Court Opinion

ID: 2963583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:12:25.980224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:43.262575
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-1977

                                IRIS V. RIVERA-FLORES,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                            PUERTO RICO TELEPHONE COMPANY,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                      [Hon. Justo Arenas, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
                                          _____________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                               and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
                                        _____________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             Harry Anduze Montano for appellant.
             ____________________
             Edgardo  Colon Arraras, with whom Ina  M. Berlingeri Vincenty and
             ______________________            ___________________________
        Goldman, Antonetti & Cordova were on brief for appellee. 
        ____________________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                  September 6, 1995
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.    Iris  Rivera-Flores  ("Rivera")
                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.    
                          _____________

          challenges  certain district  court rulings  relating to  various

          commonwealth  and  federal claims  against  appellee  Puerto Rico

          Telephone  Company ("PRTC"), her  former employer,  for condoning

          the harassment she experienced  at work on account of  her visual

          handicap, and  for terminating  her employment.    We vacate  the

          district court judgment and remand for retrial.

                                          I
                                          I

                                     BACKGROUND1
                                     BACKGROUND
                                     __________

                    Rivera began  working the  night shift  for  PRTC as  a

          traffic  operator in 1984.  In  January 1986, PRTC acceded to her

          request for reasonable accommodation  of her visual impairment   

          congenital  cataracts in  both eyes  and secondary  angle closure

          glaucoma     by  transferring her  to a  day-shift position  as a

          service  representative.    During  her four-month  tenure  as  a

          service  representative,  Rivera's  supervisors   and  co-workers

          harassed  her  by  making  derogatory remarks  about  her  visual

          handicap;  her  supervisors  reported  her  work  performance  as

          unsatisfactory; and  in April  1986, she  was  reassigned to  her

          former position as a traffic operator on the night shift.  

                    Rivera's  labor union filed  a successful  grievance in

          opposition to her reassignment, and  in November 1988, Rivera was

                              
          ____________________

               1The district court decision  directing judgment as a matter
          of law  is reviewed de novo.   Favorito v. Pannell,  27 F.3d 716,
                              __ ____    ________    _______
          719 (1st Cir. 1994).  The evidence, and all reasonable inferences
          therefrom,  are viewed in the  light most favorable  to the party
          opposing judgment.  Id. 
                              ___

                                          2

          reinstated, with back pay,  as a sales representative on  the day

          shift.   Her supervisors  resumed their complaints  that Rivera's

          visual  problems  were adversely  affecting her  job performance;

          provided her with inadequate on-the-job training; refused to give

          her a desk or  work assignments for several weeks;  brushed aside

          her repeated  requests  for  reasonable  accommodation  (e.g.,  a

          special  magnifying  glass  to facilitate  reading,  and overtime

          compensation for  catching up  on a preexisting  three-month work

          backlog); and attempted to coerce  her into accepting an unfavor-

          able job  evaluation.   Her day-shift supervisors  and co-workers

          resumed their  derogatory  comments (e.g.,  calling  her  "little

          blind  lady,"  "mentally  retarded,"  "mutant,"  cross-eyed,  and

          physically repulsive), and hid or defaced her paperwork.  

                    In April  1989, Rivera reported to  the State Insurance

          Fund  ("Fund"),  and  was diagnosed  with,  and  treated  for, an

          emotional and  mental condition  attributable to  the job-related

          harassment.2  She  filed suit  in December 1989  against PRTC  in

          federal district court, seeking compensatory and  punitive damag-

          es, front and back  pay, injunctive relief, prejudgment interest,

          and attorney fees.  When Rivera sought to return to  work follow-

          ing her discharge from  the Fund in December 1991,  PRTC informed

          her  that her position was no longer available because the Puerto

          Rico workers'  compensation statute  obligated employers  to hold
                              
          ____________________

               2The physicians treating Rivera  noted wide fluctuations  in
          the intraocular pressure  in her  right ("good") eye.   In  April
          1990, she underwent surgery on her right eye, which resulted in a
          permanent,  partial loss of visual acuity.  Rivera attributed the
          increase in intraocular pressure to job-related stress.  

                                          3

          jobs open for only twelve months after the onset of the disabili-
                                           _____ ___ _____ __ ___ _________

          ty.   See P.R.  Laws Ann.  tit. 11,    7 (1991).   PRTC  sent its
          __    ___

          formal termination letter to Rivera on December 14, 1992, without

          according Rivera a pretermination hearing.

                    Thereafter,  Rivera filed her  final amended complaint,

          which included two federal claims.  First, she alleged that PRTC,

          an  instrumentality  of  the  Commonwealth of  Puerto  Rico,  had

          violated  her procedural  due process  rights by  terminating her

          employment  without a  pretermination hearing.   See  U.S. Const.
                                                           ___

          amends.  V, XIV.  Second, she pleaded a Rehabilitation Act claim,

          based on her  termination and on PRTC's  negligent condonation of

          the discriminatory harassment she experienced at the hands of its

          employees.  See 29 U.S.C.   794 (prohibiting discrimination based
                      ___

          on handicap  by any  program "receiving federal  financial assis-

          tance"),    794a  (prescribing equitable  and legal  remedies for

          violation); 42 U.S.C.    2000d-7 (waiving State's Eleventh Amend-

          ment immunity for damages in actions under Rehabilitation Act).  

