Court Opinion

ID: 9747553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:20:32.966887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:24.468320
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. I conclude that on the facts of this case the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial in view of the fact that no supplemental instruc*317tions regarding distinctions between first and second degree murder were given, and the trial court failed to take any precautionary measures to minimize any possible prejudicial effects of the outburst by courtroom spectators.
The majority opinion fails to mention that the verdict slip in this case contained the following options:
COUNT ONE — murder, COUNT TWO — voluntary manslaughter, COUNT THREE — involuntary manslaughter. The slip did not distinguish between first and second degree murder in Count One.
When the foreman of the jury announced that they had found the defendant guilty of the first count of murder, (as opposed to second count of voluntary manslaughter and third count of involuntary manslaughter) the trial judge queried the foreman as to the degree of murder. The following discussion took place:
“THE COURT: Was it an oversight as to the assessing the degree of the crime, and necessary for further deliberation, or had you in fact deliberated on the question of degree of crime ?
JURY FOREMAN: 1 can’t say — from looking at the form we assumed the charges, and it says first count. We just assumed that there was no other degree to go on from there, I guess. We felt that it was it, that it was the highest you could go.” (Emphasis added.)
It is obvious from this discussion that the jury did not understand the original charge as to distinctions between first and second degree murder. It is also obvious that they did not deliberate as to the degree of guilt prior to returning the defective verdict. At this point the trial court should have given supplemental instructions prior to further deliberations by the jury. See Commonwealth v. Dzvonick, 450 Pa. 98, 297 A.2d 912, 914, n. 4 (1972).
*318In Commonwealth v. Komatowski, 347 Pa. 445, 32 A.2d 905, 910 (1943) this Court noted:
“When a jury tenders a verdict which is defective in substance, uncertain, repugnant, or not responsive to the issue, it is proper for the court to reject it, as not warranted by law, call the attention of the jury to the defect, instruct them as to the form of verdict in case they mean to acquit or convict the defendant and send them back to their room where they can, untrammeled by the presence and influence of others, find such verdict as they think proper.” (Emphasis added.)
Since the “spontaneous expression of approval” by one or more spectators in this case occurred when the jury was in the middle of its deliberations, I cannot conclude that they were “untrammeled by the presence and influence of others” in reaching their ultimate verdict. At the very least, the trial court should have cautioned the jury with respect to the prejudicial outburst. See Commonwealth v. Faison, 437 Pa. 432, 264 A.2d 394 (1970).
The only thing that we can be certain of in this case is that the defendant was found guilty of murder. Accordingly, the only proper judgment is the lowest degree of murder, — second degree.