Court Opinion

ID: 9489884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:26:50.342221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:46.410828
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I believe Rick Waggoner’s hunting was consistent with the purpose of the § 2K2.1(b)(1) reduction. Accordingly, I dissent.
Waggoner pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court determined that Waggoner’s sentencing range was 10-16 months and sentenced him to five months incarceration and five months home confinement. Waggoner 'asserts that he was entitled to a reduction under the Sentencing Guidelines because he used the firearm for a “lawful sporting purpose.” If the reduction applies, Waggoner falls within a 0-6 month sentencing range. I believe the reduction is appropriate.
DISCUSSION
I.
The 1989 version of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1) states, “[i]f the defendant obtained or possessed the firearm or ammunition solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection, decrease the offense level determined above to level 6.” Waggoner hunted with a license during hunting season and obeyed all gaming laws. Accordingly, the Government concedes that Waggoner used the gun solely for a sporting purpose (i.e., hunting) and only contests the lawfulness of that hunting. The district court reluctantly agreed that Wag-goner hunted unlawfully because a probation *728condition instructed him not to hunt.1 (Sentencing Tr. at 33.)
The majority opinion concludes that Wag-goner’s hunting was not “lawful” by making two arguments. First, the majority opinion holds that, for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(1), the term “lawful” must be given its “ordinary” meaning. Op. at 726. Second, the majority opinion determines that Waggoner’s hunting was unlawful because he could be held in criminal contempt of court for violating a probation condition that he not hunt. Id. at 726.
I respectfully disagree. First, the majority’s definition of “lawful” finds no support in the case law, is implicitly rejected by every court analyzing the reduction, and contradicts a definition of “lawful” utilized in a case quoted approvingly by the majority. Second, the majority’s contempt argument cannot be distinguished from recent Eighth Circuit law.
A.
Whether the § 2K2.1(b)(1) reduction applies depends on whether Waggoner’s hunting was “lawful.” The majority opinion, searching for a definition of “lawful,” observes that “lawful” is not defined within § 2K2.1(b)(1), op. at 727, then decides to define “lawful use” by “look[ing] to that phrase’s ordinary meaning____” Id. The majority opinion concludes that Waggoner’s hunting was not within the ordinary meaning of “lawful” because he violated a condition of his probation. Id. at 727.
The majority opinion concedes, however, that ‘Waggoner cannot be denied the reduction simply because a felon may not lawfully possess firearms for hunting or collection.” Id. at 726. By definition, then, the “ordinary” meaning of “lawful” cannot be used for § 2K2.1(b)(1) as it “would render ... [the reduction] a nullity, because the provision applies only to the receipt, possession, or transportation of firearms by ‘prohibited persons,’ or persons who could not lawfully possess them.” United States v. Buss, 928 F.2d 150,152 (5th Cir.1991).
Felons are not the only individuals who receive the benefits of § 2K2.1(b)(1) despite their unlawful use. For example, fugitives from justice, illegal aliens, those dishonorably dismissed from the Armed Forces, and individuals who renounce their citizenship are all forbidden from possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and the application of an “ordinary” definition of “lawful” would preclude them from the reduction. Of course, the reduction does apply to these individuals, United States v. Prator, 939 F.2d 844, 846-47 (9th Cir.1991), because the courts do not adopt the “ordinary” definition of “lawful” for § 2K2.1(b)(1).
In fact, the Sentencing Commission intended to sentence felons in possession who use guns in a manner not involving criminal activity or with the potential to harm other people less severely than other felons in possession. See, e.g., United States v. Lam, 20 F.3d 999, 1002 (9th Cir.1994) (“[W]e do see a good deal of logic in the Commission’s decision to limit the reduction to those who hold a weapon for lawful sporting or collection purposes. Neither of those purposes encompasses the killing or maiming of human beings, but personal protection surely does.”); Buss, 928 F.2d at 152 (“[A] former felon who possesses a firearm for use in hunting does not raise the same concerns as one who possesses a firearm for use in future crimes.”). This policy is also consistent with the commentary notes to § 2K2.1(b)(1). *729Prator, 939 F.2d at 846 (“The commentary to section 2K2.1(b)(1) fully supports our view that the Sentencing Commission intended to reduce the punishment if the illegally possessed firearm was not intended to be used for criminal activities.”).
In my view, the Fifth Circuit correctly defines “lawful” as a sporting purpose or collection that would be lawful if performed by any citizen free of all legal disabilities. United States v. Shell, 972 F.2d 548, 552-53 (5th Cir.1992). This definition is consistent with the language and purpose of the reduction.
