Court Opinion

ID: 9854209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:03:12.084647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:58.535916
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, J.
(dissenting in a separate opinion):
I disagree with the majority’s reasoning and analysis. In my view, the trial court erred in failing to set aside the default judgment on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Specifically, Glenwood is entitled to relief because its attorneys abandoned it. I VOTE to REVERSE.

ABANDONMENT

Juridical writing in South Carolina articulates the general rule that the acts and omissions of an attorney are attributable to the client. Hillman v. Pinion, 347 S.C. 253, 257, 554 S.E.2d 427, 429 (Ct.App.2001); Simon v. Flowers, 231 S.C. 545, 99 S.E.2d 391, 394 (1957). The exception to this rule is recognized in the seminal case, Graham v. Town of Loris, 272 S.C. 442, 248 S.E.2d 594 (1978). Graham inculcates:
Although a wide discretion is vested in courts to set aside or vacate judgments because of the neglect, misconduct or inadvertence of counsel employed in the case, the general rule undoubtedly is that the neglect of the attorney is the neglect of the client, and that no mistake, inadvertence or neglect attributable to an attorney can be successfully used as a ground for relief, unless it would have been excusable if attributable to the client. The acts and omissions of the attorney in such case are those of the client.
However, under the facts of the present case, we are not merely considering neglect, inadvertence, or mistake of counsel. We are concerned with a wilful and unilateral abandonment of the client by counsel. There is authority for the proposition that the general rule is not applied to such a factual situation. This exception to the general rule is expressed at 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, s 737 (1969) in the following language:
*347The rule that an attorney’s negligence may be imputed to his client and prevent the latter from relying on that ground for opening or vacating a judgment does not necessarily prevail in the event of the attorney’s abandonment or withdrawal from the case.
272 S.C. 442, 451-52, 248 S.E.2d 594, 599; accord Paul Davis Systems, Inc. v. Deepwater of Hilton Head, LLC, 362 S.C. 220, 226, 607 S.E.2d 358, 361 (Ct.App.2004) (recognizing an exception to the general rule when the attorney’s conduct constitutes willful abandonment).
The rule that the acts and omissions of an attorney are attributable to the client is not a hard and fast rule. Brown v. Butler, 347 S.C. 259, 265, 554 S.E.2d 431, 434 (Ct.App.2001). “Rather, it is one that is ‘to be applied rationally, with a fair recognition that justice to the litigants is always the polestar.’ ” Id. (citing Graham, 272 S.C. at 452, 248 S.E.2d at 599).
In Graham, our Supreme Court held “the attorney’s action in withdrawing from this case at a crucial stage without reasonable notice to his client is one of willful abandonment.” 272 S.C. at 452, 248 S.E.2d at 599. “An attorney who undertakes the conduct of an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination and is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause and reasonable notice.” Graham, 272 S.C. at 452-53, 248 S.E.2d at 599 (citing Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N.C. 147, 152, 63 S.E.2d 133, 137 (1951)); Floyd v. Kosko, 285 S.C. 390, 393, 329 S.E.2d 459, 460 (Ct.App.1985). When counsel withdraws from a case at a crucial stage in litigation without reasonable notice to his client, the “[client] should not be charged with the abandonment of the case by its counsel.” Graham, 272 S.C. at 452-53, 248 S.E.2d at 599 (“Conscience requires this Court to charge the attorney alone with his gross dereliction of duty and not to visit its consequences upon an innocent client.”).
The majority enunciates the position that any failure of counsel must be based upon assumptions. The French phrase “pas du tout”7 is efficacious. Not only does the failure in this case transcend mere neglect, it rises to the level of abandonment.
*348Kleinman believed Nettles to be Glenwood’s attorney when she forwarded DC Development’s cross-complaint to him on May 13, 2004. She persisted in attempting to contact Nettles, but he did not respond, nor did he file an answer to the cross-claim. On June 24, 2004, in a letter to Kleinman and Cisa, Nettles disavowed representation of Glenwood. In addition, Cisa’s November 9, 2004 letter to counsel for DC Development indicated he was taking over Glenwood’s representation. Cisa explained the reason no answer to DC Development’s cross-claim had been filed was due to “the failure of the original attorney for Glenwood Falls, LP to respond.”
It is commonly understood that a client may assume a lawyer who has previously represented him will continue to serve in that capacity. When the attorney becomes aware the client is opei-ating under that assumption, it is incumbent upon the attorney to immediately and clearly, resolve any doubt about whether the attorney-client relationship still exists. Delay in clarifying whether the representation continues risks exposing the client to prejudice, should the client mistakenly believe the attorney is acting to protect the client’s interests. Although Nettles had the cross-complaint in his possession and had received multiple contacts from Kleinman, he nevertheless delayed nearly six weeks before addressing the attorney-client relationship. During that time the cross-complaint should have been answered to avoid admission of the allegations therein. Glenwood needed the advice of counsel on how to protect its interests. Glenwood was unquestionably prejudiced by Nettles’ conduct.
The etiology of the default position of Glenwood arises from the failure and inaction of Nettles. The default position of Glenwood is concatenated from Nettles through Cisa. On November 8, 2004, Cisa received DC Development’s letter informing him of the December 16, 2004 trial date. In acknowledgement of that letter, Cisa confirmed he was taking over Glenwood’s representation and indicated he intended to proceed on the merits of the case. Cisa represented Glen-wood on November 9, 2004, at the latest. The majority agrees his conduct thereafter was neglectful.
Recognizing the dissimilitude of the facts in Graham v. Town of Loris as juxtaposed to this record, the annunciation *349of the principles and doctrines of law in Graham command the same result in this case. The attorney representing the Town of Loris resigned the day before a summary judgment hearing without notifying the town of his resignation. When no one appeared at the summary judgment hearing the court granted summary judgment against the Town of Loris. In this case, Cisa acknowledged he represented Glenwood, had notice of the December 16 trial, yet simply failed to appear at the trial. Entry of default and the subsequent default judgment against Glenwood resulted from Cisa’s abandonment. His failure to appear at this critical stage in litigation without any notice to Glenwood was tantamount to unilateral and willful abandonment. The rationale in Graham is equally applicable in this case: “Conscience requires this Court to charge the attorney alone with his gross dereliction of duty and not to visit its consequences upon an innocent client.”

CONCLUSION

The opinion of the majority is infected with expository difficulty when juxtaposed to the precedent extant in South Carolina law on abandonment. I VOTE to REVERSE.

. This phrase means "not so” or "not at all”.