Court Opinion

ID: 9427975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:22:28.811471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:10.932894
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Rehnqtjist,
dissenting.
The Court today concludes that the Government through the use of an informant “deliberately elicited” information from respondent after formal criminal proceedings had begun, and thus the statements made by respondent to the informant are inadmissible because counsel was not present. The exclusion of respondent’s statements has no relationship whatsoever to the reliability of the evidence, and it rests on a prophylactic application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel that in my view entirely ignores the doctrinal foundation of that right. The Court’s ruling is based on Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), which held that a postindictment confrontation between the accused and his accomplice, who had turned State’s evidence and was acting under the direction of the Government, was a “critical” stage of the criminal proceedings at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached. While the decision today sets forth the factors that are “important” in determining whether there *290has been a Massiah violation, ante, at 270, I think that Mas-siah constitutes such a substantial departure from the traditional concerns that underlie the Sixth Amendment guarantee that its language, if not its actual holding, should be re-examined.
I
The doctrinal underpinnings of Massiah have been largely-left unexplained, and the result in this case, as in Massiah, is difficult to reconcile with the traditional notions of the role of an attorney. Here, as in Massiah, the accused was not prevented from consulting with his counsel as often as he wished. No meetings between the accused and his counsel were disturbed or spied upon. And preparation for trial was not obstructed. See 377 U. S., at 209 (White, J., dissenting). In short, as Mr. Justice White aptly observed in Massiah:
“It is only a sterile syllogism — an unsound one, besides— to say that because [the accused] had a right to counsel’s aid before and during the trial, his out-of-court conversations and admissions must be excluded if obtained without counsel’s consent or presence. The right to counsel has never meant as much before, Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504; Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, and its extension in this case requires some further explanation, so far unarticulated by the Court.” Ibid.

