Court Opinion

ID: 9958209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 15:02:19.639677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:05.171410
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-2238    Document: 16     Page: 1   Filed: 04/08/2024

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                JAMES THOMAS RYAN,
                      Petitioner

                             v.

             DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
                      Respondent
                ______________________

                        2023-2238
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. DC-1221-14-0323-B-1.
                 ______________________

                  Decided: April 8, 2024
                  ______________________

    JAMES RYAN, Bel Air, MD, pro se.

     JOSEPH ALAN PIXLEY, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, TARA K. HOGAN, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY.
                   ______________________
Case: 23-2238      Document: 16     Page: 2    Filed: 04/08/2024

 2                                             RYAN v. DEFENSE

     Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE, Circuit Judge, and
                 ALBRIGHT, District Judge. 1
 PER CURIAM.

     James Thomas Ryan appeals from a final order of the
 Merit Systems Protection Board (“the Board”) denying his
 petition for review and affirming the denial of his request
 for corrective action under the Whistleblower Protection
 Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (“WPA”). See Ryan v. Dep’t of
 Def., No. DC-1221-14-0323-B-1 (M.S.P.B. May 30, 2023)
 (“Final Order”), R.A. 1–26; Ryan v. Dep’t of Def., No. DC-
 1221-14-0323-B-1 (M.S.P.B. July 12, 2017) (“Initial Deci-
 sion”), R.A. 27–50. 2

       For the following reasons, we affirm.
                         BACKGROUND
     From February 2009 until his removal in June 2017,
 Ryan was employed as a police officer by the Pentagon
 Force Protection Agency (“the Agency”). 3 Throughout 2014
 and 2016, Ryan filed a series of individual right of action
 (“IRA”) appeals with the Board, alleging that the Agency
 had taken several adverse personnel actions against him
 in retaliation for various whistleblowing disclosures that
 he had made. See Initial Decision, R.A. 27, 31. His appeals
 were consolidated, and six of the eight disclosures forming
 the basis of Ryan’s appeals were dismissed for lack of juris-
 diction. See id. at 28, 31. We say no more as to those six
 disclosures, the dismissal of which Ryan does not challenge

       1 Honorable Alan D Albright, District Judge, United
 States District Court for the Western District of Texas, sit-
 ting by designation.
     2   “R.A.” refers to the appendix filed with Respond-
 ent’s brief.
     3   We affirmed Ryan’s removal from service in Ryan
 v. Department of Defense, 760 F. App’x 990 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Case: 23-2238      Document: 16   Page: 3    Filed: 04/08/2024

 RYAN v. DEFENSE                                           3

 on appeal. We focus instead on the two disclosures over
 which the Board concluded that it did have jurisdiction: a
 January 4, 2013 memorandum submitted to the Agency’s
 Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”) describing
 three incidents of alleged assault, and an April 5, 2013
 memorandum submitted to OPR describing an additional
 incident of alleged assault. Id. at 31. A hearing to deter-
 mine whether Ryan was entitled to corrective action based
 on either of those two disclosures was held before an ad-
 ministrative judge (“AJ”) on May 4, 2017. Id. at 32.
     The first incident, disclosed in Ryan’s January 4, 2013
 memorandum, occurred during an honor guard assignment
 in or around June or July 2012 at the Raven Rock Moun-
 tain Complex in Pennsylvania. Id. at 33–34. Ryan alleged
 that a fellow police officer (“the accused officer”) had at-
 tempted to embarrass Ryan by intentionally giving him
 conflicting commands causing him to be out of step with
 the rest of the detail. Id. at 34. According to Ryan, the
 accused officer mocked him, making him apprehensive and
 distracted from his duties. Id. The AJ concluded that, even
 assuming the accused officer had in fact given a false or
 conflicting command as Ryan claimed, Ryan could not have
 reasonably believed that he was assaulted because he did
 not allege that the accused officer intended to cause him
 fear of bodily injury. Id. at 35.
      The second incident occurred on August 28, 2012, in
 Mitchellville, Maryland. Id. According to Ryan, while both
 officers were on duty and surrounded by several fellow of-
 ficers (including their lieutenant), the accused officer
 placed his left hand on Ryan’s chest and pushed him, tell-
 ing him to “get out [of] the way” in a taunting manner. Id.
 (alteration in original). The AJ concluded that, even as-
 suming there was physical contact, Ryan could not have
 reasonably believed that the accused officer’s conduct con-
 stituted assault. Id. at 36. The AJ reached that conclusion
 based on Ryan’s subsequent characterizations of the inter-
 action as an affront to his dignity (rather than as a threat
Case: 23-2238    Document: 16      Page: 4    Filed: 04/08/2024

