Court Opinion

ID: 9630424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:10:50.792789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:02.570639
License: Public Domain

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR., Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority that the decision to strike a venireperson because of that person’s race is unacceptable. How*659ever, the majority’s decision-making process in this case fails because of its selective identification of the applicable law, its misapplication of the law to the facts and, in several instances, its mischaracterization of the facts themselves. All in all, the majority has failed to show that it was clear error for the trial court to accept the state’s race-neutral explanations for its strikes.
I.
Though the majority parrots the appropriate legal standard of review, which is review for clear error, State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 525 (Mo. banc 2003), the length to which the majority stretches to satisfy the critical reader that the state’s explanations were not race-neutral shows that the majority is actually engaging in de novo review so as to reach its preferred outcome. Moreover, the majority fails to give so much as a passing reference to the rule that reviewing courts should defer to the trial court’s judgment when it comes to assessing the legitimacy of an explanation for a peremptory strike. State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100, 114 (Mo. banc 1998). The nature of peremptory strikes is necessarily subjective, and where the evidence before a court is amenable to two competing views, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Id. Thus, even if this Court would have decided a close case differently, if the trial court’s decision was plausible, that decision must stand. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242, 121 S.Ct. 1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001).
In much the same way, the majority misapplies the “totality of the relevant facts” test explained in Batson and recently applied in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). In Miller-El the Supreme Court applied the test in the context of addressing institutional and procedural defects that established the existence of an overarching discriminatory purpose. Specifically, the Supreme Court found evidence of jury shuffling, disparate questioning that amounted to trickery, and a formal written manual on the topic of how to exclude minorities from jury semice. Miller-El, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. at 2333-39. The Supreme Court was not (as the majority appears to do here) using the totality of the relevant facts to apply a de novo standard of review to the trial court’s determinations as to individual venirepersons. If there were any doubt, just three months ago, in a follow-up case to Miller-El, Justice Breyer clarified the “present legal framework” as follows:
The trial judge is best placed to consider the factors that underlie credibility: demeanor, context, and atmosphere. And the trial judge is best placed to determine whether, in a borderline case, a prosecutor’s hesitation or contradiction reflect (a) deception, or (b) the difficulty of providing a rational reason for an instinctive decision. Appellate judges cannot on the basis of a cold record easily second-guess a trial judge’s decision about likely motivation. These circumstances mean that appellate courts will, and must, grant the trial courts considerable leeway in applying Batson.
Rice v. Collins, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 969, 977, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).
In Rice, the Supreme Court also reconfirmed the rules that prosecutors must abide by when making their peremptory strikes and in defending them after a Bat-son challenge. “Although the prosecutor must present a comprehensible reason [for making the strike] ... this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it *660suffices.” Id. at 973-74. And even if the prosecutor’s perception of the venireper-son is based merely on a race-neutral hunch, or on race-neutral “horse sense,” the strike may be made. State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100, 114 (Mo. banc 1998). Unfortunately, these principles too, are omitted from the majority’s analysis.
Yet another failing is the majority’s methodology in comparing each stricken venireperson to non-stricken venireper-sons to determine whether non-stricken venirepersons were similarly situated to those stricken. It is quite evident that, in each case, the majority cherry picked individual characteristics from a number of non-stricken venirepersons (who were otherwise completely different) and then concluded that the sum of those characteristics is the equivalent of a single similarly situated venireperson. This amalgamation of venirepersons to create a sort of super-venireperson that can then be used for comparison is completely incongruous with the analysis it purports to employ. While several of the non-stricken venirepersons shared individual characteristics with the stricken venirepersons — as any human being would! — the majority’s methodology does not show that stricken and non-stricken venirepersons were “similarly situated” in a way that gives that term real meaning.
Finally, the majority inexplicably fails to acknowledge that McFadden did not challenge the state’s reasons for striking two of the venirepersons, C.N. and V.G. As this Court has made clear, “the right of criminal defendants to challenge racially motivated strikes by the prosecutor” is “predicated ... upon the defendant’s timely objection.” State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Mo. banc 1992) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-99, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)). “A defendant’s failure to challenge the State’s race-neutral explanation in any way waives any future complaint that the State’s reasons were racially motivated, and leaves nothing for this Court to review.” State v. Taylor, 944 S.W.2d 925, 934 (Mo. banc 1997). Thus, the majority’s holdings relating to venirepersons C.N. and V.G. are in direct contravention of this Court’s precedent.
As for the remaining three venireper-sons, a close review of the record shows that none were improperly stricken:
1. Venireperson C.W.
The state offered several race-neutral reasons for striking C.W.: (1) She was visibly distracted during voir dire and was distracting other venirepersons by not taking the voir dire process seriously; (2) her cell phone was ringing throughout the process; and (3) she maintained that it would be an unreasonable hardship to her employer to be without her service for the duration of the trial. On that last point, she had explained that she did not want to be on the jury because she needed her to fulfill her duties as an area manager. These are, of course, race neutral reasons for striking C.W.
