Court Opinion

ID: 9726382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:47:13.746074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.755536
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. As the court held in Bradshaw v. Metropolis, 293 Ill. App. 3d 389, 393 (1997), both the Act and the Code apply in the factual situation at issue, yet these two statutory provisions are not in harmony. As the Bradshaw court noted, “[b]oth the Act and the Code can apply to this factual situation since it involves a public entity and a police officer engaged in the act of executing and enforcing the law at the time of the occurrence.” Bradshaw, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 393. In other words, both the Act and the Code address the standard of care applicable to police officers enforcing the law, by pursuing an actual or suspected violator of the law. I simply cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Act and the Code apply to “different actors under different circumstances.” 342 Ill. App. 3d at 968. As I would find that the two statutes at issue are in conflict, in that both mandate a different duty of care upon the defendant, I would resort to general rules of statutory construction, as did the Bradshaw court. Specifically, where there are two statutory provisions, one of which is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other is particular and relates to only one subject, the particular provision must prevail. Bradshaw, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 393, citing Cleaver v. Marrese, 253 Ill. App. 3d 778, 780 (1993). The Act is a general statute applying to all civil actions, while the Code is a specific statute containing express provisions establishing a particular duty and standard of care governing the operation of emergency vehicles, including police vehicles in pursuit of a lawbreaker. Bradshaw, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 394-95 I would find no error in the judgment of the circuit court in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss, and I would answer the certified question by finding that the Tort Immunity Act does not bar the plaintiffs’ action. I would, therefore, affirm the ruling of the trial court and remand the matter for further action.