Court Opinion

ID: 9427877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:22:10.489081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:10.205698
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the result.
Assuming that proof of intent is a prerequisite to appellees' prevailing on their constitutional claim of vote dilution, I am inclined to agree with Mr. Justice White that, in this case, “the findings of the District Court amply support an inference of purposeful discrimination,” post, at 103. I concur in the Court's judgment of reversal, however, because I believe that the relief afforded appellees by the District Court was not commensurate with the sound exercise of judicial discretion.
*81It seems to me that the city of Mobile, and its citizenry, have a substantial interest in maintaining the commission form of government that has been in effect there for nearly 70 years. The District Court recognized that its remedial order, changing the form of the city’s government to a mayor-council system, “raised serious constitutional issues.” 423 F. Supp. 384, 404 (SD Ala. 1976). Nonetheless, the court was “unable to see how the impermissibly unconstitutional dilution can be effectively corrected by any other approach.” Id., at 403.
The Court of Appeals approved the remedial measures adopted by the District Court and did so essentially on three factors: (1) this Court’s preference for single-member dis-tricting in court-ordered legislative reapportionment, absent special circumstances, see, e. g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 415 (1977); (2) appellants’ noncooperation with the District Court’s request for the submission of proposed municipal government plans that called for single-member districts for councilmen, under a mayor-council system of government; and (3) the temporary nature of the relief afforded by the District Court, the city or State being free to adopt a “constitutional replacement” for the District Court’s plan in the future. 571 F. 2d 238, 247 (CA5 1978).
Contrary to the Court of Appeals, I believe that special circumstances are presented when a District Court “reapportions” a municipal government by altering its basic structures. See also the opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, ante, at 70, and n. 15. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 20, n. 14 (1975); Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U. S. 187 (1972). I also believe that the city’s failure to submit a proposed plan to the District Court was excused by the fact that the only proposals the court was interested in receiving were variations on a mayor-council plan utilizing single-member districts. Finally, although the District Court’s order may have been temporary, it was unlikely that the courts below would have approved any attempt by Mobile to return to the commission form of government. And even *82a temporary alteration of a long-established form of municipal government is a drastic measure for a court to take.
Contrary to the District Court, I do not believe that, in order to remedy the unconstitutional vote dilution it found, it was necessary to convert Mobile’s city government to a mayor-council system. In my view, the District Court at least should have considered alternative remedial orders that would have maintained some of the basic elements of the commission system Mobile long ago had selected — joint exercise of legislative and executive power, and citywide representation. In the first place, I see no reason for the court to have separated legislative and executive power in the city of Mobile by creating, the office of mayor. In the second place, the court could have, and in my view should have, considered expanding the size of the Mobile City Commission and providing for the election of at least some commissioners at large. Alternative plans might have retained at-large elections for all commissioners while imposing district residency requirements that would have insured the election of a commission that was a cross section of all of Mobile’s neighborhoods, or a plurality-win system that would have provided the potential for the effective use of single-shot voting by black voters. See City of Rome v. United States, post, at 184, n. 19. In failing to consider such alternative plans, it appears to me that the District Court was perhaps overly concerned with the elimination of at-large elections per se, rather than with structuring an electoral system that provided an opportunity for black voters in Mobile to participate in the city’s government on an equal footing with whites.
In the past, this Court has emphasized that a district court’s remedial power “may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation,” and that “the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.” Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971). I am not convinced that any violation of federal constitutional rights established by appellees required the District Court to dismantle Mobile’s *83commission form of government and replace it with a mayor-council system. Accordingly, I, too, would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for reconsideration of an appropriate remedy.