Court Opinion

ID: 9898292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:43.234976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:15.222648
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                 No. 84027-4-I
              Respondent,
                                                 DIVISION ONE
              v.
                                                 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 DAVID DARRELL SYKES,

              Appellant.

      BIRK, J. — Because we conclude David Sykes’s criminal conviction was

affected by ineffective assistance of counsel, we reverse and remand.1

                                        I

      Evidence showed that on March 26, 2021, Sykes and another individual

later identified as Richard Moore physically fought one another on a bus, and

Moore was stabbed. After the stabbing, Sykes exited the bus. A sheriff’s deputy

located Sykes, who indicated, “Yeah, I did it,” asserting Moore had robbed him.

Three days earlier, Sykes had reported to police that two assailants had attempted

to rob him. A deputy testified Sykes asserted Moore had been one of the

assailants, and that he stabbed Moore in self-defense.

      1 On June 26, 2023, Sykes filed a pro se motion seeking dismissal of the

charges against him with prejudice. He does not provide a justification for this
relief, and we deny his motion.
        On July 28, 2023, Sykes filed a pro se motion seeking reversal of his
conviction. In light of our disposition, we deem this motion moot.
No. 84027-4-I/2

       To support his self-defense claim, Sykes introduced exhibit 17, a partially

redacted medical chart note from March 23, 2021. According to the chart note,

Sykes reported he had been assailed by two men attempting to rob him. The

exhibit included a medication list, among other medical data. During deliberations,

the jury submitted a question asking in part, “Can we consider # 17 Sykes

medication list? There seems to be antipsychotic meds.” Defense counsel initially

was uncertain which listed medication was being referenced, but it later became

evident the jury was referring to the drug olanzapine. Based on concern healthcare

professionals seated on the jury were applying specialized expertise not admitted

in evidence, the trial court instructed the jury:

       You may consider Exhibit #17 in its entirety. However, your
       deliberations must be based on the evidence in the case and the law
       given to you by the court. The evidence that you are to consider
       during your deliberations consists of the testimony that you have
       heard from witnesses, stipulations, and the exhibits that I have
       admitted during the trial. You are not permitted to apply highly
       specialized knowledge during your deliberations that you may have
       gained as a result of professional or personal experience.

The jury returned a guilty verdict.

       In a posttrial motion for a mistrial, Sykes’s counsel offered several

statements attributed to jurors to attempt to show jury misconduct affecting the

verdict. A court may consider affidavits of jurors only to the extent they do not

attest to matters that inhere in the verdict. Richards v. Overlake Hosp. Med. Ctr.,

59 Wn. App. 266, 272, 796 P.2d 737 (1990). Jurors’ statements inhere in the

verdict if the facts alleged are linked to the juror’s motive, intent, or belief, or

describe their effect on the juror. Gardner v. Malone, 60 Wn.2d 836, 841, 376 P.2d

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No. 84027-4-I/3

651, 379 P.2d 918 (1962). The proffered juror statements in this case inhered in

the verdict except to the extent they established the extrinsic fact that olanzapine

is an antipsychotic medication. In addition, in denying the motion, the trial court

concluded that knowledge that olanzapine is an antipsychotic is not specialized

knowledge. The State maintains the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so

concluding.

      Sykes asserts his counsel’s neglect to redact the medication list was

ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,

a defendant must show that counsel performed deficiently and that the deficient

performance resulted in prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,

104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Review is de novo. State v. Wafford,

199 Wn. App. 32, 41, 397 P.3d 926 (2017). Counsel’s performance is deficient if

counsel erred so seriously that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 32-33, 246

P.3d 1260 (2011). We presume effective representation and require the defendant

to show the absence of legitimate strategic or tactical reasons for the challenged

conduct.   State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 336, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).

Counsel’s performance is evaluated based on the entire record. Id. at 335. To

show prejudice, the defendant must show counsel’s deficient performance

deprived the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Grier, 171

Wn.2d at 32-33. This showing is made when there is a reasonable probability that,

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No. 84027-4-I/4

but for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different. State v.

Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 226, 743 P.2d 816 (1987).

