Court Opinion

ID: 9686311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:41:05.722542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:17.548313
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 51. (dissenting). Like the court of appeals, I conclude that the evidence seized during the warrantless search should be excluded because it was seized as a result of the agents' exploitation of their concededly unconstitutional entry. Both the facts of this case and precedent support this conclusion.
¶ 52. The issue is whether the connection between the illegal police entry and the subsequent seizure of evidence has become so attenuated as to purge the seizure from the taint of the constitutional violation. It is the State's burden to prove the admissibility of evidence after the primary taint has been established. See State v. Walker, 154 Wis. 2d 158, 186, 453 N.W.2d 127 (1990).
¶ 53. The attenuation issue focuses on three primary factors: temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of any official misconduct. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); State v. Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d 441, 448, 477 N.W.2d 277 (1991). The majority's review of the facts of this case leads it to conclude that the defendant's consent to search and the agents' subsequent discovery of illegal drugs were purged of any taint arising from the unconstitutional entry. I disagree.
¶ 54. Consideration of the first factor, temporal proximity, includes measurement of the intervening time as well as consideration of then existing conditions which might outweigh the short time interval. *214See Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 449; State v. Tobias, 196 Wis. 2d 537, 548, 538 N.W.2d 843 (Ct. App. 1995). The existence of a "congenial atmosphere" may thus weigh in favor of attenuation. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 108 (1980); Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 449. Neither the short time interval nor the existing conditions weigh in favor of attenuation in this case.
¶ 55. The majority's consideration of temporal proximity begins with a concession that "[i]n the strictest of custodial conditions, the passing of only a short time might not be long enough to purge the initial taint." Majority op. at 207. While acknowledging that the temporal proximity consists of "only a few minutes," the majority attempts to save the situation by relying on the "non-threatening, cooperative" atmosphere surrounding the search. Such reliance is misplaced.
¶ 56. In support of this picture of a "non-threatening, cooperative" atmosphere, the majority throughout the opinion maintains that there is no evidence that shows coercive police tactics. There is no evidence that the agents used "any misrepresentation, deception, or trickery to entice the defendant to give his consent to search his bedroom." Majority op. at 198. "There is no credible evidence that the agents threatened. . .the defendant." Majority op. at 199. There is no evidence that the agents "employ[ed] any other coercive interrogation tactics before the defendant consented to the search of his bedroom." Majority op. at 200. There is no evidence that the defendant "act[ed] annoyed with or objected] to the agents' presence in the basement." Majority op. at 207.
¶ 57. Contrary to the lack of evidence assertions, the record reflects an alternative that undermines the picture of a "non-threatening, cooperative" encounter. *215As the State conceded, the entry into the basement was illegal. Three officers came into the small basement storage area to ask the defendant questions and to search his living quarters for drugs. The officers asked permission to search his room and the defendant inquired if they had a search warrant. The defendant testified:
A: They said they didn't need one. And they said if they had to come back with one that they'd have to bust down the door and search through the whole house.
Q: Is it your testimony that they said they wanted to search the house or they just wanted to search your room?
A: When they first came down, they just said they wanted to search the room. They said if I did not give them permission they would come back with a search warrant and they would search the whole house....
¶ 58. The officers knew that the defendant's parents lived upstairs in the house. The record reflects that his mother was dying of cancer.1 The threat of busting down the door and searching the living area of his mother paints a picture of something less than a non-threatening atmosphere. Yet, in the face of this record, the majority clings to its assertion that "[t]here *216is nothing in the record that suggests the agents.. .exploited this information [of the sick mother upstairs] to coerce the defendant into consenting to the search." Majority op. at 208 n.12.
