Court Opinion

ID: 9753217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:04:00.098121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:33.894623
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
Although I concur in the result, I find many of the views contained in the majority opinion to be wholly unacceptable. I am thus impelled to explain my disagreements.
*567I. Guilty Plea
I agree with the majority that the trial court did not in the instant case violate the settled rule that “if a defendant pleads guilty to a criminal charge and in the next breath contravenes the plea by asserting facts which, if true, would establish that he is not guilty, then his guilty plea is of no effect and should be rejected.” Commonwealth v. Roundtree, 440 Pa. 199, 202, 269 A. 2d 709, 711 (1970). See also, United States ex rel. Crosby v. Brierley, 404 P. 2d 790, 801-02 (3d Cir. 1968); Hulsey v. United States, 369 P. 2d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1966).
The necessary elements of the defense of prior withdrawal were definitively set forth by this Court in Commonwealth v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547, 135 Atl. 313 (1926) : “[The defendant] joined in the common design, and is responsible for the acts of each naturally to be expected to occur in carrying it out. It is true that he could hare abandoned the enterprise, and given sufficient time to the others to do likewise, and thus have relieved himself from liability for subsequent acts of his fellows. But he cannot escape responsibility for an act which is the probable consequence of the criminal scheme which he has helped to devise and carry forward. To have this result, there must be an actual and effective voluntary withdrawal before the act in question has become so imminent that its avoidance is practically out of the question. . . .” Id. at 551-52, 135 Atl. at 315 (citations omitted).
Shortly after his plea of guilty to murder generally, appellant testified at the degree of guilt hearing that he had bolted from the taxicab after his co-felon had drawn a pistol and that he was but thirty-five to fifty feet away when the co-felon fatally shot the driver. Since appellant by his own admission “withdrew” only after the murder weapon had already been brandished *568and Ms fligM occurred only a few scant seconds before the homicide, his testimony at the degree of guilt hearing did not establish a defense to the felony murder charge.
The majority opinion continues, however, by propounding the following dictum: “[A] guilty plea coupled solely with a flat deMal of responsibility is entirely separate and distinct from a guilty plea accompanied by an assertion of facts establishing an affirmative defense; in the latter situation, it is error to accept the guilty plea.” TMs is surely a distinction without a difference, unsupported by either reason or precedent.
One rationale underlying the rule forbidding the acceptance of a guilty plea coupled with a substantially contemporaneous assertion of exculpatory facts is the recogmtion that such a situation raises a substantial possibility that the plea is not voluntary and understanding. See Commonwealth v. Roundtree, supra, 440 Pa. at 202, 269 A. 2d at 711. The rule also reflects a wholesome reluctance to permit an innocent person to seal his own doom, for the proper administration of criminal justice certainly requires a concern for the acquittal of the innocent as well as the conviction of the guilty. It would seem indisputable that these same concerns are equally applicable to “a guilty plea coupled solely with a flat denial of responsibility”. Thus, the American Bar Association Project on Mínimum Standards for Criminal Justice has concluded: “On the other hand, if the defendant is called upon to make a statement and he demes commission of the offense, then, notwithstanding the existence of other information tending to verify the accuracy of the plea, it would be inappropriate for the judge to enter judgment on the plea.” Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty §1.6, Commentary (Approved Draft, 1968).
*569Nor is the majority’s distinction in any way supported by prior decisions of this Court. The majority opinion cites Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 433 Pa. 177, 249 A. 2d 294 (1969), but that decision explicitly and unequivocally rejects the majority’s present position. Writing for a unanimous Court in Cottrell, Mr. Justice Eagen stated: “[W]here the accused at the time of arraignment does not know, or asserts that he does not know, whether he has committed the crime, a plea of guilty to that crime should be accepted with great caution. However, such a situation, as the one just described, is not to be equated with a situation where the accused admits his guilt in one breath, but in the next proclaims his innocence. The latter clearly loould not be a sufficient plea upon which to enter a judgment” Id. at 178-79, 249 A. 2d at 295 (emphasis added).
The majority’s reliance upon North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), is equally misplaced. In Alford, the United States Supreme Court held that a state trial court commits no federal constitutional error when it accepts a guilty plea accompanied by a protestation of innocence when there is other strong evidence of the defendant’s actual guilt. Had our prior decisions in this area been reluctantly arrived at under the compulsion of analogous United States Supreme Court decisions, the Alford decision might indeed be an appropriate signal for reexamination and reevaluation of our prior case law. That, however, was not the case. Cottrell and Roundtree were salutary when decided and are equally salutary today. That they may no longer be constitutionally compelled is no reason why this Court should summarily disavow them.
In sum, I believe that a guilty plea should not be accepted if coupled either (a) with the assertion of exculpatory facts or (b) with a proclamation of innocence.
*570II. Character Evidence
I likewise concur with the conclusion that the exclusion of evidence of appellant’s good character from the degree of guilt hearing was not reversible error, but I do so solely on the ground that appellant failed to object to the court’s deferral of the receipt of such evidence until after the fixing of the degree of guilt.
It has long been the law that a defendant in a murder trial may introduce evidence of his own good character in order to attempt to convince the trier of fact of his innocence. See, e.g., Commonwealth, v. Aston, 227 Pa. 106, 75 Atl. 1017 (1910); 1 Wigmore on Evidence §55 (3d Ed. 1940). This same rule of admissibility should likewise prevail at a degree of guilt hearing following a plea of guilty to murder generally.
In this Commonwealth there is no such thing as a plea of guilty to first degree murder. If the prosecution desires to obtain such a conviction following a plea of guilty to a charge of murder, it must prove all of the elements of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Andrews v. Russell, 420 Pa. 4, 6, 215 A. 2d 857, 858 (1966); Commonwealth v. Kurus, 371 Pa. 633, 637, 92 A. 2d 196, 198 (1952); Commonwealth v. Chapman, 359 Pa. 164, 58 A. 2d 433 (1948); Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 Atl. 823 (1935). In other words, the Commonwealth must establish that the homicide was “willful, deliberate and premeditated” or that it occurred in the commission or attempt to commit any one of certain enumerated felonies. Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §701, as amended, 18 P.S. §4701. In either case, evidence of the accused’s good character would be relevant to negate willfulness, deliberation and premeditation or, if the prosecution’s theory be felony murder, to raise a reasonable doubt as to his participation in the felony.
*571Despite the above, the majority declares that “a guilty plea in a felon-murder case normally removes the issue of participation.” I can find no basis for this assertion. Appellant only pleaded guilty to murder, and in so pleading he did not admit participation in robbery or any other felony or forego his right to raise any defense to first degree murder.
Mr. Justice O’Brien joins in this concurring opinion.