Court Opinion

ID: 9551432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:53:23.69207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:47.274655
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. I believe the motion to remand should by tabled. On May 15, 1972, defendants filed their brief in chief as appellants. On May 18, 1972, Duke City filed a motion to remand for the purpose of allowing defendants to file in the trial court a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) [§ 21-1-1(60) (b) (6), N.M. S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4)]. This rule provides in part: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party * * * from a final judgment * * * for the following reasons: ****** (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. [Emphasis added], Duke City sought a remand to allow the trial court to grant relief from the operation of the judgment insofar as it awarded damages to plaintiff for an alleged loss of the sawmill and planing mill. This court reserved a ruling and directed the movant to file its motion under Rule 60 (b) (6), supra, with the trial court requesting an expression of opinion whether it would entertain a motion under Rule 60(b)(6), supra. The motion was filed and argument made. On June 30, 1972, the trial court expressed its opinion that it would not entertain a motion under Rule 60(b)(6). The trial judge is the Chief Judge of this court. On July 20, 1972, upon rehearing of the motion to remand, Duke City orally requested that the motion be tabled until a decision was arrived at on the merits. The reason given was that the motion was premature because the judgment of the trial court might be reversed on appeal. The majority of this court denied the motion to remand. This is a novel proceeding in the Court of Appeals. Section 21-2-1 (16) (1), (2), N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 4) provides that motions shall be typewritten; that a motion directed to a matter which may substantially affect the disposition of the case must be supported by a separate brief. No provision is made specifically for a motion to remand without decision pending appeal. In my opinion, a motion to remand is included in the above rules if it is directed to a matter which may substantially affect the disposition of the case. Rule 17 [§21-2-1(17), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4)] provides for disposition for cause. We must examine the record, and on the facts therein contained alone, we must award a new trial, reverse or affirm the judgment of the district court, or give such other judgment as to us shall be deemed agreeable to law. Rule 52(B) (a) (7) [§ 21-1-1 (52) (B) (a) (7), N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 4)], which pertains to findings of fact is the only reference to remand in our statutes. It provides in part: * * *, [B]ut where the ends of justice require the cause may be remanded to the district court for the making and filing of proper findings of fact and conclusions of law. [Emphasis added]. This was a jury trial and Rule 52(B)(a)(7), supra, is inapplicable, but the rule sets a tone for us to hear on motions to remand without decision in jury trials. The “ends of justice” is the controlling issue in determining the grant or denial of a motion to remand. For “ends of justice,” see Smith v. South, 59 N.M. 312, 283 P.2d 1073 (1955); ATMA v. Munoz, 48 N.M. 114, 146 P.2d 631 (1944); Prater v. Holloway, 49 N.M. 353, 164 P.2d 378 (1945); Edington v. Alba, 74 N.M. 263, 392 P.2d 675 (1964); 5B C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1836g. The general rule on remand to permit further evidence is set forth in 5B C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1836d: Where necessary to the furtherance of justice, a case on appeal may be remanded, without decision, for the introduction of further evidence. Duke City did not request a remand for the introduction of further evidence. It sought a hearing in the trial court under Rule 60(b)(6), supra. If it would seek a remand for the introduction of further evidence, I would favor a remand. The case at issue is extensive in testimony, complex in the law, and lengthy in written briefs. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $635,458.50, $367,000 of which Duke City claims was for “loss” of plaintiff’s sawmill and planing mill. It will take an unusually long time to decide the issues. If, at the time of decision on the merits, this court beHeves the judgment should be affirmed, it will consider only the facts in this transcript. The motion to remand should be kept alive and should be seriously considered. Duke City will have no knowledge of the proposed opinion of this court. After the opinion is rendered, Duke City will have no opportunity to present a motion to remand in order to preserve error, if any, on application to the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari. Furthermore, this court will not know at the time of affirmance on the facts contained in the record, whether the judgment is fair and correct. Duke City claims plaintiff did not lose his sawmill or planing mill because on May 8, 1972, over one year after judgment was rendered, plaintiff’s sawmill was definitely in operation. We have no basis upon which to determine whether evidence produced under Rule 60(b)(6), supra, will affect the award of damages or award a new trial on the issue. The “ends of justice” demand that the motion to remand be tabled. If this court intends to affirm the judgment, the motion to remand should be granted with instructions to the trial court to grant or deny a motion made under Rule 60(b)(6), supra. The record can then be brought to this court by supplemental transcript. It is obvious the trial court will deny any mottion made under Rule 60(b) (6), supra. By supplemental transcript, this claimed error can then be raised by Duke City under a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. There is no injustice in preserving claimed error on matters which arose after an appeal was taken to this court. We are not concerned with evidence that could have been presented before judgment. The purpose of this test is not to harm plaintiff. The time may come when a plaintiff may seek similar relief. A rule should be adopted which will serve the ends of justice in the future.