Court Opinion

ID: 9484021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:38:29.984275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:58.461746
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Career criminals. Habitual violent offenders. Repeat offenders. Recidivists. In recognizing that innocent people become unfortunate victims of the truly merciless members of our society; in attempting to balance the dual concerns of retribution and rehabilitation of the seemingly unrepentant individuals of our communities; and in trying to grapple with the immeasurable scarring and enduring pain created by a small, yet notorious clan of criminals; we, as a society, beckoned Congress to establish and the courts to implement drastic solutions for dealing with the social defiants.
Congress, in realizing that we, as a society, are being engulfed by the problems created by these career offenders, has acted. With the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA” or “Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988 & Supp. Ill 1991), Congress enacted legislation which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence for recidivists.1
Unfortunately, in their otherwise laudable zeal to implement these stiff penalties, the courts, including the Sixth Circuit, have gone well beyond the underlying rationale which Congress had in establishing the *671ACCA. In this case, as our fellow circuits have previously done, the majority has expanded the scope of the ACCA to treat as separate and distinct criminal episodes those actions which are part of one continuous criminal episode or crime spree. Because this expansive interpretation and implementation of the ACCA is at odds with the language and underlying policy of the ACCA, I respectfully dissent.
I.
In a curious, yet disturbing way, the federal judiciary has come full circle in dealing with career criminals in a relatively short time period. Perhaps because of our genuine eagerness to place incorrigible repeat offenders behind bars, many courts have refused to adhere to and respect the parameters Congress has established.
In a predecessor statute to the present version of the ACCA, Congress established enhanced punishment for armed career criminals. Under 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1) (1982) (repealed 1986), any person who had three previous convictions by any court for robbery or burglary, or both, and subsequently violated 18 U.S.C.App. § 1201 (1982) (repealed 1986) would be sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years.2’3 Unlike other enhanced penalty provisions enacted by Congress which provided that prior convictions must be for offenses “committed on occasions different from one another,” see .18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)(1) (1982) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987) (dangerous special offender); 21 U.S.C. § 849(e)(1) (1982) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987) (dangerous special drug offender), there was no express requirement in Section 1202(a) that the three convictions be separate in time.
Although there was no explicit reference to the requirement that convictions be separate in time, the legislative history of Section 1202(a) provides substantial clues. Before the 1984 amendments to Section 1202(a) were added, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania drafted a bill which created federal jurisdiction over state-law armed burglary and armed robbery offenses committed by career criminals. Although Senator Specter’s bill went through several revisions, a general policy concept remained constant. That general policy was summarized in a report based on an early version of the bill. The report stated that the bill
is very narrowly aimed at the hard core of career criminals with long records for robbery and burglary offenses who have now “graduated” to the point of dangerousness and recklessness that they are using firearms to commit further robberies and burglaries. Accord*672ingly, the robbery provisions of S. 1688 [the early version of Senator Specter’s bill] only apply to a very small portion of the total robberies occurring in the United States. The important feature of the bill is that it focuses on the very worst robberies, by the very worst offenders with the worst records.
United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 680 (3d Cir.1989) (en banc) (quoting S.Rep. No. 585, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-63 (1982) [hereinafter S.Rep. No. 585]) (emphasis added). “The title is meant to suggest that the Bill have limited scope in that it only deals with career criminals and only those career criminals who are armed.” Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 585 at 69) (emphasis added).
That version of the bill originally called for life imprisonment. The justification for such a harsh penalty was as follows:
[T]he Act was so narrowly drawn to apply to only the most repetitive and violent and dangerous offender, that a life sentence would be justified in any case that could reasonably be expected to be prosecuted under the Act. Indeed, it is the underlying premise of the Act that at a certain point, a career criminal becomes practically impossible to rehabilitate.
* * * * * sH
[T]he idea was that once the career criminal had become a “three time loser,” the only reasonable disposition is permanent incarceration.
Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 585 at 76-77) (emphasis added).
In addition to the Senate report, Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, explained the policy behind the Act as follows:
These are people who have demonstrated, by virtue of their definition, that locking them up and letting them go doesn’t do any good. They go on again, you lock them up, you let them go, it doesn’t do any good, they are back for a third time. At that juncture, we should say, “That’s it; time out; it is all over. We, as responsible people, will never give you the opportunity to do this again.”
United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 891 (2d Cir.) (quoting Armed Career Criminal Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, 64 (1984) (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Stephen S. Trott)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101, 109 S.Ct. 2456, 104 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1989).
