Court Opinion

ID: 9532159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:18:41.384407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:41.507653
License: Public Domain

M. S. Coleman, J.
(dissenting). My opinion in McGillen #1 concerning the voluntariness of defendant’s statement and the Miranda objection is adopted in this matter. The same statements of Officer Haustein were introduced in the second Walker hearing before trial on the alleged May 23, 1970 rape. The matter has been discussed and will not be further belabored.
The only other ground for reversal cited by the majority opinion was the testimony of the physician, an issue which was not raised by either party on appeal and, therefore, not briefed. Perhaps this was because they, as I, saw little merit in such an objection.
*287In reversing defendant’s second conviction, the Court has declared that certain testimony of the examining doctor constitutes reversible error. The Court says that the error is obvious. The trial judge saw no error, the Court of Appeals saw no error and I see no error.
On direct examination, the doctor said that his examination of the daughter disclosed that she had a marital vagina. On cross-examination, he agreed that this might result from causes other than sexual intercourse. He further said there was no evidence of sperm, blood or bruises.1 On redirect he said his findings were consistent with the history given by the victim. On recross, the doctor said he accepted the history as true and that this was not contradicted by his examination.
In language heavy with hyperbole and light on specifics, the Court indicates that grave injustice has been done by admission of this testimony. The Court must realize that under the statute the prosecutor’s proof must show penetration. The daughter claimed that intercourse had occurred. The doctor said his examination disclosed nothing to refute this story.
The Court states that the doctor’s "testimony should be limited to the question of whether or not the complaining witness still had an intact hymen at the time of examination.” This statement is unexplainable. The crime of rape is not proved or disproved by such evidence. The standard is penetration, however slight. It is penetration not defloration that the statute requires.
The Court further says, "in no event is the doctor permitted to lend his expert testimony” on the issue of whether a prosecutrix "was actually *288raped at a specific time and place.” The doctor in this case did not so testify — in fact, he said that the marital vagina was not inconsistent with some other explanation. It is not a matter in issue.
The Court’s statement is put in language which indicates that it is a rule of law. If so, I could not subscribe to it. I believe that such testimony could and in many cases would be relevant. The Court’s language is a gratuitous statement which hopefully the members of the Bar will regard as such.
The Court, citing testimony given by the doctor under cross-examination by defendant’s attorney implies that he improperly authenticated the daughter’s story. All that the doctor said was that his findings were consistent with the history given him by the daughter. He offered no opinion as to the truth of her story. The jury remained the final arbiters of the weight to be given the daughter’s accusation.2 By their verdict they indicated acceptance of her version. I see no reason to reverse that determination.
1 would affirm the conviction.
J. W. Fitzgerald, J., concurred with M. S. Coleman, J.

 The examination was made eight days after the last rape and about two weeks after the first, the subject of this case.

 The jury also properly considered Barbara Jean’s detailed description of the crime and the scene of the crime; defendant’s shifting stories concerning the events of that day; character evidence; Rose DeLong’s testimony that the defendant asked her to keep Barbara from going to a doctor and to ask Barbara to drop the charges; defendant’s replies to the testimony of others.