Court Opinion

ID: 9779740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:41:45.318526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:24:04.782279
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring: While I concur in the majority’s decision affirming defendant’s conviction for resisting a peace officer resulting in an injury to the officer, I write separately to voice my concerns with this result. On appeal, defendant calls our attention to the fact that the modified version of IPI Criminal 4th No. 22.14, which was tendered to the jury, only required the jury to find that defendant’s act of resisting was “a proximate cause” and not “the proximate cause” of Officer Scott’s injury. As the majority has correctly pointed out, the statutory language for the charged offense reads: “the proximate cause.” See 720 ILCS 5/31 — 1 (West 2006). Recently, the supreme court in People v. Brown, 229 Ill. 2d 374, 382-83, 892 N.E.2d 1034, 1041 (2008), stated: “When interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. [Citation.] Legislative intent is determined by considering the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning, as well as the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and goals to be achieved. [Citation.] Each word, clause and sentence of the statute must be given reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous, and we presume the General Assembly did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. [Citation.]” Section 31 — 1 expressly requires that the State establish that defendant’s act of resisting was “the proximate cause” of Officer Scott’s injury. See 720 ILCS 5/31 — 1 (a — 7) (West 2006). Thus, the gravamen of this appeal revolves around the question of whether the modified version of IPI Criminal 4th No. 22.14, which substituted the indefinite article “a” for the definite article “the,” constitutes plain error. While Justice Schmidt and Justice Holdridge ultimately do not apply any plain error analysis due to the fact that they each find the absence of error altogether, both apparently find that section 31 — 1 is ambiguous. Specifically, Justice Schmidt appears to find ambiguity in light of the fact that he cites 19 other statutes in an attempt to define the term “proximate cause.” 404 Ill. App. 3d at 248. If section 31 — 1 were indeed unambiguous, it would be unnecessary and inappropriate to resort to sources outside the plain language of the statute. See People v. Algarin, 200 Ill. App. 3d 740, 747, 558 N.E.2d 457, 461 (1990).2  Justice Holdridge expressly finds section 31 — 1 to be ambiguous and proceeds to examine the statute’s legislative history. I too find section 31 — 1 to be ambiguous. After careful review of these outside sources, I acknowledge that an argument can be made that the legislature did not attach exclusive significance to the definite article in the phrase “the proximate cause.” My concurrence with the majority’s decision is based solely upon this acknowledgment and the fact that we are charged with ascertaining the legislature’s ambiguous intent. I am left troubled, however, because a principle of statutory construction is that “ ‘the definite article “the” particularizes the subject which it precedes. It is a word of limitation as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of “a” or “an.” ’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Sibenaller v. Milschewski, 379 Ill. App. 3d 717, 722, 884 N.E.2d 1215, 1219 (2008), quoting Brooks v. Zabka, 168 Colo. 265, 269, 450 P.2d 653, 655 (1969). Applying this principle, a compelling argument can be made that the legislature’s use of the language “the proximate cause” illustrates an intent to focus on the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury. See Robinson v. City of Detroit, 462 Mich. 439, 459-60, 613 N.W.2d 307, 317 (2000). Alternatively, the language “a proximate cause” merely requires that the State establish that the accused’s actions were a contributing cause of the victim’s injuries. People v. Merritt, 343 Ill. App. 3d 442, 448, 797 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (2003) (holding “[a] person commits aggravated DUI when his or her driving under the influence ‘was a proximate cause of the injuries’ *** [citation], not the sole and immediate cause of the victim’s injuries” (emphasis omitted)). Moreover, because section 31 — 1 is susceptible to two reasonable and conflicting interpretations, I am concerned that our holding violates the rule of lenity. The supreme court in People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 333, 864 N.E.2d 196, 210 (2007), expressly stated: “ ‘[P]enal statutes, where ambiguous, should be construed to afford lenity to the accused.’ [Citation.] In such a circumstance, the penal statute must be strictly construed in favor of the accused, with nothing taken by intendment or implication beyond the obvious or literal meaning of the statute. [Citation.]” While I am wary of ignoring the rule of lenity simply on the basis of other irrelevant statutes and Senator Petka’s sparse statement that the State must prove that the officer’s injury was “proximately related” to the defendant’s resistance (92d Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 4, 2002, at 87-89), I acknowledge that we ultimately do in fact look to the legislative history of a statute when attempting to ascertain its intent. See In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill. 2d 123, 135, 839 N.E.2d 1008, 1015 (2005). It is my sincere hope, however, that the legislature takes the opportunity in the future to clarify its intent so that other important cases like this one, where an individual’s conviction is being enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony, are not determined on the basis of a senator’s two-word utterance.  Justice Schmidt has, however, dropped a footnote asserting that he finds the statute unambiguous. It is legally incorrect to cite and discuss outside sources where the statute in question is itself unambiguous. People v. Nunez, 236 Ill. 2d 488, 495, 925 N.E.2d 1083, 1087 (2010) (“When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it is unnecessary to resort to other aids of interpretation”); Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass’n, 236 Ill. 2d 433, 440, 925 N.E.2d 1113, 1117 (2010) (“When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction”); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 339-40, 924 N.E.2d 961, 966 (2010) (“Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect as written, without resort to other aids of construction”). Justice Schmidt has elected to “plead guilty” to violating this canon of statutory construction rather than conform the decision to the rule.