Court Opinion

ID: 2963492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:10:51.170835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:41.920345
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USCA1 Opinion

	

          May 3, 1996       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 94-1202

                                  JOSEPH F. CONSOLO,

                                Plaintiff - Appellee,

                                          v.

                              DANIEL F. GEORGE, ET AL.,

                               Defendants - Appellants.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________
                       [Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                             and Young,* District Judge.
                                         ______________

                                _____________________

               Donald V.  Rider, Jr.,  Assistant City Solicitor,  with whom
               _____________________
          David M.  Moore, City  Solicitor, and  Diana H.  Horan, Assistant
          _______________                        _______________
          City Solicitor, were on brief for appellants.
               Thomas  C. Cameron, with whom Dennis J. Curran, and Curran &
               __________________            ________________      ________
          Cameron, were on brief for appellee.
          _______

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                    Per  Curiam.  Pursuant to  42 U.S.C.    1988(b) and 1st
                    Per  Curiam
                    ___________

          Cir. R. 39.2,  Joseph F. Consolo ("Consolo")  here seeks attorney

          fees  incurred in defending  a jury verdict in  his favor both on

          appeal and through a futile petition for certiorari.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                    A jury  awarded  Consolo  $90,000  in  damages  against

          Worcester police  officers Daniel  George ("George") and  Michael

          Mulvey  ("Mulvey")  for  violations of  Consolo's  civil  rights.

          George  and  Mulvey appealed  four issues  to  this Court  and we

          affirmed in all  respects.  Consolo v.  George, 58 F.3d  791 (1st
                                      _______     ______

          Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 520 (1995).
                 _____ ______

                    On  behalf  of  Consolo,  Attorneys  Thomas  C. Cameron

          ("Cameron")  and   Dennis  J.  Curran  ("Curran")   filed  a  fee

          application (the  "Application") for  award of appellate  counsel

          fees  pursuant to  42  U.S.C.    1988(b).   In  the  Application,

          Consolo  also  requested  an  award  of  expenses  and  fees  for

          paralegal Kenneth O'Sullivan ("O'Sullivan").   Consolo also filed

          a supplemental  fee application (the  "Supplemental Application")

          for services related to opposing certiorari.

                    George and Mulvey's  objections to the  Application and

          Supplemental Application  fall into six general  categories:  (1)

          the  timeliness of Consolo's appeal;  (2) the adequacy of records

          kept by Cameron and Curran regarding their fees and expenses; (3)

          whether work  performed by Cameron  and Curran was  necessary and

          productive; (4)  the reasonableness  of rates charged  by Cameron

          and  Curran;  (5)  whether   work  performed  by  O'Sullivan  was

          necessary and productive; and  (6) the reasonableness of expenses

          charged by Cameron and Curran.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

                    Traditionally,  litigants have  borne  their own  legal

          costs.  See Alyeska  Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness  Soc'y, 421
                  ___ ___________________________    _________________

          U.S. 240, 247 (1975).   Certain statutes and equitable  doctrines

          permit  departure from  this  tradition.    See  In  re  Thirteen
                                                      ___  ________________

          Appeals, 56 F.3d 295, 304-305  (1st Cir. 1995).  Under  the Civil
          _______

          Rights Attorney's  Fees  Awards Act  of  1976, courts  may  award

          reasonable  attorney's fees  to  a prevailing  party  in a  civil

          rights action.  42 U.S.C.   1988(b).  In authorizing such awards,

          Congress intended to reduce the financial impediments that hinder

          individuals from asserting their rights.  Furtado v.  Bishop, 635
                                                    _______     ______

          F.2d 915, 918-19 (1st Cir. 1980).

                    Courts  grant attorney's  fees under     1988(b) unless

          there  is a  special reason  compelling denial.   Supreme  Ct. v.
                                                            ____________

          Consumer's  Union of the United  States, Inc., 446  U.S. 719, 737
          _____________________________________________

          (1980).   Prevailing plaintiffs  may receive fees  for time spent

          defending an  appeal, if the plaintiff  is ultimately successful.

          See  Souza  v. Southworth,  564 F.2d  609,  613 (1st  Cir. 1977).
          ___  _____     __________

          Parties  may also  receive  fees for  time  spent litigating  fee

          applications.   Lund  v. Affleck,  587 F.2d  75, 77-78  (1st Cir.
                          ____     _______

          1978).

          A.        Timeliness of Consolo's Application
          A.        Timeliness of Consolo's Application
                    ___________________________________

                    George  and  Mulvey  object  to   the  Application  and

          Supplemental Application,  claiming that both are  untimely.  The

          governing local rule regarding appellate fee applications states:

                                         -3-

                      An application . . . for an award of fees
                      and other  expenses . . .  shall be filed
                      with the  clerk of  the court  of appeals
                      within 30  days of  the date of  entry of
                      _______________
                      the  final circuit judgment . .  . .  For
                      purposes of the 30-day limit,  a judgment
                      shall not be  considered final until  the
                      time for  filing an appeal or  a petition
                      for a writ of certiorari has expired,  or
                      judgment is entered by  the court of last
                      resort. 

          1st Cir. R. 39.2 (emphasis added).

                    Consolo filed the  Application on August 8, 1995.   The

          Supreme Court  denied George  and Mulvey's  Petition for  Writ of

          Certiorari on November 27, 1995.  Consolo filed the  Supplemental

          Application on December 15, 1995.

                    1.   Supplemental Fee Application
                    1.   Supplemental Fee Application

                    George and  Mulvey note  that parties may  petition the

          Supreme  Court  for  rehearing up  to  25  days  after denial  of

          certiorari.  Sup. Ct. R. 44.2.  For purposes of 1st Cir. R. 39.2,

          George  and  Mulvey contend  that final  judgment does  not occur

          until this 25 day period ends.

                    However, "[t]he  order of denial will  not be suspended

          pending disposition  of a  petition  for rehearing  except by  an

          order of the Court or a Justice."  Sup. Ct. R. 16.3.  The Supreme

          Court  issued no  such order  in  the instant  case.   Without  a

          delaying order, denial  of certiorari is  final judgment for  the

          purposes of the local rule.  After this final judgment, Consolo's

          attorneys had 30 days to file an application for attorney's fees.

          1st  Cir. R. 39.2.   Consolo  met this  requirement by  filing on

          December 15, 1995.  Therefore, Consolo's Supplemental Application

                                         -4-

          is timely under 42 U.S.C.   1988(b) and 1st Cir. R. 39.2.

                    2.   Fee Application
                    2.   Fee Application

                    Rule  39.2  serves three  purposes:    (1) it  promotes

          fairness  by  requiring  parties  to  apply  for  fees  within  a

          reasonable  time  after  a  case's resolution;  (2)  it  advances

          judicial efficiency by reducing of the number of fee applications

          filed; and (3) it prevents this Court from issuing awards under  

          1988(b) inconsistent with subsequent decisions on the case.

                    George  and  Mulvey  contend  that  Consolo  filed  his

          Application prematurely, and that the Court should deny both  the

          Application  and  the  Supplementary  Application.2   George  and

          Mulvey argue that we  should interpret 1st  Cir. R. 39.2 to  deny

          applications filed before final  judgment.  Because Consolo filed

          his Application  before the Supreme Court  denied certiorari, the

          Application was most certainly premature.  Consolo's Supplemental

          Application,  however,  amended  and  expanded  his  Application.

          Thus, even though Consolo's  first application was premature, the

          Supplemental Application incorporated  and cured the Application.

          Since the Supplemental  Application is timely  under 1st Cir.  R.

          39.2, we  must, therefore, examine  the claims presented  in both

          the Application and Supplemental Application.

          B.        Reasonableness of Consolo's Applications
          B.        Reasonableness of Consolo's Applications

                    This Court has customarily thought it best to calculate

          reasonable  fees  through  the  lodestar time  and  rate  method.
                              
