Court Opinion

ID: 9757145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:20:38.588567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:35.301480
License: Public Domain

OPINION BY
Judge SIMPSON.
Brian Moore (Claimant) appeals from an order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) grant of Babcock & Wilcox Company’s (Employer) suspension petition and reversed the WCJ’s grant of Claimant’s penalty petition. The WCJ and the Board found that Claimant, while under house arrest, was “incarcerated” and ineligible for benefits under of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).1 We affirm.
In July 1994, Claimant began receiving workers’ compensation benefits. Since that time, Claimant was convicted of crimes in West Virginia and confined once to jail, once to a rehabilitation facility, and twice to electronically monitored home detention, house arrest.2 Claimant did not inform Employer of these confinements.
Claimant’s hoiise arrest officer testified that in West Virginia an individual on house arrest serves his criminal sentence at his personal residence rather then in a traditional correctional facility. He is required to pay his living expenses and fees covering the cost of the electronic monitoring device.3 Failure to comply with the rules applicable to house arrest may result in revocation of the house arrest privilege and confinement to a traditional correctional facility. Further, any unauthorized departure by a detainee from his dwelling constitutes criminal escape under the West Virginia crimes code. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 310-311R, 347R).
*633Upon learning of Claimant’s 1998 house arrest, Employer unilaterally suspended Claimant’s benefits from July 28, 1998 through October 13, 1998. Employer alleged that Claimant was not eligible to receive benefits under Section 306(a.l) of the Act,4 because he was “incarcerated,” a term the Act does not define.
Claimant filed a reinstatement petition on August 5,1998, in which he argued that suspension of his benefits was not warranted because house arrest with work release does not constitute “incarceration.” Claimant simultaneously filed a penalty petition alleging Employer’s unilateral suspension of his July through October 1998 benefits violated the Act.
On May 28, 1999, Employer filed a suspension petition. The WCJ consolidated both parties’ petitions and held a hearing. The WCJ found Claimant’s house arrest constituted incarceration under the Act. The WCJ further concluded that Claimant was entitled to reinstatement of his benefits at the end of his house arrest. However, the WCJ granted Employer credit for benefits received by Claimant during the periods of incarceration he did not report to Employer. The Board affirmed all aspects of the WCJ’s decision except the grant of Claimant’s penalty petition. Claimant now appeals to this Court.5
Claimant, emphasizing his eligibility for work release, argues that his house arrest did not constitute incarceration under the Act. This Court addressed a similar issue in Brinker’s International, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd. (Weissenstein), 721 A.2d 406 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), where we held a rehabilitation center detainee was incarcerated despite eligibility for work release. We noted that the General Assembly failed to create any exception to the Act for individuals on work release. The Court further stated:
Although a prisoner on work release is typically granted the privilege of leaving an institution for a limited period of time and is confined for the remainder of the day, we do not believe that the term “incarcerated” in Section 306(a)(2) should be narrowly defined to apply only to prisoners who are confined inside the walls of a jail 100 percent of the time. This is because a prisoner on work release remains in the constructive custody of the Commonwealth, and may be charged with escape if he or she fails to return to the prison or housing facility from outside employment.
Id. at 410.
Our Supreme Court approved this reasoning in Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd. (Hendrie), 565 Pa. 493, 776 A.2d 951 (2001). In Henkels, the claimant, following a criminal conviction, was found incarcerated under the Act while he resided at a psychiatric hospital. The Court reasoned:
[ W]e do not believe that the General Assembly intended to narrowly limit the term “incarceration” solely to confinement in a penal facility. It is evident that the legislature sought to preclude the payment of workers’ compensation *634benefits to persons who are convicted of violations of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code and who, as a result of those convictions, are thereafter removed from the work force.
565 Pa. at 500, 776 A.2d at 955.
Like those confined to residential inpatient rehabilitation facilities and psychiatric hospitals, an individual on house arrest is in constructive custody. His liberty and movements are significantly limited by security measures. Unauthorized departures from the dwelling may result in criminal sanctions for escape or administrative discipline administered to traditional prison inmates. As such, a house arrest detainee is not eligible to receive benefits while serving his sentence regardless of his eligibility for work release.6
Claimant argues entitlement to benefits because, unlike the individuals in Brinker’s Int’l or Henkels, his West Virginia confinement was not at taxpayer expense, since he was responsible for his living expenses and specific fees covering the costs his incarceration. We are not persuaded. In Flynn v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd. (Sovereign Staffing Source, Inc.), 776 A.2d 1043 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), we held a claimant injured on work release should be denied benefits despite a requirement he be employed and self sufficient while residing at a halfway house. Claimant’s situation is analogous.
Claimant next argues that even if he were “incarcerated,” Employer was not permitted to unilaterally suspend his benefits. This issue is controlled by Banic v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Bd. (Trans-Bridge Lines, Inc.), 664 A.2d 1081 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995), affirmed on other grounds, 550 Pa. 276, 705 A.2d 432 (1997). The Banic Court held that Section 306 is self-executing. Authorization from a WCJ is not required before an employer may suspend benefits during a claimant’s incarceration. Employer did not violate the Act by suspending Claimant’s benefits, and, therefore, no penalty is justified.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Board.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2002, the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board is affirmed.

. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended § 1-1041.4; 2501-2626.

. During the course of the litigation, the parties stipulated to Claimant’s periods of restraint as follows; house arrest for 42 weeks five days from October 1995 through August 1996; Shawnee Hills Rehabilitation Center for two weeks from July 1997 through August 1997; Northern Regional Jail/Hancock County Jail for nine weeks three days from late December 1997 through February 1998; and house arrest for 34 weeks one day from July 1998 through March 1999.

.This device is an ankle bracelet that signals authorities if the detainee attempts to leave his dwelling without permission. In addition to the bracelet, authorities monitor the detain- ' • ee’s behavior through regular telephone contact, personal interviews, drug/alcohol tests, and daily logs. A detainee may leave his dwelling only with permission from his supervising officer. Additionally, a detainee may be granted work release. WCJ Op. of March 7, 2001 at 5.

. Added by Section 4 of the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, 77 P.S. § 511.1. The Section states, in pertinent part, "[n]othing in this act shall require payment of compensation ... for any period during which the employe is incarcerated after a conviction....”

. This Court’s scope of review of a Board’s decision is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed, findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence or constitutional rights were violated. Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 704; Vinglinsky v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd. (Penn Installation), 139 Pa.Cmwlth. 15, 589 A.2d 291 (1991).

. In Pennsylvania, house arrest with electronic monitoring is a form of intermediate punishment. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9763(b)(16),(17). The term of intermediate punishment may not exceed the maximum term for which the defendant could be confined. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9763(a).