Court Opinion

ID: 2964497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:32.51871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:56.196077
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2102

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                 RICHARD D. MANGONE,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Bruce Green for appellant.
            ___________
            Paul  G. Levenson,  Assistant United  States Attorney,  with  whom
            _________________
        Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Victor A. Wild, Assistant
        _______________                              ______________
        United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                   January 28, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.  Defendant Richard D.
                      BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
                              ____________________

            Mangone was convicted after a lengthy jury trial on counts of

            conspiracy,  bank  fraud, unlawful  receipt  of  monies by  a

            credit union officer, and money laundering.  He appeals  both

            his conviction  and the  district court's decision  to depart

            upward from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.  

                                          I 
                                          I
                                        Facts
                                        Facts
                                        _____

                      In  order to  understand  the  issues  properly,  a

            thorough  recitation of  the  scope  of defendant's  criminal

            conduct is required.  We relate  the facts in the light  most

            favorable  to the verdict.   See United States  v. Wihbey, 75
                                         ___ ________________________

            F.3d 761, 764  (1st Cir.  1996).  Between  December 1985  and

            March  1991, defendant  conspired  with James  Smith,  Robert

            Cohen, and  Ambrose Devaney  to defraud two  separate lending

            institutions,  the Barnstable Community  Federal Credit Union

            ("BCCU")  and  the  Digital Employees  Federal  Credit  Union

            ("Digital").   Defendant, president of Digital  and a founder

            of BCCU,  and Smith, a real estate developer and a founder of

            BCCU, were the primary organizers of the fraud.  Robert Cohen

            was  general counsel to both  credit unions.  Ambrose Devaney

            was a  real estate  developer on  Cape Cod.     This  court's

            affirmance of  the convictions and sentences  of Smith, Cohen

            and Devaney is found at United States v. Smith, 46 F.3d  1223
                                    ______________________

            (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 176 (1995).
                        ____  ______

                                         -2-
                                          2

                      Defendant and Smith used their control over the two

            credit  unions to obtain tens of millions of dollars in loans

            for their  own speculative real  estate ventures.   The loans

            were  used in part to finance the purchase of commercial real

            estate  on Cape Cod, usually motel properties or raw land for

            residential subdivisions.  The loans were, in many instances,

            funded in amounts far in excess of the purchase price of  the

            property,  with much of  the excess  going directly  into the

            pockets  of defendant, Smith, and Devaney.  In order to avoid

            the credit  union's policies restricting  "insider" loans  as

            well as policies limiting maximum borrowing by an individual,

            the conspirators formed over a dozen nominee trusts to create

            the  fiction  that the  loans  were going  to  many different

            borrowers.     As president of Digital, which had experienced

            explosive  growth  since  its  founding  in  1980,  defendant

            enjoyed  the  confidence  of  that credit  union's  board  of

            directors and staff.  Defendant was therefore  able to induce

            Digital   to   allocate    approximately   $20,000,000    for

            "investment"   in  participation  loans  with  BCCU,  without

            disclosing the  fact that  defendant himself was  one of  the

            ultimate borrowers of those funds.   All of the participation

            loans were made to  trusts owned by defendant and  Smith (and

            in most cases Devaney).   In each instance, the participation

            loans  were funded  in amounts  far in  excess of  the actual

            purchase  price of  the  commercial property.   These  excess

                                         -3-
                                          3

            funds,  known  as "pie,"  were siphoned  off and  diverted to

            accounts  controlled  by  defendant  or  Smith   for  further

            distribution.  The  amount of "pie" varied  but was generally

            between $75,000 and $200,000 per partner per loan.

                      For  all of  the participation  loans and  for many

            additional loans, defendant and his co-conspirators concealed

            their ownership interests by  placing in BCCU's and Digital's

            files  phony  certificates  of  beneficial  interest, falsely

            naming  certain individuals as  beneficiaries of  the trusts.

            In order to obtain loans well in excess of the purchase price

            of  the  property, defendant  and  Smith  forged and  altered

            purchase and sale agreements,  often inflating prices by over

            one million dollars.   For most  of the participation  loans,

            defendant,  Smith,  and  Lynn Vasapolle,  an  unindicted  co-

            conspirator, prepared fake financial statements to create the

            false impression that the putative borrowers (the "trustees")

            were wealthy individuals capable  of repaying the loans being

            extended.

