Court Opinion

ID: 9894141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 17:01:03.918802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:47.568462
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
         FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BURT CAMENZIND, an individual,                    No. 22-15931

                   Plaintiff-Appellant,             D.C. No.
    v.                                           2:19-cv-00632-
                                                    MCE-AC
CALIFORNIA EXPOSITION AND
STATE FAIR; RICK PICKERING, in
his official capacity as General                    OPINION
Manager of California Exposition and
State Fair,

                   Defendants-Appellees.

           Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the Eastern District of California
         Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

               Argued and Submitted April 19, 2023
                    San Francisco, California

                      Filed October 31, 2023

    Before: Lawrence VanDyke and Gabriel P. Sanchez,
    Circuit Judges, and Robert S. Lasnik, * District Judge.

*
 The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
2           CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

                 Opinion by Judge Sanchez;
              Partial Dissent by Judge VanDyke

                          SUMMARY **

                First Amendment/Public Fora

    The panel affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment for defendants in an action alleging that state
police officers violated the First Amendment and the Speech
Clause of the California Constitution when they removed
plaintiff Burt Camenzind from a privately organized Hmong
New Year Festival at the state-owned California Exposition
and State Fair (“CalExpo”) for distributing religious tokens
to attendees.
    Officers told Camenzind that he could distribute his
tokens in designated zones, referred to as Free Speech
Zones, outside the entry gates but not inside the festival
itself. Camenzind nevertheless purchased a ticket, entered
the festival, began handing out tokens, and was subsequently
ejected. He brought suit alleging that the Cal Expo
fairgrounds, in their entirety, constitute a traditional “public
forum,” analogous to a public park, thereby entitling his
speech to the most robust constitutional protections.
    The panel first held that the enclosed, ticketed portion of
the fairgrounds constituted a nonpublic forum under the
United States Constitution and the California Speech Clause.

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
           CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR           3

The space did not permit free access, its boundaries were
clearly delineated by a fence, and no evidence suggested that
access had previously been granted as a matter of
course. The panel further noted that California courts have
drawn distinctions between ticketed and unticketed portions
of venues, and Camenzind pointed to no case holding that an
enclosed area with a paid-entry requirement constitutes a
public forum.
    The panel determined that it need not decide whether the
area outside the fence was a public forum under the First
Amendment because the California Speech Clause provided
independent support for Camenzind’s argument that it was
indeed such a forum, albeit subject to reasonable restrictions
on speech. The panel concluded that the Free Speech Zones
in the exterior fairgrounds were a valid regulation of the
time, place, and manner of Camenzind’s speech. The
guidelines on distributing literature in the enclosed area were
likewise permissible.
    Dissenting in part, Judge VanDyke agreed with much of
the majority’s analysis, but did not think the majority
properly applied California law to determine whether the
area inside the fence was a public forum under the California
Speech Clause, nor was the record sufficiently developed to
make that determination. Accordingly, Judge VanDyke
would remand for the district court to develop the record and
properly answer that question.
4          CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

                         COUNSEL

Matthew B. McReynolds (argued), Senior Counsel, and
Kevin T. Snider, Chief Counsel, Pacific Justice Institute,
Sacramento, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
David R. Norton (argued), Carl L. Fessenden, and Thomas
L. Riordan, Porter Scott, Sacramento, California, for
Defendants-Appellees.

                         OPINION

SANCHEZ, Circuit Judge:

    Burt Camenzind visited the Hmong New Year Festival
hoping to distribute religious tokens to attendees. The
festival, a privately organized event, took place at the state-
owned California Exposition and State Fair (“Cal Expo”)
fairgrounds in Sacramento County. Cal Expo police officers
told Camenzind that he could distribute his tokens in
designated zones, referred to as Free Speech Zones, outside
the entry gates but not inside the festival itself. Camenzind
nevertheless purchased a ticket, entered the festival, and
began handing out the tokens. After the officers removed
him from the fairgrounds, Camenzind brought this suit. He
claims that Cal Expo’s conduct violated the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the
Speech Clause of the California Constitution.
    To resolve this case, we must decide whether Cal Expo
constitutes a public forum under the federal or state
constitutions when the property is being rented for a
privately organized event, and, in light of that determination,
           CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR          5

whether the restrictions imposed by Cal Expo were
permissible. Reviewing the district court’s order de novo,
Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 2008), we hold
that the exterior, unticketed portion of Cal Expo is a public
forum under the California Speech Clause and the interior,
ticketed portion of the fairgrounds is a nonpublic forum. We
further hold that Cal Expo’s Free Speech Zones were a valid
regulation of Camenzind’s speech in the exterior fairgrounds
area and Cal Expo’s prohibition on distributing literature in
the enclosed area was likewise permissible. We therefore
affirm the district court’s order granting Cal Expo’s motion
for summary judgment.

                              I.
                             A.
    Cal Expo is a sprawling event venue in Sacramento
County owned and operated by the State of California.
About half of the 800-acre property is surrounded by fencing
and is accessible only through entry gates. The fenced-in
portion contains various indoor and outdoor event facilities.
The area outside of the fence largely consists of parking lots
and sidewalks leading to the gates.
    For a few weeks each summer, Cal Expo hosts the
California State Fair. During the rest of the year, private
organizations pay to rent Cal Expo facilities for trade shows
and other events. The private organizations usually charge
attendees for admission or charge vendors to rent booths.
The Cal Expo Police Department provides security for all
events that take place on the grounds.
   Cal Expo’s Free Speech Activities Guidelines (the
“Guidelines”) govern all events at the fairgrounds. The
6              CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

