Court Opinion

ID: 9665207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:42:41.207579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:13.981141
License: Public Domain

Mb, Justice Smith,
joined by Justices Sharp and Calvert, dissenting.
I most respectfully :dissent from the opinion expressed by the majority in this case.
Obviously, the vital and ultimate answer that determines the merits of this case is whether or not Houghland was acting within the scope of his authority on the occasion when Hagenloh was injured. The majority opinion, while purporting to have followed the rule set out in Wininger v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co., 105 Texas 56, 143 S.W. 1150, states: “we are of the opinion that it is not reasonably to be inferred that Houghland’s words and conduct on the night of the assault as described in respondent’s testimony or from that testimony and any other evidence in the record, that Houghland in accosting respondent and assaulting him was acting within the scope of his employment or in pursuance of his duties or in the furtherance of petitioner’s business.” With this conclusion we cannot agree.
There can be but little disagreement between us over the rules by which we are to test whether the action of Houghland was within the scope of his employment. However, we disagree with the statement in the majority opinion that the rule quoted by the majority from International & G. N. R. Co. v. Anderson, 82 Texas 516, 17 S.W. 1039, applied only when the employee is possessed of the authority to use some degree of force. To the contrary, we think the quoted language announces the essential tests for determining the scope of general authority of any employee. His act, to be within the scope of his general authority, must be done (1) in furtherance of the master’s business, and (2) for the accomplishment of an object for which the Servant is employed. In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Guffey, 129 Texas 293, 102 S.W. 2d 408, these two elements were described as follows: “The final and conclusive test in all cases without any distinction as to negligent torts and willful torts is whether or not the act or omission of the agent constituting the tort, although itself not authorized, and even if in violation of instructions, was an act done or omitted in pursuance of the principal’s business, and within that particular part of such business, - if less than all, committed to the agent.”
*203Our difference with the majority opinion concerns a limitation on the above rule which we do not believe is a proper limitation. We understand the majority opinion to say, in effect, that an employer can never be liable for an assault and battery committed by his employee unless the employee acts pursuant to an authority, general or limited, which permits the use of physical force to some degree. Consequently, Houghland could not, in the majority’s view, have been acting within his general investigative authority because the majority found “no evidence” . that he was authorized to use physical force against persons in. obtaining information for the company. Before disposing the law point, we will state that in our view there is a serious question presented by the record as to whether this, em-through its agents, Bishop, Brannon and French, could have been found by, the jury to have known of and acquiesced in Houghland’s threatened use of force to get information so that Houghland would be held to have had apparent authority to so act. See Restatement, Agency, Sec. 26, Comment d., p. 75. The record indicates that Hagenloh had complained to each of them of Houghland’s methods. The record shows that -after the incident at Monahans, Bishop, in the presence of Hagenloh, said to Houghland, “If you have anything against Hagenloh, find out about it and settle with him after he gets off of the train, after you are through working.” Following this, Houghland pointed his finger at Hagenloh and said, “I am going to find out; that is exactly what I am going to do.” Admittedly this evidence will bear many different interpretations, but, in our view, it may well be sufficient, under Rule 279, to have supported a finding thereon by the jury that there was, on the employer’s part, at least an acquiescense in a course of conduct by Houghland calculated to force information from Hagenloh,, if it could not be interpreted as an, express authorization to so act.
But we do not think it necessary to the employer’s liability here that it should be found that Houghland had authority to use physical .force to get information. As we read the cases, such a finding is not a prerequisite to a conclusion that an assault and battery were within the scope of employment of the assaulting employee. All that is required is (1) that the act was in furtherance of the master’s business, and (2) that the act was done for the accomplishment of an object for which the particular séryánt. was employed.’ The Anderson case, supra, illustrates the separate functions of both parts of the rule. It would be in furtherance of the master’s business for a brakeman, or any other specialized employee, to eject trespassers. *204Yet ejection of trespassers does not accomplish the object for which a brakeman is employed. Therefore, the plaintiff in that case had not met his burden of showing that the brakeman was within his general scope of authority and it was error for the trial court to imply authority on the brakeman’s part and to shift the burden of proving otherwise to the employer. The most impressive negation of the idea that there must be some authority to use force before an assault and battery can be within the scope of authority is Houston Transit Co. v. Felder, 146 Texas 428, 208 S.W. 2d 880. There is no indication whatever in that case that the bus driver was authorized to use any amount of force in obtaining information about the collision. Nevertheless this court affirmed the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals which had reversed a judgment non obstante for defendant and had rendered judgment for plaintiff on the jury verdict. The rule of law applicable is stated in Corpus Juris as follows:
“If the act complained of was within the scope of the servant’s authority, the master will be liable, although it constituted an abuse or excess of the authority conferred. The master who puts the servant in a place of trust or responsibility, or commits to him the management of his business or the care of his property, is justly held responsible when the servant, through lack of judgment or discretion, or from infirmity of temper, or under the influence of passion aroused by the circumstances and the occasion, goes beyond the strict line of his duty or authority and inflicts an unjustifiable injury on a third person.” 39 C. J. p. 1285, Sec. 1476.
