Court Opinion

ID: 9839122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 19:04:12.324433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:59.221093
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/11/23 P. v. Madrigal CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084614
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. PCF413779A)
                    v.

 JULIO CESAR MADRIGAL,                                                                    OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Juliet L.
Boccone, Judge.

         Cliff Gardner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Carly Orozco,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                                INTRODUCTION
         K.G. and Jonathan Ramirez were stopped in a black vehicle on the side of the road
waiting to pick up marijuana when a light blue vehicle pulled up next to them. Defendant
Julio Cesar Madrigal and Jose Barraza got out of the light blue vehicle and confronted
Ramirez about five pounds of missing marijuana. When K.G. and Ramirez said they did
not know about the missing “weed,” Barraza told defendant to take K.G. into their blue
vehicle and that Barraza would take Ramirez. Defendant opened K.G.’s door and tried to
drag K.G. out of the vehicle. Ramirez struck defendant who then shot Ramirez in the
head, killing him.
       Before trial, defendant pleaded no contest to two counts of being a felon in
possession of a firearm and one count of possession of ammunition and admitted related
allegations. A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and kidnapping and found
true the related allegations. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of
97 years to life with the possibility of parole.
       On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred when it did not require juror
unanimity as to the underlying theory for the first degree murder conviction, and the
prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by misstating the law during closing
argument. We reject defendant’s claims and affirm the judgment.
                               FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       On May 21, 2021, K.G. and her boyfriend Ramirez were sitting in a black vehicle,
stopped on the side of the road, waiting to pick up some marijuana. K.G. was sitting in
the driver’s seat and Ramirez was sitting in the front passenger seat. While they were
waiting, a “gray-blueish” vehicle pulled up and stopped next to them at the driver’s side
of the black vehicle. Defendant, who was seated in the front passenger seat of the blueish
vehicle, and Barraza, the driver, got out of their vehicle and defendant knocked on K.G.’s
window while Barraza knocked on Ramirez’s window. Ramirez rolled down his window
about eight inches. Barraza put his arms on the window and asked where his girlfriend’s
five pounds of weed were. K.G. and Ramirez said they did not know what Barraza was
talking about. Barraza thought they were lying and became upset. Barraza told
defendant to separate them and take K.G. in the gray-blueish vehicle and that Barraza
would take Ramirez in the black vehicle.

                                               2.
       K.G. was still sitting in the driver’s seat when defendant said to her, “‘Are you just
going to ignore me and not roll down your window?’” K.G. was scared but lowered her
window. Defendant then unlocked K.G.’s door and opened it. The vehicle was not in
park at the time and so K.G. stepped on the gas pedal, but defendant was able to slide into
the vehicle and step on the brake. Defendant positioned half his body on K.G., with his
foot on the brake, while trying to pull K.G. out of the vehicle. K.G. was afraid and did
not want defendant in the vehicle. While K.G. fought with defendant, Ramirez struck
defendant, who became “discombobulated.” Defendant lifted himself off K.G., placed
his left arm over K.G.’s left arm and fired the gun. K.G. heard the gunshot but did not
see the gun and did not know where the gun came from.
       After the shooting, Barraza and defendant got in the gray-blueish vehicle and left.
K.G. turned to Ramirez and panicked when she saw him; she got out of the vehicle,
dropped to the ground, and started yelling. Ramirez was not responsive; his eyes were
closed and he appeared to have a gunshot wound to his forehead. There was a lot of
blood streaming and gushing everywhere. K.G. said she “snapp[ed] out of it” and got
back in the vehicle and drove Ramirez to the hospital. While driving, K.G. noticed blood
kept spilling out of Ramirez; there was blood coming out from the back of his head like
the bullet went through.
       K.G. knew defendant for about a year and Barraza for a few years. K.G. denied
having an intimate relationship with either defendant or Barraza. K.G. did not initially
tell the police she knew defendant or Barraza because she had a six-year-old daughter and
was afraid they would come for her. However, after Ramirez was pronounced dead from
the gunshot wound to the head, K.G. gave the police their names because she was afraid
for her life. K.G. admitted to law enforcement she was under the influence of marijuana
and methamphetamine during the incident. Law enforcement discovered 14.432 ounces
of marijuana in the black vehicle and possibly some heroin in the bottom of a soda can.

