Court Opinion

ID: 9693632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:53:46.893405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:49.165182
License: Public Domain

*258Spada, J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully disagree with the majority decision.
This is an appeal from a suppression order by the trial court invalidating, on constitutional grounds, the warrantless search of a fire-damaged building under lease to the defendant for his use as a restaurant.
The facts on appeal raise two issues: (1) whether the landlord, as a third party, had authority to consent to a police search of the building after the fire, and (2) whether the defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy was violated by the challenged search.
The threshold question in every suppression case is the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. “[The] capacity [of a defendant] to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, reh. denied, 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S. Ct. 1035, 59 L. Ed. 2d 83 (1978). The test for legitimate expectation of privacy is: (a) has there been a subjective expectation exhibited; and (b) is the expectation one society will recognize as reasonable. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979).
The lease (paragraph 11) provided in relevant part that “[s]hould the demised premises be rendered untenantable and unfit for occupancy . . . the Landlord may enter and repair the same with reasonable speed . . . .” It was undisputed that as a consequence of the February 12, 1977 fire, the premises were rendered unfit for occupancy.
*259On February 13, the landlord secured the premises by boarding them, thereby protecting both his and the defendant’s proprietary interests. A new door, required for access, was installed by the landlord. On February 14, the defendant permitted officials of the Waterbury fire marshal’s office to inspect the premises. On three separate occasions after the fire the landlord entered upon the premises for his own purposes.
The defendant testified that he assumed the lease was terminated by the fire but that he could stay to the end of February because his monthly rent had been paid. Both the landlord and the defendant removed debris and cleaned the premises. The defendant made no repairs and eventually removed his salvageable restaurant fixtures. The claimed tainted search occurred on February 23, eleven days after the fire, when the landlord granted access to fire and police officials to search the premises, without a warrant, to ascertain the cause of the fire.
We are not reviewing herein the case of a landlord authorizing a search of his tenant’s property. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S. Ct. 776, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1961). Under the lease, the landlord reserved to himself the right of access and entry upon the occurrence of a major fire. This reservation was broad enough to allow for appraisal of damage; the opportunity to repair and relet the premises; and finally to locate and abate a suspected cause of the fire. The early payment of the February rent neither altered nor reduced the landlord’s contractual right to enter upon the premises. The majority decision limits the landlord’s right of access to the time of the fire or within *260a reasonable period thereafter. No authority or precedent exists to justify the restriction of the landlord’s contractual right of access.
In Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1978), cited by the majority, the Warrantless search resulted after a fire without the intervention or presence of a landlord or third party. This precedent therefore is unpersuasive in an instance of third party consent, such as in the case before us.
The exigency of the fire triggered the landlord’s right of access bargained for and contained in the lease. The landlord’s right of unrestricted access effectively negated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Because the landlord’s claim to possession was at minimum equal to that of the defendant, he had an independent right to permit the search.
The burden rests on one who seeks to suppress to prove that his legitimate expectation of privacy has been violated by the challenged search. United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1981). The evidence does not reasonably establish that the defendant exhibited any subjective expectation of privacy in the fire damaged restaurant; nor can I conclude that society would recognize any such expectation as reasonable. “Not all places enjoy, in the eyes of society and the law, the same legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy.” United States v. Bellina, supra, 1340; see also United States v. Rucinski, 658 F.2d 741, 746 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939, 102 S. Ct. 1430, *26171 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1982), making a distinction between private houses and commercial property for fourth amendment purposes.
I would reverse the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress.