Court Opinion

ID: 9671408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:36:02.845717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.870702
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
Appellee urges in his motion for rehearing that we erred in holding that appellee’s liability is contingent upon the question of whether he was acting in good faith in issuing the warrants of arrest, and that ap-pellee had the burden of showing his good faith; erred in holding that a jury question exists in this cause and erred in holding that there was an issue of fact as to appel-lee’s good faith; that we erred in not holding that appellee, a judicial officer, acted in good faith in issuing the warrants of arrest, and that we erred in reversing and remanding and in not affirming the judgment.
Upon reconsideration we have decided that we did err in reversing the judgment and in remanding the cause, and have concluded that the judgment should be affirmed. There were “other preliminary proceedings” which showed “colorable cause” or “invocation of jurisdiction” over the person of appellant, and a judicial question was presented concerning appellee’s authority to issue the warrants of arrest. Since there was colorable jurisdiction over the person of the appellant and a judicial determination was involved appellee cannot be held liable even though he improperly determined the question of his jurisdiction and this is true even if it could be determined that he did not act in good faith. We are now of the opinion that we erred in holding that the burden was on appellant to show his good faith. In Rains v. Simpson, SO Tex. 495, 499 it was stated:
“From the very necessity of the case, this immunity from private liability extends not only to negligent, but willful and malicious judicial acts. * * *
* * * * * *
That able jurist, Judge Cooley, in a valuable contribution on this subject in 3 Southern Law Review, (N.S.,) 547, says: ‘But our own view is, that the doctrine that a public officer, acting within the limits of his jurisdiction in the discharge of a discretionary duty, can be held liable upon an assumption that he has acted willfully or maliciously, is an exceedingly unsatisfactory and dangerous one; and that those decisions are safest and most consonant to public policy which deny it altogether. Motives are not always readily justified to the public, even in cases where they have been purest; and the safe rule for the public is that which protects its officers in acting fearlessly, so long as they keep within the limits of their legal discretion.’ ”
In Turner v. Pruitt, 161 Tex. 532, 342 S.W.2d 422, Judge Calvert, speaking for our Supreme Court, stated as follows:
“The same reasons underlying immunity of district judges from tort liability for acts performed or not performed in judicial proceedings require a conclusion that justices of the peace should enjoy like immunity when acting in the course of judicial proceedings of which they have jurisdiction.”
In affirming the trial court in the cited case the Supreme Court approved the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Wilson in the Court of Civil Appeals. (See Pruitt v. Turner, Tex.Civ.App., 336 S.W.2d 440). Justice Wilson stated in his dissent as follows :
“In Mabry v. Little, 19 Tex. 337, Justice Wheeler held that even if the unlearned justice of the peace had no jurisdiction, if the plaintiff submitted to his jurisdiction he waived the trespass and an action for damages would not lie. In Anderson v. Roberts, Tex.Civ.App., 35 S.W. 416, 417, the rule is stated that even if the justice improperly determines he has jurisdiction, he cannot be held liable for his acts for *837‘When the state confers judicial powers upon an individual it confers him with full immunity from private suits.’ The general rule is similarly stated in 51 C.J.S. Justices of the Peace § 19, p. 36, and 173 A.L.R. 802. The jurisdictional test has been reiterated by such venerable authorities as Coke, Bacon, Blackstone, Kent and the ancient Dalton’s ‘Countrey Justice.’ ”
The ticket or summons given to appellant by the highway patrolman to appear before the Justice Court on a speeding charge and his written promise to appear constituted “other preliminary proceedings” and were a colorable invocation of jurisdiction over the person of appellant. This colorable jurisdiction protected appellee in his decision to issue the warrants for appellant’s arrest and he is immune from personal liability in a civil action even though his acts may have been in excess of his jurisdiction.
The judgment is affirmed.