Court Opinion

ID: 2715261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2014-08-06 17:20:26.200426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:11.095069
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

REBECCA LAMONTE, a single                        No. 69115-5-1
individual,
                                                 DIVISION ONE
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                                                                                                       293 F. 1013,1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (evidence derived from a scientific
theory or principle is admissible only if the theory or principle has achieved general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community).
      4 REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 19 states that "you are liable forthe injuries sustained by
Rebecca LaMonte as a result ofthe rear end collision between Sherman Cook's vehicle and your vehicle
on May 30, 1997." REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21 states that "as a result of the rear end collision
..., [LaMonte] developed Fibromyalgia."
                                                     10
No. 69115-5-1/11

Bruington. Westerfield identified accident reconstruction expert Charles Lewis.5 On
May 7, Westerfield also filed a "Motion to Withdraw or Amend Plaintiff's Requests for

Admissions to Defendants Westerfield Deemed Admitted." Westerfield argued the

failure to allow withdrawal of the admissions would deny Westerfield the opportunity to

present a defense on the merits and LaMonte had not established prejudice.

Westerfield's attorney argued, in pertinent part:

            From the inception of this case, the subject matter of these
       Requests has been denied or challenged, as the claims against Mr.
       Westerfield have been defended. The so-called two impact theory was
       alleged in plaintiff's Complaint and was denied in defendants' Answer. Mr.
       Westerfield answered interrogatories that described the sequence of
       events involved in the accident, to include the swerving of the van in front
       of him which blocked his view of Cook's and plaintiff's vehicles.
       Westerfield retained and disclosed accident reconstructionist Richard
       Chapman in 2001, who opined that the physical evidence did not". . .
       support a conclusion that the Cook Volvo struck the rear of the LaMonte
       Chrysler two separate times." Understanding that how this accident
       occurred was hotly contested and very much at issue, plaintiff, through her
       attorneys, retained and disclosed accident reconstruction expert Bryan
       Jorgensen to challenge the opinions offered by Mr. Chapman.
              In late 2011, plaintiff disclosed accident reconstruction expert Ward
       Bruington. In the disclosure for Mr. Bruington, it was his opinion that Mr.
       Cook's vehicle originally impacted Ms. LaMonte's vehicle, and that "[i]t is
       then likely that Mr. Westerfield rear ended Mr. Cook's vehicle driving the
       Cook vehicle back into the LaMonte vehicle... ." It is further worth noting
       that even in plaintiff[s] Second Amended Plaintiffs Witness and Exhibit
       List, plaintiff still includes Mr. Bruington and Mr. Jorgensen as witnesses to
       be called at trial. For the 12 some years that this case has been pending,
       the details as to how this accident occurred, and whether the actions of
       Mr. Westerfield has been hotly contested, and plaintiff has proceeded
       throughout the entirety of this case as if her April 4, 2000 Requests for
       Admissions never existed.161

       While Westerfield's motion to withdraw or amend the requests for admission was

pending, the case was reassigned to another judge for trial. On May 15, the judge

heard argument on the pending motion. The court granted Westerfield's motion to
       5Westerfield's previous accident reconstruction expert Chapman died in November 2011.
       6(Footnotes omitted) (alterations in original).
                                                11
No. 69115-5-1/12

withdraw the admissions by default. The court expressly found that LaMonte had not

established prejudice.7 The court also entered an order dismissing Cook as a party to

the lawsuit.

         At the beginning of the trial, LaMonte argued she was entitled to use the Cook

admissions during opening statement and to rebut the testimony of the defense

accident reconstruction expert. Westerfield argued the admissions were inadmissible

because Cook was no longer a party to the action. The court ruled that the Cook

admissions were hearsay and LaMonte could not refer to the admissions during

opening statement or in her case in chief.

         During the three-week jury trial, more than 20 witnesses testified including
LaMonte, Westerfield, and accident reconstruction experts Jorgensen, Bruington, and

Lewis.

