Court Opinion

ID: 9538375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:35:50.053746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:49.450294
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING
CONTRERAS, Judge.
The State of Arizona, as Appellee, has filed a Motion for Rehearing for the sole and limited purpose of seeking clarification of a point of law. Since the point of law with which the State is concerned is of statewide importance, we grant the Motion for Rehearing and clarify our previously issued Opinion.
The issues before this Court on appeal involved the constitutionality of the 60-day mandatory minimum sentencing provision contained in A.R.S. § 28-692.01 B. More specifically, Appellant contended that the imposition of the minimum 60 days in jail when a person has been twice convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DWI) within a 24-month period is a denial of equal protection of the law and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We concluded that there were no constitutional violations on the grounds asserted by Appellant. The particular statute challenged read: i. e., A.R.S. § 28-692.01 B:
B. When a person convicted of a violation of § 28-692 has been previously convicted of a violation of either § 13-456, subsection A, paragraph 3, 28-708, or 28-692 within a period of twenty-four months such person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than twenty days nor more than six months, and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of not less than one hundred fifty nor more than three hundred dollars. When a person is convicted of a second or subsequent violation of § 28-692 within a period of twenty-four months, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than sixty days nor more than six months, and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of three hundred dollars. In addition, the judge shall require the surrender to him of any' operator’s or chauffeur’s license of such convicted person and shall immediately forward to the department the license with the abstract of conviction. The department upon receipt thereof shall revoke the driving privilege of such person. The dates of the commission of the offense shall be the determining factor in applying this rule. A second or subsequent violation for *596which a conviction occurs as provided in this section shall not include a conviction for an offense arising out of the same series of acts. No judge may grant probation to or suspend the imposition of a jail sentence or fail to require the surrender to him of any license of any person for a second or subsequent conviction. If in the court’s opinion the offender has the problem of habitual abuse of alcohol or drugs the court may require the person to obtain treatment under its supervision. (Emphases supplied)
Upon examining this statute, it initially appears that in order for the 60-day mandatory minimum sentencing provision to become operative, a person must be convicted of a second violation of A.R.S. § 23-692 within a 24-month period. In its Motion for Rehearing, the Appellee states that it is the date of offense commission and not the date of offense conviction which is controlling with respect to the mandated sentencing for a person convicted of two DWI offenses within a period of 24 months. The basis for this statement is that portion of the statute which states:
“... The dates of the commission of the offense shall be the determining factor in applying this rule. . . . ”
Although the foregoing quoted portion of the statute regarding date of offense commission is immediately preceded by a statutory provision mandating revocation of a person’s driving privilege, it could be argued that such “rule” relates solely to revocation of driving privileges; however, such is not the case. We are of the opinion that it was the intent of the legislature that the legislatively mandated “rule” relating to date of offense commission governs both the 60-day mandatory minimum sentencing provision of the statute along with the administrative revocation of license privileges of a person so convicted and we so hold. With the foregoing clarification, our previous opinion is affirmed.
EUBANK, P. J., and HAIRE, J., concur.