Court Opinion

ID: 9373138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:59.052859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.805478
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JORGE M. GUZMAN,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         SF-0752-15-0170-A-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: January 6, 2023
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           James P. Walsh, Esquire, Long Beach, California, for the appellant.

           Carolyn D. Jones, Esquire, Williston, Vermont, for the agency.

           John B. Barkley, Esquire, Phoenix, Arizona, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review and the appellant has filed a cross
     petition for review of the addendum initial decision, which awarded $198,162 in
     attorney fees and $6,584.02 in costs. Generally, we grant petitions such as these

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     only in the following circumstances:       the initial decision contains erroneous
     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party
     has established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross
     petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and the cross
     petition for review. We MODIFY the addendum initial decision to deduct 5 hours
     from the fee award due to a mathematical error, and we reduce the amount of
     costs awarded to $3,597.90. Except as expressly MODIFIED herein, we AFFIRM
     the addendum initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The following facts, as recited in the addendum initial decision, are
     generally undisputed.    Guzman v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB
     Docket No. SF-0752-15-0170-A-2, Attorney Fees File (A-2 AFF), Tab 15,
     Addendum Initial Decision (AID). Following investigations in 2004 to 2005 and
     2010 to 2014 (related to the appellant’s educational qualifications and to the
     discovery of a microphone in his old office), the agency removed the appellant
     from his Assistant Special Agent in Charge position for lack of candor (involving
     the microphone discovery). AID at 2. The appellant retired in lieu of removal.
     Id. After the appellant filed a Board appeal and the administrative judge he ld a
     6-day hearing, the administrative judge reversed the appellant’s removal and
     granted corrective action based on a determination that the agency retaliated
                                                                                              3

     against him for whistleblowing disclosures. AID at 1-2; Guzman v. Department
     of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-15-0170-I-2, Initial Decision
     (Sept. 29, 2017). The merits initial decision became the Board’s final decision
     when neither party filed a petition for review. AID at 2.
¶3         The appellant filed a motion for attorney fees, which was dismissed without
     prejudice and automatically refiled. AID at 1, 3-4; A-2 AFF, Tab 1; Guzman v.
     Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-15-0170-A-1,
     Attorney Fees File (AFF), Tabs 1, 20.            The administrative judge issued an
     addendum initial decision, which granted in part the appellant’s motion for
     attorney fees and costs.       AID at 1-2.       The administrative judge made the
     following findings: (1) the appellant was a prevailing party in the merits initial
     decision and generally entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to
     5 U.S.C. § 1221(g); 2 (2) the appellant proved his entitlement to 13.3 hours for
     Michael Zweiback, 33.1 hours for Margarita Gevondyan, and 426 hours for James
     P. Walsh; (3) $540/hour is an appropriate rate for Mr. Zweiback, $300/hour for
     Ms. Gevondyan, and $425/hour for Mr. Walsh; (4) the appellant is entitled to a
     fee award in the amount of $7,182 for Mr. Zweiback, $9,930 for Ms. Gevondyan,
     and $181,050 for Mr. Walsh; and (5) he is entitled to $6,584.02 in costs. AID
     at 3-20.
¶4         The agency has filed a petition for review, the appellant has filed a
     response, and the agency has filed a reply. Guzman v. Department of Homeland
     Security, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-15-0170-A-2, Petition for Review (PFR)

     2
       The administrative judge concluded that, because no final decision had yet been issued
     regarding the appellant’s petition for enforcement and addendum proceedings for
     compensatory and consequential damages, his request for fees for those actions was
     premature. AID at 2-3 & n.2. The appellant does not object to this ruling. Petition for
     Review File, Tab 3 at 25. The administrative judge properly found such requests
     premature, and we do not further consider them here. See, e.g., Miller v. Department of
     the Army, 106 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 8 (2007); see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.203(d) (“A motion
     for attorney fees must be filed as soon as possible after a final decision of the Board but
     no later than 60 days after the date on which a decision becomes final.”).
                                                                                            4

     File, Tabs 1, 3, 5. The appellant has filed a cross petition for review, and the
     agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tabs 3, 6.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     Legal Standard
¶5         The administrative judge evaluated the fee award pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
     § 1221(g). AID at 5. This paragraph states that corrective action “shall” include
     “reasonable” attorney fees and “any other reasonable costs incurred” “[i]f an
     employee . . . is the prevailing party before the Merit Systems Protection Board,
     and the decision is based on a finding of a prohibited personnel practice .”
     5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(1)-(2). Section 1221(i) of Title 5 of the U.S. Code makes
     section 1221(g)(2) applicable to the appellant’s removal appeal under 5 U.S.C.
     § 7513(d), and we discern no error with the administrative judge’s use of this
     standard in this matter. 3 See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(i).
¶6         The computation of a reasonable attorney fees award begins with an
     analysis of two objective variables: the lawyer’s customary billing rate and the
     number of hours reasonably devoted to the case.         Ruble v. Office of Personnel
     Management, 96 M.S.P.R. 44, ¶ 7 (2004).              The burden of establishing the
     reasonableness of hours claimed in an attorney fee s application is on the moving
     party. Id.
¶7         The administrative judge noted that, in Rumsey v. Department of Justice,
     866 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017), the United States Court of Appeals for the
     Federal Circuit held that “the mandatory language of [5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)] makes
     clear that a petitioner who is a prevailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees and
     costs, even if the supporting documentation is in some way deficient.” AID at 5.

