Court Opinion

ID: 9913239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 15:05:46.918698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:07.367430
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                            APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
  internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                     SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                     APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                     DOCKET NO. A-3760-21

       LINDA B. BREHME,

                Plaintiff-Appellant,

       v.

       THOMAS IRWIN,

                Defendant-Respondent,

       and

       NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS
       INSURANCE COMPANY,

          Defendant.
_____________________________________

                Submitted December 12, 2023 – Decided December 27, 2023

                Before Judges Whipple, Mayer and Enright.

                On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-7134-18.

                Clark Law Firm, PC, attorneys for appellant (Gerald
                Hayes Clark and Lazaro Berenguer, of counsel and on
                the briefs).
            Foster & Mazzie, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Carl
            A. Mazzie, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Linda D. Brehme appeals from a June 27, 2022 in limine ruling

by the trial judge barring her claim for future medical expenses. Because

plaintiff filed a warrant to satisfy judgment under Rule 4:48-1, we dismiss the

appeal as moot.

      We limit our recitation of the facts relevant to the issue raised on appeal.

Plaintiff sued defendants for personal injuries resulting from an automobile

accident that occurred in December 2016.

      After completion of discovery, the matter proceeded to trial. On the first

day of trial, the judge entertained an in limine motion by defendant to bar

plaintiff's claim for future medical expenses. Because the judge determined

plaintiff's personal injury protection (PIP) coverage under her own automobile

insurance policy was not exhausted, the judge barred as speculative any claim

by plaintiff for future medical expenses.

      The matter was tried before a jury over five days. At the conclusion of

the testimony, the jury found plaintiff sustained a permanent injury as a result

of the December 2016 car accident. The jury awarded plaintiff the sum of

$225,000 for pain and suffering and $50,000 for lost wages. After calculating

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interest and costs, the judge entered a July 7, 2022 judgment in favor of plaintiff

in the amount of $311,435.59. On July 18, 2022, plaintiff's counsel signed a

warrant to satisfy judgment. Nothing in that document indicated plaintiff's

intent to appeal the judge's in limine ruling denying her claim for future medical

expenses. On August 8, 2022, the signed warrant to satisfy judgment was

entered on the trial court's docket. Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal on August

12, 2022.

      On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred in denying her claim for future

medical expenses. She seeks a new trial limited to this issue. Plaintiff further

asserts she is not precluded from proceeding with her appeal, notwithstanding

the warrant to satisfy judgment. We disagree.

      It is well settled that "a litigant who voluntarily accepts the benefits of a

judgment is estopped from attacking it on appeal." Tassie v. Tassie, 140 N.J.

Super. 517, 524 (App. Div. 1976). This rule "is but a corollary to the established

principle that any act upon the part of a litigant by which he expressly or

impliedly recognizes the validity of a judgment operates as a waiver or surrender

of his right to appeal therefrom." Id. at 525.

      In Tassie, the plaintiff was estopped from attacking parts of a divorce

judgment, addressing child support, alimony, and equitable distribution, because

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the plaintiff "knowingly and voluntarily accepted all of the benefits of the

judgment without reserving her right to appeal by accepting them under protest."

Id. at 523, 525. The court further explained "it is inequitable and unjust to permit

[a] plaintiff to accept the benefits and attack the judgment on appeal." Id. at

526.

       Here, defendant elected not to appeal the July 7, 2022 judgment and

agreed to pay the full amount to plaintiff in return for a warrant of satisfaction

under Rule 4:48-1. As we noted in Sturdivant v. General Brass & Machine

Corp., 115 N.J. Super. 224, 227 (App. Div. 1971), where a party receives and

accepts the judgment amount and the adverse party then files a warrant for

satisfaction, such conduct expressly acknowledges the validity of the judgment

and operates as a waiver of the right to appeal therefrom. See also Pressler &

Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. on R. 4:48-1 (2023).

       Plaintiff's reliance on Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Saltman, 217 N.J. Super.

604 (App. Div. 1987), and Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marking Corp.,

26 N.J. 229 (1958), is misplaced. The issue in Guarantee Insurance Co. involved

a request for attorney's fees associated with two separate actions—a declaratory

judgment action for insurance coverage and a simultaneously pending legal

malpractice action. Id. at 606. The legal malpractice action settled with the

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insurance company paying the settlement amount and issuing a warrant to satisfy

judgment. Id. at 608. However, because the defendants maintained at all times

their intent to pursue a claim for attorney's fees associated with the legal

malpractice action as well as the insurance coverage action, the court held the

defendants were not estopped from proceeding with an appeal related to the

recovery of attorney's fees in the insurance coverage action. Id. at 609.

      The facts in Aldolph Gottscho, Inc. are also distinguishable from the facts

in the instant matter. In that case, the defendant filed a notice of appeal on April

9, 1957, and the plaintiff filed a notice of cross-appeal on April 19, 1957. 26

N.J. at 241. However, the defendant paid the amount due on the judgment and

received the warrant of satisfaction on May 16, 1957, well after the parties filed

the notices of appeal and cross-appeal.       Id. at 241-42.    Thus, in Aldolph

Gottscho, Inc., the defendants knew of the plaintiff's intent to appeal prior to

paying the judgment amount based on the plaintiff's clear assertion "at all times

. . . that an additional sum was due." Id. at 242.

      Here, plaintiff never advanced, either on the record or in writing, that she

intended to pursue her claim for future medical expenses after the judge's in

limine ruling. Plaintiff accepted and received the full judgment amount from

defendant New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company and signed a warrant

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to satisfy judgment.     Under these circumstances, plaintiff's receipt and

acceptance of the full amount stated in the July 7, 2022 judgment precluded her

appeal challenging the trial judge's denial of future medical expenses.

      Dismissed as moot.

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