Court Opinion

ID: 9958257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 17:01:06.614699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.458440
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-2138     Document: 010111028110       Date Filed: 04/08/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            April 8, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,
                                                              No. 22-2138
  v.                                                (D.C. No. 1:21-CR-00750-WJ-1)
                                                               (D. N.M.)
  NICHOLAS A. MAXEY-VELASQUEZ,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Nicholas Maxey-Velasquez pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm and

 ammunition as a convicted felon, and aiding and abetting that offense, in violation of

 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 2. He appeals the district court’s application of two

 sentencing enhancements: (1) U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), which permits a four-level

 enhancement for unlawful possession of a firearm when the firearm was used in

 connection with another offense, and (2) U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), which permits a two-

 level downward departure for acceptance of responsibility. Mr. Maxey-Velasquez

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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 argues that the district court erred in applying the enhancement and failing to apply

 the departure.

       We affirm the district court. The district court’s conclusion that Mr. Maxey-

 Velasquez possessed the firearm in connection with another felony was not clearly

 erroneous, and the district court acted within its discretion in considering post-plea

 behavior to determine whether Mr. Maxey-Velasquez had accepted responsibility for

 his offense.

                                     I. Background

       Mr. Maxey-Velasquez came to the New Mexico state police’s attention during

 an investigation into the trafficking of stolen firearms. Police officers pulled him

 over as he drove off his property. After they pulled him over, Mr. Maxey-Velasquez

 informed the officers that he had a shotgun and handgun in his vehicle. Since Mr.

 Maxey-Velasquez had previously pleaded guilty to a felony offense, he was

 prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) from possessing the shotgun and handgun.

 The officers then searched Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s car and found multiple syringes

 and bags containing less than a gram of cocaine and less than a gram of

 methamphetamine. They also identified the trailer hitched to his vehicle as stolen.

 Mr. Maxey-Velasquez admitted to stealing it and stated that he planned to sell it.

       A federal grand jury indicted Mr. Maxey-Velasquez for possession of a

 firearm and ammunition as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and aiding

 and abetting that offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mr. Maxey-Velasquez

 pleaded guilty to these charges. He was not charged in connection with the drugs
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 found in his car. At the sentencing hearing, the district court reserved judgment on

 whether U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applied. It adjourned without determining a

 sentence and scheduled a subsequent sentencing hearing. After considering the

 matter, the court published an order holding that the U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

 enhancement applied, reasoning that Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s illicit firearm

 possession emboldened him to possess illegal drugs and a stolen trailer.

       Between his two sentencing hearings, Mr. Maxey-Velasquez was subject to

 another traffic stop. During a search of his car, police officers discovered suboxone

 strips, hypodermic needles, and allegedly counterfeit United States currency. At the

 second sentencing hearing, the district court concluded that while suboxone is a legal

 substance, “the quantity of Suboxone that was found on the Defendant . . . is just not

 consistent with legal prescription use.” Tr. at 31. The district court concluded that

 possession of suboxone and drug paraphernalia was inconsistent with acceptance of

 responsibility, and it denied Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s motion for a two-level decrease

 for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

       Mr. Maxey-Velasquez appeals the district court’s application of the four-level

 enhancement for possessing the firearm in connection with another felony and its

 denial of his motion for a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility.

 Reviewing the former decision for clear error and the latter for abuse of discretion,

 we affirm the district court.

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                                         II. Analysis

          A. Possession in Connection with Another Felony

                       1. Legal standards

          The sentencing guideline for unlawful possession of a firearm enhances a

 defendant’s offense level by four “[i]f the defendant . . . used or possessed any

 firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or possessed or

 transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe

 that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.”

 U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). “The government bears the burden of proving sentencing

 enhancements by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Orr, 567 F.3d

 610, 614 (10th Cir. 2009). “[W]e review the application of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) in a

 given case for clear error.” United States v. Anderson, 62 F.4th 1260, 1265 (10th Cir.

 2023).

          “[P]ossession of a firearm may facilitate an offense by emboldening the

 possessor to commit the offense.” United States v. Justice, 679 F.3d 1251, 1255

 (10th Cir. 2012). And while “[e]mboldenment is not always present when firearms

 are near drugs,” we have held that:

          when the defendant is out and about, with drugs on his person and a
          loaded firearm within easy reach, one can infer that the proximity of the
          weapon to the drugs is not coincidental and that the firearm “facilitated,
          or had the potential of facilitating,” the drug offense by emboldening the
          possessor.

