Court Opinion

ID: 9838351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 06:10:09.956522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:52.189256
License: Public Domain

Affirm and Opinion Filed August 30, 2023

                                       In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00901-CR

                          PAUL GARY, Appellant
                                   V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. F-2016883-S

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                Before Justices Pedersen, III, Garcia, and Kennedy
                         Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III
      A jury found appellant Paul Gary guilty of murder and assessed his

punishment at twenty years’ confinement. In this Court, appellant argues that the

trial court (1) erroneously admitted evidence proffered as a dying declaration, and

(2) violated his common law right to allocution. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                    Background

      Dante Humphries was stabbed in the back when he got off an arriving Dallas

Area Rapid Transit (DART) train at the St. Paul station in downtown Dallas. A

witness to the stabbing flagged down Dallas Police Sergeant Shannon Browning and
led him to Humphries. Browning testified that Humphries was lying face down on

the ground; he was moving slightly and moaning. A knife blade was visible in his

back. Browning discerned that Humphries needed immediate medical attention, so

he called over his radio for both medical and additional police assistance, and then

he waited for the paramedics to arrive.

       While Browning was taking care of Humphries, his partner Officer Melva

Jackson followed a trail of blood from Humphries to the other side of the platform,

where she encountered appellant. He was wearing a white hat and a dark jacket, and

he was sitting on the stairs, holding a knife handle. Jackson drew her gun and told

appellant to drop the handle; he complied. When Browning saw that Jackson had

drawn her weapon, he walked over, handcuffed appellant, and took him to a police

car.

       Humphries was still alive when he was taken from the scene by ambulance,

but he died shortly after arriving at the hospital. The medical examiner testified that

his death was caused by the stab wound to his back.

                                     Discussion

       Appellant raises two issues on appeal. We address them in turn.

                                          –2–
                                 Dying Declaration

      In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible

error by admitting Browning’s testimony that was hearsay and incorrectly proffered

as a dying declaration. Hearsay is not admissible unless it falls within a prescribed

statutory or rule-based exception. TEX. R. EVID. 802. The rules of evidence provide

such an exception for a “statement [made] under the belief of imminent death,” or

what is frequently referred to as a dying declaration. TEX. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). The

rule permits “[a] statement that the declarant, while believing the declarant’s death

to be imminent, made about its cause or circumstances.” Id. We review a trial court’s

decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d

274, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (trial judge has great discretion in deciding whether

statement qualifies as dying declaration).

      Following a hearing on appellant’s objection, the trial court permitted specific

testimony from Sergeant Browning concerning his interaction with Humphries.

Browning explained that Humphries was not able to speak and communicated with

“moans and gestures.” Browning related that he asked Humphries more than once

who had stabbed him but Humphries could not answer him. Then the following

exchange took place:

      Q. [The Prosecutor]: Did you ask him, uh, who stabbed him in reference
      to a particular person or a description?
      A. [Browning]: Yes, I asked him if he could identify the individual or
      what the individual was wearing.

                                        –3–
      Q. Okay. Could he answer you?
      A. No, ma’am.

      Q. Uh, did you get more specific in your question?

      A. I asked if the gentleman had a white hat on, and had a black jacket,
      and he motioned with his head in an up and down movement.
      Q. And you’re also gesturing with your head in [a] nod that is
      universally agreed upon as an affirmation or a yes?

      A. Yes, ma’am.
Appellant does not dispute that the nod described by Browning was a “statement”

for hearsay purposes. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(a) (statement may be nonverbal

conduct). Nor does he dispute that the statement referred to the “cause or

circumstances” of Humphries’s death. TEX. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).

      Appellant argues that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to

establish that Humphries believed his death to be imminent when he nodded in

response to Browning’s question. See id. He relies on Gardner v. State, which

addresses the history and legal requirements of the dying declaration exception. 306

S.W.3d 274, 289–90. On the contested issue here, Gardner states:

      Under the modern-day Rule 804(b)(2), the common-law requirement
      that “there was no hope of recovery” was abrogated, and the focus
      turned more to the severity of the injuries than the declarant’s explicit
      words indicating knowledge of imminent death. All that the rule
      requires is sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, that
      demonstrates that the declarant must have realized that he was at
      death’s door at the time that he spoke. It is both (1) the solemnity of the
      occasion—the speaker peering over the abyss into the eternal—which
      substitutes for the witness oath, and (2) the necessity principle—since
      the witness had died, there was a necessity for taking his only available
      trustworthy statements—that provide the underpinning for the doctrine.
                                         –4–
Id. at 290–91 (footnoted citations omitted; emphasis added). Appellant argues there

is no evidence that Humphries “must have realized” he was about to die, as Gardner

requires.

