Court Opinion

ID: 9390566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 19:03:09.646451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.270009
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/27/23 Hernandez v. Palo Verde Healthcare District CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY HERNANDEZ,                                                   D080910

         Plaintiff and Appellant,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. BLC2000143)

PALO VERDE HEALTHCARE
DISTRICT,

         Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Russell L. Moore, Judge. Affirmed.
         McElfish Law Firm, Raymond D. McElfish, and Tara Heckard Bryant,
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Davis, Grass, Goldstein & Finlay, Gabriel M. Benrubi, for Defendant
and Respondent Palo Verde Healthcare District.
         Plaintiff Anthony Hernandez filed a lawsuit against Palo Verde
Hospital (PVH) based on events that occurred in the hospital emergency room
on March 2, 2019. PVH filed a demurrer, contending it was a public entity,
and Hernandez failed to provide it with the notice required by the California
Torts Claims Act (“the Act”) (Gov. Code,1 §§ 911.2 & 945.4), a precondition to
filing suit. The court granted the demurrer without leave to amend and
entered judgment in PVH’s favor.
      On appeal, Hernandez contends that PVH did not provide adequate
proof it is a public entity that requires a complainant to give notice under the
Act; he should be exempted from the notice requirements because he
conducted due diligence and determined PVH was not a public entity; his
notice to the State of California (the State) and Riverside County (the
County) met the Act’s notice requirements; PVH’s knowledge of the
underlying incident provided actual notice; and procedural errors dictate a
reversal. We conclude these contentions lack merit, and we affirm the
judgment.
                                       I.
                BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL FACTS
      On September 2, 2020, Hernandez filed a complaint. It named PVH as
a defendant. PVH was served March 2, 2021.
      On March 3 or 5, 2021, the register of actions reported a first amended
complaint with summons served on two parties.
      On March 8, 2021, PVH’s attorney e-mailed Hernandez’s attorney and
asked if any claim notice had been served with Palo Verde Healthcare
District, which had been named and served as PVH. PVH’s attorney also
indicated that it would file a demurrer based on the failure to file the claim
notice. In a follow-up meet and confer letter dated March 29, 2021, PVH’s
attorney clarified that the hospital is a public entity and so Hernandez was
required to submit a notice of claim within six months of accrual of the cause

1    Further statutory references are to the Government Code unless
otherwise specified.
                                       2
of action to pursue the lawsuit. Its demurrer would be based on the failure to
do so.
         On April 9, 2021, PVH filed a demurrer based on Hernandez’s failure to
submit a notice of claim to Palo Verde Healthcare District as required by the
Act (§§ 911.2 & 945.3). PVH concurrently filed a request for judicial notice of
three documents: (1) a General Acute Care license issued in 2021 by
California and authorizing Palo Verde Healthcare District to operate as Palo
Verde Hospital; (2) a Statement of Facts, Roster of Public Agencies filing
completed by the chief executive officer (CEO) of Palo Verde Healthcare
District; and (3) a document printed from the national provider indicator
(NPI) website in March 2021 that listed Palo Verde Healthcare District
operating a General Acute Care Hospital at 250 N. 1st Street in Blythe,
California. The hearing was scheduled for May 7, 2021.
         On April 30, 2021, Hernandez’s attorney e-mailed counsel for PVH to
explain that Hernandez planned to file a second amended complaint in which
he would allege that he served the State and the County with government
claims that were denied. The amended complaint would also allege that the
only information located for PVH was a business entity.
         On May 6, 2021, PVH filed a “Notice of Plaintiff’s Non-opposition to
Palo Verde Healthcare District (Named as Palo Verde Hospital)’s Demurrer
Motion to Strike.”
         The same day, Hernandez filed and served an opposition to the
demurrer, late.
         The court heard arguments from both parties on May 7, 2021 and
treated the demurrer as responsive to the first amended complaint. The
court granted PVH’s request for judicial notice and sustained the demurrer to
the first amended complaint without leave to amend. The court explained

