Court Opinion

ID: 9416998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 19:59:59.737747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:29.863114
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD,
dissenting:
Controversy, sometimes of an imbittered character, existed in the courts of the parent country respecting th'e jurisdiction of the admiralty court for a century before the American Colonies separated from that country and proclaimed their independence. Differences of opinion also have existed here as to the proper extent of that jurisdiction ever since the adoption of the Federal Constitution, as evidenced by the decisions of the Supreme- Court at different periods in our judicial history.
Attempt was made at an early period to limit the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts to tide-waters, and to exclude its exercise altogether from waters within the body of a county, whether the waters were or were not affected by the ebb and flow of the tide. Express decision to the effect that the admiralty had no jurisdiction, even in a suit for *584seamen’s wages, was made in the case of The Jefferson,* except in eases where the service is substantially performed upon the sea cr upon1 waters within the ebb arid flow of the tide.
Jurisdiction of the admiralty courts at that period in the parent country did not extend to any case where the common-law courts could give the parties a remedy in a trial by-jury, and the theory here for a long time was that the clause of the ninth section of the Judiciary Act which saves to Suitors the right to a common-law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it, excluded all cases from the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts if the cause of action arose or accrued infra corpus comilalus. Protracted acquiescence in that theory gave it for a time the force of law, until the question was presented directly to the Supreme Court, when the whole theory was completely overturned in all cases whore the cause of action, whether tort or contract, had respect to acts done or service performed upon tidewaters.†
Doubts of a perplexing character arose in some of the circuits whether affreightment contracts were cognizable in the admiralty, which ultimately culminated in an absolute denial of the jurisdiction in all such cases. Wide differences of opiniou upon the subject existed, and in order to its final settlement the question was presented to the Supreme Court in its whole length aud broadth.‡
Nothing was left undone in that case, on either side, which could be accomplished by a skilful argument and indefatigable research. Two of the propositions, one selected from each side, will serve to illustrate the nature of the contention and the wide range of the discussion. By-the appellants it was insisted that the District Courts had no jurisdiction over such a contract, because it was made on land, within the body of a county', for the transportation of goods *585in a described route over inland waters landlocked the whole way, and because the contemplated voyage terminated infra fauces terree. Opposed to that, the appellees contended that in all eases of contract the question is whether the contract or service to be performed is in its nature maritime, and that in all eases of maritime contract the proceeding may be in rem or in personam, at the option of the libellant. Elaborate discussion followed, but the Supreme Court silenced forever all well-founded doubts upon that subject.
Such jurisdiction, however, was in the united view of the Supremo Court at that time, limited to tide-waters; nor did either of the learned justices who delivered the opinions of the court in those cases even intimate that the court could entertain appellate jurisdiction in such a case if the cause of action consisted of acts done or service performed on waters not affected by the ebb 'and flow of the tide.
Admiralty jurisdiction, by virtue of those decisions, continued in our jurisprudence to bo limited to the ebb and flow of the tide for more than a quarter of a century, in spite of the deepseated dissatisfaction which existed in all parts of the country interested in Western commerce or in the navigation of the great lakes and rivers of that portion of the Union.
Subsequent attempt was made by Congress to furnish a remedy for the difficulty, which was by no moans satisfactory, and expedients to obviate the embarrassment wore also attempted by the courts, all of which wore equally unsuccessful, until the Supremo Court was brought taco to face with the question whether the rule of decision that the jurisdiction of the admiralty was limited to the ebb and flow of the tide could-be upheld as a correct exposition of that clause of the Constitution which provides that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
Opposition to change induced the cry of stare decisis, just as when the argument was presented that the admiralty jurisdiction followed the tide even within the body of a county. Such a cry proved to be insufficient to restrain the -advance! *586of admiralty jurisdiction or to prevent it from entering even into the acknowledged limits of States having tide-waters within their borders, aud it was again destined to a still greater defeat when it was invoked as the means of perpetuating the great error that the admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to the great lakes and fresh-water rivers of our country.
Public duty required the court to review the former case, and the great magistrate presiding over the court did not hesitate to reverse the rule of decision there established and to determine to the effect that the admiralty jurisdiction is not limited to tide-waters, and that it extended to all public lakes aud rivers used for the purpose of commerce and navigation betweeu the States or for foreign trade.*
Strenuous effort was subsequently made to induce the court to qualify the rule there laid down, or to restrict its application so that the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts should not extend to aets done or service performed within, the bod}' of a county, if the waters were above the flux and reflux of the tide, but this court refused to adopt any such qualification, and reaffirmed, in the most authoritative manner, the rule previously announced in the two leading cases upon those subjects.†
Unquestionably, the jurisdiction of the admiralty is, by those cases, made to depend upon the navigable character of the water, and not upon the ebb and flow of the tide; and the court say, in the case last cited, if the water is navigable it is deemed to be public, and if public it is regarded as within the legitimate scope of the admiralty jurisdiction of the Constitution.
Except for one or two expressions contained in the opinion of the Chief Justice, which are much intensified in the head-note of the case, and which are repeated in the opinion in the case of The Magnolia, those two decisions would, in *587all probability, have settled the general question of admiralty jurisdiction under the Constitution, free from several perplexing embarrassments which presented themselves in subsequent litigations. Considerable weight is given in those opinions to the circumstance that the great lakes and fresh-water rivers are the theatre of extended commerce between different States and with foreign nations, and this court subsequently fell into the error that the admiralty jurisdiction of the District Courts was limited by the commercial power of the Constitution, and decided in two cases that an affreightment contract for the transportation of goods from oue port in a State to another port in the same State, or that a contract for necessary repairs and supplies furnished to a vessel in such a trade, is not within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts.*
