Court Opinion

ID: 9369001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 17:08:39.25284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:12.105204
License: Public Domain

J-S01031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF: D.R.W.             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: K.A.S., MOTHER                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 814 WDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered April 27, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Orphans’ Court at
                            No(s): No. 2021-190 IVT

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                            FILED: FEBRUARY 7, 2023

        K.A.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered April 27, 2022 that

involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her daughter, D.R.W., born

September 2019 (“Child”), pursuant to the Adoption Act.1 We affirm.

        On the date of Child’s birth, Cambria County Children and Youth Services

(“CYS”) received a report that Mother had been using crack cocaine and heroin

while on methadone maintenance treatment during her pregnancy; that she

had failed to attend prenatal medical appointments; and that she failed to

take prescribed medicine during the pregnancy. Upon investigating, CYS also

discovered that Mother and Child’s father, D.F.W. (“Father,” collectively

“Parents”), were unable to provide adequate housing for Child.           At the

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1   23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938.
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hospital, Parents agreed to release Child to reside in a kinship foster home

with Father’s brother and sister-in-law, pursuant to a safety plan.

      On December 5, 2019, Child was determined to be dependent and

concurrent placement goals were established of return to Parents and

adoption.   As part of the permanency plan, Parents were ordered by the

juvenile court to abstain from the consumption of drugs and alcohol, submit

to random drug testing, attend parenting classes, and cooperate with service

providers. A permanency review hearing was held on May 11, 2020, at which

Parents were determined to be minimally compliant with their permanency

plan. After a second permanency review hearing on November 4, 2020, the

court determined that Mother had no compliance with the permanency plan,

while Father had only maintained limited compliance. The court changed the

placement goal for Child to adoption and found that aggravated circumstances

were established as to Parents based upon their failure to maintain substantial

and continuing contact with Child.     See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6302, 6341(c.1)

(providing that aggravated circumstances may be found where “the identity

or whereabouts of the parents is known and the parents have failed to

maintain substantial and continuing contact with the child for a period of six

months”).

      CYS filed its petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of

Parents to Child on February 11, 2021. On May 26, 2021, at the first hearing

on the petition, CYS proceeded against Father, who did not appear despite

being served with notice of the hearing.    Mother asked for a continuance,

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which was granted, and CYS presented its case against Mother at hearings on

September 13, 2021 and April 20, 2022.2 At the September 13, 2021 hearing,

Abigail Kline, the CYS caseworker assigned to the case, testified that although

Mother agreed to a family service plan with CYS that became the basis for the

permanency plan in the dependency matter, Mother was not compliant with

the plan and she did not show signs of progress towards remedying the issues

that led to Child’s removal. N.T., 9/13/21, at 10-13. Ms. Kline stated that

Mother had made only “[v]ery limited” use of the visitation with Child that was

offered to her. Id. at 13. As of the date of the September 13, 2021 hearing,

Mother had been offered a total of 51 supervised visits at the foster family

home or the Bair Foundation Path House, but she had attended only 8 visits.3

Id. at 15-16, 18.          Ms. Kline testified that the foster parents offered

transportation to their home for visits, but Mother did not follow through and

she also did not maintain contact with foster parents to schedule visits. Id.
____________________________________________

2 Child was represented in the termination of parental rights proceeding by
Suzann Lehmier, Esquire; the orphans’ court determined that there was no
conflict between Child’s best interest and legal interest based on her young
age and the representations of Attorney Lehmier. Order, 5/26/21; Order,
4/27/22, ¶2; see also In re K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020)
(“[W]here an orphans’ court has appointed a [guardian ad litem]/Counsel to
represent both the child's best interests and legal interests, appellate courts
should review sua sponte whether the orphans’ court made a determination
that those interests did not conflict.”).
3 This included 2 of 14 visits offered at the foster parent’s home, and 6 of 37
visits through Path House, including 1 virtual visit, 1 phone call, and 4 in-
person visits. N.T., 9/13/21, at 15. The foster parents requested the
cessation of the visits at their home based upon their belief that Mother was
under the influence at one of the visits. Id. at 51.

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at 16, 31-32. Path House also offered transportation to parents for visits, as

well as use of a smart phone for video visits while in-person visitation was

suspended during the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 36, 49. Mother was not

offered parenting classes by Path House as a result of the fact that she failed

to keep up with visitation. Id. at 13, 30.

