Court Opinion

ID: 9794320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:03:52.334174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:14:36.609372
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frantz
dissenting:
This case was submitted to the jury on questions of fact and the court gave instructions on contributory negligence and assumption of risk. A verdict favorable to the plaintiff was rendered by the jury, after which the court entered judgment pursuant to the verdict. It is my opinion that this verdict and judgment should not be disturbed.
We are considering the acts of a technical trespasser, a boy who had attained the age of 11 years. “It has been considered that a trespass which is purely technical will not preclude recovery for an injury suffered by the trespasser through the negligence of the owner or person in charge of the premises.” 65 C.J.S. §24 (1), page 446.
The unfortunate happening in this case took place in an urbanized community. Many of the activities of children of tender years and even of adults in such a community, in going upon the property of another, can be described as nothing more than technical trespasses. To view them otherwise would tend to render urban life frictional. Thus, the boy who would retrieve his baseball from the front lawn of his neighbor, or who would run across the lawn of an owner in an effort to evade capture while playing with other boys, or who would be attracted to smell some beautiful flowers in a yard — examples could be multiplied — would be a trespasser only in a very technical sense. His motives would not be bad and his accountability should be viewed in the light of what prompted him to go upon the premises.
*186Such technical trespasser is far removed from the person who goes on the premises of another to burgle a house or to destroy property or to commit some other depredation or misdeed.
This is one facet of this case which should temper the general rule regarding the rights of a trespasser and the duties of the owner to him.
Cases involving the condition of property and its likelihood to injure a trespasser should be distinguished from the present case in which there is an active force that might bring harm to a technical trespasser. Starkey v. Dameron, 92 Colo. 420, 21 P. (2d) 1112, 22 P. (2d) 640. A dog kept on the premises and known to hurt persons is more nearly like the Spring-gun case, and the rule there applied should have application here.
This is another facet of the instant case which should take it out of the general rule relating to trespassers and the duties owing them by owners.
A third facet of this case involves the rule espoused by this court in the case of Krause v. Watson Bros., 119 Colo. 73, 200 P. (2d) 387, and which we should properly reaffirm in this case, to-wit:
“ ‘The known characteristics of children should, however, be taken into consideration in determining whether or not sufficient care for the safety of a child has been exercised in a particular case. Accordingly, the fact that children cannot and do not ordinarily exercise the same degree of prudence and care for their own safety as adults imposes upon those by whose acts or omissions a child may be injured the obligation of exercising more vigilance and caution than might be sufficient with respect to an adult, and conduct which might reach the standard of ordinary care with respect to an adult might, in the case of a child, amount to negligence, or even gross negligence.’ 45 C.J., 702-703.”
Lastly, we should, as did the trial court, apply the rule that whether a child at 11 years of age is guilty of contributory negligence or assumes the risk is a question of *187fact for the jury to resolve. The age and intelligence of such a boy should be evaluated by the jury, and it should not be intimated or held that, as a matter of law, such a boy was guilty of contributory negligence or assumed the risk in going upon the premises. An early case voiced the view that “the law does not exact the same degree of care and diligence from a child of tender years that it does from an adult person of presumed better judgment and discretion.” Pierce v. Conners, 20 Colo. 178, 37 Pac. 721, 46 Am.S.R. 279.
In a case involving a 13-year-old lad, this court said: “If there is a fair doubt as to the child being of the age and capacity that in law it should be held responsible for the act contributing to its injury, the question should be submitted to the jury to say, by their verdict, whether this is so or not.” Street Railway Co. v. Sherman, 25 Colo. 114, 53 Pac. 322, 71 Am.S.R. 116.
Firmly entrenched in the law of this state is the rule that “the law discriminates between children and adults, the feeble and strong, and only requires of each that degree of care to be expected in view of his age and condition,” and that the question of whether such care is exercised “is usually one for the jury to determine.” Denver City Tramway Co. v. Nicholas, 35 Colo. 462, 84 Pac. 813. Again, a boy 13 years of age was involved.
These rules have been followed in subsequent cases. Thus, they were applied to a girl 14 years of age in the case of Daniels v. Johnston, 39 Colo. 177, 89 Pac. 811; to a boy 9 years of age in the case of Richardson v. El Paso Co., 51 Colo. 440, 118 Pac. 982; to a boy 9 years of age in the case of Colorado Utilities Corp. v. Casady, 89 Colo. 156, 300 Pac. 601; to an 8-year-old girl in the case of Simkins v. Dowis, 100 Colo. 355, 67 P. (2d) 627; to a girl 12 years of age in Lakeside Co. v. Wein, 111 Colo. 322, 141 P. (2d) 171; to a girl 6 years of age in Krause v. Watson Bros., supra; to a boy 12 years of age in Walters v. Electric Light Co., 12 Colo. App. 145, 54 Pac. 960; and to a child of tender years in the case of Kopplekom v. *188The Colorado Cement Pipe Co., 16 Colo. App. 274, 64 Pac. 1047, 54 L.R.A. 284.
In view of the well-settled law in this state having application to this case, I would affirm the judgment.
Mr. Justice Doyle joins in this dissent.