Court Opinion

ID: 2964518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:52.420502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:57.153707
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

        No. 96-1592

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                    ROBERT MCMINN,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                 [Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
                                                 ___________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                           Cyr* and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             Matthew J. Lahey, with whom McLaughlin, Hemeon & Lahey, P.A. was
             ________________            ________________________________
        on brief for appellant.
             Jean B. Weld, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Paul M.
             ____________                                              _______
        Gagnon, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
        ______

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                   January 13, 1997
                                                     
                                 ____________________
                                                     

                            
        ____________________

             *Cyr, J., was not present at oral argument. 

                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.   Appellant  Robert McMinn  mounts
                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.   
                          _____________

          four challenges to the  sentence imposed following his conviction

          on several felony counts  relating to his acquisition, interstate

          transportation, and  sale of  stolen audio and  video components.

          See 18 U.S.C.    371,  2314 & 2315.  As the  sentence enhancement
          ___

          imposed pursuant  to U.S.S.G.    2B1.1(b)(4)(B) for  engaging "in

          the  business of  receiving and  selling stolen  property" ("ITB"

          enhancement)  constituted error,  we  vacate  the district  court

          judgment and remand for resentencing. 

                                          I
                                          I

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

          A.   Upward Departure (U.S.S.G.   4A1.3)
          A.   Upward Departure (U.S.S.G.   4A1.3)
               __________________________________

                    The  district court granted the government's motion for

          an upward departure under  U.S.S.G.   4A1.3 (1995), from  a Total

          Offense  Level ("TOL")  of  18 and  a  Criminal History  Category

          ("CHC") of III, to TOL 20 and  CHC VI, on the ground that CHC III

          would  have  underrepresented the  seriousness of  McMinn's prior

          criminal  conduct  and  the  likelihood of  recidivism.    McMinn

          contends that the  three affidavits relied  upon by the  district

          court for its departure-related findings were not reliable.1  

                    First,  the district  court  did  not  place  principal

          reliance on  the challenged  affidavits for its  factual findings

                              
          ____________________

               1We  review factual  findings  for clear  error, see  United
                                                                ___  ______
          States v. Shrader, 56 F.3d 288, 292 (1st Cir. 1995), mindful that
          ______    _______
          the sentencing court  is vested with "wide discretion"  to deter-
          mine whether sentencing information is reliable.  Id. at 294. 
                                                            ___

                                          2

          relating to the seriousness  of McMinn's prior criminal conduct.2

          Moreover, though McMinn claims that the affidavits were uncorrob-

          orated, and  the affiants untrustworthy,  he chose not  to cross-

          examine one of the  affiants at sentencing.  In  addition, he had

          cross-examined  the other two  affiants at  the earlier  trial on

          drug-conspiracy charges before the same judge.  See supra note 1.
                                                          ___ _____

          Finally,  the district  court  was  presented  with  unchallenged
                                                               ____________

          police  reports, describing various  burglaries and corroborating

          other  information  in the  affidavits.    See United  States  v.
                                                     ___ ______________

          Shrader, 56  F.3d 288, 294 (1st  Cir. 1995).  There  was no clear
          _______

          error.

          B.   Obstruction of Justice Enhancement (U.S.S.G.   3C1.1)
          B.   Obstruction of Justice Enhancement (U.S.S.G.   3C1.1)
               ____________________________________________________

                    Second, McMinn challenges  a two-level enhancement  for

          obstruction of justice, see U.S.S.G.   3C1.1,  based on threaten-
                                  ___

          ing letters  he sent in  February, April and  October of 1995  to

          Steven Serfass, a prospective  government witness.  McMinn argues

          that Serfass  was not connected with  the investigation, prosecu-

          tion, or  sentencing of  the "instant" offenses  involving inter-

          state transportation, receipt, and sale of stolen audio and video
                              
          ____________________

               2Rather, the  upward departure  decision was based  upon the
          following considerations as well:
               (1)  five felony drug convictions entered June 13, 1989, and
          six convictions based on  criminal conduct occurring between 1990
          and  1994, which were not  taken into account  in calculating the
          CHC;
               (2) an uncharged burglary;
               (3) an uncharged  conspiracy to distribute large  quantities
          of marijuana between 1987 and 1995; and, finally, 
               (4) the fact that McMinn  was on bail when he committed  the
          stolen-property offense, and had also violated parole and commit-
          ted various  other infractions, including drug  use, while incar-
          cerated.