 4                                           RYAN v. DEFENSE

 of bodily harm), the absence of any supporting witnesses
 (despite being in the company of several coworkers), and
 Ryan’s history of raising unfounded accusations against
 coworkers. See id. at 36–37.
      The third incident occurred on January 4, 2013, in
 Woodbridge, Virginia. Id. at 37. According to Ryan, he had
 had an argument with the accused officer over the volume
 of the radio in an agency vehicle. Id. When later retrieving
 equipment from the rear of that vehicle, the accused officer
 allegedly made unnecessary physical contact with Ryan,
 laughed, smirked, and said, “[y]ou better leave that alone
 or you’ll get smacked.” Id. According to Ryan, that inter-
 action made him apprehensive and distracted from his du-
 ties. Id. at 37–38. Considering Ryan’s sworn hearing
 testimony—characterizing the contact as, among other
 things, a “nudge”—as well as the hearing testimony of the
 accused officer and other record evidence, the AJ concluded
 that Ryan could not have reasonably believed the accused
 officer’s conduct constituted assault. Id. at 38–40. The AJ
 further found that, even if the physical contact was inten-
 tional, nothing in Ryan’s testimony or the evidence sug-
 gested that he perceived any threat of bodily harm. See id.
 at 40–42 (explaining, for example, that Ryan repeatedly
 testified that he was not alarmed or surprised by the ac-
 cused officer’s conduct).
      The fourth incident of alleged assault, described in
 Ryan’s second disclosure at issue, occurred on April 5,
 2013. Id. at 42. Ryan alleged that, as he was entering an
 agency facility in Arlington, Virginia in plain clothes, the
 accused officer, who was on duty and in possession of an
 agency firearm, stared at him with a “scorn[ful]/resent-
 ful/angry expression on his face.” Id. (alteration in origi-
 nal). Ryan alleged that the look he was given was an
 attempt by the accused officer to intimidate him with phys-
 ical force. Id. Considering all the evidence relating to that
 incident, including the Chief of OPR’s memorandum ex-
 plaining that the recorded CCTV footage of the incident did
Case: 23-2238      Document: 16   Page: 5    Filed: 04/08/2024

 RYAN v. DEFENSE                                           5

 not corroborate Ryan’s allegations, the AJ concluded that,
 even if those allegations were true, Ryan could not have
 reasonably believed that any degree of intensity or scorn
 he perceived in the accused officer’s expression caused him
 to suffer an assault. Id. at 42–44.
     Accordingly, because Ryan could not have reasonably
 believed that the accused officer’s conduct on any of the
 four occasions constituted assault, the AJ held that Ryan’s
 disclosures were not protected and that he was not entitled
 to relief under the WPA. Id. at 44.
     Ryan petitioned for review. The Board denied his peti-
 tion, holding that Ryan had not identified any error of fact
 or law in the AJ’s decision. Final Order, R.A. 2. Ryan ap-
 peals from the Board’s final order. We have jurisdiction
 under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
                         DISCUSSION
      Our review of the Board’s decision is circumscribed by
 statute. We may not reverse a Board decision unless it is
 “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or other-
 wise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without pro-
 cedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
 followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”
 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Accordingly, we will generally not over-
 turn a Board decision unless it is contrary to law, or it is
 not supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
 Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
     To establish a cause of action for whistleblowing under
 the WPA, Ryan must demonstrate by a preponderance of
 the evidence that at least one of his disclosures was pro-
 tected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). A disclosure is pro-
 tected if the employee “reasonably believes” the disclosure
 shows “any violation of any law, rule, or regulation[.]” Id.
 § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i).
Case: 23-2238     Document: 16     Page: 6    Filed: 04/08/2024

