Court Opinion

ID: 9387537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 14:03:02.87715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.112222
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                   )
                                     )
                  Plaintiff,         )
                                     )
                                     )
      v.                             )       Cr. ID. No. 1605006649
                                     )
                                     )
ROBERT HEARNE,                       )
                                     )
                  Defendant.         )

                           Submitted: February 6, 2023
                             Decided: April 17, 2023

           COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
           THAT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION
              RELIEF SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED

Diana Dunn, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington,
Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Robert Hearne, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, pro se.

O’CONNOR, Commissioner

                                         1
       This 17th day of April, 2023, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion for

Postconviction Relief and the record in this matter, the following is my Report and

Recommendation.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On January 23, 2017, after a four-day trial, a jury found Robert Hearne

(hereinafter “Defendant”) guilty of seven counts of Rape First Degree, four counts

of Unlawful Sexual Contact Second Degree, two counts of Continuous Sexual Abuse

of a Child, two counts of Dangerous Crime Against a Child, one count of Sexual

Abuse by a Person in a Position of Trust, Authority or Supervision First Degree, and

one count of Unlawful Sexual Contact Second Degree.1 Defendant’s victim was his

minor daughter.

       On March 31, 2017, the Court sentenced Defendant to serve seven natural life

sentences – one for each Rape First Degree conviction, and an additional ninety-five

years of incarceration, followed by probation supervision, for the remaining

convictions. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions on

direct appeal.2

1
  The jury acquitted Defendant of one count Rape First Degree (Count XI), two counts of Unlawful
Sexual Contact Second Degree (Counts III and IV), and one count of Sexual Exploitation of a
Child (Count XXI).
2
   Hearne v. State, 2017 WL 6336910, at *1 (Del. Dec. 11, 2017). On direct appeal, appellate
counsel filed a Rule 26(c) brief and a motion to withdraw from representation. Id. Defendant
submitted written points for the Delaware Supreme Court’s consideration on direct appeal.
Defendant argued that his ex-wife was employed by the New Castle County Prothonotary,
therefore the case should have been assigned to a Superior Court Judge in Kent County or Sussex
                                               2
       On May 23, 2018, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief,3

and on January 16, 2020, Defendant, through court-appointed counsel, filed an

Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief.4 In the amended motion, Defendant

asserted trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Motion for a Bill of

Particulars.5    The Superior Court dismissed Defendant’s postconviction claim,

concluding trial counsel’s decision not to seek a Bill of Particulars was reasonable

and strategic.6 The Court also concluded Defendant could not establish prejudice

pursuant to Strickland v. Washington.7

       On May 12, 2022, Defendant filed a Federal Habeas Corpus Petition in the

United States District Court for the District of Delaware.8 While the District Court

preliminarily concluded Defendant’s Petition was time-barred,9 it granted

County, to avoid an appearance of impropriety. Id. at *2. Second, Defendant argued his daughter’s
testimony was untruthful and coached by a detective and the prosecutor. Id. at *3. Third,
Defendant claimed the jury was not fully informed of the elements of the charged offenses. Id.
Finally, Defendant asserted the indicted rape charges were defective in that the Indictment
described the “exact same offense.” Id. at *4. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded, after
conducting its own review of the record, that Hearne’s appeal was wholly without merit, and the
Court affirmed the Judgment of Conviction. Id.
3
   Docket Item (“DI”) 48, Pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief.
4
   DI 69, Defendant’s Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief.
5
   Id.
6
   State v. Hearne, 2020 WL 7093407, at *3-4. (Del. Super. Dec. 4, 2020), aff’d, Hearne v. State,
2021 WL 2826451 (Del. July 7, 2021).
7
   Id. at *4. Defendant failed to demonstrate that counsel’s failure to file a Motion for a Bill of
Particulars was prejudicial, i.e., Defendant failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable
probability he would have been acquitted at trial. Id. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984).
8
   See generally Hearne v. May, 2022 WL 2064969 (D. Del. June 8, 2022).
9
   Id. at *3 n.5.
                                                3
Defendant’s Motion to Stay Proceedings until Defendant presented all unexhausted

habeas corpus claims in State court.10

         On January 12, 2023, Defendant filed a second Motion for Postconviction

Relief in this Court.11 In this second Motion, Defendant presents several convoluted

and overlapping claims. He first raises a statute of limitations claim pursuant to 11

Del. C. § 205, arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the statute

of limitations as a jurisdictional bar to the prosecution. Defendant argues that “13

of the charges of the indictment fell outside the time limitations,”12 and therefore the

State’s prosecution is time-barred.

