Court Opinion

ID: 9551042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:46:56.919321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:56.368555
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION OF
LEWIS, J.
In concurring in the affirmance of the judgment, I do so as to Specification No. 5 on the ground that defendant did not object to the proviso of Instruction No. 49 which informed the jury “that any verdicts of guilty must be in the same degree,” nor did defendant seek in Instruction No. 50 any direction that the jury might return verdicts of guilty in different degrees.
The colloquy in connection with Instruction No. 50, set out in pertinent part in the footnote,1 plainly shows that defendant’s whole request to the court was for amplification of the instruction with regard to acquittal. On that *180point there was no error for the reasons set out in the court’s opinion. Defendant did not seek to make it possible for the jury to bring in a verdict of second degree in his case irrespective of other verdicts, but on the contrary affirmed that if the jury “want to put it second * * * it is an acquittal.” There is no question before this court as to whether the jury should have been allowed leeway to bring in verdicts of guilty in different degrees.

 “THE COURT: The record will note that we are assembled in chambers. The defendants and their counsel are present. The jury has filed a question with the court as of 10:55 p.m. reading, ‘Some of the jurors are in doubt whether the 4 defendants have to have the same degree of guilt. Can one be 1st degree? Another be 2nd degree Inst: #49 2nd to last line?’ File this with the record.
“The Court intends to give them Instruction 50, reading, ‘In answer to your question “Can one be 1st degree, another be 2nd degree”, the reply is “no” ’.
“Any objection ?
“MR. GEORGE ST. SURE: I think there should be some amplification.
“MR. MIYASAKI [attorney for defendant-appellant]: But this does not preclude the finding of not guilty.
“THE COURT: My reaction was to include that. ‘By giving this instruction I do not mean to indicate’—
“MR. DE MELLO: But, your Honor, then we are going beyond the scope of the question.
“THE COURT: Yes, that is the trouble; it is going beyond the question. Do you object, Mr. Miyasaki?
“MR. MIYASAKI: Let me give you my mental processes why I am saying what I am, because to me it seems as though when they ask the *180question that they have, somebody, they feel, is guilty of a first degree and there is doubt that others are guilty of second and obviously they must be not guilty then, didn’t quite meet the requirements of first degree robbery.
“THE COURT: Any other objection?
“MB. MIYASAKI: And to merely say ‘no’ and to force that second degree to first by a misinterpretation here, it would be highly prejudicial, because this question, to answer ‘no’ will tend to make them do that. Let’s say you have somebody that would be beyond a reasonable doubt, let’s say, first degree, and those that they are thinking of a second degree must be acquitted in this case, because in their minds it hasn’t met the first degree test. That is the reason why they want to put it second. If so, it is an acquittal, and to say ‘no’ to that question would seem you were saying, because you say ‘no’ it should be forced to be put first degree. It should be forced to be an acquittal would be the fair thing to say.”