Court Opinion

ID: 9911061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 15:00:50.696852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:55:50.633402
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11504     Document: 35-1       Date Filed: 12/19/2023   Page: 1 of 30

                                                                [PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                   No. 22-11504
                            ____________________

        CHARLES HAROLD BEDGOOD,
        individually and on behalf of all other
        persons similarly situated,
        JOEL WILSON BRANDON,
        individually and on behalf of all other
        persons similarly situated,
        HANNAH LYN HEIL-BRANDON,
        individually and on behalf of all other
        persons similarly situated,
        EDDIE MATHEWS JR.,
        individually and on behalf of all other
        persons similarly situated,
        REENA T. SMITH, et al.,
        individually and on behalf of all other
        persons similarly situated,
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                     22-11504

                                                                Plaintiﬀs-Appellees,
        versus
        WYNDHAM VACATION RESORTS, INC.,
        WORLDMARK, THE CLUB,
        WYNDHAM RESORT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

                                                           Defendants-Appellants.

                                ____________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-00418-PGB-DCI
                             ____________________

        Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and GRIMBERG, District
        Judge.*
        NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
               This is an odd case. The lead defendant here, Wyndham Va-
        cation Resorts—which, to distinguish it from other Wyndham-re-
        lated entities, we’ll just call “Resorts”—entered into purchase
        agreements with a number of timeshare owners. Those agree-
        ments required parties to arbitrate their disputes in the American

        * The Honorable Steven D. Grimberg, United States District Judge for the

        Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation.
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        22-11504               Opinion of the Court                          3

        Arbitration Association rather than litigate them in court. So when
        relationships soured, several purchasers ﬁled arbitration petitions
        with the AAA. The AAA, though, dismissed each purchaser’s peti-
        tion on the ground that Resorts had “failed to comply with the
        AAA’s policies.” In view of Resorts’ non-compliance, the AAA “de-
        cline[d] to administer [each purchaser’s] claim and any other claims
        between [Resorts] and its consumers at this time” and thus in-
        structed the purchasers that they could “submit [their] dispute[s] to
        the appropriate court for resolution.”
                Thwarted in their eﬀorts to arbitrate, the purchasers—by
        that point joined by similarly situated individuals proceeding
        against other Wyndham-related entities—sued in federal court.
        The defendants’ response? You guessed it: They moved to stay the
        litigation and direct arbitration before the AAA—the very entity
        that, on account of Resorts’ own noncompliance, had refused to
        consider the original purchasers’ arbitration petitions.
               The principal question here is whether, having seemingly
        stymied the purchasers’ eﬀorts to arbitrate, Resorts and its co-de-
        fendants can now prevent them from litigating on the ground that
        their agreements require arbitration. For reasons we’ll explain, we
        hold as follows: (1) The three purchasers who originally sought to
        arbitrate their claims against Resorts, only to see their petitions re-
        jected on account of Resorts’ noncompliance with AAA policies,
        may proceed to litigation; and (2) three other purchasers who never
        formally submitted their claims against Resorts to the AAA, but
        whose agreements with Resorts contained identical arbitration
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-11504

        provisions, may likewise proceed to litigation; but (3) two purchas-
        ers who had an agreement with diﬀerent Wyndham-related entities
        must return to the district court for further consideration of the
        Federal Arbitration Act’s applicability to their dispute.
                                          I
                                         A
                At the outset, it will help to get straight the Wyndham-re-
        lated entities involved in this case. Wyndham Vacation Resorts
        (again, “Resorts”), Wyndham Resorts Development Corporation
        (hereinafter “Development”), and WorldMark, The Club oﬀer
        timeshare ownership interests across their respective portfolios of
        properties. Resorts manages and sells interests at resorts and hotels
        marketed and sold under the Club Wyndham name. Development
        does the same for WorldMark-branded properties.                 And
        WorldMark, The Club (hereinafter “WorldMark”) is the non-proﬁt
        owners’ association for WorldMark-branded resorts and hotels.
        The three entities are aﬃliated—either through connection to their
        common parent Travel + Leisure Co., in the case of Resorts and
        Development, or through their inventory, in the case of Develop-
        ment and WorldMark—but they maintain separate corporate iden-
        tities.
               To purchase a timeshare interest with Resorts, Develop-
        ment, or WorldMark (collectively, “the defendants”), interested
        buyers must, of course, sign a contract. And that’s exactly what
        the eight named plaintiﬀs in this case did. Charles Bedgood, Joel
        Brandon, Hannah Heil-Brandon, Eddie Mathews, Reena Smith,
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        22-11504                   Opinion of the Court                                5

        and Roslind Harper contracted with Resorts; Justin Diaz and Can-
        dice Clark contracted with Development and WorldMark.
                All parties’ agreements contain nearly identical arbitration
        clauses. Those clauses provide that “any dispute” between the par-
        ties “be determined exclusively and ﬁnally by individual arbitra-
        tion[.]” The contracts are governed by the Federal Arbitration Act
        (“FAA”), and they designate the American Arbitration Association
        (“AAA”) as the administrator. The agreements further provide that,
        in the event of a dispute, the AAA will appoint an independent ar-
        bitrator “under [the AAA’s] Consumer Arbitration Rules,” which,
        in turn, incorporate the AAA Consumer Due Process Protocol. Fi-
        nally, as relevant here, the contracts contain both (1) a forum selec-
        tion clause specifying Orange County, Florida as the sole venue for
        arbitration unless the parties otherwise agree or the independent
        arbitrator authorizes a telephonic hearing, and (2) a damages pro-
        vision limiting the seller’s liability to the total amount paid under
        the agreement.1
               The Consumer Arbitration Rules and the Due Process Pro-
        tocol articulate principles and policies that govern the ﬁling, con-
        duct, and resolution of disputes within the AAA’s arbitral forum.
        See American Arbitration Association, Consumer Arbitration Rules
        (amended and eﬀective Sept. 1, 2014), adr.org/sites/de-
        fault/ﬁles/Consumer-Rules-Web.pdf;         American     Arbitration

