Court Opinion

ID: 9928906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 15:08:01.100324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:50.433682
License: Public Domain

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                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1107-22

A.R.,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

L.H.M.,1

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________

                   Submitted December 18, 2023 – Decided February 1, 2024

                   Before Judges DeAlmeida and Berdote Byrne.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,
                   Docket No. FV-12-0769-23.

                   Hark & Hark, attorneys for appellant (Michael Joseph
                   Collis, on the briefs).

                   Danielle Marie Key, attorney for respondent.

PER CURIAM

1
  We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the record and parties. R. 1:38-
3(d)(10).
      Defendant L.H.M. appeals from the October 31, 2022 final restraining

order (FRO) entered against him by the Family Part pursuant to the Prevention

of Domestic Violence Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. We affirm.

                                       I.

      Defendant and plaintiff A.R. were in a romantic relationship, on and off,

for approximately thirteen years and do not reside together. They have two

children. The parties have joint legal custody of the children, who reside with

defendant. Each party also has a son from another relationship.

      On September 19, 2022, plaintiff filed a domestic violence complaint and

obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant. She alleged

that, on September 18, 2022, defendant committed the predicate acts of assault,

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1, and sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2, against her during an

altercation in the driveway of defendant's home. Plaintiff also asserted that she

needed protection against future acts of domestic violence by defendant.

      With respect to the history of domestic violence, the complaint alleged:

            Sometime in 2020 the defendant and the plaintiff were
            arguing when the defendant came towards her and she
            tried to push him away. The defendant then ran with
            the plaintiff into the wall causing her to fall on the
            ground with the defendant landing on top of her. The
            defendant tried to strangle the plaintiff but the
            defendant[']s son pulled the defendant off of the

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               plaintiff. The plaintiff was then able to leave the
               residence then walk to the hospital.

      On October 27, 2022, plaintiff filed an amended complaint and TRO. The

amendments concerned plaintiff's request to have the court determine parenting

time for the parties' children.

      On October 31, 2022, the day scheduled for the hearing, plaintiff filed a

second amended complaint and TRO.            The amendments added additional

allegations of prior incidents of domestic violence. In addition to the alleged

prior incident noted above, the second amended complaint alleges:

               2012-Verbal abuse. 2013-Destroy items. 2013-Assault
               Phys[i]cal. 2013-Strangle me. 2013-Strangle me.
               2013-Took items. 2013-Verbal abuse police report.
               2014-Strangle me. 2015-Verbal abuse. 2017-Kick me
               out. 2018-Verbal assault witness and police record.
               2018-Pornographic video without consent.         4-19
               St[r]angle hospital report. 11-19 Audio of threats
               verbal physical abuse. 3-2019 Assault photos. 4-2020
               Mental abuse police record and text.           3-2021
               Destroying items police report. 9-2021 Photos physical
               assault. 10-13-2022 Audio of years of abuse.

Plaintiff served the second amended complaint on defendant on the morning of

the hearing.

      At the start of the hearing, defendant's counsel and the court had the

following exchange:

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[COUNSEL]:         Your Honor, I'm forced to request an
adjournment today. There was an amendment made
literally this morning. I know that plaintiff's counsel
states, and I have no reason to disbelieve that the
amendments were actually done last week. But be that
as it may, I only got these things literally moments ago,
and I got medical records from St. Luke's at the same
time.

It's not fair, Your Honor, and I know that they're – the
allegations are primarily related to the prior history, but
they are substantial. And it will take some time to
unpack them and to make a timeline and compare them.

THE COURT:         Unpack what?

      ....

[COUNSEL]:         Well, to unpack the allegations and
also . . . to compare them . . . with phone and text
records to make a timeline, to understand the medical
records. And Your Honor, I know these are supposed
to be summary hearings, but the fact is there's a lot
being alleged here and there's a lot to be dealt with here
in terms of the evidence.

      ....

[COUNSEL]:         [Defendant] has custody of the
children he has with [plaintiff] and has had for three
years, and that could be impacted by the results of these
proceedings. And that is a substantial collateral
consequence which makes it all the more important that
[defendant] get the best defense possible today.