¶ 59. In a further attempt to buttress its analysis, the majority also expansively portrays the findings of the circuit court, effectively claiming that the circuit court uniformly believed the facts as testified to by the three agents and uniformly dismissed the defendant's testimony. Such an expansive portrayal is inconsistent with the more limited findings of the court which only addressed the consent to enter the building and consent to enter the bedroom. The court actually stated its credibility finding as follows:
there is no doubt that they [the agents] did not have actual consent to go into the basement area. I think that's pretty clear from the testimony. It's also pretty clear to the Court that, and I find the officers' testimony believable, that they did have consent to go into this room, where they found the items, and I'm quite puzzled how to handle the two different situations.
Again specifically referencing the defendant's consent to enter the bedroom, the court then noted that "I find the officers to be credible on that issue, but I don't know how the one interacts with the other."
¶ 60. The credibility findings of the court were limited and the majority's attempt to support its analysis by illusory broader findings is unpersuasive. The findings of the court support the conclusion that the court believed some historical facts in the testimony of *217the agents and some historical facts in the testimony of the defendant.2
¶ 61. In addition to some of the facts of this case undermining the majority's picture of "non-threatening, cooperative conditions," case law cited by the majority also undermines the majority's attenuation conclusion. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, a defendant detained for approximately 45 minutes pending issuance of a search warrant not only did not object to being detained, but got up, put an album on the stereo, and offered the detaining officers something to drink. Witnesses for both sides indicated that a "congenial atmosphere" existed during the 45-minute detention period. As this court described the Rawlings holding in *218Anderson, "the Court found that the non-threatening, congenial conditions that existed during the detention outweighed the relatively short period of time between the initiation of the detention and the admission." Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 449. Significantly, the Rawl-ings court expressed concern that under the "strictest of custodial conditions," even a 45-minute time span might not be enough to purge the initial taint. See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 107.
¶ 62. In State v. Anderson, officers illegally searched the garage of the defendant the day before he was arrested and made incriminating statements. Even after taking the defendant into custody the next day, the officers and the defendant exchanged humorous anecdotes and the defendant indicated that he had intended to call the police that morning anyway. Under these circumstances, this court determined that the combination of the at least seven-hour interval between the illegal search and the defendant's statements and the non-threatening and congenial atmosphere existing during that interval purged any taint from the prior search. See Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 450.
¶ 63. The standard by which the majority analyzes this case, whether the conditions were "nonthreatening [and] non-custodial" is also a puzzling one. While non-threatening conditions may in some cases outweigh temporal proximity, I question the majority's use of a "non-custodial" prong for the attenuation analysis. That prong is not referenced in Rawlings or Anderson and appears to be contrary to the examinations in those cases. If non-threatening and congenial conditions existing in a custodial situation argue for attenuation, as in Rawlings, I fail to see the merit in declaring that because only a non-custodial interaction *219occurs the taint is more likely attenuated. As the facts of this case demonstrate, a non-custodial situation may also exhibit threatening conditions.
¶ 64. The majority's attenuation analysis essentially indicates that so long as agents answer questions raised by individuals confronted in their own home, but not taken into custody, and so long as those individuals do not take the added step of attempting to expel the agents, then sufficient "non-threatening [and] non-custodial" conditions exist to dissipate any taint. Such a result is inconsistent with the understanding of the "conditions" element of the temporal proximity factor embraced in Rawlings and Anderson. It creates a rule whereby extreme temporal proximity may be disregarded in the absence of violence or protest over the constitutional violation and an arrest. The conditions presented in this record do not outweigh the very limited temporal proximity between the unlawful entry and the search. Thus, the temporal proximity factor supports the conclusion that the evidence seized during the search was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry.
¶ 65. In addressing the second attenuation factor, the presence of intervening events, the majority declares, "[t]he fact that a short conversation took place between the agents and the defendant supports a finding that the agents did not exploit their unlawful entry into defendant's home by surprising or misleading the defendant into consenting to the search." Majority op. at 209.1 do not believe that the existence of a momentary conversation, without more, inevitably leads to the conclusion that the officers did not exploit their initial illegal entry.
