Court Opinion

ID: 9638181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:36:57.199884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:04.616334
License: Public Domain

DROWOTA, Justice,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion that “it was error for the trial court to direct a verdict for Defendant in this case.”
With respect to the issue of whether it is for the trial judge or the jury to determine the issue of probable cause in a malicious prosecution case, I must again disagree with the majority’s conclusion that it is for the Court. I adhere to my views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Lewis v. Williams, 618 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn.1981), when I stated:
In my judgment, the question of probable cause should be for the jury .... the heart of the inquiry as to whether or not probable cause exists is reasonableness. The crucial question is whether the defendant was reasonable in his belief that the accused committed the crime. Inextricably bound up with that question is the reasonableness of the defendants’ examination of the situation.... I find the procedure outlined in Cohen v. Cook, cumbersome, unnecessary, and extremely difficult for judge and jury. The better procedure would be to let the jury decide whether the instigator of criminal proceedings acted reasonably and avoid the difficulties presented by the majority’s approach.... I see no good reason to take the issue of probable cause away from the jury and yet require the jury to determine malice and punitive damages.
618 S.W.2d at 304, 305.