       Circumstances converge to make the failure to redact the medication list

prejudicial deficient performance in this case. First, three healthcare professionals

had disclosed their expertise during jury selection and had been empaneled on the

jury: a hospital social worker, a behavioral health nurse, and a physician. Second,

Sheriff’s Deputy Austin Peterson transported Sykes to the police station in his

patrol car.   Peterson testified Sykes’s demeanor was “unstable” with mood

fluctuations “from real highs to real lows” and “almost like a manic laughter to angry

yelling.” Peterson testified Sykes said, “ ‘I’m God. I don’t play that shit. I don’t

give a fuck if you like me or not.’ ” Third, this was Sykes’s third trial. The first two

had ended in mistrials due to jury deadlock, and the State offered Peterson’s patrol

car statements only at the third trial. This history is suggestive the patrol car

statements were significant to the outcome. In re Det. of Post, 170 Wn.2d 302,

315, 241 P.3d 1234 (2010) (conviction after new evidence in second trial). Fourth,

Sykes’s defense turned on the jury concluding the State had not disproved that at

the time of the assault Sykes “reasonably believ[ed]” he was about to be injured

and was “preventing or attempting to prevent an offense” against him.

       Offering evidence without redacting its indication that Sykes received

antipsychotic medication was deficient performance under these circumstances.

Together with Peterson’s statements that Sykes identified himself as God, the

                                           4
No. 84027-4-I/5

reference to the medication suggested Sykes was suffering from a mental health

episode at the time of the assault. And together with the defense depending on

Sykes’s rational use of lawful force, the first two trials ending in deadlock in the

absence of Peterson’s statements, and the jury’s evident focus on the medication

list, we are satisfied the trial was prejudicially affected by the failure to redact the

medication list. The State does not contend the failure to redact the medication

list was a reasonable strategy or tactic, and exhibit 17 was already partially

redacted without objection. No party asserts and we do not hold the instruction

given during deliberations was error, but it maintained exhibit 17 within the jury’s

consideration. Relevant to ineffective assistance of counsel, it therefore did not

alleviate the prejudice from defense counsel’s failure to redact the medication list.

Sykes has demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel.

                                           II

       Because the issue is likely to arise in the event of retrial, we address Sykes’s

contention that the trial court erred by sustaining the State’s hearsay objection to

certain of Sykes’s statements he offered.        After Peterson testified to Sykes’s

unstable demeanor and statement identifying himself as God described above,

Sykes sought to elicit on cross-examination statements noted in Peterson’s report

that Sykes claimed he had been robbed. The court sustained the State’s hearsay

objection.

       Under ER 106, a party may supplement portions of a writing or recorded

statement offered by an adverse party with other relevant portions as fairness

                                           5
No. 84027-4-I/6

requires. State v. Simms, 151 Wn. App. 677, 692, 214 P.3d 919 (2009). When an

adverse party has opened the door to a subject at trial, the court may “admit

evidence on a topic that would normally be excluded for reasons of policy or undue

prejudice when raised by the party who would ordinarily benefit from exclusion.”

State v. Rushworth, 12 Wn. App. 2d 466, 473, 458 P.3d 1192 (2020). The trial

court ruled that neither principle allowed Sykes to introduce his other statements

to Peterson based on the statements the State elicited. We review this ruling for

abuse of discretion and find none here. State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 619, 41

P.3d 1189 (2002) (admissibility rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion).

      It was tenable for the trial court to conclude the additional statements Sykes

sought to offer were not necessary to explain, place in context, or correct a

misimpression or unfair implication caused by the statements the State elicited

from Peterson. Other law enforcement witnesses who had testified earlier had

already related Sykes’s agitation over his having been robbed and then having

encountered, he said, the same assailant. Sykes later called a police officer to

whom he had reported the attempted robbery three days before. The statements

Sykes wished to offer from Peterson were additional to the statements the State

elicited, but not explanatory, and would have been cumulative of other evidence

robustly represented in the record. Because we affirm the trial court’s ruling that

neither ER 106 nor the opening-the-door principle justified admitting the additional

statements, we need not reach the question disputed by the parties, whether ER

106 applies to Peterson’s testimony relating Sykes’s statements.

                                         6
No. 84027-4-I/7

      We do not reach Sykes’s remaining claims of error.

      Reversed and remanded.

WE CONCUR:

                                      7