Court Opinion

ID: 9569129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:10:47.526159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:49:31.172414
License: Public Domain

Banke, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Monroe v. Sigler, 256 Ga. 759 (353 SE2d 23) (1987), contains language which, stripped of its context, supports the majority’s holding in this case, I believe the majority’s decision extends the holding in Monroe v. Sigler well beyond its intended parameters.
As I read Monroe v. Sigler, it precludes a plaintiff from pursuing an action for malicious prosecution where, during the trial of the criminal case, the trial judge made a “binding” determination on motion for directed verdict that there was sufficient evidence of guilt to warrant sending the case to the jury, i.e., to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the plaintiff guilty of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. As interpreted by the majority, however, Monroe v. Sigler goes much further. It creates an absolute bar to an action for malicious prosecution not merely in those cases where the criminal trial judge allowed the case to go to the jury over a motion for directed verdict, but also in those cases where, after initially refusing to *568direct a verdict of acquittal, the judge ultimately granted the motion.
In Monroe v. Sigler, only one motion for directed verdict was made, and its denial thus constituted the court’s final ruling with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence. It was under those circumstances that the Supreme Court construed the denial of the motion to be a “binding determination of the existence of probable cause.” Id. at 761. In the present case, the judge’s initial denial of the plaintiff’s motion for directed verdict at the close of the state’s evidence was obviously not “binding” because it was superseded by the judge’s later decision to grant the motion upon its renewal at the close of all the evidence in the criminal case.
The majority’s holding in the present case not only extends the holding in Monroe v. Sigler well beyond its actual facts, it ignores the practical realities that often attend and influence the disposition of initial motions for directed verdict in criminal cases. For example, even where the state has failed to make out a prima facie showing of guilt, a trial judge may nevertheless legitimately choose to deny an initial motion for directed verdict made at the close of the state’s evidence in order to give the defendant an opportunity to supply the missing element of proof during the presentation of his defense. See Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371 (1) (219 SE2d 743) (1975); Hearn v. State, 145 Ga. App. 469 (1) (243 SE2d 728) (1978). “[T]he fact that the evidence at the close of the state’s case may have been insufficient to convict is not controlling so long as all the evidence justifies the conviction under the appropriate standard.” Walls v. State, 161 Ga. App. 625, 627 (288 SE2d 769) (1982), citing Hearn v. State, supra.
Conversely, the state’s evidence, standing alone, may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case yet be insufficient to support a conviction in the context of subsequent evidence establishing an uncontroverted defense or otherwise negating the basis for a finding that the defendant acted with criminal intent. See, e.g., Butler v. State, 252 Ga. 135 (311 SE2d 473) (1984) (murder conviction reversed on basis of uncontroverted evidence establishing insanity defense); Hughes v. State, 152 Ga. App. 80 (262 SE2d 245) (1979) (drug conviction reversed on basis of uncontradicted entrapment defense); Wright v. State, 121 Ga. App. 21 (172 SE2d 457) (1970) (larceny conviction reversed on basis of defendant’s testimony satisfactorily explaining his possession of stolen property in manner consistent with state’s evidence); Gilbert v. State, 94 Ga. App. 217 (94 SE2d 109) (1956) (homicide conviction reversed based on defense testimony establishing justification).
Clearly, the state’s ability to produce evidence which, considered in isolation, is sufficient to establish a prima facie case is not always dispositive of the issue of whether the evidence as a whole was sufficient to support a conviction. Similarly, the state’s ability to establish *569a prima facie case should not always be treated as dispositive of the issue of whether the criminal prosecution was supported by probable cause. Such a determination should be made on the basis of all the evidence, not just the evidence favorable to the prosecution.
Decided March 11, 1988
Rehearing denied March 29, 1988
Frank J. Beltran, Patrick M. Anagnostakis, Manley F. Brown, Audrey P. Biloon, for appellant.
H. Jerome Strickland, Craig N. Cowart, for appellees.
This is not a novel concept. We have previously held that “[w]hile a prosecutor need not be fully satisfied of the truth of the charge that he makes in his affidavit, and is not required to have a sufficient statement of fact to guarantee a conviction, nevertheless, where slight diligence would have brought to his attention facts which would have shown conclusively that there could be no conviction, whether or not he is guilty of malicious prosecution is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.” Auld v. Colonial Stores, 76 Ga. App. 329 (3) (c) (45 SE2d 827) (1947). Similarly, we have held that liability for malicious prosecution may attach although the initiation of the criminal prosecution was justified by the circumstances then known to the prosecutor, where, upon later being apprised of facts establishing the accused’s innocence, the prosecutor failed to request that the prosecution be terminated. See Voliton v. Piggly Wiggly, 161 Ga. App. 813, 815 (288 SE2d 924) (1982).
Because I do not believe that the Supreme Court’s decision in Monroe v. Sigler, supra, operates to defeat the appellant’s claim in the present case, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier, Judge Benham, and Judge Beasley join in this dissent.