                      Most  of the  participation  loans  were  initially

            closed  between December 1985 and October 1988, and were made

            with "interest  only" notes  for relatively short  terms (1-2

            years), with a balloon payment of the full principal due upon

            expiration.  When they were  unable to find legitimate buyers

            to whom they could sell the properties at a profit sufficient

            to  cover both  the original  purchase price  and  the excess

                                         -4-
                                          4

            "pie" they  had received,  the conspirators began  to pyramid

            their loans.

                      Beginning in 1986, as loans came due on subdivision

            properties, Cohen would draw up papers "selling" a portion of

            the original subdivision to a newly created trust.  Defendant

            and Smith  would then cause  BCCU to make  a loan to  the new

            trust to finance the  purchase.  The new loan  proceeds would

            then be used to  pay off the proportionate share of the prior

            loan.  Purchase "prices"  were again artificially inflated so

            as  to provide cash which was used to cover interest payments

            on  the new  loans  and  to help  with  debt  service on  the

            existing  loans.  By March 1991,  when BCCU was seized by the

            National Credit Union Administration, the outstanding balance

            of the Mangone-Smith-Devaney loans  amounted to between forty

            and sixty million dollars.  

                      On September 12, 1992, defendant, Smith, Cohen, and

            Devaney  were indicted for  conspiracy (18  U.S.C.    371) to

            commit  bank fraud  (18 U.S.C.    1344); unlawful  receipt of

            monies  by a  credit union  officer (18  U.S.C.    1006); and

            money laundering (18 U.S.C.   1957).  The case was tried on a

            redacted indictment  that included a conspiracy  count, seven

            bank  fraud  counts, seven  parallel unlawful  receipt counts

            (which  concerned defendant alone)  and the  money laundering

                                         -5-
                                          5

            charges.  Defendant was convicted on  all counts.1  Defendant

            fled prior to  sentencing and remained at large  for eighteen

            months  before  he  surrendered.    On  September  12,  1995,

            defendant was sentenced to twenty-four years of incarceration

            after the  district court departed  upward by two  years from

            the maximum sentence under the Guidelines.  

                                          II
                                          II
                                   The Bruton Error
                                   The Bruton Error
                                   ________________

                      Defendant appeals  his conviction  on the basis  of

            alleged error  under Bruton  v. United  States, 391  U.S. 123
                                 _________________________

            (1968).    This  issue   has  already  been  decided  against

            defendant's  co-conspirator Smith,  who asserted  a factually

            identical claim of Bruton error in his appeal, which we found
                               ______

            to  have been  harmless error.   Smith,  46 F.3d  at 1229-30.
                                             _____

            Although we could dispose of defendant's  claim on the ground

            of stare decisis, we provide a brief analysis.
               _____ _______

                      The Supreme  Court held in Bruton  that, because of
                                                 ______

            the substantial  risk that the jury,  despite instructions to

            the  contrary,  will look  to  a  codefendant's incriminating

            extrajudicial statement in determining the defendant's guilt,

            admission  of  a codefendant's  statement  in  a joint  trial

            violates the defendant's right of cross-examination under the

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Smith  was  also convicted  on  all  counts.   Cohen  was
            convicted  on all  counts  except for  four money  laundering
            charges.   Devaney was convicted of  conspiracy, three counts
            of bank fraud and  one count of money laundering.   Smith, 46
                                                                _____
            F.3d at 1227.

                                         -6-
                                          6

            Confrontation  Clause of  the Sixth  Amendment.   Bruton, 391
                                                              ______

            U.S. at 126.  The  evidentiary basis for the Bruton  claim is
                                                         ______

            as follows. 

                      On  the last  day of trial  testimony, co-defendant

            Cohen  called  to  the  stand  Professor  Richard  Huber,  an

            authority on the  professional responsibilities of attorneys.

