Court Opinion

ID: 9627454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:43:58.992609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:46.040758
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice,
dissenting.
I am unable to agree with the conclusion of the majority that appellant Russell Pol-ston had no right to a jury determination concerning the validity of his defense theory-
In Fulcher v. State, Wyo., 633 P.2d 142 (1981), we recognized automatism to be a complete defense to criminal activity. We set out in that case the following definition of automatism:
“ * * * Automatism is the state of a person who, though capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing. While in an automatistic state, an individual performs complex actions without an exercise of will. Because these actions are performed in a state of unconsciousness, they are involuntary. Automatistic behavior may be followed by complete or partial inability to recall the actions performed while unconscious. Thus, a person who acts automatically does so without intent, exercise of free will, or knowledge of the act.” 633 P.2d at 145.
The question before the court in the instant case is whether the evidence was sufficient to entitle appellant to submit to the jury Wyoming’s Pattern Jury Instruction on automatism.1 This court discussed the quantum of evidence necessary to justify instructing the jury on a particular issue *11in Goodman v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 400 (1977). There we said that due process requires an instruction on the defendant’s theory of the case if the offered instruction sufficiently informs the jury of defendant’s theory and if there is “competent evidence in the record to support the theory.” 573 P.2d at 408. We quoted with approval the following passage from 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1313, pp. 776-778:
“ * * * [I]t is generally recognized that any evidence which will authorize the jury to find on it, although in the opinion of the court it may be weak, inconclusive, or unworthy of belief, is sufficient to justify an instruction on the issue raised by such evidence; and even positive testimony is not required, for it is sufficient if the fact in issue reasonably may be inferred from circumstances proved. However, in order to warrant giving an instruction, the evidence should be sufficient fairly to raise the question involved therein.
“No instruction should be given which is not reasonably supported by the evidence, or which is not based on some theory logically deducible from some portion of the evidence. Thus an instruction should not be given on evidence which at the most merely raises a possibility or a conjecture, or which is inconsistent with the physical facts, or which is so inconsistent and its connection so slight that the court may set aside a verdict thereon. * * * For the purpose of determining whether an instruction in favor of accused should be given, the court must view the evidence in a light as favorable to him as is justifiable and accused’s testimony must be taken as entirely true.” 533 P.2d at 409.
Most jurisdictions which recognize the defense have concluded that loss of memory, in and of itself, is not sufficient to mandate an automatism instruction. People v. Morrall, 144 Cal.App.3d 406, 192 Cal.Rptr. 601 (1983); State v. Caddell, 287 N.C. 266, 215 S.E.2d 348 (1975). However, evidence of loss of memory in combination with evidence of a blow to the head constitute a sufficient basis to submit the question to the jury. People v. Morrall, supra; State v. Caddell, supra; People v. Ray, 14 Cal.3d 20, 120 Cal.Rptr. 377, 533 P.2d 1017 (1975). The California Supreme Court in People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal.3d 703, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913 (1974), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel, 25 Cal.3d 668, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1 (1980), set out the appropriate test:
“ * * * An unconscious act within the contemplation of the Penal Code is one committed by a person who because of somnambulism, a blow on the head, or similar cause is not conscious of acting and whose act therefore cannot be deemed volitional.” 112 Cal.Rptr. at 10, 518 P.2d at 922.
The majority rely on People v. Ray, supra, in holding that a blow to the head coupled with loss of memory is insufficient to support an instruction on automatism. In People v. Ray, however, the California Supreme Court was concerned with whether the trial court, on its own initiative, should have given an automatism instruction where the defendant claimed self-defense at trial and where no automatism instruction had been requested. The appellate court set out the standard governing the trial court’s obligation to submit an unrequested instruction in such cases:
“ * * * ‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. * * * The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary to the jury’s understanding of the case.’ [Citation.] The duty to instruct sua sponte on general principles closely and openly connected with the facts of a case includes an obligation to instruct on the defense of involuntary unconsciousness but only when it appears that the defendant is relying on that defense, ‘or if there *12is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.’ (People v. Sedeoo (1974) 10 Cal.3d 708, 716, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 10, 518 P.2d 913, 921).” 120 Cal.Rptr. at 379, 533 P.2d at 1019.
