Court Opinion

ID: 9895548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 18:09:47.537158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:55.944453
License: Public Domain

J-S24022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 ANDREW J. MCCOLLIN                    :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1198 MDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 29, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-06-CR-0002971-2020

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 ANDREW J. MCCOLLIN                    :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1199 MDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 29, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-06-CR-0004595-2019

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 ANDREW J MCCOLLIN                     :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 1200 MDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 29, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-06-CR-0004596-2019
J-S24022-23

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                       FILED: NOVEMBER 7, 2023

       Andrew J. McCollin appeals from the judgments of sentence, entered in

the Court of Common Pleas in Berks County, after a jury convicted him in a

consolidated trial1 of one count each of aggravated indecent assault of a child2

and aggravated indecent assault,3 and three counts each of endangering the

welfare of children (EWOC),4 institutional sexual assault in child care,5

indecent assault,6 and corruption of minors.7 After review, we affirm.

       This case stems from sexual assault allegations made by three pre-

school-aged boys (collectively, Children) against McCollin, the assistant

director of a daycare center that the boys attended.        The daycare center,

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Dockets CP-06-CR-0004595-2019 (No. 4595-2019), CP-06-CR-0004596-
2019 (No. 4596-2019), CP-06-CR-0002971-2020 (No. 2971-2020). McCollin
has complied with the dictates of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969
(Pa. 2018), by filing separate notices of appeal for each trial court docket
number. See id. at 971 (holding “where a single order resolves issues arising
on more than one docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed for each of
those cases”).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(b).

3 Id. at § 3125(a)(7).

4 Id. at § 4304(a)(1).

5 Id. at § 3124.2(a.3).

6 Id. at § 3126(a)(7).

7 Id. at § 6301(a)(1)(ii).

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Bright Horizons Daycare Center Creative Learning Center (Bright Horizons), is

located in in Bern Township. McCollin served as the assistant director of Bright

Horizons in 2018 and 2019. During that time, McCollin would often supervise,

alone, naptime in classrooms so that the teachers could take breaks.

       Beginning in August of 2019, three children disclosed that McCollin had

touched them inappropriately. N.G. (born 1/2015),8 was the first to disclose

McCollin’s assault and testified that, when he was four years old, McCollin

touched his penis under his clothes in a back-and-forth manner, as well as his

butt, a “couple of times,” during naptime. N.T. Jury Trial, 9/21/21, at 87-90.

C.C. (born 7/2014),9 was the second child to disclose inappropriate touching

by McCollin, and testified that when he was four years old, McCollin touched

his penis under his clothes, on more than one occasion, during naptime. Id.,

9/22/21, at 227. N.H. (born 12/2014),10 was the third child to disclose and

he testified that when he attended Bright Horizons, McCollin rubbed his

backside and touched his penis both over and under his clothes, one time,

during naptime. Id. at 150-54, 160.

       On August 23, 2019, N.G. disclosed the sexual assault incidents to his

mother, B.G., while the family was shopping for back-to-school items. Id.,

9/21/21, at 93. N.G. informed B.G. and her husband that “Andrew [McCollin]

____________________________________________

8 No. 4596-2019.

9 No. 4595-2019.

10 No. 2971-2020.

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touched my peener” during naptime. Id. Upon returning home, B.G. asked

N.G. to tell her again what happened at school that day; N.G. again reported

that “Mr. Andrew touched [my] peener” during naptime. Id. at 94.

       The same day N.G. told his mother, B.G. called Bright Horizon’s school

director, Erin Harner. Id. at 90, 93-94. Harner then contacted her supervisor,

Bright Horizon’s regional manager, Kaitlin Martin. On August 24, 2019, Martin

informed McCollin that there was an incident and that he was being placed on

administrative leave. Id. at 77-78; id., 9/22/21, at 216-18. K.S., N.G.’s

classroom teacher, testified that on August 23, 2019, she had been the only

teacher in the classroom. During naptime, she moved N.G. to a different cot

away from most of the other children because he was talking. Id., 9/22/21,

at 137-38. K.S. then left the room for approximately thirty minutes while

McCollin supervised the classroom naptime.        Id. at 138-39.    When K.S.

returned to the classroom, she observed McCollin standing near N.G.’s cot.

