Court Opinion

ID: 9880602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 20:04:53.506914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:54:21.021795
License: Public Domain

NOTICE               2023 IL App (4th) 220890-U
 This Order was filed under                                                           FILED
 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is            NO. 4-22-0890                          September 27, 2023
 not precedent except in the                                                        Carla Bender
 limited circumstances allowed                                                  4th District Appellate
 under Rule 23(e)(1).            IN THE APPELLATE COURT                               Court, IL

                                         OF ILLINOIS

                                      FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                        )      Appeal from the
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                              )      Circuit Court of
           v.                                               )      Peoria County
TERRY R. PAYTON,                                            )      No. 10CF1096
           Defendant-Appellant.                             )
                                                            )      Honorable
                                                            )      Katherine S. Gorman,
                                                            )      Judge Presiding.

                JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.
                Justice Doherty concurred in the judgment.
                Presiding Justice DeArmond dissented.

                                            ORDER

¶1     Held: The appellate court reversed the second-stage dismissal of defendant’s
             postconviction petition and remanded for a third-stage evidentiary hearing.
             Defendant made a substantial showing the trial court denied him his sixth
             amendment right to counsel when the record did not firmly establish defendant
             forfeited his right to counsel as a result of severe misconduct or waived his right
             by less severe misconduct. Nor did the record firmly establish the trial court first
             provided a warning and sufficient admonitions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
             401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) when it required defendant to proceed pro se.

¶2              In November 2010, the State charged defendant, Terry R. Payton, with two counts

of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2010)) and one count of burglary (720 ILCS

5/19-1(a) (West 2010)). After defendant twice encountered difficulty working with appointed

counsel, the trial court found defendant forfeited his sixth amendment right to counsel and

refused to appoint new counsel. See U.S. Const., amend. VI. Defendant then pleaded guilty to

one count of armed robbery. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, and the court appointed counsel to represent defendant. After discussing the motion

with defendant, appointed counsel moved to withdraw the motion. The court allowed the

withdrawal of defendant’s pro se motion, and defendant did not file a direct appeal.

¶3             In August 2015, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. In the petition,

defendant argued the trial court denied him of his sixth amendment right to appointed counsel.

The court summarily dismissed the petition, and defendant appealed. The Third District reversed

and remanded for second-stage postconviction proceedings, finding the record did not firmly

establish defendant forfeited his right to counsel as a result of severe misconduct or waived his

right by less severe misconduct. People v. Payton, 2017 IL App (3d) 150673-U, ¶ 26. The court

further found, if defendant waived his right to counsel by less severe misconduct, the record did

not establish the trial court warned defendant of the consequences of his conduct or provide

admonitions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) contemporaneous with

the denial of defendant’s right to counsel. Payton, 2017 IL App (3d) 150673-U, ¶ 27.

¶4             On remand, the State filed a motion to dismiss. Without discussing the Third

District’s order, the trial court granted the State’s motion, factually finding defendant waived his

right to counsel by misconduct and had been admonished of his right to counsel under Rule

401(a).

¶5             Defendant appeals, contending the record definitively shows he did not forfeit his

right to counsel by severe misconduct or waive his right to counsel by less severe misconduct. In

the alternative, he argues if he waived his right to counsel by less severe misconduct, he was

(1) not first properly warned of the consequences of his conduct and (2) not properly admonished

under Rule 401(a).

                                                -2-
¶6             We determine defendant made a substantial showing of a violation of his sixth

amendment right to counsel, and information outside of the record may affect a final

determination of the merits of the petition. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for third-stage

postconviction proceedings.

¶7                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶8             On November 9, 2010, the State charged defendant with armed robbery and

burglary. The trial court appointed public defender William Loeffel to represent defendant.

Judge Stephen Kouri presided over the proceedings.

¶9             At an April 8, 2011, hearing, Loeffel informed the trial court, “to put it mildly,”

he and defendant had a disagreement as to how to proceed with the case, and defendant indicated

he no longer wanted Loeffel’s representation. Defendant had also written a letter to the court

stating he wished to represent himself. Defendant told the court he wanted to represent himself,

and Loeffel stated he thought defendant also wished to have standby counsel. The court

admonished defendant of the charges and potential sentencing range. The court also admonished

defendant of his right to counsel. The following colloquy then occurred:

                       “THE COURT: You also have a right to represent yourself which you’re

               telling me you want to do. Is that what you want to do?

                       THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

                       THE COURT: Okay. I’m gonna let Mr. Loeffel be shown as withdrawn

               from the case and you’ll represent—

                       Now, let me tell you something though, we’re not gonna go back and forth

               on this. We’re not gonna be on the eve of trial and you say, [y]ou know what, this

               is lot more complicated than I thought, I don’t want—

                                               -3-
        THE DEFENDANT: As long as I am provided a counselor, that will be

fine.

        THE COURT: Well, I don’t normally do that, so—

        THE DEFENDANT: So—

        [STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Judge, the People would object to that. I do not

believe the Defendant has any right to standby counsel. I believe the law is clear,

he can represent himself, he can have a counsel of his choice, or if he can’t afford

counsel of his choice, he can have appointed counsel, but he is not entitled to

standby counsel and we would be objecting to that.

        THE COURT: Let me say this, [defendant], I don’t normally do that. I’m

also gonna say, that if—now, I want you to think about this. I’m not gonna force

an attorney on you if you don’t want one and I’m not gonna force the attorney to

represent you if it’s not working out, but I’m not gonna let you pick which

attorney from the Public Defender’s office.

        THE DEFENDANT: Right.

        THE COURT: Let me finish and then I’m gonna let you talk.

        If there comes point in time that I believe, whether it’s Mr. Loeffel or

anyone else is doing something wrong, is neglecting his duty in representing you,

not doing what he’s supposed to be doing, then I would consider giving you a

different attorney in the Public Defender’s office. But if don’t hear that, if I’m

just hearing what I hear often is, [t]he attorney’s not representing me, he’s not, I

hear that in general terms, [w]e disagree on how to proceed, that type of thing,

that comes up, that happens. You’re in a difficult spot, I understand that, but

                                 -4-
               that—those kinds of disagreements happen in these type of situations. But if he’s

               not doing his job, then I would consider giving you a different attorney.

               Irregardless of that, you have the right to represent yourself. I’m just telling you,

               I’m not going to go back and forth on this, meaning, we’re gonna excuse Mr.

               Loeffel now and then somewhere down the road you tell me, [w]ell, I want a new

               attorney or I think need an attorney.

                       Are you sure you want to represent yourself?

                       THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I mean, so I don’t get a counselor to direct me

               through the procedures?

                       THE COURT: Well, that’s not my normal practice.

                       THE DEFENDANT: I’m asking you, is that possible for me?

                       THE COURT: It’s highly unlikely.

                       THE DEFENDANT: Is that a yes or a no?

                       THE COURT: That’s a no, you’re not gonna get one.

                       THE DEFENDANT: So I have to do the whole procedure by myself?

                       THE COURT: Yes, or Mr. Loeffel.”

The court inquired with Loeffel about his representation of defendant and whether Loeffel could

continue to represent defendant. Loeffel told the court he had visited defendant five times.

Referring to his relationship with defendant, Loeffel stated, “We have disagreements as to what’s

legally viable in the case. There are some things, there are some motions that [defendant] has

asked me to file which I will not get into, which I absolutely refuse to file.” Loeffel further told

the court the two disagreed on trial strategy. However, Loeffel also stated, “I certainly, I have no

animosity towards [defendant] and I believe I can certainly stay in the case and represent him.”

