Court Opinion

ID: 9382730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 16:11:32.985195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:41.285641
License: Public Domain

J-S40027-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 CHRISTOPHER HANSON                      :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 596 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 1, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-39-CR-0001582-1983

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 CHRISTOPHER HANSON                      :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 597 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 1, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-39-CR-0000421-1984

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                         FILED MARCH 28, 2023

     Appellant, Christopher Hanson, appeals pro se from the February 1,

2022 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County dismissing as

untimely his serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

     The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are not at issue.

Briefly, the Commonwealth charged Appellant at docket number CP-39-CR-
J-S40027-22

0001582-1983 (murder and conspiracy charges) and docket number CP-39-

CR0000421-1984 (rape charge), in connection with the rape and murder of

his victim. The court consolidated the docket numbers for trial. Prior to trial,

Appellant’s co-defendant, Timothy Seip, entered a guilty plea to third-degree

murder pursuant to a plea agreement under which Mr. Seip agreed to testify

against Appellant. At the conclusion of trial, a jury convicted Appellant on

June 14, 1984, of second-degree murder, rape, and conspiracy to commit

murder. On January 30, 1986, the trial court sentenced Appellant at both

docket numbers to an aggregate term of life imprisonment.           This Court

affirmed the judgment of sentence on August 31, 1987, and our Supreme

Court denied allowance of appeal on March 23, 1988. See Commonwealth

v. Hanson, 486 PHL 86 (Pa. Super. 1987), appeal denied, 544 A.2d 1341 (Pa.

1988).

      From 1988 to 2020, Appellant filed approximately 15 petitions for post-

conviction collateral relief, none of which have garnered him relief.        On

October 26, 2021, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, which the PCRA

court denied on February 1, 2022. This appeal followed.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following question for our review:

      Did the PCRA court err in summarily dismissing Appellant’s
      petition without a hearing pertaining to unknown facts, 42
      Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii); governmental interference, 42
      Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i); after discovered facts, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
      § 9543(A)(2)(vi), and by not following the Pennsylvania Supreme
      Court’s directive in Commonwealth v. Small, 239 A.3d 1267 (Pa.
      2020) pertaining to the public record presumption?

                                     -2-
J-S40027-22

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

       When reviewing the propriety of an order pertaining to PCRA relief,
       we consider the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing
       party at the PCRA level. This Court is limited to determining
       whether the evidence of record supports the conclusions of the
       PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. We grant
       great deference to the PCRA court’s findings that are supported in
       the record and will not disturb them unless they have no support
       in the certified record. However, we afford no such deference to
       the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions. We thus apply a de
       novo standard of review to the PCRA [c]ourt’s legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 183 A.3d 417, 421 (Pa. Super. 2018).

       All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless an

exception to timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 1 “The PCRA’s

time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature.   Thus, if a PCRA petition is

untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the

petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to

address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. (Frank) Chester, 895

A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)

(overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267

(Pa. 2020)).      As timeliness is separate and distinct from the merits of

Appellant’s underlying claims, we first determine whether this PCRA petition

____________________________________________

1  The one-year time limitation can be overcome if a petitioner (1) alleges and
proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section 9545(b)(1), and (2)
files a petition raising this exception within one year of the date the claim
could have been presented, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

                                           -3-
J-S40027-22

is timely filed. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008).

If it is not timely, we cannot address the substantive claims raised in the

petition. Id.

       The instant PCRA petition is facially untimely.2          Appellant argues,

however, that he meets the governmental interference timeliness exception,

as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), and the newly-discovered fact

exception, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).3 We disagree.

       Section 9545(b), in relevant part, reads:

       (1)      Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
                subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
                date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges
                and the petitioner proves that:

          (i)         the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
                      of interference by government officials with the
                      presentation of the claim in violation of the

____________________________________________

2 Appellant was sentenced on January 30, 1986. We affirmed Appellant’s
judgment of sentence on August 31, 1987 and our Supreme Court denied
further review on March 23, 1988. Thus, Appellant’s judgment of sentence
became final on June 21, 1988, when the time for Appellant to file a petition
for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13. Appellant had one
year from June 21, 1988, to file a timely PCRA petition. Accordingly, the
instant pro se PCRA petition, which was filed on October 26, 2021, is patently
untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

3 In his PCRA petition, Appellant raises several arguments in support of the
timeliness of his petition. On appeal, however, it appears that Appellant
focuses on two grounds to overcome the facial untimeliness of the underlying
PCRA petition: governmental interference and newly-discovered facts. We
note, however, that the facts and the arguments supporting these two
grounds, as laid out in the petition, do not match the facts and the arguments
as set forth in this appeal. As discussed below, any claims raised for the first
time on appeal are waived.

