Court Opinion

ID: 9905141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 21:00:54.796659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:03.932594
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4390      Doc: 29         Filed: 11/27/2023    Pg: 1 of 3

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4390

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        JOE JUNIOR MACKEY, a/k/a Joe Joe,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
        Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior District Judge. (8:22-cr-00028-HMH-1)

        Submitted: November 21, 2023                                Decided: November 27, 2023

        Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Emily Deck Harrill, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
        FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Adair F.
        Boroughs, United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, John Whitney Sowards,
        Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Joe Junior Mackey appeals from his sentence imposed pursuant to his guilty plea to

        conspiracy to steal firearms from a federally licensed firearms dealer, in violation of 18

        U.S.C. § 371, and theft of firearms from a federally licensed firearms dealer and aiding and

        abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 922(u), 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced

        Mackey to 180 months’ imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised release. On

        appeal, Mackey argues that the district court erred by including in the written judgment

        discretionary conditions of supervised release that were not orally pronounced at

        sentencing. We affirm.

               “[I]n order to sentence a defendant to a non-mandatory condition of supervised

        release, the sentencing court must include that condition in its oral pronouncement of a

        defendant’s sentence in open court.” United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 345

        (4th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2020)). As is

        relevant here, a district court may “satisfy its obligation to orally pronounce discretionary

        conditions through incorporation—by incorporating, for instance, all Guidelines ‘standard’

        conditions when it pronounces a supervised-release sentence, and then detailing those

        conditions in the written judgment.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299. We review Mackey’s claim

        of Rogers error de novo. See United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185, 193 (4th Cir. 2022).

               In Cisson, a case with similar facts, the district court stated at sentencing “that it

        would impose the ‘mandatory and standard conditions’ of supervised release.” 33 F.4th at

        194 (emphasis omitted). We observed that the District of South Carolina has no standing

        order listing supervised release conditions that differ from the standard conditions in the

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        Guidelines. Id.; see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(c), p.s. (2021). “Thus,

        there [wa]s no other set of ‘standard’ conditions to which the court could have been

        referring other than the Guidelines ‘standard’ conditions.” Cisson, 33 F.4th at 194.

               Mackey contends that the South Carolina district court failed to orally announce the

        13 standard conditions of supervised release listed in the criminal judgment. We disagree,

        as our holding in Cisson forecloses his claim. While Mackey claims that the record fails

        to make clear which conditions the court imposed due to a misstatement by the probation

        officer, the court did not refer to the probation officer’s comment in announcing the

        applicable discretionary conditions of supervised release. Rather, the court plainly stated

        that it would impose the standard conditions of supervision. Because there was no set of

        conditions other than the Guidelines standard conditions to which the district court could

        have been referring in this case, and Mackey’s judgment does not impose any additional

        discretionary conditions of supervised release that were not included in the court’s oral

        pronouncement, we conclude that the district court sufficiently pronounced the standard

        conditions in the Guidelines as reflected in the presentence report and, thus, did not err

        under Rogers. See Cisson, 33 F.4th at 194.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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