Court Opinion

ID: 9710505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:10:55.05459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:57.250334
License: Public Domain

STOUDER, J., dissenting. Dissenting Opinion I do not agree with the majority of the court. In my opinion the judgment of the Circuit Court should be reversed. In the first place neither the opinion of the court nor the brief of Appellee suggests any theory or offers any reason for disregarding the provision of the policy excluding from coverage, “automobiles, motor trucks, trailers, and similar vehicles licensed for highway use or held for sale . . . .” This provision excludes coverage with respect to any hazard, not merely theft. Accordingly, I find no basis for Appellant’s obligation for loss of the trailer since it was admittedly licensed for highway use. In the second place I believe that the theft which occurred was excluded by the clear and unambiguous terms of the exclusionary provision. It has often been said that contracts of insurance are like other contracts and the intention of the parties is to be sought from the plain meaning of the words employed. It is only when the language is vague, uncertain or ambiguous that resort to other rules of construction such as that of liberality in favor of the insured or of interpretations favoring coverage rather than exclusion from coverage is appropriate. In Universal Coffee Co., Inc. v. American Ins. Co., 5 Ill App2d 319, 125 NE2d 643, the court reached an opposite result from that in Sally Chain Stores, Inc. v. Ace Bond Carriers, Inc., 307 Ill App 644, 30 NE2d 966, although each case involved the theft of a delivery vehicle and its insured contents. From an analysis of the foregoing cases it can only be concluded that it is the difference in the language employed in the policy which accounts for the differences in result. In Sally Chain Stores the court concluded that the theft of the contents did not take place “from” the vehicle. Thus “from” means removal of the property at the time of the theft while the phrase “while in or on,” as used in the instant case, means location at the time of the theft. Although I might agree that enclosure of the boat and motor “while in or on a trailer” might be impractical it certainly is not impossible as urged by Appellee. However, in my opinion, this fact is immaterial since I know of no requirement that each condition be applicable to all circumstances and if not so applicable such provision is thereby rendered ambiguous. The boat and motor could either have been removed from the trailer or the boatyard could have been attended under which conditions the property would have been covered.