Court Opinion

ID: 9461400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:13:51.555616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:02.867911
License: Public Domain

*1020PELL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
In the absence of a congressional mandate that this court should enter an enforcement judgment of administrative agency orders solely upon the request of the agency, I find myself considerably disturbed by the majority opinion in this case, the net effect of which is that since the agency has declined once again to follow the explicit and repeated direction of this court “to make a detailed analysis and findings,” we should therefore just drop the whole matter and order enforcement. I am particularly disturbed where what is involved is the extraordinary procedure of ordering an employer to bargain with a union which failed to demonstrate in a Board conducted secret election that it represented a majority of the employees. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion which orders enforcement of the so-called Gissel order.
While I am confining my dissent to the Gissel aspect of the case, I think it is appropriate, as a threshold matter, to observe that the balance of the Board’s order is founded on an evidentiary basis which can only charitably be described as other than feeble. It is not necessary to look further than the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision:
“As the hearing developed, I received the distinct impression that all witnesses, with the exception of Wessels, Johnson, Rogan and Hoteling had been programmed before taking the stand, and were simply responding to cues provided by their direct interrogators.”
Wessels, a lawyer, was at all pertinent times director of Employee Relations for Walgreen at its Chicago headquarters office. Johnson was assistant manager at the Petaluma store. Rogan at the time of the hearing before the ALJ, in December 1972, was assistant manager of the Petaluma store, having succeeded Johnson. He had been an employee at the time of the election and was examined briefly about the authorization card he had signed. His testimony (he had been called by the company) related mostly to the discharge of O’Neil. Hoteling, as indicated in the majority opinion, was not an employee but was a customer who had been involved in the O’Neil discharge incident which occurred in August 1972 about two weeks before Johnson left employment with Walgreen, all of which was approximately two months after the election, just prior to which the union held signed authorization cards from eleven of the twenty employees. Other than Wessels and Johnson, none of the witnesses named by the ALJ, whom he found to be the only witnesses testifying independently of cueing, and whose credibility it would seem he found superior, testified as to any of the unfair labor practices claimed to have vitiated the union majority at the time of the election. I find no support for the vitiation in the testimony of Wessels and Johnson.
Again, from the ALJ’s decision:
“Thornton [whose name was ordinarily spelled Thorton in the hearing transcript] did not remember what he had said to individual employees. Neither did witnesses called by the General Counsel have any clear recollection of the original events . . . Each witness, on the stand, attempted with varying success to conform his or her testimony, to the final version incorporated in the pre-trial affidavit Much of [Judith Whitney’s] testimony was elicited through grossly leading and suggestive questions
*1021The only testimony which I regard as generally reliable is that of Wessels, Hoteling, Johnson and Rogan. Where the recollections of Johnson and Rogan differ, I have credited Rogan. Johnson is completely free of bias.”
Apropos of the last observation of the ALJ, it is of interest that the majority opinion states that Johnson took an active part in the Company’s unfair labor practices.
Further from the ALJ’s decision:
“Wessels [about May 11] then returned to Chicago where he prepared the literature to be used in the campaign. He delivered these papers in person to the District Manager in San Francisco on May 25, with specific instructions as to the date and method of distribution of each of seven communications. Some were to be mailed, others distributed by hand and others posted. On May 26 he saw Thornton at the store and gave him the literature which he was to distribute. Wessels’ instructions were followed to the letter. No statement in any of his propaganda is demonstrably untrue, and none exceeds the limits of Section 8(c) of the Act.
“The final act in Wessels’ campaign was a gathering at a fine restaurant after closing hours on June 13, election eve. Attendance was voluntary. Eligible voters, wives, husbands and their guests were welcome. Sandwiches, coffee and soft drinks were provided. Short talks were given by Respondent’s vice president, Canning, by its Division manager from Denver, by the two district managers, and by Wessels and Thornton. None exceeded the permissive limits of Section 8(c) of the Act.” (Emphasis added.)
Then applying a principle of credibility determination which apparently has no other source than the facile pen of Conan Doyle, the ALJ concluded that certain findings were indicated even though they were improbable:
“In The Sign of Four, Chapter VI, Sherlock Holmes admonishes Doctor Watson, ‘How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)
After supporting his premise of improbability by an analysis of the witnesses’ testimony, the ALJ forged ahead to his Holmesian conclusion:
“There remains however, grossly improbable, uncontradicted testimony, which on the admonition of Sherlock Holmes, must be the truth.”
There remains a substantial question in my mind as to whether grossly improbable evidence, as it is characterized by the finder of fact, can be substantial evidence in an enforcement proceedings, particularly where the grossly improbable testimony was the only evidence of all of the pre-election claimed unfair labor practices. Assuming arguendo, however, that the record permits all of the order except the Gissel portion to sneak by on the basis of the limited scope of our review, I address myself to the order to bargain which I sincerely believe we cannot tolerate on this record. In this respect, I do not think we can ignore the ambivalency of the record as it was analyzed by the ALJ.
Thus as an initial matter on this phase of the case I note the ALJ’s finding that “Wessels could not believe that Thornton, with his loyalty, intelligence, experience and training would have overstepped legal limits.” In New Alaska Development Corp., 194 NLRB 830 (1972), the Board dismissed the 8(a)(5) allegations of the complaint (which significantly were not even filed in the complaint before us). The Board action followed a refusal by this court to enforce an order to bargain because the Board had not, “in accordance with the requirements of the Gissel case, made a proper analysis of the causal connection between the unfair labor practices and the undermining of the election process which would demonstrate that the holding of a free and fair election had been precluded.”
