Court Opinion

ID: 9562846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:34:17.620344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:33.377673
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
dissenting in part and concurring in part:
I respectfully dissent to part II of the majority opinion. The court of appeals held that a suspect cannot voluntarily waive his Miranda rights unless he is informed of the crime about which he is to be questioned. People v. Spring, 671 P.2d 965 (Colo.App.1983). The majority rejects the absolute rule adopted by the court of appeals and holds that a suspect's knowledge of the crime is only one factor to be considered in determining the validity of the waiver. In this ease, however, the court concludes that the failure of the federal agents to inform Spring that he was a suspect in the Walker homicide is a sufficient basis for holding his waiver of Miranda rights on March 30, 1979 invalid. I disagree.
Law enforcement officers have no duty under Miranda to inform a person in custody of all charges being investigated prior to questioning him. Carter v. Garrison, 656 F.2d 68, 70 (4th Cir.1981) (per curiam), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 952, 102 S.Ct. 1458, 71 L.Ed.2d 668 (1982); State v. Carter, 296 N.C. 344, 250 S.E.2d 263, 268, cert, denied, 441 U.S. 964, 99 S.Ct. 2413, 60 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1979); W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 306 (1985). All that Miranda requires is that the suspect be advised that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used against him in court, that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer present during interrogation, and that if he cannot afford a lawyer one will be appointed to represent him. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624-1630 (1966). As one court has stated:
We have serious reservations about an interpretation of Miranda v. Arizona ... which would require that before custodial interrogation begins, in addition to the mandated declarations, a statement must be made by the police as to the nature of the crime under investigation. That landmark decision was painstakingly specific in listing the basic constitutional rights which the police must propound to a suspect before he is questioned. Nowhere is there the slightest indication that there must be included a warning about the nature of the crime which has led to the interrogation conference, what the penalty is for the offense, what the elements of the offense consist of, and similar matters.... In a sense, all of these elements might conceivably enter into an “intelligent and understanding” rejection of an offer for the assistance of counsel, but the simple answer is that Miranda does not by its terms go so far. It requires that the accused be advised of his rights so that *881he may make a rational decision, not necessarily the best one or one that would be reached only after long and painstaking deliberation. Indeed, it may be argued forcefully that a choice by a defendant to forego the presence of counsel at police interrogation is almost invariably an unintelligent course of action. It is not in the sense of shrewdness that Miranda speaks of “intelligent” waiver but rather in the tenor that the individual must know of his available options before deciding what he thinks best suits his particular situation. In this context intelligence is not equated with wisdom.
Collins v. Bierly, 492 F.2d 735, 738-39 (3rd Cir.), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 877, 95 S.Ct. 140, 42 L.Ed.2d 116 (1974) (footnote and citation omitted).
Here, Spring was advised twice of his Miranda rights before he was questioned on March 30, 1985 — first at the time of his arrest and then immediately before the interrogation. Spring was also informed that he had the right to stop the questioning at any time. Thus, the warnings given to Spring exceeded the requirements of Miranda.
In concluding that Spring validly waived his Miranda rights on March 30, 1979, the trial court properly considered the totality of the circumstances under which the waiver was made. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1758, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); People v. Pierson, 670 P.2d 770, 775 (Colo.1983). The court found that Spring “was aware of his right to remain silent, to have counsel present during interrogation, to stop the interrogation at any time; and that his responses were made freely, voluntarily and intelligently.” The trial court’s findings should not be disturbed on appeal if supported by adequate evidence in the record. Pierson, 670 P.2d at 770, 776.
Here, there is ample evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Spring waived his Miranda rights. Prior to any questioning, Spring signed a written acknowledgment and waiver of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel present. Such an express waiver is strong proof of its validity. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757. Additionally, nothing in the record suggests that Spring did not understand the warnings given to him, the nature of his fifth amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). He was a convicted felon who had considerable experience with the police. He was not “worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit.” Id. at 727, 99 S.Ct. at 2573.
The majority nonetheless rejects the findings of the trial court on the sole ground that Spring was not advised that he would be questioned about the Walker homicide. In my view, a waiver of Miranda rights should never be held invalid simply because the suspect is not informed or does not know in advance of all matters that are under investigation and will be the subject of interrogation. The effect of the majority opinion is to add to the Miranda warnings the requirement that the police disclose all possible crimes that might be the subject of interrogation. The practical difficulties of satisfying this requirement are obvious. Prior to questioning a suspect, the police may have insufficient information to determine what charges will ultimately be filed against him. The nature of the offense may depend upon circumstances unknown to the police, such as whether the suspect has a criminal record. It may also turn upon an event yet to occur, such as whether the victim of the crime dies. Therefore, I reject the majority’s conclusion that Spring’s waiver of his Miranda rights on March 30, 1979 was invalid simply because he was not informed of all matters that would be reviewed when he was questioned by the police.
I would also uphold the trial court’s refusal to suppress the statements made by Spring to Colorado law enforcement officers on May 26, 1979. When Spring was told that the Colorado authorities wished to *882speak with him, he readily agreed to do so. The officers orally advised Spring of his Miranda rights, and he then signed a written acknowledgment and waiver form. Spring told the officers that he agreed to talk to them about the Walker homicide because he “wanted to get it off his chest.” The interview was conducted in the day room of the jail and lasted only one hour and thirty minutes. Spring talked freely to the officers about his participation in the Walker homicide. At no time did he refuse to answer questions or request the presence of counsel. Nothing in the record indicates that the officers conducted the interview in a coercive manner. At the conclusion of the interview, Spring read, edited, and signed a written statement prepared by one of the officers summarizing the interview. In my view, the trial court correctly found that the statement given by Spring was made freely, voluntarily, and intelligently, after a proper Miranda advisement and waiver.
Finally, I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in not suppressing the statement made by Spring on July 13,1979. In light of Spring’s refusal to answer certain questions regarding the Walker shooting, the agents should have then determined if Walker sought to invoke his right against self-incrimination on that subject. Their failure to do so renders Spring’s purported waiver of his Miranda rights invalid.
I am authorized to say that Justice RO-VIRA joins me in this dissent and concurrence.