Court Opinion

ID: 9516577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:45:43.912062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:38.129015
License: Public Domain

DAY, J.
This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals which affirmed a judgment of the Circuit Court for Marathon County, Leo D. Crooks, Judge, terminating the parental rights of the father, B.B., to Baby Girl K. under the provisions of sec. 48.415 (6) (a) 2 and 6(b),1 Stats. 1981-82.
There are four issues presented on review. The first issue is: Does sec. 48.415(6) (a)2 permit termination of the parental rights of a father of a child born out of wedlock where the father was incarcerated in the state prison system from the fifth month of the mother’s pregnancy ?
*432The second issue is: Was the termination of B.B.’s parental rights under the provisions of sec. 48.415(6) (a)2, Stats., properly ordered here ?
The third issue is: Must a specific finding of parental unfitness be made in order to involuntarily terminate parental rights under sec. 48.415(6) (a)2, Stats.?
The final issue is: Does sec. 48.415(6), Stats., violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
We conclude that the mere fact that the father of the child born out of wedlock has been incarcerated in the prison system since the fifth month of the mother’s pregnancy does not preclude possible termination of his parental rights under sec. 48.415(6) (a)2, Stats. We also conclude that due process does not require a finding of parental unfitness where the father has failed to establish a substantial parental relationship under sec. 48.415 (6) (a) 2. We determine that the trial court properly terminated B.B.’s parental rights under sec. 48.415(6) (a)2.
Finally, we conclude that sec. 48.415 (6) (b)2, Stats., does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
L.K., Baby Girl K.’s mother, and B.B. began dating in July, 1979. At that time and up through to the birth of Baby Girl K. on March 17,1981, L.K. was a minor.
In June, 1980, L.K. became pregnant with Baby Girl K. Approximately five months later, in November, 1980, B.B. was convicted of burglary and incarcerated at the Kettle Morraine Correctional Institute. A prior conviction occurred in 1977 when he was convicted of burglary and sent to the Wisconsin State Reformatory.
From June until November, 1980, B.B. continued seeing L.K. According to the testimony of L.K., B.B. did *433not work but apparently supported himself quite well by dealing in drugs and “robbing places.”2 During that period of her pregnancy, L.K. stated that B.B. treated her “fairly good” but she recalled an incident where “he picked up my bike and threw it into the road from the porch, and then . . . grabbed me around the neck and tried to strangle me.” L.K. also testified that B.B. would use the money from his drug dealing and robberies to “go out to bars and . . . buy drinks for everyone” and to buy marijuana. She noted that “he smoked a fair amount of his money away.”
Prior to his incarceration, B.B. did not contribute to defraying the cost of any of L.K.’s pregnancy related expenses although he did pay some of her dental expenses.3 After his incarceration, B.B. also made no contribution to her expenses. However, L.K. testified that she told him not to worry about the expenses while he was in prison. She also testified that B.B. suggested that she and the child go live with his mother after the baby was born.
While in prison, prior to the birth of Baby Girl K. B.B. and L.K. corresponded. In his letters, B.B. twice requested that L.K. come visit him and try to smuggle some marijuana to him. B.B.’s letters also expressed the concern if L.K. gave up the baby for adoption, that might end their relationship.4
*434Before Baby Girl K.’s birth, B.B. apparently initially consented to having his parental rights terminated. However, as L.K. testified on cross-examination, he changed his mind “right around the time I stopped writing him.” It was L.K.’s belief that B.B. wanted the child in order to perpetuate a relationship with her. The record and B.B.’s correspondence with L.K. lend credence to her statement.
B.B. points out that he offered to have L.K. and the child live with his mother and stepfather. L.K. refused that offer. A social worker’s report which was ordered by the trial court following B.B.’s request for an evaluation of his parents’ home showed that B.B. had been removed from that household and placed in a foster home and that later a half-sister had likewise been taken out of the household and placed in a foster home.5
On March 17, 1981, Baby Girl K. was born. L.K. signed a Voluntary Placement Agreement with the Marathon County Department of Social Services (Department) on March 18, 1981. The purpose of the agreement was to allow Baby Girl K. to be placed in a foster home upon her discharge from the hospital. The placement occurred on March 20, 1981. Baby Girl K. has remained in the same foster home since that date. The foster parents have expressed an interest in adopting her should the parents’ rights be terminated.
*435L.K. initially filed a petition for voluntary termination of parental rights but withdrew it after learning that B.B. would not consent to having his parental rights terminated. B.B. had filed a Declaration of Parental Interest with the Department on April 13, 1981. In June, 1981, L.K. filed a petition requesting that Baby Girl K. be found in need of protection or services and that her custody be transferred to the Department for the purpose of continued foster care placement (“Chips” petition).
On August 3, 1981, B.B. filed a petition for a determination of paternity and custody, and a motion to consolidate these matters with the “Chips” proceeding. Subsequently, L.K. filed a petition for the termination of B.B.’s parental rights under sec. 48.415(6), Stats. All of these actions were consolidated.
On December 23, 1981, the trial court adjudged B.B. the father of Baby Girl K. The court then held a hearing on L.K’s petition to terminate the parental rights of B.B. The testimony set out above was given at this hearing. In addition, at the hearing, Baby Girl K.’s guardian ad litem recommended that B.B.’s parental rights be terminated.
Following the hearing, in a decision from the bench, the trial judge ordered B.B.’s parental rights terminated. The court determined that B.B. had “failed to assume parental responsibility as set forth and defined in sec. 48.415(6) (a)2 and subsection (6) (b),” Stats. In so deciding, the court stated:
“This Court does find that preliminary to his incarceration Mr. [B.B.] was able to provide care and support and failed to do so. This record fails to show that Mr. [B.B.], in any way, attempted to carry on a meaningful relationship which this Court could consider as a substantial parental relationship, even by mail, or by phone, or in any other manner, doing those things that are essential to a substantial parental relationship: expressing concern with small gifts, a card, request that the baby be *436brought down for a visit, any number of little things that spell the difference between the results of a sexual encounter or a parent-child relationship.
“This Court does believe that in spite of his incarceration Mr. [B.B.] had that opportunity to establish a substantial parental relationship. The legislature has not given us guidelines where they will decide or where they have decided, that ‘X’ number of weeks or months or years constitutes the failure to establish that parental relationship and it is true that Mr. [B.B.] did file the Declaration of Parental Interest as set forth in Exhibit 4. There is no doubt in my mind that he is interested. But, he has failed to carry through on those areas that are essential to establish a substantial parental relationship.”
The trial court also made the following written findings of fact and conclusions of law which are pertinent:

“FINDINGS OF FACT

“7. That during the period that petitioner was pregnant with Baby Girl [K.], the respondent, [B.B.], on two occasions, wrote letters to petitioner asking her to smuggle marijuana into the Kettle Moraine Correctional Facility for his personal use.
“8. That on one occasion during the period that petitioner was pregnant with Baby Girl [K.] the respondent, [B.B.], physically assaulted petitioner.
“9. That the respondent, [B.B.], neglected to provide care or support to petitioner during her pregnancy even though respondent, [B.B.], had the opportunity and ability to do so.
“10. That respondent, [B.B.], failed to present evidence of any attempts on his part to establish a parental relationship with Baby Girl [K.] such as attempts to contact said child, write to persons caring for said child or to send the child cards or gifts.
11. That respondent, [B.B.], failed to make any attempt to contribute towards the medical expenses of petitioner occasioned by her pregnancy and the subsequent delivery of Baby Girl [K].
*437“12. That there is a high degree of likelihood that Baby Girl [K] will be adopted in the event the parental rights of [B.B.] are terminated.
“13. That Baby Girl [K.] is in good health and at the time of placement of foster care, was only three (3) days old.
“14. That the child has had no relationship with either parent or other family members so that it would not be harmful to said child to sever such relationships.
“15. That in the event the parental rights of [B.B.] are terminated, that the child will be able to enter into a more stable and permanent family relationship.
“CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . . .
“16. That respondent, [B.B.], has failed to assume parental responsibility for Baby Girl [K.] within the meaning of Sec. 48.415(6), Wis. Stats.
“17. That it is in the best interest of Baby Girl [K.] that the parental rights of her father, [B.B.], be terminated.”
B.B. appealed from the judgment. The court of appeals affirmed. That court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that B.B. had an opportunity to develop a substantial relationship with Baby Girl K. and had failed to do so. The court of appeals determined that the trial court’s finding that the termination of B.B.’s parental rights would be in the best interest of Baby Girl K. was not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. The court also concluded that a specific finding of parental unfitness was unnecessary to terminate B.B.’s parental rights. However, the court went on to note that even though a finding of unfitness was not required, such a finding “is clearly sustained by the record.” Finally, the court held that sec. 48.415(6) (a)2 did not unconstitutionally deny B.B. the equal protection of the law.
*438The first issue on review is: Does sec. 48.415(6) (a)2, Stats., permit the termination of the parental rights of a father of a child born out of wedlock where the father was incarcerated in the Wisconsin prison system from the fifth month of the mother’s pregnancy?
Section 48.415(6) (a)2, Stats., allows the parental rights of a father whose paternity has been adjudicated to be terminated under certain conditions. The conditions exist where a father has not established a substantial parental relationship prior to the adjudication of paternity even though he had reason to believe he was the father of the child and had an opportunity to establish such a relationship. The question here is did B.B. have an opportunity to establish a relationship with Baby Girl K.
In evaluating whether a substantial parental relationship exists, the legislature in sec. 48.415(6) (a)2, Stats., authorized trial courts to consider the father’s behavior during the pregnancy of the mother. Specifically, sec. 48.415(6) (a)2 allows a court to consider whether the father “has ever expressed concern for or interest in the support, care or well-being of the child or mother during her pregnancy and whether the person has neglected or refused to provide care and support even though the person had the opportunity to do so.” It is clear therefore that the legislature intended that a father’s pre-delivery behavior be a consideration in determining whether the father had established a substantial parental relationship.
May a father’s action prior to the birth of his child form a sufficient basis to conclude that he had an “opportunity” to establish a substantial parental relationship with the child ? We hold that it may.
In sec. 48.415(6) (b) the legislature defined “substantial parental relationship” as “the acceptance and *439exercise of significant responsibility for the daily supervision, education, 'protection and care of the child.” (Emphasis added.) Medical authorities have long recognized that prenatal care is important to the eventual health and well-being of an infant.6 Because what happens to a fetus in útero can have a significant impact upon the quality of life a child will have after birth, we conclude that a parent’s action prior to a child’s birth can form a sufficient basis for determining whether that parent has established a substantial parental relationship with the child.
The parental rights of fathers of children born out of wedlock have been given constitutional protection. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972). If the statute foreclosed the possibility of a father showing he had developed a substantial parental relationship with his child, due process would be violated. Here however, that possibility is not foreclosed. The father’s parental rights must be continued absent a showing that he has failed to establish a substantial parental relationship.
The opportunity to exercise responsibility for the care and protection of a child begins before the child’s birth. A statute such as this one which allows consideration of the father’s conduct before the birth of the child recognizes that fact.
We conclude that the mere fact that the father of a child born out of wedlock has been incarcerated in the prison system since the fifth month of the mother’s pregnancy does not preclude possible termination of his parental rights under sec. 48.415(6) (a)2, Stats.
