Court Opinion

ID: 9848161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:13:52.962058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:04.867348
License: Public Domain

Stolz, Judge,
dissenting. I concur in Divisions 1 and 3 of the majority opinion, but respectfully dissent from the construction placed on the waiver provisions of the contract expressed in Division 2 of the majority opinion. I cannot agree that the provisions in the contract by which the buyers (appellants) agreed that unless, within 10 days after notice of its assignment mailed to the appellant buyers, a written statement of facts giving rise to a claim or defense arising out of the sale be mailed by the buyer to the assignee (or words to this effect), the buyer shall not assert any claim or defense arising out of the sale only "refers to facts giving rise to a claim or defense arising out of the sale prior to the time notice is given.” To place such an interpretation on the language of the waiver, not only severely restricts the interpretation of the waiver provisions in the cases cited in the majority opinion from this court without specifically qualifying those cases, but also places extreme limitation on cases construing waiver decided by the Supreme Court, which this court is powerless to do. See Western & A. R. Co. v. Bishop, 50 Ga. 465, supra; Biggers v. Equitable Mfg. Co., 124 Ga. 1045 (1) (53 SE 674); Mock v. Kemp & Lewis, 17 Ga. App. 448 (1) (87 SE 608); Anderson v. International Harvester Co., 27 Ga. App. 533 (109 SE 417); Colson & Sons v. Ellis, 40 Ga. App. 768 (6, 7) (151 SE 654); Jones v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 88 Ga. App. 24, 26, supra. If the buyers (appellants) executed a contract containing a valid waiver, they are bound by those provisions of the contract as strongly as any other provision.
I am authorized to state that Hall, P. J., Eberhardt, P. J., and Clark, J., concur in this dissent.