     3
       The administrative judge found that, because an award of attorney fees was mandatory
     based on the corrective action award, she did not need to address whether an award of
     fees would be in the interest of justice under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g). AID at 6 n.4. Neither
     party specifically argues that the administrative judge used the incorrect legal standard
     for evaluating the fee petition.
                                                                                           5

     Further, she noted that the court advised that when the documentation is deficient,
     the Board has “an obligation” to critically review the records and identify hours
     that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” AID at 5-6 (discussing
     Rumsey, 866 F.3d at 1381).

     We affirm the administrative judge’s analysis and conclusions regarding hourly
     rates.
¶8         Neither party challenges on review the administrative judge’s decision to
     award a $540/hour rate to Mr. Zweiback or a $300/hour rate to Ms. Gevondyan.
     AID at 13-14. We find that the administrative judge’s analysis is reasonable, and
     we affirm her decision in this regard. We now turn to Mr. Walsh’s $425/hour rate
     awarded by the administrative judge.
¶9         In the addendum initial decision, the administrative judge considered the
     appellant’s contention that Mr. Walsh was entitled to a $500/hour rate and the
     agency’s argument that he was only entitled to a $325/hour rate. AID at 17-18.
     In addressing the appellant’s argument, the administrative judge noted that the
     Federal Circuit has declined to endorse the “Laffey matrix” 4 to evaluate a
     reasonable rate, but it held that it may consider the matrix as part of the
     determination of a reasonable rate.      AID at 18 (citing Biery v. United States,
     818 F.3d 704, 713-14 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The administrative judge noted, among
     other things, that the Central District of California 5 uses different reports than the
     Laffey matrix, and she discussed hourly rates for partners and associates in
     California.   Id.   The administrative judge acknowledged that Mr. Walsh had
     “extensive, complex trial experience, which was beneficially exhibited” in the

     4
       The Laffey Matrix is a schedule of hourly rates allowed by the U.S. District Court for
     the District of Columbia in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C.
     1983), reversed in relevant part, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled by Save Our
     Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Caros v.
     Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 231, ¶ 9 n.5 (2015). It purports to
     show the prevailing market rates for attorneys in the District of Columbia. Id.
     5
       The relevant geographic market for determining a reasonable hourly rate is the forum
     of the litigation. Casali v. Department of the Treasury, 81 M.S.P.R. 347, ¶ 9 (1999).
                                                                                            6

      merits appeal, this appeal was his first matter before the Board, and he did not
      identify any prior experience handling Federal employment law matters.             AID
      at 17-18.
¶10         The agency argues on review that an hourly rate of $425 is excessive
      because, although Mr. Walsh had extensive criminal and civil experience, he had
      no prior Board or employment law experience. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19 -21. The
      agency cites to two initial decisions to support its requested hourly rate, which
      are not precedential. Id.; see Rockwell v. Department of Commerce, 39 M.S.P.R.
      217, 222 (1988); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. Conversely, the appellant contends that
      the administrative judge should have awarded him an hourly rate of $500, relying
      on, among other things, his hourly rate before he retired in 2005 ($450 -500/hour),
      a declaration from another attorney who has extensive experience in Federal
      employment law ($560/hour), and the rate under the Laffey matrix for someone
      with 31 years of experience ($602-613/hour). PFR File, Tab 3 at 20-22.
¶11         We have considered these arguments. The administrative judge’s analysis
      was reasonable and thoughtful, and the parties have not persuaded us that her
      analysis or conclusion was in error. Therefore, we affirm her decision to award
      Mr. Walsh a rate of $425/hour. 6

      6
        For the first time on review, the agency asks that any hours charged by Mr. Walsh for
      clerical duties should be charged at a rate of no more than $100/hour. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 20-21. The Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in
      a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not
      previously available despite the party’s due diligence. Clay v. Department of the Army,
      123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). The agency has not made such a
      showing, and we do not address this argument on review.
                                                                                                 7

      With the exception of correcting a mathematical error, we a ffirm the
      administrative judge’s evaluation of the hours of work performed by
      Mr. Zweiback, Ms. Gevondyan, and Mr. Walsh. 7
¶12         The addendum initial decision contains the administrative judge’s lengthy
      and detailed analysis of the hours claimed for work performed by Mr. Zweiback,
      Ms. Gevondyan, and Mr. Walsh on the appellant’s behalf. AID at 7 -17. There
      was a considerable amount of attorney work performed before the notice of
      proposed removal (involving the microphone discovery) ; thus, the administrative
      judge explained that fees could be awarded for time spent on a separate and
      optional, but factually related, proceeding if (1) the claimed portion of work done
      in that proceeding was reasonable under Kling v. Department of Justice,
      2 M.S.P.R. 464 (1980), 8 and (2) the work, or some discrete portion of it, done in
      the other proceeding, significantly contributed to the success of the su bsequent
      Board proceeding and eliminated the need for work that otherwise would have
      been required in connection with that subsequent proceeding.                  AID at 6 -7
      (discussing Richards v. Department of Justice, 67 M.S.P.R. 46, 50 (1995)).
¶13         The administrative judge concluded that some of the time Mr. Zweiback
      billed at Nixon Peabody, LLP, related to work involving the agency investigation

