Court Opinion

ID: 9746691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:33:52.684375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:15.955008
License: Public Domain

Murphy, C. J.,

dissenting:

While I agree with the Court that there was a failure of compliance with Rule 758 a, I think the rule violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard *643adopted in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976). That standard, applicable only to criminal appeals, is as follows:
"[wjhen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed 'harmless’ and a reversal is mandated. Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of — whether erroneously admitted or excluded — may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict.” Id. at 659.
The jury impanelled to hear the charges against Sherman was apprised at the outset of the trial as to the substance of the five counts of the indictment, and was advised by the court that charges were not evidence of guilt. After the trial judge had granted Sherman’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to counts 1 (larceny after trust) and 3 (attorney escrow violation), the case was submitted to the jury on remaining counts 2 (fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary), 4 (unlawful commingling of client funds) and 5 (unlawful use of client funds). The court, in sending the indictment to the jury, instructed it that as a result of "certain rulings” which had previously been made by the court, the jury was to confine its attention only to counts 2, 4 and 5 of the indictment. The court reinstructed the jury that charges were not evidence of guilt. The court provided the jury with a "verdict sheet” which limited its deliberations and its verdict to counts 2, 4 and 5.
The majority concludes that the court’s cautionary instructions did not overcome the "unequivocal command” of the rule. It holds that where the rule is violated, and objection is seasonably made, there is "no cure” for the error since jury deliberations are always conducted in secret and it can never be said beyond a reasonable doubt by the reviewing *644appellate court that the "dead counts” played no role in the jury’s guilty verdict.
I simply cannot accept such a rigid and artificial application of the Dorsey harmless error formulation in cases involving a violation of Rule 758 a. The majority completely discounts the impact upon the jury of the court’s explicit jury instructions in this case. It assigns no significance to the limitation imposed upon the jury by the "verdict sheet.” It simply assumes that there was a "reasonable possibility” under Dorsey that the jury may have ignored these directives. It appears to me that the majority has been fatally mesmerized by Sherman’s far-fetched suggestion that the jury in some manner may have believed that it was incumbent upon it — in view of the trial judge’s earlier action removing two of the counts from its consideration — to convict on one or more of the remaining counts. I do not believe that it is within the realm of reason to attribute such thought processes to any jury. In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt within the contemplation of the Dorsey harmless error rule that merely sending the indictment containing the "dead counts” to the jury did not contribute to the rendition of the guilty verdict in this case. The error, therefore, was harmless and thus not reversible.
Other jurisdictions, state and federal, have held the harmless error rule applicable in instances where an indictment containing dismissed counts was sent to the jury over the objection of the accused. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 586 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Haynes, 573 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850, 99 S. Ct. 154, 58 L. Ed. 2d 153; United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930, 91 S. Ct. 194, 27 L. Ed. 2d 191; State v. Fisher, 39 Ore. App. 931, 593 P.2d 1294 (1979); Foster v. State, 230 Ga. 666, 198 S.E.2d 847 (1973); State v. Begyn, 58 N.J. Super. 185, 156 A.2d 15 (1959), aff'd, 34 N.J. 35, 167 A.2d 161 (1961); People v. Katz, 356 Ill. 440, 190 N.E. 913 (1934) and Berry v. State, 196 Ind. 258, 148 N.E. 143 (1925).
*645I therefore dissent from the majority holding that Sherman’s conviction should be reversed for the Rule 758 a violation.
Judge Rodowsky has authorized me to state that he concurs in the views expressed herein.