Court Opinion

ID: 9674967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:38:06.619722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:30.448850
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
I concur in the result of the majority opinion, but cannot concur in the assertion *615that a conviction, although defective under Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238; 89 S Ct 1709; 23 L Ed 2d 274 (1969), and People v Jaworski, 387 Mich 21; 194 NW2d 868 (1972), but never directly attacked, may be challenged by a timely motion during an habitual offender proceeding. I would hold that only those guilty pleas taken in violation of Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963), are subject to collateral attack in later habitual offender proceedings.
Denial of the right to counsel mandated by Gideon is a deprivation of rights altogether different from the issues before us here. The denial of the right to counsel impugns the integrity of the conviction, raising doubts about the guilt of the accused. It is for that reason, and that reason only, that the use of a counselless conviction is forbidden in collateral proceedings notwithstanding that the defendant did not raise the issue on direct review. The requirement of a record waiver of the right to remain silent, to cross-examine witnesses against him, and to be tried by a jury which is required by Boykin-Jaworski, while undoubtedly important, pales beside the right to counsel.
The United States Supreme Court has never forbidden the use of Boykin-violative convictions in state recidivist proceedings. A majority of this Court does so today because Boykin rights are of constitutional stature. Such reasoning begs the question. The right to be free from unreasonable searches, the right to effective assistance of counsel, the right to a properly instructed jury, and countless other rights are also of a constitutional nature. Are we now to assume that all violations of constitutional rights not raised during direct review of a conviction may now be reviewed during habitual offender proceedings? I agree with *616Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in United States v Timmreck, 441 US 780, 784; 99 S Ct 2085; 60 L Ed 2d 634 (1979) (failure to advise defendant of a special parole term as required by F R Crim P 11 cannot be raised collaterally) when he states:
"For the concern with finality served by the limitation on collateral attack has special force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.
" 'Every inroad on the concept of finality undermines confidence in the integrity of our procedures; and, by increasing the volume of judicial work, inevitably delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice.’ ”
The adoption by the majority of this rule does nothing to further the interests of finality. Instead of providing incentive for raising claims on direct review where proper relief can be afforded and the error corrected, the majority allows a claim dormant for ten years to be resurrected when the defendant’s tactical considerations so require. Allowing a previously settled conviction to be litigated again in a setting not normally involving the parties to the original proceeding will, in my judgment, create disorder in the administration of justice.
Ryan, J., concurred with Brickley, J.
Boyle, J., took no part in the decision of this case.