Court Opinion

ID: 9854167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:02:13.697678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:57.778808
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because the evidence on Johnson’s conviction for possession of cocaine is overwhelming and independent of the victim’s testimony, I must concur with affirming Johnson’s conviction for possession of cocaine and the rulings on errors associated with it. I cannot agree, however, that depriving Johnson of his right to make opening and closing argument granted by OCGA § 17-8-71 was mere harmless error. Thus, I must respectfully dissent from Division 1.
This is a classic case of a trial court refusing to allow a defendant to present his legitimate defense as he had planned, depriving him of what historically has been an important right, and then concluding that the errors created by the prosecution and the trial court were harmless anyway. Here, the trial court required Johnson, unnecessarily, to introduce a certified copy of the alleged victim’s prior conviction, when Johnson merely wanted to cross-examine her about her bias because she was on probation, which our law permitted him to do. The trial court, the State, and now this court concedes that this was wrong. Nevertheless, the majority now concludes that the loss of Johnson’s right to open and close was harmless error. I cannot agree.
The right to open and close, “is an important right, and its denial will generally cause a reversal of the decision of the lower court. We hold that the presumption arising from the denial of the right is that the party thus deprived of it has been injured/’Seyden v. State, 78 Ga. 105, 109 (1886). Further, “[h]arm, requiring that a defendant be given a new trial, is presumed when the right is erroneously denied, and the presumption of harm, although not absolute, is not readily overcome,” Hayes v. State, 268 Ga. 809, 813 (7) (493 SE2d 169) (1997). It is “only in those extreme cases in which the evidence of a defendant’s guilt is so overwhelming that it renders any other version of events *729virtually without belief,” id., that the error is harmless. The harmless error test applied by the majority does not take this standard into account.
Johnson
has shown “presumptive harm” because, to pursue his attempt at impeaching the witness, he was required to introduce evidence and forfeit his right to open and conclude the closing argument. . . . But here, the court erroneously required [Johnson] to choose between effectively [impeaching the victim through cross-examining her about her bias] and giving up the final argument.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Whitehead v. State, 232 Ga. App. 140, 142 (2) (499 SE2d 922) (1998). Although this court reversed Whitehead’s convictions for armed robbery, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, we found the following evidence sufficient to authorize his conviction: A victim recognized Whitehead during the robbery by his voice, use of a familiar expletive, and his physical build. She promptly called the police and reported that Whitehead was one of the robbers, and gave his address. When the officer went to that address, he could not find Whitehead there, even though Whitehead testified that he was at home sleeping when the robbery occurred. The prosecution also presented evidence that the robbers were familiar with the internal operations and layout of the business robbed. Nevertheless, because “[t]he case largely turned on the credibility of the victim,” this court found that the evidence was not overwhelming and reversed the conviction.
In this case, the evidence was far less compelling on the aggravated assault charged and was not so “overwhelming that it renders any other version of events virtually without belief.” Hayes v. State, supra, 268 Ga. at 813. In ruling on Johnson’s motion for new trial, the trial court found that “the evidence against Mr. Johnson was overwhelming, from the whispered phone call that initiated the police contact, to the defendant’s actions and the discovery of the knife and the cocaine.” Apart from the discovery of the cocaine, all of the other evidence on which the trial court relied comes from the victim.
The officer’s testimony about the victim’s statements was based upon what the victim told him. The fact that a knife was found appears to have some significance, but only because the victim’s testimony made it so. No one else testified that they saw Johnson with it. Further, only the victim and Johnson testified about these events, and they only agreed that there was an altercation and that Johnson was removing his DVD player.
*730Decided March 30, 2007
Steven L. Sparger, for appellant.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Isabel M. Pauley, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Further, the officer’s testimony that Johnson said that if he were crazy, he would have come out of the apartment with the knife still in his hands is not a clear admission that he had the knife. The statement is conditional, and even construing it to mean that Johnson once had the knife in his hand, it does not prove that he threatened the victim with it. Again, like everything else in this case, the knife only has significance because of the victim’s testimony.
Additionally, I find the error harmful because we cannot assume that Johnson’s defense counsel prepared this case for trial the same way if he had known that the trial court, in mid-trial, would take away Johnson’s right to open and close. If he had intended from the outset to impeach the witness with her prior conviction, counsel might have presented other evidence or called witnesses to support Johnson’s defense.
Thus, considering the evidence, I cannot say that depriving Johnson of his statutory right to open and close was harmless. “This is not a case where the evidence against [Johnson] was overwhelming or his defense [to the aggravated assault charge] incredible.” Dasher v. State, 233 Ga. App. 833, 835 (1) (505 SE2d 792) (1998).
Therefore, because I cannot say that this is one of “those extreme cases in which the evidence of a defendant’s guilt is so overwhelming that it renders any other version of events virtually without belief,” Hayes v. State, supra, 268 Ga. at 813,1 must respectfully dissent.