Court Opinion

ID: 9581024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:11:07.818494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:39.796195
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree that the State presented sufficient evidence to affirm Lewis’s conviction of possession of drug-related objects, and that this case must be remanded for resentencing on that conviction, I do not agree that we should affirm Lewis’s conviction of possession of methamphetamine. Therefore, I respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion.
The evidence corroborating the testimony of Lewis’s co-defendant, Bishop, consisted of cash, a pocket scale, and Lewis’s statement to the investigating officer that he was present at Bishop’s home to buy drugs, not sell them. The State must corroborate the accomplice’s testimony by evidence, independent of the accomplice testimony, which establishes or infers direct participation in the offense charged, and is more than sufficient to merely cast on the defendant a grave suspicion of guilt. Allen v. State, 215 Ga. 455, 457 (111 SE2d 70) (1959). Accord Gunter v. State, 243 Ga. 651, 654-655 (256 SE2d 341) (1979); Vaughn v. State, 139 Ga. App. 565 (228 SE2d 741) (1976). Corroborating evidence must, at a minimum, be sufficient to establish the defendant’s participation in the offense charged, without considering the accomplice’s testimony. Allen v. State, supra, 215 Ga. at 458-459 (2); Vaughn v. State, supra, 139 Ga. App. at 569 (1).
*552The majority concludes that Lewis’s statement that he was there to buy drugs, the $250 cash in his hand, and the scales in his pocket are sufficient to corroborate Bishop’s testimony that, at some point, he may have purchased the gram of methamphetamine in his bedroom from Lewis. But Lewis’s statement is inadmissible because he made it while he was in custody without receiving Miranda warnings.
At the Jackson-Denno hearing, the investigating detective testified three times that Lewis was not free to leave once the deputies entered Bishop’s house, and that he directed another deputy to accompany Lewis outside while the investigator spoke with Bishop. After talking to Bishop, the investigator went outside “and tried to find the truth.” He asked Lewis if it were true that he was there to sell drugs to Bishop, and Lewis said he was “just over here to buy drugs; I’m not selling them any drugs.”
The trial court ruled that Lewis’s statement that he was'there to buy drugs was admissible, finding that Lewis was not in custody and “was not deprived of freedom of action in any significant way.” The trial court held that a reasonable man in Lewis’s situation would not have thought he was in custody, unlike in Miranda, in which the United States Supreme Court was “concerned about the situations where the defendant was questioned by police and sequestered in an interrogation-room type situation and was held away from the outside world incommunicado.”
This search did not involve the execution of a search warrant. If that had been the case,
[a] warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. OCGA § 17-5-28 defines the limits of an officer’s authority to detain or search as follows: “In the execution of the search warrant the officer executing the same may reasonably detain or search any person in the place at the time: (1) to protect himself from attack; or (2) to prevent the disposal or concealment of any instruments, articles, or things particularly described in the search warrant.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mercer v. State, 251 Ga. App. 465, 467 (2) (554 SE2d 732) (2001). Nevertheless, in this case the officers were not executing a search warrant, and were not at Bishop’s residence to arrest him, but only to seek his consent to search his home. They had no probable cause to arrest Lewis, and, in fact, did *553not even expect Lewis to be there. This situation is therefore distinguishable from one in which the officers are permitted to detain everyone present while they execute a warrant.
We then consider whether Lewis was in custody. “For Miranda to apply a person must be taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” (Citations omitted.) Hardeman v. State, 252 Ga. 286, 288 (1) (313 SE2d 95) (1984). To determine whether Lewis’s statements were custodial, we apply an objective standard and determine whether a reasonable person in his situation would have believed he was physically deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. Harrell v. State, 204 Ga. App. 738, 739 (3) (420 SE2d 631) (1992). We will uphold the trial court’s findings as to factual determinations and credibility unless they are clearly erroneous. Lobdell v. State, 256 Ga. 769, 773 (6) (353 SE2d 799) (1987).
In this case, there is no factual dispute about whether Lewis was in custody. He was. The investigating detective stated several times that Lewis could not have left the scene, and in fact he was guarded by another detective until the investigator went outside to “find the truth” from Lewis. This coercive situation is exactly what Miranda addressed. The trial court erred in determining that Miranda does not apply in this situation, and in admitting Lewis’s statement into evidence during trial.
Eliminating the testimony of the accomplice and Lewis’s statement leaves only the evidence that Lewis had cash in his hand and scales in his jacket pocket. As to the money, the only evidence that it may have been payment from Bishop to Lewis for a drug debt is Bishop’s testimony that Lewis was one of his dealers and he owed Lewis money on a previous debt. The fact that the detective testified that $250 is the approximate cost of a certain amount of drugs does not independently corroborate that Lewis’s $250 represented a drug payment. If that were true, then the police could themselves corroborate the testimony of an accomplice of anyone accused of a drug offense with cash in his pocket. Cash itself does not establish or infer direct participation in the offense of drug possession. Allen v. State, supra, 215 Ga. at 457. Because Bishop cannot corroborate his own testimony, the money is not corroborating evidence. Milton v. State, 248 Ga. 192, 197 (2) (282 SE2d 90) (1981).
Similarly, the only evidence linking the scales to the drugs is Bishop’s testimony that Lewis was his dealer. No other evidence related the scales in Lewis’s pocket to the gram of methamphetamine located in Bishop’s bedroom cabinet. “Although the evidence presented may have created a suspicion that defendant was guilty of this act[,] this alone is not sufficient to support the conviction.” Neal v. State, 152 Ga. App. 270, 271 (1) (262 SE2d 561) (1979).
*554Decided July 15, 2004.
Avrett, Ponder & Withrock, William B. Barnwell, for appellant.
Kermit N. McManus, District Attorney, Mark P. Higgins, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Further, no evidence at all corroborates Bishop’s testimony that he “probably” bought the drugs from Lewis. The drugs were clearly not in Lewis’s possession when the sheriffs found them. They were not out in the open, but were located within a cabinet in Bishop’s closed bedroom. Lewis had no keys to the residence, but was merely a visitor. With no corroboration of the co-defendant’s testimony, I must conclude that the evidence was not sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Lewis was guilty of methamphetamine possession. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Stevens v. State, 245 Ga. App. 237, 239 (1) (537 SE2d 688) (2000).
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the majority opinion.