Court Opinion

ID: 9704733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:44:32.074615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:04.625592
License: Public Domain

MacKenzie, P.J.
(dissenting in part). I concur with the majority except I would affirm the trial court in all respects. I agree with the trial court that the activity in question was not "inherently dangerous” as a matter of law. Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91; 220 NW2d 641 (1974).
While this Court has indicated that inherent dangerousness is a jury question, see Dowell v General Telephone Co of Michigan, 85 Mich App 84; 270 NW2d 711 (1978), lv den 405 Mich 803 (1979), and Warren v McLouth Steel Corp, 111 Mich App 496; 314 NW2d 666 (1981), lv den 417 Mich 941 (1982), that logic seems to directly contradict the holding in Funk. I would conclude that the trial court did not err by deciding that the inherent dangerousness question is one of law, at least in a case like this, which is a common slip and fall.
In 3 Restatement, Torts, 2d, § 520, p 36, which has been cited by this Court in Locke v Mach, 115 Mich App 191, 195; 320 NW2d 70 (1982), this theory of liability was explained:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) Inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
*304(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
Comment:
b. Distinguished from negligence. The rule stated in § 519 is applicable from an activity that is carried on with all reasonable care, and that is of such utility that the risk which is involved in it cannot be regarded as so great or so unreasonable as to make it negligence merely to carry on the activity at all. (See § 282). If the utility of the activity does not justify the risk it creates, it may be negligence merely to carry it on, and the rule stated in this Section is not then necessary to subject the defendant to liability for harm resulting from it. [Emphasis added.]
The trial court did not find such an inherently dangerous activity here, stating:
Now, having said that much, the question then becomes that this is a matter for the court. What is it in the case at bar? First of all, Funk v General Motor [sic] said that the risk of slip and fall was not a case of inherently dangerous activity, and a case where the potential of injury was death.
The risk here is one faced by all of mankind, everyday in some degree or another and that is the risk to limb occasioned by putting the feet on areas where they won’t be supported, stepping on a roller skate, falling downstairs, stepping off of a curb, stepping into a pothole, falling into a ditch and I guess Funk v General Motor [sic] would say falling into a hole in the roof, which are not the inherently dangerous activities] contemplated. . . .
*305In my view, the trial court’s decision was correct. While it may seem contradictory to some of this Court’s cases, it is in accord with the views of the Supreme Court as espoused in Funk. Reversal is not warranted on this ground.