Court Opinion

ID: 9915987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 15:07:47.937694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:05.963118
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2421-22

LEROY KAY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SCI NEW JERSEY FUNERAL
SERVICES, LLC, d/b/a
BLOOMFIELD-COOPER
JEWISH CHAPELS,1
MARK R. HARRIS,
individually and as manager,
ANTHONY GERAHTY,
MELANIE CHONGOLOLA-
NESTOR, SARA GIUSTINO
TOLAND, ROBERT P.
SZEGETI, JAIME MAYNARD,
all individually and as
funeral directors, and SUSAN
BATKO, individually and as
Advanced Planning Director,

          Defendants-Appellants,

and

DIGNITY MEMORIAL

1
    Improperly pled as Bloomfield-Cooper Jewish Chapels.
CORPORATION,

     Defendant.
______________________________

            Argued October 3, 2023 – Decided January 9, 2024

            Before Judges Gooden Brown and Natali.

            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
            Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-2407-22.

            James-Harry Oliverio argued the cause for appellants
            (Anselmi & Carvelli, LLP, attorneys; James-Harry
            Oliverio, on the briefs).

            Clifford David Bidlingmaier, III, argued the cause for
            respondent (Law Offices of Robin Kay Lord, LLC, and
            Bidlingmaier & Bidlingmaier, PC, attorneys; Robin
            Kay Lord and Clifford David Bidlingmaier, III, on the
            brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendants SCI New Jersey Funeral Services, LLC, d/b/a Bloomfield-

Cooper Jewish Chapels,2 improperly pled as Bloomfield-Cooper Jewish

Chapels, its manager, and several directors appeal from the March 31, 2023,

Law Division order denying their motion to compel arbitration and dismiss

2
   It is unclear in the record how SCI New Jersey Funeral Services, LLC, d/b/a
Bloomfield-Cooper Jewish Chapels, and Dignity Memorial Corporation are
related. According to defendants' merits brief, Dignity Memorial Corporation
"is not affiliated with [d]efendants."
                                                                        A-2421-22
                                      2
plaintiff Leroy Kay's complaint without prejudice. We reverse and remand for

limited discovery concerning the formation of the operative agreement and

specifically whether the parties agreed to arbitrate any disputes.

                                            I.

       Defendants provided mortuary services to plaintiff, an eighty-five-year-

old widower who had just lost his wife of sixty-three years on October 3, 2020,

when she died in her sleep at their home. The dispute arose from a disastrous

mishap that occurred when defendants mishandled plaintiff's deceased wife's

body while performing the mortuary services shortly after her death.

       In his ensuing complaint, filed nearly two years later, plaintiff asserted

that he and his wife, Janet Kay, were "of the Jewish faith" and wished to be

buried in accordance with its tenets. As a result, plaintiff contacted defendants

because they held themselves out as "specializ[ing] in Jewish mortuary

services," and on October 3, 2020, defendants took possession of the body along

with specific clothing and jewelry for the burial.       Plaintiff averred in his

complaint that "a contract was formed" between plaintiff and defendants the

following day, October 4, 2020, "for mortuary services," and for Janet's 3 remains

to be "entombed" at "Mount Sinai Cemetery in Morganville." Plaintiff and

3
    We use first names because of the common surname and intend no disrespect.
                                                                            A-2421-22
                                        3
defendants agreed that the funeral would take place on October 6, 2020, and that

defendants would prepare and transport Janet's body to the cemetery.

      According to the complaint, about sixty "friends and family [members]"

gathered with plaintiff at Mount Sinai Cemetery on October 6, 2020, for the

scheduled funeral service.     However, after a prolonged delay, defendant's

representative contacted plaintiff and asked questions "indicat[ing] that they had

lost the remains of [the decedent]." During a FaceTime call initiated by the

representative, plaintiff and family members were shown a deceased woman

who was not plaintiff's wife but wearing her clothing and jewelry. Plaintiff and

the guests were distraught. Nevertheless, due to the number of family and

friends who had traveled to attend the service, the service continued at the

mausoleum without Janet's body.

