Court Opinion

ID: 9390989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 21:01:08.196405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:38.576128
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 21-1538

                  ASDRÚBAL SIMÓN MATA-CABELLO,

                      Petitioner, Appellee,

                               v.

                        TAILI TEE THULA,

                     Respondent, Appellant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

        [Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]

                             Before

                      Barron, Chief Judge,
              Lipez and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.

     Victor M. Rivera-Rios for appellant.
     Rubén T. Nigaglioni, with whom Nigaglioni Law Offices P.S.C.
was on brief, for appellee.

                         April 28, 2023
          BARRON, Chief Judge.   Taili Tee Thula ("Thula") appeals

from the denial of her request for an award of attorney's fees,

pursuant to the inherent power of the United States District Court

for the District of Puerto Rico, and the costs of translation

services, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6).   We affirm.

                                 I.

          The challenges on appeal arise out of a pair of actions

-- one filed by Thula in the Puerto Rico courts and one filed by

her husband, Asdrúbal Simón Mata-Cabello ("Mata-Cabello"), in

federal court.   We thus recount the travel of the two actions.

          Thula's action in the Puerto Rico courts began when she

filed a complaint against Mata-Cabello, then residing in Colombia,

in the Court of First Instance of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

on February 20, 2020.   The complaint alleged causes of action for

divorce under Article 96 of Puerto Rico's Civil Code, P.R. Laws

Ann. tit. 31, § 321, custody of the couple's two minor children,

child support, alimony, and "the division of the marital estate,"

as well as claims under Puerto Rico's Domestic Abuse Prevention

and Intervention Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 8, § 601 et seq.   Thula

sought further relief under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of

International Child Abduction, done at The Hague on October 25,

1980 ("Hague Convention"), and its implementing legislation, the

International Child Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA"), 22 § U.S.C.

9001 et seq.

                               - 2 -
          In   response,       Mata-Cabello    moved    to   dismiss    Thula's

divorce and custody claims on the ground that the Court of First

Instance lacked jurisdiction under Puerto Rico law to hear them

because Thula had not been a resident of Puerto Rico for one full

year prior to filing her complaint.           Mata-Cabello also requested

relief pursuant to ICARA and the Hague Convention.             Specifically,

he requested that the minor children be returned to their "habitual

place of residence" in Colombia so that "the divorce and minor

custody proceedings" could be resolved in accord with Colombia

law.

          On October 30, 2020, the Court of First Instance granted

the motion to dismiss, explaining that it lacked jurisdiction "to

hear the merits of the divorce [c]omplaint filed by [Thula]."               The

Court of First Instance also dismissed Thula's other claims.                In

doing so, the court did not address the parties' requests for

relief under ICARA and the Hague Convention.           Thula filed a timely

motion for reconsideration that was denied.

          Following      the    Court   of   First    Instance's   denial   of

Thula's   motion   for     reconsideration,      on     December   4,    2020,

Mata-Cabello filed a petition under ICARA and the Hague Convention

in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto

Rico that named Thula as the respondent.             The petition requested

that the District Court order the return of the minor children to

                                    - 3 -
their "habitual residence" in Colombia for resolution of the

custody proceedings under Colombia law.

          Mata-Cabello asserted in the petition that the District

Court had jurisdiction over the Hague Convention petition under 22

U.S.C. § 9003.   That provision grants "[t]he courts of the States

and the United States district courts . . . concurrent original

jurisdiction of actions arising under the [Hague] Convention."

          Meanwhile, on December 28, 2020, Thula timely appealed

the Court of First Instance's dismissal of her action to the Puerto

Rico Court of Appeals.    And, then, soon thereafter, on January 11,

2021, she moved in the District Court to dismiss Mata-Cabello's

Hague Convention petition in that court on the ground that "the

Hague Convention [p]etition ha[d] been raised by both parties and

[was] currently being litigated in the Puerto Rico courts for the

past eleven (11) months."

          The Puerto Rico Court of Appeals, on March 12, 2021,

decided   Thula's    appeal   from    the    Court   of   First   Instance's

dismissal.   It ruled that the Court of First Instance had erred by

"dismissing [Thula's] complaint in its totality, without having

addressed and resolved all the claims under [its] consideration."

Accordingly, the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals ordered the Court of

First Instance to:

          determine whether it has jurisdiction over the
          matter [or] the authority to address the whole
          matter under the protection of the Hague

                                     - 4 -
          Convention [ ] and [ICARA]. If said forum were
          to determine that it has the authority over
          the above cited laws, it shall resolve: (1)
          whether Puerto Rico is the habitual resident
          of the minor children procreated by the
          parties, and (2) establish a provisional legal
          precedent related to custody, parent-child
          relationships, provisional child support and
          litis expensas.

          Following the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals' ruling, the

District Court entered the following order on April 23, 2021:

          It has come to the Court's attention that the
          Puerto Rico Court of Appeals has entered its
          ruling on [Thula's] appeal related to the
          instant matter. [Thula] is to file the
          resolution entered by the Puerto Rico Court of
          Appeals dated April 5, 2021 in case no.
          KLAN202001039 by April 28, 2021. A [c]ertified
          translation of said document is to be filed no
          later than May 3, 2021.