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 Id. at 1256. Possessing drugs does not automatically trigger the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

 enhancement, but the enhancement may apply as long as the sentencing judge makes

 a factual finding that the gun possession “facilitated, or had the potential of

 facilitating” “the drug offense.”

       Consistent with that understanding, we have affirmed a district court’s

 application of the enhancement to a defendant in possession of a stolen vehicle,

 reasoning that the defendant “could have carried the gun to intimidate anyone who

 sought to interfere with his possession of [a stolen] vehicle” as not clearly erroneous.

 United States v. Sanchez, 22 F.4th 940, 942 (10th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added). In

 United States v. Sanchez, we recognized that a defendant “[d]riving a stolen vehicle

 . . . could very well have increased his concern that law enforcement, the rightful

 owner, or another would recognize the vehicle was stolen.” Id. Therefore, the

 district court could “infer that the loaded firearm emboldened Defendant to accept

 this enhanced risk and maintain possession of the vehicle.” Id. Again, the

 § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement did not apply merely because the possessor was

 knowingly driving a stolen vehicle. Rather, the district court’s finding that

 possession of a firearm facilitated possession of the stolen vehicle permitted the

 application of the enhancement.

                     2. Application

       The district court did not commit clear error when it applied the

 § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement to Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s offense. The district court

 found that Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s possession of a firearm facilitated two felonies:

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 (1) possession of cocaine and methamphetamine, in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann.

 1978 § 30-31-23 (prohibiting possession of any amount of a substance known to be

 cocaine or methamphetamine); and (2) receipt of a stolen utility trailer in violation of

 N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978 § 30-16-11 (prohibiting reception of stolen property valued

 over five hundred dollars). Order at 3. We discuss each in turn.

                             a. Narcotics Possession

        Here, the district court’s finding that possessing a weapon facilitated Mr.

 Maxey-Velasquez’s possession of cocaine and methamphetamine was not clearly

 erroneous. As a preliminary matter, the court had sufficient evidence to conclude

 that Mr. Maxey-Velasquez possessed the prohibited substances: (1) testimony by one

 of the arresting officers that a search of Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s vehicle revealed the

 forbidden substances and drug paraphernalia, and (2) Mr. Maxey-Velasquez was the

 sole occupant of the vehicle at the time of the search. Order at 4-5. The district court

 further relied on testimony by the police officer that, in his experience, “criminal

 defendants routinely carry firearms to obtain and protect narcotics.” Order at 5. We

 have concluded that district courts can infer from a defendant’s possession of drugs

 and a firearm in easy reach that “the proximity of the weapon to the drugs is not

 coincidental and that the firearm ‘facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating,’ the

 drug offense by emboldening the possessor.” Justice, 679 at 1256. Under Justice,

 therefore, the district court’s inference was reasonable.

        Resisting this conclusion, Mr. Maxey-Velasquez offers two arguments for

 reversing the district court. First, he argues that the government did not meet its

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 burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegedly prohibited

 substances were, in fact, cocaine and methamphetamine. As Mr. Maxey-Velasquez

 correctly notes, the arresting officer did not perform either a field test nor a

 laboratory test on the substances found in Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s car. The officer

 instead relied on his training and experience to identify the substances as cocaine and

 methamphetamine.

        Our precedents do not require field or laboratory identification, and instead

 permit the district court to rely on an officer’s training and experience to identify

 controlled substances. See United States v. Sanchez DeFundora, 893 F.2d 1173,

 1175 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The government need not introduce scientific evidence to

 prove the identity of a substance.”). Indeed, lay testimony and circumstantial

 evidence of “the physical appearance of the substance” is “relevant to determining

 the identity of a substance.” Id. Accordingly, the district court’s reliance on the

 arresting officer’s training and experience to identify controlled substances as

 cocaine and methamphetamine was not inconsistent with our precedent, and its

 finding that Mr. Maxey-Velasquez possessed cocaine and methamphetamine was not

 clearly erroneous.

