Court Opinion

ID: 9669892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:10:37.80152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:00.963506
License: Public Domain

McCALEB, Justice
(dissenting).
Ever since 1950, when Act 164 of that year was passed, the Legislature has been attempting to make it a criminal offense for a parent to wilfully neglect or intentionally fail to support his illegitimate child in destitute circumstances. In State v. Jones, 220 La. 381, 56 So.2d 724 and State v. Sims, 220 La. 532, 57 So.2d 177, this court concluded that the statute was applicable only to cases in which there is a civil obligation placed upon parents to provide support for their illegitimate children, forasmuch as it would be unreasonable to believe that the Legislature intended to render an act or course of conduct criminal for which no civil responsibility had been imposed. Those decisions were founded on an interpretation of legislative intent, a proper judicial function whenever a law is of doubtful meaning.
*167Soon after the decision in the Sims case, the Legislature met again and eliminated •any uncertainty which may have existed as to its design in rendering parents of illegitimate children criminally responsible for their wilful failure to provide support — for, in Act 368 of 1952, it was provided that it is the duty of such parent to provide support for his child. I thought that the clear expression of the legislative will, as announced in that statute, ended further judicial inquiry as to the conduct which was made criminal and that the only real matters thereafter left for judicial determination in these proceedings were questions of fact, i. e., parenthood of the defendant and his intentional non-support of his child in necessitous circumstances. However, a majority of the court, in State v. Mack, 224 La. 886, 71 So.2d 315, reached the conclusion that the 1952 change in the statute accomplished naught because Article 242 of the Civil Code was pertinent to the case and that the parent could only become criminally responsible when his parenthood had been established by civil judgment or by acknowledgment.
Following the finality of the decision in State v. Mack, the Legislature of 1954 endeavored to overcome the judicial objections stated therein and, in Act 298 of 1954, it was specially provided that Article 242 of the Civil Code was not to be applied in proceedings brought under the statute.
The instant case ensues from this last legislative effort and the majority approve the finding of the trial judge that the Juvénile Court is without jurisdiction because the authority to enforce responsibility of support of illegitimate children resides exclusively in the Civil District Courts and that, until the obligation to support is first established in such courts, the Juvenile Court may not inquire into, the matter of criminal responsibility.
It occurs to me that this resolution erpanates from an erroneous assimilation of the matter of jurisdiction with that of proof. It is perfectly apparent that the grant of jurisdiction in Section 96 of Article 7 of the Constitution to the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Orleans “ * * * of all; cases of desertion or non-support of children by either parent, * * * ” broadly covers desertion or non-support of illegitimate as well as legitimate children — for, had the Legislature intended to exclude the Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction over cases involving illegitimate children, such intention would undoubtedly have been specifically. expressed.1 This being so, the question of^ the judge’s authority to entertain this case is truly not a jurisdictional question at all and the majority ruling that the Juvenile Court has no authority to pass upon the criminal responsibility of the defendant herein, because his liability for the support of his illegitimate child must first be estab-' *169lished in a civil suit, is actually the determination of a question of evidence, i. e.r that parenthood of an illegitimate child" can only be established by proof that such parenthood was judicially recognized by a civil judgment or acknowledgment, as provided by Article 203 of the Civil Code.
When the basis of the prevailing opinion is thus examined, it becomes manifest that the court is not ruling on a question of jurisdiction but enunciating rules of evidence which are not authorized by the statute.2 The end result is that the legislative amendments have been unavailing and that the statute is no greater in its scope than when originally enacted. I think that these amendments should be given effect.
I respectfully dissent.

. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code children are classified as either legitimate, illegitimate or legitimated and Article 240 provides that fathers and mothers owe alimony to their illegitimate children when they are in need.

. R.S. 14:74, in providing for proof, to be administered in these cases, declares that it. shall be -made in accordance with the rules established by the Civil Code (see Articles 209, 210, 211 and 212) “as for proof of paternity or maternity for civil purpose’s” but that such proof is employable only for the purpose of establishing the duty to support an illegitimate child, and shall, not be construed as creating a civil obligation.