Court Opinion

ID: 9660961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:24:57.772664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:10.423921
License: Public Domain

HUGHES, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion herein completely stuns my sense of justice. It does these things:
(1) It obliterates the first rule of rules of civil procedure1 which provides that, “The proper objective of rules of civil procedure [are] to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of substantive law.”
(2) It violates Rule 90 which says that “general demurrers shall not be used.”
(3) It denies the right of amendment guaranteed by Rule 63.
(4) It denies application of Rule 65 which provides that an amended pleading takes the place of the pleading it amends.
(5) It denies the right to plead alternatively, guaranteed by Rule 48.
(6) It holds that the filing of a motion for summary judgment under Rule 166-A cuts off the right of the adverse party to amend his pleadings.
(7) It holds that even though the right to summary judgment turns solely on the pleadings, the right of amendment does not exist.
(8) It holds that an admission in an abandoned pleading, even though unsworn and based wholly on hearsay 2 is conclusive of the facts pleaded as against the pleader.
(9) It holds that inconclusive evidence of fact witnesses becomes conclusive by the admission of a pleader in an abandoned pleading which was unsworn and based wholly on hearsay.
(10) It holds that an admission in an abandoned unsworn pleading based on hearsay becomes conclusive on the pleader even though not offered or admitted in evidence.
(11) It flies in the face of authority.
I had thought the general demurrer was abolished. The majority not only resurrects it, but restores it in a more virulent form than it ever had when it was a respectable pleading. Even under the general demurrer practice, a suit could not be dismissed upon the demurrer being sustained without the affected party being afforded an opportunity of amendment. Pleading, Sec. 51, 33 Tex.Jur.; Jud v. City of San Antonio, 143 Tex. 303, 184 S.W.2d 821.
The summary judgment, as to the state of the pleadings was in the nature of an exception. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Secs. 17.26, 17.26.3.
When it became apparent to the Court that his ruling would be based on the state of the pleadings, an opportunity to amend should have been afforded. I quote from McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, 1960 Cumulative Supplement, Sec. 17.26.3, p. 41:
“But if the hearing upon the motion for summary judgment uncovers a defect in the opponent’s pleading which can be amended, it is error to grant the summary judgment on the pleading *461without affording the opportunity to amend.
“On defendant’s motion for summary judgment based solely on the pleadings, the court should have before it the pleading on which the plaintiff, after amending to meet any special exceptions, is prepared to stand. The court should rule upon any special exceptions stated in defendant’s answer before acting upon the motion, and should afford the plaintiff the opportunity to amend.”
Cited in support of this statement are Andrews v. Austin Motor Truck Co., 259 S.W.2d 772, by this Court, and Akin Products Co. v. Bush, 319 S.W.2d 404, Fort Worth Civil Appeals, writ ref., N.R.E. To these authorities there should be added Hammett v. Fleming, 324 S.W.2d 70, Austin Civil Appeals, writ ref., N.R.E.; Wilson v. Mitchell, 299 S.W.2d 406, Dallas Civil Appeals, and Womack v. Allstate Insurance Co., 156 Tex. 467, 296 S.W.2d 233. I quote from the opinion of Justice Walker in the Supreme Court case:
“Under the provisions of Rule 166— A, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be rendered only if the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court will normally look to the pleadings to determine the issues that may exist in the case, but when the depositions, admissions or affidavits disclose facts which show that an amendment to the pleadings of the opposite party will render the position of the moving party insupportable under the substantive law, it cannot be said that the latter has established his right to judgment as a matter of law. As stated in Rossiter v. Vogel, 2 Cir., 134 F.2d 908, 912, ‘* * * where facts appear in affidavits upon motion for a summary judgment which would justify an amendment of the pleadings, such amendment should not be prevented by the entry of final judgment. * * * ’ We hold, therefore, that when the affidavits or other summary judgment ‘evidence’ disclose facts which render the position of the moving party untenable, summary judgment should be denied regardless of defects which may exist in the pleadings of the opposite party.”
The majority relies upon Lesikar v. Lesikar, 251 S.W. 555, Galveston Civil Appeals, writ ref., N.R.E. That is not a parallel case. That was a summary judgment case in which, on the hearing, an admission made by a party in an abandoned pleading was introduced in evidence, and the record did not make this admission issuable. The abandoned pleading here was not introduced in evidence and appellant was not called upon to explain or refute it. In fact, she was powerless to do either. The admission of appellant, based on facts of which she had no personal knowledge, was made issuable, as the majority apparently concedes, by the depositions on file.3 Appellant could not add to nor detract from them. See Rule 166-A(f). There was no comparable situation in Lesikar.
In Whitaker v. Coleman, 5 Cir., 115 F.2d 305, Judge Hutcheson had this to say about summary judgments:
“Summary judgment procedure is not a catch penny contrivance to take unwary litigants into its toils and deprive them of a trial, it is a liberal measure, liberally designed for arriving at the truth. Its purpose is not to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have evidence which they will offer on a trial, it is to carefully test this out, in ad-*462vanee of trial by inquiring and determining whether such evidence exists.”
The majority here creates more than a “catch penny contrivance.” It creates a judicial monster from whose clutches there is no escape.
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse and remand this cause.

. All Rule references are to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

. By “hearsay”, I mean facts not ■within the knowledge of the party and as to which she could not testify. See Sec. (e), Rule 166-A.

. The Court does not hold that proximate cause as related to the negligence of Lou Anne Keller was shown as a matter of law by the evidence. Only by reliance upon tlie admission in the abandoned pleading is this result reached.