Court Opinion

ID: 9742738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:19:20.295022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:35.834170
License: Public Domain

Williams, C.J.
I concur with most of the rationale of my brother Ryan’s opinion, but not necessarily with the conclusion. I dissent, however, from that part of his opinion found in Part 11(C)(2)(b), "Third,” establishing an accounting principle for considering "the effect of the 'emergency’ dues upon the resources of the union allocated to supporting labor disputes” ante, p 504. The accounting principle I disagree with is stated ante, p 505, as follows:
"As applied to the UAW’s SIF, which is composed of payments from both regular and emergency sources, payments from the fund should be considered to be composed of the same percentage of regular dues and emergency dues as the larger fund.”
On the surface, as Justice Ryan writes, such an approach seems fair and logical. However, the fact of the matter is that, if this formula is applied, there will always remain a percentage of the commingled fund that relates to the "emergency” dues until the end of time unless the fund drops to zero in the interim. This is neither fair nor, I am sure, intended by the Legislature.
As a consequence, I would adopt a Last-In-First-Out (LIFO) formula for three reasons. First, the LIFO formula would relate the voting and contribution of the "emergency” dues more proximately to the distribution of an equivalent amount of money distributed in strike benefits subject to triggering disqualification from unemployment compensation than either the Justice Ryan formula or the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) formula. Second, the LIFO formula would not inflate the dura*547tion of "emergency” dues payments subject to disqualification by the totally irrelevant factor of the size of the prior properly constituted strike fund as the Justice Ryan formula does. For example, under the Justice Ryan formula if there were a prior strike fund equal to the size of the "emergency” dues payments, the disqualification would last twice as long (during the payment of twice as many strike benefit dollars) as it would if there had been no strike fund. This has the curious effect of increasing exposure to disqualification in inverse order to the comparative amount of "emergency” dues. Third, the LIFO formula does not perpetually taint the strike fund as the formula Justice Ryan has adopted would do. When the last cent of "emergency” dues is spent, there would no longer be the possibility of a financing disqualification.
In passing, the other discussed formula, the FIFO formula is not as fair as the LIFO formula. To begin with, it requires the payment of strike benefits first out of moneys deposited in the fund prior to the commingling of the "emergency” dues. This means the payment of strike funds would be made out of the least proximately concerned moneys. Second, if the strike fund were large enough, the emergency might pass without the "emergency” dues being touched. This could also mean that the "emergency” dues would be paid out at a later date when they would disqualify unreasonably or relieve the "emergency” dues from ever disqualifying. Neither alternative would seem to be what the Legislature had in mind.
In conclusion, I would remand this matter to the Board of Review to determine whether, using a LIFO formula, any amount of "emergency” funds beyond a de minimis amount, actually financed strike benefits for the striking workers in the GM *548plants supplying plaintiffs’ plants. If there were no such funds, benefits should be paid. If there were such funds, there would be disqualification pursuant to Justice Ryan’s opinion.
Levin, J., concurred with Williams, C.J.