Court Opinion

ID: 9667129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:36:23.247539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:35.236006
License: Public Domain

OPINION
WALKER, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from a conviction for the felony offense of Aggravated Sexual Assault. The trial began on April 16, 1990 and on May 1, 1990 the jury found appellant guilty. The jury then assessed punishment at ninety-nine (99) years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and assessed a fine of $10,000.00. Appellant’s brief sets out two points of error. They are as follows:
The evidence is insufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction because it fails to establish the corpus delicti of the offense alleged in the indictment.
The evidence is insufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction because a rational jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the offense.
We initially address appellant’s second point of error as our discussion and analysis of this point will be dispositive of the case.
The indictment charged that the appellant:
... intentionally and knowingly by threats, force and violence, cause the penetration of the female sexual organ of Deanna Ogg, a person not the spouse of the Defendant, by means of an object to-wit: the sexual organ of the defendant, without the consent of Deanna Ogg, and in the course of the same criminal episode, the Defendant caused serious bodily injury to Deanna Ogg by striking the said Deanna Ogg in the head with a blunt instrument the nature of which is unknown to the Grand Jury;
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The application paragraph in the trial court’s charge to the jury recited the identical language contained in the indictment. The jury found the appellant guilty of the offense “as charged in the indictment.”
We note at the outset that the State’s brief contends that appellant did not preserve the sufficiency complaints for appeal as the appellant’s objections and various motions at trial did not specifically comport with what appellant now raises as insufficient. See, Tex.R.App.P. 52(a). In examining the statement of facts, we find that the appellant did indeed preserve the sufficiency point for appellate purposes. We find that this specifically occurred during appellant’s oral motion for instructed verdict immediately prior to beginning the case for the defense. See, Gonzalez v. State, 588 S.W.2d 574, footnote 1 at 575 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Scott v. State, 534 *139S.W.2d 711 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). Having disposed of this procedural point, we give detailed review to the facts presented to the jury, continuously bearing in mind that the indictment against appellant is for the offense of Aggravated Sexual Assault and not Murder.
On September 27, 1986 at approximately 7:20 p.m., the nude body of the victim, Deanna Ogg, was discovered by two teenage boys. The body was found in a heavily wooded area of Montgomery County approximately two and one-half miles from the intersection of Old Houston Road and FM 1485, and approximately eight miles from the victim’s residence. Deanna Ogg was sixteen years old at the time of her death. She was discovered lying face down on a logging trail seventy-five to one hundred yards from Old Houston Road. Blood was all around her head and shoulders and several articles of her clothing were scattered all around her as was the contents of her purse. The purse itself was never located.
Testimony from the Harris County medical examiner revealed that Ms. Ogg died from a fractured skull due to blunt trauma to the head, and from multiple stab wounds to the neck. The neck wounds could have been made by a screwdriver among other things. There was no testimony as to what possible instrumentalities could have been responsible for the skull fracture. Further tests done on the body revealed that Ms. Ogg had sexual intercourse either recently before or after her death with a male individual as the presence of sperm was found on both vaginal and rectal smears. There was no evidence of trauma to the vaginal area and the medical examiner was unable to render an opinion as to whether the sexual intercourse was consensual or not. Toxicology tests revealed that Ms. Ogg had no drugs or alcohol present in her body at the time of her death.
The State elicited testimony from a former Montgomery County Sheriffs Deputy, Charles Self, who testified that he was involved with seizing a brown flat-bed truck with dual rear wheels belonging to appellant’s employer, Jesse Pitts, on September 30, 1986. The truck was seized with consent of the owner. Deputy Self further testified that upon looking inside of the truck, he observed a small screwdriver sticking in an air conditioning vent on the dash board. Deputy Self testified that he remembered the screwdriver to have been a flat-head type, not a Phillips-head. Deputy Self also testified that as far as he knew the screwdriver was never checked or subjected to any analysis. The defense later called Texas Ranger Stan Oldham to testify to the fact that his written report included information he had received from the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department stating that the screwdriver found in the truck was a Phillips-head type. Ranger Oldham also testified that he had no idea what was done, if anything, with the screwdriver. In examining the list of exhibits in the instant case we are amazed to find the screwdriver was not mentioned.