                                          3

          components, since Serfass neither testified, nor were the threat-

          ening  letters admitted, at the trial on these charges.  Instead,

          Serfass  testified at an earlier trial on drug charges which were

          severed  from the stolen-property charges  on June 20,  1995.  As

          the enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G.   3C1.1

          applies  only to  obstructing an "investigation,  prosecution, or

          sentencing  of  the  instant  offense," McMinn  claims  that  the
                               _______

          district  court erred  as  a matter  of  law in  concluding  that

          conduct  unconnected  with   the  stolen-property  charges  could

          support the enhancement.  We find no error.  

                    At the  time  McMinn mailed  the  threatening  letters,

          Serfass remained a prospective  government witness in relation to

          the "instant offense"; i.e., the stolen-property charges.  It was
                                 ____

          not until January  1996, immediately  prior to the  trial on  the

          stolen-property charges, that it  became clear that Serfass would

          not testify.   Thus, there was  no error in the  district court's

          determination that McMinn  attempted to obstruct the  prosecution

          of the  stolen-property charges  by mailing the  threatening let-

          ters.  C. ITB Enhancement (U.S.S.G.   2B1.1(b)(4)(B)(1995))
                 C. ITB Enhancement (U.S.S.G.   2B1.1(b)(4)(B)(1995))
                    ________________________________________________

                    Third, McMinn contends that the district court erred in

          imposing   a  four-level   ITB  enhancement   under   U.S.S.G.   

          2B1.1(b)(4)(B)  (1995).   Relying primarily  on United  States v.
                                                          ______________

          Braslawsky, 913 F.2d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 1990), he argues that  an
          __________

          ITB enhancement  is impermissible unless the defendant was in the

          business  of  receiving and  selling  property  stolen by  others
                        _________ ___                                ______

          (i.e.,  in  the business  of  "fencing"  stolen  property).   The
           ____

                                          4

          district court ruling that  McMinn's criminal conduct came within

          the  ITB enhancement guideline is  reviewed de novo.   See United
                                                      __ ____    ___ ______

          States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698, 701 (1st Cir. 1992). 
          ______    _______

                    The   four-level  ITB  enhancement  guideline,  by  its

          express terms,  applies only  if "the offense  involved receiving

          stolen property, and the  defendant was a person in  the business
                                                           __  ___ ________

          of  receiving   and  selling   stolen  property."     U.S.S.G.   
          __  _________   ___

          2B1.1(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added).  Thus, on its face at least, the

          ITB guideline does not apply to a defendant who makes  a business

          of stealing property; that is, a professional "thief," as distin-

          guished from a professional  fence.  See Braslawsky, 913  F.2d at
                                               ___ __________

          468 (holding that,  by its  terms, the ITB  enhancement does  not

          apply to a professional thief).  

                    Under the common-law tradition, stealing  property from

          another normally  does not equate with  "receiving" property from

          its  rightful owner.  See  Milanovich v. United  States, 365 U.S.
                                ___  __________    ______________

          551, 558 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("a thief cannot be

          charged with  committing two  offenses     that is,  stealing and

          receiving   the  goods   he  has   stolen[,]  .   .  .   for  the

          commonsensical,  if not  obvious,  reason that  a  man who  takes

          property does not at the same  time give himself the property  he

          has  taken.") (citations  omitted); Baugh  v. United  States, 540
                                              _____     ______________

          F.2d 1245, 1246 (4th Cir.  1976) ("logic . . . instructs  us that

          there  is an  inherent inconsistency  in treating  a taking  as a

          receipt"); see also United States v. Trzcinski, 553 F.2d 851, 853
                     ___ ____ _____________    _________

          (3d  Cir. 1976), cert. denied,  431 U.S. 919  (1977).  Therefore,
                           ____  ______

                                          5

          statutes which criminalize "receiving"  are generally not thought

          to  target the  thief himself,  but the  wrongdoer who  knowingly

          acquires  the loot  from  or  through  the  thief.    See,  e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____

          Milanovich, 365  U.S. at  729-730; Heflin  v. United States,  358
          __________                         ______     _____________

          U.S.  415, 419-20 (1959);  United States v.  Washington, 861 F.2d
                                     _____________     __________

          350,  352 (2d  Cir. 1988).   Thus,  a fair  reading of  the plain

          language  employed  in section  2B1.1(b)(4)(B)  strongly suggests

          that  a  defendant engaged  in selling  only  the property  he is

          responsible  for stealing  has  not "received"  it  in the  sense

          contemplated by the Sentencing Commission.  

