Court Opinion

ID: 9839500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 15:01:50.648092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:33.358608
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1590   Document: 30     Page: 1   Filed: 08/21/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                FICEP CORPORATION,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

          PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION,
                Defendant-Appellee
              ______________________

                       2022-1590
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 District of Delaware in No. 1:19-cv-01994-RGA, Judge
 Richard G. Andrews.
                 ______________________

                Decided: August 21, 2023
                 ______________________

    MATTHEW B. LOWRIE, Foley & Lardner LLP, Boston,
 MA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by
 KEVIN M. LITTMAN; SARAH E. RIEGER, Milwaukee, WI.

    NATHANIEL C. LOVE, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL,
 argued for defendant-appellee.   Also represented by
 STEPHANIE P. KOH, LEIF E. PETERSON, II.
                ______________________

    Before PROST, WALLACH, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-1590    Document: 30      Page: 2    Filed: 08/21/2023

 2          FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION

 CHEN, Circuit Judge.
     Ficep Corporation (Ficep) appeals from the United
 States District Court for the District of Delaware’s grant of
 summary judgment holding claims of U.S. Patent
 7,974,719 (’719 patent) patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C.
 § 101. Ficep Corp. v. Peddinghaus Corp., 587 F. Supp.
 3d 115 (D. Del. 2022) (Opinion). Because we agree that the
 claims are directed to an abstract idea, we affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
                               I
     The ’719 patent is directed to the automatic transfer of
 design data contained in a computer-aided design (CAD)
 model 1 to a machine that can manufacture an object based
 on that design data. ’719 patent col. 2 ll. 9–25. Figure 2
 shows the system of the ’719 patent, which includes a com-
 puter (205), programmable logic controller (210) having a
 receiver (215), storage unit (220), transmitter (225) and
 monitor (230), and manufacturing machine (235). ’719 pa-
 tent col. 5 l. 4 – col. 6 l. 8.

     1   The specification explains that a CAD model is “a
 three-dimensional scale model of a structure or device” that
 may be “visually produced on a computer display or printed
 as a schematic diagram.” ’719 patent col. 1 ll. 14–20.
Case: 22-1590      Document: 30      Page: 3     Filed: 08/21/2023

 FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION                    3

 The computer stores a design model, e.g., a CAD model,
 and communicates the design model to the programmable
 logic controller. ’719 patent, col. 5 ll. 17–26, col. 6 ll. 21–40.
 The programmable logic controller then identifies and ex-
 tracts information from the design model for transmission
 to the manufacturing machine. ’719 patent col. 3 ll. 53–62,
 col. 6 ll. 41–57. The design model includes information
 such as “design specifications related to the structure or
 device” 2 and “intersection and/or manufacturing parame-
 ters,” which are “design parameters related to intersections
 and points of contact or connection between components
 that come into contact with other components.” 3 ’719 pa-
 tent col. 1 ll. 20–53, col. 4 ll. 11–14.
      With prior methods of manufacturing a component
 from a CAD model, “a human operator typically must pro-
 gram manually the manufacturing machines associated
 with an assembly line based on the computer-aided design
 display.” ’719 patent col. 1 ll. 26–30; see also id. col. 1 ll.
 32–36 (“Human intervention is generally necessary to re-
 view the computer-aided design information and to provide
 the necessary information to the automated assembly line
 apparatus so that the structure or device may be manufac-
 tured.”). A problem arises, however, “when the specialized
 human operator, capable of inputting data into the manu-
 facturing machine, is unavailable.” ’719 patent col. 1
 ll. 37–43. The ’719 patent thus observes that “there is a
 direct need to improve the way in which the design

     2     Examples of design specifications include “welding
 characteristics, names of parts and components, dimen-
 sional references for squaring, and so forth.” ’719 patent
 col. 1 ll. 20–25.
      3    Examples of intersection and/or manufacturing pa-
 rameters include “distance from the floor, bolts fixing
 point, the point of support of the beam, et cetera.” ’719 pa-
 tent col. 4 ll. 24–27.
Case: 22-1590    Document: 30      Page: 4     Filed: 08/21/2023

