Court Opinion

ID: 9897304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:55.106492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.832793
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          Aug 23 2023, 10:37 am

                                                                               CLERK
                                                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jimmy Gurulé                                            Theodore E. Rokita
Kevin Murphy                                            Attorney General of Indiana
Exoneration Justice Clinic                              Kelly A. Loy
Notre Dame Law School                                   Deputy Attorney General
South Bend, Indiana                                     Indianapolis, Indiana
Robert Hochman
Minje Shin
Admitted Pro Hac Vice
Sidley Austin LLP
Chicago, Illinois

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Pink Allen Robinson,                                    August 23, 2023
Appellant-Petitioner                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                        22A-PC-1102
        v.                                              Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
                                                        Court
State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo,
Appellee-Respondent.                                    Judge
                                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                                        20C01-2012-PC-41

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023                                 Page 1 of 26
                                            Opinion by Judge Pyle

                                    Judges Crone and Bradford concur.

      Pyle, Judge.

      Statement of the Case

[1]   In 2016, the State charged Pink Robinson (“Robinson”) with three counts of

      Level 3 felony robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. A jury convicted

      Robinson of all three counts in 2018, and the trial court sentenced him to an

      aggregate sentence of forty-eight years, with three years suspended. This Court

      affirmed Robinson’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal. See Robinson v.

      State, No. 18A-CR-2212, 2019 WL 4924824 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2019), trans.

      denied. In 2020, Robinson filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In

      October 2021, attorney Jimmy Gurulé (“Attorney Gurulé”) filed an appearance

      on Robinson’s behalf.1 Also, in October 2021, Robinson filed a motion for a

      1
        At the outset, in full transparency, we note that Attorney Gurulé, who is affiliated with Notre Dame Law
      School’s Exoneration Justice Clinic (“the Clinic”), filed Robinson’s appellate brief on September 8, 2022. On
      November 16, 2022, Attorney Gurulé gave a presentation to several judges on this Court. During this
      presentation, Attorney Gurulé spoke about the Clinic. He also spoke about one of the Clinic’s cases, Royer v.
      State, 166 N.E.3d 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). In Royer, this Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s order
      that granted Royer’s successive petition for post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence and
      Brady violations and vacated Royer’s murder conviction. Royer, 166 N.E.3d at 405. In Robinson’s appellate
      brief, Attorney Gurulé cites Royer in support of his argument that the post-conviction court erred in denying
      Robinson’s motion for a change of judge. We note that none of the judges on this panel of Robinson’s
      appeal attended Attorney Gurulé’s presentation or discussed the Royer case with any of the judges who
      attended the presentation.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023                              Page 2 of 26
      change of judge pursuant to Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b). 2 The post-conviction

      court denied Robinson’s change of judge motion, and this interlocutory appeal

      concerns only the post-conviction court’s denial of that motion.3 Robinson

      specifically argues that the post-conviction court clearly erred when it denied his

      motion for a change of judge. Concluding that the post-conviction court did not

      clearly err, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of Robinson’s change of

      judge motion.4

[2]   We affirm.

      Issue

      2
       Although Robinson’s motion was titled a motion for recusal, we note that Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b)
      does not include the term recusal. Rather, Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b) uses the terms change of judge. We
      will, therefore, refer to Robinson’s motion as a motion for a change of judge.
      3
        We express no opinion on the merits of Robinson’s post-conviction relief petition, which is pending before
      the post-conviction court.
      4
        We note that Attorney Gurulé is also representing Iris Seabolt (“Seabolt”) and Leon Tyson (“Tyson”), two
      other post-conviction petitioners who appealed the post-conviction court’s denial of their change of judge
      motions. Seabolt’s appeal was originally filed under Cause Number 22A-PC-208, and Tyson’s appeal was
      originally filed under Cause Number 22A-PC-143. In May 2022, this Court’s motions panel granted
      Attorney Gurulé’s motion to consolidate these two appeals with Robinson’s appeal.
      Thereafter, in February 2023, Attorney Gurulé initiated an appeal for Reginald Dillard (“Dillard”), a fourth
      post-conviction petitioner who is appealing the post-conviction court’s denial of his change of judge motion.
      Dillard’s appeal was originally filed under Cause Number 23A-PC-261. The following month, March 2023,
      this Court’s motions panel granted Attorney Gurulé’s motion to consolidate Dillard’s appeal into Tyson’s
      appeal.
      However, it is well-established that we have the inherent authority to reconsider a ruling by the motions
      panel while an appeal remains pending. Beasley v. State, 192 N.E.3d 1026, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans.
      denied. Here, we have determined that a de-consolidation of these four appeals is necessary. Accordingly, we
      have returned each one to its original appellate cause number and will decide each appeal on its own merits.
      On August 11, 2023, we affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of Tyson’s change of judge motion. See
      Tyson v. State, No. 22A-PC-143, 2023 WL 5158093 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2023).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023                                Page 3 of 26
              Whether the post-conviction court clearly erred when it denied
              Robinson’s motion for a change of judge.

