Court Opinion

ID: 9369058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 19:02:28.829298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:12.605880
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/23 P. v. Simpson CA2/7
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,                                                B296083

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. TA127755)
         v.

DONALD ALAN SIMPSON,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ricardo R. Ocampo, Judge. Reversed.
      Richard D. Miggins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General,
Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Amanda V.
Lopez and Nicholas J. Webster, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       _________________
       Following a jury trial, Donald Simpson was convicted in
2012 of multiple offenses, including first degree felony murder
and seven counts of robbery, with a true finding the murder was
committed while Simpson was engaged in the commission of a
robbery. (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)).1 The jury also
found true Simpson personally used a firearm in connection with
the murder and specified other charges, and the murder and
specified offenses were committed to benefit a criminal street
gang. Simpson appealed, and we affirmed the convictions but
remanded for resentencing in light of multiple sentencing errors.
(People v. Simpson (July 11, 2017, B271460) [nonpub. opn.]
(Simpson I).) After a second appeal (People v. Simpson (Apr. 3,
2019, B291875) [nonpub. opn.] (Simpson II)), on remand the trial
court sentenced Simpson to life without the possibility of parole,
plus 44 years four months.
       In February 2019 Simpson filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). The
trial court found Simpson did not qualify for resentencing
because the jury found true the felony-murder special
circumstance that the murder was committed during the
commission of a robbery, for which the jury had to find Simpson
had the intent to kill or was a major participant in the crime and
acted with reckless indifference to human life. In our original

1     Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), provides for a
penalty of death or life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole if “[t]he murder was committed while the defendant was
engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of,
attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after
committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies: [¶]
(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 . . . .” Further statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

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opinion, we concluded the superior court did not err in finding
Simpson ineligible for relief without appointing counsel and
holding an evidentiary hearing because of the true finding on the
special circumstance allegation and the court’s instruction of the
jury with CALCRIM No. 703 that to prove the special
circumstance the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
Simpson intended to kill or was a major participant in the crime
who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
       After granting Simpson’s petition for review, the Supreme
Court transferred the case to us with directions to vacate our
decision and reconsider Simpson’s appeal in light of People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong) and People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis). In their supplemental briefing, Simpson
contends and the People concede that in light of Strong and
Lewis, the superior court erred in denying Simpson’s petition
without appointing counsel and holding an evidentiary hearing,
and the error was prejudicial. We agree and now reverse.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       As we explained in Simpson I, supra, B271460, Simpson’s
murder conviction arose from the killing of a meat market
employee, Louis Valadez, in the course of a robbery of the
market. During the robbery, one of Simpson’s two confederates
fired four shots at Valadez, killing him.
       The information charged Simpson with 12 counts, including
murder (§ 187), with the special allegation the murder was
committed while Simpson was engaged in the commission of a
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). The information alleged
Simpson personally used a firearm in connection with the murder
and specified other charges (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and the

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murder and specified offenses were committed to benefit a
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). The jury
convicted Simpson on all counts and found each of the special
allegations true.
       In Simpson I, supra, B271460 we affirmed Simpson’s
convictions but remanded for resentencing in light of multiple
sentencing errors. After an appeal of the sentence imposed on
remand (Simpson II, supra, B291875), Simpson was sentenced to
an aggregate state prison sentence of life without the possibility
of parole, plus 44 years four months.
       On February 7, 2019 Simpson, in pro per., filed a petition
for relief stating he had met the requirements under former
section 1170.95 for relief under Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), including that (1) the information
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder; (2) he was convicted of murder based on a theory of
felony murder; and (3) Simpson could not be convicted of first or
second degree murder under changes to sections 188 and 189
effective January 1, 2019. Simpson requested the court appoint
him counsel and vacate his murder conviction.
       On February 11, 2019 the superior court summarily denied
Simpson’s petition without Simpson or any counsel present. The
court explained, “The jury not only found the petitioner guilty of
first degree murder but also found true, the special circumstance
under [section] 190.2(a)(17)(A), that the murder was committed
while the petitioner was engaged in the commission of a robbery.
The jury was instructed that they could not find the special
circumstance allegation true unless they found that the
petitioner had the intent to kill or the petitioner was a major
participant in the crime and that he acted with reckless

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indifference to human life. (See CALCRIM No. 703). In fact, by
finding the allegation to be true, the jury had to have found that
petitioner, even if not the actual killer, acted with the intent to
kill or was a major participant and acted with reckless
indifference to human life. [¶] Therefore, due to the jury’s
findings as stated and pursuant to . . . section 189 (e)(3), the
petitioner does not qualify for resentencing [under] section
1170.95.”

