Court Opinion

ID: 9907367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 15:00:52.053287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:01.639557
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1072   Document: 32     Page: 1    Filed: 12/06/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                 BRUCE A. LING, JR.,
                  Petitioner-Appellant

                            v.

       SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
                   SERVICES,
               Respondent-Appellee
              ______________________

                       2023-1072
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:20-vv-00061-EHM, Judge Edward H. Meyers.
                  ______________________

                Decided: December 6, 2023
                 ______________________

    BRUCE A. LING, JR., Tallahassee, FL, pro se.

    EMILIE WILLIAMS, Torts Branch, Civil Division, United
 States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for re-
 spondent-appellee.   Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, C. SALVATORE D’ALESSIO, HEATHER LYNN
 PEARLMAN.
                 ______________________

     Before LOURIE, DYK, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.
Case: 23-1072    Document: 32     Page: 2    Filed: 12/06/2023

 2                                               LING v. HHS

 PER CURIAM.

      Bruce A. Ling, Jr. once again seeks compensation un-
 der the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,
 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 to -34 (“Vaccine Act”), based on his
 allegations that a seasonal influenza vaccination he re-
 ceived in November 2011 caused him to develop Guillain-
 Barré Syndrome (“GBS”). The special master denied his
 claim, finding that Ling did not present sufficient evidence
 to substantiate his allegation that he suffered from GBS.
 Ling v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-61V,
 2021 WL 3913935, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 17,
 2021) (“Decision”). The United States Court of Federal
 Claims (“Claims Court”) dismissed Ling’s untimely motion
 for review but concluded that, even if the motion had been
 timely, the special master’s decision was not arbitrary or
 capricious. Ling v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 20-
 61V (Fed. Cl. Mar. 3, 2022), R.A. 6–12. 1 Thereafter, Ling
 filed two motions for reconsideration, which the Claims
 Court denied. Ling then filed a petition for review in this
 court.
     For the following reasons, we dismiss Ling’s appeal.
                        BACKGROUND
      Ling has filed three pro se petitions under the Vaccine
 Act, each alleging injuries from the same November 2011
 flu vaccination. His first petition was denied on the merits
 after he could not substantiate his alleged, unspecified in-
 jury. Ling v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 14-1017,
 2017 WL 3814649, at *4 (Fed. Cl. July 21, 2017). His sec-
 ond petition was dismissed because he had a civil suit
 pending in the United States District Court for the North-
 ern District of Florida at the time his petition was filed.
 Ling v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 145 Fed. Cl. 778,

     1  “R.A.” refers to the appendix filed with Respond-
 ent-Appellee’s brief.
Case: 23-1072     Document: 32      Page: 3     Filed: 12/06/2023

 LING v. HHS                                                   3

 783–84 (2019); see Flowers v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health &
 Hum. Servs., 49 F.3d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding
 that § 300aa-11(a)(5)(B) “prohibit[s] the filing of any Vac-
 cine Act petition in which the petitioner has a co-pending
 civil action, irrespective of the date of that co-pendency”).
 Ling now seeks compensation for a third time, alleging that
 a 2019 GBS diagnosis by his physician substantiates his
 claim for relief. R.A. 23, 31.
      On August 17, 2021, the special master denied Ling’s
 claim, finding that Ling had not produced “persuasive evi-
 dence” of a GBS diagnosis. Decision at *4. A copy of the
 decision was served on Ling via U.S. Mail. R.A. 8. On Sep-
 tember 1, 2021, the Claims Court published the special
 master’s decision on its website, and a copy of that pub-
 lished decision was again served on Ling via U.S. Mail. Id.
 at 3, 8. Judgment was entered against Ling on September
 17, 2021. Id. at 3, 8; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-12(e)(1), (3) (“In
 the absence of a motion [for review of] the special master’s
 decision . . . the clerk of the [Claims Court] shall immedi-
 ately enter judgment in accordance with the special mas-
 ter’s decision.”); see also Vaccine Rule 11(a).
      On October 12, 2021, only after judgment had been en-
 tered, did Ling file a motion for review of the special mas-
 ter’s decision. R.A. 4, 8. He alleged, inter alia, that he
 never received the mailed copy of the special master’s Au-
 gust 17, 2021 decision, and that the delay prejudiced him
 in preparing his motion and violated his right to due pro-
 cess. See id. at 72–73, 77–80. As for the merits, he main-
 tained that the evidence he submitted was sufficient to
 support a GBS diagnosis. Id. at 74–77.
     On March 3, 2022, the Claims Court dismissed Ling’s
 motion, holding that it was untimely because, even if Ling
 had not received the mailed copy of the August 17, 2021
 decision, he had received the copy of the published, Sep-
 tember 1, 2021 decision. Id. at 10. This meant that Ling
 had at least 19 days to move for review upon receiving a
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 4                                                 LING v. HHS

