Court Opinion

ID: 9713260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:12:27.616879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:17.905960
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
This case dramatizes the desirability of a bright line distinction to be drawn between the value of finality in criminal convictions and the recognition that some convictions no matter how old may be tainted by "fundamental" error.
Following Garner's conviction, a Motion to Correct Errors was filed by his trial counsel. The Motion to Correct Errors presented the following alleged errors:
1. The prosecutor improperly tried to impeach the defendant of alleged pri- or felonies;
2. The evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.
In his memorandum in support of the Motion, trial counsel stated that the evidence was insufficient for two reasons. "First, there is no evidence of an injury sufficient *1313to raise the alleged armed robbery herein from a Class 'B' felony to a Class 'A' felony." Record at 2. The second reason challenged the credibility of the witnesses who testified against Garner. The Motion to Correct Errors was denied, and the court appointed a different attorney as appellate counsel. In the direct appeal, appellate counsel raised the same general issues that trial counsel had presented in his Motion to Correct Errors. However, appellate counsel did not specifically argue that there was insufficient evidence of injury to support a conviction for robbery as a class A felony. Instead he focused upon the conflict in testimony by the State's witnesses. Our Supreme Court affirmed the conviction finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
On September 10, 1984, Garner filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Various other pleadings were filed and continuances granted until an amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed on January 21, 1987. The amended petition, also pro se, presented the following allegations of error:;
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,
Prosecutorial Misconduct,
Conviction is in Violation of the Laws of Indiana." Record at 103.
In setting forth the facts in support of the assertion of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, petitioner alleged "counsel also failed to argue that Indiana recognizes a distinction between 'bodily injury' and 'serious bodily injury' during the court's assessment of the conviction as a class A or B felony." Record at 108. Garner did not allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Garner was represented by a new attorney at the hearing to consider the petition. The court denied Garner's petition on May 13, 1987. Garner pro se then filed a second petition for post-conviction relief which the court summarily denied based upon its earlier Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Garner thru the Indiana Public Defender then requested permission to file a Belated Motion to Correct Errors (P.C.2) addressed to the denial of his first Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. After a hearing, the court allowed Garner to file a Belated Motion to Correct Errors. Apparently to avoid waiver, Garner argued ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellate counsel, and post-conviction counsel. The court overruled the Belated Motion to Correct Errors and this appeal was perfected.
Garner presents six issues for our review which I would restate as follows:
1. Whether the post-conviction court erred in denying Garner's Petition on the basis of waiver and whether fundamental error occurred when Garner was found guilty and convicted of Class A Robbery where the Amended Information charged him with Class B Robbery;
2. Whether Garner was denied due process of law and the presumption of innocence in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article One, See-tions Twelve and Thirteen of the Indiana Constitution, when the conviction for Robbery, a Class A felony, was not sustained by sufficient evidence;1
3. Whether Garner was denied the effective assistance of trial, appellate and post-conviction counsel in violation of Article One, Sections Twelve and Thirteen of the Indiana Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
4. Whether Garner was denied his right to trial by jury in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article One, Section Thirteen of the Indiana Constitution, where his waiver of trial by jury was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary;
5. Whether Garner was denied his right to a fair trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article One, Sections Twelve and Thirteen of *1314the Indiana Constitution by prosecutorial misconduct; and
6. Whether the post-conviction court erred in finding that Garner's grounds for post-conviction relief were waived in violation of his right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article One, Section Twelve of the Indiana Constitution.
For purposes of discussion, I address Issues 1, 2 and 8 together. Garner urges us to conclude that fundamental error occurred at trial because he was convicted of class A robbery when the amended information only presented facts to support a conviction for class B robbery. Garner raises this issue as fundamental error in order to avoid a determination that the issue was waived.
The substance of Garner's argument revolves around the robbery statute as it existed in 1979 and the Supreme Court's interpretation in 1981 discussing the intent of the legislature. In 1979, robbery was defined as follows:
I.C. - 85-42-5-1. Robbery-A - person who knowingly or intentionally takes the property from another person or from the presence of another person:
(1) By using or threatening the use of force on any person; or
(2) By putting any person in fear; commits robbery, a class C felony. However, the offense is a class B felony if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon, and a class A felony if it results in either bodily injury or serious bodily injury to any other person.
Garner was convicted in 1979 and his appeal was decided in December 1980. In February, 1981, our Supreme Court decided Clay v. State (1981) 275 Ind. 256, 416 N.E.2d 842.
In Clay, the defendant was convicted of a class A robbery. During the course of the robbery, the defendant hit the victim in the face. The victim testified that he suffered a deep bruise to his sinus, a nosebleed which lasted three days and a headache lasting three weeks. On appeal, the defendant presented the issue that the injury he inflicted on the vietim "was not serious enough to warrant conviction of a class A felony." Id. at 848. This issue prompt ed the Supreme Court of Indiana to interpret the language of the robbery statute. The Court held:
"'The Legislature intended to make robbery a class A felony in two situations: (1) when bodily injury resulted to the person being robbed, and (2) when serious bodily injury resulted to any other person. Bodily injury to the robbery vie-tim need not rise to the serious level to impose class A felony liability on the robber." Id. at 844.
Because of the Clay decision, Garner alleges fundamental error in his conviction of a class A robbery when the information only charged him with inflicting "bodily injury" on a non-victim bystander. He contends that Clay should be retroactively applied and his sentence reduced to that for a class B felony.
In Bailey v. State (1985) Ind., 472 N.E.2d 1260, our Supreme Court addressed "the propriety of raising an issue singularly characterized as fundamental error in a post-conviction petition." Id. at 1262. As noted by the majority here, the court held that the remedy of post-conviction relief is not a substitute for a direct appeal. Any issue set forth in a post-conviction petition "must be raised within the purview of the post-conviction rules, e.g., (sic) 2 deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, or be an issue demonstrably unavailable to the petitioner at the time of his trial and direct appeal." Id. at 1268.
Garner argues that his allegation of fundamental error is not freestanding and is reviewable on the merits because the issue was demonstrably unavailable to him at the time of his trial and direct appeal. I dis*1315agree. Although Clay was decided after Garner's appeal, the issue which was sue-cessfully presented to the Court in Clay was that the injury inflicted was not serious enough to warrant conviction of a class A robbery. This very issue was set forth in Garner's original Motion to Correct Errors. The memorandum attached to the Motion alleges insufficient evidence to support the conviction because there was "no evidence of an injury sufficient to raise the alleged armed robbery ... from a class 'B' felony to a class 'A' felony." Record at 2. Therefore, under the Supreme Court's interpretation in Bailey, supra, the issue was demonstrably available to Garner on his direct appeal. The error was raised in his Motion to Correct Errors, but not pursued on appeal. The majority disregards the fact that the issue in question was not only available to Garner but was actually raised. That the Cloy decision in support of the issue raised had not yet been decided does not mean that the issue was not available. Under my interpretation of Batley, Garner may not now present this issue as fundamental error. In this regard a rationale of a decision in a civil appeal is worthy of note. In St. Catherine's Hospital v. Bergner (1986) 3d Dist.Ind.App., 493 N.E.2d 1321, 1322, the court quoted from an earlier decision, Sheraton Corporation of America v. Korte Paper Co., Inc. (1977) 2d Dist., 173 Ind.App. 407, 363 N.E.2d 1263, 1265, as follows:
"The ground urged for relief was merely the error of law available and in fact raised in the motion to correct errors. That a subsequent decision of this court in a different case recognized the reality of the error does not alter this. It merely demonstrates that had the claimant appealed he would have succeeded, assuming the allegedly identical evidence."
Another exception discussed in Batley to avoid a finding of waiver is to show ineffective assistance of counsel. Garner does allege ineffective assistance of post-conviection counsel, apparently to avoid waiver.3 However, the exception created in Batley to avoid waiver by showing ineffective assistance of counsel must be read in light of our Supreme Court's decisions in Baum v. State (1989) Ind., 533 N.E.2d 1200 and Schiro v. State (1989) Ind., 533 N.E.2d 1201, cert. denied 475 U.S. 1036, 106 S.Ct. 1247, 89 L.Ed.2d 355.
In Baum v. State, supra, our Supreme Court held that "[t]he right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings is guaranteed by neither the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution nor art. 1, § 18 of the Constitution of Indiana." Id. at 1201. In Schiro v. State, supra, our Supreme Court cited Alston v. State (1988) 1st Dist., Ind.App., 521 N.E.2d 1331, with approval for the following proposition:
"'The court of appeals recently stated in Alston v. State (1988), Ind.App., 521 N.E.2d 1331, 1335, that they would not 'take a step backward and create a new vehicle by which a defendant could use a PCR to attack a previous PCR on the grounds of incompetency of counsel in that PCR hearing, and then use yet a third PCR to attack the competency of counsel of the second PCR and so on in perpetuity.'" - Schiro, supra, at 1205.
