Court Opinion

ID: 9965356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 14:07:55.821011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:55.441309
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-101

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                             CHRISTOPHER SANCHEZ.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The defendant, Christopher Sanchez, appeals from

 convictions of two counts of armed robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 17,

 two counts of armed carjacking, G. L. c. 265, § 21A, one count

 of larceny of a motor vehicle, G. L. c. 266, § 28 (a), and one

 count of assault and battery by means of a firearm, G. L.

 c. 265, § 15E, after a jury trial in the Superior Court.1

 Concluding that the police detective's testimony that the

 defendant fired a gun into the air ten days prior to the

 incidents for which the defendant was convicted was not

 prejudicial, we affirm.

       1The jury acquitted him of carrying a firearm without a
 license, G. L. c. 265, § 10 (a), and assault and battery, G. L.
 c. 265, § 13A (a).
     1.   Standard of review.    "[E]vidence of prior bad acts 'is

not admissible to show a defendant's bad character or propensity

to commit the charged crime.'"    Commonwealth v. Facella, 478

Mass. 393, 403 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass.

122, 128 (2006).    "[S]uch evidence is admissible when offered

for another purpose, such as motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or pattern of operation,

so long as its probative value for that purpose is not

outweighed by its prejudicial effect."     Commonwealth v. Welch,

487 Mass. 425, 442-443 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. Hall, 485

Mass. 145, 163 (2020).    "These matters are 'entrusted to the

trial judge's broad discretion and are not disturbed absent

palpable error.'"   Commonwealth v. Childs, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 67,

71 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Keown, 478 Mass. 232, 242

(2017), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1139 (2018).     "As the defendant

timely objected to the introduction of the [prior bad act

evidence], we review the ruling for prejudic[ial error]."

Commonwealth v. Correia, 492 Mass. 220, 232 (2023).2    "An error

is not prejudicial if it did not influence the jury, or had but

very slight effect."     Commonwealth v. White, 103 Mass. App. Ct.

     2 At the start of the third day of trial, the defendant
sought to exclude evidence that the defendant had previously
fired the gun, arguing that the Commonwealth was not required to
prove that the defendant knew that the firearm was operable, and
the trial judge denied the motion. See Commonwealth v. Grady,
474 Mass. 715, 719 (2016).

                                  2
655, 659 (2024), quoting Commonwealth v. Souza, 492 Mass. 615,

627 (2023).

     2.   Prior bad act evidence.      Here, we need not decide

whether the detective's testimony that the defendant fired the

gun into the air ten days prior to the incidents for which the

defendant was convicted was properly admitted because that

evidence did not prejudice the defendant.       The evidence was part

of the detective's recitation of the defendant's admissions

during an interrogation, which went unrecorded at the

defendant's request.   If the jury accepted those admissions as

true, then they accepted that the defendant committed the far

more serious crimes of which he was convicted.       If they had

disbelieved the defendant's admissions (either because they

disbelieved the detective or disbelieved the defendant's

statements to the detective), then they would not have believed

that the defendant fired the gun into the air.       In this

particular case, there was no reason why the jury would have

believed one and not the other.3

     3 In general, of course, a jury may believe part of a
defendant's statement and disbelieve another part. See
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 484 Mass. 211, 217 (2020). Here,
however, we discern no persuasive reason -- nor has the
defendant supplied one -- that the jury would have disbelieved
the powerfully inculpatory admissions by the defendant while not
only believing, but assigning significant weight to, the
defendant's description of firing the gun into the air.

                                   3
    Furthermore, the trial judge contemporaneously instructed

the jury not to consider the evidence for propensity purposes.

"We presume, as we must, that a jury understand[ ] and follow[ ]

limiting instructions."    Commonwealth v. Martinez, 476 Mass.

186, 194 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 384 Mass. 572,

579 (1981).    We discern no prejudice.   See Commonwealth v.

Samia, 492 Mass. 135, 137, 154-156 (2023) (in drug-connected

murder case, evidence that defendant's former girlfriend met him

by buying drugs not prejudicial "given the brief nature of the

testimony, the judge's limiting instruction that the evidence

was not admitted for propensity purposes, which we presume the

jury followed, and the strength of the evidence against the

defendant").   See also Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 Mass. 1, 16

(2014) (discerning no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of

justice where Commonwealth admitted evidence that defendant had

stolen from lumber yard where theft was "relatively minor"

compared to charged "brutal killing").

                                      Judgments affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Green, C.J.,
                                        Henry & Ditkoff, JJ.4),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:   May 2, 2024.

    4   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  4