Court Opinion

ID: 9831078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:46:54.147999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:30.320399
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The first question presented in appellees’ motion for rehearing is the contention that this court has no jurisdiction; and therefore its judgment of reversal should be set aside, and the appeal dismissed. The reason for making this contention is the fact that R. L. Eidson, who was a defendant in the court below, and against whom appellee Gie-sen sought to recover judgment, in the event he did-not obtain judgment against the defendant West, is not made an obligee in the appeal bond. Th'at question is raised for the first time in appellees’ motion for rehearing.
In reply to that part of the motion for rehearing, appellant contends:
, First. That as no judgment was obtained against the defendant Eidson, and no appeal attempted from the judgment in his favor, it was not necessary to make the bond payable to him.
Second. That the bond given, even if defective, conferred jurisdiction upon this court and power to enter the judgment which it rendered.
[10] Third. ‘That the motion of appellees to dismiss the appeal was not presented within 30 days after the filing of the transcript in this court, and therefore should be considered as waived under rule 8 for the Courts of Civil Appeals’ (142 S. W. xi) appeals.
[11] Fourth. That , this court, having acquired jurisdiction on the original bond, may permit the amendment of that bond as provided by articles 1609 and 2104 of the Revised Statutes, and appellant tenders another bond, curing the defect pointed out by ap-pellee Giésen.
We sustain appellant’s third and fourth contentions, and grant his request to be permitted to file a new bond curing the defect complained of.
[12] Counsel for appellee has filed a plausible argument to the effect that the statute authorizing the filing of new appeal bonds, curing defects in substance as well as in form, should not be so construed as to permit an appeal to be perfected in that manner after the time has expired for perfecting an appeal or writ of error, by'filing the transcript in the Court of Civil Appeals. Notwithstanding that argument, we feel constrained to rule otherwise, and cite in support of our ruling Hugo v. Seffel, 92 Tex. 414, 49 S. W. 369; Williams v. Wiley, 96 Tex. 148, 71 S. W. 12; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 107 Tex. 7, 106 S. W. 326; Tynberg v. Cohen, 76 Tex. 417, 13 S. W. 315; Bank of Decatur v. Preston Nat. Bank. 85 ifex. 562, 22 S. W. 579; Slayton v. Horsey, 97 *323Tex. 342, 78 S. W. 919; Lewellyn v. Ellis, 102 Tex. 297, 116 S. W. 42; Lewellyn v. Ellis, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 453, 115 S. W. 84; First State Bank & Trust Co. v. Mann (Tex. Civ. App.) 209 S. W. 683; Butts v. Davis (Tex. Civ. App.) 146 S. W. 1015; Hall v. Hall (Tex. Civ. App.) 198 S. W. 636; Newell v. Lafarelle (Tex. Civ. App.) 225 S. W. 853; Crawford v. Wellington R. E. Committee (Tex. Civ. App.) 174 S. W. 1004; Dunnagan v. East Tex. Colonization & Develop. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 198 S. W. 357; Oliver v. Lone Star Cotton Jammers & L. Ass'n (Tex. Civ. App.) 136 S. W. 508; Appel v. Childress, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 607, 116 S. W. 129; and Slaughter v. Morton (Tex. Civ. App.) 195 S. W. 897.
In Hugo v. Seffel, supra, the Supreme Court, in considering a bond which was payable to the wife only, held that the husband was a proper and necessary party to the appeal bond, and that he should have been named as an obligee therein, but quoted the statute which is now article 1609, and used the following language:
“It follows that since the passage of the statute quoted, a defective bond is sufficient to give the Court of [Civil] Appeals jurisdiction over the appeal. We therefore conclude that, whether the appeal bond was good or not, the Court of Civil Appeals had jurisdiction of the case and properly refused to set aside its judgment of affirmance on certificate.”
