Court Opinion

ID: 9370030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 17:08:23.441272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:18.806303
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court

                                                    No. 2020-115-M.P.
                                                    (Docket No. 4688)

In re Block Island Power Company     :
Petition for Declaratory Judgment.

         NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
         before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
         are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
         Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
         Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
         Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
         or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
         made before the opinion is published.
                                                           Supreme Court

                                                           No. 2020-115-M.P.
                                                           (Docket No. 4688)

    In re Block Island Power Company       :
    Petition for Declaratory Judgment.

         Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, Long, JJ.

                                   OPINION
      Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. This Court issued a writ of certiorari to

review a decision and judgment of the Public Utilities Commission (the PUC)

regarding the Town of New Shoreham Project, enacted by G.L. 1956 § 39-26.1-7.

The petitioner, Block Island Utility District d/b/a Block Island Power Company

(BIPCo), requests a reversal of the PUC’s decision to deny BIPCo’s petition for a

declaratory judgment. BIPCo sought a declaratory judgment declaring that the

enabling act, specifically § 39-26.1-7(f), requires the costs for BIPCo’s

interconnection facilities and backup transformer to be socialized across all electric

ratepayers in Rhode Island, not just those in the Town of New Shoreham (Block

Island or the town).1 As an intervening party, Narragansett Electric Company d/b/a

National Grid (National Grid) argued before the PUC that § 39-26.1-7(f) does not

1
  This opinion will use the terms Block Island, the Town of New Shoreham, and the
town, interchangeably.

                                         -1-
encompass BIPCo’s interconnection facilities or backup transformer and, therefore,

BIPCo and its ratepayers are solely responsible for those costs. The PUC issued a

decision and judgment against BIPCo. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the

decision of the PUC.

                                          I

                                 Facts and Travel

       We glean the facts in this case from the PUC’s decision and judgment, the

transcripts of both open meetings held before the PUC, and the submissions of the

parties.

                       The Town of New Shoreham Project

       In 2009, the Legislature enacted § 39-26.1-7 (the enabling act), which

authorized the Town of New Shoreham Project (the project). The enabling act

greenlit the construction of a five-turbine wind farm off the coast of Block Island,

which is twelve miles south of Rhode Island’s mainland. Specifically, the enabling

act declared that the project would “facilitate the construction of a small-scale

offshore wind [farm] * * * including an undersea transmission cable that

interconnects Block Island to the mainland[.]” Section 39-26.1-7(a).2 Within the

2
  The Block Island wind farm was completed in 2016 and BIPCo interconnected to
it in May 2017. There is no dispute among the parties that the interconnection exists
and operates today. The matter before this Court concerns the allocation of certain
costs between BIPCo and National Grid, according to the terms of the enabling act.

                                        -2-
statute, the Legislature described its vision for this small-scale wind farm to be a

“demonstration project[.]” Section 39-26.1-7(a). As the first of its kind in the nation,

the Block Island wind farm was meant to symbolize Rhode Island’s unique role

pioneering solutions for renewable energy across the United States.

        Section (a) of the enabling act enumerated four public-policy goals driving

the project; namely, to (1) “position the state to take advantage of the economic

development benefits of the emerging offshore wind industry”; (2) “promote the

development of renewable energy sources that increase the nation’s energy

independence from foreign sources of fossil fuels”; (3) “reduce the adverse

environmental and health impacts of traditional fossil fuel energy sources”; and (4)

“provide the town of New Shoreham with an electrical connection to the mainland.”

Section 39-26.1-7(a).

        When the Legislature passed the enabling act, Block Island was not at all

connected to Rhode Island’s mainland electrical grid. For many years, without a

hookup to mainland power, Block Island sourced its electricity exclusively from

diesel-powered generators. These generators were operated by Block Island’s sole

electric utility provider, BIPCo.3 One of the imperatives for the enabling act was to,

at last, provide Block Island with an alternative power source that would render its

polluting diesel generators obsolete.

