Court Opinion

ID: 9379646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 22:02:40.291797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:03.363912
License: Public Domain

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                                                              Electronically Filed
                                                              Supreme Court
                                                              SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                              15-MAR-2023
                                                              11:44 AM
                                                              Dkt. 24 OP

           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
                            ---o0o---
________________________________________________________________
                          STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
                   Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                    vs.
                            PAOLA IBARRA,
                   Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant,
                                    and
                        GUSTAVO FERREIRA,
                Respondent/Co-Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

                            SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX

         CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
                (CAAP-19-000697; 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

                             MARCH 15, 2023

              McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ., AND
  RECKTENWALD, C.J., DISSENTING, WITH WHOM NAKAYAMA, J., JOINS

                 OPINION OF THE COURT BY WILSON, J.

                              I. INTRODUCTION

          This case arises from Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant

Paola Ibarra’s (“Ibarra”) jury conviction for promoting

prostitution in violation of Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (“HRS”) §
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712-1203(1) (2016).1,2     After the jury returned its verdict of

guilty, Ibarra filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, or in

the alternative, for a new trial, that was denied.            At issue is

whether a reasonable juror could have concluded that Ibarra

“profit[ed] from prostitution” within the meaning of HRS § 712-

1201 (2016).3

            Because there was insufficient evidence that the

defendant gained some benefit or value from another’s

prostitution activity, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment

of conviction and the ICA’s judgment on appeal affirming the

conviction.

      1     The versions of the statutes applicable to this case are those
that went into effect in October 2017 (incorporating amendments from 2016).

      2     HRS § 712-1203(1) (2016) provides: “A person commits the offense
of promoting prostitution if the person knowingly advances or profits from
prostitution.”

      3     HRS § 712-1201 (2016) provides:

            (1) A person “advances prostitution” if, acting other than as a
            prostitute or a patron of a prostitute, the person knowingly
            causes or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution,
            procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons
            for prostitution purposes, permits premises to be regularly used
            for prostitution purposes, operates or assists in the operation
            of a house of prostitution or a prostitution enterprise, or
            engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid, or
            facilitate an act or enterprise of prostitution.

            (2) A person “profits from prostitution” if, acting other than as
            a prostitute receiving compensation for personally-rendered
            prostitution services, the person accepts or receives money or
            other property pursuant to an agreement or understanding with any
            person whereby the person participates or is to participate in
            the proceeds of prostitution activity.

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                           II.   BACKGROUND
A.    Circuit Court Proceedings
      1.    Charges
            On November 15, 2017, the State charged Ibarra and co-

defendant Gustavo Ferreira (“Ferreira”) with sex trafficking in

violation of HRS § 712-1202(1)(a) and kidnapping in violation of

HRS § 707-720(1)(e).

      2.    Jury Trial
            At trial, both Ibarra and the complaining witness

(“CW”) testified that they flew from Oakland, California to

Honolulu, Hawaiʻi together on October 31, 2017.4            Ibarra paid for

her own and CW’s airfare.        Once in Hawaiʻi, Ibarra and CW stayed

in hotel rooms in Waikiki together, which Ibarra also paid for.

            CW testified that it was her understanding that she

and Ibarra were going to Hawaiʻi to “strip and dance” and that CW

was going to repay Ibarra for her share of the airfare and hotel

rooms as CW made money while in Hawaiʻi.          Ibarra testified that

CW characterized the trip as a “paycation[,]” meaning that they

were on vacation but still getting paid.           Samantha King

      4     CW testified that the reason her and Ibarra planned the trip to
Hawaiʻi was because CW reached out to Ibarra after seeing Instagram posts of
Ibarra in Hawaiʻi. CW explained that she asked Ibarra to take her along next
time Ibarra went to Hawaiʻi. CW further testified that she “had an idea” that
Ibarra was involved in prostitution when she reached out to Ibarra.
      The dissent states that “CW and Ibarra arranged over Instagram to
travel together to Hawaiʻi[,]” but omits the detail that it was CW who reached
out to Ibarra on Instagram in order to initiate the trip to Hawaiʻi.

