Court Opinion

ID: 9629318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:40:36.919515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:17.844120
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
It is my opinion that the trial court was entirely correct in refusing to arbitrarily fasten a plainly unconscionable deficiency upon the defendant personally without the latter ever having had an opportunity to contest it.
There are several important propositions to have in mind as a foundation to this review. The first is that it is a judgment of our District Court, which in fact had jurisdiction over the action ana the parties who were properly brought before it. The second is that what is referred to as a “Foreclosure” of a trust deed in Texas was in no sense an action in court, with the parties properly brought before it, and judicial action thereon; and thus in no sense could it properly be regarded as having the dignity of a judgment. The third is that there should be kept clearly separate, two different aspects of the proceeding in Texas: (a) the aspect of the proceeding which is in rem, and which could only affect the real property there situated; and (b) the aspect which purported to reach and become binding upon the defendant personally.
Concerning (a) above, as will be seen from the authorities cited below, there cannot be acquired even in rem jurisdiction to affect the property without some proper service of process. But setting that question aside here, and directing attention to (b) above, it seems to me that it is true, a fortiori, that there is -no proper basis whatsoever for a conclusion that jurisdiction was ever acquired over the defendant to hind him personally as to the Texas proceeding.
The fact which I regard as pivotal in this case is one which the pretrial order recites:
It is agreed between the parties that personal notice of the sale under the terms of the trust deeds was not given to the defendant and that he did not have actual notice of the foreclosure sale. It is further agreed between the parties that no jurisdiction was ever obtained in the State of Texas whereby judicially determined deficiency judgment could be obtained against the defendant.
There is no question but that the defendant’s address was known to the plaintiffs, and to their counsel. Nevertheless, they made no effort whatsoever to serve the defendant with process; nor did they even take the trouble to mail him notice. Neither did they bother to inform or notify the defendant’s manager, who was present at the motel. They apparently went through only the bare formality of posting *182notices in three places in the county. Everyone realizes that this is largely fictional and is supposed to be supplementary to and substitute for actual notice only when there has been some bona fide effort to notify the defendant. The plaintiffs then purported to bid in the property for $25,-000, a property which they themselves had had appraised 27 months previously at over $200,000. The defendant in his answer in this action affirmatively alleged (paragraph 5) that such a sale constituted fraud and deceit. This issue has never been tried, nor has the defendant had any opportunity to safeguard his interests, either in the purported sale in Texas, or to present and have determined the issue thus tendered herein.
It is elementary that in order for a judgment, decree or proceeding to affect one personally, he is entitled to be given a notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 20 Utah 2d 310, 437 P.2d 442; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278. It is conceded that this notice may be either by personal service or by properly conforming to a prescribed form of constructive service when personal service cannot he had. But the method of constructive service employed cannot be something which is fictional and unrealistic; it must be something reasonably calculated to give the defendant notice. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865. The requirement of giving full faith and credit under the U. S. Constitution does not preclude a collateral attack on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577.
The pathway to justice in such a situation has been pointed out by the Arizona Supreme Court in the recent case of Laz v. Southwestern Land Co., 97 Ariz. 69, 397 P.2d 52, stating that it is not enough with respect to persons whose names and addresses are known, or very easily ascertainable, to simply give notice by publication. This principle was clearly declared and adhered to by the U. S. Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, referred to above. It involved the settling of a trust fund where some of the beneficiaries were not residents of New York and in all likelihood would not receive notice published in New York newspapers. The court stated:
Accordingly we overrule appellant’s constitutional objections to published notice insofar as they are urged on behalf of any beneficiaries whose interests or addresses are unknown to the trustee.
As to known present beneficiaries of known place of residence, however, notice by publication stands on a different footing. Exceptions in the name of necessity do not sweep away the rule that within the limits of practicability notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties. Where the names and *183post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency. * * * The statutory notice to known beneficiaries is inadequate, not because in fact it fails to reach everyone, but because under the circumstances it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand. However it may have been in former times, the mails today are recognized as an efficient and inexpensive means of communication. * * *
This doctrine was later applied by the U. S. Supreme Court in 1956 in the case of Walker v. Hutchinson City, 352 U.S. 112, 77 S.Ct. 200, 1 L.Ed.2d 178, wherein it held that in condemnation proceedings, publication was not sufficient where the city had the names and addresses of the condemnees, saying: “Appellant’s name was known to the city and was on the official records. Even a letter would have apprised him that his property was about to be taken and that he must appear if he wanted to be heard as to its value.” Similar is Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 83 S.Ct. 279, 9 L.Ed.2d 255. There the city filed proceedings to divert a stream away from the plaintiff’s summer home. The U. S. Supreme Court held that where plaintiff’s address was on the tax rolls, the city was obligated to make a good faith effort to locate him and that notice by publication was not sufficient.
In accord with the U. S. Supreme Court cases just cited is Pierce v. Board of County Commissioners, 200 Kan. 74, 434 P.2d 858, which bears directly on the question here involved. That action was by a landowner to set aside a sheriff’s deed issued to a purchaser at a tax foreclosure sale. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the original owners of the land were not given due process of law when they had no actual notice of the sale, and where notice was given by publication only, when the names and addresses of the owners were readily available to the county.1
It is submitted that the fact situation thus far shown in this case: where the plaintiff knew the name and address of the defendant; where he made no effort whatsoever to notify the defendant and thus acquired no jurisdiction or semblance thereof over the person of the defendant; where this purported sale was thus without the actual or constructive knowledge of the defendant; and where the property was bid in by *184plaintiff at a price which was but a small fraction of the value the parties had themselves placed upon it; and which the defendant alleges was accomplished by fraud and deceit, do not present a situation which requires the courts of the state of Utah to give “full faith and credit” to any such proceeding as it affects the defendant personally. To do so would be contrary to principles of justice and equity, and to the well-reasoned authorities cited above, and contrary to the law and public policy of this State.2
It is for the foregoing reasons that I believe the trial judge was indisputably correct in his view that the defendant had not been accorded due process of law, had never had his day in court, and that these should be allowed him in this action. I therefore would affirm his ruling, permit the defendant to contest the issues he seeks to raise, and determine the controversy between these parties on its merits. (All emphasis added.)
TUCKETT, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of CROCKETT, C. J.

. Decisions oí other jurisdictions to tire effect that constructive notice by publication and posting is sufficient only when the names and addresses are unknown are: Minnesota, Etzler v. Mondale, 266 Minn. 353, 123 N.W.2d 603; Oklahoma, Bomford v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., Okl., 440 P.2d 713; Hawaii, Manley v. Nelson, 50 Haw. 484, 524, 443 P.2d 155.

. See See. 57-1-32, U.C.A.1953 (Pocket Supp.), which declares that: “* * * after any sale of property under a trust deed * * * the court shall find the fair market value of the property at the date of sale * * * [and] * * * shall not render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest and the costs and expenses of sale * * * exceeds the fair market value of the property.” In this respect I commend and subscribe to the quotation in the main opinion from Goodman v. Nadler, — see its footnote 10, which in turn quotes Justice Cardozo, “that foreign law will not be applied if it would violate some fundamental principle of justice * * * ” as being applicable in the instant case.