Court Opinion

ID: 9954902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 13:08:36.022969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:05.887767
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-1147.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                      HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                               :   APPEAL NO. C-230221
                                                  TRIAL NO. B-2101292
       Plaintiff-Appellee,                    :
                                                     O P I N I O N.
    vs.                                       :

 DARRIUS JOHNSON,                             :

       Defendant-Appellant.                   :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause
                           Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 27, 2024

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Joshua R. Crousey, for Defendant-Appellant.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, Presiding Judge.

       {¶1}   In an application for a warrant to search defendant-appellant Darrius

Johnson’s apartment after police twice observed him dealing drugs in downtown

Cincinnati, an officer submitted an affidavit describing his drug activity and the place

officers believed he lived. But nowhere in the affidavit did the officer connect the

things they sought to seize—drugs and drug instruments, proceeds from drug sales,

and weapons—with the place they sought to search. Because the magistrate here

issued the search warrant without any such information connecting Mr. Johnson’s

suspected drug activity to his residence, the warrant lacked probable cause and was

issued in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse Mr.

Johnson’s convictions stemming from the illegal search.         Because the evidence

supporting his conviction for failing to comply with a police signal did not arise from

the search, we affirm the trial court’s judgment on that conviction only.

                                           I.

       {¶2}   As part of an investigation of drug activity in downtown Cincinnati,

police officers began to suspect Mr. Johnson of drug trafficking. Using confidential

informants, officers conducted two controlled drug purchases from him, confirming

their suspicions. After locating an apartment in which he lived and surveilling the

property to confirm he lived there, officers set up a plan to arrest Mr. Johnson for

outstanding traffic capiases.

       {¶3}   Officers set the plan into motion on March 2, 2021. With undercover

officers stationed around Mr. Johnson’s apartment complex, two uniformed officers

in a marked police cruiser approached him on the street as he left the building with a

woman and walked toward a vehicle parked on the street. Around the same time that

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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

he entered a Chevrolet vehicle alone, the cruiser’s overhead lights activated, and an

officer stepped out of the cruiser, gun drawn, to approach and arrest Mr. Johnson.

Before they could engage him further, he rapidly sped away from the curb and evaded

officers after a brief vehicle chase. Mr. Johnson’s approach and flight was captured on

body-worn camera (“BWC”) video, which was shown at his trial.

       {¶4}   With Mr. Johnson out of the picture, officers entered the common area

of the building and asked a neighbor about who lived in the target apartment and

showed him a photo of Mr. Johnson. The neighbor confirmed that Mr. Johnson lived

there, prompting officers to apply for a search warrant. Relying on an affidavit from

Officer Grant Hunter laying out the investigation of Mr. Johnson and the events of the

day so far, the magistrate issued the search warrant.

       {¶5}   The affidavit describes the two controlled drug purchases and

subsequent surveillance of Mr. Johnson as follows. The week of January 24, 2021,

officers coordinated with a confidential informant who contacted Mr. Johnson and

met with him in downtown Cincinnati to buy drugs. Mr. Johnson and the informant

agreed to an amount of “heroin/fentanyl” and the price, and he directed the informant

to conduct the exchange with the driver of a nearby Nissan vehicle. The affidavit did

not describe where Mr. Johnson had come from before the transaction, where he went

after, or what vehicle he arrived or left in, but it did state he was “getting into” a

different Nissan vehicle upon the informant’s arrival.

       {¶6}   A few weeks later, in mid-February, officers conducted a second

controlled purchase with another informant who contacted and met with Mr. Johnson

at a different downtown intersection.         This time, the informant purchased

“heroin/fentanyl” directly from Mr. Johnson, sitting inside a blue Hyundai Elantra.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Again, the affidavit did not describe where he had come from before the transaction,

where he went after, or what vehicle he arrived or left in. During this purchase, the

affiant officer observed Mr. Johnson and the Hyundai vehicle he was “utilizing.”

        {¶7}   About a week later, the affiant obtained a “cell phone ping” on Mr.

Johnson’s phone, placing it around Allendorf Drive near the Oakley neighborhood “for

extended hours of the day and night.” He then located a utility bill record in Mr.

Johnson’s name for a specific apartment unit on Allendorf Drive.            Conducting

surveillance of the apartment building, which included four total units and which was

part of a larger apartment complex of similar buildings, the affiant in one instance

observed Mr. Johnson leave the building entrance shared by the four apartments,

enter the same Hyundai vehicle observed during the second controlled buy, and drive

away.

