Court Opinion

ID: 9581471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:15:16.703062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:58.877319
License: Public Domain

Gunter, Justice,
dissenting. My position is that it is constitutionally impermissible in a criminal case for the court to charge the jury that the accused has the burden or the responsibility to prove anything. The burden is upon the state in a criminal case to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
A burden-shifting charge to a jury in a criminal case rises to the level of constitutional error because it amounts to a denial of due process of law. The Supreme Court of the United States has said: "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (90 SC 1068, 25 LE2d 368).
The instruction to the jury in this case was, in my opinion, a burden-shifting charge, and I think it was constitutionally erroneous.
I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice Ingram joins in this dissent.