Court Opinion

ID: 9430829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:41.919606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:26.092706
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The complaint filed by petitioner in the United States District Court for the District of Montana raised questions concerning the coverage of the insurance policy that petitioner had issued to respondents Wellman Ranch Co. and its owners. Complaint ¶¶ 8, 9 (App. 3-4). It did not raise any question concerning the jurisdiction of the Blackfeet Tribal Court. For purposes of our decision, it is therefore appropriate to assume that the Tribal Court and the Federal District Court had concurrent jurisdiction over the dispute. The question presented is whether the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction is a sufficient reason for requiring the federal court to decline to exercise its own jurisdiction until the Tribal Court has decided the case on the merits. In my opinion it is not.
*21A federal court must always show respect for the jurisdiction of other tribunals. Specifically, only in the most extraordinary circumstances should a federal court enjoin the conduct of litigation in a state court or a tribal court. Thus, in National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U. S. 845 (1985), we held that the Federal District Court should not entertain a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Crow Tribal Court until after petitioner had exhausted its remedies in the Tribal Court. Our holding was based on our belief that Congress’ policy of supporting tribal self-determination “favors a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenge.” Id., at 856 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). We have enforced a similar exhaustion requirement in cases challenging the jurisdiction of state tribunals. See, e. g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 335-336 (1977).
The deference given to the deliberations of tribal courts on the merits of a dispute, however, is a separate matter as to which National Farmers Union offers no controlling precedent. Indeed, in holding that exhaustion of the tribal jurisdictional issue was necessary, we explicitly contemplated later federal-court consideration of the merits of the dispute. We noted that “the orderly administration of justice in the federal court will be served by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed.” 471 U. S., at 856 (footnote omitted). I see no reason why tribal courts should receive more deference on the merits than state courts. It is not unusual for a state court and a federal court to have concurrent jurisdiction over the same dispute. In some such cases it is appropriate for the federal court to stay its hand until the state-court litigation has terminated, see, e. g., Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 813-816 (1976), but as we have consistently held, “[ajbstention from the exercise *22of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” Id., at 813. The mere fact that a case involving the same issue is pending in another court has never been considered a sufficient reason to excuse a federal court from performing its duty “to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.” County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U. S. 185, 188 (1959). On the contrary, as between state and federal courts, the general rule is that “the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction . . . .” McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268, 282 (1910). In this case a controversy concerning the coverage of the insurance policy issued to respondents Wellman Ranch Co. and its owners by petitioner is properly before the Federal District Court.* That controversy raises no question concerning the jurisdiction of the Blackfeet Tribal Court.
Adherence to this doctrine, by allowing the declaratory judgment action to proceed in District Court, would imply no disrespect for the Blackfeet Tribe or for its judiciary. It would merely avoid what I regard as the anomalous suggestion that the sovereignty of an Indian tribe is in some respects greater than that of the State of Montana, for example.
Until today, we have never suggested that an Indian tribe's judicial system is entitled to a greater degree of deference than the judicial system of a sovereign State. Today’s opinion, however, requires the federal court to avoid adjudicating the merits of a controversy also pending in tribal court although it could reach those merits if the case instead were pending in state court. Thus, although I of course agree with the Court’s conclusion that the Federal District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, I respectfully dissent from its exhaustion holding.

The Court seems to assume that the merits of this controversy are governed by “tribal law.” See ante, at 16. I express no opinion on this choice-of-law question.