          ____________________

          2  Paradoxically, George and Mulvey also argue in the alternative
          that Consolo's  first application was  late, first  acknowledging
          but then choosing to ignore the plain test of 1st Cir. R. 39.2.

                                         -5-

          Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. 104 Acres of Land, 32 F.3d 632, 634
          __________________________    _________________

          (1st Cir.  1994); but see In re Thirteen Appeals, 56 F.3d at 305-
                            ___ ___ ______________________

          308  (common fund cases).   The lodestar is  a numerical point of

          reference  reached  by  multiplying  the total  number  of  hours

          reasonably  spent by a  reasonable hourly  rate.   Grendel's Den,
                                                             ______________

          Inc.  v. Larkin,  749  F.2d 945,  950  (1984) (citing  Hensly  v.
          ____     ______

          Eckerhart,  461  U.S. 424,  433-34 [1983]).    The lodestar  is a

          presumptively  reasonable fee,  but it  is  subject to  upward or

          downward  adjustment  for  special  circumstances.    Lipsett  v.
                                                                _______

          Blanco,  975  F.2d  934, 937  (1st  Cir.  1992)  (citing Blum  v.
          ______

          Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 [1984]).

                    1.   Adequacy of record keeping
                    1.   Adequacy of record keeping

                    For  the Court  to determine  whether hours  billed are

          reasonable, applicants  must provide  highly detailed records  of

          their time  expenditures.   Phetosomphone v. Allison  Reed Group,
                                      _____________    ____________________

          Inc., 984 F.2d 4, 7 (1st  Cir. 1993) (citing Grendel's Den, Inc.,
          ____

          749 F.2d  at  952).    The  Court  demands  specific  information

          regarding  the number  of hours,  dates, and  the nature  of work

          performed.  Deary v. City of  Gloucester, 9 F.3d 191, 197-98 (1st
                      _____    ___________________

          Cir. 1993) (citing Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 801 F.2d 558,

          560  [1st Cir. 1986]).  Lack of contemporaneous records calls for

          substantial  reduction  or  denial   of  fee  awards,  except  in

          "extraordinary  circumstances."  Id.    While this  Court has not
                                           ___

          demanded  inclusion  of the  actual, contemporaneously  kept time

          sheets or records in  fee applications, their inclusion  aids the

          Court  in  more easily  assessing  the  validity, necessity,  and

                                         -6-

          reasonableness of  hours billed.  Applicants fail  to supply such

          records  at  their peril.   See  id.  (noting that  submission of
                                      ___  ___

          actual time slips allowed a trial court to deny 78 of 699.4 hours

          requested).

                    Here,    Consolo's    Application   and    Supplemental

          Application   included   affidavits   that    distilled   records

          contemporaneously kept  by Cameron, Curran, and  O'Sullivan.  The

          Application and  Supplemental Application  did not  include their

          original time  sheets.   Normally an  attorney's account  of time

          spent must be scrutinized with care.   Calhoun, 801 F.2d at  560;
                                                 _______

          Grendel's  Den, Inc.,  749 F.2d  at 950.   Without  original time
          ____________________

          sheets, we hold an applicant's summary of hours spent to an  even

          higher level of scrutiny.  Here, we must  use  our own experience

          and  judgment  to  determine  if  Cameron  and  Curran's  billing

          accurately reflects  time spent.  We  resolve inconsistencies and

          ambiguities against the applicant.

                    Before calculating the  lodestar, we  must address  two

          issues of some concern to this Court.  The first issue relates to

          the Application.   On  July 19,  1994, Curran  filed a  Motion to

          Enlarge Time to  File Brief.   The Motion to  Enlarge would  have

          extended  the deadline  to  file Consolo's  Appellate Brief  from

          July 14,  1994  to July  21, 1994.   In  that Motion  to Enlarge,

          Curran represented that Consolo's attorneys needed the additional

          time "to  proofread the  Brief, review transcript  references and

          reproduce trial exhibits for this appeal."   Plaintiff-Appellee's

          Motion to Enlarge Time  to File Brief at   2.   The Court granted

                                         -7-

          this  Motion on  July 21,  1994, so  counsel could  perform these

          clerical tasks.  In the Application, Curran and Cameron requested

          reimbursement  for  work performed  during this  additional week.