                    Rivera's  claims under  commonwealth  law alleged  that

          PRTC  (1) violated  P.R.  Const. art.  II,    8  (providing  that

          "[e]very  person has the right  to the protection  of law against

          abusive attacks on h[er] honor, reputation and private  or family

          life"), (2)  violated the Commonwealth's statutory  analog to the

          Federal Rehabilitation Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1,   511, and (3)

          intentionally or negligently inflicted personal  injury, see P.R.
                                                                   ___

          Laws  Ann. tit.  31,     5141-5142 (cause  of action  for damages

          against employer for injury inflicted by employer and its employ-

                                          4

          ees).  Rivera demanded jury trial on all claims. 

                    PRTC moved for summary judgment, asserting, inter alia,
                                                                _____ ____

          that the  district court lacked subject  matter jurisdiction over

          the Rehabilitation  Act claim  because PRTC's receipt  of Federal

          Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") disaster funds could not, as
                                                                         __

          a matter of law, qualify it as a "program . . . receiving federal
          _ ______ __ ___

          financial  assistance."   29 U.S.C.    794.   The  district court

          disagreed,  rejected  the  jurisdictional  challenge,  and denied

          summary  judgment.   Rivera-Flores  v. PRTC,  840  F. Supp.  3, 6
                               _____________     ____

          (D.P.R. 1993) (Laffitte, J.).

                    On the first  day of trial, after  Judge Laffitte unex-

          pectedly recused himself, the parties agreed to proceed  with the

          jury trial before  a magistrate  judge.  When  Rivera rested  her

          case, PRTC moved for judgment as a matter of law on the Rehabili-

          tation Act  claim, see Fed.  R. Civ. P.  50(a)(1), on the  ground
                             ___

          that  Rivera  had  failed to  introduce  evidence  that PRTC  had

          "receiv[ed]  federal financial  assistance" in  the form  of FEMA

          disaster funds.  Rivera  responded that she did not  proffer such

          evidence, because Judge Laffitte's earlier order denying  summary

          judgment  to PRTC  conclusively  established that  the court  had

          subject  matter jurisdiction  over her  Rehabilitation  Act claim

          against PRTC.  In  the alternative, Rivera requested that  she be

          permitted to reopen her case to present this evidence.

                    The magistrate judge  summarily denied  the request  to

          reopen and dismissed the Rehabilitation Act claim, after correct-

          ly noting that  a denial  of summary judgment  normally does  not

                                          5

          settle material  factual disputes upon which  the plaintiff bears

          the  ultimate burden of proof.  The  court then decided to retain

          supplemental jurisdiction over the three commonwealth claims, see
                                                                        ___

          28  U.S.C.    1367, but  nevertheless discharged  the  jury after

          concluding that Rivera had no independent Seventh Amendment right

          to  jury trial on these commonwealth claims in federal court, see
                                                                        ___

          U.S. Const. amend. VII,  since plaintiffs enjoy no  such parallel

          right under the Puerto Rico Constitution.

                    Following a bench trial,  the court entered judgment on

          Rivera's claim for  negligent infliction  of emotional  distress,

          see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31,    5141-5142, awarding her $90,000 in
          ___

          damages.   The three remaining claims were dismissed.  First, the

          federal procedural due  process claim was dismissed on the ground

          that  Puerto  Rico  law  presumes the  natural  expiration  of an

          employee's "property right" in  her employment after one year  of

          continuous disability.  Rivera-Flores  v. PRTC, No. 89-1697, 1994
                                  _____________     ____

          U.S.  Dist. LEXIS, at *30  (D.P.R. June 20,  1994) (citing Carron
                                                                     ______

          Lamoutte  v. Compania de Turismos, 92 J.T.S. 27, at 9306 (1992)).
          ________     ____________________

          Second, the  claim asserted under  the commonwealth  constitution

          failed for  lack of proof of "reputational  damage."  Id. at *23.
                                                                ___

          Third, the  handicap discrimination  claim foundered because  the

          1992 amendment  to  the  Puerto Rico  statute  which  provides  a

          private cause of  action for  damages is not  made applicable  to

          pre-1992  causes of  action. Id.  at *30 (interpreting  P.R. Laws
                                       ___

          Ann. tit. 1,   511).  

                                          II
                                          II

                                          6

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

          A.   Federal Rehabilitation Act Claim
          A.   Federal Rehabilitation Act Claim
               ________________________________

                    Rivera focuses first on  the dismissal of her Rehabili-

          tation Act claim because she did not introduce evidence that PRTC

          was  a "program .  . .  receiving federal  financial assistance."

          She insists that this  question had never been placed  in genuine

          dispute by PRTC, that  the pretrial order denying  PRTC's summary

          judgment motion  (Laffitte, J.)  had established  this "jurisdic-

          tional" fact, and that she was caught off guard by the magistrate

          judge's decision to treat Judge Laffitte's pretrial order as non-

          dispositive.  In  these circumstances, she suggests,  at the very

          least the court  should have  allowed her briefly  to reopen  and

          introduce the  "undisputed"  evidence  that  PRTC  received  FEMA

          disaster funds. 

                    Trial court rulings on motions to reopen civil cases to

          permit additional evidence are  reviewed for abuse of discretion.