A

Our decisions recognize that after formal proceedings have commenced an accused has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at “critical stages” of the criminal proceedings. See, e. g., ante, at 269. This principle derives from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), which held that a trial court’s failure to appoint counsel until the trial began violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 68-71. Powell referred to the “critical period” as being “from the time of [the defendants’] arraignment until the beginning of *291their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important.” Id., at 57. During that period, the defendants in Powell “did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.” Ibid. They thus were deprived of the opportunity to consult with an attorney, and to have him investigate their case and prepare a defense for trial. After observing that the duty to assign counsel “is not discharged by an assignment at such time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case,” id., at 71, this Court held that the defendants had been unconstitutionally denied effective assistance of counsel.1
Powell was based on the rationale that an unaided layman, who has little or no familiarity with the law, requires assistance in the preparation and presentation of his case and in coping with procedural complexities in order to assure a fair trial. The Court in Powell stated:
“Historically and in practice, in our country at least, [a hearing] has always included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the right. The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be *292heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.” Id., at 68-69.2
More recently this Court has again observed that the concerns underlying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are to provide aid to the layman in arguing the law and in coping with intricate legal procedure, United States v. Ash, 413 U. S. 300, 307-308 (1973), and to minimize the imbalance in the adversary system that otherwise resulted with the creation of the *293professional prosecuting official. Id., at 308-309.3 Thus, in examining whether a stage of the proceedings is a “critical” one at which the accused is entitled to legal representation, it is important to recognize that the theoretical foundation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is based on the traditional role of an attorney as a legal expert and strategist.4
“Deliberate elicitation” after formal proceedings have begun is thus not by itself determinative. Ash held that an accused has no right to be present at a photo display because there is no possibility that he “might be misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary.” Id., at 317. See also Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 267 (1967) (taking of handwriting exemplars is not a “critical” stage of the proceedings because “there is a minimal risk that the absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a fair trial”). If the event is not one that requires knowledge of legal procedure, involves a communication between the accused and his attorney concerning investigation of the case or the preparation of a defense, or otherwise interferes with the attorney-client relationship, there is in my view simply no constitutional prohibition against the use of incriminating *294information voluntarily obtained from an accused despite the fact that his counsel may not be present. In such circumstances, the accused at the least has been informed of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and often will have received advice from his counsel not to disclose any information relating to his case, see, e. g.} Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977).
Once the accused has been made aware of his rights, it is his responsibility to decide whether or not to exercise them. If he voluntarily relinquishes his rights by talking to authorities, or if he decides to disclose incriminating information to someone whom he mistakenly believes will not report it to the authorities, cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293 (1966), he is normally accountable for his actions and must bear any adverse consequences that result. Such information has not in any sense been obtained because the accused's will has been overborne, nor does it result from any “unfair advantage” that the State has over the accused: the accused is free to keep quiet and to consult with his attorney if he so chooses. In this sense, the decision today and the result in Massiah are fundamentally inconsistent with traditional notions of the role of the attorney that underlie the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
To the extent that Massiah relies on Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), in concluding that the confrontation in that case was a “critical” stage of the proceedings, 377 U. S., at 205, Massiah reads the language of Powell out of context. In Powell, the period between arraignment and trial was critical because the defendants had no opportunity whatsoever to consult with an attorney during that time, and thus they were altogether deprived of legal assistance in the investigation of their case and the preparation of a defense. The Court today similarly takes an overly broad view of the stages after the commencement of formal criminal proceedings that should be viewed as “critical” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. And it is not amiss to point out that Powell was decided solely *295on the basis of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment long before the Court selected the Sixth Amendment as one that the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporated” and made applicable against the States as well as the United States. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963).
B
Massiah also relied heavily on a concurring opinion of its author in Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959), which expressed the notion that the adversary system commences with indictment, and should be followed by arraignment and trial. Id., at 327 (Stewart, J,, concurring). Spano, however, was a coerced confession case in which the accused was interrogated for eight hours after he had been indicted until he confessed. While it is true that both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments reflect the Framers’ intent to establish essentially an accusatory rather than an inquisitorial system of justice, neither suggests by its terms a rigid dichotomy between the types of police activities that are permissible before commencement of formal criminal proceedings and those that are subsequently permissible. More specifically, there is nothing in the Sixth Amendment to suggest, nor does it follow from the general accusatory nature of our criminal scheme, that once the adversary process formally begins the government may not make any effort to obtain incriminating evidence from the accused when counsel is not present. The role of counsel in an adversary system is to offer advice and assistance in the preparation of a defense and to serve as a spokesman for the accused in technical legal proceedings. And the Sixth Amendment, of course, protects the confidentiality of communications between the accused and his attorney. But there is no constitutional or historical support for concluding that an accused has a right to have his attorney serve as a sort of guru who must be present whenever an accused has an inclination to reveal incriminating information to anyone who acts to elicit such information at the *296behest of the prosecution. To the extent the accused is protected from revealing evidence that may be incriminatory, the focus must be on the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. See, e. g., Spano v. New York, supra; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944).5
C
The objectives that underlie the exclusionary rule also suggest that the results reached in Massiah and the decision today are incorrect. Although the exclusion of reliable, probative evidence imposes tremendous costs on the judicial process and on society, see, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), this Court has nonetheless imposed a rule for the exclusion of such evidence in some contexts in order to deter unlawful police activity. See, e. g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). In cases in which incriminating statements made by the accused are entirely voluntary, however, and the government has merely encouraged a third party to talk to the accused and report any incriminating information that the accused might reveal, there is in my view no valid justification for the exclusion of such evidence from trial.6
*297Ordinary citizens are expected to report any criminal activity they might observe, and they are often required under pain of compulsory process to reveal information that may incriminate others, even their friends and relatives. It generally does not matter that the information was obtained as a result of trust or confidence that develops from friendship or family ties. The incriminating information may still be obtained through use of the subpoena power, and in many instances of course it will be voluntarily revealed by the citizen interested in the enforcement of the laws.
