Court Opinion

ID: 9762589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:26:49.656284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:35.615611
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, President Judge,
dissenting:
I join in the observations of Judge BROSKY in dissent, and write separately to highlight my own concerns.
In vacating appellant Sanchez’s sentence and remanding for resentencing, this court continues to eviscerate the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s ruling in Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987) and to misread its decision in Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 532 A.2d 775 (1987). Because Sanchez waived his right to appeal by failing to include the required Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement of reasons relied on for allowance of appeal showing a “substantial question” that the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b), I would quash the appeal. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Sanchez was arrested on charges of possession of and possession with intent to deliver heroin and cocaine. He entered a guilty plea with respect to those charges, and was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of not less than seven and one half nor more than fifteen years for the counts involving cocaine, and not less than two and one half to not more than ten years for the counts involving heroin. The sentencing court merged the counts involving possession and possession with intent to deliver of each drug for sentencing purposes. Appellant then filed a motion to reconsider sentence. The court denied that motion, and Sanchez appealed to this court. On appeal, Sanchez argues that the sentence of ten to twenty-five years was manifestly excessive. He argues further that the sentence was inappropriate because the trial court failed to state appropriate *379reasons on the record for its deviation from the Sentencing Guidelines. Appellant fails, however, to include in his brief the statement of reasons relied on for appeal mandated by Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f) in appeals from discretionary aspects of sentence. Because, regardless of this court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Krum, 367 Pa.Super. 511, 533 A.2d 134 (1987) (en banc), I cannot accept the premise that the supreme court in Tuladziecki meant to make the 2119(f) requirement readily waived by the appellee, I would find that appellant’s failure to include such a statement in his brief created a fatal jurisdictional defect, and that we are precluded from exercising our discretion to hear this appeal.
I disagree at the outset with this court’s introduction of a procedural versus jurisdictional dichotomy in Krum. This distinction was a semantic one of the court’s own creation, and was not one which the court in Tuladziecki found significant. “Procedural” violations often have results which affect a court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction. The most obvious example is the “procedural” shortcoming of filing an appeal beyond the jurisdictional time limit of thirty days. Other examples are the “procedural” deficiencies of failing to raise issues in post-verdict motions, or filing such motions out of time, which may have the “jurisdictional” effect of precluding this court’s review of certain issues on appeal. In that sense, procedural violations may defeat this court’s “jurisdiction” to review certain claims, and the whole point of the supreme court’s reversal of our decision vacating a sentence in Tuladziecki was that this court should stop ignoring the jurisdictional prerequisite of Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f) in discretionary sentencing matters. In Krum, however, this court sidestepped the Tuladziecki decision and found the requirement of a 2119(f) statement “procedural” and hence subject to waiver by the appellee. Since the court will also permit the appellant to supplement his brief to supply the missing statement when the appellee does raise its absence, cf. Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 366 Pa.Super. 328, 531 A.2d 441 (1987), we have, *380in practical effect, rendered Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) a nullity, and robbed the Tuladziecki case of any significance.
In Tuladziecki, the supreme court did, in fact, refer to the absence of a 2119(f) statement as a “procedural violation.” Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. at 515, 522 A.2d at 21. However, it is a non sequitur to conclude, as we did in Krum, that because the violation is “procedural,” an appellee can “waive” it. While the requirement of a statement listing the reasons upon which an appellant relies for appeal may be procedural, it is part of the procedure by which an appellant perfects his claim to this court’s discretionary jurisdiction in sentencing matters. This court has never held that procedural requirements of this nature are waivable at the option of the appellee. In fact, the action or inaction of the appellee makes no difference to our ability to look past procedural deficiencies to review the merits of a case.
In perpetuating the error that the supreme court had corrected in Tuladziecki, this court in Krum cited to several cases to show that procedural violations could be “waived” by the appellee’s failure to object. Upon closer examination, the court’s misapprehension of these cases is evident. Firstly, in none of the cases cited by the Krum majority did this court comment upon the appellee’s objection or failure to object. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bell, 328 Pa.Super. 35, 476 A.2d 439 (1984) (although court stated it would consider merits of appeal even though appellant violated rules limiting statement of questions presented, it did not state why). In fact, in Commonwealth v. Gumpert, 354 Pa.Super. 595, 512 A.2d 699 (1986), the Commonwealth, appellee in that case, had complained that the appellant’s captioning of his appeal as an appeal from the order denying post-trial motions was incorrect because such appeals are interlocutory, and that the appeal should have been taken from the final judgment of sentence. Id., 354 Pa.Superior Ct. at 597, 512 A.2d at 700. That argument on the part of the Commonwealth would have precluded any “waiver” of the violation, under Krum’s rationale. In *381allowing that appeal to be heard, however, a panel of this court stated that the error was one of form, and not substance, so that the principles surrounding the rule that appeals must be taken from a final judgment of sentence were not contravened. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Lahoud, 339 Pa.Super. 59, 488 A.2d 307 (1985) (court, by authority of Pa.R.A.P. 105(a), which allows liberal construction of rules at court’s discretion, treated appeal from post-trial motions as appeal from judgment of sentence).
