Court Opinion

ID: 9740548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:37:02.761386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:18.766839
License: Public Domain

Becker, J.
I respectfully dissent.
We here extended the doctrine of assumption of risk to yet another area of the law. We do that at a time when legal scholars are nearly unanimous in condemnation of the doctrine. Michigan has limited the doctrine strictly to eases where the risk is expressly contractually assumed and to master and servant cases. New Jersey by unanimous opinion first sharply limited the doctrine and later altogether eliminated it from the New Jersey law.
*1250It would be presumptuous in this dissent to attempt to analyze the problems raised by this doctrine and the valid reasons for strictly limiting its application (if not for entire abandonment). The analysis by the New Jersey Supreme Court, Weintraub, Chief Justice, in Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N. J. 44, 155 A.2d 90, 82 A. L. R.2d 1208, followed by the per curiam opinion by the same court in McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N. J. 272, 196 A. 238, and by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136, are both exhaustive and compelling. The reasoning is as applicable to our Iowa law as it is to the New Jersey and Michigan law. Ironically the New Jersey opinion uses two of our Iowa cases in tracing early developments in the master and servant field. Thus, it seems best to neglect a long historic review of the doctrine in Iowa and draw attention to some of the opinions of legal scholars.
First the problem: what do we mean when we say assumption of risk? Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, Volume 2, section 496A, after stating that the term is surrounded by much confusion, gives four definitions. However, the determination by the New Jersey and Michigan courts that assumption of risk essentially has only two different meanings is more realistic. As expressed in the valuable note found at 82 A. L. R.2d 1218, 1237: “[T]he term ‘assumption of risk’ may be used by the courts in two different meanings: (1) where the injured person acted reasonably in assuming a particular risk, and the defense constitutes a denial of defendant’s negligence, the term is used in its ‘primary meaning’; (2) where the injured person acted unreasonably in assuming a particular risk, and the defense of assumption of risk coincides with the defense of contributory negligence, the term is used in its ‘secondary meaning.’ ”
In 61 Yale Law Journal 141, Professor James said: “(1) In its primary sense the plaintiff’s assumption of a risk is only the counterpart of the defendant’s lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from that risk. In such a case plaintiff may not recover for his injury even though he was quite reasonable in encountering the risk that caused it. Volenti non fit injuria. (2) A plaintiff may also be said to assume a risk created by defendant’s *1251breach of duty towards him, when he deliberately chooses to encounter that risk. In such a case, except possibly in master and servant cases, plaintiff will be barred from recovery only if he was unreasonable in encountering the risk under the circumstances. This is a form of contributory negligence” (Emphasis added.)
Prosser, Torts, Second Ed., section 55, page 305, has said: “[Assumption of risk serves no useful purpose, since it introduces nothing that is not fully covered either by the idea of an absence of duty on the part of the defendant, or by that of contributory negligence of the plaintiff.”
Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Volume 2, section 21.8, suggests that, except for express assumption of risk, the term and the concept should be abolished.
All of the foregoing may be found cited in 82 A. L. R.2d 1218, 1227 et seq. Further the Iowa Law Review, Volume 51, page 247 et seq., takes the same tack. There we find such citations as “The concept is cloudy, and although lawyers confess their inability to comprehend, yet they trust that a jury will understand what they do not, and somehow successfully apply it.” 73 N. J. Law Journal 346. This note supports the statement in the Iowa Law Review: “Because the doctrine has grown beyond the bounds of its original meaning, judges, lawyers, and jurors have become thoroughly confused.”
It is hoped that the foregoing quotes, while not exhaustive, are sufficient to bolster the position that the doctrine should not be extended, and that it should not be made applicable to cases involving contributory negligence.
In struggling with the confusion raised by this doctrine we have noted: “This is an ordinary case of negligence and contributory negligence and the matter of assumption of risk should not be injected into the case.” Holmes v. Gross, 250 Iowa 238, 251, 93 N.W.2d 714.
In Shatto v. Grabin, 233 Iowa 46, 51, 6 N.W.2d 149, we said: “Edwards v. Kirk, 227 Iowa 684, 288 N.W. 875, involves the doctrine of assumption of risk. As therein noted, except in cases arising out of some contractual relation such as master and servant and in certain cases where, by reason of the char*1252acter of the defendant's act, contributory negligence does not bar recovery, the principle of assumption of risk operates in a rather strictly limited field.”
