Court Opinion

ID: 9956383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 22:02:43.335312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:55.493154
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 240037-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                           NOTICE
 Decision filed 04/01/24. The
                                                                                This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-24-0037
                                                                                Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                                   not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                               IN THE                           limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                      under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,      )     Appeal from the
                                          )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                 )     Champaign County.
                                          )
v.                                        )     No. 23-CF-1593
                                          )
JOSHUA T. DAVIS,                          )     Honorable
                                          )     Brett N. Olmstead,
      Defendant-Appellant.                )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         PRESIDING JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Barberis and Boie concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: The trial court’s order granting the State petition to deny pretrial release is
               affirmed where the trial court’s findings that the defendant committed a
               qualifying offense and that no condition or combination of conditions would
               mitigate the threat posed by the defendant were not against the manifest weight of
               the evidence.

¶2       The defendant, Joshua T. Davis, appeals the trial court’s order denying him pretrial release

pursuant to Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Safety, Accountability,

Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act (Act).1 See Pub. Acts 101-652, § 10-255, 102-1104,

         1
         The press and politicians have also sometimes referred to the Act as the Pretrial Fairness Act.
Neither name is official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or public act.
                                                   1
§ 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective

date as September 18, 2023).2

¶3                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶4      On December 19, 2023, the defendant was charged in Champaign County, by information,

with unlawful possession of weapons by a felon in violation of section 24-1(a)(2) of the Criminal

Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(2) (West 2022)), a Class 2 felony, “in that the defendant, a

person who has been convicted of Aggravated Discharge—Firearm, a forcible felony under the

law of Illinois, in the Circuit Court of Champaign County, Illinois, in cause number 2009 CF 926,

knowingly possessed on or about his person any weapon prohibited under 720 Illinois Compiled

Statutes 5/24-1(a)(2), namely a Stihl folding saw, said folding saw being any other dangerous or

deadly weapon or instrument of like character to the enumerated items in 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(2),

with the intent to use the same unlawfully against another.” The defendant was also charged with

criminal trespass to residence in violation of section 19-4(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (id.

§ 19-4(a)(2)), a Class 4 felony. The same day, the State filed a petition to deny the defendant

pretrial release, alleging the proof was evident and the presumption great that the defendant

committed an offense listed in section 110-6.1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022)) and the defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of

any person or persons or the community.

¶5      The trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s petition on December 20, 2023. A pretrial

investigation report revealed that the defendant was 37 years old and unemployed. He had resided

        2
         Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(5) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023), our decision in this case
was due on or before March 27, 2024, absent a finding of good cause for extending the deadline. Based on
the high volume of appeals under the Act currently under the court’s consideration, as well as the
complexity of issues and the lack of precedential authority, we find there to be good cause for extending
the deadline.
                                                   2
in Champaign County for most of his life and had relatives who were also local residents. The

defendant reported that he would walk to the courthouse to attend hearings should he be released.

The defendant denied any history of mental illness. He reported that he had undergone drug abuse

treatment numerous times, with the last time being in 2016.

¶6     The defendant had prior convictions for (1) possession of a weapon by a felon for which

he was sentenced to 7 years’ incarceration, (2) aggravated battery of a peace officer for which he

was sentenced to 5 years’ incarceration, (3) aggravated discharge of a firearm for which he was

sentenced to 191 days’ incarceration and 48 months’ probation, (4) possession of a controlled

substance for which he was sentenced to 2 years’ incarceration, and (5) domestic battery for which

he was sentenced to 12 months’ conditional discharge. The defendant scored a 6 out of a possible

14 on the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument-Revised (VPRAI-R), which indicated a

14.9% chance that he would violate pretrial release conditions.

¶7     The State proffered the following information. On December 28, 2023, deputies with the

Champaign County Sheriff’s Office were dispatched to 388 Wayne Street in Mahomet, Illinois,

on a report of a possible home invasion. The reporting person, Brenda Kinkade, resided at the

residence with her elderly mother. Ms. Kinkade reported that an individual, later identified as the

defendant, forced his way into her home and was armed with a baseball bat. She stated to officers

that she did not know the defendant. The defendant had earlier knocked at her door. Upon opening

the door, Ms. Kinkade observed that the defendant was holding a baseball bat. When she attempted

to close the door, the defendant stopped it with his foot and entered the residence. Thereafter, the

defendant walked around inside the residence. Ms. Kinkade and her mother went to a bedroom

where Ms. Kinkade called 911. The officers made contact with the defendant who had a baseball

bat. The defendant was also found to have a Stihl folding saw with a 6.3-inch blade in his pocket.

