Court Opinion

ID: 9736799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:06:50.285895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:54.749202
License: Public Domain

*506VANDE WALLE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Recent decisions of this Court, some of which I have authored, may appear to minimize the purpose of the requirement in NDCC § 29-21-14 that the testimony of an accomplice be corroborated in order to convict. But, simply put, because accomplices are often given reduced sentences or other incentives to testify, the law looks with distrust on their testimony and will not allow a defendant to be convicted on that testimony unless it is corroborated. State v. Kent, 4 N.D. 577, 62 N.W. 631 (1895). The requirement is therefore more than a procedural device or a hoop through which the State must jump in order to obtain a conviction when the entire evidence against the defendant consists of the testimony of the accomplices. We have stated numerous times that all that is required is that the evidence corroborate the testimony of accomplices as to some material fact or facts and tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; that it is not necessary that the corroborating evidence be sufficient, in itself, to warrant a conviction or establish a prima facie case; and that it is not necessary that the State corroborate every fact testified to by an accomplice. E.g., State v. Haugen, 448 N.W.2d 191 (N.D.1989); State v. Lind, 322 N.W.2d- 826 (N.D.1982). But there is a point at which the evidence that “tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense” becomes so tenuous that, even though it may be some evidence, it cannot, as a matter of law, rise to a level adequate to submit the issue of whether or not it is sufficient corroborative evidence to the jury. For the reasons stated below, I believe this is such a case.
The majority opinion cites numerous authorities for the proposition that possession of stolen property is sufficient to convict of theft and therefore most certainly must be sufficient corroborative evidence. Those authorities include annotations on subjects such as instructions allowing presumption or inference of guilt from possession of recently stolen property as a violation of a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination and what constitutes recently stolen property for purpose of inferring guilt from unexplained possession of stolen motor vehicle which, as acknowledged in the majority opinion, involve issues other than that of corroborative evidence. In many instances in the authorities cited the defendant was in sole possession of the stolen property. Where that is the fact of the case, that fact alone may be sufficient corroborative evidence. I might reach that conclusion even in those instances in which the defendant is found in possession of the property with persons other than the accomplice-witnesses. Where, however, the defendant’s “possession” is shared with that of the alleged confessed or convicted accomplices it is too facile a rationale, for the defendant’s presence with the accomplices makes the defendant an easy victim upon which to place all or some of the blame for the crime.
I do not understand that the majority opinion relies upon guilt by association, i.e., that the fact the defendant is found in the company of the accomplices some days after the crime was committed and hundreds of miles away from the place of the crime is sufficient corroborative evidence. If that understanding is correct, then the defendant’s “possession” of the automobile as shared with those accomplices adds nothing of substance to the picture. For example, given the same time and distance as here, if the stolen property was a ring found in the pocket of an accomplice, would that constitute sufficient evidence of corroboration of the accomplice’s testimony that defendant had acted with that accomplice to steal the ring? 1 I assume not, because the defendant would not be in “possession” of the ring. Although the majority opinion concludes that all the persons in the automobile are “in possession” of the automobile, that conclusion is more a fiction of law than factual evidence of possession. “Many cases have recognized that *507it may be found that an inference of guilt of burglary based on defendant’s possession of stolen goods has not been raised where the stolen property was found in a place where others had an equal right and facility of access thereto.” Annotation, What Amounts To “Exclusive”Possession of Stolen Goods to Support Inference of Burglary or Other Felonious Taking, 51 A.L.R.3d § 5 727, 737 (1973).
More specifically, in dealing with a motor vehicle, there are many ways in which a person can come into possession of the vehicle, some of which involve innocence on the part of the possessor of the vehicle:
“The possession of an automobile which does not belong to the driver is not so strange, unusual, or unique that it points to guilty knowledge as more likely than innocent knowledge on the part of the driver. The borrowing or leasing of an automobile for temporary use is not an uncommon occurrence. If every person possessing an automobile which they did not own would be held accountable as having knowledge that the automobile was stolen, every person who borrowed a car would be in peril of a conviction for receiving stolen property.” Commonwealth v. Henderson, 451 Pa. 452, 457, 304 A.2d 154, 157 (1973).