                                                -5-
Defendant disagreed Loeffel visited him five times and expressed frustration with how long he

had been in jail. He stated he had been asking to view a video related to the case for almost four

months. The colloquy then continued:

                      “THE COURT: Okay. Now, let’s try to bring it full circle here. Do you—

               do you want time to think about this? Do you want to represent yourself?

                      THE DEFENDANT: I mean, when you—I mean, I thought when you

               represent yourself you are appointed a counselor.

                      THE COURT: No. You know, that’s kind of like being little bit pregnant;

               you either got an attorney or you don’t.

                      THE DEFENDANT: So in order for me to represent myself I would have

               to have enough time to understand due process, the court procedures, et cetera, et

               cetera. You know, that would take a while to learn something that people go to

               school for for so many years. So you put me at a disadvantage here.

                      THE COURT: No, I’m not putting you at any disadvantage, I’m just

               trying to apply the law.

                      THE DEFENDANT: If you appoint me a counselor, then I could work

               with that, but to not have counselor, it’s at a very disadvantage.

                      THE COURT: I’ve appointed you an attorney.

                      THE DEFENDANT: He’s not working.

                      THE COURT: Okay. Well, I’ve kind of laid out your choices. You know,

               if you think you can try to work with Mr. Loeffel—

                      THE DEFENDANT: That’s fine, I’ll do my best then. I’ll

               represent myself.

                                                -6-
                      THE COURT: Is that what you want to do?

                      THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”

The court then allowed Loeffel to withdraw.

¶ 10          The case was continued multiple times between April and September 2011. On

June 11, 2011, defendant sought a continuance until September. The trial court noted the length

of the continuance “doesn’t matter to me” and stated September was “roughly the normal

course.”

¶ 11          On July 11, 2011, defendant appeared in court, and the following colloquy

occurred:

                      “THE DEFENDANT: Is there—is there a time period where I have to be

              prepared to go to trial? I mean the reason I say that is because I have to study. I

              have to study court procedures.

                      THE COURT: I understand.

                      THE DEFENDANT: I have to study when to say objection. That’s a lot I

              have to learn.

                      THE COURT: Okay. Well, are you telling me that you’re not going to be

              ready in September for trial?

                      THE DEFENDANT: I don’t believe so. I’m dealing with experts here.

              You know what I mean? They went to schools to learn these procedures. I have

              no idea what actually—you know what I’m saying? It’s going to take me awhile

              to get the fundamentals down first.

                      THE COURT: Let me ask you this, [defendant]—

                      THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

                                                -7-
       THE COURT: —have you had a little dose of reality here in the sense that

you still feel like you’re going to be able to proceed and feel comfortable

proceeding at some point—

       [THE DEFENDANT]: Oh, without a doubt. I have to.

       THE COURT: —by yourself?

       [THE DEFENDANT]: I have to because the—the reason I have to is

because I don’t believe the public defender will represent me to the best of their

ability. So I believe I have no choice but to do this on my own and do it to the

best of my ability. That’s the way I need—

       THE COURT: All right. Well—

       [STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, the defendant has been

representing himself since May of this year. I see no reason why we need to be

continuing a September trial date at this point. That is plenty of time to go

forward.

       THE COURT: Well, we’re going to leave it on for now.

       THE DEFENDANT: Okay, that’s fine.

       THE COURT: And when I say that don’t read into that, well, that means

the judge might continue it or he is going to continue it. You need to plan on

being prepared on the trial date.

       THE DEFENDANT: I am prepared everyday. It’s not like I’m just sitting

doing nothing. That’s not the case.”

                                -8-
¶ 12           On August 12, 2011, defendant told the trial court he was having trouble finding

materials at the law library. The court told defendant it could not teach him how to use the

library resources. The following colloquy then occurred:

                      “THE DEFENDANT: I’m not asking for that; I’m not—what—I’m saying

               is I’m just—I mean, it’s like—it’s like if can’t find it in a certain amount of time,

               I’m going to be penalized for it. That’s—that’s—that’s the argument that I’m

               really presenting to you, so it’s like how much time do I have to properly prepare

               or—you know what I’m saying?

                      THE COURT: How much time do you want?

                      THE DEFENDANT: I don’t—

                      THE COURT: I don’t care if your case—you’re in custody. I don’t care if

               your case is several months away.

                      THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I just don’t—

                      THE COURT: How much time do you want? I don’t care. I don’t mind

                      THE DEFENDANT: Okay. That’s fine. I just don’t want to get on the

               bad side of you.

                      THE COURT: You’re not on my bad side.

                      THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

                      THE COURT: I am telling you, though, that this is what happens when

               people want to go pro se, meaning represent themselves. All of sudden they don’t

               realize that they’ve crossed the line where they want the judge to help them, and I

               can’t help you.

                      THE DEFENDANT: I mean, that’s fine. I mean, I understand that.

                                                -9-
                      THE COURT: That’s why I take my car to a mechanic.”

After the State expressed concern about delaying trial and further discussion of the amount of

time defendant might need, the court continued the matter to determine the amount of resources

at the law library and stated it was not necessarily going to grant further continuances. On

August 18, the court and the parties discussed a discovery request, and the court scheduled a

status hearing for September 1, 2011.

¶ 13           On September 1, 2011, the trial court readmonished defendant of the

ramifications of his decision to proceed pro se. The court explained self-representation is a

complex matter and defendant would be subject to technical rules he was likely unaware of that

would pose a disadvantage at trial and provided examples. Defendant initially responded, “I

would prefer to be represented by counsel.” However, after the court explained to defendant

counsel would handle all discovery matters, the appointment of counsel would delay matters, and

Loeffel might again be defendant’s counsel, the court asked defendant if he would like to “sleep

on it overnight.” Defendant replied, “Yes.” The next day, defendant elected to remain pro se.

Defendant also sought a continuance to obtain a police report and stated he did not need “the

average continuance for two months.” The State said it had no objection to a short continuance.

In October and November, further continuances were granted with the State’s agreement. Trial

was ultimately set for February 2012.

¶ 14           On November 3, 2011, the case was called for a hearing on defendant’s motion to

quash the indictment. At the beginning of the hearing, the State noted defendant had been

admonished several times about representing himself but had not been admonished of the

potential for consecutive sentences. The trial court then readmonished defendant of the potential

sentence for each charge as well as the potential the sentences would run consecutively.

                                              - 10 -
Defendant indicated he understood the potential sentencing ranges. Defendant reasserted his

desire to represent himself.

¶ 15           On November 23, 2011, defendant sought an original copy of the police report.

The trial court advised defendant the report might not be admissible into evidence and, when

defendant expressed an intent to use the police report, the court responded:

                       “I told you you can have an attorney. You don’t want one. Don’t try to

               drag me into being your attorney. Every time you come out you try to do that.

               Each time progressively I’m getting more and more frustrated because we go over

               the same thing every time. My answer is always the same. I’m not your attorney.

               I have given you an opportunity to have an attorney every time you come out

               here. Do you want an attorney? No, I don’t want an attorney. Fine. But don’t

               then say in the next breath, Judge, I want you to be my attorney because that’s

               essentially what you’re saying.”

Defendant responded, “I don’t think I’m asking for that.”

¶ 16           At a January 5, 2012, hearing, defendant stated he was not ready to proceed on his

motion to suppress statements, and the following colloquy occurred:

                       “THE COURT: Okay. Why not, just out of curiosity?

