Court Opinion

ID: 9796413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:56:59.649996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:13.170177
License: Public Domain

EASTAUGH, Justice,
dissenting.
I. Introduction
I respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion that reverses on the Alaska Civil Rule 26(g) issue. A trial court faced with these sorts of procedural problems on the eve of trial is entitled to exercise its discretion in resolving the problems and is entitled to deference upon appellate review.1 Kay consistently invoked Rule 26(g) to prevent the defendants from engaging in rigorous discovery, and in exchange, chose to subject himself to the rule’s $100,000 damages cap. Only ten days before discovery was to close, and having successfully and repeatedly limited the defendants’ discovery efforts, he unilaterally (without asking the court’s permission) tried to give notice that he was withdrawing his reliance on the rule. This attempt, only fifty-five days before trial, would have freed him from the rule’s $100,000 damages cap. Although it also would have exposed him to additional discovery efforts, they would have been last-minute, eve-of-trial, efforts. They were unlikely to have been as productive as defendants’ timely discovery efforts would have been had Kay not avoided them by electing to invoke the rule. Only a week before trial was to begin did Kay first request a continuance. Two days before trial began, the trial court rejected Kay’s efforts to disavow the rule and lift the cap. That was a permissible judicial decision, well within the discretion a trial court must have. By reversing, we interfere with a valid exercise of discretion and fail to give deference to the trial court.
II. There Was No Abuse of Discretion.
The legislature included Rule 26(g) in its 1997 tort reform legislation.2 The legislature intended the act to “encourage the efficiency of the civil justice system by discouraging frivolous litigation and by decreasing the amount, cost, and complexity of litigation without diminishing the protection of innocent Alaskans’ rights to reasonable, but not excessive, compensation for tortious injuries caused by others.”3 The rule patently assumes that a moderate damages cap is a fair quid pro quo for a significant limit on discovery. As with other fair bargains, unilateral disavowal of the bargain after one side has performed is potentially unfair. Given Kay’s early election and his repeated invocations of the rule to limit discovery, his late filing of the unilateral withdrawal notice would have been inherently unfair had withdrawal been allowed. The trial court must have concluded that Kay’s attempted withdrawal would be unfair. Likewise, the court must have concluded that granting Kay’s last-minute continuance motion would be unfair.
We review discovery orders and denials of motions for reconsideration, continuance, and relief from judgment under the abuse of discretion standard.4 This is, or is supposed to be, a deferential standard of review. We will find an abuse of discretion only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction after reviewing the record that the trial court erred.5 Given the circumstances facing the trial court, I do not have a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred.6
*274A. A motion to amend a complaint is not analogous to an attempt to withdraw from a Rule 26(g) election.
The court’s opinion states that an attempt to withdraw an election of the Rule 26(g) damages cap is “analogous to a claimant’s motion for leave to amend a complaint under Alaska Civil Rule 15.”7 It also contends that a motion to withdraw the Rule 26(g) cap is “functionally similar to a motion to amend a pleading” because the plaintiff “essentially seeks leave to amend its previously asserted damages claim.”8
I think the court is mistaken in both regards: no such attempt to amend was made here, and Rule 15 provides no analogy. Kay did not seek judicial permission to amend his complaint or his previously asserted damages claim. He simply filed a notice with the court that he was withdrawing from Rule 26(g). Only later, after another three weeks had passed, did he implicitly seek court approval of his withdrawal from his election. The court suggests that prohibiting Kay from withdrawing from the rule would deprive him of the opportunity to test his claim on the merits.9 I agree that a plaintiff should be able to test his claims on the merits.10 But a damages cap does not affect a plaintiffs ability to test his claim on the merits. Kay was still able to bring all applicable legal claims to trial; only his recoverable damages were limited by the affirmative choice he made early in the litigation in exchange for the benefit of limited discovery.
Nor was the procedure Kay followed at all analogous to a motion to amend a complaint. A Rule 15 motion to add a new claim or amend the damages prayer is not typically inconsistent with the plaintiffs affirmative representations and the parties’ mutual understandings. An attempt to withdraw from a Rule 26(g) election fundamentally differs from a motion to amend because the election consists of an affirmative representation that damages will not exceed $100,000, and results in significant limitations on discovery. The election, per the rule, results in a mutual understanding by the parties. The resulting expectations are reasonable and enforceable. Moreover, in this case, Kay repeatedly invoked the cap to limit defense discovery efforts. As an example of a valid analogy, consider instead a plaintiffs affirmative statement that he is forgoing a particular claim in exchange for some bargain with the defendant. In that situation, a trial court ruling on whether to rescind the agreement would be entitled to the same deference we should be giving the trial court here. Our usual expressions of the liberal policy favoring amendment of pleadings would be irrelevant to a valid analogy.
B. Withdrawal of the Rule 26(g) cap would have prejudiced RE/MAX.
Kay first invoked Rule 26(g) in May 2001, three months after filing his complaint, when he responded to the Tanners’ initial discovery requests.11 Kay continued to invoke Rule 26(g) in response to further defense discovery requests until shortly before he filed his notice of withdrawal in March 2002. *275Despite the text of Rule 26(g),12 Kay knowingly took affirmative steps to invoke the rule throughout the pre-trial period. Kay used Rule 26(g) to shield himself from defendants’ discovery efforts for nearly ten of the fifteen months between the filing of the complaint and the scheduled trial date and for nearly all of the time when discovery was open.
Kay argues that he gained no advantage from trying to withdraw from Rule 26(g), but his unilateral efforts to avoid discovery forced his opponents to file a motion to compel, requiring them to spend additional resources to obtain discovery. His efforts also limited and delayed the allowable discovery. Defendants prepared their defense believing that, per the rule, their damages exposure could not exceed $100,000. Defendants who are sued for personal injury guide their litigation efforts by the risks the lawsuit poses. It is often the damages exposure, more than the liability exposure, that drives how a lawsuit is litigated. A defendant may choose not to litigate as vigorously in a case that can be defended through trial at relatively modest cost if the damage exposure is limited. In contrast, if damages might be much greater and uncapped, a defendant will usually litigate more aggressively to discover all facts relevant to liability (including allocation of fault and causation) and damages, may engage in motion practice to limit its exposure, may prepare for trial far more thoroughly, and may finally chose to avoid trial with a favorable settlement after appropriate discovery and investigation.
It is impossible to imagine how RE/MAX would have defended the case had Kay not invoked the Rule 26(g) cap. If Kay had given timely indication he would claim much greater losses, RE/MAX would have had time to reassess its defensive efforts. Indeed, it is precisely because the late effort to withdraw was prejudicial to RE/MAX that this court has fashioned its remedy and its remand instructions so carefully.13
A short continuance would not have remedied the prejudice, given the lost discovery opportunity. And a long continuance would not have avoided prejudice because defendants would have needed to prepare for trial a second time, at additional cost, and witness memories would have faded.
It is hard to be very sympathetic to Kay. His lack of diligence caused the problem. Had he been reasonably diligent about his medical treatment, his doctor would have informed him of the likelihood of further surgery early enough that withdrawal of the election would not have prejudiced RE/MAX. Had he been reasonably diligent about his trial preparation, he would have included a knowledgeable estimate of future medical expenses in his damage estimate. Kay also could have moved for a continuance immediately after visiting his doctor for the first time since filing suit, on March 5, 2002, rather than allowing nearly fifty more days to pass before moving for a continuance. The lateness of Kay’s visit to his doctor, coupled with his delay in requesting a continuance, reflects either a lack of diligence or a tactical choice. In any event, Kay asked for an open-ended continuance pending the resolution of his medical condition. His request as made was patently without merit. An indefinite delay of trial is “undue” and is not a proper use of a trial continuance.14
C. The record supports the trial court’s decision.
The court suggests that the trial court promised at the May 2001 trial setting eon-*276ference to be flexible in its scheduling decisions,15 and implicitly concludes that it was not flexible after Kay belatedly tried to change the ground rules for the lawsuit.16 I do not read the trial court’s statements as amounting to an enforceable “promise of flexibility.”17 Although the trial court stated that it would usually grant motions to extend or file late for good cause shown, it also repeatedly emphasized that it did not want pre-trial deadlines crowding too close to the trial date and potentially delaying the trial. The trial court’s decision not to allow Kay to withdraw from Rule 26(g) is consistent with its previous statements expressing concern about late filings and delay of trial. The court’s trial setting comments could not have misled Kay, and reliance on them to justify the late withdrawal and eve-of-trial continuance efforts would have been unreasonable. Kay had to understand that such efforts are addressed to the trial court’s discretion.
III. Conclusion
The trial court was in the best position to assess how Kay’s invocation of Rule 26(g) affected the course of the lawsuit. It exercised its discretion in dealing with the potential prejudice created by Kay’s last minute attempts to withdraw from the damages cap and continue the trial. Because I do not have a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred, I cannot conclude that it abused its discretion here.

. See Willoya v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 53 P.3d 1115, 1119 (Alaska 2002); Dougan v. Aurora Elec. Inc., 50 P.3d 789, 793 (Alaska 2002).

. Ch. 26, §§ 1, 48, SLA 1997.

. Id. at § 1(1).

. Manelick v. Manelick, 59 P.3d 259, 262 (Alaska 2002) (reviewing denial of motion for reconsideration); Fleegel v. Estate of Boyles, 61 P.3d 1267, 1278 n. 51 (Alaska 2002) (applying abuse of discretion standard to review of relief from judgment); Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. State, 42 P.3d 531, 535 (Alaska 2002) (reviewing generally rulings on discovery for abuse of discretion).

. Rockstad v. Erikson, 113 P.3d 1215, 1220 (Alaska 2005).

. Finding, as the court does, that the appellant's arguments are "more persuasive” than the ap-pellee’s seems at odds with the deferential standard of review that applies here. See Op. at 266.

. Id.

. Id. at 266.

. Id.

. See Alaska R. Civ. P. 15(a); Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 102 P.3d 282, 295 (Alaska 2004).

. The court states that Kay served initial disclosures "suggesting” that his damages totaled less than $100,000. Op. at 265-66. That characterization minimizes the specificity of Kay's disclosure. His disclosure stated:
G. Categories of damage.
Past medicals: $21,937.33
Future medical: $ 5-10,000 approx.
Past wages: $ 17,000, minus taxes
Reduced abilities: $ 15,000 approx.
Pain & suffering: $ 35,000 approx.
The disclosed total was less than $99,000. To read "approx." as an indication Kay either was uncertain or wanted defendants to think he was uncertain about his damages is inconsistent with his explicit invocations of the discovery limitation in first responding to discovery and then repeatedly fending off defendants' discovery attempts. The disclosed total closely approached $100,000. We must assume Kay's counsel was acting in good faith and understood the rule's unambiguous effect on damages. "[Alpprox.” must therefore be read to imply that the actual damages were less than the disclosed total. Any other reading would be inconsistent with candor and good faith.

.The text of Rule 26(g) suggests that the damages cap is self-executing: "In a civil action for personal injury or property damage involving less than $100,000 in claims, the parties shall limit discovery.” (Emphasis added.) The court’s opinion does not address the difficulties created by this text. Regardless of whether he needed to “invoke” Rule 26(g)'s limited discovery shield (or whether it was appropriate to do so in this context), Kay did so repeatedly and as such chose to bring his case within the rule's ambit.

. See Op. at 268. Thus, this court approves the alternative remedy of remittitur because it acknowledges that RE/MAX "proceeded to trial on the understanding that it faced a potential liability of $100,000.” Op. at 268 n. 9.

. In the complaint amendment context, we have repeatedly stated that "undue” delay is a sufficient basis to deny a motion to amend. See Miller, 102 P.3d at 294; Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, 742 P.2d 1346, 1348-49 (Alaska 1987).

. Op. at 267.

. See id. at 267-68.

.See id. at 267.