Court Opinion

ID: 9547565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:48:59.952615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:51.634707
License: Public Domain

OAKS, Justice
(concurring):
I concur in the Court’s opinion, but believe that instead of reserving judgment on the effect of plaintiffs “failure to mitigate damages,” this Court should give guidance on how the district court should handle the issue of apportionment of damages on the new trial.
Our comparative negligence statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-37, only applies to negligence “resulting in death or in injury to person or property....” The “resulting ... injury” referred to in this section is the accident, in this case the fire. Consequently, as the main opinion holds, only negligence that caused the fire is properly compared under the statute.
Negligence that only contributed to the harm, detriment, or loss sustained by reason of the accident is also relevant and should be given effect before money damages are finally apportioned. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 465 comment c (1965). In the context of our comparative negligence statute, this requires a two-step process, as follows:
First, the negligence of plaintiff and defendant that resulted in the accident are compared, in the manner and with the effect specified in § 78-27-37. That is, the trier of fact determines the amount of damages the plaintiff would be allowed to recover (independent of damages caused by his failure to mitigate or avoid damages), and that amount is then “diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence [in causing the accident] attributable to the [plaintiff].” This step exhausts the effect of the comparative negligence statute.
Second, the amount of damages the plaintiff would be allowed to recover under the first step is subjected to a further reduction dictated by the common-law rule of mitigation of damages or what the Restatement calls “the damages rule as to avoidable consequences _” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 465 comment c (1965). This reduction, on which the defendant has the burden of proof, applies *733where the plaintiff is found to have been negligent in failing to mitigate or avoid damages and where this negligence is found to have increased his total damages beyond what he would have suffered if he had not been negligent in this manner. The reduction under this step is the percentage of the total damages that is attributable to plaintiffs negligence in failing to mitigate or avoid damages.
The two-step process specified here is the one described and applied by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Halvorson v. Voeller, N.D., 336 N.W.2d 118 (1983), a well-reasoned opinion to which reference is made for further discussion. The process is illustrated in that court’s example, quoted in the footnote.1

. Assume: X driving a car, and Y, driving a motorcycle, get in an accident. Y is not wearing a helmet. The jury finds X is 60 percent liable for causing the accident [the "injury” under § 78-27-37], making Y, the motorcyclist, 40 percent liable for causing the accident. The jury also finds Y would have avoided 60 percent of his injuries [damages] if he had worn a helmet; X is 40 percent liable for causing Y’s [damages]. Y proves |100,000 in damages.
On the basis of these findings, the $100,000 award should be reduced by 40 percent, which accounts for Y’s contributing to the cause of the accident. Hence, the award is diminished to $60,000.
The $60,000 should now be reduced to the extent that Y’s [damages] would have been [avoided] had he worn a helmet, i.e., 60 percent. This adjustment leaves a total award of $24,000.
Id. at 121-22 n. 2.