Id. at 139-40.

       Following his disclosure, N.G. was interviewed by staff at the Children’s

Alliance Center of Berks County (CAC), a service of the Berks County District

Attorney’s office that interviews and supports child victims of sexual abuse.11

Id., 9/21/21, at 104-07. A report of N.G.’s interview was provided to law

enforcement and Corporal Detective Heather Calabria of the Berks County

____________________________________________

11   Children’s Alliance Center of Berks County, County of Berks,
https://www.countyofberks.com/departments/da/children-s-alliance-center
(last visited Oct. 12, 2023).

                                           -4-
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District Attorney’s Office contacted McCollin to ask if he would be willing to

speak with her. McCollin agreed and met with Detective Calabria on August

28, 2019. During the interview, McCollin initially denied the allegations, but

later admitted to touching N.G.’s penis underneath his clothes. McCollin also

admitted to inappropriately touching C.C. Id., 9/23/21, at 289-94. Based on

McCollin’s admission regarding a second victim, law enforcement and Berks

County Children and Youth Services (CYS) reached out to C.C.’s family.12 See

id., 9/22/21, at 237-38, 264.

       CAC staff interviewed C.C. on or about September 3, 2019. Initially,

C.C. did not disclose any sexual abuse. Id. at 238, 266. However, when C.C.

and his parents were leaving the CAC, C.C. asked why no one asked him

questions about McCollin.        C.C. then revealed to his parents that McCollin

touched his penis and anally penetrated him with his fingers. Id. at 238-39,

254. C.C.’s mother, W.C., testified that while the family was in the parking

lot following C.C.’s interview with the CAC, he informed her and her husband

that McCollin had “stuck his finger up [C.C.’s] butt” and that “it hurt.” Id. at

239.   C.C. stated to his parents that this happened “every naptime.”        Id.

C.C.’s father testified that C.C. told him that he “was strong” and “didn’t cry.”

Id. at 254. At that point, C.C.’s father told him that he did not have to be

strong and that he should “tell [his father] honestly what happened” when he

was ready. Id.
____________________________________________

12 Jennifer Hack, a CYS caseworker, initially met with C.C. and his family after

McCollin made his statement to Calabria.

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      C.C. was interviewed a second time at the CAC, this time by CYS

caseworker Hack, to whom he repeated the same information he told his

parents. Id. at 263-65, 267. Additionally, Renee Riddle, M.D., examined all

three minor victims, on behalf of the CAC, on separate occasions in September

or October 2019. Id. at 247-48. When C.C. was alone with Dr. Riddle, he

disclosed that “Mr. Andrew” was “touching his penis and butt” and told Dr.

Riddle that he experienced some pain and that the touching happened multiple

times during naptime.     Id. at 249.   C.C. also testified that one time in

particular, McCollin “stuck his finger in his butt” and C.C. saw “poop” on

McCollin’s finger when he removed it. Id. at 227-29.

      On August 30, 2019, Bright Horizons informed parents about the

allegations against McCollin. Following that relay of information, B.H. spoke

to her son, the third victim, N.H., to determine whether anything occurred

between N.H. and McCollin. See id. at 169. On September 2, 2019, while

N.H.’s mother was putting him to bed, N.H. asked his mother to rub his back.

When B.H. asked N.H. if anyone else rubbed his back, N.H. told her that

McCollin would rub his back. Id. at 162-64. N.H. then told B.H, that, during

naptime, McCollin would rub N.H.’s back under his shirt, rub his behind over

his shorts “a lot,” and “poked” his penis over his underwear. N.H. informed

B.H. that McCollin only touched his penis twice. Id. at 164-67. B.H. testified

that, after her initial conversation with N.H. about “Mr. Andrew,” she spoke to

him several more times about it, either when N.H. brought it up unprompted

or when she initiated further conversation about the touching. Id. at 168.

