Court Opinion

ID: 9552410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:10:14.348723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:19.461880
License: Public Domain

PETERSON, J.,
concurring.
I concur with the opinion of the court in all respects except one. I disassociate myself from part III of the opinion, not because I necessarily disagree with what is stated therein, but because that part of the opinion is totally unnecessary to the decision of this case, involves questions not raised or considered in either the trial court or the Court of Appeals and not argued or discussed by the parties, and adopts significant rules of law on important controversial questions without the issues being presented, contended for, briefed, or argued.
*615It is clear that the parties, from the beginning of the case, disputed whether the contributory negligence of plaintiff would bar or reduce a recovery when the plaintiffs claim is based on a strict liability theory. But there was no issue in the trial court relating to the quantification of fault, the comparison or apportionment of fault, or the manner by which the plaintiffs comparative fault would be calculated to bar or reduce recovery.
Although the plaintiffs attorney took exception to the giving of any comparative negligence instructions, no other exceptions to the court’s comparative fault instructions were taken.1 On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiffs comparative negligence could bar or reduce her recovery. This was one of the issues tendered to the Court of Appeals for decision, and this issue was decided by the Court of Appeals in the plaintiffs favor. There were no other claims of error addressing liability.
The defendants, in their petition for review, claimed only (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to hold that all forms of contributory negligence “can be considered for comparative purposes in a strict liability action” and (2) that the Court of Appeals erred in “* * * * ruling that the jury could not consider the fault of the plaintiff in voluntarily encountering an obvious risk or hazard * * *.” The court’s opinion decides all of the questions presented in the petitions for review. In addition, in part III of the opinion the court adopts rules relating to (1) what conduct determines fault; (2) against what standard the conduct is compared to determine the amount of a *616party’s fault; and (3) the manner by which the “* * * respective degrees of fault are to be converted into a percentage which will be applied to the plaintiffs total damages to determine his actual recovery.”
The question whether the determination of fault is to be made (1) by the extent to which fault caused the injury, (2) by comparing “fault,” or (3) by making both comparisons, is a significant, provocative, controversial, important question.2 I don’t suggest that we back away from provocative and controversial questions. But we should not adopt such significant rules of law when no facts are before us for decision, where the issue has not been presented for decision, when the issue has not been raised by any party, and when a ruling on the issue is not necessary to the disposition of the case.3
*617I am sensitive to the fact that these are important questions. But I would rather make all decisions when the issue is properly before us, rather than in the abstract, without argument from anyone, and without facts to look to in making the decision. All questions, especially important questions, are best decided when the parties raise them, brief them, and argue them. There may be significant reasons not revealed by our own research and consideration which point toward a different conclusion. Even though we are a court of review (Rule of Appellate Procedure 10.05), nonetheless our function is to decide cases that come before us, not to muse about “what the rule of law should be if.”
The advent of strict liability and comparative negligence has created difficult, provocative, challenging and important questions. In the past generation, we have decided a host of cases involving such questions. But to the best of my knowledge, since the enactment of ORS 18.470 in 1971,4 no party has ever claimed error by reason of the instructions of the court relating to the manner in which “fault” is to be determined or apportioned, or the manner in which the plaintiffs damages are to be diminished by reason of such fault. Obviously, the development of new rules of law is necessary if courts are to be responsive to societal needs. But rules of law are best forged on the anvil of actual controversy rather than by taking a massive bite out of the carcass of a field of law and spitting out a rule of law which, in the abstract, tastes good. We have repeatedly refused to give advisory opinions, even though the parties have asked for them. We should not gratuitously render advisory or academic opinions which are not sought. See Oregon Medical Association v. Rawls, 281 Or 293, 296-300, 574 P2d 1103 (1978); Oregon Medical Assn. v. Rawls, 276 Or 1101, 1108, 557 P2d 664 (1977); Smith v. Smith, 209 Or 96, 98, 304 P2d 421 (1956).
