Court Opinion

ID: 9587766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:26:01.934283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:55.509880
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
There is a remedy for failure to file a separate enumeration of errors but the majority’s reasoning does not overcome Leslie’s failure to file one, because under the current state of the court rules, without a separate enumeration this Court does not have jurisdiction.
OCGA § 5-6-48 (f) does not apply because there is no legally effective enumeration of errors at all; that subsection contemplates instances where an enumeration, which is a necessary part of the record, is filed. That subsection provides: “Where it is apparent from the notice of appeal, the record, the enumeration of errors, or any combination of the foregoing. . . .” It does not list briefs, which are not part of the CPA-required items for perfection of an appeal. This deficiency foreclosed invoking subsection (f) in Lewis as well, as stated in the special concurrence in that opinion.2
The “separate” enumeration of errors required by OCGA § 5-6-40 is a part of the record, whereas the repetition of it in the brief as required by Rule 27 (a) (2) does not constitute a part of the record because a brief is not part of the record.3 The separate enumeration is a statutory requirement, not simply a requirement of the court rules which can be adjusted by the court. The statute purposefully authorizes the court to “by rule, . . . permit the enumeration to be made a part of the brief.” The court has not done so; the rule, Rule 22 (a), is otherwise. Yet the majority has made a rule change for this case. I have no doubt that is practical, but it skirts the law. And because the current rules, in conjunction with the statute, require the record rendition of the enumerations to be separate, the record *661needs supplementation. The absence of a record enumeration of errors would deprive the court of jurisdiction for failure to perfect the appeal.4
There is a remedy available that would allow this Court to prompt a correction of the deficiency by supplementation. The court may simply order the appellant to file the statutory enumeration within some reasonable period of time, failing which the appeal would be dismissed. The court could also consider citing the offender for contempt. Court of Appeals Rule 7. The court can also change its rule, accepting the invitation of the legislature at the end of OCGA § 5-6-40.
OCGA § 5-6-48 (d) establishes that “[a]t any stage of the proceedings, . . . the court shall by order, either with or without motion, provide for all necessary amendments, ... or take any other action to perfect the appeal and record so that the appellate court can and will pass upon the appeal and not dismiss it.”
This sentence gives the appellate court broad authority so that the purpose of allowing appeals, a review on the merits, is achieved. It does not confine the court to issuing orders of direction to the trial court. Even that is not narrowly meant, as the order may require obedience by the clerk or the court reporter and not the judge. But “amendments” are not limited to amendments emanating from the trial court itself; they may be needed from counsel, who is in each case an officer of the court. The court is empowered by this section to exercise discretion and require amendments, corrections, and additions of whatever kind are needed “to perfect the appeal.”
Windsor v. Southeastern Adjusters5 does not prevent this Court from exercising the authority granted by the statute. In that case the Supreme Court chose not to utilize the power expressly bestowed, for whatever reason it had. It may have determined to set a stern example at the commencement of the Appellate Practice Act, as it had gone into effect August 1, 1965, only two months before the case was decided.6 Regardless of the reason, it did not rule that an appellate court could not invoke OCGA § 5-6-48 (d) to cure the deficiency in the record.
But, as indicated above, the court is authorized by law to exercise discretion to assure its jurisdiction by alerting appellant to the deficiency and allowing a correction. In both Napier v. Napier7 and *662Benfield v. State8 the Supreme Court recognized that where the enumeration is filed but late, it “may” by its rules deem this transgression a failure to perfect the appeal. It exercised its discretion to do so instead of utilizing the authority in OCGA § 5-6-48 (d) to prompt perfection. In Napier it had looked for a reason not to do so but found that appellant did not offer an explanation or reason for the untimeliness. Without a perfected record, of course, the Court had no jurisdiction to proceed. In this case the record could have easily been supplemented by filing the two-error enumeration which is now contained on a single page of the appellant’s brief.
The opportunity to obtain a ruling on the merits should have been granted here by ordering appellant to file the enumerations. The following reasons warranted such an opportunity:
(1) All else has been done properly; the rules have been followed, unlike in Lewis v. State,9 where several of the requirements for briefs were also overlooked. The court need not become engaged as a school for brief-writing.
(2) The absence of the enumeration from the record has not hampered appellee in responding; appellee does not even call attention to the deficiency by motion, as in Lewis, or in her brief.10
(3) Appellant does set out clearly and succinctly the errors she claims were made by the trial court and identifies them as such; in Lewis, appellant recited no enumeration of errors but merely incorporated “objections” in his brief, and in Windsor there was no enumerations of error included as a part of the brief but only “questions allegedly presented for review.”11
(4) No motion to dismiss, as in Lewis, and no court order, as in Wordu v. State,12 has given appellant an opportunity to complete the record. Lewis tried to defend his omission when it was called to his attention, not correct it.
(5) DeKalb County v. Beacon Indus13 and Lee v. State,14 both cited in Miles v. Emmons15 deal with an effort by appellant to expand the enumeration to include others, which relates to a different although related procedural rule. These two cases do not constitute controlling precedent for the problem here. Miles itself differs, in that *663Miles failed to comply with the court rule as well, so there was no enumeration of errors identified anywhere. His omissions would substantively preclude a consideration of the merits of the appeal.

 Lewis v. State, 226 Ga. App. 344 (487 SE2d 533) (1997).

 Windsor v. Southeastern Adjusters, 221 Ga. 329 (144 SE2d 739) (1965).

 Benfield, v. State, 224 Ga. 139 (160 SE2d 398) (1968) (appeal dismissed for want of timely enumeration of errors); Lowery v. Smith, 225 Ga. 814 (171 SE2d 500) (1969) (appeal dismissed for want of enumeration of errors); Napier v. Napier, 222 Ga. 681 (151 SE2d 712) (1966) (appeal dismissed for want of timely enumeration of errors).

 Supra.

 Ga. L. 1965, p. 18, § 24.

 Supra.

 Supra.

 Supra.

 Compare Russell v. State, 225 Ga. 371, 372 (169 SE2d 124) (1969) (Mobley, J., dissenting).

 Windsor, supra; see Russell v. State, 225 Ga. 371, 372 (169 SE2d 124) (1969) (in Windsor, “no enumerations of error was filed, either as a part of the brief, or separately.” Mobley, J., dissenting.).

 216 Ga. App. 552 (1) (455 SE2d 101) (1995).

 187 Ga. App. 370, 373 (3) (370 SE2d 191) (1988).

 265 Ga. 112, 116 (8) (454 SE2d 761) (1995).

 234 Ga. App. 487 (507 SE2d 762) (1998).