Court Opinion

ID: 9906328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 18:02:40.28598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:15.286083
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 Northpoint Capital Fund v. McClenahan CA6

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 NORTHPOINT CAPITAL FUND, LLC,                                       H050514
                                                                     (Santa Clara County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 Super. Ct. No. 20CV373467)

           v.

 JAMES MCCLENAHAN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         Northpoint Capital Fund, LLC (Northpoint) successfully moved for summary
judgment against James McClenahan and additional defendants on six causes of action
stemming from defendants’ fraudulent conveyance of a deed of trust. Following entry of
judgment, Northpoint was awarded $31,617 in attorney fees and sanctions.
         McClenahan appeals, arguing the trial court improperly entered an “amended
judgment” six months after the original judgment, and erred by awarding fees against him
when he was not a signatory to the underlying deed of trust. We conclude the amended
judgment did not alter the original judgment in the manner McClenahan contends, so we
need not decide whether it was improperly entered. We also determine that the trial court
did not err in awarding fees against McClenahan. Accordingly, we affirm.
                      I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
        A. The promissory note and deed of trust
        On October 30, 2018, Northpoint and defendant The Overlook Road Los Gatos
Development, LLC (Overlook) executed a promissory note and deed of trust secured by
certain real property located in Los Gatos (deed of trust).2 Saul Flores signed the deed of
trust on behalf of Overlook as its manager and chief executive officer. McClenahan, a
licensed real estate professional and a member of Overlook, drafted the terms of the deed
of trust.
        Northpoint was designated as the beneficiary and Overlook as the trustor under the
deed of trust. After Overlook failed to make payments to Northpoint, Overlook and
Northpoint executed an “updated installment note” on April 24, 2019. Although
repayment of the loan was due no later than July 31, 2019, Overlook again failed to make
any payments.
        B. The fraudulent conveyance
        Before Northpoint could foreclose on the deed of trust, defendants conspired to
record a fraudulent “substitution of trustee and deed of full reconveyance” to transfer the
deed to their own newly created entity. First, Flores and McClenahan created and
registered a new California limited liability company on June 24, 2020, which they
named “Northpoint Capital Fund, LLC” (Northpoint California), with the same business

        1
         We take our facts from Northpoint’s unopposed separate statement of undisputed
facts, which resulted in the trial court granting Northpoint’s unopposed motion for
summary judgment.
        2
          “A deed of trust to real property acting as security for a loan typically has three
parties: the trustor (borrower), the beneficiary (lender), and the trustee. ‘The trustee
holds a power of sale. If the debtor defaults on the loan, the beneficiary may demand that
the trustee conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.’ ” (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage
Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 926, quoting Biancalana v. T.D. Service Co. (2013) 56
Cal.4th 807, 813.)

                                             2
address as Overlook and McClenahan.3 They intentionally used the same name of
plaintiff Northpoint to create confusion as to the beneficiary of the deed of trust. Flores
was designated as the manager and chief executive officer of Northpoint California.
       Second, on September 3, 2020, Northpoint California recorded a notice
substituting itself as trustee of the deed of trust, and reconveying the deed of trust
(fraudulent reconveyance deed). The fraudulent reconveyance deed stated in pertinent
part: “The undersigned, present Benficiary/ies, of the Deed of Trust dated 10/30/2018
executed by the Overlook Road Los Gatos Development LLC as Trustor(s), to as original
Trustee, for Northpoint Capital Fund LLC as Beneficiary/ies), Recorded on 10/31/2018
… do(es) in accordance with the provisions of said Deed of Trust, hereby appoints and
substitutes itself, Northpoint Capital Fund LLC as Trustee in place and instead of the
current Trustee, and do(es) hereby vest in said Substituted Trustee, all the rights, title,
estate, power, duty and trusts conferred by said Deed of Trust upon the Trustee therein
named. And whereas the indebtedness secured, by the Deed of Trust above mentioned is
unenforceable. [¶] As such duly appointed and substituted Trustee, Northpoint Capital
Fund LLC, hereby accepts said appointment as Trustee under the above Deed of Trust, as
successor Trustee, and pursuant to the request of said beneficiary and in accordance with
the provisions of said Deed of Trust, does hereby reconvey without warranty, to the
person or persons legally entitled thereto, all the estate, title and interest now held by said
trustee under said Deed of Trust.”
       The fraudulent reconveyance deed was signed by Flores as “Member” of
Northpoint California. McClenahan approved of and participated in the plan to substitute
Northpoint California as trustee.

       3
          We label the California entity as “Northpoint California” to distinguish it from
plaintiff Northpoint, a Delaware limited liability company.