That rationale is even more compelling where, as here, “possession” of the automobile is shared with accomplices who are the source of the only evidence that the defendant committed the theft of the automobile. Furthermore, as an annotation at 15 A.L.R.Fed. 856, 859 (1973) discusses, the inference of guilt flowing from possession of a recently stolen motor vehicle grows weaker as the time of the possession recedes from the time of theft. Thus, if the defendant had been found in the vehicle with the accomplices within a few hours of the theft and not days later and hundreds of miles away from the place of the crime, I might agree that there was sufficient inference to permit the matter to go to the jury.
In State v. Haugen, 449 N.W.2d 784 (N.D.1989), we recently observed that an inference is a fact logically drawn from the admitted evidence and that speculation is a mere theorization of facts from the evidence. We reversed two burglary convictions because the accomplice testimony was not sufficiently corroborated. We noted that that “corroborative evidence” presented by the State did not support the inferences it sought to make, but only amounted to mere speculation that the defendant was connected with the crime. In one instance we reversed the conviction because there was no independent testimony placing the defendant in the vicinity of the place of the crime before, during, or after the burglary or otherwise connecting the defendant with the burglary. Here, although the majority opinion does not so indicate, there was no independent evidence that Hogie was even a resident of North Dakota much less that he was in the vicinity of the place of the crime before, during, or after the burglary.
We reversed another burglary conviction, observing that:
“We have previously stated that evidence that defendant was in the company of accomplices or was present at or near the place of the crime shortly before or after the crime was committed may be corroboration that tends to connect defendant with commission of the crime. [Citations omitted.] We do not have such evidence in this case. All we have is speculation as to Haugen’s presence. Speculation is not evidence tending to connect defendant with the commission of the crime.” Haugen, supra, 449 N.W.2d at 789.
In conclusion, I do not believe that the State entered sufficient corroborative evidence to allow the court to submit the case to the jury. If § 29-21-14, NDCC, is to protect a defendant, more than coincidence and speculation are required. The State’s corroborative evidence was too remote in time and place to “tend to connect” Hogie to the theft in Jamestown. If the testimony of the accomplices is to be believed, it appears that the State had more persuasive corroborative evidence available to it which it did not offer into evidence. For example, the State could have entered into evidence the testimony of Dave Buckeye, Mark Buckeye’s brother, or the full-service gas *508station attendant. The testimony of these individuals could have placed Hogie in the automobile, and in the company of the accomplices, near the place of the theft immediately after it occurred. See State v. Garcia, 425 N.W.2d 918 (N.D.1988) [evidence that defendant was seen in the company of the accomplices near the scene of the crime before and after it occurred was sufficient corroborative evidence tending to connect defendant to the crime]; State v. Thorson, 264 N.W.2d 441 (N.D.1978) [testimony that defendant and accomplices were together near the scene of the crime was sufficient corroborative evidence].
Because I do not believe there was sufficient corroborative evidence tending to connect Hogie to the crime to submit the case to the jury, I would reverse Hogie’s judgment of conviction for theft.
The second case in this consolidated appeal stems from the district court’s order revoking Hogie’s earlier probation. It is clear from the order that the court considered Hogie’s judgment of conviction for theft, two minor-in-possession convictions and testimony that Hogie had not paid court-ordered restitution which, at the time of the revocation hearing, was not yet due. However, the order did not specify which of the aforementioned grounds the court utilized in revoking Hogie’s probation. Because I am unable to determine from the order whether the court based its decision to revoke the probation solely on the judgment of conviction for theft, solely on the minor-in-possession conviction, or on a combination of all the listed grounds, I would remand the order revoking probation to the district court for reconsideration and instruct the court to consider the grounds for revocation in light of the reversal of Ho-gie’s judgment of conviction for theft.
LEVINE, J., concurs.

. Compare State v. Smith, 238 N.W.2d 662 (N.D.1976), in which this Court concluded that a stolen diamond ring, found in the pocket of the defendant, was sufficient corroborative evidence to submit the case to the jury.