Court Opinion

ID: 9928192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:02:37.805915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:31.311422
License: Public Domain

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   GLEN S. v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION*
                  (AC 45655)
                       Suarez, Seeley and Norcott, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a guilty plea entered pursuant
   to North Carolina v. Alford (400 U.S. 25), of sexual assault in a cohabiting
   relationship, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial
   counsel had provided ineffective assistance by allowing him to enter a
   guilty plea while he was under the influence of prescription drugs that
   affected his ability to give a knowing and meaningful plea. At trial, when
   the petitioner’s counsel attempted to call his first witness, R, to testify
   as to the petitioner’s character for truthfulness, counsel for the respon-
   dent, the Commissioner of Correction, objected on the grounds of rele-
   vance. The court sustained the respondent’s relevancy objection. The
   petitioner’s habeas counsel never sought to recall R as a witness after
   the petitioner testified. The court rendered judgment denying the petition
   for habeas corpus and, thereafter, denied the petition for certification
   to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas
   court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification
   to appeal, the petitioner having failed to show that there was an issue
   that was debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could have
   resolved the issue in a different manner or that the question was adequate
   to deserve encouragement to proceed further: the habeas court properly
   determined that R’s testimony, when R had no connection with the
   plea hearing, was not relevant to the petitioner’s claim of ineffective
   assistance of counsel; moreover, at the time the petitioner’s counsel
   called R to testify, the petitioner had not himself testified and, thus, his
   veracity had not been challenged or impeached and extrinsic evidence
   of his character for truthfulness was immaterial.
       Argued October 5, 2023—officially released January 2, 2024

                             Procedural History

   Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Tolland and tried to the court, M. Murphy, J.; judgment
denying the petition; thereafter, the court, M. Murphy,
J., denied the petition for certification to appeal, and
the petitioner appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
  Vishal K. Garg, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(petitioner).
  Melissa E. Patterson, senior assistant state’s attor-
ney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt,
state’s attorney, and Donna Marie Fusco, assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
                           Opinion

   SUAREZ, J. The petitioner, Glen S., appeals following
the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from
the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims that
the court (1) abused its discretion in denying his petition
for certification to appeal and (2) improperly denied
his petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the
court erred in precluding evidence of his character for
truthfulness.1 We dismiss the appeal.
  The following procedural history is relevant to this
appeal. The petitioner was charged with one count of
sexual assault in a cohabitating relationship in violation
of General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-70b (b)2 and
one count of assault in the third degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-61. The charges resulted from a
complaint by the petitioner’s girlfriend, who alleged
that the petitioner wanted her to ingest an antipsychotic
medication known as Seroquel, and, when she refused,
he struck her numerous times with his fist, ordered her
to bathe while he watched, and forced her to engage
in penile-vaginal intercourse. Attorney TaShun Lake
represented the petitioner at all relevant times in the
underlying proceedings.
   On August 13, 2008, the petitioner pleaded guilty,
under the Alford doctrine,3 to one count of sexual
assault in a cohabitating relationship in violation of
General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 53a-70b (b). The court,
Fasano, J., canvassed the petitioner when he entered
his plea and accepted the plea after finding that it was
made knowingly and voluntarily. On that same day, the
petitioner was sentenced by the court pursuant to an
agreed upon recommendation to serve a total effective
sentence of fifteen years of incarceration, suspended
after five years, followed by fifteen years of probation.
   On June 26, 2017, the petitioner initiated the present
habeas petition. On December 28, 2021, the petitioner’s
habeas counsel filed an amended petition on the peti-
tioner’s behalf. In the December 28, 2021 amended peti-
tion, the petitioner claimed that his trial counsel was
ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty while under
the influence of prescription drugs that affected his
ability to give a knowing and meaningful plea. The peti-
tioner further alleged that, but for trial counsel’s ineffec-
tive assistance, he would have gone to trial and been
acquitted of all charges. On January 3, 2022, the respon-
dent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a return,
leaving the petitioner to his proof and asserting proce-
dural default as a special defense.
  On January 19, 2022, a trial was held before the court,
M. Murphy, J., at which the petitioner attempted to
call his first witness, Sam Romowi,4 to testify regarding
his character for truthfulness. The respondent objected
to Romowi’s testimony on the grounds of relevance.
After hearing arguments by counsel, the court sustained
the respondent’s relevancy objection. Thereafter, only
the petitioner testified at the trial. The evidence before
the court consisted only of the petitioner’s testimony
and the transcript of the August 13, 2008 plea hearing.
Following the trial, both parties submitted posttrial
briefs.