Thus it would seem that the doctrine has for the most part been restricted by us to cases brought under our gratuitous guest statute, and those involving a master-servant or principal-agent relationship. Bohnsack v. Driftmier, 243 Iowa 383, 390-394, 52 N.W.2d 79; Hansen v. Nelson, 240 Iowa 1298, 1304, 39 N.W.2d 292; and White v. McVicker, 216 Iowa 90, 94, 246 N.W. 385.
Having noted some of the authorities, what of the facts of this case? Had the defendant here made a full and fair disclosure to his prospective tenant that the premises were equipped with a faulty and dangerous gas hot water heater which had recently exploded and had not since been repaired (the jury to reach its verdict had to find defendant knew these facts), and if, after receipt of this knowledge, plaintiff rented and occupied the house, assumption of risk might be applicable as a result of express contract. A better way to outline the principle, if it is to be applied, would be to say that in such a situation the defendant owed no duty after such warning.
But defendant did not say anything at the time he rented the premises to plaintiff. This was clearly a latent defect which plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to discover until after he moved in with his family. As a matter of evidence the property was rented on Thursday, the family moved in on Friday, and the condition was not discovered until Saturday when the man came to hook up the heater.
With this knowledge defendant can and properly does urge contributory negligence. He was entitled to an instruction on contributory negligence. The court instructed:
“As applied to this case, if you find from all of the evidence that the plaintiff had knowledge of a defective and dangerous condition of the gas heater before his injuries and failed to use ordinary care under all of the circumstances, he would be guilty of negligence, and cannot recover herein, and your verdict should be for the defendant. Further, if you find from all of the evidence herein that the plaintiff had the said *1253Stanley light said heater and continued using the same, under all the circumstances shown by the evidence, and used the care of an ordinarily prudent person, then you are directed to return your verdict in accordance with all other instructions herein.”
Thus the real concept referred to at length by the authorities cited in this dissent was fully covered in the instruction on contributory negligence. Assumption of risk should not be added.
To state the proposition in another way is to reject it; i.e., at the minimum defendant had a duty to disclose the dangerous condition of the heater when he rented the property; if we apply assumption of risk we say this duty was negated or satisfied, or relieved, when plaintiff discovered for himself that the gas heater was defective and dangerous, because he voluntarily assumed the risk. He should have (1) spent his own money to do defendant’s work or (2) not used the heater or (3) moved out. Failing to do this the defendant is relieved of liability not because of contributory negligence but because of the absence of a primary duty on part of defendant. This conclusion seems preposterous. But it is the only conclusion available, unless we take the other tack and say defendant is entitled to a third instruction on contributory negligence but couched in new and different terms.
A quote from 51 Iowa Law Eeview, 247, 250, deserves comment. “This review of decisions reveals that a court may react in one of three ways when faced with a defense of assumption of risk. It may distinguish the case from others on the particular facts involved, basing its decision on a technical distinction, thus delaying the basic question concerning the value of the assumption of risk concept. Alternatively, a court may examine in detail the history of the assumption of risk doctrine and seek to clarify the problem by one of two methods —eliminating the language entirely, or severely limiting its applicability.”
The writer overlooked a fourth reaction! The court may apply and extend the doctrine despite the lack of solid reason for its applicability. Such seems to be the action here.
It is not suggested that we now eliminate assumption of *1254risk as a defense. It is only suggested that we not broaden it. In restricting the concept to where it now is, we can at least start on the road to understandable delineation of its applicability.
It is interesting to note that Wisconsin, which does not have the guest statute, has eliminated assumption of risk in automobile cases. McConville v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 15 Wis.2d 374, 384, 113 N.W.2d 14, stating: “The unreasonable assumption of risk constitutes negligence.”
We have the guest statute and have applied the assumption of risk doctrine to that type case under certain factual situations. Again, it should be emphasized that it is not here proposed to abandon this concept in that situation. That question is not now before us.
The objection to the mortality table is good but does not appear to be enough to call for reversal. The life expectancy difference is only 1.78 years out of a 31.29 year life expectancy. However, if the case is to be reversed it should be reversed on that ground, not for failure to instruct on assumption of risk. I would affirm.
Moore and Rawlings, ,TJ., join in this dissent.