Court Opinion

ID: 9417971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:45:37.967731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:53.513225
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holmes,
dissenting.
I regret that I am unable to agree with the decision of the court. The question on which I differ is whether a proceeding for the taking of land by eminent domain, authorized by the State of Kentucky to be begun in the Courts of Kentucky, can be begun in the Circuit Court of the United States, whenever one of the parties is a citizen of another State. Of course, I am speaking of the proceeding for the taking of the land, not of that for compensation, to which I shall refer later. The argument which does not command my assent, stated in a few words, is that such a proceeding in such a case is a controversy between citizens of different States, and therefore by the very words of the Constitution must be within the jurisdiction of the United States courts. It seems to me that this is rather too literal a reading, and, on the whole, is a sacrifice of substance to form.
The fundamental fact is that eminent domain is a prerogative' of the State, which on the one hand may be exercised in any way that the State thinks fit, and on the other may not be exercised except by an authority which the State confers. The taking may be direct, by an act of the Legislature. It may be delegated to a railroad company, with a certain latitude of choice with regard to the land to be appropriated. It may be delegated subject to the approval of a legislative committee or of a board other than a court. When the State' makes use of a court, instead, for instance., of a railroad commission, the character of the proceeding is not changed. The matter still is wholly within its sovereign control. The State may intervene after the proceedings have been begun, and take the land. It may direct the entry of a decree of condemnation. An illustration of its continuing power may be seen in In re Northamp*258ton, 158 Massachusetts, 299. The matter of grade crossings had been referred by the Legislature of Massachusetts to the courts, and a petition was pending for the abolition of certain grade crossings in Northampton. The case had been sent to commissioners, and they had reported. Pending a motion to confirm their report the Legislature passed an act forbidding a change in that case without the consent of the city council. It was held that, as the whole subject was originally within the control of the Legislature, it did not cease to be so by being referred to the courts, and the act was sustained.
A further illustration, and one in which substance has prevailed over form, is to be found in the case of suits by citizens of another State against officers of a State. In form such suits are controvérsies between citizens of different States and within the jurisdiction of the United States Courts. But if, in substance, they have the effect of suits against a State, the jurisdiction is denied..; And the decisions do not stop there, but when the State has waived its immunity, as it may, and has given permission to a suit against the officer in a state court, it still is held that, although there is a controversy between citizens of different States which thus has become subject to litigation, that litigation must be confined to the courts which the State has named. Yet there is no doubt that, with the State’s consent, its officers, or the State itself, could be sued in the courts of the United States. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436; Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590.
It seems to me that, if a State authorizes a taking to be acccomplished by certain machinery', the United-States has no constitutional right to intervene and to .substitute other machinery because. the State has chosen to use its law courts rather than a legislative committee and thus to give to the exercise of its sovereign power thq external form of a suit at law. It seems to me plain that the exercise of that power depends Wholly on the State, may be limited as the State chooses, and cannot be carried further than the State has authorized in terms. Suppose that ¡a proceeding for taking land is removed *259to the United States Court contrary to the legislation of the State, by whose authority, I ask myself, is a subsequent taking to be decreed? It is open to any one who can think it to say that the attempt to use the state courts to the exclusion of the United States courts makes the taking void, but I cannot understand how "a taking unauthorized by the State can be good. If I am right in supposing that the State has an absolute right' to limit the exercise of eminent domain as it sees fit, then, so far as the construction of the Kentucky statute is concerned, I need only invoke the cases last cited, to show that the statute imports that the State meant to confine the proceedings to its own courts. Certainly it does not purport to authorize them elsewhere, and that is enough. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 445; Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590, 592. The difference between myself and the majority is not merely on the construction of the Kentucky statutes. If that were all I should not express my dissent. But the difference as to construction is a consequence and incident of a difference on the far more important question of power. Of course, what I have said is without prejudice to the possibility that in case a question of rights under the Constitution of the United States should arise and be' carried to the highest court of the State, it might be. brought here by writ of error, as was said by Mr. Justice Harlan in Smith v. Reeves. I do not go into that, as it is immaterial now.
It is said that the question which I am discussing has been settled by the adjudications of this court. I do not think so. The only cases that have any bearing are Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, and Searl v. School District No. 2, 124 U. S. 197. In the former of these cases Mr. Justice Field states in the most explicit way that at the stage the case had reached when it was removed from the state court the compensation to be paid the owner of the land was the only question open. I have no criticism to make on that case. It seems to me to favor my'views throughout. I think it very possible that after the title to; property has -been taken, if the question of com*260pensation still is unsettled, that may-be a controversy within the meaning'of the Constitution. The sovereign power of the State is at an end, and the former owner has-a right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States to get his pay.
Boom Co. v. Patterson was followed by Searl v. School District No. 2, seemingly without noticing the distinction that in the latter case the property had not yet been' appropriated. There was no serious reasoning in the case, and I should think it a most inadequate justification for trenching upon the powers of the States, even if it were strictly in point. It arose, however, under the former statute as to removals, which did not limit them to cases which could have been begun in the United States courts. Whether I should think that a sufficient- distinction if that case were before me now I shall not consider— but I feel warranted in believing that no one who took part in that decision imagined that he was establishing the doctrine now laid down or any principle broad enough to cover the present case. I cannot think that even Mr. Justice Matthews would have denied that the day after removal the State could have withdrawn the power to condemn the land and left the court in the air, or could have condemned the land pending the proceedings without paying them the slightest regard. If the State did retain those powers, I think it no less retained the delectus personarum and the right to confine its authority, while it left it outstanding,. to the persons of its choice.
I wish to add only that I am not aware of any limitations in the Constitution of the United States upon a State’s power to condemn land within its borders, except the requirements as to compensatiqn. All that was decided in Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, and Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1, was that the constitutions of certain States did not-authorize the taking of private property for a private use. But if those decisions had been rested on the Fourteenth Amendment, which they were not, and in my opinion could not have been, *261I do not perceive that they have any bearing upon what I have said or upon the case at bar.
I am authorized to say that the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Peckham concur in this dissent.