Court Opinion

ID: 9889712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 13:04:11.892079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:20.219888
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: October 11, 2023

                            S23A0753. Maynor v. The State.

        COLVIN, Justice.

        Appellant Reginald Genard Maynor appeals his convictions for

felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and other crimes

related to the shooting death of Marti Stegall, Sr.1 This case arises

        1 The crimes occurred on July 3, 2015. On October 2, 2015, a Fulton

County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder (Count 1), felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), two counts of aggravated
assault (Counts 3-4), two counts of cruelty to children in the first degree
(Counts 5-6), three counts of cruelty to children in the third degree (Counts 7-
9), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 10). A
jury trial was held from February 21 to 24, 2017. At the close of the State’s
evidence, the trial court granted Appellant’s motion for directed verdict as to
Count 4 (aggravated assault against A. H.). The jury found Appellant guilty of
felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, two
counts of cruelty to children in the third degree (against A. H. and M. S. J.),
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On February
27, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison with the
possibility of parole for felony murder and merged the underlying aggravated
assault count into the felony murder conviction for sentencing purposes.
Appellant was also sentenced to 12 months in prison for each of the two counts
of cruelty to children in the third degree, to be served concurrently with each
other and with Appellant’s life sentence for felony murder, but the trial court
out of a romantic affair involving two couples residing in the Trestle

Tree Village Apartments in Fulton County. The conflict caused by

this affair ultimately resulted in Appellant shooting and killing

Stegall during a neighborhood Fourth of July celebration which took

place on July 3, 2015. At trial, Appellant admitted that he shot

Stegall but claimed that he did so in self-defense.2

      On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient

as a matter of constitutional and statutory law to disprove his claim

of self-defense. Appellant also contends that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to effectively

cross-examine a witness and failed to move for a mistrial when the

trial evidence did not substantiate a factual claim made by the

commuted these sentences to time served. Lastly, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to five years in prison for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony to be served consecutive to Appellant’s life sentence for
felony murder. Appellant’s trial counsel timely filed a motion for new trial on
February 27, 2017, which was subsequently amended by new counsel on April
15, 2021. After a hearing, the trial court denied the amended motion on
December 5, 2022. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was
docketed to this Court’s April 2023 term and submitted for a decision on the
briefs.
       2 Appellant testified at trial that he shot the victim both in self-defense

and by accident. On appeal, however, Appellant does not argue that the
shooting was accidental.
                                        2
prosecutor in his opening statement. Appellant also asks that we

consider the prejudicial effect of trial counsel’s errors cumulatively.

For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

     1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the

evidence at trial showed the following. Appellant lived in the Trestle

Tree Village Apartments with his children and his long-term

romantic partner, Laquetta Holt. Appellant was a long-haul truck

driver and was often away on assignments. Separately, Stegall had

a 14-year relationship with Katisha Gray, who lived in the Trestle

Tree Apartments with her three children: 13-year-old J. M., eight-

year-old M. S. J., and three-year-old M. S.       At the time of the

shooting, Katisha’s 20-year-old niece, Iyonna Little, also lived at the

apartment. According to Katisha, Stegall did not live with her at

the time of the shooting but “would come sometimes.”

     At some point in 2013 or 2014, Stegall began an affair with

Appellant’s partner, Holt. Appellant discovered the affair when he

found a text message from Stegall to Holt on Holt’s phone. Appellant

later informed Katisha about the affair, to their mutual dismay.

                                  3
     Several months before the shooting, in February or March of

2015, Appellant met with Katisha about the affair. The meeting took

place while Katisha was visiting with her sister, Mackiyona Gray,

who also lived at the Trestle Tree Apartments. Dwiesha Johnson

was also present and later testified regarding Appellant’s visit.

During Appellant’s visit, he and Katisha discussed their partners’

infidelity, and Appellant proposed that he and Katisha “hook up” to

get back at them. Katisha rebuffed his advance and testified at trial

that “[Appellant] came out and told me that he was going to kill

[Stegall].” Appellant had a gun in his waistband at the time he made

this threat, and he demonstrated his seriousness by expressing a

familiarity with the details of Stegall’s life, including where Stegall

worked, where Stegall got his dreadlocks styled, and where Stegall’s

mother lived.

