Court Opinion

ID: 9541903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:29:28.691656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:15.244300
License: Public Domain

MATHIAS, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the trial court committed clear error in overruling Killebrew's Batson objection. I believe the majority reads the decision in Snyder v. Louisiana 552 U.S. 472, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008), too broadly.
In Snyder, the Court did not base its conclusion exclusively on the fact that the prosecutor had failed to strike white jurors who had given responses similar to that of the black student juror. The Court's holding was also based on the fact that the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral explanation was implausible and, indeed, illogical. Considering the implausibility of the prosecutor's proffered explanation in conjunction with the prosecutor's inconsisten-ey, the Court held that the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral explanation for striking the black juror was pretextual and that this pretext gave rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. Id. at 484-85, 128 S.Ct. 1203. And because it could not uphold the trial court's ruling on the grounds of the juror's nervousness when the trial court had not specifically ruled on that explanation, the Court held that the defendant's Batson objection should have been sustained. Id. at 486, 128 S.Ct. 1203.
*404The present case is readily distinguishable from Snyder. First, the reasons for striking the black jurors proffered by the deputy prosecutor were not implausible considered by themselves. When asked to give a race-neutral reason for striking juror D.R.,5 the deputy prosecutor explained that D.R. had a great-nephew who had been convicted of drug dealing and that D.R. had stated that he thought that the police had acted unfairly in that case. The deputy prosecutor therefore thought that D.R. would not give the State a "fair shake." Tr. p. 487. This is clearly a valid concern for the prosecution and, by itself, a valid race-neutral reason for using a peremptory strike. See Nicks v. State, 598 N.E.2d 520, 523 (Ind.1992) (affirming trial court's overruling of defendant's Batson objection to prosecutor's use of peremptory strike to remove black juror where prosecutor gave several race-neutral explanations, including that juror's nephew had recently been convicted of murder in that court); Buckner v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (concluding that prosecutor provided race-neutral explanation for use of a peremptory strike to remove black juror where that juror had a close family friend who had been charged with murder).
I acknowledge that the deputy prosecutor did not use a peremptory strike on a white member of the jury panel, P.H., who indicated on his jury questionnaire that his cousin had been found guilty of a crime that P.H. did not think his cousin had committed.6 But P.H. explained that his cousin's crime was "between two brothers and the parents[,]" tr. p. 429, whereas there is no indication that D.R.'s nephew's conviction involved an intra-family dispute.
I do not deny that this is a close case. But while the deputy prosecutor's inconsistency may be evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination, see Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005), I do not read Snyder or Miller-ElL to mean that such inconsistency is, by itself, conclusive proof of discrimination. The Snyder Court's holding was also based on the implausibility of the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral explanation. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483, 128 S.Ct. 1203; see also Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 266, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (relying upon substantial evidence of racial discrimination, in addition to the prosecutor's failure to strike white jurors who had given responses similar to those of stricken black jurors, in holding that prosecutor had engaged in racial discrimination in use of peremptory strikes). Because there were differences between D.R. and P.H.'s responses regarding their relative's prior history with the criminal justice system, I am unwilling to say that the trial court, who was in the best position to judge the credibility of the deputy prosecutor and D.R.'s demeanor at the time, clearly erred in believing the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reasons for striking D.R.
With regard to L.S., the record confirms that L.S. did appear to agree with Kille-brew's counsel with regard to reasonable doubt, with LS. eventually saying that he *405would not vote to convict if he had "a doubt in [his] mind" and that the State had to prove guilt "beyond a shadow of a doubt." Tr. pp. 387-88. I believe the deputy prosecutor could properly base a peremptory challenge on this exchange between Killebrew's counsel and LS., which indicated that L.S. might hold the State to an impossibly high standard of proof. At the very least, this is a facially race-nen-tral reason for striking LS. And unlike the proffered reason in Snyder, this reason is not illogical or implausible.
Again, I acknowledge that the deputy prosecutor did not strike two white members of the jury panel who gave responses similar to those of LS. One of these white jurors, B.C., stated that he would define reasonable doubt as "if all [olf the evidence is laid out there, there is no other possible doubt." Tr. p. 383. This response, however, is not as favorable to the defendant as LS., whose responses indicated that he might hold the State to the impossibly-high standard of "beyond a shadow of a doubt." Tr. p. 388.
The other white juror in question, B.B., stated that he thought reasonable doubt was "certain guilt." Tr. p. 383A. In response to the question "What if you are pretty sure," B.B. stated, "I would have to be one hundred percent sure that they were guilty." Id. This is admittedly similar to the response given by L.S., and I do not deny that this is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317. But I am unwilling to say that this inconsistent use of peremptory strikes is, by itself, conclusive proof of discriminatory intent upon the part of the deputy prosecutor.
In reviewing the LS. strike it is once again important to emphasize the trial court's unique position to assess L.S.'s demeanor during voir dire. In answering Killebrew's Batson challenge, the prosecutor referred to the "emphatic" manner in which LS. apparently agreed with defense counsel. The trial court, not our court, was in the best position to determine whether LS. was "emphatic," and whether, because of LS's demeanor in the courtroom, the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral explanation for striking L.S. was credible. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (noting importance of trial - court's first-hand observation of juror's demeanor). Unlike the majority, I do not read Snyder to mean that, simply because the trial court did not specifically make a finding regarding the juror's demeanor, that we are at liberty to second-guess the trial court's ultimate conclusion regarding the credibility of the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reasons for striking a minority juror.
Even though there was some evidence tending to prove racial discrimination, I would not second-guess the eredibility and demeanor judgments of the trial court in making the ultimate factual determination of whether the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral explanations were believable or simply pretextual. In both Snyder and Miller-El there was important evidence of the prosecutor's racial discrimination that is simply not present here. Although I admit that this is a very close call, under the standard of review applicable to the issues before us, I cannot say that the trial court's decision to overrule Killebrew's Batson objection constitutes clear error. I would therefore affirm Killebrew's convictions.

. The majority concludes that the trial court erred in overruling Killebrew's Batson objection with regard to juror L.S. and therefore does not fully address his claim as to the trial court's ruling regarding D.R. Because I do not believe the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous with regard to either juror, I address the trial court's ruling with regard to both.

. P.H. also indicated on the questionnaire that he did not think that he could be a fair and impartial juror. However, when asked by the trial court if he could be a fair and impartial juror, P.H. changed his mind and indicated that he could be fair and impartial.