Court Opinion

ID: 9906853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 15:24:47.743211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:13.783875
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                     San Antonio, Texas
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                          No. 04-23-00109-CV

                             NEC NETWORKS, LLC d/b/a CaptureRx,
                                       Appellant

                                                  v.

  Brooke GILMARTIN, Independent Court Administrator of the Estate of J. Edward Charles
                              Gilmartin, Deceased,
                                   Appellee

                         From the Probate Court No. 1, Bexar County, Texas
                                    Trial Court No. 2018PC3985
                             Honorable Oscar J. Kazen, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Beth Watkins, Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Beth Watkins, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 29, 2023

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART; REMANDED

           Appellant NEC Networks, LLC d/b/a CaptureRx challenges the trial court’s denial of its

motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens’ Participation Act. We affirm the trial court’s order in

part, reverse it in part, and render judgment dismissing appellee Brooke Gilmartin’s counterclaim

for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We remand this cause for a determination of

CaptureRx’s court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in defending against Brooke’s

intentional infliction counterclaim.
                                                                                      04-23-00109-CV

                                           BACKGROUND

        In 2000, Edward “Jake” Gilmartin and Christopher Hotchkiss co-founded CaptureRx. In

2016, Jake married Brooke. In 2018, Jake died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Brooke was

eventually appointed independent administrator of Jake’s estate.

        This dispute revolves around the parties’ competing claims to Jake’s interest in CaptureRx.

After Jake died, CaptureRx contended that a 2012 “Company Agreement” he had signed entitled

it to purchase his interest in the company. CaptureRx valued Jake’s interest at $356,764.20 under

the terms of the Company Agreement, and it made an offer in that amount to Jake’s estate. Brooke,

as the independent administrator of Jake’s estate, declined CaptureRx’s offer because she believed

it did not fairly value Jake’s interest.

        At some point after it made the initial offer, CaptureRx discovered a 2014 “Profits Interests

Agreement Letter” that Jake purportedly signed and which CaptureRx contended was relevant to

the valuation. Both CaptureRx and Jake’s estate subsequently hired their own valuation appraisers

to review the relevant documents. CaptureRx’s valuation appraiser concluded that under the terms

of the Profits Interests Agreement Letter and the Company Agreement, Jake’s interest had no

monetary worth. Based on this valuation, CaptureRx offered Jake’s estate $10,000 “in a gesture of

goodwill[.]” The valuation appraiser hired by Jake’s estate also considered both the Company

Agreement and the Profits Interests Agreement Letter, but he concluded Jake’s interest was worth

between $19,157,000 and $33,900,000.

        During the valuation dispute, Hotchkiss—who was CaptureRx’s CEO at that time—openly

denigrated Brooke in front of CaptureRx’s employees and executives. He referred to her as “a slut,

a cunt, a prostitute, a bitch,” expressed a desire to do physical harm to her, and asked CaptureRx’s

then-general counsel, Jose Padilla, “to find someone . . . that could rape” her. Hotchkiss told

                                                -2-
                                                                                      04-23-00109-CV

“everyone” at CaptureRx that he “wanted to make sure that [Brooke] got nothing” from Jake’s

interest in the company.

       On August 12, 2019, the board of CaptureRx accepted Hotchkiss’s resignation, and Padilla

and another individual took over as co-CEOs of the company. Two weeks later, on August 26,

2019, CaptureRx sued Brooke in her individual capacity for breach of contract, money had and

received, and claims under the Theft Liability Act. CaptureRx also asserted the same claims

against Brooke “as assignee” of Jake’s interest. CaptureRx filed its claims against Brooke in Kerr

County district court.