3
    At the time the enabling act was passed, BIPCo was a privately owned company.

                                         -3-
      The vehicle for this new power source—and the subject at the heart of this

case—is an underwater transmission cable. See § 39-26.1-7(f). This cable is but one

piece of the multifaceted project, which includes the five-turbine wind farm, an

underwater transmission cable connecting the wind farm to a National Grid-owned

and -operated substation on Block Island, the substation, and an underwater

transmission cable connecting the substation to the mainland grid in the Town of

Narragansett. Of the two transmission cables involved in the project, the one

relevant to this case is the second—the cable that runs from National Grid’s

substation on Block Island to the mainland. See § 39-26.1-7(a) (contemplating “an

undersea transmission cable that interconnects Block Island to the mainland”).

      This system operates by transmitting wind-generated power from the turbines

to the National Grid substation via the first transmission cable, at which point it

diverts energy from the substation to BIPCo’s local distribution system and then

transfers the remaining power, unused by BIPCo’s customers, to the mainland grid

via the second transmission cable. Thus, the substation serves as the juncture—or

interconnection—between BIPCo’s distribution system and National Grid’s network

accessing the mainland.

      The two pieces of infrastructure at issue in this case are (1) BIPCo’s

interconnection facilities and (2) the backup transformer. BIPCo’s interconnection

facilities include the “wooden poles, overhead lines, a switch, and circuit breaker”

                                       -4-
required to connect its local distribution system to the National Grid substation

where it receives power from the wind farm. The backup transformer would, as the

name suggests, act as a backup for the principal transformer that powers BIPCo’s

interconnection to the substation.4          BIPCo argues that both units—the

interconnection facilities and backup transformer—are covered in the cost allocation

scheme laid out in section (f) of the enabling act.

      Section (f) of the enabling act governs the construction, ownership, and cost

allocation associated with the transmission cable project. Section 39-26.1-7(f). In

relevant part, section (f) provides that “the [Division of Public Utilities and Carriers]

shall support transmission rates and conditions that allow for the costs related to the

transmission cable and related facilities to be charged in transmission rates in a

manner that socializes the costs throughout Rhode Island.” Id. (emphasis added).

This portion of section (f) provides the basis for BIPCo’s claim that its

4
 Typically, utility servicers retain spare or backup transformers because weather and
manufacturing defects commonly cause outages. Here, however, the transformer
powering BIPCo’s electricity supply to the island requires a special voltage due to
the unique nature of the wind-powered project. As such, an additional transformer
for this project is inordinately expensive and threatens extensive delays to build and
obtain. BIPCo claimed that it could take as long as six months to procure a
replacement transformer if necessary, which would force BIPCo to resort to its diesel
generators to provide the island with power. At the time BIPCo petitioned the PUC
for a declaratory judgment, BIPCo had not yet procured a backup transformer from
National Grid, but discussions between the two entities concerning the cost and
specifications for the transformer had taken place.

                                          -5-
interconnection expenses should be socialized to all Rhode Island ratepayers

because, arguably, those expenses qualify as “related facilities” costs.5

      Section (f) also granted National Grid the option to own and operate the

transmission cable project by purchasing “the transmission cable and related

facilities” from the developer. Section 39-26.1-7(f) (“The electric distribution

company, at its option, may elect to own, operate, or otherwise participate in such

transmission cable project. * * * The electric distribution company may elect to

purchase the transmission cable and related facilities from the developer or an

affiliate of the developer, pursuant to the terms of a transmission facility’s purchase

agreement[.]”). On January 15, 2015, National Grid exercised that option and

purchased the transmission cable project from the wind farm developer, Deepwater

Wind Block Island, LLC (Deepwater), including the “engineering, permits, property

rights, and other development work[.]” Deepwater subsequently constructed and

installed the wind turbines, while National Grid built the Block Island substation and

the underwater transmission cables connecting the wind farm, the island, and the

mainland.

