Court Opinion

ID: 9696870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:00:43.808642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:27.333446
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 44. {dissenting) . I agree with the majority opinion that Gary M.B. did not strategically waive his objection to the introduction of his prior convictions.1 I also agree that the circuit court has the discretion to determine whether to admit evidence of prior convictions for impeachment purposes under Wis. Stat. § 906.09.2 After that, the majority opinion and I part ways.
¶ 45. Three justices (Justices Wilcox, Prosser, and Roggensack) join the lead opinion, concluding that this case does not involve an erroneous exercise of discretion. The concurring justice (Justice Crooks) takes no *92position on whether there was error, but concludes that if there were error it was harmless. Three justices (Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justices Bradley and Sykes) conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion and that the error was prejudicial.
¶ 46. I disagree with the majority opinion and the concurring opinion for two reasons: First, the majority opinion eviscerates the notion that a circuit court's exercise of discretion requires a meaningful process of reasoning demonstrated on the record and drastically expands the scope of the independent appellate review doctrine beyond what has been previously recognized in this state. Second, the concurring opinion's conclusion that any error in this case was harmless ignores the relevant standard for evaluating harmless error claims and eviscerates this court's formulation of the "counting rule" for admitting prior convictions as evidence at trial.
1 — H
¶ 47. I conclude that in this case the circuit court judge did not properly exercise discretion in admitting the three prior convictions. This court has frequently explained that "[a] discretionary determination, to be sustained, must demonstrably be made and based upon the facts appearing in the record and in reliance on the appropriate and applicable law. Additionally, and most importantly, a discretionary determination must be the product of a rational mental process by which the facts of record and law relied upon are stated and are considered together for the purposes of achieving a reasoned and reasonable determination."3
*93¶ 48. The purposes of requiring a circuit court to perform this process on the record are many. The process increases the probability that a circuit court will reach the correct result, provides appellate courts with a more meaningful record to review, provides the parties with a decision that is comprehensible, and increases the transparency and accountability of the judicial system.
¶ 49. That said, I recognize that no record is perfect, however diligent circuit courts may be in their efforts to explain their decisions. Circuit courts will sometimes fail to explain their decisions fully, not because of incompetence or carelessness, but because the requirements of circuit court judges are boundless and the resources available to meet those demands are few.
¶ 50. Recognizing these facts, appellate courts can provide assistance to circuit courts. An appellate court may independently review a record and uphold a circuit court's exercise of discretion where at least the foundation of an explanation have been laid, even if the circuit court has not stated all of the facts, stated all of the law, and fully demonstrated the rational mental process to connect the two.
¶ 51. In this case, however, the foundation. is missing. The majority opinion exercises its discretion when the circuit court has failed to do so as the law requires. After this decision, I am concerned that the exercise of discretion no longer requires a "rational mental process," no longer requires that the facts and law relied upon be "stated," and no longer requires that a "reasonable determination" be made on the record by a circuit court. Instead this court acts as both the initial decision maker and reviewing court.
*94¶ 52. I turn now to examine the facts of this case and the circuit court's decision to admit the evidence in question.
¶ 53. The State sought to introduce five prior convictions of the defendant, which are as follows:
• 1973 State of Maine. Uttering or insufficient funds; suspended sentence; 1 year probation.
• 1975 State of Maine. Disorderly conduct; fine.
• 1977 State of Maine. Assault; 30 days jail suspended, probation.
• 1991 State of Iowa. Assault, domestic; fine.
• 1991 State of Iowa. Domestic abuse; 2 days jail suspended, one year probation.
¶ 54. I begin by reprinting the transcript of the motion in limine held between the circuit court and counsel regarding the admission of the defendant's five prior convictions:
COURT: There was a discussion about witnesses with prior convictions. Mr. Everix.
MR. EVERIX: Mr. Bassett's record in Main[e] and in the State of Iowa, in 1973 was uttering or insufficient funds. It says suspended, one year probation, in the District Court for Bath, Main[e]. In September of '75, disorderly conduct. Paid a fine through the District Court of Augusta, Maine. 1977, assault, 30 days in jail, suspended probation, Lewiston, Maine; and also a record out of the State of Iowa I believe in — I think it was in 1991, domestic disorderly conduct, and in the same year there was an enhancer for domestic disorderly conduct. I'm trying to find that teletype.
