Court Opinion

ID: 9820200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 07:00:26.567829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:16.542037
License: Public Domain

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MARJORIE L. PETRUCELLI,                         DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        PH-0752-17-0076-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: August 31, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Marjorie L. Petrucelli, Cranston, Rhode Island, pro se.

           Kimberly Jacobs, Esquire, Newington, Connecticut, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such
     as this one only in the following circumstances:        the initial decision contains
     erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
     of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
     After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
     has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
     review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial
     decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         On June 17, 2013, the agency granted the appellant’s request for a
     temporary reasonable accommodation because of her medical condition. Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 48, 57. The accommodation consisted of a 4-hour per
     day work schedule with the remaining 4 hours per day being coded as leave
     without pay (LWOP). Id.
¶3         By letter dated August 5, 2014, the agency advised the appellant that it
     could not continue to grant her a 4-hour per day work schedule given that there
     appeared to be no foreseeable end to her condition.         Id. at 57.   Instead, in
     August 2014, and again in May 2015, it offered the appellant an accommodation
     of a permanent, part-time (4 hours per day) schedule in her current position. Id.
     at 48, 60. The appellant did not respond to either offer. On August 26, 2015, she
     filed an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging disability
     discrimination. IAF, Tab 5, Subtab 1. Before the agency issued a decision on her
     EEO complaint, she submitted an application for disability retirement with the
     Office of Personnel Management and amended her EEO complaint to allege that
     the agency’s disability discrimination and retaliation for filing her earlier EEO
                                                                                           3

     complaint coerced her retirement. Id., Subtabs 1-3. After the agency issued the
     final agency decision (FAD) on the allegation of forced retirement, 2 the appellant
     filed this appeal alleging that her disability retirement was involuntary because
     the agency failed to accommodate her disability. IAF, Tab 1, Tab 5, Subtab 1.
¶4           The administrative judge, after issuing an acknowledgement order that
     provided appropriate notice of the jurisdictional questions at issue, IAF, Tab 2,
     adjudicated the appeal under the standard to determine whether a disability
     retirement is involuntary. He found that the agency acted within its discretion by
     offering the appellant a reasonable and effective accommodation of a permanent
     part-time position, which she declined, apparently based on her belief that she
     could only be accommodated by continuing her initial accommodation of a
     combination of work and LWOP. IAF, Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID) at 9-11. He
     found that, under the circumstances of this case, the agency had no obligation to
     provide the appellant with the specific accommodation that she wanted. ID at 12.
     He concluded that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolo us allegation of fact
     that, if proven, would establish jurisdiction over her appeal, and he dismissed the
     appeal without affording her the hearing that she requested. ID at 13 ; IAF, Tab 1
     at 3.
¶5           In her petition for review, the appellant disagrees with the findings in the
     initial decision, including the administrative judge’s failure to afford her a
     hearing. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. She states that the decision in
     her EEO complaint directed her to appeal to the Board to receive her requested
     hearing, and she asks which agency has jurisdiction over her appeal, the Equal
     Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the Board. Id. The agency has
     responded in opposition to the petition. PFR File, Tab 3.

     2
       The only issue that the agency addressed in the FAD was the appellant’s alleged
     forced retirement, which the agency processed as a mixed-case complaint. The FAD
     did not address the other issues that the appellant raised in her EEO complaint, and the
     agency processed those matters separately. IAF, Tab 5, Subtab 1.
                                                                                       4