                                                 3
The defendant stated that he did not know the residents of the home. The State asked the court to

take into consideration the defendant’s criminal history.

¶8     Defense counsel proffered that the defendant was fully compliant with the officers; he put

down the bat when instructed to do so and he advised them that he had the saw in his pocket. The

defendant left the residence before the police arrived and presumably made no threats to the

residents. The defendant went to the residence because a book told him to go there.

¶9     The State argued that it had presented clear and convincing evidence that the defendant

violated section 24-1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-(a)(2) (West 2022)). It

conceded that the folding saw was not listed as a dangerous weapon in the statute but argued that

it fell under the catchall provision of “any other dangerous or deadly weapon or instrument of like

character.” The State averred that the saw was akin to a folding knife in that it opened up. It

reiterated that the saw had a six-inch blade with very sharp teeth. The State argued that the saw

was something that “could very easily be of like character of the other items in that paragraph.”

The State further argued that the defendant had gone to the home of strangers armed with a

dangerous saw that was similar to knives intending to use it against them. It opined that the

defendant was a danger to the community because he was willing to enter random peoples’ homes

knowing they were present. It noted that a no-contact order would not help. It stated, “If the Court’s

not willing to detain, I would ask to address conditions, but we’re seeking detention first and

foremost.”

¶ 10   After a brief recess to allow the defendant to speak with defense counsel, defense counsel

told the court that he had one fact to add. He stated that the defendant did not force his way into

the home, but rather was allowed into the home. Defense counsel then argued that the State had

not presented clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had committed a detainable

                                                  4
offense. He further argued that there was “absolutely no indication that [the defendant] was using

an item of like character with an intent to harm anyone else.” Defense counsel averred the

defendant’s cooperation with police mitigated any indication of dangerousness. He opined that the

defendant was a long-time resident of the area, which indicated stability. Defense counsel

suggested that a mental health evaluation was more appropriate for the defendant’s situation and

for the public’s safety than putting him in jail.

¶ 11   The trial court stated that it considered the fact presentations, pretrial investigation report,

and arguments of counsel. The court noted that the charged offense that was detainable was

unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. It further noted that the defendant had a felony

conviction. The court stated, “the question is whether the folding saw qualifies” under the statute

and further stated that the statute required that the weapon “be carried or possessed with the intent

to use it unlawfully against someone else.” It found that the State met its burden by clear and

convincing evidence of showing the offense was detainable. It stated that the facts presented

indicated that the defendant went to the residence of people he did not know with a bat and a

folding saw in his pocket because a book told him to do so. The court stated, “And he’s armed.

He’s armed with a bat and he’s armed with this thing in his pocket. And he’s not there to do

something good. He’s there to do something unlawful. That’s the inference there.”

¶ 12   The trial court further found the State met its burden, by clear and convincing evidence,

that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the defendant’s threat to the

community. It noted the defendant’s significant criminal record which included two convictions

for weapon felonies and the defendant’s unemployment. The court then stated, “GPS monitoring

doesn’t mean anything here because this home, this home and these people don’t mean anything

to him. They don’t know him. So there’s no GPS I can enter that’s gonna prevent him from going

                                                    5
to the next house that he thinks a book has told him to go to.” The trial court then advised the

defendant of his appeal rights.

¶ 13   In its written order, the trial court stated in its findings regarding whether the defendant

committed a detainable offense that, in addition to the baseball bat, the defendant “had in his pocket

a Stihl folding saw with a 6.3 [inch] blade, which he also had no reason to possess other than as a

weapon meant for unlawful conduct.” The order further found the defendant posed a real and

present threat and no condition or combination conditions could mitigate the real and present threat

he posed. It summarized its findings as follows:

       “Mr. Davis’s conduct that day, of which the State has clear and convincing evidence, was

       terrifying and extremely dangerous, and demonstrates distorted perceptions diminishing

       Mr. Davis’s ability to refrain from such conduct. The victim was home with her elderly

       and infirm mother, and Mr. Davis forced his way into their home armed with weapons for

       a purpose that appears irrational. The defense’s presentation included the facts that (1) Mr.