          See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321,
          ___ __________________    ________________________

          331  (1971); Hibiscus Assocs., Ltd.  v. Board of  Trustees of the
                       ______________________     _________________________

          Policemen and Firemen Retirement Sys., 50 F.3d 908, 917-18  (11th
          _____________________________________

          Cir. 1995);   Joseph v. Terminix  Int'l Co., 17  F.3d 1282,  1285
                        ______    ___________________

          (10th  Cir. 1994); Bradford Trust Co.  v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
                             __________________     _______________________

          Fenner  & Smith, Inc., 805 F.2d 49,  52 (2d Cir. 1986); Swartz v.
          _____________________                                   ______

          New  York Cent.  R.R. Co.,  323  F.2d 713,  714 (7th  Cir. 1963).
          _________________________

          While the particular criteria that guide a trial court's decision

          to  reopen  are necessarily  flexible  and  case-specific, it  is

          generally  understood that a trial court abuses its discretion if

                                          7

          its refusal  to reopen  works  an "injustice"  in the  particular

          circumstances.   See Gas Ridge,  Inc. v. Suburban  Agric. Proper-
                           ___ ________________    ________________________

          ties, Inc., 150 F.2d 363, 366 (5th Cir. 1945).  Among the materi-
          __________

          al  factors which  should  be assessed  by  the trial  court  are

          whether: (1) the evidence sought  to be introduced is  especially

          important and  probative; (2) the moving  party's explanation for

          failing to introduce the  evidence earlier is bona fide;  and (3)
                                                        ____ ____

          reopening will cause  no undue prejudice to the  nonmoving party.

          See, e.g., Joseph,  17 F.3d at  1285; see generally  6A James  W.
          ___  ____  ______                     ___ _________

          Moore,  Moore's Federal  Practice   59.04[13],  at 59-33  (2d ed.
                  _________________________

          1993).

               1.   The "New" Evidence
               1.   The "New" Evidence
                    __________________

                    Trial  courts as a rule  act within their discretion in

          refusing to reopen a  case where the proffered "new"  evidence is

          insufficiently  probative  to  offset the  procedural  disruption

          caused by reopening.  See, e.g.,  Joseph, 17 F.3d at 1285 (noting
                                ___  ____   ______

          that "new" evidence  would have been cumulative); Thomas  v. S.S.
                                                            ______     ____

          Santa Mercedes,  572 F.2d 1331,  1336 (9th Cir.  1978) (affirming
          ______________

          denial  of motion  to  reopen  where  "new" evidence  would  have

          provided  little additional  probative  force).   In the  instant

          case,  however, there can be no question that the proffered "new"

          evidence was  critical to  the Rehabilitation  Act claim once  it

          became clear  that subject matter jurisdiction  was contested; it

          was the only evidence on an essential element of the claim.  See,
                  ____                                                 ___

          e.g.,  Nathanson v. Medical College  of Pa., 926  F.2d 1368, 1380
          ____   _________    _______________________

          (3d  Cir. 1991).  Thus,  this factor weighed  heavily in favor of

                                          8

          allowing the motion to reopen. 

               2.   Bona Fide Explanation
               2.   Bona Fide Explanation
                    _____________________

                    Trial  courts  likewise  should  consider  whether  the

          moving  party  offered a  bona  fide explanation  for  failing to
                                    ____  ____

          introduce the evidence before  it finally rested its case.   See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g.,  Bradford Trust Co., 805 F.2d at 52-53 (upholding denial of
          ____   __________________

          motion to reopen after trial court  repeatedly warned that movant

          would need to produce  evidence on "key issue"); Air  Et Chaleur,
                                                           ________________

          S.A. v. Eliot Janeway, 757 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir.  1985) (uphold-
          ____    _____________

          ing refusal to  reopen where trial  court forewarned movant  that

          omitted  evidence  would be  essential).    Moreover, the  courts

          recognize that  it may  amount to an  abuse of  discretion for  a

          trial  court  to decline  to  reopen in  circumstances  where the

          movant  has demonstrated  "reasonably  genuine  surprise."    Id.
                                                                        ___

          There are at least  four compelling reasons for finding  that the

          "good  faith"  factor weighed  heavily in  favor of  allowing the

          motion to reopen in the instant case.

                    First, the record bears  out the contention that Rivera

          refrained  from introducing  the  undisputed evidence  of  PRTC's

          receipt  of FEMA funds, not  because she lacked  proof but solely

          because  she reasonably  understood  that  the  district  court's

          subject  matter jurisdiction had been settled prior to trial.  In
                                                        _____ __ _____

          the  statement of  uncontested  material  facts accompanying  its

          summary judgment  motion, for example, PRTC  admitted receiving a

          $9,765 check from FEMA,  dated January 10, 1986,  "while [Rivera]

          was working as a  Service Representative," as well as  other FEMA

                                          9

          payments during 1987, 1989 and 1990.  

                    Notwithstanding these undisputed facts,  PRTC presented

          the  magistrate  judge  with  two alternative  theories  for  its

          narrowly focused legal contention  that the district court lacked
                           _____ __________

          subject  matter "jurisdiction":    (1) FEMA  fund recipients  are

          subject to  the  special  anti-discrimination  provisions  of  44

          C.F.R.     7.1 to 7.949 (1994), which do not proscribe employment
                                                                 __________

          discrimination  by  the recipient,  and  therefore  PRTC was  not

          subject to the  more comprehensive anti-discrimination provisions

          of the Rehabilitation Act; or (2) the FEMA funds must be shown to
                                     __

          have  been  received during  the same  time  period in  which the

          alleged discriminatory acts against the recipient's employee took

          place.   

