Court Opinion

ID: 9749491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:47:37.083883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:20.119627
License: Public Domain

*178Arthur H. Healey, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion although I write separately to state my views on their observation that “the contrast between the defendant’s recently acquired clerical position and the plaintiff’s 25-year career as an aluminum siding contractor cannot support the trial court’s finding that the employability of the parties is ‘equal.’ ” My view is that to so state, in effect, equates “employability” with “earning capacity” or “earning potential”; see deCossy v. deCossy, 172 Conn. 202, 205, 374 A.2d 182 (1977); or, more to the point, does not fully consider certain other factors in General Statutes §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82 that go to the present disparate incomes of the parties. In that regard the statutes also enumerate “vocational skills,” “occupation,” “opportunity of each for future acquisition of . . . income” and “health” as factors for the court to consider in determining alimony and property division.
In construing a statute, no word should be treated as superfluous or insignificant; Kulis v. Moll, 172 Conn. 104, 111, 374 A.2d 133 (1976); Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Water Resources Commission, 162 Conn. 89, 101, 291 A.2d 721 (1971); and words and phrases are to be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language. Wiegand v. Heffernan, 170 Conn. 567, 581, 368 A.2d 103 (1976); Consolidated Diesel Electric Corporation v. Stamford, 156 Conn. 33, 38, 238 A.2d 410 (1968). Webster defines “employability” as the “quality or state of being employable” and “employable” as “capable of being employed, specif: physically and mentally capable of earning a wage at a regular job and available for hiring.” Webster, Third New International Dictionary. In my view, since *179both parties are in fact employed, the “employability” of both parties is equal. This is one factor to be considered under §§ 46b-81 (c) and 46b-82. “[E]arning potential” has been said to be one of the important factors to be considered; see deCossy v. deCossy, supra, 205; and the statute has other terms going to that factor, i.e., “vocational skills,” “occupation,” “opportunity for future acquisition of . . . income” and “health.” Arguably, this list may not be exclusive, but the “employability” of a person is liminal to any meaningful determination of earning potential or earning capacity as that is explicated by such other statutory terms. In any event, the majority opinion attenuates the distinction between “employability” and the other factors in §§ 46b-81 (c) and 46b-82 referred to above.
I therefore concur in the result.