         LaMonte testified that as she was approaching the I-5 overpass, she put on the

brakes and stopped after she suddenly saw "brake lights, all the brake lights were
stopping in front of me." LaMonte said that she "was hit from behind, the air bag
deployed, Iwas hit again, and the last thing Iremember is my head falling into the
deflated air bag." On cross-examination, LaMonte admitted that in a 1997 recorded
interview, she said that she could not be sure whether there were two impacts.
         Before calling accident reconstruction expert Jorgensen, LaMonte argued she
was entitled to introduce the Cook admissions because Jorgensen relied on the

         7The court stated, in pertinent part:
         Ihave significant concerns about the appellate issues at play here, and Ihave a
         significant concern whether Judge McCullough's decision will be reversed for abuse of
         discretion in failing to have an adequate record of prejudice to the plaintiff    Ithink at
         this point it would be an abuse of discretion for me not to consider the prejudice issue
          and what Ithink is an evidentiary deficiency in terms ofthe lack of prejudice.
                                                      12
No. 69115-5-1/13

admissions in forming his opinion.

       The court ruled that LaMonte's expert could testify about the Cook admissions.

The court instructed the jury that the admissions were Cook's and not Westerfield's.

       Jorgensen testified that in his opinion, "Westerfield strikes Cook and Cook strikes

LaMonte again, but on the corner this time." LaMonte's attorney displayed the Cook

admissions and asked Jorgensen to read the admissions and to explain the significance

of the admissions. Jorgensen testified that he relied on Cook's written statement to the

police and Cook's response to the requests for admission. Jorgensen testified, in

pertinent part:

       [B]ecause Richard Westerfield's vehicle collided with [Cook's] vehicle,
       [Cook's] vehicle collided with the rear ofthe LaMonte vehicle. And that
       was admitted. And that - that was important as a cause and effect
       relationship to the accident event.

On cross-examination, Jorgensen admitted he did not review Cook's response to the
requests for admission until two weeks before trial.
       LaMonte's other accident reconstruction expert Bruington also testified that after

Westerfield's car hit Cook, Cook's car hit LaMonte's car "a second time." Bruington

testified, in pertinent part:

       [Mr. Cook] can't stop in time and crashes into the back of Ms. LaMonte's
       Chrysler.
             And then behind Mr. Cook there's a mention of a van. This van
       isn't involved in the crash. It - it turns off and gets to the shoulder of the
       road. And behind that van is Mr. Westerfield driving a Geo. And then he
       crashes into Mr. Cook's Volvo. And that causes Mr. Cook's Volvo to crash
        into Ms. LaMonte's Chrysler a second time.

        Westerfield testified that on the day of the accident, there was heavytraffic and

the "road spray was really bad." Westerfield said that when his car hit Cook's, "it
shoved [Cook] about three feet, maybe, into the I'll call it the left lane, and at the same

                                             13
No. 69115-5-1/14

time [Cook] accelerated, continuing on in the left lane."

       Defense accident reconstruction expert Lewis testified that the impact of

Westerfield's car did not cause Cook's car to hit LaMonte's car a second time. Lewis

testified, in pertinent part:

              The 1,600 pound Geo Metro that Mr. Westerfield was operating
       then collided with the rear of [Cook's] Volvo and shoved it into the
       oncoming lane partially....
               The Geo Metro did not drive the Volvo into the rear of the LaMonte
       vehicle and did not cause a second impact between the Volvo and
       [LaMonte's] Chrysler.

During cross-examination, Lewis testified that in reaching his conclusion, he relied in

part on the testimony Cook gave in the perpetuation deposition that his car ended up on

the side of the road.

        Before redirect, Westerfield asked for permission to play excerpts from the

videotaped perpetration deposition of Cook. After reviewing the videotape ofthe
deposition, the court ruled Westerfield could play excerpts of the perpetration
deposition. The court ruled the videotaped deposition was "clearly" a perpetuation
deposition and Cook's deposition testimony was not contrary to his admissions—Cook
"just says he can't remember, which is different than it being contrary" to the admission.
The court also ruled that during the cross-examination of Lewis, LaMonte had opened

the door to the deposition testimony.