       Davis said he was at the house because a book told him to go to that address, and (2) Mr.

       Davis currently believes that he was allowed in the home, which further demonstrates Mr.

       Davis’s ongoing distorted perceptions as it is completely inconsistent with what the victim

       said or what a reasonable person in her position would do if a strange man appeared at the

       door with a bat in his hand. Mr. Davis has a serious criminal record, including three prior

       DOC sentences, two weapon felonies including Aggravated Discharge, and a prior offense

       of being a Felon in Possession of a Weapon, the same charge he faces today, for which he

       served 7 years in DOC and was not deterred. He’s established a pattern as a person who,

       when he loses the will or ability to refrain from dangerous conduct, engages in seriously

       dangerous conduct, and that is his condition today. GPS is useless because Mr. Davis had

                                                   6
       no connection to the victims here and it is unrealistic to believe it would deter him when

       he decides to follow what he believes a book has told him to do and, given the level of

       dangerousness involved here, no conditions of release can mitigate the real and present

       threat that he poses to community safety.”

The order thereafter committed the defendant to the custody of the sheriff for confinement in the

county jail pending trial. The defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on January 2, 2024.

¶ 14   The Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent the

defendant on appeal. On February 13, 2024, OSAD filed a Rule 604(h) memorandum in support

of defendant’s appeal. On March 8, 2024, the State filed a responsive Rule 604(h) memorandum.

¶ 15                                    II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16   Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

(Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)). A defendant’s pretrial release may only be denied

in certain statutorily limited situations. Id. §§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1. After filing a timely verified

petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has

committed a qualifying offense, (2) the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat

to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk, and (3) less restrictive conditions

would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or

prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. Id. § 110-6.1(e). The trial court may order

a defendant detained pending trial if the defendant is charged with a qualifying offense, and the

trial court concludes the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the

community (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1)-(7)) or there is a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid

prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(a)(8)). If the trial court determines that the defendant should be denied

                                                  7
pretrial release, the court is required to make written findings summarizing the reasons for denying

pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1(h)(1).

¶ 17      The statute provides a nonexclusive list of factors that the trial court may consider in

making a determination of “dangerousness,” i.e., that the defendant poses a real and present threat

to any person or the community. Id. § 110-6.1(g). In making a determination of dangerousness,

the court may consider evidence or testimony as to factors that include, but are not limited to,

(1) the nature and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime

of violence involving a weapon or a sex offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the

defendant; 3 (3) the identity of any person to whom the defendant is believed to pose a threat and

the nature of the threat; (4) any statements made by or attributed to the defendant, together with

the circumstances surrounding the statements; (5) the age and physical condition of the defendant;

(6) the age and physical condition of the victim or complaining witness; (7) whether the defendant

is known to possess or have access to a weapon; (8) whether at the time of the current offense or

any other offense, the defendant was on probation, parole, or supervised release from custody; and

(9) any other factors including those listed in section 110-5 of the Code (id. § 110-5). Id. § 110-

6.1(g).

¶ 18      Once the trial court finds the State proved a valid threat to the safety of a person or persons

or the community and/or a defendant’s likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution, the court

must then determine what pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the

          3
          The defendant’s history and characteristics include: “the defendant’s character, physical and
mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community,
community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, *** criminal history, and record concerning
appearance at court proceedings,” as well as “whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the
defendant was on probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of
sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A),
(B) (West 2022).
                                                     8
appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the

likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” Id. § 110-

5(a). In its determination, the trial court must consider (1) the nature of the circumstances of the

offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and

characteristics of the defendant; (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real, and present

threat to any person that would be posed by the defendant’s release; and (5) the nature and

seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. Id. No

singular factor is dispositive. See id.

¶ 19    To reverse a trial court’s finding that the State presented clear and convincing evidence of

a defendant’s dangerousness or that conditions of release would fail to protect any person or the

community, the reviewing court must conclude that the trial court’s findings were against the

manifest weight of the evidence. See People v. Swan, 2023 IL App (5th) 230766, ¶ 12; see also

In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001) (setting a similar standard of review for requirement of clear

and convincing evidence by the State in juvenile proceedings). “ ‘A finding is against the manifest

weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.’ ” Swan, 2023 IL App (5th)

230766, ¶ 12 (quoting People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008)). “Under the manifest weight

standard, we give deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the best position

to observe the conduct and demeanor of the parties and witnesses.” Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d at 332. The

trial court’s ultimate decision to deny pretrial release is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People

v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 10. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision of

the circuit court is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person agree with

the position adopted by the trial court.” Id.; see also People v. Heineman, 2023 IL 127854, ¶ 59.