Guidelines prohibit attendees from leafletting, picketing, or
gathering signatures—collectively described as “free speech
activities”—within the enclosed portion of the fairgrounds. 1
During the State Fair, anyone wishing to conduct “free
speech activities” in the enclosed portion must purchase an
exhibit space. For privately hosted events, “free speech
activity is allowed only if that activity is allowed by the
terms of the lease.” Private-event organizers typically
prohibit attendees from soliciting other attendees to preserve
value for vendors who pay to rent booths.
    The Guidelines also restrict free speech activities in the
parking lots and on the sidewalks outside the fairgrounds
fence. To “prevent[] . . . accidents or [traffic] congestion
which could lead to injury,” the Guidelines require “free
speech activities” to be conducted in designated “Free
Expression Zones” directly outside the entry gates. The Free

1
    The Guidelines define “Free Speech Activities” as follows:

           For purposes of these guidelines, “free speech
           activities” mean individual or group display of signs
           other than specifically allowed herein; picketing,
           leafleting, collection of signatures or marching and
           any group activity involving the communication or
           expression, either orally or by conduct of views and/or
           grievances, and which has the effect and intent or
           propensity to express that view or grievance to others.
           As used in these guidelines, neither the definition of or
           limitations on “free speech activities” includes one-
           on-one voluntary discussions or individual wearing of
           buttons or symbolic clothing.

The Cal Expo Code of Conduct similarly prohibits “[s]oliciting
contributions or signatures, leafletting, picketing or displaying signs,
posters or banners, except in designated areas as defined by the” Cal
Expo Guidelines.
           CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR          7

Expression Zones each span six feet by six feet and are
available at no cost on a first-come, first-served basis.
Anyone entering the enclosed portion of the fairgrounds
must walk within a few dozen feet of the zones. The
Guidelines do not restrict individuals from conducting one-
on-one conversations or wearing “buttons or symbolic
clothing” anywhere on the fairgrounds.
                             B.
    The Sacramento Hmong New Year Organization
(“SHNYO”) leased the Cal Expo fairgrounds to host the
2018 Hmong New Year Festival. The festival took place
over four days in the fall of that year and attracted nearly
30,000 attendees. Vendors paid to rent booths at the festival,
and festival attendees were required to purchase a ticket for
entry.
    Camenzind, an Evangelical Christian, wanted to spread
the message of his faith at the festival. He arrived at the
fairgrounds wearing a vest covered in pockets, each filled
with custom coins bearing biblical verses and other religious
messages. Camenzind planned to distribute the coins to
festival attendees. Many of the coins contained messages in
Hmong and various other languages so that Camenzind
could proselytize attendees who did not speak English.
    The hundreds of coins bulging from Camenzind’s
pockets attracted the attention of Cal Expo police when he
reached the entry gates. A Cal Expo police officer advised
Camenzind that handing out his coins inside the festival
would violate the Guidelines. The officer told Camenzind
that he could distribute the coins from the Free Expression
8            CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

Zones outside the entry gates. 2 Camenzind declined,
insisting that effective communication requires one-on-one
conversations that he did not believe were possible from the
designated zones.
    Camenzind purchased a ticket, entered the fairground
gates, and began distributing his coins to fairgoers. When
Cal Expo police officers spotted him doing so, they ejected
him from the property.
                                  C.
    Camenzind filed a complaint in Sacramento County
Superior Court alleging that Cal Expo’s enforcement of the
Guidelines and Code of Conduct, both facially and as
applied to him, violated his rights under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the
Speech Clause of the California Constitution. Cal Expo
removed the case to the Eastern District of California.
Following discovery, the district court granted Camenzind’s
motion for summary judgment on his as-applied challenge,
finding that the police officer arbitrarily enforced the
Guidelines because there was no individual registration
requirement for using the Free Expression Zones. The
district court, however, granted Cal Expo’s motion for
summary judgment on the facial challenge to the Guidelines,
holding that the Guidelines did not violate Camenzind’s
right to free expression under the United States or California
Constitution.

2
  The officer told Camenzind that he needed to fill out an application to
use one of the Free Expression Zones. The parties agree the officer’s
statement was incorrect: the Cal Expo Guidelines only require
applications for groups of twenty-five or more. Camenzind does not
contend that the application requirement affected his decision not to use
the Free Expression Zones.
           CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR          9

    In assessing Camenzind’s argument that Cal Expo is a
public forum, the court analyzed the fenced-in portion of the
fairgrounds separately from the exterior portion. The court
determined that the area outside of the fence—the parking
lots and sidewalks leading up to the entry gates—constitutes
a public forum under the California Speech Clause. The
court then concluded that Cal Expo’s establishment of Free
Expression Zones near the entry gates was a permissible
regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech. The
court also determined that the enclosed area of the
fairgrounds was not a public forum under either the United
States or California Constitution. After determining that the
Guidelines’ prohibition on “free speech activities” inside the
enclosed area was reasonable and content-neutral, the court
concluded that Camenzind’s rights were not violated.
Because Cal Expo does not appeal the district court’s ruling
on Camenzind’s as-applied challenge, only Camenzind’s
facial challenge to the Guidelines is before us.
                             II.
    The First Amendment reflects this country’s “profound
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Even so,
“protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and
at all times.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985). “To ascertain what limits, if
any, may be placed on protected speech, we have often
focused on the ‘place’ of that speech, considering the nature
of the forum the speaker seeks to employ.” Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 479 (1988).
    Camenzind contends that the Cal Expo fairgrounds, in
their entirety, constitute a “public forum,” entitling his
10         CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