       In her capacity as independent administrator of Jake’s estate, Brooke filed her own lawsuit

against CaptureRx in Bexar County statutory probate court. CaptureRx’s Kerr County claims were

eventually transferred by agreement to the Bexar County probate court, and the lawsuits were

consolidated. Multiple discovery disputes that are not directly relevant to this appeal ensued, and

CaptureRx changed attorneys several times. At some point during this litigation, Hotchkiss

rejoined CaptureRx as CEO, and he made representations on CaptureRx’s behalf during a June

2022 hearing before the probate court.

       On August 15, 2022, Brooke, acting “individually and allegedly as assignee,” sought

sanctions against CaptureRx. Brooke alleged CaptureRx’s lawsuit against her “ha[d] no basis in

fact or law [and] was brought in bad faith, for an improper purpose and maliciously[.]” In her

individual capacity, she also filed a counterclaim against CaptureRx for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. In support of both claims, Brooke argued that CaptureRx initiated litigation

against her while she “was in a vulnerable and fragile mental state” after Jake’s suicide because it

wanted to intimidate her into selling Jake’s interest for an unfairly low price. Shortly after Brooke

filed her counterclaim, CaptureRx voluntarily non-suited the claims it had asserted against her in

her individual capacity.

                                                -3-
                                                                                         04-23-00109-CV

          On October 14, 2022, CaptureRx filed a motion under the TCPA to dismiss Brooke’s

counterclaim and request for sanctions. After a hearing, the trial court denied the TCPA motion by

operation of law. CaptureRx then timely filed this appeal.

                                               ANALYSIS

          In six issues we construe as three, CaptureRx argues the trial court erred by denying its

TCPA motion because: (1) the TCPA applied to Brooke’s claims; (2) Brooke did not present prima

facie evidence to support her claims; and (3) CaptureRx was entitled to judgment as a matter of

law on Brooke’s claims.

                     Did CaptureRx Bring Its Appeal Against the Wrong Party?

          Before turning to the merits of the trial court’s ruling on CaptureRx’s TCPA motion, we

consider Brooke’s assertion that CaptureRx brought its appeal against the wrong party. Brooke

notes that CaptureRx’s docketing statement, motions for extension of time, and brief identified

“Brooke Gilmartin as the Independent Administrator of the Estate of Edward J. Gilmartin” as the

appellee in this dispute. She further notes that none of CaptureRx’s appellate filings identify her

as a party in her individual capacity. Because “[t]he errors asserted by CaptureRx in this appeal

could only impact” her in her individual capacity, Brooke argues this appeal “should be summarily

dismissed[.]” We decline to interpret our jurisdiction so narrowly.

          “The filing of a notice of appeal by any party invokes the appellate court’s jurisdiction over

all parties to the trial court’s judgment or order appealed from.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1. It is

undisputed that Brooke was a party to the “order appealed from” in her individual capacity—

CaptureRx appealed the order denying its motion to dismiss the counterclaims Brooke asserted

against it in her individual capacity. CaptureRx’s notice of appeal was therefore effective to invoke

this court’s jurisdiction over her in that capacity. See id. Accordingly, we decline to dismiss this

appeal.

                                                   -4-
                                                                                      04-23-00109-CV

                                    CaptureRx’s TCPA Motion

                             Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       We review a trial court’s denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss de novo. Robert B. James,

DDS, Inc. v. Elkins, 553 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. denied). In

reviewing a ruling on a TCPA motion, “[w]e view the pleadings and evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmovant.” Id.

       A motion to dismiss under the TCPA is subject to a three-part analysis. First, the movant

must demonstrate that the respondent’s “legal action is based on or is in response to [the movant’s]

exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association[.]” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003(a). “When it is clear from the plaintiff’s pleadings that the action is

covered by the [TCPA], the defendant need show no more.” Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467

(Tex. 2017). If the movant shows the TCPA applies, the burden shifts to the respondent to

“establish[] by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the

claim in question.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(c). If the respondent establishes

its prima facie case, the burden shifts back to the movant to “establish[] an affirmative defense or

other grounds on which the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.

§ 27.005(d).

