Court Opinion

ID: 9889254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-07 06:11:32.076339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:50:01.946904
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed October 5, 2023

                                      In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   __________

                                No. 11-21-00253-CR
                                    __________

                   DEMETRIUS SHAUN LEE, Appellant
                                        V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                 On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
                            Midland County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. CR165593

                                   OPINION
      A jury found Demetrius Shaun Lee guilty of abuse of official capacity, a Class
A misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE 39.02(a)(2), (c)(3) (West 2016). The trial
court sentenced Appellant to confinement for a term of one year in the Midland
County jail and assessed a fine of $4,000. However, the trial court suspended the
confinement portion of the sentence and placed Appellant on community supervision
for a term of eighteen months. In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant contends that
there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We reverse and render a
judgment of acquittal.
                                 Background Facts
      Appellant was a police officer serving with the Midland Police Department.
The Midland Police Department has multiple software programs installed on
department computers that allow police officers to conduct searches for a person’s
driving records and involvements with the Midland Police Department. Police
officers can conduct a search for a person’s information by using the person’s name,
driver’s license number, and/or license plate number. These searches allow police
officers to view information such as a person’s address, height, weight, vehicle
ownership and insurance information, history of driving-related convictions, and
whether a person has been involved in a locally reported crime as a victim, suspect,
or witness.
      The software programs are only accessible via department computers and
cannot be accessed on personal devices. A police officer must use his specific login
credentials to access the software programs. In turn, each entry a police officer
makes is recorded in the officer’s “unit” history. Police officers are required to
receive training on the use of the software programs and are instructed that using the
software programs for personal reasons is prohibited.
      Around May 22, 2018, Sergeant Brian Taylor began an internal affairs
investigation of Appellant’s unit history. Sergeant Taylor reviewed Appellant’s unit
history to determine whether Appellant had accessed anyone’s information for
personal reasons. Sergeant Taylor’s investigation revealed that, between January 1,
2017, and April 26, 2018, Appellant ran a total of twenty-five searches for
information on six individuals, doing so with no legitimate law enforcement
purpose. Sergeant Taylor determined that Appellant personally knew these six
individuals through either dating relationships or the police department.
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      Sergeant Patrick Bostick, the Chief Investigator at the District Attorney’s
Office, conducted a recorded interview with Appellant that was admitted into
evidence and played for the jury. During the interview, Appellant said that three of
the six individuals had asked him to access their information and that he thought
running a search for an individual’s information upon their request was permitted.
      Four of the six individuals whose information was accessed by Appellant
testified at trial. Only Courtney Cler, Appellant’s wife, confirmed that she asked
Appellant to access her driving record. Cler testified that she gave Appellant her
driver’s license number and asked him to see whether a ticket she had received in
Florida was visible on her driving record. The other three testifying individuals
stated that they had not given Appellant permission to access their information.
      In an effort to prove value, the State offered a purchase order for eight laptops.
However, the State did not prove whether Appellant’s in-vehicle laptop was one of
the computers listed in the purchase order. Jennifer Frescaz, the City of Midland’s
Chief Information Officer, confirmed that Appellant’s in-vehicle laptop was not
damaged in any way upon its return and that none of the searches at issue caused the
laptop to depreciate in value. Officer Jacob Churchwell and Sergeant Taylor
testified that they were unaware of any charges associated with an officer’s use of
the software programs.
      After the State rested its case-in-chief, Appellant filed a motion for directed
verdict. Appellant argued, among other points, that the State did not introduce
evidence establishing that (1) Appellant acted with an intent to obtain a benefit,
harm, or defraud another; or (2) the value of the use of the computer(s) accessed by
Appellant was between $750 and $2,500. The trial court overruled Appellant’s
motion for directed verdict. Appellant did not present any witnesses during the
guilt/innocence phase of trial.

