Court Opinion

ID: 9492380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:40:03.756989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:16.896493
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I write separately to discuss whether this court should apply sua sponte the fugitive disentitlement doctrine.
Brown became a fugitive after a state court ordered that he be resentenced but before the resentencing occurred. Upon his recapture, Brown initiated state post-conviction proceedings based in part on new information undermining the scientific testimony that was significant evidence at his trial. The Mason Circuit Court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals considered and rejected the merits of the claims he now presses in federal court. The Supreme Court of Kentucky accepted discretionary review and affirmed on the merits. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359 (Ky.1996). Although Brown’s escape occurred during the pendency of state proceedings, the Kentucky courts, for whatever reason, did not invoke the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Cf. Harris v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 429, 224 S.W.2d 427 (1949) (dismissing an appeal of a fugitive who was still at large). In light of the Supreme Court’s recent warnings against using our inherent power to control our docket as a tool for inflicting ad hoc punishment for the crime of escape, I do not believe it is appropriate for us, on the basis of his former status as a fugitive, to deny Brown his appeal of the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
In the Supreme Court’s early cases approving the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, appellants had effectively abandoned their appeals by fleeing the jurisdiction of the court. See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 90 S.Ct. 498, 24 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970); Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 17 S.Ct. 525, 41 L.Ed. 949 (1897); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 24 L.Ed. 32 (1876). Dismissal pursuant to the court’s inherent powers was warranted by the fugitive’s abandonment of the case and unwillingness to submit to the authority of the court. See Allen, 166 U.S. at 141, 17 S.Ct. 525; Smith, 94 U.S. at 98. Later, the Court considered a state statute that *584provided for automatic dismissal of a fugitive’s appeal. See Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 535, 95 S.Ct. 1173, 43 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975). The Court held that the Constitution did not prohibit invoking this statute even after the fugitive was recaptured. See id. at 537-42, 95 S.Ct. 1173. It is important to note, however, that permitting a state to follow such a strict rule of fugitive disentitlement is not the same as adopting the practice as a matter of policy for the federal courts. It is also important that the dismissal in Dorrough was based not on the inherent powers of the court but on a statute enacted by the legislature. Cf. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823-24, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996) (stating that “[p]rinciples of deference counsel restraint in resorting to inherent power”); id. at 828, 116 S.Ct. 1777 (distinguishing the Court’s holding that inherent powers did not support disentitlement in the circumstances of that case from the possibility that “enforcement of a disentitlement rule under proper authority” might be permissible).
The courts of appeals have on occasion applied the disentitlement doctrine to appellants who were recaptured before the commencement of their appeals and even to plaintiffs in civil proceedings who were fugitives in related criminal cases. See, e.g., Prevot v. Prevot, 59 F.3d 556 (6th Cir.1995) (dismissing suit under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act because plaintiff was a fugitive); United States v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.1988) (refusing to review trial errors after defendant escaped for seven years between conviction and sentencing); Broadway v. City of Montgomery, 530 F.2d 657 (5th Cir.1976) (dismissing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because plaintiff-appellant was a fugitive in related criminal proceeding). In these cases, the courts expanded on the basis for the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, asserting that any fugitive from justice was “not entitled to call on the resources of an appellate court for a determination of his case.” Broadway, 530 F.2d at 659.