        1 The only difference is that Resorts’ arbitration provision contains an explicit

        prohibition on class actions, whereas Development’s and WorldMark’s
        clauses don’t.
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                       22-11504

        Association, Consumer Due Process Protocol (eﬀective Apr. 17, 1998),
        https://www.adr.org/sites/default/ﬁles/document_reposi-
        tory/Consumer%20Due%20Process%20Protocol%20(1).pdf. The
        rules delegate ministerial tasks and administrative determinations
        to the AAA administrator. See Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra at
        6. Of particular importance here, Commercial Arbitration Rule 12
        outlines the administrator’s arbitration-clause-vetting process and
        attendant procedures. Id. at 16–17; 43. By contrast, the arbitra-
        tor—not the administrator—-makes all merits-based decisions. Id.
        at 44.
               The contracts at issue here stipulate that “[i]n the event of
        any conﬂict between the AAA Rules and this Agreement, the pro-
        visions of this Agreement shall be controlling.”
                                               B
               Dissatisﬁed with their timeshare programs, and pursuant to
        the arbitration clause in their contracts, plaintiﬀs Bedgood, Bran-
        don, and Heil-Brandon sought to arbitrate breach-of-contract and
        fraudulent-inducement claims against Resorts. To that end, they
        ﬁled arbitration petitions with the AAA.
               After initial review but before appointing an arbitrator, the
        AAA summarily rejected Bedgood’s and the Brandons’ petitions on
        the ground that Resorts had “failed to comply with the AAA’s poli-
        cies.”2 The AAA explained that it would “decline to administer this

        2 The defendants insist that the record doesn’t show—and indeed, that we

        have no way of knowing—which AAA policies Resorts violated. But in their
        reply brief in support of the motion to compel arbitration in the district court,
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        22-11504                  Opinion of the Court                               7

        claim and any other claims between [Resorts] and its consumers at
        this time.”3 But, it said, if Resorts “advise[d] the AAA in the future
        of its intention to comply with the AAA’s Consumer Arbitration
        Rules . . . the AAA may consider at its sole discretion, accepting
        newly ﬁled consumer cases going forward.” To regain access to the
        AAA forum, the AAA said, Resorts would need, “at a minimum,
        [to] register its [arbitration] clause” with the AAA’s Consumer
        Clause Registry, a pre-arbitration vetting mechanism designed to
        ensure that arbitration clauses meet the AAA’s minimum due-pro-
        cess requirements. The record doesn’t reﬂect, nor have we been
        told, whether Resorts has submitted its arbitration clause to the
        AAA for review or whether it otherwise intends to comply with the

        the defendants represented that “the AAA declined to administer arbitrations
        because Wyndham’s forum selection clause and damages clause were ‘at odds
        with the AAA’s rules.’” Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Compel
        Arbitration, Doc. 19 at 1–2 (emphasis added). In any event and as we’ll ex-
        plain, knowing which particular AAA policies Resorts violated is irrelevant to
        our analysis.
        3 Bedgood’s letter referred to “Wyndham Vacation Club,” but the entity’s legal

        name is “Wyndham Vacation Resorts,” and Bedgood’s contract was clearly
        with “Wyndham Vacation Resorts.” The Brandons’ contract was also with
        “Wyndham Vacation Resorts,” but their AAA letter referred to “Wyndham
        Destinations,” which, the defendants have explained, is the “general trade
        name for Travel + Leisure Co’s timeshare business.” The defendants have
        conceded that both AAA letters refer, at the very least, to Resorts. See Br. of
        Appellants at C-1 (stating that all references to “Wyndham” in the brief refer
        to “Wyndham Vacation Resorts”); id. at 47 (stating explicitly that “the record
        is limited to the AAA’s refusal to administer arbitrations from Defendant
        Wyndham”) (citing the Bedgood and Brandon AAA rejection letters) (emphasis
        in original).
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11504

        AAA’s Consumer Arbitration Rules (or even challenge the AAA’s
        determination that its clause is noncompliant).
               Having declined to administer Bedgood’s and the Brandons’
        arbitrations on account of Resorts’ failure to comply with the
        AAA’s policies, the AAA informed the plaintiﬀs that they could
        “submit [their] dispute[s] to the appropriate court for resolution”
        pursuant to Rule 1(d) of the Consumer Arbitration Rules.
        Bedgood, Brandon, and Heil-Brandon thus sued in the United
        States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. They were
        joined by plaintiﬀs Mathews, Harper, Smith, Diaz, and Clark in a
        putative class action on behalf of similarly situated individuals.
                After the AAA declined to adjudicate the plaintiﬀs’ attempts
        to resolve the dispute in the arbitral forum that it had speciﬁed in
        its timeshare contracts, Resorts then objected to the plaintiﬀs’ ef-
        forts to litigate in federal district court. Pursuant to Sections 3 and
        4 of the FAA, Resorts, together with Development and WorldMark,
        moved to stay litigation and direct arbitration in the AAA—the very
        forum in which the plaintiﬀs had attempted to arbitrate their claims
        in the ﬁrst place. In the alternative, the defendants requested that
        the district court appoint a substitute arbitrator—i.e., one not aﬃl-
        iated with the AAA—under Section 5 of the FAA.
               Drawing on Resorts’ conduct, its corporate relationship
        with Development and WorldMark, and their nearly identical arbi-
        tration clauses, the district court denied the motion to stay litiga-
        tion and direct arbitration as to all parties. The court observed that
        “[s]ections 3, 4, and 5 [of the FAA] create mechanisms for the courts
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        22-11504               Opinion of the Court                         9

