Court Opinion

ID: 9728321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:04:55.675636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:47.586854
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: I must dissent from the holding that the trial court erred in not asking the jury the questions submitted by the defendant. The opinion quotes Rule 234 (87 Ill. 2d R. 234), which, in the last sentence, provides: “Questions shall not directly or indirectly concern matters of law or instructions.” The three questions defendant submitted are set forth in the opinion. The first relates to the State’s duty to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The second relates to the drawing of inferences from defendant’s failure to testify. The third relates to the presumption of innocence. The first and third questions are covered by Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI), Criminal, No. 2.03 (2d ed. 1971), which was given by the court. That instruction covers the presumption of innocence and the burden of the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The second question tendered is covered by IPI Criminal No. 2.04, which instructs the jury that the fact that the defendant did not testify cannot be considered in any way in arriving at the verdict. Thus, all three questions tendered by the defendant were covered by instructions on the law that were given to the jury by the court. The judge was thus precluded by our Rule 234 (87 Ill. 2d R. 234) from entertaining the questions tendered. He complied with our rule. Now, a majority of this court holds that the trial court erred in following our rule and conducting a voir dire examination in the very manner this court has directed. The lengthy discussion contained in historical and practice notes to Rule 234 contained in Smith-Hurd Annotated Statutes (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 234, Historical and Practice Notes, at 258 (Smith-Hurd 1968)) reveals that the rationale of this rule is to prohibit the asking of questions of the type tendered by the defendant. The holding of this court today could well lead to a return to the very practice which Rule 234 was designed to eliminate. Those of us who presided as trial judges prior to the adoption of Rule 234 can well remember the interminable voir dire examinations conducted by counsel for both sides who propounded questions on the law in a manner slanted to benefit the side propounding the questions. In our case, if the defendant is entitled to have the questions submitted asked, then, of course, the prosecution has a right to also propound questions relating to the law, possibly exploring the reverse side of the same legal proposition by submitting a question phrased in a manner favorable to the prosecution. Also, by opening the door, as this opinion does, both sides are invited to tender, and the judge is obliged to propound to the jury, questions on any number of questions of law that may be involved in a case. Rule 234 has performed the role for which it was designed in a very satisfactory manner. It should not be forsaken, but should be applied as the trial judge applied it in this case. For these reasons, I cannot agree with my colleagues that the trial court erred in not propounding to the jury the three questions tendered by the defendant. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD joins in this dissent.