        Westerfield played excerpts ofthe videotaped perpetration deposition during the
redirect of Lewis. In the first deposition, Cook states he is not sure whether Westerfield

hit his car before or after he hit LaMonte.

               QUESTION: Do you know whether or not Mr. Westerfield struck
        the rear of your car before or after you initially made impact with the
        LaMonte vehicle?

                                              14
No. 69115-5-1/15

             ANSWER:        I have no idea. It was too quick, too fast to - I - I
      have no idea.

In the second deposition, Cook stated he did not know whether Westerfield's car

knocked him into LaMonte's car. Cook testified, "I don't remember the sequence."

      The written jury instructions reiterate that the answers to the requests for

admission of nonparty Cook do not bind Westerfield. Jury "Instruction No. 20" states:

      Non-party entity Sherman Cook's Answers to Requests for Admission
      served by plaintiff have been admitted for a limited purpose. These
      answers may be considered by you for the limited purpose of forming the
      basis of the experts' opinions, and for no other purpose. These answers
      are binding on Sherman Cook, but defendant Westerfield is not bound by
      Cook's answers.

      Jury "Instruction No. 18" states that if the juryfinds more than one entity

negligent, it should determine what percentage of negligence was attributable to each

entity. The instruction states that entities may include Westerfield and nonparty Cook.

Jury Instruction No. 18 states:

               If you find that more than one entity was negligent, you must
       determine what percentage of the total negligence is attributable to each
       entity that proximately caused the injury to the plaintiff. The Court will
       provide you with a special verdict form for this purpose. Your answers to
       the questions in the special verdict form will furnish the basis by which the
       court will apportion damages, if any.
              Entities may include the defendant Richard Westerfield and non
       party Sherman Cook.

                                               15
No. 69115-5-1/16

       The jury found Westerfield and Cook were negligent but that only nonparty

Cook's negligence was a proximate cause of the injury to LaMonte.8 The court entered
a judgment on the verdict dismissing the claims against Westerfield with prejudice.

                                              ANALYSIS

       LaMonte argues the trial court erred by (1) granting Westerfield's motion to

withdraw the admissions by default under CR 36(b), (2) ruling Cook's admissions were

hearsay, and (3) allowing Westerfield to introduce into evidence testimonyfrom the

perpetuation deposition of Cook.

       1.   Withdrawal of Admissions

       LaMonte asserts the court abused its discretion in allowing Westerfield to

withdraw the admissions under CR 36(b).9 We review the trial court's decision on a
motion to withdraw or amend admissions under CR 36 for an abuse of discretion.

Santos v. Dean, 96 Wn. App. 849, 857-58, 982 P.2d 632 (1999). Atrial court abuses its

       8The special verdict form states, in pertinent part:
              We, the jury, answerthe questions submitted by the court as follows:
                 QUESTION NO. 1: Were any of the following negligent?
                 (Answer "yes" or "no" after the name ofthe defendant and each entity not party to
       this action.)
                Answer:                                  Yes             No
                 Defendant, Richard Westerfield          _X_
                 Non-Party, Sherman Cook                  X
                (If you answer Question No. 1 "no" as to the defendant, sign and return this
       verdict. If you answer Question No. 1 "yes" as to the defendant, then answer Question
       No. 2.)
                 QUESTION NO. 2: Was such negligence a proximate cause of injury to the
       plaintiff?
                 (Answer "yes" or"no" after the name ofthe defendant and the name ofeach
       entity, ifany, found negligent by you in Question No. 1.)
                 Answer:                                 Yes              No
                 Defendant, Richard Westerfield                          _X_
                 Non-Party, Sherman Cook                 _X_
       9Preliminarily, LaMonte contends the trial judge did not have the authority to reconsider the
decision granting her motion to deem admitted the requests for admission propounded to Westerfield.
We disagree. Atrial judge has the authority to reconsider a ruling made by another judge. In re Estate of
Jones 170 Wn. App. 594, 605-06, 287 P.3d 610 (9m?y rpp also Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hosp. &
Med. Ctr.. 123 Wn.2d 15, 37, 864 P.2d 921 (1993). The record establishes thatWesterfield's motion to
withdraw oramend the requests for admission was pending when the case was transferred for trial.
                                                    16
No. 69115-5-1/17

discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or is based on untenable

grounds. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker. 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).

