Court Opinion

ID: 9951905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 15:02:55.215015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:43:23.606711
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

             CHARLES TYRONE GRIMES, Plaintiff/Appellant,

                                        v.

                KATHLEEN H. MEAD, Defendant/Appellee.

                             No. 1 CA-CV 23-0110
                               FILED 3-19-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                          No. CV2022-007977
                 The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Charles Tyrone Grimes, Eloy
Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Stephanie Elliott, Daniel P. Schaack
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
                             GRIMES v. MEAD
                            Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1            Charles Grimes appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit against
former Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Kathleen Mead. While his
appeal lists multiple defendants-appellees, they were not named parties in
his complaint, and this Court has found Judge Mead to be the only
defendant-appellee. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                              BACKGROUND

¶2             In June 2022, Grimes filed this case against Judge Mead, who
presided over his 2017 criminal case. See State v. Grimes, 1 CA-CR 19-0322,
2020 WL 2500617 (Ariz. App. May 14, 2020) (mem. decision). His complaint
contained disjointed ramblings of securities fraud, bonds, contracts, and
corporations. The complaint made no allegations against Judge Mead—
rather, he broadly asserted a “demand for recall of outstanding bonds” and
his release from prison. He referred to himself as a plaintiff “corporation”
and a “co-claimant” seeking 50 million dollars.

¶3           In November 2022, the Arizona Attorney General’s Office,
representing Judge Mead, moved to dismiss Grimes’ complaint with
prejudice. The superior court granted the motion in a December 16 minute
entry based on judicial immunity and because it was a “nonsensical
complaint.” The dismissal became a final judgment on January 31, 2023.
Grimes timely filed his notice of appeal.

                               DISCUSSION

¶4            While Grimes’ claims are unclear, we address their merits to
the best of our ability. We review orders granting a motion to dismiss de
novo. Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 356, ¶ 8 (2012). “[W]e accept as
true the well-pled facts alleged in the complaint and affirm only if the
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts
susceptible of proof.” Blankenbaker v. Marks, 231 Ariz. 575, 577, ¶ 6 (App.
2013).

                                      2
                             GRIMES v. MEAD
                            Decision of the Court

¶5            Grimes’ complaint was devoid of any well-pled facts. See
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 11(b); Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 249
Ariz. 382, 385, ¶ 14 (App. 2020). It appears Grimes believes his social
security number was used fraudulently, but he does not explain how, nor
does he link Judge Mead to this accusation. The complaint contains
allegations that are conclusory statements with no factual support. As an
example, he alleged that he is a “contracting officer” for a “bond escrow
account” with ties to Cook County, Illinois, and that “the court sold bonds
and/or securities” bearing his name. The superior court properly found the
complaint to be nonsensical.

¶6            Even had Grimes’ complaint made sense, he fails to address
the other grounds for dismissal—judicial immunity—on appeal. Instead, he
merely re-states the allegations in his complaint. We therefore find his
arguments waived for failure to comply with ARCAP 13’s opening brief
requirements. See ARCAP 13(a)(4)-(7); Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522,
¶ 9 (App. 2022).

¶7            We also agree with the court’s dismissal based on judicial
immunity. The record shows Grimes’ only relation to Judge Mead was that
she presided over his criminal case. As such, any harm he claims resulted
from her actions as judge cannot be grounds for a civil lawsuit against her.
See Acevedo v. Pima Cnty. Adult Prob. Dep’t, 142 Ariz. 319, 321 (1984).

                               CONCLUSION

¶8            We affirm the court’s dismissal.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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