                                                  9
“[I]n reviewing the circuit court’s ruling for abuse of discretion, we will not substitute our

judgment for that of the circuit court, ‘merely because we would have balanced the appropriate

factors differently.’ ” People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 15 (quoting People v. Cox,

82 Ill. 2d 268, 280 (1980)).

¶ 20   OSAD argues that we should apply a de novo standard of review as set forth in the special

concurrence in People v. Saucedo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232020, ¶¶ 98-102 (Ellis, J., specially

concurring). We do not agree. According to the Saucedo special concurrence, a de novo standard

of review is warranted because of the gravity of the question involved. Id. ¶ 104. In support of this

argument, the special concurrence explains that in In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347 (2004), the Illinois

Supreme Court rejected the deferential abuse of discretion for a best interest determination in child

custody or parental right termination cases due to the fundamental liberty interest in parental care.

Saucedo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232020, ¶¶ 108-10. The special concurrence is misguided as the court

in In re D.T. determined the burden of proof the State must meet at a best interest hearing, not the

standard of review on appeal. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 358, 366. Moreover, despite a parent’s

fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their child, an appellate court

reviews a trial court’s best interest of the child determination only to determine if that finding is

against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Fatkin, 2019 IL 123602, ¶ 32. Thus,

like appellate review of best interest determinations, we will continue to review the trial court’s

findings under a manifest weight of the evidence standard and disagree that the standard

undermines the importance of the issue before us.

¶ 21   We also find the Saucedo special concurrence’s argument that de novo review is required

because there is no live testimony at most detention hearings equally unpersuasive. All the cases

cited by the Saucedo special concurrence in support of this position regard documented testimony

                                                 10
(discovery depositions or transcripts) or other documentary evidence. Saucedo, 2024 IL App (1st)

232020, ¶¶ 99-100 (Ellis, J., specially concurring) (collecting cases). Under the Code, the parties

“may present evidence at the hearing by way of proffer based upon reliable information.” 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2) (West 2022). Proffers differ from purely documentary evidence in that

proffers do not represent a wholly objective view of the evidence. A proffer apprises the court of

“what the offered evidence is or what the expected testimony will be, by whom it will be presented

and its purpose.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Weinke, 2016 IL App (1st) 141196,

¶ 41. The State and the defendant are allowed to present competing proffers of evidence, provided

the evidence is based upon reliable information. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2) (West 2022). Pretrial

detention hearings also differ in that “the rules concerning the admissibility of evidence in criminal

trials do not apply to the presentation and consideration of information at the hearing.” Id. § 110-

6.1(f)(5). A pretrial detention hearing thus necessarily requires the court to consider the reliability

of the evidence as presented and weigh the competing proffers to determine whether the State met

its burden of proof. Therefore, we find that pretrial detention hearings are distinguishable from the

cases relied upon in the Saucedo special concurrence. Accordingly, the Saucedo special

concurrence fails to convince this court to alter our standard of review.

¶ 22   On appeal, the defendant requests that this court reverse the trial court’s order denying him

pretrial release. Although the defendant utilized a notice of appeal form with boxes to check next

to each of the preprinted “Grounds for Relief” and “Imposing Conditions of Pretrial Release,” he

checked no boxes. However, under each potential issue for review, the defendant included

generalized assertions. In its memorandum, OSAD contended that the State failed to prove by clear

and convincing evidence that the defendant was charged with a qualifying offense and the State

failed to prove no conditions could mitigate the threat the defendant posed. In People v.

                                                  11
Forthenberry, 2024 IL App (5th) 231002, ¶ 42, this court held “if a memorandum is filed, it will

be the controlling document for issues or claims on appeal and we will not reference the notice of

appeal to seek out further arguments not raised in the memorandum, except in limited

circumstances, e.g., to determine jurisdiction.” Other appellate districts have also adopted this

holding. See also People v. Rollins, 2024 IL App (2d) 230372, ¶ 22; People v. Martin, 2024 IL

App (4th) 231512-U, ¶¶ 57-59. Accordingly, despite the general assertions listed in the defendant’s

notice of appeal under each issue, we will address only the arguments raised by OSAD in the Rule

604(h) memorandum.

