Court Opinion

ID: 9889245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-07 00:00:32.788399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:39.235798
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60466     Document: 00516923198       Page: 1    Date Filed: 10/06/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                          FILED
                                                               October 6, 2023
                                No. 22-60466                    Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                          Clerk

   Darling Ingredients, Incorporated,

                                                                      Petitioner,

                                     versus

   Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission;
   Martin Walsh, Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor,

                                                                  Respondents.
                  ______________________________

      Appeal from the Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission
                           Agency No. 21-0240
                ______________________________

   Before Jones, Clement, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
   Edith Brown Clement:
         Two people were killed while unclogging a machine at a chicken-
   rendering plant. When the Occupational Safety and Health Agency
   investigated, it found that the plant’s “lockout/tagout” procedures did not
   “clearly and specifically outline” how to safely work on the machine, so it
   cited the plant’s owner. Because we find no error in the decision to uphold
   those citations, we AFFIRM.
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                                         No. 22-60466

                                               I.
           Darling Ingredients, Inc. operates a chicken-rendering facility in
   Byram, Mississippi.1 One of the machines there is a “hydrolyzer,” or a
   contraption that uses pressurized steam to break down “poultry parts,”
   namely feathers and quills. The result is a digestible liquid known as “poultry
   meal” which Darling uses to make pet food.
           Like any machine, the hydrolyzer requires upkeep. Specifically,
   chicken parts regularly build up in the hydrolyzer and lead to “blockage[s].”
   When that happens, pressure becomes trapped and “caus[es] the whole
   [machine] to stop.” To get it running again, the hydrolyzer must be cleaned
   out. But to do that, the hydrolyzer’s pent-up pressure must be released first.
   Apparently, that can be done in a number of ways. An operator can “shuttl[e]
   the gates,” meaning he or she opens and closes a series of doors in the
   machine in a certain order, or unlatch a pressure-relief valve. A worker could
   also wait for the pressure to bleed off naturally, but that takes time.
           On August 10, 2020, the Unit A hydrolyzer at Darling’s facility
   became clogged, causing a pressure buildup. The machine’s operator
   “shuttl[ed] the gates,” but nothing happened. So he alerted his supervisor,
   and his supervisor called the maintenance team. Maintenance sent over three
   men—Fortenberry, Young, and Jackson. When they arrived on the scene,
   the trio tried the usual tricks—they shuttled the gates and opened the relief
   valve—but to no avail. So they cut the power to the hydrolyzer and “closed
   the steam valve” so that no more steam would flow into the machine. Then,

           _____________________
           1
            Such a facility “cuts and grinds accepted animal carcasses into small pieces, to be
   blended[,] cooked,” and “separated” into “[f]at, protein, and water,” which is used to
   make products like soap, cooking oils, and animal feed. Rendering Module, United
   States                   Department                     of                Agriculture,
   www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/carcass/docs/training/7-rendering.pdf.

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   with apparent hesitation, the team decided to remove a bolted, eight-inch
   flange from the hydrolyzer in order to release the trapped pressure.
          But the removal of any part of the hydrolyzer may result in rapid
   depressurization. So, by removing the flange’s bolts, the maintenance crew
   risked exposing themselves to the release of 2,000 pounds or more of
   pressurized air. That wasn’t lost on the group—each time they took a bolt
   off, they would “jump back.” Eventually, however, the “pressure overcame
   the threading” of the remaining bolts and the “flange burst open.” When it
   did, “steam and hot material . . . spewed out of the machine,” “covering”
   the three workers. Jackson and Fortenberry were gravely burned and died
   from their wounds.
          When the Occupational Safety and Health Administration learned of
   Fortenberry and Jackson’s deaths, they launched an investigation. The
   agency “took photographs, measurements, [and] conducted interview[s].”
   After the investigation, OSHA cited Darling for two violations of 29 C.F.R.
   § 1910.147, a “lockout/tagout” regulation. Lockout/tagout is an industry
   term for a safety system that tries to prevent the “unexpected energization
   or start up of [] machines” or the “release of stored energy” during
   “servic[e] and maintenance.” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(b). Section 147 instructs
   employers to safeguard their employees from such dangers through isolation
   devices, protective equipment, regular training programs, and detailed
   written work procedures. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147.
          Specifically, Darling was charged with failing to “clearly and
   specifically outline the . . . rules and technique to be utilized for the control
   of hazardous energy,” § 1910.147(c)(4)(ii), and (2) “clearly and specifically
   outline the steps for shutting down, isolating, blocking and securing the
   machines or equipment to control hazardous energy” in its “energy control
   procedures,” § 1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(B). In citing Darling, OSHA concluded

