Court Opinion

ID: 9939556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:09:47.957579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:24.492024
License: Public Domain

J-A03010-24

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 SHAWN LEANEIL DANIELS                   :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 451 WDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 5, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0011757-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                       FILED: February 9, 2024

     Shawn Leaneil Daniels appeals pro se from the order that dismissed as

untimely his serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”). We affirm.

     This Court has offered the following brief summary of this case:

            On March 5, 2018, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty
     plea to aggravated indecent assault of a child and indecent assault
     of a person less than thirteen years of age. Appellant did not file
     a direct appeal. Thus, his sentence became final on April 4, 2018.
     See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (providing “a judgment becomes
     final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
     review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
     Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for
     seeking the review”); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (providing that a notice of
     appeal “shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order
     from which the appeal is taken”).

            Since his conviction in 2018, Appellant has filed numerous
     petitions seeking relief pursuant to the PCRA, none of which
     garnered him relief.
J-A03010-24

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 270 A.3d 1137 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-

precedential decision at 1-2).

      On March 8, 2023, Appellant filed the petition at issue in the instant

appeal, which is at least his twelfth. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/23, at 3;

Commonwealth brief at 9. In either event, Appellant in this latest petition

checked the box indicating that he was raising a claim of trial counsel

ineffectiveness, but also included some suggestion that he contended that his

lifetime sexual offender registration requirement was illegal.      Appellant

invoked two timeliness exceptions for the petition: (1) the newly discovered

facts contained in the affidavit of Joyce Daniels; and (2) a newly-recognized,

retroactively-applicable constitutional right based upon our Supreme Court’s

decisions in Commonwealth v. Hill, 238 A.3d 399, 409 (Pa. 2020) (holding

that a double jeopardy challenge to imposition of a second sentence was a

non-waivable challenge to the legality of the sentence), and Commonwealth

v. Ford, 217 A.3d 824, 831 (Pa. 2019) (holding sentence was illegal where a

fine was imposed pursuant to negotiated guilty plea without record evidence

of the defendant’s ability to pay). See PCRA Petition, 3/24/23, at 4.

      Buried within the filing was a motion for recusal of the PCRA judge,

alleging the judge had publicly expressed that all criminals should receive

maximum sentences and had at some point exhibited bias against Appellant,

whose appeal of a prior ruling by the same judge purportedly resulted in

discharge. Id. at unnumbered 9. As exhibits to the recusal motion, Appellant

                                    -2-
J-A03010-24

attached documents from his child custody case in which a conviction and

sentence for indirect criminal contempt (“ICC”) that was imposed by the PCRA

judge based upon his violation of a protection from abuse order was vacated

on appeal because the court erroneously applied the incorrect burden of

proof.1 See Tyusbey v. Daniels, 60 A.3d 863 (Pa.Super. 2012) (unpublished

memorandum at 8-9).

       The PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition as

untimely with no applicable exceptions and advised Appellant of the right to

respond within twenty days. See Order, 3/9/23 (incorrectly docketed as an

order dismissing the petition). Appellant did not timely respond. On April 5,

2023, Appellant re-filed the same recusal motion and the PCRA court

dismissed the petition as untimely.            Appellant then filed a timely notice of

appeal. The PCRA court ordered him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of

errors complained of on appeal, and he timely complied.

       On appeal, Appellant presents the following question: “Did the court

below err as a matter of law when it determined Appellant’s actual innocence

claims lacked arguable merit contrary to an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court in

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013)?”                    Appellant’s brief at 4

____________________________________________

1 The family court public docket indicates that the ICC charge in question was

dismissed in 2013 after this Court’s remand.

                                           -3-
J-A03010-24

(unnecessary capitalization omitted, spelling corrected, format of internal

citation modified).

      We begin with a review of the governing law. “In general, we review an

order dismissing or denying a PCRA petition as to whether the findings of the

PCRA court are supported by the record and are free from legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 657 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned

up). “It is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA court erred

and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 161

(Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up).

      It is well-settled “that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional

and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition

and cannot grant relief.” Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994

(Pa.Super. 2022). The PCRA provides as follows, in pertinent part, regarding

the time for filing a petition:

      Any petition [filed pursuant to the PCRA], including a second or
      subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
      judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
      petitioner proves that:

         (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
         interference by government officials with the presentation of
         the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
         Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
         States;

         (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
         to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
         exercise of due diligence; or

                                      -4-
J-A03010-24

          (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
          recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
          Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided
          in this section and has been held by that court to apply
          retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Further, a petition invoking a timeliness exception

“shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been

presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Finally, “[a]sserted exceptions to the

time restrictions for the PCRA must be included in the petition, and may not

be raised for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d

350, 356 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc).

       As noted above, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in 2018.

The instant petition was filed nearly five years later. Accordingly, in order for

any court to have jurisdiction to entertain his substantive claims, one of the

exceptions must be satisfied. As is also noted supra, in this Court Appellant

appears to rely upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in McQuiggin to

justify review of the substance of his petition.2 See Appellant’s brief at 4.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant’s stated question is also not included in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement. However, since the PCRA court’s order incorrectly informed
Appellant that failure to comply with the order “may” result in waiver rather
than advising him that waiver “shall” result, and because service of the order
upon Appellant is not noted on the docket, Rule 1925(b) waiver does not
pertain. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis, 867 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa.Super.
2005) (en banc) (holding waiver did not apply where it was “clear the clerk
did not comply with the mandatory requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 114”);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 193 A.3d 957, 962 (Pa.Super. 2018) (deeming
waiver inapplicable where the order provided “that failure to comply ‘may be
considered’ waiver” instead of advising the appellant that waiver “shall”
result).

