Court Opinion

ID: 9647822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:51:41.648973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:53.777687
License: Public Domain

*201NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
In this case the majority has made a mockery of the “integrity of our judiciary” which it purports to uphold. In the latest chapter of the sad saga of the Philadelphia Roofer’s scandal, the majority opinion, by intimation, excoriates the constitutionally mandated Judicial Inquiry and Review Board (“JIRB”). The opinion makes no real attempt to apply controlling, unanimously held case law while simultaneously justifying the acceptance of a gift of substantial value by posturing the recipient as merely an “unwitting participant” (original emphasis), at 65. It artfully dis-creates this Court’s requirement that all members of the judiciary disclose their financial status and activities each year. If such spuriousness is accepted in exoneration of the conduct here involved, public confidence in the integrity of our judicial system can appropriately be expected to sink to unimagined depths.
I.
As previously noted by this writer, under the scheme of Article V, Section 18 of the Constitution of this Commonwealth, “a recommendation of removal by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board ... requires this Court’s action before it has efficacy.” In the Matter of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board v. Snyder, 514 Pa. 142, 151, 523 A.2d 294, 300 (1987) (Nix, C.J., Concurring Opinion joined by Flaherty, J.). Article Y, § 18(g) provides: “If, after hearing, the Board finds good cause therefor, it shall recommend to the Supreme Court____” Article V, § 18(h) states: “The Supreme Court shall review the record of the Board’s proceedings on the law and facts and may permit the introduction of additional evidence. It shall order ... [the form of discipline] ..., as it finds just and proper.” To suggest that this broad scope of review was vested in this Court by the people of this Commonwealth because of an apprehension that the members of the Board would abuse the rule of confidentiality that surrounds their deliberations, would give vent to personal animosities, would re*202spond to base personal predilictions or prejudices, or would deliberately and knowingly render an unfair judgment demeans the intelligence of the people and distorts the motives of the electorate of this state, for such a suggestion has no foundation in fact.
The constitutional rule for confidentiality,1 was' designed for the protection of the reputation of the jurist whose conduct may become the subject of an inquiry based upon meritless or unfounded accusations. It is a recognition that the honest and fair judge is vulnerable to unjustified and scurrilous attacks upon his character by those who may be offended by his proper exercise of the office. See, Boettger v. Loverro, 521 Pa. 366, 377, 555 A.2d 1234 (1989). To suggest that the rule of confidentiality might invite a Board of this stature to “indulge its suspicions, yield to public pressure, even its whims, send zealous agents with a deliberate intent to find grounds to bring a judge beneath its influence for good or purposes of their own”, at p. 60, reflects a siege mentality totally unrelated to reality and casts grave aspersions upon the integrity of highly respected citizens of this Commonwealth who have been called upon to volunteer to perform an important societal function. While we may disagree in a particular instance with the judgment of this body, it is unseemly to invite general suspicion of the body as an institution.
The majority apparently has overlooked the fact that under Article V, § 18(a) this Court is charged with the responsibility of naming five of the nine members of that Board. The remaining four members of the Board are named by the Governor. To indirectly question the integrity of the Board members without foundation would be to impune the judgment of the appointing authorities.
II.
The fiction that the gift to Judge Chiovero was not improper was reached by examining the record as if Judge *203Chiovero had not responded to the financial disclosure form; as if there were a new standard prohibiting the use of a jurist’s response to the financial disclosure form as substantive evidence and by ignoring the relevant case law.
It is not disputed that the roof on Judge Chiovero’s home was in need of repair, and in response to that need, he called Stephen Traitz, who was then the business agent for Roofers Union Local 30-30B. The record reflects that, during an interview with a member of the FBI, Judge Chiovero stated his reason for calling Mr. Traitz on that occasion was to receive a recommendation as to roofing contractors. In prompt response to this conversation, a roofing company installed an entirely new roof on the Judge’s residence. The testimony of record also reflects that the company never received payment for the labor and material involved in the installation of that roof. Both the owner of the contracting company and the crew foreman testified that no bill was ever issued to Judge Chiovero, nor was payment ever received. That testimony was not disputed by Judge Chiovero. Therefore, that testimony can be believed without question.
We agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence presented establishes the fact that a gift was received, at 64; however, the basis for the majority’s conclusion is substantially different from the basis employed by this writer. The majority asks the public to accept the conclusion that Judge Chiovero’s inquiry was not intended to elicit the response of a gift by Stephen Traitz. That conclusion would not be difficult to accept if Judge Chiovero had paid for the work involved after it was apparent that he was not being billed; such action by Judge Chiovero would have prevented any appearance of impropriety. However, that was not the case. As stated previously, the majority gratuitously characterizes Judge Chiovero as an “unwitting participant” in this gift, at 65, and suggests that a judge should not be legally bound to pay for something which he did not explicitly authorize and which he can not return. At 64.
*204Here is the case of a judge who definitely accepted a gift of substantial value. Although Judge Chiovero did not directly contact the contractors who performed the work, his inquiry to Stephen Traitz concerning roofing work set in motion the wheels of favors and influence. In fact, Judge Chiovero himself implicitly characterized the roof as a gift by including it in response to question 11 of the financial disclosure form required by this Court’s Order No. 47 of April 13, 1984.2 Therefore, it is clear that Judge Chiovero accepted a roof without payment and believed it to be a gift.
The majority’s decision turns upon the propriety of such- a gift being accepted by a judicial officer. As we noted in Matter of Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473 (1988), the fact that an individual serves as a judge does not preclude that individual from acceptance of gifts under proper circumstances.
This Court’s rejection of a per se prohibition against a jurist receiving a gift reflected our recognition that there would be occasions where such acceptance would be proper. The interest to be protected is the impartiality of the judicial process; the impropriety of accepting gifts arises only when that interest is compromised. Thus a per se prohibition is not only unnecessary, it would constitute an unnecessary restriction upon the conscientious jurist.
Id., 517 Pa. at 433, 538 A.2d 481.
The test as to the propriety of the acceptance of a gift was carefully delineated in that decision:
Thus when a jurist is offered a gift by litigant he or she must be aware of the possible appearance of an impropriety. Such gifts should not be accepted unless a relationship exists, and the circumstances are such that a *205conclusion of wrongdoing cannot reasonably be drawn. The jurist must be held accountable, even though he or she may not harbor an intent to show favor to the donor, in those circumstances which would legitimately give rise to a contrary conclusion. See In the Matter of Dandridge, 462 Pa. 67, 337 A.2d 885 (1975). In accepting gifts in questionable situations the judge exposes himself to such a charge. Such a demanding standard is justified in view of the importance of the interest to be protected. Id., 517 Pa. at 430, 538 A.2d 479. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the majority stated that once the Board has
established the acceptance of a gift, that transaction could be made legitimate,
but only if the donee [jurist] is able to establish (1) that the gift was given only in connection with that relationship and (2) that the donee is satisfied that the circumstances surrounding the acceptance of the gift would not create a reasonable basis for the donor to believe that the gift places the donor in a position to exert improper influence over the donee in the discharge of his legal duties.
Id., 517 Pa. at 441, 538 A.2d at 486. (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Justice Papadakos is satisfied that the record before us presents no evidence that Mr. Traitz was in a special position to influence Judge Chiovero, p. 65,3 or that he arranged the roofing work here so that he could curry special favor for members of the Union who might be before Judge Chiovero. However, even a cursory review of the record reveals sufficient evidence to create an appearance of impropriety for a judge who accepted a roof worth over $2,000 as a gift from a union business manager, with whom he had no previous relationship which could explain such a gift. A judge must expect to be held to a higher level of scrutiny and be willing to limit his conduct, if necessary, in order to maintain the public’s confidence in his *206or her impartiality. As this Court noted' in In Re Greenberg, 442 Pa. 411, 280 A.2d 370 (1971):
[A] judge must possess the confidence of the community; ... he must not only be independent and honest, but, equally important, believed by all men to be independent and honest...-. Without the appearance as well as the fact of justice, respect for the law vanishes in a democracy*
Id., 442 Pa. at 416, 280 A.2d at 372.
It is important to note that Judge Chiovero did not attempt to “légitimize” the gift accepted in this case, as was his burden. The majority’s attempts to shift the burden of the donee, set forth in Cunningham, by stating, “More importantly, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that the respondent [Judge Chiovero] was aware of any improper motives when he accepted the new roof.” At 65. However, the Court in Cunningham clearly placed the burden on the jurist to legitimize any gift brought into question by the Board. Therefore, without any testimony of Judge Chiovero to explain the reason for a gift from a union businessman, with whom he had no prior relationship, the conclusion of impropriety drawn by the Board must be accepted.