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   that the maintenance crew was exposed to a “hazardous energy source”—
   the release of “[h]igh pressure steam” from the hydrolyzer—because
   Darling did not have any “specific procedure or steps” for the “employee[s]
   to reference” while working on the machine.
           Darling challenged the citations before the Occupational Safety and
   Health Review Commission. At a trial before an Administrative Law Judge,
   Darling insisted that the maintenance team went off script. The company
   maintained that the group should have called a supervisor—as they were
   trained to do—or let the pressure bleed off naturally after their initial efforts
   failed. Darling claims that this was the established practice at the Byram
   facility and was clearly stated in the hydrolyzer’s machine-specific
   lockout/tagout procedure. OSHA, on the other hand, argued that the crew’s
   conduct stemmed directly from a lack of clearly written guidance in the
   company’s lockout/tagout procedures. Specifically, “Step 6” of the
   procedure told the workers only that, to make the machine safe, they must
   “[r]elieve internal pressure.” Per OSHA, Darling should have—as required
   by law—written a clearer, more instructive policy on locking out the
   hydrolyzer before working on it.
           After the trial, the ALJ ruled in favor of OSHA, finding that (1)
   Darling did violate Section 147; (2) the violation was a repeat; (3) it was
   serious; and (4) Darling waived any “independent employee misconduct”
   defense. Darling appeals all of these decisions, save for the serious
   classification.2

           _____________________
           2
            We note briefly that the ALJ concluded that “there is no question[] the violations
   were serious—death did occur and it was a probable consequence if an accident resulted
   from the violative condition.” The former factor—the occurrence of a death—is not a
   consideration under the “seriousness” standard. Instead, in line with the court’s latter
   conclusion, we ask whether there’s a “‘substantial probability’ that a particular violation
   could result in death or serious physical harm.’” Chao v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev.

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                                               II.
           We are “bound by the administrative law judge’s findings of fact” if
   they are “supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Austin Indus. Specialty
   Servs., L.P. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 765 F.3d 434, 438
   (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 660(a)). Substantial
   evidence means “evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
   support a conclusion.” Id. It’s a “deferential” standard. S. Hens, Inc. v.
   Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 930 F.3d 667, 682 (5th Cir. 2019).
   “[E]ven if the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion,” it
   must “uphold [the] factual findings if a reasonable person could have found”
   similarly. Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Perez, 811 F.3d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 2016)
   (citation and quotations omitted); Excel Modular Scaffold & Leasing Co. v.
   Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 943 F.3d 748, 754 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (ALJ decisions will be upheld “even if this court could justifiably reach a
   different result de novo”) (citation and quotations omitted). As for “legal
   conclusions,” they are reviewed for whether they are “arbitrary, capricious,
   an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” S. Hens,
   930 F.3d at 675 (citations omitted).

                                               A.
           We begin with Darling’s merits-based challenge to the citations. To
   start, “[OSHA] has the burden of proving sufficient facts to support [a]
   citation.” S. Hens., 930 F.3d at 675. That means they must show “by a
   preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the cited standard applies; (2)
   noncompliance with the cited standard; (3) access or exposure to the

           _____________________
   Comm’n, 401 F.3d 355, 367 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). But because Darling didn’t
   appeal that issue, it’s forfeited. See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th
   Cir. 2021).

