Court Opinion

ID: 9472148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:51:22.672803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:46.706767
License: Public Domain

CONTIE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join that portion of Judge Well-ford’s opinion which holds that Rule 9(a) of the rules for habeas corpus proceedings does not bar consideration of the merits of Buchanon’s claim that he did not waive his right to counsel at the degree and sentencing hearing and that portion which holds that Buchanon is entitled to relief on the merits of this claim. I also join that portion of Judge Wellford’s opinion which holds that Buchanon’s claims that his confession was coerced and that he was not present at the degree and sentencing hearing are barred by Rule 9(a). I disagree, however, with Judge Wellford’s application of Rule 9(a) to Buchanon’s other claims. Accordingly, I write separately.
Judge Wellford states, in discussing the issue of Buchanon’s waiver of his right to counsel at the degree and sentencing hearing, that “[t]here is a sufficient record of these proceedings to indicate that the state has not been prejudiced in its ability to respond to petitioner’s claims in this respect of the case only.” (Emphasis added.) I do not believe that Rule 9(a) sweeps so broadly. Although I agree that Buchanon is not entitled to relief on the other grounds he presents, I reach this result by considering the merits of Buchanon’s claimed lack of a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel at the time he entered his plea and lack of a knowing and voluntary entry of his guilty plea.
Buchanon argues that the state trial judge failed in his duty to examine closely Buchanon’s waiver of the right to counsel at the time he pleaded and to take steps to assure that the waiver was a knowing one. Specifically, he relies upon Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948), which states that a constitutionally valid waiver of the right to counsel,
must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered.
Id. at 724, 68 S.Ct. at 323. Buchanon makes a similar, albeit less clearly articulated, claim that he did not act knowingly in entering his guilty plea. See Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 78 S.Ct. 191, 2 L.Ed.2d 167 (1957). Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).1 Buchanon also claims that the waiver of his right to counsel was not voluntary due to a coercive atmosphere. This coercive atmosphere, Buchanon argues, also made his plea involuntary. The district court ruled against Buchanon on the merits of these four issues. Buchanon’s claim that his confession was coerced and that he was not present at the degree and sentencing hearing were rejected by the district court on the basis of Rule 9(a), although the district court indicated that it would also rule against Buchanon on the merits of these two claims. Finally, the *283district court found that Rule 9(a) did not bar consideration of Buchanon’s claim that he did not waive counsel at the degree and sentencing hearing and that Buchanon is entitled to relief on this claim.
It should be clear beyond doubt that a respondent relying on Rule 9(a) must show prejudice and that prejudice cannot be presumed from the mere passage of time. See Moore v. Smith, 694 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 1442, 75 L.Ed.2d 798 (1983). Clear though these propositions may be, a temptation exists to find prejudice in the absence of any specific indication of lost evidence or failed memories. Allowing petitions of this age to be considered on the merits may be impolitic, but Congress has clearly determined that, absent demonstrable prejudice, such petitions are to be heard. In our judicial role, we must act consistently with Congress’ determination.
As originally drafted, Rule 9(a) established a rebuttable presumption of prejudice if a petition was filed more than five years after the conviction. See H.R.Rep. No. 94-1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News, 2478, 2481. Although this presumption was intended only to place a burden on the petitioner of going forward with evidence to meet or rebut the presumption, see Advisory Committee Note, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. foil. § 2254 at 1137, 1138, Congress thought that even such a mild shifting of burdens was “unsound policy” and that the deletion of the presumption of prejudice was necessary to bring Rule 9(a) “into conformity with other provisions of law.” H.R.Rep. 94-1471 at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 2481. Rule 9(a), therefore, is not a strict statute of limitations, but instead incorporates the doctrine of laches into § 2254 proceedings. See Davis v. Adult Parole Authority, 610 F.2d 410, 414 (6th Cir.1979).
It is apparent that a resolution of Buchanon’s claims of a lack of knowledge in waiving counsel and pleading guilty depend only upon the discussions contained on the record and upon the in-chambers conference between Buchanon and the trial judge.2 The transcript of the plea entry and waiver of counsel have been preserved. The trial judge was able to recall and testify as to the substance of the in-chambers discussion. Nothing more is needed to disprove Buchanon’s claim of a lack of knowledge in waiving counsel and entering his plea. The state, therefore, has failed to show any prejudice to its ability to respond to these two claims. Thus, Rule 9(a) does not bar their consideration.
Buchanon’s claims of coercion, i.e. that his waiver of counsel at the arraignment and the entry of his plea were involuntary, are more troublesome under Rule 9(a). The district court ruled against Buchanon on the merits of these claims, implicitly finding that Rule 9(a) did not apply to them. Although I might reach a different conclusion upon de novo consideration,3 the matter is of little moment because the district court did not grant relief on these two grounds. The district court’s finding that Buchanon acted voluntarily is not clearly erroneous.
Finally, I agree with Judge Wellford and the district court that Rule 9(a) bars consideration of Buchanon’s claims that his con*284fession was coerced and that he was not present at his degree and sentencing hearing. The state made a showing of prejudice as to both of these claims. It was stipulated that the prosecutors involved in the case had no independent recollection of Buchanon’s statement and the trial judge testified that he could not remember whether or not Buchanon was present at the degree hearing. Buchanon has not rebutted this showing of prejudice.
To summarize, the state made no showing that it was prejudiced in its ability to respond to Buchanon’s claims that his waiver of counsel at the time of his plea and the entry of his plea were unknowing. The district court correctly reached the merits of these claims and correctly denied relief on the merits. The district court acted within the scope of its discretion in reaching the merits of Buchanon’s claims of coercion in his waiver of counsel at the time he pleaded and in the entry of his guilty plea and its ruling on the merits of these two claims is not clearly erroneous. I join Judge Wellford’s opinion only insofar as it finds that Rule 9(a) bars relief for the claim of a coerced confession and the claim that Buchanon was not present at the degree and sentencing hearing and finds for Buchanon on the merits of his claim that he did not waive counsel at the degree and sentencing hearing.

. This circuit has repeatedly held that Boykin does not apply retroactively. See, e.g., Hendron v. Cowan, 532 F.2d 1081, 1083 (6th Cir.1976). This claim, accordingly, must be evaluated under pre-Boykin standards.

. In Roddy v. Black, 516 F.2d 1380, 1384 n. 5 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 917, 96 S.Ct. 226, 46 L.Ed.2d 147 (1975), we held that the knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea may be established by the testimony of the trial judge when off-the-record discussions occurred in the state proceedings. This rule should also apply in the context of determining whether a waiver of the right to counsel was knowing.

. Although the determination of the underlying factual question of the presence or absence of prejudice is subject to the clearly erroneous standard, the ultimate question of whether a delayed petition is to be dismissed is subject to review only for abuse of discretion. See Berry v. Mintzes, 726 F.2d 1142 at 1146 (6th Cir. 1984). See also Advisory Committee Note, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254 at 1137:
Also, the language of the subdivision, "a petition may be dismissed,” is permissive rather than mandatory. This clearly allows the court which is considering the petition to use discretion in assessing the equities of the particular situation.