Court Opinion

ID: 9857183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 13:54:49.514674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:06.523122
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting:
There are two major problems with the conviction of Letcher Powell: (1) The trial judge’s apparent conviction of Powell for the acts of sexual abuse among the members of his family rather than for an act of sexual abuse by the defendant of his youngest daughter for which he was charged; and (2) The trial judge’s admission of inadmissible evidence, including hearsay and testimony on prior uncharged acts.
CONVICTION NOT ON THE BASIS OF THE ACT FOR WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED
The defendant was charged with a single count of lewd conduct with a minor, the complaint alleging that defendant had intercourse with his youngest daughter. In his oral findings following final argument the trial judge stated:
(Proceedings following final argument)
Tuesday, January 5, 1988
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Powell, I don’t think that there is any question that I still stick with my original findings that this child was sexually abused, and that your son [] had sexual intercourse with her. That's very obvious from the evidence. And I so reiterate.
There is also no question in my mind that physically and mentally your family has abused this child. Now, I’m not so sure from the evidence that I have heard that this is serious physically, but I’m sure that it has a terrible mental effect upon the child.
I don’t know what your family has done to create such a situation in your home, but I don’t think any children ought to be raised in your home.
Now, I have listened to this child’s statements through others, and I have listened to tapes and I have reread yesterday some of the statements made by the child.
And I don’t think there is any question there was a lot of fantasy in thought and inconsistency in the statements of the child.
This case is bad enough that I really for the first time — maybe not the first time, but one of the few times — I really wish that the jury could have heard this. I’m very sorry you waived the jury because it is a very difficult matter, and maybe the good Lord will give me the ultimate wisdom to make the appropriate decision.
But after considering and thinking and listening and based on all the statements, I must find you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and I am going to find you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
And I’m going to raise the bond to a hundred thousand dollars and I’m going to remand Mr. Powell to custody.
And I am going to set sentencing in lieu of objections for February 5th, 1988, at 1:30.
And, Mr. Bailiff, would you take Mr. Powell in custody.
THE BAILIFF: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is there anything further we should take up.
MR. ROSENTHAL: Not from the state, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Court is in recess.
*712(The matter then concluded.)
It is Ordered that the above shall constitute the official findings of this Court.
1/7/87
/s/ Robert G. Newhouse District Judge
At sentencing the judge stated:
(Judge Newhouse’s comments at sentencing)
Tuesday, January 5, 1988
THE COURT: Would you rise and stand?
Well, Mr. Powell, I have to admit to you that this is one of the hardest cases for me to try that I have ever heard. I admit freely that I don’t really know the complete truth that went on here. I submit that no one does, even I suspect the children don’t and because many things were fantasized in their mind and there were many statements and they talked to each other and back and forth.
Everything that has gone on, of course, has been done in the secret, been in the closet so to speak, it’s unknown. And I submit to you that I might be wrong, but I don’t believe that I am.
And I do — if this is the situation, I believe it, and these attorneys have gone back and forth and chewed it over forever, the home life that you come from is an actual cess-pool, and it was so bad some of the things that I heard, I didn’t rest well at night during the trial. Many times I have wished over and over that you had asked a jury to hear this. Even the attorneys got more worked up certainly than the average.
Now, the damage that you caused, as I determined, is going to affect our society for generations. We have seven children with no idea of any moral standards, and they’ll likely sexually abuse their own children, along with each other, and their children’s children will abuse their children, and this will perpetuate itself forever. And there’s no question in my mind, and I’m convinced of this, that you are the strong person in that family. You dominate the family. You’re an extremely strong person.
And if one-third of the things I’ve heard is true, it would make a good “R” movie, certainly better than most things I’ve seen. I’ve read about this type of family, the so-called incestuous family. I really couldn’t believe that they were basically real until I heard this case.
I feel very strongly in this case based on these statements, and I have tried to pattern what I think is a fair sentence considering the severity of the matter as I view it.
Based on the thinking I’ve done, and I can assure you that’s been a lot, I’m going to sentence you to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction under the Unified Sentence Law of the state of Idaho for an aggregate term of not more than 20 years. The court specifies a minimum period of confinement of 10 years and a subsequent indeterminate period of custody of 10 years. By that time, your children will certainly be of age and can protect themselves.
