Court Opinion

ID: 9914344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-30 00:02:01.372511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:21.809297
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/29/23 In re A.F. CA2/1
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                          DIVISION ONE

 In re A.F., et al., Persons Coming                                 B330057
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
 _________________________________                                  (Los Angeles County
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                 Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP07874)
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 CHRISTINA S.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
      Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant
County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       In 2019, the Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) removed A.F. (then age 5) and Me.F. (then age 2) from
their parents’ custody following the death of their two-month-old
sibling, Mo.F. After DCFS placed the children with relative
caregivers, the parents failed to visit the children consistently or
to make meaningful progress with their court-ordered case plans.
The juvenile court thereafter terminated parental rights to free the
children for adoption by their relative caregivers, with whom they
had lived for over three years.
       The children’s mother, Christina S. (Mother), now asks us to
reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights.
She argues the court erred in failing to apply the parental-benefit
exception set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).1 That exception bars the termination of
parental rights where a parent establishes: “(1) regular visitation
and contact [with the child], (2) a relationship [with the child],
the continuation of which would benefit the child such that
(3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.),
citing § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Mother urges that she
established “regular visitation” and that the juvenile court
improperly obstructed her ability to prove the exception’s two
remaining requirements by denying her request to present
testimony from A.F. at the parental rights termination hearing.
       We conclude, however, (1) the record demonstrates that
Mother failed to establish the requisite “regular visitation,”
(2) we need not reach the merits of Mother’s argument concerning

      1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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the exclusion of A.F.’s testimony, and (3) even were we to do so,
Mother would not be entitled to relief. We therefore affirm.

         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY2
       A.F. and Me.F. came to DCFS’s attention on December 6,
2019, when their two-month-old sibling, Mo.F., suffocated
underneath a blanket on a sofa in the family home. Mother and
Michael F. (Father) had left the three children unattended for
several hours while they smoked marijuana in another room. The
parents delayed significantly in calling 911, and the baby arrived
at the hospital after she had been unresponsive for over two hours.
       DCFS’s subsequent investigation culminated in the filing of
a section 300 petition on behalf of A.F. and Me.F. on December 10,
2019. The petition alleged that Father had physically abused
Mo.F., and that both parents had placed all three children “in a
detrimental and endangering situation” by “fail[ing] to provide . . .
proper care and supervision.” The petition alleged further that
both parents had histories of substance abuse and actively abused
marijuana, and that Mother failed to take prescribed psychotropic
medications for her diagnosed depression and anxiety. Finally, the
petition alleged that the parents maintained “a filthy, unsanitary
and hazardous home environment,” which included the presence
of electrical wires on the floor that ran to a marijuana growing
operation in the back of the house. DCFS later filed an amended
petition that added an allegation that Father had sexually abused
A.F.

      2 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history
relevant to the issues Mother raises on appeal. Father is not a
party to this appeal, and we therefore discuss his involvement in
the dependency proceedings only to the extent relevant to Mother’s
claims.

                                  3
       DCFS placed the children with a maternal great aunt and
uncle. The caregivers adeptly managed the children’s special
needs, and the children thrived in the placement. The symptoms
associated with A.F.’s diagnoses of attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and pica improved over
time. Similarly, certain developmental issues associated with
Me.F.’s autism diagnosis also improved; for example, she began
to communicate verbally more frequently. The caregivers expressed
interest in adopting the children.
       Over the course of the three-and-a-half-year dependency
proceedings, Mother failed to visit the children consistently.
At the December 11, 2019 detention hearing, the court granted
Mother monitored visits three times per week. Initially, Mother
visited the children regularly. In November 2021, however, the
caregivers and children moved from Los Angeles to Murietta,
California. Following the move, Mother’s visits decreased
significantly. DCFS reported that, despite providing Mother
approximately $900 in transportation funds, she visited the
children no more than six times throughout 2022. In addition,
at the conclusion of one such visit, the relative caregiver reported
that Mother pressured her to write a letter to the juvenile court
falsely stating that Mother had been visiting and calling the
children regularly. Mother also declined to participate in A.F.’s
April 2022 individualized education program meeting.
       On September 12, 2022, the juvenile court terminated
Mother’s reunification services due to her failure to make
adequate progress with her court-ordered case plan. After the
court terminated services, Mother began calling the children three
times a week. DCFS reported, however, that Mother sometimes
made inappropriate statements during the calls. For example,
A.F.’s therapist reported that, during one call, Mother told A.F.