Trott’s testimony and Congress’ comments plainly presuppose that the Act is intended to apply to only incorrigible, habitual criminals or, as the Second Circuit in Towne stated, to “recidivists ... who have engaged in violent criminal activity on at least three separate occasions, and not individuals who happen to acquire three convictions as a result of a single criminal episode.” Id. at 891.
Soon after Section 1202(a)(1) was enacted, the Eighth Circuit read out any implied requirement that the crimes had to be committed on different occasions. Despite the important history and powerful language which undergirds Section 1202(a), the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Petty, 798 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir.1986), vacated and remanded, 481 U.S. 1034, 107 S.Ct. 1968, 95 L.Ed.2d 810 (1987), rev’d and remanded, 828 F.2d 2 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1057, 108 S.Ct. 2827, 100 L.Ed.2d 928 (1988), applied the statute quite literally. That circuit affirmed an enhanced sentence where the prior convictions relied upon included convictions on six counts of armed robbery, even though the six victims were located in one restaurant and were robbed “simultaneously.” Id. at 1159-60. In a brief one-paragraph opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit’s holding, suggesting that it reconsider in light of the argument of the Solicitor General in his brief to the Court. Petty v. United States, 481 U.S. 1034, 1034, 107 S.Ct. 1968, 1969, 95 L.Ed.2d 810 (1987). The Solicitor General argued that the legislative history of the Act “strongly supported] the conclusion that the statute was intended to reach multiple criminal episodes that were distinct in time, not multiple felony convictions arising out of a single criminal episode.” *673United States v. Petty, 828 F.2d 2, 3 (8th Cir.1987).
As a result of the Supreme Court’s admonishment and the Solicitor General’s concession of error, the Eighth Circuit revisited Petty and reversed its earlier decision. Id.
In the aftermath of Petty, the interpretation of Section 1202(a) was different. For example, in Balascsak, the Third Circuit read into Section 1202(a) a requirement that there must be intervening convictions between each offense before Section 1202(a) would be applicable. 873 F.2d at 681-82. Cf. United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 192-94 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831, 109 S.Ct. 87, 102 L.Ed.2d 63 (1988) (majority of panel held that the plain language of the statute “encompasses any person with three predicate convictions, whenever obtained”; majority also implicitly held that statute applied in this case because the two crimes were distinct in time).
In 1988, Congress added the phrase— “committed on occasions different from one another” — to the ACCA. See Minor and Technical Criminal Law Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4395, 4402. Prior to its passage, sectional analysis of the proposed Minor and Technical Criminal Law Amendments Act provided the following explication for that phrase:
Section 151 [the proposed phrase] would clarify the armed career criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), by inserting language describing the requisite type of prior convictions that trigger the law’s mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. Presently, section 924(e) provides that a person found in possession of a firearm shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum prison term of not less than fifteen years if such person “has three previous convictions ... for a violent felony or a serious drug offense” (as those terms are defined in the law). Recently, a court of appeals held that the “three previous convictions” requirement was met by a conviction on six counts for armed robbery in New York State in which the defendant was convicted for having robbed six different people at a restaurant at the same time. United States v. Petty, 798 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir.1986).
On petition for a writ of certiorari, the Solicitor General on behalf of the United States confessed error, pointing out that, while the armed career criminal statute lacked descriptive language found in other similar statutes to the effect that the convictions be for “offenses committed on occasions different from one another”, see 18 U.S.C. 3575(e)(1), 21 U.S.C. 849(e)(1), the legislative history nevertheless made clear that a similar interpretation was intended here. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of the Solicitor General’s views. [481] U.S. [1034, 107 S.Ct. 1968, 95 L.Ed.2d 810] (1987).
The proposed amendment would clarify the armed career criminal statute to reflect the Solicitor General’s construction and to bring the statute in conformity with the other enhanced penalty provisions cited above. Under the amendment, the three previous convictions would have to be for offenses “committed on occasions different from one another”. Thus, a single multi-count conviction could still qualify where the counts related to crimes committed on different occasions, but a robbery of multiple victims simultaneously (as in Petty) would count as only one conviction. This interpretation plainly expresses the concept of what is meant by a “career criminal”, that is, a person who over the course of time commits three or more of the enumerated kinds of felonies and is convicted therefor. It is appropriate to clarify the statute in this regard, both to avoid future litigation and to insure that its rigorous sentencing provisions apply only as intended in cases meriting such strict punishment.