speech to the most robust protection of the federal and state
constitutions. He also argues that Cal Expo’s Free
Expression Zones fail to survive the scrutiny we apply to
speech regulations in such a forum.
    To analyze his claims, we begin by “identify[ing] the
nature of the forum, because the extent to which government
may limit access depends on whether the forum is public or
nonpublic.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797. The First
Amendment and California Speech Clause sometimes
impose different tests for identifying public fora, see Kuba
v. 1-A Agr. Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2004), and so
we analyze the Cal Expo fairgrounds under each
constitutional provision in turn. Finally, we consider
whether the restrictions on Camenzind’s speech were
permissible under the applicable forum analysis.
                             A.
    At the threshold, we must specify the contours of the
forum at issue. We define a forum based on the “access
sought by the speaker.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801. “When
speakers seek general access to public property, the forum
encompasses that property [as a whole]. In cases in which
limited access is sought, our cases have taken a more tailored
approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum within the
confines of the government property.” Id.; accord Clark v.
Burleigh, 4 Cal. 4th 474, 484–85 (1992).
    Camenzind contends that the forum in question is the
entire 800-acre Cal Expo property. But Camenzind’s
conduct at Cal Expo, along with his arguments throughout
this litigation, indicate that he specifically sought access to
the Hmong New Year Festival, an event that took place
within the enclosed area of Cal Expo. Camenzind alleged in
his complaint that “he went to Cal Expo to attend the
             CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR                   11

[Hmong New Year] celebration and interact with fellow
attendees.” He refused to distribute his coins from the
designated zones outside the gates. At oral argument,
Camenzind’s counsel repeatedly declined to identify any
exterior area that Camenzind wanted to access.
    At the same time, Camenzind also claims that the Free
Expression Zones, which are located outside the entry gates,
impermissibly limited his ability to interact with fairgoers.
Camenzind further alleges that he sought access to the
exterior portion after Cal Expo officers ejected Camenzind
from the fairgrounds, asking them if he could distribute his
coins outside the gates as a fallback option. Cal Expo
officers denied his request and “informed him that he must
leave the grounds entirely.” 3
    Because Camenzind appears to challenge Cal Expo’s
regulation of free speech both within and outside the
fairgrounds, we analyze both sets of challenges. Like the
district court, we assess the two parts of the property
separately. The areas are separated by a physical barrier and
are governed by different policies. Each area therefore
requires distinct analysis. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (“[T]he First
Amendment [does not] require[] equivalent access to all
parts of a . . . building . . . .”); Int’l Soc. for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992)
(“[S]eparation from acknowledged public areas may serve to
indicate that the separated property is a special enclave,
subject to greater restriction.”).

3
  The Guidelines state that “[a]ny violation . . . will result in a person
already admitted to Cal Expo to leave the facility grounds without
refund, liability, or compensation.”
12         CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

                             B.
    We turn next to the question of whether the forum was
public. “The standard under the California Constitution for
whether a particular area is a ‘public forum’ is one aspect of
constitutional law in which the California Constitution
varies from its federal cousin.” Kuba, 387 F.3d at 856. We
therefore consider the question under each constitutional
provision in turn, beginning with the First Amendment.
                              1.
    The First Amendment affords special protection to
“places which by long tradition or by government fiat have
been devoted to assembly and debate.” Perry, 460 U.S. at
45. Such areas, called “public fora,” facilitate the free
exchange of ideas essential to our democracy. McCullen v.
Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014) (quoting Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009)). Traditional
examples of public fora include streets, parks, and
sidewalks—publicly owned spaces which, for “time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)); Cinevision Corp. v. City of
Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 569 (9th Cir. 1984). The
government may also create new public fora by intentionally
designating properties for expressive purposes.        See
Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 469. “Examples of designated
public fora include university meeting facilities, school
board meetings, and municipal theaters.” Koala v. Khosla,
931 F.3d 887, 900 (9th Cir. 2019). In both traditional and
designated public fora, “the government may impose
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech,
           CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR          13

but content-based restrictions must be viewpoint neutral and
satisfy strict scrutiny review.” Id.
    Nonpublic fora, in contrast, “are areas that do not, by
tradition or designation, serve as a forum for public
communication.” Preminger v. Peake, 552 F.3d 757, 765
(9th Cir. 2008). “Examples of nonpublic fora include airport
terminals, highway overpass fences, and interstate rest stop
areas (including perimeter walkways).” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical
Reform, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 455 F.3d 910, 919
(9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). “In a nonpublic
forum, . . . the government has much more flexibility to craft
rules limiting speech.” Minnesota Voters All. v. Mansky,
138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018). After all, “[n]othing in the
Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access
to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every
type of Government property.” Cornelius, 472 U.S. at 799–
800.
    Camenzind contends that the Cal Expo fairgrounds are a
“traditional” public forum, analogous to a public park. He
points out that Cal Expo was established under state law as
part of the state parks system. Cf. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC.
CODE §§ 3304–05. Drawing on language from Cal Expo’s
website, he says that the property was created “as a gathering
place for Californians of all backgrounds.” Cf. About Us,
CAL. EXPO STATE FAIR, https://calexpostatefair.com/about-
us [https://perma.cc/U8BH-5PZV].
    When determining whether a location is a traditional
public forum for First Amendment purposes, we consider:
“(1) ‘the actual use and purposes of the property, particularly
status as a public thoroughfare and availability of free public
access to the area,’ (2) ‘the area’s physical characteristics,
including its location and the existence of clear boundaries
14        CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

