Court Opinion

ID: 3552807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 23:04:54.171216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:06:42.008743
License: Public Domain

August 17, 1878, the plaintiff conveyed by quitclaim deed the Bosworth farm to the defendant, the deed containing no special reservation of any hay, or the right to remove any. October 24, 1878. W. O. Bosworth and others conveyed the Bosworth farm to the defendant, not reserving any hay, or the right to remove any. On the same day, by an agreement in writing, with provisions by which Bosworth might be entitled to a deed of the farm, the defendant leased the farm to Bosworth, who was then in the occupation of it, and sold to him all his interest in the hay thereon. July 29, 1878, the plaintiff attached all the hay in the two barns on the Bosworth farm, as the property of Bosworth, on a writ against Bosworth and others, the officer leaving a copy of the writ and of his return with the town-clerk. The plaintiff recovered judgment and took out execution October 9, 1878; and October 18 the officer advertised the hay in the south barn for sale. At the time and place advertised the defendant attended, and forbade the sale by the officer. The sale was thereupon adjourned from time to time until November 15, 1878, when the old hay and one undivided half of the new hay in the south barn was sold by the officer to the plaintiff. On two or three occasions after the execution sale, the defendant notified the plaintiff that he must not remove the hay, claiming that he had bought it of the plaintiff with the farm. These conversations occurred away from the farm. The defendant was not in possession of the farm after October 24, 1878, and did not after that date sell, move, use, or in any way meddle with the hay except as above stated. Bosworth used the hay before the next spring. The plaintiff never personally demanded it of any one in possession of the farm or barns.
The question on these facts is, whether there was evidence from which it was competent to find a conversion of the hay by the defendant. It having been lawfully attached, the officer had constructive possession of it, equivalent in law to actual possession, until the sale. Johnson v. Farr,60 N.H. 426. The attachment gave the plaintiff no title to the property, and no right to it or to its possession. It gave him a statutory lien upon it, with the right to hold Bosworth's interest in the property at the time of the *Page 105 
attachment to satisfy his debt, provided he should obtain judgment, and should seasonably sue out execution and cause the officer to take the hay and apply its avails in satisfaction of the judgment. If the defendant's act in forbidding the sale was a conversion, it gave the officer a cause of action; but it was not assignable, and the plaintiff cannot rely upon a conversion which took place before he acquired a title to the property. Tome v. Dubois, 6 Wall. 548, 554. But the purchase of the hay by the plaintiff from the officer who had the legal custody of it gave him a good title to it, and the right to its immediate possession. Delivery of the hay by the officer was not necessary to constitute a valid sale. The legal right to the possession drew to it the possession. Balme v. Hutton, 9 Bing. 471, 477.
As the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff by reason of anything he did in regard to the hay before the sale, the question then is, whether the notification to the plaintiff after the sale not to remove it, accompanied with a claim by the defendant that he bought it with the farm, was evidence of a conversion. Any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's property in denial of his right, or inconsistent with it, is a conversion. It is not necessary that there should be a manual taking of the property. If the wrong-doer exercises a dominion over it in exclusion or defiance of the owner's right, whether it be for his own or another's use, it is in law a conversion. Cooley Torts 448; 2 Greenl. Ev., s. 642. Evans v. Mason, 64 N.H. 98. "The very denial of goods to him that has a right to demand them is an actual conversion, and not only evidence of it, as has been holden; for what is a conversion but an assuming upon one's self the property and right of disposing of another's goods? And he that takes upon himself to detain another man's goods from him without cause takes upon himself the right of disposing of them." Holt, C. J. in Baldwin v. Cole, 6 Mod. 212.
Although the defendant did not have the possession of the hay after the sale, or the right to control the movements of Bosworth, there was evidence that both understood after the sale that Bosworth was authorized by the defendant as vendor to use the hay, and that was a conversion by the defendant. He had sold it for a price to Bosworth. His claiming that he bought it of the plaintiff, and his forbidding the plaintiff to remove it, then in the actual possession of Bosworth, was evidence from which it was competent to find that his purpose was to enable his vendee to consume the hay, and that, for the purpose of this case, its conversion by his vendee, authorized by the vendor, was the act of the vendor. In authorizing and aiding Bosworth to convert it to his own use he became liable to the plaintiff in trover. Flanders v. Colby, 28 N.H. 34. When several join in the conversion, trover will lie against either of them. Pattee v. Gilmore,18 N.H. 460. There *Page 106 
was evidence from which it was competent to find a conversion by the defendant.
Exceptions overruled.
BLODGETT, J., did not sit; the others concurred.