Court Opinion

ID: 9753613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:20:14.242887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:39.081423
License: Public Domain

Justice FLAHERTY,
dissenting in part and concurring in the result.
There can be no more powerful evidence in a criminal trial than a defendant’s admission that he is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. A confession packs an intellectual and emotional wallop, and once it is submitted to a fact-finder, the focus predictably shifts from the guilt or innocence of the accused to whether the statement was voluntary. It is precisely because of the potency of such admissions that law enforcement officers work so hard to obtain them, employing, as they should, sophisticated techniques designed to draw concessions from suspects. Invariably, jurors are tasked with determining whose story to believe: the police, who categorically say that the accused was calm, comfortable, and subjected to no inappropriate physical or emotional pressure, or the defendant, who often complains of emotional browbeating and physical deprivation.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to decline to require that a cautionary instruction be given whenever the prosecution attempts to meet its evi-dentiary burden by relying on an unrecorded, or partially recorded, custodial interrogation. Specifically, I would hold that when a suspect is interrogated in a detention setting for a crime punishable by imprisonment for life, and law enforcement has the capability to video record the interrogation but declines to do so, the jury should be informed by instruction that this was so, if such an instruction is requested by the defendant.20
A Tradition of Concern Surrounding Custodial, Detention-Centered Interrogation
Ascertaining the essential truth of the circumstances surrounding a custodial, detention-centered interrogation long has presented the criminal justice system with unique challenges. As far back as 1936, the United States Supreme Court articulated deep concern in its seminal decision, Brown v. Mississippi, in which the Court acknowledged:
“Coercing the supposed state’s criminals into confessions and using such confessions so coerced from them against them *1186in trials has been the curse of all countries. It was the chief iniquity, the crowning infamy of the Star Chamber, and the Inquisition, and other similar institutions. The Constitution recognized the evils that lay behind these practices and prohibited them in this country. * * * The duty of maintaining constitutional rights of a person on trial for his life rises above mere rules of procedure, and wherever the court is clearly satisfied that such violations exist, it will refuse to sanction such violations and will apply the corrective.” Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936) (quoting Fisher v. State, 145 Miss. 116, 110 So. 361, 365 (1926)).
The challenge of balancing the rights of defendants, the evidence-collecting responsibilities of law enforcement and prosecutors, and the truth-seeking goals of judges and juries has been a moving target. Since Brown (and without doubt before Brown), courts have struggled to maintain an appropriate balance between these interests in myriad contexts. The increased availability and ease of use of advanced technology has altered that balance still more.
State-Based Evolution: Custodial, Detention-Centered Interrogation and Technology
As eloquently outlined by the majority, the first state court to require electronic recording of detention-centered interrogations was the Alaska Supreme Court, which, in 1985, found electronic recording (either by audio or video tape) to be a due-process right under that state’s constitution. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985). Other states that have analyzed the issue have declined to conclude, and I agree, that such a right is founded on due-process principles.21 However, several states have reached the same result, basing their analyses on principles of fairness or justice.22
Moreover, several state courts have held that recording confessions promotes or even ensures accuracy. See, e.g., State v. Sawyer, 561 So.2d 278, 280 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (commending police department “in its practice of maintaining a record of interrogations through the use of tape recording” and “recommending] this practice to all other law enforcement agencies so that challenges to future confessions can be exposed to the light of truth”); Lara v. State, 25 P.3d 507, 511 (Wyo.2001) (noting that “tape-recorded interviews [ ] leave far fewer loose ends to be tied up and in many, if not most, instances would be a well-advised protocol to follow”).
It is significant that most courts that have considered the merits of electronic recording have concluded that adopting the practice significantly improves the criminal justice system, and specifically, the ability of judges and juries to get to the truth.23 See, e.g., United States v. *1187Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d 136,144 n. 3 (1st Cir.2000) (“[Tjhere is little doubt that accurate, contemporaneous recording of custodial statements would facilitate the truth-seeking aims of the justice system, and it would also facilitate review on appeal”); Jimenez v. State, 105 Nev. 337, 775 P.2d 694, 696 (1989) (finding that recordings “would alleviate the problems of credibility of police officers who claim a defendant made incriminating statements”); State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 772 (Tenn.2001) (“There can be little doubt that electronically recording custodial interrogations would reduce the amount of time spent in court resolving disputes over what occurred during the interrogation.”); State v. Kilmer, 190 W.Va. 617, 439 S.E.2d 881, 893 (1993) (opining that recording would benefit law enforcement, the suspect, and the court).
