Court Opinion

ID: 9771963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:03:36.24469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:40.620083
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
The appellee points out that the general rule is that a nonparticipating partner is not liable unless the tortious act was done within the course and scope of authority. It adds that an exception to this rule is recognized when the nonparticipating partner adopts or ratifies the unauthorized conduct, and it asserts that an exception based on consent (or ratification or adoption) applies only to unauthorized acts purportedly done on behalf of, or for the benefit of one alleged to have ratified the act.
The rule stated in the K & G Oil Tool & Service Co. case, supra, and quoted in our opinion, has frequently been observed in opinions and texts, sometimes in slightly different terms.
In its opinion in the K & G case our Supreme Court cited Corona Petroleum Co. v. Jameson, 146 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tex.Civ. App.1940, writ dism., correct judg.), when *233it enunciated the Texas rule on this point. In Corona it was stated:
“To hold all members of a partnership liable jointly and severally, it must be made to appear from the evidence that the wrongful acts of the offending one were, in law, authorized by the partnership, or were done in the performance of something connected with the furtherance of the interests of the copartnership; these things may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. * * *”
A leading case, Schloss v. Silverman, 172 Md. 632, 192 A. 343 (1937), discusses application of the rule to a number of fact situations and states “the weight of authority supports the view that where one partner commits a willful and malicious tort not within the scope of the agency or the common business of the partnership, to which the other members have not consented, and which has not been ratified, they are not liable for harm thereby caused.”
A frequently cited statement of the rule is found at 40 Amer.Jur. 262, Partnership § 190. “A necessary foundation for the liability of partners or the partnership for the tortious act of a copartner is that the act shall be performed in the line of the copartnership business, and if the injury results from a wanton or wilful act of one of the parties committed outside the agency or common business, then the person doing the act and causing the injury is alone responsible, unless the act which constituted the tort was authorized by the members of the partnership or subsequently ratified by them, the act itself having been done in their behalf and interest.” Does “the act itself having been done in their behalf and interest” apply to acts authorized as well as those ratified by the other members of the partnership? We look to the only case cited by the text in support of the rule, Idom v. Weeks, 135 Miss. 65, 99 So. 761. In explanation of the point it was stated: “‘The authorities just cited establish simply that, as a partnership is an aggregation of individuals, where each one is the authorized agent of the others to perform any act within the scope of the partnership enterprise, if one of them, in the prosecution of the business of the partnership, be guilty of a willful wrong towards another, the other partners will be liable, and that, if one partner is guilty of an act outside of the partnership business which causes any injury, the other partners will not be liable unless it appear that such act was expressly authorized by them, or, after the same had been performed in their behalf and interest, they had either expressly ratified the same or knowingly received the fruits of the wrongful act.’ ” Citing Page v. Citizens Bkg. Co., 111 Ga. 73, 36 S.E. 418 (1900).
The K & G Oil Tool & Service Co. case, supra, states the rule broadly enough to apply to either acts which were consented to or authorized by the nonparticipating partner. We find no Texas case which indicates the character of consent needed to make a nonparticipating partner liable, but note the holding in the case of Gilbert v. Emmons, 42 Ill. 143, 89 Am.Dec. 412 (1866), cited at 120 A.L.R. 1325, that mere knowledge and consent of one partner in the act of a copartner in causing the arrest of a person on a charge of larceny of money belonging to the firm will not render the partner so knowing and consenting liable to an action for malicious prosecution, but it is necessary that the consent be of such a character as to amount to advice and cooperation.
Other courts have not required that the consent shown be more than tacit. In Dulchevsky v. Solomon, 136 Wash. 645, 241 P. 19 (1925), cited in Vrabel v. Acri, 156 Ohio St. 467, 103 N.E.2d 564, 30 A.L.R.2d 853 (1952) which was cited in the K & G case, supra, it was held that a jury issue as to liability of Morris Solomon for a willful and malicious attack on a customer by his partner, Joseph Solomon, was raised by evidence that Morris was present but did not say or do anything. This was held to be sufficient evidence to raise a fact issue as to Morris’ tacit consent to Joseph’s attack. *234“The rule is as stated in Polis v. Heizmann, 276 Pa. 315, 120 A. 269 (1923), which decided that, while the act of the offending partner was committed during a transaction which was within the scope of the firm’s business, the offense of assault was not, and said: ‘The case is different where the master or partner sought to be charged was present at the assault and failed to protest.’ * * *”
 We consider that the cases cited by the appellee support its position that the partnership may be held to have ratified only those unauthorized acts purportedly done on behalf of or for its benefit, but we do not agree that Sullivan v. O’Brien, 85 S.W.2d 1106 (Tex.Civ.App.1935 writ ref.), supports its argument that consent alone cannot establish the liability of a nonparticipating partner for malicious acts of his copartner. We believe that in the Sullivan case it was not shown that the defendants were partners of the one whose acts were allegedly malicious.
It is not for us to speculate in this summary judgment proceeding on what pos-siblity there might be of the appellant’s showing in a trial on the merits that any of Dr. Brewer’s partners consented to his alleged conduct.
The appellee’s motion for rehearing is denied.