Court Opinion

ID: 9819513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:26:49.077089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:11.810060
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TURNER, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority order finding the $1,551,616.48 Fidelity account No. X53094005 was petitioner’s nonmarital property. As the majority notes, to rebut the presumption the account at issue was marital property, petitioner bore the burden of proving by clear, convincing, and unmistakable evidence that she acquired the account as a gift from respondent. The fact the account was listed in petitioner’s name only was insufficient to rebut the marital property presumption. Thus, petitioner had to prove respondent transferred the account to her with a donative intent to pass title and relinquish all present and future dominion over the account. See 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1154. I find petitioner’s testimony was not clear, convincing, and unmistakable evidence and thus was insufficient to rebut the marital property presumption. The facts of this case are similar to those in both Davis, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 771-73, 576 N.E.2d at 49-51, and Leff, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 806-08, 499 N.E.2d at 1052-53, where the courts found the property was marital property. See 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1155. Here, respondent testified he transferred the account into petitioner’s name to protect the account from his pending malpractice lawsuits. See Leff, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 807-08, 499 N.E.2d at 1052-53 (finding a lack of donative intent where the respondent testified he transferred property to his spouse to protect it from a possible malpractice action). He anticipated the account would be returned to joint ownership when he retired. Contrary to the majority’s finding, respondent continued to deal with the account after the transfer by depositing his paycheck into the account until the parties separated. ín this case, the trial court took judicial notice of two medical malpractice cases that were pending against respondent at the time of the transfer. That evidence supports respondent’s testimony that the transfer was for asset protection purposes. Also, as in Davis, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 576 N.E.2d at 50, respondent filed no gift tax return. Moreover, petitioner did not assert the account at issue was her nonmarital property in both her response to respondent’s interrogatories and her initial prejudgment pretrial memorandum. It was not until her supplemental pretrial memorandum that she alleged the account was a gift. Petitioner cites In re Marriage of Weiler, 258 Ill. App. 3d 454, 463, 629 N.E.2d 1216, 1222 (1994), wherein the Fifth District distinguished the respondent donor’s motive for transferring his property from his intent for making the transfer. The court found that “[mjotive is what prompts a person to act or fail to act, and intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done or omitted.” Weiler, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 463, 629 N.E.2d at 1222. I am unconvinced and discern no reason to distinguish motive and donative intent as they are the same concept. The majority intimates its disapproval of respondent’s attempt to hide his assets from potential creditors. See 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1155. This is certainly understandable, but by recognizing the transfer here as a completed gift, the majority’s ruling tends to give credence to the practice of hiding assets from creditors rather than discouraging it. For the reasons stated, I would reverse the trial court’s classification of the $1,551,616.48 Fidelity account No. X53094005.