Court Opinion

ID: 9764993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:47:30.094059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:40.074655
License: Public Domain

*503OPINION
RICKHOFF, Justice.
This is a double jeopardy case. Before trial, the court granted a motion in limine barring evidence of any uncharged misconduct by the defendant, Samuel Bauder, that occurred before the charged offense.
After the jury was impaneled, the prosecutor presented the arresting officer’s testimony that he approached a car parked on Rain-tree Path. The occupants fled in the car, but the officer quickly caught them. When the driver, the appellant, got out of the car, he was barely able to stand and his pants were unbuttoned. The officer thought he appeared intoxicated. Additional testimony covered the arrest and transportation for an intoxilyzer test. After this testimony, the prosecutor asked what appellant had been doing in the parked car before the alleged crime. The officer responded in graphic language that the defendant was receiving oral sex. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The prosecution argued for a curative instruction, but the court granted the mistrial.
The appellant filed a petition for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus. He claimed trying his case again would subject him to double jeopardy. The trial court found that (1) the officer’s testimony about oral sex was based on conjecture and speculation, and lacked probative value; (2) the prosecutor had elicited the testimony to inject prejudice into the trial; and (3) the prosecution did not elicit the testimony to goad appellant into obtaining a mistrial. We affirm.
Mr. Bauder claims on appeal that trying him after that mistrial would violate the double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitutions.1 The federal double jeopardy clause bars retrial only if the government conduct in question intentionally provoked the motion for a mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 678-79, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). The appellant argues we should create a more generous legal standard under the state double jeopardy clause, citing Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Although existing cases on point predate Heitman, we see no reason to deviate from the pronouncements of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 640 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). (The Kennedy standard applies in Texas.).
As the Supreme Court stated in Oregon v. Kennedy:
Prosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defendant’s motion, therefore, does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A defendant’s motion for a mistrial constitutes “a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.”
456 U.S. at 675-76, 102 S.Ct. at 2089 (citation omiztted).
As a matter of federal law the intent of the prosecutor is a question for the trier of fact. Collins v. State, 640 S.W.2d at 288. In this habeas corpus proceeding, the trial judge was the trier of fact. Tex.Code CRiM. PROcAnn. art. 11.44 (Vernon 1979). Since the trial judge in this case was present as the events unfolded, and since he had the opportunity to judge the demeanor and credibility of the actors and witnesses, it was and should be his responsibility to infer the existence or non-existence of the requisite intent from the objective facts and circumstances. Anderson v. State, 635 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).
While safeguarding fundamental rights is the responsibility of every member of the bar, the duty falls primarily on trial judges. Individual prosecutors have provoked—and will provoke—mistrials intentionally. Their testimony about their intent is not determinative. Judging the intent of advocates is but one of many difficult fact determinations for all trial judges. The great difficulty inherent in judging human behavior is why appellate courts impose their judgment only when the trial court’s determination is clearly erroneous. Ex parte May, 852 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1993, pet ref'd).
*504Under the record, we cannot conclude he was wrong. The appellant’s points are overruled, and the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

. U.S. Const, amend V; Tex. Const., art. I, § 14.