                                         3
that the judicially noticed documents established that PVH was a public
entity and cited People v. Superior Court (Sahlolbei) (2017) 3 Cal.5th 230, 233
(Sahlolbei), a case in which the Supreme Court noted PVH “is a public entity
under California law.” Because the complaint, filed almost 18 months after
the alleged injury, was silent about filing a claim with PVH within six
months of the incident, the court concluded it did not meet the requirements
of section 911.2.
      An amendment to complaint was entered on the register of actions on
May 11, 2021.
      At a case management conference on June 25, 2021, the court granted
Hernandez leave to amend the first amended complaint.
      The same day, judgment was entered in favor of Palo Verde Healthcare

District.2
      Hernandez timely appealed.
                                       II.
                                 DISCUSSION
                             A. Standard of Review
      “On appeal from an order of dismissal after an order sustaining a
demurrer, the standard of review is de novo; we exercise our independent
judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of
law.” (Stearn v. County of San Bernardino (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 434, 439.)
To establish adequate pleading, a plaintiff must show the facts pleaded are
“sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action.” (Cantu v.
Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879 (Cantu).) In making

2     The judgment states that the court entered judgment “having
sustained the Demurrer of Defendant Palo Verde Healthcare District, sued
and served as Palo Verde Hospital to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
on May 7, 2021, without leave to amend . . . .”
                                        4
our determination, we admit all facts properly pleaded. (Aubry v. Tri-City
Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) We also read allegations “in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff and liberally construed with a view to
attaining substantial justice among the parties.” (Venice Town Council v.
City of L.A. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1557.)
       However, “ ‘ “a complaint otherwise good on its face is nevertheless
subject to demurrer when facts judicially noticed render it defective.” ’ ”
(Marina Tenants Assn. v. Deauville Marina Development Co. (1986) 181
Cal.App.3d 122, 130.) A court may take judicial notice of facts that contradict
the face of a complaint. (Swiss Park, Inc. v. City of Duarte (1982) 136
Cal.App.3d 755, 758-759.) When they contradict, “[t]he complaint should be
read as containing the judicially noticeable facts, ‘even when the pleading
contains an express allegation to the contrary.’ ” (Cantu, supra, 4
Cal.App.4th at p. 877, quoting Chavez v. Times-Mirror Co. (1921) 185 Cal. 20,
23.)
       We review the trial court’s refusal to grant leave to amend the pleading
under the abuse of discretion standard. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002)
27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.)
                     B. The Government Claims Act
       The Act defines a public entity to include a “district.” (§ 811.2.) A
“[l]ocal public entity” also includes a “district.” (§ 900.4.) Local health care
districts are a type of “district” under the Local Health Care District Law.
(Health & Saf. Code, § 32000 et seq.) In 1994, Senate Bill No. 1169 changed
the name of “The Local Hospital District Law” to “The Local Health Care
District Law.” (Sen. Gov. Cmt., Aug. 8, 1994). Healthcare districts “are
independent public agencies governed by five or seven popularly elected
directors.” (Sen. Gov. Com. Bill Analysis of Sen. Bill 1169 (1993-1994 Reg.

                                        5
Sess.) as amended Aug. 8, 1994, para. 1.); Health & Saf. Code, § 32100.) “As
local agencies, they must comply with the Brown Act, the Public Records Act,
the Political Reform Act, and public contracting laws, among others.” (Sen.
Floor Analysis of Sen. Bill 1169 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 12, 1994,
Analysis.) Health care districts are governed by a locally elected board of
directors (Health & Saf. Code, § 32100), and claims against them are
governed by the Government Code (id. at § 32492).
      Under the Act (§ 810 et seq.), a person may not sue a public entity for
personal injury unless he or she presents a timely written claim for damages
to the public entity. (§§ 911.2, subd. (a), 945.4.) Section 905 requires that
“all claims for money or damages against local public entities” must be
“presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and
Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) . . . .” Such claims must be
presented to the public entity “not later than six months after the accrual of
the cause of action.” (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) The failure to do so bars the
plaintiff from suing that entity. (§ 945.4.) When a complaint fails to allege
compliance with the requirements of the Act, the complaint is subject to
dismissal. (See State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234,
1237.)
                                  C. Analysis
      It is a “cardinal rule of appellate review that a judgment or order of
the trial court is presumed correct and prejudicial error must be
affirmatively shown.” (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198
Cal.App.4th 181, 187 (Foust).) To overcome this presumption, the
appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record to
affirmatively demonstrate error. (Ibid.; Sutter Health Uninsured Pricing
Cases (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 495, 498 (Sutter Health) [incomplete record