                                           -4-
J-S40027-22

                     Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
                     Constitution or laws of the United States;

          (ii)       the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
                     unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
                     ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(ii).

       “The governmental interference exception permits an otherwise

untimely PCRA petition to be filed if it pleads and proves that ‘the failure to

raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government

officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or

laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States[.]’”

Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 955 (Pa. 2018). This exception

requires a petitioner to “show that but for the interference of a government

actor ‘he could not have filed his claim earlier.’” Id.

       In his brief before us, Appellant provides no facts that would support a

finding of governmental interference.            Similarly, in the underlying PCRA

petition, Appellant fails to identify any fact supporting the allegation.     See

PCRA Court Order, 12/9/21, at 1 n.1.

       In his reply brief, Appellant seems to argue that in his 2018 unsuccessful

PCRA petition,4 he attempted to litigate the timeliness argument now

____________________________________________

4  The 2018 petition was Appellant’s fourteenth PCRA petition. See
Commonwealth v. Hanson, No. 43 EDA 2019, unpublished memorandum
(Pa. Super. filed September 9, 2019).

                                           -5-
J-S40027-22

advanced in the instant petition/appeal, but that our Court prevented him

from doing so by raising sua sponte a Walker5 issue.          In other words,

Appellant argues that the proper discharging of our duties qualified as

governmental interference.

        We are not aware of any authority that would support Appellant’s

argument, nor does Appellant cite to any. It also is worth noting that our

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal from our

decision. The governmental interference claim is therefore meritless on its

face.

        Regarding the newly-discovered facts exception, we note that Appellant,

before the PCRA court, argued that the discovery of a recent case,

Commonwealth v. Yale, 249 A.3d 1001 (Pa. 2021),6 qualified as a newly-

discovered fact.     The PCRA court properly denied relief because “it is well

established that judicial decisions do not constitute ‘facts’ under Section

9545(b)(1)(ii).” Order, 12/9/21, at 2, n.1 (citing Commonwealth v. Watts,

23 A.3d 980, 987 (Pa. 2011)). We agree.

____________________________________________

5 Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). In Walker, our
Supreme Court held that appellants are required to file separate notices of
appeal when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one lower
court docket. The decision applies to all appeals filed after June 1, 2018.

6 Yale holds that where a third party is charged or convicted of crimes similar
to those with which the accused is charged, evidence of those charges may
be admissible to negate the accused’s guilt.

                                           -6-
J-S40027-22

       Appellant also argues for the first time, a different “newly-discovered”

fact. Appellant claims that on March 14, 2018, he received a copy of an article

that ran in The Morning Call on March 21, 1986, which suggested that Seip

provided testimony at a post-conviction hearing held on March 20, 1986,

which was inconsistent with the testimony Seip provided at Appellant’s trial.

The claim is waived because “[i]ssues not raised in the [PCRA] court . . .

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

       Even if not waived, Appellant would not be entitled to relief. The newly-

discovered facts exception requires a petitioner to plead and prove, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the facts upon which the claim was

predicated were unknown, and (2) the facts could not have been ascertained

by the exercise of due diligence. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d

618 (Pa. 2017).

       Here, Appellant did not plead or prove that the new “fact” alleged here

was unknown to him, nor could he do so. Indeed, the inconsistency alleged

now has been previously litigated and/or known to Appellant.         This Court

previously considered and rejected Appellant’s effort to invoke the previously

unknown fact exception based upon Seip’s plea deal.7

____________________________________________

7 While the contours of the claim have morphed through the years, the claim
itself remains the same.          Specifically, Appellant claims that the
Commonwealth offered Seip a “secret” plea deal, which had not been disclosed
at Appellant’s trial. What changed through the years is how Appellant learned
of the alleged “secret” plea deal. In 2007, Appellant learned of the “secret”
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -7-
J-S40027-22