                    Judge Laffitte had rejected  both these legal  theories

          prior to trial: 

                    [PRTC's]  arguments do  not  carry  the  day.
                    First, neither  party contests the  fact that
                           _______  _____ ________ ___  ____
                    after  various hurricanes and  heavy rains in
                    Puerto  Rico, PRTC applied for Federal finan-
                    cial assistance to receive  reimbursement for
                    expenditures paid to repair the damage caused
                    by the disasters.  Neither party contests the
                                       _______ _____ ________ ___
                    fact that  PRTC either was  receiving Federal
                    ____
                    funding  or was awaiting the receipt of fund-
                    ing  throughout the  period  of  the  alleged
                    discriminatory conduct.  The Court finds that
                                             ___ _____ _____
                    in the context of the Rehabilitation  Act, an
                    employer "receiving  Federal financial assis-
                    tance"  includes  a  qualified applicant  who
                    although approved  to  receive the  funds  is
                    awaiting  the receipt of them.  Consequently,
                    because PRTC was  either receiving or expect-
                    ing to receive  Federal financial  assistance
                    throughout  the  period  pertinent to  plain-
                    tiff's claim,  the Court finds that  PRTC was
                                   ___ _____ _____
                    "receiving Federal  financial assistance" and
                    is subject to the Rehabilitation Act for that
                    __ _______

                                          10

                    period of time. 

          Rivera-Flores, 840 F. Supp. at 5 (emphasis added).  
          _____________

                    Normally, of  course, the mere denial  of a defendant's

          summary judgment motion does not relieve a claimant of the burden

          of  introducing evidence at  trial on every  element essential to

          her claim, even though  the factual predicate was not  in genuine

          dispute at summary  judgment.  However,  Civil Rule 56(d)  estab-

          lishes a procedural mechanism whereby a district court can ensure

          a more enduring effect for its summary judgment ruling, and, with

          the acquiescence of  the parties, narrow  the factual issues  for

          trial: 

                    If on motion under  this rule judgment is not
                    entered upon the whole case or for all relief
                    asked and a trial  is necessary, the court at
                    the hearing of  the motion, by examining  the
                    pleadings and the evidence  before it and  by
                    interrogating  counsel, shall  if practicable
                                            _____  __ ___________
                    ascertain what material  facts exist  without
                    _________ ____ ________  _____ _____  _______
                    substantial  controversy  and  what  material
                    ___________  ___________  ___  ____  ________
                    facts are actually and  in good faith contro-
                    _____ ___ ________ ___  __ ____ _____ _______
                    verted.   It shall  thereupon  make an  order
                    ______    __ _____  _________  ____ __  _____
                    specifying  the  facts  that  appear  without
                    __________  ___  _____
                    substantial controversy, including the extent
                    to which  the amount of damages  or other re-
                    lief is  not  in controversy,  and  directing
                    such further proceedings in the action as are
                    just.  Upon the trial of the action the facts
                           ____ ___ _____ __ ___ ______ ___ _____
                    so specified shall be deemed established, and
                    __ _________ _____ __ ______ ___________
                    the trial shall be conducted accordingly.

          Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (emphasis added).  

                    The December 1993 order  entered by Judge Laffitte fits

          well within  the spirit, if not  the letter, of Rule  56(d).  Its

          language,  see  supra, belies  PRTC's  main  contention that  the
                     ___  _____

          district court  order did not sufficiently  "specif[y]" the facts
                                                       _________

          that were "without substantial  controversy."  PRTC counters that

                                          11

          an order can have no Rule 56(d) effect unless the court expressly

          announces its intention  to enter  a Rule 56(d)  order, and  then

          "interrogates"  counsel concerning  the  appropriateness of  such

          relief.  

                    On the contrary, the  language of the rule contemplates

          merely that  the court,  inter alia, "interrogat[e]  counsel [to]
                                   _____ ____

          ascertain what  material facts  . .  . are actually  and in  good

          faith  controverted . .  . ."   Id.  Rule 56(d)  gives counsel no
                                          ___

          veto power over the decision to enter such an order.  Although it

          is unquestionably advisable for the court to announce its  inten-

          tion to  enter such an order, Rule 56(d) does not make it compul-

          sory.3   Thus, "interrogation" of counsel is a suggested means of
                                                       _           _____

          determining facts  not  in  substantial  controversy,  where  the

          pleadings and  other  evidence before  the court  leave room  for

          doubt.  But it is the substance of the order that matters.  
                                _________

                    Second, in  our view Rivera's reliance  on the pretrial

          order seems justified  in these circumstances since  the fact not

          in substantial  "good faith"  controversy did not  pertain exclu-

                              
          ____________________

               3The lone case  cited by PRTC for  its view     Audi Vision,
                                                               ____________
          Inc.  v. RCA Mfg.  Co., 136  F.2d 621, 625  (2d Cir.  1943)    is
          ____     _____________
          inapposite.  There  the court reviewed a partial summary judgment
          entered on various claims,  but counterclaims remained for trial.
          The  appeal was  dismissed as  interlocutory because  the partial
          summary  judgment was  not "final."   See Fed. R.  Civ. P. 58(b).
                                                ___
          The appellate  court simply  recommended that trial  courts alert
          the  parties  to the  fact  that  partial summary  judgments  are
          subject to  further modification  as required to  avoid "manifest
          injustice."    It did  not require  that  trial courts  alert the
          parties when their pretrial orders result in a partial "adjudica-
          tion" of less than all material factual issues.  Id. 
                                                           ___

