Court Opinion

ID: 9899809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 18:06:30.55621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:50.256810
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 211422
                                               No. 1-21-1422
                                      Opinion filed November 17, 2023

                                                                       Sixth Division
      ___________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE
                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                              FIRST DISTRICT
       ___________________________________________________________________________
                                                               )
      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                     )       Appeal from the Circuit Court of
                                                               )       Cook County.
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                               )
                                                               )       No. 17 CR 09924
      v.                                                       )
                                                               )       The Honorable
      QUINTON GATES,                                           )       Charles P. Burns,
                                                               )       Judge, presiding.
             Defendant-Appellant.                              )
      _____________________________________________________________________________

             JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
             Justice Pucinski concurred in the judgment and opinion.
             Justice Coghlan concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.

                                                 OPINION

¶1          Quinton Gates, 18 years and 2 months at the time of the offense, was convicted of first

     degree murder. Gates raises two issues: (i) the constitutionality of our supreme court’s

     administrative order, M.R. 30370 (In re Illinois Courts Response to COVID-19 Emergency/Impact

     on Trials, Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Mar. 20, 2020)), tolling of the speedy trial term during the

     recent pandemic and (ii) ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.

¶2          We find no violation of Gates’s right to a speedy trial. As to ineffective assistance, we find

     his counsel failed to challenge Gates’s sentence as a de facto life sentence. Not receiving effective
     No. 1-21-1422

     representation at sentencing is constitutionally offensive and fundamentally wrong. Accordingly,

     we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.

¶3                                                Background

¶4                                                Trial Delay

¶5            On June 7, 2017, 18-year-old Quinton Gates was arrested for murder. Gates appeared in

     bond court on June 9 and was arraigned on July 14. Gates’s trial was initially scheduled for

     November 11, 2019, but continued by agreement to December 2 so the State could subpoena three

     witnesses. On December 2, Gates demanded trial. On February 28, 2020, the State sought and was

     granted a continuance to March 23.

¶6            On March 17, 2020, the Illinois Supreme Court issued M.R. 30370, directing courts to

     conduct nonessential matters remotely and reschedule criminal cases until 30 days after the

     Governor’s state of emergency ended. In re Illinois Courts Response to COVID-19 Emergency,

     Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Mar. 17, 2020). The court noted that the order “serve[d] the ends of

     justice and outweigh the best interests of the public and defendants in a speedy trial.” In re Illinois

     Courts Response to COVID-19 Emergency/Impact on Trials, Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. Apr. 7,

     2020).

¶7            Finally, on June 30, 2021, the supreme court reinstated the speedy trial term beginning

     October 1, 2021, so dates before March 20, 2020, and after October 1, 2021, would be included in

     computing time for speedy trial purposes. In re Illinois Courts Response to COVID-19

     Emergency/Impact on Trials, Ill. S. Ct., M.R. 30370 (eff. June 30, 2021).

¶8            The sequence of relevant events for Gates’s speedy trial term can be summarized as

     follows:

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                               GATES’S SPEEDY TRIAL TERM TIMELINE
           Date                       Event               Speedy Trial         Acting party
                                                           Term Day
         6/7/17        Arrest                                                  State
         6/8/17        Speedy trial term begins                      Day 1     State
         7/14/17       Arraignment                                             Circuit Court
                       First continuance by agreement; 37 total                State     and
                       days by agreement until 12/2/19               Day 37    Gates
         12/2/19       First demand for trial—Speedy trial term      Day 38    Gates
                       resumes
                       State unable to subpoena witnesses                      State
         1/6/20        Second demand for trial                       Day 73    Gates
         1/13/20       Third demand for trial                        Day 80    Gates
                       Fourth demand for trial                       Day 112   Gates
         2/14/20       State granted 60-day continuance under                  State
                       725 ILCS 5/103-5(c); case continued by
                       motion, tolling until 4/14/20
         2/28/20       Fifth demand for trial                        Day 112   Gates
         3/16/20       Sixth demand for trial                        Day 112   Gates
         3/17/20       Supreme Court issues M.R. 30370               Day 112   Supreme
                                                                               Court
         3/20/20       M.R. 30370 begins tolling of speedy trial     Day 112   Supreme
                       term                                                    Court
         4/14/20       60-day tolling per State’s 725 ILCS           Day 112
                       5/103-5(c) motion ends; term tolled under
                       M.R. 30370
         4/21/20       Denial of Gates’s motion to dismiss for                 Circuit court
                       violation of right to speedy trial and due
                       process
         4/22/20       Seventh demand                                Day 112   Gates
         4/27/20-      Gates demands trial 19 times; term still      Day 112   Gates
         4/27/21       tolled under M.R. 30370
         5/4/21        Trial                                         Day 112   Circuit Court

¶9                                              Trial Evidence

¶ 10         At trial, the State presented testimony from several witnesses.

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¶ 11          Two witnesses, sisters Tremia Gilmore and Ishonna Gilmore, testified that they resided in

       a three-flat building with their other siblings in a neighborhood claimed as “Lowe Life” gang

       territory. On the evening of the shooting, they were with their cousin, a member of the Lowe Life

       gang, when Gates arrived and asked for him.

¶ 12          Terence Evans, who lived on the second floor, heard about seven shots. Evans went to the

       back and saw Gates shoot the cousin twice and yell “F*** Lowe Life” before leaving.

¶ 13          Several police investigators testified about their participation in the investigation.

       Detective Jeremy Morales testified that, the night of the shooting, he spoke to the Gilmore sisters

       and Evans outside the building. All three identified Gates by his nickname, “Man Man.” With that

       information, Morales created a photo array, which included Gates’s photo. The next day, at the

       station, the Gilmore sisters and Evans identified Gates from his photo as the shooter.

¶ 14          Gates testified that he knew the Gilmore sisters, Evans, and the victim and had been friends

       until they affiliated with the “Lowe Life” gang. Gates ended the friendship in 2016, as he belonged

       to a rival gang. Gates denied being in Englewood on the day of the shooting.

