Court Opinion

ID: 9673937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:20:48.505509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:35.642003
License: Public Domain

LAMBERT, Justice,
dissenting.
With but a single paragraph and no authority, the majority has settled the most important issue in this case. It has proclaimed that KRS 403.340(2) applies to wholly intrastate cases. Despite the prefatory language of the statute, “If a court of this state has jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ...,” the majority has decided that it “applies to all cases, regardless of whether the custody order originated with the court now asked to consider a change of custody, or originated elsewhere.”
By its plain language the introductory phrase in KRS 403.340(2) limits its application to those cases in which the forum court has acquired jurisdiction pursuant to the U.C.C.J.A. To determine whether the U.C.C.J.A. applies, one need look no further than KRS 403.400, the first section of this uniform Act. This section, titled “Purposes; construction,” begins as follows: “(1) The general purposes of KRS 403.410 to 403.620 are to:” Thereafter nine subsections are set forth which limit the applicability of the Act to cases in which another state has some connection with the parties. Finally, to make it abundantly clear that *490the purposes set forth in KRS 403.400 govern the entire Act, section (2) states:
“KRS 403.410 to 403.620 shall be construed to promote the general purposes stated in this section.”
In 96 ALR3d 968 (1980), an annotation entitled Validity, Construction, and Application of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, collects numerous cases interpreting the Act. In Section 3, a number of decisions from throughout the United States are annotated and demonstrate that the purpose of the Act is to define child custody jurisdiction when two or more states have a connection with the child. A number of courts have flatty stated that the U.C.C.J.A. does not apply to intrastate custody disputes. In Nelson v. Nelson, 433 So.2d 1015 (Fla.App. 3 Dist.1983), this proposition is stated as follows:
“Insofar as intrastate custody disputes are concerned, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act does not apply, Adams v. Adams, 374 So.2d 29 (Fla.3d DCA 1979), and the court which entered the custody decree continues to have exclusive jurisdiction to modify the decree.”
In In Re Marriage of Trouth, 631 P.2d 1183 (Colo.App.1981), the Colorado Court of Appeals said:
“This provision of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, together with its stated purposes, indicate that the Act does not apply to actions which are purely intrastate. The purposes of the Act are to promote cooperation between courts of different states which will lead to an informed decision on custody1, Section 14-13-102, C.R.S.1973, and to ‘prevent the desperate shifting from state to state of thousands of innocent children by interested parties seeking to gain custody rights in one state even though denied those rights by the decree of another state.’ Fry v. Ball, 190 Colo. 128, 544 P.2d 402 (1975). Thus, Section 14-13-111 is not applicable here since the child, his parents, and his grandparents resided in Colorado, and the divorce and the custody decree were entered by a Colorado court.” Id. at 1185.
Finally, in Amos v. Amos, 282 Ark. 532, 669 S.W.2d 200 (1984), the Arkansas Supreme Court said
“The chancellor found that the statute [the Arkansas codification of KRS 403.-420] is solely for custody battles between residents of different states. We agree.” Id. 669 S.W.2d at 201.
To make matters worse, the majority has even disregarded Kentucky precedent on this issue. In Shumaker v. Paxton, Ky., 613 S.W.2d 130 (1981), this Court recognized the purposes of the U.C.C.J.A. as follows:
“While we feel that the above statute is aimed primarily at interstate rather than intra-state applications we do view it as affording some direction and guidance for the proper forum in which to main- . tain an action such as we have here.” Id. at 132.
In Shumaker the Court candidly acknowledged the nonapplicability of the U.C.C.J.A. to intrastate cases but borrowed from it for the purpose of determining venue. The majority in the case at bar demonstrates no such candor. It flatly holds that the U.C.C. J.A. applies to every child custody case.
In clear disregard of the foregoing authority and the prevailing rule of law throughout the United States, the majority has held, “Thus, the U.C.C.J.A. is a threshold consideration in every case.... ” This conclusion is accurate only to the extent that the forum court must first determine whether the order sought to be modified was rendered in another state. Wholly intrastate cases are not governed by the U.C. C.J.A. and by its own terms KRS 403.340(2) does not apply to intrastate custody modification actions.
Perhaps the majority believes that if KRS 403.340(2) does not apply to intrastate cases, there may be a void in the law or an absence of standards by which a trial court should measure the evidence on a motion to modify custody. Such a situation, however, is hardly unique in the law of Kentucky. In many areas the Legislature has failed to enact statutes where we think such would be desirable. It is not our prerogative, however, to use a “law *491wrench” to make a statute apply when by its very terms it does not apply. We should be guided by well known rules of statutory construction such as are found in Gateway Construction Company v. Wallbaum, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 247 (1962), as follows:
“The best way in most cases to ascertain such intent or to determine the meaning of a statute is to look to the language used, but no intention must be read into the statute not justified by the language. The primary rule is to ascertain the intention from the words employed in enacting the statute and not to guess what the Legislature may have intended but did not express. Resort must be had first to the words, which are decisive if they are clear. The words of the statute are to be given their usual, ordinary, and everyday meaning.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 249. .
The majority’s misinterpretation of KRS 403.340(2) has created a nearly impenetrable barrier for noncustodial parents when a change of custody is sought. Regardless of the number of years which have passed since entry of the original decree, the changes in the circumstances of the parties, the age of the child, and the wishes of the child (a significant factor in the case at bar), trial courts will be required to retain the original custodian unless the movant is able to demonstrate that the child’s present environment “endangers seriously his physical, mental, moral or emotional health,” a standard which is nearly impossible to achieve in ordinary circumstances.
I am of the opinion that trial courts should not be hamstrung to such a degree, but should retain a measure of discretion to determine custody modification upon a showing of changed circumstances. By judicious use of the power to impose court costs and attorneys’ fees, trial judges would be able to prevent vexatious custody modification litigation.