Court Opinion

ID: 9808065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:26:47.693132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:47.305131
License: Public Domain

Clark,-],
(dissenting): The denial of the first application for a restraining order for want of a material averment. is no obstacle to this second application in sufficient *524form. Halcombe v. Commissioners, 89 N. C., 346, distinguishing Jones v. Thorne, 80 N. C., 72.
If the special levy herein had been authorized solely for the two purposes first named, of maintaining free public ferries, and maintaining, constructing and repairing the bi-idges in said county, the validity of the act could not have been gainsaid. If the act had authorized the special levy for the purpose of supplying “ a deficiency in the current expenses of the county ” we find nothing in the Constitution to forbid it. Indeed, as the county cannot go beyond the constitutional limitation in levying taxation without special permit of the Legislature, when the sum raised by the ordinary rate is not enough to pay the current expenses, the only relief is to apply to the Legislature for authority to exceed the limit. Const., Article V., Section 6. And this has been the course pursued ever since the Constitution of 1868 was adopted whenever the current receipts of a county have not been sufficient to pay its current expenses. A county need not first get into debt and then get permission to levy the tax. The Legislature in its discretion may authorize the extra taxation whenever satisfied that it is necessary, of which necessity the General Assembly is the sole judge. Here the Legislature unites in one act the three purposes above recited as those for which this special levy is authorized. There is nothing in the Constitution forbidding this or authorizing us to declare the act unconstitutional on that account.
The commissioners of a county are authorized by the Constitution, Article TIL, Section 7 to create debts for necessary expenses without the approval of a majority of the qualified voters (Evans v. Commrs., 89 N. C., 154) and are to judge of what expenses are necessary. Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 244; Halcomb v. Commissioners, supra ; Vaughn v. Commissioners, 117 N. C., 429. Neither sound *525principles of political eneonomy nor any provision of the Constitution requires that indebtedness for such necessary expenses should be incurred at a heavy discount in county paper before the Legislature will authorize a tax levy to pay it. It is as much a “ special purpose ” if the Legislature, being satisfied that the current rate of taxation is insufficient to pay the .current expenses of a county, authorizes by a special act the special tax in the beginning of the inevitable deficit, as after it has been incurred.
Besides, the other two purposes of this special tax (roads and bridges) are admittedly constitutional, and this Court has held, as recently as McCless v. Meekins, 117 N. C., 34, (opinion by MONTGOMERY, J.,) that in such case the act, being valid in part and invalid in part, the fund will be held for the benefit of the valid purposes of the act, and in Trull v. Commissioners, 72 N. C., 388, that only the collection of the invalid part can be restrained; and here it cannot be seen till the end of the year that in fact any part of this special tax will be in excess of the expenses for roads and bridges. Clifton v. Wynne, 80 N. C., 145. To reverse the court below and order the injunction to issue is objectionable : (1) Because it would restrain taxes for special purposes admittedly legal; (2) because the taxes, having already been collected since the dissolution of the injunction, (December 2, 1895,) it would be a vain thing to restrain an act already accomplished.
Indeed, if the levy had been authorized for the first two purposes only, and a surplus had been raised, it would have gone into the county treasury to meet current expenses, without any further authorization in the act. Long v. Commissioners, 76 N. C., 273. That is the effect of this *526act, and it cannot be that a course which, if tacitly pursued, is legal, becomes illegal because expressly anthmized. The restraining order was nnprovidently granted, and the injunction to the hearing was properly denied.
Avkry, J. : I concur in the dissenting opinion.