Court Opinion

ID: 9840674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 19:05:12.73987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:00:01.956851
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/19/23 P. v. Stelly CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
  Plaintiff and Respondent,                              A166281

v.                                                       (Contra Costa County
                                                         Super. Ct. No. 05001711365)
KAMANI STELLY,
 Defendant and Appellant.

         Kamani Stelly was convicted by a jury of one count of discharging a
firearm at an occupied motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246; all further statutory
references are to this code) (count one) and four counts of attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder of D.R., O.Q., John Doe 1, and John
Doe 21 (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664 (counts two through five), together with related
true findings that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm causing great bodily injury to D.R. and A.W. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d);
(§ 12022.53(d)). This court affirmed the convictions for discharging a firearm
at an occupied motor vehicle (count one) and for the attempted murders of
D.R., O.Q., and John Doe 1 (counts two, three, and four). (People v. Stelly

1    We use initials to protect the victims’ privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).) Two victims were designated in the trial court as
John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 as their identities were unknown.

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(Aug. 16, 2021, A157142) [nonpub. opn.] at pp. 2, 20.) We reversed the
conviction for the attempted murder of John Doe 2 (count five) based on
insufficient evidence, dismissed that count, and remanded for resentencing.
(Id. at p. 2.) In all other respects, we affirmed the judgment. (Ibid.)
      Defendant was initially sentenced to an aggregate term of 37 years to
life, consisting in pertinent part, of five years (middle term) for discharging a
firearm at an occupied motor vehicle, plus 25 years to life on the related
firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(d) (count one), and a
consecutive life term (minimum of 7 years before parole eligibility) for the
attempted murder of D.R. (count two).
      Following our remittitur after defendant’s direct appeal, the
Legislature amended certain Penal Code provisions applicable to sentencing.
Specifically, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1385,
“to specify mitigating circumstances that the trial court should consider when
deciding whether to strike enhancements from a defendant’s sentence in the
interest of justice. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.)” (People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87
Cal.App.5th 9, 16.)2 Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amended
section 654, subdivision (a), by removing the requirement that the trial court
must impose the longest term among several possible prison terms imposed
for a single act or occasion. (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.)
      At resentencing, defendant asserted that under People v. Tirado (2022)
12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado), the court had the discretionary authority to strike
the section 12022.53(d) enhancement related to count one, and, in its place,
impose a shorter term under either section 12022.53, subdivision (b)

2     Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature amended section 1385 so that
the mitigating circumstances now appear in subdivision (c)(2). (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 15.)

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(§ 12022.53(b)) or subdivision (c) (§ 12022.53(c)), as a lesser uncharged
enhancement.
      While the court refused to dismiss the section 12022.53(d)
enhancement under section 1385 (finding dismissal would endanger the
public safety), it did not impose the consecutive mandatory 25-years-to-life
term for the section 12022.53(d) enhancement. Rather, the court resentenced
defendant to a reduced aggregate term of 32 years to life, consisting in
pertinent part, of five years for discharging a firearm at an occupied motor
vehicle, plus 20 years for an enhancement under section 12022.53(c), as a
lesser uncharged enhancement under section 12022.53(d) (count one), and a
consecutive life term (minimum of 7 years before parole eligibility) for the
attempted murder of D.R. (count two).
                                 DISCUSSION
      Defendant filed a notice of appeal and his appellate counsel filed a brief
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). After
independently reviewing the record pursuant to our obligation under Wende,
we asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing: (1) whether
the trial court had imposed an unauthorized sentence with respect to count
one; and (2) if the sentence were unauthorized, what would be the
appropriate disposition.
I. Trial Court Imposed Unauthorized Sentence on Count One
      The Attorney General argues, and we concur, that the trial court
imposed an unauthorized sentence on count one by imposing a 20-year term
under section 12022.53(c) as a lesser uncharged enhancement of
section 12022.53(d); this is because the jury’s true finding under
section 12022.53(d) does not include a true finding under section 12022.53(c)
where, as here, the section 12022.53(d) enhancement was added to a charge

