Court Opinion

ID: 9763085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:36:33.101972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:39.302902
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority opinion in this case for two reasons. First, I dissent from the view that KRS 533.060(2) overrides KRS 532.110(l)(c), and mandates that the sentences for the various offenses committed by the appellant while on parole run consecutively. Second, in my view the conviction of the defendant for both theft and receiving stolen property, which was not discussed in the majority opinion, was double jeopardy.
In a multiple count indictment appellant has been convicted of separate offenses, with each sentence enhanced as a persistent felony offender, and each sentence to run consecutively. KRS 532.110(l)(c) provides that in such circumstances:
“The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms shall not exceed in maximum length the longest extended term which would be authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of crime for which any of the sentences is imposed.”
In this case the most serious offense is a class “C” felony, and the “longest extended term which would be authorized” after enhancement as a PFO is twenty (20) years. Appellant has been sentenced to eighty (80) years.
The majority holds that the provisions of KRS 532.110(l)(e) are overridden by KRS 533.060(2), which is part of KRS Chapter 533, “Probation and Conditional Discharge.” In my view the provisions in KRS 533.060 are directed to the fact that sentences for new offenses shall not run concurrently with past offenses for which the defendant is on parole. A reasonable interpretation of the phrase “with any other sentence,” (KRS 533.060(2)) is that “any other sentence” means the unserved portion of the sentence for the felony for which probation or parole should be revoked.
The majority has taken the phrase “with any other sentence” and extended it beyond the context and statutory framework where it is found. If there were a reasonable argument to the contrary, such ambiguity *832in a sentencing statute should be resolved in favor of the defendant.
KRS 532.110 was amended and reenacted in 1982, retaining the same language requiring concurrent sentencing as to multiple convictions for new offenses as previously existed. It is difficult to maintain that the statute does not mean what it says in these circumstances. It says “the aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms shall not exceed in maximum length the longest extended term which would be authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of crime for which any of the sentences is imposed.” In this case it means that the aggregate of consecutive indeterminate sentences shall not exceed twenty (20) years.
Appellant was convicted of both theft of a pie safe and dishes and of knowingly receiving the same property. We have affirmed the conviction following Sutton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 623 S.W.2d 879 (1981). Sutton holds that the legislative change in terminology describing the offense of receiving stolen property permits one who steals property to be convicted of both theft and knowingly receiving. Sutton states:
“KRS 514.110(1) applies to a person who ‘receives, retains or disposes of movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen.’ Literally, it covers the thief who retains or disposes of property he has stolen himself.”
Sutton states further:
“The facts of (Sutton) illustrate the wisdom of so construing the law. Sutton was apprehended in Edmonson County with various items of property he had stolen in three other counties. To hold that he could be prosecuted only in the other three counties would result in a great deal of unnecessary expense, inconvenience and waste of time to reach the same end.”
In my view Sutton was result-oriented, and the present case shows the difficulty in such an approach. I interpret the action of the legislature in broadening the language describing receiving stolen property to include the word “retaining” was nothing more than an effort to avoid technicalities that otherwise exist in use of the word “receiving” without further explanation. It was not intended to permit carving multiple offenses out of a single criminal act. In every case where a theft occurs, there is some element of retaining. I find the conclusion that the legislature intended the thief to be prosecuted for both offenses to be unreasonable. I believe that carving the offense as described into two offenses is not what the legislature intended, and is a multiple conviction for a single criminal transaction. I would limit Sutton to the fact situation in that case.
AKER, J., joins in this dissent.