Court Opinion

ID: 9625874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:53:37.846317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:16.279766
License: Public Domain

Wedell, J.
(concurring): I recognize the possibility of a view contrary to that reached by the majority. One of my principal reasons for concurring in the majority opinion is that, upon extended study, it appears to me the majority interpretation of G. S. 1947 Supp. 59-2238 coincides with other provisions of the probate code and the interpretation we have placed thereon relative to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the probate court over simple unsecured money demands. The death of the defendant, appellee, in nowise altered the nature of the demand. It remained a plain unsecured money demand. The only question decedent’s death raised pertained to the proper forum in which to establish, .to prove, such a demand.
Upon the death of a person all property of his estate is drawn *277into administration in the probate court. (Burns v. Drake, 157 Kan. 367, 371, 139 P. 2d 386.) Thereafter the provisions of the probate code and not those of the civil code govern all matters pertaining to the settlement and distribution of a decedent’s estate. This principle, although most fundamental, is sometimes overlooked. It was declared early by a unanimous court following the adoption of die new code but only after the most deliberate and searching consideration. We said:
“A careful study of the provisions of the new probate code leads us to conclude it was the intent and purpose of the framers of the Kansas probate code and of the legislature which enacted it to grant to probate courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters incident and ancillary to the settlement and distribution of decedent estates, except as to any matter over which that code expressly confers concurrent jurisdiction upon district courts.” (Foss v. Wiles, 155 Kan. 262, 270, 124 P. 2d 438.) (Italics inserted.)
Reference to the citator will readily disclose that declaration of intent has been the basis of a host of later decisions. If that principle is wrong all of those decisions are erroneous but remain the law of this state.
Neither the provisions of G. S. 1947 Supp. 59-2238 nor any other provision of the probate code expressly confers concurrent jurisdiction upon district courts to adjudicate an unsecured money demand against a decedent’s estate whether the action was filed in the district court before or after the decedent’s death. It, therefore, seems to me it is consistent to conclude G. S. 1947 Supp. 59-2238 should be interpreted to apply only to actions over which the probate code expressly confers concurrent jurisdiction upon district courts. So interpreted the statute may be harmonized with principles repeatedly enunciated in our former decisions. Otherwise interpreted it cannot be harmonized as it would permit the district court to deprive the probate court of exclusive original jurisdiction over ordinary unsecured money demands. I have no desire to labor the point.