      Ms. Kline testified that Mother had been residing in public housing for

approximately one year, and that the housing was appropriate for a child;

however, Ms. Kline expressed concern that Mother had allowed people who

are not named on the lease, including Father, to stay at her residence for long

periods, a fact that could result in her eviction if discovered. Id. at 18, 25-

26, 29. Mother has not cooperated with CYS’s designated service providers.

Id. at 12. While Mother received a psychological evaluation as required by

the permanency plan, she did not follow through with the recommendations

made during the evaluation. Id. at 13.

      Ms. Kline stated that Mother has at times submitted to drug screens;

however, she has only maintained minimal contact with the agency and

therefore it was difficult for CYS to schedule the screens. Id. at 12, 54-55.

Mother did complete an in-patient recovery program in December 2020, but

she subsequently began using drugs again afterwards. Id. at 13, 23. On

March 16, 2021, Mother tested positive for ecstasy, ethyl glucuronide, and 6-

AM, which is a heroin mixture. Id. at 13-14. In addition, CYS received a

report that, on September 2, 2021, Mother had overdosed on heroin, Narcan

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was administered by emergency personnel, and heroin needles were found

throughout her apartment. Id. at 42-43; CYS Exhibit 18.

      Ms. Kline stated that Mother has no bond with Child and therefore

termination of Mother’s parental rights will not cause any harm to Child. N.T.,

9/13/21, at 18-19, 22. On the other hand, Child is “extremely bonded” with

her foster parents, as well as their adult son who lives in the home. Id. at

17, 22, 24.   Furthermore, Child is doing “extremely well” with the foster

family, with whom she has resided since birth.     Id. at 16, 20. The foster

parents are able to provide for Child’s special needs, which includes

attendance at occupational therapy, physical therapy, and speech therapy

sessions.   Id. at 17, 50.   In addition, the foster parents are an adoptive

resource for Child. Id. at 22, 50.

      Ms. Kline opined that it would be in Child’s best interests for Mother’s

parental rights to be terminated to allow for Child’s adoption by a family that

has cared for her and met her needs beginning when she was a few days’ old.

Id. at 20. Ms. Kline stated that Child has never been in the full-time care and

custody of Mother, and Mother has either failed or refused to perform parental

duties on Child’s behalf throughout the duration of the case. Id. at 10, 17.

Moreover, Ms. Kline had seen no signs that Mother would be able to remedy

the issues that led to Child’s placement and become a suitable caregiver for

Child. Id. at 18-19.

      Julia Bloom, a family advocate at the Bair Foundation, testified that she

began working with Mother on March 6, 2020, when Parents attended the

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intake visit with Child at Path House. Id. at 57-59. After COVID-19 began

spreading throughout the nation in mid-March 2020, Path House began virtual

visits; however, Mother remained largely out of contact and refused Ms.

Bloom’s offer to drive over to Mother’s house and pass a smart phone through

the door to conduct virtual visits. Id. at 59-60, 67, 70. Mother participated

in one telephone call with Child in June 2020; although face-to-face visits

resumed in July 2020 and Path House offered parents transportation, Mother

did not attend any more visits for the remainder of the year, although she was

suffering from pneumonia for several weeks during this period and then stayed

at a rehabilitation facility in December. Id. at 60-63, 66-67.

      Mother attended one visit in January 2021 and a second one in March

2021; the latter was the visit where she tested positive for ecstasy, ethyl

glucuronide, and 6-AM. Id. at 63-64. Mother only attended two more visits

between the date of her positive test and the September 13, 2021 hearing,

leaving her attendance record at 6 out of a total of 37 scheduled visits with

Path House. Id. at 58, 65, 67. Ms. Bloom described Mother as “very difficult

to get ahold of” throughout the time she worked with her, with Mother

regularly offering different reasons for why she was unreachable. Id. at 71.

Ms. Bloom stated that Mother attempted to play with Child during the visits,

but Child played independently and always wanted to know where her foster

father or mother was. Id. at 65. Ms. Bloom stated that Child is “[a]bsolutely”

bonded to her foster parents, but she has not observed any bond developing

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between Mother and Child during the handful of visits they had together. Id.

at 65-68.

        When recalled at the April 20, 2022 hearing, Ms. Bloom stated that

Mother had attended five of the seven visits offered since the last hearing;

she missed one visit without explanation and called to cancel one of the visits

she could not attend based upon illness. N.T., 4/20/22, at 7-9. However,

Mother tested positive for cocaine, morphine, and her prescribed methadone

when given a random screen at the November 15, 2021 visit. Id. at 5. Ms.

