Court Opinion

ID: 9785568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:13:18.629961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:30.124735
License: Public Domain

Judge WEBB
dissenting.
In my view, the plain language of the seven insurance policies before us at least raises a disputed factual issue concerning plaintiffs’ entitlement to $200,000 in uninsured motoristyunderinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage, notwithstanding the anti-stacking provisions in each of the policies. Because our review of both the trial court’s summary judgment and the policy language is de novo, I would interpret these provisions in light of the policies’ identification of two different companies as insurance providers, even though this argument was not raised below. Accordingly, and with respect, I dissent.
The parties’ supplemental briefs agree that: (1) at the time of the accident, plaintiffs had UM/UIM coverage under one motorcycle policy and six automobile policies, each with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident; (2) the motorcycle policy was issued by American Standard Insurance Company of Wisconsin, while the six automobile policies were issued by American Family Mutual Insurance Company; and (3) each policy defines “We, us and our” as “the company providing this insurance.”
Defendants’ supplemental brief asserts that American Standard and American Family “are affiliated insurance companies” and urges us to take judicial notice of filings with the Colorado Secretary of State that indicate, “American Standard is a wholly owned subsidiary of American Family Mutual Insurance Company.” The policies identify the issuing companies, American Standard and American Family, as members of “the American Family Insurance Group Madison, WI.” Plaintiffs concede that American Standard and American Family “are both members of the American Family Insurance Group,” and they “would appear to be affiliated insurer(s) under common ownership or management,” within the meaning of § 10-4-609(2), C.R.S. 2003.
However, defendants do not assert that American Standard and American Family are the same company. Nor do they point to any evidence, beyond the Secretary of State filings, that they would have presented, had the “We, us and our” definition been raised below.
Instead, defendants contend we should not interpret the anti-stacking provisions on the basis of this definition because it arose for the first time in response to a question from the panel during oral argument, and before the trial court plaintiffs treated American Standard and American Family as the same company. Despite the majority’s adoption of this view, I reject it as fundamentally inconsistent with both summary judgment practice and de novo review of contract language using basic principles of contract interpretation.
*170The majority cites Committee for Better Health Care for All Colorado Citizens v. Meyer, 830 P.2d 884 (Colo.1992); Christensen v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525 (Colo.1982); and In re Marriage of Christen, 899 P.2d 339 (Colo.App.1995), for the principle that an appellate court may entertain only issues raised in the trial court. Although this principle is beyond dispute, these cases do not involve de novo review of a contract interpretation question decided on summary judgment.
We review a summary judgment de novo. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251 (Colo.1995). Because of the strict requirement that summary judgment can be entered only in the absence of any disputed issue of material fact, appellate courts may recognize disputed factual issues in the record, even if not raised by the opposing party. Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Town of Crested Butte, 690 P.2d 231 (Colo.1984) (reversing summary judgment and remanding for further proceedings based on deficiencies in the factual record, although not questioned by the appellant); see also NBC Subsidiary (KCNC-TV), Inc. v. Living Will Center, 879 P.2d 6 (Colo.1994)(Justice Erickson dissenting from majority’s refusal to consider error in entering summary judgment on disputed facts because issue not raised in certiorari petition); cf. United States v. Gammache, 713 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.1983)(case not ripe for summary judgment due to genuine issues of material fact and ambiguities in materials presented by the parties).
Interpretation of an insurance policy, as of any contract, is reviewed de novo. TerraMatrix, Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 939 P.2d 483 (Colo.App.1997). An insurance policy is a contract that should be construed according to general principles of contract interpretation. Wota v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 831 P.2d 1307 (Colo.1992).
These general principles include interpreting contracts as a whole, giving effect to every provision. See, e.g., E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Jagow, 30 P.3d 798 (Colo.App.2001), aff'd, 49 P.3d 1151 (Colo.2002). Indeed, “all parts and clauses of a contract, including exceptions and conditions, must be considered together in order to determine if one particular clause is explained, modified, limited, or controlled by any other clause.” J & S Enters. Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 825 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Colo.App.1991). The numerous cases espousing this principle do not limit its application to only those contractual provisions expressly argued by the parties.
Here, considering all contract language bearing on the anti-stacking provisions furthers judicial economy, because of the high probability that identical language is in many other of defendants’ policies insuring Colorado residents and the public nature of automobile insurance. See Hansen v. Barmore, 779 P.2d 1360 (Colo.App.1989). Nor does considering all contract language offend due process, because the parties have submitted supplemental briefs addressing the language that I consider precludes summary judgment for defendants.
This ease presents only one issue: whether these policies unambiguously prohibit stacking. The record is complete and undisputed concerning all terms of these policies. Cf. Ward v. Indus. Comm’n., 44 Colo.App. 301, 612 P.2d 1164 (1980)(addressing issue not raised by the parties that clearly appeared in the record). Applying de novo review, the plain language of the policies does not support the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants, which limited plaintiffs’ UM7 UIM coverage to $100,000 per person based on the anti-stacking provisions.
According to defendants, the coverage limitation recognized by the trial court necessarily results from provisions in the “UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE (Including Underinsured Motorist Protection)” sections of each policy that state:
Regardless of the number of vehicles described in the declaration, insured persons, claims or policies, or vehicles involved in the accident, we will pay no more than the limit of liability shown for this coverage in the declarations for each person injured in any one accident.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Defendants also point to an identical paragraph in the GENERAL PROVISIONS section of each policy that provides, “The total limit of our liability under all policies issued *171to you by us shall not exceed the highest limit under any one policy” (emphasis supplied).
However, the policies name two different companies as providers of the insurance. Therefore, applying the common definition of “we,” “us,” and “our” to these anti-stacking provisions, the trier of fact could conclude that: (1) under the motorcycle policy issued by American Standard, it must provide plaintiffs (“we will pay”) with $100,000 of UM/ UIM benefits, regardless of additional UM/ UIM coverage arising from the six automobile policies that were issued, not “by us,” but by American Family, a separate company; (2) similarly, under the automobile policies issued by American Family, it must provide plaintiffs with $100,000 of UM/UIM benefits, regardless of additional UM/UIM coverage arising from the motorcycle policy that was issued by American Standard, a separate company; and (3) the anti-stacking provisions in the automobile policies limit coverage to a total of $100,000 (“the total limit of our liability”) under those six policies, all of which were issued by the same company (“by us”), American Family.
None of the policies contains language extending the anti-stacking provisions to affiliates of the named issuing company. Cf. Curry v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 101 P.3d 1133, 2004 WL 2278281 (Colo.App. No. 03CA0629, Oct. 7, 2004)(anti-stacking provision read, “If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you by us or any other member company of the [insurer’s group of companies] .... (emphasis added)). Hence, interpretation of the anti-stacking provisions to afford plaintiffs $200,000 in UM/UIM coverage is not precluded by accepting defendants’ assertion that American Standard and American Family are affiliates, as members of “the American Family Insurance Group Madison, WI.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 59 (7th ed.1999)(defining “affiliate” as “[a] corporation that is related to another corporation by shareholdings or other means of control”); see also § 7-101-401(2), C.R.S. 2003.
Thus, on the one hand, if American Standard and American Family are different, albeit affiliated, companies, as the policies state, then the policies do not support summary judgment for defendants. On the other hand, if, notwithstanding their different names, they are effectively the same company, then defendants must establish this fact before the trial court may adopt their interpretation of the anti-stacking provisions.
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment for defendants and denying summary judgment for plaintiffs.