The majority quotes Shell regarding the policy underlying the § 2K2.1(b)(1) reduction, op. at 726, but fails to mention a detailed discussion in the following paragraph of Shell which contradicts the argument that Waggoner’s hunting was unlawful:
[T]he reduction provisions ... for felons in possession do not turn on the axiomatic truism that a felon can never lawfully possess a firearm. The entire reduction would clearly be subsumed in such a proposition. Rather, the availability of the reduction turns on the purpose or use for which the firearm is acquired or possessed and the lawfulness of such use if it were to be exercised by a citizen not under any legal disability — lawful hunting, lawful target practice, or lawful gun collecting.
Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
Shell then clarified an earlier decision, United States' v. Pope, 871 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.1989), which suggested that a felon could never lawfully possess a gun collection under § 2K2.1(b)(1). The majority opinion quotes Shell a second time without mentioning that the sentences immediately preceding and following the quoted phrase, when read in the context of the entire opinion, appear to contradict the holding of the majority. I quote the three sentences in their entirety, with the phrase quoted by the majority underlined:
The unavailability of the reduction in Pope stemmed not from the fact that felons cannot possess guns in a collection, but from the unlawful nature of the gun collection— one which included an unregistered silencer — because even a citizen free of all [legal] disabilities could not lawfully possess such a collection. The same would be true, for example, if the felon possessed a shotgun for the purpose of hunting wild turkey, but did so out of season, in an illegally baited area. As that would be an unlawful sporting possession by any citizen, the sporting purpose reduction would be unavailable to the convicted felon.
Id. at 552-53 (emphasis added).
In Shell, the Fifth Circuit makes explicit what was implicit in the case law by emphasizing the lawfulness of the activity from the perspective of a citizen who is “not under any legal disability.” Id. at 552 (emphasis added). Indeed, the analysis of the lawfulness of the hunting under the reduction “turns” on this analysis. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, we do not consider whether the individual is a felon, on probation, released on bail, or under a court order forbidding him to hunt, because these individual-speeific factors are irrelevant for purposes of determining, as a general matter, what constitutes a “lawful sporting purpose.” Of course, under this view of § 2K2.1(b)(1), Waggoner is entitled to the reduction because, if a citizen, not under the legal disabilities of Waggoner’s probation conditions, engaged in the hunting actually performed by Waggoner, that hunting would be lawful.
B.
The majority’s second argument is. that Waggoner’s hunting was unlawful, because, by violating a condition of probation, Wag-goner theoretically could be prosecuted for criminal contempt. Op. at 726. This is not consistent with this court’s precedent. In United States v. Mendoza-Alvarez, 79 F.3d 96 (8th Cir.1996), the defendant pled guilty to illegal entry after deportation for a felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). Id. at 97. Mendoza-Alvarez asserted he should receive a § 2K2.1(b)(2) reduction because he pos *730sessed the firearm solely for hunting, but the district court denied the reduction because Mendoza-Alvarez violated Iowa law by operating his vehicle with a loaded rifle. Id. This court reversed and remanded, holding that “transporting a firearm in violation of auto safety laws does not constitute, per se, an ‘otherwise unlawful use’ of a firearm.... ” Id. at 98.
Under the majority’s reasoning in this ease, however, Mendoza-Alvarez’s hunting would not constitute a “lawful sporting purpose.” Presumably, the district court order deporting Mendoza-Alvarez directed him not to return to this country. Thus, Mendoza-Alvarez could be held in criminal contempt for reentering and, therefore, his hunting could not be “lawful.” In addition, Mendoza-Alvarez committed another crime, beyond unlawful possession of a firearm, by illegally reentering the country. Finally, Mendoza-Alvarez could not “lawfully” hunt in Iowa because he could not lawfully hunt anywhere in the country.
A unanimous Mendozar-Alvarez court, however, engaged in no discussion whatsoever of the “lawfulness” of Mendoza-Alvarez’s hunting in relation to the fact that he could not, by definition, hunt lawfully in this country. Nor did the court consider whether Mendoza-Alvarez could be in contempt for violating a court order by reentering. The court did not explore these issues because they are irrelevant for a determination of the lawfulness of the hunting.
It is instructive, however, to observe the facts which this court did find indicative of “lawful” hunting. For example, this court noted that Mendoza-Alvarez presented evidence that he possessed the firearm solely for hunting, hunted the morning of his arrest, and possessed an Iowa hunting license. Id. at 98. Indeed, this court noted that, from this evidence, “a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that he ‘possessed all ... firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes,’ i.e., hunting pursuant to a state hunting license.” Id. (emphasis added).