                                          12

          sively to  the  merits of  her  claim.   Unlike  the three  other

          elements  of 29  U.S.C.    794, "receipt  of federal  funds" also

          directly implicates the district court's subject matter jurisdic-
                                                   _______ ______ _________

          tion over a Rehabilitation  Act claim.  See Bentley  v. Cleveland
          ____                                    ___ _______     _________

          Cty. Bd. of  Cty. Comm'rs, 41 F.3d 600, 603-04  (10th Cir. 1994).
          _________________________

          Contested factual  matters relating  to a court's  subject matter

          jurisdiction  are properly  determined  on  pretrial  motions  to

          dismiss, see  Fed. R. Civ.  P. 12(b)(1);  Bell v. Hood,  327 U.S.
                   ___                              ____    ____

          678,  682  (1946)  (court  must assure  its  jurisdiction  before

          reaching merits of  claim), and even where  the claim is  set for

          jury  trial,  the court  has  great  latitude to  direct  limited

          discovery and to make  such factual findings as are  necessary to

          determine  its subject matter jurisdiction.   See Land v. Dollar,
                                                        ___ ____    ______

          330 U.S. 731, 735  (1947); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).  We
                                     ___ ____

          need  express no  opinion concerning  whether the  Rehabilitation

          Act's jurisdictional  element might properly be  adjudicated on a

          Rule 12(b)(1) motion.4  Rather, we note merely that  Rivera in no

          sense  acted unreasonably in  treating Judge  Laffitte's pretrial

          order  as determinative  of  the jurisdictional  findings therein

          contained.  

                              
          ____________________

               4Rehabilitation Act  claims have been dismissed  for lack of
          subject matter jurisdiction prior  to trial.  See, e.g.,  Foss v.
                                      _____  __ _____   ___  ____   ____
          City of Chicago, 640 F. Supp. 1088, 1090 (N.D. Ill. 1986)  (find-
          _______________
          ing  that defendant  was not a  "program . .  . receiving Federal
          financial assistance"), aff'd, 817  F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1987).  But
                                  _____                                 ___
          cf. Careau Group v. United Farm Workers, 940 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th
          ___ ____________    ___________________
          Cir. 1991)  (noting that,  "where jurisdiction is  so intertwined
          with  the merits that its  resolution depends on  a resolution of
          the  merits, `the trial court should employ the standard applica-
          ble to a motion for summary judgment'") (citation omitted). 

                                          13

                    Third, the  record indicates that PRTC  may have engen-

          dered further  confusion concerning the intended  import of Judge

          Laffitte's pretrial  order.  In  the pretrial order,  PRTC repre-

          sented that  Rivera's prima  facie case  required proof of  three
                                                                      _____

          elements, omitting any reference to the fourth     the "jurisdic-
                                                  ______

          tional"  element.  See Pretrial Order,  at 13.5  PRTC also repre-
                             ___

          sented  that  it  "[wa]s not  a  recipient  of federal  financial

          assistance  within  the  meaning of  [the  Rehabilitation  Act]."
                      ______  ___  _______ __   ___  ______________  ___

          Arguably at least, this connoted that PRTC continued to challenge

          Judge  Laffitte's legal  rulings interpreting  the Rehabilitation
                            _____  _______

          Act, but  that it accepted the fact that proof of receipt of FEMA

          funds no longer  remained in bona fide dispute  for trial.  Thus,

          Rivera presented a bona fide explanation for failing to introduce

          her evidence before resting at trial.

               3.   Undue Prejudice
               3.   Undue Prejudice
                    _______________

                    The third  factor meriting  consideration by  the trial

          court was the degree to which an order allowing  Rivera to reopen

          would  prejudice PRTC.    See, e.g.,  Joseph,  17 F.3d  at  1285.
                                    ___  ____   ______

          First,  we note that the  motion to reopen  was filed immediately

          after Rivera rested  her case,  upon learning that  PRTC did  not
                               ___

          share her understanding of Judge Laffitte's pretrial order.   Cf.
                                                                        ___

          id. at 1284  (upholding denial  of motion to  reopen, and  noting
          ___

          logistical  unfairness  to  defendant in  allowing  plaintiff  to

          present  new  evidence  after  defendant had  rested  its  case).
                                  _____  _________
                              
          ____________________

               5In her  jury instruction  requests, Rivera  likewise listed
          three Rehabilitation Act claim  elements, omitting mention of the
          "jurisdictional element."  

                                          14

          Presumably, the documentary evidence demonstrating PRTC's receipt

          of FEMA funds, including a cancelled check attached as an exhibit

          to PRTC's  own Rule 56  statement of  undisputed material  facts,

          constituted the only "new"  evidence to be introduced.   Unlike a

          reopening  to permit  extended  testimony, cf.  Hibiscus Assocs.,
                                                     ___  _________________

          Ltd.,  50 F.3d  at  918 (denying  motion  to reopen,  for  expert
          ____

          testimony, where evidence was  type that could be  proved without

          extensive  expert testimony),  the introduction  of such  readily

          obtainable documentary  evidence could have entailed  but minimal

          delay.  Cf. Capital Marine Supply, Inc. v. M/V Roland Thomas, 719
                  ___ ___________________________    _________________

          F.2d  104,  107 (5th  Cir. 1983)  (finding  no abuse  in granting

          motion  to reopen "where the missing testimony can be made avail-

          able without undue delay").  

