Court Opinion

ID: 9396118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 16:02:14.619634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:14.177363
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 21-3006                                                  September Term, 2022
                                                             FILED ON: MAY 19, 2023

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                   APPELLEE

v.

DEON COLE,
                      APPELLANT

                          Appeal from the United States District Court
                                  for the District of Columbia
                                     (No. 1:20-cr-00044-1)

       Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, PILLARD, Circuit Judge, and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit
              Judge.

                                        JUDGMENT

        This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia and on the briefs and oral argument of the parties. The panel has accorded
the issues full consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. See
D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). It is hereby

       ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the judgment of the District Court be AFFIRMED.

       Appellant Deon Cole pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Probation Office’s presentence report
recommended a stolen-firearm enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines, which specify that
if “any firearm . . . was stolen,” the defendant’s offense level should “increase by 2 levels.”
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A). The Probation Office’s recommendation was based on the sworn
criminal complaint and the arrest report, which stated that a Washington Area Law Enforcement
System/National Crime Information Center check of the gun’s serial number revealed that it had
been reported stolen.

       Both Cole and the government objected to the stolen-firearm enhancement throughout the
proceedings below, and they both calculated the appropriate Sentencing Guidelines range to be 30
to 37 months. The Probation Office, however, continued to maintain the applicability of the stolen-
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firearm enhancement, and it calculated the resulting Sentencing Guidelines range to be 37 to 46
months.

       Based on the information in the presentence report and statements at the sentencing hearing
by Cole, the government, and the probation officer, the district court concluded that the gun Cole
possessed had been stolen and applied the stolen-firearm enhancement. That enhancement resulted
in a Sentencing Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months, and the district court sentenced Cole at the
low end of that range, to 37 months of imprisonment.

        The court stated, though, that it would have imposed the same 37-month sentence
regardless of whether the gun was in fact stolen: “Ultimately, however, the fact that the gun was
stolen . . . I want to make clear that that is not going to impact the sentence that I intend to impose
here.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 34, App. 108. The court subsequently reiterated that the applicability
of the stolen-firearm enhancement did not affect its choice of sentence: “I want to make clear that
even if I’m wrong about whether this stolen firearm enhancement applies, I would still be giving
you the same sentence.” Id. at 41, App. 115. The court elaborated on why the gun’s stolen status
did not affect the sentence, citing the “lack of evidence that [Cole] knew that the gun was stolen,”
the “arguments that [Cole’s] attorney has made” about the unfairness of accounting for such a fact,
and the “fact that the government is not seeking to have additional punishment based on the fact
the gun was stolen.” Id. at 34–35, App. 108–09.

        In this appeal, Cole contends that the district court clearly erred by finding that the gun was
stolen because the government failed to offer evidence to support such a finding. Specifically,
Cole maintains that the presentence report’s reference to a database check was insufficiently
reliable to support a finding that the gun was stolen.

        We affirm because any error was harmless. An error at sentencing is harmless if it “did
not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.” Williams v. United States, 503
U.S. 193, 203 (1992). Because Cole preserved his objection in the district court, the government
bears the burden of showing that any error was harmless. United States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177,
1183–84 (D.C. Cir. 2005). If the asserted error counts as a constitutional error, the government
must show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error . . . did not contribute to the [sentence]
obtained.” Id. at 1184 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). If, by contrast,
the error is a non-constitutional error, it “is harmless if it did not have a ‘substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining’ the sentence.” Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 776 (1946)). Regardless of which of those standards applies here, the government has
demonstrated that any error was harmless.

        The district court made clear that it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of
its finding that the gun was stolen and regardless of the applicability of the stolen-firearm
enhancement. Although Cole cites as ostensible evidence of prejudice the district court’s
statement that “stolen weapons tend to be much more likely to be involved in felonious activity,”
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see Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 34, App. 108, the district court, as noted, repeatedly clarified that it
would impose the same sentence regardless of whether the gun in fact was stolen. In addition to
those statements, the court provided a “detailed explanation of the reasons the selected sentence
[was] appropriate,” reinforcing the lack of prejudice from any alleged error. See Molina-Martinez
v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 200 (2016). The court justified its sentence based on factors such
as the seriousness of the offense, the fact that Cole struggled with police officers during his arrest,
Cole’s prior convictions, and the potential for recidivism. Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 32–39, App.
106–13. Based on those considerations, the court concluded that “[a]nything less than the
sentence” of 37 months—a sentence that also fell within the range suggested by Cole and the
government—“would not be sufficient to comply with the purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 41, App.
115.

         When a district court disclaims reliance on an alleged error and gives alternative reasons
for its sentence, as the court did here, we affirm on the ground that any error did not affect the
sentence imposed. See, e.g., United States v. Brevard, 18 F.4th 722, 726, 728–29 (D.C. Cir. 2021);
United States v. Ayers, 795 F.3d 168, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2015); United States v. Godines, 433 F.3d 68,
69–70 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Simpson, 430 F.3d at 1190–92. A district court’s provision
of “detailed and legally sound justifications of the sentence” distinct from the alleged error
demonstrates that it would simply “re-impose the same sentence on remand.” Ayers, 795 F.3d at
176. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

        Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is
directed to withhold issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely petition
for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41.

                                            Per Curiam

                                                             FOR THE COURT:
                                                             Mark J. Langer, Clerk

                                                      BY:    /s/
                                                             Daniel J. Reidy
                                                             Deputy Clerk