Court Opinion

ID: 9686215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:33:52.229189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:16.117416
License: Public Domain

HEFLIN, Chief Justice
(concurring specially) :
I am of the opinion that the issue in this case depends upon the applicability of the following Interstate Commerce Commission rule which appears in 49 C.F.R. (Rev.1964), § 207.4:
“§ 207.4 AUGMENTING EQUIPMENT.
“Other than equipment exchanged between motor common carriers in interchange service as defined in § 207.5, authorized carriers may perform authorized transportation in or with equipment which they do not own only under the following conditions:
(a) Contract requirements. The contract, lease, or other arrangement for the use of such equipment:
* * * * * *
(4) Exclusive possession and responsibility. Shall provide for the exclusive possession, control, and use of the equipment, and for the complete assumption of responsibility in respect thereto, by the lessee for the duration of said contract, lease or other arrangement, except:
* * * * * *»
*46■ In the case of Thornberry v. Oyl-er Bros., Inc., 164 Ohio St. 395, 131 N.E.2d 383, treatment was given to- a predecessor to the-above regulation, known as Administrative Rule No. 4 of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles of the Interstate Commerce Commission, as authorized by Part II of the Interstate Commerce Commission Act, § 301 et -se'q., Title 49 of U.S.C.A., which rule was to the effect that the arrangement under which a carrier utilizes in its operation a vehicle which it does not own, regardless of whether the services of an owner-driver. or his representative are involved, must b¿ of such a character that the carrier will have the right to direct and control the operation of the vehicle at all times and be fully responsible therefor in all respects, under all applicable provisions of law- governing the duties and obligations of the carrier to the shipper and to the public generally. But Thornberry held such rule did not prevent a state court from holding that the carrier was not liable for the driver’s conduct when a collision occurred while the driver was on a mission outside the line and scope of his employment. For a similar decision see Kaplan Trucking Company v. Lavine, 253 F.2d 254 (6 Cir. 1958).
A similar result was reached in Gackstetter v. Dart Transit Company, 269 Minn. 146, 130 N.W.2d 326, in connection with the heretofore quoted portion of § 207.4 of 49 C.F'.R.
Under the facts of the instant case the question arises as to whether or not Hall and Johnson could have legally entered into a contractual relationship by which Johnson would be an independent contractor for the purpose of maintaining the motor vehicles in good, safe¡ operating and mechanical condition in light of the applicable I.C.C. rule. I see no good reason why such contractual arrangement would not be valid. The driver, Hayes, under said I.C.C. rule would be Hall’s employee when he was in the line and scope of his duties as such, but there is ^nothing to prevent him from becoming Johnson’s employee when he is no longer in the line and scope of Hall’s business. Thus I concur in the- result of the opinion in this case but for a different reason.■