          After   the      District    Court    received      the   translated

resolution, it ruled on May 4, 2021, that it would abstain because

the ICARA and Hague Convention remedies "ha[d] been raised by both

parties, [were] currently being litigated in the Puerto Rico

[c]ourts for the past fourteen (14) months and [were] included in

the   [r]esolution    of    the     Puerto     Rico   Court    of   Appeals."

Accordingly, the District Court dismissed Mata-Cabello's action

without prejudice on abstention grounds.

          Following     the       District     Court's   order      dismissing

Mata-Cabello's action, on May 18, 2021, Thula filed a "Motion for

an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs to Prevailing Party Pursuant

                                    - 5 -
to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Applicable

Law."   The motion sought an award of $28,937.50 in attorney's fees

and costs totaling $5,480.20 for "[i]nterpreter [s]ervices to

translate    Spanish   [d]ocuments    and   copies"   under   28   U.S.C.

§ 1920(6).

            Rule 54(d) provides, in relevant part:

            Costs; Attorney's Fees.

            (1) Costs Other Than Attorney's Fees. Unless
            a federal statute, these rules, or a court
            order provides otherwise, costs--other than
            attorney's fees--should be allowed to the
            prevailing party. But costs against the United
            States, its officers, and its agencies may be
            imposed only to the extent allowed by law. The
            clerk may tax costs on 14 days' notice. On
            motion served within the next 7 days, the
            court may review the clerk's action.

            (2) Attorney's Fees.
                 (A) Claim to Be by Motion. A claim for
                 attorney's fees and related nontaxable
                 expenses must be made by motion unless
                 the substantive law requires those fees
                 to be proved at trial as an element of
                 damages.

                 (B) Timing and Contents of the Motion.
                 Unless a statute or a court order
                 provides otherwise, the motion must:
                      (i) be filed no later than 14 days
                      after the entry of judgment;
                      (ii) specify the judgment and the
                      statute, rule, or other grounds
                      entitling the movant to the award;
                      (iii) state the amount sought or
                      provide a fair estimate of it; and
                      (iv) disclose, if the court so
                      orders, the terms of any agreement
                      about fees for the services for
                      which the claim is made.

                                - 6 -
          Thula identified 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b) as the statute

"entitling   [her]   to   the   award   [of   attorney's   fees]."   That

provision states:

          Costs incurred in civil actions

          (1) Petitioners may be required to bear the
          costs of legal counsel or advisors, court
          costs incurred in connection with their
          petitions, and travel costs for the return of
          the child involved and any accompanying
          persons, except as provided in paragraphs (2)
          and (3).

          (2) Subject to paragraph (3), legal fees or
          court costs incurred in connection with an
          action brought under section 9003 of this
          title shall be borne by the petitioner unless
          they are covered by payments from Federal,
          State, or local legal assistance or other
          programs.

          (3) Any court ordering the return of a child
          pursuant to an action brought under section
          9003 of this title shall order the respondent
          to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on
          behalf of the petitioner, including court
          costs, legal fees, foster home or other care
          during the course of proceedings in the
          action, and transportation costs related to
          the return of the child, unless the respondent
          establishes that such order would be clearly
          inappropriate.

          Thula also moved, in the alternative, for the attorney's

fees to be awarded based on the inherent power of the District

Court.   She did so due to what she contended was Mata-Cabello's

"bad faith" filing of the action against her in the District Court,

given that a district court has the inherent power to order a

                                  - 7 -
losing party to pay the "prevailing party" attorney's fees, even

in the absence of a statutory provision, when the losing party has

"acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive

reasons," Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.

240, 258-59 (1975).

              As to the costs of translation services, Thula moved for

them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6).            That statute provides that

"[a] judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as

costs   the     following:    . . .      Compensation    of    court   appointed

experts,      compensation        of   interpreters,    and    salaries,    fees,

expenses,     and   costs    of    special   interpretation      services   under

section 1828 of this title."

              On June 8, 2021, the District Court denied Thula's

request for the award of attorney's fees because: (1) 22 U.S.C.

§ 9007(b) "provides for fees only to a prevailing petitioner; the

section does not provide for fees to a prevailing respondent, and

indeed, does not even mention prevailing respondents"; and (2)

Mata-Cabello's action in federal court was "brought in good faith

in an attempt to defend what he believed were the father's rights

in a Hague Convention and ICARA proceeding."                    Mata-Cabello v.

Thula, No. 20-1687, 2021 WL 3040959, at *5 (D.P.R. June 8, 2021).

              The District Court at that same time also denied Thula's

request for the costs of translation services.                It did so based on

Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560 (2012), in

                                        - 8 -
which the Supreme Court of the United States held that "costs

stemming from the translation of written documents do not qualify

as [']compensation of interpreters,['] as that term is used in 28

U.S.C. § 1920(6), and, therefore, may not be taxed as costs against

a non-prevailing party."   Thula, 2021 WL 3040959, at *2 (quoting

Davila-Feliciano v. Puerto Rico State Ins. Fund, 683 F.3d 405, 406

(1st Cir. 2012) (per curiam)).

