Court Opinion

ID: 9372884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:20.683818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.507619
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     CHRISTOPHER SKUBIK,                             DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         PH-1221-16-0347-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: February 9, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Christopher Skubik, Havre de Grace, Maryland, pro se.

           Justin D. Wilde, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied his request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA)
     appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we VACATE the initial decision and

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     REMAND this matter to the Northeastern Regional Office for further adjudication
     in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant is a GS-14 Supervisory Operations Research Analyst
     (ORA) and the branch chief of the Systems Analysis Branch in the agency’s
     Cost &    Systems      Analysis    Division,     Resource     Management       Office,
     Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM).               Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 1 at 1; Tab 22 at 6; Tab 45, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) 2 (testimony of the
     appellant); see IAF, Tab 41 at 4. In October 2014, the agency advertised a GS-15
     supervisory ORA position; the incumbent was to serve as the division chief of the
     Cost & Systems Analysis Division.        IAF, Tab 6 at 14-24, Tab 22 at 6, HCD 2
     (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor).       The appellant’s former
     first-level supervisor, who served as the CECOM deputy director, was the
     selecting official for the position. HCD 2 (testimony of the appellant’s first-level
     supervisor). 2 She first selected an applicant who declined the position; she then
     selected a second applicant who accepted the position, but the offer was later
     rescinded because the applicant did not meet the educational requirements of the
     position, and no further selections were made.          IAF, Tab 38 at 12, HCD 2
     (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor). The appellant applied and
     interviewed for the position, but he was not selected. IAF, Tab 6 at 12.
¶3         After learning of his nonselection in January 2015, the appellant expressed
     concerns about the selection process to his first-level supervisor; his former
     second-level supervisor, who served as the CECOM director 3; the deputy to the
     commanding general; and a staff member of the agency’s Office of Inspector

     2
       The appellant’s former first-level supervisor retired from the Federal service. HCD 2
     (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor).
     3
       The appellant’s former second-level supervisor has since transferred to another
     position within the agency. IAF, Tab 44, HCD 1 (testimony of the appellant’s
     second-level supervisor).
                                                                                             3

     General (OIG). IAF, Tab 8 at 12-14. In April 2015, the agency re-advertised the
     GS-15 supervisory ORA position.            IAF, Tab 6 at 36-47.         The appellant’s
     second-level supervisor served as the selecting official and selected the same
     applicant to whom the position was last offered, but the offer was subsequently
     rescinded and the vacancy announcement cancelled. IAF, Tab 38 at 13-14. The
     appellant again applied and interviewed for the position, but he learned in
     May 2015 that he was not selected. IAF, Tab 8 at 19.
¶4         On June 17, 2015, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special
     Counsel (OSC) in which he alleged that his first- and second-level supervisors
     had provided unauthorized preferences or advantages to applicants external to his
     division during the selection processes for the GS-15 supervisory ORA position
     and retaliated against him for raising concerns about the first selection process.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 8 at 4-24. In letters dated April 8, 2016, OSC informed the
     appellant that it had closed its file regarding the complaint and notified him of his
     appeal rights. IAF, Tab 1 at 7-9.
¶5         On June 9, 2016, the appellant filed an IRA appeal with the Board alleging
     that, in retaliation for raising concerns about unfair and prohibited hiring
     practices to his chain of command, he was subjected to the following personnel
     actions:   (1) on January 12, 2015, his first-level supervisor sent him an email
     threatening him with disciplinary action; (2) on May 27, 2015, he was not
     selected for the GS-15 supervisory ORA position; and (3) he was excluded from
     key decisions within his division, which included his firs t-level supervisor’s
     failure to include him in decisions over assigning interns and selecting staff
     members to attend a September 2015 conference. 4 IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 8 at 4-24,

     4
       The appellant acknowledged that his OSC complaint alleged that prohibited personnel
     practices occurred during the first GS-15 supervisory ORA selection process, but that
     he was only contesting the personnel actions described above, which he alleged were
     taken in retaliation for his voicing concerns after the first selection process. IAF,
     Tab 13 at 4. The administrative judge subsequently dismissed any allegations regarding
     the first nonselection process because it occurred prio r to any disclosures. IAF, Tab 16.
                                                                                        4

