Court Opinion

ID: 9889402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 14:00:54.631221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:11.225551
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1818   Document: 23     Page: 1    Filed: 10/10/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                   LARRY GOLDEN,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

            QUALCOMM INCORPORATED,
                 Defendant-Appellee
               ______________________

                       2023-1818
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Northern District of California in No. 4:22-cv-03283-HSG,
 Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr.
                  ______________________

                Decided: October 10, 2023
                 ______________________

    LARRY GOLDEN, Greenville, SC, pro se.

     JOHN ALLEN YATES, Patterson & Sheridan LLP, Hou-
 ston, TX, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
 KYRIE CAMERON.
                 ______________________

    Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
Case: 23-1818    Document: 23      Page: 2    Filed: 10/10/2023

 2                       GOLDEN v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED

     Larry Golden appeals from an order of the United
 States District Court for the Northern District of California
 dismissing his antitrust, patent infringement, and unjust
 enrichment claims. Golden v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 22-CV-
 03283, 2023 WL 2530857 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2023) (“Deci-
 sion”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
     Golden owns various patents directed to systems for
 locking, unlocking, or disabling a lock upon the detection of
 chemical, radiological, or biological hazards. The specific
 patents at issue in this case are U.S. Patents 9,589,439
 (“the ’439 patent”), 9,096,189 (“the ’189 patent”),
 10,163,287 (“the ’287 patent”), 10,984,619 (“the ’619 pa-
 tent”). Appellant’s Br. at 2. On several previous occasions,
 Golden has unsuccessfully asserted infringement of those
 patents against other defendants. See, e.g., Golden v. Apple
 Inc., No. 2023-1161, 2023 WL 3400595 (Fed. Cir. May 12,
 2023); Golden v. Intel Corp., No. 2023-1257, 2023 WL
 3262948 (Fed. Cir. May 5, 2023); Golden v. United States,
 No. 2022-1196, 2022 WL 4103287 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2022).
     Golden filed the present suit against Qualcomm Inc.
 (“Qualcomm”) on June 6, 2022. The district court inter-
 preted the complaint, which included nearly 1,200 pages of
 attachments, as alleging (1) patent infringement, (2) anti-
 trust violations, and (3) unjust enrichment. Decision at *2.
 After Qualcomm moved to dismiss Golden’s complaint for
 failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
 Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court granted the mo-
 tion without leave to amend. Decision at *4. Golden ap-
 peals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
                         DISCUSSION
     This court applies the law of the regional circuit when
 reviewing a motion to dismiss. In re Bill of Lading Trans-
 mission & Processing Sys. Pat. Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1331
 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit reviews challenges to
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 GOLDEN v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED                             3

 a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
 de novo. Decker v. Advantage Fund, Ltd., 362 F.3d 593, 595
 (9th Cir. 2004).
     Rule 12(b)(6) requires “well-pleaded facts, not legal
 conclusions, that plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
 relief.” Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d 1173, 1176
 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).
     Because Golden appeals the district court’s dismissal
 as to each of his (1) patent infringement, (2) antitrust vio-
 lation, and (3) unjust enrichment claims, we discuss each
 issue in turn.
                               I
     Regarding patent infringement, although a plaintiff
 “need not prove its case at the pleading stage” and “is not
 required to plead infringement on an element-by-element
 basis,” it “cannot assert a plausible claim for infringement
 under the Iqbal/Twombly standard by reciting the claim el-
 ements and merely concluding that the accused product
 has those elements.” Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4
 F.4th 1342, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (internal citations
 and quotations omitted).
     The district court here found that Golden failed to ade-
 quately plead (1) direct infringement, (2) contributory in-
 fringement, or (3) induced infringement. Decision at *3.
     Concerning direct infringement, the district court
 faulted Golden for failing to explain what Qualcomm prod-
 uct supposedly infringed the asserted patents, or how. Id.
 Although the complaint did include two claim charts, the
 district court found those irrelevant as they only covered
 products produced by two non-parties, GM and Samsung,
 not Qualcomm. Id.
    On appeal, Golden argues that he “illustrates how
 Qualcomm is infringing Plaintiff’s patented . . . devices”
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 4                         GOLDEN v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED

 and provides several technical specification tables and fig-
 ures relating to Qualcomm’s “Snapdragon” chipset. Appel-
 lant’s Br. at 11–26. Qualcomm responds that Golden added
 new factual allegations in his opposition and reply brief at
 the district court, as well as in his opening brief on appeal,
 that were not included in his district court complaint. Ap-
 pellee’s Br. at 23. Qualcomm further argues that even if
 those belated arguments are considered, they still do not
 state a plausible direct infringement claim. Id.
     We agree with the district court that Golden’s com-
 plaint failed to sufficiently plead a claim for direct infringe-
 ment. It failed to clearly identify which specific claims of
 the asserted patents are being infringed. Furthermore,
 Golden’s complaint failed to clearly identify which Qual-
 comm products infringe the asserted patents. To the ex-
 tent that references in the complaint can be read to imply
 that Qualcomm’s “phone for Snapdragon Insiders” and/or
 “Snapdragon Ride Platform” are the alleged infringing
 products, S.A. 40–42, the complaint did not adequately ex-
 plain how those products infringe the asserted patent
 claims. As the district court noted, Golden included two
 claim charts in his complaint. Decision at *3. However,
 these claim charts only reference products made by two
 non-parties, GM and Samsung, not products made by Qual-
 comm, the accused infringer in this case.
     Golden argues that the claim charts in this complaint
 are enough to adequately plead patent infringement be-
 cause they “mirror” a claim chart presented in a previous
 case, Golden v. Apple Inc., No. 2022-1229, 2022 WL
 4103285 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2022). Appellant’s Br. at 2.
 However, Golden’s complaint contains no such reliance on
 that previous claim chart, neither directly nor through in-
 corporation by reference. Such a reference on appeal is im-
 proper, as a complaint must include “enough facts to state
 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550
 U.S. at 570.
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 GOLDEN v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED                             5

     Moreover, Golden v. Apple Inc. provides no help in this
 context because this court explicitly stated there that “[w]e
 express no opinion as to the adequacy of the complaint or
 claim chart except that it is not facially frivolous.” Golden
 v. Apple Inc., No. 2022-1229, 2022 WL 4103285, at *2 (Fed.
 Cir. Sept. 8, 2022). We made clear that “the district court
 should allow the complaint to be filed and request service
 of process;” however, “[o]ur decision [did] not preclude sub-
 sequent motions to dismiss by the defendant for failure to
 state a claim.” Id. We thus agree with the district court
 that Golden failed to adequately plead direct infringement
 by Qualcomm or its customers, as his complaint does not
 include allegations beyond the identity of the defendant,
 implied references to the alleged infringing devices, and
 the alleged infringed-upon patents. 1 Decision at *2–3; see
 also Golden v. Apple, No. 20-cv-04353, 2021 WL 5074739
 at *2, aff'd as to that holding, No. 22-1229, 2022 WL
 4103285 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2022).
     Because Golden has failed to adequately plead direct
 infringement by Qualcomm or its customers in this case,
 his complaint also fails to sufficiently plead contributory or
 induced infringement. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
 Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972). We thus agree with

     1    For the first time in this case, in a supplemental
 appendix attached to his Appellant’s Reply Brief, Golden
 included a claim chart mapping features of Qualcomm’s
 Snapdragon phone to limitations in specific claims of the
 asserted patents. Appellant’s Reply Brief Appendix at 85–
 92. Such a submission is untimely and will not be consid-
 ered. A complaint must include “enough facts to state a
 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550
 U.S. at 570; see also Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am.,
 975 F.2d 815, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“We generally will not
 consider issues that were not presented in the district
 court.” (internal citations omitted)).
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 6                        GOLDEN v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED

 the district court that “[Golden] fails to plausibly or ade-
 quately plead patent infringement.” Decision at *2.
                               II
     A party seeking to bring a private antitrust action must
 establish antitrust injury. American Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. Gen.
 Tel. Co. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1051, 1054 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1999);
 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110
 n.5 (1986). To plead antitrust injury, a party must allege
 that it suffered the suffered the type of injury that anti-
 trust laws were designed to prevent. American Ad Mgmt.,
 190 F.3d at 1055, 1057. The Supreme Court has identified
 five factors for determining whether a plaintiff who has
 borne an injury has antitrust standing: (1) the nature of
 the plaintiff’s alleged injury; that is, whether or not it was
 the type the antitrust laws were intended to forestall, (2)
 the directness of the injury, (3) the speculative measure of
 the harm, (4) the risk of duplicative recovery, and (5) the
 complexity in apportioning damages. Id. at 1054 (summa-
 rizing the factors identified in Associated Gen. Contractors
 of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
 459 U.S. 519 (1983)). Although no single factor is disposi-
 tive, id. at 1055 (citing R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Ther-
 mogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139, 146 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc)),
 the injured party must “be a participant in the same mar-
 ket as the alleged malefactors,” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc.,
 772 F.2d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Associated Gen.
 Contractors, 459 U.S. at 538–39).
     The district court found Golden’s antitrust claims to be
 frivolous based on his failure to plead antitrust standing.
 Decision at *2. The court found that Golden did not allege
 that he is a participant in the same market as Qualcomm
 or that he suffered antitrust injury in that market. Id. Ra-
 ther, the court found that Golden failed to allege the con-
 tours of the relevant market whatsoever. Id.
     On appeal, Golden argues that the district court misin-
 terpreted his antitrust injury claim by discounting the
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 GOLDEN v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED                              7

 evidentiary value provided by Federal Trade Commission
 v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 675 (N.D. Cal.
 2019), rev’d and vacated, 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2020) re-
 garding a running royalty rate charged by Qualcomm. Ap-
 pellant’s Br. at 5–6. Golden also argues that the district
 court did not give adequate weight to his “tying” arrange-
 ment arguments. Id. at 7. Qualcomm responds that (1)
 Golden’s antitrust claims are time-barred, (2) Golden failed
 to adequately plead his participation in the same market
 as Qualcomm, and (3) Golden failed to adequately plead in-
 jury suffered in that market. Appellee’s Br. at 14–18.
     Although Golden’s complaint contains general allega-
 tions that Qualcomm’s activities “substantially affected the
 flow of interstate commerce,” S.A. 23, it fails to allege that
 Golden is a participant in the same market as Qualcomm.
 In fact, Golden’s complaint seems to allege that he is not a
 participant in the same market as Qualcomm. S.A. 36
 (“Qualcomm’s anticompetitive practices has [sic] re-
 strained Plaintiff from entering the market to collect roy-
 alties on his patented inventions.”). Moreover, Golden’s
 complaint fails to adequately address his injury’s direct-
 ness, speculative nature, or complexity in apportioning
 damages. Instead, the complaint alleges injury only in a
 conclusory fashion. See, e.g., S.A. 36 (“Qualcomm's anti-
 competitive practices has [sic] restrained Plaintiff from en-
 tering the market to collect royalties on his patented
 inventions. Plaintiff is entitled to collect damages for any
 unlicensed use of his inventions. Damages are generally
 calculated based on lost profits Plaintiff suffered as a result
 of the use.”). Although Golden’s complaint seems to refer-
 ence patent infringement as the purported injury in this
 way, we have determined that Golden failed to properly
 plead patent infringement, supra.
      To the extent that Golden attempts to premise his an-
 titrust claim on a barrier to entry, we agree with the dis-
 trict court that this is “fatally implausible,” as Golden “is
 free to license his patents to whoever wants to license
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 8                        GOLDEN v. QUALCOMM INCORPORATED

 them, but [Golden’s conclusory] theory does not state a vi-
 able antitrust claim.” Decision at *2. Golden’s arguments
 on appeal explaining the limited relevance of a district
 court case that was subsequently reversed and vacated,
 and clarifying his tying claim, do not remedy the insuffi-
 ciency of his pleading. We thus agree with the district
 court that Golden has failed to plausibly plead an antitrust
 claim.
                              III
      Based on Golden’s failure to state a claim for patent
 infringement, the district court held that he also failed to
 state a claim for unjust enrichment. This court has recog-
 nized that “unjust enrichment is not recognized under Cal-
 ifornia law as a separate cause of action.” Golden v. Intel
 Corp., No. 2023-1257, 2023 WL 3262948, at *2 n.3 (Fed.
 Cir. May 5, 2023) (citing McBride v. Boughton, 123 Cal.
 App. 4th 379, 387 (2004)). Because Golden failed to ade-
 quately plead patent infringement, we agree with the dis-
 trict court that he also failed to state plausible a claim for
 unjust enrichment.
                         CONCLUSION
     We have considered Golden’s remaining arguments but
 find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the or-
 der of the district court is affirmed.
                         AFFIRMED