Court Opinion

ID: 9905374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 15:03:52.373708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:24.521529
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 548
                    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                        DIVISION III
                                        No. CV-23-129

 STACIE HOLLAND AND JERRY       Opinion Delivered November 29, 2023
 HOLLAND
                     APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
                                COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT
                                SMITH DISTRICT
 V.                             [NO. 66FJV-20-122]

 ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF        HONORABLE ANNIE POWELL
 HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR      HENDRICKS, JUDGE
 CHILDREN
                     APPELLEES AFFIRMED

                          WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge

       Stacie and Jerry Holland appeal the Sebastian County Circuit Court’s December 12,

2022 order terminating their parental rights. The circuit court terminated Stacie’s rights to

her biological daughters, Minor Child 1 (MC1), born on May 3, 2013, and Minor Child 2

(MC2), born on September 7, 2017. The circuit court terminated Jerry’s parental rights to

MC2, finding Jerry is her legal parent because she was born of the marriage between Stacie

and Jerry. On appeal, Stacie argues that there is insufficient proof of statutory grounds for

termination of her parental rights and insufficient proof that termination is in her daughters’

best interest. Jerry challenges only the circuit court’s finding that termination is in the best

interest of MC2. We affirm.
       The Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) opened a protective-services

case (PSC) involving the Hollands following an October 2019 referral for educational

neglect. Intensive Family Services (IFS) was referred due to Jerry’s continued drug use and

abusive behavior toward both the children and Stacie. In February 2020, MC1 disclosed to

an IFS worker that Jerry hit her “on her butt, back, and the back of her head a lot.” During

an interview on March 2, 2020, she disclosed that Jerry “busted her butt when I do bad

stuff[,]” and she showed the worker a bruise. MC1 explained that the family dog had urinated

on the floor, and that is when Jerry “hit her 6 times” before Stacie walked in and told him

to “stop[,] that it was too much.” MC1 said Jerry hits her on her face and head with a belt

and that MC2 does not get the same treatment “because he loves her.” DHS exercised an

emergency hold on the children that day and filed a petition for dependency-neglect against

Stacie and Jerry. DHS alleged that the children were at substantial risk of serious harm due

to abuse, neglect, or parental unfitness.

       On August 3, the circuit court entered an adjudication order finding MC1 and MC2

dependent-neglected due to parental unfitness of both parents and substance abuse by Jerry.

The court noted that Jerry continued to use illegal drugs; MC1 had reported acts by the

parents constituting physical, psychological, and emotional abuse; Stacie appeared unwilling

or unable to protect the children from abuse; and the parents had not utilized the parenting

services, substance-abuse treatment, or counseling services that had been offered.

       The court set the goal of the case as reunification and ordered both parents to comply

with the case plan among other things. In addition, Stacie was ordered to receive counseling

                                             2
as a victim of domestic violence and to address her anger-management issues during

counseling sessions. Jerry was ordered to attend domestic-violence classes, to complete all

recommendations from his drug-and-alcohol assessment, and to maintain stable

employment. Finally, the circuit court found that Jerry is not MC1’s parent.

       On August 26 and September 16, the circuit court held a review hearing. The court’s

review-hearing order, which was not entered until March 8, 2021, found that both Stacie

and Jerry tested positive for methamphetamine on August 27, as reflected in hair-follicle test

results introduced at the hearing. The goal of the case was changed to reunification with the

concurrent goal of adoption, and custody of the children remained with DHS.

       On April 21, 2021, the circuit court held a permanency-planning hearing, the order

for which was not entered until April 28, 2022. In its order, the court found that DHS had

made reasonable efforts to provide family services, but the parents had not completed the

case plan. It found that Jerry had suffered an injury that delayed his ability to complete some

of the ordered services; Stacie had served as Jerry’s caregiver during his convalescence; and

due to Jerry’s ongoing medical problems, all parties had agreed that additional time for

compliance with the case plan was appropriate. The court stated that each of the parents had

undergone a psychological evaluation but had participated in only some counseling and

classes on parenting without violence, domestic violence, and anger management. Jerry was

enrolled in treatment following his drug-and-alcohol assessment but was found to have been

less than candid during the assessment. The court ordered him to disclose his prior substance

abuse, all prior positive drug screens, and all his criminal convictions and to complete all

                                              3
recommended treatment. Stacie was ordered to continue to attend counseling sessions, be

candid with the counselor, complete counseling as a victim of domestic violence, and address

her anger-management issues. Both parents were again ordered to submit to a ninety-day

hair-follicle drug test before the next scheduled hearing.

       The court held another review hearing on August 4, 2021, the order for which was

not entered until March 30, 2022. In the order, the court reiterated the findings it made in

its previous order and specifically stated that the parties had agreed to maintain the status

quo from the April 21 permanency-planning hearing pending staffing and compliance with

the case plan and order.

       On January 25, 2022, Stacie and Jerry filed a motion seeking to schedule a hearing,

and on March 3, they filed a motion alleging that DHS had made no reasonable efforts

toward reunification in over a year. They further alleged that the children’s therapist had

discontinued family therapy and that they had completed their case plans. They asked the

court to make a finding of no reasonable efforts and to order commencement of

reunification services. On March 9, the court entered an order scheduling a permanency-

planning hearing for March 30, 2022, and ordered hair-follicle testing for Jerry.

       In the permanency-planning order, which was not entered until June 21, the circuit

court found that the permanency-planning hearing began as scheduled on March 30 but was

continued because bad weather prevented the parents from attending. The hearing was

rescheduled for April 13, at which time counsel for the parents moved for another

continuance because they could not attend due to bad weather. The court noted that the

                                              4
“sun was shining” and denied the continuance. The hearing proceeded in the absence of

Stacie and Jerry. The court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to provide family

services and finalize a permanency plan for MC1 and MC2 and that return of custody to the

parents was not in the children’s best interest. Last, the court found that Jerry had continued

to test positive for methamphetamine.

       On May 20, DHS and the attorney ad litem filed a petition for termination of parental

rights, which was amended on June 24, seeking to terminate Stacie’s parental rights to MC1

and MC2 and Jerry’s parental rights to MC2. As to both parents, the petition alleged the

following grounds: (1) failure to remedy, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Supp.

2023); (2) subsequent factors, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a); and (3) aggravated

circumstances, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(B).

       The circuit court held a termination hearing on August 17. When the case was called,

the attorneys for both parents requested a continuance because Stacie and Jerry reported

that morning that they both had COVID-19. The court suspended the hearing and ordered

DHS to administer COVID-19 rapid tests to Stacie and Jerry in their home and to bring

them to court if the tests were negative. Following administration of the tests and Stacie and

Jerry’s refusal to be brought to court, the court received evidence that the parents’ COVID-

19 tests administered by DHS were negative; that Stacie and Jerry had been seen at the

courthouse earlier that morning; that the photographs of the image of the positive COVID-

19 tests that the parents had texted to their attorneys were identical to test photographs

found online, which contained identical test numbers; and that Jerry screamed and cursed

                                              5
at the DHS caseworker and the CASA volunteer who were sent to administer the tests, he

initially refused to let them inside the house, and he slammed the door shut on them. The

circuit court denied the parents’ request for a continuance, and the termination hearing

proceeded in their absence.

       Joshua Brown, a DHS employee, testified that he was assigned to the Holland’s PSC

and that the family was provided the following services: transportation, drug-and-alcohol

assessments, parenting classes, and IFS. Brown testified that the parents tested positive for

methamphetamine multiple times and that there were reports that Jerry was yelling at the

children and Stacie. Brown stated that the children ultimately went into the care of DHS

after MC1 disclosed that Jerry had hit her.

       Bridget Cornett, a program assistant for DHS who transported the children to visits

with their parents, testified that Stacie disclosed to her that Jerry would spank the children

with belts on areas that he should not. Cornett, who observed the visits, also testified that

Stacie showed favoritism toward MC2.

       Dr. Martin Faitak, the psychologist who evaluated both Stacie and Jerry, testified that

Stacie reported that Jerry had problems with anger, drug use, and maintaining employment,

but she was dependent on him and planned to stay with him. She admitted that she gets

physically abusive toward Jerry when they argue. Dr. Faitak further stated that Stacie’s test

results indicated that she is resistant to treatment and feels there is little need to change her

behavior. Regarding Jerry, Dr. Faitak said that he had admitted using methamphetamine,

had too many DWIs and DUIs to count, and had previously been arrested for domestic

                                               6
violence. Jerry denied that he had abused anyone and said that Stacie was abusive. Dr. Faitak

diagnosed Jerry with antisocial personality disorder and indicated that Jerry was unlikely to

modify his behavior because he saw no need to do so.

