Court Opinion

ID: 9900395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:12:08.329544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.984894
License: Public Domain

No. 383                 July 26, 2023                       197

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

               Andrew DAVOODIAN, MD,
                     an individual,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
                 Crystal Lynn RIVERA,
                     an individual,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
             Washington County Circuit Court
                  21CV12484; A176456

   Theodore E. Sims, Judge.
   Argued and submitted September 15, 2022.
   Elizabeth C. Savage argued the cause and filed the briefs
for appellant. Also on the opening brief was Karmel Savage,
PC.
   Ruth A. Casby argued the cause for respondent. Also on
the brief were Janet M. Schroer and Hart Wagner LLP.
   Ashley L. Vaughn and Dumas & Vaughn, LLC, and
Caitlin V. Mitchell and Johnson Johnson Lucas & Middleton
P.C. filed the brief amicus curiae for Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
   ORTEGA, P. J.
   Reversed and remanded with instructions to grant defen-
dant’s special motion to strike as to plaintiff’s IIED and civil
extortion claims; otherwise affirmed.
198   Davoodian v. Rivera
Cite as 327 Or App 197 (2023)                                                   199

           ORTEGA, P. J.
          Plaintiff, Andrew Davoodian, MD, brought this civil
action against defendant, Crystal Rivera, after he received
a letter from her attorney advising him that she intended to
file a civil complaint alleging that he had sexually assaulted
her and seeking $2 million in damages. Plaintiff asserted
three claims: one for intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED), one for civil extortion, and one for a judg-
ment declaring that defendant’s claims based on the alleged
sexual assault are time barred. Defendant filed a special
motion to strike under ORS 31.150, Oregon’s anti-SLAPP
statute,1 which, as pertinent here, creates a procedure to
dismiss an unfounded claim that arises out of the exercise
of the constitutional right of petition in connection with an
issue of public interest. The trial court denied the motion
after determining that defendant failed to make the neces-
sary prima facie showing that plaintiff’s claims against her
arose out of activity protected by ORS 31.150(2). Defendant
appeals from the limited judgment denying her motion.
          We conclude that defendant established that plain-
tiff’s claims arose out of protected activity under ORS
31.150(2)(d). Accordingly, we proceed to the second step of
the inquiry, which the trial court did not reach, and further
conclude that plaintiff has failed to establish that there is
a probability that he will prevail on his tort claims by pre-
senting substantial evidence to support a prima facie case
on each claim.2 We therefore reverse the limited judgment
and remand with instructions to grant defendant’s special
motion to strike as to plaintiff’s IIED and civil extortion
claims.
        We begin with a brief overview of ORS 31.1503 and
our standard of review. “ORS 31.150 provides a mechanism
    1
       SLAPP stands for “strategic lawsuits against public participation.”
    2
       As we note below, although defendant’s motion to strike challenged plain-
tiff’s declaratory judgment claim, defendant failed to present an argument in
her opening brief regarding the second step of the analysis on that claim and
instead raised it for the first time in her reply brief, so we decline to address that
argument.
     3
       The legislature amended ORS 31.150 during the pendency of this appeal.
See Or Laws 2023, ch 71, § 1 (effective Jan 1, 2024). Those changes do not affect
our analysis, and we cite the current version of the statute.
200                                         Davoodian v. Rivera

for a defendant to move to strike certain nonmeritorious
claims predicated on speech and petitioning activity poten-
tially entitled to constitutional protection.” Tokarski v.
Wildfang, 313 Or App 19, 21, 496 P3d 22, rev den, 368 Or
788 (2021). The purpose of ORS 31.150 is “to provide for the
dismissal of claims against persons participating in public
issues, when those claims would be privileged under case
law, before the defendant is subject to substantial expenses
in defending against them.” Staten v. Steel, 222 Or App 17,
29, 191 P3d 778 (2008), rev den, 345 Or 618 (2009); see also
Handy v. Lane County, 360 Or 605, 612 n 4, 385 P3d 1016
(2016) (explaining that anti-SLAPP statutes “seek to mini-
mize the effect of strategic suits intended to deter persons
from expressing their views” by permitting “defendants who
are targeted for their statements to end such suits quickly
and with minimal expense”).
        A special motion to strike may be made against any
claim in a civil action that arises out of:
       “(a) Any oral statement made, or written statement
   or other document submitted, in a legislative, executive or
   judicial proceeding or other proceeding authorized by law;
      “(b) Any oral statement made, or written statement
   or other document submitted, in connection with an issue
   under consideration or review by a legislative, executive or
   judicial body or other proceeding authorized by law;
      “(c) Any oral statement made, or written statement or
   other document presented, in a place open to the public or a
   public forum in connection with an issue of public interest;
   or
       “(d) Any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise
   of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional
   right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an
   issue of public interest.”
ORS 31.150(2). A defendant making a special motion to
strike “has the initial burden of making a prima facie show-
ing that the claim against which the motion is made arises
out of” one of the four categories identified in ORS 31.150(2).
ORS 31.150(3). If the defendant meets that burden to show
that the plaintiff’s claim is subject to a special motion to
strike, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff “to establish
Cite as 327 Or App 197 (2023)                                            201

