Court Opinion

ID: 9947004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 21:00:59.822677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:44.870580
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 23-4411

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        GEORGE FIELDS, a/k/a Chin,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
        George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (1:21-cr-00351-GLR-2)

        Submitted: February 27, 2024                                 Decided: February 29, 2024

        Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Gregory Dolin, UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF LAW,
        Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Kim Y. Hagan, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               George Fields appeals his convictions and 300-month sentence imposed following

        his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,

        1951(a), and murder through discharging a firearm during a crime of violence, namely,

        substantive Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c), (j). Fields’ counsel

        has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there

        are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Fields admitted committing

        the elements of the offenses, whether plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and

        whether the sentence is reasonable. Although notified of his right to do so, Fields has not

        filed a pro se supplement brief. The Government moves to dismiss the appeal pursuant to

        the appeal waiver in Fields’ plea agreement. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.

               Fields’ appeal waiver does not bar consideration of the question of whether Fields

        admitted committing the offenses, as this implicates the validity of the underlying guilty

        plea. See United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that an appeal

        that “goes to the propriety of the guilty plea itself . . . is not barred by [an appeal] waiver”

        (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because Fields did not move in the district court to

        withdraw his guilty plea, we review the court’s acceptance of his plea for plain error.

        United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). “Under the plain error

        standard, [we] will correct an unpreserved error if (1) an error was made; (2) the error is

        plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness,

        integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d

        480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the guilty plea context, a

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        defendant establishes that an error affected his substantial rights by demonstrating “a

        reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” United

        States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 608 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               A guilty plea is valid if the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently pled

        guilty “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”

        United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). Accordingly, before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a

        plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and determines he understands, the

        rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charges to which he is pleading, and the

        maximum and mandatory minimum penalties he faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United

        States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The court also must ensure that the

        plea is voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises not contained in the plea

        agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and “that there is a factual basis for the plea,” Fed.

        R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3); see also United States v. Stitz, 877 F.3d 533, 536 (4th Cir. 2017)

        (discussing proof required to establish factual basis).

               At the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the district court did not advise Fields that the

        parties’ agreed-upon disposition of the remaining charge in the indictment would appear

        in the judgment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(4). However, because the court dismissed the

        charge in accordance with the plea agreement, the court’s omission did not affect Fields’

        substantial rights. Likewise, while the court failed to advise Fields that its obligation to

        impose a special assessment applied to each of the counts to which Fields pled, see Fed. R.

        Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(L), nothing in the record suggests that this minor omission affected

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        Fields’ decision to plead guilty. Moreover, the court otherwise complied with Rule 11. In

        particular, as relevant to the question Fields raises on appeal, the court ensured that he

        understood the elements of the offenses and that his plea was supported by a factual basis.

        We therefore conclude that Fields’ guilty plea is valid.

               Turning to Fields’ challenge to plea counsel’s assistance, this challenge also

        implicates the validity of the plea and, thus, is not barred by the appeal waiver. United

        States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Even if the court engages in a

        complete plea colloquy, a waiver of the right to appeal may not be knowing and voluntary

        if tainted by the advice of constitutionally ineffective trial counsel.”). However, the

        transcript of the plea colloquy reflects that Fields’ plea was knowing, voluntary, and

        supported by a factual basis. Thus, the present record does not conclusively establish that

        counsel provided ineffective assistance, and we decline to address Fields’ ineffective

        assistance claim on direct appeal. See United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 507-08

        (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that we do not consider ineffective assistance of counsel claims on

        direct appeal “[u]nless an attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of the

        record”). This “claim should be raised, if at all, in a [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 motion.” United

        States v. Jordan, 952 F.3d 160, 163 n.1 (4th Cir. 2020).

               Fields’ remaining challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence falls squarely

        within the scope of the appeal waiver, which unambiguously bars all appeals on any ground

        whatsoever.    Moreover, our review of the record confirms that Fields knowingly,

        voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal and that the appeal waiver is thus

        valid and enforceable. See United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 2021)

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        (holding that an appeal waiver is valid and enforceable “if the issue being appealed falls

        within the scope of the waiver” and “the totality of the circumstances” reflect that the

        defendant entered into the waiver “knowingly and intelligently” (internal quotation marks

        omitted)). Accordingly, the appeal waiver precludes us from reviewing the reasonableness

        of Fields’ sentence.

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

        found no meritorious grounds for appeal outside the scope of Fields’ valid appeal waiver.

        We therefore grant in part the Government’s motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal as

        to all issues within the waiver’s scope. We deny the motion in part and affirm the

        remainder of the criminal judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Fields, in

        writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.

        If Fields requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be

        frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.

        Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Fields. We dispense with

        oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

        materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                                                DISMISSED IN PART

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