Court Opinion

ID: 9530396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:59:32.656893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:05.973483
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Doyle
specially concurring:
I agree with the conclusions and reasoning of the majority opinion, and the present remarks are offered for the purpose of supplementing its reasoning.
The majority opinion considers the events which preceded the injury starting from 9:00 P.M. on Sunday, September 16, 1956, at Elk Mountain, Wyoming. It appears from this statement that the parties involved in this injury attended a dance at Elk Mountain which continued until 2:00 A.M. on Monday, September 17, *1531956, and that they drove the rest of the night, each taking his turn at the wheel, until the fatal accident occurred at 6:30 A.M. some 15 miles from their destination, Fort Collins, Colorado. It should also be pointed out that the transaction had its inception at 7:00 A.M. on September 16, at which time the defendant left his home at Fort Collins and drove to Elk Mountain, Wyoming. The evidence shows that he went hunting there during the afternoon of the 16th and that he returned from this around 6: 00 P.M. The boys who had accompanied him to Elk Mountain then returned to Fort Collins. The defendant, however, decided to stay over for the dance and this commenced about 9:00 P.M. The dance continued for five hours, until 2:00 A.M., and after that the defendant, in company with the others, returned to the places where they had been staying, picked up their clothing and equipment and started the return trip. On this return drive, Gary was the driver to Rock River, Wyoming, at which place Connie, the deceased, took over and drove to Laramie. The defendant had apparently slept during these first two stages and drank coffee before departing from Laramie. The record does not disclose the distance which had been covered just prior to the accident. We are told that the defendant became drowsy some 5 miles north of the Forks Hotel.
I consider significant the fact that the defendant had been active for nearly 24 hours and that the only period during which he slept occurred in the car during the drive from Elk Mountain to Laramie. Why is this important? Because the issue here is the state of mind of the defendant and this state of mind can be appraised only in terms of the surrounding facts and circumstances. The facts recited above are such as to place a reasonable man on notice that the hazard of an occurrence such as the present one existed to the level of being a strong probability.
The standards for distinguishing between ordinary *154negligence and wanton conduct or reckless misconduct are clearly set forth in the Restatement on Law, Torts, §500, quoted with approval in Coffman v. Godsoe, decided May 9, 1960. Comment (g) of that section distinguishes wanton conduct from negligence consisting of inadvertence, incompetentness or unskillfulness on the basis that reckless misconduct requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man. Applied to the present case, this means that even though the defendant did not have an actual appreciation of the extent of the hazard he did have clear notice or knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man. Comment (g) supra also distinguishes the form of negligence consisting of intentionally doing an act with knowledge that it contains a risk of harm from reckless conduct on the ground that in the area of reckless conduct the risk is substantially more serious than in the case of negligence. In order for the conduct to be reckless the result must be probable.
The conclusion seems inescapable that the case is one for the jury to evaluate. There is present here not only a consciousness or awareness of drowsiness or sleepiness, but in addition, the fact of intense tiring activity over a period of 24 hours, all of which adds to the awareness of the hazard of harm. Thus, when the defendant became cognizant of his drowsiness he had to realize that the risk of his going to sleep was a real one. When he thereafter elected to drive his car at 50 miles per hour, it was at least a question for the jury as to whether he had knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger of going to sleep and missing a turn to any reasonable man. Or stated differently, the evidence was sufficient to warrant submission to the jury of the question whether a strong probability existed that if he drove he would go to sleep and fail to manipulate a turn. *155Judged by either the surrounding circumstances and constructive notice approach or the actual awareness of a strong probability approach, I am of the opinion that the evidence here is sufficient to warrant its submission to the jury.
The defendants in the case at bar placed strong reliance on our decision in Pettingell v. Moede, 129 Colo. 484, 271 P. (2d) 1038. In that case, the defendant had been engaged in driving a jeep over an icy, snow-packed road, Berthoud Pass. He was descending the pass on the East side of the Divide and in the course of this was driving the jeep sufficiently fast so that he was sliding around corners. The plaintiff in that case warned him. The result of the warning was that he became somewhat angry and continued his course of conduct. It was there held that this was simple negligence. The trial court in the present case relied on this decision in holding the conduct in question to be simple negligence. It strikes me that in the Pettingell case the evidence was sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury on the question of whether the defendant was guilty of wanton conduct. Therefore, in my opinion, the holding in the Pettingell case and the viewpoint of the majority of the Court in this case cannot be reconciled. The rules and principles pronounced in the Pettingell case are not different from the standards of the case at bar, but the application of those rules to the facts in the Pettingell case is entirely different from the present holding. Insofar as Pettingell v. Moede is out of harmony with the present case it ought to be overruled.
I join in the decision and the order of the Court reversing the judgment and remanding the case for a new trial.