Court Opinion

ID: 9901292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 17:00:42.032322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:30.099912
License: Public Domain

21-2978-pr
Mitchell v. Annucci, et. al.

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                            SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007,
IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

       At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
York, on the 21st day of November, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT:         JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
                 SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
                            Circuit Judges.
                 JENNIFER L. ROCHON,
                            Judge. *
__________________________________________

DONTIE S. MITCHELL,

                     Plaintiff-Appellant,                     No. 21-2978-pr

ISMAEL G. REYES, a/k/a ISHMAEL REYES;
GYVON ROBERTS,

                     Plaintiffs,

                     v.

*
 Judge Jennifer L. Rochon of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, sitting by designation.

                                                  1
ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, Acting
Commissioner; PATRICK D. REARDON,
Superintendent, Marcy Correctional Facility;
C.O. JOHN DOE #1; C.O. JOHN DOE #2;
C.O. JOHN DOE #3; DONALD
VENETTOZZI, SHU Director; JEFF MCKOY,
Deputy Commissioner; CHRISTOPHER
MILLER, Superintendent of Great Meadow
Correctional Facility; TERESA TYNON,
Superintendent of Washington Correctional
Facility; MULCAHY, Deputy Superintendent of
Security at Washington C.F.; WALKER, Deputy
Superintendent of Programs at Washington C.F.;
CORRECTION OFFICER DEBEJIAN, Deputy
Superintendent of Programs at Marcy C.F.;
CHO JANE DOE, Commissioner’s Hearing
Officer at Great Meadow C.F.; ORC JOHN
DOE #1, Senior Rehabilitation Coordinator at
Marcy C.F.; OFFICER CUCCHI, Great
Meadow C.F.; JOHN DOE #4, Washington C.F.
Officer; DOCCS JOHN DOE #5, DOCCS
Central Office Corrections Officer,

             Defendants-Appellees,

ANDREW M. CUOMO, Governor; SORC
COLBERT; C.O. BROWN; C.O. MEAD; C.O.
SMALLBONE; C.O. BARSHAW; C.O. Z; C.O.
JANE DOE #1; JPAY, LLC; B. MCCLOSKEY,
Food Service Administrator at Fishkill
Correctional Facility; D. PAUSELIUS, Sergeant
at Fishkill C.F.,

             Defendants.

__________________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:               ALICE BUTTRICK (Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, on
                                       the brief), Shapiro Arato Bach LLP, New York,
                                       NY.

                                          2
       Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern

District of New York (McAvoy, J.).

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, the November 3, 2021, judgment of the

District Court is AFFIRMED, in part, and VACATED, in part, and the matter is

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order.

       Plaintiff-Appellant Dontie S. Mitchell (“Mitchell”), proceeding on appeal through

pro bono counsel, appeals the District Court’s November 3, 2021, judgment dismissing

most of his claims with prejudice and transferring the remaining claims to the Southern

District of New York. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

procedural history of the case, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our

decision.

       Mitchell is the “leader and founder” of the Ujamaa Fraternal Dynasty (“UFD”), a

“mutual self-improvement fraternity,” which Mitchell asserts that he “uses in prison to

positively organize, motivate, inspire, educate, and mentor young prisoners and to steer

them away from gangs, drugs, and violence.” App’x at 43. The New York Department of

Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) treats UFD as an “unauthorized

organization” pursuant to DOCCS Directive #4760. Id. at 45. Mitchell, proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis in district court, filed a complaint asserting a variety of claims

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 relating to DOCCS’s treatment of UFD as an “unauthorized”

organization. When he filed the original complaint, Mitchell was a prisoner. The claims

                                              3
asserted in the original complaint related solely to Mitchell’s time incarcerated at Marcy

Correctional Facility (“Marcy”). 1

       The District Court reviewed the original complaint as required by 28 U.S.C.

§1915A, which applies to actions brought by prisoners, and 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B),

which applies to all actions brought in forma pauperis. These provisions require dismissal

of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§1915A(b)(1); §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The District Court dismissed Mitchell’s First and

Fourteenth Amendment claims, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim. The District

Court permitted Mitchell to file an amended complaint within thirty days of its initial

review order.

       On September 9, 2021, Mitchell was released from DOCCS custody. On

September 13, 2021, Mitchell filed an Amended Complaint. As relevant to this appeal,

the Amended Complaint reasserted and supplemented the First and Fourteenth

Amendment claims in the original complaint as they related to Mitchell’s incarceration at

Marcy. The Amended Complaint added First and Fourteenth Amendment claims related

to incidents that occurred while Mitchell was incarcerated at Washington Correctional

Facility (“Washington”), Great Meadow Correctional Facility (“Great Meadow”), and

1
  Prior to filing the original complaint in this action, Mitchell brought an action raising
similar First Amendment claims related to his incarceration at the DOCCS Great Meadow
Correctional Facility. See Mitchell v. Annucci, No. 9:19CV00718(MAD), 2022 WL
445039, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2022) (“Mitchell I”). The District Court in Mitchell I
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants named in that action. See id. at *3-
6. Mitchell’s appeal from the grant of summary judgment in that action was heard in
tandem with the instant appeal. See Mitchell v. Annucci, No. 21-2784-cv (2d Cir. argued
Oct. 26, 2023).

