Court Opinion

ID: 9744176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:55:43.775051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:47.261802
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER, specially concurring: Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I believe the result is proper because there was an express trust rather than a resulting or possibly a constructive trust. The trial court based its determination on a finding of the existence of a constructive trust even though there was nothing in plaintiff’s statement of claim alleging facts which might support such a theory or any indication that a theory of constructive trust was proposed. Because of the inadequacy of the statement of claim it is indeed difficult to know what legal rights the claimant was asserting and what defense was interposed thereto. However, it does not appear the appellant objected to the sufficiency of the statement of claim, and it seems inappropriate to now decide the case should be reversed because of an inadequate pleading. Such inadequacy does in part explain the confusion in the trial court’s determination and the blurring of distinctions between various kinds of trusts demonstrated both in the majority opinion and some of the cases relied on therein. A resulting trust is created by operation of law and arises out of a presumed intention of the parties as evidenced by their acts and conduct. (35 Ill. L. & Prac. Trusts §41 (1958).) Such is not the situation in the case at bar. The pleadings, though vague, specifically state that the money was given to Raymond and Elmer in trust, to be used for Emily’s benefit. Further, the majority does not refer to the acts and conduct of the parties in deciding there was a trust. Instead the majority puts its emphasis on the conversations by the family members in which they specifically state that the money was given to them in trust for Emily’s benefit. From this testimony I believe that an oral, express trust was created and that it is on this basis that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed. I also believe it necessary to discuss the fact that the trust was created so that it would appear to the State that Emily Engel had no funds, permitting her to possibly enter a county nursing home, while in actuality she was the equitable owner of those funds. Such a scheme constitutes fraud. Had the scheme been actually carried and the State defrauded, then I believe the court would be unable to enforce the trust. Carlson v. Carlson (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 673, 393 N.E.2d 643, and Harnois v. Harnois (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 295 N.E.2d 511, cited by the majority, dealt with conveyances from one party to another to defeat creditors with the understanding there would be a reconveyance when the danger was past. In both cases the court found a resulting trust. However, in neither case did the conveyance result in a fraud being effected. Since the record in the instant case is devoid of any evidence that the State was in fact defrauded, I agree with the majority that these cases are proper precedent for enforcing the trust in the instant case. However, had the record shown that Emily Engel had entered a county nursing home and effected a fraud, then I believe the court would not have been able to enforce the trust. “The law will not permit a party to deliberately place his property out of his control for a fraudulent purpose and then, through the intervention of a court of equity, regain the title after his fraudulent purpose has been accomplished, but rather, will leave the parties as it finds them.” (Hanley v. Hanley (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 566, 152 N.E.2d 879.) If a fraud is effected by the creation of a trust, a court will not become a party to the fraud by enforcing the trust. In the present case, however, no fraud was actually perpetrated and, therefore, the express oral trust should be enforced.