      The complaint asserted that later in the day, defendants contacted plaintiff

and informed him that Janet "was found . . . buried in [n]orthern New Jersey"

"in the wrong cemetery," "in the wrong clothes," "with another woman's

jewelry" and "next to a deceased man she [did] not know." The following day,

October 7, 2020, after Janet's exhumation was approved, her body was

disinterred from the northern New Jersey burial site. On October 8, 2020, after

plaintiff's daughter travelled to defendants' facilities in Manalapan to identify

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Janet's decomposing body, Janet's final funeral service was held with members

of the immediate family in attendance.       At the conclusion of the service,

defendants' representative "had [plaintiff] sign a contract" without "explaining"

or "giving him the opportunity to review the document." Instead, plaintiff

alleged the representative gave the impression that "they [would] handle

everything."

      In the complaint, plaintiff asserted the following causes of action: (1) loss

of right to interment; (2) breach of contract; (3) violation of the New Jersey

Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to –228; (4) negligent infliction of

emotional distress; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (6)

negligence. Attached to the complaint was a copy of the contract, showing an

unpaid balance of $13,241.12.

      The three-page contract, which is dated October 4, 2020, contained two

provisions that referenced arbitration. The first provision, located on the second

page above the signature line, read, "NOTICE:              BY SIGNING THIS

AGREEMENT, YOU ARE AGREEING THAT ANY CLAIM YOU MAY

HAVE AGAINST THE SELLER SHALL BE RESOLVED BY ARBITRATION

AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A COURT OR JURY TRIAL

AS WELL AS YOUR RIGHT OF APPEAL." (Boldface omitted). A statement

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                                        5
incorporating terms and conditions from the third page of the contract appeared

above the notice referenced above, stating: "SEE OTHER SIDE FOR TERMS

AND CONDITIONS THAT ARE PART OF THIS AGREEMENT. DO NOT

SIGN THIS AGREEMENT BEFORE YOU READ IT OR IF IT CONTAINS

ANY BLANK SPACES. YOU ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF AN EXACT

COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT." (Boldface omitted).

      The referenced terms and conditions on the third page included an

arbitration provision that read in pertinent part:

            ARBITRATION: YOU AGREE THAT ANY CLAIM
            YOU MAY HAVE RELATING TO THE
            TRANSACTION CONTEMPLATED BY THIS
            AGREEMENT (INCLUDING ANY CLAIM OR
            CONTROVERSY         REGARDING       THE
            INTERPRETATION OF THIS ARBITRATION
            CLAUSE) SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO AND
            FINALLY RESOLVED BY MANDATORY AND
            BINDING ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH
            THE APPLICABLE RULES OF THE AMERICAN
            ARBITRATION      ASSOCIATION    ("AAA");
            PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE FOREGOING
            REFERENCE TO THE AAA RULES SHALL NOT BE
            DEEMED TO REQUIRE ANY FILING WITH THAT
            ORGANIZATION,     NOR     ANY    DIRECT
            INVOLVEMENT OF THAT ORGANIZATION. THE
            ARBITRATOR SHALL BE SELECTED BY
            MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. IF THE
            PARTIES FAIL TO OR ARE UNABLE TO AGREE
            ON THE SELECTION OF AN APPROPRIATE
            ARBITRATOR, THE AAA SHALL SELECT THE
            ARBITRATOR PURSUANT TO ITS RULES AND

                                                                         A-2421-22
                                         6
            PROCEDURES UPON THE APPLICATION OF ONE
            OR BOTH PARTIES. THIS AGREEMENT TO
            ARBITRATE ALSO APPLIES TO ANY CLAIM OR
            DISPUTE BETWEEN OR AMONG THE SELLER,
            YOU AS THE PURCHASER, ANY PERSON WHO
            CLAIMS TO BE A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
            OF THIS AGREEMENT, ANY OF THE SELLER'S
            EMPLOYEES OR AGENTS, ANY OF THE
            SELLER'S PARENT, SUBSIDIARY, OR AFFILIATE
            CORPORATIONS, AND ANY OF THE EMPLOYEES
            OR AGENTS OF THOSE PARENT, SUBSIDIARY
            OR AFFILIATE CORPORATIONS.

