Court Opinion

ID: 9810419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:49:40.805569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:54.945993
License: Public Domain

Merrimon, C. J.,
dissenting: I feel constrained to differ very widely from my brethren in this case. I dissent from the judgment of the Court, much of the reasoning of the opinion, the interpretation given therein to numerous decided cases, and the overruling of several other cases, decided after much and earnest consideration.
It seems to me very clear that this case, like that of Hughes v. Hodges, 102 N. C., 236, and going beyond it in important respects, further narrows, impairs and unsettles the right of homestead, as established and contemplated by the Constitution, while it unnecessarity renews and enlarges the conflict of decision on a subject — that of homestead— that has given the Court not a little trouble in the past, and will likely continue to do so. Moreover, it manifests an inconsiderate disregard of decided cases that cannot fail to result in more or less detriment to the public, and lessen confidence in the uniformity and stability of the decisions of this Court, something very serious in its nature and greatly to be deprecated.
*111The decision must result in grievous injustice to the defendant. Under the decisions of this Court, prevailing in pertinent and material respects at the time the sale and deed under which the plaintiff’s claims were made, they were absolutely void. This case overrules those cases and makes such sale and deed valid, and, as a consequence, the defendant loses his tract of land, which the jury found to be worth several hundred dollars, and the plaintiff gets it for the nominal price of ten dollars! I think the cases so overruled were correctly decided, but even if their correctness were questionable they should not be overruled. If they were in conflict, to some extent, as contended, with former decisions, the later ones should prevail and be observed. Otherwise, there can be no end to such conflict, and the result must be deplorable.
I will state some of the grounds of my dissent more in detail. The plaintiff contends earnestly, that inasmuch as the debt, to satisfy which the defendant’s land was sold, was contracted before the present Constitution of this State took effect, the laws of the State in respect to the right of homestead and the homestead, do not apply; that, as to this debt, they are inoperative and void, because, as he insists, they impair the obligation of the contract, and are thus in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and he cites and relies mainly upon Edwards v. Kearsy, 90 U. S. Rep , 595, which case went from this Court.
It must be observed that the Supreme-Court of the United States did not, in terms or effect, decide in the case just cited that the judgment debtor was not entitled in any case to have his homestead valued and laid off to him as allowed by the Constitution and laws of this State, if the debt on which the judgment was founded was contracted before the present State Constitution took effect. It simply decided, in substance and effect, and no more, that the homestead thus valued and laid off could not “ be exempt from sale under *112execution or other final process obtained on any” such debt, if it were necessary to the satisfaction of the debt, because to allow it to be so exempt would impair the obligation of the contract. Obviously, the Court did not decide, nor intend to decide, that in such a case the debtor could not have his homestead, if he had property, real or personal, subject to levy and sale sufficient to satisfy the debt without resorting to his homestead. Thus, if the debt were five hundred dollars, and the debtor had land of the value of two or five thousand dollars subject to the satisfaction of the debt, other than the homestead, the Court did not decide that the latter would not in such case be exempt from such sale; nor did it decide that in such case the proceedings, whereby the homestead wras valued and laid off, were void necessarily. If there were property sufficient to satisfy the debt without resorting to the homestead the latter would be exempt, because in that case the obligation of the contract would not be impaired, and the laws of the State in respect to homestead would not be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this State, and the laws of the latter, are not unnecessarily to be interpreted and treated as in conflict. On the contrary, the constitutional provisions and statutory regulations of the State on any subject will be allowed to operate and have just effect, unless they in some way materially interfere with, abridge or impair the powers, authority and guarantees established and secured by the Constitution of the United States. Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. Rep., 80; Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. Rep., 80; Austin v. Alderman, 7 Wallace, 694. The Constitution and laws of the United States, and the same of the several States, are not presumed to be at all in conflict; on the contrary, they are presumed to be in harmony, and, in material respects, are to be interpreted and treated as harmonizing as far as reasonably and justly they may be. Nor will the Courts of the *113United States unnecessarily ignore and treat as inoperative and void constitutional provisions and statutes of the several States. On the contrary, it is their duty to give,.and they will give, them effect when and where they can properly do so. Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet., 195; Claflin v. Hoaseman, 93 U. S., 130. Hence, the Court, in the case already cited, said cautiously: “ It is to be understood that the encroachment thus denounced must be material. If it be not material, it will be regarded as of no account.” The Court said further: “ The remedy subsisting in a State when and where a contract is made and is to be performed, is'a part of its obligation, and any subsequent law of the State which so affects the remedy as substantially to impair and lessen the value of the contract is forbidden by the Constitution, and is therefore void.”
