Court Opinion

ID: 9482138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:41:38.810646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:47.602891
License: Public Domain

FARRIS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority correctly concludes that Proa-Tovar did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to appeal and thus was effectively denied judicial review of the deportation hearing. Accordingly, under United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 107 S.Ct. 2148, 95 L.Ed.2d 772 (1987), use of the deportation order in the 8 U.S.C. § 1326 conviction is subject to collateral attack. However, we are not foreclosed on collateral review from assessing whether deficiencies in the deportation hearing rendered use of the deportation order fundamentally unfair in the subsequent criminal conviction. Because I conclude that no prejudice arises from the use of the deportation order as a necessary predicate to a section 1326 offense, I dissent.
Proa-Tovar argues that improper waiver of the right to appeal, in itself, renders the underlying deportation hearing fundamentally unfair and Mendoza-Lopez bars the use of the deportation order in the section 1326 indictment. He gleans support for this position from dictum pronounced in United States v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.1989), and discussed by the majority. See supra at 1453. To the extent Villa-Fabela suggests that the use of an underlying deportation order is absolutely barred if the waiver of appeal was not knowing and intelligent, the opinion misinterprets Mendoza-Lopez.
Difficulty in interpreting Mendoza-Lopez arises from the peculiar context in which the case was presented to the Supreme Court. The Eighth Circuit, in collaterally reviewing the deportation order at issue in Mendoza-Lopez, had found the deportation hearing to have been fundamentally unfair because the detainees did not fully understand the nature of the proceedings. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 832, 107 S.Ct. at 2152. In its petition for certiorari, however, the United States did not seek review of this finding, but only challenged the defendant’s right to collateral review. Id. at 834 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. at 2153 n. 8. Thus, the Court assumed the fundamental unfairness of the underlying hearing and considered only the question of whether a collateral attack was proper. Id. at 839, 107 S.Ct. at 2155. The Court held that the use of an administrative order as a conclusive element in a criminal offense offends due process if the accused has not been afforded a meaningful opportunity to challenge the propriety of the underlying administrative proceeding in a judicial forum. Id. at 838, 107 S.Ct. at 2155. Consequently, the Court required that a collateral attack be allowed where defects in the administrative proceeding had foreclosed prior judicial review. Id.
Mendoza-Lopez does not, however, stand for the stronger proposition that an improper denial of the right to directly appeal the administrative proceeding absolutely bars use of the administrative order as an element of a criminal offense. The Court envisioned a two-part analysis of collateral attacks to administrative proceed*1455ings. First, the court must determine if a collateral attack is proper. A collateral attack is required where prior judicial review of an administrative proceeding was effectively foreclosed. Second, if a collateral attack is proper, the court must review the merits of the collateral attack and determine whether defects in the administrative proceeding rendered the use of the administrative order fundamentally unfair. The second inquiry is essentially a prejudice inquiry. The Court did not undertake this second inquiry in Mendoza-Lopez because the government had not sought review of the Court of Appeal’s determination that Mendoza-Lopez’s deportation hearing was fundamentally unfair.
The approach argued by Proa-Tovar confuses the due process need to allow a collateral challenge to the underlying administrative proceeding with the actual propriety of the underlying hearing and the fundamental fairness of using the administrative order as an element in a subsequent criminal offense. That Proa-Tovar was not properly informed of his right to obtain judicial review is the basis for allowing judicial review of the proceeding through a collateral attack. It does not, however, provide a basis for determining that the administrative proceeding was so unjust that its subsequent use as an element in the criminal offense would be fundamentally unfair. We may independently assess the underlying administrative hearing and the fundamental fairness of the use of the administrative order.
The majority chooses to reject this approach. First, the majority argues that “[o]ne purpose of the Mendoza-Lopez approach is to avoid mini trials on the presence or absence of prejudice after a defective administrative hearing.” Supra at 1453. As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, a prejudice inquiry need not be a mini-trial. Federal courts are well-equipped to make such an inquiry. Indeed, as the majority acknowledges, the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits already have interpreted Mendoza-Lopez to require such a two-part inquiry and a showing of prejudice in the collateral attack. See supra at 1453. We should not create a conflict among the circuits to salvage the dicta of Villa-Fabela. This is especially true in the present case, where Proa-Tovar has made “as weak a case as can be imagined for a showing of prejudice.” Supra at 1453.
Second, the majority notes that a corollary purpose of the Mendoza-Lopez rule is “to encourage the Immigration and Naturalization Service to conduct a proper hearing if the deportation order is to be relied upon in future felony prosecutions.” Supra at 1453. Under the rule adopted by the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, immigration judges and the government have an incentive to ensure that proper procedures are followed so that deportation orders will be insulated from subsequent collateral attacks. Any additional encouragement provided by vacating a subsequent criminal conviction is unnecessary and at most minimal.
Proa-Tovar analogizes his case to that before the Eighth Circuit in Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247 (8th Cir.1989). Santos-Vanegas permitted a collateral challenge to a deportation proceeding in which the deported alien was inadequately apprised of his rights to appeal. Id. at 250-51. However, in addressing the merits of the collateral attack, the Santos-Vanegas court required a showing of actual prejudice resulting from the procedural defects in the administrative hearing. Id. at 251. The court found such prejudice as a result of the administrative hearing having applied an incorrect legal standard to the defendant’s political-asylum claim. Id.
In the instant case, no prejudice arises from the use of the deportation order as a necessary predicate to a section 1326 offense. No claim is made that Proa-Tovar was not a deportable alien. Moreover, there has been no argument that Proa-Tovar is eligible for any of the three modes of relief available from deportation: (1) suspension of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1); (2) voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e); and (3) record of admission for permanent residence under 8 U.S.C. § 1259. Because of Proa-Tovar’s felony drug conviction in December of *14561988, he is statutorily ineligible for any of these forms of relief. See Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d at 439-40. A felony drug conviction qualifies as a crime of “moral turpitude.” By statute, an alien can only qualify for suspension of deportation or voluntary departure if he meets the requirement of “good moral character.” The felony drug conviction precludes Proa-Tovar from meeting this requirement. Similarly, Proa-Tovar’s conviction for a crime of moral turpitude statutorily forecloses relief through registration under section 1259.
Proa-Tovar has failed to articulate any palpable prejudice resulting from defects in the deportation proceeding. Thus, although entitled to judicial review through a collateral challenge to the administrative order, the attack is unsuccessful on its merits. I would affirm.