Court Opinion

ID: 9940359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 01:02:03.873937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:47.773137
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/24 P. v. Bryant CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085387
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF140718A)
                    v.

 SAMUEL XAVIER BRYANT,                                                                    OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John W. Lua,
Judge.
         James Bisnow, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Erin R.
Doering, Amanda D. Cary, and Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                    INTRODUCTION
       Petitioner Samuel Xavier Bryant petitioned the superior court, pursuant to former
section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6) of the Penal Code,1 for resentencing on his convictions
for first degree murder and premeditated attempted murder. The superior court denied
the petition at the prima facie stage, without an evidentiary hearing, after determining
petitioner was the actual killer.
       On appeal, petitioner argues the jury instructions allowed the jury to find him
guilty of first degree murder and premeditated attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. He therefore argues the court erred in determining his
petition did not state a prima facie case for resentencing.
       We reverse.
                            PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Underlying Charges and Convictions
       “On July 3, 2012, [petitioner] and Joseph Jamal Hendrix were charged in the
murder of Jacob Ramirez and the shooting of Manuel Gomez. Following a jury trial,
[petitioner] was convicted of first degree murder (count 1; . . . § 187, subd. (a)),
premeditated attempted murder (count 2; §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), two counts of assault
with a semiautomatic firearm (counts 3 & 4; § 245, subd. (b)), discharging a firearm at an
inhabited dwelling (count 5; § 246), and active participation in a criminal street gang
(count 6; § 186.22, subd. (a)). Enhancements under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d)
and (e)(1) applied to counts 1 and 2; enhancements under section 12022.7 applied to
counts 2, 3, and 4; enhancements under sections 12022.5, subdivision (a) and 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1) applied to counts 3 and 4; and an enhancement under section
12022.53, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1) applied to count 5. [Petitioner], a juvenile, was

       1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Former section
1170.95 has been renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the current section 1172.6 in this opinion.

                                              2.
sentenced to an aggregate term of 82 years to life in prison, and the trial court imposed
additional fines and fees.
       “Following that same trial, Hendrix was found guilty of second degree murder
(count 1; § 187, subd. (a)), attempted murder (count 2; §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), two counts
of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (counts 3 & 4; § 245[,] subd. (b)), discharging a
firearm at an inhabited dwelling (count 5; § 246), and active participation in a criminal
street gang (count 6; § 186.22, subd. (a)). Enhancements under section 12022.53,
subdivisions (d) and (e)(1) applied to counts 1 and 2; enhancements under sections
12022.7 and 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) applied to counts 2, 3, and 4; an enhancement
under [section] 12022.5, subdivision (a) applied to counts 3 and 4; and an enhancement
under section 12022.53, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1) applied to count 5. Hendrix was
sentenced to an aggregate term of 72 years to life in prison, and the trial court imposed
additional fines and fees.” (People v. Bryant (Dec. 12, 2014, F066725) [nonpub. opn.],
fn. omitted (Bryant).)2
       On appeal, this court affirmed. (Bryant, supra, F066725.)

       2 We dispense with a statement of facts. The record on appeal does not include
admissible evidence of the underlying facts (see § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)) and, in any event,
the underlying facts are not relevant to our disposition.
        We grant in part the People’s request for judicial notice and take judicial notice of
our opinion in Bryant, supra, F066725, which was relied on by the superior court and is
cited by both parties in their briefing. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).) However, we
otherwise deny the request for judicial notice. We deny the request for judicial notice of
the transcripts from the record on appeal on the ground it does not appear these records
were before the superior court. (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 323, fn. 1
[declining to take judicial notice of documents that were not before the trial court].) We
note that, in reaching its decision, the superior court considered the verdict form, the jury
instructions, and the appellate opinion. However, the jury verdict is adequately
summarized in our appellate opinion. The jury instructions have been included in the
record on appeal as an augmented clerk’s transcript. Thus, judicial notice of these
documents from the prior record on appeal is unnecessary to the disposition. (Cf. People
v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1171, fn. 3 [judicial notice cannot be taken of any
matter that is irrelevant].)

