Court Opinion

ID: 9926010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 17:16:24.612001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:58.346677
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                         January 23, 2024

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                No. 56814-4-II

                               Respondent,

        v.                                                      PUBLISHED OPINION

 ANTHONY LYNN COUCH, SR.
 aka ANTHONY CLARK,

                               Appellant.

       MAXA, P.J. – Anthony Couch appeals his convictions of second degree rape and second

degree assault, arising from an incident involving his former girlfriend. Couch also appeals his

sentence of life without release/parole (LWOP) as authorized under the Persistent Offender

Accountability Act (POAA), RCW 9.94A.570.

       Couch argues that the trial court erred when it denied his CrR 8.3(b) motion to dismiss

for government misconduct when state actors video and audio recorded his communications with

his attorneys and opened his legal mail. We conclude that there is no indication that the trial

court applied the correct legal standard – requiring the State to show beyond a reasonable doubt

that Couch was not prejudiced – for the intrusion on Couch’s attorney-client communications. In

addition, we conclude as matter of law that the State did not produce sufficient evidence to prove

the absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred

in denying Couch’s CrR 8.3(b) motion.
No. 56814-4-II

       The trial court generally has discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy for government

misconduct under CrR 8.3(b). However, we hold that the only appropriate remedies when the

State has intruded on attorney-client communications and cannot disprove prejudice beyond a

reasonable doubt is dismissal or a new trial untainted by government misconduct. Accordingly,

we reverse Couch’s convictions and sentence, and we remand for the trial court to determine

whether to dismiss the case or order a new trial with sufficient remedial safeguards.1

                                               FACTS

       The State charged Couch with second degree rape-domestic violence and second degree

assault-domestic violence after he allegedly forced his former girlfriend to have sex with him

after she broke off their relationship.

       Before the trial began, Couch filed a motion to dismiss for governmental misconduct

under CrR 8.3(b). Couch claimed that the Grays Harbor County Jail had illegally recorded

conversations between him and defense counsel and had opened his legal mail. The trial court

held a hearing on the motion and heard testimony from Couch, Chief Corrections Deputy Travis

Davis, and Eugina Buchanan, a corrections sergeant.

       Couch testified that Christopher Swaby and Ruth Rivas were his assigned defense

counsel. He stated that he talked to his attorneys about a number of subjects: “Trial strategy,

witnesses that may be needed, private investigator, investigation, what they need to be doing,

who they need to contact. At one point it was to switch a judge. There – there’s a variety of

1
  On the merits, Couch argues that (1) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his closing
and rebuttal arguments, (2) the trial court violated his right to confrontation when it denied his
recross-examination of the alleged victim after the State’s redirect, (3) defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel, (4) cumulative error deprived him of his right to a fair trial, and
(5) the POAA is categorically unconstitutional for nonhomicide offenders and for offenders
whose strike offenses were low-level felony convictions. Because we remand for dismissal or a
new trial, we do not address these issues.

                                                  2
No. 56814-4-II

things.” 1 Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 145. All of the conversations were in furtherance of his defense

at trial.

            Couch testified that he spoke multiple times with Rivas on the phone. However, he later

learned that the telephone conversations had been recorded. Couch also had a number of video

conferences with Swaby, and later learned that they had been recorded. Finally, Couch stated

that Sergeant Buchanan informed him that a piece of his legal mail had been opened. He said

that the envelope was clearly labeled legal mail.

            Couch testified that after he found out that his telephone calls with Rivas were being

recorded, he stopped talking to her on the phone. After he found out his video meetings with

Swaby were being recorded, he stopped meeting with him. And after his legal mail was opened,

he stopped using mail to communicate with his lawyers. Couch stated, “And still right now, I

don’t want to use the telephones, I don’t want to use this kiosk, I don’t want to use mail. I’ve

been chilled on a lot of things that I . . . want to communicate with [Swaby] and Ms. Rivas, but I

– I can’t.” 1 RP at 150-51.