         Defendant next argues the evidence produced by the State at trial, namely the

minor victim’s testimony, solely consisted of “repressed memory of a victim that

has been recovered through psychotherapy.”13 According to Defendant, when a

witness’s testimony has been recovered through psychotherapy, Delaware law

requires the State must provide “some evidence of the ‘corpus delicti’ independent

of such repressed memory.”14             And here, Defendant argues trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to require the State to produce evidence independent of his

10
     Id.
11
     DI 82, January 12, 2023 Pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief.
12
     Id. p. 4.
13
     Id. p. 5.
14
     Id.
                                                 4
minor daughter’s testimony which, he argues, consisted of her memory that was

recovered through psychotherapy.

         Third, Defendant claims the jury instructions were “inadequate” in that they

did not satisfy 11 Del. C. § 205(j), and the Court failed to properly instruct the jury

on the necessary elements of the crimes charged.15

         Fourth, Defendant raises generalized claims that trial counsel was ineffective

for “lack of attention to details”:16 counsel was incapable of grasping or

comprehending the facts;17 counsel failed to file a Motion for a Bill of Particulars;18

counsel failed to investigate the applicability of the statute of limitations;19 counsel

failed to conduct an adequate investigation; counsel failed to consider hiring an

expert to potentially impeach the complaining witness;20 and counsel failed to

consider alternative defenses.21

         Finally, Defendant claims the minor victim’s testimony was insufficient to

support a guilty verdict. Specifically, he argues “none of the evidence presented

during the trial can corroborate any elements of the crimes that were brought against

the Defendant by indictment.”22

15
     Id. p. 11-12.
16
     Id. p. 25.
17
     Id. p. 14.
18
     Id.
19
     Id. p. 15.
20
     Id. p. 16.
21
     Id. p. 24.
22
     Id. p. 36.
                                            5
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant

must show: (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness,” and (2) “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”23

There is a strong presumption that counsel’s legal representation was competent and

falls within the “wide range” of reasonable professional assistance.24 “The standard

for judging counsel's representation is a most deferential one.” 25 Trial counsel

“observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and

interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge.”26 The

question is whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under

“prevailing professional norms,” not whether it deviated from best practices or most

common custom.27 As such, mere allegations will not suffice; instead, a defendant

must make concrete allegations of ineffective assistance, and substantiate them, or

23
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
24
   Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122-23 (2011); also see Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753-44
(Del. 1990) (citations omitted).
25
   Premo, 562 U.S. at 122.
26
   Id.
27
   Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
                                              6
risk summary dismissal.28 Deference must be given to defense counsel’s judgment

in order to promote stability in the process.29

       To overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel provided competent

representation, the defendant must demonstrate that “counsel failed to act

reasonabl[y] considering all the circumstances” and that the alleged unreasonable

performance prejudiced the defense.30 The essential question is whether counsel

made mistakes so crucial that they were not functioning at the level guaranteed by

the Sixth Amendment, thereby depriving defendant of a fair trial.31

       Because a defendant must prove both parts of an ineffectiveness claim, a court

may dispose of a claim by first determining that the defendant cannot establish

prejudice.32 The first consideration in the “prejudice” analysis “requires more than

a showing of theoretical possibility that the outcome was affected.”33 “It is not

enough to ‘show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the

proceeding.’”34 Defendant must show a reasonable probability of a different result

(i.e., acquittal) but for trial counsel’s alleged errors.35

28
   Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990).
29
   State v. Fithian, 2016 WL 3131442 at * 3 (Del. Super. May 25, 2016) (citing Premo, 562 U.S.
at 120-122).
30
   Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
31
   Id.
32
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
33
   Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3rd Cir. 1992).
34
   Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
35
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.
                                              7
       In any motion for postconviction relief, this Court must first determine

whether a defendant has satisfied the procedural requirements of Superior Court

Criminal Rule 61 before giving consideration to the merits of the underlying

claims.36     Rule 61(i)(1) prohibits the Court from considering a motion for

postconviction relief unless it is filed within one year after the judgment of

conviction is final.37 Rule 61(i)(2) prohibits the filing of repetitive motions for

postconviction relief, unless: under Rule 61(d)(2)(i), the movant “pleads with

particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference” of actual

innocence; or, under Rule 61(d)(2)(ii),“that a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review,” applies to the movant’s case.38

       Rule 61(i)(3) provides that “any ground for relief that was not asserted in the

proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this

Court, is thereafter barred, unless the movant shows (a) cause for relief from the

procedural default and (b) prejudice from the violation of movant’s rights.”39

36
  Taylor v. State, 32 A.3d 374, 388 (Del. 2011) (quoting Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 474 (Del.
1999)).
37
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). A judgment of conviction is final “when the Supreme Court issues
a mandate or order finally determining the case on direct review.” State v. Drake, 2008 WL
5264880, at *1 (Del. Super. Dec. 15, 2008). Rule 61(i)(1) also affords a Defendant an opportunity
to present a motion which “asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after
the judgment of conviction is final, more than one year after the right is first recognized by the
Supreme Court of Delaware or by the United States Supreme Court.” Id. Because Defendant has
not claimed a newly recognized retroactively applicable right applies to this second postconviction
motion, this exception is inapplicable.
38
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
39
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
                                                8
       Rule 61(i)(4) provides that “[a]ny ground for relief that was formerly

adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an

appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is

thereafter barred.”40

       Rule 61(i)(5) provides that the procedural bars provided in Rules 61(i)(1)-(4)

do not apply to a claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction or if the Defendant satisfies

the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or (d)(2)(ii).41

       Defendant’s present Motion for Postconviction Relief was filed on January

12, 2023.42 Defendant’s judgment of conviction became final on July 23, 2021 when

the Delaware Supreme Court issued its mandate.43 Pursuant to Rule 61(i)(1),

Defendant’s Motion was filed more than one year after the Delaware Supreme Court

issued its mandate, and is time-barred. Moreover, Defendant has failed to allege any

facts implicating the exception to Rule 61(i)(1)’s procedural bar.44 Pursuant to Rule

61(i)(1), Defendant’s untimely Motion is procedurally barred.

       Defendant’s Motion is also procedurally barred as repetitive pursuant to Rule

61(i)(2), as this is Defendant’s second postconviction Motion. Defendant could

40
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
41
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
42
    DI 82.
43
    DI 80. Mandate of the Delaware Supreme Court.
44
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). To avoid the procedural bar, Defendant must “allege facts
supporting a claim that there exists a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after
the judgment of conviction was final, more than one year after the right was first recognized by
the Delaware Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court.” Id.
                                                 9
potentially overcome this procedural bar by demonstrating the Motion satisfies the

pleading requirements of Rule 61(i)(2), but Defendant has failed to plead with

particularity that new evidence exists which creates a strong inference that he is

factually innocent,45 and he has not pled with particularity a claim that a new rule of

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Delaware

Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court, applies to his case and renders his

conviction invalid.46 Because Defendant has not met the exacting pleading standards

of Rule 61(i) and Rule 61(d)(2), this second postconviction Motion is procedurally

barred as repetitive.

       Defendant’s Motion is also procedurally defaulted pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3),

as all of his present claims, except for his claims that the jury instructions were

deficient, and that trial counsel should have filed for a Bill of Particulars, were not

asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.47 Defendant has

failed to explain why he failed to timely raise these claims, and he has not pled

specific prejudice from the failure to do so.48

45
   Id.
46
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i)-(ii).
47
   Defendant raised the deficient jury instruction claim in the points raised in direct appeal to the
Delaware Supreme Court, and the Bill of Particulars claim in his first motion for postconviction
relief.
48
   See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3)(A) and Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3)(B).
                                                 10
       Pursuant to Rule 61(i)(4), Defendant’s jury instruction and bill of particulars

claims are procedurally barred because they were formerly adjudicated on direct

appeal and in the first Motion for Postconviction Relief.49

       Finally, the Defendant could potentially have avoided the applicability of the

procedural bars in Rule 61(i)(1)-(4) if he presented valid claims (1) asserting that the

Court lacked jurisdiction or he (2) pled with particularity that (a) new evidence exists

that creates a strong inference that Defendant is innocent in fact of the charged

offenses, or that (b) a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive on cases on

collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme

Court applies to his case and makes his conviction invalid.50 Defendant has not

argued the applicability of Rule 61(i)(5) and Rule 61(d)(2) to avoid the procedural

bars noted supra, and his motion is procedurally barred as untimely and repetitive.

As a result of Defendant’s failure to overcome Rule 61(i)’s procedural bars, I

recommend Defendant’s claims be summarily dismissed.

       Despite the procedural bars to Defendant’s Motion, I will briefly address the

merits of Defendant’s claims.          As noted previously, Defendant’s claims are

overlapping and convoluted, and fail to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland’s

exacting standards.

49
   See Hearne v. State, 2017 WL 6336910, at *3 (Del. Dec. 11, 2017); State v. Hearne, 2020 WL
7093407 (Del. Super. Dec. 4, 2020), aff’d Hearne v. State, 2021 WL 2826451 (Del. July 7, 2021).
50
   See Super. Ct. Crim. R 61(d)(2).
                                              11
Claim 1: Statute of Limitations.

       Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to realize that

13 charges of the indictment fell outside the time limitations.”51 Defendant’s

argument as to the applicability of the statute of limitations is misplaced, and the

offenses for which he was convicted were not time-barred.

       Prior to July 15, 1992, the statute of limitations applicable to all felony

offenses committed in Delaware, except Murder, was five years.52 So, if committed

before 1992 (and Defendant’s crimes were not), all of the crimes for which the State

indicted the Defendant had a five-year statute of limitations.

