Court Opinion

ID: 9828992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:54:33.746316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:56.212477
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant has filed its motion for rehearing, as well as an elaborate argument in support thereof, stressing chiefly the contention that we erred in overruling its third, ninth, and tenth assignments, wherein the verdict was questioned on the ground that the principal damage complained of could not have been properly considered as the proximate result of the act of its employés in ejecting the boy from the train. We deem it advisable in this connection to amplify, to some extent, our statement as to what happened at the time of the expulsion, as *346well as the resultant effects thereof upon the health and mental status of the boy.
The boy testified that he was aroused from his sleep and told by the conductor that he had arrived at his station. Upon his asking the conductor where the station was, the latter replied it was back down the track. The conductor did not tell him that he had been taken by his station, nor did he offer to take him to the next station, nor ask him to pay fare to that point. The boy testified: “He merely told me that this was my station, and put me off. He told me which way to go to the station. He said, 'Go back down the track,’ and I went the way he told me. The night was dark. I had never been to this place before, and had never been in Texas before. I did not see any house around where I was put off. After I found out that I was not at my station, the train had gone. I could not see Cameron at all. The only way that I knew which direction to go was the conductor’s directions. He said before leaving it was a mile and a half to the station from where he put me off. X knew where the railroad bridge is across Little River. It was beyond that bridge. They had just got across the bridge good. If I had known that I was so far from the station when I was put off, I would have paid my fare to the next station. When the train left me there on the track alone, I could not see about me. It was so dark I could hardly see my hand before me. I undertook to go back to town as the conductor directed me. I just got on the track and went on. When I got to the bridge, I could feel that I was on a board or something. I had to feel my way across the bridge ‘cooning’ it, as I was afraid I might fall off. I heard and could see the train, coming. It was going north.” The boy stated that he was very much frightened, and that by dint of effort he reached the opposite side before the train passed. He was almost transfixed to the spot by fear and unable to proceed for some 30 minutes, and the testimony of those who saw him the next day show that he appeared to be dazed, half crazy, as it were; that prior to that time he was a boy of average and ordinary intelligence, able to work intelligently. Since then, however, the evidence shows he has scarcely any memory, unable to understand or intelligently work at any task. A number of physicians who testified stated that their examination disclosed that his mental status was far below that of a boy of his age; that he had a soreness about the spine and spinal column, which indicated a nervous trouble, and that the conditions described by the other witnesses as to his appearance and mental condition might have been brought about by the fright that he had undergone, which conditions existed since the time of the trial, and, in their opinion, might probably be permanent.
[9] In this case the negligence alleged and proven upon which the plaintiff relied for recovery was expelling the boy from the train at an improper place. The authorities in the original opinion amply support the view that, notwithstanding the fact that the carrier may have the right between stations to eject a passenger who has for any cause been carried by his station, still this right is a limited one, and can only be exercised by ejecting the passenger at a proper place, one where he is not likely to receive injury or harm in his efforts to reach his destination. So in the present case, if the boy was ejected from the train at an improper place, then the only question remaining for consideration is whether or not such expulsion was the proximate cause of his injury. If it was, then appellant should be held liable, otherwise not.
It is said in 13 Cyc. p. 27, that: “The question as to what damages will be considered the natural and proximate consequences of the injury, and what damages will be considered remote, is one difficult of decision. It may be stated as a general rule, however, that where the result of an unlawful act is a natural one, and one that would naturally flow from the act done, it is not remote, but proximate. If, upon the contrary, the damages complained of would not naturally or usually flow from the negligent act, but were brought about by some unforeseen casualty, then they would be remote. Within the rule which limits a recovery for injury to those damages which are its natural and proximate effects, the natural effects are those which might reasonably be foreseen, those which occur in the ordinary state of things, and proximate effects are those between which and the injury there intervenes no culpable and efficient agency. The matter is usually one of evidence, which should be left to the decision of the jury. The general rule in actions for torts is that one is liable for all injuries resulting directly from his wrongful acts, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him, provided the particular damages in respect to which he proceeds are the legal and natural consequences of the wrongful act imputed to the defendant, and are such as according to common experience and the usual course of events might reasonably have been anticipated. Remote, contingent, or speculative damages will not be considered in conformity to the general rule above laid down. To render a wrongdoer liable in damages where the connection is not immediate between the injurious act and the consequence, such nearness in the order of events and closeness in the relation of cause and effect must subsist, as that the influence of the injurious act will predominate over that of other causes to produce the consequences, or be traceable to those causes.” “To constitute a negligent act the proximate cause of the injury, it need not be the sole cause, but it is sufficient *347if it is tile concurring cause from which such a result might reasonably have been contemplated, as involving the result under the attending circumstances.” 6 Words & Phrases, p. 5760; S. A. & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Jazo, 25 S. W. 712. In discussing this subject, Mr. Hutchinson on Carriers (vol. 3, § 1429) says: “Where, therefore, the carrier has wrongfully set the passenger down short of his destination, or carried him beyond it, and has thereby imposed upon him the necessity of getting to his destination by other means, the carrier must respond, whether the action be brought for breach of contract or for the tort, if the passenger while in the exercise of reasonable care and prudence for his safety has received an injury while seeking to extricate himself from the situation in which the carrier has thus wrongfully placed him, as where a man with his wife and child, passengers to M., were told by a brakeman that they had reached that place, and to get out, when, in fact, they were three miles distant They were set down in the nighttime at a place where they could find no shelter, and therefore walked to their destination, exposed to the weather, which had been rainy, thereby causing serious illness to the wife, the carrier was held liable. So where the carrier neglected to stop at the passenger’s destination, and carried her five miles beyond, and put her off, saying that she would there find a conveyance back, which was not furnished, and she therefore walked for three hours on a hot, sultry afternoon, crossing streams, climbing fences, and pursued ánd frightened by dogs, all of which brought on a siege of illness, the carrier was held liable. So the carrier has been held liable to the passenger for sickness caused by willful delay, by unjustifiable detention and exposure to an unhealthy climate, for injury to health caused by exposure to the weather after having been wrongfully expelled from the train, for bodily suffering caused by being compelled to walk back to his destination after being negligently carried beyond it, for sickness and suffering caused by failure to stop at a regular and advertised landing place, and thereby leaving passengers exposed all night to the weather, and for an injury sustained in getting back to the station after having been wrongfully ejected.”
