Court Opinion

ID: 9392751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 22:02:56.268217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:48.552375
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/17/23; Modified and Certified for Pub. 5/5/23 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION SEVEN

 CHILDHELP, INC.,                               B311945

   Plaintiff and Appellant,                     (Los Angeles County
                                                 Super. Ct. No. BC711998)
   v.

 CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

   Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from judgment of the Los Angeles County
Superior Court, Teresa A. Beaudet, Judge. Affirmed.
      Beitchman & Zekian, David P. Beitchman and Paul Tokar
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Michael N. Feuer and Hydee Feldstein Soto, City
Attorneys, Timothy McWilliams and Peter Walford, Deputy City
Attorneys, for Defendant and Respondent.
                        INTRODUCTION

       In 1986 Childhelp, Inc., a nonprofit corporation that
provides services to victims of child abuse, leased real property
from the City of Los Angeles. The lease provided that, in lieu of
paying rent, Childhelp would provide treatment for child abuse
victims and that after 20 years the City would consider conveying
the property to Childhelp.
       In 2014 the Los Angeles City Council passed a resolution
directing various City departments and officials to prepare and
execute the necessary approvals and agreements to convey the
property to Childhelp, in exchange for Childhelp’s agreement to
continue using the property to provide services for victims of
child abuse. Ultimately, however, the City decided not to
transfer the property to Childhelp.
       Childhelp filed this action against the City for, among other
things, declaratory relief, writ of mandate, and promissory
estoppel, and the City filed an unlawful detainer action against
Childhelp. After the trial court consolidated the two actions, the
court granted the City’s motion for summary adjudication on
Childhelp’s cause of action for promissory estoppel, sustained
without leave to amend the City’s demurrer to Childhelp’s causes
of action for declaratory relief and writ of mandate, and granted
the City’s motion for summary judgment on its unlawful detainer
complaint. Childhelp appeals from the ensuing judgment. We
affirm.

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         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

       A.    Childhelp Leases Property from the City
       Childhelp began leasing property from the City in
March 1986. Three years later, the parties entered into a three-
year lease with “the intent” that the City would “renew the lease
in increments of three (3) years for a maximum of twenty (20)
years.” The parties agreed that, instead of paying rent, Childhelp
would “use the premises for the provision of services to abused
and/or neglected children and their families and purposes
incidental thereto.” The lease also stated that, after 20 years, the
City Council would “consider conveying its interest in the
property” to Childhelp if it “satisfactorily complied with the terms
and conditions of” the lease. For the next 20 years, Childhelp
provided services as required by the lease and, after the lease
expired in 2009, continued to occupy the premises as a month-to-
month holdover tenant “upon the same terms, consideration,
covenants and conditions” in the lease.
       The City Council, as required by the lease, considered
conveying the property and in July 2014 passed a resolution
adopting recommendations by two committees to convey the
property to Childhelp. Among other things, the resolution asked
“the City Attorney to work with the Los Angeles Housing and
Community Investment Department (HCIDLA) and the
Department of General Services (GSD) to prepare and execute
the necessary agreements to convey the property” to Childhelp
and to “record a covenant to ensure the continuation of services
for victims of child abuse”; authorized “HCIDLA and GSD, with
the assistance of the City Attorney, to execute all necessary
approvals, documents, and amendments to transfer ownership of”

                                 3
the property to Childhelp; directed “GSD, City Attorney and any
other necessary departments to commence the process for a direct
sale of” the property to Childhelp; declared the property was “a
surplus asset”; directed “GSD to immediately initiate the Surplus
Property Process and conduct a Class ‘A’ appraisal”; directed “the
City Administrative Officer (CAO) to prepare a report on the
direct sale to Childhelp”; and directed “GSD, with the assistance
of the City Attorney, to take all necessary steps and prepare all
required documents to effectuate the direct sale of the Property to
Childhelp.” The resolution did not provide a timeline for the sale
or include instructions on how the various municipal entities and
officials were to complete these tasks.
       Pursuant to the resolution, GSD sent notices to City
departments informing them of the proposed sale of the
City-owned property and asking if there were any objections to
the sale. 1 Some of the letters included language stating the City
“intends to offer for possible sale the property” Childhelp was
occupying. The City obtained an appraisal, which valued the
property at $2.2 million as of January 9, 2015. In analyzing the
request to convey City-owned property at below market value,
the CAO performed a “Community Benefits Analysis,” which
compared the fair market value of the property to the value of
services Childhelp would provide to the community. After

1    GSD sent letters to, among other agencies and
departments, the Real Estate Division, Economic and Workforce
Development Department, Department of Recreation and Parks,
Department of Transportation, Fire and Police Pensions, Housing
Authority, Los Angeles River Revitalization Corporation,
Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System, Los Angeles
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Santa Monica
Mountains Conservancy, and California State Resources Agency.