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that Me.F. had caused Mo.F.’s death by sitting on the baby’s chest.
In addition, the children’s therapist reported that Mother’s calls
appeared to induce emotional distress in both children. A.F.’s
therapist noted, for example, that her “most recent response to the
calls was an act resulting in near loss of a finger, where she tied her
middle finger with a rubber band for a long period of time causing
loss of circulation, medical attention, and several hospital and
urgent care visits.”
       In December 2022, Mother moved to Ohio. She had given
birth to another baby in May 2022, and explained the move to
Ohio would allow her to obtain affordable housing and additional
support. The move made it more difficult for Mother to see A.F.
and Me.F. in person, and she visited the children only twice
between January and June 2023.
       Based on Mother’s sporadic visitation record and failure to
make progress with her case plan, DCFS recommended termination
of parental rights pursuant to section 366.26. In support of its
recommendation, DCFS submitted several reports, including a
March 15, 2023 addendum report describing a February 15, 2023
meeting between an adoption social worker and the children.
During the meeting, the social worker “spoke to [A.F.] about
adoption in an age[-]appropriate manner. [A.F.] reported she likes
living with the [relative caregivers] and feel[s] safe. . . . [Me.F.]
[was] too young to provide a meaningful statement regarding
adoption[, but] . . . did report she like[s] living in the home.”
       After several continuances, the section 366.26 hearing
commenced on May 31, 2023. Mother argued that the
parental-benefit exception applied to bar termination of her
parental rights. She testified concerning her bond with the
children and claimed the relative caregivers made it difficult for
her to participate in telephone calls with the children. Children’s

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Social Worker (CSW) Joe Eisenfeld also testified, contradicting
Mother’s testimony that the caregivers obstructed Mother’s efforts
to contact the children. In addition, CSW Eisenfeld testified
concerning the children’s wishes for their permanent plan:
       “[CSW Eisenfeld:] The children are young and the youngest
child is autistic, so there is a limit to their understanding of the
difference of the permanent plan. They understand that their
mother is their mother and always will be their mother, but they
have made statements that they are comfortable where they are,
and they have made negative statements, at least [A.F.] made
negative statements about the mother’s home. . . . She keeps on
making statements about the filth in the home, the rodents in
the home, those things are still coming up two or three years after
detention.
       “[¶] . . . [¶]
       “The Court: . . . You asked [A.F.] if she wanted the
[caregivers’] home to be a forever home?
       “[CSW Eisenfeld]: Yes. Yes, Your Honor.
       “The Court: All right. And what was her answer?
       “[CSW Eisenfeld]: She said ‘yes,’ Your Honor.”
At the conclusion of CSW Eisenfeld’s testimony, the court continued
the remainder of the section 366.26 hearing to June 13, 2023.
       On June 9, 2023, DCFS submitted a last minute information
filing to the court reiterating CSW Eisenfeld’s testimony that the
children were in favor of remaining in their current placement.
The filing noted that CSW Eisenfeld “ha[d] not observed during
visits that the children ask about their mother or request phone
or in-person contact from her.” Instead, when CSW Eisenfeld
asked about Mother, the children “consistently responded with
ambivalence.” In addition, the filing noted that, during CSW
Eisenfeld’s visits to the caregivers’ home, A.F. “stated that she

