Court Opinion

ID: 2964550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:27:19.296194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:25.227633
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1317

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                RICHARD W. CZUBINSKI,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________
                   [Hon. Robert B. Collings, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
                                             _____________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                _____________________

               Susan B. Hanmer, with whom Oliver C. Mitchell, Jr., Louis J.
               _______________            _______________________  ________
          Scerra,  Jr.  and Goldstein  & Manello,  P.C.  were on  brief for
          ____________      ___________________________
          appellant.
               S. Theodore Merritt, Assistant  United States Attorney, with
               ___________________
          whom Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Amy B. Lederer,
               _______________                              ______________
          Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                  February 21, 1997
                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.    Defendant-appellant  Richard
                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
                               ___________

          Czubinski  ("Czubinski")  appeals  his jury  conviction  on  nine

          counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C.    1343, 1346, and four counts of

          computer  fraud,  18 U.S.C.    1030(a)(4).    The wire  fraud and

          computer fraud  prosecution that  led to the  conviction survived

          serious challenges put forward  by Czubinski in various pre-trial

          motions.   Given the broad  scope of the  federal fraud statutes,

          motions charging insufficient pleadings or  selective prosecution

          generally deserve careful consideration.   We need not scrutinize

          the lower court's rejection of the defendant's arguments in favor

          of  dismissing the  indictment, however,  because we  reverse the

          conviction on the clearer ground that the trial evidence mustered

          by  the government was insufficient  to support a guilty verdict,

          and  hold that the  defendant's motion for  judgment of acquittal

          should have been granted on all counts.  Unauthorized browsing of

          taxpayer files, although certainly inappropriate conduct, cannot,

          without more, sustain this federal felony conviction.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

          I.  Pertinent Facts
          I.  Pertinent Facts

                    On  an appeal  from a  jury conviction,  we review  the

          relevant facts  in the light  most favorable  to the  government.

          United States v. Tierney, 760 F.2d 382, 384 (1st Cir. 1985).  The
          _____________    _______

          evidence  in this case,  so presented,  is inadequate  to support

          convictions on either the wire fraud or computer fraud charges.

                    For all periods relevant to the acts giving rise to his

          conviction,  the defendant  Czubinski was  employed as  a Contact

                                         -2-

          Representative  in the  Boston  office of  the Taxpayer  Services

          Division of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").  To perform his

          official duties, which  mainly involved answering questions  from

          taxpayers regarding their  returns, Czubinski routinely  accessed

          information from one of  the IRS's computer systems known  as the

          Integrated  Data  Retrieval  System  ("IDRS").    Using  a  valid

          password given  to Contact Representatives, certain search codes,

          and  taxpayer  social security  numbers,  Czubinski  was able  to

          retrieve, to  his terminal  screen in  Boston, income  tax return

          information regarding virtually any taxpayer  -- information that

          is  permanently  stored in  the  IDRS  "master file"  located  in

          Martinsburg, West Virginia.  In the period of Czubinski's employ,

          IRS rules plainly stated that employees with passwords and access

          codes were not permitted to  access files on IDRS outside of  the

          course of their official duties.1 

                    In  1992, Czubinski  carried out  numerous unauthorized

                              
          ____________________

          1  In 1987 Czubinski  signed an acknowledgment of receipt  of the
          IRS Rules of Conduct, which contained the following rule:

                      Employees  must  make  every   effort  to
                      assure security  and prevent unauthorized
                      disclosure of  protected information data
                      in the  use of Government owned or leased
                      computers.    In addition,  employees may
                      not use any  Service computer system  for
                      other than official purposes.

          See  Government's Exhibit  1.   In  addition, Czubinski  received
          ___
          separate rules regarding use of the IDRS, one of which states: 

                      Access  only  those accounts  required to
                      accomplish your official duties.

          See Government's Exhibit 3.
          ___

                                         -3-

          searches  of IDRS files.   He knowingly disregarded  IRS rules by

          looking  at  confidential  information  obtained   by  performing

          computer searches that were outside of the scope of his duties as

          a  Contact Representative,  including,  but not  limited to,  the

          searches  listed in the  indictment.2  Audit  trails performed by

          internal  IRS auditors  establish that Czubinski  frequently made

          unauthorized accesses on  IDRS in 1992.   For example,  Czubinski

          accessed  information   regarding:    the  tax   returns  of  two

          individuals involved in the David Duke presidential campaign; the

          joint  tax return of an assistant district attorney (who had been

          prosecuting  Czubinski's father on  an unrelated  felony offense)

          and his  wife;   the  tax  return of  Boston  City Counselor  Jim

          Kelly's Campaign  Committee (Kelly had defeated  Czubinski in the

          previous election for the Counselor seat for District 2); the tax

          return  of one of his brothers' instructors; the joint tax return

          of a Boston Housing Authority police officer, who was involved in

          a community  organization with  one of Czubinski's  brothers, and

          the officer's wife; and the  tax return of a woman  Czubinski had

          dated a few times.  Czubinski  also accessed the files of various

          other social acquaintances by performing unauthorized searches.  