                                             3.
II.    The Petition for Resentencing
       On June 24, 2022, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6. Counsel was appointed to represent petitioner.
       The People opposed the petition. The People requested the court take judicial
notice of this court’s opinion in Bryant, supra, F066725, as well as the “court files,
records, and transcripts” in the underlying criminal case. Based thereon, the People
argued that the jury’s verdict, when viewed in context with the jury instructions,
established as a matter of law that petitioner was the actual killer of Ramirez and the
person who actually attempted to kill Gomez.
       Petitioner filed a reply, arguing the People’s response was based on inadmissible
hearsay. He asserted he had met his burden to make a prima facie showing of eligibility.
       At the prima facie hearing, the court stated it had considered “the readily
ascertainable facts taken from the record of conviction, which include the verdict form,
the jury instructions, [and] the procedural posture of this case as articulated in the
appellate opinion.” The court further stated it had not “involved itself in weighing of
facts or factual determinations as that would be improper at this stage.”
       The court then denied the petition as follows:

       “[B]ased on the record of conviction that the [c]ourt has reviewed, the
       [c]ourt will find that the petitioner has not satisfied a prima facie case or
       has not demonstrated a prima facie determination or case to set this for an
       order to show cause. It does appear to the [c]ourt based on a review of the
       documents previously described, that the defendant is ineligible for a
       petition of resentencing since he was the actual killer in this case.”
       This timely appeal followed.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     Applicable Law Regarding Section 1172.6
       Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437) “to amend the felony murder rule and the natural

                                              4.
and probable consequences doctrine . . . to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on
a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); accord, People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
707–708 (Strong).) The bill amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine by
requiring that a principal act with malice aforethought before he or she may be convicted
of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); accord, People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–
843 (Gentile).) The bill amended the felony-murder rule by providing that a participant
in a qualifying felony is liable for murder only if the victim was a peace officer in the
performance of his or her duties, or the defendant was the actual killer, aided and abetted
the actual killer in the commission of first degree murder with the intent to kill, or was a
major participant in the felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189,
subds. (e), (f); accord, Strong, at p. 708.)
       Senate Bill No. 1437 also added former section 1170.95, now renumbered as
section 1172.6, which provides a procedure for persons convicted of “felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime, [or] attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine” to
seek vacatur of the conviction and resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); accord, Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 853.) Under section 1172.6, an offender seeking resentencing
must first file a petition in the sentencing court, and the sentencing court must determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (a)–(c); accord, Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Our Supreme
Court has recently explained that “a petitioner who alleges that he or she could not
currently be convicted of a homicide offense ‘because of changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019’ [citation] puts at issue all elements of the offense under a
valid theory” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 462 (Curiel)), and this allegation is

                                               5.
not refuted “unless the record conclusively establishes every element of the offense” (id.
at p. 463). In making this determination, the court may rely on the record of conviction.
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970–971.) However, the prima facie inquiry is
limited and, at this stage of the proceedings, the court “should not engage in ‘factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 972.)
       “If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is
ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 450.) If the trial court determines the petitioner has met his or her prima facie burden,
“the trial court must issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine
whether to vacate the murder [or attempted murder] conviction and to resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts.” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 853; accord,
§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At this evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on
the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by the changes to Section
188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Significantly, “[a]
finding that there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder[ or]
attempted murder . . . is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.” (Ibid.)
II.    The Jury Instructions
       Petitioner’s jury was instructed as follows with regard to aiding and abetting:

              “A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she
       may have directly committed the crime. I will call that person the
       perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a perpetrator, who
       directly committed the crime.

             “A person is guilty of a crime whether he or she committed it
       personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator.

                                              6.
              “Under some specific circumstances, if the evidence establishes
       aiding and abetting of one crime, a person may also be found guilty of other
       crimes that occurred during the commission of the first crime.”
       Additionally, the jury was instructed in relevant part:

              “To prove that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and
       abetting that crime, the People must prove that:

                     “1.    The perpetrator committed the crime;

                    “2.  The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to
       commit the crime;

                     “3.   Before or during the commission of the crime, the
       defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime;

                     “AND

                     “4.     The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and
       abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.

              “Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the
       perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and
       does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the
       perpetrator’s commission of that crime.”
       The jury also was instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine in
relevant part as follows:

             “Before you may decide whether the defendant is guilty of
       Murder[ or] Attempted Murder . . . you must decide whether he is guilty of
       Simple Assault.

            “To prove that the defendant is guilty of Murder[ or] Attempted
       Murder . . . the People must prove that:

                     “1. The defendant is guilty of Simple Assault;

                      “2. During the commission of Simple Assault a coparticipant
       in that Simple Assault committed the crime of Murder[ or] Attempted
       Murder . . . ;