¶ 15          The jury found Gates guilty of first degree murder and discharge of a firearm causing death.

       720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2010).

¶ 16                                              Sentencing

¶ 17          At the time of the sentencing hearing, Gates had served four years, four months, and eight

       days in prison since his arrest. The State called two witnesses and provided a statement by the

       victim’s mother. Before imposing sentence, the court asked both attorneys, “Do you think the

       firearm enhancements are mandatory for the defendant?” See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b), (c) (West

       2020). After some back-and-forth, the State answered, “I believe it is not discretionary.” Defense

       counsel later stated, “I would just say if there was ambiguity, it should be resolved in Quinton’s

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       favor. I think the trend in the law has been to move away from mandatory minimums when it

       comes to juvenile offenders and to allow judges more discretion.”

¶ 18          In mitigation, the defense presented two documents: Gates’s high school diploma from

       York Alternative High School in June 2020 and an e-mail from one of the coordinators of the

       Alternative Programs and Education Department of the Cook County Department of Corrections

       verifying that Gates participated for nine months in the “Second Chance Program” and three

       months in the “Becoming a Man” program while in custody. Gates did not speak in elocution or

       submit to a presentence investigation interview.

¶ 19          The defense provided a sentencing memorandum. When Gates was 12, his mother,

       employed by the Chicago Transit Authority and the primary breadwinner, died suddenly. His

       father had occasional employment, and after Gates and his father were evicted from their home,

       they moved to Englewood. When his father went to prison for a federal gun offense, Gates lived

       with relatives, some of whom belonged to a gang.

¶ 20          Gates experienced more tragic loss. An older cousin and positive role model and mentor,

       Quintonio LaGrier, had mental health challenges but had attended college and worked part-time.

       During an episode at home, family members called police. A responding officer shot and killed

       LaGrier and a neighbor. Shortly afterward, one of Gates’s close friends was shot and killed.

       Defense counsel noted that Gates never received therapy or counseling for coping with his losses

       at a young age.

¶ 21          The court asked, “But the statutory factors are pretty clear that somebody has to be under

       the age of 18 for either the firearm enhancement or for the consideration of the Miller factors that

       were codified. Correct?” Defense counsel answered: “I think that that—sure, your Honor, is what

       the statute says. I think if there is any ambiguity, it must be resolved in [Gates’s] favor.”

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       No. 1-21-1422

¶ 22          The trial court pronounced the sentencing option for this charge was 20 to 60 years of

       imprisonment before the firearm enhancement of 25 years. The trial court sentenced Gates to a

       total of 48 years imprisonment—23 years for murder plus 25 years under the habitual criminal

       statute for gun enhancement (id. § 5-4.5-95(b)). This sentence carries the possibility of parole after

       20 years because Gates was under 21 at the time of the offense. Id. § 5-4.5-115(b).

¶ 23          To reach this sentence, the trial court recognized that, when the crime occurred, Gates was

       just two months past his eighteenth birthday. The trial court considered the Miller factors and

       whether a mandatory firearm enhancement was required. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460,

       477-78 (2012); Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11; 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 2020).

¶ 24          The Miller factors led the court to sentence Gates toward the lower end of the sentencing

       range. The court considered Gates’s age to merit a lower sentence but found no evidence Gates

       lacked the maturity to understand his actions. In mitigation, the court considered the hardships

       caused by his mother’s death when he was 12, his father’s incarceration, and the violent deaths of

       extended family members and others close to him. The court also noted that Gates completed his

       high school diploma and participated in programs and activities while incarcerated.

¶ 25          In aggravation, the court discussed jail offenses for which Gates was reprimanded, noting

       that, although some were minor, like not wearing a face mask and hanging clothes inside his cell,

       some involved violence or disrespect for authority. In addition, Gates acted alone in committing

       the crime.

¶ 26          The court ruled that the proportionate penalties clause did not apply to Gates because he

       was the principal, not an accomplice. The court further stated,

              “[t]he Illinois Supreme Court has cleared up one particular issue in the—I believe it is the

              [People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010,] case that was decided earlier this year, that it is the

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               eligibility for parole that is determinative as to whether or not something is a de facto life,

               not the actual parole date. So any way you look at it, the defendant is eligible for parole

               within 20 years.”

¶ 27                                                    Analysis

¶ 28                                                Constitutionality

¶ 29           Gates argues that the Illinois Supreme Court’s emergency COVID-19 orders tolling the

       time restrictions set out in section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (referred to as

       the speedy trial statute) (see 725 ILCS 103-5(a) (West 2020)) violated the separation of powers

       principles in article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1). In People

       v. Mayfield, 2023 IL 128092, decided after the briefing, the supreme court disposed of this issue,

       upholding the constitutionality of the orders. Mayfield controls, and Gates made no other

       arguments. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall

       not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”).

¶ 30                                               Speedy Trial Term

¶ 31           Next, we determine whether Gates’s right to a speedy trial was violated. We apply an abuse

       of discretion standard with deference to the trial court’s determination on the party responsible for

       a delay. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 115 (1998). We review de novo whether the trial court

       violated Gates’s right to a speedy trial. People v. Ballard, 2022 IL App (1st) 210762, ¶ 22 (citing

       People v. Janusz, 2020 IL App (2d) 190017, ¶ 56)).

¶ 32           Both the sixth amendment and the due process clause of the federal constitution (U.S.

       Const., amends. VI, XIV; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)), and article I, section

       8, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8) guarantee a defendant’s right to a speedy

       trial. Mayfield, 2023 IL 128092, ¶ 18. Under Illinois statute, the trial must commence within 120

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       days after a defendant is taken into custody unless he or she agrees to a continuance or causes

       delay—which tolls the speedy trial term. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2020); People v. Reimolds,

       92 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1982). The State also may apply for not more than an additional 60-day

       extension to obtain evidence under certain circumstances. See 725 ILCS 5/103-5(c) (West 2020).

