Court Opinion

ID: 9697930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:37:25.80422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:36.926344
License: Public Domain

LAVORATO, Justice.
The State sought interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s interpretation of the language “knowingly and intentionally violates” in the penalty provision of the Iowa gift law. After granting the appeal, we conclude the district court incorrectly interpreted the language. In so concluding, we also reject the State’s interpretation. We affirm as modified.
On April 9, 1998, the State charged Richard Edward Knowlés with making a gift as a restricted donor to public employees in violation of Iowa Code section 68B.22(2) (1997). The State alleged that Knowles was a party to pharmaceutical sales to the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics. The State further alleged that from December 1, 1997, through January 8, 1998, Knowles gave or offered to *801give sporting event tickets to hospital employees who made purchasing decisions.
Knowles filed a motion to adjudicate law points asking the district court to determine whether the offense charged was one of general or specific intent. He contended the language “knowingly and intentionally” in Iowa Code section 68B.25, the penalty provision, necessarily dictates that this is a specific-intent crime.
At the hearing on the motion, Knowles argued that the specific intent the State was required to prove was the “intent to influence official action.” In response, the State conceded that it had to prove that Knowles knew he was a restricted donor, knew the tickets were worth something, and knew he was giving the tickets to a public official. The State also conceded that it had to prove Knowles intentionally made the gift. The State, however, strongly resisted Knowles’ contention that it had to prove that Knowles had the specific intent to influence official action.
The district court ruled that the offense was one of specific intent and that as such the State had to prove an intent to influence official action as an element of the offense.
I. To uphold their respective positions, both parties rely on the distinction between general and specific intent. Some writers have criticized attempts to make such a distinction. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott Jr., Handbook on Criminal Law § 28, at 201 (1972) (“Much of the existing uncertainty as to the precise meaning of ‘intent’ is attributable to the fact that courts have often used such phrases as ‘criminal intent,’ ‘general intent,’ ‘constructive intent,’ and ‘presumed intent.’ ”). We have differentiated between specific and general intent. See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Iowa 1996). For reasons that follow, we need not do so here.
II. Iowa Code sections 68B.22(2) and 68B.25 are the two statutes pertinent here. We set out the two provisions in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a restricted donor shall not, directly or indirectly, offer or make a gift or a series of gifts to a public ... employee ....
Iowa Code § 68B.22(2).
In addition to any penalty contained in any other provision of law, a person who knowingly and intentionally violates a provision of ... section[ ] 68B.22 ... is guilty of a serious misdemean- or....
Iowa Code § 68B.25 (emphasis added).
What we must decide is what the legislature meant when it used the language “knowingly and intentionally violates.” Resolution of this question depends on our interpretation of this language. Our review is therefore for the correction of errors at law. See Iowa R.App. 4; State v. Blakley, 534 N.W.2d 645, 647 (Iowa 1995). The district court’s interpretation does not bind this court. See Fuller v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 576 N.W.2d 324, 328 (Iowa 1998).
III. Several well-recognized rules of statutory construction govern a court’s interpretation of a statute. One such rule controls here: “When a statute is plain and its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search for meaning beyond its express terms.” State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998).
The gift law does not define “knowingly” and “intentionally.” We therefore resort to their ordinary meaning. See State v. Kidd, 562 N.W.2d 764, 764 (Iowa 1997) (“In the absence of a legislative definition of a term or a particular meaning in the law, we give words their ordinary meaning.”). “Knowingly” means “with awareness.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1252 (unabr. ed.1993). “Intentionally” means “purposely.” Id. at 1176. “Knowingly” and “intentionally” modify “violates.” Therefore, to convict an accused of the offense charged here, the *802State must prove the accused was aware the law prohibited a restricted donor from offering or making a gift to a public employee. Otherwise, how would the accused be aware he or she was violating the law unless the accused was aware of what the law prohibited? Additionally, the State must prove the accused purposely violated the prohibition.
IV. Here, the district court concluded that “knowingly” and “intentionally” included an intent to influence official action. Such an interpretation is beyond the plain meaning of the language “knowingly and intentionally violates.” The State’s interpretation is also incorrect because the interpretation falls short of requiring the State to prove the accused (1) was aware of the law’s prohibition, and (2) purposely violated the prohibition. We therefore affirm the district court ruling as modified by our interpretation of the statute. We affirm the decision of the district court as modified and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.
All justices concur except SNELL and NEUMAN, JJ., who dissent.