Court Opinion

ID: 9750472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:00:22.966333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:18.808861
License: Public Domain

21-3127-cv (L)
Kyros Law P.C. v. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.

                                  In the
           United States Court of Appeals
                      For the Second Circuit

                          August Term, 2022
                 Nos. 21-3127-cv (L), 21-3136-cv (XAP)

               KYROS LAW P.C., KONSTANTINE W. KYROS,
                      Appellants-Cross-Appellees,

 MICHELLE JAMES, as mother and next friend of M.O., a minor child,
  and T.O, a minor child, JIMMY SNUKA, “SUPERFLY,” by and through
his guardian, CAROLE SNUKA, SALVADOR GUERRERO, IV, a/k/a CHAVO
 GUERRERO, JR., CHAVO GUERRERO, SR., a/k/a CHAVO CLASSIC, BRYAN
EMMETT CLARK, JR., a/k/a ADAM BOMB, DAVE HEBNER, EARL HEBNER,
    CARLENE B. MOORE-BEGNAUD, a/k/a JAZZ, MARK JINDRAK, JON
   HEIDENREICH, LARRY OLIVER, a/k/a CRIPPLER, BOBBI BILLARD, LOU
MARCONI, BERNARD KNIGHTON, KELLI FUJIWARA SLOAN, on behalf of
Estate of HARRY MASAYOSHI FUJIWARA, WILLIAM ALBERT HAYNES, III,
    RODNEY BEGNAUD, a/k/a RODNEY MACK, RUSS MCCULLOUGH,
 individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, a/k/a BIG
RUSS MCCULLOUGH, RYAN SAKODA, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, MATTHEW ROBERT WIESE, individually and
on behalf of all others similarly situated, a/k/a LUTHER REIGNS, EVAN
 SINGLETON, VITO LOGRASSO, CASSANDRA FRAZIER, individually and
   as next of kin to her deceased husband, NELSON LEE FRAZIER, JR.
a/k/a MABEL a/k/a VISCERA a/k/a BIG DADDY V a/k/a KING MABEL, and
   as personal representative of Estate of NELSON LEE FRAZIER, JR.,
  deceased, SHIRLEY FELLOWS, on behalf of Estate of TIMOTHY ALAN
 SMITH a/k/a REX KING, JOSEPH M. LAURINAITIS, a/k/a ROAD WARRIOR
    ANIMAL, PAUL ORNDORFF, a/k/a MR. WONDERFUL, CHRIS PALLIES,
 a/k/a KING KONG BUNDY, ANTHONY NORRIS, a/k/a AHMED JOHNSON,
 JAMES HARRIS, a/k/a KAMALA, KEN PATERA, BARBARA MARIE LEYDIG,
   BERNARD KNIGHTON, as personal representative of Estate of BRIAN
  KNIGHTON, a/k/a AXL ROTTEN, MARTY JANNETTY, TERRY SZOPINSKI,
     a/k/a WARLORD, SIONE HAVIA VAILAHI, a/k/a BARBARIAN, TERRY
   BRUNK, a/k/a SABU, BARRY DARSOW, a/k/a SMASH, BILL EADIE, a/k/a
 AX, JOHN NORD, JONATHAN HUGGER, a/k/a JOHNNY THE BULL, JAMES
BRUNZELL, SUSAN GREEN, ANGELO MOSCA, a/k/a KING KONG MOSCA,
  JAMES MANLEY, a/k/a JIM POWERS, MICHAEL ENOS, a/k/a MIKE, a/k/a
   BLAKE BEVERLY, BRUCE REED, a/k/a BUTCH, SYLAIN GRENIER, OMAR
      MIJARES, a/k/a OMAR ATLAS, DON LEO HEATON, a/k/a DON LEO
    JONATHAN, TROY MARTIN, a/k/a SHANE DOUGLAS, MARC COPANI,
      a/k/a MUHAMMAD HASSAN, MARK CANTERBURY, a/k/a HENRY
    GODWIN, VICTORIA OTIS, a/k/a PRINCESS VICTORIA, JUDY HARDEE,
   JUDY MARTIN, TIMOTHY SMITH, a/k/a REX KING, TRACY SMOTHERS,
 a/k/a FREDDIE JOE FLOYD, MICHAEL R. HALAC, a/k/a MANTAUR, RICK
  JONES, a/k/a BLACK BART, KEN JOHNSON, a/k/a SLICK, GEORGE GRAY,
a/k/a ONE MAN GANG, FERRIN JESSE BARR, a/k/a J.J. FUNK, ROD PRICE,
    DONALD DRIGGERS, RONALD SCOTT HEARD, on behalf of Estate of
    RONALD HEARD a/k/a OUTLAW RON BASS, BORIS ZHUKOV, DAVID
SILVA, JOHN JETER, a/k/a JOHNNY JETER, GAYLE SCHECTER, as personal
     representative of Estate of JON RECHNER a/k/a BALLS MAHONEY,
ASHLEY MASSARO, a/k/a ASHLEY, CHARLES WICKS, a/k/a CHAD WICKS,
   PERRY SATULLO, a/k/a PERRY SATURN, CHARLES BERNARD SCAGGS,
a/k/a FLASH FUNK, CAROLE M. SNUKA, on behalf of Estate of JAMES W.
                                  SNUKA,

                      Consolidated-Plaintiffs,

                                 v.

