Court Opinion

ID: 9738541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:55:50.858431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:06.827337
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING IN PART AND CONCURRING IN PART
Buchanan, C. J.
Recent cases, such as Sansom v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 33, 366 N.E.2d 1171; Candler v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 440, 363 N.E.2d *3191233; Hudson v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 302, 354 N.E.2d 164; Swininger v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 136, 352 N.E.2d 473, and like authority on which the majority rely, appear to be in conflict with other well established, traditional principles of criminal law repeatedly recognized by the Indiana Supreme Court.
The majority have “merged”1 theft into conspiracy in this case; in Coleman v. State (1975), 264 Ind. 64, 339 N.E.2d 51, auto banditry was merged into armed robbery; in Swininger v. State, supra, armed robbery was merged into inflicting injury in the commission of a felony; in Sansom v. State, supra, theft and auto banditry were merged into burglary; in Candler v. State, supra, armed robbery was merged into felony murder. The result in each of these cases has been that the defendant has been freed of punishment for an offense he has committed because it arose out of the same transaction — even though the lesser crime was not a necessarily included offense.
Although the sentences would usually run concurrently,2 the fact that more than one sentence is imposed could have significant impact on the offender. For one thing, though good time is based on the longest sentence imposed, a parole board could be influenced by the fact that the offender is serving more than one sentence at the time he comes up for parole. More importantly, all the convictions count for the purpose of determining habitual offender status should the offender be convicted of another felony.
Marching under the banner of “merger” from time to time have been various concepts: indivisibility, separate offenses,3 necessarily lesser included offenses, separate but related offenses, and former jeopardy. By virtue of one or more of these concepts offenses arising out of the same criminal transaction or set of operative facts “merge” into the of*320fense for which the greatest penalty is provided. See, e.g. Sansomv. State, supra.
This is so if the separate offenses are all part of the same continuous event, if the conduct involved arises “from but one set of operative circumstances”, or if the conduct is not “independently supportable, separate, and distinct”. Thompson v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 587, 592, 290 N.E.2d 724, 727. Candler v. State, supra; Swininger v. State, supra. The concern appears to be that an accused may suffer multiple punishment for the same offense.
Such an approach seems to me to nullify long standing Indiana statutes creating separate offenses for such crimes as conspriacy and automobile banditry,4 to say nothing of equally long standing case law that separate offenses may arise out of the same course of continuing conduct because proof of different facts is required for each statutory offense charged. See Dunkle v. State (1961), 241 Ind. 548, 173 N.E.2d 657; Steffler v. State (1952), 230 Ind. 557, 104 N.E.2d 729; Kokenes v. State (1938), 213 Ind. 476, 13 N.E.2d 524; Durke v. State (1932), 204 Ind. 370, 183 N.E.2d 97; Buckley v. State, supra.
In determining whether a defendant has been subjected to former jeopardy (one aspect of which bars multiple punishments for the same offense) the Supreme Court expressly rejected the “same transaction” test and adopted the “identity of offense” test. Ford v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 516, 98 N.E.2d 655; Foran v. State (1924), 195 Ind. 55, 144 N.E. 529; State v. Elder (1879), 65 Ind. 282. The court in Ford, in discussing the proper test with respect to former jeopardy stated the identity of offense test to be:
Appellant seems to argue in his brief that this was the same trans*321action. If appellant is claiming that the “same transaction” test should be applied, this test was expressly repudiated in State v. Elder (1879), 65 Ind. 282; Foran v. State, supra. The test to be applied on the issue of former jeopardy is whether the second charge is for the same identical crime as that charged by a prior affidavit or indictment upon which a defendant has been placed in jeopardy. As stated in Foran v. State, supra, in applying the “identity of offense” test, the test is whether, if what is set out in the second indictment had been proved under the first, there could have been a conviction. In other words, would the same evidence be necessary to secure a conviction in the (jase now before us as in the former prosecution? (emphasis supplied)
229 Ind. at 520-21, 98 N.E.2d at 657.
If the “same transaction test” does not apply to the determination of what constitutes a separate offense for purposes of former jeopardy, logically it should not apply to the sentence arising out of that separate claim.
Favoring such logic is the obvious fact that our Supreme Court has merged offenses quite selectively. The unmistakable inference is that the “identity of offense” test has not been abandoned in favor of the “same transaction” test. For example, in Diggs v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 547, 364 N.E.2d 1176, conspiracy to deliver heroin and the actual delivery of heroin were not merged even though the conspiracy occurred at the same time and place as the delivery. In Mitchell v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 656, 366 N.E.2d 183, sentences for entering to commit a felony, rape and robbery were all permitted to stand despite the fact that rape and robbery were the felonies the defendant entered to commit and all took place in one transaction. In Moore v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 270, 369 N.E.2d 628, the court did not merge carrying a gun in violation of the Firearms Act, armed robbery and first degree burglary though all were part of the same continuing event. In a quite recent case, Willis v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 269, 374 N.E.2d 520, first degree burglary and rape were not merged though the burglary was committed with intent to commit the rape.
To use the same transaction test to “merge” sentences of statutory offenses which require proof of different facts, creates the spectre of encouragement of criminal conduct. A crafty criminal can with impunity commit multiple lesser crimes secure in the knowledge they will be *322“merged” into a greater one.5 Surely a greater harm is done society by the burglar who breaks in with intent to steal and who in fact steals than by the burglar who breaks in with intent to steal but changes his mind. Yet under the merger doctrine as it now exists, both would receive the same sentence. By the same token, if the doctrine is systematically applied, burglary could merge with rape; incest with rape; rape with kidnapping (if the kidnapping were committed in order to accomplish the rape), etc.
Until the former jeopardy “identity of offense” test is specifically disowned by our Supreme Court, I must assume it still has vitality, and that the statutes creating separate crimes on proof of additional or different facts are valid as the basis for sentencing a defendant to multiple sentences for multiple offenses arising out of the same transaction. This has been the premise on which prosecuting attorneys, the courts, and the legal profession have operated for many years.
I would affirm the trial court because by statute theft6 is a separate offense requiring proof of additional or different facts from conspiracy7 and therefore does not merge.
In all other respects, I concur with the majority.
Note —Reported at 375 N.E.2d 660.