       Amanda Myer, a case manager at 100 Families, explained that Jerry had enrolled in

the 100 Families program, but Stacie had not, so a specific referral for Stacie could not be

made. Myer said she had offered to enroll Stacie in the program, but the parents were not

able to make it to an appointment. Nevertheless, Myer testified that services her organization

provided to Jerry benefited Stacie: assistance with paying rent; help moving the family into a

new apartment; and the provision of food deliveries, clothing, cleaning products, Angel Tree

presents for the children at Christmas, and furniture; referrals for Jerry’s drug addiction; and

referrals for marriage counseling.

       Chelsea Sewell, a DHS caseworker and supervisor, testified that she offered Stacie the

name and phone number of a shelter along with transportation to a shelter if she felt unsafe

at home. Sewell said that she received more than one phone call from Stacie when she and

Jerry were fighting. Sewell could hear Jerry yelling. Sewell told Stacie DHS would pick her

up or aid her, but Stacie refused. Sewell also testified that although both parents had

completed classes, including parenting without violence and domestic-violence intervention,

Stacie and Jerry had not demonstrated a genuine change in behavior sufficient to overcome

the barriers to reunification.

       Kathy Patton, a counselor, testified that the Hollands’ home life was chaotic. She said

that MC1 revealed there was a lot of yelling and hitting and that she is “very afraid.” Patton

                                               7
witnessed Jerry shove MC1 and Stacie. Patton read from her notes from one of her sessions

with Jerry: “An entire hour and a half yelling loudly and blaming the girls and his wife for

everything wrong in his life. Very angry and negative for everybody.” Patton also said that

Stacie shared that she and Jerry regularly argue and fight. Patton said that Stacie was

unwilling to leave Jerry, however, because he takes care of them, and she could not make it

on her own.

       Counselor Robin Williford provided child-parent psychotherapy with Stacie and her

girls and individual counseling with Stacie and Jerry. Williford noted that Stacie admitted

Jerry had abused her and MC1, and Stacie said that if MC1 had just gone to her room as

Stacie told her to do, Jerry would not have gotten so upset and hurt her. Stacie admitted that

Jerry’s abusive behavior toward her (Stacie) had continued even after the girls had been

placed in foster care. Williford addressed with Stacie her need to protect herself and the girls

from harm, but Stacie was unwilling to make any changes. In November 2021, Williford

recommended discontinuation of family therapy sessions with Stacie and Jerry because in

two years of therapy, the parents had not made sufficient progress. Williford said Stacie

shows no ability to manage confrontation in an appropriate manner. Williford also noted

that Jerry indicates there is no need to change any of his behaviors, blames Stacie for the

fighting in the home, and made veiled threats to anyone who got between him and his

children. Williford noted that there is no goal to work on with the parents because neither

was willing to identify things that they can change to make the home life safe and reduce

                                               8
conflict. Williford also offered examples of Stacie and Jerry demonstrating favoritism of MC2

over MC1.

       Finally, DHS caseworker Melissa Kaupp testified that while Stacie and Jerry had

completed their case plans, they did not apply the information they learned. Kaupp testified

that there was a risk of harm if MC1 and MC2 were returned to their parents due to ongoing

drug use by both parents and concerns about Jerry’s anger management and verbal and

physical abuse. Kaupp stated that MC1 is extremely fearful of the abuse and that the mental

impact of the “extreme” favoritism of MC2 over MC1 had adversely affected both children.

Kaupp also testified that MC1 and MC2 are adoptable.

       At the conclusion of the evidence, the circuit court granted the petition to terminate

Stacie’s and Jerry’s parental rights, finding that DHS had proved the statutory grounds of

failure to remedy, subsequent factors, and aggravating circumstances and that termination

was in the best interest of MC1 and MC2. The court restated these findings in its order

entered on December 12, 2022. The court also found that Jerry had no parental rights to

terminate as to MC1 as the result of the court’s previous finding that he is neither the

biological nor the legal parent of MC1. This appeal followed.

       This court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Lloyd v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 461, at 7, 655 S.W.3d 534, 540. Termination requires a finding

of at least one statutory ground and a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.

Id. at 8, 655 S.W.3d at 540. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3) requires a

circuit court’s order terminating parental rights to be based on clear and convincing

                                               9
evidence. Id., 655 S.W.3d at 540. Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that

will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established.