                       THE DEFENDANT: I’m not clear—or I haven’t had enough information

               to completely understand exactly how to prove the prosecution’s—how the

               prosecution’s misconduct affected the Grand Jury and exactly what makes the

               level of deprivation and what determines probable cause pertaining to the

               provision in the statute.

                                              - 11 -
       THE COURT: Okay, let me ask you a couple things. No. 1, if we don’t go

forward with your motion today, is it your thinking that we will still keep the trial

date where they are at, the trial dates?

       THE DEFENDANT: I don’t know. I mean, I don’t—but if it’s—

       THE COURT: I think it’s coming up here in the next month or so in

February. I think February 14th.

       THE DEFENDANT: Because with the information that I received from

the cases, they didn’t substantiate exactly what I needed to understand, so it was

kind of confusing.

       THE COURT: Let me ask you this, [defendant]—and I ask you this

almost every hearing but not every hearing, but I’m going to ask it again this

hearing—as we are proceeding further and further along in this case, I think

you’re seeing that these are some complex issues. Do you want an attorney or

not?

       THE DEFENDANT: I mean—

       THE COURT: I mean, I know you’ve been steadfast you want to represent

yourself. We have gone over this over and over; but at any such time as you

think, you know what, I want an attorney, maybe I’m in over my head, I’ll give

you an attorney.

       THE DEFENDANT: I mean, it’s, like—I don’t know if, like, the attorney

I had before, Bill Loeffel, I informed him that Detective Shawn Curry never read

me my Miranda warnings, and I can prove that, and he decided to—I asked him

                                - 12 -
to file a motion to suppress my statement, and he decided that I didn’t know what

I was talking about.

        So it’s, like, I mean, if I get a public defender, and he choose not to do

things in the best of my interest and he gets the last say so, then it’s, like, that’s—I

can’t go with that because I’ve got no—certain things in my case that has to be

presented; and if they choose to disregard that, then it’s ineffectiveness on their

part.

        THE COURT: Well, and you’re entitled to raise ineffective counsel, and

you’ll be able to raise it with another attorney after you—if it becomes necessary

for you to appeal the case.

        You’re not—simply by taking an attorney now doesn’t preclude you from

saying, my attorney didn’t do his job on appeal, and they’ll be a different attorney

handling the appeal. I know you don’t want to get to that point, and you might

not get to that point where you have to appeal; but I’m just saying that simply by

accepting an attorney, a public defender, and letting him do his job and so forth,

that doesn’t preclude you from, if necessary, raising the issue of ineffective

counsel.

        You’re not waiving it, but I’m not talking you into having an attorney or

not having an attorney. I just—every time you come out here, I can see you’re

struggling, which is understandable, because you don’t have three years of law

school and several years of experience.

        But if you want to represent yourself—we have gone over this—you can.

If you want an attorney, I’ll give you an attorney. I’m not, though—there are

                                 - 13 -
limits. I’m not going to tell the attorney how to do his job because I’m the Judge.

I’m not the attorney. I’m not going to be your attorney, either, if you represent

yourself, and I’m not going to let you dictate which attorney the public defender

assigns to your case because—

        THE DEFENDANT: Okay. So if I’m appointed an attorney and we have

a conflict of interest, how do I deal with that situation?

        ***

        THE COURT: I deal with it probably on a weekly basis. Usually, it’s a

dispute over, this motion should be filed or shouldn’t be filed or whatever, or he’s

not seeing me enough, not talking to me enough; and almost every time after I

hear it out, which I don’t like hearing it out, but I deal with it and we hear it out,

almost every time it does not result in a new attorney being appointed. I’m not

saying it’s never happened before, but that’s how it usually ends up.

        I can also tell you that there are numerous appeals where ineffective

counsel is raised. I don’t know what else to tell you. But if, you know, you want

to represent yourself, we will continue to try to wade through this, whether it’s

today or down the road, but it doesn’t get any easier once there’s a trial, and I

cannot sit up here and tell you what to do or not to do. I can’t be your attorney.

        THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I would ask to be appointed counsel.

                                 ***

        THE COURT: Now, when that public defender gets involved, it may or

may not be Mr. Loeffel, and he may say, well, I’m not going to pursue this motion

on dismissing the indictment.

                                 - 14 -
       THE DEFENDANT: The motion is—

       THE COURT: Yeah, I don’t know, and then you may have to raise that

issue down the road.

       [STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, before we go any further, I think

he is making it clear, and I know it’s on the record, but his reactions to any time

the Court mentions that the attorney may not file a motion, [defendant] is making

it clear that if he doesn’t—if his attorney doesn’t file whatever he wants him to

file whenever he wants them to file it, then he is going to not agree to work with

them, and we are going to be right back in the situation again where he is going to

want to fire his attorney and do it himself saying they don’t know what they are

doing, they don’t know how to handle my case, I’m the only one that can do it.

       So I think he needs to be again strongly admonished, and it needs to be

made clear to him what the role of an attorney is and how that relationship is

going to operate and that we can’t just keep flip flopping back and forth.

       THE COURT: I know, and everybody’s getting a little frustrated with this

whole thing, and [defendant’s] frustrated. He is the one with the most at stake

here. I shouldn’t say that because there are victims involved that have a lot at

stake, too, alleged victims; but [defendant] has a lot at stake, and the only thing

we are doing today is appointing [defendant] an attorney, and we are not changing

any dates yet or anything like that. So if there becomes another flare-up, which

hopefully there won’t be, but there might be, then we will have to deal with it if

and when that happens.”

                                - 15 -
¶ 17           Later in the hearing, the trial court again told defendant any motions would be

“filtered through your attorney” and explained how defendant could raise concerns about counsel

on appeal. The court then stated:

                       “Now, after I’ve lectured you on all that, do you still want an attorney or

               not? Otherwise, we are going to hear your motion today because, you know what,

               this is getting ridiculous. I’m tired of giving this lecture every time you come out

               here, and we get no[ ]place with your motion.”

Defendant responded he wished to be appointed counsel. The court appointed public defender

Kevin Lowe to represent defendant.

¶ 18           In an ex parte letter to the trial court, dated February 16, 2012, defendant

complained about Lowe’s representation. A copy of the letter appears in the record, but it is

difficult to read. Defendant alleged the letter represented his second request to have Lowe

removed as his appointed counsel. Defendant further alleged Lowe did not have time to meet

with defendant because of Lowe’s caseload. Defendant stated Lowe had a preexisting bias

against him and characterized Lowe’s representation as farcical.

¶ 19           On March 26, 2012, Lowe told the trial court defendant was dissatisfied with his

representation. Lowe stated defendant had filed a complaint in the form of a letter with the

Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC). The ARDC concluded

defendant’s complaints did not warrant an investigation. Lowe also received a letter from

defendant in which defendant expressed his dissatisfaction with Lowe’s representation. Lowe

said the letter “addresses me in some rather unkind terms shall we say,” and added, “[s]o, I don’t

certainly take kindly to that.” Later, Lowe stated the letter also used unkind terms to describe

                                               - 16 -
both himself and other attorneys. Lowe did not provide further specifics of the letter based on

concerns of attorney-client privilege.

¶ 20           Defendant said that he was dissatisfied with Lowe’s representation because Lowe

had not examined the record or consulted with him about his concerns. Defendant further stated,

“I don’t know exactly what to do at this point because I don’t understand why I’m receiving this

type of representation, and is it possible that I can receive decent representation?”

