Court Opinion

ID: 9911728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 18:09:35.245605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:55.621400
License: Public Domain

J-S38015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JAMES FOY BULLARD                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 251 EDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 13, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0003341-2019

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                          FILED DECEMBER 20, 2023

       James Foy Bullard appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after the trial court

convicted him of persons not to possess firearms,1 firearms not to be carried

without a license,2 and carrying firearms on public streets or public property

in Philadelphia.3 After careful review, we affirm the convictions, but vacate

the judgment of sentence as illegal, and remand for resentencing.

       On January 19, 2019, police responded to a report of a gunpoint robbery

outside a pharmacy located on Lancaster Avenue in Philadelphia. Detective

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).

2 Id. at § 6106(a)(1).

3 Id. at § 6108.
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Jonathan Eves interviewed the complainant and subsequently reviewed

pharmacy surveillance footage as part of his investigation.        The footage

revealed an individual with a gun taking a passerby’s backpack. Following

circulation of a still image from the surveillance footage, investigators

reviewed photos of possible suspects and determined that Bullard’s

photograph was consistent with the individual depicted in the footage.

       On February 26, 2019, Detective Eves interviewed Bullard about the

alleged robbery.      On that day, Bullard was in the Philadelphia Industrial

Correctional Center (PICC) on another unrelated matter and was transported

by police to a police station located at 5510 Pine Street, in Philadelphia, to be

interviewed by Detective Eves. Bullard’s interview was recorded.

       At the beginning of the interview, Detective Eves advised Bullard of his

Miranda4 rights. Bullard acknowledged that he understood his rights both

verbally and in writing. Detective Eves showed Bullard video of the interior

and exterior of the pharmacy where the alleged robbery took place. Bullard

identified himself in the video, but answered no further questions when

Detective Eves asked if Bullard committed a robbery. Detective Eves ended

the interview and Bullard was subsequently charged with robbery and related

offenses. The next day, Detective Eves executed a search warrant at Bullard’s

home, but was unable to recover any proceeds from the alleged robbery.

____________________________________________

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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       Also of significance, on February 5, 2019, approximately two and a half

weeks following the instant alleged robbery, a search warrant had been

executed at Bullard’s home following an unrelated gunpoint robbery on the

same day.      The search warrant yielded a silver firearm and two boxes of

ammunition. On or about that day, Bullard was charged with robbery, and

related offenses. Ultimately, the charges against Bullard in the February 5,

2019 robbery were eventually withdrawn on April 5, 2019.

       Prior to the commencement of trial in the instant case, Bullard requested

to represent himself pro se.         On October 23, 2019, the trial court held a

Grazier5 hearing and determined that Bullard’s decision to waive his right to

counsel was done knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and of his own free will.

See N.T. Grazier Hearing, 10/23/19, at 12.          On   November    12,   2019,

Bullard filed a multi-part motion to suppress on the theories that the search

of his residence was done without probable cause, that he was denied his right

to counsel, and that his trial was unnecessarily delayed.       On February 11,

2020, the Honorable Roxanne Covington held a hearing on Bullard’s motion.

       During the hearing, the motion court heard testimony from Detective

Eves about Bullard’s interview and watched the corresponding video.         See

N.T. Motion Hearing, 2/11/20, at 24-27. Detective Eves testified that when

Bullard arrived for questioning, Detective Eves explained that Bullard was

there to answer questions about a robbery and that he first had to be

____________________________________________

5 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

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Mirandized.     Id. at 30.     Detective Eves further testified that he was not

informed by other officers that Bullard had requested counsel during

transport, neither did Bullard make mention of his desire for counsel before

entering the interrogation room. Id. at 32.

       The court also heard testimony from Bullard, who stated that he was

taken from the jail to a police station, but was not informed why he was being

taken to the station. Id. at 34. Before arriving at the police station, Bullard

testified that he asked the officers transporting him to call his attorney, but

the officers informed him that he did not need an attorney. Id. at 35. On

cross-examination, however, Bullard testified that he did not request an

attorney prior to speaking with Detective Eves. Id. at 38. At the conclusion

of argument, Judge Covington denied Bullard’s suppression motion, stating

that “[a]fter careful review of the testimony and evidence presented in this

case, [Bullard’s] motion to suppress [his] statement of self-identification is

denied as evidence[d] by video [showing Bullard was] properly [M]irandized

and waived [his] right to counsel.” Id. at 41.

