Court Opinion

ID: 9586514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:12:19.647296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:41.674491
License: Public Domain

Bussey, Justice
(dissenting).
It is with regret that I find myself unable to concur in the majority opinion in this case.
The questions involved in this appeal are somewhat variously stated by the parties in their respective briefs, but the basic contentions of the appellants are, (1) that the entry of a judgment on the verdict was improper, and (2) that, regardless of whether or not the judgment was properly entered, the landowner is not entitled to recover interest on the verdict from the date thereof to the date of payment. The respondent challenges the foregoing contentions of the appellant and further expressly contends that since the Constitution of this State is self-executing, Article I, Section 17 of the Constitution of South Carolina compels that interest after verdict should be paid as a part of the just compensation provided for by the Constitution.
With respect to the first contention, the appellant argues that there is no .provision in the Highway Condemnation Statutes,’ 1962 Code Sections 33-125 et seq., authorizing the entry of a judgment and that the rule laid down by this court in Haig v. Wateree Power Co., 119 S. C. 319, 112 S. E. 55, should control the decision on this point, rather than the rule in Mauldin v. City Council of Greenville, 64 S. C. 444, 42 S. E. 202.
The Haig case is clearly distinguishable from the instant case, as there the verdict of the jury was not a final adjudication of the rights of the parties: Here, according to the statement of the case, the táking of the landowner’s property by the Department occurred on September 7, 1960, and the verdict'of the jury was'on January 25-/. 1961.-Of-course, the *368Department may abandon a condemnation at any time before taking actual possession and entering, Jennings v. Sawyer, 182 S. C. 427, 189 S. E. 746, but it is not contended that the Department has any right of abandonment here. Under the circumstances of this case, the verdict of the jury finally adjudicated the rights of the parties, just as in the Mauldin case where it was held that the clerk was required, under the provisions of what is now 1962 Code Section 10-1458, to enter a judgment on the verdict of the jury.
The majority opinion differentiates the Mauldin case from the case at bar, in part, on the ground that it was “bottomed upon the premise that an appeal to this Court must be from the judgment and not from the verdict of the jury. * * * However, this rule is no longer applicable and has been changed by Section 7-5 of the 1952 Code [of Laws], which permits an appeal from a verdict. * * * The verdict in the Mauldin case fixed the amount of damages and furnished the basis of a final judgment which necessarily had to be entered as such when the City desired to appeal therefrom because no appeal could be taken from the verdict under the rule as it then existed.”
I respectfully point out that Section 7-5 has no application except to verdicts “on which a final judgment might be entered.” Therefore, it seems to me that the enactment of said section can have no effect on the decision of this case unless the verdict is one on which a final judgment may be entered.
Moreover, it seems clear to me that the legislature contemplated and provided for the entry of a judgment upon a jury verdict in a highway condemnation case. Section 33-139 provides, inter alia, that,
' “The verdict of. the jury in such cases shall be final, unless set aside for the reasons for which verdicts may be set aside in other cases or unless the judgment of the court thereupon be reversed, for error of law, on appeal to the Supreme Court.” (Emphasis added.)
I find myself in disagreement with the construction accorded the foregoing section in the majority opinion. It *369seems to me that no effect is given to the disjunctive words “or unless”. My view of the statutory language under consideration is that it provides that the verdict shall be final except in two totally different disjunctive classifications, the first of which is that it shall not be final if set aside by the trial judge, and the other classification is -that it shall not be final if the judgment of the court thereupon (that is to say, the verdict) be reversed by the supreme court.- The language clearly contemplates an appeal to the supreme court, and such an appeal will lie, without entry of judgment, under Section 7-5, only if judgment might have been entered on the verdict.
I, therefore, conclude that the judgment was properly entered in this case, which brings us to the question of whether the verdict, even though properly entered up as a judgment, bears interest under Section 8-2 of the 1962 Code of Laws, the applicable portion of which reads as follows:
“In all money decrees and judgments of courts enrolled or entered, * * * in all cases wherein any sum or sums of money shall be ascertained and, being due, shall draw interest according to law * *
The lower court held that the judgment here falls in the same category as all other verdicts and judgments and would bear interest in accordance with the foregoing statutory provision. The appellant contends the foregoing provision is inapplicable here, even though the judgment be properly entered, in the absence of language in Section 8-2 making it expressly applicable to judgments against the State. The precise question thus raised has not heretofore been before this court but has been considered by various courts, the decisions being not in harmony, and there being some support for appellant’s contention.
