Court Opinion

ID: 9380221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 17:08:35.335093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:23.446149
License: Public Domain

J-S43017-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P.
65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T.S., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2274 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-DP-0001217-2019

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.T.S., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2275 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000580-2021

 IN THE INTEREST OF: I.D., A MINOR     :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2276 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-DP-0001218-2019
J-S43017-22

 IN THE INTEREST OF: I.I.A.-M.D., A    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2277 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000581-2021

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2278 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-DP-0001219-2019

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.B.A.-M.D.,      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 A MINOR                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2279 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000585-2021

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :

                                  -2-
J-S43017-22

 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2280 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-DP-0001221-2019

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.I.D., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2281 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000582-2021

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.-R.D., A        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2282 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-DP-0001222-2019

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.-R.I.D., A      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :

                                    -3-
J-S43017-22

                                       :   No. 2283 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000583-2021

 IN THE INTEREST OF: M.D., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2284 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-DP-0001220-2019

 IN THE INTEREST OF: M.B.A.I.D., A     :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2285 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000586-2021

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.-R.D., A        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2286 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022

                                  -4-
J-S43017-22

 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-DP-0001223-2019

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.-R.I.D., A      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2287 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000584-2021

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.D., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2288 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-DP-0001432-2019

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.B.A.I.D., A     :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: K.D., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2289 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Decree Entered August 11, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000587-2021

                                    -5-
J-S43017-22

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                          FILED MARCH 17, 2023

         In this matter, K.D. (Father) appeals the decrees entered by the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which involuntarily terminated

his rights to his eight Children, pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b).1 In addition to the termination decrees, Father

also appeals the orders which changed the goal of the dependency

proceedings from reunification to adoption. Lastly, Father also argues that his

counsel was ineffective and that the trial court was biased. After review, we

affirm the termination decrees and dismiss the goal-change appeals as moot.2

         The relevant procedural and factual history is as follows.   The family

came to the attention of DHS in Summer 2019, when Mother’s 14-year-old

daughter, T.R. alleged abuse by both Mother and Father.           Father is the

____________________________________________

1   The subject Children are:

     •   S.T.S, daughter, age 14
     •   I.D, son, age 10
     •   Ab. D., son, age 8
     •   A.-R.D. 1 son, age 7
     •   A.-R.D. 2., son, age 6
     •   Aa.D., daughter, age 5
     •   M.D., son, age 3
     •   S.D., daughter, age 2

It appears Father is not the biological father of S.T.S., but because Father’s
signed the acknowledgement of paternity, DHS proceeded with termination.
DHS also terminated the rights of the unknown biological father.

2   Mother had also appealed. Her case is separately listed before this panel.

                                           -6-
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stepfather of T.R.; T.R. is not the subject of these appeals.3 T.R. alleged that

Mother beat her and forced her to sleep outside. She also alleged that Father

inappropriately touched her on her buttocks and breasts, made her stay in the

bathroom while he showered, exposed himself to her, and on one occasion,

licked the back of her ear.

        These disclosures caused DHS to investigate the wellbeing of Father’s

seven other Children, who are the subject of this case.4               The Agency

interviewed the Children in the home.            At that time, none of the Children

disclosed abuse, but the caseworker believed that the Children were afraid to

speak up and had tried to convey to the caseworker that Father could overhear

to their conversation.       Father had chosen the room for the caseworker’s

interview, and he could be seen visible pacing outside on the porch.

        On July 25, 2019, DHS obtained orders for protective custody for the

Children.    After the shelter care hearing, the Children were temporarily

committed to DHS custody. A subsequent disclosure revealed that one of the

Children was beaten by Mother at Father’s direction, and that she was made

to sleep outside as punishment. The Child also alleged that she was forced to

____________________________________________

3T.R.’s biological father was unknown. The trial court previously changed the
goal of T.R.’s dependency proceedings from reunification to another planned
permanent living arrangement (APPLA), i.e., permanent long-term foster care
until the age of majority. Father appealed that decision, and we affirmed.
See Interest of T.R., 283 A.3d 377 (Table), 2022 WL 2813796 (Pa. Super.
2022) (non-precedential decision).