        to be able to enforce arbitration agreements by, respectively, staying
        litigation, compelling arbitration, and/or designating a substitute
        arbitrator.” But, the court noted, it could “grant the requested re-
        lief only if it ha[d] the authority to act under the FAA.”
                The district court held that it lacked this authority under
        FAA Sections 3, 4, and 5. The impediment on all fronts, it held,
        was the defendants’ own failure to comply with the AAA’s rules.
        Relying on the AAA’s determination that Resorts ﬂouted its poli-
        cies, the district court concluded that all the defendants were “in
        default” with the forum, rendering stay relief under Section 3 of
        the FAA unavailable. The court further held that the defendants
        couldn’t obtain an order directing the parties to arbitration under
        Section 4 because the plaintiﬀs hadn’t “fail[ed], neglect[ed], or re-
        fus[ed]” to arbitrate. To the contrary, the court found that they
        attempted to arbitrate but had been rebuﬀed by the AAA on ac-
        count of the defendants’ failure to comply with the forum’s poli-
        cies. Finally, the court held that the defendants weren’t entitled to
        a substitute arbitrator under Section 5 because the AAA would be
        an available forum “if it were not for [d]efendants’ negligent failure
        to follow the AAA’s rules.” “[The] defendants’ actions,” the court
        concluded, “foreclosed the arbitration of these claims under the
        plain language of the FAA.”
                Because it had lacked authority to stay the litigation, direct
        arbitration, or substitute an arbitrator, the district court held that
        all plaintiﬀs could proceed to litigation of their claims. The court
        didn’t proceed any further—for instance, to address whether the
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11504

        arbitration clause itself was valid and enforceable or whether the
        underlying contract claims were arbitrable. Instead, it limited its
        holding to the applicability of the FAA’s provisions given the de-
        fendants’ unusual litigating positions.
               The defendants promptly ﬁled this interlocutory appeal pur-
        suant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A)–(B).
                                           II
                Collectively, the defendants raise four issues on appeal. First,
        they assert that the district court erred in concluding that the de-
        fendants were “in default” within the meaning of Section 3 of the
        FAA, and thus ineligible for a stay of litigation. Second, they con-
        tend that the district court erred in declining to direct arbitration
        because, they say, they are “part[ies] aggrieved” by plaintiﬀs’ “fail-
        ure, neglect, or refusal” to arbitrate within the meaning of Section
        4 of the FAA and because, in any event, the AAA would administer
        the arbitration if ordered to do so. Third, they argue that the dis-
        trict court erred in refusing to appoint a substitute, non-AAA-
        aﬃliated arbitrator under Section 5 of the FAA. And ﬁnally, they
        contend that the district court shouldn’t have determined the arbi-
        trability of the underlying claims but should instead have referred
        that question to an arbitrator.
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        22-11504                  Opinion of the Court                              11

              For simplicity’s sake, we’ll work through each of the issues
        with respect to Resorts, and then separately turn our attention to
        Development and WorldMark. 4
                                              A
                For reasons we’ll explain in this section, we hold that Re-
        sorts’ failure to comply with the rules of its chosen arbitral forum
        renders the remedies speciﬁed in Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA una-
        vailable to it and, accordingly, that the plaintiﬀs who have contracts
        with Resorts—Bedgood, Brandon, Heil-Brandon, Mathews, Smith,
        and Harper—may proceed to litigation. Because we conclude that
        we lack jurisdiction over it, we decline to review the district court’s
        interlocutory order denying Resorts’ motion for a substitute arbi-
        trator under Section 5. And we reject Resorts’ ﬁnal argument—
        that the district court exceeded its authority in determining the ar-
        bitrability of the plaintiﬀs’ underlying claims—because, in fact, the
        court never addressed arbitrability.
                                              1
               Section 3 of the FAA entitles a party to stay the litigation of
        an action that falls within an arbitration agreement’s terms unless
        the party is “in default in proceeding with such arbitration.”
        9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added). In its letters to Bedgood and the
        Brandons, the AAA declined to administer their claims on the

        4 We review the denial of a motion to direct arbitration de novo. Attix v. Car-

        rington Mortg. Servs., LLC, 35 F.4th 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2022). The district
        court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. White Springs Agric.
        Chems., Inc. v. Glawson Inv. Corp., 660 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2011).
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11504