                                        6
is construed against appellant].) If the appellant cannot show error in the
record, the presumption of correctness requires us to affirm the order.
(Foust, at p. 187.)
      Hernandez’s failure to provide a copy of the operative complaint
means we cannot evaluate whether it pleads sufficient facts to sustain its
causes of action. This does not, itself, prove fatal here because the parties
appear to agree that Hernandez did not identify PVH as a public entity in
any version of the complaint, and he did not allege that he provided notice to
PVH, as required by the Act. (§ 911.2, subd. (a) & 945.4.) Hernandez
indicates such an allegation is not necessary because PVH has not adequately
demonstrated that it is a public entity.
      To demonstrate the complaint could not allege Hernandez met the
precondition of giving notice to a public entity, PVH sought and received
judicial notice of three documents: (1) a 2021 license issued by the state
authorizing Palo Verde Healthcare District to operate under the name Palo
Verde Hospital; (2) a website printout identifying the NPI for Palo Verde
Healthcare District that shows the healthcare district operates a general
acute care hospital at the address of PVH; and (3) a 2021 Roster of Public
Agencies filing document signed electronically by the PVH CEO.
      Hernandez challenges the submission of these documents, contending
the court lacked the authority to accept the facts stated within them.
However, he forfeited this challenge by failing to object to the propriety of
judicial notice in the superior court. (See People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th
393, 438 [absent a specific objection to evidence on the ground raised on
appeal, challenge is forfeited]; Younan v. Caruso (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 401,
406, fn. 3 [failure to timely object to propriety of judicial notice waives the
objection]; see Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)

                                         7
      Our review of these documents reveals that the State of California has
authorized the Palo Verde Healthcare District to operate under the name
“Palo Verde Hospital,” the entity named in the suit. The NPI, a unique
number assigned to healthcare providers, states that Palo Verde Healthcare
District “is a General Acute Care Hospital,” indicating Palo Verde Healthcare
District and PVH are the same entity. The address listed for Palo Verde
Healthcare District is 250 N 1st St. in Blythe, California, the same address
listed on the license issued to PVH. These documents demonstrate that Palo
Verde Healthcare District and PVH are the same entity.
      The third document, the Statement of Facts, Roster of Public Agencies
Filing, if filed with the State, would show that Palo Verde Healthcare District
is a public entity. However, the copy of the document submitted does not
show that it was actually filed with the Secretary of State; thus, it is not
evidence of inclusion in the State’s list of public agencies.
      Still, we are satisfied that Palo Verde Healthcare District and PVH are
the same entity, and because PVH is a health care district, it is a public
entity. (§§ 811.2 & 900.4.) Moreover, PVH’s status as a public entity is
confirmed in Sahlolbei, a case in which our Supreme Court considered
whether the chief of staff and director of the surgical department who had
been hired as an independent contractor could properly be considered an
employee of the hospital so that he could be liable under criminal provisions
in section 1090 for knowing and willful self-dealing. (Sahlolbei, supra, 3

                                        8
Cal.5th at p. 233.) In its opinion, the Supreme Court noted that PVH “is a

public entity under California law.”3 (Sahlolbei, at p. 233.)
      Hernandez next argues that section 950.4 should operate as an
exception to the notice requirements.
      Section 950.4 states that a cause of action against a public employee is
not barred if the claimant pleads and proves he or she did not know or have
reason to know that the injury was caused by an act or omission of the public
entity or an employee of the public entity in the scope of employment. Thus,
when a claimant acquires knowledge during the period in which a late claim
could be filed, the claimant may still file suit against an employee even
though the claimant is barred from suit against the employing public entity
for failure to meet the notice requirements. (Moore v. Morhar (1977) 65
Cal.App.3d 896, 901-902.)

