Court Opinion

ID: 9811637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:26:41.208132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:44.799484
License: Public Domain

DAVID B. GAULTNEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. “Course and scope” and “in the service of the vessel” are essentially the same issue. See Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transp. Co., 361 U.S. 129, 132-33, 80 S.Ct. 247, 4 L.Ed.2d 191 (1959); see also Daughdrill v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 447 F.2d 781, 783 (5th Cir.1971). An element of Guidry’s cause of action— whether he was in the course and scope of his employment — was not submitted to the jury as a question that required the jury to determine the matter. See 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (Supp.2001). Whether Guidry was in the course and scope of employment is a controlling fact issue in the case, and defendant brought this omitted element to the attention of the trial court. See id.
The majority asserts “in the service of the vessel” is an inferential rebuttal issue. I disagree. An inferential rebuttal issue is a defensive theory that presents a contrary or inconsistent theory from the claim relied on for recovery; it is properly submitted as an instruction. See Texas Workers’ Compensation Ins. Fund v. Mandlbauer, 988 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex.1999) (quoting Select Ins. Co. v. Boucher, 561 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex.1978)); see also Weitzul Constr., Inc. v. Outdoor Environs, 849 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied). “In the service of the vessel” is part of the plaintiffs burden of proof, not a defensive theory. See 46 U.S.C. § 688(a).
The majority does not hold that the omitted element was established as a matter of law. The facts were in dispute. Whether Guidry diverted from the course and scope of his employment — and had not returned to his employment at the time of the accident — was a disputed controlling fact issue. Litigants are entitled to have controlling questions submitted to the jury if those issues are properly pleaded and supported by the evidence. See Triplex Communications, Inc. v. Riley, 900 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex.1995); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 278.
Here the charge included a course and scope instruction but did not ask the jury to determine that fact issue. Defendant objected and submitted a proposed question asking whether Guidry was in the service of the vessel. The trial court rejected the question and overruled the objection to the defective instruction. The jury was not asked to — and therefore did not — determine whether the accident occurred in the course and scope of employment or in the service of the vessel.
I believe the trial court also erred in excluding the evidence concerning the extent of Guidry’s intoxication. The evidence was relevant not only to the issue of the extent of Guidry’s negligence but also to the issué of whether he had sobered up *267enough to have returned to the service of the vessel at the time of the accident.
I would remand this case for a new trial. See generally Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 876 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.1994) (remand because of defective jury instruction).