Court Opinion

ID: 9544002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:51:16.509001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:44.658172
License: Public Domain

Judge TURSI
specially concurring.
I disagree with that part of the majority opinion addressing the effect of § 13-80-109, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A), and therefore, I write separately.
In 1986, the General Assembly repealed and reenacted article 80, title 13, (Limitations-Personal Actions) and at that time amended the predecessor section to § 13-80-109. The predecessor statute read:
STATUTE APPLIES TO SETOFFS. The limitation provisions of this article shall apply to the case of any debt or contract alleged, by way of setoff, on the part of a defendant. The time of limitation of such debt shall be computed in like manner as if an action had been commenced therefor at the time when plaintiffs action accrued, (emphasis supplied)
With the amendatory language, as emphasized, § 13-80-109 now reads:
LIMITATIONS APPLYING TO NON-COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS AND SETOFFS. Except for causes of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim, the limitation provisions of this article shall apply to the case of any debt, contract, obligation, injury, or liability alleged by a defending party as a counterclaim or setoff. A counterclaim or setoff arising out of the transac*343tion or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim shall be commenced within one year after service of the complaint by the opposing party and not thereafter.
By these additions, the law in Colorado was brought into line with the majority of jurisdictions which allow the use of stale claims defensively. Cf. Bernklau v. Stevens, 150 Colo. 187, 371 P.2d 765 (1962).
It is not disputed that a counterclaim is a claim, see Transport Clearings of Colorado, Inc. v. Linstedt, 151 Colo. 166, 376 P.2d 518 (1962), and that a plaintiff may both answer and affirmatively defend in its reply. Thus, the amended version of the statute, which inserts the phrase “the opposing party’s claim” for “defendant,” effectuates the intent of the drafters of the statute to remove the limitations of article 80 upon any party when faced with a non-stale claim by an opposing party.
By the additions to the predecessor statute, a party with a greater time frame in which to file its claim before the running of the statute of limitations is prevented from waiting until the opposing party’s claim becomes. stale before instituting an action. Further, since there is little evidence that the facts surrounding the transaction would be unavailable to either party, fairness is achieved by allowing the defensive use of a counterclaim or setoff against either a claim or counterclaim. Thus, it achieves the general equitable purpose from which counterclaims and setoffs evolved.
The use of the word “complaint” creates an apparent contradiction. However, to harmonize the two sentences, I would hold that complaint as used in § 13-80-109, which grants up to one year before triggering the rules of civil procedure, further protects a party with stale claims.
The fact that, initially, plaintiffs’ claims are subject to the affirmative statute of limitations defense does not destroy the claims, but merely subjects them to procedural bars if, as asserted, they are not otherwise excused. See Colley v. Rowan, 71 Colo. 17, 203 P. 669 (1922).
Inasmuch as the parties agree that plaintiffs have causes of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of defendant’s claim against them, I would hold that the general limitation provisions of article 80, title 13 do not apply to plaintiffs’ claims. Section 13-80-109, supra. And, in order to give a reasonable construction to § 13-80-109 as written, I would hold that, if an opposing party’s claim is raised in either a complaint or as a counterclaim, the statutory right defensively to assert the “stale” claims as counterclaims or setoffs is revived.
However, here, inasmuch as defendant withdrew its counterclaims prior to the ruling on its motion for summary judgment, I would hold that the viability of plaintiffs’ stale claims was contingent upon defendant’s claims being actively pursued against them.
Therefore, I concur in the result.