Court Opinion

ID: 9479415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:18:04.46581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:01.859529
License: Public Domain

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Standards of review do not matter in this case; the evidence against Martinez de Ortiz is sufficient no matter what the formula. I therefore concur in the court’s judgment and join all of its opinion except the statement that “[o]nce a conspiracy is shown to exist[,] evidence that establishes a particular defendant’s participation beyond a reasonable doubt, although the connection between defendant and conspiracy is slight, is sufficient to convict”, page 522, quoting from United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 988 (7th Cir.1983). Although similar expressions dot our recent opinions, we should reexamine rather than reiterate this approach.
Xheka gives one of the two variations on a theme. See, e.g., United States v. Grier, 866 F.2d 908, 924 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Vega, 860 F.2d 779, 795 (7th Cir.1988); United States v. Alvarez, 833 F.2d 724, 728 (7th Cir.1987), following Xheka. The other version goes: “Once the existence of a conspiracy is proven only very slight evidence is needed to establish a defendant’s membership in the conspiracy.” United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1152 (7th Cir.1989). See also, e.g., United States v. Nesbitt, 852 F.2d 1502, 1510 (7th Cir.1988); United States v. Whaley, 830 F.2d 1469, 1473 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Gironda, 758 F.2d 1201, 1217 (7th Cir.1985). A few cases quote both versions. E.g., United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1343, 1346 (7th Cir.1988); Nesbitt, 852 F.2d at 1509, 1510.
“Slight connection” language first appeared in this circuit in Xheka (1983), and “slight evidence” makes its bow in United States v. Robinson, 470 F.2d 121 (1972). Searching for “slight evidence” in a criminal case is a recent rather than hoary phenomenon, and none of our cases justifies the substitution of “slight” for “substantial” — a word with the force of time and authority. E.g., Glasser v. United States, *524315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2911, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).
What do these formulas mean? They could mean that once A and B conspire, “slight evidence” or “slight connection” is enough to convict C of the same crime, an intolerable proposition. They could mean that evidence may be sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt even though “slight”, thus watering down the reasonable-doubt standard. They could mean that an appellate court must keep in mind the possibility that evidence may be slight quantitatively although substantial qualitatively — that a single piece of evidence may be enough in context, an unexceptionable proposition. They could mean that “slight” evidence of participation in the conspiracy is enough to admit other evidence, but that what comes in must be substantial enough to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Some cases use “slight evidence” language to resolve evidentiary questions, e.g., United States v. Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d 494, 498-99 (7th Cir.1988), but “slight” evidence cannot be enough given Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2778-79, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987), which holds that the preponderance standard governs questions of admissibility.
The Xheka version could mean that if someone joins the conspiracy, “slight” activity to accomplish its objectives is enough, that peripheral conspirators commit the crime no less than the mastermind. As the majority today puts it: “[wjhile a defendant’s participation in the conspiracy need not have been substantial in order to convict but may have been slight, the evidence must establish the defendant’s knowing participation in the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.” Page 522. This interpretation follows the definition of the crime (agreement plus one overt act) and is not troubling. That we have to tease it out of a formula with dubious alternative meanings, though, is a mark against its use. And the other variation — “Once the existence of a conspiracy is proven only very slight evidence is needed to establish a defendant’s membership in the conspiracy” —cannot be massaged to yield a meaning with which we should want to live. It says that “very slight evidence” is enough to send a person up the river. Maybe we could torture the phrase until it confessed to a constitutionally acceptable meaning, but why bother? Far better to throw it overboard and adopt a formula that clearly explains what we are about. The Fifth Circuit did just this in a unanimous en banc opinion. United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.1979). See also Note, Connecting Defendants to Conspiracies: The Slight Evidence Rule and the Federal Courts, 64 Va.L.Rev. 881 (1978) (recommending this course). Although Xheka came after Malatesta, and our “slight evidence” cases have blossomed recently, our circuit has never cited Malatesta, never justified these approaches, never explained how either formula can be reconciled with the reasonable-doubt standard.
Nothing we do as judges in criminal cases is more important than assuring that the innocent go free. Few innocent persons reach us: prosecutor, grand jury, trial judge, and petit jury have sifted the pool of suspects. Some of the defendants who come here are innocent, but usually we can’t tell which. False accusations of crime must be caught by prosecutor and petit jury; we cannot reverse a conviction just because the main witnesses may have been confused or, worse, liars. Now and again, however, a case arrives in which something transparently has gone wrong, and we must act. Every time we reverse a conviction on account of insufficient evidence, we avert many more; the standard of review in this court establishes the benchmark that guides conduct elsewhere.
“Conspiracy” is a net in which prosecutors catch many little fish. We should not go out of our way to tighten the mesh. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404, 77 S.Ct. 963, 973, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957). Prosecutors have many legitimate advantages in the criminal process. Defendants’ great counterweight is the requirement *525that the prosecution establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. References to “slight evidence” and “slight connection” reduce the power of that requirement.