Court Opinion

ID: 9851210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:09:00.497051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:51.393017
License: Public Domain

Danhof, C. J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
Defendant offered the terms of his parole on direct examination as an explanation of why he would not have associated with the police informant. Defendant did so to bolster his claim that he had not sold anything to the informant.
*122Under these circumstances, I do not believe that People v Rappuhn, 390 Mich 266, 273-274; 212 NW2d 205, 209; 67 ALR3d 766, 772 (1973), is properly applicable to this case. In Rappuhn the Court said, "We therefore hold that it is error to cross-examine defendant as to the duration and details of his prior prison sentences to test his credibility.” Id. at 273-274. (Emphasis added.) The Court noted that "defendant did not make any statement as to the length of sentence resulting from his prior convictions to which he did testify.” Id. at 271.
Here the prosecutor’s questions concerning the conditions of defendant’s parole, which included a requirement that he refrain from associating with known criminals, were not irrelevant, as in Rappuhn. Defendant had put in issue the question of whether the condition of his parole that he not associate with known criminals had affected his conduct, and in my opinion the prosecutor committed no error in cross-examining defendant on that point.
In People v Drew, 67 Mich App 295, 302-304; 240 NW2d 776 (1976), the trial court erroneously ruled, over defense objection, that the prosecutor could inquire not only into defendant’s prior convictions, but also into the total number of years he had spent in prison. The majority stated:
"The fact that the detrimental information was brought out by the defense attorney does not constitute a waiver because he had preserved the issue by objecting to the Court’s prior ruling. If there had been no prior ruling and no objection thereto, we would afñrm. ” Id. at 303-304. (Emphasis added.)
In the present case there had been no prior ruling *123permitting inquiry into defendant’s sentence,1 and defense counsel registered no objection to the prosecutor’s questions concerning the conditions of defendant’s parole. Under these circumstances, for the reasons ably stated by Judge D. E. Holbrook, Jr. in his dissent in Drew, I would affirm.

 The trial court did rule, over defense objection, that defendant’s prior conviction could he used for impeachment purposes, but the question of defendant’s sentence was not raised, argued, nor ruled upon.