Court Opinion

ID: 9770537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:08:37.575865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:17.423254
License: Public Domain

HARDBERGER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment and the review of facts set forth in the majority opinion. However Peterson raises serious questions in this appeal that deserve further analysis not fully dealt with in the majority opinion. Therefore, I respectfully concur.
The Jury and The Appellate Court
There was evidence in this case to support monetary damage awards for each of the elements submitted to the jury. In fact there was more evidence to support a giving of damages than the jury’s finding of zero damages for all elements except the past medical. It also seems evident that there is some contradiction between the jury’s finding of medical expenses and no other compensa-ble damages. Put plainly, where there is medical treatment, and resulting medical bills, there is usually injury, and where there is injury, there is usually pain, and other attendant loses. Counterbalancing these considerations though is the plaintiffs obligation to obtain favorable jury answers because she has the burden of proof. She did not get them. Not obtaining favorable findings on issues where a party has the burden of proof has considerable legal repercussions. The thrust of the law in insufficient evidence claims, in historical terms and modern cases, is to uphold the jury verdict except in very limited circumstances. A jury in this , state has great power. Jurors are “the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 226a, approved instruction III. Their decision is not to be tampered with lightly, whether it favors the plaintiff or the defendant. The jury has, and should have, the final word on facts.
The supreme court has stated the standard by which we review a factual sufficiency point: we assess all the evidence and reverse for a new trial only if the challenged finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951). “In considering great weight points complaining of a jury’s failure to find a fact, courts of appeals should be mindful that a jury was not convinced by a preponderance of evidence.” Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.1988). Reversal is warranted only if a detailing of the evidence shows that the great weight of the evidence supports an affirmative answer. Id.
It is true, as the appellants point out, that the courts of appeals are the court of last resort on sufficiency of evidence questions. But courts of appeal should use considerable restraint in exercising their power to overturn the jury’s work. The Magna Charta *479forced King John to give rights to juries, not appellate courts.
The majority opinion sets out several reasons, which don’t need to be recited again, as to why the jury may have found as they did. The blunt truth is they didn’t think Ms. Peterson was hurt, at least not from this accident. And while the evidence is not overwhelming for such a viewpoint, and there is evidence to the contrary, we find there is sufficient evidence to uphold the verdict.
Future Medical and Expert Testimony
Appellant points out that both doctors that testified on future medical care agreed that Ms. Peterson would need some future medical care, and as there was no contradictory expert opinion, the court has no choice but to award damages. We cannot agree.
A legion of Texas cases, named below, have held that a plaintiff is not required to have a doctor testify as to future medical damages. The converse of that is that the jury can disbelieve a doctor that does testify.
Texas follows the “reasonable probability” rule for future damages for personal injuries:
Adhering to the “reasonable probability” rule, the Texas courts have also consistently held that the award of future medical expenses is a matter primarily for the jury to determine. No precise evidence is required. The jury may make its award based upon the nature of the injuries, the medical care rendered before trial, and the condition of the injured party at the time of trial, (numerous cases cited).
Hughett v. Dwyre, 624 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex.App. — Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For additional authority and similar wording, see Furr’s, Inc. v. Logan, 893 S.W.2d 187, 194 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1995). “Plaintiff is not required to establish the future medical consequences of her injury by expert testimony based on reasonable probability.” See also, Beverly Enterprises v. Leath, 829 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Tex.App. — Waco 1992).
A jury, without the benefit of expert testimony, can look at the nature of the injuries, the medical care rendered before trial, and the condition of the plaintiff at trial and make up their own mind. That is what they did in this case. True, their observations disagreed with the two treating doctors, but the jury, has that right. If they didn’t have that authority, then there would have to be expert testimony to establish future medical. An expert can be contradicted in more ways than by another expert. He can be contradicted by facts and observations of other witnesses and the parties themselves. Ms. Peterson had nine doctor visits within the three years between the collision and trial. Other events happened that could have caused injury. There was evidence she wasn’t hurt at all. That is not overwhelming evidence that future medical is going to be required that can be attributed to this accident.
This court’s case of Novosad v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1994) is instructive.
The jury was also free to disbelieve Dr. Dennis’ opinion testimony concerning the need for and cost of future medical care. A jury may choose to be guided by expert testimony on future medical damages, but it is not bound by it ... (cites omitted). ‘Testimony of experts [on damages] is only evidentiary and not binding upon the trier of fact.’
Id. at 550.
The court goes on to explain that there may be some circumstances where uncontro-verted expert testimony may be regarded as conclusive if the nature of the subject matter requires the jury to be guided solely by the opinion of experts and the evidence is otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistency. But concludes:
Juries are not bound by a physician’s diagnosis as to the future consequences of an injury. Balandran v. Furr’s Inc., 833 S.W.2d 648, 652 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1992, no writ) (conflicting diagnoses of MRI dis-positive); Hebert v. Pan Am. Van Lines, Inc., 681 S.W.2d at 222 ... When there is expert medical testimony concerning the future consequences of the party’s injuries, the jury is not necessarily bound by such testimony. City of San Antonio v. Vela, 762 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Tex.App. — San Anto*480nio 1988, writ denied) ... Therefore, this was a matter to he decided by the jury.
Id. at 551.
Conclusion
Pool requires the court of appeals, when reversing a judgment on insufficiency grounds, to detail in the opinion “the evidence relevant to the issue in consideration and clearly state why the jury’s finding is factually insufficient or is so against the great weight and preponderance as to be manifestly unjust; why it shocks the conscience; or clearly demonstrates bias.” Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d at 635. This requirement also applies when the court reverses a jury’s failure to find as against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 652-53. There is no such requirement for affirming a judgment. Nevertheless the majority opinion has set out the evidence that would support the verdict. The jury’s answers of zero damages to the future elements, and the equivalent of only the medical bills for the past elements, is harsh, but not so “clearly wrong and manifestly unjust” as to require a remand for the trial to be done all over again. While it can be argued that the jury was “wrong” in evaluating this case, a jury within the limits of the law set forth above, has the right to be “wrong.” Ultimately conclusions of “right” or “wrong” are subjective evaluations in the mind of the evaluator. The supreme evaluator, in the Anglo-American system, is the jury. The jury has spoken in this case and there is some evidence to support their findings. We decline to disturb them.