Court Opinion

ID: 9901005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 22:11:32.013266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:24.219940
License: Public Domain

2023 UT App 132

               THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

        STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF G.H. AND R.H.,
            PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

                               L.G.,
                            Appellant,
                                v.
                          R.G. AND R.G.,
                            Appellees.

                             Opinion
                         No. 20220920-CA
                     Filed November 2, 2023

       Seventh District Juvenile Court, Price Department
                The Honorable Craig Bunnell
                          No. 1210014

            Steve S. Christensen and Clinton Brimhall,
                      Attorneys for Appellant
           Colleen K. Coebergh, Attorney for Appellees
                Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

  JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
     JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1     The maternal grandparents of two children filed a petition
for guardianship, alleging neglect by both parents and abuse at
the hands of the children’s father. The guardianship was
contested, and a trial was held. After trial, the juvenile court
granted the petition, finding facts consistent with the allegations
of the petition and determining that the guardianship was in the
best interest of the children. Further, the juvenile court
determined that the mother’s parent-time, if any, would take
place at the unfettered discretion of the grandparents. The mother
                              In re G.H.

appeals, claiming the juvenile court erred in determining neglect,
erred in failing to order parent-time, and wrongfully denied a
motion to change venue as to one of the children. For the most
part, we affirm. However, the juvenile court’s findings regarding
the mother’s parent-time rights are inadequate, and we therefore
remand this matter for the entry of further findings and
conclusions as necessary.

                          BACKGROUND

¶2     AG (Mother) and JH (Father) are the natural parents of GH
and RH (the Children). 1 In April 2022, Mother’s parents, RG and
RG (Grandparents), petitioned for guardianship and custody of
the Children, alleging that such a placement was in the best
interest of the Children due to Father’s abuse and both parents’
neglect. A few days later, Grandparents filed an ex parte motion
for temporary custody of the Children, and the juvenile court
granted the request.

¶3     At a pre-trial hearing, Mother asked for an expedited
evidentiary hearing regarding temporary custody. The court
declined that request and instead held a combined adjudication
and disposition hearing over two trial days in July and August
2022.

¶4     After that hearing, the court issued an order setting forth
findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding adjudication
and disposition. Because Mother does not dispute the findings of
fact, we recite the facts directly from the juvenile court’s findings. 2

1. RH has a twin, who has lived with the maternal great-
grandmother since April 2021 and is not involved in this case.

2. Mother disputes the findings of fact only with regard to venue.
But as our disposition makes clear, these factual disputes are
immaterial.

 20220920-CA                       2               2023 UT App 132
                             In re G.H.

¶5     The court took judicial notice of a 2019 order in which the
same court terminated Mother’s parental rights to an older child,
who was adopted by Grandparents shortly thereafter. Mother
stated she had “no idea” why her maternal rights for the older
child were terminated, but the record shows that it was primarily
due to Mother’s neglect.

¶6     Mother moved in with Grandparents in Price, Utah, in July
2019 and lived with them through the first part of January 2022.
From June through September 2021, Mother worked evenings
(5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.). She had surgery for “a minor thing” in
September 2021. Mother was unemployed until she obtained full-
time employment in December 2021. At this job, she worked ten-
hour shifts (10:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.) four days per week.

¶7      While living with Grandparents, Mother “relied on
[Grandparents] almost exclusively and for nearly everything for
[the Children] . . . . [Grandparents] were the primary caretakers
for [the Children’s] day-to-day physical, developmental, medical,
and financial needs.”

¶8      With regard to the Children’s physical needs, Mother “did
very little to make arrangements for [the Children], provide basic
care, or assist with household duties,” even when asked to do so.
She did not provide “day-to-day food or meals” for the Children,
nor did she help with potty training GH.

¶9      Regarding developmental needs, Grandparents provided
for “the vast majority of [the Children’s] indoor and outdoor
activities, toys, and one-on-one parent-role interactions.” Mother
“did very little to actually parent [the Children] or care for their
needs,” and she did not assist with “mothering” the Children.
When asked to care for the Children, other than watching the
Children for about five hours some weekdays when
Grandparents were both working, “Mother would often say she
was too tired, too busy, be on her phone or smoking, or on her bed
resting or lounging.”

 20220920-CA                     3              2023 UT App 132
                            In re G.H.

¶10 Mother’s sister (Sister) would often visit Grandparents’
house (about two times each week when Grandparents were not
there), and she observed Mother being “verbally abusive or terse
with [the Children],” leaving them “unattended or unsupervised,
not changing diapers as needed, or not caring for them.” The court
also found, based on Sister’s testimony, that Mother would often
“come to [Sister’s] house (at times unannounced) without child-
care supplies or clothes,” asking for help with the Children
because Mother was “tired, needed a break, going out with
friends, or going to work (although, at times, she did not go to
work, but went back to [Grandparents’] house to sleep or
smoke).”

¶11 Financially, Mother sometimes shared her government
food assistance card but relied on Grandparents for most of the
Children’s financial needs. She also relied on Grandparents to
provide birthday or Christmas gifts for the Children. She did,
however, reimburse Grandparents a few hundred dollars and
paid for some daycare.

¶12 Regarding medical needs, Mother took the Children for
immunizations, but she did not take them to other types of
medical appointments or help Grandparents when the Children
were sick with ear infections, colds, or other maladies.

¶13 In January 2022, Mother moved in with another relative
(Step-Grandmother) in Highland, Utah, which was twenty
minutes from her newly acquired job. Grandparents continued as
GH’s primary caretakers in Price, but RH moved to Step-
Grandmother’s house with Mother.

¶14 During this time-period, RH received daily and weekly
care in four different cities separated by nearly a hundred miles
and by four different caregivers besides Mother, namely Step-
Grandmother, Great-Grandmother, Father’s mother, and
Grandparents.      Essentially,    Grandparents      and   Great-
Grandmother would relieve Step-Grandmother when she was not
available to watch RH. Sometimes Mother would be the one to

 20220920-CA                    4              2023 UT App 132
                            In re G.H.

take RH to Great-Grandmother’s house. Step-Grandmother,
Grandparents, the maternal great-grandmother (Great-
Grandmother), or Mother transported RH, and sometimes GH,
from house to house on weekends. Mother’s mother handled
most of the Children’s care coordination, “unless Mother needed
to preplan to accommodate her own work schedule.” RH did not
stay in “one consistent place or house” during this time-period;
RH was at a “different house almost every day of the week, and
each week was different than the last.”

¶15 Watching Mother with the Children “scared” Step-
Grandmother, and she never saw Mother being “a mother” to the
Children. Mother was “negative verbally” to the Children and
“put her own wants and needs before RH’s needs.” Mother would
get upset when Step-Grandmother wanted to go out, making it
necessary for Mother to watch RH.

¶16 Mother provided very little assistance to Step-
Grandmother with household duties, except for washing her and
RH’s clothes, and “Mother’s bedroom was always cluttered (with
RH’s clothes on the floor) and never cleaned.” Mother put RH to
bed half the time, but Step-Grandmother noted that the time was
never consistent, as Mother sometimes would come home as late
as 10:30 p.m. On some Friday nights, Mother did not come home
at all until later that weekend.

¶17 While living with Step-Grandmother, Mother changed
RH’s diaper only about once per day; smoked cigarettes “all the
time”; was “always on her phone”; did not give baby food or
regular feeding; and did not read to, play with, sing to, or bathe
RH.

¶18 In mid-March 2022, Mother moved into a rental house in
Murray, Utah, with RH. Although Step-Grandmother no longer
provided RH daily care after the move, Mother still used
Grandparents, Great-Grandmother, and Father’s mother to care
for RH. Mother’s work schedule changed to eight hours per day,
five days per week (12:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. or 2:00 p.m. to 10:00

 20220920-CA                    5              2023 UT App 132
                             In re G.H.

p.m.). Grandparents primarily watched RH on weekends. GH
continued to live with Grandparents.