And I don't feel that I'm in a position to do that when
I've just been handed these things literally moments
ago.

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            THE COURT:        Counsel, what you've been handed is
            an amendment to include history. That's it. . . . I'm
            denying your application. Has no impact at all [as to]
            the allegations raised in the complaint. The second
            amendment is just about history. I'm going to deny
            your application. This matter's been pending for well
            over a month.

                  ....

            THE COURT:        Denied. You know, here's the thing.
            If I give you an adjournment, it's going to be a short
            one. It's not going to make a difference if it's tried
            today or tomorrow, you know? You know, counsel,
            you've been strangely trying to figure a way out. If you
            want an adjournment for a week, I'd give you that.
            That's all you would get.

            [COUNSEL]:        Well, I think a week – honestly, I
            have jury duty next week, so it would have to be two
            weeks. But, you know, unless Your Honor can get me
            out of jury duty.

            THE COURT:         No. I'm not getting involved in your
            jury duty or anything else.

      The court then proceeded with the trial.      The parties were the only

witnesses to testify. Plaintiff testified that prior to September 18, 2022, the

parties had reinitiated an intimate relationship. She testified that she was at

defendant's home that evening to have dinner with him and their children.

Plaintiff explained that she intended to sleep at defendant's home that night.

According to plaintiff, defendant began to question her regarding whether she

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was seeing other men. When defendant refused to drop the subject, plaintiff

announced that she was leaving and would spend the night at her home.

      She testified that defendant who had been drinking alcohol, became upset

and followed her to the driveway. According to plaintiff, defendant began

calling her a "whore," grabbed her arm and chest, and pinned her against a

parked vehicle. Plaintiff testified that defendant said "we could fuck right now,

that's what you do," bit her ear, and placed his hand down her pants and

attempted to digitally penetrate her vagina while she pleaded with him to stop.

defendant placed his finger between the lips of plaintiff's vagina. Defendant

then removed his hand and smeared plaintiff's vaginal fluid on her face. Plaintiff

alleged that as she was attempting to leave, defendant spit on her and rubbed his

hand across her face. 2

      Defendant testified that plaintiff was at his home on September 18, 2022,

because she and he had agreed that after she had dinner with their children, she

would spend the night for the purpose of having consensual sex. He testified

that plaintiff spontaneously announced that she was menstruating and, when

defendant rolled his eyes in response, invited him to join her in the bathroom to

2
  Criminal charges were lodged against defendant relating to the September 18,
2022 incident.
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verify her statement. According to defendant, after he declined, plaintiff falsely

accused him of being drunk and left the home. Defendant admitted that he

followed plaintiff to the driveway and that they had a "heated" conversation as

she was attempting to leave. He denied, however, having had any physical

contact with plaintiff, or attempting to sexually assault her. Defendant also

denied each of the prior acts of domestic violence alleged in the amended

complaint.

      At the conclusion of defendant's testimony, his counsel asked for a

continuance of the hearing to produce defendant's son as a witness with respect

to the incident that plaintiff alleged resulted in her walking to a hospital. The

trial court denied that request, concluding that the original complaint alleged

that defendant's son pulled defendant off of plaintiff during the incident, putting

defendant on notice to have his son ready as a witness on the day of the hearing.

After the trial court's denial of the request for a continuance, defendant's counsel

referred to a letter stating that the son was having surgery on the day of the

hearing. Counsel did not, however, attempt to admit the letter as evidence. The

trial court again denied the request.

      The trial court issued an oral opinion. The court found plaintiff to be

credible and to have provided an accurate account of what transpired on

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September 18, 2022. In making its credibility determination, the court relied, in

part, on plaintiff's testimony with respect to several of the prior acts of domestic

violence alleged for the first time in the second amended complaint. The court

found that plaintiff described these events in her testimony in a manner

consistent with corroborating evidence, enhancing her credibility as a witness.

