Court Opinion

ID: 9857213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:02:46.438108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:12.801977
License: Public Domain

Opinion by Judge WALLACE; Dissent by Judge PAEZ.
WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge:
The government appeals from the district court’s order suppressing evidence obtained from the search of Turvin’s vehicle. While Turvin was waiting for a police officer to issue a traffic citation, the officer questioned Turvin about methamphetamine and obtained Turvin’s consent to search his vehicle for contraband. The district court held that the officer’s questions about methamphetamine and request to conduct a search, unsupported by reasonable suspicion, turned an initially reasonable detention into an unconstitutional one and rendered Turvin’s consent involuntary. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 and we reverse.
I.
On the evening of November 20, 2005, Alaska State Trooper Christensen stopped a white pickup truck based on the truck’s unusually loud exhaust, rapid acceleration around a turn involving minor skidding, and driving six miles over the speed limit in snowy conditions. When he approached the truck, which had entered a gas station parking lot, the Trooper observed that neither occupant appeared to be wearing a seatbelt and that the truck’s registration was expired. He asked the occupants for identification; the driver was Sean T. Tur-vin and the occupant was Corina L. Cunningham. The Trooper talked to them for three or four minutes about the violations he had observed and then returned to his police vehicle, where he radioed headquarters to conduct a warrant and license check. The response informed him that Turvin’s driver’s license was current and valid.
About ten minutes after the stop began, while Christensen sat in his vehicle writing out traffic citations, Trooper Powell arrived at the scene. Powell had heard Christensen on the police radio and recognized Turvin’s name because he knew that a “rolling methamphetamine laboratory” had been found in Turvin’s vehicle following a traffic stop earlier that year.
When Powell arrived, he recognized Turvin and Turvin’s truck, and informed Christensen about the prior incident. Christensen then stopped writing out the traffic citations, turned on his tape recorder, and stepped out to speak with Turvin, who was still in his truck. Powell positioned himself at the rear of Turvin’s truck to assist if needed.
Upon approaching the truck, Christensen told Turvin that he knew about the rolling methamphetamine laboratory, which Turvin acknowledged. Christensen then observed something in plain view be*1099hind Turvin’s seat, which Turvin identified as a speaker box. Christensen then asked Turvin if he would mind if Christensen searched his vehicle because the speaker box, Christensen said, “look[ed] very odd.” The conversation was calm and relaxed, and Turvin consented to the search without equivocation.
The search ultimately yielded a sawed-off shotgun 1 inches below the minimum legal length and a small cup containing packages of a crystal substance determined by field test to be methamphetamine. Turvin was placed in custody when the methamphetamine packages were discovered.
Turvin and Cunningham were cited for not wearing seatbelts, and Turvin was cited for his truck’s loud exhaust. Cunningham was arrested based on her proximity to the drugs found in the cup. A search of Cunningham revealed $773 in cash. Later, when police examined the cash at the police station, they found mixed in among the bills a plastic bag containing a substance suspected to be methamphetamine.
Turvin and Cunningham were indicted for conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine. Turvin was also indicted for possession of a prohibited firearm. Turvin filed a motion to suppress, which Cunningham joined, arguing that “the police had no reasonable suspicion for the prolonged detention,” and that Turvin’s consent to the search of his truck was involuntary.
The district court granted Turvin’s motion to suppress, adopting the magistrate judge’s (MJ) recommendation that, though the initial traffic stop was lawful and based on probable cause that a traffic violation had occurred, Christensen “exceeded the scope of the traffic stop” by “investigating] into suspected drug activities beyond the scope of the traffic stop during the time that Turvin was not free to leave.” The MJ and district judge agreed that this investigation violated Turvin’s Fourth Amendment rights as explained by us in United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d 719 (9th Cir.2001). Turvin’s consent to the search, the MJ reasoned, did not render the search lawful because it was obtained during “an extended and an unlawful detention arising from a traffic stop.” The district judge denied the government’s motion for reconsideration and the government timely appealed.
II.
