Court Opinion

ID: 9753277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:06:09.891596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:33.075236
License: Public Domain

McEWEN, Judge,
concurring:
Since this Court, sitting en banc, in Giffear v. Johns-Manville Corp., 429 Pa.Super. 327, 632 A.2d 880 (1993), held that “[wjithout evidence that [pleura1 thickening] is causing ascertainable physical symptoms, impairment, or disability, pleural thickening is a non-compensable injury and, therefore, does not give rise to a cause of action,” id. at 341, 632 A.2d at 888, appellant cannot now recover damages for fear of cancer. Thus, our esteemed colleague Peter Paul Olszewski, in his lead Opinion, quite correctly concludes that the trial court did not commit reversible error when, in this case, it excluded evidence of that fear.
Moreover, I echo the insightful observation of Judge Olszewski-that the more difficult question — not presented in this appeal — is whether fear of cancer is compensable in those cases where a plaintiff has suffered some legally cognizable physical damage as a result of exposure to asbestos and, thus, by reason of that injury, has a cause of action. A review of the cases suggests that certain appellate expressions, upon occasion, have blurred two very distinct types of harm: (1) the risk of developing cancer which, it has been made clear, is not *429compensable in Pennsylvania, and (2) such loss of life’s pleasures as result from the fear of contracting cancer. While I personally can find no basis upon which to exclude evidence of damages flowing from the loss of life’s pleasures caused by a reasonable fear of contracting cancer, that issue is not presented by cases, such as this, where there is no cause of action.