Court Opinion

ID: 9572720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:44:04.991424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:55.813898
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting, with whom ROSE, Chief Justice, joins.
I must dissent from the majority opinion of my colleagues in this case. I am disposed to agree with much of what is in the majority opinion, but I depart quite sharply on the question of the availability of relief pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, §§ 1-37-101, et seq., W.S.1977. I also agree with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Rose, but again the ground for disposition which I would espouse is different from that which he proposes. I would, in any event, not reach the question of sovereign immunity because the remedy of a declaratory judgment is not available to the appellants, and that is a jurisdictional proposition which inhibits the consideration of any other issues.
The ground for disposition of this case which I would espouse is different from that proposed in the majority opinion, that proposed in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Rose, and that espoused by the ap-pellees in their legal position. Furthermore, it is different from that relied upon by the district court, although the law is well established that we are permitted to affirm the district court on any proper ground. Agar v. Kysar, Wyo., 628 P.2d 1350 (1981); Wightman v. American National Bank of Riverton, Wyo., 610 P.2d 1001 (1980), and cases therein cited. I cannot overlook the obvious simply because it is not perceived as obvious by others. I would hold that the relief of a declaratory judgment is not available in this instance because of the failure of the appellants to exhaust an available administrative remedy. It is conceded that the appellants in the district court sought injunctive relief as well, but the essence of this controversy is an adjudication with respect to the application of agency rules, and the availability of a remedy under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is the focus of the debate of the parties.
In City of Cheyenne v. Sims, Wyo., 521 P.2d 1347 (1974), this court said at 1350:
“Declaratory judgment should not be used to usurp or replace specific administrative relief, particularly when the initial decision is committed to an administrative body. [Footnote omitted.] * * ”
Section 9-4-106, W.S.1977, provides as follows:
“Any interested person may petition an agency requesting the promulgation, amendment or repeal of any rule and may accompany his petition with relevant data, views and arguments. Each agency may prescribe by rule the form of such petition and the procedure for its submission, consideration and disposition. Upon submission of such a petition, the agency as soon as practicable either shall deny the petition in writing (stating its reasons for the denials) or initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with section 3 [§ 9-4-103]. The action of the agency in denying a petition shall be final and not subject to review.”
The language of this statute aptly covers the relief sought by the appellants in their attempted civil action. I can see no alternative but to apply the rule of City of Cheyenne v. Sims, supra, to this situation and to hold that no action for declaratory judgment by these appellants will lie in the absence of an allegation that they have pursued the relief provided in § 9-4-106, W.S.1977, and that relief has been denied.
I hasten to add that I have the same reservations as Chief Justice Rose has stated to the existence of a justiciable controversy in any event. The pleading of the appellants states a claim which assumes that rules, which arguably could be interpreted and applied in a different manner, are to be interpreted and applied in accordance with the views of the appellants. Premising declaratory judgment jurisdiction upon such a position goes one step beyond the situation which was presented in Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Langdon, Wyo., 624 P.2d 240 (1981), in *1176which instance we refused to recognize a justiciable controversy.
If relief pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act can be obtained in circumstances such as those presented in this case, I am convinced that we must candidly recognize alternative methods for reviewing administrative rulemaking. If that is so then the 30-day limit for administrative review provided in Rule 12.04, W.R. A.P., and by the statute in this instance, § 35-11-1001, W.S.1977, becomes meaningless. The legislature and this court should not be presumed to have adopted a meaningless requirement for judicial review of the rulemaking process. Consequently the availability of relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act must depend upon allegations of a greater impact upon the party seeking relief than simply that it is a “person affected in fact by a rule adopted by an agency,” which is the premise for judicial review pursuant to § 9-4-114(a), W.S.1977, in a rulemaking procedure. I cannot discern any allegations of greater impact by the appellants in this case.
In my view the primary premise for the disposition proposed by the majority of this court is that we choose to consider this case. I find in such a position a danger of the judicial branch of government intruding in an unconstitutional way upon those matters which have been by law committed to the executive branch of government. The development of rules relating to water quality in this state has been committed to the executive branch of government by the legislature. If those rules are improper, then good jurisprudential practice requires the courts to refer those who are dissatisfied to the remedy provided by § 9-4-106, W.S. 1977, before any consideration is given to the availability of relief pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court in this case for the reasons set forth above.