        {¶8}   Finally, the affidavit describes the events of March 2, including how Mr.

Johnson left the apartment building with a woman and fled from police alone in a

Chevrolet vehicle and that officers spoke with a neighbor to confirm he lived in the

target apartment unit. Based on the officers’ investigation, the affiant explained that

he believed the apartment contained additional drugs, proceeds from drug sales,

instruments used in drug trade, and weapons or parts thereof used to protect the

proceeds. The magistrate signed the warrant and officers conducted the search, all on

March 2, about two weeks after the second controlled buy.

        {¶9}   Police seized a loaded pistol, about 250 grams of fluorofentanyl and

fentanyl-related compounds, plastic baggies, a money counter, a shoebox of cash, a

digital scale, a blender with residue, and Narcan. They also located an Internet service

bill in Mr. Johnson’s name, his birth certificate, a “jail bag” (a bag of belongings

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

someone takes home when leaving jail) labeled “Brumfield,” and a debit card with the

name “Tremond Casey.” Testing on a major DNA profile taken from the firearm

returned a hit for an unidentified female individual, and Mr. Johnson was excluded.

Testing on a minor profile could not be completed, and police conducted no

fingerprinting. They determined that Mr. Johnson likely lived alone in the apartment

because one bedroom had furniture in it, while the other was empty except for some

loose clothes, and because only his personal paperwork was located inside.

       {¶10} Mr. Johnson filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the

search, arguing the search warrant was issued without probable cause. The trial court

denied the motion after a hearing because, it concluded, officers had established that

he lived in the specific apartment unit and came and went from that apartment to

conduct two hand-to-hand drug transactions at a separate location in the weeks

leading up to the warrant’s issuance on March 2. However, as will be explored below,

the affidavit lacked any information connecting the residence in question to any drug-

related activities.

       {¶11} While testifying at trial, Officer Hunter possessed a case file that he

periodically referenced. Near the end of cross-examination, defense counsel asked

Officer Hunter whether he reviewed it in anticipation of testifying and whether it

contained the officer’s “cliff notes” on the case. He responded yes to both. Defense

counsel asked the court for an opportunity to review the officer’s notes, but it denied

the request after examining the notes because, it said, “It’s not relevant. It’s stuff that

you already objected to and I sustained it because it’s related to stuff that happened

on a different day.” Counsel renewed his request the next day, citing Evid.R. 612. The

court again denied that request and counsel’s additional request to seal and preserve

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the evidence for appellate review. Defense counsel objected a third time at the

conclusion of all evidence, this time also asking the court to allow him to preserve the

notes for appeal via a proffer, and the trial court again denied his request to review,

seal, and preserve the notes.

       {¶12} The jury convicted Mr. Johnson of six felonies: having weapons while

under disability, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) (count one); trafficking in a

fentanyl-related compound, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) (counts two and four);

possession of a fentanyl-related compound, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) (counts

three and five); and failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, in

violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) (count six). They also found the amount of drugs

exceeded 100 grams regarding counts two, three, and four, rendering Mr. Johnson a

“major drug offender” under R.C. 2925.03. The court merged count three with count

two and merged count five with count four and sentenced him to an aggregate of 14

years and nine months to 16 years and six months in prison. He now appeals his

convictions, arguing that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress, not

allowing defense counsel to review the officer’s notes, and not preserving the notes for

appeal, and that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence and were

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                                          II.

       {¶13} We begin by reviewing the motion to suppress and the underlying

search warrant because our conclusion on that assignment of error is dispositive of

Mr. Johnson’s appeal on most of his convictions. At the outset, we note that because

counts three and five were merged into counts two and four at sentencing, Mr.

Johnson cannot appeal those counts because he was not sentenced on them. See R.C.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2941.25; State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, ¶ 12-

13; State v. Bell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106842, 2019-Ohio-340, ¶ 53. Our analysis

is accordingly confined to counts one, two, four, and six.

       {¶14} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of

law and fact.” State v. Winfrey, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-070490, 2008-Ohio-3160, ¶

19. At a suppression hearing, “the trial court is in the best position to decide the facts

and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. Appellate courts accordingly must

defer to the factual findings of the trial court in evaluating a suppression motion, so

long as they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Banks-Harvey,

152 Ohio St.3d 368, 2018-Ohio-201, 96 N.E.3d 262, ¶ 14. “[B]ut we review de novo

the court’s application of the law to those facts.” State v. Olagbemiro, 1st Dist.

Hamilton Nos. C-170451 and C-170452, 2018-Ohio-3540, ¶ 9, citing State v. Burnside,

100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.

       {¶15} In making the initial determination whether to issue a search warrant

upon probable cause, “the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-

sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before

him, * * * there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found

in” the place to be searched. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76

L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The probable cause determination is a heavily fact intensive,

totality-of-the-circumstances assessment, but at a minimum, “[t]he affidavit

supporting the search warrant must set forth adequate facts to establish a nexus

between the place to be searched and the evidence sought, which depends on the facts

and circumstances of each individual case.” State v. Lang, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

220360, 2023-Ohio-2026, ¶ 19, citing State v. Hobbs, 4th Dist. Adams No. 17CA1054,

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2018-Ohio-4059, ¶ 58; see also United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th

Cir.2004) (en banc).1 Accordingly, where police officers apply for a warrant to search

the home of a suspected drug dealer, the supporting affidavit must, under the totality

of the circumstances, establish a nexus between the defendant’s criminal activity and

his residence sufficient to raise a fair probability that evidence of criminal activity will

be found there. See Lang at ¶ 19; State v. Howard, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230315,

2023-Ohio-4618, ¶ 20, 24.

        {¶16} When reviewing whether a magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant

ultimately comports with the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, “the duty

of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for

* * * [concluding]’ that probable cause existed.” Gates at 238, quoting Jones v. United

States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). In doing so, “ ‘trial and

appellate courts should accord great deference to the magistrate’s determination of

probable cause, and doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be resolved in favor

of upholding the warrant.’ ” State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266, 2015-Ohio-483, 37

N.E.3d 123, ¶ 14, quoting State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989),

paragraph two of the syllabus.

1 The probable cause “nexus” requirement is not to be confused with the “ ‘minimally sufficient
nexus’ ” requirement that Ohio courts and the Sixth Circuit have applied in determining whether
to apply the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. State v. Schubert, 171 Ohio St.3d 617,
2022-Ohio-4604, 219 N.E.3d 916, ¶ 9-13, quoting Carpenter at 596. The “minimally sufficient
nexus” requirement for the good faith exception is a distinct and lower standard than the probable
cause “nexus” requirement, and a “minimally sufficient nexus” is insufficient for concluding a
magistrate had a “substantial basis” for probable cause. See Carpenter at 594-596. At this point in
the analysis, we only consider whether a “nexus” existed to support the magistrate’s probable cause
determination. As explained below, the state did not advance a good faith exception argument for
us to consider.
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶17} This is no doubtful or marginal case. Concluding that the warrant was

supported by probable cause, the trial court indicated, “There’s a bunch of other

information about how they surveilled him and witnessed him engaging in hand-to-

hand transactions and coming back and forth from this address.” But the record

contradicts this conclusion. Certainly, the affidavit included significant evidence that

Mr. Johnson lived at the Allendorf address. However, at no point did the affidavit

include any information regarding where he had come from before or went after the

two controlled buys, and it included no other evidence of drug trafficking. At the

suppression hearing, though, Officer Hunter testified that “My investigation showed

that Mr. Johnson was staying in [the Allendorf apartment] and then travelling

downtown, picking up drug transactions.” Although the trial court may have been

persuaded by Officer Hunter’s testimony, only the affidavit, and not oral testimony,

was offered to the magistrate in support of the search warrant. And where that is the

case, “the magistrate determines the sufficiency of the affidavit by evaluating the facts

contained in the four corners of the affidavit and applies an objective-reasonableness

standard. A reviewing court,” including this court and the trial court below, “is

concerned exclusively with the statements contained within the affidavit itself.”

(Emphasis added.) Lang at ¶ 14, citing State v. Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015-

Ohio-1565, 46 N.E.3d 638, ¶ 39. Therefore, the trial court’s conclusion that Mr.

Johnson was observed coming back and forth from his Allendorf address to engage in

drug transactions is not supported by competent, credible evidence from the affidavit,

and we do not defer to that factual finding. Banks-Harvey, 152 Ohio St.3d 368, 2018-

Ohio-201, 96 N.E.3d 262, at ¶ 14.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶18} Standing alone, the affidavit merely establishes Mr. Johnson’s status as

a suspected drug dealer and the fact that he lived at the place to be searched, at least

in the weeks after he was observed selling drugs. Taken as a whole, in the totality of

the circumstances, the affidavit fails to establish a nexus between his drug activity and

the apartment the officers sought to search. Specifically, the fact Mr. Johnson was

surveilled one time leaving the apartment building and driving away in the same

Hyundai vehicle that he had “utilized,” as the affiant put it, during the second

controlled buy about a week or two earlier (the affidavit is not clear on timing)

establishes nothing beyond what was already apparent: Mr. Johnson likely lived at

that address and had at least periodic access to that vehicle. Further, the Hyundai’s

one-time presence outside Mr. Johnson’s building (well before the search on March 2)

suggests nothing about the contents of the apartment on the date of the search. To

conclude otherwise would render trivial the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause

requirement.

       {¶19} The affidavit’s lack of a substantial basis for probable cause draws into

sharper focus when contrasted with other recent cases where this court has upheld

search warrants for residences used by suspected drug dealers. In State v. Lang, this

court reversed a trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress, concluding there was

probable cause to issue a search warrant where:

       [R]eliable evidence connected Lang’s drug activity to [Address 1, where

       Lang resided]. The detectives conducted numerous hours of

       surveillance of [] two addresses and established a daily pattern of

       movement between [Address 1] and [Address 2]. Every day, Lang

       traveled from [Address 1] to [Address 2] at roughly the same time,

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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       engaged in confirmed drug transactions, and returned nightly to

       [Address 1]. That pattern caused Detective Ingram, who had numerous

       years of experience, to believe that evidence of drug trafficking would

       likely be found at [Address 1].

Lang, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220360, 2023-Ohio-2026, at ¶ 23.

       {¶20} This court also upheld a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to

suppress where:

       Based on the affidavit’s statements regarding the drugs found on

       Howard’s person during the traffic stop in November 2020, the Xanax

       found in his car in December 2020, and the observation of Howard

       exiting from his residence multiple times and approaching vehicles in

       the street for a short period of time before reentering the residence, the

       magistrate could have reasonably inferred that Howard was obtaining

       drugs from inside his house and passing them to persons in the cars

       parked on the street in exchange for money. See [State v.] Castagnola,

       145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015-Ohio-1565, 46 N.E.3d 638, at ¶ 41.

Howard, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230315, 2023-Ohio-4618, at ¶ 24.

       {¶21} In contrast to Lang, the affidavit here contained no evidence suggesting

Mr. Johnson travelled between his apartment and downtown to conduct drug

transactions. And unlike the affidavit in Howard, the affidavit reported no suspected

drug use or trafficking activity in or near the Allendorf apartment. Likewise, the

affidavit included no evidence of drugs recovered or seen near the apartment, such as

in cases where police discover discarded drugs by conducting “trash pulls,” which can

contribute to the required nexus. See Jones, 143 Ohio St.3d 266, 2015-Ohio-483, 37

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

N.E.3d 123, at ¶ 18-19; State v. Martin, 2021-Ohio-2599, 175 N.E.3d 1004, ¶ 23-24 (1st

Dist.); State v. Lackey, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230025, 2023-Ohio-3720, ¶ 16-17.

Finally, the affiant did not assert that Mr. Johnson’s cell phone was a target of the

search, and the state does not argue on appeal that his use of the phone supported the

magistrate’s probable cause determination. On such an affidavit plainly lacking a

nexus between Mr. Johnson’s drug trafficking activity and his residence, we cannot

say a substantial basis existed for the magistrate to find probable cause “that the

specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized [were] located on the property to which

entry [was] sought.” See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556, 98 S.Ct. 1970,

56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978). Therefore, we conclude the search warrant was issued in

violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

       {¶22} Of course, “[t]he question whether the evidence seized in violation of

the Fourth Amendment should be excluded is a separate question from whether the

Fourth Amendment was violated.” Castagnola at ¶ 92, citing United States v. Leon,

468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). Generally, evidence seized

in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary rule, meaning the

remedy is suppression. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081

(1961); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-140, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496

(2009). However, “[w]hen police act under a warrant that is invalid for lack of

probable cause, the exclusionary rule does not apply if the police acted ‘in objectively

reasonable reliance’ on the subsequently invalidated search warrant.” Herring at 142,

quoting Leon at 922. Nonetheless, we need not consider whether this exception to the

exclusionary rule, known as the good faith exception, applies here because the state

never raised it at the trial level or on appeal, and the trial court likewise did not address

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

it. Therefore, the exclusionary rule applies, and the trial court’s judgment denying

suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment—the drugs,

paraphernalia, and firearm recovered from the illegal search of the Allendorf

apartment—was in error.

       {¶23} Accordingly, we sustain Mr. Johnson’s fourth assignment of error and

reverse the judgment of the trial court regarding his motion to suppress.             His

convictions for having a weapon under disability and drug trafficking are reversed.

                                           III.

       {¶24} Mr. Johnson next argues that his convictions were not supported by

sufficient evidence and that they were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Although the trial court’s error regarding the motion to suppress results in reversal of

Mr. Johnson’s convictions on counts one, two, and four, we still must consider his

sufficiency argument regarding all of the convictions he appeals. See State v. Gideon,

165 Ohio St.3d 142, 2020-Ohio-5635, 176 N.E.3d 706, ¶ 27 (sufficiency argument not

mooted by reversal on other grounds because insufficiency would lead to a double

jeopardy bar on a retrial).     We consider his sufficiency argument regarding all

appealed counts before proceeding on his manifest weight and Evid.R. 612 challenges

regarding only his conviction for failure to comply (count six).

                                           A.

       {¶25} When assessing whether a conviction is sufficiently supported by the

evidence, “ ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Walker, 150 Ohio

St.3d 409, 2016-Ohio-8295, 82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. And “ ‘[w]here reasonable

minds can reach different conclusions upon conflicting evidence, determination as to

what occurred is a question for the trier of fact. It is not the function of an appellate

court to substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder.’ ” (Emphasis deleted.) State

v. Shabazz, 146 Ohio St.3d 404, 2016-Ohio-1055, 57 N.E.3d 1119, ¶ 20, quoting Jenks

at 279.
          {¶26} Mr. Johnson claims his convictions for having weapons under disability

and drug trafficking were unsupported by the evidence because mere access to the

weapon and drugs was not enough to show he constructively possessed them and had

knowledge of the trafficking operation. But the cases he cites are unpersuasive

because here, the evidence strongly suggested Mr. Johnson lived in the Allendorf

apartment alone, having full control and dominion over its contents, including the

firearm, drugs, and drug instruments. And the fact female DNA was found on the

firearm does not negate its presence in his bedroom dresser.           Construed most

favorably to the state, the evidence linking Mr. Johnson to the apartment, including

officers’ surveillance, their interview of the neighbor, the utility bill, and his birth

certificate, sufficiently established his constructive possession of its contents and

knowledge of the apparent trafficking operation.

          {¶27} To be guilty of failure to comply in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), he

must have “operate[d] a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or flee a police officer

after receiving a visible or audible signal from a police officer to bring [his] motor

vehicle to a stop.” R.C. 2921.331(B). And because he was convicted of this crime as a

third-degree felony, rather than a lower felony or misdemeanor, he must have “caused

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property” when fleeing from

police. R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(ii).

       {¶28} At trial, one of the officers who attempted to arrest Mr. Johnson testified

that the cruiser’s lights were activated before he drove away and that the BWC video,

shown in court, supported this assertion. Further, the officer testified that the dash-

cam recording would start 30 seconds prior to activation, which, based on the dash-

cam footage shown in court, would mean the lights were activated just before Mr.

Johnson entered his vehicle. Finally, video evidence showed him speeding away from

police in a residential area populated with many other cars and drivers. We hold this

evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude he violated the statute and

that he caused a substantial risk to persons or property in doing so. We therefore

overrule his assignment of error on sufficiency regarding all appealed counts.

                                           B.

       {¶29} Separately, in reviewing whether the conviction runs counter to the

manifest weight of the evidence, we sit as a “thirteenth juror,” reviewing the evidence,

the credibility of witnesses, and the entire record. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d

380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). However, we can reverse the judgment only if “the

jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d

172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). We consider his manifest weight argument

only for count six because the assignment of error is mooted by the motion to suppress

error for counts one, two, and four. See Gideon, 165 Ohio St.3d 142, 2020-Ohio-5635,

176 N.E.3d 706, at ¶ 26, citing Culver v. Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 393, 83 N.E.2d

82 (7th Dist.1948).