         The Court of Criminal Appeals stated in Gardner that to determine whether

the victim knew death was imminent, the trial court could have relied on “her express

words, her conduct, the severity of her wounds, the opinions of others stated to her,

or any other relevant circumstances.” Id. at 292.1 In this case, when Humphries

responded to Browning’s question, he had collapsed after being stabbed in the back;

    1
        The specific facts the court pointed to as relevant evidence were:
         (1) The single bullet entered her right temple, went through her brain, and exited below her
         left ear. This was a mortal wound;

         (2) Ms. Whitfield testified that Tammy's voice was very slurred and hard to understand;

         (3) Tammy kept repeating that her head hurt and that she could not hear very well “because
         her ears were ringing from the gunshots”;

         (4) She said that her husband had shot her, there was blood everywhere, and she needed an
         ambulance;

         (5) Before the phone disconnected, Ms. Whitfield heard what sounded like Tammy choking
         and vomiting;

         (6) When the first deputy arrived, he found Tammy on the blood-soaked bed, trying to sit
         up; she appeared to be in shock and was bleeding badly from both the back and top right
         of her head;

         (7) There was a trail of blood leading into the bathroom, around the toilet, and in the trash
         can;

         (8) When the paramedics finally arrived, Tammy was “spitting up a lot of blood” and
         mumbling incomprehensibly;

         (9) She was in a vegetative state and died at the hospital two days later.

Id. at 291–92.

                                                     –5–
the blade of the knife remained in his body; he was unable to speak; he moaned and

moved the entire time Browning was with him; the wound was mortal; Humphries

died from loss of blood within an hour of being stabbed.2

       We conclude the trial court could have reasonably inferred from this evidence

that Humphries realized he was “at death’s door” when he responded to Browning.

See id. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Browning’s testimony as

evidence of a dying declaration. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

                                             Allocution

       In his second issue, appellant contends that the trial court violated his common

law right to allocution; he asks for a new punishment hearing. The State contends

that appellant did not preserve this complaint for our review. We agree.

       “The term ‘allocution’ refers to a trial judge’s asking a criminal defendant to

speak in mitigation of the sentence to be imposed.” McDonald v. State, No. 05-20-

00892-CR, 2021 WL 5917506, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 15, 2021, no pet.)

(mem. op, not designated for publication). Appellant concedes that the trial court

complied with Texas’s statutory allocution requirement. Prior to sentencing

appellant, the trial court asked his lawyer: “Counsel, is there any legal reason why

sentence should not be, uh, observed?” Appellant’s attorney responded: “No, Your

Honor.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.07. Appellant did not request an

   2
       Video evidence from the DART station was admitted at trial and indicated Humphries sustained the
injury minutes before midnight; he was pronounced dead at 12:34 a.m.
                                                 –6–
opportunity to make a common-law allocution during the hearing, nor did he object

to the trial court’s failure to offer him that opportunity. To complain on appeal of the

denial of the right of allocution, whether it is statutory or one claimed under the

common law, a defendant must timely object. See Gallegos-Perez v. State, No. 05-

16-00015-CR, 2016 WL 6519113, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 1, 2016, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication). Because appellant did not do so, he has

preserved nothing for our review.

      We overrule appellant’s second issue.

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

220901f.u05                                 /Bill Pedersen, III//
Do Not Publish                              BILL PEDERSEN, III
TEX. R. APP. P. 47                          JUSTICE

                                          –7–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

PAUL GARY, Appellant                         On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial
                                             District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00901-CR          V.               Trial Court Cause No. F-2016883-S.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Pedersen, III. Justices Garcia and
                                             Kennedy participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 30th day of August, 2023.

                                       –8–