Court Opinion

ID: 9752880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:42:12.409847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:24.534281
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
concurring.
The Court vacates defendant’s death sentence and remands for resentencing. It bases its reversal on the inadequacy of the voir dire and expresses disapproval of the trial court’s refusal to list separately for the jury the mitigating factors under the catch-all factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c)(5)(h) (c(5)(h)). I agree that the inadequate voir dire here requires reversal, and would add that failure to list separately the mitigating factors under c(5)(h) independently requires reversal. However; unlike the plurality, I would state specifically that individual listing of mitigating factors under c(5)(h) is constitutionally required. I would further base reversal of this sentence in part on the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on intoxication during the penalty phase. In addition, I continue to believe that our death-penalty statute is unconstitutional as enacted, interpreted, and applied, see, e.g., State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 214-15, 586 A.2d 85 (1991) (Handler, J., dissenting); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 188-90, 548 A.2d 887 (1988) (Handler, J., dissenting), thus providing further grounds for vacating this death sentence.
*59I
One additional issue, brushed aside by the Court, merits attention and serves as an independent ground for reversal. Defense counsel’s actions at trial — particularly his dehumanizing presentation of defendant during summation and his reliance on a five-year-old videotape for key mitigating evidence— deprived defendant of the effective assistance of counsel.
A
During his summation, defense counsel repeatedly argued that the jury should vote to spare defendant’s life so that medical research could be performed on defendant in an effort to develop a cure for anti-social personality disorder with paranoid traits. At one point he urged:
Suppose, if he [defendant] lives, he’s studied and this is the person here that produces that miracle drug for adults. This is society's chance to do that, by keeping him alive, not by killing him. What do we gain by killing him? If we can keep him alive and study him, right, he is the opidimy [sic] of the person who should be kept alive____ You are never going to find a better subject person and you are never going to find I submit to you a subject person who has had records going back to 1963, that they can use, clinically, to study him with____ If he had AIDS, and he could have the cure for AIDS in his body, would you kill him?____ [W]ould anybody here hesitate to say ... save him, keep him alive as long as you can. What’s the difference?
Counsel returned to that theme throughout the summation. Perhaps most astonishingly, counsel concluded thusly:
I tel! you this, you have a human life here, a life that has had no value up until this day, but it’s still a human life____ But more importantly than that, you have a human life that may save many other lives. (Emphasis added.)
A defense lawyer’s function at the sentencing phase is to create a portrait of the defendant that convinces the jury, that defendant deserves to live. State v. Oglesby, 122 N.J. 522, 545, 585 A.2d 916 (1991) (Handler, J., concurring). I believe that counsel here betrayed his function by characterizing defendant as someone completely devoid of worth as a human being. Counsel’s summation dehumanized defendant, essentially portraying him as lacking any human virtue and inviting the jury to view defendant as a guinea pig, his only socially acceptable state. In so doing, counsel distanced himself from his client, *60communicating to the jury the irremediable repugnance of defendant. He conceded that defendant did not deserve the jury’s sympathy. To the extent that counsel had theretofore presented a meritorious case in mitigation, that case was shattered when counsel acknowledged that defendant did not deserve to live.
The summation constituted a complete capitulation to the State’s position. It conceded that defendant did not deserve to live, but urged the jury to spare him to use for the benefit of others. The Supreme Court’s recent capital punishment jurisprudence has striven to develop “a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the individual.” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 869, 874, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 (1982). “[T]he fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961 (1976) (citation omitted). Defense counsel repudiated that “fundamental respect for humanity” and denied the “uniqueness” of defendant in his summation.
In addition, defense counsel’s presentation was irresponsible and arbitrary. Even if he legitimately could have argued that defendant’s life should be spared so that he could serve as a testing ground for an experimental drug, there was absolutely no factual basis to support that argument. There was no testimony that any drug had been or could have been developed to treat defendant’s disorder; there was no evidence that defendant would consent to such testing or could be compelled to submit to it; and there was no evidence that the State would condone such experimentation or would use defendant for such undefined research. The risk that defense counsel’s bizarre theory would strike the jury as pure conjecture, if not wholly ridiculous, cannot be discounted. An attorney who treats his *61client’s life as a mockery cannot expect a jury to treat it with dignity.
In State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 519 A.2d 336 (1987), this Court adopted, with slight modification, the standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). This Court held that “a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of reasonably competent counsel, and that if counsel’s performance has been so deficient as to create a reasonable probability that these deficiencies materially contributed to defendant’s conviction, the constitutional right will have been violated.” Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 58, 519 A.2d 336.
I have urged this Court to adopt more stringent standards of review of attorney competence in capital cases. See, e.g., State v. Oglesby, supra, 122 N.J. at 543-45, 585 A.2d 916 (Handler, J., concurring); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 644-47, 577 A.2d 455 (1990) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 402-13, 561 A.2d 1082 (1989) (Handler, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). I need not restate that position. Even under the Court’s lenient Strickland-Fritz standard, however, defense counsel’s conduct indisputably rose to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. He denied that his client had intrinsic dignity as a human being. See Handler, Individual Worth, 17 Hofstra L.Rev. 493 (1989). He utterly dehumanized his client, thereby effectively abandoning him. He may well have convinced the jury that defendant had no worth as a human being and deserved to die, precisely the opposite of what capital counsel are duty bound to do. There can be no doubt that defendant suffered prejudice because of his attorney's devastating remarks.
B
As noted by the Court, at resentencing defense counsel relied on a five-year-old videotape of testimony of a psychiatric expert *62witness, Dr. Eshkenazi, made during the original sentencing trial. Ante at 54-57, 594 A.2d at 200-201. The majority concedes that defendant’s arguments that reliance on this videotape constituted ineffective assistance of counsel “have some theoretical appeal.” Ante at 55, 594 A.2d at 200.
Defense counsel’s seeming decision to rely on the videotape, rather than conduct any new investigation in preparation for this retrial, deprived defendant of competent representation. Although defense counsel had used the videotape successfully in a previous capital trial for the murder of William Ward, that trial occurred five years before this sentencing proceeding, shortly after the original trial and sentencing in this case. Furthermore, although the videotape had been used successfully in the Ward trial, Eshkenazi’s testimony had failed to persuade the jury in the first trial for the murder of Anna Olesiewicz.
Although whether counsel conducted any new investigation prior to the resentencing proceedings is unclear from the record, he indicated in papers submitted to the trial court before the proceeding that he planned to rely solely on the videotape. Defense counsel told the jury he was relying on the videotape for “expediency.” There is no indication in the record, however, that defense counsel sought to arrange or change court dates so that Eshkenazi would be able to testify in person. Also, defense counsel never intimated prior to the resentencing that lack of funds had prevented him from calling Eshkenazi to testify in person, nor did counsel request prior to the resentencing that the trial court authorize payment for Eshkenazi as an expert witness. Indeed, defense counsel never challenged, prior to the subject proceeding, the earlier denial of State funds for a psychiatric evaluation. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (if sanity is likely to be significant issue at trial, State must provide defendant with access to psychiatrist if defendant cannot afford one).
*63As a consequence, there is no evidence that defense counsel investigated or determined prior to resentencing whether a new psychiatric evaluation, either by Eshkenazi or by some other expert, would benefit defendant’s sentencing defense. The inference arises that defense counsel did not make any effort to uncover new evidence or “update” existing evidence of defendant’s psychiatric condition at the time of the crime.
That defense counsel made no effort to investigate the possibility of other mitigating factors, or to develop any other evidence of mitigating factors or evidence to counter the State’s alleged aggravating factors, also seems apparent. The record reveals nothing defense counsel did to mount a defense to the death sentence, except to rely on the videotape. That is inexcusable. See State v. Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 626, 577 A.2d 455 (“if defense counsel had presented additional information at the penalty phase regarding defendant’s mental state, there is a reasonable probability that a jury” would not have imposed the death penalty); id. at 643, 577 A.2d 455 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“total forfeiture” in “preparation and presentation” of defendant’s case in mitigation constituted ineffective assistance). Defense counsel, knowing the videotape was five years old, should have sought other witnesses, particularly to establish the existence of the catch-all factor, c(5)(h).
The Court adheres to a two-pronged test for ineffective assistance.
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. [Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.]
*64That defense counsel had priorities other than his client is very clear. He sought to proceed quickly with the case.1 For one, he intimated that he was impatient with the voir dire because he was not getting paid. He also declined the opportunity to edit the videotape in order to remove indications that the tape was old. Defense counsel instead told the court, “Just let it fly.” Many of counsel’s decisions seem to have been hasty and impatient even though the court did not apply any pressure to accelerate the proceedings. I can see no tactical advantage in the decision to use a stale videotape in a death-penalty case. Defense counsel himself described the decision as expedient. That failure to prepare adequately for the resentencing denied defendant the effective assistance of counsel.
*65II
I concur in the vacating of defendant’s sentence of death.

In Voir dire, defense counsel declined to employ a struck jury system, even though the trial court went out of its way to make clear to defense counsel that the court would gladly use the struck jury system and that the court was in no hurry.
THE COURT: Mr. Diamond?
MR. DIAMOND: I won’t have any objection to voting on these jurors right now and see what we end up with. We may not have to go through 45. Seem to be moving a lot better than we did in the previous trial.
Why should we go through 45 people for another week when we might have the first 14 or 15?
THE COURT: Why don't we go through this morning and then if you want to try it that way, I’ll do that intermediate way of doing it, sure, because if we go through this morning we’ll probably have about 20 people or so, I would guess, we have how many now, 13, 14 qualified.
Now, I don’t think there’s any sense in starting now because you know, just one is going to make us go through the process again. Are you in a rush?
MR. DIAMOND: Rush?
THE COURT: Are you in a rush?
MR. DIAMOND: I can’t see interviewing 45 people, the first 20 will do it.
THE COURT: That means you are in a rush.
MR. DIAMOND: I would like to get started, I don’t think we’re going to need that many jurors.
MR. DIAMOND: He’d like to stay here forever.
(Laughter).
THE COURT: I know it will take 14 plus 20 plus 12 and I know I have got a solid jury.
MR. DIAMOND: I don’t think it’s going to take that many.