Court Opinion

ID: 9942610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 17:00:58.952841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:20.415303
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         FEB 21 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-10186

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                2:20-cr-00044-SPL-1
 v.

CLINTON MARK LEWIS,                             MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted February 8, 2024
                                Phoenix, Arizona

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and JOHNSTONE, Circuit
Judges.

      Defendant Clinton Lewis (“Lewis”) appeals his conviction for possession of

child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), arguing that the district

court abused its discretion by denying his sixth motion for a continuance and that

there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
                                          I.

      We review the denial of a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion,

and the district court’s decision will only be disturbed on appeal if the denial was

“arbitrary or unreasonable.” United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir.

1985). Factors to consider include: (1) whether the defendant “was diligent in

preparing his defense or whether his request for a continuance appears to be a

delaying tactic”; (2) whether “the purpose of the continuance would have been

achieved had it been granted”; (3) the “extent to which granting the continuance

would have inconvenienced the court and the opposing party”; and (4) “whether [the

defendant] was prejudiced by the denial.” United States v. Kloehn, 620 F.3d 1122,

1127 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the “Flynt factors”).

      There was no abuse of discretion by denying the continuance. The underlying

forensic data from Lewis’s computers had been timely provided to the defense more

than a year earlier, and government agents had previously met with Lewis’s defense

team twice. The government also timely provided trial exhibits based on the

computer evidence in advance of the deadline established in the court’s pretrial order

and again met with counsel to walk through the exhibits and the proposed expert

testimony.1 Granting the continuance would not have served its stated purpose,

1
  The district court disallowed introduction of two of the government’s proposed
demonstrative exhibits that were not based on previously-disclosed discovery.

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particularly where previous continuances had been granted for similar reasons. In

addition, granting a continuance so close to scheduled trial would have

inconvenienced the court and the parties since the government had already prepared

its exhibits, drafted potential stipulations, and filed pretrial motions and the court

had already sent out jury questionnaires to a prospective jury pool and ruled on

striking some jurors for medical reasons. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11

(1983). Nor can Lewis demonstrate prejudice from the failure to continue the case,

as “[g]eneral allegations that a continuance would have allowed him to prepare a

better defense . . . are insufficient to allow us to find an abuse of discretion.” United

States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995).

                                           II.

      In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, draw all inferences from

evidence in favor of conviction, and affirm if any rational trier of fact could find the

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d

1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010). The government need not prove that Lewis knew of and

exercised control of the thumbnails themselves—rather, the thumbnails are the

leftover evidence of what pornographic materials Lewis had previously accessed on

his desktop by viewing specific files in icon mode. From the testimony of the

forensic expert, a jury could have reasonably inferred that Lewis had exercised

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possession over the underlying files and/or “knowingly accesse[d] with intent to

view” child pornography. 18 U.S.C § 2252(a)(4)(B).

      Evidence was presented that Lewis had been using recording software such as

ShareX and Replay Video Capture to make duplicate recordings of pornography

files he was viewing on his desktop, viewing these files in icon mode (requiring a

change from the default list view and creating residual thumbnails on his desktop),

encrypting such files using Veracrypt software, and transferring them to an

encrypted container, which he later loaded and viewed on his laptop.2 Lewis also

used deletion programs such as File Shredder and CCleaner to attempt to eliminate

all traces of the files on his desktop. Lewis stipulated that he was the only one in his

household who accessed the computers, and the government also introduced

statements in which Lewis claimed not to have any familiarity with ShareX or

Veracrypt, while evidence showed these programs had been run numerous times on

his computers during the relevant timeframe.

      From all of this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that Lewis “knowingly

possesse[d], or knowingly accesse[d] with intent to view” child pornography in

2
   The extensive evidence of the ways in which Lewis accessed and manipulated
these files makes this case factually distinguishable from United States v. Flyer, 633
F.3d, 915, 918‒19 (9th Cir. 2011), on which Lewis heavily relies, in which
pornographic images were merely found in unallocated space on a computer. Flyer
also applied the 2004 version of the statute, which did not include the “knowingly
accesses with intent to view” language of the current version. See Prosecution—
Child Pornography Cases, Pub. L No. 110-358, 122 Stat. 4001.

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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). See United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990,

998 (9th Cir. 2006).3

      AFFIRMED.

3
 Appellant’s Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief [Dkt.
Entry No. 33] is granted. The reply brief filed on December 4, 2023, is deemed filed.

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