Court Opinion

ID: 9898939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 16:11:58.391928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:51.921565
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-23-00054-CR

          DALTON DALE ROGERS, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

         On Appeal from the 115th District Court
                Upshur County, Texas
                Trial Court No. 19156

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
        Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
                                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

            After a jury found Dalton Dale Rogers guilty of possession of a controlled substance,

four grams or more but less than 200 grams, the trial court1 sentenced him to twenty-eight years

in prison and assessed $365.00 in court costs and a fine in the amount of $5,000.00.2 Rogers

appeals, maintaining that (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce

extraneous-offense evidence during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial in violation of Rules

403 and 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence, (2) he was harmed by the admission of the

extraneous-offense evidence, and (3) the judgment of conviction should be reformed to

accurately reflect the correct degree of offense. We find that the trial court did not err when it

allowed the State to introduce extraneous-offense evidence. Even so, we must modify the trial

court’s judgment to correct the degree of offense. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment of conviction.

I.          Background

            Justin Nustad, a member of a special investigations unit3 for the Upshur County Sheriff’s

Office and the handler of a drug dog named Marco, testified that Marco was certified in locating

methamphetamine, heroin, ecstasy, cocaine, and crack cocaine. To be Marco’s handler, Nustad

was required to participate in specialized training to learn how to communicate with Marco. On

1
 This case was originally appealed to the Twelfth Court of Appeals in Tyler. It was transferred to this Court by the
Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). We
are unaware of any conflict between precedent of the Twelfth Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any
relevant issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2
    Rogers pled true to one enhancement paragraph.
3
    Specifically, Nustad was assigned to the Narcotics Intervention and Detection Unit.
                                                            2
August 3, 2020, Nustad was working drug interdiction, which basically meant that he sat and

watched “for activity, vehicle traffic.” That night, a driver drove past Nustad in a vehicle that

did not have a working license plate light. Nustad activated his emergency lights and attempted

to stop the vehicle. Although the driver did not stop immediately, when he did, he quickly exited

his vehicle, closed the door behind him, and began walking toward Nustad. Nustad said that he

was familiar with the driver and knew him to be Rogers. According to Nustad, Rogers attempted

to distance himself from the vehicle so that Nustad could not see or smell what was inside of it.

Rogers was the sole person in the vehicle.

           Pursuant to existing warrants, Nustad arrested Rogers for failure to maintain financial

responsibility, failure to display a driver’s license, and displaying an expired registration. Based

on those arrests, Nustad asked Rogers if he would consent to a search of his vehicle. Rogers

denied consent, but he told Nustad that he would allow Marco to do a free-air search of the

vehicle. Marco made a positive alert for the existence of drugs in the driver’s-side quarter panel

of the truck. Specifically, the drugs were found “in the window mechanism where you roll your

windows up and down, the whole panel basically was loose.” Nustad said that he simply “stuck

[his] finger in there and just popped it open.” Nustad then “shined [his] light down there and

immediately could see [the drugs].” According to Nustad, Rogers’s vehicle contained a large

amount of methamphetamine, which was, in his opinion, well beyond an individual-user

amount.4 Nustad also found a bag containing Xanax on the top of the methamphetamine and a

4
    The methamphetamine weighed 11.39 grams.
                                                  3
hypodermic syringe.5 Nustad explained that methamphetamine could be used in a variety of

ways, including by injecting it into a body part with the aid of a syringe. Although Rogers

conceded that the truck belonged to him, he told Nustad that he did not know anything about the

drugs that were found in his truck.

            After hearing from several more witnesses, the jury found Rogers guilty of possession of

a controlled substance, more than four grams but less than 200 grams. He was sentenced to

twenty-eight years’ imprisonment and assessed court costs and a fine. This appeal followed.

