Court Opinion

ID: 9517474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:18:09.322659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:55.261670
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Supreme Court Rule 201 permits broad discovery of “any matter relevant to the subject matter *** whether it relates to the claim or defense of *** any *** party, including the existence *** of any *** things.” 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(b)(1). Certainly the ability to pay damages is relevant to liability, whether in the form of insurance or assets. The supreme court has interpreted the rule’s purpose as “ ‘expeditious and final determination of controversies’ ” (Owen, 105 Ill. 2d at 530, 475 N.E.2d at 890, quoting Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d at 357, 221 N.E.2d at 415) and has given the trial court great latitude in determining the scope of discovery (Daniels, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 324, 607 N.E.2d at 1261). Moreover, the supreme court has rejected as authority those cases limiting pretrial discovery to matters admissible in evidence. “In light of this approach, we must reject at once as authority those cases limiting pretrial discovery to matters admissible in evidence [citation] as being contrary to both the terms and intent of the [r]ule. We do not imply that answers to interrogatories can be brought to the attention of the jury.” Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d at 237, 145 N.E.2d at 592. Based upon the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring defendant to disclose his financial information. The trial court should nonetheless either issue a protective-conduct order limiting dissemination of the financial information or conduct an in camera inspection and permit only limited disclosure of the information to plaintiff. The parties concede plaintiff suffered actual damages of at least $50,000 and defendant has policy limits of $100,000. Given these facts, disclosure of defendant’s financial condition may expedite settlement as well as prevent plaintiffs attorney from committing malpractice and the insurance company from incurring a bad-faith refusal to settle in the event of an excess verdict claim. “Such knowledge, furthermore, would also lead to more purposeful discussions of settlement, and thereby effectuate the dispatch of court business. This aspect is most significant in terms of effective judicial administration in coping with today’s congested dockets which are largely attributable to the increasing volume of personal[-] injury litigation.” Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d at 239, 145 N.E.2d at 593. Moreover, the majority concedes the value of discovering a defendant’s financial condition. The majority, however, distinguishes financial information from insurance limits on the ground that insurance exists solely to protect a defendant from liability to injured parties by statute. This is a distinction without merit. The majority ignores the public policy set forth in the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law (625 ILCS 5/7 — 101 through 7 — 708 (West 2002)), which requires drivers to possess insurance or financial assets sufficient to cover damages in case of an accident on our roads. Clearly, sufficient financial assets to pay for damages to injured parties are required in Illinois absent insurance. “The Administrator as soon as practicable after the receipt of the report, required to be filed under [s]ections 11 — 406 and 11 — 410, of a motor vehicle accident occurring within this [s]tate and that has resulted in bodily injury or death of any person or that damage to the property of any one person in excess of $500 was sustained, shall determine: 1. Whether [sjection 7 — 202 of this Code requires the deposit of security by or on behalf of any person who was the operator or owner of any motor vehicle in any manner involved in the accident and; 2. What amount of security shall be sufficient to satisfy any potential judgment or judgments for money damages resulting from the accident as may be recovered against the operator or owner, which amount shall in no event be less than $500.” 625 ILCS 5/7 — 201 (West 2002). However, in Fisher, the supreme court makes a curious distinction between the discoverability of assets and an insurance policy, commenting that there are roads of discovery of a defendant’s assets but not the existence of an insurance policy. “Ordinarily a plaintiff has many sources of inquiry by means of which he can appraise the likelihood that the judgment he seeks will he enforceable. In the case of an insurance policy, however, all the customary channels are cut off.” Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d at 238-39, 145 N.E.2d at 593. I see no distinction between the discoverability of an insurance policy and a bank account, retirement account, or investments in stocks and bonds. Insurance companies, banks, and investment companies are all bound by privacy laws from disclosing a party’s assets without a release. Under the facts of this case, plaintiffs are entitled to discovery of the defendant’s financial condition, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ordering discovery. For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court.