          Some of the work  claimed during this period is  unrelated to the

          limited, clerical tasks described in the Motion to Enlarge.3

                    Poor  record keeping  by  Cameron and  Curran may  have

          resulted    in   inaccurate    billing   during    this   period.

          Alternatively, Curran may have misrepresented the reasons for his

          Motion  to  Enlarge Time.    In either  case,  the  Court is  not

          disposed to grant attorney's fees for these inconsistencies.  See
                                                                        ___

          Brewster v. Dukakis, 3 F.3d 488, 494  n.6 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting
          ________    _______

          that courts can and should deny recovery for such "sloppy" record

          keeping).      Unfortunately,  Consolo's   application   did  not

          adequately distinguish  between time spent on clerical (permitted

          under the  Motion to Enlarge)  and non-clerical tasks.4   Because
                              
          ____________________

          3  Work  that falls outside of  Consolo's Motion to Enlarge  Time
          includes:

               July 15, 1994     "[B]egin drafting Statement of Facts."
               July 18, 1994     "Revise Statement of Facts."
               July 19, 1994     "[R]evise Statement of Facts for Brief."

          4    This  is  the  source  of  much  difficulty  concerning  the
          Application  and  Supplemental Application.   Cameron  and Curran
          provided the number of hours spent on Consolo's case per day, and
          roughly the subject matter or task on which they spent this time.
          While they did divide the number of hours spent by attorney, they
          did not divide the number of  hours by task.  For example, Curran
          claims he spent 5.05 hours on July 14, 1994, "continu[ing] review
          of  ten volumes of trial transcript to prepare [the] Statement of
          Facts  for  Brief;  [and  in] telephone  conferences  with  [the]
          Clerk's  Office and  with [defense  counsel]."   This forces  the
          Court to  guess  how much  time  Curran spent  in review  of  the
          volumes  and  how  much   was  spent  in  telephone  conferences.
          Applicants  should   consider  detail  almost   as  important  as
          conscientious and accurate reporting.

                                         -8-

          we  are  unable  to  distinguish  these  time  periods,  any work

          performed inconsistent with the Motion  to Enlarge will result in

          denial of  award  for that  day.    Thus, we  will  not  consider

          Curran's  application for 10.3 hours  on July 15  and 19, 1994 in

          our calculation  of  the lodestar.    Similarly, we  will  ignore

          Cameron's application for 1.3 hours on July 18, 1994.

                    The   second  issue   relates   to   the   Supplemental

          Application; it  contains  disturbingly similar  inaccuracies  as

          those discussed above.   Under oath, Curran stated that  he spent

          one  hour making  revisions to  the Supplemental  Application and

          supporting materials drafted by Cameron.  Yet, Curran requests .9
                               __________________

          hours   for  his  own  work  spent   to  draft  the  Supplemental

          Application.  He also  claims a separate .8  hours to revise  the

          Supplemental  Application.   We  demand  the  strictest level  of

          accuracy, honesty,  and good faith in applications for fees under

            1988(b).   The Court  will deny  any section of  an application

          containing   inaccurate  statements;   we  will   similarly  deny

          applications that are knowingly incorrect.  Thus we deny .9 hours

          from  calculation  of  the  lodestar  in  Consolo's  Supplemental

          Application.