Bloom also requested a drug screen at the March 21, 2022 visit, but Mother

was unable to provide a sample, which is treated as a positive result. Id. at

6-7.    Ms. Bloom stated that Mother behaves appropriately with Child and

attempts to play during the visits, but that Child is focused on her foster parent

during the visits and does not hug or kiss Mother when Mother asks. Id. at

7-9. Ms. Bloom repeated her earlier opinion that she does not see a bond

between Mother and Child but that a bond exists with the foster parents. Id.

at 8.

        Dennis Kashurba, a child psychologist, testified that he performed a

clinical interview and personality evaluation of Mother on June 10, 2020. Id.

at 17-19.    Mother’s lone area of significant evaluation on the personality

inventory was for denial, “where high scores typically are obtained from

individuals who lack insight into their feelings and the causes of their own

behavior.” Id. at 19. Mother provided Mr. Kashurba with a detailed personal

history, including the fact that her four prior children were removed from her

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care and placed with the in-laws of the father of those children and that her

former partner died of a drug overdose in 2017. Id. at 20; CYS Exhibit 17, at

1.   Mr. Kashurba’s recommendations for Mother included hands-on parent

training and family engagement services, supervised visits with Child,

continued opioid treatment and drug screens, continued mental health

treatment, and home management services to address domestic and financial

issues.    N.T., 4/20/22, at 21-22.            He opined that Mother had adequate

intellectual capacity to learn to be a better parent and the appropriateness of

her reunification with Child could be evaluated based upon how she performed

over time in the recommended areas of improvement. Id. at 22-24.

       Mother testified at the April 20, 2022 hearing that she has been residing

for close to two years in a two-bedroom apartment in public housing in

Johnstown, for which she pays approximately $150 to $200 in rent. Id. at

26-27. She stated that she has everything she needs in her home to parent

Child, including diapers, wipes, clothing, and a crib. Id. at 66-67. Mother has

worked part-time for the past two years as a cleaner at a barbershop and

earns approximately $160 every two weeks in addition to $200 of food stamps

she receives every month.4           Id. at 27, 53, 64.     Mother stated that she

regularly takes medicine to treat anxiety, depression, diabetes, and asthma;

she had also been in methadone treatment from approximately September

____________________________________________

4 The owner of the barbershop, who described himself as a surrogate father
to Mother, testified and confirmed her employment. N.T., 4/20/22, at 78-81.

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2020, and she attended counseling services through the methadone clinic.

Id. at 28-31, 46-47, 49-50.      Mother also completed a parenting class in

February 2020, but she admitted that it was not the hands-on parenting class

that CYS asked her to attend. Id. at 47-48, 63.

      Mother stated that she attended approximately seven or eight visits with

Child at the foster family’s home in the first two months of her life, but the

foster family then decided they did not want her in their home. Id. at 33-37.

After visitation shifted to Path House and then moved online in spring 2020,

Mother stated that she was not able to access Zoom on her phone and Ms.

Bloom never offered to bring a phone to her home. Id. at 38-39, 62. Mother

also attributed her inability to attend visits to her battle with pneumonia from

August to October 2020 and then her 30-day rehab stay in December 2020.

Id. at 41-44.

      Mother testified that the last time she used opioids was a few days

before the September 13, 2021 hearing when she overdosed and that she had

not used crack cocaine since her completion of rehab. Id. at 31-32. She

presented evidence of four negative drug screens through the methadone

clinic in February and March of 2022. Id. at 51; Mother’s Exhibit 5. Mother

also denied her positive screens at Path House for opioids in March 2021 and

cocaine and morphine in November 2021 and claims that after both of these

results she had her methadone clinic retest her and she had no illicit drugs in

her system. N.T., 4/20/22, at 52, 58.

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       Mother admitted that she tested positive for drugs during her pregnancy

with Child, including a positive test for cocaine on the date of delivery, but she

denied that Child was addicted at birth. Id. at 65-66, 77. Mother stated that

her drug use was in large part triggered by grief at her prior partner’s passing

in 2017 from a heroin overdose and that these events also led to the removal

and termination of the parental rights as to her other four children. Id. at 53-

55, 63, 69, 72-73. Mother stated that she is in a better emotional place at

the time of the hearing. Id. at 54.

       Following the hearings, the orphans’ court entered its order terminating

Mother’s parental rights on April 27, 2022.5       Mother then filed this timely

appeal.6 She raises the following issue on appeal:

       Whether the [orphans’ c]ourt either abused its discretion or
       committed an error of law when it granted the Petition for
       Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, thereby terminating
       the parental rights of [Mother] to [Child].

Mother’s Brief at 2.