        ground that Resorts had “failed to comply with the AAA’s policies
        regarding consumer claims,” referring speciﬁcally to both the AAA
        Consumer Arbitration Rules and the AAA Consumer Due Process
        Protocol. Relying on the AAA’s determination to that eﬀect, the
        district court concluded that Resorts was “in default with [its] con-
        tractually chosen forum” and accordingly refused to stay litigation
        under Section 3.
                Before us, Resorts argues that the district court erred in re-
        lying on the AAA’s determination in deciding “default” because, it
        says, the question whether its arbitration clause complies with AAA
        policies is reserved to the arbitrator. According to Resorts, the AAA
        exceeded its authority in making the default determination, and
        the district court therefore erred in relying on that determination
        to make its own conclusion regarding default.
                We disagree for several reasons, which we’ll explain in turn.
        First, the contracts at issue are governed by the AAA’s Consumer
        Arbitration Rules, which expressly delegate policy-compliance de-
        terminations to the AAA administrator. Second, no provision of
        the parties’ contracts reallocates that authority to the arbitrator.
        Third, the mere fact that the AAA’s determination lacked speciﬁc-
        ity—inasmuch as it didn’t identify precisely which policies Resorts
        had violated—doesn’t undermine its legitimacy. Accordingly, we
        hold that the AAA was empowered to conclude that Resorts’ arbi-
        tration clause violated its policies, and that the district court didn’t
        err in relying on the AAA’s determination to conclude that Resorts
        was “in default” within the meaning of Section 3.
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        22-11504               Opinion of the Court                         13

                                          a
               Resorts’ primary argument turns on whether the parties’
        contracts delegate the power to determine whether their arbitra-
        tion clauses comply with AAA policies to a AAA administrator or,
        instead, to an independent arbitrator. We think it’s the former.
               As already explained, the contracts at issue here specify that
        the AAA will conduct arbitrations in accordance with its Consumer
        Arbitration Rules. Those rules require arbitration clauses to meet
        certain minimum due-process standards—concerning, for exam-
        ple, the availability of fora and the adequacy of remedies—before
        the AAA will agree to administer an arbitration between the parties
        to the contract.
                Those rules also prescribe distinct roles for the administrator
        and arbitrator. “The administrator’s role is to manage the admin-
        istrative aspects of the arbitration, such as the appointment of the
        arbitrator.” Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra, at 6. “[The] admin-
        istrator,” however, “does not decide the merits of a case or make
        any rulings on issues such as what documents must be shared with
        each side.” Id. By contrast, the rules state that “[a]rbitrators are
        neutral and independent decision makers” who “make the ﬁnal,
        binding decision . . . on the dispute.” Id. at 7. In short, the admin-
        istrator—as the name would suggest—makes administrative deter-
        minations, while the arbitrator decides the merits.
               Importantly here, the Consumer Arbitration Rules make
        clear that the determination whether a party has complied with the
        AAA’s policies is an administrative decision that can and should be
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        14                          Opinion of the Court                          22-11504

        made by the AAA before it refers the case to an arbitrator. The
        rules describe the AAA’s review of an entity’s consumer arbitration
        clause “for material compliance with due process standards” and
        the resulting “determination whether or not to administer arbitra-
        tions pursuant to that clause” as “administrative determination[s]
        by the AAA.” Id. at 16–17. While that determination “cannot be
        relied upon or construed as a legal opinion or advice regarding the
        enforceability” of the agreement, there is no reason, we think, why
        it can’t underlie a district court’s conclusion that an entity is “in
        default” with the arbitral forum under FAA Section 3. Id.
              Thus, the AAA administrator was within its prerogative to
        determine that Resorts was out of compliance with its policies.
        The district court’s ensuing reliance on that determination to con-
        clude that Resorts was “in default” with the forum was not im-
        proper. 5

        5 Resorts points to one of our unpublished decisions and a Sixth Circuit deci-

        sion that, it says, require us to hold otherwise. We disagree. Kaspers v. Comcast
        Corp., 631 F. App’x 779 (11th Cir. 2015), is both non-binding and oﬀ-point.
        There, we held, unremarkably, that “[the] AAA’s administrative determination
        is not binding on this Court” and rejected the plaintiﬀs’ argument “that [the]
        AAA’s refusal to arbitrate claims . . . because of a non-compliant damages pro-
        vision renders the arbitration provision invalid or unenforceable.” Id. at 783.
        But of course; an arbitration clause’s validity and enforceability are merits-
        based issues reserved to the arbitrator, issues over which the administrator re-
        tains no authority. This case is diﬀerent: The AAA and the district court
        didn’t—and we don’t—address Resorts’ clause’s validity or enforceability. Cic-
        cio v. SmileDirectClub, LLC, 2 F.4th 577 (6th Cir. 2021), is likewise distinguishable.
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        22-11504                  Opinion of the Court                               15

                                               b

               Resorts separately points to two provisions of the arbitra-
        tion agreement that, it says, require resolution of the clause-com-
        pliance question by an arbitrator.

               First, it cites the so-called delegation clause, which reserves
        questions of “enforcement, interpretation, or validity” of the
        agreement to an arbitrator. Resorts insists that this clause covers
        the question whether its arbitration clause complies with AAA pol-
        icies. But Resorts misunderstands the nature of the AAA’s deter-
        mination. The AAA didn’t opine on the arbitration clause’s “en-
        forcement, interpretation, or validity.” It made no attempt to com-
        pel (or forbid) the parties’ compliance with the contract’s provi-
        sions, nor did it declare that the contract itself was (or wasn’t) in
        force and eﬀect. See Enforcement, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
        2019) (“[t]he act or process of compelling compliance with a law,
        mandate, command, decree, or agreement”); Contract, id. (noting
        that a “valid” contract is one that is “fully operative in accordance
        with the parties’ intent”). Nor did it apply law to fact or otherwise
        determine whether or how the text covers the parties’ dispute. See
        Interpretation, id. (“ascertainment of a text’s meaning; specif., the