                    Nothing  in  the  record indicates  that  Czubinski did

          anything more than knowingly disregard IRS rules by observing the

          confidential information he accessed.   No evidence suggests, nor
                              
          ____________________

          2  The indictment charged ten  counts of wire fraud for accessing
          the  return  information  of  ten different  entities;  the  four
          computer fraud counts (counts eleven through fourteen) identified
          unauthorized searches  that also  underlay four of  the ten  wire
          fraud counts (counts one, two, eight and nine).

                                         -4-

          does  the  government  contend,   that  Czubinski  disclosed  the

          confidential information he  accessed to any third  parties.  The

          government's only  evidence demonstrating  any intent to  use the

          confidential  information  for  nefarious  ends  was   the  trial

          testimony of William A. Murray, an acquaintance  of Czubinski who

          briefly  participated in  Czubinski's local Invisible  Knights of

          the Ku Klux Klan ("KKK") chapter and worked with him on the David

          Duke campaign.   Murray testified that Czubinski had  once stated

          at a social  gathering in "early  1992" that "he intended  to use

          some of that information to build dossiers on people" involved in

          "the white  supremacist movement."   Trial Transcript, Vol.  2 at

          170,  188.  There is, however, no evidence that Czubinski created

          dossiers, took steps  toward making dossiers (such as by printing

          out  or recording the information  he browsed), or  shared any of

          the  information he  accessed in  the years following  the single

          comment  to Murray.   No  other witness  testified to  having any

          knowledge of  Czubinski's alleged intent to  create "dossiers" on

          KKK members.

                    The  record shows  that Czubinski  did not  perform any

          unauthorized searches after 1992.  He continued to be employed as

          a  Contact Representative  until  June 1995,  when  a grand  jury

          returned  an indictment against him on ten counts of federal wire

          fraud under 18  U.S.C.    1343, 1346, and  four counts of federal

          interest computer fraud under 18 U.S.C.   1030(a)(4).

                    The  portion  of  the  indictment  alleging wire  fraud

          states that Czubinski defrauded  the IRS of confidential property

                                         -5-

          and defrauded the IRS  and the public  of his honest services  by

          using  his  valid  password   to  acquire  confidential  taxpayer

          information  as part  of  a scheme  to:  1) build  "dossiers"  on

          associates in the KKK; 2) seek information regarding an assistant

          district attorney who was  then prosecuting Czubinski's father on

          an unrelated criminal charge;  and 3) perform opposition research

          by inspecting the records of a political opponent in the race for

          a Boston  City  Councilor  seat.    The  wire  fraud  indictment,

          therefore,  articulated particular  personal  ends  to which  the

          unauthorized   access   to   confidential   information   through

          interstate wires was allegedly a means.

                    The  portion  of  the  indictment  setting  forth   the

          computer fraud charges  stated that Czubinski  obtained something

          of  value, beyond the mere unauthorized use of a federal interest

          computer, by performing certain searches -- searches representing

          a subset of those making up the mail fraud counts.

          II.  Proceedings Below
          II.  Proceedings Below

                    After   indictment  and   arraignment  in   June  1995,

          Czubinski filed a motion  to dismiss the indictment, a  motion to

          strike surplusage from the indictment, and a motion for discovery

          from the government relating to a claim of selective prosecution.

          In separate  orders, a  magistrate judge  and the district  court

          rejected all of these motions.  Specifically,  the district court

          rejected  Czubinski's argument  that counts  1 through 10  of the

          indictment must be dismissed  because "browsing" does not deprive

          the  IRS of any property and because section 1346, the intangible

                                         -6-

          right to honest  services amendment  to the mail  and wire  fraud

          statutes, was  unconstitutionally vague  as applied  to him.   In

          December   1995,   Czubinski  filed   motions  in   limine  which
                                                         ___________

          essentially  sought  to  prevent  references  to   certain  white

          supremacist activities, such as his membership in  a KKK chapter,

          during  trial.  This motion  was also denied,  although the trial

          court  gave a  limiting  instruction regarding  the relevance  of

          Czubinski's KKK  membership  to  a  finding  of  wire  fraud  and

          computer fraud.

                    On  December  15,  1995,  the   district  court  denied

          Czubinski's motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts except

          for count 3,3 and on that day the jury returned a verdict finding

          Czubinski guilty on  all thirteen remaining  counts.  On  appeal,

          Czubinski challenges  the  denial of  his motion  to dismiss  the

          indictment, including  the rejection  of a  selective prosecution

          claim,   the finding that he had not  made out a prima facie case

          of  selective prosecution,  the admission  at trial  of allegedly

          inflammatory   evidence   of   Czubinski's    white   supremacist

          activities, the  denial of  his  motion for  acquittal, the  jury

          instructions, and the sentencing determination.