*1022On that analysis being made, the Board concluded that there was insufficient ■ likelihood that illegal conduct would recur. While New Alaska is not on all-fours with the present case, there is substantial identity on significant points. In New Alaska, there had been two elections as here with some of the unfair labor practice conduct having occurred in the first election. I am unable to find any indication in the present record that there was any such claim as to the first Petaluma election conducted in January 1971. This has a secondary significance because Thornton was transferred as manager to Petaluma in November 1971 after the first election. It is also to be noted that, as it was found by the ALJ, Wessels could properly believe that Thornton would not overstep legal limits in the campaign, as Thornton had previously been manager in three different Walgreen stores operating under union contracts.
It is true in New Alaska that the erring employee was characterized as a minor supervisor whereas Thornton was the store manager. It is a matter of fairly common knowledge that the manager of a store which is a part of a large national chain is given very little high level discretion and operates under precise rules in carrying out his well-defined duties, however, it is not necessary to rely upon this knowledge in the present case. The record affirmatively shows that the company shots in labor union election campaigns were to be called by Wessels, the national director of labor relations for this 600 store chain. He did so and assumed because of Thornton’s background the directions would be followed. Indeed, the ambivalence .of the record is reflected in the ALJ’s finding that “Wessels instructions were followed to the letter.” The booklet which Wessels reviewed for four hours with Thornton was a “do and don’t” book and again in the words of the ALJ “is an excellent summary in less than 1500 words of the rights and limitations of management in a union organizing campaign.” Wessels obviously recognized that Thornton was going to be the chief day-to-day Walgreen representative at the store but apparently mistakenly thought he would not exceed the guidelines of proper procedure.
As I read this record the unfair labor practices to the extent that the “grossly improbable” testimony shows there were any which vitiated the union majority (which again needed only a change of one vote for any reason to be no longer a majority status) rests squarely on Thornton. There is some reference to Johnson, the assistant manager but the ALJ found him to be completely free of bias. Further, the record shows that Johnson was at the time of the hearing employed in a Safeway store where he was a member of the retail clerk’s union, and that he came to the Petaluma store in April 1970 as a second assistant manager, a position of so little supervisory consequence that he was eligible to and did vote in the first Petaluma election. It is patent that Johnson was dominated by Thornton in his position on the union organizational campaign and it appears equally obvious to me that in the absence of Thornton there would have been no unfair labor practices occurring at this store, one of the large chain which according to the record “has labor union agreements ... all over the country.”
It is at this point that we must note that Thornton was transferred to another store soon after his discharge of O’Neil. The majority opinion would dismiss the crucial significance of this as it bears upon the likelihood of there being a free and fair election now at Petaluma by noting that Thornton was transferred not discharged and assistant manager Johnson was not discharged or otherwise disciplined. Neither position lends support to the majority. In the first place, transferring Thornton does in my opinion imply disapproval of his managerial actions. In the second place, and even more significantly, the record shows that Thornton’s position with the company at another store is that of registered pharmacist despite his background of having managed several of the company’s *1023stores. With regard to Johnson, as we have previously noted, he had already left Walgreen employment completely by November 1972 and the record just does not support an independent volitional participation in unfair labor practices on his part.
The ALJ, the Board and the majority of the panel hearing this case are willing to find that the conduct was of such gravity and pervasiveness that a bargaining order should be entered. Yet the record clearly belies pervasiveness of such magnitude. Despite the claim that Thornton’s conduct destroyed the union majority status, it is uncontradicted that this majority status was based upon the fact that from April 20, 1972 through May 31, 1972, the union held authorization cards from eleven of the employees of the appropriate twenty employee unit, and that the actual vote indicated a change of only one vote. It is no secret that occasionally peace at a place of work is purchased by the signing of an authorization card, the employee doing so being aware (at least in the absence of a Gissel order) that he will have the privilege of manifesting his actual desires on the subject in the privacy of the voting booth. Surely conduct pervasive enough to justify a Gissel order would have resulted in a somewhat greater exodus of support than that which occurred here.
Finally, the majority opinion, as indicated at the beginning of this dissent, is not unmindful of the repeated direction of this court that the Board should show by analysis (presumably not by conclusionary adjectives) the necessity of a Gissel order. The cases from this court are outlined in the majority opinion and need not be repeated here. The majority opinion notes that the Board has not provided us with the requisite analysis. As a matter of fact, the situation was not improved by the Board’s brief in this court which disposed of this important issue in two pages of general discussion of the Gissel law. The majority, however, while stating that it does not intend to detract from the Peerless guidelines, does just that. The reason for not remanding is apparently based on the feeling that the process is time-consuming and inefficient. That a remand would further delay bringing a labor dispute to a final conclusion is not the fault of this court. The remedy is readily available in the hands of the Board as is, indeed, the matter of making the process efficient not only after remand but by simply giving some analytic attention to this question eliminating the necessity of remand altogether.
Under the circumstances of this case as presented to us, it is utterly inconceivable to me that the claimed “unfair labor practices are ... so likely to have an inevitably lingering effect as to preclude the holding of a fair election,” Restaurant Associates Industries, Inc., 194 NLRB 1066 (1972). In my opinion, the record presented to us cries out for denying enforcement of the Gissel portion of the order.