                                 2
                 WORLD WRESTLING ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,
           Consolidated Plaintiff-Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant,

   VINCENT K. MCMAHON, individually and as the Trustee of the
 Vincent K. McMahon Irrevocable Trust u/t/a dtd. June 24, 2004, as
the Trustee of the Vincent K. McMahon 2008, and as Special Trustee
of the Vincent K. McMahon 2013 Irrev. Trust u/t/a dtd. December 5,
                         2013 and as Trust,
           Consolidated Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant,

    ROBERT WINDHAM, THOMAS BILLINGTON, JAMES WARE, OREAL
                 PERRAS, JOHN DOES, various,

                           Consolidated-Defendants. *

   On Appeal from a Judgment of the United States District Court
                 for the District of Connecticut.

                          ARGUED: MARCH 30, 2023
                          DECIDED: AUGUST 28, 2023

     Before: LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, and NARDINI, Circuit Judge. †

       * The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set
forth above.
        † Judge Rosemary S. Pooler, originally a member of the panel, died on

August 10, 2023. The two remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement,
have determined the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b); United States v.
Desimone, 140 F.3d 457, 458-59 (2d Cir. 1998).

                                         3
       Appellants-Cross-Appellees Konstantine W. Kyros and his law
firm, Kyros Law P.C. (together, “Kyros”), appeal from a judgment of
the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
imposing sanctions for litigation misconduct under Rules 11 and 37
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In 2014 and 2015, Kyros
brought several lawsuits against Appellees-Cross-Appellants World
Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. and Vincent K. McMahon (together,
“WWE”). These cases were initially filed in various jurisdictions
across the country but were eventually consolidated in the District of
Connecticut. This Court previously affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of one of Kyros’s cases against WWE and dismissed the rest
for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Kyros also previously challenged
orders entered by the district court (Vanessa L. Bryant, Judge)
determining that he should be sanctioned under Rules 11 and 37, but
we also dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the
amount of sanctions had not yet been determined. Subsequently, the
district court (Jeffrey A. Meyer, Judge) imposed sanctions against
Kyros in the amount of $312,143.55—less than the full amount
requested by WWE. Kyros now appeals these final sanctions
determinations. On cross-appeal, WWE challenges the district court’s
reduction of the requested fee award by application of the “forum
rule,” under which a court calculates attorney’s fees with reference to
the prevailing hourly rates in the forum in which the court sits.
Finding no abuse of discretion, we AFFIRM the judgment.

                         KONSTANTINE W. KYROS, Kyros Law
                         Offices, Hingham, MA, for Appellants-Cross-
                         Appellees.

                         CURTIS B. KRASIK, K&L Gates LLP,
                         Pittsburgh, PA (Jerry S. McDevitt, K&L

                                  4
                          Gates LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, Jeffrey P.
                          Mueller, Day Pitney LLP, Hartford CT, on
                          the brief), for Appellees-Cross-Appellants.

WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judge:

      Over the course of several months in 2014 and 2015,

Appellants-Cross-Appellees Konstantine W. Kyros and his law firm,

Kyros Law P.C. (together, “Kyros”) filed, in jurisdictions across the

country, class action lawsuits and wrongful death lawsuits against

Appellees-Cross-Appellants World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.

and Vincent K. McMahon (together, “WWE”), asserting various tort

claims that related to chronic traumatic encephalopathy (“CTE”) in

former wrestlers. In 2016, Kyros filed an additional mass action

lawsuit on behalf of fifty-three former wrestlers, asserting a wide

range of tort claims. See Laurinaitis v. World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc., No.

3:16-cv-1209-VLB (D. Conn.) (“Laurinaitis”). These lawsuits were all

eventually transferred to the United States District Court for the

District of Connecticut. We previously affirmed the district court’s

                                     5
dismissal of the Laurinaitis complaint and dismissed Kyros’s appeals

of the other consolidated cases against WWE for lack of jurisdiction.

See Haynes v. World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc., 827 F. App’x 3 (2d Cir. 2020).

      The present appeal concerns only the district court’s awards of

sanctions in Laurinaitis and Singleton v. World Wrestling Entertainment,

Inc., No. 3:15-cv-425-VLB (D. Conn.) (“Singleton”), one of the class

action lawsuits. At an earlier stage of the case, the district court

(Vanessa L. Bryant, Judge) ruled that Kyros had repeatedly engaged

in pleading and discovery misconduct and decided to impose

sanctions in Laurinaitis under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and in Singleton under Rule 37.             Although Kyros

challenged these orders in the previous appeal, we dismissed that

portion of his appeal because the district court had not yet entered a

final order that fixed the amount of sanctions. See Haynes, 827 F.

App’x at 11. Following our decision, the district court (Jeffrey A.

Meyer, Judge) adopted a recommended ruling of a magistrate judge

                                    6
(Robert A. Richardson, Magistrate Judge) and awarded sanctions to

WWE in the amount of $312,143.55—less than WWE’s requested

amount of $533,926.44. McCullough v. World Wrestling Ent., Inc., 2021

WL 4472719, at *1, *4–5 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2021). 2 With the amount

of sanctions calculated, we now consider Kyros’s appeal of the Rule

11 and Rule 37 sanctions and WWE’s cross-appeal, which challenges

the district court’s application of the forum rule to award less than the

requested amount of sanctions.

I.    Background

      Two former wrestlers filed the Singleton complaint in January

2015 as a putative class action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,

alleging that they suffered from, or were at increased risk of

developing, degenerative neurological conditions as a result of

traumatic brain injuries sustained while wrestling for WWE. The

Pennsylvania district court transferred the action to the District of

      2The consolidated cases were transferred to Judge Meyer’s docket on
September 5, 2019.

                                   7
Connecticut in March 2015. The Laurinaitis complaint, which was

filed in the District of Connecticut in July 2016, included a wide range

of tort claims and sought relief under various statutes on the ground

that WWE had misclassified the plaintiffs as independent contractors.

