Court Opinion

ID: 9863085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:04:36.736019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:54.021296
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring.
As a general rule, an indictment which tracks the statutory language provides sufficient notice. Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). However, there are two exceptions to this general rule. First, where an indictment contains a necessary allegation of an act by the defendant which comprises more than one statutorily defined means of its performance, but the indictment fails to specify which of the statutory definitions of the act is relied upon, the indictment fails to provide the constitutionally required notice. Gibbons v. State, 652 S.W.2d 413 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). This exception is not at issue in the present case, because the statute in question contains only one manners or means of commission.
The second exception is if the statutory language is not completely descriptive, merely tracking the language of the statute is insufficient to provide the constitutionally required notice to the defendant. Haecker v. State, 571 S.W.2d 920, 921-22 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); and, Conklin v. State, 144 Tex.Crim. 343, 162 S.W.2d 973 (1942). But in the instant case the statutorily language is sufficiently descriptive to provide the requisite notice.
However, I cannot join the majority opinion because I do not believe the conversation described in footnote 1 a., ante at 408, is an illegal solicitation sufficient to constitute the offense of barratry.
Therefore, I join only the judgment of the Court.