Court Opinion

ID: 9719320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:48:38.719887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:05.970889
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I would affirm Clemens' conviction for Neglect of a Dependent, but reverse his conviction for Murder, because of the error in failing to give Clemens' proposed and tendered jury instruction on the defense of accident. Since I agree that the evidence was sufficient to convict on both charges, I would remand for a new trial of the Murder charge or other consistent proceedings.
The standard to be applied by the trial court and the appellate court when determining whether there is a sufficient eviden-tiary basis to give an instruction on one of the defenses available in criminal cases was settled in Williams v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 105, 402 N.E.2d 954. In that case, we considered the question with respect to the defense of intoxication, and concluded:
That basis exists where the evidence of intoxication, if believed, is such that it could created a reasonable doubt in the mind of a rational trier of fact that the accused entertained the requisite specific intent. If it could do so the refusal of the instruction is error.
Id., 402 N.E.2d at 956. Here, the State employed appellant's own pre-trial statements as evidence against him. In those statements, heard by the jury, he said that he had abruptly braked the car, hurling the child into the windshield. In the aftermath of this injury, the child showed signs of having difficulty breathing, so Clemens had attempted CPR to restore breathing, though he did not know how to do so. The State also presented additional evidence that corroborated Clemens' statements. There was evidence that the windshield of the vehicle was cracked at the point described by Clemens in his story, and that several blondish colored hair follicles were removed by police from the windshield crack. While this is juxtaposed with substantial contradictory evidence at trial, and while it could not possibly serve as a defense to beatings administered to the child prior to the day of death, it does satisfy the Williams standard in the trial of the murder charge. 'That charge alleged, in general terms, only that appellant Clemens knowingly or intentionally killed the child on the date of the child's death, without any specification of the means by which this was accomplished. Upon the evidence, the defense instruction was warranted, and it was reversible error to fail to give it.
DICKSON, J., concurs.