Court Opinion

ID: 9713704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:20:29.371253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:26.843268
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J.
¶ 20. (concurring). The issue before us is whether Wisconsin's courts should extend the risk contribution theory of market share liability announced in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984), to litigation against lead paint pigment manufacturers. In my view, the only court that may extend the law in this fashion is our supreme court. Because the court of appeals is mainly an error-correcting court, we are duty-bound to apply the law as it presently exists. And presently, the acceptance of risk contribution theory in Wisconsin is limited to cases involving the use by pregnant women of a drug known as DES. For this reason, I concur in the result.
¶ 21. I do not concur with the reasoning employed by the majority. Distilled to its essence, the majority's rationale is that because plaintiffs lead poisoning injury was addressed in a suit against the landlords, he received the benefit of a remedy for his injury and is not entitled to anything more. The majority apparently interprets article 1, § 9 of our state constitution to ask two things: *394Was there an injury? If so, did the plaintiff obtain redress in the courts for that injury. If so, the plaintiff has had his day in court and is not entitled to "plumb" for deep pockets against any other alleged wrongdoers.
¶ 22. I disagree with this interpretation as it overlooks the unambiguous wording of article 1, § 9. The plain meaning of this section is that every person is entitled to a certain remedy for "all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person." [Emphasis added.] Notice that the wording is in the disjunctive. The way I read this clause, it means that even assuming only one injury, if that injury was brought about by separate wrongs against the person, that person is entitled to a remedy for each "wrong."
¶ 23. Take, for example, Anwaun A. ex rel. Muwonge v. Heritage Mutual Insurance, Co., 228 Wis. 2d 44, 55, 596 N.W.2d 456 (1999). There, our supreme court ruled that "a landlord of a house constructed prior to 1978 is under a common law duty to test for lead paint when the landlord knows, or in the use of ordinary care, should have known that the residence contained peeling or chipping paint." This duty was based on the belief that, by the late 1980's, information about the dangers of lead-based paint was so widely available that landlords should be presumed to be aware of the risks. A landlord who ignores this foreseeable risk and allowed peeling or chipping paint which a small child could ingest, has committed a "wrong" against that child.
¶ 24. But who sold the idea of putting lead paint into our nation's homes and apartments in the first place? The plaintiff has presented a panoply of evidence that the lead paint industry knew since the early 1800's that lead paint could seriously harm young children. Yet, it not only continued to sell lead based paint, it *395allegedly, blatantly lied and claimed in advertisements that the paint was "healthful" to people. The allegation is that it committed a wrong. As I read our constitution, there is a remedy for every wrong and that presupposes that there is a wrongdoer behind that wrong. I have never seen a case that insulates a wrongdoer from being exposed to lawsuit just because there exists a remedy against another wrongdoer.
¶ 25. The majority relies on Wiener v. J.C. Penney Co., 65 Wis. 2d 139, 150, 222 N.W.2d 149 (1974) as support. But Wiener is inapposite. There, the legislature had promulgated a statute fashioning exclusive out-of-court procedures to remedy excess interest rates charged by retail sellers. The plaintiffs in that case claimed that the procedures were inadequate and sued. The supreme court logically determined that just because the kind of remedy, an administrative procedure, was not to the plaintiffs liking, that did not mean that the plaintiffs were without a remedy. Wiener never touched upon the question of whether, if a plaintiff has a remedy against one party for a wrong committed by that party, he or she has a viable remedy against another party for a different wrong.
¶ 26. I submit that our constitution speaks to the right of our citizenry to pursue wrongdoers if the action exists at common law. This suit is an action for intentional, ordinary and gross negligence. It is certainly recognizable in our common law. I conclude that article 1, § 9 does not avail to the paint manufacturing industry.
¶ 27. I take no stand on whether there are other grounds upon which the paint industry might avoid lawsuit. They have listed many different theories. It is unnecessary for me to go into them here. Suffice it to say, the lead paint industry has not argued that simply *396because the plaintiff already has a remedy against the landlords, there is no right to a remedy against them. The industry does claim other reasons why landlords are properly subject to exposure to lawsuit but it should not be similarly exposed. As I earlier stated, whether to adopt one or more of the paint manufacturers' theories is for the supreme court to decide.