Court Opinion

ID: 9380977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 18:07:00.073232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:28.761259
License: Public Domain

J-A20039-22

                                  2023 PA SUPER 45

    DENIA EDWARDS, PERSONAL         :             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF :                  PENNSYLVANIA
    DOUGLAS A. EDWARDS              :
                                    :
                                    :
             v.                     :
                                    :
                                    :
    NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY        :             No. 826 EDA 2021
    COMPANY                         :
                                    :
                  Appellant         :

               Appeal from the Order Entered November 2, 2020
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                              No(s): 181003685

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                             FILED MARCH 21, 2023

        Under the relation back doctrine, our courts, in certain situations, have

validated the acts of a personal representative of an estate that predate their

official appointment. In this interlocutory appeal by permission, we consider

whether the doctrine applies when a plaintiff timely files an action on behalf

of an estate but does not apply to be appointed the personal representative

until after the statute of limitations has run.

        Finding that the doctrine applies in such situations, the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) denied the motion for

summary judgment filed by Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk

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*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A20039-22

Southern) to dismiss the action filed by Denia Edwards (Edwards), personal

representative of the estate of Douglas A. Edwards, her late husband’s estate.

Norfolk Southern appeals from that order and argues that the relation back

doctrine is inapplicable here because Edwards did not apply to be the personal

representative of the estate until two months after the expiration of the

statute of limitations. After review, we affirm and hold that her appointment

as personal representative of her late husband’s estate relates back to her

filing the complaint.

                                               I.

       On October 27, 2015, Douglas A. Edwards died. On October 26, 2018,

with one day left before the statute of limitations expired, Edwards filed an

action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60,

alleging that her late husband’s renal cell cancer was caused by his two-

decade-plus employment with Norfolk Southern.1 The complaint named the

plaintiff as “Denia Edwards, personal representative for the estate of Douglas

A. Edwards.” At the time, however, Edwards had neither applied for nor been

appointed the personal representative of her late husband’s estate, even

though she was named the executor in his last will and testament.          On

December 27, 2018, two months after the statute of limitations for a FELA

____________________________________________

1The statute of limitations for bringing a FELA action is three years. See 45
U.S.C. § 56 (“No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless
commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued.”).

                                           -2-
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action had run, Edwards finally applied to be the personal representative of

her late husband’s estate in Mercer County, West Virginia, which is where she

and her late husband lived.2

       Norfolk Southern filed preliminary objections for lack of personal

jurisdiction, which were denied after Edwards filed an amended complaint.3

Norfolk Southern then filed an answer and new matter raising the statute of

limitations as a defense, following which it moved for summary judgment on

that basis asserting that the action was time-barred because Edwards did not

apply to be the personal representative until after the statute of limitations

had expired.        Edwards countered that her appointment as personal

representative related back to her filing the complaint. The trial court agreed

and denied summary judgment.             After the trial court refused to certify its

order as an appealable interlocutory order, Norfolk Southern petitioned this

Court for permission to appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1311(b), which we granted.

____________________________________________

2Under West Virginia law, “[a] person appointed to be the executor of a will
shall not have the powers of executor until he or she qualifies by taking an
oath and giving bond, unless not required to post bond by § 44-1-8 of this
code… .” W. Va. Code § 44-1-1.

3 Norfolk Southern properly did not raise their statute of limitations defense
in their preliminary objections. See Sayers v. Heritage Valley Medical
Group, Inc., 247 A.3d 1155, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“Generally, a statute
of limitations defense is properly raised in new matter and not in preliminary
objections.”); Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030(a) (“[A]ll affirmative defenses including but
not limited to the defenses of ... statute of limitations ... shall be pleaded in a
responsive pleading under the heading ‘New Matter’ ”).

                                           -3-
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Norfolk Southern then filed this appeal to argue that summary judgment

should have been granted because Edwards waited until after the statute of

limitations to apply to be appointed the personal representative of her late

husband’s estate.