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶30} Weighing all the relevant evidence, we conclude Mr. Johnson’s

conviction for failure to comply as a third-degree felony was not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Despite his seemingly accurate claim that the cruiser’s sirens

were not activated until his vehicle had already turned the corner and fled from police,

substantial evidence shows the cruiser’s overhead lights were activated prior to his

flight and that he knowingly sped away to evade arrest. Combined with the fact that

this took place in a residential area crowded with other vehicles, we conclude the jury

did not lose its way in concluding he violated the statute and caused a substantial risk

of serious physical harm while doing so. Therefore, we overrule his assignment of

error regarding manifest weight on count six only while holding it moot regarding

counts one, two, and four.

                                             C.

       {¶31} Finally, Mr. Johnson argues the trial court erred pursuant to Evid.R. 612

in not allowing defense counsel to review notes held and viewed by Officer Hunter

during his testimony. The rule states, in part:

       If a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the purpose of

       testifying, either: (1) while testifying; or (2) before testifying, if the court

       in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests of justice, an

       adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing.

       The adverse party is also entitled to inspect it, to cross-examine the

       witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those portions which

       relate to the testimony of the witness. If it is claimed that the writing

       contains matters not related to the subject matter of the testimony the

       court shall examine the writing in camera, excise any portions not so

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       related, and order delivery of the remainder to the party entitled

       thereto. Any portion withheld over objections shall be preserved and

       made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.

Evid.R. 612.

       {¶32} The clear text of the rule allows the trial court to withhold notes from

adverse counsel when they do not relate to the witness’s testimony, but it also

mandates preservation of any excised notes upon adverse counsel’s request. Id. In

doing so, the rule provides for meaningful appellate review of the trial court’s decision

to withhold notes potentially used to refresh a witness’s recollection.

       {¶33} After defense counsel’s initial request to inspect the notes, the trial court

here sua sponte examined them and determined that all the notes were unrelated to

the officer’s testimony. Therefore, the court essentially “excise[d]” or “withheld” all

the notes, and it had nothing left to deliver to defense counsel for inspection. But it

clearly erred in refusing to preserve the notes for appeal, over Mr. Johnson’s objection

and request to proffer. We are thus left without any ability to determine whether the

trial court abused its discretion in determining that all the notes were unrelated to the

officer’s testimony and thus appropriately withheld from defense counsel’s inspection.

The trial court had no discretion over whether to preserve the excised notes for appeal,

and it therefore erred under Evid.R. 612 in failing to do so. See Johnson v. Abdullah,

166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 39 (“[C]ourts lack the

discretion to make errors of law, particularly when the trial court’s decision goes

against the plain language of a statute or rule.”).

       {¶34} Even so, such evidentiary errors are subject to harmless error review

under Crim.R. 52(A), which “affords appellate courts limited power to correct errors

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

that occurred during the trial court proceeding.” State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118,

2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 9; see State v. Benson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

180128, 2019-Ohio-3255, ¶ 22-24. “Under that rule, the government bears the burden

of demonstrating that the error did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant.”

(Emphasis deleted.) Perry at ¶ 15, citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741,

113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). In determining whether the error was

harmless, “an appellate court must consider both the impact of the offending evidence

on the verdict and the strength of the remaining evidence after the tainted evidence is

removed from the record.” State v. Morris, 141 Ohio St.3d 399, 2014-Ohio-5052, 24

N.E.3d 1153, ¶ 33.

       {¶35} Naturally, our review is complicated by the error itself: we do not know

what the notes contained, so we cannot assess their effect on Officer Hunter’s

testimony. However, because we determine the suppression issue controls regarding

counts one, two, and four, we need only consider the error’s effect on Mr. Johnson’s

failure to comply conviction. And the state introduced significant evidence, apart from

Officer Hunter’s testimony, that Mr. Johnson failed to comply with officers’ visual

signals, including testimony from other officers and BWC video to back it up.

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s Evid.R. 612 error did not affect Mr.

Johnson’s failure to comply conviction, and thus it was harmless with respect to that

count. We accordingly overrule his third assignment of error insofar as it relates to

the failure to comply conviction while not addressing the error regarding counts one,

two, and four.

                                    *      *      *

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶36} In sum, we conclude the trial court erred in denying the motion to

suppress the evidence recovered from the Allendorf apartment because the underlying

affidavit did not provide a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that there

was probable cause. We sustain his fourth assignment of error and reverse the trial

court’s judgment denying the motion to suppress, and Mr. Johnson’s convictions for

having weapons while under disability, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) (count one)

and trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound, in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)

(counts two and four) are therefore reversed. We note for the trial court’s purposes on

remand that our holding on the suppression motion also applies to counts three and

five, which were merged at sentencing.

       {¶37} We further conclude that his convictions were supported by sufficient

evidence and that his conviction for failure to comply with an order or signal of a police

officer, in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) (count six), was not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court regarding that

conviction only and overrule his first and second assignments of error. Finally, we

hold that although the trial court failed to preserve Officer Hunter’s excised notes as

required by Evid.R. 612, the error was harmless regarding count six and is moot

regarding counts one, two, and four, and we overrule his third assignment of error

accordingly. We remand this cause with instructions to the trial court to grant the

motion to suppress and for further proceedings consistent with the law and this

opinion.

                    Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

CROUSE, J., concurs.
WINKLER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

WINKLER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

       {¶38} Because I conclude that the affidavit provides a sufficient nexus between

Johnson’s Allendorf residence and his drug transactions with confidential informants

that were verified by police officers, I respectfully dissent. Consequently, I would

overrule the four assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion

to suppress and Johnson’s convictions. I concur with the majority in all other respects.

       {¶39} In order to establish probable cause to issue a search warrant, the

supporting affidavit must contain sufficient information to allow a magistrate to draw

the conclusion that evidence is likely to be found at the place to be searched. Lang,

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220360, 2023-Ohio-2026, at ¶ 12; Martin, 2021-Ohio-2599,

175 N.E.3d 1004, at ¶ 11. Probable cause means less evidence than would justify

condemnation. George, 45 Ohio St.3d at 329, 544 N.E.2d 640. There is probable

cause where a reasonably prudent person would believe that a fair probability exists

that the place to be searched contains evidence of a crime. See id. at paragraph one of

the syllabus; Lang at ¶ 12. “[I]t is clear that ‘only the probability, and not a prima facie

showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.’ ” (Emphasis deleted.)

George at 329, quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d

527. Consequently, “probable cause ‘is not a high bar.’ ” Lang at ¶ 12, quoting State

v. Hobbs, 4th Dist. Adams No. 17CA1054, 2018-Ohio-4059, ¶ 35.

       {¶40} A reviewing court, which includes a trial court ruling on a motion to

suppress as well as an appellate court, must give great deference to that determination.

See George at 329-330; Lang at ¶ 13. “[A]fter-the-fact scrutiny by the courts of the

sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review.” George at 329,
                                            20
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

quoting Gates at 236.     Our duty is to ensure that the issuing magistrate had a

substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. See George at paragraph

two of the syllabus; State v. German, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040263,

2005-Ohio-527, ¶ 12. Doubtful or marginal cases should be resolved in favor of

upholding the warrant. George at paragraph two of the syllabus; Lang at ¶ 13.

       {¶41} In some cases, courts have “permitted judges to infer a fair probability

of finding evidence in a residence even though the affidavit did not state that such

evidence had been observed directly.” United States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 383 (6th

Cir.2016), citing United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 974-975 (6th Cir.1998). The

Sixth Circuit held that “a magistrate issuing a search warrant ‘may infer that drug

traffickers use their homes to store drugs and otherwise further their drug

trafficking.’ ” United States v. Coleman, 923 F.3d 450, 457 (6th Cir.2019), quoting

United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir.2008). To the Sixth Circuit, this

inference “reflects the reality that, ‘in the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be

found where the dealers live.’ ” Coleman at 457, quoting Jones at 975.

       {¶42} However, the Sixth Circuit has vacillated on whether it approves or

disapproves of this inference. At best, the Sixth Circuit’s “jurisprudence is not entirely

clear as to whether a defendant’s status as a drug dealer, standing alone, is sufficient

to establish a nexus between his residence and drug activities.” United States v.

Badley, 6th Cir. No. 22-3789, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 33031, 12 (Dec. 12, 2023), citing

United States v. Ardd, 911 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir.2018) (collecting cases holding

evidence of drug trafficking by an individual supplies a sufficient nexus to search that

individual’s residence and cases requiring independent evidence tying an individual’s

residence to drug activity). However, we need not resolve this issue because in this

                                            21
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

case, the supporting affidavit established a sufficient nexus between Johnson’s

residence and his illegal activities. See Lang, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220360, 2023-

Ohio-2026, at ¶ 21 (holding a sufficient nexus exists between a known drug dealer’s

criminal activity and the dealer’s residence when some reliable evidence exists

connecting the criminal activity with the residence), quoting State v. Young, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 18AP-845, 2019-Ohio-4639, ¶ 18, quoting United States v. Gunter, 266

Fed.Appx. 415, 419 (6th Cir.2008).

       {¶43} Police databases suggested Johnson used a particular apartment on

Allendorf Drive. The affidavit described two connections tying Johnson’s criminal

activities to the Allendorf Drive address: the cell phone number used to arrange the

controlled drug buys was tracked to near that address and the vehicle used in one of

the controlled drug buys was seen at that address. Police officers conducted two

controlled drug buys from Johnson in which confidential informants called Johnson

at a specified cell phone number and arranged the drug transactions. After the second

controlled drug buy, the police officers requested a “ping” on the cell phone number

used in both buys to contact Johnson. The “ping” placed the cell phone with that

number within a 200-to-250-meter radius of the Allendorf address for extended

periods in both day and night. These two facts establish a fair probability that the

phone Johnson used to arrange drug transactions—itself evidence of criminal activity

and likely containing other incriminating evidence—was at the Allendorf Drive

address associated with Johnson.

       {¶44} Also connecting Johnson’s residence to his criminal activities was the

presence of one of the cars he used. During the second controlled drug buy, Johnson

was inside a blue Hyundai Elantra when he met with the confidential informant. The

                                          22
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

police surveilling the controlled drug buy recorded the Elantra’s license plate. When

conducting surveillance on Johnson’s Allendorf address, police officers noticed the

same blue Hyundai Elantra with the same license plate parked outside the apartment

complex. Further surveillance showed Johnson exited from the apartment complex’s

courtyard, entered that blue Elantra, and left the area. The fact that Johnson had

conducted a drug transaction in that blue Elantra and that car was subsequently

observed at Johnson’s Allendorf Drive residence, coupled with the cell phone that he

used to arrange those drug transactions was nearby for extended hours, lead to a

reasonable inference that Johnson may store drugs, proceeds, and other items related

to his illegal activities at the Allendorf Drive address and that evidence of those

transactions may be inside the residence.

       {¶45} Thus, the affidavit established that Johnson was undeniably an active

drug trafficker, that he resided at the Allendorf Drive address, that the cell phone used

to arrange the two controlled drug buys was present for extended periods of time near

the Allendorf Drive address, the same car Johnson utilized in one of the controlled

drug buys was observed at the Allendorf Drive address, and Johnson was seen leaving

the residence via that car. On the day of the search, police officers observed Johnson

leave from the door of the specific building in the apartment complex that housed the

apartment associated with Johnson. Prior to the search, a neighbor in that building

confirmed the specific apartment belonged to Johnson. Based on that evidence, the

averring officer concluded, based on his experience in narcotics investigations, that

there was evidence of drug trafficking at the Allendorf Drive address. The issuing

magistrate agreed and issued the search warrant. These facts established a sufficient

nexus between Johnson’s criminal activities and the Allendorf Drive address searched.

                                            23
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

See Lang, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220360, 2023-Ohio-2026, at ¶ 23 (sufficient nexus

where affidavit established police surveilled the defendant leave his residence, engage

in confirmed drug transactions, and then return to the residence); see also Coleman,

923 F.3d at 457 (sufficient nexus where affidavit established that the defendant was

an active drug trafficker, that the address searched was his home, that both of his

vehicles were regularly parked there, and that investigators observed him drive

directly from the address searched to the site of the most recent buy).

       {¶46} Although the officer testified to Johnson coming and going from his

residence to the drug transactions, the affidavit did not include a statement that

Johnson was observed doing so via electronic means. Compare Lang at ¶ 4, 23 (using

a GPS monitoring device to observe the defendant’s movements). However, this is not

fatal to the warrant. As described above, the affidavit provided the magistrate with a

substantial basis for a reasonably prudent person to conclude that a fair probability

existed that Johnson’s Allendorf Drive address contained evidence of a crime. See

George, 45 Ohio St.3d at 330, 544 N.E.2d 640.

       {¶47} Consequently, I would overrule the assignments of error, affirm the trial

court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and affirm Johnson’s convictions. Thus, I

respectfully dissent in part. I concur in all other respects.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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