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   violative conditions; and (4) that the employer had actual or constructive
   knowledge of the conditions through the exercise of reasonable due
   diligence.” Sanderson Farms, 811 F.3d at 735 (citing Sec’y of Lab. v. Jesse
   Remodeling, LLC, 22 BNA OSHC 1340 (O.S.H.R.C.A.L.J. June 2, 2006)).
          After a trial, the ALJ found that OSHA established all four
   requirements to uphold the Section 147 violations. First, the regulation
   clearly applied to the conduct of the maintenance crew—“Darling admits
   that[.]” Second, Darling’s employees were exposed to the risks of a lacking
   procedure, namely a “serious burn hazard,” because of the violation. Darling
   does not contest that either. Third, Darling’s procedure did not comply with
   Section 147’s requirement that an employer “clearly and specifically
   outline” the methods for controlling hazardous energy. The ALJ rejected
   Darling’s argument that its procedures must be “read in conjunction” with
   the hydrolyzer’s manual and any training the team received. The procedure,
   the ALJ reasoned, must be sufficient in and of itself. But, as OSHA argued,
   the hydrolyzer’s procedure was too broad and uninstructive. Finally, the ALJ
   found that Darling had actual or constructive knowledge that its
   lockout/tagout procedures violated Section 147. Specifically, OSHA proved
   that “Darling knew of the contents of its own [lockout/tagout] procedure,
   and also knew it had recently been cited for a similar [] violation.” On appeal,
   Darling advances two arguments: (1) it complied with Section 147; and (2) it
   did not have knowledge of any violation. Considering the standard of review
   at play, we disagree.
                                          1.
          First, the ALJ found that Darling’s lockout/tagout procedure did not
   satisfy the requirements of Section 147. Generally speaking, a lockout/tagout
   procedure must be at least detailed enough “to guide an employee through
   the lockout process.” Gen. Motors Corp., 22 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1019 at *8

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   (O.S.H.R.C. Dec. 4, 2007) (citation omitted). To comply with Section 147, a
   procedure must “inform the employee of the specific procedural steps to
   shut down and lock out a machine.” Id.
           In General Motors, the Commission found that a “brief[]”
   lockout/tagout procedure made up of generic commands (i.e., use “normal
   stopping procedure,” ensure “dissipation of any stored energy”) was not
   adequate. Id. Such language “lacks [] the specifics” required by Section 147.
   Id. In another case, Secretary of Labor v. Drexel Chemical Company, an
   employer’s written procedures “f[e]ll far short” because they did not guide
   employees on “the type and magnitude of the energy, the method to control
   the energy, the shut down procedure, the energy isolating device and
   method, and the method to dissipate stored or residual energy.” 17 O.S.H. Cas.
   (BNA) 1908 (O.S.H.R.C. Mar. 3, 1997) (emphasis added); see also Basic
   Grain Prod., Inc., 24 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2024 at *9 (O.S.H.R.C.A.L.J. Nov.
   5, 2013) (under Section 147, a lockout/tagout procedure must provide
   “methods to dissipate or restrain energy”).
           With that in mind, we turn to Darling’s lockout/tagout procedure.
   The machine-specific procedure for the hydrolyzer is a ten-step process that
   is mandatory when “maintenance or servicing is done.”3 After all, this
   process seeks to ensure that the machine is safe to work on. Consequently,
   the first few steps (i.e., Steps 1–5) are not surprising: a worker must notify
   anyone in the area of pending work and turn the machine off. Then, a worker
   must use “energy isolating devices,” or “lockout[s],” to ensure that the
   machine isn’t turned back on. The rub, however, is in Step 6. At Step 6,
   before working on the machine, a worker must “[m]ake all of the following
           _____________________
           3
              Darling has a general lockout/tagout policy that applies company-wide. That
   policy is not at issue. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(c) (providing that, with some exceptions,
   machine-specific procedures must be created).

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   sources of stored energy”—including “steam”—“safe by relieving pressure
   restraining, disconnecting, or discharging: Relieve internal pressure.”