       In 2009, we determined that Seip’s plea deal agreement

              was placed on the record before the judge, indicating
              that Seip in exchange for his open plea to third[-
              ]degree murder would testify for the prosecution in
              Appellant’s case. Attorney Tomsho, the assistant
              district attorney [(ADA)], made clear that the
              agreement did not include any terms with regard to
              sentencing, which was entirely left to the discretion of
              the court, that is, Seip could receive a term of
              imprisonment of 10 to 20 years, which in fact he did
              receive subsequent to Appellant’s trial. It is evident
              from Seip’s responses at the time of his plea colloquy
              that he understood that the sentencing court had
              discretion with regard to his sentencing and that he

____________________________________________

deal from Thomas Hughes, a corrections counselor working at the facility
where Seip was housed. See Commonwealth v. Hanson, 1326 EDA 2008,
unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed July 20, 2009). In 2009,
Appellant learned of the “secret” deal from Attorney Colie Chapelle, the
attorney for the victim’s family. See Commonwealth v. Hanson, 1877 EDA
2012, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed June 27, 2013). In 2014,
Appellant learned of the same “secret” deal from Seip himself.              See
Commonwealth v. Hanson, 2275 EDA 2014, unpublished memorandum
(Pa. Super. filed April 17, 2015). In 2015, Appellant learned of the same
“secret” deal from Attorney Chappelle. See Commonwealth v. Hanson,
2919 EDA 2016, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed June 27, 2017).
In the petition underlying the instant appeal, filed in 2018, Appellant learned
of “inconsistencies” regarding the plea deal from an article that ran in 1986 in
a newspaper. The article seems to suggest that Seip, at a post-conviction
hearing, may have described his plea deal with the Commonwealth in terms
inconsistent with his testimony at trial.

Whether Appellant focuses on the secrecy or the discrepancies, the claim
pertains to the same matter, i.e., whether Seip’s plea deal, as disclosed at
Appellant’s trial, represents the entire agreement between the Commonwealth
and Seip. The question has been addressed several times, and we have
consistently held that there was no secret agreement between Seip and the
Commonwealth, that the terms of the agreement reached by the
Commonwealth and Seip were fully disclosed at Appellant’s trial, and that
Seip’s hope or expectation of a lenient sentence were not part of the plea
agreement.

                                           -8-
J-S40027-22

              could be given a sentence of 10 to 20 years, which in
              fact he did receive subsequent to Appellant’s trial.

Hanson, 2919 EDA 2016, at *6 (quoting Hanson, 1326 EDA 2009).

        Thus, the record is clear that there was no secret plea deal between

Seip and the Commonwealth, that the plea Seip entered on the record is a full

and accurate representation of the agreement he reached with the

Commonwealth, and, that Appellant is fully aware of its nature.8

        We have also addressed the alleged inconsistencies in Seip’s testimony

about the plea deal. Quoting the PCRA court opinion, we noted:

        While [Seip] was confined at the state penitentiary serving his
        prison sentence, he made statements that conflicted with his trial
        testimony pertaining to what he was promised as a sentence in
        return for his cooperation against [Appellant]. While [Seip] was
        serving his sentence, he prepared a petition under the now
        repealed Post Conviction Hearing Act [(“PCHA”)], with the aid of
        a fellow prisoner. At the hearing on the PCHA petition, [Seip] gave
        false testimony that he was promised a state confinement
        sentence of no more than 5 to 10 years in return for his
        cooperation against [Appellant]. His motivation for testifying
        falsely on that point was to succeed on his PCHA petition and to
        receive a reduced sentence.
____________________________________________

8   For Appellant’s benefit, it is worth noting that

        Seip actually testified at Appellant’s February 19, 2008 PCRA
        hearing, during which he discussed his plea negotiations with the
        Commonwealth. Specifically, at said hearing, Seip was called to
        testify as Appellant’s own witness, about Seip’s plea negotiations
        with the Commonwealth.         Appellant repeatedly asked Seip
        whether he received a promise of a five to ten year sentence from
        the Commonwealth in exchange for testifying against Appellant,
        to which Seip responded in the negative.

Hanson, 2275 EDA 2014, at *10 (emphasis omitted) (citations to the record
omitted).