                    Should there be any doubt about the plain language, the

          parallel development of the sentencing guideline governing thefts

          of property, see U.S.S.G.   2B1.1, and the guideline on receiving
                       ___

          stolen  property, see id.   2B1.2, together with the evolution of
                            ___ __

          the language  employed in  the ITB enhancement  guideline itself,

          see id.    2B1.1(b)(4)(B), tend  to confirm  that the  Commission
          ___ __

          envisioned  that "theft"  alone not  constitute a  "receiving" of

          stolen property for these purposes.   Under the original Sentenc-

          ing  Guidelines,  U.S.S.G.     2B1.1  (1987)  governed  "Larceny,

          Embezzlement and Other Forms of  Theft," whereas U.S.S.G.   2B1.2

          (1987)  governed "Receiving  Stolen  Property."   The offense  of

          receiving stolen property  was subject to an ITB enhancement, see
                                                                        ___

          U.S.S.G.   2B1.2(b)(2)(A) (1987) ("If the offense [i.e. receiving
                                                ___ _______  ____

          stolen property] was  committed by  a person in  the business  of
                                                       __  ___ ________  __

          selling  stolen  property,  increase  by  4  levels.")  (emphasis
          _______  ______  ________

          added), which clearly  applied to the professional fence  and not

                                          6

          to  a defendant who simply sold property  he pilfered.  See id.  
                                                                  ___ __

          2B1.2,  comment (backg'd)  (1987)  ("Persons  who receive  stolen
                                                            _______

          property  for resale  receive a  sentence enhancement  . .  . .")
                        ______

          (emphasis added);3 Braslawsky,  913 F.2d at  468.  The  guideline
                             __________

          governing theft crimes included no corresponding ITB enhancement.

          See U.S.S.G.   2B1.1 (1987).
          ___

                    The  disjunctive treatment  required  under  these  two

          guideline sections  clearly implied  that the Commission  did not

          intend that  the ITB enhancement apply  to defendants responsible

          only for the  theft of the ill-gotten  property and not  its "re-

          sale."   See supra note 3.  At the time the Sentencing Guidelines
                   ___ _____

          were  promulgated, the  Commission consistently  demonstrated its

          intention that  like enhancements  be applicable to  both "theft"

          and  "receipt"  offenses  by  including  a  parallel  enhancement

                              
          ____________________

               3The  Commission's  choice  of  the  word  "resale"  vividly
          suggests a prior sale  (by the thief to the  fence) conspicuously
          lacking  between the  rightful owner  and the  thief.   Thus, the
          commentary provides authoritative definition  to the scope of the
          original ITB enhancement.  See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S.
                                     ___ _______    _____________
          36,  38 (1993) (" . . . commentary  in the Guidelines Manual that
          interprets  or explains  a guideline  is authoritative  unless it
          violates the Constitution or  a federal statute, or is  inconsis-
          tent with, or a plainly  erroneous reading of, that guideline.").
          The  background commentary to U.S.S.G.   2B1.2 was deleted at the
          time U.S.S.G.    2B1.2 was  consolidated into  U.S.S.G.    2B1.1.
          See U.S.S.G.   2B1.1, as amended by amendment 481 (effective Nov.
          ___                   __ _______ __
          1, 1993).   But though there  is no longer any  commentary on the
          ITB enhancement,  see United States  v. Richardson, 14  F.3d 666,
                            ___ _____________     __________
          674 (1st Cir. 1994), neither is there any reason to believe  that
          consolidation  of the  two original  guideline sections,  and the
          consequent deletion  of the  background commentary, was  meant to
          alter the scope  of the ITB enhancement.  Rather,  along with the
          consolidation and  deletion of  24 other guideline  sections, the
          Commission consolidated   2B1.2 with   2B1.1 because the offenses
          were  closely related and  the Commission wanted  to simplify the
          Guidelines Manual.  See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 481 (1995).
                              ___