4   The youngest subject Child, S.D., was not yet born.

                                           -7-
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do chores in her underwear to ensure that she did not have any food on her

person.

      In September 2019, the Children were adjudicated dependent.               The

court learned that Mother had given birth to S.D., and that the birth was

hidden from the agency. The facts that gave rise to the adjudications of the

older Children were a predicate for the removal and eventual adjudication of

S.D. The juvenile court instituted a single case plan, comprising of certain

goals to aid Father with reunification. The goals included: to attend supervised

visitation with the Children; to complete programs to address parenting,

domestic violence and anger management; to submit to evaluations for his

psychosexual behavior and parenting capacity; to obtain employment; and to

obtain housing.

      Meanwhile, investigations into the parents’ alleged abuse continued.

The   Children    subsequently   participated   in   a   forensic   interview   with

Philadelphia Children’s Alliance, where the Children were referred for

evaluations by Dr. Michelle Dominguez, M.D., a child abuse pediatrician at St.

Christopher’s Hospital for Children. During their evaluations, the Children

made additional disclosures.     They claimed, among other allegations, that

Father would punch them and whip them with extension cords; that their

refrigerator was chained shut so they could not get food; that Father forced

them to eat the ants that were in their cereal; and that they were sometimes

forced to stay in the basement, which was often dark and flooded.                Dr.

Dominguez physically examined the Children and noted the presence of

                                      -8-
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bruising consistent with inflicted trauma. Father defended some of his actions,

maintaining that he merely disciplined the Children in accordance with his

Islamic faith. He denied other allegations, which he said were fabricated by

the Children because they were rebelling against his religion.

      In August 2021, the parents were arrested. Father’s arrest resulted in

a no-contact order, which suspended visits with the children.       Father also

failed to comply with the single case plan. Although he completed the anger

management and parenting programs, these objectives remained on the case

plan because Father continued to display anger during the visits and when

speaking to the Children.

      DHS eventually petitioned to change the goal of the dependency

proceedings from reunification to adoption and to terminate Father’s rights.

The court held the termination hearing over several days on March 14, March

28, and June 2, 2022. On August 11, 2022, the court articulated its findings

on the record and entered decrees terminating Father’s rights to each

respective Child. Father timely filed appeals. In his consolidated Brief, Father

presents the following issues for our review:

            1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error,
               when it involuntarily terminated Father’s parental
               rights where such determinations were not supported
               by clear and convincing evidence under the Adoption
               Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8)?

            2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error
               when it involuntarily terminated Father’s parental
               rights without giving primary consideration to the
               effect that the termination would have on the
               developmental, physical and emotional needs of the

                                     -9-
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               child[ren] as required by the Adoption Act, 23
               Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

            3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in
               granting a goal change to adoption, where the goal
               change from reunification to adoption was not
               supported by clear and convincing evidence?

            4. Whether Father’s case was irreparably harmed by
               counsel’s representation, which fell below ordinary
               attorney representation?

            5. Whether Father’s case was irreparably harmed by
               judicial bias?

Father’s Brief at 8.

      We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

         The standard of review in termination of parental rights
         cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
         and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
         supported by the record. If the factual findings are
         supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
         court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
         decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
         upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
         partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's
         decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
         the record would support a different result. We have
         previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
         often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
         multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

      Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases,

deference to the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K.,

265 A.3d 580, 597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d 1108,

1124 (Pa. 2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive

                                     - 10 -
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case involving…the termination of parental rights, the appellate court should

review the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence supports

that trial court’s conclusions; the appellate could should not search the record

for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”).

The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential

standard and, to the extent that record supports the court’s decision, we must

affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary

determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

         Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
         seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
         evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
         grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only
         if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
         termination of his or her parental rights does the court
         engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section
         2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the
         child[.]

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

      Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of

Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

                                      - 11 -
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      Critically, we may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis

exists for the result reached. C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201. We need only agree

with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well

as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (en banc).

