Court Opinion

ID: 9486770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:59:33.055048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:55.497310
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s able analysis and disposition of all the issues save one. I have difficulty, however, with the approach to the City’s delayed drug testing and egregiously slow application of the negative test results. Garcia alleges that the City’s policy caused him to be detained for the 11 days it took the white powder to be tested for drugs, and for 15 more days after the tests came back negative. Because I think that such a policy may implicate Garcia’s Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, I would not dismiss this claim at the early stage of a 12(b)(6) motion. Whether the City policy actually caused Garcia’s detention and whether it is reasonable are issues requiring further proceedings. The waters are muddied somewhat by the fact that Garcia was on probation for an auto theft offense at the time of his arrest. At the Gerstein hearing, the state’s attorney was granted leave to file a violation of probation report, although, contrary to the majority’s assumption, Garcia’s probation was never actually revoked.1 But neither the parties, the district court nor the majority have scrutinized this ease through the probation lens. Significantly, the City never contended that Garcia’s detention was based on his alleged probation violation, nor does it argue that either his liberty interest or his due process rights are limited due to his probation status. Nor does the majority’s analysis hinge on Garcia’s status as a probationer. Because the case has proceeded along these lines, I find it useful to examine first Garcia’s detention claim without reference to his probation status.
It is significant that the district court did not dismiss Garcia’s due process claim for failure to allege a constitutional violation. Instead, the court found that “conduct that results in unreasonable, unnecessary and unjustified delays in processing and releasing arrestees violates the Constitution if done intentionally or with deliberate indifference to the rights of arrestees.” And the district court concluded that for purposes of a motion to dismiss, it must be presumed that 10 to 20 days is an unreasonable testing delay. But the court eventually dismissed the claim for failing to allege municipal liability with heightened specificity, an approach since invalidated by Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). I believe, however, that the district court was correct in its analysis of the problem — preliminary to its consideration of the pleading question.
Garcia’s objection to the City’s policy is essentially a challenge to extended pre-trial detention. The majority reasons that after a Gerstein hearing the speedy trial guarantee is the only limitation on subsequent prolonged pre-trial detention. This is cold comfort — the Constitution permits a trial months or even years after an arrest. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 536, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2194-95, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (delay of over four years is constitutional). Moreover, I am skeptical about the majority’s implicit conclusion that a Gerstein hearing *973bestows a constitutional blessing on all subsequent prolonged detention.
In Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979), the Supreme Court suggested that prolonged pretrial detention, pursuant to a valid warrant and a judicial determination of probable cause, may violate due process. Id. at 145, 99 S.Ct. at 2694-95. Baker found no constitutional violation where the plaintiff was arrested and detained for three days over a holiday before the authorities realized they had arrested the wrong man. Although the speedy trial guarantee ensured that someone could not be detained indefinitely, the court observed that continued detention “in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of ‘liberty ... without due process of law.’” Id. However, the Court was “quite sure that a detention of three days over a New Year’s weekend does not and could not amount to such a deprivation.” Id.
On the other hand, Baker also rejected a requirement that law enforcement officials exercise “due diligence” to determine whether the person detained is in fact innocent, holding that officials need not “investigate independently every claim of innocence.” 443 U.S. at 146, 99 S.Ct. at 2695; see also Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1186 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied 495 U.S. 929,110 S.Ct. 2167, 109 L.Ed.2d 496 (1990); Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875 F.2d 578, 583 (7th Cir.1989). The government here, of course, argues that Baker forecloses any challenge to the City’s policy of delayed drug testing or of delayed reaction to the results of the drug tests.
But Baker, by its own admission, is not absolute. Since Baker, courts have found that prolonged pre-trial detention without any investigation can constitute a deprivation of liberty without due process. In Johnson v. City of Chicago, 711 F.Supp. 1465 (N.D.Ill. 1989), for example, the court found that a 6-day detention violated due process when the police did not take “even minimal steps” to evaluate the detainee’s claims of innocence. Id. at 1470. Significantly, Johnson was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant (unfortunately intended for another Johnson, an Attica escapee) and brought before a judge for a first appearance; nonetheless, the court found that due process required more. Id. Similarly, in Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697 (7th Cir.1987), “an innocent person was allowed to languish in jail for almost a week; and to arrest a person over his vigorous protest that he is the wrong man ... and keep him in jail for this period without either investigating the case or bringing him before a magistrate raises serious constitutional questions, under the ... due process clause.” Id. at 700-01. In Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719 (7th Cir.1985), where the plaintiff was detained pursuant to a valid warrant for 18 days despite his protests of innocence, we held that “Baker supports, if not requires, our conclusion that plaintiffs 18-day. detention was a violation of liberty without due process of law.” Id. at 724. See also Brown v. Patterson, 823 F.2d 167, 169 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 162, 98 L.Ed.2d 117 (1987) (“prolonged confinement of an arrested person without a hearing to determine whether he is the person named in the warrant would be a deprivation of liberty without due process of law and thus violate the Fourteenth Amendment”).2
*974Baker does not, then, preclude us from finding that the constitutionality of pre-trial detention may be questioned if the authorities deliberately ignore all indications that the detainee is innocent. We should not, therefore, hold as a matter of law that the City’s failure to determine whether a suspect was carrying any drugs for 11 days cannot implicate due process.
