Court Opinion

ID: 9575699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:16:05.420982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:48.190775
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as it is my view that genuine issues of material fact remain on appellant’s allegations of negligent or wilful misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty to fully disclose material facts.
“ ‘The relationship of principal and agent is fiduciary in character, and imposes upon the parties the duties of exercising toward each other the utmost good faith. Civil Code, § 4030 (Code, § 37-707) [now OCGA § 23-2-58]. The law implies, as a part of the contract by which every agency arises, that the agent agrees to have an exercise, for and toward his principal, loyalty and absolute good faith. . . . (Citations omitted.) If the agent practices upon the principal any deception (whether intentional or not) whereby the principal is misled and damaged and the agent would reap any benefit, the transaction is fraudulent. . . .’ Williams v. Moore-Grant Co., 3 Ga. App. 756, 759 (60 S. E. 372).” Reisman v. Massey, 84 Ga. App. 796, 799 (1), 800 (67 SE2d 585). Further, when such a confidential relationship “ ‘exists, concealment when there is a duty to disclose, if resulting in injury is itself actionable fraud.’ Scott v. Lumpkin, 153 Ga. App. 17, 19 (264 SE2d 514) (1980).” Moore v. Harry Norman Realtors, 199 Ga. App. 233, 235 (1) (404 SE2d 793).
In the case sub judice, Robertson advised appellant before execution of the sales contract that the buyers were acceptable credit risks for the purposes of owner-financing, but she did not then give appellant material information regarding the buyers’ questionable financial condition. In this vein, Robertson testified that she was aware during the sales negotiations that the buyers owned a house in Washington D. C. and that she did not then view this as favorable financial infor*880mation, explaining that ownership of other property indicates debt which may impair the buyers’ ability to obtain financing. On the other hand, appellant testified that she knew nothing about the Washington D. C. property until after the buyers purchased her home and after she became a creditor in the buyers’ bankruptcy proceeding. It is my view, that this evidence supports appellant’s claims that appellees breached a fiduciary duty to disclose material information regarding the buyers’ financial status. I also believe that genuine issues of material fact remain on appellant’s claim that appellees negligently or wilfully coerced her into selling her home to unqualified home buyers, disregarding the truth of representations that the buyers were financially stable. Moore v. Harry Norman Realtors, 199 Ga. App. 233, 235 (1), supra; Reisman v. Massey, 84 Ga. App. 796, 799 (1), supra. See Lyle v. Etheridge, 40 Ga. App. 808 (1) (151 SE 531).
Decided September 23, 1992
Reconsideration denied October 22, 1992.
Churchill & Ferguson, Anthony M. Thomasson, for appellant.
Moss, Clifford, Moss & Rothenberg, Robert A. Moss, Joel Y. Moss, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Judge Pope and Judge Beasley join in this dissent.