                    2.   Necessity of work performed by Consolo's attorneys
                    2.   Necessity of work performed by Consolo's attorneys

                    Defendants strenuously object to  Consolo's application

          for fees regarding preparation for, and attendance  at, two Civil

          Appeal Management  Program pre-argument conferences  (the "Appeal

          Conferences").  Both Cameron and Curran attended these two Appeal

          Conferences.   The  Court requires  these conferences  to promote

                                         -9-

          judicial efficiency.   We give  notice that the  Court demands  a

          high  degree of  comprehension of  the legal  and factual  issues

          presented.  Thus, this Court will award fees for preparation for,

          and attendance at, the Appeal Conferences.  However,   1988(b) is

          not a full  employment program.   Where one  attorney would  have

          been  sufficient,   1988(b) will  not allow recovery  of fees for

          the work  of two; the Court will discount the work of superfluous

          attorneys.   Hart v. Bourque, 798  F.2d 519, 523 (1st  Cir. 1986)
                       ____    _______

          (citing  King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 [1st Cir. 1977],

          cert.  denied, 438  U.S. 916 [1978]).   Courts  should ordinarily
          _____  ______

          greet a claim  that several  lawyers were required  to perform  a

          single  set of tasks with  healthy skepticism.   Pearson v. Fair,
                                                           _______    ____

          980 F.2d  37, 47  (1st Cir.  1992) (internal citations  omitted).

          Similarly, we should not shift  fees for time spent in review  of

          another attorney's research.   Hart,  798 F.2d at  522-23.   This
                                         ____

          Court will only  include the work  of one attorney's  preparation

          and appearance  for the  Appeal Conferences when  calculating the

          number  of "reasonable hours" for the lodestar.  Since it appears

          that Curran performed the great majority of the preparatory  work

          for these conferences, we find that his work was reasonable under

          Hart  and Pearson.    Therefore, when  calculating the  number of
          ____      _______

          reasonable hours for the lodestar, we will not include 2 hours on

          March 30, 1994, and .75 hours on May 12, 1994, claimed by Cameron

          in conjunction with the Appeal Conferences.

                    George  and Mulvey object  to the Application regarding

          work performed in  preparation for oral argument.   While Cameron

                                         -10-

          presented oral  argument, Curran  provided research.   George and

          Mulvey would  limit Consolo's  recovery for  this overlap.   Such

          limitations are  appropriate where  there is redundancy  in legal

          work.   Hart,  798 F.2d at  523.   At best,  Curran and Cameron's
                  ____

          arrangement  was an inefficient  use of resources.   For example,

          while Cameron's  attendance would  have  been sufficient,  Curran

          joined his  co-counsel in conferences with  consultants.  Section

          1988(b) does not  compel recovery  for waste.5   This Court  will

          consider  only  one  attorney's  work in  research  of  the  oral

          argument toward the  number of "reasonable  hours spent" for  the

          lodestar.  Therefore, we deduct 7.6 hours from our calculation of

          reasonable hours spent.6

                    We do,  however, allow  recovery of  the fees for  both

          attorneys'  attendance at  the appellate  hearing, as  Curran was

          present to answer any  factual questions regarding the trial  and

          Cameron  argued the substantive issues of law.  Courts should not

          read  the requirements  of "reasonable  hours expended"  to limit

          their own factfinding process.

                              
          ____________________

          5   The attendance of two attorneys  at the Appeal Conferences is
          not   per   se  superfluous.     However,   given  the   lack  of
                ________
          contemporaneous    time    records    and    the    application's
          inconsistencies,  Consolo's application fails  to meet its burden
          of proof for this expense.

             Similarly, we do not  hold as matter  of law that Cameron  and
          Curran's  research arrangement was duplicative.  Nevertheless, in
          this instance we  find that  Consolo has failed  to justify  this
          expense.

          6  We deduct 1.1 hours for work on August 25, 1994; 1.8 hours for
          work  on September  6, 1994;  .7 hours for  work on  September 7,
          1994; and 4.0 hours for work on September 8, 1994.

