Court Opinion

ID: 9838192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 17:01:21.815209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:08.231924
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHUN MEI TONG,                                     No. 23-48

                 Petitioner,
                                                   OPINION
     v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                 Respondent.

          Application to File Second or Successive Motion
                      Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

                     Submitted July 21, 2023*
                     San Francisco, California

                     Filed September 5, 2023

       Before: EUGENE E. SILER **, KIM McLANE
    WARDLAW, and MILAN D. SMITH, Jr., Circuit Judges.

               Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

*
 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**
  The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
2                           TONG V. USA

                          SUMMARY ***

                         28 U.S.C. § 2255

    The panel (1) denied Chun Mei Tong’s application for
leave to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 in a case in which Tong was convicted of wire fraud
and aggravated identity theft; and (2) to the extent Tong’s
second motion raises claims that could not have been
adjudicated when she filed her first § 2255 motion,
transferred that aspect of the second motion to the district
court.
    Tong filed a § 2255 motion in the district court
challenging her restitution order. The district court
dismissed the motion on the ground that restitution claims
are not cognizable in a § 2255 motion. Tong then filed a
second-in-time § 2255 motion asserting new grounds for
relief. The district court denied it as an unauthorized second
or successive motion filed in violation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h). Pursuant to Circuit Rule 22-3(a), the district
court referred the matter to this court, which opened the
matter as an application for authorization to file a second or
successive motion.
   The panel held that the district court’s dismissal of
Tong’s first motion constitutes an adjudication “on the
merits” for purposes of the second-or-successive bar. The
panel explained that when an initial petition or motion is
dismissed because its claims cannot be considered by the
court or do not otherwise establish a ground for habeas relief,

***
   This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                         TONG V. USA                         3

regardless of their underlying merits, any later-filed petition
or motion is second or successive. Accordingly, to the
extent Tong’s second motion raises claims that could have
been adjudicated on the merits when she filed her first
motion, that aspect of her second motion is second and
successive for purposes of § 2255(h). Because Tong has not
argued or otherwise made a showing that she meets the
requirements of § 2255(h), the panel denied her application
to file a second or successive motion.
    In her second motion, Tong claims that her habeas
counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise
various grounds for relief in her first § 2255 motion. The
panel wrote that this claim could not have been adjudicated
on the merits of her first motion, and thus, is not second or
successive. The panel transferred this aspect of Tong’s
second motion to the district court to consider it in the first
instance.

                         COUNSEL

F. Clinton Broden, Broden & Mickelsen, Dallas, Texas, for
Petitioner.
Rebecca A. Perlmutter, Assistant United States Attorney,
United States Attorney’s Office, United States Department
of Justice, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Respondent.
4                       TONG V. USA

                         OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

    Chun Mei Tong filed a motion in the district court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging the amount of
restitution she was ordered to pay as part of her federal
sentence for wire fraud and identity theft. After the district
court dismissed the motion on the basis that restitution
claims are not cognizable in a § 2255 motion, Tong filed a
second motion asserting new grounds for relief. The district
court denied the second motion as an unauthorized “second
or successive” motion filed in violation of § 2255(h) and
referred the matter to our court pursuant to Ninth Circuit
Rule 22-3(a).

     We hold that the dismissal of Tong’s first motion for
failing to raise a claim cognizable in habeas rendered her
second motion “second or successive” for purposes of
§ 2255(h). Though a prisoner may be permitted to file a
second habeas motion when her first motion was dismissed
for curable procedural deficiencies rather than on the merits,
see e.g., Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 645
(1998), Tong’s first motion was decided on the merits.

              FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    In 2019, Chun Mei Tong was convicted of wire fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and aggravated identity theft
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). While Tong was
employed by the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), she rented out properties
through the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program in
violation of regulations prohibiting HUD employees from
                           TONG V. USA                           5

doing so.      She was sentenced to sixty-six months
imprisonment and ordered to pay $207,874 in restitution.
Tong appealed her restitution order, and we affirmed.
United States v. Tong, 2022 WL 187852, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan.
20, 2022).
    Tong then filed a pro se motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 challenging her restitution order (First Motion). She
asserted that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
by failing to argue that the victims’ loss amount was
overstated and that she was not given credit for the $5,125
in restitution she paid after trial but before sentencing. The
district court denied the motion without leave to amend on
the ground that claims challenging restitution may not be
raised in a § 2255 motion. See United States v. Thiele, 314
F.3d 399, 400 (9th Cir. 2002) (“28 U.S.C. § 2255 is available
to prisoners claiming the right to be released from custody.
Claims for other[] types of relief, such as relief from a
restitution order, cannot be brought in a § 2255
motion . . . .”).
     Tong filed a second § 2255 motion (Second Motion),
alleging new grounds for relief. There, she claimed that her
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by (1) failing to
argue that her conduct was not prohibited by law, (2) failing
to call an ethics expert at trial, (3) failing to raise the lack of
third-party accounting of the loss amount, and (4) failing to
object to the loss amount pursuant to United States v. Martin,
796 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2015). She also claimed that her
6                            TONG V. USA

