Court Opinion

ID: 9955541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 18:03:00.75809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:04.658137
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/24 P. v. Kerow CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081360

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCD280819)

MOHAMED ABDIAZIZ KEROW,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter L. Gallagher, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
         Athena Shudde, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Robin Urbanski and Namita Patel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION
         A jury found Mohamed Abdiaziz Kerow guilty of first degree murder of
his wife, Mona Salad Kuri. On appeal, Kerow solely challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence of deliberation and premeditation. We affirm and
resolve this case by memorandum opinion, focusing on the factual and
procedural background necessary for our analysis only. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851-854.)
                                       I.
      We review claims of insufficient evidence under the substantial
evidence standard. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) In a
criminal case, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment for substantial evidence that would allow any reasonable trier of
fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 (Zamudio).) To be “substantial,” the
“evidence must be of ponderable legal significance” (Estate of Teed (1952)
112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644), “reasonable, credible, and of solid value” (Zamudio,
at p. 357). Such evidence can include not only circumstantial evidence, but
also all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence. (People
v. Soriano (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 278, 286.) Reversal is only appropriate if
“upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support” the conviction. (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
      “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice
aforethought.” (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Here, the only theory of first
degree murder presented to the jury was that the killing was “willful,
deliberate, and premeditated,” and willfulness is undisputed. (§ 189,
subd. (a).) A killing is premeditated if the defendant “decided to kill before
completing the act[s] that caused death.” (CALCRIM No. 521.) A killing is
deliberate if the defendant “carefully weighed the considerations for and
against [his or her] choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill.”
(Ibid.) Thus, “[a]n intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it

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occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than
unconsidered or rash impulse.” (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 543.)
However, “[t]he true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the
extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity
and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.” (People v. Thomas
(1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 900.)
      In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and
deliberation, a reviewing court typically analyzes three categories of
evidence: (1) “‘planning’ activity” prior to the killing, showing the defendant
engaged in acts intended to result in the death; (2) “‘motive,’” inferred from
the defendant and victim’s prior relationship; and (3) “the nature of the
killing,” including whether the manner of killing was “so particular and
exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a
‘preconceived design.’” (People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27.)
Evidence of premeditation and deliberation is likely sufficient if it includes
(1) some “evidence of all three types,” (2) “extremely strong evidence” of
planning, or (3) evidence of motive with evidence of either planning or
manner of killing. (Id. at p. 27.) These “guidelines are descriptive,” are
“neither normative nor exhaustive,” and “need not [be] accord[ed] . . . any
particular weight.” (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 420.)
                                       II.
      Kerow contends that, as a matter of law, the jury’s finding of
deliberation and premeditation is not supported by substantial evidence, so
we should deem Kuri’s homicide second degree murder. Having reviewed the
entire record with the above principles in mind, we disagree.
      While Kerow argues there is “no evidence of any preexisting motive,”
we conclude otherwise. First, Kuri’s brother testified that (1) Kerow would

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approach him about “issues he was having” with Kuri and (2) those
conversations were escalating in intensity and frequency in the time leading
up to Kuri’s death. Not “too far off from” when Kuri died, Kerow told Kuri’s
brother “he basically wanted a divorce.” Second, a week or two prior to the
killing, an “angry” Kerow told one of Kuri’s sisters that Kuri had “‘violated
[sic]’” but that the sister “‘d[id no]t have to worry about it’” because Kerow
was “‘going to handle it.’” Third, the day before Kuri died, a friend saw Kuri
and said she looked “terrible.” While Kuri usually wore “cute clothes,”
“smil[ed],” and “like[d] to wear makeup,” she had a fresh bruise on her face,
looked sad, and was dressed and made up uncharacteristically. Fourth, the
night of the killing, Kerow twice told a neighbor he thought Kuri was
cheating on him in a slightly “aggressive” and “shocked” tone. Collectively,
these facts are credible evidence from which a jury could have reasonably
found (1) Kerow and Kuri were unhappy in their marriage and (2) Kerow
suspected his wife of infidelity prior to the killing. This is quintessential
motive. (People v. Winkler (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1165 [motive
established by evidence marriage was foundering, divorce was impending,
and victim was having extramarital affair].) Although Kerow points to
evidence that could support other inferences, “choos[ing] between competing
inferences” is “within the province of the jury.” (People v. Williams (2018)
23 Cal.App.5th 396, 408 (Williams).)
      Kerow initially claimed “there is no evidence . . . of any kind
whatsoever” as to planning. However, he admits on reply “the jury
reasonably could have reached the . . . conclusion[ ]” that “appellant brought
the implements into the bedroom intending to kill his wife or retrieved the
implements during the course of an argument.” Although he argues the jury
also could have found otherwise, we again are bound to follow the inference

