Court Opinion

ID: 9374098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:19:27.962175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:44.800379
License: Public Domain

#29933-a-JMK
2023 S.D. 7

                          IN THE SUPREME COURT
                                  OF THE
                         STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

                                 ****

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA,                    Plaintiff and Appellee,

     v.

JERREN DONALD MANNING,                    Defendant and Appellant.

                                 ****

                 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
                    THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
                   BROWN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

                                 ****

                  THE HONORABLE GREGG C. MAGERA
                              Judge

                                 ****

THOMAS J. COGLEY
Aberdeen, South Dakota                    Attorney for defendant
                                          and appellant.

MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General

PAUL S. SWEDLUND
Solicitor General
Pierre, South Dakota                      Attorneys for plaintiff and
                                          appellee.

                                 ****

                                          CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
                                          OCTOBER 3, 2022
                                          OPINION FILED 02/01/23
#29933

KERN, Justice

[¶1.]        In May 2019, a jury found Jerren Manning guilty of two counts of first-

degree rape and two counts of sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen.

The court sentenced Manning only on the rape convictions, imposing two

consecutive sixty-year terms in the state penitentiary. Manning appeals, raising

multiple issues including that there was insufficient evidence to support his

convictions, that the submission of the sexual contact charges to the jury violated

the prohibition against double jeopardy, that the court allowed improper bolstering

of witnesses, that the courtroom was improperly closed to the public during voir

dire, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Further, Manning

claims that his sentence is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment

and constitutes an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

                          Facts and Procedural History

[¶2.]        In 2017, Jeremy and Amanda Ahoe lived in Aberdeen along with their

three children, A.A. age eight, B.A. age six, and S.A. age three. Jeremy owned a

construction and rental company, and Amanda worked as a certified nursing

assistant. Manning, who was married with one child, also lived and worked in

Aberdeen. Jeremy and Manning were close friends, with Jeremy serving as the best

man in Manning’s wedding. Manning would often pick up A.A. and B.A. after

school and babysit all three children at the Ahoe home for a few hours until one of

their parents got home from work or Manning had to leave for work. At times,

Manning watched the children up to four days a week.

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[¶3.]        On multiple occasions, Jeremy would come home after work and find

Manning alone with B.A. in her upstairs bedroom while his other two daughters

were in different parts of the house. In the fall of 2018, Jeremy came home from

work early one day and discovered that the door to his office, located on the main

floor of their home, was closed. He opened the door and found B.A. and Manning

alone in the office. Although he was suspicious, Jeremy did not immediately

confront Manning about the situation, but instead returned to work.

[¶4.]        Later that evening, Jeremy asked B.A. about being alone in the office

with Manning. B.A. eventually disclosed to both her parents that Manning had

touched her, but she did not describe the extent of the touching. Amanda stated

that B.A. was “sad and overwhelmed” when she talked about what happened.

Jeremy and Amanda debated back and forth about what to do with this information

and decided not to call law enforcement. Amanda, however, did call the school and

inform them that Manning was no longer permitted to pick up the children.

[¶5.]        On the afternoon of October 4, 2018, Officer Jordan Mejeske of the

Aberdeen Police Department was contacted by the principal of the Ahoe girls’

elementary school, who informed him that a student had reported a possible sexual

assault of her sister. Officer Mejeske went to the school and talked to the principal,

the school counselor, and the reporting student’s teacher, but did not meet with

either A.A. or B.A. He then contacted the Central South Dakota Child Assessment

Center (CAC) to set up a forensic interview for B.A. He also contacted Amanda and

told her that law enforcement would be investigating the report and that she should

not discuss the situation with the children.

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[¶6.]        B.A. was interviewed and examined on October 11, 2018, at the CAC

by Angela Lisburg, a family nurse practitioner. During the interview, B.A. stated

that Manning had touched her more than one time. B.A. explained that sometimes

Manning would do the touching upstairs at their house, and sometimes downstairs

in her dad’s office. B.A. said that Manning would touch her with his private part,

that sometimes it would go in her bottom, and that Manning put his private part in

her bottom more than one time. She stated that Manning would pull her clothes

“half down” when he put his private part in her bottom. Lisburg asked B.A. how it

felt when Manning’s private part was in her bottom, to which she replied, “Not that

really bad, but it does hurt.” According to B.A., Manning would be on his knees and

B.A. would sometimes be laying down on her back and sometimes on her stomach.

She said that sometimes she was on her tummy on the chair in the office and

Manning would give her his phone so that she could play a game. While she was on

the phone, he would put his private part in her bottom.

[¶7.]        B.A. stated that there was one time her daddy “noticed” that she was

alone in the office with Manning. That time, she was in the office laying down on

her back with the door to the office closed. Her dad came into the house, so she had

to pull her pants up and Manning put his private part back in his pants before her

dad came into the office. Lisburg asked B.A. if Manning or her dad said anything,

and B.A. replied “no.”

