Court Opinion

ID: 9601145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:37:43.184415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:45.492224
License: Public Domain

HALLEY, Vice Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion states that the-Children’s Court found the natural father, guilty of gross neglect and, based thereon, judicially deprived him of all custody andt visitation rights. Then the opinion says-“This it had the statutory authority to do,. * * I believe this is wrong for two-reasons. First, the Uniform Adoption Act does not provide for the adopting court to-have the power as part of the adoption proceedings to make a determination judicially depriving a parent of custody of his. child. 10 O.S.1961 §§ 60.6, 60.7, specifically provide that such judicial determination-must have been made prior to the commencement' of adoption proceedings. 10-O.S.1961 § 60.6, provides that consent to-adoption is not necessary from a father “who has been judicially deprived of the-custody of the child.” And 10 O.S.1961 § 60.7, provides that where a parent “has-*503been” judicially deprived of custody his ■consent is unnecessary. This is also the ■construction placed on the Uniform Adoption Act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as shown by the Commissioners’ Note found in Uniform Laws Annotated, Volume 9, p. 30:
“It is the theory of this act that the adoption proceedings should be based •on consent. Only then can the adoption court devote its entire attention to the inquiry whether the adoptive home will serve the best interests of the ■child and whether the child is properly placed in the adoptive home.
“Under this theory controversies respecting the termination of parental rights should be settled in other proceedings in a court with jurisdiction of the parties before the adoption proceedings are brought. Once the parental rights are terminated the adoption court in the adoption proceedings has no other function in this respect except to recognize that the parental rights have been legally terminated
“It has been suggested that a proce■dure should be provided in the adoption act to terminate parental rights where the consent cannot be obtained. Aside from the jurisdictional and procedural difficulties this would entail, it is subject to a basic policy objection. The issues to be tried in a controversy ■over the termination of parental rights, i. e., the degree of unfitness of a parent, are quite different than the inquiry properly before an adoption court. The two should not be mixed. The trial of controversial issues over parental rights should not cast an influence in the adoption proceedings where the sole inquiry should be. the future best interests of the child.
“Consequently, the determination of the parental rights is left to be settled under the laws of the various states, and until terminated, by consent or by a court order in a court having jurisdiction of the parties under laws providing therefor, there can be no adoption proceedings.” (emphasis supplied.)
I believe that when our Legislature passed this Uniform Adoption Act they recognized and understood the policy considerations stated in the above Commissioners’ Note. The reasoning is valid. The adoption court should not be required to make a judicial determination concerning the custody of a non-consenting parent. As I read our statutes the adoption court is not allowed to make that determination. Such judicial determination must have been made prior to the commencing of adoption proceedings. The adoption court will then decide whether there has been a judicial determination of custody rights.
The writers on the subject of our new adoption statutes apparently share my view. See Sater, Adoption of Children, 32 O.B.J. 2376; Adoption, 14 Okl.L.R. 353.
In the instant case, the latest judicial determination prior to the adoption proceedings concerning custody was that made by the California divorce court which granted Mr. Davis partial custody. If Mr. and Mrs. Neely thought there had been a change of conditions since the California determination, they could have tried the matter in the District Court of Oklahoma County which had continuing jurisdiction over the parties as a result of the habeas corpus proceedings begun in 1955. We said in Yahola v. Berryhill, 180 Okl. 637, 71 P.2d 968, (a habeas corpus action involving custody of a child) :
“It will be noted, of course, that the trial court has continuing jurisdiction, and if a sufficient change in conditions in the future shall occur as to warrant a modification of the decree, it is within the power of the court to provide therefor.”
Similar expressions are found in Black v. May, 152 Okl. 160, 4 P.2d 17; Alford v. Thomas, Okl., 316 P.2d 188.
*504Secondly. The majority opinion makes no effort to weigh the evidence presented by Mr. and Mrs. Neely to support their claim that Mr. Davis was guilty of gross neglect of his children as this Court must do on appeal when the issue is raised. The finding of the trial court is, in my view, clearly against the weight of the evidence. The father did not neglect the children. He was prevented from ever seeing or knowing them. After her divorce from Mr. Davis in 1950, Mrs. Neely took them from California to Oklahoma. Mr. Davis corresponded with the children by letters and gifts until 1954 when he came to Oklahoma for the purpose of visiting them under the authority of the divorce decree granting his reasonable visitation privileges. Mr. and Mrs. Neely prevented him from seeing the children. In 1955, he commenced a habeas corpus proceeding to compel Mr. and Mrs. Neely to allow him to visit them. The application was denied. Thereafter letters and gifts sent to them were refused by reason of Mrs. Neely’s objections to his further contact. Her attitude is revealed in the following excerpt from her testimony on cross-examination:
“Q. Mrs. Neely, you would have to agree, would you not, that the failure of the natural father to see the children was due to your fixed objection; isn’t that true?
“A. I thought it was due to the writ of habeas corpus. I thought he wasn’t supposed to see them.