                                         -11-

                    3.   Reasonable fees per hour
                    3.   Reasonable fees per hour

                    The  fee per  hour for  work on  the litigation  is the

          "core  rate."  Brewster,  3 F.3d at  492 n.4.   Applicants should
                         ________

          bill other work, including  work on the application itself,  at a

          reduced "non-core  rate."  Id.   A reasonable hourly rate  is the
                                     ___

          prevailing  market  rate  in  the relevant  legal  community  for

          similar  services  by  lawyers of  reasonably  comparable skills.

          Blum v.  Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 & n.11.  "Absent more unusual
          ____     _______

          circumstances .  . . the  fee rates of  the local area  should be

          applied  even  when the  lawyers  seeking fees  are  from another

          area."    Ramos v.  Lamm,  713 F.2d  546, 555  (10th  Cir. 1983).
                    _____     ____

          Consolo contends that the relevant legal market is  Boston, where

          this  Court  heard the  appeal.   Consolo  provided  an affidavit

          declaring that $175 per hour is a reasonable fee for such work in

          Boston.    George  and  Mulvey  claim  that  the  relevant  legal

          community is Worcester,  where the incidents  giving rise to  the

          claim  occurred.  George and Mulvey provide no evidence regarding

          Boston area  fees, but  provide an  affidavit declaring  that the

          relevant per hour  fee in Worcester is $150.   Here, the district

          judge  allowed Consolo's request for $175 per hour for trial work

          in Worcester.  We defer to  the determination by the trial  judge

          and consider $175 the "core rate," a  reasonable fee per hour for

          purposes of the lodestar.7
                              
          ____________________

          7   Because  the  trial  court  concluded  that  $175/hr.  was  a
          reasonable  fee  in Worcester  and George  and Mulvey  admit that
          $175/hr.  was a  reasonable  fee  in  Boston,  we  need  make  no
          determination  as to  whether the  trial  court or  the appellate
          court's legal community is used in calculation of the lodestar.

                                         -12-

                    Consolo also  applied for fees in  conjunction with the

          creation of  the fee  applications themselves.   "Time reasonably

          expended  in connection with a fee application is compensable . .

          . but it may be fairly compensated at a reduced rate."  Brewster,
                                                                  ________

          3  F.3d at 494  (internal citations  omitted).   Applicants often

          spend  such  time  doing  little  more  than  documenting  action

          previously taken.   Id.  In  this case, we  will allow "non-core"
                              ___

          work such as this at one-half the "core rate."  Thus, the fee per

          hour for work on the  Application and Supplemental Application is

          $87.50.

                    4.   Lodestar calculation
                    4.   Lodestar calculation

                    Consolo applied  for a total  of 157.9 hours  under the

          Application.   This Court denied  11.3 hours from the calculation

          of  the   lodestar  for  the  obvious   inconsistencies  in  that

          application.   As noted above, this Court also denied 10.35 hours

          within  the lodestar,  as  these hours  represent unnecessary  or

          redundant  work.  Thus, this Court  finds that 136.25 hours was a

          "reasonable  number of hours" for  purposes of the  lodestar.  Of

          the 136.25 hours,  116.05 hours  are billed at  the "core  rate,"

          $175  per hour, for appellate  related work.   The remaining 20.2

          hours are billed  at $87.50 per hour,  half the "core  rate," for

          application related work.   Therefore, Consolo's lodestar for his

          Application is $22,076.25.8

                    Under the Supplemental  Application, Consolo seeks fees

          for 41.1 hours.  Of these, Cameron and Curran spent 29.7 hours on
                              
          ____________________

          8  (116.05 x $175) + (20.2 x $87.50).

                                         -13-

          certiorari-related activities; recovery for these hours is at the

          "core rate" of $175.  Cameron and Curran spent the remaining 11.4

          hours  either   on  Consolo's  rebuttal  memorandum   or  on  the

          supplemental fee application.   This Court  denied .9 hours  from

          calculation  of the  lodestar,  due to  inconsistencies regarding

          time spent  on the Supplemental  Application.  We  compensate the

          remaining  10.5   at  one-half   of  the  "core   rate,"  $87.50.

