Court Opinion

ID: 9696600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:52:22.001158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:24.051786
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I do so on the basis that I would overrule our previous decisions in Kula v. Kula, 181 Neb. 531, 149 N.W.2d 430 (1967), and Yelkin v. Yelkin, 193 Neb. 789, 229 N.W.2d 59 (1975). This case points out why we are in error in permitting third parties to intervene in domestic relations cases. On the one hand, the majority notes that the right of third parties to intervene in proceedings for dissolution of marriage is very limited. Yet, we give no guidelines as to the extent of those limits. There*42fore, trial judges are left in the impossible situation of attempting to guess just how far we will go. The law is uncertain enough without our adding to that uncertainty. The third parties in this case, just as in Yelkin and Kula, were at liberty to bring an independent action seeking to obtain whatever relief may be appropriate, either in law or in equity, if indeed a decision in a divorce action would have adversely affected the property in which they hold an interest. To permit them, however, to complicate what is already a complicated matter does not, in my view, serve any useful purpose. For that reason I would have used this case as an opportunity to overrule both Kula and Yelkin, and I would have reversed and dismissed the action insofar as the intervention is concerned.