Court Opinion

ID: 9761164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:33:05.1195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:20.461030
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
dissenting.
When a trial judge has repeatedly and exhaustively instructed a jury that they are the sole finders of fact and determiners of credibility, and where the charge as a whole makes this manifest, an appellate court errs in granting reversal based upon the consideration of isolated excerpts of that charge. That is the posture in which the majority is unfortunately to be found in this case. The Court should affirm appellant’s convictions of rape, robbery, simple assault, terroristic threats, and burglary, upon the reasoning of the Superior Court en banc majority. Accordingly, I dissent.
The controlling law was set out in Commonwealth v. Woodward, 483 Pa. 1, 394 A.2d 508 (1978). There we stated the following:
This Court has consistently held that, in reviewing jury instructions for prejudicial and reversible error, the charge must be read and considered as a whole. Commonwealth v. Lesher, 473 Pa. 141, 373 A.2d 1088 (1977). Error cannot be predicated on isolated excerpts of the charge. It is the general effect of the charge that controls. See, *471Commonwealth v. Archamhault, 448 Pa. 90, 290 A.2d 72 (1972).
483 Pa. at 4, 394 A.2d at 510.
Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Walker, 459 Pa. 12, 326 A.2d 311 (1974), we held a trial court’s comments non-prejudicial where “Other portions of the charge more than adequately cautioned the jury that they were the sole judge as to credibility of witnesses and that they could convict only if they were convinced of appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 459 Pa. at 16, 326 A.2d at 313.
Applying that analysis to this case, it is abundantly clear that the trial court, both in the excerpts cited by the majority and throughout the charge as a whole, repeatedly and specifically instructed the jury of their function. Indeed, even the brief portion of the charge from which the majority excerpts and supplies emphases contains no fewer than six (6) reminders from judge to jury concerning their role as sole fact-finders. These repeated reminders, interspersed throughout that selfsame portion of the charge, could have had no other conceivable affect than to negate any possible adverse inference stemming from the judge’s comments. If the emphasis were instead supplied to those passages (e.g., “You can determine for yourselves what her appearance was. I cannot influence you.”) the charge would read quite differently. Yet, the function of a reviewing court is to emphasize neither type of particular excerpt, but rather to consider the effect of the charge as a whole. To conclude that, notwithstanding these frequent instructions, the roles of judge and jury became hopelessly tangled, is to denigrate the ability and intelligence of both.
The portions of the charge cited by the majority themselves contain more than adequate antidote to purge any ills engendered thereby. Taken together with the rest of the charge, and considering the charge as a whole, as we must, I have no doubt that the trial court and Superior Court analyzed this issue accurately. We should affirm.