                          DISCUSSION

A.     Senate Bill 1437 and Section 1172.6 (Former
       Section 1170.95)
       Senate Bill 1437 eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of
murder and significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder
rule. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 707-708; Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 957; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-
843, 847-848.) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits
imputing malice based solely on an individual’s participation in a
crime and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of
murder except under the revised felony-murder rule as set forth
in section 189, subdivision (e). That section requires the People
to prove specific facts relating to the defendant’s individual
culpability: The defendant was the actual killer (§ 189,
subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual killer, the defendant, with
the intent to kill, assisted in the commission of the murder
(§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major participant in
an underlying felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and
acted with reckless indifference to human life “as described in

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subdivision (d) of Penal Code Section 190.2,” the felony-murder
special-circumstance provision (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See Strong,
at p. 708.)
       Senate Bill 1437 also provided a procedure (now codified in
section 1172.6) for an individual convicted of felony murder or
murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to
petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be
resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could not have
been convicted of murder under Senate Bill 1437’s changes to
sections 188 and 189. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; People
v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) The ameliorative changes
to the law now apply to attempted murder and voluntary
manslaughter. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       If the section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, including a declaration by the petitioner that he or
she is eligible for relief based on the requirements of
subdivision (a), the court must appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner upon his or her request pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (b)(3). Further, upon the filing of a facially sufficient
petition, the court must direct the prosecutor to file a response to
the petition and permit the petitioner to file a reply, and the
court must determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief. (See § 1172.6,
subd. (c).) Where a petitioner makes the requisite prima facie
showing he or she falls within the provisions of section 1172.6
and is entitled to relief, the court must issue an order to show
cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to
vacate the murder conviction and resentence the petitioner on
any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).)

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       As the Supreme Court instructed in Lewis, in determining
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing he or she
is entitled to relief under section 1170.95, subdivision (c), “[l]ike
the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus
proceedings, ‘“the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as
true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual
allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to
show cause.”’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the
petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without
first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.] ‘However, if
the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts
refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is
justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) But “[i]n
reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary
juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Id. at
p. 972.) Rather, at the prima facie review stage, the court’s
review is limited to “‘readily ascertainable facts’” in the record,
such as the jury instructions, the record of the crimes committed,
and jury findings on the enhancements. (People v. Duchine
(2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815; see People v. Harden (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50 [considering jury instructions and verdicts
to determine whether the record of conviction conclusively
established that defendant was actual killer]; People v. Ervin
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 106 [considering as part of record of
conviction the jury instructions, closing arguments, and verdicts,
which did not show defendant was ineligible for relief based on

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jury’s true findings on felony-murder special-circumstance
allegation].)

B.     The Trial Court’s Error in Denying Simpson’s Petition for
       Resentencing Without Appointing Counsel Was Prejudicial
       1.      The trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel
       Simpson contends, the People concede, and we agree the
trial court erred in summarily denying Simpson’s petition for
resentencing without appointing counsel because Simpson filed a
facially sufficient petition. Under Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952,
which was decided after the superior court’s denial of Simpson’s
petition and our original decision affirming that order, once a
petitioner files a facially sufficient petition under
section 1172.6 and requests appointment of counsel, the superior
court must appoint counsel before performing a prima facie
review under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). (Lewis, at p. 963
[“petitioners who file a complying petition requesting counsel are
to receive counsel upon filing of a compliant petition”]; see
§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3) [“Upon receiving a petition in which the
information required by this subdivision is set forth . . . , if the
petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel
to represent the petitioner.”].) The trial court therefore erred in
denying Simpson’s petition for resentencing without first
appointing counsel.

      2.    The error in failing to appoint counsel was prejudicial
      Failing to appoint counsel for a petitioner at the prima facie
review stage is state law error only, reviewable for prejudice
under the harmless error standard of People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957-958, 973-974.)

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As the Lewis court explained, “[A] petitioner ‘whose petition is
denied before an order to show cause issues has the burden of
showing “it is reasonably probable that if [he or she] had been
afforded assistance of counsel his [or her] petition would not have
been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing.”’” (Id. at
p. 974.) The error was prejudicial.
       Although the jury found the special circumstance allegation
under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A), true, Simpson’s trial
predated the Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015)
61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, in
which the court enumerated the relevant factors for determining
whether a defendant was a major participant in an underlying
serious felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life
for purposes of section 190.2, subdivision (d). As the Supreme
Court held in Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at page 721, “[U]nless a
defendant was tried after Banks was decided, a major participant
finding will not defeat an otherwise valid prima facie case. And
unless a defendant was tried after Clark was decided, a reckless
indifference to human life finding will not defeat an otherwise
valid prima facie case.” The Strong court explained, “A pre-
Banks and Clark special circumstance finding does not negate
that [prima facie] showing because the finding alone does not
establish that the petitioner is in a class of defendants who would
still be viewed as liable for murder under the current
understanding of the major participant and reckless indifference
requirements.” (Strong, at pp. 717-718.)
       Further, under Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at page 972, as
discussed, a reviewing court may not engage in factfinding at the
prima facie review stage. Therefore, we cannot find the error in
failing to appoint counsel harmless based on our independent

                                 9
review of whether the facts presented at trial showed the
Banks/Clark factors established beyond dispute that Simpson
was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference to
Valadez’s life when committing the robbery. We reverse the
postjudgment order denying Simpson’s petition and remand for
appointment of counsel, issuance of an order to show cause, and
further proceedings pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

                         DISPOSITION

      The order denying Simpson’s section 1172.6 petition is
reversed. On remand the superior court is to appoint counsel for
Simpson, issue an order to show cause, and conduct further
proceedings in accordance with section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

                                          FEUER, J.
We concur:

      PERLUSS, P. J.

      SEGAL, J.

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