                                             3.
K.G. said she was unaware of how much marijuana or heroin was in the vehicle. K.G.
had gold hoop earrings in the vehicle and said there was no gun in the vehicle.
       Prior to this incident, K.G. had been in a fight with defendant where she pushed
defendant, and he attacked her by punching her several times until she blacked out. After
the fight, K.G. told defendant, “‘You’re going to pay for this.’” K.G. stated this was not
why she was testifying in court, and she did not actually want to be testifying in court.
       Lead detective Corporal Matt Muller found a cell phone, one gold hoop earring,
and a spent nine millimeter shell casing at the scene of the incident. Samples were taken
from K.G. for gunshot residue on both her hands but Muller chose not to run the tests
because it was undisputed it would show the presence of gunshot residue. Muller
interviewed K.G. and described her as crying, angry, and sad. After interviewing K.G.,
Muller did not consider her to be a suspect. K.G. positively identified defendant as the
shooter and Barraza as the second person from a six-pack photographic lineup.
       After weeks of attempting to find defendant, Muller’s team located and arrested
defendant. With a search warrant for the unit where defendant was staying, law
enforcement collected a loaded nine millimeter handgun inside a pair of Nike shoes.
Defendant’s fingerprints were found on the exterior driver-side door of the black vehicle
driven by K.G., and Barraza’s fingerprints were located on the front passenger door
window. The cartridge casing and bullet fragments obtained from the scene of the
shooting were not fired from the nine millimeter gun retrieved from the Nike shoe.
       Defendant was charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1),
kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a); count 2), being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); counts 3 & 5) and possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count
4). It was alleged defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury and death in count 1 (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)), causing the offense
to become a serious and violent felony (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 667.5, subd. (c)(8)). In
count 2, it was alleged defendant kidnapped the victim while armed with a firearm

                                             4.
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), which was used (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1))
and caused the offense to become a serious and violent felony (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8),
667.5, subd. (c)(8)). It was further alleged defendant committed the offenses while on
parole (§ 1203.085, subd. (a)) and had suffered a prior serious or violent felony
conviction (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d), 667, subds. (b)–(i)).
       Before trial, defendant pled no contest to counts 3, 4 and 5 and admitted all related
special allegations. The jury convicted defendant of count 1, first degree murder, and
count 2, kidnapping, and found true all related special allegations. Defendant was
sentenced to an aggregate term of 97 years to life, comprising 55 years to life with the
possibility of parole for murder, an additional 25 years to life for discharging a firearm
causing death, 10 years for kidnapping, 16 months each for counts 3, 4 and 5, and three
years for personally using a firearm during the kidnapping.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     The Trial Court Did Not Err by Permitting the Jury to Find Defendant
       Guilty of First Degree Murder Without Requiring Unanimity of the
       Underlying Theory
       Defendant first contends the trial court violated his right to a jury trial by failing to
instruct the jury it must unanimously agree on a theory of first degree murder. The
People disagree, stating the California Supreme Court’s long-established precedent
makes it clear unanimity is only required as to the statutory definition of murder, not to
the underlying theory. We agree with the People and reject defendant’s claim.
       A.     Relevant Procedural History
       The trial court instructed the jury on the prosecutor’s two theories of murder as
follows: “The defendant has been prosecuted for murder under multiple theories.
[¶] Each theory of murder has different requirements, and I will instruct you on each.
[¶] You may not find the defendant guilty of murder unless all of you agree that the

