Court Opinion

ID: 9463793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:16:38.046264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:17.542981
License: Public Domain

SILER, District Judge.
I respectfully dissent. The district court was correct in its decision that it had no jurisdiction over this matter.
The statutes are clear in their meaning. The district court has jurisdiction in “[sjuits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, . . . ” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The definition of “employee” in the chapter is found in 29 U.S.C. § 142(3), where it states that “employee” has “the same meaning as when used in subchapter II of this chapter as amended by this chapter.”
Next, one goes to subchapter II of that chapter to find “employee” in 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) to exclude specifically “any individual employed as a supervisor”. Finally, “supervisor” is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 152(11), which is not quoted here because the parties have stipulated that the designated officers in this case were, in fact, supervisors under this definition.
Admittedly, Congress has indicated its intent to some degree, but where the statute is so clear, the intent must be subservient to the language in the Act itself. Otherwise, we may be giving “ ‘point to the quip that only when legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute’ ”. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971), quoting Frankfurter, “Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,” 47 Col.L.Rev. 527, 543 (1947). As in Bass, we have a case where Congress asserted its intent, but it was not reflected in the ultimate legislation. Thus, the statute there, being criminal in nature, was narrowly construed in favor of the defendant. We do not have such a requirement at law to construe narrowly this labor statute, but when Congress establishes jurisdictional statutes, they should be confined to the precise limits as defined. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 92 S.Ct. 418, 30 L.Ed.2d 383 (1971).
Here, the majority opinion quotes from the Congressional reports on the Taft-Hartley Act (LMRA) of 1947, but those reports only relate that the Act takes supervisory employees from the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. But that still is not an all-inclusive explanation, for this same definition of employees transcends the National Labor Relations Act by virtue of 29 U.S.C. § 142(3), which incorporates the definition throughout chapter 7 of Title 29.
Assuredly, this is a case of first impression in this Court. My literal interpretation of the Act is criticized in Dente v. International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, Local 90, 492 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910, 94 S.Ct. 2607, 41 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974), but Judge Browning apparently had problems with the majority’s interpretation that the district court had jurisdiction. Id. at 12 (concurring opinion). The Second Circuit’s decisions are rather diverse but one stated the district courts have no jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 185 in this type of case. See A. H. Bull Steamship Co. v. National Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Ass’n, 250 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932, 78 S.Ct. 411, 2 L.Ed.2d 414 (1958). However, that decision was eroded through subsequent dictum in United States v. National Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Ass’n, 294 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. National Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Ass’n, 292 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1961); and National Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass’n v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1960). See also Isbrandtsen Co., Inc. v. District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass’n, 256 F.Supp. 68 (E.D.N.Y.1966).
On the other hand, there is dictum from International Organization of Masters, *780Mates & Pilots v. NLRB, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 74, 78, 351 F.2d 771, 775 (1965), that
[A] collective bargaining agreement entered into by MMP on behalf of Local 47 would not be within section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, ... 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958), since that section deals only with “contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees * * *.” (Emphasis added.) Such a construction of this language would seem to be eminently correct in the context of section 301.
I would follow this language and the explicit language of the statute to uphold the decision of the district court in dismissing the suit.