 copy of the decision, which did not rise to the level of a due
 process violation. Id.; see Hervey v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
 Servs., 88 F.3d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that a
 shortened period of 20 days to file a motion for review did
 not violate vaccine petitioner’s right to due process). Ac-
 cordingly, the Claims Court determined that it lacked ju-
 risdiction over Ling’s motion for review. R.A. 10 (citing
 Widdoss v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 989 F.2d
 1170, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that the thirty-day
 deadline to file a motion for review under § 300aa-12(e)(1)
 is jurisdictional)). 2 Nevertheless, the Claims Court deter-
 mined that, even if it had jurisdiction, the special master’s
 decision was not arbitrary or capricious because there was
 no evidence that Ling in fact had GBS. R.A. 11.
      Thereafter, Ling filed two motions for reconsideration,
 which were denied on April 12, 2022, and June 27, 2022,
 respectively. Id. at 4. On August 15, 2022, Ling petitioned
 for review in this court. Id. at 5.

     2    As the Claims Court observed, since Widdoss, the
 Supreme Court has emphasized “the distinction between
 jurisdictional prescriptions and nonjurisdictional claim-
 processing rules, which ‘seek to promote the orderly pro-
 gress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain
 procedural steps at certain specified times.’” Fort Bend
 County v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019) (citation
 omitted); see ECC Int’l Constructors, LLC v. Sec’y of Army,
 79 F.4th 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2023). We have not resolved
 whether or not that recent guidance affects our holding in
 Widdoss. See Gaiter v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 784
 F. App’x 759, 762–63 (Fed. Cir. 2019). But we need not
 reach that issue here, where, as explained below, Ling’s pe-
 tition for review in this court was also untimely.
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 LING v. HHS                                                  5

                          DISCUSSION
     Section 300aa-12(f) of the Vaccine Act states that the
 Secretary or any petitioner aggrieved by the findings or
 conclusions of the Claims Court on a petition for compen-
 sation may obtain review in this court “upon petition filed
 within 60 days of the date of judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
 12(f); see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (granting this court juris-
 diction over “an appeal from a final decision” of the Claims
 Court).
     The Secretary argues that this appeal should be dis-
 missed for lack of jurisdiction because Ling’s August 15,
 2022 petition for review in this court was not filed within
 60 days of the Claims Court’s March 3, 2022 order. Secre-
 tary’s Br. at 5–6 (citing § 300aa-12(f)). We observed, how-
 ever, that the Claims Court never entered a separate
 judgment with respect to that order. See, e.g., Vaccine Rule
 30 (providing that, upon the Claims Court judge’s decision
 on a motion for review, the clerk “will enter judgment in
 accordance with the decision”). We therefore requested
 supplemental briefing from the parties to address:
 (1) whether separate judgment was necessary to render the
 Claims Court’s decision “final” and thereby appealable pur-
 suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3); (2) whether Ling’s two mo-
 tions for reconsideration of the March 3, 2022 order tolled
 the deadline to petition for review in this court; and
 (3) whether the 60-day time limit to file a “petition for re-
 view” in this court under § 300aa-12(f) is a jurisdictional
 rule or a nonjurisdictional rule subject to waiver, forfeiture,
 and equitable considerations. ECF 23; see, e.g., Fort Bend
 County, 139 S. Ct. at 1849.
                               I
      Upon consideration of that supplemental briefing, we
 first conclude that the Claims Court did not need to enter
 separate judgment upon dismissing Ling’s motion on
 March 3, 2022, to render its decision final. As a pro se liti-
 gant, Ling’s pleadings must be construed liberally.
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 6                                                   LING v. HHS