     The conflict caused by Stegall’s affair with Appellant’s partner

came to a head during a large neighborhood party for the Fourth of

July, which was held on Friday, July 3, 2015. Katisha’s daughter,

J. M., who regarded Stegall as a father-figure, witnessed the fight

                                  4
between Appellant and Stegall and the subsequent shooting. About

two days prior to the shooting, Stegall took J. M.’s phone from her,

but indicated that he planned to return it to her at the party.

According to J. M., when Stegall arrived to the party in his white

Chevrolet Tahoe, “It took him like one to two minutes to get out of

his truck because he was trying to find my phone.” When he got out

of the truck, he told J. M. to come down and get her phone. J. M.

was standing on the balcony and her brother, M. S. J., was near the

parking lot below, when J. M. saw Appellant approach Stegall and

hit him in the face. After being struck, Stegall dropped the liquor

bottle that he had been holding, and the two started throwing

punches at each other. J. M. did not see any weapons in Stegall’s

hands. J. M. testified that she heard two gunshots, and the next

thing she saw was “[her] stepfather [ ] lying on the ground.”

     Mackiyona Gray pulled into the Trestle Tree parking lot two

cars behind Stegall.3        According to Mackiyona, Appellant

     3 This portion of Mackiyona’s testimony was corroborated by security

camera footage from the street, which was played for the jury and which

                                   5
approached Stegall and punched him in the face.               Stegall then

dropped the liquor bottle he was holding and began to fight back.

Stegall was on top of Appellant when Mackiyona heard the first

gunshot. The two continued to fight, when “they somehow got up,”

and “[t]here was another shot.” Mackiyona then saw Appellant run

toward his home. During this time, Mackiyona observed that J. M.

and M. S. J. were outside near the fight and that they had a clear

view of the scene.

     Katisha Gray was in her apartment making drinks with her

niece Iyonna Little when the fight started. Katisha testified that

she was inside when she heard the first gunshot, followed by people

screaming and calling her nickname, “Tootie.” She then ran outside,

where she saw “[Appellant] shoot [Stegall] and kick him in the face.”

Katisha did not see Stegall with a firearm that night or know him

to carry a firearm.      Nor did she see Stegall attempt to strike

Appellant with a liquor bottle.

captured Stegall’s white Chevrolet Tahoe entering the complex at about
10:51 p.m. Another car entered, and then Mackiyona entered the lot in her red
two-door Pontiac about 30 seconds after Stegall.
                                     6
     Eleven-year-old A. H. was present for the Fourth of July

celebration. He saw Stegall get out of his white truck. Shortly

thereafter, A. H. heard what he initially thought were fireworks

come near and toward him. An unidentified man then picked up A.

H. and ran with him “to the house.” A. H. later learned that the

objects were bullets, rather than fireworks, when he returned and

“saw [Stegall] there dead.”

     Trestle Tree resident Crystal Jernigan was talking to

Appellant in the parking lot when Stegall arrived. Jernigan testified

that she was about ten feet away from Stegall, who initially had a

bottle of alcohol, his keys, and a cell phone in his hands. She did not

see any weapons on him. Jernigan testified that Appellant walked

up to Stegall and “swung on him.” Jernigan then saw Stegall punch

Appellant back, and the two tussled on the ground, when, according

to Jernigan, Appellant “pulled the gun and started shooting. . . .

[Appellant] then got up off the ground and ran.”

     Stegall’s autopsy was performed by Dr. Karen Sullivan of the

Fulton County Medical Examiner’s Office. The autopsy revealed

                                  7
that Stegall received two gunshot wounds: one to his torso and one

to his left leg. The gunshot wound to Stegall’s torso left both “a

dense deposition of soot surrounding the entrance wound” as well as

stippling on Stegall’s skin, collectively indicating a contact wound.

The gunshot wound to Stegall’s left shin and thigh did not show

signs of soot or stippling, which indicated to Dr. Sullivan that “the

muzzle of the gun [was] most likely at least three feet away from the

skin.”