                                      II.

      We begin by reviewing the relation back doctrine and the key cases

addressing the doctrine. Generally, “all actions that survive a decedent must

be brought by or against the personal representative” and “a decedent's estate

cannot be a party to litigation unless a personal representative exists.”

Salvadia v. Askbrook, 923 A.2d 436, 440 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation

omitted). The relation back doctrine, however, will sometimes be applied as

an exception to the general rule. As we have explained:

      Simply stated, the doctrine of relation back as applied to cases
      where an estate is a party means that the courts under certain
      circumstances will validate the acts of the personal representative
      of the estate which preceded the date of his official appointment.
      Thus, where a plaintiff, acting as the personal representative of
      an estate, initiates an action before the statute of limitations has
      run, but also before his or her appointment as personal
      representative has been finalized, the doctrine of relation back
      may be applied in appropriate circumstances to validate the filing
      of the action, even though the plaintiff’s appointment is not
      finalized until after the limitations period has expired.

Prevish v. Northwest Med. Ctr. Oil City Campus, 692 A.2d 192, 201 (Pa.

Super. 1997) (en banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

      In the late 1970s, the doctrine was applied in three cases in which the

plaintiffs applied to be the personal representative but were not formally

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appointed until after the statute had run. The first case was McGuire v. Erie

Lackawanna Ry. Co., 385 A.2d 466 (Pa. Super. 1978). In McGuire, the

plaintiff petitioned to be the administrator of his daughter’s estate after she

was hit and killed by a train.    While he paid the filing fee, the letters of

administration were not issued because he did not post the bond. Before the

statute of limitations ran, he filed a survival action alleging that he was the

administrator of his daughter's estate. Three weeks later, he finally posted

the bond and was issued the letters of administration. The defendant moved

for summary judgment because the statute of limitations had run before the

letters were issued. The trial court denied summary judgment and certified

its order as involving a controlling question of law.

      On appeal, we held that the father’s appointment as administrator

related back to when he filed the action. We began by noting that the relation

back doctrine had generally been limited to actions that benefit an estate. We

found this test too limited, however, because it did not answer whether a

railroad should have to pay an asset to an estate that did not exist at the time

the limitations period expired. Id. at 467-68. As a result, we suggested the

better test was “whether in all circumstances ‘relation back’ will achieve a just

result.” Id. at 468.

      To answer what a just result would be in the case, we emphasized that

the purpose of statutes of limitations is to “expedite litigation and thus to

discourage delay and the presentation of stale claims” and “promote finality

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and stability.” Id. (citations omitted). With this in mind, we found that the

plaintiff had done enough within the statutory period to fulfill the purposes of

the statute of limitations.

      When the complaint was filed, it represented a timely statement
      of every element of the claim, except in one respect: the plaintiff
      appellee had not been formally named administrator.                That
      deficiency, however, was minimal. At the time the complaint was
      filed, that is, within the statutory period, [the plaintiff] had applied
      for letters of administration.        Under the provisions of the
      Decedents, Estates & Fiduciaries Code, Act of June 30, 1972, P.L.
      508, No. 164, [§] 2, 20 P.S. [§] 3155(b)(3), [the plaintiff] as
      decedent’s father had a prior right to be appointed; having applied
      to be appointed, he was unlikely not to pursue his application to
      completion. Nor had anyone else applied. The only thing that
      held up the issuance of letters was appellee’s failure to post a
      nominal bond of $1000. While we grant that the bond represents
      something of a contingency, we nonetheless find that in the
      circumstances, appellee’s appointment as administrator was
      substantially assured at the time the complaint was filed, that is,
      within the statutory period of limitations.

McGuire, 385 A.2d at 468 (footnote omitted).