                                              5.
People have proved that the defendant committed murder. You need not all agree on the
same theory but you must unanimously agree on the degree of murder.”
       The prosecutor presented two theories of first degree murder at trial: (1)
defendant committed deliberate, premeditated, and willful murder; and (2) defendant
committed felony murder in the course of kidnapping K.G. and Ramirez. The jurors
were instructed on both possible theories. The jury convicted defendant of kidnapping
and first degree murder.
       B.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law
       We review de novo claims of instructional error. (See People v. Myles (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 711, 728.) “The independent or de novo standard of review is applicable in
assessing whether instructions correctly state the law [citations] and also whether
instructions effectively direct a finding adverse to a defendant by removing an issue from
the jury’s consideration.” (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)
       In prosecutions for first degree murder, the California Supreme Court has
consistently held it is not necessary for all jurors to agree on one or more of several
theories of murder proposed by the prosecution; it is sufficient each juror is convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of first degree murder as the offense is
defined by the statute. (People v. Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d 185, 194–195; People v. Nye
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 166, 173; People v. Chavez (1951) 37 Cal.2d 656, 670–672 [not
necessary that jurors agree on underlying theory of murder]; see People v. Visciotti
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 61, fn. 31 [jury unanimity on the theory of first degree murder was
not required]; People v. Nicholas (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 249, 273 [same].)
       C.     Analysis
       Defendant argues his murder conviction violates his Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial because the jurors were not given a unanimity instruction for the theories of first
degree murder. Defendant argues “the facts which the state was required to prove for a

                                              6.
premeditated murder conviction were very different from the facts the state had to prove
to convict him under a felony murder theory.” Defendant concedes Schad v. Arizona
(1991) 501 U.S. 624, 645 (Schad) held the Sixth Amendment does not require the state to
treat different factual theories as elements of an offense, and California has rejected the
notion unanimity instructions pertaining to distinct theories of murder are required.
However, defendant argues this court is no longer bound by Schad after Apprendi v. New
Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 (Apprendi) and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 (Ring).
       Defendant is entitled to a unanimous verdict from the jury. (Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 16; People v. Nicholas, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d at p. 272; People v. Collins (1976) 17
Cal.3d 687, 693, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Boyette
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 462, fn. 19.) Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) defines
“murder” as “the unlawful killing of a human being … with malice aforethought.”
Section 189, subdivision (a) categorizes those killings constituting murder in the first
degree: “All murder that is perpetrated by means of … any … kind of willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing, or that is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate … [a listed felony, i.e., the felony-murder rule] is murder of the first degree.”
Here, the jury unanimously decided defendant was guilty of first degree murder.
“‘Felony murder and premeditated murder are not distinct crimes’” but alternate theories
of first degree murder. (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 413; see People v. Kipp
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1131.)
       Under a long-standing rule in California, a jury need not agree on the specific
theory by which a unanimous verdict is reached. (See People v. Milan, supra, 9 Cal.3d at
pp. 194–195; People v. Nye, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 173; People v. Chavez, supra, 37
Cal.2d at pp. 670–672; People v. Hardenbrook (1957) 48 Cal.2d 345, 353–354.) In
Milan, our Supreme Court rejected a complaint like the claim defendant raises here.
(Milan, supra, at pp. 194–195.) According to Milan, “in a prosecution for first degree
murder it is not necessary that all jurors agree on one or more of several theories