       Defendants must object through written or oral demand for trial to prevent delays from being

       attributed to them. Id. § 103-5(a). In calculating the days in custody, the first day is excluded, and

       the last day is included. People v. Bivins, 97 Ill. App. 3d 386, 392 (1981). Under Bivins, Gates’s

       speedy trial term began on June 8, 2017.

¶ 33           As the timeline indicates, on July 14, Gates agreed to a continuance, pausing the clock at

       37 days. See Reimolds, 92 Ill. 2d at 106. After the first demand for trial, Gates made three more

       demands between January 6, 2020, and February 14, 2020, amounting to 112 days. The State’s

       February 14, 2020, motion tolled the term for 60 days not attributable to the State. Id.; 725 ILCS

       5/103-5(c) (West 2020).

¶ 34           In the wake of Mayfield, Gates’s trial commenced within 120 days. While extraordinary

       circumstances led to the delay, the extraordinary circumstances did not cause a violation of Gates’s

       right to a speedy trial.

¶ 35                                           Excessive Sentencing

¶ 36           Gates argues that his sentence of 48 years is unconstitutional as a de facto life sentence that

       violates his constitutional rights under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois

       Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). The proportionate penalties clause requires

       courts to determine all penalties based on the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of

       restoring the offender to useful citizenship. Id. A sentence’s constitutionality presents a question

       of law we review de novo. People v. Taylor, 2015 IL 117267, ¶ 11.

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       No. 1-21-1422

¶ 37                                           Possibility of Parole

¶ 38          Gates’s sentence came after the law was changed to make a person convicted of first degree

       murder eligible for parole after serving 20 years, if under 21 years old at the time of the offense,

       and the sentencing occurred after the law took effect. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2020). “This

       legislation was enacted in response to emerging case law to address ‘youthful offenders under the

       age of 21.’ ” People v. Kendrick, 2023 IL App (3d) 200127, ¶ 37 (quoting People v. Green, 2022

       IL App (1st) 200749, ¶ 41).

¶ 39          The legislature has the power to define a criminal offense and fix the punishment, whereas

       “the imposition of the sentence within the limits prescribed by the legislature is purely a judicial

       function.” People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 196 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting, joined by Goldenhersh,

       C.J., and Clark, J.); People v. Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d) 220066, ¶ 52. (citing People ex rel.

       Kubala v. Kinney, 25 Ill. 2d 491, 493-94 (1962) (“legislature may change the terms and conditions

       for parole”)).

¶ 40           The State contends that Gates “is not foreclosed from achieving a meaningful chance at

       rehabilitation after 20 years” because he will be eligible for parole then. So, according to the State,

       Gates’s 48-year sentence does not equate to a de facto life term under People v. Buffer, 2019 IL

       122327, ¶¶ 27, 41 (prison sentence for juveniles not exceeding 40 years is not life term), or Miller

       (Miller, 567 U.S. at 469-70 (forbidding mandatory life terms for juvenile offenders)), “insofar as

       it adequately affords [Gates] opportunities for rehabilitation.” In oral argument, the State relied on

       People v. Dorsey, where the supreme court considered good conduct credit a relevant inquiry

       regarding the proportionate penalties clause. People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010; 730 ILCS 5/3-3-

       3(c) (West 1994).

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¶ 41          Dorsey, however, is inapplicable. The good conduct credit statute allows inmates to have

       time taken off their sentences for daily good behavior, allowing a “predictable, fairly accurate

       assessment at the time of sentencing of the ultimate length of imprisonment,” and usually inmates

       serve half of their sentence. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶¶ 51-52. Further, Dorsey focused on the

       “ ‘power’ ” that inmates have to shorten their sentence because their behavior, not a subjective

       board determination, determines whether a day is counted towards their sentence. Id. ¶¶ 52-53; see

       People v. Brakes, 2021 IL App (1st) 181737, ¶ 38 (“Because the consecutive six-year sentences

       are eligible for 50% credit, they give him the ‘power’ to behave and potentially achieve release

       before he has served 40 years.”).

¶ 42          In Illinois, inmates are given credit as long as no infraction occurs, and even then, inmates

       can earn lost credit back. See State of Ill. Prisoner Review Bd., 44th Annual Report, January 1 to

       December 31, 2020, at 5 (July 2022), https://prb.illinois.gov/content/dam/soi/en/web/prb/

       documents/prb20anlrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VUF-PFZX] (“The Board is further authorized to

       review IDOC recommendations for restoration of lost credits in cases in which an inmate’s good

       behavior appears to merit such a reward.”). Dorsey found the good conduct credit statute applicable

       to remedy the potential issue of a de facto life sentence. But, of the utmost importance here,

       inmates like Gates are not afforded any opportunity to lessen their sentence beyond applying for

       parole after serving 20 years, and then with low expectations of success.

¶ 43          A prisoner has no due process right to a parole hearing. Hill v. Walker, 241 Ill. 2d 479, 487

       (2011). As Dorsey recognized, parole is not a right, and if an individual is denied parole, no review

       is available. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 56. Indeed, a defendant can take no viable action to

       challenge a parole board’s finding. The defendant in Dorsey faced an entirely different future with

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       “an opportunity to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation so that he only needs to serve 38 years

       of his aggregate 76-year sentence.” Id. ¶ 50.

¶ 44          The State urges that we follow People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, where a panel

       of this court applied Dorsey’s analysis of the good conduct statute (730 ILCS 5/3-3-3(c) (West

       2020)) to the parole statute. We find the rationale of Elliott, the first appellate case to reach the

       issue, seriously flawed. Parole differs conceptually from good conduct credit. Parole is a legislative

       function. There is no right to parole nor opportunity for judicial review. So, categorizing parole as

       some type of pilot release is misconceived.