     Appellant testified in his own defense. According to Appellant,

he was at home in the Trestle Tree Village Apartments for the

Fourth of July celebration on an unexpected break from a long-haul

trucking assignment. Appellant testified that while he was walking

through one of the parking lots, Stegall drove into the lot and nearly

hit Appellant with his vehicle. According to Appellant, Stegall did

not get out of his vehicle slowly or call up to J. M., as J. M. had

previously testified.   Appellant testified that Stegall actually

jumped out of his vehicle, said to Appellant, “F**k, n***a, what’s up

now,” and pulled out a gun. Appellant knocked Stegall’s right hand,

                                  8
in which Stegall held the gun, into Stegall’s vehicle, causing Stegall

to drop it. Stegall threw a punch at Appellant and missed but then

knocked Appellant to the ground with a hard object that Appellant

later learned was a liquor bottle.      While Appellant was on the

ground, he saw Stegall coming toward him, so Appellant reached in

his pocket and pulled out his own gun, which he regularly carried or

kept in his truck. Appellant then “shot low.” Appellant tried to get

up, but by that time, Stegall was on top of him, hitting him with the

liquor bottle. Appellant “pushed – tried to push him off and the gun

went off.” When explaining why he felt it was necessary to use his

weapon, Appellant stated, “Whatever he hit me with I didn’t want

to get hit with it again, so, you know, I tried to defend myself as best

as I could.”

     In his testimony, Appellant described his gun as a five-shot

revolver, which he kept loaded. Appellant testified that he shot the

gun at Stegall twice. After the fight, Appellant returned to his

apartment, put the gun in a toolbox on his back porch, “sat down . . .

and tried to figure out what just happened and what [he] need[ed]

                                   9
to do because [he] was scared.”       Appellant then left the scene.

Neither Appellant’s revolver nor the pistol Appellant claimed

Stegall possessed were ever recovered.

     On cross-examination, Appellant confirmed that he discovered

the affair between Holt and Stegall when he saw a text message

from Stegall to Holt on Holt’s phone. Appellant also confirmed that

he called Katisha to speak to her about the affair, but Appellant

denied that he ever went to Mackiyona’s apartment or that he told

Katisha he was going to kill Stegall. Appellant further testified that

it was Katisha who proposed that they have an affair, rather than

Appellant. According to Appellant, Stegall was mad at him on the

night of the party because Katisha had sent Appellant text messages

containing pornography. Appellant further testified that Stegall

addressed Appellant as soon as Stegall got out of his vehicle, rather

than calling to J. M.

     2. Appellant argues that the evidence presented was

constitutionally insufficient to disprove his claim of self-defense

beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant also argues that the evidence

                                 10
was statutorily insufficient because it was based on “solely

circumstantial” evidence and the State failed to “exclude every other

reasonable hypothesis save that of [his] guilt” as required by OCGA

§ 24-14-6. We disagree.

     (a) “When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of

constitutional due process, the proper standard of review is whether

a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 147, 150 (1) (886

SE2d 818) (2023) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III)

(B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). “When a defendant presents

evidence that he was justified in using deadly force, the State bears

the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Allen v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (2) (890 SE2d 700, 707) (2023) (citation

and punctuation omitted). But “it is the role of the jury to evaluate

the evidence and decide whether the defendant was justified in

using deadly force in self-defense.” Huff v. State, 315 Ga. 558, 562

(1) (883 SE2d 773) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). When

doing so, “the jury may reject any evidence in support of a

                                 11
justification defense and accept evidence that a shooting was not

done in self-defense.” Gibbs v. State, 309 Ga. 562, 564 (1) (847 SE2d

156) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). As relevant here,

“[a] person is not justified in using force [in self-defense] if he . . .

[w]as the aggressor[.]” Carter v. State, 310 Ga. 559, 562 (1) (b) (852

SE2d 542) (2020) (quoting OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (3)).

     The State presented evidence from Katisha Gray, Dwiesha

Johnson, and Mackiyona Gray that Appellant expressed his intent

to kill Stegall in retaliation for Stegall’s affair with Holt. Though

the jury did not convict Appellant of malice murder, this evidence

supported an inference that Appellant was motivated to instigate a

fistfight with Stegall, and it was consistent with Appellant shooting

Stegall when Appellant began to lose that fight. Crystal Jernigan

and J. M. each testified that they saw Appellant throw the first

punch without provocation from Stegall. See Mosby v. State, 300

Ga. 450, 452 (1) (796 SE2d 277) (2017) (“An aggressor is not entitled

to a finding of justification.” (citing OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (3))).

