Court Opinion

ID: 9530168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:57:54.2816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:00.967781
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority that petitioner’s death sentence must be vacated because of trial counsel’s inadequate preparation and presentation of the penalty phase, I find counsel’s performance at the guilt phase to be equally inadequate. I therefore dissent from the majority’s decision to uphold petitioner’s conviction for murdering Ascención Hernandez.
The hearing before this court’s habeas corpus referee established beyond question that defense counsel’s investigative efforts to prepare for the guilt phase of this case were shockingly inadequate, and indeed were a misuse of the funds allocated to him for that purpose. Counsel failed to properly pursue an investigation that would have led him to 77 alibi witnesses, who were prepared to testify that at the time of the murder petitioner was in a small village in Mexico, located more than 1,500 miles from the scene of the crime. At the reference hearing, a representative sample of the 17 witnesses testified; the referee, a retired superior court judge with many years of experience, found the testimony to be straightforward and credible.
The majority does not dispute defense counsel’s incompetence at trial; it finds his inadequacy harmless because of the strong evidence of guilt. But the doctrine of harmless error can only be taken so far. By holding that 17 alibi witnesses are insufficient to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the verdict, the majority stretches it past the breaking point.
I.
On March 15, 1981, three men invaded the home of Ascención Hernandez and murdered him. Nine months later, police arrested petitioner and charged him with killing Hernandez. At trial, the prosecution relied chiefly on evidence that defendant was identified as one of the killers by the victim’s wife and two children, and that petitioner admitted participation in the offense to Detective Linda Parrott of the El Monte Police Department.
Petitioner presented an alibi defense at trial. He testified that he had been staying in the remote Mexican village of El Pilón in the months before and *611after the murder, and was in an infirmary in a nearby town on the day of the murder.1 He said that when Detective Parrott questioned him, his girlfriend (whom petitioner referred to as his wife) was pregnant and in custody, and Detective Parrott promised him his girlfriend would be released if he told Parrott what she wanted to hear. He said he answered “yes” to whatever Parrott said in the hope that it would lead to his girlfriend’s release. He also claimed he did not understand everything Parrott said because he did not understand her Spanish.2 Parrott’s interview with defendant was not tape-recorded, nor was any other means used to preserve a verbatim record of defendant’s statement.
Three other witnesses testified at trial in support of petitioner’s alibi defense: his girlfriend, who said she was with petitioner in Mexico at the time of the murder; petitioner’s sister, Ana Maria Llamas, who was living in the United States and testified that petitioner had left this country but that she did not actually observe him in Mexico; and Dr. J. Jesus Godinez Gonzales (Dr. Godinez), a physician from a town near El Pilón, who said petitioner was an inpatient at his clinic on the day of the murder. The testimony of these witnesses was open to question, for various reasons: the girlfriend had an obvious bias, the sister had no personal knowledge that petitioner was in Mexico, and Dr. Godinez had no records corroborating his testimony and had told an investigator for the prosecution that he did not know the exact dates on which he treated petitioner.
At the habeas corpus reference hearing, overwhelming evidence was presented that defense counsel’s trial preparation for the guilt phase was grossly inadequate. Because petitioner said he was in El Pilón at the time of the murder, a thorough effort to locate alibi witnesses in El Pilón was essential to prepare for trial. Defense counsel and his investigator took a week-long investigative trip to Mexico, during which they spent five nights in a luxury hotel in Mexico City and one night in the resort town of Patzcuaro. They spent only one day in El Pilón; the only witnesses they interviewed there were petitioner’s parents and Dr. Godinez (who lived in a nearby town).
Petitioner’s parents and Dr. Godinez corroborated petitioner’s alibi defense. Although defense counsel subpoenaed Dr. Godinez to testify at trial, *612he made wholly inadequate efforts to secure the attendance of petitioner’s parents, as a result of which they were not available to testify at trial. In attempting to justify his actions at trial, counsel gave demonstrably false testimony at the reference hearing. As a result, the referee made an express finding that he did “not credit the testimony of attorney [d]e [l]a Pena where it is not independently corroborated by documents or other witnesses.”3
At the habeas corpus reference hearing, seven residents of El Pilón testified as a “sample” of the alibi evidence that could have been offered had counsel undertaken an adequate investigation. The referee also admitted, without objection from the prosecution, declarations from an additional 10 villagers. The testimony and declarations stated that petitioner was in El Pilón from the time of the village’s annual festival celebrating the consecration of its church one month before the murder of Hernandez until the *613wedding of petitioner’s brother one month after the murder. As noted earlier, the referee found that the seven witnesses who testified were “straightforward and credible.”
II.
The majority does not dispute the hearing referee’s conclusion that defense counsel’s investigation of the alibi defense was inadequate. Nor does the majority disagree with the referee’s finding that the testimony of the alibi witnesses at the reference hearing was credible. Instead, the majority concludes that counsel’s inadequacy was harmless. It cites several grounds for this holding, none of which is persuasive.
First, the majority attempts to impugn the accuracy of the recollections of the alibi witnesses who testified at the reference hearing, saying that their testimony was “vague as to specific times.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 604.) Not so. The residents of El Pilón explicitly recalled that petitioner was present at particular events that were important in their lives: a wedding and a religious festival. Although some of them were not able to recall the exact dates on which those events took place (this is hardly surprising, as the reference hearing took place several years after the events in question), those dates are independently verifiable and not in dispute.