¶ 21           Lowe explained he initially was unable to spend a large amount of time on

defendant’s case because he had three pending jury trials. Lowe also admitted he had not been

able to visit defendant and, by the time his second jury trial concluded, defendant had already

filed the complaint with the ARDC. Lowe stated the letter defendant sent to him personally

upset him but also stated he understood “people are frustrated” and he could “get beyond this

personal letter to me.” The following colloquy then occurred:

                       “THE DEFENDANT: This is, I mean, I don’t know what’s going to

               become of this.

                       THE COURT: I know what’s going to become of this.

                       THE DEFENDANT: I’m sure you do, but I don’t.

                       THE COURT: I do.

                       THE DEFENDANT: The reason I say that is if I can get Mr. Lowe to

               represent me, you know what I’m sayin’, without the low caliber of representation

               that I see now, I wouldn’t have problem, you know what I’m sayin’, allow him to

               represent me.

                       THE COURT: You know what, you’re just going to represent yourself.

               We’ve gone down this road. You’ve exhausted my patience. You have

                                               - 17 -
exhausted my patience. I don’t think you ever want to go to trial. I think you

want to stay right where you’re at.

        THE DEFENDANT: What I want to do, your Honor, I want to present my

motion. And the way I need to present my motion, if I have to do it, then I have

to subpoena Mr. Steven Pattelli.

        THE COURT: Well, Mr. Lowe and Mr. Loeffel and anybody else in the

Public Defender’s office doesn’t get paid enough to [be] told what a lousy job

they’re doing for you.

        THE DEFENDANT: Even if [they’re] doing a lousy job?

        THE COURT: Well, you know what, after two, I’m starting to think

maybe it’s [defendant] and not Mr. Lowe or Mr. Loeffel because I see them all

the time. I’m not supposed to consider this. I see how they do their job all the

time in here. I’m not supposed to consider that, but I don’t see the low caliber—

that doesn’t mean that they might have a bad day or might have a bad case. But

I’m starting to think that it’s [defendant] that has the bad case. That’s what I’m

starting to think.

        So, you know what, you’re not, if you want to get somebody from your

own corporate legal department to represent you, you can. If you want to have

your buddy out at the jail tell you what to do, you can, but we’re not doing this

anymore. We’re not doin’ it anymore. You’re representing yourself. Got it?

        THE DEFENDANT: That’s fine.

        THE COURT: Okay. Because they don’t have to put up with what you’re

dishin’.

                               - 18 -
                       THE DEFENDANT: You’ve made your point clear.

                       THE COURT: Good.

                       THE DEFENDANT: Now, I need some papers to subpoena Steven

              Pattelli.

                       THE COURT: We’ve done all that, and I’m not giving you any more

              papers to subpoena. I’m not giving you standby counsel. You’re set for trial—I

              think a week from today you’re set for trial. I think it’s a week from today. Good

              luck.”

¶ 22          At an April 2, 2012, hearing, defendant said he was not ready for trial because he

needed representation. Defendant further stated he was not hiring private counsel. The trial

court responded:

                       “THE COURT: Okay. Let me make something clear about the ruling that

              I made. I want the record to be clear. I think you’ve forfeited your right to have

              an attorney represent you by the way you were treating your attorney, okay? So

              that’s why I didn’t go through a bunch of admonitions with you, which I’ve gone

              through those admonitions with you in the past, because we keep going back and

              forth, back and forth, back and forth, and we’re not going to do it anymore. And

              when you filed your [ARDC] complaint against I think it was Mr. Loeffel this

              time—I can’t remember.

                       [STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Mr. Lowe.

                       THE COURT: Mr. Lowe, I think you’ve forfeited your right to be

              represented by a public defender. Now, if you want to—if you want to

                                             - 19 -
represent—if you want to hire your own attorney, go right ahead, but I’m not

appointing any more. I’m just not.

       THE DEFENDANT: I mean, if you force me to go pro se, then that’s—

       THE COURT: I’m not forcing you. You made that choice, but go ahead.

       THE DEFENDANT: I was—I was—the last time I was here, I told you

that Kevin Lowe was being ineffective, and he [told] me—he told you himself

that the situation by my writing the [ARDC] put him in an awkward situation, and

that was either he’s going to be hostile toward me or he’s going to be vindictive

towards me.

       [STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Your Honor—

       THE DEFENDANT: And therefore—

       [STATE’S ATTORNEY]: I’m going to object to him saying that. It’s

not—

       THE DEFENDANT: And therefore—and therefore, he’s unreliable. Now,

to give me partial representation—you know what I’m saying—is a violation of

my constitutional rights. So therefore, I’m asking you that—I’m telling you that

I’m not qualified to represent myself, and I need representation.

       THE COURT: Okay. Well, there’s been a long history about this. We’re

not going to regurgitate it every time you come out. And it didn’t start with the

last hearing. It started with other attorneys, and you wanted to represent yourself

pro se. You’re going to keep going through the list until you find somebody that

will agree with you, and I don’t know that you’re going to find somebody that

agrees with you. But I can tell you right now, I’m not appointing anybody else.

                               - 20 -
                       So when are we going to—when are we going to try this case?

                       THE DEFENDANT: I mean, that’s for you to decide, Your Honor.

                       THE COURT: Well, I know. I just did.

                       THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Well, I mean, you asking me—

                       THE COURT: I mean, I decided it a long time ago, but I’ve just repeated

               it.

                       THE DEFENDANT: You asking me when—you asking me when do I

               want to go to trial.

                       THE COURT: Oh, I see.

                       THE DEFENDANT: And I’m telling you that I’m not capable of

               representing myself. So it’s your call.”

The court set the case for trial, and defendant said he intended to file a motion to change “venue”

because he felt that the court was prejudiced against him. Defendant’s motion for substitution of

judge was heard by another judge and denied.

¶ 23           On May 4, 2012, defendant noted he did not have time to present motions and

stated, “I mean, I’ve been trying to get some representation here also, and you denied it.”

Defendant also asked, “Would you consider representation?” and the trial court responded,

“We’re not going to go down that road again at this point.”

¶ 24           On July 2, 2012, the case was called to set a trial date. Defendant again stated he

needed appointed counsel. The trial court responded it had already been through that issue,

noting it thought defendant had been through “four, five, six public defenders.” Defendant

responded that he had two prior public defenders, and the court stated, “Two. That’s it?” The

court explained it needed to review the transcripts “as to the situation with the last public

                                                - 21 -
defender” and indicated it would consider appointing counsel for defendant. The court continued

the case.

¶ 25           On July 13, 2012, the trial court stated it had reviewed the transcripts and it

decided not to appoint standby counsel for defendant, as it had previously told defendant he

would not get standby counsel. The following colloquy then occurred:

                        “THE DEFENDANT: I’m not requesting stand-by counsel. I am

               requesting counsel period.

                        THE COURT: Oh, I see.

                        THE DEFENDANT: I’m not—I’m not qualified to represent myself.

                        THE COURT: Well, we probably agree on that, but—

                        THE DEFENDANT: Yes

                        THE COURT: But you—you’re not getting another attorney. You’ve run

               through them.

                        THE DEFENDANT: So what—how can you deny me my constitutional

               right?

                        THE COURT: You know what—

                        THE DEFENDANT: You’re denying me my Sixth Amendment for

               something that I didn’t—

                        THE COURT: You keep flipping back and forth. You know what I think,

               [defendant]? I think you just want to keep—

                        THE DEFENDANT: No, I want an opportunity—no, no. I want an

               opportunity to read—to receive a reasonable service of representation. That’s it.