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was in support of [the] plan to remain in [the] care of her relative
caregivers permanently.”
        At approximately 5:00 p.m. on June 12, 2023, Mother’s
counsel emailed the children’s counsel to request for the very
first time that A.F.—then eight years old—testify at the continued
section 366.26 hearing set for the next day. Mother’s counsel
reiterated her request for A.F.’s testimony at the outset of the
June 13 hearing, arguing that DCFS’s June 9 filing contained new
information concerning the children’s purported “ambivalen[ce]”
toward Mother. Mother’s counsel argued that earlier reports
contained “conflicting information [that] . . . the children get upset
when they can’t visit the Mother[3]. . . . So I do believe that the
court should entertain some testimony about what exactly these
children feel when it comes to this.” Children’s counsel opposed
the request as untimely and unreasonable, but cited no authority
in support of its position.
        The juvenile court therefore took a brief recess to conduct
its own legal research on the issue. It then resumed the
proceedings and denied Mother’s request for A.F.’s testimony,
explaining:
        “I do not think that, given everything this child has been
through in this case, and the totality of the circumstances, and
the late request for this examination, that it is warranted, and I

      3 For example, in a May 2022 report, DCFS informed the
court that “[w]hen asked directly by [a social worker] if she
want[ed] to return to her parents, [then-]seven-year[-]old [A.F.]
state[d] that she [did] indeed want to return to her mother and
father. However, it is worth noting, that if not solicited with this
question, [A.F.] [did] not ask about her father or mother. Further,
she [did] not exhibit any distress about separation from her parents
[nor] lack of visits or phone calls from her parents.”

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am going to deny the request. I don’t think it’s—I don’t think it’s
a denial of due process. I think this child would be traumatized.
She’s already been traumatized enough during this hearing, and
Mother—we don’t even get to the first prong[,] as far [as] this
court is [concerned][,] of Caden C., because visitation has not been
consistent. Whatever visitation—Mother chose to move out of
the area. She’s not had in-person visits with the children. After
[termination of reunification services] and she was facing the
potential of having [her parental] rights terminated, she did start
having some video visitation with her, but that—the fact that those
are video was all Mother’s doing. She chose to move out of the area
and that was her choice. The visitation has not been, in the court’s
view, beneficial or consistent, . . . and I don’t think that asking the
child—telling the child the difference between legal guardianship
and adoption would be fruitful. The request is late, and at some
point the child deserves permanency.”
      The court then concluded the parental-benefit exception
did not apply and terminated Mother’s parental rights.
      Mother timely appealed.

                            DISCUSSION
      Mother contends the trial court erred in terminating her
parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing because (1) she proved
the “regular visitation” requirement, and (2) the court’s purportedly
incorrect decision to exclude A.F.’s testimony prevented her from
establishing the two other requirements of the parental-benefit
exception.

      A.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review

     The parental-benefit exception set forth in section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) is “an exception to the presumptive rule of

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terminating parental rights after reunification efforts have failed,
in order to free a child for adoption.” (See In re Eli B. (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1061, 1067 (Eli B.), boldface & underscoring omitted.)
“It applies where ‘[t]he court finds a compelling reason for
determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due
to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents
have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and
the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ ” (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631, quoting § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
The parent therefore must prove: “(1) regular visitation and
contact, (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit
the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, at p. 631.)
         We review a juvenile court’s findings with respect to “regular
visitation” for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 639–640.) “In reviewing factual determinations for substantial
evidence, a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the evidence,
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary
conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations should ‘be upheld
if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial
evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might
have reached a different result had it believed other evidence.’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)

            B.    The Juvenile Court Properly Concluded the
                  Parental-Benefit Exception Does Not Apply
      Mother argues the juvenile court erred by refusing to apply
the parental-benefit exception. The record, however, contains
substantial evidence supporting the court’s determination that

