Court Opinion

ID: 9497763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:59:32.496267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:24.329737
License: Public Domain

LAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides employees with a private right of action, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2), to recover damages when an employer interferes with an employee’s exercise of FMLA rights, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). To prevail on an interference claim, the employee must establish that the employer interfered with a right to medical leave or failed to reinstate the employee to the same or an equivalent position upon return to work. Hoge v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 384 F.3d 238, 244 (6th Cir.2004). The employer’s intentions are irrelevant. Id. The employer is required to restore the employee to the same position, or “to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.” § 2614(a)(1)(B). “An equivalent position is one that is virtually identical to the employee’s former position in terms of pay, benefits and working conditions, including privileges, perquisites and status. It must involve the same or substantially similar duties and responsibilities, which must entail substantially equivalent skill, effort, responsibility, and authority.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(a). “[U]pon return from FMLA leave, employees are entitled to reinstatement to the same or an equivalent position without the loss of benefits.... ” Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673, 679 (8th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). A position that offers comparable pay, but has fewer opportunities for advancement or future increases in salary does not offer the same benefits. Id. at 679-80.
I conclude that there is a dispute of material fact regarding the equivalency of *1004the Night Service Manager position and the Quality Control position. While McBurney may concede that the rate of pay and structure of standard benefits between the two positions were the same, this is not tantamount to conceding equivalency under the FMLA.4 The record shows that McBurney’s former position of Night Service Manager was a managerial job supervising six mechanics, retrieving parts, ensuring service was done correctly, discussing repairs with customers, and calculating bills. The Night Service Manager job was an established position in the organization, and was sought after by other employees, had a recognized and respected title, and occupied a permanent office. The newly-created Quality.Control position was not managerial, lacked recognition and respect internally, played an ill-defined role in the organization’s operations, and lacked an office.
While the pay was the same, the Quality Control position had non-equivalent working conditions, privileges, perquisites, and status, and thus was not equivalent under the FMLA. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(a). Moreover, the new position was so utterly lacking in value to the organization that it offered virtually no job security. An employee who valued his employment would be ill-advised to choose this new Quality Control position with no job description and little responsibility over the established Night Service Manager position, which was important to the organization’s success. At the very least, McBurney has presented a dispute of material fact whether these two positions were equivalent.
I suggest the real issue before us in assessing McBurney’s interference claim on summary judgment is whether McBur-ney can prove damages flowing from this violation of the FMLA. The majority ends its inquiry into McBurney’s interference claim after it concludes, incorrectly in my view, that McBurney’s entire interference claim rests on the non-compensable damages of emotional distress and lost future wages. To the contrary, the record shows a monetary loss of $1,561.81 in reduced wages in the Service Advisor position. I believe that, if McBurney can prove causation, the subsequent loss is compensable under the FMLA.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to McBurney, as we must on summary judgment, we are presented with the following facts: Stew Hansen’s gave McBurney’s job to another employee while he was on FMLA leave; Stew Hansen’s concocted the Quality Control position at the last minute upon McBurney’s return from leave to avoid liability under the FMLA; the Quality Control position was purely a sham position that lacked any job description or defined duties; Stew Hansen’s quickly eliminated the Quality Control position because it served no real business purpose; upon eliminating the Quality Control position, Stew Hansen’s abruptly transferred McBurney to yet another non-equivalent position; and in this last position McBurney experienced re*1005duced wages in the sum of $1,561.81. The key question on summary judgment for MeBurney’s interference claim is whether he can prove the loss of $1,561.81 was caused by Stew Hansen’s violation.
McBurney has a tough case to prove under an interference theory, but it is his case to prove. I respectfully disagree with the majority and would hold that summary judgment is not appropriate on MeBur-ney’s interference claim.

. I concur with the majority on several important points: First, McBurney has waived his ability to obtain front pay damages by failing to raise it below; second, damages for emotional distress and lost future wages are not available under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA); and third, McBurney has failed to identify any evidence of a retaliatory animus on the part of Stew Hansen's necessary to sustain his retaliation claim. However, I dissent from the majority's opinion that McBurney has not identified damages for his remaining claim of interference with his FMLA rights. I conclude that McBurney has identified compensable damages in the amount of $1,561.81 and that a genuine dispute of material fact regarding equivalency of the Night Service Manager position and the Quality Control position prevents summary judgment on McBurney's interference claim.