¶ 45          The possibility of parole is impossible to determine. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the

       Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (“[i]n parole releases, *** few

       certainties exist”); Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 276 (1996) (no right to parole). Gates

       has no right to release from prison before the end of his 48-year sentence.

¶ 46          Under the statute, if, after 20 years, Gates applied for and was denied parole, he would

       have to wait 10 more years for reconsideration—if the Board denied a second request, he would

       not have another opportunity. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(m) (West 2020). In contrast to good conduct

       credit, under the parole scheme, inmates do not have control over their shortened term and minimal

       chance for review. See Hill, 241 Ill. 2d at 486 (parole is matter of “grace and executive clemency”);

       Hanrahan, 174 Ill. 2d at 276 (board has discretion to grant parole). According to the Illinois

       Prisoner Review Board, in 2020, only 44 adult parole reviews were even considered; of those,

       about 22% were granted. See State of Ill. Prisoner Review Bd., 44th Annual Report at 8. Similarly,

       in 2019, the parole board considered 51 cases and granted less than 30%. See Ill. Prisoner Review

       Bd., 43rd Annual Report, January 1 to December 31, 2019, at 8 (Feb. 1, 2021),

       https://prb.illinois.gov/content/dam/soi/en/web/prb/documents/prb19anlrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/

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       6P39-NTHG]. In 2017, the parole board denied all 56 cases considered. See State of Ill. Prisoner

       Review Bd., 41st Annual Report, January 1 to December 31, 2017, at 8 (Apr. 24, 2019),

       https://prb.illinois.gov/content/dam/soi/en/web/prb/documents/prb17anlrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/

       WU63-8WF7]. These statistics indicate that obtaining parole is inscrutable and difficult to

       accomplish.

¶ 47          Our parole scheme does not afford offenders like Gates access to the courts or a meaningful

       opportunity for release and cannot be used to remedy a de facto life sentence that violates the

       proportionate penalties clause. Because parole is inherently different from good time credit, we

       agree with Gates.

¶ 48          The dissent cites Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d) 220066, on the legislative role in the statute’s

       creation. Infra ¶¶ 81-82. The court stated

              “[the legislature] considered not only Miller and all of its implications, but also victims’

              rights, the seriousness of offenses (deliberately tailoring waiting periods for petitions based

              on the offense), and the proper factors to be considered within the Board’s authority. In

              short, the new parole statute affords defendant a meaningful opportunity for release, based

              on his maturity and rehabilitation, before serving a de facto life sentence of over 40 years’

              imprisonment.” Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d) 220066, ¶ 60.

       In doing so, the Cavazos court noted the legislature deliberately tailored “waiting periods for

       petitions based on the offense,” while also expressing a “hope the legislature reconsiders some

       parole restrictions (particularly the lengthy period between petition opportunities and foreclosure

       of opportunities thereafter).” Id.

¶ 49          The single word “meaningful” does some heavy lifting in this context. Repetition of the

       term “meaningful opportunity” does not guarantee that prisoners realistically have the chance to

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       apply for parole and receive full consideration of the parole board. The lengthy 20-year waiting

       period before an even seeking parole renders the opportunity close to “meaningless” rather than

       “meaningful.”

¶ 50                                         Emerging Adult Status

¶ 51          The legislature addressed the different treatment of young adults in the criminal justice

       system in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, where the legislature defines minors as those under 21.

       705 ILCS 405/1-3(10) (West 2020). Minors may receive a station adjustment after arrest, probation

       adjustment, and opportunities to participate in community mediation programs, opportunities not

       available to adults. Id. §§ 5-301, 5-305, 5-310. Effective June 1, 2019, the legislature enacted a

       provision in the Unified Code of Corrections granting defendants under 21 years old at the time of

       the offense the chance to have parole review after serving homicide sentences 20 years or longer.

       Pub. Act 100-1182 (eff. June 1, 2019) (amending 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b)). These changes

       establish differing treatment for emerging adults, evaluating them more like juveniles than adults

       for sentencing purposes.

¶ 52          Language included in recent legislation indicates a willingness to recognize differences

       between “youthful offenders” and individuals over 21 years. It requires the Prisoner Review Board

       panel to “consider the diminished culpability of youthful offenders, the hallmark features of youth,

       and any subsequent growth and maturity of the youthful offender during incarceration.” Id. § 5-

       4.5-115(j).

¶ 53          Although the age of separation between juveniles and adults has been set at 18 by the

       United States Supreme Court (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005)), the concept of

       emerging adults has been considered and discussed by the courts in Illinois and throughout the

       nation. While Miller-based eighth amendment challenges are not available to young adult

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       offenders, the Illinois Supreme Court has left open the possibility for a young adult offender to

       raise an as-applied constitutional challenge to a de facto life sentence under the Illinois

       Constitution’s proportionate penalties clause. People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48. See People

       v. Hilliard, 2021 IL App (1st) 200112, ¶ 25 (“young adults (those between 18 and 21 years old)

       may rely on the evolving neuroscience regarding brain development in juveniles and its correlation

       to maturity underpinning the Miller decision” to support constitutional challenge to life sentence).

¶ 54          We also find persuasive the discussion of the emerging adult concept in People v. Ward,

       2021 IL App (1st) 182402-U. In Ward, the appellate court found the trial court erred by denying a

       19-year-old leave to file a successive postconviction petition challenging the constitutionality of

       his 45-year sentence, given his age. Id. ¶¶ 31-38. The Ward court noted the overwhelming amount

       of research pointing to the need to extend the rights afforded juveniles to “emerging adults,” those

       18-25 years old. Id. Additionally, the Ward court addressed the legislature’s treatment of 21-year-

       olds as not-quite adults by restricting their rights to buy alcohol and guns and to engage in

       gambling, pointing toward different treatment in the judicial process. Id. Likewise, in People v.

       Murry, 2022 IL App (1st) 182425-U, ¶ 47, we acknowledged the rationale in Ward as it related to

       the consideration of an “emerging adult[ ].”

