Court Opinion

ID: 9737548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:28:23.372064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.690873
License: Public Domain

Reardon, J.
The defendant was indicted on September 29, 1967, for murder in the first degree of David Martin Sidlauskas on April 24, 1966, and after a twelve day trial was, on February 20, 1968, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed to this court, assigning as error the admission of eyewitness identification testimony and the exclusion of evidence implicating another person in the crime. We affirmed the judgment. Commonwealth v. Geraway, 355 Mass. 433 (March 7, 1969).
On November 10, 1970, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial alleging, inter alla, that newly discovered evidence revealed a “conflict of interest on the part of the law firm that represented petitioner at trial so severe that it resulted in a denial of the right to effective counsel as guaranteed in the 6th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and the right to equal protection of the law, as guaranteed in the 14th Amendment.”
After an evidentiary hearing the trial judge denied the motion. 1 The defendant excepted to the denial and claimed an *170appeal under the provisions of G. L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33H.
We summarized the factual framework of the trial in our opinion cited above. In essence, the case against the defendant consisted of certain eyewitness testimony given by two persons who identified him as a man they had seen in a yellow car near the site where the victim’s body was discovered on the day of the murder, and the testimony of six other witnesses to admissions by the defendant that he had perpetrated it. It appeared at the hearing on the motion that four of these latter witnesses, and members of their immediate families, were represented, or had been represented, in various civil and criminal matters by the firm of Crane, Inker & Oteri. These witnesses were Carol Davies (sometimes referred to as Miss Kennedy), the defendant’s ex-wife; her brother, Edward Kennedy; her sister, Michelle LeClair; and one William Dennett, a friend of the defendant.
The relationships between several members of this firm, the defendant, and certain witnesses at his trial can be summarized as follows. On May 9, 1967, Mr. Oteri, a member of the firm, wrote to the defendant, then incarcerated in Indiana, notifying him of one murder indictment against him, and the possibility of another, and suggesting a meeting “in order that we can prepare to defend against this charge.”* 2 Two days later Mr. Oteri again wrote to the defendant and indicated that he had asked Mr. Inker of his firm to be counsel “with me functioning as his associated counsel,” and instructed the defendant to ask the Chief Justice of the Superior Court to appoint Mr. Inker as counsel. Mr. Oteri noted, “We are prepared to represent you through the trial, *171and any subsequent appeal . . . even though you have no money.”3 Mr. Inker was thereafter appointed counsel and represented the defendant at his trial and through his subsequent appeal.
Mr. Oteri testified that “I had William Dennett a number of times on various criminal charges in Massachusetts and he would call me at times when he would be arrested outside of Massachusetts and I would attempt to counsel him as to what he should do.” His representation of Dennett included at least one case in May, 1966, shortly after the Sidlauskas murder. Although Mr. Oteri testified initially that “I don’t have any memory of ever talking to Dennett after he went to Michigan and became involved with the district attorney’s office in certain testimony that I think he gave against Mr. Geraway,” he later testified that he did remember talking to Dennett in Michigan and consulting with him about a case in that jurisdiction involving checks. In a communication to Boston police Lt. Ingenere on March 14, 1967, Dennett referred to Mr. Oteri as his counsel.
Carol Davies, the defendant’s ex-wife, testified that in March, 1967, she and her sister, Michelle LeClair, and her mother were questioned by Lt. Ingenere about the two murder cases involving the defendant and that she first told the lieutenant she knew nothing. The questioning by the lieutenant continued for about a week. During that period Carol Davies called Mr. Oteri “a few times” to ask his advice about the questioning and was advised by him to tell the lieutenant what she knew. Thereafter she told Lt. Ingenere that the defendant had made certain statements about the Sidlauskas murder, and she testified to that effect at the defendant’s trial.
Michelle LeClair also gave evidence of questioning by Lt. Ingenere, and further said that she engaged in a discussion with her sister Carol as to whether she should answer his questions, that she was with Carol when she called Mr. Oteri, *172and that when they saw Mr. Oteri in the court house he advised her to tell what they knew. She testified that prior to getting advice from Mr. Oteri to testify she had not told Lt. Ingenere anything, and that her decision to answer his questions was at least partially influenced by Mr. Oteri’s advice.
Edward Kennedy, a brother of Carol and Michelle, gave evidence that he also was questioned by Lt. Ingenere about the defendant’s involvement in a murder case about March, 1967. Mr. John P. White, Jr., of the firm of Crane, Inker & Oteri represented him on the first day of the interrogation. Later in that week Edward Kennedy consulted Mr. Oteri. Before talking with Mr. Oteri, Kennedy told Lt. Ingenere that he did not know anything about the subject of the interrogation. Later he said that the defendant had said something relative to the murder. He also testified that the police at the interrogation suggested they might involve him in a current armed robbery investigation, and that at the time of the defendant’s trial armed robbery charges were in fact pending against Kennedy. He was subsequently acquitted on these charges. At the hearing on the motion, Edward Kennedy testified that what he ultimately told Lt. Ingenere concerning the defendant’s statement that “I whacked a guy” was untrue.
In addition to counseling these witnesses, the firm of Crane, Inkér & Oteri represented various members of their immediate family during the time it was representing the defendant. The firm represented Dennett’s child and wife (as guardian and next friend) in a tort case which began about 1965 and was not finally disposed of until April 8, 1968. A judgment for $4,500 was eventually entered on a case in which the ad damnum was $250,000.
