Court Opinion

ID: 9892126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 17:09:47.719279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:54.768167
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Dennis, 2023-Ohio-3815.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                     :
                                                   :
       Appellee                                    :   C.A. No. 29519
                                                   :
 v.                                                :   Trial Court Case No. 2021 CR 01672
                                                   :
 JOHN DENNIS                                       :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                   :   Court)
       Appellant                                   :
                                                   :

                                              ...........

                                              OPINION

                                     Rendered on October 20, 2023

                                              ...........

JOHN A. FISCHER, Attorney for Appellant

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by SARAH H. CHANEY, Attorney for Appellee

                                             .............

LEWIS, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant John Dennis appeals from a judgment of the

Montgomery County Common Pleas Court following his conviction, following his guilty

plea, on one count of rape (by force or threat of force), a felony of the first degree. On

appeal, Dennis challenges the trial court’s imposition of extradition costs.       For the
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reasons that follow, we will reverse the trial court’s judgment insofar as it imposed

extradition costs and remand the case to the trial court to consider whether the extradition

costs should be waived. The judgment will be affirmed in all other respects.

          I.   Facts and Procedural History

        {¶ 2} On November 9, 2021, Dennis was indicted by a Montgomery County grand

jury on one count of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the first degree,

and one count of sexual battery, in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), a felony of the third

degree. On May 27, 2022, Dennis entered a negotiated guilty plea wherein Dennis

agreed to plead guilty to one count of rape (by force or threat of force), a felony of the first

degree, with an agreed mandatory sentence of five years in prison and designation as a

Tier III sex offender. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the other count. On June

13, 2022, Dennis was sentenced to a mandatory term of five years in prison and

designated a Tier III sex offender. The trial court waived court costs and fines but

ordered Dennis to pay $1,912.24 to the Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney's

Office for the costs of extradition, with the amount to be paid through the Montgomery

County Clerk of Courts. Dennis filed a timely notice of appeal.

        {¶ 3} Dennis’ appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), in which counsel stated

that she had found “no meritorious issues for review” and requested to withdraw from the

case.   Following our independent review of the record, we found at least one non-

frivolous issue for appeal relating to the imposition of the costs of extradition.

Accordingly, we set aside appellate counsel’s Anders brief, allowed her to withdraw from
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the case, and appointed new counsel.

       {¶ 4} Dennis now raises a single assignment of error.

        II.   Extradition Costs

       {¶ 5} In his sole assignment of error, Dennis contends that the trial court erred by

ordering him to pay the costs of extradition. Dennis argues that the trial court imposed

the extradition costs without considering whether he was indigent, and Dennis further

contends that he is indigent based on the record. Dennis therefore asks this Court to

vacate the costs of extradition. The State concedes that the trial court erred in imposing

the costs of extradition without considering whether Dennis was indigent or had the ability

to pay. However, the State requests this Court reverse the imposition of the costs of

extradition and remand the cause to the trial court to determine whether the costs of

extradition should be waived. We agree with the State.

       {¶ 6} R.C. 2947.23 governs the trial court's authority to impose costs on a

defendant convicted of a felony.     The statute provides that, “[i]n all criminal cases,

including violations of ordinances, the judge or magistrate shall include in the sentence

the costs of prosecution * * * and render a judgment against the defendant for such costs.”

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a).         Because the statute uses mandatory

language, it requires a court to assess the costs of prosecution against all convicted

defendants, regardless of whether they are indigent or not. State v. White, 103 Ohio

St.3d 580, 2004-Ohio-5989, 817 N.E.2d 393, ¶ 8.          Nevertheless, R.C. 2947.23(C)

provides that a trial court may “waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of

prosecution * * * at the time of sentencing or any time thereafter.” Thus, “[w]hile the
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imposition of those costs is mandatory, the court may waive the payment of all costs when

the defendant is determined to be indigent.” State v. Davis, 159 Ohio St.3d 31, 2020-

Ohio-309, 146 N.E.3d 560, ¶ 14, citing White at ¶ 14.

       {¶ 7} “The phrase ‘costs of prosecution’ has not been statutorily defined.”

Middleburg Hts. v. Quinones, 120 Ohio St.3d 534, 2008-Ohio-6811, 900 N.E.2d 1005,

¶ 8. The term “costs,” however, has been defined as “the statutory fees to which officers,

witnesses, jurors, and others are entitled for their services in an action or prosecution,

and which the statutes authorize to be taxed and included in the judgment or sentence.”

Id., citing State ex rel. Franklin Cty. Commrs. v. Guilbert, 77 Ohio St. 333, 338, 83 N.E.