      In contrast, the court found defendant's testimony to be "bizarre" in some

respects and lacking in credibility. The court concluded that overwhelming

evidence established that defendant's conduct on September 18, 2022,

constituted an assault and a sexual assault of plaintiff.

      With respect to the parties' history of domestic violence, the court found

that defendant "abused [plaintiff] over the years."         In assessing plaintiff's

credibility, the court noted the strength of the evidence establishing the truth of

plaintiff's allegations regarding the April 2019 incident described in the initial

and amended complaints in which she walked to a hospital for treatment. The

court, however, did not rely on that incident when discussing the history of

domestic violence.3 The court found that defendant slammed a screen door on

plaintiff's leg in September 2021, which it determined to be a prior act of

3
  The amended complaint alleged that the incident in which plaintiff walked to
the hospital for treatment took place "[s]ometime in 2020." Plaintiff's testimony
and hospital records established that the incident took place in April 2019.
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domestic violence. That incident was alleged for the first time in the second

amended complaint as "9-2021 Photos physical assault."

      The court found that the record established that plaintiff was in need of

protection from imminent danger and future acts of domestic violation. As a

result, the court entered the October 31, 2022 FRO.

      This appeal followed. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying his requests for an adjournment at the start of the hearing

and during the hearing to produce his son as a witness.

                                        II.

      Defendant's arguments with respect to the denial of his adjournment

requests must be analyzed in the context of the overall structure of FRO

hearings. The entry of an FRO requires the trial court to make certain findings.

See Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). The court

first "must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of

the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A.

2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred."      Next, the court must determine "whether a

restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29[(a)](1) to -29[(a)](6), to protect the victim from an immediate

danger or to prevent further abuse." Id. at 127 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b));

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see also J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 476 (2011). This determination requires

evaluation of:

            (1) The previous history of domestic violence
            between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats,
            harassment and physical abuse;

            (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or
            property;

            (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and
            defendant;

            (4)    The best interest of the victim and any child;

            (5) In determining custody and parenting time the
            protection of the victim's safety; and

            (6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection
            from another jurisdiction.

            [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a); see also Cesare v. Cesare, 154
            N.J. 394, 401 (1998).]

      Defendant argues that the trial court's denial of his adjournment requests

deprived him of due process. "Due process is 'a flexible [concept] that depends

on the particular circumstances.'" H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 321 (2003)

(alteration in original) (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995)). "What

that means is that '[a]t a minimum, due process requires that a party in a judicial

hearing receive notice defining the issues and an adequate opportunity to prepare

and respond.'" J.D., 207 N.J. at 478 (alteration in original) (quoting McKeown-

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                                       10
Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 132 N.J. 546, 559 (1993) (internal

quotations omitted)).

             There can be no adequate preparation where the notice
             does not reasonably apprise the party of the charges, or
             where the issues litigated at the hearing differ
             substantially from those outlined in the notice. It
             offends elemental concepts of procedural due process
             to grant enforcement to a finding neither charged in the
             complaint nor litigated at the hearing.

             [Nicoletta v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 77
             N.J. 145, 162 (1978) (quotation omitted).]

      The Supreme Court examined due process concerns arising in domestic

violence hearings in two opinions that guide our analysis here. In H.E.S., the

trial court, over the defendant's objection, permitted the plaintiff to testify about

both an alleged predicate act and several alleged prior acts of domestic violence

that were not set forth in the complaint. 175 N.J. at 317. Those allegations were

raised for the first time during plaintiff's testimony at the hearing. Ibid.

      At the close of plaintiff's testimony, the court permitted a one-day

continuance to allow defendant to consult with his counsel prior to presenting

his case-in-chief. Id. at 318. After the one-day continuance, defendant's counsel

asked for an additional continuance, arguing he needed more time to prepare a

defense to the allegations first raised during plaintiff's testimony and to

subpoena the police officers who responded to the newly alleged incidents. Ibid.

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The trial court denied the request. Ibid. Ultimately, the trial court determined

it would not consider the prior acts of domestic violence raised for the first time

during the plaintiff's testimony because they were too remote in time from the

predicate acts and did not establish a pattern of violent behavior. Ibid. The

court did, however, find that plaintiff had proven the predicate act of domestic

violence first raised during her testimony and relied on that predicate act as a

basis for issuance of an FRO. Id. at 319.