Maurita Howarth, a forensic serologist with the Texas Department of Public Safety, testified as to scientific analyses she conducted on blood, semen, and hair samples taken from both the victim’s body and the appellant. Ms. Howarth was supplied with known samples of hair (head and pubic) from both Ms. Ogg and appellant. Ms. Howarth was also supplied with unknown hair taken from combing of the victim’s pubic hair and other unknown hair taken off of the victim’s body as well as unknown hair taken from the brown truck that appellant was operating on the day of the incident. The results of the various comparisons showed that all of the hair found inside the truck did not match the victim’s; that from the pubic hair combing of the victim, none of the hair matched appellant’s and, in fact, our reading of Ms. Howarth’s testimony seems to indicate that she was unable to match one of the unknown pubic hairs to either the victim or appellant. Ms. Howarth further testified that the blood and semen tests were equally inconclusive as to identifying appellant as the assailant.
Testimony from Ms. Ogg’s family established that Ms. Ogg had planned to attend a dance that Saturday, September 27, 1986, with her grandmother and her uncle. Ms. Ogg’s grandmother and uncle lived in a *140mobile home about thirty minutes away from Ms. Ogg’s home. When Ms. Ogg’s mother was unable to drive her to her grandmother’s home, Ms. Ogg left her home on foot.
Testimony from Virginia Mathes, a clerk at the “Stop N Go” convenience store located at the intersection of FM 1314 and Sorter’s Road in Porter, Texas, established that Ms. Ogg came into the store and purchased cigarettes sometime between 5:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. on September 27. Ms. Mathes did not see how Ms. Ogg arrived but Ms. Mathes did testify that Ms. Ogg stated that she was with some friends and was going to a party in Conroe. From the state of the record before us, Ms. Mathes was the last person to see Ms. Ogg alive other than the person responsible for her death.
The State’s case was based entirely upon the above recited facts and eyewitness testimony and on extrajudicial statements allegedly made by the appellant to three other witnesses: Terry Dale Hooker, Michael Ringo, and Jeffrey Pitts. In essence, the State’s case against appellant critically hinged on tying the alleged statement to the facts already in existence in order to prove that appellant was the person guilty of the aggravated sexual assault of Deanna Ogg.
As in every criminal case where sufficiency of the evidence is raised, the standard for reviewing the evidence is whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Jackson v. State, 672 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). The standard is applicable to both direct and circumstantial evidence eases. Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). A conviction based on circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained, however, if the circumstances do not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt. Butler, supra at 238. If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, there is a reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused, then it cannot be said that the guilt has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Martin v. State, 753 S.W.2d 384 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). As the instant case is a classic example of a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, the Chambers/Martin/Butler line of cases are particularly pertinent to our analysis of the evidence before the jury.
As mentioned earlier, the State’s ease against the appellant hinged on the extrajudicial statements allegedly made by appellant to Hooker, Ringo, and Pitts. Hooker and Ringo both testified that on the evening of September 27 they were both at Hooker’s house working on vehicles. Ringo testified that between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. that night appellant drove up. Ringo further testified that appellant stated that he (appellant) had done something real bad, but that it had turned out all right; that he (appellant) had picked up a girl hitchhiking off of North Park and that the girl was drunk; that appellant did not describe the girl; that his (appellant’s) first thoughts after picking up the girl was to have sex with her; that he (appellant) drove behind Kidd Road located behind New Caney School District and at this point the girl got scared and started crying; that he (appellant) pulled the girl down in the seat by the hair of the head. At this point, Ringo testified that he walked away from appellant and Hooker in disgust, and then returned less than a minute later. When Ringo returned, he testified that he heard the appellant say, “I’m going to kill you,” with appellant making some sort of motion with his hand. Ringo testified that the, “I’m going to kill you,” was part of appellant’s story about the girl. Ringo testified that he believed appellant’s story. Ringo testified that he and appellant went to grade school together and that he has known appellant for approximately eleven years. Ringo further testified that appellant did not give any date or time-frame as to when these events with the girl took place; nor did appellant say that he (appellant) had non-consensual sex with anyone; nor did appellant say that he (appellant) *141actually killed or caused serious bodily injury to anyone.
