Court Opinion

ID: 9569656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:16:11.465111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:42.592319
License: Public Domain

SENIOR JUSTICE POFF, with whom JUSTICE WHITING and JUSTICE LACY join,
dissenting.
Underlying the majority’s decision to reverse this firearm conviction is the holding that “(pjossession of a firearm is an essential element of the statutory offense, and the fact that Konchal merely thought or perceived that Yarborough was armed is insufficient to prove that he actually possessed a firearm.” Because I need not, I do not defend or challenge that holding. Nevertheless, I dissent from the decision to reverse.
The record reflects the following colloquy between the trial court and counsel out of the presence of the jury:
THE COURT: Let me see your instructions.
MS. NORMAN [Attorney for the Commonwealth]: Your Honor, these were all agreed upon.
THE COURT: All right. Do you agree, Counsel?
MR. WOOLSON [Defense Counsel]: Yes. We have already been through them.
The transcript of the proceedings shows that the trial court read the instructions approved by counsel to the jury, including the following:
A firearm is any object which gives the appearance of having a capability of firing a projectile. It is not necessary that the object actually has the capability of firing a projectile. A firearm *220does not actually have to he seen by the victim to sustain a conviction of displaying a firearm and committing robbery.
Display includes not only exhibited to the sight but also that which is manifested to any of the victim’s senses, causing the victim to believe a firearm is present.
The Commonwealth’s Attorney, acknowledging in closing argument that the investigating officers were unable to find a firearm, reminded the jury that Konchal “believed that this man, that this defendant had a gun” and that “she was honest enough to tell the dispatchers, T didn’t see it. I thought he had a gun.’ ” The transcript reveals no objection to that argument.
The instructions as drafted, as counsel agreed, and as invoked by the Commonwealth’s Attorney in argument, became the law of the case. Where “two instructions were read to the jury which imposed an inappropriate standard .... [wjithout objection, these instructions became the law of this case.” Owens-Corning Fiberglas Ins. Corp. v. Watson, 243 Va. 128, 136, 413 S.E.2d 630, 635 (1992). “It is well settled that instructions given without objection become the law of the case and thereby bind the parties in the trial court and this Court on review.” Owens-Illinois v. Thomas Baker Real Estate, 237 Va. 649, 652, 379 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1989). “The instruction, given without objection, was the law of the case . . . and we will analyze the case on appeal as it was tried below.” Medical Center Hospital v. Sharpless, 229 Va. 496, 498, 331 S.E.2d 405, 406 (1985). See also Oden v. Salch, 237 Va. 525, 533, 379 S.E.2d 346, 351 (1989); Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 232 Va. 502, 509, 352 S.E.2d 311, 315 (1987); Norfolk & Portsmouth Railroad v. Barker, 221 Va. 924, 929, 275 S.E.2d 613, 616 (1981); Preston v. Land, 220 Va. 118, 120, 255 S.E.2d 509, 510 (1979); Bostic v. Whited, 198 Va. 237, 239, 93 S.E.2d 334, 335 (1956).
In effect, the majority rejects the contemporaneous objection rule, Rule 5:25, and applies the “ends of justice” exception to that rule. See Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 402 S.E.2d 678 (1991). In my view, the majority does not attain the ends of justice by ignoring the fact, conclusively established by the evidence, that Yarborough accomplished an act of robbery, an offense against the person, by word and deed deliberately designed to convince his victim that he possessed a firearm and was prepared to use it. Indeed, as this Court observed in Jimenez, “application of the rules tends to promote, not hinder, the administration of justice.” Id. at 249,402 S.E.2d at 680.
*221Application of Rule 5:25 is an application of the doctrine of waiver. We have repeatedly enforced that waiver in civil and criminal appeals, including numerous reviews of capital penalties. In Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 436, 304 S.E.2d 271, 278 (1983), a capital murder case, we applied the rule to a constitutional challenge (search and seizure) raised for the first time on appeal; accord Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 690 n.1, 251 S.E.2d 202, 207 n.1 (1979) (equal-protection challenge). And the United States Supreme Court has held that three state prisoners who had failed to comply with a state rule “mandating contemporaneous objections to jury instructions, may not challenge the constitutionality of those instructions in a federal habeas proceeding.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 110 (1982).
Rule 5:25 is designed “to protect the trial court from appeals based upon undisclosed grounds, to prevent the setting of traps on appeal, to enable the trial judge to rule intelligently, and to avoid unnecessary reversals and mistrials.” Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 414, 374 S.E.2d 46, 52 (1988) cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989). The instructions the trial judge read to this jury were fully consistent with contemporary precedent. Failure to apply Rule 5:25 in our analysis of this appeal defeats its purpose, dilutes the doctrine of waiver, overrules the law of the case, and hinders the orderly administration of justice.
In summary, the defendant failed to object to the instruction, failed to object to the Commonwealth’s argument to the jury based upon the instruction, and failed to assign error to the instruction on appeal. Accordingly, I would apply Rule 5:25 and the law of this case and affirm the judgment of the trial court and that of the Virginia Court of Appeals.