Court Opinion

ID: 9682139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:05:54.947568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:37.425384
License: Public Domain

CULVER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The two statutes which authorize the Attorney General to represent the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and the State Purchasing and General Services Commission (SPGSC), when strictly applied to the facts of this case, bring about an ostensible violation of the principle of separation of powers contained within our State Constitution. Judge Cofer sought to prevent these glaring improprieties by exercising his inherent power to ensure that the judicial proceedings in his court remained adversary in nature. The majority, while recognizing that a court has inherent power to take such action, determined that the action Judge Cofer took in this cause was “not appropriate.” This determination leads to a result this writer can neither condone nor accept.
The many inherent powers of our courts were expressly recognized in Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.1979). In that case, the court explained that inherent judicial powers spring from the doctrine of separation of powers between the three governmental branches. Id. at 399; Tex. Const. Art. II, Sec. 1. Specifically, the inherent judicial powers of our courts include the power to regulate admission to the bar and practice of law, the power to disbar, and the power to determine what constitutes practice of law. Id. at 398 n. 1. This court has exercised its inherent judicial power by establishing a Code of Professional Responsibility. Supreme Court of Texas, Rules Governing the State Bar of Texas art. X, Sec. 9 (Code of Professional Responsibility) (1987). It is not necessary to cite the specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibit attorneys from representing opposing parties in litigation. I mention the Code only as an example of the broad power our constitution bestows upon judges to maintain fairness and integrity in their courts. Any legislative enactments, such as the ones involved here, are unconstitutional to the extent they encroach upon the inherent powers enumerated above. The legislature is constitutionally prohibited from exercising any power properly attached to the judicial branch. Tex. Const. Art. II, Sec. 1.
The majority reasons that representation by the Attorney General of opposing agencies, does not, standing alone, violate the principle of separation of powers or constitute such a threat to the integrity of the court as to authorize the action that Judge Cofer took. It is suggested that the Legislature has only given the Attorney General the right and duty to represent the agencies, but he has no authority to exercise powers that have been delegated by the Legislature to the agencies. The majority concedes that any attempt on the part of the Attorney General to exercise such powers by collusive representation would violate the principle of separation of powers. The majority concludes that no such violation has been shown in this cause, as there is no evidence in the record of any attempt by the Attorney General to “fix” the outcome of the case. With all due respect to my brethren, I cannot participate in this credulity. So long as the Attorney General is allowed to represent both sides, the record will never contain any evidence of collusion because neither agency will be represented by an advocate who is willing to reveal the collusion. Under the majority view, if the trial judge or the agencies suspected misconduct on the part of the Attorney General, they would be powerless *127to remove him from the case because their hands would be tied by the statutes. If the trial judge declared a mistrial, the entire parody would begin anew. The solution proposed by the majority is simply unworkable.
In conclusion, I do not dispute the authority of the Legislature to appoint the Attorney General as the legal representative of state agencies in cases before our courts. However, to the extent these statutes prohibit our courts from exercising their inherent powers, they violate the principle of separation of powers set out in our State Constitution. I would deny leave and allow Judge Cofer’s order to stand. Under these circumstances, one of the agencies should be allowed to seek independent representation.
SPEARS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.