Court Opinion

ID: 9528422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:40:58.859324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:50.934891
License: Public Domain

THOMPSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the judgment but dissent from that portion of the opinion construing the charter provisions. There are numerous authorities from other jurisdictions, as well as the eases of Spencer v. City of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 103 [179 Pac. 163], Continental Ins. Co. v. City óf Los Angeles, 92 Cal. App. 585 [268 Pac. 920], and Crescent Wharf etc. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 207 Cal. 430 [278 Pac. 1028], which not only indicate that practically all large municipalities are protected by a rule designed for a purpose similar to that of section 363 of the charter, but also that the purpose of such a rule is twofold. It aids in the auditing of proper claims and advises the city of claims that it may make its investigation and prevent litigation where the circumstances warrant such action. Continental Ins. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, especially points out the various purposes served by such a rule. Entirely in harmony with the foregoing are the cases of Beeson v. City of Los Angeles, 115 Cal. App. 122 [300 Pac. 993], and Huey v. City of Los Angeles, 137 Cal. App. 48 [29 Pac. (2d) 918], In the Beeson case a child of the age of ten years, playing near a storm drain, fell into a water hole and was drowned. The demand was served upon the city council. The District Court of Appeal, after quoting applicable provisions of the charter, concluded that the demand should have been presented to the board of public works. In the Huey case a fifteen year old lad was accidentally killed on a drawbridge maintained by the city of Los Angeles. The court held, with respect to a demand presented to the city council, that it was “not proper or effective for any purpose” and *139should have been presented to the board of harbor commissioners.
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the provision under scrutiny should be given such construction as will fully attain its object and purpose. That can be done in the present case by construing the section as though it read that “such claim ‘shall be presented to the board, officer or employee’ whose act or omission has incurred the liability”. It cannot be done by construing the section to mean that the city council is one of the boards included within the section, and this in the face of the fact that the city council was designedly dropped from the wording of the section. If, however, the section is construed as I think it should be, the claim would go to the board or department of the municipal government which should be conversant with the facts giving rise to the liability. Its report thereon, with approval or rejection, would then be presented (according to section 365 of the charter) to the controller, who, if the claim is not properly payable out of any fund, must, according to the same section, transmit the same to the council. The council, being advised, is in a position to allow or disallow as a result of the examination made. If, however, by judicial construction the process defined by the charter provisions is reversed, and the claim- is allowed to be presented to the council, it must be referred to the board, then to the controller and back to the council for action. Not only that, but it must be conceded that claims must be presented to those departments having control of their .own revenues. Why, then, should the rule not be uniform ? The rule should be uniform, and it should coincide with the procedure outlined by other provisions of the charter.
We arrive at the same result by another line of reasoning. Let us suppose a case of street improvement where the owner has, under section 3 of part I of the Street Improvement Act, filed his protest to the proposed grade or modification of grade. Under such circumstances the damages to his property have presumably been estimated and included within the assessment for the improvements and are properly payable therefrom. Assuming that proper notice has been given and preliminary procedure observed, it cannot be doubted that the board of public works incurred the liability if damage was in fact done to the property. Manifestly such a claim, under *140the charter provision and under the authority of Spencer v. City of Los Angeles, supra, would have to be presented to the board of public works, as would all other claims of a contractual nature incurred by it under its authority (conferred by charter) to contract for street improvements and its duty to keep the streets in repair. It will thus be seen that any other interpretation than the one herein would result in endless confusion.
I do not feel that the cases of Musto-Keenan Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 139 Cal. App. 506 [34 Pac. (2d) 506], and Haigh v. City of Los Angeles, 139 Cal. App. 595 [34 Pac. (2d) 779], should control the rule or be considered as sufficient to establish the rule that the city council is the proper body to which the demand should be presented. It cannot be said as a matter of law that the city council incurred the liability involved in those eases. A complete answer to this suggestion is found in Eachus v. Los Angeles Consol. Elec. Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 614 [37 Pac. 750, 42 Am. St. Rep. 149], and Bancroft v. City of San Diego, 120 Cal. 432 [52 Pac. 712].
We ought, therefore, to avoid setting aside the procedure outlined in the charter by judicial construction and, in order to prevent confusion arising out of the nature of the claim to be presented, I am convinced that the claim should have been, in so far as the charter provisions are concerned, presented to the board of public works, that board being charged with the responsibility of keeping the streets in repair.
Rehearing denied.