Such an error was too palpable not to attract the attention of the court as soon as a case was presented involving the same question, and two or three years later, such a question was presented in the form of a libel for a collision, and the court unanimously decided that the admiralty jurisdiction was conferred by the Constitution; that in cases of tort the question is wholly unaffected by the consideration that the ship was not engaged in foreign commerce or in commerce between the States; that the jurisdiction, whether the cause of action is contract or tort, does not depend on the regulations of commerce; that the two matters of jurisdiction arc entirely distinct things, and that they were conferred by separate and distinct grants; that locality is the test of jurisdiction in cases of tort, and that, consequently, if the wrongful act is done on navigable waters, the case is one properly cognizable in the admiralty courts.†
Attention was again called to those two cases in an aft freightment suit, when they were both distinctly overruled without hesitation, and the whole court decided that contracts, claims, or service purely maritime and touching *588rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation, are of admiralty cognizance and properly cognizable in the District Courts.*
• Pending these difficulties and before the Supreme Court decided that the Judiciary Act extended the admiralty jurisdiction over all our navigable waters, the restriction that it- did not extend to voyages from a port in one State to another port in the same State had become incorporated into the act of Congress passed professedly to extend such jurisdiction to the great lakes and the rivers connected with the same; but the Supreme Court, in view of the constant and perplexing embarrassment growing out of that restriction,' did not hesitate to' decide that the act of Congress in that regard had become obsolete and inoperative, and that the admiralty jurisdiction created by the Constitution and conferred by the Judiciary Act was tire same everywhere withiu the United States, and that every distinction between tidewaters and other navigable waters was in that regard obliterated and overruled.†
Erroneous theories also became prevalent in certain quarters in respect to the true-nature of the liability of . the owners of ships and vessels for necessary repairs and supplies furnished to the master on the credit of the ship, that the burden of proof was in all cases upon the merchant to show both that the ship needed such necessaries and that the master was justified in resorting to the credit of the vessel. Decrees to- that effect were rendered in the Circuit Courts, but on appeal to this court the error was corrected and the true rule applied in the case.‡
Where it appears that the repairs and supplies are necessary to enable the ship to proceed on her voyage the presumption is, if they are furnished in good faith, that the ship as well as the master and owner is responsible to those who supplied such necessaries, unless it appears that the master had funds which he ought to have applied to those *589objects, and that the furnishers knew or ought to have known those facts.*
Sufficient has been remarked to show that the several decisions referred to had the effect to remove every stumbling-block in the way of the full legitimate exercise of admiralty jurisdiction except two—the one arising from the long acquiescence of the legal profession in the opinion that the admiralty courts could not take cognizance of suits founded upon marine policies of insurance, and the other growing out of an early decision of this court which it is supposed prohibits the admiralty courts from taking jurisdiction of a libel in rem filed by a material-man to enforce a contract for necessary repairs and supplies furnished to a ship in her home port.
Happily the first of the two obstructions mentioned is removed b\- a more recent decision of this court, and it is much to be regretted that thp majority of this court have decided not to remove the other until they “ have ” a more “ convenient season ” to accomplish that great purpose.†
Promptitude in correcting such an error, when it is discovered, is very desirable, as the longer it is suffered to prevail the greater is the danger that the correction will impair vested rights. Justice is slow but sure, and it is not doubted that sooner or later the correction will come, as the rule of decision which prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case is manifestly founded in mistake.
Enough of the facts of the case appear in the statement of them already given, ‡ without reproducing the details of the evidence. Suffice it to say that the controversy has respect to the balance of a fund in the registry of the District Court, derived from the sale of a steamer seized and sold for the payment of seamen’s wmges. Both parties in this court were interveuors in the District Court. Appellants claim what remains of the proceeds of the sale as mortgagees by virtue of a mortgage of the steamer executed to *590them by the owner. On the other hand the appellees make claim to the same by virtue of the lien which they insist they have for repairs and necessary supplies furnished to the master on the credit of the vessel. Proofs were taken and the parties heard, and the District Court ultimately determined that the mortgagees were entitled to the balance of the fund. Due appeal was taken by the intervenors who furnished the repairs and supplies, to the Circuit Court, where the parties were again heard, and the Circuit Cdurt reversed the decree of the District Court and entered a decree in favor of the intervenors who furnished the repairs and supplies. Prompt appeal was taken by the intervening mortgagees to this court from that decree.
Two errors are assigned, in substance and effect as follows: (1) That the Circuit Court erred in giving effect to the new twelfth admiralty rule, which had not been adopted when the libels of intervention were filed. (2) That the Circuit Court, erred in awarding the fund to the material-men, as it is not shown that such creditors have any privilege by the laws of the State.
Contracts or claims for service or damage purely maritime and touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation are cognizable in the admiralty. Whenever a maritime lien arises in such a contract or claim, as in controversies respecting repairs made or supplies furnished to a ship, or in case of collision, the libellant may pursue his remedy, whether it be for a breach of a maritime contract or for a marine tort, by a suit in rem against the vessel, or by a suit in personam against the master and owner in cases where they are jointly liable for the alleged default. By the civil law a lien upon the ship is given, without any express contract, to those who repair the vessel or furnish her with necessary supplies, whether the. vessel was at her home port or abroad when the repairs and supplies were made and furnished.*
