Court Opinion

ID: 9768259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:53:01.413332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:38.735593
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,

dissenting.

In my opinion the Court is heading for constitutional trouble in its tendency to construe Article 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., as carte blanche for receiving any and every bit of derogatory evidence against an accused. This, I believe, turns the purpose of the provision, as well as the interpretative gloss of intent given by the Supreme Court of the United States in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), on its head. Indeed, while this Court did say in its Jurek opinion, 522 S.W.2d 934, 940, that the jury could consider that range and severity of his “prior criminal conduct” — a phrase that does not necessarily embrace “details” of his prior offenses — the principle enunciated was that the “quality of discretion” exercised by the jury and “the manner in which it is applied” are what “must be controlled.” In my view, we enhance neither by the opinion of the Court rendered today.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
PHILLIPS, J., joins.