Court Opinion

ID: 9783636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:53:28.244008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:27.880203
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, J.,
dissenting:
I am compelled to dissent from the majority’s conclusion that bar complainants *612enjoy absolute — rather than qualified — immunity from civil liability rightfully arising from the filing of an alleged malicious bar complaint. I simply do not believe the majority’s conclusion is supported by the Constitution of this Commonwealth or sound precedent of this Court.
Bar complaints have the potential to devastate an attorney’s reputation — the lifeblood of any lawyer’s practice. In fact, one’s reputation, be it that of a lawyer or not, is so precious in this Commonwealth that the term is enshrined in Section Fourteen of the Kentucky Constitution, a provision that commands:
All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
(Emphasis added.) Today, in broad strokes, the majority concludes that the judicial statements privilege “encompasses the act of filing the complaint, so as to bar [a] claim for ‘misuse of the attorney discipline process’ and ‘reckless filing of a Bar complaint.’ ” Given the fact that the right to recover for one’s reputation is secured in our Constitution, I simply cannot agree.
Moreover, I believe that this Court’s decision is at odds with our adoption of the tort of “wrongful use of civil proceedings.” In Drasin v. Raine, 621 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Ky.1981), we explained that there are six basic elements necessary to maintain an action of “wrongful use of civil proceedings,” namely: 1) the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings or of administrative or disciplinary proceedings; 2) by, or at the instance, of a party; 3) the termination of such proceedings in the opposing party’s favor; 4) malice in the institution of such proceeding; 5) want or lack of probable cause for the proceeding; and 6) the suffering of damage as result of the proceeding. See also Mapother & Mapother, P.S.C. v. Douglas, 750 S.W.2d 430 (Ky.1988).
It is true, however, that the Douglas court recognized, as I do today, that these actions are not favored in the law. Yet, as plainly stated in Douglas, the disfavor of the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings springs forth from a desire to protect only those actions filed “in good faith and upon reasonable grounds.” Id. This preference for claims made in good faith and upon reasonable grounds is key, and dis-positive, in my opinion. Nothing in our jurisprudence, until today, has ever supported the notion that a bad-faith claim deserves the protection of absolute immunity. The majority’s decision today overwhelms even the “tort of outrage” against attorneys who assert malicious bar complaints.
To do so, the majority cites to the case of Field v. Kearns, 43 Conn.App. 265, 682 A.2d 148 (1996) for the proposition that there is a present trend by other states in adopting absolute immunity for even “the act of filing a grievance complaint.” Indeed, the Connecticut Court of Appeals in Field did address whether the act of filing a bar complaint gives rise to absolute immunity in favor of the complainant, the issue squarely before the Court today. Id. However, according to the Connecticut Supreme Court, Field is contrary to Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 927 A.2d 304 n. 6 (2007) (“In Field, the court concluded that absolute immunity applied to a vexatious litigation claim. The holding of Field is inconsistent with the holding of this opinion.”).
In Rioux, the Connecticut high court held that the stringent requirements of wrongful use of civil proceedings4 provid*613ed enough protection to complainants rendering unnecessary an “additional layer of protection” to “would-be litigants in the form of absolute immunity.” Id. at 310. The Court’s logic surrounded the premise that because the tort had such stringent requirements, there existed adequate room for both appropriate incentives to report wrongdoing and protection of the injured party’s interest in being free from unwarranted litigation. Id. Thus, because the tort strikes the proper balance, the Connecticut high court found it unnecessary to foreclose those who suffered harm as a result of vexatious litigation. Id.
Furthermore, the Connecticut Supreme Court, noted:
[W]ere we to provide absolute immunity for the communications underlying the tort of vexatious litigation, we would effectively eliminate the tort.... [Virtually any initiation or procurement of a previous lawsuit would necessarily be part of any judicial proceeding. Thus, the tort of vexatious litigation would virtually always be subject to absolute immunity. Indeed the Restatement of Torts implicitly recognizes this by providing that statements made in the course of a judicial or quasi judicial proceeding are absolutely immune in the context of a defamation suit but not in the context of a suit for vexatious litigation. See 3 Restatement (Second), Torts Section 587, at 249, comment (a) (1977).
Like the Connecticut Supreme Court, I believe the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings provides adequate protections to would-be bar complainants and would not have the chilling effect posited by the majority. Rather than adopting an approach that provides bad faith bar complainants with the impenetrable shield of absolute immunity, I would adopt a more tempered approach consistent with our own rules of professional conduct, that of qualified immunity. See Kentucky Rule Civil Procedure 11 (requiring attorney to have good faith regarding the factual and legal soundness of documents bearing his name); SCR 3.130(8.3)(d) (providing immunity to lawyer acting in good faith in the reporting of misconduct); see also Comment 5, SCR 3.130(8.3) (explaining that qualified immunity applies to attorney’s reporting misconduct).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that bar complainants enjoy absolute — rather than qualified — immunity from civil liability rightfully arising from the filing of a vexatious and bad-faith bar complaint.
SCHRODER, J., joins.

. The Connecticut tort in Rioux is referred to as vexatious litigation which requires the same elements as the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings. See Rioux, 927 A.2d 304.