Court Opinion

ID: 9421407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:58:11.306152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:30.068143
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner instituted this suit in the District Court in 1954 to recover the proceeds of a National Service Life Insurance policy. Petitioner’s son, the insured, has been missing since disappearing from his army unit in 1943. The complaint alleges that, prior to the insured’s disappearance, his condition was one of “general debility and weakness and despondency,” and that he had become totally and permanently disabled as a result of certain “diseases, ailments and injuries.” The complaint further avers that the insured had died in 1943, and that his total and permanent disability during the time the policy was in force entitled him to waiver of premiums on the policy.
The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the insured would, under the allegations of the complaint, be presumed to be dead as of 1950, and that the policy had lapsed in the interim. 138 F. Supp. 810. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 229 F. 2d 503. It held that the complaint contained no allegations which would entitle the trier of fact to conclude that the insured had died *45at a time when the policy continued in force. Id,., at 504. We granted certiorari. 352 U. S. 822.
Respondent urges that the insured’s death must be presumed to have occurred in 1950, at the end of seven years’ unexplained absence, when this policy had long lapsed for failure to pay premiums. In the alternative, it is argued that, if the petitioner’s claim is founded on the insured’s death in 1943, it is barred by the six-year statute of limitations, 38 U. S. C. § 445. We hold that, under the allegations in this complaint, petitioner is entitled to take her case to a jury.
Congress has provided in 38 U. S. C. § 810 that a presumption of death shall arise upon the continued and unexplained absence of the insured for a period of seven years. Where proof of the insured’s death must rest primarily upon his unexplained absence, suit may not be maintained, as a practical matter, prior to the expiration of the statutory seven-year period. Petitioner’s cause of action, therefore, “accrued” at the time when, under § 810, .she might have successfully maintained her suit, and that is the date from which the six-year statute of limitations should be computed.
Moreover, nothing in the provision of § 810 that the death of the insured “as of the date of the expiration of such period . . . may ... be considered as sufficiently proved” precludes the beneficiary from introducing- further evidence from which the jury might conclude that the insured’s presumed death occurred at an earlier date when the policy was still in force. United States v. Willkite, 219 F. 2d 343.* The jury might so conclude here, *46if petitioner can prove the allegations of the complaint concerning the insured’s frail health and disability or other relevant facts. The presumption leaves it open to prove the precise time of the death, as the statute does not purport to create a conclusive presumption that the insured died at the end of the seven-year period. To compute the six-year limitation period from the date which the trier of fact establishes as the date of death would be to say that the beneficiary’s right to recover had expired before she could have successfully prosecuted a lawsuit to enforce that right. It is only where the beneficiary proves merely the fact of the insured’s seven years’ unexplained absence that the statute establishes the presumption of death as of the end of that period. The “contingency on which the claim is founded,” as used in 38 U. S. C. § 445, must, therefore, mean the end of the seven-year period when the presumption of death arose.
That seems to us to be the common sense of the matter; and common sense often makes good law.
Furthermore the allegations of permanent and total disability at the time of disappearance of the insured, if proved, would bring the petitioner within the premium waiver provisions of 38 U. S. C. §802 (n). Since the claim was filed by petitioner within one year subsequent to the presumed date of death, it should be considered as including the lesser claim of premium waiver. Hence, even though the jury found the actual date of death to be later than 1943, the coverage of the policy might continue. As we read the complaint, this alternative cause of action would also not have accrued until 1950; and *47the six-year statute of limitations had not run when this suit was brought.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for trial.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

That was the view even before the presumption of death at the end of seven years’ absence was codified. In Davie v. Briggs, 97 U. S. 628, 634, the Court said, “If it appears in evidence that the absent person, within the seven years, encountered some specific peril, or within that period came within the range of some impending *46or immediate danger, which might reasonably be expected to destroy life, the court or jury may infer that life ceased before the expiration of the seven years.”