Court Opinion

ID: 9758590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:37:30.667641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:06.647605
License: Public Domain

VAN der VOORT, Judge,
dissenting:
On August 13 and 15, 1974, complaints were filed against appellant Larry Walburn, charging him with various narcotics violations, with unsworn falsification, and with violations of the Uniform Firearms Act. On March 3, 1975 (more than 180 days after filing of the complaints) appellant filed a petition with the lower court to dismiss the indictment under Rule 1100 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. This petition was denied by the lower court on March 11, 1975,1 and appellant’s case proceeded to trial the same day. After three witnesses testified, appellant, on the advice of counsel pursuant to plea bargaining, changed his plea to guilty. Appellant was then sentenced to a term of three to *466seven years imprisonment for possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or deliver, and to lesser terms (running concurrently) on the other offenses. No direct appeal was taken, and no attempt was made to withdraw the guilty plea, although appellant specifically requested, by letter dated March 19, 1975, that his attorney take some further action on the Rule 1100 issue. By letters dated March 24, 1975, and May 9, 1975, appellant’s trial counsel informed appellant that no grounds existed for an appeal, and that counsel would not file “a useless and ridiculous appeal.” After obtaining new counsel, appellant filed a petition under the Post Conviction Hearing Act, challenging the validity of his guilty plea and raising the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.2 A hearing was held on the petition on September 16, 1975, and relief was denied by Order dated April 6, 1976. Appeal was taken to our Court from the Order of April 6, 1976. In this appeal, one of appellant’s arguments is that the conduct of his trial counsel in advising him to plead guilty and in failing to pursue the Rule 1100 issue constituted a denial of his constitutional right to representation by competent counsel. I agree.
At the PCHA hearing of September 16, 1975, appellant’s trial counsel testified that appellant had asked him to file an appeal based on the Commonwealth’s failure to try appellant within 180 days, but that counsel had felt that an appeal based on the 180 day rule would be unsuccessful because of the Ingram case.3 No other explanation was given by trial counsel for his advice that appellant plead guilty or for his failure to pursue the Rule 1100 issue. In the Opinion and Order of Court filed after this hearing, the hearing judge simply stated that appellant’s guilty plea “negated Rule 1100’s basis for an appeal” and concluded that trial counsel had a reasonable basis for his actions. Rule 1100 clearly *467states that trial must commence within 180 days of the date the complaint is filed, and the rule clearly indicates that the effect of the Commonwealth’s failure to try a person within the prescribed period is the dismissal of the charges and the discharge of the defendant. No continuations or extensions of time were requested or granted in the case before us, and appellant clearly should have been brought to trial before March 11, 1975. Counsel had an opportunity at the PCHA hearing to explain his actions, but failed to adequately do so. Trial counsel’s advice that appellant plead guilty, and counsel’s failure to pursue the Rule 1100 issue, did not have any discernable strategic basis which might conceivably have furthered his client’s interests, Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967), and I must conclude that appellant was not effectively represented by counsel.4
I would reverse and discharge appellant.5
CERCONE, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Reasons for denying appellant’s petition for dismissal were stated by the trial judge on the record before the commencement of trial on March 11, 1975:
“It should be noted that the petition to suppress was filed on November 21, 1974, and that the hearing thereon was scheduled for November 27, 1974, the latter date being a Wednesday, and the following day was Thursday, November 28, 1974, which was Thanksgiving. The next regularly scheduled term of Court was to begin Monday, December 2, 1974, and the next regularly scheduled term of criminal court following the December 2, 1974 term is the present term of criminal court beginning on March 3, 1975, in which term of Court this case is set for trial.
“The Court feels that we had several complicated questions which were presented and included in the petition to suppress, and the Court believes that substantial justice would not be served by acting upon the issues presented in the petition to suppress without deliberation and research. Further, it should be noted, as has been indicated, this is only a thirty day period beyond the so-called 180 day rule, and we conclude that the defendant has not been prejudiced in any way regarding the small delay which has been occasioned, and therefore, the petition is denied. Exception noted.”

. Since appellant has adequately coupled his incompetency of counsel allegation with a challenge to the validity of the guilty plea, the issue is properly framed for our consideration. Commonwealth v. Bunch, 466 Pa. 22, 28, n. 6, 351 A.2d 284, 286-87, n. 6 (1976).

. Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974).

. Because of this finding, it is not necessary for us to examine the other issues raised by appellant.

. Since the lower court has already had an opportunity to consider this matter, it would be pointless for us to remand for an evidentiary hearing.