Court Opinion

ID: 9673571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:14:37.325603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:55.715332
License: Public Domain

Knutson, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the result arrived at in the majority opinion. In my opinion, the case is controlled by State ex rel. Smiley v. Holm, 184 Minn. 228, 238 N. W. 494, and State ex rel. Gardner v. Holm, 241 Minn. 125, 62 N. W. (2d) 52. It is true that we were forced to accept the construction of our constitution that the United States Supreme Court saw fit to place upon it in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 52 S. Ct. 397, 76 L. ed. 795, for the reason that the case involved a construction of the Federal Constitution and the decision of the Federal court was binding upon us in that area. As far as our construction of the language of our constitution is concerned, what we said in State ex rel. Smiley v. Holm, supra, still controls in the areas where the Federal Constitution is not involved. We so held in the Gardner case in these words (241 Minn. 137, 62 N. W. [2d] 60):
“* * * [0]ur construction of our own constitution is controlling, and the construction placed thereon in the Smiley case still stands as far as it relates exclusively to our fundamental law.”
However, aside from the Smiley case, the language construed in the Gardner case is identical to that now before us. It cannot be that the framers of our constitution intended this language to have one meaning when they dealt with judicial salaries and an entirely different meaning when they dealt with other matters. If we were right in the Gardner case, and I think we were, we should adhere to the construction placed on the same language now before us in that case. Reference to Minn. Const, art. 4, § § 2 and 23, prior to its amendment in 1964 can hardly lead to any other conclusion. In § 2, the provision relating to the fixing of the number of members of the Senate and House of Representatives was in a separate sentence from that providing for apportionment of the number so fixed among the various parts of the state. Section 23 provided specifically that the legislature should provide by law for an enumeration of the inhabitants of the state and that “the legislature shall have the power to *444prescribe the bounds of congressional, senatorial and representative districts, and to apportion anew the senators and representatives among the several districts” of the state. (Italics supplied.) When the article was amended in 1964, § 23 was changed to read: “The legislature shall have the power to provide by law for an enumeration of the inhabitants of this State, and also have the power at their first session after each enumeration of the inhabitants of this state made by the authority of the United States, to prescribe the bounds of congressional, senatorial and representative districts, and to apportion anew the senators and representatives among the several districts according to the provisions of section second of this article.” (Italics supplied.) The language in § 2 remained as it was — that the number of senators and representatives should be prescribed by law. In so far as the matter now before us is concerned, § 23 as amended has the same meaning as if it read: “The legislature shall have the power to provide by law for an enumeration of the inhabitants of the state, and the legislature shall have the power to prescribe the bounds of congressional, senatorial and representative districts.”
There can be little doubt that the legislature understood the difference in the language of the two provisions after the Gardner case. It is interesting to note that a constitutional commission was established by L. 1947, c. 614, to study the need for constitutional revision. It was composed of many eminent men and women, and made its report to the legislature in 1948. With respect to the judiciary article, which was Minn. Const, art. 6, the commission proposed that the language of § 8 provide in part: “The compensation of all justices and judges, which shall not be diminished during their term of office, shall be prescribed by law.” (Italics supplied.) The Gardner case was decided on January 29, 1954. The proposed amendment of the judiciary article came before the legislature at its 1955 session and, obviously as a result of the Gardner case, art. 6, § 7, as proposed by the legislature read in part: “The compensation of all judges shall be prescribed by the legislature and shall not be diminished during their term of office.” (Italics supplied.) This change retained the result obtained by the Gardner case. Even more interesting were the changes made in a schedule attached at the end of the judiciary article. Paragraph (e) of the commission’s schedule read: “Sal*445ary schedules in effect when this Article is adopted, for the compensation of judges, court commissioners, clerks of court, and other court employees, shall remain in effect until otherwise provided, by law.” (Italics supplied.) The bill as drafted and as introduced in the legislature was identical to the report of the commission. As such it passed the House 1 and was sent to the Senate. The Senate passed it without amendment and returned it to the House 2 but later recalled it from the House.3 Upon recall of the bill, the Senate amended paragraph (e) of the schedule, which had become paragraph (d) in the bill, to read as follows:
“Salary schedules, in effect when this Article takes effect for the compensation of judges, court commissioners, clerks of court, and other court employees, shall remain in effect until otherwise prescribed by the legislature or provided by law.” (Italics supplied.)
It is clearly evident that the legislature understood the difference in meaning between “prescribed by the legislature” and “provided by law.”
Should we then assume that when art. 4, dealing with the legislature, was amended in 1964 the legislature no longer realized the difference in this language? It strikes me that to so find would unjustifiably ascribe to the legislature an ignorance of what they had done in prior years. In proposing an amendment to our judiciary article in 1955, which was adopted by the people in 1956, the legislature had ample opportunity to change the interpretation of the language we were confronted with in Gardner, and are confronted with now, if it had desired or intended to do so. The legislature not having done so, we must assume that both they and the people were satisfied with the construction we had placed on this language. It cannot be successfully argued that it was not deliberately retained, at least by the legislature, when they drafted and passed the proposal to amend our judiciary article. I think the same is true when the article dealing with the legislature was amended in 1964.
Nor can I agree that there is no logical difference between fixing the number of senators and representatives and apportioning them among *446the various districts of the state. Much the same reasons exist for requiring the lawmaking process to be used in the one instance and leaving it to the legislature alone in the other as existed in the Gardner case. The number of senators and representatives affects directly the cost of operating the legislature. In this area the same considerations exist as in any appropriation of money for state purposes. That is not necessarily so in apportioning the number so fixed among the various sections of the state. Here there is a constitutional mandate that the boundaries of the districts shall be so drawn that the members of the legislature shall be apportioned as nearly equally on a basis of population as can reasonably be accomplished. That function involves an entirely different process and can be performed by the legislature alone. To permit the governor to veto the action of the legislature in performing this function makes it more difficult to accomplish the necessary redistricting and sometimes makes it virtually impossible to reach agreement when the governor and the majority of the legislature are at odds politically.
The historical background of the language involved here has been fully explored in Smiley and Gardner, and I see no need of retreading that ground in order to find an escape route along a different path from that which we have heretofore followed in order to arrive at a result which is inconsistent with that reached by our former decisions. Our function in this case, as it is in all cases involving constitutional interpretation, is limited to determining, as best we can, what the language used in the constitution means. Here, more than anywhere else, it is important that our decisions be consistent and that, once having construed specific language in our constitution, we adhere to the meaning placed on it unless we are convinced that we were originally in error. It is not our concern whether the meaning is popular or not, nor is it our concern whether the construction contended for by one group or another will further the political ambitions of anyone.
There are other areas where the legislature under our constitution operates without concurrence of the governor. As we pointed out in Gardner, one of these areas is the selection of the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota. The case of State ex rel. Peterson v. Quin-livan, 198 Minn. 65, 268 N. W. 858, clearly points this out and holds *447that an attempt by the legislature to provide by law that the governor make such appointments was unconstitutional. Again, in Minn. Const, art. 14, § 1, dealing with the amendment of our constitution itself, the proposal to amend comes from the legislature. The governor has no power to veto such proposal. With respect to approval or rejection by the people, however, the section provides that it shall be “in a manner to be provided by law.” Thus it is apparent that it is not uncommon that one act be done by the legislature alone and another be subject to the governor’s veto to accomplish a single purpose.
There may be still other areas where the governor has no veto power over the actions of the legislature. Those we have mentioned are sufficient to demonstrate that the framers of our constitution used the term “provided by law” understandingly when they intended that the lawmaking process should apply in the article now before us as well as in the judiciary article and elsewhere.
I think the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
Otis, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Knutson.
Nelson, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Knutson.

 See, Journal of the House, 1955, pp. 1282 to 1283.

 See, Journal of the Senate, 1955, pp. 1417 to 1418.

 See, Journal of the Senate, 1955, p. 1500.