                    We reverse on the ground that the district  court erred

          in denying Czubinski's motion for acquittal, and therefore bypass

          Czubinski's other claims.

                              
          ____________________

          3    On  count  3,  the  district  court  ruled  that  there  was
          insufficient proof showing that the search alleged in count 3 was
          not requested by the taxpayer whose files were browsed.

                                         -7-

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW
                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

                    A motion  for judgment of acquittal  under Federal Rule

          of Criminal Procedure 29 is the proper vehicle for a defendant to

          make  a sufficiency challenge.  See 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice
                                          ___

          and Procedure:  Crim. 2d   467 (1982). The denial of a motion for

          judgment  of acquittal presents a question of law, and our review

          is de  novo. See United States  v. Staula, 80 F.3d  596, 604 (1st
             ________  ___ _____________     ______

          Cir.   1996).    We  determine  anew  whether  "the  evidence  is

          sufficient to sustain a conviction."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).

                    In determining the evidentiary sufficiency  of a guilty

          verdict,  "the relevant  question is  whether, after  viewing the

          evidence  in the  light  most favorable  to the  prosecution, any
                                                                        ___

          rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

          the crime beyond a  reasonable doubt."  Jackson v.  Virginia, 443
                                                  _______     ________

          U.S.  307, 319 (1979); see  also United States  v. Valle, 72 F.3d
                                 _________ _____________     _____

          210, 216  (1st Cir.  1995).   The  scope of  review  is over  the

          totality of  the evidence,  both direct and  circumstantial:   we

          "take  a hard look at  the record" and  "reject those evidentiary

          interpretations    and    illations   that    are   unreasonable,

          insupportable, or overly speculative."  United States v. Spinney,
                                                  _____________    _______

          65 F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1995).

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

          I.  The Wire Fraud Counts
          I.  The Wire Fraud Counts

                    We  turn first  to Czubinski's  conviction on  the nine

                                         -8-

          wire fraud counts.4  To support a conviction for wire fraud,  the

          government  must prove  two elements  beyond a  reasonable doubt:

          (1) the defendant's knowing and willing participation in a scheme

          or artifice to defraud  with the specific intent to  defraud, and

          (2) the use of interstate  wire communications in furtherance  of

          the scheme.  United States v.  Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723 (1st Cir.
                       _____________     ______

          1996) (citing United States  v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006,  1011 (1st
                        _____________     ________

          Cir.  1993)).    Although  defendant's  motion  for  judgment  of

          acquittal places emphasis on shortcomings in proof with regard to

          the  second element,  by arguing that  the wire  transmissions at

          issue were not proved to be interstate, we find the first element

          dispositive and hold that the government failed to prove beyond a

          reasonable doubt  that the defendant willfully  participated in a

          scheme  to defraud within the meaning of the wire fraud statute.5
                              
          ____________________

          4   The federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.   1343, provides in
          pertinent part:

                      Whoever, having devised  or intending  to
                      devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,
                      or  for obtaining  money  or property  by
                      means of false  or fraudulent  pretenses,
                      representations,  or  promises, transmits
                      or causes  to be transmitted by  means of
                      wire . . . communication in interstate or
                      foreign  commerce,  any writings,  signs,
                      signals,  pictures,  or  sounds  for  the
                      purpose  of  executing  such   scheme  or
                      artifice, shall be fined under this title
                      or imprisoned  not more than  five years,
                      or both. 

          5  We  do not find that it was irrational  for a trier of fact to
          conclude  beyond  a  reasonable doubt  that  Czubinski's searches
          caused information from the IDRS master file in Martinsburg, West
          Virginia, to  be sent to his terminal  in Boston.  The interstate
          element   could  reasonably   be  inferred   from  circumstantial
          evidence.    See,  e.g.,  Testimony of  Edward  Makaskill,  Trial
                       ___   ____

                                         -9-

          That  is, assuming  the counts  accurately describe  unauthorized

          searches   of   taxpayer   returns   through    interstate   wire

          transmissions, there is insufficiant  record evidence to permit a

          rational  jury to conclude that  the wire transmissions were part

          of a criminal scheme to defraud under sections 1343 and 1346.

                    The government  pursued two  theories of wire  fraud in

          this prosecution:  first, that Czubinski defrauded the IRS of its

          property,  under   section   1343,  by   acquiring   confidential

          information for  certain intended personal uses;  second, that he

          defrauded the IRS and the public of their intangible right to his

          honest  services, under sections 1343 and 1346.6  We consider the

          evidence with regard to each theory, in turn.

          A.  Scheme to Defraud IRS of Property
          A.  Scheme to Defraud IRS of Property

                    The  government  correctly   notes  that   confidential
                              
          ____________________

          Transcript, Vol. 3  at 82 (explaining that  certain command codes
          used by Czubinski generally  access information from out-of-state
          computer).

