Court Opinion

ID: 9584736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:52:13.055022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:40.234287
License: Public Domain

BENTON, Judge,
concurring.
I join in the opinion’s “hold[ing] that a trial [judge] has discretion to require a complaining witness to submit to an independent physical examination provided the defendant makes a sufficient threshold showing.” Therefore, I also would reverse the trial judge’s ruling.
I write separately because I do not agree with the standard that the majority adopts to guide the determination whether the accused has made a sufficient threshold showing. When addressing the accused’s constitutional “right [under the Virginia Constitution] ... to call for evidence in his favor,” Va. Const, art. I, § 8, the Supreme Court of Virginia has generally used as a standard whether the accused has made a showing of materiality. See, e.g., Massey v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 436, 442, 337 S.E.2d 754, 757 (1985) (holding that “the constitutional right to call for evidence in one’s favor” includes the right to prove evidence material to an accused’s defense); McHone v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 435, 444, 57 S.E.2d 109, 114 (1950) (holding that no constitutional violation was proved absent a showing that the accused was deprived of “material evidence”); Bobo v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 774, 779, 48 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1948) (holding that the constitutional right of an accused to call for evidence in his or her favor “includes the right to interview material witnesses”). The Court has explicitly ruled that “[w]hen [an accused] seeks disclosure of evidence, the standard to be applied in determining its materiality is whether ‘a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists.’ ” Cox v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 324, 328, 315 S.E.2d 228, 230 (1984). Thus, when an accused establishes that evidence is material, “denying the [accused] access thereto violate[s] her constitutional right ‘to call for evidence in [her] favor.’ ” Id. at 328-29, 315 S.E.2d at 230.
*112Citing Cox, we have applied the same standard in a similar context. In Henshaw v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 338, 451 S.E.2d 415 (1994), an accused sought access to a private residence to inspect, photograph, and measure the purported crime scene. See id. at 339-40, 451 S.E.2d at 416. Ruling that the trial judge erred in refusing the request, we held that “[t]he right ‘to call for evidence’ in one’s defense is an ‘unqualified’ right, which is restricted only by whether ‘a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists.’ ” Id. at 344, 451 S.E.2d at 419 (quoting Cox, 227 Va. at 328, 315 S.E.2d at 230). I believe that this is the appropriate standard to be used in this case, in which Jack Clark relies upon the protection of Article I, Section 8 of the Virginia Constitution “to call for evidence in his favor.”
We are not required to adopt the “compelling need” test. Other courts have used their state law as a basis for adopting an appropriate standard. See State v. Barone, 852 S.W.2d 216, 221-22 (Tenn.1993) (cataloging the rulings of courts of various states and noting that “state courts have adopted a number of approaches to determining whether an accused sex-offender is entitled to a compulsory physical examination of a complainant”). For example, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, wíien faced with this precise issue, ruled that the standard to be applied was whether the “results of the examination would have been of material assistance to the [accused].” Turner v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky.1988). See also State v. Hewett, 93 N.C.App. 1, 376 S.E.2d 467, 472 (1989) (finding no abuse of discretion and ruling that the accused “failed to make a preliminary showing to the judge that the examinations would be probative and were necessary”).
In Virginia, the constitutional right of an accused “ ‘to call for evidence in his [or her] favor’ ... is central to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system ... [and] is designed to ensure that the [accused] ... will not be unduly shackled in his [or her] effort to develop [the] best defense.” Massey, 230 Va. at 442, 337 S.E.2d at 757. I believe that the standard announced in Cox best implements this constitutional protection.