                                               3
       C. Complaint
       On November 13, 2020, Northpoint filed the initial complaint in this action. It
filed the operative first amended complaint on December 20, 2020, naming Northpoint
California, Overlook, and McClenahan as defendants. (complaint). The complaint
alleged causes of action for fraud, declaratory relief, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and conversion of collateral. According to
Northpoint, the gravamen of its complaint was that defendants conspired to unlawfully
remove the collateral for the loan.
       D. Discovery
       On January 27, 2021, Northpoint submitted requests for admissions to each
defendant. After defendants failed to respond, Northpoint filed a motion on May 21,
2021, to deem the requests admitted. Defendants did not oppose or otherwise respond to
the motion, which the trial court granted on July 29, 2021. The court also awarded
Northpoint $1,250 in attorney fees as sanctions against defendants.
       E. Summary judgment
       Northpoint moved for summary judgment on September 22, 2021. Defendants did
not oppose or otherwise respond to the motion. The trial court granted the motion in its
entirety on April 1, 2022.
       Judgment was then entered the same day in favor of Northpoint against all
defendants (original judgment). The original judgment provided that the deed of trust
recorded on October 31, 2018, “is reinstated,” and that the fraudulent reconveyance deed
recorded on September 3, 2020 “is vacated.” In addition, it provided that judgment was
entered in favor of Northpoint against all defendants for the $1,250 in discovery sanctions
previously ordered. Lastly, it provided that Northpoint was the prevailing party and
therefore entitled to recover its reasonable costs. Notice of entry of judgment was filed
and served on April 7, 2022.

                                              4
       F. Attorney fees
       Northpoint filed a motion for attorney fees on May 26, 2022. It argued that
attorney fees were authorized pursuant to Civil Code section 1717 for an “action on a
contract,” because the attorney fees provision in the deed of trust was specifically
intended to protect its security interest.
       The deed of trust provided: “To protect the security of this Deed of Trust, and
with respect to the property above described, Trustor agrees… to appear in and defend
any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof of the rights or power of
Beneficiary of Trustee; and to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of
title and attorney’s fees in a reasonable sum, in any action or proceeding in which
Beneficiary or Trustee may appear, and in any suit brought by Beneficiary to foreclose
this Deed of Trust.” Accordingly, Northpoint argued, its claims were “an action on a
contract” under Civil Code section 1717 because they involved a contract and one of the
parties would have been entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to that contract if it
prevailed in its lawsuit. The gravamen of its lawsuit, Northpoint argued, was “to enforce
the terms of the promissory note and deed of trust due to a breach of agreement.”
       Northpoint argued in the alternative that it was entitled to attorney fees pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, due to the defendants’ failure to admit the
requests for admission. Northpoint sought $30,367.50 in attorney fees.
       Defendants opposed the motion on three grounds. First, they argued that
Northpoint’s action was not “on a contract” under the meaning of Civil Code section
1717 because it was not an action to enforce the deed of trust itself. Second, they argued
that, even if the lawsuit could be construed as an action “on a contract,” Northpoint could
only theoretically recover fees from Overlook, the signatory to the deed of trust, and not
from the other defendants, who were non-parties and not in privity of contract with
Northpoint.

                                              5
       Third, they argued that attorney fees could not be recovered from Overlook, the
only signatory to the contract, because it had filed for bankruptcy in June 2022, thereby
staying all legal proceedings against it outside of the bankruptcy action. Defendants
attached to their opposition a purported copy of a notice of bankruptcy filing in U.S.
Bankruptcy Court.
       The trial court granted Northpoint’s motion. It cited the operative language from
the deed of trust which Northpoint relied on, and held that “the mutual intent of the
parties evidenced from the express provision is sufficiently clear and provides for
recovery of all costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees in ‘any action or proceeding in which
Beneficiary or Trustee may appear,’ ” which includes “ ‘any action or proceeding
purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee.’
” The court explained that the language in the contract was broad in scope and not
limited to actions to enforce the note and deed of trust. Accordingly, it included both
contractual and non-contractual causes of action, including tort, declaratory relief, breach
of fiduciary duty or other claims, “provided the cause of action affects the security or
rights or powers of the plaintiff-beneficiary under the deed of trust.” The causes of action
alleged in the complaint, the court held, “pertain to and affect the security and the rights
of the beneficiary (plaintiff) and/or the trustee under the deed of trust….”
       The trial court also held that the summary judgment and judgment had been
entered against all defendants on all causes of action, even though Overlook was the only
signatory to the deed of trust. According to the court, that constituted “proof of the
elements and allegations of the causes of action, including that each defendant is the alter
ego of the other defendants.” The court noted that Northpoint’s complaint had included
allegations within each cause of action that each defendant was the alter ego of the other
defendants, and Northpoint prevailed on those claims.

