Court Opinion

ID: 9953437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 05:06:29.219297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:23.069021
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

DANYEL GODFREY,                                                       UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      March 21, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                     No. 366941
                                                                      Eaton Circuit Court
HALSTON SLEGERS,                                                      Family Division
                                                                      LC No. 16-001194-DS
               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and BOONSTRA and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals the trial court’s order finding that modifying the parenting time of the
parties’ minor child during the school year and changing the child’s school would not be in the
child’s best interests. We affirm.

                 I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        Plaintiff has physical custody of the child on weekdays and defendant has physical custody
of the child on weekends. There is no dispute that the parties’ child does exceptionally well in
school. In 2022, defendant moved to change the child’s school to the school in his district, and to
modify the parties’ parenting time arrangement. He asserted his local district would provide the
child with greater opportunities, including a gifted and talented program which is not offered at
the child’s present school. The change would have effectively reversed the parties’ parenting time,
with defendant having physical custody of the child on weekdays and plaintiff having physical
custody on weekends. Plaintiff opposed the change, arguing the child was doing well at her current
school and that changing her school would upset her stability.

        The trial court referred the case to the Friend of the Court (FOC) for an investigation. After
discussing the best-interest factors under the Child Custody Act of 1970, MCL 722.21 et seq., the
investigator found that changing the child’s school and parenting time would not be in her best
interests. Defendant challenged the decision, and a referee held hearings and took testimony. The
referee determined the child had an established custodial environment with both parents and that
changing her school would not alter her environment. Under the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard, the referee found that changing the child’s school and modifying parenting time would

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not be in her best interests. Defendant objected to the referee’s order. Following a de novo
hearing, the trial court adopted the investigative order, with modifications, and found that changing
the child’s school and modifying parenting time would not be in her best interests.

                                II. EVIDENTIARY STANDARD

        Defendant argues the trial court erred because it failed to explicitly identify the relevant
legal standard. He believes the trial court committed reversible error by failing to state on the
record that the burden of proof was preponderance of the evidence. We disagree.

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Issues of law, such as the appropriate standard of review, are reviewed de novo. See, e.g.
Ross v Auto Club Group, 478 Mich 902, 902; 732 NW2d 529 (2007) (quotation marks omitted)
(“[I]nherent legal determinations are reviewed under a de novo standard.”).

                                    B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

         Parents who share joint legal custody share authority to make important decisions affecting
the child’s welfare. Marik v Marik, 325 Mich App 353, 360; 925 NW2d 885 (2018). A decision
regarding whether to change a child’s school is one such decision. Id. If the parents cannot agree,
“the court is responsible for resolving the issue in the best interests of the child.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Before making any decision that would affect the welfare of the child,
the trial court must determine whether the decision would modify the child’s established custodial
environment. Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich 81, 85; 782 NW2d 480 (2010). If a proposed
modification would change the child’s established custodial environment, the moving party must
show, “by clear and convincing evidence, that the change is in the child’s best interests.” Id. at 92.
However, if the proposed modification does not change the child’s custodial environment, the
moving party must only show that the change is in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of
the evidence. Id. at 93.

        Defendant argues that the correct standard in this case was preponderance of evidence,
because his proposed change—moving schools and switching parenting time—would not alter the
child’s established custodial environment. He says that, although the trial court correctly
employed the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, it erred by failing to specifically identify
preponderance of the evidence as the precise legal framework.

         In making this argument, defendant does not cite to any authority for the proposition that
the trial court was required to explicitly state the standard on which the change was warranted. It
is not this Court’s role to explain or develop a party’s argument. In re Bell, 341 Mich App 596,
602-603; 991 NW2d 251 (2022) (citation omitted) (“A party may not merely announce a position
and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim.”). Beyond that,
defendant admits the trial court employed the correct standard. In the absence of any meaningful
argument showing the trial court’s use of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard was
incorrect, we conclude defendant’s argument is meritless.

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                           III. BEST-INTERESTS DETERMINATION

        Defendant alleges that the trial court made several errors when finding that changing the
child’s school would not be in her best interests. We disagree.

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Regarding custody determinations, this Court must affirm the trial court’s decisions unless
its factual findings were against the great weight of the evidence, it palpably abused its discretion,
or it made a clear legal error on a major issue. MCL 722.28. The trial court’s factual findings are
against the great weight of the evidence only if the evidence “clearly preponderate[s] in the
opposite direction.” Pierron, 486 Mich at 85 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

                                    B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

        To determine what is in a child’s best interests, the trial court must consider the sum total
of the following factors:

              (a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties
       involved and the child.

               (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child
       love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child
       in his or her religion or creed, if any.

              (c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child
       with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted
       under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.

              (d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
       environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.

             (e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
       home or homes.

               (f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.

               (g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.

               (h) The home, school, and community record of the child.

               (i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child
       to be of sufficient age to express preference.

               (j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and
       encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and
       the other parent or the child and the parents. A court may not consider negatively
       for the purposes of this factor any reasonable action taken by a parent to protect a

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       child or that parent from sexual assault or domestic violence by the child’s other
       parent.

               (k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed
       against or witnessed by the child.

               (l) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular
       child custody dispute. [MCL 722.23.]

        Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by addressing only five best-interest factors
rather than all the required best-interest factors. In its independent opinion, the trial court
addressed only Factors (c), (d), (j), (k), and (l). But, the trial court also incorporated by reference
the investigator’s order as part of its opinion. The investigator addressed each best-interest factor
individually and used facts to support its conclusions about which factor favored which party.
Reading these two orders together, the trial court did not leave any best-interest factor unaddressed.

        Defendant next argues that the trial court did not adequately consider the numerous
problems with cooperation between the parties, specifically with plaintiff’s adjusting of
defendant’s parenting-time schedule. Specifically, defendant asserts the court failed to consider
disparaging TikTok videos, a dentist appointment, plaintiff’s threat to ground the child, plaintiff’s
unilateral decision to enroll the child in her current school, the child missing school while sick,
and plaintiff’s enrolling the child in gymnastics in a different location.

        The trial court’s decision regarding the weight of the best-interest factors is a matter of the
court’s discretion. Kessler v Kessler, 295 Mich App 54, 64; 811 NW2d 39 (2011). The trial court
is not required to comment on each piece of evidence provided by the parties, and a failure to
address each piece of evidence does not suggest that the court overlooked the relevant evidence.
Id. at 65.

       We note that the trial court did address the TikTok videos in its decision. Additionally,
while the investigative order addressed the child’s dental appointments when it found that Factor
(c) favored plaintiff, the trial court found that Factor (c) equally favored the parties because
defendant attended the child’s dental appointments. The trial court also found that Factor (j)
(regarding each party’s willingness to facilitate a relationship with the other parent) favored
defendant. Regardless, the trial court was not required to address each individual piece of
evidence.

        To the extent that defendant argues that the trial court failed to address plaintiff’s
opposition to a week-on, week-off parenting time schedule in the summer, we note that plaintiff
stated she was agreeable to increasing defendant’s parenting time to some extent, and thought it
would be fair for defendant to have more parenting time in the summer, including that defendant
might like to have the child on some weekdays and she would like to have the child on some
weekends. The court ultimately granted defendant’s request for week-on, week-off summer
parenting time. Again, the trial court was not required to address plaintiff’s opposition to the

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specific schedule requested by defendant. The court clearly did not overlook the summer parenting
time dispute.1

        Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by focusing exclusively on Factor (l) and
finding that defendant coached the child. The trial court “need not make its custody determination
on the basis of a mathematical calculation and may assign differing weights to the various best-
interest factors.” Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 712; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). This Court
defers to the trial court’s credibility determinations. Id. at 705.

        Of the factors that the trial court addressed in its de novo opinion, Factors (c), (d), (j), and
(k) favored both parties, and Factor (l) favored plaintiff. In the investigative order, the investigator
determined that Factor (b) favored plaintiff because defendant did not exercise all his parenting
time in 2018 and 2019, and Factors (a), (e), (f), (g), and (h) favored neither party. Construing both
orders together, two factors favored plaintiff and one factor favored defendant. Even if the trial
court had mathematically weighed the factors, they did not favor defendant.

        Regardless, as previously stated, mathematical application is not appropriate, Berger, 277
Mich App at 712, and the primary dispute in this case was where the child would attend school.
The investigator found that the child’s academic excellence was tied to her existing living
arrangement and there was no evidence to support a conclusion that the child needed to change
school districts when she was already doing so well. Defendant was primarily opposed to the child
being “a secondary teacher” for other children in school since he thought it was not a good use of
the time in which she was supposed to be learning. But, both of the educators who testified,
including the educator called by defendant, testified that mixed-ability classrooms actually benefit
advanced students. Plaintiff thought changing schools would be detrimental to the child because
it would disrupt her existing environment and relationships, but defendant thought that changing
schools would be beneficial because it would offer her more opportunities and because he himself
had not been negatively affected by changing schools when he was a child. This reflects only a
parental difference of opinion. There was no question that the evidence established the child was
doing extremely well in her current educational environment. We conclude that the evidence did
not clearly preponderate in the opposite direction of the trial court’s finding that changing schools
would not be in the child’s best interests because there was inadequate evidence that the child, who
is already a gifted student, would receive greater benefit from a new school environment as
compared to the potential disruptions to her stability.

       Finally, defendant argues the trial court’s finding that defendant, or someone aligned with
defendant, coached the child about the school decision was so cryptic that it renders appellate
review nearly impossible. When considering Factor (l), the trial court found that the referee who

1
  To the extent that defendant argues that the trial court is required to provide a parenting-time
schedule that encourages his relationship with the child, we conclude that he has abandoned any
separate parenting-time argument. See In re Bell, 341 Mich App at 602 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). This alleged error is not addressed in any detail in defendant’s brief. He has not
mentioned the parenting-time factors, see MCL 722.27a, much less provided any separate
parenting-time analysis.

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had interviewed the child was concerned that she was coached to say that defendant’s proposed
school district was better than her current district.

        Contrary to defendant’s argument, the trial court’s finding is reviewable on the existing
record. Defendant agreed that he had consulted the child before making decisions for her and that
he told her that there might be a potential change in schools. He also agreed that he had described
the potential school. Plaintiff further testified that the child was present when defendant talked
about the child potentially attending a new school. Although defendant is likely opposed to the
characterization of his discussions as “coaching,” the evidence does not clearly preponderate
against the trial court’s finding.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                            /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                            /s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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