Court Opinion

ID: 9405349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 00:00:36.081524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:21.502590
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30672      Document: 00516802163         Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/27/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                    Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                     FILED
                                                                              June 27, 2023
                                   No. 21-30672                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                     Clerk

   The Intestate Succession of Chris Anthony Joseph;
   Michell Strickland, Individually and in her capacity as the duly
   confirmed natural tutrix of C.J., A.J., Jr., M.J., and M.J.; Passion
   Tapange Joseph,

                                                            Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                       versus

   Sheriff Joseph P. Lopinto, III, in his official capacity as the duly
   elected Sheriff of Jefferson Parish; Narcotics Detective Allen
   Doubleday, Individually and in his capacity as a duly sworn officer employed
   by the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office; Narcotics Detective Ben
   Jones, Individually and in his capacity as a duly sworn officer employed by the
   Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office; Narcotics Detective
   Carmouche, Individually and in his capacity as a duly sworn officer
   employed by the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office; Narcotics Detective
   Wible, Individually and in his capacity as a duly sworn officer employed by the
   Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office,

                                                          Defendants—Appellees,

   ______________________________

   Leshonna Monique Steptore, Individually and in her capacity as the
   natural tutrix of D.R., a minor child,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus
Case: 21-30672      Document: 00516802163         Page: 2     Date Filed: 06/27/2023

   Joseph P. Lopinto, in his official capacity as the duly elected Sheriff of
   Jefferson Parish,

                                                            Defendant—Appellee,

   ______________________________

   Daviri Oseanus Robertson, Intestate Succession of;
   Darrelyn Smith, Individually and in Her Capacity as the Natural Tutrix
   of D.R.; Keshaun Morgan, Individually and in Her Capacity as the
   Natural Tutrix, a minor child,

                                                            Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                       versus

   Sheriff Joseph P. Lopinto, III, in his official capacity as the duly
   elected Sheriff of Jefferson Parish; Narcotics Detective Allen
   Doubleday, Individually and in his capacity as a duly sworn officer employed
   by the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office; Narcotics Detective Ben
   Jones, Individually and in his capacity as a duly sworn officer employed by the
   Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office; Narcotics Detective
   Carmouche, Individually and in his capacity as a duly sworn officer
   employed by the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office; Narcotics Detective
   Wible, Individually and in his capacity as a duly sworn officer employed by the
   Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office,

                                            Defendants—Appellees.
                   ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                  USDC Nos. 2:19-CV-11268, 2:20-CV-1006,
                                 2:20-CV-841
                  ______________________________

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Case: 21-30672          Document: 00516802163             Page: 3      Date Filed: 06/27/2023

                                           No. 21-30672

   Before Smith, Clement, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
           During a narcotics investigation, Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office
   (JPSO) law enforcement officers shot and killed Chris Joseph and Davari
   Robertson. Plaintiffs, three groups of individuals seeking recovery on behalf
   of the decedents and their heirs, contend that the officers used excessive
   force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Defendants interposed the
   defense of qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment, which the
   district court granted. Plaintiffs appeal, and we affirm.
                                                I.
           In March 2019, members of the JPSO Special Investigations Bureau
   used a cooperating individual to organize a heroin transaction with Joseph.
   Joseph and the individual agreed to meet at an IHOP Restaurant in Gretna,
   Louisiana. The JPSO unit set up surveillance in the restaurant’s parking lot
   and waited for Joseph to arrive. A security camera recorded what happened
   next:
           Joseph and Robertson, who was not a target of the investigation,
   arrived at the appointed time, parking at 9:01:12 p.m. Joseph was in the
   driver’s seat and Robertson was in the front passenger’s seat as the narcotics
   unit converged in several unmarked vehicles. Within seconds, officers had
   used their vehicles to box in Joseph’s car on two sides. The officers, all in
   plainclothes, exited their vehicles with guns drawn and surrounded Joseph’s
   vehicle. Though the video is unclear on this specific point, Detective Jones
   testified that he positioned himself at the rear of Joseph’s vehicle, between it
   and a JPSO vehicle. The officers then directed Joseph and Robertson to step

