Court Opinion

ID: 9450181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:37:45.509628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:11.147223
License: Public Domain

WRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
In his petition for rehearing en banc, appellant seeks to raise again the issue of censorship of program content by Government officials. He argues:
“A majority of the present Supreme Court has made it clear that any examination into ‘program content’ by an administrative agency functioning under a broad ‘public interest’ or ‘general welfare’ stand*538ard contravenes First Amendment freedoms. Where administrative agencies, in the exercise of their licensing functions, ‘judge the content of the words and pictures to be communicated’, the safeguards of the First and Fourteenth Amendments become applicable save in the exceptional case. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 [72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098] (1952). A violation of the First Amendment arises where a government agency 'undertakes to censor the contents of the broadcasting’. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 [69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513] (1949) (Jackson, J. concurring). ‘Any examination of thought or expression in order to prevent publication of “objectionable material” ’ is censorship. Farmers Educational [and Co-op] Union [of America, North Dakota Division] v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 527 [79 S.Ct. 1302, 3 L.Ed.2d 1407] (1960) (emphasis by the Court). * * *
“[Additionally], a basic concept runs throughout recent Supreme Court decisions to the effect that, since First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, the government may regulate in this area ‘only with narrow specificity’. NAACP v. Button, 31 Law Week, 4063, 4067 [371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405] (1963); cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 32 Law Week 4184 [376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686] (1964); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 [78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460] (1958). Accordingly ‘stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech’. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 [80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205] (1959). * * *
“ * * * [See also Joseph Bur-styn, Inc. v. Wilson, supra; Staub v. [City of] Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 [78 S.Ct. 277, 2 L.Ed.2d 302] (1958);] Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 [77 S.Ct. 524, 1 L.Ed.2d 412] (1957); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 31 Law Week 4194, 4194-4196 [372 U.S. 58, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584] (U.S.Sup.Ct. 1963).”
Most important, appellant suggests^ that the absence of a ruling from this-court on the Commission’s powers of program review will be understood by the-broadcasting industry as an endorsement of Commission censorship. A predictions of a law review writer is quoted:
“ * * * The court of appeals, in-reviewing [Robinson], may uphold' the Commission’s action on some of' the alternative grounds of decision: In this event, the limits on FCC authority will remain unclear, and. its action in [Robinson] may prove a. successful feint of regulation, whereby the FCC can affect program content even when it may not actually have authority to do so. * * * ”
77 Harv.L.Rev. 713 (1964).
I do not read the decision of this court to endorse program content regulation. See 48 Stat. 1091, 62 Stat. 682, 47 U.S.C. § 326. The opinion stated, “We intimate no views on whether the Commission could have denied the applications if Robinson had been truthful.” (pp. 536) The concurring judge noted: “Perhaps as the majority refrained from discussing the other issues because of a desire to avoid approving any Commission action which might be called program censorship.” (pp. 537)
If the Commission were likely to undertake such program content review, en banc consideration would be justified. But this does not seem likely, for the Commission seems to recognize the First Amendment, statutory, and policy bases for px*otection of programming from the Government censor. Subsequent to its action in the matter under review, the Commission announced:
“We x*ecognize that * * * provocative programming * * * may offend some listeners. But this does. *539■not mean that those offended have the right, through the Commission’s .licensing power, to rule such pro.gramming off the airwaves. Were ■.this the case, only the wholly inoffensive, the bland, could gain access to the radio microphone or TV camera. No such drastic curtailment can be countenanced under the ■Constitution, the Communications .Act, or the Commission’s policy, which has consistently sought to in.sure ‘the maintenance of radio and television as a medium of freedom of ¡speech and freedom of expression for the people of the Nation as a whole’ (Editorializing Report, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1248). In saying this, we do not mean to indicate. that those who have complained about the :foregoing programs are in the wrong as to the worth of these programs .and should listen to them. This is a matter solely for determination by •the individual listeners. Our function, we stress, is not to pass on the merits of the program — to commend •or to frown. * * *
**■***••*
“ ':f * * [W]e are charged under the Act with ‘promoting the larger and more effective use of radio in the .public interest’ (Section 303(g)), and obviously, in the discharge of that responsibility, must take every precaution to avoid inhibiting broad- ’ ■cast licensees’ efforts at experimenting or diversifying their programming. Such diversity of programming has been the goal of many Commission policies (e.g., multiple ownership, development of UHF, the fairness doctrine). Clearly, the Commission must remain faithful to that goal in discharging its functions in the actual area of programming itself.”
In re Applications of Pacifica Foundation, FCC 64-43, No. 45386, pp. 3-5.
I see no need now to decide whether this statement exhausts the constitutional protection of free speech in broadcasting, or whether the Commission, in the quoted case and in the case before us, correctly applied the constitutional guarantees. It is enough now for me that the Commission realizes the vital importance of preserving both free speech and an atmosphere of freedom in these communications media. For this reason, I do not feel that an en banc consideration of this case is necessary.