Court Opinion

ID: 9918360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 18:02:34.638504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:38.906214
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/12/24 Blanco v. Cargasacchi CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

HENRY BLANCO,                                                 2d Civil No. B324397
                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 17CV04672)
     Plaintiff and Appellant,                               (Santa Barbara County)

v.

GIOVANNI CARGASACCHI,
Individually and as Trustee,
etc., et al.,

  Defendants and
Respondents.

      Henry Blanco appeals from the judgment after the trial
court concluded he must comply with the terms of a
memorandum signed in 1990 (the 1990 memorandum) before
securing permits necessary for completing the construction of a
residence in the Lakeview Estates development of the Santa
Ynez Valley. He contends the court erred in finding that the
1990 memorandum terminated an easement granted in 1968 to
his predecessor-in-interest (the 1968 easement). He also
contends the court erred in finding that he could not improve an
existing road that runs over the 1968 easement, requiring him
instead to construct a new road to secure his desired permits per
the terms of the 1990 memorandum. And lastly, Blanco claims
the court’s findings amount to an unconstitutional taking. We
affirm.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       In 1968, a previous owner of Blanco’s property recorded
“[a]n easement and right-of-way . . . for road purposes[] on, over[,]
and across a strip of land” owned by the Cargasacchi family.1
Nineteen years later, the Cargasacchis and Lakeview Estates
landowners signed a document specifying that the 1968 easement
was 30 feet wide and available for all Lakeview Estates
landowners to use (the 1987 clarification). The clarification also
reaffirmed the terms of the 1968 easement: “Except as expressly
clarified and expanded herein, all terms, conditions[,] and
stipulations of [the 1968 easement] shall remain in full force and
effect and are hereby confirmed as such.”
       In 1990, the Cargasacchis, Lakeview Estates landowners,
and owners of an adjacent plot of land, Rancho Dos Mundos,
signed the 1990 memorandum. This memorandum specified the
location of a 30-foot-wide easement across the Cargasacchis’ land,
and required Lakeview Estates and Rancho Dos Mundos
landowners to “release all other easements or other rights that lie
outside [the 1990] easement, and . . . release and quitclaim all

      1 The Cargasacchi Family Trust; the estate of Giovanni
Cargasacchi; John M. Cargasacchi; Laura Teresa Cargasacchi
Belluz, as trustee of the Laura Teresa Cargasacchi Belluz
Separate Property Trust; Mark J. Cargasacchi; and Peter A.
Cargasacchi.

                                 2
other rights and claims across” Cargasacchi lands. The
memorandum permitted the construction of a paved road across
the easement (the 1990 road), but allowed landowners to
continue using the road crossing the 1968 easement until the
1990 road was completed. They could not “materially increase
the burden or impose new or additional burdens [on] the
easement,” however. The signing parties acknowledged that the
1990 memorandum “result[ed] in the relocation of the [1968]
easement,” but that all other “terms, conditions[,] and
stipulations of [that easement] and [the 1987 clarification would]
remain in full force and effect.”
       In 1998, the prior owner of Blanco’s property, the Marks
family, obtained a permit from the County of Santa Barbara (the
County) to build a residence. They commenced construction of
the residence, which continued until it was about 90 percent
complete. At that point, the County ordered the Markses to stop
construction until the 1990 road was completed.
       In 2004, the Cargasacchis agreed to permit the Markses to
increase the use of the 1968 easement, as clarified in the 1987
clarification and 1990 memorandum, to allow them to finish the
construction of their residence (the 2004 agreement).2 This
increase in the use of the easement did not allow the Markses to
change or alter the road crossing the 1968 easement, however,
and required them to stop using it once the 1990 road was
useable.
      After Blanco acquired the Markses’ property in 2012,
County officials told him he would need to widen and add

      2 The 2004 agreement was admitted into evidence, but the
trial court did not rely on it in its decision. Neither do we; we
describe it only for context.

                                  3
compacted gravel to the road leading to his residence before it
would issue the permits necessary to finish construction. This
required Blanco to show that the Cargasacchis had granted him
“the authority to alter and improve” the road crossing the 1968
easement. The Cargasacchis refused to grant that authority,
claiming that Blanco instead had to construct the 1990 road to
meet County standards.
      Blanco sued the Cargasacchis for quiet title and declaratory
relief.3 The trial court rejected Blanco’s claims. It concluded the
1990 memorandum “expressly rejects the [1968] easement,
substitutes it for the new road, and identifies a new location . . .
with specific requirements and dimensions.” The road crossing
the 1968 easement could not be updated to County standards
because if Blanco were “permitted to go forward with the
improvements of” it the easement “would no longer be ‘old.’ ”
Instead, it would “essentially [become] the new easement road,
semi-permanent and fully operational, with no future transition
realistically possible,” rendering the 1990 memorandum’s
requirements “ephemeral.” The court concluded that the road
crossing over the 1968 easement must be “phased out,” and
Blanco must build a new road to finish construction of his
Lakeview Estates property.
                            DISCUSSION
                 Termination of the 1968 easement
       Blanco first contends the trial court erred in finding that

      3 Blanco also petitioned the trial court to issue a writ of
mandate to compel the County to issue the permits. The court
denied Blanco’s petition, and we affirmed the judgment on
appeal. (See Blanco v. County of Santa Barbara (Oct. 18, 2021,
B308340) [nonpub. opn.] [2021 WL 4839083].)

                                  4
the 1990 memorandum terminated the 1968 easement. We do
not resolve this contention.4 As explained below, even if the 1968
easement were not terminated the terms of the 1990
memorandum do not permit Blanco to improve the road crossing
it.
         Improvement of the road crossing the 1968 easement
       Blanco next contends the trial court erred in finding that
he could not improve the road crossing the 1968 easement and
instead had to construct and improve the 1990 road to secure
building permits from the County. We are not persuaded.
       Interpreting the 1968 easement, 1987 clarification, and
1990 memorandum presents a question of law subject to our
independent review. (Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resort (2005) 129
Cal.App.4th 1458, 1470.) Standard principles of contract
interpretation apply. (Hill v. San Jose Family Housing Partners,
LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 764, 777.) Our “paramount goal . . .
is to determine the intent of the parties.” (Ibid.) We ascertain
that intent “from the language of the [documents] alone” so long
as it is “ ‘clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.’ ”
(Ibid.) We read the documents “together, so as to give effect to
every part.” (Civ. Code, § 1641.) The language of the documents,
“or the nature of the enjoyment by which it was acquired,”
defines the extent of the easement granted. (Civ. Code, § 806.)
       The trial court here correctly interpreted the language of
the relevant documents. The 1968 easement granted Blanco’s
predecessor-in-interest a right-of-way “for road purposes” over

      4 We also do not resolve Blanco’s assertion, not raised
during the proceedings below, that he acquired a prescriptive
easement if the 1990 memorandum terminated the 1968
easement.

                                  5
Cargasacchi family lands. The 1987 clarification specified that
the easement was 30 feet wide. The 1990 memorandum relocated
that easement and required Lakeview Estates landowners to
build a new road. It also required landowners to “release all other
easements or other rights that lie outside [the 1990] easement,”
and prevented them from “materially increas[ing] the burden or
impos[ing] new or additional burdens [on] the [1968] easement.”
(Italics added.) Read together, these documents indicate that
Blanco could not improve the road crossing over the 1968
easement, as the trial court correctly concluded.
       Blanco complains that this conclusion runs counter to
long-established laws governing easements. He first cites
Dolnikov v. Ekizian (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 419, 428 (Dolnikov),
for the proposition that “ ‘[e]very easement includes what are
termed “secondary easements,” ’ ” including “the right to make
‘repairs, renewals[,] and replacements on the property that is
servient to the easement’ [citation] ‘and to do such things as are
necessary to the exercise of the right’ [citation].” But a secondary
easement cannot “ ‘increase the burden on . . . the servient
tenement, or make any material changes therein.’ ” (Id. at p.
429.) Rather, such an “easement may be exercised ‘only when
necessary and in such reasonable manner as not to increase the
burden needlessly on the servient estate or to enlarge it by
alteration in the mode of operation.’ ” (Ibid.)
       Here, Blanco does not seek to make repairs necessary to
exercise his right to use the road crossing over the 1968
easement. Instead, he seeks to improve the road to meet County
standards—improvements that will require laying thousands of
tons of compacted gravel, materially enlarging the road and
significantly increasing the burden on the Cargasacchis’ land.

                                 6
These improvements are not needed for any dominant tenement
owners—including Blanco—to use the right of way, but rather
are required so that the County will issue the permits he needs to
complete construction of his home. In our view, such
improvements are outside the scope of any secondary easements
included in the 1968 easement. (Dolnikov, supra, 222
Cal.App.4th at p. 429 [only “ ‘ “changes that do not affect [the]
substance” ’ ” of an easement are permitted].)
       Blanco next relies on Kosich v. Braz (1967) 247 Cal.App.2d
737 to claim that he had the right to improve the 1968 easement.
But as the Kosich court noted, “a purchaser of real property in fee
takes the property subject only to the servitude which [they]
know[] or should know.” (Id. at p. 740, italics added.) There, the
appellants knew that the easement at issue had been enlarged,
and they impliedly consented to that enlargement. (Ibid.) But
here, Blanco points to no evidence that the Cargasacchis knew of
or consented to the improvement of the road crossing over the
1968 easement. The 1990 memorandum shows the opposite: It
requires Blanco to “release all other easements or other rights
that lie outside [the 1990] easement, and . . . release and
quitclaim all other rights and claims across” Cargasacchi lands.
       Zissler v. Saville (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 630 similarly does
not aid Blanco. In Zissler, this court explained that “the parties
to an express right-of-way easement presumptively contemplate
‘normal future development,’ ” meaning that “such an easement
will generally not be restricted to its historic use.” (Id. at p. 641.)
We cautioned, however, that “ ‘ “uncontemplated, abnormal uses[]
[that] greatly increase the burden [on the easement] are not” ’ ”
within the realm of “normal future development.” (Ibid.) What is
paramount is the intent of the parties: i.e., an “easement may be

                                  7
used to the extent that the use is reasonably necessary for the
convenient enjoyment of the easement and is consistent with the
purpose for which the easement was granted.” (Id. at pp. 645-646,
italics added.)
       Unlike Zissler, this case is about improving an easement,
not increasing its use. The 1968 easement was granted for road
purposes, to permit Lakeview Estates and Rancho Dos Mundos
landholders ingress to and egress from their properties. But the
documents defining the purpose of the easement do not suggest
that landholders can materially improve the road crossing it to
meet County standards, as Blanco seeks to do here. To the
contrary, the documents expressly restrict landholders from
“materially increas[ing] the burden or impos[ing] new or
additional burdens [on] the easement.” And they impliedly
exempt improvements of the road crossing the 1968 easement
from the realm of “normal future development” by permitting the
construction of a paved road across the 1990 easement. Such
limitations distinguish the easement at issue in this case from
the unrestricted easement at issue in Zissler.
       Blanco argues that improving the road crossing over the
1968 easement will not increase the burden on the easement.
But this argument ignores testimony that the improvements
required by the County would require laying several inches of
gravel on the road and the trial court’s finding that such
improvements would be “significant.” And it ignores the fact that
improving the road crossing over the 1968 easement would
undermine the 1990 memorandum’s purpose of delineating
future road development.
       Blanco also complains that preventing him from improving
the road crossing over the 1968 easement forces him to bear the

                                8
“onerous burden” of building the 1990 road himself, something
not contemplated by the 1990 memorandum. We disagree that
the 1990 memorandum forces Blanco alone to shoulder this
burden. The memorandum does state that Lakeview Estates and
Rancho Dos Mundos landowners “shall” form an assessment
district to pay for the “costs of design, construction[,] and
maintenance of the [1990] road.” But it puts no timeline on when
the landowners must do so. And it contemplates that such a
district may not be formed: “If such a funding mechanism is not
established, then [the landowners] will make every effort to
ensure that each of [them] will individually have [their] own
homeowner’s policy extended to include the [1990] road easement
and to name [the Cargasacchis] as additional insureds.”
                       Unconstitutional taking
       Finally, Blanco contends the trial court’s decision to “phase
out” the 1968 easement constitutes a taking without just
compensation. Blanco did not raise this contention below, and we
do not resolve it. (People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211,
1229 [constitutional arguments forfeited on appeal if not raised
at trial].)
                            DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. The Cargasacchis shall recover
their costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.          CODY, J.

                                 9
                    Timothy J. Staffel, Judge

            Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

                ______________________________

      Garrett & Tully, Ryan C. Squire and Nicholas D. Lauber
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Law Offices of E. Patrick Morris and E. Patrick Morris for
Defendants and Respondents.