Court Opinion

ID: 9693223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:30:50.831228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:42.977107
License: Public Domain

*424Steinle, J.
{dissenting). Granting that it is well established in this state that division of property in divorce proceedings depends upon the particular facts of the case and rests in the sound discretion of the court, and that the division is not a problem in fractions, and that the disposition shall be equitable, just, and reasonable, nevertheless, notwithstanding the rather low value of the estate of the parties and the requirements of the wife for herself and children in the case at bar, I cannot concur in the view that it was proper to have awarded all of the property to the wife besides having made potential provision for substantial alimony payments to her in the future.
“Division” means to divide in parts. “Whole” means not to divide in smaller parts. The award of the whole of the property to the wife and nothing to the husband, in my view, was not division of property such as is contemplated by sec. 247.26, Stats. I find in the statutes no authority, express or implied, permitting a division of estate in lieu of support allowance (in whole or in part) for the minor children of the parties to the suit. Recognizing that under sec. 247.30 payments for support money for the minor children of the parties may be imposed as a specific charge against real estate awarded to a husband in a division of the estate, or that the husband may be required to furnish sufficient security for the payment of the support allowance for the minor children, nevertheless I believe that it was not proper in the instant case to award to the wife the husband’s share of the division of the estate as a supplement to the support allowance decreed for the children, if such was within the contemplation of the court here.
While I would be obliged to concede that under the facts in this case the court was entitled to properly make an award of more than one half of the estate to the wife particularly because of her own contributions to the amount of the estate, I do not believe that it was equitable, just, and reasonable to *425have obliged the husband to part with practically all that he owned. In Perloff v. Perloff (1932), 206 Wis. 565, 240 N. W. 126 (decided before the statute permitted award of both division of estate and alimony), the entire value of the property of the parties exclusive of furniture was $5,500. The court awarded to the wife the sum of $5,000 and the furniture valued at $600. The husband was directed to contribute $50 toward the wife’s attorney fees. This court reduced the award to $2,000 and the furniture. In that case this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Fairchild, said (p. 567) : “The amount so awarded to the plaintiff was practically the whole estate. To raise this amount of money the defendant would have to part with everything he owned or incumber it to its full value, . . .”
In Steinbach v. Steinbach (1929), 200 Wis. 208, 227 N. W. 879, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Fowler, said (p. 210) : “In every case all the circumstances must be considered, including the separate estate of the wife. The question always is, What should the wife receive, under the circumstances, in view of what she already has, and what will remain to the husband after division?” (Italics supplied.)
In Quigley v. Quigley (1943), 244 Wis. 94, 97, 11 N. W. (2d) 638, the parties to the divorce action owned a farm and other property valued at about $7,050 which was incumbered by mortgages in the amount of $4,200 together with accrued interest and taxes of $250. They also owned farm machinery, livestock, and other personal property, the net value of which was slightly in excess of $5,700. Nine children were born to the marriage, five of whom were still minors when the divorce action was commenced. The court found that the husband had been guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment for more than five years and also that he had been an habitual drunkard. The trial court observed that “ ‘if he were given the farm and personal property they soon would be dissipated, leaving nothing for the family.’ ” The *426property was awarded to the wife, but the court directed payment of $2,500 to the husband by the wife in instalments, and the husband was given an equitable lien on the property. Such arrangement was approved by this court on appeal.
While in the case at bar the record establishes that the wife assisted the husband in the accumulation of their estate by taking in roomers for two of the seventeen years of their married life, it is undisputed that the husband worked throughout the entire married life'and at one time held down two jobs. Regardless of his mistreatment of the wife or the needs of the family, I cannot believe that, under the spirit of the statute or the letter of the decisions of this state, it was proper to have deprived him of all right to the property which the parties had accumulated. As in Quigley v. Quigley, supra, there ought to have been awarded to him an amount equal to 20 per cent to 25 per cent of the value of the assets of the parties with payment due in the future, and with an equitable lien against the property until such amount was paid. Trial courts may not be arbitrary in matters of division of estate. They may in dividing the estate exercise a reasonable discretion within limitations of standards well established under the decisions of this court, but to deprive a husband of all that he possesses, in my opinion, is to exceed the exercise of the discretion so permitted.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Currie and Mr. Justice Fairchild join in this dissenting opinion.