      On appeal, we held that the trial court's reliance on the predicate act not

alleged in the complaint did not violate the defendant's due process rights

because he was given a one-day continuance to prepare a defense. Ibid. The

Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the defendant's "due process rights

were . . . violated by the trial court's refusal to grant an adjournment after

plaintiff alleged an incident of domestic violence not contained in the complaint

. . . and by the court's decision to grant a FRO on the basis of that allegation."

Id. at 324. As the Court explained, "it constitutes a fundamental violation of

due process to convert a hearing on a complaint alleging one act of domestic

violence into a hearing on other acts of domestic violence which are not even

alleged in the complaint." Id. at 325 (quoting J.F. v. B.K., 308 N.J. Super. 387,

391-92 (App. Div. 1998)). "The fact that defendant's counsel had overnight to

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                                       12
consider his response does not diminish defendant's due process rights in this

case." Ibid. (quotations and citation omitted). Therefore, the Court vacated the

FRO. Ibid. Because the trial court did not rely on the prior acts of domestic

violence raised for the first time during the plaintiff's testimony, the Court did

not address due process concerns with respect to that aspect of the plaintiff's

testimony.

      In J.D., the Court addressed the due process rights of a defendant with

respect to prior acts of domestic violence identified for the first time at an FRO

hearing. 207 N.J. at 466-68. There, the plaintiff filed a domestic violence

complaint alleging, in addition to a predicate act of domestic violence, four prior

acts of domestic violence. Ibid. At the hearing, in response to an open-ended

question from the court, the plaintiff testified with respect to multiple prior acts

of domestic violence not alleged in the complaint. Ibid. At the conclusion of

the plaintiff's testimony, the defendant told the court that he was not prepared to

respond to the plaintiff's testimony about the prior acts of domestic violence not

alleged in the complaint. Id. at 468-69. Notwithstanding defendant's statement,

the trial court proceeded to take testimony from defendant regarding the alleged

past acts. Id. at 469. The trial court subsequently relied on the past acts of

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domestic violence not alleged in the complaint when reaching its decision that

the alleged predicate act constituted harassment. Id. at 470.

      On appeal to this court, the defendant argued, among other things, that he

was denied due process because the trial court permitted testimony about the

past acts of domestic violence not alleged in the complaint. Ibid. We affirmed,

concluding that the contested testimony was properly admitted. Id. at 470-71.

      The defendant raised the same argument in the Supreme Court. Id. at 471.

The Court noted that during FRO hearings parties often expand upon the history

of domestic abuse alleged in their complaints. Id. at 479. In addition, the Court

found that trial courts often will attempt to elicit a fuller picture of the history

of the parties' relationship during a hearing. Ibid. The Court held by eliciting

testimony that "allows" the prior history alleged in the complaint "to be

expanded," the trial court "permitted an amendment to the complaint and must

proceed accordingly." Id. at 479-80. As the Court explained,

            To be sure, some defendants will know full well the
            history that plaintiff recites and some parties will be
            well-prepared regardless of whether the testimony
            technically expands upon the allegations of the
            complaint. Others, however, will not, and in all cases
            the trial court must ensure that defendant is afforded an
            adequate opportunity to be apprised of those allegations
            and to prepare. See H.E.S., supra, 175 N.J. at 324
            (concluding that allowing defendant only twenty-four
            hours to prepare violates due process).

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                                        14
            When permitting plaintiff to expand upon the alleged
            prior incidents and thereby allowing an amendment to
            the complaint, the court also should have recognized
            the due process implication of defendant's suggestion
            that he was unprepared to defend himself. Although
            defendant's assertion that he needed time to prepare was
            not cloaked in the lawyer-like language of an
            adjournment request and was made as part of a longer
            response to a question, it was sufficient to raise the due
            process question for the trial court and it should have
            been granted. Our courts have broad discretion to reject
            a request for an adjournment that is ill founded or
            designed only to create delay, but they should liberally
            grant one that is based on an expansion of factual
            assertions that form the heart of the complaint for relief.