Furthermore, under the majority’s reasoning, virtually no individual on probation can receive a § 2K2.1(b)(l) reduction because probation orders include boilerplate conditions that the probationer obey all federal and local laws. A probationer who carries a gun, for example, violates federal law. Thus, every probationer who hunts violates a condition of probation and could theoretically be held in contempt. Of course, no court holds that the reduction is inapplicable for probationers because such a result violates the purpose of the reduction. In short, the potential of a contempt conviction fails to illuminate whether the hunting itself was lawful.
II.
When the above analysis is framed by an examination of the Sentencing Commission’s commentary for § 2K2.1(b)(1), the lawfulness of Waggoner’s hunting is apparent. The commentary notes state:
Under § 2K2.1(b)(1), intended lawful use, as determined by the surrounding circumstances, provides a decrease in the offense level. Relevant circumstances include, among others, the number and type of firearms (sawed-off shotguns, for example, have few legitimate uses) and ammunition, the location and circumstances of possession, the nature of the defendant’s criminal history (e.g., whether involving firearms), and the extent to which possession was restricted by local law.
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment, (n. 2) (1989).
These factors favor Waggoner. There is no dispute that (1) Waggoner used a hunting shotgun, not a sawed-off shotgun or otherwise illegal gun, and his ammunition consisted of field loads for pheasants; (2) Waggoner hunted safely and in an appropriate location; (3) Waggoner had no prior conviction involving the illegal use of guns; and (4) local law permitted Waggoner to hunt during hunting season and with a license.
I find no case which considers, as a relevant factor under the commentary notes to § 2K2.1(b)(1), the probationary status of the felon in possession or the possibility of a contempt order. In my view, we should adopt the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in *731Shell because it offers a standard consistent with the purpose of the § 2K2.1(b)(1) reduction and is faithful to the commentary notes which focus upon the lawfulness of the hunting itself, not whether the defendant was under any sort of legal disability.
Finally, the above analysis of “lawful sporting purpose” is consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines treatment of probation violations. The Guidelines define a violation of a condition of probation as a “breach of trust,” U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A, intro, comment. 3(b) (Nov. 1995), and reached this conclusion only after a careful consideration of two competing theories regarding sanctioning violations of probation. Id. This provision of the Guidelines indicates the Sentencing Commission’s recognition of a distinction between breach of trust and unlawful behavior.2
CONCLUSION
Waggoner’s actions fit squarely within the behavior envisioned by the Sentencing Commission when it formulated the reduction for “lawful sporting purposes.” Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for resentencing.

. The district court made- repeated references to the injustice of the 10-16 month sentencing range:
It pains me to rule against you. Personally I would want to rule in your favor. It's a close enough question I would like to rule in your favor to get into a sentencing range that I think is more just,____ (Sentencing Tr. at 33.)
I — I am the first one to recognize I could be wrong. I hope I’m wrong. I hope the Eighth Circuit sees it your way,____ (Id. at 34.)
[The 10-16 month range] is too harsh, it’s too long, it’s too severe,.... If it were up to me, I would give you probation. I wouldn’t hesitate. (Id. at 41.)
After sentencing Waggoner to the most lenient sentence available, the court observed that "[i]f I could do less than that, I would. But my hands — my hands are bound.” Id.

. Indeed, courts repeatedly describe violations of probation conditions or supervised release as a "breach of trust.” See, e.g., United States v. Glasener, 981 F.2d 973, 975 (8th Cir.1992) (“breach of trust” for violation of terms of supervised release); United States v. Agard, 77 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir.1996) ("breach of trust” for violation of condition of probation); United States v, Gaskins, 849 F.Supp. 1102, 1105 (E.D.Va.1994) (stating that defendant lying to probation officer constituted a “serious breach of trust”). In fact, the district court considered Waggoner’s transgression consistent with this view because the court stated in its revocation of probation that Waggoner "has proven by his conduct, to be unworthy of the trust a probationary sentence is based upon.” (Appellee's Add. at 29.) Viewing a probation violation as a "breach of trust” is logical because "[i]n order to justify a revocation order 'all that is required is enough evidence, within a sound judicial discretion, to satisfy the district judge that the conduct of the probationer has not met the conditions of probation.' " United States v. Goeller, 807 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Burkhalter, 588 F.2d 604, 606 (8th Cir.1978) (quoting United States v. Garza, 484 F.2d 88, 89 (5th Cir.1973))).