                                           -9-
J-S40027-22

      On approximately August 14, 2003, [Seip] was a prisoner at SCI
      Retreat. Thomas Hughes was his corrections counselor. On that
      date, [Seip] was in the process of attempting to be reparoled. Mr.
      Hughes told him that he had little chance of being reparoled.
      [Seip] became angry and stated that he was told by Attorney
      Makoul [Seip’s trial counsel] that he would receive a 5 to 10 year
      prison sentence in return for his testimony against [Appellant].
      [Seip] said he was told this “behind the scenes by Attorney
      Makoul. At that point, Mr. Hughes did not yet know [Appellant.]
      [Seip] told Mr. Hughes that because of his secret deal, he should
      be getting out of prison. [Seip] also made similar statements on
      a number of occasions to a cellmate, Michael J. Nalaschi.

      [Seip] wrote two letters to [ADA] Tomsho in which [Seip] made
      various arguments as to why his sentence should be reduced. In
      the letter [Seip] did not refer to a secret deal alleged by
      [Appellant] in this PCRA proceeding.

Hanson, 1326 EDA 2008, at *7-8 (quoting PCRA Court Opinion, 3/27/08, at

8).

      The PCRA court concluded, and we agreed, that

      [Seip] may have made the statements to Mr. Hughes and Mr.
      Nalaschi that they attribute to him. [Seip]’s motivation at that
      point was to be released from prison short of the 20 year sentence
      that he received. However, if the statements were made by
      [Seip], they were false. He would have known they were false.
      They were not based upon anything said to him by the prosecutor
      or by his own attorney[.] They were motivated by the desire that
      he had at that point that the statements were made, namely, an
      early release from prison.

Id. at *16 (quoting PCRA Opinion, 3/27/08, at 11).

      In the most recent PCRA petition, filed in 2021, Appellant alleges that

he learned from a 2018 newspaper article that Seip provided testimony at a

PCHA hearing regarding his plea that was inconsistent with Seip’s testimony

at trial. Appellant once again is challenging the very same issue, hoping that

                                    - 10 -
J-S40027-22

some cosmetic changes on how he presents it will garner different results. It

does not.9 Accordingly, the inconsistencies in Seip’s representations of the

terms of his own plea agreement, alleged here for purposes of the Section

9545(b)(1)(ii) exception, were known to Appellant.10               As such, Appellant

cannot rely on the newly-discovered facts exception.

        Appellant also argues that he is entitled to relief based on Section

9543(a)(2)(vi), which provides that a conviction or sentence resulted from the

“unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has

subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the

trial if it had been introduced.” Section 9543(a)(2)(vi) identifies the grounds

upon which relief can be granted. However, Appellant must first plead and

prove    that   the    underlying     PCRA     petition   is   timely.   See,   e.g.,

____________________________________________

9 To the extent Appellant focuses on the newspaper article as opposed to the
facts upon which his claim is predicated, we note that the “focus of the
exception is on [the] newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or
newly willing source for previously known facts.”         Commonwealth v.
Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008) (emphasis and alteration in original)
(citation omitted). Appellant’s use of the newspaper is just “another conduit
for the same claim [, which] does not transform his latest source into evidence
falling within the ambit of [Section] 9545(b)(1)(ii).” Id. (citation omitted).

10 As noted above, not only has Appellant been aware of the inconsistencies
for many years, but he also was aware that the issue had been litigated,
repeatedly, before the PCRA court and our Court, and that the issue had no
merit, as evidenced by the fact that PCRA court and our Court, repeatedly,
denied Appellant relief on that ground. Yet, despite the above, in 2021,
Appellant argued, once again, that the inconsistencies in Seip’s testimony
constituted a “newly-discovered” fact for purposes of the Section
9545(b)(1)(ii) exception.

                                          - 11 -
J-S40027-22

Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 211, 229 n.11 (Pa. 2016). Having failed

to prove the timeliness of the underlying petition, we cannot entertain the

merits of this argument.

      Finally, Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267

(Pa. 2020), apparently to argue that the PCRA court erred in crediting him

with knowledge of the actual content of Seip’s testimony at the PCHA hearing

on March 20, 1986. Small stands for the proposition that an inmate may not

be presumed to have knowledge of facts in the public record. Small, however,

requires an analysis of petitioner’s knowledge, not that of the public at large.

Id. at 1283. Here, Appellant’s knowledge of Seip’s inconsistent testimony is

well-documented as the inconsistency has been the main issue in several of

Appellant’s prior PCRA petitions, starting from 2007.     See, e.g., Hanson,

1326 EDA 2008. Thus, because Small is distinguishable, reliance on Small

is misplaced.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/28/2023

                                     - 12 -