Court Opinion

ID: 9654679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:46:54.520612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:12.441313
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent for the following reasons:
1) Evidence of prior history of non-as-saultive criminal behavior was erroneously admitted at the penalty phase.
KRS 532.025(2)(b) specifies that the defendant may present evidence of “no significant history of prior criminal activity” as one of the “mitigating circumstances.” Skaggs presented no such evidence. He did not open the door to this subject.
The statutory “aggravating circumstances” (KRS 532.025(2)(a)) do not include previous criminal history in general as a statutory aggravating factor; only proof of “substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions ” is permitted. (Emphasis added)
We should not permit evidence of aggravating circumstances other than those statutory aggravating circumstances which the law allows. Such evidence was erroneous and obviously prejudicial. Maggard v. State, Fl., 399 So.2d 973, cert. den. 454 U.S. 1059, 102 S.Ct. 610, 70 L.Ed.2d 598 (1981).
*683Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983), is erroneously cited in the majority opinion as holding otherwise. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), cited in the majority opinion is inap-posite. It is concerned with proof of a statutory aggravating circumstance (“substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions”), held unconstitutionally vague by the Georgia Supreme Court; not with the unfettered use of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances.
2) Failure to suppress the confession given by the appellant in response to a police-initiated interrogation conducted after appellant was represented by counsel.
Perhaps admitting the appellant’s first statement, given in Indiana on May 14, 1981, can be approved although counsel was not present on grounds that his then attorney was for unrelated Indiana offenses. But the second statement of May 18, 1981 was conducted by police-initiated interrogation after the accused had been arraigned in Kentucky District Court, and the officers knew appellant had appointed counsel on the charges in question. Under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) evidence thus obtained must be suppressed. Our decision is squarely in conflict. Recently, in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed and reenforced its ruling in Edwards. We are not free to officially disagree with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.
3) The trial court erroneously refused a change of venue on the second trial of the penalty phase.
The new trial took place only three months after the mistrial of the penalty phase. The prosecutor had been quoted extensively in local news media, stating that he was seeking the death penalty because of the potential for parole, that there was an enormous amount of money involved in retrying the accused, and that the jury was derelict in its duty at the first trial in not finding the death penalty. The parole problem could not be addressed on voir dire, since to raise the subject is to cause the problem. At one point the trial court stated into the record that the information to the press from the prosecutor to the press was irrelevant and clearly erroneous. Failing to grant a change of venue in these circumstances was an abuse of discretion. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966).
4) Jurors Stilts and Mills should have been excused for cause at the penalty trial.
Mills knew about the possibility of parole and admitted she would be influenced by it. Stilts stated that he had formed an opinion that the death penalty was appropriate at the time of the first trial. Such a juror should not be “rehabilitated” by asking him whether he could put his opinion aside and be fair. See Irvin v. Dowd, supra. The situation calls for application of the principle of implied or presumed bias. Pennington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 316 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
5) Other cumulative errors are:
a) Error in repeated references to collateral criminal activity: (1) selling drugs illegally; (2) having “pulled time”; (3) defendant was on a list of persons with the propensity to commit robbery; and (4) the defendant had a stolen gun.
b) The prosecutor’s repeated references to the juror’s duty as being only “a recommendation.” See our recent decision in Ward v. Commonwealth, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 404 (1985).
The glaring deficiency in this case is the problem with fundamental fairness that resulted from failure to grant a change of venue for the second trial to consider the death penalty. The prosecutor created the problem by generating unacceptable pretrial publicity. The defense was shut off in four different directions: the court refused to either change venue or limit to life; the court refused individual voir dire of jurors regarding exposure to pretrial publicity *684and group voir dire in such circumstances is impossible.