Court Opinion

ID: 9547986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:55:40.954044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:19.478589
License: Public Domain

THORNTON, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority opinion with respect to the pleading of attorney fees under ORS 91.755. The rule enunciated in Draper v. Mullennex et al, 225 Or 267, 357 P2d 519 (1960), is applicable to the instant case. Contrary to the majority’s interpretation, the Draper rule is not dictum. That rule was stated as follows:
"If plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for attorney’s fees against a defendant by reason of any special contract or particular statutory allowance other than provided by ORS 20.070, then the right to such recovery should be particularly pleaded and proved.” 225 Or at 271.
The Draper court relied upon the rule to strike an allegation by plaintiff claiming attorney fees and thereby held that plaintiff’s complaint alleged an amount of damages within the jurisdictional limit of the district court. The court stated:
"If plaintiff relies upon some special statute which she believes confers such right [to attorney fees], she has made no endeavor to justify it by appropriate reference thereto. In the absence of any allegation as to the foundation of her claim for attorney’s fee, the matter found in paragraph V is surplusage, vulnerable to a motion to strike, and should be ignored when making a *172determination as to the jurisdiction of the court.” 225 Or at 271-72.
The cases cited by the majority which do not apply the rule stated in Draper are concerned with the application of statutes which provide for an award of attorney’s fees "as a part of the costs,” Colby v. Larson, 208 Or 121, 125, 297 P2d 1073, 299 P2d 1076 (1956); Railton v. Redmar, 209 Or 80, 88, 304 P2d 408 (1956); Tiano v. Elsensohn, 268 Or 166, 168, 520 P2d 358 (1974); "in addition to other costs” (emphasis supplied), State ex rel Nilsen v. Adams, 248 Or 269, 276, 431 P2d 270, 433 P2d 831 (1967); or "costs * * * including a reasonable attorney’s fee,” Douglas County v. Meyers et al, 201 Or 59, 66, 268 P2d 625 (1954). The rule of these cases is "limited to those instances in which reasonable attorney fees are provided by statute as a part of costs.” Tiano v. Elsensohn, supra at 170.
The majority argues that the language of ORS 91.755 providing that attorney fees may be awarded "together with costs” is synonymous with the phrase "as a part of costs.” I cannot agree because the Oregon Supreme Court has stated that under ORS 91.755 an award of attorney fees is a money judgment rather than costs, and is therefore reviewable on appeal. Pacific N.W. Dev. Corp. v. Holloway, 274 Or 367, 370-71, 546 P2d 1063 (1976). Accordingly, attorney fees under ORS 91.755 and costs cannot be treated in a procedurally similar fashion as suggested by the majority. To so hold would formulate a rule whereby attorney fees would be treated like costs at trial but not on appeal. I read nothing in the statute or the cases cited by the majority that supports such a proposition.
Since attorney fees under ORS 91.755 are not treated as a part of costs, the amount of such fees to be awarded is a question of fact for the trier of fact and must be pleaded and proved in the same manner as any other question of fact. See, State High. Com. et al v. Kendrick et al, 227 Or 608, 610, 363 P2d 1078 (1961). Attorney fees not having been properly pleaded *173were erroneously awarded by the trial court in this case, and I therefore respectfully dissent.