Court Opinion

ID: 9724056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:42:45.024717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:54.841162
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
Bonnie J. Walkowiak (Walkowiak) seeks review of a court of appeals' decision which refused to suppress her confession. The narrow issue presented is whether the inquiry made by Walkowiak to the police, "Do you think I need an attorney?" is sufficient to invoke her right to counsel. The inquiry was made after she had been told of her Miranda1 rights and signed the standardized form acknowledging them,2 but prior to her *480confessing. Walkowiak argues that her inquiry was an invocation of her right to counsel and any admissions obtained after that inquiry were obtained in violation of her rights and should be suppressed. We disagree. We conclude that her inquiry, based on this record, is equivocal and therefore insufficient to invoke the right to counsel. The mere mention of an attorney does not trigger the right to counsel. However, upon an equivocal inquiry all interrogation must cease until the ambiguity is resolved. Although the record before us also indicates that the interrogating officer's responses were appropriate under the circumstances, the record is incomplete. Walkowiak presented no evidence at the suppression hearing inasmuch as the circuit court suppressed the confession based solely on the officer's testimony. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' unpublished decision refusing to suppress the confession and remand for further proceedings.
The facts developed in the record are as follows: Two Brown County sheriff's deputies, Sergeant Brosig (Brosig) and Lieutenant Baudhuin (Baudhuin), followed a woman, later identified as Bonnie J. Walkowiak, into the Green Bay Correctional Institu*481tion on a tip that she was bringing drugs into the prison in balloons on her person.
Once inside the prison, the prison guard informed Brosig and Baudhuin that Walkowiak was in the bathroom. The guard then unlocked the door to the bathroom, the officers entered, observed Walkowiak pulling up her jeans, and arrested her. Brosig then noticed cash scattered on the floor and several colored balloons in the garbage can. Some of the balloons contained what Brosig believed was marijuana, and one balloon contained two white pills.
Walkowiak was transported to the Brown County sheriffs department and upon arrival, Brosig gave her a copy of a standardized rights form which lists the Miranda rights. Brosig read this form to Walkowiak, and she signed it.
It is difficult to determine from the record the exact chain of events at this point in the questioning. The record only contains Brosig's testimony at the preliminary examination and the motion hearing and is void of any testimony by Walkowiak. Although Brosig could not remember the exact words exchanged during questioning, he testified that sometime after Walkowiak signed the Miranda form she told Brosig that she had an attorney from another case and asked Brosig whether she needed an attorney. The circuit court made a finding that Walkowiak stated, "Do you think I need an attorney?" Brosig responded that he could not answer that question, and that she would have to decide for herself whether or not to get an attorney. In addition, Walkowiak expressed concern about her children, and Brosig responded that he was not able to tell her what would happen to her children since they were under the jurisdiction of a different county.
*482Sometime after this conversation, Brosig told Walkowiak that he could not talk to her about the incident at the prison until she signed the waiver portion of the rights form. Walkowiak signed the waiver portion of the form which stated that she read and understood her rights, that she was willing to answer questions and that she did not want an attorney at that time. She then proceeded to make inculpatory statements to Brosig. Brosig prepared a written summary of Walkowiak's statements, read it to her, and asked her to sign it. Walkowiak signed the statement.
On December 24, 1992, a criminal complaint was filed in Brown County charging Walkowiak with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver it to a prisoner. Walkowiak entered a not guilty plea and moved the circuit court to suppress any and all statements made at the Brown County sheriffs department claiming that she had invoked her right to counsel prior to the statements, and thus the statements were taken in violation of her Miranda rights. At the motion hearing, Brosig testified about the interview he conducted with Walkowiak. Upon conclusion of Brosig's testimony, Walkowiak moved to suppress based solely on Brosig's testimony and preserved her right to testify if the court did not order suppression.
The circuit court concluded that Walkowiak's inquiry, "Do you think I need an attorney?" was an invocation of her right to counsel under State v. Lampe, 119 Wis. 2d 206, 349 N.W.2d 677 (1984), and that questioning should have ceased immediately. Accordingly, the circuit court determined that any statements made after the invocation were obtained in violation of Walkowiak's Miranda rights and ordered that they be suppressed.
*483The court of appeals reversed. It concluded that the circuit court misconstrued the law under Lampe, that the statement by Walkowiak was equivocal, and that the issue whether the statement was sufficient to invoke Walkowiak's right to counsel required further fact-finding. It remanded for further evidentiary hearings. Walkowiak petitioned for review which we granted.
The question of law we decide today is very narrow. We must determine whether the inquiry, "Do you think I need an attorney?" is sufficient to invoke Walkowiak's right to counsel. We do not address whether Walkowiak's subsequent waiver of rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent since that question has not been decided by the circuit court.
We begin then with the fundamental precept that once an accused in custody "states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present," Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, unless the accused validly waives his request. Id. at 444. This rule embodies two inquiries: whether the accused invoked his right to counsel, and if so, whether he initiated further discussion with the police and knowingly and intelligently waived his right. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984).