      Therefore, we review the trial court’s termination of Father’s rights

under Section 2511(a)(2), which provides:

         (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
         child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
         following grounds:

                                      […]

         (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
         or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
         essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
         his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
         causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
         will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

      To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party

must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.”

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt

                                     - 12 -
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assumption of full parental duties. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.

Super. 2010).

      We note that the grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative

misconduct like abuse but concern parental incapacity that cannot be

remedied. See id. This case, however, explicitly concerns abuse. The trial

court set forth its Section 2511(a)(2) findings on the record:

         [T]he testimony of Dr. Dominguez, which I found credible,
         was that these children, not only were they subject to
         continued and repeated abuse, whether by denying food or
         being hit in the head with 2-by-4s, being hit with extension
         cords, being made to get into showers that were hot, and
         then with cords that were run under cold water, being hit
         with those cords, Dr. Dominguez went a step further from
         saying that that’s abuse. In fact, she indicated that that
         meets the definition of child torture. And while she testified,
         and, again, credibly, that neither [Ab.D, A-R.D. 1 or A.-R.D.
         2.] disclosed any abuse, the physical findings on those
         children’s bodies were consistent with the physical findings
         on the bodies of [T.R., S.T.S., and I.D.], all of whom disclose
         physical abuse in the manner in which they were abused.
         And so the fact she also determine that based on photos
         review from [Ab.D.] and well as her physical examination of
         [I.D., T.S., and A.-R. D. 1, and A.-R.D. 2,] that the markings
         on [A.-R.D.1, A.-R.D. 2, and Ab.-D.’s] body were consistent
         with he physical abuse that was disclosed as to [T.R., S.T.S.,
         and I.D.] in their PCA interviews. […]

         In addition to what the children disclosed in their PCA
         interview and to their CUA case manager, because Ms.
         McNeill also testified that [I.D., T.R., and S.T.S.] disclosed
         abuse, found in the transcripts that were entered into
         evidence that were part of this court’s prior hearings,
         [S.T.S., I.D., and T.R.] testified in camera as to the abuse
         that they suffered. And this court found them credible when
         they testified in camera. All counsel was present for those
         hearings, except for TPR counsel, as she was appointed after
         those hearings.

                                     - 13 -
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        And so the testimony has been consistent each time these
        Children have disclosed as to what they were subjected to
        in [Father’s] and [Mother’s] home. And I have to say, I
        started out as a social worker working with families in the
        system. I worked for nine years as a solicitor for DHS. And
        I’ve been on the bench. This is my fifth year. I have never
        ever heard a doctor testify that what children suffered was
        torture. I’m speechless.

        And so this court is going to find that while there was no
        testimony as to the younger children, the testimony of Dr.
        Dominguez as an expert that the fact that sexual abuse was
        found as to [T.R], and physical abuse as to the other
        Children, all of the Children in Mother and Father’s care
        would be at risk. And so I am terminating for all the Children
        under [Section] 2511(a)(2). Specifically, [T.R., I.D., S.T.S.,
        A.-R.D. 1, A.-R.D. 2, and Ab.D.] suffered actual abuse at
        the hands of their parents consistent with the markings on
        their bodies.

N.T., 91-94.

     On appeal, Father notes that termination under Section 2511(a)(2) was

erroneous, because past incapacity, alone, in not sufficient to terminate a

parent’s rights. See Father’s Brief at 26 (citing In re Adoption of A.N.D.,

510 A.3d 31 (Pa. Super. 1986)). Father maintains that DHS only put forth

evidence of past behaviors and thus could not establish that termination was

warranted. Father also argues that because only the older Children disclosed

abuse, and the court improperly concluded that Father abused the younger

Children.