    On May 18, 2022, in a memorandum of decision, the
court denied the petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. The court concluded that ‘‘the petitioner failed
to demonstrate deficient performance by showing that
trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.’’ The court found that
‘‘[t]he evidence presented failed to prove that the pre-
scribed medication the petitioner received affected his
ability to give a knowing and meaningful plea and that
counsel was therefore ineffective in allowing the peti-
tioner to plead guilty. Furthermore, even if counsel’s
performance was deficient, this court does not find the
petitioner’s testimony that he would have otherwise
pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial to be
credible.’’ The habeas court further found that ‘‘the trial
court thoroughly canvassed the petitioner when he
entered his plea. When the court asked the petitioner
if he was presently under the influence of any sub-
stance, the petitioner responded that he was on medica-
tion but that it would not interfere with his plea, and
that he understood the proceedings and knew what
he was doing despite taking the medication. . . . The
petitioner then informed the court that the charges he
faced carried a maximum sentence of twenty years and
indicated the corrections he wished to be made to the
state’s recitation of facts. The petitioner also provided
specific details about another case, informing the court
that he also had to plead guilty to a violation of proba-
tion . . . .’’
   Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for certifica-
tion to appeal, which the court denied. In the petition
for certification to appeal, the petitioner set forth the
grounds for his appeal, including the issue of whether
the court erred by precluding his character witness from
testifying.5 This appeal followed. Additional procedural
history will be provided as necessary.
                              I
   We first address the petitioner’s claim that the habeas
court abused its discretion in denying his petition for
certification to appeal. We conclude that the habeas
court’s ruling did not constitute an abuse of its discre-
tion.
   The following legal principles are relevant to our
resolution of the petitioner’s claim. ‘‘General Statutes
§ 52-470 (g) provides: No appeal from the judgment
rendered in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by or
on behalf of a person who has been convicted of a
crime in order to obtain such person’s release may be
taken unless the appellant, within ten days after the
case is decided, petitions the judge before whom the
case was tried or, if such judge is unavailable, a judge
of the Superior Court designated by the Chief Court
Administrator, to certify that a question is involved in
the decision which ought to be reviewed by the court
having jurisdiction and the judge so certifies.
  ‘‘Faced with the habeas court’s denial of certification
to appeal, a petitioner’s first burden is to demonstrate
that the habeas court’s ruling constituted an abuse of
discretion. . . . A petitioner may establish an abuse of
discretion by demonstrating that the issues are debat-
able among jurists of reason . . . [the] court could
resolve the issues [in a different manner] . . . or . . .
the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further. . . . The required determination
may be made on the basis of the record before the
habeas court and applicable legal principles. . . . If
the petitioner succeeds in surmounting that hurdle, the
petitioner must then demonstrate that the judgment of
the habeas court should be reversed on its merits. . . .
   ‘‘In determining whether the habeas court abused
its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for
certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of
the petitioner’s underlying [claim] to determine whether
the habeas court reasonably determined that the peti-
tioner’s appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review
the petitioner’s substantive [claim] for the purpose of
ascertaining whether [that claim satisfies] one or more
of the three criteria . . . adopted by [our Supreme
Court] for determining the propriety of the habeas
court’s denial of the petition for certification.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ayuso
v. Commissioner of Correction, 215 Conn. App. 322,
331–32, 282 A.3d 983, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 967, 285
A.3d 736 (2022).
   For the reasons set forth in part II of this opinion,
we conclude, on the basis of our review of the record
and applicable legal principles, that the petitioner has
failed to demonstrate that the claim of error related to
the habeas court’s denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus involves an issue that is debatable among
jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issue
in a different manner, or that the question is adequate
to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Accord-
ingly, we dismiss the appeal.
                            II
   On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
improperly precluded evidence of his character for
truthfulness. Specifically, he claims that the court
abused its discretion by excluding Romowi’s testimony
on relevancy grounds because that testimony was rele-
vant to a central issue in the petitioner’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. The petitioner argues that
his credibility was relevant because it pertains to the
prejudice prong under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).6
The petitioner avers that the court’s assessment of the
prejudice prong of Strickland involves a credibility
determination regarding his assertion that he would
have insisted on going to trial but for his trial counsel’s
deficient performance in connection with his plea. We
are not persuaded.
   The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to the present claim. At the outset of the habeas
trial and before the petitioner was called to testify, the
petitioner’s attorney sought to present testimony from
Romowi about the petitioner’s alleged character for
truthfulness and honesty. The following colloquy
between the court, the petitioner’s counsel, and the
respondent’s counsel took place:
  ‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Petitioner calls Mr. Sam
Romowi . . . .
  ‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: Your Honor . . . I
would ask for [an] offer of proof on this witness. We’re
here on [an] ineffective assistance of counsel claim. I’m
unclear as to what Mr. Romowi would be testifying to
or what his relevance would be to this [claim] . . . .
   ‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: Mr. Romowi is a . . .
friend of [the petitioner]. He’s going to testify solely as
a character witness as to my client. A lot of this comes
down to my client’s credibility versus [the] credibility
of his attorney. It’s . . . how the judge perceives him
as to be truthful and honest, I think it would be relevant
to that because Mr. Romowi is a character witness, and
so I think it is relevant to this case. . . .
   ‘‘[The Respondent’s Counsel]: Again, Your Honor,
we’re here on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
I’m unsure of what relevance this would have. Unless
Mr. Romowi is going to testify to being present at the
[plea] hearing . . . on the August [13] date, I see no
real relevance . . . as to having this other character
witness. Again, this is . . . an ineffective assistance [of
counsel] claiming at the time of the plea, [the petitioner]
was under the influence of prescription medication.
This has nothing to do with his character or anything
of the sort, so, I’m not sure what relevance this witness
could have. Nor do I see it adding anything to the trier
of fact.
  ‘‘The Court: So, [Counsel], was Mr. Romowi . . . at
the hearing on August 13?
  ‘‘[The Petitioner’s Counsel]: No. I do not believe he
was, Your Honor. . . . [H]e’s a friend of the petitioner.
He’s known him for a while and they still remain in
contact, and he would be testifying solely as to the
[petitioner’s] character. It wouldn’t be a long witness
but, again, I think honesty is a character issue that he
would be testifying about because truly it is really the
truthfulness, and the honesty of my client versus the
honesty . . . of his attorney.
  ‘‘The Court: All right. So, I’m going to sustain the
objection. I don’t see his relevance. You’re not telling
me that he knows the attorney or was at the [plea]
hearing. So, I’m going to sustain the objection with
regard to the testimony of Mr. Romowi. So, I don’t think
we need to hear from him.’’
   We begin by setting forth the following relevant legal
principles. ‘‘We review the [habeas] court’s decision to
admit [or exclude] evidence, if premised on a correct
view of the law . . . for an abuse of discretion. . . .
We will make every reasonable presumption in favor
of upholding the [habeas] court’s ruling, and only upset
it for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . The [habeas]
court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy
[and admissibility] of evidence . . . . In order to estab-
lish reversible error on an evidentiary impropriety . . .
the [petitioner] must prove both an abuse of discretion
and a harm that resulted from such abuse. . . .
   ‘‘Relevant evidence means evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is material
to the determination of the proceeding more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Conn. Code Evid. § 4-1. As it is used in our code, rele-
vance encompasses two distinct concepts, namely, pro-
bative value and materiality. . . . Conceptually rele-
vance addresses whether the evidence makes the
existence of a fact material to the determination of
the proceeding more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence. . . . In contrast, mate-
riality turns upon what is at issue in the case, which
generally will be determined by the pleadings and the
applicable substantive law. . . . If evidence is relevant
and material, then it may be admissible.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ayuso v. Com-
missioner of Correction, supra, 215 Conn. App. 381–82.
   ‘‘Relevance does not exist in a vacuum. . . . To
determine whether a fact is material . . . it is neces-
sary to examine the issues in the case, as defined by the
underlying substantive law, the pleadings, applicable
pretrial orders, and events that develop during the trial.
Thus, relevance of an offer of evidence must be assessed
against the elements of the cause of action, crime, or
defenses at issue in the trial. The connection to an
element need not be direct, so long as it exists. Once
a witness has testified to certain facts, for example,
his credibility is a fact that is of consequence to [or
material to] the determination of the action, and evi-
dence relating to his credibility is therefore relevant—
but only if the facts to which the witness has already
testified are themselves relevant to . . . [a] cause of
action, or [a] defense in the case.’’ (Emphasis altered;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Ulanoff v. Becker
Salon, LLC, 208 Conn. App. 1, 13, 262 A.3d 863 (2021).
   As stated by this court in Ulanoff, a witness’ credibil-
ity becomes relevant only after they have testified to
facts that are connected to an element of the cause of
action, the crime, or a defense. In the present case, the
record reflects that the petitioner called Romowi to
testify at the outset of the trial before the petitioner
had taken the stand and testified to any fact whatsoever.
The petitioner’s veracity had not yet been challenged,
and, therefore, any extrinsic evidence of his character
for truthfulness was immaterial at the time he attempted
to call Romowi. Although the petitioner subsequently
testified, habeas counsel never sought to recall Romowi
as a witness.7
  The petitioner’s credibility was not materially rele-
vant to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the
time that he attempted to present Romowi’s testimony.
Accordingly, the petitioner is unable to demonstrate
that the court abused its discretion in precluding
Romowi from testifying with respect to the petitioner’s
character for truthfulness.
   The appeal is dismissed.
   In this opinion the other judges concurred.