I have no quarrel with concurring opinions which point up problems in a given area. Such concurring opinions perform a beneficial function and often lead to beneficial results. See, for example, the concurring opinion of *618Justice Linde in State v. Stroup, 290 Or 185, 620 P2d 1359 (1980), which flagged an issue which is even now being considered by this court in State v. Buttrey, 54 Or App 40, 642 P2d 704, rev allowed 292 Or 108 (1981); the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Denecke in State v. Wolfe, 273 Or 518, 528, 542 P2d 482 (1975), which pointed up a problem which was recently considered by this court in State v. Douglas, 292 Or 516, 641 P2d 561 (1982); and the opinion of Justice Lent in Hendrix v. McKee, 281 Or 123, 125, 575 P2d 134 (1978), which led to our decision in Falk v. Amsberry, 290 Or 839, 626 P2d 362 (1981).
A study of the articles and cases cited in the majority opinion and in this opinion compels the conclusion that the issues with which part III is concerned are difficult, complex, controversial questions which are far from being settled with any substantial uniformity. On the question of allocation of fault under Connecticut’s then new comparative negligence law, Professor Fleming James wrote:
“What is to be compared. A perennial question under comparative negligence statutes is whether apportionment is to be made by comparing fault, or by comparing the extent to which fault contributed to the injury, or by making both comparisons. The statutory language suggests that only faults are to be compared: ‘damages. . . shall be diminished in the proportion of the percentage of negligence attributable to the person recovering.’ And Prosser says bluntly, that ‘once causation is found, the apportionment must be made on the basis of comparative fault, rather than comparative contribution.’
“Courts which have dealt with comparative negligence statutes have not, however, embraced the appealing simplicity of this view. The Wisconsin statute is worded very much like ours. In Kohler v. Dumke defendant urged a view diametrically opposite to Prosser’s, that if plaintiff were found negligent ‘then in resolving the comparative negligence issue only the element of causation should be considered.’ The court disagreed, saying, ‘We deem it clear that the word “negligence” in the comparative negligence statute. . . means causal negligence . . Therefore, in comparing the negligence of two or more persons, the jury is to consider both the elements of negligence and causation.’ The Mississippi statute, which is worded like the Wisconsin statute in this respect, has been construed the same way. The Maine statute, patterned after the British, *619is somewhat differently worded. Under both of these comparison is made both of fault and of causal contribution. Professor Fleming, with an extensive background in the law of the British Commonwealth, takes more or less the same view. The weight of authority, then, inclines heavily to this view and it seems likely that Connecticut courts will follow it.”5 (Footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.)
On the question of how fault is to be determined the answer is anything but clear, as is seen by these commentators.
“On these foundations, we may proceed to examine the theoretical concept of ‘degrees of fault.’ Immediately, we encounter an anomaly, with which we will be required to struggle throughout our study. ‘Fault’ is not a finite object. It is, rather, an evaluative judgment about the quality of conduct or performance. As such, it is not a judgment which proceeds out of sensory observation or measurement in the same direct sense that quantitative evaluations or conclusions do. A judgment of fault, in other words, is only mediately supported by objective evidence; immediately and directly, it is a subjective legal or ethical pronouncement of responsibility for wrongdoing.
* * * *
“It is out of a candid recognition of the essential subjectivity of these judgments that ‘the rule of law’ attempts, by book and by instruction, to superimpose its own standards and definitions on subjective conceptions of fault and nonfault, and solemnly charges its judges and jurors to adopt and apply those standards and definitions in the process of litigation. In this vein, we devise careful legal definitions of such concepts as ‘negligence’ and ‘cause,’ identifying specific standards for determining their presence or absence.
“If, for lack of any alternative, we are compelled to accept the somewhat naive notion that this process of superimposition really works to unseat the studied or instinctive preconceptions of the individuals concerned, it is sheer fantasy to assume that subjective standards of evaluation will not continue to govern the matter where no rational or objective legal standard or definition is possible, or is even suggested. Such is the case with respect to *620the concept of ‘degrees of causative negligence.’ ”6 (Emphasis in original.)
On cause-in-fact apportionment, Professor Twerski writes:
“It is time to consider the use of the comparative fault doctrine to include within its sweep not only fault and proximate cause but cause-in-fact as well. In my opinion, the inevitable effect of instructing a jury that proximate cause is an item for comparison will be that cause-in-fact will be factored into the jury’s consideration. * * *
“As a statement of fact and pure logic, it is clear that cause-in-fact is not subject to apportionment. But in our saner moments, we ought to be ready to admit that cause-in-fact is one of the most intractable items to prove in a law suit. * * *
