Court Opinion

ID: 9373742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:07:03.957565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:43.036126
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     BRANDY BRANSTETTER,                             DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          DE-315H-16-0125-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                     DATE: April 27, 2022
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Michael W. Macomber, Esquire, Albany, New York, for the appellant.

           Gavin M. Frost, Esquire, and Jennifer Koduru, Washington, D.C., for the
             agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction.        For the
     reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and
     REMAND the case to the field office for further adjudication in accordance with
     this Remand Order.

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2         On November 19, 2015, the agency separated the appellant from the
     position of Utility Systems Operator (USO) during his probationary period.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 23, 48-49. The appellant’s Federal service
     preceding his competitive-service appointment as a USO consisted of seven
     temporary appointments. Id. at 49-50, 65-71. As relevant here, the last six were
     alternating appointments to the position of Maintenance Worker, served from
     spring to fall, and Laborer, served from fall to spring. Id. at 65-71. The final
     temporary Laborer appointment was from October 19 to November 29, 2014.
     Id. at 49-50, 63. On November 30, 2014, he was appointed to the position of
     USO, without a break in service, subject to 1-year probation. Id. at 49-50.
¶3         The appellant filed a pro se appeal to the Board challenging his separation.
     IAF, Tabs 1, 9.    The administrative judge informed him of his jurisdictional
     burden and pointed out that he could show he was not a probationer if his Federal
     service immediately preceding the USO appointment contained no more than one
     break in service of 30 days or less, and was performed in the same agency and in
     the same line of work.     IAF, Tab 6 at 2-3.    The appellant responded that he
     satisfied the criteria.   IAF, Tab 9.    The agency replied by producing job
     descriptions of Maintenance Worker, Laborer, and USO. IAF, Tab 10 at 6-13,
     Tab 12 at 8-27.
¶4         The administrative judge found that the appellant’s prior Federal service
     could not be tacked on to his probationary appointment because the USO and
     Laborer positions were not in the same line of work.         IAF, Tab 16, Initial
     Decision (ID) at 5-6. She then found that he was a probationer who did not allege
     that his termination was based on marital status or partisan political reasons, and
     dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction, without holding his requested
     hearing. ID at 7-8.
¶5         The appellant has timely petitioned for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 3. He argues that the administrative judge: (1) did not provide him
                                                                                      3

     with the guidance sufficient for a pro se litigant; and (2) failed to view his
     allegations about the duties he performed during his prior Federal service in the
     light most favorable to him. Id. at 5. The agency has responded to the petition
     for review, and the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 6-7.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The administrative judge provided the appellant with guidance sufficient for a
     pro se litigant to nonfrivolously plead Board jurisdiction.
¶6        An administrative judge is obligated to provide an appellant with explicit
     information concerning what is required to establish jurisdiction over his appeal,
     see Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir.
     1985), and the Board has demonstrated heightened sensitivity to pro se appellants
     when administrative judges have failed to detail jurisdictional burdens, see
     Mesbah v. Department of Justice, 87 M.S.P.R. 491, ¶ 8 (2001).          Below, the
     administrative judge informed the appellant of the jurisdictional requirements
     under 5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b). IAF, Tab 6 at 2-3. While she did not clarify that an
     employee’s “line of work” is “determined by the employee’s actual duties and
     responsibilities,” 5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b)(2), the appellant’s response to her
     jurisdictional order indicated his awareness of that principle , IAF, Tab 9. Thus,
     we find that he was not deprived of the guidance he needed.

     The administrative judge erred in finding that the appellant failed to
     nonfrivolously allege jurisdiction.
¶7        To appeal an adverse action, such as a removal, an individual appointed to
     the competitive service generally is required to complete a 1-year probationary
     period.   5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A); see McCormick v. Department of the Air
     Force, 307 F.3d 1339, 1341-43 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (addressing the alternative
     methods under section 7511(a)(1)(A) by which an appellant may prove that he is
     a competitive-service “employee” who may appeal his removal). However, an
     appellant who has not served a full year under his appointment can acquire appeal
     rights by tacking his prior Federal service onto his probationary service, provided
                                                                                           4

     that his prior service was completed with no more than one break in service of
     30 days or less, and was in the same agency and line of work.             See 5 C.F.R.
     § 315.802(b). The positions are in the same line of work if they involve related
     or comparable work that requires the same or similar skills . 2        Mathis v. U.S.
     Postal Service, 865 F.2d 232, 234 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (interpreting the similar
     statutory language in 5 U.S.C. 7511(a)(1)(B)); Sandoval v. Department of
     Agriculture, 115 M.S.P.R. 71, ¶ 8, ¶ 11 n.2, ¶ 14 (2010) (explaining that the
     interpretation of section 7511(a)(1)(B) in Mathis applies to tacking under
     5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)).
¶8         Below, the appellant alleged that, during his prior Federal service, his
     duties were similar to those of a USO, and he kept performing these duties
     regardless of seasonal changes in his job title, which was altered merely to
     accommodate the agency’s administrative needs. IAF, Tab 9; PFR File, Tab 7
     at 6-8. The administrative judge did not address these allegations and found that
     the appellant’s prior Federal service was not in the same line of work as his
     probationary appointment because the USO and Laborer positions had different
     job descriptions. ID at 5-6. In doing so, she erred. See Sosa v. Department of
     Defense, 102 M.S.P.R. 252, ¶¶ 11‑13 (2006) (remanding an appeal that an
     administrative judge dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without holding a hearing
     in light of the differences in job descriptions, and pointing out that he was
     required to address the appellant’s allegations about the nature and character of
     the duties he actually performed); 5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b)(2) (indicating that
     whether positions are in the same line of work is “determined by the employee’s
     actual duties and responsibilities”).
¶9         The administrative judge also erred in finding that the appeal could be
     dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the agency met its burden by

     2
       In determining whether positions are in the same line of work , the Board also may
     consider whether the positions are in the same competitive level for reduction -in-force
     purposes. Pagan v. U.S. Postal Service, 111 M.S.P.R. 212, ¶ 6 (2009).
                                                                                     5

preponderant evidence. ID at 6-7. The process of establishing Board jurisdiction
generally is a two-step inquiry. See Bledsoe v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
659 F.3d 1097, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2011), modified by regulation on other grounds,
as recognized in Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10 (2016).
Initially, an appellant is obligated to raise nonfrivolous allegations of fact that, if
proven, could establish a prima facie case that the Board has jurisdiction over the
matter at issue. See Coleman v. Department of the Army, 106 M.S.P.R. 436, ¶ 9
(2007); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). If he raises nonfrivolous allegations, he is entitled
to a hearing at which he must prove jurisdiction by preponderant evidence. See
Bledsoe, 659 F.3d at 1102; O’Brien v. Department of Agriculture, 91 M.S.P.R.
139, ¶ 5 (2002). Therefore, the preponderant evidence test is inapplicable to the
initial stage of the jurisdictional inquiry in general and to an agency’s
submissions in particular. Moreover, an administrative judge may not deem the
agency’s evidence dispositive if it merely contradicts the appellant’s otherwise
adequate prima facie showing of jurisdiction. See Ferdon v. U.S. Postal Service,
60 M.S.P.R. 325, 329 (1994). Accordingly, a remand is necessary. On remand,
the administrative judge should afford the appellant his requested jurisdictional
hearing and determine whether he meets the definition of employee under
section 7511(a)(1)(A).
                                                                                     6

                                          ORDER
¶10        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the field office for
      further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.