Court Opinion

ID: 9646467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:00:38.168727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:46.661656
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10926   Document: 58-3    Date Filed: 08/22/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-10926
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       TOP TOBACCO, L.P.,
       REPUBLIC TECHNOLOGIES (NA), LLC,
       REPUBLIC TOBACCO, L.P.,
                                                  Plaintiﬀs-Appellees,
       versus
       GABSONS NOVELTIES,
       et al.,

                                                          Defendants,

       DIAMOND J. WHOLESALE, LLC,
       d.b.a. Gabsons Novelties,
USCA11 Case: 22-10926         Document: 58-3        Date Filed: 08/22/2023         Page: 2 of 6

       2                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10926

                                                             Defendant-Appellant.

                               ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-02148-LMM
                            ____________________

       Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Diamond J Wholesale, LLC, and Raj Solomon, its sole
       owner and member, appeal a judgment of $11 million in statutory
       damages in favor of the plaintiﬀs (Top Tobacco, L.P., Republic
       Technologies (NA), LLC, and Republic Tobacco, L.P.) on their
       claims of willful trademark infringement under the Lanham Act,
       15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 et seq. Following review of the parties’ briefs and
       the record, we aﬃrm.1
              Evidentiary Rulings. The appellants contend that the district
       court erred in excluding certain evidence (witness testimony and
       invoices) which purportedly would have shown that they and their
       suppliers had purchased the counterfeit products from a legitimate

       1 As we write for the parties, we assume their familiarity with the case and set

       out only what is necessary to explain our decision. The panel unanimously
       determined that this appeal should be removed from the oral argument calen-
       dar and decided on the briefs. See 11th Cir. R. 34-3(b).
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       22-10926                Opinion of the Court                          3

       wholesaler named Star Importers. According to the appellants, this
       evidence would have shown that they and their suppliers believed
       that Star Importers was a large and reputable seller of the plaintiﬀs’
       products. And that, the appellants say, would have helped them
       defeat the plaintiﬀs’ claim that the trademark infringement was
       willful.
               Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see Chrysler Int’l Corp. v.
       Chemaly, 280 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 (11th Cir. 2002), we discern no er-
       rors. First, the district court did not abuse its discretion in exclud-
       ing the testimony of Steve Kent—one of the appellants’ suppliers—
       because, among other things, Mr. Kent did not purchase products
       from Star Importers during the time period relevant to this suit.
       See D.E. 172 at 38–39. Second, the district court did not abuse its
       discretion in excluding the invoices under Rule 37 because the ap-
       pellants did not turn them over in discovery and only brought them
       to the district court’s attention a year or so after the discovery dead-
       line ended. See D.E. 154 at 17–19. In any event, even if the exclu-
       sion of the invoices constituted an abuse of discretion, any error
       was harmless because the invoices were not for transactions be-
       tween Diamond J and Star Importers—they were between Quick
       Save Food Mart (a convenience store owned by Mr. Solomon) and
       Star Importers. The invoices therefore do not bear on the appel-
       lants’ purported good faith in obtaining the counterfeit products at
       issue, and any error in excluding them was harmless. See Luxottica
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10926

       Grp., S.p.A. v. Airport Mini Mall, LLC, 932 F.3d 1303, 1319 (11th Cir.
       2019); 28 U.S.C. § 2111. 2
                Judicial Notice. The appellants complain that the district
       court failed to take judicial notice of the deﬁnition of the word
       “culpability.” See D.E. 172 at 36, 39–40. If there was any error un-
       der Federal Rule of Evidence 201, it was harmless because the dis-
       trict court permitted the appellants to include their deﬁnition of
       “culpability” in the jury instructions. See id. at 39–40. The appel-
       lants acknowledged that including the deﬁnition in the jury instruc-
       tions would basically accomplish the same thing as judicial notice,
       see id. at 40, but they chose not to place the deﬁnition in the instruc-
       tions. Given that course of action, any error in declining to take
       judicial notice of the deﬁnition was invited, is procedurally barred,
       or was harmless, or a combination of those three things.
              Mr. Solomon’s Individual Liability. Mr. Solomon challenges
       the district court’s grant of summary judgment holding him indi-
       vidually liable for trademark infringement. He asserts that
       knowledge of infringement is required for individual liability under
       the Lanham Act, and that—as the district court originally
       thought—there are genuine issues of fact about his state of mind.
             We conclude that the district court did not err. Under 15
       U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)—which in relevant part prohibits the use in

       2 With respect to the matter of financial data about Diamond J and its compet-

       itors, the appellants were able to testify and comment on Diamond J’s small
       size and the restrictive effect that its size had on purchasing directly from Top
       Tobacco. Any error respecting that evidence was therefore also harmless.
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       22-10926                Opinion of the Court                          5

       commerce of counterfeit marks—a “showing of intent or bad faith
       is unnecessary to establish a violation[.]” Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Ac-
       tivewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1476 (11th Cir. 1991). And an
       individual is liable under that provision if he “actively and know-
       ingly caused the infringement.” See id. at 1477.
               In Chanel we aﬃrmed a district court’s summary judgment
       order holding a corporate oﬃcial individually liable because he (1)
       was the president and CEO of the infringing company, (2) pur-
       chased the infringing goods, (3) advertised those goods as legiti-
       mate, and (4) operated the showroom where the goods were sold.
       See id. at 1478. Here Mr. Solomon was the owner and sole member
       of Diamond J, and he stipulated that he was “chieﬂy responsible for
       buying and selling the counterfeit products and therefore ‘actively
       caused the infringement as a moving, conscious force.’” D.E. 130–
       6 at ¶ 3. This was suﬃcient for the district court to grant summary
       judgment against him on the issue of individual liability. See Chanel,
       931 F.2d at 1478 n.8 (explaining that an individual is liable if he “ac-
       tively participated as a moving force in the decision to engage in
       the infringing acts, or otherwise caused the infringement as a
       whole to occur”) (emphasis omitted). See also Edmondson v. Velvet
       Lifestyles, LLC, 43 F.4th 1153, 1164 (11th Cir. 2022) (“In other words,
       a corporate oﬃcer who directs, controls, ratiﬁes, participates in, or
       is the moving force behind the infringing activity is personally lia-
       ble for that infringement.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
       omitted).
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       6                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10926

              Simply stated, we held in Chanel, 931 F.2d at 1476, that intent
       is not necessary to demonstrate a violation of § 1114(1)(a). Given
       this underlying principle, individual liability under that provision
       does not demand proof of scienter. Any issues of fact relating to
       Mr. Solomon’s state of mind were therefore not material. See 87
       C.J.S. Trademarks, Etc. § 296 (Aug. 2023 update) (“Actual intent to
       infringe is not necessary for liability under the Lanham Act, and,
       therefore, individual liability may be imposed on a corporate of-
       ﬁcer who had no knowledge of the infringement, but who had (1)
       the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity, and (2) a
       direct ﬁnancial interest in [that] activity. In determining whether a
       corporate oﬃcer’s acts render the oﬃcer individually liable under
       the Lanham Act, it is immaterial whether the oﬃcer knows that the
       acts will result in infringement.”) (citations omitted). 3
               We aﬃrm the district court’s judgment.
               AFFIRMED.

       3 Knowledge of infringement is required for the remedy of treble damages and

       attorney’s fees under § 1117(b) of the Lanham Act, and such knowledge is usu-
       ally a matter for the fact-finder. See Chanel, 931 F.2d at 1476–78. Here the jury
       found that Mr. Solomon acted willfully. See D.E. 191.