          6    The district  court's jury  instructions  on the  wire fraud
          counts repeat both of the scheme to defraud theories:
           
                      In  this case, the government has charged
                      Mr. Czubinski  with devising a  scheme or
                      artifice,  that  is, a  plan,  to do  two
                      things:
                      (1) to defraud the IRS, the United States
                      Government,   and    the   citizens   and
                      taxpayers   of   the  United   States  by
                      depriving them of their  intangible right
                      to   his  honest   services  as   an  IRS
                      employee; and
                      (2) to defraud the  IRS and to obtain its
                      property, that  is, confidential taxpayer
                      information,    by    false    pretenses,
                      representations and promises.

          Trial Transcript, Vol. 4 at 76-77.

                                         -10-

          information  may constitute  intangible "property"  and that  its

          unauthorized dissemination or other use  may deprive the owner of

          its  property rights.  See  Carpenter v. United  States, 484 U.S.
                                 ___  _________    ______________

          19, 26  (1987) ("Confidential business information  has long been

          recognized as property. . . .  [A newspaper] had a property right

          in  keeping  confidential  and  making exclusive  use,  prior  to

          publication,  of  the  schedule  and contents"  of  a  particular

          column.).   Where such deprivation is  effected through dishonest

          or  deceitful means, a "scheme to defraud," within the meaning of

          the  wire fraud  statute, is  shown.   See id.  at  27.   Thus, a
                                                 ___ __

          necessary step toward satisfying  the "scheme to defraud" element

          in  this  context  is  showing  that  the  defendant intended  to

          "deprive" another of their protected right.

                    The government, however, provides no case in support of

          its   contention   here   that  merely   accessing   confidential

          information, without doing, or clearly intending  to do, more, is

          tantamount  to a deprivation of IRS property under the wire fraud

          statute.  In Carpenter, for example, the confidential information
                       _________

          regarding the contents of a newspaper column was converted to the

          defendants's use to  their substantial  benefit.  See  id. at  27
                                                            ___  __

          (defendants participated in "ongoing  scheme to share profit from

          trading in anticipation" of  newspaper column).  We do  not think

          that  Czubinski's unauthorized  browsing, even  if done  with the

          intent  to deceive the IRS  into thinking he  was performing only

          authorized  searches,  constitutes  a  "deprivation"  within  the

          meaning of the federal fraud statutes.

                                         -11-

                    Binding  precedents,  and   good  sense,  support   the

          conclusion  that  to  "deprive"  a  person  of  their  intangible

          property interest in confidential information under section 1343,

          either some  articulable  harm  must befall  the  holder  of  the

          information  as a result  of the defendant's  activities, or some

          gainful  use  must  be  intended  by  the  person  accessing  the

          information,  whether  or  not  this  use is  profitable  in  the

          economic sense.7    Here, neither the taking of the IRS' right to

          "exclusive use" of the  confidential information, nor Czubinski's

          gain from access to the information, can be shown absent evidence

          of his "use"  of the information.   Accordingly, without evidence

          that  Czubinski used or intended to  use the taxpayer information

          (beyond mere browsing),  an intent to  deprive cannot be  proven,

          and, a fortiori, a scheme to defraud is not shown.
               __________

                    All  of the cases cited by the government in support of

          their contention that the confidentiality breached by Czubinski's

          search  in itself constitutes  a deprivation of  property in fact

          support our  holding today, for they all involve, at a minimum, a

          finding of a further intended use of the confidential information

          accessed by the defendants.   The government's best support comes

          from  United  States v.  Seidlitz, 589  F.2d  152, 160  (4th Cir.
                ______________     ________

          1978),  in which  a former  employee of  a computer  systems firm

          secretly accessed its files, but never was shown to have sold  or

                              
          ____________________

          7  For  example, had  the government  established that  Czubinski
          disclosed or intended to  disclose taxpayer information, then the
          deprivation or intended deprivation of property rights would have
          been shown.  

                                         -12-

          used the data he accessed, and was nevertheless convicted of wire

          fraud.  The affirming  Fourth Circuit held, however, that  a jury

          could  have reasonably  found  that, at  the  time the  defendant

          raided a  competitor's computer  system, he intended  to retrieve

          information that would be helpful for his own start-up, competing

          computer  firm.  In the instant case, Czubinski did indeed access

          confidential  information  through  fraudulent  pretenses  --  he

          appeared to  be performing his  duties when  in fact he  used IRS

          passwords to perform unauthorized searches.  Nevertheless, it was

          not proven that  he intended to deprive the IRS of their property

          interest through either disclosure or use of that information.

