Court Opinion

ID: 9830629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:20:12.755472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:24.975510
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant in his motion cites us to a number of Texas decisions, many of them by our Supreme Court, which he urgently insists sustain his contention that, in order to take a parol gift or parol sale out of the statute of frauds (article 3965, § 4, Vernon’s Sayles’ Texas Civil Statutes), possession alone, with payment, in case of a sale, of purchase price, in part or in whole, by the vendee, will not suffice, but there must also be shown valuable improvements made by the latter with the knowledge and consent of the former. Hence it is urged that we were in error in sustaining the conveyance in this case, since we found that no such improvements had been made as would of themselves take the conveyance out of the operation of the statute.
On reconsideration we have carefully examined, not only every Texas authority cited by appellant, but also many others, and have concluded that at least some of the Supreme Court decisions fail to support our heretofore expressed views. While in many, if not most, of the’ states having the same or similar statutory adoption of the English statute of frauds, enacted in 1676 (29 Car. LI, c. 3, *756§ 1), courts oí equity have been very liberal in construing such statutes and in giving relief, yet our own courts have seemingly been loath to depart from the somewhat rigorous terms of the statute. This conservative sentiment was voiced in the opinions of Chief Justice Hemphill and Associate Justice Lipscomb in one of the leading cases on this question, Garner v. Stubblefield, reported in 5 Tex. 552. Early in our judicial history, however, the Supreme Court of Texas modified the statutory inhibition, by enforcing specific performance of a parol contract to convey land where valuable improvements had been made by the vendee or donee, with the knowledge and consent of the vendor or donor. This departure from the strict rule of the statute is justified upon the ground that to follow the statute enacted to prevent frauds would in such a case induce and encourage the evils sought to be prevented by the statute. While it may be questioned whether in case of the payment of all, or a large part, 'of the purchase price, especially where the insolvency of the parol vendor is shown, there is not presented a more cogent appeal to the equity powers of the courts than in the case of valuable improvements .made, yet the decisions have established the •distinction beyond question, and it has become stare decisis. Equity might permit the removal of improvements, where possible, made by the vendee who is denied specific performance, but it could hardly give substantial value to a moneyed judgment recovered against a hopeless bankrupt.
In many cases language has been used indicating that the court did not intend to hold, or wish to be understood as holding, that the making of valuable improvements was the only equitable ground upon which specific performance should be granted. In Wood v. Jones, 35 Tex. 66, and Morris v. Gaines, 82 Tex. 255, 17 S. W. 538, it is stated in so many words that either valuable improvements made in good faith by the ven-dee, with the consent of the vendor, or (italics ours) delivery of possession by a vendor, will take the transaction out of the statute. In Neatherly v. Ripley, 21 Tex. 434, it is said that, the purchase money having been paid, possession alone is sufficient to raise an equity to prevent the contract from being treated as a nullity. In Dugan v. Colville, 8 Tex. 126, Justice Lipscomb says:
“I apprehend that the true principle is that, if there has not been such a change of circumstances produced or growing out of the parol contract that it would be difficult to place the vendee in the same position that he was in before making the contract, there would not be a sufficient equity raised to justify a decree for a conveyance of the title. If, however, the vendor, by a parol contract, should permit the ven-dee to go into the possession and bestow much labor and expense in improving the land, in the confidence that the vendor would make the title in conformity with his parol promise, such circumstances would raise an equity in favor of the vendee against his vendor, aside from and uncontrolled by the statute of frauds.”
But the opinion does not say that the state of facts used as an illustration is the only one that would avoid the statute, and reasonably implies the contrary. In Robinson v. Davenport, 40 Tex. 334, there were shown valuable improvements to sustain the conveyance, but in discussing the questions involved the court says:
“The doctrine that courts of equity will decree specific performance of parol contracts for the sale of lands under certain circumstances against the inhibitions of 'the statute of frauds requmng the agreement or some memorandum to be in writing has been too long established to be seriously questioned. The inquiry therefore is not whether relief will be granted in any case, but whether the case comes within certain defined rules which have been held to establish exceptions to the statute. The decisions proceed upon the idea that the equities which will be enforced are in aid of the statute which was to prevent fraud, and independent of it.”
In Jones v. Carver, 59 Tex. 293, 296, the court uses the following language:
“ * * * To entitle the plaintiffs to its specific performance, it is not enough, under the decisions of this court, to show that such a contract was made, and that the greater part, or even all, of the purchase money has been paid. Some other equitable matter [italics ours] must be shown to entitle a party to the specific performance of such a contract.”