      We then noted that this reasoning was similar to that used in Beckman

v. Owens, 5 A.2d 626 (Pa. Super. 1939), a case in which we allowed a suit

against an estate even though the executor named in the decedent’s will was

not granted testamentary letters until after the statute ran. In so noting, we

quoted Beckman’s holding that

      (A)n executor “derives his authority to act from the will. The
      granting of letters testamentary by the register of wills is a pro
      forma act, to give effect to the will of the testator.” . . . “(P)arties,
      upon whom is a necessity of present action, may proceed on the
      presumption that (the executor appointed) will accept, and their
      action is valid until he actually renounces, or they have notice that
      he will not accept. (”)

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McGuire, 385 A.2d at 468 (quoting Beckman, 5 A.2d at 627) (omission in

original) (internal citation omitted).

       We then contrasted its facts with those in an earlier case in which this

Court declined to apply the relation back doctrine. In Lovejoy v. Georgeff,

303 A.2d 501 (Pa. Super. 1973), the plaintiff timely filed a writ of summons

on behalf of his injured son against the father of the deceased driver as

“administrator” of the driver’s estate. The plaintiff applied for the issuance of

letters of administration for the estate but the letters were not issued until

after the statute of limitations had run. We distinguished these facts by noting

that

       when the [writ of summons] was filed, the identity of the
       administrator was uncertain; either parent [for the deceased
       driver] could have renounced the right to letters and the other
       accepted, or both could have renounced. At the time the statute
       ran, therefore, there could have been no such presumption as in
       [Beckman] and as in the present case, that the father would be
       administrator. Thus it was quite possible that the [writ of
       summons] had identified as a party someone who was not, and
       would not become, a party, so that the [writ of summons] might
       have been served on the wrong person entirely. This possibility
       introduced the sort of instability not present in Beckman or the
       present case, and was fatal.

McGuire, 385 A.2d at 469 (footnotes omitted). Thus, unlike Lovejoy, the

McGuire court concluded that the defendant railroad could “proceed on the

presumption that” the plaintiff’s appointment as administrator would be

completed.    Id. at 468-69.    For that reason, the relationship between the

plaintiff and the defendant “was not affected with the sort of instability that

statutes of limitations seek to preclude.” Id. at 469.

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      We reached a similar result a year later in D'Orazio v. Locust Lake

Vill., Inc., 406 A.2d 550 (Pa. Super. 1979). There, the decedent was a child

who drowned in defendants’ lake. Before the statute of limitations ran, the

decedent’s mother filed (1) a petition for letters of administration and (2) a

complaint against the defendant, naming herself administrator of her son’s

estate. The mother assumed that letters had been issued because she had

obtained the bond and paid its premiums for several years. After the statute

of limitations had run, however, she learned that the letters had not been

issued because she did not execute the bond. Upon learning this, she signed

the bond and was issued the letters. The trial court, however, dismissed the

complaint because the letter had not been acquired until after the statute of

limitations had run.

      On appeal, we reversed and held that our decision in McGuire

compelled finding the relation back doctrine applied, explaining:

      Although [the plaintiff] here was finally granted letters much
      longer after the statute’s running than was [the plaintiff in
      McGuire], this fact does not alter our disposition. The crucial
      factors are that letters had been requested and the action
      commenced within the statutory period, and [the plaintiff’s]
      appointment as administratrix, under the circumstances of this
      case, “was substantially assured at the time the complaint was
      filed, ... within the statutory period of limitations.”

D’Orazio, 406 A.2d at 552 (quoting McGuire, 385 A.2d at 468).

      Not long after D’Orazio, our Supreme Court addressed a similar

scenario in Estate of Gasbarini v. Medical Ctr. of Beaver Cnty., 409 A.2d

343 (Pa. 1979).    In Gasbarini, the decedent died while a patient in the

                                    -8-
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defendant hospital and under the care of the defendant physicians.          The

decedent’s widow promptly applied for letters of administration but her

counsel failed to post bond. Counsel later filed a writ of summons against the

defendants, naming the decedent’s estate as plaintiff. Counsel again named

the estate as plaintiff when he later filed a complaint asserting wrongful death

and survival actions. Defendants responded by filing preliminary objections

alleging that the estate was not a proper party.       When counsel failed to

respond, the complaint was dismissed.