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(“King”), a long-time friend of CW’s, testified that CW was

“fully” aware that she was going to Hawaiʻi to engage in

prostitution, and not just to strip and dance.

            After arriving in Hawaiʻi, Ibarra paid for and posted

prostitution advertisements for her and CW on a website called

Backpage.    Ibarra took photographs of CW, and CW took

photographs of Ibarra for the advertisements.          Each of the

advertisements indicated that it was for a “two-girl special.”

Calls from potential customers would go to Ibarra and CW’s cell

phones individually.     CW came to Hawaiʻi with two cell phones and

had control over both at all times.        CW testified that she set

the prices for her own prostitution dates.         Ibarra testified

that she and CW would go on prostitution dates together for

safety, but that she and CW would not engage in sexual acts with

a customer together.     CW testified that she and Ibarra

participated in sexual acts together on “maybe two or three”

prostitution dates.

            Ibarra testified that she and co-defendant Ferreira

had an intermittent romantic relationship.         Ibarra explained

that they broke up in mid-September of 2017 when Ferreira

discovered that Ibarra engages in prostitution, and that they

were not “boyfriend, girlfriend” at the time of the trip to

Hawaiʻi.

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              Ferreira joined Ibarra and CW in Hawaiʻi on November 3,

2017.       CW testified that between October 31 and November 2, it

was her choice to answer her phone, to make dates, set prices,

and engage in sexual acts for money.         CW further testified that

she was not scared of Ibarra and that she had a good time in

Hawaiʻi when it was just her and Ibarra.         However, CW stated that

“the vibe chang[ed]” when Ferreira arrived.5

              CW testified that before Ferreira arrived, she gave

Ibarra all of the money that she made from engaging in

prostitution activities because “[n]ot only did [Ibarra] ask,

but it only felt right because [Ibarra] had paid [CW’s] way to

come to Hawaiʻi.”6      After Ferreira arrived, CW testified that she

gave all of the money that she made from prostitution activities

directly to Ferreira.       According to Ibarra, Ibarra told CW that

Ibarra would front the costs of the trip, and that CW “would

just pay [Ibarra] back once [CW] made the money.”            Ibarra

further testified that CW did not give Ibarra money that CW made

        5   CW testified that she witnessed Ferreira “slapping [Ibarra]
around” a few times and “slamming her on the ground” while in Hawaiʻi. Ibarra
testified that Ferreira never hit her.
      CW also stated that there was “more pressure” to go on prostitution
dates after Ferreira arrived, but “[n]ot necessarily force.”

        6   The dissent states that “CW attested that though there was no
agreement, she paid Ibarra because she felt obligated.” It is important to
note that it was not Ibarra’s behavior that made CW feel obligated to repay
her. Rather, CW testified that if she chose not to repay Ibarra, she would
have “[b]een greedy” and that she “gave [Ibarra] the money because [she]
thought that was right[.]”

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from prostitution activities “[o]ther than what...our

arrangement was[.]”

            3.   Verdict

          On October 22, 2018, the jury returned a verdict of

guilty against Ibarra for the lesser included offense of

promoting prostitution in violation of HRS § 712-1203(1).             The

jury found Ferreira not guilty on all charges.

          4.     Ibarra’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, or in
                 the alternative, Motion for New Trial Is Denied
          On October 30, 2018, Ibarra filed a motion for

judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative, a motion for new

trial.   As noted, in order to be convicted of promoting

prostitution under HRS § 712-1203(1), a person must “knowingly

advance[] or profit[] from prostitution.”         Ibarra argued that

she cannot be convicted of promoting prostitution under HRS §

712-1203 because she neither advanced nor profited from CW’s

prostitution.

          Ibarra noted that the definition of “advances

prostitution” in HRS § 712-1201(1) excludes a person that is

“acting as a prostitute” themself from being found guilty.

