Court Opinion

ID: 9477441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:23:33.012368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:52.783912
License: Public Domain

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree strongly with the majority that the issue in this case should be decided by the court en banc. I also agree with the majority that we are bound to follow Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. Unit A 1981) as our court’s first pronouncement on the elements of § 1983 actions complaining of undue force. Further, I agree that our circuit has conflicting decisions on whether “severe injury” is a necessary element of such an action. I disagree, however, with the majority’s interpretation of Shillingford. Shillingford, it seems to me, cannot be interpreted as imposing a “severe injury” requirement. The facts and disposition of that case it seems to me do not support the imposition of this requirement.
Shillingford does say that “we must inquire into the amount of force used in relationship to the need presented, the extent of the injury inflicted and the mo-fives of the state officer.” Id. at 265 (emphasis added). Additionally, the opinion says, “[i]f the state officer’s action caused severe injuries, was grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances and was inspired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience, it should be redressed under Section 1983.” Id. (emphasis added). This language, however, does not set forth those elements as necessary; the language says only that they would be sufficient for a Section 1983 action.
The Shillingford panel, therefore, did not impose an absolute requirement of a severe injury. Indeed, it implicitly found in that case that there was no severe injury: “That the results of the attack on Shilling-ford’s person were not crippling was merely fortuitous. The same blow might have caused blindness or other permanent injury.” Id. at 266 (emphasis added). Rather, that panel appears to have taken a more generalized look at all of the circumstances of the case in its holding that a Section 1983 cause of action existed. Perhaps the panel was examining only whether the circumstances amounted to an abuse of official power that “shocks the conscience.” See id. at 265.
The more general test examines all the circumstances to determine whether the action rises above a standard tort. Naturally, the elements listed in Shillingford will commonly appear in valid Section 1983 *849claims, and they should be considered at trial. But, they are not exclusive or mandatory. This general circumstances test is more flexible than the rigid requirements and reaches the abuses of official power at which Section 1983 was aimed. Therefore, I would reverse the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s action and remand to that court for it to consider whether Officer Moral’s actions “shock the conscience.”