Court Opinion

ID: 9449212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 05:07:11.421974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:47.147561
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                   revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                              STATE OF MICHIGAN

                              COURT OF APPEALS

ZANE LEE BATTON,                                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     August 3, 2023
                 Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 363258
                                                                     St. Clair Circuit Court
AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE,                                               LC No. 21-000557-NI

                 Defendant,
and

SCOTT DAVID ROMESBURG and ROMESBURG
INTERNATIONAL LLC,

                 Defendants-Appellees

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff, Zane Lee Batton, appeals by right the trial court’s order granting summary
disposition in favor of defendant Scott David Romesburg and defendant Romesburg International
LLC pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact).1 We reverse.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        This case arises from an incident in which Batton was riding his bicycle when he was struck
by Romesburg’s car. On September 12, 2020, Romesburg was driving his car, and he pulled up
to a three-way intersection. Romesburg stopped and waited for an opportunity to make a right
turn, while cross traffic coming from the other two directions did not have a stop sign. While
Romesburg looked left and waited for an opportunity to turn, Batton was riding his bicycle down
the sidewalk, which adjoined the road onto which Romesburg planned to turn, and was coming up

1
    Defendant Auto Owners Insurance is not a party to this appeal.

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on Romesburg’s right. While the exact circumstances surrounding the collision are disputed,
Romesburg began to make his turn as Batton entered the intersection, and they collided. Batton
was injured and subsequently filed a negligence action against Romesburg. The trial court
ultimately granted summary disposition in Romesburg’s favor, reasoning that no rational jury
could find that Romesburg was more at fault for the accident than was Batton. This appeal
followed.

                                         II. DISCUSSION

        Batton argues that the trial court erred by granting Romesburg’s motion for summary
disposition rather than allowing the case to be decided by a jury. We agree.

        This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition, and the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. West v
Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). Summary disposition should be
granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) when the evidence reveals no genuine issue of material
fact. West, 469 Mich at 183. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the
benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable
minds might differ.” Id.

        This case arises from Batton’s claim that his injuries were the direct and proximate result
of Romesburg’s negligence. “To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove
four elements: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3)
causation, and (4) damages.” Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000)
(footnote omitted). In this case, the court’s decision to grant summary disposition was premised
on its conclusion that “no reasonable juror could find that Romesburg was more at fault in the
cause of this accident than was Plaintiff, [emphasis added]” and it did not conclude as a matter of
law that Romesburg was not at fault at all. This was an application of comparative negligence. In
the context of a motor vehicle accident, “a party who is more than 50% at fault” may not recover
any damages. MCL 500.3135(2)(b). Comparative negligence may be decided on a motion for
summary disposition if no reasonable juror could find that the defendant was more at fault than
the plaintiff. Huggins v Scripter, 469 Mich 898, 898; 669 NW2d 813 (2003).

        The trial court’s decision emphasizes its conclusion that Batton’s failure to yield the right
of way to Romesburg violated Mich Admin Code, R 28.1706, which provides that “[e]very
pedestrian who crosses a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk at an
intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles on the roadway.” “An individual lawfully
operating a bicycle upon a sidewalk or a pedestrian crosswalk has all of the rights and
responsibilities applicable to a pedestrian using that sidewalk or crosswalk.” MCL 257.660c.
Batton seems to concede that this was an unmarked crosswalk and that his failure to yield therefore
violated Rule 28.1702. “[V]iolations of administrative rules or regulations do not constitute
negligence per se but may provide evidence of negligence.” In re Consumers Energy Co for Gas
Cost Recovery, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022); slip op at 16, citing Zeni v
Anderson, 397 Mich 117, 142; 243 NW2d 270 (1976). The trial court also considered Batton’s
deposition testimony that he saw defendant was looking the other direction as he entered the
intersection and that he did not make a complete stop before riding his bicycle into the intersection.

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         The trial court erred by failing to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See West, 469 Mich at 183. The trial court emphasized that Batton admitted in
his deposition to having entered the intersection despite seeing that Romesburg was looking in the
opposite direction. However, a reasonable jury could conclude that a prudent person in Batton’s
position would expect Romesburg to check both directions prior to commencing his turn.
Moreover, the trial court’s opinion wholly overlooks Romesburg’s deposition testimony that he
saw Batton riding the bicycle down the sidewalk when he approached the intersection. Romesburg
testified that Batton was approximately 400 feet away when he saw Batton, and Batton testified
that he was going approximately 10 MPH but slowed down as he approached the intersection. If
a jury found these two statements credible, then it could deduce that approximately 30 seconds
elapsed between Romesburg seeing defendant and making the turn.2 A jury could find that it was
negligent for Romesburg to make the turn despite going 30 seconds without checking Batton’s
location. The court also failed to consider the fact that the parties collided so forcefully that
Batton’s bicycle got stuck underneath the car, and Romesburg needed help from a police officer
to extract it. Moreover, Batton testified that Romesburg’s car hit the side of his bicycle and his
leg, and Romesburg testified that there was heavy traffic. Taken together, this evidence could
support an inference that Romesburg executed the turn at an unreasonable rate of speed in order
to fit into a small gap in the traffic. The trial court also failed to consider that Romesburg’s manner
of driving arguably violated Mich Admin Code, R 28.1716, which provides:

              (3) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this part, every driver of a
       vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian on any
       roadway, shall give warning by sounding the horn when necessary, and shall
       exercise proper precaution upon observing any child or any confused or
       incapacitated person on a roadway.

               (4) A person who violates this rule is responsible for a civil infraction.

        Romesburg proceeded into the intersection despite knowing that Batton was approaching
the intersection on his bicycle, and without looking ahead to see whether his path was clear, in
order to, according to his deposition testimony, “slide into” a “gap” between two vehicles. A
reasonable jury could conclude that he therefore “failed to exercise due care to avoid colliding
with [a] pedestrian” in violation of the administrative rule. A jury could draw reasonable
inferences based on the totality of the evidence that would lead it to conclude that Romesburg was
more at fault than Batton. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the trial court to resolve this matter
with summary disposition rather than letting it proceed to a jury.

2
  10 miles per hour is equivalent to approximately 14.7 feet per second. Moving at a pace of 14.7
feet per second, Batton would have needed approximately 27 seconds to travel 400 feet. When
accounting for Batton’s testimony that he slowed down prior to entering the intersection, 30
seconds is a reasonable estimate of the amount of time that elapsed between Romesburg seeing
Batton and making the turn.

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        The trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of Romesburg is reversed.
This case is remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.

                                                          /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                          /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

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