Court Opinion

ID: 9404764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-25 02:05:48.052752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:16.935510
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                            STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                COURT OF APPEAL

                                  FIRST CIRCUIT

                                   2022 KA 1283

                            STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                      VERSUS

                              JUSTIN HUTCHINSON

                                      Judgment Rendered:     JUN 2 3 2023

v

                Appealed from the 22nd Judicial District Court

                       In and for the Parish of St. Tammany
                                  State of Louisiana
                           Case No. 4154- F-2020, Div. E

              The Honorahle William H. Burris, Judge Presiding

Warren L. Montgomery                    Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney                       State of Louisiana
J. Bryant Clark, Jr.

Assistant District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana

Holli Herrle- Castillo                  Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant
Marrero, Louisiana                      Justin Hutchinson

             BEFORE: WELCH, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ.

                         Tj (   trALcN'a/
LANIER, J.

        The defendant, Justin Hutchinson, was charged by bill of information with

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon ( count         1),   a violation of La. R.S.

14: 95. 1;   and aggravated assault upon a peace officer ( count 2), a violation of La.

R.S. 14: 37. 2.    He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty on

count 1 of the responsive offense of attempted possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon.      See La. R.S. 14: 27.   He was found not guilty on count 2.      The

defendant filed a motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal or alternative motion

for new trial, which was denied. The trial court sentenced the defendant to seven -

and -one- half years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation,

or suspension of sentence and imposed a $ 500 fine. The defendant now appeals,

designating three assignments of error.      We affirm the conviction and sentence.

                                         FACTS

        On the night of August 17, 2020,          Deputy Chris Galloway, with the St.

Tammany Parish Sheriff' s Office, was on patrol when he observed the a vehicle

driven by the defendant swerving on the road in Sun, Louisiana. Deputy Galloway

also saw the defendant moving back and forth in the vehicle, and because of the

defendant' s actions, made a traffic stop. During the stop, the defendant backed up

and hit the front of Deputy Galloway' s police unit,          then drove forward about

twenty feet and stopped. Deputy Galloway ordered the defendant out of the car.

The defendant got out, walked to the front of his vehicle, then walked back to the

driver' s side of his vehicle and leaned in.      Deputy Galloway ordered the defendant

to get away from the vehicle. At this point, backup for Deputy Galloway arrived.

Upon approaching, Deputy Galloway smelled marijuana on the defendant and in

the vehicle he was driving. Because of the defendant' s swerving as he drove, and

because of the smell of marijuana in the vehicle and on the defendant' s person,

Deputy Galloway suspected the defendant was intoxicated.             Due to the suspected

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intoxication, the defendant was placed in a police unit. Deputy Galloway shined

his flashlight through the window of the defendant' s car and observed a mini

Draco AK -47, loaded with a thirty -round magazine, on the rear floorboard of the

passenger      side.
                       The backup officer, Deputy Seth Cunningham,           recognized the

defendant as a former jail inmate.           Deputy Galloway ran a name check on the

defendant and learned of a prior felony conviction. Deputy Galloway then seized

the firearm and arrested the defendant.        The defendant did not testify at trial.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

          In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was

insufficient to support the conviction.         Specifically, the defendant contends the

State failed to prove he had knowledge the gun was in the car.

          A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due

Process.      See U. S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. 1, §        2.   The standard of

review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether or not,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.        Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789,

61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 ( 1979).        See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821( B); State v. Ordodi,

2006- 0207 ( La. 11129106), 946 So. 2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So. 2d 1305,

1308- 09 ( La. 1988).      The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821,

is   an    objective    standard   for testing the   overall   evidence,    both   direct   and

circumstantial, for reasonable doubt.        When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La.

R.S.      15: 438 provides that the factfinder must be satisfied the overall evidence

excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.             See State v. Patorno, 2001-

2585 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 6121102),    822 So. 2d 141, 144.

          Pursuant to La. R. S. 14: 95. 1,   it is unlawful for any person who has been

convicted of certain felonies to possess a firearm. To prove a violation of La. R. S.

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14: 95. 1, the State must prove: ( 1) the defendant' s status as a convicted felon; and

2) that the defendant was in possession of a firearm. The State must also prove

that ten years have not elapsed since the date of completion of the punishment for

the prior felony conviction.          La. R.S, 14: 95. 1( C).     State v. St. Cyre, 2019- 0034

La. App.       1st Cir. 12119119), 292 So. 3d 88, 113, writ denied, 2020- 00142 ( La.

5/ 26120), 296 So. 3d 1063.

       The defendant notes that to prove an attempt, the State must show he had the

specific intent to commit the offense. La. R. S. 14: 27( A).               Possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon is a general intent crime, whereas the attempt to commit that

offense is a specific intent crime.               State v. Hills, 2010- 1521 (   La. App.     1st Cir.

