Court Opinion

ID: 9597754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:02:36.90996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:23.714676
License: Public Domain

SOSA, Chief Justice (dissenting). I hereby adopt as my dissent the majority opinion of the court of appeals as appended herein in full. APPENDIX MEMORANDUM OPINION GARCIA, Judge. Plaintiff appeals and defendants cross-appeal from the trial court’s judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for worker’s compensation death benefits and defendants’ counterclaim for reimbursement, and denying plaintiff attorney fees for successfully defending against defendants’ counterclaim. We reverse the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint and the denial of attorney fees and affirm the trial court’s denial of defendants’ counterclaim. Plaintiffs decedent, Robert Griego (Griego), was employed as a loan officer by defendant Mortgage Investment Company of El Paso. While at work during regular business hours, he was beaten, shot and killed. Angel R. Martinez (Martinez) later pled to the charge of voluntary manslaughter in the death of Griego, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). Based on this plea, the trial court found that Martinez was the perpetrator of Griego’s death. Defendants, in an effort to demonstrate that Griego’s death did not arise out of his employment, attempted to show that Martinez’s motivation for killing Griego was an extramarital affair he had had ten years previously with Martinez’s wife. There was also evidence that Griego had foreclosed on the Martinezes home in 1974. The trial court found that the statements of Griego’s family regarding the alleged affair were not credible and that defendants had failed to produce sufficient credible evidence that Griego’s death was motivated by jealous revenge. The trial court also determined that: “[t]he reason or motivating cause of Robert Griego’s death is unknown and unexplained, but may have been explained by Angel R. Martinez and/or Dorothy Martinez had they been asked or subpoenaed to testify.” The trial court also found, however, that plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient credible evidence to establish that Griego’s death was caused by a risk incident to, was a natural consequence of, or arose out of his employment. Plaintiff has briefed the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the identity of the murderer; (2) whether the trial court erred in holding the summary judgment in abeyance during trial and in admitting evidence relevant to this issue; (3) whether plaintiff had met her burden in establishing that Griego’s death arose out of his employment; and (4) whether plaintiff is entitled to recover her costs and attorney fees. In their cross-appeal, defendants claim the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proving the motivation for the killing from plaintiff to defendants and erred in denying their claim for reimbursement. Because the trial court determined that the reason or motivating cause of Griego’s death is unknown and unexplained, this case is controlled by Ensley v. Grace, 76 N.M. 691, 417 P.2d 885 (1966). The fact that Griego was murdered while at work during regular business hours is undisputed. In Ensley, the supreme court determined that when a worker dies at work and the cause of death is unexplained, it is presumed that the death arose out of the employment. Id. Although defendants presented evidence which might have explained Griego’s cause of death, the trial court explicitly determined that this evidence was not sufficiently credible to prove jealous revenge as the motive. Cf. Gutierrez v. Artesia Pub. Schools, 92 N.M. 112, 583 P.2d 476 (Ct.App.1978) (worker’s compensation not available for widow of decedent who, while at work, was killed by another for personal reasons bearing no relation to decedent’s employment). The fact that there exists evidence consistent with defendant’s view of the case is of no consequence. On appeal, we must determine if there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings. This court does not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses. Sanchez v. Homestake Mining Co., 102 N.M. 473, 697 P.2d 156 (Ct.App.1985). Rather, we defer to the fact finder who heard the testimony, saw the witnesses and ultimately determined that the evidence proving jealous revenge was not credible. In upholding this determination, however, we must further determine that the Ensley presumption is applicable. Since plaintiff was entitled by law to a rebuttable presumption that Griego’s death arose out of the employment and defendants failed to rebut this presumption with credible evidence, the trial court erred both in finding that plaintiff failed to establish Griego’s death arose out of the employment and in denying plaintiff death benefits. See Ensley v. Grace. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case for a determination of the appropriate amount of death benefits. Based on the above disposition, we need not reach plaintiff’s first two issues regarding summary judgment or the admission of evidence as to the identity of the murderer. Plaintiff also asserts that she was entitled to attorney fees for successfully defending against defendants’ counterclaim. We agree. By analogy, NMSA 1978, Section 52-l-54(E) (Repl.Pamp.1987) provides for the payment of a worker’s attorney fees where an employer failed to establish that the worker’s disability diminished under NMSA 1978, Section 52-1-56 (Repl. Pamp.1987). Because defendants failed to establish their right to reimbursement, plaintiff’s attorney fees related to the efforts of plaintiff's attorney in preserving plaintiff’s right to those death benefits previously paid and are, thus, recoverable. See Jaramillo v. Kaufman Plumbing & Heating Co., 103 N.M. 400, 708 P.2d 312 (1985). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s attorney fees. On remand the trial court should award fees for plaintiff’s success in defending against defendants’ counterclaim and shall consider plaintiff’s attorney’s efforts on appeal. See Nelson v. Nelson Chem. Corp., 105 N.M. 493, 734 P.2d 273 (Ct.App.1987). In light of the above discussion, it is clear that the trial court did not improperly shift the burden of proof to defendants. Since plaintiff is entitled to receive death benefits, defendants have no claim for reimbursement of monies paid as death benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of defendants’ claim for reimbursement of the death benefits paid. Ensley v. Grace. IT IS SO ORDERED. ALARID and MINZNER, JJ., concur.