February 23 of '91, domestic abuse, assault— charge was assault, domestic abuse. Sentenced on *95March 4 of '91, guilty, and paid a fine at that time; and on October 24 of '91 also found guilty of domestic abuse with a penalty enhancement, two days, suspended, one year probation with assault class. So I believe that there are five convictions during an extended period of time.
MS. OLIVETO: Your Honor, we ask that the court not allow him to testify as to the convictions in the 1970's since it has been — '73,'75, and '77 — since it has been quite some time since those had occurred. I don't believe they would go towards truthfulness. I realize Wisconsin law doesn't have it but the federal law does. One is assault and the other disorderly conduct, and the bank check happened almost 20 years ago. We ask that the court not allow that to be admitted against him.
MR. EVERIX: The consistent series of '73, '75, and '77, twice in '91 make it significant.
COURT: The law generally in Wisconsin doesn't follow the federal law. There is no exclusion for convictions more than 10 years old. Some of these are' 27 years, 25 years, 23 years. But to the extent that there is I guess a presumption in the statute and the statute allows for prior convictions to be brought in because it does say something about the person's credibility, I will allow it.
¶ 55. This concluding paragraph presents the only analysis of the circuit court in deciding to admit the three contested convictions. Of the four sentences the judge articulated on the subject, the first two sentences merely reiterate that Wisconsin law differs from federal law in that there is no bar on the admission of convictions more than 10 years old. The third sentence simply states the number of years that had elapsed since the defendant had been convicted of those *96offenses. Thus, it is the concluding sentence of the circuit court judge on this issue that sets forth the sole reasoning behind the admission of the convictions. It is this sentence, therefore, that should guide the court in determining whether the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the prior convictions.
¶ 56. I agree with the majority opinion that even though all prior convictions are relevant under Wisconsin law because the convictions speak to a witness's truthfulness,4 circuit courts are nevertheless required, in determining whether to admit or exclude prior convictions, to examine a number of factors, including: the lapse of time since the conviction, the rehabilitation or pardon of the person convicted, the gravity of the crime, and the degree to which the crime involved dishonesty or false statements.5 A circuit court is also required under Wis. Stat. § 906.09(2) to determine whether the value of the evidence of a prior conviction is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.
¶ 57. The issue on appeal is whether the circuit court exercised its discretion in accordance with the accepted legal standards and in accordance with the facts of record.
¶ 58. The majority opinion quotes and cites these rules, but speaks louder with its actions than with its *97words. The majority opinion minimizes the import of a circuit court's obligation to consider the factors and engage in balancing in a number of ways.
¶ 59. First, the majority opinion tries to shift the inquiry from the actions (or inaction) of the circuit court to the actions of defense counsel and the alleged sparseness of her motion in limine.6 In support of this proposition, the majority opinion cites State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983). The Pharr court did not base its holding on defense counsel's failures. Rather, the court concluded that the record implicitly supported the circuit court court's exercise of discretion.7
¶ 60. Furthermore, in the present case defense counsel properly specified the nature of the prejudice. Of the four factors to be considered in evaluating the prejudicial effect of introducing a prior conviction, defense counsel articulated two of them: the lapse of time since the oldest three convictions and the lack of involvement of dishonesty or false statement in the *98crimes.8 Defense counsel was not remiss in her obligation to articulate the nature of the prejudice in this case.9
¶ 61. Second, the majority opinion minimizes the importance of a circuit court's responsibility to consider the relevant balancing factors. The majority opinion converts the requirement that circuit courts "should consider" these factors to the requirement that circuit courts "may consider" these factors.
¶ 62. Third, the majority opinion effectively neutralizes the need for circuit courts to exercise discretion by finding that the circuit court engaged in "implicit balancing" in this case. The majority opinion asserts that a circuit court need not invoke the "magic words" in *99order to demonstrate an exercise of discretion.10 I agree. That the circuit court failed to use words like "weighing" and "balancing" is not dispositive.
¶ 63. Nevertheless, the record must demonstrate that the circuit court gave some consideration to the relevant factors. When the record shows that the circuit court did not consider the relevant factors, this court should not construct a record.