          In reading Step 6, we’re left with a simple question—what does
   “[r]elieve internal pressure” mean? According to Darling, once you reach
   Step 6, you are “to do nothing [] as that is the only way to relieve the internal
   pressure from the hydrolyzer.” Consequently, Darling told its employees
   “all that they need[ed] to tell [them].” OSHA, on the other hand, argues that
   Step 6 is not detailed enough to instruct a worker on how to make the
   “sources of stored energy[y] . . . safe,” much less how to “[r]elieve internal
   pressure.” There is “no specific instruction . . . on how to do that,” or
   anything “that even tells the operator . . . [to] go find a supervisor.” We
   agree with OSHA.
          Practically speaking, Darling’s argument is flawed for a couple of
   reasons. First, there are steps that a worker can take besides waiting around.
   For example, they can shuttle the gates or open the relief valve. But those
   two well-established activities aren’t written down in the protocol. Neither is
   the “next step” that you follow if those do not work, namely “contact [a]
   supervisor.” In fact, Darling’s personnel plainly admitted at trial that such
   commands are “not written in the procedure.” In short, Darling’s policy
   does not match up with its own current practices.
          Second, doing nothing is doing something; if waiting was the right thing
   to do, there is no reason that Darling’s procedure could not say that. In

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   response, Darling contends that it should not be required to put “what ifs”
   and “troubleshooting procedures” in the lockout/tagout policy. But, by its
   own admission, sitting by is not a “what if”—it’s the only thing to do. Yet
   it’s not in the policy. That means Darling’s current procedure is in direct
   conflict with the supposedly correct approach of sitting and waiting. After all,
   to “relieve pressure” is an active instruction.
          But the shortcomings of Darling’s policy go beyond practical
   considerations. Consider General Motors and Drexel Chemical. In both cases,
   the lockout/tagout policies were “overgeneralized document[s]” that, as a
   result, had “little to no practical utility for the end user.” Basic Grain, 24
   O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2024 at *10; Control of Hazardous Energy Sources
   (Lockout/Tagout), 54 Fed. Reg. 36644-01 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. Pt.
   1910). Ordinarily, “because the purpose of the lockout procedure is to guide
   an employee through the lockout process, [] general procedures are not
   acceptable.” Drexel Chem., 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1908 at *5. That is why
   procedures must be specific, “developed, documented and utilized.” 29
   C.F.R. § 1910.147(c)(4)(i); S. Hens, 2018 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 33662 at *5
   (CMPAU Mar. 20, 2018).
          Here, Step 6’s command gives away the game: you’re told to, but not
   how to, “[r]elieve internal pressure.” That is fatal. At the very least, Darling’s
   procedures should have told the crew how to “dissipate or restrain” energy
   stored in the hydrolyzer. Basic Grain, 24 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2024 at *10.
   Instead, it simply states that the crew must “[r]elieve” pressure. That is not
   detailed enough. See S. Hens, 2018 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 33662 at *5
   (CMPAU Mar. 20, 2018) (finding OSHA has “emphasized the importance
   of having [the] procedures in writing” and noting that “[n]one of the written
   procedures or training materials contain an explicit instruction to shut down
   and lock out the equipment after rinsing and foaming but before scrubbing,”
   meaning the “document is not specific to any equipment and provides no

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   further explanation. It is not a clear directive”). We agree with the ALJ—
   Darling’s “procedures must say more,” whether by providing a detailed
   method or even telling the team “to stop and wait . . . until the pressure
   dissipates . . . .” But Darling did neither. Consequently, the user is left with
   no clear guidance on how to safely control the release of hazardous pressure
   and steam from the hydrolyzer. Thus, there is substantial evidence to support
   the ALJ’s finding of noncompliance, namely that Darling failed to “clearly
   and specifically outline the . . . rules and technique to be utilized for the
   control of hazardous energy.” 29 C.F.R. § 1910.147(c)(4)(ii).
                                         2.
          Second, the ALJ found that Darling knew or should have known its
   policies didn’t pass Section 147 muster. Under our caselaw, Darling must
   have “[known] of, or with [the] exercise of reasonable diligence could have
   known of the non-complying condition.” Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Occupational
   Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 206 F.3d 539, 542 (5th Cir. 2000). The
   knowledge prong is focused on the “physical conditions constituting the
   violation,” meaning “[t]he departure from OSHA standards, not the
   worker’s injury, is the violation.” S. Hens, 930 F.3d at 676, 679 (citing
   Calpine Corp. v. O.S.H.R.C., 774 F. App’x 879 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)).
   And, under our caselaw, a “physical condition” can be an intangible thing or
   even the absence of something. See id. at 676. (discussing the lack of training
   as a violation).
          Darling insists that it did not have knowledge of any Section 147
   violation because it did not know the maintenance crew would remove the
   cover to the hydrolyzer’s flange. But Darling misunderstands the focus of the
   knowledge prong. The company was cited for failing to “clearly and
   specifically address appropriate lockout, tagout procedures for steam trapped
   in [the] hydrolyzer during clog removal.” It was not cited for the maintenance