*591Every man, says Abbott,* who had repaired or fitted out a ship, or lent money to be employed in those services, had by the law of Rome, and still possesses in those nations which have adopted the civil law as the basis of their jurisprudence, a privilege or right of payment in preference to other creditors upon the value of the ship itself without any instrument of hypothecation, or any express contract, or agreement, subjecting the ship to such a claim. “ Qui in navem exstruendam vel instruendam credidil vel eiiam emendam privilegium habel.” † “ Quod quis navis fabricando vel emendo, vel armendo, vel instruevdo causa, vel quoquo modo credidcrit vel ob navem vendilam petal, habel privilegium post fiscum”‡ Wherever a maritime lien exists, it gives a claim upon the ship a jus ad rein to be carried into effect by legal process, and the claim travels with the ship into whosesoever possession she may come, and is enforced in the court of admiralty by a proceeding in rem.§
Beyond all doubt such is the rule of the civil law, but the only lien recognized by the common law in such cases, independent of statutory regulations, is the possessory lien which arises out of, and is dependent upon, the possession of the ship, as in cases where goods are delivered to an artisan or tradesman to be manufactured or repaired. Such a lien, as understood at common law, did not attach unless the ship was in the possession of the person who set up the claim, and the extent of the privilege which it conferred was that he might retain the ship in his possession until he was paid the money due him for the repairs made or the supplies furnished.
Undisputed matters need not be discussed, consequently it may bo assumed that a contract for necessary repairs or supplies is a maritime contract, whether the vessel was at *592lionie or abroad when the repairs and supplies were made and furnished; and it may also be assumed that neither a coutract. for building a ship nor to furnish the materials for the construction of the same is a maritime contract, because such contracts are not directly’ connected with maritime commerce. They are contracts made on land and are to be performed on land. Contractors of the kind collect their materials yery largely from the forests and the mines, and until the ship is launched there is no necessary connection between the subject-matter of the contract and her subsequent employment as a vehicle of commerce and navigation.*
Repairs and. supplies were furnished by the intervening appellees to the steamer inker home port, and they claim that they have a lien upon the balance of the fund-in the registry of the court for the payment of their demand, which is resisted by the appellants chiefly upon two grounds: (1) They deny that any maritime lion arises in such a case. (2) Because, as they contend, they, the appellants, have a superior claim to what remains of the fund by virtue of the mortgage of the steamer executed to them by the owner.
Support to the first proposition is chiefly drawn from a decision of this court, which it is supposed establishes that rule of decision.† Claims of the kind, the court admit, in that case, give rise to a maritime lien where the repairs or supplies are furnished to a foreign ship or to a ship in a port of a State to which the ship does not belong, and that the general maritime law, following the civil law, gives the party a lien on the ship itself'for his security, and that he may well maintain a suit in rem in the admiralty to enforce his right. All the authorities, ancient and modern, admit that proposition, but the court proceed to say that, in respect to repairs and necessaries in the port or State to which the ship belongs, the case is governed altogether by the mu*593nicipal law of that State, and that no lien is implied unless it is recognized by that law. Taken as a whole the opinion in that case is more unsatisfactory than any one ever given in a commercial case by that learned judge. It is unaccountable, says a distinguished jurist, that Judge Story, in delivering the opinion of the court on-a question so interesting and pregnant, should have done so little. He gives but one page to the entire opinion, cites no authorities, and treats the subject in a slight and unsatisfactory manner.* Other judges have attempted to give the reason for the distinction set up in that case between the remedy given to a party who furnishes necessary repairs and supplies to a ship in the port of a State other than that to which she belongs and the remedy given to the party who furnishes like necessaries to a domestic ship. Those reasons are frankly.stated by the late Chief Justice Taney in endeavoring to vindicate the action of the court in denying the process in rent to a party who had furnished such necessaries to a domestic ship in a State where the State law made such claims a lien upon the vessel. His view is that the Supreme Court, being invested with the power to make rules, may in its discretion grant or withhold the right to use the process in rem as may seem best suited to promote the ends of justice in such controversies ; that the process in rem is granted to the party furnishing necessaries to a foreign ship or a ship in the port of a State to which she does not belong because “ the supplies,” in such a case, “ are presumed to be furnished on the credit of the vessel,” and that the process in rem is denied to the party who furnishes such necessaries to the domestic ship because it is presumed that they were “furnished on the personal credit of the owner or master.”†
Sometimes it is said that the process is granted in the former case because the presumption is that the owner is absent, and that it is denied in the latter case because the presumption is that the owner is present, which is but another mode of stating the same rule of decision. Unless-*594the credit is given to the ship the true rule is that there is no maritime lien in either case, and if the credit is given to the ship, reason and sound policy dictate that the party furnishing the necessary repairs and supplies to the domestic ship should be allowed to proceed against the ship as well as the party who afforded similar relief to the foreign ship or to the ship of a State to which she did not belong.
Examples almost without number may be given to illustrate the impolicy, injustice, and absurdity of a rule of decision founded on such a distinction. Suppose a vessel, whose home port is York, Maine, all of whose owners except one reside in Portsmouth, N. EL, nine /miles distant. Well manned and equipped the vessel starts on a voyage for St. Johns, but meeting with rough weather and receiving damage she puts into Eastport, four hundred miles distant from her home port, for repairs and supplies. Material-men there, under the supposed rule of decision, would have no maritime lien upon the ship, and the master being unknown there and without credit the necessary repairs and supplies could not be procured, although the presumption of law is that the owners in such a case are present, because the port of Eastport is in the State to which the ship belongs. UnJ able to find relief there for the want of credit, the ship being only crippled and not entirely disabled, may possibly be able to return, and suppose the master decides to make the attempt, and that the ship arrives in safety off the port of Portsmouth, and puts in there for the relief she vainly sought in her first port of refuge, it may now be assumed that she will-meet with no difficulty at that port in obtaining credit, as the material-men there will have a lien upon the ship, because the legal presumption is that the owners are absent, though they all reside there except one, whose residence is only nine miles distant.
