Court Opinion

ID: 9819133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:18:47.985325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:11.542295
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in part I of the majority’s opinion, holding the IUOE, Local 148, has standing to appeal the Director’s decision denying unemployment benefits to its members. 215 Ill. 2d at 61. I respectfully dissent, however, to part II of the majority’s opinion, holding the members of Local 148 ineligible for unemployment benefits. 215 Ill. 2d at 70. Under section 604 of the Act (820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1994)), the members of Local 148 were “ineligible [for benefits] only if both (1) their unemployment was due to a stoppage of work which existed because of a labor dispute at the premises where they worked, and (2) they or others of their grade or class were participating in, financing, or directly interested in the labor dispute.” (Emphasis added.) General Motors Corp. v. Bowling, 85 Ill. 2d 539, 542 (1981). Under the facts of this case, the only issue is whether the members of Local 148 belonged to a grade or class of workers who were directly interested in the labor dispute between CIPS and Local 702. I believe the members of Local 148 were not of the same grade or class as the members of Local 702. This court’s decision in Shell Oil Co. v. Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d 329 (1955), is directly on point, and I disagree with the majority that Cummins is distinguishable (215 Ill. 2d at 69-70). In Cummins, this court found that although the unions involved were affiliated by membership in the Metal Trades Council, there was no evidence to show the unions surrendered their autonomous nature. Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d at 337. This court reasoned: “Each union was free to act jointly or independently in presenting and enforcing its employment demands, and without regard to the wishes of the others. It is true that in many cases, a single agreement indicates that all employee parties thereto are of the same grade and class. However, it is only one factor which must be considered and is not, in and of itself, conclusive. It is our opinion that these claimants did not belong to a grade or class of workers who participated in, financed, or were directly interested in this labor dispute.” Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d at 337-38. In the present case, Local 148 represented employees at the Coffeen, Meredosia, Hutsonville, and Grand Tower facilities. Local 702 represented employees at the Newton facility and the Eastern, Southern and Western divisions. The sole overlap occurred at the Grand Tower facility, where Local 702 represented 12 workers in the production department. These employees were included in Local 702’s Southern division bargaining unit. Nevertheless, each facility division was covered by a separate collective-bargaining agreement. Not only did each union enter into separate contracts, each contract required ratification by the respective members of each union. I believe each union was autonomous, being “free to act jointly or independently in presenting and enforcing its employment demands, and without regard to the wishes of the others.” Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d at 337-38. I would therefore conclude that the members of Local 148 were not of the same grade or class as the members of Local 702. I also agree with the appellate court that the members of Local 148 did not have a direct interest in the outcome of the labor dispute between CIPS and Local 702. Although Local 148 would benefit if Local 702 elected insurance coverage under Salaried Plan B and successfully bargained for higher contributions by CIPS to the medical plan, Local 702 was under no obligation to select coverage under the plan. Indeed, during the negotiations, Local 702 asked CIPS to consider providing insurance coverage to its members under the $100 deductible plan, while freezing the employee portion of the premiums through June 30, 1995. Had Local 702 bargained for coverage under another medical health plan, Local 148 would not have received an increase in the contributions toward the $100 deductible plan as a result of bargaining by Local 702. The appellate court noted: “Presumably, Local 702 would choose whichever option afforded its members the greatest benefits. If it were able to negotiate a better premium payment by leaving Salaried Plan B, it would not be in Local 148’s interest for Local 702 to succeed in getting the best possible deal.” 345 Ill. App. 3d at 396. This court has likewise held that the mere expectancy of better economic terms does not give rise to a direct interest in a labor dispute. See General Motors Corp., 85 Ill. 2d 539. In General Motors Corp., the court rejected a claim that the members of a union representing the shop clerks at General Motors’ plants in Chicago and La-Grange, Illinois, had a direct interest in a labor dispute between General Motors and the members of another union representing the production workers at the plants. The court recognized that certain parts of the production workers’ agreement with General Motors would customarily be copied into the shop clerks’ own agreement. The shop clerks, therefore, might anticipate that the strike by the production workers would influence their terms of employment. That, however, was at most an indirect interest. The court explained: “All they had was a hope, not any assurance. A mere expectancy without any legal right, subject to GM’s views on the fairness and convenience of adopting parts of another agreement, does not disqualify the shop clerks for unemployment benefits.” General Motors Corp., 85 Ill. 2d at 543. See also Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d 329; Nestle Co. v. Johnson, 68 Ill. App. 3d 17 (1979). Here, Local 148’s agreement with CIPS concerning medical benefits was not contingent in any way on CIPS negotiations with Local 702, and nothing in the agreement between Local 148 and CIPS directly tied Local 148 to any benefit Local 702 might receive. Local 148 agreed to accept whatever contributions CIPS gave to all its employees insured under Salaried Plan B, including nonunion employees. Local 148 had already reached an agreement with the employer that was binding, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations between Local 702 and CIPS. The members of Local 148 had no control over the health insurance agreement reached by Local 702 and CIPS. In fact, the conduct of CIPS in negotiating the final health insurance agreement was a variable completely outside Local 148’s control. If CIPS had never offered the health insurance plan accepted by Local 702, then Local 148 would have received no benefit whatsoever from those negotiations. Any benefit Local 148 members may have expected to receive from resolution of the dispute between CIPS and Local 702 was speculative at best. Consequently, the mere possibility of increased contributions toward their medical plan did not equate to a direct interest of the members of Local 148 in the outcome of the labor dispute between CIPS and Local 702. It is, therefore, my opinion that the members of Local 148 were not directly interested in the labor dispute between CIPS and Local 702. Accordingly, I would conclude that the members of Local 148 were eligible to receive unemployment benefits. The majority, however, asserts that Local 148 had more than a mere expectancy of better economic terms because the union members would have a legally enforceable right to increased contributions based on the success of negotiations between Local 702 and CIPS. 215 Ill. 2d at 69-70. Any such “legally enforceable right,” however, was contingent and tenuous. Nothing in the language of the contract gave Local 148 any enforceable rights based on Local 702’s negotiations. In fact, the record in this case shows that at the time Local 148 entered into its agreement with CIPS (1) it appeared that Local 702 would not participate in Salaried Plan B; (2) there was no indication any premium support would be provided under Salaried Plan B; and (3) there was no indication the lockout of Local 702 was related to the issue of premium support. As the appellate court correctly observed: “the interests of the two unions did not directly coincide because the fortunes of Local 148 did not necessarily rise or fall with those of Local 702.” 345 Ill. App. 3d at 396. Moreover, the legislature’s declared public policy underlying the Unemployment Insurance Act is to lighten the burden of involuntary unemployment that “so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family.” 820 ILCS 405/100 (West 1992); see Panther Creek Mines, Inc. v. Murphy, 390 Ill. 23, 28 (1945) (the purpose of unemployment compensation is “to alleviate the distress and suffering occasioned by involuntary unemployment”); see also Outboard, Marine & Manufacturing Co., Johnson Motors Division v. Gordon, 403 Ill. 523, 536-37 (1949) (“the legislature intended to provide for the innocent victims of a labor dispute by specifically excluding them from the denial of unemployment compensation”). Accordingly, the Act is to be liberally construed to provide financial assistance to those who are unemployed through no fault of their own. Bridgestone, 179 Ill. 2d at 155; Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d at 339. The policy behind the Act mandates the members of Local 148 be eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part.