Court Opinion

ID: 9732213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:12:05.717544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:12.953079
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN, specially concurring: I agree completely with the holding and the analysis of the majority as to all issues in this case. I write separately to express my strong disagreement with our supreme court’s position that “nonidentification” testimony is inadmissible. The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of nonidentification testimony in the landmark case of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967). The Supreme Court held that testimony regarding nonidentification is properly a factor to consider when determining whether an identification at a lineup has an independent basis for admissibility even though the defendant’s right to have counsel present was violated: “Application of this test in the present context requires consideration of various factors; for example, the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification.” (Emphasis added.) Wade, 388 U.S. at 241, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 1165, 87 S. Ct. at 1940. In People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 137-38 (1990), our supreme court held that testimony that eyewitnesses to a crime had not identified the defendant from mug books and photo arrays was not admissible at trial. Their reasoning was that testimony on this issue did not involve identification. The court cited People v. Hayes, 168 Ill. App. 3d 816 (1988), and People v. Trass, 136 Ill. App. 3d 455 (1985), as support for this holding. However, the appellate court in the Hayes case did not hold that admitting evidence that the eyewitnesses had looked through many police photo books without identifying the defendant was error. The court merely recited that the defense cited the holding in Trass and then held that the nonidentification testimony was harmless. Hayes, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 820. In Trass, a detective testified that one of the eyewitnesses had toured the area of the crime and picked out two possible suspects. The detective testified that those two persons were put in a lineup. The eyewitness did not identify either of the two suspects he had pointed out earlier but did identify one of the defendant’s codefendants. This court held: “[T]he State argues that evidence of a prior positive identification of the defendant is admissible and thus suggests that a prior consistent nonidentification of another suspect should also be admissible. We do not find the State’s argument to be persuasive. A prior identification of the defendant is admissible because it refutes the possibility that an in-court identification is based solely on the suggestiveness of the trial setting. (People v. Rogers (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 571, 411 ,N.E.2d 223.) Evidence that a witness previously did not identify someone other .than the defendant is not relevant for that same purpose and, therefore, is not admissible on that ground.” Trass, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 464. There is nothing in the Trass opinion that suggests the prosecutor at trial was offering the detective’s testimony to rebut a defense argument that the in-court identification was suggestive. Indeed, there is nothing in the Trass opinion that the testimony was offered for any purpose. The most reasonable explanation for the State’s action in calling the detective was to “front” the misidentification of the two people on the street. The fact that the witness had misidentified two persons on the street within minutes of the home invasion could certainly have been raised by the defense to attack the witness’ testimony regarding any other identification. Fronting the misidentification would have restricted the amount of damage caused to the State’s case. On appeal, the State posited a reason for the trial prosecutor’s actions that did not appear to have any basis in fact. The appellate court correctly rejected this rationale. It is obviously true that evidence that a witness previously did not identify someone other than the defendant is not relevant as to the suggestiveness of the in-court identification. However, the fact that a witness looked at dozens or hundreds of photographs or multiple lineups does refute the possibility that the prior identification of the defendant during the investigation was based on the suggestiveness of that pretrial identification procedure. The appellate court in Trass never considered this as a basis for the admissibility of the initial misidentification and subsequent nonidentification. In People v. Jones, 153 Ill. 2d 155 (1992), the victim was allowed by the trial court to testify regarding a lineup at which he made no identification. The appellate court held that this was error. The supreme court said, “The State argues that this testimony was necessary to counter the defense’s allegation that the lineup was overly suggestive and that the identification was therefore not trustworthy. This is simply a fancy way to argue that it was necessary to corroborate Wallace’s testimony, which is precisely what Hayes disallows.” Jones, 153 Ill. 2d at 162. As just pointed out, Hayes is entirely reliant on Trass and the court in Trass did not consider whether nonidentification testimony is admissible to refute the notion that the pretrial identification was suggestive. The significant role pretrial identifications play at trial has been well recognized by our courts. In United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 98 L. Ed. 2d 951, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988), the Supreme Court considered Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), which is very similar to our section 115 — 12 on allowing admission of pretrial identifications. There, the Court held that the victim’s out-of-court identification was admissible as nonhearsay where the victim was present and available for cross-examination concerning the identification even though the witness had suffered brain damage and had no memory at trial of who had attacked him. The Court pointed out: “The premise for Rule 801(d)(1)(C) was that, given adequate safeguards against suggestiveness, out-of-court identifications were generally preferable to courtroom identifications. Advisory Committee’s Notes on Rule 801, 28 U.S.C. App., p. 717.” Owens, 484 U.S. at 562, 98 L. Ed. 2d at 960, 108 S. Ct. at 844. In People