Court Opinion

ID: 9721333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:56:49.869522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:24.959653
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Until the majority's opinion, this Court and the Indiana Supreme Court have never found conduct to be so outrageous as to remove the protection of enforcement of the law immunity. The exceptions to enforcement of law immunity mentioned in Seymour have been dismissed as dicta and nothing more than a theoretical possibility. Riggin v. Bd. of Trust. of Ball State Univ. (1986), Ind.App., 489 N.E.2d 616, 681. See also: Jacobs v. City of Columbus (1988), Ind.App., 454 N.E.2d 1258; Ind. Dept. of Correction v. Stagg (1990), Ind.App., 556 N.E.2d 1338.
Seymour theorized that outrageous acts whether intentional or willful and wanton can be beyond the scope of employment. There is no evidence suggesting that Officer Miller's conduct was intentional. Applying the following precise definitions of willful and wanton, uncontradicted evidence demonstrates that Officer Miller enforced Indiana motor vehicle law within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident entitling him to enforcement of the law immunity as a matter of law:
"Willful or wanton misconduct means: A course of action that shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause injury; or A course of action on the part of the defendant that, under existing conditions, shows either an utter indifference or conscious disregard for the safety of others."
Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil § 5.71 (2nd Ed.1989).
"Willful or misconduct is defined as conduct committed with an intentional or reckless disregard for the safety of others."
Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990). The majority ignores the plain language
of Seymour, which limited theoretical exceptions to enforcement of the law immunity to outrageous acts which are intentional or willful and wanton, by fashioning a new exception termed "outrageous recklessness." Even in applying this new ambiguous exception, there is no evidence that Officer Miller's conduct was "outrageously reckless." Recklessness requires knowledge of the specific harm. An actor cannot be reckless with regard to an unknown potential harm. Wallace v. State (1990), Ind. App., 558 N.E.2d 864. In Wallace, the appeals court reversed a conviction of criminal recklessness when a trucker changed lanes foreing a passenger car off the road. The trucker had no intent to change lanes with conscious and unjustifiable disregard for the safety of the occupants of the passenger car, because the trucker had no knowledge of the presence of the passenger car.
In the present case, Officer Miller failed to see the traffic ahead of him stop. Officer Miller had no knowledge of the presence of the specific harm of stopped traffic. His conduct could not be considered reckless as a matter of law. Officer Miller's conduct may have been negligent. Indiana has not adopted a due care or negligence exception to "enforcement of a law" immunity.
But see: Seymour Nat. Bank v. State, supra, (1981), Ind., 422 N.E.2d 1223, 1226-*1121227, reh. 428 N.E.2d at 205-206 (DeBruler and Hunter, JJ., dissenting). Note, Seymour National Bank v. State Interprets the Indiana Tort Claims Act: Can the Enforcers do no Wrong? (1988) 16 Ind. LR. 705.
Officer Miller's conduct was not intentional, willful and wanton or outrageously reckless as a matter of law.
The trial court should have entered summary judgment.