          This appeal followed.

                                  II.

          Thula challenges the District Court's denial of her

request for an award of attorney's fees on a single ground.     She

contends that the District Court abused its discretion, see In re

San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 F.3d 220, 228 (1st

Cir. 1997), by not exercising its inherent authority to grant her

request that the fees be awarded.

          To support that contention, Thula argues that the record

establishes that Mata-Cabello acted in "bad faith" in filing the

action in the District Court.      She argues, in that regard, that

the record shows that, at the time of his federal court action

against her, Mata-Cabello had requested similar relief in the Court

of First Instance in response to Thula's claims in that court,

previously "submitted himself to the [jurisdiction of the] Puerto

Rico [c]ourts," and "had full knowledge that [Thula's] [p]etition

                                 - 9 -
pursuant to the Hague Convention and ICARA was still pending before

the Puerto Rico [c]ourts."

               The District Court pointed out, however, that, at the

time    that    Mata-Cabello       filed    his     ICARA   and   Hague    Convention

petition       in   federal     court,   the    Court      of   First    Instance   had

dismissed Thula's action in its entirety without having addressed

the merits of either Thula's or Mata-Cabello's requested relief

under ICARA and the Hague Convention.                See Thula, 2021 WL 3040959,

at *5.     Thus, we see no basis for concluding that the District

Court    abused     its    discretion      in   determining       that   Mata-Cabello

"chose to file in federal court mainly because the issues of the

Hague Convention and ICARA were not considered by the First

Instance Court of San Juan," and thus "in good faith in an attempt

to defend what he believed were the father's rights in a Hague

Convention and ICARA proceeding," id.

               Thula bases her challenge on appeal to the District

Court's denial of her request for costs of translation services

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) on a single ground as well.                         The

District       Court      based    the     denial     on    the    Supreme    Court's

determination in Taniguchi that "the compensation of interpreters

that may be awarded under [§ 1920(6)] is limited to the cost of

oral    translation       and     does   not    include     the   cost   of   document

translation."        Id. at *2.      Thula contends that the District Court

erred in doing so because it failed to "take into account the Jones

                                         - 10 -
Act," which requires that "[a]ll pleadings and proceedings in the

United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico shall

be conducted in the English language," 48 U.S.C. § 864.                    She

contends that is so because:

           Congress'[s] mandate pursuant to the Jones Act
           makes it mandatory that all Spanish documents
           must be translated to English, any party that
           is forced to translate any Spanish documents
           to English should be able to benefit from
           requesting reimbursement for translator costs
           in the territory of Puerto Rico pursuant to
           the Jones Act.

           But, although Thula asserts to us that the District Court

should have "evaluate[d] the case under the legal framework of the

Jones Act," she did not make this argument to the District Court,

which means the challenge is at least forfeited, see Igartúa v.

United States, 626 F.3d 592, 603 (1st Cir. 2010).              And, to the

extent that she may be said to have adequately developed the

challenge on appeal, United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st

Cir. 1990) ("It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument

in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work,

create   the   ossature   for   the   argument,   and   put   flesh   on   its

bones."), she fails to explain how, given Taniguchi, the "legal

framework of the Jones Act" bears on whether she is entitled to

the costs that she seeks under § 1920(6).               She instead simply

asserts, in conclusory fashion, that the Jones Act somehow requires

§ 1920(6) to be read differently with respect to cases that are

                                  - 11 -
brought in Puerto Rico federal court than Taniguchi requires it to

be read with respect to cases that are brought in all other federal

courts.   And, she advances that conclusory contention even though

Congress enacted § 1920(6) sixty-one years after it enacted the

Jones Act, and the customary rule is that all federal court

proceedings in the United States must be conducted in English, see

United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002)

("It is clear, to the point of perfect transparency, that federal

court proceedings must be conducted in English.      Even if this

practice were not intuitively obvious in Puerto Rico, Congress

enacted section 42 of the Jones Act."      (emphasis added)).   We

therefore reject Thula's Jones Act-based challenge to the District

Court's rejection of her request for the costs of translation

services.1

     1 The District Court noted that the 2017 Taxation of Costs
Guidelines of the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
state: "[o]ther expenses not specifically allowed by statute but
necessary for the case may be taxed as costs only with prior
authorization granted by the Court." § II.I. But, the Taxation
of Costs Guidelines also provide: "The following expenses are not
taxable as costs: . . . The costs of translating into the English
language all documents filed with the District Court or presented
as evidence at trial, since they are not interpreter services under
28 U.S.C. § 1920(6)." § II.H.2.a.
https://www.prd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Taxation%20of%2
0Costs%20Guidelines%202007%20rev%2008.10.2017_0.pdf

                              - 12 -
                           III.

    For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court is

affirmed.

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