¶ 55          Further refining the concept of adulthood, we have described “the line of adulthood” as age

       21. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶ 42. Green recognized that the recent statutes regarding

       youthful offenders allowed relief to defendants under 21. Id. ¶ 41 (citing 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115

       (West 2020) and 705 ILCS 405/1-3(2), (10) (West 2018)).

¶ 56          In People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶¶ 31-32, the supreme court remanded for second-

       stage postconviction proceedings where a 19-year-old defendant raised an as-applied challenge to

       a mandatory life sentence under the proportionate penalties clause. Even though statutes are

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       presumed constitutional and a petitioner must overcome that presumption by clearly establishing

       that his or her mandatory sentencing statute is invalid when applied to them, in House the supreme

       court held a fully developed record was necessary to determine unconstitutionality in an as-applied

       constitutional claim and remanded to allow defendant the opportunity to develop the record. Id.

       ¶¶ 18, 27-29, 32; see People v. Zumot, 2021 IL App (1st) 191743, ¶ 27 (“The court has thus opened

       the door to the possibility that a young-adult offender might demonstrate, through an adequate

       factual record, that his or her own specific characteristics were so like those of a juvenile that

       imposition of a life sentence absent the safeguards established in Miller was ‘cruel, degrading, or

       so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community.’ ”); see

       also People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 44 (suggesting 19-year-old could raise as-applied

       challenge to mandatory life sentence in postconviction proceeding).

¶ 57          Gates cites several cases holding de facto life sentences violate the proportionate penalties

       clause when applied to emerging adults, even those who were principals in committing the crime.

       In People v. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 25, this court noted young adults 20 years old

       and younger may “rely on the evolving neuroscience and societal standards underlying the rule in

       Miller” to support constitutional challenges to life sentences, even an 18-year-old principal actor.

       See also People v. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628, ¶ 69 (age 18, principal); People v. Johnson,

       2020 IL App (1st) 171362, ¶¶ 25-34 (age 19, principal); People v. Bland, 2020 IL App (3d)

       170705, ¶ 14 (age 19, guilt by accountability); People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541,

       ¶¶ 37-47 (age 19, principal); People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶¶ 28-59 (age 18,

       principal); People v. Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534, ¶¶ 109-12 (age 18, principal);

       People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶¶ 67-78 (age 22, principal).

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       No. 1-21-1422

¶ 58          Caselaw on sentencing young defendants continues to evolve, continues to respond to

       research on the minds of young people, and continues to forge a more humane approach to

       incarceration. In the midst of this, “[o]ur supreme court opened the door for young adults to invoke

       Miller under the Proportionate Penalties Clause, and it has not closed that door or explicitly limited

       it to a particular age range.” People v. Crockett, 2023 IL App (1st) 220128-U, ¶ 32 (citing Harris,

       2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 45-48). Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that it “has not

       foreclosed ‘emerging adult’ defendants between 18 and 19 years old from raising as-applied

       proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the evolving science on

       juvenile maturity and brain development.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 87. In Clark, the

       24-year-old defendant sought to raise a constitutional challenge to a discretionary de facto life

       sentence in a successive postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 88. The court held the defendant could not

       meet the requirements of either prong of the cause-and-prejudice test for filing his proposed

       successive postconviction petition. Id. The court decided it need not resolve the issue of whether

       defendant’s age at the time of the offense would preclude raising a Miller-based challenge to his

       sentence under proportionate penalties clause standards in an initial postconviction petition. Id. Of

       note is the recognition of the “evolving science.”

¶ 59          We recognize that this was a senseless crime of violence. That, however, does not preclude

       Gates from asserting his constitutional claim. A factor pertinent to sentencing was Gates’s dismal

       upbringing. His mother died when he was 12 years old, his father was incarcerated when he was

       15, and without a family or finances, Gates was forced to leave his familiar and relatively safe life

       to live with extended family that included gang members and drug dealers. Gates lost everything

       as a child and became exposed to violence and crime.

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       No. 1-21-1422

¶ 60          In 2015, Gates’s cousin was killed by police gunfire after experiencing a mental crisis. In

       2016, Gates’s close friend was gunned down in gang violence. Despite all the trauma in his young

       life, Gates never received counseling or therapy.

¶ 61          At the time of the murder, Gates was barely past his eighteenth birthday, well under 21

       years old. Advances in science and law recognize that emerging adults like Gates are less culpable

       and more capable of rehabilitation than older offenders, especially when the offenders are trapped

       in violent, crime-ridden neighborhoods. See People v. Jones, 2021 IL App (1st) 180996, ¶¶ 1-2

       (50-year sentence for 19-year-old defendant vacated and remanded for resentencing).

¶ 62          A recent unpublished opinion recognized that scientific literature supports the idea that

       individuals 18 and older at the time of their crimes should not be treated as adults for sentencing

       purposes. People v. Vega, 2022 IL App (1st) 200663-U, ¶ 38, vacated, No. 128404 (Ill. Sept. 27,

       2023) (supervisory order). Quoting an article from the Center for Law, Brain & Behavior at

       Massachusetts General Hospital, the court noted, “ ‘during emotionally charged situations, late

       adolescents (ages 18-21) respond more like younger adolescents (ages 13-17) than like young

       adults (22-25) due to differences in brain maturation.’ ” Id. (quoting Ctr. for Law, Brain &

       Behavior at Mass. Gen. Hosp., White Paper on the Science of Late Adolescence: A Guide for

       Judges, Attorneys, and Policy Makers (Jan. 27, 2022), https://clbb.mgh.harvard.edu/white-paper-

       on-the-science-of-late-adolescence/ [https://perma.cc/9DNX-FZQP].

