Court Opinion

ID: 9534813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:42:53.166509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:32:41.191684
License: Public Domain

Abbott, J.,
concurring and dissenting: I concur in the majority opinion and its reasoning concerning prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, the limitation of voir dire examination, and the sufficiency of the evidence to convict for aggravated kidnapping. However, I would hold one of the rape charges to be. multiplicitous. Defendant was convicted of three counts of rape. At issue are two of the counts, with the third count not at issue.
K.S.A. 21-3502 defines rape, in part, as “sexual intercourse with a person who does not consent to the sexual 'intercourse. ” In order to convict an accused, the State must prove “sexual intercourse” took place. Thus, sexual intercourse is an element of the crime of rape.
The legislature has, in a separate statute, defined “sexual intercourse” as “any penetration of the female sex'organ by a finger, the male sex organ or any object.” K.S.A. 21-3501. '
Here, the jury was instructed that it could find the defendant guilty of rapé by insertion of a finger into the victim’s-vagina and could find the defendant guilty of a second-' count óf tape by insertion of his penis. The jury was not giveii an opportunity to determine if both acts were part of one act-of sexual intercourse.
The majority holds that these counts aré not multiplicitous because one count is by use of defendant’s fingers and.one count *697is by use of the male sex organ. The majority concludes that, because different facts must be proven for each rape count, there is no multiplicity. This rationale is similar to holding that each individual penetration is an individual act of rape because it occurred at a slightly different time.
This court has long held that “[i]t is a generally accepted principle of law that the state may not split a single offense into separate parts. Where there is a single wrongful act it generally will not furnish the basis for more than one criminal prosecution. (State v. James, 216 Kan. 235, 531 P.2d 70; State v. Gauger, 200 Kan. 515, 438 P.2d 455.)” State v. Lassley, 218 Kan. 752, 761, 545 P.2d 379 (1976).
K.S.A. 21-3502 lists sexual intercourse as an element of rape. Then, K.S.A. 21-3501 defines the ways in which sexual intercourse may take place. Section 3501 is merely definitional, it does not set forth elements of rape. It is the act of sexual intercourse that is an element of rape, not the insertion of a finger, a penis, or an object.
Here, the victim did not have good communication skills. She first testified:
“Q. Where did he put his fingers?
“A. In my vagina.
“Q. About how long did that last?
“A. Just for a couple of seconds, not very long.
“Q. What happened after that?
“A. And then when he took his fingers out, he went ahead and went about his business and put his penis inside.”
She later testified:
“Q. Now, how long after he put his fingers on you did you actually have sexual intercourse?
“A. I don’t know, probably about two minutes.
“Q. A couple of minutes?
“A. Yeah.”
The victim did not state that there was a two-minute interval between the insertion of defendant’s fingers and the insertion of his penis. The second question and answer were framed as fingers “on her,” which could have many meanings, and the jury did not consider the interval of time between the acts because it was not in issue. What we do know is that there was a very short *698interval of time. Obviously, there was penetration by both the fingers and penis and either penetration can be the basis for a conviction of rape. The victim does not appear to be testifying there was literally a two-minute break between the insertion of the fingers and the penis.
The jury should have been instructed as contained in PIK Crim. 2d 57.01, all as recommended by the Notes on Use following 57.01, that the State must prove the defendant hád sexual intercourse with the victim without her consent. The court should have included, as part of that instruction, the statutory definition of sexual intercourse. Instead, the trial court allowed two separate counts, of whát I believe to be the same offense, to go to the jury.
In my opinion, as a matter of law, only one act of sexual intercourse took place during the time interval in question, and I would hold one count to be multiplicitous and instruct the trial court that the accused can only be retried on two rape counts.
Lockett and Allegrucci, JJ., join in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.