Court Opinion

ID: 9381923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 06:05:39.859717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:35.771518
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

STACEY LYNN CAMMENGA, also known as                                  UNPUBLISHED
STACEY LYNN TIMMER,                                                  March 23, 2023

               Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-
               Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 358463
                                                                     Barry Circuit Court
MICHAEL PHILIP CAMMENGA,                                             LC No. 2020-000233-DO

               Defendant/Counterplaintiff-
               Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In this divorce action, defendant, Michael Cammenga, appeals the divorce judgment as of
right, and plaintiff, Stacey Cammenga, has filed a cross-appeal. For the reasons explained in this
opinion, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

                                        I. BASIC FACTS

       The parties married in October 1992 and have two adult children. During the marriage,
Michael worked at various jobs in the paper industry. The parties lived in several states during the
marriage, and Michael sometimes lived separately from Stacey and the children. Michael was the
primary breadwinner, whereas Stacey was primarily responsible for the home and childrearing. In
2018, Michael started a business, Cammenga Investments, LLC, which he used—in partnership
with other entities that he had an interest in—to purchase a papermill. In March 2020, after
discovering that Michael was having an affair with an employee of the papermill, Stacey filed a
complaint for divorce. Michael filed a counterclaim for divorce.

       The divorce was contentiously litigated. Relevant to the issues raised on appeal, the trial
court entered a status quo order that limited the parties’ spending to their past practices and
prohibited Michael from spending money on the woman identified as his mistress. Both parties
presented evidence indicating that the other had violated the status quo order, and the trial court

                                                -1-
eventually determined that their spending in violation of the order resulted in a “wash” so there
was no need to credit either party for the other’s improper spending. There was also extensive
pretrial litigation related to Michael’s untimely and incomplete responses to discovery requests.
The court ultimately sanctioned Michael by prohibiting the use of documentation that he had not
provided to Stacey. Additionally, after the court ordered Michael to pay temporary spousal
support, he moved to modify the amount owed based on a purported decrease in his monthly
income from $10,000 to $2,500. The trial court denied his request after determining that Michael
lied about the decrease in his income.

       Following a three-day bench trial, the court placed detailed findings on the record
addressing numerous issues related to the parties’ assets, the division of the martial estate, spousal
support, and Stacey’s requests for attorney fees. Thereafter, in response to motions for
reconsideration and clarification, the court placed additional findings on the record. This appeal
and cross appeal follow.

                                        II. CREDIBILITY

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Michael argues that the trial court improperly prejudged his credibility during the discovery
proceedings. We review a trial court’s factual findings for clear error. Hodge v Parks, 303 Mich
App 552, 554-555; 844 NW2d 189 (2014). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when this Court
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 555 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “Special deference is afforded to a trial court’s factual findings that
are based on witness credibility.” Id.

                                          B. ANALYSIS

       Michael claims that, during the discovery process, there was no legitimate basis upon
which the trial court could assess his credibility. The record belies his assertion.

        The discovery proceedings were lengthy, spanning multiple hearings over several months.
Although there were various issues, the most significant issues involved Stacey’s requests for
business documents. She first moved to compel discovery in August 2020, which the trial court
granted. When Michael still did not provide the materials, Stacey sought to enforce the discovery
order. The court—after viewing information that had been provided by Michael—concluded that
Michael had provided irrelevant documents, but had not provided necessary information about his
income and the business. Despite Michael’s failure to comply with discovery, the court did not
sanction him. Instead, the court ordered Stacey to hire an accountant to help her determine what
information she needed. The court ordered Michael to produce that information within seven days
after the accountant identified it.

      Stacey hired an accountant and provided a detailed list of the information needed, which
Michael did not provide within seven days. Michael maintained that he could not produce
documents because they were in the possession of third parties and that, in any event, producing
the materials would be unduly expensive. He claimed that there was no point in producing
documents related to the value of the business because the business was a “dumpster fire” with no

                                                 -2-
value whatsoever. Thereafter, Michael moved for a protective order, and Stacey filed a
countermotion to compel discovery.

        The court again reviewed information provided by Michael. That information included
empty electronic folders, Michael’s assertions that he lacked the information, financial statements
that appeared to have been prepared by Michael’s alleged mistress, and instructions for Stacey to
direct her inquiries to other entities. Additionally, Michael claimed that Stacey did not need the
information because documents had been given to his expert and she had been given “unfettered”
access to this expert. (He later admitted that the access was not, in fact, unfettered). Although the
court expressed concern that Michael was “playing fast and loose with the rules” by not providing
information necessary for Stacey to determine the value of the business, the court gave him
additional time to get his “ducks in a row.”

        At a subsequent hearing, the court noted that Michael sent the court a large box of “what
appears to be discovery,” which Michael explained he was offering as an exhibit to demonstrate
his good faith effort to comply with discovery. Michael did not ask to testify or present any other
evidence. His lawyer reiterated Michael’s position that he could not provide Stacey with third-
party discovery, that she did not need this information because the business was a “dumpster fire,”
and that it would be a waste of money to generate documents to determine the business’s value.
In response, Stacey again identified the materials that she had not received and explained why they
were necessary for her evaluation of Michael’s income and the value of the business.

       Ultimately, after eight months of Michael not providing Stacey with the requested
information, the trial court held that Michael did not have to produce any “third-party”
information, but that he would not be able to use any third-party information at trial that was not
provided to Stacey by April 16, 2021. See MCR 2.313(B)(2)(b). Michael did not object.

        On this record, Michael’s complaints about the trial court’s discovery determinations and
his claim that the court formed unfairly negative opinions about him or treated him harshly during
discovery are spurious. The court showed considerable patience and forbearance in the face of
Michael’s repeated failure to comply with discovery. Indeed, the court’s discovery sanction was
eminently fair. Moreover, to the extent that the trial court found that Michael failed to provide the
information Stacey sought, the trial court was presented with materials from both parties to review
in assessing Michael’s compliance with discovery. Michael did not seek to testify, and he has not
shown that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that he had not complied with discovery.