            [(Boldface omitted).]

      Below the arbitration clause was an integration clause which stated:

            This [a]greement contains all terms which have been
            agreed upon by you and us relating to the goods and
            services listed in the Statement of Funeral Goods and
            Services Selected. This [a]greement replaces all other
            discussions and agreements, whether oral or written,
            relating to those goods and services. No subsequent
            discussion or agreement can change the terms of this
            [a]greement unless it is written and is signed by both
            you and us.

      Relying on the arbitration provision in the contract, defendants moved to

dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(a) and compel arbitration. In a

certification opposing defendants' motion, plaintiff averred that he signed the

contract on October 8, 2020, not October 4, 2020. Plaintiff asserted he signed

the contract "on a podium . . . placed in front of [him] in the mausoleum"

following his wife's funeral service "after having seen [his] wife's partially

                                                                         A-2421-22
                                       7
decomposed body." Plaintiff certified he "was instructed to . . . sign what [he]

believed to be an invoice presented by [defendant] Anthony Gerahty," one of

the funeral directors. According to plaintiff, Gerahty "claimed that it needed to

be signed so that the funeral home could 'pick up the bill.'" Plaintiff stated "[a]t

no point [has he] ever been asked to . . . nor . . . paid . . . [d]efendants for the

services and arrangements for [his] wife's funeral" and "at no time prior to

October 8, 2020, did [he] ever discuss an arbitration agreement with . . .

[d]efendants."

      On March 31, 2023, the motion judge conducted oral argument, positing

that the issue before the court was "whether . . . the [arbitration] agreement

[was] valid, and . . . whether this dispute falls within the agreement's scope."

Defendants argued that the funeral services agreement was a valid contract

containing an arbitration clause applicable to claims by both parties and required

resolution by an arbitrator of any claims concerning the transaction or any

related wrongdoing. Defendants further asserted that plaintiff's challenge to the

enforceability of the contract as a whole, which included lack of consideration,

fraud, duress, misrepresentation, and unconscionability, was a matter statutorily

reserved for the arbitrator pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6 under Prima Paint

Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).

                                                                              A-2421-22
                                         8
      Plaintiff countered that he entered into an oral agreement with defendants

on October 4, 2020, which did not include any mention of an arbitration

agreement.    Therefore, according to plaintiff, the October 4, 2020, oral

agreement rendered the arbitration clause contained in the October 8, 2020,

invoice invalid under Bernetich, Hatzell & Pascu, LLC v. Medical Records

Online, Inc., 445 N.J. Super. 173, 184 (App. Div. 2016), where this court held

that "a party may not impose an arbitration clause after the parties have already

exchanged consideration and created an enforceable contract." Plaintiff also

argued the arbitration provision was unenforceable because there was no

meeting of the minds or mutual assent, as the agreement was presented to him

as simply an invoice acknowledging receipt of funeral services. Alternatively,

plaintiff asserted the October 8, 2020, agreement was procedurally

unconscionable and a contract of adhesion.

      In an order entered on March 31, 2023, the judge denied defendants'

motion. In an oral decision, the judge acknowledged that "the parties actually

entered into an oral contract previously, where no arbitration was discussed."

However, the judge determined the subsequent written contract entered on

October 8, 2020, following "an alleged breach . . . contain[ed] the required

mutual assent required to enforce an arbitration provision." Further, the judge

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                                       9
found that "the terms of the arbitration provision [were] clear and

unambiguous," and plaintiff's dispute "aris[ing] out of funeral services

rendered" fell "within the scope" of the agreement.

      Nevertheless, the judge relied on Moore v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics

& Gynecology, L.L.C., 416 N.J. Super. 30, 37-38 (App. Div. 2010), where this

court stated that "courts may decline to enforce when well-established principles

addressing the absence of a consensual agreement and unfairness in contracting

and the agreement warrant relief." Applying Moore's principles, the judge

declined to enforce the agreement to            arbitrate   on the ground of

"unconscionability."

