Court Opinion

ID: 9652879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:34:10.969691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:54.786045
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ROBERTS, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the Court’s opinion on the Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing. However, these are two additional grounds of error which require that this case be reversed.
I.
During the trial, the trial judge admonished the appellant’s counsel as follows:
“THE COURT: Counsel, I think it is highly improper of you to criticize the jury.
*880“MR. ZIMMERMANN: Your Honor, I object to the Court’s comments.
“THE COURT: I object to your manner of argument. You shouldn’t tell the jury they couldn’t have read the charge in an hour and a half. It was read to them. They didn’t have to read it again unless they wanted to—
“MR. ZIMMERMANN: I object to your comments, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: You’ve been objecting all through the trial. I object to your conduct, too.
“MR. ZIMMERMANN: I object to the Court attacking—
“THE COURT: Don’t hold it against the Defendant because Mr. Zimmermann gets out of the record. I’ve been trying to keep him in the record for years and haven’t had any success at it yet.
“MR. ZIMMERMANN: Your Honor, I would object to the entire line of comments by the Court.
“THE COURT: All right. Get on with your argument. I’m getting tired of listening to you.
“MR. ZIMMERMANN: Your Honor, I object to the comments. I would like a ruling on my objections.
“THE COURT: I overrule your objection.”
These judicial remarks do not constitute a comment on the weight of the evidence. See Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., Article 38.05. Rather, they comment on the behavior and tactics of appellant’s counsel. The proper scope of our inquiry should necessarily follow from the well established rule that although the trial judge can properly admonish counsel to conduct himself properly during the trial, this judicial power is subject to review when the comments are not necessary to control and conduct the trial. An abuse of discretion standard should be relied upon to guide us in this task, and when an abuse of discretion has resulted in prejudice to the accused, our task should be to reverse and remand for a new trial.
A review of prior cases involving judicial remarks which constituted a comment on defense counsel’s conduct and tactics reveals that the following have been significant factors in determining whether judicial comments were necessary to control and conduct the trial: (1) failure of defense counsel to observe prior rulings of the trial judge and/or rules of evidence, Williams v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 438, 220 S.W.2d 663 (1949); Fleck v. State, 380 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Cr.App.1964); Gaines v. State, 481 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Joshlin v. State, 488 S.W.2d 773 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); (2) failure of defense counsel to object to the trial judge’s comments, Fleck v. State, supra; Cartwright v. State, 426 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Cr.App.1968); Gaines v. State, supra; Joshlin v. State, supra; Banks v. State, 510 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); (3) the prejudicial nature of the comments, Reeves v. State, 118 Tex.Cr.App. 310, 40 S.W.2d 150 (1931); (4) whether the trial judge’s comments were justified by the record, Joshlin v. State, supra; and (5) whether the trial judge’s comments limited the defendant’s rights, Cartwright v. State, supra.
In the present case, we shall assume, without deciding, that the trial judge’s first comment — “Counsel, I think it is highly improper of you to criticize the jury” — was justified by the appellant’s criticism of the jury. Appellant, however, had every right to object to the trial judge’s reply. The trial judge, however, responded to appellant’s objection to his (the trial judge’s) comment. It was at this point that the trial judge began to abuse his discretion. The trial judge’s second comment — “I object to your manner of argument. You shouldn’t tell the jury . . . ” — was retaliatory in nature. The trial judge should have removed the jury before he continued his response to appellant’s objection.
Furthermore, appellant again properly objected. The trial judge again retaliated by stating that, “You’ve been objecting all through the trial. I object to your conduct, too.” This could not but convey an unfavorable impression to the jury.
*881Again the appellant objected, and again the trial judge commented in response to the appellant’s objection. This, the fourth comment by the judge in the colloquy, did instruct the jury not to hold counsel’s conduct against the appellant. However, it also interjected the behavior of counsel from past cases into the trial. This was completely unnecessary and served no legitimate end.
The appellant likewise objected to the trial judge’s fourth comment and the trial judge responded with his fifth and final comment: “All right. Get on with your argument. I’m getting tired of listening to you.” This admonition was unnecessary and could not but convey the impression that appellant’s final argument lacked merit.
Thus, with the exception of the first comment by the trial judge, four comments were made by the trial judge in response to proper objections by appellant. Therefore, it is clear that the judge’s comments were not in response to appellant’s failure to observe the prior rulings of the judge or rules of evidence and that appellant did properly object.
Moreover, these objections contained nothing to warrant the responses made by the trial judge.1 As stated in Hampton v. State, 120 Tex.Cr.R. 158, 46 S.W.2d 314, 315 (1932):
“The judge on the bench cannot too scrupulously refrain from the very appearance of partiality. He is for neither side in any litigation. The State has its officers to look after its interests in any case. Without bias or prejudice the judge should rule as the law commands, blind alike to friend and foe.”