      Facts
[3]   In October 2021, Robinson, represented by Attorney Gurulé, filed a 29-page

      change of judge motion.5 At the beginning of his motion, Robinson alleged as

      follows:

              There is an epidemic in Elkhart, Indiana where innocent people
              are wrongfully convicted as a result of systemic police
              misconduct, false and fabricated testimony, undisclosed promises
              of consideration to witnesses, faulty forensic evidence, and the
              widespread failure to disclose material exculpatory and
              impeachment evidence. These wrongful convictions are the
              byproduct of a culture of misconduct at the [Elkhart County
              Prosecutors Office] and [the Elkhart Police Department] that has
              spanned decades. Tragically, these unjust convictions often take
              years to unravel, leaving innocent men and women to languish in
              prison for crimes they did not commit.

      (App. Vol. 9 at 150).

[4]   In addition, Robinson specifically argued that the post-conviction court should

      grant his change of judge motion because the post-conviction court judge had

      been a deputy prosecutor in the Elkhart County Prosecutor’s Office from 1998

      until 2002. Robinson further argued that the post-conviction court should grant

      his motion for a change of judge because the post-conviction court’s order in a

      5
       In this motion, Robinson stated that he intended to amend his post-conviction petition “to add additional
      allegations and claims.” (App. Vol. 9 at 148). However, he has not yet filed an amended petition.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023                              Page 4 of 26
      prior unrelated case involving Andrew Royer (“Royer”) had shown that the

      post-conviction court judge had “already prejudged allegations identical to Mr.

      Robinson’s to be ‘defamatory’ and false, based not on evidence, but the Court’s

      own extrajudicial prejudices and beliefs.” (App. Vol. 9 at 164). Robinson also

      argued that because the post-conviction court had ultimately granted Royer’s

      motion for a change of judge, the post-conviction court should grant Robinson’s

      motion for a change of judge as well.

[5]   At this point, for a better understanding of Robinson’s argument and the post-

      conviction court’s response to this argument in its order denying Robinson’s

      motion for a change of judge, we find it helpful to review the facts and history

      of Royer’s case. A jury convicted Royer of murdering Helen Sailor (“Sailor”)

      in 2005. In 2006, this Court affirmed Royer’s conviction. Royer v. State, No.

      20A03-0601-CR-14, 2006 WL 1634766 (Ind. Ct. App. May 31, 2006). In 2007,

      Royer filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court

      denied after a hearing. This Court affirmed the denial. Royer v. State, No.

      20A04-1106-PC-325, 2011 WL 6595351 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2011).

[6]   A few years later, in June 2013, Royer, represented by Attorney Elliot Slosar

      (“Attorney Slosar”), filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana

      Trial Rule 60(B).6 Immediately after filing this motion, Attorney Slosar and

      Royer’s family members gathered in front of the prosecutor’s office for a press

      6
       Slosar’s petition for temporary admission to appear in Robinson’s post-conviction proceeding is pending
      before the post-conviction court.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023                             Page 5 of 26
      conference. During the press conference, Attorney Slosar stated that there was

      a “‘systemic failure’ and an ‘epidemic’ in Elkhart County where people [were]

      wrongfully convicted because of police corruption, uninspiring defense counsel

      and an overzealous prosecutor.” (App. Vol. 3 at 57). Attorney Slosar also

      stated that “these factors contributed to Andrew Royer being convicted of a

      murder that he is absolutely innocent of.” (App. Vol. 3 at 57). In addition,

      Attorney Slosar stated that “we have proven that [Royer’s] conviction was an

      absolute fraud and the conviction was based on intentional misconduct.” (App.

      Vol. 3 at 57). Attorney Slosar further referred to the pending Trial Rule 60(B)

      motion as an appeal and released videotapes of witnesses that would be

      testifying at the hearing on Royer’s motion.

[7]   Following the press conference, the State filed a motion for an emergency

      hearing and a request for an injunction. In support of its motion, the State

      attached two newspaper articles from the South Bend Tribune. The headline

      for one of the articles, which is dated June 13, 2018, is “Mentally disabled man

      says shoddy policing, false statements led to Elkhart murder conviction.” (No.

      20D03-0309-MR-155, Chronological Case Summary, June 19, 2018 entry).

      The headline for the other article, which is dated June 14, 2018, is “Attorney of

      Andrew Royer blasts Elkhart police for ‘miscarriage of justice.’” (No. 20D03-

      0309-MR-155, Chronological Case Summary, June 19, 2018 entry). Royer filed

      a response to the State’s motion. Following a hearing, the trial court judge in

      Royer’s case, who is the post-conviction court judge in Robinson’s case, issued

      an order that provides, in relevant part, as follows:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023      Page 6 of 26
            9.      Additionally, Slosar contends that he made no statements
                    that violate Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 3.6, as only
                    information contained in the public record was stated at
                    the press conference, along with matters he has a
                    constitutional right to say on behalf of Royer. The Court
                    carefully reviewed the State’s Motion, as well as Royer’s
                    Response, along with the various attachments referencing
                    news articles about the conference. Particularly troubling
                    to the Court were Slosar’s statements at the subject press
                    conference characterizing “‘systemic failure’ and an
                    ‘epidemic’ in Elkhart County where people are wrongfully
                    convicted because of police corruption, uninspiring
                    defense counsel and an overzealous prosecutor.” Slosar
                    went on to say that “these factors contributed to Andrew
                    Royer being wrongfully convicted of a murder that he is
                    absolutely innocent of.” Slosar also stated that “we have
                    proven that his conviction was an absolute fraud and the
                    conviction was based on intentional misconduct.”
                    Additionally, videos of proposed witnesses were released
                    and Slosar inaccurately referred to the pending Trial Rule
                    60(B) Motion filed in this Court as an “appeal.”

