Court Opinion

ID: 9728381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:06:35.389869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:48.232186
License: Public Domain

ROGOSHESKE, Justice
(concurring specially).
While I agree with the disposition of this appeal, I feel compelled to express two concerns with the approach taken by the majority. First, since the majority holds the search constitutionally permissible, the evidence seized as a result of the search is by implication admissible not only in a probation revocation proceeding but in a prosecution for a new offense. Second, Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897, 96 S.Ct. 200, 46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975), relied upon by the majority, adopts a reasonableness standard which authorizes a search of a parolee’s dwelling by his parole officer on facts insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.
In constitutional law it is fundamental that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, * * * are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established * * * exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).1 This protection has been extended to probationers where the search was conducted by a person other than a probation officer. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975). The majority agrees that the fourth amendment applies but concludes that the pervasiveness of probation regulation, the demands of the probation relationship, the probationer’s lowered expectation of privacy, and protection of the public interest render a warrantless search reasonable when based upon probable cause. I am persuaded, however, that rehabilitation, the goal of the probation system, is not advanced by adopting a rule that allows probation officers by reason of their special status to make warrantless searches of a probationer’s dwelling which the police could not make when the effect is to gather evidence of crime rather than to corroborate information that a probationer was violating the terms of his probation. By holding such searches of a probationer’s dwelling constitutional, the majority has enabled probation officers to assume a pros-ecutorial role unintended by the probation system, since once evidence is lawfully seized it cannot be excluded in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897, 96 S.Ct. 200,46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975), the principal case relied upon by the majority, presents those facts. Although the majority apparently assumes that its holding is restricted to probation revocation proceedings and that the rule might be different if the proceeding were a criminal prosecution, in fact both questions are decided in that there is no legal basis for holding evidence constitutionally obtained admissible in one proceeding and not another. The possible use of evidence is not an aspect of the reasonableness of a search. I would, therefore, hold the search in violation of the fourth amendment.
Inquiry does not stop, however, with the determination that a search is unconstitutional, since the fruits of an illegal search may be used for purposes that do not contravene the policies underlying the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule requires that evidence obtained by an illegal search cannot be used in a criminal prosecution, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Although there is a split of authority on whether the *371exclusionary rule applies to probation revocation proceedings, those cases holding the rule inapplicable are, in my opinion, better reasoned.2
Probation revocation proceedings are governed by statute, and the inquiry assigned to the trial court is a narrow one. Minn.Stat. § 609.14, subd. 2 (1978) requires written notice to the defendant of the alleged grounds upon which the stay of sentence was revoked and, if requested, “a summary hearing * * * thereon at which he is entitled to be heard and to be represented by counsel.” The issue, which involves elements of factfinding and exercise of discretion, is whether “the defendant has violated any of the conditions of his probation or has otherwise been guilty of misconduct which warrants the imposing or execution of sentence * * Minn.
Stat. § 609.14, subd. 1 (1978). Thus, in this case where the trial court based revocation primarily upon defendant’s failure to obey the law by illegally possessing drugs, the state was required to reasonably satisfy the judge that probationer violated the condition to obey the law or to maintain good behavior, such that he failed to act with regard to the safety of society entitling him to remain free from imprisonment.
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2604, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that parolees are not without minimum due-process protection but underscored the fact that parole revocation is not equivalent to criminal prosecution:
We emphasize there is no thought to equate this second stage of parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.
See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). In my opinion, this distinction, acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court and embodied in our statutes, supports the conclusion that the exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation proceedings.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule where it does not serve the dual purposes of deterring future unlawful police misconduct and preserving the integrity of the courts.3 A probation officer has unannounced access to his client’s environment to enable him to assess and guide his proba*372tioner’s progress. His purpose is primarily to counsel his client and secondarily to enforce the terms of probation in the public interest. In my view, application of the exclusionary rule would hamper the effective functioning of the probation system rather than deter unlawful conduct. I would, however, require that the probation officer be able to articulate concrete facts giving reasonable cause to believe that evidence would be found in the place to be searched and that the search not be needlessly intrusive in time or manner. This approach would permit fulfillment of the objectives of the probation system without tempting the police to use probation officers to acquire evidence that the police could not lawfully obtain without a warrant.
I am also concerned that the majority’s reliance on Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897, 96 S.Ct. 200, 46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975), may be read too broadly. Latta upheld against a fourth amendment challenge a parole officer’s search of a parolee’s residence based upon a reasonable belief that the search was necessary in the performance of his duties. The court stated that the facts supporting the search need not be sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause. Since probable cause for the search was admitted in the present case, I would hope that our disposition is not interpreted as authorizing a war-rantless search of a probationer’s dwelling when the facts are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause.

. None of the elements which would validate a warrantless search of a dwelling is applicable here. See, Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1261, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (search with consent); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2041, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (limited search incident to lawful arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1645, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (search in “hot pursuit”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454, 69 S.Ct. 191, 192, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948) (search in exigent circumstances); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (seizure of evidence in plain view).

. See, e. g., United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Allen, 349 F.Supp. 749 (N.D.Cal.1972); United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F.Supp. 648 (D.La.), aff’d, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880, 92 S.Ct. 195, 30 L.Ed.2d 160 (1971); State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1976); Croteau v. State, 334 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1976); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495 (Me. 1975); People v. Dowery, 20 Ill.App.3d 738, 312 N.E.2d 682 (1974), aff’d, 62 Ill.2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1974); State v. Thorsness, 165 Mont. 321, 528 P.2d 692 (1974); Stone v. Shea, 113 N.H. 174, 304 A.2d 647 (1973); see also Annotation, 77 A.L.R.3d 636, §§ 3, 6(a) (1977); Annotation, 30 A.L.R.Fed. 824, § 3 (1976); Cole, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and Parole Revocation Proceedings: Some Observations on Deterrence and the “Imperative of Judicial Integrity,’’ 52 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 21, 26 (1975).

. The twin purposes of deterring future unlawful police conduct and preserving the integrity of the courts were announced in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444, 1446, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960).
The application of the rule has been limited in the following cases: United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (not extended to grand jury questioning based upon illegal evidence); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973), and Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969) (no standing to invoke rule where evidence is not used against victim of unlawful search); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), and Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1954) (not extended to discrediting of defendant’s voluntary testimony); United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983, 91 S.Ct. 1198, 28 L.Ed.2d 334 (1971) (not extended to sentencing after application in trial). But see, Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961, 91 S.Ct. 1623, 29 L.Ed.2d 124 (1971) (applicable in sentencing where police purpose was to secure additional evidence in order to enhance sentence).