Court Opinion

ID: 9369611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 16:01:43.486814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:16.129000
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-9527    Document: 010110810631        Date Filed: 02/09/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          February 9, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  VINCENT MCKINNON,

        Petitioner,

  v.                                                           No. 22-9527
                                                           (Petition for Review)
  MERRICK B. GARLAND,
  United States Attorney General,

        Respondent.
                          _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Petitioner Vincent McKinnon, a lawful permanent resident of the United

 States, was convicted of robbery with a dangerous weapon in 1988 and sexual assault

 on a child by a person in position of trust in 2004. The Department of Homeland

 Security (“DHS”) charged Mr. McKinnon as removable under 8 U.S.C.

 § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having twice been convicted of crimes involving moral

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-9527    Document: 010110810631       Date Filed: 02/09/2023    Page: 2

 turpitude (“CIMTs”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found that his convictions

 qualified as CIMTs and sustained the charge of removability. The Board of

 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed. Mr. McKinnon has filed a petition for

 review. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we deny the petition.

                                    I. BACKGROUND

       Mr. McKinnon was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent

 resident in 1982. In 1988, he pled guilty in North Carolina to robbery with a

 dangerous weapon in violation of § 14-87(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes.

 Mr. McKinnon was sentenced to 14 years in prison, but he was released after five

 years. In 2004, a Colorado jury convicted him of (1) sexual assault on a child in

 violation of § 18-3-405(1) of the Colorado Revised Statutes, and (2) sexual assault on

 a child by a person in a position of trust in violation of § 18-3-405.3(1). He was

 sentenced to 16 years in prison.

       In May 2021, the DHS issued a Notice to Appear charging Mr. McKinnon as

 removable for having been convicted of CIMTs not arising out of a single scheme of

 misconduct. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (“Any alien who at any time after

 admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising

 out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, . . . is deportable.”). The charge was

 based on the North Carolina robbery conviction and the Colorado conviction for

 sexual assault on a child by a person in a position of trust. Mr. McKinnon admitted

 to the fact of the convictions but denied the charge of removability. He applied for

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 asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

 Torture, and testified in support of his applications on October 6, 2021.

        The IJ’s written decision found Mr. McKinnon removable and denied his

 applications for relief and protection. The IJ determined Mr. McKinnon is removable

 under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) because his convictions were for CIMTs that did not arise

 out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. Mr. McKinnon appealed this

 conclusion to the BIA, which affirmed. He then filed the instant petition for review

 with this court.

                                    II. DISCUSSION

                                 A. Standard of Review

        Mr. McKinnon argues his convictions for robbery and sexual assault on a child

 by one in a position of trust are not CIMTs under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). We review

 this question of law de novo. De Leon v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir.

 2015). We owe no deference to the BIA’s interpretation of a state-law offense, but

 “if a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . is arguably subject to

 differing interpretations, we will defer to the BIA’s interpretation provided it is

 reasonable.” Id. (quotations omitted). In cases where the BIA affirms the IJ, we

 review the BIA’s decision. See Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th

 Cir. 2006). But we may consult the IJ’s decision when it provides a more complete

 explanation. See id.

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                          B. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude

       Moral turpitude involves conduct that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved,

 contrary to the accepted rules of morality and duties owed between man and man,

 either one’s fellow man or society in general.” Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 921

 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). To qualify as a CIMT, an offense must

 involve “reprehensible conduct” and require “some form of scienter.” Flores-Molina

 v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1150, 1159 (10th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted).

       In determining whether an offense is a CIMT, we apply a categorical

 approach. De Leon, 808 F.3d at 1230. Rather than consider actual conduct

 underlying the conviction, “we presume that the conviction rested upon nothing more

 than the least of the acts criminalized by the statute, and then determine whether even

 those acts are encompassed by the generic federal offense.” Id. (brackets and

 quotations omitted). “[T]he focus on the minimum conduct criminalized by the state

 statute is not an invitation to apply legal imagination to the state offense.” United

 States v. Dominguez-Rodriguez, 817 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th Cir. 2016) (quotations

 omitted). “[T]here must be a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that

 the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of

 a crime.”1 Id. (quotations omitted).

       1
          Mr. McKinnon argues the “realistic probability” standard impermissibly
 shifts the burden to respondents in removal proceedings, requiring them to show they
 are not removable despite statutory direction that the burden of establishing
 removability rests with the agency. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). But
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 1. Robbery Conviction

       The BIA has held that “robbery is universally recognized as a crime involving

 moral turpitude.” Matter of Martin, 18 I. & N. Dec. 226, 227 (B.I.A. 1982).

 Mr. McKinnon argues that his North Carolina robbery conviction does not satisfy the

 common law definition of robbery because the statute does not require the use of

 force or an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. The North

 Carolina Supreme Court has held otherwise.