134 Cong.Rec. 13,782-83 (1988).
The sectional analysis of the phrase shows the outer reaches of the ACCA as *674Congress intended. On one end, there is Petty. Petty establishes, at a minimum, that simultaneous acts should be treated as one conviction for the purposes of the ACCA. On the other end, Congress, through its amendment and accompanying legislative history, establishes that the rationale Balascsak is grounded on is probably no longer good law. That is to say, the phrase “committed on occasions different from one another” means that there need not be an intervening conviction between offenses before the ACCA becomes applicable.4
Congress did not explicitly instruct the courts on how to deal with the large, undefined, murky middle ground that rests between Balascsak and Petty, however. As a result, the courts have, unfortunately, moved alarmingly close to the original Eighth Circuit position announced in Petty. Seemingly, the courts have allowed a defendant to be subject to the ACCA in every situation except where there is a true “simultaneous” criminal episode. In coming back to the original Petty rationale, the courts have made the holding in Petty so narrow that it now exists only as a nebulous concept. Petty, as it relates to temporal concepts, remains good law only where a fortuitous defendant commits his crimes at the same precise time, see United States v. Montgomery, 819 F.2d 847, 850 n. 2 (8th Cir.1987) (government conceded that a single incident involving simultaneous robberies of two individuals constituted a single criminal conviction). Any lapse at all, even if for a minimal amount of time, will hurtle the defendant into the clutches of the ACCA. Regrettably, courts, including this court today, have done this despite legislative history relating to both the current and previous ACCA statutes, the Solicitor General’s comments in Petty, and the underlying meaning in Petty to the contrary. The federal judiciary has come full circle.
II.
The problem with the majority’s adoption of a “near-Petty” rationale is two-fold: 1) it blurs the concept of “committed on occasions different from one another”; and 2) it extinguishes the concept that the only defendants to be subject to the ACCA are the career criminal offenders.
A.
With the majority’s opinion today, we have forsaken the proper understanding of what it means to commit offenses “on occasions different from each other.” As stated earlier, we now know that the phrase can only be understood within the parameters the sectional analysis of the phrase provided. In trying to locate where within those parameters the phrase is best understood, the courts tinker with the concepts to show that the case before them does not involve truly “simultaneous” offenses. The courts have become masterful in using phrases and concepts such as the acts committed by the defendant were distinct in time, the defendant had successfully completed the first crime and was free to leave, there are different victims, and the locations are different, to explain why the case before them is different from the simultaneous acts in Petty. See, e.g., Wicks, 833 F.2d at 194; United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095, 1099 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 596, 116 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); United States v. Schieman, 894 F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 856, 111 S.Ct. 155, 112 L.Ed.2d 121 (1990); United States v. Antonie, 953 F.2d 496, 497-99 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 138, 121 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992). The majority does this as well in this case by holding, as a broad rule, that “we believe that offenses committed by a defendant at different times and places and against different victims, although committed within less than an hour of each other, are separate and distinct criminal episodes and that convictions for those crimes should be counted as separate predicate convictions under *675§ 924(e)(1).” United States v. Brady, 914 F.2d 258 (6th Cir.1993) (en banc).
Unfortunately, in mastering these different phrases and concepts, the courts have misconstrued the reasonable test Petty and Congress implicitly established. The test is not simultaneous versus non-simultaneous; same place versus different place; or same victim versus different victim. Furthermore, the test is not to merely look at those factors in total and conclude, as the majority has in this case, that all defendants whose actions fit those factors are thereby subject to the ACCA. There is no policy justification supporting that type of artificial line-drawing. In fact, the legislative history of the ACCA, explored earlier, refutes that type of simplistic line-drawing.
Rather, the general test that Petty and Congress established is whether two or more acts can be best capsuled as being one occasion of activity or different occasions of activity. Under this test, the important concepts are the defendant’s premeditation to commit several crimes at once and- general continuity of the defendant’s actions. Cf. Schieman, 894 F.2d at 915 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Furthermore, under this test, a defendant who, for whatever reason, did not commit the offenses simultaneously is not automatically lumped with the truly recidivist criminals. Finally, it more logically treats defendants who commit acts as part of one continuous activity or crime spree the same as the defendant who commits the acts simultaneously.5
With this test, the policy objective of subjecting a particular type of criminal to enhanced punishment is met. Through this test, there is a much greater likelihood of applying the ACCA to the career criminal. It will ensnare those who, over commit crimes which are random and disjunctive while not capturing those who commit crimes over a short time period and in a continuous manner.
