Court Opinion

ID: 9467869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:58:19.876955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:33.931266
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree with all aspects of the majority’s opinion except the imposition upon the plaintiffs of the burden of proving the extent of their enhanced injuries attributable to the design defect for which defendant Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellsehaft (VW AG) is responsible. The majority acknowledges that our task in this diversity case is to predict how the New York courts would rule on the issues before us. However, in resolving the burden of proof question in part VII of the Court’s opinion, the majority makes no mention of the New York cases1 relied upon in the carefully considered opinion of the late Judge Dooling, who was the trial judge in this case. See Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 468 F.Supp. 593, 602, 604 (E.D.N.Y.1979). Instead the majority selects the rule adopted by a divided panel of the Third Circuit in its effort to predict the course of New Jersey law, Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
In its leading decision recognizing that an automobile manufacturer may be found liable for injuries caused by latent design defects, even though the defects were not the initiating cause of the accident, Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973), the New York Court of Appeals opted in favor of “traditional rules of negligence.” Id. at 159, 305 N.E.2d at 774, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 651. As the majority here points out, that statement was made in the context of determining whether the manufacturer may be found liable. However, there is not a hint in the Bolm opinion that traditional rules of negligence are not applicable to any of the other issues in a so-called “second collision” case, including the burden of proof as to apportionment of damages for which the second tort-feasor is liable.
The traditional rule is set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433(B)(2) (1965): “Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.” A New York trial judge, confronted with the issue that faced Judge Dooling, would very likely have instructed the jury according to the following language contained in 1 New York Pattern Jury Instructions § 2:307 (2d ed. 1974):
*254If you find ... that both defendants caused plaintiff’s injuries but that, because of the nature of the accident and the nearness in time of the negligent acts and resulting injuries and the lack of opportunity to ascertain precisely which injuries were caused by the respective defendants, you cannot determine which of the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the respective defendants, both defendants will be liable for all the injuries plaintiff received and you will award only one verdict against both defendants.
Since this instruction places upon all of the defendants the risk that the evidence does not permit ascertainment of “precisely which injuries were caused by the respective defendants,” it seems evident that it is up to the defendant who seeks to limit his liability to some portion of the damages to persuade the jury that a limitation is appropriate. No doubt this rule assigns VWAG a difficult task, to which Judge Learned Hand long ago replied, “He is a wrongdoer; let him unravel the casuistries resulting from his wrong.” Navigazione Libera Triestina S.A. v. Newton Creek Towing Co., 98 F.2d 694, 697 (2d Cir. 1938).
In Huddeli the majority rejected the force of the authorities that place the burden of limiting damage liability upon the defendant by pointing out that many of them dealt with concurrent causes of a single injury. Huddell v. Levin, supra, 537 F.2d at 738. In such cases, assigning the burden of proof to the defendants is especially important to avoid the risk that the plaintiff, though establishing the negligence of both defendants, is left without remedy against either because he cannot prove which defendant caused his injury. Our case concerns causes closely related in time (the initial collision caused by Valentine’s negligent operation of his car and the subsequent opening of the door latches caused by VWAG’s negligent design) under circumstances where the second cause was responsible for less than the total injuries. That is precisely the situation described in Illustration 6 to § 433B of the Restatement, in which a, second tort-feasor, aggravating injuries initially caused by a first tort-fea-sor, was entitled to limit his liability only if he proved the portion of damages for which he was responsible. In such situations, it is true that leaving the burden upon the plaintiff to prove which of his injuries were caused by the second tort-feasor does not risk denial of all recovery, since the first tort-feasor is liable for all reasonably foreseeable injuries (including those enhanced by the second tort-feasor). But the fact that the argument for shifting the burden of apportionment to the second tort-feasor is not as forceful as in the situation where the plaintiff may be denied all recovery simply distinguishes a case of the sort that confronted the Huddeli court; it does not help to resolve the issue as to which side bears the burden of proof.
However the issue may be decided elsewhere, compare Huddell with Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 787 (10th Cir. 1978), and Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123, 1131 (Wyo.1978), our concern is how New York courts would rule. That is the question Judge Dooling considered, and I find nothing in the majority’s opinion to indicate that he erred in answering it. The majority rejects Judge Dooling’s answer,2 not with citation of any contrary New York authority, but only with an expression of concern that placing the burden of apportionment on the second tort-feasor permits “undue speculation” by the jury and lets the jury resolve its uncertainties by “assigning responsibility to the defendant most able to pay a plaintiff’s award.” Supra at 250-51. But the majority’s rule concerning the burden of proof does nothing to lessen jury speculation. Any jury asked to determine what the injuries would have been if one of the contributing causes had not been *255present faces a task of considerable uncertainty, regardless of whether the burden of apportioning damage is placed upon the second tort-feasor or the plaintiff. Nor is the issue dependent upon whether the jury is inclined to find against the party better able to pay. If the jury were so inclined, it would not be deterred by an instruction placing the burden of proof upon the plaintiff.3 Once a case presents a fair jury question, as all agree this case does, selection of a burden of proof rule requires a choice as to which party should be assigned the risk of loss in the event that the uncertainties in the evidence make it difficult to say that the fact in dispute is more likely so than not so. The choice is between the non-negligent4 plaintiff who suffered injuries and the negligent defendant who caused at least some of them. Or, in terms of this case, the choice is between the plaintiffs, who were unfortunate enough to have been injured by the combined negligence of two defendants, and defendant VWAG, who was unfortunate enough to have its latent defect involved in an accident initially precipitated by defendant Valentine. When the nature of the events creates uncertainty as to which share of the injuries was caused by a particular defendant, the burden of apportionment should be on that defendant. In any event, I think Judge Dooling was right that New York courts would so rule.
If the majority’s concern is that the jury’s assessment of % of the damages against VWAG is too high and that the reduction of 25% for non-use of seat belts is too low, the appropriate remedy need not be a new trial on damages with the apportionment burden placed on the plaintiff. Instead, the burden of proof should be left on VWAG to limit its liability, and if the jury’s verdicts are against the weight of the evidence, as the majority suggests, supra at 249, the order for a new trial on damages should be conditioned on the plaintiffs’ refusal to accept a remittitur adjusting both VWAG’s share of damages and the reduction for non-use of seat belts to appropriate percentages.5

. See particularly, Hawkes v. Goll, 256 A.D. 940, 9 N.Y.S.2d 924 (2d Dep’t) (second motorist who ran over plaintiff struck minutes before by first motorist liable for entire damages), aff’d, 281 N.Y. 808, 24 N.E.2d 484 (1939).

. In placing the burden upon VWAG to persuade the jury as to the portion of the plaintiffs’ injuries for which it was not responsible, Judge Dooling first required the plaintiffs to establish the fact of enhanced injury, /. e., that VWAG was responsible for some aggravation of damage. On reflection he concluded that this charge was too generous to VWAG and that plaintiffs should have been required to prove only that the VWAG design defect was a proximate cause of some of plaintiffs’ injuries. 468 F.Supp. at 601.

. In this respect, rules concerning burdens of proof are like canons of ethics. The latter, it has been observed, are not designed for the “bad man” inclined to cut comers but for the “good man” who seeks guidance in an uncertain area. See General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974). The willful jury will simply invade the deep pocket. A burden of proof rule is not designed to protect that deep pocket, but to offer guidance to the conscientious jury, whose members are faithfully endeavoring to follow the judge’s charge. If the evidence is really evenly balanced, that jury will find against whichever party is assigned the burden of proof.

. The fact that the plaintiffs did not wear seat belts does not make them contributorily negligent under New York law, Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974), although it is a circumstance the jury_ may consider in determining recoverable damages. Under Spier the amounts for which both defendants are liable are to be reduced by a percentage reflecting the extent to which the injuries would not have occurred if the plaintiffs had worn seat belts. All members of the panel agree that the burden of establishing this percentage was properly placed on the defendants. But if, as I believe, New York will follow the rule that obliges one of two tort-feasors to bear the burden of limiting his liability when the harm inflicted by each is capable of apportionment, then I find nothing in New York law to indicate that this burden of proof rule concerning apportionment should be altered simply because the plaintiffs may have their damage recovery reduced for not wearing seat belts.

. The use of a remittitur in this diversity action is a matter of federal law. West v. Jutras, 456 F.2d 1222, 1225 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972); Karlson v. 305 East 43rd Street Corp., 370 F.2d 467, 472 n.l (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 905, 87 S.Ct. 1690, 18 L.Ed.2d 625 (1967). We have followed the practice of setting a remittitur figure at a reasonable sum, Lanfranconi v. Tidewater Oil Co., 376 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 951, 88 S.Ct. 334, 19 L.Ed.2d 361 (1967), rather than at the highest or lowest figures supportable by the evidence. See 6A Moore’s Federal Practice H 59.05[3], at 58-59 (2d ed. 1979). In the absence of federal case law on whether a remittitur may adjust the figures for one of several defendants, New York law provides a helpful precedent. Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 19 A.D.2d 464, 244 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1st Dep’t 1963), aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 899, 200 N.E.2d 778, 252 N.Y.S".2d 95 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 916, 85 S.Ct. 900, 13 L.Ed.2d 801 (1965).