II.         The Trial Court Did Not Err When it Admitted Extraneous-Offense Evidence

            Rogers appeals, maintaining (1) that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to

introduce extraneous-offense evidence during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial in violation

of Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence, (2) that he was harmed by the

admission of the extraneous-offense evidence, and (3) that the judgment of conviction should be

reformed to accurately reflect the correct degree of offense.

            A.       The Extraneous Offenses

            At trial, the State offered, and the trial court admitted, two extraneous offenses that

Rogers objected to at trial and now complains of on appeal. The first offense was alleged to

have occurred on December 21, 2010. John Beasley, an investigator with the Mount Pleasant

Police Department,6 testified that Mr. Lopez, a loss-prevention officer at the Walmart in Gilmer,

contacted him about potential narcotics activity at the store. When Beasley arrived at Walmart,

5
    Rogers claimed that the syringe belonged to a diabetic friend of his.
6
    In December 2010, Beasley was assigned to the narcotics unit of the Upshur County Sheriff’s Office.
                                                             4
Lopez told him about Rogers’s interest in purchasing pseudoephedrine.                      Pursuant to that

information, Beasley struck up a conversation with Rogers, who ultimately offered to sell Rogers

marihuana, Xanax, or hydrocodone in exchange for Beasley purchasing pseudoephedrine for him

from Walmart.7 After Beasley purchased the pseudoephedrine, he met Rogers in the parking lot

to complete the transaction. At that point, Rogers was arrested for delivery of a controlled

substance or offer to deliver a controlled substance. During a search of Rogers’s person, officers

located Xanax and a hypodermic needle. Rogers claimed that he had a prescription for Xanax.

In 2011, a jury found Rogers guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to the maximum

punishment.

            Beasley also explained that there are laws in the State of Texas that place limits on the

amount of pseudoephedrine a person can buy from a store. To get around those laws, it was

common for an individual to purchase pseudoephedrine for another individual so that they could

manufacture methamphetamine. Beasley believed that Rogers needed pseudoephedrine for that

reason.

            Nustad testified about the second extraneous offense (trial court cause number 19179),

which was alleged to have occurred approximately one year after the offense occurred in this

case. In cause 19179, Rogers was driving a U-Haul rental truck when Nustad and his partner

stopped Rogers based on a traffic violation.8 At that time, there was an outstanding warrant for

Rogers related to another offense. Rogers would not give the officers consent to search the

7
 While Beasley and Rogers were talking inside the store, Rogers showed Beasley some marihuana and told him that
he had Xanax and hydrocodone.
8
    Rogers was the sole occupant in the vehicle.
                                                      5
vehicle, so Marco was instructed to do a free-air search. Marco alerted to the presence of drugs

in the driver’s side door of the vehicle. When the vehicle was searched, the officers located

almost fifteen grams of methamphetamine next to Rogers’s person.9                      They also found a

methamphetamine pipe in between the driver’s seat and the center console of the vehicle.

Rogers denied knowing anything about the presence of the methamphetamine in the truck. The

State indicted Rogers for the first-degree-felony offense of possession of a controlled substance,

specifically, methamphetamine. At the time of trial in the pending case, the trial in cause 19179

had not taken place.

        B.       Discussion

        Rogers maintains that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to present

extraneous-offense evidence, arguing that it related only to his propensity to possess

methamphetamine, to sell drugs, and to manufacture methamphetamine. According to Rogers,

“[t]he State had no need or reason to introduce the evidence, and the timing—at the beginning of

trial—supports that such evidence should not have been admitted.” Furthermore, he contends

that the State’s use of the extraneous-offense evidence was not necessary for rebuttal purposes

because Rogers did not offer a defense theory.