[¶8.]        Lisburg also asked B.A. about the touching that happened upstairs,

and B.A. stated that “it’s the same thing” as happened downstairs. B.A. explained

that the touching upstairs would occur in her bedroom on the bed and that it

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happened more than one time. B.A. described lying on her back on the bed, with

Manning kneeling on the floor. Later in the interview, B.A. indicated that Manning

would tell her to “lay down and lift yourself up.” When later asked to clarify this,

B.A. said “I would be lifting my legs up and he would tell me to put them on his

shoulder.”

[¶9.]        B.A. recounted that on one occasion she was upstairs looking for a

battery when Manning came into the room and told her to come lie down on her

bed. She told him no. Lisburg asked B.A. to describe this incident in more detail.

B.A. said that Manning picked her up and told her that if she did not lie down he

would not come over again. She said she was scared because he said it in a mean

voice. She said that her sister was coming upstairs, and she pulled her pants up.

When asked to clarify what Manning did in the bedroom, she said he “did the same

thing as he does every single time.”

[¶10.]       Lisburg asked B.A. if anything ever came out of Manning’s private

part, and B.A. responded that white stuff would come out and go on Manning’s

hands. He would have to wash his hands a lot to get it off. Sometimes it would spill

on the ground next to the chair in the office and Manning would use a baby wipe to

clean it up. He would then flush the baby wipe down the toilet. Lisburg asked B.A.

to describe what Manning’s body would be doing when his private part was in her

bottom. B.A. responded that it would be “going forward.” B.A. also stated that

sometimes Manning would tell her not to tell her dad.

[¶11.]       After the interview, several items of physical evidence and samples

believed to contain potential DNA evidence were collected from the Ahoe home.

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Investigators swabbed both the office chair and floor in Jeremy’s office and sent the

samples to the state laboratory in Pierre for testing.

[¶12.]         A Brown County grand jury indicted Manning specifying the type of

crime and location of the offenses to wit: Count 1—first-degree rape in violation of

SDCL 22-22-1(1) (anal penetration/office); Count 2—first-degree rape in violation of

SDCL 22-22-1(1) (anal penetration/ bedroom); Count 3—sexual contact with a child

under the age of sixteen in violation of SDCL 22-22-7 (penis to buttocks/office);

Count 4—sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen in violation of SDCL

22-22-7 (penis to buttocks/bedroom).

[¶13.]         A two-day jury trial began on May 22, 2019. After opening

statements*, the State called Officer Majeske, Kristina Dreckman (a forensic

scientist from Pierre), Amanda, Jeremy, A.A., B.A., and Lisburg. Manning called

his ex-wife and testified on his own behalf.

[¶14.]         Amanda testified about Manning’s willingness to babysit the girls,

stating that he once offered to watch them overnight. The offer arose after Manning

heard that she and Jeremy wanted to attend a concert in Sioux Falls. Although

Manning offered to stay overnight with the girls, Amanda testified that she was not

comfortable leaving them with a male for this length of time. After they had

decided not to go because they did not have a babysitter, Manning kept “pushing

the idea of babysitting them.” He even told Amanda that he thought about buying

the tickets for them so that they could attend.

*        Manning initially reserved his right to make an opening statement, but after
         the close of the State’s case he waived this right, instead proceeding directly
         with his case-in-chief.
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[¶15.]       Amanda also testified that on one occasion Manning came over to help

her clean the house, something he had never done before. He told her that he felt

obligated to help her because he had stayed at their home after he and his wife had

an argument. Amanda relayed that Manning cleaned the kitchen and was

scrubbing the floors when she left for work that day. The children later told her

that Manning cleaned the office as well. Amanda testified that she found rugs from

the office hanging outside after they had apparently been hosed down.

[¶16.]       Jeremy testified about the times he had found B.A. and Manning alone

in the office and bedroom together. Regarding the occasion where he found

Manning alone with B.A. in the office, he testified that when he opened the door

B.A. ran to the other side of the room, prompting him to ask Manning, “what’s going

on?” to which Manning “didn’t really reply.” Jeremy also testified that he and his

wife had sex in the office on multiple occasions, which was likely why investigators

found his sperm cell DNA in the office. Amanda confirmed this activity, testifying

that she and Jeremy often had sex in the office because it had a door which they

could lock to ensure the children did not enter the room. Jeremy also testified that

he had never asked Manning to clean the floor in the office.

[¶17.]       A.A., who was nine years old at the time of trial, testified that she

knew B.A. and Manning had been alone in the office of their home with the door

closed. She also testified that on one occasion when she was checking on B.A.’s

whereabouts, she saw Manning in B.A.’s bedroom pulling up her pants.

[¶18.]       B.A., who was seven at the time of trial, testified, albeit very briefly.

The State engaged in a short colloquy with her to establish that she knew the

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difference between the truth and a lie. B.A. promised that everything she would

say in court would be the truth, and the circuit court placed her under oath. B.A.

acknowledged that she knew Manning because he babysat her and her sisters. She

also agreed that something bad happened while he was at the house. The State

asked B.A. if she told Lisburg during the recorded interview about the things that

happened with Manning and if what she told Lisburg was the truth. B.A. testified

that she did tell Lisburg about what happened and that she told the truth. The

State then asked B.A. what Manning did with his private part and she whispered

that Manning put his private part in her bottom. The State ended its examination

and Manning’s counsel did not cross examine B.A. After B.A.’s testimony, the State

offered the DVD of B.A.’s forensic interview which was played for the jury.

[¶19.]       The State next called Lisburg, who testified about her credentials as a

family nurse practitioner and her extensive experience interviewing children. In

addition to conducting B.A.’s forensic interview, she also physically examined her

genitalia and perianal regions. Lisburg’s examination revealed no signs of physical

trauma. Lisburg testified that in the majority of child sexual abuse cases it is

normal to find no signs of physical trauma. She explained that this occurs because

the tissues in these areas heal “very quickly and often completely without any

evidence of scarring.”

[¶20.]       The State also called Kristina Dreckman, a forensic scientist at the

South Dakota State Forensic Lab. She testified that she received several items that

had been collected from the Ahoe home. After briefly explaining the nature of DNA

to the jury, Dreckman stated that of the items collected, only two contained DNA

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evidence. A swab taken from a chair in the office contained a DNA mixture from

three individuals, the major contributor being Amanda. Manning, Jeremy, and B.A.

were all excluded as contributors to that sample. The other sample, taken from a

stain on a floor mat in the office, revealed sperm cell DNA matching Jeremy and

excluding Manning.

[¶21.]       At the conclusion of the State’s case, Manning moved for a judgment of

acquittal on all counts, contending there was insufficient evidence to sustain the

allegations. The circuit court denied the motion.

[¶22.]       In his defense, Manning first called his ex-wife, Breana Olson. She

was asked about her sexual intimacy with Manning and the size of his penis. She

described it as around eight or nine inches long with a width a little less than a

silver dollar. She described experiencing a tear in her vaginal area prior to their

marriage as a result of sexual penetration by Manning. On cross examination, she

testified that Manning preferred small breasts and shaved pubic hair.

[¶23.]       Manning testified in his own defense. He stated that the only time he

had been alone in a room with any of the girls was the day that Jeremy came home

early and found him in the office with B.A. He explained that after he picked the

girls up from school and took them home, he was in the office. B.A. opened the door

and came into the office asking for some chapstick. Because of the weight of the

coats hanging on the back of the office door, Manning testified that it bounced back

and partially closed. He said he hung out in the office because Jeremy allowed him

to smoke pot in there. He also testified that the day he cleaned the rugs and mat in

the office, Jeremy had asked him to do so. He denied ever sexually abusing B.A.

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On cross-examination he acknowledged that B.A. was raped by someone, as she

described, but reiterated that he was not the perpetrator. He also claimed his penis

was so large that it would have caused physical trauma to B.A. if he had in fact

committed the alleged sexual acts.

[¶24.]       The jury returned a verdict finding Manning guilty of all four counts.

Manning admitted the part II information alleging that he was a habitual offender,

having been convicted in 2010 of felony child abuse. The court ordered a

presentence investigation report and a psychosexual evaluation and scheduled a

sentencing hearing for July 17, 2019. At the beginning of the hearing, the State

requested that the circuit court sentence Manning on only the rape convictions

because the sexual contact convictions were based on the same factual

circumstances as the rape charges. Defense counsel did not object but requested

that the court “either strike or vacate” the sexual contact convictions. The court

denied the request to vacate but only entered judgments of conviction and sentences

on the rape convictions. The court sentenced Manning to serve sixty years in the

state penitentiary on each of the rape counts to be served consecutively.

[¶25.]       Manning’s trial counsel filed a notice of appeal on July 19, 2019, but

then moved for substitute counsel to handle the direct appeal. The circuit court

appointed new counsel, but this Court dismissed the appeal on December 3, 2019,

after Manning failed to file a brief. Manning later filed a pro se petition seeking a

writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of his

attorney’s failure to pursue his appeal. Manning was appointed new counsel, and

the circuit court agreed to issue an order vacating Manning’s sentence so that he

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could be resentenced in order to restore his right to appeal. A hearing was held on

January 26, 2022, at which the circuit court resentenced Manning to the same

sentence originally given and issued amended judgments of conviction for the two

rape counts.

[¶26.]         Manning raises a number of issues on appeal which we consolidate and

restate as follows:

               1.     Whether the circuit court erred by denying Manning’s
                      motion for judgment of acquittal on the two rape charges.

               2.     Whether the circuit court erred by denying Manning’s
                      motion for judgment of acquittal on the two sexual contact
                      charges in violation of the constitutional prohibition
                      against double jeopardy.

               3.     Whether there was improper bolstering of witnesses at
                      trial by the circuit court and the prosecution.

               4.     Whether the circuit court improperly closed the courtroom
                      during the jury selection phase of Manning’s trial.

               5.     Whether Manning’s sentence violates the Eighth
                      Amendment or constitutes an abuse of discretion.

               6.     Whether Manning received ineffective assistance of
                      counsel.

               7.     Whether Manning was deprived of a fair trial by the
                      cumulative effect of the alleged errors.

