Court Opinion

ID: 9643034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:16:16.651733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:14.133436
License: Public Domain

*111McDERMOTT, Justice,
dissenting.
Property specifically devised in a will, but not owned by a testator (testatrix) at death, is adeemed. The testator’s (testatrix’) intention in disposing of the property in one’s lifetime is not relevant and does not change or alter the fact that one cannot give what one does not possess. Nor is the devise or legacy to be substituted by its value in cash or other property.
The quarrel here is not over the intention of the testatrix, rather, the appellee argues the right to show that when the specifically devised property left the possession of the testatrix she was incompetent and therefore could form no acceptable intention; and that the intention specifically expressed in her testament ought not be obviated by an intervening incompetency.
In Nakoneczny Estate, 456 Pa. 320, 319 A.2d 893 (1974), this contention, despite its merit, was necessarily denied under paragraph 17, section 14 of the Wills Act of 1947,1 which then read in pertinent part:
Ademption. A specific devise or bequest shall not be adeemed when the testator or the testator’s estate receives an asset in exchange for the subject of the devise or bequest and the act which otherwise would have caused the ademption occurs while the testator is an adjudged incompetent. In such case the devise or bequest shall be deemed to apply to whatever was received in exchange, (emphasis added)
20 P.S. § 180.14, ¶ 17. (Repealed)
In Nakoneczny Estate, id., Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice Nix, not only outlined the classic doctrines of ademption, but was required to interpret paragraph 17. Properly, he found that it was an exception to the general rule of ademption, operable however, if and only if, the testator was an “adjudged incompetent” in his lifetime.
*112Two years after the holding in Nakoneczny Estate, the legislature rewrote and rephrased Section 14, which now reads in pertinent part:
Nonademption; incompetency. — If property of an incompetent specifically devised or bequeathed is sold or exchanged or if a condemnation award or insurance proceeds are paid to the estate of an incompetent as a result of condemnation, fire or casualty, the specific legatee or devisee has the right to the net sale price, the property received in exchange, the condemnation award or the insurance proceeds. This paragraph does not apply if subsequent to the sale, exchange, condemnation, or casualty, the testator has been adjudicated competent and survives the adjudication by one year.
20 P.S. § 2514(16.1).2
Upon its face, there can be no question but that the legislature endeavored to relieve the harsh rule that only an “adjudged incompetent” was relieved from the consequences of his or her incompetence. By rephrasing the exception provided in section 14 of the Wills Act of 1947 the legislature not only rewrote the words but intended to change their consequence. The amended exception is now entitled, “Nonademption; incompetency” and it seems to me most clear that incbmpetency, whether adjudicated or not, is an exception to ademption. By removing the necessity for an “adjudged” incompetency before the exception applies, it seems most clear that incompetency may be raised whenever it is ascertained, before or after death.
It is a standard rule of statutory interpretation that each word of a statute must be given effect. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903.3 A logical corollary to this rule is that specific deletions from statutes must also be given effect. See Fidelity Trust Company v. Kirk, 344 Pa. 455, 458, 25 A.2d 825 (1942): “Where words of a later statute differ from those of a previous one on the same subject they presum*113ably are intended to have a different construction (citations omitted).” See also Panik v. Didra, 370 Pa. 488, 88 A.2d 730 (1952).
The majority apparently finds no difference between the two enactments and treats the new words to mean what was meant before. The legislature perceived a harshness and moved to rectify it. When their words are liberally construed, as they should be, they plainly present an opportunity to show incompetency whenever it can be shown to exist or existed.
Finally, I agree with Mr. Justice Larsen that allegations of fraud and undue influence were sufficiently pleaded, and that this case should be remanded to Orphan’s Court for an evidentiary hearing.

. Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 89 § 14, as amended, 20 P.S. 180.14, ¶ 17.

. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 551, No. 135 § 13.

. Statutory Construction Act of 1972. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, No. 290 § 3.