Court Opinion

ID: 9400224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 19:02:11.697671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:43.108046
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               File Name: 23a0258n.06

                                         No. 22-1834

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

LONNIE OLMETTI,                                  )                          FILED
                                                 )                     Jun 07, 2023
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )                 DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
                                                 )
v.                                               )
                                                 )
KENT COUNTY, MICHIGAN,                           )      ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
        Defendant,                               )      STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
                                                 )      THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
TYLER KING and JUSTIN LINSEA, in their           )      MICHIGAN
individual and official capacities,              )
                                                 )                               OPINION
        Defendants-Appellants.                   )

Before: MOORE, CLAY, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

       KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Lonnie Olmetti, a sixty-year-old pretrial

detainee in Kent County, Michigan, alleges that he was manhandled and handcuffed excessively

tightly while being transported back to jail after a hospital visit. The district court denied

defendants Tyler King and Justin Linsea qualified immunity, and we AFFIRM the district court’s

decision.

                                     I. BACKGROUND

       From November 2017 to March 2018, Lonnie Olmetti was incarcerated at the Kent County

Correctional Facility (“KCCF”). R. 69-6 (Olmetti Dep. Tr. at 166:5–6, 190:10–19) (Page ID #608,

610). On March 23, he was released on bond, and on March 25, after drinking to excess and

becoming ill in the motel where he was staying, Kentwood police, the fire department, and
No. 22-1834, Olmetti v. Kent County, Mich., et al.

paramedics came to check on him. R. 90-3 (Olmetti Dep. Tr. at 190:13-15) (Page ID #1889);

R. 93-4 (KCCF Central Intake Admission Form at 1) (Page ID #2053). When emergency

personnel attempted to wake him, he swung at a firefighter, and was arrested and returned to

KCCF. R. 90-3 (Olmetti Dep. Tr. at 194:7–15) (Page ID #1890). At the jail, before he could be

booked, he collapsed, and when a nurse attempted to wake him, he struck the nurse in the face. Id.

at 195:19–196:25 (Page ID #1890); R. 74-5 (Med. Records at 4) (Page ID #943). Correctional

officers restrained him and took him to Butterworth Hospital, where he was restrained and sedated

because he was combative with hospital staff. R. 69-11 (Med. Note at 1) (Page ID #648). He was

sent back to KCCF the following day, and he received a low-bunk pass1 due to concerns about

alcohol withdrawal. R. 69-13 (Med. Alert at 1) (Page ID #655). This pass expired after a few

days. R. 74-5 (Med. Records at 17) (Page ID #956). Though Olmetti previously had a low-bunk

pass due to a shoulder injury and uneven gait during his initial incarceration at KCCF, when he

was reevaluated in March 2018, a nurse concluded that he no longer required a low-bunk pass. R.

69-1 (Sherwood Dep. Tr. at 133:7–22; 133:23–135:7) (Page ID #560).

        On April 3, 2018, Olmetti attempted to climb into his upper bunk and fell to the floor,

sustaining severe injuries. R. 90-3 (Olmetti Dep. Tr. at 225:3–23) (Page ID #1897); R. 95-7 (Photo

of Olmetti in Cell) (Page ID #2148); R. 96-3 (EMS Rep. at 2) (Page ID #2228). His cellmate

called for help, and officers called EMS. R. 96-2 (Mezsets Incident Rep. at 1) (Page ID #2224).

Olmetti was taken to the hospital in an ambulance. Id.

        1
          A low-bunk pass is issued to prisoners who cannot safely climb onto an upper bunk bed because of physical
limitations. See R. 69-1 (Sherwood Dep. Tr. at 33:4–36:9) (Page ID #552).

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No. 22-1834, Olmetti v. Kent County, Mich., et al.

       Two correctional officers, defendants Linsea and King, accompanied Olmetti to the

hospital with the EMS team. Id. Olmetti reported pain in his head, forearm, and ribs to EMS.

R. 96-3 (EMS Rep. at 2) (Page ID #2228). He also reported numbness in his left hand to a nurse

at the hospital. R. 96-9 (Debenham Dep. Tr. at 86:12–18) (Page ID #2359). The resident who

treated Olmetti testified that he suffered two acute rib fractures and a possible third fracture, and

that the primary method of treatment for a broken rib or rib fracture was immobilization. R. 96-9

(Debenham Dep. Tr. at 36:17–37:5, 41:18–42:6) (Page ID #2346, 2347–48). She treated his scalp

laceration with six staples and gave him morphine and Haldol for his pain. Id. at 24:17–19; 53:14–

21 (Page ID #2343, 2350). He was discharged from the hospital with a sling for his left arm, an

incentive spirometer to encourage deep breathing, and a prescription for pain medication. Id. at

83:1–3; 91:7–17 (Page ID #2358, 2360).