                                        ANALYSIS
     The appeal is properly before the Board.
¶6        The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111,
     provides for a complex interplay between the Board and the EEOC. Hess v. U.S.
     Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 40, ¶ 11 (2016). An employee or applicant alleging
     discrimination in conjunction with an otherwise appealable action initially may
     elect either to file an EEO complaint with her agency or proceed d irectly to the
     Board.   Id.; Lott v. Department of the Army, 82 M.S.P.R. 666, ¶ 6 (1999);
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701(a),
     7702(a)(1)-(2).   However, regardless of the avenue chosen, the complaining
     individual’s only right to an evidentiary hearing in such mixed cases is before the
     Board, not the EEOC.     Hess, 124 M.S.P.R. 40, ¶ 11; Rosso v. Department of
     Homeland Security, 113 M.S.P.R. 271, ¶ 11 (2010); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701(a)(1),
     7702(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(d)(3) (providing that an agency issuing a FAD on
     a mixed-case complaint “shall advise the complainant of the right to appeal the
     matter to the [Board] (not EEOC)”).
¶7        An employee-initiated action such as a retirement is not appealable to the
     Board unless the appellant proves that it was involuntary.       Gutierrez v. U.S.
     Postal Service, 90 M.S.P.R. 604, ¶ 7 (2002); see Aldridge v. Department of
     Agriculture, 111 M.S.P.R. 670, ¶ 7 (2009).         An involuntary retirement is
     tantamount to a removal and, accordingly, is appealable to the Board as an
     adverse action under chapter 75. Aldridge, 111 M.S.P.R. 670, ¶ 7; see Garcia v.
     Department of Homeland Security, 437 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en
     banc); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512(1), 7513(d), 7701.         Thus, an involuntary
     retirement is an otherwise appealable action. When an appellant elects to file an
     EEO complaint alleging an involuntary retirement, the appellant’s path to proving
     that her retirement was involuntary, and thus an otherwise appealable action
     entitling her to hearing on a mixed-case complaint, is before the Board.       See
     Ragland v. Department of the Army, 84 M.S.P.R. 58, ¶ 2 (1999).
                                                                                          5

¶8         Once an involuntary retirement appeal is before the Board, the dispositive
      issue is jurisdictional. See Aldridge, 111 M.S.P.R. 670, ¶ 7 (observing that the
      jurisdictional issue and the merits of an alleged involuntary resignation or
      retirement are inextricably intertwined).      When, as here, the appellant has
      requested a hearing, the threshold question is whether she has made a
      nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction entitling her to a hearing at which she
      would have the opportunity to prove jurisdiction. See Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1344
      (finding that once an appellant makes nonfrivolous allegations of jurisdiction
      over a constructive adverse action, she is entitled to a hearing at which she then
      must prove that the Board has jurisdiction over her appeal); Cruz v. Department
      of the Navy, 934 F.2d 1240, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (en banc) (finding that an
      alleged involuntary action is not a “mixed” case involving a discrimination claim
      until the appellant proves that a constructive removal or suspension took place).

      The appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction .
¶9         The Board’s jurisdiction over an involuntary disability retirement claim is
      subject to greater limitations than is the case involving an ordinary alleged
      involuntary retirement. Timinski v. Department of Agriculture, 88 M.S.P.R. 559,
      ¶ 9 (2001).   Disability retirement cases differ from typical retirement cases
      because an appellant who meets the statutory requirements for disability
      retirement has “no true choice between working (with or without accommodation)
      and not working, and disability retirement cannot be considered as a removal
      within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7512(1).” Id. (quoting Nordhoff v. Department
      of the Navy, 78 M.S.P.R. 88, 91 (1998), aff’d, 185 F.3d 886 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
      (Table)). Thus, the standard for determining whether a disability retirement was
      involuntary, and therefore tantamount to a removal, focuses on the availability of
      an accommodation. Timinski, 88 M.S.P.R. 559, ¶ 9; Nordhoff, 78 M.S.P.R. at 91.
¶10        To invoke the Board’s jurisdiction over an involuntary disability retirement
      appeal, the appellant must prove that: (1) she indicated to the agency that she
      wished to continue working but that her medical limitations required a
                                                                                          6