We discuss below the facts and procedural history of Singleton and

Laurinaitis to the extent they are relevant to the challenged sanctions

orders.

      A.     Rule 37 Sanctions in Singleton

      At a Singleton status conference in June 2015, WWE provided

the district court with updates on Kyros’s various class actions and

raised concerns about apparent defects in the complaint, including

untimeliness and glaringly false allegations. As an example, WWE

pointed to the allegation that CTE had caused the plaintiffs’

“untimely death” when, in fact, the plaintiffs were still very much

alive. Supp. App’x at 73–74. The district court admonished Kyros for

filing a complaint that failed to satisfy fundamental pleading

                                   8
standards and instructed him to re-file “without a lot of superfluous,

hyperbolic, inflammatory opinions and references to things that don’t

have any relevance.” Supp. App’x at 127–28. A week later, Kyros

filed a second amended complaint.

       In March 2016, the district court dismissed all claims but one in

the second amended complaint.               Specifically, the district court

allowed the plaintiffs’ fraudulent omission claim to proceed because

the complaint, as amended, alleged that WWE was aware of the link

between repeated head trauma and degenerative neurological

conditions at a time when the plaintiffs were still active as wrestlers

for WWE. 3      In dismissing the rest of the claims, the district court

again admonished Kyros for, among other things, making “patently

false,” “copied and pasted” allegations in the complaint; “repeatedly

       3 WWE later moved for summary judgment as to the fraudulent omission
claim, and the district court granted the motion in March 2018, concluding that
Kyros failed to establish that WWE was aware of a link between wrestling and
CTE during the relevant time period. The district court noted, “[o]nce again,” that
Kyros had “asserted facts and advanced legal theories for which there is no
reasonable evidentiary and legal basis,” and “caution[ed] that such conduct
subjects counsel to Rule 11 sanctions.” Supp. App’x at 990.

                                        9
misrepresent[ing] both the substance and the meaning” of certain

testimony; and failing to include specific and substantive allegations.

Special App’x at 7–9, 58.

      During discovery on the fraudulent omission claim, WWE

served the plaintiffs with interrogatories. The plaintiffs responded,

and, after the parties met and conferred, WWE filed a motion to

compel, claiming that the plaintiffs’ responses were incomplete or

evasive. In May 2016, the district court granted in part the motion to

compel and ordered the plaintiffs to submit supplemental responses

to certain of the interrogatories. The district court instructed that,

where the plaintiffs were “unable to identify a statement or speaker

in response to an interrogatory,” they “must state that fact.” Supp.

App’x at 248.

      On August 8, 2016, WWE moved for Rule 37 sanctions, arguing

that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the district court’s May 2016

order. The district court referred the Rule 37 motion to a magistrate

                                  10
judge. In February 2018, the magistrate judge issued a recommended

ruling on the motion. He concluded that the plaintiffs’ interrogatory

responses were insufficient. For example, he noted that, rather than

identifying specific “deceptive public statement[s]” WWE had made,

the plaintiffs’ responses directed WWE to an “entire book” along with

“random publications and documents with little specificity or

guidance.” Special App’x at 175, 178. Accordingly, the magistrate

judge recommended sanctioning Kyros “to dissuade further abuse of

the discovery process and promote thorough compliance with court

orders moving forward.” Special App’x at 179–80.

      Additionally, the magistrate judge observed that Kyros “ha[d]

been on notice that plaintiffs need to comply with Court orders and

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure throughout this litigation,” id. at

180, and clarified that “plaintiffs and their counsel are now on notice

that any further noncompliance during the remainder of this

litigation may result in the dismissal of the case,” id. at 183. The

                                  11
magistrate judge also recommended that Kyros pay WWE’s legal fees

in connection with the sanctions motion. In July 2018, the district

court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommended ruling.

      B.     Rule 11 Sanctions in Laurinaitis

      Kyros filed the Laurinaitis complaint in July 2016 on behalf of

fifty-three former WWE wrestlers. The complaint was 214 pages long

and contained 667 paragraphs, including seventeen causes of action

that were each asserted on behalf of all plaintiffs. Shortly thereafter,

WWE notified Kyros of its intention to move for Rule 11 sanctions.

Specifically, on two occasions in August 2016, WWE served Kyros

with draft Rule 11 motions setting forth as grounds for sanctions,

among other things, the issues of time-barred claims in the complaint

and the lack of a good-faith basis for allegations regarding WWE’s

knowledge.

      The draft Rule 11 motions asserted that many of the allegations

in the complaint appeared to have been indiscriminately cut and

                                  12
pasted from a complaint filed in the National Football League

(“NFL”) concussion litigation. For example, the complaint alleged

that one purported wrestler (who was, instead, an NFL football

player) “sustained repeated and disabling head impacts while a

wrestler for the Steelers”—Pittsburgh’s NFL team. Special App’x at

205 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the complaint

alleged that various studies had warned of the danger that a

concussion would pose to a “football wrestler.” Supp. App’x at 346.

         On October 17, 2016, after Kyros failed to withdraw or correct

the complaint, WWE filed in the district court its first motion for Rule

11 sanctions against Kyros and his co-counsel, premised on the two

draft motions it had served on Kyros in August 2016. WWE pointed

to purported “false allegations,” “frivolous legal claims,” and “bad

faith,” and sought dismissal of the complaint. Supp. App’x at 466.

The district court referred this first Rule 11 motion to the magistrate

judge.

