Court Opinion

ID: 9518378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:51:34.643677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:47.655893
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the defendant has met the statutory burden of establishing that he is entitled to DNA testing of both the bloodstained pants and the fingernail scrapings and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for DNA testing. It is axiomatic that statutes passed by our legislature are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning and when the intent of the legislature can be ascertained from the statutory language, it must be given effect without resorting to other aids of construction. People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448 (1989). In other words, when it comes to trying to figure out the intent of the legislature, we must assume that it means what it says and says what it means. In this matter, only by ignoring the plain language of the statute can my colleagues on the majority affirm the trial court. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent. Section 116 — 3 of the Code states that “[t]he trial court shall allow the testing *** upon a determination that *** the result of the testing has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant’s assertion of actual innocence.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/116 — 3(c)(1) (West 1998). The plain and ordinary meaning of this provision is that the trail court must order testing where there is a “potential” that “materially relevant” evidence may result from the testing. The plain and unambiguous language of the statute clearly bespeaks no legislative intent to limit the use of scientific testing only to situations where the testing will result in “total vindication.” Nor is there any indication from the language of the statute that the legislature intended scientific testing only where it had the potential to exonerate the defendant. If the legislature had intended this statute to only be available where the scientific evidence would lead to “total vindication,” it could have easily said so. As such, it chose to allow testing in any case where the results were “materially relevant.” We should honor its clearly stated intention. Reviewing the record in this matter, it is clear that the defendant has met his burden in petitioning for DNA testing. There is no question that he has established a prima facie case for chain of custody regarding the bloodstained pants. In addition, those pants stained with blood of the same blood type as one of the victims were the key piece of physical evidence against him. If it could now be shown through DNA testing that the blood on the pants was not the victim’s, those results would be “materially relevant” to the defendant’s claim of “actual innocence,” i.e., a claim of innocence that is freestanding rather than one based upon a claim of trial error. See People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 479 (1996). For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the trial court and I dissent on that basis.