 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Although titled
 as a “motion for review,” we find the substance of Ling’s
 October 12, 2021 motion best construed as one for post-
 judgment reconsideration pursuant to Claims Court Rule
 59. See Vaccine Rule 36. So construed, Ling’s motion, filed
 within 28 days of the September 17, 2021 entry of judgment
 was timely. See Claims Court Rule 59. Moreover, when
 construed in this way, the Claims Court need not have en-
 tered separate judgment, see Claims Court Rule 58, and the
 60-day time limit for Ling to file a petition for review in this
 court would have been tolled, running not from the entry
 of judgment on September 17, 2021, but from the entry of
 the Claims Court’s March 3, 2022 order disposing of the
 motion. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).
      But liberally construing Ling’s post-judgment motion
 in this way, his petition for review in this court, filed on
 August 15, 2022—more than five months after March 3,
 2022—clearly did not meet the 60-day time limit of
 § 300aa-12(f). This conclusion is unaffected by Ling’s two
 subsequent motions for reconsideration because those mo-
 tions, each filed more than 28 days after the entry of judg-
 ment, did not toll the time to appeal. Browder v. Dir., Dep’t
 of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978) (noting that Fed. R.
 App. P. 4(a)(4) requires “that a [Rule 59] motion be timely
 if it is to toll the time for appeal”). Although we recognize
 that Ling is not an attorney and that he is not fully ac-
 quainted with court rules and appellate procedures, the
 Supreme Court has instructed courts to enforce procedural
 rules even against pro se litigants who may not be familiar
 with them. See, e.g., McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106,
 113 (1993) (noting that the Supreme Court has “never sug-
 gested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation
 should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who
 proceed without counsel”).
     Accordingly, we conclude that Ling’s petition for review
 in this court was untimely.
Case: 23-1072     Document: 32      Page: 7   Filed: 12/06/2023

 LING v. HHS                                                 7

                               II
     Because the petition was untimely, the Secretary urges
 us to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. But as we
 noted above, the Supreme Court has recently emphasized
 the distinction between jurisdictional prescriptions and
 nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules.
     “A ‘jurisdictional’ prescription sets the bounds of the
 ‘court’s adjudicatory authority.’ By contrast, nonjurisdic-
 tional rules govern how courts and litigants operate within
 those bounds.” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411,
 416 (2023) (internal citation omitted). While jurisdictional
 rules are absolute and cannot be waived, nonjurisdictional
 claim-processing rules, although mandatory, are subject to
 equitable exceptions. See id. That is, unlike jurisdictional
 rules, the enforcement of a claim-processing rule may be
 waived or forfeited where the party asserting it “waits too
 long to raise the point.” Fort Bend County, 139 S. Ct. at
 1849.
     We need not decide for the purposes of this case
 whether the time limit imposed by § 300aa-12(f) is a juris-
 dictional prescription or a nonjurisdictional claim-pro-
 cessing rule. We dismiss the appeal regardless because,
 even if the rule is not jurisdictional, the Secretary has nei-
 ther waived nor forfeited its enforcement. See Secretary’s
 Br. at 5–6. And we see no other equitable considerations
 which would warrant deviation from this rule. Accord-
 ingly, we adhere to the 60-day time limit of § 300aa-12(f).
                         CONCLUSION
      For these reasons, we conclude that, because Ling’s pe-
 tition for review in this court was untimely filed under
 § 300aa-12(f), his appeal must be dismissed.
                        DISMISSED
                            COSTS
 No costs.