Court Opinion

ID: 9836986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:52.813458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.669552
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Judge
(dissenting):
I dissent because we have previously noted that, when a “military judge properly inquired and received assurances from appellant that no sub rosa agreements existed, we will not consider inconsistent post-trial assertions.” United States v. Muller, 21 MJ 205, 207 (1986). Likewise, in United States v. Miles, 12 MJ 377, 379 (1982), this Court indicated that it will not consider post-trial affidavits submitted long afterward which indicate that an appellant did not understand the pretrial agreement he signed. Additionally, before this case was tried, we held in United States v. Weasler, 43 MJ 15 (1995), that unlawful command influence issues may be waived.
Appellant admitted that the pretrial agreement originated with him; that the plea was voluntary; and that the agreement included a waiver of any issue arising from the 3-day delay between service and referral. The judge then asked if there were any other agreements in the case. Appellant replied that there were not, as did both counsel. Appellant reiterated that the plea was voluntary and no one forced or threatened him to enter into the agreement. He stated that he had fully discussed the agreement with counsel and was satisfied that the agreement was in his own best interest.
*77Now, the defense asserts that there was a sub rosa pretrial agreement in this case. Appellant’s defense counsel, Major Eric B. Stone, states that the trial counsel implied that there might not be a pretrial agreement if appellant decided to raise motions. Appellant himself states that his defense counsel told him they would “have to hide” the motions concerning improper confinement and unlawful command influence “from the Judge” in order to have a pretrial agreement.
This is not a case where there is a color-able claim of command influence that appears on the record, as in United States v. Bartley, 47 MJ 182 (1997). The fact that a trial counsel is aware of potential motions does not equate to the existence of a sub rosa agreement; nor would such a discussion between counsel indicate that a pretrial agreement would be withdrawn if those motions were raised. Candor with the tribunal requires that both parties be open and honest at the time of trial and not litigate these issues through post-trial affidavits. See generally 32 C.F.R. § 776.41 (1998) (Department of Navy Rule for Professional Conduct of Attorneys Practicing Under the Supervision of the Judge Advocate General).
For these reasons, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.