“Q. Mrs. Neely, who made it necessary to apply for a writ of habeas corpus?
“A. I felt that it would hurt the children, and I was certainly for it.
“Q. Then it has been your objection, hasn’t it?
“A. Oh, yes; and still is.”
Going on to another point, the majority opinion says: “We therefore hold that Where an adoption court determines that 'consent of a natural parent is not necessary in an adoption proceeding, such parent may yet participate in the adoption proceedings.” Despite such holding, the majority opinion finds no error was committed by the trial court in denying Mr. Davis the right to so participate, because he made no offer of proof. The case of Taylor v. Davis, 199 Okl. 260, 185 P.2d 444, cited by the majority opinion is authority only for the rule that a party who is properly allowed to participate in a trial cannot preserve for review an objection to the exclusion of evidence, unless a proper' question is asked, and, on objection thereto, a proper offer of proof is made. Such a rule cannot be stretched to fit the situation which the instant case discloses. The record shows that Mr. Davis was not advised that the hearing on the merits of the adoption would be had on the date it was held. Also the natural father should not be required to anticipate the evidence which would be presented by the Neelys and then make an offer of proof concerning what information he would elicit from their witnesses on cross-examination and what evidence he would present by his witnesses to rebut the testimony of their witnesses. Merely stating such a requirement is sufficient to show its impracticably and infeasibility.
At the conclusion of the hearing on the application for order determining the children eligible for adoption without consent of the natural father the following colloquy took place between counsel for Mr. Davis and the trial judge:
“THE COURT: The evidence on both sides having been concluded, the decision in said cause hereby being taken under advisement until May 27th at 10:00 o’clock a. m.; suggested findings of fact and conclusions of law to be presented as I have stated, and- the Court will render its decision based upon findings of fact and conclusions of law as requested by counsel.
“MR. LUTTRELL: At that time, Your Honor, the decision rendered will *505te as to whether or not the children are eligible for adoption without the consent of Mr. Davis; is that correct?
“THE COURT: That is all we have before the Court at this time.
“MR. LUTTRELL: I didn’t want to face the proposition of going into a hearing on the merits of the adoption at that point without knowing about it.”
Thereafter on the 27th day of May, 1960, the following occurred:
“MR. LUTTRELL: If the Court please, if the court should go ahead right now on the petition for adoption it would become entirely an ex parte proceeding. The court would necessarily hold that the father has no right to be heard or to take part in such proceeding. We specifically had an understanding when we left this courtroom before that the only thing we were coming back here for on May 27th was the question of eligibility of these children for adoption, and the transcript of testimony will so show, and if the court takes the view that we just don’t have any more rights at all, that’s one thing; but if the court thinks we have any rights, they would be violated by proceeding further at this time. ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ »
“THE COURT: * * * My feeling at this time is that the petition for adoption itself is part of the whole proceeding and should be disposed of at this time and that the entire matter should be appealed from at the same time; and I’m going to proceed with that, and I hope that the Supreme Court will help us in the future in determining what to do in this type of case. * * * ”
“MISS OTTER: If the Court please, we are ready to put on testimony if you desire. We have the Petitioners here on the question of adoption; however, as I have mentioned before, it is our feeling that the very testimony that would be applicable here is already of record. I would be happy to put Mr. and Mrs. Neely on if you would like for me to do so.
“MR. LUTTRELL: Your Honor, may I ask for the record, is it now the ruling of the Court that the Respondent father has no further right to be heard at this time ?
“THE COURT: Yes.
“MR. LUTTRELL: Very well, sir, may we have an exception?
“THE COURT: Yes, show the exception.”
Thereafter some evidence as to adoption was presented to the trial court and the following took place:
“THE COURT: * * * It will be the order of the court that the final decree of adoption at this time will be entered, declaring that said children named herein shall from this day forward be known as Paul Neely and Gaylord Neely, lawfully adopted children of Ralph Neely. Are you going to make any record in regard to this?
“MR. LUTTRELL: As soon as the court is through, I would like to be heard.
“THE COURT: All right, go ahead.
“MR. LUTTRELL: I would like if the the court please, to state that Mr. Rice and I feel that we should also file a motion for new trial as to this last order, and we do not have it ready because we did not anticipate this step being taken this morning. * * * ”
I am of the firm belief that the Law should be as a mantle about a man’s shoulders to give protection for the most precious and personal rights he can possess: being a father of his own children and having them bear his name. The Court should not put itself into the position of giving lip-service to such a great principle by saying he has the right to participate in the *506trial of such a matter, then in the next breath destroy its effectiveness by denying his right to participate and at the same time require him to make an offer of proof when he had been given no warning or notice that there would even be such a hearing, let alone that he should make an offer of proof as to the many intangible and at that time unknown to him elements of testimony that could and should be presented upon a hearing of this nature.
In my judgment the majority opinion distorts both the facts and the law.
I dissent.