           _____________________
           *
               This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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                                     No. 21-30672

   out of the vehicle; they did not comply. At 9:01:27 p.m., Joseph put the
   vehicle in reverse. Around the same time, the officers opened fire on the
   vehicle. Joseph and Robertson were both shot; Detective Doubleday was also
   shot, evidently by another officer. Joseph died at the scene, while Robertson
   was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. Detective Doubleday
   survived.
          Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers’
   actions constituted excessive force and asserting a claim for municipal
   liability. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were
   entitled to qualified immunity. The district court, relying on the video, found
   that Joseph reversed the car in the direction of the police officers before the
   officers fired. Based on that finding, the district court held that there was no
   genuine fact dispute that the JPSO officers’ use of force was not excessive
   under the circumstances, such that there was no constitutional violation.
   Plaintiffs’ claims thus failed at the first step of the qualified immunity
   analysis, and the court did not reach the second, i.e., whether the law bearing
   on Plaintiffs’ claims was clearly established. The court granted summary
   judgment to Defendants. Plaintiffs now appeal.
                                         II.
          Generally, “[w]e review a grant of summary judgment de novo,
   viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
   drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Kariuki v. Tarango,
   709 F.3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). But
   “a qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of
   proof.” Kokesh v. Curlee, 14 F.4th 382, 392 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation and
   quotation marks omitted).
          “Qualified immunity shields public officials sued in their individual
   capacities from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

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Case: 21-30672      Document: 00516802163           Page: 5     Date Filed: 06/27/2023

                                     No. 21-30672

   violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
   reasonable person would have known.” Id. at 391 (citation and quotation
   marks omitted). “[T]he plaintiff has the burden to negate the defense once
   it is properly raised.” Id. at 392 (citation omitted). “Thus, once the defense
   is invoked, the plaintiff must rebut the defense by establishing that the
   official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law and that
   genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of the
   official’s conduct according to that law.” Id. (cleaned up).
          The district court’s ruling for Defendants largely turned on its
   determination that the vehicle reversed before the officers fired. That makes
   sense. This court’s caselaw is clear that officers who are endangered by a
   weaponized vehicle may properly, within the strictures of the Fourth
   Amendment, use deadly force to neutralize the threat. It follows that this
   appeal primarily turns on (A) whether the district court was correct, based
   on the summary judgment record, that Joseph’s vehicle moved before the
   officers fired. Plaintiffs actually differ on this point, as discussed infra. They
   raise three additional issues, namely whether: (B) the officers identified
   themselves and commanded Joseph and Robertson to exit the vehicle before
   Joseph reversed the vehicle; (C) Joseph reversed the vehicle in the direction
   of an officer positioned at the rear of the vehicle; and (D) the fact that
   Robertson was merely a passenger in the vehicle bears on our analysis. We
   examine each of these issues in turn and then analyze Plaintiffs’ excessive
   force claims in their light.
                                          A.
          First, and foremost, whether Joseph reversed the vehicle before the
   officers fired. The district court relied in part on the security video in finding
   that Joseph reversed the vehicle first, and two of the three groups of Plaintiffs
   concede the district court’s view of the evidence. But the third group of

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                                          No. 21-30672

   Plaintiffs contends that the officers fired first. While the district court
   determined that the video of the incident provided a clear answer, we find
   the video inconclusive on this question. Nevertheless, the district court did
   not err in granting judgment on this basis because Plaintiffs offer nothing to
   counter other evidence, including officers’ testimony, that demonstrates
   Joseph reversed the vehicle before they fired.
           The Plaintiffs who contest this point rely solely on the video to
   support their position that the officers fired before Joseph reversed the car.
   Or, they say, at the least, there is a material fact dispute precluding summary
   judgment because the video is inconclusive. But the video does not move the
   needle in either direction, even under the latter theory, because it supports
   neither side’s version of events. On the other hand, two of the officers
   testified in their depositions that the vehicle moved first. Likewise, the JPSO
   investigative report states that the officers fired only after the vehicle moved.
   The video does not contradict this definitive evidence that the vehicle
   reversed first, and thus is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material
   fact. See Kokesh, 14 F.4th at 392; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (“A
   party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the
   assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record[.]”).
                                               B.
           Plaintiffs similarly fail to proffer evidence that the officers did not
   identify themselves as law enforcement and order Joseph and Robertson to
   exit the vehicle.1 By contrast, the officers consistently testified that they
   identified themselves and ordered Joseph and Robertson to step out of the
           _____________________
           1
             Plaintiffs alternatively characterize this issue as whether Joseph and Robertson
   heard the officers. But this point is irrelevant, as “we consider only what the officers knew
   at the time of their challenged conduct.” See Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 456 (5th Cir.
   2019), as revised (Aug. 21, 2019).

