Court Opinion

ID: 9754221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:50:43.945312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:50.865649
License: Public Domain

Jacobs, J.
(concurring). Our Legislature has granted partial exemption from inheritance taxes on transfers of property to “churches, hospitals and orphan asylums, public libraries, Bible and tract societies, religious, beuevolent and charitable institutions” (R. S. 54:34-2) and total exemption on transfers to “educational institutions.” L. 1948, c. 268 (R. S. 54:34-4(d)). When I expressed the view in Tappan Washington Memorial Corp. v. Margetts, 9 N. J. Super. 212 (App. Div. 1950) that the Legislature meant to confine its total exemption to traditional educational institutions such as universities and other schools, I found support in the statement attached to L. 1948, c. 268, when originally intro*359duced as a legislative bill. It set forth that its purpose was “to encourage privately endowed higher education by making uniform the exemption from inheritance tax of bequests and devises to all educational institutions not operated for profit” and that its language would confine “the full exemption of bequests to such institutions as Princeton University, Rutgers University, the State University of New Jersey, the Institution for Advanced Study, Drew University, St. Peter’s College, Seton Hall College, Upsala College, John Marshall College, Newark College of Engineering, Stevens Institute of Technology, and other privately-endowed nonprofit institutions at the elementary, - secondary and higher educational levels in this State, and on a reciprocal basis in other States.” However, in Hoffman v. Hock, 8 N. J. 397, 408 (1952) this court recently indicated that such statement may not in anywise be used as an extrinsic aid in the ascertainment of the legislative purpose, meaning or intent. Cf. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527, 538 (1947). I disagree with this view as being without basis in reason or support in persuasive authority elsewhere and take this first opportunity as a member of this court to record my dissent therefrom. See Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886 (1930); de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 527 (1940); Note, A Re-Evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in the Federal Courts, 52 Col. L. Rev. 125 (1952). But cf. Jackson, J., in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distiller’s Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 395, 71 S. Ct. 745, 95 L. Ed. 1035, 1048 (1951).
Chief Justice Marshall struck early at the notion that extrinsic aids are inadmissible in the ascertainment of the legislative meaning by remarking in his common sense fashion that “Where the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived.” United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386, 2 L. Ed. 304, 313 (1804). Expressions of comparable import are readily found in recent decisions of the United States *360Supreme Court. Thus in Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476, 479, 63 S. Ct. 361, 87 L. Ed. 407, 410 (1943) the court stressed that since words are inexact tools at best, there is wisely no rule forbidding resort to legislative history. And in United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554, 562, 60 S. Ct. 1034, 1038, 84 L. Ed. 1356, 1362 (1940) the court, while recognizing that particular legislative materials may be contradictory, ambiguous or without substantial probative value, pointed out that they can scarcely be deemed “incompetent or irrelevant” and that the meaning to be ascribed to congressional legislation “can only be derived from a considered weighing of every relevant aid to construction.”
In McFadden v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 130 N. J. L. 601 (Sup. Ct. 1943) our former Supreme Court availed itself of legislative history in ascertaining the meaning of ,a congressional enactment. Similarly, when seeking to ascertain the meaning of provisions of our State Constitution this court has freely used all available constitutional history. See Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N. J. 578 (1950); Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N. J. 240 (1950). Indeed, in the Winberry case the court placed some reliance on a gubernatorial veto message and in Koch v. Koch, 79 N. J. Eq. 24, 29 (Ch. 1911) the court expressed the opinion that it could properly use a commission report and gubernatorial message as aids in interpreting an ensuing legislative enactment. Cf. Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 2 N. J. Super. 93, 98 (1949), affirmed 3 N. J. 27 (1949), app. dism. 338 U. S. 946, 70 S. Ct. 488, 94 L. Ed. 583 (1950); Ablondi v. Board of Review, 8 N. J. Super. 71, 75 (App. Div. 1950); Family Finance Corp. v. Gough, 10 N. J. Super. 13, 21 (App. Div. 1950). It is true that notwithstanding the foregoing we sometimes find reexpression in our cases of the generally discarded view that in construing a legislative enactment the court may not look beyond the words of the statute itself. See In re Hudson County, 106 N. J. L. 62, 73 (E. & A. 1928). But cf. Stone, The Province and Function of Law, p. 200 (1950). However, this may be contrasted with our settled *361doctrine that contemporaneous administrative construction will be given weight in ascertaining the meaning of the legislative language. Harper v. New Jersey Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co., 1 N. J. 93, 98 (1948); Kravis v. Hock, 137 N. J. L. 252, 255 (Sup. Ct. 1948). See Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 370, 390 (1947) where the author pointed out that “The rule that administrative interpretations are entitled to great weight rests on a basis similar to that justifying recourse to the legislative history.” It may be further contrasted with the broadening concepts of our courts which enable the use of pertinent extrinsic materials in ascertaining the proper meaning of written contracts and other private instruments. Cf. Casriel v. King, 2 N. J. 45, 50 (1949).
In Flagg v. Johansen, 124 N. J. L. 456, 459 (Sup. Ct. 1940) the court described the introducer’s statement as a “frail and unreliable” source of legislative intent which should not be considered. It seems to me that this fails to distinguish between legal admissibility and weight. The introducer’s statement clearly constitutes relevant evidence on any proper issue as to the legislative purpose, meaning or intent; it sets forth the interpretation of the draftsman or sponsor of the legislation, is circulated amongst his fellow members of the Senate or Assembly, as the ease may be, and becomes a matter of record available for inspection by all, then and thereafter. It may be very complete and embody a fully documented narrative of purpose entitled to substantial consideration. See e. g., Assembly Ho. 15 introduced on March 21, 1952, and bearing a statement which is in form comparable to a detailed committee report. On the other hand it may be inadequate and perhaps misleading and entitled to little consideration. But before this court can tell what kind of statement it is it must have the privilege of looking at it, and that is what Flagg v. Johansen denied. I, for one, am for removing the blinkers. See Winne v. Casale, 100 N. J. L. 291, 295 (E. & A. 1924) where Chief Justice Gummere found significance in the introducer’s statement and Schweg*362mann Bros. v. Calvert Distiller’s Corp., supra, where Justice Douglas remarked that “It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt.” In construing particular statutory phraseology such as that embodied in L. 1948, c. 268 we must, unless we are to usurp functions of the other branches of government, seek to ascertain and effectuate the legislative meaning rather than our own. To that task we should bring minds unafraid to explore.
Justice Brennan joins in this opinion.
Wacheneeld, Burling, Jacobs and Brennan, JJ., concurring in result.
For affirmance — Uhief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Oliphant, Wacheneeld, Burling, Jacobs and Brennan
For reversal — Justice Hetier — 1.