                                   13
      Kyros responded in two ways. On November 9, 2016, he filed

a first amended complaint, which added numerous plaintiffs, pages,

and paragraphs. Then, in December 2016, Kyros filed an opposition

to WWE’s October sanctions motion, arguing that certain “improper”

allegations in the complaint were attributable to editing mistakes and

that the rest of the complaint contained plausible allegations made in

good faith.

      Later in December 2016 WWE filed a second motion for Rule 11

sanctions, arguing that the first amended complaint was just as

deficient as the original one.    Kyros opposed WWE’s December

sanctions motion, arguing that there was a good faith basis for the

plaintiffs’ allegations, that any plagiarism from the NFL litigation was

not sanctionable, and that the allegations were sufficient with respect

to tolling and knowledge.

      In September 2017, the district court issued an interim order on

WWE’s pending motions to dismiss and for Rule 11 sanctions.

                                  14
Admonishing Kyros for failing to comply with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and its own prior instructions, the district court listed

several of the “numerous allegations” in the “335 page complaint

with 805 paragraphs . . . that a reasonable attorney would know are

inaccurate, irrelevant, or frivolous.” Special App’x at 150. The district

court concluded that the first amended complaint “remain[ed]

unnecessarily and extremely long, with an overwhelming number of

irrelevant allegations,” such that parsing the claims as they stood

“would be both a waste of judicial resources [and] unduly prejudicial

to the WWE.” Id. at 162–63. Ultimately, the district court reserved

judgment on the pending motions for Rule 11 sanctions and to

dismiss, pending the filing of a second amended complaint and the in

camera submission of sworn affidavits by each Laurinaitis plaintiff that

would “set[] forth facts within each plaintiff’s . . . personal knowledge

that form[ed] the factual basis of their claim.” Id. at 163. The district

court also warned Kyros that it would grant the motion to dismiss

                                   15
and “pursuant to Rule 11(c)(3) . . . sua sponte revisit whether to award

attorney’s fees as a sanction,” if Kyros failed to comply with the order.

Id. at 165. Kyros subsequently filed a second amended complaint and

submitted affidavits on behalf of the plaintiffs.

      In September 2018, the district court issued its final order in the

consolidated cases. The order first concluded that dismissal was

warranted because the second amended complaint and the affidavits

that Kyros had filed did not comply with its September 2017 order.

The district court reviewed Kyros’s “repeated failures to comply with

the clear, and unambiguous provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and this Court’s repeated instructions and admonitions,

which has resulted in a considerable waste of the Court’s and the

Defendants’ time and resources.” Id. at 196–97. It commented that

“despite second, third, and fourth chances to submit pleadings that

comply with Rules 8, 9, and 11, Attorney Kyros has persisted in

asserting pages and pages of frivolous claims and allegations for

                                   16
which he lacked any factual basis.” Id. at 230–31. And it added that

Kyros “offered the Court no reason to believe that if given a fifth,

sixth, or seventh chance, he would prosecute this case in a manner

consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 231.

      The district court further concluded that an award of attorney’s

fees and costs was necessary to deter Kyros from violating Rule 11

and ordered Kyros to pay all legal fees that WWE reasonably incurred

in connection with the sanctions motions. “[I]n order to protect the

public,” the district court also ordered Kyros to send a copy of its

ruling to each of the Laurinaitis plaintiffs and any other future,

current, or former WWE wrestler who retained Kyros to sue WWE.

Id. Kyros appealed from that judgment.

      On October 22, 2020, we affirmed the district court’s dismissal

of the Laurinaitis complaint. See Haynes, 827 F. App’x at 10. But we

dismissed as premature the appeal as to the Rule 11 sanctions—and

                                  17
the Rule 37 sanctions in Singleton—because the amount of sanctions

had not yet been determined. Id. at 11.

       C.     Determination of the Amount of the Sanctions

       The amount of sanctions was calculated in subsequent

proceedings. WWE asked for $533,926.44, which were the attorney’s

fees and costs it had incurred in connection with its three sanctions

motions.     The district court referred WWE’s application to a

magistrate judge for a recommended ruling. On September 2, 2021,

the magistrate judge recommended an award of $312,143.55, which

included the Rule 37 sanctions in Singleton and the Rule 11 sanctions

in Laurinaitis. In reaching that number, the magistrate judge reduced

the amount of attorneys’ fees sought, based in part on a fifteen-

percent, “across-the-board” reduction, id. at 272, and in part on the

“forum rule,” under which a court calculates attorney’s fees with

reference to the prevailing hourly rates in the forum in which the

court sits, id. at 258.

                                 18
      WWE objected to the magistrate judge’s recommended ruling

on the ground that he erroneously applied the forum rule.      Kyros

did not object to the recommended ruling. On September 30, 2021,

the district court overruled WWE’s objections and adopted the

magistrate judge’s recommendation, awarding WWE $312,143.55. In

particular, the district court rejected WWE’s argument that the forum

rule should not apply where certain of the consolidated cases had

originated in jurisdictions outside the forum, reasoning that local

counsel in Connecticut was at least as well positioned to defend the

litigation as the out-of-district counsel WWE retained. The district

court also noted that it was foreseeable that the cases would be

consolidated in Connecticut, in light of mandatory forum-selection

clauses in WWE’s contracts with the plaintiffs and the Connecticut

location of WWE’s corporate headquarters.

      The district court also rejected WWE’s broader arguments that

the forum rule does not apply in the sanctions context and that the

                                 19
fees WWE paid should be deemed presumptively reasonable. It

concluded that WWE failed to show that experienced civil litigators

in Connecticut could not have obtained the same result as out-of-

district counsel.   And it endorsed the fifteen-percent, across-the-

board recommended reduction, reasoning that the magistrate judge’s

approach to trimming excess fees was a practical one.