In Williams v. Wiley, supra, an appeal bond, which was not given for any stated amount, was held to be sufficient to give the Court of Civil Appeals jurisdiction, and in so holding the Supreme Court used the following language:
“This [statute] seems to allow the curing of defects of every character in such bonds, and we can see no good reason why, under such a statute, a new bond may not supply the omission of the penalty in the first as well as any other defect. It is true the statute requires a bond in an amount, and that it has been heretofore held that the giving of a bond is essential to the jurisdiction of the appellate court; but it can no longer be held that suc-li jurisdiction cannot be made to attach by a bond defective in substantial particulars. * * * If that which is filed is a bond, though a defective one, and appears to be an attempt to comply with the statute regulating writs of error, the jurisdiction necessarily attaches, because the court is empowered to entertain the case and permit the party to comply with the law. We think it cannot be successfully denied that the instrument in question is a bond. * * * The bend shows on its face that it was filed as an attempt to comply with the statute in order to prosecute the writ of error, complies in most respects with the statute, and must be held sufficient, under the liberal provision quoted, to give jurisdiction to the court, and entitle plaintiffs in error to file a new one.”
In Eirst State Bank y. Mann, supra, this court said:
“The courts of this state have passed upon every requisite of an appeal bond as above set forth, and have held, as to each of them, that a bond deficient as to any one of them is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court, and may be amended when objected to.”
The only other question we care to consider in this opinion is appellee’s contention that the court erred in reversing and rendering judgment in favor of appellant West, because appellee Giesen was entitled to have the judgment affirmed as to §360, the damage sustained by him on account of appellant’s failure to furnish water to irrigate his land for the year 1917. In support of that proposition it is contended on behalf, of appellee Giesen that he pleaded a contract between himself and the defendant West by which the latter agreed to furnish him water to irrigate his land for the year 1917; that he submitted proof sufficient to sustain that allegation, and, as that phase of the case was not submitted to the jury, and as no one asked to have it submitted, it should be presumed, in support of the judgment to the extent of §360, that the court found in favor of the plaintiff upon that issue.
The pleading relied upon by appellee on that feature of the case reads as follows:
“Plaintiff further says that the defendant J. M. West became the owner of the land and estate herein described as belonging to him in the month of September, 1914, and he has since said date continuously owned the said estate; that plaintiff acquired title to the land that he now owns during the month of February, 1917; that during all of the time that said West has owned the land described as belonging to him up to the time hereinafter mentioned he has recognized the right of the land now owned by plaintiff to receive water for irrigating purposes from the pumping plant and through the ditches, pipes, and conduits upon his said land, and when plaintiff was delivered possession of said land in the early part of the year 1917, to wit, in February, 1917, the said J. M. West was then furnishing water from said pumping plant and through said pipes, ditches, and conduits to the land of plaintiff; plaintiff accordingly prepared’his said land for use as irrigated land, and said defendant J. M. West and his agents well knew that plaintiff was expecting to receive water for irrigating purposes for the purpose of raising a crop upon said land for the year 1917; that plaintiff was never notified that sufficient water would not be furnished him, but, on the contrary, the said J. M. West undertook to furnish this plaintiff with water for irrigating purposes, and at all times acquiesced in plaintiff’s statement as to his right to receive water as aforesaid, and accepted from plaintiff a poi’tion of the compensation which the deed from Eidson and AVood to Blackmon provided should be paid for such water. Wherefore plaintiff says that, regardless of whether or not his land was legally entitled to receive such watexy the said West impliedly contracted and agreed to. furnish him with necessary water for irrigation purposes for the year. 1917. Plaintiff alleges that, relying upon *324such implied agreement as well as upon his legal right to receive such water, he, the said plaintiff, went to great expense in preparing his said land to make a crop of cabbage and other truck and to grow on said land crops of various kinds for the year 1917.”
It may be seriously doubted if the facts alleged in that plea showed that any contract was entered into binding appellant to furnish water. When analyzed, it seems to contain allegations only that the defendant, without any alleged consideration, acquiesced in the plaintiff’s contention that he was entitled to water, not under a special contract, but on account of the alleged easement by which the land was entitled to have water furnished from the defendant’s irrigation plant.
[13] But, if it be conceded that the plaintiff’s pleading presented the issue of a separate and distinct contract for water for the year 1917, counsel for appellee have referred us to no testimony, and we have found none, which would sustain a finding that any such contract was made. Furthermore, the judgment of the court shows with reasonable certainty that it was rendered for the plaintiff solely upon the theory of his right to water under his alleged easement, and not upon a contract separate and apart from that creating the easement; and for that reason we do not think the statute invoked by ap-pellee, providing that in certain contingencies it will be presumed that the trial judge made a finding of fact in favor of the successful litigant, is applicable.
The other questions presented in the motion for rehearing have been duly considered and are decided against the appellee and in favor of the appellant.
Motion overruled