Court Opinion

ID: 9753138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:00:09.516907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:08.428898
License: Public Domain

O’Sullivan, J.
(dissenting). The case suggests two possible theories for claiming actionable fraud on the part of Jere Adametz, hereinafter called the defendant. The first is based on his failure to disclose to the plaintiff that he had bought the Tesar farm, and the second on certain fraudulent representations made by him to the plaintiff. In other words, the one rests on his silence, the other on what he said. Neither theory, it seems to me, has any merit.
As indicated, the first theory is based on the fact that, while holding himself out as Tesar’s agent, the defendant purchased the farm and thereafter sold to the plaintiff, through two dummies, seventeen of the eighty acres without revealing to the plaintiff the true nature of the entire transaction and the furtive steps which he, the defendant, had taken in acquiring the land for his son. Our law is clear that, under the circumstances found by the court to have prevailed, no duty was imposed upon the defendant to refrain from buying the farm himself or *227to disclose that he had done so, as long as he was not acting at the time as agent for, or did not occupy a confidential relationship towards, the plaintiff. Kurtz v. Farrington, 104 Conn. 257, 265, 132 A. 540. Since the plaintiff concedes that the defendant was not his agent and since the facts do not admit of the existence of any confidential relationship between the parties, neither the defendant’s conduct nor his silence about it presents an instance of actionable fraud.
The second theory is grounded on certain representations, fraudulently made by the defendant, to the effect that he had submitted to Tesar the plaintiff’s offer to pay $7000 for the entire farm and that Tesar, while rejecting that offer, had authorized the defendant to sell to the plaintiff for $6000 the seventeen acres upon which stood the house and the other buildings. To recover on the basis of these obviously false representations, the plaintiff had to establish (1) that they were made as statements of fact, (2) that they were untrue and known by the defendant to be untrue, (3) that they were made for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to act upon them, (4) that the plaintiff was in fact induced to act upon them, and (5) that in so acting he was legally injured. Helming v. Kashak, 122 Conn. 641, 642, 191 A. 525; Macri v. Torello, 105 Conn. 631, 633, 136 A. 479. All the foregoing essentials must be proven, and the absence of any one of them is fatal to recovery. Bradley v. Oviatt, 86 Conn. 63, 67, 84 A. 321.
It is to be noted that the plaintiff, as a result of the representations, took no positive act respecting the remaining sixty-three acres. It is, of course, true that fraudulent representations may be actionable even in the absence of a positive act, since fraud inducing inaction can be as culpable as fraud which *228prompts action. Kordis v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 311 Mich. 247, 251, 18 N.W.2d 811; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hedrick, 181 Va. 824, 833, 27 S.E.2d 198. Thus, recovery was permitted where the representations caused the plaintiff to refrain from perfecting an inchoate lien,1 or from rescinding a contract,2 or from selling his property,3 or from putting his merchandise on the market.4 Cases such as those cited, however, give no comfort to the plaintiff, since his failure to act did not affect any property interest owned by him. The law does not appear to subject a defendant to legal culpability for fraudulent representations in those instances where the person, induced to inaction, sustains no damage to his property interests or rights. Such instances would be those of injuria absque damno. See Austin v. Barrows, 41 Conn. 287, 297. They would be fraud without damage. Sherwood v. Salmon, 5 Day 439, 445.
But even if the law were otherwise, the plaintiff would not be advantaged. Because of the absence of an appendix, the finding cannot be corrected. Practice Book § 447. Since the finding does not disclose that the sixty-three acres are worth over $1000, the plaintiff has failed to establish any pecuniary loss whatsoever.
For the reasons stated above, I must disagree with my colleagues.

 Alexander v. Church, 53 Conn. 561, 563, 4 A. 103.

 Bowen v. Carter, 124 Mass. 426, 430; New York Land Improvement Co. v. Chapman, 118 N.Y. 288, 295, 23 N.E. 187.

 Fottler v. Moseley, 179 Mass. 295, 299, 60 N.E. 788; Continental Ins. Co. v. Mercadante, 222 App. Div. 181, 183, 225 N.Y.S. 488.

 Butler v. Watkins, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 456, 462, 20 L. Ed. 629.