Our focus in this case is solely on the first inquiry. We must determine whether Walkowiak invoked her right to counsel when she asked Brosig, "Do you think I need an attorney?" In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, the Supreme Court adopted a rigid, prophylactic standard: "If... [an accused] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning."
The State contends that the Supreme Court narrowed this standard fifteen years later in Edwards v. *484Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), when it characterized the invocation of the right to counsel as "having expressed [the] desire to deal with the police only through counsel . . ." Id. at 484, and "clearly asserting] [the] right to counsel." Id. at 485.
Edwards, however, did not resolve the issue of whether equivocal requests are sufficient to invoke the right to counsel. In Edwards, the accused had clearly asserted his right to counsel; the only issue remaining was whether all questioning must cease upon such a clear invocation. Accordingly, the Court fashioned a bright-line rule requiring all interrogation to cease when an accused clearly asserts his or her right to counsel.
The Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of whether equivocal requests by an accused are sufficient to invoke the accused's right to counsel. This is evinced by the Court's decision in Smith, 469 U.S. at 95, where in deciding whether an accused invoked his right to counsel, the Court cited both the "clearly asserted" standard in Edwards and the "indicates in any manner" standard in Miranda.
We note, however, that the Court in Smith recognized that some statements made by an accused in custody may be equivocal. Although the Court did not define equivocal in this context, it stated that in attempting to define equivocal, the only relevant considerations are the circumstances leading up to the request and the context of the actual request. Id. at 98.
Further, although the Court did not rule on the consequences of an equivocal statement, it recognized the three conflicting approaches to this question adopted by those courts that have considered the issue. Id. at 96.
*485The first approach is that used by the circuit court in this case: any request for or reference to an attorney, however equivocal or ambiguous, acts as an invocation of the right to counsel and requires all questioning to cease immediately. See also Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978). Other courts have adopted a second approach in which they have attempted to define a threshold standard of clarity for requests. Any requests that fall below this threshold do not trigger the right to counsel. See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Ill. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981).
The majority of courts that have addressed this issue, however, have adopted a third approach: all questioning need not cease upon mention of the words "attorney" or "lawyer." Thése courts hold that when an accused makes an equivocal statement that could be construed as a request for counsel, " 'the police must cease all questioning, except that they may attempt to clarify the suspect's desire for counsel.'" U.S. v. Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988) (cite omitted). See also Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1979).
The first issue we must resolve is whether the statement, "Do you think I need an attorney?" is equivocal in that it does not communicate a clear desire for counsel. In determining whether a question is equivocal, the reviewing court must look not only at the words used but also at the circumstances leading up to the request and the context of the actual request. If these indicate that the accused unequivocally requested counsel, then, of course, all questioning must cease immediately. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
*486Based on this record, we conclude that this statement is equivocal. It appears to be nothing more than a request by Walkowiak to Brosig for advice on whether to obtain an attorney. Since Walkowiak did not testify at the suppression hearing, however, there may be facts not in the record which would dictate a contrary interpretation. It appears to reflect indecision. But regardless of whether a question or reference to an attorney reflects indecision or equivocation, the conclusion is inescapable that the suspect has uncertainty. We therefore treat such a reference or question as being, at best, equivocal.3
Having determined that Walkowiak's statement, "Do you think I need an attorney?" was equivocal, we next determine the consequences of such an ambiguous inquiry. We do so by adopting the approach utilized by the majority of courts who have addressed this issue. We hold that an equivocal question such as the one before us is insufficient to invoke the right to counsel. In doing so, we explicitly reject the per se rule adopted by some courts that the mere mention of an attorney triggers the right to counsel and requires all questioning to cease. However, that does not mean that interrogation may proceed uninterrupted. The police must cease all interrogation, except they may attempt *487to clarify the suspect's desire for counsel. Interrogation may not begin anew until the ambiguity is resolved. This approach recognizes that the terms "lawyer" and "attorney" do not have talismanic qualities which immediately invoke the right to counsel. Further, it ensures that only actual desires for counsel are honored by requiring law enforcement to discern the meaning of an accused's ambiguous statement regarding counsel.
Under this approach then, Brosig's response to the situation he confronted was appropriate. The record indicates that when Walkowiak made her equivocal inquiry, Brosig stopped questioning her, and simply responded that she would have to decide for herself whether or not to get an attorney. After further conversation, Brosig told Walkowiak that he could not talk to her about the incident at the prison until she signed the waiver portion of the rights form. The act of signing the waiver in conjunction with Brosig's response, resolved all ambiguity with respect to whether Walkowiak was requesting an attorney. The waiver stated that she had read and understood her rights, that she was willing to answer questions, and that she did not want a lawyer at that time.4 The officer's response reinforced Walkowiak's right to counsel and she unequivocally waived that right, thereby clarifying any question that may have remained with respect to whether she was invoking her right to counsel. She was not.