      modification of her work conditions or duties, i.e., accommodation; (2) there was
      a reasonable accommodation available during the period between the date on
      which she indicated to the agency that she had medical limitations but desired to
      continue working and the date that she was separated that would have allowed her
      to continue working; and (3) the agency unjustifiably failed to offer that
      accommodation. Pariseau v. Department of the Air Force, 113 M.S.P.R. 370,
      ¶ 13 (2010); see Okleson v. U.S. Postal Service, 90 M.S.P.R. 415, ¶ 8 (2001);
      Nordhoff, 78 M.S.P.R. at 91. Once the appellant has raised a nonfrivolous
      allegation that such an accommodation existed but was not provided, she is
      entitled to a jurisdictional hearing. Deines v. Department of Energy, 98 M.S.P.R.
      389, ¶ 13 (2005).
¶11            We construe the appellant’s allegation that the administrative judge erred in
      failing to afford her the hearing that she requested as an assertion that the
      administrative judge erred by failing to find that she made a nonfrivolous
      allegation of jurisdiction.     See Melnick v. Department of Housing and Urban
      Development, 42 M.S.P.R. 93, 97 (1989) (stating that pro se pleadings are to be
      liberally construed), aff’d, 899 F.2d 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Table). Nonfrivolous
      allegations of Board jurisdiction are allegations of fact which, if proven, could
      establish a prima facie case that the Board has jurisdiction over the matter at
      issue.     Bruhn v. Department of Agriculture, 124 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 10 (2016).         In
      determining whether the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation of
      jurisdiction entitling her to a hearing, the administrative judge may consider the
      agency’s documentary submissions; however, to the extent that the agency’s
      evidence constitutes mere factual contradiction of the appellant ’s otherwise
      adequate prima facie showing of jurisdiction, the administrative judge may not
      weigh evidence and resolve conflicting assertions of the parties , and the agency’s
      evidence may not be dispositive. Ferdon v. U.S. Postal Service, 60 M.S.P.R. 325,
      329 (1994).
                                                                                          7

¶12        Here, there is no dispute that the appellant indicated to the agency that she
      wished to continue working but that her medical limitations                  required
      accommodation. IAF, Tab 5, Subtab 1. She identified an accommodation that
      would have allowed her to continue working, a continuation of the temporary
      accommodation that the agency had provided to her from June 2013 to
      August 2014, a 4-hour per day work schedule with the remaining 4 hours per day
      being coded as LWOP.        At issue is whether, by asserting that she wished to
      continue in the previous temporary accommodation, the appellant made a
      nonfrivolous allegation that the agency unjustifiably failed to offer t hat
      accommodation, thereby rendering her retirement involuntary.
¶13        The agency ended its temporary accommodation of the appellant ’s disability
      because she encumbered a full-time position, and medical evidence she provided
      showed no foreseeable end to her medical condition. IAF, Tab 9 at 48.             The
      agency offered the appellant permanent accommodation of a part-time position,
      4 hours per work day. Id. The appellant submitted no evidence to show that
      there was a foreseeable end to her medical condition. She merely reiterated her
      preference for continuing the temporary accommodation. 3               IAF, Tab 5,
      Subtabs 4-5.
¶14        An appellant is not entitled to the accommodation of her choice when the
      agency    acts   within   its   discretion   to   offer   reasonable   and   effective
      accommodation. See Miller v. Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 21
      (2014).   Here, the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that the
      accommodation offered by the agency was unreasonable.            Thus, she failed to

      3
        The appellant’s situation is complicated by the fact that she also sought Office of
      Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) benefits based on a December 14, 2015
      incident when a veteran threatened and lunged at her while she was working. IAF,
      Tab 5, Subtab 4. The appellant appears to have sought LWOP relative to her OWCP
      benefits claim. Id., Subtab 11. Whether the appellant could receive LWOP regarding
      her OWCP claim is unrelated to whether she made a nonfrivolous allegation that the
      agency unjustifiably failed to offer her continued LWOP as an accommodation.
                                                                                         8

make a nonfrivolous allegation that her retirement was involuntary.                    See
Pariseau, 113 M.S.P.R. 370, ¶ 13.         We therefore find that the administrative
judge properly denied the appellant’s request for a jurisdictional hearing and
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 4

                          NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
       You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.                5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

4
  The Board has held that other theories of involuntariness in an alleged involuntary
disability retirement appeal cannot lead to a different conclusion because the essence of
claims of involuntariness based on coercion, duress, or intolerable working conditions
is that the employee had a choice between retiring or continui ng to work but was forced
to choose retirement by improper acts of the agency. Rule v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 85 M.S.P.R. 388, ¶ 13 (2000). An employee who is unable to work because of
a medical condition that cannot be accommodated simply does not have such a choice.
Id. To the extent that the administrative judge’s consideration of other theories of
involuntariness in this case was error, it did not harm the appellant ’s substantive rights
and provides no basis to reverse the initial decision. Panter v. Department of the Air
Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (explaining that an adjudicatory error that is not
prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial
decision).
5
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                          9

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of revi ew
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided b y any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                10

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     11

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                12

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our w ebsite at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.