Court Opinion

ID: 9854335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:05:54.636084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:02.087664
License: Public Domain

DOOLING, J.
I concur in the order reversing the order made by the San Francisco Superior Court on the ground that no showing of necessity and ability to pay was made by respondent and appellant was not permitted to introduce evidence on those questions.  I am satisfied that on an application for temporary maintenance, counsel fees and costs the court should not inquire into the question of whether or not the husband deserted his wife (Civ. Code, § 176), since that goes to the merits of the action and the merits are not in issue on an application for an allowance pendente lite (Locke Paddon v. Locke Paddon, 194 Cal. 73 [227 P. 715]; Kowalsky v. Kowalsky, 145 Cal. 394 [78 P. 877]; Storke v. Storke, 99 Cal. 621 [34 P. 339]). The reason for this rule is tersely stated in the Storke case, 99 Cal., page 622: “If the court were compelled to try and determine the issues in the case before it could allow alimony, the entire purpose of *158allowing alimony ‘during the pendency of the action’ would be defeated.”
I concur in the order affirming the award of $75 per month for temporary maintenance.  An impecunious husband’s right to support by his wife is completely correlative with that of an impecunious wife to support by her husband (Civ. Code, §137) as are his right to pendente lite orders for support, counsel fees and costs (Civ. Code, §§137.2, 137.3).
I concur in the reversal of the order allowing counsel fees and costs for opposing the two appeals on the sole ground that the amount awarded was excessive. We have affirmed the order attacked in the second appeal. The reasonable counsel fees and costs of respondent should be allowed for successfully opposing an appeal which his counsel has satisfied us should be affirmed.  The trial court can now find the value of the services actually rendered by counsel in opposing the appeals and the costs actually incurred. The amounts so found should be allowed by the trial court as counsel fees and costs. (Kohn v. Kohn, 95 Cal.App.2d 722, 724 [214 P.2d 80].)
Goodell, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 26, 1953, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 22,1953.