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court rejected such expansive applications of the disentitlement doctrine. The Court first considered the case of a criminal defendant who had escaped after being convicted but before being sentenced and was a fugitive for almost a year. See Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 237, 113 S.Ct. 1199, 122 L.Ed.2d 581 (1993). Upon recapture, he was indicted and convicted for contempt of court and failure to appear. In the appeal of the original conviction, the court of appeals granted the government’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the appellant was disentitled to appeal because of his escape during the pendency of the district court proceedings. See id. at 239, 113 S.Ct. 1199. The Supreme Court reviewed the justifications for the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and noted that they “assume some connection between a defendant’s fugitive status and the appellate process, sufficient to make an appellate sanction a reasonable response.” Id. at 244, 113 S.Ct. 1199. The Court stated that “[tjhese justifications are necessarily attenuated when applied to a case in which both flight and recapture occur while the case is pending before the district court, so that a defendant’s fugitive status at no time coincides with his appeal.” Id. The Court noted that the district courts are “quite capable” of protecting their own jurisdiction with more finely tuned sanctions than are available to the courts of appeals, see id. at 247, 113 S.Ct. 1199, and it rejected the argument that an appellate court may “sanction by dismissal any conduct that exhibits] disrespect for any aspect of the judicial system.” Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 246, 113 S.Ct. 1199. The Court concluded:
[Wjhile dismissal of an appeal pending while the defendant is a fugitive may serve substantial interests, the same interests do not support a rule of dismissal for all appeals filed by former fugitives, returned to custody before invocation of the appellate system. Absent some con*585nection between a defendant’s fugitive status and his appeal, as provided when a defendant is at large during “the ongoing appellate process,” Estelle [v. Dorrough], 420 U.S., at 542, n. 11, 95 S.Ct., at 1178, n. 11, the justifications advanced for dismissal of fugitives’ pending appeals generally will not apply.
Id. at 249, 113 S.Ct. 1199.
In Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996), a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court re-affirmed Ortegar-Rodriguez’s limitations on the inherent power to refuse to consider claims brought by a fugitive, this time in the context of a civil action related to the criminal prosecution. Degen was living in Switzerland and did not return to the United States to face criminal prosecution for drug-related crimes. He did, however, seek to defend his property against a related forfeiture proceeding initiated by the government. The lower courts held that he was not entitled to appear in the civil forfeiture proceeding until he submitted to the criminal prosecution. See Degen, 517 U.S. at 822, 116 S.Ct. 1777. Reversing, the Supreme Court emphasized the need for “restraint in resorting to inherent power” because of the “danger of overreaching when one branch of the Government, without benefit of cooperation or correction from the others, undertakes to define its own authority.” Id. at 823, 116 S.Ct. 1777. Despite the possible prejudice to the government’s criminal case if the forfeiture proceeding were to go forward while Degen remained a fugitive, the Court believed that disentitlement was “too blunt an instrument” and would be “an arbitrary response” to the government’s concerns. Id. at 828, 116 S.Ct. 1777. Therefore, the Court held that Degen should be permitted to defend his property from forfeiture, noting that the district court could take steps to protect the integrity of the criminal case while not affording Degen any “advantage” due to his “unwillingness to appear in person.” Id. at 827, 116 S.Ct. 1777. The lesson of Ortega-Rodriguez and Degen is that we should refrain from using our inherent powers to deter conduct already deterred by the statutes criminalizing flight or to augment the punishments for that crime set by state and federal legislatures. Inherent powers exist only to the extent that they are necessary “to protect [our] proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging [our] traditional responsibilities.” Degen, 517 U.S. at 823, 116 S.Ct. 1777.
In a case decided between Ortegar-Rodriguez and Degen, this court dismissed a civil case because the plaintiff was wanted in Texas for violating the terms of his probation. See Prevot, 59 F.3d at 558. The plaintiff sued pursuant to an international treaty, seeking to have his children, who were living with their mother in the United States, join him in France. Acknowledging the requirements of Ortega-Rodriguez, we concluded that there was sufficient connection between the civil appeal and the plaintiffs flight because the civil case was his attempt to have his children join him in flight. See id. at 566-67. If he had not been a fugitive, he would have had no cause of action at all because his probation required him to remain in the United States. In addition, the plaintiffs refusal to come to this country hindered discovery in the civil case. See id. at 560. We therefore concluded that he was not entitled to use the courts as an aid to his flight. There is room for disagreement about whether this was a correct application of Ortega-Rodriguez. See Daccarett-Ghia v. Commissioner, 70 F.3d 621, 628 (D.C.Cir.1995) (declining to follow Prevot). There is also language in the opinion that relies on arguments later rejected by the Supreme Court in Degen, so it is not clear whether Prevot would be decided the same way today. Compare Prevot, 59 F.3d at 567 (arguing that dismissing the custody case was the only means available to punish Prevot for his other crimes and for “flout[ing] the interests of the criminal courts”) with Degen, 517 U.S. at 829, 116 S.Ct. 1777 (“There *586would be a measure of rough justice in saying Degen must take the bitter with the sweet, and participate in the District Court either for all purposes or none. But the justice would be too rough.”); see also Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 246, 249, 113 S.Ct. 1199 (rejecting “reasoning that would allow an appellate court to sanction by dismissal any conduct that exhibited disrespect for any aspect of the judicial system” and stating that “punishment by appellate dismissal introduces an element of arbitrariness and irrationality into sentencing for escape”). There was in Prevot, however, at least some direct connection between the fugitive’s flight and the proceedings in this court.
