Court Opinion

ID: 9757806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:59:50.489681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:44.614114
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
The judgment of sentence should be reversed and the case remanded for new trial. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
*126In speaking about the testimony of the defendant, I want to bring your attention to a specific point.
You will recall that Mr. Hayes testified that he had been a user of narcotics.
In weighing the testimony of any person, as I said, you may, of course, consider all of the factors, the whole case, in deciding whether you want to believe or disbelieve a person.
If you wish, you may consider that factor, if you believe it is appropriate.
However, the fact that Mr. Hayes indicated that he was a user of narcotics may not be considered as evidence of his guilt in this case.
In other words, the fact that a person is a drug user does not prove that he committed another burglary or another robbery.
As I say, it is a fact you can consider, just the whole picture, in deciding how much you want to believe a person, but the use of narcotics is not evidence of guilt in this case.
N.T. 30.
The prosecutor could not have made this statement, as part of his closing argument. Therefore, neither should the trial judge have made the statement.
-1-
The general rule is that evidence of prior criminal conduct is inadmissible to impeach a defendant who testifies in his own defense. See McCormick on Evidence § 191 (2d ed. 1972). There are two exceptions to the rule. First, evidence that the defendant has been convicted of crimen falsi, i.e., an offense that indicates a propensity for dishonesty, is admissible to impeach the defendant, if he testifies in his own defense. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973). Second, if the defendant places his character in issue by presenting evidence that a particu*127lar aspect of his character is good, evidence of prior criminal activity that serves to rebut that particular aspect of his character is admissible. Commonwealth v. Moore, 246 Pa.Super. 163, 369 A.2d 862 (1977); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5918(1) (1982). And see State v. Turcio, 178 Conn. 116, 422 A.2d 749 (1979) (Where character witness testifies to accused’s nonviolent disposition, prosecution may inquire whether witness has heard of accused’s involvement in violent incidents). Cf. United States v. Wooden, 420 F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir.1969) (Where traits in issue are honesty, peacefulness, and quietness, cross-examination as to inebriation improper); Albertson v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 68, 226 S.W.2d 523 (1950) (Where traits in issue are peacefulness and quietness, cross-examination as to illegal liquor sales improper); Kennedy v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 215, 200 S.W.2d 400 (1947) (Where traits in issue are peacefulness, quietness, law-abidingness, and truthfulness, cross-examination as to illicit sexual relations improper). See generally McCormick on Evidence § 191 at 456 n. 73 (2d ed. 1972) (“[T]he inquiry must relate to crimes or misconduct relevant to the trait vouched for”).
Here, appellant testified in his own defense. However, that didn’t make the crimen falsi exception to the general rule available, for drug offenses are not crimen falsi. Commonwealth v. Candia, 286 Pa.Super. 282, 428 A.2d 993 (1981). The question we must decide, therefore, is whether the character-in-issue exception to the general rule is available.
It is clear that the character-in-issue exception is not available. It would make no sense to say that by testifying to prior drug use, appellant offered “evidence tending to prove his own good character.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5918 (1982) (emphasis added). The decision in Commonwealth v. Craft, 455 Pa. 616, 317 A.2d 213 (1974), is instructive. There the defendant testified that he had pleaded guilty to larceny and receiving stolen goods. The trial judge then *128admitted evidence of other convictions. The dissenting Justices, ROBERTS and NIX, JJ. would have held this error, but the majority believed that in the circumstances, the defendant’s testimony amounted to a claim of good character. Here, if appellant had testified, for example, that he had engaged in the use of drugs, but as a result of entering a therapy program, had cured his addiction, then I should agree that his testimony could be regarded as amounting to a claim of good character. Under Craft, evidence of prior criminal activity might then be admissible. But appellant gave no such testimony.
