Court Opinion

ID: 9904845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 01:00:41.540463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.144651
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30302     Document: 00516979536       Page: 1     Date Filed: 11/27/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                              _____________                                       FILED
                                                                         November 27, 2023
                                No. 22-30302                                Lyle W. Cayce
                              _____________                                      Clerk

   Allen Johnson; Linda Johnson; Donald A. Crosslin, Jr.;
   Mary Jo Gragg; Rodney M. Hudson; Clifton Layman;
   Alfred R. Meshell; Sherman R. Meshell; David E.
   Oliver; Tracy Oliver; Laura S. Pendleton; Andrew L.
   Piccolo; Karla S. Piccolo; Randall S. Rodgers; Freddie
   P. Spohrer; Tim G. Taylor; Charles R. Waldon; Rexford
   Galen White; James Shope; Donna Shope; Charlotte
   McCune; Jerry McCune,

                                                         Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                     versus

   Chesapeake Louisiana, L.P.; Chesapeake Operating,
   L.L.C.,

                                           Defendants—Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 5:16-CV-1543
                  ______________________________

   Before Dennis, Elrod, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
         This case concerns the interplay between Louisiana’s relatively new
   conservation laws and its deeply rooted negotiorum gestio doctrine. Because
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   we cannot make a reliable Erie guess as to the applicability of Louisiana’s
   negotiorum gestio doctrine, we CERTIFY a question to the Louisiana
   Supreme Court. 1
                                               I
           Louisiana oil and gas law authorizes the state Commissioner of
   Conservation to combine separate tracts of land and appoint a unit operator
   to extract the minerals. La. Stat. Ann. § 30:9(B) (2022); id. § 30:10(A)(1)
   (2022). Where a tract is not subject to a lease, the unit operator can sell the
   landowner’s share of production but must pay the landowner a pro rata
   share of the proceeds within one hundred eighty days of the sale. Id. §
   30:10(A)(3) (2022).
           Linda and James Johnson own unleased mineral interests in
   Louisiana that are part of a forced drilling unit. Chesapeake is the operator.
   The Johnsons allege on behalf of themselves and a named class that
   Chesapeake has been improperly deducting post-production costs from
   their pro rata share of production and that this practice is improper per se. 2
   The district court initially granted Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial
   summary judgment. Chesapeake then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
   That motion for reconsideration was granted, holding that the quasi-
   contractual doctrine of negotiorum gestio provides a mechanism for
   Chesapeake to properly deduct post-production costs. 3

           _____________________
           1
             We previously certified this same issue in Self v. BPX Operating Co., 80 F.4th
   632 (5th Cir. 2023). This opinion reflects the same reasoning as in Self. We certify this
   case, so that the parties might have the opportunity to present their case to the Louisiana
   Supreme Court.
           2
            This case was consolidated for oral argument with Self v. BPX, No. 22-30243,
   because both cases raise the same statutory interpretation issue.
           3
               Only the first count of this lawsuit, seeking monetary damages, declaratory

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           Plaintiffs filed this action as unleased mineral owners whose interests
   are situated within forced drilling units formed by the Louisiana Office of
   Conservation and operated by Chesapeake.                    Plaintiffs have not made
   separate arrangements to dispose of their shares of production, so the unit
   operator can sell the shares but must pay the owners a pro rata share of the
   proceeds within one hundred eighty days of the sale. La. Stat. Ann. §
   30:10(A)(3) (2022). Chesapeake has been paying the pro rata share of
   production but has been withholding from that amount the pro rata post-
   production costs for transporting, gathering, marketing, treating, and
   compressing produced minerals, as well as amounts related to minimum
   volume commitments or capacity reservation fees. Plaintiffs alleged, that
   the practice of withholding the post-production costs from their pro rata
   share of production is improper per se. See Johnson v. Chesapeake La., L.P.,
   No. CV-16-1543, 2019 WL 1301985 (W.D. La. Mar. 21, 2019), vacated on
   reconsideration, 2022 WL 989341.
           Chesapeake timely removed this action to the district court, based on
   diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a). Chesapeake sought dismissal
   of the Plaintiffs’ primary claim that Chesapeake can never deduct post-
   production costs incurred in the sale of unleased mineral owners’ pro rata
   shares of production. The district court granted Chesapeake’s motion for
   reconsideration and held that the Louisiana Civil Code doctrine of
   negotiorum gestio provides a mechanism for unit operators to be reimbursed
   for post-production costs not otherwise covered by specific statutes. La.
   Civ. Code Ann. art. 2292 (2023). The district court certified its ruling for
   interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This court granted

           _____________________
   relief, and permanent injunctive relief to prohibit Chesapeake from deducting any post-
   production costs from plaintiffs’ pro rata share of production proceeds as per se illegal, is
   now at issue.