*488Walkowiak contends that Brosig's response was manipulative and that the only appropriate response would have been to tell her that she did need to consult an attorney. We do not find these arguments persuasive. We find nothing in the record to indicate that Brosig attempted to coerce Walkowiak or that Brosig used Walkowiak's uncertainty about counsel or her concern for her children to manipulate her into confessing. Further, it would have been clearly inappropriate for Brosig to give Walkowiak legal advice as to whether she should or should not consult counsel. That decision is one which rested solely with Walkowiak. Thus, absent facts to the contrary, Brosig's response was consistent with the approach we adopt. Although we have no argument with Brosig's response, we recognize that there are other responses which would also have been appropriate. For example, Brosig could have simply reiterated the Miranda warnings, or he could have asked Walkowiak if she wanted an attorney.
Walkowiak argues that this approach is inconsistent with our previous decision in Lampe, 119 Wis. 2d 206, because Lampe requires that questioning cease upon any reference to an attorney. We disagree. In Lampe we held that the defendant's statements were obtained in violation of her Miranda rights because the defendant had clearly invoked her right to counsel and because of the egregious circumstances in that case. The defendant in Lampe was arrested for armed robbery and after being read her rights refused to sign a waiver and clearly demanded counsel. She was not provided counsel but was transported to the place of the crime three days later where she made her initial appearance. The public defender made a special appearance on her behalf at the initial hearing and informed her that he would appoint a local attorney for *489her. At the conclusion of the initial appearance, the district attorney, outside the presence of the judge and the public defender, threatened the defendant with prosecution unless she cooperated. Id. at 209-10.
That same day, the district attorney and a female jail attendant initiated a one hour interview with the defendant wherein the district attorney again threatened prosecution and reminded her that she had two children about whom she should be concerned. Id. at 210. Near the end of this interview, the defendant asked the district attorney whether she should have a lawyer. The district attorney informed her that a lawyer would tell her not to cooperate and reminded her that if she did not cooperate with him, he would prosecute her. Again, the defendant asked for an attorney. Id. at 211.
At the end of the interview, despite the defendant's second request for an attorney, the district attorney asked her whether or not she would cooperate. She stated she would and proceeded to the police department where she inculpated herself. Not until the next day was she informed that, prior to the interview on the day before, an attorney had been appointed to represent her. Id.
These facts clearly distinguish Lampe from the present case. Nothing in the record before us indicates that Walkowiak ever requested counsel, that she was coerced or threatened by any law enforcement officers or that she was forced to sign a waiver form. Walkowiak was simply read her rights, told that she had to make her own decision about whether or not she wanted an attorney, and given the opportunity to sign the waiver portion of the rights form. Based on the limited record before us, we determine that her statement alone was insufficient to invoke her right to *490counsel. Any language in Lampe to the contrary is hereby withdrawn.
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and hold that the inquiry "Do you think I need an attorney?" based on this record, is equivocal and therefore insufficient to invoke the right to counsel under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We also hold that such an inquiry requires an interrogating officer to cease interrogation until the inquiry is clarified. The record before us indicates that this was done. Because the record is not fully developed, however, facts may exist which would dictate a contrary interpretation. Therefore, we remand to the circuit court for further fact-finding. On remand, the circuit court must determine, consistent with the approach we adopt, whether the facts leading up to the inquiry and the context within which the inquiry was made would render the statement an unequivocal request for counsel or Brosig's response inappropriate. In addition, the circuit court must determine the factual question of whether Walkowiak's waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Because the circuit court invoked the per se rule — that the mere mention of an attorney invoked the right to counsel — it never considered the fact that Walkowiak signed an express waiver and more importantly, the court never elicited evidence to determine that the waiver satisfied the constitutional requirements of being voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Accordingly, we remand for such a determination.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed and cause remanded with directions.

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

 This form read:
*480Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.
You have the right to remain silent.
Anything you say can be used against you in Court.
You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have him/her with you during questioning.
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish.
If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.

 The dissent states that it is in agreement with the majority opinion that the defendant's question "was an ambiguous request for an attorney." (Abrahamson, J., concurring and dissenting op. at 491). That is not our conclusion. Under no circumstances is such a question or reference a request for counsel. It is no more than an equivocal reference to an attorney which could have a myriad of meanings including nothing more than indecision.

 The waiver portion of the form read:
I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.