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   team’s conduct. After all, the “physical conditions constituting the
   violation” was Darling’s lacking written policy, nothing else. Id.
          Concluding that Darling had knowledge of its insufficient written
   procedures is easy enough. The ALJ found that “Darling knew or . . . should
   have known of” them because “Darling knew of the contents of its own []
   procedure, and also knew it had recently been cited for a similar
   [lockout/tagout] violation.” There is substantial evidence in the record to
   support that finding.
          Darling—as the master of its files—“created, reviewed, and []
   revised” its lockout/tagout procedures. That includes creating and annually
   assessing, including in 2020, the hydrolyzer’s machine-specific procedure.
   That alone may be enough to satisfy the knowledge requirement for a Section
   147(c) violation. In Basic Grain, the Commission found that an employer had
   “direct knowledge” of its Section 147(c) violation because it had an
   employee who “was responsible for drafting and implementing the
   [lockout/tagout] policy.” 24 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2024 at *11. The
   Commission reasoned that the employer had “constructive knowledge” of
   the violation because its employee “could have performed a more diligent
   search of OSHA’s website” and federal regulations “which would have
   placed her on notice that” the lockout/tagout policy “was not in compliance
   with the standard.” Id.
          Beyond the paperwork, though, Darling was aware that it might have
   problematic procedures company-wide. Just months before the citations at
   issue, OSHA cited Darling for the exact same violations of Section 147 at an
   Idaho plant. The year before, in 2019, Darling was forced to reassess all of its
   lockout/tagout procedures after a Tampa facility was similarly cited for
   insufficient written protocols. Ultimately, “employer knowledge [is] a fact-
   specific, practical inquiry” that “look[s] to company practice, the details of

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   specific incidents, knowledge of supervisors imputable to the company, and
   commonsense inferences about what a company and its supervisors should
   know and do.” S. Hens, 930 F.3d at 676. The factors for knowledge—
   including “company practice[s]” and “commonsense inferences”—clearly
   capture past violations. Id. Consequently, Darling’s repeated violations for
   similar shortcomings likely should have alerted management—both
   company-wide and locally—to the need for changes to their lockout/tagout
   policies.
          At the very least, the Byram facility—which has its own regional
   management—should have been tipped off by the fact that the hydrolyzer’s
   written policies didn’t comport with the actual practices of its employees.
   That’s common sense. Id. Of course, if local supervisors knew (or should
   have known) of any shortcomings in the lockout protocols, that may mean
   Darling as a whole knew too. See Basic Grain, 24 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2024 at
   *14 (imputing the “management team[’s]” knowledge that employees were
   not trained to the employer as a whole). Consequently, for a host of reasons,
   we conclude that the ALJ’s determination that Darling had knowledge of its
   Section 147 violations is supported by the law and substantial evidence.
                                        B.
          Now we briefly consider whether Darling’s violations were repeat.
   Generally, the law discourages—via increased fines—employers from
   “repeatedly violat[ing]” OSHA regulations. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a). A violation
   is repetitive if, at the time it occurred, it was preceded by “a Commission
   final order against the same employer for a substantially similar violation.”
   Bunge Corp. v. Sec’y of Lab., 638 F.2d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 1981). To start,
   OSHA must show that “the prior and present citations are for failure to
   comply with the same standard.” Deep S. Crane & Rigging Co. v. Harris, 535
   F. App’x 386, 390 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); see also Bunge, 638 F.2d at