       On July 15, 1992, the General Assembly enacted the first of two amendments

to 11 Del. C. § 205 by amending § 205(e), which contained a “first disclosure”

clause. The version of § 205(e) implemented on July 15, 1992 provided:

       (e) If the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this section has expired,
       a prosecution for any sexual offense in which the accused acts include
       or constitute any of those crimes delineated in §§ 767-768 and § 1108
       of this title where the victim of such sexual offense was a child under
       the age of 18, at the time of its occurrence, such prosecution may be
       commenced within 2 years following an initial disclosure to the
       Delaware Division of Child Protective Services or to an appropriate
       law enforcement agency.53

51
   DI 82, Motion for Postconviction Relief, p. 4.
52
   Hoennicke v. State, 13 A.3d 744, 746 n. 1 (Del. 2010) (citing 11 Del. C. §205(b)(1)).
53
   Bryant, 2001 WL 433452, at *1 (quoting 11 Del. C. § 205(e)). (emphasis added).
                                               12
As indicated, the first disclosure clause was a tolling provision which permitted the

prosecution of sexual offenses after the expiration of the five-year statute of

limitations period if the prosecution commenced within two years of the minor

victim’s initial disclosure to Child Protective Services or a law enforcement

agency.54

       Approximately eleven years later, on June 24, 2003, the General Assembly

amended 11 Del. C. § 205(e) a second time, striking the text of § 205(e) and

replacing it with its current version. The current version of 11 Del. C. § 205(e), in

effect since June 24, 2003, provides as follows:

       (e) Notwithstanding the period prescribed by subsection (b) of this
       section, a prosecution for any crime that is delineated in § 787 of this
       title and in which the victim is a minor, subpart D of subchapter II of
       Chapter 5 of this title, or is otherwise defined as a “sexual offense” by
       § 761 of this title except § 763, § 764 or § 765 of this title, or any attempt
       to commit said crimes, may be commenced at any time. No prosecution
       under this subsection shall be based upon the memory of the victim that
       has been recovered through psychotherapy unless there is some
       evidence of the corpus delicti independent of such repressed memory.
       This subsection applies to all causes of action arising before, on or after
       July 15, 1992, and to the extent consistent with this subsection, it shall
       revive causes of action that would otherwise be barred by the section.55

       In 2010, the Delaware Supreme Court considered the applicability of the

statute of limitations as it applied to sexual offenses in Hoennicke v. State.56 In

54
   Hoennicke, 13 A.3d at 746.
55
   11 Del. C. § 205(e) (emphasis added).
56
    Hoennicke v. State, 13 A.3d 744 (Del. 2010).
                                               13
Hoennicke, the defendant was alleged to have committed a series of sexual assaults

on his minor son between 1988 and 1992. Hoennicke’s son did not report the sexual

assaults committed by his father to the Delaware State Police until 2009.57 In

considering Hoennicke’s statute of limitations claim, the Delaware Supreme Court

concluded the State’s ability to prosecute Hoennicke “was still within the two year

‘extended disclosure’ limitations period of the previous subsection (e) because [the

victim] had not yet disclosed Hoennicke’s alleged misconduct.” 58 And, because

Hoennicke’s son did not disclose the sexual abuse committed by his father until the

2003 amendments to § 205(e) became operable, the Court concluded “the 2003

amendments clearly extended the previous limitations period of two years after

reporting, to an unlimited period.”59

       Here, the twenty-one count Indictment alleges Defendant sexually abused the

minor victim beginning in January 2003, up to late 2012. The Indictment alleges the

Defendant committed Unlawful Sexual Contact Second Degree upon the minor

victim from January 2003 through December 2004.60 All other indicted crimes,

including all Rape First Degree charges, were alleged to have occurred on or after

January 1, 2004.61 Like the defendant in Hoennicke, Defendant’s prosecution was

57
    Id. at 745.
58
    Id. at 746.
59
    Id. at 747 (emphasis added).
60
   See Indictment, Counts I-IV. The Jury acquitted Defendant of Counts III and IV.
61
   See Indictment, Counts V-XXI.
                                              14
not time-barred on the date of the 2003 amendment that extended the limitations

period indefinitely, because Defendant’s minor daughter had not yet reported the

abuse to any law enforcement agency.62 Therefore, the indefinite extension of the

statute of limitations by the 2003 amendment to 11 Del. C. § 205(e) applies, and

Defendant’s statute of limitations argument is misplaced - all of the crimes for which

the jury found the Defendant guilty were not time-barred, as the State could have

commenced them “at any time.”63

         Hearne also argues that the State was required to include in the Indictment

language consistent with the tolling provision in 11 Del. C. § 205(e), namely that the

prosecution was not based on the memory of the victim that had been recovered

through psychotherapy without some additional evidence of the corpus delicti

independent of the victim’s repressed memory. Hearne asserts that trial counsel’s

failure to “subject [the] indictment to scrutiny for any defects shows ineffective

assistance of counsel.” Hearne’s argument is misplaced.