¶ 64. In this case, we have only the circuit court's one sentence: "But to the extent that there is I guess a presumption in the statute and the statute allows for prior convictions to be brought in because it does say something about the person's credibility, I will allow it." The circuit court never acknowledged any legal standard beyond the presumption of admissibility.
¶ 65. The majority opinion bolsters the paucity of the circuit court's explanation by noting that the district attorney prompted: "The consistent series of '73, '75, and '77, twice in '91, make it significant." Even if the majority opinion is correct that an appellate court could conclude that a circuit court adopted the reasoning expressed by the prosecutor,11 the circuit court did not expressly agree with the prosecutor's arguments, and the district attorney's argument in this case provides precious little additional traction for the circuit court judge's thought processes.
¶ 66. Fourth, the majority opinion relies on the concept of "implicit balancing." I find it difficult to distinguish between implicit balancing and independent appellate review. Under the independent appellate review doctrine, when a circuit court "fails to set forth its reasoning in exercising its discretion to admit evi*100dence, the appellate court should independently review the record to determine whether it provides a basis for the [circuit] court's exercise of discretion."12 None of the cases cited by the majority opinion required an appellate court to engage in the extensive post hoc reconstruction that the majority opinion engages in to find an appropriate exercise of discretion in this case.
¶ 67. Fifth, the majority opinion's reasoning that the circuit court's issuance of the limiting instruction in this case demonstrated the exercise of discretion is unpersuasive. Although the court of appeals apparently found this argument persuasive in State v. Johnson, 121 Wis. 2d 237, 253-54, 358 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1984), I do not. A limiting instruction merely serves to exercise a check on how the jury uses a particular piece of evidence. It demonstrates a conclusion of the circuit court to admit the evidence, not the circuit court's reasoning why the evidence is admissible.
¶ 68. The majority opinion admonishes circuit courts that in the future "it would be prudent for circuit courts to explicitly set forth their reasoning in ruling on § 906.09(2) matters in order to demonstrate that they considered the relevant balancing factors applicable in the case before them."13 As a practical matter, such a warning is futile because this case demonstrates that this court will consider the relevant balancing factors itself.
¶ 69. I conclude that the circuit court erred in failing to exercise its discretion in admitting the prior convictions. The presumption that prior convictions are relevant to the issue of a witness's credibility is a correct statement of law, but the circuit court did not consider *101the relevant factors and did not weigh the probative value of the three oldest convictions against the danger of unfair prejudice. I agree with the court of appeals that because there were no evidentiary proceedings and only very brief argument, the record provides no basis for me or this court to conclude that had the circuit court applied the correct legal standard, it would have reached the same result.
II
¶ 70. I turn to whether the error in admitting evidence of the three oldest convictions was harmless. I must first state the facts. I agree with the majority opinion that this was a `he said, she said" case. There was no physical evidence and no witnesses to the crime.14 The case turns on the credibility of the accused and the defendant. The defendant's case relied heavily on impeaching the credibility of the accuser, while the State focused on challenging the credibility of the defendant, primarily through his prior convictions. The State made the defendant's prior convictions an integral part of the credibility issue.
¶ 71. Evidence of this strategy is apparent in the State's brief closing argument, which raised the issue of the defendant's credibility three separate times and discussed his prior convictions twice:
The defense is [sic] basically put into issue, the entire issue, of credibility; and the credibility of Dessa versus the credibility of the defendant who testified in this case.... First of all, you have to look in terms of everybody's credibility, including that of the defendant. You can take into consideration his interest, who has the ultimate interest to gain by a finding of not guilty. *102He does. He has the absolute ultimate greater interest. Because of that you can take into consideration the fact that he had five prior convictions. Use it only in terms of whether or not he is credible, not in terms of whether something else happened. It goes toward his credibility.
But let's look at the credibility issue again. When you take into consideration, and the Judge will give you the various categories and things that you can consider, it includes the witness Gary [B.] as it does any other witness who testified in this trial, the position to know, their ability to recollect, bias, prejudice, if any is shown, and as I say the ultimate interest in this case comes from Gary [B], He does not want 12 of you to go back there and say guilty.
