Court Opinion

ID: 9845532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:23:55.972753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:13.184131
License: Public Domain

*529Goolsby, Justice, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The respondent Linda B. Van Norman’s cross-claim against the appellant Mack Gregory doing business as Mack Gregory Pest Eliminators arises out of an action for fraud brought by the plaintiffs Robert Griffin and Teri B. Griffin against Van Norman and Gregory. The Griffins’ complaint does not allege that Van Norman was vicariously liable for Gregory’s conduct; rather, it alleges that “both” Van Norman and Gregory made false representations about the condition of a house sold the Griffins by Van Norman and that both failed to disclose, as was their duty to do, that the house had been damaged extensively by moisture and termite damage. In her answer, Van Norman alleges as a second defense, which also embraced her cross-claim, “[t]hat any damage suffered by the [Griffins] in this matter [was] due to the negligence or misrepresentation of [Gregory].” Van Norman, however, later paid the Griffins $5,000 to settle their claim against her. Following a bench trial thereafter held upon Van Norman’s cross-claim, the trial court, relying upon Stuck v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc., 279 S.C. 22, 301 S.E. (2d) 552 (1983), found Van Norman entitled to indemnification from Gregory for the amount that she paid the Griffins in settlement of their claim against her. I would reverse.
The Griffins’ complaint required Van Norman to defend against allegations of fraud on her own part. It did not require her to defend against allegations of fraud on Gregory’s part for which Van Norman was allegedly secondarily liable. See Addy v. Bolton, 257 S.C. 28, 183 S.E. (2d) 708 (1971) (allowing indemnity to a landlord called upon in an action brought by tenants to defend against the wrongful acts of a general contractor hired by the landlord to make needed repairs to the building); 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 29 at 610 (1944) (“[W]here two wrongdoers are made parties defendant and they are not in pari delicto, the one secondarily liable may have a judgment over against the other without being forced to a separate action....”). Thus, had the Griffins’ action been tried rather than settled and had it resulted in a verdict in favor of Van Norman, Van Norman would not have defended against conduct imputed to her as a result of fraud committed
*530by Gregory but would have defended against her own conduct and, under her second defense, would have used Gregory’s fraudulent conduct as a defense.1 Under those circumstances, she would not have been indemnified for the expenses she incurred in successfully defending the action. Lightner v. Duke Power Company, 719 F. Supp. 1310 (D.S.C. 1989). That she settled with the Griffins, then, should make no difference.
I recognize that this court in Town of Winnsboro v. Wiedeman-Singleton, Inc., Op. No. 1552 (S.C. App., October 8, 1990), overruled the case that the court in Lightner relied upon, JKT Company, Inc. v. Hardwick, 284 S.C. 10, 325 S.E. (2d) 329 (Ct. App. 1984); however, I did not concur in the majority’s action, believing as I do that this court correctly decided JKT and that the majority in Town of Winnsboro misconstrued JKT when they reached out to overrule it. See Town of Winnsboro v. Wiedeman-Singleton, Inc., Op. No. 1552 (S.C. App., October 8, 1990) (Goolsby, J., concurring and dissenting).
*531Indeed, the majority continues to misread JKT. They now say that JKT “held that the right to indemnity was to be determined on the face of the pleading, rather than by facts in evidence at trial.” JKT contains no such holding. The court’s discussion in JKT of the Addy case makes it clear that the court understood that the “evidence in the record,” and not simply the allegations set forth in the pleadings, must also be considered. JKT Company, Inc. v. Hardwick, 284 S.C. at 14-15, 325 S.E. (2d) at 332.
In any case, Addy and Town of Winnsboro, relied upon by the majority, and Stuck v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc., 279 S.C. 22, 301 S.E. (2d) 552 (1983), relied upon by the trial court, do not support what the majority does here.
I also dissent because Van Norman voluntarily paid the Griffins $5,000 in settlement of the Griffins’ claim against her, even though, as the court later found, there was no basis for liability on her part. See 41 Am. Jur. (2d) Indemnity § 33 at 723 (1968) (“Indemnity against losses does not cover losses . for which the indemnitee is not liable to a third person, and which he improperly pays.”); 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 14c(2) at 590 (1944) (“[A] contract of indemnity does not protect the indemnitee against loss through a payment which is entirely voluntary on his part, in the sense that there is no legal obligation on him to make it, unless such payment is made with the knowledge and approval of the indemnitor.”); cf. Vause v. Mikell, 290 S.C. 65, 69, 348 S.E. (2d) 187, 190 (Ct. App. 1986) (“A remainderman is not entitled to reimbursement for property taxes paid as a volunteer.”) Van Norman was not faced, as the majority suggests, with an obligation that she could not legally resist or, as some would say, “an offer she couldn’t refuse.” See 41 Am. Jur. (2d), supra (“The fact of voluntary payment does not negative the right to indemnity, since a person confronted with an obligation that he cannot legally resist is not obligated to wait to be sued and to lose a reasonable opportunity for compromise.”).

 The record reflects that Van Norman clearly understood that, had she not settled and gone to trial, she would have had to defend her own, and not Gregory’s, conduct in the sale of the house.
Moreover, it is not surprising that Van Norman settled or, as the majority puts it, “bought peace.”
After Gregory discovered the termite and moisture damage and gave Van Norman a wood infestation report, Van Norman retained a local contractor, Handy Man Repairs, to repair the damage found by Gregory. When Handy Man finished making the repairs, Van Norman’s husband crawled underneath the house and inspected Handy Man’s work. Twenty-three days after Van Norman sold the house to the Griffins and supplied them with only a second wood infestation report given her by Gregory, the Griffins discovered that the house had widespread termite and moisture damage, including “[ejxtensive termite damage ... on the hardwood floor in the bedroom in the right rear comer of the house.”
There is no evidence that Van Norman disclosed to the Griffins that the house had ever been damaged by moisture and termites and that repairs had been made, a material fact that any sensible home buyer would want to know. She did not provide the Griffins, so far as the record reveals, with the first wood infestation report that indicated, among other things, that the damage observed by Gregory would be “corrected by another company.”
Also, the second wood infestation report, which she did provide and is in the record, has a check list with the following entries checked “no”: “(2) There is visible evidence of a previous infestation of: (A) Termites [and] (B) Other wood-destroying insects” and “(3) There is visible evidence of prior treatment.” Arguably, the repairs made by Handy Man with Van Norman’s knowledge would themselves constitute “visible evidence” of a previous infestation and of prior treatment.