Next, the majority asserts that the alibi testimony of the residents of El Pilón was “cumulative” to the alibi defense that had been presented at trial. This assertion, however, is directly contrary to the findings of the habeas corpus referee, who concluded: “The evidence not presented [at trial] would have been particularly valuable in this case. . . .” The referee gave three reasons for this finding: 1) the witnesses who testified at trial had no “contemporaneously prepared documentation to anchor their recollections”; 2) petitioner’s own alibi testimony and that of his girlfriend were open to question because of their obvious bias; and 3) Dr. Godinez’s testimony was also suspect because he could produce no corroborating documents.
The majority’s claim that the alibi testimony by the residents of El Pilón would have been “cumulative” to the alibi testimony presented at trial ignores the just-discussed findings by the referee. The alibi evidence that could have been provided by the residents of El Pilón was not cumulative to the alibi testimony presented at trial because, unlike the testimony at trial, the residents of El Pilón could have given testimony that was anchored to specific, independently verifiable occurrences. Furthermore, if the defense had been able to offer the testimony of 20 alibi witnesses (the 3 who actually testified at trial plus the 17 residents of El Pilón who could have testified), *614the very fact that 20 persons were willing to offer alibi testimony on petitioner’s behalf would have weighed powerfully in his favor.
Third, the majority concludes that the prosecution’s strong evidence of guilt rendered defense counsel’s inadequacy at trial harmless. But the fact that the prosecution had a strong case does not permit us to uphold the conviction when defense counsel inadequately failed to present a persuasive alibi defense; such a defense may raise a reasonable doubt in the jury’s mind even when evidence of guilt is strong. The majority cites no published decision that has treated as harmless the unjustified failure by defense counsel to have a credible alibi witness testify. When incompetence of this nature has occurred, California and federal courts have uniformly found that counsel’s inadequacy requires reversal of the judgment. (People v. Shaw (1984) 35 Cal.3d 535 [198 Cal.Rptr. 788, 674 P.2d 759]; In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408 [179 Cal Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690]; Montgomery v. Peterson (7th Cir. 1988) 846 F.2d 407; Code v. Montgomery (11th Cir. 1986) 799 F.2d 1481; Nealy v. Cabana (5th Cir. 1985) 764 F.2d 1173; Eldridge v. Atkins (8th Cir. 1981) 665 F.2d 228; Wilson v. Cowan (6th Cir. 1978) 578 F.2d 166; Bell v. Georgia (5th Cir. 1977) 554 F2d 1360.)4
Moreover, although the evidence of guilt was strong, it was not conclusive. No physical evidence linked defendant to the murder; the prosecution’s case was based on identifications by three eyewitnesses and on petitioner’s alleged confession. This testimony, although persuasive, was not immune to challenge.
The victim’s wife and two children each positively identified petitioner at a lineup and at trial. But cases of mistaken eyewitness identification are not uncommon. As one court has observed: “However convinced, and convincing, [the eyewitnesses] were in their identification at trial, we cannot ignore the fact that the identification of strangers in violent crime situations is fraught with the hazard of mistake.” (Wilson v. Cowan, supra, 578 F.2d at p. 168 [new trial ordered for counsel’s inadequate failure to call alibi witness, despite the fact that the two victims had identified the defendant at a *615lineup and at trial].) This court, too, has recognized the fallibility of eyewitness identification in such circumstances. (People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 363-364 [208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, 46 A.L.R.4th 1011].) In this case, there are additional reasons to question the identifications by the witnesses: they were not made until six months after the murder; the victim’s wife was unable to select petitioner’s picture out of a photographic lineup; and the identifications by the victim’s two daughters may have been influenced by their mother’s actions at the lineup at which they identified petitioner (the mother got up from her seat, stood in front of petitioner, and glared at him, thus suggesting to her daughters her belief that he was the murderer).
Detective Parrott testified that defendant confessed his involvement in the murder to her. Petitioner, however, repudiated his confession at trial, claiming that he had difficulty understanding Parrott and that he answered “yes” to whatever she said in the hope of securing the release of his pregnant girlfriend, who was in custody. The majority finds Detective Parrott’s description of petitioner’s confession more convincing than that of petitioner. But because the police did not record the confession, it is difficult to evaluate whether Parrott’s account or petitioner’s is the more accurate. If the defense had called the 17 alibi witnesses from El Pilón to substantiate petitioner’s claim that he was out of the country at the time of the murder, the jury might well have believed petitioner’s explanation for his confession.
But for defense counsel’s inadequate performance, petitioner would have been able to counter the prosecution’s strong evidence of guilt with strong evidence of innocence. We do not know how a jury would have resolved an evidentiary dispute of this nature.
The United States Supreme Court has held that to obtain relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant “need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.” (Strickland v. Washington (1980) 466 U.S. 668, 693 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697, 699-700, 104 S.Ct. 2052].) Rather, reversal of the conviction is required when there is a probability “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” that, “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Id. at p. 694 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 698].) Had counsel adequately presented petitioner’s strong alibi defense, it cannot be concluded with confidence that the result—conviction of murder—would have been the same. In such circumstances, we must put aside our personal beliefs as to petitioner’s guilt or innocence: a jury must listen to all of the evidence, presented by competent attorneys, and make its own determination as to the truth of the charge.
*616I would reverse petitioner’s conviction for murdering Ascención Hernandez.5
Mosk, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied March 18, 1992. Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