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under section 246. (See Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p.700, fn. 12.) Having
refused to dismiss the section 12022.53(d) enhancement, the court was
mandated to impose a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the
section 12022.53(d) enhancement related to count one.
      Section 12022.53 sets forth escalating additional and consecutive
penalties, beyond that imposed for a substantive crime, for the use of a
firearm in the commission of specified felonies. (Id., subds. (a)–(d).)
Section 12022.53(a) lists the felonies to which the section applies.
Section 12022.53(b) mandates the imposition of a 10-year term for the
personal use of a firearm in the commission of one of the subdivision (a)
felonies; section 12022.53(c) mandates the imposition of a 20-year term for
the personal and intentional discharge of a firearm in the commission of one
of the subdivision (a) felonies; and section 12022.53(d) mandates a 25-years-
to-life term for the personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing
great bodily injury or death to a person other than an accomplice in the
commission of either one of the subdivision (a) felonies, felonies specified in
section 246, or felonies specified in subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 26100.
Section 12022.53, subdivision (h) (§ 12022.53(h)) authorizes a trial court “to
strike or dismiss an enhancement required to be imposed by this section.”
Section 12022.53, subdivision (j) (§ 12022.53(j)) authorizes the imposition of
sentence of any section 12022.53 enhancement.
      In Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688, our Supreme Court found as a general
rule that when a “court determines that [a] section 12022.53(d) enhancement
should be struck or dismissed under section 12022.53(h), the court may,
under section 12022.53(j), impose an enhancement under section 12022.53(b)
or (c).” (Tirado, at p. 700, fn. omitted.) This general rule “only applies when
a true finding under section 12022.53(d) necessarily includes a true finding

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under section 12022.53(b) or (c). That would not be the case if a
section 12022.53(d) enhancement were added to a charge under section 246
. . . or under subdivisions (c) or (d) of section 26100 . . . . Those offenses are
not ‘specified in subdivision (a),’ as required for imposition of an
enhancement under section 12022.53(b) or (c).” (Tirado, at p. 700, fn. 12.)
      Because count one is a conviction for discharging a firearm at an
occupied motor vehicle under section 246, the general rule in Tirado does not
apply and the trial court was not authorized to impose a term of 20 years
pursuant to section 12022.53(c) for the related enhancement. The parties
disagree as to the appropriate remedy.
II.   Case is Remanded for Reconsideration of Sentence
      Defendant urges us to affirm the trial court’s sentence on count one on
the basis that applying section 12022.53 as interpreted in Tirado, supra, 12
Cal.5th at page 700, footnote 12, and applied in this case, would violate his
federal and state constitutional guarantees of equal protection. The Attorney
General urges us to reinstate the section 12022.53(d) enhancement on the
basis that (1) there is no merit to defendant’s constitutional claims, and (2)
remand for resentencing is not necessary because this court may correct the
unauthorized sentence by reinstating the stricken section 12022.53(d)
enhancement since the trial court already ruled that striking that
enhancement is not consistent with public safety.
      Alternately, defendant argues that if this court finds section 12022.53
to be constitutional, the sentence should be reversed and the matter
remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to consider
whether to strike the section 12022.53(d) enhancement and, in its place,
impose a 10-year term under section 12022.5, subdivision (a) (§12022.5(a)), as
a lesser uncharged enhancement. As the Attorney General correctly notes,

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with exceptions not applicable here, section 12022.5(a) “does not apply if
firearm use is an element of the underlying offense.” Therefore, as to the
count one charge of discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle under
section 246, the trial court could not strike the section 12022.53(d)
enhancement and impose a section 12022.5(a) enhancement. (People v.
Kramer (2002) 29 Cal.4th 720, 723, fn. 2.)
      We shall reverse and remand to allow the trial court to reconsider
resentencing in its entirety. As we have concluded, the trial court imposed an
unauthorized term of 20 years pursuant to section 12022.53(c) as a lesser
uncharged enhancement of the section 12022.53(d) enhancement related to
count one. (Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 700, fn. 12; see People v. Scott
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [“legal error resulting in an unauthorized sentence
commonly occurs where the court violates mandatory provisions governing
the length of confinement”].) Indeed, the trial court issued conflicting
decisions by initially refusing to dismiss the section 12202.53(d) enhancement
under section 1385, but then apparently deciding that imposing the
consecutive mandatory 25-years-to-life term for that enhancement was not
appropriate.
      In making its sentencing choices, the court “ ‘undoubtedly considered
the overall prison term to be imposed and was influenced in its choices by the
length of the enhancements.’ ” (People v. Stevens (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1452,
1457; see People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1258.) We therefore
conclude that a reconsideration of the sentence in its entirety is required as
the court’s sentence on count one “ ‘necessarily’ ” infected the imposed
aggregate term. (People v. Burns (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1183 [the
aggregate prison term cannot be viewed “ ‘as a series of separate independent

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terms, but rather must be viewed as one prison term made up of
interdependent components’ ”].)
      Our decision should not be read as expressing an opinion as to how the
trial court should exercise its discretionary authority at resentencing or its
consideration of defendant’s constitutional challenges to section 12022.53(d).
                                  DISPOSITION
      The August 12, 2022 resentencing order is reversed and the matter is
remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

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                                _________________________
                                Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

A166281/People v. Stelly

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