that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on
the claim by presenting substantial evidence to support a
prima facie case” on each claim. Id. The court shall grant
the motion unless the plaintiff meets that burden. ORS
31.150(1).
         We review a trial court’s ruling on a special motion
to strike for legal error. Mohabeer v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,
318 Or App 313, 316, 508 P3d 37, rev den, 370 Or 212 (2022).
In conducting that review, we “consider pleadings and sup-
porting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which
the liability or defense is based.” ORS 31.150(4).
         In October 2018, plaintiff asked defendant on a
date via an online dating app and, according to plaintiff,
the parties engaged in consensual sexual contact during
that date. On March 5, 2021, defendant’s attorney, Megan
Johnson, mailed plaintiff a letter on law firm letterhead
with the subject line “Rivera v. Davoodian, Pre-litigation,
Multnomah County Circuit Court” and attached a copy of an
unfiled draft of a civil complaint. Johnson identified herself
as defendant’s attorney and stated that “[t]he attached com-
plaint is self-explanatory,” and that she intended to file the
complaint in Multnomah County Circuit Court on March 30,
2021. Johnson “urge[d]” plaintiff “to seek an attorney versed
in these types of cases as soon as possible” and “have them
contact” her.
         The unfiled complaint attached to the letter alleged
that defendant was a 33-year-old woman who met plaintiff
in October 2018 on an online dating app; that plaintiff lied
about his name and told defendant that he was an anesthe-
siologist at Oregon Health and Science University; and that
plaintiff invited defendant on a date where plaintiff kissed
defendant, lured her to his apartment by deception, locked
her inside, sexually assaulted her, and threatened her. The
unfiled complaint alleged claims for sexual battery, false
imprisonment, and IIED, and it asserted that the claims
were timely under ORS 12.1174 and sought $2 million in eco-
nomic and noneconomic damages.
    4
      ORS 12.117(1) provides that “an action based on conduct that constitutes
child abuse * * * that occurs while the person is under 18 years of age must be
commenced before the person attains 40 years of age or * * * not more than five
202                                                    Davoodian v. Rivera

          On March 30, 2021, plaintiff initiated this action
in Washington County Circuit Court alleging, among other
things, that the allegations in defendant’s unfiled complaint
are false, that defendant knew they were false when the let-
ter and unfiled complaint were sent to plaintiff, and that the
letter and unfiled complaint “in effect threaten [p]laintiff
that unless he pays [d]efendant money for her silence, the
false allegations contained in the letter and the [unfiled c]om-
plaint would be publicly exposed, and [d]efendant would
bring a civil lawsuit against [p]laintiff.”
         As to his IIED claim, plaintiff alleged that “[t]hrough
the letter and the [unfiled c]omplaint, [d]efendant intended
to inflict severe mental or emotional distress on [p]laintiff
or knew with substantial certainty that her conduct would
cause such distress” and that defendant’s acts “constitute
outrageous conduct and are an extraordinary transgression
of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct.” As to his civil
extortion claim, plaintiff alleged that defendant “attempted
to compel or induce [p]laintiff to deliver money to [d]efendant
by instilling in [p]laintiff a fear that, if the money [d]efen-
dant demanded was not so delivered, [d]efendant would
expose an alleged secret or publicize an asserted fact intend-
ing to subject [p]laintiff to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.”
Finally, as to his claim for a declaratory judgment, plaintiff
alleged that defendant’s allegation in the unfiled complaint
that her claims “are timely pursuant to ORS 12.117” is “friv-
olous” because that statute applies only to claims of child
abuse and that defendant’s claims are barred by the two-
year statute of limitations under ORS 12.110(1).5
         Defendant responded with a special motion to
strike under ORS 31.150. Defendant argued that plaintiff’s
claims arise out of conduct protected by ORS 31.150(2)(d),
specifically, that her drafting a civil complaint and mailing
it to plaintiff prior to filing it are protected as part of her

years from the date the person discovers * * * the causal connection between the
child abuse and the injury, whichever period is longer.” See also ORS 12.117(2)
(defining “child abuse”).
     5
       ORS 12.110(1) provides, in relevant part, that “[a]n action for assault, bat-
tery, false imprisonment, or for any injury to the person or rights of another,
not arising on contract, and not especially enumerated in this chapter, shall be
commenced within two years.”
Cite as 327 Or App 197 (2023)                                           203

right to petition the government, and that “allegations of
forcible and non-consensual sexual assault at the hands of a
(now) licensed medical professional whose specialty is anes-
thesia” is both a public issue and an issue of public inter-
est.6 Defendant also argued that plaintiff failed to present
substantial evidence to support a prima facie case on each
of his claims. Specifically, defendant argued that the IIED
claim failed because her conduct was not outrageous, that
the civil extortion claim failed because it is not a viable tort
claim under Oregon law, that both the IIED and extortion
claims failed because her conduct was protected by the lit-
igation privilege, and that the declaratory judgment claim
was moot.
         In support of her special motion to strike, defen-
dant submitted as exhibits copies of email correspondence
between Johnson and plaintiff’s attorney, John Kaempf. In
one email dated March 25, 2021, Kaempf advised Johnson
that plaintiff had retained him and that Johnson should
communicate solely with Kaempf going forward. In another
dated March 30, 2021, Johnson responded and asked
whether Kaempf was authorized to accept service of the com-
plaint. Defendant also submitted as an exhibit a copy of the
complaint that she had filed in Multnomah County Circuit
Court on April 1, 2021. The filed complaint differed from
the unfiled complaint sent to plaintiff in only one respect:
Defendant omitted the allegation regarding the timeliness
of her claims under ORS 12.117 and replaced it with an alle-
gation that the alleged acts were committed intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly and are each punishable as a crime
in Oregon. Finally, Johnson submitted a declaration that
averred that, in October 2018, it was reported to police that
plaintiff had sexually abused defendant, police investigated
the matter, and Johnson had received 11 pages from the
police bureau regarding its investigation.
         Plaintiff opposed defendant’s special motion to
strike. On the first step of the analysis, plaintiff argued that
defendant’s conduct was not protected by ORS 31.150(2)(d)
for two reasons. First, plaintiff argued that the court should