The suggestion that this Court has made decisions since Edwards v. Kearsy, supra, was decided, not in harmony with it, is certainly unfounded. On the contrary, it has, uniformly, in many cases, expressly recognized that case, and substantially, in all material respects, applied the law as expounded and settled by it, as the cases presently to be cited, and other cases, abundantly show. Giving effect to the constitutional provisions and .statutory regulations in respect to homestead, the Court has decided in numerous cases that debts contracted before the present constitutional provision establishing the right of homestead took effect, do not necessarily prevail against the homestead — that they do not unless it is necessary to their satisfaction to sell it; and it. has also so interpreted the statutory regulations in respect to the valuation and laying off the homestead as to give them practical effect. The Court has, as we shall see, made no decision that impairs the right of such creditor, or that materially delays or cripples the enforcement of that right. It has only administered the right of homestead of such *114debtor as far as this might be done consistently with the paramount right of such creditor.
In Albright v. Albright, 88 N. C., 238, the late Justice Ruffin said : “ The plaintiff has a clear constitutional right to his exemptions in both his realty and personalty, and this right he has against each and every one of his creditors without regard to the date of his demand. It is a mistake to suppose that the law giving such exemptions is necessarily void as against debts existing prior to its adoption. It is only so in case there should not be a sufficiency, after allowing the exemptions,'fully to satisfy them, whereby they would be defeated. Otherwise they are operative and constitutional as to them as against any other demand whatever; that is to say, the debtor has a right to have his allotment made, setting apart specifically his homestead and his exemptions, and then to have the creditor, though his claim be an old one, to exhaust all his other possessions of every kind before he shall put his hands on them. Cheatham v. Jones, 68 N. C., 153; Burton v. Spiers, 87 N. C., 87.” This the present case expressly overrules.
In Miller v. Miller, 89 N. C., 402, the Court said: “ But where the homestead does not*prevail, the debtor takes what is left after the debt’ is paid. If nothing is left, the laying off the homestead would have nothing to operate upon and it would be useless. It would be otherwise, however, if the debtor had property sufficient to pay the judgments whose liens ante-date the last mentioned judgment, for the law favors the homestead; and if the debt, that may, if need be, prevail against it, can be paid without selling it, this must be done. The classes of debts that prevail against the homestead do not so prevail necessarily and at all events, but they do so only when to sell it is necessary to pay them. If the personal property over the exemption and the real property of the debtor will more than pay the judgment that prevails against the homestead, then and in that case the homestead should *115be laid off so that the excess may first be sold, and the Sheriff will be in peril if he fails to have this done. * * * It may happen that the debtor will get a homestead of less value than one thousand dollars.” The substance and pertinent part of what is thus said is also overruled by the present case.
In Lowdermilk v. Corpening, 92 N. C., 333, the late Chief Justice SMITH said: “Indeed, the homestead exemption is not void as to either class of debts, and it only becomes so as to such as were contracted before it became a law, when otherwise the latter could not be collected out of other property of the debtor. Such other property ought first to be appropriated, and, if sufficient, the debtor allowed to avail himself of the benefit of the constitutional provision made in his behalf.” Cobb v. Hallyburton, id., 652; Morrison v. Watson, 101 N. C., 336; Wilson v. Patton, 87 N. C., 318; Butler v. Stainback, id., 216, are to the same effect, and there are other like cases. These cases are all overruled in the respect now under consideration.