We review for clear error the district court’s underlying findings of fact and de novo the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress. United States v. Miranda-Guerena, 445 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir.2006). The only disputed issue on appeal is whether Christensen violated Turvin’s and Cunningham’s Fourth Amendment rights by asking questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop that unreasonably extended the duration of the initially lawful traffic stop.
A.
Our analysis of the district court decision is based primarily on our recent and on-point decision in United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.2007), which we decided after the district court’s final ruling. In Mendez, we rejected a Fourth Amendment claim despite the fact that police officers in that case had, without reasonable suspicion, asked Mendez questions unrelated to the purpose of an initially lawful traffic stop. Id. at 1081. In so deciding, we acknowledged that the Supreme Court had overruled those portions of Chavez-Valenzuela (the case upon which the district court’s decision was based) that required police officers to have reasonable suspicion to ask questions be*1100yond the scope of a traffic stop. Id. at 1080.
In Mendez, Detectives Jaensson and Bracke had stopped Mendez because his car did not have a license plate or temporary registration tag. Id. at 1078. While Bracke conducted a records check in the patrol car, Jaensson waited at the curb with Mendez and asked him several questions unrelated to his license plate or vehicle registration. Id. at 1078-79. Once Bracke completed the records check, he started back toward the curb to inform Mendez that his temporary registration plate had expired; en route, he overheard Mendez telling Jaensson that he was “trying to get away from the gang life” and that he had spent time in an Illinois prison. Id. at 1079. As he approached the curb, Bracke asked Mendez why he had been imprisoned; Mendez replied that he had been convicted of a weapons violation. Id. Bracke then asked whether Mendez had any weapons in the car and Mendez eventually admitted to having a firearm in the driver’s door handle. Id. The officers arrested Mendez and searched the vehicle, finding a loaded, small caliber, semi-automatic pistol. Id. Mendez moved to suppress the handgun, but the district court denied his motion. Id.
Mendez pled guilty but preserved the right to appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to interrogate him about matters beyond the purpose of the stop and that the officers unreasonably prolonged the stop. Id. We rejected Mendez’s arguments, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005), which held that “mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure” and thus no reasonable suspicion is required to justify questioning that does not prolong an initially lawful stop. Mendez, 476 F.3d at 1080, quoting Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465 (internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded that “the officers’ questioning of Mendez did not extend the duration of a lawful stop” and so “the expanded questioning need not have been supported by separate reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 1081.
The Mendez and Muehler reasoning is persuasive in this appeal, and we reject Turvin’s and the dissent’s reliance on Chavez-Valenzuela; contrary to the dissent’s assertion, none of the aspects of Chavez-Valenzuela that are relevant to this appeal survive Muehler.
We disagree with the dissent’s characterization of the primary holding in Chavez-Valenzuela. The dissent asserts the primary holding was “that an officer cannot ask questions that extend the duration of a traffic stop beyond its initial purpose without having reasonable suspicion for doing so.” Diss. Op. at 1107. The dissent errs as the issue before this court in Chavez-Valenzuela was whether nervousness alone provided the reasonable suspicion required (at the time) to justify an officer’s continued detention of a suspect after he had satisfied the purpose of the stop. 268 F.3d at 726. The question of whether reasonable suspicion was necessary to justify questioning that prolonged the duration of the stop was simply not relevant (and certainly not addressed) in Chavez-Valenzuela, because at the time it was decided any questioning unrelated to the purpose of the stop, regardless of its effect on the duration of the stop, needed to be supported by reasonable suspicion. See id. at 724. That underlying assumption is no longer good law. See Mendez, 476 F.3d at 1080 (“To the extent that Chavez-Valenzuela ... holdfs] that such questioning must be supported by reasonable suspicion, [it has] been overruled by Muehler”) Mendez is the law on police questioning *1101during a traffic stop, and it is Mendez that we must apply to the facts of this case.
B.
However, we must now address a factual distinction between this case and Mendez that has not yet been resolved by our post-Muehler cases. As we pointed out in Mendez, “the stop was not unnecessarily prolonged.” Id. at 1079. Jaensson’s questioning occurred while Bracke was checking on Mendez’s identification, so “the stop would, in any event, have lasted until after the check had been completed.” Id. at 1080. Once the records check was complete, Bracke, who had overheard Mendez’s comments about gang" membership and jail time, “immediately asked his two questions.” Id. We also pointed out that from the time of the stop up to the arrest was only eight minutes. Id.
