Court Opinion

ID: 9479252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:12:34.995714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:54.502580
License: Public Domain

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
A state judge, confronted with the mutually contradictory affidavits of two witnesses concerning a crucial fact, decided that one witness was credible and the other was not without hearing either witness’ testimony or affording counsel the opportunity to confront and cross-examine them. The ma*149jority concludes that this decision, on the basis of which the state judge denied the petitioner relief from a death sentence, was made after a “full and fair hearing.”1 In a simple tort case involving only damages, let alone a case in which a man’s life is at stake, controverted material facts would not be decided in such a truncated fashion. Because the judge’s reading of the affidavits, without appearance by the witnesses or examination by counsel, does not provide the full and fair hearing that the habeas corpus statute commands as a prerequisite to crediting the state court’s judgment, I respectfully dissent from Part II of the opinion and from the judgment.
It is undisputed that Carr-Fitzgerald and Crow, Buxton’s trial co-counsel, submitted affidavits to the state court containing contradictory factual accounts. Carr-Fitzgerald swore in her affidavit that a juror had “conceded (paraphrase) his vote during the guilt phase of the trial when he did not feel the defendant was guilty contingent on the agreement by the other jurors that the death penalty would not be imposed by their vote.” Crow swore that Carr-Fitzgerald later told him that she had overheard one juror tell another: “‘Hell, I didn’t even believe he was guilty and now you want me to kill him?’ ”
Without hearing the testimony of either witness, the state court credited Crow’s affidavit, and found that no juror misconduct had occurred under the facts Crow asserted. The federal district court presumed that the state court’s accreditation of Crow’s affidavit was correct, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and affirmed the state court’s denial of Buxton’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to challenge the juror misconduct. Were the state court to have credited Carr-Fitzgerald’s affidavit, the majority acknowledges, “there is a strong possibility that a Texas court would have granted an eviden-tiary hearing on the question of juror misconduct,” since members of the jury would have violated Texas law by “mak[ing] an agreement to render a guilty verdict in exchange for a lighter punishment.”2
When reviewing the application of a ha-beas petitioner convicted in state court, a federal court presumes that the state court’s determination of a factual issue after a hearing on its merits is correct “unless the applicant shall establish ... that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing.”3 If the district court determines that the state court’s procedure did not provide for a full and fair hearing, the district court holds its own evidentiary hearing.4
The majority correctly holds that “fact-finding based [solely] on a record can in some circumstances be adequate” (emphasis supplied).. In cases in which the historical facts are not in dispute and there are no conflicting affidavits, both the Supreme Court5 and this court6 have held that a state court’s fact-finding procedures may afford a full and fair hearing without personal testimony and examination of witnesses.
When affiants have sworn to conflicting affidavits placing historical facts in dispute, however, a trial judge is unable to make an informed judgment that one affi-ant is more credible than the other solely on the basis of the contradictory affidavits. Every practitioner knows that it is easy to *150obtain a witness’ signature on an affidavit prepared by a lawyer: how facilely the lawyer’s narrative spills from the word processor; how readily the affiant puts pen to paper. Every practitioner also knows how often the lawyer’s version of events crumbles when the witness is called to testify and is cross-examined on his personal knowledge of events.
A judge, like a juror, determines facts from contradictory witnesses by assessing each witness’ credibility. This determination is based not only on each witness’ testimony in court before the judge, which may differ substantially from the affiant’s statement on a piece of paper, but is informed by the judge’s observation of the witness’ demeanor on direct and cross-examination. The rigors of a “live” eviden-tiary hearing thus not only enhance the likelihood that a witness testifies truthfully, but enable a fact-finder to conclude from personal observation of each witness’ behavior that one witness is truthful and the other mendacious. Because Buxton was not afforded the opportunity to “present relevant evidence and rebut the evidence of the opposition,” 7 and the judge did not have a chance to assess either witness’ credibility during direct and cross-examination, the state court’s fact-finding procedures were inadequate and failed to provide Buxton with a “full and fair” hearing under § 2254(d)(2).8 It is, indeed, ironic that the state court credited Crow’s affidavit which contained only second-hand hearsay — what Carr-Fitzgerald allegedly told him — over Carr-Fitzgerald’s first-hand account.
To support its conclusion that the state court’s fact-finding procedure was adequate, the majority relies on our decision in Evans v. McCotter.9 In Evans, we “assumed] arguendo ” that a state trial court’s determination of fact from conflicting affidavits was
sufficient under [§ 2254(d)(2) ]. See, e.g., Sumner v. Mata, ... Smith v. Estelle, ... Camarillo v. Estelle.10
In addition to the obvious fact that this portion of Evans is obiter dicta, not precedent, the three cases Evans cites do not support the conclusion reached by the Evans court and the majority in this case. In Mata and Smith, no historical facts were in dispute;11 neither case, therefore, addresses whether a hearing may be considered full and fair when a court determines controverted facts on the basis of conflicting affidavits. In Camarillo, we actually “remanded for an evidentiary hearing” because the “prisoner’s right to relief tum[ed] on facts which [we]re in dispute.”12
Having no precedential support, the majority ultimately roots its opinion on the ground that the state trial judge who credited Crow’s affidavit was the judge who had tried Buxton and, therefore, “saw both Crow and Carr-Fitzgerald in action” and “may have developed” more “respect” for one attorney than the other. A judge’s familiarity with attorneys practicing before him does not, however, establish his ability to ascertain their credibility as affiants, and takes no account of the effect of direct and cross-examination on testimony. The credibility of a lawyer retained to represent an individual in court, qua counsel, is vastly different from the trustworthiness of an individual testifying about historical facts. The lawyer is an agent, an adversary, an attorney at law, and, except for unusual circumstances, may not be a witness in a cause in which he is counsel.13 A witness, in contrast, speaks on his own behalf, swears that his testimony is true, and his factual averments are subject to the scruti*151ny of a presiding judge, counsel, and other witnesses.
Rather than presuming that the state court’s finding of fact was correct, the district court should have held its own evi-dentiary hearing to determine which affi-ant’s account of events was more accurate.14 Because the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford Buxton a full and fair hearing, I would remand the case to the district court so that it may conduct a real evidentiary hearing to determine whether the facts recited in Carr-Fitzgerald’s or in Crow’s affidavit are true.

. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1977).

. Vorwerk v. State, 735 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex.App.—Austin 1987) (emphasis in original); see Daniels v. State, 600 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).

. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (1977).

. See Advisory Committee Note to Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 cases, Rule 8, 28 foil. § 2254 (1977).

. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981); cf. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 388 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 689, 698 n. 5, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds, Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503 n. 7, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1922 n. 7, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987).

. See Uresti v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir.1987); Smith v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 677 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 906, 104 S.Ct. 1685, 80 L.Ed.2d 159 (1984); cf. Camarillo v. Estelle, 670 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.1981).

. Campbell v. Minnesota, 487 F.2d 1, 4 (8th Cir.1973) (footnote omitted).

. Ibid.

. 805 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.1986).

. Id at 1214.

. See Mata, 449 U.S. at 543, 101 S.Ct. at 767; Smith, 711 F.2d at 682; see also Uresti, 821 F.2d at 1101.

. Camarillo, 670 F.2d at 474.

. See e.g., ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility 3.7.

. See Campbell, 487 F.2d at 4 & n. 3.