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supporting the judgment: Kerow intentionally brought one or more of the
weapons used in the killing into the bedroom for the purpose of killing Kuri.
(Williams, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 408.) Kerow further claims “any time
for reflection was slight and, therefore, insufficient to ascribe planning to any
stage of the incident.” But adequate planning can take place over a short
period of time, even during the attack resulting in the death. (People v.
Pettigrew (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 477, 493-494 (Pettigrew).) And, as discussed
further below, the manner of this killing—a “multistage and multiple-method
attack”—further supports an inference of planning. (Id. at p. 493.)
      The jury was presented with additional evidence of planning.
Photographs taken from ATM security video footage and the testimony of a
bank fraud investigator establish that early in the morning preceding the
killing, Kerow unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw nearly $3,000 from a
bank account owned solely by Kuri before ultimately withdrawing $1,000. He
unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw further money both before and after.
Data law enforcement obtained from Facebook showed Kerow fled
through Mexico and Nicaragua in the following days, and Kerow was
apprehended in Panama about two weeks after Kuri’s death. The reasonable
inference that Kerow secured what funds he could in advance to facilitate
flight should he carry out his plan to kill Kuri, confirmed by his actual flight,
additionally supports a finding that Kerow planned to kill Kuri. Given this
substantial evidence of planning, we need not address the contested issue of
whether Kerow’s post-killing conduct evinces planning.
      Finally, Kerow claims the manner of killing is inconsistent with
deliberation and premeditation. He claims the wounds all over Kuri’s body
“are the antithesis of a particular and exacting killing.” But nonexecution-
style killings can support a finding of premeditation and deliberation,

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particularly where, as here, evidence of both motive and planning exists. (Cf.
People v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253.)
      Blunt force trauma of the head was the cause of Kuri’s death. There
was blunt force trauma of her neck, torso, and extremities as well. Kuri had
fractures too numerous to count on the top and back of her head and the base
of her skull, as well as fractures of both jaws, both nasal bones, and a tooth.
There was bleeding around and bruising of her brain. The blunt force
trauma caused multiple lacerations, abrasions, and contusions to her head,
face, and body. At a minimum, Kuri was struck three times on her head, in
addition to the blows to her body. Given the severity of the injuries, it would
have been “very difficult” and was “unlikely” a fist inflicted them. The blunt
force trauma could have been caused by a seemingly bloodstained wooden
board Kerow was videorecorded holding in the hours after the killing.
Similar boards were found in the garage of the residence where Kuri was
killed, and blood samples taken from the garage matched the DNA of both
Kerow and Kuri.
      In addition, Kuri had “sharp force injuries.” She had cuts on her left
arm and a puncture wound on her shoulder caused by a sharp edge with a
serrated blade. She had superficial incised wounds to her right hand
consistent with warding off a knife attack. A knife blade and its broken
handle were found in the bedroom where Kuri was killed. The pieces had
both Kerow and Kuri’s fingerprints and DNA on them.
      This credible evidence supports the reasonable inferences that
(1) Kerow first attacked Kuri with the knife, when she was capable of trying
to ward off the attack; (2) when the knife broke, rather than stop his assault
on Kuri, Kerow made the deliberate decision to go to the garage, grab a
board, and continue his attack on Kuri; and (3) Kerow reaffirmed his decision

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to kill when he struck Kuri at least four times with it. A defendant’s use of
multiple weapons and multiple acts to kill is sufficient to find the manner of
killing to evidence premeditation, given the defendant’s repeated
opportunities to stop, and yet persistence in, killing the victim. (E.g., People
v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1126-1127.) Thus, the evidence of the manner
of Kuri’s killing is substantial evidence from which a jury could have
reasonably found Kerow killed Kuri with premeditation and deliberation.
(See Pettigrew, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 492-494.) Once more, the
existence of other evidence and inferences favoring Kerow is immaterial
given our deferential review.
      In sum, the record contains sufficient credible evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn from that evidence to enable a reasonable factfinder to
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Kerow’s motive, his planning
activity, and the manner in which he killed Kuri evince sufficient
deliberation and premeditation to find Kerow guilty of first degree murder.

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                                     III.
      We affirm. However, we agree with both parties that remand is
required for the limited purpose of correcting the abstract of judgment.
(People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) We thus remand this matter
to the trial court to (1) both correct the minute order from the November 29,
2022 sentencing hearing and prepare an amended abstract of judgment to
reflect the 1,351 days of actual custody credit awarded to Kerow at
sentencing and (2) forward a certified copy of the amended abstract to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

                                                                CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DO, J.

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