Court Opinion

ID: 9524196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:50:34.278173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:05.746415
License: Public Domain

Jansen, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I would affirm defendant’s sentence. The trial court’s finding that there were substantial and compelling reasons to depart below the statutory minimum sentence is not clearly erroneous. I find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to fashion a sentence of three to twenty years’ imprisonment in this case.
Following a bench trial in the Oakland Circuit Court, defendant was acquitted of conspiracy to deliver more than 50 but less than 225 grams of cocaine, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), and convicted of delivery of more than 50 but less than 225 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2) (a)(iii). The actual amount of cocaine involved in this case was about sixty-seven grams. The statute provides that an offender in this category shall be imprisoned for not less than ten nor more than twenty years. However, trial courts are permitted to depart *285from the minimum term if the court finds that there are substantial and compelling reasons to do so on the record. MCL 333.7401(4); MSA 14.15(7401)(4).
Our Supreme Court has recently held that “only those factors that are objective and verifiable may be used to judge whether substantial and compelling reasons exist.” People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 62; 528 NW2d 176 (1995). In determining whether substantial and compelling reasons to depart exist, courts first are to place particular emphasis on mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense. Id., p 76. Other factors to then evaluate include: (1) the defendant’s prior record, (2) the defendant’s age, (3) the defendant’s work history, (4) the defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement officials, and (5) factors arising after the defendant’s arrest. Id., p 77.
The existence or nonexistence of a particular factor is a factual determination for the sentencing court that is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review. Id. The determination that a particular factor is objective and verifiable is to be reviewed as a matter of law. Id. A trial court’s determination that the objective and verifiable factors present in the case constitute substantial and compelling reasons to depart from, the statutory minimum sentence is to be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id., p 78.
In reviewing the lower court record and the trial court’s findings, I cannot conclude that the trial court’s determination of the existence of substantial and compelling factors to depart was clearly erroneous. The trial court first found that defendant was employed at a local restaurant at the time of the offense, but had been unemployed for approximately six months and was seeking employment. He had five *286previous years of employment at another restaurant. Defendant graduated from Cody High School in 1990 and had been admitted to attend Wayne County Community College. The trial court noted that defendant had done well in school and was on the honor roll, even though he was considered learning disabled because of attention deficit disorder and dyslexia. Defendant resided with his mother and stepfather in the City of Detroit.
The trial court also noted that defendant was single. The trial court placed particular emphasis on the fact that defendant (who was twenty-one years old at the time of the offense) had no prior criminal record and no juvenile record. There was no indication of any substance abuse by defendant, and the result of a drug test conducted by the probation department was negative. The trial court noted that there was no history of mental or emotional problems, but did note that defendant suffered a serious leg injury during his arrest.
The trial court, which sat as the finder of fact in this case, then recounted the circumstances surrounding the offense, and noted that defendant was unquestionably involved in a drug sale. Although it was uncertain, the trial court did seem to indicate that whether a person was more or less involved in the crime should be a factor to consider. Because the Supreme Court specifically stated that mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense should first be considered, there is no error in determining that defendant’s involvement was fairly minimal. The evidence at trial revealed that defendant did not actually deliver the cocaine, nor did he receive any money.
*287The existence of the factors to depart as found by the trial court are not clearly erroneous because they are all amply supported by record evidence. Further, the factors identified are objective and verifiable and have been specifically identified as being valid factors by the Supreme Court. Unlike the majority, I would hold the trial court to its word because the trial court specifically stated on the record that it would not weigh defendant’s leg injury as a factor in deviating. The majority’s decision to treat the leg injury as an improper reason for deviating is puzzling because the trial court said it would not weigh this as a factor.
With regard to the trial court’s decision to include the probation officer’s recommendation of probation, had probation been an option, as a reason to deviate, I do not find any error requiring reversal. The probation officer wrote in the presentence report as follows:
If the defendant were convicted of a probationable offense, the writer would certainly recommend such, however, it appears conviction, as indicated, precludes such a recommendation. Therefore, we are recommending a confinement sentence, as mandated.
The trial court stated that it would weigh the probation officer’s evaluation. I believe that the probation officer recognized that defendant was an appropriate candidate for probation, but also recognized that he was not eligible for probation and, therefore, recommended a period of confinement as mandated by the statute. I see nothing improper in the trial court’s decision to rely on the probation officer’s expertise in this area.
*288I cannot conclude that the trial court’s determination that the factors constitute substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the mandatory minimum sentence is an abuse of discretion. Further, I do not find the sentence to violate the principle of proportionality because the sentencing guidelines’ range was determined to be twelve to thirty months and the trial court carefully considered the background of the offender and the circumstances surrounding the offense. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
I would affirm defendant’s sentence.