Court Opinion

ID: 9833063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:25:26.310614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:59.228213
License: Public Domain

WALTHALL, J.
Appellees, John W. Hunt & Son, brought this suit in Dallas county, Texas, against appellants, C. R. Hill and J. T. Harper, residents of Franklin county, Texas, and the St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company, a railway corporation, alleged to have an agent in Dallas county, to recover $230, alleging that on November 4, 1925, they purchased 40 bales of cotton, which appellants represented to be in good condition; that the cotton was to be shipped to appel-lees’ order with draft attached to bill of lading ; that the cotton was delivered to the said railway company, which issued its standard form of bill of lading consigning the cotton to appellants’ order at Galveston, Tex., the bill of- lading certifying that the cotton was in good condition, and attached to the bill of lading was a certificate of the Western Weighing & Inspection Bureau that said cotton was in good condition; that appellees obtained possession of the bill of lading by paying the draft at Dallas, Tex.; that appellees relied upon the representations as to the condition of the cotton, the recitals of the bill of lading and the certificate of the Bureau as to the condition of the cotton when they paid the draft; that the representations, recitals, and certificate as to the condition of the cotton were false, in that the cotton was wet, stained, sample cut, and in bad condition at time of shipment, all of which was known to appellants and the railway company; that on account of the condition of the cotton it was necessary to recondition and recompress the cotton, at a loss to appellees of the amount sued for, for which they sought judgment. ,
The petition alleged that appellants and the railway company acted in collusion and a conspiracy in perpetrating the fraud on ap-pellees. Appellees pleaded in the alternative that, in the event no collusion was shown, it was the custom in transactions of that nature, known to all parties, that the purchaser would rely upon the recitations in the bill of lading and weighing certificate, and that the railway company was guilty of negligence in issuing the bill of lading without noting the exception as to the condition of the cotton, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of appellant’s damages.
In a second count the railway company is *639charged with negligence in handling the cotton in transportation, causing the damages to the cotton. This count alleges no cause of action against appellants.
Appellants filed a verified plea of privilege to be sued in Franklin county, the county of their residence. The plea was controverted. On the hearing of the plea it was agreed that appellant’s residence was and at all times has been in Franklin county. The controverting affidavit alleged that the said railway company is a carrier of freight, doing business in Texas and having an agent in Dallas county, Texas, and that the suit arises from damages to and in the 'transportation of freight and contract in relation thereto; that appellants are properly suable in Dallas county, because there is a joint cause of action against appellants and the said railway company, and that appellants are necessary parties to said suit, since the relief sought by appellees against appellants grows out of the same transaction, and alleging the law to be that, whenever there are two or more defendants in any suit, brought in any county in the state, and such suit is maintainable therein under the provisions of article 1995, Rev. St., as to any of such defendants, then and in such event suit may be maintained in such county against any and all necessary parties thereto.
The court overruled appellants’ plea, and the only question prosecuted on the appeal is as to the correctness of that ruling.
Opinion.
Article 1995 of our Revised Civil Statutes of 1925, provides that: “No person who is an inhabitant of this state shall be sued out of the county in which he has his domicile except in the following cases.” The venue of the suit against appellants cannot be maintained in Dallas county, under subdivision 4 of the above article, unless it is alleged and shown that one of the defendants resides in that county. Admit that the railway company is properly suable in Dallas county, it is because, as alleged, it has an agent in that county, and not because its residence is in that county.
Article 6287, R. C. S. 1925 (formerly 6437), provides:
“Domicile of the Corporation.—The public office of a railroad corporation shall be considered the domicile of such corporation.”
“Domicile,” as used in the above statute, denotes the residence, and should be treated as synonymous with the word “residence” as used in subdivision 4 of article 1995, R. C. S. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. McKnight, 99 Tex. 289, 89 S. W. 755, and cases cited; Alvis v. Holbert (Tex. Civ. App.) 238 S. W. 730, and many other cases that might be cited.
It is agreed here, and appellants so pleaded, that appellants each have their domicile—that is, residence—in Franklin county. It is not alleged that any of the 'several acts complained of as constituting the fraud complained of were committed in Dallas county, so that the only contention that could be made to maintain the venue in Dallas county as to appellants is in the construction to be given section 29a of article 1995, R. C. S., as added by Gen. and Sp. Acts 40th Leg. 1st Called Sess. c. 72, § 2, and in the. construction of that subdivision of the article to hold that appellants were necessary parties to the suit.
In Wool Growers’ Central Storage Co. v. Edwards, 10 S.W.(2d) 577, recently decided by this court, we had occasion to construe that subdivision of the statute on the question of venue, and in which Judge Higgins, speaking for this court, after reviewing many authorities, said: “In our opinion it is wholly inadmissible to say that appellant was a necessary party to the suit.”
The case is reversed and remanded, with instructions to change the venue of the suit, as to appellants, to Franklin county.