Court Opinion

ID: 9442926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:04:11.466803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:17.048525
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge
(specially concurring).
Still entertaining doubt, for the reasons expressed in our first opinion, that the discriminations complained of come within the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, I concur in the opinion as far as it goes. However, I think it leaves at large an important question which should be decided.
Mead Service Company and Mead’s Fine Bread Company, hereinafter referred to as Mead, were confronted with a boycott at Santa Rosa, New Mexico, which entirely deprived them of a market for their bread at that point. The boycott gave Moore a complete monopoly of the bread business in Santa Rosa. Mead had the alternative of giving up its bread business at Santa Rosa or reducing its prices in an effort to break the boycott and regain its market.
Section 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(b) provides: “Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden •of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That nothing contained in sections 12, 13, 1-4 — 21, and 22-27 of this title shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his> lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.”
It is true that Mead offered and sold bread at Santa Rosa at a lower price than it offered and sold bread at other markets. My brother Murrah is of the opinion that because of the proviso in the quoted section a justification for a discriminatory price can only be shown by proof that the lower price “was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.” It seems obvious to me that had such been the intent of Congress it would not have used the general language, “unless justification shall be affirmatively shown,” but would have stated, “unless the defendant justifies his lower price by showing it was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.” I think the context clearly shows the intent and purpose of the proviso. It was not to limit the grounds of justification, but rather, it was to eliminate any doubt that might arise because of the provisions of Sections 12, 13, 14 — 21 and 22-27, that the defendant could justify by showing that the lower price was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.
Meeting Moore’s price here would have been wholly ineffectual. He had a monopoly, not by reason of price, but by reason of a boycott agreement. Mead met the boycott confronting it, in the only effective way it could. I think Mead should be permitted to justify by showing it reduced its price in good faith solely to break the boycott and not to destroy competition or to create a monopoly. Of course, if Mead carried its price cutting to a degree that would destroy competition and obtained a monopoly by it, or if it cut the price of bread with an intent and purpose so to do, it would not be justified.
If we deny Mead the right to justify in this case by showing it acted in good faith, solely to break a boycott, the statute, in*543stead of fostering competition and preventing monopoly, will become an instrument to destroy competition and foster monopoly. Such, in my opinion, was not the intent and purpose of Congress.