      Kyros appealed from the judgment imposing sanctions, and

WWE cross-appealed as to the application of the forum rule.

II.   Discussion

      On appeal, Kyros argues that the district court should not have

imposed any Rule 11 and Rule 37 sanctions at all. On cross-appeal,

by contrast, WWE argues that the award should have been higher;

specifically, it challenges the application of the forum rule to award a

lower amount of attorney’s fees than it actually paid. We address

each argument in turn and, as set forth below, find no abuse of

discretion in the district court’s imposition of sanctions or its

application of the forum rule.

                                  20
      A.     Rule 11 Sanctions

      This Court “review[s] the imposition of sanctions for abuse of

discretion.” Liebowitz v. Bandshell Artist Mgmt., 6 F.4th 267, 280 (2d Cir.

2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “An abuse of discretion

occurs when a district court bases its ruling on an erroneous view of

the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or

renders a decision that cannot be located within the range of

permissible decisions.” Huebner v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 897 F.3d

42, 53 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).            “This

deferential standard is applicable to the review of Rule 11 sanctions

because . . . the district court is familiar with the issues and litigants

and is thus better situated than the court of appeals to marshal the

pertinent facts and apply the fact-dependent legal standard mandated

by Rule 11.” Universitas Educ., LLC v. Nova Grp., Inc., 784 F.3d 99, 103

(2d Cir. 2015) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Still,

our review of sanctions “is more exacting than under the ordinary

abuse-of-discretion standard” because “sanctions proceedings are

                                    21
unique, placing the district judge in the role of accuser, fact finder and

sentencing judge all in one.”      Liebowitz, 6 F.4th at 280 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

      Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides that, “[b]y

presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper,”

an attorney “certifies that to the best of [her] knowledge, information,

and belief,” formed after a reasonable inquiry, the filing is: (1) “not

being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause

unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation”;

(2) “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for

extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing

new law”; and (3) supported by available evidence, or evidence likely

to be discovered on further investigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). A

court may sanction an attorney who violates Rule 11(b) if the court

first provides notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1).

                                   22
      A party must move for sanctions in a filing that is “separate[]

from any other motion” and that “describe[s] the specific conduct that

allegedly violates Rule 11(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Such a motion

may not be presented to the court until the expiration of a twenty-

one-day “safe harbor” period, during which the alleged violator has

the chance to withdraw or correct the challenged filing. See id. The

court may also initiate sanctions sua sponte by issuing an order “to

show cause why conduct specifically described in the order has not

violated Rule 11(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(3). When a court initiates

Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte and the opportunity to correct or

withdraw the challenged submission is unavailable, the court must

make a finding of bad faith on the part of the attorney before imposing

the sanctions. See In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 91–92 (2d

Cir. 2003).

      Kyros argues that the district court abused its discretion by

failing to follow the procedures set out in Rule 11 and by failing to

                                  23
satisfy the requirements of due process. Characterizing the district

court’s Rule 11 sanctions order as having been imposed sua sponte,

Kyros contends that the district failed to issue the show-cause order

required by Rule 11(c)(3) and to provide him with notice and an

opportunity to be heard. By the same token, Kyros claims that the

district court failed to make the requisite finding of bad faith before

imposing sua sponte sanctions.

      WWE asserts that Kyros’s characterization of the sanctions

order ignores the district court’s repeated admonitions and interim

order putting him on notice that his conduct risked punishment.

Noting the oppositions and sur-reply Kyros filed in response to its

Rule 11 motions as to the original and first amended Laurinaitis

complaints, WWE argues that Kyros cannot now claim that he lacked

notice of the grounds for sanctions.      In particular, WWE suggests

that the district court gave Kyros “a last chance to avoid sanctions . . .

by complying with the Court’s detailed order regarding the

                                   24
information to include in each plaintiff’s affidavit and filing amended

pleadings in accordance with the Federal Rules and the Court’s prior

instructions,” but Kyros did not comply. Appellees’ Br. at 47.

       On the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion because

the district court ordered sanctions based on pleading defects that

WWE had identified in their motions seeking Rule 11 sanctions. As

detailed above, WWE first notified Kyros of its intention to seek Rule

11 sanctions in August 2016, raising the issues of time-barred claims

and the lack of a good-faith basis for allegations in the original

complaint regarding WWE’s knowledge.          In October 2016, WWE

filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions in the district court that

incorporated precisely those claims it had flagged in August. Days

after the Rule 11(c)(2) safe harbor period passed, Kyros filed a first

amended complaint, adding plaintiffs and new allegations without

addressing the issues of which WWE had complained in its sanctions

motion.   As WWE notes, Kyros then opposed the October 2016

                                  25
sanctions motion as well as WWE’s December 2016 motion for

sanctions as to the first amended complaint—even filing a sur-reply

in connection with the latter. These filings were all responsive to the

issues raised in WWE’s sanctions motions. As Kyros acknowledged

in a filing below, the district court’s September 2017 order reserved

judgment on these two sanctions motions, providing Kyros with an

opportunity to file yet another amended pleading in order to comply

with the Federal Rules. And, once Kyros filed yet another deficient

complaint (the second amended version), the district court sanctioned

Kyros under Rule 11 on the same timeliness and lack-of-good-faith

grounds that WWE had asserted in its earlier sanctions motions.

