Court Opinion

ID: 9943356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 14:02:25.262883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:50.949159
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                         ROBERT L. BATTLE, JR.,

                                Appellant,

                                     v.

                           STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                 Appellee.

                              No. 2D22-2763

                            February 23, 2024

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for
Pinellas County; Philip J. Federico, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Maureen Surber, Assistant
Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Katherine Cline,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

     Robert L. Battle, Jr., appeals a final order on his motion to correct
illegal sentence filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
We find no error in the postconviction court's conclusion that Battle's life
sentence without the possibility of release was illegal under the Eighth
Amendment as established in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010)
(holding that a life sentence without possibility of parole for a juvenile
defendant convicted of a nonhomicide offense is unconstitutional).
However, we reverse the order and remand for the court to hold a
sentencing hearing on count three to impose a sentence that complies
with Graham.
      Battle was a juvenile when, in 2000, he discharged a firearm and
caused great bodily harm during an attempted robbery. At a jury trial in
2001, he was convicted and sentenced for his crimes. Ultimately, after
several corrections and amendments, Battle was left with a fifteen-year
sentence with a ten-year minimum mandatory for attempted robbery
(count two) and a mandatory life sentence for attempted felony murder
with a firearm (count three), concurrent.
      The count three sentence is at issue in this appeal. It resulted from
application of two different sentencing statutes. First, because the State
requested and proved that Battle qualified as a Prison Releasee
Reoffender (PRR), the trial court was required to impose a mandatory
minimum sentence of life on count three.1 Second, due to the facts of
the case, the "10-20-Life" law, section 775.087, Florida Statutes (2000),
applied. Under that statute the trial court had discretion to sentence
Battle to anything between twenty-five years and life imprisonment day-
for-day. It chose to impose life. Thus, Battle's day-for-day life sentence
was the product of two different sentencing schemes, only one of which
was nondiscretionary.

      1 Section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), mandates a life

sentence as a PRR upon the State's request and proof that the defendant
qualifies for the enhancement. Subsection (b) of the statute makes that
PRR life sentence a minimum mandatory, eliminating any chance of early
release.
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     In 2017, Battle filed a rule 3.800(a) motion to correct illegal
sentence directed to his mandatory life sentence without the possibility
of parole on count three. He argued that the sentence was a cruel and
unusual punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment, as the
Supreme Court held in Graham, and he demanded resentencing.
     The postconviction court found that the PRR minimum mandatory
life sentence under the PRR statute was illegal under Graham.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that Battle's life sentence must stand and
that no resentencing was required because the court had no sentencing
discretion under the PRR statute. Thus, it denied Battle's request to be
resentenced. Instead, the court endeavored to "harmonize" Graham and
the PRR statute by ordering that Battle would be entitled to a sentence
review hearing in the future under section 921.1402(2)(d), Florida
Statutes (2014). That statute is part of a legislative scheme enacted
following Graham to ensure that future post-Graham sentences would
not violate the Eighth Amendment in the manner addressed in Graham.
     We fully agree with the postconviction court's conclusion that
Battle's minimum mandatory life sentence for his nonhomicide crime
violated the Eighth Amendment. Like the defendant in Graham, "[t]he
State has denied him any chance to later demonstrate that he is fit to
rejoin society based solely on a nonhomicide crime that he committed
while he was a child in the eyes of the law."2 560 U.S. at 79.
     However, we conclude that the postconviction court erred in failing
to conduct a resentencing. In Kelsey v. State, 206 So. 3d 5, 8 (Fla.
2016), the supreme court held that "all juveniles who have sentences

     2 Battle, the State, and the postconviction court all agree that

Battle's sentence of life imprisonment without any possibility of release is
illegal. The question for the courts, this one included, is what to do
about it.
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that violate Graham are entitled to resentencing pursuant to chapter
2014-220, Laws of Florida, codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401 and
921.1402, Florida Statutes (2014)." See also Pedroza v. State, 291 So. 3d
541, 547 (Fla. 2020) (reaffirming that this statement in Kelsey was
intended as the court's holding while other statements from Kelsey were
dicta). Thus, under Kelsey's plain language, Battle is entitled to
resentencing that accords him the process and consideration of the
factors set forth in sections 921.1401 and 921.1402. Anything less is
insufficient.
      Because we reverse for a full resentencing, we need not determine
whether it is possible to harmonize the statutory prohibition against a
defendant ever being released from a PRR life sentence and Graham's
specific prohibition against imposing that very sentence for a
nonhomicide offense committed by a juvenile. Indeed, on remand for
resentencing, the State may well exercise its discretion to not seek PRR
sentencing. See § 775.082(9)(a)3 (stating that "the state attorney may
seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a prison releasee
reoffender" (emphasis added)). Should the State elect not to pursue PRR
sentencing enhancement, the sentencing court will have no need to
determine whether or how to harmonize the PRR statute with Graham.
Further, the court would have discretion to impose any sentence in the
range of those authorized by the 10-20-Life statute so long as the facts
support the application of that statute and the ultimate sentence does
not violate Graham.
      Reversed and remanded.

SILBERMAN and BLACK, JJ., Concur.

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Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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