Court Opinion

ID: 9572104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:38:27.607205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:32.483052
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree with the majority that there is an issue of fact regarding duty, breach, proximate cause, and punitive damages for the owner/ operators. See Doe v. Briargate Apts., 227 Ga. App. 408 (489 SE2d 170) (1997) (physical precedent). I specially concur with regard to Division 5, because the tenants were not third-party beneficiaries of the security contract.
First, there is no inconsistency in holding that the owner/operators may be liable even though the security defendants are not, as the trial court ruled. The owner/operators had a nondelegable duty to the tenants. OCGA §§ 51-2-5 (4); 51-3-1; Moon v. Homeowners’ Assn. of Sibley Forest, 202 Ga. App. 821, 824 (4) (415 SE2d 654) (1992). Seaton and Seals have alleged in part that the owner/operators failed to provide a sufficient amount of security given the past history of crime at the complex. See Briargate Apts., 227 Ga. App. at 410 (1). Under certain circumstances an independent contractor, such as the security defendants here, may not be liable for defective design of the work. See generally David Allen Co. v. Benton, 260 Ga. 557, 558 (398 SE2d 191) (1990).
The second question is whether the security company may be liable in addition to the owner/operators. The trial court held that the company owed no duty to the tenants. The majority reverses that decision based on a negative inference drawn from the wording of the contract. The majority reasons that because the security contract expressly provided that the security defendants did not have any liability to the owner/operators or “any other parties” for property damage, that the security defendants impliedly agreed they would be liable to “any other parties” in tort.
“In order for a third party to have standing to enforce a contract ... it must clearly appear from the contract that it was intended for his benefit. The mere fact that he would benefit from performance of the agreement is not alone sufficient.” (Citations and punctuation *890omitted.) Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126, 135 (3) (249 SE2d 573) (1978); OCGA § 9-2-20 (b). In Miree, the plaintiffs claimed third-party beneficiary status based on language in a contract between DeKalb County and the Federal Aviation Administration that stated the contract was “ ‘for the use and benefit of the public.’ ” Id. at 127. The Supreme Court found this language did not clearly show an intention by the parties to permit the general public to sue on the contract. Id. at 135-136. See also Page v. City of Conyers, 231 Ga. App. 264, 265-267 (1) (499 SE2d 126) (1998).
Here, in addition to the provision relied on by the majority, the security contract includes a merger clause which states, “this writing constitutes the sole agreement between the parties, and any representation, warranty or promise not included herein shall be of no effect.”
It is unreasonable to say that an intent “clearly appears from a contract” when a negative inference is required to show it, especially where there is a merger clause in the agreement. Further, there are over 2,500 tenants at the apartment complex. It is certainly not clear from the contract that by hiring one or two security guards to patrol at night that the owner/operators and the security defendants intended to give all 2,500 tenants the right to sue under the contract. See Armor Elevator Co. v. Hinton, 213 Ga. App. 27, 30 (2) (443 SE2d 670) (1994) (building patrons not beneficiaries of contract between security company and building owners); Culberson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 201 Ga. App. 347, 349 (1) (d) (411 SE2d 75) (1991), rev’d on other grounds, Lemonds v. Walton County Hosp. Auth., 212 Ga. App. 369 (441 SE2d 821) (1994) (patient and family were not beneficiaries of contract whereby hospital authority agreed to maintain medical facility for the indigent); compare Kirby v. Chester, 174 Ga. App. 881, 884-886 (331 SE2d 915) (1985) (lender was third-party beneficiary of contract between attorney and borrower whereby attorney certified borrower’s title to land which was to secure the loan). The trial court correctly held that the tenants were not third-party beneficiaries of the security agreement even though they may have benefited from it.
However, the security defendants may be liable if they voluntarily undertook to provide security for the tenants. If so, they are liable if they were negligent and either (1) Seaton and Seals detrimentally relied on the security defendants’ actions or (2) the security defendants created an increased risk of harm by their own actions. Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga. App. 1, 3 (2) (470 SE2d 474) (1996); Adler’s Package Shop v. Parker, 190 Ga. App. 68, 71-72 (1) (b) (378 SE2d 323) (1989).
An expert for the plaintiffs testified that the security services that were provided would reasonably lead a tenant to the conclusion *891that security was being provided for them and that the premises were safe. Seals thought the security was for the tenants. Boone, the security guard on duty on the night in question, explained that he would watch over people in addition to the apartment complex property. The expert also testified that Boone’s failure to contact the police after seeing the suspicious vehicle fell below the standard of care in the industry. Thus, there is an issue of fact concerning whether the security company negligently undertook to protect the tenants, and for this reason I specially concur with regard to Division 5.
Decided November 3, 1999
Reconsideration denied November 18, 1999
Shapiro, Fussell, Wedge, Smotherman & Martin, Robert B. Wedge, Mary L. Hahn, for appellants.
Hammond, Carter & Watson, A. Cullen Hammond, Bauer & Deitch, Gilbert H. Deitch, for appellees.