Court Opinion

ID: 9587108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:18:01.560045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:01.656817
License: Public Domain

Steffen, J.,
joined by Mowbray, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
In my view, the majority have misperceived the thrust of the actual physical control provision contained in NRS 484.379. Both the hearing officer and the district court judge understood, correctly I submit, that the legislature sought by that language to discourage intoxicated persons from entering their vehicles in the capacity of operators in areas accessible to the public.
I agree with the hearing officer’s conclusion that although “it is commendable for an individual not to drive his vehicle once he is *329incapable of safely operating his vehicle in his condition, the purpose of the ‘physical control provision’ is preventative in nature and designed to discourage drivers from testing their diminished driving ability. A person sleeping it off is considered to be a continuing threat to public safety, as there is no assurance that the intoxicated individual will [not] awaken and believe himself to be allright and operate his vehicle while still impaired.”
The majority’s decision is contrary to the prevailing view that actual physical control includes “constructive” control of a vehicle. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Kelley, 351 N.E.2d 85 (Ohio 1976); City of Toledo v. Voyles, 471 N.E.2d 823 (Ohio App. 1984); Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023 (Okla.Crim.App. 1975); Adams v. State, 697 P.2d 622 (Wyo. 1985). In Adams, 697 P.2d at 623-624, the court noted that the defendant was parked about twenty feet oif the side of the highway, the engine was not running, no lights were on, the keys were in the ignition, but in the “off” position, and the defendant was unconscious in the driver’s seat behind the steering wheel. In affirming defendant’s conviction, the court held that “[a]s long as a person is physically or bodily able to assert dominion in the sense of movement by starting the car and driving away, then he has substantially as much control over the vehicle as he would if he were actually driving'it.” Id. at 625 (citing State v. Webb, 274 P.2d 338 (Ariz. 1954)).
In the instant case, it is beyond cavil that Bullock had domination and actual physical control of his vehicle. He alone was in the vehicle, he was the owner of the car and he alone would have determined when to drive away and whether his faculties were sufficiently free from the influence of alcohol. Moreover, the vehicle was parked partially within the travel lane of the parking lot of the Grand Ball Room. Furthermore, the arresting officer testified, contrarily to Bullock, that Bullock was directly behind the steering wheel in an upright position. The engine was running and the parking lights were on. Although asleep, Bullock was poised to simply drive away at his own command, however impaired. I believe it was precisely that risk that the legislature sought to discourage by the enactment of the “actual physical control” provision of NRS 484.379.
Under Nevada’s public policy, intoxicated persons are to refrain from entering vehicles as drivers or potential drivers if the vehicles are located in areas accessible to the public. Thus, intoxicated persons having access to such vehicles should enter them only as passengers. I respectfully suggest that the majority have diminished the efficacy of Nevada’s statutory scheme by today’s ruling. I therefore dissent.