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       Following this disclosure, B.H. brought N.H. to law enforcement for a

forensic interview.     At the first interview in October of 2019, N.H. did not

disclose the assault to law enforcement. Id. at 185. Sometime in late fall of

2019, N.H. disclosed the assaults to his teacher, T.L. Id. at 258-60. T.L. was

reading a book to the class and teaching vocabulary words, including the word

“principal.”   T.L. asked the students if they knew the principal at Bright

Horizons, at which point the children identified “Ms. Erin,” the director of Bright

Horizons, and “Mr. Andrew,” identified by T.L. as McCollin.            N.H. then

announced to the entire class that McCollin touched his penis and his behind.

T.L. reported this disclosure and N.H. was interviewed by law enforcement a

second time in July 2020.           Id. at 185-86, 259-62.   During this second

interview, N.H. revealed that McCollin touched him on several occasions

during naptime, touching his penis under his clothes, and rubbing his back

and behind. Id. at 186-87. N.H. also identified McCollin in a picture provided

to him by law enforcement. Id. at 188.

       On May 25, 2021, prior to trial, the trial court held a hearing pursuant

to the Tender Years Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.1 (the Act),13 in response to

____________________________________________

13 The Tender Years Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:

   (a)    General rule. --

       (1) An out-of-court statement made by a child victim or witness,
       who at the time the statement was made was 16 years of age or
       younger, describing any of the offenses enumerated in paragraph
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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____________________________________________

       (2), not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is
       admissible in evidence in any criminal or civil proceeding if:

              (i) the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the
              evidence is relevant and that the time, content and
              circumstances of the statement provide sufficient
              indicia of reliability; and

              (ii) the child either:

                     (A) testifies at the proceeding; or

                     (B) is unavailable as a witness.

       (2) The following offenses under 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] (relating to
       crimes and offenses) shall apply to paragraph (1):
                                       ...
       Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses).
                                       ...
       Section 4304 (relating to [EWOC]), if the offense involved sexual
       contact with the victim.
       Section 6301(a)(1)(ii) (relating to corruption of minors).
                                       ...

   (a.1) Emotional distress. -- In order to make a finding under
   subsection (a)(1)(ii)(B) that the child is unavailable as a witness, the
   court must determine, based on evidence presented to it, that
   testimony by the child as a witness will result in the child suffering
   serious emotional distress that would substantially impair the child’s
   ability to reasonably communicate. In making this determination, the
   court may do all of the following:

       (1) Observe and question the child, either inside or outside the
       courtroom.

       (2) Hear testimony of a parent or custodian or any other person,
       such as a person who has dealt with the child in a medical or
       therapeutic setting.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -8-
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several motions filed by the Commonwealth. For each of the three dockets,

the Commonwealth filed notices of its intent to introduce out-of-court

statements made by the child victim. Subsequently, the Commonwealth filed

a motion under each docket requesting that the testimony of the three minor

victims be by closed circuit television pursuant to section 5985.     See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 5985. At the hearing, the Commonwealth presented each witness

it intended to call to testify pursuant to the Act. On May 27, 2021, following

the hearing, the trial court ordered that C.C.’s and N.H.’s testimony be made

pursuant to a contemporaneous alternative method, after concluding that

testifying in the defendant’s presence would cause the minor victims to suffer

____________________________________________

   (a.2) Counsel and confrontation. -- If the court hears testimony in
   connection with making a finding under subsection (a)(1)(ii)(B), all
   of the following apply:

       (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the defendant, the
       attorney for the defendant and the attorney for the
       Commonwealth or, in the case of a civil proceeding, the attorney
       for the plaintiff has the right to be present.

       (2) If the court observes or questions the child, the court shall
       not permit the defendant to be present.

   (b) Notice required. -- A statement otherwise admissible under
   subsection (a) shall not be received into evidence unless the
   proponent of the statement notifies the adverse party of the
   proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the particulars of
   the statement sufficiently in advance of the proceeding at which the
   proponent intends to offer the statement into evidence to provide the
   adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the
   statement.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.1.

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serious emotional distress and, thus, would impair their ability to reasonably

communicate.       See Trial Court Order, 5/27/21.   The trial court order also

allowed for the presentation of Tender Years testimony in each case,

permitting testimony of out of court statements made by Children to specific

persons. See Trial Court Order (II), 5/27/21. See also Trial Court Opinion,

12/16/22, at 6, 9.

