Court Opinion

ID: 9910438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 17:08:51.334437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:56.304145
License: Public Domain

J-S36014-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 NORMAN LOMAX HARVEY                      :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1043 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered April 3, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                     at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000796-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                         FILED DECEMBER 15, 2023

      Norman Lomax Harvey appeals from the order denying his Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. We affirm.

      Appellant pled guilty to one count of theft from a motor vehicle on

May 21, 2012. On the same day, the court imposed six to twelve months of

incarceration at the Montgomery County Correctional Facility with credit for

time served beginning November 3, 2011, followed by ten months of

probation. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.

      In December of 2016, Appellant filed pro se his first PCRA petition. The

PCRA court did not appoint counsel, instead determining that Appellant was

ineligible for relief under the PCRA because he was no longer serving a

sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole for the crime at issue. See

42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i).     Appellant did not appeal the resulting order

dismissing the petition as moot.
J-S36014-23

       Appellant filed pro se the petition at issue in August of 2022. Therein,

he acknowledged that his petition was facially untimely; however, he pled the

timeliness exceptions of newly-discovered facts and a newly-recognized

constitutional right. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely

after finding that the asserted exceptions did not apply. Thereafter, Appellant

filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the PCRA court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court stated that

Appellant was not currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or

parole for the underlying crime, and was therefore not entitled to relief under

the PCRA. See PCRA Court Opinion, 6/6/23, at 2. On appeal, Appellant raises

fourteen issues for this Court’s consideration, including, inter alia, the

timeliness of his petition.1 See Appellant’s brief at 6-7.

       We begin with an examination of the pertinent legal principles. Initially,

we observe that our “standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition

is whether that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is

free of legal error.”      Commonwealth v. Cruz, Jr., 223 A.3d 274, 277

(Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up). Furthermore, “this Court may affirm a PCRA

court’s order on any legal basis.” Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590,

595 (Pa.Super. 2021).

       As a prefatory matter, in order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner

must be “currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole
____________________________________________

1 Appellant does not address whether he is still serving a sentence for the
crime at issue as required by the statute.

                                           -2-
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for the crime” at issue. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i). Thus, the High Court has

held that “the denial of relief for a petitioner who has finished serving his

sentence is required by the plain language of the statute.” Commonwealth

v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1997).

      Upon review of the record, we observe that Appellant was sentenced on

May 21, 2012, to a maximum of twelve months of incarceration, with credit

for time served beginning November 3, 2011. Sentencing Order, 5/21/12, at

unnumbered 2.       The sentence imposed was not consecutive to any

outstanding sentence, nor is there any indication that it was ever amended or

that Appellant was resentenced. Id. Hence, as to the crime underlying the

PCRA petition at issue, the incarceration portion of Appellant’s sentence would

have been satisfied no later than November 3, 2012, one year after he was

initially imprisoned. Factoring in the ten-month probationary tail, he would

have completed his total sentence no later than September 3, 2013, almost

nine full years before the instant petition was filed.   Since Appellant is no

longer serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole for the crime

at issue in this case, he is ineligible for PCRA relief.      See 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9543(a)(1)(i); Ahlborn, supra.

      We are cognizant that Appellant was not appointed counsel when

litigating his first PCRA petition or the instant petition. Ordinarily, “a PCRA

petitioner is entitled to the assistance of counsel to litigate a first PCRA

petition.”   Commonwealth v. Snook, 230 A.3d 438, 446 n.2 (Pa.Super.

2020). However, we have held that when a petitioner has served the sentence

                                     -3-
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that he is challenging yet has been denied the right to counsel, “remanding

for appointment of counsel . . . [is] a futile act.” Id. In that vein, “the law

does not require the performance of a futile act,” and not remanding is

harmless error.      Commonwealth v. Hart, 911 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa.Super.

2006). The reason for appointing counsel, even where a petition appears to

be untimely filed, is to assist an indigent petitioner in establishing a timeliness

exception.    Id.   Where the petitioner has finished serving the sentence at

issue, it is a legal impossibility to establish one of the necessary exceptions to

achieve relief, as the statute is inapplicable.2 See id. Thus, it does not serve

Appellant to appoint counsel to litigate the current petition because he

completed the sentence at issue in 2013, at the latest.

____________________________________________

2  In Commonwealth v. Ramos, 14 A.3d 894 (Pa.Super. 2011), the PCRA
court dismissed Ramos’s petition because he had completed his sentence for
the challenged crime. Ramos was not afforded counsel, and we remanded for
the appointment of counsel. However, the record “was not dispositive of the
status of [Ramos’s] sentence.” Id. at 896 n.1. In the instant case, the record
shows that Appellant finished serving his sentence almost nine years before
the filing of the instant PCRA petition. The Court in Ramos, moreover, did
not acknowledge prior case law. See Commonwealth v. Hart, 911 A.2d
939, 942 (Pa.Super. 2006) (holding that failure to appoint counsel for a
petitioner who has served his sentence is harmless error); Commonwealth
v. Auchmuty, 799 A.2d 823, 827 (Pa.Super. 2002) (explaining that there is
“no remedy available” when it has been established that a petitioner is no
longer serving the sentence at issue). Further, the Court in Ramos did not
address the well-settled principle that there is no rationale for the appointment
of counsel once a petitioner has finished serving his sentence, because
establishing an exception to the time-bar is a legal impossibility. See Hart,
supra at 942. Since Ramos, this Court has favored the position that a PCRA
court’s failure to appoint counsel for a petitioner who has served his sentence
is harmless error. See Commonwealth v. Snook, 230 A.3d 438, 446 n.2.
(Pa.Super. 2020).

                                           -4-
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      Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the PCRA court did not err in

denying Appellant’s petition.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 12/15/2023

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