Court Opinion

ID: 9543747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:48:53.134608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:06.845006
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice.
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice HENRIOD reaffirming our original decision, but in view of the points urged on rehearing think a brief explanation is in order.
The evidence does not show, that Mr. Gibbs was going to work, nor in fact where he was going, nor which direction the bicycle was pointed. It is therefore necessary to let the jury determine his direction from the sparse facts in the record.
Without again detailing the evidence, it seems clear to me that from the direction of the cab (from the west) and *283what was shown of the position of the vehicles at the time of impact and thereafter, plus the uncontrovertible fact that the cab struck the rear of the front wheel of the bicycle (that was the only place the bicycle was struck or damaged), the jury could reasonably find that the bicycle was pointed east or easterly at the time, and for some period before the impact; therefore, the cab having approached from the west, would not have seen the bicycle’s light if it had had one. The dissenting opinion speaks of “a gleam emanating from a light” casting a “reflection on an object or the ground it might have warned the driver” as though the bicycle light might be equivalent to an automobile or at least a motorcycle headlight. Any kind of light would have satisfied the legal requirement; and it is common knowledge that bicycle lights, necessarily powered by little batteries, are but small lights. If pointed away from the cab, the deceased’s body behind it, as it naturally would have been whether walking or riding, could have completely obliterated the light from the view of the cab. Under such facts, whether deceased had a light on his bicycle or not would have had nothing to do with the cause of the collision.
Thus the question of whether deceased’s contributory negligence in not having the light was a proximate cause of his injury and death is within the principle recently announced by this court:
“* * * y? there js any reasonable basis, either because of lack of evidence, or from the evidence and the fair inferences arising therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, upon which reasonable minds may conclude that they are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence * * * (b) that such [contributory] negligence proximately contributed to cause the injury, the plaintiff is entitled to have the question submitted to a jury.”1
Counsel voice considerable concern over the statement in the original opinion concerning the “confusion of already decided cases” which the author says is “wholly irrecon*284cilable by employment of any amount of logic.” Respondent now contends that the confusion is not only added to but multiplied by such statement. It is to be noted that that part of the original opinion is but obiter dicta, ratio impertinens, having nothing to do with the ratio decidendi of the case. The decision itself was entirely logical and consistent with principles well established and expressly relied upon by this court in similar cases in recent decisions.2

Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2d 749.

Lowder v. Holley, 120 Utah 231, 233 P. 2d 350; Poulsen v. Manness, 121 Utah 269, 241 P. 2d 152; Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 P. 2d 510; Martin v. Stevens, see Note 1, supra.