Court Opinion

ID: 9352571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 21:00:53.363082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:46.241283
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-10809    Document: 67-1      Date Filed: 01/06/2023   Page: 1 of 19

                                                               [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-10809
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                        Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        CLARK DOWNS,
                                                     Defendant-Appellant.
                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cr-00039-TKW-MJF-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                21-10809

        Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
        NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
               Clark Downs was convicted of producing and possessing
        child pornography in violation, respectively, of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a)
        and 2252A(a)(5)(b). On appeal, he challenges his convictions on
        three grounds. First, he argues that the government failed to
        present sufficient evidence to satisfy § 2251(a)’s interstate-
        commerce element. Second, he contends that the district court
        reversibly erred when it discharged an impaneled-but-not-yet-
        sworn jury in his absence. Third, he asserts that the evidence was
        legally insufficient to establish production under § 2251(a) because
        of what he calls a “factual impossibility.”            After careful
        consideration, we affirm Downs’s convictions.
                                          I
               Downs was indicted in the Northern District of Florida for
        producing and possessing child pornography. Of particular
        relevance to this appeal is the production statute, which, in
        pertinent part, provides as follows:
              Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces,
              entices, or coerces any minor to engage in . . . any
              sexually explicit conduct for the purpose
              of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or
              for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction
              of such conduct, shall be punished . . . if that visual
              depiction was produced or transmitted using
              materials that have been mailed, shipped, or
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        3                      Opinion of the Court                21-10809

              transported in or affecting interstate or foreign
              commerce        by   any     means,     including
              by computer . . . .
        18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
                Downs’s trial was slated to begin in September 2020 in
        Pensacola, Florida. Early during the week of September 14, the
        district judge impaneled a jury. The judge and both parties agreed,
        however, not to swear the jury because a tropical storm that had
        been brewing in the Gulf of Mexico was soon set to make landfall.
        As it turned out, by the time the storm reached Pensacola, it had
        become a Category 2 hurricane, and it flooded downtown,
        disrupted internet service, and downed telephone lines and bridges
        in the area surrounding the courthouse.
               Shortly after the storm passed, the judge scheduled a
        teleconference to discuss next steps. Downs was not present at the
        conference, in part because the internet and telephone lines at his
        prison facility were down. During the conference, the judge
        informed the parties that he intended to continue the trial for three
        weeks. He planned to contact the as-yet unsworn jurors to ask
        whether they could accommodate the new trial calendar. If any of
        the jurors was unavailable for the new trial date, the judge
        explained, he would dismiss the entire jury and impanel a new one.
        Downs’s lawyer suggested that the judge consider discharging and
        replacing only the jurors for whom the new trial date wouldn’t
        work, but the judge declined that suggestion. Instead, per his plan,
        the judge discharged the entire jury after learning that one of the
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                21-10809

        members couldn’t make the new date. Downs unsuccessfully
        moved the judge to reconsider his decision.
                The case ultimately went to trial a month and a half later
        before a new jury, which was impaneled and sworn in the presence
        of all parties, including Downs. At the trial, Downs’s victim, L.H.,
        testified that Downs was a family friend of her mother, L.L. Cox,
        and L.L.’s husband, Jimmy Cox. Each summer, she said, the Coxes
        would drive L.L.’s three children to Downs’s home in the Florida
        Panhandle. During one of those trips, when L.H. was 15 years old,
        Downs asked her to undress and took photos of her using a “flip
        phone” on at least three occasions. L.H. explained that Downs told
        her that he later transferred the photos to his home computer.
               Several law-enforcement officers testified that they found
        explicit photos of L.H. on Downs’s home computer during their
        investigation. One of the investigators confirmed that the
        computer’s internal hard drives were manufactured in China and
        that the external drives were made in Thailand. Subsequent
        forensic analysis revealed that the photos found on the hard drives
        were taken with a Samsung SCH-S738C model cell phone. On
        cross-examination, the same investigator admitted that he didn’t
        know whether that particular model was a flip phone, and no
        testimony was elicited regarding where the Samsung was
        manufactured.
             Following the prosecution’s case-in-chief, Downs moved for
        judgment of acquittal, arguing that the government had failed to
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        5                          Opinion of the Court                      21-10809

