Court Opinion

ID: 9686415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:46:31.02369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:18.799278
License: Public Domain

RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that entry into a home with intent to violate an order for protection (OFP) is the equivalent of entry into a home with intent to trespass. I also disagree with the majority’s characterization of the district court’s written findings of fact. By improperly focusing on two short phrases in the district court’s findings, the court not only ignores the fundamental finding of the court that the felony underlying the burglary was violation of the OFP and not a mere trespass, but fails to appreciate the significant difference between entry into a home and entry into a home where a person protected by an OFP resides.
The entirety of the district court’s findings in this case is as follows:
1. On February 25, 1999, Defendant entered the building located at [address];
2. He did so without consent;
3. In entering the building, he intended to and did commit a crime — specifically violation of the October 14, 1998 Order for Protection which excluded Defendant from that building;
4. The building was a dwelling, and;
5. Another person, not an accomplice, was present in the building during some of the time that Defendant was in the building.
(Emphasis added.) The majority focuses exclusively on the phrases, “In entering the budding,” and “which excluded Defendant from that budding” to conclude that the district court found that the independent crime committed was a violation of the “no-entry part of the order for protection.” However, the district court stated that the specific violation was simply violation of the OFP, not the “no-entry part” of the order.
The majority strains to construe the district court order as finding a violation of only the “no-entry” aspect of the OFP so that it can characterize Colvin as a mere trespasser. In Larson, we stated: “[t]o allow an intent to commit a trespass to satisfy the requirement of intent to commit a crime would mean that a mere trespasser who had no intent other than to enter or remain in a budding without the consent of the owner could be convicted of burglary.” State v. Larson, 358 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn.1984). The majority’s characterization of Colvin as a mere trespasser is not supported by the record nor is it supported by our previous case law, which permits circumstantial evidence to determine an intruder’s intent.
The record in this case1 belies the majority’s characterization of Colvin as a *457mere trespasser. This mere trespasser had twice previously broken into Michelle Colvin’s home, stealing money and personal belongings. This mere trespasser had threatened violence against Michelle and their children. This mere trespasser appeared at Michelle’s home every day for a 30-day period, intoxicated. This mere trespasser brought drugs and alcohol to Michelle’s home. This mere trespasser brought his friends to the home, which resulted in an allegation of inappropriate contact with the children. About this mere trespasser, Michelle stated, “I am afraid.”
In addition, the majority ignores the case law, acknowledged in Larson, that permits the consideration of circumstantial evidence to determine the intent of an unlawful intruder; that is the consideration of circumstantial evidence to determine if one is a “mere trespasser.” See, e.g., State v. Mills, 289 Minn. 528, 529, 185 N.W.2d 276, 277 (1971) (holding that “proof of intent to commit a crime must necessarily rest on a permissible inference reasonably to be drawn from all of the facts and circumstances proved” when apprehension of the suspect occurred before anything in the building was taken or disturbed); State v. Crosby, 277 Minn. 22, 25, 151 N.W.2d 297, 300 (1967) (“[PJroof of intent to commit a crime in connection with proof of burglary is always one that must rest on a permissible inference from the facts proved.”); see also Larson, 358 N.W.2d at 670; State v. Propotnik, 280 Minn. 556, 557, 158 N.W.2d 861, 862 (1968); State v. Witte, 280 Minn. 116, 118-19, 158 N.W.2d 266, 268 (1968). When consideration is given to the circumstantial evidence in this case — that is Colvin’s history of domestic violence towards Michelle — a perfectly reasonable inference from Colvin’s occupation of Michelle’s home was that Colvin intended contact with Michelle and their children,2 and that Colvin intended to cause Michelle and the children fear of harm. The court is unwilling to consider the circumstantial evidence, provided by the very order that Colvin violated, that Colvin intended to do more than merely enter into the home without consent. The court’s analysis that Colvin is a mere trespasser is contrary to both the law and the facts.
