Court Opinion

ID: 9753249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:05:22.885667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:32.746563
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, J.,
with whom RUDMAN, J. joins, dissenting.
[¶ 24] Because, in my view, the Superior Court properly analyzed the facts in the statements of material facts and correctly entered summary judgment for Gagne on Curtis’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 25] Although there is evidence from which a jury could infer that Gagne had some knowledge that Porter and Fifield were contemplating a theft of pizza, in my view there is nothing to point to Gagne’s participation in any planning of the theft. Moreover, Curtis’s emotional distress was caused not by the theft of the pizza, but by the assault that was committed by Alan Porter, an action that was not foreseen even by Ryan Fifield, who participated in the theft with Porter.
[¶ 26] In my view, Curtis has failed to present sufficient evidence from which, without engaging in speculation, a jury could rationally infer that Gagne was “substantially certain that [Curtis’s severe emotional] distress would result from [Gagne’s] conduct” or that Gagne’s conduct was so “extreme or outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious, utterly intolerable in a civilized community,” or that her actions “caused [Curtis] severe emotional distress.” Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr., 1998 ME 87, ¶ 15, 711 A.2d 842, 847.
[¶ 27] I would affirm the Superior Court’s judgment in full.