Court Opinion

ID: 9534141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:37:10.243584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:42.142494
License: Public Domain

NIX, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting.
To the extent that the majority concludes that Cressley’s statement was admissible, I agree. I believe, however, based on the totality of the circumstances in this case that Officer Moore possessed articulable and reasonable grounds to stop Appellant. As such, he was justified in investigating whether or not Appellant was intoxicated. Accordingly, I must disassociate myself from that portion of the opinion which holds otherwise.
In Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 668 A.2d 1113 (1995), this Court held that the standard to be applied in addressing the legality of an automobile stop by a police officer is whether a police officer possesses articulable and *621reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of the Vehicle Code. Relying on this standard, the majority concludes that Officer Moore’s stop of Appellant was not supported by articulable and reasonable grounds. In reaching that determination, the majority finds that the officer’s stop was based solely on Cressley’s statement. Op. at 617-620. I cannot agree with such a conclusion and believe that the majority reaches this determination by analyzing the statement in a vacuum and neglecting to consider the attendant circumstances surrounding the statement.
In reviewing the grant of a suppression motion, a reviewing court must consider only the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses and so much of the evidence for the prosecution as read in the context of the record as a whole [that] remains uneontradicted. To hold otherwise would make a mockery of the suppression court and place an impossible burden on every defendant regardless of his success or failure at the suppression hearing.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 518 Pa. 156, 159-60, 541 A.2d 1387, 1389 (1988). Here, only two witnesses were presented to the court at the suppression hearing, both by the Commonwealth. Because their testimony does not conflict, an appellate court may examine the testimony from both witnesses in assessing whether the trial court was correct in determining that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion. An appellate court will reverse only where there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those factual findings. Commonwealth v. Reddix, 355 Pa.Super. 514, 513 A.2d 1041 (1986) (citing Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 460 Pa. 516, 333 A.2d 892 (1975)).
The trial court found, and it is supported by the record, that Officer Moore witnessed two people standing next to the driver’s side door of a car located in the parking lot adjacent to a bar at 2:45 a.m. (R.R. at 38a). The bar closed at 2:00 a.m. (R.R. at 38a). The timing and location of this observation aroused Officer Moore’s suspicion. (R.R. at 5a). Officer Moore testified that he drove over to the parking lot to ascertain why the people were there. (R.R. at 6a). He *622further testified that Cressley and another woman were standing next to the driver’s side of Appellant’s vehicle. (R.R. at 6a). Although the officer was unable to identify Appellant at that time, he was fairly certain that the person behind the wheel in the vehicle was a male. (R.R. at 6a-7a). He also testified that there did not appear to be anyone else in the vehicle. (R.R. at 6a).
The two women then came over to the officer’s car. (R.R. at 7a). The officer was able to identify the two women from a previous encounter with them. (R.R. at 7a). One of the women, Cressley, informed the officer that everything was alright and that she had Appellant’s keys; the clear implication being Appellant was intoxicated. (R.R. at 38a). Officer Moore testified that he had no reason to believe that she would lie to him. (R.R. at 30a). It is important to note that this statement was not an anonymous tip; rather, it came from a person who was standing next to Appellant and had an opportunity to observe Appellant at close range.
At this point, the majority states that “[f]or whatever reason, Officer Moore did not pursue Appellant until he pulled out of the parking lot.” Op. at 619. The record is clear that after speaking with Cressley, Officer Moore proceeded across the street to do some paperwork, a place where he routinely went to catch up on paperwork. (R.R. at 25a-26a). Officer Moore then noticed Appellant’s vehicle coming out of the parking lot. (R.R. at 25a-26a). The officer testified that he recognized Appellant’s car because of its missing grill. (R.R. 26). Officer Moore then put his paperwork away, put the car in gear, and pulled out into the street. (R.R. at 26a). The officer testified that it was his intention to find out who was driving. (R.R. at 27a). He followed the vehicle, eventually pulling up along side it and witnessed Appellant driving the vehicle. (R.R. at 27a). At that point the officer testified that the car “turned right and then immediately turned left across three lanes of traffic and pulled in the parking area by the Cozy Corner.” (R.R. at 27a).
Based on the totality of the circumstances, I believe that Officer Moore possessed sufficient grounds to stop Appellant *623once he observed Appellant driving the vehicle.1 Accordingly, I believe that the trial court erred in its legal conclusion that Officer Moore did not possess articulable and reasonable grounds for stopping Appellant. Cressley’s statement and the attendant circumstances surrounding it provided a sufficient basis for stopping Appellant. In this case it was not necessary for Officer Moore to witness a Vehicle Code violation as a prerequisite to stopping Appellant as Officer Moore possessed an independent basis for doing so. Thus, I would affirm the Order of the Superior Court.
CASTILE, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. I believe that the majority’s attention to Officer Moore’s failure to “further inquire as to whether Appellant was fit to drive” is misplaced. Op. at 618. Based on Cressley’s statement that she had the keys, there was no reason to investigate further. By failing to inquire fiirther, it can be reasonably assumed that Officer Moore believed Cressley’s assurances that everything was alright and that the situation, at least for the time being, did not warrant further action on his part. This is especially true in this case where Officer Moore testified that he knew Cressley and had no reason to believe that she would lie to him. (R.R. at 7a, 30a). Thus, it would have been perfectly reasonable for the officer to believe that either Cressley or the other woman would have driven Appellant home or that Appellant was going to wait and sober up before driving.