Court Opinion

ID: 9756499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:30:51.861177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:23.741536
License: Public Domain

*462HANDLER, J.,
concurring.
I am in accord with the Court’s determination that the police did not have sufficient information to justify the degree of intrusion involved. See ante at 461, 730 A.2d at 357. Accordingly, I concur in the Court’s disposition of this appeal and agree that defendant’s motion to suppress must be granted. I write separately because I take issue with the Court’s holding in two respects. First, the majority opinion obscures the distinction between investigatory stops and arrests, and between the discrete levels of knowledge needed to justify those respective intrusions. I believe that defendant discarded the contraband he now seeks to suppress pursuant to an investigatory stop. Therefore, the initial detention of defendant must have been justified only by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity; it need not have been supported by probable cause. The majority opinion is not clear on this issue. More importantly, I emphasize that the officers in this case acted only on an informant’s tip that a “black man standing outside 86 Butler Street” was wanted on a warrant. That information was not sufficiently descriptive to provide an adequate basis for the investigatory stop.
I
Preliminarily, I note that this was not a ease where probable cause was required. What must be clarified is that the detention of defendant was an investigatory stop.
A person is “seized” in a Fourth Amendment context when, “by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom or movement is restrained” and “if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed' that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980). That understanding of “seizure” is central to the provisions of the New Jersey Constitution that prohibit unreasonable searches and *463seizures. See State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 164, 642 A.2d 401 (1994); State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 498, 517 A.2d 859 (1986).
In certain circumstances, police are justified in conducting seizures or searches on a basis of knowledge less than probable cause for arrest, so long as those searches and seizures are correspondingly limited in scope and “do not rise to the level of full arrests.” State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 477, 706 A.2d 180 (1998); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880-81, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905-06 (1968); Davis, supra, 104 N.J. at 500, 517 A.2d 859. An investigatory stop is such a seizure. See Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d at 903. A frisk or pat-down for weapons as part of an investigatory stop is such a search. See State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 8, 691 A.2d 808 (1997).
The reasonableness of an investigatory stop and an attendant protective search are related, but distinct, inquiries. See State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 678-79, 542 A.2d 912 (1988) (“[Wlhether there is good cause for an officer to make a protective search incident to an investigatory stop is a question separate from whether it was permissible to stop the suspect in the first place.”). We must first consider whether the initial stop was justified, and then assess whether the subsequent search “was ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ ” Dickey, supra, 152 N.J. at 476, 706 A.2d 180 (quoting Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905). In Dickey, we considered solely the question of whether the detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the interference. Ibid. In the present case, the focus should be on whether the officers’ action was justified at the outset.
An investigatory stop need not be supported by probable cause, but “ ‘must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.’ ” Davis, supra, 104 N.J. at 500-01, 517 A.2d 859 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 (1981)). “Based upon [the] whole picture the detaining *464officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Cortez, supra, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at 695, 66 L.Ed.2d at 629; see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 614 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 616-17 (1972); State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 279, 712 A.2d 1096 (1998); Arthur, supra, 149 N.J. at 8, 691 A.2d 808; Thomas, supra, 110 N.J. at 678, 542 A.2d 912.
The police, however, may not “seek to verify their suspicions by means that approach the conditions of arrest.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 237 (1983); see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2258, 60 L.Ed.2d 824, 838 (1979) (holding custodial interrogation exceeded scope- of investigation justifiable by reasonable suspicion). When the conduct of the detaining officers exceeds that appropriate for a reasonable investigatory stop, such that the “detention is the functional equivalent of an arrest,” the action must then be based on probable cause. Dickey, supra, 152 N.J. at 478, 706 A.2d 180. In the absence of probable cause, “the investigation for which the stop was made may amount to an illegal arrest if the stop is more than ‘minimally intrusive.’” Ibid. Similarly, if a search incidental to an investigatory stop exceeds a protective pat-down or frisk necessary for the safety of the officers, it must be based on probable cause. See Arthur, supra, 149 N.J. at 14-15, 691 A.2d 808 (holding officers’ observation of possible drug transaction could not, alone, justify a protective search where officers did not believe defendant was armed and dangerous).
In this case, the record discloses that the officers arrived at 86 Butler Street in an unmarked sedan with the intention of arresting Curtis Stuart on an outstanding warrant. They were looking for a black male suspect at that location. They saw a black man. The black man ran from the front of the building into a hallway, with the officers in pursuit, yelling “stop, police, ... don’t run anymore.” Defendant complied. The officers then asked defendant *465to walk towards them. As defendant turned to face the officers, he tossed away the evidence he now seeks to suppress. One of the detectives retrieved the discard, which resembled and was. later proved to be crack cocaine.