Apply these suggestions to the different localities of navigation, and it will be easy to see that such rules of decision must lead to unparalleled mischiefs and perplexities. Commerce requires more sensible rules of decision, and those whose interests are embarked in such perilous pursuits are *595entitled to better protection than such rules of decision afford.
Executory contracts for repairs and supplies to a domestic ship it is admitted, are as much within the jurisdiction of the admiralty court as one for similar necessaries furnished to a foreign ship or to the ship of a State other than that to which the ship belongs, but the argument of the opinion under consideration is that the party in the case of the domestic ship must seek his remedy against the person and not against the vessel. What Judge Story’s reasons were for his conclusion does not appear, as he gave none, but it is safe to conclude, in the absence of such, that the best which exist are those given by the organ of the court in the case last cited.* He expressly conceded that the contract was a maritime contract, and placed the vindication of the prior decision upon the ground that the process in rem given for repairs and supplies to a domestic vessel by the court of admiralty, in those countries where the principles of the civil law prevail, is no part of the general maritime code, and he insists that it is obvious that the court in the prior case based the decision upon the ground that the laws of those countries are local laws. Here, then, all interested in the question may see the fatal error pervading those decisions, -which is, that the rule of decision embodied in the several maritime codes are mere local laws, each of the particular country where the code was framed and ordained.
Unless the principles embodied in the ordinances, treatises, sea laws, digests, and codes adopted by the countries where the civil law prevails, constitute, to the extent that they concur-in the rule of decision, the general maritime code as known in judicial investigation, it is difficult even to imagine what does, as it is known to every legal reader of judicial history that those countries never convened, as in a congress of nations,.and ordained a system of maritime regulations which can properly be regarded as the standard authority upon that subject.
*596Such a maritime code as that referred to, in that opinion, does not exist; and if not, and all the codes of the respective countries which adopt the civil law are to be regarded as mere local laws, the inquiry arises, from what source came the rule of decision that the District Courts as courts of admiralty have jurisdiction over contracts for repairs and • supplies furnished to a foreign ship or to the ship of a State to which the ship does not belong, or over contracts of affreightment. Certainly the rule of decision was not derived from the jurisprudence of the parent country as administered at the period of the Revolution, as the prohibition of the common-law courts had, long before that event, compelled the admiralty to relinquish all claim to the exercise of such jurisdiction.
Support to such a claim of jurisdiction could not be drawn from that source, aud if not, and the civil-law codes are to be regarded as mere local laws, it is impossible to see, if the views of the appellants are correct, that the admiralty has no jurisdiction over contracts for repairs and supplies to domestic ships, from what source the rule of decision was derived that the words “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” include jurisdiction over contracts for repairs and supplies even to a foreign ship or to the ship of a State to which the ship does not belong, as no such jurisdiction was exercised by the admiralty court of the parent country .at the time of the separation.
Two suggestions may be made in response to that argument :
, 1. That the words of the Constitution may refer to the admiralty jurisdiction of the parent country before it had been narrowed by the unfriendly prohibitions of the common-law courts.
Admit that, but then it follows beyond peradventure that the same rule of decision which construes the words of the Constitution conferring admiralty power as including jurisdiction over contracts for repairs and supplies to foreign ships,.must lead tp the same conclusion in respect to contracts and supplies furnished to domestic ships, as the an*597cient jurisdiction of the admiralty courts of the parent country extended to such contracts, whether the repairs and supplies were furnished to foreign or domestic ships. By the civil law every one who repaired or supplied a ship had a privilege or lien upon the ship herself for the amount of the debt thus contracted, and for centuries the admiralty courts of that country exercised such jurisdiction, in respect to which the best text-writers say that the lien or privilege extended to all ships and vessels,- without any distinction between foreign and domestic ships.*
Indeed, it is not easy to see, says Benedict, how any difference cau exist in principle; if one is a ship or vessel, so is the other; if one is a maritime contract, so must be the other; and the same law and the same reason which give the rule in the one case give it in the other. In both it is for service, labor, materials, and supplies furnished, which, when used for the purpose, become a part of the vessel, and a lien attaches to her because the repairs and supplies were for her benefit, which is just as true of a domestic ship as of a foreign sbip.†
By the civil law and the general maritime law, says Parsons, the lien or privilege extends to all ships, without any distinction between foreign and domestic vessels; and be asserts that the admiralty courts of the parent country exercised that jurisdiction until they were compelled to abandon it by tbe prohibitions of the common-law courts, for which there is the highest'authority.
Furnishers of repairs and supplies, says Lord Stowell, in most of the countries governed by the civil law, have a lien on the ship itself, and in our country the same doctrine had for a long time been held by the. maritime courts, but after a long contest it was finally overthrown by the courts of common law and by the highest judicatoiy of tbe country.‡
Argument to show tliat a contract to furnish repairs and *598supplies, whether to a domestic or foreign ship, is a maritime contract, is hardly necessary, as there is not a well-considered decision to the contrary in our language, and the twelfth admiralty rule, throughout all its mutations, from the time it was first adopted to the present time, has always given the District Courts jurisdiction over such contracts either in rem. or in personam. Both the enemies and the friends of the admiralty have always concurred in that proposition, which leaves nothing in controversy in this case except the question whether a maritime lien arises where the contract is to furnish repairs and supplies for a domestic ship, as it must be conceded that wherever there is a maritime Hen it may be enforced in the admiralty.
