Court Opinion

ID: 9947884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 20:11:29.633454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:43.133352
License: Public Domain

03/05/2024
         IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT KNOXVILLE
                           Assigned on Briefs February 28, 2024

             STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ALFONSO THOMAS PECK

                  Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County
                          No. 241695 Amanda B. Dunn, Judge
                       ___________________________________

                              No. E2023-01123-CCA-R3-CD
                          ___________________________________

Pro se Petitioner, Alfonso Thomas Peck,1 was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of two
counts of aggravated rape, for which he received concurrent sentences of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. He filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant
to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily denied in
part and granted in part. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the partial summary denial,
arguing that his sentences are illegal because the judgment documents fail to specify the
sentence length in years. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.
WEDEMEYER and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Alfonso Thomas Peck, Wartburg, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Caroline Weldon, Assistant Attorney
General; Coty Wamp, District Attorney General; and Tom Landis, Assistant District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                             OPINION

       On September 14, 2002, the Petitioner approached the victim, knocked her to the
ground, penetrated her digitally, and raped her vaginally and anally. The jury convicted
him of two counts of aggravated rape, and the trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent
offender to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

1
 The Petitioner’s name is spelled “Alfonzo” and “Alfonso” throughout the record. We will refer to him
as Alfonso Thomas Peck, consistent with the case caption.
This court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See State v. Peck, No.
E2005-00342-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 223688, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2006),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 26, 2006). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction
relief, which the trial court denied. This court affirmed the denial. See Peck v. State, No.
E2009-00779-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 550878, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2010),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 17, 2010).

       On July 10, 2023, the Petitioner filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. See
Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1. He alleged that his sentences: (1) did not specify the length in
years, in direct contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-209(e)(1)(A);
and (2) did not include community supervision for life, in direct contravention of
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524. The trial court summarily denied the
motion on the first ground for failure to state a colorable claim, finding that the statute
referenced “merely requires district attorneys general to complete and file uniform
judgment documents” and “neither authorizes nor prohibits sentences of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.” The court, without conducting a hearing, granted the
motion on the second ground and ordered that the judgments be amended to include
community supervision for life. This appeal followed.

                                       ANALYSIS

       The Petitioner argues that ground one of his Rule 36.1 motion states a colorable
claim that his sentences contravene Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-209(e)(1)(A)
because the judgments “do not reflect a sentence authorized to be served” in the Tennessee
Department of Correction. He contends, for the first time on appeal, that though life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is statutorily authorized, it is not a
determinate or specific sentence under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-111(a)
and 40-35-211(1). The State responds, and we agree, that the claim is not colorable
because: (1) Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-209(e)(1)(A) only requires that a
prosecutor complete and file uniform judgment documents; and (2) the Petitioner has
waived any claims that the sentence is illegal under Tennessee Code Annotated sections
40-35-111(a) and 40-35-211(1) by not raising them in the trial court.

       Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, a defendant may file a
motion to correct an illegal sentence at any time before the sentence expires. Tenn. R.
Crim. P. 36.1(a)(1). “[A]n illegal sentence is one that is not authorized by the applicable
statutes or that directly contravenes an applicable statute.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(a)(2).
“If the court determines that the motion fails to state a colorable claim, it shall enter an
order summarily denying the motion.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1(b)(2). A colorable claim is
“a claim that, if taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the moving party,
would entitle the moving party to relief under Rule 36.1.” State v. Wooden, 478 S.W.3d
                                           -2-
585, 593 (Tenn. 2015). Whether a motion states a colorable claim for correction of an
illegal sentence under Rule 36.1 is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Id.
at 589 (citing Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007)).

       Even taking the Petitioner’s allegations as true and viewing them in the light most
favorable to him, he has failed to state a colorable claim that his sentences are illegal. The
Petitioner relies on Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-209(e)(1)(A), which provides
that:

       (e)(1) After the defendant is sentenced, the district attorney general shall
       complete and file within thirty (30) days the uniform judgment document for
       the conviction that is signed by all parties; but if not signed by the parties,
       the clerk shall make a copy of the document available to the parties before
       entry by the court, which shall indicate for each offense the following:

       (A) The type of offense for which the defendant was charged and convicted
       and the sentence imposed[.]

This subsection, as the trial court correctly noted, merely directs district attorneys general
to complete and file uniform judgment documents. Such documents were completed and
filed in this case and indicate the sentence imposed—life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. Though the Petitioner contends that the sentence must be specified
in years, “the trial court is not required to specify a term of years in sentencing a defendant
to life imprisonment.” Blake v. State, No. W2015-01423-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL
4060696, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 22,
2016); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-211(1) (“Specific sentences for a felony shall be
for a term of years or months or life[.]”) (emphasis added).

       To the extent the Petitioner has raised new issues under Tennessee Code Annotated
sections 40-35-111(a) and 40-35-211(1), he has waived these issues by failing to raise them
in the trial court. The Petitioner’s initial motion makes no mention of either statutory
provision. Because he raises the issues for the first time on appeal, the issues are waived.
See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be
granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was
reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.”); see also State v.
McDougle, No. W2022-01103-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 2968224, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Apr. 17, 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 28, 2023) (holding that the defendant waived
appellate review of an issue by failing to include it in his Rule 36.1 motion).

                                      CONCLUSION

                                             -3-
        Because the Petitioner has failed to state a colorable claim that his sentences are
illegal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                     ___________________________________________
                                       CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, PRESIDING JUDGE

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