Court Opinion

ID: 9378510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 18:01:00.532164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.759631
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11396      Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 03/10/2023    Page: 1 of 7

                                                       [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                  No. 22-11396
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

       DAVID LAMAR HARPER,
                                                         Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       WILLIAM PATRICK ADAMS,
       Retired State Court Judge,
       SOLICITOR GENERAL, BIBB COUNTY,
       SHARELL FINCHER LEWIS,
       in her official capacity as State Court Judge
       at Macon Bibb,
       TIMOTHY T. MOORE,
       in his offical capacity as Sergeant
       at Macon Bibb,
       LEE W. ROHRBACH,
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                      22-11396

       in his offical capacity as Bibb
       County Deputy, et al.,

                                                           Defendants-Appellees.

                               ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-00405-TES
                            ____________________

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               David Harper, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
       dismissal -- for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
       -- of his pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action. 1 No reversible error
       has been shown; we affirm. 2

       1 We read liberally briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. Sampson,
       518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se pleadings.
       See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
       2 We DENY Harper’s motion to supplement the record. We have said that
       we will “rarely supplement the record to include material that was not before
       the district court” and will do so only if supplementing the record is “in the
       interests of justice” or would assist us in making an informed decision. See
       Schwartz v. Millon Air, Inc., 341 F.3d 1220, 1225 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003). Harper
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       22-11396                  Opinion of the Court                              3

             This appeal arises from these alleged facts. In March 2014,
       Harper -- acting as a bail recovery agent -- entered the rear door of
       a home while attempting to capture a fugitive. The homeowner
       reported the incident to the police; Harper was later arrested for
       criminal trespass.
              Harper proceeded to trial in June 2015. A jury convicted
       Harper of two counts of criminal trespass, in violation of Georgia
       law. Harper appealed his convictions, arguing chiefly that a bail
       recovery agent could not be held criminally liable for trespass. The
       Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed Harper’s convic-
       tions. See State v. Harper, 810 S.E.2d 484 (Ga. 2018). Harper began
       serving his sentence on 13 November 2018.
               Three years later -- on 12 November 2021 -- Harper filed this
       civil action. Harper named six defendants, sued in their official ca-
       pacity: (1) the state court judge who presided over Harper’s crimi-
       nal trial; (2) two state prosecutors involved in Harper’s criminal
       proceedings; and (3) three officers with the Bibb County Sheriff’s
       Department.
             Harper alleged an array of constitutional violations stem-
       ming from the March 2014 incident and the resulting prosecution
       and criminal trial. Among other things, Harper alleged that

       seeks to introduce documents Harper says support his underlying claim that
       his criminal judgment is void. These documents are not pertinent to the issues
       before us on appeal and, thus, do not warrant supplementing the record at this
       stage.
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                       22-11396

       defendant law-enforcement officers falsified the 2014 incident re-
       port, tampered with evidence, influenced improperly a witness,
       and perjured themselves during Harper’s 2015 criminal trial. Har-
       per alleged that the state prosecutors influenced witnesses, tam-
       pered with evidence, and prosecuted him unlawfully. Harper also
       alleged that the state court judge lacked jurisdiction over his case
       and permitted others to engage in unlawful conduct during Har-
       per’s 2015 criminal trial. As relief, Harper sought compensatory
       and punitive money damages. Harper also sought to clear his crim-
       inal convictions from state and national criminal databases.
              The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss
       Harper’s complaint. The district court -- among other things -- con-
       cluded that Harper’s claims were subject to dismissal on two inde-
       pendent grounds: (1) as time-barred by the applicable statute of
       limitations; and (2) as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
       (1994). 3
              We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to
       state a claim, accepting all properly alleged facts as true and

       3 The district court also concluded that Harper’s official-capacity claims
       against the state court judge, the state prosecutors, and the sheriff were barred
       by judicial, prosecutorial, and Eleventh Amendment immunity doctrines. Be-
       cause the district court concluded properly that Harper’s claims were subject
       to dismissal as time-barred and under Heck, we need not address the district
       court’s ruling about immunity.
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       22-11396                  Opinion of the Court                              5

       construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
       Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir.
       2012).
               “All constitutional claims brought under § 1983 are tort ac-
       tions, subject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury
       actions in the state where the § 1983 action has been brought.”
       Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2011). In Geor-
       gia, personal-injury actions “shall be brought within two years after
       the right of action accrues.” O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. The statute of lim-
       itations for claims brought under section 1983 begins to run when
       facts supporting the cause of action are or should be reasonably ap-
       parent to the claimant. Brown v. Ga. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335
       F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003).
               The district court determined correctly that Harper’s claims
       -- claims seeking money damages under section 1983 for alleged
       constitutional violations -- are governed by Georgia’s two-year stat-
       ute-of-limitations for personal-injury actions. That Harper’s sec-
       tion 1983 claims related to a purported “void judgment” does not
       render the statute of limitations inapplicable in this case.
              Harper’s claims accrued -- at the latest -- on the date of Har-
       per’s incarceration (per sentencing) on 13 November 2018. 4 By

       4 In his complaint, Harper asserted that his claims accrued on 13 November
       2018. The district court determined, instead, that many of Harper’s claims
       accrued at the time of the alleged unconstitutional acts in March 2014 or dur-
       ing Harper’s 2015 criminal trial. Nevertheless, the district court concluded
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       6                         Opinion of the Court                    22-11396

       that time, Harper knew or should have known of the purported
       constitutional violations that Harper says occurred following the
       2014 incident and during his 2015 criminal proceedings. Because
       Harper did not bring this civil action until November 2021 -- three
       years after the latest date on which his claims could have accrued -
       - the district court dismissed properly Harper’s claims as time-
       barred.
               Harper also challenges the district court’s determination
       that his section 1983 claims are barred by Heck. A section 1983
       plaintiff seeking damages for an allegedly unconstitutional convic-
       tion or sentence must first demonstrate that the underlying “con-
       viction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
       by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
       to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
       court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-
       87. If “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
       the invalidity of his conviction or sentence” -- and the plaintiff can-
       not demonstrate that his conviction or sentence has already been
       invalidated -- the section 1983 complaint must be dismissed. Id. at
       487.
             Here, Harper’s section 1983 claims challenge directly the
       propriety and validity of his underlying criminal proceedings.

       that -- even if the court applied the 13 November 2018 accrual date advanced
       by Harper -- Harper’s claims still would be time-barred. For purposes of this
       appeal, we also apply the November 2018 accrual date.
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       22-11396              Opinion of the Court                      7

       Harper has not alleged that the challenged criminal-trespass con-
       victions had already been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or
       otherwise called into question. To the contrary, Harper acknowl-
       edges that his convictions were upheld by the Georgia Supreme
       Court on appeal. Thus, to the extent Harper’s section 1983 claims
       were not time-barred, they were dismissed properly as barred by
       Heck.
             AFFIRMED.