                                          7

          provision in each guideline.  See id.    2B1.1(b)(2); 2B1.2(b)(3)
                       ____             ___ __

          (1987) (parallel enhancements relating  to stealing and receiving

          (stolen)  firearm, destructive  device or  controlled substance);

          id.     2B1.1(b)(4); 2B1.2(b)(2)(B) (1987) (parallel enhancements
          __

          for more than minimal planning relating to stealing and receiving

          (stolen)  property);  id.       2B1.1(b)(6);  2B1.2(b)(4)  (1987)
                                __

          (parallel enhancements for engaging in organized criminal activi-

          ty  relating to  stealing and  receiving (stolen)  property); see
                                                                        ___

          also U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 117 (effective Nov. 1, 1989) (adding
          ____

          ITB  enhancement  to U.S.S.G.     2B6.1     trafficking  in motor

          vehicles  with altered or  obliterated identification  numbers   

          "to resolve an inconsistency between . . . section [2B6.1] and   

          2B1.2").  

                    The subsequent  evolution of the ITB enhancement guide-

          line  likewise  substantiates  that it  was  meant  to  cover the

          professional fence, not the  thief.  As the  Commission broadened

          the  scope of U.S.S.G.   2B1.2 ("Receiving Stolen Property"), the

          language  in the ITB enhancement itself was amended to retain its

          narrow  focus  upon defendants  who  "fence" stolen  goods.   The

          "Receiving  Stolen Property"  guideline  was amended  in 1989  to

          cover  "Transporting,  Transferring, Transmitting,  or Possessing

          Stolen Property."   U.S.S.G.    2B1.2, as amended  by amend.  102
                                                 __ _______  __

          (effective  Nov. 1,  1989).   Under the  same amendment,  the ITB

          enhancement guideline  was changed to read, "[i]f the offense was

          committed  by a person in  the business of  receiving and selling
                                                      _________ ___

          stolen property,  increase by  4 levels."   Id.    2B1.2(b)(3)(A)
                                                      __

                                          8

          (1989) (emphasis  added to  amendatory  language).   Thus, it  is

          apparent from  the context  that the  words "receiving  and" were

          included  so as to restrict application of the ITB enhancement to

          defendants who receive and sell stolen property (i.e. profession-
                         _______ ___

          al  fences) and to exclude  from its reach  others, including the

          thief, who  transport, transfer,  transmit, or possess,  and then

          sell, stolen property. 

                    In  1993, the  separate guideline  provisions governing

          theft offenses and the receiving of stolen property were consoli-

          dated.  See  U.S.S.G.   2B1.1 as amended by amend. 481 (effective
                  ___                   __ _______ __

          Nov. 1, 1993).   The same 1993 amendment introduced  the language

          currently found  in the ITB enhancement  guideline, prescribing a

          four-level  enhancement  "[i]f  the  offense  involved  receiving
                                          _________________________________

          stolen property, and the  defendant was a person in  the business
          _______________

          of receiving  and selling stolen property."  Id.   2B1.1(b)(5)(A)
                                                       __

          (1993) (emphasis added to amendatory language).  

                    The historical context in  which the 1993 amendment was

          adopted thus demonstrates that the reconstructed  ITB enhancement

          was designed to  apply only to  defendants who "received"  stolen

          property and  whose offense of  conviction would come  within the

          scope of  former U.S.S.G.   2B1.2  ("Receiving Stolen Property"),

          as  opposed to  defendants who  pilfered the  property  and whose

          offense of  conviction  therefore came  within the  scope of  the

          original version of U.S.S.G.   2B1.1.  It seems reasonably clear,

          therefore, viewed  in an  historical perspective, that  the words

                                          9

          "receiving and" were added  to preserve the limited reach  of the

          ITB enhancement.

                    On the other hand, the interpretation propounded by the

          government  presumes that  the Commission  twice amended  the ITB

          enhancement  so as to make  it applicable only  to defendants who

          "receive" stolen  property, yet intended the  term "receiving" to

          mean merely "taking possession  of," thereby encompassing  simple

          theft.  Though as a literal matter, without regard to its histor-

          ical context,  the term "receiving" does  not necessarily exclude

          "theft,"  we  conclude  that  the references  to  defendants  who

          "receive and sell" stolen  property were not meant to apply  to a

          defendant who simply sells only property he has stolen.

