Court Opinion

ID: 9486028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:36:21.960727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:10.532834
License: Public Domain

HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority opinion expands our power to review remand orders, contrary to the will of Congress in section 1447(c) and of the Supreme Court in Themitron Products. In so doing it fails to abide by controlling precedent of this circuit and creates a split with another circuit. I must respectfully dissent.
I
This circuit reviews remand orders only if the district court “affirmatively states a non-1447(c) ground for remand.” Soley v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 923 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir.1991); In re Weaver, 610 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir.1980); In re Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 587 F.2d 642, 647 (5th Cir.1978). It does so because Themitron limits review to the “extreme situation” where a judge has “clearly not relied upon § 1447(c).” Weaver, 610 F.2d at 337. This order simply does not create an extreme situation.
Correct or not, the district judge decided subject matter jurisdiction. Section 1446, like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), requires a “short and plain statement” of the grounds for jurisdiction. See H.R.Rep. No. 100-889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6032; Charles A. Wright et al., 14A Federal Practice and Procedure § 3733 (Supp.1993). Pleading residency instead of citizenship fails to meet that requirement. Nadler v. American Motors Sales Corp., 764 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir.1985). The judge recognized that failure and remanded, basing his decision solely on the inadequacy of the jurisdictional pleadings. No matter how faulty we consider his reasoning or how inaccurate we consider his result, we cannot review such a remand order. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343, 96 S.Ct. 584, 589, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976). (section 1447(d) prohibits review of remand orders issued under 1447(c) “whether erroneous or not”).
II
Two arguments can be made that such a remand is not “jurisdictional” but rather is “procedural.” The first is that jurisdiction “exists” independently of the allegations in the notice of removal, and a jurisdictional remand is present only when the trial judge undertakes a review of the entire record to determine that “existence.”
This argument is not persuasive because the jurisdictional nature of a remand order should not hinge on the depth of the judge’s inquiry into jurisdiction. A remand order based on jurisdiction is nonreviewable even if the trial court appears to have reasoned superficially or reached the wrong result. Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. at 589. The trial judge in this case made a quick decision based solely on the pleadings, but those actions are within his discretion. See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Brown, 535 F.Supp. 486, 487 (W.D.Ark.1982) (remanding sua sponte because the removal petition alleged residence rather than citizenship). See also Nadler, 764 F.2d at 413 (trial court could allow cure by amendment or remand as district courts “do not sit to receive new evidence”); D.J. McDuffie, Inc. v. Old Reliable Fire Ins. Co., 608 F.2d 145, 146-47 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830, 101 S.Ct. 97, 66 L.Ed.2d 35 (1980) (noting that defective allegations of jurisdiction in removal petitions “can” and “may” be amended). When this court reviews the entire record to decide if remand is proper, it reviews the judge’s reasoning in the guise of reviewing his thoroughness. Such review makes an end run around Themitron.
This argument also subverts the purpose of the statute, which is to prevent “delay through protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues.” Soley, 923 F.2d at 408. If we must evaluate the thoroughness of a trial judge’s inquiry into jurisdiction to decide if the trial judge’s inquiry was in fact “jurisdictional,” section 1447(d) will not prevent much delay.
The second argument that the order is not jurisdictional is that the judge did not state with sufficient clarity that he was remanding on jurisdictional grounds. The order is comparable, however, to other orders this court *225has found unreviewable. In Merrimack the judge stated that:
This ease was removed from state court to this Court due to the existence of diversity of citizenship between the original parties. Subsequent to removal, two additional persons were included as defendants. It is apparent that no diversity exists between the plaintiff and the new defendant, Rex N. Smutts and K.W. McDowell. Accordingly, this Court no longer has jurisdiction over this matter, and the entire case should be, and is hereby, REMANDED back to state court for appropriate disposition.
587 F.2d at 644. The defendant complained that the two new parties were not indispensable but had been added by the court in its discretion. The court agreed that remanding on the basis of joinder of dispensable parties would be “clearly improper” but added that it “simply [could not] tell from the face of the remand order what grounds the district judge relied on” and upheld the order.
Judge Maloney’s order in this case has a stronger claim to nonreviewability than did the one in Merrimack. The Merrimack judge did say the word “jurisdiction,” but the court did not consider the presence or absence of that word. It instead focused on the absence of a proper reason for remanding. Judge Maloney’s order has a reason for remanding — the inadequate pleading of jurisdictional facts — that is a proper and potentially dispositive concern in evaluating jurisdiction.
This order also has as strong a claim to nonreviewability as the claim in In re Weaver. That order read “in pertinent part: ‘If the case was removable at all, it was removable prior to the appearance of the Defendants in the Superior Court action.’ ” 610 F.2d at 336 n. 4. The court concluded that it “seems apparent” that the judge “believed the case was not removable,” producing a “logical inference that he felt jurisdiction was lacking.” Id. at 337. Judge Maloney’s order produces an inference at least that strong.
This interpretation of a “procedural” remand does not collapse its definition into that of a “jurisdictional” remand. “Procedural” defects involve the parts of the removal process separate from the invocation of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Maniar v. FDIC, 979 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir.1992) (untimely removal). See generally Wright et al., supra, § 3739 at 575 & n. 9 (listing various “procedural irregularities”).
Ill
The majority’s decision forgets the Supreme Court’s statement to this court in Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, 430 U.S. 723, 97 S.Ct. 1439, 52 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977) (per curiam). This court granted a writ of mandamus vacating a remand order, reasoning that the district court incorrectly applied the Texas doctrine of judicial estoppel in determining the existence of diversity. In re Southwestern Bell Tel., 535 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.1976) (per curiam), aff'd, 542 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.1976) (en banc) (per curiam). The Supreme Court reversed, stating that “[t]he District Court’s remand order was plainly within the bounds of § 1447(c) and hence was unreviewable by the Court of Appeals, by mandamus or otherwise.” Gravitt, 430 U.S. at 723, 97 S.Ct. at 1439. Our sister circuit recognizes that Gravitt bars review when a district judge bases a remand order on the inadequacy of the jurisdictional pleadings. Bregman v. Alderman, 955 F.2d 660, 664 (11th Cir.1992) (per curiam). On this issue the majority stands alone.
In sum, the only issue addressed in the remand order is the adequacy of the jurisdictional pleadings. Calling this issue “procedural” undermines judicial discretion and circumvents 1447(c)’s ban on review of jurisdictional remands by requiring appellate courts to test the depth of the inquiry into jurisdiction.