      Unbeknownst to the widow, counsel was suspended and later disbarred.

As a result, she hired new counsel and was named administrator of her

husband’s estate after posting the bond. Counsel then petitioned to reinstate

the complaint and amend its caption to add the widow as the estate’s personal

representative, which the trial court granted. On appeal, we reversed and

ordered that the complaint be dismissed. On allowance of appeal, however,

our Supreme Court adopted our reasoning in McGuire in applying the relation

back doctrine in the widow’s favor.

      The original complaint, filed by [prior counsel], made clear that
      the action was based upon our wrongful death and survival
      statutes. Further, as previously mentioned, the complaint made
      clear that [decedent’s widow] was bringing this action in her
      capacity as administratrix of the decedent’s estate.

                                      ***

      We believe the instant case is on all fours with McGuire and we
      believe its reasoning is persuasive. Instantly, the only deficiency
      in [plaintiff’s] complaint was the fact she had not yet been named
      administratrix of decedent’s estate.       All other requirements,

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      however, had been completed within a short time period after
      decedent’s death and within the applicable statute of limitations
      for either a wrongful death or survivor action. As we believe the
      appointment of appellant as administratrix should relate back to
      the … date on which the complaint was filed, we find that neither
      action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Id. at 346-347.

      In Wilkes-Barre Gen. Hospital v. Lesho, 435 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1981), our Commonwealth Court considered a scenario where—unlike

McGuire, D'Orazio and Gasbarini—the decedent’s plaintiffs waited until

after the statute of limitations had run to apply to be the personal

representatives of the estate. There, the plaintiffs’ daughter allegedly died of

medical malpractice. Two months later, the plaintiffs petitioned to settle her

estate but did not apply for letters of administration. The plaintiffs then filed

a complaint in the Arbitration Panels for Health Care against the defendants,

identifying   themselves   in   the   caption   and   body   as   individuals   and

administrators of their daughter’s estate. While letters of administration were

eventually granted, the plaintiffs neither applied for nor were granted the

letters until after the statute of limitations had run. The defendants moved

for summary judgment but the arbitrator found that the relation back doctrine

applied.

      On appeal, the defendants argued that McGuire, D’Orazio and

Gasbarini supported reversal because the plaintiffs in those cases applied for

letters of administration before the statute of limitations had run, thus giving

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“substantial assurance that the letters would be granted to the person alleging

his or her fiduciary capacity in the pleading.” Lesho, 435 A.2d at 1342.

      Nevertheless, the Commonwealth Court held that the reasoning used in

McGuire and reiterated in Gasbarini applied with equal force to the plaintiff

parents in Lesho, explaining:

      Absolutely nothing was changed in the [plaintiffs’] complaint by
      virtue of letters of administration having been granted to them
      after the statute of limitations had run. From the time the original
      complaint was filed, the [defendants] were aware that they were
      being sued for their alleged negligence resulting in the death of a
      named decedent. Every element necessary to establish the two
      causes of action against the [defendants] was set forth in the
      complaint, including the erroneous fact that the [plaintiffs] had
      been appointed administrators of their daughter’s estate.

                                      ***

      In any event, it is our opinion that by permitting the doctrine to
      apply to the circumstances of this case, the acts of the
      administrators will have been validated, a just result will have
      been achieved, the estate will have been benefited and a remedy
      will not have been lost. Neither will the objectives of the statute
      of limitations have been disturbed.

Id. at 1343.