     Tab 9 at 29, Tab 13 at 4, 10, 18. The appellant requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1
     at 2.     In her order summarizing the telephonic prehearing conference, the
     administrative judge stated that, “it appears that the agency has conceded that the
     appellant has made what he believes to be a protected disclosure and has met the
     knowledge and timing test with regard to such disclosure in relation to the
     agency’s selection decision,” and she dictated that the hearing should focus on
     whether the agency could prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would
     have made the same selection decision and taken the same personnel actions
     absent the appellant’s protected activity.      IAF, Tab 29 at 4.     Neither party
     objected to this portion of the order.
¶6            Following a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     denying the appellant’s request for corrective action.        IAF, Tab 46, Initial
     Decision (ID).     The administrative judge found that, as to the May 27, 2015
     nonselection, the agency conceded that the appellant made what he believed to be
     a protected disclosure and met the knowledge/timing test.           ID at 11.    The
     administrative judge then found that the January 12, 2015 email and the
     appellant’s supervisors’ failure to assess his leadership skills before he attended a
     leadership program were not personnel actions. ID at 12-13, 16. Next, she found
     that the appellant met the knowledge/timing test concerning the intern assignment
     and conference attendance decisions. ID at 13-16. However, the administrative
     judge found that that the agency showed by clear and convincing evidence that it
     would have taken the same actions absent the appellant’s protected activity. ID
     at 38.     In support of her finding, she found that the evidence unequivocally
     supported management’s decisions during the second selection process to assign
     interns and to choose staff to attend the conference. ID at 17-35. She also found
     that, while the appellant’s first- and second-level supervisors had some motive to
     retaliate, there was no evidence of retaliation, and there was little evidence of
     how the agency treated similarly situated non-whistleblowers. ID at 35-38.
                                                                                         5

¶7         The appellant has filed a petition for review alleging that the administrative
     judge erred in finding that the January 12, 2015 email and his supervisors’ failure
     to complete the leadership assessment were not personnel actions and challenging
     numerous findings that the administrative judge made in concluding that the
     agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the
     nonselection, intern assignment, and conference attendance decisions absent the
     appellant’s protected activity.      Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.       The
     agency has filed an opposition to the petition. PFR File, Tab 3. As set forth
     below, we find that the administrative judge erred in failing to identify and
     analyze the appellant’s alleged protected disclosure and, as a result, we remand
     this matter for further adjudication.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The appellant exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC and established
     Board jurisdiction over his appeal.
¶8         To establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal brought pursuant to the
     Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), the appellant must
     exhaust his administrative remedies before OSC and make nonfrivolous
     allegations that:    (1) he made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the protected disclosure or activity
     was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a
     personnel   action    as   defined      by   5 U.S.C.   § 2302(a)(2)(A). 5   5 U.S.C.
     §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(e)(1); Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R.
     230, ¶ 5 (2016). The administrative judge dismissed for lack of jurisdiction any
     allegations of wrongdoing that occurred prior to any allegedly protected

     5
      During the pendency of this appeal, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
     Year 2018 (NDAA), Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, was signed into law on
     December 12, 2017. Section 1097 of the NDAA amended various provisions of Title 5
     of the U.S. Code. Our decision to remand this appeal would be the same under both
     pre- and post-NDAA law.
                                                                                        6

      disclosures.   IAF, Tab 16. The administrative judge implicitly found that the
      appellant exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC              and made
      nonfrivolous allegations sufficient to establish Board jurisdiction over th e appeal
      as to the remaining claims. IAF, Tab 16, Tab 29 at 1-2; ID at 8. We discern no
      basis for disturbing the administrative judge’s implicit findings on exhaustion. In
      particular, we find that the written record, specifically the appellant’s OSC
      complaint, shows that he exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC as to
      the claims at issue. IAF, Tab 8 at 4-24, Tab 13 at 4.
¶9          Additionally, in dismissing allegations of wrongdoing that occurred before
      any allegedly protected disclosures, the administrative judge discussed the
      evidence the appellant submitted in support of his claim that he made at least one
      protected disclosure and narrowed the scope of the appeal to whether the agency
      retaliated against him for “engaging in whistleblowing activity” by taking or
      failing to take four alleged personnel actions. IAF, Tab 16. In narrowing the
      scope, the administrative judge implicitly found that the appellant made
      nonfrivolous allegations that he made at least one protected disclosure, and the
      protected disclosure was a contributing factor in the four alleged personnel
      actions, thus finding Board jurisdiction over the remaining claims. Id. Neither
      party disputes the Board’s jurisdiction over these claims, nor do we discern a
      reason to disturb the administrative judge’s implicit findings that the appellant
      made nonfrivolous allegations sufficient to establish Board jurisdiction over
      his appeal.