But whatever haziness obscures the exact contours of a duty to investigate burns off once the authorities know that they have no basis for detention. Baker only permitted pre-trial detention after a valid arrest pursuant to a valid warrant “until it was discovered that [the detainee] was not the person sought.” Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 689, 651-52 (7th Cir.1981) (emphasis in original). Baker and its progeny did not involve “actual knowledge of the defendant’s innocence, but rather the failure to take affirmative steps to determine his innocence.” Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir.1985); see also Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir.1992). Here, after March 26, the City had tested the white powder and knew that it contained no drugs. Absent any other basis for suspicion — and at this stage we must assume there was none other than probation violation concerns — Garcia’s extended detention at least presumptively violates the due process clause. See e.g. Powe, 664 F.2d at 651-52; Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d at 179; Pennington v. Hobson, 719 F.Supp. 760 (S.D.Ind.1989). As far as we can tell, the balance of incriminating evidence did not merely shift; there simply was no incriminating evidence. The situation was exactly as if the authorities had found that they had arrested the wrong person. See, e.g., Patton, 822 F.2d at 700-01; Powe, 664 F.2d at 651. In those circumstances — when the law enforcement officers know there is no hint of wrongdoing — continued pre-trial detention cannot be justified.
Richmond, Indiana had a drug testing policy that resulted in a similar prolonged detention that the district court found unconstitutional in Pennington v. Hobson, 719 F.Supp. at 770-72. Pennington was found with a packet of white powder, which a field test indicated was cocaine. A state court determined there was probable cause to detain Pennington pending confirmation of the field test. Confirmation took two months since the police officer responsible for transporting drugs to the state lab took only one trip each month and had just returned from that month’s trip. The white powder turned out to be aspirin after all, but Pennington was kept in jail for another month after the test results came back. Id. at 763-64. Like Garcia, Pennington brought a § 1983 claim alleging that the testing policy resulted in an unlawful detention. The district court concluded that although the police were not required to confirm their positive field test sooner than they did, the continued detention after the tests proved negative violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 771. The court denied the police officers’ claim of qualified immunity, finding that “reasonable police officers [were] on notice that the Constitution proscribed intentional deprivations of liberty in the face of clearly exculpatory evidence.” Id.
The Fifth Circuit also recently concluded that detention without investigation could be unconstitutional. Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir.1992). Sanders was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant and detained for about 50 days. The police officer did not follow up on the significant leads suggesting that he was innocent. Id. at 1156-57. The Fifth Circuit held that Sanders’ § 1983 claim alleging a due process violation survived dismissal since “a fact-finder reasonably could conclude that Lt. McCoy deliberately looked the other way in the face of exonerative evidence indicating that he had arrested the wrong man_ Baker imposes no impediment to Sanders’ claim because the thrust of his contention is not that Lt. McCoy failed to take affirmative steps to investigate Sanders’ innocence, but rather, that Lt. McCoy failed to release him even *975alter he knew (or should have known) that Sanders had been misidentified.” Id. at 1162.
In the Fourth Amendment context, if the evidence that forms probable cause for a warrantless arrest dissipates before the ar-restee is brought before a judge, continued detention is unconstitutional. Sivard v. Pulaski County, 959 F.2d 662 (7th Cir.1992), remanded and affirmed on other grounds, 17 F.3d 185 (7th Cir.1994), held that a plaintiff had stated a due process claim when the “sheriff ... knew of his wrongful detention and continued to detain him in spite of that knowledge.” Id. at 668. The same principle should apply in the due process context when the sole basis for detention has evaporated. Of course, it remains to be seen in the course of developing the facts to what extent the City’s policy contributed to Garcia’s continued detention. But since his detention presumptively violated his due process rights, I would not dismiss the matter at this stage.
