Court Opinion

ID: 9601861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:50:19.131891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:59.542793
License: Public Domain

Hill, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
When a county officer is sued, or is required to file suit, the county attorney represents him or her. But when the county governing authority sues, or is sued by, a county officer, the county *685attorney represents the county governing authority and the county refuses compensation to the county officer’s attorney. County officers should not be required to solicit lawyers to provide them with free legal representation and in this day when it appears that everyone is entitled to be represented by counsel, it seems unconscionable to me that counties can deprive county officers of the benefit of counsel.
Counties have the implied power to employ a county attorney. See Templeman v. Jeffries, 172 Ga. 895 (1) (159 SE 248) (1931).1 If county governing authorities have the implied power to employ counsel, county officers should have the implied power to employ counsel where the county attorney cannot represent the county officer.
The majority say, but do not explain why, attorney fees are not authorized “under the facts of this case.” In a unanimous opinion rendered last month, Grimsley v. Twiggs County, 249 Ga. 632 (292 SE2d 675) (1982), this court clearly implied that attorney fees may be awarded for legal services to a county officer in the discretion of the court.
The “facts of this case” referred to by the majority cannot be that the county officer was the plaintiff, or that he failed to prevail on the merits, because the county attorney is compensated when the county is the plaintiff, and when the county loses. (Patti Grimsley was the plaintiff in Grimsley v. Twiggs County, supra.)
The “facts of this case” referred to by the majority may be that this is not an “inherent power” case whereas Grimsley v. Twiggs County, supra, was. Grimsley was an “inherent power” case on its merits, but this court did not say there that the separate issue of attorney fees came under the inherent power of the court. And if the trial court in Grimsleyh&d the inherent power to award attorney fees in its discretion, then why not here? I was of the opinion that courts had not only the inherent power but also the inherent duty to treat litigants before them fairly and even-handedly. I therefore dissent in Case No. 38814 (division 4 of the majority opinion).
While I dissent, I cannot approve the trial judge’s poll of the DeKalh Superior Court judges in deciding whether to award attorney fees. Nevertheless, their determination that attorney fees were warranted is indicative to me that county officers are entitled to legal representation. I would remand for the trial judge to exercise his discretion in awarding attorney fees. Grimsley v. Twiggs County, supra. After all, even though the plaintiff was not successful on the *686merits, the county has benefited by having this matter litigated and resolved now, rather than sometime later.
I am authorized to state that Justice Smith joins in this dissent.

 A county under the county manager form of government has express statutory authority to employ a county attorney. Code § 23-917.