¶ 63                                         Ineffective Assistance

¶ 64          To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant has to show (i) counsel’s

       performance was deficient, (ii) which prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

       668, 687 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526 (1984). The errors must be “so serious

       that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed” by the constitution. Strickland, 466

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       No. 1-21-1422

       U.S. at 687. In assessing the performance prong of Strickland, a court must “show great deference

       to counsel’s strategic decisions [citation], making every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of

       hindsight *** and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” (Internal

       quotation marks omitted.) People v. Massey, 2019 IL App (1st) 162407, ¶ 25.

¶ 65           We find that Gates meets both prongs.

¶ 66           Regarding the first prong, Gates’s counsel failed to advocate for a lesser sentence under

       the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11),

       given the developments on emerging adults in the criminal justice system. Being barely 18 at the

       time of the crime unequivocally establishes Gates as an emerging adult. Both our legislature and

       courts have moved toward a better understanding of emerging adults and how their lower

       culpability and underdeveloped brains should be considered in the criminal justice process.

¶ 67           The trial court asked both sides whether the 25-year firearm enhancement was mandatory,

       given that Gates was over 18. Counsel for the State and defendant stated that it was likely

       mandatory. Defense counsel added that ambiguities in the statute should be construed in favor of

       Gates and was unaware of caselaw to support straying away from a mandatory firearm

       enhancement sentence. The trial court found the sentencing option was 20-60 years plus the

       mandatory 25-year enhancement, with a minimum of 45 years: 20 years plus 25. The court

       believed the proportionate penalties clause did not apply because Gates was the principal actor.

¶ 68           We find Gates’s counsel erred when the trial court asked whether imposing the firearm

       enhancement was mandatory as applied to Gates—counsel failed to argue that the minimum

       sentence was unconstitutional as to Gates. And counsel erred by failing to research the applicability

       of the firearm enhancements to those barely over 18. Counsel further erred by failing to highlight

       or ask the court to consider the movement toward considering the diminished culpability of

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       No. 1-21-1422

       emerging adults—which was briefly mentioned during mitigation arguments. Both failures fall

       below the professional standard, which suffices to satisfy the first prong of deficiency. See People

       v. Nicholson, 2021 IL App (3d) 180010 (deficiency found in unawareness of application of

       sentencing statutes to client).

¶ 69           Regarding the second prong, establishing prejudice does not require certainty but a

       “reasonable probability.” People v. Lewis, 2022 IL 126705, ¶ 46. These arguments, including the

       reconsideration of applying the firearm enhancement, might have lowered the length of the

       sentence. A careful consideration of the record indicates that the trial court wanted to hear defense

       counsel argue for the discretionary imposition of the firearm enhancement. In addition, although

       there was consideration of mitigating factors, the primary factor missing in that analysis was

       emerging adults’ developing brains, their similarities to juveniles, and their possibility for

       rehabilitation. Had counsel attempted to present these arguments to support a lesser sentence, we

       find a reasonable probability the court would have imposed a lower sentence.

¶ 70           Our supreme court has determined that a 40-year sentence for a juvenile was a de facto life

       sentence. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 41-42. Thus, based on the legislature’s view of persons under

       21 as minors for treatment in the juvenile system, Gates’s status as an emerging adult should have

       been argued and considered at his sentencing. Under Buffer, Gates’s sentence of 48 years would

       amount to a de facto life sentence and violates the proportionate penalties clause. See Ill. Const.

       1970, art I, § 11; Buffer, 2019 IL 122327. Although Gates could be eligible for parole after serving

       20 years (see 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2020)), we find that the possibility for parole does

       not preclude Gates from serving a de facto life sentence, and so his 48-year sentence amounts to a

       de facto life sentence.

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       No. 1-21-1422

¶ 71          One final observation. This court recently found the minimum aggregate penalty for a first

       degree murder committed with a firearm constitutes a de facto life sentence. People v. Leanos,

       2023 IL App (1st) 191079. “[A] mandatory minimum sentence that amounts to a de facto life

       sentence is a mandatory (de facto) life sentence.” Id. ¶ 128. The Leanos court noted that the

       defense counsel never mentioned the proportionate penalties clause or asked for a sentence below

       the statutory minimum based on defendant’s youthful traits. Id. ¶ 136. Instead, counsel asked five

       times for the minimum sentence allowed by law. Id. Counsel never suggested that the law gave

       the court discretion to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum. Id.

¶ 72          While expressing no view on the substantive merit of the argument, Leanos held the

       defendant’s claim was “legally viable” and that “properly raised, in the right forum, the claim does

       demand to be heard.” Id. ¶ 128-29. In a footnote, the dissent asserts Leanos is inapplicable. Infra

       ¶ 78 n.1. Although the underlying facts are dissimilar, the Leanos court recognized a proportionate

       penalties claim is viable under the right circumstances.

¶ 73          The Illinois Constitution of 1970 proportionate penalties clause requires courts to

       determine all penalties based on the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring

       the offender to useful citizenship. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. We find that the possibility for

       parole does not preclude Gates from serving a de facto life sentence. Therefore, Gates’s 48-year

       sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence.

¶ 74          Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

¶ 75          Cause remanded.

¶ 76          JUSTICE COGHLAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

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       No. 1-21-1422

¶ 77           I agree that defendant’s constitutional and statutory speedy trial rights were not violated in

       this case. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s determination that the trial court imposed a

       de facto life sentence under People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327. Supra ¶¶ 34, 70.

¶ 78           Defendant was sentenced to 23 years for murder plus a mandatory firearm enhancement

       (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2016)). Since he was “under 21 years of age at the time of

       the commission of first degree murder” and was “sentenced on or after June 1, 2019,” defendant

       will be “eligible for parole review by the Parole Review Board after serving 20 years” of his

       sentence. 1 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2020).

¶ 79           In People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶¶ 53-54, our supreme court equated parole with

       good conduct credit in that, under either, “it is in a defendant’s power to shorten his sentence.”