       On September 20, 2021, while represented by counsel,6 Bullard’s non-

jury trial commenced before the Honorable Kai N. Scott.        The court heard

testimony from Detective Eves as to his investigation of the robbery. See
____________________________________________

6 During a hearing on August 26, 2021, Bullard expressed that he would like

to be represented by counsel at his non-jury trial, particularly Joel Krantz,
Esquire, his stand-by counsel during pre-trial procedures. See N.T. Motion
Hearing, 8/26/21, at 49-53. The trial court confirmed that Bullard wished to
proceed with counsel at the outset of the non-jury trial. See N.T. Non-Jury
Trial, 9/20/21 at 4-5.

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N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 9/20/21 at 11-12. Detective Eves also testified that he

knew Bullard was represented by counsel in the unrelated February 5, 2019

robbery case for which Bullard had been in custody at the time Detective Eves

sought to interview Bullard about the instant case. Id. at 22. Detective Eves

stated that, despite knowing that information, he still had Bullard brought to

the police station for an interview. Id. The court also heard from Detective

Idris Amir, who was involved in the investigation of the unrelated gunpoint

robbery and conducted a search of Bullard’s residence, pursuant to a search

warrant, wherein he recovered, among other items, a handgun and two boxes

of live rounds. Id. at 26-28. At the close of argument, Judge Scott found

Bullard guilty of the three aforementioned gun-related charges.7 Sentencing

was deferred for a presentence investigation report and mental health

evaluation.

       On November 18, 2021, the court sentenced Bullard to 6 to 23 months’

incarceration for persons not to possess firearms, with no credit for time

served, two years’ reporting probation for firearms not to be carried without

a license, and no further penalty for carrying firearms on public streets or

public property in Philadelphia. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 11/18/21, at

23-24.

       Bullard filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence nunc pro tunc on

December 17, 2021.          On the same day, the trial court vacated Bullard’s
____________________________________________

7 Judge Scott found Bullard not guilty of robbery, theft, receiving stolen
property, possession of the instrument of a crime, and simple assault.

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sentence and scheduled a hearing on the motion.8 Following a hearing, the

court denied Bullard’s motion and reimposed his sentence on January 13,

2022. See N.T. Motion Hearing, 1/13/22, at 14-15.

       On January 12, 2023, Bullard was before Judge Scott again for a hearing

on a violation of probation (VOP) in the instant matter. Bullard stated that,

after his sentence was reimposed following the denial of his reconsideration

motion, he believed that his trial attorney, who had not represented him at

his motion for reconsideration,9 was going to file a direct appeal. See N.T.

VOP Hearing, 1/12/23, at 6-8. During the VOP hearing, the court instructed

the Defender Association of Philadelphia to file a motion to reinstate Bullard’s

appellate nunc pro tunc rights due to no appeal being filed during the

appropriate time period. See id. at 22. Judge Scott reappointed the Defender

Association, who had represented him during trial, to represent Bullard. See

id.; see also Short Certificate, 1/12/23. Subsequently, counsel made an oral

____________________________________________

8 Bullard’s post-sentence motion was not filed within the 10-day limit required

by Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1). However, the trial court expressly granted
Bullard’s request to file a nunc pro tunc post-sentence motion within 30 days
of the imposition of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Capaldi, 112 A.3d
1242, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2015) (time for filing notice of appeal tolled where
trial court expressly granted filing of nunc pro tunc post-sentence motion
within 30 days of imposition of sentence). Accordingly, Bullard’s nunc pro
tunc post-sentence motion was timely.

9 Bullard was represented by private counsel at the reconsideration hearing.

However, that counsel did not inform Bullard as to the outcome of the hearing
and did not represent him beyond that hearing. See N.T. VOP Hearing,
1/12/23, at 5-6.

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motion to reinstate Bullard’s appellate rights nunc pro tunc. See N.T. VOP

Hearing, 1/12/23, at 23. The court accepted the oral motion, and, on January

13, 2022, the court ordered that Bullard’s appellate rights be reinstated nunc

pro tunc. See Order, 1/18/23.

