Court Opinion

ID: 9650735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:50:44.068327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:25.754222
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice-Roberts:
I agree that summary judgment was properly granted but so conclude for a reason differing from that of the majority. Rule 1035(b) governing summary judgments mandates that such judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The deposition of Mrs. Mallesky clearly stated that the Hritz vehicle did not strike her home and in fact, to a point some thirty feet in front of her house, tracked. the passage carved by Stevens’ automobile. Simply, no damage was done to the persons or property of the Malleskys by the Hritz automobile.1
It is elementary that, no matter how grave a defendant’s negligence, defendant’s conduct must have resulted in damage to plaintiff. Since it is obvious from *357a reading of Mrs. Mallesky’s deposition that the Hritz car created no compensable injury, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and Hritz was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Our Rule 1035(b) is in all material particulars identical to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Reference to federal cases is therefore appropriate and clearly supports this result. For a number of years the Third Circuit Court of Appeals followed what Professor Moore has termed the “unfortunate”2 rule that affidavits or depositions could not penetrate well pleaded allegations. See, e.g., Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corp., 169 F. 2d 580, 581 (3d Cir. 1948). This doctrine nullified one of the prime purposes of a summary judgment proceeding— to pierce the pleadings. Therefore, in 1963, Federal Rule 56(e) was amended to state: “When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” This amendment was incorporated verbatim into our Rule 1035(d).
Stevens could thus not rely upon allegations in his third-party complaint that Hritz had also caused damage to the plaintiffs and was compelled, upon penalty of summary judgment, to support his allegations by affidavit or otherwise. The trial court was required to conclude that the Hritz vehicle was not responsible for any of the damage claimed in the Mallesky complaint and properly granted summary judgment.

 Stevens’ brief states the question here involved as follows: “May an additional defendant in a trespass action be dismissed from the said proceedings and his Motion for Summary Judgment be granted solely on the depositions of the wife-plaintiff, which absolves the additional defendant from liability?” (Emphasis supplied.)

 6 Moore, Federal Practice ¶56.15[1.~03] (1985),