Court Opinion

ID: 9946774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 15:15:34.902874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:23.281248
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 23, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2023-CA-0703-MR

BRIDGET MICHELLE CLAVERY                                               APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                  HONORABLE JULIE KAELIN, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 20-CI-004523

ART EATABLES, LLC                                                         APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; EASTON AND GOODWINE,
JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Bridget Michelle Clavery (“Appellant”) appeals

from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor

of Art Eatables, LLC (“Appellee”) on her claim of tortious interference with a

business relationship. Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in its

interpretation of a non-disclosure and non-compete agreement, and that a question
of fact remains on the issue of whether Appellee acted with an improper motive.

After careful review, we find no error and affirm the order on appeal.

                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             Appellee is a chocolatier engaged in the business of producing and

selling bourbon-infused chocolate candies and other products. In March 2019,

Appellee hired Appellant as an associate to sell products in its retail location. As a

condition of her employment, Appellant was required to sign a Confidentiality,

Non-Compete, and Non-Solicitation Agreement (“the Agreement”). The

Agreement was broadly drafted to prohibit Appellant’s employment in Kentucky

or any adjoining state with any entity in the business of selling candy. The

confidentiality requirement lasted in perpetuity, and the non-compete provision

lasted for 24 months after Appellant’s employment with Appellee ended.

Appellant read the Agreement and signed it at the time of her hiring.

             In January 2020, Appellant informed Appellee that she was leaving

her employment with Appellee, and had applied for and received an offer for part-

time employment with Evan Williams Bourbon Experience (“Evan Williams”).

Appellee told Appellant that employment with Evan Williams would violate the

terms of the Agreement because Evan Williams sold competitors’ chocolates.

Appellee also told Appellant that it could sue her for breach of contract if she

accepted employment with Evan Williams.

                                         -2-
             Appellee sent a letter to Evan Williams informing it that Appellant’s

employment with Evan Williams would violate the terms of Appellant’s agreement

with Appellee. Thereafter, Evan Williams withdrew its offer of employment with

Appellant. Appellant then filed the instant action against Appellee alleging that

Appellee’s letter to Evan Williams was malicious, improper, and constituted

tortious interference with employment.

             The matter proceeded in Jefferson Circuit Court, where Appellee filed

a motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion, Appellee argued that

there was no genuine issue of material fact that the Agreement prohibited

Appellant’s employment with competing candy vendors in Kentucky for two

years; that Evan Williams was a competitor in the candy business; and that

Appellee was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on Appellant’s claim of

tortious interference.

             After considering the arguments of counsel, the Jefferson Circuit

Court concluded that Appellee was entitled to summary judgment. The court

determined that Appellee’s letter to Evan Williams was sent in good faith, as

Appellant had executed the Agreement voluntarily, and Evan Williams was a

competitor in the candy business. The court was not persuaded by Appellant’s

contention that Evan Williams was not a competitor of Appellee due to candy

being only a small portion of Evan Williams’ overall sales. Lastly, the court

                                         -3-
rejected Appellant’s argument that the Agreement was overly broad and could not

be enforced in good faith. The court found that the Agreement was drafted in a

manner to reasonably protect Appellee’s interest of guarding its information and

customer base, and was therefore enforceable. This appeal followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 56.03. “The record must be

viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary

judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v.

Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Summary

judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that the nonmoving party

will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor. Id.

“Even though a trial court may believe the party opposing the motion may not

succeed at trial, it should not render a summary judgment if there is any issue of

material fact.” Id. Finally, “[t]he standard of review on appeal of a summary

judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine

                                          -4-
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996).

                         ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

             Appellant argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court erred in concluding

that Appellee was entitled to summary judgment on her claim of tortious

interference with a prospective business relationship. In support of this argument,

she directs our attention to the elements of tortious interference as set out in Snow

Pallet, Inc. v. Monticello Banking Co., 367 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. App. 2012). In Snow

Pallet, a panel of this Court recited the elements of tortious interference with a

prospective business relationship as follows: 1) the existence of a valid business

relationship or expectancy; 2) the defendant’s knowledge of that business

relationship or expectancy; 3) intentional interference; 4) improper motive; 5)

causation; and 6) damages.

             Appellant argues that the record clearly proves all but one element of

her tortious interference claim. In her view, the only question for this Court is

whether she is entitled to present to a jury the question of whether the “improper

motive” element is satisfied. To demonstrate Appellee’s improper motive,

Appellant argues that, 1) she presented evidence upon which a jury could conclude

that Evan Williams is not a competitor in the candy business; 2) the circuit court

improperly failed to consider that Appellee’s co-owners cannot agree as to the

                                          -5-
application of the Agreement; and, 3) the Agreement is so overly broad that it

could not have been executed in good faith. She requests an opinion reversing the

order of summary judgment.