The court then concluded that an automatism instruction was not required under the facts of that case:
“Although defendant sustained a severe beating which left him unconscious following his initial confrontation with the victim, it taxes the imagination to give any credence to his contention that he remained unconscious during the following four hours and until the time he fired two bullets into the victim’s head. The evidence is undisputed that defendant regained consciousness and drove his car away from the scene. * * * [E]ven defendant’s own testimony does not support his claims of continuing unconsciousness. He stated that he remembered very clearly the events leading up to the shooting. * * *
“There is likewise no merit to the claim that defendant was unconscious as the result of wounds received in the second confrontation immediately prior to the killing. * * * Defendant described this encounter as a ‘scuffle’ * * *. No blows were struck * ⅜ ⅜. Defendant described these events in sharp detail and he could not reasonably be deemed to have been rendered unconscious by these incidents. * * * Police officers who were on the scene almost immediately after the killing found defendant to be functioning normally.” 120 Cal.Rptr. at 380, 533 P.2d at 1019-1020.
In the trial of the instant case, appellant presented evidence corresponding to the textbook symptoms of a concussion as described in the majority opinion on page 12. The bar patron, who delivered a karate kick to Polston’s head shortly before the nose-biting incident, testified that he knocked out Polston. Appellant testified that he could not remember anything that had occurred for a period of time before and after the blow to his head. Furthermore, the bystander who hit appellant on the side of the head in order to remove him from his girl friend testified that Polston was knocked unconscious or had passed out.
With regard to absence of criminal intent, Polston testified that he would never intentionally bite off Miss Olson’s nose or disfigure her in any way. The victim herself testified that the incident was an accident and that Polston had not acted “on purpose.”
Where two independent witnesses testified that appellant was unconscious shortly before and immediately after the nose-biting incident, where appellant testified that he had no memory of the incident, and where appellant and the victim both testified as to the unintentional nature of the incident, reasonable minds could disagree as to whether appellant's behavior was that of an automaton. Certainly, such evidence more than satisfies the test for an automatism instruction adopted by other courts.
The majority bolster their conclusion that the trial court properly refused the unconsciousness instruction by noting that appellant also defended the nose-biting incident as accidental. I see no inconsistency between accidental conduct and automatism, since both involve unintentional acts. More importantly, nothing precludes a defendant from presenting evidence at trial and seeking a jury determination on diverse defense theories. Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S.Ct. 839, 40 L.Ed. 980 (1896). The assertion of a defense theory on appeal inconsistent with that asserted at trial bears only on the trial court’s duty to submit an unrequested instruction sua sponte. People v. Ray, supra.
The majority say:
“ * ⅜ * We do not know whether the unconsciousness resulted from the blow to the head or his extreme drunken condition.”
And, further:
“ * * * The inability to recall may have been a means of ‘coping with neurotic conflict’; an inability to accept or face the enormity of his actions that resulted in maiming and disfiguring another human being * * *.”
*13It must be remembered, however, that the jury, not this court, was the appropriate body to weigh the conflicting evidence and to determine whether appellant, in fact, acted unconsciously when he bit off his future wife’s nose and further to determine the cause of such unconscious state. The fact that this court finds the appellant’s evidence “weak, inconclusive, or unworthy of belief” should not strip the jury of its function to determine the validity of the offered defense. Goodman v. State, supra, 573 P.2d at 409.
In Goodman, we established a reasonable, evidential threshold for submitting the defendant’s theory of the case to the jury. I believe that appellant Polston met this threshold and, therefore, would have reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

. Wyoming Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal 4.301, Unconscious Acts, provides:
“Where a person commits an act without being conscious thereof, such act is not criminal even though, if committed by a person who was conscious, it would be a crime.
"This rule of law applies only to cases of the unconsciousness of person of sound mind, in which there is no functioning of the conscious mind."
The Use Note states:
"Specific examples of where this instruction would apply include: sleep walkers or per*11sons suffering from the delirium of fever, epilepsy, a blow on the head or the involuntary taking of drugs or intoxicating liquor.”