Court Opinion

ID: 9534571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:41:07.315896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:31:27.811365
License: Public Domain

Taylor, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that *713the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition because the plaintiff could not establish negligence as a matter of law. I therefore join part m(B) of the lead opinion. However, I disagree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that the public building exception to governmental immunity applies to this case.
Plaintiff’s decedent was placed in a holding cell after he was arrested. Because he had been cooperative, the decedent was placed in the only empty cell that was equipped with a toilet. Unfortunately, there was also a hole in the wire mesh that had been previously installed to prevent detainees from hanging themselves on the overhead bars. Unexpectedly, by the acknowledgment of all parties, the decedent endeavored to gain access to the overhead bars through this hole. He was successful and hanged himself. Suit followed, and defendants moved for summary disposition, claiming governmental immunity. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The question at issue here is whether the public building exception1 to governmental immunity2 applies under these undisputed facts. In every *714instance where a plaintiff brings a tort claim against a governmental entity on the basis of the building defect exception to governmental immunity, a two-step analysis is warranted. The first question is whether the plaintiffs cause of action invokes an exception to governmental immunity. If this requirement is met, the plaintiff must then establish the elements of his underlying cause of action. See Canon v Thumudo, 430 Mich 326, 335; 422 NW2d 688 (1988) (which cautions against confusing separate inquiries into immunity and negligence).
The lead opinion concludes that this case qualifies for application of the public building exception to governmental immunity. The foundation of the lead opinion’s analysis is the notion that the cell at issue here was converted from a nondefective general holding cell to a defective suicide-deterrent cell by reason of the installation of wire mesh preventing access to the overhead bars of the cell and the subsequent failure to repair a hole in the mesh before the decedent hanged himself. I disagree.
Pursuant to Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716, 731-732; 275 NW2d 268 (1979), whether there was, in fact, a building defect, warranting application of the public building exception to governmental immunity, depends on the use to which the area of the building at issue was put. In Bush, a nonlaboratory classroom was used to teach a chemistry class. Because the classroom was not normally used in this manner, it failed to have various safety features, including a safety shower, ventilation or exhaust hoods, sinks, enclosed storage areas, stationary laboratory desks, and water and gas outlets. Id., *715p 725. Unfortunately, an accident occurred during a chemistry class, and the plaintiff was injured.
Bringing suit, the plaintiff alleged, in part, that the absence of appropriate safety devices rendered the classroom unsafe for science classes and therefore that the classroom was defective, triggering the public building exception to governmental immunity. This Court stated:
To be sure, the lack of certain safety devices did not render the classroom defective per se; it is ordinarily unnecessary to install laboratory safety equipment in classrooms. In determining whether a place is safe, one must consider the use or purpose it serves. A building may be safe for one use or purpose, but not for another. . . . The room in which Foxworth was injured had by use become a physical science room, and therefore had to meet the standards of a physical science room although it had once been a mathematics room. [Id., p 732.]
Thus, under the rationale of Bush, cells such as the one at issue are required to meet standards consistent with their use in order to avoid the defective building exception.3 This means when it is being used as a general holding cell, i.e., a cell to be used for those such as this plaintiff who give no indication of suicidal tendencies, that the standards for such a cell (that is a nonsuicide-deterrent cell) are the standards to be employed in determining whether the cell was defective. This the lead opinion fails to do, instead *716saying merely that if the suicide prevention “add-ons” to the cell are in any way defective there is a cause of action if a detainee commits suicide in it without regard to how the cell really was being used. This cannot be reconciled with Bush.
Moreover, in Jackson v Detroit, 449 Mich 420; 537 NW2d 151 (1995), this Court concluded that a similar cell was not defective, despite the fact that the plaintiff’s decedent was known to be suicidal at the time and the overhead bars of the cell were completely exposed, i.e., no wire mesh had been installed. Relying on Hickey v Zezulka (On Resubmission), 439 Mich 408; 487 NW2d 106 (1992), the Court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim related more to safety in a public building rather than to the safety of the building itself. Jackson, supra, 449 Mich 428-429. The Court held that the statute did not create an exception to governmental immunity in instances where the decedent utilized an otherwise benign physical feature as a means of committing suicide. Id.
The Court went on, however, to conclude that the plaintiff had presented a prima facie allegation that the city of Detroit, by a policy of inaction, i.e., a failure to incorporate suicide-deterrent features in these cells in light of the historical suicide risk, had been “deliberately indifferent” to the safety of its detainees.4 Consequently, this Court concluded that it was *717possible that the plaintiff might prevail against defendant through an action based on 42 USC 1983.
In the cell at issue, defendant had installed wire mesh as an additional feature that, having a hole in it, the lead opinion now would find rendered the cell itself defective. However, the fact that defendant took action that could negate a finding that it was deliberately indifferent to the safety of its detainees does not demonstrate that the intended use of the cell had changed. Furthermore, where these cells without wire mesh were previously found in Jackson to be without defect when housing a suicidal detainee, it logically follows that a similar cell is not defective, despite the fact that the wire mesh installed still allowed access to the overhead bars because of a rip in the mesh. While in the instant case defendant had taken the extra step of adding mesh covering the overhead bars, this Court’s decision in Jackson demonstrates that the cell already met the standards consistent with its use. As in Jackson, the fact that the decedent utilized the otherwise benign physical feature of the cell to commit suicide did not demonstrate that the cell itself contained a defect as contemplated by the Legislature.5
*718Under Bush and Jackson, I would conclude that the cell at issue was not defective. Therefore, there being no defect, the public building exception to governmental immunity is not applicable to this case, and I would hold that the trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition on this basis as well.
Boyle and Weaver, JJ., concurred with Taylor, J.

 Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from a dangerous or defective condition of a public building if the governmental agency had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect and, for a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge, failed to remedy the condition or to take action reasonably necessary to protect the public against the condition. [MCL 691.1406; MSA 3.996(106).]

 Except as otherwise provided in this act, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. [MCL 691.1407(1); MSA 3.996(107)(1).]

 I note that I take no position on whether the absence of a safety device itself constitutes a public building defect. This contention has not been endorsed in a decision from this Court subsequent to Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). I rely on Bush only for its holding that it is the intended use of the building that controls the analysis.

 It should be noted that under the current “deliberate indifference” standard necessary to prevail in a § 1983 action, the record appears devoid of any evidence that would allow plaintiff to prevail. See Bryan Co, Oklahoma Bd of Co Comm’rs v Brown, 520 US 397, 415; 117 S Ct 1382; 137 L Ed 2d 626 (1997) (“Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights”); Simmons v Philadelphia, 947 F2d 1042, 1064 (CA 3, 1991) (a plaintiff must show that responsible *717policymakers were aware of the number of suicides in city lockups and of the alternatives for preventing them, but either deliberately chose not to pursue alternatives or acquiesced in longstanding policy or custom of inaction). As is clear, historical data of prison suicide alone is not sufficient to demonstrate liability under 42 USC 1983.

 The lead opinion fails to appreciate our discussion of the interplay between Bush and Jaclcson. Bush stands for the proposition that the intended use of the building controls whether it is defective. Jackson demonstrated that these cells are intended to accommodate a general detainee population and that even if the detainee was known to be suicidal, accessability to the overhead bars and the detainee’s act of hanging himself does not demonstrate that the cell is defective. The lead opinion now effectively would rule by judicial fiat that because this general *718detainee population, in other cases, has been shown to have a known risk of suicide these cells are intended to function as suicide-deterrent cells and the failure to maintain “appropriate” suicide-deterrent features strips the city of governmental immunity. Ante, p 709, n 8. Moreover, to the extent the lead opinion attempts to cloak that holding, by suggesting that the installation itself of the mesh changed the use of the cell, Bush effectively demonstrates the fallacy of that argument by finding that “[t]he room in which Foxworth was injured had by use become a physical science room . . . .”