       On September 23, 2021, at the conclusion of a three-day jury trial,

McCollin was convicted of the above-mentioned offenses. See N.T. Jury Trial,

9/23/21, at 405-10.         Sentencing was deferred to allow for the Sexual

Offenders Assessment Board (SOAB) to complete an evaluation. Id. at 413-

14. On March 29, 2022, the trial court held a hearing after which it found that

McCollin met the criteria to be classified as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP),

and, thus, was subject to the requirements of the Sexual Offender’s

Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).14 See N.T. Sentencing Hearing,

3/29/22, at 19. The trial court sentenced McCollin to an aggregate term of

34 to 68 years of incarceration, followed by 40 years of probation. Id. at 51.

       On April 6, 2022, McCollin timely filed post-sentence motions raising

weight and sufficiency of the evidence claims and seeking modification of his

sentence.     On August 2, 2022, following a hearing, the court denied the

motions. McCollin timely filed notices of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

____________________________________________

14 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.75 (Subchapter H).

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1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. McCollin raises

the following issues for our review:

       [1.] Did the lower court improperly allow remote audiovisual
       testimony from child-victim C.C., and hearsay-based evidence
       under the “tender years” exception, without which many of
       [McCollin’s] convictions, and all of [McCollin’s] convictions
       pertaining to C.C.’s docket, would have no evidentiary ground to
       stand on?

       [2.] Were [McCollin’s] convictions based on legally insufficient
       evidence, where (1), if the remote audiovisual testimony and
       “tender years” testimony regarding C.C. were improperly
       admitted, there were no other facts on record from which any
       offense against C.C. could be inferred; (2) [McCollin] was never
       identified by the victims in court as the perpetrator, and no
       evidence excluded the possibility of an alternative male
       perpetrator; and (3), even if [McCollin] was the male who touched
       the [C]hildren, he did not do so intentionally, or otherwise
       inappropriately, i.e. for sexual gratification or out of specifically
       prurient curiosity?

       [3.] Did the verdicts otherwise go against the weight of the
       evidence, given the unreliability of the [C]hildren’s testimony, the
       incredibility of the parents’ testimony, and the plausible
       exculpatory explanations offered by [McCollin]?

       [4.] Did the lower court abuse its discretion in imposing what
       was very nearly in practical effect a life sentence on [McCollin]
       where it noted only one adverse factor and failed to consider the
       [pre-sentence investigation] report15 and other mitigating
       circumstances such as [McCollin’s] lack of criminal history, his
       middle age and his favorable reputation in the community?

Appellant’s Brief, at 7-8.

____________________________________________

15 A review of the record suggests  there was no pre-sentence investigation
(PSI) report; there was, however, an SOAB report upon which the court made
an SVP determination.

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       As an initial matter, we note that an appellant must provide a complete

record for review. Moreover, this court is limited to considering only those

materials contained in the certified record on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1921.

See also Frank v. Frank, 587 A.2d 340, 342 n.5 (Pa. Super. 1991).

Recently, this Court stated:

       With regard to transcripts, our Rules of Appellate Procedure require an
       appellant to order and pay for any transcript necessary for resolution of
       the issues appellant raises on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a). When
       an appellant fails to adhere to the precepts of Rule 1911 and order all
       necessary transcripts, any claims that cannot be resolved in the absence
       of the necessary transcripts or transcripts must be deemed waived for
       the purpose of appellate review.

In the Interest of G.E.W., 233 A.3d 893, 899-900 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citations omitted).

       Here, a thorough review of the record of the three dockets indicates that

the May 25, 2021 pre-trial hearing, regarding the Commonwealth’s motions

to allow the minor victims to testify via remote video and to allow tender years

testimony for each of the victims, was never made part of the record.16

McCollin, as the appellant, was responsible for requesting the transcript.

Therefore, we are unable to conduct a meaningful review of McCollin’s first

claim pertaining to the minor victim C.C. We are also unable to meaningfully

____________________________________________

16 We note that a review of the court sheet from the hearing reflects that a

stenographer was present at the hearing, suggesting that the hearing could
have been transcribed upon a request from either counsel. See Interest of
G.E.W., supra; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a); Commonwealth v. Preston,
904 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“responsibility rests upon the appellant to
ensure that the record certified on appeal is complete”).