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   the Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order. This
   court took up the appeal.
                                          II
             We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
   Green v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 754 F.3d 324, 329 (5th Cir. 2014). Summary
   judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute of any
   material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
   R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The sole question is whether a ‘reasonable jury drawing
   all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party could arrive at a verdict in
   that party’s favor.’” Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 160
   (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257,
   1263 (5th Cir. 1991)).
             On cross-motions for summary judgment, we review each party’s
   motion independently. All evidence and inferences are viewed in the light
   most favorable to the nonmovant. Amerisure Inss. Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co.,
   611 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2010). The district court’s denial of a motion
   for reconsideration is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Austin v.
   Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2017). “The trial court is free
   to consider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems sufficient.” Id.
   at 336.
                                          III
             Louisiana is one of many states with forced pooling laws designed to
   prevent the waste of mineral resources. These laws provide mechanisms
   for sharing both the risks and benefits of production in the absence of a
   contract. TDX Energy, LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 857 F.3d 253,
   257 (5th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, the forced pooling law allows the recovery
   of certain costs:

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          In the event a drilling unit is formed by a pooling order by the
          commissioner and absent any agreement or contract between
          owners as provided in this Section, then the cost of
          development and operation of the pooled unit chargeable to
          the owners therein shall be determined and recovered as
          provided herein.
   La. Stat. Ann. § 30:10(A)(2) (2022).
          Louisiana law and the oil and gas industry in general recognize a
   distinction between production and post-production costs.          Production
   costs end “at the wellhead when the minerals are reduced to possession.
   Post-production costs . . . include those related to taxes, transportation,
   dehydration, treating, compressing, and gathering.” J. Fleet Oil & Gas
   Corp. v. Chesapeake La., L.P., No. CV-15-2461, 2018 WL 1463529, at *6
   (W.D. La. Mar. 22, 2018) (citation omitted). The provision addressing
   recovery of costs mentions only certain types of production costs: “drilling,
   testing, completing, equipping, and operating expenses,” as well as a charge
   for supervision. See La. Stat. Ann. § 30:10(A)(2)(b)(i) (2016). It is silent as
   to post-production costs.      Most relevant here is La. Stat. Ann. §
   30:10(A)(3), which addresses payment of production proceeds:
          If there is included in any unit created by the commissioner of
          conservation one or more unleased interests for which the
          party or parties entitled to market production therefrom have
          not made arrangements to separately dispose of the share of
          such production attributable to such tract, and the unit
          operator proceeds with the sale of unit production, then the
          unit operator shall pay to such party or parties such tract’s
          pro rata share of the proceeds of the sale of production within
          one hundred eighty days of such sale.
   La. Stat. Ann. § 30:10(A)(3) (2022).
          The Plaintiffs contend that “proceeds” of the sale here mean “gross
   proceeds.” Chesapeake countered initially that “proceeds” is ambiguous