Like the forfeiture proceeding in Degen, habeas is a civil action that is closely related to a criminal case. Under the approach of Ortega-Rodriguez and Degen, disen-titlement is inappropriate unless Brown’s flight had a connection to the appellate process in this court. In Ortega-Rodri-guez, the Court indicated that a lengthy escape might justify dismissal of a fugitive’s appeal, even after recapture, because of the prejudice to the government if a retrial were required. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 249, 113 S.Ct. 1199. I would hesitate, however, to invoke the dis-entitlement doctrine sua sponte purely on the basis of possible prejudice to the government. The government has never argued that Brown’s prior escape deprives him of his statutory right to petition for habeas relief, and the Kentucky courts whose proceedings.Brown had directly disrupted allowed him to present the merits of his claims. I do not believe it is the province of the federal courts to punish a habeas petitioner for crimes committed under the jurisdiction of the state courts.
Federal habeas courts have generally treated state-court invocations of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine as we would treat any other state-law grounds for affirming a criminal conviction. In Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 79 S.Ct. 825, 3 L.Ed.2d 900 (1959), the habeas petitioner had escaped for three weeks during the state proceedings. Under the state’s dis-entitlement doctrine, this escape was sufficient to dismiss his direct appeal. The federal district court refused to entertain the habeas petition because it believed the state courts had affirmed the conviction on that basis. The Supreme Court, however, pointed out that the state court’s opinion had discussed both the disentitlement issue and the merits of the appeal, and that the discussion of the merits constituted an alternative basis for affirming the conviction. See id. at 403, 79 S.Ct. 825. Because the petitioner had obtained a decision on the merits from the highest state court, habeas review was available. See id. at 406, 79 S.Ct. 825.
Other courts of appeals have followed Irvin’s approach to fugitive disentitlement in the habeas context, treating escapes during the state proceedings like any other state-law issue. Thus, when a state court dismisses a fugitive’s appeal pursuant to the state’s disentitlement doctrine, the recaptured fugitive’s claims are cognizable on habeas only if the petitioner satisfies the usual tests for “cause and prejudice” or “actual innocence.” See Schleeper v. Groose, 36 F.3d 735, 737 (8th Cir.1994). Similarly, the fugitive disen-titlement doctrine can provide adequate and independent grounds for the state court’s affirmance of a conviction only where the doctrine is applied rationally and consistently with state law. See Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 683-86 (3d Cir.1996); Branch v. Turner, 37 F.3d 371, 375-76 (8th Cir.1994), rev’d on other grounds, Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 115 S.Ct. 1275, 131 L.Ed.2d 152 (1995).
While the escapes in some of these cases lasted only a few days, the petitioner in Doctor was a fugitive for more than five years — not as long as Brown but still a significant delay in the state proceedings. Yet, the federal habeas court saw no reason to invoke the fugitive disentitlement doctrine on its own once it had concluded that the state court’s decision did not pres*587ent a procedural bar to habeas review. I believe it is appropriate that we act with the same restraint in this case. Like federal district courts, state courts are quite capable of defending their jurisdiction and protecting the government from prejudicial delays. The Kentucky courts saw fit to consider the merits of Brown’s challenge to his conviction despite Brown’s escape pending resentencing in state court. I therefore see no reason for us to invoke this procedural bar sua sponte, and I concur in the majority opinion resolving the merits of this appeal.