5
  Before the PUC and in its briefs, BIPCo claimed that its facility interconnection
costs summed to $263,700; grid interconnection costs were $1,836,000; and the
spare transformer cost was $450,000. The total cost, $2,549,700, socialized among
the roughly two thousand Block Island ratepayers would translate to a charge of
$1,275 per customer. That amount would be collected from BIPCo’s ratepayers over
a six-year amortization period. If the total cost were to be socialized across all Rhode
Island ratepayers, the charge would come to about $5 per customer.

                                         -6-
                          The Local Service Agreement

      The project is subject to the authority of ISO-New England Inc. (ISO-NE), a

private, nonprofit entity that operates within the federal regulatory hierarchy headed

by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).6 ISO-NE promulgates

transmission rates, terms, and conditions for utility projects operating in New

England through its ISO-NE Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (the

ISO-NE tariff), which ensures regional compliance with federal standards.

      As required by federal regulation, four agreements were filed with FERC in

connection with the project, including a Local Service Agreement (LSA) executed

between BIPCo (the Transmission Customer), New England Power Company (NEP)

(the Transmission Owner), and ISO-NE (the Regional Transmission Organization).

The LSA between BIPCo, NEP, and ISO-NE incorporated all terms of the ISO-NE

tariff. The original LSA was submitted, uncontested, before FERC, allowing the

commission to simply approve the agreement as presented without imposing its own

determination.

6
  ISO-NE serves as one of the many independent system operators or regional
transmission organizations in the nation created by FERC in the late 1990s. See
Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (Dec. 20, 1999); see also
18 C.F.R. § 35.34. ISO-NE manages the power companies that own the transmission
lines in New England, in this case New England Power Company—a wholly owned
subsidiary of National Grid—under a set of rates, terms, and conditions contained in
the ISO-NE Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff (ISO-NE tariff).

                                        -7-
      In a letter to FERC dated April 7, 2015, NEP and ISO-NE jointly sought to

amend the original LSA because the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers (the

division) determined that the original LSA did not comply with the enabling act.

Specifically, the division informed NEP and ISO-NE that the LSA improperly

calculated the transmission cable surcharge because it did not assess a higher rate to

Block Island ratepayers, as section (f) directs.7 To rectify the error and bring the

LSA—and by extension the tariff—in compliance with section (f), the LSA was

amended to adjust the rate calculation such that Block Island ratepayers would never

pay less than 120 percent of the rate charged to typical National Grid customers.

7
 Section (f) provides that the transmission rates for the cable shall be calculated in
the following manner:
             “The allocation of the costs related to the transmission
             cable through transmission rates or otherwise shall be
             structured so that the estimated impact on the typical
             residential customer bill for transmission costs for
             customers in the town of New Shoreham shall be higher
             than the estimated impact on the typical residential
             customer bill for customers on the mainland of the electric
             distribution company. This higher charge for the
             customers in the town of New Shoreham shall be
             developed by allocating the actual cable costs based on the
             annual peak demands of [BIPCo] and the electric
             distribution company, and these resultant costs recovered
             in the per-KWh charges of each company. * * * [T]he
             difference in the individual charge per KWh or per
             customer/month shall not exceed the ratio of average
             demand to peak demand for [BIPCo], relative to the
             electric distribution company, currently at 1.8 to 1.0
             respectively.” Section 39-26.1-7(f) (emphasis added).

                                        -8-
      FERC tariffs, including the ISO-NE tariff, typically contain “Direct

Assignment Facility” (DAF) charges that an interconnecting customer must pay to

the electric distribution company as reimbursement for the cost of connecting the

new customer to the existing grid. BIPCo’s LSA contained a rate schedule, Schedule

21, which listed the DAF charges BIPCo owed to National Grid for the cost of

connecting to the grid. The DAF charges included under Schedule 21 were as

follows: “Interconnection facilities and associated equipment: [one ]34.5kV breaker,

[one ]34.5/4.16kV/2.4kV transformer, [and a] 5kV insulated line to customer

substation and associated equipment.” Schedule 21, however, by its own terms,

operated “in accordance with the rates, terms and conditions of Schedule 21-NEP[,]”

which came from the ISO-NE tariff and was incorporated by reference into the LSA.

