Court Opinion

ID: 9739250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:11:09.887192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.033062
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 200. (concurring in part, dissenting in pari). I join the majority opinion except in two respects: First, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the physical evidence confiscated by police during the second search of Knapp's bedroom was admissible because Knapp's brother, George, consented to the search of Knapp's bedroom.1 I agree with the majority opinion that George did not have actual authority to consent to the *359search of Knapp's bedroom.2 I disagree, however, with the majority opinion that based on the facts known to the officers at the moment of the search George had apparent authority to consent to the search.3
¶ 201. I conclude that the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the officers were reasonable in their belief that George had apparent authority to consent to the search of Knapp's bedroom. Moreover, the physical evidence seized by the police during their illicit search is not admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. Accordingly, I conclude that the physical evidence seized was inadmissible.
¶ 202. Second, I conclude that the majority opinion errs when it holds that Farrell's testimony regarding Borchardt's personal observations was admissible under the hearsay exception for statements of recent perception. There is no evidence that the statements meet the foundational requirement of recent perception.
HH
¶ 203. The majority opinion correctly states the legal test for determining whether an officer may rely on an individual's consent to a search:
[D]etermination of consent to enter must "be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment... 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises? If not, then *360warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the search is valid."4
The burden is on the State to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the officers were reasonable in their belief.5
¶ 204. The record is clear. The only facts the officers knew "at the moment" they searched Knapp's bedroom were that George paid the rent for the apartment; that Knapp stayed at the apartment; that Knapp had his own bedroom in which he kept his possessions, including his clothing; and that George was cooperating with the police. This is not enough information for an officer to believe that George had authority over Knapp's bedroom.
¶ 205. The officers have an obligation to ask questions to clarify the power of the individual giving consent. Yet the officers made no inquiry of George at all. They did not even ask whether Knapp paid any rent to George. The information available at the moment of the search is readily apparent from the officer's testimony at a hearing on the motion to suppress:
Q. [counsel] You, at the time that you met with [George] in the office there to discuss this issue [of consenting to the search], never asked him about his agreement with Matthew Knapp as to Matt's living there or renting a room from [George] correct?
A. [officer] Correct.
*361The officer further testified about what he knew and about what questions he asked before he entered Knapp's bedroom. The testimony again clearly shows the officer knew just the facts I have set forth:
Q. [counsel] Okay. You then went back to the office and idled out the Consent to Search form with George, right?
A. [officer] Yes, sir.
Q. And again, there is nothing in your report that you indicate you asked him any questions about his relationship with Matt relative to his using that room or living in that room, right?
A. Right.
Q. In fact, the only information that you indicated in your report relative to any of the circumstances surrounding George Knapp's living arrangement in that apartment is that you indicate, once you're in the apartment during the course of the search with George, that you were informed that he lived there with his fiance [sic], right?
A. That George did?
Q. Correct.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You never attempted to question George or ask him about whether he felt comfortable on his own entering Matthew Knapp's room in the apartment, right?
A. No. I don't recall any conversations like that.
Q. Whether or not he felt that he had the authority to go into that room to retrieve something, right, never questioned him on anything like that?
*362A. No, sir.
Q. You never questioned him about how long Matthew Knapp had lived there, right?
A. No, not that I recall.
Q. How long he anticipated Matthew Knapp living there?
A. That's correct.
Q. Never questioned him about any lease or arrangement that he had with his landlord?
A. No. I was aware of the fact that he [George] was in control of the apartment and was paying the rent at the apartment. I didn't ask him specifics about the length of his monthly lease or an annual lease, no. But I knew he was in control in paying the rent.
Q. How did you know he was in control of the apartment?
A. I asked him if he was paying the rent at the apartment.
Q. When did you ask him that?
A. At the police station.
Q. Again, that's not something noted anywhere. This is something you remember now?
A. He is the one that I approached to get the Consent to Search.
Q. I appreciate that. Other than the question regarding rent, you had no other discussion with him regarding Matthew Knapp's living in that apartment?
A. Right.
*363¶ 206. This case is very similar to and is governed by State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998), in which the court held for the defendant. The record is clear that the officers did not have sufficient facts to determine George's authority to consent to the search and did not make sufficient inquiry to gather more facts. The State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the officers were reasonable in their belief that George had apparent authority to consent to the search of Knapp's bedroom.
¶. 207. The majority opinion obviously struggles to base its holding on the meager facts known to the officers "at the moment" they embarked on the search. The majority opinion asserts that "[t]he record seems somewhat unclear as to whether the officers learned all of this information before, during, or after the consent search"6 and then uses this opening to rely on facts not known to the officer "at the moment" of the search. The majority opinion states that George "certainly had access to the bedroom" since he and his fiancée "kept personal property there, including two hunting rifles, two shotguns, a couch, a bed, and a dresser."7
¶ 208. The record is clear, however, that these facts about George's personal property were not known to the officers "at the moment" of the search and are therefore not relevant to any apparent authority analysis. The officers learned the facts about George's personal property upon which the majority opinion relies only after they entered Knapps's bedroom. An officer so testified:
*364Q. [counsel] The — when you were searching in the bedroom, did you notice any guns or hunting equipment?