      Requests for admission are deemed conclusively established under CR 36(b)

unless the court permits amendment or withdrawal of the admission. CR 36(b) states:

      Effect of Admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively
      established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment
      of the admission. Subject to the provisions of rule 16 governing
      amendment of a pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or
      amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be
      subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to
      satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in
      maintaining his action or defense on the merits. Any admission made by a
      party under this rule is for the purpose of the pending action only and is
      not an admission by him for any other purpose nor may it be used against
      him in any other proceeding.

      The purpose of CR 36 is to" 'obtain admission of facts as to which there is no

real dispute and which the adverse party can admit cleanly, without qualifications.'"

Reid Sand & Gravel. Inc. v. Bellevue Props.. 7 Wn. App. 701, 704, 502 P.2d 480 (1972)

(quoting Weyerhaeuser Sales Co. v. Holden. 32 Wn.2d 714, 726, 203 P.2d 685 (1949)).

" 'Accordingly, requests for admissions as to central facts in dispute are beyond the

proper scope of the rule.'" Reid, 7 Wn. App. at 704 (quoting Pickens v. Equitable Life

Assurance Soc'v of the U.S.. 413 F.2d 1390, 1393 (5th Cir. 1969)).

       CR 36(b) permits the court to exercise its discretion to grant a motion to withdraw

admissions only if "presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved," and the

party who obtained the admission fails to show withdrawal will result in prejudice "in

maintaining his action or defense on the merits." Hadlev v. United States, 45 F.3d 345,

1348 (9th Cir. 1995); Santos, 96 Wn. App. at 858-59; see also Asea. Inc. v. S. Pac.

                                            17
No. 69115-5-1/18

Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir. 1981).10
         The first prong of the test is met when upholding the admissions would

"practically eliminate any presentation of the merits of the case." Hadlev. 45 F.3d at

1348. LaMonte concedes the first prong is met. We accept the concession as well

taken. The admissions are contrary to the position Westerfield steadfastly maintained

since 2000.

         LaMonte has the burden to establish the prejudice prong of the test. Hadlev, 45

F.3d at 1348. "The prejudice contemplated by Rule 36(b) is 'not simply that the party

who obtained the admission will now have to convince the factfinder of its truth.'"

Hadlev, 45 F.3d at 1348 (quoting BrookVill. N. Assocs. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 686 F.2d 66,

70 (1st Cir. 1982)).11 "The prejudice contemplated by Rule 36(b) 'relates to the difficulty
a party may face in proving its case'[,] 'e.g., caused by the unavailability of key
witnesses, because of the sudden need to obtain evidence' with respect to the

questions previously deemed admitted.'" Santos. 96 Wn. App. at 859, 860 (quoting
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Prusia, 18 F.3d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 1994); Hadlev, 45 F.3d at

1348).

         " 'The necessity of having to convince the trier of fact of the truth of a matter

erroneously admitted is not sufficient.'" Santos, 96 Wn. App. at 859 (quoting Prusia, 18
F.3d at 640). Under CR 36(b), the trial court must "focus on the prejudice that the
nonmoving party would suffer at trial." Conlon v. United States, 474 F.3d 616, 623 (9th

         10 In construing CR 36, the court ofappeals has looked to federal case law as persuasive
authority. Santos, 96 Wn. App. at 859.
        11 We note Hadlev misquotes Brook Village: however, the error does not change the meaning of
the quote. The correct Brook Village language states, "The prejudice contemplated by the Rule is not
simply that the party who initially obtained the admission will now have to convince the factfinder of its
truth." Brook Vill.. 686 F.2d at 70 (emphasis added).