      7
        In Wilson v. Department of Health & Human Services , 834 F.2d 1011, 1012 (Fed. Cir.
      1987), the Federal Circuit held that, if an administrative judge has concerns about
      deficiencies in a motion for attorney fees, she should afford the appellant an
      opportunity to address the matter before rejecting the claims. Here, the administrative
      judge disallowed certain claimed hours without first communicating her doubts to the
      appellant and providing him an opportunity to answer. However, an adjudicatory error
      that is not prejudicial to the appellant’s substantive rights provi des no basis for reversal
      of the addendum initial decision. Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R.
      281, 282 (1984). The agency noted objections to the fee petition and supplemental
      filings, e.g., AFF, Tab 15; A-2 AFF, Tab 10, and the appellant discusses these claims on
      review, PFR File, Tab 3. Accordingly, we are able to decide the reasonableness of the
      disputed fees without remanding the matter to the administrative judge. See Driscoll v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 116 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 12 (2011); Diehl v. U.S. Postal Service,
      88 M.S.P.R. 104, ¶ 9 (2001).
      8
       Kling discussed the lawyer’s customary hourly billing rate and the number of hours
      devoted to the case. Kling, 2 M.S.P.R. at 472.
                                                                                           8

      into the appellant’s educational qualifications and the appellant’s response to that
      investigation was recoverable because it was “directly relevant to persuading the
      agency to resolve the [earlier] proposed removal related to alleged lack of candor
      about the appellant’s education background.”          AID at 7-8.      However, Mr.
      Zweiback’s Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, billing records from 2010 largely related to
      criminal matters and interactions with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and were not
      recoverable.   AID at 8.    Similarly, she found that Mr. Zweiback’s Arent Fox
      billing records related to litigation at the Equal Employment Opportunity
      Commission and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) were not recoverable, in
      part because the appellant did not timely appeal from OSC’s close-out letter. 9 Id.
      The administrative judge also discussed in detail numerous other Nixon Peabody
      billing records for Mr. Zweiback and Ms. Gevondyan and approved, rejected, or
      reduced the claimed hours. 10 AID at 9-13.
¶14         Regarding Mr. Walsh, the administrative judge rejected as too disconnected
      from the issues in this appeal 40 hours of preliminary research in July 2012,
      50 hours drafting an OSC complaint and corresponding with OSC, 35 hours
      working to obtain information through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
      request, 40 hours corresponding with high-ranking agency officials, and
      additional time spent researching and drafting a complaint under the Federal Tort
      Claims Act (FTCA). 11      AID at 14-15.     However, she awarded 100 hours for

      9
        The appellant concedes that Mr. Zweiback’s work at Arent Fox in the equal
      employment opportunity matter “is not sufficiently related to the action under
      consideration by the Board to warrant an award of attorney fees.” PFR File, Tab 3 at 9.
      We affirm the administrative judge’s decision not to award fees for this work.
      10
         The administrative judge explained that, due to Mr. Zweiback’s use of block billing,
      it was impossible to determine how much of certain entries was recoverable (because it
      related to the educational qualifications issue) and how much was not recoverable
      (because it was related to the criminal matter). AID at 9 & n.6.
      11
         The appellant does not appear to challenge the administrative judge’s decision to
      disallow 50 hours for time spent “dealing with the OSC” or 20 hours claimed in
      connection with the filing of a complaint under the FTCA. PFR File, Tab 3 at 15, 17.
      We affirm her decisions in this regard.
                                                                                        9

      reviewing the report of investigation related to the lack of candor charge
      (involving the appellant’s educational qualifications) and responding to that
      earlier notice of proposed removal, 150 hours for preparing the response to the
      notice of proposed removal regarding the lack of candor charge (involving the
      microphone discovery), 10 hours spent in the mediation process, 12 and 19 hours
      for preparing the fee petition.     AID at 15-17.       The administrative judge
      acknowledged that Mr. Walsh estimated spending 38 hours drafting pleadings and
      53 hours reviewing pleadings and discovery responses for a total of 91 hours
      prior to mediation; however, because she already approved a significant amount
      of time for Mr. Walsh to review the agency file materials during the pr edecisional
      period and much of the discovery related to the equal employment opportunity
      process, the administrative judge only approved 60 hours for this work.       AID
      at 16. Similarly, after mediation, Mr. Walsh estimated spending at least 92 hours
      drafting motions, conducting the hearing, and preparing the written closing
      argument, but because the motions for a protective order were denied, the
      administrative judge only approved 87 hours for this work. AID at 17. In total,
      the administrative judge awarded 13.3 hours for Mr. Zweiback, 33.1 hours for
      Ms. Gevondyan, and 426 hours for Mr. Walsh. AID at 12-13, 17.
¶15        Both parties challenge the administrative judge’s assessment of claimed
      hours.   PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-19, Tab 3 at 9-18.       It is well settled that the
      administrative judge who adjudicated the case on the merits is in the best position
      to determine whether the number of hours expended is reasonable and absent a
      specific showing that the administrative judge’s evaluation was incorrect, the
      Board will not second-guess it.    Wightman v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      111 M.S.P.R. 109, ¶ 11 (2009); Ruble, 96 M.S.P.R. 44, ¶ 13; Holliman v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 81 M.S.P.R. 637, ¶ 4 (1999); Beall v. Department of the Interior,
      68 M.S.P.R. 231, 234 (1995). The arguments in the petition for review and cross
      12
        Neither party challenges the administrative judge’s award of hours related to
      mediation, and we affirm this decision.
                                                                                        10