            Testifying  under the  district court's  limiting instruction

            that the testimony  was relevant  as to Cohen  only, and  had

            nothing to  do with  any of Cohen's  co-defendants, Professor

            Huber  reiterated the events of April 4, 1991, when Cohen met

            with him  to obtain  advice concerning his  representation of

            BCCU,  which by  that  time  was  in  the  hands  of  federal

            regulators.  Huber testified that Cohen explained to him that

            Cohen's  clients, "a  former officer  of the  bank, a  former

            director of the bank, and a bank manager came in and spoke to

            [Cohen] . .  . concerning activities  that involved them  and

            their work  at the bank."  Smith, 46 F.3d at 1228.  According
                                       _____

            to  Huber,  Cohen stated  that  "certain  documents had  been

            changed, the  information had been changed,  figures had been

            changed, data had been changed, [and] that this had been done

            after  preparation  by Mr.  Cohen  and  after they  had  been

            presumptively completed."  Id.  
                                       ___

                      Like  Smith  before  him,  defendant  asserts  that

            Huber's testimony constitutes reversible Bruton error because
                                                     ______

            it  "expressly implicate[s]  the defendant, leaving  no doubt

                                         -7-
                                          7

            that it would prove powerfully incriminating."  Id. (internal
                                                            ___

            quotation   marks   and   citations  omitted)(alteration   in

            original).   In Smith, we  assumed without deciding  that the
                            _____

            admission  of Huber's testimony constituted Bruton error, but
                                                        ______

            held that  any such  error was  harmless beyond  a reasonable

            doubt.  46 F.3d at 1229. 

                      Relying  on  Chapman  v. California,  386  U.S.  18
                                   ______________________

            (1967), and related cases, defendant  argues strenuously that

            the  error was  not  harmless.    We  disagree.    We  remain

            convinced that any Bruton error that may have occurred below2
                               ______

            was harmless for the reasons stated in Smith: 
                                                   _____

                      The jury convicted  all the defendants on
                      the  conspiracy count, and  Cohen on most
                      of the  substantive counts.  Even  if the
                      jury threw the  curative instructions  to
                      the  wind  and  considered  the  stricken
                      testimony as evidence against [Mangone],3
                      the scenario which implicates  Bruton, it
                                                     ______
                      could  not  have  believed Cohen's  claim
                      that the unnamed clients confessed to him
                                               _________
                      at the  close of the conspiracy.   No one
                      confesses to a partner in crime.

                           Admittedly, Cohen's  statement might
                      tend to incriminate [Mangone] and Devaney
                      by showing that the coconspirators met to
                      discuss damage  control.  In  this sense,
                      however, the statement falls  far outside
                      the     pale    of     the    "powerfully
                      incriminating"  evidence   that  produces
                      Bruton  errors.    Vasapolle had  already
                      ______
                      testified     in     detail    to     the

                                
            ____________________

            2.  As  we did in Smith, we "assume without deciding that the
                              _____
            district   court  correctly  found   that  Bruton  error  had
                                                       ______
            occurred."  Smith, 46 F.3d  at 1229.  
                        _____

            3.  The name "Mangone" has been substituted for "Smith."

                                         -8-
                                          8

                      coconspirators' meetings in  the wake  of
                      the  BCCU takeover.   Thus,  once Cohen's
                      statement  is   considered  as  something
                      other    than    an   account    of   the
                      codefendants'  confessions,   it  becomes
                      merely  cumulative  of  the  government's
                      case and could  not have produced  Bruton
                                                         ______
                      error.

                           The  right of  confrontation ensures
                      that  a  criminal  defendant  can  cross-
                      examine his  or her accusers.   Had Cohen
                      testified  to   the  confession  himself,
                      [Mangone's]  cross-examination  of  Cohen
                      would   have  sought  to   show  that  no
                      confession ever occurred.   The  verdicts
                      suggest that  the jury, if  it considered
                      this  evidence,  found  just  that.   The
                      jury, even if it disregarded the limiting
                      instructions,  plainly  did  not  believe
                      Cohen's claim that  his codefendants  had
                      confessed   to   him.     It   is  clear,
                      therefore,  that  any  Bruton  error  was
                                             ______
                      harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

            46 F.3d at 1229-30 (footnote and citations omitted).  Because

            there is  no difference  between defendant's claim  of Bruton
                                                                   ______

            error and the Bruton  error asserted by Smith in  his appeal,
                          ______

            we  follow  the  holding  of  Smith  and  affirm  defendant's
                                          _____

            c   o   n   v   i   c   t   i   o   n   .                    

                                         III
                                         III
                                The Sentencing Appeal
                                The Sentencing Appeal
                                _____________________

                      At  sentencing, the district  court departed upward

            by  two years  from the  maximum sentence  allowed under  the

            Sentencing Guidelines.   Defendant appeals this departure  on

            two grounds:  (1)  that the district court failed  to provide

            him  with notice of its planned  departure, as required under

            Federal  Rule of  Criminal  Procedure 32,  as interpreted  in

                                         -9-
                                          9

            Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991); and (2) that the
            ______________________

            upward  departure was impermissible as  a matter of  law.  We

            begin our analysis with a  recitation of the district court's

            procedure at sentencing.

