Court Opinion

ID: 9449696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:19:46.706451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:56.762586
License: Public Domain

McGOWAN,
Circuit Judge, with whom WILBUE K. MILLEE, Circuit Judge, joins (concurring).
We concur fully in the reasons set forth by Judge Bastían for the reversal of the judgment of the District Court. We believe, however, that there is an additional ground why the appellee may not, in this court, press the claim that the statute of limitations bars the relief sought by appellants.
It is clear, in our view, that the District Court passed upon the statute of limitations point adversely to the appellee. The record shows that two separate motions were filed in the District Court by the appellee: one, a motion for summary judgment on the merits, in which was included a statute of limitations ground, and, two, a motion to dismiss the complaint based solely upon the statute of limitations. In its memorandum opinion granting the first such motion, the District Court expressly excepted “that part of the Defendant Udall’s motion for summary judgment based on the grounds of non-compliance with the statute of limitations * and stated that that part “should not form part of the basis for the granting of Defendant Udall’s motion for summary judgment and, accordingly, Defendant Udall’s motion to dismiss is denied.” In the judgment subsequently entered pursuant to this memorandum, the ordering portions recited explicitly that “Defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.” The appellee has taken no appeal from this part of the judgment adverse to him.
In the absence of such an appeal, we do not believe that appellee is free to raise the statute of limitations here as a basis of affirmance. Our conclusion in this regard rests on authority of long standing. In Morley Construction Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 300 U.S. 185, 57 S.Ct. 325, 81 L.Ed. 593 (1937), Justice Cardozo, speaking for a unanimous court, said that “[T]he rule is inveterate and certain.” There, the plaintiff surety had sought specific performance of a contract supplemental to an agreement of suretyship or, alternatively, exoneration by the contractor of the surety from loss on unpaid bills. The District Court held the surety not entitled to the specific performance requested, but did grant the relief of exoneration. It entered a decree reflecting these dispositions. The contractor appealed from the grant of exoneration, but no cross-appeal was taken by the surety from the denial of specific performance. The Court of Appeals concluded that specific performance, rather than exoneration, was the proper relief and sent the case back with directions to the District Court to revise its judgment to this end.
The Supreme Court held that it was error for the Court of Appeals to take this action at the instance of a non-appealing, albeit successful, litigant. It cited a number of cases, including an early decision of the Supreme Court, wherein it was said:
“Where each party appeals each may assign error, but where only one party appeals the other is bound by the decree in the court below, and he cannot assign error in the appellate court, nor can he be heard if the proceedings in the appeal are correct, except in support of the decree from which the appeal of the *418other party is taken.” The Maria Martin, 12 Wall. 31, 40-41, 20 L.Ed. 251.
One of the cases relied upon by Justice Cardozo was Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 528, 44 S.Ct. 194, 68 L.Ed. 427 (1924). There, the United States had prevailed below on the merits, but it had also contended in the lower court that the venue was improperly laid. This latter point was resolved against it, but on appeal it was renewed. Justice Brandéis, speaking for the entire court, said (at 263 U.S. p. 536, 44 S.Ct. p. 197) that “* * * by failure to enter a cross appeal from the court’s action in overruling its objection, the right to insist upon it here was lost. The appellees can be heard before this Court only in support of the decree which was rendered.”
This court has recognized this principle. In Wisconsin Bankers Association v. Robertson, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 85, 294 F.2d 714, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 938, 82 S.Ct. 381, 7 L.Ed.2d 338 (1961), the case was litigated below both on the merits and on a challenge to plaintiff’s standing to sue. The defendants prevailed on the former, but suffered an adverse ruling on the latter. The standing point was renewed on appeal, but this court said: “As a cross appeal was not filed by the appellees, we cannot consider, and therefore express no opinion concerning, their argument that the District Court erred in holding that appellants had standing to sue. In the absence of a cross appeal, an ‘appellee may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary * United States v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 1924, 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct. 560, 564, 68 L.Ed. 1087. * * *”1 See also, Whitehead v. American Security & Trust Co., 109 U.S.App.D.C. 202, 285 F.2d 282 (1960).
It may seem anomalous at first blush that a successful litigant in the lower court should be under any necessity whatsoever of appealing from the decree which brought him victory. But the judgment may, as here, be comprised of several elements, adverse as well as favorable. If the prevailing party wishes to rely on appeal on a contention decided against him, he must preserve his rights by an appeal. This can be by a cross-appeal if time permits after his opponent has appealed, or it may be by a timely notice of appeal which can be dismissed if the other party elects not to pursue the litigation further. In the absence of such a preservation of the point, the successful litigant must be taken to have regarded the grounds upon which he won as so strong that he is content to rely upon them alone in the appellate proceedings.
The defense of the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and it may be waived at any time. By failing to appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss founded upon the statute, the appellee here made such a waiver and cannot now attack that part of the judgment with which he disagrees.

. 111 U.S.App.D.C. at 86, 294 F.2d at 715. The Railway Express case appears to have involved a situation where the lower court did not in fact decide or pass upon the ground sought to be raised on appeal. In this situation the successful litigant may well be able to renew the point on appeal as a basis of affirmance. Justice Brandéis reaffirmed the force of the Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. holding by this reference (n. 11 on. p. 436 of 265 U.S. on p. 564 of 44 S.Ct. 68 L.Ed. 1087): “ * * * There the objection upon which the appellee relied was one of venue. The District Court overruled it; and then dismissed the bill on the merits. An objection to venue can be waived at any stage of the proceeding. This Court held that it was waived by failure to take a cross-appeal.”