Court Opinion

ID: 9671626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:40:43.998855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:11.198615
License: Public Domain

Roberds, J.,
dissenting.
This one is just too fantastic. Just why Mrs. Ready had to sit in the exact spot occupied by the gun is a little hard to understand. There was plenty of space for her to sit elsewhere on the couch. There were two chairs in the room, either of which she could have occupied. There were two tables in the room. They weighed about twelve pounds each. She could easily have moved either to any place in the room. This appears to be a case of liability by choice of seats. Sit where the gun was lying —liability; sit in some other place — no liability. Or liability imposed by choice of tables: use the coffee table— no liability; use the table closer to the couch — liability.
Mrs. Ready undertook to move the gun as housekeeper — not as bookkeeper. It was not necessary to remove the gun to do the book work. She could have utilized several other seating places. Of course, as a housekeeper she would have removed the gun from the couch the moment she saw it there. Indeed, the fact of its being upon the couch is, at least, a strange incident. Ready had testified that a short time before that he had oiled and greased it. There is no testimony showing it was not yet oily and greasy. The gun was usually kept in a closet in a room adjoining the living room.' Mrs. Ready was not merely removing the gun from the sofa and laying it aside — but she said her purpose was to place it in the closet where it usually stayed. She was acting as a housekeeper — not a bookkeeper — in doing that.
Pages could be consumed citing and quoting from cases under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Perhaps there is no case closer in its facts to those of the *89case at bar than Glasser v. Youth Shop, Inc. et al. (Fla. 1951), 54 So. 686. The Florida Statute, as does ours, requires the injury to arise in the course of and out of the employment. There claimant was vice president and manager of the Youth Shop. One of his duties was to record the sales and keep the records of the "Shop. For that purpose he took the books home at night and did the book work there, generally in the morning before departing for the Shop. On the morning in question he arose at seven o’clock and worked for an hour on the store records “in an office adjoining his bedroom.” He then placed the records in a folder and proceeded to carry them down the stairway to eat his breakfast and then take them to the Shop. In the act of descending the stairway, he fell and injured himself. The Florida Court, in denying the claim, said:
“The purpose of the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act, as expressed in Protectu Awning Shutter Co., et al. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 16 So. 2d 342, 343, is ‘to shoulder on industry the expense incident to the hazards of industry; to lift from the public the burden to support those incapacitated by industry and to ultimately pass on to the consumers of the products of industry such expense.’ Since industry must carry the burden, there must then be some causal connection between the employment and the injury, or it must have had its origin in some risk incident to or connected with the employment, or have followed from it as a natural consequence. General Properties Company v. Greening, 154 Fla. 814, 18 So. 2d 908; Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Moore, 143 Fla. 103, 196 So. 495; Sweat v. Allen, 145 Fla. 733, 200 So. 348. While there is a presumption that the claim comes within the provisions of the Act, the claimant is not relieved of the burden of proving that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Fort Pierce Growers Ass’n v. Storey, 155 Fla. 769, 21 So. 2d 451.
*90“When tested by the above rules, appellant’s injury cannot be said to have arisen ‘out of and in the course of his employment. ’ The appellant was not on the stairs because of his employment; he would have been there in any event, regardless of whether he had broug’ht his work home from the store. * * * ”
I can only emphasize that the object of the Act, as above stated, is to protect from the hazards of industry. This accident did not happen as a result of any hazard or condition existing at the service station or the cafe, nor was the gun connected with, or used in or about any phase of the operation of the business.
McGehee, C. J., and Kyle and Lotterhos, JJ., join in this dissent.
ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR
July 3,1953 35 Adv. S. 12 65 So. 2d 272
Hall, J.
This cause was affirmed on June 8, 1953, by a decision of four Judges with four Judges dissenting. The writer hereof did not participate in the original consideration and decision for the reason that he was temporarily absent because of illness.
The Suggestion of Error raises two questions. One is that the decision on the merits is erroneous. The other is that this Court is powerless to affirm the judgment of the lower court by a vote of four Judges and therefore an attack is made on the last paragraph of the opinion heretofore rendered herein.
The case has been thoroughly reconsidered on the merits by all nine members of the Court and five of us are of the opinion that the original decision on the merits is correct and that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. This makes it unnecessary for us to now decide whether a case may be affirmed by four Judges *91and the last paragraph of the original opinion herein is accordingly withdrawn and a decision of that question is expressly pretermitted. On the merits of the case the judgment of the lower court is affirmed and the Suggestion of Error overruled.
Suggestion of error overruled.
Lee, Holmes, Arrington and Ethridge, JJ., concur as to decision on the merits.
McGehee, C. J. and Roberds, Kyle and Lotterhos, JJ., dissent as to decision on the merits.
All Judges concur as to withdrawal of the last paragraph of the former opinion.