¶19 On April 5, 2022, Mother picked up Father from prison,
and he lived with Mother from then until at least July 2022, when
Mother learned—on the first day of trial through Father’s
probation officer’s testimony—that Father had used drugs just a
week before. Before hearing this testimony, “Mother did not
believe he would use drugs.” Mother allowed Father to watch the
Children unsupervised, and until trial, she had planned to
continue living with him, despite knowing that Father was
convicted of assaulting someone in prison two months prior to his
release and despite complaining to Grandparents that Father was
“controlling and threatening her, taking her phone and car,
refusing to work, and taking advantage of her.” Father’s assault
conviction “did not cause her any concern” about him being with
her or the Children.3 The court found that Mother’s reintroduction
of Father into the Children’s lives “was an emphatic
demonstration to the Court of Mother’s poor judgment and her
continued inability (since having her parental rights terminated
to an older child in 2019 and since [the Children] were born) to
put [the Children’s] needs and welfare before her own.”

¶20 Mother made efforts to obtain a full-time job and to
perform well at her job to provide for her and the Children. 4 But
the court concluded that Mother “did not progress over the last
three years as was necessary and appropriate for her to meet the
daily needs” of the Children. Instead, Grandparents, Step-

3. Although the court found that Father had “an extensive and
violent criminal history, including convictions for interfering with
arrests, assaults, disorderly conduct, and threats of violence,” it
did not make a specific finding regarding Mother’s knowledge of
his violent criminal history outside of the event in prison.

4. When asked about how Mother was performing at work, her
supervisor testified, “She is incredibly reliable. She’s one of my
go-to staff . . . .”

 20220920-CA                     6              2023 UT App 132
                             In re G.H.

Grandmother, Great-Grandmother, and others provided “the
crucial day-to-day parenting and caretaking that are necessary for
[the Children] to thrive developmentally and otherwise.”

¶21 The court also found that the Children “thrived living
together with [Grandparents] prior to Mother moving out of
[Grandparents’] home in January 2022” and after being reunited
in Grandparents’ home in April 2022. The court noted that
Grandparents “demonstrated their reliability and consistent
efforts to provide for all of [the Children’s] day-to-day physical,
mental, emotional, developmental, medical, financial, and
educational needs.” The court emphasized that the Children
should be living together.

¶22 Based on these factual findings, the court concluded there
was clear and convincing evidence that Mother neglected the
Children. The court also concluded, based on clear and
convincing evidence, that the Children’s best interests would be
met by granting Grandparents permanent custody and
guardianship. Additionally, the court ordered that Mother’s and
Father’s parent-time with the Children “shall be at the discretion
and under the control or management of [Grandparents].”

¶23 As relevant here, Mother moved the court to dismiss
Grandparents’ petition for improper venue or to transfer venue,
which the court denied. Mother now appeals.

            ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶24 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred when it
determined that the Children were neglected. Mother clarifies
that she is not disputing the court’s findings of fact but the court’s
application of these findings to the law; therefore, “we accept
these findings as true in our analysis on appeal.” d’Elia v. Rice
Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, ¶ 24, 147 P.3d 515. “We view the
question presented here as law-like because it concerns whether
the facts as constituted meet the legal standard of the statute. . . .

 20220920-CA                      7               2023 UT App 132
                             In re G.H.

Accordingly, we review the issue presented here giving no
deference to the juvenile court.” In re A.B., 2021 UT App 91, ¶ 10,
498 P.3d 894, aff’d, 2022 UT 39, 523 P.3d 168.

¶25 Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred in not
awarding her parent-time and thus failing to give due
consideration to her residual parental rights. “We generally will
not disturb the district court’s parent-time determination absent a
showing that the court has abused its discretion. However, we
review the district court’s interpretation of a statute for
correctness. Likewise, we review the legal adequacy of findings of
fact for correctness as a question of law.” Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App
137, ¶ 4, 427 P.3d 1221 (cleaned up).

¶26 Finally, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in
denying her motion to dismiss or transfer based on venue. Venue
“is a question committed to the district court’s discretion, which
we review for an abuse of discretion.” Davis County v. Purdue
Pharma, LP, 2020 UT 17, ¶ 7, 463 P.3d 619.

                            ANALYSIS

                            I. Neglect

¶27 “If, at the adjudication[5] hearing, the juvenile court finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the allegations contained
in the abuse, neglect, or dependency petition are true, the juvenile
court shall conduct a dispositional hearing.” Utah Code § 80-3-
402(1). “The dispositional hearing may be held on the same date
as the adjudication hearing . . . .” Id. § 80-3-402(3). At the
dispositional hearing, the juvenile court then “may vest custody
of an abused, neglected, or dependent minor in the division or any
other appropriate person.” Id. § 80-3-405(2)(a)(i). “If a minor has

5. Adjudication “means a finding by the court . . . that the facts
alleged in the petition have been proved.” Utah Code § 80-1-
102(3)(a).

 20220920-CA                     8              2023 UT App 132
                             In re G.H.

been placed with an individual or relative as a result of an
adjudication . . . , the juvenile court may enter an order of
permanent legal custody and guardianship with the individual or
relative of the minor.” Id. § 80-3-405(2)(d)(i). “Clear and
convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof that
implies something more than the usual requirement of a
preponderance of the evidence; and something less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Put differently, this standard requires
the existence of facts that make a conclusion very highly
probable.” In re K.K., 2023 UT App 13, ¶ 22, 525 P.3d 519 (cleaned
up), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 731 (Utah 2023).

¶28 Neglect is statutorily defined, and can be proved in any one
of several ways. See Utah Code § 80-1-102(58)(a)(i)–(vi). 6 While the
juvenile court found neglect under several subsections, to affirm
we need conclude only that neglect was established under one of
the bases. See In re E.F., 2013 UT App 13, ¶ 3, 295 P.3d 1165 (per
curiam) (upholding juvenile court’s conclusion that mother
neglected child under the sole basis of lack of proper parental care
by reason of parent’s faults or habits). Among other bases, the
juvenile court found neglect under subsection (ii), which defines
neglect as “action or inaction causing . . . lack of proper parental

6. Utah Code section 80-1-102(58)(a) defines “neglect” as follows:
       [An] action or inaction causing: (i) abandonment of
       a child . . . ; (ii) lack of proper parental care of a child
       by reason of the fault or habits of the parent,
       guardian, or custodian; (iii) failure or refusal of a
       parent, guardian, or custodian to provide proper or
       necessary subsistence or medical care, or any other
       care necessary for the child’s health, safety, morals,
       or well-being; (iv) a child to be at risk of being
       neglected or abused because another child in the
       same home is neglected or abused; (v) abandonment
       of a child through an unregulated child custody
       transfer under Section 78B-24-203; or (vi)
       educational neglect.

 20220920-CA                     9               2023 UT App 132
                            In re G.H.

care of a child by reason of the fault or habits of the parent,
guardian, or custodian.” Utah Code § 80-1-102(58)(a)(ii). We agree
with the juvenile court that the evidence supported a finding that
this basis for neglect had been proved.

¶29 First and foremost, the factual findings demonstrated that
Mother did not attend to the Children’s basic health and welfare
needs, such as feeding and bathing them, changing their diapers
regularly, and obtaining medical care for them when they were
sick. Mother also did not show any interest in potty training GH.

¶30 Moreover, Mother did not behave in a manner consistent
with parenting a child. For example, Mother did not demonstrate
a desire to play with the Children, read or sing to them, or buy
them birthday and Christmas presents. And Grandparents were
the ones to provide the Children’s indoor and outdoor activities
and toys rather than Mother.

¶31 Similarly, the findings revealed that Mother lacked interest
in being around the Children, and she would refuse to care for
them when asked by the family members with whom she was
living. Mother would complain that “she was too tired” or “too
busy,” or she would prefer to “be on her phone or smoking, or on
her bed resting or lounging.” Likewise, Mother would drop off
the Children unannounced at Sister’s house—“without child-care
supplies or clothes”—because Mother was “tired, needed a break,
[or was] going out with friends, or going to work,” although, at
times she went back to Grandparents’ house “to sleep or smoke”
instead. Mother also would get upset when Step-Grandmother
wanted to go out some evenings, thus leaving Mother to care for
the Children. In addition, “Mother did not do household duties
when asked to do so.”