El Pilón is in the Province of Michoacan, which is in central Mexico. It is more than 1,500 miles from Los Angeles County, where Hernandez was murdered.

Defendant’s claim that he did not understand Parrott is supported by his actions at the lineup at which the victim’s wife and children identified him. Although the police officer in charge gave directions in Spanish as well as English, defendant exhibited substantial confusion and, unlike the other participants in the lineup, had difficulty in following the officer’s directions.

The following examples illustrate defense counsel’s apparent falsehoods in his attempts to justify his actions:
1. In explaining at the reference hearing his ability to deal with possible language difficulties, defense counsel testified that he had a master’s degree in Spanish from the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), a claim he had also made at trial. When petitioner presented documentary evidence that UCLA had no record of giving counsel a master’s degree, counsel then claimed that he had been involved in an undercover investigation for the United States Navy and attended UCLA under an assumed name. Petitioner responded with a declaration from a naval officer, who said that he had searched counsel’s military records and that during the time period in question counsel did not have an undercover assignment: he was a naval recruitment officer and was attending law school at Southwestern University in Los Angeles.
2. In a sworn declaration in which he attempted to account for the deficiencies in his investigation, defense counsel said that Ana Maria Llamas, petitioner’s sister who had testified at trial, told him that petitioner had no other siblings in the United States. When, at the reference hearing, petitioner pointed out that at trial defense counsel had elicited testimony from Llamas that petitioner had a brother in the United States, counsel claimed that Llamas had told him that she did not know how to locate her brother. Thereafter Llamas denied telling counsel any such thing; three witnesses testified that petitioner’s brother was living with Llamas and her husband at the time of petitioner’s trial, and the parties stipulated that the supervisor at Los Angeles Die and Mold Company would testify that petitioner’s brother and Llamas’s husband were both working for the company at the time of trial.
3. Defense counsel wrote to petitioner’s appellate counsel claiming that while in Mexico he had interviewed five of petitioner’s sisters and three of his brothers. He added, “[T]he five sisters were extremely impressive in terms of appearance. The brothers left a lot to be desired." But in his initial testimony before the habeas corpus referee, counsel said he had been unable to interview the brothers and sisters. And in a declaration filed by the Attorney General in opposition to the petition for writ of habeas corpus, counsel asserted that he had asked petitioner’s parents to bring the brothers and sisters to meet with him, but that they had not done so. When faced at the reference hearing with these inconsistent statements, counsel professed a lack of memory, and suggested that he “may have interviewed them by telephone.” It is difficult to reconcile an interview by telephone with counsel’s comments (in his letter to appellate counsel) about the appearance of the interviewees. Also, some of petitioner’s siblings lived in El Pilón, where there are no telephones. Moreover, the written report prepared by counsel’s investigator at the time of the trip failed to show that any interviews had been conducted.

In several of the cases cited, defense counsel was found to be inadequate not only for failure to investigate and present alibi witnesses, but in other respects as well. Here, too, the defense attorney’s inadequacies were not confined to investigation and presentation of petitioner’s alibi defense. Counsel’s investigation and presentation of the penalty phase were manifestly deficient; the majority agrees that as a result petitioner is entitled to a new trial on the issue of penalty. In addition, as explained in this court’s opinion addressing petitioner’s appeal, defense counsel took the bizarre step of calling himself as a witness to rebut a minor point made by the prosecution. The prosecution then asked him questions that went far beyond the scope of his testimony on direct examination; instead of objecting, counsel answered the questions, giving testimony that damaged his client’s case. (People v. Marquez, ante, 553, at pp. 573-574 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 822 P.2d 418].)

With regard to petitioner’s conviction for the murder of Angel Rodriguez, although the issue is closer, I am of the view that defense counsel’s inadequate representation of petitioner on the charge of murdering Ascención Hernandez prejudicially affected petitioner’s conviction of murdering Rodriguez. The only evidence linking petitioner to the murder of Rodriguez was his admission to Detective Parrott that he was the killer. That admission, however, occurred at the same time that petitioner confessed his involvement in killing Hernandez. At trial, petitioner repudiated both confessions, for the reasons previously explained. If defense counsel had presented alibi testimony from the residents of El Pilón to refute the charge of murdering Hernandez, it would have supported petitioner’s claim that one portion of his statement to Detective Parrott was incorrect, thereby undermining confidence in the remaining portion as well.