Court Opinion

ID: 9913150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 22:01:46.361231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:31.002876
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/26/23 Faulkner v. Pringle CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re Matter of:
 PRINGLE FAMILY TRUST, DATED
 APRIL 8, 2004, AS AMENDED
                                                                 D081866
 JENNIFER FAULKNER,

           Petitioner and Appellant,                            (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-00045026-
                                                               PR-TR-CTL)
           v.

 STEPHEN PRINGLE,

           Respondent.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Julia C. Kelety and Katherine A. Bacal, Judges. Affirmed.
         Jennifer Faulkner, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Appellant.
         HainesLaw and Laurence F. Haines for Respondent.
                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION
         Jennifer Faulkner (Jenny) appeals a probate judgment declaring valid
four transfer on death deeds (TODs) executed by her mother before her death.
She claims on appeal (1) the judgment is premature, (2) the trial court erred
in assigning her the burden of proof on her claim of undue influence, and
(3) the TODs are void for failure to comply with the notarization requirement.
We find this matter appropriately resolved by memorandum opinion and
affirm. (See generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847.)
                                      I.
      Decedent Heather Pringle and her predeceased husband were the only
beneficiaries of the Pringle Family Trust (Trust). The primary assets of the
Trust were four residential properties located in San Diego County. Jenny
and Stephen Pringle are Heather’s only children. Heather suffered from
health issues in the years preceding her death.
      In November 2018, Heather executed four TODs, one for each of the
Trust properties, transferring three properties to Stephen and one to Jenny.
Gabriel Mejia notarized the TODs. When Heather passed away in May 2019,
Stephen became acting successor trustee of the Trust.
      In August 2019, Jenny petitioned for relief as to various issues
concerning the Trust and the disposition of Heather’s estate. As relevant
here, Jenny’s amended petition sought an order directing the properties
Stephen received under the TODs to be transferred back to the Trust. She
claimed Stephen unduly influenced their mother to transfer him more
properties than Jenny. Judge Kelety bifurcated this issue for trial before
Judge Bacal.
      After a four-day, unreported bench trial, Judge Bacal found: (1) neither
Jenny nor Stephen fully credible, (2) Heather’s “clear” wish was for “a 50/50
split of her properties,” and (3) the undisputed testimony was that Stephen’s
three properties were mortgaged while Jenny’s one property was “‘free and
clear.’” Accordingly, the court found the TODs reflected Heather’s wishes and
were not the product of undue influence, so it refused to order any properties
returned to the Trust. The subsequent statement of decision noted “both

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sides agreed that [Jenny] had the burden of proof” and concluded that Jenny
“did not meet her burden of proving that [Stephen] caused the decedent to
take any of the disputed actions as a result of undue influence.”
      Jenny also presented evidence that state records “do not indicate”
Mejia’s notary commission “ever took effect,” although the records show that
he had applied to become a notary public. Judge Bacal “found credible the
testimony of Gabriel Mejia that he believed that he was a valid notary at the
time he notarized the disputed documents.”
      A December 2022 minute order took Jenny’s amended petition “off
calendar” and granted her leave to file an amended petition. Judge Kelety’s
subsequent judgment: (1) represented that the minute order had “dismissed
without prejudice” the amended petition, (2) incorporated by reference the
statement of decision, and (3) declared that the four TODs “are valid and
conform to the intent of deceased Trustor Heather Pringle.”
                                      II.
      As we presume the judgment of a lower court is correct and draw all
presumptions to support it, an appellant must affirmatively demonstrate
error to succeed. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
                                       A.
      First, Jenny contends the judgment was premature under
rule 3.1591(a) of the California Rules of Court, which provides, as to issues
decided by bifurcated trial, that “the court must not prepare any proposed
judgment until the other issues are tried, except when an interlocutory
judgment . . . may otherwise be properly entered.” We disagree.
      Jenny is correct that a final judgment would be premature here. The
December 2022 minute order did not dismiss with prejudice the
unadjudicated claims. Because the judgment does not fully decide the rights

