Court Opinion

ID: 9741098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:49:34.455493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:22.284701
License: Public Domain

*803Clinton, J.,
dissenting.
After the issuance of the order of stay by Mr. Justice Blackmun as Circuit Judge, and since this matter was set for hearing in this court, the relators, we are reliably informed, have invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States in an application to that court for full court action to overturn the portion of the order of the District Court for Lincoln County, Nebraska, sustained by the order of Mr. Justice Black-mun.
There is no precedent or authority for this court and the Supreme Court of the United States to exercise concurrent jurisdiction in matters relating to construction of the federal Constitution. Either we have jurisdiction in this case, or the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction.
We have supervisory jurisdiction over the trial courts of this state. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Graves, 66 Neb. 17, 92 N. W. 144. I know of no precedent and none has been cited to us which gives to the United States Supreme Court the same supervisory jurisdiction over the "trial courts of this state that it clearly has over the federal courts.
The jurisdiction of Mr. Justice Blackmun, as Circuit ■Judge, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the ■United States, as Mr. Justice Blackmun recognizes in ■his opinion, rest upon the provisions of section 1257(3), ■Title 28 U.S.C., under which “Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had” may be reviewed “where any title, right, privilege or immunity ... is claimed under the Constitution ... of the United States.” Mr. Justice Blackmun concluded that a final order had been made because our failure to announce a decision exceeded “tolerable limits.”
' I again point out, as we did in the order which set this matter for hearing, that the application of the relators was filed in this court late on'Friday, October 31, *8041975. So far as the writer of this opinion is aware, the ■application did not come to the attention of any member of this court until Monday, November 3, 1975, at which time we were engaged in the first of 6 days of oral argument in cases pending before us and already irrevocably scheduled.
This is a collegial court and no member of this court has any constitutional or statutory power to grant a stay of the type here requested. That power must be exercised by the court as a whole. Neither may we act upon the basis of telephone calls from counsel, or telegrams. Where factual matters must be reviewed, we must have before us a bill of exceptions containing the evidence expected to be reviewed.
Although an application to file an original action would not normally be considered until we sat at a regularly scheduled weekly consultation, nonetheless, in this particular case the matter was, in accord with our standing practice, assigned to one of the judges of this court on November 4, 1975, for the purpose of preparing a report and recommendation to be considered by the full court at special consultation on Monday, November 10, 1975. While that report was in the process of preparation, the relators on November 4 or 5, 1975, had filed with Mr. Justice Blackmun in Washington, D. C., the application for a stay. This intervening, and to us unanticipated occurrence, affected the content of the report and resulted in the Per Curiam order of continuance adopted by us on November 10, 1975.
On November 13, 1975, Mr. Justice Blackmun rendered his first opinion on his expectation that we would “act forthwith and without delay.” On November 13,- 1975, there was filed by the relators the bill of exceptions in case No. 40445 and for the first time we had before us something other than ex parte representations as to what had occurred in the trial court. On November 17, 1975, we entered an order permitting the filing of the original action and set for hearing on November 25, *8051975, the application for stay both in the original action and the direct appeal and gave notice to all parties of the hearing.
Apparently both the relators and Mr. Justice Black-mun expected that we would act summarily without notice to all interested parties and without a hearing. We did not do so, I think for reasons that should be obvious.
Despite the fact that Mr. Justice Blackmun acted on November 20, 1975, we nonetheless held the hearing on November 25, 1975. All parties were heard. However, between November 20, 1975, and November 25, 1975, as I have already mentioned, the relators invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States to overturn Mr. Justice Blackmun’s stay. I believé the relators are estopped to claim that we still have jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Blackmun indicated that the problem of the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court under section 1257, Title 28 U.S.C., is “not free from difficulty.” We ought now to remove that difficulty. The circular state of affairs which has existed ought to come to an end.
The appeal of the relators in case No. 40445 should be dismissed on the ground they have no standing to intervene in a criminal prosecution. § 25-328, R. R. S. 1943; State v. Berry, 192 Neb. 826, 224 N. W. 2d 767.
The original action of the relators, case No. 40471, ought to be dismissed as improvidently granted because of the intervening jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of the United States.
White, C. J., joins in this dissent.