Court Opinion

ID: 9737668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:31:53.074717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.660462
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
Qconcurring). In this taking case, defendant, the city of East Lansing, appeals from a Court of Appeals decision affirming the trial court in part and reversing it in part in favor of plaintiff, Adams Outdoor Advertising. The issue is whether defendant’s sign ordinance resulted in a regulatory taking of plaintiff’s billboards and rooftop leaseholds.
I would reverse the Court of Appeals decision insofar as it holds that defendant’s sign ordinance resulted in a taking and reverse the trial court order granting compensation to plaintiff. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s analysis. It is premised on the rights of the lessor who is not before the Court and whose rights were not litigated.
BACKGROUND
This dispute concerns rooftop billboards at two different locations in East Lansing. Plaintiff owns the billboards and leases the rooftop locations where they are installed. The billboards were erected in 1968 and 1955, respectively. The leases at issue in this dispute were entered into in 1996 and 1993.
In 1975, defendant enacted a new ordinance to regulate signs and billboards throughout the city. The ordinance made plaintiff’s rooftop billboards nonconforming and prohibited plaintiff from displaying them after May 1, 1987.1
*29In 1987, defendant advised plaintiff that it would enforce its sign ordinance. After exhausting its appeals with defendant, plaintiff initiated this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for partial summary disposition, finding that the sign ordinance was enacted without legislative authority. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
This Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding that the city had the authority to enact its sign code. The Court remanded the case to the trial court to resolve the issue whether enforcement of the sign code resulted in a taking without just compensation. 439 Mich 209; 483 NW2d 38 (1992).
On remand, the circuit court ruled that, with regard to the rooftop leaseholds, enforcement of the sign code resulted in a taking without just compensation. It reasoned that plaintiff was deprived of all economically viable use of that property. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 232 Mich App 587; 591 NW2d 404 (1998).2
*30ANALYSIS
I
The issue is whether a regulatory taking has occurred that requires defendant to compensate plaintiff when defendant’s sign ordinance prohibits plaintiff from using its existing rooftop billboards. The federal constitution and the Michigan Constitution require a governmental entity to pay just compensation for any private property it takes for public use. US Const, Am V;3 Const 1963, art 10, § 2.4
Those constitutional prohibitions against taking private property without just compensation can be implicated by governmental regulation that overburdens private property. We have held that such regulation can result in a taking in two general situations:
(1) where the regulation does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest, or (2) where the regulation denies an owner economically viable use of his land. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 485; 107 S Ct 1232; 94 L Ed 2d 472 (1987).
The second type of taking, where the regulation denies an owner of economically viable use of land, is further subdivided into two situations: (a) a “categorical” taking, where *31the owner is deprived of “all economically beneficial or productive use of land,” Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1015; 112 S Ct 2886; 120 L Ed 2d 798 (1992); or (b) a taking recognized on the basis of the application of the traditional “balancing test” established in Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104; 98 S Ct 2646; 57 L Ed 2d 631 (1978).
In the former situation, the categorical taking, a reviewing court need not apply a case-specific analysis, and the owner should automatically recover for a taking of his property. Lucas, supra at 1015. A person may recover for this type of taking in the case of a physical invasion of his property by the government ... , or where a regulation forces an owner to “sacrifice all economically beneficial uses [of his land] in the name of the common good . . . .” Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original). In the latter situation, the balancing test, a reviewing court must engage in an “ad hoc, factual inquir[y],’’ centering on three factors: (1) the character of the government’s action, (2) the economic effect of the regulation on the property, and (3) the extent by which the regulation has interfered with distinct, investment-backed expectations. Penn Central [supra at] 124. [K & K Construction, Inc v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 456 Mich 570, 576-577; 575 NW2d 531 (1998).]
