Court Opinion

ID: 9526883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:25:36.926712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:16.621687
License: Public Domain

*402Beasley, P. J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part). I concur with that part of the opinion which remands for supplementation of the record regarding the trial judge’s reasons for accepting the plea of nolo contendere.
I dissent from that part of the opinion which dismisses two counts of criminal sexual conduct, first degree, on the strength of People v Willie Johnson.1
1 would believe People v Nelson2 is the more compelling articulation of the Legislature’s intentions in enacting the new criminal sexual conduct statute in 1975. I find it inconceivable that at a time when the increase in violent crime is a problem of major proportion this Court would base its interpretation of this statute on application of a rule of lenity.3
Like the majority, I would find People v Gonzales4 apropos. Therefore, I would remand for supplementation of the record in accordance with this opinion.

 75 Mich App 221; 255 NW2d 207 (1977).

 79 Mich App 303; 261 NW2d 299 (1977).

 See, People v Willie Johnson, supra, at 225-226, where that panel said:
"It was on these and similar considerations that the 'rule of lenity’, as defined and applied in People v Bennett, 71 Mich App 246; 247 NW2d 368 (1976), was formulated to resolve ambiguities in a single statutory scheme in favor of permitting only one rather than two criminal convictions absent clear legislative guidance to the contrary.” (Footnote omitted.)

 70 Mich App 319; 245 NW2d 734 (1976).