Court Opinion

ID: 9949817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 17:03:38.487868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:32:03.257187
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/12/24 P. v. Mitchell CA4/1
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081223

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCN362476)

 KENYATTA MITCHELL,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Lisa R. Rodriguez, Judge. Affirmed.
         John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and
Christopher P. Beesley and Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION
      Kenyatta Mitchell’s 17-year sentence was reduced to 15 years when he

was resentenced under Penal Code1 section 1172.75 and two now-invalid
prison prior enhancements under former section 667.5, subdivision (b), were
stricken. In resentencing Mitchell, the trial court again imposed an upper
term sentence based on prior convictions that were admitted by Mitchell in
his original trial.
      Mitchell claims for the first time on appeal that the resentencing
provisions of section 1172.75, subdivision (d), violate his right to equal
protection of the laws by treating defendants resentenced under section
1172.75 differently than defendants resentenced under other laws. As a
remedy, he seeks a remand for a new resentencing hearing. We conclude
Mitchell fails to demonstrate he was personally subjected to the allegedly
disparate treatment of which he complains. For this reason, we decline to
exercise our discretion to consider his forfeited constitutional challenge; even
if we were to consider it, it would fail because Mitchell suffered no prejudice.
We affirm.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In 2016, a jury found Mitchell guilty of second degree robbery (§ 211).
Mitchell then waived his right to a trial on prior convictions and admitted he
suffered (1) at least two convictions for which he served a term of
imprisonment, each supporting a one-year sentencing enhancement (§§ 667.5,
former subd. (b), 668); (2) a conviction for a serious felony, supporting a five-
year enhancement (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)); and (3) a prior
strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, 668).

1     Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                        2
      At his original sentencing in 2017, the trial court sentenced Mitchell to
the upper term of five years for the robbery, doubled to 10 years due to the
strike prior. The court imposed two consecutive one-year terms for the two
prison priors plus a consecutive five-year term for the serious felony prior.
His total term of imprisonment was 17 years.
      In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021−2022 Reg.
Sess.) to add former section 1171.1, later renumbered as section 1172.75

(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12), to the Penal Code.2 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, §§ 1, 3.)
Effective January 1, 2022, and subject to exceptions not relevant here, section
1172.75 declared sentence enhancements imposed under subdivision (b) of
section 667.5 legally invalid and provided a mechanism for resentencing
affected individuals. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a)–(c).) This change applied to
Mitchell.
      In September 2022, the trial court (with a different judge presiding)

held a hearing to resentence Mitchell in accordance with section 1172.75.3
The parties had agreed Mitchell was entitled to have both of his one-year
prison prior enhancements stricken. They disagreed, however, on other
aspects of Mitchell’s resentencing.
      Relying on People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 and
section 1385, among other authorities, Mitchell urged the trial court to
dismiss his prior strike conviction and prior serious felony enhancement and
to impose a middle-term sentence. The prosecution opposed further

2     For simplicity, we shall refer to the statute as section 1172.75.

3     Prior to resentencing, the trial court granted Mitchell’s Faretta motion
to represent himself. (See Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.)

                                        3
reduction of Mitchell’s sentence on the ground his numerous offenses and
poor performance in prison showed he was a danger to public safety.
        The trial court denied Mitchell’s Romero motion to dismiss the prior
strike after concluding the seriousness of his criminal history and the recency
of the strike conviction brought him squarely within the spirit of the Three
Strikes law. It elected to impose the serious felony enhancement based in
part on its finding that Mitchell had continued to engage in violent conduct
while in prison such that public safety would be endangered by dismissal of
the enhancement. Finally, the trial court elected to impose the upper term,
stating: “The [c]ourt is choosing the upper term based upon the prior
convictions that were admitted by the defendant in his original trial, and
thus proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and is relying on [California Rules of
Court, rule] 4.421(b)(2) and (b)(3) to choose the upper term.” After making its
sentencing decision, the court “also note[d] pursuant to [section] 1172.75, the
upper term was originally chosen.”
        The court thus resentenced Mitchell to a total prison term of 15 years,
consisting of the upper term of five years for the robbery, doubled to 10 years
for the strike prior, plus a consecutive five-year term for the prior serious
felony.
                                  DISCUSSION
                                        I.
                        Mitchell’s Equal Protection Claim
        The only aspect of the judgment that Mitchell challenges on appeal is
the trial court’s selection of the upper term for his robbery conviction in
resentencing him. He claims there are “two features” of the resentencing
provisions of section 1172.75 that violate his right to equal protection of the
laws.

                                        4
      The first is subdivision (d)(3) of section 1172.75, which provides that
the resentencing court “may consider postconviction factors, including, but
not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the
defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time
served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the
defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that
circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
Mitchell contends subdivision (d)(3) permits the resentencing court to impose
the upper term on the basis of postconviction factors, with no requirement
that the postconviction factors be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a trier
of fact or stipulated to by the defendant.
      The second is subdivision (d)(4), which provides: “Unless the court
originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation
that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(4).) Mitchell interprets subdivision (d)(4) as
authorizing courts to reimpose the upper term because it was originally
imposed, “without the defendant’s admission to the facts in aggravation or a
true finding [beyond a reasonable doubt]” of the facts in aggravation. Based
on this interpretation, he contends subdivision (d)(4) “simply dispenses” with

the “proof requirements” set forth in sections 1170, subdivision (b)(2),4 and

4     Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), states in relevant part, “[t]he court
may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a

                                         5
1170.1, subdivision (d)(2),5 for defendants, like him, who are resentenced
under section 1172.75.
      He further contends that defendants resentenced under sections
1170.18 (authorizing recall of sentence and resentencing for certain felonies
reclassified as misdemeanors) and 1172.1 (authorizing resentencing when the
applicable sentencing laws are changed within 120 days of the date of
commitment) get the benefit of the proof requirements of sections 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), and 1170.1, subdivision (d)(2). He asserts that defendants
resentenced under section 1172.75 are similarly situated with those
resentenced under sections 1170.18 and 1172.1, and there is no rational basis
for allowing trial courts to give upper term sentences to the first group of
defendants under circumstances that would not justify imposition of the
upper term on the second group of defendants. As a remedy for the asserted
equal protection violation, he seeks a remand to the trial court for a new
resentencing hearing.

term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying
those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.”

5      Section 1170.1, subdivision (d)(2), states in relevant part, “[t]he court
may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term [for a sentencing
enhancement] only when there are circumstances in aggravation that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.”

                                       6
                                        II.
  Mitchell Fails to Show He Was Subjected to the Disparate Treatment That
              Forms the Basis of His Equal Protection Challenge
      Mitchell’s challenge to subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4) of section 1172.75
suffers from an immediate, fatal flaw: he fails to show his sentence was
impacted by the features of these provisions he identifies as creating an equal
protection problem. As we will explain, his inability to demonstrate that his
own equal protection rights were violated affects our willingness to entertain
his challenge as well as its capacity for success on the merits.
      First, as to subdivision (d)(3) of section 1172.75, Mitchell does not
establish the trial court actually relied on postconviction factors (that is, the
factors subdivision (d)(3) purportedly authorizes courts to consider even if not
proven beyond a reasonable doubt or stipulated to by the defendant) as a
basis for giving him the upper term. To the contrary, the record
demonstrates the court did not rely on such factors in making this sentencing
decision. The court gave a clear and finite statement of its reasons for
choosing the upper term. The only facts it identified were the prior
convictions previously admitted by Mitchell. These prior convictions, in turn,
supported two aggravating circumstances. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(b)(2) [“The defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained
petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing
seriousness.”]; id., rule 4.421(b)(3) [“The defendant has served a prior term in
prison or county jail under section 1170(h).”].) Nothing in the court’s
statement suggests its decision to impose the upper term was predicated on
postconviction factors.
      In an effort to demonstrate that the trial court erred and violated his
equal protection rights, Mitchell points to statements the court made earlier

                                        7
in the resentencing hearing with respect to his behavior in prison. He asserts
we must “presume” the court’s upper term selection was influenced by these
postconviction facts. We disagree.
      The trial court began the sentencing hearing by reciting all relevant

sentencing standards,6 as well as the full history of Mitchell’s case. It was in
this context that the court gave a narrative description of his performance in
prison. However, the court did not announce its discretionary sentencing
choices until after completing these prefatory remarks. When it did so, it was
careful to identify the discrete reasons underlying each decision. When it
addressed Mitchell’s motion to dismiss his prior serious felony enhancement,
for example, the court called out his “continued violent conduct while in
prison” as a basis for concluding an early release would endanger public
safety. But when it announced its decision to impose the upper term and
explained its reasons for doing so, it made no mention of his prison
performance or any other postconviction factors. On this record, we conclude
the court did not rely on postconviction factors to impose the upper term.

6     The standards recited by the court included sections 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(1), and 1385, subdivision (c). (See §§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1)
[“Resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than
the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.”], 1385, subd. (c)(2)
[“Proof of the presence of one or more [listed mitigating] circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds
that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety”;
“ ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of
the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to
others.”].) To the extent Mitchell appears to interpret the trial court’s
prefatory remarks as indicating the court believed it could not resentence
him to a total term of less than 15 years if doing so endangered public safety,
we disagree with his interpretation.

                                       8
      Second, as to subdivision (d)(4) of section 1172.75, Mitchell also fails to
show he was affected by its ostensibly relaxed proof requirements. Mitchell’s
equal protection attack is based on a particular gloss he gives this provision.
Under his interpretation, the initial clause of subdivision (d)(4) authorizes
courts to reimpose the upper term at resentencing because the upper term
was previously imposed. (Cf. § 1172.75, subd. (d)(4) [“Unless the court
originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation
that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (Italics added.)].)
      But the record of Mitchell’s resentencing does not reflect that this was
how the trial court understood, or applied, subdivision (d)(4). In its prefatory
remarks, the court stated, “The [c]ourt may not impose the upper term unless
the [c]ourt originally imposed the upper term.” (Italics added.) This
comment reveals the court viewed the initial clause of subdivision (d)(4) as
restricting the scope of defendants eligible to receive the upper term at
resentencing to those who previously received the upper term, not as creating
a condition that itself justified the imposition of the upper term. Under the
court’s interpretation, such a defendant would be eligible for the upper term
but could not receive it in the absence of aggravating factors stipulated to by
the defendant or proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a trier of fact.
      That the trial court gave subdivision (d)(4) this interpretation—which
evades the alleged equal protection problem raised by Mitchell—is further
supported by its statement of reasons for giving Mitchell the upper term for
the robbery. The court expressly stated it was “choosing the upper term

                                        9
based on the prior convictions that were admitted by [Mitchell] in his original
trial, and thus proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” The aggravating factors it
identified relied on this criminal history. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(b)(2) & (3); People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 819‒820 [concluding
defendant’s criminal history established one of two aggravating
circumstances that independently satisfy Sixth Amendment requirements
and render him eligible for the upper term].)
      Moreover, Mitchell concedes “the trial court cited [his] criminal record
and [California Rules of Court,] rules 4.421[(b)(2)] and (3) as the reasons for
imposing the upper term”; that the court “may impose the upper term based
on a single factor in aggravation”; and his “prior convictions were lawfully
proven and the basis to impose the upper term.” Although the court also
“note[d] pursuant to [section] 1172.75, the upper term was originally chosen,”
it merely noted that this was Mitchell’s original sentence; it did not say it was
choosing the upper term because he previously received it. Moreover, the
court’s belief that it needed to make this notation is consistent with our
conclusion that it believed only defendants previously sentenced to the upper
term were eligible to receive the upper term at resentencing.
      For these reasons, we conclude that Mitchell’s sentence was not
affected by the asserted disparity in the proof requirements for imposing an
upper term sentence in subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4) of section 1172.75 as
compared with other resentencing statutes.
                                      III.
We Decline to Overlook Mitchell’s Forfeiture of His Equal Protection Challenge
       Because He Fails to Demonstrate His Own Rights Were Violated
      Mitchell did not raise his equal protection challenge in the trial court.
Citing Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394 (Hale), and In re Sheena K.

                                       10
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887‒888 (Sheena K.), he claims we may nevertheless
consider it for the first time on appeal because it raises a pure issue of law.
He asserts that we have discretion to do so because it raises a constitutional
issue as well as an important question of statutory interpretation.
      We agree with Mitchell that whether to entertain his belated challenge
is a matter committed to our discretion. “Ordinarily, a criminal defendant
who does not challenge an assertedly erroneous ruling of the trial court in
that court has forfeited his or her right to raise the claim on appeal.” (Sheena
K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 880.) “ ‘ “[A] constitutional right,” or a right of any
other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to
make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to
determine it.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 880‒881; accord, People v. McCullough (2013) 56
Cal.4th 589, 593 (McCullough).) Further, “the forfeiture rule applies in the
context of sentencing as in other areas of criminal law” (Sheena K., at p. 881),
and encompasses challenges to the constitutionality of penal statutes relied
upon at sentencing (see People v. Marchand (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1056,
1060‒1061 [defendant forfeited due process challenge to constitutionality of
sex offender registration statute by failing to object to its assertedly deficient
proof requirements at sentencing], cited with approval in Sheena K., at
p. 887, fn. 7).
      However, application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic.
(McCullough, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 593.) “Thus, an appellate court may
review a forfeited claim—and ‘[w]hether or not it should do so is entrusted to
its discretion.’ ” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887, fn. 7.) Hale, cited by
Mitchell, is consistent with the conclusion we have discretion in deciding
whether to entertain his equal protection challenge. (See Hale, 22 Cal.3d at
p. 394 [holding an unpreserved challenge to validity of a statute “may” be

                                        11
examined for on appeal where it raised a pure question of law presented on
undisputed facts (italics added)].)
      Sheena K., also cited by Mitchell, carved out an exception to the
forfeiture rule under which appellate courts are required to consider certain
unpreserved constitutional challenges. However, this exception does not
apply here. In Sheena K., a defendant argued for the first time on appeal
that a probation condition requiring her not to “ ‘associate with anyone
disapproved of by probation’ ” was facially vague and overbroad because it
“fail[ed] to specify that [the] defendant know which persons were disapproved
of.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 880.) Our high court held the
probationer did not forfeit this challenge by failing to raise it in the trial
court, reasoning it was similar to “a challenge to an unauthorized sentence
that is not subject to the rule of forfeiture,” was “capable of correction without
reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court,”
and presented an asserted error that was a pure question of law, “easily
remediable on appeal by modification of the condition.” (Id. at pp. 887, 888.)
      For two reasons, Mitchell’s equal protection challenge to subdivisions
(d)(3) and (d)(4) of section 1172.75 falls outside the forfeiture exception of
Sheena K. First, the constitutional challenge Mitchell raises is not properly
categorized as a facial challenge. “ ‘ A facial challenge to the constitutional
validity of a statute or ordinance considers only the text of the measure itself,
not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual.’
[Citation.] A facial challenge seeks to void the statute as a whole by showing
that ‘ “no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,’ i.e.,
that the law is unconstitutional in all its applications.” ’ ” (In re D.L. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 144, 157.) “Unlike a ‘facial challenge,’ an ‘as[-]applied’
challenge may seek ‘relief from a specific application of a facially valid statute

                                        12
or ordinance to an individual or class of individuals who are under allegedly
impermissible present restraint or disability as a result of the manner or
circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has been applied.’ ” (Ibid.,
italics added.) “[T]he ‘minimum’ our [Supreme Court’s] cases have accepted
[to present a facial challenge to a statute] is a showing that the statute is
invalid ‘in the generality or great majority of cases.’ ” (People v. Buenrostro
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 388 (Buenrostro).)
      Applying these descriptions compels the conclusion that Mitchell’s
constitutional challenge is an as-applied rather than a facial challenge.
Mitchell does not contend subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4) of section 1172.75 are
invalid “ ‘in the generality or great majority of cases.’ ” (Buenrostro, supra, 6
Cal.5th at p. 388.) He contends subdivision (d)(3) violates equal protection,
but only when relied upon to impose an upper term sentence based on proof
lesser than the proof required under other statutes. He does not argue that it
violates equal protection in other contexts. Indeed, although the trial court
in this case expressly relied on postconviction factors—Mitchell’s misconduct
in prison—to deny his motion to dismiss the prior serious felony sentencing
enhancement, Mitchell does not argue this application of subdivision (d)(3) is
violative of his (or anyone else’s) equal protection rights.
      Similarly, Mitchell contends subdivision (d)(4) of section 1172.75
violates equal protection, but only when interpreted to authorize
resentencing courts to choose the upper term because the upper term was
originally imposed. He does not contend it violates equal protection when
interpreted to limit eligibility for the upper term to those defendants who
previously received the upper term. These are as-applied challenges, not
facial challenges, because they are context-dependent: they seek “ ‘relief from
a specific application of a facially valid statute or ordinance to an individual

                                        13
or class of individuals who are under allegedly impermissible present
restraint or disability as a result of the manner or circumstances in which the
statute or ordinance has been applied.’ ” (In re D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 157.) This is the first reason Sheena K.’s forfeiture exception does not
apply here.
      The second reason is that the alleged equal protection violations
Mitchell raises are not “capable of correction without reference to the
particular sentencing record developed in the trial court[.]” (Sheena K.,
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 887.) Rather, they can be addressed only by reviewing
the sentencing record to assess the basis of the court’s upper-term decision
and, if sustained, they require a remand for the trial court to reconsider its
decision based only on proper factors. Indeed, as the People point out, this is
precisely the remedy Mitchell seeks.
      Therefore, Sheena K. does not apply, and our consideration of Mitchell’s
challenge, if at all, is discretionary. We recognize reviewing courts generally
exercise their discretion to consider forfeited claims where they present
constitutional issues or important questions of public interest. (See, e.g.,
Hale, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 394.) However, we do not believe this is an
appropriate case in which to do so.
      Mitchell’s failure to show he was affected by the aspects of subdivisions
(d)(3) and (d)(4) of section 1172.75 he claims are violative of equal protection
triggers several related principles which, when considered together, counsel
against entertaining his attack on these provisions. The first principle is that
“we do not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so
to dispose of the matter before us.” (People v. Williams (1974) 16 Cal. 3d 663,
667, accord Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hunter) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1245,
1275, fn. 31; see Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v.

                                       14
Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230‒231, quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Prot. Assn. (1988) 485 U.S. 439, 445 [“ ‘A fundamental and
longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid
reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding
them.’ ”].) Here, consideration of Mitchell’s challenge does not stand to make
any difference in his sentence. Far from being “absolutely required”
(Williams, at p. 667) it is entirely unnecessary for us to consider the merits of
his challenge in order to dispose of his appeal. This consideration weighs
strongly against exercising our discretion to overlook Mitchell’s forfeiture.
      Second, because Mitchell’s rights to equal protection were not violated
by the manner in which the trial court resentenced him, any consideration we
might give his attack on the validity of subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4) of section
1172.75 could only be based on hypothetical scenarios in which other
defendants’ rights might be violated under the circumstances he describes.
Considering such a challenge would violate the “well-settled rule that courts
should ‘avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.’ ” (People v.
Watson (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 474, 489, quoting In re William M. (1970) 3
Cal.3d 16, 23, fn. 14.) This principle, too, weighs heavily against exercising
our discretion to consider Mitchell’s challenge.
      Finally, we observe the usual rule is that “ ‘ “[o]ne who seeks to raise a
constitutional question must show that his rights are affected injuriously by
the law which he attacks and that he is actually aggrieved by its
operation.” ’ ” (People v. Conley (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 566, 576; see
Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973) 413 U.S. 601, 610 [“a person to whom a statute
may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on
the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in
other situations not before the Court”]; Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60

                                       15
Cal.4th 595, 599 [“ ‘To have standing, a party must be beneficially interested
in the controversy; that is, he or she must have “some special interest to be
served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above
the interest held in common with the public at large.” [Citation.] The party
must be able to demonstrate that he or she has some such beneficial interest
that is concrete and actual, and not conjectural or hypothetical.’ ”].) We do
not specifically hold Mitchell lacks standing to assert his challenge, because
neither the Attorney General nor Mitchell have addressed the issue.
However, the fact that defendants in Mitchell’s position are generally
precluded from proceeding with their constitutional claims further persuades
us the more appropriate course is to decline to exercise our discretion to
consider Mitchell’s challenge here.
      For all of these reasons, we believe the more prudent course is to
decline to exercise our discretion to consider Mitchell’s equal protection
challenge to subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4) of section 1172.75. Consideration
of this challenge is better reserved for a case actually affected by it; this will
ensure the issue is properly framed and contextualized in an actual set of
facts and will encourage full development of the relevant issues by the
parties, all of which will ultimately lead to a more informed judicial decision.
                                        IV.
 Even If We Were to Overlook Mitchell’s Forfeiture, His Challenge Would Fail
                                  on the Merits
      Even if we were to entertain Mitchell’s challenge, we would reject it
because he was not prejudicially affected by the aspects of section 1172.75,
subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4) he identifies as unconstitutional.
      Mitchell brings his equal protection challenge to subdivisions (d)(3) and
(d)(4) of section 1172.75 as a basis for obtaining a new resentencing hearing.

                                        16
To grant him this relief, we would have to reverse his existing sentence. But
we cannot reverse his existing sentence unless we first find the court
committed a prejudicial error in imposing it. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; see
People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1109‒1110 [before remanding
to redress erroneous failure to apply proof requirements of § 1170,
subd. (b)(2), at sentencing, reviewing court must first engage in harmless
error review; “error in itself is not ground for reversal”]; People v. Lopez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 465 [failure to comply with proof requirements of
§ 1170, subd. (b)(2), is not structural error].)
        Mitchell fails to overcome this essential hurdle to obtaining the remedy
he seeks. In his opening brief, Mitchell asserts that his sentence must be
reversed under the federal and state standards for evaluating prejudice. (See
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [federal constitutional error
does not require reversal if harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836‒837 [error of state law requires reversal
only when it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been
reached absent the error].) But reversal could not be required under any
standard unless the trial court actually relied on improper factors to give him
an upper term sentence. For the reasons we have discussed, Mitchell fails to
establish this occurred: he does not succeed in showing that the court relied
on postconviction factors, nor does he succeed in demonstrating that the court
based its upper term decision on the fact that he originally received the upper
term.

                                         17
                              DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                            DO, J.

I CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

                                  18
CASTILLO, J., Concurring.
      Like my colleagues in the majority, I would affirm. Unlike my
colleagues, however, I reach that result by resolving the important and pure
legal question Kenyatta Mitchell raises: whether subdivisions (d)(3) and
(d)(4) of Penal Code section 1172.75 treat defendants resentenced under
section 1172.75 differently from defendants resentenced under other laws in
a manner violative of equal protection.
                                        I.
      My colleagues in the majority decline to exercise discretion to reach the
merits of this issue because they “do not believe this is an appropriate case in
which to do so.” (Maj. opn., at p. 14.) They conclude Mitchell’s claim is solely
a forfeited “as-applied” challenge (maj. opn., at pp. 13-14), and as the trial
court relied on only appropriately considered aggravating factors in
resentencing Mitchell to the upper term, his “sentence was not affected by the
asserted disparity in the proof requirements for imposing an upper term
sentence in subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4) of section 1172.75 as compared with
other resentencing statutes.” (Maj. opn., at p. 10.) In their view,
“[c]onsideration of this challenge is better reserved for a case actually affected
by it.” (Maj. opn., at p. 16.)
      To the extent Mitchell argues the trial court relied on impermissible
postconviction factors in his particular resentencing, I, too, decline to address
the claim’s merits. Applying the forfeiture rule to a claim seeking
“modif[ication of] a sentence . . . premised upon the facts and circumstances
of the individual case” encourages objection to the sentence at the time it
“initially is imposed in order to permit the trial court to consider, and if
appropriate in the exercise of its informed judgment, to effect a correction.”
(In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 885, 889 (Sheena K.).)
      Both parties, however, additionally contest and fully brief the
constitutionality of section 1172.75 divorced from the individual facts of
Mitchell’s case, disputing whether the statute impermissibly exempts trial
courts resentencing defendants under section 1172.75 from the universal rule
that eligibility for any upper-term sentence depends on “facts that have been
established consistently with Sixth Amendment principles.” (People v. Black
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 813.) Mitchell contends this is “a pure issue of law
which can be raised for the first time on appeal,” and the People classify
Mitchell’s claim as “a facial equal protection challenge” in which the details of
Mitchell’s underlying crime, trial, and sentencings are irrelevant.
(Zuckerman v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners (2002) 29 Cal.4th 32,
38 (Zuckerman).)
      A statute cannot violate equal protection if it treats all persons the
same. (People v. Castel (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1321, 1326.) Interpreting
section 1172.75 to determine whether it treats any persons differently at all
is a “pure question of law,” only “requir[ing] the review of abstract and
generalized legal concepts—a task that is well suited to the role of an
appellate court.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 885, 888.) Moreover,
this is “an important question of law” appropriately “reviewed on the merits
by [an] appellate court notwithstanding the applicability of the forfeiture
rule.” (Id. at p. 888.) Mitchell raises a timely and important question as to
the validity and constitutionality of a relatively new resentencing provision of
wide applicability. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6;
see Senate Rules Com., Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
as amended Sept. 1, 2021, pp. 5-6 [thousands of requests to resentence under
section 1172.75 are likely in even single counties].) Appeals of the numerous
resentencings under section 1172.75 will continue for the foreseeable future.

                                       2
(Pen. Code, § 1172.75, subd. (c)(2) [resentencing deadline only recently passed
on Dec. 31, 2023].) As such, appellate review of Mitchell’s claim “may save
. . . time and government resources that otherwise would be expended in”
many courts interpreting and applying, and subsequently redressing, a
statutory provision potentially “invalid as a matter of law.” (Sheena K.,
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 885.)
      For these reasons, I embrace Mitchell’s facial challenge to the
constitutionality of Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4),
and write separately to address his claim on the merits.
                                        II.
                                        A.
      In reviewing a facial constitutional challenge to a statute, a court
considers only the statutory text and not its application to any given
individual. (Zuckerman, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 38-39.) A statute’s proper
construction is a question of law decided de novo. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 961 (Lewis).)
      In interpreting a statute, the goal is to ascertain the Legislature’s
intent so as to effectuate the statute’s purpose. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 961.) The court first gives “the statute’s words . . . a plain and
commonsense meaning.” (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.)
“If the language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.” (Voices of the
Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499, 519.)
The words, however, must be construed in context, so a court must look to the
entire section as well as “the statutory framework as a whole” to harmonize
terms as possible. (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d
222, 230.) The court should avoid a construction that renders a provision
“surplusage” (People v. Cobb (2010) 48 Cal.4th 243, 253) and “may reject a

                                        3
literal construction that is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the
statute or that would lead to absurd results.” (Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc.
v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 27 (Simpson).)
      Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, a statute should not be
construed to violate the Constitution if any other construction is viable.
(People v. Garcia (2017) 2 Cal.5th 792, 804 (Garcia).)
                                         B.
      Mitchell first challenges subdivision (d)(3) of section 1172.75, which
allows the court to “consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited
to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while
incarcerated[;] evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and
diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for
future violence[;] and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed
since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in
the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
      Mitchell argues this provision “permits the trial court to consider
postconviction factors which will obviously be facts neither admitted by the
defendant in court nor proven true [beyond a reasonable doubt] to a trier of
fact.” Because this provision does not apply to “defendants who are
resentenced under other provisions of law,” Mitchell claims section 1172.75
treats resentenced defendants differently.
      The People respond that Mitchell relies on “a flawed construction” of
section 1172.75. “[B]y its terms” and read in conjunction with the rest of
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3) “indicates [its] postconviction factors are to
be considered for ameliorative purposes.” Immediately preceding
subdivisions (d)(1) and (d)(2) require, respectively, (1) a lesser sentence
absent clear and convincing evidence it would endanger public safety and

                                         4
(2) application of all changes in sentencing law that reduce prison terms,
promote uniformity, and eliminate disparity. (§ 1172.75, subds. (d)(1)-(2).)
Thus, subdivision (d)(3)’s factors are to be used to determine the
appropriateness of a lower term rather than a higher one.
      Either interpretation of subdivision (d)(3) is plausible if read in
isolation. But, read in context, Mitchell’s proposed reading contradicts the
plain terms of subdivision (d)(2), which requires the trial court to “apply any
other changes in law that reduce sentences.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
Further, as section 1172.75 was added to the Penal Code at the same time
section 1170 was amended to require that circumstances in aggravation
relied on to impose an upper-term sentence be established in accordance with
the Sixth Amendment, Mitchell’s proposed construction contradicts “the
legislative intent apparent in the statute” and “would lead to absurd results.”
(Simpson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 27; § 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
      Section 1172.1, added to the Penal Code concurrently with
section 1172.75, further supports the People’s proposed interpretation of
subdivision (d)(3). Like section 1172.75, section 1172.1 requires any new
sentence to (1) not exceed the initial sentence and (2) comply with any
changes of law that reduce sentences. (Compare § 1172.75, subds. (d)(1)-(2),
with § 1172.1, subds. (a)(1)-(2).) Section 1172.1 also permits the resentencing
court to consider the same postconviction factors as subdivision (d)(3) of
section 1172.75. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(5).) In section 1172.1, those factors
appear in a subdivision that also includes section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)’s
factors that justify presumptive imposition of the lower term, reinforcing the
Legislature’s intent that the factors in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3) are
to be considered to reduce, rather than increase, sentences. (Compare
§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(5), with § 1170, subds. (b)(6)(A)-(C).)

                                         5
      I thus conclude subdivision (d)(3) of section 1172.75 does not
impermissibly allow its specified postconviction factors to be considered as
circumstances in aggravation and does not treat defendants resentenced
under section 1172.75 differently from any other resentenced defendants.
                                           C.
      Mitchell next challenges subdivision (d)(4), which provides: “Unless the
court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation
that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(4).)
      Mitchell posits that the opening subordinate clause applies to the
entirety of the following sentence, thus excluding defendants originally
sentenced to the upper term from the requirement that circumstances in
aggravation be stipulated to by the defendant or proven beyond a reasonable
doubt to impose the upper term. The People disagree but concede Mitchell’s
interpretation is plausible. They urge, however, application of the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance and the presumption that the Legislature is aware
of related statutory sections and “intends to maintain a consistent body of
rules” to construe section 1172.75 in a manner consistent with, respectively,
(1) a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and (2) other relevant
Penal Code provisions. (People v. Galvan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 846, 854.)
      Again, both interpretations of subdivision (d)(4) are reasonable if
interpreting the subdivision in isolation. Nonetheless, considering the
provision contextually, I conclude subdivision (d)(4) requires circumstances in

                                           6
aggravation to be proven true beyond a reasonable doubt whether or not the
upper term was originally imposed.
      Mitchell’s proposed reading runs afoul of section 1172.75’s own express
requirement that the resentencing court apply any changes in law that
reduce sentences, which would encompass section 1170’s requirement that
circumstances in aggravation used to justify an upper-term sentence be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (See § 1172.75, subd. (d)(2); § 1170,
subd. (b)(2).) Nor is it reasonable to conclude that the Legislature, enacting
section 1172.75 at the same time it amended section 1170, intended
section 1172.75 to contradict those new amendments. Mitchell’s
interpretation is thus contrary to the apparent legislative intent. Most
importantly, however, Mitchell’s reading would needlessly result in a statute
that violates both the federal and state Constitutions. (Simpson, supra,
49 Cal.4th at p. 27; Garcia, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 804.)
      Meanwhile, a constitutional reading exists if the initial subordinate
clause modifies only the independent clause and not the second subordinate
clause. Under such a reading, a court could not impose a term exceeding the
middle term unless (1) the upper term was originally imposed and
(2) circumstances in aggravation proven beyond a reasonable doubt justified
the upper term. This construction gives purpose to each subordinate clause.
The first subordinate clause is consistent with section 1172.75’s requirement
that “[r]esentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer
sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) The
second subordinate clause is consistent with other sentencing laws that
require sentencing to the upper term to be justified by circumstances in
aggravation proven true beyond a reasonable doubt. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(2);
§ 1170.1, subd. (d)(2).)

                                        7
      Accordingly, applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, I
conclude subdivision (d)(4) does not treat defendants resentenced under
section 1172.75 differently from defendants resentenced under any other
provision. (Garcia, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 804.)
                                 *      *     *
      Because subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4) of section 1172.75 are consistent
with other resentencing provisions and do not treat resentenced defendants
differently, Mitchell’s equal protection claim fails. (See People v. Jacobs
(1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 797, 804-805.)
                                       III.
      For these reasons, I concur only in the majority’s decision to affirm.

                                                                   CASTILLO, J.

                                        8