Court Opinion

ID: 9758588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:37:14.553737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:05.313155
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.,
dissenting. The majority holds that the ordinance involved here is unconstitutional because it may, in certain instances, deprive landlords of their property without due process of law. This conclusion is based on its finding that the 15% ceiling on rent increases embodied in the law, even with rent subsidies from the municipality, may prevent a landlord from receiving a reasonable return on his property. Second, it finds that the disparity in treatment of seniors and non-senior tenants in controlled buildings is improper. It reasons that the ordinance places an unfair burden on non-senior tenants since they will be called upon to pay higher rents as a result of the ordinance. However, it is unclear what significance the majority attaches to this second ground, since it refuses to find that this scheme results in a denial of equal protection.
The first ground relied upon by the majority for striking down the ordinance is easily disposed of by referring to the majority’s own opinion. As Mr. Justice Schreiber states for the 'Court:
although the North Bergen ordinance has no express provision assuring that the landlord will have the opportunity to receive a just and reasonable rate of return, such a provision must be impliedly deemed to have been incorporated in it.
[Ante at 336]
*340The fact that this ordinance refers to a 15% ceiling on rent increases, then, should not bar the landlord from applying for a greater increase where it would be necessary in order to ensure a just and reasonable return.
This conclusion seems inescapable since we held in Hutton Pk. Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, 68 N. J. 543 (1975) that:
An ordinance is not rendered facially unconstitutional by the fact that it does not expressly include a provision assuring a just and reasonable return in its regulatory mechanism. * * * Every rent control ordinance must be deemed to intend, and will be so read, to permit property owners to apply to the local administrative agency for relief on the ground that the regulation entitles the owner to a just and reasonable rate of return.
[68 N. J. at 572; citation omitted]
We upheld the ordinance there even though it provided, as does this one, for an overall ceiling on rent increases. 68 N. J. at 552-53. Thus, I see no reason to distinguish the result reached today from our recent holding in that case.1
Moreover, we held there that an actual showing of an inability to achieve a reasonable rate of return was required in order to demonstrate the facial unconstitutionality of a statute. Referring to the ordinances in that case, we stated:
Although the total increases permitted under these ordinances are sharply limited, and may be less than price increases prevailing in other sectors of the economy, . . . , we cannot say a priori that the ordinances preclude any possibility of permitting a just and reasonable return to apartment house owners in general. The return *341which landlords were obtaining at the base rent levels may well have been so far above the just and reasonable mark that the present diminished rate of return may still be more than just and reasonable even if current cost increases are outpacing permissible rent increases.
[68 N. J. at 571-72; citation omitted]
Significantly, that ordinance provided for a 10% ceiling on rent increases. The instant ordinance not only provides a higher ceiling, 15%, but it also expressly includes the possibility of receiving subsidies from the municipality. See ante at 336.2
I find the majority’s second “fatal flaw” to be equally defective. Essentially, the majority argues that the ordinance impermissibly spreads the cost of the rent reduction for senior citizens among a small group of persons, instead of requiring the public to assume this obligation or spreading the cost among a large group of persons. See ante at 337. Although stopping short of such a holding, the majority concludes that “[s]ueh uneven treatment may well constitute a denial of constitutional equal protection.” Ante at 336.
*342However, the majority’s concerns in this case are wholly speculative. I would have serious doubts about the propriety of striking down the ordinance on the basis of its harm to tenants. Significantly, no tenant is even a plaintiff in this case or has sought to make his disagreement with the ordinance known. While it is appropriate at times to allow a plaintiff to assert the constitutional rights of another person or group, see Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 73 S. Ct. 1031, 97 L. Ed. 1586 (1953); In re Quinlan, 70 N. J. 10, 34 (1976), cert. den. - U. S. -, 97 S. Ct. -, 53 L. Ed. 2d- (1976). I do not believe that this is such a case. Standing requirements are more .permissive under State than Federal precedents, but we have not abandoned the requirement that a litigant must demonstrate a “sufficient stake and real adverseness” in- order to have a claim considered. Crescent Park Tenants Ass’n v. Realty Equities, 58 N. J. 98, 107 (1971); In re Quinlan, supra, 70 N. J. at 35. Here the impact of the senior tenant amendments on remaining tenants is wholly speculative, and there is a substantial likelihood that their actual impact may be de minimis. Additionally, there is no inherent inability on the part of tenants to be joined in this suit. Barrows v. Jackson, supra, 346 U. S. at 257, 73 S. Ct. at 1035, 97 L. Ed. at 1596. It is perfectly plausible that non-senior tenants might be willing to pay a slightly higher rental at this time since they may receive the benefit of the ordinance in the future if they continue to live in. the community.
Nor am I convinced that the ordinance would be unconstitutional even if it did impose some burden upon non-senior tenants. The majority’s argument, if accepted, would undermine most forms of regulation. Surely it would not contend that any form of price regulation is unconstitutional merely because it created the potential of higher costs for a certain, class of consumers, as opposed to spreading the cost across the community as a whole.
For instance, a rent control generally imposes a burden on a small group of persons. Under a rent measure a land-
*343lord is usually required to forego a portion of the rent which he might have otherwise charged tenants. Even though he is guaranteed a reasonable rate of return, it cannot be denied that he suffers a “burden” because of the rate restriction.3 Yet our recent holdings in Hutton Pk. Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, supra; Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N. J. 576 (1975); and Troy Hills Village v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp. Council, 68 N. J. 604 (1975), make it obvious that rent control ordinances are not unconstitutional merely because the community as a whole does not share in the landlord’s “burden.” In fact, it might be asserted that the instant enactment presents even less of a problem than a normal rent control measure since it allows the landlord to resort to remaining tenants in his building to share the burden along with him.
The only remaining question which might be considered is whether senior tenants are an improper group to receive rent protection. Thus, it might -be theorized that there are other tenants in the building who are more needy than some who receive the benefit of the ordinance. However, the simple answer to this argument is that legislation need not operate perfectly in order to pass constitutional muster. In rejecting another equal protection attack in Troy Hills Village v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp. Council, supra, we stated:
‘Equal protection is not denied because a regulatory statute might have gone farther than it did, or might have included some persons or classes of persons who were excluded. Regulatory need in a particular field may appear to the legislative mind in different dimensions and proportions; as more acute in one area than in another. *344Consequently, the reform' may proceed one step at a time, addressing itself to the aspect of the problem which seems the most pressing.’
[68 N. J. at 633, quoting from N. J. Chapter, Am. I. P. v. N. J. State Bd. of Prof Planners, 48 N. J. 581, 593 (1967), appeal dismissed and cert. den. 389 U. S. 8, 88 S. Ct. 70, 19 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1967)]
Accord, Pleasure Bay Apartments v. Long Branch, 66 N. J. 79, 93-95 (1974); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 486-87, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 1162-63, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491, 502-03 (1970). Furthermore, the majority concedes that “appropriate legislative action may be taken to ameliorate the financial problems of senior citizens. . . .” Ante at 335. It finds that this conclusion is “inescapable.” Id.
Although North Bergen’s ordinance contains within one enactment both rent control restrictions and favored treatment for senior citizens, I cannot accept the majority’s objections to it. Our task in reviewing this ordinance may be characterized by the oft-repeated statement that a court’s role is not to review the wisdom of a piece of legislation, but merely its constitutionality. In Troy Hills Village, supra, we held that “the wisdom of the regulatory policy which it has adopted, is not pertinent to the constitutional challenge made to the ordinance.” 68 N. J. at 632; footnote omitted. It is irrelevant that we might have drafted the ordinance to require the municipality to pay for the entire reduction in rents for senior tenants. Similarly, we are not authorized to strike down the legislation even though we might have based eligibility for rent protection solely on a tenant’s income, as opposed to age. Bearing in mind this limitation on our review power, I can find nothing objectionable about the instant ordinance.
I would reverse the Appellate Division and uphold the constitutionality of the ordinance.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Clieeord, Schreiber and Handler — 6.
For reversal — Justice Pashman — 1.