See, also, I. & G. N. R. R. Co. v. Gilbert, 64 Tex. 536, where it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for bodily and mental injuries resulting from her efforts to reach a place of comfort and safety, she having been ejected from the cars, where Justice Willie says in passing upon a demurrer to the petition: “Of course, it is not urged by the defendant that these were not the direct, natural, and proximate results of the misconduct of the conductor. But, if it were, the position would be so contrary to reason and authority as to require no argument to overthrow it. But it is said that the damages resulting to defendant from having walked back to Longview from the place where she was ejected from the cars were too remote to be allowed. As to whether or not she was justified in going back to Longview depends upon the circumstances by which she was surrounded when left by the train. As already stated, the plaintiff was unaccompanied by any male protect- or. She had with her a sister and two infant children. She was in the swamp of a river in a strange land. It was a cold, dark night, and she could get no shelter, except with negroes; and, -whilst she and her companions might have been as safe with them as anywhere else, it was certainly justifiable in her to seek security at the nearest point, where, within her knowledge, it could be afforded. The condition and surroundings of the place where she was forced from the cars were well known to the employés of the road. The influence that they would have upon a person in the plaintiff’s condition must also have been known to them; and they might reasonably have contemplated that she would take such precautions as in her judgment would contribute to her safety and comfort. This is precisely what she did; and, ifi she committed an error, it was an innocent one, and those who forced her into the condition in which she was placed by their own wrongful acts have no right to complain” — citing H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Devainey, 63 Tex. 174. In T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Mansell, 23 S. W. 549, it was held, Mr. Justice Rainey delivering the opinion, that¡ where a passenger was carried half a mile past his station on a dark and damp night, he could recover for the exposure, fatigue, and mental distress caused by his walk back to the station. It appears that one of the injuries complained of in the last case cited was fright from a passing railway train. In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Ry. Go. v. Parry, 67 Kan. 515, 73 Pac. 105, it was held, as shown by the syllabus, that negligence, to be the proximate cause of an injury, must be such as a person of ordinary caution and prudence must have foreseen would likely result in injury, not that the specific injury would result. The question whether negligence is the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily one of fact for the jury. • In that case a judgment for damages was sustained where the plaintiff, having been removed from the car by the conductor and left in charge of a station agent, was by the latter permitted after a short time, and before his recovery, to go where he pleased; the cause of the removal being that he had had a fit upon the car. Some time after-wards he was found four or five miles from the station dead, having been run over by a train. In passing upon the question as to whether the company was responsible, the court said: “ ‘The duty of the railroad company, however, with respect to Weber did not end with his removal from the train. *348He was unconscious and unatile to care for himself. The company could not leave him upon the platform helpless, exposed, and without care or attention. It was its duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence to make temporary provision for his protection and comfort. As was said by the learned judge who tried the cause: “Of course, the carrier is not required to keep hospitals or nurses for sick or insane passengers; but, when a passenger is found by the carrier to be in such a helpless condition, it is the duty of the carrier to exercise the reasonable and necessary offices of humanity toward him until some suitable provision may be made.” ’ ” The court also remarking in passing: “It is further contended that, even though the depot master was negligent in his manner of treatment of the deceased, such negligence was not the proximate cause of the death; that no reasonably prudent man would have foreseen that Parry would have wandered away for a distance of five miles, and have laid down or fallen upon the track in such a place and position that he would be run over by the train and thus killed; and that the company, therefore, was not required to guard against so improbable a result. Negligence, to be the proximate cause of an injury, must be such that a person of ordinary caution and prudence would have foreseen that an injury would likely result therefrom; not that the specific injury would result, but an injury of some character. ‘ “It is not necessary,” say the Supreme Court of Minnesota, following the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, “that the injury, in the precise form in which it in fact resulted, should have been foreseen. It is enough that it now appears to have been a natural and probable consequence.” In other words, it is not necessary to a defendant’s liability, after his negligence has been established, to show, in addition thereto, that the consequence of his negligence could have been foreseen by him. It is sufficient that the injuries are the natural, though not the necessary and inevitable, result of the negligent fault.’ Thompson’s Com. Law of Neg. § 59. It here appears that the place where the depot master permitted Parry to go by himself was a street crossing, over which tracks were laid, along which trains passed. It was a place of danger to one not in the possession of his faculties — a place where the depot master might reasonably have apprehended that harm of some sort would come to Parry in his then condition; so that, although he wandered for hours and was run over five miles from this place, the act of the depot master in permitting him to go was no less the proximate cause of his death than it would have been if it had occurred within a short distance and a few moments.”