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   and should be interpreted to mean “net proceeds,” after deduction of pro
   rata post-production costs. Chesapeake later contended, however, that
   when section (A)(3) is properly harmonized with Louisiana’s civil code
   regime, there is a legal mechanism to support the deductibility of post-
   production costs: the quasi-contractual regime of negotiorum gestio.
          The Louisiana Supreme Court has held, and the parties agree, that
   the relationship between them is quasi-contractual. Wells v. Zadeck, 89 So.
   3d 1145, 1149 (La. 2012) (“A quasi-contractual relationship is created
   between the unit operator and the unleased mineral interest owner with
   whom the operator has not entered into contract.”). The parties disagree,
   though, as to what type of quasi-contractual relationship they have. The
   Louisiana Code provides two non-exclusive examples that give rise to quasi-
   contractual obligations in the state: negotiorium gestio and enrichment
   without cause. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2292, 2298 (2023); Louisiana is the
   only state that employs negotiorium gestio, and it has “deep roots” in the
   state. Under this doctrine, a proposed “gestor” must act 1) voluntarily and
   without authority, 2) to protect the interests of another, and 3) in the
   reasonable belief that the owner would approve of the action if made aware
   of the circumstances. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2292 (2023). If negotiorum
   gestio applies, Louisiana Civil Code Article 2297 requires “[t]he owner
   whose affair has been managed [to] . . . fulfill the obligations that the
   manager has undertaken as a prudent administrator and to reimburse the
   manager for all necessary and useful expenses.” La. Civ. Code Ann. art.
   2297 (2023).
          Plaintiffs assert that Chesapeake cannot be a gestor because it did not
   act “voluntarily and without authority”; it acted pursuant to a statutory
   duty. Plaintiffs also contend that Chesapeake did not act exclusively to
   protect the unleased mineral owners’ interests, but rather to protect its own
   interests. If gestio principles are applicable, Plaintiffs assert, a factfinder

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   would need to determine that Chesapeake always acted for the plaintiffs’
   benefit in marketing unit production before Chesapeake would be entitled
   to reimbursement under Article 2297.
          Chesapeake contends that Louisiana case law recognizes it as a gestor
   in all circumstances when dealing with unleased mineral owners, but the
   parties agree that no controlling case deals with the specific facts at hand.
   In Taylor v. Smith, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that a
   cause of action under section 30:10(A)(3) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes
   should be construed together with the Civil Code’s negotiorum gestio
   doctrine. 619 So. 2d 881, 887 (La. App. 1993) (“The statute gives the
   owner a cause of action in quasi-contract under LSA-C.C. art. 2292, et.
   seq., insofar as the operator, in selling the owner’s proportionate share of
   the oil produced, is acting as a negotiorum gestor or manager of the owner’s
   business in selling the oil produced.”). The Louisiana Supreme Court cited
   Taylor in Wells, where it held that the relationship between an unleased
   mineral interest owner and operator is quasi-contractual. Wells, 89 So. 3d at
   1149 (citing Taylor, 619 So. 2d 881). Yet that case involved the proper
   prescriptive period for an action brought under section (A)(3) and did not
   directly reference the part of Taylor discussing gestores.          Thus, no
   controlling Louisiana case resolves the parties’ issue.
          This unsettled state of the law raises the question whether the
   appropriate course is to certify the issue for resolution by the state court of
   last resort. The rules of the Louisiana Supreme Court allow for certification
   from the federal courts of appeals of dispositive questions of Louisiana law.
   La. Sup. Ct. R. 12, §§ 1–2 (2023). The issue presented here satisfies that
   condition.
          The issue presented also satisfies the three factors used by this court
   in deciding whether to certify:

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          1) [T]he closeness of the question and the existence of
             sufficient sources of state law;
          2) [T]he degree to which considerations of comity are rele-
             vant in light of the particular issue and case to be decided;
             and
          3) [P]ractical limitations on the certification process: signifi-
             cant delay and possible inability to frame the issue so as to
             produce a helpful response on the part of the state court.

   In re Gabriel Inv. Grp., 24 F.4th 503, 507 (5th Cir. 2022); see also Austin v.
   Kroger Tex. LP, 746 F.3d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 2014).         As explained above,
   Louisiana law is unsettled on this issue. “[A]ny Erie guess would involve
   more divining than discerning.” McMillan v. Amazon.com, Inc., 983 F.3d
   194, 202 (5th Cir. 2020). The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal and
   the district court in this case both concluded that the negotiorum gestio
   doctrine applies. But the scholarly dissent provides cogent reasons to think
   it does not. And the district court concluded that the issue was sufficiently
   close to certify its ruling for interlocutory appeal.
          Comity interests also favor certification. The interplay between
   Louisiana’s oil and gas law and its unique negotiorum gestio doctrine presents
   a complex and novel issue “peculiarly calling for the exercise of judgment
   by the [Louisiana] courts.” McKesson v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 48, 51 (2020).
   “Speculation by a federal court” about how to square Louisiana’s new
   conservation laws with its ancient civilian doctrines is inappropriate “when
   . . . the state courts stand willing to address questions of state law on
   certification.” Arizonans for Official Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997)
   (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Finally, we are unaware
   of any practical impediments to certification.

