Court Opinion

ID: 9523287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:38:19.388084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:49.882166
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in result as to Parts I and II. I fully concur as to Parts III and IV.
With regard to Part I, I agree that the trial court did not err in excluding Pierce's proffered evidence of the victim's sexual history. I do not, however, agree that such exclusion is appropriately premised upon Pierce's failure to comply with the ten-day notice provision of Ind. Evidence Rule 412(b).
In this regard I am in agreement with the discussion of this court in Sallee v. State, 777 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) to the effect that the ten-day notice requirement applies only with respect to evidence sought to be admitted as an exception to the general rule pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-37-4-4(b) (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1998). Although the majority here correctly observes that "[tlo the extent that there is a difference between [The Rape Shield Statute and Evid R. 412], the rule controls," I do not find any difference between the two in the context of the issue before us. Slip op at 6. Evidence Rule 412(a), covering exceptions to the general rule, tracks, virtually verbatim, the exeep-tions as set forth in I.C. § 35-37-4-4 itself, except that the Rule adds one more exception, ie. use of the evidence of a conviction of a crime to impeach under Evidence Rule 609.11
Furthermore, and more importantly, under the cireumstances of this case, it would seem illogical to require compliance with the ten day notice requirement when the *658impetus for attempting to introduce the sexual history evidence did not arise until the trial itself when the State arguably attempted to paint the victim as young and/or sexually naive.
With regard to Part II, I concur but do so with two parenthetical observations. I would first observe that with respect to the matters being appealed, the majority states that the trial court "merged the sexual battery comviction into the criminal deviate conduct conviction." Op. at 650, n. 2 (emphasis supplied). However, although the jury returned a guilty verdict upon the sexual battery charge, the trial court did not enter a judgment of conviction upon that verdict and of course, in its "merger" order, did not sentence Pierce for that crime. See Carter v. State, 750 N.E.2d 778 (Ind.2001). Accordingly, as there was no conviction for sexual battery there is no need to vacate a conviction upon double jeopardy principles.
Secondly, I must respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion, as drawn from our Supreme Court's decision in Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831 (Ind.2002), that there is not a double jeopardy violation unless proof of all of the essential elements of one offense also establish all of the elements of the second offense.
In an opinion of clarification upon rehearing of our decision in Alexander v. State, 768 N.E.2d 971 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). This court held:
"We thus reiterate our holding in Alexander, that the Richardson actual evidence test, as applied by our Supreme Court, has found double jeopardy to be violated where the evidentiary fact(s) establishing one or more elements of one challenged offense establish all of the elements of the second challenged offense. For there to be a double jeopardy violation it is not required that the evidentiary facts establishing all of the elements of one challenged offense also establish all of the essential elements of a second challenged offense. To be sure, if such is the case, double jeopardy has been violated, but that scenario is not the only situation in which double jeopardy prohibitions exist. Both of the offenses being analyzed for double jeopardy purposes must be viewed in the context of the other offense. If the evi-dentiary facts establishing any one or more elements of one of the challenged offenses establishes the essential elements of the second challenged offense, double jeopardy considerations prohibit multiple convictions." 772 N.E.2d 476, 478 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trams. denied.
Be that as it may, I agree that in the case before us the crime of deviate sexual conduct was separate and distinct from the crime of criminal confinement and that the two convictions do not run afoul of double jeopardy protections.
Subject to the above, I concur in the affirmance of Pierce's convictions and the sentences imposed for those crimes.

. It should be noted that Rule 609 concerning impeachment allows evidence of several crimes which have been held to reflect adversely upon the witness's credibility or honesty. The only crime enumerated in Rule 609 which arguably involves the past sexual conduct of the witness is rape. One may meritoriously contend that the additional exception for impeachment purposes does nol in any way dilute the conclusion that in all other respects the ten-day notice provisions of both the Rule and the statute are closely tied to the three exceptions which are found in each.