Court Opinion

ID: 9403644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 15:07:51.1066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:08.459698
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 23-0189
                               Filed June 21, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF L.F. and S.F.,
Minor Children,

L.L., Mother,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Korie Talkington,

District Associate Judge.

       A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

       Kim Aboyure, Davenport (until withdrawal), and Brian P. Donnelly of Mayer,

Lonergan and Rolfes, Clinton, for appellant mother.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

       Timothy J. Tupper, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

children.

       Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
                                        2

AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

      The juvenile court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her two children,

L.F. (born in 2013) and S.F. (born in 2015). The mother appeals.1

      We conduct a de novo review of orders terminating parental rights. In re

Z.K., 973 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). Our review follows a three-step process that

involves determining if a statutory ground for termination has been established,

whether termination is in the children’s best interests, and whether any permissive

exceptions should be applied to preclude termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280,

294 (Iowa 2021).

      The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights to both children

under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f), and (i) (2022). The mother’s

petition on appeal does not specify which statutory grounds she challenges.

Instead, her petition generically challenges the statutory grounds by arguing the

children would not be subject to adjudicatory harm if returned to her custody.2 The

State concedes her argument is sufficient to challenge the statutory grounds under

paragraphs (d), (i), and (f). However, it argues the mother’s argument is not

sufficient to challenge paragraph (e), as there is no adjudicatory-harm element

under paragraph (e). See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e). We agree with the State.

When the juvenile court finds multiple grounds satisfied, we may affirm on any one

ground.   In re N.S., No. 14-1375, 2014 WL 5253291, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.

1 The court also terminated the father’s parental rights. He does not appeal.
2 The mother also claims under a separate issue heading that the juvenile court
improperly considered the geographical distance between herself and the children.
Because this issue is intertwined inextricably with the statutory-grounds issue, we
will not address it separately.
                                          3

Oct. 15, 2014). As the mother’s argument cannot be construed as a challenge to

termination under section 232.116(1)(e), we find that unchallenged statutory

ground sufficient to satisfy the first step in the three-step analysis. See In re J.P.,

No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020) (“Because the

mother does not challenge the statutory grounds under paragraph (l), we find the

statutory grounds authorizing termination satisfied under section 232.116(1)(l).”).3

       We next address the mother’s remaining challenges. To do that, we must

determine what the challenges are. Making this determination is made more

challenging because the mother’s petition on appeal conflates the best-interests

analysis4 with her claim that we should forgo termination due to a parent-child

bond, a permissive exception to termination.5 See In re A.B., No. 23-0235, 2023

WL 3335422, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 10, 2023) (“In considering the best interests

of the children, we are required to use the best-interests framework set out by our

legislature. And that framework does not include the word ‘bond.’” (internal citation

omitted)). Despite the blending of these two issues, we choose to address them

separately and begin with whether termination is in the children’s best interests.

3 Although we find it unnecessary to address any other grounds for termination due
to the mother’s failure to challenge termination under section 232.116(1)(e), our
de novo review of the record persuades us that the children could not be safely
returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing, so her
challenges on that basis under the other subsections would not have prevailed had
we considered them on the merits.
4 When making a best-interest determination, we “give primary consideration to

the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and
growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs
of the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2)).
5 Section 232.116(3)(c) allows the court to forgo termination when “[t]here is clear

and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at
the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.”
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       Following our de novo review of the record, we conclude termination is in

the children’s best interests. These children suffered multiple years of “ongoing

trauma” while in the mother’s custody.        The younger child in particular has

struggled with trauma associated with the mother. She has complained that her

stomach hurts when she thinks about her mother or her visits with her mother, and

she has exhibited extreme behaviors following increased visits with the mother

such as being physically aggressive toward the older child and vomiting due to

anxiety. Yet the mother has failed to fully accept accountability for the trauma she

and her past paramours have inflicted on the children. The mother has also been

inconsistent with her own mental-health therapy.

       In contrast, the children are currently placed with a stable, pre-adoptive

foster family. That family “has allowed them to start healing from [the] trauma that

they’ve faced and they feel that they are a part of that family and they feel that they

are accepted.” The foster parents provide the children with much-needed structure

and routine while allowing the children to express their feelings and work through

their emotions. It is clear the foster family can provide the children the type and

level of care they now require. Termination is a necessary step before these

children can be adopted and permanently integrated into the foster family.

Accordingly, we conclude termination is in the children’s best interests.

       Finally, the mother asserts that we should apply an exception to preclude

termination under section 232.116(3)(c) based on her bonds with the children. It

is her burden to establish applicability of an exception. See In re A.S., 906

N.W.2d 467, 475–76 (Iowa 2018). The record convinces us there is a bond

between the mother and children. Yet the mere “existence of a bond is not
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enough.” See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021). Instead, the bond

must be so significant that severing it would be manifestly detrimental to the child.

Id. The record does not establish a bond of this magnitude with either child. As

previously noted, the children experience anxiety and behavioral setbacks after

visits with the mother and when contemplating visits with the mother.           This

evidence suggests the children suffer more harm from continued contact with the

mother than they would by curtailing such contact. Based on this record, the

mother has failed to meet her burden to establish that termination of her rights

would be detrimental to the children such that we should apply the close-bond

exception of section 232.116(3)(c).

       AFFIRMED.