     These arguments merit no relief. It has long been established that the

use of prognostic evidence applies to both dependency cases, as well as

termination cases. See In re E.B., 83 A.3d 426, 433 (Pa. Super. 2013); see

also In re Angry, 522 A.2d 73, 74-75 (Pa. Super. 1987). The court may

                                    - 14 -
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consider a parent’s previous actions, toward an older sibling, when assessing

the risk that the parent poses toward the younger child. The notion that a

court is barred from such considerations “ignores the possibility that if the

‘experiment’ proves unsuccessful, the consequences to the child could be

seriously detrimental or even fatal.” Angry, 522 A.2d at 74-75 (quoting

Matter of DeSavage, 360 A.2d 237, 241-42 (Pa. Super 1976)).

     Although not every Child made a disclosure, the court agreed with Dr.

Dominguez’s expert opinion that all the Children would be at risk of abuse.

Moreover, some of the younger Children, who did not disclose abuse, evinced

the same bruising as that older Children who verbalized an allegation.

Although Father may have complied with some aspects of his single case plan

objectives, he has made no progress toward alleviating the causes of the

Children’s dependency. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion when it

concluded that Father’s repeated abuse caused the Children to go without

parental care, and that such abuse cannot or will not be remedied. The trial

court did not err when it determined that DHS met its burden under Section

2511(a)(2).

     Having discerned no error or abuse of discretion as to the first prong of

the bifurcated termination analysis, we next address second prong under

Section 2511(b), which comprises of Father’s second appellate issue.

     The section provides:

        (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
        rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
        developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

                                   - 15 -
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         of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
         solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
         inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
         medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
         With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
         (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
         the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
         are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
         filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

      This Court has explained further:

         [S]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
         parental rights would best serve the developmental,
         physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
         In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005),
         this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort,
         security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the
         needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
         that the trial court must also discern the nature and status
         of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
         on     the     child  of    permanently     severing     that
         bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of
         a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer
         that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63
         (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-
         effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
         the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists,

but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial

relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see also K.Z.S.,

946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving where the child

had been in foster care for most of the child’s life, which caused the resulting

                                     - 16 -
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bond to be too attenuated). Moreover, the court is not required to use expert

testimony to resolve the bond analysis. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121

(citing In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

     “Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they

have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.   Finally, we

emphasize that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with her and/or her child

is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when

determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d

95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

     Instantly, the caseworker testified that there was no bond worth

preserving between Father and each of the respective Children. Though some

Children had desired to have contact with Mother, none requested to see

Father. I.D. was fearful of Father. S.T.S. did not consider Father to be her

biological parent.   Moreover, the Children also demonstrated positive

behaviors after the parental visits were suspended. The court also noted that

the two youngest Children have spent more of their life in foster care than

they did with Father. See generally N.T. 102-115

     On appeal, Father argues that DHS failed to prove that bonds do not

exist between the Children and Father.      See Father’s Brief at 30.   Father

argues that there was competing testimony as to the bonds, and that the trial

court failed to fully consider the needs and welfare of the Children when it

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decided to side with the testimony of DHS rather than the testimony of the

parents.

      We find Father’s arguments unpersuasive. We reiterate that when there

no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer

that no bond exists. K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 762-63.      Furthermore, the mere

existence of “competing testimony” does not mean the trial court’s ultimate

determination was somehow deficient. A trial court must necessarily resolve

the competing evidence and testimony when rendering its factual findings and

legal conclusions. Lastly, Father also misunderstands the role of this Court.

As noted above, we do not search the record for contrary conclusions or

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. See S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d at

1124. Rather, we must affirm even if evidence exists that would also support

a contrary determination. See P.Z., 113 A.3d at 849. With this standard in

mind, and upon our review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law.

      Having concluded that the trial court properly terminated Father’s rights

as to each Child, we turn our focus to Father’s third appellate issue. Here,

Father claims the trial court erred when it changed the goals of the

dependency cases from reunification to adoption. Because we have already

concluded that termination was warranted, we dismiss these challenges as

moot. See Interest of D.R.W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An

issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter

an order that has any legal force or effect.”).