A. [officer] Yes.
Q. Camping kind of things?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall there being any discussion between you and George Knapp about whose items those were?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you have — did you ask him or did he volunteer, or don't you remember?
A. I believed he volunteered. I'm not absolutely certain.
Q. What did he say about whose guns and hunting gear that was?
A. He told me that they were — that was his equipment, and the guns were his.
George's testimony corroborated the officer's:
Q. [counsel] Well, didn't you stand there as they were in the bedroom and make a comment regarding the hunting equipment and firearms —
A. [George] They come —
Q. —claiming it was yours?
A. They come and asked me whose guns they are, and I said, "Them are all mine."
¶ 209. The majority opinion concludes that George had apparent authority based on the fact that he "was a resident, and it was reasonable to conclude *365that he had full authority to consent to the search."8 Implicit in this argument is that it is reasonable for any resident of a home to consent to a search of every part of that home. This is simply not the law.
¶ 210. "In Wisconsin there is no presumption of common authority to consent to a search when an adult defendant lives with his or her spouse's parents or close relatives."9 A third party's authority to consent to a search is "not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the property."10 Rather, authority to consent to a search rests "on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched."11 In the present case, the officers did not know facts that would lead them to reasonably believe that George had "joint access or control for most purposes" over Knapp's bedroom.
¶ 211. Indeed, the facts known to the officers at the moment of the search (and maybe even thereafter) cast considerable doubt on George's joint access or control over Knapp's bedroom or George's authority to consent to the search of the bedroom. The officers knew from their first visit with Knapp that Knapp spent time in the apartment that he shared with George, that Knapp had his own bedroom, and that Knapp kept his *366possessions, including his clothes, in the bedroom. These facts are sufficient to trigger a reasonable officer to question George's access or control over Knapp's bedroom and George's authority to consent to a search of the bedroom.
¶ 212. Moreover, the majority opinion states that evidence of authority to consent can be found in George's consent itself. The majority opinion states, "It seems quite clear that George did not limit his consent to search in any way . . . and he permitted the officers to search his entire home."12 This statement is irrelevant to our inquiry here. The question is not whether George consented to the search. The question is whether George had the authority to consent. The law is that law enforcement officers cannot take an individual's (here George's) consent to search at "face value" but must consider the surrounding facts.13 No "surrounding facts" are in this record.
¶ 213. Indeed, even if one agrees (and I do not) with the majority opinion's reading of the record as being unclear about what the officers knew when they entered the bedroom, the inescapable conclusion is that the State did not carry its heavy burden by clear and convincing evidence.
¶ 214. Because George did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of Knapp's bedroom, the State argues that the evidence is admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. To admit the evidence under this doctrine, the State must prove the following by a preponderance of evidence:
*367(1) It is reasonably probable that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means but for the intervening police misconduct;
(2) Before the misconduct occurred, the police already had the leads making the discovery inevitable; and
(3) The police were actively pursuing these leads at the time of the illegality.14
¶ 215. It is unnecessary to determine whether the first two prongs can be established in the present case, because the State fails on the third prong. The third prong cannot rest on speculation but must be supported by historical fact. Here, there were no historical facts in the record that the police were pursuing a lead at the time they searched Knapp's bedroom. Testimony that the officers would have obtained a warrant had consent not been given is not enough to satisfy the third prong.
h — 1 J — i H-i
¶ 216. Finally, I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that Farrell's testimony regarding Borchardt's personal observations was admissible under the hearsay exception for statements of recent perception. The concurrence in State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485 (Bradley, J., concurring), which I joined, discusses the foundation necessary to meet this hearsay exception and emphasizes that the exception is to be narrowly applied. In this case, the majority not only broadly applies the exception, but it also completely ignores a foundational requirement: the event or condition must be recently perceived.
*368¶ 217. Here, there is no indication of the amount of time between when Borchardt perceived the event and the time he made the statement to Farrell describing that event. The facts cited by the majority opinion state that "sometime after Resa's murder Borchardt told Farrell" what he had seen on the night of the murder.15
¶ 218. Accordingly, because the timing of the conversation between Borchardt and Farrell is uncertain, it is impossible to determine if the statement was made recently after the event. I therefore conclude that because Knapp failed to demonstrate that Borchardt's statement describes a recent perception, it was an erroneous exercise of discretion for the circuit court to admit the hearsay testimony under the statement of recent perception exception.
¶ 219. For the reasons set forth, I agree with the circuit court that the physical evidence seized on the second search of the bedroom should be suppressed. I also conclude that Farrell's testimony regarding Borchardt's personal observations was inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, I dissent.
¶ 220. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 See majority op., parts X & XI, ¶¶ 122-156.

 Majority op., ¶ 147.

 Majority op., ¶ 151.

 Majority op., ¶ 151 (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968))).

 State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 549-50, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998).

 Majority op., ¶ 152.

 Id.

 Majority op., ¶ 155 (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186).

 State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 554, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998).

 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1974).

 Id.

 Majority op., ¶ 153.

 Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d at 549.

 State v. Schwengler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 500, 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987)).

 Majority op., ¶ 10 (emphasis added).