Court Opinion

ID: 9914785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 07:07:38.619631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:29.060069
License: Public Domain

DISSENT and Opinion Filed December 28, 2023

                                    S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-23-00839-CR

                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant
                                  V.
                         IQBAL JIVANI, Appellee

         On Appeal from the County Criminal Court of Appeals No. 1
                           Dallas County, Texas
                   Trial Court Cause No. MC23-R0001-D

       DISSENTING OPINION FROM DENIAL OF EN BANC
                    CONSIDERATION
                      by Justice Goldstein

      The State appeals the county criminal court of appeals’ (CCCA) judgment

affirming the judgment of the municipal court of record quashing the complaint

against appellee, Iqbal Jivani. The panel questions and finds that this Court lacks

jurisdiction over the appeal, summarily dismissing this cause for want of jurisdiction

under this Court’s precedent in State v. Villa, 673 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2023, pet. filed). I requested that the Court consider this issue en banc, which it

refused to do. For the reasons I stated in Villa, I disagree and respectfully dissent.

See Villa, 673 S.W.3d at 50 (Goldstein, J., dissenting); see also O’Connor v. First
Court of Appeals, 837 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1992) (“[W]hen a court of appeals votes

against hearing a case en banc, any member of the court is entitled to file a dissent,

regardless of whether the judge was on the original panel deciding the case.”).

      I write, not to belabor or reiterate my dissent in Villa, but rather, merely to

highlight the perpetuation and exacerbation of the analytical infirmities prevalent in

Villa, as well as Pugh, the opinion on which the Villa majority relied. See State v.

Pugh, No. 02-21-00108-CR, 2022 WL 1793518, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June

2, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The Code of Criminal

Procedure, Article 44.01, provides in part that:

      (a) The state is entitled to appeal an order of a court in a criminal case
      if the order:

          (1) dismisses an indictment, information, or complaint or any
              portion of an indictment, information, or complaint; [or]

          ...

          (3) grants a new trial;

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a)(1), (3). Villa and Pugh involved the

State’s appeal under subsection (a)(3). Villa, 673 S.W.3d at 44; Pugh, 2022 WL

1793518, at *1. Here, the CCCA affirmed the municipal court’s judgment quashing

the complaint and dismissing the charges, thus invoking the State’s right of appeal

under subsection (a)(1). The panel concludes that Article 44.01 is trumped by

Chapter 30 of the Government Code. I disagree. When, as here, the CCCA affirms

the judgment of the municipal court of record quashing the complaint and dismissing

                                         –2–
the charges, the State may appeal that decision pursuant to § 30.00014 because

§ 30.00014 provides that the “state has the right to appeal as provided by Article

44.01, Code of Criminal Procedure” and Article 44.01 provides that the State may

appeal the dismissal of a complaint. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 30.00014; see also

Villa, 673 S.W.3d at 55 (Goldstein, J., dissenting).

      What sets this case apart from Villa and Pugh is the panel’s interpretation and

thus its determination that the CCCA may make a final, non-appealable ruling

establishing the facial unconstitutionality of a municipal ordinance. The panel

concludes that when a county criminal court of appeals, a court of limited appellate

jurisdiction, affirms the municipal court’s quashing of the complaint, this Court, as

the constitutional appellate court, lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. The panel

reasons that “when the State appealed the dismissal of the complaint to the county

criminal court of appeals, it received its appeal under article 44.01.” In other words,

the panel specifically determines that the State’s right of appeal was exhausted, not

just as a practical matter but as a clear demarcation, precluding, without

equivocation, appellate review by the intermediate appellate courts or the Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals. The panel thus abdicates its appellate jurisdiction and

once again makes the CCCA the appellate court of last resort in criminal cases

originating in a municipal court of record.

      The State argues that interpreting Chapter 30 of the Government Code to

preclude appellate review of a CCCA decision to uphold a municipal court of record

                                         –3–
ruling that strikes down as facially unconstitutional a municipal ordinance would

lead to absurd results. The panel rejects this argument, holding that even if the result

is inequitable, it is not absurd. I disagree. The Texas Constitution provides that:

      The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have final appellate jurisdiction
      coextensive with the limits of the state, and its determinations shall be
      final, in all criminal cases of whatever grade, with such exceptions and
      under such regulations as may be provided in this Constitution or as
      prescribed by law.

TEX. CONST. art. V § 5(a) (emphasis added). Although this provision authorizes the

Legislature to limit appellate jurisdiction in some contexts, such a limitation must

be expressly stated. See id.; Ex parte Golden, 991 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999) (where Legislature intends a statute to be jurisdictional, it makes that intent

clear). In contrast, the panel’s opinion construes Chapter 30 of the Government Code

as an implicit limitation of jurisdiction, thus imbuing the CCCA with final authority

to determine the facial constitutionality of, and as a practical matter strike down, a

municipal ordinance. Such a regime allows for a particular ordinance enacted in

substantially the same form by two different Texas cities to be ruled constitutional

in one and unconstitutional in the other, with no recourse to, or review by,

constitutional appellate courts. This is an absurd result that runs contrary to what the

People of Texas intended when they adopted Article V, Section 5(a) of the

Constitution and vested the court of criminal appeals with final appellate jurisdiction

in all criminal cases.

                                          –4–
        The State has filed a petition for discretionary review in Villa, supported by

two amicus curiae briefs, all of which aptly set forth the issues relative to the scope

of jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate courts and the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals as it relates to municipal courts of record.1 The Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals has before it the opportunity to provide clarity and guidance in this

important, unique, and unprecedented jurisdictional conundrum of constitutional

magnitude. Alternatively, I would once again invite the Legislature to revisit the

issue of the State’s right to appeal and whether it intended to expressly divest the

intermediate courts of appeal or the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals of jurisdiction

in this context.

                                          CONCLUSION

        I would grant en banc consideration and conclude that we have jurisdiction

over this appeal. Because the Court fails to do so, I respectfully dissent.

                                                      /Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
Publish                                               BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)                               JUSTICE
230839DF.P05

    1
      State’s Pet. for Discretionary Rev., State v. Villa, No. PD-056-23 (Tex. Crim. App. filed Oct. 24,
2023); Br. for City of Plano as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, State v. Villa, No. PD-056-23 (Tex.
Crim. App. filed Nov. 8, 2023); Br. for Tex. Mun. Cts. Educ. Ctr. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
State v. Villa, No. PD-056-23 (Tex. Crim. App. filed Nov. 26, 2023). On December 13, 2023, the court of
criminal appeals struck the State’s petition for discretionary review for noncompliance with Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 68.6 and provided the State thirty days to redraw its petition. See State v. Villa, No.
PD-0756-23, 2023 WL 8613846, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2023). As of the date of this opinion, the
State has not yet redrawn its petition.
                                                   –5–