        Nevertheless, Michael contends that the court’s pretrial discovery rulings resulted in a
“prejudgment” of the case, such that the subsequent trial proceedings were tainted. However,
“[o]pinions formed by a judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring during the course
of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute bias or partiality unless they
display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”
Schellenberg v Rochester Mich Lodge No 2225, of Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks of USA,
228 Mich App 20, 39; 577 NW2d 163 (1998). Nothing in the trial court’s statements or discovery
rulings evinces a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment at trial
impossible.

                                                -3-
        Moreover, to the extent that, following trial, the trial court concluded that Michael had
misrepresented the facts by asserting that he was a “little” person with no access to documents,
this finding was supported by the record, which showed that, through his corporations, Michael
owned 25% of the LLC that owned the papermill, that he worked at the papermill, and that he was
intimately involved in the business’s dealings. Further, insofar as the trial court considered
Michael’s conduct during discovery as a factor when valuing the business and dividing assets, this
was not improper. See Draggoo v Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415, 430; 566 NW2d 642 (1997)
(“Defendant’s refusal to answer the interrogatories or supply bank documents could be considered
as a relevant factor in determining an equitable division of property because it was tantamount to
an attempt to conceal assets.”) In sum, Michael’s complaints regarding the discovery proceedings
as an improper “prejudgment” of the case are without merit.

                           III. TEMPORARY SPOUSAL-SUPPORT

       Next, Michael argues that the trial court abused its discretion and denied him due process
by preventing him from presenting expert testimony at a temporary spousal-support hearing. We
disagree.

        In domestic relations actions, a temporary spousal-support order may be entered at any
time during the pendency of case. MCL 552.13(1). Such an order may also be “modified at any
time during the pendency of the case, following a hearing and upon a showing of good cause.”
MCR 3.207(C)(3). Here, the court entered a temporary spousal-support award requiring Michael
to pay $3,739 in monthly spousal support. Michael moved to modify that order.

        The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Michael testified at length that,
as of February 2021, his monthly income had been reduced from $10,000 to $2,500. He explained
that the $2,500 was being paid by a customer called Selig Sealing Products, Inc., and that it was
his sole source of income. Stacey, however, presented testimony and evidence regarding an
application at a credit union, which Michael completed in March 2021. The loan officer testified
that Michael represented that he earned $15,000 each month, that his employer was Cammenga
Investments, and that his income was not likely to decline. Given the discrepancy between his
testimony and his representations to the loan officer, the court found that Michael had lied about
his income. As a result, the court denied the motion to modify spousal support. Considering the
record, we conclude that the court did not clearly err by determining that Michael lied about his
income being reduced to $2,500.

        Michael, however, argues that the court erred by preventing him from presenting testimony
from an accountant who was going to testify about Michael’s tax forms. The expert testimony
regarding tax forms for the 2018 and 2019 tax years appears irrelevant and a needless waste of
time given Michael’s misrepresentation about his income in 2021, which was the time frame at
issue. See MRE 402; MRE 403. The court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the
accountant’s testimony. See Nahshal v Fremont Ins Co, 324 Mich App 709, 710; 922 NW2d 662
(2018) (stating that a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion).

                                                -4-
                            IV. ADMISSION OF TEXT MESSAGES

         Michael next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting his text messages
to his mistress evincing their affair. According to Michael, the messages should have been
excluded because Stacey obtained them from his cell phone in violation of MCL 752.795. Under
MCL 752.795, it is a felony for a person to access a computer program, system, or network to
acquire property if the person was acting “intentionally and without authorization or by exceeding
valid authorization.” Here, the testimony shows that while Michael was sleeping, Stacey entered
the password for his cell phone, accessed his text messages, and recorded several messages so that
she could view them at her leisure. Although there is evidence suggesting that the password on
the device was to prevent Michael’s employees, not his family from accessing his phone, Stacey’s
furtive actions when accessing the device suggest that she was aware that she lacked authorization
to access the text messages stored on his phone. Yet, assuming arguendo that the trial court abused
its discretion by admitting the text messages, we conclude that reversal is not warranted.

        The text messages were one piece of evidence supporting that Michael had an affair with
his mistress. The other evidence of his affair included the photos of Michael and his mistress that
he inadvertently uploaded to the family’s iCloud account, including photos of his mistress in her
underwear. There was also testimony about the thousands of dollars Michael had recently begun
spending on libido and sex enhancers, his post-it note about “hot love” “last night,” testimony from
the parties’ daughter about her observations of Michael and his mistress whispering together at the
papermill, the fact that Michael had moved in with his mistress, and the e-mail to a realtor
supporting that Michael and his mistress were buying a house together and putting it in the
mistress’s name to conceal the purchase. In short, the evidence of an affair was substantial, and
even assuming some error in the admission of the text messages, exclusion of the messages would
not have affected the outcome of the proceedings. See MCR 2.613(A). Michael is not entitled to
relief on this basis.

                                    V. PROPERTY DIVISION

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Both parties raise numerous challenges to the property award.

               In deciding issues on appeal involving division of marital property, this
       Court first reviews the trial court’s findings of fact. Findings of fact, such as a trial
       court’s valuations of particular marital assets, will not be reversed unless clearly
       erroneous. . . . If the trial court’s findings of fact are upheld, this Court must decide
       whether the dispositive ruling was fair and equitable in light of those facts. The
       dispositional ruling is discretionary and will be affirmed unless this Court is left
       with a firm conviction that the division was inequitable. [See Butler v Simmons-
       Butler, 308 Mich App 195, 207-208; 863 NW2d 677 (2014) (citations omitted).]

                                                 -5-
                                          B. ANALYSIS

           1. MICHAEL’S CHALLENGES TO THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION

        “The goal in distributing marital assets in a divorce proceeding is to reach an equitable
distribution of property in light of all the circumstances.” Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700,
716-717; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). “Each spouse need not receive a mathematically equal share,
but significant departures from congruence must be explained clearly by the court.” Byington v
Byington, 224 Mich App 103, 114; 568 NW2d 141 (1997). When addressing the distribution of
marital property, the court should consider:

       (1) duration of the marriage, (2) contributions of the parties to the marital estate,
       (3) age of the parties, (4) health of the parties, (5) life status of the parties,
       (6) necessities and circumstances of the parties, (7) earning abilities of the parties,
       (8) past relations and conduct of the parties, and (9) general principles of equity.
       There may even be additional factors that are relevant to a particular case. For
       example, the court may choose to consider the interruption of the personal career
       or education of either party. The determination of relevant factors will vary
       depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. [Cassidy v Cassidy, 318
       Mich App 463, 477; 899 NW2d 65 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

“The trial court must consider all relevant factors but not assign disproportionate weight to any
one circumstance.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

         Michael first contends that the court erred because it discussed property valuation and the
division of assets before reviewing the enumerated factors relevant to the property distribution.
We disagree. The court is not required to make its findings in any particular order. Instead, the
court is required to consider the relevant factors, Cassidy, 318 Mich App at 477, and to set forth
its findings of fact and law, see MCR 2.517(A)(1) through (3). The court fulfilled these obligations
in this case.

