Court Opinion

ID: 9411904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 15:00:27.950391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:17.203003
License: Public Domain

20-2796
     Perez Fuentes v. Garland
                                                                                 BIA
                                                                          Farber, IJ
                                                                        A216 557 785

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 28th day of July, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
 9            EUNICE C. LEE,
10            BETH ROBINSON,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _________________________________________
13
14   JOSUE ARMANDO PEREZ FUENTES,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                v.                                             20-2796
18                                                               NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _________________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                  Craig Relles, Esq., White Plains,
25                                    NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                  Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
28                                    Attorney General; Sabatino F. Leo,
 1                                     Assistant    Director;    Madeline
 2                                     Henley, Trial Attorney, Office of
 3                                     Immigration   Litigation,   United
 4                                     States   Department  of   Justice,
 5                                     Washington, DC.
 6
 7        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 8   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 9   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

10   is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.

11        Petitioner Josue Armando Perez Fuentes, a native and

12   citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of an August 13, 2020

13   decision of the BIA, affirming a February 28, 2020 decision

14   of   an   Immigration     Judge    (“IJ”),   denying   withholding   of

15   removal    and   relief    under   the   Convention    Against   Torture

16   (“CAT”). In re Josue Armando Perez Fuentes, No. A216 557 785

17   (B.I.A. Aug. 13, 2020), aff’g No. A216 557 785 (Immigr. Ct.

18   N.Y. City Feb. 28, 2020). We assume the parties’ familiarity

19   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

20        We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the

21   BIA, i.e., minus the findings that the BIA did not reach.

22   See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522

23   (2d Cir. 2005).           “We review factual findings under the

24   substantial evidence standard,” while “[q]uestions of law, as

25   well as the application of legal principles to undisputed

                                          2
 1   facts, are reviewed de novo.”            Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d

 2   191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 3     A. Withholding of Removal

 4       To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an

 5   applicant must show that he “will more likely than not” be

 6   persecuted   “on    account   of    race,        religion,    nationality,

 7   membership   in    a   particular       social    group,     or   political

 8   opinion.”    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1), (2); see also 8 U.S.C.

 9   §§ 1101(a)(42), 1231(b)(3)(A).            The agency did not err in

10   finding that Perez Fuentes failed to establish either a

11   likelihood that he would be targeted on account of an imputed

12   political opinion or that his proposed group – consisting of,

13   as Perez Fuentes phrased it, “men with . . . tattoos who would

14   be perceived as criminal[s] or associated with a gang that

15   will be targeted by police and gang members in El Salvador”

16   – was a cognizable social group.             Certified Admin. Record

17   at 65.

18       1. Political Opinion

19       To demonstrate that past or prospective persecution bears

20   a nexus to an applicant’s political opinion, “[t]he applicant

21   must . . . show, through direct or circumstantial evidence,

22   that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from the

                                         3
 1   applicant’s political beliefs.”               Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales,

 2   426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2005).              “The persecution may also

 3   be on account of an opinion imputed to the applicant by the

 4   persecutor, regardless of whether or not this imputation is

 5   accurate.”      Hernandez-Chacon         v.    Barr,   948   F.3d   94,   102

 6   (2d Cir. 2020) (emphasis omitted). “[O]pposition to criminal

 7   elements such as gangs, even when such opposition incurs the

 8   enmity of these elements, does not thereby become political

 9   opposition simply by virtue of the gang’s reaction.” Zelaya-

10   Moreno v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 190, 201 (2d Cir. 2021).

11        The agency reasonably concluded that Perez Fuentes failed

12   to demonstrate that gang members or the police would likely

13   target him on account of his political opinion, real or

14   imputed.   He has never expressed a political opinion related

15   to gangs in the past, and he admitted that he did not know

16   what he would do if a gang approached him in El Salvador.

17   Further, he did not allege that the gangs he fears “possess[]

18   an   ideology   or   stance   that       he    opposes,   that   he   has   a

19   particular stake in how gangs operate, or [that he has] a

20   position on how governance in [El Salvador] ought to occur,”

21   as might have established that his resistance “took on a

22   political dimension by transcending mere self-protection.”

                                          4
 1   Id. at 203 (internal quotation marks omitted).                 Accordingly,

 2   the agency did not err in rejecting his claim that he would

 3   be targeted on account of an imputed anti-gang political

 4   opinion as speculative.          See id. at 202–03; see also Jian

 5   Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005)

 6   (holding that a fear is “speculative at best” if it lacks

 7   “solid support” in the record).            Similarly, Perez Fuentes’s

 8   claim that police would target him as a suspected gang member

 9   does not show a likelihood of persecution on account of

10   political opinion because membership or suspected membership

11   in a criminal gang is not political in nature.                 See Zelaya-

12   Moreno, 989 F.3d at 201.

13          2. Social Group

14          To constitute a particular social group, a group must be

15   “(1)    composed    of    members   who    share   a   common    immutable

16   characteristic,          (2)   defined     with    particularity,      and

17   (3) socially       distinct    within     the   society   in    question.”

18   Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014);

19   see also Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196.

20          We find no error in the BIA’s determination that Perez

21   Fuentes waived his challenge to the IJ’s conclusion that he

22   failed to define his proposed group with particularity.                 At

                                          5
 1   most, Perez Fuentes offered conclusory assertions without

 2   identifying any error in the IJ’s specific findings. Because

 3   the BIA did not err in finding that Perez Fuentes waived a

 4   challenge to that dispositive finding, see Yueqing Zhang, 426

 5   F.3d at 541 n.1, 545 n.7, we do not consider that unexhausted

 6   claim, see Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104,

 7   120–22 (2d Cir. 2007).

 8          We therefore conclude that the agency did not err in

 9   denying withholding of removal, since Perez Fuentes did not

10   satisfy his burden of showing that the harm he fears would be

11   on     account   of     a        protected     ground.       See   8 U.S.C.

12   §§ 1101(a)(42),       1231(b)(3);           Paloka,   762   F.3d   at   195.

13   Accordingly,     we    do    not    reach     Perez   Fuentes’s    remaining

14   challenges to the denial of withholding of removal.                 See INS

15   v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule

16   courts and agencies are not required to make findings on

17   issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results

18   they reach.”).

19        B. CAT Relief

20          To be eligible for CAT relief, an applicant must show

21   that he would “more likely than not” be tortured by or with

22   the     acquiescence        of     government     officials.        8 C.F.R.

                                             6
 1   §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1); Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361

 2   F.3d 161, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2004).                      In assessing whether an

 3   applicant has satisfied his burden of proof, the agency may

 4   consider    “[e]vidence       of     past       torture,”       the   applicant’s

 5   ability to relocate, violations of human rights within the

 6   country     of   removal,      and    “[o]ther          relevant      information

 7   regarding conditions in the country of removal.”                        8 C.F.R.

 8   § 1208.16(c)(3).          Unlike withholding of removal, CAT relief

 9   does not require a nexus to any protected ground.                        See id.

10   § 1208.16(c)(2).

11        Here, the IJ’s conclusion that Perez Fuentes failed to

12   establish a likelihood of torture is erroneous for three

13   reasons.     First, the IJ stated that the CAT claim failed

14   because Perez Fuentes did not “meet his burden of proof in

15   demonstrating       [a]    clear     probability         of     persecution     for

16   purposes of withholding.”            CAR at 72.         But the IJ denied the

17   withholding      claim     based     on       Perez    Fuentes’s      failure    to

18   establish any “nexus” to a protected ground and did not make

19   a finding regarding the likelihood of persecution.                        Because

20   a   claim   under    CAT – “[u]nlike           asylum     and    withholding     of

21   removal [–] does not require a nexus to a protected ground,”

22   the IJ erred in relying on her withholding findings in denying

                                               7
 1   Perez Fuentes’s CAT claim.      Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891

 2   F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).

 3       Second, the IJ surmised that Perez Fuentes could avoid

 4   gangs and corrupt authorities in El Salvador by travelling

 5   only “from his job to home,” just as he “ha[d] been able to

 6   keep out of the way of gangs while at Brentwood High School

 7   and after leaving school” in the United States.          CAR at 73.

 8   But there is nothing in the record to suggest that the

9    conditions in El Salvador are comparable to those in the

10   United States, or that the IJ could logically infer Perez

11   Fuentes’s ability to avoid gangs and corrupt authorities in

12   the former from his experience in the latter.             Siewe v.

13   Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e will reject

14   a deduction made by an IJ . . . when there is a complete

15   absence of probative facts to support it – that is, when the

16   speculation is ‘bald.’”).       Because “there is a complete

17   absence of probative facts to support” the IJ’s speculation,

18   we remand the case to the BIA.

19       The agency compounded this error by failing to adequately

20   explain   its   conclusion   with   respect   to   the   issues   of

21   likelihood and acquiescence.        While the agency “need not

22   expressly parse or refute on the record each piece of evidence

                                     8
 1   offered by the petitioner, there must be some indication of

 2   reasoned consideration and adequate findings.”                    Scarlett v.

 3   Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 329 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation

 4   marks and alteration omitted).                 There is evidence in the

 5   record that gangs and government officials associate tattoos

 6   with gang membership and that tattoos are the most common

 7   factor among deportees who are murdered.                      The record also

 8   contains testimony and news articles providing accounts of

 9   police and gang violence against tattooed individuals.                       The

10   agency must analyze this evidence and make a finding as to

11   whether it establishes that Perez Fuentes has a greater than

12   50 percent chance of being tortured.                 See Scarlett, 957 F.3d

13   at 329; see also Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 77.

14       Finally,     in   evaluating       whether        Salvadoran       officials

15   would acquiesce in Perez Fuentes’s torture, the IJ relied

16   entirely    on   statements       in       a   State      Department     report

17   describing two instances in which the government took action

18   against gang members and extrajudicial violence. But the IJ

19   did not address statements in the same report that impunity

20   persists    despite   such    actions          and     that    gangs     control

21   territory   within    the   country.           The     agency’s    failure   to

22   sufficiently     explain    its   rejection          of   material     evidence

                                            9
 1   contrary to its conclusions requires remand.           See De La Rosa

 2   v. Holder, 598 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is not

 3   clear to this Court why the preventative efforts of some

 4   government    actors   should   foreclose       the   possibility    of

 5   government acquiescence, as a matter of law, under the CAT.

 6   Where a government contains officials that would be complicit

 7   in torture, and that government, on the whole, is admittedly

 8   incapable of actually preventing that torture, the fact that

 9   some officials take action to prevent the torture would seem

10   neither    inconsistent     with        a   finding   of    government

11   acquiescence nor necessarily responsive to the question of

12   whether torture would be ‘inflicted by or at the instigation

13   of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official

14   or other person acting in an official capacity.’” (quoting

15   Article 1, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85(CAT))).

16       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

17   DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, and the case is REMANDED

18   to the BIA with respect to Perez Fuentes’s CAT claim.               All

19   pending    motions   and   applications      are   DENIED   and   stays

20   VACATED.

21                                   FOR THE COURT:
22                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
23                                   Clerk of Court

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