   * In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of sexual abuse, we decline to identify the victim or others through
whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
   1
     In his appellate brief before this court, the petitioner also argues that,
at the time he attempted to present testimony from his character witness,
his character for truthfulness had been impeached in that the record before
the court reflected that he had a prior felony conviction. The petitioner also
makes other arguments in support of the admissibility of his character
witness. Specifically, he claims that an exception to § 6-6 (a) of the Connecti-
cut Code of Evidence for when a witness is a ‘‘stranger’’ applies. Moreover,
the petitioner invites us to abandon the ‘‘impeachment first’’ rule of evidence
as outlined in § 6-6 (a) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. These arguments
were not raised before the habeas court and, therefore, because they were
not part of the petitioner’s theory of admissibility at trial, they cannot be
considered on appeal. ‘‘The theory of admissibility is germane to our consid-
eration of whether the court properly exercised its discretion to exclude
the proffered testimony on the basis of a correct view of the law. An appellant
who challenges on appeal a trial court’s exclusion of evidence is limited to
the theory of admissibility that was raised before and ruled upon by the
trial court. A court cannot be said to have refused improperly to admit
evidence during a trial if the specific grounds for admission on which the
proponent relies never were presented to the court when the evidence was
offered. . . . Error does not lie in the exclusion of evidence claimed on an
inadmissible ground even though it might have been admissible had it been
claimed on another and different ground [at trial].’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Fernando V., 170 Conn. App. 44, 62, 153 A.3d 701 (2016),
aff’d, 331 Conn. 201, 202 A.3d 350 (2019). Thus, we decline to review the
petitioner’s additional admissibility arguments because they are unpre-
served.
   2
     On July 9, 2019, § 53a-70b was repealed by Public Acts 2019, No. 19-189,
§ 44, effective October 1, 2019.
   3
     ‘‘Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed.
2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt, but
consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of proceed-
ing to trial. . . . A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is a judicial oxymo-
ron in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the
state’s evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the
entry of a guilty plea nevertheless. . . . The entry of a guilty plea under
the Alford doctrine carries the same consequences as a standard plea of
guilty.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 204–205, 842
A.2d 567 (2004).
   4
     The habeas trial transcript contains multiple spelling variations of
Romowi’s last name. In this opinion we will use the spelling ‘‘Romowi’’
when referring to the petitioner’s proposed character witness.
   5
     In his petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner set forth the
following grounds for his appeal: ‘‘(1) Whether the petitioner has a legal right
to call character witnesses on his own behalf? (2) Whether the petitioner
has a legal right to call a character witness to testify as to whether the
petitioner was honest, credible, and trustworthy, when the petitioner’s hon-
esty and credibility are [issues] in the case? (3) Whether the habeas court
erred when it failed to allow a character witness [to] testify as to the
character of the petitioner? (4) Whether the habeas court erred when it
failed to allow a character witness to testify as to whether the petitioner
was honest and trustworthy, when the truthfulness of the petitioner was
an issue in the case? (5) Whether the habeas court erred when it failed to
credit the petitioner’s testimony as to how the medication affected his ability
to understand his plea agreement? (6) Whether the habeas court erred when
it credited the testimony of Attorney Lake when Attorney Lake did not
testify in this trial? (7) Whether the habeas court wrongfully found the
petitioner’s testimony not credible?’’ And ‘‘(8) [a]ny other issues found on
appeal . . . .’’ On appeal, the petitioner is claiming only that the court erred
in precluding his character witness from testifying.
   6
     ‘‘[I]n order to satisfy the prejudice requirement [under Strickland when
the conviction resulted from a guilty plea], the defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. . . . It
is clear enough that a defendant must make more than a bare allegation
that he would have pleaded differently and gone to trial . . . but it is not
clear how much more is required of him.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction, 144 Conn.
App. 461, 472–73, 72 A.3d 426 (2013), appeal dismissed, 317 Conn. 594, 119
A.3d 1153 (2015).
   7
     We note that, even if the petitioner had testified to material facts in
connection with his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel before calling
his character witness, extrinsic evidence of his character for truthfulness
would have been admissible only if he had been impeached. Section 6-6 (a)
of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: ‘‘The credibility of a witness
may be impeached or supported by evidence of character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness in the form of opinion or reputation. Evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthful-
ness has been impeached.’’ Moreover, this court has previously stated that,
‘‘[w]here a witness has not been impeached, it is not in general permissible
to support his testimony by other evidence, corroborative in its nature,
which bears on the credibility of the witness rather than on the issues in
the cause . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Suckley, 26
Conn. App. 65, 72, 597 A.2d 1285, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 600 A.2d 1028
(1991). See E. Prescott, Tait’s Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (6th Ed.
2019) § 6.23.2 (a), p. 370 (‘‘[e]vidence accrediting or supporting a witness’s
honesty or integrity is not admissible until after the witness’s credibility
has first been attacked’’).