Court Opinion

ID: 8946587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-27 08:25:52.74174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:09:51.999768
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
The potential range of criminal prosecution under the federal mail and wire fraud laws is vast, made so in part by expansive judicial interpretation. United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1247 (9th Cir.1976); Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 110 (5th Cir.1958). The reach of those statutes exists against a backdrop of prosecutorial discretion, however, discretion which, if sensitively exercised, operates as a check to the improvident exertion of federal power. No such check operates in the civil realm. A company eager to weaken an offending competitor obeys no constraints when it strikes with the sword of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982) (RICO).
It is most unlikely that Congress envisaged use of the RICO statute in a case such as the one before us, but we are required to follow where the words of the statute lead, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985), and I agree with my colleagues that a claim for relief might be stated on these facts. Thus, federal power inches forward when a statute is left unattended, whether from Congress’ indifference or its acquiescence. I concur.