               On Appellant’s first assertion that Evan Williams is not a competitor

in the candy business and is, therefore, not an entity contemplated by the

Agreement, she argued before the circuit court that though Evan Williams does sell

candy, the amount of candy sold is negligible. In considering this argument, the

circuit court determined that the amount of candy sold by Evan Williams is

immaterial, as the Agreement does not specify how much candy a competitor must

sell in order to implicate the terms of the Agreement. According to the record, the

Agreement prohibits Appellant from accepting employment with any “entity in the

business of selling candy products including, but in no way limited to, bourbon

and/or chocolate candies.” Evan Williams sells candy products, thus

characterizing it as “an entity in the business of selling candy products” per the

terms of the Agreement. The circuit court did not err in concluding that the

amount or type of candy sold by Evan Williams is immaterial. We find no error on

this issue.1

1
 In her Reply Brief, Appellant also argues that Heaven Hill, Inc. or Heaven Hill Brands was her
actually prospective employer, and that Heaven Hill is not a competitor of Appellee. We are not
persuaded by this argument because Heaven Hill Brands owns Evan Williams, and the Jefferson
Circuit Court properly so found.

                                              -6-
             Appellant’s second contention is that the circuit court improperly

failed to consider that Appellee’s co-owners cannot agree as to the scope of the

Agreement. According to Appellant, one co-owner believed that the Agreement

applied to any candy vendor, while the other opined that it applied only to sellers

of bourbon candies who offer a bourbon candy experience. In Appellant’s view,

this disagreement demonstrates that Appellee’s communication with Evan

Williams was made with an improper motive per Snow Pallet, supra.

             The co-owners were asked in deposition to give their opinions as to

the applicability of the Agreement in various hypothetical situations. We agree

with Appellee that even if their answers were not always identical, the underlying

issue of summary judgment does not center on hypothetical scenarios but rather on

what actually occurred and is memorialized in the record. As noted above, the

Agreement which Appellant voluntarily read and executed prevented her from

accepting employment with any entity in the business of selling candy. It is

uncontroverted that Evan Williams sells candy. We find no error and cannot

conclude that this issue forms a basis for reversing the order of summary judgment.

             Lastly, Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in failing to find

that Appellee’s interpretation of the Agreement is so overly broad that it cannot

have been made in good faith. She argues that having not made this interpretation

in good faith, it follows that Appellee’s communication with Evan Williams was

                                          -7-
made with an improper motive per Snow Pallet. According to Appellant, Appellee

believes the Agreement prohibits employment by every entity that sells candy,

from office supply stores to chain general merchandise stores, as well as

restaurants, distilleries, coffee shops, hotels, and museums. Appellant argues that

such an interpretation is overly broad and unreasonable, and demonstrates that

something other than protecting its legitimate business interests motivated its

communication with Evan Williams. Appellant argues that this issue should have

gone before a jury, thus rendering the entry of summary judgment premature and

unsupported by the record.

             We believe it is immaterial as to what Appellee may – or may not –

subjectively believe about the Agreement’s application to coffee shops, hotels, or

museums. Rather, the underlying issue of summary judgment centers on the

express terms of the Agreement, whether those terms apply to Evan Williams, and

whether the circuit court properly concluded that Appellee is entitled to summary

judgment on Appellant’s claim of tortious interference with a business relationship.

Again, the Agreement is broadly drafted to prohibit Appellant from engaging in

any business relationship, including employment “with an entity in the business of

selling candy[.]” The prohibition continues for two years after Appellant’s

employment with Appellee and applies to entities located in Kentucky and

                                         -8-
adjoining states, as well as those doing business on the internet. Evan Williams is

an entity contemplated by the Agreement.

             We find no basis for concluding that Appellee had an improper

motive per Snow Pallet in its execution and enforcement of the Agreement. The

Jefferson Circuit Court determined that Appellee is a small business which may

properly protect its business interests from larger companies via the Agreement.

This conclusion is supported by the record and the law. Nothing in the record

points to an improper motive sufficient to sustain Appellant’s claim for relief.

                                  CONCLUSION

             We conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and

Appellee is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Steelvest, supra. The

Jefferson Circuit Court properly so found. Accordingly, we affirm the opinion and

order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of

Appellee.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -9-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Michele Henry             Ruby D. Fenton
Louisville, Kentucky      Ayala Golding
                          Louisville, Kentucky

                        -10-