Court Opinion

ID: 9681197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:45:51.830577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:32.617384
License: Public Domain

Ward, J., dissenting. First I wish to point out two respects in which I cannot agree with the majority opinion. I now refer to these as briefly as possible consistent with clarity and without setting forth the controversial clauses. (a) At pp. 1021-1022 in the majority opinion, there is language which appears to assume the existence of ambiguity in the policy. This assumption is based on the fact that one part of the policy says the Company is liable if the insured is “injured while occupying an automobile,” while another part says the Company is not liable if the insured is injured in an automobile provided for his regular use. Undoubtedly it cannot be said that an insurance policy is ambiguous merely because it contains a limitation clause. If this were true, then every insurance policy would be ambiguous. Therefore, we must start out with the proposition that if there is any ambiguity in the policy it is only in the limitation clause itself. (b) The majority opinion misconstrues the effect of the holdings in every case cited in relation to the limitation clause here under consideration. I cannot help but feel certain that the majority, in considering the controversial words “for the regular use of” are confusing the purpose of the use of the automobile with the extent of the use. All of these cases referred to above and cited by the majority deal only with the extent and not the purpose of the use of the automobile. In the Davy case nothing was said about the purpose but only the extent of the use of the taxicab. The holding in this case is directly opposite the holding in the majority opinion to the extent that there the taxicab was used not for his personal use but for the use of his employer. The same thing is true in the Home Insurance Company ease where all of the discussion was relative to the extent of the use. And again, the holding in that case is contrary to the majority opinion. It is there said: “Defendant agrees that he would be excluded from coverage if the pick-up truck had been furnished for his regular use. However, he argues, that ‘furnished for regular use’, under exclusion clause (d) (1) of Insuring Agreement Y, means he was entitled to an indiscriminate and unrestricted, full and complete use of the truck, and since his use of the truck was restricted by his employer to a ‘business use’, it was therefore not furnished to him for his ‘regular use’. Defendant then argues that ‘for regular use’ must mean indiscriminate and unrestricted use, . . . ” In rejecting the above contentions the court there said: “If defendant is right, then he would be getting insurance on the Dodge and the pick-up truck for the price of the insurance on the Dodge alone. Every day, two vehicles could be on the road at one time, the Dodge driven by his wife, and the pick-up truck driven by him in his occupation, covered by one policy. This would be a bargain, and not one that was intended by the policy.” In the Voelker case the court considered only the extent and not the purpose of the use of the automobile. The gist of the reasoning given by the court is couched in the 3rd headnote which reads: “It is common knowledge that a greatly increased hazard against which the insured was protected under a liability policy would greatly increase the premium for such coverage.” It is too obvious for argument that the hazard would be the same regardless of the purpose for which an automobile is used. The holding in the Farm Bureau case is the same as in the other cases just mentioned. Again a good reason is given by the court where it said: “The purpose of the clause is to cover casual or occasional use of other cars. Any other interpretation would subject the insurance company to greatly added risk without the payment of additional premiums.” In no way was the court concerned with the purpose of the use of the automobile but only with the extent. Likewise in the Pacific Automobile Insurance Company case, a careful study of the opinion reveals that the court was concerned only with the extent and not the purpose of the use of the automobile. A careful and extensive research reveals that there is no court decision which sustains the position taken by the majority opinion. On the other hand there are several decisions, and two recent ones in particular, which are in point as to the terms of the policy and very similar to this case on the facts. Home Insurance Co. v. Robert E. Kennedy, Jr., Del. Super., May 19, 1959, 152 A. 2d 115, cited above, and George Moore v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., Miss., June 13, 1960, 121 So. 2d 125. In the Moore case the decision also appears to be in point here and is contrary to appellee’s contentions. The facts involved in the cited case were similar to the facts in this case and the pertinent parts of the policies are exactly the same. Appellant had a policy on his own automobile — a Family Policy —the same as here, and the same “Medical Payments” were involved. Also, there was the same “exclusion” involved there as here. Contained in the opinion is the following state of facts: ‘ ‘ For some two years prior to the accident later mentioned, insured was employed by Wade Tung Oil Company which owned some ten trucks. Insured drove trucks for his employer and had other duties, including operating a bulldozer, mechanical, tractor, and some carpenter work. He drove trucks for his employer two or three times a week; sometimes lie would haul machinery, and sometimes he would make trips to haul tung nuts. He was not assigned any particular truck the two or three trips a week he would make driving trucks. When he was not driving trucks, he would at times work on a truck as a helper. The court, in holding there was no liability on the part of the insurer said: “As-stated, the obvious purpose of the exclusionary clause is to limit the extension of medical payments coverage to casual or infrequent use or occupancy of automobiles other than the one defined in the policy, in this case the insured’s Chevrolet. It is regular use of other automobiles that brings the exclusionary clause into operation, . . . ” Following the above the court also stated: “there is no ambiguity in the policy.” There are, of course, many words in the English language which are susceptible to more than one interpretation. This does not mean that every sentence in which such a word is used is ambiguous. The normal and sensible thing to do is to look to the context to gather the intended meaning. The word “use” is such a word. Webster’s small dictionary gives 10 different uses of the word. The thing that makes clear the intended use of the word in the policy is the fact that the liability of the Company would be the same regardless of the purpose of the use. Therefore it makes no difference in the case under consideration whether the insured was using the automobile to haul furniture for his employer or take his family to church.