      petition for review largely constitute mere disagreement with the administrative
      judge’s detailed determinations.     Nevertheless, we will address some of the
      parties’ arguments herein.
¶16         For example, the agency argues that the administrative judge erred in
      awarding attorney fees to Mr. Zweiback, Ms. Gevondyan, and Mr. Walsh for
      work performed in unrelated matters, particularly the appellant’s educational
      qualifications matter. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-13. The agency asserts that the
      educational qualifications case has never been before the Board and the appellant
      did not show that work done by his attorneys in that matter significantly
      contributed to his success in his merits appeal. Id. at 10. The agency also argues
      that the administrative judge’s reliance on Richards was misplaced because
      Richards involved an award of fees for work prior to the issuance of the proposal
      at issue, and not for work on a different proposal that never made its way to the
      Board and was unrelated to the Board appeal. Id. at 11. Alternatively, the agency
      contends that any fees awarded should be “substantially reduced because the work
      performed [was] not detailed and its context not provided.” Id. at 12.
¶17         We discern no error with the administrative judge’s analysis or reliance on
      Richards. Although Richards may have involved fees for work performed related
      to the removal at issue, the holding in Richards does not preclude the
      administrative judge from taking a holistic view of the appellant’s whistleblower
      retaliation claim in her decision to award fees. Indeed, the administrative judge
      concluded in the merits initial decision that the educational qualifications case
      was tied to the appellant’s allegations of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures.
      See Guzman v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-
      15-0170-I-2, Initial Decision at 34 (Sept. 29, 2017) (finding that the appellant
      proved by preponderant evidence that “his 2010 disclosure prompted the agency
      to initiate the [educational] credentials investigation . . . which led to the agency
      re-opening the investigation into the 2004 microphone discovery, the culmination
      of which was his removal”).       Because of the administrative judge’s explicit
                                                                                       11

      findings linking the whistleblower reprisal claim to the educational qualifications
      case, we discern no error in the administrative judge’s decision to award fees in
      this regard.
¶18         The agency argues that the administrative judge erred in awarding
      Mr. Walsh 150 hours for the March 7, 2014 notice of proposed removal
      (involving the microphone discovery) because he “lacks any records of the time
      worked” and he only “offers generalities for much of the work performed.” PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 13-15.   The agency does not dispute that some fees should be
      awarded; it argues instead, as it did before the administrative judge, that only
      49 hours should be awarded for this work. Id. at 13; A-2 AFF, Tab 10 at 15-17.
¶19         Mr. Walsh admitted before the administrative judge that it was his intention
      to work pro bono for the appellant; thus, he did not maintain time-keeping records
      until a July 18, 2018 status conference in which he was directed to file an
      accounting of his work. A-2 AFF, Tab 3 at 5. Therefore, he had to reconstruct
      time-keeping records from his 6 years of representation through notes,
      correspondence, emails, and pleadings. Id. As the agency noted, however, the
      absence of contemporaneous records is normally an insufficient basis, by itself, to
      completely deny an attorney fee request, but it may prompt the Board to carefully
      scrutinize the reconstructed records and reduce the hours claimed if there is
      uncertainty as to their accuracy.    A-2 AFF, Tab 10 at 11 (citing Wilson v.
      Department of Health & Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 435, 437 (1984)). The
      addendum initial decision reflects the administrative judge’s proper consideration
      of Mr. Walsh’s reconstructed records and explanation of claimed hours both
      regarding the notice of proposed removal (involving the microphone discovery )
      and other filings.
¶20         The record supports the administrative judge’s decision to approve
      150 hours for Mr. Walsh’s work on the notice of proposed removal (involving the
      microphone discovery). Importantly, Mr. Walsh provided a narrative explanation
      made under penalty of perjury for the work that he performed during this time
                                                                                      12