Further, neither Jernigan, J. M., nor Mackiyona saw Stegall with a

                                   12
gun, and no such weapon was found at the scene. Lastly, Appellant

fled the immediate area, from which the jury could infer

“‘consciousness of guilt, and thus . . . guilt itself.’” State v. Orr, 305

Ga. 729, 741 (4) (a) (827 SE2d 892) (2019) (quoting United States v.

Borders, 693 F2d 1318, 1324-1325 (11th Cir. 1982)).             See also

Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81, 89 (3) (868 SE2d 205) (2022) (same).

     Moreover, the only evidence supporting Appellant’s affirmative

defense was his own self-serving testimony. Though the fight and

shooting occurred in the midst of a neighborhood party, no one other

than Appellant testified that Stegall tried to hit Appellant with his

car; that Stegall verbally instigated a fight after getting out of his

vehicle; or that Stegall was armed. The jury was free to disbelieve

Appellant’s testimony in favor of the State’s witnesses. See Ivey v.

State, 305 Ga. 156, 159 (824 SE2d 242) (2019) (“Issues of witness

credibility and the existence of justification are for the jury to

determine, and it is free to reject a defendant’s claim that he acted

in self-defense.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).        The jurors

were also authorized to consider their disbelief in Appellant’s

                                   13
testimony — and the inconsistencies between it and the eyewitness

accounts of others — as substantive evidence of his guilt. See Mims

v. State, 310 Ga. 853, 855 (854 SE2d 742) (2021) (noting that “the

defendant’s testimony, in which he claimed he was justified or

provoked into acting, may itself be considered substantive evidence

of guilt when disbelieved by the jury, as long as some corroborative

evidence exists for the charged offense” (citation and punctuation

omitted)). The evidence was therefore constitutionally sufficient to

disprove Appellant’s self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt.

     (b) Appellant also contends that the evidence of his guilt failed

to satisfy the standard articulated in OCGA § 24-14-6, which

requires that, where a conviction is based solely on “circumstantial

evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the

hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable

hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6.

But Appellant’s conviction was not based solely on circumstantial

evidence as he contends. The eyewitness accounts of J. M., Katisha,

Mackiyona, and Crystal Jernigan are direct evidence.        See e.g.,

                                 14
Jackson v. State, 307 Ga. 770, 772 (838 SE2d 246) (2020) (noting

that “there was substantial direct evidence . . . in the form of

testimony from multiple eyewitnesses identifying [the defendant] as

the perpetrator” (citation and punctuation omitted)). And, “if there

is any direct evidence presented by the State, the circumstantial

evidence statute does not apply in a sufficiency analysis.” Brown v.

State, 314 Ga. 193, 196 (1) (875 SE2d 784) (2022) (citation and

punctuation omitted) (holding that the defendant’s claim of

insufficient evidence under OCGA § 24-14-6 failed because the State

did not rely solely on circumstantial evidence).           Appellant’s

statutory insufficiency claim therefore fails.

     3. Appellant next contends that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel in two ways: his trial counsel failed to fully and

thoroughly cross-examine Katisha, and his trial counsel failed to

move for a mistrial based on the State’s failure to admit evidence in

support of a factual claim the prosecutor made in his opening

statement.

     (a) To succeed on his ineffective assistance claims, Appellant

                                  15
must show that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally

deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance.

See Davis v. State, 315 Ga. 252, 260-261 (4) (882 SE2d 210) (2022).

See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt

2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).        Trial counsel’s performance was

deficient if he “performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way

considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing

professional norms.” Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (5) (b) (884

SE2d    346)    (2023)    (citation    and   punctuation    omitted).