        There, the Sixth Circuit determined that an arbitrator—rather than an admin-
        istrator—had to determine whether the underlying claim was arbitrable. See
        id. at 579–80. But that, too, is a merits issue, quite unlike the administrative
        determination that an arbitration clause violates the forum’s generally appli-
        cable policies.
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        16                         Opinion of the Court                         22-11504

        determination of how a text most ﬁttingly applies to particular
        facts”). Instead, the AAA merely determined that the arbitration
        clause—irrespective of its “enforcement, interpretation, or valid-
        ity”—violated AAA policies and thus declined to open its forum to
        the parties. The AAA’s determination thus falls outside the delega-
        tion clause’s purview.
               Second, Resorts points to the conﬂicts clause, which states
        that “in the event of any conﬂict between the AAA Rules and this
        Agreement, the provisions of this Agreement shall be controlling.”
        Under that provision, Resorts says, the contract requires the AAA
        to administer the arbitration according to the agreements’ terms.
        But the AAA isn’t a party to the contract. And, at least in this con-
        text, we can say it “goes without saying that a contract cannot bind
        a nonparty.” E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002).
        So Resorts’ argument—as with any that would force an entity to
        adhere to a contract it never agreed to—is a non-starter. 6
                                                c

                Finally, Resorts assails the generality of AAA’s determination
        that it was out of compliance. The AAA, Resorts insists, was re-
        quired to specify precisely which policies it had violated. The rea-
        son, we’re told, is that while the AAA administrator can make

        6 To be clear, our analysis is based in part on the fact that we aren’t considering

        a record where a nonsignatory is seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement.
        Cf. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 632 (2009) (“[A] litigant who
        was not a party to the relevant arbitration agreement may invoke § 3 if the
        relevant state contract law allows him to enforce the agreement.”).
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        22-11504                  Opinion of the Court                             17

        “empirical” determinations—like, say, whether required ﬁling fees
        have been paid—it cannot make “subjective” determinations of the
        sort that would underlie a conclusion that a party was out of com-
        pliance with AAA policy. See Oral Arg. at 14:53–15:07.

               We disagree. According to the Consumer Arbitration Rules,
        the AAA is empowered to make all policy-compliance determina-
        tions. Rule 12, in particular, explains that the AAA vets arbitration
        clauses for “material compliance with due process standards” up
        front, long before an arbitration petition is ﬁled, fees are paid, or
        an arbitrator is appointed. See Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra at
        16–17. That vetting process covers all arbitration clauses and, so
        far as we can tell, tests for compliance with all AAA policies. Be-
        cause the Consumer Arbitration Rules don’t draw the “empirical”-
        “subjective” distinction that Resorts posits, we won’t either. Again,
        Resorts’ contracts prescribe arbitration in the AAA and in compli-
        ance with the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules. And again,
        those rules, in turn, empower the AAA to answer the “subjective”
        questions that go to whether a party’s arbitration clause complies
        with AAA policies.7

                                              d

             Having concluded that the AAA was empowered to deter-
        mine whether Resorts violated AAA policies, we turn to the

        7 In any event, as already noted, Resorts told the district court that the AAA

        found it noncompliant in two speciﬁc respects: “[T]he AAA declined to ad-
        minister arbitrations because Wyndham’s forum selection clause and damages
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        18                       Opinion of the Court                     22-11504

        question whether the district court erred in concluding that Resorts
        was “in default” within the meaning of Section 3. It did not. In its
        rejection letters to Bedgood and the Brandons, the AAA stated that
        Resorts had “failed to comply with the AAA’s policies.” To be sure,
        the AAA’s determination that Resorts’ arbitration clause violated
        AAA policies wasn’t binding on the district court. The district court
        could have discredited or ignored it. But the court didn’t reversibly
        err in accepting it as the basis for its own conclusion that Resorts
        was “in default with the arbitration proceedings.” That’s especially
        true given that Resorts has made no eﬀort to investigate—let alone
        remedy—its noncompliance before the AAA. See Oral Arg. at 2:56–
        3:48. The district court thus didn’t err in concluding that Resorts
        was in “default” with the AAA.

                                             2
                Resorts next contends that the district court erred in refus-
        ing to direct arbitration in the AAA. Orders staying litigation and
        directing arbitration are “parallel devices.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l
        Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983). Even so, they
        are governed by separate statutory sections and attendant stand-
        ards. Section 4 of the FAA provides that “[a] party aggrieved by the
        alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a
        written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States
        district court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration

        clause were ‘at odds with the AAA’s rules.’” Defendants’ Reply in Support of
        Motion to Compel Arbitration, Doc. 19 at 1–2.
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        22-11504               Opinion of the Court                         19

        proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.” 9 U.S.C.
        § 4. The district court held that Resorts wasn’t a “party aggrieved
        by [any] alleged failure, neglect, or refusal” of plaintiﬀs Bedgood,
        Brandon, and Heil-Brandon, all of whom attempted to arbitrate
        pursuant to their agreements. The court further concluded that
        the plaintiﬀs who hadn’t formally sought to arbitrate didn’t have to
        because their contracts contained nearly identical arbitration
        clauses and, therefore, that their attempts to arbitrate would have
        been “futile.”
               Section 4 prescribes two conditions to relief. They are sepa-
        rate, but they are causally related: ﬁrst, the party resisting arbitra-
        tion must have “fail[ed], neglect[ed], or refus[ed]” to arbitrate; and
        second, the party seeking to direct arbitration must have been “ag-
        grieved” by that failure, neglect, or refusal. See Cmty. State Bank v.
        Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1256 (11th Cir. 2011) (“After all, FAA § 4 is
        only triggered when one party has expressed a ‘refusal’[, failure, or
        neglect] to arbitrate, and the other party has been thereby ‘ag-
        grieved.’” (emphasis added)).
               The plaintiﬀs who had contracts with Resorts are properly
        sorted into two groups: (1) Bedgood, Brandon, and Heil-Brandon,
        who petitioned the AAA to arbitrate; and (2) Mathews, Smith, and
        Harper who didn’t. With respect to Group (1)—plaintiﬀs who con-
        tracted with Resorts and tried to arbitrate—Resorts isn’t a “[a]
        party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another
        to arbitrate.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. To put the matter plainly, because each
        of the Group (1) plaintiﬀs attempted to arbitrate, there was no
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                   22-11504