          Therefore, Consolo's lodestar for the Supplemental Application is

          $6,116.25.9  Consolo's total lodestar is $28,192.50.10

                    5.   Special factors
                    5.   Special factors

                    Courts may  depart from the lodestar  to compensate for

          "special  circumstances."  Lipsett, 975  F.2d at 937.   Here, the
                                     _______

          Court  addressed the concerns of  both parties when it calculated

          the lodestar.  We, therefore,  find no reason to depart from  the

          lodestar in  awarding appellate  and certiorari  fees.   We  must

          satisfy ourselves  of the overall fairness  and reasonableness of

          the  fee under these particular circumstances.  Lund, 587 F.2d at
                                                          ____

          77.  This  lodestar meets  these requirements.   Thus, the  Court

          awards Consolo  $28,192.50 for attorney's fees under  42 U.S.C.  

          1988(b).

                    6.   Paralegal fees under   1988(b)
                    6.   Paralegal fees under   1988(b)

                    Consolo also  applied for $1,312.50 in  paralegal fees.

          Consolo  claims that O'Sullivan  spent 37.5 hours  on the appeal,

          for  which Consolo claims compensation  at $35 per  hour.  Courts
                              
          ____________________

          9  (29.7 x $175) + (10.5 x $87.50).

          10  $22,076.25 + $6116.25.

                                         -14-

          may  grant  paralegal  fees  pursuant  to  42  U.S.C.    1988(b).

          Missouri v. Jenkins, 491  U.S. 274, 285 (1989).   Courts commonly
          ________    _______

          use the lodestar for calculation of such fees.  Id.
                                                          ___

                    O'Sullivan's  work  included attendance  at  the Appeal

          Conferences and the oral  argument before this Court.   As stated

          above, we deny recovery  where the work performed by  an attorney

          is redundant.  Hart, 798 F.2d at 523.  We will also deny recovery
                         ____

          for unnecessary  paralegal work.  O'Sullivan's  attendance at the

          conferences and  the hearing was  unnecessary; we will  not shift

          this expense to George and Mulvey.  Thus we deny recovery for 5.4

          hours of O'Sullivan's claim.

                    "Purely  clerical or  secretarial  tasks should  not be

          billed at  a paralegal  rate, regardless  of who performs  them."

          Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 288 n.10.  Some of O'Sullivan's claimed time
          _______

          is clerical.11   The  court will  not order a  shift of  fees for

          this time; therefore, we deny an  additional 4.05 hours requested

          by  Consolo for  O'Sullivan's work.    The remaining  28.05 hours

          constitute  a  "reasonable  number  of  hours"  for  O'Sullivan's
                              
          ____________________

          11  Tasks that are clearly clerical include:

               March 21, 1994     Review file             .15 hours
               April 18, 1994     Locate documents        .3 hours
                                  in file
               July 20, 1994      To Copy Cop             .3 hours
               July 21, 1994      Reorganize file        1.3 hours
               July 22, 1994      Continue to             .4 hours
                                  reorganize file
               September 6, 1994  Locate documents        .2 hours
                                  for oral argument
               September 7, 1994  Locate documents        .5 hours
                                  for oral argument
               January 26, 1995   Retrieve documents      .5 hours
               July 5, 1995       Locate documents        .4 hours

                                         -15-

          lodestar.   George and  Mulvey did not  contest the $35  per hour

          rate claimed by  O'Sullivan.   Thus, we adopt  this as the  "core

          rate" for O'Sullivan's  lodestar.   We see no  reason to  deviate

          from  the  lodestar  in   this  case  as  we  find   no  "special

          circumstances" that merit an increase or decrease.   See Lipsett,
                                                               ___ _______

          975 F.2d  at 937.   Thus, this Court  awards Consolo  $981.75 for

          O'Sullivan's fees.12

                    7.   Expenses
                    7.   Expenses

                    Courts  may include  an attorney's  reasonable expenses

          when awarding fees  under    1988(b).  Grendel's  Den, Inc.,  749
                                                 ____________________