In Alston v. State,4 supra, our First District discussed the issue of a post-conviction petition addressed to a prior post-conviction proceeding. The court held,
"(aln examination of the rule clearly discloses that a post-conviction petition and remedy is addressed solely to the original conviction or plea of guilty. There is nothing within the rule that indicates that a post-conviction petition may be addressed to a prior post-conviction proceeding. Alston cites no authority that so holds. If counsel is inadequate at a prior post-conviction proceeding, a remedy would be to allow the defendant to start over. However, his new efforts *1316must still be addressed to events occurring at the trial or guilty plea hearing, and the issues would be determined by prevailing law as though no prior PCR had been filed." Id. at 1885.5
The apparent meaning of Boum and Schiro taken in light of the First District's decision in Alston, is that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel cannot be raised in a subsequent post-conviction petition focusing upon the denial of an earlier post-conviction petition.
Although Baum, Schiro and Alston all dealt with a post-conviction petition under Post Conviction Rule 1 (PCR 1) addressed to the denial of an earlier PCR 1 petition, the same analysis would seem to apply to a Belated Motion to Correct Errors under Post Conviction Rule 2 (PCR 2) addressed to the denial of a PCR 1 petition. Allowing the petitioner to successfully present ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in a PCR 2 petition would permit the petitioner to evade the holdings in Baum and Schiro. Although Garner presented ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in a PCR 2 petition rather than in a subsequent PCR 1 petition, I read Baum and Schiro to mean that a successful PCR petition in general cannot be addressed to a former PCR proceeding.
That Garner is attempting to avoid waiver is illustrated by the fact that he did file a second Petition for Post Conviction Relief under PCR 1. When the court summarily denied that petition, he then filed a Belated Motion to Correct Errors under PCR 2 alleging the same issue presented in his second petition under PCR 1. Based upon Baum and Schiro I would hold that the issue of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not now available to Garner.6
I believe my view reflects the specific concern in Baum and Schiro with respect to a post-conviction challenge (either PCR 1 or PCR 2) to a prior post-conviction proceeding. There may be a distinction, although somewhat tenuous, between raising ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in a timely Motion to Correct Errors and raising it in a Belated Motion to Correct Errors addressed to the denial of a post-conviction relief petition. The former is not a post-conviction petition addressed to a prior post-conviction proceeding whereas the latter is. For this reason, a timely Motion to Correct Errors raising the issue of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may not be proscribed by Baum and Schiro.
For example, in Murphy v. State (1985) Ind., 477 N.E.2d 266, our Supreme Court treated the issue of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel on the merits through a timely Motion to Correct Errors addressed to the denial of a PCR 1 petition. If Murphy is to be reconciled with Baum, and Schiro, it must be upon grounds that a petitioner may present the issue of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in a timely Motion to Correct Errors after the denial of a PCR 1 petition, but not in a Belated Motion to Correct Errors. Although this may seem incongruous, the *1317distinction I discern is that in a criminal setting a Belated Motion to Correct Errors is a special creature allowed specifically as a post-conviction remedy whereas a timely Motion to Correct Errors is not a post-conviction remedy. Therefore, a timely Motion to Correct Errors is not "a PCR [being used] to attack a previous PCR on the grounds of incompetency of counsel in that PCR hearing." Schiro, supra, 588 N.E.2d at 1201. Furthermore, as earlier noted in footnote 8, the Supreme Court must have envisioned some situation in which a reviewing court could reach the merits of whether or not post-conviction counsel was ineffective. I base this conclusion upon the fact that the Supreme Court in Baum specifically set out a standard for reviewing post-conviction - counsel's - performance. Baum, supra, 588 N.E.2d at 1201. Accordingly, it would appear that the only situation in which an appellate court may ever review the issue of ineffective assist ance of post-conviction counsel is where the issue has been preserved in a timely Motion to Correct Errors when one is required under Trial Rule 59 or in a timely perfected appeal when a Motion to Correct Errors is not required. The issue may not be preserved however in a belated appeal allowable only as a post-conviction remedy.
Garner directs our attention to Heyward v. State (1988) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 524 N.E.2d 15. In Heyward, the defendant was convicted of class A robbery when the facts of the information would only support a conviction for class B robbery. Heyward was denied post-conviction relief and the First District reversed relying on Clay, su-pro. There was no issue of whether Cloy should be applied retroactively because Heyward was not convicted until after Clay was decided.
Although the Heyward case is factually very similar to the case presented here, it is, nevertheless, distinguishable. The court in Heyward was asked to review a procedurally different situation than the one before us now. In Heyward, the defendant made a timely appeal of the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief presenting both fundamental error and ineffective assistance of counsel both at trial and on direct appeal. The court stated:
"In this case, Heyward failed to preserve for review on direct appeal the errors asserted on this appeal. Thus, unless these errors are of fundamental magnitude, they are deemed waived." Heyward, supra, 524 N.E.2d at 17.
The Heyward court did not discuss the supreme court's decision in Bailey v. State (1985) Ind., 472 N.E.2d 1260, which only contemplates presenting fundamental error involving deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel or with respect to an issue demonstrably unavailable to petitioner at the time of his direct appeal,. Bailey, supra, 472 N.E.2d at 1268.
Heyward did not follow the precise approach to fundamental error as set forth in Bailey. The Heyward court addressed, in freestanding form, the issue of whether Heyward was convicted of class A robbery when the information set forth facts which would only support a conviction for class B robbery. The Heyward court held that fundamental error had occurred and therefore, the issue was not waived. In another part of the opinion, the court addressed a claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The court stated that on the issue of whether Heyward was improperly convicted of class A robbery "Hey-ward's attorney should have been aware of the distinction between 'bodily injury' and 'serious bodily injury.'" Heyward, supra, 524 N.E.2d at 20. However, the court did not hold the denial of effective assistance of counsel to be reversible error because it had already reversed Heyward's conviction of class A robbery on the grounds of fundamental error. The outcome of Heyward would have been the same even if the court had strictly followed Bailey. The Hey-ward court could have addressed the claimed fundamental error by finding that Heyward had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Heyward involved a claimed denial of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel (i.e., trial and/or appellate counsel). Therefore, it falls within one of the exceptions created by Bailey to allow a petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding to allege *1318fundamental error and avoid a waiver defense. Garner, however, alleges ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Because of this procedural distinction, Garner may not raise fundamental error whereas Heyward could.
As previously stated, Bawm holds that the right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Further, Schiro holds that a petitioner cannot raise a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel to get to an issue which would otherwise be waived. Therefore, the exception created in Bailey is limited by Baum and Schiro to claims of ineffective assistance of trial and/or appellate counsel which are guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The Bailey exception does not apply to claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel.7
Because I conclude that Garner is prohibited from asserting ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in this appeal, I would hold that the other issues Garner presents are now unavailable to him. Although Garner did present ineffective assistance of trial counsel at his first post-conviction hearing, he did not allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in failing to challenge the performance of trial counsel. Since appellate counsel and trial counsel were different, appellate counsel had the first opportunity to raise alleged trial counsel's inadequacies.8 And, since Garner did not argue ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at his post-conviction hearing, any issue of ineffective trial counsel has not been preserved for our review.
The same result should obtain with respect to reviewing appellate counsel's performance. Garner had the opportunity to argue ineffective assistance of appellate counsel at his post-conviction hearing. Since he did not do so, the issue is now unavailable to him.
As to Issues 4 and 5, Garner argues that he was denied his right to trial by jury and was denied his right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. However, since Garner is precluded from alleging ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, and Garner did not, in his first post-conviection petition, allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issues which were available to Garner at the time of his direct appeal, I believe we are not at liberty to now review them.
Under Issue 6, Garner makes a final attempt to avoid waiver on all of the foregoing issues by arguing that "[alny waiver finding on these allegations ... would be erroneous because the Indiana appellate courts did not apply a procedural bar to post-conviction actions at the time of Garner's 1980 direct appeal." Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 46.