        The State argues that, during voir dire, and then later during trial, Rogers maintained that

“one cannot possess with ‘care, custody, and control,’ a controlled substance if one had no

knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance.” According to the State, Rogers provided

the jury panel with examples regarding the issue of intent, i.e., that a person who did not have

9
 According to Nustad, almost fifteen grams of methamphetamine was a dealer amount of drugs as opposed to a user
amount.
                                                      6
knowledge of the presence of a controlled substance could not have the intent to possess it. The

State also maintains that Rogers “opened the door” with those examples, which allowed the State

to offer the extraneous offenses for the purpose of proving intent and knowledge. Moreover, the

State argues that, during trial, Rogers raised the issue of ownership and registration of the vehicle

that he was driving, thereby implying that he could not have known what was inside the vehicle.

       A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of extraneous-offense evidence is reviewed for

an abuse of discretion. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

An appellate court must uphold a trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record

and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. See id. “An appellate court will

not reverse a trial court’s ruling [to admit evidence] unless that ruling falls outside the zone of

reasonable disagreement.” Burden v. State, 55 S.W.3d 608, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that

       [a] trial court’s ruling is generally within th[e] zone if the evidence shows that
       1) an extraneous transaction is relevant to a material, non-propensity issue, and
       2) the probative value of that evidence is not substantially outweighed by the
       danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury.
       Furthermore, if the trial court’s evidentiary ruling is correct on any theory of law
       applicable to that ruling, it will not be disturbed even if the trial judge gave the
       wrong reason for his right ruling.

De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (footnote omitted) (citation

omitted). All relevant evidence is admissible unless it is excluded by law. TEX. R. EVID. 402.

“Evidence is relevant if . . . it has any tendency to make” the existence of any “fact [that] is of

consequence [to the] determination of the action” “more or less probable than it would be

without the evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 401.

                                                 7
       Further, “[e]vidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to prove

that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.” TEX. R.

EVID. 404(a)(1). However,

       [t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
       opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
       lack of accident. On timely request by a defendant in a criminal case, the
       prosecutor must provide reasonable notice before trial that the prosecution intends
       to introduce such evidence—other than that arising in the same transaction—in its
       case-in-chief.

TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); see Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “The

exceptions listed under Rule 404(b) are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive.”

De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343. “Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Bowie, 232 F.2d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). “The rule excludes only

that evidence that is offered (or will be used) solely for the purpose of proving bad character and

hence conduct in conformity with that bad character.” Id. (emphasis added).

       But, when a defendant raises a defensive theory, he “opens the door” for the State to offer

rebuttal evidence regarding an extraneous offense if the extraneous offense has characteristics

common with the offense for which the defendant was on trial. Dabney v. State, 492 S.W.3d

309, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Simply stated, “As a general proposition, when a party

introduces matters into evidence, he invites the other side to reply to that evidence.” Wheeler v.

State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 885 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (citing Kincaid v. State, 534 S.W.2d 340,

342 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). In Dabney, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held “that [a]

defensive theory raised in voir dire and opening statements open[s] the door to . . . extraneous-

                                                8
offense evidence presented by the State and the State [is] not required under Rule 404(b) to

provide notice of such rebuttal evidence.” Dabney, 492 S.W.3d at 318.

       Rogers maintains that the State had no need to introduce the extraneous offenses before

Rogers presented a defensive theory, if, in fact, he presented one.

       However, a review of the record shows that, during jury selection, Rogers stated,

                       All right. Now, the State, as Mr. Byrd talked about, they have the
       burden of proof throughout the whole trial. And the things [the State] talked to
       you about, the care, custody, control, management are going to be crucial in this
       case. So let’s say -- I’ll give you another example. Let’s say somewhere in this
       room there’s a large quantity of drugs. Let’s say everyone in here is charged.
       Well, if you personally were charged because there were drugs in this room you
       would want the State -- and you’re in front of a jury like this -- the State would
       have to prove that you personally had one of those things, either care, custody, or
       control of those drugs. Does everybody understand that, to be found guilty. But
       let’s say you’re in a bus, and maybe just five of y’all are in there, the same things.
       It gets pulled over, everyone gets charged with it, well, still the State would have
       the burden of proving that those particular drugs were under your care, custody,
       control, or management.

