Court Opinion

ID: 9710363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:08:04.731571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:56.260601
License: Public Domain

AMDAHL, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The legislature has expressly refused to recognize a claim for wrongful birth in this state. As the concurring opinion notes, the legislature is free to decide whether or not to recognize a wrongful birth action provided that its decision does not interfere with a constitutional right. The majority and concurring opinions hold,that the legislature’s refusal to recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth, Minn.Stat. § 145.424, subd. 2 (1984), is permissible in that the legislature’s action does not interfere with any constitutional right. I disagree.
Roe established a woman’s right to an abortion as a right of privacy founded in the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments, as well as in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. 410 U.S. at 152, 93 S.Ct. at 726. Although the limits of the right of privacy are not rigidly defined, the Court stated that “[t]his right of privacy * * * is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Id. at 153, 93 S.Ct. at 726.
In my opinion, Roe protects the decision-making process involved in choosing or not choosing an abortion and allows a woman to make an informed choice concerning abortion. Where a state has acted to interfere with a woman’s decisionmaking process, the state’s action is unconstitutional. This point was clearly made in Roe and has been subsequently upheld in all cases where state regulation has affected the decisionmaking process. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 426-27, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2490-91, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983) (discussing the right to an abortion as it exists within the patient-physician relationship); Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 490-93, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 2524-26, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983) (interpreting parental consent requirements for pregnant minors so as to find them constitutional); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 99 S.Ct. 3035, 61 L.Ed.2d 797 (1979) (invalidating parental consent statute as unconstitutionally infringing pregnant minor’s rights under Roe); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (invalidating spousal consent statute under Roe because it im-permissibly impedes upon woman’s decision concerning abortion).
The majority and concurring opinions find no constitutional violation because they do not find state interference with the decisionmaking process protected by Roe. They reason that state action is present only where the state has placed affirmative obstacles in the path of a woman’s rights under Roe; because subdivision 2 does not place affirmative obstacles in the path of a woman’s rights under Roe, subdivision 2 does not constitute state action.
The majority and concurring opinions are unarguably correct in their conclusions that a litigant must demonstrate state involvement in order to support a claimed violation of a right under the fourteenth amendment. The concept of state action, however, is nebulous and defies precise definition. A state may become so significantly involved with private discrimination that its actions constitute state action. For *19this reason, the United States Supreme Court has refused to attempt “the ‘impossible task’ of formulating an infallible test for determining whether the State ‘in any of its manifestations/ has become significantly involved in private discriminations.” Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378, 87 S.Ct. 1627, 1632, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967); see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722, 81 S.Ct. 856, 860, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961). Only by “sifting facts” and “weighing circumstances” on an individual basis can a court determine whether state action is involved. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 378, 87 S.Ct. at 1632.
The rights under Roe are decisionally based, and subdivision 2 constitutes an official interference with the decisionmaking process. While, facially, it is the doctor’s conduct which deprives the woman of the information she needs to make an informed decision, the deprivation of the information carries with it the imprint of the state. Roe contemplates that a woman makes an informed decision within the setting of the doctor-woman relationship, see Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986), and the entry of the state into that relationship has been found to be constitutionally impermissible under Roe and its progeny. Subdivision 2 constitutes a subtle entry into that relationship and interference with the informed decisionmaking process.
The possibility that a doctor will be held responsible for negligent conduct stands as a safeguard that the woman will be fully informed. The legislature’s removal of the negligence action safeguard, while not preventing a woman from actually obtaining an abortion, does harm the complete exercise of a woman’s rights under Roe. I see this as a direct infringement on the informed decisionmaking process as enunciated in Roe. This point has also been noted by other jurisdictions when considering whether to impose liability for wrongful birth. See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir.1981); Phillips v. United States, 508 F.Supp. 544 (D.S.C.1981); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
I find the cases cited in the majority and concurring opinions for their “no affirmative obstacle” argument distinguishable from the case at hand and not persuasive authority in this case. Harris and Maher, along with Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 97 S.Ct. 2391, 53 L.Ed.2d 528 (1977), did not involve state restrictions interfering with the abortion decisionmaking process. They involved monetary restrictions placed upon the rights of certain indigent persons to obtain abortions. These restrictions were upheld as constitutional because they did not directly interfere with the right of a woman to obtain an abortion; they merely encouraged an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. Because no claim was made in those cases that the challenged restrictions infringed upon the informed decisionmaking of women, I find them distinguishable from our present case. Although the Court has been willing to allow restrictions on the right to an abortion that do not involve the decision-making process, see Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 97 S.Ct. 2391, 53 L.Ed.2d 528 (1977), it has been unwilling to uphold as constitutional any restrictions on the deci-sionmaking process that do not assist a woman in making a more informed decision. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 65-75, 96 S.Ct. at 2839-44. Restrictions that circumvent the rights of a woman to make an informed decision on abortion, see Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 639-44, 99 S.Ct. at 3046-48, or that directly impede upon the decisionmak-ing process by imposing unnecessary requirements, see City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439-49, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2497-2502, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983), have been held unconstitutional.
Because I find that the fundamental right that Roe protects has been interfered with in this case, it is necessary to determine whether there exists a compelling state interest that would justify interference. Although appellants and the state posit several compelling interests, only two have been recognized as compelling under *20Roe: (1) protecting the woman s health, and (2) protecting the potentiality of human life. Neither interest, however, is sufficiently compelling prior to viability of a fetus to justify the restriction imposed by subdivision 2.
The interest in protecting the health of the mother cannot be used to justify subdivision 2. I cannot accept as fact that physician negligence protects a woman’s health. On the contrary, subdivision 2 would seem to endanger a woman’s health by not discouraging the negligent withholding of medical information. Subdivision 2 cannot be justified on the basis that it protects and preserves the health of a woman seeking an abortion. Neither can subdivision 2 be justified on the basis that it protects the potential for human life. This interest does not become compelling until the fetus is viable. Prior to that time, a restriction on the right to an abortion cannot be based on protecting human life. After viability, the state’s interest in preserving life becomes paramount and would justify the restriction imposed by subdivision 2. The present case, however, involves alleged negligence on the part of Dr. Sharpe that took place prior to viability. The amniocentesis procedure Simin sought is performed well within the second trimester. Because no compelling state interest exists that would justify upholding subdivision 2 as constitutional, the statute must fail under Roe as an unconstitutional restriction on a woman’s right to an abortion prior to viability.
I would find subdivision 2 unconstitutional for negligence occurring prior to viability. It places an obstacle in the path of a woman’s decision under Roe. Such obstacle cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. I would affirm the decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals and of the Hennepin County District Court.
By way of a final comment, the special concurrence notes that section 145.424, subd. 2, does not protect a doctor’s intentional conduct. Subdivision 3 of the statute, enacted at the same time as subdivision 2, contains the phrase “intentional or negligent malpractice (Minn.Stat. § 145.-424, subd. 3 (1984)), whereas subdivision 2 only precludes a claim based on “negligent conduct.” From a comparison of these sections, we can infer that the legislature understood the difference between intentional and negligent conduct and intended to preclude only a wrongful birth action based on negligent conduct.