3      Hernandez’s claim that PVH’s own website makes no mention of it
being a public entity is not entirely accurate. The offered website URL,
paloverdehospital.com, does not lead to an active website. However,
paloverdehospital.org indicates PVH is a health care district. Specifically, as
of April 27, 2023, the “About Us” page states: “The Palo Verde Healthcare
District was created for the purpose of purchasing and reopening Palo Verde
Hospital. The Palo Verde Healthcare District, which encompasses 1,022
square miles in eastern Riverside County, is the only publicly elected body in
the Palo Verde Valley charged solely with overseeing healthcare in our
community. The five member board is elected from at-large throughout the
District to represent the people of the Palo Verde Valley[.]”
( [as of April 27, 2023]
archived at .) This information clearly
indicates PVH falls within the statutory definition of a public entity. (See
Gov. Code, §§ 811.2, 900.4; Health & Saf. Code, § 32000 et seq.) We do not
know if this information was presented to the superior court, or whether the
website was altered in the time between the demurrer ruling and our review
because, although Hernandez refers to it, he does not direct us to any
documents in the record referencing the PVH’s website. Thus, we do not rely
on it to reach our conclusion that PVH is a public entity.
                                        9
      However, section 950.4 applies to public employees, not public entities.
(See, e.g., Williams v. Braslow (1986) 179 Cal. App.3d 762, 772 [applying
section 950.4 to a public employee].) Although Hernandez comments that
this exception should apply to entities, he does not explain why. He points to
nothing in the code that would suggest the Legislature agrees. Had the
Legislature wanted to extend the reach of the exception, it could have.
Because section 950.4 does not apply to public entities, amending the
complaint to add facts demonstrating that Hernandez diligently conducted an

exhaustive search would not cure the defect here.4
      Hernandez alternatively contends that he timely submitted the
required notice to PVH by providing notices to the State and the County. He
also argues that PVH had actual notice of the claim because it investigated
the incident when it occurred. He maintains that these actions demonstrate
substantial compliance with the Act’s notice requirements.
      These arguments were raised on appeal for the first time in
Hernandez’s reply brief. It is well settled that “ ‘ “points raised in the reply
brief for the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for
failure to present them before. . . .” ’ ” (Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative
Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 894, fn. 10
(Shade Foods), quoting Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enterprises (1990) 217
Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn. 8.) Hernandez waived these arguments by failing to
raise them in his opening brief, and he has not demonstrated good cause for
doing so.

4     A plaintiff can argue a trial court’s decision sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend abused discretion by demonstrating for the first
time on appeal that additional facts can be alleged that would cure the
pleading defect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 472c; see Sanowicz v. Bacal (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 1027, 1044.)
                                        10
      Were we to consider the merits, we would nonetheless affirm the
sustention of the demurrer. A health care district is an independent public
agency, not one owned or operated by the State or the County. (See Sen. Gov.
Com. Bill Anal. Of Sen. Bill No. 1169 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended
Aug. 8, 1994, para. 1.) Notice to other public entities is not sufficient to meet
the notice requirements of the Act. DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 983 (DiCampli-Mintz) does not hold otherwise.
      In DiCampli-Mintz, the plaintiff provided notice to a hospital rather
than to the county that owned and operated it. (DiCampli-Mintz, supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 987.) The Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff’s
actions complied with section 915, subdivision (e)(1), a statute that explains
how “actual receipt” can meet the notice requirements of the Act. (DiCampli-
Mintz, at p. 990.) The plaintiff argued she had substantially complied by
delivering notice to the Risk Management Department of the hospital, which
she alleged “was the county department most directly involved with”
processing tort claims against the hospital. (Id. at pp. 988-989.) The court
explained that “[t]he claimant bears the burden of ensuring that the claim is
presented to the appropriate public entity. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 991.) It
concluded that “if an appropriate public employee or board never receives the
claim, an undelivered or misdirected claim fails to comply with the statute.”
(Id. at p. 992.) Further, “[e]ven if the public entity has actual knowledge of
facts that might support a claim, the claims statutes must be satisfied.
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 990.) Because the plaintiff acknowledged that she
presented notice to the wrong public entity by delivering it to the hospital
instead of the county, she failed to comply with the notice requirements,
barring her suit. (Id. at p. 991.)

