Court Opinion

ID: 9583129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:35:03.848271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:51.476291
License: Public Domain

*436WYNN, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding as an aggravating factor that Defendant joined with another person in the commission of the offense, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of my well-learned colleagues.
The State is required to prove the existence of an aggravating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16(a) (2003). In addition to the aggravating factors listed in section 15A-1340.16(d) of the General Statutes, the trial court in its discretion may find “[a]ny other aggravating factor reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16(d)(20) (2003). The purposes of sentencing are to
impose a punishment commensurate with the injury the offense has caused, taking into account factors that may diminish or increase the offender’s culpability; to protect the public by restraining offenders; to assist the offender toward rehabilitation and restoration to the community as a lawful citizen; and to provide a general deterrent to criminal behavior.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.12 (2003). As noted by the majority, the trial court’s decision to find a nonstatutory aggravating factor may be reversed only upon a showing that its decision is manifestly unsupported by reason.
In State v. Manning, 327 N.C. 608, 398 S.E.2d 319 (1990), our Supreme Court held the trial court could properly use as a nonstatu-tory aggravating factor the fact that the offense was committed for pecuniary gain, thereby reversing a decision by the Court of Appeals. The trial court in Manning sentenced the defendant for his convictions of the crimes of aiding and abetting in the solicitation to commit murder and conspiracy to commit murder. As a nonstatutory aggravating factor, the trial court found the crimes were committed for pecuniary gain. Although there was substantial evidence to support the factor, there was no evidence that the defendant was hired or paid to commit an offense. At the time, the Fair Sentencing Act allowed a trial court to find as a statutory aggravating factor that “[t]he defendant was hired or paid to commit the offense.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(a)(l)(c) (1988). The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, holding the trial court could not use pecuniary gain as a nonstatutory aggravating factor where it could not be used as a statutory aggravating factor. See State v. Manning, 96 N.C. *437App. 502, 504-05, 386 S.E.2d 96, 97 (1989), reversed, 327 N.C. 608, 398 S.E.2d 319 (1990). The Court of Appeals examined the statutory aggravating factor and the intent of the General Assembly in its en-action, reasoning that
[t]he North Carolina Legislature has indicated that pecuniary gain may be considered as an aggravating factor only in very peculiar circumstances. In essence, the “hired or paid” language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4(a)(l)(c) requires the criminal act occur as a result of a bargained for arrangement. . . . [T]he Legislature sought to impose greater punishment where the crime arose from a contractual agreement involving pecuniary compensation.
Manning, 96 N.C. App. at 504, 386 S.E.2d at 97 (citation omitted). Because “the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant participated in the crime as a result of a bargained for arrangement,” the Court of Appeals held that pecuniary gain could not be used by the trial court as a nonstatutory aggravating factor and reversed the trial court. See id. at 504-05, 386 S.E.2d at 97.
On further appeal, our Supreme Court reversed the decision by the Court of Appeals, stating that “[b]ecause the evidence would not support the statutory aggravating factor in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4(a)(l)(c) ... does not mean that it cannot be used to support a nonstatutory aggravating factor” as long as it was reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing. Manning, 327 N.C. at 613-14, 398 S.E.2d at 322. The Supreme Court stated that “[a] person who conspires and solicits the taking of a person’s life, so that he may live off the insurance proceeds from that person’s death and live in that person’s home, is more culpable by reason of those motives, and a sentence greater than the presumptive is warranted for purposes of deterrence as well as protection of the unsuspecting public.” Id. at 615, 398 S.E.2d at 323. Because the Supreme Court deemed pecuniary gain as an incentive to commit a crime to be reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing, it explained that pecuniary gain “can be a nonstatutory aggravating factor unless there is something to preclude its use.” Id. at 614, 398 S.E.2d at 322. For example, pecuniary gain could not be used as an aggravating factor if it was also used to support an essential element of the crime. As pecuniary gain was not an element essential to the crimes of solicitation to commit murder or conspiracy to commit murder, the Manning Court held that there was “nothing to prevent use of pecuniary gain as a nonstatutory aggravating factor.” Id. at 615, 398 S.E.2d at 323.
*438In the instant case, the majority opinion concludes the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating factor that Defendant committed the offense with another person. The majority opinion examines the language of the statutory aggravating factor of section 15A-1340.16(d)(2) allowing aggravation where the defendant joins with more than one person to commit the offense and concludes that “our legislature has ascribed a higher degree of culpability to a defendant who joins with more than one accomplice to carry out a criminal enterprise.” With no further explanation or analysis, the majority opinion concludes “the trial court erred to the extent that it intended for its finding that defendant joined with one other person, Parlier, in committing the offense of robbery and was not charged with conspiracy to constitute a non-statutory aggravating factor.” I disagree with this conclusion.
There is substantial evidence of record tending to show Defendant joined with Parlier in committing the offense. This fact could be properly used by the trial court as a nonstatutory aggravating factor as long as it was reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing and nothing precluded its use. The fact that Defendant joined with another person in committing the crime, thereby committing the separate crime of criminal conspiracy, increased Defendant’s culpability and was therefore reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing. As there were no grounds to preclude its use, the trial court acted within its discretion in using the factor that Defendant joined with another person to commit the crime as a nonstatutory aggravating factor. See Manning, 327 N.C. at 613-15, 398 S.E.2d at 322-23.