Garcia has also challenged the City’s policy as objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. As the majority noted, this circuit has a line of cases stating that after a Gerstein hearing, the Fourth Amendment ceases to apply and due process furnishes the only standard. Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1026, 110 S.Ct. 733, 107 L.Ed.2d 752 (1990); Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 797 (7th Cir.1992). Although I agree that these cases preclude consideration of Garcia’s Fourth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Albright v. Oliver, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), potentially blurs the bright line we have drawn. Albright was arrested for selling look-alike drugs. He was bound over for trial at a preliminary hearing (although not imprisoned), and the charges against him were eventually dismissed. Id. — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 810. The court was presented with the narrow question whether Albright could maintain a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution on substantive due process grounds. Id. — U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 812. A plurality of the court held that there is no substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution. Rather, any such claim should be brought under the Fourth Amendment (although the court noted that Albright had not challenged his treatment on procedural due process grounds either). Id. Justice Ginsburg, who joined the plurality, wrote separately to explain her reasons for considering the case under the Fourth Amendment: “Albright may have feared that courts would narrowly define the Fourth Amendment’s key term ‘seizure’ so as to deny full scope to his claim. In particular, he may have anticipated a holding that the ‘seizure’ of his person ended when he was released from custody on bond.... Such a concern might have stemmed from Seventh Circuit precedent set before Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). See Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 195 (1989) (substantive due process ‘shock the conscience’ standard, not the Fourth Amendment, applies to brutal ‘post-arrest pre-charge’ interrogation).” Id. — U.S. at-& n. 2, 114 S.Ct. at 815 & n. 2. The Ginsburg opinion further observes that the Fourth Amendment continues to apply even after an initial bond hearing and release on custody, since the defendant remains “ ‘seized’ for trial, so long as he is bound to appear in court and answer the state’s charges.” Id. — U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 816.
Since, however, the court’s statements about the applicability of the Fourth Amendment are essentially only dicta in an otherwise narrow substantive due process case, I have difficulty concluding that they revive Garcia’s Fourth Amendment claim. In any event, it probably makes little difference here, since the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable” seizures is coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition against deprivations of liberty without due process. Id. — U.S. at-, n. 24, 114 S.Ct. at 829, n. 24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
No party has suggested that Garcia’s claim with respect to pre-trial detention has been affected by his status as a probationer. Nor did the district court consider this germane to the issues presented here. I therefore do not think the issue is properly before us. Even if it were, I do not think that Garcia’s probation status would significantly affect the analysis of this case. Once the essential *976basis for probation revocation — a probation violation — had disappeared, there was no justification for denying even a probationer’s minimal liberty interest.3 See, e.g., Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 432, 93 S.Ct. 2199, 2200-01, 37 L.Ed.2d 52 (1973) (“we conclude that the finding that petitioner had violated the conditions of his probation ... was so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to be invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 781-82, 93 S.Ct. at 1759-60 (due process applies to probation revocation).
On a final note, the majority observes that Garcia was detained for an additional five days after the charges against him were nolle prossed, or three days after probation had been restored. Inexplicably, Garcia does not appear to challenge this period of detention. I mention this fact only to underscore my view that such arbitrary detention — when a person is neither suspected, arrested, charged nor convicted of any crime or wrongdoing — is clearly unconstitutional.

. Probation may be revoked only after a full hearing that includes notice of the alleged violation, an opportunity to appear and present evidence, a conditional right to confront adverse witnesses and a written report. Gagnon v. Scar-pelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1761-62, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); see also 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4 (revocation hearing must occur within a reasonable time). There is no evidence that Garcia received such a hearing. At the April 12 hearing after the prosecutors nolle prossed the charges against Garcia, the court restored (as opposed to reinstated) probation, noting that it had never been terminated.

. These cases all rely, to some degree, on the fact that the detainees were not brought before a magistrate to present their claims of innocence. But although Garcia received a Gerstein hearing, it is by no means clear that this alone renders these cases inapplicable. A Gerstein hearing follows a warrantless arrest, and essentially replaces the probable cause determination that otherwise precedes issuance of an arrest warrant, Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120, 95 S.Ct. at 866; hence adversary safeguards, such as the right to be present at the hearing, are absent. McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F.2d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.1989), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 500 U.S. 44, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991). But all defendants, whether arrested pursuant to a warrant or not, are usually afforded an opportunity under state law (e.g. 725 ILCS 5/109-1) or under Fed.R.Crim.P. 5(a) to be presented to a magistrate soon after arrest. Since the defendants in Coleman and Patton were arrested pursuant to warrants, it is, in part, the absence of this "first appearance” that rendered their detention unconstitutional. Coleman, 754 F.2d at 723-24; Patton, 822 F.2d at 701. But I am skeptical whether the Coleman or Patton courts would have considered due process satisfied if the defendants in those cases had not themselves been brought to court nor been repre*974sented by counsel who knew about their claim of mistake. The results might have been different if a judge had only read the police affidavits and ruled that the defendants could remain in detention. The latter is, essentially, the process that Garcia received. While this process comports with the requirements of Gerstein, it is far from clear that it is the equivalent of the hearing we have required as a prerequisite to extended pretrial detention in Coleman or Patton.

. Of course, a probation violation may exist where no crime has been committed. See, e.g., Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d at 1187 (three day delay in conducting parole revocation hearing was constitutional when there were reasons to suspect parole had been violated). We do not know, again in great part because the probation revocation question has never been presented in this case, whether after the drug testing there remained any basis on which to conclude that Garcia had violated a condition of his probation. We also do not have the benefit of the district court’s consideration of the factors set forth in United States v. Scott, 850 F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir.1988).