Court Opinion

ID: 9836857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:14.409532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.066537
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge
(dissenting):
The members found appellant guilty of 3 specifications of committing indecent acts with his 15-year-old daughter. The appellate court below stated:
The victim of MSG Armstrong’s misconduct was his eldest daughter, CA. CA was born on 15 December 1978. The first three specifications alleged that three distinct, indecent acts (rubbing CA’s chest and neck area, placing his penis in CA’s hand, and rubbing his groin area against his daughter’s groin area) occurred “on diverse occasions” between 1 November and 14 December 1994.
Unpub. op. at 2.
The majority sets aside these convictions because opinion testimony from a government witness, Doctor Geiger, was improperly admitted at appellant’s court-martial over defense objection. The majority also specifically holds that it is not persuaded that such error was harmless. I conclude, based on the entire record in this case, that this objected-to evidentiary error was harmless because it did not “materially prejudice[] the substantial rights of [appellant].” Article 59(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 859(a); see United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1272 (10th Cir.1999); cf. United States v. Dollente, 45 MJ 234 (1996).
Turning first to the evidentiary error, I agree with the appellate court below that it occurred. See United States v. Suarez, 35 MJ 374, 376 (CMA 1992) (Expert testimony admissible to “help[ ] explain why many sexually abused children delay reporting their abuse, and why many children recant allegations of abuse and deny that anything occurred.”). At the very least, expert testimony concerning the typical responses of child sex abuse victims is admissible at court-martial if a proper foundation is laid. Id. Here, the alleged victim’s failure to object to her father’s conduct or to call it to the attention of some other adult was a focal point of the defense’s attack on her credibility. Moreover, the defense attacked the victim’s credibility on the basis of a defense expert’s view that she “may be prone to perceptual inaccuracies.” Thus, the prosecution properly *83asked Dr. Geiger: “Based upon your interview with [CA], were you able to form an opinion as to whether she exhibited the characteristics and responses consistent with those exhibited by victims of sexual abuse?” Id; see United States v. Charley, supra at 1264-65.
However, Dr. Geiger’s testimony in response to this proper and reasonable question was inadmissible. She replied: “My opinion is that the information that I obtained during the course of the evaluation with [CA] is highly indicative of her being sexually abused by her father.” This response goes far beyond the question asked and that permitted by military law. See United States v. Birdsall, 47 MJ 404, 410 (1998); see also United States v. Charley, supra at 1266-68. The core question then becomes one of harmless error under Article 59(a). The majority has “grave doubts” concerning the harmlessness of such error. As I explain later, I do not. First, I wish to focus on the majority’s reasoning.
In reversing this case, the majority engages in an unwarranted attack on the alleged victim’s testimony. It describes her testimony as “the ambiguous, uncertain testimony of a 17-year-old girl who appeared to live in a fantasy world and ‘may be prone to perceptual inaccuracies.’ ” 53 MJ at 81. However, when a reasonable person reads the record in this case, it appears that facts, not fantasies, were presented to the jury. In fact, appellant clearly corroborated key portions of the victim’s testimony in his own pretrial statement admitted at this trial. (Prosecution Exhibit 6). There, appellant stated:
CONCERNING THE REASON THAT I AM AT THE POLICE STATION: SINCE I HAVE THOUGHT ABOUT WHAT HAS BEEN SAID I WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT I HAVE USED POOR JUDGEMENT. MY ACTIONS WHICH ARE THE BASIS OF THIS COMPLAINT WERE NEVER MEANT TO GIVE ME SEXUAL GRATIFICATION OR INJURE MY DAUGHTERS. AS FOR THE STATEMENT ABOUT ME TOUCHING [CA’S] CHEST/ BREASTS I HAVE POSSIBLY TOUCHED THEM BY ACCIDENT WHILE GIVING HER A MASSAGE.
IN THE MORNING BEFORE GOING TO WORK I WOULD OCCASIONALLY ENTER [CA’S] BEDROOM AND GIVE HER A KISS GOOD-BYE. SOMETIMES I WOULD ALSO MASSAGE HER SHOULDERS, NECK AND I ACCIDENTLY TOUCHED HER WHERE SHE DID NOT FEEL COMFORTABLE. AT NO TIME DID [CA] INDICATE THAT SHE DID NOT LIKE THIS OR ASK ME TO STOP UNTIL LAST THURSDAY MAY 23RD. SOME TIME AGO THERE WAS ALSO AN INDICENT [sic] WHERE MY PENIS TOUCHED [CA’S] HAND. THIS WAS NOT INTENTIONAL, BUT I WAS IN MY UNDERWEAR AND I WAS MASSAGING HER. ONE OF U.S. MOVED AND MY PENIS WENT ACROSS HER HAND. AGAIN THIS WAS AN ACCIDENT.
(P.E. 6). Obviously, the alleged victim did not fantasize about all of the inappropriate touchings in this case.