Concluding that sec. 48.415(6) (a) 2 allows a trial court to terminate the parental rights of a father in a situa*440tion like the one here, we now turn to the second issue before this Court on review: Was the trial court’s decision terminating B.B.’s parental rights under the provisions of sec. 48.415(6) (a)2, Stats., proper? We conclude it was.
The trial court determined that B.B. had “failed to assume parental responsibility for Baby Girl [K.] within the meaning of sec. 48.415(b).” As the basis for this conclusion, the court in its findings of fact noted that: 1) B.B. had asked L.K. on two occasions to smuggle marijuana to him in prison, 2) had physically assaulted L.K. while she was pregnant, 3) B.B. had neglected to provide care or support to L.K. during the pregnancy even though he had the opportunity and ability to do so, 4) had failed to present any evidence of attempts on his part to contact the child, write to persons caring for her or to send cards or gifts, and 5) B.B. had failed to contribute toward L.K.’s medical expenses arising from the pregnancy and delivery of Baby Girl K.
A trial court’s finding of fact will not be set aside unless against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.7 A review of the record here convinces us that the findings here were correct. Each finding is supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record.
L.K. established a 'prima facie case for the termination of B.B.’s parental rights under the statute. Because such a case had been established, the burden shifted and it became necessary for B.B. to present evidence that he had established a substantial parental relationship with Baby Girl K. This he completely failed to do. Although he attended the trial, he presented no testimony whatso*441ever on his behalf and, with the exception of his Declaration of Parental Interest, no evidence on the termination question.
Based upon its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that B.B.’s parental rights should be terminated under sec. 48.415(6) (a)2. The trial court also concluded that the termination would be in the best interest of Baby-Girl K.
In order for parental rights to be terminated, the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that the termination is appropriate. This burden of proof is required both by sec. 48.31, Stats. 1981-82, and by the due process clause, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1402-1403 (1982).
We conclude that the petitioner here met this burden. The findings of fact as set out by the trial court provide clear and convincing evidence that B.B. had failed to establish a substantial parental relationship with Baby Girl K. and that termination of B.B.’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest.
B.B. showed a blatant disregard for both mother and child when he asked L.K. to smuggle marijuana into prison for his use. If L.K. had acquiesed to his request and been apprehended, she would have faced the possibility of a prison term.8 Further, B.B.’s physical assault of L.K. certainly shows no concern for the care or well-being of either mother or child. In addition, the testimony of the guardian ad litem supported termination.
The law is made to try and cope with the ever increasing number of illegitimate births and to alleviate the increasing burden to society that such households often present; ever growing relief rolls, and the bleak future the children face living at a near poverty level. It is for these reasons among others that when the single mother is willing to allow her child to be adopted *442whatever right such a child’s father may have must be resolved in a manner that looks out for the child’s best interest and at the same time protects the rights of the father. It is for this reason that examining his attitude and relationship to the unborn child and its mother makes common sense. Short of abortion, the pregnant mother can’t escape responsibility. But the putative father’s relationship is voluntary.
After the child is born his relationship to the child is also indicative of whether a substantial relationship has been established with the child. A court cannot ignore the circumstances of why this father was not physically available from the fifth month of pregnancy. He was convicted and sentenced for burglary. This was not a case of being absent because of illness, military service or the demands of a job. His absence was due to incarceration from the wilful act of burglary. It was his second incarceration for that crime.
B.B.’s parental rights were properly terminated under the provisions of sec. 48.415(6) (a) 2, Stats.
The third issue on review is: Must a specific finding of parental unfitness be made in order to involuntarily terminate parental rights under sec. 48.415(6) (a)2, Stats. ?
Even though sufficient findings have been made so that B.B.’s parental rights may be terminated under the statute, a question remains as to whether such a termination may be accomplished without a finding of unfitness.
In Stanley, the United States Supreme Court held that before the parental rights of an unwed father could be terminated that person was constitutionally entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent. 405 U.S. at 658. In Santosky, the Supreme Court noted that, “the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, *443custody and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents,” 455 U.S. at 753, and because of this interest held that termination could only take place where there was clear and convincing evidence it was appropriate. Id. at 769.
This court, in In the Interest of J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981), held that “the due process protections of both the state and federal constitutions prohibit the termination of natural parent’s rights, unless the parent is unfit.” In J.L.W., because no finding was made that the natural mother was an unfit parent and because such a finding could not be sustained by the record, this Court reversed the order and judgment of the trial court terminating the natural mother’s rights and returned the child to the mother.