Schedule 21-NEP included pro forma language providing:

            “[I]nterconnection facilities and additional facilities shall
            be the financial responsibility of the Transmission
            Customer, to the extent consistent with Commission
            policy.”

      BIPCo did not dispute any of the LSA terms quoted above, but rather argued

before the PUC that the enabling act language controls. BIPCo submitted that the

division’s previous amendment to bring the LSA in conformity with section (f)

established that the enabling act trumps the tariff. National Grid disputed BIPCo’s

argument, cautioning the PUC that a ruling in favor of BIPCo would challenge the

                                        -9-
tariff’s authority, flout FERC’s plenary jurisdiction over the wholesale energy

market, and potentially create federal preemption issues.

                                The PUC Decision

      On January 31, 2017, BIPCo filed a petition for declaratory judgment before

the PUC. BIPCo contended that it should not be solely responsible for shouldering

the costs of (1) the interconnection facilities required to hook up to National Grid’s

substation and (2) the backup transformer because these are “related facilities” with

respect to the transmission cable that should be socialized to all Rhode Island

ratepayers per § 39-26.1-7(f). BIPCo averred that FERC precedent, which requires

interconnecting customers to pay for interconnections to the main grid, does not

apply to BIPCo because § 39-26.1-7(f) is a “specific provision that overrides the

general interconnection tariff.” Additionally, BIPCo maintained that the backup

transformer is not a proper DAF charge under the LSA because the LSA refers to

only one transformer, not a second, backup transformer.

      On February 25, 2017, National Grid intervened and filed an objection to

BIPCo’s petition. National Grid advanced two key arguments, first that categorizing

BIPCo’s interconnection expenses as socialized costs would contradict FERC

precedent; and second that § 39-26.1-7(f) unambiguously excludes the costs for

which BIPCo seeks reimbursement because the statute makes no reference to

BIPCo’s interconnection or its transformer.

                                        - 10 -
      In March 2017, the division filed a memorandum in support of National Grid’s

objection. The division argued that the socialization for “related facilities” should

be limited solely to those costs incurred by National Grid, not BIPCo. The division

also concurred with National Grid’s claim that BIPCo’s interconnection is entirely

separate from the socialization scheme the Legislature established in section (f).

      On May 30, 2017, the PUC held an open meeting to hear oral arguments from

BIPCo, National Grid, and the division. At the meeting, BIPCo argued that the PUC

should construe “related facilities” to include its interconnection facilities and

backup transformer because such a reading would (1) be consistent with the

legislative intent of the statute; and (2) properly regard the statute, not the ISO-NE

tariff, as the prevailing authority for the cable cost calculations.

      National Grid countered BIPCo’s claims with several arguments, asserting

that (1) the Legislature never intended all costs to be socialized, only those incurred

by National Grid for the assets it bought from Deepwater; (2) the enabling act does

not override the ISO-NE tariff; (3) BIPCo’s interconnection facilities and backup

transformer are “sole-use”—or facilities that benefit only the customer—which

FERC precedent requires the customer to cover; and (4) deciding for BIPCo would

open the door for other similarly situated customers to seek recovery for

interconnecting costs.

                                         - 11 -
      In an open meeting held on July 27, 2017, the PUC issued its decision with

two votes in favor of National Grid and one vote against.            The majority of

commissioners were convinced that FERC precedent and the ISO-NE tariff

contemplate BIPCo as an ordinary, voluntary interconnecting customer solely

responsible for the costs of interconnection. Chairwoman Curran discussed “how

interconnections are dealt with in the wholesale market” and stated that, typically,

“the interconnection to something like the cable * * * is the responsibility of the

customer.” Commissioner Gold also added that § 39-26.1-7 does not technically

require BIPCo to interconnect to the project at all and that “the legislative goal” of

“moving the state and the region off fossil fuels * * * can be met even if Block Island

were to continue to use their diesel generators.”