habeas counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
address these issues in her First Motion. 1
    The district court asked the parties to brief whether
Tong’s Second Motion should be deemed a “second or
successive” motion filed in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h),
which requires such motions to be authorized by the court of
appeals. Tong argued that her Second Motion should not be
deemed second or successive because her First Motion was
not adjudicated on the merits. The district court rejected her
argument, explaining that “the question is whether the court
could have adjudicated the Second § 2255 Motion on the
merits earlier, not whether the First § 2255 [M]otion was
adjudicated on the merits.” The district court dismissed her
Second Motion as second or successive and referred the
matter to our court pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 22-3(a),
which provides that “[i]f an unauthorized second or
successive . . . section 2255 motion is submitted to the
district court, the district court may, in the interests of
justice, refer it to the court of appeals.”
    Upon referral, Tong filed a Motion to Remand to the
district court, which was construed as a supplement to her
application for leave to file a second or successive motion.
We ordered the government to file a response, addressing:

        (1) whether the applicant’s second-in-time
        motion was second or successive, including
        whether the denial of the applicant’s first
        § 2255 motion was “on the merits” for
        purposes of § 2255(h); and

1
  According to Tong, her First Motion was ghostwritten by her attorney,
Earle Partington, who had previously been disbarred. Tong is the only
signatory on the motion; the “Signature of Attorney” line is left blank.
                              TONG V. USA                                 7

         (2) whether authorization is warranted if the
         second-in-time § 2255 [motion] is second or
         successive.

   JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
United States v. Buenrostro, 638 F.3d 720, 721 (9th Cir.
2011). We review de novo a district court’s determination
that a habeas petition is second or successive. Clayton v.
Biter, 868 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 2017).
                             ANALYSIS
    A federal prisoner challenging her custody “is generally
limited to one motion under § 2255.” United States v.
Washington, 653 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2011). Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) a prisoner may file a “second or
successive” motion only if the appropriate court of appeals
certifies that the motion contains newly discovered,
dispositive evidence or relies on a new constitutional rule
made retroactive to collateral proceedings. In this case,
Tong does not contend that her Second Motion meets the
requirements of § 2255(h). Rather, she argues that her
Second Motion was not second or successive at all, because
her First Motion was not dismissed “on the merits.”
    In habeas law, “second or successive” is a “term of art.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486 (2000). 2 “Habeas

2
  Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the meaning of “second
or successive” in § 2255(h), the parties primarily rely on caselaw
interpreting the phrase as it is used in § 2244(b)(2). Similar to § 2255(h),
§ 2244(b)(2) limits state prisoners from raising new claims in a “second
or successive” petition unless it meets certain requirements. Therefore,
“we assume, without deciding, that the Court’s interpretation of ‘second
8                         TONG V. USA

petitions that are filed second-in-time are not necessarily
second or successive.” Clayton, 868 F.3d at 843. “Instead,
courts have held that in certain circumstances petitions that
follow an earlier-filed petition should not be deemed second
or successive because, as a categorical matter, they do not
constitute an abuse of the writ.” Goodrum v. Busby, 824
F.3d 1188, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 2016).
    As we have recognized, “if a petitioner files a first
petition that the court dismisses on technical procedural
grounds without reaching the merits, a subsequent petition
will not be deemed second or successive.” Id. at 1194. This
principle is illustrated in Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,
where the Supreme Court considered whether a prisoner’s
later-filed petition challenging his competency to be
executed was “second or successive,” after his prior petition
raising the same claim was dismissed as premature. See 523
U.S. 637, 644 (1998). The Court held that it was not,
because the “petitioner d[id] not receive an adjudication of
his [prior petition],” and “[t]o hold otherwise would mean
that a dismissal of a first habeas petition for technical
procedural reasons would bar the prisoner from ever
obtaining federal habeas review.” Id. at 645. Similarly, in
Slack v. McDaniel, the Court held that a petition filed after a
prior petition that was “unadjudicated on its merits and
dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies” is not a
second or successive petition. 529 U.S. at 485–86. In both
cases, the prisoner’s prior filing was dismissed without
prejudice for curable deficiencies, which the Court did not
consider a dismissal “on the merits” for purposes of the
second-or-successive bar. McNabb v. Yates, 576 F.3d 1028,

or successive’ for purposes of § 2244(b)(2) applies to § 2255(h).”
Buenrostro, 638 F.3d at 724.
                         TONG V. USA                          9