What this court has said in the cases cited by the majority is that a procedural violation will result in the dismissal of the appeal if this court cannot, in its discretion, provide effective appellate review because of that procedural noncompliance. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 269 Pa.Super. 544, 410 A.2d 835 (1979), for example, we held that the appellant’s failure to include ineffective assistance of counsel among the reasons for appeal cited in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement filed in response to the trial court’s order could have waived that issue but did not. Instead, we considered the merits of the issue “because appellant’s failure to comply with the rule [did] not defeat our ability to exercise appellate review.” Id., 269 Pa.Superior Ct. at 548, 410 A.2d at 837. The decision concerning whether or not the defect is so grievous as to prevent review is one for us as the appellate court to make; it does not hinge upon what the appellee does or does not do. In Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 351 Pa.Super. 603, 506 A.2d 936 (1986), we reviewed the merits of appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim even though he had couched that issue in “boilerplate” language, saying, “We are able to glean from appellant’s inartfully drafted brief his mistaken belief that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim revives those substantive claims which counsel is allegedly ineffective for failing to preserve.” Id., 351 Pa.Superior Ct. at 607, 506 A.2d at 938. Exercising our discretion, we overlooked the appellant’s procedural error. In Commonwealth v. Stoppie, 337 Pa.Super. 235, 486 A.2d 994 (1984), we exercised that same discretion even though the violations were much more serious. Id., 337 Pa.Superior Ct. at 240, 486 A.2d at *382997. In both cases, we did so without regard to any action or inaction on the part of the appellee. It is rather incongruous, then, for the Krum majority to have relied on these cases for its proposition that the appellee’s waiver of a procedural violation permits review by this court. If such a tenet is extant, none of the cases cited by the Krum majority give it support.
Closer examination of the supreme court’s opinion in Tuladziecki, on the other hand, shows that the court considered omission of the Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement not subject to cure. Tuladziecki overturned a decision in which this court had ignored the fact that the appellant had not included a 2119(f) statement in its brief, and had found a substantial question that the sentence imposed was not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. This court had read the note to rule 902 which states that “the question of the appropriateness of sentence may be briefed and argued in the usual manner,” Pa.R.A.P. 902 note, to allow an examination of the appellant’s argument on the merits to determine whether or not a substantial question warranting an appeal under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b) existed. See Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. at 512, 522 A.2d at 19. In refuting this analysis, the supreme court examined Pa.R.A.P. 2116(b), and drew a distinction between the requirement that an “appellant shall include any questions relating to the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed” and the necessity of briefing “the issue whether the appellate court should exercise its discretion to reach such question.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(b).
It must first be observed that our rules make a careful distinction between “questions relating to the discretionary aspects of the sentence” and “the issue whether the appellate court should exercise its discretion to reach such question____” Recognizing this distinction, the language from the Note to Pa.R.A.P. 902 quoted in footnote 1 of the Superior Court’s memorandum, speaks only to the fact that the appellant is to supply his brief, with argument on the merits of the question, at the same time *383as he provides his concise statement of the reasons relied on for appeal. It does not and cannot obviate the need for such a statement.
Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. at 512, 522 A.2d at 19. This language mandates that the appellant include such a statement, and, further, indicates that the supreme court viewed this statement as a threshold requirement for the exercise of jurisdiction by this court. “The procedure outlined in the Note accompanying Rule 902 was published in the interest of maintaining consistency between practice under this section of the Sentencing Code and typical appellate practice in [the] Superior Court, which does not ordinarily have discretion as to the exercise of its jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added).
Unless the requirement of the 2119(f) statement is seen to be jurisdictional and therefore non-waivable, the supreme court’s decision in Tuladziecki is nonsense. One can be no clearer than the supreme court in stating its holding in Tuladziecki: “It is only where a party can articulate reasons why a particular sentence raises doubts that this scheme as a whole has been compromised that the appellate court should review the manner in which the trial court exercised its discretion.” Id., 513 Pa. at 515, 522 A.2d at 20 (emphasis added). If a party does not first articulate those reasons, we cannot, according to the decision in Tuladziecki, go rummaging through the record and the merits of the issue raised to discover some substantial question. I therefore take issue with the decision in Krum, and would find appellant’s appeal waived for failure to supply a 2119(f) statement of reasons relied on for appeal.
Although I would quash Sanchez’s appeal, had I, like the majority, been able to determine that this appeal is proper, I would also take issue with the majority’s interpretation of Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 532 A.2d 775 (1987). Sessoms declared that the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional and void ab initio. The court in Sessoms further propounded that its ruling was not available to a party challenging a sentence unless that party had *384previously raised the issue of the guidelines’ unconstitutionality at every appropriate stage of the appellate proceedings. Properly understood, the Sessoms ruling means only that a defendant sentenced under the guidelines may not belatedly raise the issue of their unconstitutionality as grounds for vacating an otherwise proper sentence. However, it does not follow, and Sessoms does not mean, that non-compliance with the guidelines alone can still be grounds for finding a “substantial question” that the sentence is inappropriate simply because the parties have not attacked the guidelines’ constitutionality. To date, despite the Sessoms caveat that the guidelines’ unconstitutionality must be raised to be applied, the supreme court has never found lack of compliance with the guidelines to be sufficient reason for overturning a sentence. Compare Commonwealth v. Samuels, 516 Pa. 300, 532 A.2d 404 (1987) (reinstating legal sentence which superior court had vacated on erroneous ground that it was imposed under unconstitutional portion of guidelines) with Commonwealth v. Mourar, 517 Pa. 83, 534 A.2d 1050 (1987) (per curiam) (vacating superior court’s vacation of sentence entered on erroneous ground that guidelines were applied improperly; remanding in light of Sessoms). Rather, because the guidelines are void ab initio, even a sentence that ignores them completely is not for that reason objectionable. A sentencing court’s failure to follow the invalid guidelines cannot logically raise a “substantial question” about the appropriateness of a sentence, nor can non-compliance with them provide grounds for vacating a sentence, because the guidelines are “of no force at all." 516 Pa. at 380, 532 A.2d at 782. The Sessoms declaration that its ruling was available only to parties who had raised the guidelines’ unconstitutionality therefore means only that to achieve reversal of a sentence, a party must have timely raised the unconstitutionality issue; it does not mean that the failure to follow the guidelines itself provides the requisite grounds for vacating a sentence.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.