3125111),     2011     WL   1103455, *       7(   unpublished),   writ denied, 2011- 1120 ( La.

11114111),     75 So. 3d 940.     Even if the evidence is insufficient to support the

conviction for attempted possession of a firearm by a felon because it failed to

establish specific intent, the defendant' s conviction would not be subject to

reversal on this basis.     The jurisprudence provides that, if a jury is instructed on a

responsive verdict, without objection by the defendant, then the reviewing court

may affirm the conviction if the evidence would have supported a conviction of the

greater     offense,   whether   or    not    the    evidence   supports   the   conviction    of the

legislatively responsive offense returned by the jury.'              Id. See La. R.S. 14: 27( 0);

State ex rel. Elaire v. Blackburn, 424 So. 2d 246, 251- 52 ( La. 1982), cert. denied,

461 U.S. 959, 103 S. Ct. 2432, 77 L.Ed.2d 1318 ( 1983).

       The defendant does not dispute he has a prior qualifying conviction or that

the gun was found on the back-seat floor of the car he was driving.                   He disputes,

however, that he had any knowledge of the gun' s existence and, as such, did not

possess it or attempt to possess it.          The defendant notes that the car he was driving

  The responsive verdict of attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was included
in the jury instructions without objection.

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was not registered to him.           He further points out that he never had actual

possession of the gun, and there was no physical evidence such as fingerprints or

DNA linking him to the gun.

        Under La. R. S. 14: 95. 1,   actual possession is not a necessary element of the

offense,   and there is no requirement that the defendant have the firearm on his

person to be in violation. Constructive possession satisfies the possessory element

of the offense.      State v.   Day, 410 So. 2d 741, 743 (             La. 1982).       Constructive

possession of a firearm occurs when the firearm is subject to the defendant' s

dominion and control. See State v. Frank, 549 So. 2d 401, 405 ( La. App. 3rd Cir.

1989) (    finding that gun in plain view on the front seat of a car next to an

unconscious     defendant    who     was   the       sole   occupant   of   the   car    constituted

constructive possession of the gun, despite defendant' s claims that he did not own

the car and was unaware of the gun' s presence in the car).              St. Cyre, 292 So. 3d at

113.

        Dominion and control over a weapon constitutes constructive possession

even if it is only temporary and even if the control is shared.                         Further, the

jurisprudence has added an aspect of awareness to the offense of La. R.S. 14: 95. 1.

Therefore, the State must also prove that the offender was aware that a firearm was

in his presence and that the offender had the general criminal intent to possess the

weapon.     St. Cyre, 292 So. 3d at 113. Mere presence of a defendant in the area of

the contraband or other evidence seized alone does not prove that he exercised

dominion and control over the evidence and therefore had it in his constructive

possession.     State v. Johnson, 2003- 1228 ( La. 4/ 14/ 04),              870 So. 2d 995, 999.

Whether the proof is sufficient to establish possession turns on the facts of each

case.     See State v. Harris, 94- 0970 ( La. 1218194), 647 So. 2d 337, 338- 39 (                per

curiam).    Further, guilty knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances of the

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transaction and proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.      Johnson, 870 So. 2d

at 998; St. Cyre, 292 So. 3d at 113.

       Herein, when Deputy Galloway first attempted the traffic stop, the defendant

drove for about another half mile before pulling over. Deputy Galloway observed

the defendant moving back and forth in the vehicle and leaning over to the

passenger side.    The defendant then backed up into the deputy' s unit and drove

forward approximately twenty feet before stopping.       The defendant then got out of

the vehicle, walked to the front of the vehicle, then went back to the driver' s side

of the vehicle and leaned his head and both hands inside the vehicle.         The jury

could have found that all of these actions by the defendant, as a whole, strongly

suggest the defendant had something in the car that he sought to conceal.          The

defendant in brief suggests that this furtive movement and leaning inside the

vehicle could have been his trying to dispose or hide any marijuana located inside

the vehicle.   The record does not reflect, however, that the police officers found

marijuana in the vehicle or on the defendant' s person.          Regardless, after the

defendant was arrested and placed in a jail holding cell the following day, he spoke

to a male on the phone.       During this recorded conversation, the male asked the

defendant why he had a gun. The defendant responded, " I        had the gun ` cause me

and [ Nick] was coming back to the [ city]."

       In State v. Blount, 2001- 844 ( La. App. 5th Cir. 12126101),    806 So -2d 773,

774, during a traffic stop, as he approached the vehicle, the police officer saw a

rear passenger make a sudden forward movement. The officer ordered everyone

out   of the   vehicle,   interviewed the   occupants,   conducted limited pat   down

searches,   and found a loaded magazine in the defendant' s pocket.        The officer

searched the vehicle and found a loaded . 380 caliber handgun under the driver' s

seat toward the rear of the seat.      The Fifth Circuit, in upholding the defendant' s

conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, noted that the gun was
found under the driver' s seat toward the back, was slightly visible,                       and     was

accessible to the defendant.'       Id. at 776.