      The judge explained:

            [I]t's presently disputed as to when plaintiff signed the
            subject contract, and the circumstances surrounding the
            signature. The [c]ourt finds that his age, regarding
            what could be a sophisticated business term, that the
            bargaining tactics, and more importantly, the particular
            setting, all weigh in favor of a finding of procedural
            unconscionability under Muhammad[ v. County Bank
            of Rehoboth Beach, 189 N.J. 1 (2006)].

                  The fact that he was told it was just an invoice he
            needed to sign off on also weighs against finding
            otherwise.

      The judge noted further,

                                                                           A-2421-22
                                      10
           if the paper contract was not presented to plaintiff until
           after the funeral, plaintiff would have been in a position
           where he essentially had to accept the terms of [the]
           contract, which would indicate lack of . . . consent,
           especially in reviewing how the services were rendered,
           which would make it more of an adhesion contract.

                 . . . Last but not least, it would not be in the
           public interest to enforce an arbitration clause under
           these circumstances.

This appeal followed.

     On appeal, defendants raise the following points for our consideration:

           POINT I

           THE LAW DIVISION ERRED BY NOT DISMISSING
           THE COMPLAINT SO THAT AN ARBITRATOR
           CAN DETERMINE THE VALIDITY AND
           ENFORCEABILITY     OF   THE   CONTRACT
           CONTAINING THE ARBITRATION PROVISION.
           (NOT RAISED BELOW).

           POINT II

           THE DECISION BELOW SHOULD BE REVERSED
           BECAUSE THE LAW DIVISION'S FINDING THAT
           THE    ARBITRATION    PROVISION     WAS
           PROCEDURALLY UNCONSCIONABLE WAS NOT
           SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE, SUBSTANTIAL
           AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.

                 A.   Plaintiff Failed to Carry His Burden
                 That the Arbitration Agreement was
                 Unconscionable.

                                                                        A-2421-22
                                      11
                    B.    Alternatively, The Law Division
                    Should Have Permitted Limited Discovery
                    on the Conscionability Issue.

                                              II.

       In reviewing an order on a motion to compel arbitration, the principles

governing our analysis are well-established.

                     We review a trial court's order granting or
              denying a motion to compel arbitration de novo because
              the validity of an arbitration agreement presents a
              question of law. Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46
              (2020) (citing Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of
              Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 316 (2019)). As a result, we
              "need not give deference to the [legal] analysis by the
              trial court." Goffe v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J.
              191, 207 (2019) (citing Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst.,
              225 N.J. 289, 303 (2016)).

                     New Jersey has a long-standing policy favoring
              arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. See
              Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 133 (2020)
              ("Like the federal policy expressed by Congress in the
              FAA,[4] 'the affirmative policy of this State, both
              legislative and judicial, favors arbitration as a
              mechanism of resolving disputes.'" (quoting Martindale
              v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76, 92 (2002))). "Although
              'arbitration [is] a favored method for resolving disputes
              . . . [t]hat favored status . . . is not without limits.'"
              Gayles by Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park, 468
              N.J. Super. 17, 23 (App. Div. 2021) (alterations in
              original) (quoting Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics
              & Gynecology Assocs., PA, 168 N.J. 124, 131-32
              (2001)).

4
    FAA refers to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
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                                         12
                    "An arbitration agreement must be the result of
             the parties' mutual assent, according to customary
             principles of state contract law." Skuse, 244 N.J. at 48
             (citing Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., LP, 219 N.J.
             430, 442 (2014)). "Thus, 'there must be a meeting of
             the minds for an agreement to exist before enforcement
             is considered.'" Ibid. (quoting Kernahan, 236 N.J. at
             319).

             [Santana v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, 475 N.J. Super.
             279, 285 (App. Div. 2023) (alterations in original).]

