Court Opinion

ID: 9427549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:21:08.442008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.666823
License: Public Domain

Mb. Justice Brennan,
with whom Me. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Stevens join, dissenting.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 470 (1966), held that “[n]o effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given.” (Emphasis added.) Support for this holding was found in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 (1962), which held that in the absence of an allegation of an “affirmative waiver . . . there is no disputed fact question requiring a hearing.” (Emphasis added.)
There is no allegation of an affirmative waiver in this case. As the Court concedes, the respondent here refused to sign the waiver form, and “said nothing when advised of his right to the assistance of a lawyer.” Ante, at 371. Thus, there was no “disputed fact question requiring a hearing,” and the trial court erred in holding one. In the absence of an “affirmative waiver” in the form of an express written or oral statement, the Supreme Court of North Carolina correctly granted a new trial. I would, therefore, affirm its decision.
The rule announced by the Court today allows a finding of waiver based upon “infer [ence] from the actions and words of the person interrogated.” Ante, at 373. The Court thus shrouds in half-light the question of waiver, allowing courts to construct inferences from ambiguous words and gestures. But the very premise of Miranda requires that ambiguity be interpreted against the interrogator. That premise is the *378recognition of the “compulsion inherent in custodial” interrogation, 384 U. S., at 458, and of its purpose “to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner,” id., at 457. Under such conditions, only the most explicit waivers of rights can be considered knowingly and freely given.
The instant case presents a clear example of the need for an express waiver requirement. As the Court acknowledges, there is a disagreement over whether respondent was orally advised of his rights at the time he made his statement.* The fact that Butler received a written copy of his rights is deemed by the Court to be sufficient basis to resolve the disagreement. But, unfortunately, there is also a dispute over whether Butler could read. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22, 23. And, obviously, if Butler did not have his rights read to him, and could not read them himself, there could be no basis upon which to conclude that he knowingly waived them. Indeed, even if Butler could read there is no reason to believe that his oral statements, which followed a refusal to sign a written waiver form, were intended to signify relinquishment of his rights.
Faced with “actions and words” of uncertain meaning, some judges may find waivers where none occurred. Others may fail to find them where they did. In the former case, the *379defendant’s rights will have been violated; in the latter, society’s interest in effective law enforcement will have been frustrated. A simple prophylactic rule requiring the police to obtain an express waiver of the right to counsel before proceeding with interrogation eliminates these difficulties. And since the Court agrees that Miranda requires the police to obtain some kind of waiver — whether express or implied — the requirement of an express waiver would impose no burden on the police not imposed by the Court’s interpretation. It would merely make that burden explicit. Had Agent Martinez simply elicited a clear answer from Willie Butler to the question, “Do you waive your right to a lawyer?” this journey through three courts would not have been necessary.

The Court states that whether Butler was orally advised of his rights at the time of the interrogation, or rather was orally advised only at the scene of the arrest, is “not relevant to the basic issue in this case.” Ante, at 371 n. 1. But the fact that Butler received oral warnings upon his arrest in the Bronx does not establish that he understood that the same rights applied to the interrogation conducted in New Rochelle. This is particularly so since he was told at the latter that he did not have to sign the “Advice of Rights” form, but that the agent “would like for him to talk.” 295 N. C. 250, 253, 244 S. E. 2d 410, 412 (1978). Indeed, the Court does not argue that the earlier oral recitation was sufficient, but rather cites in addition Butler’s receipt of the written “Advice of Rights” form. However, if .Butler could not read, oral warnings were the only ones that mattered, and it thus becomes highly relevant whether he was told of his rights at the time he was interrogated.