Court Opinion

ID: 9848166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:14:01.729393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:05.206581
License: Public Domain

Ingram, Justice,
dissenting. The majority opinion of the court plainly overlooks, or ignores, the compelling and essential demands of the Georgia and United States Constitutions as they must be applied to the facts of this case. To place all of the primary issues in proper perspective, it is necessary to review briefly the evolution of several U. S. Supreme Court pronouncements in this area of our law.
Art. I, Sec. I, Par. V of the Georgia Constitution of 1945 and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution contain the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him. For 174 years the Sixth Amendment was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States not to be applicable to the several States of the Union. E. g., see Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 195 (73 SC 1077, 97 LE 1522). In April, 1965, this view met its demise when the U. S. Supreme Court, in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403 (85 SC 1065, 13 LE2d 923), decided "the Sixth Amendment’s right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is ... a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Since the year of Sixth Amendment application to the state, a number of decisions have been rendered by the U. S. Supreme Court dealing with the right of confrontation and they have to be confronted in this case.
I agree that the confrontation clause cannot be read literally for to do so would allow testimonial evidence only through witnesses present in court. All hearsay evidence would thereby be excluded and recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule would be lifeless. We learned long ago from Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 240 (15 SC 337, 39 LE 409), that this was not the intended effect of the *464Sixth Amendment. The case of Pointer v. Texas, supra (p. 404), applying the confrontation clause to the states, gives us one of the first insights into how this important doctrine is now being viewed. In that case, the U. S. Supreme Court observed that, "It cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of cross examination is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him.” The court further noted that "a major reason underlying the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged with crime an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses against him.” Id., p. 406. On the same date that Pointer v. Texas, supra, was decided, the court also decided Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (85 SC 1074, 13 LE2d 934). There, Douglas and an alleged accomplice were tried separately, for assault with intent to murder, in an Alabama State Court. The state called the accomplice as a witness at Douglas’ trial but he repeatedly refused to testify on the ground of self-incrimination. Over defense objection, the prosecutor was allowed to read in the presence of the jury a purported confession by the accomplice which implicated Douglas in the crime. This was allowed by the trial court on the prosecutor’s asserted basis of refreshing the recollection of the witness. However, the witness refused to answer the prosecutor’s questions. Three law enforcement officers then identified the purported confession signed by the accomplice but the document itself was not offered in evidence. Douglas was convicted and the Alabama appellate court affirmed his conviction. On appeal, the U. S. Supreme Court reversed and concluded in its majority opinion that, under the circumstances, Douglas’ inability to cross examine the alleged accomplice as to the purported confession denied him the right of cross examination secured by the confrontation clause. The court went on to note that the opportunity to cross examine the police officers was not "adequate to redress this denial of the essential right secured by the confrontation clause.” Id., p. 420. Cross examination of the police officers on the question of the genuineness of the confession "could not substitute for cross examination of (the alleged accomplice) to test the truth of the statement itself.” Id., p. 420.
Thus, in these two cases, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, and Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415, supra, the U. S. Supreme Court determined that the right of cross examination was strongly identified with the right to confrontation, and indicated that, as a general rule, only non-hearsay evidence may be used in criminal *465trials in the absence of opportunity for cross examination.
Further enlightment came in California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149 (90 SC 1930, 26 LE2d 489). In that case, the U. S. Supreme Court considered a California conviction involving admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement of a witness made under oath and subject to cross examination. The court said in its opinion, "... there is good reason to conclude that the confrontation clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross examination.” Id., p. 158.
