Court Opinion

ID: 9656768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:59:56.803796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:35.418247
License: Public Domain

JAMES M. SMART, JR., Judge,
concurring.
The issue in this case is whether the application for review was sufficiently specific in compliance with 8CSR20-3.030(3)(A).1 The Commission granted the *716motion to strike the application for review for failure to comply with the rule. I agree that the application for review could have more specifically asserted the contentions of error. I write separately because to me it seems unusual that no case has given consideration to the two-track system (one can file a brief or not file a brief) before the Commission. In my view, the two-track aspect of the regulations requires some comment.
A party petitioning the Commission to reverse a ruling by the ALJ can choose whether or not to file a brief. The petitioner is not required to file a brief. 3.030(3)(B). Nevertheless, the regulations seem to treat all applications for review the same in the sense that the application for review must in every case describe the nature of the error with the same degree of specificity.
Certainly, where the petitioner does not intend to file a brief, specificity is necessary for the Commission to be able to process the appeal. 3.030(3)(A). The respondent may file an answer to the petitioner’s application for review, “concisely addressing” the contentions set forth in the application. 3.020(4)(A). Thus, we see that, when there is no plan to file a brief, it is especially important for the application for review to specify the exact nature of the claimed error so that the Commission is able to process the appeal. In the case of an assertion by the petitioner that the decision lacks substantial evidence and is against the weight of the evidence, the petitioner cannot reasonably expect the Commission to do all the work of going detail-by-detail through the whole transcript to determine the strength of the evidence, without even knowing what it is that makes the petitioner believe the decision was not supported in the evidence.
On the other hand, a petitioning party, in an application for review, may request briefing and oral argument. 3.020(3)(B). The Commission establishes the briefing schedule. Id.
The regulations say that the purpose of the briefs, inter alia, is to “identify the issues in dispute” and discuss those issues. 3.020(5)(C). At oral argument, the parties conceded that, in cases where briefing is requested, there is no reason to believe that the Commission even looks at the content of an application for review unless an issue is raised by the respondent as to its adequacy.
The employer here stated in its application that it intended to argue that the award was against the weight of the evidence in awarding: 1) benefits for permanent total disability attributable to the last accident; 2) future medical; 3) past medical of $9,575.46; and 4) interest on the past medical. The employer did not, however, specify the evidence (e.g., the testimony of a particular physician that claimant’s disability was such-and-such) upon which it intended to rely in asserting such error. One would think that the attorney who represented the employer at the hearing would have had a sufficient idea of exactly what evidence was contrary to the award to be able to more fully complete the application for review. Therefore, I cannot disagree that the application did not comply with regulation 3.030(3)(A).
It is not clear what is accomplished by a rigorous enforcement of regulation 3.030(3)(A) when the petitioner intends to brief the issues under 3.030(4) and 3.030(5), and neither the Commission nor the opposing party are hindered or disadvantaged by a lack of specificity in the application for review. Perhaps the purpose of such rigorous enforcement, as hinted at by the respondent in this case, is to deter employers/insurers from petitioning for review merely for purposes of delay or negotiation when the employer/insurer has no good faith opinion that grounds of ap*717peal exist. In such a case, the employer/insurer may simply hope to later scan the transcript to find something to argue in order to delay the ultimate resolution, in hope that the claimant is under such financial distress that the claimant allow a significant discount in the award just to avoid the delay of an appeal. For the Commission to rigorously enforce the regulation to try to reduce such practices presumably is part of the Commission’s design. I cannot say that such a design would be unlawful or unwise. It may conflict with the principle that rules relating to appeals are to be construed liberally in favor of allowing appeals to proceed. See Isgriggs v. Pacer Industries, 869 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Mo.App. E.D.1994) (taking a liberal approach to the application of 3.030(3)(A)). But even if it does conflict with that general principle, there may be justification for the Commission’s position in an effort to limit merit-less appeals in this context. As the majority opinion demonstrates, there are other cases upholding a strict enforcement, even in “briefing track” cases. See, e.g., Taluc v. TWA, 34 S.W.3d 831 (Mo.App.2000); Smith v. Smiley Container Corp., 997 S.W.2d 126 (Mo.App.1999). I write simply because none of the Missouri cases that have addressed the specificity of an application for review under the regulation in question have discussed the “two track” system, nor commented on any justification for strictness in “briefing track” cases.
In any event, a party appealing to the Commission had best be wary of waiting until briefing to state specifically and fully the grounds on which it is appealing.

. All regulations cited hereafter are cited in short form, dropping the ‘'8CSR20'' portion of the title.