                       Now, that burden didn’t shift to you. You don’t have to come up
       and prove or -- the defendant wouldn’t have to come up and prove they weren’t
       yours, it’s the State’s burden. Does anybody think that that burden that’s placed
       on the State is unfair, that it should be the defendant to come up and prove it
       wasn’t his drugs? Anybody feel that way?

Rogers continued, “Does everybody understand it’s the State’s burden? And some people think

-- well, and I’m going to get to this -- ‘I want to hear the defendant get up and say, “It wasn’t

mine. This is how I can prove it.”’”

       Relevant to the issue of whether Rogers knew methamphetamine was in the truck, at trial,

Rogers asked Nustad the following:

               Q.    Now, the vehicle -- is it your testimony that Mr. Rogers, at the
       scene, claimed that was his vehicle?
                                                 9
          A.   Yes.

          Q.   Did you run the title to see whose vehicle it actually belonged to?

        A.      We did run the registration like we always do when we stop a car.
That’s the first thing we give out, location and the license plate. So we did.

        Q.     Okay. And isn’t it true it did not actually belong to Mr. Rogers; is
that accurate?

     A.        I don’t have a copy of the face sheet, just the report. I don’t
remember.

       Q.     Now, you’re the -- was there an investigator assigned to this
offense or was it pretty much just you and Mr. Lambert there on the scene and
that was it?

          A.   Basically we are the investigators for narcotic crimes, yes, sir.

         Q.     Now, would the ownership, the title of that vehicle be important as
far as if you’re finding drugs in different places?

          A.   No.

          Q.   No?

        A.     I mean, we find drugs all the time in cars that are not registered to
the person driving it.

          Q.   So it’s not relevant to you whether he actually owned the vehicle
or not?

          A.   No, sir.

        Q.     Would it be relevant if somebody else had been using the car prior
to that day?

          A.   He didn’t mention that.

          Q.   Did you ask him who else had been driving this car?

                                         10
              A.      I think I did, but I don’t remember. I can’t tell you.

              Q.      You agree with me, that would be important, correct?

              A.      Yes, sir.

              Q.      It would also be important actually who owned the car, correct?

              A.      Honestly, I disagree with you. I don’t believe that.

             Q.       Okay. But as you sit here today, you don’t know who actually
       owned it?

              A.       No, I don’t. I mean, he said it was his car, so I’m assuming he was
       the owner of it.

              Q.      All right.

On recross-examination, Rogers continued questioning Nustad.

              Q.      . . . . The location of the drugs found, at least on August 3rd, that
       was inside the door panel, literally you had to pull up the --

              A.      The window mechanism.

               Q.     Yes. The window mechanism -- that little panel, you had to pull
       out the side armrest to find the drugs inside, correct?

              A.      Yes.

              Q.     All right. Was there any other investigative methods that could
       have been used to maybe tie what was in that location to Mr. Rogers? . . .

       In addition to Nustad’s testimony, Chris Lambert, an investigator with the Upshur County

Sheriff’s Office, testified that he was working with Nustad when Rogers was pulled over for a

traffic violation. Rogers questioned Lambert as follows:

              Q.      Sure. Now, when you called dispatch that night, isn’t it true this
       car wasn’t registered to Mr. Rogers?

                                                11
               A.      Correct.

               Q.      Do you know who it was registered to?

               A.      I don’t recall the registered owner [sic] name, no, sir.

Lastly, in his closing argument, Rogers stated,

                      So what I argue to you is the care, custody, and control. Did the
       State meet their burden in proving care, custody, and control? Did they prove that
       Mr. Rogers knew that those drugs were inside the door of his car? Did they prove
       that it was his car? They didn’t have to prove that, but did they bring any
       evidence of whose car it was?