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   837. Then, the burden shifts to the employer to “rebut” that showing with
   “evidence of the dissimilarity of the conditions and hazards associated with
   the[] violations.” Deep S. Crane, 535 F. App’x at 390. Then we ask “whether
   the prior and instant violations resulted in substantially similar hazards.” Id.
   (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
          Here, OSHA showed that Darling “was previously cited for violations
   of the same provisions,” namely 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.147(c)(4)(ii) and
   1910.147(c)(4)(ii)(B), at a worksite in Idaho. In an attempt to show
   dissimilarity, Darling argues that because the citations involved “very
   different” machines—a hydrolyzer versus a “pneumatic air-powered”
   machine that “pushes cow carcasses”—the hazards at play were clearly
   different. We are not convinced.
          Admittedly, the Idaho citations involved a different machine that
   almost certainly requires its own unique lockout/tagout procedures. That
   machine may even pose different hazards—say, a “crush injury” as opposed
   to the hydrolyzer’s “burn” risk. But those considerations—which go to the
   nature of the machine in question—are not necessarily relevant here.
   Although meaningful, it is not even controlling that Darling was cited for the
   exact same violation. See Bunge, 638 F.2d at 837–38. Instead, we look to the
   hazards associated with Darling’s violations. For example, in Deep South
   Crane this Court affirmed a repeat violation for inadequate training even
   though the two violations at issue “involved a different type of crane that
   caused a different injury.” 535 F. App’x at 390. That is because “both
   violations were caused by the same hazard,” namely that the employer
   “failed to adequately train a crane operator.” Id.
          The logic in Deep South Crane is instructive here. While the machines
   and injuries in question may have varied, the potential hazards that led to
   each violation were the same in each of Darling’s cases. By failing to detail

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   the lockout/tagout procedure in the Mississippi and Idaho facilities,
   Darling’s employees were subjected to the same risk, namely that they would
   be inadvertently exposed to uncontrolled energy.4
           Darling insists that the “record is replete with evidence of the lack of
   similarity between” the two citations and the “lack of specificity cited differ
   greatly between the two citations.” Tellingly, however, Darling provides no
   record cites for those propositions. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). At the
   end of the day, the hazards are clearly similar, and Darling fails to disprove
   that similarity.5
                                                C.
           Finally, we address whether Darling waived an “unforeseeable
   employee conduct” argument. We conclude that it did. Employers may
   assert an affirmative defense (although not recognized in any statute) that an
   OSHA violation was the result of “unpreventable employee misconduct.”
   S. Hens, 930 F.3d at 678. Here, the ALJ found that “Darling failed to offer
   any evidence in support” of the defense at trial and did not “mention it in its
   post-trial brief, let alone point to any evidence in the record” to satisfy its
   burden. It is true that Darling did not push the defense at trial—other than a
   passing mention in its opening statement—or advance it in its post-trial
   memorandum. But, if a “party wishes to preserve an argument for appeal,
   the party ‘must press and not merely intimate the argument during the
           _____________________
           4
             Darling’s framing fails on first principles, too. The focus cannot be on the type of
   machine at issue. That would be simply too narrow of a reading of the law, and it would
   consequently render the “repeat” classification meaningless—a company would face
   increased penalties following prior violations only when it (1) violated the same exact law
   and (2) that violation was for the same exact machine.
           5
             Darling has a high bar to overcome, too—“rebuttal may be difficult since the two
   violations almost have to be substantially similar in nature in order to constitute violations
   of the specific standard.” Bunge, 638 F.2d at 837.

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Case: 22-60466     Document: 00516923198            Page: 15   Date Filed: 10/06/2023

                                     No. 22-60466

   proceedings before the [trial] court.’” Centerpoint Energy Hous. Elec. LLC v.
   Harris Cnty. Toll Rd. Auth., 246 F. App’x 286, 289 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting
   Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 2005)). Beyond
   that, Darling barely raises the argument before us—it presents a single page
   in its main brief and a few more in its reply brief. Still, it does not point the
   panel to any related or dispositive cases. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).
   Consequently, Darling failed to advance the argument before two different
   tribunals and has therefore waived the defense.
                                       * * *
          Considering the record and the deferential standard at play, we
   conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusions.
   Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

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