The majority finds support for its conclusion in the stipulation that there was no allegation that Colvin committed or attempted to commit any crime independent of the OFP violation. However, while actual conduct can be indicative of intent, what is relevant to a burglary charge is the intruder’s intent at the time of entry, not whether Colvin committed or attempted to commit a crime independent of the OFP violation once inside the home. Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1 (2000). The intent that the district court found was the simple intent to violate the OFP, not the intent that the majority surmises, the intent to enter into the home. While the record is sparse, one can easily surmise that Colvin’s intent was to have contact *458with Michelle and the children and to cause fear of harm. In State v. Crosby, we affirmed a burglary conviction that relied upon circumstantial evidence of intent, stating:
[W]hether they found what they expected to find in the building does not detract from the fact that they had an intent to commit a felony or gross misdemeanor; and if that intent existed it is sufficient, even though they did not actually find in the building what they expected to take.
277 Minn, at 26, 151 N.W.2d at 300. Our holding in Crosby applies with equal force here. It is irrelevant that Colvin did not find Michelle when he unlawfully entered her home, staying for two hours while drinking a beer and watching TV. His intent, as found by the district court, was to violate the OFP, which, in addition to prohibiting entry into the home, prohibited Colvin from causing fear of harm to Michelle and prohibited contact with her “in any other way.”
The effect of the majority’s ruling is to erase any distinction between a court-prohibited entry into a home by a person with a court-identified propensity to harm or cause fear of harm to the home-owner and a mere trespass into a building by a stranger. The two, one an offense against a person and the other an offense against property, certainly are not the same and should not be merged indiscriminately, as the majority does today.
In addition, the effect of the majority’s analysis — parsing out what aspect of an OFP has been violated — requires the state to allege and the factfinder to find in burglary cases exactly what aspect of the OFP the intruder intended to violate upon entry. In other contexts, we do not require a jury to agree unanimously on exactly how a law was violated, but only to agree on the “bottom line” — that the particular violation alleged was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d 910, 918 (Minn.2002); State v. Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d 433, 439 (Minn. 2001). The majority analysis subverts this principle by requiring a jury to agree on which aspect of an OFP an intruder intended to violate where burglary is charged. This result appears to inject unnecessary complexity into a relatively simple charge.
I suspect the majority’s true concern, a valid one, is whether a burglary charge, a severity level 6 offense, should be charged when the perhaps more accurate characterization of the offense is felony violation of the order for protection, a severity level 4 offense. However, if the state has misused its charging authority given the facts in this case, that action should be addressed directly rather than through a strained interpretation of the district court’s straightforward ruling. The effect of the court’s ruling will be to discourage the state from charging similar offenses as burglaries, perhaps contrary to legislative intent.
In sum, the majority analysis, which parses out and requires proof of the particular aspect of the OFP an intruder intended to violate upon entry in order to determine whether a burglary charge will stand, is simply unworkable. Moreover, it is unnecessary in this case, given that the district court found that the felony underlying the burglary charge was violation of the order for protection and not the “no-entry part” of the OFP, and given that Colvin was much more than a mere trespasser.
I would affirm.

. In the OFP that Colvin violated, the district court concluded that the petition, referred to in the order, alleges "an immediate danger of domestic abuse.” Colvin did not request a hearing to refute the petition. The district court ordered Colvin not to "commit acts of domestic abuse against” Michelle. The court explained that Colvin was to stay away from the home and was not to enter the home, even if invited. Colvin was not to harm "or cause fear of harm” to Michelle or the children. According to the order, Colvin was not to *457have "any contact” with Michelle or the children through other persons, by telephone, letter, "or in any other way.” Colvin was ordered to reimburse Michelle the sum of $900 "for breakage [and] theft of money.” The order advised Colvin that the Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2000), made the order enforceable in all 50 states, Washington D.C., tribal lands, and U.S. Territories, and further, that Colvin must comply with the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000), concerning the shipping, transporting, possession, or receiving of firearms and ammunition.

. Indeed, one wonders why Colvin did not leave the home after not finding Michelle if, as the majority concludes, his sole intent was to enter the home.