Court Opinion

ID: 9485994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:35:31.593084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:29.041380
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree that the judgment of the district court ought to be affirmed. I cannot agree, however, that this result ought to be grounded in this circuit’s political patronage eases. Rather, I believe that the appropriate course is to affirm the judgment on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983), and Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968).
As the panel majority points out, despite this court’s decision in Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir.1991), reh’g en banc denied, 938 F.2d 84 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1262, 117 L.Ed.2d 491 (1992), many communities in this Nation have recognized that politics and police work not only need not go hand in hand but ought not go hand in hand. As the panel majority also points out, this value judgment has, in many instances, been reflected in the law of the jurisdiction. In other instances, a nonpolitical police force may simply be a matter of custom and practice, still strong factors in local governance. On the record before us, there is, at the very minimum, a genuine issue of controverted fact as to whether Mr. Heideman was discharged because of either his political affiliation or his political activities. Indeed, the record reflects that he had engaged in those activities for quite a while without becoming the object of any adverse employment action. It is entirely possible that, in a state that protects most of its police officers from political retribution, local traditions of governance would render such action unlikely even though not protected by the statute. Therefore, even though under the present caselaw in this circuit it might have been possible to discharge Mr. Heideman for political activity, we can hardly assume, in assessing the correctness of a summary judgment, that such politically-based action took place. If, as well may have been the case, no such action was taken, we can hardly justify the action that was taken on that ground.
The record does show, however, that Mr. Heideman was discharged because his dis*665course on a matter of public interest degenerated into a disturbance of the peace for which he received, as my colleagues point out, a standard citation. While the content of most of Mr. Heideman’s speech may have been protected by the First Amendment, the governmental interest in discouraging bar room brawls by those sworn to protect the peace certainly outweighs that protection. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 142, 103 S.Ct. at 1687; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at 1734. The police department is not obligated constitutionally to retain an officer who engages in the sort of activity that the community expects the police to check.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court on this alternate basis because I believe that it is the ground supported by the record.