Court Opinion

ID: 9665896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:59:07.160811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:20.248777
License: Public Domain

STUMBO, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent. I disagree with the majority’s holding that the Commonwealth is not limited to seeking certification of the law when a trial court grants a motion for a new trial.
This Court has held that the Commonwealth may seek review from a trial court’s granting of a new trial in a criminal case, but only for the purpose of certifying the law. Commonwealth v. Littrell, Ky., 677 S.W.2d 881, 885 (1984). When that rule is applied to the present case, it is clear that the Commonwealth was not attempting to have any issue of law certified by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals recognized this and applied the proper rule that was handed down by this Court approximately 18 years ago. However, the Court today has seen fit to overrule Littrell at least with respect to limiting the Commonwealth’s ability to appeal new trial orders to a certification of the law. In support of this holding, the majority relies on Commonwealth v. Devine, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 60 (1965) and Commonwealth v. Lewis, Ky., 548 S.W.2d 509 (1977). Those cases, however, can be distinguished from Littrell and the present case. In Devine, the Commonwealth was seeking a new trial as a result of the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. In Lewis, the Commonwealth was seeking a new trial as a result of the trial court’s dismissal of a felony theft indictment. In both Littrell and the present case, the Commonwealth is seeking to reverse the trial court’s grant of a *86new trial. The majority rely on the language in Devine that provides that the Commonwealth is allowed “an appeal not only for a certification of the law, but also for a reversal in any case in which a new trial would not constitute double jeopardy.” Devine, 396 S.W.2d at 61. The majority’s reliance on Devine and Lewis is not persuasive. Here the Commonwealth is not seeking a new trial, rather it seeks to prevent a new trial from occurring. Devine provides for appeal by the Commonwealth on certification of the law or a reversal in which a new trial would not put the defendant twice in jeopardy. This is a significant factual difference given the Commonwealth on the one hand wants a new trial when it does not get a ruling in its favor as opposed to when it does get one. I would not construe Devine and Lewis to have any significant impact on Littrell or the present case. The majority assumes that the holding of Devine and Lewis were never brought to the attention of the Littrell Court given neither case is mentioned in the opinion. I find it more plausible that Devine and Lewis were not mentioned in the Littrell opinion because the Court found them to be of no consequence to that case. Littrell is specific in its rule that the Commonwealth may only appeal the granting of a new trial in a criminal case for the sole purpose of certifying the law. Devine and Lewis do not concern a court granting a new trial, and are not controlling over either Littrell or the present case.
The majority also holds that the Court of Appeals can uphold the jury’s verdict if it is determined that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial. Overturning the Littrell decision is not needed in order to allow an appeal for a trial court’s grant of a new trial, if it is based on the trial judge’s abuse of discretion. “Only what appears to be a clear abuse of that discretion should be approved for appellate review by the Attorney General.” Littrell, 677 S.W.2d at 886. It is evident that the Commonwealth may still bring an appeal for the granting of a new trial if there is clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.
In addition, the majority’s holding will be detrimental to the authority of trial courts throughout the Commonwealth. As it is mentioned in Littrell, the “granting of a new trial largely rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Littrell, 677 S.W.2d at 886. No one is better equipped to determine what has and has not occurred properly during trial than the trial judge herself. I fear the majority has struck a blow to the province of the trial court. If the Commonwealth is able to appeal anytime it receives an unfavorable ruling for any reason, then the Commonwealth will always appeal. In the present case, the trial court below expressed concern that the jury’s verdict of guilty had been wrongfully influenced by irrelevant testimony regarding other office practices in the county clerk’s office. If the trial court was concerned that any granting of a new trial it might make would always be appealed by the Commonwealth, then the trial court might be hesitant to grant a motion for a new trial when it would in fact be proper. Also, the possibility of continuous appeals by the Commonwealth will do nothing more than cause further delay in our already over-crowded judicial system.
I see no reason to overturn Littrell. The majority today has simply made it easier for the Commonwealth to appeal anytime it receives an unfavorable decision. Trial judges will also suffer from the majority’s holding in that they will lose much-needed judicial discretion out of concern of having their decisions reversed by a higher court. For all of the above reasons, I would affirm the decision of the *87-95Court of Appeals and uphold the trial court’s grant of a new trial.