Court Opinion

ID: 9852451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:30:40.445518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:28.015600
License: Public Domain

Scott, Justice
(dissenting).
I disagree with the majority opinion mainly because it deviates from a current trend in the Minnesota law. This court has steadily moved toward equality with regard to the rights of the accused in all criminal proceedings, yet it appears that the majority is at this time taking a step backward, or at least not adhering- to the movement in the field of criminal justice that we have considered healthy and just.
This pattern of progression was initially employed by the court when examining the theory that a municipal ordinance was not a criminal statute, that its violation was therefore not a crime, and that the rules of criminal law were inapplicable. State v. Robitshek, 60 Minn. 123, 61 N. W. 1023 (1895). This court concluded, in Village of Crosby v. Stemich, 160 Minn. 261,199 N. W. 918 (1924), that although prosecutions for ordinance violations are treated as civil matters for some purposes, they are to be considered criminal proceedings for purposes of appeal.
This initial step has now culminated in this court’s repeated efforts to afford the same rights and procedural standards to proceedings involving ordinance violations as are applied to proceedings involving felonies, gross misdemeanors, and misdemeanors. In State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N. W. 2d 888 (1967), and State v. Illingworth, 278 Minn. 434, 154 N. W. 2d 687 (1967), this court held that an indigent defendant was entitled to the assistance of counsel, without regard to whether he was charged with an ordinance violation or a violation of a statute. Until City of St. Paul v. Whidby, 295 Minn. 129, 203 N. W. 2d 823 (1972), the standard of proof applied in city ordinance violations was the civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence. In Whidby, we held that the rules of criminal procedure, as well as the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and the unanimous-verdict standard, shall apply where the conviction might result in a penalty of incarceration. In City of St. Paul v. *103Hurd, 299 Minn. 51, 216 N. W. 2d 259 (1974), this court extended the rights of appeal afforded the state in criminal proceedings to include municipalities. Such appeals are governed by the pertinent statutory requirements. State, City of St. Louis Park, v. Brown, 297 Minn. 109, 209 N. W. 2d 920 (1973). In a more recent case, this court stated that Minn. St. 609.035, which applies by its terms to “offenses under the laws of the state” in proscribing serialized prosecutions, includes ordinance violations which might result in incarceration. State v. White, 300 Minn. 99, 219 N. W. 2d 89 (1974).
Rule 1.01 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted by this court, and effective July 1, 1975, provides in part:
“* * * Except where expressly provided otherwise, misdemeanors as referred to in these rules shall include state statutes, local ordinances, charter provisions, rules or regulations punishable either alone or alternatively by a fine or imprisonment of not more than 90 days.”
Rule 26.01, subd. 1(1) (a), of the newly adopted rules provides that defendants charged with misdemeanors, which by definition includes ordinance violations, shall have a right to a jury trial in the first instance in county court. This is but another step in the progression of ordinance violation procedures and improves upon the former two-tiered system under which an accused was entitled to a jury trial only in the district court after a plea or court trial in the municipal court. State v. Leininger, 286 Minn. 555, 176 N. W. 2d 629 (1970); City of St. Paul v. Hitzmann, 295 Minn. 301, 204 N. W. 2d 417 (1973.
As exemplified above, our purpose in recent years has been to provide uniformity, not only geographically but intrinsically, within the entire field of criminal justice.
There is apparent concern that such offenses as traffic ordinance violations would be labeled “criminal” and therefore be used for impeachment, when evidence of such violations in fact had no probative value. Such is neither suggested here nor per*104missible under the theory espoused in State v. Stewart, 297 Minn. 57, 209 N. W. 2d 913 (1973), where we expressed grave reservations as to the propriety of using a 9-year-old burglary conviction for impeachment purposes in a prosecution for first-degree murder. We stated that the use of the old conviction appeared to have little relevance to the truth-seeking process or to the present character of the defendant. An expansion of this theory would allow an exercise of discretion by the trial court as to whether the prior misdemeanor conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes. To be considered, therefore, is whether the conviction is germane to any determination of the honesty or veracity of the defendant. A negative finding by the trial court would preclude admissibility.
It would seem to me that, being mindful of the progress which has been made in abolishing this false and baseless distinction between ordinance violations and misdemeanors, it would be more logical to take the path suggested above rather than to reconstruct this wall of legal papier mache.
The majority view is inconsistent with all that we have accomplished in recent years.
Peterson, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice Scott.
Kelly, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice Scott.
Mr. Justice Knutson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.