Ibarra argued that she was acting as a prostitute herself at all

times, and thus cannot be convicted of advancing the

prostitution of CW.     That is, “[t]he taking of the photographs,

the preparation of advertisements [], the posting of the

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advertisements [], the accompaniment on the prostitution dates,

[and] the prostitution dates all involved [] Ibarra, as well as

CW [], acting as prostitutes.”

          Ibarra also contended that she did not “profit from

prostitution” as defined in HRS § 712-1201(2) because the money

she received from CW was for reimbursement only.

          Finally, Ibarra pointed to the legislative history of

HRS §§ 712-1201 and 712-1203 reflecting that the legislature was

intending to target those who benefit the most from

prostitution, such as sex traffickers and pimps, not prostitutes

themselves.   Ibarra noted that CW “confirmed that she

voluntarily and willingly engaged in prostitution, . . . that

Ibarra did not use force, threats, fraud or intimidation” and

that CW “never told Ibarra that she did not want to engage in

prostitution[.]”

          The circuit court denied Ibarra’s motion for judgment

of acquittal, or in the alternative, motion for new trial.             The

circuit court agreed that Ibarra was barred from conviction for

promoting prostitution under the “advancement” alternative

pursuant to HRS § 712-1201(1).       The circuit court concluded that

“the definition of advances prostitution” exempts from

conviction “those acting as prostitutes[.]”          In light of the

evidence adduced at trial, the circuit court found that “no

reasonable juror could have found that [Ibarra] did not fall

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within the statutory exception” because Ibarra herself was

acting as a prostitute at all times that she was advancing CW’s

prostitution.

          However, the circuit court found that a reasonable

juror could find Ibarra guilty of promoting prostitution under

the “profit” alternative pursuant to HRS § 712-1201(2).

Specifically, the circuit court held that a reasonable juror

“could have found that [Ibarra] and [CW] had an agreement or

understanding that [CW] would pay [Ibarra] back for any airfare

and/or half of the hotel room costs.”        The circuit court also

found that a reasonable juror could have concluded that Ibarra

knew the money paid to her by CW was from CW’s prostitution

activities, personally rendered by CW and not by Ibarra.            Under

this analysis, the circuit court concluded that the jury found

Ibarra guilty of promoting prostitution under the “profit”

alternative and denied Ibarra’s motion for judgment of acquittal

or in the alternative, motion for new trial.

          5.    Judgment of Conviction
          On September 11, 2019, the circuit court entered its

judgment of conviction.     Ibarra was sentenced to a five-year

term of probation and required to register as a sex offender

pursuant to HRS § 846E-1.

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B.      ICA Proceedings
            On appeal, the ICA affirmed Ibarra’s conviction in a

Summary Disposition Order (“SDO”) filed May 27, 2022.              The ICA

found that substantial evidence supported the finding that

Ibarra profited from prostitution because Ibarra testified that

she and CW had an agreement that CW would pay money to Ibarra

that CW earned by rendering services as a prostitute.              The ICA

explained that “profits from prostitution” in HRS § 712-1201(2)

is not defined in the financial accounting sense of profit, but

rather, a defendant “profits from prostitution” if they

“accept[] or receive[] money” other than for prostitution

services the defendant personally renders.

C.    Supreme Court Proceedings
            Ibarra filed a timely application for writ of

certiorari, contending that she could not have profited from

prostitution where CW simply paid Ibarra back for CW’s airfare

and CW’s share of the hotel rooms.

                         III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.    Sufficiency of the Evidence

            The test on appeal regarding sufficiency of the

evidence is whether there is substantial evidence to support the

conclusion of the trier of fact.           See State v. Mattiello, 90

Hawaiʻi 255, 259, 978 P.2d 693, 697 (1999) (internal citations

omitted). “Substantial evidence” is “credible evidence which is

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of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of

reasonable caution to support a conclusion.”            Id. (brackets and

citations omitted).       Additionally, “evidence adduced in the

trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the

prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal

sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction.”              Id.

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

B.    Statutory Interpretation

            “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law

which this court reviews de novo.”          Labrador v. Liberty Mut.