                                             4
Fishkill Correctional Facility (“Fishkill”). When he filed the Amended Complaint,

Mitchell was no longer incarcerated; the Amended Complaint included new allegations

that Mitchell’s First Amendment rights were violated as a non-incarcerated person.

       Although Mitchell was no longer a prisoner at the time he filed the Amended

Complaint, the District Court reviewed the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). The District Court: (1) severed Mitchell’s claims relating to

his incarceration at Fishkill and transferred those claims to the Southern District of New

York, and (2) dismissed with prejudice the remainder of Mitchell’s claims for failure to

state a claim. Mitchell appeals both the severance and transfer of his claims to the

Southern District of New York and the dismissal of his First and Fourteenth Amendment

claims.

I.     Severance and Transfer

       We review the District Court’s decision to sever and transfer Mitchell’s Fishkill

claims for abuse of discretion. See New York Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am.,

Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010); City of Syracuse v. Onondaga Cnty., 464 F.3d 297,

307 (2d Cir. 2006); 7 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &

Procedure §1689 (3d ed.).

          “A district court may exercise its discretion to transfer venue ‘for the convenience

of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.’” Lafarge, 599 F.3d at 112 (quoting 28

U.S.C. §1404(a)). “District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of

convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are

considered on a case-by-case basis.” D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d

                                               5
Cir. 2006). When considering whether to transfer an action, some of the factors a district

court may consider include: “(1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (2) the convenience of

witnesses, (3) the location of relevant documents and relative ease of access to sources of

proof, (4) the convenience of parties, (5) the locus of operative facts, (6) the availability

of process to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses, and (7) the relative means of

the parties.” Id. at 106-07 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

       Although the District Court did not explicitly recite these factors, it is apparent

from the decision that it considered many of these factors in evaluating whether to sever

the claims against defendants Pauselius, McCloskey, and JPay. 2 The allegations of the

Amended Complaint related to Mitchell’s time at Fishkill implicate only these three

defendants and are focused on a discrete event, specifically, a disciplinary hearing

conducted by McCloskey related to an incident report issued by Pauselius. As the District

Court correctly concluded, those claims are “separate and distinct from the claims arising

out of alleged wrongdoing that arose while Plaintiff was confined [at the other DOCCS

facilities] and will require different witnesses and documentary proof.” App’x at 72-73.

Based on the allegations of the Amended Complaint, it is apparent that the convenience

of the witnesses, the convenience of defendants McCloskey and Pauselius, the location of

the relevant documents, and the locus of operative facts support the District Court’s

decision to transfer those claims to the Southern District of New York. Mitchell contends

that his “choice of venue was . . . entitled to substantial consideration.” Appellant’s Br. at

2
 McCloskey and Pauselius both worked at Fishkill, the former as a Food Service
Administrator, and the latter as a Corrections Sergeant.

                                              6
51 (citation and quotation marks omitted). But Mitchell’s choice of venue “is just one of

the several factors” a court should consider, and does not outweigh the other factors in

this case. Corley v. United States, 11 F.4th 79, 90 (2d Cir. 2021).

       Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by severing and

transferring the claims against defendants Pauselius, McCloskey, and JPay. See id.

(District Court did not abuse its discretion in transferring a case to Connecticut because

“the parties resided in Connecticut, where the operative facts had occurred, and it was

reasonable to expect that all relevant documents, witnesses, and means of process for

obtaining evidence were there.”). 3

II.    Dismissal

       “We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of complaints under 28 U.S.C.

§§1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B).” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004).

“To avoid dismissal, a complaint must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep’t, 879 F.3d 486, 489 (2d

Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “We construe

a pro se complaint liberally to raise the strongest arguments it suggests.” Darby v.

Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

       A.     Post-Release First Amendment Claim

3
 After these claims were transferred to the Southern District of New York, litigation there
continued in earnest. Defendants Pauselius and McCloskey filed a motion to dismiss,
which the District Court for the Southern District of New York granted. See Mitchell v.
JPay, LLC, No. 7:21CV09070(NSR), Doc. #40 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2023). Transferring
this action back to the Northern District of New York now would make little sense and
would not further the interests of justice. See 28 U.S.C. §1404(a).