      In its written decision, the PUC majority engaged with the statutory

interpretation issue in greater detail and reasoned that “the transmission cable and

related facilities are treated [in the statute] as a package of items.” The conjunctive

phrase “transmission cable and related facilities” deliberately “isolate[d] the

equipment and infrastructure as items that National Grid * * * elect[ed] to purchase

from the developer[,]” according to the PUC. (Emphasis added.) This infrastructure

included everything National Grid received from Deepwater, but not the

interconnection facilities, which pertain exclusively to BIPCo and were never owned

by Deepwater.     The PUC decided that, because BIPCo’s facilities were not

                                        - 12 -
“necessary to serve the developer’s project,” they are not “related facilities” to the

transmission cable under § 39-26.1-7(f) and that the costs thereof were not subject

to be socialized.

      Commissioner DeSimone did not pen a written dissent, but he did articulate

his reasons for opposing the majority’s decision at the July meeting. He stressed

that, when viewing the statute in its entirety, it became clear to him that failing to

socialize the costs of BIPCo’s interconnection would frustrate a fundamental

legislative purpose of § 39-26.1-7: to connect the Town of New Shoreham to the

mainland. Commissioner DeSimone further dismissed National Grid’s concerns

that a decision in favor of BIPCo would lead to a slippery slope because the statute

is single purpose, necessarily limiting any ruling from the PUC to this case and this

project. Finally, Commissioner DeSimone rejected National Grid’s claim that

BIPCo is a voluntary interconnecting customer, instead perceiving BIPCo as an

entity composed of ratepayers—the citizens and businesses of Block Island—who

had no choice whether to interconnect. This made the interconnection cost an

“involuntary assessment” to Block Island ratepayers, according to Commissioner

DeSimone.

      The PUC filed a decision and judgment in favor of National Grid on May 6,

2020. On May 12, 2020, BIPCo filed a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking review

of the PUC’s order, which we granted.

                                        - 13 -
                                          II

                                Standard of Review

      The General Assembly has prescribed the standard of review for decisions by

the PUC brought before this Court, under G.L. 1956 § 39-5-3:

             “The findings of the commission on questions of fact shall
             be held to be prima facie true and as found by the
             commission, and the [S]upreme [C]ourt shall not exercise
             its independent judgment nor weigh conflicting evidence.
             An order or judgment of the commission made in the
             exercise of administrative discretion shall not be reversed
             unless the commission exceeded its authority or acted
             illegally, arbitrarily, or unreasonably.”

“[T]his Court reviews judgments and orders of the PUC solely to determine whether

the PUC’s findings are lawful and reasonable, fairly and substantially supported by

legal evidence, and sufficiently specific to enable us to ascertain if the evidence upon

which the PUC based its findings reasonably supports the result.” In re A & R Marine

Corp., 199 A.3d 533, 537 (R.I. 2019) (brackets omitted) (quoting Narragansett

Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 773 A.2d 237, 240 (R.I. 2001)).

      “[P]ure questions of law, including statutory interpretations, decided by the

[PUC] are reviewed de novo by this Court.” In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham

Project, 25 A.3d 482, 504 (R.I. 2011). “It is well settled that when the statutory

language is clear and unambiguous, we give the words their plain and ordinary

meaning.” In re Estate of Cardiff, 266 A.3d 1217, 1219 (R.I. 2022) (quoting Butler

v. Gavek, 245 A.3d 750, 754 (R.I. 2021)). “It is only when confronted with an

                                         - 14 -
unclear or ambiguous statutory provision that this Court will examine the statute in

its entirety to discern the legislative intent and purpose behind the provision.”