        “failure, neglect, or refusal” by which Resorts could have been “ag-
        grieved.” Bedgood and the Brandons ﬁled petitions with the AAA
        to pursue their claims in accordance with their contracts, and their
        actions and representations in this Court evince a genuine desire to
        arbitrate. They were thwarted in that pursuit by Resorts’ own con-
        duct.
               Before us, Resorts asserts that the AAA “will comply with
        any court orders issued from litigation involving the parties to the
        dispute”—the point apparently being that a court need only issue
        an order demanding that the AAA administer the arbitration. But
        Resorts is missing the point. It is ineligible to move to direct arbitra-
        tion under Section 4 because it hasn’t been “aggrieved” by any “fail-
        ure, neglect, or refusal” on the part of Bedgood, Brandon, or Heil-
        Brandon to arbitrate.
                Group (2)—comprising plaintiﬀs who contracted with Re-
        sorts but who didn’t formally seek to arbitrate—presents a closer
        call. Groups (1) and (2) have identical arbitration agreements with
        Resorts. Group (1) received AAA rejection letters expressly stating
        that “[p]rior to the ﬁling of this arbitration, [Resorts] failed to com-
        ply with the AAA’s policies regarding consumer claims” and that,
        “[a]ccordingly, we must decline to administer this claim and any
        other claims between [Resorts] and its consumers at this time . . . .”
        Doc. 1-2 at 2–3 (emphasis added). To be sure, the Group (2) plain-
        tiﬀs “fail[ed], neglect[ed], or refus[ed]” to arbitrate, so the ﬁrst con-
        dition to Section 4 relief is met. But the second, causal condition
        isn’t, because Resorts can’t demonstrate that it has been “thereby
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        22-11504                Opinion of the Court                           21

        aggrieved.” Strong, 651 F.3d at 1256. To the extent that Resorts is
        aggrieved, it was aggrieved either by its own failure to bring its ar-
        bitration clause into compliance with AAA policies or, at the very
        least, by the AAA’s decision to that eﬀect, not the Group (2) plain-
        tiﬀs’ conduct. Without any indication that Resorts has brought or
        intends to bring its arbitration agreements into line with AAA pol-
        icies, it can’t claim to have been “aggrieved” by the Group (2) plain-
        tiﬀs’ failure or refusal to arbitrate.
                                            3
                Resorts separately argues that even if the district court was
        correct to conclude that Resorts couldn’t invoke Sections 3 and 4
        of the FAA, it erred in refusing to appoint a substitute, non-AAA-
        aﬃliated arbitrator under Section 5. We conclude that we lack ju-
        risdiction to consider Resorts’ substitute-arbitrator argument.
                 We’re “generally precluded from hearing interlocutory ap-
        peals under the ﬁnal judgment rule.” Wajnstat v. Oceania Cruises,
        Inc., 684 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Jenkins v. Prime Ins.
        Co., 32 F.4th 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Congress has not given
        us the power to review interlocutory orders at will.”) (quoting Cor-
        ley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 1222, 1231 (11th Cir. 2020)). The FAA
        “carves out exceptions to the general rule allowing review of
        some”—but, importantly, not all—“interlocutory orders.” Hamrick
        v. Partsﬂeet, LLC, 1 F.4th 1337, 1352 (11th Cir. 2021). In particular,
        the FAA provides for immediate appeals of orders “refusing a stay
        of any action under section 3” and those “denying a petition under
        section 4 . . . to order arbitration to proceed.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A–
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        22                         Opinion of the Court                         22-11504

        B). By contrast, the Act says nothing one way or the other about
        whether a party may immediately appeal an order refusing to ap-
        point a substitute arbitrator under Section 5. Because the statute
        speciﬁcally authorizes interlocutory appeals of Section 3 and Sec-
        tion 4 orders but doesn’t mention Section 5 orders, we conclude
        that we lack jurisdiction over the district court’s substitute-arbitra-
        tor decision. See Hamrick, 1 F.4th at 1352. 8
                Nor do we have pendent jurisdiction. “Pendent appellate ju-
        risdiction is present when a nonappealable decision is ‘inextricably
        intertwined’ with the appealable decision or when ‘review of the
        former decision [is] necessary to ensure meaningful review of the
        latter.’” King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 562 F.3d 1374, 1379 (11th Cir.
        2009) (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 51
        (1995)). “Issues are not inextricably intertwined with the question
        on appeal when the appealable issue can be resolved without reach-
        ing the merits of the nonappealable issues.” Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d
        1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
        needn’t resolve the Section 5 issue to reject Resorts’ contentions
        with respect to Sections 3 and 4, both of which are resolvable by