As said by Justice Alexander in Central Motor Co. v. Gallo, Tex. Civ. App., 94 S.W. 2d 821, 822:
“The real test of the master’s liability is, not whether the servant’s employment contemplated the use of force or whether the act complained of was done in accordance with the master’s instructions, but whether the act complained of arose directly out of and was done in the prosecution of the business that the servant was employed to do.”
See also Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Guffey, supra.
The second reason given by the majority for its conclusion that no evidence supported the jury finding that Houghland was within the scope of his authority is the conclusion reached by the majority that the evidence shows as a matter of law that *205Houghland struck Hagenloh out of personal animosity. We are in complete accord with the idea that a servant who commits an assault and battery solely in response to insulting words, or other purely personal reasons, does not act within the scope of his authority. Such action would not pass either of the two tests for scope of authority which we have spoken of. Our difference with the majority springs from our conviction that they have refused to discard “all adverse evidence,” have refused to give credit “to all evidence favorable to plaintiff,” and have refused to indulge “every legitimate conclusion favorable to the plaintiff which might have been drawn from the facts proved.” Wininger v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co., supra. There is ample evidence in this record that the scope of Houghland’s authority permitted him a wide choice of methods in collecting information. We think, within the limits of the review of the evidence to which we are here committed, that “a jury might have found” and reasonably could have found, in answering the issue that Houghland acted to recover lost jewelry in furtherance of his master’s business, that his act was done for the accomplishment of an object for which Houghland was employed; namely, to get information. The witness, Houghland, testified that it was his duty to investigate claims for missing baggage and other property, and respondent, Hagenloh, also testified, without objection, that such was one of the duties of Mr. Houghland.
Shortly after Christmas, 1946, the claim was filed for the missing “Pecos jewelry.” Mr. Houghland began his investigation and continued working on the case until July 27, 1947. Mr. Houghland worked under contract with the Railroad as a special officer on a monthly salary basis. The missing jewelry was alleged to have been taken from some baggage being transported in a baggage car under the exclusive control of Mr. Hagenloh. The petitioner lays great stress on a claim that Mr. Houghland did not, at any time during the investigation, accuse Hagenloh of stealing the jewelry, and the majority opinion emphasizes this. We think the testimony would lead a jury to believe that Mr. Houghland did accuse Mr. Hagenloh of stealing the jewelry and that he continued to think so right up to the moment he accosted respondent and made the attack on the night of July 27, 1947. Hagenloh testified on cross-examination:
Q. “Did Mr. Houghland ever accuse you of stealing anything?”
A. “He had said there were some things missing out of the baggage car and that I had handled and I was the only man who *206did handle that very specifier piece of, baggage from Pecos to El Paso, from which the jewelry was missing.”