80 (1907). “The expenses which may be taxed as costs in a criminal case are those

directly related to the court proceedings and are identified by a specific statutory

authorization.” State v. Christy, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-04-04, 2004-Ohio-6963, ¶ 22.

See also R.C. 2949.111(A)(1) (" ‘Court costs’ means any assessment that the court

requires an offender to pay to defray the costs of operating the court.”).        We have

previously determined that extradition costs are included in the costs of prosecution.

State v. Jones, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 25315 and 25316, 2013-Ohio-1925, ¶ 13-15.

       {¶ 8} Accordingly, a trial court must impose court costs, including costs of

extradition, but has discretion to waive them at the time of sentencing.          Where a

defendant moves to waive costs at the time of sentencing, the trial court’s decision will be

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76,

2010-Ohio-954, 926 N.E.2d 278, ¶ 12, citing State v. Threatt, 108 Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-

Ohio-905, 843 N.E.2d 164, ¶ 23. “An abuse of discretion connotes an unreasonable,
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arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude.” (Citation omitted.) State ex rel. Grady v. State

Emp. Relations Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 677 N.E.2d 343 (1997). “[A]n ‘arbitrary’

decision is one made ‘without consideration of or regard for facts [or] circumstances.’ ”

State v. Beasley, 152 Ohio St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16, 97 N.E.3d 474, ¶ 12, quoting Black's

Law Dictionary 125 (10th Ed.2014).

       {¶ 9} In the case at bar, after imposing Dennis’ prison sentence, the trial court was

informed there were extradition costs in the amount of $1,912.24. Defense counsel

alerted the court that Dennis was indigent and was being represented as such. Although

the trial court indicated it would waive any fines and court costs, the trial court stated it

“will always order extradition costs.” Tr. 32. Accordingly, the trial court waived court

costs but ordered Dennis to pay the costs of extradition.

       {¶ 10} The record reflects that Dennis had a high school education and had served

in the United States Army and National Guard. Dennis had been “employed most of his

life as a heavy equipment operator” according to the presentence investigation report,

although he indicated in his financial disclosure form that he was not employed. At the

time of sentencing, Dennis was represented by appointed counsel and was 67 years old

with several alleged health problems. But the trial court did not consider any of the

individual facts or circumstances in the particular case before it and ostensibly followed

its blanket policy of always imposing extradition costs. “It is a basic principle of our legal

system that a trial court's decision must not be arbitrary and cannot be based on

considerations wholly unrelated to the decision it is tasked with making. A trial court

could not, for instance, deny a motion to waive costs based on the flip of a coin or the
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color of a defendant's hair or because it is Tuesday. Neither could a court adopt a

standing order to reject all such motions, as that would be opting out of any sort of rational

assessment altogether.”     State v. Taylor, 161 Ohio St.3d 319, 2020-Ohio-3514, 163

N.E.3d 486. Consequently, we must conclude that the court's adherence to such an

arbitrary policy constituted an abuse of discretion and sustain Dennis’ sole assignment of

error. See Beasley at ¶ 13 (trial court’s blanket policy of not accepting no-contest pleas

constituted an abuse of discretion).

       {¶ 11} While Dennis and the State agree that the trial court erred in imposing

extradition costs, the parties disagree as to whether the costs portion of the judgment

should be vacated or reversed and remanded for further consideration by the trial court.

Dennis contends that the trial court already made an explicit finding that Dennis is indigent

and therefore cannot impose extradition costs. Dennis relies on the fact that the trial

court found him to be indigent for purposes of appointing counsel. However, “[a] finding

that a defendant is indigent for purposes of appointed counsel does not shield the

defendant from paying court costs or a financial sanction.” (Citation omitted.) State v.

Felder, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21076, 2006-Ohio-2330, ¶ 64. Although there was

evidence in the record that Dennis may have been indigent and unable to pay extradition

costs at the time of sentencing and, therefore, waiver may have been appropriate, the

determination of whether extradition costs should be waived must be made by the trial

court in the first instance, not an appellate court. In this case, the trial court imposed the

extradition costs due to its blanket policy, not because it found that waiver was appropriate

under the facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we reverse the imposition
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of extradition costs and remand the cause to the trial court for it to consider if the

extradition costs should be waived, taking into account the individual facts and

circumstances of the present case.

       III.   Conclusion

      {¶ 12} Having sustained the sole assignment of error, we reverse the imposition of

extradition costs and remand the cause to the trial court to consider whether extradition

costs should be waived. The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed in all other respects.

                                     .............

WELBAUM, P.J. and EPLEY, J., concur.