Court Opinion

ID: 9929252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 05:06:21.390497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:20.483896
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                       UNPUBLISHED
                                                                       February 1, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                      No. 366716
                                                                       Wayne Circuit Court
RICKY GENE ALLISON,                                                    LC No. 22-003174-01-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and HOOD, JJ.

K. F. KELLY, P.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

         I agree with the majority’s determination that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied defendant’s motion to introduce evidence concerning his sexual relationship with the
victim. I write separately, however, to express my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion
that the trial court also abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion regarding the
introduction of evidence about the existence of the victim’s relationship with another individual at
the time of the alleged assault. In my view, such testimony is prohibited under the rape-shield
statute, MCL 750.520j, is irrelevant, and I respectfully dissent.

         In defendant’s motion to offer evidence, which the trial court denied, defendant asserted
that he desired to introduce evidence that the victim was “in a relationship with another person at
the time of the alleged incident.” The purpose of such evidence, according to defendant, was to
probe the victim’s “credibility, bias, and motive to make false allegation [sic] . . . .” For its part,
the trial court determined that the potential evidence was not relevant and was not admissible under
MCL 750.520j:

       [W]ith respect to the proposed offer of evidence or questioning regards to the
       complainant’s potential relationship with another third-party individual to show
       that there was a motive to lie or fabrication, the Court does not find that that line of
       questioning or proposed evidence would be relevant in this case.

               The fact that the complainant may have been in a relationship at the time
       does not show any real relevance in this case. You may say there could be a motive
       to lie or it’s being fabricated because of this other relationship, but I haven’t seen

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       anything in the motions or the briefs indicating there’s any other information other
       than you just want to ask questions about this other relationship to, in essence, call
       into question the complainant’s lifestyle, the fact that she was dating someone when
       these allegations came about.

               So while you had brought up the concern of confrontation with respect to
       that and, as the parties agree, it doesn’t fall under the exceptions to the rape statute,
       Mr. Allison does not have a right to confrontation for irrelevant pieces of
       information and there’s very strong policy in this State through the legislature that
       questioning a witness or a complainant or a victim about sexual conduct with—
       potential sexual conduct with third parties, not the Defendant, is certainly frowned
       upon and viewed as quite prejudicial.

        In my view, the trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. “The rape-shield
statute constitutes a legislative policy determination that sexual conduct or reputation regarding
sexual conduct as evidence of character and for impeachment, while perhaps logically relevant, is
not legally relevant.” People v Sharpe, 502 Mich 313, 326; 918 NW2d 504 (2018) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “The statute also reflects a belief that inquiries into sex histories,
even when minimally relevant, carry a danger of unfairly prejudicing and misleading the jury.”
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Finally, the statute protects the privacy of the alleged
victim and, in so doing, removes an institutional discouragement from seeking prosecution.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

       Under MCL 750.520j(1):

               (1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct, opinion
       evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim’s
       sexual conduct shall not be admitted under sections 520b to 520g unless and only
       to the extent that the judge finds that the following proposed evidence is material
       to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not
       outweigh its probative value:

               (a) Evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the actor.

               (b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or
       origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.

        Defendant’s offer to introduce evidence that the victim was in another relationship at the
time of the alleged assault is inadmissible under the rape-shield statute. By asking the victim if
she is in another relationship, the implication would not be that she had an acquaintance or
friendship with this person, but rather that the victim and the third party had a sexual relationship.
While defense counsel insisted at oral argument before this Court that the victim would not be
asked if she was in a “sexual relationship,” only if she was in a “relationship” with another
individual, counsel readily conceded that any such question would “assume[]” a sexual one.
Indeed, as conceded, the implication and inference is absolutely clear—it goes to the victim’s
sexual conduct; defendant does not want to elicit testimony from the victim about her friends and
acquaintances, he wants to elicit testimony about her other sexual partners. Thus, in my view,

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defendant’s offer of evidence amounts to offering “reputation evidence of the victim’s sexual
conduct.” See MCL 750.520(j)(1). The victim’s sexual conduct and history with individuals that
are not defendant are simply “not legally relevant.” Sharpe, 502 Mich at 326.

        Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that the only question defendant merely asks
the victim is whether she was in another “relationship,” even another “sexual relationship,” I also
agree with the trial court that the question is not otherwise relevant. That the victim had a sexual
relationship with another person at the time of the alleged assault is not, by itself, relevant to show
that the victim had a motive to fabricate the criminal complaint. Perhaps the alleged relationship
was “casual,” in that neither party expected monogamy from the other. Or perhaps not. But simply
asking the victim if she was in a relationship, without otherwise having any basis to conclude the
victim was not truthful, tells the jury nothing about whether the victim had a motive to lie, and
only has the potential to mislead the jury. Thus, this case is unlike Olden v Kentucky, 488 US 227,
232; 109 S Ct 480; 102 L Ed 2d 513 (1988), cited by the majority, where the defendant intended
to pursue an entire “proposed line of cross-examination” that the victim lied about being sexually
assaulted “out of fear of jeopardizing her relationship” with her boyfriend. Questioning the victim
about whether she was in a relationship, without more, simply is not enough to make the potential
responses to the question relevant.

        Moreover, defendant’s assertion that the only “evidence” that would be introduced would
be a single question to the victim inquiring whether she was in another relationship is not well
taken. Should the victim simply deny that she was in a relationship or dispute defendant’s
characterization of the term, defendant concedes he would attempt to impeach her or introduce
other evidence that there was a relationship by calling witnesses who claim to know her
dating/sexual history. And should the prosecutor feel the need to rehabilitate the victim by having
her explain the nature of that alleged relationship, the victim would be open to cross-examination
regarding that testimony. Thus, the path that defendant wants to travel has the real potential to
turn the proceedings into a minitrial concerning the victim’s sexual conduct and history, which the
rape-shield statute prohibits and permits the trial court discretion to disallow.

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion to offer
evidence of the victim’s other relationship, and I would affirm that portion of the order. The
proposed evidence would not only violate the rape-shield statute but, as proposed by defendant,
would also be irrelevant. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

                                                               /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

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