                                            Application

       A.      Brooke’s intentional infliction of emotional distress counterclaim

       The TCPA’s definition of “legal action” expressly includes counterclaims. TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(6). Brooke’s live petition alleged that her intentional infliction of

emotional distress counterclaim arose from CaptureRx’s filing of a lawsuit against her. Because

filing a lawsuit involves “a communication in or pertaining to . . . a judicial proceeding,” that

action falls within the TCPA’s definition of “[e]xercise of the right to petition.” See id.

                                                 -5-
                                                                                        04-23-00109-CV

§ 27.001(4)(A)(i). Brooke’s live petition therefore showed on its face that her counterclaim was

“based on” or “in response to” CaptureRx’s exercise of a right protected by the TCPA. See TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.003(a); Hersh, 526 S.W.3d at 467. Accordingly, CaptureRx met its

burden under the first prong of the TCPA analysis as to that claim.

        The second prong of the TCPA analysis asks whether Brooke established “by clear and

specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of” her counterclaim. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c). The TCPA does not define “clear and specific evidence.” See

id.; In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 588 (Tex. 2015). However, this evidentiary standard neither

“impose[s] a higher burden of proof than that required of the plaintiff at trial” nor “require[s] direct

evidence of each essential element of the underlying claim to avoid dismissal.” In re Lipsky, 460

S.W.3d at 591. “Instead, a plaintiff must provide enough detail to show the factual basis for its

claim.” Id. The TCPA also does not define “prima facie case,” but that term “has a traditional legal

meaning.” Id. at 590. A TCPA respondent establishes a prima facie case by presenting “the

minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact

is true.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

        “To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must

establish that: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant’s conduct was

extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and

(4) the resulting emotional distress was severe.” Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144

S.W.3d 438, 445 (Tex. 2004). To satisfy the required elements of an intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim, the conduct in question must be “so outrageous in character, and so

extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,

and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” See Brewerton v. Dalrymple, 997 S.W.2d 212,

215–16 (Tex. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Elkins, 553 S.W.3d at 609–10.

                                                    -6-
                                                                                                  04-23-00109-CV

        The Texas Supreme Court has described the required elements of an intentional infliction

claim as “exacting.” Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 815 (Tex. 2005). “Meritorious

claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are relatively rare because ‘most human

conduct, even that which causes injury to others, cannot be fairly characterized as extreme and

outrageous.’” Walgreens v. McKenzie, 676 S.W.3d 170, 178 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2023, no pet. h.) (quoting Kroger Tex. L.P. v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 796 (Tex. 2006)). Conduct

may be “callous, meddlesome, mean-spirited, officious, overbearing, and vindictive” and still fall

short of the high threshold required to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress. See Creditwatch, 157 S.W.3d at 817–18.

        Here, Brooke argued that CaptureRx’s decision to sue her in her individual capacity was

extreme and outrageous because: (1) CaptureRx sued her less than a year after Jake’s suicide; (2)

the lawsuit was part of a scheme to take advantage of her vulnerable state to intimidate her into

selling Jake’s 20% interest for an unfairly low price; and (3) CaptureRx knew there was no legal

or factual basis to assert its claims against her individually. She further argued that CaptureRx’s

decision to sue her in her individual capacity must be viewed in light of Hotchkiss’s “extreme

animosity” toward her, and she presented evidence of that animosity.

        We are required to view the pleadings and evidence in the light most favorable to Brooke.

See, e.g., Elkins, 553 S.W.3d at 603. We note, however, that Brooke has not argued that

CaptureRx’s claims against her in her representative capacity—which were identical to the claims

it asserted against her individually—were tortious or otherwise procedurally wrongful. 1 Stated

differently, Brooke has not disputed that she was a proper defendant in her representative capacity.

Furthermore, while Brooke argued that Padilla “had a plan to ensure that CaptureRx paid Brooke

1
 Brooke has challenged the substantive merits of CaptureRx’s claims against her in her representative capacity, and
we express no opinion on the merits of those claims or Brooke’s defenses against them.