¶32 Although the court did acknowledge Mother’s
commendable efforts with her current job, it still found that
Mother “did not progress over the last three years as was
necessary and appropriate for her to meet the daily needs of each
of [the Children].”

 20220920-CA                   10              2023 UT App 132
                            In re G.H.

¶33 Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that Mother was
not troubled by Father being with her or the Children. Even
though Mother knew that Father was convicted of assaulting
someone while in prison and said that he was “controlling and
threatening her, taking her phone and car, refusing to work, and
taking advantage of her,” Mother allowed Father to watch the
Children unsupervised and, until learning of his continued drug
use at trial, had planned to go on living with him. Additionally,
despite Father’s history with drug use, Mother “did not believe he
would use drugs.” Mother’s reintroduction of Father into the
Children’s lives demonstrated to the court “emphatic[ally]” that
Mother showed “poor judgment and [a] continued inability (since
having her parental rights terminated to an older child in 2019 and
since [the Children] were born) to put [the Children’s] needs and
welfare before her own.”

¶34 The court also highlighted that during the time when
Mother lived with Step-Grandmother, the Children were cared
for by many different caregivers other than Mother. The court
found that Grandparents were the main caregivers for GH, and
the court emphasized that RH’s daily and weekly care was
provided by five different caregivers located in four different
cities. Mother argues that a “child is not without proper parental
care solely because that care is not always at the hands of a
parent” and that it is “not uncommon for parents, especially
single working mothers, to place children in daycare or arrange
for care with family.” In support of her argument, Mother cites In
re A.B., 2021 UT App 91, 498 P.3d 894, aff’d, 2022 UT 39, 523 P.3d
168, where we held that a child is not neglected if the child
receives proper parental care, “even if not always at [a mother’s]
hand.” Id. ¶ 20.

¶35 We agree with Mother that it can be completely
appropriate for parents to arrange for others to help them in
caring for their children, and we empathize with single parents
whose childcare arrangements may not always seem ideal to
others of greater means and opportunity. But Mother’s behavior
in this case is distinguishable from that in In re A.B. Here, the

 20220920-CA                    11              2023 UT App 132
                             In re G.H.

juvenile court found, and Mother does not dispute, that Mother
did “very little to make arrangements” for the Children, would
drop off the Children at Sister’s “at times unannounced,” would
not come home when she was expected to, and would not take
care of the Children when at home. In contrast, In re A.B.
concerned a child who spent summers with “welcoming relatives[,]
. . . and on agreement, summer turned into a whole year.” Id. ¶ 1
(emphases added). Moreover, that mother arranged the child’s
care with the relatives, id. ¶¶ 2–3, and she never refused to take
care of her child when she oversaw the child’s care, id. ¶ 19.
Therefore, Mother’s reliance on In re A.B. misses the mark.

¶36 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile
court’s findings of fact meet the legal standard of neglect. See Utah
Code § 80-1-102(58)(a)(ii). Therefore, we affirm its grant of
permanent custody and guardianship to Grandparents. See id.
§ 80-3-405(2)(d)(i). 7

                          II. Parent-Time

¶37 Mother next argues that the juvenile court erred by failing
“to even consider providing Mother parent-time in the final
analysis order.” While we don’t quite agree with Mother’s
characterization of the order as a complete failure to consider
Mother’s residual rights, we agree that remand on this issue is
necessary.

7. After a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court may award
permanent custody and guardianship to a relative if it finds by
clear and convincing evidence either abuse or neglect by the
natural parent. See Utah Code §§ 80-3-402(1), -405. Mother made
additional arguments that the court erred in determining that GH
was abused by Father and that Mother had standing to appeal any
determinations regarding Father that contributed to a finding that
Mother neglected the Children. Because we affirm the juvenile
court’s determination that Mother neglected the Children, we do
not need to address these arguments.

 20220920-CA                     12              2023 UT App 132
                             In re G.H.

