Court Opinion

ID: 9928788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:10:35.651997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:53.691701
License: Public Domain

J-A18006-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 KRIEBEL MINERALS, INC., KRIEBEL        :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 PRODUCTION CO., KRIEBEL                :        PENNSYLVANIA
 RESOURCES COMPANY, JGG                 :
 PARTNERS, L.P., K & K MINERAL          :
 RESOURCES CO., KRIEBEL GAS &           :
 OIL, INC., KMSD LLC, KMSD 2019         :
 LLC, KMSD 2020 LLC, KRIEBEL            :
 PRODUCTION CO. LLC, KRIEBEL            :
 LEASING LLC, KRIEBEL RESOURCES         :   No. 1427 WDA 2022
 CO., LLC, KREIBEL RESOURCES AND        :
 K & K MINERALS LLC                     :
                                        :
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 EQT CORPORATION, EQT                   :
 PRODUCTION COMPANY, EQT                :
 ENERGY LLC, EQUITRANS LP,              :
 EQUITRANS MIDSTREAM CORP.,             :
 EQUITRANS SERVICES, LLC, EQT           :
 MIDSTREAM, EQT GATHERING, INC.         :
 AND EQT GATHERING, LLC                 :
                                        :
                   Appellants           :

            Appeal from the Order Entered November 21, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Civil Division at No(s):
                              254 CD 2022

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:               FILED: January 31, 2024

     EQT Corporation, EQT Production Company, EQT Energy LLC, Equitrans

LP, Equitrans Midstream Corp., Equitrans Services, LLC, EQT Midstream, EQT

Gathering, Inc., and EQT Gathering, LLC (collectively “Appellants”) appeal

from the order entered on November 21, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas
J-A18006-23

of Clarion County, denying Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration in the

underlying action.1 We affirm.

       We glean the following relevant facts and procedural background from

the record.      On June 11, 2008, Kriebel Minerals, Inc. (“KMI”), Kriebel

Production Co., Kriebel Resources Company, JGG Partners, L.P., K & K Mineral

Resources Co., and Kriebel Gas & Oil, Inc. (collectively, together with KMI,

“Sellers” or “Appellees”), entered into a purchase and sale agreement (“PSA”)

with Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC (“Range Resources” or “Buyer”),2 by

which Sellers transferred certain oil and gas leasing rights located in

southwestern      Pennsylvania      to   Range   Resources.3   Range    Resources

subsequently assigned these rights to Appellants.

       As part of the PSA, the parties agreed to an area of mutual interest

(“AMI”), which generally consisted of lands within one mile of the conveyed

oil and gas interests, with certain exceptions. Of particular importance to the

matter before us, if Appellants decide to drill or participate in the drilling of a

well located on any of the leases conveyed by the PSA or within the AMI,
____________________________________________

1 An order denying an application to compel arbitration is appealable as of
right. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8); 42 Pa.C.S. § 7320(a)(1).

2 Range Resources is not a party to the underlying action or the instant appeal.

3 We note that the additional appellees named in the above caption, e.g.,
KMSD LLC, KMSD 2019 LLC, KMSD 2020 LLC, Kriebel Production Co. LLC,
Kriebel Leasing LLC, Kriebel Resources Co. LLC, Kriebel Resources, and K & K
Minerals LLC, are the purported “designees of the original contracting [Sellers]
pursuant to the express terms of the PSA[,]” Appellees’ Brief at 2 n.1, and,
for the sake of brevity, are included by reference to “Appellees” herein.

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Appellees maintain the right to elect to participate in such drilling interest.

Appellees’ participation rights are governed by Section 11.5 of the PSA, which

provides:

       11.5 Participation of KMI

             (a) KMI and any Permitted Participation Assignee[4] shall
       have the right to elect to participate for up to an aggregate of 15%
       of the Drilling Party’s interest in each well … to be drilled in the
       Deep Rights[5] by or on behalf of such Drilling Party upon any
       Lease, any Jointly Owned AMI Interest or any lands pooled or
       unitized therewith (collectively, the “Participation Lands”) in
       accordance with the terms and conditions of this Section 11.5.

              (b) If Buyer or its successors and assigns with respect to
       the Participation Lands (Buyer and or such successors and
       assigns, a “Drilling Party”) decides to drill or participate in the
       drilling of any such well, then such Drilling Party shall provide to
       KMI notice of such Drilling Party’s decision to drill or participate in
       the drilling of any such well … (the “Well Notice”)….

              (c) KMI (on its own behalf and/or on behalf of any Permitted
       Participation Assignee) shall have the right to elect to participate
____________________________________________

4 Section 11.3 of the PSA provides, in part:

       KMI may assign all or part of its rights under Section 11.5 to any
       Seller or any Affiliate of any Seller (a “Permitted Participation
       Assignee”); provided that any Well Notice required to be given by
       a Drilling Party under Section 11.5 shall be given only to KMI who
       shall be responsible for providing any such Well Notice to any of
       its Permitted Participation Assignees.

PSA, 6/11/08, at 17 § 11.3.
5 The PSA defines “Deep Rights” as “all depths and formations lying 100 feet

below the base of the Elk Formation/Group/Zone, such base of the Elk
Formation/Group/Zone being depicted at a depth of 6,086 feet on the gamma
ray density, neutron, induction and temperature log run on August 19, 2004[,]
in the Range Resources Leitch #1 well (Permit 37-129-25338) located in
South Huntingdon Township of Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania….” Id.
at 1-2 § 1.1.

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      in the drilling of such well by delivering to such Drilling Party, on
      or before the close of business on the 15th day following its receipt
      of a Well Notice (the “Election Date”), a notice of the election to
      participate in such well by such Person(s) and the amount of such
      interest (up to such 15% interest) in which such Person(s) elect
      to participate (the “Well Interest”), together with all amounts (in
      immediately available funds) that are attributable to such Well
      Interest based upon the amounts set forth in the [authority for
      expenditure (“AFE”)] (the “Participation Costs”) delivered by
      Drilling Party to KMI with respect to such well. Any failure by KMI
      to deliver such notice and pay such Participation Costs on or
      before the close of business on the Election Date shall be deemed
      an election by KMI and the Permitted Participation Assignees to
      not participate in the drilling of the well described in the applicable
      Well Notice.

             (d) If KMI (on its own behalf and/or on behalf of any
      Permitted Participation Assignee) timely elects to participate in the
      drilling of a well described in any Well Notice and pays the
      applicable Participation Costs in accordance with the foregoing,
      then Drilling Party, within 5 days of its receipt of such election
      notice and Participation Costs, shall assign to such Person(s)
      its/their Well Interest in the production unit formed for such well.
      Such assignment shall be in a form mutually agreeable to such
      Drilling Party and KMI and shall be without warranty of title except
      for a special warranty of title by, through and under such Drilling
      Party. All operations with respect to any well in which KMI
      or any Permitted Participation Assignee elects to
      participate in accordance with this Section 11.5 and the
      production unit formed therefor shall be governed by [a
      Joint Operating Agreement, the form of which is attached
      hereto as “Exhibit E” (the “JOA”)].

PSA at 17-18 §§ 11.5(a)-(d) (emphasis added).

      KMI and Range Resources executed the JOA on August 19, 2008, as part

of the closing of the PSA. The JOA contains the following arbitration clause:

      I.    Arbitration:

            Any controversy relating to this agreement shall be settled
      by three (3) disinterested non-related parties, one (1) selected by
      [KMI], one (1) by Range Resources…, and the remaining one (1)
      to be appointed by the first two (2) so selected; and the majority

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      decision of the three (3) arbitrators shall be final and conclusive.
      The arbitrators shall be jointly instructed by [KMI] … and Range
      Resources … to choose between the position taken on that issue
      by [KMI] … and the position taken on that issue by Range
      Resources…, as opposed to adopting either a compromise position
      or any position not taken by [KMI] … or Range Resources…. The
      arbitrators shall report their conclusions in writing to the parties
      as promptly as possible after submission of the matter to
      arbitration, but in any event within thirty (30) days after such
      submission. The arbitrators’ ruling will be binding upon the
      parties. The non-prevailing party will pay the fees and expenses
      of the arbitrators. A party will be the “prevailing party” if the
      position proposed by that party is the position determined by the
      arbitrators.     Such arbitration shall occur in Pittsburgh,
      Pennsylvania.

JOA, 8/19/08, at Art. XVI ¶ I (“Arbitration Clause”).

      In March of 2022, after learning of certain drilling and production being

conducted by Appellants on leases included in the PSA, Appellees instituted

the underlying action with the issuance of a praecipe for writ of summons.

Appellees then began their pre-complaint discovery in accordance with

Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.8, and filed a notice of their intent to serve Range Resources

with a subpoena for the production of “documents and things for discovery[,]”

in accordance with Pa.R.Civ.P. 4009.1, in an effort “to obtain information

about the conveyance of and acquisition of leases subject to the PSA, as well

as Range[ Resources’]/[Appellants’] compliance with their obligations under

the PSA and activities related to [Appellees’] rights thereunder.” Appellees’

Brief at 5.

      In their first set of interrogatories and request for production of

documents served on Appellants, Appellees stated, inter alia:

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      Upon information and belief, EQT Production Company has drilled
      wells on leases conveyed by [Appellees] to [Appellants,] and
      [Appellees] ha[ve] not been afforded proper notice and the timely
      opportunity to participate in and acquire an interest in all the wells
      drilled or ha[ve] otherwise received no information or, rather,
      inaccurate and/or incomplete information that has precluded
      [Appellees] from making an informed decision as to [their]
      participation in wells as contemplated by the [PSA].             Upon
      information and belief, the drilling, development, completion, and
      sale of production was completed by EQT Production Company and
      its affiliates. The cause of action instituted by [Appellees] has
      been filed to pursue all available causes of action arising from the
      assignment of rights under the [PSA] and subsequent actions
      taken by other parties relative to [Appellees’] rights, including the
      identification of all appropriate parties to this cause of action.
      [Appellees’] pre-complaint discovery seeks information material
      and necessary to the filing of [their c]omplaint, including
      surrounding facts necessary to satisfy the Commonwealth of
      Pennsylvania’s fact-pleading requirements and damages for which
      [Appellees are] entitled to recover.

First Pre-Complaint Discovery Directed to Appellants, 5/13/22, at 3.

      On June 16, 2022, Appellants filed a motion to compel arbitration,

suggesting that any causes of action which Appellees seek to assert relating

to their rights under the PSA “are covered by a mandatory arbitration

agreement incorporated into the PSA….” Motion to Compel, 6/16/22, at 1.

See id. at 2 ¶ 3 (Appellants’ averring that “[u]nder the PSA, all operations

relating to wells or production units in which [Appellees] elect to participate

are governed by … [the JOA] that is attached to the PSA as Exhibit E and

incorporated into the PSA by reference”); id. at 2 ¶ 4 (“Under the JOA, the

parties agreed to submit any controversy relating to the agreement to binding

arbitration.”).   They argued that “the Arbitration Clause meets the

requirements of an enforceable contract under Pennsylvania law[,]” and that

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“[a]ny causes of action … [Appellees] might assert in this action are … within

the scope of the Arbitration Clause….” Id. at 3 ¶¶ 7-8. See also id. at 3 ¶ 6

(“Under Pennsylvania law, the [c]ourt must compel arbitration if there is a

valid agreement to arbitrate and the dispute is within the scope of the

agreement.”).    Hence, Appellants sought an order from the trial court

compelling arbitration and staying the underlying action pending resolution of

any arbitration proceeding. Id. at 10 ¶ 9.

      Contrarily, Appellees argued that their pre-complaint discovery is

directed at compliance with the notice and election terms solely governed by

the PSA — not the JOA — and that the PSA does not contain an arbitration

clause.   See Response to Motion to Compel Arbitration, 6/28/22, at 4.

Appellees emphasized that the JOA only applies once they elect to participate

in a well, which is not the case here. Id.

