Court Opinion

ID: 9659937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:59:07.142773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:13.248494
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, J.,
delivered the concurring opinion.
The majority correctly affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeals. However, it does so only after performing an erroneous harm analysis. Consequently, I cannot join the majority opinion.
The majority correctly finds the trial judge did not substantially comply with Tex. Code Crim. Proe. Ann. art.26.13(a)(4). Ante, at 656. Under the plain language of Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(e), where there is no substantial compliance, no harm analysis should be attempted. Morales v. State, 872 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.Cr.App.1994). This was the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals. The majority, however, takes a different tact.
In Matchett v. State, 941 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Cr.App.l996)(plurality opinion), and Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), this Court erroneously held the error resulting from the failure to comply with art. 26.13(a)(4) was subject to a harm analysis.1 Those opinions are erroneous because the statute provides its own species of harm analysis depending on whether there has been no compliance or substantial compliance with the statute. Consequently, Tex.R.App. P. 44.2 is not applicable to cases dealing with admonishment error. Matchett, 941 S.W.2d at 942 (Baird, J., concurring). As noted above, in no compliance cases, the error is reversible. However, if there is substantial compliance, the error is not reversible unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court.2
In an attempt to follow Matchett and Cain, the majority purports to apply a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(b). But the harm analysis actually employed is the analysis prescribed by art. 26.13(c) when there has been substantial compliance. Ante at 657-658. But since this is a no compliance case, the result of the majority decision is to eliminate the art. 26.13(c) distinction between compliance and non-compliance cases. Consequently, the majority has accomplished what it was attempting to avoid; by eliminating the statutory distinction, Rule 44.2(b) now trumps the art. 26.13(c). Ante, at 658.
For these reasons, I join only the judgment of the Court.

. As I have previously stated, Matchett and Cain were wrongly decided because the true issue in each case was one of statutory construction, not the propriety of a harm analysis. Matchett, 941 S.W.2d at 941 (Baird, J., concurring); and, Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 265 (BAIRD and Price, J.J., concurring).

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.