                      Indicating   that  it  was   following  its  "usual

            procedure,"  the  district court  stated  that  it would  "go

            through  mathematically  the requirements  of  the Sentencing

            Guidelines, and if  anyone, government or defense,  disagrees

            with the  numbers as I state them . .  . we will then discuss

            and  resolve  the differences  right  at that  time."   After

            having verified  that the  defendant had read  and understood

            the Presentence Report (PSR), the district court proceeded to

            calculate  the  applicable   Guidelines  sentence,   assisted

            throughout by both  the government and defense  counsel.  The

            district court  scrupulously determined the  applicability of

            each  guideline and  made  certain that  both government  and

            defense agreed on the accuracy of the court's calculations.  

                      The court then turned  to the question of departure

            from the Guidelines, inviting  argument from both  government

            and defense.  The government urged an upward departure of two

            years on the basis  of defendant's eighteen-month flight from

            justice.  Defense counsel  argued against departing upward on

            the basis of flight, suggesting  that modest credit should be

            given to  defendant for surrendering,  and that consideration

            should  be given  to  defendant's age  in weighing  departure

                                         -10-
                                          10

            upward from an already lengthy sentence.   The district court

            then provided  defendant with  an opportunity to  address the

            court,  during  which  defendant  expressed  remorse  for his

            actions.  The district court then announced the sentence:

                      [T]his court  sentences you to a total of
                      24 years  in  the custody  of the  United
                      States Attorney General . . . .

                           The  total  sentence  of   24  years
                      exceeds the maximum on the various counts
                      of  which  you  stand  convicted.    And,
                      therefore,  it's  appropriate to  explain
                      the manner in which the sentence  will be
                      calculated and  the  counts on  which  it
                      will be calculated.

                      . . . .

                           I  depart upward  not on  the ground
                      that the government has adverted to; I do
                      not punish  you for  a crime,  though you
                      admit it  here, for which  you have never
                      been  indicted,  and  never been  brought
                      before a jury  and never had  the process
                      of law.  I depart  upward solely because,
                      in my judgment, having presided over this
                      case, the egregiousness, evilness of your
                      conduct,   on   each   of  the   criteria
                      considered  by the  Sentencing Guidelines
                      taken in their entirety, takes you out of
                      the heartland of the guidelines.

                           I  adopt  the   argument  that,   in
                      effect, you max  out under the guidelines
                      at a sentence that undervalues the actual
                      criminality of  your conduct if  it is an
                      appropriate goal of the  criminal justice
                      system to punish.

                      . . . .

                           Mr. Mangone,  you've ruined people's
                      lives;  lots of  lives, people  you don't
                      even know.  Being  sorry to these various
                      financial institutions isn't the  half of
                      it.  That's  the sentence  of the  Court.

                                         -11-
                                          11

                      At the same  time I'm not insensitive  to
                      the Draconian nature of this sentence.  I
                      believe    it's   appropriate    in   the
                      circumstances  and  I arrive  at  it only
                      after  most  careful reflection.   That's
                      the sentence of the Court.

                                        Notice
                                        Notice
                                        ______

                      The PSR  contains  no information  which  could  be

            construed to provide  notice to the defendant that  the court

            was   contemplating  an  upward  departure  based  upon  this

            particular ground.   In fact, when  the district court  asked

            the  government about  the  possibility  that the  Guidelines

            sentence undervalued defendant's criminality,  the government

            expressly stated that "the guidelines  adequately address the

            enormity of the offense here."