        Indeed, the court made detailed finding of fact to support its determination that a 60/40
division of the marital property, favoring Stacey, was warranted. The court found that the parties’
marriage was a long-term marriage of over 28 years, in which both parties contributed to the
marital estate. Michael primarily contributed financially, while Stacey primarily cared for the
home and the children. Although Michael worked outside the home, his contribution to the estate
had not been entirely positive because he had lost marital assets in his business ventures. The
parties were middle-aged and able to work. Stacey’s lack of work history limited her opportunities.
Michael had some health issues, but they did not prevent him from working. The court found that
Michael and his affair were at fault for the breakdown of the marriage, but the court did not treat
this as a significant fact in the distribution of assets. Instead, in concluding that a 60/40 division
was warranted, the court emphasized Michael’s lack of credibility regarding his assets and income
and his obstructionist behavior during the court proceedings.

        As it relates to the court’s factual findings, Michael contends that the court afforded too
much weight to his fault. The fault at issue in this case is twofold: Michael’s fault in engaging in
an extramarital affair that contributed to the breakdown of the marriage and Michael’s misconduct

                                                 -6-
related to the parties’ assets. “Marital misconduct is only one factor among many and should not
be dispositive.” Cassidy, 318 Mich App at 478 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Fault is
not a punitive basis for an inequitable division.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Instead, fault should be considered in conjunction with all the other relevant factors.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Although misconduct related to assets does not require
automatic forfeiture of those assets, attempts to conceal assets, or behavior that results in
unnecessary litigation, can be considered when dividing assets and can support a deviation from
an equal split. Draggoo, 223 Mich App at 430.

        The trial court gave some weight to Michael’s extramarital affair, but its overall focus was
on Michael’s misconduct relative to the parties’ assets and the divorce proceedings. The court
detailed Michael’s obstructionist behavior at length—including both his behavior during discovery
and his numerous lies during the course of these proceedings—which interfered with Stacey’s
efforts to value the business, hindered efforts to determine his income, and stymied the court’s
ability to accurately value assets. On this record, the trial court did not err by considering
Michael’s misconduct as a significant factor warranting a 60/40 distribution of the marital estate.

        Moreover, although Michael’s misconduct was a significant factor in the trial court’s
analysis, it was not the only factor considered. As noted above, the court considered many of the
factors, including the parties’ age, the length of the marriage, their earning abilities, their health,
and their contributions to the marital estate. Considering the trial court’s analysis as a whole, the
60/40 division of assets appears to be a fair and equitable on the facts of this case.

        Michael briefly argues that the division was inequitable because he received few liquid
assets and the business which the court found was worth $0. Although Michael complains about
a lack of liquidity, the court’s findings make clear that Michael has greater earning capabilities
than Stacey and a house in which to live with his mistress which lessens his need for liquid assets.
Further, Michael’s argument ignores the liquid assets that he received before trial as well as the
assets that he received as the beneficiary of the estate of David Hendrickson.1 Although the court
correctly treated the inheritance as separate property, see Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 585; 597
NW2d 82 (1999), the fact remains that, contrary to his complaints about liquidity, Michael has
liquid assets at his disposal.

        Next, with regard to the business, the court valued it at $0, meaning that it did not affect
the overall liquidity or value of Michael’s property award one way or the other. Moreover,
although the court valued the business at $0, Michael testified that the papermill is in the process
of building back to full strength. Thus, it is an asset with a potential for additional value and
income. See Hodge, 303 Mich App at 564 (noting that the husband’s business, awarded to him as
an asset, “although currently of minimal value, has the potential to improve as economic conditions
change”). Michael’s general arguments regarding the equity and liquidity of the award, therefore,
lack merit.

1
 Prior to his death, Hendrickson was a friend who loaned the parties approximately $76,000
during their marriage.

                                                 -7-
        Next, Michael contends that a tax loss carryforward is not an asset and that it should not
have been divided as part of the marital estate. In contrast, Stacey asserts that the court correctly
identified the carryforward as a marital asset but that it clearly erred by assigning the asset to
Michael’s without valuing the carryforward. We agree that the tax loss carryforward is a marital
asset and that the trial court erred by awarding it to Michael without first determining its value.

        “Generally, assets earned by a spouse during the marriage, whether they are received
during the existence of the marriage or after the judgment of divorce, are properly considered part
of the marital estate.” Woodington v Shokoohi, 288 Mich App 352, 364; 792 NW2d 63 (2010).
Tax benefits—such as the right to a tax refund—may be divided as marital assets. See Burkey v
Burkey, 189 Mich App 72, 75; 471 NW2d 631 (1991). Several courts to consider the issue have
also concluded that tax loss carryforwards, which involve the right to offset future earnings with
losses, can constitute marital property subject to division when the losses to be carried forward
were incurred during the marriage. See 1 Equitable Distribution of Property, 4th, § 5:9 & n 16
(compiling cases). Here, during the marriage, Michael used marital assets to purchase the
business, and he incurred significant business losses—apparently totaling more than $2 million—
that he may use to offset taxes on future income. Thus, the trial court did not err by determining
that the tax loss carryforward is a marital asset.