A
Before determining whether a compensable taking has occurred, we must first classify the property rights under consideration. The Court of Appeals found them to constitute real property. It stated;
[A] review of the record makes it abundantly clear that this case was tried on the theory that the property interests claimed to have been taken by East Lansing’s sign code are Adams’ real property interests, whether leasehold or fee simple, in the places where its billboards are located. East Lansing’s argument that no taking occurred because the billboards are personal property misapprehends the nature *32of the property interests claimed to have been taken in this case and is therefore rejected. [232 Mich App 596.]
Plaintiff asserts that defendant’s sign ordinance results in a taking of its billboards and also interferes with its leaseholds on which its billboards are attached. Defendant continues to argue that its sign ordinance is directed solely toward plaintiff’s personal property, its billboards. Defendant points out that, unlike the city’s action in In re Acquisition of Billboard Leases & Easements5 where the city condemned leaseholds on which billboards were located, its ordinance does not condemn any real property. It regulates only the placement of billboards.
I find that defendant’s ordinance comes to bear on two different property interests of plaintiff: plaintiff’s property interest in its billboards and also plaintiff’s property interest in the leaseholds on which its billboards are located.
I proceed without considering defendant’s arguments regarding the proper “denominator parcel” to use. Those arguments were first raised in the Court of Appeals, so they are unpreserved for our review. Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 422 (1993). Furthermore, consideration of the issue is an inherently factual inquiry that falls within the province of the trial court. K & K Construction, supra at 580. Thus, I concentrate my focus on the specific billboards and leaseholds at issue.
*331
Plaintiffs interest in its billboards is an interest in personal property. Personal property is broadly defined as
everything that is the subject of ownership, not coming under denomination of real estate. A right or interest in things personal, or right or interest less than a freehold in realty, or any right or interest which one has in things movable. [Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 1217; see also City of Holland v Fillmore Twp, 363 Mich 38, 42; 108 NW2d 840 (1961).]
The fact that plaintiffs billboards are affixed to the rooftops of the buildings on which they are located does not bring them within the “denomination of real estate.” I agree with the recent Court of Appeals decision in Outdoor Systems Advertising, Inc v Korth,6 holding that a lessee’s billboards located on a rooftop are trade fixtures, and trade fixtures are the personal property of the lessee. Accordingly, I would hold that plaintiff’s billboards are personal property.
2
Plaintiff’s other property interest affected by defendant’s sign ordinance is its rooftop leases. We have previously determined that leases are interests in real property. See Fidelity Trust Co v Wayne Co, 244 Mich 182; 221 NW 111 (1928).
Plaintiff leased the rooftops for the sole purpose of mounting its billboards upon them. Defendant’s ordinance prohibits rooftop billboards. Thus, defendant’s *34ordinance has rendered plaintiff’s leases useless, adversely affecting plaintiff’s real property interest in them.
B
Having defined the property rights,7 I consider whether defendant’s sign ordinance was a taking of plaintiff’s personal property interest in its billboards or its real property interest in its leaseholds. First, we analyze plaintiff’s personal property interest in its billboards.
Defendant’s ordinance did not result in a regulatory taking of plaintiff’s billboards. “ ‘The general *35rule ... is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.’ ” K & K Construction, supra at 576, quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393, 415; 43 S Ct 158; 67 L Ed 322 (1922). That same principle applies to the regulation of personal property. See Andrus v Allard, 444 US 51; 100 S Ct 318; 62 L Ed 2d 210 (1979).
