Court Opinion

ID: 9636340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:24:40.735892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:44.434124
License: Public Domain

MONTEMURO, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
While I agree that the trial court’s order suppressing the defendant’s typewritten statement must be reversed, I would also reverse the order suppressing the oral statement. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The oral statement was made by the defendant approximately one hour and twenty minutes after his arrest. I do not believe that the judically promulgated rule of Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977) was designed to prevent the admission of such statements despite the broad sweep of the holding of that case.
The analysis of our supreme court in Davenport relies to a great extent upon Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 319 A.2d 419 (1979), which “established a three part *249test for determining whether evidence obtained during prearraignment delay will be suppressed: (1) the delay must be unnecessary; (2) the evidence must be prejudicial; and (3) the evidence must be reasonably related to the delay.” Commonwealth v. Davenport, supra 371 Pa. at 284, 370 A.2d at 305. The defendant’s oral statement cannot be said to be “reasonably related” to the delay in this case. The delay was an isolated circumstance occurring hours later. Additionally, it was of limited duration and did not prejudice the defendant.
In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144, 454 A.2d 1004 (1982), our supreme court clarified any misconceptions about the rigid prophylactic effect of the Davenport rule. In Jenkins, the court stated that:
From the outset we stressed that it was not intended to be a mechanical rule to enforce compliance with our procedural rules by insisting upon a reasonable relationship between the delay and the evidence sought to be excluded. (Citation omitted)
Id., 500 Pa. at 148, 454 A.2d at 1006. Furthermore, they went on to say:
Nevertheless our objective remains the same. At no time did we wish to cut off freely volunteered confessions of guilt, nor did we wish to impede legitimate law enforcement efforts. The primary purpose sought to be obtained was to discourage the obtaining of incriminatory information through coercive means.
Id, 500 Pa. at 150, 454 A. 2d at 1007. See also Commonwealth v. Bennett, 498 Pa. 656, 450 A.2d 970 (1982).
I do not think that suppression of a statement made a short time after arrest because of a brief delay in arraignment furthers the purpose of the rule. There is no allegation of any coercive circumstances save that the arraignment was six hours and fifteen minutes after arrest. Consequently, I do not think that the severe sanction of suppression is warranted in this case.