Court Opinion

ID: 9746006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:49:23.271366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:07.387871
License: Public Domain

PERLUSS, P. J., Dissenting.
McAdams and Heather Baines want to Lloyd remodel their home in the Marquez Knolls section of the Pacific Palisades by constructing a one-story addition. Their neighbors on Turquesa Lane, John and Jaylene Zabrucky, object because the addition would impair their unobstructed ocean view. Acknowledging that the neighbors’ competing arguments regarding the correct interpretation of the governing covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&R’s) are closely balanced, the majority has fashioned a practical and fair resolution of the problem: McAdams and Baines may proceed with their remodeling project only to the extent it does not unreasonably obstruct the Zabrucky s’ view.
*630As sensible as the majority’s compromise may be (putting aside the inevitable future disputes between these warring neighbors as to what could possibly constitute a “reasonable obstruction” of the Zabrucky s’ self-described “incredible, unobstructed ocean view”), the plain language of paragraph 11 of the CC&R’s, upon which the Zabruckys and the majority rely, particularly when considered together with other provisions in the CC&R’s, does not support the majority’s evenhanded result. First, paragraph 11 cannot properly be read to restrict renovations or alterations to a property owner’s existing home—a subject expressly covered by paragraph 2 of the CC&R’s. Second, unlike the view protection clause in Seligman v. Tucker (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 691, at page 693 [86 Cal.Rptr. 187] (Seligman), which prohibited new structures that “ ‘unreasonably obstruct the view from any other lot,’ ” paragraph 11’s protection of a neighbor’s view is by its terms absolute: If it applies, no new construction or renovation of an existing dwelling house is permissible if it obstructs a neighbor’s view to any extent, excepting only those impairments that could truly be termed de minimis. (See Civ. Code, § 3533.) The majority’s attempt to ameliorate the harshness of its reading of paragraph 11 by the introduction of a reasonableness test is simply not justified by the language of the CC&R’s.
1. Paragraph 11 Does Not Restrict Renovating or Altering Existing Residences
Paragraph 1 of the Marquez Knolls CC&R’s limits residences built on lots within the subdivision to one-story, single-family dwellings, except that a two-story residence could be approved by the architectural committee if it did not detract from the view of any other lot. Paragraph 2 of the CC&R’s required plan approval for initial construction, as well as for the “making of any alterations” in existing residences, but only through December 31, 1995—a termination date more than 32 years after the 1963 recording date of the CC&R’s. Paragraph 2 specifies in part, “No building shall be erected, placed or altered on any building plot in this subdivision until the building plans, specifications, and plot plan . . . have been approved in writing . . .” by the architectural committee or, when that committee ceased to function as of December 31, 1980, by the Marquez Knolls Property Owner’s Association. This covenant further provides that all building plans will be reviewed by the committee or homeowners association for both “location” and “elevation.” Paragraph 3 further limits how a residence can be constructed or remodeled by creating side- and front-yard set-back restrictions. Paragraph 11, intended at least in part as a view protection clause, provides, “No fences or hedges exceeding three feet in height shall be erected or permitted to remain between the street and the front set-back line nor shall any tree, shrub or other *631landscaping be planted or any structures erected that may at present or in the future obstruct the view from any other lot. . . .”1
Paragraph 2, which regulates both initial construction and renovations and which uses the nouns “building” and “alterations” and the verbs “place,” “alter” and “erect,” would, without question, apply to McAdams and Baines’s proposed addition if that provision were still in effect.2 For whatever reason, however, the CC&R’s provide that the architectural committee and homeowners association’s responsibility for reviewing and approving plans for remodeling and alterations of existing homes terminates on December 31, 1995—a fact of which the Zabruckys are deemed to have had at least constructive notice when they purchased their home with its unobstructed view in 1993. (See, e.g., Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson (1995) 12 Cal.4th 345, 366 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 898, 906 P.2d 1314]; City of Oceanside v. McKenna (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1429 [264 Cal.Rptr. 275].)
In contrast to the explicit provisions in paragraph 2 regarding alterations to an existing dwelling house, the critical language in paragraph 11 is limited to the noun “structures” and the verb “erect” (that is, in addition to the verb “planted” and nouns conceded by all parties to be limited to landscaping). I believe the trial court correctly concluded the interpretation of those words— and the breadth of paragraph ll’s restriction on “structures”—is necessarily influenced by their placement in the overall document, by the existence of a provision in the CC&R’s expressly governing alterations to an existing residence and by the other terms used in paragraph 11, all of which concern potential obstructions of a neighbor’s view separate from the residence itself: fences, hedges, trees, shrubs and other landscaping.
First, the plain meaning of the actual language used in the CC&R’s supports the trial court’s interpretation of paragraph 11. New structures, whether houses, fences or pergolas, are “erected”; but remodeling an existing residence normally involves “altering” the building, not erecting it. The CC&R’s recognize that distinction by including “erect” and “alter” (and also *632“place”) in both paragraphs 1 and 2, which are unquestionably intended to govern construction and remodeling of the residences built in the subdivision. If paragraph 11 were also intended to apply to remodeling projects, there is simply no reason the same verbs would not have been repeated to accomplish that purpose. (See Ezer v. Fuchsloch (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 849, 861-862 [160 Cal.Rptr. 486] [disapproving “disjointed, single-paragraph, strict construction approach to a restrictive-covenant-document interpretation” and holding CC&R’s must be construed as a whole to give effect to every paragraph and to the general intent of the covenanting parties]; see also Civ. Code, § 1644 [“words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense”].)