Both Stanley and J.L.W. involved natural parents who had at some point in their children’s lives participated in raising them. However commentators have suggested that the failure of a parent to participate at all in raising of the child may eliminate the constitutional requirements for a finding of unfitness.9 We agree.
The recent United States Supreme Court case of Lehr v. Robertson, -U.S. - (Case No. 81-1756, decided June 27, 1983) supports this position.10 In Lehr, the *444Court determined that the rights enjoyed by the natural fathers of children born out of wedlock did not acquire constitutional protection under the due process clause until “the unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child.’ ” Slip op., p. 12, quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979). The Court went on to add that “the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.” Slip op., p. 12.
In Lehr, the United States Supreme Court determined that the father of a child born out of wedlock who had lived with the mother of the child up to the time of the child’s birth and who had seen the child occasionally after the birth,11 had no due process right to be notified *445of the impending adoption of the child. Essential to this holding was a determination that the father, lacking a substantial parental relationship with the child, had no constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with the child' which would be offended by his failure to be notified of the adoption proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court in Lehr, noting that there is a “clear distinction between a mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental responsibility,” quoted with approval a statement by Justice Stewart in Caban:
“Even if it be asumed that each married parent after divorce has some substantive due process right to maintain his or her parental relationship, cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863 (opinion concurring in judgment), it by no means follows that each unwed parent has any such right. Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.” 441 U.S., at 397, (emphasis in original) slip op., pp. 10-11).
The United States Supreme Court then further said in the footnote following:
“In the balance of that paragraph Justice Stewart noted that the relationship between a father and his natural child may acquire constitutional protection if the father enters into a traditional marriage with the mother or if ‘the actual relationship between father and child’ is sufficient.
*446“ ‘The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father’s parental claims must be gauged by other measures. By tradition, the primary measure has been the legitimate familial relationship he creates with the child by marriage with the mother. By definition, the question before us can arise only when no such marriage has taken place. In some circumstances the actual relationship between father and child may suffice to create in the unwed father parental interests comparable to those of the married father. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, supra. But here we are concerned with the rights the unwed father may have when his wishes and those of the mother are in conflict, and the child’s best interests are served by a resolution in favor of the mother. It seems to me that the absence of a legal tie with the mother may in such circumstances appropriately place a limit on whatever substantive constitutional claims might otherwise exist by virtue of the father’s actual relationship with the children.’ ” Lehr fn. 16, slip op., pp. 11-13 quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397. (Stewart, J. dissenting.) (Emphasis added.)
Although in J.L.W., this court suggested that due process might require a finding of unfitness before any natural parent’s parental rights are terminated, the specific holding related only to a parent who had physical custody of the child for the first four months of the child’s life and whose every action “from the time she learned of her pregnancy showed a concern for the child she was to bear.” J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d at 137. Unlike Lehr, J.L.W. was a case where the parent had already “demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood.” Lehr, slip op., p. 12. Thus, this court’s holding in J.L.W. does not require that a finding of parental unfitness be made where the father has failed to establish a parental relationship with the child.
In this case, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that B.B.’s parental rights should be terminated because he had the opportunity but failed to *447establish a substantial parental relationship with Baby Girl K. We agreed with this determination. B.B.’s failure to establish a substantial parental relationship under the statute is the equivalent of a failure to “demonstrate a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘coming forward to participate in the rearing of the child.’ ” Lehr, slip op., p. 12.
A natural father’s interest in personal contact with his child is protected under the due process clause because of this society’s belief in the protection of the familial relationship. Lehr, slip op., p. 12. The significance of this relationship “ ‘to the individuals involved and to society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in ‘promot[ing] a way of life’ through the instruction of children as well as from the fact of blood relationship.’ ” Id., quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972)) (emphasis added).
Here, although in prison, B.B. had the opportunity to establish a substantial parental relationship with Baby Girl K. Instead of offering care and support to the mother and child, he did the opposite and proceeded along a path which jeopardized not only his own future but that of the mother and child. Although B.B. did not have an opportunity for “daily association” with his child, that opportunity was lost because of his own doing. We cannot ignore this fact nor the fact that B.B. on at least one occasion attempted to strangle the mother of his child.