                                              7.
proposed by the prosecution.” (Id. at p. 195.) Some jurors may find the murder occurred
during the course of a felony, while others may find it was deliberate and premeditated.
The court held it was sufficient that each juror was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
the defendant was guilty of first degree murder as defined by statute. (Ibid.)
       In People v. Nicholas, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d at page 272, the defendant
complained the verdict was not unanimous as to either of the two theories on which he
was found guilty. He argued some of the jurors convicted him based on a “‘willful,
deliberate and premeditated’” murder, while others convicted him under the felony-
murder rule. (Ibid.) The court cited Milan and rejected his claim. (Nicholas, at p. 273.)
Here, like in Milan and Nicholas, defendant complains his verdict could have been based
on one of two theories: (1) premeditated murder or (2) felony murder. However, as
Milan held, defendant may be convicted of murder in the first degree without unanimity
of agreement on the theories advanced by the prosecution. (See People v. Milan, supra, 9
Cal.3d at p. 195.)
       The United States Supreme Court in Schad affirmed the states did not need to
require unanimity of theory for first degree murder. The Schad court considered a series
of state court decisions, agreeing “‘it was not necessary that all the jurors should agree in
the determination that there was a deliberate and premeditated design to take the life of
the deceased, or in the conclusion that the defendant was at the time engaged in the
commission of a felony, or an attempt to commit one; it was sufficient that each juror was
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the crime of
murder in the first degree as that offense is defined by the statute.’” (Schad, supra, 501
U.S. at p. 641, quoting People v. Sullivan (1903) 173 N.Y. 122, 127; see People v. Milan,
supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 195; People v. Travis (1988) 170 Ill.App.3d 873, 890–891; State v.
Fuhrmann (Iowa 1977) 257 N.W.2d 619, 623–624; State v. Wilson (1976) 220 Kan. 341,
344–345; Commonwealth v. Devlin (1957) 335 Mass. 555, 565–566; People v. Embree
(1976) 70 Mich.App. 382, 384; State v. Buckman (1991) 237 Neb. 936, 940–942; James

                                              8.
v. State (Okla.Crim.App. 1981) 637 P.2d 862, 865–866, overruled in part on other
grounds in Brown v. State (Okla.Crim.App. 1987) 743 P.2d 133; State v. Tillman (Utah
1987) 750 P.2d 546, 563–564.) The Schad court recognized not all state courts have been
unanimous in this respect (see State v. Murray (1989) 308 Ore. 496), but found there was
“sufficiently widespread acceptance of the two mental states as alternative means of
satisfying the mens rea element of the single crime of first-degree murder to persuade [it]
that Arizona [had] not departed from the norm.” (Schad, supra, at p. 642.) Schad
concluded the Constitution does not require unanimity of alternate theories of murder.
(Schad, at p. 645.)
       Defendant recognizes the California Supreme Court “has rejected the argument
that jurors must be instructed to unanimously agree on a theory of murder, sometimes
citing Schad.” He also concedes that “if the Schad plurality is still good law, there is no
constitutional infirmity with these instructions.” However, defendant contends Schad is
no longer the law after the high court’s Apprendi and Ring decisions. We disagree.
       We begin with Walton v. Arizona (1990) 497 U.S. 639, where the United States
Supreme Court held Arizona’s sentencing scheme was compatible with the Sixth
Amendment because the additional facts found by the judge qualified as sentencing
considerations, not as “element[s] of the offense of capital murder.” (Walton, at p. 649;
see Ring, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 588.) Ten years later, the court in Apprendi held the Sixth
Amendment does not permit a defendant to be “expose[d] … to a penalty exceeding the
maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict
alone.” (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 483.) This proscription governs even if the state
characterizes the additional findings made by the judge as “sentencing factor[s].” (Id. at
p. 492.) In deciding Apprendi, the high court stated, “[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of
form, but of effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?” (Id. at p. 494.) Because
the factual allegations at issue in Apprendi did indeed expose the defendant to additional

                                             9.
punishment, they were allegations to which the Sixth Amendment applied. (Apprendi, at
p. 491.) Subsequently, the court in Ring concluded Apprendi’s reasoning is
irreconcilable with Walton’s holding in this regard and overruled Walton in relevant part.
(Ring, supra, at p. 589.) “Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, … are
entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase
in their maximum punishment.” (Ibid.)
       “Following Apprendi, numerous cases have reaffirmed the rule that a jury need not
unanimously agree whether the defendant committed premeditated murder or felony
murder.” (People v. Quiroz (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 65, 75 [Apprendi has not vitiated
California’s authority to distinguish between alternative theories and separate crimes and
to require unanimity only for separate crimes]; see People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at
p. 413; People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 617 [nothing in Apprendi requires
unanimous verdict on theory of first degree murder]; People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th
574, 626 [rejecting defendant’s claim a unanimity instruction is required under
Apprendi]; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 712–713 [nothing in Apprendi
requires a unanimous jury verdict as to the particular theory of first degree murder].) Our
Supreme Court made clear its position on unanimity post-Apprendi by stating, “[I]t has
long been settled ‘that unanimity as to the theory under which a killing is deemed
culpable is not compelled as a matter of state or federal law. Each juror need only have
found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the single offense of first degree
murder as defined by statute and charged in the information.’” (Moore, supra, at p. 413;
see Schad, supra, 501 U.S. at pp. 630–645 (plur. opn. of Souter, J.); id. at pp. 648–652
(conc. opn. of Scalia, J.); see also Taylor, supra, at p. 626; Morgan, supra, at p. 617;
Nakahara, supra, at pp. 712–713.) Apprendi “addresses the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury determination of facts used in sentencing beyond the elements of the charged
offenses.” (Moore, supra, at p. 413.) It did not create “new notice or unanimity