      A hearing was held on the motion to compel arbitration on September

13, 2022. After careful consideration of the arguments presented by both

parties, the trial court agreed with Appellees that the JOA only applies “upon

conditional circumstances in which Appellees elect to participate[,]” and

concluded that because Appellants “have not elected to participate and are

not raising a claim under that election[,] … the JOA’s Arbitration Clause does

not apply.”     Trial Court Opinion and Order (“TCOO”), 11/18/22, at 4

(unnumbered). Accordingly, the trial court denied Appellants’ motion. Id. at

5 (unnumbered). Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal and subsequently

complied with the trial court’s direction to file a concise statement of errors

                                     -7-
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complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The reasons for the

trial court’s decision are set forth in its November 18, 2022 opinion. See id.

at 2-4 (unnumbered).

      Herein, Appellants present the following single issue for our review:

“Whether the Clarion County Court of Common Pleas erred when it denied

[Appellants’] motion to compel arbitration on the basis that the Arbitration

Clause within [the JOA] is not applicable to claims relating to election notices

for participation in oil and gas wells?” Appellants’ Brief at 5 (cleaned up).

      We begin by noting the relevant standard of review:

      We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration
      for an abuse of discretion and to determine whether the trial
      court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. In doing
      so, we employ a two-part test to determine whether the trial court
      should have compelled arbitration. The first determination is
      whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. The second
      determination is whether the dispute is within the scope of the
      agreement.

      Whether a claim is within the scope of an arbitration provision is
      a matter of contract, and as with all questions of law, our review
      of the trial court’s conclusion is plenary. The scope of arbitration
      is determined by the intention of the parties as ascertained in
      accordance with the rules governing contracts generally. These
      are questions of law and our review is plenary.

      Arbitration is a matter of contract, and parties to a contract cannot
      be compelled to arbitrate a given issue absent an agreement
      between them to arbitrate that issue. Even though it is now the
      policy of the law to favor settlement of disputes by arbitration and
      to promote the swift and orderly disposition of claims, arbitration
      agreements are to be strictly construed and such agreements
      should not be extended by implication.

Elwyn v. DeLuca, 48 A.3d 457, 461 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).

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      Accordingly, we must first ascertain whether a valid agreement to

arbitrate exists in the case sub judice. The record indicates that, on August

19, 2008, KMI and Range Resources executed the JOA, which contained an

arbitration clause stating, “[a]ny controversy relating to this agreement shall

be settled by” arbitration.    JOA at Art. XVI ¶ I.       See also TCOO at 1

(recognizing “the parties adopted an August 19, 2008 … JOA, which contained

an arbitration clause”). The parties do not dispute the existence or validity of

the JOA on appeal; thus, we are satisfied that the first prong of the two-part

test — the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate — is met. See Elwyn,

48 A.3d at 461.

      Next, we must determine whether the dispute for which Appellants

sought to compel arbitration is within the scope of the Arbitration Clause. See

id.   In ascertaining the intent of the parties manifested in their written

arbitration agreement,

      the court may take into consideration the surrounding
      circumstances, the situation of the parties, the objects they
      apparently have in view, and the nature of the subject matter of
      the agreement. The court will adopt an interpretation that is most
      reasonable and probable bearing in mind the objects which the
      parties intended to accomplish through the agreement.

Provenzano v. Ohio Valley General Hosp., 121 A.3d 1085, 1095 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

      Instantly, Appellants argue that the Arbitration Clause contains broad

language, e.g., “[a]ny controversy relating to this agreement[,]” which is

incorporated by reference into the PSA, and that the trial court erred in limiting

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the application of this provision, finding that it does not encompass Appellees’

claims. Appellants’ Brief at 22. More specifically, they aver that the trial court

committed the following errors in reaching its conclusion:

      The first error was to assume that the [JOA] does not govern
      election notices or is otherwise limited to cases where KMI or its
      permitted assignees invoke participation rights. The second error
      was to effectively read out the term “relating,” which extends the
      [A]rbitration [C]lause’s scope beyond just those controversies
      arising under the [JOA] to also encompass those relating to the
      [JOA]. The third error was to not account for the [JOA’s]
      incorporation to the [PSA] as part of a single transaction and
      contractual relationship.

Id. at 22-23 (citations to record omitted; emphases in original). Appellants

have failed to convince us that any relief is due.

      As the trial court so aptly opined:

      Relevant to this case are two separate contracts: (1) the PSA and
      (2) the JOA. Looking at the plain language of the PSA, the parties
      did not intend for the provisions of the PSA to be subject to an
      arbitration clause because the contract lacks such a clause.
      However, it is clear from the inclusion of an arbitration clause in
      the JOA, that the parties intended for disputes arising under the
      provisions of the JOA to be arbitrated. The matter at issue here
      is the interplay between the two agreements and whether the
      parties intended the Arbitration Clause of the JOA to apply to the
      process for electing to participate as outlined in the PSA. …

      The Arbitration Clause in the JOA applies to “[a]ny
      controversy relating to this agreement….” JOA [at] Art. XVI[
      ¶] I. The language “this agreement” refers only to the JOA.
      Further, it is too broad an interpretation to infer that the phrase
      “relating to” subjects the provisions of the PSA to the Arbitration
      Clause. … [S]ection 11.5 of the PSA references the JOA
      under limited circumstances, and cannot be interpreted as
      applying wholly to the other parts of the PSA. Under this
      section, if [Appellees] elect[] to participate, the provisions
      of the JOA will apply to that election.

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         If KMI … timely elects to participate in the drilling of a well
         described in any Well Notice and pays the applicable
         Participation Costs…[,] all operations with respect to any
         well in which KMI or any Permitted Participation Assignee
         elects to participate in accordance with this Section 11.5 and
         the production unit formed therefor shall be governed by
         the JOA.

      PSA [at 17 §] 11.5(d).

      The reference to the JOA only applies upon conditional
      circumstances in which [Appellees] elect to participate.
      Absent an election to participate under … [S]ection 11.5 of
      the PSA, the JOA does not apply. [Appellees] have not elected
      to participate and are not raising a claim under that election.
      [Appellees] proposed a pre-complaint subpoena to ascertain
      compliance with provisions of the PSA governing the election
      process, not participation in the actual well drilling activities under
      the JOA.      Therefore, because the issue is not related to
      [Appellees’] “participation in the drilling of a well,” the JOA’s
      Arbitration Clause does not apply. If the parties intended an
      arbitration clause to apply to the provisions of the PSA outlining
      the election process, then an arbitration clause should have been
      included in the PSA itself[;] however, such a clause was not
      included in the PSA.

TCOO at 2-4 (cleaned up; emphases added).             Based on our review, we

conclude that the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence

in the record.

      We agree with the trial court’s thorough and well-thought-out analysis

regarding the interplay of the PSA and the JOA. Appellants’ argument that

the trial court erred in determining that the application of the JOA’s Arbitration

Clause is limited to cases in which Appellees have invoked their participation

rights ignores the plain and unambiguous language in the documents. It is

clear that absent an election to participate under Section 11.5 of the PSA,

the JOA does not apply. See PSA at 17 § 11.5(d) (expressly stating that

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“if” Appellees elect to participate in the drilling of a well, all operations with

respect to such well “shall be governed by the JOA”) (emphasis added).

      To the extent that Appellants insist that the language in the Arbitration

Clause is so “broad” as to evidence the parties’ intent to arbitrate all claims

regarding election notices and participation rights, regardless of whether

Appellees exercised their participation rights, we emphasize that Appellants

again ignore the terms of the documents and fail to recognize the self-limiting

language contained in the JOA. See Provenzano, 121 A.3d at 1096 (defining

a “broad” arbitration clause in a contract as one that is “unrestricted” and

contains language that encompasses “all disputes which relate to contractual

obligations”) (emphases added).

      As Appellees point out, the cover page of the JOA plainly states:

      The Contract Area shall consist of leasehold acreage included in
      the production unit for any wells drilled on or on a production unit
      including the Leases (as such term is defined in the [PSA]) in
      which [KMI] elects to participate for a working interest
      pursuant to Section 11.5 of the [PSA].

Appellees’ Brief at 14 (citation omitted; emphasis added). Moreover, the JOA

begins with a declaration that the agreement incorporates a specified set of

leases and/or oil and gas interests identified in Exhibit “A,” in which “the

parties hereto have reached an agreement to explore and develop these

Leases and/or Oil and Gas interests for the production of Oil and Gas to the

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extent and as hereinafter provided.” Id. (quoting JOA at 1).6      Article XVI of

the JOA further provides:

       A. Prior Agreement:

             This agreement is being entered into by the parties pursuant
       to that certain [PSA] dated June 11, 2008, by and between
       [Sellers] and Range Resources … to which this agreement is
       attached as Exhibit “E[.”] Pursuant to Section 11.5 of the [PSA],
       [KMI] has the option to participate on a well by well basis in wells
       proposed by Range [Resources] on or on a production unit
       including the Leases (as such term is defined in the [PSA]). In
       the event of a conflict between any terms and provisions of this
       agreement and any other similar terms and provisions of the
       [PSA], the respective terms and conditions of the [PSA] take
       precedence and prevail….

JOA at Art. XVI ¶ A (emphasis in original).        Thus, the JOA expressly and

unambiguously limits its scope and application to those leaseholds included in

wells drilled on or production units including leases for which Appellees have

exercised their rights to participate pursuant to Section 11.5 of the PSA.
____________________________________________

6 Exhibit “A” to the JOA states, in part:

       (1)    Description of lands subject to this agreement:

              The lands subject to this agreement are the leasehold
              acreage included in the unit surrounding any wells drilled on
              or on a production unit including the Leases in which
              [KMI] participates for a working interest pursuant to
              Section 11.5 of the [PSA].
                                        …

       (5)    Oil & Gas Leases subject to this Agreement are:

              The leasehold acreage included in the production unit
              surrounding any wells drilled on or using Leases in which
              [KMI] participates for a working interest pursuant to
              Section 11.5 of the [PSA].

Id. at 14-15 (quoting JOA at Exhibit “A”) (emphases added).

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      Finally, we reject Appellants’ assertion that the Arbitration Clause of the

JOA must be applied to claims brought pursuant to the PSA, because the JOA

and the PSA are part of a single transaction. See Appellants’ Brief at 32-34.

See also id. at 37 (suggesting that the Arbitration Clause extends to claims

arising under the PSA “of which it forms a part” and concluding that “the

absence of an arbitration clause in the [PSA] itself was unremarkable”). While

the PSA and JOA were executed on separate dates, we recognize that the JOA

is an integral part of the PSA.    See PSA at 32 § 13.5 (“The Exhibits and

Schedules referred to in this Agreement shall be deemed to be an integral part

of this Agreement.”). “It is a general rule of law in the Commonwealth that

where a contract refers to and incorporates the provisions of another, both

shall be construed together.”     Southwestern Energy Production Co. v.

Forest Resources, LLC, 83 A.3d 177, 187 (Pa. Super. 2013). See also id.

(“Where several instruments are made as part of one transaction they will be

read together, and each will be construed with reference to the other; and this

is so although the instruments may have been executed at different times and

do not in terms refer to each other.” (quoting Huegel v. Mifflin Const. Co.

Inc., 796 A.2d 350, 354-55 (Pa. Super. 2002)). The record reflects that the

trial court properly read the PSA and the JOA in reference to each other.

Nonetheless, it is clear that the terms of the JOA only apply once Appellees

have invoked their participation rights under Section 11.5 of the PSA. See

TCOO at 2-4.

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      As Appellees have not elected to participate in the drilling of a well

pursuant to Section 11.5 of the PSA in this matter and are not raising a claim

under such election, the trial court properly determined that the Arbitration

Clause in the JOA does not apply. Moreover, there is no separate arbitration

clause contained in the PSA. We concur with the trial court’s conclusion that

“[i]f the parties intended an arbitration clause to apply to the provisions of the

PSA outlining the election process, then an arbitration clause should have been

included in the PSA itself….”    TCOO at 4.    Accordingly, we affirm the trial

court’s November 21, 2022 order denying Appellants’ motion to compel

arbitration.

      Order affirmed.

 1/31/2024

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