       We apply the following standard of review in this appeal:

____________________________________________

5The orphans’ court also terminated Father’s parental rights in its April 27,
2022 order. Father did not file an appeal from this order. According to CYS,
Father died on October 22, 2022. CYS Brief at 2 n.1.
6 Mother filed a pro se notice of appeal on May 26, 2022, as well as a
concurrent concise statement of errors, as required by Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i). On August 2, 2022, this Court filed a per curiam order directing
Mother’s counsel to file an amended concise statement by August 12, 2022.
Counsel filed the amended concise statement on that date, and on August 24,
2022, the orphans’ court filed an order stating that it was relying on the
reasoning set forth in its April 27, 2022 order.

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      The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
      requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
      credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
      by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
      courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
      of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
      court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
      the record would support a different result. We have previously
      emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In the Interest of J.R.R., 229 A.3d 8, 11 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted).

      The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental

rights are valid. In the Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 522 (Pa. Super.

2021). The clear and convincing evidence standard is defined as “testimony

that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to

come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts

in issue.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act.      “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds

describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary

termination[.]” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021); see

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). If the orphans’ court determines the petitioner

established grounds for termination under subsection 2511(a) by clear and

convincing evidence, the court then must assess the petition under subsection

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(b), which focuses on the child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d

251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

     Here, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant

to Sections 2511(a)(1) and (2), and subsection (b). However, this Court may

affirm the court’s decision to terminate if we agree with its determination

concerning any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b).

See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We focus

our analysis on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

     (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
     be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
     grounds:

        *     *     *

        (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
        or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
        essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
        his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
        causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
        will not be remedied by the parent.

        *     *     *

     (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
     of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
     physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
     of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
     environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
     income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
     control of the parent. . . .

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

     Under Section 2511(a)(2), “the moving party must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that there is (1) repeated and continued incapacity,

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abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence;

and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or

will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 600 (Pa.

2021).

      [S]ubsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a parent’s refusal or
      failure to perform parental duties, but instead emphasizes the
      child’s present and future need for essential parental care,
      control[,] or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
      being. Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2) should not be
      read to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home
      and strong, continuous parental ties, which the policy of restraint
      in state intervention is intended to protect. This is particularly so
      where disruption of the family has already occurred and there is
      no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.

In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104-05 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

      The grounds for termination under Section 2511(a)(2) are not limited

to affirmative misconduct, but also include refusal and parental incapacity that

cannot be remedied. Id. at 1104; In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439,

443 (Pa. Super. 2021). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward

the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” A.H., 247 A.3d at

443; see also In re Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. Super.

2019) (en banc), affirmed, 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 2020) (noting that a parent

has an “affirmative duty” to work towards the return of her children, which

requires, at a minimum, that she “cooperate with the Child and Youth Agencies

and complete the rehabilitative services necessary so that the parent can

perform [her] parental duties and responsibilities”).       “A parent’s vow to

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cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity

or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or

disingenuous.” S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105 (citation omitted). “[W]hen a parent

has demonstrated a continued inability to conduct [her] life in a fashion that

would provide a safe environment for a child, whether that child is living with

the parent or not, and the behavior of the parent is irremediable as supported

by clear and competent evidence, the termination of parental rights is

justified.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Mother argues that even to the extent that CYS showed that she

exhibited a repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal to

provide essential parental care for Child, the evidence was not sufficient to

show that these issues cannot or will be remedied. Mother refers to various

efforts she has taken to remedy the issues that led to Child’s removal from

her care, including distancing herself from Father and obtaining a job and

adequate housing.      Mother notes that she has made great strides in

addressing her drug abuse issues, including regular methadone treatment and

attendance at an in-patient rehab program. She further contends that she

attempted to maintain contact with Child but her efforts to attend the

scheduled visits were stymied for various reasons, including the actions of the

foster family, COVID-19 and her inability to attend Zoom visits, her bout with

pneumonia, and her completion of rehab.

      Upon our review of the record, we find that the record supports the

orphans’ court’s conclusion that CYS met its burden of showing by clear and

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convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child was

appropriate under Section 2511(a)(2). Mother concedes that CYS satisfied

the first two components of the Section 2511(a)(2) analysis.       The agency

presented ample evidence to show that Mother demonstrated a continuing

incapacity to parent Child, who was removed from Mother shortly after birth

and not returned throughout the over two-and-one-half-year duration of this

case. Mother also failed to consistently attend scheduled visitation to maintain

a steady relationship with Child in furtherance of a potential future

reunification.   Furthermore, Mother’s incapacity led to Child being without

essential parental care, control, or subsistence, as Child has been in the care

of the kinship foster family since leaving the hospital.