The appellant lays much ’stress on what is said in Ghenn v. Summey, 80 N. C., 187; Grant v. Edwards, 86 N. C., 515, and Keener v. Goodson, 89 N. C., 273. But these cases, in their substance, properly understood and interpreted, do not contravene what is said and decided in the cases just cited, supra, and quoted from. They decide, generally and properly, that debts contracted anterior to the Constitution prevail against the homestead; and it is further said in them, in general terms, that it is not necessary to value and lay the same off. But the question now under consideration was not raised or adverted to at. all in them, as it was in numerous cases afterwards. The Court did not then, or at any time afterwards, so understand. The Judge who wrote the opinion of the Court in those cases, and the same Judges who decided them, made most of the subsequent decisions cited, supra, and, in doing so, so far as appears, never sup*116posed for a moment that they were overruling them, as, really, they were not. Indeed, in deciding the subsequent cases referred to, they were, as to the subject now under consideration, simply passing upon new aspects of the subject of homestead as they were from time to time presented. So that, Gheen v. Summey and Grant v. Edwards, supra, and perhaps other cases more or less like them, prove nothing to the present purpose.
It thus appears from a multitude of decisions of this Court that the debtor, in a proper case, may have the homestead valued and laid off to him, although the debt be one that majq if need be, prevail against it, and there is not a single decision, properly understood, to the contrary.
The Constitution (Art. N, §§ 2, 8) gives and secures the right of homestead, and the statute {the Code, §§502, 524) prescribes how the homestead shall be valued and laid off to the owner thereof. The purpose thus expressed is a lawful one, and the constitutional provisions and statutory regulations cited are, in their general application, valid, although, in some particular respects, they may not be. They are not, on this latter account, void, and hence must prevail and have effect as far and in as full measure as practicable. A statute wholly void cannot operate at all, but when its purpose is lawful, and it may operate in some of its material parts and in material respects, it must be allowed to have effect and be enforced to such extent as it has validity^.
Now, as we have seen, one otherwise entitled may have his homestead, although he owes a debt that may, if need be, prevail against and take it for satisfaction thereof. Why shall-the homestead in that case not be valued and laid off to the debtor in as full measure as practicable? No substantial reason has been given why it should not be. The statute does not provide, by exception or otherwise, that it shall not be. On the contrary, it, in effect, provides affirma*117tively that it shall be. The constitutional provision and the statute, intending to give the homestead, encounter the objection that the owner thereof owes a debt that, if need be, prevails against it; then, and in that case, the purpose of them is to give it as far and as fully as practicable. In view of the generous and wholesome purpose of the Constitution, such interpretation is just and reasonable and necessary, and there is neither statute nor decision to the contrary. The contention of the plaintiff is, that in such a case the land of the debtor must be sold, without valuing and laying off the homestead, although the. debtor might have land enough in addition to and other than the homestead to pay the debt twice over! It is said that in such case the law of homestead does not apply at all, and, therefore, all proceedings in that respect are nugatory and void! Such a view surely ought not to be allowed to prevail. In such a case, the debtor ought not to be put to the inconvenience, and perhaps great sacrifice, of having his whole tract sold. It would be wholly unnecessary, and the law, properly applied, does not allow it to be done; it intends that the homestead shall be valued and laid off and the remainder sold.
It is contended further, that the statute (The Code, § 501, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, which classify debts and provide certain exemptions as to them,) suggests and implies that the debtor is not entitled to have his homestead valued and laid off to him as to debts contracted anterior to the present Constitution. This contention is founded in serious misapprehension. The statute just cited re-enacts and brings forward in The Code certain statutory exemptions from sale under execution that prevailed before the present Constitution took effect, the purpose being to secure them to the debtor, if for any reason he could not have the benefit of the exemptions given and secured by the present Constitution. This appears from the statute itself, and more particularly from the preamble to the statute (Acts 1879, ch. 256).
*118The statute {The Code, §§ 502-524), prescribing how the homestead shall be valued and laid off, is as broad and comprehensive in its terms and effect as it can be; properly-interpreted, there is no exceptive provision in it, by implication or otherwise, as to any debt or class of debts; it allows and in legal effect requires, that the homestead shall be valued and laid off in every case where it may be done.
But, if the contention of the plaintiff as to the statutory exemptions referred to were more plausible than it is, it could not be allowed to prevail: because the exemption of the homestead, and the right to have the same in whole or in part, in as large or as small measure as may be allowed, exists and has effect, not by virtue of the statute, -but perl force of the Constitution. It gives, secures and exempts the homestead, as far as may be, within the limit it prescribes. It is supreme and controlling, and it is the duty of the Courts to be prompt and diligent in giving it effect in as large measure as may be done. The spirit and purpose of the Constitution so require, and the decisions of this Court have generally harmonized with such spirit and purpose.
