Court Opinion

ID: 9908511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 22:07:56.691307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:12.971246
License: Public Domain

12/08/2023
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                           Assigned on Briefs April 11, 2023

                 ELVIN PEARSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
                     No. 2007-C-1912 Monte Watkins, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                           No. M2021-01560-CCA-R3-PC
                       ___________________________________

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, P.J., dissenting.
         An attorney’s failure to fulfill a promise made in opening statements “may be
justified when ‘unexpected developments warrant changes in previously announced trial
strategies.’” United States ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 257 (7th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2002) (emphasis added)). Otherwise,
“little is more damaging than to fail to produce important evidence that had been promised
in an opening [statement].” Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16, 17 (1st Cir. 1988), aff’d sub
nom. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 408 Mass. 803, 563 N.E.2d 1353 (1990). The reason
being that the jury may infer that the testimony would have been adverse to the defendant
and may also question the attorney’s credibility. Hampton, 347 F.3d at 259. Because the
record in this case clearly shows that no unexpected developments occurred which justified
trial counsel’s decision not to call Reid, the only alibi witness, as promised in the opening
statement, I must part ways with the majority and respectfully dissent.
        As touched upon by the majority, an attorney’s failure to produce evidence that he
or she promised the jury in opening statements may be deficient. State v. Zimmerman, 823
S.W.2d 220, 225-26 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). This court has cautioned that “[t]he trial
attorney should only inform the jury of the evidence that he is sure he can prove.… His
failure to keep [a] promise [to the jury] impairs his personal credibility. The jury may view
unsupported claims as an outright attempt at misrepresentation.” Id. at 225 (quoting
McCloskey, Criminal Law Desk Book, § 1506(3)(O) (Matthew Bender, 1990)). In my
view, the majority misses the mark in this case by attempting to distinguish the facts of
Zimmerman without recognizing that the key inquiry is whether there were developments
during trial that prompted a legitimate change in strategy. See id. at 225-26; see also Felts
v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 284-85 (Tenn. 2011). The Tennessee Supreme Court has
highlighted that “[m]aking… promises and then abandoning them for reasons that were
apparent at the time the promises were made cannot be described as legitimate trial
strategy.” Felts, 354 S.W.3d at 285 (quoting Hampton, 347 F.3d at 259). Abandoning a

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promise in response to unexpected developments in the proof presented at trial, however,
is not deficient. Id. at 284-85.
        In Johnson, this court held that an attorney’s failure to call an expert witness to
testify as promised in voir dire and opening statements was deficient. Johnson v. State,
145 S.W.3d 97, 118-19 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004). The defendant was charged with first
degree murder, and the theory of defense was that the defendant acted under extreme
passion and emotional duress. Id. at 118. During voir dire and opening statements, the
attorney informed the jury that a psychological expert would testify about the defendant’s
mental state at the time of the offense. Id. The attorney then chose not to call the expert
to testify, despite the expert being an essential component of the defense theory. Id. This
court reasoned that:

       [T]rial counsel failed to keep their promises to the jury, without a reasonable
       basis for such departure. All potential pitfalls regarding [expert’s] testimony
       were known and considered by counsel prior to trial. If counsel had
       determined that a chance existed that [expert] would not be called to testify
       at trial, counsel should not have assured the jury that they would hear his
       expert testimony, or, in the alternative, should have offered the jury an
       explanation for the failure to call the expert. We note that “[t]he first thing
       that the ultimately disappointed jurors would believe, in the absence of some
       other explanation, would be that the [expert was] unwilling, viz., unable, to
       live up to [his] billing.”

Id. at 119 (quoting Anderson, 858 F.2d at 17). Therefore, the attorney’s failure to call the
promised witness was deficient. Id. at 118-19.

        Tennessee courts and courts in other jurisdictions have often held that an attorney’s
failure to produce evidence that he or she promised during opening statements prejudiced
the defendant. See, e.g., Johnson, 145 S.W.3d at 119; Anthony v. State, No. M2003-02272-
CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 1947811, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 11, 2004); English v.
Romanowski, 602 F.3d 714, 729-30 (6th Cir. 2010). The First Circuit has emphasized that
the error of failing to present the promised testimony of an important witness is “not small,
but monumental.” Ouber, 293 F.3d at 33. The Ninth Circuit has elaborated that:

       A juror’s impression is fragile. It is shaped by his confidence in counsel’s
       integrity. When counsel promises a witness will testify, the juror expects to
       hear the testimony. If the promised witness never takes the stand, the juror
       is left to wonder why. The juror will naturally speculate why the witness
       backed out, and whether the absence of that witness leaves a gaping hole in
       the defense theory. Having waited vigilantly for the promised testimony,
       counting on it to verify the defense theory, the juror may resolve his
       confusion through negative inferences. In addition to doubting the defense

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       theory, the juror may also doubt the credibility of counsel. By failing to
       present promised testimony, counsel has broken “a pact between counsel and
       jury,” in which the juror promises to keep an open mind in return for the
       counsel’s submission of proof. When counsel breaks that pact, he breaks
       also the jury’s trust in the client. Thus, in some cases—particularly cases
       where the promised witness was key to the defense theory of the case and
       where the witness’s absence goes unexplained—a counsel’s broken promise
       to produce the witness may result in prejudice to the defendant.

