Court Opinion

ID: 9636108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:16:57.633194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:50.435262
License: Public Domain

*84on state’s motion for rehearing
DICE, Judge
The state insists that we were in error in sustaining appellant’s attack upon the jurisdiction of the court because his attack upon the court’s jurisdiction was made for the first time on appeal and came too late.
In Brady v. State, 119 Tex. Cr. R. 178, 44 S. W. 2d 373 this court, in overruling a plea to the jurisdiction of the trial court when made for the first time on appeal, said:
“In the cases mentioned, the subject has been considered and the anouncement made in substance that, in instances in which there are two district courts, each having criminal jurisdiction, situated in the same county, and the legislative provision authorizing the transfer of cases from one to another, it is too late on appeal to complain, as is done in the present case, that the trial is upon an indictment filed in one of the courts and the trial is had in the other. Under such circumstances, the presumption will be indulged that the proper transfer was made. See Lindley v. State, 99 Tex. Cr. R. 85, 268 S. W. 167; Koehan v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. R. 368, 248 S. W. 365; Walker v State, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 663, 267 S. W. 988.”
In creating County Court at Law No. 2 and County Court at Law No. 3 for Harris County the legislature conferred upon both courts concurrent criminal jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses. Art. 1970-95 to 110b, V.A.C.S. Under Sec. 2 of Art. 1970-110b, supra, the judges of the two courts, with the consent of one another, are authorized to transfer criminal cases between said courts by entry of an order on the docket of the court from which the cause is transferred.
We agree with the state’s contention that under the rule stated in Brady v. State, supra, appellant’s attack upon the jurisdiction of the court when made for the first time on this appeal comes too late.
Briefly, the state’s testimony shows that on the night in question an automobile driven by the appellant collided with the rear of a pick-up truck which was stopped at a red light on Jensen Drive, a public street in the city of Houston. After *85the collision, appellant got out of his automobile and according to the tesitmony of the investigating officers on two occasions got back in the automobile and attempted to leave by driving the automobile a short distance. Two pint whiskey bottles were found in the appellant’s automobile, one being broken and the other having been opened and having a few drops left therein. In describing appellant’s action and appearance at the scene, the officers testified that he talked “loud and belligerent,” his speech was “slurred,” and that he had a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. Two of the officers expressed the opinion that appellant was on such occasion intoxicated.
Testifying as a witness in his own behalf, appellant admitted being involved in the collision on the night in question and having “run into” the truck. Appellant admitted that he did move his automobile after the collision but denied that he was attempting to flee from the scene. No denial of intoxication was made by appellant. One witness called by appellant testfied that he observed appellant at the scene and that he looked dazed but was not drunk.
The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding appellant guilty as charged.
In his brief, appellant urges error on the ground that the jury panel was examined outside of the court room and outside of the presence of the trial judge. The record does not show that this occurred hence such contention cannot be considered.
The state’s motion for rehearing is granted; the judgement reversing the conviction is set aside and the judgment is now affirmed.