Court Opinion

ID: 9672394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:53:58.712655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:15.786828
License: Public Domain

*689Shepherd, P.J.
(dissenting). I dissent. In this case defendant was appointed receiver in 1982 in an attempt to collect a 1980 marital property settlement award requiring plaintiff to pay $375 per month for fifteen years. Plaintiff has assiduously avoided payment. Plaintiff’s only apparent asset in Michigan is his state trooper’s pension. Defendant was unable to force the Department of Treasury to turn over the pension funds necessary to satisfy the judgment directly. The trial court then ordered plaintiff to authorize payment from his pension to defendant on pain of contempt. I agree with the majority opinion so far as it goes. However, I believe that defendant acquired the rights and power of a receiver when she was so appointed in 1982. I would affirm the trial court’s order compelling plaintiff to sign over assets to the court-appointed receiver on pain of contempt. MCL 600.2926; MSA 27A.2926.
There is no question that the court in the present case had the authority to appoint a receiver. Cohen v Cohen, 125 Mich App 206, 214; 335 NW2d 661 (1983), lv den 417 Mich 1100.35 (1983). A receivership operates to give the receiver the right to custody and possession of property subject to the receivership for the benefit of the party ultimately proving to be entitled thereto. MCL 600.2926; MSA 27A.2926; 65 Am Jur 2d, Receivers, § 161, p 985. A receiver derives his possessory right from the court appointing him, and his custody and possession is the possession of the law or the court. Id.; see also 19 Michigan Law & Practice, Receivers, § 41, p 382. Furthermore, a person who interferes with the right of a receiver by any unauthorized refusal to turn over property or funds to which the receiver is entitled may be guilty of contempt of court. 17 Am Jur 2d, Contempt, § 18, p 22; 6A Michigan Law & Practice, *690Contempt, § 13, p 19. The instant case is analogous to a case in which the court has jurisdiction over the party-debtor but not over the property. The general rule appears to be:
Although a court of equity cannot send its receiver out of its jurisdiction to enforce its orders or decrees, it may act on parties within its jurisdiction and amenable to its process, whether or not the property is within the jurisdiction; and such parties will be in contempt if they resist the court’s orders or interfere with the receiver’s possession. . . .
The court may order a party to execute an assignment or conveyance to the receiver of property beyond its territorial jurisdiction, and disobedience of the order will be a contempt. [75 CJS, Receivers, § 125, pp 764-765.]
In Carnahan v Carnahan, 143 Mich 390; 107 NW 73 (1906), a case not involving a receivership, plaintiff wife was granted a divorce but was ordered to turn over $644 which the court found constituted a fair property settlement. The sum was apparently in her possession and control and on deposit with a loan and investment company in Sarnia, Ontario. The trial court ordered the wife to turn over the money on pain of contempt. In other words, while the court had no jurisdiction over the fund itself, the court, through its contempt power, was able to order the party over whom it did have jurisdiction to act. The Supreme Court specifically held that the wife would not have been subject to contempt if the decree had been merely for the payment of money. However, because the decree was specific as to the fund in the Ontario account, the decree was properly enforced under the power of contempt. In the instant case, I believe the pension can be seen as a specific *691fund and an asset under receivership control. Thus, the trial court’s order is one directed at a party relating to a specific fund, enforceable by contempt.
I would affirm the trial court’s order requiring defendant to turn over funds from his pension sufficient to satisfy the judgment on pain of contempt. I am concerned that if in domestic relations cases we force spouses to suffer the loss of their bargain as we do here and treat them as nothing more than arm’s length business venturers we will do irreparable harm to the survivors of divorce who are generally financially burdened ex-wives and children.