Court Opinion

ID: 3098818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-10-16 04:54:17.069828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:51:31.352988
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                         SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                              FORT WORTH

                             NO. 02-12-00288-CR

JEFFREY BOYCE JONES                                                APPELLANT

                                       V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                      STATE

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          FROM THE 432ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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                        MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

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      Appellant Jeffrey Boyce Jones appeals his felony convictions for two

counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a

child by contact. Appellant pled guilty to all three counts pursuant to an open

plea, and the trial judge assessed his punishment at thirty-five years’

confinement for each aggravated sexual assault count and twenty years’

      1
      See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
confinement for the indecency with a child count, all to run concurrently. We

affirm.

       Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to

withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel

avers that, in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief

and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California, by presenting a

professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable

grounds for relief. 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We gave appellant

an opportunity to file a pro se brief, but he has not done so. Likewise, the State

has not filed a brief.

          Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we

are obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record.

See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v.

State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only

then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

          We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with

counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in

the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178
S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d
2
684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to

withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                             TERRIE LIVINGSTON
                                             CHIEF JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: September 19, 2013

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