       On January 23, 2023, Bullard filed a nunc pro tunc notice of appeal.10

Bullard raises the following issue for our review:

       Did not the court err in failing to suppress Bullard’s subsequent
       statement despite his Miranda waiver where Bullard, was
       incarcerated on an unrelated offense and asked transporting
       police to allow him to call his lawyer before taking him to be
       questioned by detectives, and officers refused and told him that
       he did not need a lawyer? See Miranda, supra (right to counsel
       under Fifth Amendment when person in custody and subjected to
       police interrogation).

Appellant’s Brief, at 3 (reworded for clarity; footnote omitted).

       Bullard’s claim that the court erred in denying his motion for suppression

is two-fold.    First, he claims that the court erred because he had already

invoked his right to an attorney prior to questioning by Detective Eves. Id.

at 18-19. Second, he claims that the court erred by not placing findings of

fact and conclusions of law on the record at the conclusion of the suppression

hearing. Id. at 21-22.

____________________________________________

10 It does not appear that the trial court ordered Bullard file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Moreover, a
review of the docket indicates that no concise statement was filed. Judge
Scott is no longer on the bench in Philadelphia. On February 22, 2023, the
appeals unit of the trial court sent a letter that no Rule 1925(a) opinion would
accompany the file.

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      Initially, we note our standard of review of the denial of a suppression

motion. In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion,

      [w]e may consider only the Commonwealth’s evidence and so
      much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted
      when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
      record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are
      bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions
      drawn therefrom are in error. An appellate court, of course, is not
      bound by the suppression court’s conclusions of law.

Commonwealth v. Hampton, 204 A.3d 452, 456 (Pa. Super. 2019). Such

an inquiry must take into account the totality of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Delvalle, 74 A.3d 1081, 1085 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Additionally, it is exclusively within the province of the trial court to determine

the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony.

Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 666 A.2d 323, 325 (Pa. Super. 1996). If

the evidence supports the findings of the trial court, we are bound by such

findings and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are

erroneous. Id.

      Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that:

      in Miranda, the United States Supreme Court determined that in
      order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
      incrimination from the inherently compelling pressures of
      custodial interrogation, “if an individual states that he wants an
      attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
      present.” 384 U.S. at 473 []. In Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
      477, 484 (1981)], the Court determined that additional
      safeguards for the Miranda right to counsel were necessary and
      held that once a suspect asserts the right, he may not be further
      interrogated “until counsel has been made available to him [].”
      [I]n Minnick [v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990)], the

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       Court clarified the Edwards rule by holding that “when counsel is
       requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not
       reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not
       the accused has consulted with his attorney.”

Commonwealth v. Marinelli, 690 A.2d 203, 215 (Pa. 1997). Specifically,

Edwards is “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into

waiving his previously[-]asserted Miranda rights.”               Commonwealth v.

Champney, 65 A.3d 386, 401 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Minnick, 498 U.S. at 150).

       In the present case, Bullard testified at the suppression hearing that on

February 26, 2019, while incarcerated on an unrelated matter at PICC, two

officers told him to get dressed and transported him to a police station located

at 5510 Pine Street in Philadelphia. See N.T. Motion Hearing, 2/11/20, at 34.

Upon arriving to the station, Bullard was placed in a holding cell until Detective

Eves moved him to an interrogation room. Id. at 35. Bullard testified that,

prior to being questioned by Detective Eves, he asked for an attorney. Bullard

stated that he asked the officers who retrieved him from PICC, when he met

them in the receiving room at PICC, if he could contact an attorney, to which

he was told that he did not need an attorney.11            Id.   Specifically, Bullard

testified that he asked Officer Jeremy Duff if he could contact an attorney

while in the receiving room at PICC.             Id.   On cross-examination at the

suppression hearing, however, the following exchange occurred:

____________________________________________

11 Bullard also stated that he did not make any statements to the officers while

in transport from PICC to 5510 Pine Street. See id.

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      [Commonwealth:] Sir, let me try this again. I asked you very
      simple question. Did you ask for a lawyer? I’m not talking about
      going in your house[.]

      [Bullard:] Okay.

      [Commonwealth:] Did you ask for a lawyer on this day prior to
      talking to the detectives?