Maritime liens differ from common-law liens in important particulars, as common-law liens are always connected with the possession of the thing and are lost when the possession is relinquished. On the other hand a maritime lien does not in any manner depend upon the possession, as it is a right affecting the thing itself, which gives a proprietary interest in it and a right to proceed against it to recover that interest. Jurisdiction exists in the admiralty in all such cases, and the rule is that wherever there is a maritime lien upon the property it adheres to the proceeds in ease of sale and follows the same' into whose hands soever they may go, and the proceeds under such circumstances may be attached in the admiralty. Jurists tod civil-law writers frequently call it a privilege, and it is well settled that the proceeding in rem, in the admiralty is the only proper process to enforce such an interest.
Usually a maritime lien is the proper foundation of a proceeding in rem, as such process is seldom or never appropriate for any purpose except to enforce the inehoate interest created by such a lien, andthe law appears to be well settled that where a proceeding in rem is the proper pleading there a maritime lien exists in the thing which it is the office of such a process or pleading to perfect-.*
*599Successful contradiction of the proposition that the party furnishing repairs and supplies to a domestic ship, as well as he who furnished such repairs and supplies to a foreign ship, had a lieu upon the ship by the aueient admiralty law of the parent country cannot be made, as thejudicial history of that country is full of evidence to establish the affirmative of the proposition in its full length and breadth.* Admitted or not, the proposition is established, and it would seem to follow that if it was that practice which led the Supreme Court to the conclusion that the words “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” must include contracts for repairs and supplies furnished to foreign ships, that -the same practice should induce the court to hold that the same words also include repairs and supplies furnished to domestic ships, inasmuch as that ruling will correspond as well with the civil law and the general maritime law, as with the ancient practice of the admiralty court of the parent country.
2. All agree that the framers of the Constitution, when they employed the words “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” must have had in view some system of maritime jurisprudence, and those who deny that the reference was to the general maritime regulations of the commercial world usually’ insist, either that the inference was to the English system as known at the date of the Revolution, or to the system and practice known in the States prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, i
Much discussion at this day to refute the theory that it was the crippled and servile system of the parent country as it existed at the dawn of our independence is quite unnecessary, as the reports of the decisions of the Supreme Court are interspersed throughout with cases in which that theory is denied and overruled. None, it is believed, will *600now deny that the better source of reference in expounding that part of the Constitution, in order to ascertain the extent and boundaries of the admiralty jurisdiction, is to the system and practice in that regard of the admiralty courts during colonial times and before the Federal Constitution was ratified.
Still the same conclusion must follow as if the question was tested by the system and practice of the admiralty courts of the parent country as it existed before the essential features of that .system were annulled and overthrown by the prohibitions of the courts of common law, for the reason that the history of that period shows to a demonstration that the admiralty courts, organized in the Colonies prior to the Revolution, claimed aud exercised sucia jurisdiction over contracts for repairs aud supplies furnished, to domestic ships as well as over contracts to furnish such necessaries to foreign ships.
Matters of admiralty cognizance were, in most cases, reserved to the crown in the colonial charters, but the first charter granted to the colony of Massachusetts Bay contained no such reservation. Consequently jurisdiction of such matters was exercised in that colony under that charter by a Court of Assistants organized by the colony, whose powers and functions were prescribed and regulated by a colonial ordinance, the last article of which ordained that “ all cases of admiralty shall be heard aud determined by the Court of Assistants without a jury, unless the court shall see cause to the contrary, provided always that this act shall not be interpreted to obstruct the just p]ea of any mariner or merchant, impleading any person in any other court upon any matter or cause that depends upon contract, covenant, or other matter of common equity in maritime affairs.”*
"Without any explanation it is apparent from the words of the ordinance that it vests in the court thereby created full jurisdiction over all maritime cases of contract, covenant, or other matters of equity, reserving to the suitor the right to *601choose a common-law remecí}’ in cases where the common law is competent to give it. Eighteen years later the charter was granted to the province of Massachusetts Bay, and by that charter all such jurisdiction, power, and authority were reserved to the crown, to be exercised by virtue of commissions issued under the great seal. ■ Commissions of the kind issued to the judges of the provincial admiralty courts have been published, and they prove that those courts were vested with jurisdiction over all maritime causes and cases in the most unqualified terms.*
Two volumes of the proceedings of those courts in colonial times have recently been found among the papers of a registrar of the court and deposited in a public library in the city of Boston, which are full of instruction on the subject. Libels for contribution are there found both in rem and in personam, and libels on charter-parties and on contracts of affreightment, and libels by material-men, both in rem and m personam, for repairs and supplies furnished in the home port, showing conclusively that the jurisdiction of those courts extended to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction as understood for centuries in the parent country until the power of the admiralty court was paralyzed by the prohibitions of the courts of common law.†
Throughout many years of our judicial history it was a vexed question whether the District Courts could exercise jurisdiction in cases founded upon marine policies of insurance, and all agree that the discovery of those volumes containing the proceedings of the colonial admiralty courts contributed very much to the true solution of that question. Authentic proof is there exhibited that the colonial admiralty courts exercised jurisdiction in such cases, and the proof is equally full and undeniable that those courts also exercised jurisdiction in rem in favor of material-men to enforce the payment of their claims for repairs and supplies furnished to domestic ships.
*602Creditors of the kiud have suffered very severely for nearly twenty years, and it seems cruel to deny them all means of proceeding against the ship when every proctor knows that it is the only remedy they ever had which is of much value.
