Court Opinion

ID: 9855946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:34:40.461106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:19.003503
License: Public Domain

STEELMAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur with the majority opinion, with the exception of its analysis finding plain error and a fatal variance between the indictment and the trial judge’s charge to the jury. As to this portion of the opinion, I must respectfully dissent.
*194The relevant portion of the indictment reads:
Manufacture methamphetamine, a controlled substance included in Schedule II of the N.C. Controlled Substances Act. The manufacturing consisted of chemically combining and synthesizing precursor chemicals to create methamphetamine.
The relevant portion of the trial court’s instructions reads:
Producing, preparing, propagating, compounding, converting or processing methamphetamine, either by extraction from substances of natural origin or by chemical synthesis, would be manufacturing methamphetamine.
“A. charge must be construed contextually, and isolated portions of it will not be held prejudicial when the charge as a whole is correct.” State v. McWilliams, 277 N.C. 680, 684-85, 178 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1971) (citing State v. Cook, 263 N.C. 730, 140 S.E.2d 305 (1965); State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181, 134 S.E.2d 334 (1964), overruled on other grounds, News & Observer v. State, 312 N.C. 276, 322 S.E.2d 133 (1984); State v. Taft, 256 N.C. 441, 124 S.E.2d 169 (1962)).
While the trial court’s instructions utilized slightly different words than the indictment, the import of both the indictment and the charge are the same. The manufacture of methamphetamine is accomplished by the chemical combination of precursor elements to create methamphetamine. The charge to the jury, construed contextually as a whole, was correct and without prejudice. I would find no error, much less plain error, in the charge given by the learned trial judge.
I further note that our Supreme Court, in the case of State v. Odom, stated that “when the ‘plain error’ rule is applied, it is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.” 307 N.C. 655, 660-61, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (citation, quotation and internal alterations omitted). In determining whether a defect in a jury instruction amounts to plain error, we “must examine the entire record and determine if the instructional error had a probable impact on the jury’s finding of guilt.” Id. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at 378-79 (citing United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1978)); see also State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 436 S.E.2d 321 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 129 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1994). In the instant case, I would hold that a review of the whole record reveals no plain error mandating a new trial.