v. Panczko, 86 Ill. App. 3d 409, 411 (1980), this court cited with approval language from People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 626, 354 E2d 865, 867, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 275 (1960), overruled on other grounds by People v. Cuevas, 12 Cal. 4th 252, 906 P.2d 1290, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135 (1995): “Unlike other testimony that cannot be corroborated by proof of prior consistent statements unless it is first impeached [citations], evidence of an extrajudicial identification is admitted regardless of whether the testimonial identification is impeached, because the earlier identification has greater probative value than an identification made in the courtroom after the suggestions of others and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness’ mind.” Also see State v. Freber, 366 So. 2d 426, 428 (Fla. 1978): “In our view, an identification made shortly after the crime is inherently more reliable than a later identification in court.” Wigmore is even more direct: “Ordinarily, when a witness is asked to identify the [defendant], the witness’ act of pointing out the accused *** then and there in the courtroom, is of little testimonial force. After all that has intervened, it would seldom happen that the witness would not have come to believe in the person’s identity.” 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1130, at 277 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1972). Evidence of pretrial identification is even more important when the trial takes place long after the crime was committed. United States v. Higgins, 507 F.2d 808, 811 (7th Cir. 1974). Here, many months had elapsed between the time of the shooting and the time of trial. The significant role that pretrial identifications play at trial requires that the trier of fact be told what safeguards against suggestiveness existed at the time of the pretrial identification. The number of lineups and photos viewed is clearly the most significant safeguard against suggestiveness. Extensive research into this area has turned up only two state court cases outside Illinois which directly address the issue of whether nonidentification testimony is admissible. In Milholland v. State, 319 Ark. 604, 608, 893 S.W.2d 327, 330 (1995), the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the fact that the witness had viewed over 200 mug shots and viewed several suspects and dismissed all of them before identifying the defendant was admissible and supported the reliability of the witness’ identification. In People v. Bolden, 58 N.Y.2d 741, 743, 445 N.E.2d 198, 200, 459 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23 (1982), Justice Gabrielli wrote in a concurring opinion: “[Njegative identification testimony is not hearsay. Such testimony by a third-party witness is not offered in evidence for the truth of the statement made by the declarant eyewitness. Rather, it is offered only to prove that the eyewitness possesses the ability to distinguish the particular features of the perpetrator of the crime. *** Furthermore, it may also be useful in demonstrating that the eyewitness was unwilling simply to select anyone offered to him by the police.” Similarly, in United States v. Reliford, 58 F.3d 247, 249 (6th Cir. 1995), the court upheld the admissibility of lineup instruction sheets and index cards on which the witnesses had written their identification of the defendant: “The exhibits were not hearsay; they were admitted for the purpose of showing that the lineup was not suggestive.” Further, witnesses may testify as to conversations which are part of the investigating procedure without violating the hearsay rule. Jones, 153 111. 2d at 159-60. In the case sub judice, our holding will require the State on retrial to confine its evidence on the subject of identification of the defendant to the date of the first identification — one year (or two) after the shooting. What is the jury to make of this delay? The defense will attack the investigation and the State will be precluded from explaining what investigatory steps were taken from the time of the shooting to the first lineup identification. Evidence of which investigatory identification procedures were employed is especially relevant and should be admissible where those procedures are reliable. As Professor LaFave has said, “[a]s the number of photographs displayed decreases, the suggestivity increases.” W. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 7.4, at 589 (1984). As a corollary, as the number of photographs displayed increases, the suggestivity decreases. This is even more true when the photos viewed are of persons of the same race, age and have similar facial characteristics. None of the cases criticizing nonidentification testimony addresses this crucial factor. Indeed, none of the cases discuss whether the defendant’s photo was in any of the mug books viewed by the witnesses. If there is no evidence that the defendant’s photo was not in the mug books viewed by the witness, the evidence does not actually “bolster” the identification. Also, all identifications involve a form of negative identification evidence inasmuch as the selection by the eyewitnesses necessarily meant that the witness did not identify the other participants in the lineup or other photos in the mug book. When this court in People v. Graham, 179 Ill. App. 3d 496, 503 (1989), held that it was proper for a witness to testify that she viewed 300 mug shots before she identified a photo of the defendant, the witness was also saying that she did not identify the other 299 mug shots. Indeed, the holding in Graham provides a basis for the admission of nonidentification testimony if the questions and answers are phrased correctly. Finally, the Supreme Court in People v. Rogers, 81 Ill. 2d 571, 578-79 (1980), cited Wigmore on evidence as support for admitting third-party testimony regarding pretrial identification. Wigmore commented: “This is a simple dictate of common sense and was never doubted in orthodox practice. That some modern courts are on record for rejecting such evidence is a telling illustration of the power of a technical rule of thumb to paralyze the judicial nerves of natural reasoning.” 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1130, at 279 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1972). Illinois’s rule barring nonidentification testimony is just such a technical rule that goes against all reason and logic and it should be discarded.