Court Opinion

ID: 9563757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:46:16.170603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:03.697954
License: Public Domain

Justice Meyer
dissenting.
Apparently conceding that the inhalation of synthetic fiber dust is not known to cause an occupational disease, the majority states the issue presented on this appeal as follows: “[WJhether exposure to a substance which is not known to cause an occupational disease may nevertheless be a last injurious exposure to the hazards of such disease under N.C.G.S. § 97-57 if it makes the disease, already in progress, worse.”
First, I continue to adhere to the position expressed in my dissent in Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E. 2d 359 (1983). My position, there stated, is that any disease, in order to be compensable, must be an occupational disease, or must be aggravated or accelerated by an occupational disease or by an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.
Secondly, the majority readily concedes that in order for a substance to be a “hazard” of the disease it must be a substance peculiar to the workplace. Indeed, the majority states, “We emphasize that in order for a substance to be a ‘hazard’ of an occupational disease within the meaning of § 97-57, it must be, as we have indicated, a substance peculiar to the workplace.” (Emphasis added.) It is as clear as the English language is capable of conveying that it is the nature of the substance itself which must be peculiar to the workplace and this test is not and cannot be met by the second alternative of the “either/or” test adopted by the majority. The majority expresses its new test as follows:
By this we mean that the substance is one to which the worker has a greater exposure on the job than does the public generally, either because of the nature of the substance itself or because the concentrations of the substance in the workplace are greater than concentrations to which the public generally is exposed. (Emphasis added.)
Because we are not here concerned with whether the claimant has an occupational disease but only with the question of “last injurious exposure,” the majority would have us completely disregard our treatment of similar terms in cases dealing solely *78with whether the claimant had an occupational disease. The terms used by the majority here: “peculiar to the claimant’s workplace” and the term “peculiar to the claimant’s employment” used in determining the presence of an occupational disease are too similar to disregard. Their similarity demands a comparison.
In Walston I this Court, in an opinion by Huskins, J., said:
Disability caused by and resulting from a disease is compensable when, and only when, the disease is an occupational disease, or is aggravated or accelerated by an occupational disease, or by an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. G.S. 97-53(13); Morrison v. Burlington Industries, 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E. 2d 458 (1981); Booker v. Medical Center, 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E. 2d 189 (1979); Anderson v. Motor Co., 233 N.C. 372, 64 S.E. 2d 265 (1951); Henry v. Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E. 2d 760 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
Walston v. Burlington Industries, 304 N.C. 670, 679-80, 285 S.E. 2d 822, 828 (1982).
Unfortunately the members of this Court, including this writer, agreed to alter the opinion in Walston I by Order of the Court dated 8 March 1982 appearing at 305 N.C. 296, 285 S.E. 2d 822, and thus changed the last sentence of the above quoted portion of the opinion to read as follows:
Disability caused by and resulting from a disease is compensable when, and only when, the disease is an occupational disease, or is aggravated or accelerated by causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to claimant’s employment. (Emphasis added.)
I am now of the opinion that we acted in haste and that we should not have changed the wording of the original opinion and am of the further opinion that we should now repudiate that change. Nevertheless, the language as changed clearly states that the subsequent aggravating cause or condition must be “characteristic of and peculiar to claimant’s employment.” This clearly means, contrary to the majority’s view in the case sub judice, that it cannot be a cause or condition not “characteristic of and peculiar to the claimant’s workplace” or one to which the general public is equally exposed.
*79The reader of the majority opinion is distracted from this comparison of similar terms used in different contexts (ie., last injurious exposure and occupational disease) by what I would call “judicial sleight-of-hand.”
The majority says that the “substance” requirement of the term “substance peculiar to the workplace” can be satisfied not only by evidence of the nature of the substance but also by unusually high “concentrations” of a substance. The all too obvious question raised by the majority opinion but left unanswered is whether the requirement of a “substance peculiar to the workplace” can be satisfied by showing “concentrations” greater than those to which the public generally is exposed of ordinary substances not necessarily characteristic of or peculiar to a particular employment or workplace. The majority’s choice of wording for its new test is confusing at best. I suppose the meaning the majority intends to convey is “substance peculiar to the workplace” or “concentration peculiar to the workplace.”
The majority’s choice of words in describing synthetic dust may be revealing. The majority opinion describes the airborne material in defendant Waverly Mills’ plant not as “synthetic fiber dust” but as “dust arising from the processing of synthetic fibers.” Does the majority equate “dust” arising from the processing of synthetic fibers with “dust” arising from sources not peculiar to the workplace? Would the majority apply its new “either/or” test to “concentrations” of such ordinary substances as common store and schoolyard or construction yard dust, dampness in the local car wash, cooking fumes in the restaurant kitchen, or cigarette smoke in the company office? If this is the case then the majority’s new “either/or” test is indeed nothing more than “judicial sleight-of-hand” — now you have the “substance peculiar to” requirement and now you don’t — it having been satisfied by the showing of “concentrations” of a very ordinary substance not at all peculiar to the workplace. Under the “or” portion of the majority’s new test it is of course the “concentration” which is peculiar and not the “substance.”
If it is the synthetic fibers in the air of defendant Waverly Mills’ plant, as the majority seems to agree, which is the “substance peculiar to the workplace” to which Mr. Caulder had a greater exposure than does the public generally, then the “or” *80part of the majority’s new test, ie., “concentrations,” is unnecessary.
The majority’s holding today could have a far-reaching, detrimental impact on the employment opportunities for a significant number of our textile workers. If, as I suspect, the majority has set out upon the path which I anticipate, this Court may effectively preclude the subsequent employment of textile workers who are unable to continue to work in that industry because of a lung disease. Since Rutledge began the process, this Court continues to create a situation in which, in order to reduce losses from claims for total, permanent disability from older workers previously employed in the textile industry, no employer will consider employing anyone who has worked in that industry for a significant number of years, or will employ them only after exhaustive pulmonary function tests. If that is the result it is not the employers or their insurance carriers who will be hurt but the textile workers.
I would vote to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and to hold that the claimant was not last injuriously exposed in his employment at Waverly Mills.
Chief Justice BRANCH joins in this dissent.