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of Jenny and Stephen and terminate the litigation between them, it is not
final. (Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th
1, 5.) Rather, the judgment is interlocutory. (Ibid.) The judgment thus falls
within rule 3.1591(a)’s exceptions as to when a judgment may issue on a
bifurcated issue. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1591(a).) Given the
interlocutory nature of the judgment, whether the unadjudicated claims were
taken “off calendar” or “dismissed without prejudice” is irrelevant. Either
way, they were not finally decided and Jenny, who has since filed an
amended petition asserting the remaining claims, can establish no prejudice.
      Jenny further asserts the judgment is premature because “[u]ndue
influence is NOT the only basis” by which to return the properties to the
Trust. But neither the judgment nor the incorporated statement of decision
claim to be a final determination of issues other than undue influence and
the validity of the TODs, and again, Jenny has filed an amended petition
reasserting the unadjudicated claims. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by
this argument.
      Finally, to the extent Jenny suggests it was improper for the judgment
to declare the TODs “valid” because “matters, yet to be litigated in the other
part of the bifurcated action, once properly adjudicated, might indicate a
different determination,” we disagree. As Stephen argues, “[t]he only
allegation that implicated the validity of the TODs was undue influence.”
Accordingly, the judgment correctly adjudged the TODs valid based on the
court’s findings and conclusions in the bifurcated trial.
                                       B.
      Second, Jenny argues the trial court improperly assigned her the
burden of proof for her undue influence claim. Specifically, she claims, under
Probate Code section 21380, a rebuttable presumption that Stephen unduly

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influenced Heather arose, as he was “[t]he person who drafted the
instrument,” “[a] care custodian of [Heather as] a dependent adult,” or
someone “related by blood or affinity, within the third degree,” to such a
person. (Prob. Code § 21380, subds. (a)(1), (3), (5).)
      Jenny, however, is incorrect, as “[s]ection 21380 does not apply” to
someone “related by blood or affinity, within the fourth degree, to the
transferor.” (§ 21382, subd. (a).) The rebuttable presumption therefore did
not apply to Stephen, Heather’s son; rather, the general rule that someone
who challenges an instrument bears the burden of proving undue influence
applied. (David v. Hermann (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 672, 684.) We thus
perceive no error in the court assigning Jenny the burden of proof.
                                        C.
      Finally, Jenny claims the TODs are void under Probate Code
section 5624, which, at the time Heather executed the TODs and Jenny
brought this action, provided: “A revocable [TOD] is not effective unless the
transferor signs and dates the deed and acknowledges the deed before a
notary public.” (Prob. Code, § 5624, added by Stats. 2015, ch. 293, § 17.)
Jenny contends the instant TODs are not effective because Mejia was never a
commissioned notary public, including when Heather executed the TODs.
      But we conclude this argument lacks merit. Jenny cites no authority to
support her claim that a document acknowledged by a person every party to a
transaction mistakenly thought to be a valid notary public is necessarily void.
The trial court found credible Mejia’s testimony that he believed he was a
valid notary public when he notarized the TODs. The court “did not find any
evidence” that Mejia had participated in a “‘scheme’” to take advantage of
Heather to Stephen’s benefit and Jenny’s detriment. We conclude
substantial evidence—including the court’s assessment of Mejia’s credibility,

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which we cannot revise on appeal (In re Marriage of Balcof (2006)
141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1531)—supports the court’s finding on Mejia’s status
as a notary public and its effect on the validity of the TODs. (Eyford v. Nord
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 112, 123.)
      Jenny also claims the TODs are invalid because they were not
acknowledged before two witnesses, as required under statutory amendments
made effective over three years after Heather executed the TODs. (Prob.
Code, § 5624, subd. (b).) However, Jenny does not cite, and our review of the
record does not show, any evidence she raised this argument during trial.
Accordingly, we conclude this issue is forfeited and decline to address it.
(Johnson v. Greenelsh (2009) 47 Cal.4th 598, 603.)
                                      III.
      We affirm. Jenny shall bear Stephen’s costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

                                                                  CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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