      Finally, this Court revisited the relation back doctrine in the context of

a survival action in Prevish v. Northwest Med. Ctr. Oil City Campus, 692

A.2d 192, 201 (Pa. Super. 1997) (en banc).           There, the plaintiff’s wife

allegedly suffered a stroke and paralysis because of defendants’ medical

malpractice. After she died, the plaintiff filed a writ of summons against the

defendants, with a caption naming the plaintiff as his wife’s estate. In his

subsequent complaint filed after the statute of limitations had run, the plaintiff

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listed himself as the plaintiff and alleged that he had been appointed the

executor of the estate. The defendants filed preliminary objections to strike

the complaint because the plaintiff had not obtained consent or leave to

amend the complaint’s caption to correct of the name of a party. The trial

court agreed and declined to apply the relation back doctrine because (1) the

writ of summons named the estate as plaintiff, and (2) no personal

representative had been designated until after the statute had run.

      On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court should have allowed

him to correct the caption to reflect his appointment as executor of his wife’s

estate. To address this contention, the Prevish court reviewed all the above

cases and found them distinguishable.

             In McGuire, D'Orazio, and Lesho, a survival action was
      commenced by the timely filing of a complaint the caption of which
      identified the plaintiff by name as the administrator of the
      decedent’s estate.      In Gasbarini, a survival action was
      commenced by the timely filing of a complaint the caption of which
      named the decedent’s estate as the plaintiff, but the body of which
      explained that the plaintiff was in fact the administratrix of the
      estate.    In each case the designation of the plaintiff as
      administrator/administratrix was premature, as certain steps
      remained to be taken which were not accomplished until after the
      statute of limitations had run. In all four cases, however, the
      defendants were notified, before the statute of limitations had
      run, of the fact that an action had been filed against them by a
      named individual who was, at least putatively, the personal
      representative of the decedent’s estate.           Insofar as the
      commencement of the action was concerned, nothing remained to
      be done after the limitations period had expired but to formalize
      the plaintiff’s previously asserted appointment as personal
      representative.

Prevish, 692 A.2d at 204 (emphasis in original).

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       With this in mind, the Prevish court went on to find that the relation

back doctrine did not apply to the plaintiff’s actions because

       …[t]he writ of summons was the only document filed before the
       limitations period expired, and its caption identifies the estate of
       the decedent as the plaintiff. Such a writ is, of course, a nullity.
       Moreover, the writ does not identify the executor of the estate,
       nor does it inform the defendants that there is, even potentially,
       an executor (that is, that the decedent died testate). Concerning
       the parties’ relationship, these facts evidence “the sort of
       instability that statutes of limitation seek to preclude.” McGuire,
       supra.

       [Plaintiff] has cited no case, and we are aware of none, in which
       the relation back doctrine was applied to ratify, post-appointment,
       the attempted commencement of an action by a personal
       representative whose existence was in no way suggested by the
       pleading that he filed. We decline to extend the doctrine to
       encompass such a situation. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
       court’s order dismissing the complaint.

Id. at 204-05.

                                           III.

       On appeal, Norfolk Southern argues that Edwards lacked the capacity to

bring her action on behalf of her late husband’s estate since a FELA action can

be maintained only by either the injured person or, if the person is deceased,

their personal representative.        See 45 U.S.C. § 59.4   It emphasizes that

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4 “Any right of action given by this chapter to a person suffering injury shall
survive to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving
widow or husband and children of such employee, and, if none, then of such
employee’s parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such
employee, but in such cases there shall be only one recovery for the same
injury.” 45 U.S.C. § 59.

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Edwards did not apply to be the personal representative of her late husband’s

estate until after the statute of limitations had run. Because she failed to do

so, Norfolk Southern argues that the complaint was a nullity because Edwards

lacked standing to pursue claims on behalf of the estate at the time when she

filed the complaint.