delimiting the area,’ and (3) ‘traditional or historic use of
both the property in question and other similar properties.’”
Wright v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 665 F.3d
1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting ACLU of Nev. v. City of
Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2003)); Askins
v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 899 F.3d 1035, 1045 (9th
Cir. 2018).
    None of the factors weighs in favor of treating the
enclosed portion of the fairgrounds as a traditional public
forum. First, the space does not serve as a public
thoroughfare, and Cal Expo does not permit free public
access to it. For most of the year, the fairgrounds remain
locked and inaccessible until leased by a private party. And
leasing the property is not free—the SHNYO had to pay
about $10,000 per day for that privilege. Even during the
few weeks that Cal Expo hosts the State Fair, the property is
open only during limited hours. Patrons must also generally
pass through a security checkpoint and purchase a ticket to
gain entry. The property is thus in no sense “continually
open” to the public as, for example, a park or public square.
See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990)
(quoting Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981)); see also Perry, 460 U.S. at
47 (“[S]elective access does not transform government
property into a public forum.”). Second, the boundaries of
the space are clearly marked by the fencing surrounding it.
The fencing “proscrib[es] access to” the property “and
clearly indicate[s] to the public” that the space is “not
intended for the exercise of First Amendment rights.”
Wright, 665 F.3d at 1136. Third, no evidence suggests that
“access to [the forum] ha[s] been granted as a matter of
course to all who s[eek] to distribute material.” Id.
(discussing Perry, 460 U.S. at 47–48). On the contrary, the
           CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR         15

Cal Expo has a policy of allowing only “reasonable access
to its grounds and designated free speech expression zones
for demonstrations for free speech activity.” We thus
conclude that the enclosed area of Cal Expo is not
“traditionally open to expressive activity.” Kokinda, 497
U.S. at 727.
    The exterior portion of the fairgrounds presents a closer
question. Camenzind does not specify which parts of the
400-acre property outside the fence he believes are
analogous to a public park. Some areas outside the fence
include roadways and sidewalks, which generally occupy “a
‘special position in terms of First Amendment protection’
because of their historic role as sites for discussion and
debate.” McCullen, 573 U.S. at 476 (quoting United States
v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983)). Still, not all roadways
and sidewalks are the same. In United States v. Kokinda, the
Court held that a sidewalk leading from a parking lot to the
front door of a Postal Service building lacked “the
characteristics of public sidewalks traditionally open to
expressive activity.” 497 U.S. at 727. As in Kokinda, the
sidewalks at Cal Expo seem “constructed solely to assist
[Cal Expo] patrons to negotiate the space between the
parking lot and the [entry gate].” Id. at 728.
    On the other hand, some areas outside the fence are, at
the very least, designated public fora. “The government
creates a designated public forum when it intends to make
property that hasn’t traditionally been open to assembly and
debate ‘generally available’ for ‘expressive use by the
general public or by a particular class of speakers.’” Seattle
Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cnty., 781 F.3d 489,
496 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n
v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 667–68 (1998)). Here, Cal Expo
created Free Expression Zones for expressive use by the
16         CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

general public. Those zones, which take up several hundred
feet outside the entry gates, undoubtedly constitute public
fora.
    In any event, we need not decide whether the area
outside the fence is a public forum under the First
Amendment. As we discuss below, the California Speech
Clause provides “independent support” for Camenzind’s
argument that it is indeed such a forum, Kuba, 387 F.3d at
856 (quoting Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039,
1042 (9th Cir. 1985)), albeit subject to reasonable
restrictions on speech.        We therefore “avoid the
determination of [the] federal constitutional issue[].” Id.
We conclude that the enclosed portion of Cal Expo, during
the Hmong New Year Festival, was a nonpublic forum under
the United States Constitution.
                              2.
     The California Speech Clause provides: “Every person
may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A
law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”
CAL. CONST. art. I, sec. 2(a). “California Courts have
developed an extensive body of case law addressing whether
the government regulation of speech in certain locations
violates” that clause. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness
of Cal. Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 530 F.3d 768, 774 (9th
Cir. 2008), certified question answered 48 Cal. 4th 446, 227
P.3d 395 (2010). “Nonetheless, there is still some confusion
about how properly to articulate California’s public forum
test.” Id.
    In some settings, the California Speech Clause treats
privately controlled properties as public fora. For example,
although privately owned shopping centers are not public
          CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR         17

fora for purposes of the First Amendment, the California
Supreme Court has recognized them as such under the
California Speech Clause. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); San Leandro Tchrs. Ass’n v.
Governing Bd. of San Leandro Unified Sch. Dist., 46 Cal.
4th 822, 842 (2009). In reaching that conclusion, the
California Supreme Court reasoned:

       A privately owned shopping center may
       constitute a public forum under the
       [California] Constitution because of the
       growing importance of the shopping center as
       a place for large groups of citizens to
       congregate and to take advantage of the
       numerous amenities offered there, and also
       because of the public character of the
       shopping center, which is a result of the
       shopping center’s owner having fully opened
       his property to the public.

Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Com. Workers Union
Loc. 8, 55 Cal. 4th 1083, 1091 (2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr.,
23 Cal. 3d 899, 907, 910 & n.5 (1979), aff’d 447 U.S. 74
(1980)).
    The state supreme court has nevertheless “stressed that
‘those who wish to disseminate ideas’ in shopping centers
do not ‘have free rein.’” Id. (quoting Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d
at 910). And more recently, the court “held that the entrance
to an individual store within a privately owned shopping
center is not a public forum.” Park Mgmt. Corp. v. In Def.
of Animals, 36 Cal. App. 5th 649, 660 (2019) (citing Ralphs
Grocery, 55 Cal. 4th at 1093).
18         CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