                        THE COURT: So what are you suggesting?

                                               - 22 -
                      THE DEFENDANT: I’m suggesting that you appoint me a counselor.

                      THE COURT: Do you want Mr. Lowe?

                      THE DEFENDANT: Do I have choice?

                      THE COURT: No.

                      THE DEFENDANT: Appoint me counselor.

                      THE COURT: I’m not appointing you counsel. I’ve decided—

                      THE DEFENDANT: You just asked me do I want Mr. Lowe.

                      THE COURT: Pardon me?

                      THE DEFENDANT: You just asked me do I want Mr. Lowe.

                      THE COURT: I did.

                      THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Well, appoint me Mr. Lowe.

                      THE COURT: I’ve decided that I’m not appointing you counsel. You are

               going it alone. You are going it alone.”

¶ 26           On July 30, 2012, the case was called for a trial scheduling conference. The State

expressed concern about defendant’s waiver of counsel and told the trial court it wanted the

record to be clear whether defendant still wished to proceed pro se, and if not, whether the court

was willing to appoint counsel, and if not, on what grounds. Defendant stated again he wanted to

be appointed a public defender. The court advised defendant it was not appointing counsel

because defendant had “made a mockery out of this whole process.” The court further stated it

thought defendant was intentionally trying to delay the proceedings. Near the end of the hearing,

the following exchange occurred.

                      “THE DEFENDANT: And I have been denied counsel?

                                              - 23 -
                       THE COURT: Yes, you have been. You have been denied as clear as can

               be as I’m saying it. You’re going it alone.

                       THE DEFENDANT: Okay. So, like—so when it’s time to pick the jury—

                       THE COURT: I’m actually going to consider standby counsel.

                       THE DEFENDANT: Only then?

                       THE COURT: For jury selection.”

¶ 27           On August 15, 2012, defendant entered a fully negotiated guilty plea to one count

of armed robbery. In exchange for his plea, the trial court accepted the State’s recommendation

to dismiss the remaining two charges and impose a sentence of 32 years’ incarceration.

¶ 28           On August 27, 2012, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea,

and the trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant. After discussing the motion with

defendant, appointed counsel moved to withdraw the motion. The court granted the motion to

withdraw defendant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Defendant did not file a direct appeal.

¶ 29           On August 3, 2015, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. In the

petition, defendant argued the trial court denied him his sixth amendment right to appointed

counsel. The court summarily dismissed the petition.

¶ 30           Defendant appealed. In September 2017, the Third District reversed and

remanded for second-stage postconviction proceedings. Relying in part on this court’s opinion

in People v. Ames, 2012 IL App (4th) 110513, ¶ 34, 978 N.E.2d 1119, the appellate court noted

two ways a defendant’s conduct may affect his right to counsel: (1) forfeiture of the right to

counsel resulting from the defendant’s severe misconduct (such as physically attacking defense

counsel), which requires no prior warning and (2) waiver of the right to counsel resulting from

less severe forms of misconduct. In the second instance, after a trial court’s warning, a

                                               - 24 -
defendant’s engagement in dilatory tactics may be treated as an implied request to proceed pro se

and, thus, as a waiver of counsel. Payton, 2017 IL App (3d) 150573-U, ¶¶ 22-23. The court

found the record did not firmly establish defendant forfeited his right to counsel as a result of

severe misconduct or waived his right by less severe misconduct. People v. Payton, 2017 IL

App (3d) 150673-U, ¶ 26. The court further found, if defendant waived his right to counsel by

less severe misconduct, the record did not establish the trial court provided the necessary

warnings or admonitions before it denied defendant’s right to counsel. Accordingly, defendant

stated the gist of a constitutional claim, making summary dismissal improper. Payton, 2017 IL

App (3d) 150673-U, ¶ 27.

¶ 31           On remand, the case was assigned to Judge Paul Gilfillan. On November 8, 2017,

in a written order, Gilfillan noted the remand and issues and set the matter for second-stage

review. However, the second-stage hearing was presided over by Judge Katherine Gorman.

¶ 32           The trial court appointed counsel. The record shows there were multiple

continuances, including changes of counsel, along with an intervening “General Order in Peoria

County Post-Conviction Cases or Other Post Conviction-Type Cases” that delayed review of

certain postconviction actions. On August 23, 2021, counsel filed a supplemental petition

incorporating defendant’s arguments in his pro se petition and alleging the court denied

defendant’s right to counsel and failed to properly admonish him concerning waiver of counsel

by misconduct.

¶ 33           On July 6, 2022, the State moved to dismiss. In its motion, the State did not

mention the Third District’s disposition and remand and instead stated, “After a first stage

review by [Judge Gilfillan], the matter was docketed for [stage-two] proceedings and defendant

was appointed defense counsel.” The State further stated the docketing order filed by the trial

                                               - 25 -
court “indicated there were [two] issues that needed to be considered upon second stage review:”

(1) whether defendant waived his right to counsel due to misconduct and (2) if defendant did

waive his right to counsel, whether the court improperly failed to admonish defendant a second

time when it denied defendant his right to counsel. The State then recited the basic facts without

citing any legal principles. The State also did not argue defendant forfeited the issues by failing

to raise them on direct appeal. Defendant argued he did not waive his right to counsel by

misconduct, was not properly warned of the consequences of his conduct, and was not given

proper Rule 401(a) admonitions when the court denied him counsel. He requested a third-stage

evidentiary hearing.

¶ 34           At the August 19, 2022, hearing on the matter, the trial court stated, “All right.

So am I correct that on August 3rd of 2015, [defendant] filed a pro se post conviction petition

that was adopted on August 23rd of 2021, and then a motion to dismiss was filed?” Defense

counsel replied “yes” and indicated the court was not missing any pleadings. The State conceded

twice it did not think defendant forfeited his right to counsel by severe misconduct. However,

the State argued defendant waived his right to counsel by misconduct. The State then argued

defendant was previously admonished at least twice of his right to counsel, and the record

showed he understood that right. Defense counsel argued defendant’s conduct did not amount to

a waiver of his right to counsel. Citing People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, 123 N.E.2d 1060,

defense counsel also argued, even if defendant’s conduct could amount to waiver of his right to

counsel by misconduct, the court failed to properly warn him before denying him counsel.

¶ 35           On September 20, 2022, the trial court found defendant waived his right to

counsel “due to his efforts to circumvent and delay the process” and found the court covered the

ramifications of that decision. The court did not discuss the order of the Third District or the

                                               - 26 -
cases the appellate court relied on when remanding the case for second-stage proceedings.

Instead, it cited two cases involving the appointment of standby counsel for the proposition

“though an indigent defendant is entitled to have counsel appointed for him, the right to counsel

of your choosing may not be employed as a weapon to thwart indefinitely the administration of

justice or otherwise embarrass the prosecution of the crime.” See People v. Myles, 86 Ill. 2d 260,

427 N.E.2d 59 (1981); People v. Timmons, 233 Ill. App. 3d 591, 599 N.E.2d 162 (1992).

¶ 36           This appeal followed.