      As for the relation back doctrine, Norfolk Southern asserts that it does

not apply here. It argues that McGuire, D’Orazio and Gasbarini support

reversal because the plaintiffs in those cases applied to be the estates’

personal representatives before the statute of limitations ran. On this point,

Norfolk Southern highlights the D’Orazio court’s statement that the “crucial

factors” in allowing the relation back doctrine in that case were “that letters

[of administration] had been requested and the action commenced within the

statutory period,” thus substantially assuring the plaintiff’s appointment as

the estate’s executor.   See D’Orazio, 406 A.2d at 552.        Further, Norfolk

Southern contends the presumption that one will be appointed an estate’s

executor attaches only at the time the application is made. See McGuire,

385 A.2d at 468-69.

      Turning to Edwards, while conceding that a decedent’s estate cannot be

a party to litigation unless a personal representative exists, she contends that

the relation back doctrine applies here. First, she notes that the plaintiffs in

McGuire, D’Orazio and Gasbarini all died intestate.         Here, in contrast,

Edwards was named the executor in her late husband’s last will and testament.

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Next, she notes that in the most “on point” case on this matter—Lesho—the

Commonwealth Court rejected the very same argument that Norfolk Southern

raises here: that McGuire, D’Orazio and Gasbarini stand for the proposition

that the relation back doctrine applies only when the plaintiff applies to be the

personal representative before the statute of limitations has run. Rejecting

this argument, the Lesho court concluded that the reasoning used in McGuire

and Gasbarini supported finding that the relation back doctrine could be

applied even the plaintiff waits until after the statute of limitations had run to

be appointed the personal representative. Edwards further emphasizes that

like the plaintiffs in McGuire, D’Orazio and Gasbarini, she identified herself

in the complaint’s caption as the personal representative of her late husband’s

estate, thus notifying Norfolk Southern before the statute of limitations had

run that an action had been filed against it by a person who was, at least

putatively, the personal representative of the decedent’s estate.

                                               IV.

       After review, the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment

and concluding that the relation back doctrine applied here.5

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5 Our standard of review of an order granting or denying summary judgment
is well-settled:

       We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
       party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of
       material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only
       where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is

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       First, just as we did in McGuire, we begin with the purpose of statutes

of limitations to determine whether the relation back doctrine can be applied

under these circumstances. “Generally speaking, statutes of limitations are

rules of law that set time limits for bringing legal claims.” Nicole B. v. Sch.

Dist. Of Phila., 237 A.3d 986, 993-94 (Pa. 2020).                “They serve several

purposes:     imposing finality on the litigation system; providing defendants

with an end to their potential liability; and avoiding litigation of disputes

involving stale evidence.” Id. at 994. As this Court has long recognized, the

“purpose of any statute of limitations is to expedite litigation and thus

discourage delay and the presentation of stale claims which may greatly

prejudice the defense of such claims.” McCreesh v. City of Philadelphia,

888 A.2d 211, 222 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted).

       In McGuire, D’Orazio, Gasbarini and Lesho, our courts noted two

main reasons why application of the relation back doctrine did not contravene

the purpose of statutes of limitations.            First, in each of those cases, the

____________________________________________

       clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
       of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review of
       a trial court’s order granting or denying summary judgment is
       plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial court’s order
       will be reversed only where it is established that the court
       committed an error of law or abused its discretion.

Siciliano v. Mueller, 149 A.3d 863, 864 (Pa. Super. 2016). Moreover, the
standard or review for issues involving the interpretation of a statute of
limitations is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. See Erie Ins.
Exchange v. Bristol, 174 A.3d 578, 585 n.13 (2017).

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complaint was timely filed within the statute of limitations and set out every

element of the plaintiffs’ claims.      Thus, except for the plaintiffs’ formal

appointment as personal representative, the defendants in those cases were

put on notice before the statute of limitations had run that “an action had been

filed against them by a named individual who was, at least putatively, the

personal representative of the decedent's estate.” Prevish, 692 A.2d at 204.

Thus, at that stage in those cases, the only thing that remained for the plaintiff

to do was to formalize their previously asserted appointment as personal

representative. Id.