But you can look at credibility as well. He said that it didn't happen. But look at his prior record and look at his interest in the outcome of this case and he has the ultimate interest.15
¶ 72. Although the court has stated the harmless error test a number of ways, the court generally applies the Chapman test,16 namely that an error is not harmless if it "contributed to the outcome of the trial."17 An error is not harmless when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of "contributed to *103the verdict obtained."18 The harmless error test does not ask whether there is evidence in the record, apart from erroneously admitted evidence, that could support a conviction. The focus of the Chapman test is on whether the error might reasonably have contributed to the conviction. In other words the question is whether the defendant's testifying to five prior convictions instead of only two prior convictions contributed to the jury's verdict.
¶ 73. The court has posited several guidelines for assessing whether an error was harmless, including but not limited to the nature of the error, the frequency of the error, the nature of the state's case, the nature of the defense, the importance of the erroneously admitted or excluded evidence to the prosecution's or defense's case, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the erroneously admitted or excluded evidence, whether the erroneously admitted evidence duplicates the untainted evidence, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case.19
*104¶ 74. Considering the nature of the error, the nature of the state's case, the nature of the defense, the importance of the erroneously admitted evidence to the prosecution and defense, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case, I conclude that the error was not harmless.
¶ 75. I part with the court of appeals and the concurring opinion on whether the error in admitting five prior convictions instead of two was, in their words, "outcome determinative."20 They take the position that once a jury is apprised of a witness's past criminal convictions, evidence of the exact number of prior convictions is rarely "outcome determinative."21 I conclude that the error contributed to the verdict.
¶ 76. The reason for allowing the jury to hear the number of convictions that a defendant has had without an explanation of what those offenses were is based on the notion that the number of convictions speaks to the credibility of the witness.22 "The assumption is that the longer the criminal record, the less credible the individual."23
¶ 77. In Wisconsin, we have codified this "counting rule." The rule provides as follows:
All prior criminal convictions, regardless of their nature, are potential fodder for the counting.rule. Misdemeanors "count" as heavily as felonies. The crimes need *105not have any relevance to a person's character for truthfulness. The rule assumes that the longer the criminal record, the less credible the individual.24
¶ 78. In Wisconsin, we have concluded as a matter of law that the number of convictions, regardless of their type, is highly relevant to a witness' character for truthfulness. I agree with the defendant that
[tjhere is a logical disconnect between the presumption that a person who has five convictions is less credible that a person who has only been convicted twice, and the court of appeals' holding that the incremental difference between two convictions and five convictions is too insignificant to have swayed the jury's assessment of [the defendant's] credibility."25
I agree with Judge Dykman's dissent that "[t]o say that it doesn't matter whether a defendant answers [regarding his convictions] 'once,' 'nine times,' or '57 times' does not comport with the way ordinary people think."26
¶ 79. The curative instruction emphasizing that the prior convictions could be used only to determine the credibility of the defendant and not to decide whether the defendant committed the crime charged only exacerbated the prejudicial effect of admitting the five convictions into evidence. The significant issue in .the case was the defendant's credibility, as the State emphasized in its closing statement. The circuit court *106emphasized that the convictions could be used to persuade them about the defendant's credibility.
¶ 80. The jury had a hard time with the case. The jurors deliberated for approximately three hours before announcing their inability to reach a unanimous verdict. The circuit court instructed them to continue deliberating. The jury then returned guilty verdicts.
¶ 81. Because the central issue in this case was the defendant's and accuser's credibility, because each conviction and the cumulative number of convictions bear on the defendant's character for truthfulness, and because the State stressed the prior convictions and the number thereof in closing argument, I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict. In asserting otherwise the court of appeals and the concurring opinion eviscerate the counting rule.
¶ 82. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 83. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.

