Court Opinion

ID: 9397113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 15:06:02.383072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.465499
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-1361
                              Filed May 24, 2023

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF RONALD DEAN HORACEK
AND WANDA KAY HORACEK,

Upon the Petition of
RONALD DEAN HORACEK,
      Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
WANDA KAY HORACEK, n/k/a WANDA KAY JENSEN,
     Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Roger L. Sailer,

Judge.

      Wanda Horacek appeals from the spousal-support award in the decree

dissolving her marriage to Ronald Horacek. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

      Jay P. Phipps of Phipps Law Office, PLC, Moville, for appellant.

      Elizabeth A. Rosenbaum of Rosenbaum Law Firm, P.C., Sioux City, for

appellee.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
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GREER, Judge.

      Wanda Horacek appeals the spousal-support award in the decree

dissolving her marriage to Ronald (Ron) Horacek. She contests the district court’s

award of rehabilitative spousal support in the amount of $700 per month for twenty-

four months, claiming she is entitled to traditional spousal support for the

remainder of her life in the amount of $1500 per month. In addition, she asks for

$4750 in appellate attorney fees. Ron asks us to affirm the decree and award him

$5887 in appellate attorney fees.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

      Ron and Wanda were married in December 1996. The couple had three

children, one of which was still a minor at the time of the 2022 dissolution. Both

Ron and Wanda have high-school equivalent degrees1; neither pursued further

formal education. During the marriage, Ron worked numerous jobs in the pipeline

industry, primarily as an inspector.2 Over time, through experience and on-the-job

training, Ron earned a comfortable living for the family. And while Ron suffers from

diabetes, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol, none of these conditions have

prevented him from working or reaching his full earning capacity. The parties lived

comfortably, but did not live an extravagant lifestyle during the twenty-five-year

marriage. After considering Ron’s fluctuating income over the years, the district

court attributed an annual income of $80,697.33 to him. Ron, who was then fifty-

1 Ron achieved a GED, and Wanda has a high school diploma.
2 Ron was laid off from his employment just days before trial, but both parties
testified it was not uncommon for him to be off for several weeks each year.
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four years old, testified he wanted to retire in about ten years. Wanda was then

fifty-three.

        Wanda did not work outside the home throughout the majority of the

marriage and instead cared for and supported the family while Ron was away for

work, often for months at a time.        In the three years prior to the April 2022

dissolution trial, Wanda worked as a grocery store clerk, and in 2021 earned

$22,000. In the months leading up to trial, Wanda’s health declined and she was

diagnosed with and treated for a number of ailments including osteoarthritis,

fibromyalgia, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and depression. The pain

she was experiencing was so extensive that her physician advised her to reduce

the number of hours she was working, and when that did not help, advised her to

take a leave of absence and apply for social security disability benefits. At the time

of trial, Wanda was not working because of her medical issues. She had applied

for social security disability benefits but had not yet learned whether she would

qualify for those benefits.

        Before the dissolution trial, the parties resolved numerous contested issues

which are not part of the considerations in this appeal. A one-day trial was held

over the remaining issues on April 27, 2022.

        The district court entered its findings of facts, conclusions of law, and decree

on June 30. The decree incorporated the partial stipulation filed prior to trial. As

for the remaining contested issues, the property was divided equitably between

the two parties with Wanda receiving $7409.98 more in value than Ron.3 The

3The net property settlement award to Wanda equaled $52,773.50 and Ron’s net
award was $45,363.52.
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district court also ordered Wanda to pay child support of $50 per month, awarded

Wanda rehabilitative spousal support of $700 per month for twenty-four months,

and required Ron to pay $1000 toward Wanda’s $5430 attorney-fee obligation.

       On July 15, 2022, Wanda moved to reconsider the terms of the decree. She

argued the district court’s award of rehabilitative spousal support failed to achieve

equity between the parties and that Ron should be required to pay all of her

attorney fees instead of the $1000 due to his superior financial position. Ron

resisted the motion. After reviewing both filings, the district court denied Wanda’s

motion.

       Wanda appeals the ruling on spousal support and requests appellate

attorney fees.

II. Standard of Review.

       Our review of equity cases, which encompasses dissolution-of-marriage

proceedings, is de novo. In re Marriage of Mann, 943 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Iowa 2020).