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                                  *        *         *
          Accordingly, we CERTIFY the following determinative question of
   law to the Louisiana Supreme Court:
          1) Does La. Civ. Code art. 2292 apply to unit operators selling
          production in accordance with La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3)?
          We disclaim any intention or desire that the Louisiana Supreme
   Court confine its reply to the precise form or scope of the question certified.
   We will resolve this case in accordance with any opinion provided on this
   question by the Court. The Clerk of this Court is directed to transmit this
   certification and request to the Louisiana Supreme Court in conformity
   with the usual practice.
          QUESTION CERTIFIED.

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   James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
           This case is straightforward. La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3), part of
   Louisiana’s oil and gas conservation law, allows a unit operator to
   unilaterally sell production under specific conditions and imposes a specific
   duty of repayment to the owner. Negotiorum gestio, by contrast, is a
   traditional civilian doctrine, codified at La. Civ. Code art. 2292, that
   allows one person to manage the property of another if certain
   circumstances are met. Not only are La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) and article 2292
   distinct legal regimes with different requirements and different duties, they
   are necessarily incompatible. A unit operator who sells an owner’s
   production under the statutory authority of La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) cannot
   be a gestor as defined in article 2292, because a gestor, as the codal article
   provides, is one who acts “without authority.” In certifying the question of
   whether a unit operator acting under the authority of § 30:10(A)(3) may
   simultaneously act as a gestor under article 2292, the majority disregards not
   only the plain text of article 2292 but also basic rules of statutory
   interpretation. Because the answer is clear that negotiorum gestio cannot
   apply, I find certification to the Louisiana Supreme Court inappropriate. I
   respectfully dissent. 1
                                               I.
           Title 30 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes includes a comprehensive
   regime for the conservation of the state’s oil and gas during extraction. The
   Commissioner of Conservation, for the prevention of waste and to avoid the
   drilling of unnecessary wells, is vested with authority to establish a drilling
   unit for each pool of underground oil or gas. B.A. Kelly Land Co. v. Aethon
          _____________________
           1
              This dissent reflects the same reasons I dissented from certification of the
   identical issue in Self v. BPX Operating Co., 80 F.4th 632, 637-41 (5th Cir. 2023) (Dennis,
   J., dissenting).

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   Energy Operating, L.L.C., 25 F.4th 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing La.
   R.S. 30:9(B)). The Commissioner “has the plenary authority to declare
   drilling and production units, to force pool neighboring tracts and leases
   into a single unit, to designate a single well and operator for the unit, and to
   allocate production from the unit well to each participating tract and
   lease—all for the purpose of conserving resources, avoiding waste, and
   eliminating unnecessary wells.” Peironnet v. Matador Res. Co., 2012-2292, p.
   42 (La. 6/28/13), 144 So. 3d 791, 822 (citing La. R.S. 30:4, 9, 10).
          The designated unit operator has several duties. The operator is
   charged with drilling within the unit and paying a proportionate share of
   production to the owners of mineral interests in the unit. B.A. Kelly, 25
   F.4th at 275 (citing T D X Energy, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 857
   F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 2017)). However, if an unleased owner is included in
   the unit, as relevant here, the law authorizes the unit operator to instead sell
   the share of production owed to the unleased owner and provide the owner
   the proceeds within 180 days. La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3). Louisiana law also
   imposes a duty on operators to report information to unleased owners if
   requested. B.A. Kelly, 25 F.4th at 375-76 (citing La. R.S. 30:103.1).
          “In both voluntary and compulsory unitization, well cost disputes
   arise. When there is an operating agreement [i.e. a contract or mineral lease]
   among the parties, such disputes are generally addressed in the agreement.”
   Id. at 375 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 Bruce M. Kramer &
   Patrick H. Martin, The Law of Pooling and Unitization
   § 14.04 (3d ed. 2016)). But, in a “forced pooling” regime, the statute itself
   “‘has to address a number of issues that contracts usually decide, such as
   how to allocate costs and risk among those holding interests in the oil and
   gas,’ and how the operator should provide an accounting of well production
   and costs to owners of oil and gas interests.” Id. (quoting T D X Energy,
   L.L.C., 857 F.3d at 256). When the operator proposes to drill a well in a

