Court Opinion

ID: 9577413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:34:44.779148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:34.509258
License: Public Domain

OPINION WOOD, Chief Judge. The child was charged with a delinquent act — the murder of a two-month-old baby. The Children’s Court, after a hearing, transferred the matter to the District Court so that the child could be prosecuted as an adult. This appeal involves the propriety of that transfer. The issues involve the sufficiency of the evidence to support the transfer; the issues concern: (1) reasonable grounds for transfer, and (2) age of the child. Reasonable Grounds The child claims that the evidence was insufficient to permit the court to find that he committed the various elements of murder, that he was not mentally ill, and that he was not amenable to treatment and rehabilitation as a child in available facilities. The child argues these claims on the basis that the evidence must be sufficient to sustain a finding that the child did in fact commit murder, was in fact not mentally ill, and was in fact not amenable to treatment and rehabilitation in available facilities. The child’s contentions ignore the provisions of the statute. Section 13-14-27, N. M.S.A.19S3 (Repl.Vol. 3, pt. 1) provides for a transfer hearing. Paragraph (A) (4) of that section states: “(4) the court finds upon the hearing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: “(a) the child committed the delinquent act alleged; and “(b) the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child through available facilities; and “(c) the child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill; and “(d) the interests of the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint or discipline.” The statute requires the court to find there are reasonable grounds to believe that (a), (b), (c) and (d) exist. Yucca Ford, Inc. v. Scarsella, 85 N.M. 89, 509 P.2d 564 (Ct.App.1973) states: “ ‘Reasonable grounds’ pertain to facts and circumstances which would warrant a prudent and cautious person in believing that the one arrested was guilty of an offense.”  As used in § 13-14-27(A) (4), supra, reasonable grounds means facts and circumstances which would warrant a prudent and cautious person in believing that the child came within the requirements of items (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Pargraph (A)(4).  The facts and circumstances set forth in the docketing statement show the existence of the required reasonable grounds. Age  In the docketing statement it is asserted that the child’s attorney recalls no testimony at the transfer hearing as to the age of the child. The claim is that age is jurisdictional and without substantial evidence at the transfer hearing as to the child’s age, the Children’s Court did not have jurisdiction to transfer the child to District Court. Paragraph (A) (4) of § 13-14-27, supra, does not require a finding of age “upon the hearing”. The age requirement is stated in Paragraph (A)(1). That paragraph states that the child “was sixteen [16] years of age or more at the time of the conduct alleged to be a delinquent act”. If the record establishes the age, the age requirement of Paragraph (A)(1) of § 13-14-27, supra, is met regardless of whether evidence of age was introduced at the transfer hearing. The Children’s Court petition alleges the child’s birthdate and the date of the offense. These dates indicate the child came within the age requirement. Although the child contested the transfer on various grounds, no issue was raised as to the child’s age. In this state of the record we cannot say the Children’s Court was without jurisdiction to transfer the child. See State v. Lucero, 82 N.M. 367, 482 P.2d 70 (Ct.App.1971); Compare, Begay v. First National Bank of Farmington, 84 N.M. 83, 499 P.2d 1005 (Ct.App.1972).  The child also contends that § 13-14-27.1, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 3, pt. 1) is unconstitutional. We do not consider this contention because the transfer under § 13-14-27, supra, was proper. The transfer order is affirmed. IT IS SO ORDERED. HENDLEY, J., concurs. SUTIN, J., dissenting.