Beginning in January, 1967, the firm represented Russell Kennedy, the brother of Carol Davies, Edward and Bernard Kennedy, and Michelle LeClair on a homicide charge. This case was disposed of in June of 1967, but the firm continued rendering services relative to it until the summer of 1968. According to statements made by both Mr. Oteri and Edward Kennedy, the whole Kennedy family was involved in retain*173ing Mr. Oteri and discussing various matters with him and attempting to raise money for a fee in conjunction with the charge against Russell Kennedy. According to the testimony of Edward Kennedy, this fee was to consist of a payment of $500 to $800, plus an agreement to retain the firm for any civil cases which the family might have.
The firm also represented Bernard Kennedy on an assault and battery charge in April, 1967.
In that same month the firm represented Edward Kennedy and his wife Maureen in a tort suit on behalf of their son Stephen, a case which was settled in 1970 on the payment of certain sums. The firm handled another tort suit involving Sheila, another child of Edward and Maureen Kennedy, in 1968, and on this case money was recovered in December, 1969.
It would thus appear from virtually undisputed testimony that Mr. Oteri, as well as other members of the firm, was closely associated with William Dennett at least through the time of the police investigation of the Sidlauskas murder, and served as counsel for many members of the Kennedy family in both civil and criminal matters around the time of the defendant’s trial.4 Since it appears there was a significant possibility suggested by the evidence that Dennett in fact committed the murder, that various members of the Kennedy clan were in serious trouble with the police during this period, and that the firm was handling several tort cases for close relatives of the witnesses, the situation was replete with potential constraints, both ethical and economic, on the firm’s representation of the defendant.
The questions raised by the foregoing recitation are made even more acute in that the defendant himself repeatedly questioned the firm’s interest in representing him. He wrote to Mr. Oteri more than a few times asking why the firm wanted to represent him since he had no money to pay them. To his repeated questions he received no written response. *174He also specifically inquired whether the firm was representing Dennett and therefore would not be able to give him its undivided loyalty. Mr. Inker finally replied specifically in a one line letter: “We never heard of Billie Dennett.” However, there was a file maintained for Dennett in the firm and his name was apparently in the firm’s card index of clients.
We accept the findings of the trial judge as true. Thus, although the firm considered as a single entity was involved in a serious conflict of interest, Mr. Inker’s lack of knowledge of that conflict (finding No. 5) and the competence and vigor with which he conducted the defence (finding No. 8) indicate, as does our independent examination of the trial transcript, that there was slight, if any, possibility of prejudice to Geraway. Although there is doubt whether Federal constitutional principles require that a new trial be granted where a nonprejudicial conflict exists, see Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942); Hayman v. United States, 205 F. 2d 891 (9th Cir. 1953); Lollar v. United States, 376 F. 2d 243 (D. C. Cir. 1967); Zurita v. United States, 410 F. 2d 477 (7th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Williamson v. LaVallee, 282 F. Supp. 968 (E. D. N. Y. 1968), and no State constitutional claim has been argued to us, the requirements of justice would be best served by ordering a new trial under our power set forth in G. L. c. 278, § 33E. The web of circumstances and overlapping relationships here, highlighted by Geraway’s insistent inquiries about the possibility of a conflict, go far beyond cases of simple dual representation as, for example, Commonwealth v. Smith, 362 Mass. 782.
The defendant was entitled to the undivided loyalty of counsel as defined in the new American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics, Ethical Consideration (EC) 5-14: “Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely affect his judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem arises whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients who may have differing interests, whether such interests be conflicting, inconsis*175tent, diverse, or otherwise discordant” (emphasis supplied). At the very least, if there exists even the possibility of a conflict of interest a lawyer is under an obligation to reveal it to his client. DR 5-105(C). See A. B. A. Standards Relating to The Prosecution Function and The Defense Function. § 3.5,
р. 211. In this case not only was Mr. Inker a partner of the firm that represented four of the six witnesses to the defendant’s alleged admissions but, when questioned about a possible conflict by the defendant, he flatly and specifically denied the existence of the relationship as to one of them.
It is conceivable that the foregoing facts were produced by utterly inadequate office management; it is tragic that any such inadequacy serves to produce the result of this opinion, causing as it will additional heavy expense to the county in which an otherwise faultless trial was held in which there was strong evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The situation serves to point up the necessity of the institution by counsel of adequate checking arrangements to prevent a situation similar to that which obtained here.
As was stated in Commonwealth v. Cox, 327 Mass. 609, 614 (1951), which also involved a trial free from error, G. L. с. 278, § 33E, “consigns the facts as well as the law to our consideration, gives us the power and the duty exercised by a trial judge upon a motion for a new trial, and requires us to consider the whole case broadly to determine whether there was any miscarriage of justice.” We conclude that in this case such a miscarriage occurred.
Following our opinion in Commonwealth v. Geraway, 355 Mass. 433, a rescript affirming the judgment below was docketed in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court for Norfolk County on March 10, 1969. General Laws c. 278, § 33E, states in part: “[I]f any motion is filed in the superior court after rescript, no appeal shall lie from the decision of that court upon such motion unless the appeal is allowed by a single justice of the supreme judicial court on the ground that it presents a new and substantial question which ought to be determined by the full court.” It is apparent, however, that what is now before us was not before us when we carried *176out a review under c. 278, § 33E, and decided Commonwealth v. Geraway, supra. We thus have not had the opportunity to engage in a complete review under that section and no good purpose would therefore be accomplished by a remand to the single justice under § 33E.
In view of the foregoing we are of opinion that this is an appropriate occasion for the exercise of our power to order a new trial for reasons required by justice. The rescript is withdrawn, the judgment is reversed, the verdict is set aside, and the case is to stand for further proceedings on the indictment.

