Court Opinion

ID: 9728712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:14:49.375549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:50.896275
License: Public Domain

WIENER, Acting P. J.,
Dissenting.—At trial appellant wanted to introduce the following evidence.
Shortly after decedent separated from respondent he returned to appellant’s residence and lived with her. He continued to do so until he left for Dallas to regain his property and to divorce respondent. Starting in 1985 *344and continuing up to the date of his death he represented to appellant and their children he intended to return to his family and live in the family residence. He also told her their joint tenancy deed could be left as it was and that no additional documents would be necessary to reflect their agreement that upon his death appellant would have the rights of a surviving joint tenant. Relying upon these representations appellant did not consult counsel and made no effort to determine whether anything further had to be done to formalize their agreement. Finally, because of their renewed interest, appellant went to Texas to care for her former husband when he became ill, continuing to do so until he died on July 6, 1986.
For our purposes we must review these facts in the light most favorable to appellant. In doing so I conclude we should reverse.
I agree the trial court correctly determined the joint tenancy was terminated by the July 1983 order providing for sale and division of the net proceeds of the house. The provisions of the parties’ agreement incorporated into the order were inconsistent with the “four essential unities” of a joint tenancy (succession to the whole upon the death of a joint tenant) and accordingly the joint tenancy was destroyed, creating an ownership as tenants in common.
The focus here, however, should be on the events occurring after the 1983 order. If the facts can only be viewed as reflecting the parties’ agreement to create a joint tenancy in the property they held as tenants in common, we would be required to affirm the judgment. The reason for this is that joint tenancy is a unique combination of rights to real property, created only by an instrument in writing. (Civ. Code, § 683.) A joint tenancy in realty cannot be created by oral agreement. (See e.g., Donovan v. Donovan (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 691, 697 [36 Cal.Rptr. 225]; Allen v. Samuels (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 710, 715 [22 Cal.Rptr. 528]; Estate of Horn (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 635, 639 [228 P.2d 99]; Estate of Harris (1937) 9 Cal.2d 649, 662 [72 P.2d 873].) In my view, however, the facts need not be so narrowly construed.
If there is a reasonable probability the facts can be interpreted as reflecting the parties’ agreement to nullify the unexecuted part of their earlier dissolution agreement, the later agreement would not be an effort to create a joint tenancy, but rather their mutual decision to rescind their respective duties as defined by the earlier court order. As a result of that agreement they would no longer be required to sell their house and divide the proceeds. After rescinding their agreement to sell, they would be restored to their respective positions before their marital dissolution agreement, i.e., they would again hold the property as joint tenants with rights of *345survivorship. Accordingly, I think it essential that the facts be examined to determine whether the parties’ discussions can be construed as a rescission and if so whether an oral rescission is valid.
California does not impose a heavy burden on those desirous of rescinding a contract. To the contrary, the law is sympathetic to parties who wish to terminate their contractual obligations. Civil Code section 1689, subdivision (a) expressly authorizes parties to rescind an executory bilateral contract by mutual consent. The mutual promises of the parties to forego their rights under the contract is sufficient consideration to support the rescission. (Jura v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 442, 447 [258 P.2d 90].) The parties are not required to show their consent in writing. They may manifest their agreement orally or through their conduct. (Treadwell v. Nickel (1924) 194 Cal. 243, 258 [228 P. 25].)
Thus, here no particular formality precluded appellant and her former husband from rescinding their contract to sell their home and divide the proceeds. Although the facts of this case have not been established, appellant’s offer of proof constitutes a sufficient factual basis to warrant a hearing. To deprive her of her right to present evidence violates the strong public policy of assuring litigants that their claims will be decided on the merits. Accordingly, I conclude we should reverse the judgment and remand for a trial to permit the appellant to present evidence on her claim.