 4          FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION

 parameters for all the components of an object . . . are pro-
 vided to a manufacturing machine.” ’719 patent col. 1
 ll. 43–49. The patent’s proposed solution to improve effi-
 ciency and accuracy, lower cost, and “eliminate the possi-
 bility of operator error when providing instructions to
 automated assembly line equipment” is to remove the hu-
 man operator from the data transfer equation and instead
 automatically extract and transfer information from the
 design model to the manufacturing machine. ’719 patent
 col. 1 ll. 9–14, col. 1 ll. 49–58, Abstract.
     Claim 7 is representative4 and recites:
     7. An apparatus for automatic manufacture of an
     object, comprising:
     a computing device adapted to create a design
     model of an object having multiple individual com-
     ponents, at least two of the individual components
     defining an intersection at which the two compo-
     nents are in contact with one another;
     at least one programmable logic controller in com-
     munication with the computing device and with at
     least one manufacturing machine;
     a receiver associated with the programmable logic
     controller for receiving the design model of the ob-
     ject;
     a database unit adapted to store the design model
     received at the receiver;
     a processor which is associated with the program-
     mable logic controller and extracts from the design

     4   The district court treated claim 7 as representa-
 tive. Opinion, 587 F. Supp. 3d at 120. The parties do not
 dispute this on appeal. Appellant’s Br. 16; Appellee’s
 Br. 15 n.1.
Case: 22-1590    Document: 30      Page: 5    Filed: 08/21/2023

 FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION               5

     model a plurality of dimensions of components
     which define a plurality of components of the ob-
     ject;
     wherein the processor identifies a plurality of in-
     tersection parameters which define the intersec-
     tion of the two components;
     wherein the processor extracts from the design
     model the intersection parameters;
     a transmitter associated with the processor for
     transmitting the intersection and machining pa-
     rameters and the component dimensions from the
     programmable logic controller to the at least one
     manufacturing machine; and
     wherein the at least one manufacturing machine
     manufactures the components based at least in
     part on the transmitted component dimensions and
     on the transmitted intersection and manufacturing
     parameters.
 ’719 patent at claim 7.
                              II
     Ficep sued Peddinghaus Corporation (Peddinghaus) in
 the District of Delaware, alleging infringement of one or
 more claims of the ’719 patent. Opinion, 587 F. Supp. 3d
 at 118. Peddinghaus moved for summary judgment on the
 basis that the ’719 patent’s claims are patent ineligible un-
 der 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. The district court granted Ped-
 dinghaus’s motion, concluding that the claims of the ’719
 patent are directed to an abstract idea without an in-
 ventive concept. Id. at 118, 125, 127. The district court
 identified the abstract idea as “identifying, extracting, and
 transferring data from a design file for the purpose of man-
 ufacturing an object,” finding that the ’719 patent “seeks to
 simply automate the prior art methods to minimize human
 error and fails to recite any specific technological
Case: 22-1590    Document: 30      Page: 6    Filed: 08/21/2023

 6          FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION

 improvement to manufacturing or computer technology.”
 Id. at 123, 125. The district court also determined that the
 claims contain no inventive concept because the claims
 “simply replac[e] the human operator with a conventional
 machine,” which “is not sufficient to transform the claims
 into patent-eligible subject matter.” Id. at 125–26.
    Ficep timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28
 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
                         DISCUSSION
     We review the grant of summary judgment under the
 law of the regional circuit, here the Third Circuit. Frolow
 v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 710 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed.
 Cir. 2013). The Third Circuit reviews the grant of sum-
 mary judgment de novo. DiFiore v. CSL Behring, LLC, 879
 F.3d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 2018). Patent eligibility under 35
 U.S.C. § 101 is ultimately an issue of law that we review de
 novo. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
 2018).
      Section 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discov-
 ers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
 composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
 thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the condi-
 tions and requirements of” Title 35 of the United States
 Code. The Supreme Court has long held that “[l]aws of na-
 ture, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not pa-
 tentable” under § 101. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank
 Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular
 Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589
 (2013)).
     In Alice and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
 Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), the Supreme Court
 set forth a two-step test for determining whether claimed
 subject matter falls within one of the judicial exceptions to
 patent eligibility. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18; Mayo, 566
 U.S. at 77–78. First, we “determine whether the claims at
Case: 22-1590     Document: 30      Page: 7    Filed: 08/21/2023

 FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION                 7

 issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept,” such as
 an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 218. Second, if the
 claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, we “ex-
 amine the elements of the claim to determine whether it
 contains an inventive concept sufficient to transform the
 claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
 Id. at 221 (cleaned up).
                   I. Alice/Mayo Step One
     We agree with the district court that claim 7 is directed
 to the patent-ineligible abstract idea of extracting and
 transferring information from a design file to a manufac-
 turing machine.
     To determine whether the claims are directed to an ab-
 stract idea, we evaluate “the focus of the claimed advance
 over the prior art to determine if the claim’s character as a
 whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs
 of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed.
 Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Where the “focus of the claimed
 advance over the prior art” shows that “the claim’s ‘charac-
 ter as a whole’ is directed to” steps that “can be performed
 in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper”
 the claim is for a patent-ineligible abstract idea. In re
 Killian, 45 F.4th 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
     Here, the focus of the claimed advance, as the patent
 specification indicates, is automating a previously manual
 process of transferring information from a CAD design
 model to a manufacturing machine. The manual activity
 required a human to identify and extract information from
 a design model and transfer the information to a manufac-
 turing machine. ’719 patent col. 1 ll. 26–36. The parties’
 representations to the district court in their joint claim con-
 struction brief further confirms this: “The specification of
 the ’719 patent explains that ‘a problem arises when the
 specialized human operator, capable of inputting data
 into the manufacturing machine, is unavailable’ to perform
 this function,” where “[t]he ‘specialized’ operator is a
Case: 22-1590     Document: 30      Page: 8     Filed: 08/21/2023

 8           FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION

 human who can translate the CAD drawing into the in-
 structions that program the machine on where to make
 marks.” J.A. 1278 (emphasis in original). The ’719 patent
 claims “a programmable logic controller” that automates
 the identification, extraction, and transfer of information
 from a design model. ’719 patent at claim 7, col. 1 ll. 8–13
 (“[T]he present invention relates to systems and methods
 for automatic manufacture of an object based on automatic
 transmission of a three-dimensional rendering of the ob-
 ject, such as a rendering from a CAD to an assembly line
 for manufacture.”), col. 7 ll. 33–38 (“[S]ystems and meth-
 ods . . . capable of extracting automatically from a design
 model the dimensions of the components and the intersec-
 tion and/or machining parameters of the components and
 of instructing a manufacturing machine to manufacture an
 object based on this information.”), col. 1 ll. 53–55 (“[I]t is
 desirable to eliminate the possibility of operator error when
 providing instructions to automated assembly line equip-
 ment.”).
      Automating a previously manual process is not suffi-
 cient for patent eligibility. The ’719 patent is a “quintes-
 sential ‘do it on a computer’ patent,” much like the one we
 held abstract in University of Florida Research Founda-
 tion, Inc. v. General Electric Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed.
 Cir. 2019). There, the patent at issue sought to improve
 upon “pen and paper methodologies” of acquiring, analyz-
 ing, and displaying bedside patient information from vari-
 ous bedside machines by using device drivers to synthesize
 and present the data from multiple bedside devices in a
 single interface. Id. We held the claims abstract because
 the patent “acknowledge[d] that data from bedside ma-
 chines was previously collected, analyzed, manipulated,
 and displayed manually” and “simply propose[d] doing so
 with a computer.” Id.; accord Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Cap-
 ital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
 (holding abstract claims “directed to . . . collecting, display-
 ing, and manipulating data”); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v.
Case: 22-1590    Document: 30      Page: 9    Filed: 08/21/2023

 FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION               9

 Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (hold-
 ing abstract claims directed to “collecting information, an-
 alyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection
 and analysis”).
      Ficep likens its patent claims to the patent-eligible
 claims in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America
 Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016), on the view that
 its claims identify intersection parameters differently than
 a human. Appellant’s Br. 49–53. Ficep asserts that the
 manual method of identifying intersection parameters re-
 quired using a crane to take a component off the manufac-
 turing line, taking a two-dimensional print-out of the
 design to identify the parts that intersected and the loca-
 tion of the intersection, using a ruler and soapstone to
 mark the intersection, and then using a crane to move the
 component back to the manufacturing line. Appellant’s
 Br. 12–13, 52. In contrast to the prior manual methods,
 according to Ficep, the claimed invention identifies the in-
 tersection parameters from the three-dimensional CAD de-
 sign model. Appellant’s Br. 51–52.
     We are not persuaded, however, that the claims require
 a novel means of garnering the intersection parameters for
 an object. On its face, claim 7 simply calls for a “computing
 device” to create a design model, and then a “processor”
 that “identifies” and “extracts from the design model the
 intersection parameters;” the claim does not specify
 whether the design model somehow on its own generates
 the intersection parameter data based on some other, un-
 mentioned data, or whether the intersection parameter
 data is simply fed into the computing device by hand to
 help create the design model. The short patent specifica-
 tion likewise offers no clues as to the means for how the
 intersection parameters were derived; that information
 simply exists in the design model. Thus, when focusing on
 the relevant aspect of the claims—automatically providing
 information to a manufacturing machine—we do not see
 any difference between the manual process and the
Case: 22-1590    Document: 30     Page: 10   Filed: 08/21/2023

 10         FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION

 automated process, other than performance of the step by
 a computer. 5
     Even accepting Ficep’s argument that that the manual
 process and claimed automated process differ because the
 intersection parameters can be extracted directly from the
 design model, this difference alone does not make the
 claims non-abstract. The claims do not require any partic-
 ular method of deriving intersection parameters and are
 broad enough to encompass a human deriving intersection
 parameters and adding this information to the design
 model for later extraction. Ficep itself admits that humans
 could calculate intersection parameters from other data
 contained in the design model. Appellant’s Br. 12 (“A CAD
 model would include a complete design, and thus intersec-
 tion parameters could be derived from CAD models.”); see
 also Appellant’s Br. 28; Appellant’s Reply Br. 27 (analogiz-
 ing identifying intersection parameters from a CAD model
 to calculating the hypotenuse of a triangle using infor-
 mation in the CAD model). Thus, deriving intersection pa-
 rameters from a design model still encompasses an
 abstract idea because it can be performed by the human
 mind or a human using a pen and paper. In re Killian, 45
 F.4th at 1379, 1382; PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google
 LLC, 8 F.4th 1310, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Ericsson Inc. v.
 TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317, 1327

      5  At oral argument, Ficep’s counsel contended that
 the “computing device” could generate the intersection pa-
 rameters when creating the design model, but the “proces-
 sor” alternatively could be the device that generates the
 intersection parameters when it “identifies” them. Oral
 Arg. at 11:10–13:40; ’719 patent at claim 7. The fact that
 Ficep could not settle on one understanding of claim 7 as to
 the origins of the intersection parameters underscores how
 unlimited the claim is as to this feature.
Case: 22-1590    Document: 30     Page: 11    Filed: 08/21/2023

 FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION              11

 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also SAP America, Inc. v. Investipic,
 LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167–68 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
     As to Ficep’s McRO argument, the claimed automated
 process differed from the manual process in that case, but
 the claim also provided “a specific means or method that
 improves the relevant technology.” See McRO, 837 F.3d at
 1314–15. In McRO, the claims were not abstract because
 they were directed to “a specific asserted improvement in
 computer animation, i.e., the automatic use of rules of a
 particular type.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314. “The claimed
 improvement was to how the physical display operated (to
 produce better quality images).” SAP, 898 F.3d at 1167.
      Unlike the claims in McRO, the claims here do not re-
 cite any specific means or method for deriving intersection
 parameters. Ficep repeatedly emphasizes that the inven-
 tion is not directed to how to identify intersection parame-
 ters from a design model. Appellant’s Br. 51 (“[T]he
 invention here was not how to identify intersection param-
 eters using a computer, but rather, when setting up one’s
 manufacturing line, the decision to do so from a 3D CAD
 model and to use them within the manufacturing line ra-
 ther than outside it”); Appellant’s Reply Br. 26 (“The im-
 provement to manufacturing technology does not depend
 on the specific algorithm for identifying parameters”). As
 drafted, the claims of the ’719 patent do not recite any spe-
 cific means or method for identifying intersection parame-
 ters and are unlike the technical-improvement claims of
 McRO.
     Ficep also analogizes its claims to those in Diamond v.
 Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) and other inventions directed to
 “real world” systems. Appellant’s Br. 39–43 (citing Thales
 Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1345, 1349
 (Fed. Cir. 2017); XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, LC, 968
 F.3d 1323, 1330–31 (Fed. Cir. 2020); CardioNet LLC v. In-
 foBionic, Inc., 955 F.3d 1358, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2020); and
 Ecoservices, LLC v. Certified Aviation Services, LLC, 830 F.
Case: 22-1590    Document: 30      Page: 12     Filed: 08/21/2023

 12          FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION

 App’x 634, 636, 642–43 (Fed. Cir. 2020)); Appellant’s Reply
 Br. 4–10. But the claims in these cases were patent eligible
 because, like McRO, they recited specific means for techno-
 logical improvements. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184, 187 (claims
 “describe[d] in detail a step-by-step method” for curing syn-
 thetic rubber that would “significantly lessen[] the possi-
 bility of ‘overcuring’ or ‘undercuring’”) 6; Thales Visionix,
 850 F.3d at 1345, 1349 (claims used inertial sensors in a
 nonconventional manner to reduce errors in measuring the
 relative position and orientation of a moving object, which
 provided a technological improvement in the accuracy with
 which inertial sensors measure the object); XY, 968 F.3d
 at 1331–32 (claims “include[d] a detailed recitation of the
 means” of operating a flow cytometry apparatus to sort in-
 dividual particles in the same sample in real time, provid-
 ing a technological improvement in the accuracy of highly
 pure particle separation of similar particles); CardioNet,
 955 F.3d at 1368–70 (claims “focus[ed] on a specific means
 or method” and provided “a specific technological improve-
 ment” by achieving “speedier, more accurate, and clinically
 significant detection” of atrial fibrillation or atrial flutter
 in a patient improved cardiac monitoring technology);
 Ecoservices, 830 F. App’x at 642–43, 643 n.5 (claims for sys-
 tems for washing jet engines directed to “a specific combi-
 nation of a type of washing unit, information detector, and
 control unit, configured in a certain way” provided tech-
 nical improvements such as a higher degree of quality of
 an engine washing procedure).

      6  We have previously explained that Diehr preceded
 the evolution of the modern-day Alice/Mayo test, but at
 step one “the Diehr claims were directed to an improve-
 ment in the rubber curing process, not a mathematical for-
 mula.” Thales Visionix, 850 F.3d at 1348, 1348 n.2 (Fed.
 Cir. 2017).
Case: 22-1590    Document: 30      Page: 13    Filed: 08/21/2023

 FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION               13

     In contrast, the claims of the ’719 patent do not recite
 any means of technical improvements to an existing pro-
 cess. While the ’719 patent eliminates human error by au-
 tomating the data transfer step, this type of improvement
 does not make the claims patent eligible. See FairWarning
 IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir.
 2016) (“While the claimed system and method certainly
 purport to accelerate the process of analyzing audit log
 data, the speed increase comes from the capabilities of a
 general-purpose computer, rather than the patented
 method itself.”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur-
 ance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could be
 performed more efficiently via a computer does not materi-
 ally alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject mat-
 ter.”). Indeed, “mere automation of manual processes
 using generic computers does not constitute a patentable
 improvement in computer technology.” Credit Acceptance
 Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir.
 2017).
     Ficep also asserts that the extraction of intersection pa-
 rameters from a CAD model allows for an automated man-
 ufacturing process that is different from prior methods
 because the claimed manufacturing machine marks the
 components rather than a human. Appellant’s Br. 51–53.
 But claim 7 does not require marking a manufacturing
 component, and simply recites “manufactur[ing] the com-
 ponents” based at least in part on the transmitted intersec-
 tion parameters. See ’719 patent at claim 7. Thus, Ficep’s
 asserted distinction is not in the claim and therefore not
 relevant to our inquiry.
     Accordingly, we conclude that the claims of the ’719 pa-
 tent are directed to an abstract idea.
                  II. Alice/Mayo Step Two
     At step two, we agree with the district court the ’719
 patent claims do not contain an inventive concept. Beyond
Case: 22-1590    Document: 30     Page: 14    Filed: 08/21/2023

 14         FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION

 the abstract idea, claim 7 recites generic, conventional ele-
 ments of a computing device, a programmable logic control-
 ler, a receiver, a database unit, a processor, a transmitter,
 and a manufacturing machine. ’719 patent at claim 7. “An
 inventive concept . . . cannot simply be an instruction to
 implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer.”
 BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility
 LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Further, the
 recited generic manufacturing machine that manufactures
 the component based on received data is no different than
 the conventional machine and, in the context of this claim,
 is merely post-solution activity. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92
 (“[I]nsignificant post-solution activity will not transform
 an unpatentable principle into a patentable process”).
 Thus, the additional elements in the claims do not provide
 an inventive concept.
      Ficep contends that identifying intersection parame-
 ters from a CAD model was unconventional and thus es-
 tablishes an inventive concept. Appellant’s Br. 54–55
 (citing J.A. 780–82 ¶¶ 15–16; J.A. 838–840 ¶¶ 6–9). We
 disagree. As we explained above, adding data to a CAD
 model and then identifying that data is an abstract idea.
 Moreover, neither the claims nor the specification explain
 the process for obtaining the intersection parameters from
 the design model and leave open the possibility that a hu-
 man determines the intersection parameters and inputs
 this information into the design model—also an abstract
 idea. An abstract idea, however, “cannot supply the in-
 ventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly
 more’ than that [abstract idea].” BSG Tech LLC v.
 Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
     Ficep also argues that the claims move the location of
 the marking from the manual layout stations to the auto-
 mated manufacturing line, which provides an inventive
 concept much like the claims in BASCOM. Appellant’s
 Br. 55 (citing BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350). But the claims
 do not require marking, so this unclaimed feature cannot
Case: 22-1590     Document: 30      Page: 15    Filed: 08/21/2023

 FICEP CORPORATION v. PEDDINGHAUS CORPORATION                 15

 provide an inventive concept. Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Com-
 cast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
 2017) (“To save a patent at step two, an inventive concept
 must be evident in the claims.”).
     Finally, Ficep relies on evidence of secondary consider-
 ations to show an inventive concept. Appellant’s Br. 56–57.
 Questions of nonobviousness such as secondary considera-
 tions, however, are irrelevant when considering eligibility.
 See SAP, 898 F.3d at 1163 (explaining that it is not “enough
 for subject-matter eligibility that claimed techniques be
 novel and nonobvious in light of prior art, passing muster
 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.”); Intell. Ventures I LLC v.
 Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d at 1315 (“While the claims may
 not have been anticipated or obvious . . . that does not sug-
 gest that the idea . . . is not abstract, much less that its im-
 plementation is not routine and conventional.”).
     In sum, the claims of the ’719 patent lack an inventive
 concept.
                          CONCLUSION
     We have considered Ficep’s remaining arguments and
 find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af-
 firm.
                         AFFIRMED