    Outside of shopping centers, “California’s public forum
test, and how that test differs from its federal counterpart, are
not abundantly clear.” Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness
of Cal. Inc., 530 F.3d at 775. In Golden Gateway Center v.
Golden Gateway Tenants Association, a divided California
Supreme Court held that a privately owned apartment
complex was not a public forum. 26 Cal. 4th 1013, 1016
(2001). A majority of the court distinguished Pruneyard,
holding that the apartment complex was “not the functional
equivalent of a traditional public forum” because it was not
“freely and openly accessible to the public.” Id. at 1032–33;
see also id. at 1038 (George, C.J., concurring). A plurality
of the court would have narrowed Pruneyard further,
reasoning that “California’s free speech clause contains a
state action requirement.” Id. at 1023 (plurality opinion of
Brown, J.). No justice articulated a “precise standard to
judge whether private property constitutes a public forum for
free speech purposes under California’s Constitution.” Park
Mgmt. Corp., 36 Cal. App. 5th at 659.
    The California standard for analyzing government-
owned fora is similarly elusive. In the 1980s, one state
appellate court announced that “the label ‘public forum’
cannot be applied mechanically,” and instructed that
government-owned properties must be assessed on “a
continuum, with public streets and parks at one end and
government institutions like hospitals and prisons at the
other.” U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project v.
Lawrence Livermore Lab’y, 154 Cal. App. 3d 1157, 1163–
64 (1984). The “test” under California law, that court
concluded, was whether the communicative activity “is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time.” Id. at 1168 (citation
omitted).
            CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR                  19

    We dutifully adopted this “basic incompatibility” test,
see Carreras, 768 F.2d at 1045, and attempted to apply it for
decades. See, e.g., Kuba, 387 F.3d at 856–57; Cuviello v.
City of Vallejo, 944 F.3d 816, 826 (9th Cir. 2019). California
courts, meanwhile, seem to have immediately abandoned the
test. See San Leandro Tchrs. Ass’n, 46 Cal. 4th at 845
(recognizing that the “basic incompatibility test has not been
found in California appellate cases since U.C. Weapons
Labs” was announced). And in 2009, the California
Supreme Court declined to adopt the “basic incompatibility”
test, acknowledging flaws in its reasoning. Id. 4 Thus, our
cases applying the test, which Camenzind urges us to follow,
stand on what appears to be a hollow foundation.
    Fortunately, a closely analogous California Court of
Appeal decision provides a path for assessing the forum at
issue in this case. See T-Mobile USA Inc. v. Selective Ins.
Co. Am., 908 F.3d 581, 586 (9th Cir. 2018) (“An
intermediate state appellate court decision . . . is not to be
disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other
persuasive data that the highest court of the state would

4
  U.C. Weapons Labs borrowed the “basically incompatible” language
from Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). See U.C.
Weapons Labs, 154 Cal. App. 3d at 1168 (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at
116); see also Prisoners Union v. Dep’t of Corr., 135 Cal. App. 3d 930,
935 (1982) (same). In San Leandro Teachers Association v. Governing
Board of the San Leandro Unified School District, the California
Supreme Court pointed out that Grayned did not use “the concept of
‘basic incompatibility’” to determine whether a location was a public
forum. 46 Cal. 4th at 845 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116). Rather,
the basic incompatibility test was used in Grayned “to determine whether
[the challenged] regulation constitute[d] a reasonable time, place or
manner restriction”—that is, the test applied only “after it ha[d] been
decided that the government property in question [was] a public forum.”
Id. (emphasis added).
20         CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

decide otherwise.” (quoting Estrella v. Brandt, 682 F.2d
814, 817 (9th Cir. 1982))). In Park Management Corp. v. In
Defense of Animals, the court considered whether Six Flags
Discovery Kingdom constituted a public forum under the
California Speech Clause. 36 Cal. App. 5th at 654. Several
important aspects of the Six Flags property match the Cal
Expo fairgrounds: “the [Six Flags] amusement park consists
of a ticketed interior portion where the entertainment
activities are located, accessible through a single point of
entry and exit, and an exterior portion” made up of parking
lots and walkways leading to the admissions area. Id. at 653.
     Recognizing that “the California Supreme Court’s
decisions in this area are hard to synthesize,” id. at 661, the
Park Management court employed a balancing test based on
its survey of other state appellate court decisions. Id. at 664.
The court weighed “society’s interest in free expression”
against the park-management corporation’s “interests as a
private property owner,” to “conclude the unticketed,
exterior portions of the Six Flags Discovery Kingdom are a
public forum.” Id. (emphasis added). Necessary to the
court’s conclusion was its observation that there were “no
other areas within the amusement park available for free
expression, because the interior area is by ticketed admission
only.” Id. at 665.
     Park Management teaches that the exterior, unticketed
portions of the Cal Expo constitute a public forum under the
California Speech Clause. Id. at 664. Cal Expo, for its part,
concedes as much. “[T]he public’s interest in engaging in
expressive activity in the exterior portions of [the Cal Expo]
is strong” due to the significant volume of pedestrian traffic,
id. at 665, with the 2018 Hmong New Year Festival alone
attracting nearly 30,000 attendees. In comparing the
public’s interest with that of the property holder, Cal Expo’s
           CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR            21