Group, 103 Hawaiʻi 206, 211, 81 P.3d 386, 391 (2003) (citations,

internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

                              IV.    DISCUSSION
A.    To profit from prostitution within the meaning of HRS §
      712-1201(2), a defendant must obtain value, or benefit
      from, another’s prostitution activity
              Ibarra was convicted of promoting prostitution in

violation of HRS § 712-1203(1), which provides that “[a] person

commits the offense of promoting prostitution if the person

knowingly advances or profits from prostitution.” (emphasis

added).    HRS § 712-1201(1) defines what constitutes “advanc[ing]

prostitution”:

            [a] person “advances prostitution” if, acting other than as a
            prostitute or a patron of a prostitute, the person knowingly
            causes or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution,
            procures or solicits patrons for prostitution, provides persons
            for prostitution purposes, permits premises to be regularly used
            for prostitution purposes, operates or assists in the operation
            of a house of prostitution or a prostitution enterprise, or

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          engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid, or
          facilitate an act or enterprise of prostitution.

(emphasis added).    In the order denying Ibarra’s motion for

judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative, for a new trial,

the circuit court’s unchallenged finding of fact (“FOF”) No. 12

states “that in all instances where [Ibarra] took action to

advance prostitution[,] she herself was also acting as a

prostitute” and thus, a reasonable jury could not find Ibarra

guilty of promoting prostitution under the “advancement”

alternative.

          However, the circuit court concluded that a reasonable

juror could find Ibarra guilty of promoting prostitution under

the “profit” alternative.      A person “profits from prostitution”

if “acting other than as a prostitute receiving compensation for

personally-rendered prostitution services, the person accepts or

receives money or other property pursuant to an agreement or

understanding with any person whereby the person participates or

is to participate in the proceeds of prostitution activity.”

HRS § 712-1201(2).    Despite the circuit court’s finding that

Ibarra was merely paid back for expenses that she fronted, the

circuit court held that reimbursement constitutes “profit[ing]”

within the meaning of the statute, because Ibarra knew that she

was reimbursed from the proceeds of CW’s prostitution activity.

          The circuit court’s interpretation of “profits from

prostitution” is overbroad because it does not account for the
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ordinary definition of the term “profit.”         The ordinary meaning

of the term “profit” in HRS § 712-1201(2) is “a valuable

return,” “gain” or “the excess of returns over expenditure in a

transaction or series of transactions[.]”         Profit, Merriam-

Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/profit (last

visited Dec. 8, 2022).     Put another way, a person “accept[ing]

or receiv[ing] money or other property” must be benefitting or

obtaining something of value, in order to come within the scope

of the statute.    HRS § 712-1201(2).      Otherwise, the term

“profit” itself would be meaningless.        Indeed, there is no

ordinary definition of “profit” which includes mere

reimbursement.

          The legislative intent of HRS §§ 712-1203 and 712-1201

supports interpreting the language “accepts or receives money or

other property” in light of the plain meaning of “profit.”             HRS

§ 712-1201(2).    When interpreting a statute, “[a] court may

examine [] sources [other than the language itself], including a

statute’s legislative history, in order to discern the

underlying policy [that] the legislature sought to promulgate in

the enactment of the statute.”       O’Grady v. State, 141 Hawaiʻi 26,

28, 404 P.3d 292, 294 (2017) (citations and quotations omitted).

As Ibarra points out, in the 2011 amendments to the statute, the

legislature stated that the purpose was to target “those who

benefit most from [] prostitution[,]”:

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          Your Committee finds that prostitution remains a concern within
          Hawaii communities, not only for the prostitution activity
          itself, but also for the criminal conduct that it can bring to
          the area within which it occurs. However, there are also concerns
          that some of those engaged in prostitution are victims of human
          traffickers or others and are thus coerced into prostitution.
          Accordingly, it is incumbent on the State to craft legislation
          that combats those who benefit most from the prostitution, the
          traffickers and pimps, while providing protection to victims of
          traffickers who step forward seeking safety, and addresses the
          demand for prostitution by assuring that habitual patrons are
          penalized when they engage in this conduct. Your Committee
          believes that thoughtful legislation in those areas will act to
          protect those victimized by prostitution, including those coerced
          into prostitution and residents of sensitive communities that
          must grapple with the effects of prostitution and related
          criminal activities.

Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1137, in 2011 Senate Journal, at 1284-85.

(emphases added).    Thus, the apparent legislative intent was to

target those who benefit from prostitution without engaging in

prostitution themselves (e.g., pimps and sex traffickers).

          Given the legislative intent to target those who

“benefit most” from prostitution, a defendant who is merely

reimbursed for expenses has not “profit[ed] from prostitution”

within the intended meaning of HRS § 712-1201(2).           The ordinary

definition of the term “benefit” is “to be useful or profitable

to” or “to receive help or an advantage[.]”          Benefit (verb),

Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

benefit (last visited Dec. 22, 2022).        The circuit court’s

unchallenged FOF No. 15 states that a reasonable juror could

have found that there was an agreement or understanding only

that CW would pay Ibarra “back for any airfare and/or half of

the hotel room costs.”     That is, Ibarra did not derive any

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benefit from CW’s prostitution activity; reimbursement is not

“profitable” nor does it constitute an “advantage[.]”             Id.

Rather, reimbursement is the simple act of paying someone back,

and “implies a return of money that has been spent for another’s

benefit.”    Reimburse, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/reimburse (last visited Dec. 22, 2022).

Given that Ibarra was merely reimbursed, and derived no profit

or benefit (i.e., did not receive any value or an advantage)

from CW’s prostitution activities, the legislature did not

intend Ibarra’s conduct to come within the scope of HRS § 712-

1201(2).7

            The phrase “agreement or understanding” in HRS § 712-

1201(2) must also be interpreted in light of the plain meaning

      7     The dissent cites to a comment to HRS § 712-1204 (1972), which is
“functionally identical to the present HRS § 712-1203[,]” to argue that
Ibarra’s actions were like those of a taxicab driver, bartender, or hotel
clerk who engage in “small scale acts of trafficking that the provision was
intended to target.” But the record is clear that unlike those small scale
promoters, CW, not Ibarra, made the arrangements for CW's dates. The comment
provides:

            This section strikes at the small scale promoter. The
            taxicab driver who pimps for a prostitute, the bartender
            who sets up customers for a prostitute, and the hotel clerk
            who regularly furnishes the prostitute and his or her
            customer with accommodations would all come within the
            ambit of this provision.

Ibarra’s conduct in the instant case is distinct from the listed examples.
Ibarra did not “pimp” for CW, as did the taxicab driver. Ibarra did not set
CW up with customers as did the bartender; CW answered her own phone and set
her own dates. And Ibarra did not arrange accommodations for CW to engage in
prostitution like the hotel clerk; CW made the arrangements for her own
prostitution dates. CW answered “[y]es” when asked if it would “be fair to
say…that when [she] would get either a call or text on [her] phone, that
[she] would make the date arrangement [her]self.”

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of the term “profit” and the legislature’s intent to target

those who benefit most from prostitution without engaging in

prostitution themselves.       Ibarra and CW had an “understanding”

that CW would reimburse Ibarra for the airfare and hotel rooms,

and Ibarra knew that she was reimbursed from the proceeds of

CW’s prostitution activities.8,9        However, there was no

      8    The circuit court’s unchallenged FOF’s No. 15 and 16 state:

           15. In this case, based on the evidence adduced at trial, a
           reasonable juror could have found that the Defendant and
           complaining witness had an agreement or understanding that the
           complaining witness would pay the Defendant back for any airfare
           and/or half of the hotel room costs.

           16. In this case, based on the evidence adduced at trial, a
           reasonable juror could have further found that Defendant knew
           that the money paid to the Defendant by the complaining witness
           arose from the complaining witness’s prostitution activities.

