Court Opinion

ID: 9762590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:26:49.660312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:35.618421
License: Public Domain

*385BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s resolution of this matter.
Initially, I do not concur in the majority’s determination that Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 532 A.2d 775 (1987) is inapplicable in its entirety to the first issue presented in this appeal. I feel the majority has reached this determination by overlooking the significance of the placement of the footnote 2 annotation in the body of the Sessoms opinion.
The footnote in question arises in the following context: ____ Because the present guidelines were not adopted according to [the constitutional] scheme, however, but were the product of a rejection resolution that was not presented to the Governor in violation of Article III, § 9, they must be declared to be of no force at all. The appellant’s sentence is vacated and his case remanded for resentencing pursuant to the remaining valid provisions of the Sentencing Code.2
Sessoms, supra, 516 Pa. at 380, 532 A.2d at 782. The footnote annotation does not follow the pronouncement that the Sentencing Guidelines “must be declared to be of no force at all”, but, rather, annotates the directive for vacation and remand for resentencing “under the remaining valid provisions of the Sentencing Code”. Hence, I interpret “(T)his ruling”, in footnote 2, as a reference to the directive for resentencing only. In other words, I construe footnote 2 as limiting the availability of the remedy of vacation and resentencing in Guideline cases, to those cases in which the precise Sessoms issue, i.e. the unconstitutional passage of the Guidelines, has been preserved at all stages of adjudication. I do not believe it was the Supreme Court’s intent to condition in any way its holding that the Guidelines were void ab initio, and to permit vacation and resentencing in other Guidelines cases where the appellant *386has challenged only the application of, or a deviation from, the Guidelines, where the sentence is otherwise appropriate under the remaining valid provisions of the Sentencing Code.1 Cf. Sessoms, supra, 516 Pa. at 380, 532 A.2d at 783. (Concurring Opinion by Papadakos, J.) (“(T)he *387Sentencing Code, devoid of the Sentencing Guidelines, forms an adequate foundation to support sentences heretofore imposed by the judiciary.”)
I therefore would find that the first issue presented, concerning the failure of the sentencing court to state reasons for its departure from the Guidelines, fails to raise a substantial question that the sentence was inappropriate under the Sentencing Code as a whole, and I would decline to resolve the first issue on the merits.2
Appellant secondly contends that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, in that the sentencing court failed to take into account the probation officer’s recommendation, based upon presentence investigation. However, appellant has failed to give any reasons in his argument as to why the probation officer’s recommendation should have been binding upon the sentencing court, and has not explained how the sentence imposed was in any way inconsistent with the gravity of the offense, the protection of the public, or appellant’s rehabilitative needs.3 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). As such, I find appellant’s second issue also fails to present a substantial question under the remaining valid provisions of the Sentencing Code.
As I believe appellant has not presented any substantial questions under the Sentencing Code, I would hold that he *388has waived all claims as to the appropriateness of his sentence, and would quash the current appeal.4

. This ruling is applicable to cases where the issue has been "properly preserved at all stages of adjudication up to and including and direct appeal.” Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 503 Pa. 228, 233, 469 A.2d 146, 148 (1983).

. I am aware that several of my colleagues do not concur in my position, in light of the later Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Samuels, 516 Pa. 300, 532 A.2d 404 (1987). In Samuels, the Supreme Court implicitly overruled this Court's interpretation of the enabling legislation at 42 Pa.C.S. § 2154, in Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 366 Pa.Super. 328, 531 A.2d 441 (1987) (en banc), and reinstated the original judgment of sentence as enhanced by prior non-deadly weapon misdemeanor convictions. It has been the position of many panels of this Court that, had Sessoms precluded consideration of other Guideline cases, Samuels would not have been necessary. However, I believe footnotes 3 and 4, 516 Pa. at p. 304, 532 A.2d at pp. 405-06, indicate precisely the opposite:
3. It is noted that the effect of our decision is limited to the present case and others decided in reliance on the Superior Court’s decision in it where the Commonwealth has pursued the matter on appeal. Act 165 of 1986, effective February 9, 1987, amended § 2154(2) to overcome the uncertainty caused by the Superior Court's decision in this case and even more explicitly provided the Commission with authority to increase the severity of guideline sentences on the basis of misdemeanors of any kind.
. 4. Inasmuch as Samuels failed to preserve his challenge to the constitutionality of the sentencing guidelines. Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 532 A.2d 775 (1987) is inapplicable. See Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 503 Pa. 228, 469 A.2d 146 (1983) (appellate decision announcing new principle to be applied "retroactively" to cases where the issue in question is properly preserved at all stages of adjudication up to and including any direct appeal.) The trial court’s sentence, being within the statutory limits, is not illegal and, in the absence of a valid claim of error properly preserved must be reinstated.
(Emphasis added to the original).
The import of this language is clear. Where our Court has vacated and remanded for resentencing pursuant to a Guidelines misapplication or deviation, and the resentencing issue has been properly preserved on appeal to the Supreme Court, the original sentence will be reinstated, regardless of the Guidelines violation, unless the resentencing was ordered pursuant to a Sessoms challenge i.e. unconstitutional passage of the Guidelines. Where the original sentence is “within the statutory limits” and “not illegal”, it will be permitted to stand. The remedy sought in Samuels was not a vacation and remand for resentencing pursuant to the void Guidelines, but the reinstatement of the original sentence as a valid sentence. As such, I do not concur in the conclusion reached by my other colleagues that Sessoms and Samuels, read together, permit a remand for resentencing sheerly for failure to conform to the void Sentencing Guidelines.

. Appellant’s first issue, as set forth in his statement of questions presented, also challenges the adequacy of the sentencing court’s reasons for the imposition of a severe sentence under the Sentencing Code as a whole. However, appellant’s argument focuses upon the inadequacy of the reasons as they relate to the sentencing court’s departure from the Guidelines. Hence, I would find that appellant has waived any challenge to the adequacy of the reasons as a whole, for failure to carry forth argumentation in his brief. Trustees of the First Presbyterian Church of Pittsburgh v. Oliver — Tyrone Corp., 248 Pa.Super. 470, 375 A.2d 193, 194 n. 1 (1977) (en banc).

. Appellant has explained his position, with respect to the sentencing criteria specified in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), in his argumentation of his first claim, concerning the adequacy of the sentencing court’s statement of reasons. He has not, however, repeated that position, or made reference to it, in his argumentation pursuant to his excessiveness claim. Hence, I believe appellant has, once again, waived argumentation in his brief.

. The Dissenting Opinion by Cirillo, P.J., would also quash the current appeal, but for a different reason: the failure of appellant to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), as interpreted by Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987). As I authored the Dissenting Opinion in Commonwealth v. Krum, 533 A.2d 134 (Pa.Super.1987) (en banc), I am clearly in agreement with his analysis that Tuladziecki’s requirements are jurisdictional. It is only because I am constrained by precedent, as established by the Krum majority, that I am quashing on different grounds.