Court Opinion

ID: 9580139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:02:15.746812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:03.836795
License: Public Domain

WAHL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority that the Minnesota Striker Replacement Act, Minn.Stat. § 179.12(9) (1992), is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1988), and is thus in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Any consideration of possible preemption of section 179.12(9) by the National Labor Relations Act must begin with an understanding of the Act’s core provisions.
The National Labor Relations Act guarantees workers the right to join unions, to bargain collectively, and “to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection * ⅜ 29 U.S.C. § 157. The primary “concerted” activity which provides workers the ability to engage in meaningful collective bargaining is the strike. Absent this ability to strike, workers have little or no bargaining power. Congress recognized this fact and, in addition to the other relevant language in the NLRA, specifically addressed the right to strike as follows:
Nothing in this [Act], except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike ‡ ‡ ⅜
29 U.S.C. § 163.
The NLRA prohibits employers from discharging or disciplining employees for exercising their right to strike. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). The clear NLRA mandate of protecting workers’ right to strike is wholly consistent with Minn.Stat. § 179.12(9) which prohibits employers from responding to a strike by hiring permanent replacement workers.
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that there is a presumption against preemption of state law. As the Court recently reemphasized, “Consideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.” Building & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./Rhode Island Inc., — U.S. —,—, 113 S.Ct. 1190, 1194, 122 L.Ed.2d 565 (1993) (citation omitted). When Congress does intend to preempt state law, it does so expressly or impliedly. Congress included no express preemption language in the NLRA. Id. Absent explicit preemption, the United States Supreme Court has recognized two types of implied preemption: preemption of the entire field, or field preemption, and conflict preemption. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, — U.S. —,—, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 2383, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992) quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1909, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (“Congress * * * has never exercised authority to occupy the entire field in the area of labor legislation.”) The question then becomes whether there is “conflict preemption,” in that section 179.-12(9) would stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Gade, — U.S. at —, 112 S.Ct. at 2383. The Supreme Court has made clear that even in NLRA cases, it “[is] reluctant to infer pre*892emption.” Building & Construction Trades, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 1994. There is a strong presumption that Minn.Stat. § 179.-12(9) is not preempted.
In addition to the general law of preemption, two specific principles have developed around the NLRA. The Garmon preemption principle prohibits state regulation of activities that are actually or arguably “protected by § 7 of the [NLRA], or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8 * * San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). Garmon preemption does not apply in this ease for a number of reasons. First, nothing in the NLRA expressly provides protection for an employer’s hiring of permanent replacement workers. Second, not only does the NLRA contain no language that even arguably protects the practice of hiring permanent replacements, the opposite appears true. The NLRA’s prohibition on discharge of strikers and its mandate that the Act not be construed to impede the right to strike indicate that prohibiting a practice such as hiring permanent replacements is more in line with the language and policies of the Act than allowing the practice. There is no real distinction between the threat of discharge and the threat of permanent replacement; with both, workers are threatened with permanently losing their jobs.
The issue here, however, is not whether the NLRA prohibits the practice of hiring permanent replacements, which the Supreme Court has said it does not, but whether the NLRA protects the hiring of permanent replacement workers. Given the absence of express protection, the language and policy of the Act protecting the right to strike, and the express prohibition of similar employer conduct, the NLRA cannot be read to protect the practice of hiring permanent replacement workers, and therefore, Garmon preemption does not apply.
The majority opinion, relying on Supreme Court case law, concludes that “it cannot reasonably be asserted that the right to hire permanent replacements is not at least ‘arguably protected’ by the NLRA.” I disagree. In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 S.Ct. 904, 82 L.Ed. 1381 (1938), the United States Supreme Court declared in dicta that the NLRA does not require employers who replace striking workers to discharge the replacements in order to make room for the strikers. Id. at 345-46, 58 S.Ct. at 911. The National Labor Relations Board had held that the employer’s refusal to reinstate all of the strikers was an unfair labor practice. Id. at 340-41, 58 S.Ct. at 908. The Mackay court, however, said it was an unfair labor practice only if an employer selectively refused to reinstate striking employees because of their union activities. Id. at 346, 58 S.Ct. at 911. Subsequent to Mackay, other Supreme Court decisions have characterized the Mackay dicta as a holding. E.g., Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 505, n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 3172, 3179-80, n. 8, 77 L.Ed.2d 798 (1983).
The rule created in Mackay dicta is not sufficient to overcome the strong presumption against preemption and to compel the conclusion that Congress intended to protect an employer’s hiring of permanent replacement workers. Such a rule contradicts both the policies and the express language of the NLRA. Labor-management experiences1 in *893recent years strongly suggest that the threat of potential permanent loss of a job as a result of striking “impedes” an employee’s right to strike, in contravention of the express language of section 163 of the NLRA. Furthermore, to say that the NLRA does not prohibit the practice of hiring replacement workers is not to say that the NLRA protects, or even arguably protects, that practice even if the practice is referred to as a right. The NLRA guarantees and preserves certain rights for employees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157,163. Beyond that there are only prohibitions of certain kinds of conduct by employers and unions. 29 U.S.C. § 158. Given the strong presumption against preemption and the express language and clear policy of the NLRA, the rule created by Mackay dicta is not sufficient to pull Minn.Stat. § 179.12(9) within the Garmon preemption principle.
