Court Opinion

ID: 2965350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:39:02.778973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:36.228184
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                                
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit
                                
                                

No. 97-2118

                      ZORAIDA CRUZ-CAJIGAS,
                     Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                
                               v.
                                
                COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
                      Defendant, Appellee.
                                

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
                                
         [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
                                
                                

                             Before
                                
                    Boudin, Stahl and Lynch,
                        Circuit Judges.
                                

     Melba N. Rivera-Camacho and Melba N. Rivera Camacho & Assocs.on brief for appellant.
     Honorable Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Lilliam
Mendoza Toro, Assistant United States Attorney, and Donna McCarthy,
Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, Office
of the General Counsel, on brief for appellee.

June 18, 1998

            Per Curiam.  Appellant Zoraida Cruz Cajigas ("Cruz")
    appeals from the district court's judgment upholding the denial
    of her application for Social Security disability benefits.  We
    remand for further consideration consistent with this opinion. 
              In October 1993, Cruz filed an application for
    disability benefits, based on pinched nerves in her hands, neck
  pain, lower back pain radiating to her leg, and muscle spasms.   
    In support of her claim, she submitted medical records dating
    from April 1993 to June 1994 showing her treatment for back and
    neck pain and muscle spasms.  Her application was denied
    initially in April 1994 and on reconsideration in August 1994. 
    At a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), Cruz
    testified about her various impairments and symptoms and
    submitted medical evidence showing that she had had carpal
    tunnel surgery in October 1994.
       The ALJ concluded that Cruz was not disabled.  In
    addition to other medical evidence, he relied on a residual
    functional capacity ("RFC") assessment by a nonexamining
    consulting physician, which had been based on the medical
    evidence relating to Cruz's back and neck condition.  While
    this physician believed that Cruz could perform medium
    exertional work, the ALJ partially credited her testimony at
    the hearing, determining that she could only perform the
    exertional requirements of light unskilled work.  He stated
    that Cruz could not perform her past work of sewing shoes by
    hand "due to the good manual dexterity requirements of the
    job."  Citing the Medical-Vocational Guidelines as a framework
    for his decision, he concluded that Cruz was not disabled,
    stating that "[m]ost light work does not require good manual
    dexterity[.]"
       The Appeals Council denied review and Cruz filed an
    action in federal district court seeking review of the ALJ's
    decision.  Her primary contention was that substantial evidence
    did not support the determination that she could do light work. 
    Concluding that substantial evidence supported the denial of
    benefits, the district court affirmed the decision, and Cruz
    appealed to this court.
       On appeal, she again asserts principally that
    substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's determination
    that she could perform light work.  We think the district court
    correctly rejected that claim as it related to the back and
    neck condition.  While there was medical evidence on that
    condition which might have supported a determination that Cruz
    was disabled, there was also medical evidence which would
    support a different conclusion.  For example, while a physician
    who had treated Cruz for her back and neck pain had expressed
    the opinion that, exertionally, she was "severely limited," the
    Commissioner's consulting physician had determined, after
    reviewing her medical record, that she could perform medium
    work.  Since the treating physician had treated Cruz for only
    several months and had not considered the diagnostic
    examinations, showing an essentially normal spine and
    extremities, which had been considered by the consulting
    physician, we cannot say that the ALJ unreasonably discounted
    the treating physician's functional assessment.      
       Nonetheless, we are troubled by one aspect of this
    case: the apparent determination by the ALJ that Cruz lacked
    good manual dexterity, but could perform light unskilled work. 
    Cruz did not squarely present this issue for our consideration,
    as clearly as she could have, but she did object that the
    consulting physician had not considered her carpal tunnel
    syndrome in assessing her RFC, and she did assert that the
    ALJ's determination that she could no longer perform her prior
    light work of sewing shoes by hand conflicted with his
    determination that she could perform other light work.  Since
    disability proceedings are nonadversarial, we give her the
    benefit of the doubt on this point and conclude that her
    arguments suffice to preserve this issue for our review.  
       Unfortunately, as the record now stands, it is hard
    to evaluate this potentially significant claim.  As indicated,
    the ALJ apparently found that Cruz lacked good manual
    dexterity, but he did not explain why this was so, and the
    evidence of record on that issue is limited and equivocal.  At
    the hearing, Cruz submitted medical evidence showing her
    surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome, a condition which
    apparently arose only after the Commissioner had a consulting
    physician examine her relative to her other impairments and
    after the Commissioner had solicited an RFC assessment of those
    other impairments.  By itself, the evidence of past carpal
    tunnel surgery is inconclusive and may or may not point to a
    dexterity problem.  If credited, however, Cruz's hearing
    testimony might support a conclusion of inadequate hand
  dexterity.    If Cruz has a loss in dexterity, it could affect
    her ability to perform light unskilled work.  See Soc. Sec.
    Rul. 83-14 ( "many" unskilled light jobs require the gross use
    of the hands to grasp, hold and turn objects); Soc. Sec. Rul.
    85-15 (the ability to work with the whole hand, e.g., to seize,
    hold, grasp and turn, is required in almost all jobs). 
       In the absence of subsidiary findings by the ALJ, we
    are therefore uncertain about the extent of the dexterity
    problem perceived by the ALJ and whether it would in fact
    permit Cruz to perform light unskilled work.   Lest there be
    any injustice, we think it appropriate to remand to the ALJ for
    further consideration and explanation, including, in the ALJ's
    discretion, the taking of further medical evidence and
    testimony by a vocational expert, should the degree of
    impairment warrant it.  Our remand intimates no opinion as to
    what the outcome should be:  the ALJ remains free to determine,
    after further consideration consistent with this opinion, that
    Cruz's hand condition is not disabling.  We remand solely to
    permit further consideration of, and explanation concerning,
    this narrow issue, which lacked adequate development, having
    arisen after the Commissioner had obtained medical evidence and
    evaluations on Cruz's other impairments.
       The decision of the district court is vacated and the
    district court is directed to enter an order remanding the case
    to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings
    in accordance with this opinion.