Court Opinion

ID: 9745436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:56:33.598562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:00.725500
License: Public Domain

SPENCER, P. J., Concurring.
I agree Fireman’s Fund had no duty to defend, in that the Environmental protection Agency’s (EPA) orders did not emanate from a suit. I do not agree, however, that the definition of “suit” is limited to proceedings in a court of law tried by a judge or jury. As noted in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993) page 2286, column 3, “suit” is not only “an action or process in a court for the recovery of a right or claim,” but it may include “the attempt to gain an end by legal process,” or “prosecution of [a] right before any tribunal.” (Italics added.) While a court undoubtedly is a tribunal, additionally a tribunal is a “forum of justice” *1222and may consist of any “person or body of persons having authority to hear and decide disputes so as to bind the disputants” or who “decides or judges” a matter and “determines or directs a judgment or course of action.” (Id. at p. 2441, col. 1.) In my view, therefore, the common, ordinary meaning of “suit” is broad enough to cover alternative dispute resolution proceedings such as adjudicatory administrative hearings without resort to the “functional equivalent” approach to contract interpretation (Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. v. Bronson Plat. (1994) 445 Mich. 558 [519 N.W.2d 864, 868, 870]).
What the EPA conducted here was merely an investigative administrative proceeding seeking a negotiated settlement and a consent decree. As the agency lacked the requisite authority to bind the disputants, even under the “functional equivalent” approach to interpretation, this proceeding did not qualify as a suit. I therefore concur in the judgment.