Court Opinion

ID: 9598353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:08:06.327378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:09.979791
License: Public Domain

*769HALL, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority concludes, as a matter of law, that actual bias on the part of two veniremen was displayed by virtue of their examination on voir dire. I do not agree that this Court should arrive at such a conclusion in the face of the contrary factual determination made by the trial judge.
I deem the trial judge to have acted well within the bounds of discretion afforded him, it being within his prerogative to pass upon the qualification of jurors and to try the challenges for cause.1
The trial judge has great latitude in examining prospective jurors on voir dire to ascertain their fitness and competency.2 His advantaged position permits him to determine, first hand, whether reasonable grounds exist for believing that a prospective juror can render a fair arid impartial verdict. As a necessary consequence, the decision whether to sustain a challenge for cause lies within his sound discretion.3
The object of voir dire examination is to ascertain whether prospective jurors meet statutory qualifications and, if so, whether there are grounds for challenge of either actual or implied bias and to enable the parties to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges.4
In this jurisdiction, the court generally conducts the voir dire examination, although the parties are permitted either to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is material and proper, or request the court to do so.5
A challenge for actual bias is defined by statute6 as one based upon the existence of a state of mind on the part of a juror which leads to a just inference in reference to the case that he will not act with impartiality. It is further provided by statute7 that a challenge for actual bias must specify the cause from which bias is to be inferred, and it is not sufficient that the challenge be made generally.8/ The challenge may be oral, but must be entered in the minutes of the court or noted by the reporter.9
In the instant case, the defendant chose not to seek further voir dire examination, nor did he make of record any specific challenge for cause. Instead, he informed the court “I would like to reserve my objections having previously indicated to the Court that I challenge for cause.” He thereupon proceeded to exercise his peremptory challenges, utilizing two of them to remove the prospective jurors in question from the panel. These procedural deficiencies, standing alone, are sufficient to sustain the discretionary ruling of the trial court, and they also distinguish this case from the prior pronouncements of this Court on the subject.10
The portions of the voir dire examination excerpted by the majority of the Court fall short of demonstrating a disqualification for cause for they show neither that there was such prejudice against defendant nor formation of an opinion as. to his guilt as would render them less than fair and impartial jurors. The mere fact that they considered persons trained in law enforcement as generally reliable observers and not likely to jump to conclusions should not be viewed as a basis for disqualification for actual bias.
*770A comparable situation is presented in cases where doctors, dentists, architects, or other professionals (experts) might be called as witnesses. Certainly it is not an ipso facto disqualification if a prospective juror acknowledges that he might be impressed by the testimony of such persons professionally trained in their calling and that they would give due consideration to their expertise should they be called as witnesses. On the contrary, such a response is indicative of the quality of jurors so sought after to assist in the search for truth.
I agree that the law to be applied in the instant case is as was aptly stated in Reynolds v. United States.11 However, the single sentence therein (cited by the majority) that “The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot be impartial,” is but a broad statement of the general law and thus it is without absolute or unqualified application. Reynolds recognized the limitations of the aforementioned rule and in the next succeeding sentences had this to say:
. . . Every opinion which he may entertain need not necessarily have that effect. In these days of newspaper enterprise and universal education, every case of public interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention of all the intelligent people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be found among those best fitted for jurors who has not read or heard of it, and who has not some impression or some opinion in respect to its merits. It is clear, therefore, that upon the trial of the issue of fact raised by a challenge for such cause the court will practically be called upon to determine whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed are such as in law necessarily to raise the presumption of partiality. The question thus presented is one of mixed law and fact, and to be tried, as far as the facts are concerned, like any other issue of that character, upon the evidence. The finding of the trial court upon that issue ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest. No less stringent rules should be applied by the reviewing court in such a case than those which govern in the consideration of motions for new trial because the verdict is against the evidence. It must be made clearly to appear that upon the evidence the court ought to have found the juror had formed such an opinion that he could not in law be deemed impartial. The case must be one in which it is manifest the law left nothing to the “conscience or discretion” of the court. [Emphasis added.]
Only with considerable naiveté can it be supposed that an intelligent juror could be found who has not “formed an opinion” about numerous things. To engage in such a search would be foolhardy.
The court in Reynolds also observed that “. .if hypothetical only, the partiality is not so manifest as to necessarily set the juror aside.”12 In the instant case the “partiality” or “opinion” that was expressed was clearly in the abstract, based upon a hypothetical set of circumstances, viz., that a professionally trained person commands a certain modicum of respect. Generally speaking, a prospective juror would be far less than candid to state otherwise.
It is significant that the defendant does not now assert that the jury, as it was ultimately impaneled, was in any way biased or prejudiced against him. His only assertion of error is that the court caused him to “waste” two peremptory challenges. In the absence of any showing of prejudice, defendant’s ipse dixit of “waste” should not be accepted.
A further critical aspect of this case is that the defendant did not seek a new trial 13 as he was obliged to do if he had in fact been aggrieved.14 Consequently, the trial *771court was not afforded an opportunity to consider any claimed error.15
The defendant makes no contention as to his innocence and only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as not being corroborated. Corroboration was, of course, unnecessary under the facts of this case. The record contains substantial, believable evidence to support the judgment of conviction and affords no basis for a conclusion that a new trial might result in an acquittal.
I would affirm the conviction and judgment of the trial court.
CROCKETT, C. J., concurs in the views expressed in the opinion of HALL, J.

. Rule 47(f)(6), U.R.C.P.

. State Bank of Beaver County v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P.2d 612 (1933).

. State v. BeBee, 110 Utah 484, 175 P.2d 478 (1946); State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 126 P. 286 (1912); State v. Brosie, 24 Ariz.App. 517, 540 P.2d 136 (1975).

. Balle v. Smith, 81 Utah 179, 17 P.2d 224 (1932).

. Provided for by Rule 47(a), U.R.C.P.

. U.C.A., 1953, 77-30-18(2).

. U.C.A., 1953, 77-30-21.

. Territory v. Hopt, 3 Utah 396, 4 P. 250 (1884), reversed on another point, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884).

. Supra, footnote 7.

. See State v. Brooks, Utah, 563 P.2d 799 (1977), State v. Moore, Utah, 562 P.2d 629 (1977), and Crawford v. Manning, Utah, 542 P.2d 1091 (1975), cited by the majority.

. 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878).

. Ibid, at p. 155.

. Although he did move in arrest of judgment in an apparent attempt to gain acquittal.

. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1693(2), p. 1251.

. That such a claim of error raised for the first time on appeal is not generally reviewable see State v. Kelsey, Utah, 532 P.2d 1001 (1975).