Court Opinion

ID: 9600340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:26:04.298348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:50.462217
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE BOTTOMLY:
I dissent.
The relator, James R. Zumwalt, filed in this court his petition for an appropriate writ to inquire into the lawfulness of his incarceration in the state prison. The writ was granted and a hearing had before this court.
The facts are simple.
The relator served overseas in the United States Marine Corps 23 months. There he contracted elephantiasis and was returned to the United States for treatment for the disease.
On June 24, 1952, relator arrived by bus in Missoula, Montana, from Spokane, Washington. He was in an intoxicated condition *539when he boarded the bns in Spokane and when he reached Missoula. He had a bus ticket, destination Butte, Montana, where he expected to go to work in the mines.
While the bus tarried in Missoula for the lunch stop, relator proceeded to a bar where he took on more drinks and the bus then left without him. That same afternoon, while noticeably under the influence of liquor, he proceeded to Cecil’s Shop, an exclusive women’s dress shop, where he dickered for some time for a woman’s hat and dress for which he tendered a partially made out bank check on a Spokane bank signed by himself as payer and payable to the order of himself as payee but bearing neither date nor amount. These omitted details the eager dress shop employee obligingly wrote in and supplied on the cheek and then accepted same in payment for a woman’s hat and dress for the combined total retail price of $51 and handed relator $14 difference in cash.
An hour or so later, on complaint of the manager of Cecil’s Shop, the relator, still plainly intoxicated, was arrested and taken into justice court.
Two days later, to-wit, on June 26, 1952, the county attorney of Missoula County, on filing in the district court an information against the relator Zumwalt, stated to that court that Zumwalt had theretofore been arrested and arraigned in justice court •charged with a felony, entered a plea of guilty and that he was then bound over to the district court.
At the same time, to-wit, on June 26, 1952, Zumwalt was taken before the district court where, without an attorney to represent him, he was handed a copy of the information so filed, the charging part whereof reads :
“That at the County of Missoula, State of Montana, on or about the 24th day of June, A. D. 1952, and before the filing of this Information, the said defendant then and there being, did then and there wilfully, wrongfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass a false and worthless check to Cecil’s Shop in the Hammond Arcade in the City of Missoula, in words and figures as follows:
*540“‘16 No. 4# 28-70
1251
Spokane, Washington, June 24, 1952
Pay to the Order of James E. Zumwalt................................$65.00
Sixtyfive................................................................................no dollars
First Avenue Branch
The Old National Bank of Spokane
Spokane, Washington
/s/ Mr. James E. Zumwalt
421 Oak St.’
“said check being passed on or about the 24th day of June, 1952 and that for said cheek the defendant received cash and merchandise in the amount of $65.00; that on said date the defendant had no account in said bank and that said check was passed with the intent in him, the said defendant, to defraud the complainant thereof, all of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such ease made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Montana. ’ ’
At his initial appearance therein the district court inquired of relator if he had a lawyer, to which relator replied in the negative and stated further that he had no means with which to employ counsel and that he would plead guilty. The court then informed relator that it was its duty under the laws of this state to advise relator he was entitled to a lawyer if he desired one.
The court then continued the matter until the next morning, June 27, 1952, at 9 :30 o ’clock a.m. At which time the relator stated to the court that he did not desire a lawyer and that he was then ready to enter his plea. The court thereupon read to the relator the charge against him as set forth in the information, and informed the relator that the charge against him, if he was found guilty, was punishable by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than fourteen years under E.C.M. 1947, section 94-2007, and in relator’s presence inquired of the county attorney if that was not also his view, to which the county at*541torney replied, “Yes, it is, your honor.” The court also informed the relator that relator had advised the court he had been in the penitentiary about sis years all together, so there could be in this case no suspended sentence; that under the law relator’s sentence must be a term in the state penitentiary of this state. Thereupon relator, without counsel^ pleaded guilty to the purported crime charged against him in the information and the court then set a time for pronouncing sentence.