      It is therefore clear from the record that the district court’s

sanctions order was based on WWE’s two motions for Rule 11

sanctions, not on some new and spontaneous initiative of the district

court. Kyros argues that the district court’s order was issued “sua

sponte,” but this misreads the record. The district court did state in its

                                   26
September 2017 order that it would “sua sponte revisit” the sanctions

issue “pursuant to Rule 11(c)(3),” Special App’x at 165, but that

language appears in a ruling that merely reserved decision on WWE’s

already-filed sanctions motions.        And the district court did not

ultimately follow the path of imposing sua sponte sanctions based on

the independent content of the second amended complaint. In its

September 2018 order granting sanctions, the court based its findings

on precisely the same conduct about which WWE had complained in

its two Rule 11 motions, including “factually unsupportable

allegations,” “frivolous claims,” and lack of a good-faith basis.

Special App’x 228–31. The decretal language of the September 2018

order likewise confirmed that the court was granting in part WWE’s

December 2016 sanctions motion—which was based entirely on the

original and first amended complaints—“to the extent it sought the

award of attorney’s fees and costs,” Special App’x at 232. And the

amount later awarded was premised entirely on attorney’s fees and

                                   27
costs that WWE had expended on those two motions—that is, before

Kyros filed the second amended complaint. In other words, it makes

no difference that the district court had earlier suggested that it might

follow the route of considering sanctions sua sponte; its actual decision

was explicitly framed as a decision on WWE’s earlier-filed motions.

Accordingly, we reject Kyros’s argument that the sanctions order was

imposed sua sponte such that the district court was bound by the

procedural requirements of Rule 11(c)(3). 4

       For much the same reasons, we reject Kyros’s argument that the

district court violated his due process rights by depriving him of

       4 Kyros also argues that the district court erred in granting a sanctions
motion addressed to the original and first amended complaints, well after Kyros
had later filed a second amended complaint. Given the purpose of the safe harbor
provision under Rule 11, we agree that district courts should ordinarily not reach
back in time to sanction filings that were later superseded, because doing so risks
the same lack of notice associated with truly “sua sponte” sanctions. We read In re
Pennie & Edmonds, however, to impose a check on such a possibility by requiring
a finding of subjective bad faith in the absence of “an explicit ‘safe harbor’
protection or an equivalent opportunity” to correct a deficient filing. 323 F.3d at
93. Here, because the WWE’s earlier motions gave Kyros the explicit benefit of the
Rule’s safe harbor provision, no such finding was necessary. And even had
WWE’s motions not provided this benefit, the district court’s repeated warnings
to Kyros in this case would have likewise provided an “equivalent opportunity”
to correct his filings—an opportunity he did not take.

                                        28
notice and an opportunity to be heard before imposing sanctions.

Here, Kyros had abundant notice of the risk of, and the potential

grounds for, sanctions based on WWE’s Rule 11 motions and the

district court’s interim order reserving judgment. Indeed, Kyros took

advantage of multiple opportunities to be heard in his responses to

those sanctions motions and within the window the district court

gave him to amend his complaint. See, e.g., Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d

55, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that “the district court was not

required to give appellants notice of grounds for sanctions that were

clearly expressed in defendants’ Rule 11 motion papers” and noting

that the appellants “took advantage of the notice they received from

the defendants’ Rule 11 papers” by submitting a declaration in

opposition to the motion).      Under such circumstances, even our

“more exacting . . . abuse-of-discretion standard,” Liebowitz, 6 F.4th at

280, does not require us to craft new procedural hurdles for district

courts to clear before sanctioning attorneys who violate Rule 11(b).

                                   29
      We have considered the remainder of Kyros’s Rule 11

arguments and find them unpersuasive. See Int'l Ore & Fertilizer Corp.

v. SGS Control Services, Inc., 38 F.3d 1279, 1286–87 (2d Cir. 1994)

(“Appellants raise numerous objections on the merits to the

imposition of sanctions, but, even viewing the record in the light most

favorable to them, we cannot say that the district court abused its

discretion.”). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not

abuse its discretion by imposing Rule 11 sanctions on Kyros.

      B.     Rule 37 Sanctions

      As with Rule 11 sanctions, we review the imposition of Rule 37

sanctions for abuse of discretion. Yukos Capital S.A.R.L. v. Feldman, 977

F.3d 216, 234 (2d Cir. 2020).     Just as a district court has broad

discretion to manage discovery, it likewise has wide discretion to

impose sanctions for abusing that process.          See, e.g., S.E.C. v.

Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 25 (2d Cir. 2013); Daval Steel Prods. v. M/V

Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1365 (2d Cir. 1991).

                                   30
      Rule 37 gives a district court the authority to impose “just”

sanctions on a party who fails to comply with a discovery order. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). In evaluating a district court’s exercise of its

discretion to impose such sanctions, we weigh factors like: “(1) the

willfulness of the non-compliant party or the reason for

noncompliance; (2) the efficacy of lesser sanctions; (3) the duration of

the period of noncompliance, and (4) whether the non-compliant

party had been warned of the consequences of noncompliance,”

S. New Eng. Tel. Co. v. Glob. NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 144 (2d Cir. 2010)

(internal quotation marks omitted).       But “these factors are not

exclusive, and they need not each be resolved against the party

challenging the district court’s sanctions for us to conclude that those

sanctions were within the court’s discretion.” Id.

      The district court properly imposed Rule 37 sanctions on Kyros

based on its finding that he failed to make a good-faith effort to

comply with its order to supplement his responses to certain of

                                   31
WWE’s interrogatories. For example, rather than identifying specific

“deceptive public statement[s]” in response to one of the

interrogatories, Kyros’s supplemental responses directed WWE to an

“entire book” and, in general terms, various previously provided

documents and records. Special App’x at 186 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Like the district court, we find no error in the

magistrate judge’s thorough analysis.      We agree that Kyros’s

discovery responses were insufficient and that Rule 37 sanctions were

warranted.

