Court Opinion

ID: 9705504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:09:35.509996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:12.032317
License: Public Domain

SCHUDSON, J.
¶ 29. (concurring, in part; dissenting, in part). I write separately to: (1) provide added factual background to assure a complete understanding of the customers' claims; (2) identify the legal pivot *68point of the majority's decision on the unlawful-liquidated-damages issue, which, I believe, is appropriate for certification and now merits supreme court review; and (3) explain my disagreement with the majority's conclusion on the customers' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.
I. The Customers' Claims
¶ 30. Because in reviewing a circuit court's dismissal of a complaint, we must "accept the facts stated in the complaint, along with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from them, as true," Wausau Tile, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 245, 593 N.W.2d 445 (1999), it is essential to completely consider a complaint's allegations. Further, because some of the customers' allegations, not mentioned in the majority opinion, are important to our review of the circuit court's dismissal of the claims for unlawful liquidated damages and for declaratory and injunctive relief, I begin by offering additional information to supplement the majority's summary of the customers' amended complaint.
¶ 31. The customers alleged that Time Warner was a "licensed monopoly" that "unilaterally set and determined" the contractual terms with its customers, and that it "consciously designed its billing cycles and due dates to uniformly and systematically 'catch' a consistent percentage of its customer base paying late." Further, they alleged:
By use of the term "late fee"1 and by other statements, representations, and omissions, Time Warner *69fully implies that the "late fee" constitutes only an administrative or service charge to cover Time Warner's costs that result from late payments and/or late paying customers.
In reality, the vast percentage of the "late fee" represents pure profit to Time Warner.
(Footnote added.) More specifically, the amended complaint alleged:
Time Warner fraudulently misrepresents, conceals, suppresses, and omits certain information about the late fee from each customer, including the information that: (1) the late fee amount is not based on a reasonable advance estimate of the actual or anticipated loss (i.e., costs) that might be caused by late payments and/or late paying customers; (2) the late fee amount does not, in fact, bear a reasonable relationship to the costs incurred by Time Warner solely as a result of late paying customers and/or late payments; (3) the actual damages/costs, including interest, suffered by Time Warner as a result of a customer who pays "late" is between $0.38 and $0.48 per customer per month, or approximately 1/10 of the late fee that Time Warner imposes upon such a customer; (4) Time Warner uses the late fee to recover costs wholly unrelated to late payments such as non-payment costs or collection costs *70related to non-paying customers; (5) Time Warner uses the late fee as a profit generating device and receives substantial annual revenues from late fees; and (6) Time Warner disguises this penalty/profit generating device as an administrative charge for late payments.
Moreover, the amended complaint alleged: "Time Warner already has incorporated these non-payment costs, or collection costs relating to non-paying customers, into Time Warner's basic cable rates submitted to the [Federal Communications Commission] for approval. Time Warner thus is enjoying a 'double recovery' of these costs."
¶ 32. The customers brought numerous claims and, on appeal, reiterating the contentions in the amended complaint, they assert that "Time Warner acted unreasonably in structuring its billing system to systematically snare each month a significant percentage of its customers with late fees." Explaining that the cable television industry is highly regulated, they further assert that while rates for basic service and premium channels are set by local, state, and federal authorities, "the imposition of late fees is the only aspect of cable service that is not regulated." Thus, they contend, Time Warner's late fees "[t]ak[e] advantage of this oversight." The customers maintain that "a cable company should not be allowed to use late fees as a profit source," and assert that Time Warner "systematically gouges its customers by charging excessive late fees" in order to gain millions of dollars in profit beyond that allowed under the regulated rates.
*71II. Unlawful Liquidated Damages2
¶ 33. The majority rightfully rejects the argument, as phrased in Time Warner's brief to this court, that "the alleged unenforceability of the cable television contract!] is merely a defense, and does not state an affirmative cause of action." The majority correctly observes that "neither law nor logic absolutely precludes a party from ever bringing an action to recover unlawful liquidated damages." Majority at ¶ 19 n.7. The majority's brief references to Northwestern Motor Car, Inc. v. Pope, 51 Wis. 2d 292, 293-94, 187 N.W.2d 200 (1971), see Majority at ¶¶ 17, 19 n.7, however, are inadequate to explain why Northwestern does not support Time Warner's argument.
¶ 34. In Northwestern, the supreme court commented: "The unreasonableness of the liquidated damages, then, is properly a matter of defense. It cannot be reached by demurrer but is a question to be determined after trial." Northwestern, 51 Wis. 2d at 295. This comment, however, was with specific reference to the *72litigation in that case; it did not preclude the possibility of a party bringing an unlawful-liquidated-damages claim.
¶ 35. While Wisconsin's appellate courts have not clarified that a party may bring an unlawful-liquidated-damages claim, the proposition that a party may do so is rather unremarkable. Indeed, in a variety of contexts, other courts have confirmed the validity of such a claim. See Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 511 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1973); Beasley v. Wells Fargo Bank, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
¶ 36. Thus, in theory at least, the customers may bring an unlawful-liquidated-damages claim. Whether they may do so in the instant case, however, "absent either their refusal to pay or their payment under contemporaneous protest," depends on whether, as the majority has concluded, for reasons related to fiscal planning and predictability, the circumstances of a private enterprise are comparable to those of government. See Majority at ¶ 20 & n.8. But does the rationale of G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. City of La Crosse, 105 Wis. 2d 152, 312 N.W.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1981), encompass private enterprise? Is it enough to say, as the majority declares, that "some of a government's fiscal concerns . . . are analogous to a private entity's fiscal concerns as well"? See Majority at ¶ 20 n.8.