      The same applies here. Edwards timely filed her FELA action and set

out all the elements of her claims before the statute of limitations had run,

thus putting Norfolk Southern on notice that they were being sued. Critically,

just as the Lesho court recognized, nothing changed concerning those claims

by   virtue   of   Edwards   later   being   formally   appointed   the   personal

representative.    See Lesho, 435 A.2d at 1343 (“Absolutely nothing was

changed in the [plaintiffs’] complaint by virtue of letters of administration

having been granted to them after the statute of limitations had run.”).

      Second, in each of the four cases, the complaint listed the plaintiff as

the personal representative of the estate in the caption or alleged that the

plaintiff was the administrator of the estate. See McGuire, 385 A.2d at 467;

D’Orazio, 406 A.2d at 551; Gasbarini, 409 A.2d at 345; Lesho, 435 A.2d at

1341. Likewise, in both her original and amended complaints, Edwards listed

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the plaintiff in the caption as “DENIA EDWARDS, Personal Representative for

the Estate of Douglas A. Edwards.” Further, she averred in both complaints

that she was the personal representative of the estate.          See Complaint,

10/26/18, ¶ 2; Amended Complaint, 12/17/18, ¶ 2. As a result, while she

had not yet applied to be the personal representative of the estate, the

complaint put Norfolk Southern on notice that Edwards was bringing the action

in her capacity as personal representative of the estate.

      On this point, we do not find it fatal to her claims that Edwards waited

until after the statute of limitations had run to apply to be the personal

representative of her late husband’s estate.        In McGuire, D’Orazio and

Gasbarini, despite each of the decedents dying intestate, it was “substantially

assured” that each of the plaintiffs would be appointed the personal

representative of the estate. In McGuire, the appointment was held up by

the plaintiff failing to post the bond; in D’Orazio, it was the plaintiff’s failure

to execute the bond; and in Gasbarini, it was plaintiff’s counsel failing to post

bond. In each case, there was no dispute that the plaintiff would be appointed

the estate’s personal representative, as the only thing delaying the

appointment was the oversight of paying or executing the bond for the letters

of administration.

      While this case differs from those cases in that the decedent died

testate, there was still no real dispute that Edwards would be appointed the

personal representative of her late husband’s estate since she was named

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executor in her late husband’s last will and testament. Under West Virginia

law, the only thing she needed to do to be appointed the personal

representative was file the application of fiduciaries and take an oath in the

county in which her late husband’s last will and testament had been recorded.

See W. Va. Code § 44-1-1.6 Given that Edwards was (1) named the executor

in her husband’s will, and (2) listed herself as the plaintiff in the timely filed

complaint, Norfolk Southern could “proceed on the presumption” that she

would seek appointment as personal representative of her late husband’s

estate.     Thus, just as the McGuire court concluded, we find that “the

relationship between the parties was not affected with the sort of instability

that statutes of limitations seek to preclude.” McGuire, 385 A.2d at 469.

       As   noted,    citing   McGuire,        Norfolk   Southern   asserts   that   the

presumption that Edwards would seek appointment as personal representative

could attach only if she made a timely application. Based on our reading,

however, McGuire states no such thing.

       To recap, in McGuire, we held that the defendant railroad could

presume that the plaintiff would be appointed the personal representative of

his daughter’s estate because he had applied for letters of administration and

had a prior right to be appointed under statute. Id. at 468. For support, the

____________________________________________

6Edwards did not need to post bond because she was the sole beneficiary of
her late husband. See W. Va. Code § 44-1-8(b).

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McGuire court likened its reasoning to that in Beckman in which this Court

held that a creditor of the decedent could file suit against the executor

appointed in the decedent’s will prior to the probate of the will and issuance

of letters testamentary. As noted, the McGuire court quoted the Beckman

court’s holding that an executor “derives his authority to act from the will.