        present sufficient evidence to satisfy § 2251(a)’s interstate-
        commerce element. The district judge denied Downs’s motion.
               Downs was convicted on both the production and possession
        counts. The court sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment on
        the former and a concurrent term of 120 months’ imprisonment on
        the latter, followed by two concurrent 10-year terms of supervised
        release.
             On appeal, Downs challenges his convictions on three
        grounds, which we will consider in turn.
                                               II
                Downs first contends that the government presented
        insufficient evidence to satisfy the production statute’s interstate-
        commerce element. The reason, he says, is because the
        government introduced no evidence that the Samsung phone with
        which he took the photos of L.H. ever traveled in interstate
        commerce. But, of course, the government did produce evidence
        that the hard drives to which Downs transferred the photos were
        manufactured overseas. The question thus turns on whether the
        act of transferring the photos from cell phone to hard drive can itself
        constitute the “produc[tion]” prohibited by § 2251(a). 1

        1 There is some doubt about whether Downs properly preserved his
        sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge—and if he didn’t, how that failure affects
        the standard of review. He contended that the evidence was insufficient to
        meet the statute’s interstate-commerce element, but on a different basis than
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        6                           Opinion of the Court                         21-10809

               We begin, as always, with the statute’s plain language.
        Again, § 2251(a) states, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person who
        employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to
        engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose
        of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the
        purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall
        be punished . . . if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted
        using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or
        affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including
        by computer . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (emphasis added). Section
        2256(3), in turn, defines the key term “producing” to mean

        he argues on appeal. At least one of our cases states that “[w]here the specific
        grounds upon which a defendant made his sufficiency-of-the-evidence
        challenge at trial differs from those he asserts on appeal, we review under his
        new theory only for manifest miscarriage of justice.” United States v.
        Ezquenazi, 752 F.3d 912, 935 (11th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). But other
        decisions suggest that the deferential manifest-miscarriage-of-justice standard
        applies only where a defendant failed to raise a sufficiency challenge in district
        court at all. See, e.g., United States v. Fries, 725 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2013)
        (“[W]here a defendant does not move for acquittal or otherwise preserve an
        argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in the court below, . . . we
        will reverse the conviction only where doing so is necessary to prevent a
        manifest miscarriage of justice.”); United States v. Thompson, 610 F.3d 1335,
        1338 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (applying the manifest-miscarriage-of-justice
        standard where the defendant never moved for a judgment of acquittal on
        certain counts at issue on appeal); United States v. Tagg, 572 F.3d 1320, 1323
        (11th Cir. 2009) (reviewing for manifest miscarriage of justice where “[a]t no
        time did the defense move for a judgment of acquittal”). We needn’t resolve
        the issue here, because we conclude, for reasons explained in text, that even on
        the more indulgent de novo standard, Downs’s sufficiency challenge fails.
        United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1084 (11th Cir. 2001).
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        7                      Opinion of the Court                21-10809

        “producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing, or
        advertising.” Id. § 2256(3).
               Based on the statutory text alone, we might be inclined to
        conclude that a defendant’s act of transferring photos from his
        phone to a hard drive does not amount to “producing” them. That
        is so for two reasons. First, none of § 2256(3)’s definitions of the
        word “producing”—“directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing,
        or advertising”—clearly covers the act of transferring photos from
        one device to another. Second, § 2251(a) itself targets two different
        actions—“producing” and “transmitting.” Between the two, the
        latter would seem to be the more natural linguistic basis for
        capturing the act of transferring photos. Here, though, the
        government hasn’t relied on § 2251(a)’s prohibition on
        “transmi[ssion],” perhaps having assumed that it refers only to “live
        visual depiction[s]” of the sort not at issue in this case.
               For his part, though, Downs seems to concede—or at least
        not to dispute—that, as used in § 2251(a), the term “producing” is
        properly read to cover the act of transferring photos from phone to
        hard drive. See Br. of Appellant at 20. He does so presumably on
        the ground that our precedent requires as much. Having carefully
        considered the issue, we agree.
               Although we haven’t specifically considered the definition of
        the term “producing” in the production statute, we have examined
        its meaning in the possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a).
        Specifically, in United States v. Maxwell, we held that the act of
        copying photos from a phone to an external drive constitutes
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                21-10809

