Court Opinion

ID: 9538660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:39:08.911204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:04.224459
License: Public Domain

Grady, C. J.
(dissenting)—This is another of the many cases to be found in our reports in which we have made ref*261erence to the rule to be applied when a court considers the sufficiency of the evidence, a motion for á nonsuit, or a motion for a directed verdict, and then have proceedéd to become a trier of fact or have approved the action of a trial court becoming such, and by such process have defeated the case of a plaintiff.
In those cases where drivers of motor vehicles are confronted with the fact of the presence of small children within the danger zone, the amount of care and foresight to be exercised in order to meet the standard imposed by law is very great, and it is only in exceptional cases that the court should say that as a matter of law the standard has been met. The adjudicated cases so differ in their factual situations that they are not helpful aid in other cases except as they pronounce legal principles concerning the duty to anticipate or foresee what a child might probably do when near a motor vehicle.
In this case there arose a question of fact for the jury to determine whether respondent was or should have been aware of the presence of the child in such close proximity to the standing automobile that at any moment she might get into a place of danger upon the starting of such vehicle to move; and it also became a question for the jury to determine whether, with such knowledge, respondent acted as a reasonably careful and prudent driver should have done under the circumstances. Even though it may be said the testimony is not in substantial dispute, the jurors were not required to believe all that respondent said as to what he thought or believed to have been the movements of the child, or all of the word picture he portrayed when reconstructing the scene and events leading up to the accident. The physical facts coupled with the verbal version of respondent and permissible inferences made a factual situation, and it will not do to justify the action of the trial court by saying that as a matter of law no act of negligence was proven. The arguments made in the majority opinion to support the conclusion that no negligence was proven could properly and possibly with much effect have been made to *262the jury, but are not suitable in applying the rules by which a court approaches a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. This has been largely the trouble to be found in those cases I have referred to when the coúrts have stated the rules cited in previous cases and then by an argumentative process found the facts to be such that a conclusion of negligence would not be warranted.
The judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
October 15, 1954. Petition for rehearing denied.