Court Opinion

ID: 2965722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:44:07.397862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:24.355515
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
                                 No. 98-1605

                          UNITED STATES,

                            Appellee,

                                v.

                         PAUL E. KEAVENY,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

       [Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

 Stahl, Circuit Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

     Mark L. Sisti and Twomey & Sisti Law Offices on brief for appellant.
     Paul M. Gagnon, United States Attorney, and Peter E. Papps, First Assistant U.S. Attorney, on Motion for Summary Disposition.

MARCH 4, 1999

                                
                                

      Per Curiam.    Defendant was convicted by a jury and
  sentenced to 96 months' imprisonment for a violation of the
  federal firearms statute.  He alleges that the selection of the
  jury in his case was closed to the public by a court security
  officer in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public
  trial.  See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1,
  7 (1986) (holding that the guarantee of an open public trial 
  includes the voir dire examination of jurors).
       Below, defendant's first objection to the alleged closure
  of the voir dire came in a post-trial motion to set aside the
  jury's verdict.  The motion was denied by the trial judge
  without an evidentiary hearing on the ground that the objection
  was untimely.  On appeal, defendant argues that the trial judge
  erred in (1) failing to grant a defense request for an
  evidentiary hearing on the alleged closure, and (2) failing to
  grant a new trial.  
       In opposition, the government has twice moved for a
  summary affirmance.  We denied the government's first motion
  without prejudice to a renewal of the motion with "appropriate
  and relevant record citations for each of the factual
  assertions therein."  The renewed motion includes record
  citations but the cited exhibits do not provide undisputed
  support for the government's factual contentions that the
  courtroom was never closed to the public during the jury
 selection process,  and that the defense allegation was 
 "concocted."   These are not the sort of matters of which this
  court can possibly take judicial notice.
       We also do not agree with the government's reading of the
  trial judge's decision as incorporating "factual findings" on
  the alleged courtroom closing.   The decision confirms that
  there was no judicial order excluding the public, and reflects
  the court's skepticism of the defendant's claim.  However, the
  court did not determine whether members of the public were in
  fact excluded nor whether the defendant's bypass of the
  objection constituted a knowing waiver.  In the absence of a
  knowing waiver, constitutional concerns may be raised even by
  a court officer's unauthorized partial exclusion of the public. 
  See, e.g., United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 29-35 (1st 
  Cir.) (disapproving of the marshals' unauthorized initiation of
  security measures which effected a partial closure, but
  upholding a court order ratifying the measures on the second
  day of the trial in light of a balancing of the interests),
  cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 174, 268 (1998); see also Martineau v.
  Perrin, 601 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding that a knowing
  and deliberate waiver of the right to a public trial was
  sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
  prejudice arising from a bailiff's mistaken locking of the
  courtroom doors for several days of the trial).       
       We do not reach defendant's second contention that the
  availability of reasonable alternatives to a closure renders
  constitutionally impermissible any retrospective ratification
  hypothetically explained by space limitations or the like.  A
  decision by us on that issue would be purely advisory without
  a determination of the predicate facts.
       We are reluctant to extend further the proceedings in this
  case.  We can understand the skepticism that arises from the
  delay in raising this issue.  But not only is a very
  substantial period of imprisonment involved but also the basic
  respect owed to the Sixth Amendment.  If we err, we prefer to
  err in the direction of ascertaining with assuredness that
  basic rights have either been waived or observed.  We therefore
  vacate the order denying the motion for a new trial and remand
  to enable the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
  or otherwise determine the crucial facts.
       The government's motions to dispense with oral argument
  and to file a motion memorandum in lieu of a brief are granted. 
  The district court's order denying defendant's motion for a new
  trial is vacated and the case is remanded for further
  proceedings consistent with this decision.  See Loc. R. 27.1.