Turvin contends that in this case, the stop was unnecessarily prolonged. The MJ did not specifically address this point, determining that the questions were unconstitutional merely because they were outside the scope of the stop, a conclusion now clearly foreclosed by Mendez. After a motion for reconsideration, however, the MJ did state in his final report that “the traffic stop ... was extended or prolonged because of the comments by late arriving Trooper Powell.... Although Trooper Christ[e]nsen had been writing traffic tickets ... he stopped his ticket-issuing process and used a tape recorder solely for the purpose of asking Turvin about drugs and for [ ] consent to search his vehicle.”
The question, then, is this: does the fact that Christensen paused his ticket-writing process to ask a few questions unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop, thereby prolonging, for at least a few moments, the duration of that otherwise legal stop, turn the initially lawful stop into an unlawful detention? That is, based on the factual circumstances underlying this appeal, did Christensen’s brief pause unreasonably prolong the traffic stop and thus violate Turvin’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure?
We have never considered whether questioning unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop and separate from the ticket-writing process that prolongs the duration of the stop may nonetheless be reasonable under Muehler’s Fourth Amendment analysis. Nor have other circuits squarely addressed this factual situation. However, the Supreme Court’s teaching that “the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), gives us important guidance. The Court has emphasized that a fact-specific reasonableness inquiry is appropriate for Fourth Amendment questions. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996). Therefore, in the present case, we must examine the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the stop, and determine whether Christensen’s conduct was reasonable. Id.
In Mendez, we identified the overall length of the stop, observing that the eight-minute stop was not beyond the time normally required to issue a citation. 476 F.3d at 1079-80. We also pointed out that Jaensson and Bracke did not intentionally delay the stop but diligently pursued their investigation into the purpose of the stop. Id. at 1080.
As in Mendez, the circumstances surrounding the brief pause here were reasonable. The total duration of the stop up to the point at which Turvin consented to the search was, according to Christensen’s uncontested testimony, about fourteen minutes. This is no longer than an ordinary traffic stop could reasonably take, and we do not agree with the dissent that *1102evidentiary findings are necessary to demonstrate the sensible observation that fourteen minutes is not unreasonably long for a traffic stop. Of that time, it took Christensen perhaps four minutes to speak with Powell and then to walk to Turvin’s vehicle and ask him about the rolling methamphetamine laboratory and for consent to search. This was reasonable for him to do based on Powell’s arrival and information about a rolling methamphetamine laboratory involving the same vehicle and the same person.
Moreover, that Christensen observed the speaker box prior to requesting consent to search buttresses the conclusion that his request was reasonable under the circumstances. Christensen knew of a pri- or rolling methamphetamine laboratory, which could have been contained in something like the speaker box, justifying further inquiry. The speaker box observation is significant. The MJ’s initial findings of fact indicated that Christensen did not see the box behind Turvin’s seat until after he sought consent to search. We agree with the government that this finding is clearly erroneous; the audio recordings of the stop show that Christensen did observe the box before requesting consent to search. This fact is relevant in establishing the circumstances in which Christensen asked for consent to search. Just as it was reasonable in Mendez for officers to ask questions based on information learned during the course of the stop, Christensen’s question and request to search were reasonable based on facts learned and observations made after he stopped Turvin.
Sister circuits have adopted the same analysis: brief pauses to ask questions during traffic stops, even if those questions are unrelated to the purpose of the stop, may be permissible under Muehler. The Tenth Circuit held that questioning that does not “appreciably” extend the duration of a traffic stop is reasonable, see United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir.2007), United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir.2006). The Tenth Circuit has declined to “make a time and motion study of traffic stops” in order to determine the precise effect that questioning has on the duration of a stop, reasoning instead that courts must “consider the detention as a whole.” United States v. Patterson, 472 F.3d 767, 776 (10th Cir.2006).