stated mission remains public oriented “as a place to
celebrate California[] . . . [and the] diversity of its people,
traditions and trends.” About Us, CAL. EXPO STATE FAIR.
The exterior area of the Cal Expo is “large and freely open
to the public,” akin to the exterior portions of the amusement
park in Park Management. Park Mgmt. Corp., 36 Cal. App.
5th at 665. Similarly, Camenzind “handing out [coins] there
is not likely to interfere with the property’s use.” Id. While
the amusement park in Park Management had allowed
activists to protest peacefully on its property for years, Cal
Expo’s establishment of the Free Expression Zones
analogously “suggests a diminished interest in enforcing a
private property right to exclude” Camenzind’s speech from
the entirety of its grounds. Id.
     Park Management’s distinction between ticketed and
unticketed portions of a property is also dispositive in
assessing the nature of the enclosed portion of the Cal Expo
fairgrounds. Here, the interior, ticketed portion of the
fairgrounds is the exact type of forum that Park Management
stated was unavailable for free expression. Id. The
California Supreme Court has likewise recognized the
distinction between ticketed and unticketed sections of a
forum. In International Society for Krishna Consciousness
of California Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 530 F.3d 768 (9th
Cir. 2008), we certified a question to the California Supreme
Court, asking whether Los Angeles International Airport
constituted a public forum under the California Speech
Clause. The California Supreme Court declined to assess the
airport as a whole, and instead analyzed only the portions of
the airport that were accessible by the general public—that
is, the court did not consider the parts of the airport that were
accessible only by ticketed passengers. See Int’l Soc’y for
Krishna Consciousness of Cal., 48 Cal. 4th at 460; see also
22         CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

id. at 461 (Kennard, J., concurring) (“More precisely, the
question is whether the areas of that airport that are
accessible to the general public—excluding areas reserved
for ticketed passengers who have passed through security
screening—are public forums.”).
    Camenzind points us to no case holding that an enclosed
area with a paid-entry requirement constitutes a public
forum. The cases on which he principally relies, our
decisions in Carreras and Kuba, analyzed only exterior,
freely accessible spaces. See Carreras, 768 F.2d at 1045
(holding that “the exterior walkways and parking areas of
Anaheim Stadium and the Anaheim Convention Center” are
public fora (emphasis added)); Kuba, 387 F.3d at 857 (same
for “the parking lots and . . . walkways around the Cow
Palace” (emphasis added)). Even in the shopping-center
context, the California Supreme Court has drawn analogous
distinctions. See Ralphs Grocery, 55 Cal. 4th at 1092
(“[W]ithin a shopping center or mall, the areas outside
individual stores’ customer entrances and exits, at least as
typically configured and furnished, are not public
forums . . . .”).
    Absent controlling authority from the state supreme
court, “a federal court must ‘predict how the highest state
court would decide the [state law] issue using intermediate
appellate court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions,
statutes, treatises, and restatements as guidance.’” Kaiser v.
Cascade Cap., LLC, 989 F.3d 1127, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Judd v. Weinstein, 967 F.3d 952, 955–56 (9th Cir.
2020)). Given the distinction drawn by California courts
between ticketed and unticketed portions of venues, and in
particular the analysis by the California Court of Appeals in
Park Management, we hold that the enclosed portion of Cal
Expo during the Hmong New Year Festival did not
          CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR         23

constitute a public forum under the California Speech
Clause. The area outside the Cal Expo fence, however, did
constitute a public forum under that clause.
                            III.
    We finally consider whether the restrictions on speech in
the forum were permissible. As discussed above, the
exterior, unticketed portion of Cal Expo is a public forum
under the California Speech Clause. The interior, ticketed
portion of the fairgrounds is a nonpublic forum under the
First Amendment and the California Speech Clause.
    We conclude that the Free Speech Zones were a valid
regulation of Camenzind’s speech in the exterior fairgrounds
area. In a public forum, “the government may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of
protected speech.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989). Time, place, or manner regulations “must
be content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the message.” Galvin v.
Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 752 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United
States v. Baugh, 187 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999)); see
Kuba, 387 F.3d at 857–58 (recognizing that the same
requirements apply under the California Speech Clause).
The zones fulfill all those requirements.
     Camenzind concedes that the Free Expression Zones are
content-neutral because they are allocated on a first-come,
first-served basis. The zones also serve a substantial
government interest: public safety. In the exterior area,
pedestrian activity is generally confined to narrow walkways
to and from the parking areas. The Free Speech Zones serve
the “substantial state interest” of preventing congestion in
that area by “confining distribution, selling, and fund
24         CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

solicitation activities to fixed locations.” Heffron, 452 U.S.
at 654; see Kuba, 387 F.3d at 858. From the Free Speech
Zones, Camenzind would have been able to distribute his
coins while not blocking the narrow walkways and causing
attendees to stray into adjoining parking lots with
automobile traffic. The zones are adequately tailored
because they do not “burden substantially more speech than
is necessary” to achieve the government’s public-safety
interest. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. The zones are positioned
next to the entry gates—a prime location that provides
speakers with exposure to virtually everyone who enters the
fairgrounds. Camenzind points to nowhere in the exterior
area that he would find preferable. We therefore conclude
that Cal Expo’s Free Expression Zones were a permissible
regulation of the time, place, and manner of Camenzind’s
speech.
    The Guidelines’ prohibition on distributing literature in
the enclosed area was likewise permissible. In a nonpublic
forum, speech restrictions “need only be ‘reasonable and not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker’s view.’” Preminger v. Peake,
552 F.3d 757, 765 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Perry, 460 U.S.
at 46); see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Vir., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
    Cal Expo, like any event-venue owner, makes the
facilities inside the gates attractive by offering lessees the
freedom to control them. A couple in search of a wedding
venue, for example, would be uneager to book a property
where they could not exclude an uninvited uncle. By
allowing the lessee to set the rules for their events—and by
enforcing those rules—Cal Expo adds value for such
customers. We think it perfectly reasonable for Cal Expo to
have done so here. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 725 (“It is a
           CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR         25

long-settled principle that governmental actions are subject
to a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny when ‘the
governmental function operating is . . . as [a] proprietor to
manage its internal operations.’” (alterations and
punctuation mark omitted) (quoting Cafeteria & Rest.
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961))).
   At bottom, we have little difficulty concluding that the
government’s actions were reasonable and not aimed at
suppressing Camenzind’s viewpoint.
                      CONCLUSION
   For the reasons above, we affirm the district court’s order
granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.
   AFFIRMED.