         As alleged in the Indictment, Counts I-IV are the only counts which allege

conduct which may have occurred prior to the 2003 amendments to § 205(e), and

the jury did not find the Defendant guilty of Counts III and IV. A review of the

Indictment reveals the State did not address this tolling provision in the Indictment.

62
     See Hoennicke, 13 A.3d at 747.
63
     See 11 Del. C. § 205(e).
                                          15
In Counts I-IV, Defendant’s unlawful sexual contact of his minor daughter is alleged

to have occurred on or between January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2004.64

Therefore, the first four counts of the Indictment (Unlawful Sexual Contact Second

Degree in violation of 11 Del. C. § 768) may have been subject to the five-year

statute of limitations in effect as a result of the 1992 amendment to § 205(e), if they

occurred prior to June 24, 2003.65 The State could commence prosecution of the

remaining counts of the Indictment which were alleged to have occurred after June

24, 2023 “at any time,” as those offenses (Counts V-XXI) were subject to an

unlimited limitations period.

       The tolling provision upon which Defendant relies is an anomaly. It imposes

a specific burden of proof upon the State if it seeks to prosecute a defendant based

on the admission of a victim’s psychotherapeutically refreshed testimony. If the

State does so, they are also required to produce evidence supporting the corpus

delicti independent of the victim’s psychotherapeutically refreshed testimony to

satisfy its burden of proof.       The tolling provision is not triggered by an event in

time, and it remains inert if the State does not rely on a victim’s

psychotherapeutically refreshed testimony. Unlike this tolling provision, other

64
   All remaining indicted offenses, Counts V-XXI, were alleged to have occurred no earlier than
January 1, 2004.
65
   Because the evidence presented at trial did not specify dates on which the first four counts of
the Indictment occurred, the Court will presume, for the sake of argument, they occurred in the
relevant time period of January 1, 2003 through June 24, 2003.
                                               16
tolling provisions found in 11 Del. C. § 205 are connected to a time limitation – for

example, if a defendant had not been prosecuted within five years of the commission

of a sexual offense, the tolling provision of the former version of § 205(e) suspended

the running of the statute of limitations, and required the State to prosecute a

Defendant within two years of disclosure to the Delaware Division of Child

Protective Services or a law enforcement agency.

       The purpose of a tolling provision is to suspend the running of the statute of

limitations. Here, all crimes Defendant committed after June 24, 2003, are subject

to an unlimited statute of limitations. And if the limitations period is “unlimited,”

there is no purpose for a tolling provision – the provision does not become operative

because there is no limitations period to toll.66 Therefore, Defendant’s claim as to

any charged offense alleged to have occurred after June 24, 2003 does not constitute

an actual controversy. The tolling provision only applies to pre-2003 offenses

previously subject to a five-year statute of limitations, i.e., Counts I-IV of the

Indictment. And, Counts III and IV resulted in not guilty jury verdicts.

       Defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice under Strickland – a reasonable

probability of a different result at trial - from counsel’s failure to object to the State’s

66
  See Huffman v. State, 2015 WL 4094234, at *3 (Del. July 6, 2015) (“We concluded [in
Hoennicke] that the unlimited statute of limitations period as applied to appellant’s offenses did
not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it simply extended the statute of limitations and did
not revive a prosecution where the statute of limitations had already expired.”)
                                               17
omission of the tolling provision in the Indictment. Even if counsel successfully

objected to those counts, the same objection would not have applied to Counts V-

XXI, and the Defendant was sentenced to seven life sentences without the possibility

of release for the Rape First Degree convictions, plus more than eighty years of

incarceration on the remaining convictions.67 Because Defendant is unlikely to serve

out the seven life sentences, his claim does not present an “actual controversy.”68

       Moreover, Defendant suffered no prejudice. The record reflects the State’s

evidence presented at trial was not solely based upon a memory of the victim

recovered through psychotherapy. The record reflects that the victim’s disclosure

of sexual abuse was a delayed report of a series of sexual assaults which Defendant

perpetrated over almost a decade, and her testimony was corroborated, at least in

part, by several other State’s witnesses. There is no record evidence that the

prosecution was solely based upon a memory of the minor victim recovered through

psychotherapy, and as discussed supra, there was additional circumstantial and

corroborating evidence produced by the State at trial to establish corpus delicti

sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions.

67
  DI 36, Sentence Order.
68
  See Govan v. State, 2003 WL 22227548, at *1 (Del. Sept. 24, 2003), State v. Govan, 2010 WL
3707416 (Del. Super. Aug. 31, 2010).
                                            18
Claim 2: Victim’s memory was recovered through psychotherapy.

