Court Opinion

ID: 9412293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-29 00:00:36.490937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:38.091992
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60920        Document: 00516838613             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/28/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                     July 28, 2023
                                      No. 21-60920                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                     Clerk

   Denilson Alexis Morazan-Castro,

                                                                                 Petitioner,

                                            versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                               Respondent.
                     ______________________________

                        Petition for Review of an Order of the
                            Board of Immigration Appeals
                              Agency No. A089 099 603
                     ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge: *
         The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal from
   an order of the immigration judge denying his application for asylum,
   withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
   Torture. The central issue presented for our review is whether petitioner
   should have been classified as an unaccompanied alien child when he entered
   the country in 2008. We find no error and DENY the petition for review.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-60920       Document: 00516838613             Page: 2      Date Filed: 07/28/2023

                                        No. 21-60920

               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          Denilson Alexis Morazan-Castro is a native and citizen of Honduras.
   In September 2008, when he was nine years old, he entered the United States
   with his 12-year-old brother, Walter Rene Morazan-Castro, without being
   admitted or paroled. They were each issued a notice to appear, and removal
   proceedings were initiated against them in immigration court. 1
          Morazan-Castro was initially detained but was released in December
   2008 to his aunt in Texas. In May 2009, the immigration judge (“IJ”)
   ordered administrative closure of Morazan-Castro’s court proceedings to
   allow him to file an asylum application with the United States Citizenship
   and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), which has initial jurisdiction over an
   asylum application filed by an unaccompanied alien child (“UAC”). See 8
   U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(C); William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
   Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5081.
          In January 2010, Morazan-Castro filed an I-589 application with
   USCIS seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). On his application, in response to
   the question regarding the “Current Location” of his parents and siblings,
   he listed that his mother and brother were in the “same” location as was he.
   In February 2010, after filing his application, Morazan-Castro, was
   interviewed by an asylum officer.           USCIS issued notice in July 2010,
   explaining that it lacked jurisdiction over Morazan-Castro’s I-589 application
   because he did not qualify as a UAC. The notice stated, without elaboration,
   that, at the time of his filing, he had “a parent or legal guardian in the United
   States who is available to provide care and physical custody of” him.

          _____________________
           1
             The brothers’ cases were companion cases, but Walter’s case was severed and is
   not part of this petition for review.

                                              2
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                                          No. 21-60920

           Because USCIS concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, the case
   returned to immigration court. In April 2012, Morazan-Castro moved for
   administrative closure of his case on the ground that USCIS erred in
   concluding he was not a UAC. He maintained that, even though he had been
   released to his aunt’s custody and was in the same location as his mother at
   the time of his I-589 application, there was insufficient evidence to show that
   he failed to meet the legal definition of a UAC. Additionally, he filed a
   separate, alternative motion for discovery of recordings, interview notes, and
   all other documents relating to his I-589 application.
           The IJ considered the motions at a May 2012 hearing. The judge ruled
   Morazan-Castro was not a UAC and denied his motion for administrative
   closure. 2 Regarding the discovery motion, the IJ determined it would remain
   pending while awaiting a resolution on his outstanding records request under
   the Freedom of Information Act. That discovery motion was not discussed
   in subsequent proceedings before the IJ.
           Morazan-Castro’s case was continued without further action until, in
   October 2018, the IJ conducted a hearing on the I-589 application. In his
   application, filed over eight years prior to that hearing, Morazan-Castro
   claimed that gang members in Honduras sought to recruit him when he was
   a child and threatened his life in attempts to get him to join the gang. He
   sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT, based on
   persecution because of his membership in a particular social group (“PSG”).

           _____________________
           2
             After denying the motion, the IJ stated that, because Morazan-Castro was
   presently residing with his mother, he was not a UAC. Morazan-Castro’s counsel
   disagreed: “[T]he critical time is the time of filing the application in 2010. That’s by
   statute. They live with their — well, they didn’t live with their mother at that time because
   she was not available to take care of them because of medical reasons. They lived with their
   aunt, auntie. But they do live with their mother now. That’s true.”

