Court Opinion

ID: 9645592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:29:27.96159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:29.647256
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellant argues, in two grounds of error, that two prospective jurors were im*48properly excluded from the jury in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (hereafter Witherspoon). The majority disposes of these contentions with a series of concluso-ry statements after setting out the respective voir dire examinations. It is instructive, however, to examine more closely the precise procedure the majority today approves for excluding prospective jurors. In appellant’s case one juror was properly excluded. The other was not.
The first of these veniremen, Kenneth Holstead, told the trial court that he did not believe in the death penalty. He told the prosecutor on direct examination that he could never answer both punishment issues “yes” knowing the death penalty would be assessed as a result. “I don’t think I could take an oath that would put me in that situation.”1
On crossexamination the venireman was asked if he could put aside his feelings and vote on the special issues according to the instructions and the law he would be given by the trial court, to which he replied, “You [sic] asking about taking an oath as a juror, I would have to.” On redirect examination, however, he reverted to his earlier position, with the qualification, “No, I couldn’t effectively take the oath.” 2 When he was once again questioned by defense counsel Hol-stead was asked, “And whether or not you feel you agree with that particular law, the fact is you could follow the law of what the Judge would give you in his Charge?” and answered, “Yes.”
On the last round of questioning by the State, this crucial exchange took place, after the venireman was asked once more if he could take an oath to follow the law in arriving at his verdict:
“A: [By the venireman] First let me ask you this.
Q: [By the prosecutor] Okay.
A: Say I’m selected.
Q: All right.
A: What happens if I refuse to take this oath?
Q: Well, nobody can make you take the oath. I’m not saying you would go to jail or anything like that.
A: I don’t know; I’m not a lawyer.
Q: You’re talking about the consequences of not taking the oath. The only consequences are if you take an oath and don’t follow your oath; you see what I’m saying? Nobody can force you to take an oath that you cannot, in your mind, carry out ...
Would you take the oath, an oath to render a true verdict, according to the law and the evidence, or would you refuse to take the oath because you would be asked to participate in a system that might result in the death penalty being assessed?
A: I would refuse to take the oath.
Q: Mr. Reyes earlier asked you nearly the same question. Are you withdrawing the answer you had at that point?
A: I’m getting confused. What I’m saying is: If I were to take an oath, then, under those conditions, I would feel a moral duty to perform under that oath.
Q: But given the choice—
A: But given the choice, I would not want to.
Q: You would not want to or you would not do it, given the choice?
A: I would not.”
The State’s challenge for cause was then granted without further questioning by either side.
“A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath he takes as a juror.” Witherspoon, *49391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. at 1775, 20 L.Ed.2d 776. This potential juror, however, stated more than once that he could never answer both special issues affirmatively, knowing death would be assessed, no matter what the evidence showed. Because the jury’s function in the punishment phase of a capital murder trial is to answer the special issues based on the law and evidence, clearly Holstead’s performance of this duty would have been impaired by his scruples against capital punishment. This belief made him properly subject to a challenge for cause under Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589 (1980) [hereafter Adams ]:
“... a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”
This standard was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 849 (1985).
However, Holstead also stated that he could follow the oath he would take as a juror, to render a true verdict based on the law and the evidence, not on the dictates of his own conscience. This equivocation in his answers seems to have arisen due to Holstead’s apparent misapprehension that he would be violating the law if he said he could not take the oath. This belief left him in a dilemma: If he took the oath he would feel morally bound to follow it, but in doing so he would be violating his own belief that capital punishment is wrong. In casting about for a way out of this moral maze, Holstead asked what would happen if he did not take the oath, and discovered there would be no legal reprisal if he did not. He therefore managed to resolve his crisis of conscience by saying he would refuse to take the oath. In so doing he was in effect reasserting that he could not “effectively” take the oath; that he could not follow the law and the evidence in answering the special issues. It was clear Holstead would be “substantially impaired” in the performance of his duties as a juror. He was properly excluded for cause. Adams, supra; Witt, supra; Kelly v. State, 669 S.W.2d 720, 728 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).