Where a father shows so little care, support or concern for the well-being of his child that his parental rights may be terminated under sec. 48.415(6) (a) 2, that failure to establish a substantial parental relation*448ship with the child means that the father’s interest in contact with his child does not warrant protection under the due process clause of the constitution. Due process does not require a finding of parental unfitness before a father’s parental rights may be terminated under sec. 48.415(6) (a) 2.
The final issue on review is: Does sec. 48.415(6) (a)2, Stats., violate the equal protection clause?
This issue was raised for the first time on appeal. The court of appeals considered this question and concluded that this statute did not deny B.B. the equal protection of the law.
Consideration of a constitutional issue raised for the first time on appeal is discretionary with this court and will be done if “it is in the best interests of justice to do so, if both parties have had the opportunity to brief the issue and if there are no factual issues that need resolution.” Laufenberg v. Cosmetology Examining Bd., 87 Wis. 2d 175, 187, 274 N.W.2d 618 (1979); State v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 101 Wis. 2d 142, 158, 303 N.W.2d 834 (1981). In this case, these requirements are met. Further, the court of appeals had the opportunity to examine this issue and render an opinion on the question. We therefore will exercise our discretion to consider the issue.
Where a statute discriminates on its face between males and females, it is subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, - U.S. -, slip op., p. 5 (July 1, 1982). For a statute which discriminates on the basis of gender to be upheld, there must be a showing that it “serves ‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achivement of those objectives.’ ” Hogan, slip op., pp. 5-6 quoting *449Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980). This test must be applied “free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.” Hogan, slip op., p. 6. However, where a statute draws a distinction between classes where all the members of one class possess a characteristic not possessed by all the members of the other class, the fact that the distinction is “gender-based” should not give rise to a presumption that the Equal Protection Clause has been violated. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 409-410 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The majority in Caban held that a New York statute which gave the mother of children born out of wedlock, but not the father of such children, veto power over the adoption of the children violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Caban, the children involved were four and six years old at the time of the adoption proceeding. The father had lived with the mother and children as a “natural family” for several years prior to the proceeding. 441 U.S. at 389.
Although rejecting the contention that unwed fathers necessarily have less of a relationship with their children then do unwed mothers, the Court noted that where newborn infants were concerned, the differences between unwed mothers as a class and unwed fathers might form a basis for a valid gender-based distinction regarding adoption proceedings. 441 U.S. at 389.
In his dissent in Caban, Justice Stevens recognized this exception. He noted that from conception, “on through pregnancy and infancy, the differences between the male and female have an important impact on the child’s destiny.” 441 U.S. at 404. We agree. During pregnancy, the biological makeup of the mother insures that she will provide care and support for the child forming within her. She cannot help but accept and exercise significant responsibility for the protection and *450care of the child because her own welfare is tied intimately to the child’s.
The purpose of sec. 48.415(6) (a)2 is to promote the best interest of a child while insuring that the rights of a father who has established a substantial parental relationship with the child will not be terminated. Both the state and the unwed mother may have substantial interests in terminating the parental rights of a father who had no substantial relationship with the child. The statute gives fathers incentive to provide care and support for the mother and child during pregnancy and infancy. Further, it allows for a prompt determination of the status of the child so that, if desired, the child might be adopted into a family that wants a child.
The statute as applied in this case is not based upon fixed notions of what the “proper” roles of males and females should be. The United States Supreme Court in Lehr recognized that “the existence or non-existence of a substantial relationship is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights of the parents and the best interests of the child.” Slip op., p. 18. The statute here is based upon a recognition that for women biology dictates that they provide care and support for a child during pregnancy. For men however, that care and support must be voluntarily given. Men may or may not accept and exercise significant responsibility for the care and protection of the child during pregnancy; women have it thrust upon them. For men, failure to establish a substantial parental relationship after a child is born is the equivalent of a married father abandoning or neglecting his child which can be the basis for a finding of unfitness. And, as the United States Supreme Court in Lehr noted, “if the father had not ‘come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause [would] preclude [] the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adop*451tion of that child.’ ” Slip op., p. 19. Here, while termination of parental rights rather than the availability of a veto over the child’s adoption is at issue, the equal protection question is substantially the same.
The statute as applied here does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We agree with the trial court and the court of appeals that the record here amply supports termination of B.B.’s parental rights.12
By the Court. — Decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.

