Court Opinion

ID: 9790182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:48:34.605511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:27.187123
License: Public Domain

I dissent. I subscribe to the view' that appeals should, if possible, be heard on the merits, and that a dismissal for procedural default should only be ordered where the appellant is clearly at fault. If a motion to dismiss an appeal were made in this court under circumstances similar to those shown- by the record herein, denial of the motion would be reasonable, despite the fact that much of the delay was caused by appellant’s own neglect in failing to commence proceedings promptly, and to his subsequently delivering bad checks to the reporter as advances on his fees. That this is a criminal appeal, that eventually appellant paid the *79reporter’s fees, and that subsequent delays in settlement and certification of the record were not within his power to avoid, would ordinarily be persuasive reasons for leniency in ruling on the motion.
These considerations, however, are not before us. The motion to dismiss was not addressed to this court, and we are not deciding it. The motion was addressed to the superior court, in which the appeal was pending, and was granted by that court. We have recently pointed out that “the jurisdiction of the superior court upon an appeal from a proceeding in a justice’s court was the same as that of any appellate court unless the superior court sought to conduct a new trial.” (Portnoy v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 375, 377 [125 P.2d 487], restating the holding in Redlands High School Dist. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 348 [125 P.2d 490].) Since the superior court in appeals from justices’ courts is in fact an appellate court, with the usual appellate jurisdiction, its judgments of affirmance, reversal, or dismissal within its jurisdiction are free from review in another appellate court. There is no provision, by statute or rule, for a further appeal to or hearing in this court; and the determination by the superior court that the appellant was guilty of inexcusable neglect, even if regarded as erroneous or harsh, was no more our concern than its determination of any substantive question of law or fact. Our procedural system does not provide for an ultimate right of review of every controversy in this court, but instead gives finality to decisions of the various appellate courts, except in the situations in which hearings in the Supreme Court are permitted after decisions by the District Court of Appeal.
All this is implied in the majority decision and opinion, which treats the application herein as a petition for a writ of certiorari, and grants relief by annulling the order of dismissal. The opinion therefore holds that the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction in making that order, notwithstanding the fact that the appellant was admittedly guilty of neglect and improper conduct in the proceedings for preparation of the record, and that the sole question was whether the resulting delays should be excused. The failure of another appellate court to exercise leniency in favor of a de-, faulting appellant can hardly be regarded as in excess of its jurisdiction. In the light of all of the facts disclosed, it can*80not even be said with assurance that the superior court exercised its discretion unwisely.
The majority opinion nevertheless purports to find the superior court lacking in jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal by reason of the absence of an order of the trial (justice’s) court “terminating proceedings for a record.” It is said that the question whether the appellant is in default is one for the trial court and not for the appellate court to determine. If this view is correct; an important part of its appellate jurisdiction has been stripped from the appellate court, and given to justices of the peace, who are, in many cases, not lawyers. They may countenance delay of months—perhaps years—without any control by the superior court. Before we accept any such theory we ought to be assured that the law plainly demands it. Actually, the law is clearly to the contrary.
The former rule governing appeals to the Supreme Court or District Court of Appeal was that a motion to dismiss for failure to file a record would not be considered unless a motion to terminate proceedings for a record had first been made in the trial court and granted by that court. The reason was that the former Supreme Court rules fixed no time for filing of the record on appeal, and expressly made an order of termination a prerequisite to the motion to dismiss. (Former Supreme Court rule I, § 1, and rule VI; see Hohnemann v. Pacific G. & E. Co., 31 Cal.App.2d 692 [88 P.2d 748]; Crocker v. Crocker, 76 Cal.App. 606 [245 P. 438].) The procedure on a motion to terminate, and the incidental appeal from an order of termination (see Wood v. Peterson Farms Co., 214 Cal. 94 [3 P.2d 922]; Howland v. Howland, 11 Cal.2d 20 [77 P.2d 475]) was a serious cause of delay in the prosecution of appeals, and was eliminated from the new Rules on Appeal recently adopted by the Judicial Council. (See Judicial Council Annotated Rules, p. 45; Witkin, New California Rules on Appeal, 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 79, 127.)
The rules governing criminal appeals from inferior courts to the superior court do not establish this procedure, either expressly or by implication. The attempt to apply it herein is by analogy only, and any justification for its introduction disappeared when the new Rules on Appeal were adopted. Rule 10(a) of the rules governing appeals to the superior court provides that if “the appellant otherwise fails to prosecute it with diligence . . . the Superior Court may, on motion *81of the respondent or on its own motion, after written notice to the appellant, order it dismissed. ’ ’ Nothing is said therein about a motion to terminate proceedings. Yet the majority opinion, without explanation, not only imposes on the superior court a procedure already abandoned in the other appellate courts, but makes that outmoded procedure jurisdictional. Neither reason nor authority can be found to sustain this decision.
If the superior court should arbitrarily dismiss an appeal where the uncontroverted evidence clearly established compliance by the appellant with all applicable rules, we might hold that its act was an unwarranted refusal to assume jurisdiction, and issue mandate to compel it to hear the cause. But where, as here, the record contains some evidence of lack of diligence in prosecution of the appeal, the granting or refusing relief to the appellant lies with the court to which the appeal was taken. If the rule for which this ease stands were to be followed, every litigant whose appeal was dismissed for lack of diligent prosecution, in the superior court or appellate department thereof, or in any District Court of Appeal, would be entitled to a writ of review in this court, for the purpose of determining whether the facts justified the dismissal of the appeal.