                                          - 12 -
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review the first part of McCollin’s second claim, that his conviction was based

on legally insufficient evidence in C.C.’s case, because the remote testimony

and tender years testimony were improperly admitted. Therefore, McCollin’s

claims as to improper allowance of remote testimony and tender years

testimony with respect to C.C. are waived.

      Though the first portion of McCollin’s second claim is waived, we are

able to address McCollin’s remaining argument of his second claim—that the

evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions.

      In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must

determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as verdict winner, together with all reasonable inferences

therefrom, the trier of fact could have found that each and every element of

the   crimes   charged   was    established   beyond    a   reasonable   doubt.

Commonwealth v. Randall, 758 A.2d 669, 674 (Pa. Super. 2000). “This

standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial

rather than direct so long as the combination of the evidence links the accused

to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Swerdlow,

636 A.2d 1173, 1176 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citation omitted).            See also

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 639 A.2d 9, 10-11 (Pa. 1994). Furthermore, “it

is within the province of the fact finder to determine the weight to be given to

the testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Moore, 648 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citations

omitted).   Moreover, the fact that the evidence establishing a defendant’s

                                     - 13 -
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participation in a crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where

the evidence, coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,

overcomes the presumption of innocence.        Commonwealth v. Stays, 40

A.3d 160, 167 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation and quotation omitted). Finally, we

may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as

the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s

crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the convictions will be upheld. Id.

      McCollin makes two sufficiency arguments: first, he argues that he was

never identified in court by Children as the perpetrator, and no evidence

excluded the possibility of an alternative male perpetrator; second, McCollin

claims that, even if he was the person who touched Children, he did not do so

intentionally or otherwise inappropriately.

      With regard to his first sufficiency claim, McCollin argues that there was

insufficient evidence to prove that he committed the alleged crimes against

the minor victims where his mere presence at or near the scene of a crime is

not sufficient to predicate a conviction.     Specifically, McCollin points to

testimony that he was in the classroom during naptime on the days of the

alleged assaults, but that none of the minor victims could identify him in court

as the person who assaulted them. Rather, they could only state that they

were touched by a “Mr. Andrew.” Appellant’s Brief, at 41-42. McCollin asserts

that Children could have been assaulted by an “unknown or little-known male

passing through the naptime area,” or some “unremembered male employee

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who sometimes interacted with the children.” Id. at 42. Finally, he supports

this claim with the fact that because Children were only four or five years old

at the time of the assaults, they could have misidentified the perpetrator by

mixing them up or confusing names and faces, particularly given the traumatic

nature of the assaults. Id. We find no merit to this claim.

      Instantly, there was additional circumstantial evidence, in the form of

testimony, identifying McCollin as the perpetrator. Erin Harner, the director

of Bright Horizons, testified that not only was McCollin often assisting in

classrooms during naptime, but he was also the only male teacher at Bright

Horizons. See N.T. Jury Trial, 9/21/21, at 74-75. The only other male Bright

Horizons’ employee, who was not named Andrew, never assisted in

classrooms and only interacted with the children in passing. Id. at 75. K.S.,

N.G.’s classroom teacher, testified that on the date N.G. reported the assault,

McCollin had been in the classroom alone with the children for approximately

thirty minutes and had been near N.G.’s sleep cot when K.S. returned to the

classroom.   See id., 9/22/21, at 137-40.     T.L., another teacher at Bright

Horizons, testified that the children would refer to McCollin as “Mr. Andrew,”

and that N.H. disclosed to the entire class, while T.L. was reading to the

children, that Mr. Andrew touched his penis during naptime. Id. at 259-62.

When N.H. was later interviewed by law enforcement, he identified McCollin

in a picture. Id. at 188. That picture was presented during trial. McCollin

himself admitted to touching N.G.’s penis under his clothes and identified C.C.

as another child he inappropriately touched, before law enforcement was

                                    - 15 -
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aware of C.C. as another potential victim. See id., 9/23/21, at 289-94. This

admission was recorded by law enforcement and shown to the jury at trial.

Id. at 293-96.

