Court Opinion

ID: 9765072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:50:04.238297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:04.635223
License: Public Domain

Melton, Justice.
Hector Gibson was tried and found guilty by a jury of felony murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime relating to the shooting death of Vipin Patel.1 Among other things, Gibson contends on appeal that the trial court erred by referring to the appellate review of his case when responding to a jury question about trial exhibits that were not sent out with the jury. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the record shows that on December 23, 2005, at approximately 7:00 a.m., Patrick Grant drove Anthony Haynes, Jonathan Johnson, Harry Newkirk, and Gibson to a Kwik Way store in a stolen Mitsubishi Montero. When the men arrived at the Kwik Way store, Johnson, Haynes, and Newkirk exited the vehicle and entered the store with the intent of committing a robbery. Three minutes later, Gibson also entered the store, where Patel was working as the clerk. One of the men ordered Patel to get down on the floor, but Patel pushed a panic button to alert police. Gibson shot Patel, who later died from a gunshot wound to the chest. The four men then ran to the vehicle *618where Grant was waiting, taking the cash register and cigarette boxes with them. As the men were leaving the store, Tony Maxwell, a frequent patron of the store, saw Newkirk and Haynes entering the Montero, but could not see the vehicle’s other occupants. Maxwell phoned 911 to report these observations, as well as the vehicle’s license plate number. Maxwell later identified Newkirk and Haynes as the two persons he observed leaving the store. The men sped away in the car, but soon ran out of gas. The men exited the car, scattering in different directions. Gibson and Johnson fled to a nearby cemetery, where Gibson disposed of the gun. Police recovered the cash register from a wooded area, a shell casing from the murder weapon in the store, Gibson’s fingerprints in the vehicle, and cash register tape and cigar casings near the vehicle. Gibson was not apprehended until December 28, 2005. Gibson then directed the police to the gun in the cemetery and a black pistol grip in Johnson’s home. Grant testified at trial that Gibson admitted to him that he shot Patel. This evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Gibson guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Price v. State, 280 Ga. 193 (2) (625 SE2d 397) (2006).
2. Gibson argues that, by referring to the appellate process in its answer to a question from jurors during deliberations, the trial court erred. See OCGA § 17-8-57. We agree.
The record shows that the jury, during deliberations, sent a note to the trial court stating, “We’d like to have all of the evidence. Have only exhibits through 72.” The trial court responded:
Let me tell you that you have all of the evidence, which by law, you are entitled to. There are several things that, if I give them to you, we would have to try the case all over again. . .. Some evidence is considered to be such that it’s disadvantageous for you to have it out with you, particularly in regard to statements and things like that. They are supposed to be read like any other testimony, and it would be reversible error for me to give you all the exhibits.
(Emphasis supplied.) These statements improperly referred to the availability of appellate review, thus intimating that Gibson was in fact guilty and would need to appeal his forthcoming conviction.
This Court addressed a similar statement in Faust v. State, 222 Ga. 27 (148 SE2d 430) (1966). There, the trial court instructed the jury: “there are certain entries which cannot be removed from the indictment, and I am of the opinion it would be improper and maybe reversible error by the Appellate Court if I allowed you to see the indictment with these several entries hereon.” Id. at 28-29 (2) *619(emphasis in original). We found that these statements could convey to the jury that the entries were unfavorable to defendant and “that the court itself believed the defendant would be found guilty, since only the defendant can appeal from a verdict in a criminal case.” Id. at 29 (2). This Court was particularly concerned that the jury may draw inferences about the content of the indictments. Based on these reasons, as well as the rule that courts should not reference appellate courts, except to cite their decisions, we held the trial court’s statements to be reversible error.2 Id. See also Price v. State, 149 Ga. App. 397, 400 (2) (254 SE2d 512) (1979) (judge’s statement “If I make an error then there is [sic] two Courts ahead of me in Atlanta ... If I make an error at law they are going to reverse this case and send it back,” intimated to the jury that the trial judge thought the defendant would be convicted); Hollis v. State, 215 Ga. App. 35 (5) (450 SE2d 247) (1994) (judge’s comment that the Supreme Court would have a chance to review the record of the case at hand intimated the trial judge’s opinion that the defendant would be convicted).
In the present case, the statements regarding potential error could have intimated to the jury that the requested exhibits were harmful to the defendant and that the trial court believed the defendant was guilty. This, in turn, may have caused undue focus on the exhibits being withheld and lessened the jury’s sense of responsibility for the verdict. The jurors are presumed to be intelligent people, and the trial court’s comments could have logically led them to the conclusion that “the trial court was telling them that after the trial had ended, defendant and his counsel would be cast in the role of ‘excepting’ to what had taken place during the trial — in other words, that they would lose the case and defendant would be convicted.” (Emphasis omitted.) Floyd v. State, 135 Ga. App. 217, 218-219 (217 SE2d 452) (1975). As in Faust, where this Court held that the contents of the unknown indictment entries could convey that the entries were harmful to the defendant, the trial court’s statement that there was certain evidence that could be considered “disadvantageous” could have led the jury to believe that the exhibits were actually disadvantageous or harmful to Gibson and any defenses he presented. This prejudice, coupled with the reference to the reviewing courts at a crucial point in the trial, thus constituted reversible error.
Although trial counsel failed to object to the trial court’s *620response during the trial, the objection was not waived since violations of OCGA § 17-8-57 are subject to plain error review. Thus, even though trial counsel failed to preserve the issue by objecting, review is still proper under the plain error rule, as it applies where the trial judge, in violation of OCGA § 17-8-57, has expressed or intimated an opinion as to the guilt of the accused. Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 514 (2) (640 SE2d 280) (2007) (citing Paul v. State, 272 Ga. 845 (3) (537 SE2d 58) (2000)); State v. Gardner, 286 Ga. 633 (690 SE2d 164) (2010).
To reach the opposite conclusion, the dissent argues that this Court should simply choose not to follow Faust, supra. In fact, the dissent goes so far as to say that this Court has simply chosen not to follow Faust in the past, despite the fact that it remains binding precedent. There is, however, no proof of the dissent’s overreaching assumption. As pointed out by the dissent, itself, this Court has cited Faust with approval in Walker v. State, 255 Ga. 251 (2) (336 SE2d 752) (1985). The Walker case is wholly distinguishable on its facts from the present case; it dealt with a trial court’s admonishment of a sleeping juror, not a statement regarding evidence. Walker also resulted in a different outcome based on the concept of waiver. As a result, Walker does not, in any rational way, support the dissent’s assumption that this Court has thrown Faust by the wayside. It is clear, then, that this Court has not disregarded Faust. To the contrary, Walker reasonably leads only to the opposite conclusion — Faust remains the law. As a result, the dissent’s proposition that we should circumvent this binding precedent merely because we dislike it must be rejected.
3. Because we conclude that the language complained of was reversible error, we need not reach Gibson’s other enumerations of error.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Carley, P. J., and Nahmias, J., who dissent.

 On March 8, 2006, Gibson was indicted for malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Gibson was found guilty on March 6, 2008 of felony murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. On March 6, 2008, Gibson was sentenced to life plus five years. The trial court merged the armed robbery with the felony murder count for purposes of sentencing. Gibson filed a motion for new trial on March 7, 2008, and an amended motion on June 15, 2009. On April 27, 2010, the motion was denied. Gibson’s timely appeal was docketed in this Court to the September 2010 term and submitted for decision on the briefs.

 Not all comments regarding reviewing courts are reversible error. Mere abstract references to appellate courts, which do not convey the trial court’s opinion, are not necessarily reversible error. However, the comments at issue here do not fall into that category.