Court Opinion

ID: 9775753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:08:29.788679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.824282
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
dissenting.
For the reasons set forth below, I cannot concur in the principal opinion, and therefore would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.
I.
The defendant took the stand to deny participation in the crime, asserting that he had been at a dance on the evening of the crime. Defendant’s alibi was corroborated by two witnesses. Defendant also exercised his valuable right of calling witnesses who claimed knowledge of his good character.1 He thus placed the state squarely on its burden of proving the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
The state, of course, was entitled to rebut the defendant’s character evidence by adducing testimony of persons familiar with defendant's reputation in the community in which he was known. It produced no such witnesses. Instead, it propounded the testimony of the Sheriff of Marion County, Missouri, who neither personally knew the defendant, nor had heard of him until he was accused of the crime which is the subject of the present appeal. The sheriff simply got in touch with unnamed police officers in Quincy, Illinois and repeated what they had told him. We are not told whether this contact was in person, by telephone, or by letter.2 ¡
State v. Cross, 343 S.W.2d 20 (Mo.1961) lends support to defendant’s assertion of the inadequacy of the sheriff’s investigation. There a hired investigator from outside the community who had made a daylong investigation on behalf of the defendant, interviewing more than 20 witnesses, was not allowed to testify as to the defendant’s reputation, and this Court upheld the exclusion of that testimony. Here the investigation was much less extensive, as the principal opinion readily concedes.
The principal opinion suggests, however, that standards for receiving character evidence offered by the state to refute the defendant’s evidence of good character are not as stringent as those applied to the defendant’s initial proffer. I can find no basis in authority for this holding. Simply because the state may introduce evidence to show that the defendant’s witnesses do not know as much about him as they claim to know, or that there are verifiable instances of disreputable conduct on the defendant’s part which the character witnesses do not know about, or which they appar*535ently look upon with indifference, does not give license for offering the kind of evidence challenged here. The state, indeed, must act in good faith in questioning character witnesses about particular instances of the defendant’s misconduct,3 and may not make use of rumor or conjecture in bad faith. The state must refute the defendant’s character evidence by evidence which conforms to normal standards of admissibility.
Sheriff White could not be effectively cross-examined. To ask him about the details of the opinions he received might very probably result in the reception of further unverifiable hearsay information from a person knowing nothing about the details. There would be no opportunity to probe possible bias on the part of the officers who furnished the sheriff information or to inquire about the depth of their knowledge. If the present opinion stands prosecutors will be tempted to rely on telephonic inquiries by local officers, rather than bringing in persons who have knowledge of the facts about the defendant’s character. The less the witness knows, the harder it is to challenge him.
The state gains nothing by observing that all character and reputation evidence is essentially hearsay. The testimony must come from one who is in a position to hear. When the witness lacks this opportunity the testimony should be excluded because of the same policy considerations which underlie the general hearsay rule.
I would not foreclose the possibility that a police officer of a community such as Hannibal might claim actual familiarity with the reputation of a person who lived in Quincy, Illinois, approximately 18 miles distant. He might acquire the required familiarity in the course of his official duties. Nor would I accept any suggestion that police officers are less able to testify about character or reputation than private citizens would be. Sheriff White, however, claimed no knowledge of the defendant’s character or reputation other than what the Quincy officers had told him in response to his specific inquiry about the defendant.
It cannot reasonably be argued that the reception of , the testimony was harmless. The only eyewitnesses against the defendant were admitted accomplices, whose testimony naturally is suspect.4 They received lenient treatment when charged with the same theft. Fingerprint evidence described in the prosecutor’s opening statement did not materialize. The jury had to decide whether to believe the miscreants who testified for the state, or whether to accept the testimony of the defendant and the witnesses who supported his alibi. The jury’s assessment of the defendant’s character well might be decisive.
II.
I believe that the defendant was entitled to an instruction which would have permitted the jury to convict him of the misdemeanor offense of stealing less than $150, rather than the felony of stealing in excess of $150.
The state might have avoided any problems along this line if it had charged defendant with stealing the contents of the safe, containing $500 in cash. The only charge, however, was of stealing the safe itself.
The owner’s testimony that the safe had a value of $250 or $260 was properly received in evidence, but the jury did not have to accept this valuation and might be of the opinion that the witness was puffing the value of his property. The state, in *536arguing for the admissibility of the evidence, stated that the jury was entitled to give it such weight as it considered appropriate.5 The defendant would not be entitled to an acquittal simply because the jury disbelieved or discounted the owner’s appraisal, because the safe necessarily had some value and its theft, at the very least, would constitute a misdemeanor. The jury was not told about a verdict which was properly available to it in this case.
The jury treated the defendant leniently, as is shown by its recommending only a six-month sentence.6 It still branded him a felon, and might not have done so if it had realized that it could assess the same sentence by finding guilt of a misdemeanor.
I recognize the cases holding that the lesser included offense need not be instructed on when there is no genuine issue as to the value of the property.7 This is not such a case. The state is required to establish value in excess of $150 beyond reasonable doubt. The owner’s scanty opinion evidence does not remove this fact issue from the case.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. Two witnesses testified that defendant had a "good” reputation in the community for being an honest and law abiding person. One witness stated that his opinion was formed from people that he had talked to who "always had good words for [defendant] and for his ability to do [his] work.” The other witness based his opinion of defendant on "seeing [defendant’s] coaches and the people [he and defendant] both associate[d] with and the high regard they h[e]ld [defendant] in_”

. When asked what the defendant’s reputation was with respect to honesty in the Quincy community and Adams County, Sheriff White responded that defendant did "not have a reputation of being an honest person.” The sheriff also stated that defendant did "not have a good law abiding reputation” in and around the community prior to and subsequent to the offense.

. The purpose of cross-examination of character witnesses is to test the good faith of the witnesses and their knowledge of the individual’s reputation. State v. Hastings, 477 S.W.2d 108, 113 (Mo.1972); State v. Curry, 372 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Mo.1963); State v. Selle, 367 S.W.2d 522, 529 (Mo.1963); State v. Harris, 622 S.W.2d 330, 334 (Mo.App.1981).

. United States v. Dunmore, 446 F.2d 1214, 1220 (8th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041, 92 S.Ct. 726, 30 L.Ed.2d 734 (1972); State v. Merrell, 263 S.W. 118, 121 (Mo.1924); State v. Lewis, 539 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Mo.App.1975).

.In its brief, the state argues that
The fact that the safe was a gift, the age of the safe, and the fact that [the owner] had no actual knowledge of its true value were all brought to the attention of the jury for their consideration. The appellant offered no contrary evidence to refute [the owner's] alleged erroneous valuation. There was ample evidence presented on the question of the stolen property’s value so that the issue was properly before the jury whose function it was to determine the value of that testimony, (citations omitted).

. The defendant undertakes the risk of reconviction of a felony and a longer sentence, if he obtains a new trial.

. See, e.g., State v. Walters, 636 S.W.2d 122 (Mo.App.1982); State v. Thornton, 557 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.App.1977).