      We conclude that, considering all the evidence admitted at trial and

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the

jury reasonably could have found that the Commonwealth established McCollin

as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. Randall, supra. Thus, this

claim has no merit.

      Next, McCollin argues that even if he was the perpetrator, there is

insufficient evidence to prove that he touched the minor victims intentionally

or otherwise inappropriately. For the following reasons, this claim is waived.

      First, McCollin failed to raise this claim in his Rule 1925(b) statement.

It is well-settled that an appellant’s failure to include an issue in his Rule

1925(b) statement waives that issue for purposes of appellate review.

T.M.W. v. N.J.W., 227 A.3d 940, 947 (Pa. Super. 2020).

Moreover, McCollin does not specify which of his convictions require that the

touching be inappropriate, intentional, indecent, corrupting, or welfare-

endangering. See Appellant’s Brief, at 43. McCollin’s argument is also devoid

of citations to relevant case law, specific argument, or the record.       See

Pa.R.A.P. 2111, 2119.

      An appellant bears the burden of sufficiently developing his arguments

for appellate review. Commonwealth v. Armolt, 294 A.3d 364, 377 (Pa.

2023) (“Where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with

                                     - 16 -
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citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other

meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.        It is not the

obligation of an appellate court to formulate [an] appellant’s arguments for

him.”). Accordingly, this claim is waived.

       McCollin’s third claim is that his convictions are against the weight of

the evidence due to the overwhelming lack of credibility of the adult witnesses

and lack of reliability of the minor victim witnesses. 17

       McCollin highlights the fact that because the minor victims were so

young at the time of the alleged assaults and they did not testify until two

years after the incidents occurred, their memories may not have been

accurate, they may have been so traumatized that they were misled, and the

time between the assaults and the trial was enough for “false or distorted

memories” to replace the actual circumstances. Appellant’s Brief, at 46. In

addition, McCollin claims that Children’s parents’ testimony was “unnaturally

clean and seamless” with “airtight consistency” and they seemed to “parrot”

each other.     Id. at 47.     McCollin also notes that Children’s parents had a

financial interest in the outcome of the trial because they had pending civil

lawsuits against McCollin regarding the alleged assaults. Id. at 14, 17, 46.

Finally, McCollin argues that his in-court statements should be given greater

____________________________________________

17 McCollin raised the weight issue in his post-trial motions. Thus, he has
preserved it for appellate review. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607. We note that while
a court sheet states there was a hearing on the motions on July 18, 2022, and
that the matter was taken under advisement, no stenographer is listed on the
court sheet, nor was a transcript available for our review.

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weight than his “flustered misrepresentations during his interview” with law

enforcement. Id. at 47.

      When a defendant challenges the weight of the evidence, relief in the

form of a new trial may be granted only where the verdict shocks one’s sense

of justice. Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003)

(citations omitted). “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder

of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine

the credibility of the witnesses.     An appellate court cannot substitute its

judgment for that of the finder of fact.” Id. Moreover, in evaluating such a

claim, this Court reviews the trial court’s exercise of discretion in ruling on the

weight claim, not the underlying question of whether the verdict was against

the weight of the evidence. Id.

      A review of the evidence admitted at trial reveals that N.G. disclosed

the assault to his parents spontaneously, that McCollin, himself, pointed law

enforcement in the direction of C.C., prompting his disclosure, and that N.H.

also disclosed the details of McCollin’s actions without any leading questions

from his parents. N.H. also identified McCollin in a photo array during his

forensic interview, well before trial. See N.T. Jury Trial, 9/22/21, at 188.

      Instantly, the testimony by the minor victims at trial was consistent with

their initial disclosures to parents and law enforcement. Additionally, the jury

was able to view the recorded interviews of Children and weigh them against

their trial testimony. McCollin was able to cross-examine the witnesses and

highlight any inconsistencies between the initial disclosures and the testimony

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at trial. Furthermore, McCollin cross-examined Children’s parents about the

pending civil case and any ulterior motives the parents may have had to testify

against him. Finally, it is not the duty of either the trial court or this Court to

determine how much weight the jury gave to McCollin’s recorded out-of-court

statement to law enforcement versus his in-court statements. The jury was

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented against McCollin.

