Court Opinion

ID: 9382547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 00:00:43.45271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:40.131435
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20383     Document: 00516690388        Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/27/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                                                        FILED
                                 No. 22-20383                     March 27, 2023
                               Summary Calendar                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                        Clerk

   Randall Kallinen,

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                      versus

   Judge Michael Newman,
   In his individual capacity
                                                          Defendant—Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:22-CV-652

   Before Stewart, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:
         This appeal arises from Randall Kallinen’s (“Kallinen”) suit against
   Judge Michael Newman (“Judge Newman”) in his individual capacity for
   allegedly violating Kallinen’s rights under the First Amendment. Because
   Kallinen failed to plead facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, we
   AFFIRM.
Case: 22-20383      Document: 00516690388               Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/27/2023

                                         No. 22-20383

                                   I.      Background
          Kallinen is a Houston lawyer who has appeared before Judge
   Newman, a former probate judge, in Harris County. It is undisputed that
   Judge Newman used his private Facebook account to support his campaign
   for reelection as well as share news about his personal and family life with the
   public. Kallinen commented on three of Judge Newman’s posts that related
   to his campaign for reelection. The comments accused Judge Newman of
   having “court cronies” and doing “favors for them at the expense of other
   litigants.” He also commented that he would not vote for Judge Newman and
   accused him of favoritism. Judge Newman deleted the comments and
   blocked Kallinen’s account.
          Kallinen sued Judge Newman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he
   violated his First Amendment rights. The district court denied his motion to
   amend his complaint and granted Judge Newman’s motion to dismiss under
   Rule 12(b)(6), holding that he failed to plead facts sufficient to show that
   Judge Newman acted under the color of state law as required by § 1983. The
   district court further determined that even if Kallinen alleged that Judge
   Newman acted under the color of state law, the alleged facts showed that
   Judge Newman was entitled to qualified immunity “because there was no
   clearly established law that made the Facebook campaign page a government-
   created forum subject to First Amendment protection.” See Kallinen v. Judge
   Newman, 2022 WL 2834756, at *13 (S.D. Tex. July 20, 2022). Kallinen
   timely appealed.
                             II.        Standard of Review
      A. Motion to Dismiss
          This court reviews a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de
   novo. Butts v. Aultman, 953 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2020). To avoid
   dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

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   true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Masel
   v. Villarreal, 924 F.3d 734, 743 (5th Cir. 2019)). A claim is facially plausible
   “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
   reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
   Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
   550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
      B. Motion to Amend
          This court reviews the denial of a motion to amend for abuse of
   discretion. Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir.
   2008). “A district court abuses its discretion if it (1) relies on clearly
   erroneous factual findings; (2) relies on erroneous conclusions of law; or (3)
   misapplies the law to the facts.” Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d
   586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016). “Denying a motion to amend is not an abuse of
   discretion if allowing an amendment would be futile.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C.
   v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014).
                                  III.   Discussion
          On appeal, Kallinen argues that the district court erred in dismissing
   his First Amendment claim under § 1983 and in denying his motion to amend
   his complaint. We disagree.
      A. First Amendment
          To advance a successful claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
   “(1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
   United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged violation was committed
   by a person acting under the color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726. F.3d
   631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013). A defendant acts under color of state law when he
   “abuses the position given to him by the State.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
   49–50 (1988). Moreover, we have explained that “if . . . a state officer

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   pursues personal objectives without using or misusing the power granted to
   him by the state to achieve the personal aim, then he is not acting under color
   of state law.” Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted).
          Kallinen argues that the way that Judge Newman used his Facebook
   account and the content that he posted made the webpage a medium for
   official government business. He maintains that the excerpts of Judge
   Newman’s Facebook page demonstrate that the page was used as both “an
   organ of Judge Newman’s official position and a means to advance his
   candidacy.” He argues that when a “Facebook account’s name includes the
   government official’s title and the page carries a ‘government official’ label,
   the account [can] be deemed as bearing the trappings of office.” See Garnier
   v. O’Connor-Ratcliff, 41 F.4th 1158, 1171 (9th Cir. 2022)). In support of his
   contentions, he highlights that courts have considered “elements such [as]
   the style and contents of the cover pictures and inclusion of a flag,
   governmental logo, or tagline” to be indicative of an official government
   page. Id. (citing Blackwell v. City of Inkster, No. 21-10628, 2022 WL 989212,
   at *1, *11 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2022)). Thus, he concludes that Judge
   Newman was acting under the color of state law when he deleted Kallinen’s
   commentary, effectively suppressing his speech in violation of the First
   Amendment.
          District courts throughout this circuit and our sister circuits have
   directly addressed whether a public official using a social media account is
   acting under color of law. Indeed, in Clark v. Kolkhorst, a state senator’s social
   media page highlighted meetings, events, and projects she participated in
   while in office. Clark v. Kolkhorst, WL 5783210, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 7,
   2021). The district court there correctly held that although the defendant-
   official’s posts documented activities that were unique to her position as a
   state senator, the “record indicated that these posts largely aimed to