            Davis testified that when a phone number was placed on the privileged list at the jail,

phone calls to and from that number were not recorded. Audio and video also were not recorded

between accounts identified as attorneys and their clients during video visits.

            In October 2021, Swaby requested Rivas to be put on the privileged list. Davis stated

that after he added Rivas to the privileged list, he checked the phone system to see if there had

been any recorded calls with her number before it was added to the privileged list. There were

70 recorded calls that were made with her involving various inmates. The software indicated

that no one had listened to any of the calls. Davis then “locked” the calls so no one could find or

listen to them, and they were deleted from the system.

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No. 56814-4-II

       Regarding the video calls, Davis testified that the video system was set up for family

visits, and they were recorded. He did not realize until May 7, 2021 that lawyers like Swaby

were using the system. So he assumed that conferences between Swaby and Couch were

recorded until May 7. Davis stated that he had no knowledge as to whether or not anyone had

watched the video recordings.

       Buchanan testified that she found an opened envelope marked as legal mail and

addressed to Couch. The contents of the envelope were not visible. Buchanan testified that a

support specialist at the sheriff’s office, who no longer worked there, had opened the mail.

Buchanan took the mail directly to Couch and notified him that it was opened and then she made

a copy of the outside of the envelope. She testified that she did not have any knowledge as to

whether or not any employee of the sheriff’s office or the county viewed the contents of the

envelope.

       The State did not call as witnesses any of the prosecutors or police investigators handling

the case as to whether they had seen the videos or the opened legal mail. The State also did not

call the employee who had opened the mail to testify.

       The trial court denied Couch’s motion to dismiss. The court first stated that the only

recorded communications between Couch and defense counsel were the 70 telephone calls

involving Rivas. But the court found that there was no evidence that anyone had listened to or

overheard the recordings. In addition, the video of the attorney meetings was without audio, and

any documents exchanged were not able to be read. And there was no evidence that the sheriff’s

office eavesdropped on those conversations.

       Regarding the opened legal mail, the trial court noted Buchanan’s testimony that she did

not look at the contents and she was not aware that anyone else looked at the contents. The court

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No. 56814-4-II

found that there had “been no evidence presented by the defendant that any human being

observed the contents of that envelope at any time, other than him and the person who sent it to

him had.” 1 RP at 214.

       In conclusion, the trial court stated,

       I do not find that there has been any violation of the attorney-client privilege. And
       to the extent that there has been a violation, there’s certainly no evidence before the
       Court that any prejudice resulted especially in light of the uncontroverted facts of
       this case that no one ever listened to or – or any conversations or – or overheard
       any conversations or viewed any video inappropriately or viewed the contents of
       Mr. Couch’s mail.

1 RP at 214-15.

Verdict and Sentence

       The jury convicted Couch of second degree rape and second degree assault.

       Couch previously had been convicted of two other felonies that were strike offenses

under the POAA – vehicular assault by DUI or reckless driving in 2006 and second degree

assault in 2010. Because Couch’s current offenses also were strike offenses, the trial court

sentenced Couch to life in prison without the possibility of early release.

       Couch appeals his convictions and his sentence.

                                            ANALYSIS

A.     INTRUSION ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS

       Couch argues that state actors unlawfully intruded on his communications with his

attorneys and that the trial court erred because it did not require the State to establish the absence

of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that there is no indication that the trial

court applied the correct legal standard in ruling on Couch’s motion to dismiss, and that as a

matter of law the State did not prove the absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt.

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No. 56814-4-II

       1.    Legal Principles

       The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant

the right to the assistance of counsel, and that right includes the right to confer privately with

their attorney. State v. Myers, 27 Wn. App. 2d 798, 804, 533 P.3d 451 review denied, 539 P.3d 8

(2023). A state actor’s intrusion into private conversations between attorney and defendant

violates this right. Id. And there is no distinction between an intrusion by jail security and an

intrusion by law enforcement. State v. Irby, 3 Wn. App. 2d 247, 258, 415 P.3d 611 (2018).