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Kaya, 947 A.2d 869, 872 (R.I. 2008) (quoting

State v. LaRoche, 925 A.2d 885, 887 (R.I. 2007)).

      The PUC decision and judgment at issue here is one of statutory

interpretation; we, therefore, proceed with our review de novo.

                                        III

                                    Discussion

      This is not the first time that the Block Island wind project has reached this

Court. In 2011, in In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, we dealt with a

dispute concerning the power purchase agreement (PPA) between the electric

distribution company, National Grid, and the wind farm developer, Deepwater. In re

Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 485-86. Our decision in that

case also recounted a thorough history of the project, its inception in the General

Assembly, and its previous proceedings before the PUC. Id. at 486-504.8

      Our discussion here pertains only to the narrow question on which BIPCo

seeks review: Does the phrase “related facilities,” under § 39-26.1-7(f), cover

BIPCo’s interconnection facilities and backup transformer such that those costs must

8
 We encourage the curious reader to review the In re Proposed Town of New
Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482 (R.I. 2011), opinion for a more exhaustive
background on the project.

                                       - 15 -
be socialized across all Rhode Island ratepayers? This is a question of statutory

interpretation.

      The parties advocate for two opposing interpretations of “related facilities”

under § 39-26.1-7(f), National Grid advancing a narrower definition and BIPCo a

broader one. The PUC decided in favor of National Grid, ruling that “related

facilities” must be narrowly construed to encompass only the equipment and assets

National Grid had the option to purchase from the developer—Deepwater—as part

of the transmission cable project. See § 39-26.1-7(f). On the contrary, BIPCo

implores this Court to read the statute as a whole and hold that, as a matter of law,

“related facilities” must include its interconnection facilities and backup

transformer.

      “It is well settled that when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous,

we give the words their plain and ordinary meaning.” Butler, 245 A.3d at 754

(quoting Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Providence Business Loan Fund, Inc., 200

A.3d 153, 157 (R.I. 2019)). Further, “when we examine an unambiguous statute,

there is no room for statutory construction and we must apply the statute as written.”

Morel v. Napolitano, 64 A.3d 1176, 1179 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Mutual Development

Corp. v. Ward Fisher & Co., LLP, 47 A.3d 319, 328 (R.I. 2012)).

      The Legislature does not define or itemize “related facilities” in section (f),

nor does the term possess any existing meaning in our caselaw to guide this Court’s

                                        - 16 -
understanding of its plain and ordinary meaning. Section 39-26.1-7(f); see Jerome

v. Probate Court of Town of Barrington, 922 A.2d 119, 123 (R.I. 2007) (holding that

the terms “encumbrance” and “lien” were not ambiguous because, even though

undefined in the statute, these terms “have a particular meaning in our law”).

However, even though the Legislature did not define the term “related facilities,” it

did qualify it in a way that extinguishes any ambiguity. See Freepoint Solar LLC v.

Richmond Zoning Board of Review, 274 A.3d 1, 6 (R.I. 2022) (reasoning that “where

the Legislature has not defined or qualified the words used within the statute” it is

“particularly true” that we must give clear and unambiguous language its plain and

ordinary meaning) (emphasis added) (quoting Drs. Pass and Bertherman, Inc. v.

Neighborhood Health Plan of Rhode Island, 31 A.3d 1263, 1269 (R.I. 2011)).

      “Related facilities” is mentioned three times in § 39-26.1-7(f), each time in

conjunction with the transmission cable.

      First: “The electric distribution company may elect to purchase the

transmission cable and related facilities from the developer or an affiliate of the

developer, pursuant to the terms of a transmission facility’s purchase agreement[.]”

Section 39-26.1-7(f) (emphasis added).

      Second: “Once written consent is provided, the electric distribution company

and its transmission affiliate are authorized to make a filing with the Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission to put into effect transmission rates to recover all of the

                                        - 17 -
costs associated with the purchase of the transmission cable and related facilities

and the annual operation and maintenance.” Section 39-26.1-7(f) (emphasis added).

