Court Opinion

ID: 9654193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:09:27.372278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:06.650478
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear
The petition to rehear attacks in two respects this court’s opinion to the effect that the pendency of the tort action in federal court against Hubbs does not abate Hubbs’ subsequent independent suit in the State Court *311asserting a claim which, grew out of the same transaction. The basis of the attack is, of course, the Federal Civil Procedure Rule 13(a) requiring that a defendant to a tort action pending in federal court assert by way of a counterclaim his alleged rights growing out of the same transaction.
The first insistence is that a Federal Statute takes precedence over a conflicting law of a State, and that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have the force and effect of a Federal Statute. Though the premises be granted, the conclusion, in so far as it applies to this case, does not follow.
The scope of these Federal Rules is procedure in Federal Court in suits instituted in that Court. Rule 1, in so far as material to the point, is as follows:
“Scope of Rules — These rules govern the procedure in the district courts of the United States in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity*' *
The suit with which this case is concerned is one instituted in a state court; hence, beyond the declared scope of the Federal Rule.
The next insistence is that the adjudication of this Court in this case is contrary to a statement made in its opinion in Roy v. Brittain, — Tenn. —, 297 S.W.2d 72, 74. That statement is to the effect that the federal court, having first acquired jurisdiction, retains it “to the exclusion of all other Courts”.
The Roy Brittain case was a suit sought to be maintained in our state court for the purpose of preventing by direct or indirect means the attendance of negro *312children at a certain public school attended by white children at Clinton, and wherein the federal court had previously prohibited involuntary segregation. Aside from anything else that might be said, the fact is that the federal district court in the instant case never obtained jurisdiction of Hubbs’ claim because Hubbs had never asserted any claim in federal court.
The petition to rehear will be denied.