Court Opinion

ID: 9613352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:16:22.662395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:01.066263
License: Public Domain

HODGES, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Section 16-5-204(4)(k), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8) specifically calls upon the district court to review a grand jury record and to dismiss an indictment not supported by probable cause. The obvious purpose of the statute is to screen out cases which the trial court finds are without probable cause. This has the salutary effect of protecting an accused and promoting judicial economy by purging the trial court docket of a fatally weak case. The preliminary hearing procedure is intended to accomplish the same purpose. See People v. Quinn, 183 Colo. 245, 516 P.2d 420 (1973).
In this case, the trial court reviewed the grand jury record and found “[t]here was a total lack of any evidence in the grand jury’s testimony that could indicate any criminal offense.” On this finding, the trial court then dismissed the indictments. In my view, the grand jury record reveals the kind of evidence which can be reasonably interpreted as showing no more than a creditor-debtor relationship between the ap-pellees and the school district. If this is what the evidence revealed to the trial judge, it seems obvious that he did not believe the evidence was subject to any reasonable inference of criminal intent. On this basis, it is difficult for me to perceive how an appellate court can hold that there are some kind of inferences which, nevertheless, can be gleaned from the evidence and must be resolved against the appellees. On this record, I do not believe an appellate court should countermand the trial court.
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment, because under the record of this case, it is my view, to do otherwise effectively renders as nugatory section 16— 5-204(4)(k), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8).