parties may enforce an arbitration agreement
they did not sign. Here, Astrix was a signatory to the contingent
worker agreement (containing the arbitration provision) and
could have enforced any right to arbitration in that way.
However, Astrix subsequently entered into the employment
agreement as the final and exclusive embodiment of Gooden’s
employment. Thus, Astrix contracted away its right to arbitrate.
       Further, Astrix is prohibited from using extrinsic evidence,
such as the contingent worker agreement, to vary or contradict
the terms of the integrated employment agreement. (EPA Real
Estate, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 175.) This principle bars
Astrix from enforcing the arbitration agreement under an agency
or equitable estoppel theory because that would vary the terms of
the employment agreement, which does not contain an
arbitration requirement.1

1     In addition to these grounds, there was a discussion in oral
argument that equitable estoppel does not apply because Gooden
did nothing inequitable. “‘Equitable estoppel precludes a party
from asserting rights “he otherwise would have had against

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      Therefore, the trial court’s interpretation of the
employment agreement as superseding the right of Astrix to seek
arbitration under the contingent worker agreement was correct,
and since the employment agreement did not require arbitration
of employment disputes, Astrix’s motion to compel arbitration
was properly denied.2

                          DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded
her costs of appeal.

                                     ________________________
                                     CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

______________________________       ________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.          HOFFSTADT, J.

another” when his own conduct renders assertion of those rights
contrary to equity.’” (Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental
Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1713,
italics added.) Here, Gooden notes Astrix agreed the employment
agreement was the final and only agreement between them
concerning her employment. There is nothing “contrary to equity”
in her assertion that Astrix contracted away its right to arbitrate.
This is not further grounds to allow Astrix to use equitable
estoppel.
2     Astrix also contends the trial court erred by excluding its
evidence that Gooden signed the contingent worker agreement.
As this does not identify any ground to reverse the superseded
contingent workers agreement, we decline to address this issue.

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