Now we come to the prospective juror Kenneth Bradshaw. His voir dire examination came days after that of venireman Holstead, but in some ways the earlier voir dire provided a framework for Bradshaw’s questioning, as shall be demonstrated.
Initially the venireman told the trial court, “I couldn't say that a man should die for something; no.” The voir dire examination then began. The prosecutor explained what capital murder is in Texas, distinguishing it from “ordinary” murder, .and also explained the two questions the jury would be required to answer during the punishment phase of the trial. When asked if he would always answer one of those questions no in order to prevent the assessment of the death penalty, the venireman said, “I believe so.” The prosecutor pressed him for a yes or no answer to the question, “Are you so against the death penalty that you would always answer one of these questions no in order to prevent the death sentence from being assessed?” “Yes,” said the venireman. “In every case?” “Yes.”
The prosecutor, showing a commendable desire to be certain of the juror’s feelings, went on to explain that, “[I]f you are qualified for a jury, you have to take an oath to follow the law...” However, “the law will not require you to take that oath if you cannot live up to the oath.”
“The question I want to ask you is: Considering your feelings about the death sentence and given the choice of taking that oath or not taking the oath in a capital murder, would you refuse to take the oath?
A: Yes.”
The State thereupon challenged for cause and defense counsel was allowed to question the venireman for the first time. As so often happens, the venireman began to equivocate.
Defense counsel again explained the procedure during the punishment phase of a *50capital murder trial. After the explanation Bradshaw was asked,
“Q: If you were selected as a member of the jury, could you along with the other jurors after the State having proved to the members of the jury at the guilt or innocence phase of the trial could you thereafter be able to answer Special Issues 1 and 2 provided it is proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt?
A: Yes. I could answer them.
Q: And you understand that in order for the person to be given the death penalty the State does have the burden of proving both of these two special issues beyond a reasonable doubt...
If the State proved to you as a member of the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt that these special issues should be answered yes, could you answer this yes? A: Yes.”
A moment later, asked again if he could answer both special issues affirmatively, Bradshaw replied,
“Can I say yes? I could answer yes to both of them but I don’t think, you know, he should get — they should get punished but, you know, death.”
At this point it began to appear that Bradshaw might be the type of juror Adams held cannot be properly excluded from a jury: those who have scruples against the death penalty but could nevertheless follow the law in answering the punishment issues. As Adams said, citing With-erspoon, “[I]f prospective jurors are barred from jury service because of their views about capital punishment on ‘any broader basis’ than inability to follow the law or abide by their oaths, the death sentence cannot be carried out.” 448 U.S. at 48, 100 S.Ct. at 2528, 65 L.Ed.2d at 591. Bradshaw had stated that he could follow the law and abide by his oath. He remained adamant in that assertion when the trial court resumed questioning him:
“THE COURT: Well we talked to you earlier about your qualifications and if you have some feelings about something, if you can set those feelings aside and be fair and impartial, then you are qualified as far as your qualifications as far as setting your feelings aside.
What they are concerned about if you were on Question 2 and you knew if you answered Question Number 2 yes and you already answered Question Number 1 and if the State proved to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to Number 2 should be yes and in your own mind you know that it should be yes— they proved it to you beyond a reasonable doubt that you should answer Question Number 2 yes, however heinous the crime is — would you vote yes knowing that I am going to assess the death penalty?
THE VENIREMAN: Yes, I would. I would tell the truth. Yeah. What I thought was right. Yes.
THE COURT: So then what you said earlier about having some scruples against the death penalty are not exactly what you led us to believe they are?
THE VENIREMAN: Well, I’m not going to lie, you know. If both things are yes and that’s the only choice I have and it’s been proven I have to answer yes and be honest with the Court and what I know is right as far as the facts in my head, I have to answer yes.