                                        Analysis

               1.     Whether the circuit court erred by denying
                      Manning’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the
                      two rape charges.

[¶27.]         Manning first challenges the circuit court’s denial of his motion for

judgment of acquittal. “Denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de

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novo.” State v. Nelson, 2022 S.D. 12, ¶ 21, 970 N.W.2d 814, 823 (quoting State v.

Ware, 2020 S.D. 20, ¶ 12, 942 N.W.2d 269, 272). “We consider ‘whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting State v. Snodgrass, 2020 S.D. 66, ¶ 51, 951 N.W.2d

792, 808). In doing so, we “will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, assess the

credibility of witnesses, or evaluate the weight of the evidence.” State v. Seidel,

2020 S.D. 73, ¶ 32, 953 N.W.2d 301, 313 (quoting State v. Brim, 2010 S.D. 74, ¶ 6,

789 N.W.2d 80, 83). This is because “the jury is . . . the exclusive judge of the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.” Id. (quoting State v.

Jensen, 2007 S.D. 76, ¶ 7, 737 N.W.2d 285, 288). “[W]e accept the evidence and the

most favorable inferences fairly drawn therefrom, which will support the verdict.”

Id. “If the evidence, including circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences

drawn therefrom sustains a reasonable theory of guilt, a guilty verdict will not be

set aside.” State v. Otobhiale, 2022 S.D. 35, ¶ 37, 976 N.W.2d 759, 772 (quoting

State v. Stone, 2019 S.D. 18, ¶ 38, 925 N.W.2d 488, 500).

[¶28.]        The jury convicted Manning of two counts of rape in the first degree in

violation of SDCL 22-22-1(1). Rape in the first degree is “an act of sexual

penetration . . . if the victim is less than thirteen years of age[.]” Id. It is

uncontested that B.A. is under the age of thirteen. Sexual penetration is defined as

“an act, however slight, of sexual intercourse, . . . anal intercourse, or any intrusion,

however slight, of any part of the body or of any object into the genital or anal

openings of another person’s body.” SDCL 22-22-2.

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[¶29.]       Manning argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish

penetration because the DNA evidence excludes him as the source of the semen

found in the office and that a penis of his size would leave evidence of trauma on a

seven-year-old victim, which was not present.

[¶30.]       Regarding the first count of rape that occurred in the office, B.A.’s

testimony taken alone is sufficient to sustain the conviction. “[W]hen a conviction

turns in large part upon the credibility of witnesses, a circuit court properly leaves

‘to the jury the pervasive issue of credibility and considering the evidence as a

whole[.]’” Seidel, 2020 S.D. 73, ¶ 36, 953 N.W.2d at 314 (quoting State v. Guthrie,

2001 S.D. 61, ¶ 50, 627 N.W.2d 401, 422). B.A. acknowledged that bad things

happened with Manning and when asked what happened she told the jury that

Manning put his private part in her bottom. In addition, B.A.’s forensic interview,

which was played for the jury, contained B.A.’s description of how Manning’s

private part went in her bottom. If the jury believed this evidence, as it appears

they did, then the penetration element is effectively established, and this evidence

alone is sufficient to find Manning guilty of first-degree rape.

[¶31.]       Although “there is no requirement that the testimony of a child

witness be corroborated,” State v. Smiley, 2004 S.D. 119, ¶ 6, 689 N.W.2d 427, 429,

there were other facts presented at trial to support B.A.’s testimony. Her

statements were corroborated by testimony from her father who found B.A. and

Manning alone together in the office with the door closed when he came home

unexpectedly from work. The testimony from Amanda about Manning encouraging

her and Jeremy to go to a concert in Sioux Falls so that he could babysit the girls

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overnight and Manning’s decision to hose down the rugs from the office further

corroborates B.A.’s story. A.A.’s testimony that B.A. and Manning were alone in the

office with the door closed along with Olson’s testimony about Manning’s sexual

preferences also substantiate B.A.’s account.

[¶32.]       The second count of rape that occurred in the bedroom upstairs can

also be sustained by B.A.’s testimony alone. While the only evidence of penetration

on this charge is B.A.’s statements in her interview that “the same thing” happened

in her bedroom as happened in the office and that Manning “did the same thing as

he does every single time,” a reasonable inference can be drawn from these

statements that penetration took place in the bedroom as well. Reasonable

inferences can also be made from B.A.’s statements during her interview about

white stuff coming out of Manning’s private part and him having to wash his hands

a lot to remove it to show that he committed this crime. B.A.’s account of lifting her

legs up and Manning telling her to put her legs on his shoulder when they were in

her bedroom would also support the jury’s conclusion of Manning’s guilt. B.A.’s

statements are corroborated here by A.A.’s testimony that she walked into B.A.’s

bedroom on one occasion as Manning was pulling B.A.’s pants up.