The majority also errs in evaluating appellant’s testimony solely in terms of his credibility as a senior noncommissioned officer with 23 years of honorable service. Appellant’s actual testimony in this case must also be considered. He explained his practice of entering his daughter’s bed early in the morning before she awoke as follows:
So in the morning, I’d try and spend a little bit of time with them to make me— me feel better about the time I can’t spend with them, and to — just kind of start their day off with — with a warm feeling that they know that — even if they can’t remember that their dad’s been there, they know that — that I come in and I at least kiss them goodbye. They know I’ve been there, and they feel a little bit better about the day.
(R. 333). He further explained why he did not wake his children at this time:
Q. Did you think that they would be able to remember that you had done this?
*84A. It’s — it’s possible. I’ve heard stories of where personnel — people who are in comas, if you read to them, sing to them and so on, that some doctors mil claim that that helps them. It helps maintain a hold on reality and such, and so I had sort of the same idea in mind. Even if they can’t remember for sure I was there, you know, they — maybe it would transfer a little bit like that. And again, at least I felt better if I had spent some time with them during the day.
(R. 333) (Emphasis added.) Finally, he admitted that he occasionally did this while in his underwear.
In my view, appellant’s testimony is damning material for the jury, and his “innocent explanations” could reasonably be discounted by the jury. Moreover, appellant’s testimony is substantially different from that presented in United States v. Dollente, 45 MJ at 234. In that case, the accused basically asserted that he had a regular practice of crawling into his teenage daughter’s bed in the morning to wake her, and he may have accidentally touched her in inappropriate places during this process. Moreover, in Dollente, supra, the alleged victim recanted her accusations of sexual abuse prior to trial. Here, the alleged victim did not recant her testimony, and appellant’s explanation of his own conduct was considerably more bizarre than that presented by the accused in Dollente. * In these circumstances, I am convinced that this case was not as close as the majority indicates. Id. at 238.
The majority opinion’s legal standard for determining harmless error is correct. Consistent with my separate opinion in United States v. Powell, 49 MJ 460, 466 (1998) (Sullivan, J., concurring in the result), on plain error, the majority follows Supreme Court cases on the subject of harmless error when we are interpreting and applying Article 59(a). See United States v. Berry, 1 USCMA 235, 239, 2 C.M.R. 141, 145 (1952); United States v. Lee, 1 USCMA 212, 216, 2 C.M.R. 118, 122 (1952); United States v. Lucas, 1 USCMA 19, 23, 1 C.M.R. 19, 23 (1951). More particularly, it follows the harmless error standard enunciated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), and recently discussed in O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995). The Supreme Court indicates that it is somewhat misleading to focus on which party has the burden and whether that burden has been met when an appellate court reviews for harmless error. The real question the Court is asking itself when applying the legal standard of harmless error is, “Do I, the judge, think that the error substantially influenced the jury’s decision?” O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 992; see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (did error have substantial and injurious effect on or influence in determining the jury’s verdict). If the appellate court concludes that the error did not have a substantial influence on the outcome or has no grave doubt that it had such effect, the error is harmless. See United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d at 1270, 1272.
As to my view on harmless error in this case, my independent review of the record shows that no actual prejudice inured to appellant as a result of the evidentiary error noted above. Strong curative instructions were given by the military judge prohibiting the improper use of Dr. Geiger’s testimony, once after she testified and once again during the instructions before deliberation. See United States v. Harris, 51 MJ 191, 196 (1999)(instructions to the members absolved any resultant harm from admitting numerous *85instances of improper testimony). Moreover, Dr. Geiger’s unsolicited answer was not exploited by the Government, and it was not referred to by either party in their closing arguments. Also, appellant’s story of his regular practice of massaging his 15-year-old daughter in her bed each morning, sometimes in his underwear, in order to personally bond with her while she was asleep, did not have great exculpatory value. See United States v. Weeks, 20 MJ 22, 25 (CMA 1985).
On the other hand, the Government presented a strong witness in CA, whose story was corroborated to a large degree by appellant’s damaging admissions to civilian police. Finally, in view of the “relatively modest amount of erroneously admitted testimony” from Doctor Geiger, I am convinced that this error did not materially prejudice appellant. See United States v. Charley, supra at 1270 n. 29, 1272 (affirming conviction based on Court of Appeals’ own evaluation for absence of prejudice). In the case before us, the record shows appellant received a fair trial before a jury that properly convicted him. The jury fairly heard both sides in this case and decided against the appellant. Accordingly, I see no legal reason to disturb this jury’s verdict. I would affirm this case.

 Unlike in this case, Judge Gierke, in Dollente, supra, took a less sympathetic view of the accused child abuser's explanations and characterized Staff Sergeant Dollente's statement to the Office of Special Investigations that he "sometimes awakens his 13-year-old step-daughter by lying on the bed with her, and hugs and kisses her, and sometimes 'goes on top of her to wake her up,’ ” as being "bizarre" and an "implausible excuse.” United States v. Dollente, 45 MJ 234, 244 (1996) (Gierke, J., with whom Crawford, J., joins, dissenting). One might find more incredible, however, the instant appellant’s explanation of his regular practice of bonding with his teenage daughters by massaging them every morning before they awake (R. 333, 336), sometimes in his underwear, in hopes of starting their day off with a warm feeling (like helping "people who are in comas”).