Saesee v. McDonald, 725 F.3d 1045, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams v.
Woodford, 859 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1167 (E.D. Cal. 2012)).

        Applying similar principles, the Sixth Circuit has held that an attorney’s failure to
present a promised witness prejudiced the defendant. English, 602 F.3d at 729-30. In
English, the defendant was charged with assault with intent to murder. Id. at 717-18. The
defense’s theory of the case was self-defense. Id. at 719. The attorney told the jury in
opening statements that an eyewitness would confirm that the defendant acted in self-
defense. Id. The attorney, however, did not call the witness to testify. Id. The Sixth
Circuit emphasized that the broken promise not only damaged the credibility of the attorney
and the defendant, but also damaged the credibility of the defendant’s testimony
specifically. Id. at 729. Because the attorney promised that a witness would corroborate
the defendant’s account of the events and then broke that promise, the jury likely made
negative inferences about the truthfulness of the defendant’s account. Id. In light of the
lack of overwhelming evidence of guilt, this loss of credibility, in addition to the admission
of inflammatory testimony regarding the witness, prejudiced the defendant. Id.

       In my view, trial counsel’s failure to call Reid to testify as promised in his opening
statement was deficient. See Johnson, 145 S.W.3d at 118-19. The present case is nearly
identical to Johnson. See id. The theory of defense was that the Petitioner could not have
committed the offense because he was with Reid and their child the entire day. During
opening statements, trial counsel twice emphasized that Reid would testify and corroborate
the Petitioner’s alibi. Trial counsel agreed at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that
Reid was “a very integral part of [the Petitioner’s] alibi” because she was the only other
adult that was with him during the entirety of the relevant time period. Still, trial counsel
chose not to call Reid to testify or explain to the jury why they did not hear from her.

       Trial counsel’s decision not to call Reid to testify was based on his concern that the
jury would not find Reid to be reliable. Trial counsel testified at the post-conviction
evidentiary hearing that he “thought it was going to be damaging that she was testifying
while she was incarcerated” and worried that her past crimes of dishonesty “were going to
be concerning in front of a jury.” He also testified that he thought that the car dealership
employee, though only a partial alibi witness, was more important because he was an
unbiased third party. Like Johnson, however, the potential pitfalls regarding Reid’s

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testimony—her incarceration, her criminal history, and her bias—were known and
considered by counsel before trial. 145 S.W.3d at 119. Trial counsel agreed at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing that he was aware of Reid’s criminal history prior to trial,
and that he knew at the time of his opening statement that Reid was incarcerated. There
were no developments or surprises during trial that warranted changing his decision to call
Reid to testify. If there was a chance that he would not call Reid due to his concerns about
her reliability, he should not have assured the jury that they would hear from her. Id. at
119. For these reasons, trial counsel’s failure to call Reid to testify as promised during
opening statements was deficient. See also Myers v. Neal, 975 F.3d 611, 621 (7th Cir.
2020) (noting that “counsel’s false promises are indefensible—a clear instance of deficient
performance”).

        Trial counsel’s failure to call Reid to testify as promised in his opening statement
was also prejudicial. See Johnson, 145 S.W.3d at 119; English, 602 F.3d at 729-30.
Without this broken promise, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Like English, this broken promise not only
damaged the credibility of trial counsel and the Petitioner, but also damaged the credibility
of the Petitioner’s alibi testimony specifically. See 602 F.3d at 729. Because trial counsel
promised that Reid would corroborate the Petitioner’s alibi and then failed to call Reid to
testify, the jury likely made negative inferences about the truthfulness of the Petitioner’s
alibi testimony. See id. As highlighted in Johnson, the first thing that the jury would
believe is that Reid was unwilling or unable to provide the promised testimony. 145
S.W.3d at 118-19. In other words, the jury may have inferred that Reid did not testify
because she could not corroborate the Petitioner’s alibi, and therefore the Petitioner must
be lying about being with her—and not at the crime scene—when the shooting occurred.

       Moreover, the evidence of the Petitioner’s guilt is not overwhelming. See English,
602 F.3d at 729. The State presented no physical evidence connecting the Petitioner to the
offense. Instead, the State’s case relied on the identifications of Comer, Newsom, and
Carney. However, certain factors cast doubt on their identifications. Both Comer and
Carney were unable to identify the Petitioner during pre-trial photo lineups. At trial,
Carney was initially unable to identify the Petitioner and only did so upon being recalled
by the State. Carney also repeatedly agreed that she was uncertain about her identification.
Without trial counsel’s broken promise and the accompanying loss of credibility, there is
a reasonable probability that the Petitioner’s alibi testimony, partially supported by the
testimony of the car dealership employee, would have resulted in a different outcome.

       Accordingly, I would have concluded that the Petitioner was deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel, reversed the determination of the trial court on this ground,
and remanded the case for a new trial.
                                          ___________________________________________
                                            CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, PRESIDING JUDGE

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