Baker v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 340 Ark. 42, 48, 8 S.W.3d 499, 503 (2000). When the

burden of proving a disputed fact is by clear and convincing evidence, the question that must

be answered on appeal is whether the circuit court’s finding was clearly erroneous. Tankersley

v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 109, at 7, 389 S.W.3d 96, 99. A finding is clearly

erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id., 389

S.W.3d at 99. This court gives a high level of deference to the circuit court because it is in a

far superior position to observe the parties before it and to judge the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight of the evidence. Barnett v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App.

481, at 4–5.

                                             I. Stacie

       In her first point on appeal, Stacie argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding

that DHS proved statutory grounds necessary to terminate her parental rights. The circuit

court found that three grounds supported termination of Stacie’s parental rights. Only one

statutory ground is necessary to terminate parental rights. Willis v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2017 Ark. App. 559, at 9, 538 S.W.3d 842, 848. We hold that the circuit court did not

clearly err in finding that Stacie subjected MC1 and MC2 to aggravated circumstances.

       Aggravated circumstances is defined to include a determination made by a judge that

there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful reunification. Ark.

                                                10
Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(B)(i). Here, the record demonstrates that despite

having received almost three years of numerous services, Stacie has not developed the skills

necessary to have the children safely returned to her custody. The testimony and reports of

numerous witnesses show that Stacie conceded that physical and verbal abuse had occurred

in the home. Stacie nevertheless was unwilling to make any changes and was resolute in her

decision to stay with Jerry because he provided for her and the children and she could not

make it on her own. In therapy sessions with Williford, Stacie’s answer to the abuse was not

to resolve it but to learn to live with it. She noted that the abuse was not as bad as that she

had suffered as a child and suggested that the children could have avoided Jerry’s emotional

and physical abuse by taking her advice and going to their bedroom. DHS caseworker Sewell

further testified that Stacie had resisted efforts to assist Stacie in seeking safety from the abuse

in a shelter. Sewell and Williford testified that Stacie had not learned from the services.

There was still aggression, yelling, cursing, and anger in the home with no indication of any

genuine change. As the circuit court noted in its oral findings, Jerry’s volatile behavior

continued up to the morning of the termination hearing. Dr. Faitak testified that Stacie was

resistant to treatment and feels there is little need to change her behavior.

       On the basis of this evidence, we cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred in

finding that Stacie subjected MC1 and MC2 to aggravated circumstances. Despite all the

services provided and offered to Stacie, the evidence demonstrates that she is unable or

unwilling to protect her children from the harm that caused their removal. This court has

held that a parent’s continued inability to protect and care for her child and failure to benefit

                                                11
from the services provided are sufficient to demonstrate little likelihood that further services

will result in a successful reunification. Reyes-Ramos v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark.

App. 46, at 11, 571 S.W.3d 32, 38; Bentley v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 374,

at 11–13, 554 S.W.3d 285, 292–93. We further have held that when a case involves physical

abuse, it is extremely important for a parent to demonstrate an ability to protect the child

from physical harm before the child can return to the parent’s custody. Bentley, 2018 Ark.

App. 374, at 11–12, 554 S.W.3d at 292–93 (noting appellant would not acknowledge abuse

to her child by live-in boyfriend until he had been sentenced for the abuse). Even full

compliance with the case plan is not determinative; the issue is whether the parent has

become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her child. Cobb v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2017 Ark. App. 85, at 6, 512 S.W.3d 694, 697.

          Moreover, the evidence shows that Stacie was using drugs during the pendency of the

case. She tested positive for methamphetamine on August 27, October 26, and November

10, 2020. On June 23, 2022, just a few months prior to the termination hearing, she tested

positive for methamphetamine. Kloss v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 389, at 7,

585 S.W.3d 725, 729; (holding that continued drug use supported termination under

aggravated-circumstances ground); Ladd v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 419, 526

S.W.3d 883 (same); Shaffer v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 208, 489 S.W.3d 182

(same).

          Stacie’s only argument challenging grounds is that DHS failed to provide her

adequate services and that she was “often an afterthought” to Jerry, who received more

                                               12
services than she did. A finding of aggravated circumstances does not require DHS to prove

that meaningful services toward reunification were provided. Miller v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 249, at 7, 666 S.W.3d 879, 884; Richardson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2023 Ark. App. 451, at 8–9. Nevertheless, the record reveals that DHS provided Stacie with

many services for almost three years. Stacie’s argument that she did not receive as many

services as Jerry is a request that this court reweigh the evidence in her favor and second-

guess the circuit court’s determinations, which we will not do. Gibby v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.

Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 146, at 24, 643 S.W.3d 794, 808.