See, also, Johnson v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 104 Ala. 241, 16 South. 75, 53 Am. St. Rep. 39, where a drunken passenger who was ejected was afterwards run over and killed by another train. It was said by the court in discussing the question under consideration: “There is another principle of law to be observed, which requires of all persons, in the exercise of a right or the performance of duty, that it be done with reasonable regard to the preservation of life and prevention of great bodily harm or the infliction of unnecessary injury to others, and they will be held responsible for the manner in which the right is exercised or duty performed. It is an exceptional case where the law does not subordinate personal rights to the preservation of life. A conductor has the right, under proper circumstances, to eject a passenger from a car; but he would not be justified in exercising this right while the car was at a high rate of speed, or when upon a high trestle, nor would he be justified in putting off a person who was blind or deaf, knowing his infirmity, except at a safe place. Upon like principles, the law would not justify a conductor in putting off a passenger at a time and place, and under conditions and circumstances, which would expose him unnecessarily to great peril of life or bodily harm; and this, too, whether the danger arose from the natural infirmity of the person or was self-imposed. If the conductor did not know of the infirmity of the person and the peril attending the ejection, there would be no liability arising from the exercise of the right and performance of the duty. It is the fact of notice or knowledge of the danger on the part of the conductor under such circumstances that constitutes the act culpable or willfully wrong.” 'See, also, 15 Dec. Ed. Cent. Dig. § 59, under the subject of “Negligence,” supported by many authorities, where it is said: “To give a right of action on the ground of defendant’s negligence, the injury must have been the natural and probable consequence of such negligence, and such as, under the circumstances of the case, might and ought to have been foreseen.” See, also, M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Hennessy, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 316, 49 S. W. 917, T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Gott, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 335, 50 S. W. 193, T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Casey, 52 Tex. 112, and 6 Cyc. p. 566, on the question of the right of a passenger to recover for personal injuries resulting from efforts to reach some place of security after expulsion.
It would seem, therefore, to be the settled law of this state that if the plaintiff in this case was ejected at an improper place, and in his effort to reach his station he was injured and hurt, if such injuries ought to have been anticipated as the natural and probable result of such expulsion, the carrier would be liable therefor.
[10] Ought the conductor to have foreseen that an inexperienced boy, who had been directed by him to leave the train under the belief that he had reached his station, would *349not likely suffer some injury in endeavoring to reach his destination by walking up the track and across the trestle, in the dark, as he had directed him to do? Was the conductor not charged with a knowledge of the schedule of appellant’s trains, and with such familiarity with its roadbed and trestles as to have anticipated danger to the boy in his effort to cross the same? Could it not be fairly said that he should have anticipated that this boy whom he had put off in the dark would likely follow his directions in an effort to reach the station, and that in doing so he would undertake to cross this river bridge and trestle, and that while so doing the north-bound train would probably overtake him while on the bridge, thereby causing him injury and harm? Was not the wrongful act of putting the boy off in the night, under the circumstances, the proximate cause of the terrible fright occasioned by the swiftly approaching train, from which he narrowly escaped death by dint of his presence of mind and energy, but which left him almost transfixed to the spot with fright, and the results of which are shown to have been so damaging to him. Can appellant shield itself from responsibility by urging that the boy, a stranger, should have remained in the woods till morning before attempting to reach his station and the friends who were there expecting him? Was it not the most natural thing for him to endeavor to reach Cameron, and in so doing follow up the right of way, as directed by the conductor, and ought not the conductor to have reasonably anticipated that accident or damage might befall him under the circumstances? We think so. We have carefully considered each of the cases cited by appellant in support of its contention that appellee’s injuries in this case are not shown to have been the proximate result of his expulsion. We think the facts in each, of them distinguish them from the case at bar, and the law announced in neither of them should control the present appeal.
Believing that appellee’s injuries were the proximate result of the negligence of appellant in ejecting him from the cars, and that the correct result has been reached by us in the original opinion, its motion for rehearing is therefore overruled.
Motion overruled.