Court Opinion

ID: 3598148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 23:45:20.100832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:10.398291
License: Public Domain

This action was to recover seven months' rent of a dwelling house situated upon Madison avenue in the city of New York. There was a lease between the parties by which the defendants rented the premises from May 1, 1894, for the period of one year, the rent payable in monthly installments in advance. The rent for that term has been paid. By this action the plaintiff seeks to recover rent for a portion of the succeeding year, on the ground that the defendants held over after the expiration of their term, and thus became liable for the rent of the premises for that time.
The facts are undisputed. The defendants alleged as a defense to the action the making of the contract or lease with the plaintiff; that in the month of February, 1895, before the expiration of their term, they notified the plaintiff that they would not retain the premises for another year, and that after such notice the plaintiff and his agents were permitted to show the premises and to place the usual notice "To Let" upon them, which remained during the balance of the term. The defendants then specially alleged that on May 1, 1895, the defendants were prevented from yielding up the possession of the premises by the act of God in afflicting their mother, who was a member of their family, with a disease which, at that time, previously, and subsequently including May fifteenth, confined her to her bed so that it would have endangered her life to take her from the house; that for that reason and no other, of which the plaintiff had full knowledge and notice, the defendants were obliged to and did occupy a small portion of the premises until May fifteenth; that all their property, furniture and belongings and their family were removed from the premises, and every part thereof on May 1, 1895, except *Page 42 
from the sick room in which their mother was confined, and that they were forbidden by the physician in charge to remove her until May fifteenth, when she was at once removed.
Upon the trial it was admitted that upon the first of February, 1895, the defendants notified the plaintiff that on the first of May they would give up and surrender the possession of the premises. That they were occupied under the lease was admitted, also the rate of rent, and the fact that the defendants from necessity held over after the expiration of the lease some fifteen days. The plaintiff then admitted the facts set up in the answer as to the impossibility of the defendants' surrendering possession at the expiration of the year, so that the question presented is whether, notwithstanding the facts alleged in the answer, the plaintiff was entitled as a matter of law to recover rent for the succeeding year, upon the ground that the defendants held over after the expiration of their term.
The admission of the plaintiff amounts to a concession that by reason of the sickness of the defendants' mother it was impossible for them to surrender up the possession of the premises to the plaintiff; that so far as it was possible they did so; and, hence, that their retention was wholly involuntary. If there was any doubt as to the question of impossibility, it should have been submitted to the jury, and the defendants' exception to the direction of a verdict was well taken. Thus, in a word, the question is whether that impossibility justified the defendants' action, or whether, although it was impossible to surrender the entire premises, the holding of a small part for a few days imposed upon them a liability for rent for the succeeding year.
It is well settled that where a tenant voluntarily holds over after the expiration of his term, he may be held as upon an agreement to hold for a year upon the terms of the prior lease. (Conway v. Starkweather, 1 Denio. 114; Commissioners ofPilots v. Clark, 33 N.Y. 251; Haynes v. Aldrich, 133 N.Y. 287,289.)
The basis of this liability is often said to be an implied *Page 43 
agreement upon the part of the tenant to hold for another year. While I doubt, as I always have, the propriety of calling this class of obligations implied contracts, but think they are to be regarded as duties which the law imposes, yet, whether they be denominated implied contracts or duties created by law, in either case the right arises upon an implication of law and in no sense upon an express or absolute contract.
It is also well settled that where a duty or charge is created by law, and the performance is prevented by inevitable accident or the act of God, without fault of the party sought to be charged, he will be excused, but where a person absolutely and by express contract binds himself to do a particular thing which is not at the time impossible or unlawful, he will not be excused, unless through the fault of the other party. The reason given for the latter portion of this rule is that he might have provided by his contract against inevitable accident or the act of God. (Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N.Y. 99; Tompkins v. Dudley,25 N.Y. 272; Dexter v. Norton, 47 N.Y. 62.)
Thus the most that can be said of the obligation that arises from the relation of landlord and tenant and follows by a general lease, is that the tenant is charged with the duty of vacating the premises at the end of his term. If he fails, it is a breach of his duty and ordinarily the law implies or creates a liability on his part for another year's rent. This being a duty implied or created by law and not by an express or absolute agreement, it falls within the first part of the foregoing rule, and, hence, it is obvious that if the tenant's removal was rendered impossible by inevitable accident or the act of God, he is excused for his omission to surrender the premises, at least so far as it creates a liability for a year's rent which is implied by law.
The reason for the distinction between the effect of impossibility of performance, occasioned by inevitable accident or the act of God, upon an obligation created by express contract, and upon an obligation which the law implies, has been held to rest "upon the unwillingness of the law to at once *Page 44 
create, impose and exact the performance of an obligation forbidden or rendered impracticable by the interposition of Providence." (School District v. Dauchy, 25 Conn. 530.) Under the principle of the authorities relating to this subject, I think it is clear that, as the obligation sought to be enforced was one created by law and not by the agreement of the parties, impossibility of performance was a valid excuse, and the defendants cannot be held for the rent for the subsequent year.
Moreover, the same result may be reached upon another ground. There are many cases where the courts have implied a condition in a contract to the effect that a party is relieved from its terms where its performance has, without his fault, become impossible. The principle upon which those cases are based is that, when the contract was made, the parties contemplated that the condition which subsequently existed might arise and render performance impossible, and that the implied condition is to be construed as a part of the existing contract, and thus relieves the party from liability in case that condition arises. (Dexter v. Norton,47 N.Y. 62; Lorillard v. Clyde, 142 N.Y. 456, 462; Stewart
v. Stone, 127 N.Y. 507; Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N.Y. 40, 44;Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best  S. 826; Robinson v. Davison,
L.R. [6 Ex.] 269; Kein v. Tupper, 52 N.Y. 550, 555; Dolan
v. Rodgers, 149 N.Y. 489, 492.)
To hold in this case that this agreement was made upon an implied condition that the defendants should not be required to vacate the premises at the expiration of their term in the event that it was rendered impossible by inevitable accident or the act of God is quite within the principle of the authorities cited. But, be this as it may, it is manifest that the charge or liability which the plaintiff seeks to enforce was created by law and not by agreement, and that as its performance was prevented without the defendants' fault, they were excused from the onerous liability which the plaintiff now seeks to enforce.
It may well be, and doubtless is, true that the plaintiff may *Page 45 
recover for the time the premises were occupied by the defendants, or if by reason of their failure to surrender up the premises additional damages follow, that they may be recovered in a proper action so that all damages caused by the defendants' misfortune would be borne by them, but that he cannot recover the rent for the subsequent year upon the implied contract or duty imposed by law, seems to me clear.
These considerations lead me to the conclusion that the judgment in this action should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.