Court Opinion

ID: 9837041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:16:06.148987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.991611
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge
(concurring in the result):
In my view, the issue of unlawful command influence was raised in this case, and properly so. See Art. 37, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 837. Public, pretrial condemnation of an accused by his first sergeant is illegal command influence. United States v. Martinez, 42 MJ 327, 331-32 (1995). The real damage from such statements is a possible poisoning of the jury and the witness pools.
The Government, on appeal, does not argue that the issue of command influence was not properly raised at trial, and the military judge expressly ruled that it was raised at trial. The majority, in its timid dance with command influence, refuses to even state with firmness that it was raised, much less existed in this case. I disagree and state that command influence was not only in the air but on the ground where the first sergeant publicly condemned appellant’s actions before his trial.
*153Furthermore, I strongly disagree with the statement of the appellate court below that the command’s actions in this ease were a “legitimate and necessary exercise of leadership.” Unpub. op. at 3. Congress has precluded this activity in Article 37 when it may “influence the action of a court-martial ... or any member thereof.” Command lectures or addresses on pending military justice matters, even if for a good leadership purpose, are prohibited if those actions may influence a court-martial. United States v. Cruz, 25 MJ 326, 329 (CMA 1987); United States v. Levite, 25 MJ 334, 339 (CMA 1987); United States v. Brice, 19 MJ 170, 172 (CMA 1985); McCann, 8 USCMA 675, 676, 25 CMR 179, 180 (1958). Moreover, I seriously doubt that Marines need to be advised that gang robberies or “jackings” are inappropriate conduct. United States v.
Nevertheless, I agree with the result of the majority opinion. Its prejudice analysis shows beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was not harmed by the misguided actions of his military superiors. The real hero in this case is the military judge, who took strong steps to insure (1) that the jury and witness pools were not poisoned; and (2) that appellant received a fair trial.