The Eighth Circuit has similarly held that a traffic stop based on probable cause for driving at an excessive speed was not made unreasonable when an officer “ask[ed] three brief questions related to possible drug trafficking amidst his other traffic related inquiries and tasks.” United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir.2007). (We do not pass upon that court’s adoption of a de minimis exception justifying brief questions.)
Indeed, officers are not required to move at top speed when executing a lawful traffic stop. As the Eleventh Circuit has stated,
A traffic stop for speeding can doubtlessly last long enough for the police to ask questions about the reasons for speeding and to conduct a variety of checks about licenses, registration, insurance and so on. We underline that the police are not constitutionally required to move at top speed or as fast as possible. For the police to be vigilant about crimes is, at least broadly speaking, a good thing. And at a traffic stop, the police can occasionally pause for a moment to take a breath, to think about what they have seen and heard, and to ask a question or so. The police are authorized to detain traffic violators for a reasonable amount of time.
United States v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1212 n. 7 (11th Cir.2005) (internal *1103citation omitted); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (holding that a detention was not unreasonable where officers, though slowed down, were diligent in their investigation).
This analysis applies with particular force where, like here, officers have probable cause to know of a traffic violation. The Seventh Circuit, in a pre-Muehler decision, persuasively reasoned that where probable cause of a traffic violation supports a stop, a driver does not
ha[ve] a right to be released the instant the steps to check license, registration, and outstanding warrants, and to write a ticket, ha[ve] been completed. It is therefore not necessary to determine whether the officers’ conduct added a minute or so to the minimum time in which these steps could have been accomplished .... What the Constitution requires is that the entire process remain reasonable. Questions that hold potential for detecting crime, yet create little or no inconvenience, do not turn reasonable detention into unreasonable detention.
United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 953-54 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc). We agree with this reasoning and result.
Christensen’s brief pause in the ticket-writing process was reasonable, as was the duration of the detention until consent was given. We will not accept a bright-line rule that questions are unreasonable if the officer pauses in the ticket-writing process in order to ask them. The Supreme Court has “consistently eschewed bright-line rules [in the Fourth Amendment context], instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.” Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39, 117 S.Ct. 417. It is true that in Mendez, the officers managed to ticket and question detained drivers simultaneously. See Mendez, 476 F.3d at 1078-79. That has been true in situations considered by other circuits as well. See, e.g., United States v. Soriano-Jarquin, 492 F.3d 495, 501 (4th Cir.2007) (“In this case,[the Trooper’s] request for identification did not prolong the stop, as it occurred while the police trainee checked the driver’s license and registration and prepared his citations”). It does not follow, however, that those are the only circumstances in which it is reasonable to ask unrelated questions. The Supreme Court does not set such a narrow rule, and neither do we. An officer who asks questions while physically writing a ticket will likely be slowed down just as an officer who briefly pauses to do so. There is no principled reason why the second situation is unconstitutional but not the first.
The present case illustrates the irrationality of the distinction Turvin and the dissent offer. Under their proposed bright-line rule, Christensen’s questions may have been permissible in a number of scenarios materially indistinguishable from what happened here: if Christensen had asked about drugs when he originally stopped Turvin, or as he was handing the ticket to Turvin, or if Christensen had asked Powell to continue writing the ticket while he approached Turvin, or if Powell had asked the questions while Christensen wrote the ticket. Permitting those scenarios but not the reasonable actions that Christensen chose to take would draw an arbitrary and unjustified line between constitutional and unconstitutional conduct. Rather than bright-line simplification, the Constitution requires a reasonableness analysis.
III.
We hold that Mendez’s conclusion that officers do not need reasonable suspicion to ask questions unrelated to the purpose of an initially lawful stop applies here because Christensen’s question and request *1104for consent to search did not unreasonably prolong the duration of the stop. Because we decide on this basis, we do not reach the issue of whether reasonable suspicion supported Christensen’s questioning.
As the stop was at all times a lawful detention, Turvin’s voluntary consent rendered Christensen’s search legal. See United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 83 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir.1996). Therefore, the evidence obtained as a result of that search is admissible and the district court’s order to suppress is REVERSED.