Second, to the extent an interpretative aid is necessary, the applicable principle of construction in this context is noscitur a sociis (it is known by its associates), not ejusdem generis: “Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, ‘ “the meaning of a word may be enlarged or restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used.” ’ [Citation.]” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1391, fn. 14 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323].) In accordance with this principle, a court properly adopts a restrictive meaning of a listed item if acceptance of a more expansive meaning would “make the item markedly dissimilar to the other items in the list.” (Moore v. California State Bd. of Accountancy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 999, 1012 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 358, 831 P.2d 798]; see People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 307 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855, 926 P.2d 1042].) Although in other contexts the word “structure” may include the residence itself, given the apparent object of paragraph 11, particularly when read together with paragraph 2, “structures” in this paragraph is properly limited to landscaping or other outdoor items separated from the residence itself—gazebos, trellises, carriage or pool houses. (See Ezer v. Fuchsloch, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at p. 862 [“[t]he language, ‘nor shall any tree, shrub or other landscaping be planted or any structures erected that may at present or in the future obstruct the view from any other lot,’ seems clearly designed to maintain the area above the one-story homes free and clear in order to preserve the view of the individual lot owners at various elevations”].)3
Finally, the majority’s discussion of Seligman, supra, 6 Cal.App.3d 691, and its critique of White v. Dorfman (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 892 [172 Cal.Rptr. 326] (White), misapprehend the significance of those cases to the *633question before us. There was no dispute in Seligman that the proposed construction of the rumpus room came within the scope of the view protection clause or that the construction would substantially obstruct the plaintiff’s view. (Seligman, at p. 695.) Rather, the question before the court was only whether the clause was too vague or uncertain to permit enforcement by injunction because, unlike paragraph 11 in the case at bar, it prohibited only unreasonable obstruction of the view from another lot. (Id. at pp. 695-696.) The Seligman court had no occasion to interpret the scope of the view protection clause—and specifically whether the term “structure” included the proposed room addition—and there was simply no reason for the court to quote the language omitted by its ellipses, language that was irrelevant to the issue of vagueness actually before it.
With respect to White, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d 892, my colleagues are correct that differences in the operative language in the view protection clause considered in that case and paragraph 11 of the Marquez Knolls CC&R’s (“hedge or hedgerow, or wall or fence or other structure” in White compared to “tree, shrub or other landscaping ... or any structures” in the case at bar) make the ejusdem generis principle less helpful for our task than it was in White. But in dismissing that decision, they fail to appreciate the primary reason the restrictive covenant, limiting the height of an “other structure” obstructing the view of neighboring Trousdale Estates lot owners, was held inapplicable to the construction of a dwelling house in White was that the Court of Appeal found the height of a residence, rather than ancillary structures, was regulated by another provision of the CC&R’s: “We believe a fair interpretation of the [CC&R’s] and the plain meaning of its language indicate that paragraph 111(b) imposes a specific height limit of 22 feet for buildings, structures or improvements, unless the architectural committee gave their prior written consent to build higher. Whether paragraph 111(b) is for the purpose of protecting views or not need not be decided here. Paragraph IV by its own terms is a view provision and applies to things other than dwelling houses and garages.” (White, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 897.)4
The CC&R’s in this case parallel exactly those at issue in White. Paragraph 1 imposes a specific one-story height limit on dwelling houses unless the architectural committee gave its prior consent to a two-story single-family residence; paragraph 2 requires architectural committee approval for building plans for initial construction as well as renovations or “alterations” to homes *634previously approved. Paragraph 2 further provides that all building plans will be reviewed for “location” and “elevation.” Paragraph 11 by its own terms is a view provision. As did the court in White, I would construe that latter provision, based on the content of the entire document, paragraph ll’s placement in the document and the plain language used, to apply to structures other than dwelling houses.5
2. Paragraph 11 ’s Absolute Prohibition of Structures That May Obstruct the View from Any Other Lot Cannot Be Read to Preclude Only “Unreasonable Obstructions” of View
Apparently uncomfortable with the harsh consequences of their restrictive reading of the view protection clause, my colleagues adopt the suggestion advanced by amicus curiae Marquez Knolls Property Owners Association (but notably not endorsed by the Zabruckys) and create a reasonableness limitation on the absolute prohibition of view obstruction contained in paragraph 11. This effort to mitigate the impact of their decision for homeowners like McAdams and Baines who may wish to renovate homes that are now 40 years old is in many respects commendable, but it constitutes an impermissible rewriting of the express terms of the CC&R’s. (See Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 374 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 467, 826 P.2d 710] [“as a general matter, implied terms should never be read to vary express terms”]; Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 798, 808 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 747] [“where the contract is unambiguous, the express language is to govern, and ‘[n]o obligation can be implied . . . which would result in the obliteration of a right expressly given under a written contract.’ ”].)
The majority’s citation to Seligman, supra, 6 Cal.App.3d 691, as apparent support for its insertion of the word “unreasonably” before “obstruct” in the language of paragraph 11 is misplaced. By its terms, the view protection clause in Seligman expressly prohibited only structures that “ ‘unreasonably obstruct the view from any other lot.. .’ ” (Id. at p. 693.) Indeed, the issue on appeal was whether the restrictive covenant’s use of the concept of reasonableness made it too vague or uncertain to be enforceable. No similar language appears in paragraph 11. Like the prohibitions against raising poultry, found in paragraph 10 of the CC&R’s, and using any portion of a lot for a riding or livery stable, found in paragraph 9, paragraph ll’s protection of the view from other lots—where it properly applies—is absolute.
*635The majority’s legitimate concern that paragraph 11 may be applied unreasonably suggests to me it has misinterpreted that provision. Its apprehension, however, is not a justification for a judicial rewriting of the parties’ agreement.
I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 3, 2005.