¶ 37                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 38           On appeal, defendant contends the record definitively shows he did not forfeit his

right to counsel by severe misconduct or waive his right to counsel by less severe misconduct. In

the alternative, he argues, if he waived his right to counsel by less severe misconduct, he was

(1) not first properly warned of the consequences of his conduct and (2) not properly admonished

under Rule 401(a). He asks us to reverse the dismissal of his postconviction petition and either

(1) find that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary and remand for a new trial or, in the

alternative, (2) remand for a third-stage evidentiary hearing.

¶ 39           Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West

2022)), a convicted defendant may challenge his or her conviction on the basis he or she suffered

the deprivation of state or federal constitutional rights. People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688,

¶ 32, 987 N.E.2d 767. The Act sets forth a three-stage process: at the first stage, a defendant

need only present the gist of a constitutional claim. At the second stage, a defendant’s petition

and its accompanying documentation must make a substantial showing of a constitutional

deprivation. At the third stage, an evidentiary hearing on the claim is held. Domagala, 2013 IL

113688, ¶¶ 32-34.

                                               - 27 -
¶ 40           When a petition is advanced to the second stage, the court may appoint counsel

for an indigent defendant, and counsel may amend the postconviction petition as necessary.

People v. Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 27, 51 N.E.3d 802.

¶ 41           The State may answer the petition, in which case the proceedings are advanced to

the third stage, or it may move to dismiss the petition. People v. Andrews, 403 Ill. App. 3d 654,

658, 936 N.E.2d 648, 653 (2010). If the State moves to dismiss the petition at the second stage,

such a dismissal is warranted only when the allegations in the petition fail to make a substantial

showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 334, 841 N.E.2d 913, 920

(2005). We review de novo the trial court’s dismissal of a postconviction petition at the second

stage. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473, 861 N.E.2d 999, 1008 (2006).

¶ 42                    A. Forfeiture of Defendant’s Postconviction Claims

¶ 43           Before addressing defendant’s claims, we note the State argues defendant

forfeited his claims because he failed to raise them in a direct appeal. The State acknowledges it

did not previously raise the issue of forfeiture in the trial court or in the first appeal. However,

the State argues it may now raise the issue for the first time and further contends the factual basis

for defendant’s contentions is based on the existing record, such that the matter could have been

determined on direct appeal. We disagree.

¶ 44           The doctrines of forfeiture and res judicata typically bar arguments which were

raised or could have been raised on direct appeal from being raised in a postconviction petition.

People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 442-45, 831 N.E.2d 604, 614-616 (2005). Further, a

postconviction petition is subject to dismissal on grounds of res judicata or forfeiture at both the

first and second stages. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d at 450-51, 831 N.E.2d at 618-19 (2005); see People v.

Smith, 2013 IL App (4th) 110220, ¶ 27, 986 N.E.2d 1274 (stating the trial court has the authority

                                                - 28 -
to summarily dismiss a petition based on a finding the defendant could have but did not raise the

claims in an earlier proceeding). However, the failure to file a direct appeal does not forfeit

constitutional claims in a postconviction hearing. People v. Grammer, 24 Ill. App. 3d 648, 651,

321 N.E.2d 735, 737 (1974); People v. Rose, 43 Ill. 2d 273, 279, 253 N.E.2d 456, 461 (1969)

(“[A] party who fails to take an appeal, whether by careful choice, inadvertence, indigence, or as

a result of fleeing the jurisdiction as here, may waive claims of error, but any right which may

have existed to a post-conviction hearing on the constitutionality of imprisonment will remain

undiminished.”). Because no direct appeal was taken in this case, we may consider defendant’s

constitutional claims.

¶ 45           Moreover, it has long been held res judicata and forfeiture do not apply where

fundamental fairness so requires or where facts relating to the claim do not appear on the face of

the original appellate record. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d at 450-51, 831 N.E.2d at 619. “The right to

counsel is fundamental and will not be lightly deemed waived.” People v. Stoops, 313 Ill. App.

3d 269, 273, 728 N.E.2d 1241, 1244 (2000); see generally People v. Vernón, 396 Ill. App. 3d

145, 149, 919 N.E. 2d 966, 972 (2009) (expressing doubt the court could apply the forfeiture

doctrine to a failure to admonish of the right to counsel). In addition, despite the parties’

insistence that determination of this appeal can be accomplished from the face of the record, as

we discuss in the following section of this disposition, we disagree. Thus, the issue also is not

one that was amenable to determination on direct appeal, leaving postconviction proceedings a

particularly proper course of action. Accordingly, we address defendant’s claims.

¶ 46             B. Forfeiture and Waiver of the Right to Counsel by Misconduct

¶ 47           Defendant contends the record definitively shows he did not forfeit his right to

counsel by severe misconduct or waive his right to counsel by less severe misconduct. In the

                                                - 29 -
alternative, he argues, if he waived his right to counsel by less severe conduct, he was (1) not

first properly warned of the consequences of his conduct and (2) not properly admonished under

Rule 401(a).

¶ 48             At the outset, we note defendant argues the parties agree that he did not forfeit his

right to counsel because of severe misconduct. Meanwhile, the State conceded the issue in the

trial court, and it does not clearly contest the issue in its appellate brief. However, our review of

the matter is de novo, and “[i]rrespective of the parties’ arguments, the record is what it is.”

People v. Carter, 2015 IL 117709, ¶ 22, 43 N.E.3d 972. Thus, “[a]s far as any arguable

concession is concerned, it is well established that we, as a court of review, are not bound by a

party’s concession.” Carter, 2015 IL 117709, ¶ 22. To the extent the State could be deemed to

have conceded the issue in the trial court or on appeal, we are not bound by such a concession

and will decline to accept a concession that the record fails to support. See People v. Rolfe, 2016

IL App (4th) 130832, ¶ 13, 51 N.E.3d 1130.

¶ 49             We also note the trial court proceedings originally took place under the

jurisdiction of the Third District. After the Third District decided the first appeal, Peoria County

was redistricted from the Third District to the Fourth District. Pursuant to the order of our

supreme court:

                 “If a case is heard by one appellate district on appeal and if a subsequent appeal in

                 that case is heard by a new appellate district pursuant to this order, the new

                 district shall treat the decision of the prior district as the law of the case. The fact

                 that the decision of the prior district applied the law of the prior district that is

                 contrary to the law of the new district shall not be a basis for departing from the

                 decision of the prior district.” Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30858 (eff. Dec. 8, 2021).

                                                  - 30 -
Accordingly, the propositions of law set forth below are generally derived from the Third

District’s disposition remanding defendant’s case for second-stage proceedings, which we

observe relied heavily on this court’s disposition in Ames.

¶ 50           The sixth amendment entitles a criminal defendant to counsel at all critical stages

of the prosecution. Vernón, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 153, 919 N.E.2d at 975. This right extends to the

plea-bargaining process. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012). However, a defendant can

expressly waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se during the proceedings. People v.

Lesley, 2017 IL App (3d) 140793, ¶ 17, 76 N.E.3d 42, overruled on other grounds, Lesley, 2018

IL 122100. A defendant may also relinquish his right by (1) forfeiture or (2) waiver by

misconduct. Ames, 2012 IL App (4th) 110513, ¶ 26.

¶ 51           Forfeiture of a defendant’s right to counsel results from a defendant’s severe

misconduct and requires no prior warning. Ames, 2012 IL App (4th) 110513, ¶ 37. A trial court

has the discretion to determine the defendant’s misconduct was so severe that no warning of

forfeiture of counsel is necessary or foreseeable before the court concludes the defendant has

forfeited his right to counsel. Ames, 2012 IL App (4th) 110513, ¶ 37. “ ‘[F]orfeiture [of

counsel] is reserved for the most severe cases of misconduct and should result only when less

restrictive measures are inappropriate.’ ” Lesley, 2017 IL App (3d) 140793, ¶ 18 (quoting

Arizona v. Hampton, 92 P.3d 871, 874 (2004) (en banc)).

