Court Opinion

ID: 9585582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:01:49.085083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:00.866520
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
dissenting.
This defendant struck and kicked a policeman. For this he was convicted twice, once for disorderly conduct in municipal court and later for simple battery in state court. I dissent on the basis of Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161 (97 SC 2221, 53 LE2d 187) (1977), and In re Nielsen, 131 U. S. 176 (9 SC 672, 33 LE 118) (1889).
*292In Brown v. Ohio, supra, it was held that after a person has been convicted of one offense, the double jeopardy clause bars prosecution for a greater offense of which the first was a lesser included offense (unless additional facts have occurred or have been discovered). Specifically, the court held that conviction of the crime of joyriding precluded a subsequent prosecution for auto theft joyriding being a lesser included offense under auto theft.
Subject to two decisional exceptions (Ashe v. Swensen, 397 U. S. 436 (90 SC 1189, 25 LE2d 469) (1970), and In re Nielsen, supra), the court in Brown reaffirmed the Blockburger test, to wit: " 'The applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not . . .’ ” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. at 166, quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 304 (52 SC 180, 76 LE 306) (1932).
Brown v. Ohio, not Blockburger, is applicable here. The Atlanta Code proscribes the following as disorderly conduct: "Any person who shall by acts of violence interfere with another’s pursuit of a lawful occupation...” 1977 Atlanta Code of Ordinances 17-3001.10.1 Our Criminal Code defines simple battery as follows: "A person commits simple battery when he either (a) intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with the person of another or (b) intentionally causes physical harm to another.” Code Ann. § 26-1304.
Here, oddly, simple battery is the "lesser offense” in that the crime of disorderly conduct requires proof of a fact that the crime of simple battery does not; to wit: interference with another’s pursuit of a lawful occupation. However, aside from this difference, the crime of simple battery requires proof of no fact that disorderly *293conduct does not. The "acts of violence” necessary to prove disorderly conduct were the same here as the intentional physical contact or harm necessary to prove simple battery. Hence, Brown v. Ohio bars reprosecution here.
Moreover, In re Nielsen, supra (the Blockburger exception), bars reprosecution here. Insofar as pertinent, Nielsen was living in Utah while it was still a territory and where Congress was suppressing polygamy. He was convicted in district court of the crime of cohabiting with more than one woman. Later he was convicted of committing adultery with one of the women he had been cohabiting with, it being alleged in the indictment that he was married to another woman. The Supreme Court found double jeopardy. In order to prove the crime of cohabiting, it was necessary to prove "living together,” yet it was not necessary to prove "living together” in order to prove adultery. And, in proving adultery, it was necessary to prove that marriage to another existed, although it was not necessary to prove marriage to prove cohabiting. Thus, each crime required proof of facts that the other did not (living together in the one crime, and marriage in the other crime).
Even though the later Blockburger test was technically satisfied, double jeopardy nevertheless was found. This was so because, in those successive prosecutions, the court found sexual intercourse, living together and marriage to be elements of both crimes — adultery and cohabiting. That is to say, even where each crime requires proof of a fact that the other does not, double jeopardy attaches on a successive prosecution where each crime admits (and the state relies upon) proof of the disparate required fact as proof of the other required fact; i.e., the disparate facts of marriage to one person and sexual intercourse with another, albeit not required to prove unlawful cohabitation, were admissible as proof in the unlawful cohabitation case.
In the case before us, the proof of acts of violence (striking a policeman) in the disorderly conduct case (even if it could be said that such proof was not required in the simple battery case) was admissible and was utilized as proof of intentional physical contact or harm in the later battery case, and thus the Nielsen principle was *294violated.
I therefore dissent on the grounds of Brown v. Ohio and In re Nielsen, supra.

 Other provisions of the Atlanta Code, e.g., § 17-3001.1, make it clear that "acts of violence” as used in § 17-3001.1Ó are more than simple assaults.