                                             10.
requirements for alternative theories of a substantive offense such as first degree
murder.” (Ibid.; see Taylor, at p. 626; Morgan, at p. 617.)
       Here, defendant is not challenging the finding of facts that would increase his
maximum punishment for first degree murder as in Apprendi. Instead, like in Moore,
defendant challenges this state’s law not requiring unanimity of alternative theories of
murder without offering any United States Supreme Court decision “creating new notice
or unanimity requirements for alternative theories of a substantive offense such as first
degree murder.” (People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 413.) We are bound by the
higher court’s ruling and find no reason to part from precedent. (See Auto Equity Sales,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
       Even assuming a unanimity instruction on the alternative theories of first degree
murder were required, any assumed error would be harmless under any standard. The
jury unanimously found defendant guilty of first degree murder of Ramirez and guilty of
the substantive crime of kidnapping and found true the special allegations that defendant
was armed with a firearm during the commission of the kidnapping and also personally
used the firearm in the commission of the kidnapping. Given these verdicts and findings,
the jury necessarily reached a unanimous agreement that defendant committed first
degree felony murder in the commission of the kidnapping. (See People v. Taylor, supra,
48 Cal.4th at p. 626 [any error harmless where “jury necessarily reached unanimous
agreement that defendant committed a first degree felony murder based on” their
unanimous agreement finding the defendant guilty of “rape, forcible oral copulation, and
burglary”]; cf. People v. Hawthorne (2009) 46 Cal.4th 67, 89–90 [where jury found true
the felony-murder special circumstance, it necessarily agreed with the first degree felony-
murder theory], disapproved on another point in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th
610, 637–643; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 395 [where jury found
defendant guilty of rape of murder victim, it unanimously agreed with a first degree
felony-murder theory], overruled on other grounds in People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th

                                            11.
1176, 1190–1191.) Consequently, if there were any instructional error it would be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 18, 24.) Therefore, defendant’s claim fails.
II.    The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Prejudicial Misconduct by Telling Jurors
       that Because the Evidence Supported an Intent to Kill Finding They Should
       Start Their Analysis at Second Degree Murder
       Additionally, defendant argues the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct
by telling the jurors their analysis started at second degree murder. The People state
defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object at trial. The People also argue
defendant’s claim lacks merit because the prosecutor did not misstate the law, nor did
defendant suffer prejudice. We agree with the People and reject defendant’s claim.
       A.     Relevant Procedural History
       Before closing arguments, the court instructed the jury: “Nothing that the
attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements and closing arguments, the
attorneys discuss the case, but their remarks are not evidence.” The court also instructed
the jury to defer to the instructions given by the court. “You must follow the law as I
explain it to you, even if you disagree with it. If you believe that the attorneys’
comments on the law conflict with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.
[¶] Pay careful attention to all these instructions and consider them together.”
Additionally, the court instructed the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was
placed on the People, and the jury was required to find defendant not guilty if the People
failed to meet their burden.
       As to first and second degree murder, the court instructed the jury: “If you decide
the defendant committed murder, it is murder in the second degree unless the People have
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that it is murder of the first degree as defined in the
instruction. [¶] The defendant is guilty of first-degree murder if the People have proved
that … he acted willfully and deliberately and with premeditation. [¶] The defendant