                                                    18
No. 69115-5-1/19

Cir. 2007).12
       Here, the court ruled that LaMonte did not establish prejudice under CR 36(b).

The court ruled, in pertinent part:

       [T]he plaintiff has been on notice for years about the defense theory of the
       case and the plaintiff is represented by two able counsel, who are
       obviously prepared to rebut the defense case.
              So it's really hard to say that the plaintiff is prejudiced by having to
       present their case . . . because they're fully prepared to do that.

                ... I am a little concerned about the kind of the clear policy in the
       appellate case law favoring resolution on the merits as opposed to - and it
       would be a completely different matter if somebody had affirmatively
       answered X .. . and then they were stuck with the admission.
              But what we have here is a request for admission which apparently
       wasn't forwarded to counsel, then went unanswered. So it was deemed
       admitted, a significant period of time went by. . ..
               Clearly there was originally a denial on several bases in the original
       answer and actually motion practice and multiple instances in which the
       plaintiff was put on notice that liability was contested on various grounds.

       The record supports the determination that LaMonte did not meet her burden of

showing that withdrawal of the default admissions resulted in " 'the unavailability of key

witnesses'" or the " 'sudden need to obtain evidence with respect to the questions

previously deemed admitted.'" Santos, 96 Wn. App. at 859 (quoting Hadlev, 45 F.3d at

1348). When the case was initially scheduled for trial on February 25, 2002, LaMonte

identified an accident reconstruction expert witness to testify at trial. In the Amended

Joint Statement of Evidence filed one week before the scheduled trial date in May 2012,

LaMonte identified accident reconstruction experts Bruington and Jorgensen.

       Nonetheless, LaMonte argues that because the motion to withdraw the

admissions was made at the beginning of trial, the court erred in granting Westerfield's

motion to withdraw the default admissions under CR 36(b). LaMonte relies on Brook

       12 (Emphasis added.)
                                               19
No. 69115-5-1/20

Village to argue the court erred in failing to evaluate the prejudice prong under CR 36(b)

under a manifest injustice standard. Brook Village is distinguishable.

        In Brook Village, plaintiff Brook Village filed a lawsuit against General Electric

(GE) alleging modular housing units were defective, and propounded requests for

admission to GE. Brook Vill.. 686 F.2d at 68. GE responded to the requests for

admission nine months later. Brook Village immediately moved to strike the responses

and deem as admitted the requests for admission. The court granted the motion.

Brook Vill., 686 F.2d at 69. GE filed repeated motions asking the court to reconsider

and permit withdrawal of the admissions. The court denied the motions for

reconsideration and included the admission in the pretrial Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure (FRCP) 1613 order. Brook Vill.. 686 F.2d at 69, 71.
       At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found GE liable and assessed

damages against GE. However, the court did not give conclusive effect to the

admissions on damages. Brook Vill.. 686 F.2d at 69-70. Instead, the court relied on the

testimony at trial. Brook Vill.. 686 F.2d at 69.

        On appeal, the First Circuit reversed, holding the trial court abused its discretion

by ignoring the admissions. Brook Vill., 686 F.2d at 73-74. The court held, "[A] party

who obtains an admission by default does not waive his right to rely thereon by

presenting evidence at trial that overlaps the matters controlled by the admission."

Brook Vill.. 686 F.2d at 72. The court concluded that because the admissions were part

of the FRCP 16 pretrial order, the trial court could amend the pretrial order only to

prevent manifest injustice; "a more restrictive standard" governs "a request to avoid the

          13 FRCP 16(e) provides, in pertinent part: "The court may modify the order issued after a final
pretrial conference only to prevent manifest injustice."
                                                     20
No. 69115-5-1/21

effect of an admission once trial [begins]." Brook Vill., 686 F.2d at 71.

