Court Opinion

ID: 9588702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:37:11.18525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:00.003542
License: Public Domain

Lewis, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
Neither precedent in this State nor reason justify the adoption of the rule that a conviction, although reversed, conclusively establishes probable cause.
It is true that in many jurisdictions the issue of “probable cause,” as a defense to civil actions for malicious prosecution, can be conclusively resolved in favor of a defendant upon a showing that the plaintiff was convicted of the charges, even where the conviction is subsequently reversed or set aside, absent fraud, perjury or similar impeaching circumstances. Annotation, “Malicious Prosectuion — Probable Cause,” 86 A.L.R. (2d) 1090. The principle does not, however, enjoy universal acceptance. A number of jurisdictions view such a conviction as merely prima facie evidence of “probable cause” which the plaintiff may rebut. 86 A.L.R. (2d) 1090,1104.
This minority view strikes me as preferable to the principle of conclusive effect, given that a multitude of factors can distinguish one reversal from the next. There are, for example, jurisdictions which apply a different presumption to convictions depending upon the status of the trial court. 86 A.L.R. (2d) 1090, 1093, 1106. I voice no opinion as to the propriety of so weighing convictions but simply note this practice'as evidence of the complexities which the majority opinion ignores.
A more flexible, prima facie rule would be in keeping with the many decisions of this Court holding that the issue of *86“probable cause” in- malicious prosecution actions is a question of fact for jury resolution. Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S. C. 318, 143 S. E. (2d) 607; Margolis v. Telech, 239 S. C. 232, 122 S. E. (2d) 417; Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 231 S. C. 565, 99 S. E. (2d) 384; Brown v. Bailey, 215 S. C. 175, 184, 54 S. E. (2d) 769 (and cases cited). See also Annotation, 87 A.L.R. (2d) 183, 200.
I fail to find the “well-reasoned” support for the view adopted by the majority. The majority gives as the reasons for adopting the “conclusive” rule:
(1) In determining the existence of probable cause; the focus is on whether the defendant had reasonable cause to believe the plaintiff guilty, and not on the plaintiffs actual guilt or innocence.
(2) If a court proceeds to conviction, it necessarily had evidence before it which could convince a reasonable man of the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In either of the foregoing arguments, the fact remains that the conviction was set aside, leaving unresolved the question of whether the defendant had reasonable cause to believe the plaintiff guilty. To say that, if a court proceeds to conviction, it necessarily had evidence before it to convince a reasonable man of guilt, is conclusively refuted by the number of cases in which this Court has set aside because there was a total lack of evidence to support it, is not to be regarded as conclusive of the issue of probable cause. Yet, the rule adopted by the majority accomplishes that result.
Many factors enter into the reversal of cases, which the conclusive rule, adopted by the majority, simply refuses to recognize. I fear that the majority opinion takes a leap without looking, the impact of which may be felt by parties who should, but now never will, have their day in court.
However, assuming the soundness of the majority rule, I am further compelled to dissent in this instance because the record simply does not permit us to reasonably apply the rule of conclusive effect. The convictions of the appellants were set aside for lack of a transcript. Conceivably the convictions might have been in fact obtained through fraud or perjury which presents the universally acknowledged exception to the so-called “majority rule.” We have no way to know if the *87general rule can be fairly and justly relied upon here, which was precisely the situation of the Nevada Supreme Court when it adopted the minority view described above. Chapman v. Reno, 85 Nev. 365, 455 P. (2d) 618.
I would reverse and, therefore, dissent.