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

    This case asks us to determine whether, under either the
First Amendment or the California Speech Clause, a publicly
owned facility may constitute a private forum when it is
rented out to private organizations. Because we do not have
enough information to properly evaluate whether Cal Expo
is a public forum during the Hmong New Year Festival
under the California Speech Clause, I would remand for
further factual development.
    I agree with much of the majority’s analysis. First, I
agree that we should analyze Cal Expo’s regulation of
speech inside and outside the fenced-in section of the
fairgrounds separately. Second, I agree with the majority’s
analysis of regulations outside the fence under both the First
Amendment and the California Speech Clause, and that in
26         CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

the end, those regulations are valid time, place, and manner
restrictions. Finally, I agree that the area inside the fence is
not a traditional public forum for First Amendment
purposes.
    But I depart from the majority’s analysis of the
regulations within the fence under the California Speech
Clause. I do not think the majority properly applied
California law to determine whether the area inside the fence
is a public forum, and I do not think the factual record is
developed enough for us to determine whether the fenced-in
area is a public forum under the California Speech Clause.
Accordingly, I would remand for the district court to develop
the record and properly answer that question.
    “The California Constitution provides protections for
speakers in some respects broader than provided by the First
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.” Kuba v. 1-A Agric.
Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2004). The California
Speech Clause is “more definitive and inclusive than the
First Amendment” because it does not “couch[] the right to
free speech as a limit on congressional power.” Golden
Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 26 Cal. 4th
1013, 1019 (2001). As the majority explains, one area where
the California Speech Clause differs from the First
Amendment is the standard under which a particular area is
determined to be a public forum (or not). Kuba, 387 F.3d at
856.
    Under the California Speech Clause, “the ‘public forum’
doctrine is not limited to traditional public forums such as
streets, sidewalks, and parks, or to sites dedicated to
communicative activity.” Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768
F.2d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1985). Instead, “private property
that [is] open to the public in the same manner as public
           CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR         27

streets or parks could constitute a public forum for free
expression.” See Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. Nat’l Lab.
Rel. Bd., 42 Cal. 4th 850, 859 (2007). Under this standard,
private properties like shopping malls, railway terminals, or
sidewalks outside businesses may be deemed public forums
under the California Speech Clause. Park Mgmt. Corp. v. In
Def. of Animals, 36 Cal. App. 5th 649, 659–60 (Cal. Ct. App.
2019).
    Though the test is clearly broader than the public forum
analysis under the First Amendment, “[t]he California
Supreme Court has not articulated a precise standard to
judge whether private property constitutes a public forum for
free speech purposes under California’s Constitution.” Id. at
659. Our court has applied the “basic incompatibility” test
explicated by one state appellate court, which asks whether
the proposed communicative activity “is basically
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at
a particular time.” Carreras, 768 F.2d at 1045 (quoting
Univ. of Cal. Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project v.
Lawrence Livermore Lab’y, 154 Cal. App. 3d 1157, 1164,
1168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)). But as the majority correctly
observes, that test was never adopted by the California
Supreme Court. See San Leandro Teachers Ass’n v.
Governing Bd. of San Leandro Unified Sch. Dist., 46 Cal.
4th 822, 845 (2009). And I agree that our court has probably
been misapplying California law in our cases applying that
test.
    Instead, the California Supreme Court has provided
some guideposts, rather than bright-line rules, for when
private property constitutes a public forum. For example, in
Golden Gateway Center, the California Supreme Court
looked at the extent to which a privately owned apartment
complex “restricts the public’s access to the Complex,”
28         CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

versus the extent to which “the property is freely and openly
accessible to the public.” 26 Cal. 4th at 1033. And in
Ralph’s Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union Local 8, the California Supreme Court contrasted
“shopping centers’ common areas, which generally have
seating and other amenities producing a congenial
environment that encourages passing shoppers to stop and
linger, to leisurely congregate for purposes of relaxation and
conversation,” with areas immediately adjacent to individual
store entrances, which “typically lack seating and are not
designed to promote relaxation and socializing.” 55 Cal. 4th
1083, 1092 (2012). Areas with the “utilitarian purposes of
facilitating customers’ entrance to and exit from the stores”
are not public forums, the California Supreme Court
explained, but areas “designed and furnished in a way that
induces shoppers to congregate for purposes of
entertainment, relaxation, or conversation” are. Id. at 1093.
So various factors play into whether a private area is open to
the public in the same manner as public streets or parks and
thus constitutes a public forum under the California
Constitution.
    The California Supreme Court has not, however,
pronounced a test like that adopted by the majority in this
case. According to the majority, any “enclosed area with a
paid-entry requirement” is not a public forum under
California law. But while a ticketed-entry test may be an
administrable bright-line rule, and thus one the California
courts could consider adopting, that test appears neither in
the cases the majority cites for it nor in any decisions of the
California Supreme Court. It is true that a couple California
cases factually involved ticketed and unticketed areas, but in
none of those cases did the courts’ analysis rely on that
distinction. In my view, the majority here—much like it
           CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR          29