I see no need to perform an extended analysis of whether a regulatory taking sufficient to require compensation has occurred. Defendant’s ordinance prohibits plaintiff from displaying its billboards from only two rooftop locations. As such, it affects merely one “strand” of plaintiff’s “bundle” of rights in its billboards. Plaintiff is free to move the billboards elsewhere and continue to use them for its economic benefit. Significantly, plaintiff remains free to possess and transfer its billboards. See Andrus, supra at 66.
The fact that a substantial effort may be involved in removing and relocating the billboards does not result in a taking. See Outdoor Systems Advertising, supra at 671-672, citing Wentworth v Process Installations, Inc, 122 Mich App 452, 465; 333 NW2d 78 (1983).8 Therefore, I would hold that defendant’s sign ordi*36nance does not go so far as to result in a taking of plaintiff’s billboards.
c
i
Neither does defendant’s sign ordinance result in a regulatory taking of plaintiff’s leaseholds. “[E]ven if a regulation denies a landowner all economically productive use of the land, there is no compensable taking unless the landowner’s ‘bundle of rights’ previously included the right to engage in the restricted activity.” Outdoor Graphics, Inc v City of Burlington, 103 F3d 690, 694 (CA 8, 1996). Thus, where the proscribed use was not part of a property owner’s title to begin with, there can be no taking of the property when the proscription is enforced. Lucas, supra at 1027.
In Outdoor Graphics, the defendant’s sign ordinance prohibited billboards in residential areas. Id. at 692. The plaintiff’s billboards were erected before the sign ordinance was enacted but, at the time the plaintiff purchased them, they already constituted nonconforming uses under the defendant’s zoning code. Id. Thus, when the defendant required the plaintiff to remove them, compensation was not due because the plaintiff had never included in its “bundle of rights” the right to display the billboards. Id. at 694. The use of the billboards was illegal when the plaintiff purchased them. Id.
Here, plaintiff entered into the leases at issue after the effective date of defendant’s sign ordinance. Upon entering into these leases, plaintiff had full knowledge that the ordinance prohibited billboards from being displayed on its rooftop location after May 1, 1987. *37Plaintiff never had the right, among its leasehold “bundle of rights,” to display the rooftop billboards after that date. Thus, defendant’s sign ordinance takes something that plaintiff never had. In such a situation, there is no categorical taking. See Outdoor Graphics, supra at 694. See also Loveladies Harbor, Inc v United States, 28 F3d 1171, 1177 (CA Fed, 1994).9
Plaintiff argues, however, that the Court must consider its expectation that it would renew its leases. In certain instances, the expectation of future lease renewals is considered in a taking analysis. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co v United States, 409 US 470; 93 S Ct 791; 35 L Ed 2d 1 (1973).
Here, however, plaintiff entered into its current leases for the rooftops after defendant’s sign ordinance had gone into effect. That fact distinguishes this case from Almota, where the government sought to condemn a leasehold interest that had arisen before condemnation proceedings began and ran for another Tk years. See Almota, supra at 471.
It cannot be said that plaintiff had an expectation that it could continue to renew its leases while defendant’s ordinance was in effect. Under the circumstances presented, plaintiff had no realistic expectancy that the leases it entered into after the effective date of defendant’s ordinance would last their full term or be renewable. Thus, I do not find that plain*38tiff’s asserted expectancy of lease renewals is a protected legal right.10
2
Having found no categorical taking of plaintiff’s leasehold interests, I next examine whether there was a compensable taking pursuant to the balancing test outlined in Penn Central, supra. That test requires me to consider 1) the economic effect of the regulation on plaintiff, 2) the extent to which that regulation has interfered with distinct, investment-backed expectations, and 3) the character of the government regulation. Penn Central, supra at 124.
There is no set formula for determining whether a taking has occurred under the balancing test. K & K Construction, supra at 588. However, I will first consider whether plaintiff had any distinct, investment-backed expectations in its leaseholds.
Here, plaintiff never had a legitimate expectation that its leaseholds or billboards would continue to produce income in perpetuity. The fact that plaintiff continued to invest in new leaseholds after defendant enacted its sign ordinance does not compel this Court to find a taking. Plaintiff was well aware that the enforcement of defendant’s sign code could, at any time, render its leasehold interests worthless.11
*39Plaintiff argues that several Michigan cases gave it the expectation that, if challenged, defendant’s sign ordinance would be struck down or defendant would be required to pay plaintiff just compensation. See Central Advertising Co v Ann Arbor, 391 Mich 533; 218 NW2d 27 (1974); Wolverine Sign Works v Bloomfield Hills, 279 Mich 205; 271 NW 823 (1937). The court in Naegele Outdoor Advertising v City of Durham12 addressed this issue directly:
“A person who purchases land with notice of statutory impediments to the right to develop that land can justify few, if any, legitimate investment-backed expectations of development rights which rise to the level of constitutionally protected property rights . . . the state cannot be the guarantor by inverse condemnation proceedings, of the investment risk which people choose to take in the face of statutory or regulatory impediments.” Claridge v New Hampshire Wetlands Bd, 125 NH 745 [750]; 485 A2d 287, 291 (1984). . . . This is especially true in the case of . . . leases for sign locations. [Id. at 1079.]
I agree with the Naegele court that constitutional protections are not meant to insure risky investments. Here, plaintiff entered into lease agreements with full knowledge that at anytime defendant could enforce its sign code and render the leaseholds useless. Plaintiff had no legitimate or reasonable investment-backed expectation in them.
Turning to the character of the governmental regulation, defendant’s ordinance constitutes an outright ban on rooftop billboard advertising. Courts, however, have recognized the social benefits that such bans promote. See Outdoor Graphics, supra at 695. *40The United States Supreme Court cited aesthetic or safety reasons to justify the prohibition of billboards. Metromedia, Inc v San Diego, 453 US 490, 512; 101 S Ct 2882; 69 L Ed 2d 800 (1981). Therefore, I find that the character of the governmental regulation “tilts the scales” even further toward a finding that no taking has occurred.
I realize that the economic effect on the plaintiff in this case is substantial because defendant’s ordinance precludes plaintiff from using its leaseholds. I balance that fact against the absence of any investment-backed expectation and the recognized social benefit of improving safety and aesthetics. I conclude that defendant’s sign ordinance did not result in a taking of plaintiff’s leaseholds. Accordingly, no compensation is due plaintiff for the regulatory effect of defendant’s sign ordinance on its leasehold interests.13
CONCLUSION
I would hold that defendant’s sign ordinance proscribing all rooftop billboards within defendant’s city *41limits does not result in a taking per se of plaintiffs rooftop billboards. There has been no per se taking of plaintiff’s property, because defendant’s ordinance does not authorize defendant to take title to or physically occupy plaintiff’s property. There has been no regulatory taking, because plaintiff retains an economically beneficial use of its billboards. It had no protected right to continue to use its leaseholds to display rooftop billboards when those leases were entered into after the effective date of defendant’s ordinance.
Defendant’s sign ordinance did not result in a taking of plaintiff’s rooftop billboards or leaseholds that requires just compensation. Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals decision to the contrary and would vacate the trial court order granting compensation to plaintiff for the taking of its rooftop billboards.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 The ordinance stated at § 8.39:
*29Any existing sign on the effective date of this Chapter or any amendment hereto, which does not at that time comply with all of the provisions here, including any amendment
* ** *
Shall not be placed, maintained, or displayed by any person on or after May 1, 1987.