           10.      The Indiana Supreme Court in In re: Litz[,] 721 N.E.2d 258
                    (Ind. 1999) addressed behavior such as [Slosar’s] and held
                    that Litz’s publication of a letter in several local newspapers
                    which state[d] his client committed no crime, criticized the
                    prosecutor’s decision to retry the case, and mentioned his
                    client had passed a lie detector test constituted a violation
                    of Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 3.6(a).[7]

7
    Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a) provides as follows:

           A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a
           matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023                                     Page 7 of 26
           11.      In sum, Slosar’s comments and statements are beyond the
                    scope of the exceptions stated in Ind. Professional Conduct
                    Rule 3.6(b) as to what a lawyer who is participating in
                    litigation of a matter may state.[8] The statements are highly
                    inflammatory, defamatory, inaccurately state the law as it
                    exists at this time with respect to Royer’s conviction, and
                    draw legal conclusions about matters not yet adjudicated.
                    Slosar’s actions go beyond simply summarizing evidence
                    that is a matter of public record. Further, any alleged “new
                    evidence” must be heard in accordance with the judicial
                    process before any legal conclusions may be reached.
                    Essentially, the extrajudicial statements made by Slosar at
                    the public press conference, and which were reported in the
                    media, do exactly what the Rule prohibits - forming public
                    opinion that has a substantial likelihood of materially
                    prejudicing the adjudicative proceedings pending in this
                    Court.

           should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a
           substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.

8
    Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(b) provides as follows:

           Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state:

           (1)      the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the
                    identity of the persons involved;
           (2)      information contained in the public record;
           (3)      that an investigation of a matter is in progress;
           (4)      the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
           (5)      a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;
           (6)      a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is
                    reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an
                    individual or to the public interest; and
           (7)      in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):
                    (i)       identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;
                    (ii)      if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid
                              in apprehension of that person;
                    (iii)     the fact, time and place of arrest; and
                    (iv)      the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the
                              length of the investigation.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023                                      Page 8 of 26
                                      *         *         *        *         *

           13.      Here, the Court finds that the statements Slosar made at
                    the public press conference held on June 13, 2018, violated
                    Ind. Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a) in that they were
                    extrajudicial statements that Slosar knew or reasonably
                    should have known would be disseminated by means of
                    public communication and would have a substantial
                    likelihood of prejudicing the adjudicative proceeding that
                    is pending in this matter, specifically, his Trial Rule 60(B)
                    Motion.

           14.      While the Court clearly recognizes Slosar’s First
                    Amendment right to free expression, as noted by the
                    Indiana Supreme Court in the Commentary to Ind.
                    Professional Rule of Conduct 3.6,[9] that right must be
                    balanced with the right to fair and impartial legal
                    proceedings, which may entail some restriction of the
                    information that may be disseminated about a party prior
                    to and during those proceedings. Ind. Professional Rule of
                    Conduct 3.6 does not curtail free speech except to the
                    extent necessary to protect the corresponding right to fair

9
    The commentary to Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

           It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and
           safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily
           entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior
           to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result
           would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic
           decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital
           societal interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having
           legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to
           know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a
           legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general
           public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct
           significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023                                       Page 9 of 26
                       proceedings. This is the basis upon [which] the Court is
                       acting.

              15.      For all these reasons, Slosar is hereby enjoined from
                       making extrajudicial commentary and statements to the
                       extent explained in Ind. Professional Rule of Conduct 3.6
                       on the matter that is pending before this court. Failure to
                       comply with this Order will be deemed willful failure to
                       comply with Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 and is
                       subject to appropriate sanctions.

      (App. Vol. 3 at 56-59). Also, in the order, the trial court noted that Attorney

      Slosar had argued that Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 had not

      applied to this case because no trial had been pending. The trial court

      responded that it disagreed with Attorney Slosar’s over[-]simplification of the

      intent of the rule and found that “the clear and express language of paragraph

      (a) is that dissemination of extrajudicial statements that will have a likelihood of

      materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding (Emphasis added) is

      prohibited. Indeed, that language, as well as ‘legal proceedings’ is used

      throughout the Rule, the Commentary, and in case law.” (App. Vol. 3 at 56).