<<* * * * *
“In reality I believe that this will occur when cases are turned over to juries on a comparative fault instruction. Jurors, not being schooled in the separate pigeon holes created by tort teachers, are still naive enough to believe that an accident does not take place in five stages. Duty, standard of care, cause-in-fact, proximate cause and damages are supposed to be analytical aids. They are not descriptive of the process of accomplishing a tort. Thus, juries will have to be excused if they view the entire injury event as a unitary whole and factor the probability of causation together with fault in arriving at a percentage apportionment. * * *.” (Footnotes omitted.)7
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act recognizes the difficulty in determining fault. Section 2(b) of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (12 ULA 37, 1982 Pocket) provides:
“(2)(b) In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.”
Although I may agree with the holding of part III of the opinion if and when the questions are presented, I have serious reservations as to the practical implications of *621the court’s holding. To implement the holding of part III of the court’s opinion lawyers must formulate requested instructions and trial judges must give instructions to the jury concerning how fault is to be determined, how fault is to be apportioned and how plaintiffs damages are to be diminished by reason of the plaintiffs fault. I have no doubt that this will be done, for now it must be done, but I have reservations whether the desired end product — a verdict based upon objectivity and fairness and in accordance with the law — is more likely to be achieved than is now the case under current Oregon practice. See Oregon Uniform Jury Instructions 11.50-11.60. To .accommodate the rules set forth in Part III of the court’s opinion among the instructions that a trial judge will have to give upon proper request are these:
1. What fault is.
2. The standard against which a party’s fault is to be compared in determining the party’s percentage of fault.
3. That although “[b]oth the defect and the plaintiffs fault must in fact be causes of one injury before a question of apportionment of fault arises” (majority opinion at 601), once the jury finds causation in fact to exist they are not to consider the causal relationship between the fault and the injury in apportioning the party’s fault. Rather, their apportionment of fault must be made by comparing the party’s fault against “* * * behavior that would have been faultless under the circumstances * *
4. How the jury is to calculate the degree of each party’s fault against the norm.
Comment: The majority would require that the initial determination of fault be made against a standard of behavior “that would have been faultless under the circumstances” or by comparing the product to “what the product should have been without the defect.” The result could be expressed numerically, by a percentage, or otherwise. The number is to reflect the degree by which or to which the behavior falls short of the norm, and must then be expressed in terms of a “* * * deficit as a numerical percentage, which then is applied to diminish the recoverable damages.” Majority opinion at 607.
*6225. How the jury should convert the party’s percentage of fault into “* * * a percentage of the total fault attributable to all parties represented in the action,” as required by ORS 18.480.
Comment: Keep in mind that ORS 18.480 requires that, upon request, the jury “* * * shall answer special questions indicating: * * * (b) The degree of each party’s fault expressed as a percentage of the total fault attributable to all parties represented in the action” (Emphasis added). The jury will have to convert the percentage by which the party’s conduct “fell short of [the] norm” into “a percentage of the total fault attributable to all parties represented in the action,” as required by ORS 18.480(1) (b). If the jury decided that a plaintiffs fault, when tested against the norm of faultless conduct, were 20 percent, and that a defendant’s fault, when compared against the appropriate norm, were 25 percent, the jury must then convert those percentages into percentages “of the total fault,” as required by ORS 18.480(1)(b). The result: Plaintiffs percentage of fault would be 44.44 percent (20/45); the defendant’s percentage of fault would be 55.56 percent (25/45), and the plaintiffs recovery would be reduced not 20 percent, but 44.44 percent. If there were three parties, and the respective percentages of fault were plaintiff, 20 percent; defendant No. 1, 25 percent; defendant No. 2, 30 percent, the conversion into percentages “of the total fault attributable to all parties represented in the action” would be: Plaintiff, 26.67 percent (20/75); defendant No. 1, 33.33 percent (25/75); and defendant No. 2, 40 percent (30/75), and the plaintiffs recovery would be reduced by 26.67 percent.
6. Finally, the jury is required to “* * * be informed of the legal effect of its answer to the questions ***.” ORS 18.480(2).
The majority opinion itself reflects the potential for confusion which may arise in applying the rules set forth in the opinion. Footnote 18 states:
“* * * This approach would not necessarily deny all damages even to a plaintiff guilty of extreme misconduct (say ‘80 percent’ below the ‘fault line’) if the extent that defendant fell short of the norm is even greater; it would *623simply reduce plaintiffs recovery to 20 percent of her damages.”
I gather that the quoted statement applies to the theory discussed in 43 Mo L Rev 431, 449-450, for the statement cannot be correct as applied to ORS 18.470 and ORS 18.480. If plaintiffs misconduct were 80 percent, before there could be any recovery, the fault of the defendants) must equal or exceed that of the plaintiff. Thus, if there were but one defendant, whose fault was also 80 percent, the plaintiffs recoverable damages would be 50 percent of the total damages, not 20 percent. If the fault of the defendant were 90 percent, plaintiffs recoverable damages would be reduced by 47.06 percent (80/170).
The mathematics can be difficult. Regarding the mathematical calculations, David L. Nixon wrote:
“Entrusting the entire process of dollar damages apportionment to the jury under general verdict procedures will strike some as an act of faith bordering on irresponsibility. The express prohibition of special interrogatories was not contained in the bill as drafted when first introduced, although the bill did require that ‘the jury. . . diminish the damages’. As the hearings and discussions on the subject of the comparative negligence bill progressed through the Legislative Session and as knowledge was gained of Maine’s experience with its 1965 statute, the realization grew that the rough and basic justice of unfettered jury deliberation was probably preferable (and at least worth a good try) as an alternative to the horrendous mathematical processes described by opponents of the legislation as necessarily a part of the jury’s function under special verdict statutes. Most of those involved in the jury trial process, it is submitted, would agree on reflection that New Hampshire juries are populated in the main by neither misers nor spendthrifts. Others, with much in the way of research and experience to draw from, agree on the fundamental fairness and good sense of the average juror.” (Footnotes omitted.)8
The practices which have been followed in Oregon trial courts (which generally utilize the Uniform Jury Instructions) appear to me to have been generally satisfactory. Whether or not I am correct, there is no reason for *624this court to unilaterally impose far-reaching rules of procedure and substantive law on the citizenry without input from anyone.
As a young lawyer, it took me months to understand and apply the “Lamb-Weston rule,” as set forth in Lamb-Weston et al v. Ore. Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Or 110, 137-138, 341 P2d 110, 346 P2d 643, 76 ALR 2d 485 (1959), which states the principle that when there are two or more policies of valid and collectible insurance which are applicable to a loss, the total loss will be apportioned among the insurers in the ratio which the limits of each policy bear to the total available coverage. I fear that many juries will find it difficult if not impossible to understand and apply the similar rules set forth in part III of the opinion.
The doctrine of comparative negligence intends to avoid the harsh result of the common law contributory negligence rule that any negligence by the plaintiff, however small, barred recovery. Comparative fault statutes were designed to temper that rule by either granting plaintiff recovery against a negligent defendant whatever the degree of the plaintiffs fault (pure comparative fault) or by permitting the plaintiff to recover from negligent defendants if the plaintiffs fault was “not greater than” or was less than the defendant’s or the combined fault of multiple defendants. The superimposed declaration under statutes similar to Oregon’s comparative fault statute, is that the plaintiffs right to recover turns on whether the plaintiffs fault was not greater than or less than the fault of the person against whom claim is made. Inherent in the doctrine is the comparison of fault — the plaintiffs fault is compared to the defendant’s. That premise leads me to conclude that it is likely that the framers of comparative fault legislation contemplated that the fault of a party be determined by directly comparing his or her fault against the fault of other party or parties against whom claims were made, rather than by the injection of an intermediate step whereby fault is determined by comparing conduct against a separate standard and then comparing the numerical results to determine who wins or loses and by how much. I am not convinced that the drafters of ORS 18.470 intended this type of comparison.
*625The advent of strict liability has made it more difficult to compare fault based on negligence against fault based on strict liability. But jurors have been equal to that task, possibly without benefit of rational definition or standard, and until the issue arises, I would do nothing and say nothing.
Part III of the opinion of this court is unnecessary to the decision, does not involve the correction of any error, does not involve a question likely to arise on remand (except for our gratuitous reference to the matter), and involves issues which have concerned the bench and bar of this state, until now, very little or not at all. On a comparative fault basis, our fault is a 99 for publishing part III of the opinion.
Denecke, C. J., joins in this opinion.