                    In  the final  analysis, therefore,  all  three central

          factors weighed overwhelmingly in favor of reopening, whereas the

          summary ruling below afforded no apposite rationale for declining

          to reopen.   For these  reasons, we conclude that  the refusal to

          reopen, resulting  in dismissal of the  Rehabilitation Act claim,

          constituted an abuse of discretion.  

          B.   Discharge of Jury
          B.   Discharge of Jury
               _________________

                    Following  dismissal of  the Rehabilitation  Act claim,

          the  district court  discharged  the jury,  over Rivera's  timely

          objection,  and assumed the  role of factfinder,  on the mistaken

          theory that Rivera had no right to jury trial on her commonwealth

          claims.   Puerto Rico litigants do have  a right to jury trial on

          their  commonwealth claims  in federal  district court  where the

                                          15

          court  decides,  as it  did  here, to  exercise  its supplemental

          jurisdiction.  See  28 U.S.C.     119, 451; Fed.  R. Civ. P.  1 &
                         ___

          38(a).  The  fact that  the Puerto Rico  constitution confers  no

          parallel  right  to jury  trial on  such  claims is  immaterial. 

          Thus,  the  three  commonwealth  claims must  be  reinstated  and

          remanded for jury trial as well. 

                    Although  in  the normal  course  we  would proceed  no

          further, the  district court  eventually dismissed  several other

          claims  on legal  grounds presently  challenged on  appeal.   The

          aborted  jury  trial in  this case  lasted  several weeks,  and a

          retrial necessarily would entail a further expenditure of consid-

          erable judicial resources.  In the interests of judicial economy,

          therefore, we briefly discuss the dispositive legal issues likely

          to recur on remand.6  

          C.   Due Process Claim
          C.   Due Process Claim
               _________________

                    The district  court dismissed a federal  claim alleging

          that  PRTC violated  Rivera's due  process  rights by  failing to

          accord  her a pretermination hearing.  See U.S. Const. amends. V,
                                                 ___

          XIV;  Cleveland Bd. of Educ.  v. Loudermill, 470  U.S. 532 (1985)
                ______________________     __________

          (holding that  state may not  discharge public employee,  who has

          property right in employment position, without benefit of preter-

          mination  hearing).   The  process  "due" Rivera  is  governed by

          federal law; her property right  is defined by commonwealth  law.

          See Kauffman v. PRTC, 841 F.2d 1169, 1173 (1st Cir. 1988).  
          ___ ________    ____
                              
          ____________________

               6Of  course, our  vacation  of the  district court  judgment
          moots  Rivera's  appellate  challenges  to  the  district court's
          findings.

                                          16

                    The  Puerto Rico workers' compensation statute includes

          what  the district  court  described as  a "caducity"  provision:

          employers need  hold a disabled  worker's position open  for only

          twelve months, after  which they are  not obligated to  reinstate

          the worker.   See P.R.  Laws. Ann. tit.  11,    7.  The  district
                        ___

          court  ruled that Rivera no longer  had a "property right" in her

          position  as service  representative  because  more  than  twelve

          months had  elapsed between  the time her  job-related disability

          began (April 1989) and the time she sought to resume her position

          in  December 1991.  We think its  ruling is based on an erroneous

          construction of commonwealth law.

                    The Puerto  Rico Supreme  Court has delineated  the ap-

          plicable standards.   See, e.g., Carron  Lamoutte v. Compania  de
                                ___  ____  ________________    ____________

          Turismo del Estado Libre  Asociado de Puerto Rico, 92  J.T.S. 27,
          _________________________________________________

          at 9603 (1992).  A public employee who once acquires a cognizable

          "property right" in  her employment position,  and who suffers  a

          work-related injury  or  accident and  reports  to the  Fund  for

          treatment, has an absolute right to reinstatement to her position

          once she is discharged  from the Fund (i.e., from  medical treat-

          ment), provided  she seeks reinstatement within  twelve months of
                 ________  ___ _____ _____________ ______  ______ ______ __

          her injury or  accident.  Id. at 9607.7   If the employee remains
          ___ ______ __  ________   ___
                              
          ____________________

               7PRTC urges affirmance on  an alternate ground not presented
                                                              ___
          to  the district court;  viz., Rivera's  "property right"  in her
          position,  unlike that  of PRTC's  managerial employees,  was not
          defined by  the commonwealth  statute, Personnel Act,  P.R. Laws.
          Ann.  tit. 3,    1301  et seq. (defining  "merit principle" posi-
                                 __ ____
          tions),  but  only  under  the  collective  bargaining  agreement
          between PRTC and  her union.   Mercado Vega v.  Martinez, 692  F.
                                         ____________     ________
          Supp.  36 (D.P.R. 1988).   PRTC therefore suggests  that the "due
          process" cases cited by Rivera are inapposite.  We do not agree.

                                          17

          under treatment for more than twelve months, however, the employ-
                              ____

          er acquires the right to dismiss her on the ground that she is no

          longer physically  or mentally  capable of performing  her former

          work.   Id. at 9608.  Thus,  it is merely the employee's absolute
                  ___

          right not to be  terminated on account of her  disability, rather

          than  her property  interest  in her  employment position,  which

          lapses   under  the  one-year  workers'  compensation  "caducity"

          provision.    

