Court Opinion

ID: 9381213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 14:05:45.216095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.772576
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-769

                               GEORGE FRANCISCO

                                       vs.

                          ROBERT PETTIE & another.1

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        The plaintiff, George Francisco, filed a complaint in the

 Superior Court against the defendants, alleging negligence

 resulting in a motor vehicle accident.           Answering special

 verdict questions, the jury found that the defendant, Robert

 Pettie, was negligent but that his negligence was not the cause

 of the plaintiff's injuries.         Judgment entered for the

 defendants.     The plaintiff filed a motion for additur and/or

 reconsideration or in the alternative for a new trial; the

 motion was denied.       The plaintiff timely appealed the judgment

 and denial of the motion.        We affirm.

        Background.    In 2014, while in stop and go traffic, the

 plaintiff was rear-ended by a Toyota Tacoma driven by Pettie on

 1   American Gutter Cleaning and Installations, Inc.
Interstate Highway 93 near Boston.       Pettie estimated that he was

traveling between five and thirteen miles per hour shortly

before the accident.    The impact caused the front of the Tacoma

to become lodged in a trailer hitch extending from the rear of

the plaintiff's Ford F-350.    The parties do not dispute that

Pettie was at fault for the accident or that he was driving a

vehicle owned by his employer, defendant American Gutter

Cleaning and Installations, Inc.      The question for the jury was

whether Pettie's negligence was the cause of the plaintiff's

claimed injuries.2

     Discussion.     The plaintiff raises multiple issues on

appeal, none of which persuades us that the judgment should be

disturbed.    We address each in turn.

     1.   Inconsistent verdict.   The plaintiff argues that the

jury's answers to the special verdict questions (special

questions) were inconsistent and therefore the verdict cannot

stand.    Notably, the plaintiff does not contend that the special

questions were inconsistent -- in fact, the judge adopted the

plaintiff's proposed questions.       Rather, the plaintiff bases his

argument on the judge's answer to a jury question received

during its deliberations.    The jurors asked the following:

2 The plaintiff claimed that as a result of Pettie's negligence
he "sustained serious injuries to his neck, back, head, arms and
other injuries, suffered great mental and emotional pain, was
obliged to expend monies for medical care and attendance."

                                  2
"Regarding Question 1 on the special verdict questions, in order

to satisfy the legal definition of negligence does the plaintiff

have the burden of proving all, underlined, all four elements

cumulatively."   The note referenced "pages 23 to 24 of [the

judge's] charge to the jury," which the jury had in the jury

room.3

     After discussion with the attorneys, the judge said that he

planned to answer the question as follows:       "The simple answer

to the jury's question is, yes.       The plaintiff must prove each

of the elements of his negligence claim by a preponderance of

the evidence . . . although it need not be the same seven jurors

who agree as to each element."    Both attorneys said they

"agreed" with the proposed answer, and it was provided to the

jury in writing.   On appeal, the plaintiff contends that if the

jury answered "yes" to the first special question, then in light

of the judge's answer, the second special question would be

moot.    And because the jury answered "yes" to special question

one and "no" as to special question two, the judge allowed a

"contradictory and inconsistent verdict to stand."

     We first observe that the plaintiff did not object to and

in fact agreed with the judge's proposed answer to the jury

question.   Passing on whether this constitutes waiver, the

3 The jury received a written copy of the judge's charge to
assist in its deliberation.

                                  3
plaintiff's failure to object to the alleged inconsistent

verdict before the jury was discharged is fatal to his claim.

See Adams v. United States Steel Corp., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 102,

104 (1987) ("A party must object to inconsistent answers to

special questions before the jury is discharged").    If there is

no timely objection, any claim of error is waived and cannot be

raised for the first time on appeal.    See Shafnacker v. Raymond

James & Assocs., Inc., 425 Mass. 724, 731 (1997).    Here,

approximately ten minutes after the judge answered the jury's

question, it returned with a verdict.    The clerk, without

objection, then recorded the verdict.    The plaintiff's request

to then poll the jury was not a substitute for the failure to

object.   This claim is therefore waived.4   See Adams, supra.

    2.    Cross-examination of defense expert witness.   The

plaintiff contends that the judge erred in precluding him from

cross-examining the defendants' expert witness on his status as

an employee of the defendants' liability insurer.    We review for

4 Although the judge's answer to the jury's question could have
been more precise, taking the instructions as a whole, the
jury's answers to the two special questions can be harmonized
and thus are not inconsistent. See Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co.,
399 Mass. 790, 800 (1987). A party's action may be negligent,
but not the legal cause of the other party's injuries. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 430, 431, and comments (1965).
This is particularly true here, as Pettie admitted the accident
was his fault but challenged whether that negligence was the
cause of the plaintiff's claimed injuries. See Service Publ.,
Inc. v. Goverman, 396 Mass. 567, 573 n.8 (1986).

                                 4
an abuse of discretion or error of law.     See Antoniadis v.

Basnight, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 176 (2021).    Ordinarily, a

plaintiff may not elicit testimony showing that a defendant has

liability insurance because evidence of insurance can lead to

exaggerated verdicts for plaintiffs.    See Goldstein v. Gontarz,

364 Mass. 800, 808 (1974).   However, the rule does not

necessitate exclusion of evidence of liability insurance when

offered to prove bias of a witness.    See McDaniel v. Pickens, 45

Mass. App. Ct. 63, 66-67 (1998).