                    The resolution  of the instant case  is complex because

          it  is  well-established that  to be  convicted  of mail  or wire

          fraud, the defendant need not successfully carry  out an intended

          scheme to defraud.  See, e.g., United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d
                              ___  ____  _____________    _______

          1, 6 (1st Cir. 1989) (defendant need only participate in a scheme

          to  defraud with the  intent to achieve  its illicit objectives);

          Seidlitz, 589 F.2d at 160 (where circumstantial evidence suffices
          ________

          to  prove intent to accomplish  scheme to defraud,  actual use of

          confidential information need not be shown).  The government does

          not contend  either that  Czubinski actually created  dossiers or

          that   he  accomplished  some  other   end  through  use  of  the

          information.   It need  not do so.   All that  the government was

          required  to  prove  was the  intent  to  follow  through with  a
                                        ______

          deprivation  of the IRS's property and the use or foreseeable use

          of interstate  wire transmissions pursuant  to the accomplishment

                                         -13-

          of the scheme  to defraud.  See, e.g.,  United States v. Silvano,
                                      ___  ____   _____________    _______

          812 F.2d  754, 760  (1st Cir.  1987).  In  the case  at bar,  the

          government failed to make even this showing.

                    The  fatal flaw in the government's case is that it has

          not  shown beyond a  reasonable doubt that  Czubinski intended to

          carry out a scheme to deprive the IRS of its property interest in

          confidential information.   Had there been  sufficient proof that

          Czubinski  intended either  to create  dossiers  for the  sake of

          advancing   personal  causes   or  to   disseminate  confidential

          information to third parties, then his actions in searching files

          could arguably be said to be a step in furtherance of a scheme to

          deprive  the  IRS  of   its  property  interest  in  confidential

          information.   The government's case regarding Czubinski's intent

          to make  any  use of  the  information he  browsed rests  on  the

          testimony  of one witness at trial who stated that Czubinski once

          remarked at a social gathering that he intended to build dossiers

          on  potential KKK informants.8   We must assume,  on this appeal,

          that Czubinski did indeed make such a comment.  Nevertheless, the

          fact that during  the months  following this remark  -- that  is,

          during  the  period  in  which Czubinski  made  his  unauthorized

          searches -- he  did not  create dossiers (there  was no  evidence

          that he created dossiers either during or after the period of his

          unauthorized  searches); given the fact that he did not even take

          steps toward creating dossiers, such as recording or printing out

          the information; given the  fact that no other  person testifying
                              
          ____________________

          8  Testimony of William J. Murray. See Background, supra.
                                             ___             _____

                                         -14-

          as to Czubinski's involvement  in white supremacist organizations

          had  any  knowledge  of  Czubinski's  alleged  intent  to  create

          dossiers or use confidential information; and given the fact that

          not  a  single piece  of  evidence suggests  that  Czubinski ever

          shared taxpayer  information with others, no  rational jury could

          have  found beyond  a reasonable  doubt that, when  Czubinski was

          browsing  taxpayer files,  he was  doing so  in furtherance  of a

          scheme to use the information he browsed for private purposes, be

          they  nefarious or otherwise.  In addition, there was no evidence

          that  Czubinski   disclosed,  or  used  to   his  advantage,  any

          information regarding political opponents or regarding the person

          prosecuting his father.

                    Mere  browsing of the records  of people about whom one

          might have a particular  interest, although reprehensible, is not

          enough  to sustain a wire  fraud conviction on  a "deprivation of

          intangible property" theory.   Curiosity  on the part  of an  IRS

          officer may  lead  to dismissal,  but  curiosity alone  will  not

          sustain a finding of participation in a felonious criminal scheme

          to deprive the IRS of its property.

          B.  Honest Services Fraud (Section 1346)
          B.  Honest Services Fraud (Section 1346)

                    In  McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987),  the
                        _______    _____________

          Supreme Court held that  the mail and wire fraud statutes  do not

          prohibit schemes to defraud individuals of their intangible, non-

          property  right to  honest government  services. Id.  at 359-60.9
                                                           ___
                              
          ____________________

          9  Before McNally, however, the fraud statutes had been  "read as
                    _______
          a broad  shield"  by  this  and  other  circuits,  applying,  for
          example,  to cases of corruption on the ground that the defendant

                                         -15-

          Congress responded  to McNally in 1988 by  enacting section 1346,
                                 _______

          the honest services amendment, which provides:

                      For  the purposes  of  this chapter,  the
                      term  "scheme  or  artifice  to  defraud"
                      includes  a scheme or artifice to deprive
                      another of the intangible right of honest
                      services.