In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74 (91 SC 210, 27 LE2d 213), relied on by the majority opinion, the U. S. Supreme Court had an opportunity to review a murder case tried in Georgia dealing with the declaration of a co-conspirator and it decided the admission of this evidence, allowed under Code § 38-306, did not violate the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. At the trial a prosecution witness testified to a statement made to him by one of the alleged accomplices in the crime. He testified that after the alleged accomplice had been arraigned in the state court and been returned to the Federal penitentiary the alleged accomplice said that "if it hadn’t been for [the defendant], we wouldn’t be in this now.” Dutton v. Evans, supra, pp. 77. Defense counsel objected to this testimony as being hearsay, and violative of defendant Evans’ right of confrontation. This court previously held the evidence admissible under Code § 38-306, which allows admission of declarations made by co-conspirators after the actual commission of the. crime, but while the conspiracy continues (for concealment). See Evans v. State, 222 Ga. 392, 402 (150 SE2d 240). Though this was an out-of-court statement which was not under oath and was not subject to cross examination, the U. S. Supreme Court agreed that the admission of this statement did not violate the confrontation clause. It is significant, however, that there were numerous other prosecution witnesses (19) in the Dutton case, one of whom (another alleged accomplice) gave detailed eyewitness testimony of the crime and the participation of the alleged accomplices who made the declaration as well as defendant Evans. The evidence admitted there, as an exception to the hearsay rule without opportunity for cross examination, was not the main thrust of the prosecution’s case relied on for conviction. It was only a small part of the picture, and it had the ring of reliability about it because it was spontaneous and against the interest of the person who made it. Thus, "the trier of fact [had] a satisfactory basis for *466evaluating the truth of the prior statement.” California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, supra, p. 161. The indicia of reliability, noted by the Supreme Court in Dutton v. Evans, supra, in approving the admission of such a declaration, were: that it was not made in the coercive atmosphere of official interrogation; that it did not involve assertions about past facts and that under the circumstances there was no reason to believe it was not truthful (it was against the interest of the declarant); and, that it was a spontaneous declaration. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 87-89, supra. As I noted in the dissent filed in Morgan v. State, 231 Ga. 280, Dutton is basically a "harmless error” decision of a fragmented and divided court in that case. This is indicated by the majority’s observation in that case that the declaration was not "crucial” or "devastating.”
One additional case must be noted with regard to the confrontation issue, and it is Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204 (92 SC 2308, 33 LE2d 293). The U. S. Supreme Court in that case predicated the use of hearsay declarations upon the bona fide unavailability of the witness. In doing so, it relied upon its earlier holding in Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 (88 SC 1318, 20 LE2d 255), and stated that in order to introduce hearsay statements of an absent declarant, the state must show both that he was legitimately unavailable and that the hearsay statements bear strong indicia of reliability.
Although the conviction in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415, supra, was reversed by the U. S. Supreme Court on the confrontation question it also prohibits a prosecuting attorney from calling a witness, as a co-conspirator, to the stand in the jury’s presence and reading aloud his alleged statement, incriminating the defendant on trial when the prosecutor knows the witness will refuse under the Fifth Amendment to testify about the statement. The court noted (p. 420), that "the circumstances are therefore such that 'inferences from a witness’ refusal to answer added critical weight to the prosecution’s case in a form not subject to cross examination, and thus unfairly prejudiced the defendant.’ Namet v. United States, 373 U. S. 179, 187. See also Fletcher v. United States, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 137, 332 F2d 724 (1964).” See also Commonwealth v. Granito, 326 Mass. 494 (95 NE2d 539); Washburn v. State, 164 Tex. Cr. 448 (299 SW2d 706); and De Gesualdo v. People, 147 Colo. 426 (364 P2d 374, 86 ALR2d 1435).
Therefore, in my opinion, the minimum requirements to authorize admission of hearsay declarations of an alleged co-*467conspirator may be fairly stated as follows:1
1. There must be sufficient preliminary proof of a conspiracy. Hearsay declarations may not be introduced pending proof of the conspiracy (by evidence independent of the declarations). If not proved, the acts and declarations of an alleged co-conspirator are inadmissible. Code § 38-306; Park v. State, 224 Ga. 467 (162 SE2d 359); and Lanier v. State, 187 Ga. 534 (1 SE2d 405). Cp. Carbo v. United States, 314 F2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. den. 377 U. S. 953 (1964).
2. The witness, as co-conspirator, must be genuinely unavailable. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U. S. 204, supra. This requirement may be satisified in several ways. One way is for the state to establish to the court out of the presence of the jury that the witness will refuse to testify under his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. See Park v. State, 225 Ga. 618 (170 SE2d 687).
The witness, as a co-conspirator, may not be called to testify under circumstances where the state knows in advance the witness will refuse to testify but nevertheless places him on the stand in the presence of the jury and, in the face of his Fifth Amendment refusal to testify, reads into evidence his entire declaration or admission incriminating the defendant on trial. This procedure was condemned in Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415, supra.
3. The prior declaration or admission must bear sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant a reasonable belief in its truth. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, supra, and Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 *468U. S. 204, supra. This determination of reliability should be made preliminarily by the court outside the jury’s presence. However, an in-custodial confession obtained through official interrogation of the co-conspirator, incriminating the defendant cannot meet the test of reliability. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (88 SC 1620, 20 LE2d 476); Dutton v. Evans, supra; Mancusi v. Stubbs, supra; and Code § 38-414.
