Court Opinion

ID: 9663040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:26:34.22296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:45.081262
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Appellant Lorenzo Keith LaSalle correctly contends with his first point of error that the trial court erred in not granting his motion to suppress his written confession because of the failure to comply with the requirements of Article 38.22, § 2(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Annotated (Vernon 1979). Consequently, I would sustain the point, reverse the judgment, and remand the cause to the trial court.. Because my brethren do not do so, I respectfully dissent.
It is undisputed that appellant’s written confession was secured as the result of custodial interrogation after he received from Detective Susan Smith the warnings mandated by Article 38.22, § 2(a), supra. The confession itself recites that appellant “WAS WARNED ... BY OFFICER Det. S. Smith, THE PERSON TO WHOM I AM MAKING THIS STATEMENT....” However, it is also undisputed that the confession was given to, and reduced to writing by, Detective Hoyt T. Hugg, who was not present when appellant was given the warnings by Detective Smith, and who himself did not give any warning to appellant prior to taking the confession. And it is further undisputed that Detective Smith was not present when the confession was given.
When the confession was offered into evidence during the trial, appellant unsuccessfully objected on the ground that the confession did not comply with the requirements of Article 38.22, supra, because the warnings were not administered by either a magistrate or the person to whom the confession was made. The objection invoked the provisions of the article, which provide that:
No written statement made by an accused as a result of custodial interrogation is admissible as evidence against him in any criminal proceeding unless it is shown on the face of the statement that:
(a) the accused, prior to making the statement, either received from a magistrate the warning provided in Article 15.17 of this code or received from the person to whom the statement is made a warning that:
* ⅜ * * # ⅜
Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.22(a) (Vernon 1979).
“It seems to have been the unbroken rule since [the original enactment of the requirement that prior to making a statement, the accused must receive the warnings from the person to whom the statement is made] that the confession must have been made to the person named therein as the person to whom it is made.” Barker v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 318, 299 S.W.2d 142, 143 (1957). Thus, “unless there has been a showing that the statute has been complied with, the State may not use such evidence as a criminative fact against the defendant.” Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190, 193-94 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Without the showing, the admission of the *829confession over objection is reversible error. Barker v. State, 299 S.W.2d at 142-43.
I,therefore, cannot concur in the majority’s assertion that “[ujnder the interpretation of article 38.22 in cases such as Lugo-Lugo [Lugo-Lugo v. State, 650 S.W.2d 72 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) ] and their progeny, and under the record before us, appellant was sufficiently advised of his rights in compliance with article 38.22 before he executed the confession.” Neither can I agree with their assertion that “the rationale of the Lugo-Lugo decision is that the absence of the officer (who initially gave the rights orally) at the time the statement is reduced to writing does not prevent its validity or receipt into evidence.”
In my view, the rationale of the Lugo-Lugo decision is that the absence of the officer who gave the accused the article 38.22, supra, warnings does not render the confession inadmissible provided the confession is given to an officer who was present when the warnings were given. 650 S.W.2d at 83. The rationale produced a decision which is, also in my view, an aberration in that it is contrary to the mandatory requirement of article 38.22, supra. Be that as it may, none of Lugo-Lugo ⅛ progeny, as illustrated by the majority’s candid recitation of the facts of them, has gone so far to hold, contrary to the mandatory language of article 38.22, supra, that the absence of the officer who administered the warnings does not render the confession inadmissible when the confession was given to an officer who was not present when the warnings were administered. If article 38.22, supra, is to be rewritten to permit that result, it should be done by the Legislature, not this court.
Because appellant’s confession obviously was not taken in compliance with the statute, its admission over objection was reversible error. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the overruling of appellant’s first point of error.