The Machinist preemption doctrine precludes states from regulating conduct that Congress intended to be left to the “free play of economic forces.” Lodge 76, Int’l. Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 155, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 2560, 49 L.Ed.2d 396 (1976). States may not enact regulations concerning certain “economic weapons,” but are still free to regulate in certain areas concerning the substantive terms and conditions of employment. Id. at 141, 96 S.Ct. at 2553. For example, laws have been upheld concerning minimum standards for pension plans, Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978), mental health care, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985), and severance pay, Fort Halifax Meat Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987), despite the fact that the issues could arise in collective bargaining.
In the specific area of replacement workers, the Supreme Court has indicated that states are not prohibited from applying their laws. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 3172, 77 L.Ed.2d 798 (1983).2 In Belknap, replacement employees who were discharged after accepting jobs on a permanent basis were allowed to bring misrepresentation and breaeh-of-contract actions in state court. Id. at 496, 103 S.Ct. at 3175. Despite the fact that the application of the state law would affect the manner in which employers could hire and fire replacement employees and use the threat of permanent replacements against strikers, the state law was not preempted. Id. at 497, 103 S.Ct. at 3175. Section 179.12(9) directly affects the relationship between employers and replacement employees, but instead of permitting state court misrepresentation and breach-of-contract actions, the Minnesota law prohibits employers from hiring workers on a permanent basis. Although language in Belknap indicates continued adherence to the Mackay rule, the ease demonstrates that the area of replacement workers is not completely free from state regulation.
Perhaps a more important reason foreclosing Machinist preemption is that the practice of hiring permanent replacements cannot be considered a protected “weapon” of the employer. Congress expressly prohibited discharging employees as a weapon against striking employees, presumably because granting the employer that power would destroy all bargaining power of employees and eliminate their ability to strike. An employer effectively bypasses the prohibition on discharge by hiring permanent replacement workers to fill strikers’ positions. The employer need not ever rehire replaced strikers unless a replacement worker leaves his or her position. Once permanent replacements are hired, striking workers have no bargaining power, and the employer has no incentive to bargain in good faith. Furthermore, even if the strike is settled, workers are still unemployed unless the workers, who replaced them leave the job. With this outlook, it is impossible to believe that a worker’s will to *894strike is not greatly diminished, thereby diminishing the right to strike granted by the NLRA. The NLRA states that nothing in the Act “shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike * * 29 U.S.C. § 163. Construing the NLRA to protect the threat, or actual hiring, of permanent replacement workers clearly violates this Congressional mandate. For all of the reasons above, Machinist preemption does not apply to Minn.Stat. § 179.12(9).
Finally, although not the foundation for this dissent, Minnesota does have the right to pass laws to.protect the safety of its citizens. Section 179.12(9) does just that. The most important factor contributing to strike-related violence, according to the affidavit of Professor Hyman Berman, is the perception by strikers that “their job security is being threatened.” This perception “arises immediately when employers hire permanent replacements.” Professor Berman stated:
Otherwise peaceful strikes often become violent only after the employer hires permanent replacements. For example, the Hormel strike of the mid-1980’s in Austin, Minnesota, was peaceful for many months, and erupted in serious violence immediately after the employer hired permanent replacements. Similarly, the Pittston coal strike was peaceful until permanent replacements wére brought in.
Section 179.12(9) effectively eliminates a primary cause of strike-related violence.
I would hold that Minn.Stat. § 179.12(9) is not preempted by the NLRA and would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

. Since 1980, there has been both a sharp drop in the number of work stoppages and an increase in the expressed willingness of employers to hire permanent replacements for strikers. Roughly two-thirds of unions reported that employers were much more likely to use the permanent replacement strategy during the late 1980s than they were during the late 1970s. Although no study has established a relationship between growing employer willingness to hire permanent replacements and the sharply diminished number of strikes, the impact that the replacement strategy has had on union decisionmaking during the 1980s suggests such a relationship.
* * * ⅜; * #
Unions and employers watched * * * strikes during the past decade to assess the effectiveness of striking when an employer threatens to hire, or actually hires, permanent replacements; they have seen that, on balance, the unions lost these strikes decisively. Furthermore, unions have seen that employers are more willing to hire permanent replacements and, accordingly, that their members are more likely to lose their jobs.
Michael H. LeRoy, The Mackay Radio Doctrine of Permanent Strike Replacements and the *893Minnesota Picket Line Peace Act: Questions of Preemption, 77 Minn.L.Rev. 843, 850-53 (1993).

. The Supreme Court itself has limited an employers relationship with replacement workers, prohibiting the granting of superseniority, NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963) or additional vacation pay, NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 87 S.Ct. 1792, 18 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1967) to replacements.