          F.2d  at 951.  Section 1988(b) provides for awards of "incidental

          and  necessary  expenses  incurred  in  furnishing  effective and

          competent  representation."   Northcross v.  Board of  Educ., 611
                                        __________     _______________

          F.2d  624, 639  (6th Cir.),  cert. denied,  447 U.S.  911 (1979).
                                       _____ ______

          Consolo claimed $290.78 in  his Application for expenses relating

          to  the  appeal.   He also  claimed  $427.71 in  the Supplemental

          Application for certiorari-related expenses.

                    We  will not  shift the  cost of  long-term investments

          made  during litigation.    Included in  his Application,  Curran

          requests $117.91 for a police misconduct litigation treatise.  We

          do  not question the usefulness of  this text; however, attorneys

          should  make  a good  faith  effort to  minimize  expenses before

          filing for  fees under   1988(b).   We find no  such effort here.

          Certainly, Consolo's attorneys could  have borrowed the text from

          a library for a significantly smaller sum.   Thus we deny payment
                              
          ____________________

          12  28.05 x $35.00.

                                         -16-

          for this expense.

                    George  and   Mulvey  objected  to  expenses   for  the

          transcript  of  the Defendant's  closing  argument.   George  and

          Mulvey  claim that Consolo never used the transcript, and thus we

          should  not shift  its cost.   We  think it  is inappropriate  to

          cross-reference expenses to the text of an Appellant's Brief when

          awarding fees.  It is likely that Cameron and Curran investigated

          a  course of argument they  later deemed unworthy.   Denying such

          research  is contrary  to the purpose  of    1988(b).   Thus, the

          Court  grants Consolo's request for $84 for the transcript of the

          closing argument.

                    George  and Mulvey also contest the use of a courier to

          send Consolo's appellate  brief to the Defendants' counsel.  This

          service cost $14.   Consolo appears to have retained  the courier

          in  good faith; it was a reasonable attempt to provide George and

          Mulvey  with a copy of the brief.   Thus we grant the request for

          $14.

                    Consolo  requests  $54.15   in  photocopy  and  library

          expenses.    Parties  may  recover  such  reasonable  expenses.13

          See, e.g., Northcross, 611 F.2d at 639.  George and Mulvey do not
          ___  ____  __________

          object; thus this  expense is granted.  George and Mulvey also do

          not object to a $8.39 expense for a videotape; this is granted.

                    The remaining $26.27 in  the Application was an expense

          Consolo  should  have  obtained   under  Fed.  R.  App.  P.   39.
                              
          ____________________

          13  Counsel billed  $3.20 of Consolo's fee application  for costs
          to "misc." and not to Consolo.  We do not consider this amount in
          our calculations.

                                         -17-

          Applicants should  not seek  such costs under  the aegis  of a   

          1988(b) action.   Therefore, we  grant $143.40 in  expenses under

          the Application.14

                    In  the  Supplemental Application,  Consolo  included a

          bill  from a  legal publisher  clearly identifying  necessary and

          reasonable expenses  related to  certiorari.   While  we have  no

          record of payment, bills such as these are rebuttable evidence of

          an expense.   We presume  that Cameron  and Curran will  pay this

          bill.   If George and Mulvey had demonstrated otherwise, we would

          not  have shifted  this  expense.   Thus,  we grant  $327.71  for

          reproduction  and  service  of  Consolo's  Brief  in  Opposition.

          Finally, Cameron  requests $100 reimbursement  for admission fees

          to the bar of the Supreme Court.  George and Mulvey do not object

          to this expense; it is thus granted.

          C.        Conclusion
          C.        Conclusion

                    In total,  this court awards $29,745.36  to Consolo for

          appellate and certiorari attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42

          U.S.C.   1988(b) and 1st Cir. R. 39.2.

                              
          ____________________

          14  $290.78 - ($117.91 + $26.27 + $3.20).

                                         -18-