[¶33.]       Manning’s argument that a penis his size would leave evidence of

trauma was disputed by Lisburg who testified that the lack of physical trauma was

the norm in sexual abuse cases. Further, the jury was not obligated to accept

Manning’s theory regarding the absence of any physical trauma as evidence that

the crimes did not occur. Additionally, the lack of DNA evidence does not prevent

the jury from finding him guilty through other evidence. Taking the evidence in the

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light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to convict

Manning of both rape charges. The circuit court did not err in denying Manning’s

motion for judgment of acquittal on these counts.

             2.     Whether the circuit court erred by denying
                    Manning’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the
                    two sexual contact charges in violation of the
                    constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

[¶34.]       Manning next argues that the circuit court should have granted his

motion for judgment of acquittal on the sexual contact charges because they were

based on the same conduct as the rape charges. He claims the submission of these

charges to the jury violated his right to be free from double jeopardy. Both the

United States Constitution and the South Dakota Constitution forbid double

jeopardy. U.S. Const. amend. V; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 9. “These provisions shield

criminal defendants from both multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for

the same criminal offense if the Legislature did not intend to authorize multiple

punishments in the same prosecution.” State v. Bausch, 2017 S.D. 1, ¶ 26, 889

N.W.2d 404, 412 (quoting State v. Dillon, 2001 S.D. 97, ¶ 13, 632 N.W.2d 37, 43).

“The prohibition against double jeopardy . . . ‘protect[s] against three types of

governmental abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal;

(2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple

punishments for the same offense.’” State v. Babcock, 2020 S.D. 71, ¶ 31, 952

N.W.2d 750, 760 (quoting State v. Garza, 2014 S.D. 67, ¶ 10, 854 N.W.2d 833, 837).

Only the third type of abuse is at issue here.

[¶35.]       This Court has stated, “[w]e do not believe that the legislature

intended the sexual contact statute to apply to touching incidental to rape.” State v.

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Brammer, 304 N.W.2d 111, 114 (S.D. 1981). When the charges alleged relate to the

same act, “the offenses of rape and sexual contact are mutually exclusive.” Id.

Therefore, a defendant may not receive multiple punishments for rape and sexual

contact with a minor under the age of sixteen arising out of the same conduct.

[¶36.]       Here, the indictment included one count of rape and one count of

sexual contact for the conduct in the office. It also included one count of rape and

one count of sexual contact for the conduct in the bedroom. The jury found Manning

guilty of all four counts. The charges were not made in the alternative nor were

they required to be. What the double jeopardy clause prohibits is “multiple

punishments for the same offense.” Babcock, 2020 S.D. 71, ¶ 31, 952 N.W.2d at 760

(quoting Garza, 2014 S.D. 67, ¶ 10, 854 N.W.2d at 837). The State is not required to

pick between two viable theories that are supported by the evidence. In Manning’s

case, the circuit court emphasized that Manning was being sentenced only on the

rape charges. Although Manning relies on Brammer and Bausch to support his

claim that his rights were violated, the cases are distinguishable. In both cases,

this Court vacated sexual contact convictions and sentences arising out of the same

conduct on which the defendant was also convicted and sentenced for rape.

Brammer, 304 N.W.2d at 114-15; Bausch, 2017 S.D. 1, ¶ 29, 889 N.W.2d at 413.

Here, because there were no judgments of conviction entered on the sexual contact

charges and Manning was not sentenced on those charges, Manning’s double

jeopardy rights were not violated.

[¶37.]       Nonetheless, Manning contends that the sole fact that the State

pursued four crimes against him instead of two constitutes a violation of his double

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jeopardy rights. Manning claims that his indictment was multiplicitous.

“Multiplicity . . . is the splintering of a single offense into separate counts in an

indictment.” Babcock, 2020 S.D. 71, ¶ 31, 952 N.W.2d at 760 (quoting State v.

Muhm, 2009 S.D. 100, ¶ 19, 775 N.W.2d 508, 514). “The ‘principal danger that the

multiplicity doctrine addresses’ is the risk that a defendant might receive multiple

punishments for a single offense.” U.S. v. Roy, 408 F.3d 484, 492 (8th Cir. 2005)

(quoting U.S. v. Webber, 255 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2001)). Manning did not

receive multiple punishments for a single offense. Further, because rape and sexual

contact are two separate offenses that are mutually exclusive if based on the same

underlying conduct, they are not multiplicitous. The circuit court did not err by

denying Manning’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

             3.     Whether there was improper bolstering of witnesses
                    at trial by the circuit court and the prosecution.

[¶38.]       Next, Manning alleges that the court and the prosecution improperly

vouched for the credibility of the child witnesses in this case. “Improper vouching

‘invite[s] the jury to rely on the government’s assessment that the witness is

testifying truthfully.’” Snodgrass, 2020 S.D. 66, ¶ 45, 951 N.W.2d at 806 (quoting

State v. Goodroad, 455 N.W.2d 591, 594 (S.D. 1990)). It is well established that it is

within “the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of a witness.”

Id. (quoting State v. McKinney, 2005 S.D. 73, ¶ 32, 699 N.W.2d 471, 481).