 Paragraph 12 of the CC&R’s prohibits fences or walls with a height in excess of three feet on the side lines of any lot except with the approval of the architectural committee. Amicus curiae Marquez Knolls Property Owners Association suggests the restrictions in paragraphs 11 and 12 on fences and hedges in the front- and side-set back areas serve not only to protect views but also to prevent homeowners from isolating their properties from the neighborhood.

 Paragraph 16 of the CC&R’s requires construction of all residences to begin within two years of purchase of the residential lot. Accordingly, the plans for initial construction of all residences in Marquez Knolls necessarily would have been reviewed and approved by the architectural committee well before its December 31, 1980 sunset date. The provision for an additional 15 years of oversight by the homeowners association, therefore, could only be intended to control remodeling and renovation of existing residences.

 Ezer v. Fuchsloch, supra, 99 Cal.App.3d 849, interpreted the same provision of the Marquez Knolls CC&R’s now before us, but with reference to a tree that had grown substantially higher than the height of a one-story dwelling. Because “trees” are expressly included within the scope of paragraph 11, the actual holding in Ezer does not assist our analysis.

 The White court first construed the view protection clause to exclude dwelling houses based on its interpretation of the entire document containing the restrictive covenants and the plain meaning of the words used and then added, “This interpretation of paragraph IV is strengthened by the rule of construction ejusdem generis . . . .” (White, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 897.)

 The majority does not attempt to reconcile the express provisions of paragraph 2 regarding alterations to the original residence with paragraph 11, which it interprets to apply to the same subject matter.