Court Opinion

ID: 9666927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:30:20.394926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:33.577445
License: Public Domain

NORTON, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In Wittmer v. Ruegemer, 419 N.W.2d 493, 496-97 (Minn.1988), the supreme court held that Minn. Stat. § 541.051 (1984) began to run upon discovery of the defective condition, not upon discovery of the damage (or in this case, the injury), and that the date upon which the statute begins to run is often a question of fact which cannot be determined as a matter of law. The Wittmer court expressly concluded that “if reasonable minds may differ about the time of discovery or when the defective and unsafe condition should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the question is one for the trier of fact.” Id. at 497. Given appellant’s claim that he did not know of the existence of a defective or unsafe condition until May 29, 1986 (the day he was finally given access to the plant), I believe that a fact question has been raised on the issue of reasonable diligence and as to when appellant should have discovered the defective condition of the improvement.
I further agree with appellant that the 1988 amendments to the statute cannot be applied to this case because they represent an unconstitutional change in existing law. While the legislature is free to change statutes of limitation, it must allow litigants a reasonable opportunity to comply with such a change. Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 108, 83 N.W.2d 800, 817 (1957); Kozisek v. Brigham, 169 Minn. 57, 60, 210 N.W. 622, 623 (1926). The 1988 legislature failed to give litigants such an opportunity when it made the amendments effective immediately to pending cases. See 1988 Minn. Laws ch. 607, § 3.
Finally, adoption of an amendment generally raises a presumption that the legislature intended to change preexisting law. Honeymead Products Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 270 Minn. 147, 150, 132 N.W.2d 741, 743 (1965) (quoting Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Spaeth, 232 Minn. 128, 132, 44 N.W.2d 440, 442 (1950)). In this case, it has been argued that that presumption was rebutted when the 1988 legislature enacted the amendments at issue with the following title:
AN ACT relating to civil actions; clarifying the statute of limitations for damages based on services or construction to improve real property; * * * amending Minnesota Statutes 1986, section 541.051, subdivision 1[.]
Minn. Laws 1988, ch. 607 (emphasis added).
Admittedly, the title of an act is generally indicative of legislative intent. State v. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co., 258 Minn. 162, 166-67, 103 N.W.2d 225, 227-28 (1960). In this case, however, I believe that any attempt by the legislature to label its amendments a clarification should be rejected.
As interpreted by Wittmer, the pre-1988 version of the statute could in certain circumstances be read to raise a fact issue as to when the two-year limitation period began to run. Following enactment of the 1988 amendments, however, there is no room for argument on the issue, particularly in a case such as this where the date of injury is undisputed. That represents a clear change in the statute, not a mere clarification.
Moreover, the opinion of a subsequent legislature upon the meaning of a statute is entitled to no more weight than that of a person on the streets, particularly after the supreme court has issued an intervening interpretation of the statute in question. See Gudvangen v. Austin Mutual Insurance Co., 284 N.W.2d 813, 818-19 (Minn.1979) (Otis, J., dissenting). For these reasons, I believe that the 1988 amendments change the statute, and do not merely clarify it.
*823I would therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment to respondents and, as in Wittmer, remand for further proceedings to determine the date on which the two-year limitation period began to run.