Court Opinion

ID: 9714606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:41:23.87091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:24.947168
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The majority looks to Frederick's conduct and infers, from the totality of the cireum-stances, that Frederick demonstrated his knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel. While the majority enunciates the procedural history which culminated in Frederick's decision to represent himself at his battery trial, it ignores the trial court's failure to affirmatively determine whether Frederick knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. -It is the trial court's failure that warrants reversal.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that a waiver of one's right to counsel must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently and that our courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against a waiver. Hatcher v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 49, 414 N.E.2d 561, 564 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461).
When a defendant requests to proceed pro se, the defendant must be fully advised regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and it is incumbent upon the trial court to determine if the waiver of the right to counsel is made knowingly and voluntarily. Hagy v. State (1994), Ind.App., 639 N.E.2d 693, 694 and see Leonard v. State (1991), Ind., 579 N.E.2d 1294, 1295.
The trial court must:
. conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's competency to represent himself and also to establish a record of the waiver. The record must show that the defendant was made aware of the nature, extent, and importance of the right to counsel and the necessary consequences of waiving such a right. Merely making the defendant aware of his constitutional right is insufficient. The trial court should inquire into the educational background of the defendant, the defendant's familiarity with legal procedures and rules of evidence, and additionally, into the defendant's mental capacity if there is any question as to the defendant's mental state.
Seniours v. State (1994), Ind.App., 634 N.E.2d 803, 804-805 (citations omitted).
The record reveals that prior to his court proceedings, Frederick watched a videotaped Advice of Rights in which he was informed of his fundamental right to counsel as well as his right to represent himself. On March 21, 1994, Frederick entered a plea of not guilty, indicated his desire to retain counsel, and was granted a continuance. On April 6, 1994, Frederick appeared and informed the court that he could not afford an attorney but the court determined that he was ineligible for indigent counsel and suggested he hire an attorney based upon the seriousness of the charge. Frederick asked the court if he could represent himself if he were unable to obtain counsel and the court responded that he could. Frederick returned to court on April 15, 1994, informed the court that he would represent himself at trial, and indicated he wanted a bench trial. The matter was set for trial. On June 21, 1994, Frederick *946appeared pro se for his bench trial, represented himself, and was found guilty of battery.
The record does not indicate that the trial court conducted a pretrial hearing to determine Frederick's competency to represent himself, and the record does not reveal, beyond its bald statement regarding the seriousness of the charge, that the trial court apprised Frederick of the advantages of representation by counsel or the pitfalls of self-representation. The record fails to show that Frederick was fully informed as to the nature, extent, and importance of his right to counsel so that he could make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right.
Despite these omissions, the majority looks at the totality of the ctreumstances and relies upon Frederick's interaction with the court to infer that Frederick sufficiently waived his right to counsel.1 Yet, the record clearly indicates that the trial court was derelict in its duties and the majority's attempt to circumvent the trial court's failure is in error. By allowing the trial court's omissions to stand, the majority weakens the strict standard the Sixth Amendment compels us to follow in determining whether a defendant has waived his right to counsel.
Because the trial court failed to adequately advise Frederick and ensure that his waiver of his right to counsel was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, I would reverse his conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

. In limited instances, waiver may be found if the record demonstrates that the defendant's background, experience, and conduct enable him to competently forego the right to counsel. Seniours, supra, at 809 (Rucker, J., dissenting). In Kindred v. State (1988), Ind., 524 N.E.2d 279, the Indiana Supreme Court reviewed a defendant's waiver of right to counsel claim in the context of the totality of the circumstances and determined that the defendant demonstrated his competence and his knowledge of his right to counsel. There, the record showed that the defendant claimed to have over ten years experience as a paralegal and indicated that he was involved in over three hundred adversarial proceedings. Id. at 283; see also Kindred v. State (1988), Ind., 521 N.E.2d 320. The court noted that the defendant had been involved as both a defendant and an appellant in numerous judicial proceedings. In addition, the defendant filed several motions in his own defense but at the same time frequently consulted with an assisting public defender. Based upon these circumstances, the court concluded that the defendant was not only competent to represent himself but also that he understood the pitfalls of self-representation. Id. at 284.
No such facts exist here. In addition to the trial court's complete failure to inform Frederick of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, the record does not establish that Frederick's background, experience, and conduct reflected his competence to forego his right to counsel. Instead, the majority imputes Frederick's knowing and voluntary waiver from his supposed attempt to manipulate the system. Yet, the record indicates that these delays were the result of Frederick's unsuccessful attempts to retain private counsel. Waiver cannot be implied in this instance. See Hagy, supra (defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive her right to counsel where trial court did not warn defendant of the dangers of self-representation and waiver could not be implied from defendant's background, experience, and conduct).