        Second, Mr. Maxey-Velasquez argues that the district court “failed to

 articulate specific facts to support that the firearm actually facilitated or had the

 potential to facilitate narcotics possession.” Aplt. Br. at 17. We are unpersuaded for

 two reasons. First, the district court relied on the New Mexico police officer’s

 testimony that “in his experience, criminal defendants routinely carry firearms to

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 obtain and protect narcotics.” Order at 5. And because the Federal Rules of

 Evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings, see Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3), the

 district court could permissibly draw a propensity inference based on this evidence.

 Second, under our precedents, a district court may infer from a defendant’s proximity

 to both illegal narcotics and a firearm that “the proximity of the weapon to the drugs

 [was] not coincidental and that the firearm ‘facilitated, or had the potential of

 facilitating,’ the drug offense by emboldening the possessor.” Justice, 679 at 1256.

        Accordingly, the district court’s reasoning was consistent with our precedent,

 and its finding that Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s possession of a firearm facilitated, or had

 the potential to facilitate, his possession of narcotics was not clearly erroneous.

                          b. Receipt of a Stolen Trailer

        For similar reasons, the district court’s finding that possessing a weapon

 facilitated Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s receipt of the stolen trailer was not clearly

 erroneous. The district court found that Mr. Maxey Velasquez “was aware of the

 substantial risk that law enforcement or the rightful owner of the trailer might

 recognize it as stolen and confront” him, and that “[c]arrying a firearm had the

 potential to embolden him to retain possession of the trailer.” Order at 5.

        Yet, Mr. Maxey-Velasquez argues that the district court order should be

 reversed. He contends that the district court’s conclusion relied on speculation rather

 than specific facts tying Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s firearms possession with his receipt

 of the stolen trailer.

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       We disagree. Contrary to Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s contention, the district

 court’s conclusion here was rooted in evidence, not guesswork. The guidelines

 commentary directs courts to apply the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement “if the firearm

 or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another felony

 offense.” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(A) (emphasis added); see also Sanchez, 22 F.4th

 at 942 (“All § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) requires under our precedents is that Defendant’s

 possession of the firearm had the potential to facilitate his possession of the stolen

 vehicle.”). The U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement may be applied based on a

 firearm’s potential to facilitate another felony. Determining whether the possession

 of a firearm could potentially facilitate another felony inherently involves a forward-

 looking assessment of what could have occurred due to the firearm’s presence—a

 reasoned judgment about possible outcomes based on the evidence available. But in

 reaching that conclusion regarding the firearm’s potential to facilitate another felony,

 the district courts must still analyze the evidence presented and establish how the

 firearm’s presence, within the specific facts of the case, could contribute to the

 criminal activity. The district court did that here.

       Indeed, the district court’s factual findings support its conclusion that the

 firearm could have facilitated the felony: (1) Mr. Maxey-Velasquez was aware of the

 substantial risks that might occur if the trailer’s owner or law enforcement were to

 confront him while he was in possession of the trailer, and (2) possessing the firearm

 would have emboldened Mr. Maxey-Velasquez to confront these risks. Order at 5.

 Neither of these findings was clearly erroneous. We have affirmed the application of

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  the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement under analogous circumstances and see no reason

  to reach the opposite conclusion here. Sanchez, 22 F.4th at 942 (finding no abuse of

  discretion in application of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement appropriate where

  defendant possessed a firearm while knowingly driving a stolen car).

        In sum, the district court did not clearly err in applying the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

  enhancement for use of a firearm in connection with drug possession and receipt of

  stolen goods.

        B. Acceptance of Responsibility

                      1. Legal standards and background

        A court should decrease a defendant’s offense level by two if “the defendant

  clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G.

  § 3E1.1(b). If the defendant qualifies for a reduction under this provision, a district

  court may reduce his offense level by another level if: (1) the offense level was above

  16 prior to that operation, and (2) the government submits a motion “stating that the

  defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own

  misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty,

  thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the

  government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently.” Id. The defendant

  bears the burden of proving that he qualified for the sentencing reduction. United

  States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1486 (10th Cir. 1996).

        The guidelines commentary for this provision provides a non-exhaustive list of

  factors that a court may consider when determining whether a defendant has accepted

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  responsibility: (1) admitting to the conduct, (2) terminating or withdrawing from

  criminal conduct or associations, (3) voluntary payment of restitution, (4) voluntary

  surrender to authorities shortly after commission of the offense, (5) voluntary

  assistance to authorities in the recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities of the

  offense, (6) voluntary resignation from the office or position held during commission

  of the offense, (7) post-offense rehabilitative efforts, and (8) timeliness of the

  defendant’s conduct in manifesting the acceptance of responsibility.

