Court Opinion

ID: 9627663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:49:53.964827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:12.290457
License: Public Domain

McDEVITT, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case because I believe that its facile deference to the Industrial Commission vitiates the function of appellate review. Our purpose in reviewing this case is to ascertain whether there is substantial and competent evidence in the record to sustain the Industrial Commission’s decision, in order to ensure that the appellant’s case is not decided on the arbitrary basis of passion and prejudice. The majority upholds a conclusion that was reached by the Industrial Commission in some fashion not discernible from the record.
Appellant was examined by a medical panel in the course of the evaluation of his Worker’s Compensation claim. That panel of physicians rated his disability at 35% of the whole man. Appellant’s personal physician generally concurred in that estimation.
At the first Industrial Commission hearing, that rating was accepted. Thus, appellant was rated with a 35% medical disability. The remaining factors leading to the total permanent disability rating were non-medical, and comprised the Commission’s conclusion that employment opportunities for persons with appellant’s degree of disability were severely limited due to economic circumstances in his area. The evidence at the first Industrial Commission hearing established that appellant could work, but would need to spend his working day alternately sitting, standing and lying down. The Commission found that anyone employing appellant would have to make significant accommodations for appellant’s *849disability, putting appellant “at a serious competitive disadvantage for the few sedentary jobs which he might otherwise perform.” Since respondent was unable to show to the Commission’s satisfaction that appellant in his present physical condition was employable within a reasonable distance from his home, appellant was classified as an odd-lot worker and awarded total permanent disability payments.
Respondent subsequently renewed inquiry into appellant’s physical condition. Investigators produced photographs and videotapes of appellant’s participation in a roofing project on his brother’s house. These photographs and videotapes recorded intermittent portions of appellant’s activities over the period of several days.
Respondent filed a timely petition for re-hearing, and a motion requesting that the award be set aside or modified to correct a manifest injustice under I.C. § 72-719. The Industrial Commission agreed to review the new evidence, which consisted of the photographic, documentary, and testimonial evidence of the investigators, and testimony about appellant’s employability in the job market where appellant resides. The Commission modified its original award, finding that appellant’s activities were inconsistent with categorization as an odd-lot worker. The Commission reduced the award of compensation to 55% total disability.
The amount of disability based on medical factors remained unchanged at 35%, and appellant was awarded an additional 20% disability based on non-medical factors, i.e. the disadvantage created by his disability in competing for scarce employment in the area where he resides.
Appellant argues that the Commission’s second decision was not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
To uphold the Commission’s revised award this Court must find that as a matter of law the evidence supporting the decision was substantial and competent. Lopez v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 107 Idaho 590, 691 P.2d 1205 (1984). In order to make this evaluation, it is first necessary to determine what evidence the Commission considered when it deviated from appellant’s first disability rating. The Commission stated in Conclusion of Law IV that it was modifying the original award on the ground of manifest injustice based on “the additional evidence received by the Commission” at the second hearing. Therefore, this Court should review only the evidence presented at the second hearing to determine whether it was sufficient to justify modification of the original award.
Appellant was originally classified as an odd-lot worker as a result of the first hearing. The odd-lot worker category is defined in Idaho case law:
“An employee who is so injured that he can perform no services other than those which are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist, may well be classified as disabled.” While they are physically able to perform some work, they are so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well known branch of the labor market— absent a business boom, the sympathy of a particular employer or friends, or a superhuman effort on their part.
Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dep’t, 107 Idaho 109, 112, 686 P.2d 54, 57 (1984) (citations omitted).
The evidence presented by respondent in support of modification at the second hearing consisted primarily of photographs, videotapes, written reports and testimony concerning the observations of respondent’s investigators of appellant’s participation in a roofing project. This evidence is said to have established that appellant had engaged in roofing activity over the course of several days for “significant periods of time.” It does not appear from the record, however, that appellant was ever observed working for more than one hour at a time. There was also evidence presented that appellant drove a car for two and a half hours, stopping occasionally. The longest continuous driving time was one hour and five minutes.
In addition, two investigators were each asked in the course of their testimony the *850single question of whether they observed the appellant exhibiting any signs of pain during the roofing activity from their point of observation across the street from appellant. Both answered in the negative. This testimony was elicited without any foundation or elaboration.
One witness, Bovino, also testified as to employment opportunities available to appellant. However, he acknowledged that his opinion was based solely on the testimony received by the Commission from an employment expert at the first hearing, and thus must be disregarded for the purposes of examining the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the second hearing.
Most of the evidence presented by the investigators is not inconsistent with appellant’s status as an odd-lot worker. It was never disputed at the first hearing that appellant is capable of labor, even physical labor, for short periods of time. The substance of appellant’s medical disability is the pain which such activity leads to, and the resulting need to rest in between periods of work. Appellant’s odd-lot categorization is based on the fact that employers in an area of fierce competition for employment are unlikely to go out of their way to accommodate appellant’s needs. The fact that appellant has been proven capable of working up to an hour at a time does not suffice to overcome his odd-lot categorization.
The key to appellant’s disability is the pain that he suffers as a result of extended activity. Therefore, the investigators' testimony that they did not see evidence of pain during appellant’s roofing activity might be sufficient to warrant a modification of the original award. That testimony however, was without any foundation. The investigators simply made the bald assertion that from their observation point some distance from appellant they did not witness any evidence of pain on appellant’s part and said nothing more on the issue. This cannot be considered to be substantial, competent evidence, particularly since the Commission evidently did not consider this evidence sufficient to alter the percentage of appellant’s medical disability rating. As that medical rating was not changed, we must assume that the reason for the change relates to the non-medical factors, the employability of appellant in the area where he resides. No new evidence whatsoever was received on this point.
In short, the evidence presented in the second hearing before the Industrial Commission was not inconsistent with the evidence presented in the first hearing. The evidence going to appellant’s pain at the second hearing was not substantial enough to justify overturning appellant’s classification as an odd-lot worker.
The majority opinion seemingly assumes that the Commission reviewed the case de novo, but this cannot be determined from the record. The Commission expressly stated that the modification was based on the new evidence alone, but even assuming that there is ambiguity in the record, the case should be remanded for clarification as to the basis for the Commission’s actions. This Court is not empowered to assume matters not reflected in the record. The prior opinion issued in this case, upon which the majority relies, cursorily recites the “substantial and competent evidence” standard of review, but does not elaborate on what relevant evidence it considers sufficient to uphold the modification of the award. Instead, it cites testimony to the effect that appellant was not enthusiastic about the vocational training program. Although he participated as required by the Worker’s Compensation system, the opinion notes that the appellant was “unrealistic and disinterested in completing the program.”
I note that this Court’s longstanding policy is to afford Worker’s Compensation law a broad and liberal construction, resolving doubtful cases in favor of compensation. Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9, 13, 644 P.2d 331, 335 (1982), quoting Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 26, 170 P.2d 404, 406 (1946). I do not believe that this policy is consistent with the majority’s decision to castigate appellant for his lack of enthusiasm. Worker’s Compensation law does not require enthusiastic compliance with its programs, nor are workers required to overcome the natural discouragement which results from sudden and severe disablement.
*851APPENDIX A
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