Court Opinion

ID: 9410104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 15:01:41.596009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:55.358987
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13201   Document: 35-1    Date Filed: 07/20/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit
                         ____________________

                               No. 21-13201
                         ____________________

       SEANA BARNETT,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       SARA MACARTHUR,
       individually, et al.,

                                                          Defendants,

       SHERIFF, SEMINOLE COUNTY FLORIDA,

                                                Defendant-Appellant.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 21-13201      Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 07/20/2023     Page: 2 of 7

       2                       Opinion of the Court                 21-13201

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 6:15-cv-00469-GKS-DCI
                           ____________________

       Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               This Section 1983 case is before us for the third time. In Bar-
       nett v. MacArthur (“Barnett II”), 956 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020),
       cert. denied sub nom. Lemma v. Barnett, 141 S. Ct. 1373 (2021), we af-
       ﬁrmed the judgment and the district court’s denial of Barnett’s mo-
       tion for a new trial, but we reversed the district court’s grant of
       summary judgment as to Count II of the Amended Complaint—
       Barnett’s unconstitutional detention claim against the Sheriﬀ. Id.
       at 1303. We held that if, after a warrantless DUI arrest based on
       probable cause, “the oﬃcers seek and obtain information which
       shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the arrestee is not intoxi-
       cated—in other words, that probable cause to detain no longer ex-
       ists—the Fourth Amendment requires that the arrestee be re-
       leased.” Id. at 1299. And we further concluded that “Barnett’s de-
       tention claim against the Sheriﬀ must be decided by a jury.” Id.
       This Court in Barnett II then “reverse[d] the district court’s grant of
       summary judgment on Barnett’s Fourth Amendment detention
       claim against Sheriﬀ under Monell and remand[ed] for a trial on that
       claim.” Id. at 1303.
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       21-13201                Opinion of the Court                         3

               On remand, Barnett moved again for summary judgment on
       the remaining claim. The Sheriﬀ opposed the motion both on the
       merits and as contrary to this Court’s mandate. The district court
       granted summary judgment in favor of Barnett on the remaining
       claim. Barnett v. MacArthur, 548 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1212 (M.D. Fla.
       2021). The district court characterized Barnett’s motion as requir-
       ing the “[i]nterpretation of a statute” and a “facial challenge” to the
       Sheriﬀ’s hold policy. Id. at 1208, 1209–10. The district court then
       concluded that the hold policy was facially unconstitutional be-
       cause “it requires that every DUI arrestee be detained for eight
       hours without exception even after objective breathalyzer evidence
       establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the arrestee is not intox-
       icated and probable cause no longer exists to continue the deten-
       tion.” Id. at 1211. The district court then permanently enjoined
       the Seminole County Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce from enforcing its hold policy.
       Id. at 1212.
              The Sheriﬀ moved for relief from the district court order,
       arguing that they had not received notice of, or the opportunity to
       respond to, a potential injunction and that there were questions of
       fact remaining about whether the evidence showed that probable
       cause to detain Barnett had dissipated beyond a reasonable doubt.
       The district court denied the Sheriﬀ’s motion to reconsider, and this
       appeal ensued.
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                     21-13201

              After careful consideration and with the beneﬁt of oral ar-
       gument, we reverse both the entry of summary judgment and the
       entry of the permanent injunction. 1
                                            I.

              We ﬁrst address the Sheriﬀ’s argument that the district court
       violated this Court’s mandate by entering a summary judgment on
       Count II in favor of Barnett following remand for a jury trial on the
       remaining claim. “We review de novo the district court’s interpre-
       tation and application of this Court’s mandate in a previous ap-
       peal.” Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., v Dolgencorp, LLC, 881 F.3d 835, 843
       (11th Cir. 2018) (alteration adopted).
              The Sheriﬀ argues that the district court’s grant of summary
       judgment below was foreclosed by this Court’s mandate in Barnett
       II where we “reverse[d] the district court’s grant of summary judg-
       ment on Ms. Barnett’s Fourth Amendment detention claim . . . and
       remand[ed] for a trial on that claim.” Barnett II, 956 F.3d at 1303 (em-
       phasis added).
               “The law of our circuit concerning the obligations of a dis-
       trict court to follow our mandates is settled.” Litman v Mass. Mut.
       Life Ins. Co., 825 F.2d 1506,1511 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (collecting
       cases). “A district court when acting under an appellate court’s

