Court Opinion

ID: 9492232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:35:43.327395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:11.685375
License: Public Domain

GAJARSA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The facts presented in this case are quite simple. In 1990, Transmatic sued Guiton for patent infringement. In 1993, the district court impaneled an advisory jury to determine, among other issues, whether there was infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. The advisory jury found infringement with damages of approximately $3 million in lost profits. The district court adopted the advisory jury’s conclusions with respect to the infringement issue and the damages award.
On appeal, this court vacated the damages award because the district judge had not complied with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon.” We held that, given the district court’s sparse findings and reasoning, we could not evaluate the damages award. We therefore vacated the damages award and remanded for “further factual findings and [reconsideration of] the amount of the award, if appropriate, in light of the court’s supplemental findings.” Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 1270, 1276, 35 USPQ2d 1035, 1040 (Fed.Cir.1995).
On remand, the district court provided the necessary factual findings and reasoning and reached the same damages award as it had previously. The district court then awarded Transmatic prejudgment interest under 35 U.S.C. § 284 for the period from October 1993 until its remand decision. The district court also awarded postjudgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 for the period after its remand decision.
In the present appeal, Guitón argues that the operative judgment date at which prejudgment interest must end under 35 U.S.C. § 284 and postjudgment interest must begin under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is the date of the first judgment of the district court that was vacated by our court.
*1351DISCUSSION
A. The Question of Deference
I am deeply troubled by this part of today’s majority opinion for two reasons. First, the issue of deference is not relevant to this case because the determination of the operative judgment date requires interpretation of Section 284, which is clearly within our exclusive mandate of interpreting the Patent Act. Second, even if deference were at issue today, the majority has announced a new test for deference that is in conflict with prior case law from our court.
The first question we are faced with is whether deference to regional circuit law is appropriate in deciding at what point prejudgment interest under 35 U.S.C. § 284 ends and postjudgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 begins. As this court has previously explained, our initial inquiry in deciding whether deference is due is “whether the law that must be applied, whether procedural or substantive, is one ‘... over which this court does not have exclusive appellate jurisdiction.’ ” Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 855-56, 20 USPQ2d 1252, 1256 (Fed.Cir.1991) (citation omitted). We noted that this inquiry has also been phrased as (1) whether the issue concerns a subject which is not unique to patent law or which is not specific to our statutory jurisdiction, or (2) whether the procedural issue may be related to substantive matters unique to the Federal Circuit. See id. at 856. The Federal Circuit has recognized that “resolution of the issue of deference in particular cases would depend on whether the procedural matter should ‘pertain to’ or be ‘related to’ patent issues, [such that] they have a direct bearing on the outcome.’ ” Id. at 857 (citing Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg., Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75, 223 USPQ 465, 471 (Fed.Cir.1984)). The Biodex court concluded its analysis of the state of the law on deference by stating “Panduit did not engrave a fixed meaning to the terms ‘unique to,’ ‘related to,’ or ‘pertainfing] to,’ our exclusive statutory subject matter jurisdiction, but instead recognized that each case must be decided by reference to the core policy of not creating unnecessary conflicts and confusion in procedural matters.” Id.
In applying this framework, the Federal Circuit has not deferred in the resolution of all procedural issues merely because those issues also arise in cases having nothing to do with patent law. We have held that the applicable standard for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, which is a procedural issue not limited to patent law, involved substantive matters unique to the Federal Circuit and therefore we declined to give deference. See Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 15 USPQ2d 1469 (Fed.Cir.1990). We have also held that the determination of whether a post-verdict motion is a prerequisite to appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a jury verdict is a procedural issue that is to be decided under Federal Circuit law because it “bears an essential relationship to matters committed to our exclusive control by statute.” Biodex, 946 F.2d at 858-59. We have also held that federal due process analysis with respect to personal jurisdiction, although a procedural issue, is intimately tied to substantive patent law, and thus merits no deference. See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564, 30 USPQ2d 1001, 1006 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“[T]he due process issue ... is a critical determinant of whether and in what forum a pat-entee can seek redress for infringement of its rights.... The creation and application of a uniform body of Federal Circuit law in this area would clearly promote judicial efficiency, would be consistent with our mandate, and would not create undue conflict and confusion at the district court level.”).