        “produc[tion]” within the meaning of § 2252A(a). See 386 F.3d
        1042, 1051–52 (11th Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 446 F.3d
        1210 (11th Cir. 2006).
               We find that Maxwell controls here for two reasons. First,
        the statutory definition of the word “producing” applies to both the
        possession and production provisions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(3)
        (defining “producing” “[f]or the purposes of this chapter,” including
        §§ 2251 and 2252A). And second, the production and possession
        statutes use the term in fundamentally the same way. Compare id.
        § 2251(a) (“if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted
        using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or
        affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means . . . .”), with
        id. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (“child pornography . . . that was produced
        using materials that have been mailed, or shipped or transported in
        or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means”).
        Accordingly, our interpretation of the word “producing” in
        Maxwell to cover the act of transferring a photograph from a phone
        to an external drive—albeit there with respect to a possession
        charge—controls our interpretation of the same term here.
               For what it’s worth, other circuits have come to the same
        conclusion. In United States v. Angle, for instance, the Seventh
        Circuit held, as we did in Maxwell, that the term “producing” in the
        possession statute covers the act of transferring photos from a
        phone to an external drive. See 234 F.3d 326, 341 (7th Cir. 2000). In
        a follow-on case, that court held—as we do today—that the
        production statute’s use of the same § 2256(3)-based definition of
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        the term “producing” meant that it should be understood to reach
        the act of transferring, as well. See United States v. Foley, 740 F.3d
        1079, 1083–86 (7th Cir. 2014). Relying heavily on the Seventh
        Circuit’s reasoning in Foley, the Second Circuit likewise held in
        United States v. Pattee that the term “producing” in the production
        statute should be read to include the act of copying photos to a hard
        drive. See 820 F.3d 496, 509–11 (2d Cir. 2016). And finally, even in
        the absence of Maxwell- or Foley-like precedent interpreting the
        possession statute’s use of the word “producing,” the First Circuit
        held that the production statute’s use of that term covered the act
        of transferring photos from a phone to an external storage device.
        See United States v. Poulin, 631 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2011). Indeed,
        even the decision on which Downs principally relies, United States
        v. Lively, recognizes “that ‘producing’ child pornography, as used
        in § 2251(a), encompasses copying images onto a hard drive.” 852
        F.3d 549, 560 (6th Cir. 2017). 2
              Downs nonetheless insists that the production statute’s mens
        rea element requires that there be an interstate-commerce

        2 Downs’s reliance on Lively is misplaced. Lively is distinguishable from this
        case in an important respect. As best we can tell from its opinion, the Sixth
        Circuit held there that copying photos from a phone to a hard drive did not
        constitute “production” within the meaning of § 2251(a) where one person
        took the photos and another person then copied them to a hard drive. Lively,
        852 F.3d at 561. That, the Sixth Circuit seemed to say, was because (1) the
        “purpose” mens rea element that appears in the statute’s first clause must carry
        through to the interstate-commerce clause, and (2) that’s impossible when two
        different actors are involved. Id. at 562–63. Here, of course, one person—
        Downs—both took the photos and downloaded them to a hard drive.
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  21-10809

