Court Opinion

ID: 9962965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 13:07:55.749959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:59.060726
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Modreski, 2024-Ohio-1550.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                   FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                             HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                                     :   APPEAL NO. C-230511
                                                        TRIAL NO. 23CRB-6809
      Plaintiff-Appellant,                          :
                                                           O P I N I O N.
   vs.                                              :

 JAMES MODRESKI,                                    :

      Defendant-Appellee.                           :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 24, 2024

Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
and Phoebe Cates, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Krista Gieske, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee.
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

KINSLEY, Judge.

       {¶1}    Plaintiff-appellant the city of Cincinnati appeals from the trial court’s

decision granting defendant-appellee James Modreski’s motion to suppress evidence

obtained during a warrantless search of his home. In its sole assignment of error, the

city contends that the warrantless entry into Modreski’s apartment by police was

justified by the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement. It does so on the

basis of a report made by a social services worker to police. The report indicated that

an infant’s mother did not heed the recommendation of her child’s physician to take

the baby to the hospital following a diagnosis of “failure to thrive.” The report also

suggested that the mother and baby resided at the apartment occupied by Modreski.

       {¶2}   Because the information conveyed from the social services worker to the

police did not suggest that the infant was in need of immediate aid, we agree with the

trial court that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search

of Modreski’s home. Accordingly, we overrule the city’s sole assignment of error and

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                     Factual and Procedural Background

       {¶3}   The charges against Modreski arose from an encounter with the police

that occurred during a wellness check on his infant granddaughter. After a warrantless

search of his home on April 27, 2023, Modreski was charged with obstructing official

business and resisting arrest. He moved to suppress any evidence obtained from that

search, including his arrest. The trial court held a suppression hearing on September

20, 2023.

       {¶4}   At the hearing, the parties stipulated that the officers did not have a

warrant to search Modreski’s home on the evening of his arrest. Thus, the state bore

                                              2
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the burden of presenting evidence to justify the search. See Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio

St.3d 216, 218, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988).

       {¶5}   A critical piece of evidence presented by the state at the suppression

hearing was the body-worn camera (“BWC”) footage of Officer Nicholas Bicknell.

Bicknell arrived at Modreski’s apartment at approximately 9:01 p.m. in response to a

report from Angel Bell, a case worker with Hamilton County Children’s Services. The

footage from Bicknell’s BWC showed him arriving outside the apartment building and

being greeted by Bell, who provided information as to the basis of the request for

assistance.   According to Bell, an infant in the apartment had previously been

hospitalized due to malnourishment, and the infant’s mother requested that the infant

be released from the hospital with a follow-up doctor’s appointment instead. At the

follow-up appointment, which had occurred earlier that day, the doctor recommended

that the infant be admitted to the hospital, because the infant had lost more weight.

The infant’s mother did not follow the recommendation, and Children’s Services was

contacted.

       {¶6}   On the body-worn camera video, Bell indicated that she had rung the

doorbell to the apartment and that an older gentleman had answered. He confirmed

that the mother and infant did in fact live at the residence, but did not allow Bell to

speak to them without confirming who she was and why she was there. She explained

to the officers that she was not permitted to disclose her purpose for the wellness check

to the man who answered the door since she did not know who he was. In response to

Bicknell’s questions, Bell agreed that her purpose for being at the property was to “talk

to mom.”

                                               3
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶7}   After speaking with Bell, the officers asked Modreski to open the door.

The officers did not identify themselves or explain why they were there. They then

told Modreski they would arrest him for obstructing official business if he did not open

the door. When they told Modreski that they needed to speak with the infant’s mother,

Modreski responded without opening the door that she was not there.

       {¶8}   The footage next shows Modreski’s neighbor opening the main door of

the building and inquiring about why the officers were there. Modreski’s neighbor

asked if the officers had a warrant and the officers responded that they were there due

to a report of a malnourished infant. Modreski’s neighbor asked for a few minutes to

speak with Modreski and see what was going on with him. The officers disregarded

the request, pushed past Modreski’s neighbor, and went upstairs to Modreski’s unit.

       {¶9}   When Modreski opened his door, the officers asked him to step outside.

Modreski refused, and the officers then arrested him. They conducted a sweep of

Modreski’s unit for the infant, but they did not find anyone else on the scene.

       {¶10} While on the stand at the suppression hearing, Bicknell testified that

when Modreski was inside the police cruiser, Bell confirmed that the mother had

already taken the infant to the hospital.

       {¶11} Bell also testified to the events depicted in Bicknell’s BWC footage. On

cross-examination, Bell conceded that she was only there to speak to the infant’s

mother.

       {¶12} Following the hearing, the trial court granted Modreski’s motion and

held that exigent circumstances did not exist for the officers to conduct a warrantless

search of Modreski’s home.

       {¶13} The city now appeals.

                                               4
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                             Exigent Circumstances

       {¶14} In its sole assignment of error, the city argues that the trial court erred

in granting Modreski’s motion to suppress.

       {¶15} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of

law and fact. We must accept the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by

competent and credible evidence, but we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.”

(Citations omitted.) State v. Buck, 2017-Ohio-8242, 100 N.E.3d 118, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.).