      Third: “The division shall support transmission rates and conditions that allow

for the costs related to the transmission cable and related facilities to be charged in

transmission rates in a manner that socializes the costs throughout Rhode Island.”

Section 39-26.1-7(f) (emphasis added).

      Observing these three uses of “related facilities,” National Grid insists that the

phrase is clear and unambiguous. Looking to the first use, National Grid argues that

“related facilities” refers to the transmission cable project exclusively as National

Grid acquired the project from the developer. Moreover, because the developer

never owned BIPCo’s interconnection facilities, National Grid contends, those

facilities cannot possibly be related to the transmission cable project optioned from

Deepwater.

      As to the second use, National Grid contends that “related facilities” covers

only the infrastructure for which “the electric distribution company and its

transmission affiliate” would seek reimbursement through transmission rates filed

with FERC. Section 39-26.1-7(f). National Grid also emphasizes that section (f)

never mentions the words interconnection facilities or transformer. Such glaring

omissions must, National Grid argues, signal that the Legislature never intended for

BIPCo’s interconnection to be socialized.

                                        - 18 -
      And finally, as to the third use, National Grid simply asserts that if the

Legislature had intended to socialize all costs associated with the project, including

those for BIPCo’s interconnection, it would have written that into the statute.

      BIPCo, meanwhile, grounds its argument in a more holistic reading of the

statute. BIPCo maintains that, because a topline priority of the enabling act is to

“provide the town of New Shoreham with an electrical connection to the mainland,”

any infrastructure facilitating that connection must be, at minimum, “related” to the

transmission cable. Section 39-26.1-7(a). Removing the interconnection and backup

transformer from the “related facilities” costs socialized to all Rhode Islanders

defeats and frustrates the fundamental purpose of the act, according to BIPCo.

      Considering these arguments, the PUC based its final decision on National

Grid’s first argument, concurring that “related facilities” encompasses only the

facilities necessary to complete the wind farm as acquired from Deepwater. The

PUC ruled, “[I]t is clear from the text of the statute that the ‘related facilities’

associated with the ‘transmission cable’ that National Grid was permitted to

purchase from the ‘developer or affiliate of the developer’ includes only those

facilities necessary to serve the developer’s project, the Block Island Wind Farm.”

      Having reviewed the matter de novo, we agree with the PUC’s decision. See

In re Narragansett Electric Company, 276 A.3d 363, 371 (R.I. 2022). Upon each

use of the term “related facilities,” the Legislature coupled it with the conjunctive

                                        - 19 -
connector “and” along with “the transmission cable.” See § 39-26.1-7(f). Reading

section (f) according to this plain construction, “related facilities” clearly refers only

to those facilities directly involved with the transmission cable project as National

Grid purchased it from Deepwater. Purely as a matter of grammar, therefore, the

language does not arouse any hint of ambiguity.

      We also acknowledge that this reading of section (f) aligns with this Court’s

previous analysis of the enabling act in In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham

Project. In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 509. In that

case, we drew a distinction between the Town of New Shoreham Project, generally,

and the transmission cable project, specifically. See id. (noting that § 39-26.1-7(f)

“refer[s] to National Grid’s optional participation in the ‘transmission cable project’”

and that § 39-26.1-7(g) “distinguish[es] the ‘transmission cable project’ from ‘the

Town of New Shoreham Project’”).9 We further opined that “the ‘Town of New

9
 Section (g) of the enabling act reads, in relevant part:
             “Any charges incurred by [BIPCo] * * * in implementing
             this section * * * shall be recovered annually in rates
             through a fully reconciling rate adjustment, subject to
             approval by the commission. If the electric distribution
             company owns * * * the transmission cable project,
             pursuant to section (f) of this section, the provisions of
             § 39-26.1-4 shall not apply to the cable cost portion of the
             town of New Shoreham project.” Section 39-26.1-7(g).
      National Grid argues that any cost-recovery options available to BIPCo are
contemplated in section (g), negating any claims it may seek under section (f). This
argument does not impact our analysis as we find the language in section (f) to be

