Court Opinion

ID: 9671803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:43:33.778998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:12.167184
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice
(dissenting).
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the clear and unambiguous language of Article XIII, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution permits any person to sell the products of his or her farm, including meat products, without obtaining a license. But because I also conclude that the majority opinion, by upholding the custom meat processing regulation in the context of the present dispute, guts the constitutional protections granted to farmers to sell their own products, I respectfully dissent.
We today declare, that it is “clear that the voters of Minnesota intended to protect the commercial relationship between farmers and their customers by restricting the state’s power to license the sale of farm products directly to the consumer.” This much the majority grants. The language of article XIII, section 7, the majority says, is “broad and clear.” But then, by adopting a distinction between “pure licensing requirements and substantive regulation,” the majority states that “[ajrticle XIII, section 7, does not exempt the Hart-manns from [Minn.Stat. § 31A.10(4)] that prohibits the sale of uninspected meat.” The distinction the majority draws between licensure and substantive regulation is real, but it cannot be employed, without more, to circumvent-constitutional provisions and the intent of the people of Minnesota.
There "is no dispute that ensuring the safety of the food supply is a valid purpose of regulation, nor is it disputed that inspection is a valid means to that end. Food inspection has a long history in Minnesota — the first sanitary food law giving the Minnesota Dairy and Food Department (the precursor to the current Department of Agriculture) general inspection duties for food-related establishments was promulgated in 1913; state meat inspection, first enacted in 1969, is of more recent vintage. Act of March 6, 1913, ch. 47, 1913 Minn. Laws 41; Act of Apr. 29, 1969, ch. 225, 1969 Minn. Laws 338 (codified at Minn.Stat. ch. 31A. (2004)). What is disputed here is a provision of Minnesota law that permits the custom slaughtering and preparation of animals for use by the immediate family of the farmer. The state alleges, and the majority agrees, that because the statute does not permit sale of custom slaughtered animals by the farmer-owner, such sale is therefore illegal not*461withstanding the constitutional prohibition against a licensing requirement.
But in the present case, the state makes no showing that the small-scale sale of custom processed meats by livestock farmers presents a public health risk. Nor does the state attempt to justify the disparate treatment of custom processors of meat and farmers wishing to sell then-meat directly to consumers. Custom processors may, without inspection, process and return meats to individual farmers for use by the farmer, his or her family and employees. Minn.Stat. § 31A.15, subd. 1(2) (2004).1 Despite the fact that custom processors may return uninspected, processed meats to an unlimited number of qualifying persons for individual use, a farmer may not sell his own custom-processed meats to the public. Id. If the former does not present a public health risk, it is difficult to see how the latter does, especially considering the low volume of sales normally associated with sales by a single farmer. The state makes no showing that the Hartmanns’ sale of the produce of their farm endangers public health any more than does the custom processing and return of uninspected meat for use by farmers, their families and employees. The majority merely notes without analysis that the prohibition of the sale of custom-processed meats is a “trade off’ for exemption from inspections.
A word needs to be said about the underlying arguments offered by the parties. The basis of the state’s argument is that custom processed meat is a threat to public health if offered for sale to the public. This is not illogical but it is unsupported by the statute and the record before us. The legislature could speak clearly on this question, addressing when and where, consistent with public health, a farmer is permitted to sell processed meat that is the product of his or her farm. But this the legislature has not done.
Similarly, implicit in appellant’s argument is the superiority of “organic” meat custom processed by the farmer for sale to the public. Not only is this not self-evident, but, here, too, there is nothing in this record to support such a conclusion. Indeed, it may very well prove that public health demands tight and burdensome regulation of custom processed meat before permitting, if at all, sale of a farmer’s product to the general public.
As footnote four in the majority opinion implicitly demonstrates, the licensing requirement prohibited by Minnesota voters was so onerous (essentially a fee equivalent to nearly 50% of annual household income) as to be an indirect bar to the sale of farm products. The custom slaughter sale ban we consider here has virtually the same effect. I do not contend, and the Hartmanns do not argue, that the voters insulated farmers from public safety regulation. But where the Minnesota Constitution has protected the commercial relationship between a farmer and the farmer’s customers, there needs to be at least some minimal showing that the regulation in question actually addresses public safety issues.2 This is not a difficult burden to impose on the state; to hold otherwise, however, is to ignore the intent of the voters as expressed in article XIII, section 7, which recognized “the fact that tillers of the soil stand in a peculiar position in reference to the marketing of their prod*462ucts,” Minnesota Wheat Growers’ Co-op. Marketing Assn. v. Huggins, 162 Minn. 471, 480, 203 N.W. 420, 424 (1925).3 Because I conclude that the prohibition on the sale of custom processed meat found in section 31A.10(4) is unconstitutional as applied to the Hartmanns, I respectfully dissent.

. The underlying assumption in this litigation is that the only vehicle available for the Hart-manns to sell directly to the public their own organically raised animal products is by way of the custom processing provisions found at Minn.Stat. § 314A.10(4). In any event, neither party cites any authority for the proposition that the Hartmanns had other options available that would avoid the constitutional interpretation issue presented here.

. Given the absence of litigation in connection with Article XIII, Section 7, of the Minne*462sota Constitution, it is perhaps not surprising that it is unclear what standard applies to constitutional analysis of this provision and which party bears the burden of proof in connection with a constitutional challenge. Usually, a statute is presumed valid and the duty is on the challenging' party to prove invalidity. Essling v. Markman, 335 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Minn.1983). But the burden may shift to the state when a law impinges on a right recognized implicitly or explicitly in the constitution. See, e.g., Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993). Similarly, while it is at least arguable that a higher level of scrutiny applies when a challenged statute directly impinges on a right guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution, see id. at 312-13, here, at the very least, the state must show that the statute ’must be rationally related to achievement of a legitimate governmental purpose. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981); Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732, 741 (Minn.1979). Because the state is unable to meet these minimal analytical standards, it is not necessary to resolve these issues in' the context of this appeal.
Additionally, because the Hartmanns have clearly asserted that the sale of their own meat is protected by the Minnesota Constitution, I reject the argument made by the majority and the concurring opinion that the Hartmanns somehow failed to make the required constitutional challenge to the custom slaughtering provision. While greater clarity in the argument would have been helpful, the Hartmanns have claimed from the start of these proceedings that they are constitutionally permitted to sell the products of their farm, e.g., custom slaughtered meat. I believe the issue is adequately preserved for consideration by this court in this criminal prosecution.

. It is undisputed that Minnesota is far more urban in character than 1906, when Minnesotans amended the state constitution. Yet it is worth noting that according to the Minnesota Department of Agriculture, Minnesota currently ranks 7th in total agricultural production among the states, and is home to some 80,900 farms, comprising 55% of our state's land. And, given that the average Minnesota farm is 344 acres, smaller farm operations are still significant contributors to Minnesota agriculture. Minnesota Department of Agriculture, Minnesota Agriculture: A Profile of Minnesota’s Agriculture and its Contribution to the State Economy at 3 (2004-05), available at http ://www.mda.state.mn.us/maitc/agpro-file.pdf.