Court Opinion

ID: 9536990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:10:43.765237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:41.224178
License: Public Domain

COWAN, Judge (dissenting). I cannot agree with the majority that Dr. McBride’s testimony was sufficient “to create an issue of fact on aggravated injury and the extent thereof.” It is not correct, as stated in the majority opinion, that the doctor testified to an aggravation of fifty percent of plaintiff’s total injury. The plaintiff fractured the neck of her left femur and later developed aseptic necrosis, a “lack of circulation in the tissues”, near the fracture site. It was for aggravation of this condition alone that defendants were alleged to be liable and it was to the aggravation of this condition alone that the doctor testified. The question posed was “Do you have an opinion, Doctor, from your examination of the X-rays, the medical history taken and your examination of Mrs. Elliott, as to the percentage of aseptic necrosis which can be or could be attributed to her activity such as walking after the initial injury?” [Emphasis added] Pie answered “ * * * [l]t Would be my opinion that in this case it would be about fifty-fifty.” Later in the answer he said “ * * • * so I think that about fifty per cent [of the aseptic necrosis] was due to the fact that it was fractured there and another fifty per cent was probably the aggravation.” [Emphasis added] The case concerns itself, then, only with the cause of fifty percent of the aseptic necrosis, the other fifty percent having been a direct result of the fracture. It appears that the majority stopped their consideration of Dr. McBride’s testimony at this point. Unfortunately for the majority’s position, the doctor did not stop testifying at this point. With an amazing lack of constancy but with considerable candor, the doctor elaborated upon the causes of the aggravation. The opinion question was restricted to “activity such as walking”, the plaintiff’s walk from the site of her fall to the warming hut below being the alleged cause of the claimed aggravation. Before starting her walk, she shook her leg “real hard” and “kind of stomped” so that “I could go on down the hill.” It is noted that the plaintiff did not know of the fracture, it being one ordinarily revealed only by x-ray. The weakness of the doctor’s belief in his initial opinion was first evidenced when he replied to a question as to reasonable medical probability with “Well, I think so.” He then testified to aggravative factors in addition to the walking: the twisting motion at the time of her first fall; the impaction of bone into socket at the time of the initial fall; the sitting on the bench at the warming hut; other weight bearing; her bus trip to the Taos hospital; the fitting of the cast in Taos; and the pin inserted in the bone in Oklahoma. When asked to define the relative contribution of these various factors to the aggravation he used, either by express words of his own or by response to their use in questions, phrases such as: impossible to separate; hard to distinguish; you can’t do it; you can’t tell; they are not separable; I wouldn’t know; there is no way to tell; it’s arbitrary; purely a matter of speculation. Even when he once predicated his opinion to some extent on his experience, he added “But I speculate on that.” The rules of law governing this case are: “The extent of the aggravation can be established by testimony that the pre-existing condition has been aggravated by a stated percentage amount. * * * ” Morris v. Rogers, 80 N.M. 389, 456 P.2d 863 (1969). “The defendant * * * is liable ■only for the aggravation * * * and the burden of proving with reasonable certainty the extent of the agg'ravation was on the plaintiff.” Hebenstreit v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 65 N.M. 301, 336 P.2d 1057 (1959). “Difficulty in proving extent of aggravation * * * does not justify non-application of the rule that plaintiff must prove the injury that defendant inflicted. * * * The extent of aggravation of a pre-existing * * * condition must be proved by the plaintiff. * * * ” Martin v. Darwin, 77 N.M. 200, 420 P.2d 782 (1966). The burden of proving with reasonable certainty the causal connection is on the plaintiff. Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962). The cause of a plaintiff’s condition, at the time of trial, must be established by medical testimony. Alvillar v. Hatfield, 82 N.M. 565, 484 P.2d 1275 (Ct.App.1971). “ * * * The rule is unquestioned that the evidence must show damages to a reasonable certainty.” Bokum v. Elkins, 67 N.M. 324, 355 P.2d 137 (1960). “While it may be true that, generally speaking, if a witness’ testimony on direct examination conflicts with that given by him on cross-examination, it is for the jury to decide when, if at all, he has testified truthfully, Armishaw v. Kan., 123 Or. 69, 260 P. 1011; 58 Am.Jur. 492, Witnesses § 863; yet that rule can have no application if the witness so explains his prior testimony as to leave the facts to which he testifies a mere matter of conjecture, possibility or guess. * * *’ Washburn v. Simmons, 213 Or. 418, [323 P.2d 946], 325 P.2d 255 (1958). [Emphasis added] “Hence it is that where the plaintiff’s case rests upon the testimony of a witness whose further examination so explains or qualifies his prior testimony as to leave the fact to which he testifies a matter of conjechire, possibility, or guess, his testimony will be construed as a whole to be so lacking in probative-force as not to make a case for the jury. In such circumstances, the defendant, as a matter of law, is entitled to the direction of a verdict.” Annot., 66 A.L.R. 1518 (1930). [Emphasis added] A fair appraisal of Dr. McBride’s entire testimony, upon which the plaintiff’s proof of damage rests, convinces me beyond doubt that his evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to make a case for the jury. In directing a verdict for the defendants, the court said: “There is too much vagueness, and I think to submit it to the jury would be submitting it on the pure basis of speculation and conjecture. To me there is a lack of proof to the extent of aggravation of the injury.” I agree. This case goes beyond mere “contradictions in testimony” to be resolved by the fact finder. The doctor’s testimony, after his initial opinion testimony, so undermined the latter that it became not just contradictory evidence, but, probatively, no evidence at all. Under such circumstances, the defendants, as a matter of law, were entitled to a directed verdict and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The majority feel otherwise and I, therefore, dissent.