                                              6
       Lastly, the court held that the automatic stay resulting from the bankruptcy filing
applied only to debtor-defendant Overlook, but not to non-debtors, defendants Northpoint
California and McClenahan.
       The court awarded Northpoint $30,367 in attorney fees, plus $1,250 for the
attorney fees previously ordered to be paid as sanctions for the discovery violations. The
award was made against defendants Northpoint California and McClenahan, “jointly and
severally.”
       The attorney fees order was entered on August 30, 2022.
       G. Amended judgment
       On October 18, 2022, a document labeled “amended judgment” was filed in the
trial court. The amended judgment included some of the same language as the original
judgment entered in April 2022, providing that judgment is entered in favor of Northpoint
and against all defendants; the original deed of trust is “reinstated”; and the fraudulent
reconveyance deed is “vacated.” The amended judgment also included language from
the attorney fees order, providing that judgment was further entered in favor of
Northpoint against all defendants in the amount of $31,617, “which is reasonable
attorneys’ fees awarded, including a prior discovery sanction that the Defendants have
not paid.”
       H. Appeal
       McClenahan filed his first notice of appeal on October 19, 2022, appealing the
attorney fees order. The next day, McClenahan filed an amended notice of appeal
purporting to appeal both the attorney fees order and the “putative amended judgment.”
                                        II. DISCUSSION
       McClenahan presents three arguments on appeal. First, he argues the amended
judgment, made and entered without any notice to defendants, constituted an improper
sua sponte modification of the original judgment by the trial court and is therefore void.
Second, he argues attorney fees cannot be awarded as costs under Civil Code section

                                              7
1717 based on a contract against parties who are not in privity under the contract. Third,
he argues in the alternative that attorney fees cannot be awarded as costs as an element of
damages if the judgment did not award damages.
       We address these in turn below.4
       A. Applicable law and standards of review
                    1. Amending or modifying a judgment
       “ ‘The general rule is that once a judgment has been entered, the trial court loses
its unrestricted power to change that judgment. The court does retain power to correct
clerical errors in a judgment which has been entered. However, it may not amend such a
judgment to substantially modify it or materially alter the rights of the parties under its
authority to correct clerical error. [Citations.]’ ” (Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing
Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1237.)
       After judgment has been entered, a trial court retains jurisdiction for a limited
period of time to entertain and grant motions for a new trial, for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, to vacate a judgment and enter a different judgment, or for
relief from a judgment entered through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect, all
pursuant to prescribed statutory procedures. (Id., citing Craven v. Crout (1985) 163
Cal.App.3d 779, 782-783.)
           “ ‘A clerical error in the judgment includes inadvertent errors made by the court
“which cannot reasonably be attributed to the exercise of judicial consideration or
discretion.” [Citations.] “Clerical error ... is to be distinguished from judicial error which
cannot be corrected by amendment. The distinction between clerical error and judicial
       4
        Northpoint did not file a respondent’s brief or appear in this appeal, after its
attorney substituted out. A limited liability company may not represent itself in propria
persona, and Northpoint failed to retain counsel within the time allotted by this court.
(Merco Construction Engineers, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 724, 729-730.)
We therefore decide the appeal on the opening brief and the record, bearing in mind that
the appellant nevertheless retains the affirmative burden to show error. (Smith v. Smith
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1078; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.360(c)(5)(B).)

                                               8
error is ‘whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in recording the
judgment rendered.’ [Citation.] Any attempt by a court, under the guise of correcting
clerical error, to ‘revise its deliberately exercised judicial discretion’ is not permitted.
[Citation.]” [Citation.] A judicial error is the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and
determination.’ ” (Estate of Douglas (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 690, 695, quoting
Conservatorship of Tobias (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1034-1035.)
       Whether a judgment is void on its face is generally a question of law subject to
independent review on appeal. (See, e.g., Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146
Cal.App.4th 488, 496.)
                  2. Awarding attorney fees
       “California follows the ‘American rule,’ under which each party to a lawsuit must
pay its own attorney fees unless a contract or statute or other law authorizes a fee award.”
(Eden Township Healthcare District v. Eden Medical Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th
418, 425 (Eden Township), citing Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1021, 1033.5, subd. (a)(10),
Musaelian v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 516.) Where attorney fees awards are
authorized by contract and incurred litigating claims that sound in contract, Civil Code
section 1717 governs. (Eden Township, supra, at p. 425, citing Frog Creek Partners,
LLC v. Vance Brown, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 515, 523.
       Civil Code section 1717 provides in pertinent part: “In any action on a contract,
where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred
to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing
party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether
he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable
attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (a).)
       “ ‘California courts construe the term “on a contract” liberally.’ ” (Eden
Township, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 426, quoting Turner v. Schultz (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 974, 979.) “The phrase ‘action on a contract’ includes not only a traditional

                                               9
action for damages for breach of a contract containing an attorney fees clause [citation],
but also any other action that ‘involves’ a contract under which one of the parties would
be entitled to recover attorney fees if it prevails in the action [citation].” (Eden
Township, supra, at p. 426.) “ ‘In determining whether an action is “on the contract”
under section 1717, the proper focus is not on the nature of the remedy, but on the basis
of the cause of action.’ ” (Id., quoting Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th
316, 347.)
       Although an order granting an award of attorney fees is generally reviewed for
abuse of discretion, issues of law concerning entitlement to attorney fees are reviewed de
novo. (Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 286, 298 [discretionary decision on
propriety or amount of fees to be awarded, but “ ‘determination of the legal basis for an
attorney fee award is a question of law to be reviewed de novo’ ”]; Rickley v. Goodfriend
(2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1528, 1533; Carpenter & Zuckerman v. Cohen (2011) 195
Cal.App.4th 373, 378.) An order awarding attorney fees, made after entry of judgment, is
separately appealable. (DeZerega v. Meggs (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 28, 43, citing Soldate
v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1073.)
       B. Analysis
              1. Amended judgment
       McClenahan argues that the amended judgment improperly sought to amend the
original judgment in a material way, to render him “ ‘jointly and severally’ liable with his
co-defendants below, after the original judgment became final no later than June 1,
2022.” He claims the amended judgment went “well beyond the actual terms of the
[original judgment] which contains no mention of torts nor breach of contract, but only
removes a cloud on title, without reference to any money damages.” He argues that the “
‘judicial’ changes between the two judgments, aside from repeating the prior title rulings,
is [sic] the second document alters the finding regarding discovery sanctions, and adds
language creating ‘joint and several’ liability….”

                                              10
          As a threshold matter, the record does not specify whether the amended judgment
intended to amend the original judgment entered in April 2022, the attorney fees order
entered in October 2022, or both. McClenahan presumes it intended to amend the
original judgment. However, the amended judgment did not identify the underlying
judgment being modified, and the proposed order cover sheet submitted by Northpoint’s
counsel omitted information regarding the description, date or time of the relevant
proceeding.
          In actuality, the amended judgment appears to have combined the terms of the
original judgment and the attorney fees order. It first restated the language of the original
judgment verbatim, except for the language regarding the discovery sanctions. It then
restated the language from the attorney fees order awarding $31,617 to Northpoint
against defendants Northpoint California and McClenahan jointly and severally, which
included the $1,250 in discovery sanctions.
          For this reason, the amended judgment did not alter the original judgment or the
attorney fees order in the manner McClenahan contends—that is, it did not materially
alter the parties’ rights by newly rendering McClenahan jointly and severally liable with
his co-defendants below. Instead, as we have explained, the original judgment and the
attorney fees order had already established that McClenahan was jointly and severally
liable.
          McClenahan argues that the “obvious motive” for the amended judgment was to
make up for a perceived gap in liability created by the bankruptcy filing and the limited
scope of relief in the original judgment—“i.e., to add ‘joint and several’ liability with the
bankrupt entity to ‘snag’ appellant with personal liability.” Whatever the motive may
have been, though, there was no such gap in liability. McClenahan was already subject,
along with his co-defendants, to the entirety of the original judgment, which stated:
“judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff Northpoint Capital Fund, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company, and against Defendants Northpoint Capital Fund, LLC, a

                                              11
California limited liability company, The Overlook Road Los Gatos Development, LLC,
and James McClenahan.” Similarly, he was already jointly and severally liable for the
attorney fees and discovery sanctions pursuant to the attorney fees order.
          McClenahan argues that “summary modification of a judgment to add defendants
as ‘alter egos’ of an entity defendant in order to open the door to personal liability is void
[and] that appears to be exactly what the objective was in modifying the judgment,”
relying on Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Corp. v. Western Pacific Roofing Corp.
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 110. In Tokio Marine¸ the trial court had granted a motion to
correct a clerical error in the judgment to add a different insurer as an additional
judgment debtor. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the added insurer had not
been a party to the action, but had only provided insurance to a party in the action, so
there was no basis on which it could be summarily named as a new judgment debtor.
(Ibid.)
          We are not confronted with such facts here, though. Instead, as we have
explained, the amended judgment did not add McClenahan as a new defendant or
otherwise change his liability. He was already specifically named as a defendant in the
original judgment, and as a jointly and severally liable defendant in the attorney fees
order. McClenahan contends Overlook was the only defendant in privity with Northpoint
so that the amended judgment “was an obvious attempt to ‘rule around’ the privity
problem” resulting from Overlook’s bankruptcy proceedings. As we explain further
below, though, Overlook was not the only defendant in privity with Northpoint. Instead,
the attorney fees order provided that the judgment had been entered against all defendants
on all causes of action, which constituted “proof of the elements and allegations of the
causes of action, including that each defendant is the alter ego of the other defendants.”
In other words, the amended judgment was not necessary to rule around a privity problem
because no such problem existed.

                                              12
       Because the amended judgment did not alter the original judgment or the attorney
fees order in the manner McClenahan contends, we need not decide if it was improperly
entered and therefore void. Whether the amended judgment stands or falls, the outcome
on this issue is the same—both the underlying judgment and the order awarding attorney
fees will remain. The amended judgment essentially purported to combine those two
judgments—whether it was necessary or proper to take that step in this case, we need not
decide.
              2. Attorney fees award
       McClenahan argues that attorney fees cannot be awarded pursuant to Civil Code
section 1717 against a party not in privity under the contract. He contends that “the only
parties to the note and trust deed in this dispute were [Northpoint] and [Overlook].” In
other words, because McClenahan did not sign the deed of trust, he was not a party to the
contract and is not subject to a fee award under Civil Code section 1717.
       However, McClenahan was established as the alter ago of Overlook. Accordingly,
it is immaterial that he did not sign the contract. The California Supreme Court’s opinion
in Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124 (Reynolds Metals), is on point.
In that case, the court considered whether a plaintiff, having sued a non-signatory on the
contract as if he were a contracting party, becomes liable for attorney fees pursuant to
Civil Code section 1717 if the non-signatory prevails. The court held: “Had plaintiff
prevailed on its cause of action claiming defendants were in fact the alter egos of the
corporation [citation], defendants would have been liable on the notes. Since they would
have been liable for attorney’s fees pursuant to the fees provision had plaintiff prevailed,
they may recover attorney’s fees pursuant to section 1717 now that they have prevailed.”
(Reynolds Metals, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 129.) Here, Northpoint did prevail on its claim
that McClenahan was the alter ego of Overlook; accordingly, it was entitled to recover
attorney fees pursuant to the fees provision of the deed of trust and Civil Code section
1717. (See also, Apex LLC v. Korusfood.com (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017–1018

                                             13
[“nonsignatory will be bound by an attorney fees provision in a contract when the
nonsignatory party ‘ “stands in the shoes of a party to the contract” ’ ”].)
       McClenahan argues that “the complaint does not contain any allegations of alter
ego theory against [him].” He is incorrect. As we have noted, the complaint specifically
alleged that “each defendant was the alter ego, agent, representative, subsidiary, affiliate
and/or employee of each of the other defendants….”
       McClenahan next argues that “there must be a judgment constituting a ‘win’ based
on the contract containing the attorney fees clause, and fees cannot be awarded until there
is.” He contends the original judgment only determined that the fraudulent reconveyance
deed was an “illegitimate cloud on title and void,” so that Northpoint’s relief was not “on
the contract per se.” As we summarized above, though, the phrase “action on a contract”
within Civil Code section 1717 includes any action that involves a contract “under which
one of the parties would be entitled to recover attorney fees if it prevails in the action
[citation].” (Eden Township, supra, at p. 426.) The deed of trust here provided that the
trustor agreed to pay reasonable attorney fees “in any action or proceeding in which
Beneficiary or Trustee may appear,” including “any action or proceeding purporting to
affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee.” Under the
standard articulated in Eden Township, Northpoint’s action here was “on a contract”
within the meaning of Civil Code section 1717.5

                                      III.   DISPOSITION
       The attorney fees order is affirmed. No costs are awarded because Northpoint did
not file a respondent’s brief.

       5
         McClenahan argues in the alternative that attorney fees cannot be awarded as
costs as an element of damages if the judgment does not award damages. Instead, he
argues, attorney fees are limited to those available under Civil Code section 1717, which
he contends are unavailable here. Because we conclude that attorney fees were available
under Civil Code section 1717, we need not address this alternative argument.

                                              14
                               ___________________________________
                                                Wilson, J.

WE CONCUR:

__________________________________________
                 Greenwood, P.J.

______________________________________
                 Bamattre-Manoukian, J.

Northpoint Capital Fund, LLC v. McClenahan
H050514