 Section 48.415(6) (a)2 and 6(b), Stats., 1981-82 reads:
“Grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights. At the fact-finding hearing the court may make a finding that grounds exist for the termination of parental rights. Grounds for termination of parental rights shall be one of the following: . . .
“(6) Failure to Assume Parental Responsibility, (a) Failure to assume parental responsibility may be established by a showing that a child has been born out of wedlock, not subsequently legitimated or adopted, that paternity was not adjudicated prior to the filing of the petition for termination of parental rights and:
“(2) That although paternity to the child has been adjudicated under s. 48.423, the father did not establish a substantial parental relationship with the child prior to the adjudication of paternity although the father had reason to believe that he was the father of the child and had an opportunity to establish a substantial parental relationship with the child.
“(b) In this subsection, ‘substantial parental relationship’ means the acceptance and exercise of significant responsibility for the daily supervision, education, protection and care of the child. In evaluating whether the person has had a substantial parental relationship with the child, the court may consider such factors, including, but not limited to, whether the person has ever expressed concern for or interest in the support, care or well-being of the child or the mother during her pregnancy and whether the person has neglected or refused to provide care or support even though the person had the opportunity and ability to do so.”

 L.K.’s testimony as to these acts was admitted at trial not to prove the commission of the acts but for the purpose of showing that B.B. had funds to support L.K. during this period.

 L.K. testified on cross-examination that she asked B.B. prior to his incarceration for help in paying her expenses and in fact had her first doctor bill sent to his house. After the bill went unpaid, it was redirected to L.K.’s parents’ house for payment.

 B.B.’s January 26, 1981, letter to L.K. (Exhibit 1 in the record) shows this concern: “I feel that if you do give our baby away that you’ll be out fucking guys and you’ll forget about me ... I worry alot about guys going after your ass . . . .”