                                4
completing this analysis the CAO recommended the City require
Childhelp to continue providing services at the location for 20
years. Childhelp initially objected to any such requirement and
took the position there should not be any covenant, but
eventually offered to continue providing services at the location
for “a minimum of an additional 10 years.” The parties
negotiated but never reached an agreement on the duration of a
covenant that would require Childhelp to continue providing
services to child abuse victims on the property.
       In the spring of 2016 HCIDLA became concerned about low
client enrollment at Childhelp’s facility on the property. After
the parties met in March and August 2016, HCIDLA sent
Childhelp a letter in January 2017 stating that the City had
determined Childhelp was providing minimal services at the
facility on the property and that the types of programs and
services Childhelp was providing did not comply with the terms
of the lease. In particular, HCIDLA found that Childhelp was
not putting “the City-owned leased facility to its highest and best
use in the delivery of contracted services to the low- and
moderate-income children and families of Los Angeles”; that
Childhelp was providing foster services to children in a
residential program in Beaumont, California, a Childhelp facility
in Riverside County; and that Childhelp was not conducting
foster parent training programs at the facility. HCIDLA
recommended that the City reconsider transferring the property
to Childhelp pending the outcome of the CAO’s community
benefits analysis or, in the alternative, that the City not transfer
the property because doing so “would not inure a benefit to the
community and the city of Los Angeles.” Childhelp disputed
HCIDLA’s findings Childhelp was violating the lease, and in

                                 5
June 2018 the City served Childhelp with a 30-day notice
terminating the tenancy.

       B.    Childhelp Sues the City
       Four years after the City Council passed the July 2014
resolution, the City had still not conveyed the property to
Childhelp. In July 2018 Childhelp sued the City, alleging in its
second amended complaint two causes of action for declaratory
relief (one relating to the City Council’s resolution and one
relating to the 1989 lease), one cause of action for quiet title, and
a cause of action for promissory estoppel. In its promissory
estoppel cause of action Childhelp alleged that the City made
“promises and representations [that] are contained within the
[lease] whereby the City agrees to consider transferring title to
the Property after twenty years to Childhelp” and that, “[i]n
furtherance of its promises as set forth in the [lease], on or
around July 2, 2014 the City Council determined that the
Property should be transferred and directed the City of Los
Angeles to transfer title to the Property to Childhelp.” Childhelp
alleged it reasonably relied on the City’s promises to its
detriment because for over 30 years it continued to occupy and
maintain the property. In addition, Childhelp alleged that it
refrained from looking for an alternative property “when the real
estate market in Los Angeles was not at its peak” and that, “[b]y
comparison, real estate prices have increased an average of 25%
between 2014 and 2018 in and around Los Angeles.”
       The City and Childhelp filed cross-motions for summary
judgment or in the alternative for summary adjudication on all
four causes of action in the second amended complaint. The trial
court denied Childhelp’s motion in its entirety and denied the

                                  6
City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s first and
second causes of action for declaratory relief. The court granted
the City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s third
cause of action for quiet title (a ruling Childhelp does not
challenge) and fourth cause of action for promissory estoppel. On
the promissory estoppel cause of action, the court identified two
alleged promises by the City: the promise in the lease “to
consider” transferring the property to Childhelp and the promise
in the resolution to actually transfer the property to Childhelp.
The court ruled that it was undisputed the City made these
promises (and actually considered transferring the property), but
that there were triable issues of material fact regarding
Childhelp’s reasonable reliance on the promises and its resulting
detriment. The court nevertheless granted the City’s motion for
summary adjudication on the promissory estoppel cause of action
because the court concluded that applying promissory estoppel
would contravene requirements in the Los Angeles City Charter
for the sale of real property owned by the City.
       After the trial court’s summary judgment rulings,
Childhelp amended its complaint two more times. In its fourth
and final amended complaint, Childhelp alleged three causes of
action: for declaratory relief relating to the 2014 resolution, for
declaratory relief relating to the 1989 lease, and for writ of
mandate. Regarding the declaratory relief cause of action
relating to the 2014 resolution, Childhelp alleged there was an
“actual controversy” between the parties “as to their respective
rights and interests as it applies to the Los Angeles City
Council’s July 2014 written directive . . . as it relates to title to
the Property and whether the City of Los Angeles is required to
transfer title to the Property to Childhelp . . . .” Childhelp stated