              An armed robbery [under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87] is defined
              as the taking of the personal property of another in his
              presence or from his person without his consent by
              endangering or threatening his life with a firearm, with the
              taker knowing that he is not entitled to the property and the
              taker intending to permanently deprive the owner of the
              property.

 State v. Davis, 271 S.E.2d 263, 264 (N.C. 1980) (emphasis added). Because the

 statute requires a permanent taking that threatens or endangers a person’s life, we

 agree with the BIA that Mr. McKinnon’s North Carolina robbery conviction was

 categorically a CIMT. See Matter of C-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 370, 376 (B.I.A. 1953) (“The

 unlawful taking of the property of another by force or by threats is a crime so vile

 that it unquestionably involves moral turpitude.”).

 Mr. McKinnon acknowledges the “realistic probability” standard has been adopted in
 this circuit, see De Leon, 808 F.3d at 1232, and we “cannot overrule the judgment of
 another panel absent en banc consideration or an intervening Supreme Court decision
 that is contrary to or invalidates our previous analysis,” United States v. White, 782
 F.3d 1118, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted).

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 2. Sexual Assault

       Mr. McKinnon argues his conviction for sexual assault on a child by one in a

 position of trust is not a CIMT because the statute encompasses non-reprehensible

 conduct. We disagree.

       The relevant Colorado statute provides:

              Any actor who knowingly subjects another not his or her
              spouse to any sexual contact commits sexual assault on a
              child by one in a position of trust if the victim is a child
              less than eighteen years of age and the actor committing
              the offense is one in a position of trust with respect to the
              victim.

 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-405.3(1). The statute defines “sexual contact” as “[t]he

 knowing touching of the victim’s intimate parts by the actor, or of the actor’s

 intimate parts by the victim, or the knowing touching of the clothing covering the

 immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts if that sexual contact is for

 the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.” Id. § 18-3-401(4)(a).

       The statute defines “[o]ne in a position of trust” as

              [A]ny person who is a parent or acting in the place of a
              parent and charged with any of a parent’s rights, duties, or
              responsibilities . . . including a guardian or someone
              otherwise responsible for the general supervision of a
              child’s welfare, or a person who is charged with any duty
              or responsibility for the health, education, welfare, or
              supervision of a child, including foster care, child care,
              family care, or institutional care . . . no matter how brief, at
              the time of an unlawful act.

 Id. § 18-3-401(3.5). The Colorado Supreme Court has held that this definition

 includes “doctors and health care professionals, teachers and counselors, child care

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 and foster attendants, and those who assume responsibility for the temporary care of

 a child in the parent’s absence, such as a babysitter.” People v. Roggow, 318 P.3d

 446, 451 (Colo. 2013) (quotations omitted). The court explained that “the broad

 definition . . . adopted by the legislature is not limited to these categories,” which

 reflect, however, the legislature’s “overarching intent to target those offenders who

 are entrusted with special access to a child victim and who exploit that access to

 commit an offense against the child.” Id. at 450 (emphasis added; quotations

 omitted).

       We agree with the BIA that the “position of trust” element, as defined by the

 legislature and interpreted by the Colorado Supreme Court, renders a conviction

 under § 18-3-405.3(1) categorically a crime involving moral turpitude.

       Mr. McKinnon argues the position-of-trust limitation is so broad that the

 statute’s reach includes non-reprehensible conduct. He hypothesizes that the statute

 would criminalize an 18-year-old lifeguard’s consensual touching of the clothed

 buttocks of a 17-year-old swimmer, but he has not cited any precedential support. He

 therefore “has not carried his burden of showing an actual risk that [Colorado] would

 prosecute his hypothetical [lifeguard].” De Leon, 808 F.3d at 1232.

       Mr. McKinnon also argues that Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 826

 (B.I.A. 2016), is the “controlling case” regarding unlawful sexual contact with a

 child. Opening Br. at 26. There, the BIA held that a conviction under a Texas statute

 prohibiting sexual contact with a child under 17 years old was not a CIMT. Silva-

 Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 835. Silva-Trevino is distinguishable. Unlike the

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 Colorado statute, the Texas statute lacked language limiting it to persons in a position

 of trust. Also, Texas precedent showed a realistic probability that the statute would

 be applied to non-reprehensible fact patterns. See id. at 828, 835-36. Mr. McKinnon

 has not cited any Colorado decisions establishing a reasonable probability that § 18-

 3-405.3(1) would be applied in such a manner.

       We thus discern no error in the BIA’s conclusion that Mr. McKinnon’s sexual

 assault conviction in Colorado was for a CIMT within § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).2

                                  III. CONCLUSION

       We deny Mr. McKinnon’s petition.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
                                             Circuit Judge

       2
         Because Mr. McKinnon admits he was convicted of robbery and sexual
 assault on a child, we reject his argument that the government failed to prove that
 Mr. McKinnon is removable.

                                               8