        Defendant next claims the minor victim’s memory was recovered through

psychotherapy, and as a result the State was required to produce “some evidence of

the corpus delicti independent of such repressed memory.”69 Defendant argues the

State failed to produce evidence beyond the victim’s psychotherapeutically

recovered memory. Defendant’s argument is not supported by the record.

        There is no evidence to support Defendant’s claim that the minor victim’s

memory was recovered through psychotherapy, and the Defendant has not identified

any testimony or evidence to support his claim. The minor victim’s uncontradicted

trial testimony is that she discussed the sexual abuse she suffered at the hands of the

Defendant in early 2016, when she made a disclosure to her then-boyfriend.70

Specifically, when asked why she did not say anything about the sexual abuse, she

testified as follows:

        It was – I was just it was my dad, like, it was just, like, weird, like, I
        knew it wasn’t supposed to happen, but it was still my dad. I didn’t say
        anything until, like, it was just as I got older it started to bother me more
        and more. I finally, like, when I broke down, told my boyfriend at that
        time, and like, ever since then I had told him he was always encouraging
        me to tell someone, So I finally did.71

69
    See 11 Del. C. § 205(e).
70
   DI 32, Jan. 20, 2017 Trial Transcript, p. 23, l. 19 – p. 24, l. 11.
71
   Id., p. 58. L. 6-14.
                                                   19
Her boyfriend then encouraged her to tell someone else, and she then disclosed the

sexual abuse to her mother.72 Her mother then made her an appointment to speak to

a therapist, and the victim was eventually interviewed by the New Castle County

Police in the spring of 2016.73           There is no record evidence which supports

Defendant’s claim the minor victim’s memory was recovered through

psychotherapy, and the State produced additional circumstantial and corroborative

evidence to satisfy the corpus delicti.74

Claim 3: Inadequate Jury Instructions.

       Defendant’s jury instruction claim is premised on the same facts as the Statute

of Limitations argument—that there was a defect in the Indictment which required

the State to include an additional element as to certain charged offenses. Defendant

carries this argument through to the jury instructions, but here he argues counsel was

ineffective for failing to request the Court amend the jury instructions to specifically

reference the tolling provision of the 2003 version of 11 Del. C. § 205(e).

Defendant’s claim lacks record support and he cannot demonstrate prejudice,

because the victim’s testimony was not recovered through psychotherapy, and the

72
   Id.
73
   Id., p. 89, l. 1-9.
74
   On cross-examination, Defendant’s counsel elicited testimony from the minor victim that she
had been seeing therapist to address “disagreements” between the minor victim and her mom, but
the minor victim specifically testified she first disclosed Defendant’s sexual abuse to her mom,
who then informed the therapist of the sexual abuse. See DI 32, Trans. P. 89, l. 23 – p. 91, l. 22.
There is no record testimony that the minor victim’s testimony was recovered through
psychotherapy.
                                                20
State produced evidence to satisfy the corpus delicti.       And, Defendant’s jury

instruction claim was considered and rejected by the Delaware Supreme Court on

direct appeal. In considering Defendant’s claim on direct appeal, the Delaware

Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the jury instructions and

subsequently opined:

         “[W]e reviewed the jury instructions for reversible error and found
         none. The jury instructions provided the jury with a correct statement
         of the law and a full explanation of the elements of each offense.”75

Defendant’s claim is unavailing.

Claim 4: Counsel lacked knowledge of the law and failed to prepare a viable
defense; failure to consult an expert; failure to consider alternative defenses.

         Defendant presents factually unsupported accusations – counsel didn’t

understand the rules and principles of court; counsel did not obtain a bill of

particulars; counsel failed to investigate and enlist the assistance of an expert; and

counsel failed to consider alternative defenses. But, Defendant does not identify

how any of counsel’s alleged failures prejudiced his defense. He does not identify

which court rules counsel did not understand. He does not identify a specific

defense, or identify an expert witness whose testimony would have resulted in an

acquittal – demonstrating Defendant was actually innocent of the charged offenses.

A defendant must make specific allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them

75
     Hearne, 2017 WL 6336910, at *3.
                                          21
or risk summary dismissal.76 Defendant’s bald accusations of ineffective assistance

of counsel do not establish prejudice. Defendant’s claim is meritless.