On appeal, “[w]e give weight to the factual determinations made by the district

court; however, their findings are not binding upon us.” In re Marriage of Gust, 858

N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2015). “The institutional deference afforded the district

court in determining spousal support counsels against undue tinkering with

spousal support awards.” In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa

2023). A district court’s award of spousal support should be disturbed “only when

there has been a failure to do equity.” Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 406 (citation omitted).
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III. Discussion.

      A. Spousal Support.

      After considering Wanda’s property award along with the factors bearing on

a spousal-support award, the district court based its decision to award

rehabilitative spousal support on Wanda’s ability to rejoin the workforce and

become self-supporting through a “limited period of education and retraining.”

Taking note of her compromised physical condition, the court stated

      the limitations that her health problems currently place on her
      employment are purely physical, in the form of her lack of ability to
      grasp, lift, and carry items, as is necessary for her most recent
      employment in a grocery store. There is no evidence in the record
      that with some education and/or training Wanda could not be
      suitable for employment that did not require these particular physical
      tasks . . . . .

      Wanda challenges the district court’s award and maintains that the length

of the marriage, her poor physical and emotional health, low earning capacity, and

overall lack of ability to become self-supporting justify an award of traditional

spousal support of $1500 monthly for the remainder of her life. Although arguing

the award that was ordered will cause him financial stress, Ron did not cross-

appeal the spousal-support award and asks that the decision of the district court

be affirmed.

      “Alimony ‘is a stipend to a spouse in lieu of the other spouse’s legal

obligation for support.’” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 702 (Iowa

2007) (citation omitted). When possible, courts try to award alimony so that both

parties can maintain the standard of living they enjoyed during the marriage. In re

Marriage of Grauer, 478 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991); In re Marriage of

Hayne, 334 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983). Iowa Code section 598.21A(1)
                                          6

(2021) provides guidance on determining the necessity, type, and amount of

spousal support, including a list of factors to consider:

               a. The length of the marriage.
               b. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
               c. The distribution of property made pursuant to section
       598.21.
               d. The educational level of each party at the time of marriage
       and at the time the action is commenced.
               e. The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance,
       including educational background, training, employment skills, work
       experience, length of absence from the job market, responsibilities
       for children under either an award of custody or physical care, and
       the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or
       training to enable the party to find appropriate employment.
               f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance becoming
       self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that
       enjoyed during the marriage, and the length of time necessary to
       achieve this goal.
               g. The tax consequences to each party.
               h. Any mutual agreement made by the parties concerning
       financial or service contributions by one party with the expectation of
       future reciprocation or compensation by the other party.
               i. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement.
               j. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an
       individual case.

       The issue in this appeal centers on if Wanda will be able to become self-

supporting with the help of the rehabilitative spousal-support award or whether the

factors and circumstances justify a need for traditional spousal support.

“Rehabilitative spousal support is ‘a way of supporting an economically dependent

spouse through a limited period of re-education or retraining following divorce,

thereby creating incentive and opportunity for that spouse to become self-

supporting.’” Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 185 (citation omitted). This type of spousal

support “addresses training, education, work-readiness, and human capital

development.” Id. at 187. Traditional support, on the other hand, “is equitable in

marriages of long duration to allow the recipient spouse to maintain the lifestyle to
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which he or she became accustomed.” Id. at 185. “Generally, only ‘marriages

lasting twenty or more years commonly cross the durational threshold and merit

serious consideration for traditional spousal support.’” Id. (citation omitted). Here,

the marriage crossed the durational threshold for traditional support, but there are

other factors to consider including a “marked disparity of income” between

spouses. See Mann, 943 N.W.2d at 21 (citing Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 411–12).

       The factors in section 598.21A(1) and goals of spousal support conveyed

in Sokol weigh heavily in favor of an award of traditional spousal support. See 985