        connection at the moment of initial creation. Recall that the statute
        requires that the offender “employ[], use[], persuade[], induce[],
        entice[], or coerce[] any minor to engage in . . . any sexually explicit
        conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such
        conduct” if that depiction was “produced or transmitted using
        materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or
        affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)
        (emphasis added). From that language, Downs reasons that the
        interstate-commerce element “must be satisfied by an examination
        of the means or materials used at the point in time of the original
        production.” Br. of Appellant at 15.
                Downs’s argument, though, can’t survive his concession—or
        at the very least, his failure to contest—that the transfer of photos
        from a phone to a hard drive constitutes “produc[tion].” From that
        starting point, our decision in United States v. Grzybowicz, 747 F.3d
        1296 (11th Cir. 2014), resolves the interstate-commerce issue.
        There, we interpreted the statutory language of the production
        statute to mean that “[t]he interstate commerce element . . . is
        satisfied by proof that the child pornography . . . was produced using
        materials that had been transported in interstate or foreign
        commerce.” Id. at 1306 (emphasis added). If, as all here seem to
        agree under Maxwell, the transfer of the photos to the hard drive
        constitutes the required “produc[tion],” and if, as the evidence
        shows, the hard drives were manufactured overseas, then the
        necessary nexus exists between the actionable “produc[tion]” and
        interstate commerce.
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               To the extent that Downs means to argue that there was
        insufficient evidence to demonstrate that, at the time he originally
        captured the pornographic photos on his phone, he intended to
        transfer them to his computer, we disagree for two reasons. First,
        based on our decision in Maxwell—and our sister circuits’ similar
        decisions in Foley, Pattee, and Poulin—we reject the premises (1)
        that “produc[tion]” is limited to the moment of an image’s initial
        creation and (2) that a defendant’s intent must therefore be assessed
        at that time. Second, and in any event, when viewed in the light
        most favorable to the government, the evidence defeats Downs’s
        contention. The proof at trial showed (1) that investigators found
        pornography of L.H., as well as illicit photos of other children, on
        Downs’s computer; (2) that Downs sexually abused L.H. and took
        nude photos of her in his car, on the beach, and in motel rooms
        when she was only 15 years old; (3) that Downs would drive for
        more than an hour in some cases to abuse L.H., presumably so that
        no one else—most notably her family—would be around when he
        did; and (4) that Downs transferred the photos he took of L.H. from
        his phone to his home computer, and had in fact told L.H. as much.
        From that evidence, a jury could have reasonably concluded that
        Downs had the requisite intent to “produce” child pornography
        when he originally captured the photos of L.H.
                                         III
               Downs separately contends that the district court reversibly
        erred when it discharged the impaneled-but-as-yet-unsworn jury in
        his absence. Downs makes two arguments in this regard: first, that
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        the district court judge shouldn’t have dismissed the entire panel;
        and second, regardless whether that decision was proper, that
        Downs should have been present when the decision was made.
        We’ll take Downs’s arguments in turn.
                                          A
               A defendant only has the right to have his case decided by a
        particular jury once jeopardy attaches. United States v. Therve, 764
        F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014). Jeopardy doesn’t attach until a jury
        is both impaneled and sworn. Id.
                Here, Downs’s initial jury was impaneled, but not sworn. In
        fact, the record shows that both parties agreed not to swear the jury
        given the impending storm—and, further, that once the storm had
        made landfall, Downs’s lawyer admitted that he was “glad the jury
        wasn’t sworn” because it gave the court the necessary flexibility to
        make new trial arrangements. Because the jury wasn’t sworn,
        jeopardy never attached. And absent jeopardy, Downs had no right
        to have his case decided by the particular jury that the judge had
        initially impaneled. Accordingly, the district court did not err when
        it discharged the entire panel.
                                          B
              Downs also argues that he was impermissibly excluded from
        the conference at which the judge decided to discharge the jury.
        We have explained that a defendant’s right to be present during
        criminal proceedings stems from “the Confrontation Clause of the
        Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
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        Amendment, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43.” United
        States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 997 (11th Cir. 2001). Downs
        contends that each of those provides a basis for reversal here.
                Downs’s lawyer didn’t object to his client’s absence from the
        teleconference in which the judge decided to discharge the jury.
        When a party fails to object to his absence from a proceeding, we
        review only for plain error. See United States v. Martinez, 604 F.2d
        361, 365 (5th Cir. 1979). We can reverse on plain-error review only
        if: (1) there was an error; (2) that error was plain; (3) the error
        affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the error
        seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
        judicial proceedings. United States v. Cingari, 952 F.3d 1301, 1305
        (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).
               Downs’s constitutional arguments are unavailing because he
        has failed to show any error—plain or otherwise—under either the
        Fifth or Sixth Amendment. With respect to the latter, the
        Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
        the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
        witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added).
        Needless to say, there were no “witnesses” at the conference at
        which the judge was considering what to do with Downs’s
        impaneled-but-not-yet-sworn jury. And we have held that the Sixth
        Amendment “does not confer upon the defendant the right to be
        present at every conference at which a matter pertinent to the case
        is discussed, or even at every conference with the trial judge at
        which a matter relevant to the case is discussed.” United States v.
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        Vasquez, 732 F.2d 846, 848 (11th Cir. 1984). Here, a pretrial
        meeting about the discharge of an unsworn jury does not implicate
        the Confrontation Clause.
               Downs’s Fifth Amendment argument likewise fails. We
        have assumed that even when the defendant is not confronting
        witnesses or evidence against him, he has a due-process right “to be
        present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation,
        reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend
        against the charge.” Novaton, 271 F.3d at 998 (quoting Kentucky v.
        Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987)). The government’s and defense’s
        cases-in-chief are paradigmatic stages of a criminal proceeding with
        respect to which the Due Process Clause protects a defendant’s
        right to be on hand. Id. The reason, of course, is that at those
        junctures, a defendant’s right to defend against the charges before
        him is at an apex. Here, by contrast, a judge’s decision whether to
        discharge an unsworn jury in Downs’s absence doesn’t trigger the
        same concerns. The discharge decision is not “critical to [the trial’s]
        outcome” because it doesn’t interfere with a defendant’s ability to
        defend against the charges before him, nor does the defendant’s
        absence “thwart[]” the fairness of his hearing. Id. By all accounts,
        Downs was present for all stages of his trial that would implicate his
        right to a fair and just hearing. That is all the Due Process Clause
        requires.
               Downs’s argument under Federal Rule of Criminal
        Procedure 43, by contrast, has merit. In relevant part, Rule 43 states
        that “[u]nless this rule, Rule 5, or Rule 10 provides otherwise, the
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        defendant must be present at: (1) the initial appearance, the initial
        arraignment, and the plea; (2) every trial stage, including jury
        impanelment and the return of the verdict; and (3) sentencing.”
        Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a). Accordingly, to determine whether Rule 43
        gave Downs a right to be present for the conference at which the
        judge considered whether to discharge the impaneled-but-not-yet-
        sworn jury, we must consider two questions. First, is jury discharge
        a “trial stage” within the meaning of Rule 43(a)(2)? And if so, do
        any of Rule 43’s exceptions apply?
               The Rule’s language and structure convince us that the
        answer to the first question is yes—jury discharge is a “trial stage.”
        Rule 43(a) subdivides district-court proceedings into three phases:
        pre-trial, in subsection (1); trial, in subsection (2); and post-trial, in
        subsection (3). Subsection (2)’s language indicates an all-
        encompassing, “soup-to-nuts” coverage of the trial phase, extending
        to “every trial stage,” from “jury impanelment” at the very
        beginning of trial to “the return of the verdict” at the tail end. If,
        per the Rule’s plain language, jury impanelment is a “trial stage” at
        which a defendant has a right to be present, it seems clear enough
        that any necessarily subsequent (but pre-verdict) jury discharge is,
        too.
               Resolution of the issue thus turns on whether any of Rule
        43’s “unless”-based exceptions applies. None does. Neither Rule 5
        nor Rule 10 has any relevance here—the former applies to the initial
        appearance, and the latter to the arraignment. Nor do any of the
        exceptions specified in “this Rule”—i.e., Rule 43 itself—exempt the
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        jury-discharge conference at issue. Rule 43(b) specifies four
        “circumstances” in which the defendant’s presence is “[n]ot
        [r]equired,” but the only one of those that could even arguably
        apply here is where “[t]he proceeding involves only a conference or
        hearing on a question of law.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(3). But a
        review of the transcript from the jury-discharge conference reveals
        that the parties and the judge never discussed any “question[s] of
        law”; to the contrary, their discussion focused entirely on the
        practical difficulties posed by the hurricane.
               Because jury discharge is a “trial stage” within the meaning
        of Rule 43(a)(2), and because none of Rule 43’s exceptions applies,
        we hold that Downs had a right to be present when the impaneled-
        but-not-yet-sworn jury was discharged. Accordingly, his absence
        from that conference constitutes error—and we think plain error—
        under Rule 43. Even so, Downs must show that the error affected
        his substantial rights. Cingari, 952 F.3d at 1305. For three reasons,
        he can’t do so. First, Downs’s lawyer was present and represented
        his interests when the judge decided to discharge the jury. At the
        conference, Downs’s counsel suggested an alternative to
        discharging the entire jury panel, which the judge summarily
        rejected. Moreover, the transcript makes clear that no matter what
        argument Downs’s lawyer made, the judge intended to discharge
        the entire jury if even a single member wouldn’t be available at the
        later date. Even now, having presumably consulted with his client,
        Downs’s lawyer doesn’t offer any new arguments against
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        17                      Opinion of the Court                 21-10809