                                             12.
acted willfully … if he intended to kill. [¶] The defendant acted deliberately if he
carefully weighed the consideration for and against his choice and, knowing the
consequences, decided to kill. [¶] The defendant acted with premeditation if he decided
to kill before completing the acts that caused death.” Again, the court stated: “The
People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was first-
degree murder rather than a lesser crime. If the People have not met this burden, you
must find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder and the murder is second-degree
murder.”
       The court also instructed: “A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to
voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in
the heat of passion. The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel or in the
heat of passion if: [¶] One, the defendant was provoked; [¶] Two, as a result of the
provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that
obscured his reasoning or judgment; [¶] And three, that the provocation would have
caused a person of average disposition to act rashly, without due deliberation, that is from
passion rather than judgment.”
       During closing arguments, the prosecutor argued the following:

              “[Defendant] is charged in Count 1 with murder. And as the Judge
       instructed you, there are three types of murder. First-degree murder,
       second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. I think the easier way
       to understand or to process the types of murder and how you determine
       which ones is to start with the second-degree murder. [¶] … [¶] So
       instruction 520 explains what second-degree murder is. One, the defendant
       committed an act that caused the death of another person; and, when the
       defendant acted, he had a state of mind called malice aforethought. A
       complicated legal term. What does that mean? The instruction further
       explains.

              “It can be one of two types of malice. There’s express malice,
       unlawfully intended to kill. And then there’s implied malice, which is all
       these other things that you could read in the instruction.

                                            13.
              “But, folks, the evidence has shown that there was an intent to kill.
       And I’m going to talk about that in just a minute. There is an intent to kill.
       This isn’t a case of implied malice. This is a case of express malice. So we
       have caused the death of another, intent to kill. We have second-degree
       murder already. That’s from the starting point.

               “After you have second-degree murder, the next question I
       recommend you ask is, ‘Well, does this get downgraded to voluntary
       manslaughter?’ And the jury instruction for that is 570. And it explains
       that voluntary manslaughter is when the defendant was provoked; as a
       result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under the influence
       of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or judgment; and the
       provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act
       rashly and without due deliberation, that is from passion rather than from
       judgment. [¶] … [¶]

              “There is no provocation. They didn’t act rashly under the influence
       of intense emotion. And even a person of average disposition would never
       think that this is an excuse to kill. So, folks, there is no voluntary
       manslaughter. We’re back to second-degree murder, and now we have
       another question to determine. Is it first-degree murder?”
       Defendant raised no objection to this part of the prosecutor’s argument.
       B.     Standard of Review
       “‘To preserve for appeal a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defense must
make a timely objection at trial and request an admonition; otherwise, the point is
reviewable only if an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the
misconduct.’” (People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1215; see People v. Price (1991)
1 Cal.4th 324, 447; see also People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 274; People v.
Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44 [defendant must timely object to prosecutor’s argument
unless admonition from the court could not have cured any harm or the objection would
have been futile]; People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1212 [objection required
because an admonition could potentially cure any harm from any misconduct].)
       “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks to the jury,
the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the
complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner. [Citations.] In

                                            14.
conducting this inquiry, we ‘do not lightly infer’ that the jury drew the most damaging
rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements. [Citation.]”
(People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970, disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22; accord, People v. Lima (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
468, 477–478.)
       C.     Analysis
       Defendant argues the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by telling the
jury that since the evidence supported an intent to kill, its analysis started at second
degree murder. Defendant also claims it was misconduct for the prosecutor to tell the
jury there was insufficient evidence to downgrade the crime to manslaughter. Defendant
claims the prosecutor’s argument undercut the state’s burden of proof, which is to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt both an unlawful killing and malice. The People argue
defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object at trial. The People also argue the
prosecutor did not misstate the law and defendant did not suffer prejudice. Defendant
concedes he failed to object to the prosecutor’s comments at trial but argues the court can
consider the merits of his claim because it raises a pure question of law on undisputed
facts, and the court may consider the claim to avoid habeas corpus litigation raising
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
       We begin with the undisputed fact defendant failed to object to the challenged
comments during the prosecutor’s closing argument. The rule requiring “claims of
prosecutorial misconduct be preserved for appellate review by a timely and specific
objection and request for admonition is well established” and long settled. (People v.
Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1340; see People v. Gionis, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1215;
People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 447; People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 274;
People v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 44; People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p.
1212; see also People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 960; People v. Wilson (2008) 44