There can be no question that as courts and legislatures engage in the continuing work of providing for a just determination in every criminal proceeding, there has been a concomitant trend to require that the interrogations of suspects be recorded. Indeed, since Alaska’s adoption of the practice a quarter of a century ago, fourteen states and the District of Columbia now require law-enforcement personnel to record some or all custodial interviews. The legislatures and the courts of our sister states that have traveled that path have expressed a preference that confessions be recorded through the development of sundry procedures that encourage or mandate such recordings. Those preferences have ranged from (1) a statement by the court of its preference for electronic recording of detention-based custodial interrogations,24 (2) a statute requiring a jury instruction that a jury may presume involuntariness from the absence of a recording, complete or otherwise,25 (3) a presumption of inadmissibility when the custodial interrogation is not recorded in its entirety,26 (4) a presumption of admissibility when the custodial interrogation is recorded in full,27 (5) a jury instruction con*1188veying that a jury should evaluate with particular caution an alleged statement or confession made at a place of detention and derived from an unrecorded interrogation.28 Significantly, many law enforcement agencies across the country record such interviews as a matter of sound policy and best practice.29
Oversight Responsibility for the Fair Administration of Justice Obligates this Court to Exercise its Supervisory Authority
It is almost axiomatic that the prosecution generally will prevail when the defendant is directly pitted against the police in a “swearing contest” with respect to what occurred during an interrogation resulting in a confession. See Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1158 n. 6. On the other hand, the growing proliferation of recording devices as part of our daily lives presents palpable risks to law enforcement. On this point, the Iowa Supreme Court recently opined:
“Commentators, and the American Bar Association, have advocated videotaped recording of custodial interrogations. See Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The Need for Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 Drake L.Rev. 619, 619-46 (2004). As these authors have stated,
‘failing to record police interrogations may no longer be a luxury that police officers can afford. We live in a video age, an age when satellites can track our every movement and when cameras are in our banks, in our stores, on our roads, and in our homes. Most of the citizens who make up the jury pool either have or will soon have video or digital cameras of their own. In this context, it is becoming increasingly difficult for jurors to accept the assertions of police officers that they did not tape interrogations because it was not their policy to do so. In the post-DNA age, when every wrongful conviction is front-page news, and police officers and prosecutors are being asked to explain what went wrong in each of these cases, police , officers may have to start recording interrogations as a matter of self-preservation. Their failure to do so will, as the reformers suggested, breed distrust in their methods and cause a strain in their relations with the public.’ ” State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 455-56 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Drizin & Reich, 52 Drake L.Rev. at 638-39).
And therein lies the rub. There is no question that there may be a multitude of valid reasons why law enforcement does not record a suspect’s confession. These may range from an experienced interrogator’s judgment that the suspect will not talk if he is being recorded, to the flat refusal of a person being interrogated to give a recorded statement. However, despite such valid potential reasons, it is the fact-finder who carries the burden of adjudging the voluntariness of the statement, and the fact-finder is entitled to the best and highest quality of evidence, or an ex*1189planation why it was not presented to it. And it is this Court’s responsibility, under its supervisory authority, to aid the fact-finder in its search for the truth.
The Humane Practice Rule Should Not Be Relied Upon as an Exclusive Safeguard of Voluntariness
The majority has set forth correctly, and with admirable clarity, this state’s long adherence to the Humane Practice Rule, which “requires that judge and jury make separate and independent determinations of voluntariness.” State v. Dennis, 893 A.2d 250, 262 (R.I.2006). However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holding that this is a sufficient safeguard, and I also disagree with its averment that it is “satisfied that juries in this state routinely receive adequate instructions with respect to the voluntariness vel non of custodial interrogations— most notably because of - our Humane Practice Rule.” Although it certainly is true that the Humane Practice Rule does provide a valuable safeguard, I cannot accept that fairness — especially in cases involving investigation of a crime punishable by life imprisonment — is conclusively resolved when balanced against the generally accepted observation that “[ljisten-ing to a defendant be inculpated by his or her own voice has a persuasive power unrivaled by contradictory testimonial evidence.” State v. Barnett, 147 N.H. 334, 789 A.2d 629, 632 (2001); accord Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533 (2004) (characterizing confessional evidence as being of an “exceptionally potent quality”). Furthermore, and especially in light of the ease of access to recording technology in today’s society, it is my opinion that the Humane Practice Rule should not be relied on as the sole standard for a determination of voluntariness.30