[8]   In August 2018, Royer filed a motion to withdraw, without prejudice, his Trial

      Rule 60(B) motion, which the trial court granted. In May 2019, Royer filed a

      motion for permission to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief,

      which this Court granted. Royer then filed a successive petition for post-

      conviction relief and a motion for change of judge. The post-conviction court

      judge, who had issued the order finding that Attorney Slosar had violated

      Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a), granted Royer’s motion for a

      change of judge.
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023          Page 10 of 26
[9]    Royer’s case was subsequently assigned to Kosciusko Superior Court Judge Joe

       V. Sutton (“Judge Sutton”), who held a four-day hearing on Royer’s successive

       petition for post-conviction relief in October and November 2019. Following

       the hearing, Judge Sutton issued a fifty-five-page order granting Royer’s

       successive petition for post-conviction relief and vacating Royer’s murder

       conviction based on newly discovered evidence and Brady violations.

[10]   Judge Sutton specifically found newly discovered evidence that Elkhart County

       Forensic Specialist Dennis Chapman (“Forensic Specialist Chapman”) had not

       been qualified to conduct the latent fingerprint comparisons that he had made

       in Royer’s case.10 Judge Sutton noted that then-Elkhart County Chief Deputy

       Prosecutor Vicki Becker (“Deputy Prosecutor Becker”)11 had been responsible

       for meeting with Forensic Specialist Chapman and preparing him to testify.

       However, Judge Sutton found that Deputy Prosecutor Becker had not been

       provided with Forensic Specialist Chapman’s resume and had not been told

       that he was not qualified to conduct comparisons of latent prints. Judge Sutton

       further found that Forensic Specialist Chapman had “misled [Deputy

       Prosecutor] Becker into believing that he was qualified to conduct the type of

       latent print comparisons that [had] exist[ed]” in the case. (App. Vol. 3 at 69).

       10
         In 2012, the Elkhart County Sheriff’s Department disciplined Forensic Specialist Chapman for his role in
       Royer’s case. Forensic Specialist Chapman retired in 2013.
       11
            Vicki Becker is currently the elected Elkhart County Prosecutor.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023                            Page 11 of 26
       Judge Sutton also found a Brady violation because Forensic Specialist

       Chapman’s lack of qualifications had not been disclosed to the defense.

[11]   Judge Sutton further found newly discovered evidence that Detective Carl

       Conway (‘Detective Conway”), the lead investigator in the Sailor homicide had

       been removed from the homicide unit before Royer’s trial. The reason for

       Detective Conway’s removal was a misrepresentation that he had made to an

       attorney regarding one of the attorney’s clients. 12 Based upon this

       misrepresentation, Detective Conway’s supervisors had concerns about the

       impact that his misrepresentations would have on future homicide

       investigations and his credibility at trials if called to testify. However, Detective

       Conway’s removal from the homicide unit had not been disclosed to Royer

       before trial. Judge Sutton further found a Brady violation because the Elkhart

       Police Department had not disclosed Detective Conway’s removal to the

       defense.

[12]   In addition, Judge Sutton found newly discovered evidence that Detective

       Conway had threatened a critical witness in Royer’s case and promised her

       $2,000 to falsely testify against Royer at trial. Judge Sutton further found that

       12
         Judge Sutton further explained that Detective Conway’s appeal of his removal from the homicide unit had
       been summarily denied. In addition, Detective Conway had later been removed from the sex-crimes unit.
       According to Judge Sutton, during that removal process, Detective Conway had “made a complaint to
       [Deputy Prosecutor Becker]. A disciplinary proceeding ensued that resulted in an agreement between
       [Detective] Conway and the Elkhart Police Department. As part of that agreement, the Elkhart Police
       Department agreed to withdraw any allegations alleging or suggesting that ‘he caused the Office of the
       Prosecuting Attorney to lose faith in the Elkhart Police Department or to question its ability to supervise its
       detectives, investigate sex crimes or to perform any other form of police activities.’ In exchange, Detective
       Conway accepted a written reprimand.” (App. Vol. 3 at 83-84 n.7).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023                                Page 12 of 26
       the witness’ recantation of her trial testimony at the post-conviction hearing and

       her explanation for how her statement had been crafted were both credible. In

       addition, Judge Sutton found a Brady violation because the coercion of the

       witness and the fabrication of her testimony had not been disclosed to the

       defense.

[13]   Judge Sutton further found newly discovered evidence that Royer’s two audio-

       recorded statements obtained on September 3 and September 4, 2003, which

       totaled approximately sixty-one minutes, were unreliable and involuntary.

       Judge Sutton specifically noted that Detective Conway had interrogated Royer

       for approximately seven and one-half hours and that there was newly

       discovered evidence that Detective Conway had a reputation for obtaining

       confessions from every suspect that he had interrogated while assigned to the

       homicide unit. In addition, Judge Sutton found newly discovered evidence that

       Detective Conway’s ability to obtain confessions had not been a direct result of

       his internal interrogation training at the Elkhart Police Department. Judge

       Sutton further found newly discovered evidence that the Elkhart Police

       Department had not provided Detective Conway with any meaningful training

       on how to conduct interrogations, including how to interrogate a suspect such

       as Royer, who suffered from a mental disability. Judge Sutton also found that

       although Detective Conway had been aware of Royer’s mental disability,

       Detective Conway did not use any protections to safeguard against the

       possibility of Royer giving false and unreliable statements. Judge Sutton

       specifically pointed out that although another member of the homicide unit had

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023      Page 13 of 26
       told Detective Conway that the Elkhart Housing Authority had documentation

       revealing that Royer was severely disabled and had the mind of a child, Royer

       had not been permitted to have a lawyer, counselor, or family members present

       for his interrogations on September 3 and 4.