  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2004). Because “[t]he

  sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of

  responsibility,” Note 5 counsels that “the determination of the sentencing judge is

  entitled to great deference on review.” Id., cmt. n. 5; see also United States v.

  Nevarez, 55 F.4th 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Wooten, 377

  F.3d 1134, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5)).

        “A district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines is reviewed for

  abuse of discretion.” Anderson, 62 F.4th at 1265. “In applying that standard, we

  review questions of law de novo and factual findings for clear error, giving due

  deference to the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts.” Id.

  (internal quotation marks omitted).

                      2. Application

        The district court held two hearings to determine Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s

  sentence. As noted above, the court reserved judgment on the applicability of the

  § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement at the first hearing, stating that it would issue a

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  written opinion on the matter subsequently. In the interim, police officers conducted

  a traffic stop on Mr. Maxey-Velasquez. During a subsequent search of his car, police

  officers discovered suboxone strips, hypodermic needles, and allegedly counterfeit

  United States currency.

        The district court considered this new development when it reconvened for the

  second sentencing hearing. Although suboxone is a legal substance, the district court

  found that “the quantity of Suboxone that was found” on Mr. Maxey-Velasquez was

  “not consistent with legal prescription use.” Tr. at 31. The district court therefore

  concluded that possession of suboxone and drug paraphernalia was inconsistent with

  acceptance of responsibility, and it denied Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s motion for a

  decrease under § 3E1.1(a).

        The issue before this court is whether the district court abused its discretion

  when it denied Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s § 3E1.1(a) motion upon consideration of

  felonies unrelated to the specific charge at sentencing. Does “acceptance of

  responsibility” mean a defendant accepts responsibility for his specific crime, or for

  his general criminal conduct? The sentencing guidelines commentary instructs courts

  to consider a defendant’s “voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal

  conduct or associations”—but it does not specify whether the criminal conduct or

  associations must relate to the specific crime charged. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(B).

        But in United States v. Prince, 204 F.3d 1021, 1023 (10th Cir. 2000), “we

  joined the majority of circuits and held that the Guidelines do not prohibit a

  sentencing court from considering, in its discretion, criminal conduct unrelated to the

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  offense of conviction in determining whether a defendant qualifies for an adjustment

  for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1.” United States v. Finnesy, 953 F.3d

  675, 701 (10th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

        Under our precedents, “[e]ven when a defendant truthfully admits his role in

  the offense of conviction, a district court may properly deny the § 3E1.1 decrease if

  the court concludes the defendant engaged in conduct that is inconsistent with

  acceptance of responsibility.” United States v. Patron-Montano, 223 F.3d 1184,

  1189 (10th Cir. 2000). Thus, courts may consider both the defendant’s admission of

  wrongdoing in the offense of conviction and his broader conduct when determining if

  he has accepted responsibility for his offense. Here, the district court did not abuse

  its discretion to consider the Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s subsequent possession of

  narcotics, and its conclusion that such possession was inconsistent with acceptance of

  responsibility was not clearly erroneous.

         Urging us to reverse the district court, Mr. Maxey-Velasquez asks us to adopt

  the Sixth Circuit’s jurisprudence on the matter. The Sixth Circuit restricts

  “acceptance of responsibility” to “conduct which is related to the underlying

  offense.” United States v. Morrison, 983 F.2d 730, 735 (6th Cir. 1993). But as

  stated above, this interpretation is foreclosed by our precedent. We have held that

  the Guidelines do “not . . . qualify [the voluntary termination or withdrawal from

  criminal conduct or associations] factor to permit consideration of only criminal

  conduct related to or of the same nature as the offense of conviction.” Finnesy, 953

  F.3d at 701 (citing Prince, 204 F.3d at 1023).

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        In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering conduct

  unrelated to the underlying offense of conviction. We therefore affirm the district

  court’s decision to deny Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s § 3E1.1(a) motion.

                                     III. Conclusion

        We affirm the district court’s application of the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement

  and its denial of Mr. Maxey-Velasquez’s motion for a § 3E1.1(a) decrease.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                             Circuit Judge

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