Hagenloh further testified that Houghland tpld him, that it was missing and lie was the only man that had handled it, and he wanted to know what became of it, He also testified .that when Mr. Houghland came to his house with- .two F.B.-1. officers, some three weeks later, Mr. Houghland was still searching for the.missing jewelry, and again repeated that it was missing from his baggage car, and that “I xyas the only one that did. handle it.” Mr Hagenloh. at , all times denied any knowledge of the. missing jewelry, .and went to three officials, Bishop, Bran-non and French, ¡ and demanded an invpstigatipn of the-case. He gxplained the nature of the case and the activities of Mr. Houghland. Under the contract between the Railroad and the Railroad Brotherhood of which Hagenloh was a member, he, Hagenloh, had the right, under such circumstances, to demand an investigation, - either by making such demand through the Brotherhood, or in person. He chose, the. látter .course. All of these officials in authority knew the facts, yet failed to grant his request. They knew Mr. Houghland was investigating the theft of the jewelry and that was the only business Mr. Houghland had with Hagenloh. Mr. Houghland claims that .he merely, wanted to straighten Mr. Hagenloh out as to his (Houghland’s) duties. He says that when he went into .the baggage car several days before July 27,. 1947, he had np purpose other than to see if Mr. Bishop had any mail in the car, but while in there Mr. Hagen-Ioh says that Houghland began his usual routine of. searching the car, which he had a right to do; that when Mr. Houghland started to search his personal bag on that date, he had gotten tired of such conduct,, and refused to allow the search; that he had made repeated efforts to have a complete investigation, as provided for in his contract with the Railroad, and although the" officials would make promises to do so, they failed. The petitioner, knowing that Mr. Bishop, an official with authority, was present When this incident occurred failed, to call Mr. Bishop as a witness. It seems to me that, if Mr. Bishop had sent Mr. Hpughland info the car solely- for. the purpose of getting mail, he cpujd have said. so'. .Hagenloh testified that Mr. Houghland told him, on one occasion prior to July 27, 1947, that he' (Houghland) was continuing, to search his belongings because- he had not - cleared, up the Pecos jewelry deal and it was his job to do it. When Mr. Hagenloh refused Mr. Hpughland permission to search his “perspnal f jbelongingsU on- the - date Mr. Bishop was present,. Bishop was called into the car and told by Mr. Houghland what had *207happened. Mr. Bishop knew that Mr. Houghland was then searching for the missing jewelry, and knowing that he had not granted Hagenloh’s request for a thorough investigation, as provided under the contract heretofore mentioned, continued to approve Mr. Houghland’s method of procedure, and while standing in the car said to Mr. Houghland “if you have anything against Hagenloh, find out about it and settle with him after he gets off of the train, after you me through working." (Emphasis added.) Houghland then pointed his finger at Hagenloh and said “I am going to find out; that is exactly what I am going to do.”
Now what was Mr. Bishop referring to when he made this statement? Was he talking about his personal mail, or was he directing Mr. Houghland to continue his investigation of the missing jewelry and settle with Mr. Hagenloh? The jury reached the conclusion, supported by a preponderance of evidence, that at the time Houghland accosted Hagenloh on July 27, 1947, he did so in pursuance of one or more of his duties as agent of the defendant. The jury further found that at the time Houghland struck plaintiff, he, (Houghland) was on duty for the company. In other words, the jury believed that Houghland was still searching for the missing jewelry when he accosted Hagenloh and said: “I want to talk to you about the baggage incident.” The jury believed Hagenloh’s statement as to the conversation which immediately followed the above statement: “I don’t think that this is the place to talk about it. I would like to have an investigation, which I have asked for, and probably will get.” To which Houghland replied: “I don’t need an investigation. I have made up my mind to find out right now, right here, right now. You are a thief and you belong in the penitentiary.” Hagenloh said, “Well, how come.” And Houghland said that Judge Schmidt told him, and Hagenloh said, “That is a lie.” From this and other evidence a jury could believe that Houghland was still seeking the missing jewelry, that he sought information for his master, and that he planned to get it by terrorizing Hageloh, and that he struck respondent pursuant to such plan.
It is true that prior to the first blow Hagenloh stated “That is a lie.” This statement may have precipitated the blow. But then again it may not have. Since we are convinced that there is some evidence, which, when interpreted favorably to respondent, supports the finding that Houghland acted within his scope of authority, the assignment of error asserting that there was no evidence is not well taken.
*208This view of the evidence distinguishes Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Currie, 100 Texas 136, 96 S.W. 1073, 10 L. R. A. N. S. 367. We cannot say that Houghland had “turned aside” from his employment if there is evidence to support the finding by the jury that he acted in furtherance of his master’s business and to accomplish an objective of his particular employment. In the Currie case the act of the employee was intended as a personal joke and there was no evidence which gave the slightest inference that it was undertaken in furtherance of the railroad’s business or to accomplish an objective of the engine dispatchers’ employment.