In the case at bar, the determination of the operative judgment date, i.e., the judgment that serves as the dividing line between prejudgment interest under 35 U.S.C. § 284 and postjudgment interest *1352under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, is not a determination that merely is “closely related to the exercise of our mandate” or “bears an essential relationship to our mandate.” Rather, this determination requires interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 284, the provision in the Patent Act of 1952 that provides for damages for patent infringement, which ordinarily requires prejudgment interest be awarded as part of the damages. Section 284 is a statutory provision that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. Because the determination of the operative judgment date requires interpretation of Section 284, we cannot defer to regional circuit law, otherwise we abdicate our duty to interpret patent laws. In sum, deference is not even at issue in this case as we are interpreting the Patent Act itself!
The majority opinion, however, holds that prejudgment interest under Section 284 of the Patent Act must end at the district court’s initial judgment and that such a determination does not involve the patent laws and therefore requires deference. The majority reaches this result through inconsistent reasoning. The opinion begins by stating that “the patent laws do not determine the issue before us. Section 284 ... does not connect the award of interest to any particular judgment date.... When interest begins or ends is not stated.” However, the term “interest” in Section 284 clearly refers to prejudgment interest only. See General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 103 S.Ct. 2058, 76 L.Ed.2d 211, 217 USPQ 1185 (1983). Even if it were unclear whether Section 284 applied to pre- or postjudgment interest, this would be an even greater reason to give no deference to regional circuit law. Under such circumstances, there would be an apparent overlap or conflict between Section 284 and Section 1961 and it should be within the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit to resolve this tension rather than allowing the tension to be resolved by regional circuit law. I find the majority’s opinion allowing deference on this issue to be inconsistent with our mandate.
Another factor that seems to influence unduly the majority is that the identification of the date of judgment as the dividing line between pre- and postjudgment interest is “a matter of general, not patent, law.” The majority seems to be greatly persuaded that, because many areas of law also allow for awards of pre- and post-judgment interest, such awards are not “unique to patent law” and therefore we must defer.
This is simply not the test for determining deference that we have used in the past and we should not begin its use now. That the same issue may arise in different areas of law in addition to patent law is not a reason for automatically giving deference. As this court stated in Biodex, “we have not deferred in the resolution of all procedural issues merely because that issue might separately arise in a case having nothing to do with the patent laws.” Biodex, 946 F.2d at 858. This court has, as I described above, held that procedural issues, such as the applicable standard for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the reviewability of fact findings in the absence of post-verdict motions, and the analysis of personal jurisdiction under the federal due process clause, are closely related to our mandate and require no deference. These issues all appear in contract, tort, insurance, admiralty, employment, securities, and civil rights cases and yet we have refused to give deference on these issues when patents are involved.
The majority is employing a simplistic rule for deference: If an issue can appear in a nonpatent context, then deference should be given to the regional circuit because the issue is not “unique” to patent law. Basically, the majority is announcing a new rule for determining deference today that is in conflict with prior Federal Circuit case law. This may explain why the majority fails to cite to any Federal Circuit cases during its analysis of the three factors that it believes shows no deference is required.
*1353For these reasons, I would not defer to regional circuit law.
B. The Question of When Damages are Meaningfully Ascertained
Sections 284 and 1961 are complementary statutory provisions and should therefore be interpreted consistently.1 The Supreme Court has discussed the application of Section 1961 to a vacated judgment in Kaiser and the logic of that case should apply in our present analysis of Section 284 and its interplay with Section 1961. In Kaiser, Bonjorno sued Kaiser for antitrust violations and the district court entered a directed verdict for Kaiser. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990). The appellate court reversed, holding the case had to be tried by a jury. The trial resulted in a jury verdict for Bonjorno of approximately $5.4 million (the “first jury verdict”). The district court granted Kaiser’s motion that the evidence did not support the jury award and granted a new trial as to damages. The retrial resulted in a jury verdict of approximately $9.5 million (the “second jury verdict”). Upon a motion for remittitur, the district court agreed to lower the second jury verdict. The appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment and reinstated the second jury verdict.