Suggestion is sometimes made that the court may restore the old twelfth rule and give the District Courts authority in such cases to enforce the State-law lien by a proceeding in rem. Such an expedient was tried for many.years, and it seems to me that the experience of that trial, as given by the late Chief Justice Taney, ought to deter any well-wisheof the Federal system from any attempt - to re-establish a practice which so signally failed in the former trial.
Necessaries, whether for repairs or supplies, are usually ordered by the master, and the best text-writers say that his authority is sufficient to cover all such repairs and the supply of such provisions and other things as are necessary to the due employment of the ship, and that it extends even to the borrowing of money in the absence of the owner, if ready mouey is required for the purpose of the same employment.*
Frequent credit is indispensable in cases of emergency, and all experience shows that in many cases it cannot be obtained unless the merchant, provision-dealer, material-man, or ship-chandler is allowed a lien on the ship which may be enforced by a libel in rem, as the master and owner are often of too doubtful responsibility and too frequently become insolvent to enable the master to procure such necessaries without other security. State-lien laws are too complicated and pregnant with too many conditions and special regulations in their machinery to be administered in a court of admiralty, even if it be competent for this court to provide for the exercise of such a jurisdiction by a District Court sitting as a court of admiralty.
Authority to make rules, it is conceded, is vested in this *603court, and it may be that such a rule might not be productive of very serious embarrassment if the State-lien laws were permanent laws and gave the lien in general terms, without specific conditions or limitations inconsistent with the rules and principles of the maritime lien. But the State-lien laws, even in such a case, were enforced under the old twelfth rule, not as a right which the admiralty court was bound to carry into execution upon the application of the libellant. On the contrary, those who framed the rule always regarded it in the light of a lien established by a foreign country, which the admiralty court might, at its discretion, enforce under that rule in cases where it did not involve controversies beyond the limits of admiralty jurisdiction.*
Process in rem was authorized by that rule upon the ground that the local laws gave the lien where none was given of a maritime character, and the- court in that case proceeded to say that the practice was found to be inconvenient in most cases and absolutely impracticable in others, which induced the court to repeal the rule. Different expedients have since been tried, as appears from the various modifications to which that rule has been subjected, and now it is suggested that it may become advisable to return to the practice which the justices who framed that rule found it necessary to abandon “ as entirely alien to the purposes for which the admiralty power was created, and decided that it formed no part of the code of laws which the admiralty was established to' administer.” Before doing so it-may be wise to weigh the reasons given by the justices who framed that rule as the grounds for its abandonment.
In many of the States, say the court-, the laws were found not to harmonize with the principles and rules of the maritime code. Certain conditions and forms of proceeding were required to obtain the lien, and it was generally declared to be forfeited or regarded as waived after the lapse of a certain time, or upon some future contingency. These *604conditions and limitations differed in different States, and if the process is to be used wherever the local law gives the lien it will subject the admiralty court to the necessity of examining and expounding the lien laws of every State and of carrying the same into execution, and that, too, in controversies where the existence of the lien is denied and the right depends altogether on a disputed construction of a State statute, or indeed, in some cases, of conflicting claims under the statutes of different States, as when the vessel formerly belonged to the port of another State where she also became subject to a State-law lien. Cases also arise where a third party claims a lien prior and superior to that of the libellant under the provisions of a statute of another State, and where such a controversy arises, say the equrt, in such a proceeding in rem, the admiralty court clearly has no power to decide or to adjust the prior claims in dispute, and consequently would be compelled to abandon the contest and recall its process whenever the controversy assumed that shape.
Reasons such as those given by the court in that case certainly deserve mature consideration', and it will be sufficient to refer to the lien laws of two or three of the States to show that the picture there portrayed is not overdrawn.
Work done or material furnished for or towards the building, repairing, fitting, furnishing, or equipping ships or vessels constitute, by the law of the State of New Jersey, a lien upon the ship or vessel, her tackle, apparel, or furniture, aud thp provision is that the lien shall continue for nine months after the debt is contracted, and that it shall be preferred to all other liens except mariners’ wages.* Means are also provided in the same act to enforce such a lieu if the debt amounts to the sum of twenty dollars. Application in writing must be made by the creditor to one of the magistrates named in the act for a warrant to enforce the lien and to collect the amount, but if the application is drawn in due form the officer or magistrate to whom the same is addressed *605is required to issue his warrant to the sheriff, or other proper officer, commanding him to attach, seize, and safely keep the ship or vessel, to be disposed of as directed in the same act. He must also make return of his doings in the premises within ten days, to the officer who issued the warrant, and make out, subscribe and annex thereto, a just and true inventory of all the property so seized, to be signed by him and annexed to his return.
Important duties are also imposed upon the officer who issued the warrant. He must direct that a notice containing certain prescribed requisites shall be published in one or more of the newspapers printed in the county, in order that any other person having such a lien upon the ship or vessel may deliver to the said officer an account in writing of his demand, accompanied by the prescribed affidavits and proofs; and the act provides that every such person shall be deemed an attaching creditor and shall be entitled to the same benefits and advantage and be subject to the same responsibilities and obligations as the creditor who made the first application ; and the further provision is that liens not so presented and verified shall be deemed inoperative and cease.