        Once a determination has been made that an item constitutes marital property, a trial court
is required to make specific findings regarding the value of that property “if the value is in dispute.”
Olson v Olson, 256 Mich App 619, 627; 671 NW2d 64 (2003). It is clear error for a court to simply
award an asset with a disputed value to one party without first placing a value on the disputed
piece of marital property. Id. At trial, Stacey presented expert testimony from a certified public
accountant to support that Michael’s tax documents evince a more than $2 million carryforward.
The accountant testified that the carryforward will continue until it is used completely and that it
may be used to offset ordinary income as well as things like capital gains. As a result, Michael
will effectively be able to earn $2 million without paying any taxes on those earnings. The
carryforward is nontransferable, so Michael could not assign a portion to Stacey for use on her
own taxes. Nevertheless, the accountant testified that the value of the carryforward could be
determined by calculating Michael’s taxes each year and to ascertain how much he saved as a
result of the carryforward. This would involve looking at Michael’s income, determining his tax
bracket and any deductions first, and then calculating the tax that he would owe but for the
carryforward. Michael did not present any evidence as to the value or lack thereof of the tax loss
carryforward.

         Based on the accountant’s testimony, a portion of the tax loss carryforward’s value could
be allocated to Stacey by ordering Michael to annually pay Stacey an amount equal to 60% of his
tax savings attributable to the carryforward. That is a permissible way to divide an asset. There
is no prohibition on the trial court entering orders that will require future disclosures by the parties.
See, e.g., Hodge, 303 Mich App at 562 (approving a 2011 property division that, among other
things, required the husband to “thereafter submit his personal and business income tax returns in
2012, 2013, and 2014 to show whether the business improves”). The trial court rejected this
approach because it posed the risk of the parties being “in litigation forever.” The court’s concern
for future litigation is understandable. But the court’s reluctance to preside over anticipated future
litigation does not provide a basis for awarding the asset solely to Michael without placing a value
on it. Because the trial court clearly erred by awarding the carryforward to Michael without

                                                  -8-
determining the value of the asset, we vacate the court’s conclusions regarding the carryforward
and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court shall, on the existing record,
determine the value of the carryforward and readjust the property division to compensate Stacey
accordingly.2

        Michael also argues that the trial court clearly erred by valuing the notes in the Entrust
account at $362,500 when, according to Michael, the notes are worthless. We disagree. Although
Michael contends that the notes are worthless because they are backed by the papermill’s earnings,
and the papermill is in turn worthless, the only evidence Michael offered to support his assertions
regarding the terms of the notes was his own testimony. The court was not required to and, in fact,
did not find his testimony credible. See Hodge, 303 Mich App at 555. Moreover, the court’s
valuation determination is supported by the record. With regard to the Entrust account, the
statement for the account admitted at trial indicated that it has a total “market value” of
$377,813.44. This amount consists of $15,313.44 in cash, and $362,500 in “notes” related to
“Columbia OPSCo, LLC,” which is one of the partner companies in Michael’s business. The chief
financial officer for Entrust testified that Michael withdrew $362,500 in actual cash from the
account. Further, Michael conceded that he gave money to Columbia in exchange for the
promissory notes. Thus, the record provided evidence that there is an outstanding debt in the
amount of $362,500 owed to the marital estate. The court did not err by valuing this asset on the
basis of the amount owed to the marital estate and dividing this asset as part of the marital estate.
See 2 Equitable Distribution of Property, 4th, § 6:100 & n 2 (“Debts receivable are acquired in
exchange for the funds or property transferred to the debtor, and they are normally given the same
classification.”).

        Next, Michael argues that the court erred by assigning the debt associated with his personal
guaranties solely to him without first valuing them. The court addressed Michael’s personal
guaranties in connection with the business, concluding that the best estimate for everything—on
the basis of Michael’s accountant’s testimony—was to value the business at zero while also giving
Michael zero credit for any liabilities that he may have related to the business. In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on Michael’s accountant’s testimony that the business had a value of
$0. In contrast, the trial court emphasized that evidence also showed that the business was hiring
new employees and had offered Michael a position with a $128,000 salary, which were activities

2
  Michael argues that the court’s failure to value the carryforward in the context of the property
division is of no importance because the court considered the carryforward when calculating
spousal support. This argument lacks merit. The carryforward is an asset, and as such, must be
valued by the trial court as part of the property division. See Olson, 256 Mich App at 627-628.
Without a value—or another means for determining the carryforward’s equitable distribution
between the parties—it is impossible to determine the equity of the property division or the equity
of the spousal-support award. See Seifeddine v Jaber, 327 Mich App 514, 523-524; 934 NW2d
64 (2019) (“[T]he property awarded to the parties is a factor that should be considered when
deciding whether to award spousal support.”). Michael’s claim that spousal support somehow
obviates the need to value an asset is without merit.

                                                -9-
that Michael’s accountant testified were contrary to the condition of the business at the time he
valued it. That suggested a potential change of circumstance and an improvement in the business.
In bundling the personal guaranties with the business, the court noted that these personal guaranties
were not among the “debts” that Michael claimed on his Verified Financial Statement. The court
also again emphasized Michael’s obstructionist behavior, and that of his business partners, in
attempting to thwart Stacey’s discovery requests. Further, the court also addressed the various
loan arrangements in this case as a “tangled web of business garbage.” With limited information
about the business, and given the loan arrangements, the trial court ultimately awarded the business
and related liabilities to Michael at a $0 value. On this record, given the lack of information
regarding the particulars of the business, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by
assigning Michael’s personal guaranties to him,” and awarding the business and associated debts
to him with a net value of $0 and no credit for the potential liability on the personal guaranties.

         Moreover, a guaranty is “an independent collateral agreement” by which the guarantor
“undertakes to pay the obligation if the primary payor fails to do so.” Bandit Indus, Inc v Hobbs
Intern, Inc, 463 Mich 504, 508 n 4; 620 NW2d 531 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The contingent nature of a guaranty is notable in the context of a divorce and the division of
liabilities because a liability that is merely speculative or hypothetical need not necessarily be
divided or assigned value when dividing the marital estate. See, e.g., Hanaway v Hanaway, 208
Mich App 278, 301 & n 13; 527 NW2d 792 (1995) (concluding that the trial court did not err by
valuing stock without considering possible tax consequences when no sale or other taxable event
was planned or contemplated). In the context of guaranties, a speculative possibility of liability
associated with a guaranty should not be considered; rather, there must be a showing that there is
a “quantifiable likelihood of liability” before guaranties can be divided in a divorce. See 2
Equitable Distribution of Property, 4th, § 6:98 & n 12. See, e.g., Larson v Larson, 733 NW2d 272,
275-276 (SD, 2007) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to deduct
the husband’s personal guaranties from his total asset award when liability under them was
contingent and speculative).