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                                       Analysis
      In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence with respect to multiple elements of the offense for which he was
convicted. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the
standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286,
288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we
review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Issasi v. State, 330
S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
      When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted
at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted.
Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235
S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder’s role as the
sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight witness testimony is to be
afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the factfinder’s
duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319;
Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we
presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to
that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
      It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant’s guilt;
circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a
defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient to establish
guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing
Hooper v. State¸ 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Each fact need not
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point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating
circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
Because evidence must be considered cumulatively, appellate courts are not
permitted to use a “divide and conquer” strategy for evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Instead,
appellate courts must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v.
State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
        In its second and final superseding information, the State charged Appellant
with a violation of Section 39.02(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code.1                                  PENAL
§ 39.02(a)(2). A person commits an offense under this section if:
        with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another,
        he intentionally or knowingly . . . misuses government property,
        services, personnel, or any other thing of value belonging to the
        government that has come into the public servant’s custody or
        possession by virtue of the public servant’s office or employment.
Id. The punishment for an offense under subsection (a)(2) ranges from a Class C
misdemeanor to a first-degree felony, depending upon “the value of the use of the
thing misused.” Id. § 39.02(c). Here, the State’s information alleged that Appellant
misused a government-owned computer or computers, and the value of the use of
the computer or computers was “$750 or more but less than $2,500,” a Class A
misdemeanor. See id. § 39.02(c)(3).

        1
          In its information, the State charged Appellant in two paragraphs, one that alleged that Appellant
committed the offense of abuse of official capacity as described in Section 39.02(a)(1) (violation of law
relating to the public servant’s office or employment) and one that alleged Appellant committed the offense
as described in Section 39.02(a)(2) (misuse of government property, services, personnel, or thing of value
belonging to the government). See PENAL § 39.02(a). However, the State acknowledged that it did not
offer any evidence in support of the paragraph alleging a violation of Section 39.02(a)(1) and withdrew that
paragraph of its information; therefore, the trial court did not include it in its charge.
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      Value
      We note at the outset a concession made at oral argument in this case by the
State with respect to the evidence on value. At trial, the State took the position that,
because the computer searches were run on computers only available to a police
officer, the value of the use of those computers was synonymous with the value of
the computers. At oral argument, the State conceded that the value of the computers
did not comport with the value of their use. Accordingly, the State suggested at oral
argument that Appellant’s conviction should be reformed to a Class C misdemeanor.
See id. at 39.02(c)(1).
      Intent to Obtain a Benefit
      Appellant asserts there was insufficient evidence that he intended to obtain a
benefit when conducting the searches at issue. The Texas Penal Code defines the
term “benefit” as “anything reasonably regarded as economic gain or advantage,
including benefit to any other person in whose welfare the beneficiary is interested.”
PENAL § 1.07(a)(7) (West 2021).
      Sergeant Bostick testified that he did not receive any information indicating
that Appellant had accessed any information to gain an economic benefit for himself.
Notwithstanding this testimony, the State’s contention in its closing argument was
that Cler received a benefit when Appellant ran a search for her driver’s license
information. The State argued that outstanding tickets are “very expensive” and that
Cler would have been “worried about how much it’s going to cost” to pay her
outstanding ticket. Thus, the State contended, the benefit conferred on Cler when
Appellant accessed her information was that Cler “[got] to know whether or not she
ha[d] to spend money on these things.” The State elaborates on this point on appeal,
arguing that “[f]inding out about the ticket would have conferred Ms. Cler an
economic benefit because it would have saved her time from having to use other