                    Once the Commonwealth confers  a "property interest" in

          employment, it  cannot take the position away  without abiding by

          the dictates of procedural due process.   Id. at 9608-09.  Twelve
                                                    ___

          months after an employee's accident or injury an employer wishing

          to discharge a disabled employee must notify her of its intention

          not to keep her position open for reinstatement.  Thus, in Carron
                                                                     ______

          Lamoutte,  id., where  the  plaintiff-employee  had exceeded  the
          ________   ___

          twelve-month, post-injury  grace period,  the employer  was still

          obligated  to provide advance notice of dismissal and an informal
                              
          ____________________

               State  statutory law is  not the  sole source  of "property"
                                                 ____
          interests in employment.  See Board  of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
                                    ___ _________________    ____
          564, 577 (1972) (property interests are created "from an indepen-
          dent source such as state law") (emphasis added).  For procedural
                      ____ __ _____ ___
          due  process  purposes, it  is  well settled  that  an employee's
          "property  right" in  her  job may  be  established by  contract.
                                                              __  ________
          Perry v.  Sindermann, 408  U.S. 593, 601-02  (1972) (noting  that
          _____     __________
          "'property' interests  subject to procedural due  process protec-
          tion  are not  limited  by a  few  rigid, technical  forms  [but]
          [r]ather, 'property' denotes a broad range of  interests that are
          secured 'by existing rules or understandings,'" including express
          or implied contracts) (citations  omitted).  Even the case  cited
          by  PRTC so  recognized. See  Mercado Vega,  692 F.  Supp. at  42
                                   ___  ____________
          (noting that either the Personnel Act  or a collective bargaining
                       ______                    __ _ __________ __________
          agreement  may give  rise  to a  "property interest"  which would
          _________
          entitle plaintiff to  "some kind of hearing" consistent  with the
          dictates of procedural due process). 

                                          18

          pretermination hearing, at which she would be given the  opportu-

          nity to establish, inter  alia, that (i) she  had not been  under
                             _____  ____

          post-injury  treatment for more than twelve  months;8 or (ii) she

          was no longer suffering a disability which would prevent her from

          returning to her former position.   Id.; see also  Laborde-Garcia
                                              ___  ___ ____  ______________

          v. PRTC,  993 F.2d 265,  267-68 (1st  Cir. 1993).   Further,  the
             ____

          employer is  required to  review the employee's  medical records,

          and, after  the pretermination  hearing, to make  express factual

          findings on both these  factors.  Carron Lamoutte, 92  J.T.S. 27,
                      ____                  _______________

          at  9610.   Accordingly, the district  court erred  in dismissing

          Rivera's due process  claim on  the ground  that her  right to  a

          pretermination hearing lapsed automatically in April 1990.
                                        _____________

          D.   Commonwealth Constitutional Claim
          D.   Commonwealth Constitutional Claim
               _________________________________

                    Rivera also  challenges the dismissal of  her claim for

          damages under P.R.  Const. art. II,    1, 8.   Section 1 provides

          that "[t]he dignity of the human being is inviolable."  Section 8

          provides  that "[e]very person has the right to the protection of

          law against  abusive attacks on  his honor, reputation  or family

          life."9   Rivera  essentially argues that  the evidence  that her
                              
          ____________________

               8The  other case relied on by the district court in dismiss-
          ing the  due process  claim is  not to the  contrary.   In Torres
                                                                     ______
          Gonzalez v. Star Kist Caribe, Inc., 94 J.T.S. 5 (1994), the court
          ________    ______________________
          simply  held  that the  12-month  term during  which  an employee
          retains an absolute right to reinstatement is not tolled by those
          temporary discharges  from medical  treatment which  simply allow
          the employee to return to  work for a brief period of  time.  The
          Gonzalez  decision did  not  involve the  procedural due  process
          ________
          argument settled earlier in Carron Lamoutte. 
                                      _______________

               9The rights  safeguarded by these provisions  of the common-
          wealth constitution operate, ex proprio vigore, to make violators
                                       __ _______ ______
          amenable to tort-damage  awards.  See  Arroyo v. Rattan  Special-
                                            ___  ______    ________________

                                          19

          co-workers  harassed and  insulted her  was sufficient  to demon-

          strate affronts to her  "dignity" as a human being,  in violation

          of her Section 1 rights.  

                    The  problem with  Rivera's contention  is fundamental:

          at  no point  prior  to this  appeal has  she  alleged that  PRTC

          violated Section 1.  In her amended complaint she stated that the

          court had jurisdiction over "all claims arising out of violations

          to  Section 8, Article II of the Constitution of the Commonwealth
              _________

          of Puerto Rico." (Emphasis added.)  In the pretrial order, Rivera

          did  not  alter this  designation,  even  when PRTC  specifically

          characterized it  as a Section 8  claim.  Thus, it  is clear that

          the  district court simply dismissed the Section 8 claim for lack

          of  proof, making no mention of any  Section 1 claim.10  Finally,

          on appeal Rivera does not appear to contest that she failed, as a

          matter of law, to prove her Section 8 claim since her co-worker's

          insults,  based  primarily on  her  physical  handicap, were  not

          probative of damage to her reputation or honor.11

          E.   Handicap Discrimination Claim
          E.   Handicap Discrimination Claim
               _____________________________

                    Finally, Rivera challenges the dismissal of her common-

          wealth  claim  based  on  handicap discrimination  under  Law  53

          (codified at P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1,   511 (1992)).  
                              