In support of his contention, Garner cites Wheat v. Thigpen (5th Cir.1986) 793 F.2d 621, cert. denied 480 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 1566, 94 L.Ed.2d 759. In that case, the defendant, Wheat, had petitioned the federal district court for habeas corpus. The State of Mississippi appealed the district court's ruling that the prosecutor's closing argument at sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment. The State argued that the federal district court erred in reaching the *1319Eighth Amendment question because Mississippi procedure barred the raising of claims in a post-conviction proceeding which were not previously raised in the direct appeal. Id. at 624. Since federal courts forego the exercise of their habeas corpus power when an "independent and adequate state ground" exists supporting the State's decision, the State argued that its procedural bar rule should be treated as an "independent and adequate state ground" precluding federal review. Id. In determining whether the procedural bar rule was an "independent and adequate state ground," the Fifth Circuit cited the rule established by the United States Supreme Court "that a state procedure rule is not entitled to respect as an adequate and independent state ground unless the procedural rule is 'strictly or regularly followed'". Id. The court then held that Mississippi had not strictly or regularly followed its procedural rule at the time of Wheat's direct appeal and therefore the procedural bar did not constitute an "independent and adequate state ground" precluding federal review.
Based upon this case, Garner argues that at the time of his direct appeal, the Indiana appellate courts could recognize fundamental error at any time and not apply a procedural bar to post-conviction actions. Therefore, Garner argues, the trial court erred in applying a procedural bar to his petition for post-conviction relief.
Garner's strong reliance on Wheat is not to me persuasive. The instant case is not in federal court nor does it involve the prudential limits upon federal court review. Although the procedural bar involving ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel set forth in Baum and Schiro were not in effect at the time of Garner's direct appeal, we should nevertheless be bound by those decisions in reviewing Garner's denial of post-conviction relief at this time. To the extent that Garner's argument impliedly challenges the "retroactive" application of the Baum-Schiro reasoning, I would reject it.
On one hand, Garner requests us to apply to his conviction the analysis of the robbery statute enunciated in Cloy after his direct appeal. On the other hand, he impliedly seeks to preclude the application of the Schiro-Baum rationale on grounds that those decisions were rendered after he had been denied post-conviction relief.9 In essence he claims that had the post-conviction courts correctly applied the law then in effect they would not have held his assertions of ineffective assistance waived and that therefore, upon review, we should not do so. His approach to retroactivity in this sense seems to be somewhat inconsistent.
In any event I deem the matter to be controlled by the rationale of White v. State, supra, and its progeny. More particularly, in Patton v. State (1987) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 507 N.E.2d 624, trans. denied, we observed that White had altered the law applicable to a review of post-convietion proceedings and had been and was to be applied retroactively. I see no distinetion to be made as concerns the applicability of those decisions which hold issues sought to be presented at various post-conviction stages to be waived. There is legitimate confusion as to when our courts will apply a rule change retroactively and when it will not. In Martin v. State (1985) Ind., 480 N.E.2d 543, our Supreme Court made clear that German v. State (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 234, enunciating a rule more favorable to persons seeking to set aside guilty pleas, was to be applied prospectively only, i.e., to guilty pleas entered after the date of German. The decision in White v. State (1986) Ind., 497 N.E.2d 893, which abrogated the German rule and effectively returned to the more stringent rule of Neeley v. State (1978) 269 Ind. 588, 382 N.E.2d 714, has, however, been uniformly applied retroactively. Patton v. State, supra.
In Rowley v. State (1985) Ind., 483 N.E.2d 1078, the court reviewed denial of a second post-conviction relief petition following affirmance of a conviction in a direct appeal. The trial court had found the issue of admissibility of evidence induced *1320through hypnosis to have been waived. Our Supreme Court, despite a waiver claim by the State, applied retroactively a decision rendered after the first post-conviction proceeding. It did so because the issue went to the heart of the factfinding process and to the matter of Rowley's guilt or innocence. It must be noted, however, that neither the Schiro nor Bawm decisions were in place at the time.
Another case, Ramos v. State (1989) 3d Dist.Ind.App., 541 N.E.2d 300, although decided after Schiro and Baum, did not discuss those cases in rejecting the State's waiver claim with respect to review of denial of post-conviction relief. Ramos had been convicted in 1980. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in 1982 and the post-conviction petition had been denied in 1987. Our Third District held that a change in applicable law after his conviection concerning use of defendant's post-arrest silence should be retroactively applied because the admission of such evidence was fundamental error and had not been waived. The court nevertheless determined that application of the new judicial decision did not render erroneous the denial of post-conviction relief.
Until such time as our Supreme Court gives us additional guidance in the matter we should hold that procedural rules governing review of post-conviction relief proceedings are to be given retroactive effect if the result of such rules is to finalize criminal convictions and discourage collateral attacks.10 See Clay v. State (1989) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 532 N.E.2d 1204, trans. denied.
I would hold that the issues presented on this appeal are not now available to Garner and the trial court did not err in denying Garner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or his Belated Motion to Correct Errors.
For this reason, I dissent.

