Court Opinion

ID: 9744152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:54:55.986784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:47.052523
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the result reached by the majority opinion.
While I agree that Rehborg’s trial in the superior court should be de novo I cannot assent to his discharge under the provision of CR. 4(C). That Rehborg was not speedily brought to trial at the city court level is of no consequence at his subsequent appeal on the merits of his case.
Rehborg did not comply with the requirement that protest be made to the court at the first opportunity that a defendant is aware or reasonably should be presumed aware that his trial date falls outside the permissible bounds for a speedy trial. Utterback v. State (1974), 261 Ind. 685, 310 N.E.2d 552; Mayes v. State (1974), 162 Ind.App. 186, 318 N.E.2d 811. Regardless of when Rehborg received notice of the trial date he had opportunity to move for discharge before commencement of the March 1, 1978 trial. His failure to timely present his contention served to waive the issue forever.
To discharge Rehborg at the superior court level frustrates the purpose of CR. 4(C) which is to assure early trials. It also results in that abuse which the Utterback court cautioned against:
“The courts are under legal and moral mandate to protect the constitutional rights of accused persons, but this should not entirely relieve them from acting reasonably in their own behalf. We will vigorously enforce the right to a speedy trial, but we do not intend that accused persons should escape trial by abuse of the means that we have designed for their protection.”
310 N.E.2d at 554.
As a consequence of the waiver Rehborg sought the benefit of a finding and judgment upon the merits in the city court. Upon losing his case in that court Rehborg should not be heard to complain that the trial was not timely, but rather should proceed with his challenge of the judgment upon the merits. This result best serves the interests of justice and judicial economy.
I would therefore grant the State’s appeal with instructions that Rehborg’s motion for discharge be denied and that trial on the merits of this case proceed in the Porter Superior Court.