                                                       -7-
                                                                                      04-23-00109-CV

the lowest amount possible,” she has not argued or presented any evidence that this plan involved

suing Brooke in her individual capacity. Under these unique circumstances, even if we assume

CaptureRx’s initial choice to sue Brooke in her individual capacity instead of in her representative

capacity was wrongful, we do not believe a reasonable factfinder could conclude that choice was

so extreme and outrageous “as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” See Brewerton, 997

S.W.2d at 215–16; see also Creditwatch, 157 S.W.3d at 818 (noting that even “heinous” acts “will

rarely have merit as intentional infliction claims”); Elkins, 553 S.W.3d at 609. Accordingly, we

must conclude that Brooke did not establish a prima facie case for this essential element of her

intentional infliction counterclaim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c); In re Lipsky,

460 S.W.3d at 590.

       For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order as to Brooke’s intentional infliction of

emotional distress counterclaim and render judgment dismissing that counterclaim. We also

remand this cause for a determination of CaptureRx’s “court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees

incurred in defending against” that counterclaim. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 27.009(a)(1). Based on our resolution of this issue, we need not consider CaptureRx’s contention

that it satisfied its burden on the third prong of the TCPA analysis. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

       B.      Brooke’s request for sanctions

               1.      The TCPA applied to Brooke’s request for sanctions.

       CaptureRx also sought a TCPA dismissal of Brooke’s request for monetary sanctions. That

request was a “legal action” as defined by the TCPA. See KB Home Lone Star Inc. v. Gordon, 629

S.W.3d 649, 655–57 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.). And, like Brooke’s intentional

infliction counterclaim, her petition showed on its face that her request for sanctions was based on

CaptureRx’s exercise of the right to petition. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

                                                -8-
                                                                                      04-23-00109-CV

§§ 27.001(4)(A)(i), 27.003(a). CaptureRx therefore met its burden to show the TCPA applied to

that request. See Hersh, 526 S.W.3d at 467.

               2.      Brooke presented prima facie evidence of each required element of her
                       claim for sanctions.

       Brooke’s live petition sought sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13. A trial

court may impose Rule 13 sanctions on an attorney who signs a filing, a represented party, or both.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. “Rule 13 precludes a signatory from signing any motion that is (1) groundless

and (2) brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment.” KB Home Lone Star, 629 S.W.3d

at 658. Rule 13’s first prong requires the party seeking sanctions to establish that the challenged

filing lacked any basis in law or fact. Id.; TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. Rule 13’s second prong—a showing

that a pleading or motion was filed in bad faith—“entails more than simply bad judgment or

negligence; rather, it is the conscious doing of a wrong for dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious

purposes.” In re Estate of Aguilar, 492 S.W.3d 807, 813–14 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet.

denied) (internal quotation marks omitted). As explained above, Brooke was required to establish

a prima facie case of both these elements to avoid a TCPA dismissal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 27.005(c); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590.

       CaptureRx asserted several claims against Brooke individually, including breach of

contract. To prevail on its breach of contract claim, CaptureRx was required to establish, inter alia,

that “a valid contract existed between the plaintiff and the defendant”—i.e., that a valid contract

existed between CaptureRx and Brooke in her individual capacity. See, e.g., Van Dyke v. Builders

W., Inc., 565 S.W.3d 336, 342 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); cf. Elizondo

v. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n, 974 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.)

(individual acting in her individual capacity “is, in law, not the same person” as that individual

acting in her representative capacity). The evidence presented below showed that Brooke was not

                                                 -9-
                                                                                         04-23-00109-CV

a signatory to the Company Agreement or the Profits Interests Agreement Letter in any capacity.

