Court Opinion

ID: 9716733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:49:36.656696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.421346
License: Public Domain

ROBINSON, J.,
concurring.
I readily concur in the result reached by the Court in this case. I also concur in the Court’s analysis and discussion concerning the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal and concerning the denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial. However, while I agree with the Court that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence11 when she allowed testimony about prior drug transactions between defendant and Sama, I feel compelled to disassociate myself, with all due respect, from the Court’s lengthy discussion and extended exegesis of that important and much-debated12 evidentiary rule. To my mind, that discussion contains unnecessary dicta, and I respectfully disagree with its characterization of this Court’s Rule 404(b) jurisprudence.
In my view, there is absolutely no reason for the Court to go on at length with respect to Rule 404(b) in this case. All members of the Court agree unequivocally that the evidence at issue was admissible under the “intent” exception that is expressly provided for in Rule 404(b). I fail to see why it does not suffice to simply hold that the evidence about previous purchases of narcotics by Sama was admissible to show defendant’s felonious intent and therefore is not barred by Rule 404(b). That is all that need be said, and I would end the Rule 404(b) discussion at that point. See, e.y., Grady v. Narragansett Electric Co., 962 A.2d 34, 42 n. 4 (R.I.2009) (referring to “our usual policy of not opining with respect to issues about which we need not opine”); see also United States v. Gertner, 65 F.3d 963, 973 (1st Cir.1995) (“The judicial task, properly understood, should concentrate on those questions that must be decided in order to resolve a specific case.”).
However, in view of the fact that the majority has chosen to write expansively when there is no necessity to do so, I must state that it is my considered view that the majority opinion inaccurately characterizes this Court’s jurisprudence as to the admissibility of evidence in general and as to the admissibility of evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) in particular.
I am unable to agree with the majority as to the existence of “broad admissibility principles that undergird our rules of evidence.” Rather, when I look at our rules of evidence (both the codified Rules and other recognized evidentiary norms), I am struck by how insistently the law of evidence narrows the manner in which any particular point may be proven.13 I will *154refrain from going on at length about this topic, but it is nonetheless my considered view that it is inaccurate to state that our rules of evidence are undergirded by “broad admissibility principles.”
Moreover, I take issue with the majority’s implication that this Court should interpret Rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion. While I acknowledge that the federal appellate courts and many state courts have characterized Rule 404(b) as a rule of inclusion, I have yet to locate an opinion from this Court which characterizes the rule in that manner — whereas several opinions of this Court clearly indicate that Rule 404(b) should be viewed as a rule of exclusion. See State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228, 232 n. 8 (R.I.2008) (“It should at all times be remembered * * * that Rule 404(b) is fundamentally a rule of exclusion.”); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1050 (R.I.2000) (referring to “the general exclusionary rule of Rule 404(b)”); State v. Gallagher, 654 A.2d 1206, 1210 (R.I.1995) (discussing exceptions “to this exclusionary rule”); State v. Chartier, 619 A.2d 1119, 1122 (R.I.1993); see generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 2:30 at 159, 160 (1999) (stating that the “exclusionary view still has adherents among the states, [djespite the clear trend toward the inclusionary conception of the doctrine”) (citing State v. Lamoureux, 623 A.2d 9 (R.I.1993)).
However, the issue of which label one should use to characterize Rule 404(b) is far less important to me than is a proper understanding of the rule’s function. I read this Court’s jurisprudence as indicating that evidence of prior wrongs is presumptively inadmissible.14 See State v. Gomes, 690 A.2d 310, 316 (R.I.1997) (acknowledging that there are “exceptions” to the general rule of inadmissibility, but first stating: “Evidence of other crimes or bad acts is usually considered so prejudicial that it is per se inadmissible regardless of any relevancy that it might have to show the propensity of a defendant to have committed the charged crime.”) (Emphasis added.).
The majority summarizes defendant’s position with respect to Rule 404(b) as follows: “[A]ny evidence of prior criminal activity is presumed inadmissible under Rule 404(b) as inherently prejudicial.” The majority then states that “[s]ueh a view does not comport with our longstanding interpretation of the rule.” I am unable to agree with that statement by the majority.
I am convinced that, due to the potential for such evidence unduly influencing jurors, this Court should expressly recognize that there is (1) a rebuttable presumption against the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence15 and (2) a principle that the proponent of Rule 404(b) evidence bears the burden of establishing its admissibility. See State v. Pona, 948 A.2d 941, 949 (R.I.2008) (stating that evidence may be admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b) under “excep*155tions to the general rule” against admissibility); see also United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C.Cir.1980) (“Unless the Government can establish the relevancy of the [Rule 404(b) ] evidence to some such issue in the criminal trial, the evidence must be excluded.”); State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 624, 382 A.2d 526, 531 (1978) (“As a general rule, in prosecuting for a particular crime, evidence which in any way shows or tends to indicate that the accused has committed another crime completely independent of that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same type, is irrelevant and inadmissible.”).
In my judgment, this Court should continue to adhere to an interpretation of Rule 404(b) whereby admission of evidence of prior wrongs is the exception rather than the rule. See Lamoureux, 623 A.2d at 13 (“In our prior cases we have pointed out that evidence of criminal activity on the part of the accused, other than the crime with which he or she is charged, is noimally inadmissible because it is irrelevant to prove the charge save by its indication that the defendant is a bad man or woman who would therefore be predisposed to commit the crime with which he or she is charged.”) (Emphasis added.). In doubtful cases, the presumption should be in favor of nonadmissibility.16 See generally Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475, 475-76, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948) (Jackson, J.) (“Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant’s evil character to establish a probability of his guilt. * * * The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.”); United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 648 (1st Cir.1996) (“Although logically relevant, ‘propensity’ or ‘bad character’ evidence carries an unacceptable risk that a jury will convict for crimes other than those charged, or that it will convict, although uncertain of guilt, because a bad person deserves punishment.”); People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930) (Cardozo, C.J.) (“In a very real sense a defendant starts his life afresh when he stands before a jury, a prisoner at the bar.”); see also Foskey, 636 F.2d at 523; United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir.1977) (“A concomitant of the presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be tried for what he did, not for who he is.”).
The following language from the First Circuit’s opinion in the case of United States v. Cortijo-Diaz, 875 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.1989) summarizes in a particularly felicitous manner that court’s understanding of the scope of Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence at the time the opinion was issued:
“Although it seems unnecessary to restate the rule’s plain language, experience shows that we cannot over-emphasize the central principle for which this rule stands, which is a negative one: evidence of other acts is not admissible to prove propensity to engage in criminal activity. * * * This rule is, of course, simply a legislative enactment of long-established notions of fair play and due process, which forbid judging a person on the basis of innuendos arising from conduct which is irrelevant to the *156charges for which he or she is presently standing trial, ie., against finding present guilt based on a ‘bad character profile.’ The general rule is thus against admissibility of ‘other act’ evidence.” Corbijo-Diaz, 875 F.2d at 15 (emphasis in original).
In conclusion, I would have refrained from engaging in a lengthy analysis of Rule 404(b) — because such discussion is completely unnecessary to the decision of that evidentiary issue in this case. However, since the majority has deemed such a discussion to be desirable, it is my view that we should continue to adhere to this Court’s historic preference in favor of a narrow interpretation of Rule 404(b). Having said that, I am nonetheless pleased to concur in the result reached by the Court with respect to the Rule 404(b) issue in this case, and I concur unreservedly in the Court’s analysis and discussion concerning the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal and concerning the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

. Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence is quoted in its entirety at footnote 7 of the majority opinion.

. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 2:30 (1999); Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidenced 5.15 (3d ed. 1996).

. Some random examples of my thesis that our rules of evidence are not undergirded by broad admissibility principles would be the prohibition against hearsay evidence (unless it falls within an exception); the recognition of divers testimonial privileges; and the rules as to the competency of witnesses. See generally In re Philip S., 881 A.2d 931, 934 (R.I.2005) (“Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely — may be pursued too keenly— may cost too much.”) (quoting Pearse v. Pearse, 1 DeG. & Sm. 12, 28-29, 63 Eng. Rep. 950, 957 (Ch. 1846)); see also Pastore v. Samson, 900 A.2d 1067, 1074 n. 5 (R.I.2006).

. Moreover, this Court has long held that, "even when such evidence is admitted under an exception to Rule 404(b), a trial justice should receive it with great caution and should specifically instruct the jury regarding its limited purpose.” State v. McVeigh, 660 A.2d 269, 272 (R.I.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also State v. Pona, 948 A.2d 941, 950 (R.I.2008) (stating that a trial justice must engage in a "careful weighing” process "when admitting evidence under Rule 404(b)”); State v. Rice, 755 A.2d 137, 145 (R.I.2000) ("[W]e have warned trial justices to use extreme caution when admitting evidence of an accused's similar * * * offenses in cases such as this one.”); State v. Lamoureux, 623 A.2d 9, 13 (R.I.1993).

. See State v. Merida, 960 A.2d 228, 232 n. 8 (R.I.2008) (discussing the meaning of the term "Rule 404(b) evidence”).

. Such a "the tie goes to the runner” approach is by no means unusual in the law. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008) ("Under a long line of our decisions, the tie must go to the defendant.”).