¶ 23   OSAD first contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence that the defendant was charged with a qualifying offense. It argues that a

folding saw does not qualify as the type of prohibited weapon set forth in section 24-1(a)(2) of the

Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(2) (West 2022)).

¶ 24   Section 24-1 in pertinent part states:

               “(a) a person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:

                       ***

                       (2) Carries or possesses with intent to use the same unlawfully against

               another, a dagger, dirk, billy, dangerous knife, razor, stiletto, broken bottle or other

               piece of glass, stun gun or taser or any other dangerous or deadly weapon or

               instrument of like character[.]” Id.

The common law definition of “dangerous weapon” involves the division of “dangerous objects

into three categories: (1) objects that are dangerous per se, such as loaded guns; (2) objects that

are not necessarily dangerous, but were actually used ***; and (3) objects that are not necessarily

                                                 12
dangerous, but may become dangerous when used in a dangerous manner.” People v. Ross, 229

Ill. 2d 255, 275 (2008).

¶ 25   The defendant’s Stihl folding saw falls into the third category. The saw had a 6.3-inch

blade with sharp teeth. There is no question that it could be dangerous if used nefariously.

However,

       “the unlawful weapons statute is not intended to make the possession of every tool,

       implement, or sporting device, which has the potential to inflict serious bodily harm an

       unlawful weapon. Common sense must be the guide. Such an approach acknowledges the

       character of the device and its potential for harm, while not being oblivious to the article’s

       everyday use, the circumstances of its discovery, and in certain cases, the person’s

       explanation as to its presence or possession.” City of Pekin v. Shindledecker, 99 Ill. App.

       3d 571, 574 (1981).

Here, the circumstances were such that the defendant forced his way into a stranger’s home,

wielding a baseball bat. In addition to being armed with a baseball bat, the defendant was found to

possess a sharp-toothed folding saw in his pocket when he was searched. Under the circumstances,

common sense indicates that the defendant could have used the saw as a weapon if he had chosen

to do so and the use of a saw with a sharp-toothed 6.3-inch blade could have been very dangerous

and inflicted bodily harm. Moreover, the circumstances in no way support that the defendant

intended to use the saw for its everyday use. Therefore, we find that the saw falls under the purview

of “other dangerous *** weapon” in the unlawful use of weapons statute. 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(2)

(West 2022).

¶ 26   For purposes of section 24-1(a)(2), “knowingly carrying or possessing a dangerous weapon

with intent to use the same unlawfully against another constitutes the offense of unlawful use of

                                                 13
weapons.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Kincy, 106 Ill. App. 3d 250, 254 (1982). “It is proof of

that intent, ‘or circumstances from which such intent is reasonably inferrable,’ that is required.”

In re Marquita M., 2012 IL App (4th) 110011, ¶ 29 (quoting People v. Sullivan, 46 Ill. 2d 399,

403 (1970)). Again, the State’s proffer evidenced that the defendant forced his way into a

stranger’s home while wielding a baseball bat. He was at the home because, according to the

defendant, a book told him to go there. As noted by the trial court, the defendant was not there to

do something good. Given these circumstances, it is reasonable that the court would infer from

them that the defendant had the intent to use the saw unlawfully against the home’s residents.

Moreover, the defendant has not given any other reason why he had the saw. Therefore, we find

that the Stihl folding saw falls within the definition of a prohibited weapon under the unlawful use

of weapons statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(2) (West 2022)) and the court’s finding in this regard was

not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 27   OSAD next argues that the State failed not only to prove that no conditions could mitigate

any threat posed by the defendant, but it also failed to address conditions of release. It further

argues that as a result of the State’s failure to address conditions of release, there was no clear and

convincing evidence that no conditions would mitigate the threat to any person or the community

posed by the defendant.

¶ 28   The State argues that the defendant’s detention was necessary because lesser conditions

would not mitigate the defendant’s threat to other persons or the community. It avers that its proffer

showed the defendant was being held for a detainable offense and that the trial court explained its

reasoning on the record, including its consideration and rejection of lesser conditions which

included GPS monitoring. It opines, “[t]he bizarre and extremely dangerous facts surrounding

defendant’s arrest clearly show that he is a threat to any person or persons and to the community

                                                  14
at large.” The State further argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the

defendant’s detention. It avers the court considered and applied the factors listed in section 110-

5(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022)) and explained its analysis of the facts and

evidence presented in its decision to detain the defendant.