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means to find out about the status of the ticket. This is time that she could have used
to work to make money.”
      The State’s “time is money” argument is unpersuasive. The only evidence
regarding Cler’s employment was Cler’s testimony that she did not know whether
she was at work when she asked Appellant to run the search. The State did not
establish where Cler was employed, how many hours she worked per week, or
whether she was a salaried employee or paid hourly. No evidence was presented
regarding Cler’s intentions when she asked Appellant to conduct the search, how she
could have alternatively accessed her information, or whether she expected to save
time in having Appellant access her information for her.
      Further, cases prosecuted under Section 39.02(a) tend to have clear, readily
ascertainable economic gains at issue. See, e.g., Becker-Ross v. State, 595 S.W.3d
261, 268–69 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (holding that a rational jury
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the highest-paid city official was
pressuring the city marshal to enforce an illegal traffic ticket quota in order to protect
her salary, which was paid for using city revenue); Megason v. State, 19 S.W.3d 883,
886 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d) (county clerk wrote her children’s
moving company two checks for a total of $4,300 for work that they did not do and
subsequently deposited funds from the checks into her personal bank account);
Talamantez v. State, 829 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (county
commissioner used county equipment to improve realty belonging to his children “at
county expense”); State ex rel. Hightower v. Smith, 671 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. 1984)
(sheriff used county vehicles and fuel to monitor an apartment complex and received
a rent-free apartment within the complex in return).
      As a result of Appellant’s conduct, Cler gained knowledge that an outstanding
ticket in Florida was not visible on her Texas driving record. This might have
provided Cler some sort of benefit within the plain meaning of the word, but the
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State did not establish a nexus between the knowledge Cler gained and any
corresponding economic gain or advantage to Appellant as required by the Penal
Code. See PENAL §§ 1.07(a)(7), 39.02(a). As such, no rational jury could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant intended to obtain a benefit or
confer a benefit upon Cler within the meaning of the statute. See id.; Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319; Issasi, 330 S.W.3d a 638.
      Intent to Harm
      Appellant also asserts that there is no evidence that he intended to harm any
of the six individuals when conducting searches for their information. The Texas
Penal Code defines “harm” as “anything reasonably regarded as a loss, disadvantage,
or injury, including harm to another person in whose welfare the person affected is
interested.” PENAL § 1.07(a)(25).
      Sergeant Taylor testified that he spoke with the six individuals and that there
was no indication that Appellant accessed their information to “harm or blackmail”
them. Sergeant Bostick testified that he did not receive information indicating that
Appellant was intending to “hurt” the individuals by accessing their information.
None of the four individuals who testified at trial stated that Appellant intended to
cause them a loss, disadvantage, or injury when he accessed their information.
Rather, they testified about how they knew Appellant, whether they had asked
Appellant to access their information, and whether Appellant informed them that he
had accessed their information.
      None of the four individuals that testified said that they actually experienced
a loss, disadvantage, or injury. See PENAL § 1.07(a)(25). Another individual who
did not testify at trial previously told an investigator that Appellant told her that he
had accessed her information because she was going to be watching his child, but
her statement did not indicate that she experienced a loss, disadvantage, or injury

                                           8
because of the search. Rather, the individual stated that she thought Appellant was
joking with her.
      During Sergeant Bostick’s interview with Appellant, Appellant provided
explanations as to why he ran some of the searches at issue. Specifically, Appellant
told Sergeant Bostick that he searched for Sergeant Georvarsey Mitchell’s
information to find his address. Appellant stated that he wanted to stop by Sergeant
Mitchell’s home to speak with him about “something going on at the P.D.”
Appellant asserted that he searched for Sabrina Sanchez, Stephanie Reyes, and
Cler’s information because they had asked him to access their driving records.
Appellant did not provide an explanation as to why he searched for information for
Loralea Ray and Bernice Rodriguez. In summary, the evidence at trial did not
demonstrate that Appellant had a malicious intent behind any of the searches.
Rather, the evidence that the State presented only demonstrated that Appellant’s
intentions were unclear.
      The State contends on appeal that “the mere act” of accessing these
individuals’ private information demonstrates an intent to harm because the
information “is intended to be confidential unless voluntarily disclosed.” However,
the State fails to define whether a privacy violation is a loss, disadvantage, or injury.
See id. At trial, the State asserted in its closing argument that the individuals who
did not give Appellant permission to access their information were harmed because
“now [Appellant] gets to know things about them that puts them at a disadvantage.”
Yet the State did not explain how Appellant’s knowledge of this information would
put any of those individuals at a disadvantage. Further, the issue before us is not
whether Appellant had permission to access this information, but whether there was
sufficient evidence that Appellant intended to harm at least one person in doing so.
Whether the jury chose to believe that Appellant had permission to access this

                                           9
information or not, there was no evidence connecting Appellant’s conduct to an
intent to harm any of these individuals.
      As such, no rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant intended to harm any of the six individuals when he conducted searches
for their information. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319;
Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
      Intent to Defraud
      Appellant also contends there was no evidence that he intended to defraud
anyone. During closing arguments, the State told the jury to “focus on the first two
[elements]” because it did not present any evidence of Appellant’s intent to defraud.
The State again concedes on appeal that no evidence regarding an intent to defraud
was presented at trial. We also find no evidence in the record that Appellant intended
to defraud anyone.
      In summary, there was no evidence to support Appellant’s conviction under
Section 39.02(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code. Accordingly, we sustain Appellant’s
sole issue on appeal.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
      We reverse the judgment of the trial court and render a judgment of acquittal.

                                                JOHN M. BAILEY
                                                CHIEF JUSTICE

October 5, 2023
Publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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