THE COURT: So then if you took the oath, if you had a choice of taking that oath to follow the law knowing full well what you have said to us about your feelings about the death penalty, are you telling me now that you would or would not?
THE VENIREMAN: I would not take the oath.
THE COURT: You would and could take the oath?
THE VENIREMAN: I would not take the oath. Either I don’t understand or you don’t understand. What I am saying if I had to take the oath for some reason and I was in that situation and I saw the facts and it was true I would say yes; But — I would try to avoid taking the oath because I just can’t see sentencing someone to death if the situation arose.
THE COURT: Okay. The situation will arise if you are chosen as a juror in *51this case. You will have to vote yes or no. There is no two ways about it. And you know if you take the oath that you will a true verdict [sic] according to the law and the evidence submitted to you, that you are going to have to answer those questions one way or another. And the question they are trying to determine is if it gets down to answering those questions and you have already taken the oath now, you see what I am saying? And you have got to answer those questions one way or another and you have got some feelings against the death penalty and at one point in time you said you don’t believe in the death penalty.
THE VENIREMAN: I don’t but I have to tell the truth, too.
THE COURT: What you are saying—
THE VENIREMAN: I’m going to follow it.”
It was by this time quite clear that Bradshaw was precisely the type of venireman who could not be excluded for cause under Adams. He had stated firmly that in spite of his opposition to the death penalty he could answer both punishment issues in the affirmative if the evidence so dictated, even knowing death would be assessed as a result. The trial court continued questioning, however, after this clear assertion that Bradshaw would follow the law:
“THE COURT: No matter whether it does injury to your conscience and your soul or not?
THE VENIREMAN: If that’s what I have to do because—

THE COURT: You don’t have to.

THE VENIREMAN: I’m not going to lie.
THE COURT: But you don’t have to. If your feelings are so strong — we are trying to find out how strong your feelings really are and we are not arguing about it.
THE VENIREMAN: I understand that.
THE COURT: We need to find out how strong your feelings really are. If your feelings are strong enough that if you take the oath and you are going to follow your oath and it is not going to do damage to your own conscience and your own soul and if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt both of those questions should be yes knowing full well if you answer them yes that I am going to assess the death penalty, then you could do that?
THE VENIREMAN: If I took the oath, yes, sir, I would have to answer honestly.
THE COURT: The next question: would you take the oath?
THE VENIREMAN: No, then I would have to put myself in a situation.
THE COURT: Have you got any more questions?
MR. ADALPE: No, Your Honor.
MR. HAGSTETTE: Reurge the challenge, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The challenge for cause will be granted.”
Thus exited this troublesome potential juror who stubbornly insisted that in spite of his opposition to the death penalty he could follow the law and the evidence and answer both special issues affirmatively if the State proved to him beyond a reasonable doubt that they should be so answered. He was excluded on the same ground Holstead had been, because he stated he would not take the oath. The crucial distinction between Bradshaw and the earlier venireman, however, is that he did not himself decide he would not take the oath; the idea was thrust on him. Even after he had been informed that “the law will not require you to take that oath if you cannot live up to that oath,” he had said time and again that he could live up to the oath. It was only after suggestive remarks from the trial court (“... if you had a choice of taking that oath ...”; “You don’t have to”) that Bradshaw firmly stated he “would” not take the oath, because that would mean “I would have to put myself in a situation.” The situation he would be in would be an uncomfortable one, no doubt— serving in a case which might result in a death penalty. That would certainly have made this venireman uneasy.
*52“But neither nervousness, emotional involvement, nor inability to deny or confirm any effect whatsoever is equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability on the part of the jurors to follow the court’s instructions and obey their oaths, regardless of their feelings about the death penalty. The grounds for excluding these jurors were consequently insufficient under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.”
Adams, 448 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. at 2529, 65 L.Ed.2d at 592-593.
