Court Opinion

ID: 9409405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 07:00:21.089572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.231863
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MICHAEL R. SHUMAKER,                            DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        DC-3443-16-0816-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: July 17, 2023
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

          THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Michael R. Shumaker, Fairfax, Virginia, pro se.

           Stephanie E. Sawyer, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his employment practices appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we
     grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial
     decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application
     of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
     the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
     procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
     outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
     that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
     closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude tha t
     the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
     the petition for review.     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and
     AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.113(b).

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant applied for the position of Deputy Executive Director,
     Program Accountability and Risk Management, a Senior Executive Service (SES)
     position at the agency. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 5, Tab 8 at 18-24. He
     was informed that his application did not indicate that he met the minimum
     requirements for the position. IAF, Tab 5 at 15-16. The appellant subsequently
     contacted several agency officials in the Executive Services Division who
     reviewed his application and confirmed that he lacked the necessary experience
     for the position. Id. at 10-22.
¶3         The appellant timely filed this appeal, and he requested a hearing. IAF,
     Tab 1. Below, he alleged that the agency officials who reviewed his application
     violated the basic requirements for employment practices set forth in 5 C.F.R.
     § 300.103 and agency Management Directive 3030.1 by misreading his résumé,
     erroneously finding that he did not meet the minimum qualifications for the
     position, and failing to forward his application to the SES rating panel. IAF,
     Tab 5 at 3-4, 10-14. Without holding the requested hearing, the administrative
                                                                                           3

     judge found that the Board does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the
     employment practices used to review the appellant’s application for an SES
     position. IAF, Tab 18, Initial Decision (ID) at 3. The administrative judge found
     in the alternative that, even if the appellant had been seeking a position in the
     competitive service, instead of an SES position, the Board lacked jurisdiction
     over his appeal because it concerned a single unfavorable personnel action rather
     than a practice or the application of a practice, and he did not show that the
     Office   of   Personnel   Management      (OPM)    had    any involvement      in   the
     administration of the alleged employment practices. ID at 4.
¶4         The appellant has filed a petition for review and a supplemental petition for
     review, the agency has filed a response, and the appellant has filed a reply.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1-2, 4, 7.          The agency also has filed a
     motion to strike the appellant’s supplemental petition for review.          PFR File,
     Tab 5.   The appellant thereafter filed a motion to request leave to file his
     supplemental petition. PFR File, Tab 6. We grant the appellant’s motion to file a
     supplemental petition for review, and we deny the agency’s motion to strike that
     submission.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5         The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
     given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.           Maddox v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Generally, a nonselection is
     not appealable directly to the Board. 2     Pridgen v. Office of Management and
     Budget, 117 M.S.P.R. 665, ¶ 6 (2012). However, an applicant for employment

     2
       On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s characterizing the
     agency’s action as a nonselection, and he submits evidence that the agency canceled the
     vacancy announcement. E.g., PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 18, 23. Because we find that the
     Board lacks jurisdiction over this employment practices appeal, we need not address
     this evidence or argument.
                                                                                                4

     who believes that an employment practice 3 applied to him by OPM violates a
     basic requirement in 5 C.F.R. § 300.103 is entitled to appeal to the Board.
     Burroughs v. Department of the Army, 116 M.S.P.R. 292, ¶ 5 (2011); 5 C.F.R.
     § 300.104(a). The Board has jurisdiction over an employment practices appeal
     pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 300.104(a) when the following two conditions are met:
     (1) the appeal must concern an employment practice that OPM is inv olved in
     administering; and (2) the appellant must make a nonfrivolous allegation 4 that the
     employment practice violated one of the “basic requirements” for employment
     practices set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 300.103. Burroughs, 116 M.S.P.R. 292, ¶ 15;
     Mapstone v. Department of the Interior, 110 M.S.P.R. 122, ¶ 7 (2008).
¶6         The appellant asserts on review that the regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 300.101
     allows him to challenge an employment practice that affects his selection to any
     initial appointment within the Federal Government, including to an SES position.
     PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7. This argument is unavailing. The stated purpose of this
     regulation is to establish principles to govern employment practices “that affect
     the recruitment, measurement, ranking, and selection of individuals for initial
     appointment and competitive promotion in the competitive service.”                5 C.F.R.
     § 300.101 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Board has held that the regul ations at
     5 C.F.R. part 300 only apply to the competitive service. Walters v. U.S. Postal
     Service, 65 M.S.P.R. 115, 118 (1994). 5 As the administrative judge noted in the

     3
       The regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 300.101 states that “the term ‘employment practices’
     includes the development and use of examinations, qualification standards, tests, and
     other measurement instruments.”
     4
       A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could es tablish the matter at
     issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). An allegation generally will be considered nonfrivolous
     when, under oath or penalty of perjury, an individual makes an allegation that is more
     than conclusory, is plausible on its face, and is material to the legal issues in the appeal.
     Id.
     5
       We are not persuaded by the appellant’s assertion that the administrative judge
     improperly relied on Walters in the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8; ID at 3.
                                                                                         5