                                          - 20 -
Shoreham Project’ was the umbrella project over which the contract for the purchase

of renewable energy and the ‘transmission cable project’ were integral, but not

necessarily simultaneous parts.” Id. at 491. We further stated that “the general policy

goals for the Town of New Shoreham Project” do not “create an express mandate”

for each of its composite parts, including the transmission cable project. Id. at 509-10

(rejecting the notion that section (a)’s policy goals informed the requirements for the

2010 PPA because “§ 39-26.1-7(a)’s policy intention * * * of interconnecting Block

Island [was] directed at the ‘Town of New Shoreham project’ to ‘effectuate’”).

      BIPCo’s attempt to use the section (a) policy goals to graft new language onto

section (f)—like “interconnection” and “transformer”—defies this Court’s explicit

disaggregation of the Town of New Shoreham Project from the transmission cable

project. Section (f) covers the transmission cable project only, which need not

advance the general policy goals espoused in section (a). See In re Proposed Town

of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d at 509 (admonishing the petitioners for

“cherrypick[ing] and then cobbl[ing] together the overarching policy goals for the

Town of New Shoreham Project to form what they allege is a * * * mandate for the

2010 PPA”). BIPCo misunderstands the framework of the enabling act with its

contention that the project’s goal in section (a) to “provide the town of New

unambiguous and exclusive of BIPCo’s interconnection costs, regardless of section
(g).

                                         - 21 -
Shoreham with an electrical connection to the mainland” must inform the meaning

of “related facilities” as it appears in section (f). Sections 39-26.1-7(a), (f). That is

not what this Court held in In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project and it is

not what a plain and ordinary reading of the statutory language demands.

      Noting that “we accord great deference to the PUC[] * * * and [that] we will

not disturb an order unless the PUC ‘clearly * * * acts illegally, arbitrarily, or

unreasonably[,]’” we observe no grounds to overturn the PUC’s decision. In re Kent

County Water Authority Change Rate Schedules, 996 A.2d 123, 128 (R.I. 2010)

(quoting Narragansett Electric Co., 773 A.2d at 240). We hold that “related

facilities” clearly and unambiguously excludes the costs of BIPCo’s interconnection

facilities and backup transformer. See In re A & R Marine Corp., 199 A.3d at 537.

As such, we affirm the PUC’s decision in favor of National Grid.10

                                           IV

                                      Conclusion

      For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decision and judgment of the PUC.

We remand the record to the PUC with our decision endorsed thereon.

10
   Given our affirmance of the PUC’s definition of “related facilities,” no conflict
exists between section (f) of the enabling act and the terms of the ISO-NE tariff. The
ISO-NE tariff, Schedule 21-NEP, incorporates BIPCo’s interconnection and backup
transformer as DAF charges owed by BIPCo and its ratepayers. This scheme is not
at odds with the cost allocation structure established in either section (f) or (g) of the
enabling act. Absent any conflict, we need not reach the parties’ arguments as to the
tariff or preemption of FERC’s plenary authority.

                                          - 22 -
                                               STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
                                         SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
                                               Licht Judicial Complex
                                                 250 Benefit Street
                                               Providence, RI 02903

                                     OPINION COVER SHEET

                                         In re Block Island Power Company
Title of Case
                                         Petition for Declaratory Judgment.
                                         No. 2020-115-M.P.
Case Number
                                         (Docket No. 4688)

Date Opinion Filed                       February 10, 2023

                                         Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, Long,
Justices
                                         JJ.

Written By                               Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal                         The Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission

Judicial Officer from Lower Court        N/A

                                         For Petitioner:

                                         Leah J. Donaldson, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal                    For Respondent:

                                         Tiffany A. Parenteau, Esq.
                                         Christine E. Dieter, Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)