      The administrative judge failed to identify or analyze the protected disclosure or
      activity in which the appellant engaged and whether the disclosure or activity was
      a contributing factor in the personnel actions at issue.
¶10         Once Board jurisdiction is established over an IRA appeal, the appellant
      may be entitled to corrective action if he proves by preponderant evidence that he
      made a protected disclosure or engaged in protected activity, and that the
      protected disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in a pe rsonnel action
                                                                                             7

      that was taken or is to be taken against him. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Corthell v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8 (2016). However, the
      Board will not order corrective action if the agency then proves by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the
      absence of the protected disclosure or activity. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); Corthell,
      123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8.
¶11         As to the May 27, 2015 nonselection, the administrative judge, citing to the
      agency’s failure to object to her prehearing order, found that the agency conceded
      the appellant made what he believed to be a protected disclosure and met the
      knowledge/timing test. ID at 11. However, regardless of any concessions by the
      agency, “[t]he question of whether a disclosure is protected under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8) is a matter of mixed fact and law and stipulations relating to such
      matters are not binding.”     Jensen v. Department of Agriculture, 104 M.S.P.R.
      379, ¶ 7 (2007) (quoting Schneider v. Department of Homeland Security,
      98 M.S.P.R. 377, ¶ 17 n.4 (2005)) 6; cf. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.63 (providing that parties
      may stipulate to matters of fact). The administrative judge thus erred in failing to
      independently analyze whether the appellant proved by preponderant evidence
      that he made a protected disclosure, and that the protected disclosure was a
      contributing factor in a personnel action taken against him.
¶12         The administrative judge also failed to identify the disclosure, or
      disclosures, made by the appellant. ID at 11. Although the administrative judge
      found that, according to the appellant, he first raised “an issue regarding the
      selection process with the agency on January 9, 2015,” and she discussed the
      appellant’s meetings with his first- and second-level supervisors on that date, she

      6
        The WPEA, which became effective on December 27, 2012, does not affect the
      relevant holding in the cited authority, nor does it affect the rel evant holdings in the
      other authorities cited herein that were issued prior to the effective date of the WPEA.
      See Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465.
                                                                                         8

      did not identify the content of the appellant’s disclosure, nor did she identify
      whether the appellant made a disclosure to one or both supervisors. ID at 3.
¶13         Our review of the record evidence reflects that the appellant has not proven
      by preponderant evidence that he made a protected disclosure on or before
      January 9, 2015.    He maintained throughout the proceedings below that on
      January 7, 2015, when he learned in a meeting with his first-level supervisor that
      he was not selected for the GS-15 supervisory ORA position, he “questioned” the
      “criteria and weights” she used in scoring the applicants.        IAF, Tab 8 at 12,
      HCD 2 (testimony of the appellant). The appellant also maintained that, during a
      January 9, 2015 meeting with his first-level supervisor, he told her that he did not
      understand how a “non-ORA” could have been better qualified than him and that
      “something just didn’t add up[.]”       IAF, Tab 8 at 12, Tab 24 at 34, HCD 2
      (testimony of the appellant).      The appellant further alleged that, also on
      January 9, 2015, he met with his second-level supervisor and “shared the same
      concerns” he had expressed to his first-level supervisor, and he told her that he
      “had strong reservations that the scoring matrix was done correctly from a
      mathematical perspective” and that the scoring criteria and weights “could have
      been determined in such a way as to benefit a ‘non-ORA’” that did not work in
      his division.   IAF, Tab 8 at 13, HCD 2 (testimony of the appellant).            The
      appellant asserted that he subsequently met with the deputy to the commanding
      general on January 26, 2015, to “outline the specifics of my concerns,” and with
      an OIG staff member on February 6, 2015, to “go over my concerns.” IAF, Tab 8
      at 14-16.
¶14         The appellant has not established that his statements to his supervisors on or
      before January 9, 2015, reflected a reasonable belief that his first-level supervisor
      had violated a law, rule, or regulation by granting unauthorized preference or
      treatment during the first selection process.     Under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(6), an
      agency employee with the authority to take, recommend, or approve a personnel
      action is prohibited from granting any preference or advantage not authorized by
                                                                                         9