                                  7
it was seeking “a judicial determination regarding those
respective rights and interests in the ownership and title to the
Property, stemming from the July 2, 2014 City Council written
Resolution.” Regarding the declaratory relief cause of action
relating to the 1989 lease, Childhelp sought an adjudication of its
rights under the lease, including title to and ownership of the
property and the scope of services Childhelp had to provide under
the lease. Regarding its cause of action for writ of mandate,
Childhelp alleged the City failed to fulfill its “clear, mandatory
duty to comply with the July 2, 2014 Resolution which directed
the City of Los Angeles to prepare and execute the necessary
documents to transfer title to the Property to Childhelp.”
Childhelp alleged that it had no available administrative
remedies or an adequate remedy at law and that it would be
harmed if the City continued with “its ongoing eviction
proceedings and further attempts to recapture the Property.”
       The City demurred to the fourth amended complaint. The
trial court overruled the demurrer to the declaratory relief action
relating to the 1989 lease agreement and sustained without leave
to amend the demurrer to the declaratory relief action relating to
the resolution and the cause of action for writ of mandate. 2 The
court ruled the resolution could not have transferred ownership
of the property to Childhelp because the City can only transfer
City-owned property by ordinance, and Childhelp did not allege
there ever was such an ordinance. The court concluded that any
resolution, including the 2014 resolution, “that purports to sell
City property is void because sale of City property may only be
effected by ordinance” and that, because it was void, the 2014

2     Childhelp subsequently dismissed its cause of action for
declaratory relief relating to the 1989 lease agreement.

                                 8
resolution “cannot form the basis for a contractual obligation on
the part of the City to sell the Property to Childhelp.” The court
also ruled that, “in order for the acts set forth in the Resolution to
be considered purely ministerial, there had to be some language
that directed the passage of an ordinance for the sale of the
Property to Childhelp.” Because the resolution did not include
this language, the court concluded, Childhelp had not exhausted
its administrative remedies.

      C.     The City Prevails in Its Unlawful Detainer Action
      Three months after Childhelp sued the City, the City filed
an unlawful detainer action against Childhelp, alleging that the
lease had expired on March 10, 2009 and that Childhelp was a
month-to-month holdover tenant. In February 2019 the trial
court consolidated Childhelp’s action and the City’s unlawful
detainer action.
      After the trial court sustained the City’s demurrer to the
fourth amended complaint without leave to amend, the trial court
granted a motion by the City for summary judgment on its
unlawful detainer complaint. The court stated it had ruled in
favor of the City on Childhelp’s declaratory relief causes of action.
Treating the unlawful detainer action as alleging a cause of
action for ejectment, the court ruled the City, as the owner of title
to the property, demonstrated a superior right to possession.
      On March 29, 2021 the trial court entered judgment in the
consolidated action. Childhelp timely appealed. 3

3    Childhelp mistakenly checked the box on the notice of
appeal stating it was appealing from an order after judgment.
There were no postjudgment orders between the March 29, 2021

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                          DISCUSSION

      A.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the City’s
            Demurrer to Childhelp’s Causes of Action for
            Declaratory Relief and Petition for Writ of Mandate

            1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. (City
of Coronado v. San Diego Assn. of Governments (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 21, 35.) “In an appeal from a judgment following
an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, we first
review de novo ‘whether the complaint states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.’” (Jane Doe No. 1 v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 410, 419; see City of
Oakland v. Oakland Raiders (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 458, 472.)
“‘“[W]e accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint,
but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. We
also consider matters that may be judicially noticed.”’” (City of
Coronado, at p. 35; see City of Oakland, at p. 472.)

judgment and the April 1, 2021 notice of appeal. We liberally
construe the notice of appeal to be from the March 29, 2021
judgment. (See K.J. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020) 8
Cal.5th 875, 882 [“‘“notices of appeal are to be liberally construed
so as to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what
[the] appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the
respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced”’”];
Ellis Law Group, LLP v. Nevada City Sugar Loaf Properties, LLC
(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 244, 251 [checking the wrong box on a
notice of appeal “is not fatal to the appeal”].)

                                10
       We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
(Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 857.) The same is true
for local ordinances and municipal codes (Tran v. County of Los
Angeles (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 154, 162) and city charters (Sieg v.
Fogt (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 77, 88).
       “If the court sustained the demurrer without leave to
amend, . . . we must decide whether there is a reasonable
possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect with an amendment.
[Citation.] If we find that an amendment could cure the defect,
we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and we
reverse; if not, no abuse of discretion has occurred. [Citation.]
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that an amendment
would cure the defect.” (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003)
31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; see Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1081, 1100.) “‘“While such a showing can be made for
the first time to the reviewing court [citation], it must be made.”’”
(Nealy v. County of Orange (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 594, 608.)

             2. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the
                City’s Demurrer to Childhelp’s Cause of Action for
                Declaratory Relief
       Section 1060 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “Any
person interested under a written instrument . . . or who desires
a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to
another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property . . . may, in
cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties
of the respective parties, bring an original action . . . for a
declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises,
including a determination of any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument . . . .” To allege facts

                                 11
sufficient to state a cause of action for declaratory relief, the
plaintiff must allege “two essential elements: ‘(1) a proper
subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy
involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or
obligations of a party.’” (Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527,
546.)
       “It is the general rule that in an action for declaratory relief
the complaint is sufficient if it sets forth facts showing the
existence of an actual controversy relating to the legal rights and
duties of the respective parties . . . and requests that the rights
and duties be adjudged. [Citation.] If these requirements are
met, the court must declare the rights of the parties whether or
not the facts alleged establish that the plaintiff is entitled to a
favorable declaration.” (Bennett v. Hibernia Bank (1956)
47 Cal.2d 540, 549-550; accord, Nede Mgmt. Inc. v. Aspen
American Ins. Co. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1130-1131.)
“‘[A] general demurrer is usually not an appropriate method for
testing the merits of a declaratory relief action, because the
plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of rights even if it is adverse
to the plaintiff’s interest.’” (Qualified Patients Assn. v. City of
Anaheim (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 734, 751.)
       Nevertheless, “a trial court may properly sustain a general
demurrer to a declaratory relief action without leave to amend
when . . . the controversy presented can be determined as a
matter of law.” (City of Fresno v. California Highway Com.
(1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 687, 699; see Nede Mgmt. Inc. v. Aspen
American Ins. Co., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1131 [court may
sustain a demurrer to a declaratory relief cause of action “when it
is clear the plaintiff seeks a declaration of rights to which he or
she is not legally entitled”]; Jefferson, Inc. v. Torrance (1968)

                                  12
266 Cal.App.2d 300, 303 [“where a complaint sets forth a good
cause of action for declaratory relief regarding only a disputed
question of law, declarations on the merits unfavorable to a
plaintiff have been upheld although such determinations were
made in the form of a judgment sustaining a demurrer”].)
Allowing the plaintiff to proceed on a cause of action for
declaratory relief “can often lead to a waste of court and litigant
resources when it is clear the plaintiff seeks a declaration of
rights to which he or she is not legally entitled. It would seem
unnecessary to reverse a judgment sustaining a demurrer simply
because an ‘actual controversy’ has been alleged. [Citation.]
Although the sustaining of the demurrer might be technically
incorrect, reversing ‘would merely provoke further appellate
recourse since the record discloses that the trial court dismissed
the case on the merits and the legal issues are clearly presented
by the pleadings.’” (Nede Mgmt., at p. 1131.) 4
      Childhelp contends it alleged an actual controversy
between the parties about whether the City Council’s resolution
required the City to transfer the property to Childhelp. The City
argues the resolution did not transfer and could not have
transferred title of the property to Childhelp as a matter of law
because the resolution did not meet the requirements in the City
Charter to sell City-owned property.
      The City is a charter city (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 3; L.A. City
Charter, § 100.) with “‘maximum allowable control over [its]

4     Childhelp does not argue the trial court erred in sustaining
the City’s demurrer to the cause of action for declaratory relief
because such a cause of action is not subject to demurrer.

                                 13
municipal affairs,’” including the power to enter into contracts.
(Michael Leslie Productions, Inc. v. City of Angeles (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1021, 144; see First Street Plaza Partners
v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 650, 661 (First Street
Plaza Partners).) “It is well settled that when a municipal
charter contains an express limitation upon the mode in which
the city may contract, the city is bound only by contracts executed
in accordance with the charter provisions; in other words, where
the statute provides the only mode by which the power to
contract shall be exercised, the mode is the measure of the
power.” (Dynamic Industries Co. v. Long Beach (1958)
159 Cal.App.2d 294, 298-299; see Domar Electric, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles (1994) 9 Cal.4th 161, 171 [“a charter city may not act
in conflict with its charter,” and any “act that is violative of or not
in compliance with the charter is void”]; Los Angeles Dredging Co.
v. City of Long Beach (1930) 210 Cal. 348, 353 [“the mode of
contracting, as prescribed by the municipal charter, is the
measure of the power to contract; and a contract made in
disregard of the prescribed mode is unenforceable”].) Thus, the
City can only enter into a binding contract in a way that complies
with the City Charter. (See First Street Plaza Partners, at
p. 671.)
       The City Charter and the City’s Administrative Code
prescribe the procedures for selling City-owned property.
Section 385 of the City Charter, titled “Sale of City Property,”
states in relevant part, “Any real or personal property owned by
the City that is no longer needed may, subject to the limitations
elsewhere prescribed in the Charter, be sold under terms and
conditions prescribed by ordinance.” Section 370 of the City
Charter requires that “[e]very contract involving consideration

                                  14
reasonably valued at more than an amount specified by
ordinance shall . . . be made in writing, or other manner as
provided by ordinance,” and signed by the mayor or other
authorized personnel. Section 370 provides that the City “shall
not be, and is not, bound by any contract unless it complies with
the requirements of this section and all other applicable
requirements of the Charter.”
       The Administrative Code prescribes the procedure for
selling real property the City no longer needs. Among other
requirements, various City departments must submit
recommendations to the City Council, including the CAO’s
opinion on the propriety of the sale and GSD’s recommendation
on minimum sale price. (L.A. Admin. Code, § 7.22,
subds. (a) & (d).) The Administrative Code generally requires
that “every contract involving consideration reasonably valued at
more than $5,000 . . . shall be made in writing or other manner as
provided by ordinance” and approved by the City Attorney as to
form. (L.A. Admin. Code, § 10.2.)
       Childhelp sought a declaration that the 2014 resolution,
without more, transferred the property. But more was required
to sell City property. Childhelp did not allege, nor can it allege,
the City complied with the requirements in the City Charter and
Administrative Code for contracting and selling real property.
There is no ordinance prescribing the terms and conditions of the
sale or a written contract signed by the mayor or other
authorized personnel and approved by the City Attorney. Nor
does Childhelp claim there is. Instead, acknowledging the sale of
City-owned property requires an ordinance, Childhelp argues
that, “[e]ven if [the] City is required to enact an ordinance which
complies with the terms of the Resolution after it acts as directed

                                15
in the Resolution, Childhelp is not precluded from alleging a
declaratory relief claim regarding the actions that the City is
required to take to effectuate the transfer of the Property.” That,
however, was not the relief Childhelp sought in its fourth
amended complaint. As discussed, Childhelp sought a
declaration the City had to transfer title to the property, not a
declaration of the actions the City needed to take to effectuate
the transfer of title.
       And the 2014 resolution was not enough. As the court
explained in San Diego City Firefighters, Local 145 v. Board of
Administration Etc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 594, there is a
“substantial difference between a resolution and an ordinance:
[A] resolution. . . is ordinarily not equivalent to an ordinance.
A resolution is usually a mere declaration with respect to future
purpose or proceedings. . . . An ordinance is a local law which is
adopted with all the legal formality of a statute. A resolution
adopted without the formality required of an ordinance cannot be
deemed an ordinance. Resolution denotes something less formal.
It is the mere expression of the opinion of the legislative body
concerning some administrative matter for the disposition of
which it provides. Ordinarily it is of a temporary character,
while an ordinance prescribes a permanent rule of conduct or of
government.” (Id. at pp. 607-608, internal quotation marks and
citations omitted.) The City’s resolution was not an ordinance or
a contract. (See City of Brentwood v. Department of Finance
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 418, 434 [“resolutions are not
agreements”].) Childhelp’s declaratory relief cause of action fails
as a matter of law. 5

5     Childhelp does not argue the trial court abused its
discretion in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.

