Court Opinion

ID: 9577353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:34:04.481517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:25.017816
License: Public Domain

BONEY, Chief Justice,
with whom CONNOR, Justice, joins, dissenting:
We cannot agree with the majority that Armstrong’s motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied.
We do agree that the proper standard to be applied is the one announced in Bush v. State:
On a motion for a judgment of acquittal the judge must take the view of the evidence and the inferences therefrom most favorable to the state. If he determines that fair minded men in the exercise of reasonable judgment could differ on the question of whether guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, then he must submit the case to the jury.1
The controversy here does not concern the primary cause of death. The parties agree that Corrine Armstrong died from asphyxiation resulting from a dense and viscous mucous clot blocking her wind passage.2 The expert testimony revealed that, while in a normal individual the clot would ordinarily have been expectorated by a cough reflex, the deceased’s coughing reflex was inhibited by her deep unconsciousness. What was controverted was whether excessive alcohol consumption or blows to the head caused the deceased’s unconsciousness.
The majority concedes, and we agree, that expert testimony was necessary here for the state to establish its case. The majority further concedes that Dr. Rogers could not isolate which factor was the cause of the victim’s death and that he believed the reflex-inhibiting state of unconsciousness could have resulted solely from the extremely high blood-alcohol level. Dr. Rogers, in short, was unable to state with even a modicum of certainty whether either the alcohol or the blows caused the deceased’s unconsciousness.3 Armstrong could be found guilty only if the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that *452the blows, his criminal agency,4 caused the unconsciousness.5
We regard the logic of the majority opinion as untenable. In effect it holds, that, although expert testimony is required in cases of this type, the jury may find beyond a reasonable doubt that the blows caused the death, even though the expert is unable to reach such a conclusion.
Further, we do not disagree with the majority’s statement that the fact that a victim died from the “combined effects” of a pre-existing condition and a blow maliciously inflicted by a defendant does not relieve the defendant of liability. Nor do we take issue with the court’s acknowl-edgement of the following legal principle:
[I]t is well settled that the consequences of an act which is the efficient cause of the death of another are not excused, nor is the criminal responsibility for causing death lessened, by the pre-exist-ing physical condition of the person killed, at the time the act was done, or by his low vitality, which rendered him unable to withstand the shock of the wound inflicted, and without which preexisting condition the blow would not have been fatal, if a causal connection between the blow and the fact of death is made to appear. Accordingly, the fact that the victim died from the combined effects of the wound maliciously inflicted by the defendant and a disease not connected with the wound does not relieve the defendant of liability.6
These rules of criminal law are simply in-apposite. We do, however, strongly disagree with the majority’s apparent belief that Dr. Rogers’ testimony clearly demonstrates that the blows were the “efficient cause” of Mrs. Armstrong’s death; that the “combined effects” of the alcohol consumption and blows caused the victim’s death; or that “a causal connection between the blow[s] and the fact of death” exists. On the contrary, we think the expert testimony of the state was ambiguous and that Dr. Rogers failed to state with certainty which factor caused the deep unconsciousness.
We believe also that the majority has overlooked some of the subtleties of the Bush v. State test.7 The situation here is analogous to Jennings v. State 8 where we held that the evidence was such
as to permit a reasonable inference that [the victim’s] fatal injuries were caused by events or circumstances other than a beating inflicted by [the defendant], a reasonable doubt as to [the defendants’] guilt would in fact exist. Fair minded men could not then reasonably have differed on the question of whether there existed a reasonable doubt of [the defendants’] guilt, and therefore a judgment of acquittal would have been required.9
*453Here there were two alternative theories of the cause of death: the state advocating one, the defense the other. Even the expert witnesses were unable to select one theory over the other. In such circumstances, fair minded men could not reasonably have differed on the question of whether there existed a reasonable doubt of Armstrong’s guilt. The evidence clearly demonstrates the existence of such a doubt. Therefore it was error to deny the motion for judgment of acquittal.10
We conclude that the judgment should be reversed.

. 397 P.2d 616, 618 (Alaska 1964).

. In regard to this primary cause of death, it is worth noting that the state failed to anticipate accurately its own expert’s testimony concerning the ultimate cause of death. As a result, the state was placed in the awkward position of having to modify its theory midway in the presentation of its evidence. In his opening statement, the state’s attorney indicated his intent to prove that asphyxiation resulted from a blood clot caused by lacerations of the oral cavity opened by a beating. Unexpectedly, the state, as the prosecuting attorney admitted in closing argument, was forced to abandon that theory when its expert indicated that the clot was composed of mucous formed independently of the lacerations.

. Dr. Rogers testified:
Q. Even knowing her complete background, in a medical sense, if it’s impossible to say whether one or the other is responsible, it’s entirely possible that —that the blows had nothing to do with her passing out, is that correct or not?
A. She could have been unconscious from the alcohol alone. She could have been unconscious from the blows alone.
Q. Did the mucous plug — or would a mucus plug ever result' — normally result then from — directly from — from blows such as this woman struck in the absence of other factors?
A. Well the mucous plug was not the result — not the result of the blows or the alcohol it’s — the mucous plug is a normal phenomenon and the important thing was that she did not cough it up and the reason she didn’t cough it out is because she was unconscious.
Q. And the reason that she was unconscious from alcohol would — would ha — might have the same effect?
A. Unconsciousness for any reason.

. No doubt Armstrong could have been found guilty of assault and battery under AS 11.15.230. Perhaps had the state been fully apprised of the nature of the mucous clot, see note 2 supra, the state might have charged Armstrong with assault and battery.

. At various points in his testimony the state’s expert indicated that the deceased had consumed alcohol at or near lethal levels, and that alcohol consumjition alone may have caused the unconsciousness which led to the death. Regarding the quantity of alcohol consumed, his testimony on direct examination indicated that:
[H]er blood alcohol level was extremely high. The blood alcohol level was 344 milligrams percent and the urine was even higher, 432. Now 344 milligrams percent in the blood would render most casual drinkers at least unconscious, without any doubt. In fact a few small people perhaps might even die at that level although that would be sort of touch and go but most people would be unconscious ....
See R. Donigan, Chemical Tests and the Law 24 (2d ed. 1966).

. 1 Anderson, Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure § 197, at 446 (1957).

. Text accompanying note 1 supra.

. 404 P.2d 652 (Alaska 1965).

. Id. at 654. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the language of Bush v. State, 397 P.2d 616, 618 (Alaska 1964), and correctly indicated that such *453evidence would be insufficient under that test as well as the now disapproved test enunciated in Davis v. State, 369 P.2d 879, 882 (Alaska 1962). For cases indicating our disapproval of the Davis test, see Tarnef v. State, 492 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1971) ; Jordan v. State, 481 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1971) ; Allen v. State, 420 P.2d 465 (Alaska 1965).

. Since we regard this issue as controlling, we see no reason to discuss the other matters raised by Armstrong.