          18 U.S.C.   1346 (effective Nov.  11, 1988).  We have held, after

          considering the relevant legislative  history, that section  1346

          effectively  restores to  the scope  of the  mail and  wire fraud

          statutes10   their   pre-McNally   applications   to   government
                                   _______

          officials'  schemes  to defraud  individuals of  their intangible

          right  to honest  services.   See  Grandmaison,  77 F.3d  at  566
                                        ___  ___________

          (collecting cases).11

                    We  recently had  the opportunity  to discuss,  at some

          length,  the  proper  application  of  the  section  1346  honest

          services amendment to the wrongful acts of public officials.  See
                                                                        ___

          Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 722-26.   The discussion and holding in Sawyer
          ______                                                     ______

                              
          ____________________

          had used  the mails  in furtherance  of a  scheme to defraud  the
          public  of its intangible right  to honest services.   See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____
          Silvano,  812 F.2d  754 (1st  Cir. 1987)  (applying, pre-McNally,
          _______                                                  _______
          mail fraud statute to local political corruption);  see generally
                                                              _____________
          United  States v. Grandmaison, 77  F.3d 555, 565  (1st Cir. 1996)
          ______________    ___________
          (discussing change wrought by McNally).
                                        _______

          10    Identical standards  apply  in determining  the  "scheme to
          defraud"  element under the mail and wire fraud statutes.  United
                                                                     ______
          States v. Boots, 80  F.3d 580, 586  n.11 (1st Cir. 1996)  (citing
          ______    _____
          Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25 n.6).
          _________

          11  Finding insufficient evidence to convict, we do not reach the
          issue of  whether the honest services  amendment raises vagueness
          concerns.  Cf. United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 568-69 (11th
                     ___ _____________    ______
          Cir. 1995) (rejecting facial vagueness and overbreadth  challenge
          to section 1346).

                                         -16-

          directly guide  our disposition of the instant  appeal.12  First,

          as  a general matter, we noted in  Sawyer that although the right
                                             ______

          to  honest  services "eludes  easy  definition,"  honest services

          convictions  of  public   officials  typically  involve   serious

          corruption,  such as  embezzlement  of public  funds, bribery  of

          public  officials, or  the failure  of public  decision-makers to

          disclose certain  conflicts of interest.  Id. at 724.  Second, we
                                                    ___

          cautioned  that "[t]he  broad scope  of  the mail  fraud statute,

          however, does not encompass every instance of official misconduct

          that  results  in the  official's personal  gain."   Id.  at 725.
                                                               ___

          Third,  and most  importantly, Sawyer  holds that  the government
                                         ______

          must not  merely indicate wrongdoing  by a  public official,  but

          must also demonstrate that the wrongdoing at issue is intended to

          prevent or call into question the proper or impartial performance

          of that public  servant's official  duties.  Id.  at 725  (citing
                                                       ___

          pre-McNally  precedent  to  demonstrate that  even  where  public
              _______

          officials  violated state laws,  their actions were  not found to

          defraud citizens of  their right to honest  services, because the

          officials did not actually fail to perform their official  duties

          properly).   In other  words, "although  a public  official might

          engage  in   reprehensible  misconduct  related  to  an  official

                              
          ____________________

          12   In Sawyer, we  vacated and remanded  for further factfinding
                  ______
          the mail  and wire fraud conviction of a private lobbyist who was
          found to have violated  Massachusetts' gift and gratuity statutes
          in the course of his lobbying activities.  See 85 F.3d at 730-31.
                                                     ___
          The  conviction  was vacated  because the  violation of  the gift
          statute,  in itself, was held insufficient  to establish a scheme
          to defraud the public of its intangible right to honest services.
          See id.
          ___ ___

                                         -17-

          position, the conviction of that official cannot stand where  the

          conduct does not actually  deprive the public of its right to her

          honest services, and it is not shown to intend that result."  Id.
                                                                        ___

                    Applying these  principles to Czubinski's  acts, it  is

          clear that his conviction  cannot stand.  First, this  case falls

          outside  of  the  core   of  honest  services  fraud  precedents.

          Czubinski  was not bribed  or otherwise influenced  in any public

          decision-making capacity.  Nor did he embezzle funds.  He did not

          receive, nor  can it  be found that  he intended to  receive, any

          tangible  benefit.     His  official  duty  was   to  respond  to

          informational requests from taxpayers regarding their returns,  a

          relatively straightforward  task that  simply does not  raise the

          specter  of   secretive,  self-interested   action,  as  does   a

          discretionary,  decision-making  role.    Cf.  United  States  v.
                                                    ___  ______________

          McNieve, 536 F.2d  1245, 1251  (8th Cir. 1976)  (finding no  mail
          _______

          fraud  violation  where  city  employee  accepted  gratuities  in

          connection with non-discretionary duty).

                    Second,  we believe  that  the cautionary  language  of

          Sawyer is  particularly  appropriate  here,  given  the  evidence
          ______

          amassed by the defendant at trial indicating that during his span

          of employment at IRS, he received no indication from his employer

          that this workplace violation  -- the performance of unauthorized

          searches   --  would   be  punishable   by  anything   more  than

                                         -18-

          dismissal.13  "To allow every transgression of state governmental

          obligations to amount to mail  fraud would effectively turn every

          such   violation  into   a   federal  felony;   this  cannot   be

          countenanced."  Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 728.  Here, the  threat is one
                          ______

          of transforming governmental workplace violations  into felonies.

          We find no evidence that Congress intended to create what amounts

          to a draconian personnel  regulation.  We hesitate to  imply such

          an  unusual result  in the  absence  of the  clearest legislative

          mandate.