Demonstrating deficient performance is a difficult task because

there is “a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”

Monroe v. State, 315 Ga. 767, 781 (6) (884 SE2d 906) (2023) (citation

and punctuation omitted). Overcoming this presumption requires

an appellant to show “that no reasonable lawyer would have done

what his lawyer did, or would have failed to do was his lawyer did

not.” Evans v. State, 315 Ga. 607, 611 (2) (b) (884 SE2d 334) (2023)

(citation and punctuation omitted). Further, “[d]ecisions regarding

                                  16
trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness

claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent

attorney would have followed such a course.” Mathews v. State, 314

Ga. 360, 368 (4) (877 SE2d 188) (2022) (citation and punctuation

omitted). For Appellant to prove that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s deficient performance, he “must demonstrate that there is

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result

of the trial would have been different.” Washington v. State, 313 Ga.

771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022) (citation and punctuation

omitted). If Appellant fails to carry his burden on one prong of the

Strickland test, we need not address the other prong. See id.

     (b) Appellant claims that Katisha’s responses on cross-

examination were misleading. Appellant argues that his counsel

was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to ask Katisha

follow-up questions and to impeach her with additional evidence

that showed that Katisha did not witness the shooting. We are not

persuaded that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally

deficient.

                                  17
     In her initial testimony at trial, Katisha stated that she was in

her kitchen when the fight between Appellant and Stegall began and

that she did not see how the fight started or the initial exchange of

blows. According to her testimony, she became aware of the incident

when she heard the first gunshot, together with people screaming

and calling to her by her nickname, saying, “Tootie, Tootie, they

fighting; they fighting.” Katisha testified that J. M. called to her

from the balcony, saying, “My daddy is fighting; my daddy is

fighting.” Katisha claimed that she then ran downstairs to the

parking lot below, where she saw Appellant shoot Stegall, “kick[ ]

him in the face, and t[ake] off running.”

     Later that night, Katisha went to the police station and

provided a written statement, which Appellant’s trial counsel used

to impeach her on cross-examination. At trial, Appellant’s counsel

showed Katisha a copy of the statement, which said:

     I was in the kitchen when I saw them[4] fighting[.] [B]y
     the time I got out the door I heard shots (4 or 5)[.] This all

     4  Katisha Gray’s handwritten statement included an arrow and
additional text to show that “them” referred to “Reginald Denard Maynard [sic]
and Marti Stegall.”
                                     18
     started over sexual relations with Mr. Stegal[l] and
     LaQuatta [sic] Holt.

Appellant’s trial counsel then engaged in the following colloquy with

Katisha:

     DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. So first you tell them that
     you’re in the kitchen; right?

     GRAY: Uh-huh.

     DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you tell them you saw the
     fighting in that statement?

     GRAY: Yes, in the statement.

     DEFENSE COUNSEL: But that’s not true?

     GRAY: No, it’s not true. It’s not that I saw them fighting.
     I heard them saying they were fighting. [ . . . ] And that’s
     when I ran out the door.

     DEFENSE COUNSEL: But you told the police you saw
     them fighting?

     GRAY: Uh-huh.

     DEFENSE COUNSEL: That’s not true?

     GRAY: I can’t tell you if I saw it or I didn’t see it right
     now. It’s all a blur. I don’t know.

     DEFENSE COUNSEL: And you told – you said that by
     the time you got there what happened?

                                 19
GRAY: I saw Reginald Maynor shoot —

DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, no. On your statement you
said, by the time I got there you said what?

GRAY: I heard shots.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay, so you heard shots, correct?

GRAY: Uh-huh.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: But your testimony before this
jury is that saw you Reginald Maynor shoot?

GRAY: Uh-huh.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: But you never said in that
statement that you saw him shoot, did you?

GRAY: No, not in this statement.

                          ...

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You never told the police in the
statement that you saw Reginald Maynor shoot Marti
Stegall. You never say that, do you?

GRAY: No, not in this statement.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. And in there you say you
saw them fighting, but you actually didn’t see them
fighting; correct?

GRAY: In this statement, correct.

                           20
In other cross-examination about her statement, Katisha also

clarified that some of the four or five noises she heard may have been

fireworks, rather than gunshots.