[¶39.]       At the beginning of A.A.’s testimony, the circuit court had a colloquy

with her in the presence of the jury in which it discussed the difference between the

truth and a lie and the importance of telling the truth in court. The State

conducted a similar colloquy at the beginning of B.A.’s testimony, also in the

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presence of the jury. Manning submits that these exchanges improperly bolstered

the credibility of the witnesses. He also contends that the prosecutor improperly

vouched for B.A.’s credibility during closing argument when he stated:

             Now, why should you believe [B.A.’s] testimony? That’s the
             number one thing we’re here for. Why should you believe it?
             Well, [B.A.] came up here, she testifies under oath. You heard
             us go through the whole colloquy about what it means to tell the
             truth, the difference between truth and a lie. She talked about
             all those things with me. She talked about it a little bit with the
             judge. She told the judge I promise you I’m going to talk about
             only the truth in here today.
                    . . . She knew people get in trouble if they don’t tell the
             truth. She told us that. When she doesn’t tell the truth at
             home, she gets in trouble.

[¶40.]       Manning did not object to either colloquy prior to the children’s

testimony, nor did he object to the statements in the State’s closing argument.

“[W]hen ‘an issue has not been preserved by objection at trial,’ this Court may

conduct a limited review to consider ‘whether the circuit court committed plain

error.’” State v. Bryant, 2020 S.D. 49, ¶ 19, 948 N.W.2d 333, 338 (quoting State v.

Buchhold, 2007 S.D. 15, ¶ 17, 727 N.W.2d 816, 821). “To establish plain error, an

appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights; and

only then may this Court exercise its discretion to notice the error if, (4) it seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

(quoting State v. McMillen, 2019 S.D. 40, ¶ 13, 931 N.W.2d 725, 729–30).

[¶41.]       Here, the colloquies could not be categorized as improper vouching,

and the court did not err by permitting them. Ensuring that a child witness

understands the difference between the truth and a lie is different than ensuring

the jury that the witness’s statements are true. Requiring child witnesses to

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promise that they will tell the truth in an age appropriate fashion is “the same

promise” any other witness makes at trial when they take an oath to tell the truth.

See State v. Westerfield, 1997 S.D. 100, ¶ 12, 567 N.W.2d 863, 867 (quoting United

States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366, 378 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that a provision in a plea

agreement requiring a witness to testify “truthfully” does not rise to the level of

improper vouching because it is the same promise made by anyone testifying at

trial).

[¶42.]       As for the statements made in the State’s closing, “the State is

permitted to make fair comments on the credibility of witnesses during final

argument.” Jenner v. Leapley, 521 N.W.2d 422, 428 (S.D. 1994). The statements

made by the prosecutor concentrated more on what was actually said during the

colloquy and did not express “a direct opinion as to whether the child[] [was] telling

the truth.” State v. Koepsell, 508 N.W.2d 591, 593 (S.D. 1993). Indeed, the

statements about B.A. understanding that telling a lie could get her in trouble were

made in the specific context of foundational questioning to ensure B.A. understood

the moral obligation to tell the truth. This was not an argument in which the

prosecutor was attempting to bolster an adult’s testimony with the suggestion that

the witness would run the risk of punishment or adverse consequences if the

witness did not tell the truth. For these reasons, there was not an improper

bolstering of witnesses.

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             4.     Whether the circuit court improperly closed the
                    courtroom during the jury selection phase of
                    Manning’s trial.

[¶43.]       Manning contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the

courtroom was closed during the voir dire phase of his jury trial. “A violation of the

right to a public trial is among the narrow class of errors regarded as structural,

and it is, therefore, not subject to further review for harmlessness.” State v. Uhre,

2019 S.D. 8, ¶ 12, 922 N.W.2d 789, 795. A structural error “necessarily renders a

trial fundamentally unfair” to the point that “automatic reversal is required.”

Guthmiller v. Weber, 2011 S.D. 62, ¶ 16, 804 N.W.2d 400, 406. The United States

Supreme Court has identified a violation of the right to a public trial as a structural

error. Id. (citing Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 144 L. Ed. 2d

35 (1999)). The right to a public trial extends to the voir dire stage of trial. Presley

v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213, 130 S. Ct. 721, 724, 175 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2010).

[¶44.]       Manning bases his contention that the courtroom was closed on a non-

notarized “affidavit” provided by his mother, Tammy Dudley, dated August 5,

2021—more than two years after Manning’s trial. Dudley asserted that she

attempted to attend jury selection but was told that no one was allowed in the

courtroom. She stated that there was a piece of paper hanging by the courtroom

door that said “closed” next to Manning’s name.

[¶45.]       Relying on the document from his mother, Manning filed a motion for a

new trial on September 7, 2021. A motion for new trial must be served and filed

within ten days after the filing of the judgment. SDCL 23A-29-1. Manning

requested this motion to be held in abeyance until the amended judgments of

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conviction were issued. It is unclear whether this motion was addressed at the

January resentencing hearing, as no transcript of this hearing is contained in the

record. Further, there is no order in the record granting or denying the motion for

new trial. However, “SDCL 15-6-59(b) permits a circuit court to take no action on a

motion for a new trial, and a motion for a new trial is deemed automatically denied

if the circuit court fails to timely rule upon the motion.” State v. Timmons, 2022

S.D. 28, ¶ 20, 974 N.W.2d 881, 888. A denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed

under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. ¶ 19.

