Court Opinion

ID: 9694067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:20:00.614353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:54.974805
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The court’s opinion today relies on the distinction between *75Indian tribes and Indian bands. Because that distinction violates the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe’s (MCT) inherent right to self-governance, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 168, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973) (“Indian nations were ‘distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive ....’” (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832))), and because the conduct at issue here is governed by our decision in State v. Stone, 572 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Minn.1997), I would reverse the court of appeals.
In Stone, we recognized that “Indian tribes retain ‘attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.’ ” Id. (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987)).1 In determining whether Minnesota could exercise its jurisdiction “over the activities of member Indians on reservations without an express federal grant of authority,” we based our decision on whether an indirect purpose to regulate non-Indians existed. Id. at 731. We held that, for a speeding violation, a preemption analysis was unnecessary because the state could not overcome “ ‘the right of reservation Indians to make them own laws and be ruled by them.’ ” Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 732 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 65 L.Ed.2d 665 (1980)). In addition, we noted our expectation that Indian tribes would develop methods, based on the available resources of each tribe, to ensure safe driving conditions and the reasonable enforcement of traffic regulations. Id. at 732.
Our decision in Stone followed directly from a long line of United States Supreme Court cases that affirmed the sovereignty of Indian tribes. In United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975), the Court stated that “Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.” Thus, we start from the principle of inherent tribal sovereignty before acknowledging that “under certain circumstances a State may validly assert authority over the activities of nonmembers on a reservation, and ... in exceptional circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal members.” New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331-32, 103 S.Ct. 2378, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983) (quoted in Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215, 107 S.Ct. 1083, and Stone, 572 N.W.2d at 731). The focus is always on the tribe as the unit of sovereign government. In Stone, we said that exceptional circumstances exist primarily if there is “any collateral purpose of controlling non-members.” 572 N.W.2d at 732. I believe that because this case is also a traffic violation case, our decision in Stone is controlling: “Without exceptional circumstances, we do not reach the preemption analysis.” Id.
The MCT is the governing unit federally recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the individual bands such as the Leech Lake Band and the Mille Lacs Band are merely “component reservations” of the MCT. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 73 Fed. Reg. 18,553, 18,555 (Apr. 4, 2008). Yet the court concludes with little explanation that the MCT has no tribal interest in self-governance.2 Nor *76does the court cite any authority for the distinction it makes between Indian tribes and Indian bands. I would also note that there is no indication in this record that the MCT has no interest in self-governance or has chosen to relinquish its interest in self-governance. Absent a showing that the MCT has chosen to relinquish its interest in self-governance, it is presumptuous for us to impose such a choice on the MCT. Because we held in Stone that no exceptional circumstances exist requiring a preemption analysis for tribal members who are alleged to have been speeding on tribal territory and because Davis is an MCT member whose alleged speeding offense occurred within the MCT’s territory, I conclude that the state has no jurisdiction over Davis.3

. In this case, Davis is an enrolled member of the MCT and, on the record before us, it appears that the conduct in question took place within the MCT’s territory.

. Under the Constitution of the MCT, which is the supreme law of the Mille Lacs Band, the *76purpose and function of the MCT is to "promote the general welfare of the members of the Tribe; [and] to preserve and maintain justice for its members and otherwise exercise all powers granted and provided the Indians....” MCT Const, art. I, § 3. The court cites to 2 MLBS § 1, which states, in full, that:
All political powers of the Non-Removable Mille Lacs Bands of Chippewa Indians derive from the ... inherent and aboriginal rights of the people of the Band to self-government. Some of these rights have been delegated to establish a constitutional form of government in which the Constitution of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe is the supreme law of the Band. The Band "has reserved to itself, however, the power to maintain a Band government which may enact laws to preserve the sovereignty of the Band and to promote and maintain individual rights and promote the general welfare of the people of the Band.
(Emphasis added.)
The Mille Lacs Band is not a party in this case, and it has made no statements regarding any interest it might have here. The Mille Lacs Band Statute for speeding slates that "[e]very person operating a vehicle of any character on a public road within the territorial jurisdiction of the Non-Removable Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians shall drive in a careful and prudent manner....” 19 MLBS § 403. On its face, section 403 is not limited to violations by Mille Lacs Band members, and without more information, it is inappropriate for the court to limit the Band's interest in self-governance to Mille Lacs Band members.
Further, nothing in the record supports the court’s assumptions that the interests in prohibiting state jurisdiction over a traffic offense were not delegated to establish the MCT’s "constitutional form of government.” Regardless of the extent of the Band’s interest in self-governance, the court does not explain why that interest is at odds with, or even relevant to, the MCT’s interest in promoting the general welfare of and maintaining justice for its members. Without any such assertion from either the Mille Lacs Band or the MCT, it is inappropriate for this court to define and restrict the scope of the MCT’s form of government. Given our precedent in Stone, it is enough for me to acknowledge that the MCT is a tribe and Davis is a member of that tribe.

. State v. R.M.H. provides little guidance in this case because the decision there to conduct a preemption analysis "rest[ed] heavily on the status of R.M.H. as a nonmember Indian.” 617 N.W.2d 55, 63 (Minn.2000). We did, however, acknowledge in R.M.H. that the strength of a state’s jurisdictional power over "a person on a tribal reservation varies depending on whether that person is an enrolled member of the tribe.” Id. at 61. Here, Davis is an enrolled member of the tribe.