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   unit, it may give notice to owners of oil and gas interests within the unit,
   allowing owners to elect to participate in the risk by contributing to the
   drilling costs up front. Id. (citing T D X Energy, L.L.C., 857 F.3d at 258). If
   an owner does not participate and the well produces, the operator may
   recover out of production the nonparticipating interest owner’s share of
   “expenditures incurred in drilling, testing, completing, equipping, and
   operating the well,” and, in certain cases and except in the case of an
   unleased mineral owner, a “risk charge” of two hundred percent of the
   owner’s drilling expenditure share. La. R.S. 30:10(A)(2)(b)(i), (e)(i); B.A.
   Kelly, 25 F.4th at 275. However, if an operator fails to timely comply with
   an unleased mineral owner’s request for reporting and also fails to cure its
   default within thirty days of receiving notice of such failure from the
   unleased owner, then the operator cannot collect from the owner “the costs
   of the drilling operations of the well.” La. R.S. 30:103.2; B.A. Kelly, 25
   F.4th at 276.
          The statute does not specifically address whether a unit operator
   may deduct post-production costs—those costs after the minerals are
   reduced to possession, including costs related to taxes, transportation,
   dehydration, treating, compressing, and gathering. See J. Fleet Oil & Gas
   Corp. v. Chesapeake La., L.P., No. CV-15-2461, 2018 WL 1463529, at *6
   (W.D. La. Mar. 22, 2018). Unit operators like the Defendant in this case
   have raised several arguments for why they ought to be allowed to deduct
   post-production costs in the absence of a lease providing as much, but the
   only argument before us is the applicability of negotiorum gestio to the sale of
   an unleased mineral owner’s share of production under La. R.S.
   30:10(A)(3).

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                                         II.
          As noted, part of Louisiana’s oil and gas conservation law, La. R.S.
   30:10(A)(3), authorizes the unit operator to unilaterally sell the share of
   production owed to an unleased mineral owner. Section 30:10(A)(3) applies
   when there is 1) a unit created by the Commissioner of Conservation 2)
   which includes one or more unleased interests 3) for which the party
   entitled to market production therefrom has not made arrangements to
   separately sell or otherwise dispose of the share of such production
   attributable to such tract, and 4) the unit operator sells or otherwise
   disposes of such unit production. Then, the unit operator must pay to such
   party its pro rata share of the proceeds within 180 days. Id. This relationship
   is quasi-contractual. Wells v. Zadeck, 2011-1232, p. 6 (La. 3/30/12), 89 So.
   3d 1145, 1149. The purpose of this relationship is to “facilitate[] the sale of
   minerals.” See King v. Strohe, 95-656, p. 17 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/8/96), 673 So.
   2d 1329, 1338.
          On the other hand, negotiorum gestio—or management of affairs—“is
   a typically civilian institution that derives from the Romanist tradition and is
   found in all civil codes.” La. Civ. Code art. 2292 cmt. (a). Negotiorum
   gestio applies when a person, the manager or gestor, acts 1) without
   authority, 2) to protect the interests of another, and 3) in the reasonable
   belief that the owner would approve of the action if made aware of the
   circumstances. La. Civ. Code art. 2292. The gestor must have
   “undertake[n] the management with the ‘benefit’ of the owner in mind”
   and not have “act[ed] in [its] own interest or contrary to the actual or
   presumed intention of the owner.” Id. cmts. (c)-(d); see also Johnco, Inc. v.
   Jameson Ints., 98-1925, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/23/99), 741 So. 2d 867,
   870; Kirkpatrick v. Young, 456 So. 2d 622, 624-25 (La. 1984). These
   requirements generally “depend[] on facts.” Woodlief v. Moncure, 17 La.
   Ann. 241, 242 (La. 1865); see also Bank of the S. v. Fort Lauderdale Tech.

