Court Opinion

ID: 9418758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:38:22.474937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:09.667823
License: Public Domain

*208Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was charged with violating the National Prohibition Act by possessing and selling intoxicating liquor at the Bouckville Hotel. The District Court denied his request to restrain the use of evidence procured by federal officers while searching the hotel under a warrant alleged to be invalid. This evidence was introduced at the trial over his objection. He was found guilty and the judgment against him was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. [54 F. (2d) 1083.] This Court granted certiorari. The only question presented is as to the validity of the warrant.
Subject to petitioner’s contention, the parties'entered into a stipulation of facts which so far as pertinent to the question is as follows:
“ That on or about the sixth day of July, 1926, William Arthur, United States Commissioner, at Rome, New York, issued a search warrant based upon an affidavit introduced in evidence in this case, of C. G. Dodd, in which Dodd swore that he made a purchase of beer of the defendant; that on the twenty-seventh day of July, 1926, the said search warrant not having been executed in the interim and ten days from the date of the search warrant having expired, the search warrant was taken by the prohibition agents to whom it was directed back to the commissioner and by him, or by someone in his office under his direction and control, the date of the search warrant was changed from July sixth to July twenty-seventh, 1926, and thus reissued; that acting under the color of such search warrant,” the search in question was made.
*209The record also contains a certificate by the United States Commissioner, under date of December 20, 1926, as follows:
“ I hereby certify that the complaint or affidavit, upon which the search warrant was issued in the above entitled matter, was made before me on the 6th day of July, 1926. That the search warrant was issued on or about said 6th day of July, 1926, but was not executed within the ten days prescribed by statute, and was returned to me by Albert Vandiver, Prohibition Agent in Charge of the Syracuse office requesting that same be reissued or re-dated, and my docket book shows that same was reissued on the 27th day of July, 1926, and mailed back to said Vandiver.”
The National Prohibition Act, § 26, 41 Stat. 305, 315, U. S. C., Tit. 27, § 39, authorizes the issue of warrants to search for intoxicating liquors as provided in Title XI of the Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 228.1 Section 11 of the last mentioned Act has the following requirement:
*210“ Sec. 11. A search warrant must be executed and returned to the judge or commissioner who issued it within ten days after its date; after the expiration of this time the warrant, unless executed, is void.”
As the original warrant was issued on July sixth and was not executed within ten days, it became void under this explicit provision. But the Government contends that the warrant could be redated and reissued, and that in this form it should be regarded as a new warrant under which the search could lawfully be made.
With this argument we cannot agree. The proceeding by search warrant is a drastic one. Its abuse led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, and this, together with legislation regulating the process, should be liberally construed in favor of the individual. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 635; Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 32; Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 196, 197; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 464. The statute requires that the judge or commissioner issuing a search warrant for intoxicating liquors must be satisfied “ of the existence of the grounds of the application or that there is probable cause to believe their existence.” Act of June 15, 1917, Tit. XI, § 6. He must take proof to that end. Id., §§ 4, 5. The warrant must state “the particular grounds or probable cause for its issue and the names of the persons whose affidavits have been taken in support thereof.” Id., § 6. While the statute does not fix the time within which proof of probable cause must be taken by the judge or commissioner, it is manifest that the proof must be of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time. Whether the proof meets this test *211must be determined by the circumstances of each case. It is in the light of the requirement that probable cause ■must properly appear when the warrant issues that we must read the provision which in explicit terms makes a warrant void unless executed within ten days after its date. That period marks the permitted duration of the proceeding in which the warrant is issued. There is no provision which authorizes the commissioner to extend its life or to revive it.
The issue of a second warrant is essentially a new proceeding which must have adequate support. The fact that it is a second warrant gives the commissioner no privilege to dispense with the statutory conditions. These cannot be escaped by describing the action as a reissue. If the warrant is the old one, sought to be revived, the proceeding is a nullity, and if it is a new warrant, the commissioner must act accordingly. The statute in terms requires him before issuing the warrant to take proof of probable cause. This he must do by examining on oath the complainant and his witness and requiring their affidavits or depositions. The proof supplied must have appropriate relation to the application for the new warrant and must speak as of the time of the issue of that warrant. The commissioner has no authority to rely on affidavits which have sole relation to a different time and have not been brought down to date or supplemented so that they can be deemed to disclose grounds existing when the new warrant is issued. The new warrant must rest upon a proper finding and statement by the commissioner that probable cause then exists. That determination, as of that time, cannot be left to mere inference or conjecture. The purpose of the statute would be thwarted if by the simple expedient of redating, without more, the time for the execution of a warrant could be extended.
*212Applying these principles to the instant case, the warrant cannot be sustained. The proceeding for the warrant issued on July sixth had terminated and that war- ■ rant was dead. On the new application of July twenty-seventh the commissioner took no proof to show that probable cause then existed and he made no finding of probable cause at that time. It is impossible by any process "of reasoning to obscure or alter what he actually did. He simply changed the date of the old warrant and it was “ thus reissued.” Such action was unauthorized.

Judgment reversed.

Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo think that the Commissioner, by redating the warrant, in effect, issued a new warrant, which was adequately supported by facts disclosed in the affidavit, then before him, on which the first warrant had been issued.

 The following are among the provisions of the Act of June 15, 1917, Tit. XI, 40 Stat. 228:
“ Sec. 3. A -search warrant can not be issued but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person and particularly describing the property and the place to be searched.
“ Sec. 4. The judge or commissioner must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the complainant and any witness he may produce, and require their affidavits or take their depositions in writing and cause them to be subscribed by the parties making them.
“Sec. 5. The affidavits or depositions must set forth the facts tending to establish the grounds of the application or probable cause for believing that they exist.
“ Sec. 6. If the judge or commissioner is thereupon satisfied of the existence of the grounds of the application or that there is probable cause to believe their existence, he must issue a search warrant signed by him with his name of office, to a civil officer of the Uni led States duly authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any law thereof, or to a person so duly authorized by the President of the United States, stating the particular grounds or probable cause for its issue and the *210names of the persons whose affidavits have been taken in support thereof, and commanding him forthwith to search the person or place named, for the property specified, and to bring it before the judge or commissioner.”