     At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Appellant’s trial counsel

was questioned about his impeachment of Katisha.            Appellate

counsel confronted trial counsel with two exhibits that were not

admitted at trial. First, appellate counsel tendered into evidence an

audio recording of an interview between Katisha and Investigator

Egbert in which Katisha confirmed that by the time she got outside,

the shooting had already occurred, Stegall was lying on the ground,

and Appellant was gone. Additionally, appellate counsel tendered

Detective Kevin Leonpacher’s “Supplement Incident Report,” which

stated that Katisha identified Appellant in a photograph lineup, but

that she “did not witness the shooting.” Trial counsel testified that

he did not remember Katisha’s interview with Investigator Egbert

and that he did not recall a specific reason for not confronting

Katisha with this evidence at trial. Nor did he recall a specific

                                   21
reason for not entering Detective Leonpacher’s notes into evidence.

Trial counsel did surmise, however, that he declined to impeach

Katisha with these additional exhibits because “in her statement,

she said she didn’t see the shooting. So . . . I wouldn’t have felt the

need to present her with a police report.”

     The trial court denied Appellant’s motion for new trial. In its

order, it concluded that Appellant’s trial counsel’s performance “was

objectively reasonable” because trial counsel “was aware of [the]

other statements but . . . he had a number of other concerns

including that further impeachment would be cumulative, that the

witness’s response could potentially be harmful, and that multiple

other witnesses indicated that Maynor was the aggressor when the

unarmed victim was shot.”

     Appellant argues the trial court made factual errors when it

concluded that his trial counsel’s performance was objectively

reasonable. Contrary to the trial court’s findings, Appellant claims,

trial counsel could not recall the audio recording of Katisha’s

interview with Investigator Egbert; whether he was concerned that

                                  22
additional evidence would be cumulative; or whether he was

influenced by the strength of the State’s multiple eyewitnesses. It

was therefore clear error, Appellant argues, to hold that trial

counsel’s decision to forgo a motion for a mistrial was reasonable.

     In addition to the trial court’s factual errors, Appellant argues

that Katisha’s responses on cross-examination were misleading, and

that his trial counsel’s failure to rectify any misleading impressions

with follow-up questions and impeachment evidence constituted

deficient performance. Specifically,           Appellant   contends    that

Katisha’s repeated use of the phrase “no, not in this statement”

implied that she may have given other statements in which she

claimed to have seen the shooting, consistent with her trial

testimony, when in fact she gave no statements where she claimed

to have seen the shooting.

     Even assuming, without deciding, that Appellant is correct

about the trial court’s factual errors in its order denying Appellant’s

motion for new trial, we remain unpersuaded by Appellant’s

ineffective   assistance     claims        because   Appellant   has   not

                                      23
demonstrated      that   his   trial    counsel’s   performance   was

constitutionally deficient.

     First, in the context of Katisha’s testimony as a whole, her

repeated use of the phrase “not in this statement” was not

misleading and thus further cross-examination was not needed to

clarify it.   Immediately prior to her cross-examination, Katisha

testified that she had given only two statements: an oral statement

to a female officer on the scene and a written statement to Detective

Leonpacher at the police station. According to Katisha, she gave the

“same statement” to both law enforcement officers. Though her

claim to have given only two statements was inaccurate — as it

omits the interview she later had with Investigator Egbert — the

jury did not know this. Based on Katisha’s uncontested testimony

that she gave only two materially identical statements to law

enforcement, the phrase “no, not in this statement” was not

misleading because Katisha’s own testimony foreclosed the

possibility that she had provided different information in some other

statement not admitted at trial.

                                   24
     Second, we cannot say that trial counsel’s failure to further

impeach Katisha by means of her interview with Investigator

Egbert and Detective Leonpacher’s report was so patently

unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made the

same decision. “Decisions about what questions to ask on cross-

examination are quintessential trial strategy and will rarely

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. In particular, whether

to impeach prosecution witnesses and how to do so are tactical

decisions.” Moss v. State, 312 Ga. 202, 211 (2) (c) (ii) (862 SE2d 309)

(2021) (citation and punctuation omitted) (holding trial counsel’s

decision to forego further efforts to cross-examine a witness and

impeach his testimony was reasonable where such efforts would be

fruitless or unnecessary given the damage already done to the

witness’s credibility and the availability of related evidence from

other witnesses); Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 269 (2) (d) (882 SE2d

227) (2022) (rejecting an argument that trial counsel’s cross-

examination of a witness was objectively unreasonable, where the

appellant argued that the cross-examination should have been more

                                  25
thorough).