In cases such as this one and Massiah, the effect of the governmental action is to encourage an informant to reveal information to the authorities that the ordinary citizen most likely would reveal voluntarily. While it is true that the informants here and in Massiah were encouraged to “elicit” the information from the accused, I doubt that most people would find this type of elicitation reprehensible. It involves merely engaging the accused in conversation about his criminal activity and thereby encouraging him voluntarily to make incriminating remarks. There is absolutely no element of coercion, nor is there any interference whatsoever with the attorney-client relationship. Anything the accused might reveal to the informant should, as with revelations he might make to the ordinary citizen, be available for use at trial. This Court has never held that an accused is constitutionally protected from his inability to keep quiet, whether or not he has been encouraged by third-party citizens to voluntarily make incriminating remarks. I do not think the result should be different merely because the government has encouraged a third-party informant to report remarks obtained in this fashion. When an accused voluntarily chooses to make an incriminatory re*298mark in these circumstances, he knowingly assumes the risk that his confidant may be untrustworthy.7
II
In holding that the Government has “deliberately elicited” information from the accused here, the Court considers the following factors to be relevant:
“First, Nichols was acting under instructions as a paid informant for the Government; second, Nichols was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of Henry; and third, Henry was in custody and under indictment at the time he was engaged in conversation by Nichols.” Ante, at 270.
I disagree with the Court’s evaluation of these factors, and would conclude that no deliberate elicitation has taken place.
A
The Court acknowledges that the use of undercover police-work is an important and constitutionally permissible method of law enforcement. Ante, at 272. As the Court observes, Hoff a v. United States, 385 U. S., at 302, for example, recognizes that the Constitution affords no protection to “a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it,” even if that person is an undisclosed informer. And in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545, 557 (1977), we acknowledged the “necessity of undercover work” and “the value it often is to effective law enforcement.” See also, e. g., United States v. Russell, 411 U. S. 423, 432 (1973); United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 752 (1971).
*299The Court nonetheless holds that once formal criminal proceedings have commenced, such undercover activity in some circumstances may not be constitutionally permissible even though it leads to incriminating statements by an accused that are entirely voluntary and inherently reliable. The reason for this conclusion is not readily apparent from the Court’s opinion.
The fact that police carry on undercover activities should not automatically be transmuted because formal criminal proceedings have begun. It is true that once such proceedings have commenced, there is an “adversary” relationship between the government and the accused. But an adversary relationship may very well exist prior to the commencement of formal proceedings. And, as this Court has previously recognized, many events, while perhaps “adversarial,” are not of such a nature that an attorney can provide any special knowledge or assistance to the accused as a result of his legal expertise. See, e. g., United States v. Ash, 413 U. S. 300 (1973) (no right to an attorney at pretrial photographic identifications at which the accused is not present); Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S., at 267 (no right to an attorney at taking of handwriting exemplars). When an attorney has no such special knowledge or skill, the Sixth Amendment does not give the accused a right to have an attorney present.
In addition, the mere bringing of formal proceedings does not necessarily mean that an undercover investigation or the need for it has terminated. A person may be arrested on the basis of probable cause arising in the immediate aftermath of an offense and during early stages of investigation, but before the authorities have had an opportunity to investigate fully his connection with the crime. And for the criminal, there is no rigid dichotomy between the time before commencement of formal criminal proceedings and the time after such proceedings have begun. Once out on bail the accused remains free to continue his criminal activity, and very well may decide to do so. See, e. g., Rogers v. United States, 326 *300F. 2d 485 (CA10 1963), cited in Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S., at 212 (White, J., dissenting). Indeed, in Massiah itself there was evidence that after indictment one of the defendants attempted to persuade a Government agent to go into the narcotics business with him. Id., at 212-213 (White, J., dissenting). As the Court stated in Massiah: “We do not question that in this case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the suspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted.” Id., at 207. I would hold that the Government’s activity here is merely a continuation of its lawful authority to use covert operations in investigating a criminal case after formal proceedings have commenced.8
B
The Court secondly states that here the informant ostensibly was no more than a fellow inmate, and thus the conversation “stimulated” by him may lead the accused to communicate information that he would not intentionally reveal to persons known to be government agents, who are “arm’s-length” adversaries. While the Court deems relevant the question whether the informant took active steps as a result of a prearranged deal with the Government to elicit incriminating information from the accused, ante, at 273,9 I do not think this *301type of encounter is one that is properly viewed as a critical stage at which counsel is necessary to provide guidance or protection to the accused to enable him to cope with unfamiliar legal proceedings, or to counterbalance the expertise of a professional prosecutor. Rather, as previously discussed, when the accused voluntarily reveals incriminating information to a third party in this context, I do not think there is any justification for excluding his admissions from trial, whether or not the third party was acting at the behest of the prosecution.
C
Finally, the Court considers relevant the fact that because the accused is confined and in custody, “subtle influences” are present “that will make him particularly susceptible to the ploys of undercover agents.” Ante, at 274. An appeal to an accused’s conscience or willingness to talk, however, does not in my view have a sufficiently overbearing impact on the accused’s will to warrant special constitutional protection.
In the instant case, for example, if the informant had been in the cell next to respondent and overheard him make incriminating statements to his cellmate, no Sixth Amendment violation would have occurred. See, e. g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F. 2d 1331, 1347-1348 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 1000 (1978). In such circumstances it would be clear that the Government had engaged in no affirmative conduct spe*302cifically designed to extract incriminating statements from the accused. The same would be true if the accused made a statement that a prison guard happened to overhear. See, e. g., United States v. Barfield, 461 F. 2d 661 (CA5 1972). I think there likewise is no Sixth Amendment violation when the accused’s cellmate initiates conversation with him, and the accused makes incriminatory admissions. The fact that the cellmate is an informant has no impact on the accused, because the informant appears to him to be an ordinary cellmate. Whether the accused makes any statements is therefore dependent on his own disposition to do so, despite the fact that he is confined in a cell.
Ill
Finally, I disagree with the Court’s reading of the facts, though that reading obviously narrows the scope of its holding. Here the District Court found that the Government did not employ Nichols to question respondent or to seek information from him, but merely to report what he heard. The Government had no part in having Nichols placed in the jail cell with respondent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. And the record in my view fails to support the conclusion that Nichols engaged in any affirmative conduct to elicit information from respondent. The Court of Appeals did not either explicitly or implicitly find to the contrary. Thus, this Court’s factual conclusions are not supported by the findings of the District Court. I consequently would conclude, as did the District Court, that here respondent has not been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

