Court Opinion

ID: 9904835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 23:14:07.899768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.753472
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 IMADUDIN M. HIRMAS and LINA                       No. 84929-8-I
 ALQASEM, individually and as a
 marital community,                                DIVISION ONE

                           Appellants,

                 v.

 AMAZON.COM, INC., a foreign                       UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 corporation, AMAZON LOGISTICS,
 INC., a foreign corporation; and JOHN
 DOE EMPLOYEE, an individual,

                           Respondents.

       BOWMAN, J. — Imadudin Hirmas sued Amazon for negligence after he

injured his foot by falling into a gap between his delivery truck and the loading

dock at an Amazon distribution facility. The case proceeded to bench trial.

Hirmas appeals, challenging the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of

law dismissing his claims because he failed to show an unreasonable risk of

harm or that Amazon failed to exercise reasonable care. We affirm.

                                      FACTS

       Hirmas drives a box truck for Delivery Force. Delivery Force contracts

with Amazon for “Last Mile” package delivery. On June 1, 2018, Hirmas arrived

at an Amazon distribution facility in Seattle to collect packages for delivery. He

backed his truck into position at the loading dock to retrieve the packages. The

height difference between the truck and the loading dock and the presence of
No. 84929-8-I/2

bumpers affixed to the face of the loading dock caused a gap between Hirmas’

truck and the loading dock.

       The loading bay Hirmas parked in was equipped with a dock leveler—a

mechanical device used to bridge the gap between a truck and the loading dock.

Amazon employees seldom operated the dock leveler on behalf of drivers

employed by other companies, but they were available to show drivers how to

use it. The distribution facility also made available portable dock plates that a

driver could use to manually bridge a gap between a truck and the loading dock.

       Hirmas did not use the dock leveler or a portable dock plate. Instead, he

repeatedly stepped over the gap while loading packages into his truck. On one

of the trips, Hirmas fell into the gap, fracturing his foot. Hirmas sued Amazon for

negligence.

       In December 2022, the court held a bench trial. At trial, Dr. Jeremy Bauer

testified about the industry standards for walkways and whether the Amazon

loading dock met those standards. He specifically referred to the federal

Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

standards under 29 C.F.R. 1910.22 (OSHA 1910.22) and the globally recognized

industry standards of the ASTM International Technical Committee F-13 on

pedestrian/walkway safety and footwear (ASTM F-13). Dr. Bauer testified that

both OSHA 1910.22 and ASTM F-13 established minimum requirements for

walking surfaces. He explained that OSHA 1910.22 “speaks to walkway hazards

and gaps and taking care of or eliminating any gaps if they exist after they have

been identified,” and ASTM F-13 “talk[s] about walkway safety,” including

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walkway grading and “changes in height between two surfaces and a walkway.”

He testified that ASTM F-13 does not allow walkways to have “any gaps greater

than a half-inch in the direction someone is walking.” According to Dr. Bauer,

“going from a truck into the warehouse via a loading dock would be considered a

walkway under the industry standards” because it is a “surface that’s intended for

pedestrian use.”

       Dr. Bauer testified that he estimated a five- to six-inch gap between

Hirmas’ truck and the loading dock, which exceeded the maximum standards

under OSHA 1910.22 and ASTM F-13. When asked whether there are “specific

industry standards governing loading docks,” Dr. Bauer answered, “Not that I

have seen.” Dr. Bauer then explained that because there are no industry

standards specific to loading docks, “[t]hey end up defaulting to the larger federal

standard . . . [OSHA] 1910.22” addressing walkways.

       Dr. Bauer testified that the gap Hirmas repeatedly crossed was an

unreasonably hazardous condition. Dr. Bauer also testified that it was

foreseeable that drivers might load packages without mitigating the gap to save

time. So, he concluded that Amazon should have a system in place to ensure

that delivery drivers used a dock leveler to eliminate the hazard.

       After trial, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The

court found that Dr. Bauer “briefly testified about studies about injuries at loading

docks” but “was unaware of any specific industry standards regarding loading

docks.” The court concluded that

       Hirmas failed to show that there was an unreasonable risk of harm
       and that Amazon failed to exercise reasonable care. Given the

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       obviousness of the potential danger posed by the gap, the regular
       use of the loading dock by other drivers, the availability of dock
       plates, and the lack of evidence of any prior significant injuries
       occurring at the loading dock, Mr. Hirmas has not shown that there
       was an unreasonable risk of harm. In addition, in light of these
       facts and circumstances and the lack of any evidence about
       standards or practices specifically pertaining to loading docks, Mr.
       Hirmas has not established that Amazon failed to exercise
       reasonable care.

       The court dismissed Hirmas’ claims with prejudice. Hirmas appeals.

                                     ANALYSIS

       Hirmas challenges the trial court’s finding that Dr. Bauer was unaware of

any specific industry standards that apply to loading docks and its conclusion that

he “failed to show that there was an unreasonable risk of harm and that Amazon

failed to exercise reasonable care.”

Findings of Fact

       Hirmas argues substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s

finding that Dr. Bauer “was unaware of any specific industry standards regarding

loading docks.” We disagree.

       Following a bench trial, we review whether substantial evidence supports

challenged findings of fact. Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d

873, 879, 73 P.3d 369 (2003). Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to

persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the declared premise. Merriman v.