That the trial court determined the jury properly convicted McCollin is not so

contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. Thus, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant McCollin a new trial and

this claim fails. See Champney, supra.

      McCollin’s final claim is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. Such a claim is not appealable as of right; rather, a defendant’s

appeal is considered a petition for permission to appeal. Commonwealth v.

Williams, 562 A.2d 1385, 1386-87 (Pa. Super. 1989) (en banc). Before this

Court can address such a discretionary challenge, an appellant must invoke

this Court’s jurisdiction by: (1) filing a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly

preserving the issue at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify

sentence; (3) including in his brief a concise statement of reasons relied upon

for allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) raising a

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under

the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 337 (Pa.

Super. 2015). See also Pa.R.A.P. 902, 903; Pa.R.Crim.P. 720. The existence

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of a substantial question must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 1995).

      In this case, McCollin filed a post-sentence motion for reconsideration

of sentence, and a timely notice of appeal. McCollin has also included in his

brief a statement of reasons relied on for allowance of appeal from

discretionary aspects of sentence, pursuant to Rule 2119(f). See Appellant’s

Brief, at 22-23. Therefore, we now determine whether McCollin has raised a

substantial question for review.

      McCollin asserts that the trial court’s sentence was contrary to

fundamental norms, that the trial court failed to consider mitigating

circumstances,    that   the   trial   court    disregarded     McCollin’s   possible

rehabilitation and the nature and circumstances of the offenses, and that the

trial court failed discuss its rationale for McCollin’s sentence. See Appellant’s

Brief, at 22-23, 48-49. McCollin also argues that the court imposed “very

nearly[,] in practical effect[,] a life sentence.” Id. at 48.

      To demonstrate that a substantial sentencing question exists, a party

must articulate reasons why a particular sentence raises doubts that the trial

court did not properly consider the general guidelines provided by the

legislature.   Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 727 (Pa. Super.

2000).   More specifically, we have stated that “where a defendant merely

asserts that his sentence is inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or contrary

to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing scheme without

explaining how or why, we cannot determine whether he has raised a

                                       - 20 -
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substantial question.” Id. However, we have also held that if a trial court

fails to state its reasons for sentencing and that sentence deviates from the

guidelines, a substantial question exists. See Commonwealth v. Garcia-

Rivera, 983 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2009). As McCollin was sentenced

outside of the sentencing guidelines and he argues that the trial court failed

explain its rationale for his sentence, we will consider the merits of McCollin’s

claim.

      Our standard of review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is as

follows:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code, an appellate court must

vacate a sentence if the trial court erroneously applied the Sentencing

Guidelines, if the circumstances of the case cause the application of the

guidelines to be clearly unreasonable, or if the court sentenced outside the

guidelines in an unreasonable manner.         See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c).     In

reviewing the record on appeal from a discretionary aspect of sentence claim,

we consider:

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      (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
      and characteristics of the defendant.

      (2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
      defendant, including any presentence investigation.

      (3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

      (4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

Id. at § 9781(d).

      The sentencing court is permitted to deviate from the sentencing
      guidelines; however, the court must place on the record its
      reasons for the deviation. In sentencing outside of the guidelines,
      the court must demonstrate that it understands the sentencing
      guidelines ranges. Where the trial judge deviates from the
      sentencing guidelines . . . he must set forth on the record, at
      sentencing, in the defendant’s presence, the permissible range of
      sentences under the guidelines and, at least in summary form, the
      factual basis and specific reasons which compelled the court to
      deviate from the sentencing range.

Garcia-Rivera, 983 A.2d at 780 (internal citations omitted). See also 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).

      At sentencing, the court stated that it considered “all of the information

that was provided at [the] hearings.” N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 3/29/22, at

51. In addition, the court noted that sexual offenses against young children,

as in this case, “are particularly abhorrent.” Id. Although the court did not

specifically note each item it considered in fashioning McCollin’s sentence, we

take the term “all” to mean that the court considered the factors as required.