I’m going to remand you to the proper agent of the state board of correction in execution of this sentence, and the defendant is to receive credit for the number of days spent in jail prior to entry of this judgment, and I’ll direct my presentence investigator to check with the jail and get an exact figure on that. I’ll put it in the judgment of conviction, and if anybody has any objection, they can bring appropriate motions to this court.
Now, the court, since the defendant is incarcerated in the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction, determines that an order of restitution would be inappropriate at this time.
Good luck to you, Mr. Powell. If I have made an error, why, I’m very sorry. I think not. We’ll take a short recess before we take up our next case.
(Emphasis added.)
It is not clear by any means that the trial court was able to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Powell was guilty of a specific incident of lewd conduct. Rather, it is more apparent that Powell was convicted *713for his responsibility for the moral degeneration of his family, for acts of sexual abuse committed by his children, and for other acts of abuse for which he was not charged, but to which some of his children testified. If the case is not to be reversed and remanded for a new trial because of the evidentiary errors (to be discussed below), it should at least be remanded to the district court with the direction that the court prepare some finding or findings as to whether it finds Powell to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the specific incident for which he was charged, and if so, the court should then identify the evidence in the record which supports that finding.
ADMISSION OF INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
At trial numerous evidentiary issues were hotly contested. The trial judge chose to admit all of the disputed evidence, stating only that he would later give his ruling as to its admissibility. The judge later did deny defendant’s motion to strike the testimony of defendant’s oldest son and oldest daughter, but there are no other instances in the record where the judge made a ruling on any of the objections he had earlier deferred.
Defendant objected to the testimony by his oldest son and oldest daughter, on the grounds that it was irrelevant because the events testified to were remote in time and space. Initially, the court allowed the testimony on the basis that it was a court trial and the disputed testimony was subject to a motion to strike. Tr. Vol. Ill, 259. The son testified as to events which occurred in 1984 and 1986, not in Idaho, but in North Carolina and Illinois. He testified that he had sex with the youngest daughter, that this daughter had told him that her father had sexually abused her, and that his father sexually abused another one of the daughters. The oldest daughter testified that her father had sexually abused her from 1975 to 1984 while they lived in North Carolina and Illinois, and that her father physically abused the youngest daughter in Illinois. At the close of the oldest daughter’s testimony the defendant again objected to the testimony of his oldest children as irrelevant and prejudicial. The trial court denied the motion to strike, stating that the testimony was relevant but furnishing no reasons to support its relevance.
The trial judge abused his discretion in admitting this evidence. The defendant correctly points out that the prior uncharged acts of sexual misconduct testified to were too remote in time and place to be relevant to the question of whether the defendant abused his youngest daughter in Idaho. See State v. Boothe, 103 Idaho 187, 646 P.2d 429 (Ct.App.1982) (prior acts occurring one year earlier were not too remote in time; court cites to a case holding that act three years prior was too remote); State v. Maylett, 108 Idaho 671, 701 P.2d 291 (Ct.App.1985) (trial court properly limited testimony on prior acts to a period of one year prior to the act charged). The prior acts of misconduct that defendant’s oldest son and daughter testified to occurred between two and eighteen years prior to the act defendant was charged with and were therefore inadmissible as being too remote in time to be relevant. The prejudice to the defendant resulting from the admission of the oldest son’s and daughter’s testimony requires that the defendant be given a new trial.
The defendant also objected to the admission into evidence of the contact notes of Kim Huitt, the youngest daughter’s caseworker and a witness for the state. When Huitt concluded her testimony, the prosecution offered her contact notes into evidence. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the notes had only been used to refresh the recollection of the witness and contained extensive hearsay regarding conversations with several persons occurring during the investigation of the case. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed the notes into evidence, stating only that it would take into account what was legally admissible. Tr. Vol. IX, 912.
It is impossible on review to ascertain from this ruling what parts of the contact notes the trial judge found to be legally admissible or inadmissible, or even to veri*714fy that the court indulged itself in the exercise of allowing in or weeding out evidence. Since the judge made no finding as to which parts were inadmissible, it is possible that he found the entirety of the notes to be admissible. Where a large part of the notes contained inadmissible hearsay, it is almost certain that the defendant was prejudiced by the admission of this material. The primary contention on appeal, and a sound one, is that the district court’s repeated failure to rule on defendant’s evidentiary objections has resulted in defense counsel’s inability to mount a meaningful appeal. This failure to rule on the evidentiary objections requires that the conviction be vacated and the defendant be granted a new trial.
DISSENT ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING