Court Opinion

ID: 9663796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:51:14.032433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:56.788981
License: Public Domain

T. G. Kavanagh, P. J.
(dissenting). “Will a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity insure the defendant of immediate release without further treatment in an institution?” asked the jury.
, “I am sorry, I cannot answer this question,” responded the trial court.
For the reasons set forth in the opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Lyles v. United States (1957), 103 App DC 22 (254 F2d 725) and Gatlin v. United States (1957), 102 App DC 127 (251 F2d 368), the court should have answered the question by quoting the statute applicable to that circumstance (CL 1948, § 766.15c [Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.933(3)]).
The case of People v. Warner, supra, cited in the majority opinion correctly states the law as to punishment for a crime, but that is not what the jury asked.
Equating the provisions of the cited statute with punishment is a totally repulsive concept. As said by the supreme court of Nevada in Kuk v. State (1964), 80 Nev 291, 300 (392 P2d 630, 634):
*259“A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity means neither freedom nor punishment. It does mean that the accused will be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill until he has recovered his sanity and will not, in the reasonable future, be dangerous to himself or others.”
My Brother’s suggestion that “post-verdict consequences should not enter into the jurors’ deliberations” expresses a lofty ideal to which we may all subscribe. It is ingenuous, however, to suppose that anticipated consequences do not enter jurors’ deliberations and to base a rule of law on such supposition is dangerous.
To do a little evil to accomplish a great good is a temptation as old as Eve. To find an innocent person guilty to protect society, alas, may appear to some as a fair bargain, but it is the old temptation nonetheless.
Here the fear in the mind of the jury stands stark in its question. The virtue of its verdict could not have been assured without instruction in the law to allay that fear and to permit deliberation in confidence based on knowledge.
To refuse the requested information and to accept this verdict so tainted is a miscarriage of justice.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.