¶38 When the juvenile court vests custody of a child in
someone other than the child’s natural parent, the court “shall
give primary consideration to the welfare of the minor.” Utah
Code § 80-3-405(2)(a)(ii)(A). Here the court did so by awarding
custody to Grandparents, whom the court found to “have
demonstrated their reliability and consistent efforts to provide for
all of [the Children’s] day-to-day physical, mental, emotional,
developmental, medical, financial, and educational needs.”

¶39 But the court’s responsibilities when awarding custody do
not end there. The court also “shall give due consideration to the
rights of the parent or parents concerning the minor.” Id. § 80-3-
405(2)(a)(ii)(B). This includes consideration of awarding
reasonable parent-time. Specifically, the statute provides that “[a]
parent of a minor for whom a guardian is appointed retains
residual parental rights and duties.” Id. § 75-5-209(5). These
residual parental rights include “the right to reasonable parent-
time unless restricted by the court.” Id. § 80-1-102(70)(a)(iv). Thus,
our legislature intended for juvenile courts to give careful thought
to an award of parent-time when granting custody and
guardianship to someone else. And we note that parent-time is
significant because it offers “the parent the possibility of
maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child despite lack
of physical custody.” Moreno v. Board of Educ., 926 P.2d 886, 890
(Utah 1996).

¶40 Yet here, the juvenile court simply stated that Mother’s and
Father’s parent-time with the Children “shall be at the discretion
and under the control or management” of Grandparents, without
making any findings regarding the amount of parent-time that
would be reasonable. Instead, the court delegated that
determination entirely to Grandparents. And this could lead to
Grandparents denying Mother any parent-time 8 without the court

8. Mother alleges that when she has asked Grandparents for
parent-time, they have refused and told her, “You have no rights.”
                                                   (continued…)

 20220920-CA                     13               2023 UT App 132
                             In re G.H.

making any findings of fact to justify such a denial. 9 Here, we find
the court’s findings and conclusions regarding parent-time to be
inadequate.

¶41 A juvenile court’s factual findings “must be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the
evidence upon which they are grounded.” In re S.T., 928 P.2d 393,
398 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); see also In re M.G., 2003 UT App 313U,
para. 5 (holding that “a review of the court’s oral findings reveals
the subsidiary facts and basis for the juvenile court’s written
findings and demonstrates that the written and oral findings,
taken together, are sufficiently detailed to permit appellate
review”). “Put another way, findings are adequate when they
contain sufficient detail to permit appellate review to ensure that
the [juvenile] court’s discretionary determination was rationally
based. Indeed, the [juvenile] court’s obligation to render adequate
findings facilitates meaningful appellate review and ensures the
parties are informed of the [juvenile] court’s reasoning.” Lay v.
Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 19, 427 P.3d 1221 (cleaned up). “Unless
the record clearly and [incontrovertibly] supports the [juvenile]
court’s decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact
ordinarily requires remand for more detailed findings by the
[juvenile] court.” Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (cleaned up).

¶42 We are unable to determine the court’s basis for leaving all
parent-time decisions in the hands of Grandparents, a situation
that potentially denies Mother any parent-time with the Children.

Mother’s allegations are not part of our appellate record,
however.

9. It is possible for a juvenile court, in an appropriate case, to
determine that a parent retaining residual rights is not entitled to
any parent-time. But any such determination should be rare and
should be supported with findings that demonstrate why it is not
reasonable, for example, for the parent to have at least short
periods of unsupervised or supervised parent-time.

 20220920-CA                     14              2023 UT App 132
                             In re G.H.

Accordingly, we vacate the juvenile court’s decision regarding
parent-time and remand this matter for specific findings
demonstrating what conditions of parent-time are reasonable. If
the court determines that it is reasonable to award no parent-time
to Mother, then the court must make specific findings to justify
such a determination.