       If a state actor has violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right, prejudice to the

defendant is presumed. Myers, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 809. Significantly, the presumption of

prejudice applies regardless of the intention of the state actors or the degree of interference. Id.

at 809-10. The presumption of prejudice can be rebutted, but only if the State proves beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was not prejudiced. Id. at 809. “Because the ‘constitutional

right to privately communicate with an attorney is a foundational right,’ the State must be held to

the ‘highest burden of proof to ensure that it is protected.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Peña Fuentes,

179 Wn.2d 808, 820, 318 P.3d 257 (2014)).

       CrR 8.3(b) states that the trial court may dismiss a criminal prosecution due to

“governmental misconduct when there has been prejudice to the rights of the accused which

materially affect the accused’s right to a fair trial.” Intruding on confidential attorney-client

communications constitutes misconduct under CrR 8.3(b). Irby, 3 Wn. App. 2d at 256. We

review a trial court’s CrR 8.3(b) ruling for abuse of discretion. Myers, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 804.

An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard. Id.

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No. 56814-4-II

       2.    Applicable Cases

       In Peña Fuentes, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial after being convicted of

three offenses. 179 Wn.2d at 812, 814-15. The prosecutor and the police then decided to

investigate possible witness tampering. Id. at 816. The prosecutor asked a detective to listen to

the defendant’s phone calls from jail. Id. The detective notified the prosecutor that he had

listened to all of the defendant’s phone calls, including six conversations between the defendant

and his attorney. Id.

       The prosecutor immediately told the detective not to listen to any more phone calls and

not to disclose the content of the attorney-client conversations to anyone. Id. at 817. The

prosecutor also requested that the detective be removed from the investigation. Id. The

prosecutor then told defense counsel about the eavesdropping and submitted a declaration stating

that the detective did not disclose the content of the attorney-client phone calls to him. Id.

Because of the detective’s conduct, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges. Id. Although

the trial court agreed that the conduct was egregious, it denied the motion to dismiss, finding that

the police misconduct did not affect the previous trial or the motion for a new trial. Id.

       The Supreme Court adopted the rule that when eavesdropping on attorney-client

communications has occurred, the State must prove the absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id. at 819-20. The court held that the record was unclear as to what standard the trial

court applied and therefore remanded for the trial court to consider whether the State proved the

absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 820.

       In Irby, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the jail guards opened and

read his outgoing mail that contained privileged legal communications for his attorney. 3 Wn.

App. 2d at 251. Although the trial court found that the jail guards violated the defendant’s right

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No. 56814-4-II

to counsel, the trial court did not presume prejudice because no investigative law enforcement

were involved in the infringing conduct. Id. at 251, 257. The trial court then placed the burden

of proving prejudice on the defendant and found that he had not done so. Id. at 251-52.

       Division One of this court held that the trial court erred by not imposing a presumption of

prejudice and not requiring the State to prove the absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id. at 259-60. The court rejected the trial court’s distinction between misconduct by law

enforcement and by jail security officers, stating the presumption of prejudice applied in both

instances. Id. at 258-59. The court reversed and remanded for the trial court to hold an

evidentiary hearing in which the court must apply the presumption of prejudice and require the

State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not prejudiced. Id. at 263.

       In Myers, the defendant was arrested for first degree robbery of a bank. 27 Wn. App. 2d

at 802. Pursuant to a search warrant, law enforcement found a handwritten note in the

defendant’s home that appeared to be the one given to the bank teller. Id. In an effort to

compare the handwriting, corrections deputies seized five documents from the defendant’s jail

cell. Id. An employee at the sheriff’s office called the prosecutor when she viewed the

documents, believing that they contained privileged attorney-client communications. Id. In

order to determine whether the documents were privileged, the prosecutor had a detective that

was not involved in the case to review the documents. Id. at 802-03. The detective concluded

that several of the seized documents may have contained privileged attorney-client

communications. Id. at 803.