suggests our court previously did in Carreras—adopts a test
that is unsupported by the California Supreme Court’s
caselaw. But worse than in Carreras, the test adopted by the
majority today is not supported by any California court, not
even a single intermediate court of appeals decision. We are
effectively making California constitutional law from
scratch.
    Consider       International    Society     for    Krishna
Consciousness of Cal. v. City of Los Angeles, 48 Cal. 4th 446
(2010). In that case, the California Supreme Court was
tasked with determining whether a prohibition on
solicitation at the Los Angeles International Airport violated
the California Speech Clause. Id. at 449. The court refused
to determine whether the airport was a public forum because
the regulation was valid either way. Id. at 453 (“[W]e do not
determine whether Los Angeles International Airport is a
public forum under the liberty of speech clause of the
California Constitution ….”). Granted, as the majority
notes, the court concluded that the regulation was valid
“even if those areas of Los Angeles International Airport that
are open to the general public are public forums” and did not
seem to consider the secure (i.e., “ticketed”) sections of the
airport. Id. at 460. But the opinion nowhere says that the
secure, ticketed sections of the airport were not public
forums. Rather, it never analyzed those areas at all. So
International Society for Krishna Consciousness does not
support the majority’s rule that ticketed areas are necessarily
not public forums under California law.
    Park Management is similar. As the majority explains,
that case considered whether Six Flags Discovery
Kingdom—which, like Cal Expo here, included both a
ticketed portion and an exterior parking and admissions
area—was a public forum. 36 Cal. App. 5th at 653. But
30         CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

again, it does not support the majority’s categorical test.
First, that court had no occasion to pass on the legality of
speech restrictions in ticketed areas because the protest there
occurred outside the entrance to Six Flags, not beyond the
ticket booth. Id. at 656 (“[A]pproximately eight people
protested … at the park’s front entrance area, and a ninth
person handed out leaflets in the parking lot.”). Second, the
court, after reviewing California Supreme Court cases and
the decisions of other intermediate appellate courts, applied
an interest balancing test to determine whether the entrance
area and parking lot were public forums. Id. at 664. It noted
that factors included “the nature, purpose, and primary use
of the property; the extent and nature of the public invitation
to use the property; and the relationship between the ideas
sought to be presented and the purpose of the property’s
occupants.” Id. (quoting Van v. Target Corp., 155 Cal. App.
4th 1375, 1384 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)). It simply had no
reason to analyze whether the ticketed part of Six Flags was
a public forum under California law.
    While the majority is correct that Camenzind “points us
to no case holding that an enclosed area with a paid-entry
requirement constitutes a public forum” under California
law, the majority points to no case holding the opposite,
either. My own reading of California cases suggests that
California’s test is more complicated, and less categorical,
than the majority would hold. I would instead look to the
various factors considered by the California Supreme Court
in other cases, helpfully outlined by Park Management. See
36 Cal. App. 5th at 664.
    But the record in this case is currently insufficient to
consider those factors because the answer could very well be
different based on what type of event is occurring on Cal
Expo’s property.
           CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR         31

    A few examples illustrate this. First, consider a scenario
where a private company rents out Cal Expo for a company
picnic. No entry fee is required, but only employees of the
company and their families are invited to attend. None of
the relevant factors would point toward Cal Expo being a
public forum in that instance, because it is in no way held
open to the public. Cf. Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1033
(concluding that an apartment complex was not a traditional
public forum under the California Constitution because
access is limited to residential tenants and their invitees).
The fact that an entry fee is not charged would not be
dispositive in that instance.
    Second, imagine that a local farmers’ association rents
out Cal Expo once a week for its farmers’ market. The
vendors each pay to rent a booth, but no admission fee is
charged, and they hold themselves out as open to the public,
who they hope will come in to buy their goods. The market
has an open mic for music and tables for people to sit at and
enjoy their produce. The association advertises the market
in local papers and online as a place to sit, relax, and shop.
This would presumably be a public forum under the
California Free Speech Clause, akin to a shopping center.
Ralph’s Grocery Co., 55 Cal. 4th at 1092. Indeed, the only
relevant difference between this example and the type of
shopping centers that California courts have concluded are
public forums is that Cal Expo is publicly owned property,
which presumably would cut more in favor of it being
considered a public forum under California law.
    Now consider this same example, but imagine the same
market requires a small fee—say, a canned good as a
donation to charity—to enter. The farmers’ market is still
held open to the public. Indeed, the whole purpose of the
market is to allow the vendors to sell their produce to the
32         CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR

public broadly. The event also continues to provide
gathering areas where attendees can “leisurely congregate
for purposes of relaxation and conversation.” Id. It seems
to me that this example presents the paradigm of what
California courts have deemed a public forum, except for the
wrinkle of the small entrance fee. It is hard to see how the
small fee would necessarily outweigh all of the other factors
that make the farmers’ market akin to a traditional public
forum under California law. That is not what I would predict
California courts would conclude based on reading their
(admittedly not directly on-point) precedent.
    Here, we are tasked with determining whether the
application of Cal Expo’s policy to Camenzind during the
Hmong New Year Festival was contrary to the California
Speech Clause. But beyond the requirement that attendees
had to purchase tickets to enter and vendors paid to rent
booths, we know very little about the festival. If the festival
is exclusive in some important respects (which seems
unlikely given that the event attracted nearly 30,000
participants), it might be more like the company picnic
example above, and thus not a public forum. But if the
festival allows any member of the public to buy a ticket
(which seems most likely), and inside includes areas for
visitors “to stop and linger, [and] to leisurely congregate for
purposes of relaxation and conversation,” it might be more
like the farmers’ market example above—its entrance fee
notwithstanding. Ralph’s Grocery Co., 55 Cal. 4th at 1092.
Without additional facts, which I cannot find in the record,
we cannot properly evaluate where this event falls on the
spectrum. But what I am sure of is that ticketing alone is not
the touchstone California law requires.
    I thus respectfully dissent insofar as the majority affirms
the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the
         CAMENZIND V. CA EXPOSITION & STATE FAIR    33

California Speech Clause cause of action regarding the
fenced-in section of Cal Expo.