       Here, unlike in Brook Village, LaMonte did not promptly file a motion to deem the

requests for admission admitted after serving them on Westerfield in April 2000.

Instead, unlike in Brook Village. LaMonte never mentioned the requests for admissions

until 12 years later before the trial in May 2012. Further, the court granted the motion to

withdraw the admissions by default under CR 36(b) before opening statements and the

presentation of evidence. See Hadlev, 45 F.3d at 1348 ("Courts are more likely to find

prejudice when the motion for withdrawal is made in the middle of trial."); 999 v. C.I.T.

Corp.. 776 F.2d 866, 869-70 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming denial of motion to withdraw

admissions in "the middle of trial" when plaintiff had "nearly rested its case" where

plaintiff relied heavily on admission and withdrawal did not subserve merits); Pedroza v.

Lomas Auto Mall. Inc., 258 F.R.D. 453, 467 (D.N.M. 2009) (plaintiffs met burden of

establishing that withdrawal would prejudice them because parties had longstanding

understanding that subject matter of admission was undisputed).

       But even if a manifest injustice standard applied, the record supports the decision

to allow Westerfield to withdraw the default admissions under CR 36(b). There is no

dispute that Westerfield consistently denied liability, the parties engaged in lengthy

discovery, and the parties retained expert witnesses to testify on the contested issues of

liability and damages.

       2.   Cook Admissions

       LaMonte also argues the court erred by ruling the Cook admissions were

hearsay and precluding her from referring to the admissions in her opening statement.

This court reviews a trial court's evidentiary decision for abuse of discretion. Sintra. Inc.

                                             21
No. 69115-5-1/22

v. City of Seattle. 131 Wn.2d 640, 662-63, 935 P.2d 555 (1997). Abuse of discretion

occurs only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.

Crescent Harbor Water Co. v. Lvseng, 51 Wn. App. 337, 344, 753 P.2d 555 (1988).

Admissions under CR 36 are subject to the rules of evidence. Walsh v. McCain Foods

Ltd.. 81 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing 8A Charles Alan Wright, et. al, Federal

Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2264, at 571-72 (1994)); see ajso 3A Karl B.

Tegland, Washington Practice: Rules Practice CR 36, at 832 (6th ed. 2013).

      ER 801(d)(2) is an exception to the hearsay rule that allows the introduction of

admissions of a party opponent. Walsh. 81 F.3d at 726 (quoting 8A Wright, Federal

Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2264, at 571-72 (" 'It is only when the [CR 36]

admission is offered against the party who made it that it comes within the exception to

the hearsay rule for admissions of a party opponent.'")). Because Cook was not a party

at the time of trial, the hearsay exception for admissions of a party opponent under ER

801(d)(2) did not apply. See 5B Karl B.Tegland, Washington Practice: Evidence

Lawand Practice § 801.34, at 387 (5th ed. 2007) (ER 801(d)(2) "does not authorize the

introduction of statements by, or on behalf of, someone who is not a party to the present

proceeding."); 5BTegland, Washington Practice: Evidence Law and Practice §

801.50, at 422 ("If a case begins as a multiparty case, but one of the parties is removed

from the case by dismissal, ... the admissions of the party who has been removed are

inadmissible against the party who remains in the case."). The court did not err by

ruling the admissions of nonparty Cook were hearsay.

       In any event, the trial court allowed LaMonte's accident reconstruction expert

Jorgensen to testify about the Cook admissions. During cross-examination of

                                           22
No. 69115-5-1/23

Westerfield's accident reconstruction expert, LaMonte also asked about the Cook

admissions and referred to the Cook admissions in closing argument. During closing

argument, LaMonte argued that Cook admitted there was a second impact to her car:

"[Y]ou have Mr. Cook's admission that 'I was knocked into LaMonte because

Westerfield rear-ended me.'" In rebuttal, LaMonte told the jury, "I want to remind you

that this is Mr. Cook's admission that [']because Richard Westerfield[ ]collided with