   6
      Defendant argued that her conduct was also protected by ORS 31.150(2)(a)
and (b), but she does not advance those arguments on appeal.
204                                                   Davoodian v. Rivera

apply the rule adopted by the California Supreme Court in
Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal 4th 299, 317, 139 P3d 2 (2006),7
that a special motion to strike “cannot be invoked by a
defendant whose assertedly protected activity is illegal as
a matter of law and, for that reason, not protected by con-
stitutional guarantees of free speech and petition.” Plaintiff
argued that defendant’s conduct of sending the letter and
unfiled complaint constituted extortion as a matter of law
and therefore should not be protected under ORS 31.150(2).
Second, plaintiff argued that defendant’s claim that plain-
tiff sexually assaulted her is a private dispute and does not
involve an issue of public interest because plaintiff is not a
public figure and the alleged assault did not occur “in the
public arena.” Plaintiff also argued that if the court reached
the second step of the analysis, he had presented substan-
tial evidence to support a prima facie case on his claims.
In support of his opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff
submitted a declaration that “everything stated in [plain-
tiff’s c]omplaint is true.”
         The trial court heard argument on the motion and
concluded that defendant had not met her initial burden to
establish that her activity was protected by ORS 31.150(2)(d)
because, while “obviously * * * an important issue,” it was
“an issue between two private parties” and did not involve a
public official or a public proceeding. The trial court there-
fore denied the motion without reaching the second step in
the analysis.
        On appeal, the parties renew and expand upon
the arguments they made to the trial court. The parties
also agree that, if we conclude that the trial court erred
in the first step of the analysis, we may properly reach
the second step. See Mullen v. Meredith Corp., 271 Or App
698, 707, 353 P3d 598 (2015) (addressing the second step
of the anti-SLAPP inquiry where the trial court did not
because the question was fairly presented to the trial court

    7
      “There is no dispute that Oregon modeled its anti-SLAPP statute on
California’s.” Handy, 360 Or at 618. However, the statutes are not identical in
every respect, and “[w]hile the legislature intended to follow the California cases
that existed in 2001 [when it enacted ORS 31.150], California cases decided
after 2001 are relevant, at most, only for their persuasive value.” Id. at 618-23 &
nn 10-12.
Cite as 327 Or App 197 (2023)                               205

and the record was sufficiently developed to enable our
review).
          We first turn to whether defendant met her initial
prima facie burden to show that plaintiff’s claims “arise out
of” conduct protected under ORS 31.150(2)(d), viz., “conduct
in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of
petition * * * in connection with a public issue or an issue
of public interest.” We conclude that she did. As a prelim-
inary matter, the parties do not dispute the “factual ques-
tion” of what conduct plaintiff’s claims arise out of, Dept.
of Human Services v. Lindsey, 324 Or App 312, 319, 525
P3d 470 (2023), namely, defendant directing Johnson to
draft a civil complaint and mail it, along with the letter,
to plaintiff. As noted, plaintiff’s complaint alleged that
“[t]hrough the letter and the [unfiled c]omplaint” defendant
intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon plaintiff and
attempted to extort him out of $2 million. Further, plain-
tiff’s declaratory judgment claim seeks to shield him from
civil liability for the sexual assault allegations in the unfiled
complaint.
          The parties’ dispute turns on whether defendant’s
conduct meets the legal standard set forth in ORS 31.150
(2)(d), that is, whether it was “in furtherance of the exercise
of the constitutional right of petition” and “in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” Those legal
questions are ultimately issues of statutory interpretation.
In construing a statute, we examine the text of the statute
in context, considering any relevant legislative history that
a party may proffer, and, if necessary, applying maxims of
statutory construction. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72,
206 P3d 1042 (2009).
         Beginning with whether her conduct was “in fur-
therance of the exercise of the constitutional right of peti-
tion,” defendant points out that litigation between private
parties is protected petitioning activity. See Clackamas
County Oregon v. Clackamas River Water, 280 Or App 366,
370, 382 P3d 598 (2016), rev den, 360 Or 752 (2017) (explain-
ing that “a person who petitions the government for redress,
including by filing litigation, generally cannot be held liable
for damages for their petitioning conduct, even if that conduct
206                                       Davoodian v. Rivera