If the test is not as I have described it, it strains logic to not subject one defendant to the ACCA because one’s acts are simultaneous and subject another defendant to the ACCA when one’s acts are simultaneous minus one second, or five seconds, or one hour, etc. Similarly, it strains logic to hold that one defendant would be subject to the ACCA merely because the crimes were committed at two locations while another defendant would not be subject to the ACCA because the acts were committed at one location.
B.
As stated earlier, the Armed Career Criminal Act, as with its predecessor, is aimed at a “three-time loser,” see S.Rep. No. 585 at 76-77, and the “recidivists ... who have engaged in violent criminal activity on at least three separate occasions, and not individuals who happen to acquire three convictions as a result of a single criminal episode,” see Towne, 870 F.2d at 891. Therefore, the majority’s reading out of the concept of career in the general philosophy behind (not to mention the title of) the Armed Career Criminal Act is equally troubling.
The disappearance of the concept of career presents itself forcefully in the case before us. In support of its request that Brady be treated as an armed career criminal, the government relied on two prior convictions which happened on the same night. More specifically, they occurred within no more than one hour of each oth*676er. The first robbery occurred at approximately 9:30 p.m. in a beauty salon. The second robbery happened less than forty-five minutes later in a bar. Furthermore, Brady used the same weapon and had the same accomplice.
Notwithstanding the fact that the events happened as part of a continuous course of criminal activity, or a “crime spree,” the majority treats Brady’s actions as two separate crimes. In essence, the majority holds that Brady has had a “career” in less than an hour. It misses logic to hold that a “career” can comprise the events of a single evening, or more aptly put, less than one hour, and thereby subject him to fifteen years of incarceration.6
Other cases show the absurdity of having events of a single night, and in many cases, a minuscule portion of that night, somehow equal a “career.” For example, in United States v. Summers, No. 92-30075, 1992 WL 313140, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 1992), the defendant committed burglaries of four separate recreational cabins which defendant contended occurred one right after another on the same day. In United States v. Vance, 961 F.2d 217 (9th Cir.1992) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 335, 121 L.Ed.2d 252 (1992), the defendant and a companion committed three robberies on the same day. The facts are as follows:
At 10:10 p.m. they robbed two people sitting in a parked car in University City, California. Between 11:15 and 11:30 p.m. they robbed three people walking through a hotel parking lot in Mission Valley, California, and were chased by a security guard. Between 11:15 and midnight they robbed two people in another hotel parking lot approximately 0.3 miles away from the first parking lot.
Id. In Tisdale, 921 F.2d at 1099, the defendant committed three burglaries “successively” at three different stores in the same mall during the same evening. In Antonie, 953 F.2d at 497-98, the defendant committed armed robberies about forty minutes apart against different victims and at different locations.
In each of these cases, the appellate courts held that the offenses were sufficiently distinct, thereby warranting the application of the ACCA. Those courts implied, just as the majority has held in this case, a “career” subjecting a defendant to fifteen years in prison can be had for actions which occur in one brief time span that may have been one continuous crime spree.
The potential absurdity of having one night’s worth of actions conclusively and definitely considered a “career” is made poignantly clear by the potential way the ACCA can be applied. The Ninth Circuit noted an example created by a district court which shows the potential absurdity of calling one evening’s endeavors a “career”:
The district court conjectured that a heavily intoxicated 22-year-old man, with no criminal record, could commit three robberies in one evening. Twenty years later, after raising a family and encountering no other trouble with the law, this man could be arrested while hunting and convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm. If sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, he would be subject to a fifteen-year enhanced sentence.
Antonie, 953 F.2d at 499 (citing United States v. McClinton, 815 F.2d 1242, 1245 (8th Cir.1987)).
*677III.
Having set out the problem with the majority’s holding in this case, as well as other courts in numerous other cases, the issue becomes whether there is any way to determine whether a defendant’s actions were committed on different occasions such that those actions should be treated as establishing a “career.” Without question, it is far easier, as a matter of exercise, to follow the majority’s “near-Petty” test because it allows all but simultaneous acts to be counted as separate acts. Merely being easy to implement does not end the inquiry, however. Therefore, I would propose following the test I described earlier. Under this test, merely having different victims, different locations, and different times would only begin the inquiry. In addition to those questions, the test would include the continuity of the defendant’s actions and to the extent possible, a determination of the predisposition of the defendant. The courts ought to be able to look at the underlying facts of a case and determine whether a defendant’s actions of a single evening warrant the application of the ACCA. If those actions are part of the continuous crime spree, as they were in this case, the actions ought to be treated as one criminal episode for purposes of the Act. In most, if not all instances, where multiple convictions arise out of a continuous course of criminal activity, or a crime spree, only one separate and distinct criminal episode has occurred for the purposes of the Act.
