Court Opinion

ID: 9712423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:53:33.112523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:12.071066
License: Public Domain

KERN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
In my view the only issue raised by this appeal which merits en banc consideration is why in the world all nine judges of this court — confronting on the average a lapse of more than 15 months between the date of the filing of appeals and the date of their disposition1 — should consider and then decide this case. By no stretch of logic, or even imagination, can it be said that the panel’s prior decision (one judge dissenting) involved a question of exceptional importance 2 or was not in conformance with the court’s decisions — the only reasons for granting a rehearing en banc under our Rule 40(c).3
Apparently, five judges concluded that two judges had reached the wrong conclusion in concluding upon the facts of record that there was insufficient evidence of negligence to permit the case to go to the jury. If this is the stuff of which en banc cases are made, then I shudder for the future of the hapless litigants in our regular cases who must wait while all the members of the court give priority to these en banc cases.4
It seems likely that our backlog will be with us for the indefinite future. Hence, taking on unnecessary en banc cases only serves to exacerbate this situation. There have been two in-depth studies of our workload.
A subcommittee of the Judicial Planning Committee supported by consultants from the National Center for State Courts concluded in 1979 that an intermediate appellate court should be established in the District of Columbia — a recommendation estimated to add at least $700,000 annually to the District of Columbia budget. Such an additional financial burden seems now un*658likely to be borne by the District in its present fiscal straits. Also, the prospect of a backlog of yet another court in the District’s judicial system seems unlikely to galvanize much citizen support for the creation of such court.
The D.C. Bar’s Court Study Committee, the so-called Horsky Committee, deems the 15-month average time for disposition of our appeals as “intolerable” and recommended in 1981 that this court take 24 specific personnel and procedural steps, e.g., more extensive use of senior judges and reducing the size of panels in certain cases. Such recommendations have never been acted upon and have apparently slipped out of any focus. Indeed, the use of the court’s four senior judges continues to be severely limited despite the fact that our Internal Operating Procedures I.-F. mandates their use “whenever the business of the court requires.” 5
As one who was not a member of the original panel I voted against rehearing the case en banc and I deem the rehearing to have been improvidently granted. I dissent from the overturning of the panel’s decision and I protest the expenditure of scarce judicial resources on a case such as this.

. 1980 Annual Report of District of Columbia Courts, at 35. The 1981 Annual Report, issued as this opinion went to the printer, contained the gloomy news at page 24 that the time is now more than 16 months between notice and decision.

. I do not mean to denigrate the importance of the case to the parties; but then each and every case coming before us is of vital importance to those involved in that particular case, whether it be heard by a panel or en banc.

. The petition for rehearing en banc cited Washington v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 429 A.2d 1362 (1981), as the case which “is in direct conflict” with the panel’s decision in the instant case. There, we confronted the issue of what constituted a proper notice of a potential claim against the District pursuant to the applicable statute — a question of statutory construction of significance which has troubled the appellate courts in this jurisdiction for a number of years.
The other aspect of that case dealt with the existence vel non of proximate cause whereas the instant case concerns the sufficiency of evidence of negligence.

. District of Columbia Court of Appeals Internal Operating Procedures VII.-I. (1978).

. A recent news account in the New York Times recounted how senior judges in the Federal Courts — with adequate support staff— “continue to serve on the Federal bench after reaching retirement age ... using their judicial experience to reduce the heavy workload in the courts.” N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1981 at 55.
The Horsky Committee recommends this court emulate this practice.