This evidence, if uncontroverted, would support a rational inference that CaptureRx’s breach of

contract claim against Brooke in her individual capacity had no basis in law or fact and was

therefore groundless as that term is defined by Rule 13. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; Van Dyke, 565

S.W.3d at 342; see also In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590. Accordingly, the trial court did not err

by concluding Brooke satisfied her prima facie burden on the first element of her Rule 13 sanctions

claim.

         On the second prong of her Rule 13 claim—that CaptureRx sued her in her individual

capacity in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment—Brooke alleged that CaptureRx asserted

meritless claims against her to intimidate her into selling Jake’s interest for less than its fair value.

She also alleged that CaptureRx “authorized, acquiesced in and/or ratified” the actions of its on-

again off-again CEO, Hotchkiss. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.006(a) (“In determining

whether a legal action is subject to or should be dismissed under [the TCPA], the court shall

consider the pleadings[.]”); In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 587 (same). As evidentiary support,

Brooke presented deposition testimony from Padilla, who was CaptureRx’s general counsel and

co-CEO when it filed suit against her individually and was one of the people who authorized the

filing of the lawsuit. Padilla testified that Hotchkiss repeatedly and openly vilified Brooke in front

of Padilla and other CaptureRx executives, blamed Brooke for Jake’s death, and “told everyone,

make sure [Brooke] gets nothing” from Jake’s interest in the company. See In re Estate of Aguilar,

492 S.W.3d at 814 (“[H]arassment focuses on the pleader’s intent to annoy, alarm, and abuse

another person through the pleadings.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Padilla also explained

that he and others at CaptureRx, including the outside counsel who signed the petition asserting

claims against Brooke in her individual capacity, were “scared” of Hotchkiss due to his erratic

                                                  - 10 -
                                                                                                  04-23-00109-CV

behavior. Moreover, it is undisputed that Hotchkiss did not depart his leadership role at CaptureRx

until two weeks before the company sued Brooke.

        CaptureRx correctly notes that Padilla testified that he and CaptureRx took actions

intended to insulate the dispute with Jake’s estate from Hotchkiss’s influence. However, at this

stage of the litigation, the trial court was required to consider the pleadings and evidence in the

light most favorable to Brooke. See, e.g., Elkins, 553 S.W.3d at 603. When considered under the

proper standard of review, the pleadings and evidence before the trial court would permit a

factfinder to rationally infer that CaptureRx’s individual claims against Brooke were motivated by

Hotchkiss’s malice against her and were therefore filed in bad faith or for the purpose of

harassment. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590; In re Estate of Aguilar, 492 S.W.3d at 813–14.

Consequently, Brooke met her burden to establish a prima facie case of each required element of

her claim for Rule 13 sanctions. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(c).

                 3.       CaptureRx did not establish that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of
                          law on Brooke’s request for sanctions.

        In its TCPA motion, CaptureRx argued that even if Brooke met her prima facie burden on

her claim for sanctions, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that claim for several

reasons. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(d). First, it claimed that it believed in good

faith that Jake’s “outstanding debt, and/or a community portion thereof, transferred to” Brooke

upon Jake’s death. While Jake’s portion of the community estate may have been liable for his

debts, 2 see TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 101.052, Brooke herself was not individually liable for Jake’s

debts unless: (1) she acted as Jake’s agent; or (2) Jake incurred the debt in question “for

2
 CaptureRx’s own evidence showed that Jake signed the Company Agreement in 2014 but did not marry Brooke until
2016. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001(1) (defining separate property as, inter alia, “the property owned or claimed
by the spouse before marriage”). CaptureRx did not attempt to show what portion, if any, of Jake’s interest in
CaptureRx was community property. See id.

                                                      - 11 -
                                                                                      04-23-00109-CV

necessaries[.]” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.201(a). CaptureRx did not attempt to show that either

was true here. See Martinek Grain & Bins, Inc. v. Bulldog Farms, Inc., 366 S.W.3d 800, 808 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (holding wife was not personally liable for her deceased husband’s

debts).