The majority opinion characterizes these events as “a minimally intrusive stop escalat[ing] into a seizure more intrusive than the limited information possessed by the officers would support.” Ante at 461, 730 A.2d at 357 (citing Tucker, supra, 136 N.J. at 173, 642 A.2d 401). In the majority’s words, “[w]hen the officers chased defendant into the building, commanding him to ‘stop,’ a seizure of defendant occurred, and that seizure constituted something more than a limited intrusion on defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. at 459, 730 A.2d at 357 (citation omitted). The Court’s opinion should not be read to imply that such conduct effectuated an arrest.
Although there is no set rule for “ ‘determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop,’ ” Dickey, supra, 152 N.J. at 476, 706 A.2d 180 (quoting Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at 506, 103 S.Ct. at 1329, 75 L.Ed.2d at 242), previous cases in which the Court has assessed the reasonableness of a police detention according to Terry standards plainly demonstrate that, although the intended result of the detention here was an arrest on an outstanding warrant, the officers’ conduct in ordering defendant to stop and walk towards them was not overly intrusive. In Tucker, supra, 136 N.J. at 173, 642 A.2d 401, the court considered a situation in which police blockaded a fleeing suspect in a residential backyard to be an investigatory stop, eventually finding the stop unlawful because it was based on less than a reasonable suspicion. And in Davis, supra, 104 N.J. at 495-96, 517 A.2d 859, this Court reviewed the conduct of an officer who blocked a bicycling defendant’s path with his car as an investigatory detention. In contrast, the detention we found more than “minimally intrusive” in Dickey, supra, involved a situation in which the defendants “were removed from the place of the original detention, handcuffed as they were transported in a police car, albeit *466voluntarily, to the police station, handcuffed at times in the stationhouse, and told that they were not free to leave.” 152 N.J. at 482, 706 A.2d 180.
The officers’ pursuit of defendant and order to stop in this ease does not exceed the police action in Tucker or Davis, which this Court interpreted as investigatory and evaluated according to a reasonable suspicion standard. The conduct at issue here is a far cry from that found to exceed Terry bounds in Dickey, supra. See ibid.; see also State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 713 A.2d 1033 (1998) (holding Terry standard exceeded by overly intrusive search of defendant’s person); State v. Zutic, 155 N.J. 103, 713 A.2d 1043 (1998) (same). Although the Court’s opinion suggests that such conduct was tantamount to an arrest, it is clear that this was not a de facto arrest. Indeed, the majority opinion never states that probable cause was required. The fact that the officers were attempting to execute an arrest warrant does not itself convert their stop of defendant into an arrest. The officers initially sought to arrest Curtis Stuar — not Eric Caldwell. Hence, to execute the warrant, some investigation would have been necessary to establish the identity of the detained individual. Accordingly, when the officers ordered Caldwell to “stop,” that was to ascertain his identity; he was subjected to an investigatory detention. See Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at 553-54, 100 S.Ct. at 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d at 509; Davis, supra, 104 N.J. at 498, 517 A.2d 859. Therefore, the basic question remains whether the police had a reasonable, objective and particularized suspicion that the person they stopped had engaged, or was about to engage, in criminal activity.
II
The majority is right that “Detective Smith’s testimony that he would have apprehended any black male standing at or near 86 Butler Street, combined with his reliance on a ten month old state warrant and on a vague tip that a black male was standing in front of a multi-unit apartment complex, provided insufficient circum*467stances to justify the degree of intrusion involved.” Id. at 461, 730 A.2d at 357. But let us be clear: the circumstances in this case did not provide the officers with information adequate to form the reasonable, objective and particularized suspicion necessary to justify the investigatory stop.
A descriptive tip by an informant may contribute to a reasonable, objective and particularized suspicion sufficient to serve as the basis for an investigatory stop. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 (1990); Adams, supra, 407 U.S. at 147, 92 S.Ct. at 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d at 617-18; Zutic, supra, 155 N.J. at 113, 713 A.2d 1043. A valid arrest warrant can be the basis for an investigatory stop as well; the warrant would support a “reasonable suspicion” that the person named in the warrant committed a crime. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232, 105 S.Ct. 675, 682, 83 L.Ed.2d 604, 614-15 (1985). Accordingly, in many circumstances officers may be justified in conducting an investigatory stop to check identity pursuant to an informant’s descriptive tip of a suspect wanted on an outstanding warrant. The tip, however, must carry “indicia of reliability” that justify the stop. Adams, supra, 407 U.S. at 147, 92 S.Ct. at 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d at 617-18. And there must be some objectively reasonable basis for believing the detainee is the person named in the warrant. See People v. Vasquez, 108 A.D.2d 701, 485 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1010 (1985) (holding where individual matches general description of person named in warrant, “[t]he minimal intrusion of approaching to request information is permissible”). The critical question, however, is whether there is a reasonable basis to surmise that the person stopped is the person named in the warrant and, therefore, the suspect.
