Court Opinion

ID: 9628015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:04:52.140049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:55.835132
License: Public Domain

LOHR, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in part I of the majority opinion and in that portion of part II which treats letter of credit number 1168 and affirms the court of appeals’ opinion upholding the district court’s judgment against the Colorado National Bank of Denver (Bank) on that letter of credit. I dissent to that portion of part II which reverses the judgment against the Bank on letters of credit numbers 1156 and 1157. I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals in its entirety-
The majority finds that the Bank justifiably dishonored letters of credit numbers 1156 and 1157 because the draft presented by Routt County (County) did not strictly comply with the terms of the credit. See section 4-5-114(1), C.R.S. 1973. Because I conclude that this was an improper application of the rule of strict compliance to a non-material term of the letters of credit, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority indicates, the prevailing rule requires strict compliance with the terms of a letter of credit. E.g., Board of Trade of San Francisco v. Swiss Credit Bank, 597 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1979); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 550 F.2d 882 (3rd Cir. 1977); Courtaulds North America, Inc. v. North Carolina National Bank, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975); Bounty Trading Corp. v. S.E.K. Sportswear, Ltd., 48 A.D.2d 811, 370 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1975). But the rule of strict compliance is not dictated by the language of the controlling statute, Uniform Commercial Code — Letters of Credit, sections 4-5-101 to 117, C.R.S. 1973 (1980 Supp.). Section 4-5-114(1), C.R.S. 1973, merely requires that the issuer honor a draft or demand for payment “which complies with the terms of the relevant [letter of] credit...” Specifically, the code does not state whether strict compliance is necessary or “substantial performance” is sufficient. It was apparently a conscious decision of the drafters of the uniform act which is the source of our statute to leave this question unresolved. See J. White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, section 18-6 at 729 (1980).
The prevailing view stated by the majority not only lacks statutory mandate but also has not been uniformly accepted. A minority position has been adopted by a number of courts, rejecting a formalistic application of the rule of strict compliance where this would not be consistent with the policies underlying the use of letters of credit. As stated by Judge Coffin in Banco Español de Crédito v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1967), cert, denied 390 U.S. 1013, 88 S.Ct. 1263, 20 L.Ed.2d 163 (1968):
But we note some leaven in the loaf of strict construction. Not only does haec verba not control absolutely [citation omitted], but some courts now cast their *43eyes on a wider scene than a single document. We are mindful, also, of the admonition of several legal scholars that the integrity of international transactions (i.e., rigid adherence to material matters) must somehow strike a balance with the requirement of their fluidity (i.e., a reasonable flexibility as to ancillary matters) if the objective of increased dealings to the mutual satisfaction to all interested parties is to be enhanced. See e.g., Mentschicoff, How to Handle Letters of Credit, 19 Bus. Lawyer 107, 111 (1963).
Banco Español de Crédito v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., supra, at 234.
Other cases have also recognized that non-material variations from the terms of a letter of credit do not justify the issuer in dishonoring a draft or demand for payment. E.g., Flagship Cruises, Ltd. v. New England Merchants Nat. Bank of Boston, 569 F.2d 699 (1st Cir. 1978); U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Second New Haven Bank, 462 F.Supp. 662 (D.Conn. 1978); Bank of America Nat. Trust and Savings Ass’n. v. Liberty Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Oklahoma City, 116 F.Supp. 233 (W.D.Okla. 1953), aff’d. 218 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1955); First Nat. Bank of Atlanta v. Wynne, 149 Ga.App. 811, 256 S.E.2d 383 (1979);1 see also, 3 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, section 5-101:3 at 350 (1971).
In the instant case, the majority found that the County’s submission of a demand draft rather than the fifteen-day sight draft required by the letters of credit rendered the presentment defective.2 In my opinion this is the sort of non-material, technical condition which should properly be treated under a standard of substantial rather than strict compliance.3
There is no danger that the Bank would be misled by the use of the demand draft, nor did the use of that draft place the Bank at risk by providing a basis for its customer Woodmoor to refuse reimbursement. In this context, the Bank’s contention is no more than a technical defense which frustrates equity without furthering the policies and purposes underlying the use of letters of credit.
I am not unmindful of the need for certainty in letter of credit transactions, where a bank’s function is designed to be primarily ministerial, see, e.g., Far Eastern Textile, Ltd. v. City National Bank and Trust, 430 F.Supp. 193, 196, 197 (E.D.Ohio 1977). However, I believe that upholding the County’s claim in this case would require only a limited but beneficial exception to the general rule of strict compliance. The alleged nonconformance did not relate to the underlying transaction. Rather, the nonconformity concerned only a provision designed to assure the Bank adequate time to review and consider the adequacy of the demand for payment. Thus, I would hold only that non-material defects, independent of any requirements relating to the underlying transaction, do not excuse the duty to honor a letter of credit.4 This would avoid placing the issuer in the undesirable position of choosing between a suit by the beneficiary of a letter of credit and the risk of refusal of reimbursement by the customer who obtained that letter, while simultaneously avoiding the assertion of a technical defense to defeat payment where that payment would not place the issuer at risk.
Of course, the Bank was free in this case to inform the County that the demand draft *44was improper and that payment would be made as if a fifteen-day sight draft had been submitted. The County could not unilaterally deprive the Bank of the fifteen-day period for payment prescribed by the letter of credit. But the Bank should not be able to elevate a minor nonconformance into a total exoneration from liability. Neither existing law nor sound policy requires this result.
I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
ROVIRA, J., joins in this opinion.

. Some of the cases relevant to this issue are pre-code law. Those cases nevertheless appear to be of continuing vitality. Section 4-1-103, C.R.S. 1973; see also, J. White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, section 18-6 at 729 (1980).

. Although I conclude that substitution of a demand draft for the fifteen-day sight draft required by the letters of credit does not excuse the Bank from all liability, this is not to suggest that the County could demand immediate payment. As noted infra, the Bank had a right to insist upon the fifteen-day review period, and the County could not unilaterally impair that right.

. It is of interest on the issue of materiality that the Bank made no mention of the fact that the drafts were demand drafts in its letter of January 5, 1976, dishonoring the drafts and stating its reasons.

. That holding would not be inconsistent with those cases requiring strict compliance with letter of credit requirements necessary to ensure that a substantive condition precedent to *44payment has been met. See, e.g., Courtaulds North America, Inc. v. North Carolina Nat. Bank, supra (packing lists which were attached to invoices accompanying draft by beneficiary and which stated that the shipment was 100% acrylic yam did not satisfy requirement that invoices specify shipment was 100% acrylic yam); Far Eastern Textile, Ltd. v. City National Bank and Trust, supra (requirement that principal sign purchase orders evidencing underlying transaction not satisfied by the signature of an agent on those orders). When the disputed condition relates to the underlying transaction, a standard of strict compliance may well be preferable. Thus, if the noncon-formance had related to the requirement that the County certify Woodmoor’s failure to construct the agreed-upon improvements a different question would be presented. In this respect, it is not necessary to apply the rule of substantial compliance as broadly as some courts have. See, e.g., U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Second New Haven Bank, supra (failure to certify expressly that payment for goods had been demanded as required by letter of credit excused where other documents satisfied the purpose of this requirement).