The position that our Humane Practice Rule — without any accounting for the realities of contemporary technologies — is sufficient to advance the truth-seeking function of justice as it relates to a determination of voluntariness is needlessly static. Indeed, whether by judicial interpretation or legislative action, other states that employ the Humane Practice Rule (or its relative equivalent under a different name)31 have advanced their truth-seeking practices by employing new technology in concert with the Humane Practice Rule, and not as a substitute for it. These jurisdictions include Maryland (Md.Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 2-402(1) (2008) (requiring that “a law enforcement unit that regularly utilizes one or more interrogation rooms capable of creating audiovisual recordings of custodial interrogations shall make reasonable efforts to create an audiovisual recording of a custodial interrogation of a criminal suspect in connection with a case involving” named felonies “whenever possible”)); Massachusetts (DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d at 533 (holding that the defendant, when requested, is entitled to a jury instruction explaining that “the State’s highest court has expressed a preference that such interrogations be recorded whenever practicable”)); Missouri (Mo. Ann. Stat., ch. 590.700 (West 2009) (requiring the recording of custodial interviews of suspects of specified felonies if recording equipment is available and *1190recording is feasible)); Nebraska (Neb. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 2SM501 to § 29-4508 (LexisNexis 2008) (§ 29-4504 says, “a court shall instruct the jury that they may draw an adverse inference for the law enforcement officer’s failure to comply with [§ 29-4503].”)); New Mexico (N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-16 (2005) (requiring detention-centered electronic re-cordation in its entirety if reasonably available unless good cause is shown for not recording)), and Oregon (Or.Rev.Stat. § 133.400(3) (2010) (“upon the request of the defendant, the court shall instruct the jury regarding the legal requirement described in subsection (1) of this section and the superior reliability of electronic recordings when compared with testimony about what was said and done”)).32
Thus, it cannot be maintained that the contemporary and ever-widening use of available technology to mitigate the serious dangers of involuntary confessions occurring in detention-based interrogations is limited to those states that lack the safeguards provided by the Humane Practice Rule or its relative equivalent. Rather, the actions of the six states enumerated above demonstrate that the Humane Practice Rule’s dual-tier review of voluntariness is not in and of itself a sufficient prophylactic to the extent that we can confidently ignore the additional protections provided by the widespread availability and ease of use of highly reliable recording technologies.
Although I agree that the dual-tiered review provided by the Humane Practice Rule increases the likelihood that the vol-untariness of a defendant’s confession will be fully considered by the fact-finders, it does nothing to ensure that the quality of the evidence reviewed by judge and jury is the best available. By encouraging recordings of custodial, detention-centered inteiTogations, this Court would not undermine the Humane Practice Rule, but would in fact enhance it by providing judges and juries with the most accurate representation of a defendant’s proffered confession.
Summation of Dissent
Therefore, for the aforementioned reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this case does not require this Court to address the jury instruction issue raised in this appeal. In cases in which a confession to a crime punishable by imprisonment for life is garnered in a detention setting, justice is best served if the trial justice, upon request, instructs the jury that it may consider that the police had the opportunity to video record the confession but did not do so. Although a recording requirement may be an eventual step taken by more courts and legislatures, the step herein advocated— that the jury be informed by the court when law enforcement had the ability to contemporaneously record a detention-centered interrogation and chose not to do so — does not overreach or risk uncertain footing. In my opinion, it would provide the jury with a helpful general guideline designed to do no more than assist the trier-of-fact who is burdened with the responsibility for truth-seeking.
Applicability to this Case
Despite my disagreement with the Court’s reasoning with regard to the re*1191cording of the confession, I nonetheless would affirm the judgment of conviction in this case. Here, the defendant was not being interrogated at the police station for a crime punishable by life imprisonment, but rather for a weapons offense. Indeed, the record reveals that the Providence police brought in agents from the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives for that reason. The only fair conclusion that can be drawn from the record is that the interrogating officers were surprised when the defendant blurted out his involvement in a homicide when he was informed of the murder of his friend, Tonea Sims (“Nutt”).
Under the circumstances in this case, the surprised officers should have had no obligation to stop the proceedings to obtain a video recording before continuing with the interview of the defendant.