might otherwise violate the antitrust laws or other statutes,
unless the petitioning activity is a sham” and that “[t]he
doctrine serves to safeguard the First Amendment right
to petition the government” (citing Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 US
49, 56-60, 113 S Ct 1920, 123 L Ed 2d 611 (1993))). From that
premise, defendant argues that “a communication made in
anticipation of litigation is within th[e] category of speech
that the legislature sought to protect when it enacted ORS
31.150(2)(d).” That follows, defendant contends, because the
plain meaning of “in furtherance of” is to advance or pro-
mote, and because the legislature intended paragraph (2)(d)
to be a “catchall provision meant to cover additional scenar-
ios in which the right of free speech or petition is implicated”
that are not directly covered by paragraphs (2)(a), (2)(b),
or (2)(c). Under defendant’s proposed rule, the letter from
her attorney to plaintiff attaching the unfiled complaint is
conduct “in furtherance of” protected petitioning activity
because it “encompasses steps taken towards the ultimate
exercise of that right.” Finally, defendant argues that her
proposed rule is consistent with our prior construction of
ORS 31.150(2)(d) in Mullen and Tokarski.
         Plaintiff argues that defendant’s conduct of send-
ing the letter and unfiled complaint was not “in further-
ance of” her exercise of the right of petition within the
meaning of paragraph (2)(d). Plaintiff contends that, view-
ing the evidence in the light most favorable to him, defen-
dant sent the letter and unfiled complaint to plaintiff “to
warn, and impliedly threaten, [plaintiff] that she would
expose false and outrageous accusations of sexual assault
and false imprisonment at a future date and time” and “to
demand payment” of $2 million. From that premise, plain-
tiff argues that his claims arise from defendant’s “tortious
conduct committed in private” and do not target the exercise
of her right to file a lawsuit. Finally, plaintiff argues that
because the letter and unfiled complaint preceded defen-
dant’s petition to the court, under Deep Photonics Corp. v.
LaChapelle, 282 Or App 533, 546-47, 385 P3d 1126 (2016),
rev den, 361 Or 524 (2017), her conduct is merely “associated”
with the right of petition and not “in furtherance of” that
right.
Cite as 327 Or App 197 (2023)                              207

         Although we largely agree with defendant’s analysis,
we decline to adopt a categorical rule that ORS 31.150(2)(d)
encompasses all communications made in anticipation of lit-
igation. As we will explain, the text and context indicate
that ORS 31.150(2)(d) protects conduct that advances or pro-
motes the exercise of the right of petition that is not other-
wise protected by paragraphs (2)(a) through (c). Whether
conduct or communications that occur before litigation is
formally initiated meets that standard will depend on the
particular facts of each case.
          We begin with the statutory text in context, which
is the “best evidence” of what the legislature intended.
Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. Fasching, 369 Or 214, 248, 503
P3d 1233 (2022). Because the legislature has not defined
the phrase “in furtherance of,” we typically give “terms of
common usage” their “plain, natural, and ordinary mean-
ing.” State v. A. R. H., 371 Or 82, 93, 530 P3d 897 (2023).
“In” is “used as a function word to indicate activity, occu-
pation, or purpose * * * <~ search of lost treasure> <~ honor
of this event>.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1139
(unabridged ed 2002). And “furtherance” means “a helping
forward : advancement, promotion.” Id. at 924. Thus, ORS
31.150(2)(d) protects conduct that advances or promotes
the exercise of the constitutional rights of petition or free
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest. That construction is consistent with our prior cases
addressing ORS 31.150(2)(d). See DeHart v. Tofte, 326 Or
App 720, 742-43, ___ P3d ___ (2023) (holding that encourag-
ing others to engage in activity likely protected by the First
Amendment is conduct “in furtherance of” the exercise of
the right of free speech under paragraph (2)(d)); Tokarski,
313 Or App at 24-25 (holding that a decision to fund litiga-
tion is conduct “in furtherance of” the exercise of the right of
petition under paragraph (2)(d)); Mullen, 271 Or App at 706
(explaining that conduct “in furtherance of” the exercise of
rights protected under paragraph (2)(d) need not be neces-
sary to the exercise of those rights).
        Statutory context further supports that construc-
tion. ORS 31.150(2)(d) is the last of four listed categories of
speech and conduct and applies to “any other conduct” in
208                                       Davoodian v. Rivera

furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional rights of
petition and free speech. We thus understand ORS 31.150(2)
(d) to apply to conduct not expressly covered by paragraphs
(2)(a) to (c) that is nonetheless “in furtherance of” the rights
of petition and free speech and in connection to a public
issue or an issue of public interest. The absence of a judicial
proceeding is therefore not necessarily fatal. Cf. Baldwin v.
Seida, 297 Or App 67, 76, 441 P3d 720 (2019) (construing
ORS 31.150(2)(a) to encompass statements that are sent for
consideration or presented for use in a court proceeding or a
proceeding initiated to procure an order, decree, judgment,
or similar action). Finally, ORS 31.152(4) expresses the leg-
islature’s intent that ORS 31.150 is “to be liberally construed
in favor of the exercise of rights of expression described in
ORS 31.150(2).”
          Here, we conclude that defendant has made a prima
facie showing that her particular conduct was “in further-
ance of” the exercise of her right of petition because the
evidence supports a determination that it facilitated the
initiation of the lawsuit. The letter identifies its subject as
“pre-litigation” between the parties, references the attached
unfiled complaint as “self-explanatory,” gives a specific date
and time in which the complaint will be filed, and urges
plaintiff to retain a lawyer and have them contact Johnson.
The unfiled complaint seeks a judgment awarding defendant
$2 million and demands a jury trial on the stated claims. On
their face, the letter and unfiled complaint support a deter-
mination that defendant’s conduct advanced the exercise of
her right of petition by providing notice to plaintiff of her
claims and an opportunity for him to retain counsel before
she formally initiated the lawsuit. Further, in support of her
special motion to strike, defendant submitted email corre-
spondence between Johnson and Kaempf that provides addi-
tional context to the letter and unfiled complaint: Johnson
asked whether Kaempf would be authorized to accept ser-
vice of the complaint once it was filed. That additional con-
text also supports a determination that defendant’s conduct
advanced the exercise of her right of petition by facilitating
initiation of the lawsuit.
          We reject plaintiff’s contention that we must adopt
his proffered factual narrative regarding the contents of
Cite as 327 Or App 197 (2023)                             209

the letter and unfiled complaint and defendant’s purpose in
sending them in determining the legal question of whether
defendant’s conduct is protected by ORS 31.150(2)(d).
Plaintiff is correct that our standard of review requires us
to view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to plaintiff. See Plotkin v. SAIF, 280
Or App 812, 815-16, 385 P3d 1167 (2016), rev den, 360 Or 851
(2017) (“[W]here there is a conflict between the parties’ prof-
fered factual narratives and evidence—and there are many
in this case—we necessarily adopt the version most favor-
able to plaintiff, so long as it is supported by substantial
evidence.”). However, that standard applies in the first step
of the burden-shifting framework under ORS 31.150(2) only
as to the “factual question” of what conduct or statements
the plaintiff’s claim “arises out of.” Lindsey, 324 Or App at
319 (“[I]n answering the factual question of what actions the
claim arises out of, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, DHS, based on the affidavits submit-
ted and the complaint.”); Deep Photonics, 282 Or App at 545
(“Here, the parties dispute what the conduct is from which
plaintiffs’ claims ‘arise out of.’ As a result, we necessarily
must view the evidence on that factual question in the light
most favorable to plaintiffs.”). But whether the defendant’s
conduct or statements meet the additional requirements of
paragraphs (2)(a) through (d) presents a legal question that
we review for errors of law. C. R. v. Eugene School Dist. 4J,
308 Or App 773, 781, 481 P3d 334 (2021) (“Viewing the dec-
larations and depositions submitted by plaintiff in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, they describe conduct or state-
ments made outside of or after the disciplinary proceedings,
or to persons who were not involved in the investigation
of proceedings” and therefore were not protected by ORS
31.150(a) or (b).).
          We also reject plaintiff’s arguments that defen-
dant’s conduct is not protected petitioning activity because,
in plaintiff’s view, it is “tortious” as a matter of law and
because it preceded filing of the petition with the court. In
determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie
showing that their conduct is protected under ORS 31.150
(2)(d), this court “does not take into account whether the con-
duct on which a claim is predicated is wrongful.” Tokarski,
210                                      Davoodian v. Rivera

313 Or App at 25. “Rather, the merits of a plaintiff’s alle-
gation that particular conduct is wrongful are taken into
account when the court considers whether a plaintiff has
made a prima facie case in support of a claim challenged by
a special motion to strike” in the second step of the analysis.
Id.; see also Mullen, 271 Or App at 705 (“The second part of
the statutory inquiry in ORS 31.150(3) addresses the mer-
its of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant and, neces-
sarily, whether a prima facie case has been made as to the
wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct. The first part of
the inquiry aims merely to assess more generally what sort
of claim this is.”). And, as explained above, that defendant’s
conduct preceded her petition to the court is not, by itself,
dispositive of whether it is protected under paragraph (2)(d).
         Nor are we persuaded by plaintiff’s reliance on Deep
Photonics. In that case, we concluded that the defendants did
not meet their burden that ORS 31.150(2)(d) applied to the
plaintiffs’ claims because the defendants failed to explain
how the relevant conduct was “in connection with a public
issue or an issue of public interest.” 282 Or App at 542. We
also rejected the defendants’ argument that ORS 31.150
(2)(b) applied and, in doing so, did not reject California case
law that extended anti-SLAPP protection to communica-
tions made in anticipation of litigation, but instead declined
to decide whether to adopt it because we concluded that
the defendants’ argument failed under that case law. Id. at
544-47. We also cautioned that only case law that existed at
the time the legislature enacted ORS 31.150 could be deter-
minative of the legislature’s intent. Id. at 543 n 5; see also
Handy, 360 Or at 623 n 12 (“[W]hat our statute means turns
on what the Oregon legislature understood in 2001 when
it enacted ORS 31.150(3).”). We have since rejected broad
suggestions that we should adopt post-2001 California case
law in our construction of ORS 31.150. See Baldwin, 297 Or
App at 76 n 6 (rejecting as unpersuasive California cases
decided after the adoption of ORS 31.150 in construing ORS
31.150(2)(a)). To the extent plaintiff argues that we should
adopt the California Supreme Court’s decision in Flatley for
purposes of construing ORS 31.150(2)(d), we decline to do
so. Again, as a case decided after the legislature enacted
ORS 31.150, Flatley is “relevant, at most, for [its] persuasive
Cite as 327 Or App 197 (2023)                              211