¶ 29   OSAD cites People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, in support of its argument that the

State failed to prove that no conditions could mitigate any threat posed by the defendant. In that

case, as in this case, the State presented a factual proffer but no evidence that no conditions

contained in section 110-10(b) of the Code would mitigate the threat the defendant posed to any

person or the community. Id. ¶ 17. The Stock court stated:

       “This is not to say that alleged facts stating the basic elements of an offense are not relevant

       or are not part of the proof that no conditions could mitigate the threat posed by a defendant.

       But more is required. If the base allegations that make up the sine qua non of a violent

       offense were sufficient on their own to establish this element, then the legislature would

       have simply deemed those accused of violent offenses ineligible for release. In other words,

       if alleging that defendant discharged a firearm and struck a person was sufficient to show

       that no conditions of pretrial release could mitigate any threat, then no defendant charged

       with aggravated battery/discharge of a firearm would ever be eligible for pretrial release.

       That is clearly at odds with the statute’s presumption of eligibility for all defendants, and

       the plain language of article 110 of the Code indicates that more is required.” Id. ¶ 18.

¶ 30   The Stock court found that the State’s reliance on only its factual proffer about the

allegations did nothing to establish that no combination of conditions could mitigate the threat

posed by the defendant. Id. ¶ 19. It stated, “We cannot infer on behalf of the State that there is no

conceivable combination of conditions that could mitigate the threat. Without something more the

                                                 15
trial court’s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence ***.” Id. The Stock court

further found that the trial court’s order denying pretrial release underscored the lack of proof

presented by the State in that it stated in the blank space allotted for the finding only that “ ‘The

defendant shot a firearm at the complaining witness.’ ” Id. ¶ 20. The appellate court found the trial

court’s oral pronouncement contained no specific reasoning either. Id. The court went on to hold

that, “Without clear and convincing proof of this element, there is no basis upon which to detain

defendant, and the trial court erred in its determination that no condition or combination of

conditions could mitigate the threat posed by defendant.” Id. ¶ 21.

¶ 31   We find Stock to be distinguishable from the case now before us. Here, while the State did

not specifically address GPS monitoring as a pretrial condition, it did address the condition of a

no-contact order. Also, unlike Stock, the trial court here clearly considered whether GPS

monitoring was a viable condition. Moreover, there is no requirement that the State must make an

argument as to every possible condition of release. Rather, its burden is that it must present clear

and convincing evidence that no conditions would mitigate the risk posed by the defendant. 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2022). Here, the trial court explained that neither GPS monitoring nor

other conditions could mitigate the risk based on the defendant’s criminal history and his

odd/mentally unstable behavior of randomly choosing to enter a home with dangerous weapons

based on what he perceived a book told him to do. Further distinguishing this case from Stock, the

State presented this evidence at the hearing, and the evidence is more than the basic elements of

the charged offense (which is being a felon and possessing a dangerous weapon intending to use

it against another). Therefore, we do not find Stock to be controlling.

¶ 32   For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the State that the trial court’s finding that the

State’s proffer showed by clear and convincing evidence that lesser conditions would not mitigate

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the defendant’s threat to other persons or the community was not against the manifest weight of

the evidence. Moreover, we agree with the State that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

ordering the defendant’s detention. We find that the court considered and applied the factors listed

in section 110-5(a) of the Code (id. § 110-5(a)) and explained its analysis of the facts and evidence

presented in its decision to detain the defendant. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order

detaining the defendant.

¶ 33                                      III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34    The State sufficiently proved that the Stihl folding saw recovered from the defendant falls

within the definition of a prohibited weapon under the unlawful use of weapons statute (720 ILCS

5/24-1(a)(2) (West 2022)) and is thus a qualifying offense. The State also sufficiently proved there

was no condition or combination of conditions that would mitigate the threat to others or the

community posed by the defendant, and the court’s detention order regarding the less restrictive

conditions finding complied with section 110-6.1(h)(1) of the Code. Accordingly, we affirm the

trial court’s pretrial detention order.

¶ 35    Affirmed.

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