Court Opinion

ID: 9492536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:43:32.775014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:21.406513
License: Public Domain

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in all but Part III of the majority’s opinion.
*932It is an axiom of American criminal law that an attempt “includes an element of specific intent even if the crime attempted does not.” United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir.1990). As we said in United States v. Arbelaez, 812 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.1987):
[T]he elements of an attempt are (1) intent to engage in criminal conduct and (2) an overt act which is a substantial step towards the commission of the crime.
The government does not have to prove that the defendant knew that his conduct was illegal, just that he intended to complete the crime and that he took a substantial step toward that end. Contrary to what the majority says, this is true even in the case of a regulatory or mala prohibita offense.
Although the issue has seldom reached the courts, it would seem to. follow from the generally accepted notion that intent is required for an attempt that there is no such thing as strict liability attempt. That is, even if the completed crime may be committed without intent, knowledge, recklessness or even negligence, the same is not true of an attempt to commit that crime. An attempt to commit a strict liability offense is thus possible only if it is shown that the defendant acted with an intent to bring about the proscribed result.
2 Wayne R. Lafave & Austin W. Soott, Jr., Substantive CRIMINAL Law, § 6.2 (1986).
We recently applied these basic precepts, at least implicitly, in the context of an attempt reentry case very similar to this one. In United States v. Blanco-Gallegos, 1999 WL 635749 (9th Cir. August 23, 1999), an attempted reentry case in which the defense was voluntary intoxication and lack of intent to enter the United States, we held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant did, indeed, “form[ ] the necessary intent.” Id. As Judge Dorothy Nelson wrote in her partial concurrence, partial dissent in that case:
In order to prove that Blanco-Gallegos attempted to reenter the United States, the government had to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including that Blanco-Gallegos possessed the specific intent to enter the United States. See United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir.1990) (“[Ajttempt includes an element of specific intent even if the crime attempted does not”)
Id. (D.W. Nelson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (emphasis added.)
The majority argues that the cases from other circuits are legion in holding the other way. Not so. It is true that the 11th Circuit has held that attempted reentry is a general intent crime, but it did so without any analysis whatsoever. United States v. Peralt-Reyes, 131 F.3d 956 (11th Cir.1997). Instead of analysis, the court chose to “adopt” (its word) the holding of an unpublished First Circuit case, United States v. Reyes-Medina, 53 F.3d 327 (1st Cir.1995) (unpublished). In Reyes-Medina, the court merely (and correctly) held that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that Puerto Rico was part of the United States for reentry purposes. All but one of the other out-of-circuit cases cited by the majority deal with the completed crimes of illegal reentry and of “being found in” — not attempted illegal reentry.1 I agree that the completed offenses are general intent crimes requiring only proof that the defendant acted voluntarily. Those cases do not address *933the attempted reentry problem. The one other attempted reentry case cited by the majority deals with the sufficiency of the evidence, not with the intent issue.2
As far as I can tell, the only reported decision in the country actually to analyze whether attempted illegal reentry requires proof of specific intent is United States v. Morales-Tovar, 37 F.Supp.2d 846 (W.D.Tex., 1999), and it holds that it does. In that case, after examining the statute and distinguishing the cases dealing with the completed crimes of illegal reentry and of being found in, Judge Justice held:
Thus, like most other attempt-based crimes, a conviction for “attempt” under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 must include an element of specific intent. Absent deception by defendant, only be requiring specific intent to violate the law can a court distinguish between a defendant’s desire to follow the law, which must not be a crime, and a defendant’s criminal conduct.
The totality of judicial consideration of attempt-based crimes supports this reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
Id. at 851.
The irony of our case is that for all of the sound and fury, the district judge did indeed give a specific intent instruction. The instruction actually given closely mirrors the instruction requested by the defense and the well-recognized pattern instruction on attempt. See 2 EdwaRd J. DeVITT Et Al., FEDERAL JüRY PRACTICE AND INStructions § 21.03 (4th ed.1990). The judge instructed the jury that it would have to find (1) that the defendant “attempted to reenter the United States on or about December 5, 1997” and (2) “that the defendant did something which was a substantial step toward completing the crime.” This is a variant of the standard two-part “intent plus substantial step” definition of attempt set forth in United States v. Arbe-laez, supra. Although it would have been more accurate and consistent with our cases for the district court to have instructed the jury that it had to find that the defendant intended to enter the United States, instead of that he attempted to enter, the district court’s formulation adequately, albeit imperfectly, conveyed the idea. And certainly the evidence of both the defendant’s intent to enter, and of the steps he took toward that end, is overwhelming.
The majority’s holding that attempted reentry is a general intent crime is as unnecessary as it is erroneous, and it needlessly muddies the waters of attempt law. Since the instruction was an adequate statement of the law, I would hold that there was no reversible error in giving it.

. See United States v. Henry, 111 F.3d 111 (11th Cir.1997) (found in the United States); United States v. Trevino-Martinez, 86 F.3d 65 (5th Cir.1996) (same); United States v. Espinoza-Leon, 873 F.2d 743 (4th Cir.1989) (same); United States v. Hussein, 675 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.1982) (cannot tell from the facts of the case whether the defendants were attempting to reenter, found in the United States or entered the United States); United States v. Hernandez, 693 F.2d 996 (10th Cir.1982) (found); United States v. Newton, 677 F.2d 16 (2d Cir.1982) (same).

. United States v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 987 F.2d 1129, 1133 (5th Cir.1993).