On July 1, 1952, the relator, again without counsel, was brought before the court for the passing of sentence at which time the court again reviewed all of relator’s life history and transgressions which had been gleaned from his interrogation of the relator reciting prior convictions, none of which had been pleaded in the information filed and none of which had been proven other than by the unwarranted questioning of the relator who stood before him without counsel. Thereupon the court pronounced sentence as follows:
“The Court: Your sentence is seven years imprisonment in the State Penitentiary of this state at hard labor as provided by law for the crime you have committed, and as to which you plead guilty.
“You are remanded to the custody of the Sheriff with directions to deliver you to the Warden of the State Penitentiary.”
I presume the district judge and the majority of this court presumed that the State of Montana had a penitentiary in which the relator was to be incarcerated. However our statutes do not designate any such institution. I suppose it is presumed again that they had in mind another institution which our statutes designate as the “State Prison”.
I suppose it is proper to base our opinion on presumptions as the majority opinion “assumed” that the'information filed herein charges the crime of “ ‘passing a False and Worthless Check’ ” a felony.
It is apparent from the record that the district court adjudged and sentenced relator to a term of seven years at hard labor in the “state penitentiary” under R.C.M. 1947, section 94-2007.
*542Let us examine R.C.M. 1947, section 94-2007, to see if it was in any particular applicable to this purported offense. This section, as far as applicable here, is as follows: “Every person who makes, passes, utters, * * with intention to defraud any other person, or who, with like intention, attempts to pass, utter, or publish any fictitious * * check, purporting to he the * * * check, * * * for the payment of money * * of some hank, corporation, co-partnership, government, or individual in existence, when in fact there is no such hank, corporation, co-partnership, government, or individual in existence, knowing the * * * check * * * to be fictitious, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than one or more than fourteen years. ’ ’
Analyzing the said foregoing Section 94-2007, we find the gravamen or charge therein imposes a penalty only on the person who passes, with intent to defrand, a fictitious check of some non-existent bank, corporation, co-partnership, government or individual, knowing the check to he fictitious and knowing there was not such entity or individxial in existence. The information does not state a violation of Section 94-2007, supra, under which relator was sentenced.
Of course there is nothing fictitious nor non-existent about the check. The .Old National Bank of Spokane is a well known banking institution, having been established for many years. There is nothing fictitious about the signature of Mr. James R. Zumwalt.
The mere reading of the information and the record in this case shows crystal clear that there is no charge in the information nor is there any fact or evidence in the record that in any way could bring the relator under a charge of violating Section 94-2007. The sentence and judgment rendered under said Section 94-2007, supra, was and is wholly void. See State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 Pac. (2d) 949; Ex parte Garbarini, 129 Gal. App. 618, 19 Pac. (2d) 27; People v. Eppinger, 105 Cal. 36, 38 Pac. 538.
The great Chief Justice Marshall stated that due process *543of law is process due according to the law of the land and that this government is a government of laws and not of men. It is clear that the law will cease to deserve such high appellation if it furnish no remedy for the denial of one’s legal rights.
However the attorney general argues the court may have sentenced the relator Zumwalt under R.C.M. 1947, section 94-2702, but the short answer to that contention is that the court did not sentence relator thereunder. The record speaks for itself. But conceding, for argument’s sake, that the court attempted to impose and render sentence and judgment under said Section 94-2702, then let us examine that section.
Section 94-2702, as far as pertinent here, is as follows: “Any person who, with intent to defraud, shall make * * * or deliver any check, * * * for the payment of money, upon any bank * * * knowing at the time of such making, * * * or delivering that the maker or drawer has not sufficient funds in or credit with such bank * # * for the payment of such cheek, * * * if said check * * * is for more than fifty dollars, shall be deemed a felony and punished as provided for in section 94-2706, for grand larceny. In any prosecution under this section as against the maker, or drawer thereof, the making, uttering, or delivering of a check * * * payment of which is refused by the drawee because of lack of funds or credit, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud * * * provided such maker or drawer shall not have paid the drawee thereof the amount due thereon, within five days after receiving notice that such check, * * * has not been paid by the drawee.” Emphasis supplied.