Furthermore, the trial judge’s comment could only have prejudiced the minds of the jurors. After all, “[T]he influence of the trial judge on the jury ‘is necessarily and properly of great weight’ and ‘his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling.’ ” Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933).
I cannot conclude that the trial judge’s comments were necessary to properly control and conduct the trial. The trial judge should have removed the jury if he wanted to admonish appellant’s counsel in the manner he did. The trial judge’s failure to do so constituted reversible error.
II.
I would also reverse this case on the basis of the prosecutor’s final argument. The record reflects the following:
“MR. NOBLE: Ladies and gentlemen, I think you have seen something. I’m not attacking the attorney. I think I need to point some things out to you. You know you saw that older man up here. You saw him pick out pictures that did not belong to those two men over there. If you want to leave it at that, that’s fine. You know, there just might be a reason that he does that on this witness stand and he may perhaps just doesn’t do that when Mr. Zimmer-mann is not around. I suggest to you that it is a reasonable deduction from the evidence that Mr. Zimmermann can intimidate Mr. Till. He can intimidate me. He can intimidate the Judge. He can intimidate just about anybody he wants to.
Now, it’s a reasonable deduction—
“MR. ZIMMERMANN: Your Honor, I object to this lawyer attacking Robert Andrew through his attorney.
*882“THE COURT: Overrule your objection.
“MR. ZIMMERMANN: Judge, the Court is not saying by overruling my objection that I intimidated the Court.
“THE COURT: No, sir, I’m not. I’m not intimidated.
“MR. ZIMMERMANN: Thank you.”
In Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) we delineated the proper scope of jury arguments as: (1) summations of the evidence; (2) reasonable deductions from the evidence; (3) answers to arguments of opposing counsel; and (4) plea for law enforcement. The prosecutor’s argument fails to comply with the requirements of Alejandro, supra.
It is well established that prosecutorial arguments which personally attack defense counsel in an effort to inflame the minds of the jury and prejudice the defendant are not consistent with due process. Summers v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 519, 182 S.W.2d 720 (1944); Crutcher v. State, 481 S.W.2d 113 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Lopez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
In Anderson v. State, 525 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), we were confronted with the following argument by the prosecutor:
“PROSECUTOR: See, you can think about that, ladies and gentlemen. He doesn’t want you to think about it. He wants to pull the wool over your eyes, but you can think about it. He won’t argue the law, and he won’t argue the facts; all he will do is get up here and lie." (Emphasis added)
We there held that the argument was so prejudicial that it would have been remedied only if the trial judge had granted the mistrial requested by the defendant.
In Crutcher v. State, supra, we were confronted with the following argument by the prosecutor:2
“I’d sort of hoped Mr. Bruner [defense counsel] would stay with us in the courtroom . . . but I can assure you one thing, that wherever he has gone, he is not down on his knees praying to his God. I can assure you that . . ..”
We there held that arguments like the one involved in that case should not be condoned.
Anderson and Crutcher are to some degree distinguishable from the argument involved in the present case. Unlike Anderson, the prosecutor here did not call appellant’s counsel a liar, and unlike Crutcher the prosecutor did not attack the religious beliefs and/or practices of appellant’s counsel. However, the prosecutor’s argument was clearly aimed at informing the jury that appellant’s counsel had intimidated a witness, the prosecutor, the trial judge and “ . . . just about anybody he wants to.” It is obvious that the prosecutor was attempting to inform the jury that he thought that appellant’s counsel was attempting to intimidate them. Like the arguments in Anderson and Crutcher, the argument was manifestly improper and harmful.
Prosecutorial comments on the intensity and method of defense counsel’s cross-examination and defensive tactics should not be tolerated by this Court. If arguments of this nature are permitted, final arguments may be transformed into a forum where counsel for the State and the defense attack one another in an effort to influence the jury’s decision.3
More importantly, any sanction of prose-cutorial arguments on defensive tactics and *883methods may very well have a chilling effect upon vigorous cross-examination.
If prosecutors can openly comment on forceful advocacy of their opponents and imply that forceful advocacy is not proper, then due process has certainly become a meaningless concept.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur not only with the majority’s opinion on rehearing, but would reverse the cause and remand for a new trial.
PHILLIPS, J., joins in this concurrence.

. Also, continued judicial comments in response to proper objections by defense counsel directed at judicial comments may prove to have a chilling effect upon defense counsel’s willingness to actively represent his case. Judicial conduct directed at legitimate defense tactics, if it affects defense counsel’s conduct during trial, may operate to deprive defendant of effective assistance of counsel. I cannot condone any unnecessary and excessive judicial action that impinges upon the rights of a defendant to be represented zealously by his attorney.

. This argument occurred immediately after one of the defendant’s attorneys momentarily left the courtroom after completion of his argument.

. This, of course, would be completely incompatible with due process. Moreover, Sec. 5.9(d) of the ABA’s Standards Relating to the Prosecution, and 7.8(d) of the ABA’s Standards Relating to the Defense Function, Approved Draft, 1971, state:
“A [prosecutor] [lawyer] should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law or by making predictions of the consequences of the jury’s verdict.”