      [Bullard:] Did you just see what I said and signed?

      [Commonwealth:] It’s a yes or no question.

      [Bullard:] No.

Id. at 38.

      Bullard, pro se at the suppression hearing, presented no additional

evidence to support his motion.    Detective Eves testified on behalf of the

Commonwealth and stated that he had Bullard brought to 5510 Pine Street

for questioning about the instant case. Id. at 25-26. Detective Eves testified

that prior to questioning Bullard, he provided Bullard with his Miranda

warnings, showed Bullard a video purporting to show a robbery, and that

Bullard identified himself in the video.      Id. at 26.    At that point, the

Commonwealth played the recording of the interview to the suppression court.

Id.; see also Commonwealth Exhibit 1, at 26. A review of this video shows

Detective Eves and a second detective interviewing Bullard. At the outset,

Bullard asked both detectives for business cards and then stated they may

“proceed.”    Interrogation Video, 2/26/19, at 11:52:51.       Detective Eves

informed Bullard he was investigating a robbery on Lancaster Avenue and

wanted to speak with Bullard about it.       Before asking him any questions,

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Detective Eves stated that he had to “Mirandize [Bullard] first.”         Id. at

11:53:00. Detective Eves then presented a written statement and read the

statement to Bullard, at the conclusion of which he asked Bullard if he

understood “everything that [he] just read to [him].”         Id. at 11:53:01-

11:54:05. Bullard verbally acknowledged that he understood everything and

then signed the acknowledgement. Id. at 11:54:15.

      Detective Eves then placed a laptop in front of Bullard, with surveillance

video of the alleged robbery cued-up.         Id. at 11:54:40.   Detective Eves

explained where the surveillance video was from and, at that moment, Bullard

voluntarily stated “that’s me” several times.       Id. at 11:54:48-11:55:02.

Detective Eves attempted to ask Bullard several more questions about the

alleged robbery for the next five minutes.         Bullard declined to answer

Detective Eves’s questions and the interview concluded at 12:00:18.

      During cross-examination, Detective Eves stated that the officers who

transported Bullard to the police station never informed him that Bullard had

requested counsel prior to arrival. See N.T. Motion Hearing, 2/11/20, at 32.

In addition, Detective Eves testified that Bullard never made “mention of any

counsel” prior to entering the interrogation room.     Id. Neither of the two

officers who transported Bullard from PICC to the police station testified at the

suppression hearing. Id. at 32-33.

      At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court stated: “After

careful review of the testimony and evidence presented in this case, the

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defendant’s motion to suppress [his] statement of self-identification is denied

as evidence[d] by video [that the defendant was] properly [M]irandized and

waived [his] right to counsel.” Id. at 41.

      Our review of the record confirms that the trial court’s findings are

supported by the record, and its ruling is sound. See Hampton, supra. The

only evidence that Bullard may have invoked his Fifth Amendment right to

counsel was Bullard’s own testimony, to which, evidently, the court accorded

little weight, and was contradictory on cross-examination. Moreover, Bullard

conceded, on cross-examination, that he did not at any time request counsel.

See N.T. Motion Hearing, 2/11/20, at 38. Bullard was clearly informed of his

Miranda rights, acknowledged such, and told law enforcement to “proceed”

with their questions. Bullard identified himself on the video before Detective

Eves even had the opportunity to pose a question, and continued to identify

himself in the video throughout questioning. Thus, we conclude that Bullard,

without provocation or improper questioning from the police, voluntarily and

knowingly relinquished his Miranda rights.     See Champney, supra; see

also Marinelli, supra. Accordingly, we do not grant Bullard relief on this

claim.

      The second portion of Bullard’s claim is that the court erred by not

placing findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record at the conclusion

of the suppression hearing, as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I).           See

Appellant’s Brief, at 21-22. Rule 581(I) states:

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      At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge shall enter on the
      record a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law as to
      whether the evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant’s
      rights, or in violation of these rules or any statute, and shall make
      an order granting or denying the relief sought.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I).

