Court Opinion

ID: 9518169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:45:49.203954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:36.906576
License: Public Domain

HERMAN, District Judge:
I concur with that part of my colleagues’ opinion which concerns the lack of due process when an operator's license is revoked upon conviction of a violation of § 616(a)(3) of the Motor Vehicle Code (75 P.S. § 616(a)(3)) without affording the operator a prior administrative hearing or an opportunity to appeal. I cannot, however, agree with the second part of the opinion which finds no denial of the equal protection of the law in requiring proof of financial responsibility before the operator’s privilege may be reinstated when the offense for which the operator’s driving privilege was revoked was failing to stop and render assistance or to disclose his identity at the scene of an accident (75 P.S. § 616 (a)(3)).
Both named plaintiffs require driver’s licenses for employment and without
them both are presently necessarily receiving public assistance for themselves and their families. Both had valid Pennsylvania driver’s licenses prior to the offense to which they plead guilty without benefit of counsel. Both, of course, are irreparably harmed.
It seems to me that Section 1417(b) requiring the maintenance of proof of financial responsibility after the one year period of revocation in this case is a denial of the equal protection of the law and to that extent should be declared unconstitutional. It is true, as the majority points out, a state could require all motorists before driving privileges are granted to carry liability insurance, but Pennsylvania having failed to do so cannot require it of a class unless there is a reasonable and rational classification in establishing the class involved (here, operators who have left the scene of an accident or failed to disclose their identity).1 Not only is there an absence of finding of fault for the accident or even of a probability or possibility of fault on the part of the plaintiffs herein, but there is no suggestion that anyone was at fault nor even that any party to the accident is claiming any damages whatsoever.
The cases cited by the majority in support of their reasoning that there is no denial of equal protection, for the most part relate to situations in which judgments have been secured for damages resulting from the accident or there is a real possibility that judgments might be obtained. To me, these are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
*1074The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a classification established by a legislature bear a just and proper relation to the purpose for which it is made. In Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465, 77 S.Ct. 1344, 1350, 1 L.Ed.2d 1485 (1957), the Court held that, “statutory discrimination must be based on differences that are reasonably related to the purposes of the Act in which it is found.” See also, Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 51 S.Ct. 582, 75 L.Ed. 1264 (1931).
The obvious legislative purpose of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, Article XIV, “Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Provisions” (75 P.S. § 1401 et seq.), is of course a most laudable one; that is, safety on the highway and protection of the traveling public from negligent drivers likely to inflict injury or damages on other users of the highways. But, as Chief Judge Robson said in his dissent in Pollion v. Lewis, 320 F.Supp. 1343, 1356 (N.D.Ill. 1970), vacated and remanded, 403 U.S. 902, 91 S.Ct. 2212, 29 L.Ed.2d 678 on other grounds, “the method employed for singling out those persons who must bear an economic burden not common to the driving public, and who may thus be effectively prohibited from owning or driving automobiles, must be rationally related to the protection of the public from irresponsible, negligent motorists.” 2
True, each of these plaintiffs acted irresponsibly in leaving a scene of an accident in which he was involved or by failing to identify himself there (in both cases of course after the collision had occurred), and he was properly punished for this irresponsibility, but to me it does not seem to follow that this irresponsibility is in any way related to safety on the highway or protection of the traveling public from negligent drivers who might in the future inflict damage on other users of the highways.
In Miller v. Depuy, 307 F.Supp. 166 (E.D.Pa.1969), Judge Body found that § 1414 of the Financial Responsibility Act was unconstitutional as violating the Equal Protection Clause, and his reasoning there is equally persuasive in the instant case. Here, both named defendants who for all we know may be the most careful of drivers, and at least have not been shown to be unsafe drivers, will probably be deprived of their driving privileges, and perhaps thereby their means of livelihood for the rest of their lives by having been placed in a particular category by the legislature by the imposition of a restriction that cannot conceivably increase safety on the highway. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from this part of the majority opinion.

. In this regard it is interesting to note the language of Mr. Justice Brennan in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971) : “If the statute barred the issuance of licenses to all motorists who did not carry liability insurance or who did not post security, the statute would not, under our cases, violate the Fourteenth Amendment (citing cases). It does not follow, however, that the amendment also permits the . . . statutory scheme where not all motorists, but rather only motorists involved in accidents, are required to post security under penalty of loss of the licenses (citing cases). Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner’s case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment, (citing cases) . . . ”

. Emphasis added.