It is shown without dispute that this relator, James It. Zumwalt, was in an intoxicated condition when he is alleged to have passed the check and that, notwithstanding, the clerk at Cecil’s Shop wrote in the date on the check and otherwise completed it. The check itself is made to relator and signed by relator. The record does not show any endorsement thereon, and it is conceded that the check was never presented for payment. From the face of the cheek itself it is debatable whether even a civil action could be maintained against the maker for the pay*544ment thereof. It will be noted the check in the written part thereof provides for the payment of “no dollars”. The last written part of a cheek takes precedence over the figures used, and the check carried no endorsement. But laying all that argument aside, here, in this case, within an hour or two after the purported check had been received by Cecil’s Shop, the relator was arrested without the check being first presented for payment, and the woman’s hat and dress and the $14 balance in money taken from the relator, James R. Zumwalt, and the police returned and delivered to Cecil’s Shop the hat, dress and $14 so that the complainant, Cecil’s Shop, was made whole, suffering no loss whatever. The relator, James R. Zumwalt, was thus brought squarely within the “exception” in the above Section 94-2702.
It should be borne in mind that by a special amendment to the statutory law of this state our legislature, by the enactment of Chapter 63, Laws of 1919, specifically wrote into the statute, now R.C.M. 1947, section 94-2702, the above-mentioned proviso and exception. The will and specific intent of the legislature so written into the law of this state should be given effect and applied in relator’s case. The undisputed facts are that relator did not and has not violated the statutes on which the district court, the county attorney and the state rely and base their case.'
We must make good our boast that we, here in the United States of America, live under a government of laws and not of men, and for every wrong there must be a method and process for righting the wrong, and such is provided by the Bill of Rights in both our state and federal constitutions which together with the statutes, state and federal, constitute the “law of the land”.
This relator here has plainly shown to this court that the sentence imposed upon him, and the judgment rendered against him were and are illegal and void, being rendered without a lawfid, statutory charge being presented, filed or established against him and therefore without authority of law.
It is true, this relator had a right of appeal to this court *545from such purported judgment, but such right is only idle and wishful thinking for a person without competent counsel, financial means or friends, incarcerated in prison, and without legal knowledge of the technical and prompt action required and absolutely necessary to perfect an appeal. Because such an injustice has been done, and an illegal judgment rendered, no issue under law was ever formed. Must the prisoner continue on in prison without relief from the injustice? Is this court to sanction such a practice? Is this court to deny this relator his constitutional and statutory rights so clearly shown to exist here? Whether his application is denominated a writ of coram nobis or habeas corpus, or other remedial writ, is of little consequence. We should look to substance and not to form. He is here demanding his liberty and relief from a void judgment.
The majority opinion holds in substance that this court has no jurisdiction in this matter, asserting that the legislature has failed to expressly grant to this court the power or authority to hear and determine an application for the ancient English common law writ of error coram nobis. This writ ought to be used upon occasion where the law has established no specific remedy and where in justice and good government there ought to be one.
However in my opinion the legislature has clearly and adequately provided for this very contingency. In the enactment of R.C.M. 1947, section 12-103, the legislature declares that, “The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the constitution of the United States, or the constitution or laws of this state, or of the codes, is the rule of decision in all the courts of this state.” See also the last part of R.C.M. 1947, section 12-104.
Section 3 of Article VIII of our Constitution in mandatory language declares, as far as pertinent here, that, “The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court shall extend to all cases at law and in equity, subject, however, to such limitations and regulations as may be prescribed by law. Said court shall have power in its discretion to issue and to hear and determine writs *546of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo-warranto, certiorari, prohibition and injunction, and such other original and remedial writs as may be necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.” Emphasis supplied.