 The report of the social worker from the Marathon County Department of Social Services dated November 19, 1981, and filed with the Court November 24, 1981, shows that B.B. was born June 14, 1958. He was one of three children born to his mother in her first marriage. His parents were divorced in January of 1961. The mother married J.H. later that year and two children were born to them. The social worker’s report shows that the department provided social services periodically from the time of the breakup of the first marriage. In 1975 B.B. was placed “in substitute care” because of B.B.’s “disruptive behavior.” When B.B. became eighteen the case was closed. A daughter from the second marriage was placed in “substitute care” in 1976. That case was apparently closed when the girl became eighteen in 1980.

 4B G. Gray, Attorneys’ Textbook of Medicine, secs. 305.10, 305.11 (3 ed. 1983); 5B Lawyers’ Medical Cyclopedia, sec. 37.5a (C. Frankel ed. 1972).

 Onalaska Electrical Heating, Inc. v. Schaller, 94 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 288 N.W.2d 829 (1980); Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 87 Wis. 2d 243, 250, 274 N.W.2d 647 (1979); Bank of Sun Prairie v. Opstein, 86 Wis. 2d 669, 676, 273 N.W.2d 279 (1979); Gehr v. Sheboygan, 81 Wis. 2d 117, 122, 260 N.W.2d 30 (1977); Gerner v. Vasby, 75 Wis. 2d 660, 662-664, 250 N.W.2d 319 (1977).

 Section 161.465(1), Stats. 1981-82.

 S. Hayes and M. Morse, Adoption and Termination Proceedings in Wisconsin: Straining the Wisdom of Solomon, 66 Mq. L. Rev. 439, 452, 475 (1983); See Lehr v. Robertson, - U.S. -, (Case No. 81-1756, decided June 27, 1983), Slip op. p. 13, footnote 17.

 Justice Stevens stated that the questions the United States Supreme Court had jurisdiction to consider on review were “whether the New York Statutes are unconstitutional because they inadequately protect the natural relationship between parent and child or because they draw an impermissible distinction between the rights of the mother and the rights of the father.” Lehr, Slip op., p. 7, fn. 10.
On the latter issue, the father contended “that the gender-based classification in the statute, which denied him the right to con*444sent to [his daughter’s] adoption and accorded him fewer procedural rights than her mother, violated the Equal Protection Clause.” Id.

 According to Justice White in his dissent in Lehr, the fact that the father only occasionally saw the child after her birth was the direct result of the mother’s attempts to conceal her whereabouts from the father. As Justice White states the facts:
“According to Lehr, [the father], he and Jessica’s mother met in 1971 and began living together in 1974. The couple cohabited for approximately 2 years, until Jessica’s birth in 1976. Throughout the pregnancy and after the birth, Lorraine [the mother] acknowledged to friends and relatives that Lehr was Jessica’s father; Lorraine told Lehr that she had reported to the New York State Department of Social Services that he was the father. (Footnote omitted.) Lehr visited Lorraine and Jessica in the hospital every day during Lorraine’s confinement. According to Lehr, from the time Lorraine was discharged from the hospital until August, 1978, she concealed her whereabouts from him. During this time Lehr never ceased his efforts to locate Lorraine and Jessica and achieved sporadic success until August, 1977, after which time he was unable to locate them at all. On those occasions when he did determine Lorraine’s location, he visited with her and her children to the extent she was willing to permit it. When Lehr, with the aid of a detective agency, located Lorraine and Jessica in August, 1978, Lorraine was already married to Mr. Robertson. Lehr as*445serts that at this time he offered to provide financial assistance and to set up a trust fund for Jessica, but that Lorraine refused. Lorraine threatened Lehr with arrest unless he stayed away and refused to permit him to see Jessica. Thereafter Lehr retained counsel who wrote to Lorraine in early December, 1978, requesting that she permit Lehr to visit Jessica and threatening legal action on Lehr’s behalf. On December 21, 1978, perhaps as a.response to Lehr’s threatened legal action, appellees commenced the adoption action at issue here.” Lehr, (White, J., dissenting) slip op., pp. 2-3.

 The statement by Justice Abrahamson in footnote 1 of her dissent alleging that “the majority treats termination of parental rights like a punishment for a crime, thus increasing the legislatively prescribed penalties for commission of a crime by adding a new penalty, loss of a child” is an unwarranted conclusion and is simply incorrect.