The State refers us to Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), in which the Supreme Court held that four potential jurors had been properly excluded after “Each of the four specifically stated twice that he or she would not ‘take the oath.’ ” That sentence must be read in context. It came only after the trial court asked
“whether any of the prospective jurors were so opposed to capital punishment that ‘they could not sit, listen to the evidence, listen to the law, [and] make their determination solely upon the evidence and the law without considering the fact that capital punishment’ might be imposed. Four of the venire responded affirmatively. The trial judge then addressed the following question to those four veniremen:
‘[D]o you feel that you could take an oath to well and truely [sic] try this case... and follow the law, or is your conviction so strong that you cannot take an oath, knowing that a possibility exists in regard to capital punishment?’ ”
Lockett, supra, 438 U.S. at 595-596, 98 S.Ct. at 2960, 57 L.Ed.2d at 984.
In Lockett the four veniremen “would” not take the oath because they “could” not follow it. Bradshaw in the instant case had clearly stated he could.
If trial courts and prosecutors are allowed to exclude potential jurors in this fashion there will be no need for elaborate questioning designed to discover whether a venireman’s feelings about the death penalty would impair his performance. Instead anyone who evinces the slightest discomfort at serving in a death penalty case could be excused after a simple ritual such as this:
TRIAL COURT: Could you follow the law and the evidence in arriving at your verdict, in spite of your qualms about the death penalty?
VENIREMAN: Yes.
TRIAL COURT: But you don’t have to.
VENIREMAN: Then I won’t.
Of course anyone at all uncomfortable at the thought of answering questions knowing a death sentence could result would choose to escape such service. But by pointing out this escape hatch to such veniremen and then excluding them for cause the trial court will inevitably produce what Witherspoon condemned as “a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.” Adams, 448 U.S. at 44, 100 S.Ct. at 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d at 588. In the words of Adams,
to exclude all jurors who would be in the slightest way affected by the prospect of the death penalty or by their views about such a penalty would be to deprive the defendant of the impartial jury to which he or she is entitled under the law.”
Adams, 448 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. at 2529, 65 L.Ed.2d at 593. Making clear to such jurors an easy way to exclude themselves produces the same effect. All those with qualms about the death penalty would opt out of jury service and the defendant would be left with a jury composed solely of those who were perfectly at ease with assessing a sentence of death. Such a jury could hardly be called impartial. It is instead “a tribunal organized to return a verdict of death.” Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521-522, 88 S.Ct. at 1776, 20 L.Ed.2d at 784.
The exclusion of venireman Bradshaw came after five weeks of voir dire examina1 tion in which more than a hundred veniremen had already been examined. I sympa: thize with the trial court’s seizing on what appeared to be a formula, one magic question to decide whether the venireman was properly excluded for cause: “Would you *53take the oath?” A death sentence may not be imposed where even one juror has been improperly excluded, however. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 97 S.Ct. 399, 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976). This formula used by the trial court was too easy. The prosecutor and trial court, perhaps taking a cue from the earlier venireman, told this prospective juror from the beginning that he could escape this discomfiting duty by simply refusing to take the oath. That is not the law. The only reason for a juror to refuse to take the oath is if he cannot follow it. Bradshaw could. His exclusion from the jury was therefore improper.
A defendant in a capital case as in all others is entitled to an impartial jury. The method used to exclude Bradshaw in this case would produce instead a jury stripped of all those who might hesitate to impose a death sentence. We should not be willing to live with such a system, nor to let some die by it.
To the majority’s unconstitutional disposal of appellant’s third ground of error, I respectfully dissent.
TEAGUE and MILLER, JJ., join.
ONION, P.J., not participating.

. The oath referred to throughout this opinion is found in Article 35.22, V.A.C.C.P.:
"When the jury has been selected, the following oath shall be administered to them by the court or under its direction: “You and each of you do solemnly swear that in the case of the State of Texas against the defendant, you will a true verdict render according to the law and the evidence, so help you God.’"

. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.