                      In Burns  the precise question was  whether Fed. R.
                         _____

            Crim.  P.  32(a)(1), now  32(c)(1),  required the  sentencing

            court to give notice to the parties of its intent to make sua
                                                                      ___

            sponte departures from the Guidelines.  Subdivision (c)(1) of
            ______

            Rule 32  does not  contain  a specific  notice provision  but

            requires  the  district  court  to afford  the  parties  "'an

            opportunity to comment  upon .  . . matters  relating to  the

            appropriate sentence' at the sentencing hearing."  Burns, 501
                                                               _____

            U.S. at 132.  The  Court observed, "In our view, it  makes no

            sense to impute to  Congress an intent that a  defendant have

            the right to comment  on the appropriateness of a  sua sponte
                      __ _______                               ___ ______

            departure but not the  right to be notified that the court is
                                         __ __ ________

                                         -12-
                                          12

            contemplating such a ruling."  Id. at 135-36.  The Court held
                                           ___

            that

                      before a district court can depart upward
                      on a  ground not  identified as  a ground
                      for  upward  departure   either  in   the
                      presentence  report  or  in a  prehearing
                      submission  by  the  Government, Rule  32
                      requires that the district court give the
                      parties  reasonable  notice  that  it  is
                      contemplating such a ruling.  This notice
                      must specifically identify the  ground on
                      which the district court is contemplating
                      an upward departure.

            Id.  at 138-39 (footnote omitted).   The Burns  rule has been
            ___                                      _____

            incorporated  into  an application  note  to    6A1.2  of the

            Guidelines.

                      Defendant challenges the district court's departure

            on the  basis that  he was  not provided with  notice of  the

            court's intention  to depart  upward.  Because  the defendant

            failed  to object  to the  lack of  notice at  the sentencing

            hearing,  we review  the district  court's actions  under the

            rigorous standard of "plain error" review.  See United States
                                                        ___ _____________

            v.  Jones, 1 F.3d 1167,  1170 (11th Cir.  1993)(lack of Burns
            _________                                               _____

            notice subject to plain error review), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
                                                   _____ ______

            1100 (1994);  United States  v. Lowenstein, 1  F.3d 452,  454
                          ____________________________

            (6th Cir. 1993)(same).

                      Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) provides:  "Plain errors  or

            defects affecting substantial rights may be  noticed although

            they were  not brought to the  attention of the  court."  The

                                         -13-
                                          13

            Court in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), teaches
                     ______________________

            that

                      the  authority created  by Rule  52(b) is
                      circumscribed.  There must be  an "error"
                      that  is  "plain"  and   that  "affect[s]
                      substantial  rights."     Moreover,  Rule
                      52(b) leaves the decision to  correct the
                      forfeited   error    within   the   sound
                      discretion of  the court of  appeals, and
                      the  court  should   not  exercise   that
                      discretion  unless the  error "'seriously
                      affect[s]  the   fairness,  integrity  or
                      public     reputation     of     judicial
                      proceedings.'"

            Id. at 732  (quoting United States  v. Young, 470 U.S.  1, 15
            ___                  _______________________

            (1985))  (other citation  omitted) (alteration  in original).

            We now proceed with our Olano analysis.
                                    _____

                      There  must,   first   of  all,   be  an   "error."

            "Deviation from a legal  rule is 'error' unless the  rule has

            been waived."   Olano, 507 U.S.  at 732-33.  There  can be no
                            _____

            doubt  that there was a  deviation from a  legal rule in this

            case.    As  stated  supra, Burns  requires  that  "before  a
                                 _____  _____

            district court  can depart upward on a  ground not identified

            as a  ground for upward  departure either in  the presentence

            report or in a prehearing submission by the Government, . . .

            the district court [must]  give the parties reasonable notice

            that it is  contemplating such a ruling."   501 U.S.  at 138.

            This rule was completely ignored.

                      We reject the government's contention that, because

            the  PSR  contained  a  full recitation  of  the  defendant's

            criminal conduct, this put defendant on notice of the factors

                                         -14-
                                          14

            on which  the court relied  for the upward departure.   If we

            accepted the government's theory,  all defendants would be on

            notice  as to  any  sua  sponte  departure  so  long  as  the
                                ___  ______

            departure was based  on facts  contained in the  PSR.   Under

            that  theory  the  Court's  holding  in  Burns  would  become
                                                     _____

            meaningless.  

                      It is  worth noting that the  sentencing facts here

            are  remarkably similar to those in Burns.   In Burns, at the
                                                _____       _____

            conclusion of  the  sentencing hearing,  the  district  court

            announced that  it was  departing upward from  the Guidelines

            sentencing  range,  despite  a  statement  in  the  PSR  that

            "'[t]here are  no factors  that would warrant  departure from

            the guideline sentence.'"   Id. at 131 (quoting PSR).   There
                                        ___

            was a similar statement in the PSR in this case.  