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                                    No. 21-60920

          At the hearing, Morazan-Castro identified his proposed PSG as eight-
   year-old Hondurans who were recruited by gangs. He testified that he came
   to the United States to escape gangs in Honduras, and that, when he was
   eight years old, he was threatened by gang members once or twice a month
   for 10 months while they attempted to recruit him. He described the alleged
   gang members as 10 youths who approached him after school, hit him in the
   arm with sticks, and threatened to harm his family if he reported them. The
   IJ denied all relief and ordered Morazan-Castro removed to Honduras.
          The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the denial of
   asylum and withholding of removal on the ground that Morazan-Castro’s
   proposed PSG was not cognizable. Alternatively, it explained that, because
   Morazan-Castro was then 23 years old, he had not been a member of his
   proposed PSG for 15 years and factually could no longer be a member of such
   a group. As for protection under CAT, the BIA deemed this issue waived
   because Morazan-Castro failed to challenge it.
          In addition to challenging the denial of asylum and withholding of
   removal, Morazan-Castro asserted that the IJ lacked jurisdiction because
   Morazan-Castro was a UAC who fell under USCIS’s jurisdiction and had
   erred in denying a continuance when his brother’s case was severed. The
   BIA found no error.
          Morazan-Castro timely petitioned this court for review. Later, he
   moved to supplement the record with the two motions filed in 2012 — one
   for administrative closure and the other for discovery. The Executive Office
   for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) provided a supplemental record
   containing those motions. Although EOIR certified that the motions were
   received in immigration court, it clarified that they were not included in the
   record reviewed by the BIA.

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                                    No. 21-60920

          The Government filed an unopposed motion to remand the
   proceedings to the BIA on the ground that the record before the BIA was
   incomplete because it did not include Morazan-Castro’s 2012 motions. It
   asserted that, because Morazan-Castro referred to the motions in his BIA
   brief, remand was appropriate to permit the BIA to consider the effect, if any,
   of the motions regarding his UAC status. A panel of this court denied the
   initial motion.
          The Government, with the consent of petitioner, then filed a joint
   motion to have this court reconsider the denial of a remand. One of its
   arguments was that this court had allowed supplementation of the record
   with two documents which were presented to the USCIS on the UAC claim
   but which were not later part of the record before the IJ or the BIA.
   “Therefore,” the Government argued, “the agency is unable to certify a
   supplemental record satisfying this Court’s April 6, 2022, order” which
   allowed supplementation of the record. That, at least, seems to be simply a
   technical point about this court considering documents which the IJ and BIA
   never had and which counsel did not feel able to certify as the proper
   documents.
          In fact, alternative relief suggested by the Government was “that the
   Court accept the missing 2012 motions as attached by Petitioner to his
   motion to supplement and that certification by EOIR of a supplemental
   record not be required.” That alternative certainly suggests that a significant
   concern was the specific procedure by which we supplemented the record.
          As the merits panel, we have authority to overturn a ruling by a
   motions panel in earlier stages of the case. See Veasey v. Abbott, 870 F.3d 387,
   392 (5th Cir. 2017). We will analyze the remand motions later in this opinion.

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                                   No. 21-60920

                                 DISCUSSION
           Before this court, Morazan-Castro contends that the BIA erred in
   determining that he was not a UAC, that the administrative record should
   have included the materials he moved to discover relating to his 2010 asylum
   interview with USCIS, and that the BIA erred in determining he failed to
   establish a cognizable PSG.
           Morazan-Castro maintains that, because he was a UAC, his case
   should have proceeded with USCIS rather than with the IJ. As stated above,
   pursuant to the Act regarding trafficking victims, USCIS has initial
   jurisdiction over an asylum application filed by a UAC. See § 1158(b)(3)(C).
   A UAC is defined as an individual who:
          (A) has no lawful immigration status in the United States;
          (B) has not attained 18 years of age; and
          (C) with respect to whom—
                  (i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United
                      States; or
                 (ii) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is
                      available to provide care and physical custody.
   6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2); see § 1158(b)(3)(C) (referring to UAC definition in §
   279).
           Morazan-Castro argues that his aunt was never his legal guardian
   within the meaning of Section 279(g)(2)(C) and that the evidence failed to
   show whether, for purposes of Section 279(g)(2)(C)(ii), his mother was able
   to provide him care and physical custody.
           These assertions regarding Morazan-Castro’s claimed status as a
   UAC coincide with the previous motions for remand and the Government’s
   position in our court. The Government reiterates that remand is appropriate
   to allow the BIA to make the initial evaluation of Morazan-Castro’s status

