Court Opinion

ID: 9644471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:57:06.275171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:13.932128
License: Public Domain

LAMPRON, C.J.,
concurring: I do not disagree with the dissenting opinion of Douglas, J., if it is to be interpreted as advocating an effort toward adopting a rule establishing certain fixed periods of time against which delay could be measured in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v. Cole, 118 N.H. 829, 830-31, 395 A.2d 189, 190 (1978). If, however, it is to be taken as establishing ipso facto such a rule, I am opposed.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the right to a speedy trial is “generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). It is also a more vague concept than those other rights. Id. at 522. Finally the only remedy for its violation is dismissal of the indictment. This means that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free without having been tried. Id.
To be effective the rule must provide for a constant exchange of information between the prosecuting attorneys and the courts. Furthermore an adequate number of prosecuting attorneys and court personnel, as well as court facilities, must exist to render, at least probable, the prosecution of offenses in the time set by whatever rule is *33adopted. ABA Standards Relating to Speedy Trial § 1.2 (approved 1968); New Hampshire Standards and Goals 311 (1977).
If the dissenting opinion serves as a catalyst to the ultimate adoption of such a workable rule to insure a speedy trial to an accused, it will have served a useful purpose. However, there is need to research the above matters before adopting a rule.
DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. I disagree with the court’s holding that the defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. A delay of two and one-half years from indictment to trial, and over three years from his preindictment arrest on January 4, 1975, without good cause shown by the State, should be considered a per se violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. Speedy trials protect both the rights of defendants and the interests of the public. Long delays “impair the ability of an accused to defend himself,” permit “oppressive incarceration prior to trial,” and increase the “anxiety and concern” of the accused. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). Delay in the courts “deprives citizens of a basic public service .... [I]t is bad because delay may cause severe hardship to some parties . . . and it is bad because it brings to the entire court system a loss of public confidence, respect and pride.” H. Zeisel, H. Kalven, Jr., & B. Buchholz, Delay in the Court, xxii (1959). Incentives for delay in criminal cases are strong because defendants sometimes have little to gain from a trial which may deprive them of their liberty, and because prosecutors are seldom interested in prosecuting cases quickly if evidence is weak.
What is needed to ensure speedy trials is “a system of rules and procedures [which] should be concrete and definite.” W. Erickson, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 10 Houston L. Rev. 237, 244 n.8 (1973). Thirty-six States and various commissions have enacted or recommended concrete time periods. Id. at 245 n.47. The American Bar Association has recommended that individual jurisdictions establish specific deadlines to process each type of case. ABA Standards Relating to Speedy Trial § 2.1 (Approved Draft, 1968).
Aside from RSA 594:20-a (Place and Time of Detention) and RSA 596-A:l (Adjournments), there are no statutes or court rules that provide specific time requirements for processing criminal cases. Instead, we continue to evaluate speedy trial claims using the factors delineated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). See State v. Cole, 118 N.H. 829, 395 A.2d 189 (1978); State v. Blake, 113 N.H. 115, 305 A.2d 300 (1973). These factors, however, set no specific time periods against which unacceptable delay can be measured. In State v. White, 116 N.H. 687, 366 A.2d 872 (1976), this court even said a delay of over *34three and one-half years between an appeal from district court to disposition in superior court was permitted. This court has the authority to adopt specific time constraints by procedural rule. N.H. CONST, pt. II, art. 73-A (as adopted November 7, 1978). See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 523.
We are not limited to the balancing test established by the Supreme Court for the determination of violations of the right to speedy trial, but can establish a rule which provides additional safeguards under our State constitution. In other areas of criminal procedure, we have established additional safeguards beyond those mandated by federal constitutional law. See, e.g., State v. Hogg, 118 N.H. 262, 385 A.2d 844 (1978) (acquittal in the federal court bars prosecution by the State on charges arising out of the same criminal transaction); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 370 A.2d 1153(1977) (reasonable doubt standard used in determining the voluntariness of confessions).
We should establish a rule which provides that felonies be tried within specific time limits: six months from the date of initial arrest (or indictment if not previously arrested) in those cases in which the accused is not incarcerated; and three months from the date of arrest in those cases in which the accused is incarcerated. The defendant should not be required to demand a speedy trial. If the defendant files a motion to dismiss prior to trial or entry of a plea after these time periods are exceeded, the trial judge should dismiss the case unless there was good cause for the delay. Some examples of excusable delay are continuances granted at the request of defense counsel, delay caused by other proceedings concerning the defendant, delay caused ’ by the absence of the defendant, or delay caused by unusual docket congestion due to mass arrests. If the case is dismissed on speedy trial grounds, further prosecution for the charged offense should be permanently barred.
These time periods are not unreasonable given the current figures for the disposition of cases in New Hampshire. The average time from complaint to disposition for felonies in the superior court last year was almost eight months, or 232 days; the period from indictment to disposition was less than five months, or 143 days. Supreme Court Judicial Planning Committee, The New Hampshire Court System Comprehensive Plan: 1978, at 21 (1977). The time periods established by such a rule would be more generous than those recommended by the New Hampshire Court System Standards and Goals Report, National Center for State Courts (1977), the American Bar Association, and many State statutes. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1382 (West Supp. 1977) (60 *35days from filing of information to trial); Nev. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, ch. 178, § 178.556, (1967) (60 days from indictments or information to trial). I note that the average time from complaint to disposition for misdemeanors and violations in the district courts is under thirty days, which is well within the time limits recommended for district and municipal courts in this State. New Hampshire Standards and Goals, supra at 316.
In this case, the delay of over three years from arrest is four times the average delay in the superior courts. Even if the time before the defendant moved to consolidate the indictments is excluded, the delay is over two years, or almost three times greater than the average delay. One court has stated in its application of the Barker factors that:
[a] delay of a year or more between arrest and trial gives prima facie merit to a claim that an accused has been denied the right to a speedy trial. A heavy burden then shifts to the government to justify the delay. Prejudice to the defendant need not be affirmatively shown after such lengthy delay, and the longer the delay and the less serious the offense, the heavier the government’s burden will be.
Branch v. United States, 372 A.2d 998, 1000 (D.C. Ct. App. 1977) (citations omitted). A substantial part of the delay in this case was not justified, and I feel the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. He suffered great anxiety during the delay and lost his job when this case went to trial. The defendant had already been incarcerated and paroled for a previous crime that had also occurred in 1974; his parole officer stated that his behavior had been excellent. The fact that the system failed to keep proper track of defendant’s case, or that additional funding for the courts is necessary should not be a burden the defendant must sustain by delay. This court recently stated:
A person in such a situation is unable to lead a “normal life.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 527. One of the basic reasons for the speedy trial right is “to minimize [the] anxiety and concern of the accused;” another important reason is to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Id. at 532. Undoubtedly there is prejudice if witnesses are unable to recall events accurately. Moreover, “loss of memory is ... not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown.” Id.
State v. Cole, 118 N.H. 829, 395 A.2d 189 (1978). In this case memories of the State’s witnesses, one being a ninety-year-old blind woman, were *36likely impaired after a delay of over three years from the offense to trial. Such delays could easily harm the citizens of this State by causing unwarranted acquittals or the dropping of cases by prosecutors. Justice delayed is justice denied — be it to the people or the defendant. I feel that this case indicates the substantial need for a rule establishing time standards to protect defendants’ constitutional rights to speedy trial. Accordingly, I would reverse the conviction as a denial of speedy trial.