Court Opinion

ID: 9750587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:08:50.81069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:13.408577
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
by Watkins, J.:
I would reverse the judgment of sentence and grant a new trial because the appellant was denied his constitutional right to the effective representation of counsel of his own choice.
Article I, Sec. 9 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has been interpreted to mean that under our constitutional system, the accused, regardless of financial status, is guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel, either counsel of his own choosing, or, if indigent or otherwise unable to secure counsel, counsel assigned by the court. Com. ex rel. Goodfellow v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 528, 204 A. 2d 446 (1964).
Article of Amendment VI to the United States Constitution clearly states that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” In U. S. v. Johnston and Balk, 318 P. 2d 288 (C.A. 6, 1963) the court held this to mean that the defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment were not satisfied where the accused engaged counsel of his choice (Mr. Louisell) and at the time of trial Louisell asked to be excused because of other urgent business, the court granted the request since counsel’s associate Mr. Harris was present and would represent the accused and was familiar with the case. The accused insisted he wanted Mr. Louisell. Trial was held two days later resulting in a conviction.
Though it was found that Mr. Harris did a competent job and conducted the trial in a good manner and *226in this respect the accused was not prejudiced, a new trial was granted.
In view of the foregoing let us look at our present situation. The appellant was charged and convicted of receiving stolen goods, conspiracy and being an accessory before and after the fact of an embezzlement and fraudulent conversion of about $72,000 by John J. Byers, an officer of Chelsea Title and Abstract Company.
The arrest was made in September 1963 and the first trial was held in May of 1964 at which time appellant was represented by counsel of his choice. After an extended trial wherein 700 pages of testimony were taken, the jury could not agree upon a verdict and was discharged.
The case was then listed for trial on September 28, 1964. Appellant appeared at this time without counsel and the case was continued until October 1964 with instructions to appellant to arrange for counsel by that time or the court would appoint counsel for him. Appellant stated he would be in a position to secure the attorney he wanted by November 8, 1964, but the court refused a continuance until that time.
The case was then listed for October 26, 1964 and, on October 19, 1964 at a hearing before the court at the instance of the District Attorney, counsel was appointed for the appellant. Because of the nature of the ease appointed counsel stated he did not have sufficient time to prepare for trial and quite candidly stated he was unable to adequately represent appellant, and requested a continuance, which was again refused.
All through these proceedings appellant reiterated that he would be able to secure and pay counsel of his choice, being the same one who had represented him over a long period of time and at the first trial, if granted a continuance until November 10, 1964. Such a continuance was reasonable and would in no way preju*227dice tlie Commonwealth. It would have afforded appellant the constitutional right to which he was entitled.
A careful examination of this record indicates that the District Attorney seemed inordinately anxious to try this case before leaving office at the end of the year. The Judge, too, seemed greatly influenced by the attitude of the district attorney, so much so that the refusal of this reasonable continuance for the purpose of having the advice of counsel of his own choosing was a clear abuse of discretion.
The case was called at the first session of court subsequent to the mistrial. It is most surprising, at this time, when courts are leaning over backwards to protect the constitutional rights of chronic and hardened defendants, to deny a reasonable continuance for the purpose of securing counsel of his own choosing in his first brush with the law. There seems no doubt of his prior good reputation.