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                                     No. 21-30672

   vehicle before firing. One officer testified that as he was getting out of his
   vehicle, he heard another officer shout: “[P]olice, show me your hands. Shut
   it down.” Another officer testified that he got out of his vehicle yelling
   “show me your hands. Show me your hands, or turn off the vehicle.” He
   swore that he “could hear everyone else saying the same thing.” Plaintiffs
   cite to no evidence to the contrary, and because the video does not include
   audio, it cannot support their version of events. Thus, the district court
   correctly determined there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to this
   issue. See Kokesh, 14 F.4th at 392; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
                                          C.
          Likewise, Plaintiffs fail to point to any evidence creating a fact dispute
   regarding whether there was an officer behind Joseph’s vehicle when he
   reversed it. Plaintiffs posit that if there was no officer behind Joseph’s car, it
   is debatable whether Joseph was actually “weaponizing” his vehicle and thus
   questionable whether Defendants’ use of deadly force was justified. The
   video is admittedly unclear on this point. But one of the officers testified that
   he was “directly in between [a police vehicle] and [Joseph’s vehicle].” The
   same officer testified that he “remember[ed] the vehicle coming straight
   towards [him]” as Joseph reversed the vehicle. As above, because Plaintiffs
   offer no contrary evidence, there is no genuine factual dispute frustrating
   summary judgment. See Kokesh, 14 F.4th at 392; see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
   56(c)(1)(A).
                                          D.
          Finally, the Robertson Plaintiffs contend that the excessive force
   analysis is different as to Robertson because he was only a passenger in the
   vehicle, so he could not control what Joseph did as the driver. Regardless of
   their argument’s logical appeal, it is foreclosed by precedent. In cases where
   a vehicle with a passenger in it is deployed as a weapon, we examine the

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Case: 21-30672        Document: 00516802163             Page: 8      Date Filed: 06/27/2023

                                        No. 21-30672

   actions of the vehicle, not the driver. See Lytle v. Bexar County, Tex., 560 F.3d
   404, 412–15 (5th Cir. 2009). Thus, though a tragic circumstance, it is legally
   immaterial that Robertson was merely a passenger in Joseph’s car.
                                            III.
           Weighed against the record discussed above, the qualified immunity
   analysis comes into clear focus. And we focus only on whether Defendants’
   “conduct . . . violate[d] clearly established . . . constitutional rights,” Kokesh,
   14 F.4th at 391, namely Joseph’s and Robertson’s Fourth Amendment “right
   to be free from excessive force during a seizure,” Poole v. City of Shreveport,
   691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012).2 To sustain an excessive force claim, a
   plaintiff “must demonstrate: (1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only
   from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of
   which was clearly unreasonable.” Byrd v. Cornelius, 52 F.4th 265, 270 (5th
   Cir. 2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Courts weigh the Graham
   factors to assess whether the force used was reasonable: (1) “‘the severity of
   the crime at issue,’ (2) ‘whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
   safety of the officers or others,’ and (3) ‘whether he is actively resisting arrest
   or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Id. at 270 (quoting Graham v.
   Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). The “overarching question is whether
   the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and
   circumstances confronting them.”               Id. (citation and quotation marks
   omitted). “The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged
   from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene[.]” Id. (citation and
   quotation marks omitted).

           _____________________
           2
             We pretermit discussion of the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis,
   whether the law governing Defendants’ conduct was clearly established, because, as
   discussed above the line, Plaintiffs have not established a constitutional violation. See
   Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

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Case: 21-30672       Document: 00516802163            Page: 9     Date Filed: 06/27/2023

                                       No. 21-30672

          Here, the officers’ use of force was reasonable under the Graham
   factors. Heroin distribution is “certainly [a] serious offense[].” See Darden
   v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 880 F.3d 722, 729 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that
   cocaine distribution is a serious offense such that “the severity of the crime
   at issue weighs in favor of the officers”). And when Joseph threw his car into
   reverse, he “weaponized” it against the JPSO personnel at the scene—and
   against others who were in the vicinity. His maneuvering of the vehicle also
   indicated that its occupants were both “actively resisting arrest or attempting
   to evade arrest by flight.” See Byrd, 52 F.4th at 270 (citation omitted). Faced
   with these threats (which materialized within seconds of when the encounter
   began), the officers’ actions were reasonable under the Graham factors. See
   Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 322 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that a police
   officer was justified in using deadly force against a car accelerating toward
   him). Because the officers’ actions were reasonable, the use of force was not
   excessive, and there was no constitutional violation.3
          Mindful of our duty to assess “the reasonableness of a particular use
   of force . . . from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” Byrd,
   52 F.4th at 270 (citation and quotation marks omitted), we hold that the
   district court did not err in granting Defendants summary judgment on the
   basis of qualified immunity.
                                                                      AFFIRMED.

          _____________________
          3
              Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claims fail because there is no underlying
   constitutional violation. See Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 648 (5th Cir. 2013).

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