Court Opinion

ID: 9838706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 16:09:17.167609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:44.022758
License: Public Domain

J-S23013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MATTHEW GRAHAM BRYANT                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2565 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 30, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0002302-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                         FILED SEPTEMBER 7, 2023

       Matthew Graham Bryant appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas on August 30, 2022, as made

final by the order denying his post-sentence motion on September 12, 2022.1

On appeal, Bryant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After

careful review, we affirm.

       On April 21, 2022, Bryant pled guilty to criminal trespass and theft. On

August 30, 2022, the trial court sentenced Bryant to an aggregate term of

twenty-eight to fifty-six months’ incarceration, followed by three years’

____________________________________________

1 We note that in his notice of appeal, Bryant purports to be appealing from

both of these orders. “In a criminal action, appeal properly lies from the
judgment of sentence made final by the denial of post-sentence motions.”
Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n. 2 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(en banc). The caption reflects that this appeal is properly taken from the
August 30, 2022 judgment of sentence.
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probation. Bryant filed a post-sentence motion for reconsideration of

sentence, in which he argued his sentences should be run concurrently. The

trial court denied the motion. This timely appeal followed.

      In his sole issue raised on appeal, Bryant argues his sentence is

unreasonable, manifestly excessive and grossly disproportionate to the

circumstances of the case. Bryant concedes this is a challenge to the

discretionary aspects of his sentence. “A challenge to the discretionary aspects

of a sentence must be considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the

right to pursue such a claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. McAfee,

849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

      An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must

invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

      [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
      appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
      and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
      sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
      Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
      defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
      question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
      the Sentencing Code, 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

omitted; brackets in original).

      Here, Bryant filed a post-sentence motion to modify sentence and a

timely appeal, and included the requisite Rule 2119(f) concise statement in

his appellate brief. However, due to the disparity between the claims in his

post-sentence motion and his appellate brief, we must determine which, if

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any, of the challenges to the discretionary aspects of his sentence have been

preserved for our review.

      A defendant can only preserve a claim to the discretionary aspects of a

court’s sentence if he notes a specific objection at the sentencing hearing or

in a post-sentence motion. See id. Bryant did not object to any aspects of his

sentence at the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, to preserve a challenge to

the discretionary aspects of his sentence, he was required to note specific

challenges to the court’s discretion in his post-sentence motion.

      In his motion for reconsideration of sentence, Bryant challenged the trial

court’s decision to run his sentences consecutively. See Post-Sentence

Motion, 9/9/2022, at ¶ 6. He further claimed that despite the District Attorney

arguing that Bryant had a history of violence due to an incident that occurred

in the jail in July 2022, he had otherwise been a model inmate up until that

one incident. See id. at ¶ 3-5.

      However, in his Rule 2119(f) statement, Bryant asserts the court “failed

to give sufficient weight to the significant mitigating factors” and “did not

consider any mitigating factors”. Appellant’s Brief, at 8. Further, Bryant

asserts the court “focused on the seriousness of the crime without also

considering other relevant criteria.” Id. at 9.

      Because Bryant failed to raise the instant discretionary sentencing issue

in his post-sentence motion or at sentencing, we find his issue waived. See

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 936 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“Objections

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to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they are not

raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify the sentence

imposed.” (citation omitted)); see also Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83

A.3d 1030, 1042-43 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (concluding substantial

question was waived for failing to raise it at sentencing or in post-sentence

motion).

      Even if we had not found Bryant’s issue waived, we discern no abuse of

the court’s discretion in imposing sentence. Here, in its opinion on appeal, the

trial court stated:

      First, [Bryant] did not specifically establish any mistake of law or
      abuse of discretion in its Motion to Reconsider Sentence, Notice of
      Appeal, or Statement Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). [Bryant] also
      failed to identify, by reference to the record, the particular
      "legitimate mitigating factors articulated by the defendant" that
      he claims we did not consider.

      Second, [Bryant]’s sentences were below the statutory
      maximums. In fact, we imposed a standard range sentence on
      Count II. Thus, we find [Bryant]’s present claim to lie with the
      sentence on Count III, particularly it being run consecutive to
      Count II.

      Third, the "imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent
      sentences lies within the sound discretion of the sentencing court.
      Same is subject to the above standard for review of the other
      discretionary aspects of sentencing.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/2022, at 5-6. Further, in concluding its sentence

was appropriate, the trial court explained:

      Here, we ordered a pre-sentence investigative report [“PSI"] on
      Bryant and guideline sentence forms ["GSF"] for each conviction.
      Prior to sentencing, we reviewed the PSI and meaningfully
      weighed the factors therein. Specifically, we took into

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      consideration that (1) [Bryant] has a history of drug and alcohol
      addiction and mental health issues; (2) Bryant was truthful with
      the arresting officers; (3) [Bryant]’s mother was not involved in
      his upbringing, his father passed when he was four years old, he
      lived with various members of his extended family, and he
      currently has no family support system; and (4) [Bryant] is
      presently unemployed and homeless. Further, we considered
      defense counsel's argument that [Bryant] "has done very well, has
      been productive in Monroe County [Correctional Facility], and has
      not had any issues, no write-ups."

      On the other hand, we also took into consideration that [Bryant]
      (1) has a history of violent behavior, in and out of supervision; (2)
      "was on parole in Luzerne County, PA for aggravated assault when
      he committed the current offense;" and (3) committed the instant
      offense while in a public space, causing extensive damage to
      property.

      Additionally, we considered the GSF for both counts. After
      considering the aforementioned factors, we imposed an
      aggravated range sentence on Count III and ordered it to run
      consecutively to that imposed on Count II. However, we also
      tailored [Bryant]’s sentence to his rehabilitative benefit by
      requiring him to [undergo] drug and alcohol and mental health
      treatment as a condition of his probation and parole. Lastly, we
      ordered that [Bryant] serve his sentence at a state facility due to
      his history of violence, even while incarcerated, being
      "problematic and [... not] amenable to a county correctional
      facility or county supervision on probation." Thus, we find
      [Bryant]’s claim of error to be without merit.

Id. at 7-8.

      Contrary to Bryant’s assertions, the trial court considered the mitigating

circumstances Bryant claims it did not. Moreover, as the trial court specifically

noted, it had the benefit of a PSI report. Where a trial court has a PSI, “it is

presumed that the sentencing court was aware of the relevant information

regarding defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with

mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 368

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(Pa. Super. 2005) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Hallock, 603 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation

omitted) (“It would be foolish, indeed, to take the position that if a court is in

possession of the facts, it will fail to apply them to the case at hand”). The

trial court explicitly addressed its review of the PSI report as well as the GSF

report in its opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/2022, at 7-8.

      As we find Bryant’s sole issue on appeal is waived, and otherwise

without merit, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/07/2023

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