Thus, the circuit court did not find that Ibarra and CW had an “agreement or
understanding” that CW was to specifically reimburse Ibarra with the proceeds
of CW’s prostitution activity. Rather, the circuit court found that CW and
Ibarra had a general agreement or understanding that CW would pay Ibarra back
for the airfare and half of the hotel room costs, and that Ibarra knew, after
the fact, that the money CW used to reimburse Ibarra was from the proceeds of
CW’s prostitution activity.
      9     The dissent states “that there was a pre-existing agreement that
CW would repay [Ibarra] from the proceeds of [CW’s] dates” and it was “within
the province of the jury to credit Ibarra’s testimony and find there was such
an understanding.” However, as noted above (supra n. 8), the circuit court’s
FOF’s No. 15 and 16 state only that (i) there was an agreement that CW was to
reimburse Ibarra for fronting the costs of the trip to Hawaiʻi and (ii) that
Ibarra knew, after the fact, that she was reimbursed from the proceeds of
CW’s prostitution activity. These findings were not challenged on appeal,
and thus “are binding on the appellate court.” Okada Trucking Co. v. Bd. of
Water Supply, 97 Hawaiʻi 450, 458, 40 P.3d 73, 81 (2002); see also Kawamata
Farms v. United Agri Prods., 86 Hawaiʻi 214, 252, 948 P.2d 1055, 1093 (1997)
(defendants “have waived any challenge regarding the findings of fact that
support the circuit court’s denial of their motion for a new trial[.]”).
Assuming arguendo that this court could disregard FOF’s No. 15 and 16, an
agreement requires “[a] mutual understanding between two or more persons
about their relative rights and duties[.]” Agreement, Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019). CW explicitly testified that there was no agreement that
she would repay Ibarra. Accordingly, there was no mutual understanding

                                                                  continued...

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“agreement or understanding” that Ibarra was to benefit (i.e.,

gain value or an advantage) from CW’s prostitution activity.

Interpreting the language “agreement or understanding” in light

of the associated term “profits” requires that there must be an

“agreement or understanding” that the defendant will indeed

benefit or gain value from another’s prostitution activity.              See

Advertiser Publishing Co. v. Fase, 43 Haw. 154, 161, (1959)

(“There is a rule of construction embodying the words noscitur a

sociis which may be freely translated as ‘words of a feather

flock together,’ that is, the meaning of a word is to be judged

by the company it keeps.”).       The State did not prove that Ibarra

and CW had an agreement or understanding whereby Ibarra was to

gain value or benefit from CW’s prostitution activity.

            The interpretation of “profits from prostitution”

relied upon by the circuit court and the ICA would broaden the

scope of the statute beyond the meaning intended by the

legislature.10    The legislature explicitly intended to craft

. . . continued

between Ibarra and CW that CW was going to reimburse Ibarra from “the
proceeds of [CW’s] prostitution activity[,]” as required by HRS § 712-
1201(2). Thus, even under the dissent’s interpretation, where HRS §§ 712-
1201(2) and 712-1203 penalize “any agreement or understanding to receive the
proceeds of another person’s prostitution activities[,]” Ibarra’s conduct
does not fall within the scope of the statute.

      10    Ibarra notes that if her conduct falls within the scope of HRS §
712-1201(2), then if CW paid Ibarra back for a pack of gum, it would
constitute “profiting from prostitution” as well. The dissent dismisses this
argument, contending that it “ignores the language specifying that the

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legislation targeting only “those who benefit most from the

prostitution” and not prostitutes themselves.           Stand. Comm. Rep.

No. 1137, in 2011 Senate Journal, at 1284-85.           (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the State failed to prove that Ibarra “profit[ed]

from prostitution,” within the meaning of HRS § 712-1201(2).11,12

. . . continued

receipt of money must be “pursuant to an agreement or understanding.”” The
fact that “there must be a preexisting agreement or understanding wherein
both parties agree that one party will engage in prostitution and that some
or all of the proceeds will go to the other party” does not refute the point.
As an example, person X and person Y are long-time friends that both engage
in prostitution. X does not have money for lunch, so Y agrees to pay for X’s
meal, pursuant to an understanding that X will reimburse Y from the proceeds
of the prostitution date that X independently scheduled for later that day.
Under the dissent’s interpretation of HRS § 712-1201(2), Y would be guilty of
promoting prostitution.