[14]   In addition, Judge Sutton found newly discovered evidence that Royer had not

       knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights because Detective

       Conway had not properly taken the time to advise Royer of these rights. Judge

       Sutton also found newly discovered evidence that Detective Conway had

       “repeatedly provided information about the homicide to Mr. Royer throughout

       the unrecorded two-day interrogation sessions.” (App. Vol. 3 at 101). In

       addition, Judge Sutton found newly discovered evidence that although

       Detective Conway revealed at the successive post-conviction hearing that

       Royer’s “mental well-being [had] broke[n] down[]” during the interrogations,

       Detective Conway had taken Royer’s recorded statement and placed him under

       arrest. (App. Vol. 3 at 103). Royer had been “in such a state of confusion that

       Detective Conway had to remind him that he [had given] a confession and was

       under arrest.” (App. Vol. 3 at 103).

[15]   Judge Sutton also found newly discovered evidence that the Elkhart Police

       Department’s investigation into Royer’s statements corroborated their

       unreliability. (App. Vol. 3 at 104). Specifically, Detective Conway

       acknowledged that he was only able to corroborate the following two basic

       pieces of information from all of Royer’s statements: (1) Royer knew the other

       person who had been charged with killing Sailor; and (2) Royer lived in the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023      Page 14 of 26
       same building as Sailor. Further, many of the details in Royer’s recorded

       statements conflicted with the physical evidence.

[16]   Based on these extensive findings, including newly discovered evidence and

       Brady violations, Judge Sutton vacated Royer’s murder conviction after

       concluding that he was entitled to a new trial. We note that although Judge

       Sutton found several Brady violations, Judge Sutton’s order does not specifically

       state that Deputy Prosecutor Becker or any other prosecutor had known about

       Detective Conway’s misconduct or had purposely withheld evidence from the

       defense.13

[17]   On appeal, we affirmed Judge Sutton’s grant of Royer’s successive petition for

       post-conviction relief and vacation of Royer’s murder conviction. Royer, 166

       N.E.3d at 380. We specifically highlighted instances of Detective Conway’s

       misconduct and concluded that Royer had not received a fair trial. Like Judge

       Sutton, we did not state that Deputy Prosecutor Becker or any other prosecutor

       had known about Detective Conway’s misconduct or had purposely withheld

       evidence from the defense.

[18]   We now return to the facts in Robinson’s appeal. As noted above, Robinson

       filed his 29-page change of judge motion in October 2021. In November 2021,

       the State filed a response to Robinson’s motion for a change of judge, and in

       13
         “For Brady purposes, the prosecutor is charged with knowledge of information known by the police even if
       the prosecutor herself is unaware of the information.” Royer, 166 N.E.3d at 400.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023                           Page 15 of 26
       December 2021, Robinson filed a reply to the State’s response. In February

       2022, the post-conviction court held a hearing on Robinson’s motion.

[19]   In March 2022, before the post-conviction court had issued a decision on

       Robinson’s change of judge motion, Robinson filed a supplement to his change

       of judge motion. In this supplement, Robinson stated that he had newly

       discovered evidence, which revealed that the post-conviction court had been

       married from 1992 until 2003 to Stephen Cappelletti (“Cappelletti”), who had

       been an Elkhart Police Department reserve police officer from 1983 through

       1994. According to Robinson, this newly discovered evidence required the

       post-conviction court to grant his change of judge motion.

[20]   In April 2022, the post-conviction court issued an order denying Robinson’s

       change of judge motion. This order provides, in relevant part, as follows:

               No Order of this Court . . . support[s] a finding that the Court
               harbors any actual personal bias toward [Robinson]. The 2018
               order in Royer did not constitute a premature comment on the
               merits of that case that would establish improper bias in the
               instant case. Petitioner Robinson . . . has mischaracterized the
               2018 order in Royer beyond the Court’s purpose in that case
               which was to curtail the misconduct of counsel for . . . Royer,
               Elliot Slosar, as set out in the Royer Order which was a
               legitimate judicial exercise. The motion before the Court in
               Royer was the State of Indiana’s Motion for Emergency Hearing
               and Request for Injunction along with relevant attachments. The
               documents presented to the Court established that Attorney
               Slosar had held a press conference at which he made several
               statements about the criminal justice system in Elkhart County,
               including that Elkhart faced a “systemic failure” and “an
               epidemic” of wrongful convictions. After a hearing held on July

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023     Page 16 of 26
        2, 2018, this Court entered an injunction (the 2018 Order) finding
        that counsel’s public comments were highly inflammatory and
        defamatory in that they inaccurately stated the law as it existed at
        that time, and drew improper legal conclusions about matters not
        yet adjudicated. Unequivocally, the Court ordered that the
        statements Attorney Slosar made at the public press conference
        violated Ind. Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a)[.]

