Court Opinion

ID: 9644303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:52:36.029482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:05.060897
License: Public Domain

*309NIGRO, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the Majority’s determination that the immunity provisions of the Mental Health and Procedures Act (“the Act”), 50 P.S. § 7101, et seq., applies to the hospital and doctor in this case. I believe the Act applies only to treatment which is specifically directed toward aiding a patient’s mental illness and not to treatment of physical ailments. As I would affirm the Superior Court’s decision to award a new trial, I dissent.
The appellate courts have not applied the Act’s limited immunity to a health care provider other than a psychiatrist. As the Act itself states, its purpose is to provide treatment for the mentally ill, either voluntarily or involuntarily, in the least restrictive environment. See 50 P.S. § 7102. Further, the Act has not been held to apply to any health care provider treating a mentally ill patient for a physical illness.
In Farago v. Sacred Heart General Hospital, 522 Pa. 410, 562 A.2d 300 (1989), a patient with a history of mental illness was admitted to the psychiatric unit of a hospital for treatment of a chronic schizophrenic condition. After evaluation and consultation with a psychiatrist, the patient was placed on an open ward as it was determined that she did not need special observation. The patient maintained she was raped by another patient in the bathroom adjoining the ward and filed suit against the hospital, alleging negligent supervision and protection. This Court stated that “(o)ne of the purposes of [the Act] is to provide limited protection from civil and criminal liability to mental health personnel and their employees in rendering treatment in this unscientific and inexact field.” Id. at 417, 562 A.2d at 304. Finding the Act’s immunity provisions applicable, we stated that the decision by the hospital to allow the patient to remain on an open psychiatric ward was a mental health treatment decision consistent with Act’s mandate to impose the least restrictive alternatives to provide the patient with adequate treatment. Id. at 418, 562 A.2d at 304.
Similarly, in Werner v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 109 Pa. Commw. 134, 530 A.2d 1004 (1987), a psychiatric patient at a state hospital committed self-mutilation by removing his eye *310with a blunt stick just hours after he was released from leather restraints. Suit was filed alleging negligent treatment and supervision. At trial, the judge instructed the jury that with respect to the decision to remove the restraint, the hospital could be found liable if it was grossly negligent. However, the judge instructed the jury to apply a negligence standard to all other allegations of inadequate treatment. The Commonwealth Court affirmed that decision, concluding that the decision to reduce the restraints was expressly enumerated in the Act. Id.
Conversely, in McNamara v. Schleifer Ambulance Service, 383 Pa.Super. 100, 556 A.2d 448 (1989), the Superior Court found the immunity provision of the Act did not apply to insulate an ambulance company’s conduct while transporting a mentally ill patient to the hospital. The patient’s seatbelt was unfastened by an ambulance attendant who wanted to reposition himself near another patient. After the seatbelt was unfastened, the mentally ill patient opened the rear doors of the ambulance and jumped out. In reversing the trial court’s decision to apply the Act’s immunity, the Superior Court reasoned the decision to release the patient was not a decision within the realm of treatment, care, diagnosis or rehabilitation as contemplated by the legislature. Id. at 103, 556 A.2d at 449.
Based upon the foregoing, our appellate courts have consistently interpreted the Act’s immunity provision to apply only where a physician trained in the mental health field treats a patient’s mental illness. In both Farago and Werner, a psychiatrist made treatment decisions concerning the removal of restraints or supervision of a mentally ill patient. Moreover, those patients were admitted to the psychiatric wards of the hospitals in order to receive treatment for their mental illness.
Instantly, the Superior Court reached the correct decision since Appellants never established that the patient was being treated for her mental illness or that her treatment differed from a non-mentally ill patient with similar physical ailments. When she was admitted to Montgomery hospital, the patient was being treated by an internist for dehydration and internal *311medical problems in order to facilitate recovery of other physical ailments. She was admitted to the orthopedic floor of Montgomery Hospital, not the psychiatric wing, and no evidence of any consultation with a psychiatrist is found in the record. Further, as the Superior Court recognized, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the posey device “was used to treat anything other than a physical condition.” Allen v. Montgomery Hospital at 167, 668 A.2d at 570. The Superi- or Court also properly points to Dr. Casey’s testimony that in his experience, patients were never transferred to Montgomery Hospital from Norristown State Hospital for treatment of their mental illness. Id.
The Mental Health and Procedures Act applies to protect only those physicians who are actively involved in the treatment of a patient’s mental health. Since none of the treatment administered to the patient for her physical illnesses implicated the Act, I am in agreement with the Superior Court’s conclusion that the Act’s immimity provisions does not apply. I would affirm the Superior Court’s decision to award a new trial.