Court Opinion

ID: 9731440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:45:52.197828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:18.147526
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
concurring.
Despite my sympathy with those of us who must interpret these statutes, I differ from the reasoning of the majority opinion while I concur in the result.
My first objection rests on factual grounds: I found no evidence in the transcript of the trial to demonstrate that the statement by the wife admitted there was made in confidence. The statement at issue is that Andrew Hancharik told his wife:
He just claimed that he loved her very much and he needed a daughter to complete his family. I told him if that was the case he had to consider the grandmother’s feeling cause she’d spent a lot of time with her grandmother throughout the years. She just couldn’t be shut off from her life. I said I’m not her mother. You will have to go talk to her mother and he did. He told her of his need for a daughter and how much he really loved Kathy and Kathy enjoyed being with us as far as I knew.
******
Q. You indicated he was spending more time with her than you and your son. Did things seem to be progressing the way you believed that they should?
A. No. He always expressed a need to me to need this relaxation. He said when his family was complete then he could relax when Kathy was around. To me he wasn’t relaxing. Only way he could relax was if Kathy and him go for a drive or left alone. My son and I were kind of just there to complete the family.
(T.T. at pp. 28-29).
The trial court (Maj. opinion at p. 442) concluded that the statement was not privileged. The Superior Court en banc *448disagreed by determining that the statements were confidential.
As posed by the majority of our Court, the statement-issue reads (Maj. opinion at p. 437): “that ‘he loved [the girl] very much and needed a daughter to complete his family’ and ‘he could relax when [she] was around.’ ” Without explanation, the majority then concludes that the “testimony complained of just as clearly does come within the scope of section 5914 as confidential communications.”
It is not clear at all. A close reading of the transcript as quoted above shows that Appellant’s confession of love also was made to the victim’s mother, according to the uncontested testimony of his wife as to that fact. The record, therefore, speaks for itself as either a public statement or a waiver of any intent to maintain confidentiality. In either case, I conclude that the language cannot be designated as a confidence. I fear that the majority has decided that the Appellant’s sexual act upon the girl defines his profession of “love” as a presumption of romantic love. The evidence, therefore, is being read backwards from his deviate conduct to his feelings of “love.”
The general context of the relevant testimony, moreover, offers no support for the majority’s conclusions. Appellant told at least two people that he loved the girl, but likewise repeated his feelings that an adopted daughter would satisfy his vision of a “complete” family along with his son and that he could “relax” with her as a family member. As the majority recognizes, he told at least several other people that he wanted to adopt an “older” girl. Nothing about this broader testimony manifests any sense of confidentiality.
Because I cannot agree that a predicate of spousal confidentiality existed by virtue of this statement, I find that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the testimony. I am convinced that the majority opinion has been misled by an acutely strained reading of the testimony in order to establish a confidential communication between the Hanchariks.
*449I likewise disagree sharply with the contention that the statutory scheme embodied in sections 5913, 5914 and 5915 of 42 Pa.C.S. would foreclose revelation of a spousal confidence under these circumstances. The Superior Court decided the issue correctly, and even assuming arguendo that a confidential communication was present, I would agree that where an exception is provided in criminal cases involving an act against a child, the defendant’s spouse would be competent to testify. As pointed out by Judge Tamilia’s concurring opinion, the evolution of legal doctrine on this subject from the common law to modern statutes indicates an undeniable trend to protect children who have been abused.
In a more technical sense, by enacting amendments to § 5913, the legislature, I am convinced, meant to destroy the spousal privilege where a child in the home suffers violence. Contrary to the majority’s reading, I interpret § 5914’s prefatory pronouncement, “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter,” to refer to § 5913 and § 5915 and underscore the fact that the identical language appears in the former as well. Sections 5913 and 5914, therefore, are meant to read that a spousal confidentiality exists, except where certain conduct specifically destroys the privilege, as in this case. Section 5914 must be read in terms of the exceptions provided by § 5913. When two statutes conflict, the more specific one closely applicable to the controversy controls over a more generalized provision. The narrower and earlier statute should decide the meaning of the subsequent statute, § 5914 in this case. A common sense construction of this language makes it plain that spousal incompetency is limited by the stated exceptions. Finally, a court is not permitted to alter or ignore the unmistakable language of a statute. Commonwealth v. Scott, 516 Pa. 346, 357, 532 A.2d 426, 429 (1987) (construing § 5913). While cognizant of bad draftsmanship, I am convinced firmly that Mrs. Hancharik’s testimony was permissible.