Court Opinion

ID: 9861286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:52:03.19959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:56.395020
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE DOYLE, dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the majority that the trial court’s response to the jury’s request for a dictionary or definition constituted reversible error. Although I agree that the word "originated” is a key word in the entrapment instruction, it has a common meaning understandable to the average juror. It is not a term of art having any unique legal meaning, and it has not been defined by statute or pattern instruction. Rather than refusing to respond to the inquiry, the judge appropriately consulted the parties and provided what seems to me to be a sensible response: "The word 'originated’ has a commonly understood and accepted meaning, and needs no further definition.” I do not interpret People v. Childs to require reversal in this case. The supreme court in Childs viewed the jury’s inquiry as signaling that it was teetering on the verge of an incorrect application of the law in view of the trial court’s having previously allowed the jury to consider lesser forms of homicide as an alternative to a felony murder resolution. At least some of the jurors were confused as to whether they could find the defendant guilty of armed robbery and one of the forms of manslaughter instead of murder. Childs, 159 Ill. 2d at 231. Although the jurors were given an instruction regarding murder during the commission of a forcible felony, no verdict forms were submitted for felony murder. 159 Ill. 2d at 229-30. Considering the unique posture of the case, it is readily apparent that the jury’s inquiry manifested confusion as to an intricate and pivotal aspect of the instructions. In contrast, it is undisputed that the jurors in the present case sought merely a dictionary definition of an easily understood word. Defendant does not contend that the trial court could have provided the jury with any special meaning of the word in the context of entrapment principles, and, when given an opportunity by the judge, defendant proposed no language for the response. If the trial court had granted the request for a dictionary definition, it appears that the jurors would have received nothing more than common synonyms for the word "originated” such as "start,” "initiate,” or "begin.” It seems improbable that such a response would have provided any material assistance to the jurors sufficient to affect the verdict. A trial court may decline to respond to a jury’s question if the instructions are readily understandable and where further instructions would serve no useful purpose. People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 39 (1990). In any event, it is evident that the jury inquiry did not present a complex and confusing issue of law comparable to the dilemma confronting the jury in Childs, and, here, there is no clear indication that the jurors were on the brink of an incorrect application of the law. I believe that the other cases relied upon in the majority’s analysis are distinguishable. In People v. Oden, 261 Ill. App. 3d 41 (1994), the State proceeded in a weapons possession prosecution on a theory that the defendant had actual and direct possession of firearms. The jury instructions, originally given, contained no explanation of the concept of constructive possession. It was evident from the jury’s inquiry of the court, however, that it was considering convicting the defendant of possessing the firearms on a theory of constructive possession and wanted guidance on what would constitute constructive possession. Without consulting defendant or his counsel, the trial court refused to answer the inquiry. The appellate court reversed, holding that, given the jurors’ obvious confusion, merely referring them to the instructions already given, even if complete and accurate, was insufficient to resolve the confusion. 261 Ill. App. 3d at 47. As in Childs, the inquiry presented a complex question of law which could be clarified only by the court’s specialized knowledge. Here, however, the jurors’ common knowledge of the word "originated” should have sufficed, once they were assured by the judge that the word held no special meaning. People v. Kamide, 254 Ill. App. 3d 67 (1993), involved a problem of incomplete jury instructions in light of the evidence presented. On trial for driving under the influence of alcohol, the defendant explained that he had inhaled a medication containing nonethanol alcohol which produced a reading on the intoxilyzer. Although the applicable statutes provided for conviction only on intoxilyzer readings resulting from ethanol alcohol, which causes impairment of the brain’s function, the trial court refused defendant’s request to explain this difference in answer to the jury’s specific request for that explanation. The trial court effectively failed to inform the jury concerning an essential statutory provision central to evaluating defendant’s defense. In my view, Kamide provides little assistance in resolving the issue before us where the jury was completely and accurately instructed. In People v. Lovelace, 251 Ill. App. 3d 607 (1993), the original jury instructions were, again, incomplete. In an aggravated battery prosecution, the trial court failed to give the second paragraph of the pattern jury instruction definition of the term "knowingly.” A key issue in the trial was whether the defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to a peace officer. The second paragraph of the instruction would have referred to the defendant’s knowing the result of his conduct. IPI Criminal instructions committee comments indicate that the second paragraph is required when both conduct and result are in issue. The trial court refused the jury’s request for " 'an interpretation of "knowingly and intentionally caused bodily harm.” ’ ” 251 Ill. App. 3d at 618. The appellate court reversed, holding that the original instructions were incomplete and that the court had a duty to give the complete definition of "knowingly” when presented with the inquiry. I cannot equate the deficiency in Lovelace with the present issue involving only a request to define a commonly understood word. Under appropriate circumstances, a court may exercise its discretion to refrain from answering a jury inquiry. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39. A trial court is not required to answer a jury inquiry when the instructions are sufficient, and the court has the discretion to refuse a request for a dictionary. People v. Petty, 160 Ill. App. 3d 207, 213 (1987). Even if the majority is correct that a jury’s request for a definition of a significant word in a jury instruction must be regarded as a question of law, it does not follow that the trial judge must invariably respond by providing the definition. Considering the variable circumstances which may pertain, there can be no precise formula for resolving such inquiries. Rather, these rulings must depend primarily upon an application of the trial court’s discretion to the specific problems as they arise, and my reading of Childs does not indicate that the supreme court intended otherwise. In the present case, the trial court could have exercised its discretion in favor of providing synonyms for the word "originated” to the jury. In my opinion, however, its decision to inform the jurors instead that they should apply the commonly understood and accepted meaning of the word was not an abuse of discretion and did not deny defendant a fair trial. It is only speculation to assume that any material prejudice to defendant resulted from the judge’s handling of the question. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court.