       {¶16} In Buck, we explained the exigent circumstances exception to the

warrant requirement:

              Warrants are generally required to search a person’s home or his

       person unless the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law

       enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively

       reasonable    under   the   Fourth    Amendment.         Where    exigent

       circumstances exist, a warrantless search is reasonable because there is

       compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.

              Exigent circumstances allow a warrantless entry into a residence

       if probable cause to arrest or to search exists. Police may make a

       warrantless entry into a residence to prevent the imminent destruction

       of evidence or to engage in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.

              The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of

       Ohio have recognized a narrower subsect of exigent circumstances

       where law enforcement officers need to respond to emergency

       situations to protect people from death or serious injury.             The

       emergency-aid exception allows police to enter a home without a

                                               5
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       warrant and without probable cause when they reasonably believe,

       based on specific and articulable facts, that a person within the home is

       in need of immediate aid. Nevertheless, a warrantless entry justified by

       the emergency-aid exception must be strictly circumscribed by the

       exigency that initially justified it, and once the emergency has been

       alleviated, further intrusion must be sanctioned by a warrant.

(Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 19-21.

       {¶17} By its own terms, the application of the emergency-aid exception is

limited to circumstances requiring immediate aid. Id. at ¶ 21. Indeed, the touchstone

of the emergency-aid exception is the kind of immediacy that characterizes an

emergency. As one Ohio court has explained, this type of exigent circumstance exists

based on “the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such

injury.” State v. Gooden, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23764, 2008-Ohio-178, ¶ 5. It is

grounded in the “need to protect or preserve life.” Id.

       {¶18} In discussing the applicability of the emergency-aid exception, the Ohio

Supreme Court has used terms that resound in extreme distress. For example, in State

v. Applegate, 68 Ohio St.3d 348, 350, 626 N.E.2d 942 (1994), citing Wayne v. United

States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C.Cir.1963), the court explained that exigent

circumstances counsel against taking time to obtain a warrant because “people could

well die.” The court has also characterized situations befitting the emergency-aid

exception as placing “life or limb * * * in jeopardy.” State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325,

2012-Ohio-1008, 964 N.E.2d 1037, ¶ 21. We therefore understand the emergency-aid

exception to excuse the warrant requirement in circumstances where the time it takes

to obtain a warrant may place a person’s life in danger.

                                               6
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶19} Case law applying the emergency-aid exception further elucidates the

contours of just what constitutes a need for immediate aid. For example, in State v.

Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325, 2012-Ohio-1008, 964 N.E.2d 1037, ¶ 23, police officers

received a dispatch regarding an allegedly armed and suicidal person with a plan to

take his own life upon reaching a certain destination. The situation was literally life-

or-death.   Id.   Because officers had knowledge of the individual’s concrete and

imminent plan to harm himself, the court held that the officers were justified in

effecting a warrantless traffic stop. Id.

       {¶20} Similarly, in State v. Engle, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25226, 2013-

Ohio-1818, ¶ 21, officers properly invoked the emergency-aid exception to search a

defendant who was bleeding from his head and staggering. Engle needed immediate

attention to evaluate his head injury, both to protect his life and to prevent further

injury from occurring. Id.

       {¶21} Conversely, in State v. Fisher, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 13 CA 35, 2014-

Ohio-3029, ¶ 41-42, the court held the record was devoid of specific and articulable

facts that a person within the apartment was in need of immediate aid, where police

officers responded to a report of domestic violence and could easily see through the

window of the apartment that no one was in obvious distress. While sounds may alert

police to a need for immediate aid in a domestic violence case, the court noted that

there were no sounds noted coming from the residence. Id. at ¶ 40. On these facts,

the mere allegation that domestic violence was taking place inside the apartment was

insufficient, without more indicia of an immediate emergency, to justify excusing the

warrant requirement. Id. at ¶ 44.

                                               7
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

        {¶22} Unlike in Dunn and Engle, the police officers in Fisher did not have a

reasonable belief that they needed to render emergency aid or investigate a life-

threatening situation. Importantly, in Dunn and Engle, the immediacy with which the

officers needed to act supported a finding of exigent circumstances. There, the officers

did not have time to spare. But in Fisher, the court noted there were no facts to

establish why the officers could not have achieved the same results without violating

the sanctity of the residence by obtaining a search warrant. Fisher at ¶ 41.

        {¶23} The facts of this case are more akin to the situation in Fisher. While a

report of a malnourished infant is certainly cause for concern, no one testified that that

the infant would not survive without immediate medical intervention. Rather, the

officers understood from Bell that the infant was not thriving and should be seen at

the hospital per a recommendation from her physician. This was not characterized as

a life-or-limb emergency risking the infant’s survival.          To the contrary, Bell

characterized the purpose for her presence at the apartment as needing to “talk to

mom,” not to take custody of the child for the purpose of seeking emergency medical

care.

        {¶24} The record is therefore devoid of specific and articulable facts that the

infant was in need of immediate aid, and, as a result, the emergency-aid exception to

the warrant requirement did not apply to the officers’ entry and search of Modreski’s

apartment. We accordingly overrule the city’s sole assignment of error and affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

                                                                    Judgment affirmed.

ZAYAS, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.

                                                8
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Please note:
       The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

                                                9