Court Opinion

ID: 9941945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-19 19:00:27.839579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:28.448468
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50254            Document: 59-1         Page: 1     Date Filed: 02/19/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                   ____________                                       FILED
                                                                               February 19, 2024
                                    No. 23-50254
                                                                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                   ____________                                         Clerk

Kirk Johnston,

                                                                  Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                          versus

Chad Kroeger; Michael Kroeger; Ryan Peake; Daniel
Adair; Roadrunner Records, Incorporated;
Warner/Chappell Music, Incorporated,

                                            Defendants—Appellees.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Texas
                             USDC No. 1:20-CV-497
                   ______________________________

Before Jones, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Plaintiff Kirk Johnston brought this copyright infringement suit
alleging a popular band copied the musical composition of his song. Finding
Johnston failed to produce sufficient evidence of copying, the district court

      _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
 Case: 23-50254         Document: 59-1         Page: 2      Date Filed: 02/19/2024

                                     No. 23-50254

granted summary judgment to the defendants. For the reasons set forth
below, we AFFIRM.
                                I.    Background
        Johnston is a musician and songwriter who has been a member of a
band called Snowblind since 1997. Defendants Chad Kroeger, Michael
Kroeger, Ryan Peake, and Daniel Adair are members of the band Nickelback.
At all relevant times, Defendant Roadrunner Records, Inc. was Nickelback’s
record label and Defendant Warner Chappell Music, Inc. was Nickelback’s
music publishing company.
        In 2001, Johnston wrote and created the musical composition for the
song Rock Star. Johnston holds a federal copyright registration for this song.
Four years later, Nickelback released a song with a similar title called
Rockstar.     Johnston alleges Nickelback copied the original musical
composition of his song. In 2020, Johnston initiated this suit for copyright
infringement. 1 Nickelback moved for summary judgment, and the district
court referred the motion to a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge
recommended summary judgment in favor of Nickelback because Johnston
had not raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to factual copying; indeed,
the two songs did not sound alike. Over Johnston’s objection, the district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed
Johnston’s claim. Johnston timely appealed.

        _____________________
       1
         Johnston claims he was unaware of Nickelback’s song until 2018. While the court
must accept that statement at the summary judgment stage, it is an odd contention
considering how popular the Nickelback song was.

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                II.   Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
       The district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Johnston’s
claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a). We have appellate jurisdiction
over the district court’s final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
       We review a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standards as the district court. Voinche v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
999 F.2d 962, 963 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). In conducting this review,
we “construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant.” Batiste v. Lewis, 976 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 2020). Summary
judgment is proper where there are no genuine disputes of material fact and
the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem.
Co., 851 F.3d 422, 426 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
                            III.    Discussion
       To establish a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show
“(1) ownership of a valid copyright; (2) factual copying; and (3) substantial
similarity.” Armour v. Knowles, 512 F.3d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam). At issue here is the element of factual copying, which a plaintiff may
show with direct or circumstantial evidence. See id. When, as here, a plaintiff
lacks direct evidence of copying, factual copying may be inferred from
“either a combination of access and probative similarity or, absent proof of
access, striking similarity.” Batiste, 976 F.3d at 502. The district court held
that Johnston failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to access or
striking similarity. We agree.
                                   A. Access
       As stated above, the first way a plaintiff may establish factual copying
is with “a combination of access and probative similarity.” Id. At the first
step, the plaintiff must offer “proof that the defendant had access to the

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copyrighted work prior to creation of the infringing work.” Peel & Co. v. Rug
Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2001). Next, the plaintiff must show that
the works, “when compared as a whole, are adequately similar to establish
appropriation.” Id. at 397.
        “To establish access, a plaintiff must prove that the person who
created the allegedly infringing work had a reasonable opportunity to view [or
hear] the copyrighted work before creating the infringing work.” Armour,
512 F.3d at 152–53 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A “bare
possibility” of access is insufficient, as is mere “speculation or conjecture.”
Peel & Co., 238 F.3d at 394–95. Indeed, to survive summary judgment, “the
plaintiff must present evidence that is significantly probative of a reasonable
opportunity for access.” Batiste, 976 F.3d at 503 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
        Johnston argues the following evidence shows Nickelback had a
reasonable opportunity to access his work: (1) executives from Roadrunner’s
parent company, Universal Music, likely attended Snowblind’s Continental
Club show; (2) Nickelback’s management group likely attended Snowblind’s
show at the Whisky-a-Go-Go; 2 (3) Nickelback and Snowblind were “moving
in relatively the same circles” when they were searching for record label
deals; (4) Nickelback routinely used music ideas from third-party bands; and
(5) Johnston made significant efforts to publicize his music in the early 2000s.
But inferring access from this evidence would require “leaps of logic” that
are not supported by the record. See Armour, 512 F.3d at 155. A jury would
        _____________________
        2
          The only evidence Johnston identifies for the assertion that certain executives
attended Snowblind’s shows is that they frequently attend shows at the Continental Club
and the Whisky-a-Go-Go. Johnston has not presented evidence that any of these executives
actually attended one of Snowblind’s performances. Indeed, the record establishes only
that Johnston’s friend, an intern at Universal/Motown Records, attended a Snowblind
show with one of his colleagues in marketing.

