Court Opinion

ID: 9797248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:16:14.911571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:53:33.605830
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge,
(dissenting):
¶ 16 The majority asserts that this ease can be decided from the plain meaning of the language of the Cohabitant Abuse Act. I agree. But the plain language of the Act does not support the majority’s result.
¶ 17 The Act unambiguously defines a cohabitant as including a person who “is or was a spouse of the other party.” Utah Code Ann. § 30 — 6—l(2)(a) (2007). The plain language of the Act, without qualification, applies to persons who were at any time married. There is no question that the parties in this case were married, and the language of the Act does not treat parties whose marriages ended in annulment any differently from parties whose marriages ended in divorce. The Act, by its own terms, covers all spouses and former spouses. While there are exceptions to the Act’s ability to classify persons who otherwise would be considered *825cohabitants as such, an exception for former spouses who have ended their marriages in annulment is not included. See id. § 30-6-1(3). In my view, the plain language of the Act granted the district court jurisdiction to enter a protective order against Mr. Corwell because he is in fact a former spouse of the complainant.
¶ 18 At worst, the statute is ambiguous and could support either my reading or that of my colleagues. If the statute is ambiguous, then as the main opinion admits, we must consider the purpose of the Act to ascertain the legislative intent. “The purpose of the Cohabitant Abuse Act was to create a timely and simplified process whereby some level of protection and safety could be afforded to victims who had previously been outside the umbrella of orders available to persons involved in criminal prosecutions.” Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, ¶ 11 n. 4, 18 P.3d 1129. The majority has reproduced the trial court’s insightful analysis of the instant circumstances in the main opinion, and I believe that the trial court’s jurisdictional analysis is in line with our previous stance on the proper application of the Act. See id. The Act is in place to provide speedy protection to victims like the complainant here. She, as a former spouse of Mr. Corwell, is someone who may not have qualified for the benefits of a protective order before the Act became effective. Therefore, even if the language of the Act itself could be considered ambiguous, the district court still had jurisdiction to enter a protective order against Mr. Corwell.
¶ 19 If Mr. Corwell is subject to the Act, and I believe he is, then we must consider his argument that the trial court erred by not holding a hearing as Mr. Corwell requested. “If the hearing on the petition [for a protective order] is heard by a commissioner” and either party “file[s] an objection within ten days of the entry of the recommended order,” then “the assigned judge shall hold a hearing within 20 days of the filing of the objection.” Utah Code Ann. § 30 — 6—4.3(l)(e) (emphasis added). The holding of a hearing is therefore mandatory once either party files objections to the commissioner’s recommended order. No such hearing was ever held in this ease, despite Mr. Corwell’s objee-tions. Further, Mr. Corwell did not waive his statutory right to a hearing by filing a Notice to Submit for Decision some five months after the hearing should have been held. I would therefore remand this matter to the trial court for a hearing on the merits of whether, under conditions set forth in the Act, Mr. Corwell should have had a protective order entered against him.