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Mother failed to establish the requisite “regular visitation.”4
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
       The visitation requirement “is straightforward. The
question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking
into account ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’ [Citation.]”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) “ ‘ “ ‘Sporadic visitation is
insufficient.’ ” ’ ” (In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683, 691 (I.E.).)
The record here reflects that Mother did not consistently visit the
children. Instead, Mother’s in-person visits became less frequent
over time, notwithstanding that DCFS provided her with nearly
$900 in transportation funds. In addition, the record indicates
that—although Mother telephoned more frequently following
the termination of reunification services—she called the children
only sporadically over the course of the three-and-a-half-year
proceedings. Substantial evidence thus supports the court’s
finding that Mother failed to maintain regular visitation and
contact with the children. (See Eli B., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1070 [“ ‘regular visitation’ ” not established where “[the] father’s
visitation with his children throughout the years-long dependency
proceeding was sporadic and also entailed significant gaps”];
In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 647 [affirming order
terminating parental rights where there was “ample” evidence
parent visited “only sporadically during the first 18 months of the
dependency proceedings” even though visits became more regular
during final six months before section 366.26 hearing], disapproved

      4 Mother contends “the juvenile court seemed to find [she]
met the element ‘of regular visitation and contact.’ ” Mother
is mistaken. In denying her request to present testimony from
A.F., the court stated expressly that Mother’s “visitation ha[d]
not been . . . beneficial or consistent.”

                                   10
on other grounds in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 637, fn. 6 &
638–639, fn. 7.)
       Because Mother failed to prove “regular visitation,” we
need not resolve whether exclusion of A.F.’s testimony improperly
prevented Mother from establishing the two remaining
requirements of the exception. Even were we to reach Mother’s
argument on this issue, however, we would reject it.
       The juvenile court has a “mandatory duty . . . to ‘consider
the child’s wishes to the extent ascertainable’ prior to entering
an order terminating parental rights.” (In re Leo M. (1993)
19 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1591; see § 366.26, subd. (h)(1) [“[a]t all
proceedings under this section, the court shall consider the wishes
of the child and shall act in the best interests of the child”].) The
court nonetheless “can, consistent with a parent’s due process
rights, refuse to compel the testimony of a child who is otherwise
available when ‘the possible benefit derivable from [the] testimony
would not warrant the [psychological] injury it would cause.’
[Citation.]” (In re Daniela G. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1086
(Daniela G.); see In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1089.)
“The child’s testimony can properly be excluded where ‘the child’s
desires and wishes can be directly presented without live testimony,
where the issues to be resolved would not be materially affected by
the child’s testimony, and where it is shown that the child would be
psychologically damaged by being required to testify.’ [Citations.]”
(Daniela G., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1092.)
       Here, DCFS presented evidence concerning A.F.’s wishes for
permanency through statements she made to the adoption social
worker in February 2023, as well as through CSW Eisenfeld’s
live testimony at the section 366.26 hearing. (I.E., supra, 91
Cal.App.5th at p. 694 [“ ‘[e]vidence of a child’s wishes may, but
need not, be in the form of direct testimony at the parental rights

                                 11
termination hearing; such evidence may also appear in [DCFS’s]
reports’ ”].)
       Moreover, Mother does not argue that A.F. would have
provided testimony relevant to the “regular visitation” requirement
of the parental-benefit exception. The excluded testimony therefore
would not have “materially affected” the court’s determination
that Mother had failed to prove the first requirement of the
exception and, by extension, the exception’s overall applicability.
(Daniela G., supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1092.)
       Finally, evidence in the record—including a letter from A.F.’s
therapist—documenting the eight-year-old’s special needs and
emotional distress following telephone calls with Mother supports
the court’s finding that requiring the child to testify would have
caused her psychological trauma. (See Daniela G., supra, 23
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1088, 1095 [rejecting argument that a medical
expert opinion is required to establish a child would be traumatized
by testifying].)
       Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in
rejecting Mother’s arguments concerning the parental-benefit
exception.

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                        DISPOSITION
     The orders Mother challenges on appeal are affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                CHANEY, J.

                BENDIX, J.

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