         Michael has evaded efforts to value the business and to accurately determine its assets and
liabilities. As a result, the record provides no basis on which to assess the likelihood that the
business will default on the underlying loans and to conclude that there is a quantifiable likelihood
that defendant will become liable for the guaranties. In other words, without more information
about the business, which Michael chose not to provide, it cannot be concluded that the business
is substantially likely to default on the underlying loans or that Michael will likely become liable
as the guarantor. Therefore, on this record, the court did not abuse its discretion by bundling the
guaranties with the business and awarding the business to Michael with $0 value and $0 liabilities.

       Next, Michael argues that the trial court erred by treating the $76,000 the parties owed to
the Hendrickson Estate as a separate debt and holding him solely responsible on the basis that
Michael, as the executor of Hendrickson’s estate, was empowered by Hendrickson’s will to forgive
debts. Michael asserts that he owes a fiduciary duty and that he cannot simply forgive the debt.
He maintains that the debt should be considered a marital debt and divided accordingly.

       A trial court may find reasons to conclude that debt incurred during the marriage is an
individual debt. Reed v Reed, 265 Mich App 131, 157; 693 NW2d 825 (2005). However, that is
not what the court did in this case. Both parties testified that, during their marriage, they borrowed

                                                -10-
$76,000 from Hendrickson. When dividing the parties’ debts and assets, the trial court apportioned
the debt to Michael, noting that Michael had the power under Hendrickson’s will, as the executor
of the estate, to forgive debts. After recognizing Michael’s power to forgive the debt, the court
stated:

                 So, I’m being asked, well, half that—half that debt, make her pay part of it,
        and I’ll pay part of it. Well, you just happen to leave out that you have the power
        to forgive your part of that debt. So, you get that entire debt. That $76,000 debt is
        on your side of the marker. Because you have the authority under the will that you
        signed on behalf of [Hendrickson] to forgive that debt entirely. And you just kind
        of left that out in your testimony along with the life insurance. And if you really
        feel like his kids need that $76,000, then I suppose you could pay it out of the life
        insurance proceeds that you received or out of the IRA that you received. But since
        you have the ability to forgive that debt, you get the debt.

The court later clarified its ruling as follows:

        Then there’s the 76,000 owed to [Hendrickson’s estate]. That is apportioned to
        [Michael].

                 And in clarification of the previous statements, I did not indicate that
        [Michael] shouldn’t pay it. I said he has the ability under the terms of the will to
        forgive it. What I do not—what—what will not happen under the terms of the
        judgment is he can forgive his half, and she’s responsible for her half. No. So, he
        has that entire amount. He can—he can pay it back with the IRA he got from the
        estate. He can pay it back with the insurance proceeds he got from the estate. Or
        he can choose to pay it back some other way. Or he can choose not to pay it back,
        as he has the ability to forgive it. That’s what I said. I didn’t say he shouldn’t pay
        it. I said he has the ability to not pay it because of that clause in the will. [Emphasis
        added.]

        Considering the trial court’s analysis of the Hendrickson’s debt as a whole, particularly its
clarifications, the trial court treated the Hendrickson debt as a marital debt and apportioned it to
Michael in the property division for practical reasons. Indeed, the court’s reference to Stacey’s
“half,” makes clear that this debt was treated as a marital debt and divided as part of the marital
estate. Because Michael already received the relief requested, he is not entitled to further relief on
appeal.

             2. STACEY’S CHALLENGES TO THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION

        Stacey argues that the trial court erred by using her spending while the status quo order
was in place to offset Michael’s dissipation of assets during the same timeframe. Stacey maintains
that Michael was the only one who engaged in dissipation of marital assets and that the court erred
by failing to take punitive measure against him to compensate her for the dissipated assets.

       In a divorce action, “when a party has dissipated marital assets without the fault of the other
spouse, the value of the dissipated assets may be included in the marital estate.” Woodington, 288
Mich App at 368. Spending of marital assets on a mistress dissipates the marital estate. See

                                                   -11-
Cassidy, 318 Mich App at 468, 499-500 (indicating that the martial estate was dissipated by the
husband using marital funds to assist his mistress in purchasing a home). Fraudulent transfers to
third parties, including children, can also provide a basis for recapturing an asset for distribution
as part of the marital estate, when the transfer was made to deprive the other spouse of an interest
in marital property. See Thames v Thames, 191 Mich App 299, 302; 477 NW2d 496 (1991). In
addition, a court might specifically enter an order prohibiting certain actions regarding property
during the pendency of the divorce case, and property transfers in violation of such an order are
invalid and may be set aside. See Webb v Webb, 375 Mich 624, 627; 134 NW2d 673 (1965).

        The trial court found that Michael engaged in dissipation of marital assets. See Cassidy,
318 Mich App at 499-500. The court found that Michael purchased a home with his mistress,
which they placed in her name even though they were buying it together. The court specifically
rejected Michael’s claim that he was simply a tenant paying “rent” to a landlord. Stacey also
presented evidence that Michael spent marital funds improving his new house with his mistress,
“wining and dining” his mistress, buying supplements to enhance their sex life, and taking trips
with his mistress. The trial court credited Stacey’s evidence and concluded that Michael had
improperly spent $22,735 on his mistress. Given the evidence presented, the court did not clearly
err by concluding that Michael had engaged in improper spending, i.e., dissipation of marital
assets.

        The trial court’s findings also support that Michael’s improper spending constituted a
violation of the status quo order. That order, which was amended once, limited the parties’
spending to their past practices and it prohibited Michael from spending money on his mistress. It
also contained provisions requiring Michael to continue to deposit his income and expense
reimbursements into the marital accounts. Thus, by continuing to spend funds on his mistress, and
by failing to deposit funds in marital accounts, Michael dissipated marital assets and he violated
the status quo order. These funds should have been recaptured for the marital estate.