[¶46.]       There is no evidence in the record to corroborate Dudley’s unsworn

statement. There is no mention at any point in the trial transcript of the courtroom

being closed, nor is there a closure order in the record. Further, Manning

acknowledged in his motion for new trial that if the courtroom was ever closed, he

and his counsel were unaware of it. Based on this lack of evidence, we conclude

that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Manning’s motion for a

new trial.

             5.    Whether Manning’s sentence violates the Eighth
                   Amendment or constitutes an abuse of discretion.

[¶47.]       The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits

“cruel and unusual punishment[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This restriction

applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. “[W]hen the question

presented is whether a challenged sentence is cruel and unusual in violation of the

Eighth Amendment, we conduct a de novo review.” State v. Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8,

¶ 31, 874 N.W.2d 475, 486.

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[¶48.]       In determining whether a noncapital sentence is in violation of the

Eighth Amendment, we must decide whether the sentence is “grossly

disproportionate to its corresponding offense.” State v. Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 13, 877

N.W.2d 75, 80 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S. Ct. 2680,

2705, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment)). “To do so, we first compare the gravity of the offense—i.e., ‘the

offense’s relative position on the spectrum of all criminality’—to the harshness of

the penalty—i.e., ‘the penalty’s relative position on the spectrum of all permitted

punishments.’” Id. (quoting Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶¶ 35–38, 874 N.W.2d at 489).

This analysis will “typically mark[] the end of our review” as gross

disproportionality is rarely found. Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 38, 874 N.W.2d at 489

(quoting State v. Garreau, 2015 S.D. 36, ¶ 9, 864 N.W.2d 771, 775). However, “[i]f

the penalty imposed appears to be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the

offense, then we will compare the sentence to those ‘imposed on other criminals in

the same jurisdiction’ as well as those ‘imposed for commission of the same crime in

other jurisdictions.’” Id. (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291, 103 S. Ct. 3001,

3010, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983)).

[¶49.]       We begin by examining the gravity of the offense. Manning was

convicted of two counts of first-degree rape. “Rape is a heinous crime[.]” State v.

Yeager, 2019 S.D. 12, ¶ 6, 925 N.W.2d 105, 109. “Child rape ‘may be devastating in

[its] harm,’” to the individual victim. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S.

407, 407, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2644, 171 L. Ed. 2d 525 (2008)). Along with any physical

injury to the victim, rape can also cause grievous “mental and psychological

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damage. Because it undermines the community’s sense of security, there is public

injury as well.” Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598, 97 S. Ct. 2861,

2869, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1977)). Thus, it is clear that the gravity of Manning’s

crimes is comparatively high on the spectrum of all criminality.

[¶50.]       Turning to the harshness of the sentence, the circuit court sentenced

Manning to two consecutive sixty-year terms. First-degree rape is a class C felony

which is punishable by up to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary in addition

to a $50,000 fine. SDCL 22-22-1(1); SDCL 22-6-1(3). The spectrum of all permitted

punishments in South Dakota includes the possibility of death and mandatory life

imprisonment. Manning argues that his sentence is essentially a life sentence.

Although this term of years is lengthy, and the sentence is at the higher end of the

spectrum of all permitted punishments, Manning’s term of years sentence when

compared to the gravity of the offense, raping a child, is not grossly

disproportionate, thus ending our review of his constitutional claim.

[¶51.]       In addition to his Eighth Amendment challenge, Manning also argues

that the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing him to two sixty-year terms

to be served consecutively. An abuse of discretion analysis differs from an Eighth

Amendment analysis. “We generally review a circuit court’s sentencing decision for

an abuse of discretion.” State v. Klinetobe, 2021 S.D. 24, ¶ 26, 958 N.W.2d 734, 740.

“An abuse of discretion is a fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the

range of permissible choices, a decision, which, on full consideration, is arbitrary or

unreasonable.” Id. (quoting State v. Holler, 2020 S.D. 28, ¶ 10, 944 N.W.2d 339,

342).

                                          -22-
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[¶52.]       “Circuit courts have broad discretion in sentencing.” Klinetobe, 2021

S.D. 24, ¶ 28, 958 N.W.2d at 741 (quoting Holler, 2020 S.D. 28, ¶ 17, 944 N.W.2d at

344). When fashioning an appropriate sentence, a circuit court should be guided by

“the traditional sentencing factors of retribution, deterrence—both individual and

general—rehabilitation, and incapacitation[,]” weighing them “on a case-by-case

basis[.]” Id. (quoting State v. Toavs, 2017 S.D. 93, ¶ 10, 906 N.W.2d 354, 357). As

part of its consideration, “[t]he sentencing court should have access to ‘the fullest

information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.