                                       11
      Hernandez does not claim he ever provided notice to PVH; thus, he did
not provide “actual notice” to the entity he now wishes to sue, as required to
demonstrate substantial compliance with notice requirements. (DiCampli-
Mintz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 990.) His notice to the State and the County
does not demonstrate actual notice to the healthcare district, which functions
independently.
      Moreover, Hernandez’s contention that PVH was aware of the incident
and investigated it cannot substitute for the actual notice required by
section 915. (See DiCampli-Mintz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 990.) “ ‘ “It is well-
settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of the public
entity’s actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim.” ’ ”
(Id. at p. 991.) “ ‘The filing of a claim is a condition precedent to the
maintenance of any cause of action against the public entity and is therefore
an element that a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 990.)
      Hernandez’s reliance on Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1767 is similarly unhelpful. There, the plaintiff sought
permission to give notice late, pursuant to section 946.6, subdivision (c).
(Munoz, at pp. 1777-1778.) Under that statute, a court has discretion to give
a plaintiff relief from the notice requirements of section 954.4 if it finds that
notice was offered within a reasonable time and the failure to present the
claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect and
the defendant would not be prejudiced from the late notice. (§ 946.6,
subd. (c)(1).) However, nothing in the record here indicates that Hernandez
sought relief from his failure to give PVH notice. Thus, he never asked the
court to exercise its discretion in this manner.

                                        12
      Finally, Hernandez raises a series of procedural mistakes that he
implies warrant reversing the judgment. First, he contends that PVH did not
meet and confer in good faith. Hernandez does not articulate how PVH acted
in bad faith or explain what the consequence of that should have been.
Indeed, the meet and confer correspondence to which Hernandez directs us
shows that PVH attempted to meet and confer beginning March 8, 2021.
That communication indicated PVH planned to file a demurrer. PVH
communicated again by e-mail and U.S. mail on March 29, 2021, reiterating
its position. Hernandez’s attorney responded April 30, 2021, several weeks
after the demurrer was filed on April 9, 2021. Hernandez indicated a desire
to file a second amended complaint only after the demurrer had been filed.
      Second, Hernandez contends the court should not have issued a ruling
and should have taken the demurrer hearing off calendar because Hernandez
filed an amended complaint before the opposition to the demurrer was due.
It is unclear which amended complaint Hernandez is referencing. The
register of actions indicates a first amended complaint was filed on March 3

or March 5, 2021, before PVH filed its demurrer on April 8, 2021.5 The court
treated the demurrer as responsive to the first amended complaint.
      There is conflicting information about the filing and service of the
second amended complaint. The register of actions indicates there was an
amendment to the complaint on May 11, 2021. It also indicates that at a
June 25, 2021 case management conference, the court granted Hernandez
leave to amend the first amended complaint. Further, the judgment
indicates a second amended complaint was filed and served on the date of the
demurrer hearing, May 7, 2021. Regardless of the filing date we apply to the

5     It is unclear whether the first amended complaint was served on PVH;
the register of actions indicates two proofs of service of summons, and there
were two other defendants. The demurrer refers to the “complaint.”
                                      13
second amended complaint, Hernandez had not filed it before the deadline for
filing the opposition had passed. As it is the appellant’s burden to
demonstrate error, and Hernandez has failed to supply evidence to support
this argument, we do not consider it. (Foust, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at
p. 187; Sutter Health, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 498.)
      Hernandez’s final procedural argument, made for the first time in his
reply, is that the court entered judgment as to the second amended complaint
when the demurrer regarded the first amended complaint. He waived this
argument by failing to raise it sooner. (See Shade Foods, supra, 78
Cal.App.4th at p. 894, fn. 10.) The judgment and the notice of entry of
judgment each refer to the second amended complaint. However, the
tentative ruling and the order sustaining the demurrer reference only the
first amended complaint. Additionally, the notice of ruling on the demurrer
correctly explains that the demurrer was to the first amended complaint.
Given available information about the date on which the second amended
complaint was filed, it does not appear that the judgment regarded the
second amended complaint. Because the judgment could not regard an order
that was never given, the reference to the second amended complaint in the
judgment and notice of its entry appears to be a scrivener’s error.

                                      14
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment dismissing the suit against PVH without leave to amend
is affirmed. Parties to bear their own costs.

                                                           HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DO, J.

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