Court Opinion

ID: 9826182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 15:29:37.63213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:55.201778
License: Public Domain

Mr. J. Henry Johnson (Circuit Judge)
: I concur; and, with reference to Question 3 (Exceptions 5 and 6), take the liberty of supplementing the authorities cited by Mr. Justice Bonham in his disposition of this particular issue with the cases of Duncan v. Greenville County, 73 S. C., 254, 53 S. E., 367; Cooper v. Richland County, 76 S. C., 202, 56 S. E., 958, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.), 799, 121 Am. St Rep., 946. These cases hold that the statute in question provides two contingencies which prevent recovery by plaintiff, viz.: (1) If the injury was in any way brought by his own act, (2) if he negligently “contributed” thereto; but that, in either event, plaintiff’s act or negligence must have been the '“proximate cause” of the injury to bar recovery, and that “contributed,” as that term is used in the statute, means contributed as a “proximate cause” to the injury or damage complained of.