Court Opinion

ID: 9586482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:11:51.81223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:47.339794
License: Public Domain

Spratley, J.,
dissenting:
It seems to me that the only premise upon which the judgment in this case can be affirmed is that as there was sufficient evidence to justify the finding that defendant was guilty, it matters not how his conviction was obtained. I must, with great deference, dissent from that conclusion on the ground that the illegal detention of the defendant did deprive him of his constitutional rights and hence his conviction did lack due process of law, in that it was in violation of Section 1 of the XIV Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Every person has an inherent right not to be restrained of his liberty except by due process of law. The right to bail is an inalienable right guaranteed to every citizen who is charged, but not yet convicted, with the commission of a bailable offense. VIII Amendment, U. S. Constitution; Section 9, Article 1, Constitution of Virginia and Virginia Code, §§ 52-21, as amended, 19.1-98 and 19.1-110. A person charged with a crime has also the right “to call for evidence in his favor.” VI Amendment, U. S. Constitution; Section 8, Article I, Constitution of Virginia.
Virginia Code, §§ 19.1-98 and 19.1-110 stipulate the duties of an arresting officer and the justice of the peace before whom a person is brought, charged with an offense.
Code, § 52-21, as amended, provides that an officer making an arrest, such as in this case, ushall forthwith bring the person so arrested before an officer authorized to issue criminal warrants in the county or city where the arrest is made. The officer before whom such person is brought shall proceed to examine the officer making the arrest. If the officer before whom such person is brought has reasonable grounds upon which to believe that a criminal offense has been committed, and that the person arrested has committed *371such offense, he shall issue such a warrant as might have been issued prior to the arrest of such person under the provisions of § 19.1-91. if such a warrant is issued the case shall thereafter be disposed of in like manner as though the warrant had been issued prior to the arrest. If such a warrant be not issued the person so arrested shall be released.” (Emphasis added.)
The stipulated facts in this case were in conflict as to whether defendant was operating his automobile under the influence of intoxicants. In that connection it is but fair to add the following facts. Defendant, at the time of arrest, “immediately insisted” that he was not guilty, and thereafter consistently made that claim. In that he was corroborated by Sergeant Hughes and Police Officer Trexler. Four witnesses were called by the city. Two of these, James A. Danner and Frank L. Jones, who were in a position to observe the defendant’s condition, did not think he was under the influence of intoxicants at the time of the accident. Danner said he was selling newspapers on the street corner where the accident occurred; that he heard the noise of the collision of the motor vehicles; and that he observed the defendant but did not detect the odor of alcohol on his breath. Jones, the driver of the bus that was struck by' Holt’s automobile, said that he saw defendant immediately after the accident; that he sat in the back seat of the patrol car which took him to the police lockup; that he did not smell any alcohol on his breath; and could not say that Holt was under the influence of intoxicants.
Under the full circumstances, I agree, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict that defendant was guilty of operating his car under the influence of intoxicants. However, that is not the controlling issue here. Regardless of defendant’s guilt or innocence, he was entitled to be brought to trial by due process of law, and that is the issue which now confronts us.
The Court agrees that the detention of defendant subsequent to his arrest was in violation of his rights, and was “arbitrary and illegal.” This admission puts the Court in a position of confession and avoidance. In avoidance, it is sought to show that the illegal detention did not deprive him of any material evidence in his favor. In support, the Court cites Winston v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 386, 49 S. E. 2d 611 and McHone v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 435, 57 S. E. 2d 109.
A close reading of the opinions in those two cases shows different *372states of facts. As I see it, the material facts in the Winston case are-much like those in the present case. Here,, as in that case, the defendant, at all times, insisted that he was not guilty. Here, as in that case, “had the defendant been taken before a proper judicial officer for the purpose of securing a warrant for his arrest, the defendant could have then and there applied to such officer for bail. It would have been the duty of such judicial officer to determine whether the defendant was in a proper condition to be admitted to bail.” Here, as in that case, the action of the arresting officers “in denying the defendant this opportunity by confining him in jap * * *, pad tlie effect of substituting their discretion in the matter for that of the judicial officer.” 188 Va., supra, page 395. Here, as there, it is “perfectly apparent” that, as a result of his illegal detention, the defendant was deprived of the opportunity to exercise his constitutional right to call for evidence, “which might have supported his claim that he was innocent of the charge under which he was held.”