      Therefore, "[t]he first step in considering plaintiff's challenge to

enforcement of an arbitration requirement must be to determine whether a valid

agreement exists." Martindale, 173 N.J. at 83; see also N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6(b).

In determining validity, "arbitration agreements may not be subjected to more

burdensome contract formation requirements than that required for any other

contractual topic." Martindale, 173 N.J. at 83. As such, "'[g]enerally applicable

contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to

invalidate   arbitration   agreements    without   contravening    [the   FAA],'"

Muhammad, 189 N.J. at 12 (emphasis omitted), and in New Jersey, "[i]t is well

settled that courts 'may refuse to enforce contracts that are unconscionable,'" id.

at 15 (quoting Saxon Constr. & Mgmt. Corp. v. Masterclean of N.C., Inc., 273

N.J. Super. 231, 236 (App. Div. 1994)).

                                                                             A-2421-22
                                        13
        There are two types of unconscionability, procedural and substantive.

Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J. 28, 55 (2006) (Zazzali, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part) (citing Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 352 N.J.

Super. 555, 564 (Ch. Div. 2002)).           Pertinent to this appeal, procedural

unconscionability includes "a variety of inadequacies, such as age, literacy, lack

of sophistication, hidden or unduly complex contract terms, bargaining tactics,

and the particular setting existing during the contract formation process,"

Muhammad, 189 N.J. at 15 (quoting Sitogum Holdings, Inc., 352 N.J. Super. at

564).

        Terms within a contract of adhesion, "'[a] contract where one party . . .

must accept or reject the contract,'" Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply

Comm'n, 127 N.J. 344, 353 (1992) (alterations in original) (quoting Vasquez v.

Glassboro Serv. Ass'n, 83 N.J. 86, 104 (1980)), "necessarily involve indicia of

procedural unconscionability," Muhammad, 189 N.J. at 15 (citing Rudbart, 127

N.J. at 356). "'[T]he essential nature of a contract of adhesion is that it is

presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, commonly in a standardized printed

form, without opportunity for the "adhering" party to negotiate except perhaps

on a few particulars.'"     Ibid. (quoting Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 353).        "The

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                                       14
determination that a contract is one of adhesion, however, 'is the beginning, not

the end, of the inquiry.'" Ibid. (quoting Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 354).

      As such, a contract of adhesion is not by its nature alone unenforceable.

Rudbart, 127 N.J. at 354. Instead, as the Court set forth in Rudbart, courts

should look to additional factors such as "[1] the subject matter of the contract,

[2] the parties' relative bargaining positions, [3] the degree of economic

compulsion motivating the 'adhering' party, and [4] the public interests affected

by the contract." Id. at 356. These factors "determine whether the contract is

so oppressive, or inconsistent with the vindication of public policy, that it would

be unconscionable to permit its enforcement." Delta Funding Corp., 189 N.J. at

40 (citations omitted). Where there are allegations of unconscionability, courts

must conduct a fact-sensitive analysis. Muhammad, 189 N.J. at 15-16. But the

burden of proving the defense of unconscionability is on the party challenging

the enforceability of the agreement. Martindale, 173 N.J. at 91.

      Defendants argue that because plaintiff challenged "the enforceability and

validity of the [c]ontract as a whole," rather than specifically challenging the

arbitration provision itself, under Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04, Goffe, 238

N.J. at 195, and N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-6, an arbitrator should have determined the

                                                                             A-2421-22
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threshold issue of the container contract's overall validity and enforceability.

We disagree.

      We explained the holdings in Prima Paint and Goffe in Largoza v. FKM

Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div. 2022) as follows:

                   In [Prima Paint], the United States Supreme
            Court, relying on the [FAA], concluded that arbitration
            clauses are severable from other provisions in the
            contracts in which they are embedded, despite general
            fraud in the inducement claims, unless such claims
            pertain to the arbitration clause specifically. Similarly,
            in Rent-A-Center, [West], Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63,
            72 (2010), the Court enforced a provision in an
            arbitration agreement delegating the question of
            arbitrability to the arbitrator despite a challenge to the
            validity of the contract as a whole.

