Court Opinion

ID: 9699080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:09:47.302389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:10.739734
License: Public Domain

RENTTO, J.
(dissenting in part). I concur in that portion of the opinion reversing the trial court’s judgment in so for as it involves the interchange, but do not agree with the reason assigned by the majority for so doing. They *317say that Fauske has no standing to ask for injunctive relief as to it because he has been fully compensated for any damage he may suffer -by reason thereof. While there was evidence that this would cause him damage the state put in testimony that its inclusion in the improvement substantially diminished the detriment otherwise caused him by the new highway. If so, it was not a damage to him but rather a benefit. I believe that .it is not for us to choose between these conflicting views.
If it was in fact a benefit, and that was for the jury to say, then I think it would violate the rules of fair dealing to permit the state, after the award has been made, to remove from the improvement a feature which it urged at the trial in diminution of the loss caused the landowner by the taking. However, the record does not show that the construction plans of the state in this regard are changed from those relied on in the condemnation trial. For this reason I feel the injunction as to the interchange is improper.
Concerning the disposition made as to the underpasses I am unable to agree. In the record, in which incidentally I have not been able to find a certificate of settlement, there appears a resolution by the state reinstating the underpasses. This is not a certified copy of the resolution as contemplated by SDC 36.0901, but merely a letter purporting to be that of the Director of the Department of Highways. How it got into the record I am unable to discover. Clearly, no foundation appears to make it admissible evidence. It is not marked as an exhibit nor was it mentioned in the trial or brought to the court’s attention in any of the proceedings leading up to the judgment.
On this document the majority, on their own motion, reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the underpasses. This is predicated on the ground that in injunction suits an appellate court may take cognizance of facts occurring during the pendency of the appeal where they bear directly upon the question presented by the appeal. Assuming that such is the rule, I think that it does not apply here because the reinstatement of the underpasses did not occur during *318the pendency of this appeal. Rather, it happened while the case was still in the trial court and before its decision was made and judgment entered. Present counsel did not then represent the state. It seems to me that in fairness to the trial court, and to the other party, the state should have brought this to attention of the court promptly. When the state, or one of its agencies, becomes a party litigant it is under the same obligations as any other suitor, unless a statute or rule makes an exception.
Without the benefit of this evidence the trial court properly found that the underpasses had been eliminated from the improvement. On the basis of this resolution the majority now decide this fact issue to the contrary. That I think is not our province. As an appellate court our proper function is to review matters decided by the trial court on the record that was before that court. I see no reason why we should depart from that basic rule in the circumstances of this case, and good reason why we shouldn’t. Accordingly, I would remand it to the trial court for a determination of this question of the underpasses on the basis of present facts. That was the course taken in some of the cases from other states cited by the majority.
I have been unable to find any decisions of this court supporting the action of the majority. The Smith case comes the closest to being in point but it concerns supplemental evidence which came into existence during the pendency of the appeal and not when the matter was before the trial court. Also the supplemental evidence there considered was not inconsistent with the trial court’s finding but supported it. To me it is significant that the court very carefully limited its holding to the circumstances of that case.
If we accept the statements made on oral argument as establishing that the underpasses have been completed, then I would dismiss this portion of the appeal because the state by acquiescing in and complying with the judgment has waived its right of appeal. Assuming that the injunction should be vacated on this ground it seems to me that also is something that should be done in the trial court.