1029 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Slack, 529 U.S. at 485–86); see
also, e.g., Phillips v. Seiter, 173 F.3d 609, 610 (7th Cir.
1999) (first petition dismissed because it was filed in the
wrong court, and “its refiling in the proper district is not a
second or subsequent petition”).
    In contrast, when a prisoner’s first filing is dismissed due
to a “permanent and incurable bar to federal review,” that
dismissal is “on the merits” such that a later filing is deemed
second or successive. McNabb, 576 F.3d at 1029–30
(internal quotations omitted). For example, when a court
dismisses a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for state procedural
default, any later-filed petition is subject to the second-or-
successive bar. Howard v. Lewis, 905 F.2d 1318, 1322 (9th
Cir. 1990). As we explained in Howard, although dismissal
for procedural default does “not determin[e] the merits of the
underlying claims” in the colloquial sense, “it [does]
determin[e] on the merits that the underlying claims will not
be considered by a federal court”—and that determination is
“considered ‘on the merits’ for purposes of the successive
petition doctrine.” Id. (emphasis added and internal citations
omitted). We distinguished dismissal for procedural default,
which is final, from dismissal for failure to exhaust, where
“the opportunity is still open” for a prisoner to exhaust her
state court remedies, after which “a subsequent federal
petition for habeas corpus could be entertained.” Id.
    As the Second Circuit observed: “We consider the denial
of procedurally defaulted claims to be ‘on the merits’ even
though the underlying merits of those claims are not
reviewed by any federal court because those claims,
regardless of their merit, can never establish a basis for
habeas relief.” Graham v. Costello, 299 F.3d 129, 133 (2d
Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). The court generalized this
principle, concluding that the “distinction between petitions
10                       TONG V. USA

that are denied ‘on the merits’ and those that are not does not
depend on whether the federal court actually determined the
merits of the underlying claims but rather on whether the
prior denial of the petition conclusively determined that the
claims presented could not establish a ground for federal
habeas relief.” Id. (emphasis added).
    We agree. When an initial petition or motion is
dismissed because its claims cannot be considered by the
court or do not otherwise establish a ground for habeas relief,
regardless of their underlying merits, any later-filed petition
or motion is second or successive.
    Applying these principles to this case, we hold that
Tong’s First Motion was dismissed “on the merits” for
purposes of the second-or-successive bar. In her First
Motion, Tong argued that her trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to raise certain arguments
challenging her restitution order.        The district court
dismissed the motion because “a § 2255 petition cannot be
used as a vehicle to collaterally attack a restitution order.”
The court quoted United States v. Thiel, explaining that “28
U.S.C. § 2255 is available to prisoners claiming the right to
be released from custody. Claims for other[] types of relief,
such as relief from a restitution order, cannot be brought in
a § 2255 motion.” 314 F.3d at 400. Even though Tong
“couched [her] restitution claim in terms of ineffective
assistance of counsel,” because “§ 2255 is available only to
defendants who are in custody and claiming the right to be
released,” the district court correctly held that Tong’s
restitution challenge was not cognizable. Id. at 401–02.
Though the court did “not determin[e] the merits of the
underlying claims, it [did] determin[e] on the merits that the
underlying claims will not be considered.” Howard, 905
F.2d at 1322 (emphasis omitted). Therefore, the district court
                          TONG V. USA                          11

adjudicated the motion “on the merits,” and the principle
recognized in Martinez-Villareal and related cases does not
apply.
    However, another limitation on the second-and-
successive bar applies to one aspect of Tong’s Second
Motion: we have recognized that a habeas filing is “second
or successive only if it raises claims that were or could have
been adjudicated on the merits” in the first petition.
McNabb, 576 F.3d at 1029. In her Second Motion, Tong
claims that her habeas counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to raise various grounds for relief in her
First Motion. This claim could not have been adjudicated on
the merits with her First Motion, and thus, is not second or
successive. Because “[i]n reviewing an application for a
second or successive habeas petition, we do not assess the
cognizability of that petition,” we proceed no further. See
Clayton, 868 F.3d at 846. We transfer this aspect of Tong’s
motion to the district court to consider it in the first instance.
                       CONCLUSION
     The district court dismissed Tong’s First Motion because
it failed to raise claims cognizable pursuant to § 2255. That
decision constitutes an adjudication “on the merits” for
purposes of the second-or-successive doctrine.            See
McNabb, 576 F.3d at 1029–30. Accordingly, to the extent
Tong’s Second Motion raises claims that could have been
adjudicated on the merits when she filed her First Motion,
that aspect of her Second Motion is second and successive.
Because Tong has not argued or otherwise made a showing
that she meets the requirements of § 2255(h), we deny her
application to file a second or successive motion. However,
to the extent that Tong’s Second Motion raises claims that
could not have been adjudicated when she filed her First
12                     TONG V. USA

Motion, those claims are not second or successive and must
be considered by the district court in the first instance.
  APPLICATION           DENIED        and     PETITION
TRANSFERRED.