 The plaintiffs exceptions to the comparative negligence instructions were:
“With respect to the comparative fault situation, I, of course, previously moved to strike all the allegations of comparative fault and I set forth, I think, my reasons pretty fully at that time. And I would just adopt those at this point, if that is satisfactory with the Court.
* * * *
“* * * that the only defense that would be applicable in this type of a case that remains in Oregon to a strict liability claim is the defense of misuse of the product or abnormal usage of the product; that lack of control, excessive speed, driving a loaded vehicle without experience, are not the types of conduct which the Supreme Court says should be a defense to a strict liability case. The instruction should not have been given, in any event.”

 On this question, there are three lines of authority, which are succinctly summarized in Woods, Comparative Fault 108-109, § 5.5 (1978), as follows:
“Is apportionment to be made by comparing fault, or by comparing the extent to which fault contributed to the injury, or by making both comparisons? Most statutory languge would seem to suggest that only faults are to be compared. For instance, the Colorado statute says that ‘any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence.’ [Colo Rev Stat Ann 41-2-14] Most statutes contain similar language. Some authorities, notably Prosser, take the position that *. . . once causation is found, the apportionment must be made on the basis of comparative fault rather than comparative contribution.’ [Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich L Rev 465, 481 (1953)]
“Professors James [P. James, Connecticut’s Comparative Negligence Statute, 6 Conn L Rev 201, 216] and Fleming [Fleming, Law of Torts 241-42 (3rd ed 1965)] do not agree. Their view is that both fault and causal contribution should be compared. It is supported by most of the cases. In Kohler v. Dumke [Kohler v. Dumke, 13 Wis 2d 211, 108 NW2d 581], defendant argued that if plaintiff were found negligent, ‘then in resolving the comparative negligence issue only the element of causation should be considered.’ This is completely at odds with the Prosser view. The court accepted the approach of Professors James and Fleming. ‘We deem it clear that the word “negligence” in the comparative negligence statute . . . means causal negligence . . Therefore, in comparing the negligence of two or more persons, the jury is to consider both the elements of negligence and causation.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)

 Footnote 1 of the opinion sets forth some questions which we asked the parties. In answer to the third question, the plaintiffs attorney stated:
“The Court’s third question appears to look beyond the disposition of this appeal. Unfortunately there may be no common rationale for comparing fault applicable to all strict products liability actions, and hence no sure basis for instructing the jury in other than the most general terms.”

 In fact, comparative negligence has been a part of Oregon law since the passage of the Employers Liability Law in 1911. 1911 Or Laws, ch 3, § 6, now ORS 654.335. See Filkins v. Portland Lumber Co., 71 Or 249, 256-258, 142 P 578 (1914).

 F. James, Jr., Connecticut’s Comparative Negligence Statute: An Analysis of Some Problems, 6 Conn L Rev 207, 216-217 (1973-1974).

 Ray J. Aiken, Proportioning Comparative Negligence — Problems of Theory and Special Verdict Formulation, 53 Marq L Rev 293, 294-295 (1970).

 Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 Mercer L Rev 403, 413-414 (1978).

 David L. Nixon, The Actual "Legislative Intent” Behind New Hampshire’s Comparative Negligence Statute, 12 NH Bar J 17, 30 (1969).