Court Opinion

ID: 9682545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:13:09.636382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:40.026897
License: Public Domain

Frank Holt, Justice. The appellant was charged with second degree murder in the shooting death of Wiley Johnson, Jr. A jury convicted him of manslaughter [Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1504 (Repl. 1977)] and fixed his punishment at ten years imprisonment. He was incarcerated and later released on bail pending this appeal. In a pretrial confession the appellant admitted shooting Johnson but contended that he had done so in self-defense and had only intended to injure Johnson sufficiently to stop Johnson’s alleged assault. Appellant’s present counsel, who did not represent him at trial, acknowledges, after reviewing the record, that the only tenable ground for appeal is that the appellant did not have effective assistance of trial counsel in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights (Art. 2, § 10, Const, of Ark. [1874] and Sixth Amendment, U. S. Const.). He also argues we should overrule Hilliard v. State, 259 Ark. 81, 531 S.W.2d 643 (1976), which holds a defendant may not prosecute a direct appeal on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel absent an objection in the trial court. Here, appellant’s argument of ineffective assistance of counsel was not presented to the trial court. We affirm. In Hilliard, where the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, as here, was not raised in the trial court, we pointed out that the proper procedure for assessing the quality of legal representation is either through a motion for a new trial or a motion for postconviction relief in the trial court, because an evidentiary hearing there on “many facets” of the case better equips us to review the sufficiency of representation at trial. This case perfectly illustrates the wisdom of our rule. Appellant argues that his retained trial counsel, by allowing and advising him to confess, supplied the state with inculpatory proof that the state very well might not have been able to otherwise obtain. Further, his counsel’s cross-examination of witnesses was totally irrelevant, resulting in the net effect of strengthening the state’s case. Also, his counsel’s failure to object to improper and irrelevant inquiries on cross-examination of defense witnesses by the state portrayed the appellant as an evil man. Appellant argues that the record here establishes by clear and convincing evidence that appellant’s trial counsel was so grossly inadequate that it resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights of effective assistance of counsel and, therefore, it is unnecessary for an evidentiary hearing in the trial court to determine the competency and efficiency of trial counsel. An evidentiary hearing and finding as to the competency of appellant’s counsel by the trial court would, as Hilliard holds, “better equip us on review to examine in detail the sufficiency of the representation.” We decline to overrule or modify Hilliard. We are not alone in requiring such claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to be presented first to the trial court. See U.S. v. Mims, 440 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1971); U.S. v. Stephens, 609 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Rodriguez, 582 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1978); Grover v. State, 41 Md. App. 705, 398 A.2d 528 (1979); and Foster v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 443 (Ky. 1964). As alternative relief, appellant asks, in the event his conviction is affirmed, that we now grant permission for him to proceed in the circuit court for postconviction relief pursuant to A.R.Cr.P., Rule 37, without being required to file a formal petition here for postconviction relief. Rule 37.1 requires that a motion for postconviction relief must be verified. We recognized this requirement in Carey v. State, 268 Ark. 332, 596 S.W.2d 688 (1980), where we said: “... Rule 37.1 requires that motions for postconviction relief be verified and be filed with the court, a requirement of substantive importance to prevent perjury.” Rule 37.2 provides: “If the conviction in the original case was appealed to the Supreme Court, then no proceedings under this rule shall be entertained by the circuit court without prior permission of the Supreme Court.” We adhere to the requirement that a formal verified petition for postconviction relief be filed in this court, following our affirmance, for permission to proceed in the trial court. Affirmed. Purtle, J., dissents.