 The Court observed: “It is not enough to assume that counsel . . . precipitated into the case [on the morning of the trial] thought there was no defense, and exercised their best judgment in proceeding to trial without preparation. Neither they nor the court could say what a prompt and thoroughgoing investigation might disclose as to the facts. No attempt was made to investigate. No opportunity to do so was given. Defendants were immediately hurried to trial. Chief Justice Anderson, after disclaiming any intention to criticize harshly counsel who attempted to represent defendants at the trials, said: ‘. . . The record indicates that the appearance was rather pro forma than zealous and active. . . .’ Under the circumstances disclosed, we hold that defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense. To decide otherwise, would simply be to ignore actualities.” 287 U. S., at 58.

 This rationale has also been applied to the arraignment, where “[a]vailable defenses may be as irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted, as they are when an accused represented by counsel waives a right for strategic purposes,” Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52, 54 (1961), and to a preliminary hearing, where such defenses may similarly be lost when the accused enters his plea. White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 (1963). See also United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967) (lineup); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967) (combination probation-revocation and sentencing hearing); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970) (preliminary examination); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U. S. 220 (1977) (one-person showup at a hearing, which combined the functions of a preliminary arraignment and preliminary examination, that was adversary in nature and at which the accused was entitled to move for suppression of evidence and dismissal of charges).

 As this Court stated in Ash, the “historical background suggests that the core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure 'Assistance’ at trial, when the accused was confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor.” 413 U. S., at 309. The English common-law rule, which severely limited the right of a person accused of a felony to consult with counsel, was apparently rejected by the Framers’ as inherently irrational. Id., at 306-307.

 Any dealings that an accused may have with his attorney are of course confidential, and anything the accused says to his attorney is beyond the reach of the prosecution. But this Court has never held, nor does it hold today, that a confrontation or stage of the proceedings is critical because it may lead to the accused’s conviction. Rather, the test under the Sixth Amendment as recognized in Ash “call[s] for examination of the event in order to determine whether the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary.” Id., at 313.

 Whatever may be the appropriate role of counsel in protecting the accused’s privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, see, e. g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 719 (1979), when, as in this case, the accused merely engages in conversation with someone whom he does not know to be a governmental agent, the hazards of coercion and governmental overreaching are entirely absent.

 As stated by Mr. Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 421-422 (1977):
“[U]nlawfully obtained evidence is not automatically excluded from the factfinding process in all circumstances. In a variety of contexts we inquire whether application of the rule will promote its objectives sufficiently to justify the enormous cost it imposes on society. ‘As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.’ United *297States v. Calandra, [414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974)]; accord, Stone v. Powell, supra, at 486-491; United States v. Janis, [428 U. S. 433 (1976)]; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 606-608-609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part); United States v. Peltier, [422 U. S. 531, 538-539 (1975)].” (Footnote omitted.)

 Cf. United States v. White, 401 U. S. 745, 752 (1971), where this Court stated:
“Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.”

 I also disagree with the Court that the fact that Nichols was a paid informant and on a contingency fee is relevant in making this determination. See ante, at 270.

 It bears emphasis that even under the Court’s holding today affirmative steps to induce the accused to reveal incriminating information are required before there can be a “deliberate” elicitation in violation of the Sixth Amendment. As noted by Mr. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion:
“Massiah does not prohibit the introduction of spontaneous statements that are not elicited by governmental action. Thus, the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a passive listening device collects, but does not induce, incriminating comments. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F. 2d 1331, 1347-1348 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 1000 (1978). Similarly, the *301mere presence of a jailhouse informant who had been instructed to overhear conversations and to engage a criminal defendant in some conversations would not necessarily be unconstitutional. In such a case, the question would be whether the informant's actions constituted deliberate and 'surreptitious interrogatio[n]’ of the defendant. If they did not, there would be no interference with the relationship between client and counsel.” Ante, at 276.
Deliberate elicitation does not and cannot depend on the subjective intention of the government or its informant to obtain incriminatory evidence from the accused within the limits of the law. Such an intention of course is the essence of conscientious policework.