Court Opinion

ID: 9683508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:30:09.952804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:48.328255
License: Public Domain

Justice OWEN,
joined by Chief Justice PHILLIPS and Justice HECHT, dissenting.
Because the record reflects that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of Drilex’s expert, I respectfully dissent. The expert’s testimony was a key part of Drilex’s case. The witness’s technical violation of Rule 267 did not prejudice the plaintiffs in any way. Absent a showing of some harm to the plaintiffs, the trial court erred in excluding the expert’s testimony. Moreover, if Drilex had timely requested the trial court to exempt its expert from the Rule, the trial court would have had no discretion to deny that request under the facts of this case. The trial court’s exclusion of the expert for conversations he had with Drilex’s corporate representative when those conversations would have been permissible if the expert had been exempted is an abuse of discretion and was harmful error.
I
Jorge Flores was severely injured while working on the floor of a drilling rig. He sued Drilex, among other defendants. Drilex had manufactured the piece of equipment with which Flores was working when he was injured. One of Drilex’s principal contentions was that the accident was caused by improper procedures on the rig rather than by the design of its equipment. The only expert that Drilex retained to testify about proper operational procedures on a drilling rig was Randy Acock. The trial court prohibited Acock from testifying because he violated Rule 267.
A
We have said that exclusion of a witness’s testimony is “one of the harshest sanctions available.” Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex.1984). For a sanction to be just, it must not be excessive. See TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex.1991). “The punishment should fit the crime.” Id. Exclusion of a witness who is critical to a party’s case for a technical violation of Rule 267 is not punishment that fits the “crime” when the opposing party has not shown that it will be harmed.
The Court acknowledges that a trial court must “tak[e] into consideration all of the circumstances” before it decides whether to exclude a witness who has violated the Rule. 1 S.W.3d at 117; see also 6 WigmoRE, Evidence in TRIals at Common Law § 1842 (Chadbourn rev.1976). Yet, the Court does not explain what circum*125stances justified exclusion of Acock when the Floreses did not claim or even suggest that they were harmed or prejudiced.
None of the decisions cited by the Court stands for the proposition that once there has been a violation of the Rule, the trial court can choose to exclude or not exclude the witness with unfettered discretion. See 1 S.W.3d at 120. This Court has held that, before a trial court refuses to allow testimony, it should “take into consideration all of the facts.” Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 645, 647-48 (Tex.1965). There are other authorities, which I find persuasive, that explain that a trial court abuses its discretion when it excludes a material witness for violating the Rule but no probable harm or prejudice to an opposing party was shown. As Judge Weinstein has observed in his treatise, “[mjost courts hold that violating a proper exclusion order is not in itself sufficient to warrant excluding the testimony of the witness who violated the rule. These courts require at least a showing of probable prejudice resulting from the violation before authorizing exclusion of the witness’s testimony.” See 3 Weinstein, Weinstein’s Evidence § 615.07[2][d] (2d ed.1999). Professors Wright and Gold similarly explain that prohibiting a witness from testifying because of a violation of the Rule is a “drastic” remedy that may be appropriate when “the prejudice associated with violation of the exclusion order cannot otherwise be mitigated by permitting attack on the witness’ credibility.” 29 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6246 (1997). But when circumstances are “less compelling,” exclusion of a witness may be an abuse of discretion. Id. In this case, there were no circumstances, compelling or otherwise, that justified ex-elusion of Acock as a witness. I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded Acock because the Floreses were not prejudiced or harmed and because no other purpose was served by excluding his testimony.
B
There is an additional basis for concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Acock. The Court correctly concludes that when a witness is exempted from the Rule, he or she is exempted for all purposes. See 1 S.W.3d at 119. Thus, as the Court explains, a witness who is exempted may remain in the courtroom to hear the testimony of other witnesses and may discuss the case with other nonexempt witnesses. Acock’s two transgressions were that he listened for fifteen minutes to testimony from Dri-lex’s corporate representative and that he discussed the case with that same witness, who was exempt from the Rule.1 If Acock had also been exempted from the Rule, his conduct would have been unassailable.
When a party seeks to exempt its expert from the operation of Rule 267, the burden is minimal. See Burrhus v. M & S Supply, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 635, 643 n. 7 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ) (citing Zager, Invoking the Rule of Sequestration of Witnesses During Discovery in Civil Litigation, 52 Tex. B.J. 662, 664 (1989)). The Court acknowledges as much in surveying the authorities that have considered this question. See 1 S.W.3d at 118 n. 4 (citing Morvant v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626, 630 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801, 99 S.Ct. 44, 58 L.Ed.2d 94 (1978)). As one court has *126observed, “[i]t has been generally held that expert witnesses are exempt from the operation of the Rule, or that a violation of the Rule by an expert witness will not justify excluding his testimony.” Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. E.W. Moran Drilling Co., 509 S.W.2d 678, 685 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Lewis v. Owen, 395 F.2d 537 (10th Cir.1968)).
Drilex belatedly asked the trial court to exempt Acock from the Rule after the Floreses sought to exclude Acock’s testimony. I agree with the Court that the trial court did not find or rule that Acock was exempt. But if Drilex had timely moved to exempt Acock, that motion should have been granted. It is therefore difficult to see how Acock’s violations of the Rule could have harmed the Floreses. The Floreses offered no evidence nor did they argue that they were harmed in any way by the violations of the Rule. Acock’s expert report had been furnished to them, and they had deposed him well in advance of trial. The testimony that Acock gave in his bill of review after he was excluded as a witness was consistent with his testimony and opinions before trial commenced. The only basis the Floreses urged for excluding Acock under the Rule was a technical violation. That does not suffice.
II
The trial court’s exclusion of Acock was harmful error. Although other defense witnesses offered their opinions on some of the topics about which Acock was prepared to testify, Acock was the only outside expert prepared to testify about how operations should be conducted on a drilling rig and how deficiencies in operations led to Jorge Flores’s injuries. The other witnesses were Drilex employees or employees of other defendants. Testimony from those witnesses was also fragmented in the sense that one witness had an opinion on one topic, and another witness opined on another matter that Drilex intended to address in Acock’s testimony. Of the numerous witnesses who testified, no witness offered a comprehensive explanation of proper drilling rig operations and of how Flores’s injury was not due to Drilex’s equipment. The exclusion of Drilex’s only expert who was prepared to testify about one of its two distinct lines of defense was error.
Ill
I agree with the Court’s analysis regarding how settlement credits should have been applied under the Legislature’s statutory scheme. But because Drilex is entitled to a new trial, I cannot join in the Court’s judgment. I therefore dissent.

. It is apparent from the record that the trial court ultimately decided to exclude Acock’s testimony only because of his discussions with the corporate representative. Most of the hearing on the plaintiff's renewed motion to exclude Acock centered around the fact that he listened to testimony of one witness. At the conclusion of arguments by counsel on this score, the trial court ruled, "Okay, I’ve heard enough. Against my better judgment I am going to allow him to testify.” Subsequently, counsel for plaintiffs raised the question of whether Acock had discussed the case with Drilex’s corporate representative. It was only then that the trial court ruled that Acock would be excluded as a witness.