                      The next question is  whether the rule was "waived"

            or "forfeited."   Olano  teaches that "[w]aiver  is different
                              _____

            from forfeiture.  Whereas forfeiture  is the failure to  make

            the timely assertion of  a right, waiver is the  'intentional

            relinquishment or abandonment of  a known right.'"   507 U.S.

            at 733 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
                            _________________

            In the  case at bar  there was a  forfeiture, the failure  to

            make  the timely assertion of a right,  but no waiver.  "If a

            legal  rule   was   violated  during   the   district   court

            proceedings, and  if the defendant  did not  waive the  rule,

            then there has  been an  'error' within the  meaning of  Rule

                                         -15-
                                          15

            52(b) despite the absence  of a timely objection."   507 U.S.

            at 733-34.  We have no difficulty finding error.

                      Following Olano, we determine whether the error was
                                _____

            "plain,"  which is  defined as  "synonymous with  'clear' or,

            equivalently,  'obvious'."  Id. at  734.  We  think the error
                                        ___

            here easily fits within the definition of plain error.

                      Our  next  inquiry  is   whether  the  plain  error

            affected  the substantial rights  of the  defendant.   Id. at
                                                                   ___

            734.   We think  it did.   An increase  of two years  in time

            spent  behind bars  cannot help  but affect  one of  the most

            precious  rights  an  individual  has, to  live  in  freedom.

            Accordingly,  we  find  that  the  district  court's  plainly

            erroneous  departure  affected the    defendant's substantial

            rights.  Cf. United States  v. Miranda-Santiago, 96 F.3d 517,
                     ___ __________________________________

            531 (1st Cir.  1996) (finding  a case in  which "the  claimed

            error  could well have an impact on the length of defendant's

            incarceration"  to  present  a  "compelling  case"  for   the

            application of the plain error doctrine).

                      Our  final  step  in   the  Olano  analysis  is  to
                                                  _____

            determine  whether  we  should,   in  our  discretion,  order

            correction  of  this  plain error  that  affects  substantial

            rights.   As Olano points out, "Rule 52(b) is permissive, not
                         _____

            mandatory."  507 U.S. at 735.  The standard that should guide

            us  in the exercise of our remedial discretion is whether the

            error "'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public

                                         -16-
                                          16

            reputation of  judicial proceedings.'"   Id. at  736 (quoting
                                                     ___

            United  States  v.  Atkinson,   297  U.S.  157,  160  (1936))
            ____________________________

            (alteration in  original).  We  think this standard  has been

            met here.   When  a  district court  fails to  follow a  rule

            established by  the Supreme  Court, even though  such failure

            was not intentional, there  is bound to be an  adverse effect

            on the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial

            proceedings.   Prior  notice is  one  of the  most  zealously

            guarded rights of criminal defendants.  It is embodied in the

            Due Process Clause  of the  Fifth Amendment.   In Burns,  the
                                                              _____

            Court stated,   "In this  case, were  we to read  Rule 32  to

            dispense  with notice,  we would  then have  to confront  the

            serious question  whether notice in this  setting is mandated

            by the Due Process Clause."   501 U.S. at 138.   The singular

            importance of  such notice in  the criminal arena  means that

            disregard for it cannot help but have a denigrating effect on

            the fairness,  integrity, and public  reputation of  judicial

            proceedings.

                      It must be noted  that the district court expressly

            refused to depart  upward on the basis of  defendant's flight

            before sentencing.  This was within his discretion.

                      For  the  foregoing   reasons  the  conviction   is

            affirmed and the sentence of the district court is reduced by

            two years, the amount of additional time imposed  pursuant to

            the  unlawful  upward  departure.    The  total  sentence  of

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                                          17

            incarceration to be served is twenty-two years.  The judgment

            shall be so modified.

                      So Ordered.
                      So Ordered.
                      ___________

             

                            - Concurring Opinion Follows -
                            - Concurring Opinion Follows -

                                         -18-
                                          18

                      STAHL, Circuit Judge  (concurring).  I concur  with
                      STAHL, Circuit Judge  (concurring).  
                             _____________

            my  brethren that the failure to comply with the requirements

            of  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) warrants a vacatur of Mangone's

            sentence.  The right  to prior notice embodied in  that rule,

            however, affords a party the  opportunity to comment upon the

            appropriate  sentence; it  does not  guarantee a  lesser one.

            Unlike the majority,  therefore, I would  remand the case  to

            the  district  court for  resentencing  consistent  with this

            opinion.

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