Massachusetts has also passed laws to accomplish the same general purpose, which in effect give a lien on the ship to the material-man who, in that State, has furnished labor or labor and materials, or provisions, or stores, for or on account of such ship, to secure the payment of such debt, the lien to continue until the debt is satisfied, unless it be dissolved, as it may be, if the creditor does not within four days from the time the ship departs from the port, file in the clerk’s office of the city or town a statement, subscribed and sworn to as prescribed, giving a just and true account of his demand, with all just credits and the other particulars therein required. Provision is also made for the enforcement of the lien by petition to the Superior Court of the county where the vessel was when the debt was contracted, and the mode of proceeding prescribed is that the petition may be entered in court or filed in vacation, in the clerk’s *606office, or may be inserted in a writ of original summons, with an order of attachment, and be served, returned, and entered as other civil actions; and that the subsequent proceedings for enforcing the lien shall, except as therein further provided, be as prescribed in the act for enforcing liens on buildings and land.*
Any number of persons having such liens upon the same ship may join in the same petition to enforce the same, and the same proceedings shall be had in regard to the respective rights of each petitioner, and the claims of all shall be marshalled to prevent a double lien for the same labor, materials, stores, or provisions, and to secure the just rights of all. Proper costs and expenses are to be deducted from the proceeds, and the residue is to be distributed among the several claimants, paying them in full or pro rata as circumstances may require.
Laws to the same end have been passed by the legislature of New York. Debts contracted within that State, to the amount of fifty dollars, by the master, owner, charterers, builder, or consignee of any sea-going or ocean-bound ship, on account of work done or materials or other articles furnished towards the building, repairing, fitting, furnishing, or equipping such á ship are made a lien upon the ship, her tackle, apparel, and furniture, in preference to all other liens except mariners’ wages. Provisions and stores furnished, wharfage and the expense of keeping the ship in port, and services in loading and unloading the ship, and debts for towing or piloting, of the amount of twenty-five dollars, are also included in the same category and are entitled to the same lien.
Detailed means are also provided for enforcing the lien, whether the repairs and supplies are to ocean-bound ships or smaller vessels. Liens of the kind cease at the expiration of six months after the debt was contracted, unless the ship was absent from the port when the six months expired, in which case the provision is that the lien shall continue ten *607days after the ship shall next return to the port, subject, however, to the condition that the debt shall cease to be a lien whenever the ship shall leave the port, unless the creditor shall, within twelve days after her departure, cause to be drawn up and filed specifications of such lien as therein provided, with a statement under oath of the amount claimed to be due, and file the same specification in the office of the clerk of the county or city, as therein more fully set forth.
Compliance with these requisites being shown the creditor may apply to a justice of the Supreme Court, at chambers, in the proper county, for a warrant to enforce the lien and to collect the amount. All the various steps required to be taken to enforce the lien and to collect the debt are then prescribed, every one of which is “alien to the purposes for which the admiralty power was created, and forms no part of the code of laws which it was established to administer.”*
Separate examination of the different features of these several enactments will not be attempted, nor is it necessary, as it is manifest that any one at all acquainted with the practice in suits in rem wilUsee at a glance that the admiralty courts as now organized are utterly incompetent to execute such conditions and regulations. Alterations, it is said, may be made in the" organization of the District Courts to obviate that difficulty, but the incompetency of those courts to administer such regulations under existing laws is by no means the only objection to such an experiment, as it may well be doubted whether this court, in view of the great number of such enactments, and the frequent chauges to which the enactment of each State is annually exposed, will be able to perform all the duties which the adoption of such a system would impose, without leaving unperformed many of the high purposes contemplated by the Constitution and the original Judiciary Act.
These several conclusions render it unnecessary to give much examination to the other objections urged by the appellees to the pretensions of the appellants, that they are *608entitled to the balance of the fund in the registry of the court by virtue of their mortgage, which has never been formally foreclosed. They are mortgagees, and inasmuch as their mortgage has never been foreclosed and their claim is opposed by the owner of the steamer, I am of the opinion that the District Court sitting as a court of admiralty had no jurisdiction of the cause of action, and that the decree of the Circuit Court reversing the decree of the District Court is correct.*
Even suppose that difficulty may be obviated, which is denied, still the governing rule of decision remaius, that the appellees as material-men have a superior lien by virtue of the maritime law. Clearly that would be so in any commercial country in the world, except England, unless our own country must be included in that category. Commentators everywhere agree that by the civil law and the law of those countries which have adopted its principles, a lien upon the ship is given without any express contract, to those who repair her or furnish her with necessaries, either at home or abroad.†
Sufficient has been remarked to show that the jurisdiction of the District Courts is not limited to the particular subjects over which the admiralty courts of the parent country exercised jurisdiction when the colonists immigrated here and formed themselves into new communities, and it may be admitted, that it does not extend to all cases which would fall within it according to the civil law and the practices and usages of continental Europe.
Our ancestors, when they immigrated here, organized themselves into colonies and assumed and exercised all the powers of government. They enacted new laws, and those in operation were, in many cases, modified. Judicatories *609were created and empowered to hear and determine legal controversies, including all those of a maritime character, wholly unrestricted by the prohibitions of the common-law courts of the country from which they had emigrated; and when in the progress of events they found it necessary and proper to frame the Federal Constitution and saw fit to provide that the judicial power shall extend to “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” it was to the admiralty jurisdiction as it was known and understood in the States to which they referred.
Proofs of the highest character are now exhibited that the admiralty courts of the States did exercise jurisdiction over contracts for repairs and supplies furnished to domestic ships as well as to foreign ships, aud it follows, as it seems to me, that the appellees in this case had a maritime lieu upon the steamer and that the same attaches to the proceeds in the registry of the court below, and that the decree of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.
Mr. Justice FIELD also dissented.