¶ 66. Contrary to the majority's interpretation of the facts, both the court of appeals and the circuit court *220acknowledged that the facts of this case allowed no time for an intervening event. The search of the living quarters followed almost immediately after the war-rantless entry. In describing the brevity of events, the circuit court stated that "[e]verything happened rather quickly... . There obviously was no intervening period of time between the officers coming in and the subsequent search."3
¶ 67. The sole case cited by the majority in its brief discussion of the intervening events factor is also easily distinguished from the facts of this case. In applying the intervening event factor, the Anderson court concluded that the fact that the defendant was given Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) warnings and had signed a waiver of constitutional rights "weigh in favor of finding that the statement and resultant search were voluntary and sufficiently attenuated from the illegal searches." Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 448. During the intervening time the Anderson defendant also signed a consent to search and seize form.
¶ 68. Here, Phillips was never given Miranda warnings.4 Unlike the defendant in Anderson, Phillips *221did not have any prior knowledge that he might be the target of a police investigation. Unlike in Anderson, where the intervening time was at least seven hours between the illegality and the search, here the search followed almost immediately on the heels of the illegal entry. Nothing in this brief chain of events convinces me that this short conversation eliminated any potential for the defendant to be "surprised, frightened, or confused" by the agents' unanticipated and unlawful entry into the defendant's home. Indeed, if the mere existence of a short conversation were all that were required to fulfill this court's attenuation analysis, such an analysis would be a superfluous exercise.
¶ 69. The final factor in the attenuation analysis is an examination of the flagrancy and purposefulness of the agents' misconduct. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604. As this court has noted in the past, "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." State v. Douglas, 123 Wis. 2d 13, 17, 365 N.W.2d 580 (1985) (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). "At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
¶ 70. In determining that the agents' entry into the defendant's home was not flagrant, the majority again relies upon a paucity of evidence indicating that the agents used force, violence, threats, or deception *222when entering the home. Again, the majority fails to acknowledge the agents' threat to knock down the door and search the living area of the parents if the agents had to return with a warrant. The majority also rests on the absence of any evidence that the defendant "act[ed] annoyed with or object[ed] to the agents' presence. . . ." Majority op. at 207. Such reliance on the absence of evidence disregards the State's burden in proving attenuation. It also fails to acknowledge that this was not a situation where one officer casually entered a defendant's home to ask some questions. Rather, three officers all entered the home for the purpose of questioning the single defendant.
¶ 71. The conduct of the agents in this case also exhibits a "quality of purposefulness." See Brown, 422 U.S. at 605. One of the agents testified that all three officers went to the defendant's home with the expressed purpose of talking to him and of searching his living area. Thus, despite the majority's assertions to the contrary that rely upon the more generalized description of another agent, the concededly improper entry of the agents into the defendant's home for the purpose of conducting a search displays the necessary elements of purposefulness.5
¶ 72. Again citing Anderson and Rawlings, the majority concludes that "the conduct of the agents here.. .did not 'rise to the level of conscious or flagrant misconduct requiring prophylactic exclusion' of the evidence discovered during the consensual search of the *223defendant's bedroom." Majority op. at 209 (quoting Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 110). Once again, the majority's reliance on the holdings of Anderson and Rawlings ignores the significantly different facts presented to this court.
¶ 73. In Rawlings, the officers detained the defendant apparently believing that they could temporarily do so legally and that a warrant to search the premises would allow them to search the occupants therein. The Rawlings Court, believing the legality of the detention to be an open question, determined that the conduct was accordingly not so flagrant or purposeful as to require exclusion. See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 110.
¶ 74. Similarly, in Anderson, the officers searched the defendant's garage at least twice. The first time they searched the garage the officers were accompanied by and had the consent of the defendant's 15-year-old daughter. While it was later established that the daughter did not have the authority to consent to the search, this court found the officers' reliance upon her consent to be reasonable and did not find purposeful or flagrant misconduct. See Anderson, 165 Wis. 2d at 452. In the second search, the officer appeared before a judge and swore to and signed an affidavit for a warrant. For some unexplained reason the officer executed the search with only the affidavit, believing he had a valid warrant. While it was later established the officer had only the affidavit in his possession at the time of the search, the court again found that his conduct was not purposeful or flagrant. See id.