                    Our construction is guided by conventional interpretive

          principles.  See United States v. DeLuca, 17 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir.
                       ___ _____________    ______

          1994) (applying  customary rules  of statutory  interpretation to

          sentencing guidelines).   It  avoids interpreting the  words "re-

          ceiving  and" out of the ITB enhancement guideline as surplusage.

          See  United States  v.  Campos-Serrano, 404  U.S.  293, 301  n.14
          ___  _____________      ______________

          (1971)  ("A statute  ought, upon  the whole,  to be  so construed

          that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or  word shall

          be  superfluous, void, or insignificant.").   Whereas, were we to

          adopt the government's view     that the language in  the current

          ITB enhancement ("in the business of receiving and selling stolen

          property") reaches both the  thief and the professional fence    

          then  the  language  of the  original  ITB  enhancement ("in  the

                                          10

          business . . . of selling stolen property") need never have  been

          amended in 1989. 

                    Our  interpretation  comports   with  basic   guideline

          sentencing policy  as  well.   See  18  U.S.C.     3553(a)(1),(2)
                                         ___

          (A),(B),(C)&(5).  The services of a professional fence undoubted-

          ly facilitate  the ready,  advantageous  disposition of  property

          stolen  by  the less  well-situated  thief,  thereby providing  a

          significant  inducement to  commit  theft offenses.   See  United
                                                                ___  ______

          States v. Sutton, 77 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996); Braslawsky, 913
          ______    ______                                  __________

          F.2d at  468; United  States v.  Bolin, 423  F.2d  834, 838  (9th
                        ______________     _____

          Cir.),  cert. denied,  398 U.S.  954 (1970);  Carl Klockars,  The
                  ____  ______                                          ___

          Professional Fence  144 (1974)  (discussing the adage,  "if there
          __________________

          were no receivers, there would be no thieves").  It is reasonable

          to  assume, as a general rule, that a professional fencing opera-

          tion  efficiently can  dispose  of greater  quantities of  stolen

          goods than could  the individual thieves  who supply the  profes-

          sional fence, see  Klockars at 69-135, thereby enabling  both the
                        ___

          thieves  and  the   fence  to  realize  greater   returns.    Cf.
                                                                        __

          Braslawsky, 913 F.2d at 468.  Thus, as a rule professional fences
          __________

          may be expected to induce more stealing. 

                    Furthermore,  the  interposition  of   a  sophisticated

          fencing operation between the thief and the ultimate purchaser of

          the stolen  property may  confound or obstruct  the investigation

          and prosecution  of theft offenses.   Often, the  stolen property

          itself  may be the only tangible evidence connecting the thief to

          the  crime.  Since the professional fence is better positioned to

                                          11

          move stolen goods quickly  into the hands of the  ultimate "black

          market" consumer, see  Klockars at  77 n.2, 106-13,  the loot  is
                            ___

          more  likely to be dispersed before  law enforcement agencies can

          respond.   Consequently, the fence  not only affords  the thief a

          less  risky and more  efficient alternative for  disposing of the

          booty,  but the  increased  efficiency comes  at  the expense  of

          effective law enforcement.4

                    The  government  argues,  nonetheless,  that   the  ITB

          enhancement guideline should be construed simply to require proof

          that McMinn's sales of  stolen goods had a certain  regularity or

          sophistication.  Cf. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d at 703 (adopting a "total-
                           __  _______

          ity of the circumstances"  test).  For the reasons  stated above,

          we reject the government's interpretation as less consistent with

          the language, history, and purpose of the  ITB enhancement guide-

          line.5         We  think  it  important  to point  out  that  our

          opinion in St. Cyr does not support the position advocated by the
                     _______

                              
          ____________________

               4These considerations  represent an especially  serious hin-
          drance to law enforcement when the professional  fence utilizes a
          legitimate "front," such  as a pawn shop or an  outlet dealing in
          distressed goods at sharply  lower prices.  See United  States v.
                                                      ___ ______________
          Robinson, 698 F.2d 448, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Klockars at 69-135.
          ________
          The "front"  may afford  a superficially valid  justification for
          the low sale prices (i.e. the goods were pawned to the "front" or
                               ____
          acquired  as distressed goods) and thus serve to impede an infer-
          ence that the fence knew the goods were stolen.  

