Court Opinion

ID: 9831411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:05:06.19788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:34.597126
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Plaintiffs in error and others as amicus curia; have filed motions for rehearing in which they challenge our holding in the original opinion in this case handed down November 28, 1935, wherein it is asserted that the mechanic’s and materialman’s lien attempted to be fixed was ineffective because the contract filed with the county clerk of Rusk county was recorded in the deed records and not in the mechanics lien records. In support of their position they cite the case of Bassett v. Bowers (Bassett v. Brewer), 74 Tex. 554, 12 S.W. 229, 230, by the Commission of Appeals. In that case a “sworn account of the demand due” was filed with the county clerk on the thirtieth day after the accrual of the indebtedness, but was not recorded by said clerk until the next day. The case was before the. Supreme Court on the sufficiency of the pleadings; the lower court having sustained a demurrer thereto. That the court was not dealing with a written contract in that case, is clearly shown by the reference made in said opinion to the portion of the statute (old No.) article 3165, having to do with persons who have claims *313for labor, etc., not based upon a written contract. Article (old No.) 3165, R.S. (as amended by Acts 1885, p. 63), is as follows: “In order to fix and secure the lien herein provided for, it shall be the duty of every original contractor, within four months, and every journeyman, day laborer or other person seeking to obtain the benefit of the provisions of this article, within thirty days after the indebtedness shall have accrued, to file his or their contract in the office of the county clerk of the county in which such property is situated and cause the same to be recorded in a book to be kept by the county clerk for that purpose; provided, that if such journeyman, day laborer or other person have no written contract, it shall be sufficient for them to file an itemised account of their claim, supported by affidavit showing that the account is just and correct, and that all just and lawful offsets, payments and credits have been allowed.1’ (Italics ours.)
It will be noted that this statute makes no reference to recording a claim by the county clerk in a book kept for that purpose, or any book, where the contract is not in writing. Furthermore, a careful reading of this case reveals that the court based’its opinion on the theory that the recording of a claim was for the sole purpose of imparting notice to third persons of the existence of a lien, rather than on the principle that recording of a claim based upon a written contract is a necessary part of the procedure to be taken in fixing a lien of this character. For, in discussing the latter portion of article 3165 as applied to the facts of the case under consideration, the court says, “The purpose being to give notice to third persons of the existence of this líen,”’ and then proceeds to apply the rule with reference to the recording of deeds to the case under discussion. Therefore it is our conclusion that the holding in Basset v. Bowers, supra, that “it is no part of his duty to see that the clerk does his, by an actual record of it,” was based on the facts of the particular case under consideration and not meant to be controlling in a case where the claim of a mechanic or material-man was based upon a written contract. We feel that we are fortified in this conclusion by the case of Cameron & Co. v. Marshall, 65 Tex. 7, which antedates the Basset v. Bowers Case by several years, where it is held that: “A mechanic’s lien contract is recorded, not for the special purpose of notifying third parties of the existence of the lien, but to secure the lien as between the parties to the contract. The lien has no existence without the record. * * * The contract in this case was made in accordance with the law, but was not recorded within six months after the debt fell due. As the lien of a material-man it zvas not therefore fixed and secured as required by the statute.” (Italics ours.)
In construing the article of the statute with reference to fixing a mechanic’s lien upon a homestead, the same opinion continues : “It is true the article goes on further to require that the contract should be recorded in the county clerk’s office, but this was no more than a declaration that it should not be excepted from the general rules as to record prescribed in all cases when it zvas sought to fix and secure a mechanic’s lien upon property.” (Italics ours.)
Several years after the Basset v. Bowers decision, Chief Justice Stay ton, who was Chief Justice when said decision was rendered, speaking for the Supreme Court in the case of Lignoski v. Crooker, 86 Tex. 324, 24 S.W. 278, 279, 788, found it unnecessary to decide the very question it is claimed here was decided in Basset v. Bowers, and used the following language: “The views expressed render 'it unnecessary to determine whether, in’ order to fix and secure the lien given to mechanics and ma-terialmen by statute, it is necessary for the contract to be recorded in a book other than that in which deeds or other conveyances are recorded, in accordance with thq directions of article 4304, Rev.St.”
And again in the case of Lippencott v. York, 86 Tex. 276, 24 S.W. 275, 276, Chief Justice Stayton of the Supreme Court, in discussing the difference between a contract lien and the lien of a materialman and mechanic fixed by the statute, says: “Such liens differ materially, in nature and effect, from liens which are purely the result of contract, such as mortgages or trust deeds. Such liens may be said to be inchoate, where the facts have transpired which give to the mechanic or material man the right to lien; but they become complete where the statute requiring the contract or account, with other necessary statement, to be filed and recorded, has been complied with. The lien is thus said to be fixed or secured. There are but few instances in which, for a time, such liens are not secret; but upon evidence of the facts on which they rest being placed on. record, as required by law, such liens are *314given effect from inception of the right, and will override liens acqtiired during the interval the lien may have been essentially secret.” (Italics ours.)
. And in Berry v. McAdams, 93 Tex. 431, 55 S.W. 1112, 1114, Judge Brown, speaking for the Supreme Court says: “Assuming, however, for the purposes of this case, that the constitution does give a lien in favor of the class of persons to which the appel-lee belongs, it, at the same time, requires of the legislature to enact laws for the enforcement of such lien, which has been done, and we hold that the laws above referred to are within the powers of the legislature over the subject, and that a failure by the appellee to comply with their requirements defeats his lien claimed under the constitution. In other words, it is a reasonable and just regulation for the efficient enforcement of the lien of the material man, which he must comply with in order to avail himself of the benefit of the provisions of the constitution. There being valid laws upon the subject, the question what would be appellees’ rights if there was no such statute cannot arise.” (Italics ours.)
In Peacock v. Morgan, 61 Tex.Civ.App. 193, 128 S.W. 1191, 1193, it is said: “A statutory lien can exist only when it has been perfected in the manner prescribed by the statute authorizing it.”
To the same effect is In re Brannon et al. (City of Dallas et al. v. Ryan et al.), 62 F.(2d) 959, by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
As stated in our original opinion, it is thought that the same rule relative to the fixing of a judgment lien would apply to the fixing of a mechanic’s and materialman’s lien; both being creatures of the statute, and both, as to the persons against whom they operate, being involuntary liens. It seems now to be a settled rule of law in this state that, to fix a judgment lien, all the requirements of the statutes relating thereto must be fully complied with. Shirey v. Trust Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 69 S.W.(2d) 835, writ refused; McGlothlin v. Coody (Tex.Civ.App.) 39 S.W.(2d) 133, affirmed by the Commission of Appeals, 59 S.W.(2d) 819.
Therefore the motions for rehearing are respectfully overruled.