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   promote [her] successes from a campaign perspective rather than serve as a
   ‘tool of governance.’” Id. It concluded that the state senator did not use her
   page as “an important tool of governance.” Id.
          Likewise, in Campbell v. Reisch, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a
   “Missouri state senator did not act under color of state law when blocking a
   constituent from a Twitter page that she created to announce her candidacy
   for office.” Campbell v. Reisch, 986 F.3d 822, 823 (8th Cir. 2021). That court
   determined that the senator, acting as a private individual, created the
   account before her election and then “used [the account] overwhelmingly for
   campaign purposes.” Id. at 826. Though the Eighth Circuit did not outright
   define “overwhelming” in this context, we agree with its conclusion and
   reach a similar one here after examining Judge Newman’s Facebook page.
          While the alleged facts here suggest that Judge Newman often used
   his page as a campaign tool, they do not support a claim that Judge Newman
   used his official position to silence Kallinen’s speech, or that Judge
   Newman’s Facebook page was a function of his official duties. At best,
   Kallinen has alleged enough facts to conclude that Judge Newman used his
   Facebook page strategically to create a favorable impression in the minds of
   voters. See generally Kolkhorst, 2021 WL 5783210 at *4. Further, Kallinen
   does not allege facts demonstrating that Judge Newman used his power as a
   judge to delete Kallinen’s comments. As the district court correctly pointed
   out:
          Judge Newman’s Facebook campaign page was not operated as
          an official state website under Judge Newman’s judicial authority.
          Judge Newman’s official judicial authority was neither invoked
          nor implicated by his Facebook activity in general or as it
          concerned Mr. Kallinen. There is no allegation that Judge
          Newman retaliated against Mr. Kallinen’s negative Facebook

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          comments by disfavoring Mr. Kallinen in litigation pending
          before Judge Newman’s court.
   Kallinen, 2022 WL 2834756, at *12. We agree with this reasoning and thus
   hold that Kallinen failed to state a § 1983 claim under the First Amendment
   against Judge Newman.

      B. Amended Complaint

          “The Supreme Court has explicitly disapproved of denying leave to
   amend without adequate justification.” Mayeaux v. La. Health Serv. & Indem.
   Co., 376 F.3d 420, 427 (5th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). Here, the district
   court provided reasoning for its denial of amendment. Kallinen moved for
   leave to file a second amended complaint to: (1) add allegations related to his
   continued inability to post on Judge Newman’s Facebook page and request
   injunctive relief; (2) add a footnote that clarifies that Kallinen had provided
   a snapshot but not a full picture of Judge Newman’s Facebook posts; and (3)
   allege that in the months leading up to the primary election, roughly 60% of
   Judge Newman’s page was used for his campaign efforts, “official
   announcements and communication from his court, depictions of his official
   duties, and dispensation of public advise [sic] related to his official duties.”
   See Kallinen, 2022 WL 2834756, at *12.
          The district court held that these changes would not alter its analysis.
   It reasoned that even with the amendments, Kallinen would not meet his
   burden to sufficiently plead that “Judge Newman’s Facebook campaign page
   was intertwined with, or furthered, his official duties as a Harris County
   probate judge.” In any event, it concluded that Judge Newman would be
   entitled to qualified immunity for lack of a clearly established law that made
   his Facebook page a government-created forum subject to First Amendment
   protection.

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          Kallinen argues that qualified immunity is inapplicable in this case but
   if it were applicable, it should not be used to “permanently shield ongoing
   constitutional violations from judicial scrutiny.” But Kallinen misrepresents
   the district court’s holding. The way in which Kallinen seeks to amend his
   complaint would still not satisfy his burden of pleading facts sufficient to
   show that Judge Newman’s page was an official page, and that Judge
   Newman was acting in his official capacity when he deleted Kallinen’s
   comments. Indeed, Kallinen sought to allege more facts to show that Judge
   Newman used “about 60%” of his page for campaign activity and other
   activity that did not rise to the level of official government activity. We agree
   with the district court’s holding that amending the complaint would have
   been futile. See Brown v. Tarrant Cty., Tex., 985 F.3d 489, 498 (5th Cir. 2021)
   (holding that the proposed amendments would be futile because the plaintiff
   failed to explain how the amendment would defeat the defendant’s qualified
   immunity claim); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, (1962).
          Because Judge Newman was not acting under the color of state law
   when he blocked Kallinen and deleted his comments, we hold that Kallinen
   has not met his burden under § 1983. We further hold that the way in which
   Kallinen sought to amend the complaint would not overcome its deficiencies.
   In light of these holdings, we need not reach the question of applicability of
   qualified immunity.
                                 IV.      Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order
   granting Judge Newman’s motion to dismiss and denial of leave to amend the
   complaint.

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