[Cook's] vehicle - [Cook's] vehicle collided with the rear-end of Becky LaMonte's

vehicle.f ]"

        3.   Admission of Perpetuation Deposition Testimony

        LaMonte contends the court erred by permitting Westerfield to introduce excerpts

from the perpetuation deposition of Cook into evidence. LaMonte asserts the deposition

testimony contradicts the responses to the requests for admission.14
        After viewing videotapes of the perpetuation deposition, the court concluded the

deposition testimony did not contradict Cook's admissions.15 The record supports the
court's determination. In response to the requests for admission, Cook admitted that

"because Richard Westerfield's vehicle collided with [his] vehicle, [his] vehicle collided

with the rear end of Rebecca LaMonte's vehicle." In his deposition, Cook states that he

could not be sure about the sequence of the events of the accident and that his car

came to a rest on the left-hand shoulder of the road.

         14 We deny the motion to supplement the record on appeal with the videotapes ofthe Cook
deposition. Thecourt may direct transmittal ofadditional clerk's papers and exhibits "[i]f the record is not
sufficiently complete to permit a decision on the merits of the issues presented for review." RAP 9.10.
Here, the report of proceedings contains a transcript of the deposition.
         15 Under CR 32(a)(3), "[t]he deposition of a witness, whetheror not a party, may be used byany
party for any purpose if the court finds ... that the witness is dead." ER 804(b)(1) provides that the
hearsay rule is inapplicable to deposition testimony taken in the courseofthe same proceeding if the
declarant is unavailable. A declarant is unavailable if he is dead. ER 804(a)(4).

                                                     23
No. 69115-5-1/24

      The record also supports the ruling that LaMonte opened the door to introduction

of the perpetuation deposition testimony. See State v. Warren, 134 Wn. App. 44, 64-65,

138 P.3d 1081 (2006). For example, during the cross-examination of accident

reconstruction expert Lewis, LaMonte asked whether Lewis relied on Cook's deposition

testimony:

             Q.        ... [W]e have very little evidence as to where the cars went.
      Isn't that true?
             A.        I believe just the testimony of the people who were in the
      vehicles.
             Q.        Right. And very little evidence as to what really happened to
      the vehicles after impact. Isn't that fair?
             A.        No physical evidence. Just Mr. Cook's description of his
      final position on the opposite shoulder.

             Q.        Okay. Would it be fair to say that in your simulation you did
       not consider the admission, ["]please admit or deny that on May 30,
       1997["] - and this is admission to Mr. Cook- ["]at approximately 12:30
       p.m., because Richard Westerfield's vehicle collided with your vehicle,!"]
       being Mr. Cook's vehicle, ["]your vehicle collided with the rear end of
       Rebecca LaMonte's vehicle.!"] You didn't consider that, correct?
            A.    I consider everything. I consider all testimony.
              Q.       You ignored this, though --
             A.        No.
              Q.       - for your simulation?
              A.       No. Idon't ignore anybody's testimony. Itry to see if it fits
       the physical facts and then Icome up with my analysis. And if this jury
       believes that Mr. Cook has more information and, you know, ifthis jury
       believes that declaration is accurate, then they will find accordingly.

              Q.         In doing your simulations -
              A.       Yes.
              Q.       - you ran your different scenarios?
              A.       Yes.
              Q.       You did not run a scenario that addressed Mr. Bruington's
       set of facts?
              A.      No. He came up with that on his own. I didn't know it
       existed until I read his deposition and saw his simulation.
              Q.         Right. But you did know that Mr. Cook in his admission had
       said that he was hit by the Geo into the LaMonte vehicle?
              A.         I did.

                                                24
No. 69115-5-1/25

      In sum, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing

withdrawal of the admissions by default under CR 36(b), ruling the admissions of

nonparty Cook were inadmissible, and allowing Westerfield to introduce excerpts of the

perpetuation deposition, and affirm.

                                             SUO^WOQ                  o^-t

WE CONCUR:

                                            25