. Although the Supreme Court has not stated its history, this doctrine apparently traces its origins to the English common law doctrine of merger which called for the merger of misdemeanors into felonies if the same conduct constituted both. See West’s A.I.C. 35-41-4-3, p. 374.

. The general rule in Indiana has been that consecutive sentencing is not permitted unless a specific statute authorizes it. Hawkins et al. v. Jenkins et al. (1978), 268 Ind. 137, 374 N.E.2d 496. However, the new, criminal code leaves the decision of whether or not sentences should run consecutively or concurrently to the trial judge. Ind. Code 35-50-1-2.

. See Buckley v. State (1975), 163 Ind. App. 113, 322 N.E.2d 113, footnotes 5 & 6, p. 116.

. Ind. Code 35-12-2-1 relating to automobile banditry was repealed by Acts 1976, P.L. 148, § 24, effective October 1,1977, and was not recodified.
Ind. Code 35-1-111-1 relating to conspiracy to commit a felony was repealed by Acts 1976, P.L. 148, § 24, effective October 1, 1977. For new law see Ind. Code 35-41-5-2.
Under Ind. Code 35-41-5-3 dealing with multiple convictions a defendant may not be convicted of both a conspiracy and an attempt with respect to the same underlying crime. However, it will be noted that it does not preclude convictions for the commission of a crime and for conspiracy to commit the same underlying crime. For a discussion see West’s A.I.C. 35-41-5-3, p. 519.

. Lesser offenses which are necessarily lesser included offenses have by statute long been treated as merging into the greater offense for purposes of sentencing, and this concept is not questioned. See Ind. Code 35-8-1A-6.

. Ind. Code 35-17-5-3, repealed by Acts 1976, P.L. 148, § 24, effective October 1,1977. For new law see Ind. Code 35-43-4-2.

. Ind. Code 35-1-111-1, repealed by Acts 1976, P.L. 148, § 24, effective October 1,1977. For new law see Ind. Code 35-41-5-2.