                            III. Venue

¶43 Mother brought a motion to dismiss or change venue on
the morning of trial, asserting that the case had been brought in
the wrong venue. 10 The juvenile court took the motion under
advisement and delayed ruling on the motion until it could take
evidence and determine facts relative to venue. In its dispositional
order, the juvenile court determined that venue was correct in the
Seventh District. Now on appeal, Mother challenges that
conclusion only as to RH. Mother maintains that on the day the
petition for guardianship was filed, RH was living with Mother in
Salt Lake County. Even assuming, for purposes of the discussion,
that venue was incorrectly determined to be in the Seventh
District as to RH, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court
because Mother has failed to show any harm.

¶44 The guardian ad litem’s briefing maintained that Mother
needs to show harm to obtain reversal based on an erroneous
denial of the motion to change venue as it pertains to RH. Mother
does not quibble with this legal assertion but claims that she
implicitly identified and showed harm in her principal brief. As
both parties have proceeded under the assumption that an
appellant must show harm, we will do likewise without deciding

10. Utah law provides that “a proceeding for a minor’s case in the
juvenile court shall be commenced in the court of the district in
which . . . the minor is living or found.” Utah Code § 78A-6-
350(1)(b).

 20220920-CA                    15              2023 UT App 132
                            In re G.H.

that discrete issue. 11 The sole harm Mother points to is that the
case regarding RH would have been dismissed and that dismissal
would have benefitted Mother. Mother is wrong on the first point
and utterly fails to meet her burden of persuasion on the second.

¶45 First, as to automatic dismissal, this result was rejected
several years ago by this court when In re adoption of B.N.A., 2018
UT App 224, 438 P.3d 10, explored the consequences of hearing a
case in the wrong venue. Initially, we explained that under
current precedent, subject-matter jurisdiction is not implicated
when a case is filed in the wrong district. Id. ¶¶ 12–24. Then we
concluded that the “consequence for filing in the wrong district is
not automatic dismissal.” Id. ¶ 25. Instead, “any party, upon
proper motion, may request that the case be transferred to the
correct district.” Id. So, if the Mother’s motion had been granted,
the case would have been transferred, not dismissed.
Accordingly, the argument that harm resulted because the case
would have been dismissed fails.

¶46 Second, Mother fails to identify any other harm. She
merely concludes that “[d]ismissal would have benefitted
Mother.” But as just explained, dismissal would not have
occurred. And Mother presents no argument that she would have
obtained a different result had the case been transferred.
Importantly, where Mother does not challenge that the case
involving GH would have remained in the Seventh District, we
easily foresee that upon transfer, any other juvenile court would
have likely transferred the RH case back to the Seventh District
under its discretionary powers, and more particularly under rule

11. Some courts that have decided this issue have held that harm
must be shown. See Lamb v. Javed, 692 S.E.2d 861, 864 (Ga. Ct. App.
2010); Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
But we do not decide this issue and leave it for another day.

 20220920-CA                    16              2023 UT App 132
                             In re G.H.

42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.12 Further, Mother fails to
show how the result rendered in a different venue would have
been better for her. Thus, Mother fails to meet her burden of
persuasion that she was harmed by the denial of her motion to
change venue.

¶47 Accordingly, we see no basis to reverse the judgment of the
juvenile court on the issue of venue.

                          CONCLUSION

¶48 We affirm the juvenile court’s determination that Mother
neglected the Children and that venue was proper in the Seventh
District with regard to RH. We also conclude that the juvenile
court made inadequate findings regarding its parent-time award.
Therefore, we vacate the court’s award of sole discretion over
Mother’s parent-time to Grandparents and remand the matter for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion to consider
Mother’s residual parental rights when determining a reasonable
award of parent-time.

12. Mother asserts that venue rights are so substantial that a denial
of a motion to change venue can be grounds for an interlocutory
appeal, citing Davis County v. Purdue Pharma, LP, 2020 UT 17, 463
P.3d 619. While this is true, Mother sought no interlocutory
appeal here. And other courts have held that failure to
immediately appeal a denial of a motion to change venue
constitutes a waiver of the venue claim. See, e.g., Patterson v.
Alexander & Hamilton, Inc., 844 So. 2d 412, 415 (La. Ct. App. 2003).

 20220920-CA                     17              2023 UT App 132