                                             15.
Cal.4th 758, 800; People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1201; People v. Hill (1998) 17
Cal.4th 800, 820; People v. Fleming (1913) 166 Cal. 357, 377 [“It is now well settled that
an appellate court will not consider a claim as to the misconduct of counsel in argument
unless objection is so made”].) “The reason for this rule, of course, is that ‘the trial court
should be given an opportunity to correct the abuse and thus, if possible, prevent by
suitable instructions the harmful effect upon the minds of the jury.’” (People v. Green
(1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d
826, 834, fn. 3, and People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 239; accord, Seumanu,
supra, at p. 1341.)
       Here, defendant’s claim the prosecutor misstated the law during closing argument
is subject to the forfeiture doctrine because “misstatements of law are generally curable
by an admonition from the court.” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674; see
People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 548; People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 274
[claims of misconduct rejected on procedural grounds].) In Rowland, defense counsel
made no objection of any kind regarding the prosecutor’s conduct, and the court found no
exception excused this failure since any “harm” was readily curable. (Id. at pp. 274–
275.) Here as well, defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s alleged
misstatements of law, which, if error were found, were readily curable. (See Centeno
supra, at p. 674; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 820 [“A defendant will be excused
from the necessity of either a timely objection and/or a request for admonition if either
would be futile” or an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the
misconduct]; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 159; People v. Noguera (1992) 4
Cal.4th 599, 638 [claims of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument were forfeited
where trial counsel failed to make any objection].) On the other hand, in Hill, the failure
to object was excused where defense counsel’s previous objections were continually
overruled, and the trial court suggested defense counsel was being an obstructionist and
delaying the trial with “meritless” objections. (Hill, supra, at p. 821.) Here, there is no

                                             16.
evidence the court considered defense counsel an obstructionist or suggested counsel had
been delaying the trial with meritless objections.
       We reject defendant’s argument that his claim should not be forfeited because it
raises a pure question of law on undisputed facts. Defendant’s cited authorities address
dissimilar issues and do not apply to the facts of this case. In People v. Yeoman (2003)
31 Cal.4th 93, the defendant raised a People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 objection at
trial and was not prevented from raising a Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79
objection for the first time on appeal since “Wheeler and Batson articulate the same
standard.” (Yeoman, supra, at p. 117 [no useful purpose is served by declining to
consider on appeal a claim that merely restates, under alternative legal principles, a claim
otherwise identical to one properly preserved by a timely motion].) Therefore, “the same
factual issues [were] properly before [the court] already because of defendant’s timely
Wheeler motion.” (Yeoman, supra, at p. 118.) The holding under Yeoman does not apply
here since defendant is not raising a claim otherwise identical to one that was properly
preserved at trial under alternative legal principles.
       In People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, the court considered the defendant’s
newly raised claim challenging the constitutionality of Penal Code section 69 as
punishing protected speech because it involved “‘a pure question of law which is
presented by undisputed facts.’” (Hines, supra, at p. 1061.) Here, defendant is objecting
to the prosecutor’s statements regarding the law during closing argument and is not
challenging the constitutionality of a statute. In Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388,
394 the court found the defendant’s objection in the trial court to Civil Code section
789.3 as a “great injustice” did not waive his challenge on appeal to the constitutionality
of section 789.3. The court also held a litigant may make a challenge “for the first time
on appeal, especially when the enforcement of a penal statute is involved [citation], the
asserted error fundamentally affects the validity of the judgment [citation], or important
issues of public policy are at issue [citation].” (Hale, supra, at p. 394.) Here again,