      law, rule, or regulation to any employee or applicant for the purpose of improving
      or harming the prospects of any particular individual for employment.
      McDonnell v. Department of Agriculture, 108 M.S.P.R. 443, ¶ 12 (2008). Title 5,
      section 2302(b)(12) of the U.S. Code provides that it is a prohibited personnel
      practice to take or fail to take a personnel action if doing so violate s any law,
      rule, or regulation implementing or directly concerning merit system principles ,
      which, among other things, mandate protection against personal favoritism and
      provide that recruitment should be from qualified individuals. McDonnell, 108
      M.S.P.R. 443, ¶ 12; 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(1). The appellant’s communications with
      his supervisors asserted that the selection process could have benefitted
      individuals that did not perform the same duties as he did or did not work in his
      division.   Yet, he did not allege any specific violation of a law, rule, or
      regulation, nor would a disinterested observer with knowledge of the facts known
      to him at the time conclude that a violation of merit system principles had
      occurred simply because applicants with diverse qualifications scored higher than
      he did during the selection process.         See, e.g., Gryder v. Department of
      Transportation, 100 M.S.P.R. 564, ¶ 13 (2005) (finding that the appellant did not
      make a nonfrivolous allegation of a disclosure of wrongdoing whe n he did not
      disclose facts that led him to conclude that the agency hired candidates who
      retired before they could be trained and hired unqualified candidates).         Such
      vague, conclusory allegations of wrongdoing are insufficient to constitute a
      protected disclosure. Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶¶ 6-7.
¶15         However, it appears undisputed that at some point during his conversations
      with agency officials and an OIG staff member, the appellant disclosed that his
      first-level supervisor allegedly had selected one of her neighbors during the first
      selection process, and such a disclosure is sufficient to allege a violation of merit
      system principles and an abuse of authority. See, e.g., Schaeffer v. Department of
      the Navy, 86 M.S.P.R. 606, ¶¶ 9-10 (2000) (holding that the appellants’
      disclosures that agency officials in charge of a re-engineering study conducted it
                                                                                       10

      so as to reward friends and punish perceived enemies constituted a nonfrivolous
      allegation of a disclosure of a violation of law and an abuse of authority),
      overruled on other grounds by Covarrubias v. Social Security Administration,
      113 M.S.P.R. 583, ¶ 9 n.2 (2010), overruled on other grounds by Colbert v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶ 12 n.5 (2014). Moreover,
      the appellant’s disclosure of information to an OIG staff member was activity
      protected under the WPEA. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C). Thus, the appellant has
      proven, at a minimum, that he engaged in protected activity as of February 6,
      2015, when he met with the OIG staff member. IAF, Tab 8 at 16. However, the
      record does not reflect the content of the disclosure, or disclosures, the appellant
      has alleged making before this date, and to whom and when the disclosure was
      made. Without evidence concerning the appellant’s alleged disclosure and the
      extent to which the relevant agency officials were aware of the disclosure, the
      administrative judge could not properly evaluate the agency’s evidence that it
      would have taken the relevant personnel actions in the absence of the disclosure;
      in particular, the existence and extent of any retaliatory motive. See Belyakov v.
      Department of Health & Human Services, 120 M.S.P.R. 326, ¶¶ 9-11 (2013)
      (finding that the administrative judge’s limiting testimony regarding the
      appellant’s disclosures resulted in an unduly restrictive view on the existence and
      strength of the agency’s motive to retaliate).
¶16         The administrative judge similarly found that the agency conceded that the
      appellant met the knowledge/timing test and thus did not make independent
      findings as to whether the appellant’s protected disclosure was a contributing
      factor in the personnel actions at issue. ID at 11. An appellant may demonstrate
      that a disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action through
      circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the official taking the personnel
      action knew of the disclosure, and that the personnel action occurred within a
      period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure
      was a contributing factor in the personnel action. Dorney v. Department of the
                                                                                    11

      Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 14 (2012); see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). An appellant
      also may satisfy the knowledge prong of this knowledge/timing test by proving
      that the official taking the action had constructive knowledge of the protected
      disclosure, even if the official lacked actual knowledge. Nasuti v. Department of
      State, 120 M.S.P.R. 588, ¶ 7 (2014).    By the time of the hearing held in this
      matter, many agency officials were aware that the appellant had disclose d
      purported improprieties in the first selection process, but the record does not
      reflect whether each official became aware of his purported protected disclosure
      or activity prior to the personnel actions at issue.    Thus, we are unable to
      ascertain whether the appellant has shown that his purported protected disclosure
      or activity was a contributing factor in the personnel actions. Accordingly, we
      vacate the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant prove d that his
      protected disclosure was a contributing factor in the relevant personnel actions
      and remand this matter for further proceedings.
¶17         On remand, the administrative judge shall allow the parties to further
      develop the record regarding the appellant’s disclosures.         See Belyakov,
      120 M.S.P.R. 326, ¶ 12. The administrative judge then shall determine whether
      the appellant established by preponderant evidence that he made any protected
      disclosures prior to disclosing information to OIG, and whether the appellant’s
      protected disclosures and/or activity were a contributing factor in the personnel
      actions in question. If the administrative judge finds that the appellant has met
      his burden, she shall supplement as necessary her findings as to whether the
      agency has met its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that it would
      have taken the personnel actions absent the appellant’s protected disclosures
      and/or activity.
                                                                                      12

      The administrative judge properly found that the January 12, 2015 email and
      failure to complete a leadership assessment were not personnel actions, but she
      erred in finding that the decisions regarding intern assignment and confe rence
      attendance were personnel actions.
¶18         The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that the
      January 12, 2015 email from his first-level supervisor was not a personnel action
      on the ground that the email could serve as a basis for future disciplinary action.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-7, 9-10.       On remand, should the administrative judge
      confirm that the appellant did not make a protected disclosure or engage in
      protected activity before the email was issued, the appellant cannot prove that
      communications with his supervisors were a contributing factor to the January 12,
      2015 email. IAF, Tab 6 at 59; see Sherman v. Department of Homeland Security,
      122 M.S.P.R. 644, ¶ 8 (2015) (providing that a disclosure that occurs after the
      personnel action at issue was taken cannot be considered a contributing factor in
      that personnel action).
¶19         Regardless, we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the
      January 12, 2015 email did not constitute a threatened personnel action.        To
      prevail in his IRA appeal, the appellant must prove that the agency threatened,
      proposed, took, or failed to take a “personnel action,” as defined in 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A). 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), (b)(9); Godfrey v. Department of the Air
      Force, 45 M.S.P.R. 298, 303 (1990). The term “threatened” is afforded a broad
      interpretation, such that an agency does not have to state that disciplinary action
      is being proposed or specifically reference a particular kind of discipline to
      constitute   a   threatened   personnel   action.   Gergick v.   General   Services
      Administration, 43 M.S.P.R. 651, 656-57 (1990). Nevertheless, for a statement to
      constitute a threat of a personnel action, the agency must take some action
      signifying its intent to take a personnel action.       Rebstock Consolidation v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶ 12 (2015).
¶20         The appellant alleges that his supervisor threatened him with disciplinary
      action in her January 12, 2015 email; however, the statements to which h e refers
                                                                                         13

      do not signify the requisite intent to take a disciplinary action. In her email, the
      appellant’s supervisor notified him that she did not view his behavior during their
      January 7 and 9, 2015 meetings as professional but was “overlooking the behavior
      this time[.]” IAF, Tab 6 at 59. She further stated that she expected the appellant
      to act professionally in the future and that “[a]ny unprofessional behavior will be
      handled appropriately.” Id. The supervisor’s decision not to take a disciplinary
      action for the behavior she deemed unprofessional and issue a general reminder
      that unprofessional behavior could result in disciplinary action, without more,
      does not indicate an intent to take a disciplinary action and thus does not
      constitute a personnel action under the WPEA. See, e.g., Lith v. Department of
      the Treasury, 168 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Table) (nonprecedential) (affirming
      that a letter of understanding that cautioned the appellant that if he again engaged
      in certain behavior he could be disciplined in the future was not a personnel
      action) 7; cf. Gergick, 43 M.S.P.R. at 657 (finding that the record of inquiry issued
      to the appellant constituted a threatened personnel action where by the document,
      standing alone, did not necessarily constitute a threat to take a personnel action,
      but in light of the extensive investigation that preceded the issuance of the record
      of inquiry, the likelihood of disciplinary action was not insignificant).
¶21         The appellant’s argument-that the email should be considered a personnel
      action because it could serve as the basis for future discipline-is not persuasive.
      See PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. A general statement that future misconduct might result
      in disciplinary action remains a truism for any employee, at any time.            See
      Koch v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 48 F. App’x 778, 787 (Fed. Cir.