                     “AND

                                             7.
                    “3. Under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the
       defendant’s position would have known that the commission of the
       Murder[ or] Attempted Murder . . . was a natural and probable consequence
       of the commission of the Simple Assault.”
       The natural and probable consequences instruction further provided, “A natural
and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen
if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and
probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence. If the
Murder[ or] Attempted Murder . . . was committed for a reason independent of the
common plan to commit the Simple Assault, then the commission of Murder[ or]
Attempted Murder . . . was not a natural and probable consequence of Simple Assault.”
The instruction additionally provided, “The People are alleging that the defendant
originally intended to aid and abet Simple Assault.”
       With regard to murder, the jury was instructed on malice aforethought, including
express and implied malice. In this regard, the jury was instructed that, to prove “the
defendant” is guilty of murder, the People must prove that “[t]he defendant committed an
act that caused the death of another person,” and “[w]hen the defendant acted, he had a
state of mind called malice aforethough[t].” The jury was instructed that implied malice
required it to find “1. [The defendant] intentionally committed an act; [¶] 2. The natural
and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life; [¶] 3. At the time
he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life; [¶] AND [¶] 4. He deliberately
acted with conscious disregard for human life.”
       With regard to first degree murder, the jury was instructed in relevant part as
follows:

              “The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have
       proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The
       defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill. The defendant acted
       deliberately if he carefully weighed the considerations for and against his
       choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant

                                             8.
       acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the act that
       caused death.”
       To find defendant guilty of attempted murder, the jury was required to find that:

                     “1. The defendant took at least one direct but ineffective step
       toward killing another person;

                     “AND

                     “2. The defendant intended to kill that person.”
       With regard to deliberation and premeditation as they pertain to attempted murder,
the jury was instructed, in relevant part, as follows:

              “If you find the defendant guilty of attempted murder under Count
       Two, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional
       allegation that the attempted murder was done willfully, and with
       deliberation and premeditation.

              “The defendant or the co-defendant acted willfully if he intended to
       kill when he acted. The defendant or the co-defendant deliberated if he
       carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice and,
       knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant or the co-
       defendant premeditated if he decided to kill before acting.

              “The attempted murder was done willfully and with deliberation and
       premeditation if either the defendant or the co-defendant or both of them
       acted with that state of mind.”
III.   Analysis
       Petitioner contends the jury instructions permitted the jury to find him guilty of
murder and premeditated attempted murder under the now-invalid natural and probable
consequences doctrine. He further contends the verdict does not conclusively establish
he acted as the actual shooter, as opposed to an aider and abettor. As such, he contends
the record does not establish his ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law. In light
of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433, we must agree
with petitioner that the record does not establish his ineligibility for resentencing as a
matter of law.

                                              9.
       We begin by acknowledging that the jury necessarily found petitioner acted with
intent to kill with regard to both the murder and attempted murder counts by finding that
he acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. As stated, the instruction on first
degree murder provided:

              “The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have
       proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The
       defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill. The defendant acted
       deliberately if he carefully weighed the considerations for and against his
       choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant
       acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the act that
       caused death.” (Italics added.)
       This instruction required the jury to find petitioner personally acted with intent to
kill before it could find him guilty of first degree murder.3 Moreover, the jury found
codefendant Hendrix guilty of non-premeditated second degree murder (Bryant, supra,
F066725), further confirming the jury did not impute willfulness, deliberation, and
premeditation to petitioner based on Hendrix’s mental state. (See §§ 188, subds. (a)(1),
(3), (b), 189, subd. (e)(2).)
       As previously stated, with regard to premeditated attempted murder, the jury was
instructed in relevant part:

              “If you find the defendant guilty of attempted murder under Count
       Two, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional
       allegation that the attempted murder was done willfully, and with
       deliberation and premeditation.

              “The defendant or the co-defendant acted willfully if he intended to
       kill when he acted. The defendant or the co-defendant deliberated if he
       carefully weighed the considerations for and against his choice and,
       knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant or the co-
       defendant premeditated if he decided to kill before acting. [¶] The

       3 The instruction is therefore distinguishable from instructions given in other
cases, which left open the possibility the jury based its premeditation finding on the
conduct of a codefendant. (See, e.g. People v. Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22, 34
[instruction required the jury to find the “would-be slayer” acted with intent to kill].)

