Court Opinion

ID: 9525303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:01:56.332217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:16.080537
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I do not believe that the traditional basis for occupier liability can or should be so easily dismissed. For virtually all of the 20th Century the rule has been that the more demanding duty to use reasonable care only adhered when an occupier invited others onto his property in furtherance of his pecuniary interest. See, e.g., Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Means (1914), 59 Ind.App. 383, 104 N.E. 785. This rule provided a logical, common sense basis for premises liability by relating the need for the occupier to incur additional expense and effort to the occupier’s business interest.
Now, however, the majority discards this long-standing rule. The only rationalization that the majority provides is that the supposed broadening of the traditional business invitee test justifies dispensing with the rule altogether. Based upon reported cases from other states that have adopted the majority’s new rule, not only will business proprietors be held to the higher standard of care, but also, ior example, operators of free public amusements, Recreation Centre Corporation v. Zimmerman (1937), 172 Md. 309, 191 A. 233, and organizers of college reunions, Guilford v. Yale University (1942), 128 Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917. Landlords can more easily be found liable to their tenants’ social guests. Hiller v. Harsh (1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 332, 55 Ill.Dec. 635, 426 N.E.2d 960. Potential liability is also broadened for an array of governmental and non-profit activities.
See, e.g., Le Roux v. State (1954) 307 N.Y. 397, 121 N.E.2d 386 (public hunting ground); Baker v. Lane County (1977) 28 Or.App. 53, 558 P.2d 1247 (county fair); Ford v. Hotel and Restaurant Emp., etc., Local 159 (1967) 155 Conn. 24, 229 A.2d 346 (charity dance); and McKinnon v. Washington Federal Savings & L. Ass’n (1966) 68 Wash.2d 644, 414 P.2d 773 (permitting girl scout meeting to be held on premises).
There is no compelling justification shown for rejecting a rule that has served well and for taking Indiana down the path of ever broadening premises liability. Accordingly I respectfully dissent.