                   Our Supreme Court followed Prima Paint and
            Rent-A-Center in [Goffe], and concluded that the
            plaintiffs' claims were subject to an enforceable
            arbitration agreement.       In Goffe, the plaintiffs
            "attack[ed] the sales contracts in their entirety,
            challenging their formation process and arguing that
            they [were], at best, unenforceable." [238 N.J.] at 195.
            Plaintiffs did not, however, challenge the validity of the
            arbitration clause specifically. Ibid. Accordingly, the
            Court held that "the arbitration agreement [was]
            severable and enforceable" and required the plaintiffs
            to arbitrate their claims. Id. at 216-17. Similarly, in
            Van Syoc v. Walter, 259 N.J. Super. 337, 339 (App.
            Div. 1992), we enforced an arbitration clause despite
            allegations of fraudulent inducement as to the contract,
            reasoning "[u]nless the arbitration provision itself was
            a product of fraud, the election should be enforced."

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                                       16
            [Largoza, 474 N.J. Super. at 74-75 (fifth, sixth, eighth,
            and ninth alterations in original).]

      Here, plaintiff maintains the parties entered into a binding oral agreement

that did not include any arbitration provision, followed by a written agreement

containing a new and unconscionable arbitration clause. Unlike Goffe, plaintiff

challenges the enforceability of the arbitration provision contained in the written

version of the agreement. Under such circumstances, as we stated in Knight v.

Vivint Solar Developer, LLC,

            [T]he arbitrator cannot decide the validity of the
            [contract], unless and until the trial court initially
            resolves the issues of fact pertaining to the formation of
            the arbitration provision, and determines the parties
            agreed to arbitrate their claims. Absent that agreement,
            the arbitrator is not empowered to determine plaintiff's
            issues concerning the formation and execution of the
            [contract]. In that regard, we are unpersuaded by
            defendants' argument that because the arbitration
            agreement is contained within the [contract], which
            plaintiff also challenges, the arbitrator must determine
            its validity. In our view, that procedure puts the cart
            before the horse.

            [465 N.J. Super. 416, 428 (App. Div. 2020).]

      We acknowledge that the written contract included an integration clause

stating it "replace[d] all other discussions and agreements, whether oral or

written, relating to th[e] goods and services." We also note, however, that the

written agreement was a contract of adhesion, presented to plaintiff for signature

                                                                             A-2421-22
                                       17
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, after the funeral services had already been rendered

and leaving nothing for plaintiff to negotiate.

      Defendants claim that without limited discovery, invalidating the

arbitration provision on unconscionability grounds was not supported by

adequate, substantial, and credible evidence. We agree that limited discovery is

appropriate here. See Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resol., L.L.C., 716 F.3d

764, 776 (3d Cir. 2013) (requiring limited discovery on the question of

arbitrability when the party opposing arbitration "has responded to a motion to

compel arbitration with additional facts sufficient to place the agreement to

arbitrate in issue").

      Stated differently, we are convinced that the facts in the record are

insufficient to permit a full and proper consideration of the Rudbart factors and

a remand is appropriate to permit further discovery and factual findings on those

factors. Specifically, after reviewing plaintiff's certification, questions remain

regarding his level of sophistication, his capacity to review and understand the

agreement, and whether he was unduly influenced by other factors. In reaching

our conclusion, we recognize that generally, defendants do not dispute the

circumstances leading to the agreement's execution, including the fact that the

agreement was presented as an invoice for services already performed as well

                                                                              A-2421-22
                                        18
as the horrendous series of events leading to Janet's final funeral service at

Mount Sinai Cemetery.      Nevertheless, we remain convinced that discovery

limited to the issues of arbitrability and unconscionability is necessary and

appropriate as critical unresolved facts relevant to unconscionability are within

plaintiff's knowledge and control. Cf. Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472

(2020) (holding summary judgment is inappropriate "when discovery is

incomplete and 'critical facts are peculiarly within the moving party's

knowledge'" (quoting James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 155 N.J. 279, 311

(1998))).

      Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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