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have to infer that the executives Johnston named actually attended
Snowblind’s shows or received one of his demo CDs, and that these
executives then showed the song to Nickelback. This “chain of hypothetical
transmittals is insufficient to infer access,” id. at 153 (quotation omitted),
especially in the face of testimony from Nickelback members and relevant
executives that they had never heard of Johnston’s song, see Batiste, 976 F.3d
at 504 (considering defendants’ sworn testimony that they had never heard
of plaintiff or his music). Because Johnston’s contentions amount to mere
speculation, he has failed to raise a genuine fact issue as to whether
Nickelback had access to his work.
                             B. Striking Similarity
       Without proof of access, Johnston must establish factual copying by
showing “striking similarity” between Nickelback’s song and his. See id. To
meet this burden, he must “demonstrate that the alleged similarities are of a
kind that can only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence,
independent creation, or prior common source.” Guzman v. Hacienda Recs.
& Recording Studio, Inc., 808 F.3d 1031, 1039 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The similarities must also “appear in
a sufficiently unique or complex context . . . which is of particular importance
with respect to popular music, in which all songs are relatively short and tend
to build on or repeat a basic theme.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Johnston asserts several challenges to the district court’s
conclusion that he did not raise a material fact issue as to striking similarity.
None is availing.
       As an initial matter, Johnston contends the district court applied the
improper legal standard. First, he argues that the court erred by not applying
the “more discerning ordinary observer test.” But that test applies in certain
circumstances under the substantial similarity analysis—not striking

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                                      No. 23-50254

similarity. See Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“[T]he ‘more discerning’ ordinary observer standard . . . requires the court
to eliminate the unprotectible elements from its consideration and to ask
whether the protectible elements, standing alone, are substantially
similar.”). 3 The substantial similarity analysis applies only after a plaintiff
establishes factual copying and is thus irrelevant here. See Batiste, 976 F.3d
at 506.
          Second, Johnston asserts the district court erred by considering all
versions of the songs rather than the “stripped down” versions. However,
Johnston provides no support for this argument, citing only to cases that
apply his argued standard to the substantial similarity analysis. See, e.g.,
Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Recs., Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir.
2004) (upholding jury instruction that “correctly indicate[d] that the jury
should compare the parts of the two songs that are similar in determining
substantial similarity”), abrogated on other grounds by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010). The district court did not err by considering
all versions of the songs in the record.
          Additionally, Johnston contends the works at issue are strikingly
similar because they have similar hooks and lyrics. But he has not raised a
material fact issue on whether these alleged similarities are so unique that
they “can only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence,
independent creation, or prior common source.” Guzman, 808 F.3d at 1039.

          _____________________
          3
           Johnston argues that the “more discerning observer” test should apply to the
striking similarity analysis because “factual copying cannot be sustained on the basis of
unprotectable elements.” But we have previously held that a plaintiff can show factual
copying in part by pointing to “any similarities between the two works, even as to
unprotectable elements.” Batiste, 976 F.3d at 502 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Thus, the “more discerning observer” test is inapplicable to striking similarity.

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                                 No. 23-50254

       Johnston’s expert first opines that the hooks of the songs are strikingly
similar. He states that there are “clear lyrical similarities” between the two
hooks: “Gonna be a rock star someday” in Johnston’s work, and “Hey, hey,
I wanna be a rockstar” in Nickelback’s work.          Johnston’s expert also
contends that there are musical similarities “between the two hooks.”
However, even under Johnston’s expert’s analysis, the melodic and
harmonic similarities between the two hooks are not so great as to preclude
all explanations but copying. Further, Johnston fails to raise a material fact
issue on whether these alleged similarities arise in a “unique or complex
context.” See id. (quotation omitted). As the summary judgment record
reflects, several other Nickelback songs and other songs in the rock genre
share the same similarities. See id. at 1040 (affirming finding of no striking
similarity because the alleged similarities were “either common to the
Tejano genre or common in other songs”).
       Johnston’s argument that the rest of the songs’ lyrics create striking
similarity also fails. Johnston’s expert categorizes the lyrics into common
themes such as “making lots of money,” “connections to famous people,”
and “references to sports.” But these broad categories are mere clichés of
being a rockstar that are not unique to the rock genre. Singing about being a
rockstar is not limited to Johnston. Further, organizing the lyrics into these
categories overstates their similarities. For example, Johnston contends both
songs lyricize about sports. Well, Johnston’s work includes the phrase
“Might buy the Cowboys and that’s how I’ll spend my Sundays,” but
Nickelback’s work includes the phrases “And a bathroom I can play baseball
in” and “It’s like the bottom of the ninth and I’m never gonna win.” These
lyrics reference different sports in different contexts, and do not approach
the threshold of striking similarity. No reasonable juror would think that
Nickelback could have produced its lyric about baseball only by copying
Johnston’s lyric about football. Indeed, we have previously held that two

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songs were not strikingly similar despite “nearly identical” opening lyrics.
Id. Accordingly, Johnston has not raised a fact issue as to striking similarity.
Put another way, these two songs are simply not sufficiently similar.
       In sum, because he has not shown factual copying with either a
combination of access and probative similarity, or striking similarity,
Johnston’s copyright infringement claim fails.
                             IV.     Conclusion
       For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to the defendants. 4

       _____________________
       4
          Because summary judgment for the defendants is proper, we do not reach the
other issues raised on appeal.

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