       The facts as set out by the plaintiff are as follows. As Officers King and Linsea escorted

Olmetti out of the hospital with his hands cuffed in front of him, they each forcefully grabbed one

of his arms and pulled him back and forth between them as they approached the car, causing him

severe pain. R. 90-2 (Olmetti Dep. Tr. Pt. 1 at 115:2–9) (Page ID #1869). Officer King then

handcuffed Olmetti behind his back so tightly that he had tears in his eyes, and Linsea and King

laughed at him when he asked them to loosen his cuffs. R. 91-3 (Olmetti Dep. Tr. Pt. 6 at 612:23–

613:22) (Page ID #2002). They pushed him into the car and ignored him as he begged them to

loosen the cuffs. R. 90-2 (Olmetti Dep. Tr. Pt. 1 at 115:13–19) (Page ID #1869). Linsea and King

did not check his handcuffs in response. R. 91-3 (Olmetti Dep. Tr. Pt. 6 at 642:11–20) (Page ID

#2009).

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No. 22-1834, Olmetti v. Kent County, Mich., et al.

        Olmetti filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a claim of excessive force against

King and Linsea, both for the excessively tight handcuffing and for using excessive force when

escorting him back to the transport vehicle outside of the hospital.2 R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 60–64) (Page

ID #9). King and Linsea filed a motion for summary judgment. R. 68 (Mot. for Summ. J.) (Page

ID #507). The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, recommending that summary

judgment be granted on the handcuffing claim because Olmetti did not show that he suffered any

physical injury as a result of the handcuffing. R. 113 (R&R at 18–19) (Page ID #3021–22). The

magistrate judge recommended that the district court not grant summary judgment on the excessive

force claim for the officers’ behavior while transporting Olmetti back to the transport vehicle,

which it termed “manhandling,” id. at 20–21 (Page ID #3023), because, under the facts as alleged

by Olmetti, King’s and Linsea’s use of force was not necessarily de minimis and a genuine issue

of material fact existed as to whether King and Linsea used excessive force when transporting

Olmetti, id. at 22–23 (Page ID #3025–26).

        Both Olmetti and the defendants, King and Linsea, filed objections to the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation. R. 116 (Obj. by Defs. to R&R at 2–6) (Page ID #3073–77);

R. 118 (Obj. by Pl. to R&R at 15–20) (Page ID #3101–06). The district court adopted the report

and recommendation in part and rejected it in part. R. 142 (Op. at 1) (Page ID #3667). The district

court rejected the magistrate judge’s recommendation with regard to the handcuffing claim,

finding that Olmetti had produced medical records to document his hand pain and numbness and

that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the handcuffing caused or

        2
         Olmetti initially named seven defendants and asserted five claims for relief. R. 1 (Compl. at 1–2, 6–11)
(Page ID #1–2, 6–11). The two claims against King and Linsea are the only ones at issue in the instant appeal.

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No. 22-1834, Olmetti v. Kent County, Mich., et al.

exacerbated his injuries. Id. at 10–11 (Page ID #3676–77). The district court accepted the

magistrate judge’s recommendation with regard to the manhandling claim, finding that it is clearly

established that it is unreasonable for an officer to use gratuitous violence when a pretrial detainee

does not pose a safety risk. Id. at 19 (Page ID #3685).

       King and Linsea timely filed a notice of appeal. R. 145 (Notice of Interlocutory Appeal at

1–2) (Page ID #3689–90).

                                       II. JURISDICTION

       The courts of appeals have appellate jurisdiction over “‘final decisions’ of the district

courts.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291). Though a

denial of summary judgment is ordinarily a non-final order, “under the collateral-order doctrine[]

‘a limited set of district-court orders are reviewable’ even though they are ‘short of final

judgment.’” Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 912 F.3d 887, 896 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Peatross

v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 239 (6th Cir. 2016)). A district court’s denial of a motion for

summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity is an appealable collateral order “to the

extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Watkins v. Healy, 986 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 530). Because the officers “concede the most favorable view of the

facts” for the purposes of this appeal, Appellant Br. at vii (quoting Barry v. O’Grady, 895 F.3d

440, 443 (6th Cir. 2018)), we have appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of

qualified immunity to King and Linsea.