        8 Because this case is already on interlocutory appeal from the district court’s

        order refusing to stay litigation and direct the parties to arbitration, Resorts
        can’t rely on the principle that an appeal from a final judgment brings up all
        interlocutory orders that led to the judgment. See, e.g., Mickles on behalf of her-
        self v. Country Club Inc., 887 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2018).
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        22-11504               Opinion of the Court                         23

        reference to statutory language and the AAA Consumer Arbitra-
        tion Rules alone.
                                          4
                Finally, Resorts argues that the district court erred in deter-
        mining the question of arbitrability rather than referring that issue
        to an arbitrator—as, it says, our decision Attix v. Carrington Mortg.
        Servs., LLC, 35 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2022), required it to. In partic-
        ular, Resorts seems to contend that an arbitrator should have de-
        cided the arbitrability of the plaintiﬀs’ underlying breach-of-con-
        tract and fraudulent-inducement claims, as well as (perhaps) the
        arbitration agreement’s enforceability. Even if Resorts properly
        presented that argument in the district court—we’re dubious—the
        argument fails because the district court didn’t need to, and didn’t,
        decide the arbitrability issue.

               The district court never decided whether the arbitrability
        question was itself arbitrable. Instead, it decided the case on
        threshold procedural grounds. Attix was very diﬀerent in that im-
        portant respect. It held that the parties had unmistakably delegated
        “the arbitrability dispute in th[at] case—i.e., whether the parties’
        agreement to arbitrate Attix’s claims is enforceable under the
        Dodd-Frank Act”—to an arbitrator. Id. at 1293. We thus held that
        “the district court erred in [] deciding whether” the dispute was ar-
        bitrable under the Dodd-Frank Act. Id. at 1289. The court should
        have stopped, we said, at deciding who was empowered to decide
        the arbitrability question.
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11504

                The district court here, by contrast, never determined
        whether the plaintiﬀs’ breach-of-contract and fraudulent-induce-
        ment claims were arbitrable, nor did it resolve those claims on the
        merits. Nor, for that matter, did the court opine on the “enforce-
        ment, interpretation or validity of [the parties’] [a]greement” more
        generally. Thus, it never decided whether the arbitrability of the
        claims themselves or the agreement’s enforceability was a question
        for arbitration. Indeed, the district court had no reason to decide
        the arbitrability issue because it answered antecedent questions
        about (1) “whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the claims at is-
        sue” and (2) “whether legal constraints external to the parties’
        agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims.” As to the
        ﬁrst question, it held that the parties had agreed to arbitrate the
        underlying dispute. And as to the second, it found that the AAA
        had closed its doors to the purchasers because of Resorts’ refusal
        to comply with AAA policies. The district court thus held on pro-
        cedural grounds that the defendants couldn’t avail themselves of
        the FAA’s tools, and it accordingly directed the parties to litigation.
        Attix is inapplicable here.

                                       * * *
                For the foregoing reasons, we aﬃrm the district court’s de-
        nial of Resorts’ motion to stay litigation and direct arbitration as to
        plaintiﬀs Bedgood, Brandon, Heil-Brandon, Mathews, Smith, and
        Harper. These plaintiﬀs may proceed to litigation of their claims
        against Resorts.
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        22-11504               Opinion of the Court                        25

                                          B

               Development and WorldMark raise the same four issues as
        Resorts: The district court, they contend, erred in (1) relying on
        the AAA’s determination that the defendants were out of compli-
        ance with the AAA’s policies to conclude that they were “in default”
        within the meaning of FAA Section 3, (2) refusing to direct arbitra-
        tion under Section 4, (3) declining to appoint a substitute arbitrator
        under Section 5, and (4) determining the arbitrability of the under-
        lying claims and/or the arbitration agreement’s enforceability.

               The district court lumped all three Wyndham-related de-
        fendants together, holding that their noncompliance with AAA pol-
        icies precluded them from invoking the FAA’s procedural protec-
        tions. But we conclude that the court painted with too broad a
        brush. Although common sense suggests that the AAA would re-
        ject Diaz’s and Clark’s claims against Development and WorldMark
        on the same grounds that it rejected Bedgood’s, Brandon’s, and
        Heil-Brandon’s claims against Resorts, there is no solid evidence to
        that eﬀect. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order regard-
        ing Development and WorldMark and remand for proceedings, re-
        garding those two defendants, consistent with this opinion.

                                          1

               For reasons already explained, the AAA had the authority to
        determine whether Development and WorldMark were out of
        compliance with its policies, and the district court was entitled to
        rely on that determination to conclude that those entities were “in
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11504

        default” within the meaning of Section 3 of the FAA. See supra at
        11–18. As it pertains to Development and WorldMark, though, we
        conclude that the district court’s determination to that eﬀect lacks
        a suﬃcient foundation, at least on the current record.

               To determine whether a party has defaulted for Section 3
        purposes, a court must “decide if, under the totality of the circum-
        stances, the party has acted inconsistently with the arbitration
        right.” Ivax Corp. v. B. Braun of Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 1309, 1315–16
        (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Diaz and Clark
        are the only two plaintiﬀs who have a contract with Development
        and WorldMark. Neither of them sought to arbitrate before ﬁling
        suit in federal court. The district court inferred that the AAA
        would likely reject Diaz’s and Clark’s arbitration petition because it
        had declined to administer “any other claims between [Resorts] and
        its consumers at this time.” Invoking futility, the district court held
        that Diaz and Clark could proceed straight to litigation.
               The problem, we think, is that on this record, it’s not clear
        that Development and WorldMark have acted inconsistently with
        the arbitration right. The AAA rejected present and future claims
        only against Resorts. It said nothing about claims against Develop-
        ment and WorldMark. And that diﬀerence matters. To be sure,
        Resorts, Development, and WorldMark use similar arbitration
        clauses, but they aren’t identical. And to be sure, the companies
        are aﬃliated with one another, but they maintain separate corpo-
        rate identities. Accordingly, there is no deﬁnitive indication in the
        record that the AAA actually determined that Development and
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        22-11504               Opinion of the Court                         27