            [Ibid.]

      The Court noted that granting an adjournment to give defendant time to

prepare to address new allegations of prior acts of domestic violence poses "no

risk to plaintiff" because "courts are empowered to continue temporary restraints

during the pendency of an adjournment," which will fully protect the plaintiff

while affording the defendant due process. Ibid. So, the Court held that the

denial of the defendant's adjournment request, along with other errors, warranted

reversal of the FRO and remand for a new trial. Id. at 481-82, 488.

      In the present matter, the trial court did not depart from the holding in

either H.E.S. or J.D.    Plaintiff served defendant with a second amended

complaint alleging additional prior acts of domestic violence on the morning of

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the hearing. The second amended complaint did not allege a new predicate act;

rather it expanded on the history that had been previously set forth in the prior

complaints.

        Defendant's counsel informed the trial court that he was not prepared to

address the new allegations of prior acts of domestic violence. Although the

court's initial response was to deny the adjournment request, it subsequently

offered to adjourn the hearing for one week. Unlike the facts before the Court

in H.E.S. and J.D., the adjournment offered by the trial court would have

provided defendant's counsel sufficient time to prepare a defense to the new

allegations set forth in the second amended complaint. We, therefore, reject

defendant's contention that he was denied due process.

        We acknowledge that defendant's counsel declined the court's offer and

requested a two-week adjournment, asserting that he was scheduled for jury duty

on the proposed new return date for the hearing. We see no mistaken exercise

of discretion in the trial court's refusal to adjourn the hearing for an additional

week.     Generally speaking, "[a] court may exercise broad discretion in

controlling its calendar." State v. Kates, 426 N.J. Super. 32, 45 (App. Div.

2012). Thus, we review a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion.

Escobar-Barrera v. Kissin, 464 N.J. Super. 224, 233 (App. Div. 2020). An abuse

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of discretion "arises when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation,

inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible

basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting

Achacoso-Sanchez v. I.N.S., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). When

reviewing the denial of an adjournment request, we consider "the amount of

prejudice suffered by the aggrieved party" and will reverse where the denial has

resulted in an injustice. Escobar-Barrera, 464 N.J. Super. at 233.

      Trial courts must complete FRO hearings promptly. See R. 5:7A-(e) ("A

hearing for a final restraining order shall be held in the Superior Court within

10 days of the filing of an application."); accord N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).

However, "to the extent compliance with the ten-day provision precludes

meaningful notice and an opportunity to defend, the provision must yield to due

process requirements." H.E.S., 175 N.J. at 323. The TRO against defendant

had been issued well over a month prior to the October 31, 2022 hearing. Given

the amount of time that had passed since the issuance of the original TRO, the

one-week adjournment offered by the trial court satisfied both the statutory

obligation to adjudicate the matter promptly and defendant's due process rights.

      Defendant's counsel, although stating that he was assigned jury duty for

the week after the hearing, did not state that he had been told to report to the

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courthouse for jury duty on the day the trial court proposed for the adjourned

hearing. Nor did defendant's counsel indicate that it would not be possible to

have another attorney from his firm represent defendant at the adjourned hearing

in the event that he was required to report to the courthouse for jury duty on the

adjourned date. In light of these circumstances, the trial court permissibly

exercised its discretion.

      We reach the same conclusion with respect to the trial court's denial of

defendant's request to adjourn the hearing to produce his son as a witness. The

initial complaint, as well as both amended complaints, alleged that defendant's

son intervened to stop defendant's physical abuse of plaintiff on the day that she

walked to the hospital for medical treatment. Defendant was on notice that if he

wished to produce his son as a witness to this event he had to do so on the date

of the hearing. Moreover, defendant did not raise the issue of his son not being

available to testify until after both parties had completed their testimony. It was

within the trial court's discretion to deny defendant's last-minute adjournment

request relating to his son.

      Affirmed.

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