         Instead of recapturing the dissipated assets and undeposited income for the marital estate,
the trial court “offset” Michael’s dissipation of assets with Stacey’s spending during the pendency
of the divorce, which included her spending on the parties’ adult children as well as other
expenditures. Specifically, at trial, Michael sought to recapture $72,927 in allegedly inappropriate
spending by Stacey. Addressing Michael’s request, the court first held that his request for
repayment of money spent on a computer was addressed in the property settlement and that he
would be reimbursed for expenses related to Stacey’s hiring of a private investigator. Additionally,
Stacey conceded that Michael should be credited for the $1,500 she spent on a wedding venue for
the parties’ daughter, which was an unusual expense for which Michael did not consent.

        The trial court, however, did not make any findings as to whether the other allegedly
improper expenses were, in fact, improper expenses. In particular, with regard to Stacey’s
spending, Stacey and the parties’ children testified that her spending on the children pending the
divorce was consistent with past practices. Stacey also testified that her spending on family
members—such as her parents, brother, nieces and nephews, and friends—was consistent with
past practices. Michael offered no evidence that plaintiff’s spending on their daughter—or other
family members and friends—differed from the couple’s past practices. With regard to spending
on the parties’ son, however, Stacey acknowledged that she spent over $33,000 supporting him.
Stacey and the children testified that this spending was consistent with past practices. Michael

                                                -12-
acknowledge that the parties had provided support for their adult child before the divorce. He
maintained, however, that, during the pendency of the divorce, Stacey spent more on their son than
they had in past years and that, in any event, the parties should no longer support him because he
smoked marijuana and stopped attending college. Michael also maintained that their son should
be able to support himself. The trial court did not resolve this factual dispute.

         Among Michael’s other claims of improper spending, the trial court also failed to address
the $15,000 Stacey gave to the parties’ son, before entry of the status quo order, which Stacey
testified was a repayment of money that she and Michael took from the child’s bank account in
2017. Repayment of a marital debt does not constitute dissipation. See Elahham v Al-Jabban,
319 Mich App 112, 124; 899 NW2d 768 (2017) (concluding that a loan repayment did not
constitute dissipation of marital assets). Stacey also testified that a payment to her mother was a
repayment of money that Stacey borrowed from her parents during the pendency of the divorce
case when Michael emptied their account, leaving her with no money to pay bills. If Stacey’s
testimony is credited, this would not constitute dissipation of assets. See Hanaway, 208 Mich App
at 299-300 (concluding that the trial court erred by reducing the wife’s “share of the assets by
$30,613, the amount she spent because defendant refused to pay certain expenses, that should have
been paid from marital assets”). Yet, the trial court made no factual findings regarding these
amounts to support whether they constituted dissipation of assets or legitimate payment of debts
and marital expenses. Other than noting the amount that Stacey spent on a private investigator,
the trial court also failed to make factual findings regarding her expenditures on an accounting
expert for this case, an estate planner, or a private investigator to support that this spending
constituted dissipation or a violation of the status quo order, particularly in light of Stacey’s
testimony that Michael had also been using marital funds to pay for litigation expenses, such as an
attorney.

        In sum, apart from the $1,500 wedding debt that Stacey concedes was properly included
on her side of the ledger, there are factual questions to be resolved regarding whether Stacey’s
expenditures constitute a dissipation of marital assets or a violation of the status quo order or both.
Accordingly, we remand with instructions that the trial court make factual findings, on the existing
record, regarding Stacey’s spending to determine whether Stacey dissipated assets or violated the
status quo order or both. See Woodington, 288 Mich App at 368. If the trial court’s fact-finding
results in the elimination or reduction of the offset for Stacey’s spending, the property award
should be adjusted accordingly.

        Next, Stacey argues that the trial court’s overall distribution of assets did not,
mathematically speaking, accord with the trial court’s intention to divide the estate 60/40.
According to Stacey, she is entitled to an additional $90,000 in assets to accomplish the 60/40
split. Michael concedes that the trial court intended a 60/40 split of assets, but he argues that
Stacey’s calculations regarding the distribution of assets are incorrect. Both parties provided
detailed charts on appeal purporting to summarize the court’s distribution of assets and debts with
the corresponding values as assigned by the trial court. We conclude that there is no need to
address this issue. Remand for further proceedings related to the overall value of the marital estate
are required because the trial court clearly erred by failing to place a value on the tax loss
carryforward and because the court failed to make adequate factual findings as to whether Stacey
dissipated the marital estate, violated the status quo order, or both. Because the court’s findings
on remand related to both of those issues has the potential to affect the overall value of the marital

                                                 -13-
estate, we conclude that any mathematical errors in the court’s distribution can be addressed on
remand.

                                    VI. SPOUSAL SUPPORT

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Both parties challenge the trial court’s spousal-support award. We review a trial court’s
spousal-support award for an abuse of discretion. Woodington, 288 Mich App at 355.

                                          B. ANALYSIS

        Spousal support is governed by MCL 552.23(1), which provides for a case-by-case
approach to a determination of spousal support. See Loutts v Loutts, 298 Mich App 21, 29; 826
NW2d 152 (2012). There is no particular formula that governs spousal support. Id. at 30. “The
object in awarding spousal support is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties so that neither
will be impoverished; spousal support is to be based on what is just and reasonable under the
circumstances of the case.” Berger, 277 Mich App at 726. Factors to be considered when
addressing spousal support include:

       (1) the past relations and conduct of the parties, (2) the length of the marriage,
       (3) the abilities of the parties to work, (4) the source and amount of property
       awarded to the parties, (5) the parties’ ages, (6) the abilities of the parties to pay
       alimony, (7) the present situation of the parties, (8) the needs of the parties, (9) the
       parties’ health, (10) the prior standard of living of the parties and whether either is
       responsible for the support of others, (11) contributions of the parties to the joint
       estate, (12) a party’s fault in causing the divorce, (13) the effect of cohabitation on
       a party’s financial status, and (14) general principles of equity. [Id. at 726-727
       (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

“The trial court should make specific factual findings regarding the factors that are relevant to the
particular case.” Korth v Korth, 256 Mich App 286, 289; 662 NW2d 111 (2003).

       The trial court concluded that Stacey was entitled to spousal support. Initially, the trial
court awarded her $2,426 in monthly spousal support, imputing income to plaintiff in the amount
of $20,000 and using $128,000 as Michael’s annual income. On reconsideration, the trial court
also addressed the tax carryforward, and it reconfigured its calculations to account for the fact
Michael’s income would essentially be tax free.3 Considering this fact, the court increased the
amount of spousal support to $2,767 each month for 14 years and four months.