    After consultation with the judge, the parties agreed that

plaintiff's counsel would not elicit testimony about the

defendants' liability insurance.    Rather, the plaintiff was

permitted to elicit evidence that the expert witness was not

impartial and independent, but rather that he was an employee of

and intricately connected to the defendants.    On these facts,

because the parties agreed, the judge did not abuse his

discretion in limiting cross-examination.    However, the

defendants are cautioned that in future cases, if an expert

witness is connected to their liability insurer as this expert

was, they should expect that such will be brought out in cross-

examination, as it is appropriate evidence of bias.

    3.   Missing witness instruction.     The plaintiff argues that

the judge erred in denying his motion in limine that requested a

missing witness instruction regarding the passenger in the

                                5
Tacoma.   We review for abuse of discretion.        See Mazzoleni v.

Cotton, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 147, 150-151 (1992).         Here, the judge

determined that the passenger's testimony would be cumulative of

other evidence, particularly where Pettie admitted that he was

at fault for the accident.    See Commonwealth v. Tripolone, 57

Mass. App. Ct. 901, 901 (2003).         And the judge allowed

plaintiff's counsel to question Pettie regarding the passenger.

See Rolanti v. Boston Edison Corp., 33 Mass. App. Ct. 516, 526-

527 (1992).   There was no error.

    4.    Learned treatise.   The plaintiff claims that the judge

abused his discretion in denying his motion in limine to enter

into evidence two articles, contending that they were learned

treatises.    The articles were authored by the owner of a company

that sells safety equipment for receiving hitches, and explained

that there is an increased risk of whiplash when someone is

rear-ended in a vehicle with a receiving hitch.         There was no

error as the judge properly found that the articles were not

learned treatises where the author was selling a product, see

Federico v. Ford Motor Co., 67 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 458-459

(2006), there was no evidence that the articles were from a

reliable authority, see Commonwealth v. Sneed, 413 Mass. 387,

396 (1992), and the judge allowed plaintiff's counsel to

                                    6
question the defendants' expert witness about the contents of

the articles.5

     5.   Exclusion of citation issued by police.   The plaintiff

contends that the judge erred in excluding the traffic citation

issued to Pettie by the responding State police trooper.     There

was no error as the citation amounted to a determination of

fault, see LePage v. Bumila, 407 Mass. 163, 164-167 (1990),

contained second level hearsay, see Julian v. Randazzo, 380

Mass. 391, 394 (1980), and Pettie did not contest that he was at

fault for the accident.

     6.   Motion for directed verdict.   The plaintiff contends

that the judge erred in denying his motion for a directed

verdict on the issue of liability.   As did the trial judge, we

"construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and disregard that favorable to the moving

party."   O'Brien v. Pearson, 449 Mass. 377, 383 (2007).    We ask

whether a reasonable inference can be drawn in favor of the

nonmoving party.   See Dobos v. Driscoll, 404 Mass. 634, 656,

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989).   Pettie admitted that the

accident was his fault, and it was for the jury to determine

5 Because this is not a medical malpractice action, even if the
judge found that the articles were learned treatises,
plaintiff's counsel would only have been permitted to read the
contents of the article into evidence on cross-examination. See
Kace v. Liang, 472 Mass. 630, 645 (2015).

                                 7
whether the plaintiff proved all four elements of negligence to

establish legal liability.     See Adams v. Congress Auto Ins.

Agency, Inc., 90 Mass. App. Ct. 761, 765 (2016).6    There was no

error.

     7.   Exclusion of plaintiff's expert witness.    The plaintiff

next argues that the judge "erred by cancelling [his] ability to

call [his] expert witness."    He cites no authority for his

proposition that the due process clause grants litigants a right

to present expert testimony.    Rather, "[t]rial judges have broad

discretion to make . . . rulings conducive to the conduct of a

fair and orderly trial" (quotations omitted).     Bolton v.

Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 32 Mass. App. Ct. 654, 657

(1992).   The plaintiff had multiple opportunities to present

expert testimony, both in his case in chief and at the end of

the defendants' case, but his expert witness failed to appear

for trial.   In fact, the trial had been continued for one week

to accommodate the witness' schedule.     The judge was not

required to keep the jury for an undetermined time before the

plaintiff's expert witness arrived.    See id.

     8.   Other issues.   The plaintiff claims error in the denial

of his request to conduct an experiment in the courtroom, denial

6 Additionally, the plaintiff failed to explain how the denial of
his motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability
prejudiced him where the jury found the defendants negligent,
thereby rendering the motion moot.

                                  8
of his motion for additur or a new trial, and denial of his

request to poll the jury.    Because he failed to cite to any

authority on these issues, the arguments do not rise to the

level of appellate argument, and therefore we need not address

them.   See Cabot v. Cabot, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 756, 768 (2002);

Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628

(2019).7

                                     Judgment affirmed.

                                     Order denying motion for
                                       additur and/or
                                       reconsideration or in the
                                       alternative for new trial
                                       affirmed.

                                     By the Court (Blake,
                                       Englander & Walsh, JJ.8),

                                     Clerk

Entered:   March 22, 2023.

7 To the extent that the plaintiff raised arguments not discussed
herein, we have not overlooked them but conclude that they do
not merit discussion. See Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass.
66, 78 (1954).
8 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                 9