The weight of authority from other jurisdictions, however, supports the propositions that when a state either consents to be sued or,voluntarily becomes a party to litigation, it subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the court and the judgment thereof, and that statutes providing for interest on all judgments are applicable to any judgment which might *370be rendered against the state. For authorities supporting these propositions see Franklin Bros. et al. v. Standard Mfg. Co. et al., Tex. Civ. App., 78 S. W. (2d) 294; Commonwealth v. Lyon, 72 S. W. 323, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1747; Duree v. State, La. App., 96 So. (2d) 854; Reeves v. State of Louisiana, 232 La. 116, 94 So. (2d) 1; State v. Warden, 206 Okl. 223, 242 P. (2d) 129; State v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. et al., 101 Colo. 368, 73 P. (2d) 997; Fla. Livestock Board v. Gladden, Fla., 86 So. (2d) 812; Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. State, Cal. App., 117 P. (2d) 377.
In this state the right to sue the state for compensation for land taken for public use is granted by the Constitution and had the Department not proceeded under the condemnation statutes, but had taken the right of way without any process, the state would have been subject to suit. Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Department, 159 S. C. 481, 157 S. E. 842; Hardin v. City of Greenville, 161 S. C. 53, 159 S. E. 465. When the Department commenced the eminent domain proceedings pursuant to the applicable statutes, it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court knowing full well that under the statute the proceeding could well end in a judgment against the Department. I see no good or logical reason why this judgment, properly entered against the Department, should not bear interest in accordance with the provisions of Section 8-2 of the Code.
Assuming, however, that the majority opinion is correct in concluding that the applicable statutes do not authorize the entry of a judgment and interest thereon in a highway condemnation case, we still have left for consideration the constitutional issue relied upon by the respondent. I respectfully submit that the case of Haig v. Wateree Power Co., supra, is binding precedent for the allowance of interest on the verdict here, even in the absence of the entry of a judgment and independently of the statutory provisions above discussed. •
*371Under the circumstances of that case, the court properly-held that judgment could not be entered on the verdict because the condemnor had an election, as to whether to pay the verdict, until it actually took possession of the property. The court squarely held that in the absence of any statute on the subject, the allowance of interest on the verdict was controlled “by the constitutional principle requiring just compensation for property taken.” The court pointed out that upon the rendition of the verdict and fixing the award, the taking of the property became optional with the condemnor and the rights of the landowner were seriously affected. I quote from the opinion:
“If the amount of the award had been paid on the date of the rendition of the verdict, when the right to take vested in the condemnor, it would have been ‘just compensation.’ As the payment was postponed by the condemnor until a future time, the landowners did not receive ‘full compensation’ as contemplated under the Constitution. The difference is the same as between a sale for cash and a sale on time. The plaintiffs herein are entitled to interest under the constitutional provisions requiring just and full compensation for private property taken for public purposes.”
Attention is also invited to the equally strong language in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Cothran.
The case of South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Southern Railway, 239 S. C. 1, 121 S. E. (2d) 236, is precedent only for the proposition that interest, or its equivalent, from the date of the taking to the date of the trial may not be included in the verdict and we, of course, are bound by this decision.
The Haig case, correctly decided in accordance with the great weight of authority, was not overruled by the Southern Railway case, and we are not requested to even review it here. Therefore, the respondent is entitled to stare decisis application of the principle that the verdict in a condemnation case draws interest, as a necessary element of just compensation, even though it be held that it was improper to enter a final judgment on the verdict. The fact that here, *372contrary to the Haig case, the verdict is against the sovereign is of no legal consequence because the sovereign, just as other condemnors, is enjoined by the Constitution to pay just compensation, and the Haig case is binding authority for the proposition that this requires the allowance and payment of interest on a condemnation verdict.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the lower court.
Brailsford, J., concurs.