Claim 5: Insufficient Evidence

       Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. He

argues the minor victim’s memory was “recovered through psychotherapy” and the

State failed to present “some evidence of the corpus delicti independent of such

repressed memory.”77 Defendant argues “none of the evidence presented during the

trial can corroborate any elements of the crimes that were brought against the

Defendant by indictment.”78

       When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court

considers whether a rational trier of fact viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of

every element of the crimes charged.79 In the context of sexual assault prosecutions,

“[i]t is well settled law that a victim’s testimony concerning alleged sexual contact

alone is sufficient to support a jury’s verdict.             There is no requirement that

testimonial evidence be corroborated either by physical evidence or corroborating

testimony.”80

76
   Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 552 (Del. 1998), (citing Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356
(Del. 1996), cert. denied 517 U.S. 1249 (1996).
77
    DI 82, p. 27-28.
78
    DI 82, p. 36.
79
   Jenkins v. State, 2008 WL 4659805, *2 (Del. Oct. 22, 2008).
80
   Hardin v. State, 840 A.2d 1217, 1224 (Del. 2003).
                                               22
       The State’s burden of proof is to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.81 To do so, the State must produce, at trial, “some credible evidence tending

to prove each element of the offense.”82 The Delaware Supreme Court has “never

precisely defined the specific quantum of independent evidence required by the State

to establish the corpus delicti.”83 As is noted above, the State can satisfy this burden

through the testimony of the minor victim. But, a review of the record in this case

demonstrates the State produced circumstantial and corroborative evidence at trial,

beyond the credible testimony of the Defendant’s minor victim, to support the jury’s

guilty verdicts.

       The minor victim testified that she was sexually abused by her father

beginning around the ages of three or four years old.84 She recalled that at that time,

the Defendant brought her into the basement of their home in Stanton, Delaware and

took off all of her clothing and his pants.85 He rubbed her genitals with his hand and

made her touch his genitals.86 She recalled that the Defendant took her into the

basement on another occasion, began playing a “porno tape,” and “was touching me

and made me touch him.”87

81
    11 Del. C. § 301(b).
82
    11 Del. C. § 301(a).
83
    Wright, 953 A.2d at 192-93 (quoting Bailey v. State, 2007 WL 1041748, at *3 (Del. Apr. 9,
2007)).
84
   DI 32, Jan. 20, 2017 Trial Transcript, p. 24, l. 18 to p. 25, l. 3.
85
   Id.
86
   Id., p. 26, l. 3-15.
87
   Id., p. 28, 8-21.
                                             23
       After a passage of time, and after the Defendant moved out of the Stanton

residence, the Defendant moved into his mother’s residence in Hockessin. The

victim, then aged five or six, recalled the following:

       I would pretty much every night I stayed over, and everyone would go
       to sleep. He would, like, I would stay down in the living room with
       him, and he would just, like, do the same thing, but as I got older, like,
       he would make me give him oral sex. He would give me oral sex.88

The victim indicated this sexual abuse would happen every time she stayed at her

grandmother’s house with Defendant.89 She recalled that around the time she turned

seven years old, the Defendant would “give her oral” and digitally penetrate her

vagina.90 He also would tell her she “did a good job last night” and told her not to

tell anyone, saying “you won’t tell anybody, right, this is our secret.”91

       The victim recalled around the time she was in first grade, the Defendant

sexually assaulted her in his bedroom in her grandmother’s house.92 When the

Defendant moved into this house, the minor victim would sleep in the same bed as

the Defendant.93 When she was in the fourth or fifth grade, she recalled the

Defendant babysitting her at her mother’s residence, and “the whole night he was

just making me, like, give him oral sex, giving [her] oral sex.”94 On another

88
   Id., p. 31, l. 10-15.
89
   Id., p. 31, l. 16 to p. 32, l. 22.
90
   The victim performed oral sex on the Defendant at least twenty times. DI 32, p. 36, l. 6-10.
91
   Id., p. 34, l. 22 to p. 35, l. 6.
92
   Id., p. 37, l. 17-19.
93
   Id., p. 38, l. 5-11.
94
   Id., p. 41, l. 11-14.
                                                24
occasion, when she was seven or eight years old, she recalled the Defendant returned

from Tennessee to Delaware and was staying at a Red Roof Inn.95 Defendant took

her to the motel, and at the motel, the Defendant had her wear an adult bra and

women’s underwear – a white lace thong.96 She recalled being “so little [the bra and

panties] didn’t even fit.”97 At the Red Roof Inn the Defendant “had a friend [come]

over, and he brought some kind of drugs, then he was smoking it and, like, he tried,

like, he, like, lit it for me, like, I don’t think I inhaled it or anything, Then he, like,

touched me and stuff.”98

        When asked if the victim recalled the Defendant recording her with a video

camera, she did not remember it, but she recalled one occasion in her grandmother’s

house, in Defendant’s bedroom, where she saw herself on a TV.99 She also recalled

seeing photographs of herself, naked, but did not specifically recall being video

recorded.100 She believed the Defendant had oral sex with her over fifty times,

assaulted her with a vibrator, and recalled several parking lots in New Castle County

where the Defendant would sexually assault her.101 The minor victim believed the

sexual abuse stopped when she was approximately twelve years old.102

95
   Id., p. 42, l. 17-21.
96
   Id., p. 44, l. 22.
97
    Id., p. 42, l. 20-21.
98
    Id., p. 43, l. 21 to p. 44, l. 2.
99
    Id., p. 45, l. 8-10.
100
     Id., p. 45, l. 8-21.
101
     Id., p. 49, l. 6- p. 51, l.23.
102
     Id., p. 52, l. 17-19.
                                            25
       Portions of the victim’s testimony were corroborated by the State’s trial