       We hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that DHS proved that

there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful reunification.

Accordingly, we affirm the court’s aggravated-circumstances finding against Stacie. In light

of this holding, we need not discuss the remaining grounds found by the circuit court. Id. at

24–25, 643 S.W.3d at 809.

       Stacie next challenges the circuit court’s best-interest finding. To terminate parental

rights, a circuit court must find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the

best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1) the likelihood that the juvenile will

be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and (2) the potential harm, specifically

addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning the child to

the custody of the parent. Migues v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 439, at 10, 586

S.W.3d 221, 227–28.

                                               13
       In considering potential harm caused by returning a child to the parent, the court is

not required to find that actual harm would result or to affirmatively identify a potential

harm. Fox v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 666, at 7, 448 S.W.3d 735, 739.

Additionally, whether DHS provided or failed to provide a service has no bearing on whether

the children would suffer potential harm if returned to the parent. Holdcraft v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 151, at 11, 573 S.W.3d 555, 562. The potential-harm analysis

is to be conducted in broad terms, and a parent’s past behavior is often a good indicator of

future behavior and may be viewed as a predictor of likely potential harm. Louissaint v. Ark.

Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 494, at 7, 611 S.W.3d 709, 713.

       Stacie does not challenge the adoptability prong of the circuit court’s best-interest

finding; rather, she argues that there is insufficient evidence of potential harm. She contends

that she has a bond with her daughters, she completed her case plan, her drug use is minimal,

DHS did not provide adequate services to her, and there was no evidence of potential harm

to MC2 specifically.

       As previously stated, despite the provision of ample services and completion of the

case plan, the evidence shows that Stacie is unable or unwilling to protect her children from

the harm that caused their removal. She continues to reside with Jerry, who has been

emotionally and physically abusive to her and the children, and the evidence demonstrates

that Jerry’s volatile behavior continued the day of the termination hearing. This court has

previously held that continuing in a relationship with the abuser of one’s child is evidence

of potential harm. Bair v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 481, at 6. In addition to

                                              14
the instability in the home, Stacie did not maintain a drug-free lifestyle. This court has held

instability, illegal drug use, or failure to comply with court orders constitutes sufficient

evidence of potential harm. Johnson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 313, at 11,

603 S.W.3d 630, 636; Lloyd v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 461, at 12, 655

S.W.3d at 542.

       We further note that the evidence demonstrates that MC2 was not spared from the

effects of the emotional and physical abuse in the home, as Stacie argues. Williford’s reports

of her therapy sessions with Stacie and the children indicate that both children have been

diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder and anxiety because of the emotional and

physical abuse in the home. Like MC1, MC2 had “stomach issues” around visitation times.

Williford noted that both children said that during episodes of volatility between their

parents they would go to their room but would “sit with the door cracked watching mom

and dad fight it out.” Kaupp testified that the difference in treatment of the two girls by the

parents had an adverse impact on both children. Kaupp further stated that both children

were emotionally drained after visits with Stacie.

       This court has previously held that the existence of a bond between the biological

parent and child may not be sufficient to prevent termination of parental rights when

weighed against other facts in the case. Lemon v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App.

253, at 6. Even full compliance with the case plan is not determinative; the issue is whether

the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care for her child. McKinney v. Ark. Dep’t

of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 475, at 20, 527 S.W.3d 778, 791.

                                              15
       Finally, Stacie argues that the circuit court failed to enter orders in a timely fashion

and failed to conduct timely hearings in violation of the Juvenile Code, which she contends

were not in the best interest of her children. DHS and ad litem counsel argue that Stacie

failed to preserve this argument because she did not raise it below. We agree that Stacie did

not make this argument below, and thus it is not preserved for our review.1 See Klossv, 2019

Ark. App. 389, at 9, 585 S.W.3d at 731 (holding that this court will not address arguments

that are raised for the first time on appeal).

       Given the facts of this case, we cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred when it

determined that the children would be at risk of potential harm if returned to Stacie’s

custody and that terminating her parental rights was in the children’s best interest.

Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order terminating Stacie’s parental rights.

