Court Opinion

ID: 9845758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:27:35.749587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:21.246039
License: Public Domain

Justice WALLER,
concurring in part, and dissenting in part:
I concur in part and dissent in part.
Although I concur in result with the majority’s holding that Hardin has not suffered a compensable taking, I disagree with the rationale underlying its decision. Further, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Tallent has not suffered a compensable taking.
In my view, the majority ignores well-established precedent and then, without direct citation of authority, holds that “modern takings principles instruct that road closings and realignments which do not “take” land ... do not give rise to compensable takings because these actions do not directly interfere with an owner’s rights in the property as a whole.” To the contrary, it has long been the law of this state that an actual physical taking of property is not necessary to entitle one to compensation. Casque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. *61115, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940), overruled on other grounds McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985) (to deprive one of the ordinary beneficial use and enjoyment of property is, in law, equivalent to the taking of it, and is as much a “taking” as though the property itself were actually appropriated).
As this Court noted in South Carolina State Highway Dep’t v. Allison, 246 S.C. 389, 393, 143 S.E.2d 800, 802 (1965), “an obstruction that materially injures or deprives the abutting property owner of ingress or egress to and from his property is a ‘taking’ of the property, for which recovery may be had. The fact that other means of access to the property are available affects merely the amount of damages, and not the right of recovery.”
I agree with the majority that City of Rock Hill v. Cothran, 209 S.C. 357, 40 S.E.2d 239 (1946) was wrongly decided upon its facts and should therefore be limited. In Cothran, the plaintiffs property did not directly abut the closed portion of the road, such that there was no direct denial of ingress or egress. Cothran was not deprived of one of the immediate means of access to his property. Accordingly, under the facts of Cothran, the plaintiff suffered, at best, a diversion of traffic flow which, as the majority points out, this Court has recognized is not compensable. Carodale (landowner has no property right in the continuation or maintenance of the flow of traffic past its property).5
However, in my view, the fact that a diversion in traffic flow is not compensable does not mean that closure of a road which materially deprives the abutting property owner of ingress or egress to and from his property is not a compensable taking. See 46 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 493 § 17 (2004) (courts have often noted important distinction between a limitation of access, which may be compensable, and a change in traffic flow, which is not compensable).
*612On the facts of the Hardin case, I agree with the majority that there has been no taking. Hardin’s property does not directly abut the median which was closed by the Department of Transportation, and he was not materially deprived of ingress or egress to and from his property. Accordingly, I concur in result only with Hardin.
I dissent from the majority opinion’s holding in Tallent. In Tallent’s6 case, as a result of SDCOT’s closure of access points between Old Easley Bridge Road and Highway 123, Old Easley Bridge Road was rendered a cul de sac at one end, the end used by Tallent and her customers to access her salon. Tallent’s only remaining access to Highway 123 was by means of a series of secondary roads running through a low-income neighborhood. Due to the closure, the value of the residential properties increased, while the value of Tallent’s commercial property decreased.
Courts have generally held, consistent with South Carolina law, that a landowner on a partially closed road, whose land is on the opened portion, cannot claim damages if he still has reasonable access to the general system of roads. There is an exception to this rule, however, if the road closing leaves the landowner in a cul de sac. Mill Creek Properties v. City of Columbia, 944 So.2d 67 (Miss.App.2006), citing Miss. State Highway Comm’n v. Fleming, 248 Miss. 187, 157 So.2d 792 (1963); Kick’s Liquor Store, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 587 N.W.2d 57 (Minn.Ct.App.1998) (holding that creation of a cul de sac may be compensable if losses of access to and from existing roads “substantially impairs [the landowner’s] right to reasonably convenient and suitable access to the main thoroughfare”). See also DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 110 (Tex.1965) (where construction of viaduct left property owner in cul-de-sac, he was deprived of reasonable access, even though he could still physically get to public roads from his property); Boehm v. Backes, 493 N.W.2d 671 (N.D.1992) (Highway Department’s construction of overpass that converted street in front of auto repair business into cul-de-sac by closing off direct access to street from nearby highway was a *613taking; access to business after permanent closure forced use of indirect route of additional four large blocks, through residential neighborhood, distance comparable to six regular city blocks, and this physical interference specially affected property).
Here, the road on which Tallent’s business is located has essentially been rendered a cul de sac. In my view, therefore, if Tallent has suffered a special injury, she has a compensable taking.7
As noted by the Court of Appeals in this case, “The expert appraiser ... testified that [Tallent’s] business losses differed from those in the area because the other entities were ‘destination’ businesses, such that people will seek them out regardless of the lack of immediate access from Highway 123.... [W]hile the surrounding residential area benefited from the actions of SCDOT, the value of Tallent’s commercial property had been adversely affected. The realtor ... testified that there had been no interest in the property due to the current lack of access to Highway 123.” Tallent, 363 S.C. at 168, 609 S.E.2d at 547. Moreover, the Master indicated that several of Tallent’s patrons testified they had difficulty reaching the property since the closure, and were reluctant to do so for safety reasons in driving through the low income neighborhood.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that Tallent suffered a compensable taking.
MOORE, J., concurs.

. It has been noted that although a loss of traffic, loss of business, and circuity of travel are not themselves compensable, they are factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the remaining access to and from an abutting roadway. Cady v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 472 N.W.2d 467 (N.D.1991).

. Tallent’s beauty shop was located on Old Easley Bridge Road.

. As this Court recognized in Sease v. Spartanburg, 242 S.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 683 (1963), the test of whether a landowner is entitled to recover damages for the vacation of a street is the existence of special injury amounting to a taking.