In the circumstances of this case, neither the informant’s tip nor the warrant, alone or in combination, justified the interference. Detective Smith testified that he proceeded to 86 Butler Street solely on the basis of the arrest warrant and the tip. Given that the officers had never seen Stuart before, they would have been able to identify the object of their investigation only by using the
*468description given by the informant. That description consisted simply of the suspect’s skin color and gender. The informant did not describe the clothes worn by the individual believed to be Stuart; the tip did not provide any information regarding other characteristics of the wanted individual; the tip did not inform the officers as to whether Stuart was alone or in a group. Rather, the tip merely informed the officers that Curtis Stuart, a black man wanted on an outstanding warrant, was outside of 86 Butler Street. Accordingly, when the officers, not otherwise familiar with Curtis Stuart, arrived at 86 Butler Street, they were looking only for a black man.
Such a minimal description in this constitutional context is descriptive of nothing, and is void of underlying facts capable of corroboration sufficient to generate the level of reliability necessary to insure a reasonable investigatory stop. Cf. Thomas, supra, 110 N.J. at 683, 542 A.2d 912 (holding tip that “a man named Ike, dressed in a plaid cap, tan jacket, and wearing gold frame glasses, was in possession of illegal drugs inside the Shangri La Bar at 265 Passaic Street,” when corroborated by officer justified investigatory stop); State v. Sharpless, 314 N.J.Super. 440, 449, 715 A.2d 333 (App.Div.) (holding tip “that someone had seen a black man wearing a green jacket with a hood armed with a handgun in the area of Atkins Avenue and Adams Street” justified stop), certif. denied, 157 N.J. 542, 724 A.2d 802 (1998).
Race alone is not a specific and articulable fact sufficient to establish the reasonable, particularized suspicion needed for an investigatory stop of a defendant. Adding gender to race does not augment the description of the suspect so that he could fairly be picked out by officers intending to investigate.
In addition, the “location” of the underdescribed suspect in these circumstances adds nothing to the reliability of the tip or to the facts necessary to establish particularized suspicion. The “black male” the officers were looking for was said to be standing outside of a multi-unit dwelling in a predominantly black community. Moreover, an untold number of residents of urban Paterson *469could also have passed by that location between the time the officers received the tip and their arrival at 86 Butler Street approximately five minutes later. One may reach this conclusion even discarding as unreliable the statement of Ricky Williams, who testified that he, also a black man, was standing a “couple of feet” from 86 Butler Street when the officers arrived. In these circumstances, the informant’s tip could not have provided the officers with a reasonable basis for believing that Caldwell was Stuart. Cf. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 1110-11, 28 L.Ed. 2d 484, 489-90 (1971) (upholding arrest of defendant and fruits of attendant search pursuant to valid arrest warrant for another person as reasonable mistake).
The fact that the officer relied on a “ten month old stale warrant,” ante at 461, 730 A.2d at 357, also denigrates the validity of the stop. But even if the warrant had been current, the police officers must still have had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the man they seized was Curtis Stuart. Without that hurdle, officers would be given free reign to seize and question individuals who match scant specifications of warrants. This is too wide a net to cast when the dignity and liberty of individuals are at stake.
Given that neither the informant’s tip nor the warrant justified the interference, defendant’s flight upon the officer’s arrival has little bearing. Flight may enhance an “already existing reasonable articulable suspicion.” Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 281, 712 A.2d 1096. But the flight of defendant alone, unfounded on other articulable bases for suspicion of criminal activity, does not meet the Terry standard. See Tucker, supra, 136 N.J. at 173, 642 A.2d 401.
The conclusion that the totality of the circumstances did not provide the officers with “an articulable or particularized suspicion that the individual in question was involved in criminal activity,” Cortez, supra, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. at 695, 66 L.Ed.2d at 629, is unavoidable.
*470III
In my opinion, the motion to suppress must be granted because the investigatory detention of Caldwell was not based upon a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Caldwell was guilty of a crime. For that reason, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
Chief Justice PORITZ and Justice COLEMAN join in this opinion.
Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices HANDLER and COLEMAN, concur in result.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI,
STEIN and COLEMAN — 7.
Opposed — none.