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            3.        The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the
                      City’s Demurrer to Childhelp’s Cause of Action
                      for Writ of Mandate
       “A writ of mandate may be issued by any court . . . to
compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins,
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station . . . .” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a); see City of Dinuba v. County of
Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 868.) “In order to obtain writ relief,
a party must establish ‘“(1) A clear, present and usually
ministerial duty on the part of the respondent . . .; and (2) a clear,
present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance
of that duty . . . .”’” (City of Dinuba, at p. 868; see Bull Field,
LLC v. Merced Irrigation Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 442,
451-452.) “A ministerial act is one that a public functionary is
required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to his or her own
judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of such act.”
(Collins v. Thurmond (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 879, 914, internal
quotation marks omitted; see Monterey Coastkeeper v. Central
Coast Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
1, 19.)
       Mandate, however, “‘will not issue if the duty is . . . mixed
with discretionary power.’” (Coast Community College Dist. v.
Commission on State Mandates (2022) 13 Cal.5th 800, 815.)
Even if “‘“mandatory language appears in [a] statute creating a
duty, the duty is discretionary if the [public entity] must exercise
significant discretion to perform the duty.”’” (Grosz v. California
Department of Tax & Fee Administration (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
428; see AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County
Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701;

                                 17
Sonoma Ag Art v. Department of Food & Agriculture (2004)
125 Cal.App.4th 122, 127.) Whether a statute or ordinance (or,
here, a resolution) imposes “a ministerial duty, for which
mandamus will lie, or a mere obligation to perform a
discretionary function is a question of statutory interpretation.”
(California Public Records Research, Inc. v. County of Yolo (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 150, 178; see Lateef v. City of Madera (2020)
45 Cal.App.5th 245, 253 [“The rules of statutory construction
applicable to statutes are also applicable to municipal
ordinances.”]; County of Humboldt v. McKee (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 1476, 1489 [“[t]he interpretation of local
ordinances and resolutions is subject to ordinary rules of
statutory construction”].) In the context of a request for
“mandamus relief, where statutory interpretation is required, the
question of whether an agency has an enforceable ministerial
duty under a local ordinance is treated as an issue of law, subject
to de novo review.” (Anthony v. Snyder (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th
643, 659.)
      Childhelp sought a writ of mandate compelling the City
“to prepare and execute the necessary documents to transfer title
to the Property to Childhelp,” as stated in the resolution. Among
other things, the resolution instructed the City Attorney to work
with several municipal departments to prepare and execute the
necessary documentation to convey the property to Childhelp and
to record a covenant that would ensure Childhelp continued to
use the property to provide services to victims of child abuse. The
resolution also directed various other departments and officers to
analyze and report on the proposed sale and prepare additional
documentation.

                                18
       The tasks described in the resolution were not ministerial.
“A discretionary act requires ‘“‘personal deliberation, decision and
judgment,’”’ whereas a ministerial act consists of performing
‘“‘a duty in which the officer is left no choice of his own.’”’” (Roger
v. County of Riverside (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 510, 528.) Although
the resolution directed certain City officers and departments to
take certain actions, it did not specify how these actions should
be carried out. (See AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles
County Dept. of Public Health, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 702
[writ relief was not available where, though the statute generally
directed health officers to prevent the spread of contagious
diseases, it was “unlikely that the Legislature intended for the
health officer’s mandatory duty to be carried out in a specific
manner”].) For example, as discussed, one of the most significant
terms of the proposed sale of the property was a covenant that
would require Childhelp to continue providing services to victims
of child abuse. But the resolution did not specify the nature or
length of this covenant, and the parties never reached an
agreement on this term. The resolution’s silence on this key
point delegated the issue to various officers and departments to
determine and propose (for the CAO, in a report) a suitable
duration. (See L.A. Admin. Code, § 7.22, subd. (d) [“In cases
involving the direct sale of surplus City-owned property . . . the
City Administrative Officer shall review the proposed direct sale
and recommend to the Council upon its propriety.”].) In
preparing a recommendation, the CAO would necessarily have to
exercise “personal deliberation, decision and judgment.” 6

6     Although not relevant at the pleading stage, the evidence
at summary judgment was that the CAO, after analyzing the fair

                                  19
       Transdyn/Cresci JV v. City and County of San Francisco
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 746, relied on by Childhelp, involved a very
different situation. In that case the Public Utilities Commission
of the City and County of San Francisco passed a resolution
awarding the plaintiff a contract to monitor San Francisco’s
water supply, but the general manager of the Public Utilities
Department failed to sign the contract. The court concluded the
city “exercised its discretionary, executive function when the
[Public Utilities] Commission approved [the plaintiff’s] bid and
awarded the contract to [the plaintiff] by resolution. Once the
contract was awarded,” the city “was not free to revoke the
contract absent legal grounds for recission. [Citation.] At that
point in time the executive function was exhausted,” and the
general manager’s “duty to sign the contract became ministerial.”
(Id. at p. 758.) Here, unlike the situation in Transdyn/Cresci JV,
where the municipality had awarded the contract and the only
action remaining was for the general manager to sign it (id. at
pp. 749-750, 758), when the City Council passed the resolution
there was no contract, or even agreement on key terms. Many
tasks remained, including preparing the recommendations,
reports, and contracts, all of which required discretionary work
on the part of various City officials and personnel. And after

market value of the property and the value of the services
Childhelp had been providing to the community, recommended a
covenant of at least 20 years.

                               20
that, as the trial court correctly pointed out, the City had to pass
an ordinance approving the sale. 7

      B.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the City’s
            Motion for Summary Adjudication on Childhelp’s
            Cause of Action for Promissory Estoppel

             1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       “A court may grant a motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication ‘only when “all the papers submitted show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”’” (Doe
v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 657, 668; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c);
Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018)
4 Cal.5th 607, 618.) “A defendant moving for summary
adjudication of a cause of action must show that one or more
elements cannot be established or that there is a complete
defense.” (Clark v. Superior Court (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 289,
298; see Regents, at p. 618; Mattei v. Corporate Management
Solutions, Inc. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 116, 122.) We review an
order granting a motion for summary adjudication de novo (Jacks
v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 273) and “decide
independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute

7     To the extent Childhelp sought a writ of mandate
compelling the City to transfer the property, as discussed the
resolution did not meet the City Charter requirements for selling
City-owned property. Childhelp does not argue it could have
amended or can amend its writ of mandate cause of action.

                                 21
warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law”
(Mattei, at p. 122; see Regents, at p. 618).

              2. Childhelp Cannot Rely on Promissory Estoppel To
                 Compel the City To Act Contrary to Its Charter
       “[U]nder the doctrine of promissory estoppel, ‘[a] promise
which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.’”
(Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 310; accord,
Flintco Pacific, Inc. v. TEC Management Consultants, Inc. (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 727, 733.) “Promissory estoppel is ‘a doctrine
which employs equitable principles to satisfy the requirement
that consideration must be given in exchange for the promise
sought to be enforced.’” (Kajima/Ray, at p. 310.) “‘The elements
of a promissory estoppel claim are “(1) a promise clear and
unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the
promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and
foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be
injured by [that party’s] reliance.”’” (Broome v. Regents of
University of California (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 375, 389.)
       In its cause of action for promissory estoppel, Childhelp
alleged that it relied on promises by the City in the lease and the
resolution that the City would convey the property and that the
City induced Childhelp not to look for other, affordable
properties. The City moved for summary adjudication on
Childhelp’s promissory estoppel cause of action, arguing, among
other things, allowing Childhelp to assert promissory estoppel

                                22
against the City would be contrary to the contracting
requirements in the City Charter and the Administrative Code.
The trial court agreed with the City and granted the motion.
       “Promissory estoppel cannot be asserted against a public
entity to bypass rules that require contracts to be in writing or be
put out for bids, rules which reflect a public policy to preclude
oral contracts or other exposures to liability, including claims of
promissory estoppel.” (Ponte v. County of Calaveras (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 551, 556; see Poway Royal Mobilehome Owners
Assn. v. City of Poway (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1476
[“promissory estoppel may not be raised against a public entity
when it would defeat the public policy of requiring adherence to
statutory procedures for entering into contracts”]; First Street
Plaza Partners, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 669 [“No case has
ever held that a city may be bound to a contract by estoppel.”];
Dynamic Industries Co. v. Long Beach, supra, 159 Cal.App.2d at
p. 299 [“When the charter provision has not been complied with,
the city may not be held liable in quasi contract, and it will not be
estopped to deny the validity of the contract.”]; see also
Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Auth., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 316 [“‘neither the
doctrine of estoppel nor any other equitable principle may be
invoked against a governmental body where it would operate to
defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the
public’”]; Parmar v. Board of Equalization (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th
705, 717 [“‘“[t]he general rule is that estoppels will not be invoked
against the government or its agencies except in rare and
unusual circumstances”’”].)
       The parties did not dispute that the City was a charter city,
that the reasonable value of the property exceeded $5,000, that

