Court Opinion

ID: 9704149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:24:21.87839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:05.030836
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
dissenting.
The rationale of the majority opinion, carried to its obvious conclusion, would authorize the City to ban any or all types of entertainment which intended to induce customers to- patronize an establishment which sold alcoholic liquors. Any form of entertainment could be banned, paintings and decor could be banned or strictly regulated, and even the playing of music might be prohibited. On the reasoning of the majority opinion, anything which contributes to the enticement of customers into a drinking establishment may be restricted or banned because the sale of alcoholic liquor is subject to strict regulation by the government. The exercise of the police power, however, is not so unlimited. Neither does the fact that the liquor business may be entirely prohibited authorize the State to legalize the business and then “regulate” it by arbitrary fiat without legally justifiable reason. Under any circumstances and at all times even though the liquor industry is subject to strict regulation, the exercise of the governmental power must be in the form of actions which are within the constitutional authorization, are not unreasonable or arbitrary, and are reasonably related to the attainment of a permissible objective. See Central Markets West, Inc. v. State, 186 Neb. 79, 180 N. W. 2d 880.
The basis upon which the majority opinion avoids First Amendment problems is the conclusion that nudity or partially nude dancing presented as entertainment does not involve speech or expression but is only conduct. This holding stems from City of Portland v. Derrington, 253 Ore. 289, 451 P. 2d 111. It should be noted *639first that the Oregon Court’s conclusion in that case was directed at “the performances and costumes of female attendants in bars and taverns.” (Emphasis ours.)
The evidence in the case before us shows that the topless female dancers involved in this case were strictly entertainers and did not participate in any way in the selling, dispensing, or serving of alcoholic liquors. It is difficult to separate “conduct” and “speech” or “expression.” It is also apparent that elements of “expression” involved in nude or semi-nude attire on the part of employees primarily engaged in their duties of selling and serving alcoholic liquors are minimal contrasted with their “conduct” as attendants. As to such employees, Derrington may well be applicable. This is not true of a dancer who is hired as an entertainer, and that is the case before us. It is obvious, of course, that nudity is “conduct” and subject to regulation. Nevertheless, “dancing” is “expression” and unless it is shown that the dancing is obscene, it is protected by the First Amendment. As Justice O’Connell said in his dissent in the Derrington case: “* * * the city cannot inhibit defendant’s right simply because it decides that her nudity may have an adverse moral effect on the community or that it might cause disturbances' in the restaurant. Even if dancing were held to be entitled to less protection than some other forms of expression, certainly it cannot be prohibited merely because a part of the public, even a majority, regards non-obscene nude dancing as unacceptable. See Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U S 684, 79 S Ct 1362, 3 L Ed 2d 1512.”
Asserted conflict between First Amendment rights and the state police power calls for careful analysis rather than a broad brush treatment. The majority opinion tacitly concedes that the “conduct” involved here does not meet any current tests of obscenity but still refers to “a lewd or obscene manner” and “the titillation of erotic instincts.” If the City of Omaha were *640actually concerned with preventing the luring of customers into drinking establishments, it is strange that this ordinance is the only one dealing with the subject. Even this one ordinance prohibits only live nude entertainment. (Emphasis ours.) It is quite evident that the concern of the 'City here was not the protection of the citizenry from the evils of alcohol, but, instead, the prohibition of a certain form of entertainment determined to be morally unacceptable by the City, without observing First Amendment constitutional standards established by the Supreme Court. Because many, or even most, citizens find such performances unpalatable or debasing does not mean they lack an expressive element. Even if the dance be regarded as a lower form of expression, it is still expression and merits First Amendment protection, even though it be in the form of entertainment in a commercialized setting. See, Schacht v. United States, 398 U. S. 58, 90 S. Ct. 1555, 26 L. Ed. 2d 44; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 84 S. Ct. 1676, 12 L. Ed. 2d 793; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 22 L. Ed. 2d 452; Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767, 87 S. Ct. 1414, 18 L. Ed. 2d 515.