      Nevertheless, Mother argues that CYS did not prove that her incapacity

“will not be remedied,” L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 600, pointing to her testimony

regarding efforts to address her housing, employment, visitation attendance,

and drug abuse. We agree with the orphans’ court’s finding that Mother’s did

not demonstrate that she had overcome her failure as a parent. See Order,

4/27/22, ¶12. While Mother has made strides, particularly with respect to

suitable housing and employment, the primary issue that led to Child’s

removal is her drug abuse, and she has failed to maintain a consistent period

of sobriety to demonstrate her fitness as a parent to the court. Following the

filing of the termination petition in February 2021, Mother tested positive for

illicit drugs on two occasions at Path House in March and November 2021 and

she also failed to provide a sample on a third occasion in March 2022, which

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is treated as a positive result. Mother also overdosed on opioids in September

2021, days prior to a hearing on the termination petition.        While Mother

testified that she had not used cocaine since her December 2020 rehab stint

and any opioids beside methadone since her September 2021 overdose, this

was belied by her November 2021 drug screen at Path House showing

morphine and cocaine in her system. Even to the extent Mother submitted

evidence of negative drug screens at her methadone clinic in February and

March of 2022, this was called into question by her failure to provide a sample

at the March 21, 2022 visit with Child at Path House.

      Accordingly, we agree with the orphans’ court that CYS demonstrated

by clear and convincing evidence that Mother did not demonstrate that she

remedied her incapacity to provide parental care to Child by achieving a

sustained period of sobriety. As this Court has explained, “a child’s life cannot

be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary

to assume parenting responsibilities.” In the Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976,

983 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).      “The court cannot and will not

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a

parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” Id. (citation omitted).

We thus conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in finding

that termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child was warranted under

Section 2511(a)(2).

      We next consider whether termination was proper under Section

2511(b), which requires the court to “give primary consideration to the

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development, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.”         23

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been

properly interpreted to include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and

stability.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

The orphans’ court “must also discern the nature and status of the parent-

child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently

severing that bond.”    A.H., 247 A.3d at 445 (citation omitted); see also

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “However, in cases where there is no evidence of a

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.”

A.H., 247 A.3d at 445 (citation omitted).     “Accordingly, the extent of the

bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the

particular case.” Id. (citation omitted).

      While a parent’s emotional bond with the child is a major aspect of the

Section 2511(b) analysis, “it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be

considered by the [orphans’] court when determining what is in the best

interest of the child.” S.C., 247 A.3d at 1110 (citation and emphasis omitted).

Our Supreme Court has instructed that “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts

considering termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-

adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.”

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.

      In finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best meet

the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of Child, the

orphans’ court noted that Child has never been in Mother’s care and Mother

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has never performed parental responsibilities for Child who was two-and-one-

half years’ old at the time of the court’s ruling. Order, 4/27/22, ¶¶15-16. The

court observed that Mother has not maintained meaningful contact with Child

as she had only attended 13 out of 58 total visits since Child’s removal. Id.

¶15. The court thus found that no bond presently exists between Mother and

Child. Id. This conclusion is supported by the testimony of Ms. Kline, the CYS

caseworker, and Ms. Bloom, the Bair Foundation family advocate, at the

September 13, 2021 hearing that they observed no bond between Mother and

Child during their interactions together. Further, Ms. Bloom opined at the

April 20, 2022 hearing that, even after five additional visits, Child did not

appear to be attached to Mother and there was no apparent bond between the

two.

       The orphans’ court contrasted the absence of a Mother-Child bond with

the care and support provided to Child by the kinship foster family who have

been providing for Child’s needs and welfare for essentially her entire life,

including Child’s special needs resulting from her pre-natal drug exposure.

The court explained that Child “is thriving in her placement” with the foster

family, who “love[] her and are providing for all of her needs.” Id. The court

stated that, with the termination of Parents’ parental rights and Child’s

planned adoption by the foster family, Child “will have the opportunity to be

raised by a family who is capable of meeting all of her physical, mental,

emotional, moral, social, educational, safety, and medical needs.” Id.

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J-S01031-23

      We discern no abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s Section

2511(b) analysis. The testimony of the CYS witnesses established that no

meaningful bond exists between Mother and Child, while there is a very strong

bond between Child and her foster parents, who love and care for her and

provide for all of her needs. Clear and convincing evidence thus supports the

court’s determination that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would

be in the best interests of Child under Section 2511(b). Accordingly, we affirm

the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to

Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b).

     Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/7/2023

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