                                                  5
No. 22-1834, Olmetti v. Kent County, Mich., et al.

                                          III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

       We review de novo a denial of summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.

Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 606 (6th Cir. 2015). At summary judgment, a court views the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all justifiable inferences in

its favor. Willard v. Huntington Ford, Inc., 952 F.3d 795, 805–06 (6th Cir. 2020). If, considering

all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court concludes that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, summary judgment is not

appropriate. Baynes, 799 F.3d at 606.

B. Qualified Immunity Test

       “A government official is not entitled to qualified immunity if the official’s conduct

violated a constitutional right and that right was ‘clearly established’ such that” a reasonable officer

would know that the conduct was unlawful. Hughey v. Easlick, 3 F.4th 283, 288 (6th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). Here, the defendants argue that Olmetti has

not shown a constitutional violation and that, even if he has, his constitutional right was not clearly

established.

C. Handcuffing Claim

       In order to determine whether “unduly tight or excessively forceful handcuffing”

constitutes excessive force, we apply a three-part test. Morrison v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp., 583

F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009). “At the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff must create a genuine

dispute of material fact that ‘(1) [they] complained the handcuffs were too tight; (2) the officer

ignored those complaints; and (3) the plaintiff experienced “some physical injury” resulting from

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No. 22-1834, Olmetti v. Kent County, Mich., et al.

the handcuffing.’” Hughey, 3 F.4th at 289 (alteration in original) (quoting Morrison, 583 F.3d at

401). Here, the defendants contest only the third requirement, the showing of a physical injury.

Appellant Br. at 15.

       The defendants first contend that Olmetti has shown only a subjective feeling of pain and

numbness, and they point to Olmetti’s deposition transcript as evidence that he suffered no

physical injury related to the handcuffing. When asked what injury he suffered, Olmetti responded

that “[t]he injury I substained [sic] is the pain—they cause me a lot more pain than I needed to

be put through, and that I shouldn’t have been put through is what the answer to that would be.”

R. 69-6 (Olmetti Dep. Tr. at 245:7–10) (Page ID #614) (alteration in original). This court in

Hughey v. Easlick, however, determined that a plaintiff responding “no” to a question of whether

she had suffered an injury related to being handcuffed did not preclude a finding of a genuine

dispute of material fact. 3 F.4th at 291. Plaintiffs are likely unfamiliar with the complicated

caselaw surrounding excessive-force claims and may interpret the word “injury” more narrowly

than the courts have in this context. Id. The Sixth Circuit has held that lingering ring marks around

the wrists, bruising, swelling, and numbness are all adequate indications that handcuffs were

excessively tight and caused injury. Id. An ordinary person like Olmetti might not think that ring

marks, bruising, swelling, or numbness constitute injuries, but they do in this context.

       The defendants then argue that a plaintiff bringing a handcuffing claim must show an

“obvious physical problem” as an injury. Reply Br. at 2 (quoting Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d

565, 576 (6th Cir. 2005)). This is a misstatement of our precedent and a misquote of Lyons. In

Lyons, referring to the second prong of the handcuffing inquiry, which asks whether the plaintiff

complained that the cuffs were too tight, we stated that a plaintiff must show either “an obvious

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No. 22-1834, Olmetti v. Kent County, Mich., et al.

physical problem caused by the handcuffs or a plea by the [plaintiff] to loosen them,” because

otherwise an officer would have no reason to know that the cuffs are too tight. 417 F.3d at 576

(emphasis added). This “obvious physical problem” language is irrelevant to whether the plaintiff

suffered an injury. The correct inquiry is instead whether the plaintiff has suffered “‘some physical

injury’ resulting from the handcuffing.” Hughey, 3 F.4th at 289 (quoting Morrison, 583 F.3d at

401). That by no means excludes injuries that are not obvious to the eye. In Baynes, we held that

the plaintiff’s testimony that he experienced pain and numbness while handcuffed was sufficient

to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he had suffered a physical injury. 799

F.3d at 609. We then stated that his production of medical records indicating that he was treated

for wrist injuries, was diagnosed with bilateral radial neuropathy, and was required to wear wrist

braces for a year would also have satisfied this requirement. Id.