        [Robinson] . . . opines that the 2018 Order in Royer represents a
        product of this Court’s extrajudicial prejudices and beliefs. To
        the contrary, this Court never considered or ruled on any of the
        substantive contents of Royer’s petition. More importantly,
        contrary to [Robinson’s] assertion, this Court has not “staked out
        a clear position . . . that there are no systemic police and
        prosecutorial problems in Elkhart that lead to wrongful
        convictions.” Rather, this Court simply found that the veracity
        of Attorney Slosar’s comments at his June 13, 2018 press
        conference was lacking, and that his conduct violated
        professional standards. The Court was not engaging in or
        adjudicating the existence of an “epidemic” of wrongful
        conviction in Elkhart, but was addressing concerns created by
        Attorney Slosar’s conduct.

        Therefore, [Robinson’s] argument that the 2018 Order somehow
        demonstrates that this Court has already prejudged his post
        conviction allegations . . . and renders this Court biased is
        misguided. The Court’s disqualification in the instant case is not
        necessitated by its ruling on the past conduct of Attorney Slosar
        in a completely separate and distinct case, particularly since
        Attorney Slosar has not been admitted in the instant case and is
        not counsel of record[.]

        Additionally, [Robinson’s] contention that recusal is required in
        his case because the Judge worked with and may have had
        relationships with members of the Elkhart Police Department
        and Elkhart Prosecutor’s Office, thereby witnessing or having
        knowledge of their patterns of practice in allegedly failing to
        comply with their Brady obligations is mere speculation at best.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023        Page 17 of 26
        This Judge did not work at the Prosecutor’s Office anytime near
        [Robinson’s] case and conviction, and [Robinson] has not shown
        that this Judge was witness to anything compromising in his
        case[.]

        Along these same lines, [Robinson] filed a Supplement Based on
        Newly Discovered Evidence in Support of his Motion for
        Recusal on March 16, 2022 arguing that this Court must recuse
        in this case because the Judge was formerly married to an Elkhart
        Police Department reserve officer during a time period when
        alleged “systemic misconduct” was occurring on the police
        force[.] The fact is that the Judge of this Court was married to
        the subject reserve officer from June 6, 1992 to April 15, 2003.
        The subject officer worked at the Elkhart Police Department
        from 1983-1994; therefore, for most of the time the officer was
        with the Elkhart Police Department, this Judge was not married
        to him. Moreover, Petitioner Robinson was charged in the
        underlying criminal case on September 21, 2016, and this Judge
        had absolutely no relationship with the subject officer anytime
        remotely close to [Robinson’s] case and conviction. [Robinson’s]
        assertion that this Court or her ex-spouse carry any connection,
        let alone a significant one, to [Robinson’s] 2016 crime and 2018
        conviction fails[.]

        In the instant case, there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever
        that this Court’s former marriage to a police officer in any way
        ever swayed the Judge’s decision making or does so today
        nineteen (19) years post-divorce. The Judge has no personal
        knowledge derived from extrajudicial sources stemming from
        that marital relationship. The Judge’s ex-husband stopped
        working for the Elkhart Police Department in 1994, some
        twenty-two (22) years prior to [Robinson’s] offense. [Robinson’s]
        argument is not supported by any precedential authority, is not
        persuasive and recusal is not required based on the same.

(App. Vol. 10 at 60-65). One month later, Robinson filed a motion for

reconsideration, which the post-conviction court denied.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023     Page 18 of 26
[21]   In May 2022, the post-conviction court certified its order for interlocutory

       appeal. In its certification order, the post-conviction court stated as follows:

               The Court believes that its Order denying recusal in this case
               demonstrates that the Court took great care to research and
               address each of [Robinson’s] arguments, and appropriately
               applied well-settled case law regarding recusal in determining
               that no actual bias had been shown and that recusal was not
               warranted. Nonetheless, . . . the Court sees no reason to deviate
               from its inclination to certify the Order denying recusal in this
               case . . . to gain guidance and clarification from the Court of
               Appeals with respect to [Robinson’s] allegations for recusal
               which this Court believes are based on misinterpretation and
               mischaracterization of the Court’s previous Order in an unrelated
               case, as well as on unfounded conclusions that this Court harbors
               actual bias based on tenuous, speculative and specious claims not
               supported by the facts.

       (App. Vol. 10 at 80-81).

[22]   In May 2022, this Court accepted jurisdiction over Robinson’s interlocutory

       appeal. Also in May 2022, Robinson asked this Court to consolidate his case

       with Iris Seabolt v. State, No. 22A-PC-00208 and Leon Tyson v. State, No.

       Number 22A-PC-143. This Court’s motions panel granted Robinson’s motion

       to consolidate the three cases, which, as explained above, we have de-

       consolidated.

[23]   Robinson now appeals the denial of his motion for a change of judge in his

       post-conviction case.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023        Page 19 of 26
                                                    Decision
[24]   Robinson argues that the post-conviction court clearly erred when it denied his

       motion for a change of judge. We disagree.