The majority opinion on page nine cites a number of opinions of the Courts of Civil Appeals, stating that the evidence in each “conclusively showed that the employee in making the assault was actuated by personal animosity and that there was no close relation between the assault and the performance of the duties of the employment.” From our review of these cases we are unwilling to agree with the first clause in the majority’s statement. But if the majority’s second clause — that in those cases “the evidence conclusively showed * * * that there was no close relation between the assault and the performance of the duties of the employment” — means that, under the acknowledged tests of scope of authority, those employees were conclusively shown to be outside, then we agree with it. In none of those cases is it shown that there was any theory made out in the evidence by which the jury could have found that the assaulting employees (a telephone exchange manager, an insurance premium collector, a grocery cashier, an ice deliveryman, a watchman who was off duty, and a lunch counter employee) acted in furtherance of his master’s business and at the same time acted to accomplish an objective of his particular job. In contrast to the cases cited by the majority, there are Texas cases in which the employee (who in each case shot his adversary) was found to have been within his scope of authority because the evidence supported a theory by which the employee’s act was construed to satisfy both requirements of the scope of authority rule. Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. et al. v. Carter, et al., 261 SW 135, Tex Com App., 1935; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Cobb, Tex. Civ. App., 1931, 45 S.W. 2d 323, error dismissed.
There are two other points which should be considered. The first is petitioner’s Point IV to the effect that the jury’s finding of scope of authority is invalid because the issue submitted inquired about scope of authority at the wrong time; i.e., at *209the time of “accosting” instead of the time of striking. I think this matter was waived by the defendant because his objection to Issue No. 1 did not complain of this deficiency (did not point out specifically that this was a bad issue for this reason), but rather complained simply that there was no evidence to support a finding that plaintiff was in his scope of authority “at said time.” Rule 272 and Rule 274.
"The other point that should be discussed, in view of our conclusion that this case should be affirmed, is the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals that C. B. Houghland was an adverse witness to respondent under Rule 182. Also petitioner has presented a related point to the effect that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in overruling petitioner’s assignment of error that the trial court erred in refusing to rule upon the question whether C. B. Houghland was an adverse witness or,not under Rule 182.
On the question as to whether the trial court ruled on the objection that C. B. Houghland was not an adverse witness, we think the trial court did rule on the objection and to the effect that Houghland was not an adverse witness. Plaintiff called Houghland as an adverse witness under Rule 182. Defendant objected on the ground that Houghland had left the employ of defendant some two years previous to the date of trial. The court at that time did not rule on the objection. The examination of the witness by plaintiff proceeded, after the court stated “We will see what the objection is. Go ahead.” When the defendant began its cross-examination, the plaintiff objected to leading and suggestive questions, stating, in effect, that under Rule 182, the defendant must examine the witness as though he was the defendant’s witness on direct examination. Thereupon, the defendant’s counsel stated: “If the Court has any doubt about it, I have the only authority in the State here which is contrary to counsel’s statement as to what the law is. He then furnished the Court with the case of Dollahite-Levy Company v. Phillips, et al., 99 S.W. 2d 688, writ dismissed. The Court, after reading the case, overruled plaintiff’s objection, and from then on defendant propounded leading questions to the witness and cross-examined the witness in every detail. The witness, Houghland, admitted that, under this cross-examination, it had been so long since the conversation on the night of July 27, 1947, that he could not remember just what was said word for word. When he was asked about the “baggage incident,” he answered that he was talking about his right to enter the car *210to get Mr. Bishop’s mail, and that he wanted to explain to Mr. Hagenloh that he had the authority to do this; arid that he wanted to straighten Mr. Hagenloh out on this. The defendant did not move the Court to strike any of the testimony giveri by Mr. Houghland under examination by plaintiff. In view of the circumstances, and the further fact, as stated in the majority opinion, “that there was no important conflict, except in their testimony as to what was said just before Houghland struck respondent,” I cannot see that defendant suffered any injury because of the delayed ruling madé by the trial court.
The holding of the Court of Civil Appeals that Houghland was an adverse witness, even though erroneous, does not require a reversal of this case.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals should be affirmed.
Opinion delivered March 5, 1952.
Rehearing overruled April 9, 1952.