Cokeley, 168 Wn.2d 627, 631, 230 P.3d 162 (2010). We will not disturb findings

of fact supported by substantial evidence even if there is conflicting evidence. Id.

Unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. Nguyen v. City of Seattle, 179 Wn.

App. 155, 163, 317 P.3d 518 (2014).

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No. 84929-8-I/5

       Here, the trial court asked Dr. Bauer whether there are “specific industry

standards governing loading docks.” Dr. Bauer answered, “Not that I have seen.”

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Dr. Bauer was

unaware of any specific industry standards that apply to loading docks.

       Hirmas argues the court ignored Dr. Bauer’s testimony that the general

standards for walkways in OSHA 1910.22 and ASTM F-13 apply to loading docks

absent specific industry standards. But those regulations are not industry

standards specifically governing loading docks, they govern walkways. We reject

Hirmas’ challenge to the trial court’s finding of fact.

Conclusions of Law

       Hirmas argues that the court’s findings do not support its conclusion that

he “failed to show there was an unreasonable risk of harm and that Amazon

failed to exercise reasonable care.” Again, we disagree.

       After determining whether substantial evidence supports a trial court’s

findings, we review whether those findings support its conclusions of law.

Proctor v. Huntington, 146 Wn. App. 836, 844-45, 192 P.3d 958 (2008), aff’d, 169

Wn.2d 491, 238 P.3d 1117 (2010). In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, we

view all reasonable inferences from the findings in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party. Jensen v. Lake Jane Ests., 165 Wn. App. 100, 104, 267 P.3d

435 (2011). While the trier of fact may believe or disbelieve any evidence

presented at trial, on appeal, we do not hear or weigh evidence or substitute our

opinion for the trier of fact. Quinn v Cherry Lane Auto Plaza, Inc., 153 Wn. App.

710, 717, 225 P.3d 266 (2009).

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No. 84929-8-I/6

       In an action for negligence, a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a

duty, (2) breach of that duty, (3) resulting injury, and (4) proximate cause.

Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). A

possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to its business

invitees if it (1) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the

condition that caused harm and should realize that the condition involves an

unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, (2) should expect that the invitee will

not discover or realize the danger or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

(3) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee against the danger.

Mihaila v. Troth, 21 Wn. App. 2d 227, 233, 505 P.3d 163 (2022) (citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).

       “A possessor of land is not liable to his [or her] invitees for physical
       harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose
       danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should
       anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.”

Mihaila, 21 Wn. App. 2d at 234 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

343A(1)). Harm might be anticipated if, for example, “ ‘the possessor has reason

to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger

because to a reasonable [person] in [their] position the advantages of doing so

would outweigh the apparent risk.’ ” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 343A cmt. f).

       Here, the trial court found that “[t]here was a gap between Mr. Hirmas’s

truck and the loading dock . . . created by the height differential between the

truck and the loading dock and the bumpers that were affixed to the face of the

loading dock.” And the court found Hirmas “was aware that there was a gap.”

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No. 84929-8-I/7

Those unchallenged findings support the court’s conclusion that the risk was not

unreasonable because it was an open and obvious danger. The court also found

that “this facility was equipped with a dock leveler, which was designed to bridge

the gap between delivery trucks and the loading dock,” that “[p]ortable dock

plates, which could bridge a gap between a vehicle and the loading dock, were

also available in the facility for drivers to use,” and that Amazon employees were

available to show drivers how to operate the dock levelers. Those unchallenged

findings support the court’s conclusion that Amazon exercised reasonable care.

       Hirmas argues that in reaching its conclusions, the court overlooked Dr.

Bauer’s testimony that the gap between the loading dock and box truck violated

industry standards, and that even though the gap was obvious, it was

foreseeable that workers would continue to load their trucks without the dock

leveler to save time. But the trial court need not accept the opinion of an expert;

rather, it may accept or reject the expert’s testimony according to its judgment of

the testimony’s persuasiveness. In re Marriage of Pilant, 42 Wn. App. 173, 179-

80, 709 P.2d 1241 (1985); Brewer v. Copeland, 86 Wn.2d 58, 74, 542 P.2d 445

(1975).

       Hirmas also argues that Amazon admitted the dock plates “were not

intended to be used at docks where dock levelers had been installed,” and that

there was a dock leveler where he was injured. Hirmas’ argument misconstrues

the testimony of Adrian Lupusoru, a senior operations engineer for Amazon and

former shift manager at the facility where Hirmas was injured. Lupusoru testified

that the facility had “manually removable dock plates which could be used on the

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No. 84929-8-I/8

[loading dock bay] doors that perhaps didn’t have dock leveling equipment.” That

testimony does not support Hirmas’ argument that dock plates were intended for

only docks without dock levelers. Rather, it assumes that truck drivers would use

dock levelers when available and points out that drivers could use dock plates in

those bays not equipped with the levelers. Indeed, Lupusoru explained that the

“dock equipment was there for [truck drivers’] use, so it was up to them how they

wanted to use it.”1

       The trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law. We affirm

dismissal of Hirmas’ claims.

WE CONCUR:

       1
         Hirmas also argues that the court gave too much weight to the lack of
information about prior falls in the facility because Amazon admitted it does not track that
data. But it is the trial court’s purview to weigh the evidence or lack of evidence.
Jensen, 165 Wn. App. at 104-05. And we will not disturb a trial court’s order if its
findings of fact support its conclusions of law. Id. at 104.

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