 Majority op., ¶ 18.
The majority opinion appears to characterize the court of appeals decision in Vanlue as persuasive. See majority op., ¶ 13-14. The court of appeals in the present case viewed its decision in Vanlue as precedential and binding because this court on review of Vanlue did not address the court of appeals1 application of the strategic waiver doctrine. Vanlue v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 455, 275 N.W.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 96 Wis. 2d 81, 291 N.W.2d 467 (1980).
While the court of appeals apparently treats all or parts of its decisions as precedential even after this court has reviewed them, the question of the precedential value of a court of appeals decision that has been reviewed by this court has not been decided by this court. My own view at this time is that when this court reviews a decision of the court of appeals, the court of appeals decision no longer has precedential value.

 Majority op., ¶ 19.

 Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981).

 Majority op., ¶ 23.

 These factors, initially set forth in the Judicial Council's Note accompanying Chapter 906, have long been relied on by courts in this state. See, e.g., State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991).

 Majority op., ¶ 24.

 State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983), is significantly different from the case at bar. In Pharr, the circuit court individually evaluated two pieces of other crimes evidence and admitted one while excluding the other. No such process occurred in this case. The accused sought to exclude three prior convictions from being introduced at trial. The circuit court summarily responded to all three convictions without individually evaluating them. The implicit exercise of discretion present in Pharr did not occur in this case.

 The majority opinion correctly points out that the 1973 conviction for uttering is a crime that involves dishonesty. I agree that this very old conviction may have been admitted had the circuit court performed the proper analysis. However, since the circuit court did not distinguish between the three crimes in its brief analysis, this court is not in the position, as I discuss below, to make post hoc rationalizations as to why the circuit court did what it did.

 The majority opinion asserts that the defendant failed to respond to the prosecution's argument that the three convictions in the 1970s plus the two convictions in 1991 constituted a pattern and cites Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278, 290, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967) for the proposition that this court is unlikely to find prejudicial error when "no action was requested by counsel." Whitty is inapposite, however. In that case, the defendant complained that the circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard certain foundation testimony sua sponte. Defendant's counsel failed to make any motion to so instruct the jury in that case. In the present case, defense counsel's motion did provide a sufficient trigger for the circuit court to engage in the balancing and consider the factors in making its determination.

 Majority op., ¶ 26.

 Id., ¶ 27.

 Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d at 343.

 Majority op., ¶ 31.

 Id., ¶ 7.

 R. 18 at 73, 76, 87 (Transcript of Jury Trial, Sept. 20, 2000) (emphasis added).

 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).

 State v. Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 41, ¶ 43, 261 Wis. 2d 202, 661 N.W.2d 76.

 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; State v. Carlson, 2003 WI 40, ¶ 85, 261 Wis. 2d 97, 661 N.W.2d 51 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
The State concludes that "the test for harmless error articulated in [State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶ 46, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189] is not substantively different from the court's prior articulation of the test, i.e., 'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. A reasonable possibility is a possibility sufficient to undermine our confidence in the conviction. State v. Williams, 2002 WI 58, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶ 50, 644 N.W.2d 919." Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 20.

 State v. Norman, 2003 WI 72, ¶ 48, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 664 N.W.2d 97; State v. Billings, 110 Wis. 2d 661, 668-70, 329 N.W.2d 192 (1983).

 See State v. Gary M.B., 2003 WI App 72, ¶ 34,261 Wis. 2d 811, 661 N.W.2d 435; concurring op., ¶ 40.

 iá.

 State v. Midell, 39 Wis. 2d 733, 738-39, 159 N.W.2d 614 (1968).

 State v. Smith, 203 Wis. 2d 288, 297-98, 553 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1996) (quoting 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence § 609.1 at 311 (1991)).

 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence, § 609.1 at 417 (2d ed. 2001); State v. Smith, 203 Wis. 2d 288, 297, 553 N.W.2d 824 (Ct. App. 1996).

 Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 25. .

 State v. Gary M.B., 2003 WI App 72, ¶ 46, 261 Wis. 2d 811, 661 N.W.2d 435 (Dykman, J., dissenting).