N.W.2d at 185. The couple were married for twenty-five years. And although

Wanda received a property award that exceeded the value of that received by Ron

by more than $7400, the district court opined it would not result in a cash windfall

or a significant gain in equity for her until Ron’s pension and annuity fund kicked in

at his retirement. Ron and Wanda’s joint decision to have Wanda leave the

workforce to care for the family hindered her ability to maximize her earning

capacity during the marriage. At her current age of fifty-four, Wanda has little

opportunity to obtain gainful employment even through education, training, or other

means. Wanda presented evidence of her physical ailments and testified the pain

she experiences keeps her from working. Ron argued the recent complaints,

made just before trial, were not genuine; but the district court found “Wanda

presents competent evidence that she does have legitimate diagnoses for at least

some of these ailments and that they do impact on her ability to work.” The district

court also found no evidence Wanda had “the educational background, training,

employment skills, or work experience to obtain anything more than entry-level
                                          8

employment, likely at or near minimum wage.”           This led the district court to

conclude that,

       [a]bsent any support at all, the feasibility of Wanda obtaining a
       standard of living comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage is
       nearly zero, as she simply does not have an earning capacity
       anywhere near that of Ron, nor does she have the potential to
       achieve such an earning capacity at any time in the near future.

But, in its analysis of what type of spousal support to award, the district court noted

that although Wanda could not do physical tasks, she could find other employment,

such as a “desk job,” with some education or training. Thus, the district court

ordered “rehabilitative alimony” for twenty-four months to support Wanda “through

a limited period of education and retraining with the object of self-sufficiency.” But

the record is void of any showing about what training, over what time, and at what

cost, would bring Wanda to the goal of self-sufficiency. See id. at 186 (“Without a

showing that the recipient spouse seeks reeducation, retraining, or some discrete

period of time to increase earning capacity to become self-supporting,

rehabilitative spousal support is inappropriate.”). In sum, the record establishes

that due to her education level, time out of the workforce, age, and physical

ailments, Wanda will not be able to become self-supporting without help.4

       Having determined that traditional spousal support is warranted, we turn to

Wanda’s need and Ron’s ability to pay. Wanda maintained that her net monthly

income at a part-time job would be around $600, and even Ron limited her monthly

net earnings to $1119 on his affidavit of financial status. Ron reported his net

4Although Wanda did not file an affidavit of financial status, she did testify that her
overall monthly expenses to live in a one-bedroom studio apartment would be
approximately $2170. She believed that even if she worked a minimum wage job,
she would have a shortfall of $1570 per month.
                                         9

monthly income on his financial affidavit at $4359, assuming annual earnings of

$62,690. Instead of Ron’s numbers, we accept the district court’s determination

that Ron’s average gross annual earnings equal $80,697.33, after averaging

several years of earnings and excluding 2021 as an “outlier” year. See In re

Marriage of Kupferschmidt, 705 N.W.2d 327, 334 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (affording

the district court discretion to compute fluctuating earnings).    Likewise, even

though Wanda was earning more than $20,000 in her last full year of work, her

part-time earnings at present will be much lower given her medical conditions, and

we note the district court did not impute any income to her when calculating her

child-support obligation. Thus, Wanda’s annual income is far less than that of

Ron’s and, while she may reach some level of self-support, she will not be able to

live the comfortable lifestyle she enjoyed during the marriage.

      Still, we agree with the district court that Ron’s ability to pay is an

appropriate consideration as the entitlement of spousal support should be awarded

“without destroying the right of the party providing the income to enjoy at least a

comparable standard of living as well.” In re Marriage of Stark, 542 N.W.2d 260,

262 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). In light of the

above, we modify the spousal support award to require monthly payments of

traditional spousal support in the amount of $1000 per month until Ron retires or

dies or Wanda remarries, cohabits, or dies—whichever occurs first. Thereafter,

both Ron and Wanda will receive benefits under Ron’s pension, in addition to any

other sources of retirement income they each may have. See Sokol, 985 N.W.2d

at 185 (noting the duration of a traditional support award should correspond with
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the need). At that point, they will likely be in a place where they are more similarly

situated.

       B. Appellate Attorney Fees.

       Both Ron and Wanda request an award of their appellate attorney fees.

Each filed an affidavit of fees expended—Wanda requested $4750 and Ron

requested $5887. “An award of attorney fees is not a matter of right, but rests

within the court’s discretion and the parties’ financial positions.” In re Marriage of

Scheppele, 524 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). “In determining whether

to award appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party making the

request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the

request was obligated to defend the decision of the trial court on appeal.” Id. Given

the circumstances of this case and earnings disparity of the parties, we conclude

Ron should pay $2000 towards Wanda’s appellate attorney fees and deny Ron’s

request for appellate fees.

IV. Conclusion.

       We affirm the decree issued by the district court but modify the spousal

support award in its amount and duration. We award Wanda $2000 in appellate

attorney fees.

       AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.