     Trial counsel’s cross-examination of Katisha established

several material differences between her testimony and the written

statement that she made on the night of the shooting. First, under

the pressure of cross-examination, Katisha conceded that though

she testified that she did not see Appellant and Stegall fighting, she

wrote in her statement that she did.           The pressure applied by

Appellant’s trial counsel prompted Katisha to admit that she could

not “tell . . . if I saw it or I didn’t see it right now. It’s all a blur. I

don’t know.” Second, Katisha acknowledged on cross-examination

that though she testified that she saw the shooting, she wrote in her

statement that she heard shots. Further cross-examination clarified

that, though her written statement said she heard four or five

gunshots, she did not actually know whether some of the noises she

heard were fireworks instead. By pointing out these inconsistencies

between Katisha’s testimony and her written statement, Appellant’s

trial counsel effectively questioned Katisha’s credibility.

     Lastly, because it was undisputed that Appellant shot Stegall,

                                    26
Katisha’s testimony was only material to the extent it conflicted

with Appellant’s claim of self-defense. In this regard, trial counsel’s

decision to focus on whether Katisha witnessed the initial fight,

rather than the subsequent shooting, was not so patently

unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made the

same decision. See Mathews, 314 Ga. at 368 (4). This claim of

ineffective assistance therefore fails.

     (c) Appellant also contends that his trial counsel was

ineffective because he failed to move for a mistrial with regards to

an allegedly prejudicial factual claim the State made in its opening

statement but ultimately failed to support with evidence. Appellant

also contends that the trial court applied the wrong standard when

it evaluated this claim in its order denying his motion for new trial.

We disagree with both contentions.

     During the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor made the

following remarks:

     PROSECUTOR: [Appellant] sees Marti’s vehicle pull up
     into the apartment complex. [Appellant]’s angry. He’s
     pissed off about this affair [ . . . . ] And the first thing he

                                   27
     tells Crystal Jernigan when he sees Marti’s car pulling up
     to the apartment complex and parking is, [“]What is all of
     this s**t that is happening when I’m out of town.[”]

     He sees Marti’s car pull up and he says, “I’m getting ready
     to check this s**t.”

Jernigan’s testimony, however, did not proceed as the prosecutor

suggested it would. Her testimony, in relevant part, was as follows:

     JERNIGAN: Later on that night we were all outside in
     the parking lot. The kids were popping fireworks and I
     was in the field not too far from the parking lot, and that’s
     when [Appellant], like, approached me.

                                 ...

     PROSECUTOR: And what did you talk about?

     JERNIGAN: He came over. He was like, [“]Crystal, what’s
     really going on. And he was like, what is — why all this
     s**t be starting out here?[”] And I was like [“]what s**t?[”]
     And he was like, [“]I guess as far as the kids was fighting
     the week before.[”] And that was it.

Jernigan’s testimony ultimately did not support the State’s claim in

its opening remarks that Appellant said, “I’m getting ready to check

this s**t.”

     At the motion for new trial hearing, Appellant’s trial counsel

testified that he was generally familiar with case law unfavorable to

                                  28
motions for mistrial made in such situations. He further testified

that even though he did not specifically recall the prosecutor’s

opening statement or his deliberations related to moving for

mistrial, he must have “made the determination” that such a motion

would fail.

     In its order denying Appellant’s motion for new trial, the trial

court relied on Alexander v. State, 270 Ga. 346, 349-351 (2) (509

SE2d 56) (1998), for the following proposition:

     The general rule is that where a prosecutor does not
     present evidence to support an allegation in the opening
     there must be a showing of bad faith on the part of the
     prosecutor and the failure to provide a sufficient general
     charge that opening statements are not evidence.

(Emphasis supplied). The trial court then applied this rule and

concluded that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient because

there was no evidence that the prosecutor attempted to mislead the

jury and because trial counsel’s decision to forgo moving for a

mistrial was informed by his awareness of case law contrary to the

proposed motion.    It further concluded that Appellant was not

prejudiced by the prosecutor’s opening remarks because of the

                                 29
“negligible import of this evidence to [Appellant]’s defense and the

substantial independent evidence presented of [Appellant]’s guilt.”

     Appellant contends that the trial court misstated the

applicable law, leading it to erroneously place the burden of proof on

Appellant rather than on the State. In Alexander, we stated that

     A prosecutor should confine his opening statement to an
     outline of what he expects admissible evidence to prove at
     trial, and . . . if a prosecutor departs from these
     guidelines, a conviction will not be reversed if the
     prosecutor acted in good faith and if the trial court
     instructs the jury that the prosecutor’s opening statement
     is not evidence and has no probative value. . . . Because it
     is the prosecutor’s duty to abide by this rule . . . we
     conclude that it is appropriate to place the burden on the
     prosecutor to show that the failure to offer this proof was
     in good faith.

Alexander, 270 Ga. at 349-351 (2) (emphasis supplied). See also

Simmons v. State, 291 Ga. 705, 709 (6) (733 SE2d 280) (2012)

(placing the burden on the State to show its opening remarks were

made in good faith); Jennings v. State, 288 Ga. 120, 122-123 (4) (702

SE2d 151) (2010) (same). Appellant contends that since the burden

falls on the State to show its remarks were made in good faith, the

trial court erred when it stated that “there must be a showing of bad

                                 30
faith on the part of the prosecutor” and that trial counsel’s

performance was not deficient because there was “no evidence that

the prosecutor attempted [to] mislead the jury.”

     Appellant is incorrect. Had Appellant’s trial counsel moved for

a mistrial, the burden would have fallen on the State to prove that

its opening remarks were made in good faith, as Appellant claims.

But we are not reviewing an order denying a motion for a mistrial.

We, like the trial court below, are instead asked to consider whether

Appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a

mistrial. And where ineffective assistance is at issue, Appellant has

the burden to “establish . . . that his counsel’s performance was

deficient.”   See Davis, 315 Ga. at 260-261 (4) (citation and

punctuation omitted). To do so, he must show that no competent

attorney would think that the motion would have failed. See Premo

v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (III) (A) (131 SCt 733, 178 LE2d 649)

(2011) (explaining that “the relevant question under Strickland” is

whether “no competent attorney would think a motion to suppress

would have failed.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). See also

                                 31
Morrall v. State, 307 Ga. 444, 449-450 (2) (836 SE2d 92) (2019)

(quoting Premo, 562 U.S. at 124 (III) (A)); Moss v. State, 298 Ga. 613,

618 (5) (b) (783 SE2d 652) (2016) (citing Premo, 562 U.S. at 124 (III)

(A)).

        Here, Appellant cannot make the required showing because

the prosecutor’s colloquy with Jernigan quoted above reflects the

prosecutor’s good-faith effort to elicit the testimony he promised in

his opening remarks and Jernigan’s deficient response. See Todd v.

State, 274 Ga. 98, 100 (2) (549 SE2d 116) (2001) (holding that there

was no bad faith on the part of the State because the prosecutor had

attempted to introduce the promised evidence, unlike Alexander).

        Moreover, Detective Leonpacher’s “Supplement Incident

Report” — which Appellant admitted into evidence at his motion for

new trial hearing — substantiates the good-faith nature of the

State’s opening remarks.        The Supplement Incident Report

summarizes a statement that Jernigan gave to Detective J.

Shephard. According to the Report, Jernigan said that she was

outside before the shooting, when Appellant walked up to her and

                                  32
gave her a hug. Appellant asked her a question which “apparently

refer[red] to the relationship between [Stegall] and Laquatta [sic]

[Holt].” And when “[Stegall] arrived in his truck. . . . [Appellant]

mumbled something like, ‘I’m fixing to check this s**t right now!’”

Given Jernigan’s reported remarks, the State’s opening statement

was clearly in good faith. In light of this fact, and the trial court’s

repeated instructions to the jury that opening statements were not

evidence, Appellant’s sought-after motion for a mistrial would have

been denied, and his trial counsel’s performance was not deficient

for failing to make such a motion. Appellant’s claim for ineffective

assistance therefore fails.

     (d) Lastly, Appellant asks us to consider the cumulative

prejudicial effect of his trial counsel’s errors. Because we have not

identified any such errors, however, this claim fails. See Scott v.

State, 309 Ga. 764, 771 (3) (d) (848 SE2d 448) (2020) (“Assessing

cumulative prejudice is necessary only when multiple errors have

been shown . . . .”).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                  33