Court Opinion

ID: 9740487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:36:23.889005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:18.480999
License: Public Domain

Mackenzie, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I do not agree with the majority as to the circumstances in which attorney fees may be awarded for unreasonable allegations and denials. GCR 1963, 111.6 provides:
"If it appears at the trial that any fact alleged or denied by a pleading ought not to have been so alleged or denied and such fact if alleged is not proved or if denied is proved or admitted, the court may, if the allegation or denial is unreasonable, require the party making such allegation or denial to pay to the adverse party the reasonable expenses incurred in proving or preparing to prove or disprove such fact as the case *205may be, including reasonable attorney fees.” (Emphasis added.)
In Russell v Glantz, 57 Mich App 44, 49-51; 225 NW2d 191 (1974), appellant accused a court reporter of overcharging him for transcripts. However, appellant failed to appear at the hearing on his motion to compel the reporter to reimburse him for excess charges. The Court approved the trial court’s award of attorney fees pursuant to GCR 1963, 111.6, without discussing the language emphasized above.
In Reppuhn v Abell, 97 Mich App 407; 296 NW2d 44 (1980), and in Goodrich Theaters, Inc v Warner Brothers Distributing Corp, 103 Mich App 548; 302 NW2d 913 (1981), appellants’ actions had been voluntarily dismissed with prejudice prior to trial. In both cases, the Court held that the language emphasized above precluded an award of attorney fees. In neither case was Russell approved, but in both cases the Court pointed out that Russell was distinguishable. Russell involved a dispute between a party to the litigation and a third party. That dispute could not have been the subject of an independent action but had to be resolved by motion in the action out of which it arose. Under such circumstances, the hearing on the motion in Russell could be characterized as "the only type of 'trial’ which could have conceivably been held”, Reppuhn, supra, p 409, or as "the 'functional equivalent’ of 'trial’ ”, Goodrich Theaters, supra, p 555.
Here, as in Reppuhn and Goodrich Theaters, it is unnecessary to decide whether Russell can be reconciled with the language of the rule. The motion for accelerated judgment at issue here is not analogous to the dispute with the court reporter at issue in Russell. The majority claims *206that hearings on a motion for accelerated judgment are the "functional equivalent” of a trial, because such hearings are the only time and place where certain defenses, such as the expiration of the statute of limitations, may be adjudicated. However, GCR 1963, 116.1 states that such defenses may be raised either in a party’s first responsive pleading or by motion filed not later than the first responsive pleading. GCR 1963, 116.3 provides:
"Any defense or objection raised under this rule, whether in a responsive pleading or by motion, may be noticed for hearing by either party as if raised by motion. Affidavits or other evidence may be submitted by either party to support or oppose the grounds asserted in the pleading or motion, and in every case where the grounds asserted do not appear on the face of the pleading attacked, the demand shall be supported by affidavits or other evidence filed with the pleading or motion. As to defenses and objections based upon (1), (2), (3), or (4) in sub-rule 116.1, the court may order immediate trial of any disputed questions of fact, and judgment may be rendered forthwith if the proof shows that the moving party is entitled to júdgment upon the facts as determined; or the court may postpone the hearing on the matter until the trial on the merits. As to defenses and objections based upon sub-rule 116.1(5), the court may order immediate trial of any disputed questions of fact, and judgment may be rendered forthwith if the proof shows that the moving party is entitled to judgment on the facts as determined; or the court may postpone the hearing on the matter until the trial on the merits, and shall postpone the hearing if a jury trial has been demanded pursuant to right on or before the day of the hearing.”
This rule shows that the defenses specified in GCR 1963, 116.1 need not be resolved at a hearing on a motion for accelerated judgment, and in some *207cases cannot be resolved at a hearing on a motion for accelerated judgment. The majority’s reasoning, therefore, does not support a conclusion that such a hearing is the "functional equivalent” of a trial.
Note that the rule provides, in some instances, for an "immediate trial” of disputed questions of fact. Such a proceeding is a trial, not merely the "functional equivalent” of a trial. But, where no such immediate trial takes place, a hearing on a motion for accelerated judgment is not the "functional equivalent” of a trial.
The majority correctly holds that the language of GCR 1963, 111.6 requires that awards of expenses and attorney fees be limited to cases in which unreasonable allegations or denials of facts have been made. An assertion of an unreasonable legal position does not fall within the rule. However, the majority concludes that this case should be remanded for recomputation of attorney fees, and the majority implicitly approves an award which reflects costs incurred in countering unreasonable factual allegations contained in plaintiffs pleadings. I believe that such an award is neither authorized by the language of the rule nor warranted by the circumstances presented here. No trial or "functional equivalent” of a trial took place. Moreover, a requirement of an award under the rule is that "such fact if alleged is not proved or if denied is proved or admitted”. No evidentiary proceeding at which plaintiff could fail to prove facts alleged has ever been held here. Finally, the record shows that plaintiff agreed that the claims at issue were barred by the statute of limitations and stipulated to their dismissal. Plaintiff at first moved to amend her complaint but subsequently abandoned this motion. These actions by plaintiff *208are indistinguishable from the agreements for voluntary dismissals with prejudice at issue in Reppuhn and Goodrich Theaters.
I agree with the majority’s resolution of the issue raised on cross-appeal. I would reverse the circuit court’s award of expenses and attorney fees pursuant to GCR 1963, 111.6, and I would otherwise affirm the circuit court’s decision.