Court Opinion

ID: 9848029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:11:33.740016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:55.685310
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). The meaning and intent of sec. 655.23(5), Stats., is plain and unambiguous. The portion of that section which the majority holds needs interpretation is: “are liable for malpractice for no more than $200,000 per claim and $600,000 per year or the maximum liability limit for which the provider is insured, whichever is higher . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The obvious meaning of this portion is that if the provider carries less than $200,000 per claim, then his carrier is liable up to the limit of the policy and the provider is personally liable for the difference between the coverage limit and the $200,000. It is the $200,000 per claim that is compared to the policy limit, and whichever is higher is applied to the malpractice limit of liability for the provider. If the provider carries less than $200,000 coverage, then the provider is liable up to the higher limit of $200,000. However, the health care provider’s limit of liability never exceeds $200,000 which is the amount over which the Fund is liable. This application of the clear meaning is even more clear when it is *549considered that the section is found in sec. 655.23 for “Limitations of liability; proof of financial responsibility.” That is what is discussed in sec. 655.23(5), i.e., limits of liability. Sec. 655.27 (1), the statement of creation for the Patients Compensation Fund, does not conflict with sec. 655.23(5), nor assist in its obvious meaning. Sec. 655.23(5) is self-contained as to its clear meaning.
The majority, to reach a result it wishes, violates several rules of statutory interpretation. The first being that when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it is not necessary nor proper to look for legislative meaning elsewhere. The second violation is using one section of the statute to cause confusion in the otherwise clear and unambiguous section. This was done on the basis of the Fund’s argument and may be the first time unconvincing argument has risen to the level of authority. Even the majority recognizes the weakness of its position by stating: “ [W] e still do not have a definitive answer to the question posed. Nevertheless, each avenue pursued to discover legislative intent lends support to the Fund’s interpretation of secs. 655.23(5) and 655.27 (1).” (Supra, at 548.) That statement is not borne out by the rest of the decision and is also bad mathematics since 2 x 0 is still equal to zero.
The final and most unprecedented and unworthy consideration of statutory meaning, when the statute is obvious on its face, is to consider as valuable a former governor’s veto of a section of the statute as helpful and as another avenue lending support to the Fund’s position. This court does not even consider subsequent legislative action in defining previous legislative intent. State ex rel. Thompson v. Nash, 27 Wis. 2d 183, 133 N.W.2d 769 (1965). Certainly a governor’s veto message has no persuasive meaning as to legislative intent.
I dissent and would reverse the trial court.