       The trial court declined to apply a presumption of prejudice because the conduct of law

enforcement and the prosecutor was not sufficiently egregious. Id. at 809. The court then

concluded that the defendant had failed to demonstrate actual prejudice. Id.

                                                8
No. 56814-4-II

         Division One held that the trial court misinterpreted and misapplied the law in several

ways. Id. at 808, 809, 812-13, 814, 15. The court emphasized again that prejudice must be

presumed and the defendant had no burden to show prejudice, and that the State must prove the

absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 809, 813-14. The court reversed and

remanded for the trial court to apply the proper legal standards. Id. at 823.

         3.   Trial Court Error

         Peña Fuentes and Irby established the proper framework for the trial court here to

address the alleged violation of Couch’s Sixth Amendment right to confer privately with his

attorneys.2 First, the court must determine whether state actors intruded on confidential attorney-

client communications. Irby, 3 Wn. App. 2d at 252-53. Second, if an intrusion occurred, the

court must presume prejudice to the defendant. Peña Fuentes, 179 Wn.2d at 811. Third, the

court must determine whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the intrusion did

not prejudice the defendant. Id. at 819-20.

         Applying this framework here, it is undisputed that state actors intruded on Couch’s

communications with his attorneys in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confer privately

with those attorneys. The Grays Harbor County Jail (1) recorded multiple telephone calls

between Couch and Rivas, (2) video recorded several meetings between Couch and his attorneys,

and (3) opened at least one piece of legal mail. Therefore, the trial court was required to

presume prejudice to Couch. The only question for the trial court was whether the State proved

beyond a reasonable doubt that Couch was not prejudiced.

         However, there is no indication from the record that the trial court applied this legal

framework. The court should have acknowledged that state actors had violated Couch’s Sixth

2
    Myers had not yet been decided when the trial court addressed Couch’s motion to dismiss.

                                                   9
No. 56814-4-II

Amendment right. Instead, the court concluded, “I do not find that there has been any violation

of the attorney-client privilege” because nobody had listened to the recordings. 1 RP at 214. But

the existence of a violation is indisputable – state actors recorded attorney-client

communications.

       Possibly because of the conclusion that no violation had occurred, the trial court did not

explicitly state that it was required to presume that Couch had been prejudiced. Instead, the

court stated that if there had been a violation, there was “certainly no evidence before the Court

that any prejudice resulted especially in light of the uncontroverted facts of this case that no one

ever listened to or – or any conversations or – or overheard any conversations or viewed any

video inappropriately or viewed the contents of Mr. Couch’s mail.” 1 RP at 215. Further, the

court found that there had “been no evidence presented by the defendant that any human being

observed the contents of that envelope at any time, other than him and the person who sent it to

him had.” 1 RP at 214 (emphasis added). To the extent that the court implied that Couch was

required to present evidence of prejudice, that implication was incorrect. Prejudice was

presumed.

       Finally, the trial court did not explicitly state that the State was required to prove the

absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. As noted in the previous paragraph, the court

concluded that there was no evidence of prejudice. But the court did not conclude that the State

had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Couch had not been prejudiced.

       There is no indication that the trial court applied the correct legal standard – requiring the

State to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Couch was not prejudiced – when addressing

Couch’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, the trial court erred in analyzing Couch’s CrR 8.3(b)

motion to dismiss.

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No. 56814-4-II

       4.   Failure of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

       The courts in Pena Fuentes, Irby, and Myers all remanded for the trial court to address

whether the State was able to prove the absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. Pena

Fuentes, 179 Wn.2d at 820; Irby, 3 Wn. App. 2d at 263; Myers, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 823.

However, we conclude as a matter of law under the facts of this case that the State did not prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that Couch was not prejudiced.