Then the legislature, to implement and make effective the foregoing constitutional provision, enacted B..C.M. 1947, section 93-214, as follows: “Original jurisdiction. In the exercise of its original jurisdiction the supreme court has power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, injunction, and habeas corpus; also has power to issue all other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.” Emphasis supplied.
Our legislature has further provided by R.C.M. 1947, section 93-1106, that “When jurisdiction is, by the constitution or this code, or any other statute, conferred on a court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry into effect are also given ; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this code.”
The provisions of our statutes and the proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice.
The attorney general vigorously argues that, inasmuch as no appeal was taken from the judgment, the constitutional and statutory provisions do not apply, and the majority opinion so holds. Of course this is not the law. It is not necessary to appeal from a judgment before making an original application to this court for a writ of habeas corpus, or for a writ of coram nobis as is provided in the above provisions of our Codes and Constitution. The phrase “other original and remedial writs” includes of course the prerogative common law writs.
The foregoing demonstrates the lack of merit in the contention that this court has no jurisdiction in this particular case.
The attorney general anticipates and recognizes both the vice and the weakness in the position taken by him in this proceed*547ing, stating it might be urged the information fails to charge notice or knowledge on the part of relator of his lack of sufficient funds or to charge that the check was ever presented to the bank on which it was made. The attorney general further asserts it is not necessary for Cecil’s Shop, which accepted the unendorsed check, to have suffered any financial loss in the transaction. The attorney general further stated that the question might also here arise that the five-day period expressly allowed by statute for honoring the check must be satisfied, and contended that if the check was paid the state would necessarily be forced to resort to independent evidence to establish fraudulent intent on the part of relator, citing certain California cases in support of his above contentions. The attorney general is to be congratulated in so frankly and honestly pointing out to this court in this original proceeding the glaring, but nonetheless essential and jurisdictional defects of the “information” so filed against the relator and in the proceedings through which he was tried, convicted and sentenced. The one important matter on which the attorney general failed to comment and which the majority of this court has overlooked is that California does not have a statute like or even similar to our Section 94-2702 of the Revised Codes of 1947. It follows that the cited decisions from California are not in point nor are they here applicable. This relator may not lawfully be convicted and sentenced under authority of the California decisions.
Our Section 94-2702, supra, appears to be a unique law, yet it clearly expresses the intent of our legislature. It is the law of Montana and should be the rule for all our courts. Our Constitution and statutes apply with equal force to all people regardless of their race, creed or color, and it matters not that the accused person may be the most despicable of humans or that he be a more fortunate and favored citizen. As was said by the eminent Judge Cuthbert Pound in more concise and succinct language, “although the relator may be the worst of men * * '* the rights of the best of men are secure *548only as the rights of the vilest and most abhorrent are protected.”
James R. Zumwalt, the relator, could not, under the law, plead guilty to an offense with which he was never charged. It should be remembered that the same power that punishes also makes the law that protects. The fundamental law says that an accused shall not “be deprived of * * * liberty * * * without due process of law.” Const., Art. III, section 27; State v. Allison, 116 Mont. 352, at page 366, 153 Pac. (2d) 141.
“Equal and exact justice to all men * * * freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of person under the protection of the habeas corpus; and a fair trial by juries impartially selected, these principles form the bright constellation which has gone before us.” So spoke Thomas Jefferson concerning the Bill of Rights, which is our heritage and the foundation of our unique American tradition that every person, charged with the commission of a public offense, shall be accorded a fair and impartial trial. So it is no person can be lawfully prosecuted and sentenced for an offense neither charged nor proven, nor after his unlawful and unauthorized commitment may he be lawfully held in prison on a wholly void judgment entered against him. The fact remains however that this unfortunate relator has been held for a long time and continues to be held in the state prison at hard labor under an illegal and void commitment.
The sentence imposed and judgment pronounced and entered herein by the district court, being void, I would deny the motion to quash the writ, overrule the demurrer to the petition and writ and order the purported sentence and judgment set aside, vacated and annulled and the information dismissed.