Court Opinion

ID: 9861844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:47:30.456409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:28.645839
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAREN, specially concurring: I believe that defendant’s arguments regarding the denial of the motion to dismiss and insufficient proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt lack merit as a matter of law. Therefore, I do not believe that it is necessary to either mischaracterize defendant’s claims or opine, as does the majority, “that there must be, at the very least, intent on the part of some State actor to materially mislead the grand jury in order to give rise to a violation of due process.” 338 Ill. App. 3d at 991. Even though the trial court did not find that the testimony was false or perjured, defendant has failed to establish that the allegedly perjured testimony is material to establishing probable cause as well as proof of a necessary element of retail theft beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant claims that the State must prove that he left the store in order to prove that he committed the crime of retail theft. Likewise, he claims that the State must establish the same fact before the grand jury. Defendant does not cite to any authority for these propositions other than “store policy.” Failure to cite relevant authority is a violation of Supreme Court Rule 341 and results in waiver of the issue on appeal. 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); Hoff v. Mayer, Brown & Platt, 331 Ill. App. 3d 732, 741 (2002). Waiver aside, the State cites to several cases not cited by the majority opinion that clearly establish that such an element is not required to prove retail theft. See People v. Caplinger, 162 Ill. App. 3d 74 (1987); People v. Connell, 91 Ill. App. 3d 326 (1980); People v. Mays, 62 Ill. App. 3d 17 (1978); City of Joliet v. Gregorec, 12 Ill. App. 3d 998 (1973). Contrary to defendant’s uncited claims, the law is clear that to establish retail theft the State is not required to prove that defendant left the premises of the theft site. Therefore, the allegedly false and perjured testimony was irrelevant and immaterial to establishing probable cause before the grand jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt before the trial court. The majority’s analysis fails to address waiver in order to go beyond the issues raised on appeal. The majority skews the argument of defendant when it states: “Conversely, we know of no case that has held a prosecutor’s unintentional presentation of inaccurate evidence to violate due process. Moreover, defendant does not argue that the prosecutor intentionally misled the grand jury.” (Emphasis added.) 338 Ill. App. 3d at 991. The majority raises a straw man and proceeds to knock him down in an attempt to misdirect the reader from the simple, basic, and correct argument raised by defendant that an indictment may be dismissed if it is based upon false or perjured testimony. The majority opinion also goes far beyond the facts in the case to opine that there must be deception on the part of a State “actor.” In addition to this being obiter dicta, it is incorrect to require deception on the part of a State actor. The case cited by defendant and its precursors suggest the opposite conclusion. See People v. DeCesare, 190 Ill. App. 3d 934 (1989); People v. Wolfe, 114 Ill. App. 3d 841 (1983); People v. Rivera, 72 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (1979). In People v. Hunter, 298 Ill. App. 3d 126 (1998), an indictment was quashed without any finding of deception on the part of a State “actor.” The court said: “In addition to the public policy of protecting the public against the overreaching and oppression of the State, our determination provides the State with a strong deterrent against future uses of perjured testimony. Honesty and integrity are essential to the performance of the functions of the police and prosecutor in our criminal justice system and the maintenance of our freedoms. ‘[A]s the guardians of our laws, police officers are expected to act with integrity, honesty, and trustworthiness. ’ [Citation:] This admonition applies with equal force to the prosecution. If the police and prosecution know that perjured testimony will lead to the dismissal with prejudice of their cases, they will be careful to use only truthful testimony. Additionally, we recognize the ramifications of our holding and emphasize that this case involves wilful perjury discovered and brought before the court by defendants. We cannot say that, had the false testimony been made by accident, mistake, or inadvertency, or had the State discovered the perjured testimony and brought it to the attention of the court in order to correct the violation of defendants’ rights, our result would be the same. We merely hold that, where defendants discovered the perjured testimony and the court dismissed the indictment due to the due process violation arising from the State’s use of perjured testimony, the State may not seek a new indictment.” (Emphasis added.) Hunter, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 131-32. Hunter did not require deception on the part of a State actor; it required only that the State use the perjured testimony. It is inappropriate for this majority to fail to cite, let alone fail to follow, prior precedent. It is also inappropriate to do so when the issues are not justiciable and the statements are obiter dicta. I conclude by voicing my opinion that this disposition is not precedential and therefore should not be published. 166 Ill. 2d R. 23. The “law” contained in the majority opinion appears to be precedential only because the majority fails to cite to prior authority brought to its attention by the State and fails to recognize prior precedent cited by defendant regarding perjured testimony. For these reasons, I specially concur.