Court Opinion

ID: 9860274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:16:52.714077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:20:19.482717
License: Public Domain

MORAN, J., dissents in part. I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that every donee named in the will, except the devisees of real estate specifically excluded, shares in the residuary estate because, in my opinion, the will and codicil when read as a whole and construed together, mean that the testatrix intended to confine the residuary estate to the recipients of specific amounts of money under the will. The language “all the rest and residue of my property is to be divided among the above named legatees in the amount of their legacy as herein specified” contained in the residuary clause of the will, when read in conjunction with the rest of the will, supports this contention. The quoted language obviously applies only to those clauses in the will in which specific amounts of money were awarded and specific amounts of money, ranging from $500 to $1,500 were given only in Clauses Three through Sixteen with the testatrix, in each instance, using the words, “I give and bequeath.” In addition, the following language: “In case any of the above named parties to whom I have made legacies in this my last will and testament shall die before I do, the legacy given to such party shall abate” was placed between Paragraphs Sixteen and Seventeen of the will. Paragraph Sixteen was the last paragraph which made a specific bequest of money and Paragraph Seventeen was the first of three paragraphs which made a specific devise of real estate. Therefore, the use of the quoted words in this particular place in the will also indicates that every donee of a specific bequest of money in Paragraphs Three through Sixteen was considered a legatee. Since the testatrix then used the words “above named legatees in the amount of their legacy as herein specified” in the residuary clause of the will she meant those donees specified in Paragraphs Three through Sixteen. It is fundamental in construing wills that the intention of the testator, as determined from the entire will, be given effect unless contrary to law. Such intention is determined in two ways, one, by ascertaining the testator’s actual meaning from the words employed, to which all rules of construction give way, and the other, by finding his presumed intention by the application of rules of construction where the meaning is obscure, doubtful or uncertain. Resort to such rules is necessary, however, only where the actual intent cannot be ascertained. If the intention may be gathered from the language of the will without reference to rules of construction, there is no reason to use them. Wiener v. Severson, 11 Ill2d 347, 143 NE2d 225, and cases cited therein. The majority opinion violates the above principles because it resorts to rules of construction to negate the actual meaning of the language employed by the testator. If two constructions are each fairly possible, one which indicates an absurd or unjust intention and the other a reasonable and fair intention, the courts will give preference to that construction which indicates a reasonable and fair intention. Page on Wills, Vol 4, p 90, Sec 30.12; Storkan v. Ziska, 406 Ill 259, 94 NE2d 185. Assuming that two different constructions of the will are fairly possible here, the above rule of law applies. Under the majority decision the share of each donee under the residual clause will not be ascertainable without an appraisal of the real estate of those devisees who are to share in the residuary estate. It would seem unreasonable for the testatrix to intend this result. However, if we adopt the construction that only those donees who receive specific money bequests under the will and codicil share in the residuary estate, a reasonable and fair intention will result, because then the share of each recipient of the residuary estate will be definitely ascertainable. For example, a donee receiving $1,000 would be entitled to one-tenth of the residuary estate if the total money bequests under the will came to $10,000 and one-fifth of the residuary estate if the specific money bequests came to $5,000, etc. I do not agree that the codicil indicated an intention on the part of the testatrix for every donee named in the will and codicil to participate in the residuary estate, with the exception of the two devisees specifically hy name excepted. The testatrix used the words “I give and devise and bequeath” to make specific money bequests in her codicil. She then gave “a proportionate residuary share in my estate with the other devisees and legatees thereof as set forth in my last will and testament.” It is not apparent from the will or the codicil that the testatrix always clearly understood the difference between a bequest and a devise or a legatee and devisee. This is clearly shown by the majority decision which properly held that she did not. If a conflict obtains between the will and a codicil, an interpretation is preferred rendering» effective the will and eliminating or reconciling conflicts if such construction is not inconsistent with the general intent of the testator as gathered from the entire instrument. See Illinois Law and Practice, Yol 36, c 7, § 220, p 319.