Even if appellant had given such testimony, or by other similar testimony had claimed good character, the prosecutor could not have argued that he should therefore be disbelieved. For as already discussed, when a defendant puts his character in issue, evidence of prior criminal activity is limited to evidence of activity that rebuts the particular aspect of the defendant’s character that has been put in issue. See Commonwealth v. Moore and other authorities cited supra. And evidence of prior drug use does not put in issue the witness’s character for truthfulness. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Duffy, 238 Pa.Super. 161, 174, 353 A.2d 50, 57 (1975), we rejected the defendant’s argument that he should have been permitted to impeach a Commonwealth witness by showing that the witness was a drug user:
Appellant first contends that the testimony of Joseph Bozzell, John Foley, and Bridget Duffy was improperly limited with respect to Beachem’s use of drugs. However, the questions that the trial court prohibited were questions regarding Beachem’s use of drugs in general; they were not related to any event as to which Beachem testified. Such questions were properly excluded. Commonwealth v. Dreibelbis, supra [217 Pa.Super. 257, 269 A.2d 387 (1970)].
The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the prosecutor could not have made the statement, as part of his *129closing argument, that the evidence of appellant’s prior drug use impeached appellant’s credibility, and that because of that evidence, appellant could be disbelieved.
The majority’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Hudson, 489 Pa. 620, 414 A.2d 1381 (1980), and Commonwealth v. Whack, 482 Pa. 137, 393 A.2d 417 (1978), is misplaced. These cases stand for two distinct propositions, neither of which is pertinent here.
The first proposition for which Hudson and Whack stand is that the jury may consider whether a witness’s admitted, or proved, use of drugs at the time of the incident in question impaired the witness’s ability to observe the incident. Thus in Hudson the defendant argued that “[the Commonwealth’s witness] Johnston’s physical condition after consuming drugs” made his testimony “ ‘patently unreliable.’ ” 489 Pa. at 628, 414 A.2d at 1385 (quoting Commonwealth v. Whack, 482 Pa. at 140, 393 A.2d at 419). Similarly, in Whack the defendant argued that the Commonwealth’s witness Newell’s testimony was incredible and “should be rejected” because he “was an admitted marijuana user, and ... his testimony was based upon an observation in a crowded bar approximately 30 feet from where the deceased was standing____” 482 Pa. at 141 n. 2, 393 A.2d at 419 n. 2. Of course this is good law, but it has no pertinence here, for no one argues that appellant’s ability to observe had been impaired by the use of drugs.
The second proposition for which Hudson and Whack stand is that evidence of drug use is not a sufficient basis for disregarding a witness’s testimony. Thus in Hudson the defendant argued that “[t]he testimony of [the Commonwealth’s witness] Hassett” was “ ‘patently unreliable’ ” because, among other reasons, Hassett was “an admitted drug addict” and had a prior criminal record. 489 Pa. at 629, 414 A.2d at 1386 (quoting Commonwealth v. Whack, 482 Pa. at 140, 393 A.2d at 419). The Supreme Court held that these were “matters of credibility properly left to the *130jury’s consideration.” Id. Of course this too is good law, but neither is it pertinent here. Appellant does not argue that any witness’s testimony should be disregarded on the basis of evidence of prior drug use by the witness. Moreover, both Hudson and Whack are consistent with Commonwealth v. Duffy, supra: if evidence of drug use is inadmissible to rebut evidence of veracity, as Duffy holds is the law, then such evidence cannot serve as a basis for disregarding a witness’s testimony.
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I should think it self-evident that a trial judge may not do what a prosecutor may not do: the judge may not “out-prosecute” the prosecutor. Here, not only did the judge tell the jury that it could disbelieve appellant because of appellant’s prior drug use—something the prosecutor couldn’t have done—but he emphasized appellant’s prior drug use, singling it out as a matter deserving of special attention. Said the judge: “In speaking about the testimony of the defendant, I want to bring your attention to a specific point.” And then he went on to say that “in deciding whether [it] want[ed] to believe or disbelieve” appellant, the jury could consider that appellant had “testified that he had been a user of narcotics.” To be sure, the judge added that the jury did not have to consider appellant’s prior drug use in appraising his credibility (“you may consider that factor, if you believe it is appropriate”). But a judge does not escape error by telling a jury that it may follow him in error but it doesn’t have to. The judge also added that “the use of narcotics may not be considered as evidence of his [appellant’s] guilt in this case.” But no one had suggested that appellant’s prior use of narcotics was evidence of his guilt. The issue was whether it could be evidence of his truthfulness. In telling the jury that it could be, the judge misstated the law.
The judgment of sentence should be reversed, and the case remanded for new trial.