          Next, CaptureRx argued Brooke was personally bound by the terms of the Company

Agreement because the agreement defined her as an “assignee” of Jake’s membership interest.

CaptureRx also argued Brooke should be bound by the terms of the Company Agreement because

she sought to benefit from it. CaptureRx did not, however, point to any portion of the Company

Agreement that made an assignee individually liable for the debts of her deceased assignor. Nor

did it present any evidence that Brooke sought benefits under the agreement in her individual

capacity as opposed to in her capacity as the administrator of Jake’s estate. See Elizondo, 974

S.W.2d at 931.

          Finally, CaptureRx argued the evidence showed Hotchkiss resigned as its CEO

approximately two weeks before it filed its lawsuit against Brooke. On appeal, CaptureRx contends

Brooke “never made a connection between her feud with” Hotchkiss and CaptureRx’s decision to

sue her in her individual capacity. This appears to be a contention that Hotchkiss’s undisputed

animus toward Brooke cannot properly be imputed to CaptureRx for sanctions purposes. However,

Padilla testified that Hotchkiss resigned “about seven or eight times” during Padilla’s

approximately one-year tenure at the company, and that the resignation CaptureRx relies on here

“was just the first time that the board actually accepted it.” Moreover, the trial court took judicial

notice of the entire record of this case, and that record showed Hotchkiss reclaimed his position as

CEO during this litigation. Hotchkiss also personally appeared in the trial court during a June 24,

                                                - 12 -
                                                                                                  04-23-00109-CV

2022 hearing, where he made representations on CaptureRx’s behalf. 3 CaptureRx itself identified

Hotchkiss as its “corporate representative” during a September 21, 2022 hearing that occurred

approximately one month after Brooke filed her counterclaim and request for sanctions. And, as

explained above, Brooke presented evidence that when Hotchkiss was CEO, he made it clear to

“everyone” at CaptureRx that he did not want Brooke to reap any benefit from Jake’s interest in

the company. Under these circumstances, reasonable people could disagree about whether

Hotchkiss’s short-lived resignation precluded his undisputed vitriol toward Brooke from being

imputed to CaptureRx for sanctions purposes. See, e.g., In re Vesta Ins. Grp., Inc., 192 S.W.3d

759, 762 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (corporations act through human agents);

Dall. Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. 2019) (TCPA respondent may rely

on circumstantial evidence that supports reasonable inference).

        To obtain a dismissal of Brooke’s sanctions claim under the third prong of the TCPA,

CaptureRx was required to conclusively establish its entitlement to judgment on that claim. See

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(d); Graves v. Evangelista-Ysasaga, No. 14-22-00137-CV,

2023 WL 370589, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 24, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

CaptureRx argues its claims “were warranted by evidence known by CaptureRx at the time it filed

its pleadings,” and it points to evidence that arguably raised a fact issue on that point. However,

evidence that merely raises a fact issue will not support a dismissal under the third prong of the

TCPA. See Graves, 2023 WL 370589, at *6; cf. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816

(Tex. 2005). The trial court did not err by denying CaptureRx’s TCPA motion as to Brooke’s claim

for sanctions. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(d).

3
  The June 24, 2022 hearing occurred at a time when CaptureRx did not have an attorney in this litigation. Hotchkiss
told the trial court during that hearing that he had not yet been able to locate new counsel for CaptureRx.

                                                       - 13 -
                                                                                     04-23-00109-CV

                                          CONCLUSION

       We reverse the trial court’s denial of CaptureRx’s TCPA motion as to Brooke’s intentional

infliction of emotional distress counterclaim and render judgment dismissing that counterclaim.

We remand this cause for a determination of CaptureRx’s court costs and reasonable attorney’s

fees incurred in defending against Brooke’s intentional infliction counterclaim. We affirm the trial

court’s denial of CaptureRx’s TCPA motion as to Brooke’s request for sanctions.

                                                  Beth Watkins, Justice

                                               - 14 -