                                              17.
defendant is not challenging the enforcement or constitutionality of a statute, but
claiming the prosecutor misstated the law during closing argument. Last, the holding in
Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736 does not apply to this case. In Ward, the court
allowed the plaintiff in a civil case to advance an alternate theory of recovery that was
sufficient to uphold recovery when the facts as pleaded and proved did not sustain the
judgment on the theory of tort. (Id. at p. 742.) Ward is not applicable here since this is
not a civil case and defendant is not offering alternate theories of recovery to sustain the
judgment.
       Were the merits of defendant’s claim properly before us, we would conclude the
prosecutor’s comments did not amount to misconduct. It is misconduct for a prosecutor
to misstate the law generally (see, e.g., People v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 43;
People v. Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 538), and particularly to attempt to absolve the
prosecution from its prima facie obligation to overcome reasonable doubt on all elements
(People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 829; People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179,
1215, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Steele (2004) 32 Cal.4th
682, 691). Here, the prosecutor’s comments are not contrary to the court’s instruction on
the law. Defendant argues in his opening brief that “before even getting to murder the
state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both an unlawful killing and malice.” But
the prosecutor explained this in closing argument, stating that since the evidence showed
defendant committed an act causing the death of another and had an intent to kill, which
was explained as express malice, the evidence showed second degree murder. This was
consistent with the court’s jury instructions: “If you decide the defendant committed
murder, it is murder in the second degree unless the People have proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that it is murder of the first degree as defined in the instruction.” As
such, the prosecutor’s comments align with both the court’s instructions and defendant’s
comments in his brief.

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       Essentially, defendant complains the prosecutor undercut the state’s burden of
proof by telling the jury second degree murder was the starting point for its deliberations.
However, the statement was made only after the prosecutor explained how the evidence
should lead the jury to a finding of second degree murder. The prosecutor “has the right
to fully state his views as to what the evidence shows and to urge whatever conclusions
he deems proper.” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 526; accord, People v. Cole,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1203 [a prosecutor may discuss and draw reasonable inferences
from the evidence at trial].)
       We also disagree the prosecutor misstated the law by suggesting the jury ask
whether murder should be downgraded to manslaughter. As the court properly instructed
the jury, a “murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone
because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.” (Italics added.) Defendant fails to
explain how the prosecutor “plainly misstated the law” or undercut the state’s burden of
proof when the prosecutor’s explanation aligned with the court’s instructions. Therefore,
we conclude defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct would also fail on the merits.
But even if we agreed with defendant’s claim on the merits, defendant cannot
demonstrate any prejudice. Any error by the prosecutor in misstating the law was cured
by the court’s instructions on the law. (See People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 436
[we presume the jury followed the court’s instruction]; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th
491, 574.)
       To the extent defendant alternatively raises an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, defendant fails to demonstrate his counsel’s performance was deficient under an
objective standard of professional reasonableness or that he was prejudiced by the
prosecutor’s comments. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 445; People v.
Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216–218.) There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 689.) As discussed above, we cannot conclude the

                                            19.
prosecutor misstated the law and therefore, counsel is not ineffective in failing to raise
meritless or fruitless objections. (Ochoa, supra, at p. 463.) Even if there were a
meritorious basis to object, the decision whether to object is “‘inherently tactical,’” and
“a failure to object will rarely reflect deficient performance by counsel.” (People v.
Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1335, abrogated on another ground as stated in
People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 100; see People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 520.)
And here, where “the record on appeal ‘“‘sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to
act in the manner challenged[,] …’ the claim on appeal must be rejected.”’” (People v.
Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 876, overruled on other grounds by Hardy, supra, at pp.
103–104; see People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958–960.) Nor can defendant
demonstrate prejudice since, as discussed above, any misstatement in the law was
remedied by the court’s instruction on the law. (See People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th
at p. 436.) Therefore, defendant fails to demonstrate he received ineffective assistance of
counsel.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                     PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

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