In the case of Altgelt v. Escalera, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 108, 110 S. W. 989, by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District, a very full discussion of this question is presented, and the writer of the opinion, Justice Fly, uses this language:
“A person claiming real estate under a parol sale or gift obtains no assistance from' the law, because it declares such a sale or gift invalid, and in order to enforce such parol agreement he must present proof of possession and the making of valuable improvements of a permanent character, or other foots [italics ours] showing that the transaction is a fraud on the purchaser or donee, it not enforced.”
There are expressions in other decisions of our Supreme Court and the Courts of Civil Appeals indicating the judicial purpose to limit the exception to the statute to the case of valuable improvements exclusively. For instance, in Woolbridge et al. v. Hancock et al., 70 Tex. 18, 6 S. W. 818, our Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Maltbie, uses the following language:
“But it is necessary to the validity of a parol sale or gift of land in Texas, however the rule may be elsewhere, that possession be delivered and substantial and valuable improvements made, with the consent or knowledge of the vendor, upon the faith of such gift or sale, and that the mere taking possession or making improvements of insignificant value is not sufficient, especially where the value of the rents exceeds that of the improvements.”
But the force of this enunciation as a general statement of the law, rather than as an application of the law to the particular facts disclosed in that case, is somewhat impaired by the subsequent language in that opinion, to wit:
“It follows that every case of this class must stand on its special facts, and when it would be *757inequitable and fraudulent, as against the person in possession, and especially when he cannot be restoréd to bis former condition, the vendor or donor will not be permitted to repudiate the contract; but the inclination of courts is against extending the rule dispensing with writings in the transfer of lands beyond its present limit, whatever hardships its enforcement may cause in particular cases; the policy of ever having dispensed with it in any case being doubted.”
[3] Though we fully appreciate the importance of the main question involved in this case, yet, in spite of a seeming conflict of authorities, we are still of the opinion that defendant in this case presented proof entitling her to the protection of the beneficent equitable power residing in the courts. The evidence justifies the conclusion that M. P. Moore, by parol, 'conveyed the property in question to the defendants in consideration of years of faithful service and tender care and a like service and care to he rendered during his remaining years. Neither party to the contract knew for what length of time such service would continue. Though an old man, it might reasonably be presumed that Moore would live for many years. The Loftons accepted the contract tendered, and undertook to fulfill, and the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conclusion that they did fulfill to its utmost, their part of the contract. It is difficult to measure in dollars and cents the value of such service. The care of the sick, and especially of the aged, is oftentimes exceedingly trying on the patience and nerves of the attendants. As was said in the case of Bryson v. McShane, 48 W. Va. 126, 35 S. E. 848, 49 L. R. A. 527:
•“There are some cases that cannot be compensated for by mere money damages. There are some services that are incapable of valuation in money. As to these the law permits individuals to make their own contracts. Old age is naturally repulsive. The hair grows gray, the eyes sunken, the skin wrinkled and drawn, the will feeble, the habits careless, needing all the care and attention of childhood, without its purity, loveliness, and affection as a compensation*
[4, 5] Since plaintiff’s suit was in form of trespass to try title, defendants were entitled to give in evidence any lawful defense to the action except the defense of limitation, without any special .pleading as a predicate therefor. We are of the opinion that under the evidence plaintiff was entitled in equity to a conveyance on the theory that, while at the time of the purchase of the premises in question 'the legal title thereto was taken in the name of M. P. Moore, yet in fact the equitable title was at all times thereafter in the defendants. Mrs. Lofton testified that said Moore told her that it was for her that he ivas buying the place, and other evidence set out in the original opinion sustains the theory that it was the understanding of both Mr. Moore and the defendants that at the time of the conveyance to Moore of the property in question, though the paper title was placed in him, the equitable title was vested in the defendant Mrs.' Lofton.- A conveyance to Moore of the premises, if he at the time of the conveyance agreed by parol to hold the same for the defendants, would vest the equitable title in them, and such parol agreement would constitute a valid enforceable trust, and would authorize a court of equity to decree the transfer of his interest in the property to the defendants. James v. Fulcrod, 5 Tex. 512, 55 Am. Dec. 743; Long v. Gray, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 172, 35 S. W. 32; Miller v. Thatcher, 9 Tex. 482, 60 Am. Dec. 172; Houser v. Jordan, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 398, 63 S. W. 1049. In such a case the statute would not apply.
Hence we conclude that appellant’s motion for rehearing should be overruled; and it is so ordered.