Court Opinion

ID: 9555310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 17:00:34.526488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:17.847464
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                       No. 23-1085
                                       __________

                                TIMOTHY R. DEFOGGI,
                                             Appellant

                                             v.

                              WARDEN FORT DIX FCI
                       ____________________________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of New Jersey
                         (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-12269)
                       District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
                      ____________________________________

                    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                                   August 8, 2023

            Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

                             (Opinion filed: August 11, 2023)
                                      ___________

                                        OPINION*
                                       ___________

PER CURIAM

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
       Timothy R. Defoggi appeals pro se from orders of the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey denying his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and denying

his motion for reconsideration. We will affirm.

       In 2015, a jury in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska

found Defoggi guilty of various crimes related to child pornography. He ultimately was

sentenced to 25 years in prison on four counts of knowingly accessing a means or facility

of interstate commerce to view child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). He

unsuccessfully pursued relief on direct appeal, see United States v. Defoggi, 878 F.3d

1102 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam), and through a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

       Thereafter, in June 2021, Defoggi filed in the district where he was then confined

– the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey – a pro se petition under

28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF 1.) He alleged that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) “erroneously

determine[d] that [his] crime of conviction rendered him ineligible for the Elderly

Offender Home Detention Program [EOHDP].” (Id. at 11 of 25.) The Government filed

a response in opposition to the motion (ECF 9), to which Defoggi replied. (ECF 10.)

       The District Court denied the petition, holding that it “lack[ed] the authority to

order the BOP to admit [Defoggi] into the EOHDP” because pre-release placement

decisions are committed to the BOP’s sole discretion. Defoggi v. N’Diaye, 2022 WL

16552790, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2022). The District Court further explained that the

BOP did not arbitrarily interpret the relevant statutes or abuse its discretion because

Defoggi’s offenses qualified as “sex offense[s]” under the Sex Offender Registration and

Notification Act (“SORNA”), thereby rendering him ineligible for the EOHDP pursuant

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to 34 U.S.C. § 60541(g)(5)(A). Id. at *5. Defoggi filed a motion for reconsideration

(ECF 16), which the District Court denied in relevant part. Defoggi v. N’Diaye, 2022

WL 17959575, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2022). Defoggi timely appealed. (ECF 23.)

       We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District

Court’s denial of a § 2241 habeas petition de novo, see Blood v. Bledsoe, 648 F.3d 203,

206 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), and the denial of the motion for reconsideration for

abuse of discretion, see Max’s Seafood Café, ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d

669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).

       The EOHDP, a pilot program reauthorized as part of the First Step Act, provides

that “the Attorney General may release some or all eligible elderly offenders and eligible

terminally ill offenders from [BOP] facilities to home detention . . . .” § 60541(g)(1)(B)

(emphasis added). As that language indicates, “Congress has vested the executive

branch, not the judicial branch, with the power to decide which prisoners may participate

in the” EOHDP. Melot v. Bergami, 970 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2020). Therefore, to the

extent that Defoggi challenges the District Court’s conclusion that it lacked authority to

order that he be placed in home detention under the EOHDP, the claim lacks merit. See

Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 331 (2011) (“When a court sentences a federal

offender, the BOP has plenary control, subject to statutory constraints, over the place of

the prisoner’s imprisonment and the treatment programs (if any) in which he may

participate.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

       Furthermore, assuming that Defoggi’s challenge to the BOP’s denial of his request

for home detention under the EOHDP can be brought in a § 2241 petition, see Vasquez v.

                                             3
Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012), we agree that Defoggi did not qualify for

relief. Inmates are ineligible for home detention under the EOHDP if they have been

convicted of a sex offense as defined by the SORNA. § 60541(g)(5)(A)(ii), (iii).

SORNA’s definition of “sex offense” includes “a Federal offense . . . under . . . chapter . .

. 110 (other than section 2257, 2257A, or 2258) . . . of Title 18.” 34 U.S.C.

§ 20911(5)(A)(iii). Defoggi was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), which

appears in chapter 110 of Title 18, but is not one of the three sections specifically

excluded from the definition. Accordingly, he is ineligible for home detention under the

EOHDP.1

       Finally, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Defoggi’s motion for reconsideration. In that motion, Defoggi argued that the District

Court, in holding that he was ineligible for home detention under the EOHDP, relied on

convictions that had been vacated. (ECF 16, at 1-2.) The District Court acknowledged

that Defoggi’s convictions for conspiracy to advertise and distribute child pornography

had been vacated and granted the motion for reconsideration “to the extent necessary to

correct any factual error.” Defoggi, 2022 WL 17959575, at *2-3. But because the

1
  Defoggi’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. He asserts that he is eligible for
relief because his § 2252A(a)(5)(B) conviction is not included in § 20911(7). Appellant’s
Br., 6. As the Government correctly notes, however, the EOHDP defines “sex offense”
pursuant to § 20911(5), not pursuant to § 20911(7). Appellee’s Br., 15-16. Defoggi also
asserts that knowingly accessing child pornography is not included in the United States
Sentencing Guidelines for sexual exploitation of a minor, nor is it criminalized in various
states and countries. Appellant’s Br., 11-18. But those observations, even if accurate,
have no bearing on whether a conviction under § 2252A(a)(5)(B) precludes an inmate
from participating in the EOHDP.
                                              4
vacated convictions were not material to its denial of relief, the District Court denied the

motion for reconsideration in part. Id. at *2. We agree with the District Court that, even

in the absence of the convictions for conspiracy to advertise and distribute child

pornography, Defoggi’s “undisputed four access-with-intent-to-view convictions still

exclude him from EOHDP as a matter of law.” Id.

       For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

                                              5