        discharging the jury. So, it seems clear enough that Downs’s
        presence wouldn’t have made a difference to the ultimate outcome.
               Second, Downs only “speculate[s] as to whether the replaced
        juror[s] may have been more favorably disposed to [him] . . . .”
        United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1153 (11th Cir. 2003). We
        require more for reversal than bald assertions that a different jury
        would have reached a different verdict. Accordingly, Downs has
        not shown that the error affected his substantial rights. Id.
                Finally, the action that the judge took after discharging the
        initial jury is the very action that would have been required to
        remedy a Rule 43 violation—namely, impaneling a new jury. So
        even if Downs could show that his presence would have changed
        the judge’s decision to dismiss the jury, the judge’s subsequent
        impaneling of a proper jury cures any potential harm.
                                          IV
               Lastly, Downs contends that the government’s evidence was
        legally insufficient due to what he calls a “factual impossibility.” As
        already explained, at trial, L.H. testified that Downs took photos of
        her in a state of undress using a “flip phone.” Subsequent testimony
        from a forensic analyst revealed that the photos were taken with a
        Samsung SCH-S738C. On appeal, Downs asserts that a Samsung
        SCH-S738C isn’t a flip phone and can’t be confused with one. He
        argues, therefore, that L.H.’s testimony was factually impossible,
        leaving the evidence legally insufficient for conviction. We review
        only for plain error because Downs didn’t raise factual impossibility
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                21-10809