                    These general considerations, although serious, are not

          conclusive:  they  raise  doubts  as to  the  propriety  of  this

          conviction that  can be outweighed  by sufficient  evidence of  a

          scheme to  defraud.   The third  principle identified in  Sawyer,
                                                                    ______

          instructing  us as  to  the basic  requirements  of a  scheme  to

          defraud  in this  context,  settles any  remaining  doubts.   The

          conclusive consideration  is that  the government simply  did not

          prove that Czubinski deprived, or intended to deprive, the public

          or his  employer of their right to his honest services.  Although

          he  clearly  committed   wrongdoing  in  searching   confidential

          information, there is no  suggestion that he failed to  carry out

          his official tasks adequately, or intended to do so.

                    The government alleges that,  in addition to defrauding

          the  public of his  honest services, Czubinski  has defrauded the

                              
          ____________________

          13  See  Appendices to Czubinski's  Motion to Dismiss  (including
              ___
          February 8, 1994 IRS memorandum to employees indicating  that the
          probable   penalty  for  "unauthorized   accessing"  of  taxpayer
          information ranges from "Reprimand" to "Removal").

                                         -19-

          IRS  as  well.   The  IRS  is  a public  entity,  rendering  this

          contention  sufficiently  answered  by  our  holding  above  that

          Czubinski  did not  defraud  the public  of his  honest services.

          Even if the IRS were a private employer, however, the pre-McNally
                                                                    _______

          honest  services  convictions  involving  private  fraud  victims

          indicate that  there must be a  breach of a fiduciary  duty to an

          employer  that involves  self-dealing of  an  order significantly

          more  serious  than the  misconduct at  issue  here.   See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          United  States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1332-34 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
          ______________    ______

          (employee took bribes  and did not  disclose that contractor  was

          overcharging); United States v.  Seigel, 717 F.2d 9, 14  (2d Cir.
                         _____________     ______

          1983)   (employees  used   corporate   funds  for   non-corporate

          purposes);  United States  v. Boffa, 688 F.2d  919, 931 (3d  Cir.
                      _____________     _____

          1982) (union official bribed into accepting lower wages for union

          members).   Once again, the  government has failed  to prove that

          Czubinski  intended to  use  the IRS  files  he browsed  for  any

          private purposes, and  hence his actions, however  reprehensible,

          do not  rise to the level of a  scheme to defraud his employer of

          his honest services.

          II.  The Computer Fraud Counts
          II.  The Computer Fraud Counts

                    Czubinski  was convicted  on all  four of  the computer

          fraud counts on which he was indicted;  these counts arise out of

          unauthorized searches that also  formed the basis of four  of the

          ten  wire fraud counts in  the indictment.   Specifically, he was

          convicted  of  violating  18  U.S.C.    1030(a)(4),  a  provision

          enacted in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.  Section

                                         -20-

          1030(a)(4) applies to:

                      whoever .  . . knowingly and  with intent
                      to defraud, accesses  a Federal  interest
                      computer   without    authorization,   or
                      exceeds authorized access,  and by  means
                      of  such  conduct  furthers the  intended
                      fraud  and  obtains  anything  of  value,
                      unless the  object of the  fraud and  the
                      thing obtained consists  only of the  use
                      of the computer. 

          We  have never  before addressed  section 1030(a)(4).   Czubinski

          unquestionably exceeded  authorized access to a  Federal interest

          computer.14  On appeal he argues that he did not obtain "anything

          of  value."   We  agree, finding  that  his searches  of taxpayer

          return information did not satisfy the statutory requirement that

          he  obtain  "anything of  value."   The  value of  information is

          relative to one's  needs and objectives; here, the government had

          to show that the  information was valuable to Czubinski  in light

          of a fraudulent scheme.  The government failed, however, to prove

          that  Czubinski  intended  anything  more than  to  satisfy  idle

          curiosity.  

                    The  plain language  of  section 1030(a)(4)  emphasizes

          that more  than mere  unauthorized  use is  required: the  "thing

          obtained"  may not  merely be the  unauthorized use.   It  is the

          showing  of some  additional  end --  to  which the  unauthorized

          access is a means -- that is  lacking here.  The evidence did not

          show that Czubinski's end  was anything more than to  satisfy his

                              
          ____________________

          14  "[T]he  term 'exceeds  authorized access' means  to access  a
          computer with authorization and  to use such access to  obtain or
          alter  information  in the  computer  that  the  accesser is  not
          entitled so to obtain or alter."  18 U.S.C.   1030(e)(6). 

