Court Opinion

ID: 9777504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:14:10.578734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:55.344238
License: Public Domain

HAYES, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion reached by the majority. I would conclude that the issue raised by the appellant in the case is not properly before this court in that it was not properly certified for appeal in accordance with Tenn.R.Crim.P. 37(b)(2). In State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn.1988), our supreme court stated:
Regardless of what has appeared in prior petitions, orders, colloquy in open court or otherwise, the final order or judgment from which the time begins to run to pursue a T.R.A.P. 3 appeal must contain a statement of the dispositive certified question of law reserved by defendant for appellate review and the question of law must be stated so as to clearly identify the scope and the limits of the legal issue reserved. For example, where questions of law involve the validity of searches and the admissibility of statements and confessions, etc., the reasons relied on by defendant in the trial court at the suppression hearing must be identified in the statement of the certified question of law.... Without an explicit statement of the certified question, neither the defendant, the State nor the trial judge can make a meaningful determination of whether the issue sought to be reviewed is dispositive of the ease.
Id. at 650 (emphasis added). In the present case, the certified question of law, recited in the final order granting this appeal perfunctorily questioned “the validity of the search of the defendant’s property where the marijuana was found.” This statement of the certified question of law clearly violates the mandates announced in Preston. First, the statement is patently non-specific. The certified question does not clearly identify the scope and limits of the legal issue raised. The record raises multiple issues that may or may not be dispositive of the case. These potential issues include the validity of the *626civil process in this case, the scope of authority to search incident to execution of civil process, “curtilage”, and the “open fields” doctrine. Also, the Reasons relied on” by the appellant in the trial court at the suppression hearing are not identified in the statement. Appellant’s motions to suppress offer no assistance in identifying the “reasons relied on” for suppression. Furthermore, appellant’s argument at the suppression hearing, which perhaps would have been of benefit in identifying or at least narrowing the grounds relied upon, was omitted from the record. Given this total noncompliance with Preston, I would hold that we are unable to reach the merits of appellant’s claim and therefore dismiss the appeal. See State v. Bowlin, 871 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993); State v. Ewing, No. 02C02-9305-CC-00089, 1994 WL 109012 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jackson, March 25, 1994).