        WorldMark had violated AAA policies as relevant to these plaintiﬀs.
        Although it’s tempting to assume, as the district court seemed to,
        that the AAA would reject Diaz’s and Clark’s petition against De-
        velopment and WorldMark, there is no evidentiary basis—in the
        form, say, of an actual rejection letter—to conclude that those two
        entities are in default as to Diaz and Clark. In contrast to Resorts’
        failure to investigate or remedy its noncompliance after the AAA’s
        rejection, Development’s and WorldMark’s actions have thus far
        apparently evinced a willingness to arbitrate.

               Given the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the liberal enforce-
        ment of arbitration agreements, see, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S.
        at 626 (“[A]s with any other contract, the parties’ intentions con-
        trol, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of
        arbitrability.”), we conclude that the district court erred in denying
        Development and WorldMark’s motion to stay litigation under Sec-
        tion 3 on the present record.
                                          2
                For similar reasons, we hold that Development and
        WorldMark are “part[ies] aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect,
        or refusal of another to arbitrate” under Section 4 of the FAA. 9
        U.S.C. § 4. As we’ve explained, to obtain relief under Section 4, a
        movant must show (1) that the party resisting arbitration must have
        “fail[ed], neglect[ed], or refus[ed]” to arbitrate and (2) that the mo-
        vant was “aggrieved” by that failure, neglect, or refusal. Neither
        Diaz nor Clark attempted to arbitrate in accordance with their con-
        tracts, so the ﬁrst condition is clearly satisﬁed. And because there’s
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        28                         Opinion of the Court                       22-11504

        no hard evidence in this record that the AAA would refuse to con-
        sider Diaz’s and Clark’s claims against Development and
        WorldMark, those entities can be said to be aggrieved by Diaz’s and
        Clark’s failure to arbitrate, thus satisfying the second condition.
                Accordingly, on the current record, we conclude that the dis-
        trict court erred in denying Development and WorldMark’s motion
        to compel arbitration under Section 4. 9
                                               3
               Perhaps anticipating the AAA’s possible rejection, Develop-
        ment and WorldMark next argue that the district court erred in re-
        fusing to appoint a substitute arbitrator per Section 5 of the FAA.

        9 Even after supplemental briefing, it remains unclear to us exactly how Re-

        sorts, Development, and WorldMark relate to one another—and, in particu-
        lar, whether Development falls, as we think Resorts plainly does, under the
        “Wyndham Destinations” umbrella. On the one hand, Development and Re-
        sorts are separate legal entities, and neither Diaz nor Clark has sought to arbi-
        trate his or her claims, respectively, against Development in the AAA. On the
        other hand, the Brandons’ AAA rejection letter “declined to administer this
        claim and any other claims between Wyndham Destinations and its consumers.”
        “Wyndham Destinations” is the “general trade name for Travel + Leisure Co’s
        timeshare business,” Travel + Leisure Co. is Development’s parent company,
        and Development’s and Resorts’ arbitration clauses are nearly identical. Based
        on our read of the parties’ supplemental briefing, it appears to us that Devel-
        opment might be properly looped in with Resorts by way of the AAA’s rejec-
        tion letter regarding “Wyndham Destinations,” but we have no firm record
        evidence to that effect. Accordingly, we will remand to the district court for
        proceedings consistent with this opinion, in part to clear up Development’s
        relationship to Resorts and Wyndham Destinations and determine how that
        relationship might affect Development’s ability to avail itself of Sections 3 and
        4 of the FAA.
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        22-11504               Opinion of the Court                         29

        As already explained, we conclude that we lack appellate jurisdic-
        tion to consider this issue. See supra at 21–23.
                                          4
                Finally, Development and WorldMark’s argument that the
        district court erroneously determined the arbitrability of Diaz’s
        and Clark’s underlying claims and the enforceability of the con-
        tract—rather than, they say, leaving that issue to an arbitrator—
        fails for the same reason that Resorts’ identical argument did: The
        district court never decided the arbitrability question; rather, it re-
        jected Development and WorldMark’s motion on threshold proce-
        dural grounds. See supra at 23–24. We needn’t say anything more.
                                          III
                Given the FAA’s text, we cannot say that the district court
        erred in concluding that Resorts’ refusal to comply with the AAA’s
        generally applicable policies disqualiﬁed it from seeking a stay of
        litigation or an order directing the parties to arbitration. But the
        court’s decision swept too broadly. Absent rejection letters (or
        other record evidence) directed to Development and WorldMark
        of the sort we have for Resorts, or a demonstrated evidentiary con-
        nection between the defendants, we cannot currently discern—at
        least on the record as it exists before us—a suﬃcient basis for refus-
        ing similar relief to those entities.
               Therefore, as to plaintiﬀs Bedgood, Brandon, Heil-Brandon,
        Mathews, Smith, and Harper, all of whom had contract with Re-
        sorts, we AFFIRM. With respect to plaintiﬀs Diaz and Clark, who
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        30                 Opinion of the Court              22-11504

        had contracts with Development and WorldMark, we VACATE
        AND REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN
        PART.