                                           -5-
J-A03010-24

      Appellant’s reference to McQuiggin is ineffectual.     First, he did not

invoke it in his petition and therefore cannot rely upon it now. See Larkin,

supra at 356. Second, McQuiggin’s holding that a claim of actual innocence

may overcome the statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus actions has

no bearing upon our application of the PCRA’s timeliness provisions.      See

Commonwealth v. Brown, 143 A.3d 418, 420–21 (Pa.Super. 2016) (“While

McQuiggin represents a further development in federal habeas corpus law,

. . . this change in federal law is irrelevant to the time restrictions of our

PCRA.”). It remains the law of Pennsylvania that a claim of actual innocence

cannot overcome the PCRA’s one-year time bar. Id. Third, Appellant waived

any McQuiggin issue by failing to invoke the 2013 decision in any of his prior

PCRA proceedings, all of which were commenced after McQuiggin was

decided. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b) (“[A]n issue is waived if the petitioner

could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary

review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.”).

      Nor did the exceptions that Appellant pled in his petition confer

jurisdiction upon the PCRA court.       Neither the Hill nor Ford decision

announced a new rule of law, let alone one held by the High Court to apply

retroactively on collateral review.      Rather, as we explained in our

memorandum affirming the dismissal of one of Appellant’s earlier untimely

PCRA petitions:

      [E]ven though a defendant cannot waive a legality of sentence
      issue, we do not have jurisdiction to review the legality of a

                                     -6-
J-A03010-24

      sentence in a PCRA petition unless the petitioner can establish that
      the PCRA grants the court the authority to exercise jurisdiction
      over the legality of sentence issue. Commonwealth v. Jones,
      932 A.2d 179, 182 (Pa. Super. 2007); see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b);
      Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999)
      (“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within
      the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or
      one of the exceptions thereto.” (citation omitted)).

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 225 A.3d 1173 (Pa.Super. 2019) (non-

precedential decision at 4).

      As for the newly-discovered facts exception, Appellant proffered a new

affidavit from one of the witnesses identified in a previous petition, indicating

that she had some new hearsay evidence pointing to the same supposed

actual culprit that Appellant implicated in earlier PCRA proceedings.          In

particular, Appellant indicated that Ms. Daniels sent him a letter on an

undisclosed date telling him to call her and that he did so at some unidentified

point in time and she shared the information. See PCRA Petition, 3/24/23, at

4. In the attached affidavit, dated February 14, 2023, Ms. Daniels recounted

that she ran into Appellant’s child victims and their mother on some unnamed

date, at which time everyone said that Appellant did not commit the crimes,

but some person named Michael did. Id. at unnumbered 5.

      From this, there is no indication exactly which facts were new or when

Appellant learned them.        Rather, this appears to be a new source for

previously known facts that, as the Commonwealth observes, were the basis

for “recycled claims that he has repeatedly raised in previously filed petitions.”

Commonwealth’s brief at 13.          See, e.g., PCRA Petition, 6/7/22, at

                                      -7-
J-A03010-24

unnumbered 4 (affidavit of Ms. Daniels detailing that “Michael,” the boyfriend

of the victims’ grandmother, was the one who assaulted the children). Such

cannot   satisfy   the   newly-discovered-facts    exception.      See,      e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Myers, 303 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa.Super. 2023) (“The focus

of this exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered

or newly willing source for previously known facts.”) (cleaned up). Moreover,

as the PCRA court aptly noted, “Appellant again has failed to explain the delay

in obtaining this purported evidence or describe the due diligence undertaken

to do so.” PCRA Court Opinion, 6/26/23, at 5. Accordingly, we discern no

error in the PCRA court’s dismissal of the instant PCRA petition as untimely.

      Finally, to the extent that Appellant asserts on appeal his complaint that

the PCRA court did not grant his recusal motion, we observe that “recusal

requests must be timely made.” Commonwealth v. Blount, 207 A.3d 925,

930 (Pa.Super. 2019). As we have stated:

      The law is clear. In this Commonwealth, a party must seek recusal
      of a jurist at the earliest possible moment, i.e., when the party
      knows of the facts that form the basis for a motion to recuse. If
      the party fails to present a motion to recuse at that time, then the
      party’s recusal issue is time-barred and waived.

Id. at 931 (cleaned up). Appellant does not indicate when he learned of the

PCRA judge’s alleged comments about severe sentencing, but obviously he

knew of her 2011 ruling in his child support case before the instant aggravated

                                     -8-
J-A03010-24

indecent assault action was even commenced against him in 2017. Thus, it is

plain that the motion is untimely and unavailing.3

       Order affirmed.4

DATE: 02/09/2024

____________________________________________

3 It also appears that the identical recusal motion was filed and denied in
connection with one of Appellant’s many prior PCRA petitions. However, given
our disposition of the issue above, we need not untangle the web of Appellant’s
prolix filings.

4 On November 27, 2023, Appellant filed in this Court an application for post-

submission communication detailing that his family had been in touch with the
United States Justice Department, and the staff told them that there is clear
evidence in the plea transcript that he was coerced into pleading guilty and is
actually innocent. On November 30, 2023, he filed an application for us to
treat the November 27th filing as a supplement to his reply brief. As
Appellant’s attempt to supplement the appellate record with this document
containing double hearsay is wholly inappropriate, both applications are
hereby denied.

                                           -9-