¶ 52           A defendant waives his right to counsel as a result of less severe forms of

misconduct that persist after a trial court’s warning to defendant that continued misconduct will

result in the loss of the right to appointed counsel. Lesley, 2017 IL App (3d) 140793, ¶ 19. After

a trial court’s warning, a defendant’s engagement in dilatory tactics “ ‘may be treated as an

implied request to proceed pro se and, thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel.’ ” Ames, 2012 IL

                                               - 31 -
App (4th) 110513, ¶ 34 (quoting United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1100 (3d Cir. 1995)).

In addition, before a defendant’s misconduct can result in waiver of counsel, a trial court must

comply with the admonishment requirements of Rule 401(a).

¶ 53           In defendant’s first appeal, the Third District, noting the limitations put upon it on

an appeal from a first-stage summary dismissal of a postconviction petition, indicated it was not

concerned with whether the facts affirmatively established defendant’s conduct resulted in

forfeiture or waiver of counsel. Instead, the relevant question was whether defendant stated the

gist of a constitutional claim—that is, whether he sufficiently showed his conduct did not rise to

the level of misconduct required to find either forfeiture or waiver. The court found it “highly

questionable whether defendant’s letter to Lowe, and defendant’s use of alternating requests to

proceed pro se, constitute misconduct of such a severe nature so as to justify his forfeiture of

appointed counsel.” Payton, 2017 IL App (3d), 150673-U, ¶ 26. Likewise, the court found

“there is a question of fact as to whether defendant’s letter to Lowe, and defendant’s use of

alternating requests to proceed pro se, establish misconduct in the sense that defendant was

attempting to intentionally delay the proceedings.” Payton, 2017 IL App (3d), 150673-U, ¶ 26.

Accordingly, defendant alleged the gist of a claim that he did not forfeit or waive his right to

counsel due to misconduct, and the court remanded for second-stage proceedings. Payton, 2017

IL App (3d), 150673-U, ¶ 26.

¶ 54           Likewise, we too, at the second stage, are not concerned whether the facts

affirmatively establish defendant’s conduct resulted in forfeiture or waiver of counsel. At the

second stage of postconviction proceedings, the trial court is concerned merely with determining

whether the petition’s allegations sufficiently demonstrate a constitutional infirmity that would

necessitate relief under the Act. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1071

                                               - 32 -
(1998). At this stage, “the defendant bears the burden of making a substantial showing of a

constitutional violation,” and “all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the trial

record are to be taken as true.” Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473, 861 N.E.2d at 1008. Our supreme

court has emphasized when a petitioner’s claims are based on matters outside the record, the Act

does not intend such claims be adjudicated on the pleadings. People v. Simms, 192 Ill. 2d 348,

360, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1105 (2000). Thus, at a dismissal hearing, the court is prohibited from

engaging in any fact finding. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 380-81, 701 N.E.2d at 1071. The dismissal

of a postconviction petition at the second stage is warranted only when the allegations in the

petition, liberally construed in light of the trial record, fail to make a substantial showing of a

constitutional violation. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 382, 701 N.E.2d at 1072.

¶ 55           Here, despite the parties’ assertions to the contrary, a determination of issues of

forfeiture or waiver of counsel by misconduct involves factual questions partially based on

matters outside the record. As to forfeiture, while we agree with the Third District it is “highly

questionable whether defendant’s letter to Lowe, and defendant’s use of alternating requests to

proceed pro se, constitute misconduct of such a severe nature so as to justify his forfeiture of

appointed counsel,” a full determination of the matter necessitates further details about

defendant’s letters to Lowe and his complaint to the ARDC, along with greater details about his

behavior toward both Loeffler and Lowe.

¶ 56           The trial court has the discretion to find forfeiture of the right to counsel in certain

contexts involving extremely serious misconduct. While the Third District noted the lack of a

physical confrontation, extremely serious misconduct is not limited to a physical battery. See

United States v Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 250 (3rd Cir. 1998). It may also include a context in

which a defendant is “abusive toward his attorney,” and can include situations in which the

                                                - 33 -
defendant was verbally abusive, threatened to harm counsel, threatened to sue counsel, or tried to

persuade counsel to engage in unethical conduct. United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325

(11th Cir. 1995). It also may include yelling at counsel, combined with refusal to cooperate with

counsel, and attempts to force counsel to file frivolous claims, especially if the defendant

engaged in such conduct in relationships with multiple attorneys. See United States v. Thomas,

357 F.3d 357, 363 (3rd Cir. 2004), see also Kostyshyn v. Delaware, 51 A.3d 416, 419-20 (2012)

(stating defendant’s yelling, coupled with derogatory and insulting statements and threats to sue

counsel, was sufficiently egregious activity so as to forfeit the right to counsel). We are not

aware of a case in which the filing of an unwarranted disciplinary complaint alone constituted

sufficiently severe conduct to allow a finding of forfeiture by misconduct. However, we note the

North Carolina Court of Appeals has found forfeiture when a defendant was “deliberately

difficult,” continually argumentative, and uncooperative with counsel, and where defendant had

filed a complaint against his counsel with the State bar. North Carolina v. Forte, 817 S.E.2d

764, 775-76 (2018). Further, the Third District, without discussing the difference between

forfeiture of counsel and waiver of counsel, has held a defendant “waived” the right to counsel

by refusing to cooperate with counsel, delaying proceedings, and filing a federal lawsuit and a

disciplinary complaint against counsel with the ARDC. People v. Kennedy, 204 Ill. App. 3d 681,

683-84, 561 N.E.2d 1347, 1349-50 (1990).

¶ 57           Here, evidence showed defendant was difficult to work with and that he presented

challenges to more than one attorney. Loeffel informed the trial court, “to put it mildly,” he and

defendant had a disagreement as to how to proceed with the case, and defendant indicated he no

longer wanted Loeffel’s representation. Defendant further sent a letter to Lowe, which Lowe

stated, “addresses me in some rather unkind terms shall we say.” Later Lowe stated the letter

                                               - 34 -
also used “unkind terms” to describe himself and other attorneys. However, complete details of

defendant’s conduct toward his attorneys are outside of the record. In particular, specific details

of defendant’s letter to Lowe are outside of the record; thus, it is unknown whether the “unkind

terms” included threats, abusive language, or material that would rise to the level of extremely

serious misconduct. Lowe stated defendant also filed a complaint with the ARDC, which

concluded defendant’s complaints did not warrant an investigation. But that complaint is also

not in the record, and it is unknown if the allegations included were abusive or entirely frivolous.

There are also indications defendant asked both of his attorneys to file frivolous motions and that

he was repeatedly uncooperative.

¶ 58           This is not to say that defendant’s actions were such as to warrant the trial court’s

finding of forfeiture of his right to counsel by severe misconduct. However, the final

determination of that issue requires fact finding that is not appropriate at the second stage of

postconviction proceedings.

¶ 59           Likewise, whether defendant waived counsel by less serious misconduct also

requires fact finding at third-stage proceedings. While the trial court found defendant’s actions

dilatory, and defendant’s letter to Lowe and filing of a complaint against Lowe with the ARDC

certainly suggest waiver by misconduct, as previously noted, the record is missing details about

the letters to Lowe and the ARDC complaint. As to whether defendant’s actions were dilatory,

we note the record shows multiple occasions in which defendant stated arguably valid reasons

for seeking continuances, and in many instances those continuances were agreed to by the State.