I understand that this may pose a slightly more difficult line-drawing task for this court than other circuits have been willing to undertake, but, given what I believe to be Congress’ intent in enacting the ACCA, I strongly urge that the burden is one we must shoulder. Cf. Schiemcm, 894 F.2d at 915 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (if the court implemented test similar to the test suggested above, court’s task would not be impossible). Congress sought to target career criminals with this statute, and I cannot agree with the majority and our sister circuits that a career logically comprises the events of a single evening.7
The courts should not be so quick to impose such a drastic penalty on defendants who essentially have one bad night. While it is undisputed that a defendant should be punished for each conviction, Congress determined that no less than three convictions, “committed on occasions different from one another,” are necessary to evidence that a wrongdoer is a career criminal deserving of fifteen additional years of incarceration. We should not join the other circuits in buckling under to the societal pressures and concerns by making that phrase “committed on occasions different from one another” and the term “career” utterly meaningless.

. The ACCA dramatically enlarges the penalty for any person who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988) and has three previous convictions of violent felonies or serious drug offenses by imposing a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence. It states, in pertinent part:
(1) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be fined not more that $25,000 and imprisoned not less that fifteen years, and, notwithstanding- any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under section 922(g), and such person shall not be eligible for parole with respect to the sentence imposed under this subsection.

. 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a)(1) stated, in part: Any person who — (1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony, ... and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both. In the case of a person who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce any firearm and who has three previous convictions by any court referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection for robbery or burglary, or both, such person shall be fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under this subsection, and such person shall not be eligible for parole with respect to the sentence imposed under this subsection.
(Emphasis added.)

. The present version of the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), has a storied past. The first version was the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-351, § 1202(a), 82 Stat. 197, 236. That version was amended by the Armed Career Criminal’s Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, § 1802, 98 Stat. 1976, 1837, 2185, and was later repealed by the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(4), 100 Stat. 449, 458-59. The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986 also changed the codification of the ACCA to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), the provision relevant to this case, was subsequently amended by the Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-570, § 924(e)(1), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-39 to 3207-40, and by the Minor and Technical Criminal Law Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4395, 4402.

. As the majority opinion ably points out, every circuit, including the Third Circuit, has declined to accept and apply the Balascsak rationale.

. But for a temporal distinction, the "crime spree” defendant and the “simultaneous” defendant can be strikingly similar. Both may have an established predetermined course of action. The intent to commit the crimes in either situation may be identical. In Petty, for example, the defendant may have predetermined that he would rob six restaurant patrons. In the same way, Brady could have contemplated robbing six customers at two locations and that he would do them back to back.
In addition, with both a crime spree and a simultaneous act, there is a continuity of activity. Either the act is presently occurring or there is movement or activity that would tie one act of violence with the next act of violence. Any pause in the actual acts of violence in the crime spree situation are merely lulls between the commissions of crimes to allow the defendant an opportunity to do certain things like reload weapons or plot final strategies.
Finally, both are committed over a relatively short time period.

. "Career” has been defined as "an occupation or profession followed as a life's work.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary 117 (1974) (emphasis added). That definition implies a lengthy, time-consuming undertaking which consumes a good portion of one’s life. In this context, any use of the word "career" to signify any short period of time is probably being so used in a joking way only to highlight a particular grand accomplishment. For example, when it is mentioned in sports (e.g., "that person had a career night”) because of some grand accomplishment (e.g., Francisco Cabrera propelling the Atlanta Braves to the World Series in 1992 by driving in the tying and winning runs with the bases loaded and two outs in the bottom of the ninth inning), it is not expected that, based on one night’s performance, she or he will be placed in some shrine that honors "career” or "lifetime" achievers (e.g., the Baseball Hall of Fame).

. Another plausible way of dealing with how to determine whether a criminal is a "career” criminal offender is to establish, via new legislation, a scheme which balances numerous factors including a defendant’s propensity for crime, the time lapse between the defendant's prior convictions and the conviction which would subject her/him to the ACCA, and the types of crimes. See, e.g., James E. Hooper, Note, Bright Lines, Dark Deeds: Counting Convictions Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 Mich.L.Rev.1951 (1991).