      frame.   A-2 AFF, Tab 5 at 3, 32-34.      Notably, the March 7, 2014 notice of
      proposed removal included a lengthy, 450-page Report of Investigation, the
      appellant submitted written replies on June 26 and July 22, 2014, and the
      appellant made an oral reply on July 31, 2014; after the agency notified the
      appellant that the deciding official would rely on additional materials, the
      appellant submitted additional written replies on September 23 and 29, 2014, and
      he provided an October 21, 2014 oral reply. Guzman v. Department of Homeland
      Security, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-15-0170-I-1, Initial Appeal File, Tab 6 at
      32-101, 103-12, 114-15, 120-22, 124-239, Tab 7 at 4-29, 51-55, 57-203, Tab 8 at
      4-99, Tab 9 at 4-222, Tab 10 at 268-72, 275-77, Tab 11 at 4-321, Tab 12 at 4-150.
      Given the volume of documentation relating to the lack of candor charge
      (involving the microphone discovery), as well as the amount of substantive
      correspondence between the parties before a decision was made on the proposed
      removal, we do not find such hours excessive, and we discern no error with the
      administrative judge’s award of 150 hours of work.
¶21        The agency also argues that the 91 hours sought by Mr. Walsh related to
      work performed after the appeal was filed and prior to the referral to mediation is
      excessive. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15-18. These arguments were largely raised before
      the administrative judge. Compare id. at 15-17, with A-2 AFF, Tab 10 at 17-19.
      However, the agency correctly notes on review that there is a mathematical error.
      Although Mr. Walsh claimed 53 hours for reviewing pleadings and discovery
      responses, the total amount was actually 48 hours. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15-16 &
      n.2; see A-2 AFF, Tab 5 at 37 (explaining that he spent 8 hours, 15 hours, and
      25 hours, respectively, reviewing agency documents).        Therefore, instead of
      91 claimed hours for Mr. Walsh’s work in the appeal prior to mediation, the
      correct amount is 86 hours of work.       Because we discern no error with the
      administrative judge’s decision to reduce the claimed hours by 31 hours, it is
      appropriate to subtract that amount from the new starting point of 86 hours for
      this work.   Accordingly, we modify the addendum initial decision to award
                                                                                      13

      Mr. Walsh 55 hours for his work reviewing agency pleadings and discovery
      responses in MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-15-0170-I-1.
¶22        Regarding the refiled appeal, the agency asserts that Mr. Walsh failed to
      adequately support his claim of 92 hours to include drafting motions for a
      protective order (5 hours) and a prehearing submission (7 hours), conducting the
      hearing (60 hours), and preparing the written closing argument (20 hours). PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 17-18. Instead, the agency requests that the appellant recover only
      80 hours for this work. Id. at 18; A-2 AFF, Tab 10 at 20. The agency’s argument
      is not persuasive, and we affirm the administrative judge’s decision to award
      87 hours for Mr. Walsh’s work in the refiled appeal.
¶23        The agency contends that the administrative judge erred by granting the full
      amount of 19 hours requested for Mr. Walsh’s work on the fee petition as both
      premature and lacking support.     PFR File, Tab 1 at 1 8-19.    In the addendum
      initial decision, the administrative judge addressed this argument, noting that the
      Board has approved fees for time spent preparing a fee petition without requiring
      a separate addendum petition to evaluate fees.         AID at 17 (citing Guy v.
      Department of the Army, 118 M.S.P.R.       45, ¶ 23 (2012), and Driscoll v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 116 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 30 (2011)). She also noted that the agency
      did not challenge the request for 19 hours. Id. We discern no error with the
      administrative judge’s assessment that 19 hours was a reasonable amount of time
      for the work on the appellant’s fee petition, particularly given his success at the
      merits stage and the fact that multiple attorneys had represented him at various
      stages in his litigation against the agency. See, e.g., Driscoll, 116 M.S.P.R. 662,
      ¶ 30 (awarding 15.45 hours for the fee petition).
¶24        The appellant also challenges some of the administrative judge’s findings in
      the addendum initial decision. For example, he argues that he was entitled to all
      fees claimed by Mr. Zweiback for his work at Seyfarth Shaw in connection with
      the criminal matter because it was “not a bona fide criminal investigation ,” but
      instead, agency investigators “[made] use of [F]ederal criminal tools and
                                                                                         14

      processes to accomplish their goal” of removing the appellant. PFR File, Tab 3
      at 9-11. He argues that, although labeled as “criminal” work, Mr. Zweiback’s
      contacts with the U.S. Attorney’s Office were an “early part of the effort to
      frustrate” the agency’s retaliation against the appellant for his whistleblowing
      disclosures. Id. at 11. The appellant has not persuaded us that the administrative
      judge’s assessment of this work was in error.
¶25           The appellant also contends that the administrative judge erred by
      significantly reducing hours claimed by Mr. Zweiback and Ms. Gevondyan at
      Nixon Peabody. Id. at 11-14. Although he criticizes the administrative judge’s
      decision to “disallow[] a very substantial amount of fees,” he concedes that he
      would essentially be comparing his “estimate of the fairness of a particular
      assignment of allowable hours” with the administrative judge’s estimate.           Id.
      at 11-13. We discern no specific error in the administrative judge’s determination
      in this regard.
¶26           Finally, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge erred by
      disallowing some of Mr. Walsh’s claimed hours, such as 40 hours “familiariz[ing]
      himself with the background and details of the [a]gency investigation,” 35 hours
      to obtain information from the agency through a FOIA request, 13 and 40 hours
      corresponding with agency managers. Id. at 14-17. The appellant’s submissions
      do not persuade us that it is appropriate to second -guess the administrative
      judge’s decisions in this regard.
¶27           We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments, but none warrant a
      different outcome.       For these reasons, we affirm the administrative judge’s
      decision to award 13.3 hours for Mr. Zweiback ($7,182), and 33.1 hours for Ms.
      Gevondyan ($9,930).          We modify the addendum initial decision to award
      421 hours for Mr. Walsh ($178,925). Thus, the total fees awarded are $196,037.

      13
           He proposes instead that 12 hours should be awarded. PFR File, Tab 3 at 16.
                                                                                            15

      We modify the addendum initial decision to reduce the award of costs to
      $3,597.90.
¶28         The administrative judge noted that 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g) permits recovery of
      costs and the Board has interpreted this provision to permit a broader recovery
      than may apply in appeals under 5 U.S.C. § 7701.           AID at 19 (citing Smit v.
      Department of the Treasury, 61 M.S.P.R. 612 (1994), and Department of Health
      & Human Services v. Balaban, 33 M.S.P.R. 309 (1987)).               The administrative
      judge awarded the appellant costs for 50 round trips of 80 miles each for
      Mr. Walsh to drive to his house, based on the Internal Revenue Service mileage
      rate ($0.535 per mile), for a total of $2,140. Id. Noting that the agency “did not
      file anything” after Mr. Walsh submitted receipts for mailing and related
      expenses, the administrative judge also awarded the appellant $4,444.02 for such
      expenses. Id. However, she did not award costs for Mr. Walsh’s annual state bar
      dues and continuing legal education requirements because they were “routine
      item[s] of attorney overhead.” 14 AID at 19-20. The total award of costs awarded
      by the administrative judge was $6,584.02. AID at 20.
¶29         On review, the agency argues that the administrative judge erred in
      awarding costs when the appellant failed to provide an itemized accounting of
      services and expenses claimed as costs, untimely filed his ev idence of costs, and
      was awarded costs for nonreimbursable items. PFR File, Tab 1 at 21-26. For the
      following reasons, we find that the appellant is entitled to an award of costs, but
      the amount of costs awarded by the administrative judge should be reduced.

      14
         The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s decision not to award costs for
      activating Mr. Walsh’s bar membership and accompanying continuing legal education
      because he was “fully retired,” and it was the “shared understanding” between him and
      Mr. Walsh that he would be compensated for these expenses. PFR File, Tab 3 at 19.
      However, the appellant offers no legal authority to support this proposition that routine
      items of attorney overhead, such as bar dues, are recoverable. Accordingly, we affirm
      the administrative judge’s conclusion in this regard.
                                                                                       16

            Travel Expenses

¶30         As support for his request for reimbursement for travel, Mr. Walsh stated
      under penalty of perjury that, “during the course of [6+] years of representing”
      the appellant, from approximately July 2012 to 2018, “[he] made a great many
      trips to [the appellant’s] house in connection with document filing, because [the
      appellant] is much more computer-literate than [he was], and [he] relied upon his
      expertise to help [him] format and submit documents to the Board.” A-2 AFF,
      Tab 5 at 43.     Mr. Walsh also stated that it was “much easier to have [the
      appellant] answer specific questions about documentary assertions if [they were]
      together as [he worked].” Id. Mr. Walsh stated that the distance between his
      home and the appellant’s home was 40 miles and the roundtrip was 80 miles. Id.
      He estimated that he made “not fewer than a total of 50 trips.” Id. Mr. Walsh
      asked for reimbursement of “that amount of mileage . . . at the prevailing per
      diem mileage rate paid for government travel,” which he calculated to be
      “$2140.00 at .53.5 a mile based on the Internal Revenue Service standard mileage
      rate for reimbursement.” Id.
¶31         The agency asserts that, because Mr. Walsh failed to provide the dates of
      these trips and the specific reason for each trip, the administrative judge erred in
      awarding him costs for these expenses.          PFR File, Tab 1 at 22.          The
      administrative judge acknowledged that the dates offered by Mr. Walsh were not
      clear, but she noted that the court in Rumsey held that, although specific date
      records were the “preferred practice,” an estimate was also acceptable. AID at 19
      (citing Rumsey, 866 F.3d at 1379). We discern no error with the administrative
      judge’s analysis in this regard.
¶32         However, even if we credit Mr. Walsh’s statements made under penalty of
      perjury regarding the distance between his house and the appellant’s house as
      well as his estimate that he made “not fewer than a total of 50 trips” during this
      time frame, he is not entitled to recover all such claimed expenses. The merits
                                                                                        17