. The defendant in this case proffered two suggested jury instructions. One, modeled on the instruction required by Rule 3:17 of the New Jersey Rules Governing Criminal Practice, concludes that the absence of the required recording "permits but does not compel [a jury] to conclude that the State has failed to prove that oral admissions were in fact made and if so, was accurately reported by State's witnesses.” The other was based on the Massachusetts instruction laid out by the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533-34 (2004). That proffered instruction said, in part, that ”[t]he absence of an electronic recording of an interrogation in its entirety permits (but does not compel) [the jury] to conclude that State has failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, which in this context is a heavy burden.” I do not, by this dissent, specifically endorse either of these approaches.

. The rejection of a due-process approach by numerous jurisdictions was reviewed comprehensively by the Connecticut Supreme Court in its decision in State v. Lockhart, 298 Conn. 537, 4 A.3d 1176, 1188-89 n. 10(2010).

. Minnesota was the first state to rely on this approach in its decision in State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994). There, the court held that the "fair administration of justice” requires that all custodial interrogations should be electronically recorded when feasible, and must be recorded when the questioning occurs at a place of detention. Id. at 592. Several states subsequently have adopted this reasoning. See, e.g., DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d at 533-34; State v. Barnett, 147 N.H. 334, 789 A.2d 629, 632-33 (2001); State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533, 847 A.2d 530, 545-47 (2004).

.Stakeholders that have used electronic recordings have cited numerous benefits. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Recording Federal Custo*1187dial Interviews, 45 Am.Crim. L.Rev. 1297, 1306-10 (2008). Recording reduces pretrial motions and increases pleas of guilty; it protects police from false accusations of improper conduct or allegations that they are misstating what occurred during interrogations; it helps expose and deter improper conduct, and prosecution and potential wrongful convictions of innocent suspects; it allows judges and juries to see and hear what truly occurred rather than relying on the recollections of witnesses after the passage of time; it enhances the public’s confidence in law enforcement and the criminal justice system. Id.

. State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 456 (Iowa 2006) (“We believe electronic recording, particularly videotaping, of custodial interrogations should be encouraged, and we take this opportunity to do so.”).

. See North Carolina, N.C. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 15A-211(f)(3) (West 2008) (“When evidence of compliance or noncompliance with the requirements of this section has been presented at trial, the jury shall be instructed that it may consider credible evidence of compliance or noncompliance to determine whether the defendant's statement was voluntary and reliable.”).

. See Illinois, 725 III. Comp. Stat. 5/103-2.1 (2005) (Requiring electronic recordation of custodial interrogations of both minors and adults conducted in places of detention, and creating a presumption of inadmissibility as evidence against the accused in enumerated proceedings of the Illinois Criminal Code).

. See Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2933.81(B) (2010) ("All statements made by a person who is the suspect of a violation of or possible violation of * * * a felony of the first or second degree, * * * during a custodial interrogation in a place of detention are presumed to be voluntary if the statements made by the person are electronically recorded.”).

. See DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d at 533; see also Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-4-408 to 410 (2009) (requiring electronic recordation of custodial interrogations, setting forth exceptions to the recordation requirement, and providing that "[i]f the defendant objects to the introduction of evidence under 46-4-408 and the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements are admissible, the judge shall, upon motion of the defendant, provide the jury with a cautionary instruction”).

. Sullivan, 45 Am.Crim. L.Rev. at 1337-41 (Appendix A).

. See DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d at 539 (Spina, X, dissenting) ("[0]ur ‘humane practice’ rule ensures greater safeguards for defendants than those provided by many other jurisdictions.”).

. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378-79 n. 9, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964) (discussing the difficulty of applying a tidy term of art to the procedural safeguard),

. For cases pertaining to adoption of the Humane Practice Rule or its relative equivalent, see Dempsey v. State, 277 Md. 134, 355 A.2d 455, 461 (1976); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 338 Mass. 460, 155 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1959); State v. Washington, 399 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Mo.1966); State v. Scott, 200 Neb. 265, 263 N.W.2d 659, 663 (1978); Pece v. Cox, 74 N.M. 591, 396 P.2d 422, 423 (1964); and State v. Brewton, 238 Or. 590, 395 P.2d 874, 880 (1964).