Court Opinion

ID: 9574878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:09:13.847077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:13.166525
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. As the majority states, pursuant to MCL 331.533; MSA 14.57(23), the data collected by or for a review entity are confidential, are not public records, and are not discoverable. However, the Legislature has established several exceptions to this general rule. See MCL 331.532; MSA 14.57(22). In particular, MCL 331.532; MSA 14.57(22) provides:
The release or publication of a record of the proceedings or of the reports, findings, and conclusions of a review entity shall be for 1 or more of the following purposes:
* * *
(e) To review the qualifications, competence, and performance of a health care professional with respect to the selection and appointment of the health care professional to the medical staff of a health facility.
The Legislature did not specify to whom the review entity materials could be released; it stated only that release “shall” be for the purposes set forth in the statute.
*675The majority reads this language to mean that disclosure is authorized only for the purpose of reviewing the qualifications, competence, and performance of a health care professional during the process of determining whether the health care professional should be selected for and appointed to the medical staff of a health facility. Under the majority’s construction, the provision allows a review entity that has completed an evaluation of a health care professional to release its records or reports only to itself or another health care facility.
In my view, this restrictive inteipretation is not supported by the text of the statute. The statute clearly provides that records relating to a review entity’s decision whether to grant a doctor staff privileges may be released for review of the doctor’s qualifications, competence, and performance.1 Judicial construction of a statute is not permitted where the plain and ordinary meaning of the language is clear. Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 136; 545 NW2d 642 (1996).
Moreover, the majority ignores the fact that, in addition to her claim of malpractice, plaintiff also alleges that defendant St. John Hospital and Medical Center was negligent in extending staff privileges to Dr. Paz. The evaluation of this claim specifically calls for a review of “the qualifications, competence, and performance of a health care professional with *676respect to the selection and appointment of the health care professional to the medical staff of a health facility.” Accordingly, I would conclude that the trial court did not err in ordering defendant to produce documents from Dr. Paz’ personnel/credentials file.
The trial court found that approximately half of the documents in Dr. Paz’ personnel/credentials file were subject to discovery. However, because the record does not reflect that the trial court considered MCL 331.532; MSA 14.57(22) in making its ruling, I would remand so that the trial court could conduct another in camera review with the provisions of that statute in mind.

 The majority relies on Attorney General v Bruce, 422 Mich 157; 369 NW2d 826 (1985), in which the Court noted that “[i]n enacting [MCL 333.20175(5); MSA 14.15(20175)(5) and MCL 333.21515; MSA 14.15(21515)], the Legislature provided a strong incentive for hospitals to carry out their statutory duties.” Id. at 169-170. However, the Supreme Court decided Bruce before the enactment of MCL 331.532(e); MSA 14.57(22)(e) in 1992 PA 215.