The State then called Terry Hooker to the stand. Hooker testified that he had known the appellant for about eight years. Hooker testified that when appellant first arrived at Hooker’s house appellant looked as if he had just gotten off of work as appellant was dirty and greasy. Hooker then testified that appellant stated that he (appellant) had done something bad, but it turned out all right; that he (appellant) had gone to a store in New Caney and had seen a girl having an argument with some friends of hers and then the girl took off walking and that is when appellant picked the girl up; that the girl was walking down FM 1485 East; that he (appellant) drove around behind a school in New Caney and then went to “Pitts’ land;” that when they got to Pitts’ land, he (appellant) made the girl perform oral sex on appellant; that he (appellant) grabbed a screwdriver off the dash board or out of the glove compartment and told the girl that if she tried to get away or make any noises he (appellant) would kill her; that he (appellant) then took the girl to Humble, Texas and kicked her out of the truck. Hooker testified that appellant did not describe how the girl acted. Hooker further testified that appellant did not describe the girl or anything about her, but recalled that appellant stated the girl was from “Porter, New Caney.” Hooker also testified that he did believe the appellant’s story. On cross-examination, Hooker testified that he was sure appellant said the girl was walking on FM 1485 East and not on North Park Drive, and that appellant said that the events with the girl took place on Friday night which would have been September 26. Hooker testified that appellant used the words “the night before.” Hooker further admitted that appellant did not say that he (appellant) had non-consensual sex with anyone nor did appellant say that he (appellant) ever killed anyone. Hooker also testified that during appellant’s account of the events with the girl, appellant did not make any jabbing motions with the screwdriver, nor did appellant even use the phrase, “I’m going to kill you.”
The next witness for the State was Jeffrey Pitts. Appellant had been employed by the Pitts family logging business during the time when the offense occurred. Jeffrey Pitts was twenty-three years old at the time of trial and had taken over as head of the family’s logging business. The Pitts family owned a great deal of land in Montgomery County and the land was heavily forested. Jeffrey Pitts testified that he had known appellant since the sixth or seventh grade in school. On direct examination by the State, Pitts testified that on September 27, 1986, he and appellant and appellant’s brother, Richard, were working at a logging site and that Pitts and Richard Criner arrived at about 10:00 a.m. or 10:30 a.m. that morning. Appellant arrived later. Pitts testified that he and Richard left the work area in the woods at about 3:00 p.m. or 4:00 p.m. that afternoon in order to get a replacement part for a bulldozer. Appellant stayed behind at the logging site. Appellant had access to and regularly operated a company vehicle described as a brown one-ton, flat-bed truck with dual rear wheels. This is the same vehicle that both Ringo and Hooker described appellant driving when he arrived at Hooker’s house on the evening of September 27. Pitts further testified that he and Richard Criner arrived back at the logging site at about 7:30 p.m. or 8:00 p.m. on September 27 and that appellant was there when they arrived. Pitts testified that he first repaired the bulldozer and then had a conversation with appellant. Pitts testified that appellant stated that he (appellant) had picked up a blond-haired girl; that he (appellant) took the girl down the road and threatened her with a screwdriver and had some words; that he (appellant) had gotten the screwdriver from the air-conditioner vent in the truck he was driving; that he (appellant) had raped the girl and had left her there when he got through. Pitts testified that when he read an article describing Deanna Ogg’s murder, which appeared in the newspaper the following Monday, he spoke to appellant several days later and showed appellant the newspaper. Pitts testified that appellant’s response was that he (ap*142pellant) did not do it, and that he (appellant) had picked the girl up and brought her to her grandmother’s house, which appellant described as a trailer house in New Caney. Over vigorous defense objections, Pitts was allowed to testify to the fact that a week or two after the murder, appellant told Pitts that he hated women because appellant’s mother had left him when he was young.
At the conclusion of the State’s direct examination of Pitts, they tendered to appellant’s counsel copies of three statements, made at various times to authorities, by Jeffrey Pitts. Two of the statements were handwritten statements by Pitts himself, and the other was a transcribed copy of Pitts’ sworn grand jury testimony. These were used to thoroughly impeach Pitts’ direct examination testimony. The essence of Pitts’ sworn grand jury testimony was that appellant was in Pitts’ presence at the logging camp from approximately 10:00 a.m. or 11:00 a.m. until 10:00 p.m. on September 27, 1986; that appellant recounted the story the evening of September 27 so the incident with the girl must have occurred sometime late Friday, September 26, 1986 at around 2:00 a.m. or 3:00 a.m. in the morning; that appellant talked about picking up a girl, but appellant did not say the girl was blond-haired nor did appellant describe the girl’s appearance at all; that appellant did say the girl was about twenty years old, but that it was dark in the truck. Then the following exchange took place between Pitts and appellant’s trial counsel as trial counsel was going over Pitts’ grand jury testimony line by line:
Q. Question: “Okay. What about the grandmother’s house?” Do you recall that question from Mr. Walker?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you recall your response that you made?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you recall saying, and let me go slow because it’s a lengthy one. “What he told me is that he was driving through New Caney. There was a bunch of guys arguing at a station and they looked pretty drunk, he said. He said he went through the underpass and there was a girl walking. He said she was pretty drunk or messed up and whatnot.” Did you make that response?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was that true when you made it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. “He said I stopped and asked her if she wanted a ride and she got in and I carried her down the road. And she said she wanted to go to her grandmother’s.” A. Yes, sir.