Information which should be available to the court includes general moral

character, mentality, habits, social environment, tendencies, age, aversion or

inclination to commit crime, life, family, occupation, and previous criminal record.’”

Id. ¶ 29 (quoting Holler, 2020 S.D. 28, ¶ 18, 944 N.W.2d at 344).

[¶53.]       Here, we do not conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in

sentencing Manning. To assist in fashioning an appropriate sentence for Manning,

the circuit court ordered court services to prepare a presentence investigation report

(PSI) and obtain a psychosexual evaluation (PSE). The PSI contained, among other

things, information regarding Manning’s criminal history, family history, education,

employment history, social circumstances, and attitudes/orientation. The PSE

contained further information on topics such as Manning’s mental state, personality

functioning, psychosocial history, and psychosexual history. The circuit court noted

at sentencing that it considered both reports when applying the traditional

sentencing factors to arrive at its decision.

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[¶54.]       There were many aggravating factors present in both reports that

support the circuit court’s decision to impose a lengthy sentence. Manning has a

prior felony conviction for abuse/cruelty to a minor less than seven years of age. His

juvenile criminal history includes an incident of sexual contact with a child under

sixteen. The psychosexual evaluator diagnosed Manning with antisocial personality

disorder and pedophilic disorder with a poor prognosis for treatment. Importantly,

Manning was found to be a “high-risk for sexual reoffense,” meaning that he is “a

poor candidate for probation and/or community placement[,]” and rather should be

placed in a “highly secure and structured setting[.]” When being interviewed for the

PSE, Manning continued to assert that he did not commit the crimes he was

convicted of and was “unsure whether he would engage in sexual offender specific

treatment programming” if it were offered. The circuit court found that Manning

had failed to accept responsibility for his crimes and that Manning was “a danger to

the community and will likely reoffend.”

[¶55.]       While the State recommended fifty years on each of the rape charges,

the circuit court’s sixty-year sentences were not beyond the range of permissible

choices and in the court’s view were necessary to protect the public. The circuit

court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning Manning’s sentence.

             6.     Whether Manning received ineffective assistance of
                    counsel.

[¶56.]       Manning alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel

because of errors committed by his trial counsel: (1) during the jury selection

process, (2) by not moving to dismiss multiplicitous counts in the indictment, and

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(3) for not objecting to the bolstering of witnesses. He claims that the compilation of

these errors prejudiced him at trial.

[¶57.]        As a general rule, “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, we will not

address an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. We depart from this

principle only when trial counsel was so ineffective and counsel’s representation so

casual as to represent a manifest usurpation of the defendant’s constitutional

rights.” State v. Vortherms, 2020 S.D. 67, ¶ 30, 952 N.W.2d 113, 120-21 (quoting

State v. Golliher-Weyer, 2016 S.D. 10, ¶ 8, 875 N.W.2d 28, 31). “This is because the

record on direct appeal typically does not afford a basis to review the performance of

trial counsel.” Id. Rather, ineffective assistance claims are better heard through a

writ of habeas corpus. Id. “[T]hrough habeas, an attorney charged with

ineffectiveness can explain or defend actions and strategies[,] [a]nd this Court can

obtain a ‘more complete picture of what occurred.’” Golliher-Weyer, 2016 S.D. 10,

¶ 9, 875 N.W.2d at 31-32 (quoting State v. Thomas, 2011 S.D. 15, ¶ 23, 796 N.W.2d

706, 714).

[¶58.]        Manning’s second and third claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

require no further development of the record as we have addressed them, herein, as

part of his claims on direct appeal, concluding they lack merit. Therefore, Manning

did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to object

to witness bolstering or counsel’s failure to move to dismiss a multiplicitous

indictment.

[¶59.]        However, the alleged error regarding the jury selection process that

Manning has raised is not the type of “exceptional circumstance” that would

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warrant review of this claim on direct appeal. Because further development of the

record regarding this issue would enhance our ability to review this claim, we

decline to address it herein.

             7.     Whether Manning was deprived of a fair trial by the
                    cumulative effect of the alleged errors.

[¶60.]       Finally, Manning argues that when taken together, all of the errors

committed at his trial amounted to an unfair trial. “[T]o determine whether a

defendant was denied the constitutional right to a fair trial based on the cumulative

effect of trial errors, we review the entire record to determine if a fair trial was

held.” State v. Delehoy, 2019 S.D. 30, ¶ 20, 929 N.W.2d 103, 108.

[¶61.]       Having found no prejudicial error in any of the other issues analyzed,

we fail to find cumulative error as well. To do so “would recognize a degree of error

that is greater than the sum of its parts.” Reay v. Young, 2019 S.D. 63, ¶ 26 n.7,

936 N.W.2d 117, 124 n.7.

[¶62.]       Affirmed.

[¶63.]       JENSEN, Chief Justice, SALTER and DEVANEY, Justices, and

RASMUSSEN, Circuit Court Judge, concur.

[¶64.]       RASMUSSEN, Circuit Court Judge, sitting for MYREN, Justice, who

deemed himself disqualified and did not participate.

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