      Kyros argues that the district court abused its discretion by

imposing Rule 37 sanctions on only him and his law firm because

WWE’s Rule 37 motion was directed to both “Plaintiffs and their

counsel.” Kyros Br. at 56 (quoting App’x at 67). He claims that an

order imposed under Rule 37(b) must be “directed at the party against

whom the sanctions are sought to be imposed.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted) (citing Daval Steel Prods., 951 F.2d at 1364). Kyros

                                 32
made a similar argument below, and the district court rejected it,

relying in part on Rule 37(b)(2)(C), which requires the court to order

“the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay

the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the

failure [to comply with the district court’s discovery order].” Special

App’x at 189 (emphasis added) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)).

We agree with the district court. Both logic and the text of Rule

37(b)(2)(C) dictate that a court may impose sanctions in a targeted

way against the actors whom it identifies as responsible for

misconduct, whether those be parties, their attorneys, or both. On

appeal, Kyros points to no authority that supports his argument that

sanctions had to be imposed jointly on his clients as well as himself

(and his firm). Daval, the lone case Kyros cites, stands merely for the

proposition that one party’s violation of a discovery order directed

only to that party is not a sufficient basis for a court to impose

sanctions on another party to which no such discovery order had been

                                  33
directed. See 951 F.2d at 1364. It does not suggest that a disobedient

party’s counsel is not covered by an order directed at that same party.

       Kyros also argues that the district court abused its discretion

by imposing Rule 37 sanctions because WWE was not prejudiced by

the plaintiffs’ failure to provide sufficient responses to WWE’s

interrogatories. Specifically, Kyros makes the bare assertion that the

interrogatories were irrelevant and assigns particular significance to

the order of operations as it played out below—namely, that the case

was dismissed under Rule 56 before the plaintiffs provided their

responses to the interrogatories and that the district court issued the

sanctions order one year after the magistrate judge held a hearing on

the sanctions motion.

      Once again, Kyros points to no authority that supports his

arguments. The Fifth Circuit case Kyros cites, FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d

1376, 1381–82 (5th Cir. 1994), suggests only that dismissal for failure to

comply with a discovery order is not justified where discovery

                                   34
violations do not substantially prejudice defendants. But here, the

sanction imposed by the district court for the Singleton discovery was

an order to pay attorney’s fees and costs, not dismissal of the

complaint. (Dismissal did occur, to be sure; but that was on the

merits, not as a result of sanctions.) And the district court acted well

within its discretion when it ordered Kyros to supplement discovery

responses that, for example, directed WWE to “random publications

and documents with little specificity or guidance.” Special App’x at

178. In the magistrate judge’s words, the sanctions were imposed “to

dissuade further abuse of the discovery process and promote

thorough compliance with court orders moving forward”—not as a

means of disposing of the case. Id. at 179–80.

      We decline to consider Kyros’s conclusory argument, already

considered and rejected below, that WWE’s interrogatories were

irrelevant. See Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005)

                                  35
(deeming argument waived where “only a single conclusory

sentence” was devoted to it).

      Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district

court’s imposition of Rule 37 sanctions on Kyros for his failure to

make a good-faith effort to comply with the court’s order compelling

responses to WWE’s interrogatories.

      C.     The Forum Rule

      Finally, we turn to WWE’s cross-appeal, which challenges the

district court’s decision to award sanctions in an amount less than

requested by WWE, based on application of the forum rule. We

review for abuse of discretion a district court’s calculation of the

amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded. Holick v. Cellular Sales of New

York, LLC, 48 F.4th 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2022). “Our review is highly

deferential in this area because of the district court’s inherent

institutional advantages in determining attorneys’ fees.” H.C. v. New

York City Dep’t of Ed., 71 F.4th 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In conducting our review, we also bear in

                                  36
mind that “[t]he essential goal in shifting fees . . . is to do rough

justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826,

838 (2011).

      One methodology district courts employ to determine the

amount of attorney’s fees to award involves the “forum rule,” under

which courts are directed to calculate fees based on the prevailing

rates in the forum in which the litigation was brought. Simmons v.

New York City Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 2009). In

Simmons, we clarified that, “when faced with a request for an award

of higher out-of-district rates, a district court must first apply a

presumption in favor of application of the forum rule.” Id. at 175.

“[T]o overcome that presumption, a litigant must persuasively

establish that a reasonable client would have selected out-of-district

counsel because doing so would likely (not just possibly) produce a

substantially better net result.” Id. Among the “experience-based,

objective factors” district courts should consider in making that

                                  37
determination is “counsel’s special expertise in litigating the

particular type of case, if the case is of such nature as to benefit from

special expertise.”   Id. at 175–76.    Litigants must also “make a

particularized showing . . . of the likelihood that use of in-district

counsel would produce a substantially inferior result.” Id. at 176.

      WWE argues that the district court abused its discretion by

applying the forum rule for four main reasons. We consider each in

turn. First, WWE notes that the underlying consolidated cases began

in jurisdictions outside Connecticut, and asserts that the forum rule

“does not apply to a case that was initially brought in another district

but subsequently transferred to the forum.” WWE Br. at 49. For

support, WWE relies on our decision in Polk v. New York State

Department of Correctional Services, 722 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1983). But Polk