 10 Wheaton, 428.

 Waring v. Clarke, 5 Howard, 452.

 The Lexington, 6 Id. 392.

 The Genesee Chief, 12 Howard, 454.

 The Magnolia, 20 Howard, 298; Waring v. Clarke, 5 Id. 452; The Genesee Chief, 12 Id. 454.

 Allen v. Newbury, 21 Howard, 245; Maguire v. Card, Ib. 250.

 The Commerce, 1 Black, 578.

 The Belfast, 7 Wallace, 637.

 The Eagle, 8 Id. 20.

 The Lulu, 10 Id. 197; The Grapeshot, 9 Id. 129.

 The Kalorama, 10 Id. 205; The Custer, Ib. 215.

 Insurance Company v. Dunham, 11 Wallace, 21.

 Williams & Bruce’s Practice, 154; The John, 3 Robinson’s Admiralty, 288; Hosmer v. Bell, 7 Moore’s Privy Council, 24; 3 Kent, 12th ed. 168; 3 Id. 169, note a.

 On Shipping, 142.

 Digest, L. 42, Tit. 5, 1. 26.

 Id L 42, Tit. 5, 1. 34; Code du Commerce, Art. 197; French Code, Li v. 1, Tit. 12, Art 3; The Harrison, 2 Abbot’s United States Reports, 74 ¡ Ex parte Kirkland, 12 American Law Register, New Series, 301; The Nestor, 1 Sumner, 79.

 Addison on Contracts (6th cd.), 273; 1 Wynn’s Life of Leoline Jenkins, 76 to 99.

 The Jefferson, 20 Howard, 400; Roach v. Chapman, 22 Id. 129; Morewood v. Enequist, 23 Id. 494; Young v. Ship Orpheus, 2 Clifford, 36; Edwards v. Elliott, supra, p. 553.

 The General Smith, 4 Wheaton, 443.

 7 American Law Review, 2.

 The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 527.

 The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 529.

 The Nestor, 1 Sumner, 79; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 6th ed. 260.

 Benedict (2d ed.), § 272; 2 Parsons on Shipping, 322.

 The Zodiac, 1 Haggard’s Admiralty, 325; Rich v. Coe, 2 Cowper, 639; Farmer v. Davies, 1 Term, 109.

 Harmer v. Bell, 7 Moore’s Privy Council, 284; The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wallace, 215.

 The Neptune, 3 Haggard, 142; 2 Life of Jenkins, 746; 1 Parsons’s Maritime Law, 490; Hoar v. Clement, 2 Shower, 338; Justin v. Ballam, 1 Salkeld, 34; Watkinson v. Bernardiston, 2 Peere Williams, 367; Wilkins v. Carmichael, 1 Douglas, 105; Ex parte Shank, 1 Atkyns, 234; 1 Parsons on Shipping, 322.

 Ancient Charters, App., p. 716.

 Benedict’s Admiralty, 2d ed., § 151; Stokes’s Colonial History, 166; Waring v. Clarke, 5 Howard, 454; Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wallace, 10.

 Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wallace, 10.

 Maclachlan on Shipping, 129; Beldon v. Campbell, 6 Exchequer, 886; 1 Conkling’s Admiralty, 73.

 The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522.

 Sessions Acts, 1857, p. 382.

 General Statutes of Massachusetts, 768;

 4 Stat. at Large, New York, 653.

 Schuchardt v. Ship Angelique, 19 Howard, 241; The John Jay, 17 Id. 401; The Neptune, 3 Haggard, 132; The Dowthorpe, 2 W. Robinson, 73; The Sailor Prince, 1 Benedict, 461.

 Maude & Pollock on Shipping, 67; 1 Valin, 363, 369; Ordonnance de la Mer, Title 2, Art. 1; Cleirac Jur. de la Mer, 351, Art. 6; Casaregis Dis. 18; 2 Brown’s Civil and Admiralty Law, 142; Roccus de Nav. et Nat. 82, 91-93.