      appeal concluded in 2017, the appellant filed a December 2017 p etition for
      enforcement, and the damages appeals commenced in January 2018, all of which
      were granted (at least in part) and are currently pending on review. Mr. Walsh’s
      statements did not indicate whether the purpose of any of the 50 claimed trips was
      to discuss the petition for enforcement or the addendum damages proceedings,
      which for the above reasons are not included in a fee award at this time.
¶33            A closer review of the appellant’s submissions provides some clarity on this
      point. In a supplemental declaration made under penalty of perjury, Mr. Walsh
      indicated that he compiled an accounting of “attorney time spent on this appeal”
      since July 18, 2018, which included desk calendar entries. A-2 AFF, Tab 11
      at 88.    A review of Mr. Walsh’s desk calendar, which covers July 16 through
      December 16, 2018, reflects that on various dates, including July 31, August 21,
      September 6, October 22, October 24, October 28, and December 3, his trips to
      the appellant’s house involved meetings to discuss issues relating to the
      compliance matter or the addendum damages proceedings.               Id. at 91-109.
      Accordingly, because there has been no final decision in these matters, these trips
      are not reimbursable at this time, and we subtract these seven trips from the total
      number of trips claimed by Mr. Walsh.
¶34            Also, given Mr. Walsh’s concession that he “made a great many trips to [the
      appellant’s house] in connection with document filing” and “relied upon [the
      appellant’s] expertise to help [him] format and submit documents to the Board,”
      A-2 AFF, Tab 5 at 43, Mr. Walsh likely visited the appellant on various dates in
      late 2017 and early 2018 to discuss and file certain pleadings in the enforcement
      action and addendum damages appeals. For example, Mr. Walsh likely visited
      the appellant on or before December 13, 2017, to discuss and file the petition for
      enforcement, on or before January 2, 2018, to discuss and file the motion for
      damages, on or before January 18, 2018, to discuss and file the first supplement
      to the motion for damages, on or before January 30, 2018, to discuss and file the
      reply to the agency’s response to the petition for enforcement, and on or before
                                                                                           18

      April 6, 2018, to discuss and file the second supplement to the motion for
      damages. Therefore, we subtract an additional five trips from the total number of
      trips claimed by Mr. Walsh.
¶35         Accordingly, if we multiply 38 trips to the appellant’s house by 80 miles
      round trip by the claimed rate of $0.535 per mile, 15 the total is $1,626.40 in travel
      expenses awarded. We modify the addendum initial decision in this regard.

            Receipts

¶36         As support for his request for reimbursement for costs, Mr. Walsh stated
      under penalty of perjury that he gathered receipts during his representation of the
      appellant. A-2 AFF, Tab 11 at 16. He explained that it was his “regular practice
      to obtain paper receipts for items purchased to advance his case, including office
      supplies [and] costs of copying documents” that were sent by the Board or
      opposing counsel, “which [he] was unable to download at home.” Id. He stated
      that he “placed those receipts into a file folder which was dedicated to those
      receipts.” Id. Copies of these receipts “in an undifferentiated accumulation” are
      in the record.    Id. at 17-86.    Mr. Walsh acknowledged that “[p]lacing those
      receipts into date order, or attempting to now recall what purpose was served by
      each expenditure is, as a practical matter, impossible.” Id. at 17. He indicated
      that the receipts totaled $4,444.02. Id.
¶37         The agency objects to an award of any costs because the appellant failed to
      describe each expense in detail and did not show how each claimed expense
      related to the current litigation. 16 PFR File, Tab 1 at 26. The agency also objects

      15
        The agency does not argue on review that the claimed mileage rate of $0.535 is
      unreasonable. We discern no error with the administrative judge’s reliance on the
      appellant’s claimed mileage rate for the allowed trips. Roman v. Department of the
      Army, 72 M.S.P.R. 409, 419 n.2 (1996), aff’d, 129 F.3d 134 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
      16
        In responding to the administrative judge’s statement in the addendum initial decision
      that the agency “did not file anything” after Mr. Walsh submitted the receipts for
      mailing and related expenses, AID at 19, the agency argues on rev iew that it could not
      dispute the “late-filed receipts” because the record on attorney fees was closed, PFR
                                                                                            19

      to all pre-2014 receipts (because the appellant failed to show how these expenses
      related to his successful litigation) and to all illegible receipts. Id. The agency
      asserts that certain expenses are not recoverable, including copying expenses,
      printer ink, paper, and all office supplies. Id. Finally, the agency objects to the
      administrative judge’s decision to award costs for a new MacBook laptop and
      diagnostics, and for packages sent to the U.S. district court, the agency’s FOIA
      Deputy Director, D.S., and an unknown recipient. Id.
¶38         We agree with the agency that some of these costs are not recoverable .
      Consistent with the administrative judge’s decision not to award Mr. Walsh costs
      for his annual state bar dues and continuing legal education requirements because
      such expenses are a “routine item of attorney overhead,” we also consider the
      following expenses as overhead and therefore nonreimbursable: ear buds ($8.71),
      Thomson Reuters – Federal Judicial Procedure and Rules, full set ($139.52), 2015
      At-A-Glance calendar ($23.99), Really Useful 64L storage box ($32.69),
      MacBook plus extras ($2,114.37), and diagnostics ($79). A-2 AFF, Tab 11 at 33,
      36, 45, 54, 73. The total amount of this additional nonreimbursable overhead is
      $2,398.28, which we deduct from the award of costs.
¶39         Additionally, there are other expenses that are not reimbursable because the
      appellant has not shown how the particular receipts are related to the merits
      appeal, including a March 15, 2013 package to U.S. district court ($3.31), an