       The majority declares Dorsey “inapplicable” because the court focused on “the ‘ “power” ’ that

       inmates have to shorten their sentence because their behavior, not a subjective board

       determination, determines whether a day is counted towards their sentence.” Supra ¶ 41. On the

       contrary, in Dorsey, our supreme court “flatly reject[ed]” the notion that “good-conduct credit is

       not like parole because obeying prison rules does not demonstrate rehabilitation.” Dorsey, 2021

       IL 123010, ¶ 53.

¶ 80           Pursuant to section 5-4.5-115(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections, if a defendant is

       eligible for parole review after serving 20 years in prison, his sentence is not a de facto life

               1
                Relying on People v. Leanos, 2023 IL App (1st) 191079, the majority asserts that “[t]his court
       recently found the minimum aggregate penalty for a first degree murder committed with a firearm
       constitutes a de facto life sentence.” Supra ¶ 71. The defendant in Leanos was not sentenced “on or after
       June 1, 2019,” and will not be eligible for parole after serving 20 years of his sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-
       4.5-115(b) (West 2020). In this case, Leanos “does not apply to [defendant’s] specific facts and
       circumstances, as he is not subject to a de facto life without the possibility of parole sentence.” See
       People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56.

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       No. 1-21-1422

       sentence. See, e.g., People v. Peter, 43 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1071 (1976) (finding that “[a]mong the

       factors that may be considered in determining whether a sentence is excessive is the defendant’s

       eligibility for parole”). In People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56, we held that a 20-

       year-old sentenced to a 70-year prison term did not receive a de facto life sentence because he was

       eligible for parole after serving 20 years in prison. Relying on Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, and

       Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), we explained that “courts look to the earliest

       opportunity for release to assess whether a de facto life sentence has been imposed” and

       “consideration for parole remedies any Miller violation.” Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56.

       We also noted that the legislature’s enactment of section 5-4.5-115(b) of the Unified Code of

       Corrections “seems to have been a remedial response to the constitutional issues recognized in

       Miller for both juveniles and young adults.” Id.

¶ 81          In People v. Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d) 220066, ¶¶ 50, 53, the Second District looked to

       comments made by Senator Harmon during the legislative floor debate prior to enacting the new

       parole statute in evaluating whether the statute offered a “meaningful opportunity for release.”

       (Emphasis in original.). Following debate, and before the bill passed, Senator Harmon noted the

       “ ‘science of brain development’ ” and remarked:

              “ ‘[T]here is no judge on the planet who can look at a nineteen-year-old and say, I know

              for a fact that you’re the kind of young person who is going to mature and rehabilitate in

              prison or you’re the kind who is never going to get out of prison. That’s why we create this

              parole process, so that *** down the road, we can have a second look at the offender and

              say whether or not it’s appropriate for them to be released.’ ” Id. ¶ 53 (quoting 100th Ill.

              Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 31, 2017, at 35-36 (statements of Senator

              Harmon)).

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       No. 1-21-1422

¶ 82          The Cavazos court concluded, “It is clear that the legislature, fully aware of Miller and the

       relevant considerations considering juvenile sentencing and fully within its exclusive authority,

       created the new parole statute and modified the parole review factors for the purpose of creating a

       meaningful opportunity for parole for juvenile offenders.” Id. ¶ 54. Lest there be any

       misunderstanding, the court unequivocally determined that “the new parole statute affords

       defendant a meaningful opportunity for release, based on his maturity and rehabilitation, before

       serving a de facto life sentence of over 40 years’ imprisonment.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 60.

¶ 83          At the sentencing hearing in this case, the trial court properly considered that Dorsey “talks

       about the eligibility for parole” and the fact that defendant would be eligible for parole in 20 years

       under section 5-4.5-115(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections. The trial court also acknowledged

       the legislature’s “remedial response” in passing section 5-4.5-115(b), stating, “And to throw

       everything on top of this is the recent change in law with regard to eligibility for parole for an

       individual under the age of 21 that committed the offense of first degree murder. That is 20 years.”

       The court continued:

              “I believe it is the Dorsey case that was decided earlier this year, that it is the eligibility for

              parole that is determinative as to whether or not something is a de facto life, not the actual

              parole date. So any way you look at it, the defendant is eligible for parole within 20 years.”

¶ 84          The record establishes that the trial court understood and complied with existing Illinois

       law in imposing an appropriate sentence within the lower end of the statutory range.

¶ 85          Regarding defendant’s ineffectiveness claim, it is well established that effective assistance

       of counsel requires competent, not perfect, representation. People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 344

       (2000). Regarding the first Strickland prong, there is a strong presumption that “ ‘the challenged

       action or inaction of counsel was the product of sound trial strategy and not of incompetence.’ ”

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       No. 1-21-1422

       People v. Crawford, 2013 IL App (1st) 100310, ¶ 130 (quoting People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366,

       397 (1998)). To meet the second prong, the defendant must show a reasonable probability, i.e.,

       “ ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,’ ” that, but for defense

       counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Id. (quoting

       Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). Defendant is unable to meet his burden under

       either prong of ineffective assistance under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694.

¶ 86          The majority deems defense counsel’s performance deficient because he failed to “argue

       that the minimum sentence was unconstitutional as to Gates,” failed to “research the applicability

       of the firearm enhancements to those barely over 18,” and failed to “highlight or ask the court to

       consider the movement toward considering the diminished culpability of emerging adults.” Supra

       ¶ 68. As the author of the majority opinion in this case recognized in People v. Mobley, 2022 IL

       App (1st) 201255-U, “[c]ritical is the record, and the record here does not support the majority’s

       conclusion.” Id. ¶ 44 (Hyman, J., dissenting).

¶ 87          Defense counsel’s sentencing memorandum highlighted defendant’s tumultuous

       upbringing, which was marred by trauma, poverty, and violence; emphasized that this case was

       “his first adult arrest”; and thoroughly addressed “Gates’s status as an emerging adult” as follows:

              “Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and its progeny of cases have discussed at length

              the way in which youth of a certain age are categorically less culpable given, among other

              things, their immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.