        Based on the foregoing facts of this case and the jurisprudence, a juror could

have reasonably concluded that the defendant was aware of the gun in the car and

that he constructively possessed it.

        The factfinder can accept or reject the testimony of any witness.                    State v.

Eby, 2017- 1456 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 6/ 16),            248 So. 3d 420, 426, writ denied, 2018-

0762 ( La. 2/ 11/ 19), 263 So. 3d 1153.        See State v. Mire, 2014- 2295 ( La. 1/ 27/ 16),

269 So. 3d 698, 700- 01 (       per curiam).      The Jackson standard of review does not

permit a reviewing court to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for the

factfinder' s, assess the credibility of witnesses,             or reweigh     evidence.     State v.

McGhee,        2015- 2140,     2015- 2141 ( La. 6/ 29/ 17),       223    So. 3d   1136,    1137 (   per

curiam);     State v.   Calloway,       2007- 2306 ( La. 1121109),        1   So. 3d 417, 422 (     per

curiam).      Thus, in the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict

with the physical evidence, one witness' s testimony, if believed by the factfinder,

is sufficient to support a factual conclusion.                State v. Higgins, 2003- 1980 ( La.

4/ 1/ 05),   898 So. 2d 1219, 1226, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 883, 126 S. Ct. 182, 163

L.Ed.2d 187 ( 2005).       An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the

evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder and thereby

overturning      a   verdict    based     on   an        exculpatory   hypothesis    of    mitigatory

circumstances presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. Eby, 248 So. 3d at

426- 27.

        After a thorough review of the record, we find that the evidence supports the

jury' s guilty verdict of attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon was

a   proper    responsive   verdict.     See Hills, 2011 WL 1103455 at * 7- 8.                We are

2 In Blount, 806 So.2d at 775- 76, while the officer stated the defendant admitted ownership of
the gun, the defendant claimed he had no knowledge of the gun' s presence and denied ever
admitting ownership of the gun to the police.

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convinced that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any

rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the

exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant was

guilty of attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.                This assignment

of error is without merit.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

      In   his    second     assignment    of    error,     the    defendant     argues   he   was

impermissibly limited in his voir dire of prospective jurors.

      After more than an hour of questioning by defense counsel, the trial court

asked him how many more questions he had.                 Defense counsel replied, " A couple

more hours."     The trial court told him he had only five or ten minutes more for his

voir dire questions.    Defense counsel objected.             The trial court noted they had

already been conducting voir dire for three hours ( first              panel) and that it was not

going to permit defense counsel to "            go on for hours and hours and hours."

Defense    counsel   stated    he   had   not   been      able    to   discuss   burden   shifting,

conf rmation bias, feelings about intoxicated drivers, and the right not to testify; he

then went back to questioning prospective jurors.                Later, the trial court concluded

voir dire for the first panel and,         following defense counsel lodging another

objection, the trial court stated the following:

            Certainly. Thank you for that objection. As a brief response,
      and frankly, I don' t feel the need to go delve into it too deeply. The
      defense had way more time on [ voir dire] than the State took. Of
      course, if they would have gone on for too much longer, I would have
      time limited them as well.
               As far as your inability to get to the certain topics, I gave you
      time when I came back.     Certainly I know you wanted to delve into it
      through a whole lot of detail. But some simple questions and answers
      to the entire group, you could have easily gotten through those topics,
      in a general sense enough to inform you as to whether or not they
      would   have been candidates.       And frankly, I think with the

      information you' ve already elicited through the multiple hours of
       voir dire] has been enough.
                 I also note that the Supreme Court in 2014 upheld a trial court' s
        decision to limit attorneys to 20 minutes each for [ voir dire].     And I

        gave you way, way, way more than that.             I' m not sure the exact
        amount of time.     But it' s been hours.

        Prior to the second panel being questioned, the trial court stated, in pertinent

part:

        To give everybody a heads up, I' m not going to impose any type of a
        time limit. But somewhere around the hour and a half mark seems to

        be pretty sufficient. Less would certainly be better. But especially
        considering the simplistic, there' s not too many elements in any of
        these crimes,    around that hour and a half mark, I' m going to start
        looking at it real closely and make sure we are not beating the dead
        horse.  If you want to structure it accordingly, that' s where I' ll be
        looking for.
              With that being said, I' m not going to have a stopwatch.

