Court Opinion

ID: 9736406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:55:18.509649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:06.518676
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLaren, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority’s interpretation of the insurance policy permits defendant to have collected insurance premiums from plaintiff for virtually no meaningful coverage. The majority ignores the well-settled principle that the law accords the insured the most favorable and liberal construction of exclusionary insurance provisions. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Glenview Park District, 158 Ill. 2d 116, 122 (1994). Insurance provisions that limit or exclude coverage are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and “most strongly against the insurer.” Glenview Park District, 158 Ill. 2d at 122. The majority has construed the relevant provision liberally in favor of the insurer rather than the insured. The policy at issue in this case excludes any loss or damage: “Arising directly or indirectly out of any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or illegal act committed by you or your agents.” There is no doubt that plaintiff committed a “crime” within the common meaning of the word. The appropriate question now becomes whether the exclusionary clause should be enforced when it results in an illusory promise to provide coverage. Generally, provisions that deny coverage for intentional acts are interpreted to exclude coverage where the insured has (1) intended to act and (2) specifically intended to harm a third party. Lincoln Logan Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fornshell, 309 Ill. App. 3d 479, 483 (1999). However, it is contrary to the parties’ intentions to interpret such a provision to deny coverage for negligent or innocent acts as well, because the clause would contradict and swallow the entire personal liability policy. Fornshell, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 484. Whenever possible, courts should construe a contract so that different provisions are harmonized and do not conflict with one another. In this case, plaintiff committed the illegal act of driving under the influence. See 625 ILCS 5/11 — 501 (West 2004). This illegal act has no mens rea element. That is, the State is not required to prove intent. See 625 ILCS 5/11 — 501 (West 2004). Rather, DUI is a strict liability offense. See People v. Gassman, 251 Ill. App. 3d 681, 689 (1993). Although not at issue here, an individual involved in an automobile accident can be charged with numerous traffic violations, or “illegal acts” as the term is used in the exclusion provision. See, e.g., 625 ILCS 5/11 — 601(a) (West 2004) (failure to reduce speed); 625 ILCS 5/11 — 601 (West 2004) (operating a vehicle at a greater-than-reasonable speed for traffic conditions); 625 ILCS 5/11 — 709 (West 2004) (improper lane usage). None of these “illegal acts” has a mens rea element. Yet, they are “illegal” within the meaning of the exclusion provision. Curiously, in determining that minor traffic offenses and petty offenses are not excluded from coverage, the majority makes a distinction without a difference, relative to insurance law, and an immaterial distinction, relative to criminal law, concerning the level of punishment. Because defendant has neither alleged nor attempted to prove that plaintiffs act of driving into the tree that damaged the vehicle was an intentional act, i.e., had a mens rea and was intended to harm persons or property, it was neither more nor less unintentional than the minor traffic offenses, petty offenses, and negligent torts that the majority has seen fit to exclude under the exclusion provision. If all unintentional, negligent acts, as defined by the exclusion provision, are excluded from coverage as illegal, the exclusion subsumes the entire purpose of the policy, which is to provide gap coverage, despite the majority’s improper attempt to limit the extent of the exclusion to unintentional acts. Yet, the majority announces that the intent of the parties was that DUI would be the sole unintentional act that is excluded from coverage. This is not a question of public policy but a question of the parties’ intent. Here, the majority has interpreted the language of the policy to provide illusory coverage to the insured. I believe that the majority’s interpretation is unreasonable and leads to an absurd result in the context of the purpose and policy of insurance coverage. I recognize that DUI is a more serious offense than a simple traffic violation. However, the majority is recasting the agreement according to what it wants the contract to exclude rather than what the parties reasonably intended. The majority’s particular interpretation of “illegal” has no support in the text of the policy. It focuses on the level of criminality. Yet, this interpretation is based on nothing more than the majority’s understandable distaste for plaintiffs conduct. The majority should refrain from redrafting an overly broad, ambiguous clause to exclude coverage for plaintiffs conduct. The exclusion provision is sufficiently ambiguous that it should be interpreted to exclude only intentional illegal acts, which require a mens rea and an intention to harm a third party. When the terms of an insurance policy are ambiguous, they must be construed against the insurer, as the drafter of the policy. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Kelly, 352 Ill. App. 3d 873, 875 (2004). The majority not only fails to do so but erroneously differentiates between unintentional illegal acts for apparent reasons immaterial to insurance law.