So ordered.

In his findings, rulings and order relative to the defendant’s motion, the judge stated as follows: “1. Attorney Munroe Inker was trial attorney for the defendant herein at the trial of this indictment. 2. At all material times, before and during the said trial, Mr. Inker was a partner in the law firm of Crane, Inker and Oteri. 3. Before and during the said trial the said firm, or certain attorneys associated with the firm, represented as attorneys one William Dennett and certain members of the Kennedy family of Roxbury in certain legal matters. These legal matters were not related to the within murder indictment. 4. Said William Dennett and certain members of the said Kennedy family testified at the trial of said indictment, all were called by the Commonwealth as witnesses, and all testified to facts which were substantially adverse to the interests of the defendant. 5.1 find that Mr. Inker, at all times material to his representation of the defendant, was unaware that the firm of Crane, Inker and Oteri or any of its members or associates were acting as attorneys or had ever acted as attorneys for any of the witnesses who testified at the trial of this indictment. 6.1 find that Mr. Inker was not affected in his judgment or conduct in his representation of Mr. Geraway by the legal representation of the said witnesses by other attorneys in the said law firm. 7. No credible evidence appeared before me that any attorney associated with the firm of Crane, Inker and Oteri ever informed Mr. Inker of the firm’s representation of the said witnesses, and no credible evidence appeared before me that any attorney associated with the said law firm and who was aware of the firm’s representation of said witnesses ever influenced or attempted to influence the judgment or conduct of Mr. Inker in the defense of the indictment. I find that Mr. Inker was not informed by anyone of the firm’s representation of the witnesses, and I find that no such member or associate *170of the firm ever influenced Mr. Inker or attempted to influence Mr. Inker in his conduct of the Geraway defense. 8. I find that Mr. Inker’s legal representation of Mr. Geraway in the preparation for trial and the trial of this indictment was competent and skillful. 9. I find that Mr. Geraway was found guilty at the trial of this indictment by a jury which had heard a great weight of clear and convincing evidence of his guilt. 10. It is ORDERED that the within motion for a new trial is denied.”

The extent of Mr. Oteri’s prior professional relationship with the defendant was unspecified, although the defendant suggested it began in May of 1966, two to three weeks after the murder of Sidlauskas, when the wife of William Dennett retained Mr. Oteri to represent the defendant on an unrelated charge. It is quite apparent from Mr. Oteri’s testimony, and from the fact that his letter indicated that it was a response to one from the defendant, that he and the defendant had been acquainted with each other for some time prior to this.

Mr. Oteri could not represent the defendant as his counsel as he was a member of the bar for less than ten years and hence, not eligible for appointment as his counsel. See Rule 95 of the Superior Court (1954).

Mr. Inker himself testified that Dennett told him, when being interviewed by Mr. Inker prior to the defendant’s trial, that Mr. Oteri had “helped his kid.” Furthermore, Mr. Oteri testified that he probably discussed the possibility of a conflict of interest with Mr. Inker, as well as other aspects of the case.