Court Opinion

ID: 9665784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:57:08.980893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:18.958223
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). While I have signed Chief Judge Lesinski’s opinion, I think it necessary to write separately to make clear that our decision today should not be read as barring an action for a declaratory judgment by a person claimed by a demanding state to be a fugitive from justice.1 If *125a person charged with being a fugitive can make a showing of substantive grounds entitling him to relief from a requisition issued by the governor of the demanding state and that more complete and adequate relief is obtainable through a declaratory judgment than by habeas corpus or that, for other reasons, declaratory relief is appropriate, then he would be entitled to the entry of a declaratory judgment in his favor and the matter would no longer reside in the trial judge’s discretion.
The crux of the matter is whether a person charged with being a fugitive may properly contest a demanding state’s requisition by raising substantive issues other than the traditional issues of identity, fugitivity, substantiality of the indictment and regularity of the extradition procedure.2
I agree with Judge Lesinski when he says that, “It is doubtful whether the scope of review is any broader when the action is one for a declaratory judgment” than in habeas corpus. But, while it is doubtful, it is not yet incontrovertible. It may well be that the time has come to recognize new substantive grounds of attack.3
Habeas corpus is, indeed, the Great Writ, but all forms and processes tend to take on a structure of *126their own.4 Perhaps the law should grow in this area and in order to accomplish growth it may be necessary to break out of traditional forms, to leave the mansion house of habeas corpus for the uncharted fields of declaratory judgment or some other procedural device or remedy.
The two questions, whether additional substantive issues should be recognized and, if so, the means of providing relief are tried together. No doubt, decision on the substantive question will carry with it decision on the procedural question. A court is not likely to recognize a substantive right and deny relief because it is at a loss to find a proper procedural device to implement the right.
The parties have argued the question of whether the plaintiff, Williams, is entitled to a declaratory judgment as an abstract question unrelated to the pivotal question of whether substantive issues other than the traditional ones of identity, fugitivity, substantiality, and regularity should be recognized. Our decision will not end Williams’ attack on North Carolina’s requisition. No doubt, an application for a writ of habeas corpus will be filed in his behalf. I see no reason why as an alternative prayer Williams, despite our decision today, could not ask for declaratory relief as well as the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.5 We decide only that Williams has not yet demonstrated that he is entitled to declaratory relief and, more specifically, we decide only that he has failed to demonstrate that he has *127a substantive right to relief unobtainable through the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and that, therefore, he needs declaratory relief or, for other reasons, declaratory relief is appropriate.6

 Cf. Wacker v. Bisson (CA5, 1965), 348 F2d 602.

 See Notes and Comments, Extradition Habeas Corpus, 74 Yale L J 78, 91 (1964).

 See Notes and Comments, Extradition Habeas Corpus, 74 Vale L J 78, 125 et seq. (1964), where the author urges that a broad-scope inquiry should be allowed where it can be established that the person claimed to be a fugitive will suffer “prospective irreparable injury” and argues that Sweeney v. Woodall (1952), 344 US 86 (73 S Ct 139, 97 L Ed 114), reh den (1953), 344 US 916 (73 S Ct 332, 97 L Ed 706), can be read as only requiring careful pleading or may justifiably be deemed to have been overruled sub silentio by later Supreme Court decisions concerning habeas corpus. But see Murray v. Burns (1965), 48 Hawaii 508 (405 P2d 309); United States, ex rel. Hammershoy, v. Director of Connecticut Correctional Center (D Conn, 1969), 299 F Supp 1354; United States, ex rel. Brown, v. Fogel (CA4, 1968), 395 F2d 291; State, ex rel. Gegenfurtner, v. Granquist (1965), 271 Minn 207 (135 NW2d 447).

 See 39 Am Jur 2d, Habeas Corpus, §§ 11, 12.

 As to the availability of declaratory relief in criminal proceedings, see Strager v. Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney (1968), 10 Mich App 166.
Even if habeas corpus is an adequate remedy, declaratory relief may be obtained if “appropriate”. “The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.” GCR 1963, 521.3.
See, generally, 22 Am Jur 2d, Declaratory Judgments, § 14.

 See GCR 1963, 518.3: “every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.”