value.” Handy, 360 Or at 623 n 12. Further, its holding is
contrary to our prior construction of ORS 31.150 in Tokarski
and Mullen that the alleged wrongfulness of a defendant’s
conduct is not relevant to whether the defendant met their
prima facie burden to show that their conduct is protected
by ORS 31.150(2) under the first step of the analysis.
         We next turn to whether defendant’s conduct was
“in connection with a public issue or an issue of public inter-
est.” Defendant argues that her unfiled complaint alleged
that plaintiff had sexually assaulted her and that both sex-
ual assault generally and, more particularly, “whether a
licensed medical practitioner at an esteemed local hospital
was preying on women he met online” are of interest to the
community at large.
          Plaintiff responds that the trial court correctly con-
cluded that, while sexual assault is generally “an important
issue,” it is not a public issue or an issue of public interest
because “the matter at issue and not merely the general-
ized subject must be of public interest.” Plaintiff contends
that “[t]here is no evidence in the record to support that [he]
was a ‘licensed medical practitioner’ or that he ‘was prey-
ing on women,’ ” and he argues that ORS 31.150(2)(d) does
not shield from civil liability “private communication con-
cerning two private individuals about conduct that allegedly
occurred on their personal time.”
         We agree with defendant. A court examines “the
content, form, and context” of statements to determine
whether the statements “involve matters of public concern”
such that they are protected under the First Amendment.
Neumann v. Liles, 358 Or 706, 720, 369 P3d 1117 (2016)
(Neumann II) (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, 472 US 749, 761, 105 S Ct 2939, 86 L Ed 2d 593
(1985)). In Neumann II, the court held that the defendant’s
online review of a wedding venue involved “a matter of public
concern” for purposes of the First Amendment because the
review “was posted on a publicly accessible website, and the
content of [the] review related to matters of general inter-
est to the public, particularly those members of the public
who are in the market for a wedding venue.” Id. On remand,
we adopted that reasoning to conclude that the defendant’s
212                                      Davoodian v. Rivera

review was in connection with an “issue of public interest”
for purposes of ORS 31.150(2)(d). Neumann v. Liles, 295 Or
App 340, 345, 434 P3d 438 (2018), rev den, 365 Or 195 (2019)
(Neumann III). We explained that “[n]othing in the text,
context, or legislative history of ORS 31.150 suggests that
the legislature intended the phrase ‘issue of public interest’
to be understood in any way other than its common-sense
meaning” and that, “[u]nder that common-sense meaning,
an ‘issue of public interest’ is one that is of interest to the
public.” Id.
         The same reasoning applies here. It is true that,
unlike the online review in Neumann, the letter and unfiled
complaint here were communicated privately, but the sub-
ject matter of that communication—civil claims arising
from an alleged sexual assault by a person who identified
himself on an online dating app as an anesthesiologist at
Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU)—was simi-
larly “related to a matter of general interest to the public,”
and particularly those members of the public who are using
online dating apps or need anesthesia at OHSU. See Lowell
v. Wright, 369 Or 806, 852, 512 P3d 403 (2022) (Balmer,
J., concurring) (explaining that Neumann II “readily con-
clude[d]” that the online review involved matters of public
concern “due to the clarity with which the court understood
that the character and reputation of a local business can be
of great importance to members of the surrounding commu-
nity, regardless of whether they are consumers of that busi-
ness’s products or services”). Contrary to the trial court’s
reasoning, whether plaintiff is a public figure is not deter-
minative of whether defendant’s conduct was in connection
with an issue of public interest. See Mullen, 271 Or App at
704-06 (concluding that the trial court erred in focusing “on
whether [the] plaintiff was a public figure whose identity
could be a matter of public interest”); Lowell, 369 Or at 827-
29 (reaffirming Neumann II’s holding that a negative online
review of a wedding venue involves a matter of public con-
cern and observing that “[t]he touchstone principle in eval-
uating whether speech is on a matter of public concern is
whether the speech must be protected to ensure the contin-
uance of vigorous debate on public issues and, by extension,
self-governance”). We therefore conclude that defendant has
Cite as 327 Or App 197 (2023)                              213

made a prima facie showing that her conduct was “in con-
nection with * * * an issue of public interest” because the
evidence supports a determination that sending a letter and
draft complaint alleging civil claims arising from an alleged
sexual assault by a self-identified employee of a prominent
public hospital was related to a matter of general interest
to the public and that that speech should be protected to
ensure continued discourse on public issues.
          Having concluded that defendant met her initial
burden of showing that plaintiff’s claims are subject to a
special motion to strike, we next turn to whether plaintiff
has established that there is a probability that he “will
prevail on the claim by presenting substantial evidence to
support a prima facie case” on each claim. ORS 31.150(3).
ORS 31.150(3) requires a plaintiff to “submit sufficient evi-
dence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that
the plaintiff met its burden of production.” Handy, 360 Or
at 622-23. A plaintiff fails to carry that burden when the
plaintiff fails to present evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find that the plaintiff has established the
elements of the claims. Id. at 626. We conclude that plaintiff
has failed to meet that burden with respect to the IIED and
civil extortion claims.
          We first address plaintiff’s IIED claim. To prevail on
a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) the defen-
dant intended to inflict severe emotional distress on the
plaintiff, (2) the defendant’s acts were the cause of the plain-
tiff’s severe emotional distress, and (3) the defendant’s acts
constituted an extraordinary transgression of the bounds
of socially tolerable conduct.” McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321
Or 532, 543, 901 P2d 841 (1995). “Because proof of intent
is often indirect and evidence of psychic harm is usually
self-serving, proof of this tort largely turns on * * * whether
a defendant’s conduct is sufficiently outrageous.” House v.
Hicks, 218 Or App 348, 358, 179 P3d 730, rev den, 345 Or 381
(2008). Whether conduct is “an extraordinary transgression”
is a fact-specific inquiry, to be considered on a case-by-case
basis, based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 358-
59. And whether the offensiveness of the conduct “exceeds
any reasonable limit of social toleration” is “a judgment of
214                                      Davoodian v. Rivera