A review of the facts in the present case leads inescapably to the conclusion that none of the hearsay testimony used by the state meets the criteria necessary to satisfy constitutional requirements for use as evidence. Admission of the statement of Herbert Smith, though otherwise admissible under Code § 38-314 and the holding in California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, supra, was error under Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415, supra, because the jury was led to believe that the appellant Bennett might be guilty since his co-indictee was refusing to testify. The procedure used by the prosecuting attorney here, having been disapproved in Douglas v. Alabama, supra, must be regarded as prejudicial error. The in-custodial statement made by James Lingerfelt suffers the same infirmity as the Smith statement and additionally it was not shown to have sufficient indicia of reliability to authorize its admission into evidence under the tests noted above which are constitutionally required. Finally, the statement of Marcus Ratledge, as read to the jury by Detective Russell, fails to pass the confrontation clause tests because there was no showing Ratledge was unavailable to testify and no showing as to the reliability of the statement. The conviction in this case should be reversed and a new trial ordered in view of these decisions as they apply to the facts of this case.
There is still another reason a new trial must be ordered. The trial court charged the jury as follows: "It is further contended by the state in this case that certain statements were made in the presence and hearing of the defendant, Charles Bennett, as to the offense and how it was done, and that the defendant failed to make any answer, failed to make any denial or protest under conditions which require such actions. In this connection, the court charges you that acquiescence or silence when the circumstances require an answer, or the denial or other conduct, may amount to an admission. Whether such statements were made in the presence and hearing of the defendant, Bennett, whether or not the circumstances were such as to require an answer, or to require a denial by him, wherein Charles Bennett failed to answer or deny, *469and whether such failure, if any, amounted to an admission on his part, are matters for you, gentlemen, to determine.”
The appellant argues (1) this charge was not adjusted to the evidence and (2) this charge is unconstitutional in that it would tend to deny appellant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and have no inference of guilt drawn therefrom.
Whether the evidence warranted the charge or not is unnecessary to determine here. These instructions by the court authorized the jury to find that the defendant’s silence was evidence of guilt and this severely compromises his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. I believe this is a civil charge, is unconstitutional on its face and cannot be approved in criminal cases under the rationale of the holdings in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (84 SC 1489, 12 LE2d 653); Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (85 SC 1229, 14 LE2d 106); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974); and Spevack v. Klein, 385 U. S. 511 (87 SC 625, 17 LE2d 574).
Finally, the majority has concluded that all of this, if error, was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, citing Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (87 SC 824, 17 LE2d 705, 24 ALR3d 1065), and Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (89 SC 1726, 23 LE2d 284). I cannot agree the error was harmless here. Even if it were conceded that the charge by the trial court on silence as an admission was not reversible error and that the procedure used by the prosecution in calling witnesses it was forewarned would refuse to testify was not prejudicial, the admission into evidence of the statement of Marcus Ratledge alone would require a reversal in this case. As noted above, the Ratledge statement was "crucial” and "devastating.” No direct evidence was offered by the state to show who actually did the killing — the Ratledge statement directly incriminates appellant Bennett — and the admission of this statement cannot be regarded as harmless error. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, supra.
No one believes more strongly than I do that the "guilty” should be swiftly apprehended, tried and, when found guilty in a fair trial, punished under the law. What does concern me, however, is when our zeal to punish the guilty overtakes and impinges upon the right of innocent and guilty alike to have a fair trial in accordance with the basic rights of our Constitutions. It is this concern which motivates me to point out what I consider to be grave constitutional deficiencies in this trial.
I am authorized to state that Justice Undercofler and Justice Gunter concur in this dissent.

 For further comment, see Garland and Snow, The Co-Conspirator’s Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Procedural Implementation and Confrontation Clause Requirements, 63 J. of Crim. L. 1; Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and The Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1378; Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 711; Note, Confrontation and The Hearsay Rule, 75 Yale L. J. 1434; Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 76; Note, The Confrontation Test for Hearsay Exceptions: An Uncertain Standard, 59 Cal. L. Rev. 580; and Note, Confrontation: Prior Testimony, Confessions and the Sixth Amendment, 36 Tenn. L. Rev. 382. See also the recent case of Hoover v. Beto, 467 F2d 516 (5th Cir.).