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      Next, we consider Father’s fourth appellate issue, where he claims

ineffective assistance of counsel. Father claims his counsel was ineffective

because counsel failed to object to certain leading questions. See Father’s

Brief at 33. Father also claims that his counsel failed to argue that Father’s

disciplinary methods were informed by his Islamic faith. Id.

      Our Supreme Court has recognized that an indigent parent has a

constitutional right to counsel in a termination case. In re J.T., 983 A.2d 771,

774 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing In re Adoption of R.I., 312 A.2d 601 (Pa.

1973).   “The right to counsel in parental termination cases is the right to

effective assistance of counsel even though the case is civil in nature.” J.T.,

983 A.2d at 774-75 (citing In re Adoption of T.M.F., 573 A.2d 1035 (Pa.

Super. 1990) (en banc) (further citation omitted)). “We [] review the record

as a whole to determine whether or not the parties received a ‘fundamentally

fair’ hearing; a finding that counsel was ineffective is made only if the parent

demonstrates that counsel’s ineffectiveness was ‘the cause of the decree of

termination.” Id. at 775 (citations omitted).

      Upon review, we do not find that counsel was ineffective.         Neither

counsel’s failure to object to certain questions, nor his supposed failure to

contextualize Father’s religious beliefs was a cause for the entry of the

termination decrees. Quite plainly, the driving cause of the termination of

Father’s rights was his “torture” of the Children, his failure to address such

harm, and the subsequent effects of that harm on the Children.         Father’s

fourth appellate issue is without merit.

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      Finally, in his fifth appellate issue, Father claims the trial court

demonstrated bias. He alleges that the court only paid “lip service” to the fact

that the family was Muslim. See Father’s Brief at 35. Father maintains that

their “religious practices around discipline included using corrective teaching

and learning the Quran, the main Muslim scripture.” Id. Father claims the

court did not inquire into the cultural values of the family. Id.

      We review challenges to a court's partiality for an abuse of discretion.

See Commonwealth v. McCauley, 199 A.3d 947, 950 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Both our Supreme Court as well as the Supreme Court of the United States

have addressed how a judge's partiality cuts directly to an individual's right to

due process:

         It is axiomatic that a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
         due process. See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. The United
         States Supreme Court has recognized that a litigant's due
         process rights are violated when the circumstances of a
         judicial decision give rise to an unacceptable risk of
         actual bias. Williams v. Pennsylvania, -- U.S. --, 136
         S.Ct. 1899, 1908 (2016).          Moreover, the appearance
         of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence
         in the administration of justice as the actual presence
         of bias or prejudice. Commonwealth v. Goodman, 311
         A.2d 651, 654 (Pa. 1973).

         However, simply because a judge rules against a defendant
         does not establish any bias on the part of the judge against
         that defendant. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d
         352, 367 (Pa. 1995).

Interest of D.J.B., 230 A.3d 379, 385 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting McCauley,

199 A.3d at 950-51).

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      We note several problems with Father’s challenge. First, Father did not

seek recusal during the hearing. A party seeking recusal or disqualification

based on judicial bias or impartiality is required to raise the objection at the

earliest possible moment, or the party will suffer the consequences of being

time barred. Jordan v. Pennsylvania State University, 276 A.3d 751, 762

(PA. Super. 2022) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not

raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal.”). Second, if Father means to argue that the court’s bias was not

evinced until its ultimate decision, he has failed to demonstrate how. Father’s

brief does not Father cite to any specific instance where the court evinced

bias, nor does Father cite to any pertinent legal authorities beyond the Judicial

Code of Conduct. It is well-established that the failure to develop an argument

with citation to, and analysis of, pertinent authority results in waiver of that

issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119. For these reasons, we find the issue is

waived.

      In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not error or abuse its

discretion when it determined DHS met its burden to terminate Father’s rights

under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b). Given this conclusion, we dismiss Father’s

goal change challenges as moot. We further conclude that Father’s counsel

was not ineffective, and we conclude that Father waived his claim that the trial

court evinced bias.

      Termination decrees affirmed. Goal change orders affirmed.

      Judge Nichols joins the memorandum.

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        Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/17/2023

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