Q. “She was supposed to go to her grandmother’s house and instead they went down the road and had sex and whatnot. He didn’t say nothing; like I told the Texas Ranger.”
A. Yes, sir.
Q. “He didn’t say he raped the girl or nothing to me.”
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you make that response?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was it true when you made it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. “All he told me was he just carried her down the road and had sex with her and I made a crack and said, 'What did you pick her up and carry her home?’, and he said, no, I left her there. I said all right, like that, and we kind of dropped the subject. And that was before y’all come and picked up my dually and fingerprinted it.”
Did you make that response—
A. Yes, sir.
Q. —to the Grand Jury and to Mr. Walker under oath?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And was it true when you made it?
A. Yes, sir.
The record reflects that the serious impeachment of Pitts continued for several more pages. On re-direct examination, the State attempted rehabilitation by reiterating Pitts’ previous trial testimony of the more incriminating version of appellant’s story to Pitts. As to any explanation why his sworn grand jury testimony and a written statement made two months later were *143so different Pitts responded essentially with the excuse that a spoken rendition of events was a much different experience from a written rendition of events, and that, “Just, it’s been four years ago. It’s hard for me to remember everything.” (sic).
The offense of Aggravated Sexual Assault includes within it the offense of Sexual Assault. Perryman v. State, 798 S.W.2d 326 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.); McGahey v. State, 744 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1988, pet. ref’d). Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 22.021 (Vernon 1989) provides what amounts to five additional elements, any one of which turns what would otherwise be a Sexual Assault into an Aggravated Sexual Assault. This list is in subsection (a)(2) and classifies a sexual assault as aggravated if the State pleads and proves that the perpetrator:
(i) causes serious bodily injury or attempts to cause the death of the victim or another person in the course of the same criminal episode;
(ii) by acts or words places the victim in fear that death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping will be imminently inflicted on any person;
(iii) by acts or words occurring in the presence of the victim threatens to cause the death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping of any person, or
(iv) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon in the course of the same criminal episode; or
(B) the victim is younger than 14 years of age.
In the instant case, after a very exhaustive examination of the record before us, we are unable to find any evidence that appellant caused serious bodily injury to Deanna Ogg “by striking the said Deanna Ogg in the head with a blunt instrument ...,” as charged in the indictment, and as provided to the jury in the trial court’s charge. This is most significant as the Benson-Boozer line of cases provide us with the authority under these circumstances. Benson v. State, 661 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1219, 104 S.Ct. 2667, 81 L.Ed.2d 372 (1984); Boozer v. State, 717 S.W.2d 608 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). These cases hold that the sufficiency of the evidence must be measured against the jury charge, even if the instruction is erroneous — and the State has not objected to increasing its burden of proof. See, Saunders v. State, 794 S.W.2d 91, 92 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, pet. granted); Husting v. State, 790 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.).
In the instant case, in each of the renditions of the extrajudicial statement allegedly made by appellant, where is any language even reasonably related to appellant having struck or beaten “the girl” that he picked up hitchhiking, in the head or anywhere else on her body? We hold that no trier of fact, rational or otherwise, could have culled from any of the evidence presented the essential aggravating element of Aggravated Sexual Assault; that being that appellant caused serious bodily injury to the victim by striking her with some unknown blunt instrument. Where was any evidence from the medical examiner or any other witness as to how the victim could have sustained such an injury, or, more importantly, how the appellant caused or could have caused the head injury to the victim? In short, there was no evidence for a rational trier of fact to latch onto in order to find that the aggravating element of the offense had indeed been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, supra; Butler, supra. Furthermore, testing the sufficiency of the evidence against the charge given, and applying the standards of review enunciated above leads us to the identical conclusion that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense charged. Appellant’s second point of error is sustained.
In view of our disposition of the second point of error, we need not reach appellant’s other contention. Because the evidence is insufficient, the conviction must be set aside and an acquittal ordered. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978).
*144The judgment is reversed and the appellant is ordered acquitted.
REVERSED AND ACQUITTED.