                                         -21-

          curiosity  by viewing  information about  friends, acquaintances,

          and  political rivals.  No evidence suggests that he printed out,

          recorded, or used the  information he browsed.  No  rational jury

          could conclude beyond a  reasonable doubt that Czubinski intended

          to  use   or  disclose  that  information,   and  merely  viewing

          information cannot be deemed  the same as obtaining something  of

          value for the purposes of this statute.15

                    The legislative history further supports our reading of

          the  term "anything  of  value."    "In  the  game  of  statutory

          interpretation, statutory language  is the ultimate trump  card,"

          and the remarks of sponsors of legislation are authoritative only

          to the extent that they are compatible with the plain language of

          section 1030(a)(4).   Rhode Island v.  Narragansett Indian Tribe,
                                ____________     _________________________

          19  F.3d 685, 699  (1st Cir. 1994) (citing  Grove City College v.
                                                      __________________

          Bell, 465  U.S. 555,  567 (1984)).  Here,  a Senate  co-sponsor's
          ____

          comments  suggest that  Congress intended  section 1030(a)(4)  to

          punish  attempts  to steal  valuable data,  and  did not  wish to

          punish mere unauthorized access: 

                    The  acts  of  fraud  we  are  addressing  in
                    proposed  section 1030(a)(4)  are essentially
                    thefts  in  which  someone  uses   a  federal
                              
          ____________________

          15   The  district  court, in  denying a  motion  to dismiss  the
          computer  fraud   counts  in  the  indictment,   found  that  the
          indictment  sufficiently alleged  that the  confidential taxpayer
          information was itself a "thing of value" to Czubinski, given his
          ends.  The indictment,  of course, alleged specific uses  for the
          information, such  as creating dossiers on KKK members, that were
          not proven at trial.  In light of the trial evidence -- which, as
          we have said, indicates  that there was no  recording, disclosure
          or  further use of the  confidential information --  we find that
          Czubinski  did  not  obtain   "anything  of  value"  through  his
          unauthorized searches.

                                         -22-

                    interest computer to wrongly obtain something
                    of value from another. . . . Proposed section
                    1030(a)(4)   is   intended  to   reflect  the
                    distinction between the theft of information,
                    a  felony, and  mere  unauthorized access,  a
                    misdemeanor.  

          132 Cong.  Rec. 7128,  7129, 99th Cong.,  2d. Sess. (1986).   The

          Senate Committee  Report further  underscores the fact  that this

          section  should  apply to  those  who  steal information  through

          unauthorized access as part of an illegal scheme:

                    The  Committee  remains convinced  that there
                    must be a  clear distinction between computer
                    theft, punishable as a felony  [under section
                    1030(a)(4)],    and    computer     trespass,
                    punishable  in   the  first  instance   as  a
                    misdemeanor  [under  a different  provision].
                    The  element in  the  new  paragraph  (a)(4),
                    requiring a showing of an intent to  defraud,
                    is meant to preserve  that distinction, as is
                    the requirement that the  property wrongfully
                    obtained via computer  furthers the  intended
                    fraud.

          S.  Rep. No.  132,  99th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  reprinted  in  1986
                                                        _____________

          U.S.C.C.A.N.  2479.   For the  same reasons  we deemed  the trial

          evidence  could not support a finding that Czubinski deprived the

          IRS of its property,  see discussion of wire fraud  under section
                                ___

          1343 supra,  we find  that  Czubinski has  not obtained  valuable
               _____

          information  in  furtherance  of  a  fraudulent  scheme  for  the

          purposes of section 1030(a)(4).

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    We  add a cautionary note.   The broad  language of the

          mail  and wire fraud statutes  are both their  blessing and their

          curse.  They can address new forms of serious crime  that fail to

          fall  within more  specific legislation.    See United  States v.
                                                      ___ ______________

                                         -23-

          Maze,  414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (observing that the mail fraud
          ____

          statute serves "as a  first line of defense" or  "stopgap device"

          to tackle  new types of frauds  before particularized legislation

          is developed)  (Burger, C.J.,  dissenting).   On the other  hand,

          they  might be used to  prosecute kinds of  behavior that, albeit

          offensive  to the  morals or  aesthetics of  federal prosecutors,

          cannot  reasonably  be expected  by the  instigators to  form the

          basis of  a federal felony.   The  case at bar  falls within  the

          latter  category.    Also   discomforting  is  the  prosecution's

          insistence,  before  trial,  on  the  admission  of  inflammatory

          evidence   regarding   the   defendant's   membership   in  white

          supremacist  groups purportedly as a  means to prove  a scheme to

          defraud,  when, on appeal, it  argues that unauthorized access in

          itself is  a  sufficient ground  for  conviction on  all  counts.

          Finally, we caution that the wire fraud statute must not serve as

          a vehicle for  prosecuting only  those citizens  whose views  run

          against the  tide, no  matter how incorrect  or uncivilized  such

          views are.

                    For  the reasons  stated in this  opinion, we  hold the

          district  court's denial  of defendant's  motion for  judgment of

          acquittal on counts 1, 2,  and 4 through 14, to be in error.  The

          defendant's conviction is thus reversed on all counts.
                                         reversed
                                         ________

                                         -24-