Respondents to a disciplinary matter are not guaranteed the rights of a criminal defendant. This Court in Matter of Glancey, (Glancey I), 515 Pa. 201, 527 A.2d 997 (1987), addressed the precise issue of the applicability of the Fifth Amendment to a judicial officer in a Board proceeding. We held that where a question posed by the Board “specifically, directly and narrowly” relates to the performance of the respondent-jurist’s official duties, “the Fifth Amendment is not a bar to the removal of a judicial officer for refusing to provide the information sought.” Glancey I, supra, 515 Pa. at 217, 527 A.2d at 1002. This proposition was reiterated in Matter of Glancey, (Glancey II), 518 Pa. 276, 542 A.2d 1350 (1988), wherein we held:
We do not believe that requiring a judge to respond honestly to an official inquiry would be unduly burden*207some on the judicial official, nor do we believe that it creates a Hobson’s choice which effectively abridges that official’s rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
518 Pa. at 288, 542 A.2d at 1356.
Incredulously, the majority disregarded these two opinions, Glancey I and II. Significantly, each member of the present majority joined in both of these opinions; it is therefore difficult to understand how such collective action could have occurred. Candor, at the very least, should have required the majority to explain its sub silentio departure from such recent precedent. Notwithstanding, Glancey I and Glancey II are irreconcilable with today’s result.
Further, the matter in which the majority characterizes Judge Chiovero’s role in accepting the new roof gift as “unwitting” is a far cry from how this Court perceived former Judge Thomas A. White’s explanation that money left on his desk by an agent of the Roofer’s Union was left without his knowledge. In former Judge White’s case, In The Matter of Honorable Thomas A. White, sub nom, Matter of Cunningham, supra, this entire Court characterized former Judge White’s explanation of his mental state as “specious.” Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 443, 538 A.2d at 481. I fail to see the difference between the two mental states, nor do I comprehend how this Court can rationally distinguish, as to truthfulness, between the two statements.
III.
The majority clearly eviscerates or discreates this Court’s requirement that all members of the judiciary disclose their financial status and activities each year. This is ingeniously accomplished by affording Judge Chiovero another opportunity to answer question 11 of the Statement of Financial Disclosure more fully, and with impunity, because the charges brought against Judge Chiovero are dismissed with prejudice. At pp. 198-199. It serves no purpose to direct the judge to give a “full, accurate and specific answer to question 11 by describing completely the facts surrounding *208the installation of his roof.” Having exonerated Judge Chiovero in this opinion, the Court now pays only lip service to our requirement that the Statement of Financial Disclosure must be completed.
Besides, there is no reason why Judge Chiovero should be afforded a third chance to answer a question he was required to answer but failed twice before. As the majority clearly stated, “In Matter of Glancey, [Glancey I, supra ] ..., we determined, after an extensive review of the relevant United States Supreme Court cases [footnote omitted], that a jurist could be removed from office for failing or refusing to answer the disclosure statement ... [citation omitted].” However, in this case, the majority is content to allow the same jurist involved in Glancey, a third chance to answer or fail to answer question 11.
Finally, I am extremely troubled by the disparate treatment afforded Judge Chiovero as compared with former Judges Kenneth Harris,. Julian King and Thomas White, Cunningham, supra, insofar as the evidential value of the financial disclosure forms are concerned. In those cases, the jurist’s response to the financial disclosure form was used as substantive evidence. Here, Judge Chiovero’s amended and inadequate response is treated as if that response did not exist; the response was not used at all by the majority in its analysis of the case. Have we not violated fundamental notions of fairness? As former Chief Justice (then Justice) Roberts stated in his eloquent dissent in Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457, 475, 417 A.2d 128, 137 (1980), “[i]t should no longer be open to question that decisions of this Court, particularly those of constitutional import, must be applied to all cases then pending direct review. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 2 L.Ed. 49 (1801)....”
I repeat, this record, even without consideration of the statement in the financial disclosure form, supports the Board’s recommendation of removal.
I strenuously dissent.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this dissent.

. The majority's use of the term "secrecy” in place of the Constitution’s term "confidential[ity]” is obviously designated to raise the sinister specter of the Star Chamber.

. In an amended statement of financial interest Judge Chiovero responded that partial payment was tendered; he clearly stated that he was not certain if the undisclosed amount paid was in fact the full value for those services. Further, Judge Chiovero does not make clear how he arrived at the amount he supposedly paid since no bill was issued and no direct contact between the judge and the contractors ever existed.

. The majority ignores the fact that Matter of Cunningham, 517 Pa. 417, 538 A.2d 473 (1988), established Mr. Traitz enjoyed a special position to influence judges.