      11     The dissent asserts that interpreting HRS § 712-1201(2) to
require the defendant obtain value from another’s prostitution activity risks
creating a safe harbor for traffickers. Specifically, the dissent states
that sex traffickers may provide funds or assistance, which the victim agrees
to repay, but if “the loan proves prohibitively difficult to repay, [] the
victim is trapped in a coercive dynamic.” However, because the criminal
conduct the dissent is concerned would receive safe harbor protection is
criminalized elsewhere in Hawaiʻi law, there is no such safe harbor created
for traffickers who provide coercive loans to victims. HRS § 712-1203, for
example, provides that a person is guilty of “promoting prostitution” if they
“advance[] prostitution” or “profit[] from prostitution.” Under the
advancement alternative, a person is guilty if the person “knowingly causes
or aids a person to commit or engage in prostitution, procures or solicits
patrons for prostitution, provides persons for prostitution purposes, permits
premises to be regularly used for prostitution purposes, operates or assists
in the operation of a house of prostitution, or a prostitution enterprise, or
engages in any conduct designed to institute, aid or facilitate an act or
enterprise of prostitution.” HRS § 712-1202(1) also provides that a person
is guilty of sex trafficking if they knowingly advance prostitution “by
compelling or inducing a person by force, threat, fraud, coercion, or
intimidation to engage in prostitution[.]” Thus, the dissent’s concern about
creating a safe harbor is not a reason to contradict legislative intent and
criminalize reimbursement between friends from funds gained from
prostitution.
      Moreover, the dissent’s interpretation, which would seemingly result in
finding that a person is guilty of profiting from prostitution where they are
knowingly reimbursed from the proceeds of another’s prostitution activity,
risks criminalizing the conduct of those like Ibarra, in cases where “the

                                                                  continued...

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    *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

                              V.    CONCLUSION
            For the foregoing reasons, the ICA’s June 20, 2022

judgment on appeal, the circuit court’s September 11, 2019

judgment of conviction, and the circuit court’s October 21, 2019

order denying Ibarra’s motion for judgment of acquittal, are

reversed.

Myron H. Takemoto                   /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
for Petitioner
                                    /s/ Michael D. Wilson
Brian R. Vincent
for Respondent                      /s/ Todd W. Eddins

. . . continued

equities” do not favor conviction, as the circuit court explicitly
acknowledged. Convicting Ibarra of promoting prostitution because she
received funds for reimbursement of a personal debt from a friend who earned
the money as a prostitute, and requiring her to register as a sex offender
serves no public safety purpose, but limits her professional opportunities
and makes it more likely that she will continue to engage in prostitution.
Adopting the dissent’s interpretation could lead to the criminalization of
landlords, personal friends, retail establishments, grocery stores and day
care centers who receive money from people – including single parents — if
they believe the money was earned through prostitution. The legislature did
not intend to so cripple the welfare of those seeking to survive through
prostitution.

      12    Ibarra also contends that the circuit court erred in failing to
ensure that Ibarra’s waiver of her right not to testify was knowing,
intelligent and voluntary. The ICA was correct to conclude that the circuit
court was not required to engage Ibarra in a Tachibana colloquy prior to her
testimony. State v. Lewis, 94 Hawaiʻi 292, 296, 12 P.3d 1233, 1237 (2000)
held that an ultimate Tachibana colloquy is not required in cases where the
defendant testifies. Although State v. Torres, 144 Hawaiʻi 282, 285, 439 P.3d
234, 237 (2019) held that a Tachibana colloquy must be given in all trials,
including where a defendant testifies, this requirement was imposed
prospectively only. Because Torres was decided after Ibarra’s trial, Lewis
is controlling, and the circuit court was not required to engage Ibarra in a
Tachibana colloquy.

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