[25]   At the outset, we note that the law is well-settled that “adjudication by an

       impartial tribunal is one of the fundamental requirements of due process

       imposed on the courts of this state by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal

       constitution.” Matthews v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1250, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)

       (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927)), trans. denied. Judges are

       presumed impartial and unbiased. Matthews, 64 N.E.3d at 1253. “‘[T]he law

       will not suppose a possibility of bias or favor in a judge, who is already sworn to

       administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that

       presumption and idea.’” Matthews, 64 N.E.3d at 1253 (quoting 3 William

       Blackstone, Commentaries *361)).

[26]   In post-conviction cases, parties seeking to overcome the presumption of

       judicial impartiality must move for a change of judge under Post-Conviction

       Rule 1(4)(b). That rule provides, in relevant part, as follows:

               Within ten (10) days of filing a petition for post-conviction relief
               under this rule, the petitioner may request a change of judge by
               filing an affidavit that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice
               against the petitioner. The petitioner’s affidavit shall state the facts
               and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists,
               and shall be accompanied by a certificate from the attorney of
               record that the attorney in good faith believes that the historical
               facts recited in the affidavit are true. A change of judge shall be

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023            Page 20 of 26
               granted if the historical facts cited in the affidavit support a
               rational inference of bias or prejudice.

       (Emphasis added).

[27]   This rule requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts

       recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a

       rational inference of bias or prejudice. Pruitt v. State, 903 N.E.2d 899, 939 (Ind.

       2009). A change of judge is neither automatic nor discretionary but calls for a

       legal determination by the post-conviction court. Id. We presume that the post-

       conviction court is not biased against a party and disqualification is not required

       under the rule unless the judge holds a “personal bias or prejudice.” Id.

       (quoting P.-C.R. 1(4)(b)). Typically, a bias is personal if it stems from an

       extrajudicial source, which means a source separate from the evidence and

       argument presented at the proceedings. Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 939. “Such bias

       or prejudice exists only where there is an undisputed claim or the judge has

       expressed an opinion on the merits of the controversy before [her].” L.G. v.

       S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1073 (Ind. 2018).

[28]   “Further, Indiana courts credit judges with the ability to remain objective

       notwithstanding their having been exposed to information which might tend to

       prejudice lay persons.” Id. In addition, “[a] showing of prejudice sufficient to

       support a motion for a change of judge must be established from personal,

       individual attacks on a defendant’s character, or otherwise.” Miller v. State, 106

       N.E.3d 1067, 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. Stated differently, “a

       motion for a change of judge should be granted only if the evidence reveals such

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023         Page 21 of 26
       a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make a fair judgment

       impossible.” State v. Shackleford, 922 N.E.2d 702, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)

       (cleaned up), trans. denied.

[29]   The ruling on a motion for change of judge is reviewed under the clearly

       erroneous standard. Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 433 (Ind. 2003).

       Reversal will require a showing which leaves us with a definite and firm

       conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.

[30]   We restate Robinson’s first argument as whether the post-conviction court

       clearly erred in denying his motion for change of judge because the post-

       conviction court’s 2018 order in the unrelated Royer case finding that Attorney

       Slosar had violated Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a) supports a rational

       inference of bias or prejudice against Robinson.14 “Prior judicial rulings

       generally do not support a rational inference of prejudice.” Voss v. State, 856

       N.E.2d 1211, 1217 (Ind. 2006). “Adverse rulings and findings by a trial judge

       14
          We note that Robinson asserts that in Royer, 166 N.E.3d at 380, this Court found systemic police and
       prosecutorial misconduct in Elkhart. We did not. Specifically, we find no language in our opinion in Royer
       to support such an interpretation. Rather, our review of our opinion in Royer reveals that the newly
       discovered evidence related primarily to the horrific conduct of one Elkhart Police Department detective.
       Robinson also asserts that in its July 2018 order in the Royer case, the post-conviction court found that there
       was no systemic police or prosecutorial misconduct in Elkhart. It did not. The post-conviction court’s order
       in the Royer case solely addressed the statements that Attorney Slosar made at a press conference after he
       had filed in Royer’s case a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B).
       Specifically, the post-conviction court found that Attorney Slosar’s statements violated Rule of Professional
       Conduct 3.6(a) because Attorney Slosar knew or reasonably should have known that these statements would
       be disseminated by means of public communication and would have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing
       the adjudicative proceeding that was pending in the matter.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023                                Page 22 of 26
       from past proceedings with respect to a particular party are generally not

       sufficient reasons to believe the judge has a personal bias or prejudice.” Id.

       Although the mere assertion that certain adverse rulings by a judge constitute

       bias and prejudice does not establish the requisite showing, there may be

       circumstances in which a rational inference of bias or prejudice may be

       established if a judge’s order is sufficiently egregious. Id.