It is further insisted that the statute does not provide for valuing and laying off the homestead in such a case. And, in two or three particulars, it does not, in terms. But the purpose of the Constitution and the statute is clear, and the latter must be so interpreted as to effectuate that purpose, if this be at all practicable. This the Court endeavored to do in McCanless v. Flinchum, 98 N. C., 358, and that case, in this respect, was afterwards expressly approved in Morrison v. Watson, 101 N. C., 332, although Mr. Justice Davis dissented in both cases.
It is also insisted that the method of valuing and laying off the homestead, in such case, impairs the obligation-of the contract. This objection has no substantial force. Clearly the Legislature may change methods of procedure as it may deem proper, if it does not materially change the *119existing methods adversely to the creditor, without impairing such obligation. It has been so uniformly decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as by this Court and other State Courts, in many cases. Here, the creditor is not delayed at all. If need be, he takes the whole homestead to pay his debt and costs, and he is at once, upon the sale of the land, reimbursed the money — costs—he is required to advance. The costs are trifling in amount and could not reasonably be regarded as materially affecting the substance of the remedy of the creditor; they are simply not an unreasonable incident of the change of procedure. Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. Rep., 203.
It has been decided in numerous cases that a sale of land by the Sheriff in cases where, under the law, he is required to have the homestead valued and laid off to the judgment debtor, and he fails to do so, is generally void and the deed of the Sheriff passes no title. There could scarcely be a more striking illustration of the propriety and importance of the rule thus settled until now, than the present case. The plaintiff undertook to purchase land, which the jury found to be of the value of nineteen hundred dollars, for twenty dollars! He took the Sheriff’s deed and now insists upon his purchase!
I need not here re-state the reasons that led the Court to make such decisions. It is sufficient to cite several cases in which they may be readily found. They are cogent, founded upon principles of justice, sound public policy and strong statutory provisions. Mebane v. Layton, 89 N. C., 396; Arnold v. Estis, 92 N. C., 162; McCanless v. Flinchum, 98 N. C., 358; McCracken v. Adler, 98 N. C., 400; Morrison v. Watson, 101 N. C., 332.
The plaintiff contends that the land was sold as two distinct tracts, and he is entitled to that one on which the defendant does not live, claiming benefit of the exception pointed out in McCracken v. Adler, supra, as to land “sepa*120rate and. distinct from the homestead property, and not necessary to make the homestead complete, as allowed by the statute.” Surely this case cannot be treated as coming within that exception. The jury found the fact that the two tracts adjoined each other, and the defendant cultivated and used them as one farm. The two tracts were not separate and distinct in-the sense of the exception; hence the price- — -ten dollars — bid for each! Obviously, the plaintiff regarded the sale as an adventure, and others regarded it as a mockery of a- serious proceeding. It turns out to be serious indeed to the debtor defendant.
The defendant did not relieve himself of the incidents of the debt by paying the principal and interest of the judgment. The remedy and the Court costs incident .thereto were of the debt, the contract contemplated and embraced them', and they partook of its nature. Hence, the judgment for the costs was on the same footing as the judgment for the principal and interest of the debt. The plaintiff has the same remedy against the defendant’s land for costs that he had for the principal debt.
It was, according to the cases pertinent cited, the duty of the Sheriff to have the defendant’s homestead valued and laid off as the law prescribes. As he failed to do so, the sale of the land and the deed relied upon by the plaintiff were void. The Court, however, have now decided otherwise— that, as to debts contracted anterior to the present Constitution, the debtor is not entitled to have his homestead valued and laid off to him, and that a sale of the land under execution as to such debt is valid, without regard to the homestead. I do not think so.
It is difficult to determine the compass of the decision in this case. How does it affect sales of land as to debts contracted after the Constitution became operative? Are they valid where the homestead was not valued and laid off to *121the debtor before the sale? If so, would the bidders at such sale bid a fair price for the land, not knowing where the homestead might afterwards be laid off, and how much it might embrace? These are important questions.