Court Opinion

ID: 9731212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:38:41.20622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:46.784817
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion and would reverse and remand this case with instructions to dismiss the action as being untimely filed.
IC 1971, 18-5-17-1 provides in part:
“All appeals now allowed, or which may hereafter be allowed by law from any action or decision of the board of public works or the board of park commissioners of any city, or the common council of such cities wherein it performs the functions of either or both such boards, or of any other board, shall be taken by the party appealing, filing in the circuit or superior court of the county wherein such city is located, an original complaint against such city as defendant. Such complaint on appeal shall be filed within thirty [30] days from the date of the action or decision complained of, and one or more parties appealing may join in the same complaint.” (Emphasis added.)
The majority apparently interprets the word “law” as being synonymous with “statute.” Although such an interpretation was previously made in City of Richmond v. S. M. O., Inc. (1975), 165 Ind.App. 641, 333 N.E.2d 797, I believe it to be unduly limited and contrary to the express language of IC 1971, 18-5-17-1.
“Law” is defined as
“[tjhat which is laid down, ordained, or established. A rule or method according to which phenomena or actions co-exist or follow each other. That which must be obeyed and followed by citizens, subject to sanctions or legal consequences, is a ‘law.’ ”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1028 (4th ed. 1951).
See also, Randall v. Town of Highland (1981) Ind.App., 416 N.E.2d 891. Among the many examples of what “law” may embrace are: constitutional provisions, judicial decisions and judgments. Black’s Law Dictionary at 1028.
At the time IC 1971, 18-5-17-1 was enacted, a person could appeal from the decision of a board of public works only when the Legislature had granted statutory authority to do so. See e. g., City of Gary v. Roper (1931), 202 Ind. 445, 175 N.E. 242; Murdick v. City of Muncie (1929), 201 Ind. 245, 167 N.E. 132. Since that time however, the Indiana Supreme Court has declared that due process mandates every decision of an administrative agency be reviewable by a court. Judicial review exists notwithstanding the failure of the Legislature to specifically provide for such a procedure. Dortch v. Lugar (1971), 255 Ind. 545, 266 N.E.2d 25; Mann v. City of Terre Haute et al. (1960), 240 Ind. 245, 163 N.E.2d 577; State ex rel. City of Marion et al. v. Grant Cir. Ct. (1959), 239 Ind. 315, 157 N.E.2d 188. See generally, Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. (1940), 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399. To hold that the thirty-day limitation of IC 1971, 18-5-17-1 does not apply to Brooksfield Farm is tantamount to holding that the pronouncements of the Indiana Supreme Court guaranteeing the right of judicial review are not law in this state.
*309The majority’s decision also frustrates the purpose of IC 1971,18-5-17-1. The statute provides for thirty days within which a person may challenge the acts of the board of public works. The limitation allows the city to proceed with its projects at the end of thirty days without fear of interruption from future lawsuits. The costs and delays which could follow from the majority’s decision would be tremendous.
For the above reasons I would reverse and remand this action with instructions that it be dismissed.