                                 23
the City Attorney had not approved the form of any agreement to
sell the property, or that the City had not passed an ordinance or
entered into a written contract to sell the property to Childhelp. 8
Even assuming the resolution included a promise to transfer the
property to the City, such a promise was unenforceable because
the evidence was undisputed the City had not passed an
ordinance or prepared a written contract that met the charter
requirements to sell City-owned property. (See Baldwin v. City of
Los Angeles (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 819, 827, fn. 1 [“‘The Charter
of the City of Los Angeles plainly mandates [in Section 385] that
a city contract of the type involved here must be signed by the
mayor, be approved by the city council, and be approved as to
form by the city attorney.’”].)
       First Street Plaza Partners, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th 650, is
instructive. In that case the developers and the city engaged in
lengthy and elaborate negotiations over the development of a
parcel of land owned by the city. The parties, however, never
completed the procedures for contracting prescribed by the city’s
charter, and the city subsequently decided not to proceed with
the project. (Id. at p. 658.) The developers sued the city,
asserting the city was equitably estopped from denying the
parties had a contract. (Id. at p. 654.) In affirming an order
granting the city’s motion for summary judgment, the court in
First Street Plaza Partners acknowledged that the plaintiffs
presented “a case with sympathetic appeal,” but held that the
provisions of the city’s charter, “which itemize[d] specific steps

8      The City’s undisputed material fact No. 9 stated: “There
[was] no written agreement(s) between Childhelp and City for the
transfer of the Property to Childhelp.” Childhelp disputed this
fact, but only by citing the 2014 resolution.

                                24
necessary for that city to enter into a contract,” could not be
satisfied by implication or by other means and that, absent
compliance with the city charter’s contracting requirements, the
city could not be “equitably estopped from denying that a contract
has been formed.” (Ibid.)
       Childhelp had occupied the property for almost 30 years
and had an expectation it would eventually own the property.
The 2014 resolution certainly suggested the City was seriously
considering selling the property to Childhelp. But it was
undisputed the parties never completed the transaction in
accordance with the City Charter. While Childhelp cites cases
reciting general principles of promissory estoppel, it does not cite
any cases where the plaintiff successfully invoked promissory
estoppel against a municipality in these circumstances. The trial
court did not err in granting the City’s motion for summary
adjudication on Childhelp’s promissory estoppel cause of action.

      C.     The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the City’s
             Motion for Summary Judgment on Its Unlawful
             Detainer Complaint
       Childhelp’s contention the trial court erred in granting the
City’s motion for summary judgment on its unlawful detainer
complaint rests solely on Childhelp’s contentions the trial court
erred in granting the City’s motion for summary adjudication on
Childhelp’s promissory estoppel cause of action and in sustaining
the City’s demurrer to Childhelp’s causes of action for declaratory
relief and writ of mandate. Because those arguments lack merit,
and Childhelp makes no other argument, the trial court did not
err in granting the City’s motion for summary judgment on its
unlawful detainer complaint.

                                25
                        DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed. The City is to recover its costs
on appeal.

                                    SEGAL, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             ESCALANTE, J. *

*     Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

                               26
Filed 5/5/23
                     CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                       SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION SEVEN

 CHILDHELP, INC.,                              B311945

   Plaintiff and Appellant,                    (Los Angeles County
                                               Super. Ct. No. BC711998)

   v.
                                              ORDER MODIFYING AND
                                              CERTIFYING OPINION FOR
 CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
                                              PUBLICATION;
                                              NO CHANGE IN APPELLATE
        Defendant and Respondent.
                                              JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

      The opinion filed on April 17, 2023 and not certified for publication is
modified as follows:

        1. On page 1, change the title of counsel of record, Timothy
           McWilliams, from Deputy City Attorney to Managing Assistant City
           Attorney.

        2. On page 2, first paragraph, line 2, change the word “provided” to
           “stated,” so that the sentence reads:

      The lease stated that, in lieu of paying rent, Childhelp would provide
treatment for child abuse victims and that after 20 years the City would
consider conveying the property to Childhelp.

                                        1
        3. On page 2, third paragraph, delete the sentence “We affirm,” which
           is the last sentence in that paragraph.

        4. On page 2, after third paragraph, add the following paragraph:

       We affirm: Childhelp did not allege facts sufficient to state a cause of
action for declaratory relief because the resolution passed by the City
Council, without an ordinance, did not transfer title to Childhelp; Childhelp
was not entitled to a writ of mandate directing the City to complete the sale
of the property because the resolution did not create a ministerial duty to sell
the property; and Childhelp cannot rely on promissory estoppel to avoid the
City’s requirements for entering into contracts.

      The opinion filed April 17, 2023 was not certified for publication.
Because the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), respondent’s request for publication
under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a) is granted.

      IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED the opinion meets the standards for
publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and

      ORDERED that the words “Not to be Published in the Official Reports”
appearing on page 1 of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be
published in the Official Reports.

        This order does not change the appellate judgment.

PERLUSS, P. J.                          SEGAL, J.                          ESCALANTE, J. *

*       Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                                 2