              Although Quinton was 18 at the time of incident, and thus properly charged as an adult, he

              had only been 18 for two months. He falls into the category of ‘emerging youth’ [sic] who,

              arguably, should be given similar considerations to juvenile offenders. It is thus proper for

              this court to take into consideration Quinton’s age and immaturity as factors in mitigation.

                                                        - 24 -
       No. 1-21-1422

              There is no evidence to suggest that Quinton is either permanently incorrigible nor unable

              to be rehabilitated. To the contrary, his age and all of the attendant circumstances suggest

              that Quinton can go on to be a productive member of society and should be sentenced to

              the minimum sentence allowable.”

¶ 88          At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel urged the court to consider the trend of

       emerging adult status, including defendant’s “age, his immaturity, all of those attendant factors,

       and to sentence him to the minimum.” Counsel argued that defendant “was only two months after

       his eighteenth birthday” when this crime was committed. In response to the trial court’s inquiry

       about defendant’s parole eligibility, counsel advised the court that “becoming eligible [for parole]

       isn’t a guarantee” and repeatedly asked the court to consider the Miller factors “because it is so

       close in time to when [defendant] was a juvenile.”

¶ 89          Regarding the mandatory firearm enhancement, defense counsel acknowledged that the

       court was bound by “what the statute says.” Nevertheless, counsel vigorously argued that “the

       trend in the law has been to move away from mandatory minimums when it comes to juvenile

       offenders and to allow judges more discretion,” that “any ambiguity” in the statute “must be

       resolved in [defendant’s] favor,” and that “caselaw involving Miller and Buffer the progeny of

       cases that have come after” recognize that “juveniles are simply different.” Counsel also argued:

       “It is hard to say that you can go from having all those factors make such a big difference to

       suddenly those factors making no difference in a matter of eight weeks, which is the time span ***

       that [defendant] was over 18.”

¶ 90          The record confirms that defense counsel’s highly competent performance in this case far

       exceeded the “reasonably effective assistance” constitutional standard for legal representation.

       Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. While begrudgingly admitting that counsel “briefly mentioned”

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       No. 1-21-1422

       the diminished culpability of emerging adults at the sentencing hearing, the majority blindly insists

       that “Gates’s status as an emerging adult should have been argued and considered at his

       sentencing.” (Emphasis added.). Supra ¶ 70. At the risk of repeating myself, I must again

       emphasize that the record overwhelmingly establishes that Gates’s status as an emerging adult was

       extensively argued and considered at his sentencing hearing.

¶ 91          In order to justify finding prejudice where none exists, the majority speculates that the trial

       court “might have lowered the length of the sentence” had defense counsel argued for a

       reconsideration of the application of the firearm enhancement. Supra ¶ 69. In the words of our

       supreme court, “under no circumstances can conjecture constitute the sole basis for a claim of

       prejudice.” People v. Hannon, 48 Ill. 2d 462, 466 (1971). It is well established that “[c]onduct of

       a lawyer will not be deemed deficient for his or her failure to make an argument that has no basis

       in the law.” People v. King, 192 Ill. 2d 189, 197 (2000); see also People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272,

       305 (1994) (“An attorney’s conduct does not fall below the range of ‘reasonable professional

       assistance’ under Strickland [citation] by failing to make an argument that has no legal basis.”).

¶ 92          Considering the state of the law at the time of defendant’s sentencing hearing, defense

       counsel did not render constitutionally deficient assistance in failing to argue that the imposition

       of the 25-year firearm enhancement was discretionary for an adult offender or that a sentence in

       which defendant was eligible for parole after serving 20 years in prison was a de facto life term.

       “ ‘Representation based on the law prevailing at the time of trial is adequate, and counsel is not

       incompetent for failing to accurately predict that existing law will change. [Citation.]’ ” People v.

       English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 34.

¶ 93          Our supreme court’s decision in Dorsey, which was filed on July 29, 2021, was the law

       prevailing on the date of defendant’s sentencing hearing. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶¶ 50-51. As

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       No. 1-21-1422

       the author of the majority in this case recognized in People v. Brakes, 2021 IL App (1st) 181737,

       “Dorsey reaffirms the principle that the relevant sentencing scheme need only provide ‘some

       meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation before

       he spends more than 40 years in prison.’ *** Nothing requires the General Assembly to guarantee

       an opportunity for release before 40 years.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 4; see also People v. Beck,

       2021 IL App (5th) 200252, ¶ 22 (“While release is not promised, the opportunity for parole

       provides a meaningful opportunity for release.”). And as noted herein, in Elliott, this court held

       that a sentence in which an offender is eligible for parole after 40 or fewer years is not a de facto

       life sentence. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 56.

¶ 94          Based on the law prevailing at the time of defendant’s sentencing hearing and existing

       Illinois law, counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient. Concluding otherwise

       violates this court’s obligation “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight *** and to evaluate

       the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.

       Massey, 2019 IL App (1st) 162407, ¶ 25.

¶ 95          Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, defense counsel’s performance did not “fall below

       the professional standard” (supra ¶ 68) for failing to anticipate that a divided panel of this court

       would find the Elliott court’s determination that parole provides a meaningful opportunity for

       release “seriously flawed.” Supra ¶ 44. Our supreme court’s analysis in Dorsey, this court’s

       analysis in Elliott, and the record do not support the decision reached by my colleagues.

¶ 96          For the reasons stated herein, I would affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence. I dissent

       from the majority’s decision to remand for a new sentencing hearing.

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No. 1-21-1422

                     People v. Gates, 2023 IL App (1st) 211422

Decision Under Review:    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 17-CR-
                          09924; the Hon. Charles P. Burns, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                 James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Peter Sgro, of State
for                       Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                 Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique
for                       Abraham, David H. Iskowich, and Gerrard R. Burch Jr.,
Appellee:                 Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

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