[31]   Here, however, we find nothing egregious in the July 2018 order that the trial

       court judge, who is the post-conviction court judge in Robinson’s case, issued in

       the unrelated Royer case. Rather, the trial court simply concluded that

       Attorney Slosar’s press conference statements regarding systemic police

       misconduct in Elkhart, which he had made before the adjudication of Royer’s

       Trial Rule 60(B) motion, violated Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6(a). Further,

       and more importantly, the trial court’s July 2018 order does not mention

       Robinson or anything about Robinson’s case, which occurred more than ten

       years after Royer’s case. In sum, we find nothing in the Royer order that

       supports a rational inference of bias or prejudice against Robinson.15

       15
           We further note that Robinson’s argument that the post-conviction court should have granted his motion
       for a change of judge because it granted the motion for a change of judge in the Royer case is unavailing.
       Specifically, the fact that the post-conviction court granted a motion for a change of judge in Royer’s case
       “appears to us to evidence the fact that [the post-conviction court judge] would conduct herself as an
       unbiased jurist in applying the law to the particular facts of a case.” Smith v. State, 613 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ind.
       1993) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a motion for a change of judge where the petitioner argued that the
       adverse publicity that the post-conviction court received as a result of granting an unrelated petition for post-
       conviction relief would cause the post-conviction court to be biased against granting post-conviction relief in
       petitioner’s case), cert. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023                                 Page 23 of 26
[32]   We restate Robinson’s second argument as whether the post-conviction court

       clearly erred in denying Robinson’s motion for a change of judge because the

       post-conviction court’s 1998-2002 tenure as a deputy prosecutor supports a

       rational inference of bias or prejudice against Robinson. In Calvert v. State, 498

       N.E.2d 105, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), this Court concluded “that a trial judge

       must disqualify [her]self from a proceeding in which [s]he has actively served as

       an attorney for one of the parties regardless of whether actual bias or prejudice

       exists.” Here, there is no allegation that the post-conviction court judge actively

       served as a deputy prosecutor on Robinson’s case. Indeed, this would have

       been an impossibility because the post-conviction court judge left the

       prosecutor’s office in 2002, fourteen years before the State charged Robinson

       with three counts of Level 3 felony robbery with a deadly weapon and twenty-

       one years before Robinson’s upcoming hearing on his post-conviction petition.

       Given the remoteness in time of the post-conviction court’s tenure in the

       Elkhart Prosecutor’s Office in relation to the charges against Robinson and his

       upcoming post-conviction hearing, Robinson has failed to show how the post-

       conviction court’s 1998-2002 tenure as a deputy prosecutor supports a rational

       inference of bias or prejudice against Robinson. See Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v.

       Kiang, 961 N.E.2d 61, 66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that the proximity in

       time of the historical facts alleged in the affidavit to the matter concerning the

       motion for a change of judge is a relevant inquiry).

[33]   Lastly, we restate Robinson’s third argument as whether the post-conviction

       court clearly erred in denying Robinson’s motion for a change of judge because

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023        Page 24 of 26
the post-conviction court judge’s 1992-2003 marriage to Cappelletti supports a

rational inference of bias or prejudice against Robinson. We note that the post-

conviction court judge’s marriage to Cappelletti ended thirteen years before the

State charged Robinson with three counts of Level 3 felony robbery while

armed with a deadly weapon and twenty years before Cappelletti’s potential

testimony in Robinson’s post-conviction case. Robinson’s affidavit does not

allege that any relationship existed between Cappelletti and the post-conviction

court judge after their marriage had been dissolved. Indeed, in her order

denying Robinson’s motion for a change of judge, the post-conviction court

judge specifically noted that she had not had contact with Cappelletti since their

marriage had been dissolved in 2003. Given the remoteness in time of the

post-conviction court judge’s marriage to Cappelletti to the charges against

Robinson and his upcoming post-conviction hearing, Robinson has failed to

show that this prior marriage supports a rational inference of bias or prejudice

against Robinson. See Bloomington Magazine, 961 N.E. 2d at 66. See also

McKinney v. State, 873 N.E.2d 630, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that

where the personal relationship between the trial court judge and her former

employee, who was the murder victim’s mother, had ended twenty years before

the defendant’s trial and the defendant had not alleged any facts suggesting that

any relationship existed between the two after that employment had been

terminated, the trial court did not clearly err in denying defendant’s motion for

a change of judge), trans. denied.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023        Page 25 of 26
       Conclusion
[34]   In sum, the recited historical facts on which Robinson based his motion for a

       change of judge simply do not support a rational inference of bias or prejudice

       against Robinson as contemplated by Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(b). We further

       note that the post-conviction court has neither expressed an opinion on the

       merits of Robinson’s case nor attacked his character. Accordingly, because we

       are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made,

       we conclude that the post-conviction court did not clearly err in denying

       Robinson’s motion for a change of judge. See Garland, 788 N.E.2d at 433. We,

       therefore, affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of Robinson’s motion. See

       Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 939 (explaining that where Pruitt’s post-conviction court

       judge was the same judge who had presided over his trial and where Pruitt’s

       affidavit in support of his motion for a change of judge had shown no historical

       facts that had demonstrated personal bias on the part of the post-conviction

       court judge, Pruitt had been provided with a full and fair post-conviction relief

       hearing before an impartial judge).

[35]   Affirmed.

       Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PC-1102| August 23, 2023      Page 26 of 26