Moreover, in the Winston case, as here, there was an entire lack of showing that the evidence the defendant might have called, had he been given that opportunity, would have been in his favor. That could have been determined only upon presentation of the evidence. The right of a defendant to call upon a physician for evidence in his favor is no greater than his right to call upon a layman for the same purpose. The material point is that each defendant was denied the exercise of his right to call for the evidence. Hence, the conviction in each case lacked due process of law.
In the McHone case, the defendant, at the time of his arrest, on his way to jail, and in the jail, freely admitted his guilt. He asked that he be allowed to pay his fine to the officers and be released. He did not request that he be allowed to give bond, and the only time it was mentioned by him was to the jailer sometime after the arresting officers had gone; but even then he did not deny his guilt. McHone offered no defense. He freely proclaimed his guilt in such a manner as to negative any desire to call for evidence to the contrary. Consequently and logically, he was not denied any right or privilege.
A denial of bail is as effective a violation of rights as is the requirement of excessive bail. A denial of the opportunity to exercise the right to call for evidence is a denial of the right itself.
Neither in the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Virginia, or in the statutes of Virginia is there any requirement that *373before a person charged with a crime can call for evidence in his favor, he must prove that he can obtain such evidence. Whether a defendant could or could not obtain favorable evidence is beside the question. We do know that Holt was deprived of his right to give bond, of the exercise of the discretion of the bailing officer as to whether he should be detained, of the right to call for evidence, and the right to call for the assistance of friends or counsel. He was to all effects and purposes held incommunicado for about 9 hours.
Instruction No. 5, given by the court, without objection, was erroneous, contrary to the evidence, contrary to the law, and prejudicial to the defendant. It is admitted that he was denied “the opportunity to obtain bail,” and it is indisputably true that he did not have “the opportunity to obtain evidence in his behalf.” Hence, there was no factual issue before the jury except as to his guilt or innocence of the offense charged against him. As the Court says, there was “no showing that if the defendant had been promptly admitted to bail he could probably have secured evidence material to his defense or tending to show his innocence.” The question as to the nature of the evidence was not in issue. In reality, the instruction involved a determination of law, that is, whether the denial of bail and of the right to call for evidence in his favor constituted a lack of due process of law.
The instruction imposed the burden on defendant to show that his illegal detention and the denial of bail “prevented him from having the opportunity of obtaining evidence in his behalf,” a purely conjectural and speculative question under the circumstances.
The constitutional and statutory provisions are more than merely procedural requirements. They go to the heart of the provision of Section 1 of the XIV Amendment to the U. S. Constitution providing that no “state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”—a safeguard for the protection of individual rights. However, if the provision be considered procedural, defendant was denied procedural due process, a denial as prejudicial as the denial of the assistance of counsel, of a speedy trial, or of freedom from illegal search and seizure. A defendant may prefer a witness in his favor rather than the assistance of counsel. Cf. State v. Krozel, 24 Conn. Sup. 266, 190 A. 2d 61, (March 5, 1963), where under facts similar to those here, it was held that defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel.
*374The opinion of the Court, as I read it, imposes a serious restriction of constitutional rights guaranteed to the defendant under our Federal and State Constitutions, and represents a disregard of the express mandatory provisions of Virginia Code, § 52-21. I adhere to the view that courts are not invested with the power to enact laws. Their function is to ascertain what the law is, as enacted by the legislature. It is to be regretted that this should occur in Virginia, the fountainhead of constitutional government.
History and experience remind us that if a guilty man be denied his constitutional rights, sooner or later one without guilt may likewise suffer.