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   Coll., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 260, 261 (E.D. La. 1969). Only if all these
   requirements are met does a person qualify as a gestor such that “[t]he
   owner whose affair has been managed is bound to fulfill the obligations that
   the manager has undertaken as a prudent administrator and to reimburse
   the manager for all necessary and useful expenses.” La. Civ. Code art.
   2297. Negotiorum gestio is “rooted in altruism,” and its purpose is to
   “encourage people to assist friends and neighbors in need.” See Cheryl L.
   Martin, Louisiana State Law Institute Proposes Revision of Negotiorum Gestio
   and Codification of Unjust Enrichment, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 181, 186-87, 193
   (1994).
          “The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute
   controls over a broader, more general statute.” Burge v. Louisiana, 2010-
   2229, p. 5 (La. 2/11/11), 54 So. 3d 1110, 1113. This rule has been especially
   true regarding Louisiana’s oil and gas conservation law, modern statutes
   intended to alter and override general legal principles that were inadequate
   for mineral production and conservation.
          The prime example is Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d
   955 (La. 1986). In that case, a landowner within a drilling unit sued the unit
   operator for trespass because a well bore crossed onto his property several
   miles below the surface while drilling for oil. Id. at 956-58. The court held
   that “private property law concepts, such as trespass, have been
   superceded in part by Louisiana’s Conservation Law when a unit has been
   created by order of the Commissioner.” Id. at 964. To begin, the court
   recounted the developments in Louisiana’s oil and gas conservation law,
   from the initial “rule of capture” that resulted in “haste, inefficient
   operations, and immeasurable waste within the ground and above” to the
   present method of forced pooling into drilling units, which “was found to
   convert separate interests within the drilling unit into a common interest
   with regard to the development of the unit and the drilling of the well.” Id.

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   at 960-62. This change marked a “departure from the traditional notions of
   private property,” and the court “conclude[d] that the established
   principles of private ownership, already found inadequate in Louisiana to
   deal with the problems of subsurface fugacious minerals, need not
   necessarily be applied to other property concepts, like trespass, within a
   unit.” Id. at 962-63 (quoting Mire v. Hawkins, 186 So. 2d 591, 596 (La.
   1966)). Thus, the court “h[e]ld that the more recent legislative enactments
   of Title 30 and Title 31 supercede in part La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 490’s
   general concept of ownership of the subsurface by the surface owner of
   land.” Id. at 964. Importantly, the court noted that this scheme not only
   changed general property principles but also other “legal relationships
   between landowners and lessees within the unit.” Id. at 963; see also Amoco
   Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d 376, 393 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1987) (holding
   the oil and gas conservation law is “sui generis”); Teekell v. Chesapeake
   Operating, Inc., No. 12-0044, 2012 WL 2049922, at *4 (W.D. La. June 6,
   2012) (“The Nunez opinion makes it clear that unitization changes the
   property rights and obligations of landowners.”); Peironnet, 2012-2292, at p.
   42, 144 So. 3d at 822 (“When such units are created, the operations of the
   designated operator constitute operations for all lessees participating in the
   unit, and the orders of the Commissioner creating said units supersede,
   supplement, replace and are incorporated in the provisions and obligations
   of the leases subject thereto.”).
          As in Nunez, here, the legislature has prescribed a specific quasi-
   contractual relationship between unleased mineral owners and unit
   operators under La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) as part of the oil and gas
   conservation law. This relationship is separate from negotiorum gestio under
   La. Civ. Code art. 2292, as each has distinct and specific requirements
   and duties. The mere fact that each relationship is quasi-contractual does
   not make them the same, as a quasi-contractual obligation is simply one that