In its opinion, the trial court clarified that “all” encompassed “the facts of the

case, the sentencing guideline ranges, the arguments of counsel, the victim

impact testimony, and the allocution of [McCollin].”        Trial Court Opinion,

12/16/22, at 16. The court pointed to the fact that Children were in McCollin’s

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care at the time of the abuse, that Children were of a vulnerable age, and that

McCollin did not accept responsibility for his actions. See id. at 15.

       Further, in his brief, McCollin fails to provide any argument or analysis

as to how the sentence imposed is a de facto life sentence, whether each

sentence is excessive or if it is the consecutive imposition that renders the

sentence altogether excessive.18

       McCollin was sentenced to an aggregate term of 34 to 68 years’

imprisonment followed by 40 years’ probation. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing,

3/29/22, at 51-55.        McCollin had a prior record score of zero.     For his

convictions of aggravated indecent assault of a child,19 EWOC,20 indecent

assault of a minor under the age of thirteen,21 and institutional sexual assault

____________________________________________

18 We note that had McCollin provided argument, this claim, too, would fail.

This Court has not recognized a definitive length of imprisonment as a de facto
life sentence; however, we have rejected claims of de facto life sentences for
aggregate sentences of 35 to 70 years’ incarceration, similar to the instant
case. See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 224 A.3d 40, 46 (Pa. Super.
2019); see generally Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798 (Pa. Super.
2013).

19On Count 1 of No. 4595-2019, McCollin was sentenced to 120 to 240
months’ incarceration.

20 On Count 3 of No. 4595-2019, Count 1 of No. 4596-2019, and Count 1 of

No. 2971-2020, McCollin was sentenced to 60 to 120 months’ incarceration
for two counts and 42 to 84 months’ incarceration for one count.

21 On Count 5 of No. 4595-2019, Count 2 of No. 4596-2019, and Count 2 of

No. 2971-2020, McCollin was sentenced to 84 months’ probation for one count
and 42 to 84 months’ incarceration for two counts.

                                          - 23 -
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by a child care employee,22 McCollin’s sentence of incarceration fell above the

aggravated range, but within the statutory maximum. McCollin’s sentence of

probation for his convictions of corruption of minors23 goes above the

Sentencing Guidelines but, with no incarceration period, does not exceed the

statutory maximum.

       While McCollin’s sentence for each of his convictions, as stated above,

is outside the Sentencing Guidelines, each is within the statutory maximum

and less than the Commonwealth’s requested aggregate sentence of 54 to

108 years’ imprisonment.          See Trial Court Opinion, 12/16/22, at 15.   In

addition, the discretion to impose a sentence, concurrent or consecutive to

other sentences being imposed at the same time, lies within the sentencing

court. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1212 (Pa. Super.

2021).    Moreover, “[w]e will not disturb consecutive sentences unless the

aggregate sentence is grossly disparate to the defendant’s conduct, or

viscerally appear[s] as patently unreasonable.”        Id. (internal quotations

omitted).

       Our review of the sentencing transcript reveals the court did not simply

adopt the Commonwealth’s representations nor did it abuse its discretion in
____________________________________________

22 On Count 4 of No 4595-2019, Count 4 of No. 4596-2019, and Count 3 of

No. 2971-2020, McCollin was sentenced to 42 to 84 month’s incarceration for
two counts and 84 months’ probation for one count.

23 On Count 6 of No. 4595-2019, Count 3 of No. 4596-2019, and Count 4 of

No. 2971-2020, McCollin was sentenced to 84 months’ probation for two
counts and 60 months’ probation for one count.

                                          - 24 -
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sentencing McCollin. Rather, after the parties presented evidence and

argument, the trial court imposed a sentence individualized to McCollin, taking

into account the specifics of his crimes and all of the information provided to

the court.24 Accordingly, we can discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s

imposition of sentence.

       Judgments of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/7/2023

____________________________________________

24 We look with distaste upon a court’s cursory acknowledgement of “all of the

information” used to guide the imposition of a sentence. In particular,
sentencing outside the Sentencing Guidelines merits a full discussion of the
factors and reasons for the sentence imposed. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721.
Nevertheless, because the trial court stated that it considered all the
information, we do not find the court’s sentence unreasonable or a manifest
abuse of discretion so as to merit vacatur of the sentence imposed. See
Shugars, supra.

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