Court Opinion

ID: 9620102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:38:21.500238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:25.666345
License: Public Domain

CARDINE, Justice,
dissenting, with whom URBIGKIT, C.J., joins.
The question here presented is which of two widows should suffer the detriment of a depressed economy causing loss of business, loss of value of assets, and eventual bankruptcy. Resolution of the question should not involve the natural sympathy a jury might have for one who most recently and tragically lost her husband or who might be in the greatest financial need. Rather, the question should be resolved by application of law, giving effect to and enforcing the solemn written agreements of the parties as the parties themselves recognized and acted in accordance with their provisions during their lifetime. I would hold that neither widow gets all.
The husbands of appellant Wilson and appellee McMahon entered into a business partnership for the operation of a car dealership in 1969. Mr. McMahon died during March 1983. The partnership agreement required Wilson to pay appellee, Mrs. McMahon, $1,000 every two weeks plus furnish medical insurance, a car, license, auto insurance, maintenance, and gas. On June 22, 1984, the parties made a written agreement by which Wilson purchased ap-*1157pellee’s entire interest in the business for $151,227.58, to be paid $1,000 twice monthly plus medical insurance, a car, license, auto insurance, maintenance, and fuel. This was essentially what Mr. Wilson was required to pay under the partnership agreement. The net effect was that he was purchasing the business without incurring an additional obligation. During the ensuing five years, the parties treated the agreement as in force and effect. Mr. Wilson paid appellee according to the terms of the agreement. He made no objections or demands of any kind.
The debt to appellee for the sale of her partnership interest was secured by purchase of a $150,000 insurance policy which is the subject of this litigation. The trial to determine who should receive what from the $150,000 insurance payment following Mr. Wilson’s death was to a jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant Mrs. Wilson, finding that nothing was owed Mrs. McMahon and effectively awarding the entire $150,000 proceeds from insurance to Mrs. Wilson. The trial court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and ordered a new trial on the question of damages. Were we to affirm, the effect of that trial court’s decision would be to award to Mrs. McMahon the amount still owed to her and award the balance to Mrs. Wilson.
Judgment notwithstanding the verdict was entered pursuant to W.R.C.P. 50(b) which provides in pertinent part:
If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed.
When the evidence is wholly insufficient to support a verdict, it is the duty of the trial court to direct a verdict or enter a JNOV, thus promoting judicial economy. Erickson v. Magill, 713 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 1986); Cody v. Atkins, 658 P.2d 59, 63-64 (1983). In determining whether a JNOV is proper, we apply the same test on appeal as does the trial judge in considering the motions originally, i.e., whether the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion reasonable persons could have reached. Carey v. Jackson, 603 P.2d 868, 877 (Wyo.1979).
In this case, the undisputed evidence establishes the parties made an agreement to sell and to buy Mrs. McMahon’s interest in the automobile and business partnership. They treated the agreement as a complete, enforceable obligation and performed under the agreement for five years. That some minor details were left to be completed did not concern the parties — probably for two reasons: First, there was no question that the minor details left would be performed upon simple request. However no such request or demand was ever made. Second, when the economy turned sour, business and profits were down, the business was unable to meet its obligations, and performance of housekeeping details was not a very significant or necessary concern.
The majority opinion cites question-and-answer testimony of appellee McMahon as evidence of an unwillingness to perform her obligations under the agreement. At best, the testimony is equivocal. In truth, it demonstrates lack of understanding of its legal ramifications by a lay person. In fact we know that had there been a demand for performance, Mrs. McMahon would have complied: First, because it was in her best interest to do so, and second, because, being required to perform as a matter of law, she would have had no other choice. The effect of the majority decision here is an all-or-nothing result, i.e., one party gets all, the other party gets nothing. That is unfair, is not justice, and thus the reason for my dissent.
The trial judge here had the benefit of sitting through several days of trial, watching live witnesses testify, observing their demeanor on the witness stand, and being involved in the dynamics of the trial. The trial court can better assess whether a verdict is the result of emotion, sorrow, and sympathy for a widow who, with her *1158husband, suffered through the depression of a failing business and ultimate suicide. The trial court concluded that neither appellant nor appellee should receive the entire $150,000 insurance policy but that ap-pellee should receive what was due and unpaid, appellant should receive the balance left after payment. Thus the order for new trial oh damages. I agree with the trial court’s disposition and would affirm.