Court Opinion

ID: 9660714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:19:16.396146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:21.537247
License: Public Domain

KAROHL, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The issue before the court in this case is whether the state may directly refer to the defendant’s failure to testify, a violation of the defendant’s constitutional, statutory and rule protection against self-incrimination, without committing prejudicial plain error. Also at issue is whether the court must on its own motion declare a mistrial if the state makes a direct reference argument and whether defendant’s voir dire questions or his submission of an MAI-CR 3.76 instruction is a waiver or in some way removes the prejudice of the argument.
The privilege against self-incrimination is unique in that it is a constitutional privilege found in both the federal and state constitutions which has been reenforced by both *634statute, § 546.270 RSMo 1978, and Supreme Court Rule 27.05(a). No other privilege has enjoyed the composite protection offered by constitutional, statutory and rule provisions. Read together these provisions absolutely forbid any reference before the jury to the constitutional right against self-incrimination. See State v. Barker, 399 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo.1966). This court noted in State v. Gray, 503 S.W.2d 457, 463 (Mo.App.1973) that a direct reference is plain error and “the only way to cure such a transgression is to abort the trial.” Id. at 463.
The prosecutor’s comment which violated defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination occurred at the very beginning of the state’s closing argument. An analysis of the argument indicates that the state attacked the presumption of innocence claiming it is less probative than testimony which is subject to cross-examination. Our appellate courts have frequently recognized that presumptions are the equivalent of proof. This was followed by a statement indicating that defendant’s failure to testify was not proof of innocence or guilt. This was a direct attack on the foundation of our system of criminal law since the defendant had no burden of proof on innocence. See Charles v. State, 573 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Mo.App.1978).
The state’s response to appellant’s point on appeal is:
The trial court did not commit plain error by not declaring a mistrial, sua sponte, when the prosecutor noted in closing argument that “the defendant’s failure to testify is not proof of anything”, because the prosecutor’s statement was nonprejudicial and any error had been waived by the defendant in that (1) the prosecutor’s statement contained only a general statement of the law and (2) appellant’s trial counsel, during voir dire examination, repeatedly indicated that the appellant might not testify, and that the jury was to be precluded from drawing adverse inferences from the defendant’s failure to testify or present any evidence.
The function of voir dire is the selection of a fair and impartial jury. In conducting a voir dire examination competent counsel must consider the nature of the case, the source and type of evidence to be offered, and the effect on the jury of defendant’s failure to take the stand and deny the charge or offer a defense.
We have held that the voir dire inquiry may be a waiver of the privilege against comment on defendant’s failure to testify in indirect reference cases. See State v. Harris, 636 S.W.2d 403, 404-405 (Mo.App.1982) and State v. Wilborn, 525 S.W.2d 87, 94-95 (Mo.App.1975). However, indirect references are not plain error. We said in State v. Gray, 503 S.W.2d at 462-463 that a direct reference is plain error. In order to achieve both the purpose of voir dire and insure protection of defendant’s rights against self-incrimination the voir dire questions cannot be deemed a waiver of defendant’s right. The questions’ sole purpose is to pick an impartial jury and should not be deemed a waiver of any rights later in trial.
For similar reasons the defendant’s request of an MAI-CR 3.76 instruction should not be a consideration in determining nonprejudice in a direct reference case. The instructions are determined before argument. The mandates of both constitutions, the statute and rule are applicable at the time instructions are determined and continue in force thereafter, including during closing argument. The instruction given by the court does not and should not lessen the prohibition against a direct reference argument. It should not be considered a waiver permitting direct references in any part of the state’s closing argument with the possible exception of a rereading of the instruction and then only with the permission of the court. Our Supreme Court recently said in State v. Williams, 673 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Mo. banc 1984),
It is appropriate to express concern about prosecutor’s attempts at subtle comment about the defendant’s failure to take the stand. Perhaps some of our holdings have been too tolerant of subtle *635references. A holding that a comment during argument does not require reversal of a particular conviction is not a license for the prosecutor’s use of similar argument in future cases.
In Williams the court reversed on other grounds but elected to discuss the issue in an indirect reference case. My dissent is addressed to the same concern, that prosecutors should not be permitted to make any reference to defendant’s failure to testify.
I would hold that the state may not make a direct reference argument as it is a violation of constitutional, statutory and rule prohibitions. Such argument is plain error and presumptively prejudicial and neither voir dire nor MAI-CR 3.76 instruction, individually or collectively, constitute either a waiver of the privilege nor render the argument harmless error. State v. Gray, 503 S.W.2d 457 (Mo.App.1973). None of the cases cited in the majority opinion’s footnote number 4 commenting on Gray dilute the effect of the Gray opinion. None of those cases deal with a prohibited direct reference to the defendant’s failure to testify. In one case the defendant testified, in another there was at most an indirect reference, in another there was found to be no reference at all. One dealt with the issue of the introduction of evidence contended to be prejudicial. One dealt with a contention of argument error in the sentencing phase of a capital murder case and the disputed argument had nothing to do with the failure of the defendant to testify.
I attach great significance to the statutory and rule reenforcement of the constitutional guarantees against self-incrimination and believe that their violation by a direct reference is plain error and preju-dicially erroneous. If this view was adopted the rule in the prosecution of criminal cases would be clear and this contention of error would be eliminated from future appeals. It would likewise insure that the defendant has the special privilege guaranteed by constitutions, mandated by the legislature and reenforced by Supreme Court rule. The state, defendants and courts would have the benefit of the virtue of certainty and the absence of confusion.