Further, the court expressed indifference about the delays on multiple occasions. At third-stage

proceedings, defendant would have the opportunity to present evidence to show his actions were

not intended to unnecessarily delay the proceedings.

                                               - 35 -
¶ 60           Because we remand for third-stage proceedings, we need not address defendant’s

remaining arguments that the trial court erred in determining he was sufficiently warned and

provided Rule 401(a) admonitions before the court denied him counsel. However, as discussed

further below, we note the court did not fully apply the appropriate law when it determined the

issues. Accordingly, because the matter could arise again on remand, we address the appropriate

law to be applied.

¶ 61                                    C. Failure to Warn

¶ 62           Defendant argues the trial court failed to warn him of the consequences of his

conduct before depriving him of counsel. As previously indicated, forfeiture of the right to

counsel based on serious misconduct requires no warnings. However, this court, the Third

District, and our supreme court have all held, before a trial court may deny a defendant the right

to counsel based on waiver by misconduct, it must first warn the defendant of such a possibility.

¶ 63           In Ames, this court adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in

Goldberg, holding, “ ‘Once a defendant has been warned that he will lose his attorney if he

engages in dilatory tactics, any misconduct thereafter may be treated as an implied request to

proceed pro se and, thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Ames, 2012

IL App 4th 110513, ¶ 34 (quoting Goldberg, 67 F. 3d at 1100). As the Ames court explained:

               “ ‘These are not “waiver” cases in the true sense of the word. In many

               situations[,] there will be defendants who engage in dilatory conduct but who

               vehemently object to being forced to proceed pro se. These defendants cannot

               truly be said to be “waiving” their Sixth Amendment rights because although they

               are voluntarily engaging in misconduct knowing what they stand to lose, they are

               not affirmatively requesting to proceed pro se. See United States v. Fazzini, 871

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               F.2d 635 (7th Cir. [1989]) (defendant who was warned about consequences of

               dilatory conduct insisted he was not waiving his right to counsel), cert. denied,

               493 U.S. 982, 110 S. Ct. 517, 107 L. Ed.2d 518 (1989).’ ” Ames, 2012 IL App

               4th 110513, ¶ 34 (quoting Goldberg, 67 F. 3d at 1101).

¶ 64           This court further held in Ames the same colloquy required for affirmative

waivers must also be given before a defendant can be said to have waived his right to counsel by

conduct. Ames, 2012 IL App 4th 110513, ¶ 35. Thus, combining the two propositions, this court

stated, “For a trial court to conclude that waiver of counsel by conduct has occurred in the case

before it, the court must first comply with the requirements of Rule 401(a), explaining to the

defendant what is at stake if his conduct continues.” Ames, 2012 IL App 4th 110513, ¶ 38.

¶ 65           In Ames, this court ultimately held the trial court committed reversible error

because it never admonished defendant pursuant to Rule 401(a). This court noted the trial court

there “could have—and should have—repeatedly admonished defendant pursuant to Rule 401(a).

The court should also have emphasized that his conduct could constitute his waiver of counsel.”

Ames, 2012 IL App 4th 110513, ¶ 38.

¶ 66           In Lesley, the Third District applied Ames to hold the trial court erred when it

found the trial court never warned the defendant he could lose his right to appointed counsel if

his misconduct toward his attorney continued. In doing so, the court stated, “In the absence of

such a warning, defendant’s repeated failure to cooperate with his appointed counsel cannot be

construed as a knowing waiver.” Lesley, 2017 IL App (3d) 140793, ¶ 21.

¶ 67           Our supreme court reversed the appellate court in Lesley based on the facts,

finding the defendant had been sufficiently warned, but it applied the same law. Lesley, 2018 IL

122100, ¶ 60. Addressing waiver of counsel by conduct, the court favorably cited cases holding

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defendants who were warned of the consequences of their failure to cooperate were appropriately

found to have waived their right to counsel by conduct. See Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 53

(collecting cases). The court further stated, while it declined to impose specific requirements of

trial courts faced with difficult defendants, “we instruct them to warn defendants of the

consequences of their repeated refusals to work with appointed counsel and the difficulties of

self-representation before requiring them to proceed pro se.” Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 61.

¶ 68           Here, the Third District in the first appeal expressly noted, even if it found the

record conclusively established defendant engaged in misconduct resulting in his waiver of

counsel, the record did not clearly indicate the trial court provided the necessary warnings before

it denied defendant’s right to counsel. Payton, 2017 IL App (3d) 150673-U, ¶ 27. However, the

trial court did not address the issue of a warning on remand or apply the law set forth by the

Third District. Instead, the court relied on two distinguishable cases involving the lack of Rule

401(a) admonitions when the court did not entirely discharge counsel. : Myles and Timmons.

Indeed, the record of the second-stage hearing, which occurred nearly five years after the

remand, indicates the trial court and the parties did not specifically discuss the remand and

referred to the proceeding as if the trial court had advanced the petition from the first to the

second stage. On remand, if it becomes applicable, the court should apply the law pertaining to

the warning that must be given before a court denies a defendant counsel based on waiver of

counsel by misconduct.

¶ 69           Regarding Rule 401(a) admonitions, those were also required if defendant waived

his right to counsel by conduct. In that regard, the Third District, in the first appeal, noted an

argument by the State that earlier Rule 401(a) admonitions were sufficient to satisfy Rule 401(a)

requirements. The appellate court found the issue presented a question of law as to whether the

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earlier admonition, which was provided when defendant voluntarily elected to proceed pro se,

carried through to the proceedings where the court denied defendant’s right to counsel. Payton,

2017 IL App (3d) 150673-U, ¶ 27.

¶ 70           Regarding that question of law, we note the issue is currently pending before our

supreme court. People v. Ratliff, 2022 IL App (3d) 210194-U, petition for leave to appeal

allowed, No. 129356 (Mar. 29, 2023). Because there are underlying factual issues that could

preclude this issue arising on remand, and because the outcome of that appeal could affect a

determination of whether any Rule 401(a) admonitions or warnings to defendant about the

effects of his conduct must be contemporaneously addressed with the denial of counsel issue, we

decline to address the law on that issue at this juncture.

¶ 71                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 72           For the reasons stated, defendant made a substantial showing of a constitutional

claim of the denial of his right to counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment

and remand for third-stage postconviction proceedings.

¶ 73           Reversed and remanded.

¶ 74           PRESIDING JUSTICE DeARMOND, dissenting:

¶ 75           I respectfully dissent. I would find defendant failed to make a substantial

showing of a constitutional claim that he was denied his right to counsel as the result of waiver

by conduct. The record reveals defendant engaged in an intentional abuse of the court process,

dilatory tactics, and repeated efforts to manipulate the trial court into appointing standby counsel

or counsel who would follow his direction, regardless of its legal or strategic propriety. Further,

I believe the court properly admonished defendant, as contemplated by Rule 401(a), when it

repeatedly explained, or attempted to explain, the dangers of self-representation. Defendant

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demonstrated his understanding through his comments, requests, and obvious experience. More

importantly, in my opinion, he understood exactly how he was manipulating the system.

Ultimately, defendant expressed his desire to proceed pro se, and he eventually avoided trial and

obtained a favorable plea agreement. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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