                                              7
       It is not clear that the District Court fully acknowledged the impact of Mitchell’s

status at the time of the filing of the Amended Complaint as a former prisoner, rather than

an incarcerated person. The order of dismissal makes a single passing reference to

Mitchell’s release from confinement, but otherwise fails to address Mitchell’s post-

release First Amendment claim, which was raised for the first time in the Amended

Complaint. The Amended Complaint alleges that Mitchell, as a civilian, sought to

communicate with prisoners regarding UFD, but was prohibited from doing so because

DOCCS designated UFD as an “unauthorized organization.” App’x at 45. Such

allegations could state a plausible First Amendment claim because “prison walls do

not . . . bar free citizens from exercising their own constitutional rights by reaching out to

those on the inside.” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) (citation and

quotation marks omitted); cf. Green Haven Prison Preparative Meeting of Religious

Soc’y of Friends v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 16 F.4th 67, 78-79,

82-86 (2d Cir. 2021) (acknowledging that non-incarcerated plaintiffs may have standing

to challenge prison regulations that impact their own First Amendment rights and clearly

differentiating between claims of incarcerated and non-incarcerated plaintiffs), cert.

denied sub nom. Green Haven Preparative Meeting v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty.

Supervision, 142 S. Ct. 2676 (2022).

       Here, the District Court erred by (a) failing to address the sufficiency of Mitchell’s

post-release First Amendment claim, and (b) dismissing that claim with prejudice. See

Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639-40 (2d Cir. 2007). Accordingly, we vacate the

judgment of the District Court dismissing Mitchell’s post-release First Amendment claim

                                              8
with prejudice, and instruct the District Court to determine whether the Amended

Complaint adequately pleads a plausible cause of action. If the District Court finds that

the Amended Complaint fails to state a First Amendment post-release claim as pled, it

shall permit Mitchell an opportunity to amend that claim.

       B.     Pre-Release First and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

       The District Court acknowledged that the Amended Complaint added new claims

related to Mitchell’s incarceration at Washington and Great Meadow. Despite this, the

District Court dismissed these newly asserted claims, with prejudice, as though they had

been pled in the original complaint. See App’x at 85. This was error.

              1.      Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

       In the original complaint, Mitchell alleged that the conditions of solitary

confinement in DOCCS imposed “atypical and significant hardship on” him and other

inmates, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), and that the disciplinary hearing

conducted at Marcy violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court

dismissed this claim without prejudice, on the ground that the original complaint did not

allege sufficient facts relating to the disciplinary determination. In particular, the original

complaint failed to allege that Mitchell had been denied “a hearing affording him a

reasonable opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence,” and his

allegations of bias against the hearing officer were purely conclusory. Sira v. Morton, 380

F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2004).

       The Amended Complaint reasserts Mitchell’s claims regarding the disciplinary

hearing at Marcy, adding details regarding the penalty imposed, and asserting for the first

                                               9
time that the hearing officer denied Mitchell’s “requests to present documentary evidence

and call witness[es] which would prove his defense.” App’x at 55. The Amended

Complaint also alleges for the first time a separate Fourteenth Amendment claim based

on a disciplinary hearing at Great Meadow, at which Mitchell’s “requests to submit

documentary evidence and to call witnesses which would prove his defenses” were also

denied. App’x at 51. Mitchell alleges that he spent 61 days in the SHU at Great Meadow,

and 98 days in the SHU at Marcy. See App’x at 52, 56.

       Construing the matter generously, in light of Mitchell’s pro se status, we find that

he should be granted a further opportunity to amend his complaint as to these claims.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the District Court dismissing Mitchell’s

procedural due process claims with prejudice, and instruct the District Court to permit

Mitchell an opportunity to amend these claims. 4

              2.      First Amendment Claims

       We reach the same conclusion with respect to Mitchell’s remaining pre-release

First Amendment claims relating to incidents at Great Meadow and Washington. It is

unclear whether the District Court properly reviewed these claims, which were asserted

for the first time in the Amended Complaint. At the very least, because of Mitchell’s pro

4
  We note that it may not have been clear to Mitchell that the Amended Complaint would
completely supersede the original complaint, and that upon review, the District Court would not
consider allegations set forth only in the original complaint that were not reiterated in the
Amended Complaint. On remand, the District Court may wish to advise Mitchell that any
Second Amended Complaint will completely supersede and replace both prior complaints, and
that, therefore, the allegations of any Second Amended Complaint must be sufficient, standing
alone, to state a claim.

                                              10
se status, the District Court should have afforded Mitchell at least one opportunity to

amend these newly asserted claims before entering a sua sponte dismissal with prejudice.

See Abbas, 480 F.3d at 640 (“[F]ailure to afford an opportunity to oppose a contemplated

sua sponte dismissal may be, by itself, grounds for reversal.” (citation and quotation

marks omitted)). Accordingly, we also vacate the judgment of the District Court

dismissing Mitchell’s pre-release First Amendment claims with prejudice, and instruct the

District Court to determine whether the Amended Complaint adequately alleges a First

Amendment claim related to Mitchell’s incarceration at Marcy, Great Meadow, or

Washington. If the District Court finds that the Amended Complaint fails to state a pre-

release First Amendment claim as pled, it shall permit Mitchell an opportunity to amend

that claim.

                                      *      *      *

       For the foregoing reasons, the November 3, 2021, judgment of the District Court is

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and the matter is REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this Order.

                                          FOR THE COURT:
                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

                                            11