According to the majority, however, ven-ireperson S.R. was similarly situated but not stricken. The record does not bear out that conclusion. S.R. maintained that she did not want to be absent from work when her employer was going through an audit, but the trial court determined that the audit was not to take place until well after the trial was over. C.W. may well have been rightfully concerned about her employer, but S.R. should have had no concern about hers. Furthermore, unlike the situation with C.W., there was no complaint that S.R. was distracted and that her cell-phone was ringing during the proceedings.
2. Venireperson M.B.
*661The state’s race-neutral reasons for striking M.B. were that: (1) she had some connection with a witness in the case; (2) she had several questions about accomplice liability that the prosecutor had not been able to resolve; (3) she was familiar with the Pine Lawn area where the murder occurred; and (4) her expectations of scientific evidence were too high. On appeal, the state now concedes that the prosecutor misspoke in offering the second reason concerning accomplice liability and that he had confused M.B. with another venireper-son.
Regarding the state’s first reason, M.B. had indicated that she knew a relative of a potential state’s witness. The majority found fault with this first reason by arguing that any bias on the part of M.B. due to her connection with the witness would favor the state. This argument is self-defeating. If M.B. could be biased in favor of any party, it follows that this bias could serve as a race-neutral non-pretextual reason for the state to strike M.B.
The majority dismisses the third explanation by claiming that there were “five white venirepersons who also possessed familiarity with the area of the crime [but who] were not struck from the jury.” However, these persons were not similarly situated because, unlike M.B., none of them had “present knowledge” of the Pine Lawn area.
Finally, the majority claims that the state’s fourth reason is pretextual because M.B.’s high expectations concerning scientific evidence “would only strengthen the credibility of the State’s fingerprint evidence linking McFadden to the crime.” This misses the point altogether. As the prosecutor explained, there was little scientific evidence linking appellant to the crime, and he was fearful that M.B. would “expect more” — that she would have unrealistic expectations about the evidence she believed the state ought to be able to produce. This is no proof of pretext.
3. Venireperson W.S.
The state’s race-neutral reasons for striking W.S. were that: (1) he appeared agitated, confused and unwilling to be present; (2) he slept during portions of voir dire; (3) he appeared confused over how to handle conflicting witnesses; (4) he lived near Pine Lawn, but failed to express his familiarity with Pine Lawn; and (5) he refused to talk about his nephews, who were law enforcement officers. The state’s second reason — that W.S. was asleep — is alone sufficient to justify the strike. In fact, the majority acknowledges as much, but then concludes that W.S.’s sleeping must be discounted “when examining the facts of the case in a larger context.” No case is found, however, that holds, even in the “larger context,” that a sleeping juror is not always subject to a peremptory strike, and in fact, the sleeping juror is most often the proper subject of a strike for cause.
Even without the sleeping juror problem, each of the state’s other reasons for the strike were independently sufficient to justify the strike. The majority first addresses the state’s concern over W.S.’s agitation and confusion by simply stating that “there is no indication that W.S.’s confusion would have impaired his ability as a juror.” But given the trial court’s superior vantage point on matters relating to the venireperson’s demeanor, this Court must defer to the trial court’s determination. And even if W.S.’s demeanor was not agitated, the fact that he appeared confused concerning the role of the jury is certainly a valid race-neutral reason for striking him.
Then, as with M.B., the majority suggests that familiarity with the Pine Lawn area was a pretextual reason for striking *662W.S. However, just as with M.B., the majority again fails to explain exactly how W.S. was similarly situated with the veni-repersons who were familiar with Pine Lawn and who were not stricken.
Finally, regarding the state’s fifth reason — W.S.’s refusal to discuss his nephews’ law enforcement experience — the majority concludes that, if anything, “his attitude toward law enforcement appears to be generally positive” and that “such an attitude is usually favorable to the state’s position.” This conclusion, of course, is speculation, and it may well be that W.S.’s refusal to discuss the matter may be caused by some dissatisfaction with his nephews’ experience. In any event, the state’s concern that a venireperson may be biased in one way or another toward law enforcement is a valid race-neutral reason for striking a venireperson.
II.
Although I am concerned that five out of six black venirepersons were stricken, and though I agree that such a disproportionate removal of minority venirepersons can be an inference of discriminatory intent, that inference alone will not convert facially neutral explanations into Batson violations. Parker, 886 S.W.2d at 984. For the reasons stated, the state’s explanations for its peremptory strikes were not “inherently discriminatory.” I would hold that the trial court did not clearly err in denying the Batson challenges, and I would affirm the judgment.