Court Opinion

ID: 9599410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:18:33.842687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:45.079039
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting):
The main opinion has properly set forth the proposition that the plaintiffs’ claims for unlawful price discrimination under both the Federal and the State law have “the same nucleus of operative facts,” so that they are essentially the same cause of action; and consequently the Federal court could have acted upon and rendered judgment upon the cause of action under the state law. It appears quite clearly that the basis of the plaintiffs’ claims are essentially the same under the Federal and the State law; and that the Federal court dismissed these claims, not on the merits, but upon a procedural point.
The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Texaco claims lack of jurisdiction in that all of the alleged discriminatory sales took place in Utah. Texaco contends, and we agree, that the “in commerce” provision of the Robinson-Pat-man Act has not been satisfied.
And the decision concludes:
The “in commerce” requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act has not been met. The trial court did not have jurisdiction. The judgment recovered under this count is reversed and set aside.1
Inasmuch as it thus appears that the reversal of the judgment by the Federal court was a decision “not on the merits” of the action, I am unable to see any reason why the plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of Sec. 78-12-40, U.C.A.1953, which provides:
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or otherwise if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits and the time limited either by law or contract for [commencement of the] same shall have expired, the plaintiff, may commence a new action within one year after the reversal or failure.
*383In accordance with that statute, the plaintiffs having commenced this action within one year after the dismissal by the Federal court, not on the merits, it should not be deemed barred by the statute of limitations.
Correlated to the above and for the same reason: that a party should be allowed his day in court to have an adjudication of his complaint on the merits, it is also well-established law that the Doctrine of Res Ju-dicata only applies to prevent a party from pursuing his remedy when there has been a previous adjudication on the merits of the controversy.2
I would reverse the summary dismissal of the case, and remand it for further appropriate proceedings. [All emphasis added.]

. Belliston et al. v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 408 U.S. 928, 92 S.Ct. 2494, 33 L.Ed.2d 341.

. Stephens v. Doxey, 58 Utah 196, 198 P. 261.