Court Opinion

ID: 9647092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:23:10.126127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:45.445414
License: Public Domain

CASTILLE, Justice,
dissenting.
The issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred by refusing to give an entrapment instruction to the jury. Our entrapment statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a) General rule. — A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by:
‡ ^ ‡ ^
or
(2) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
sf; # sí* í{! sfc
18 Pa.C.S. § 313 (emphasis added). The majority focuses only upon the introductory language of section (a) without analysis of subsection (2), which would require an entrapment instruc*358tion in this case only if Appellant presented evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the police employed methods of persuasion and inducement that created a substantial risk that the drug offense would be committed by a person other than a person ready to commit it. A review of the evidence, in the light most favorable to Appellant, reveals that Appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of entrapment; therefore, no instruction was warranted.
Here, the evidence provided by Appellant and his witness Sharon Norfleet, reveals that a confidential informant, with whom Appellant had previously shared heroin, contacted him once during a nine month period requesting that he purchase some cocaine for her.1 (T.T. at 88, 92). Appellant testified that he met the confidential informant at a bar, where he agreed to buy the illegal substance for the confidential informant because he was experiencing heroin withdrawal and needed money to purchase more illegal drugs for himself. Shortly after receiving “front money” from the confidential informant, he proceeded to a known drug area, where he had previously purchased illegal drugs (T.T. at 124-129), and purchased the requested contraband for the confidential informant. He also purchased heroin for himself. (T.T. at 130-133). While he was there, he met another user of illegal substances and before returning the cocaine to the confidential informant, he stopped to share his drugs with the other user. (T.T. at 141-143). Nothing in the record indicates that the detectives employed methods that would overwhelm persons who would not otherwise commit this crime. To the extent Appellant was induced to commit his crimes, he was induced only by his own physical need to obtain money to purchase *359more illegal substances for his own use and not by improper police conduct.
As noted by Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958), from which the present codification of the entrapment defense finds its origin:2
[The defense of entrapment] does not mean that the police may not act so as to detect those engaged in criminal conduct and ready and willing to commit further crimes should the occasion arise. Such indeed is their obligation. It does mean that in holding out inducements they should act in such a manner as is likely to induce to the commission of crime only these persons and not others who would normally avoid crime----
356 U.S. at 383-84, 78 S.Ct. at 826-27. Appellant was ready and willing to commit these crimes because he wanted money to purchase and use controlled substances for which he himself was responsible in creating his own need. Therefore, as a matter of law, I would find that Appellant failed to establish prima facie evidence of the elements of the defense of entrapment so as to bar any instruction. The majority’s holding to the contrary suggests that the mere request by a police officer, or by a confidential informant acting at the behest of the police, to purchase illegal substances warrants an entrapment instruction. I do not believe this to be the case. Therefore, I would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and properly refused the requested entrapment instruction.
The police conduct leading up to Appellant’s possession and delivery of the illegal substance in question hardly amounts to the persistent conduct of the informant in Commonwealth v. Borgella, 531 Pa. 139, 611, A.2d 699 (1992), upon which the majority relies. Indeed, the majority’s reliance upon Borgella is misplaced. In Borgella, this Court found sufficient evidence warranting an entrapment instruction where the defendant testified that months prior to the charged incident, the confi*360dential informant appeared as a stranger at defendant’s home asking to use his bathroom. The informant used the bathroom and then asked the defendant to obtain drugs for him, which the defendant refused to do. The informant subsequently returned to the defendant’s home several times over the several months prior to the charged incident, seeking drugs and seeking to develop a relationship which would induce the defendant to commit a drug offense. The informant also attempted to play on Borgella’s sympathy by masquerading as an addict with domestic problems who was unable to obtain drugs himself because each time he tried he was “ripped off” or beaten. However, Borgella persisted in his refusal to purchase illegal drugs for the informant. As the two became social Mends, Borgella became enviable of the informant’s income and became interested in employment by the informant’s “boss”. Per Borgella’s testimony, he had been led to believe the informant was employed in the area of construction.
The informant agreed to the introduction and drove Borgella from his home to meet his “boss” in a parking lot to discuss a potential job in construction for Borgella. Police testified that at this meeting Borgella sold them drugs. However, Borgella testified that he did not. The issue before the Court in Borgella was whether an entrapment instruction was warranted where the accused denied any criminal wrongdoing. Here, unlike Borgella, we have a seasoned drug veteran who admitted he purchased and delivered the contraband and admitted he agreed to partake in the drug transaction in order to perpetuate his own drug use.
Appellant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case that entrapment occurred under these facts. No entrapment instruction was therefore required. To hold otherwise under these flimsy set of facts will do irreparable harm to future law enforcement efforts to control the deadly flow of illicit drugs in our society. I would respectfully affirm the Superior Court’s order affirming Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
FLAHERTY and PAPADAKOS, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.

. The majority implies that Appellant only agreed to buy the illegal drugs for the confidential informant because of the confidential informant’s unyielding persistence in her requests for drugs. I submit that this is belied by Appellant’s own testimony set forth above. The majority also bases its decision upon what it characterizes as the confidential informant's exploitation of her friendship with Appellant. This characterization also finds no support. As discussed previously Appellant testified that the confidential informant made only a single request for drugs in a nine month period, and that he did not know the confidential informant very well or for a long period of time. (T.T. at 84, 88).

. Commonwealth v. Weiskerger, 520 Pa. 305, 311, 554 A.2d 10, 13 (1989), citing with approval, Commonwealth v. Jones, 242 Pa.Super. 303, 363 A.2d 1281 (1976).