                                             II. Jerry

       1
        Regardless, this argument lacks merit. First, while the record reveals that there were
multiple delays in the entry of orders and in holding hearings, the record also reflects that
the COVID-19 pandemic and weather caused delays in some of the proceedings and that
the Hollands expressly waived delays in several hearings. Furthermore, the parties agreed to
maintain the status quo following the April 21, 2021 permanency-planning hearing so that
the parents could be afforded more time for compliance with the case plan due, in part, to
an injury Jerry had suffered during the pendency of the case. Second, this court has
consistently held that although the Juvenile Code sets forth time frames for conducting
dependency-neglect proceedings, the legislation does not require reversal for noncompliance.
Blasingame v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 71, at 8–9, 542 S.W.3d 873, 877–78
(noting our precedents unequivocally hold that compliance with the statutory time frames is
a matter of best practice and does not warrant reversal or other sanction). Nevertheless, “we
strongly encourage the circuit courts to abide by these timelines because compliance is in the
juveniles’ best interests.” See Picinich v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 288, at 4,
549 S.W.3d 916, 919.

                                                 16
         Jerry first argues that the circuit court’s finding that he is not MC1’s parent is

erroneous and requires reversal of the best-interest finding as to MC2. Jerry contends that

he is in fact MC1’s legal parent, and as her parent, he retains parental rights to her that

remain unresolved, which impedes the permanency plan for MC2 to be adopted with MC1

and is not in MC2’s best interest. His sibling-separation argument rests on his assertion that

he is the parent of MC1. In support of this argument, Jerry relies on several orders that were

entered prior to termination in which the circuit court found that Stacie and Jerry had signed

an acknowledgement of paternity regarding MC1 on October 18, 2017. Jerry argues that

these references to an acknowledgment of paternity demonstrate that the circuit court’s

finding in the termination order is erroneous under Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-

303(41)(C)(ii) (Supp. 2023) because the definition of “parent” includes a man “[w]ho has

signed an acknowledgment of paternity[.]”

         Jerry’s argument is premised on a parentage finding that was made in the adjudication

order:

         [MC1] was conceived and born to Stacie Dannielle Carter (now Holland), an
         unmarried mother. Jerry Allen Holland has acknowledged that he is not
         [MC1’s] biological father. Stacie and Jerry were married on or about March
         22, 2017 in Muskogee, Oklahoma, almost three (3) years after [MC1’s] birth.
         Jerry Holland asserted at the Probable Cause hearing on March 11, 2020 that
         he had legally adopted [MC1]. However, that is not the case. He and the
         mother did sign the Acknowledgment of Paternity on October 18, 2017,
         knowing with certainty at that time that Jerry Holland could not possibly be
         the biological father of [MC1]. He is not a parent to [MC1]. No evidence
         regarding the identity of [MC1’s] biological father has been presented.

                                              17
However, Jerry did not appeal from the adjudication order in which the circuit court stated

that he and Stacie had signed an acknowledgment of paternity but found that he is not

MC1’s parent.

         An adjudication order is an appealable order in a dependency-neglect proceeding.

Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(a)(1)(A) (2020). When a party fails to appeal from an adjudication order

and challenge the findings therein, he is precluded from asserting error on appeal with

respect to those findings from an order terminating parental rights. Denen v. Ark. Dep’t of

Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 473, at 5, 527 S.W.3d 772, 775. Thus, this court does not

question the circuit court’s finding that Jerry is not MC1’s parent because that fact has been

established by the unchallenged adjudication order.2 Villasaldo v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

2014 Ark. App. 465, at 6–7, 441 S.W.3d 62, 66 (stating that “this court does not question

whether Villasaldo indeed failed to protect her son from abuse because that fact has been

established” by the adjudication order that Villasaldo failed to appeal). Because there was no

challenge to the circuit court’s finding that Jerry is not MC1’s parent, there is no impediment

to the adoptability of MC1 and MC2, and Jerry’s best-interest sibling-separation argument

fails.

         Like Stacie, Jerry argues that the circuit court failed to enter orders in a timely fashion

following hearings and failed to conduct timely hearings. For the same reasons discussed

earlier as to Stacie, this argument is not preserved and lacks merit in any event. Given the

         2
         We note that Jerry’s counsel argued at the termination hearing that, as to MC1,
“[Jerry] is not the legal father of [MC1]” and that “he has no rights that can be terminated.”

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evidence supporting the circuit court’s best-interest finding, we are not left with a definite

and firm conviction that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that termination of Jerry’s

parental rights was in MC2’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order

terminating Jerry’s parental rights.

       Affirmed.

       ABRAMSON and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

       Tabitha McNulty, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for separate appellant

Jerry Holland.

       Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson, for separate appellant

Stacie Holland.

       Kaylee Wedgeworth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for

appellee.

       Dana McClain, attorney ad litem for minor children.

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