        as a basis for granting his motion for judgment of acquittal. See
        United States v. Hunerlach, 197 F.3d 1059, 1068 (11th Cir. 1999).
               With respect, Downs misunderstands factual impossibility.
        “Factual impossibility occurs when the objective of the defendant is
        proscribed by the criminal law but a circumstance unknown to the
        actor prevents him from bringing about that objective.” United
        States v. Delgado, 321 F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations
        omitted). That isn’t Downs’s contention, and for good reason:
        Using a flip- (or non-flip-) phone doesn’t make the production of
        child pornography impossible. Instead, Downs insists that a
        discrepancy in the evidence—about whether or not he used a flip-
        phone to take the photos—fatally undermines the jury’s verdict. At
        worst, that’s a factual ambiguity, not a factual impossibility.
               Credibility questions are the exclusive province of the jury,
        and on sufficiency review we must assume that they were answered
        in a manner that supports the verdict, see United States v. Jiminez,
        564 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009), unless witness testimony is
        “unbelievable” as a matter of law, United States v. Ramirez-Chilel,
        289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002). Here, L.H. testified that the
        photos were taken with a flip phone, and the forensic analyst stated
        that the photos were taken with a Samsung SCH-S738C. No
        testimony was elicited as to whether that Samsung model was or
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        19                        Opinion of the Court                     21-10809

        was not a flip phone. The jury was entitled to resolve that
        evidentiary ambiguity. 3
                                           * * *
               For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Downs’s convictions.
               AFFIRMED.

        3And to be clear, the jury heard evidence from which it could have reconciled
        any perceived inconsistency. The testimony revealed, for instance, that L.H.
        was drunk at the time that Downs took the pictures of her, and four years had
        elapsed between the time that Downs took the photos and the time that L.H.
        reported the event to law enforcement. Accordingly, the jury could have
        concluded that L.H. was simply confused about the type of phone that Downs
        had used. Separately, the jury heard testimony that investigators found a flip
        phone at Downs’s residence, from which it could have adduced that L.H.
        remembered that Downs used a flip phone at times and just misremembered
        the precise details about the time when he took pictures of her.