Court Opinion

ID: 9603421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:06:00.958197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:11.409384
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
dissenting.
It has been settled law for years that evidence of sexual contact between a defendant and a victim of a sexual offense is admissible to show the disposition of the defendant to pursue the victim. See State v. Kristich, 226 Or 240, 242, 359 P2d 1106 (1961); State v. Risen, 192 Or 557, 565, 235 P2d 764 *224(1951); State v. Pace, 187 Or 498, 507, 212 P2d 755 (1949); State v. Eggleston, 31 Or App 9, 13, 569 P2d 1088 (1977), rev den 281 Or 99 (1978); Barzee v. Cupp, 29 Or App 705, 707, 564 P2d 1366 (1977).
There is no basis for the majority’s supposition that the legislature intended to change this rule by adopting the Oregon Evidence Code. According to the majority, the exceptions to the rule against using evidence of a person’s character to prove that he acted in conformity with that character on the occasion in question are “carefully delimited in OEC 404(2).” 93 Or App at 222. That fails to acknowledge, however, that OEC 404(2) does not pertain to evidence intended to show the defendant’s lustful disposition or sexual propensity. Rather, such evidence traditionally has been viewed as “admissible for other purposes.” See Getz v. State, 538 A2d 726, 732 (Del Supr 1988); McCormick, Evidence 560-1, § 190 (3d ed. 1984).1 Evidence of lustful disposition thus must be examined within the context of OEC 404(3), either as relating to one of the specifically named admissible categories or as an unlisted exception under that language.
OEC 404(3) is not an exhaustive list of those categories of evidence that may be admitted despite their bearing on a defendant’s character. On the contrary, the plain language of the rule provides that evidence of bad acts or crimes may be admitted for purposes “such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” (Emphasis supplied.) The legislative commentary to OEC 404(3) stresses that “[t]he list of purposes set forth in subsection (3) for which evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be admitted is not meant to be exclusive.” It is difficult to see how such an expression could be intended to remove evidence of a defendant’s propensity to pursue the victim from the ambit of the common law principles codified in 404(3).
Moreover, the Oregon Supreme Court has made it clear that OEC 404(3) is inclusionary, rather than exclusionary. State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 725 P2d 312 (1986). That *225means that OEC 404(3) forbids evidence of the defendant’s other crimes, “only when the evidence is offered solely to prove (1) the character of a person, and (2) that the person acted in conformity therewith.” State v. Johns, supra, 301 Or at 548. (Emphasis supplied.) If the evidence offered is relevant to a fact at issue in the trial and is not “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence,” it should be admitted. State v. Johns, supra, 301 Or at 549-50.
In the present case, the evidence in question shows defendant’s attraction to the victim, which certainly has a bearing on defendant’s motive. It also explains why the victim failed to report the rape promptly.2 The majority has argued that OEC 404(2) forbids introduction of evidence whose “overwhelming probative effect” would be to show defendant’s bad character “unless defendant had opened the door by putting his character ‘clearly and expressly’ in issue.” 93 Or App at 222. Neither rule, however, places such a limitation on evidence that is not prohibited in the first place. The trial court properly exercised its discretion.
Because the majority, in reversing this decision, has ignored the plain language of OEC 404(3), the intent of the legislature and established case law, I must respectfully dissent.

 Other jurisdictions that traditionally have admitted evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct have found that the principle survives the adoption of language identical to that found in OEC 404(3). See Johnson v. State, 288 Ark 101, 702 SW2d 2 (1986); State v. DeLong, 505 A2d 803, 805-6 (Me 1986).

 Sexual abuse cases such as this often involve numerous contacts between the perpetrator and the victim over a long period of time. Evidence such as the majority would suppress here is helpful to explain the seemingly inexplicable crime and failure to report it promptly.