Court Opinion

ID: 9832560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:00:00.228881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:47.940938
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
In response to appellant’s request, we shall attempt to further clarify our conclusions reached on original' hearing.
The right to recover of Lampkin and Dumraese under their contract with Harper and Jones, the sum of $100 per month for drilling operations performed by plaintiff after he acquired 15/16ths interest in the entire leasehold estate, and the same right of recovery against Taylor and wife after they acquired the l/16th interest in question from Lampkin and Dumraese, lies at the very foundation of plaintiff’s claim of an equitable lien on the l/16th interest in the leasehold estate as against Taylor and wife, assignees of Lampkin and Dum-raese. The lien was claimed as an incident only of the contract of Lampkin and Dum-raese with Harper and Jones. It must fail if the contract was not then enforceable against them. Even if Lampkin and Dum-raese had owned that l/16th interest at the time plaintiff incurred the expenses for operation of the lease, by 'reason of which he sought to establish an equitable lien on that interest — which ownership did not exist — their prior contract to contribute $100 per month towards operation expenses was not then enforceable against them for. lack of definiteness, because it was expressly stipulated in their contract with Harper and Jones that their obligation to pay the same would continue until “such time as the parties hereto may mutually agree to vary or change the amount of said monthly payment” ; thus giving either party to the contract the option to terminate the agreement to contribute that sum towards drilling operations, at any time. 10 Tex.Jur., para. 101, page 175; para. 196, page 341; para. 198, page 344; para. 266, page 399; para. 213, page 377; para. 223, page 393. It was not enforceable against W. H. Taylor, the assignee of Lampkin and Dumraese, for the adclitional reasons, first, it was the personal contract of Lampkin and Dumraese to pay Harper and Jones expenses which the latter might incur and which the Taylors did not assume; second, it was not a covenant running with title; and third, Harper and Jones being then dead, it was impossible for them to mutually agree with Lampkin and Dum-raese to a continuation of that executory contract to the time plaintiff incurred drilling expenses in question; in the absence of which Lampkin and Dumraese were not bound to such continuation, for that further reason. 10 Tex.Jur., para. 253, page 438; 38 Tex.Jur., para. 6, page 649; para. 34, page 695;. para. 23, page 678; para. 28, page 687; para. 79, page 765; 12 Tex.Jur., para. 43, page 65.
It is to be noted further that plaintiff’s suit, in the first count of his petition, was not for damages for breach of the personal contract of Lampkin and Dumraese to contribute $100 per month towards operating expenses, but was an action to fix a lien on the l/16th interest in controversy, as an incident to the breach of that contract by Lampkin and Dumraese, on the theory that the contract was enforceable as against Lampkin and Dumraese, in the first instance, and as against W. H. Taylor and wife, their vendees, under a quitclaim deed, who bought with notice of the contract, but who did not assume it. Nor were Lamp-kin and Dumraese made defendants in the suit.
Moreover, in his motion for' rehearing, appellant admits that the contract in question of Lampkin and Dumraese was not a covenant running with their title to the l/16th interest in the leasehold estate, and also that he made no claim of personal liability of defendants for $100 per month for drilling expenses incurred by plaintiff; by reason of the prior contract of Lampkin and *896Dumraese to pay expenses of that character which Harper and Jones might incur.
When plaintiff incurred the expenses for operation of the entire lease, he was a co-tenant with Taylor and wife, as assignees of Lampkin and Dumraese, and the 1/lóth interest in the leasehold in question was therefore chargeable with an equitable lien for its pro rata portion of such expenses, by reason of such co-tenancy, independently of the contract of Lampkin and Dumraese in question, as prayed for in the second alternative count in plaintiff’s petition; and that relief was decreed to plaintiff in the judgment rendered.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.