       The defendants next argue that Olmetti has not shown any corroborative evidence that he

suffered an injury from being handcuffed too tightly, and that he alleges only subjective pain and

numbness. Appellant Br. at 16. We have held that a plaintiff’s testimony that he experienced

numbness was sufficient to survive summary judgment. Baynes, 799 F.3d at 609. And just as in

Baynes, Olmetti’s allegations of pain and numbness do not stand alone. As the district court

recognized, Olmetti provided contemporaneous medical records that support his claims of hand

pain and numbness. R. 142 (Op. at 10) (Page ID #3676); R. 97-1 (4/4/2018 Progress Note at 1)

(Page ID #2367); R. 87-4 (4/22/2018 Nursing Encounter Tool at 1) (Page ID #1723); see also R.

118-6 (Med. Records at 1–6) (Page ID #3176–81).

       The defendants point to Miller v. Sanilac County, 606 F.3d 240 (6th Cir. 2010), in which

a plaintiff could not satisfy the third prong of the handcuffing inquiry because his assertions that

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No. 22-1834, Olmetti v. Kent County, Mich., et al.

he had a continuing inability to use his hands and that he lost color in his hands for more than a

day after his arrest were “not supported by his medical records or the intake form he completed

during his arrest,” id. at 252. They claim that Miller held that a failure to report at intake new

handcuff-related injuries “forecloses the possibility of finding a physical injury” in a handcuffing

case. Appellant Br. at 21. We made no such statement in Miller. In Miller, we held that the

district court properly concluded that the defendant had not used excessive force in handcuffing

the plaintiff because the plaintiff was unable to show that the defendant ignored his complaints of

tight handcuffs and because he was unable to show an injury from the handcuffing, even though

he “stated in his deposition that he lost color in his hands for more than a day after the arrest and

has a continuing inability to use his hands.” Miller, 606 F.3d at 252. We referred to the plaintiff’s

medical records, which did not support his assertion at his deposition that he was unable to use his

hands after the handcuffing. Id. The medical records at issue in Miller indicated that the plaintiff

experienced tingling and numbness in his left hand after he slept on it, not after being handcuffed.

Med. Records at 1, Miller v. Sanilac County, 2009 WL 416438, No. 2:07-cv-14965-PJD-SDP

(E.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2009) R. 30-15. Here Olmetti’s medical records indicate ulnar and radial

neuropathy dating back to Olmetti’s fall from his bunk at KCCF––the same date as the

handcuffing. R. 118-6 (Med. Records at 1–6) (Page ID #3176–81). To be sure, the records

reference his fall from the bunk. They also specify that the neuropathy “likely” stems from the

elbow or just below. Id. at 5 (Page ID #3180). Whether that injury resulted from the handcuffing

is a question for a jury. Olmetti has shown a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he

suffered injury from unduly tight handcuffs.

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No. 22-1834, Olmetti v. Kent County, Mich., et al.

          Finally, the defendants argue that Olmetti’s right not to be handcuffed in an excessively

forceful way is not clearly established.       But “this Court [has] directly and unequivocally

determined, time and time again, that unduly tight or excessively forceful handcuffing” is

unconstitutional, and thus this argument is unavailing. Baynes, 799 F.3d at 613; Hughey, 3 F.4th

at 293; see also Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 520 (6th Cir. 2016) (unduly tight

handcuffing is unconstitutional); Morrison, 583 F.3d at 401 (same); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d

937, 944 (6th Cir. 2002) (same); Martin v. Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1312–13 (6th Cir. 1997)

(same).

D. Manhandling Claim

          With respect to the general excessive-force claim, we must ask whether the force used

purposely or knowingly against Olmetti was objectively reasonable. When conducting this

inquiry, we must consider “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the

officer knew at the time”; the legitimate interests of the government in managing a pretrial

detainee; “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the

extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or limit the amount of

force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer;

and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Coley v. Lucas County, 799 F.3d 530, 538 (6th

Cir. 2015) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 394, 397 (2015)). A pretrial detainee

can show that a use of force is excessive by showing that “the challenged governmental action is

not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or . . . is excessive in relation to that

purpose.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398.