social standards rather than of specific occurrences.” Id.
(quoting Hall v. The May Dept. Stores, 292 Or 131, 137,
637 P2d 126 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by
McGanty, 321 Or at 548).
         Defendant argues that no reasonable factfinder
could conclude that her conduct was “outrageous” due to the
lack of a special relationship, alleged or proven, and because
her conduct is protected by litigation privilege. In response,
plaintiff does not dispute that no special relationship existed
between the parties. Instead, plaintiff first argues that,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him, the
letter and unfiled complaint, together with his declaration
that everything stated in his complaint is true, show that
defendant made accusations that she knew were false to
threaten and to scare plaintiff into believing that defendant
would publicly expose the false allegations unless plaintiff
paid defendant $2 million for her silence. In plaintiff’s view,
“publishing false allegations of sexual misconduct or false
reports of criminal conduct exceeds the bounds of socially
tolerable conduct.” Second, plaintiff argues that the litiga-
tion privilege is inapposite because, in his view, ORS 31.150
does not require a plaintiff to produce evidence capable of
defeating affirmative defenses to establish a prima facie
case.
         We again largely agree with defendant. “The rela-
tionship between the parties has particular bearing on
potential characterization of the conduct as extreme or out-
rageous.” Delaney v. Clifton, 180 Or App 119, 130, 41 P3d
1099, rev den, 334 Or 631 (2002). A plaintiff must generally
allege and prove that the defendant’s “position or role vis-à-
vis” the plaintiff was one that “imposes on the defendant a
greater obligation to refrain from subjecting [the plaintiff]
to abuse, fright, or shock than would be true in arm’s-length
encounters among strangers.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). “[T]he lack of such a relationship
generally defeats a conclusion that the conduct is actionable
through an IIED claim.” Id. at 130-31 & n 7.
        Here, the parties were strangers who met online
and went on a single date. Plaintiff did not allege or sub-
mit evidence that a special relationship existed between
Cite as 327 Or App 197 (2023)                                               215

the parties; rather, the facts alleged establish that none
existed. The lack of a special relationship between the par-
ties distinguishes this case from the first case upon which
plaintiff relies. See Hall, 292 Or at 141 (concluding that an
employer’s security personnel’s “deliberate and systematic
tactic to threaten and frighten [an] employee into a con-
fession” for theft took the “plaintiff’s case over the thresh-
old into the range within which the jury could decide that
defendants’ method of interrogation was an extraordinary
transgression of contemporary standards of civilized con-
duct toward an employee”). The second case, Kraemer v.
Harding, 159 Or App 90, 111, 976 P2d 1160, rev den, 329
Or 357 (1999), involved parents’ repeated public allegations
to a school board that the plaintiff bus driver was a child
sex abuser—allegations that persisted even though multiple
investigations concluded that no inappropriate conduct had
occurred. By contrast, here, although defendant threatened
to publish the unfiled complaint by filing it in Multnomah
County Circuit Court, and the allegations are sufficiently
stigmatizing and would have particularly damaging effect
on plaintiff’s personal and professional reputation, there is
no allegation or evidence that she repeated false allegations
despite their being disproven in multiple investigations or
in a court of law.8 Further, Kraemer involved statements
that were only conditionally privileged, and that privilege
was lost because the jury could have inferred that the defen-
dants did not believe or lacked reasonable grounds to believe
that the accusations were true. See id. at 107-08. Here, even
assuming, as we must, that defendant’s allegations are false
and she knew they were false when she sent the letter and
unfiled complaint, those statements are nonetheless abso-
lutely privileged, as we will now explain.
         Turning to the litigation privilege, plaintiff is cor-
rect that we have not yet addressed whether ORS 31.150(3)
requires a plaintiff to produce evidence capable of defeating
affirmative defenses in order to meet their prima facie burden
at the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. See Plotkin,
280 Or App at 829 (noting that we have yet to address that
    8
      Indeed, plaintiff apparently raced defendant to the courthouse steps to file
this action before defendant had an opportunity to prove her allegations in an
appropriate public forum.
216                                       Davoodian v. Rivera