Eventually, Bonjorno sought post-judgment interest under Section 1961 and argued to the Supreme Court that post-judgment interest should have accrued after the first jury verdict. The Supreme Court stated:
“[T]he purpose of postjudgment interest is to compensate the successful plaintiff for being deprived of compensation for the loss from the time between the ascertainment of the damage and the payment by the defendant.” ... Where the judgment on damages was not supported by the evidence, the damages have not been “ascertained” in any meaningful way. It would be counterin-tuitive, to say the least, to believe that Congress intended postjudgment interest to be calculated from such a judgment.
Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 835-36 (citation omitted). Because the district court had determined that the evidence did not support the first jury verdict and vacated that judgment, the Supreme Court found that the first jury verdict on damages had not been meaningfully ascertained and therefore postjudgment interest could not accrue from that date. The Supreme Court did not use hindsight to determine that the first jury verdict on damages really was supported by the evidence because the second jury verdict was for almost twice the original amount of damages.
In this case, the majority relies on the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight to determine that the original damages award by the district court was meaningfully ascertained. The majority here presumes, infers, and suspects that the original damages award issued by the district court was correct. Because the original judgment was eventually “reinstated” on remand to the district court, the majority, with such foresight that would make Merlin blush, concludes that the damages in the first judgment were reasonably ascertained. No matter how many inferences and presumptions we may draw from the first judgment issued by the district court, we cannot overcome the fact that we vacated the district court’s original damages award because it was not supported by sufficient findings of fact and reasoning to *1354permit appellate review. As the Kaiser opinion dictates, a damages award which is not supported by the evidence is not ascertainable. See id. at 836. Therefore, a damages award that is vacated for lack of factual findings and reasoning cannot be a damages award that has been “meaningfully ascertained.” There is an incongruity in the majority’s reasoning because, if the original award had been supported by the evidence, we would not have vacated it in the first place.
Also, as a procedural matter, once this court vacated the first judgment, it was not enforceable by Transmatic. A vacated judgment is annulled and canceled. Because it is legally void, it never existed and therefore it becomes unenforceable. The premise which the majority uses to determine ascertainability of the original judgment is that the damages amount was not amended by the district court. The majority therefore presumes, infers, and suspects that the damages were meaningfully ascertained. A vacated judgment cannot be resurrected by presumption, inference or suspicion.2
In addition, “[t]he purpose of post-judgment interest is to compensate the successful plaintiff for being deprived of compensation for the loss from the time between the ascertainment of the damage and the payment by the defendant.” Id at 835-36. In this case, the defendant did not “drag its feet” and deprive the plaintiff of compensation after the entry of the initial district court judgment because this judgment was vacated, i.e., this damages judgment was void and there was no specific sum of money due to the plaintiff as a result.
The majority opinion is also not in accord with the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), which provides that “[ijnterest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.... Such interest shall be calculated from the date of entry of the judgment....” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (emphasis added). A vacated judgment is not a “money judgment in a civil case recovered in district court” and therefore cannot be the relevant judgment for purposes of calculating the date of entry of such a money judgment.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would hold that Federal Circuit law is applicable and that the operative judgment date for purposes of prejudgment interest pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284 and post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is the judgment date of the second determination of the district court.

. The operative judgment date is somewhat analogous to a property line dividing the land of two neighbors. That property line cannot be drawn without reference to the legally operative documents and concerns pertaining to both of the neighbors. In other words, the property line cannot be drawn merely by looking at the deed of one neighbor and ignoring the other neighbor. Similarly, the operative judgment, which is the dividing line between prejudgment interest and post-judgment interest, cannot be determined without considering both Sections 284 and 1961 and analyzing their explicit language, underlying policies, and relevant caselaw.

. Whal if the damages had been reinstated, but were increased by $10? By $100? By $100,000? At what point would we say that the vacated damages were no longer reasonably ascertained in hindsight?