Court Opinion

ID: 9632139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:04:14.055443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:43.761101
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Justice
(dissenting).
I wish to express my dissent to the views expressed in the majority opinion authored by Justice Taylor, reversing the judgment of the trial court which denied appellant separate maintenance.
The minority viewpoint is based upon the principle that this court will not disturb findings of fact entered by a trial court when based on competent, although conflicting evidence; that the evidence before the trial court met these standards and hence the findings should not be disturbed.
The majority viewpoint recognizes the tenet that findings supported by competent evidence will not be disturbed by this court, but determines that the record reflects the plaintiff “did establish sufficient grounds for separate maintenance.” The opinion of the court remands the case with instructions to vacate the judgment “and to hear any further or supplemental evidence the parties or either of them may offer, and make a finding as to whether these parties can be reconciled, and if not, to grant either a divorce or separate maintenance to appellant.” (Emphasis added.)
The issues presented by the pleadings were fully developed by each of the parties in the trial to the court on September 28 and 29, 1966. The issues before that court were as to the grounds for divorce, and also as to the financial needs of the parties for the support of the plaintiff and the minor children. The trial court had before it the testimony of the parties to this action, and no other testimony. Over two months after the case was fully presented, the court ordered the case reopened for further evidence with reference “to custody of the children and plaintiff’s grounds for divorce,” as well as to other facts that should be developed. Further testimony was submitted to the court in December 1966. At the close of the testimony on September 29, 1966, the trial court advised the parties that it was considering the case not only as one for divorce, but also as one for separate maintenance.
To me it is clear that the trial court in entering its findings of fact weighed the evidence presented by the plaintiff and by the defendant in light of the law pertaining to divorce and separate maintenance, and was exercising judicial discretion within the ambit of its authority in enter*388ing the finding of fact which states: “The plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence her allegations of cruelty on the part of the defendant or sufficient grounds for' separate maintenance.”
This court, on several occasions, has discussed the authority of the trial court to enter a decree of separate maintenance when a divorce has been denied. The first of these cases is that of Simonton v. Simonton, 33 Idaho 255, 193 P. 386 (1920), which was an action to compel an accounting by an administratrix and to have a claim based on a judgment for separate maintenance allowed. Therein the court was faced with the sufficiency of a complaint attacked by demurrer and held the complaint sufficient. In the course of the opinion, this court stated:
“While there are conflicting decisions upon this point, the weight of authority holds that courts of equity have inherent jurisdiction to award separate maintenance for the support of the wife and minor children independent of any action for divorce and independent of any statutory provision. * * * In this state a suit for separate maintenance may be maintained by a wife, based on C.S., sec. 4654. [I.C. § 32-901].” 33 Idaho at 262,193 P. at 388.
Vollmer v. Vollmer, 47 Idaho 135, 273 P. 1 (1928) was an action for divorce by the husband, with the wife interposing an affirmative defense of non-support and prayer she be allowed separate maintenance. The trial court denied the husband the divorce but entered a decree of separate maintenance for the wife, which this court approved.
In Sauvageau v. Sauvageau, 59 Idaho 190, 81 P.2d 731 (1938), the wife sought a divorce with an award for custody of the minor child and maintenance. The trial court denied the divorce on the grounds of lack of residence but awarded separate maintenance. This court affirmed the trial court. In Radermacher v. Radermacher, 59 Idaho 716, 87 P.2d 461 (1938), the husband brought an action for divorce, and the wife asked for separate maintenance. The divorce was denied, but the court ordered payment of separate maintenance. This court affirmed the award of the separate maintenance, but reversed as to award of property. In Hiltbrand v. Hiltbrand, 68 Idaho 275, 193 P.2d 391 (1948), the husband sought a divorce, and the wife cross-complained for separate maintenance. The trial court denied the divorce, but granted separate maintenance to the wife. This court affirmed the award. In Parsons v. Parsons, 72 Idaho 455, 243 P.2d 973 (1952), the husband sought a divorce and the wife cross-complained for separate maintenance. The trial court granted the divorce, which this court reversed, and remanded to the trial court for trial on the issues of the cross-complaint.
There has been no case brought to my attention wherein this court has, after trial of a divorce action which was denied, recognized there was no error in the court’s denial of the divorce, then remanded the cause for further proceedings to determine if in the future the parties can be reconciled. The prior cases of this court dealing with separate maintenance in each instance discussed the authority of the trial court to act, and have recognized the authority of the trial court in that regard. This case is unique in that the trial court considered the issue of separate maintenance and in the application of its judicial discretion denied not only the divorce, but also found no grounds for separate maintenance. It is my conclusion this finding is binding on this court, and there is no showing of such abuse of discretion by the trial court as to justify reversing the case.
SPEAR, J., concurs.