                                             10.
       attempted murder was done willfully and with deliberation and
       premeditation if either the defendant or the co-defendant or both of them
       acted with that state of mind.” (Italics added.)
       This instruction permitted the jury to find petitioner guilty of premeditated
attempted murder if it found that either petitioner or Hendrix acted with intent to kill.
However, the jury rejected the premeditation allegation with regard to Hendrix. As such,
the jury necessarily found petitioner acted willfully and with intent to kill when he acted.
       However, these findings, standing alone are insufficient to rebut petitioner’s
allegations of resentencing eligibility. Our Supreme Court has clarified that intent to kill
is “only one element” of the offense of murder or attempted murder, and “[i]t does not by
itself establish any valid theory of liability.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.) “A
finding of intent to kill does not, standing alone, cover all of the required elements.”
(Ibid.) If only this element of the relevant offense is established by the record, “petitioner
could still be correct that he . . . could not currently be convicted of the relevant offense
based on the absence of other elements.” (Ibid.)
       We may look to the jury’s other findings to determine whether they exclude
petitioner from resentencing eligibility by establishing the jury found all elements of
murder and attempted murder under a valid theory. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 463–
464, 465.) In the instant case, we conclude they do not.
       First, we note that the jury instructions on aiding and abetting and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine are identical in nearly all relevant respects to those given
in Curiel.4 (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 446–447.) Curiel found these instructions
insufficient to establish either that the jury found that the petitioner intended to aid the
actual perpetrator in the commission of murder (rather than a target offense under the

       4 The Curiel instructions provided that an aider and abettor was “ ‘equally
guilty’ ” of the crimes (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 445–446), whereas petitioner’s
instructions provided, “A person is guilty of a crime whether he or she committed it
personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator.”

                                              11.
natural and probable consequences doctrine) or that the target offense itself was
dangerous to human life. (Id. at p. 468.) On these instructions, the high court determined
that a jury finding of intent to kill “is insufficient to establish the requisite mens rea for
aiding and abetting murder.” (Ibid.) Thus, pursuant to Curiel, the jury’s findings in the
instant case do not establish his ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law. (Cf. id.
at p. 471 [noting that the holding of Curiel may not extend to cases involving jury
instructions that are “materially different”].)
       Nor do the jury’s findings establish that the jury found petitioner was the actual
killer. As stated, the jury was instructed on both the natural and probable consequences
doctrine and principles of aiding and abetting. The natural and probable consequences
instruction explained, “The People are alleging that the defendant originally intended to
aid and abet Simple Assault.” (Italics added.) Petitioner and Hendrix were tried
together, and the instruction did not specify that “the defendant” referred to therein was
Hendrix. Similarly, the aiding and abetting instruction was not limited to codefendant
Hendrix. Thus, the instructions permitted the jury to find petitioner guilty of murder or
attempted murder under a natural and probable consequences or aiding and abetting
theory.
       The People argue the jury would not have applied the natural and probable
consequences instruction to petitioner because the prosecutor argued to the jury that
petitioner was the actual killer and Hendrix was guilty as an aider and abettor under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. However, we have declined to take judicial
notice of the transcript of closing argument. Moreover, the jury was not required to apply
the instructions in the manner argued by the prosecutor. Thus, while the People argue the
verdict is “largely consistent” with the prosecutor’s putative argument, and the argument
provides the “likely explanation” for the jury’s verdict, the argument alone could not
conclusively establish the jury limited its application of the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to Hendrix. Thus, the prosecutor’s putative argument could not

                                               12.
establish petitioner’s ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law. (See People v.
Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 976.)
       The People also argue “there was no basis in the instructions for the jury to find
that Hendrix directly committed non-premeditated murder and attempted murder but
[petitioner] committed premeditated murder and attempted murder based on natural and
probable consequences.” However, under our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Curiel, the
jury could have determined that petitioner knew that Hendrix intended to commit simple
assault and intended to aid Hendrix in that assault, without also finding that petitioner
foresaw “the homicidal or life-endangering consequences” of Hendrix’s actions in this
context. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 470.) The jury could have found that this
conduct by petitioner was done willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, but
without a subjective belief that Hendrix’s act would or could be life-endangering.
“Indeed, a defendant could act with intent to kill but at the same time believe the actual
perpetrator could never risk harm to another human being — and be genuinely surprised
when the actual perpetrator commits a life-endangering act.” (Ibid.)
       We recognize that such jury findings are highly unlikely, even implausible.
However, pursuant to Curiel, “the question is not whether it is likely a defendant could
have felt and acted in such a way, but whether the court’s jury instructions foreclose that
possibility as a matter of law. Only in the latter scenario would a trial court be permitted
to deny a defendant’s section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.” (Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 470.) Under instructions similar to those presented here, the high court
determined the jury instructions did not foreclose such theories as a matter of law. (Id. at
p. 471.) Accordingly, pursuant to Curiel, the instructions and verdict in the instant case
are insufficient to rebut petitioner’s allegation that he could not be convicted of murder
and attempted murder under current law.
       Based on the foregoing, we reverse the court’s order denying the petition and
remand with directions to issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)

                                             13.
                                    DISPOSITION
      The court’s December 7, 2022 order denying the petition is reversed and the
matter is remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause and conduct such
further proceedings as necessary pursuant to section 1172.6.

                                                                            DETJEN, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

FRANSON, J.

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