      This     issue    has    been    addressed     by   our   Supreme     Court    in

Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680 (Pa. 2005):

      [I]t is not uncommon for suppression judges to fail to comply with
      [Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I)], and the lapse is then belatedly accounted
      for, if at all, either in the court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion filed after
      an appeal is taken by the aggrieved party . . . or by the
      [Commonwealth v. Kichline, 361 A.2d 282, 290 (Pa. 1976)]
      standard of review—a standard which came into existence
      precisely because of such lapses.

Millner, supra at 688. Placing findings of fact and conclusions of law on the

record at the conclusion of the suppression hearing serves two purposes. One,

“it permits the losing party to make a more intelligent assessment of whether

or not to burden the appellate justice system with an appeal of the suppression

ruling, particularly in cases of contested evidence.” Id. Two, “it is often the

case (for example, where a waiver trial occurs) that the suppression judge is

different from the trial judge yet, if there is a conviction, it will be the trial

judge who will be responsible for preparation of the Rule 1925 opinion for

appeal.” Id. at 689. Thus, in instances where the suppression court has failed

to make specific findings of fact on the record, this Court has instead relied

on   the     record    and    the   court’s   Rule   1925(a)    opinion.   See,   e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Wood, 833 A.2d 740, 742-43 (Pa. Super. 2003).

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      Here, there is no Rule 1925(a) opinion, and the trial judge was not the

same judge who heard the suppression motion. Still, while we disapprove of

the suppression court’s failure to place specific findings of fact and conclusions

of law on the record, “remand for compliance would not serve the interests of

judicial economy or justice.”     Millner, 888 A.2d at 689.        The evidence

presented at the suppression hearing, discussed in detail above, established

by a preponderance of the evidence that Bullard’s statement was voluntary,

and that the waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent. See

Kichline, 361 A.2d at 290. Thus, the record is sufficient to allow meaningful

appellate review.    Accordingly, we affirm the court’s denial of Bullard’s

suppression motion. See Milner, supra; see also Kichline, supra.

      However, in our review of the record it became apparent that the trial

court failed to award time credit to Bullard. Such an error constitutes an illegal

sentence.   See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 A.3d 1165, 1166-67 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (trial court’s failure to award credit for time served implicates

legality of sentence).   It is well-settled that an illegal sentence must be

vacated and that we can raise and review an illegal sentence sua sponte.

Commonwealth v. Muhammed, 992 A.2d 897, 903 (Pa. Super. 2010). The

Pennsylvania Sentencing Code provides that credit “shall be given to the

defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for

which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of conduct on which such a

charge is based.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1) (emphasis added). This includes

“credit for the time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending

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sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.”             Id.   “The principle

underlying [section 9760] is that a defendant should be given credit for time

spent     in   custody    prior    to   sentencing   for   a   particular   offense.”

Commonwealth v. Hollawell, 604 A.2d 723, 725 (Pa. Super. 1992).

        There is no dispute that Bullard did not receive credit for his time

incarcerated related to this crime prior to his conviction. See N.T. Sentencing

Hearing, 11/18/21, at 19-20, 23-24; see also Sentencing Order 11/19/21.

The sentencing court acknowledged that Bullard had been in custody

approximately two years and eight months prior to sentencing on these

charges. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 11/18/21, at 7-8, 19. Placing her

sentence on the record, Judge Scott stated that she did not “want to send

[Bullard] upstate . . . . [because he does not] do well upstate.” Id. at 23.

The court sentenced Bullard to an aggregate term of 6 to 23 months’

incarceration “with no credit for time served” and two years’ reporting

probation. Id.

        The sentencing court’s failure to give Bullard credit for time served,

amounting to almost three years, is illegal pursuant to section 9760(1). While

we understand the court’s reasoning for the sentence it imposed, we are

constrained to vacate Bullard’s sentence and remand for resentencing in

accordance with the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code.12

____________________________________________

12 We recognize the sentencing court’s desire for Bullard to serve his sentence

in county jail, rather that state prison, to better his chances of rehabilitation
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded

for resentencing in accordance with the dictates of this decision. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Date: 12/20/2023

____________________________________________

and lessen his likelihood of re-offending. However, we note a sentencing
court’s ability to designate a defendant to serve a term up to five years in
county jail. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9762(a). Finally, our review of the record
indicates that Bullard was released from county jail after six months and has
been on supervision since his release.

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