Court Opinion

ID: 9691009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:00:39.11152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:08.655413
License: Public Domain

Sam Bird, Judge, dissenting. I disagree that the trial court erred in refusing to issue the disputed-accomplice instruction as it relates to Caleb Johnson. Under cases decided by our supreme court, I see no need to remand this case for new trial. The term “accomplice” cannot be used in a loose or popular sense so as to embrace one who has guilty knowledge, or is morally delinquent, or who was even an admitted participant in a related, but distinct offense. McGehee v. State, 348 Ark. 395, 72 S.W.3d 867 (2002); Hicks v. State, 271 Ark. 132, 607 S.W.2d 388 (1980); Burke v. State, 242 Ark. 368, 413 S.W.2d 646 (1967). A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, the person solicits, advises, encourages, or coerces the other person to commit the offense; aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing the offense; or, having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make a proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-403(a) (Repl. 2006).1 A person cannot be convicted of a felony based upon the testimony of an accomplice unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-111(e)(1)(A) (Repl. 2005). In King v. State, 323 Ark. 671, 916 S.W.2d 732 (1996), a murder conviction was remanded for retrial because the jury was not given instruction on the disputed-accomplice status of State’s witness Vernon Scott. The supreme court recited evidence that Scott knew of ill-will between the co-defendants and their victim, who had knowledge about another murder; that Scott was to be paid with rock cocaine, and indeed was so paid, in exchange for luring the victim to the co-defendants’ reach; that within five minutes of luring and leaving the victim, Scott heard a flurry of gunshots and had the immediate thought that “they done shot that boy”; and that Scott initially denied knowledge of the co-defendants’ involvement in the crime. In Ford v. State, 296 Ark. 8, 753 S.W.2d 258 (1988), Adam Ford and King McNichols were convicted of burglary and theft in connection with items taken from a liquor store. The supreme court reviewed the following evidence and held that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the accomplice status of Jo Ann Willis, Johnny Wyllis, and William Harvey: On the morning following the burglary, [Jo Ann Willis] awoke to find McNichols, appellant Ford and McNichols’ nephew, together with liquor and cigarettes, in her house. She stated that she did not know where the liquor came from, that she thought it may have been stolen, but she did not know. In any event, she asked the three parties to help her put it in the car so that she could take it away from the house. Jo Ann drove the appellants McNichols and Ford, McNichols’ nephew, Johnny Wyllis, and another party to a tavern, Fat Daddy’s, where McNichols sold portions of the stolen liquor to the tavern owner, William Harvey. Jo Ann’s testimony was corroborated to some extent by Johnny Wyllis. 296 Ark. at 13, 753 S.W.2d at 260; see also Shrader v. State, 13 Ark. App. 17, 25, 678 S.W.2d 777, 781 (1984) (stating that it would be proper to submit to the jury the question of whether the person who made the silencer for a gun, which he was told was to be used to kill the victim, was an accomplice). In light of these cases, I believe that this court should overrule Robinson v. State, 11 Ark. App. 18, 665 S.W.2d 890 (1984), which is the sole decision discussed in Hickman’s brief to support his position, and which the majority opinion does not even mention. In my view, the Robinson court wrongly accepted the appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury so as to allow it to determine the status of four State’s witnesses who had ridden with him to a lake: three of them fished while he was apparently stealing boat motors, and the fourth lay sick in the car while the theft was going on. There was various testimony that Robinson “toted” a motor to the car, put two motors in the back of the car, and stated that he planned to sell them in Pine Bluff. One witness stated that “they told [him] he shouldn’t take the motors but he said he needed money,” and that he asked them to go to Pine Bluff but “we said no, you know, we didn’t want to have nothing to do with it.” 11 Ark. App. at 21, 665 S.W.3d at 891. I agree with the dissenting judge in Robinson that the evidence was insufficient to make the status of these witnesses a question for the jury to decide. Here, Caleb Johnson was guilty of forgery in connection with using a check that Hickman stole from Haddad’s house. Johnson was not charged with residential burglary. His testimony, corroborated by young Sammy, was that he watched Benton pass the television over the fence to Hickman; Johnson further testified that he “didn’t want to be involved” and went back inside Ruby Douglas’s home once he saw the television being loaded into the van. Johnson had no duty to report this crime to authorities. The evidence presented — that Johnson saw other persons pass the television over the fence and load it into the van, that he knew that the television and the checks were in the van, and that he was present when the television was sold — does not suggest any way in which he aided or abetted the crime of residential burglary. Thus, there was nothing for the jury to decide about Johnson’s status as an accomplice, and the circuit court did not err in refusing to give the jury AMCI 403. I would affirm Hickman’s conviction. Gladwin, J., joins.   In Hutcheson v. State, 92 Ark. App. 307, 213 S.W.3d 25 (2005), Hutcheson’s silence, knowledge, concealment, and failure to inform law enforcement officers of sexual assaults against her child made Hutcheson an accomplice to the assaults because she had a legal duty to protect the child.