               5Nor is the caselaw in other circuits  inconsistent with the
          requirement that the defendant must be a "fence" in order for the
          ITB  enhancement  to apply.  See, e.g.,  Sutton,  77 F.3d  at 94;
                                       ___  ____   ______
          United States v. Zuniga, 66 F.3d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1995); United
          _____________    ______                                    ______
          States  v.  Warshawsky,  20 F.3d  204,  214-15  (6th Cir.  1994);
          ______      __________
          United States v.  King, 21 F.3d  1302, 1303 n.2  (3d Cir.  1994);
          _____________     ____
          United States v. Esquivel, 919 F.2d 957, 959 (5th Cir. 1990); see
          _____________    ________                                     ___
          also St. Cyr, 977 F.2d at 703.
          ____ _______

                                          12

          government.  St. Cyr neither expressed nor implied disapproval of
                       _______

          the basic  proposition that the ITB  enhancement guideline should

          apply only to "professional fences."   See id. at 703 ("We  think
                                                 ___ ___

          this assessment fits  harmoniously .  . . with  the decisions  of

          those  few circuit courts that have addressed the meaning of [the

          ITB guideline].").   Rather, the  St. Cyr panel  observed that  a
                                            _______

          "professional fence" test  is not particularly  helpful.  Id.  at
                                                                    ___

          702-03 ("Defining the  term 'professional fence' is as  chancy as

          defining the language  of the guideline itself.").   Although the

          "totality  of the  circumstances" test announced  in St.  Cyr did
                                                               ________

          define  the term "in the  business," the court  never reached the

          question squarely presented here;  viz., whether a defendant need
                                             ___

          have  been  in the  business  of "receiving  and  selling" stolen
                                            _________  ___

          property (i.e. acting as a  fence) in order for the ITB  enhance-
                    ____

          ment to  apply.  See  also United States  v. Richardson, 14  F.3d
                           ___  ____ _____________     __________

          666,  675 (1st Cir. 1994)  ("evidence . .  . clearly demonstrates

          that  defendant was a fence");  cf. United States  v. Tutiven, 40
                                          __  _____________     _______

          F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1994) ("As it was stipulated that Tutiven did

          not steal the motor vehicles . . . logic pretty  much compels the

          conclusion that Tutiven knowingly 'received  stolen property.'"),

          cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1391 (1995).  
          ____  ______

                    The  government  in  our  case  points  to  substantial

          evidence that McMinn engaged not  only in extensive thievery  but

          in storing  and disseminating stolen  property as well.   Nothing

          prevents  a professional  thief  from also  conducting a  fencing

          operation  of sufficient size  and continuity to  qualify for the

                                          13

          ITB enhancement; criminals, too,  may have more than one  line of

          business.   For the reasons we have already indicated, however, a

          thief would not qualify for the ITB enhancement if the only goods

          he distributed were those which he had stolen.

                    There is nothing in the government's analysis or in the

          district court's  findings to indicate that  McMinn sold property

          which  he had not stolen.  Of course, since reasonable inferences

          are  always permitted, the case  might be quite  different if the

          only  evidence were that McMinn had stored and sold large quanti-

          ties of stolen  property.  Here,  however, the evidence  revealed

          that  McMinn  had stolen  a great  deal of  property and,  as the

          record now  stands, we have no  basis to suppose that  he did not

          steal it all.

                    Finally, the  government argues in the alternative that

          McMinn  should be  treated  as a  professional  fence because  he

          neither proffered  evidence, nor  admitted, that he  had pilfered

          all  the stolen  goods  he sold.   Since  it is  the government's

          burden to prove  that McMinn  received and sold  goods stolen  by

          others, however,  its argument is fundamentally flawed.   See St.
                                                                    ___ ___

          Cyr, 977 F.2d at 702 ("the government bears the burden  of estab-
          ___

          lishing that the ITB enhancement applies in a given case").6

                                          II
                                          II

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                              
          ____________________

               6As the ITB  enhancement is  inapplicable to  McMinn, it  is
          unnecessary  to resolve  the  "double counting"  claim; that  is,
          whether  it was appropriate to consider the same criminal conduct
          in determining the upward departure and the ITB enhancement.
                                              ___

                                          14

                    For the foregoing reasons,  the district court judgment

          is vacated and  the case is remanded  for resentencing consistent

          with this opinion.  

                                          15