Court Opinion

ID: 9716896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:53:31.072827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:49.867963
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
In this case the trial court over objection permitted the prosecution to present evidence evithe dog tracked appellant’s scent from the laundromat. In Brafford v. Brafford (1987), Ind., 516 N.E.2d 45, this court reiterated the longstanding prohibition against the use of this type of evidence to convict:
“It has long been held in Indiana that tracking dog or “bloodhound evidence” is not sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence.”
In Ruse v. State (1917), 186 Ind. 237, 115 N.E. 778, Judge Spencer wrote for the court regarding this type evidence:
“.. both reason and instinct condemn such evidence, and courts should be too jealous of the life and liberty of human beings to permit its reception in a criminal case as proof of guilt.”
It flows a fortiori from this rule of evidence that no satisfactory foundation for the admission of bloodhound evidence can be made. The rule is based upon the unob-tainability of scientific and other information which can furnish a satisfactory basis or reason for admitting such evidence. A scientist who is intimately acquainted with every detail of a grandiose scientific investigation has not necessarily reached a single conclusion worthy of being regarded as reliable. The objection raised at trial, while not completely in focus, was adequate and should have been sustained.
While the majority opinion now recognizes that tracking dog or “bloodhound evidence” is not sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence in a criminal case as proof of guilt, the majority apparently believes that wrongfully admitted evidence should simply be ignored so long as a sufficient amount of probative evidence remains to support the conviction.
I was still under the impression that Indiana adhered to the “harmless error” standard in determining whether the erroneous admission of evidence mandates a new trial. An appropriate harmless error analysis results in the conclusion that a new trial should be granted. The entire body of trial evidence was circumstantial. Appellant had no loot in his possession and the incriminating force of his statement to the effect that he could not be convicted because he was not caught inside the building is diminished by the possibility that it may have referred to other mischief going on in the neighborhood at a nearby church. The prosecution’s case was substantially enhanced by the admission of testimony that a police dog tracked a scent from the laundromat directly to appellant. This was extremely prejudicial and in conjunction with the circumstantial nature of the prosecution’s case, cannot be deemed harmless.
The case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs.