Court Opinion

ID: 9859516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:57:27.71664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:51:03.186673
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that the affirmative defense of necessity was unavailable to the defendant. The issue of whether a defendant should be relieved of criminal liability by reason of his or her affirmative defense must be determined by the jury with proper instruction as to the applicable law, unless the evidence before the trial court is so clear and convincing as to permit the court to find as a matter of law that there is no affirmative defense. People v. Hari, 218 Ill. 2d 275, 296-97, 843 N.E.2d 349, 362 (2006), quoting People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 132, 676 N.E.2d 646, 649 (1997). In the instant case, the trial court found that the evidence established, clearly and convincingly, that the affirmative defense of necessity was not available. Particularly given that defendant drove her car for two blocks prior to pulhng over to the side of the road, I cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion. The necessity defense is viewed as involving a choice between two admitted evils where other optional courses of action are unavailable, and the conduct chosen must promote some higher value than the value of literal compliance with the law. People v. Janik, 127 Ill. 2d 390, 399, 537 N.E.2d 756, 760 (1989). Driving one’s car while intoxicated for two blocks, for the mere purpose of getting that vehicle out of the way of traffic does not promote such a higher value as to excuse the illegal conduct. Because I do not agree that the trial court’s decision was fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it (see People v. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 354, 359, 808 N.E.2d 496, 500-01 (2004)), I therefore respectfully dissent.