        Although the accused is entitled to full and complete voir dire as set forth in

La. Const. Art. I, § 17, the scope of counsel' s examination rests within the sound

discretion of the trial judge, and voir dire rulings will not be disturbed on appeal

absent a clear abuse of that discretion. La. Code Crim. P. art. 786; State v. Dyer,

95- 2368 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 10/ 2/ 96), 682 So. 2d 278, 280, writ denied, 96- 2570 ( La.

3121/ 97), 691 So. 2d Sl.    The right to a full voir dire does not afford the defendant

unlimited inquiry into possible prejudices of prospective jurors,          such   as their

opinions on evidence or its weight, hypothetical questions, or questions of law that

call for prejudgment of facts in the case.           State v. Brown, 2018- 01999 ( La.

9130121), 330 So. 3d 199, 258, cert. denied,        U.S.____, 142 S. Ct. 1702, 212 L.Ed.2d

596 ( 2022).

        A trial judge in a criminal case has the discretion to limit voir dire

examination, as long as the limitation is not so restrictive as to deprive defense

counsel of a reasonable opportunity to probe to determine a basis for using

challenges for cause and for the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges.

Therefore, when a defendant asserts that he has been deprived of his constitutional

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right to a full and fair noir dire, the reviewing court must examine the entire voir

dire in order to determine that issue. Brown, 330 So. 3d at 259.

         The defendant alleges in brief he was not permitted to ask more questions

about intoxication, which resulted in prejudice. The defendant notes he alleged he

was intoxicated on marijuana at the time of the offense of possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon. A juror' s feelings, according to the defendant, on this topic

would have made a difference in how they evaluated the case. The defendant' s

intoxication, however, had no bearing on whether or not he was in possession of a

gun.
         The intoxication issue, rather, went to whether he was guilty of aggravated

assault upon a peace officer; that is, whether he had the intent to strike Deputy

Galloway with his car.       The defendant was found not guilty of this offense.

Accordingly,     any   complaint   by   the    defendant   regarding   questions    about

intoxication was rendered moot.

         We find that the voir dire transcript as a whole does not demonstrate that the

trial court impermissibly restricted questioning by defense counsel, or show that

the defense was rendered incapable of adequately assessing the ability of venire

members to give meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence.                   To   the

contrary, defense counsel was given ample time to explore many areas of the law

with the prospective jurors, and no fault can lie with the trial court in ultimately

limiting voir dire. The trial court' s rulings were consistent with jurisprudence on

the issue.    See Brown, 330 So. 3d at 264.        This assignment of error is without

merit.

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                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

       In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in

admitting evidence of other crimes.

       Two of the defendant' s calls from jail were played for the jury.                       On the

second call, the defendant used another inmate' s PIN to make the call.                  Also during

this recorded call, the defendant said he was using other inmates' PIN codes.

       The defendant asserts herein that this evidence was impermissible pursuant

to La. Code Evid. art. 404( B)( 1), which provides in pertinent part that other crimes

evidence is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show he

acted in conformity therewith. Specifically, the defendant contends that allowing

in evidence that he used someone else' s PIN to make a call prejudiced him because

it was offered for no other purpose than to show a bad act, or additional criminal

activity.

       At trial, defense counsel made no objection regarding other crimes evidence.

Regarding the second call, the only objections lodged were of relevance, and those

objections    were   overruled.    The      basis    or    ground      for an objection must be

sufficiently brought to the attention of the trial court to allow it the opportunity to

make the proper ruling and prevent or cure any error. A defendant is limited on

appeal to the grounds for the objection articulated at trial.                  State rv. Young, 99-

1264 ( La. App, 1st Cir. 3/ 31100),    764 So. 2d 998, 1005.

       An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after the verdict unless it was

objected to at the time of occurrence.          La. Code Crim. P. art. 841( A). In order to

preserve     an   issue   for   appellate    review,       a   party    must    state   an   objection.

contemporaneously with the occurrence of the alleged error, as well as the grounds

for the objection. State v. Boyette, 52, 411 (            La. App. 2nd Cir. 1/ 16/ 19),      264 So. 3d

625,   638- 39.    Accordingly, because the defendant did not make any pretrial

objections, file any motions to exclude the La. Code Evid. art. 404( B)                  evidence, or

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raise any contemporaneous objections at trial regarding other crimes evidence, he

has failed to preserve this matter for review on appeal.        See State v. Robinson,

51, 830 (   La. App. 2nd Cir. 2/ 28/ 18),   246 So. 3d 725, 734- 35, writ denied, 2018-

0573 ( La. 2/ 11/ 19),   263 So. 3d 897, State v. Dilosa, 2001- 0024 ( La. App. 1 st Cir.

519103), 849 So. 2d 657, 670- 71, writ denied, 2003- 1601 ( La. 12/ 12/ 03), 860 So. 2d

1153.   This assignment of error is without merit.

        CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

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