                       Ladies and gentlemen, I will suggest to you as investigators, it’s
       their burden of bringing this evidence to you and proving who owned that
       methamphetamine, the drugs, that’s before us today. If you remember on cross-
       examination I questioned him about certain things. What was in the car? Who
       owned the car? Did you determine who owned the car? Did you determine who
       it was registered to? All those things were important to them because in their
       opinion they found the meth, Mr. Rogers was driving the car, it had to be his.
       And that’s where the investigation ended. But as we all know, sometimes we
       drive other people’s cars. There’s a lot of stuff in the car. There was nothing
       linking him individually to not only the things in the car, but the stuff that was
       inside the door, for what admittedly they testified was not his vehicle. And ladies
       and gentlemen, that at least brings some doubt into whether or not he had care,
       custody, control, and management of something that was in the car that didn’t
       even belong to him. And, ladies and gentlemen, I would submit to you that it at
       least raises some doubt, some reasonable doubt that cannot be removed.

       From jury selection to closing arguments, Rogers put forth a defensive theory (1) that the

truck did not belong to him, (2) that he was not aware of the existence of the methamphetamine

in the truck, and (3) that he did not knowingly possess methamphetamine. In jury selection, he

stated, “You don’t have to come up and prove or -- the defendant wouldn’t have to come up and

prove [the drugs] weren’t yours, it’s the State’s burden. Does anybody think that that burden

that’s placed on the State is unfair, that it should be the defendant to come up and prove it wasn’t

                                                  12
his drugs?” The same is true of his questions during trial and the statements he made in his

closing argument. Because Rogers opened the door to the issues of possession, ownership, and

intent, the State was allowed to offer evidence in the form of the two extraneous offenses to rebut

Rogers’s defensive theory. Notably, there were several factors in the prior offenses that were

common to the offense at issue here and that corroborated the witnesses’ testimony given in this

case. In the Walmart case, Rogers asked Beasley if he would buy pseudoephedrine for him in

exchange for other drugs. Clearly, that transaction showed that Rogers had possession of various

drugs that he was willing to sell or trade. That fact corroborates Nustad’s testimony that he

believed Rogers was in possession of a dealer amount of drugs in the instant case, rather than a

user amount.     According to Beasley’s testimony, many people in Upshur County used

pseudoephedrine to manufacture methamphetamine, which just happened to be the type of drug

Rogers was in possession of in this case. And, similar to the instant case, when officers searched

Rogers’s person and his vehicle, they located a hypodermic syringe and Xanax.

       Further, Rogers was the only person in the vehicle in cause 19179, and he was the only

person in the vehicle in the instant case. In both cases, he denied knowing of the existence of the

drugs in the vehicle. In both cases, Rogers was driving a vehicle that did not belong to him.

Likewise, in both instances he did not give consent to search the vehicle, and the drugs were

found in similar places—the driver’s side of the vehicle. Moreover, in both instances, Rogers

was in possession of a dealer amount of methamphetamine, not a user amount.

       Rule 404 allowed the State to offer the extraneous-offense evidence to prove knowledge,

absence of mistake, and intent in the pending case. Based on these common characteristics, this

                                                13
Court cannot say that the prior extraneous offenses were used “solely for the purpose of proving

[Rogers’s] bad character.” De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343. Accordingly, the trial court did not

violate Rule 404(b) when it admitted the State’s extraneous-offense evidence.

        Next, Rogers claims that the trial court’s admission of extraneous-offense evidence

violated Rule 403 because its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

When conducting a Rule 403 balancing test, we

        must balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence
        along with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of
        the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the
        evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of
        the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to
        evaluate the probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that
        presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely
        repeat evidence already admitted.

Price v. State, 594 S.W.3d 674, 680 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (quoting

Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). “In any given case,

‘these factors may well blend together in practice.’” Id. (quoting Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at

642).

