Court Opinion

ID: 9465049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:34:16.040947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:56.824020
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the court and in the majority opinion. I would have preferred, however, a search warrant affidavit that fully set out the underlying circumstances which supported the informant’s belief that the guns he saw at Lee’s house were stolen, or which indicated that independent steps were taken by the agents to corroborate the informant’s information.
In United States v. Wasserstrom, 571 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cited in the majority opinion, the search warrant affidavit contained the following information:
That on or about September 28, 1976, a confidential informant, a citizen with no known criminal felony record, who has been a “simple witness” and not a “professional informant,” obtained Stock Certificate No. AKC 209219, copy attached, 100 shares of Ohio Edison Company, issued to Sevilla W. Haver, from a drawer located under the front bedroom window on the third floor of the premises at 1985 Sunbury Road.
Said informant has told affiant that said certificate was one of approximately 1,000 certificates and 200 envelopes containing what appeared to be bond coupons which he observed in the drawer. Verification with Vercoe and Company, Mansfield, Ohio, the mailer of the stock certificate, discloses that said certificate was contained in Register No. 2794 of the United States Mails. This stock certificate is described by Vercoe and Company in the attached list of stock certificates which were contained in Register No. 2794. This register is listed in records of the U. S. Postal Service as being on an U. S. Postal truck which was robbed on September 24, 1976, in Franklin County, Ohio, the mail pouch containing said register being illegally taken from said truck at that time.
Further, U. S. Postal Service information reflects the fact that approximately 200 envelopes containing bond coupons valued at approximately $136,000.00 were included in the stolen registered mail shipment.
Appendix in No. 77-5261 at V. This affidavit clearly shows how the agents verified the information given to them by the informant. It is far more detailed and factual than the affidavit here under consideration. The verification was made necessary, of course, by the fact that the agents could not rely on the “previous reliability” of this informant. But although the affiant in the instant case states that the informant had proven to be previously reliable, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), that statement supports the informant’s assertion that he saw the guns, and not that the guns he saw were stolen. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 586-601, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) (dissenting opinion) (Harlan, J.).
In Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), involving a warrantless arrest made after the police officers had verified an informant’s tip, and United States v. Harris, supra, involving the sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit, the police officers themselves either verified the informant’s information, or the affidavit indicated how the informant knew that the suspect was engaging in illegal activity. The affidavit relied upon to obtain a search warrant in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 103-4, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965), was based upon the personal observations of the affiant Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) agent and other ATF agents. Thus, the statement in Ventresca that search warrant affidavits should not be read in an overly technical manner does not, I would suggest, apply to a situation where the affidavit is unclear as to how the informant obtained his information, and the affiant has not conducted any *1180independent verification of the informant’s information. (In this case the agents did check the cars in front of Lee’s house and established that she owned these vehicles, but that was irrelevant to the probable cause issue of whether the guns were stolen or not. The fact that she owned the cars is consistent with innocent activity.)
Cases from this circuit which have upheld the sufficiency of arrest warrant and search warrant affidavits have also involved situations where an element of probable cause was based upon information within the personal knowledge of the affiant, or where an informant’s tip had been corroborated by police investigation. Thus, in United States v. Jenkins, 525 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1975), the affiant stated that he knew of his own knowledge that Jenkins was a convicted felon. Once that fact was established, probable cause to arrest Jenkins existed when the informants stated that they saw (personal observation) Jenkins carrying a gun. And in United States v. Dudek, 560 F.2d 1288, 1292-93 (6th Cir. 1977), the court noted that “not only were there two different and detailed listings of goods alleged to be located at the two different locations and a statement that all goods had been ‘stolen in burglaries,’ but in addition, there was the confirmation by law enforcement officers themselves of one item of stolen goods, namely, the stolen boat.” (Emphasis added)
In the instant case, the search warrant affidavit alleges a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922. In another case where a similar violation was alleged, the search warrant affidavit was supported by substantially more information and corroboration than is here presented:
Rivard’s [the informant] charges that Scherer [the suspect] was selling firearms from his house was bolstered by the four purchases made at this location, three of which were made under Government surveillance. Prior to each purchase Rivard had been able to provide Government agents with the name, price, and model number of each weapon eventually sold. Finally, Rivard’s assertion that numerous weapons were lying about Scherer’s house, and that Scherer was keeping two Thompson machine guns without serial numbers in a box in his barn was corroborated by two special agents who visited the defendant’s farm prior to the search.
United States v. Scherer, 523 F.2d 371, 376-77 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 1108, 47 L.Ed.2d 315 (1976).
Here the informant personally observed the quantity and variety of guns in Lee’s house. This information is presented in the affidavit. The additional detail provided in the affidavit is the informant’s assertion that the property he saw was stolen in Ohio, and that it was “common practice” for Lee to transport and sell stolen firearms from her car. While Lee’s reputation might not be irrelevant in determining probable cause, United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. at 582, 91 S.Ct. 2075, it is certainly not a sufficient basis upon which to issue a search warrant. In United States v. Harris, supra, it was the affiant investigator’s personal knowledge of the suspect’s reputation which the Court held was a “practical consideration of everyday life” upon which an officer or Magistrate could properly rely when assessing the reliability of an informant’s tip. 403 U.S. at 583, 91 S.Ct. at 2081. In the instant case the affiant agent appears to have had no personal knowledge of Lee’s reputation. He does not confirm the unidentified informant’s report that it was “common practice” for Lee to transport and sell stolen firearms; nor does the affidavit provide the Magistrate with the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that this criminal activity was a common practice with Lee. As to the other “detail,” the affidavit does not indicate why the informant thought that the guns he saw were stolen in burglaries in Ohio, or that the ATF agents had taken steps to corroborate this information, and *1181had in fact corroborated it, prior to seeking a search warrant.