issue). However, we need not decide that question in this
case because “[a]ny ‘judgment of social standards’ requires,
in the first instance, an evaluation of whether the conduct in
question is favored or made privileged by law, or disfavored
or made unlawful by the legislature.” House, 218 Or App at
359 (emphasis added). In other words, whether defendant’s
conduct is privileged factors into the totality of the circum-
stances we consider in determining whether the conduct
is extreme and outrageous, one of the elements of IIED on
which plaintiff bears the burden to establish a prima facie
case. See also Franson v. Radich, 84 Or App 715, 718-19,
735 P2d 632 (1987) (explaining that “ordinarily, absolute
privilege is an affirmative defense that must be raised by
answer” but that “it may be raised by motion to dismiss if
the amended complaint alleges facts which, if true, estab-
lish the privilege” and extending that principle to claims of
IIED (footnote omitted)).
         “Oregon courts have long recognized, and enforced,
an absolute privilege for statements in the course of or inci-
dent to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. That privi-
lege applies equally to parties to such proceedings and to
their attorneys.” Mantia v. Hanson, 190 Or App 412, 417, 79
P3d 404 (2003) (collecting cases). The privilege is
   “based upon the ground that there are certain relations of
   life in which it is so important that the persons engaged
   in them should be able to speak freely that the law takes
   the risk of their abusing the occasion and speaking mali-
   ciously as well as untruly, and in order that their duties
   may be carried on freely and without fear of any action
   being brought against them.”
Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Or 383, 387, 347 P2d 594 (1959)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The priv-
ilege applies to “statements or writings made during or
as part of the litigation itself” and to “similar statements
which are made by a lawyer outside of the pleadings and
actual trial of the case” if the statements or writings have
“some relation” thereto. Chard v. Galton, 277 Or 109, 113,
559 P2d 1280 (1977) (holding that a lawyer’s statement in a
pre-litigation letter to the plaintiff’s insurer was absolutely
privileged where it had some relation to the proposed litiga-
tion). Here, the statements in defendant’s letter and unfiled
Cite as 327 Or App 197 (2023)                                                 217

complaint had some relation to her proposed lawsuit against
plaintiff and were therefore absolutely privileged.9
         We therefore conclude, under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, that no reasonable factfinder could conclude
that defendant’s conduct exceeds “any reasonable limit of
social toleration.” Accordingly, plaintiff failed to meet his
burden as to his IIED claim.
         We next address plaintiff’s civil extortion claim.
Plaintiff acknowledges, as he did to the trial court, that
no Oregon appellate court has recognized a common-law
claim of civil extortion. In plaintiff’s view, he met his bur-
den because he argued below that “the correct result would
infer a civil cause of action from Oregon’s criminal extortion
statute, ORS 164.075,” and because his complaint “tracks
ORS 164.075.”
          We need not decide whether to recognize a civil
cause of action for extortion because we conclude that plain-
tiff has failed to meet his burden even under his own pro-
posed rule. Plaintiff has failed to explain—either below or
on appeal—how defendant’s conduct constitutes extortion
under the operative version of ORS 164.075. In his response
to defendant’s special motion to strike, plaintiff relied on
ORS 164.075(1)(e) (2016) (defining the crime of “theft by
extortion” as, among other things, compelling or inducing
another to deliver property by instilling in the other a fear
that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor will in
the future “[e]xpose a secret or publicize an asserted fact,
whether true or false, tending to subject some person to
hatred, contempt or ridicule”). But the legislature amended
ORS 164.075 to omit that theory of extortion before plain-
tiff’s claim arose. See 2016 Or Laws, ch 47, § 2 (effective
     9
       We have recognized two exceptions to absolute privilege: wrongful use of
civil proceedings and intentional interference with economic relations when the
“improper means” is wrongful use of civil proceedings. See Mantia, 190 Or App
at 419-29 (explaining that “an absolute privilege [is] not absolute” when “[a]n
actor’s conduct is so egregious as to be deprived of the protections of the abso-
lute privilege when that conduct satisfies the elements of wrongful initiation”
of civil proceedings or when “the prosecution of unfounded litigation constitutes
actionable ‘improper means’ for purposes of tortious interference” with economic
relations). However, one element of wrongful initiation of civil proceedings is that
the allegedly wrongful proceedings were terminated in favor of the plaintiff pur-
suing a wrongful initiation claim. Id. at 419.
218                                                   Davoodian v. Rivera

Jan 1, 2017). As a result, the theory of criminal extortion
on which plaintiff has relied throughout this litigation to
infer a civil extortion claim was not operative at the time of
defendant’s conduct. On appeal, plaintiff does not address
that issue or attempt to explain how it would affect our
decision to infer a civil cause of action from ORS 164.075 or
whether defendant’s conduct constitutes extortion under the
current version of the statute. We therefore reject plaintiff’s
argument.
         Finally, although defendant’s motion to strike chal-
lenged plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim, defendant
failed to present an argument regarding the second step of
the analysis on that claim in her opening brief on appeal
and instead raised it for the first time in her reply brief.
Accordingly, we decline to address it.10 State v. Thomas, 324
Or App 114, 119, 524 P3d 969 (2023) (declining to consider
an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief).
        Reversed and remanded with instructions to grant
defendant’s special motion to strike as to plaintiff’s IIED
and civil extortion claims; otherwise affirmed.

     10
        However, we note that, contrary to plaintiff’s contention that defendant’s
claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations under ORS 12.110(1),
that statute appears to be inapposite because, “[n]otwithstanding ORS 12.110,
* * * an action based on conduct that constitutes sexual assault * * * that occurs
when a person is 18 years of age or older must be commenced within five years
from the date the person discovers * * * the causal connection between the sex-
ual assault and the injury.” ORS 12.118(1); see also ORS 12.118(2) (defining “sex-
ual assault”). Although the legislature enacted ORS 12.118 in 2019, it expressly
“applies to all actions commenced on or after the effective date of this 2019 Act.”
2019 Or Laws, ch 448, § 3 (effective June 20, 2019).