Court Opinion

ID: 9528066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:36:43.196674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:25.690836
License: Public Domain

Thompson, C.J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I agree the summary dismissal of plaintiffs' action was properly entered. However, I would also affirm the trial court's refusal to impose sanctions.
The trial court's determination regarding CR 11 violations is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Watson v. Maier, 64 Wn. App. 889, 896, 827 P.2d 311, review denied, 120 Wn.2d 1015 (1992). In denying sanctions here, the trial court explained:
The true issue in this case is the legal authority of the Indian tribal officer on the Yakima Indian Reservation to stop any law violator ... for a crime that. . . was being committed in his presence. And the law is difficult in this area.
For a number of reasons, my opinion took some amount of time.
... I thought there was some particular issues . . . concerning the recognition by the state ... of the authority of an Indian police officer. And going to the statutes, I frankly found them to be rather inexact.
RCW 10.93,[12] for example, talks about authorities of officers in certain contexts, talks about Indian police officers in *836one phrase and then, just like the word processor bleeped it out, on the next phrase or subsection of the statute, deletes Indian police officers. Why, I don't know. Consistency and common sense would indicate that they would be included. But anyway, I thought there was some issue concerning that that's worthy of debate.
The majority opinion holds this determination was an abuse of discretion. At page 834, the majority states: "[TJhere is no factual basis for the allegation that Officer Newquist arrested Mr. Gomez." But Officer Newquist admits he briefly detained Mr. Gomez in the course of an investigatory stop.13 In doing so, he exercised authority which the plaintiffs in this action contended was beyond the scope of his jurisdiction as a tribal police officer. Given the ambiguities in RCW 10.93, I do not believe the trial court abused its discretion when it held the plaintiffs' argument presented a debatable issue, even though it had previously decided this question of law against them.
The other basis for the majority's award of sanctions is the plaintiffs' attorney's misuse of the affidavit of prejudices But, as the trial court observed, no delay resulted therefrom because the court rejected the affidavit. In these circumstances, I do not think it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to sanction the attorney.
*837Accordingly, I would affirm both the trial court's summary dismissal of plaintiffs' action and its denial of defendant's motion for sanctions.

 RCW 10.93 extends the jurisdiction of certain peace officers in certain circumstances (e.g., emergency situations). See RCW 10.93.070, .080, .090. Tribal officers *836are mentioned in the definition section, RCW 10.93.020(8), but not in subsequent sections.

 Officer Newquist states in his affidavit that he stopped Mr. Gomez after he observed him driving erratically. He immediately noticed the smell of alcohol, asked Mr. Gomez for his driver's license, and then asked him to get out of his car. He was of the opinion Mr. Gomez could not safely operate the vehicle. When Mr. Gomez indicated he and his passenger were on their way to Wapato, Officer Newquist "told" them he would take them there.
While the Indian tribe may have retained authority "to detain [non-Indian] offenders and turn them over to government officials for prosecuting", see State v. Schmuck, 121 Wn.2d 373, 383, 850 P.2d 1332 (1993), the question here was whether Officer Newquist had jurisdiction to detain Mr. Gomez for purposes other than transferring him to the State. The trial court held he did, and we have affirmed that determination.