 Several freestanding billboards owned by plaintiff and located on land owned by plaintiff had also been the subject of the litigation up to this point. The trial court found that defendant’s ordinance resulted in a taking of the freestanding billboards, as well. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision with regard to the freestanding billboards. It found that all economic use of the property was not foreclosed, because defendant’s ordinance did not prohibit plaintiff from displaying all its billboards at that location. There is no issue before this Court regarding the freestanding billboards. We proceed to consider defendant’s appeal from the *30Court of Appeals finding that defendant’s ordinance resulted in a taking of plaintiff’s rooftop billboards.

 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” The Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 438 US 104, 122; 98 S Ct 2646; 57 L Ed 2d 631 (1978).

 Const 1963, art 10, § 2 provides:
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law. Compensation shall be determined in proceedings in a court of record.

 205 Mich App 659; 517 NW2d 872 (1994).

 238 Mich App 664, 667; 607 NW2d 729 (1999).

 This is an important issue over which both the majority and Chief Justice Weaver in her concurrence stumble. The majority relies on an analysis of the property owner’s rights to determine that no taking has occurred. The problem with it is that the property owner is not and has not been a party to this dispute.
Chief Justice Weaver as well fails adequately to identify the property interests at issue. She refers to the plaintiffs billboards and leaseholds as nonconforming uses that became vested rights when they preexisted defendant’s sign ordinance. However, she fails to recognize that the leases in effect at the time defendant’s ordinance was enacted or became effective had long since expired when plaintiff initiated this suit. She also fails to recognize that the billboards at issue axe the personal property of plaintiff. Her analysis of a vested nonconforming land use does not apply to them because plaintiff has no real property interest to which the billboards are attached.
Plaintiff is before the Court as a lessee. “A lease is a conveyance by the owner of an estate of a portion of the interest therein to another for a term less than his own for a valuable consideration.” De Bruyn Produce Co v Romero, 202 Mich App 92, 98; 508 NW2d 150 (1993). Accordingly, plaintiff’s real property interest is limited to the duration of its lease. A lessee does not stand in the shoes of or have rights identical to those of a real properly owner that might be entitled to continue a nonconforming use indefinitely. Thus, the questions relevant to this case are whether plaintiff had a vested right to renew its nonconforming leasehold interests. Also, did defendant’s ordinance result in a taking of plaintiff’s personal property, the billboards, or plaintiff’s real property interest, its leaseholds. Those are the issues properly before the Court and which I consider in resolving this case.

 As demonstrated above, plaintiffs billboards are trade fixtures. The Supreme Court in Cameron v Oakland Co Gas & Oil Co, 277 Mich 442, 459-460; 269 NW 227 (1936), stated:
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive that any fixture, however solid, permanent, and closely attached to the realty, placed there for the sole purpose of trade, may not be removed at the end of the term.
Thus, plaintiffs billboards remain personal property that plaintiff can remove. Defendant’s ordinance does not take the billboards merely because it prohibits plaintiff from using them where they are currently located.

 The federal circuit court of appeals stated:
[T]he owner who bought with knowledge of the restraint could be said to have no reliance interest, or to have assumed the risk of any economic loss. In economic terms, it could be said that the market had already discounted for the restraint, so that purchaser could not show a loss in his investment attributable to it.

 Accordingly, it is unnecessary to consider whether Michigan recognizes reasonable amortization periods as a method to preclude a taking.

 Plaintiff is presumed to have known the law. See Mudge v Macomb Co, 458 Mich 87, 109, n 22; 580 NW2d 845 (1998). Moreover, plaintiff received personal notice in the form of February 1987 notices from defendant instructing plaintiff to remove its nonconforming rooftop signs by May 1, 1987, as required by the sign ordinance.

 803 F Supp 1068 (MD NC, 1992).

 Chief Justice Weaver, in her concurrence, states that Wolverine Sign Works v Bloomfield Hills, 279 Mich 205; 271 NW 823 (1937), “recognized that billboard regulation could run afoul of the prohibition against taking private property without just compensation.” Post at 42. While I agree that there are certain instances where billboard regulation could result in a taking, Wolverine does not stand for that proposition.
The Court in Wolverine struck down a city ordinance that regulated billboard maintenance. Id. at 208. It did not, however, perform a taking analysis. Id. Instead, it relied on its finding that the city’s ordinance vested a municipal officer with the power to arbitrarily limit the use of billboards through a permit process. Id. The Court expressly recognized that billboards may be prohibited pursuant to zoning regulations to promote the public health, safety and general welfare. Id. Thus, if relevant to this case at all, Wolverine supports my holding that no taking occurred. Defendant’s sign ordinance did not vest any type of arbitrary authority in the city or in any of its employees.