Court Opinion

ID: 9755336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:35:07.442204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:06.124000
License: Public Domain

HARDBERGER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority finds that the admission of unreliable expert testimony is harmless error. I respectfully dissent.
The majority relies on precedent that allows an appellate court to disregard the erroneous admission of evidence supporting one definition of intoxication if sufficient evidence supports a second definition of intoxication. However, the existence of evidence to support the second definition does not mean that the jurors would have convicted Mata based on the second definition. If even one juror would not have convicted Mata in the absence of McDou-gall’s testimony, the error in admitting that testimony necessarily affects Mata’s substantial rights.
The decision by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Mata signals a need to reexamine existing precedent refusing to find harm when unreliable expert testimony is admitted based on the existence of evidence to support an alternative theory of the offense. Although the United States Supreme Court held that the federal constitution does not require the jury to reach a unanimous agreement on alternative factual theories, it also asserted:
We do not, of course, suggest that jury instructions requiring increased specificity are not desirable, and in fact the Supreme Court of Arizona has itself recognized that separate verdict forms are useful in cases submitted to a jury on alternative theories of premeditated and felony murder. We hold only that the Constitution did not command such a practice on the facts of this case.
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 645, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991). In view of the emphasis and confidence a jury places on an expert’s testimony, law has developed over the past decade requiring trial courts to determine the admissibility of that testimony under heightened standards. See Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); see also Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902, 910 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) (taking judicial notice of scientific literature not presented by either party at trial or on appeal to determine reliability of expert testimony). Given this developing law and the inherent difficulties with extrapolation testimony, the courts need to rethink whether error is harmless if it enables a jury to find a defendant guilty based on unreliable expert testimony.
In Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex.2000), the Texas Supreme Court re-examined harm in the context of broad-form submission. In that case, the trial court submitted a single broad-form *503question on the issue of the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 387. The jury was instructed on thirteen independent grounds for liability; however, four of the thirteen theories were improperly submitted. See id. at 389. In rejecting the court of appeals’ conclusion that the error was harmless, the Texas Supreme Court asserted:
It is fundamental to our system of justice that parties have the right to be judged by a jury properly instructed in the law. Yet, when a jury bases a finding of liability on a single broad-form question that commingles invalid theories of liability with valid theories, the appellate court is often unable to determine the effect of this error. The best the court can do is determine that some evidence could have supported the jury’s conclusion on a legally valid theory. To hold this error harmless would allow a defendant to be held liable without a judicial determination that a factfinder actually found that the defendant should be held hable on proper, legal grounds. Accordingly, we hold that when a trial court submits a single broad-form liability question incorporating multiple theories of liability, the error is harmful and a new trial is required when the appellate court cannot determine whether the jury based its verdict on an improperly submitted invalid theory.
Id. at 388. The Texas Supreme Court expressly disapproved of prior decisions holding that the error is harmless if any evidence supports a properly submitted liability theory. Id. at 389.
A similar analysis should be used in determining harm in this case. Because McDougall’s testimony was unreliable, no evidence supported the theory of intoxication based on blood alcohol concentration, so it should not have been submitted to the jury. Because we cannot determine from our record which theory was the basis for the jury’s verdict, the error is harmful and reversal is required. If the Texas Supreme Court is willing to reexamine harm in the context of broad-form submission in cases involving money judgments, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals should be equally willing to re-examine the issue in cases involving a defendant’s freedom.