      File, Tab 1 at 22-23. Despite the administrative judge’s order that the appellant submit
      an accounting for fees by October 12, 2018, and the agency should respond by
      October 19, 2018, A-2 AFF, Tab 2 at 1-2, the parties filed several submissions after
      these deadlines, e.g., A-2 AFF, Tabs 4-5, 9-11. In the appellant’s last submission, filed
      on December 14, 2018, he included, for the first time, nearly 70 pages of receipts. A -2
      AFF, Tab 11. The administrative judge correctly noted that the agency did not file any
      pleading after the appellant submitted these receipts, and the agency did not seek leave
      to file a response to the appellant’s December 14 submission. However, given the
      lateness of the appellant’s submission of receipts and because the agency’s petition for
      review includes numerous arguments against the admission of and reliance on these
      receipts, PFR File, Tab 1 at 22-26, we will consider these arguments in the first
      instance.
                                                                                            20

      April 29, 2014 mailing to the agency’s FOIA Deputy Director ($12.66), 17 and a
      May 2, 2015 filing with the U.S. district court ($12.50). A-2 AFF, Tab 11 at 35,
      44, 57. There are also two expenses for “Fruit Slices” candy ($0.99 each for a
      total of $1.98). 18 Id. at 52, 58. Additionally, the receipt on page 77 for $0.86
      appears to be a duplicate of the receipt on page 75; the duplicate receipt is not
      recoverable. Finally, Mr. Walsh submitted a credit card statement from June 25
      through July 14, 2013. Id. at 68. However, the transactions on June 24, 2013, in
      the amounts of $9.18 and $33.75, were already reflected on the receipts on pages
      33-34 and are not recoverable. Accordingly, we deduct an additional $74.24 from
      the award of costs.
¶40         We are not persuaded by the agency’s remaining arguments. If we subtract
      the total amount of additional overhead and nonreimbursable expenses from the
      administrative judge’s award of $4,444.02, the appellant is entitled to an award of
      $1,971.50 for the receipts.     If we add $1,971.50 in receipts to the award of
      $1,626.40 for travel expenses, the appellant is entitled to a total of $3, 597.90 in
      costs. We modify the addendum initial decision in this regard.

      Conclusion
¶41         For the reasons described herein, we affirm the administrative judge’s
      decision to award the appellant $7,182 in fees for Mr. Zweiback and $9,930 in
      fees for Ms. Gevondyan for a total award of $17,112. AID at 12-14. We modify
      the addendum initial decision to award the appellant $178,925 in fees for Mr.
      Walsh (421 hours at a rate of $425/hour) and $3,597.90 in costs.

      17
         As noted above, the administrative judge determined that Mr. Walsh’s work relating
      to the FOIA request was not recoverable, and we affirm that decision herein. AID
      at 15.
      18
        Mr. Walsh concedes that it is not the agency’s responsibility to pay for candy , and he
      agrees to remove this expense. PFR File, Tab 3 at 26.
                                                                                        21

                                            ORDER
¶42         We ORDER the agency to pay the appellant attorney fees in the amount of
      $7,182 for Mr. Zweiback’s work, $9,930 for Ms. Gevondyan’s work, and
      $178,925 for Mr. Walsh’s work, for a total of $196,037 in fees, and $3,597.90 in
      costs. The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date
      of this decision. Title 5 of the United States Code, section 1204(a)(2) (5 U.S.C.
      § 1204(a)(2)).
¶43         We also ORDER the agency to tell the appellant and the attorney promptly
      in writing when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the
      actions it has taken to carry out the Board’s Order. We ORDER the appellant and
      the attorney to provide all necessary information that the agency requests to help
      it carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant and the attorney, if not notified,
      should ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶44         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant or the attorney that
      it has fully carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant or the attorney may file a
      petition for enforcement with the office that issued the initial decision on this
      appeal, if the appellant or the attorney believes that the agency did not fully carry
      out the Board’s Order.     The petition should contain specific reasons why the
      appellant or the attorney believes the agency has not fully carried out the Board’s
      Order, and should include the dates and results of any communications with the
      agency. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

                       NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                          YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS
            The addendum initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order,
      constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You
      have the right to request review of this final decision by the U.S. Court of
      Appeals for the Federal Circuit. You must submit your request to the court at the
      following address:
                                                                               22

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, DC 20439

      The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar
days after the date of this order.    See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff.
Dec. 27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court
has held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory
deadline and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed .
See Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
      If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to
court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found
in title 5 of the U.S. Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff. Dec. 27,
2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the U.S. Code, at our
website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm.       Additional information is
available at the court's website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance
is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” whic h is contained
within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website
at http://www.mspb.gov/probono for      information     regarding    pro     bono
representation for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal
Circuit. The Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services
                                                                               23

provided by any attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation
in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD:                                   /s/ for
                                         Jennifer Everling
                                         Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.