¶ 75. The agents in this case never attempted to get a warrant prior to entering the defendant's home. The agents did not rely on another's consent in entering the defendant's home. There is no evidence that the *224agents were under the mistaken impression that their actions were legal. Thus, while the facts of this case may not be read to be as flagrant or as purposeful as other potential extreme hypotheticals, the nature of the police intrusion into the defendant's home and its purposefulness cannot be dismissed.
¶ 76. More importantly, even if the majority's argument that the entry was not flagrant or purposeful is taken at face value, that fact is not dispositive of the larger attenuation analysis. As this court noted in an attenuation case dealing with an illegal lineup:
With respect to the third factor, the fact that the arrest was not flagrant and was not [purposeful] is not enough alone to validate the lineup. Rather, the absence of this factor merely means that less is required in terms of intervening circumstances.
Walker, 154 Wis. 2d at 187.
¶ 77. Having considered the three traditional factors under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule, I conclude that all three factors argue in favor of excluding the evidence obtained as a result of the constitutional violation. A review of the facts and prior case law supports the conclusion the State has failed to meet its burden of showing sufficient attenuation between the illegal entry and the evidence seized during the search. Accordingly, I dissent.
¶ 78. I am authorized to state that SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE and WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. join this opinion.

 The record indicates that the defendant and his mother were very close and that he sold his share of a small video business so that he could remain in the home and care for his mother during her long illness. The record also indicates Agent Londre recalled that "on that particular night [the defendant] appeared nervous and he did appear concerned for his mother as he related her condition to the agents." She died three weeks after the defendant entered his plea in this case.

 The majority broadly claims that "the circuit court found the defendant's testimony not credible." As the findings above and the record actually demonstrate, it was not the case that the court uniformly dismissed the defendant's testimony in favor of the agents. For example, during his testimony, Agent Londre indicated that the three agents had express permission to enter the defendant's home. Yet, the circuit court noted that "[tjhere was, for sure, no consent," a position also acknowledged by the State. Thus, while the circuit court's findings must be read to have concluded that the defendant consented to the ultimate search, the circuit court's findings cannot honestly be read as a unilateral rejection of the defendant's testimony in regards to the conditions existing prior to that consent.
Even more ironically, the majority justifies its finding of attenuation by citing existing conditions such as "when asked whether the agents could search his bedroom, the defendant opened the door to his bedroom, located the marijuana, [and] turned it over to the agents.. .." Majority op. at 207. Thus, the majority's reasoning comes full circle. The very search and seizure of evidence which the State must demonstrate was not tainted by the unconstitutional entry is the also the majority's chief evidence of the lack of that same taint.

 It appears inconsistent for the majority, which so strongly relied upon the circuit court's findings for its examination of the conditions surrounding the constitutional violation and search, to now ignore the circuit court's determination that no intervening events could have occurred.

 The majority mistakenly concludes that this dissent would apply Miranda to this case. I do not believe Miranda applicable to the present case in the absence of a custodial arrest. However, I also do not believe that the majority can dispute that one of the chief reasons the taint in Anderson was ruled attenuated was the fact that the defendant there had been given a Miranda warning. No such supporting factor exists in this case, because it cannot — there was no custodial arrest. That inequality does not, despite the majority's apparent inter*221pretation of the dissent to the contrary, require application of Miranda to this case. However, it does preclude one strong potential foundation for the majority's otherwise weak attenuation conclusion which they attempt to buttress through citation to Anderson.

 The majority's failure to acknowledge the inconsistencies among the agents' statements trips up the majority opinion. I am aware of no legal doctrine which indicates that the acceptable actions or intentions of two agents, assuming they are to be believed, in any way forgives the purposeful misconduct of a third agent.