witnesses. Stephanie Digrerio, a former girlfriend of the Defendant, was living with

the Defendant in Tennessee when she found a videocassette in a vehicle which

contained video recordings of the victim around the ages of seven or eight, wearing

only adult woman’s underwear and a bra. According to Ms. Digrerio, Defendant

was recording the video, as she heard his voice asking the minor victim to turn

around on the recording.103 Ms. Digrerio recalled the minor victim was wearing

black thong underwear in the video.104

       Ms. Digrerio then gave the video recording to the Defendant’s brother’s wife,

and a few days later Ms. Digrerio confronted the Defendant about the content of the

video.105 In response, the Defendant became apologetic, did not want Ms. Digrerio

to leave him, was sorry for what he did, and claimed it “was the drugs and that he

had no desire to ever do it again. And it was that one time.”106

       Defendant’s brother, Thearon Hearne, testified that the Defendant came to

live with him in Tennessee around 2007.107 Thearon Hearne recalled that Ms.

Digrerio brought a VHS-type tape over to his house, and he viewed “moments of the

103
     DI 35, Jan. 19, 2017 Trial Transcript, p. 34, l. 20-23.
104
     Id., p. 35, l. 17.
105
     Id., p. 37, l. 16-23.
106
     Id., p. 38, l. 6-9. Ms. Digrerio also recalled a time when the Defendant stayed with his
children at a Red Roof Inn. Id., p. 41, l. 18-23.
107
    Id., p. 113, l. 14-20.
                                                26
tape.”108 After viewing two short portions of the recording, Thearon Hearne recalled

seeing the minor victim, his niece, “on all four positions on the bed, it was sort of,

with a face down on the bed.”109 The video also depicted his niece “wearing an adult

thong that clearly didn’t fit.”110 Thearon Hearne recognized the room where the

video was recorded as the master bedroom of his mother’s house in Delaware.111

When he confronted the Defendant about the video tape, the Defendant told him “I

never touched her. And I was drunk and high and I just made the film. And it was

a one-time thing.”112

       The victim’s brother, Marcus Hearne, corroborated the victim’s testimony that

she and the Defendant repeatedly slept in the same bed. He explained it was

common that the Defendant and victim would “just go into his room and hang out,”

and they had “shared living arrangements” – they would sleep in the same bed or on

the couch together.113 Marcus remembered a time when the victim and Defendant

sleeping in the same bed when he stayed with his father and sister at “Dave’s house,”

and he needed to wake up the Defendant and victim, who were in the same bed in

the morning, because he was going to be late for school.114 He also recalled a time

108
    Id., p. 117, l. 3-23.
109
    Id., p. 120, l. 1-2.
110
    Id., p. 120, l. 7-8; Id., p. 124, l. 3-11.
111
    Id., p. 120, l. 15-23; p. 121, l. 121, l. 1. Thearon Hearne testified he destroyed the video
recording. Id., p. 122, l. 10-23.
112
    Id., p. 123, l. 16-19.
113
    Id., p. 162, l. 18 to p. 162, l. 17.
114
    Id., p. 181, l. 17-23, p. 182, l. 19.
                                                  27
when the Defendant stayed at a Red Roof Inn in Delaware, and the victim spent the

night with Defendant at the motel.115 Marcus Hearne recalled Defendant repeatedly

asking the minor victim specific questions regarding whether she brought her panties

for visits.116

          The minor victim’s testimony regarding the alleged sexual contact was alone

sufficient to form the basis of a conviction for all convicted offenses, and the

Defendant has failed to identify any offense resulting in a conviction where the

victim’s testimony did not establish every element of the offense. The jury found

the minor victim’s testimony credible, and the State’s other witnesses corroborated

portions of the minor victim’s testimony. Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence

claim is unsupported by the record, and he cannot demonstrate prejudice.

CONCLUSION

           Defendant’s second postconviction motion is procedurally barred. It is time

barred and repetitive. Moreover, two of Defendant’s claims are procedurally barred

as they were previously raised in his direct appeal or in his first postconviction

motion. The remaining claims are procedurally barred because Defendant failed to

present the claims during trial, on direct appeal, or in a prior postconviction

115
      Id., p. 168, l. 14 to p. 169, l. 4.
116
      Id., p. 174, l. 21 to p. 176, l. 1.
                                            28
proceeding. The claims are also meritless, legally deficient and unsupported by the

trial record.

       For all of the aforestated reasons, I recommend the Motion for Postconviction

Relief should be SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

       IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

                                       /s/ Martin B. O’Connor
                                       Commissioner Martin B. O’Connor
oc:    Prothonotary

                                         29