3
 On appeal, Michael attempts to challenge the testimony regarding the valuation of the tax loss
carryforward. We consider these arguments, which Michael failed to raise in the trial court, to
be waived. See Walters v Nadell, 481 Mich 377, 387; 751 NW2d 431 (2008).

                                                -14-
                     1. MICHAEL’S SPOUSAL-SUPPORT CHALLENGES

         Michael argues that the trial court’s calculation of spousal support improperly involved the
mechanical use of a prognosticator, rather than an assessment of the parties’ particular facts and
circumstances. Yet, contrary to his contention that the trial court mechanically applied a formula
or prognosticator, the record shows that, when addressing spousal support, the trial court
considered numerous factors. The trial court noted the long-term length of the marriage, addressed
the property awarded to both parties, and their respective abilities to work and their earning
capacities. The trial court rejected Michael’s claim that his health interfered with his ability to
work, and although recognizing Stacey’s limited earning capacity given her lack of work history,
the trial court imputed income to her in the amount of $20,000 on the basis that she should be able
to work full-time and earn minimum wage. The trial court addressed the history of the marriage
and the parties’ respective contributions, noting Michael’s role as “breadwinner” and Stacey’s
contribution as a “stay-at-home parent.” The trial court considered Michael’s fault in the
breakdown of the marriage, the parties’ historical standing of living, the parties’ present needs and
respective living situations. Further, the trial court addressed equity in general, again noting
Michael’s delaying tactics in the divorce case and his numerous lies during this case. Thus, on
this record, the trial court did not rigidly adhere to any particular formula without consideration of
the parties’ particular needs and incomes.

        Michael complains that the trial court failed to address (1) Stacey’s postdivorce needs and
(2) his health. The record belies that claim. With regard to Stacey’s needs, Michael apparently
wants her to live on an incredibly restricted budget, which he maintains she can do by residing
with her parents forever. The trial court considered and rejected this view of Stacey’s needs, noting
that Stacey planned to move out of her parents’ home and that she needed spousal support “to
provide her the ability to bring her present situation to a livable situation.” Thus, the trial court
did not fail to consider Stacey’s needs. Similarly, the trial court did not fail to address Michael’s
health. Evidence was offered at trial that Michael has a history of migraines and had surgery in
the past for neck problems. However, the evidence was also clear that these problems date back
10 years, and that these issues have not prevented Michael from working during that time. Indeed,
historically, after surgeries, Michael was soon back to work and taking vacations. Further, despite
his purported health complaints, there is no dispute that Michael is currently working. Consistent
with this evidence, the trial court specifically addressed Michael’s health concerns as bearing on
his ability to work, acknowledging that Michael had a history of health concerns but concluding
that these concerns, including surgery, did not prevent him from working. There is, therefore, no
merit to Michael’s claim that the court did not address his health.

         Finally, Michael proclaims, in cursory fashion, that the award is inequitable and will clearly
leave him impoverished. He does not, however, direct this Court to any testimony supporting his
claim that paying a total of $33,204 annually in modifiable spousal support to Stacey will
impoverish him. Rather, in connection with this argument, he only directs this Court to testimony
suggesting that Stacey is relatively young and was awarded significant assets, so it is unreasonable
to expect that the “vast majority” of her financial support must come from Michael. “It is not
enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave
it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for
him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Mitcham

                                                 -15-
v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959). Accordingly, we consider this argument
abandoned on appeal.

                      2. STACEY’S SPOUSAL-SUPPORT ARGUMENTS

        On cross-appeal, Stacey argues that the trial court failed to appropriately consider her needs
and the fact that the amount of spousal support awarded to her will leave her with a budget shortfall
each month. As discussed in connection with Michael’s arguments, the trial court did not fail to
consider Stacey’s needs.

         Stacey next argues that the trial court clearly erred in its determination that Michael’s
annual income was $128,000. She asserts that the court should have found that because there was
evidence that Michael had previously lied about his income, the court should have found that his
income was higher. She does not direct this Court to testimony in the lower court record, however,
indicating what specific income should have been found. Michael testified that his annual income
was $128,000 and introduced documentation to support that assertion. Although the trial court
stated repeatedly that Michael’s credibility was “zero,” the court was not precluded from finding
his testimony regarding his income to be credible. In light of the evidence introduced at the bench
trial, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court’s finding was clearly
erroneous.

                     3. IMPACT OF THE TAX LOSS CARRYFORWARD

         The trial court’s spousal support calculation took into account the impact the tax loss
carryforward would have on Michael’s income. Based on its determination that Michael would,
essentially, not have any tax liability as a result of the carryforward, the court used Michael’s gross
income when calculating spousal support. Under the circumstances, that decision was “just and
reasonable.” See Berger, 277 Mich App at 726. Yet, because the trial court must assign a value
to that tax-loss-carryforward asset and must distribute 60% of the value of that asset to Stacey, the
carryforward’s impact on the spousal-support calculation will likely be affected. Therefore, on
remand, the trial court must consider the impact of its tax-loss-carryforward’s valuation
determination has on the spousal support calculation.

                                      VII. ATTORNEY FEES

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Both parties also challenge the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Stacey. We review a
trial court’s decision whether to award attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Cassidy, 318 Mich
App at 479.

                                           B. ANALYSIS

       Attorney fees may, however, be awarded under MCR 3.206(D), which states:

               (1) A party may, at any time, request that the court order the other party to
       pay all or part of the attorney fees and expenses related to the action or a specific
       proceeding, including a post-judgment proceeding.

                                                 -16-
               (2) A party who requests attorney fees and expenses must allege facts
       sufficient to show that:

                (a) the party is unable to bear the expense of the action, including the
       expense of engaging in discovery appropriate for the matter, and that the other party
       is able to pay, or

              (b) the attorney fees and expenses were incurred because the other party
       refused to comply with a previous court order, despite having the ability to comply,
       or engaged in discovery practices in violation of these rules.