       1 Because the district court entered a permanent injunction, we have jurisdic-
       tion to entertain this appeal as the permanent injunction and summary judg-
       ment orders are inextricably intertwined. See Smith v. LePage, 834 F.3d 1285,
       1292 (11th Cir. 2016); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
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       21-13201                Opinion of the Court                        5

       mandate cannot vary it or examine it for any other purpose than
       execution or give any other or further relief.” Id. at 1510–11 (inter-
       nal citations omitted).
              The mandate rule holds that “[w]hen a case has been once
       decided” on appeal and remanded to an inferior court, that inferior
       court:
              must carry it into execution according to the man-
              date. That court cannot vary it, or examine it for any
              other purpose than execution; or give any other or
              further relief; or review it, even for apparent error,
              upon any matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle
              with it, further than to settle so much as has been re-
              manded.
       In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255 (1895).
               The mandate in Barnett II was clear. We expressly held that
       “[o]n this record, Ms. Barnett’s detention claim against the Sheriﬀ
       must be decided by a jury.” Barnett II, 956 F.3d at 1299. And we
       remanded the case back to the district court for “a trial on that
       claim.” Id. at 1303. Notwithstanding our mandate, upon remand,
       Barnett ﬁled another motion for summary judgment with the dis-
       trict court, arguing that no reasonable jury could ﬁnd that the Sher-
       iﬀ did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights by detaining her.
       Barnett further argued that the district court was only required to
       hold a trial on the damages aspect of the claim. As the Sheriﬀ cor-
       rectly argued to the district court, this was in direct contravention
       to the mandate.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                   21-13201

              “A trial court, upon receiving the mandate of an appellate
       court, may not alter, amend, or examine the mandate, or give any
       further relief or review, but must enter an order in strict compli-
       ance with the mandate.” Piambino v Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1120
       (11th Cir. 1985). Because the district court was not free to ignore
       this Court’s mandate and reexamine the issue, we reverse and once
       again remand for a jury trial on Count II of Barnett’s Amended
       Complaint.
                                            II.
               We now turn to the Sheriﬀ’s second argument that the dis-
       trict court erred by entering a permanent injunction without no-
       tice. Due process requires, at a minimum, notice and an oppor-
       tunity to be heard. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S.
       306, 313 (1950). Notice is adequate where it is “reasonably calcu-
       lated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
       the pendency of the action and aﬀord them an opportunity to pre-
       sent their objections.” Id. at 314 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
       457 (1940)). This requirement is “ﬂexible” and will vary depending
       on what “the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer,
       408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
              The Sheriﬀ argues that he lacked notice that he could be sub-
       jected to a permanent injunction because Barnett never sought a
       preliminary or permanent injunction in any of her pleadings before
       the district court. We agree and thus hold that the district court
       erred by entering a permanent injunction sua sponte in this case
       without providing the Sheriﬀ notice and an opportunity to be
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       21-13201               Opinion of the Court                         7

       heard on whether a permanent injunction should issue. Addition-
       ally, as Barnett never moved for a permanent injunction, the four-
       factor test for granting a permanent injunction was neither ad-
       dressed nor analyzed by the district court. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v.
       Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010). An injunction
       should issue, however, only after the court determines that the tra-
       ditional four-factor test is satisﬁed. Id. at 157. Here, that determi-
       nation was not made.
                                            III.
              For the reasons stated, we reverse and vacate the district
       court’s entry of summary judgment for Barnett and remand for a
       jury trial on Count II of Barnett’s Amended Complaint. We also
       reverse and vacate the district court’s order issuing a permanent
       injunction.
             REVERSED and REMANDED for a jury trial on Count II
       of Barnett’s Amended Complaint; REVERSE and VACATE per-
       manent injunction.