is inapposite. Polk concerned the fees awarded to an attorney who

initially filed a suit in his home district, after which the case was

transferred to the forum district—“not the typical situation in which

                                   38
a lawyer from one district files suit in another district.” 722 F.2d at

25. In that case, where a class action relating to the plaintiff was

pending in the attorney’s home district, the Polk Court concluded the

district court had discretion to award fees based on the prevailing rate

in either an attorney’s home district or the forum district. Id. It also

reaffirmed a district court’s “broad discretion” to determine

reasonable fees, “[s]o long as unwarranted windfalls are not

awarded.” Id. Here, of course, the underlying cases were filed in

jurisdictions across the country—none of which was the home district

of out-of-district counsel—and were eventually consolidated in the

District of Connecticut, where the district court sits. Accordingly, Polk

does not control the outcome here. Polk, in any event, did not purport

to create an inflexible rule as to fees in transferred cases. On its own

terms, Polk described only what a district “normally” “will consider,”

as well as “special circumstance[s].” Id. Here, the district court

properly considered a number of such circumstances: that the

                                   39
defendants themselves sought consolidation and had crafted forum-

selection clauses accordingly, and that out-of-district counsel was

never solely responsible for the Connecticut litigation such that it

could not have been handed over to local counsel. Special App’x at

277–78. The district court neither strayed outside its broad discretion

nor afforded an unwarranted windfall in its application of the forum

rule to reduce WWE’s award.

       Second, WWE argues that district courts are “not constrained

to apply the forum rule where the attorney’s fees are awarded as

sanctions.” WWE Br. at 52. WWE cites On Time Aviation, Inc. v.

Bombardier Capital, Inc., 354 F. App’x 448 (2d Cir. 2009), a non-

precedential summary order that included the observation that “[t]he

reasoning behind the calculation of awards under fee-shifting statutes

. . . is not . . . precisely analogous to that applicable to Rule 11

awards.” 354 F. App’x at 452. We do not read On Time, however, to

suggest that any difference between statutory fee-shifting and Rule 11

                                  40
awards would preclude application of the forum rule in the sanctions

context.   Indeed, we see no reason why the rule should not

presumptively apply in each context. On Time suggests only that,

even after applying the forum rule, a district court may still act within

its discretion in ordering a larger award to serve the purpose of

deterrence under Rule 11. In this case, in any event, WWE points to

no evidence in the record indicating that the district court found itself

“constrained” to apply the forum rule. And the fact that fee-shifting

statutes and Rule 11 sanctions serve different purposes does not mean

that a district court abuses its discretion by applying the forum rule

to reduce a Rule 11 award. We will not disturb the district court’s

discretionary determination that the principal objectives of the

imposition of Rule 11 sanctions—“the deterrence of baseless filings

and the curbing of abuses,” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole-CNCA

v. Valcorp, Inc., 28 F.3d 259, 266 (2d Cir. 1994)—were furthered even

after it applied the forum rule to reduce the award.

                                   41
       Third, WWE argues that the forum rule does not apply because

WWE is a sophisticated paying client. In WWE’s view, “[b]ecause

there was an actual paying client” to serve as a touchstone, there was

“no need to perform a lodestar calculation to arrive at a

presumptively reasonable fee award.” WWE Br. at 55 (citing Perdue

v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010)). As we have

previously noted, an “actual billing arrangement” is a significant

factor in determining what fee is reasonable, but it is “not necessarily

controlling.” Crescent Publ’g Grp., Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 246

F.3d 142, 151 (2d Cir. 2001).         It does not, therefore, create a

presumption of reasonableness, nor displace the initial application of

the forum rule. Here, the district court gave significant weight to

WWE’s decision to retain more expensive out-of-district counsel, but

concluded that WWE failed to overcome Simmons’s presumption in

favor of the application of the forum rule. Specifically, the district

court noted that the case was dismissed pre-trial based on deficiencies

                                   42
in Kyros’s pleadings and discovery requests, and reasoned that such

matters are “within the general expertise of civil litigators.” Special

App’x at 281 (citing Simmons, 575 F.3d at 177 (reasoning that the party

bearing the cost of attorney’s fees “should not be required to pay for

a limousine when a sedan could have done the job”)). We find no

abuse of discretion in that determination.

      Fourth, WWE argues that, even if the forum rule applies, WWE

is subject to an exception under Simmons because out-of-district

counsel “likely (not just possibly) produce[d] a substantially better

net result” than local counsel would have. 575 F.3d at 172. Citing

out-of-district counsel’s extensive experience representing WWE and

litigating CTE matters, WWE asserts that no local counsel had

comparable specific knowledge, nor could local counsel have

improved upon the results achieved below.          The district court

acknowledged out-of-district counsel’s “longstanding involvement in

defending claims brought by former wrestlers,” Special App’x at 281,

                                  43
but, as discussed above, concluded that WWE failed to show that out-

of-district counsel likely produced a substantially better net result,

especially where the case was dismissed based on deficient pleadings

and conduct during discovery—that is, egregious litigation

misconduct that in-district counsel would have been equally well

placed to identify and oppose. Once again, we see no reason to fault

that determination, made within the district court’s broad discretion.

       Having carried out our “highly deferential,” H.C., 71 F.4th at

125, review of the district court’s efforts to achieve “rough justice,”

Fox, 563 U.S. at 838, in keeping with the goals of fee-shifting, we affirm

the district court’s application of the forum rule under the

circumstances of this case.

III.   Conclusion

       In sum, we hold as follows:

       1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing

          Rule 11 sanctions on Kyros. WWE’s sanctions motions and

          the district court’s order that reserved ruling on those

                                   44
   motions gave abundant notice to Kyros of the repeated

   pleading deficiencies that risked imposition of sanctions,

   and he was afforded sufficient opportunity to be heard.

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing

   Rule 37 sanctions on Kyros because Kyros failed to make a

   good-faith effort to comply with the district court’s order

   compelling responses to WWE’s interrogatories.

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by applying

   the forum rule to award WWE less than the requested

   amount of sanctions.

We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                          45