        Here, we find that the first factor favors the admission of the extraneous-offense evidence

in light of its relevance to Rogers’s claims that he had no knowledge of the existence of

methamphetamine in the vehicle and that he did not knowingly possess the methamphetamine,

both of which are related to elements that the State was required to prove. Also, the extraneous-

offense evidence made a fact of consequence—the falsity of Rogers’s position that he knew

nothing about the drugs and his knowledge that he did—more likely. Furthermore, the evidence

that Rogers committed the extraneous offenses was compelling. In the two extraneous offenses,
                                                14
drugs were found in Roger’s possession or within his reach. Moreover, Rogers’s knowledge of

the methamphetamine’s existence was a hotly contested issue at trial; consequently, the

extraneous-offense evidence had very high probative value in showing that he did have

knowledge of the drugs. Clearly, a significant amount of time was devoted to the presentation of

the extraneous-offense evidence. Yet, Rogers argues on appeal that the State had no reason to

introduce the evidence because “there was no defensive theory to rebut.” The record shows

differently. As previously stated, Rogers put forth his defensive theory as early as jury selection,

and he continued with it up to, and including, his closing argument. Lastly, the elements of

intent and knowledge can sometimes be difficult for the State to prove when there are no

additional witnesses to the alleged offense.              Here, the admission of the extraneous-offense

evidence was necessary for the State to show that Rogers had (1) intent to possess a large amount

of methamphetamine, (2) that he had knowledge of the existence of the methamphetamine in the

truck, and (3) that it was not the first time that Rogers denied having the intent to possess or the

knowledge that he was in possession of methamphetamine.

        In light of those facts, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

found that the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of

the extraneous offenses.

        We overrule Rogers’s first point of error.10

10
  Because we find that the trial court did not err when it admitted the extraneous-offense evidence, it is not
necessary for us to address Rogers’s second point of error, that is, his claim that he was harmed by the admission of
the evidence.
                                                        15
III.        The Judgment Must be Modified to Show the Correct Degree of Offense

            In his third point of error, Rogers maintains that the trial court’s judgment should be

reformed to reflect the correct degree of felony offense.11 Specifically, the State charged Rogers

with the offense of possession of a controlled substance, four grams or more but less than 200

grams, which is a felony of the second degree. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 481.115(d) (Supp.). The indictment included an enhancement paragraph that contained a prior

felony conviction, which raised the range of Rogers’s potential punishment to that of a first-

degree felony but did not change the felony degree of offense itself.12 Despite that, the judgment

of conviction shows that Rogers was convicted of a first-degree felony.

            “Appellate courts ‘have the authority to reform judgments and affirm as modified in

cases where there is non reversible error.’” Walker v. State, 557 S.W.3d 678, 690 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2018, pet. ref’d) (quoting Ferguson v. State, 435 S.W.3d 291, 293 (Tex. App.—Waco

2014, pet. struck), overruled on other grounds by Cummins v. State, 646 S.W.3d 605 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2022, pet. ref’d); see Anthony v. State, 531 S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (“This Court has the power to correct and modify the judgment of the

trial court for accuracy when the necessary data and information are part of the record.”) (citing

TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v.

State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d)).

11
     The State agrees with Rogers’s request to reform the judgment to reflect the correct degree of felony offense.
12
  The relevant enhancement statute states that, “if it is shown on the trial of a felony of the second degree that the
defendant has previously been finally convicted of a felony other than a state jail felony punishable under Section
12.35(a), on conviction the defendant shall be punished for a felony of the first degree.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 12.42(b). Here, Rogers pled true to one enhancement paragraph, resulting in an enhanced sentence. Section
12.42, however, does not speak to a change in the degree of offense.
                                                            16
       Because Rogers was tried and convicted of the second-degree-felony offense of

possession of a controlled substance, four grams or more but less than 200 grams, we sustain

Rogers’s third point of error and must modify the judgment to reflect conviction of a second-

degree felony.

IV.    Disposition

       Accordingly, we modify the judgment of conviction to reflect that Rogers was convicted

of a second-degree felony. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                            Jeff Rambin
                                            Justice

Date Submitted:       October 3, 2023
Date Decided:         November 15, 2023

Do Not Publish

                                              17