                                                  10
No. 22-1834, Olmetti v. Kent County, Mich., et al.

       “We have long held that a plaintiff may ‘allege use of excessive force even where the

physical contact between the parties did not leave excessive marks or cause extensive physical

damage.’” Coley, 799 F.3d at 539 (quoting Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 597 (6th

Cir. 1999)). The inquiry depends instead on whether the force was excessive or de minimis, rather

than whether the injury suffered was de minimis, because injury and force are not perfectly

correlated. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37–38 (2010). Although the defendants have

argued that a plaintiff must show some physical injury in order to succeed on a claim for excessive

force, we have previously held otherwise. In Pigram ex rel. Pigram v. Chaudoin, 199 F. App’x

509 (6th Cir. 2006), we upheld a denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment for a police

officer who slapped a handcuffed arrestee, id. at 513–14. We reasoned that, though the slap did

not cause significant physical injury, there was no government interest in slapping the plaintiff,

and therefore it could be considered gratuitous violence. Id. at 513; see also Carico v. Benton, 68

F. App’x 632, 637 (6th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff “can clearly claim excessive force against [the officer]

for the slap to the face”); Evans v. Plummer, 687 F. App’x 434, 441 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he

unreasonable infliction of ‘intense physical pain’ is sufficient to give rise to an excessive-force

claim; there is no requirement that the excessive force cause a permanent or visible injury” (citing

Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1996))).

       Here, Olmetti has alleged that, as he was escorted out of the hospital, having been

diagnosed with at least two acute rib fractures, defendants King and Linsea grabbed him and pulled

him back and forth, causing him serious physical pain. There was no suggestion that Olmetti was

resisting his transport back to the car, that he was in distress, or that he had been combative with

medical staff at the hospital. The defendants contend that they knew that Olmetti “had a history

                                                 11
No. 22-1834, Olmetti v. Kent County, Mich., et al.

of assaulting medical personnel.” Appellant Br. at 25. They have not, however, provided any

evidence to indicate that he had done so on this day, or that he was doing so such that the officers

would have a legitimate governmental reason for pulling him back and forth as they escorted him

to the car. Indeed, they recognize that when Olmetti was discharged from the hospital, he was “in

no apparent distress.” Appellant Br. at 26 (quoting R. 70-11 (Spectrum Records at 2) (Page ID

#709)). At this stage of the proceedings, we must consider all of the evidence in the light most

favorable to Olmetti, and Olmetti’s sworn testimony that the defendants manhandled him

constitutes evidence of the same. He contends that the officers did more than exercise minimal

force over him; he testified that they “manhandled” him and caused him severe pain. R. 69-6

(Olmetti Dep. Tr. at 316:8–9, 614:4–10) (Page ID #621, 633). Taking the evidence in the light

most favorable to Olmetti, as we must at summary judgment, we conclude that a reasonable jury

could conclude that King and Linsea used excessive force by manhandling Olmetti while escorting

him to the car.

       We must now consider whether Olmetti’s constitutional right was clearly established. We

have held that “pretrial detainees ha[ve] a clearly established right not to be gratuitously assaulted

while fully restrained and subdued.” Coley, 799 F.3d at 540; see also Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43

F.3d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995). In Coley, we held that shoving a pretrial detainee who was

handcuffed and in a belly chain and leg irons constituted a gratuitous assault. 799 F.3d at 539–40.

Like the plaintiff in Coley, Olmetti was handcuffed and in a belly chain and leg irons throughout

the incident and Linsea testified that the restraints would have been removed only if a doctor or

medical professional requested their removal for a medical reason. R. 85-5 (Linsea Dep. Tr. at

13:25–14:6, 53:2–10, 61:2–6, 61:13–62:1; 82:25–83:10) (Page ID #1568, 1578, 1580, 1585). This

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No. 22-1834, Olmetti v. Kent County, Mich., et al.

case is not materially distinguishable from Coley. Olmetti’s prior instance of being combative

with medical professionals was not relevant when he had just been treated for several hours in a

hospital for broken ribs and a head injury without incident; nor would it have justified roughly

pulling him back and forth when he was not resisting at the time. R. 85-5 (Linsea Dep. Tr. at

72:3-8) (Page ID #1582). We therefore determine that Olmetti’s constitutional right not to be

gratuitously assaulted while fully restrained and nonresistant was clearly established.

                                      IV. CONCLUSION

       Accordingly, because Olmetti has established that there is a material dispute of fact as to

whether defendants King and Linsea used excessive force when they handcuffed him and

manhandled him on the way out of the hospital, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying

qualified immunity.

                                                13