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   “arise[s] directly from the law, regardless of a declaration of will.” See La.
   Civ. Code art. 1757 (emphasis added) (noting a nonexclusive list of quasi-
   contractual obligations “in instances such as . . . the management of the
   affairs of another . . . and other acts or facts”); see also Martin, supra, at 184
   (noting the term “quasi-contract” does not appear anywhere in the Civil
   Code but is “simply a shorthand method for distinguishing this particular
   type of obligation from a contract”).
          In addition to these two relationships being distinct, we cannot apply
   them both to a unit operator without conflict. As stated, a gestor must act
   “without authority.” La. Civ. Code art. 2292. In that way,
   “[m]anagement of another’s affairs pursuant to a legal duty does not give
   rise to an action under negotiorum gestio.” See Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick,
   27,241, p. 9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/23/95), 660 So. 2d 182, 187. During the 1995
   revision of the Civil Code articles governing negotiorum gestio, the legislature
   replaced the requirement that the gestor act “of his own accord” with the
   requirement that the gestor act “without authority” to make clear that the
   requirement is not merely voluntariness but “an absence of authority
   altogether,” including authority granted by statute—appropriate for a
   doctrine rooted in pure altruism. Martin, supra, at 189-90 (discussing
   examples of statutory grants of authority that eliminate negotiorum gestio as a
   theory of recovery after the revision). Here, however, the unit operator does
   not act without authority. To the contrary, the unit operator is specifically
   authorized to sell an unleased mineral owner’s share of production under
   La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3). Cf. Martin, supra, at 189-90 (“[A] co-owner has
   authority to manage that which is co-owned [under La. Civ. Code art.
   802]. Therefore, the phrase ‘without authority’ clearly eliminates
   negotiorum gestio as a basis for liability among co-owners.”). Following the
   rules of statutory interpretation, we must “give meaning to every word in
   the statute” and cannot “read out of the statute” the elements one must

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   prove to qualify as a gestor, including that one must act without authority.
   See Bergeron v. Richardson, 2020-01409, p. 5 (La. 6/30/21), 320 So. 3d 1109,
   1113. Because we cannot apply the two statutes together consistently, only
   the specific one applicable to conservation applies. See Burge, 54 So. 3d at
   1113; Nunez, 488 So. 2d at 962-63. 2
           Taylor v. Smith, 619 So. 2d 881, 887-88 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993),
   relied on by the majority, did not hold otherwise. The only issue before the
   court in Taylor was whether the liberative prescription period applicable to
   actions in tort or the one applicable to actions in quasi-contract applied to
   an action by an unleased mineral owner seeking to recover proceeds under
   La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3). Id. at 885-88. Because the obligation of the unit
   operator was “imposed ‘without any agreement’ but instead, ‘imposed by
   the sole authority of the laws,’” the court found the “cause of action
   against the unit operator sounds in quasi-contract and is subject to a
   liberative prescription of ten (10) years.” Id. at 888. While the court
   elsewhere stated, without analysis, that a unit operator “is acting as a
   negotiorum gestor or manager of the owner’s business in selling the oil
   produced,” that statement was dicta unnecessary to the court’s holding. To
   the extent the court did hold negotiorum gestio applied, it did so before the
   legislative amendment, discussed above, that clarified a gestor is only one

           _____________________
           2
              I also note a gestor must act “to protect the interests of another . . . in the
   reasonable belief that the owner would approve of the action if made aware of the
   circumstances,” La. Civ. Code art. 2292, meaning the gestor must have “undertake[n]
   the management with the ‘benefit’ of the owner in mind” and not have “act[ed] in [its]
   own interest or contrary to the actual or presumed intention of the owner,” id. cmts. (c)-
   (d); see also Johnco, 98-1925, at pp. 5-6, 741 So. 2d at 870; Kirkpatrick, 456 So. 2d at 624-
   25. It is highly doubtful a unit operator like the Defendant did so when selling the
   Plaintiffs’ share of production. However, that is a question of fact on which the
   Defendant has the burden of proof. See Woodlief, 17 La. Ann. at 242; Bank of the S., 301 F.
   Supp. at 261.

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   who acts “without authority,” including statutory authority. La. Civ.
   Code art. 2292; Martin, supra, at 189-90. This amendment abrogated what
   the majority mistakenly believes is the holding in Taylor, that negotiorum
   gestio may apply to a unit operator acting under the authority of La. R.S.
   30:10(A)(3).
                                       ***
         Because the oil and gas conservation law provides a unique quasi-
   contractual relationship between unleased mineral owners and unit
   operators under La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) and this relationship cannot be
   applied consistently with negotiorum gestio under La. Civ. Code art.
   2292, utilizing basic rules of statutory interpretation, we should apply only
   the specific provision under § 30:10(A)(3). With the proper outcome in this
   case clear, certification to the Louisiana Supreme Court is unwarranted.
         I respectfully dissent.

                                                     A True Copy
                                                     Certified Nov 27, 2023

                                                     Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

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