. In this regard, I disagree with the majority's framing of the issue which states that "the record is devoid of evidence of serious bodily injury." (Opinion, p. 1309)

. I must believe that in light of its holding which restricts the availability of post-conviction relief, the court meant the ineffective assistance of counsel and the issue unavailability theories to be the exclusive bases for relief and not merely representative of a group of unenu-merated courses for relief.

. Garner also alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel which is discussed separately.

. - Although I filed a dissenting opinion in Alston v. State, the Supreme Court apparently adopted the holding of Alston in Schiro v. State, supra, which is binding. I therefore find it necessary to discuss the rationale presented in Alston supporting the holding adopted in Schiro.

. In White v. State (1986) Ind., 497 N.E.2d 893, Indiana's recent landmark PCR decision, our Supreme Court contemplated a subsequent proceeding following affirmance of a denial of post conviction relief. The Court stated:
"If appellant has any other basis upon which to establish that his plea was not voluntary and intelligent, he may file a new petition." 497 N.E.2d at 906.
The Alston decision as adopted in Schiro, also contemplates that a second or subsequent post-conviction petition might result in relief to the petitioner. It however requires the petitioner's "new efforts" be directed to error in the basic conviction. Nevertheless, in light of the waiver considerations embodied in Bailey v. State, supra, 472 N.E.2d 1260, as made even more stringent in Baum v. State, supra, 533 N.E.2d 1200, and Schiro v. State, supra, 533 N.E.2d 1201, unless the conviction is absolutely void, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which new efforts will achieve a setting aside of a guilty plea or a trial conviction.

. I note that in Patton v. State (1989) 4th Dist.Ind.App., 537 N.E.2d 513, the Fourth District allowed a post-conviction petitioner to allege ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in a Belated Motion to Correct Errors. The court addressed the issue on the merits and held that post-conviction counsel was in fact ineffective. Because Patton did not address whether the issue of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel was available to petitioner after Baum and Schiro, I would decline to follow it.

. I recognize that this interpretation of Batley, Baum and Schiro creates a puzzling situation for post-conviction petitioners. If petitioner's post-conviction counsel is competent enough to raise the issues of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel (as occurred in Hey-ward), fundamental error may be addressed upon the merits. However, if petitioner is not competent enough to raise ineffective assistance of trial and/or appellate counsel (as occurred in the present case), petitioner is precluded by Bailey, Baum, and Schiro from raising fundamental error unless (1) the claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is preserved in a timely filed Motion to Correct Errors or a timely appeal of the denial of the post-conviction petition, or (2) the issue was demonstrably unavailable to the petitioner at the time of his direct appeal.

. -It is frequently the case that a criminal defendant is represented by different counsel at the appellate level than at trial. It is also common for trial counsel to have prepared the Motion to Correct Errors which until recently was the predicate to an appeal. We should not expect a trial attorney to allege his own ineffectiveness in such a motion. Therefore, in many, if not most such instances, the earliest opportunity to present a claim of ineffective trial counsel would be at the time the appellant's brief is filed upon appeal.

. This contention is arguably negated by Williams v. State (1984) Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1036 (review of guilty plea entered before date of Supreme Court decision is governed by law at time of guilty plea not law at time of PCR hearing). See also Gilham v. State (1985) Ind., 481 N.E.2d 1292.

. I believe this result to be in accord with the trend toward finalizing criminal convictions illustrated not only by our own Supreme Court but also by the United States Supreme Court. In Teague v. Lane (1989) -- U.S. --, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, reh. denied, - U.S. --, 109 S.Ct. 1771, 104 L.Ed.2d 206 the Supreme Court held that a new constitutional rule created by the Court which favors a defendant should generally »oft be applied retroactively, at least in a collateral review setting, because of "the principal of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system." 1d. 109 S.Ct. at 1074. The court noted, "without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect." Id. The court also parenthetically quoted from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1179, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971):
"No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing that a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and everyday thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation." Teague, supra [109 S.Ct.] at 1074.