The granting of letters testamentary by the register of wills is a pro forma act,

to give effect to the will of the testator.” Id. at 468 (quoting Beckman, 5

A.2d at 627). The McGuire court further quoted Beckman’s holding that the

parties “may proceed on the presumption that (the executor appointed) will

accept, and their action is valid until he actually renounces, or they have notice

that he will not accept.”    Thus, as the above quoted sections show, the

McGuire court was equating the plaintiff father in its case with an executor

named in a decedent’s will who is presumed to have accepted the appointment

until that appointment is renounced.

      Finally, we address two other arguments raised by Norfolk Southern.

First, as noted, Norfolk Southern highlights that in D’Orazio, we stated that

the “crucial factors” in applying the relation back doctrine in that case were

that the plaintiff requested the letters of administration before the statute of

limitations had run. See D’Orazio, 406 A.2d at 552. In that case, however,

the plaintiff mother did not obtain the letters of administration until about a

year-and-a-half after the statute had run, which was substantially longer than

the delay in McGuire. Thus, read in context, the D’Orazio court’s statement

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that it was “crucial” that the plaintiff request the letters before the statute had

run was meant to answer the concern that the plaintiff mother was not granted

the letters until “much longer after the statute’s running than [the plaintiff in

McGuire.]” Id.

       Second, Norfolk Southern asserts that Lesho has no persuasive value

because (1) it is a Commonwealth Court decision,7 and (2) its factually

distinguishable because, unlike the defendants in Lesho, Norfolk Southern

raises its statute of limitations defense at its first opportunity. The second

point is well taken, since the Lesho court observed that none of the

defendants denied that the plaintiffs were administrators of their daughter’s

estate until they were granted leave to file amended answers. See Lesho,

435 A.2d at 1343.

       Before that observation, however, the Commonwealth Court made clear

that its decision rested on the plaintiffs timely filing their complaint and putting

the defendants on notice that they were sued by the plaintiffs in their capacity

as the personal representatives of the decedent’s estate.

       It is true that in every case cited by [the defendants], where the
       [relation back] doctrine has been applied, an application for letters
       was made before the statute of limitations expired. Nevertheless,
       we feel compelled to apply the doctrine here because our analysis
       of the reasoning used in McGuire and reiterated in the
       [Gasbarini] demonstrates that it must likewise prevail here.
       Absolutely nothing was changed in the [plaintiffs’] complaint by
____________________________________________

7 “Commonwealth Court decisions do not bind this Court, but we may consider
them as persuasive authority.” Cuth v. Cuth, 263 A.3d 1186, 1191 n.5 (Pa.
Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

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      virtue of letters of administration having been granted to them
      after the statute of limitations had run. From the time the original
      complaint was filed, the [defendants] were aware that they were
      being sued for their alleged negligence resulting in the death of a
      named decedent. Every element necessary to establish the two
      causes of action against the [defendants] was set forth in the
      complaint, including the erroneous fact that the [plaintiffs] had
      been appointed administrators of their daughter's estate.

Id.

      Like the Commonwealth Court in Lesho, we read nothing in McGuire,

D’Orazio or Gasbarini as precluding the conclusion that the trial court

reached in this case. Indeed, Edwards was named the executor in her late

husband’s last will and testament and timely filed her FELA action in which

she averred that she was the personal representative of her late husband’s

estate. Like the defendants in McGuire, D’Orazio, Gasbarini and Lesho,

Norfolk Southern was notified before the statute of limitations had expired

that an action had been filed against it by a plaintiff “who was, at least

putatively, the personal representative of the decedent’s estate.” Prevish,

692 A.2d at 204.       While it may be preferable that the plaintiff seek

appointment before the statute runs, we do not find that failure to do so

compels dismissal of a complaint when the plaintiff is the named executor and

avers that she is the personal representative in the timely-filed complaint.

      Order affirmed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

      Judge McCaffery joins the Opinion.

      Judge Stabile files a Dissenting Opinion.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2023

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