Court Opinion

ID: 9700404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:26:31.776699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:08.669483
License: Public Domain

*6Marilyn Kelly, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees under § 1703(3) of mepa, MCL 324.1703(3); MSA 13A.1703(3). Attorney General v Piller (After Remand), 204 Mich App 228, 232; 514 NW2d 210 (1994).
However, I believe that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award attorney fees to them under § 20135(5) of mera. MCL 324.20135(5); MSA 13A.20135(5). According to the majority, plaintiffs were solely responsible for the adjournments. The record indicates otherwise.
On July 27, 1990, plaintiffs petitioned the judge to adjourn the mediation and trial. They put forth three reasons: (1) they had to retain a different expert to evaluate the premises and review the documentation; (2) the son of one of defendants’ experts had been murdered, so the expert’s deposition had to be delayed; and (3) another deposition had to be rescheduled, because counsel for Buckeye Marketers and Garb-Ko had been unable to attend an earlier one. Defendant Amoco filed a concurrence to plaintiffs’ motion to adjourn. Therefore, the initial adjournment was not caused solely by plaintiffs’ delaying tactics, as the majority suggests.
Also, the record does not support the majority’s assertion that summary disposition was granted to defendant Amoco because plaintiffs failed to obtain an expert witness. Rather, plaintiffs did hire experts but did not receive their reports and affidavits before the hearing on defendants’ motion for summary disposition. Once plaintiffs had the information and submitted it to the trial court, the case was reinstated. The proceedings were delayed, also, because the *7court’s file was mislaid after being transferred to district court.
Therefore, plaintiffs were not solely responsible for the numerous delays ascribed to them by the majority. The trial court cited plaintiffs’ delays as the only reason for denying them an award of attorney fees. The court acknowledged that the equities clearly favored plaintiffs.
I am not, as the majority suggests, reviewing this matter de novo. Instead, I carefully reviewed the record to determine whether the result violates fact and logic. Wojas v Rosati, 182 Mich App 477, 480; 452 NW2d 864 (1990). In this case, it does. The record does not support the judge’s conclusion that, because of plaintiffs’ delays, they were able to seek attorneys fees. Moreover, the judge refused to award attorney fees even where defendant Amoco was found one hundred percent liable for the contamination.
Public policy favors an award of attorney fees to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party in environmental suits brought by citizens. It was in the interest of cleaning up the environment as quickly as possible that the Legislature provided the vehicle for individuals to initiate litigation without awaiting government action. The attorney fees provision of mera serves an important purpose. It enables individuals, otherwise without the necessary financial means, to initiate and carry to completion a complex environmental action. I find it compelling that attorney fees be awarded in this case where defendant Amoco was determined to be solely liable for the contamination. I would reverse the portion of the judge’s order denying attorney fees to plaintiffs under mera.