Court Opinion

ID: 9676035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:12:49.249288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:42.931442
License: Public Domain

DALTON, J.
(dissenting). — We are unable to concur in that
part of the opinion which holds that plaintiff ivas guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The facts are well stated in the opinion. Defendant’s tracks extend from east to west across Union Boulevard, a heavily traveled public street in the City of St. Louis. The opinion concedes that “defendant’s westbound, streetcars stop at the east side of Union and proceed across the boulevard”; and that the testimony of defendant’s operator shows that the streetcar in question did so stop on this occasion. “Plaintiff was familiar with the intersection' — had been there many times before.” Further, “he stated it was customary for pedestrians to pse the streetcar tracks in crossing Union Boulevard at that point. The 'automobile traffic is heavy.’ He walked ten or fifteen feet to within twelve or eighteen inches of the north rail of the westbound track. He saw no westbound street car. He then walked across Union twelve or eighteen inches north of the north rail of the north (westbound) track. * * * When he * * '* started walk*493ing across Union, he clid not turn to the left to ‘look particularly to see’ if there was any streetcar approaching from the eastward; but if there had been a streetcar ‘within fifty or seventy-five feet, why, I would have seen it. ’ After he had started walking westwardly along the north (westbound) [675] track, and twelve or eighteen inches north of the north rail thereof, he ‘didn’t look back.’ He walked along the track to be protected from automobile traffic. He did not think ‘ of the possibility of being struck by street car traffic. ’ ’ ’
Taking a view of this evidence favorable to the plaintiff, the jury could find that, when plaintiff started west across this 60 foot street, there was no westbound streetcar within fifty to seventy-five feet of the east line of Union; that only a limited time would be • required to cross the street; that plaintiff knew that if any streetcar approached from the east it would have to come to a full stop at the east side of Union and would have to start from a stopped position before crossing the street; and that the plaintiff would not reasonably have anticipated that he could not cross in safety and without looking behind him. Under such circumstances wouldn’t an ordinary person assume that he could walk 60 feet in safety without looking, behind him, wouldn’t he assume that he would hear an approaching streetcar if one approached from the rear, and wouldn’t he reasonably assume that, if he didn’t hear it, no streetcar operator would start a streetcar from a stopped position and proceed across Union Boulevard behind him at such speed as to endanger him or strike before he could cross the 60 foot street? Such assumptions were reasonable ones, we believe, and particularly so where the streetcar tracks were customarily used by pedestrians in crossing the boulevard and where the operator would be on the lookout for pedestrians. The facts in evidence here make the situation very different from an ordinary railroad crossing over a public road or street.
Whether one is guilty of contributory negligence depends upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the occurrence that caused the injury. Graves v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 342 Mo. 542, 118 S.W. (2d) 787, 791. In determining whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence precluding a recovery for primary negligence on account of the injuries sustained, his act must be measured by the standard of whether an ordinarily prudent person under the same circumstances would have conducted himself in the same manner as plaintiff did. Negligence is not to be imputed to a person for failing to look out for a danger when, under the surrounding circumstances, the person sought to be charged with negligence had no reason to suspect that danger was to be apprehended. ' Willig v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 345 Mo. 705, 137 S.W. (2d) 430, 436. As a general rule a person is not required to look for danger when he has no cause to anticipate danger *494or when the danger is created by tbe negligence of another. Elgin v. Kroger Groc. & Baking Co., 357 Mo. 19, 206 S.W. (2d) 501, 507.
We think tbe issue of contributory negligence was for tbe jury and that tbe court erred in not submitting the issue of primary negligence.