Court Opinion

ID: 9553617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:32:49.786152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:54.374590
License: Public Domain

Schwellenbach, C. J.
(concurring in the result) — I concur in the result. There was not a sufficient showing that the expenses of administration had been paid or provided for. The only testimony in the record concerning administration expenses is the following:
“Q. (By Muscek) The expenses of administration, like my expenses, you have provided for; is that correct? A. (By Caine)'That is right.”
The trial court said:
“I think the statute is clear that the surviving husband or surviving wife has the right to four thousand dollars inde*555pendent of any creditors or anything else, but he has to show that he has paid the attorney’s fees in the proceeding that he brings to set over.” (Italics mine.)
The trial court was apparently of the opinion that if the surviving spouse showed that he had paid the expenses of having the property set aside to him, he was entitled to the award as a matter of right. Before he can have the property set aside to him he must show that the expenses of administration of the estate have been paid or provided for. That showing was not made in this case.
I am particularly concerned with the following statement in the majority opinion:
“In making provision in Rem. Supp. 1949, § 1473, for setting aside property to surviving spouses in lieu of homestead, the legislature apparently intended to protect the rights of devisees. [Italics mine.] Witness the proviso in the last three lines of the statute:
“ ‘Provided, That the awards provided for in this section shall not be taken from separate property of the deceased which is otherwise disposed of by will.’ ”
The above statement would lead to the inference that an award in lieu of homestead cannot be made of separate property (not otherwise disposed of by will), if such award would deplete any devises made in the will. The proviso to the statute means that no award in lieu of homestead can be made of any separate property which has been disposed of by will. If there is separate property not disposed of by will, the surviving spouse may, as a matter of right, have such property, up to the value of $4,000 set aside, provided he makes the showing contemplated by the statute.
In In re Welch’s Estate, 200 Wash. 686, 94 P. (2d) 758, the contention was made that the award would diminish the distributive share of an incompetent minor. We held:
“We think the court erred'in denying appellant’s petition because of the short duration of the marriage and the further fact that such an award would diminish the distributive share of the minor.
“We have consistently held that award statutes, such as §§ 1473 and 1474, supra, give an absolute right, which is not subject to collateral conditions and should not be influenced *556by the countervailing equities; that such statutes are not, strictly speaking, homestead and exemption laws, although like general laws exempting homesteads and certain personal property, they rest in a sound public policy and are calculated to prevent dependency.”
See, also, In re Poli’s Estate, 27 Wn. (2d) 670, 179 P. (2d) 704.
We held in In re Small’s Estate, 27 Wn. (2d) 677, 179 P. (2d) 505, that the fact that an award to the surviving spouse would diminish an heir’s distributive share cannot defeat that right, which is an absolute one.
In the above cases we were dealing with intestate estates, but the holdings therein are indicative of the nature of the right of the surviving spouse, and the favor with which it is to be viewed.
Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1506 [P.P.C. § 213-29], provides:
“If the provision made by the will or the estate appropriated be not sufficient to pay the debts and expenses of administration and family expenses, such part of the estate as shall not have been disposed of by the will, if any, shall be appropriated for that purpose, according to the provisions of this chapter.”
Rem. Rev. Stat., § 1507 [P.P.C. § 213-31], provides:
“The estate, real and personal, given by the will to any legatees or devisees, shall be held liable for the payment of the debts, the expenses of administration and allowances to the family, in proportion to the value or amount of the several devises or legacies, if there shall not be other sufficient estate, except that specific devises or legacies may be. exempted, if it appear to the court necessary to carry into effect the intention of the testator.”
The meaning of § 1506 is simply this: If at the time the estate is ready to be closed, the provision made by the will is not sufficient to pay the debts and expenses of administration and family expenses, then such part of the estate as was not disposed of by will, “if any,” shall be appropriated for that purpose. However, if before the estate is closed, any of such separate property not disposed of by will has been set aside to the surviving spouse, such property has been *557lifted out of the estate and is not before the court at the final hearing.
Rem. Supp. 1949, § 1473, provides that the order setting aside shall vest the absolute title, “and thereafter there shall be no further administration upon such portion of the estate so set off. ...” Furthermore, § 1473 provides that there shall be set aside property of the value of $4,000.00, “exclusive of funeral expenses, expenses of last sickness and of administration.”
In the will under consideration there was no residuary clause. The property sought to be set aside was not devised, and should have been awarded to the surviving spouse, provided he had made the proper showing as to the costs of administration.