Court Opinion

ID: 9540216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:13:42.936258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:44.038137
License: Public Domain

SIMMS, Justice,
dissenting:
I concur in the result of this opinion as to these claimants, but must dissent to the majority’s “withdrawing” Lane1 and changing the rule for others who will find themselves in the same situation as these claimants.
The limitation provision of 85 O.S.1971, § 43, in question, reads as follows:
“The right to claim compensation under this Act shall be forever barred unless within one (1) year after the injury or death, a claim for compensation thereunder shall be filed with the Commission.”
Unlike the majority, I find no language there which supports the notion that a claim filed with the Commission must name everyone who is, or may be, liable for compensation and that the statute will bar a claim against one not so named.
To the contrary, I believe the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the statute and its proper application as follows:
“In plain language, the statute specifies that it is the filing of a claim — not the naming of respondents — that tolls the *387limitation period. A more restrictive construction would run counter to the presumed intent of the legislature — that the provisions of the Act are meant to be beneficial, not detrimental, to workers who are injured or killed. AMF Tubescope Co. v. Hatchel, Okl., 547 P.3d 374 (1976). An employee should not be required at his peril to devine secret or esoteric deals made by his immediate employer with others or to determine whether all those for whom he works have fulfilled their legal obligations to him under the Act. It was the duty of Wilsey to compel Hughes’ compliance with the Act. It did not do so and it cannot now avoid the statutory penalty for its dereliction by means of a strained construction of the limitation statute.” 51 OBJ 2426, 2428 (Oct.1980).
We have consistently held that no particular form of pleading is required before the Commission to give it jurisdiction to hear and determine a “claim for compensation”, and that anything filed in the Commission which challenges its attention and causes it to act is sufficient to put in motion the process of the Commission to see that compensation is paid to injured employees. See, e.g., Higgenbotham v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 155 Okl. 264, 9 P.2d 15 (1932); Apple v. State Insurance Fund, Okl., 540 P.2d 545 (1975).
The forms (3 and 3A) furnished workers and their representatives for stating their claims for compensation for injury or death contain no inquiry about a statutory employer and no space is provided for including such information.
Here, the claimants filed “claims for compensation” under the Act within one year, naming and giving notice to their employer.
The provisions of 85 O.S.1971, § 11, are designed to protect these claimants and others in similar situations. There is no requirement that statutory employers be named at the outset. In fact, the prescribed procedure contemplates that the immediate employer’s noncompliance with the Act may not be discovered until after the proceeding has begun.
Section 11 provides:
“2. The person entitled to such compensation shall have the right to recover the same directly from his immediate employer, the independent contractor or intermediate contractor, and such claims may be presented against all such persons in one proceeding. If it appears in such proceeding that the principal employer has failed to require a compliance with the Workmen’s Compensation Law of this State, by his or their independent contractor, then such employee may proceed against such principal employer without regard to liability of any independent, intermediate or other contractor...” (emphasis added)
Our decision in Lane is consistent with the purpose of the Act and faithful to the explicit provisions of § 11. The syllabus by the Court in Lane provides:
“Where an independent, intermediate or subcontractor under the provisions of the Oklahoma Workmen’s Compensation Act fails to provide workmen’s compensation insurance coverage for his employees as required by the Oklahoma Workmen’s Compensation Act, thereby casting a direct liability upon the principal contractor or party having the work done for the payment of compensation benefits arising out of injury or death of employees of such independent, intermediate or subcontractors the provisions of the one year statute of limitations, 85 O.S.1961, § 43, are tolled until the discovery of such lack of insurance by the injured employee.”
I would not overrule or “withdraw” Lane.
The Court of Appeals decision is correct and I would deny Certiorari.
I am authorized to state that Justice DOOLIN and Justice HARGRAVE join with me in the views expressed in the above opinion.

. Okl., 451 P.2d 947 (1969).