        This court rule provides two independent reasons for a party in a divorce action to obtain
attorney fees. Cassidy, 318 Mich App at 480. “Whereas MCR 3.206[D](2)(a) allows payment of
attorney fees based on one party’s inability to pay and the other party’s ability to do so,
MCR 3.206[D](2)(b) considers only a party’s behavior, without reference to the ability to pay.”
Id. at 480-481 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Under either subsection, “[t]he party
requesting the attorney fees has the burden of showing facts sufficient to justify the award.”
Woodington, 288 Mich App at 370.

        Stacey sought attorney fees under both subsections in MCR 3.206(D)(2). When a party
requests need-based attorney fees in a divorce action it is incumbent upon the trial court to
determine whether attorney fees are needed for the party to defend his or her suit, including
whether, under the circumstances, paying attorney fees would require that party to invade assets
needed for support. Myland v Myland, 290 Mich App 691, 703; 804 NW2d 124 (2010). The trial
court must also consider whether the other party has “the ability to pay or contribute” to those
attorney fees. Id. Special consideration should be given “to the specific financial situations of the
parties and the equities involved.” Id.

       Here, although Stacey specifically sought attorney fees on the basis that she was unable to
pay and that Michael was able to pay her attorney fees. The trial court, however, failed to make
any of the factual findings necessary for a determination of the propriety of attorney fees under
MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a). Without adequate fact-finding, it cannot be determined whether the trial
court’s decision regarding need-based attorney fees constituted an abuse of discretion. See
Woodington, 288 Mich App at 371. In these circumstances, we remand to the trial court for
consideration, in the first instance, of Stacey’s need-based request under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a).
See Myland, 290 Mich App at 703.

        Next, the parties dispute the trial court’s decision to awarded Stacey $20,000 on the basis
of Michael obstructive conduct and failure to follow court orders. Given the extensive discovery
history in this case and the overall lack of reliable information about Michael’s business that has
flowed from his obstructionist behavior, the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that
Michael’s behavior warranted attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b). Michael responded late
to discovery requests, withheld information about assets during discovery, lied about his income
when seeking to have spousal support modified before trial, and refused to produce information
about the business during discovery. Notably, while Michael stonewalled discovery before trial
with assertions that he lacked access to “third party” information about the companies, at trial he
attempted to authenticate business documents as records kept in the ordinary course of business,

                                                -17-
and, as emphasized by the trial court, he was able to produce business information for a valuation
review by his expert. Contrary to Michael’s arguments, the trial court did not err in its assessment
of Michael’s credibility regarding his access to documents or by concluding that Michael had
engaged in obstructionist behavior during discovery and throughout this case. In light of the record
in this case, the trial court did not err by concluding that attorney fees were warranted.

       Notwithstanding that the trial court did not err by concluding that Michael’s behavior
warranted attorney fees, the court clearly erred in setting the amount of attorney fees at $20,000.
Attorney fees and expenses are warranted when they were incurred as a result of one party’s bad
behavior. See MCR 3.206(D)(2)(b). There is, in other words, a causal requirement; the bad
behavior must have caused the incurrence of the fees and expenses. See Richards v Richards, 310
Mich App 683, 702; 874 NW2d 704 (2015). Moreover, the amount of attorney fees must also be
reviewed for reasonableness. See Cassidy, 318 Mich App at 488. Here, in setting the amount of
attorney fees at $20,000, the trial court admitted that it pulled this number “out of the air.” This is
not a sufficient basis for justifying a particular amount of attorney fees. Instead, the trial court
needed to more particularly evaluate what attorney fees and expenses Stacey incurred as a result
of Michael’s bad behavior, and before awarding a specific amount of attorney fees, the trial court
also needed to assess reasonableness. Given the trial court’s failure to make these necessary
findings, we vacate the award of attorney fees and remand for further proceedings regarding the
amount of attorney fees.

                            VIII. REMAND TO DIFFERENT JUDGE

         Finally, Michael asserts that the trial judge should be disqualified and the case remanded
for proceedings before a different judge. “The general concern when deciding whether to remand
to a different trial judge is whether the appearance of justice will be better served if another judge
presides over the case.” Bayati v Bayati, 264 Mich App 595, 602; 691 NW2d 812 (2004). That
is, this Court “may remand to a different judge if the original judge would have difficulty in putting
aside previously expressed views or findings, if reassignment is advisable to preserve the
appearance of justice, and if reassignment will not entail excessive waste or duplication.” Id.
at 602-603. None of these circumstances are present in this case. The judge’s findings relative to
Michael’s credibility were soundly rooted in the evidence, and these types of opinions, formed by
a judge on the basis of evidence and events occurring during the course of the current proceedings,
are not evidence of bias or partiality. See Schellenberg, 228 Mich App at 39. There is also no
indication of deep-seated antagonism or favoritism that would suggest that the trial judge cannot
put aside previous findings or views as would warrant reassignment to a new judge on remand.
See Bayati, 264 Mich App at 602. Moreover, in this lengthy and factually detailed case,
reassignment would involve unnecessary and excessive waste and duplication. See id. Michael’s
request for a new judge is denied.

       Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We retain jurisdiction. Neither party having prevailed in full, no taxable costs are
awarded. MCR 7.219(A).

                                                               /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                               /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                               /s/ Thomas C. Cameron

                                                 -18-
                              Court of Appeals, State of Michigan

                                                ORDER
                                                                               Michael J. Kelly
 Stacey Lynn Cammenga v Michael Philip Cammenga                                  Presiding Judge

 Docket No.     358463                                                         Kathleen Jansen

 LC No.         2020-000233-DO                                                 Thomas C. Cameron
                                                                                 Judges

               Pursuant to the opinion issued concurrently with this order, this case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court. We retain jurisdiction.

                Proceedings on remand in this matter shall commence within 56 days of the Clerk’s
certification of this order, and they shall be given priority on remand until they are concluded. The
proceedings on remand are limited to the issues specifically addressed in the opinion issued concurrently
with this order.

               The parties shall promptly file with this Court a copy of all papers filed on remand. Within
seven days after entry, appellant shall file with this Court copies of all orders entered on remand.

               The transcript of all proceedings on remand shall be prepared and filed within 21 days after
completion of the proceedings.

                                                           _______________________________
                                                            Presiding Judge

                                 March 23, 2023