Court Opinion

ID: 9758848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:52:33.395226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:54.542506
License: Public Domain

RAY THORNTON, Justice, dissenting. The majority holds that our dicta observation in Edwards v. Jameson, 283 Ark. 395, 677 S.W.2d 842 (1984), suggesting that “the better practice in cases of criminal contempt is for the trial judge to announce at the outset whether punishment in excess of six months may be imposed,” id., overrules the United States Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. Hays, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). The Supreme Court held that [P]etty contempt like other petty offenses may be tried without a jury and that contempt of court is a petty offense when the penalty actually imposed does not exceed six months or a longer penalty has not been expressly authorized by statute Id. (emphasis added). We cited this rule in Edwards, supra, for the proposition that the defendant in that case was not entitled to a jury trial on the contempt issue when only a ninety-day sentence and $500 fine was imposed for criminal contempt. Justice George Rose Smith wrote: The trial court correctly denied the petitioner’s request for a jury trial. Such a trial is mandatory only when the possible imprisonment may exceed six months. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 94 S. Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974). Here the trial judge was aware of that limitation and imposed only a ninety-day sentence. We point out that the better practice in cases of criminal contempt is for the trial judge to announce at the outset whether punishment in excess of six months may be imposed. If the judge does not contemplate the imposition of a greater sentence, a jury is not necessary; otherwise one may be demanded. Edwards, supra. Through dicta, Justice Smith mischaracterized the Court’s rule in Taylor, supra, which provides that a jury trial is not necessary unless the actual punishment is greater than six months, and writes that a jury trial may be demanded when the possible sentence exceeds six months. This marks the discrepancy in our case law. There should be no need for weighing the merits of the United States Supreme Court’s decision against a dicta observation in an Arkansas decision. Here, the punishment actually imposed was one day in jail for each of the two offenses. It is obvious that a one-day sentence actually imposed does not meet either prong of the test of petty offenses specifically stated by the United States Supreme Court. The applicable statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-10-108(b)(l) (Repl. 1999), expressly authorizes the following punishment for contempt: “[T]he fines shall in no case exceed the sum of fifty dollars ($50.00) nor the imprisonment ten (10) days.” Id. Judge Kemp stated in his recusal order, charging Mr. Etoch with contempt, that a more severe sentence of one year per offense could be imposed. We have held that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts, and they may go beyond the powers given by statute. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993), and apparendy Judge Kemp recognized this inherent power of the courts to impose a more severe penalty. However, Judge Harkey, who heard the case and imposed the sentence for contempt, did not actually impose a sentence that exceeded six months, nor did the sentence exceed the length of the penalty “expressly authorized by statute.” Taylor, supra. Rather, Judge Harkey imposed a one-day sentence for each offense, thereby meeting both prongs of Taylor, supra. For these reasons, the trial court should be affirmed. Neither the sentence actually imposed nor the penalty authorized by statute come anywhere close to the six months imprisonment that the United States Supreme Court established as a standard in Taylor, supra, before a jury trial is required. Thus, the trial court’s sentence to one-day imprisonment on each conviction does not warrant a reversal. I respectfully dissent.