     initial decision, positions in the SES are specifically excluded from the
     competitive service.        ID at 3 (citing, among other things,           5 U.S.C.
     § 2102(a)(1)(C) and 5 C.F.R. § 212.101(a)(1)); see Dean v. Department of the Air
     Force, 620 F. App’x 959, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (explaining that
     “[c]ivil service positions in the executive branch may be classified as one of
     several types including: ‘competitive service,’ ‘specifically excepted from the
     competitive    service,’    filled   through   an   appointment   requiring    Senate
     confirmation, and [SES]”). 6 We therefore agree with the administrative judge
     that the regulations at 5 C.F.R. part 300 do not apply to selecting individuals for
     SES positions, including the position at issue in this appeal.
¶7         Even if we determined that the position to which the appellant applied was
     somehow in the competitive service, a different outcome is not warranted. We
     have considered the appellant’s assertion that the agency committed an appealable
     employment practice when it misapplied a valid OPM requirement under 5 C.F.R.
     part 300.     E.g., PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-17.        The appellant states a correct
     proposition of law, see, e.g., Richardson v. Department of Defense, 78 M.S.P.R.
     58, 61 (1998); Banks v. Department of Agriculture, 59 M.S.P.R. 157, 160 (1993),
     aff’d, 26 F.3d 140 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Table), but he has not persuaded us that the
     administrative judge erred. Even though the term “employment practice” is to be
     construed broadly, it does not encompass an individual agency action that is not
     made pursuant to a rule or practice, such as an irregularity in the selection
     process. Prewitt v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 133 F.3d 885, 887 (Fed. Cir.
     1998); see Richardson, 78 M.S.P.R. at 61 (finding that the appellant’s challenge
     to how the agency rated and handled her individual application is not within the
     Board’s jurisdiction).     We construe the appellant’s contention that the agency

     6
      The Board may follow a nonprecedential decision of the U.S. Court of Appea ls for the
     Federal Circuit when, as here, it finds its reasoning persuasive.       LeMaster v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 453, ¶ 11 n.5 (2016).
                                                                                          6

     misread his résumé or experience as an irregularity in the selection process, and
     the Board therefore lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims in an employment
     practices appeal. See Prewitt, 133 F.3d at 887 (concluding that the alleged error
     by an agency employee in misidentifying the appellant’s race and the race of
     other applicants “is more aptly characterized as an irregularity in the selection
     process” and is not an employment practice that is appealable to the Board under
     5 C.F.R. § 300.104(a)); see also Banks, 59 M.S.P.R. at 160 (holding that the
     appellant’s bare allegation that the agency failed to fully consider his education
     and experience in making a selection did not establish that the agency subjected
     him to an employment practice that fell within the Board’s jurisdiction).
¶8         We also have considered the appellant’s argument that OPM was involved
     in administering the employment practice because the vacancy announcement was
     posted on the USAJOBS website. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-11. This argument is also
     unavailing. To be appealable, OPM’s involvement in administering an agency’s
     alleged employment practice must be “significant.” Prewitt, 133 F.3d at 888. We
     are not persuaded that posting the vacancy announcement on the USAJOBS
     website constitutes “significant” involvement in the agency’s selection process by
     OPM. Id. Compare Maule v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 812 F.2d 1396,
     1398 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding that OPM made a “pivotal decision” that
     ultimately resulted in the nonselection), with Dowd v. Office of Personnel
     Management, 745 F.2d 650, 651 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that OPM “played no
     part” in the agency’s nonselection). Because we agree with the administrative
     judge that the Board lacks jurisdiction over this appeal, she properly dismissed
     the appeal without holding the requested hearing. 7 ID at 5.

     7
       In our analysis of the jurisdictional issue, we have considered the supplemental
     petition for review, which includes a September 2016 report from the Government
     Accountability Office regarding converting political appointees to career positions and
     a November 27, 2016 newspaper article which appeared to discuss Congressional
     concerns regarding converting political appointees to career positions. PFR File, Tab 2
                                                                                           7

¶9         Finally, the appellant argues that the administrative judge’s order to stay
     discovery and decision to deny his two motions for sanctions constituted an abuse
     of discretion and affected the outcome of this appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 20-22;
     IAF, Tabs 13-14, 17. We disagree. The Board will not reverse an administrative
     judge’s rulings on discovery matters imposing sanctions absent an abuse of
     discretion. Pecard v. Department of Agriculture, 115 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 15 (2010);
     Wagner v. Environmental Protection Agency, 54 M.S.P.R. 447, 452 (1992), aff’d,
     996 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Table). The abuse of discretion standard is “a
     very high standard” and allows for “great deference.” Pecard, 115 M.S.P.R. 31,
     ¶ 15. The appellant has not persuaded us that the administrative judge’s rulings
     constituted an abuse of discretion. Indeed, the appellant has not persuaded us that
     any evidence that he sought to obtain through discovery would affect our decision
     on the jurisdictional issue. See Vores v. Department of the Army, 109 M.S.P.R.
     191, ¶ 14 (2008) (explaining that the appellant must show how an administrative
     judge’s alleged errors when ruling on discovery matters affected the result
     reached below), aff’d, 324 F. App’x 883 (Fed. Cir. 2009).               Moreover, the
     administrative judge found that, contrary to the appellant’s assertion in his
     motions for sanctions, IAF, Tabs 13-14, the agency’s response to the
     acknowledgment order was timely filed, ID at 3. For these reasons, we conclude
     that the administrative judge did not abuse her discretion when she is sued an
     order staying discovery and denied the appellant’s motions for sanctions.

     at 9-16, 18-20. Even if we determined that this information constituted “new”
     evidence, the Board will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a
     showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the
     initial decision. Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980). The
     appellant has not made such a showing.
                                                                                          8

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to    the   court    at   the
following address:

8
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   9

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
                                                                                10

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                      11

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9    The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by t he President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of comp etent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           12

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.