       Couch presented testimony showing how he had been prejudiced by the state actors’

intrusion on his attorney-client communications. He testified that after he found out about the

intrusions, he stopped talking to Rivas on the phone, he stopped meeting with Swaby over video,

and he stopped using mail to communicate with his lawyers. As a result, his communications

with his lawyers – which focused on trial preparation – were chilled.

       At the hearing, the State made no effort to refute this testimony. The State presented no

evidence that Couch had been able to fully communicate with his lawyers despite the intrusion

on their attorney-client communications. Therefore, the State was unable to prove that Couch

was not prejudiced in this way.

       Instead, the State focused on whether anyone had listened to the recorded telephone calls,

viewed the recorded video conferences, or read the opened legal mail. But the State’s evidence

on this issue was inadequate. Davis testified he did not know whether or not anyone had viewed

the videos. Buchanan testified that she did not know if anyone read the opened mail. The State

did not call as witnesses any of the prosecutors or police investigators handling the case as to

whether they had seen the videos or the opened legal mail. The State also did not call as a

witness the employee who had opened the mail to testify as to whether she read the mail or

                                                 11
No. 56814-4-II

shared it with anyone else. As a result, the State was unable to prove that nobody involved in

Couch’s case had seen the attorney-client communications.

       The record demonstrates that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Couch was not prejudiced by state actors’ intrusion on his attorney-client communications.

Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to grant Couch’s CrR 8.3(b) motion based

on government misconduct.

B.     REMEDY FOR INTRUSION ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS

       Because we have determined that the State cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Couch was not prejudiced, we must address the proper remedy under CrR 8.3(b) for the State’s

intrusion on Couch’s attorney-client communications.

       CrR 8.3(b) states that a trial court “may” dismiss a criminal prosecution based on

government misconduct. This means that dismissal based on government misconduct is allowed

but not required under CrR 8.3(d). Irby, 3 Wn. App. 2d at 264. The trial court has discretion to

craft an appropriate remedy. Id. “[T]he trial court should consider the totality of the

circumstances, evaluating both the degree of prejudice to [the defendant’s] right to a fair trial and

the degree of nefariousness of the conduct by the state actors.” Id.

       When the State fails to prove the absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt,

dismissal certainly is one available remedy and must be “thoroughly and meaningfully”

considered by the trial court. Myers, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 821. However, the court must recognize

that “ ‘dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, appropriate only when other, less severe sanctions

will be ineffective.’ ” Irby, 3 Wn. App. 2d at 264 (quoting State v. Garza, 99 Wn. App. 291, 301-

02, 994 P.2d 868 (2000)).

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No. 56814-4-II

       In addition, ordering a new trial untainted by government misconduct also is an available

remedy. Irby, 3 Wn. App. 2d at 264-65. Given the seriousness of governmental intrusion on

attorney-client communications, we conclude that these are the only two remedies available to

the trial court. See id. (stating that “[i]n the event that the trial court determines that a remedy

short of dismissal is warranted, vacation of the judgment will nevertheless be necessary.”) The

new trial must include remedial safeguards to ensure that the State does not benefit from state

actor misconduct. “[I]n anticipation of yet another trial, other remedies might include—

singularly or in combination—suppression of evidence, disqualification of specific attorneys

from [the defendant’s] prosecution, disqualification of the [prosecuting attorney’s office] from

further participation in the case, or exclusion of witnesses tainted by the governmental

misconduct.” Id. at 265.

       Therefore, on remand the trial court must determine in its discretion whether to dismiss

Couch’s case or order a new trial with sufficient remedial safeguards.

                                           CONCLUSION

       We reverse Couch’s convictions and sentence, and we remand for the trial court to

determine whether to dismiss the case or order a new trial with sufficient remedial safeguards.

                                                       MAXA, P.J.

 We concur:

 LEE, J.

 VELJACIC, J.

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