          ____________________

          ties, 17 O.T.S. 43, 72 (1986).  
          ____

               10Nor did Rivera file  a motion for reconsideration alerting
          the court to her Section 1 claim.

               11We express no opinion on whether  Rivera should be allowed
          on remand to  amend her pleadings to permit a  Section 1 claim to
          be tried  to the  jury.   See Fed.  R. Civ.  P. 15  (amendment of
                                    ___
          pleadings).  

                                          20

                    In 1959,  the Puerto  Rico Legislature enacted  Law 100

          (codified at  P.R. Laws  Ann. tit.  29,     146, 147, 147a,  148,

          149), which prohibited  employment discrimination  based on  age,

          gender, race, color, social or national origin, social condition,

          or  religion, and permitted  persons who  were subjected  to such

          discrimination to  bring tort claims  for damages.   However, Law

          100 made no mention of employment  discrimination based on physi-

          cal or mental handicap.  In 1985, the Legislature enacted Law 44,

          which prohibited all public or private institutions from engaging

          in  handicap discrimination  in employment,  but limited  the en-

          forcement of  the prohibition to  executive branch agencies.   In

          1992,  the Legislature enacted Law 53 (codified at P.R. Laws Ann.

          tit. 1,    511 (1992)),  which for the  first time provided  that

          handicap  discrimination claimants  would have  the  same private

          remedies  as claimants under Law 100, including a right of action

          for  damages.   The  district court  held,  however, that  Law 53

          contained no provision permitting victims of handicap discrimina-

          tion to sue for damages until 1992, that PRTC's alleged discrimi-

          natory actions antedated the 1992 amendment, and that section 511

          could not be applied retroactively to Rivera's claim.  

                    In Puerto Rico, statutes generally are presumed to have

          prospective  effect  only, unless  the  statute  expressly or  by

          inescapable inference demonstrates a contrary legislative intent.

          See  P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 31,    3 (no retroactive application of
          ___

          statutes  absent express retroactivity provision); Velez Rebroyas
                                                             ______________

          v.  Secretary of Justice, 115  D.P.R. 533 (1984),  15 O.T.S. 700,
              ____________________

                                          21

          712 (1984); accord  Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,  114 S. Ct. 1483
                      ______  ________    _______________

          (1994)   (finding that 1990  Civil Rights Act  amendments did not

          overcome the presumption of  nonretroactivity).  Rivera points to

          no language in  Law 53  which would overcome  the presumption  of

          nonretroactivity, nor  have  we found  any  evidence of  such  an

          intent in the legislative history.12 

                    Rivera argues instead that  we should follow the analo-

          gous  reasoning of  courts which  have held  that the  1987 Civil

          Rights Restoration  Act is  retroactive.   See, e.g.,  Lussier v.
                                                     ___  ____   _______

          Dugger, 904 F.2d 661,  665-65 (11th Cir. 1990); Ayers  v. Allain,
          ______                                          _____     ______

          893 F.2d 732, 754-56  (5th Cir.), withdrawn and vacated  on other
                                            _________ ___ _______  __ _____

          grounds, 914  F.2d  676  (1990).   These  cases  are  inapposite,
          _______

          however, because that statute  expressly provided that the amend-
                                         _________

          ments were intended to overturn intervening United States Supreme

          Court  decisions,  so  as  to comport  with  Congress's  original

          intent.  Law 53 does not suggest in any way  that the Legislature

          intended  in 1959  that victims  of handicap  discrimination were

          protected by  Law 100,  nor that  it intended in  1985 that  such

          victims  would have a private  cause of action  for damages under

          Law 44.   Thus, Law 53 is  inapposite to the explicit "clarifica-
                                                       ________

          tion" in the 1987 Restoration Act.           Finally,      Rivera

          contends  that even if Law  53 is not  retroactive, handicap dis-

          crimination claimants still had  a vehicle for recovering compen-

          satory  damages before  August 1992.   While  Law 44,  enacted in
                              
          ____________________

               12Law 53 establishes an effective date of August 30, 1992, a
          provision  which would seem  superfluous were Law  53 intended to
          have retroactive effect to then-pending actions.

                                          22

          1985, did not make  handicap discrimination an injury redressable

          in a private  action for damages, the  statute clearly designated

          this  type of  discriminatory  conduct a  "culpable  act," and  a

          "culpable act" resulting in injury can serve as the predicate for

          a suit  for damages under P.R.  Laws Ann. tit. 31,     5141-5142.

          Even  if Rivera's  reasoning were  arguable, the matter  is moot.

          Her claim under    5141-5142  was not dismissed by the  court; it
                                            ___ _________

          formed the legal basis for the $90,000 damages award.  On remand,

          that claim too must be presented to the jury.13 

                    The district court judgment is vacated and the case  is
                    The district court judgment is vacated and the case  is
                    _______________________________________________________

          remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
          remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
          _____________________________________________________________

                              
          ____________________

               13We  note a proviso which must  be addressed on remand.  It
          is not entirely clear that the application of Law 53 to  Rivera's
          complaint would be fully retroactive in effect.  Law 53 expressly
          provided that it would  take effect on August  30, 1992.   PRTC's
          last  alleged act  of discrimination  against Rivera  occurred on
          December 14, 1992, when  it sent its final letter  of termination
          to Rivera.  Thus, if the date of Rivera's formal termination were
          fixed on that date, damages attributable to the termination might
          be actionable under Law 44.  

                                          23