Court Opinion

ID: 9668391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:11:31.172658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:19.214512
License: Public Domain

CHAPA, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
The majority has granted a writ of mandamus directing Judge Garcia to rescind his two orders compelling disclosure on behalf of both Sheriff Falcon and Eloy Garza, Jr. In doing so, the majority has concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing both orders. I concur in the result as to the order involving Sheriff Falcon, but respectfully dissent as to the order involving Eloy Garza, Jr.
In my view, the issue before this court is not whether there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to justify its orders of disclosure as apparently perceived by the majority, but simply whether the trial court abused its discretion.
The test for abuse of discretion is not whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court’s action. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-43 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986); Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex.1984). Rather, a trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241-43; Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d at 443; Bush v. Vela, 535 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1976, no writ); King v. Guerra, 1 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1927, writ ref’d).
In ascertaining whether the trial court abused its discretion, the reviewing court must determine if the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1986). The trial court is free, however, to consider the entire record of the case up to and including the motions to be considered. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241. It is also well settled in Texas, that “[ijnferences may be drawn from actual facts proved.” Beazley v. McEver, 238 S.W. 949, 952 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1922, no writ). Moreover, the burden is on appellant to see that a sufficient record is presented to show error requiring reversal. TEX.R.APP.P. 50(d).
Unlike the issue presented before this court, everyone recognizes that what was before the trial judge involvéd ,the balancing of the plaintiff’s need for the testimony in question against the First Amendment claims of the news gatherer that the public’s right to know was being impaired. Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C.Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938, 94 S.Ct. 2654, 41 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2671, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). While the majority concentrates on the importance of a vigorous and unfettered press which I recognize, we must also acknowledge the fundamental rights of an allegedly, falsely accused litigant to be presumed innocent, to be confronted by his accuser, and to obtain judicial compulsion of the accuser’s testimony.
The presumption of innocence can be described as one of the most fundamental, if not the most fundamental, principle of our judicial system. While it is generally applicable in a criminal setting, it is nevertheless so ingrained in our general concept of justice that it has otherwise been invoked as recently as the U.S. Senate Confirmation Hearings of Supreme Court Nominee Judge Clarence Thomas. Moreover, harm to an individual’s reputation, whether administered through indictment or on the front pages of a newspaper, is nevertheless harm and equally punishing. Further, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Scalia recently recognized the profound importance of the right of confrontation in an analysis which could easily apply to the type of litigation presently before us:
The perception that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because there is much truth to it. A witness “may feel quite differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the *687facts. He can now understand what sort of human being that man is.” [Citation omitted.] It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person “to his face” than “behind his back.” In the former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less convincingly.
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2802, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988).
These fundamental rights of allegedly, falsely accused litigants have a special meaning considering that such litigants are heavily burdened with the obligation of having to not only prove that the publications are false, but also that the publications were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). In striking a proper balance, caution should be exercised to prevent a result which would only permit the very wealthy to avail themselves of the courts to protect their good nameconsidering that to many, the only thing they possess of value is their good name. Ultimately, the purpose of any trial is to find the truth, which can hardly be accomplished by hiding any part of it.
Nevertheless, I concur with the result as to the order involving Sheriff Falcon, because Falcon’s counsel clearly conceded in the record that he "made the decision as an attorney for Sheriff Falcon to wait and find out who the confidential sources [were] when the newspaper disclose[d] it.” Therefore, Falcon’s counsel admitted that his motion to disclose the confidential sources had not been preceded by any significant efforts on his part, as required by case law.2 See Carey, 492 F.2d at 638; Mize v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 475, 478 (S.D.Tex.1979).
However, I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that Falcon’s testimony was all that the trial court had before it to consider when it made its ruling. The trial court was free to consider the entire record of the case up to, and including, both motions by the plaintiffs, and any inferences which could be drawn from the evidence presented on both motions. Morrow, 714 S.W.2d at 298; Beazley, 238 S.W. at 952. The trial judge could certainly consider that the publication pertaining to the cocaine conviction of the five year old Garza child was flagrantly false. The trial judge could also consider that had the defendants conducted the most meager confirmation efforts, they would have necessarily discovered that the subject of the false Garza article was only five years old. These factors further justified the consideration by the trial judge of any reasonable inferences which flowed therefrom, which this court is prohibited from second guessing by the abuse of discretion standard which should guide us. This is especially true considering the fact that we were not present to see and hear the witnesses.
I further disagree with the majority’s suggestion that depositions of all 48 witnesses listed by the defendants as prospective witnesses should be taken before the court can consider forcing disclosure of the confidential sources. The majority makes this suggestion in spite of the fact that they acknowledge both that the confidential sources are not included in the list and that the discovery of the confidential sources would not be assured by the taking of the 48 depositions. As a matter of fact, oral arguments before this court revealed that even if the depositions of the entire community were taken, the discovery of the confidential sources would not be assured since the sources may be from an entirely different community, they may refuse to admit they are the confidential sources, or they may not know they are the sources the news gatherers relied upon. Thus, even if those deposed admitted being the confidential sources, there is no assurance that they were the sources the news gatherers relied upon. In suggesting such *688a requirement, the majority has cast upon all such plaintiffs an unfair onus, which has a potential burden that only the wealthy few could possibly bear.
Although I agree with the majority that the Garza case is different, where the majority would require the doing of a useless thing, I would approve the order of disclosure as far as it pertains to any confidential sources or documents involving the Garza article. While the majority recognizes that the acknowledged falsity of the Garza publication goes a long way towards justifying the disclosure order of the trial court, they would nevertheless require the deposition of defendant David Hanners, the author of the Garza article. I disagree, since the law should not require the doing of a useless thing.
The record reflects that interrogatories requesting the disclosure of the confidential sources were properly propounded to all the defendants, “The Dallas Morning News Company d/b/a The Dallas Morning News (‘The News’), A.H. Belo Corporation (‘Belo’), David Hanners, David McLemore, and Gayle Reaves.” All the defendants, including David Hanners, responded by refusing to reveal the confidential sources. I can see no useful purpose in requiring the taking of Hanners’ deposition when he has already clearly indicated he will not reveal the confidential sources. Although the disclosure order of the court as to Garza was too broad, I would approve that part of the order that pertained to the article involving the Garza child.
In my view, the majority has approached this case more from a sufficiency of the evidence standpoint rather than an abuse of discretion standpoint. The proper function of this court lies not in weighing the evidence which was before the trial court, but in determining whether the appellants have complied with their burden of showing that the trial court “acted without reference to any guiding rule and principles,” or “reached a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Morrow, 714 S.W.2d at 298; Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241-43. As to the relevant part of the Garza disclosure order, I cannot agree that the appellants have complied with their burden.

. Strangely enough, the majority interprets this to mean that I would not require Falcon to make "even a cursory investigation of the information provided by relator during discovery.”