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                                    No. 21-60920

   based on a complete record. Because these issues overlap, we start with the
   propriety of remand.
          I.     Government’s request for voluntary remand
          Earlier in the proceedings here, the Government filed an unopposed
   motion to remand to the BIA. Another panel of this court denied the motion
   and later denied the parties’ joint motion to reconsider. Both motions were
   based on the argument that the record before the BIA was incomplete
   because it did not include Morazan-Castro’s 2012 motions for administrative
   closure and discovery. We examine those motions.
          The first was a motion for administrative closure for lack of
   jurisdiction. It included the following assertion regarding Denilson Morazan-
   Castro’s UAC status:
          Denilson’s asylum application indicates that his mother’s
          location is the same as his as well as five siblings. This is
          insufficient evidence that Denilson’s mother was in the U.S.
          when he filed for asylum in 2010 or more importantly, if she
          was available to provide care and physical custody.
          The second was a motion for discovery. It sought the asylum officer’s
   interview notes, arguing the UAC issue cannot be determined without them.
          In his brief to the BIA, Morazan-Castro described the motions and
   reasons they were filed, stated that the UAC determination was incorrect
   because he “did not have a parent who could take care of him,” and remarked
   on his disadvantage of not having access to the asylum officer’s notes. We
   consider those assertions to have put before the BIA the significance of what
   the missing motions record would have shown.
          Evaluating the omitted motions for their possible effect before the
   BIA, we will not disturb this court’s earlier denials of a remand, as the record

                                          7
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                                       No. 21-60920

   was sufficiently developed for the BIA’s ruling on Morazan-Castro’s UAC
   status.
             II.   Merits of petition for review
             The BIA found that Morazon-Castro was not a UAC because he was
   cared for by his aunt and mother and that his proposed PSG of “8 year olds
   being subject to gang recruitment in Honduras” was not cognizable because
   it was “impermissibly defined in a circular manner.”
             In considering the BIA’s decision and the IJ’s, to the extent it
   influenced the BIA, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and factual
   findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. See, e.g., Orellana-Monson v.
   Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 517–18 (5th Cir. 2012). Under the substantial-evidence
   standard, a petitioner must demonstrate “that the evidence is so compelling
   that no reasonable factfinder could reach a contrary conclusion.” Chen v.
   Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006).
             As for Morazan-Castro’s challenge regarding the BIA’s finding that
   he was not a UAC, the record shows his asylum application indicated that his
   mother’s “Current Location” and his own in 2010 were the same. Further,
   he told the IJ in May 2012 that he lived with his mother at that time. He fails
   to show that substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s determination.
   See id.
             Next, the BIA denied Morazan-Castro asylum and withholding of
   removal based on his failure to show a cognizable PSG. To be eligible for
   asylum, an applicant’s showing must include “that race, religion, nationality,
   membership in a [PSG], or political opinion was or will be at least one central
   reason for persecuting the applicant.”             8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
   Withholding of removal requires a showing that persecution on account of
   one of those protected grounds is “more likely than not.” Jaco v. Garland,
   24 F.4th 395, 401 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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                                  No. 21-60920

         Before the IJ, Morazan-Castro identified his PSG as eight-year-old
   Hondurans who were subject to gang recruitment. In his brief to the BIA, he
   identified his PSG as “individuals (children) escaping forced gang
   recruitment and violence in Honduras.” Now, in this court, he does not
   argue that the BIA erred when it determined that a PSG of eight-year-old
   Hondurans subjected to gang recruitment was not cognizable.
         Before this court, Morazon-Castro maintains the IJ and BIA
   erroneously defined his PSG by failing to consider his family and living
   conditions in Honduras. Morazan-Castro’s failure to raise this assertion
   before the BIA renders it unexhausted.
         The petition for review is DENIED.

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