 6                                            RYAN v. DEFENSE

     Ryan challenges the Board’s conclusion that the evi-
 dence does not support a finding that he reasonably be-
 lieved that he had disclosed a violation of law, i.e., an
 assault. The test for a purported whistleblower’s reasona-
 ble belief is an objective one. The question is not whether
 Ryan himself subjectively believed the accused officer’s
 conduct constituted a violation of law, but whether “a dis-
 interested observer with knowledge of the essential facts”
 would reasonably conclude that the conduct constituted a
 violation. Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed.
 Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). Ryan’s “purely subjective
 perspective . . . is not sufficient.” Id. Applying that objec-
 tive disinterested observer standard, the Board’s conclu-
 sions that Ryan could not have reasonably believed that
 the accused officer’s conduct on any of the four occasions
 amounted to assault were supported by substantial evi-
 dence.
      Ryan’s primary challenge appears to rest on the defer-
 ence that the Board afforded to the AJ’s credibility deter-
 minations. See generally Ryan’s Informal Br. at 2. But we
 have long held that the presiding official’s (here, the AJ’s)
 credibility determinations are “virtually unreviewable.”
 Hambsch v. Dep’t of Treasury, 796 F.2d 430, 436 (Fed. Cir.
 1986). Even so, the Board here did not simply accept the
 AJ’s credibility determinations out of hand. Rather, it con-
 sidered the evidentiary record as a whole and reasoned
 that the AJ’s findings, which were “intertwined with issues
 of credibility” and Ryan’s demeanor at the hearing, were
 afforded “special deference,” which could not be rejected ab-
 sent “sufficiently sound” reasons. Final Order, R.A. 17
 (first quoting Purifoy v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 838 F.3d
 1367, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2016); and then quoting Haebe v.
 Dep’t of Just., 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). The
 Board found no such reasons, citing, among other things,
 the various inconsistencies in Ryan’s characterizations of
 the incidents throughout the proceedings and the lack of
 any evidence or testimony corroborating Ryan’s
Case: 23-2238      Document: 16     Page: 7    Filed: 04/08/2024

 RYAN v. DEFENSE                                              7

 representation of the events. See Final Order, R.A. 14–17,
 19. We therefore see no error in the Board’s deference to
 the AJ’s credibility findings.
     Ryan further argues that the Board erred as a matter
 of law by construing his disclosures as allegations of as-
 sault as opposed to battery. In his view, a “whistleblower
 is not obligated to properly label the disclosures,” and the
 Board should have recognized that battery is considered an
 assault under the relevant state laws. Ryan’s Informal Br.
 at 2. At least at common law, however, Ryan’s burden of
 establishing battery would have been higher than his bur-
 den of establishing assault, as that offense requires more
 than a mere threat of bodily injury. See, e.g., Battery,
 Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (requiring an inten-
 tional touching). We therefore see no benefit to Ryan in
 construing his allegations as the higher offense of battery.
 See, e.g., Assault and Battery, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
 ed. 2019) (“Although the term assault and battery is fre-
 quently used when a battery has been committed, one who
 commits a battery cannot also be punished for committing
 an assault, since the lesser offense of assault blends into
 the actual battery.” (citation omitted)).
      If anything, the Board provided Ryan a more liberal re-
 view of the evidentiary record than the AJ, as it not only
 considered the common law definition of assault supplied
 by the AJ, see Initial Decision, R.A. 35, but also the defini-
 tions for assault provided under relevant state law. See
 Final Order, R.A. 7–8 (considering Pennsylvania law’s def-
 inition of “simple assault” for the first incident); id. at 13–
 14 (considering Maryland law’s definition of “second-de-
 gree misdemeanor assault” for the second incident); id. at
 17 (considering Virginia law’s definition of “assault” for the
 third incident). The Board reasonably concluded that,
 based on the evidentiary record as a whole, Ryan had failed
 to prove—under any of those definitions—that he reasona-
 bly believed he had been subjected to an assault, let alone
 a battery. And to the extent Ryan maintains that the
Case: 23-2238     Document: 16      Page: 8   Filed: 04/08/2024

 8                                            RYAN v. DEFENSE

 Board’s application of those definitions was still too strict,
 we observe that the Board expressly focused on whether
 Ryan met the “lower burden of proving second-degree as-
 sault” under Maryland law, as opposed to that of first-de-
 gree assault which requires causing or attempting to cause
 serious physical injury. Id. at 14 n.11 (quoting Md. Code
 Ann., Crim. Law § 3-202) (emphases added). We therefore
 reject Ryan’s assertion that the Board improperly used his
 “labeling of the disclosures as an assault” to deny him re-
 lief. Ryan’s Informal Br. at 2.
     For at least these reasons, we hold that the Board’s
 conclusion that Ryan failed to prove by a preponderance of
 the evidence that his January 4, 2013 and April 5, 2013
 disclosures were protected was not contrary to law and was
 supported by substantial evidence. The Board therefore
 did not need to consider whether those disclosures were a
 contributing factor in the alleged adverse personnel ac-
 tions, or whether the Agency would have taken those ac-
 tions in the absence of Ryan’s disclosures. See 5 U.S.C.
 § 1221(e)(1)–(2).
                         CONCLUSION
     We have considered Ryan’s remaining arguments and
 find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Board’s final or-
 der denying Ryan’s petition for review is affirmed.
                         AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.