Court Opinion

ID: 9466828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:29:26.110048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:59.274216
License: Public Domain

TANG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Although no circuit court to date has so held, several district courts have found complaints similar to that made by Mr. Hageman to the Department of Labor (D.O.L.) sufficient to satisfy the “intent to sue” notice requirement. For instance, in Langman v. Western Electric Co., 488 F.Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y.1980), the district court for the Southern District of New York held:
“While the complaints filed with the Secretary were not in fact captioned, ‘notice of intent to sue,’ we must agree with Judge Dooling’s statement that ‘the filing of a notice of intention to sue is not required as an incantatory formality but for the definite practical purpose of inducing the Secretary to initiate conciliation and to alert him that he should consider whether to sue before the grievant himself sues.’ Cowlishaw v. Armstrong Rubber Co., (E.D.N.Y.1977), 15 FEP Cases 1108.”
Accord Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 269 F.Supp. 911 (N.D.Ga.1973); Burgett v. Cud-ahy Co., 361 F.Supp. 617 (D.Kan.1973).
Other circuits have disagreed with such an approach and have adopted a more formalistic interpretation of the ADEA “intent to sue” notice requirement. However, in an analogous area of Title VII law, this court construed a filing requirement in a more pragmatic manner. See Saulsbury v. Wismer & Becker, Inc., No. 77-2855 (9th Cir. 1980). In Title VII, as in the ADEA, if there is a state agency, a complainant has a longer period in which to file his complaint. In Title VII, the longer period is triggered if the complainant “initially institute^] proceedings” with the state agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). In *1387Saulsbury, the complainant was in contact with the proper state agency, but had not filed a formal complaint with the state. This court held that Saulsbury’s contacts did initially institute state proceedings even though the formal complaint, with its technical requirements, was not filed. Id. at -. In so holding, this court analyzed the character of Saulsbury’s contacts, and compared them with the needs and purposes to be served by the “initially instituted” requirement. Id. at---.
In the instant case, Mr. Hageman filed an Employment Information Form with the D.O.L., along with a typewritten statement of his age discrimination complaint. In these filings, he provided the D.O.L. with data regarding Philips Roxane Laboratories and his employment history there, as well as a detailed account of the events leading to his discharge. This complaint fully satisfied the purposes behind the “intent to sue” notice requirement. The majority’s opinion itself refers to its literal interpretation of the requirement as an “unnecessary procedural technicality ... in this case.”
No substantial goal of the ADEA is furthered by the majority’s decision here, nor does there appear any reason to divert from our policy of liberally interpreting remedial legislation. The information supplied by Mr. Hageman should be sufficient to fully satisfy the ADEA’s notice of “intent to sue” requirement. To require anything more, elevates form over substance in an area already beset by confusing and intricate proof and procedural requirements.