      7
       Historically, the Board has been bound by precedential decisions of the U.S. Court of
      Appeals for the Federal Circuit. However, as a result of changes initiated by the
      Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat.
      1465, extended for 3 years in the All Circuit Review Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 113-
      170, 128 Stat. 1894, and eventually made permanent in the All Circuit Review Act, Pub.
      L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510, appellants may file petitions for judicial review of
      Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any circuit court of appeals of
      competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
                                                                                         14

      2002) (nonprecedential) (“A wide range of agency rules, directives, and
      counseling measures contain the message, implicit or explicit, that failure to
      follow   those    directives   or   to   meet    expectations   may    have   adverse
      consequences … [N]ot all such general statements … constitute actionable
      ‘threats’ to take adverse action within the meaning of the Whistleblower
      Protection Act.”). To prevent a supervisor from providing a general reminder to
      an employee that prospective misconduct could result in disciplinary action would
      hamper an agency’s ability to effectively manage its workforce. Cf. Douglas v.
      Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981) (including the clarity
      with which the employee was on notice of any rules that were violated in
      committing an offense, or had been warned about the conduct in question, in the
      nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to the penalty determination in ad verse
      action cases).    Accordingly, we reject the appellant’s argument that a general
      warning of the consequences of future misconduct, such as the one at issue here,
      is a personnel action protected under the WPEA.
¶22        The administrative judge found, without explanation, that the appellant’s
      supervisors’ failure to complete the leadership assessment was not a personnel
      action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302. ID at 16. She then found that the appellant met the
      knowledge/timing test as to his allegations that he was excluded from the decision
      to assign three interns to other branches of the division and from a decision as to
      which staff should attend the Department of Defense Cost Analysis Symposium.
      Id. The administrative judge properly concluded that the appellants’ supervisors’
      failure to complete a leadership assessment was not a personnel action, but she
      erred in considering the two decisions from which the appellant was excluded as
      personnel actions. ID at 13-17.
¶23        We find that the appellant did not show that any of the three actions,
      separately   or   together,    constituted   a   personnel   action   under   5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A). The assessment and decisions at issue do not constitute one of
      the enumerated personnel actions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A), nor has
                                                                                               15

      the appellant alleged that the assessment or the decisions concern education or
      training that may “reasonably be expected to lead to an appointment, promotion,
      performance evaluation” or other action described in section 2302(a)(2)(A).
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix); IAF, Tab 8 at 17, Tab 9 at 29-30.                 Finally, the
      actions described do not rise to the level of a “significant change in duties,
      responsibilities, or working conditions.”          5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).       The
      appellant’s position description is not contained in the record and none of the
      actions appear to comprise a duty essential or significant to his position. See,
      e.g., Shivaee v. Department of the Navy, 74 M.S.P.R. 383, 388-89 (1997) (finding
      that a change in the building in which the employee worked did not constitute a
      personnel action). Even if we consider the actions as a whole, the appellant has
      not shown that these three isolated, minor actions collectively had a significant
      impact on the overall nature or quality of his working conditions, responsibilities,
      or duties.     See Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17,
      ¶ 14-15      (holding   that   to   amount    to      a    “significant   change”     under
      section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii), agency actions, individually or collectively, must have
      a significant impact on the overall nature or quality of an employee’s working
      conditions, responsibilities, or duties).     Accordingly, we find that none of the
      three actions at issue constituted a personnel action and vacate the administrative
      judge’s      findings   regarding    the     intern       assignment      and    conference
      attendance decisions.

      The burden remains with the agency to show by clear and convincing evidence
      that it would not have selected the appellant for the GS-15 supervisory ORA
      position in the absence of his protected activity. .
¶24         On review, the appellant challenges numerous findings the administrative
      judge made in concluding that the agency showed by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would not have selected the appellant during the second GS-15
      supervisory ORA selection absent his protected activity.                  PFR File, Tab 1
      at 13-24. In determining whether an agency has shown by clear and convincing
                                                                                        16

      evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of
      protected activity, the Board will consider the following factors (“Carr factors”):
      the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its action; the existence and
      strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were
      involved in the decision; and any evidence that the agency takes similar actions
      against employees who are not whistleblowers but are otherwise similarly
      situated. Soto v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 11; see also
      Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
      The Board does not view these factors as discrete elements, each of which the
      agency must prove by clear and convincing evidence, but rather weighs these
      factors together to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing as a
      whole. Lu v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7 (2015).
      In assessing whether the agency has met its burden by clear and convincing
      evidence, the Board must consider all the pertinent evidence in the record, and it
      must not exclude or ignore countervailing evidence by only looking at the
      evidence that supports the agency’s position. Herman v. Department of Justice,
      119 M.S.P.R. 642, ¶ 15 (2013); see also Whitmore v. Department of Labor,
      680 F.3d 1353, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2012). .
¶25        The appellant generally alleges that the administrative judge either erred in
      crediting certain witness testimony or misunderstood the import of certain
      evidence, and we find those assertions to be without merit.        PFR File, Tab 1
      at 13-24.    The   Board    defers   to   an   administrative   judge’s   credibility
      determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observ ing the
      demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing.       See Haebe v. Department of
      Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
¶26        In applying the Carr factors, the administrative judge acknowledged most
      of the arguments the appellant again raises on review but found that witness
      testimony and documentary evidence supported the agency’s decisions during the
      second selection process and showed that while agency officials had some motive
                                                                                         17

      to retaliate against the appellant, there was little evidence of retaliation.      ID
      at 17-37.   We have reviewed the record and conclude that the administrative
      judge’s credibility determinations and factual findings regarding the selection
      process are detailed, well-reasoned, and supported by the record. Moreover, the
      appellant has not shown that the administrative judge failed to properly weigh the
      record evidence in concluding the agency supported its selection decision; rather,
      his arguments amount to mere disagreement with the qualifications the selecting
      official sought in a GS-15 supervisory ORA. See Broughton v. Department of
      Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (observing that merely
      rearguing   factual   issues   already   raised   and   properly   resolved   by   the
      administrative judge below do not establish a basis for review).
¶27         As set forth above, the administrative judge’s failure to identify the
      appellant’s protected disclosures and/or activity limited the administrative
      judge’s ability to fully evaluate the evidence regarding the second Carr factor,
      the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency
      officials who were involved in the relevant personnel decision. See supra ¶ 15.
      Additionally, in applying the second Carr factor, the administrative judge held
      that the appellant “fail[ed] to adequately show” how his supervisors were
      motivated to retaliate against him and that his belief that his first-level supervisor
      was biased during the second selection process was “insu fficient to outweigh the
      agency’s proffered evidence.”      ID at 37.      Although the administrative judge
      discussed all the evidence concerning the supervisors’ motive to retaliate against
      the appellant, by discussing how the appellant failed to adequately show a motive
      to retaliate, the administrative judge may have improperly shifted the burden of
      proof to the appellant in considering this factor. On remand, the administrative
      judge shall weigh the Carr factors in assessing whether the agency met its burden
      by clear and convincing evidence, and shall properly place the burden of proof on
      the agency to prove that it would have taken the same personnel action s in the
      absence of protected activity.
                                                                                        18

¶28         In applying the third Carr factor, the administrative judge found that there
      was little evidence of how the agency treated similarly situated employees who
      were not whistleblowers and stated that “the absence of any evidence relating to
      Carr factor three can effectively remove that factor from the analysis.” ID at 38
      (quoting Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374). We agree. Nevertheless, on this issue the
      Board has also previously adopted the reasoning of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
      the Federal Circuit that “the failure to produce such evidence if it exists ‘may be
      at the agency’s peril,’ and ‘may well cause the agency to fail to prove its case
      overall.’”   Smith v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 4, ¶ 30 (quoting
      Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374).      In this case, it does not appear that the agency
      presented any evidence as to whether the agency took similar actions against
      similarly situated employees who were not whistleblowers.          On remand, the
      administrative judge shall consider whether the agency affirmatively presented
      evidence that there were no similarly situated employees to the appellant, in
      which case the third Carr factor is removed from the analysis, or whether the
      agency did not present any evidence on the issue of similarly situated employees,
      in which case the administrative judge shall take that into consideration when
      determining whether the agency has met its burden of proving by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions absent the
      appellant’s protected activity.
¶29         In sum, on remand, the administrative judge shall identify the appellant’s
      protected disclosures and/or activity, determine whether the protected disclosures
      and/or activity were a contributing factor in the personnel actions in question , and
      reapply the Carr factors with the appropriate burden of proof, incorporating the
      identified protected disclosures, and considering whether the agency presented
      any evidence of its treatment of employees similarly situated to the appellant who
      were not whistleblowers.
                                                                                       19

                                          ORDER
¶30        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Northeastern
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                   /s/ for
                                               Jennifer Everling
                                               Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.