Curiously, if the ceiling requirement were unconstitutional, the instant ordinance would fall even without the senior tenant amendments. Although the majority finds it necessary to hypothesize that 9 out of 10 tenants in a building may be senior, the 15% ceiling would render the ordinance unconstitutional under the majority analysis even if a building contained no senior tenants: as long as a landlord needed a 16% increase in order to arrive at a reasonable return, the ordinance would be unconstitutional. However, as I have pointed out, this result is preclued by our recent holding in Hutton Pk. Gardens, supra.

The majority asserts that even if the ordinance could be rendered constitutional by allowing a landlord to charge increases which would provide him with a reasonable return, the Court is powerless to interpret the ordinance to provide for that result. See ante at 337-338. As I have already pointed out, there is no need to engage in such “judicial surgery” here since there has been no showing that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional. However, even if the ordinance had been shown to be unconstitutional as applied, we have stated on numerous occasions that an invalid portion of an ordinance may be severed if in doing so the principal object of the enactment is not impaired. Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 72 N. J. 412, 422 (1977) ; N. J. Chapter. Am. I. P. v. N. J. State Bd. of Prof. Planners, 48 N. J. 581, 593 (1967), appeal dismissed and cert. den. 389 U. S. 8, 88 S. Ct. 70, 19 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1967). The existence of a severability provision in the instant ordinance gives rise to a presumption that the 15% overall ceiling on increases could be severed from the remainder of the ordinance if necessary to save the enactment from being invalid. See Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, supra, 72 N. J. at 422; Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N. J. 576, 600 at n. 23 (1975).

There is a disparity between what a landlord is constitutionally guaranteed and what he might have received had there been no rent control. As we stated in Sutton Pk. Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, supra, “constitutional principles require only that the landlord be permitted to obtain a just and reasonable return; they do not require that landlords uniformly be permitted to pass particular costs through to their tenants.” 68 N. J. at 574.