¶ 37. That's the tenuous pivot point in the majority's decision on the customers' unlawful-liquidated-damages claim. After all, it is undisputed that if the late fee (or a portion thereof) is unlawful, Time Warner never should have charged it. Why, then, should Time Warner be allowed to take financial advantage of its own wrongdoing? If the Heileman rationale applies, the answer is clear, and Time Warner is in the clear. If, however, the Heileman rationale (explaining *73why government is insulated against such a claim) does not apply to a private enterprise that, in our free-market economy, perhaps should be expected to suffer the consequences of its wrongdoing, then the customers' claim survives, notwithstanding the voluntary payment doctrine.
¶ 38. This presents an issue of law and public policy — exactly the kind of issue that is properly resolved by the supreme court on certification from this court. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 188-89, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (explaining that primary function of court of appeals is error correcting and that primary function of supreme court is "law defining and law development").
¶ 39. Moreover, in Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Wis. 2d 518, 331 N.W.2d 357 (1983), the supreme court, in linking the validity of liquidated damages to public policy, and in requiring circuit'courts to consider the facts underlying liquidated-damages clauses with careful case-by-case review, provided the basis for concluding that courts could recognize a party's right to claim unlawful liquidated damages, perhaps even in the absence of payment or payment under protest. The supreme court declared:
We agree with the court of appeals that the validity of a stipulated[-]damages clause3 is a question of law for the trial judge rather than a mixed question of fact and law for the jury. The validity of a stipulated[-] damages clause is a matter of public policy, and as in other contract cases the question of contractual validity *74as a matter of public policy is an issue the trial judge initially decides. But we disagree with the court of appeals that the label of "question of law" automatically relieves the trial court from its duty to consider evidence or gives the appellate court free rein in reviewing the trial court's decision.
Even though the trial court's conclusion regarding the validity of the stipulated[-]damages clause is a legal conclusion — a policy judgment — that legal conclusion will frequently he derived from a resolution of disputed facts or inferences. The trial judge, not the jury, determines these facts and inferences. In deciding whether a stipulated[-]damages clause is valid, then, the trial judge should inquire into all relevant circumstances, including such matters as the existence and extent of the anticipated and actual injury to the nonbreaching party.
Id. at 523-25 (footnotes omitted; footnote and emphases added). Additionally, the supreme court clarified that the party challenging the stipulated-damages provision of a contract has "the burden of proving facts which would justify the trial court's concluding that the clause should not be enforced." Id. at 526.
¶ 40. The supreme court then articulated "the test that the trial court (and the appellate court) should apply in deciding whether a stipulated[-]damages clause is valid," see id., explaining the competing considerations favoring and disfavoring stipulated damages:
The overall single test of validity is whether the clause is reasonable under the totality of circumstances.
The reasonableness test is a compromise the courts have struck between two competing viewpoints toward *75stipulated[-]damages clauses, one favoring enforcement of stipulated!-]damages clauses and the other disfavoring such clauses.
Enforcement of stipulated!-] damages clauses is urged because the clauses serve several purposes. The clauses allow the parties to control their exposure to risk by setting the payment for breach in advance. They avoid the uncertainty, delay, and expense of using the judicial process to determine actual damages. They allow the parties to fashion a remedy consistent with economic efficiency in a competitive market, and they enable the parties to correct what the parties perceive to be inadequate judicial remedies by agreeing upon a formula which may include damage elements too uncertain or remote to be recovered under rules of damages applied by the courts. In addition to these policies specifically relating to stipulated[-]damages clauses, considerations of judicial economy and freedom of contract favor enforcement of stipulated!-] damages clauses.
A competing set of policies disfavors stipulated [-] damages clauses, and thus courts have not been willing to enforce stipulatedf-Jdamages clauses blindly without carefully scrutinizing them. Public law, not private law, ordinarily defines the remedies of the parties. Stipulated damages are an exception to this rule. Stipulated damages allow private parties to perform the judicial function of providing the remedy in breach[-]of[-]contract cases, namely, compensation of the nonbreaching party, and courts must ensure that the private remedy does not stray too far from the legal principle of allowing compensatory damages. Stipulated damages substantially in excess of injury may justify an inference of unfairness in bargaining or an objectionable in terrorem agreement to deter a party from breaching the contract, to secure performance, and to punish the breaching party if the deterrent is ineffective.
*76The reasonableness test strikes a balance between the two competing sets of policies by ensuring that the court respects the parties' bargain but prevents abuse.
Id. at 526-29 (citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis, other than in terrorem, added).
¶ 41. The supreme court then articulated and discussed three questions to be considered in helping to determine whether a stipulated-damages clause is reasonable. See id. at 529-33. In the instant case, should the unlawful-liquidated-damages claim survive, the circuit court would need to consider and address these questions, with consideration of the supreme court's analysis:
(1) Did the parties intend to provide for damages or for a penalty? (2) Is the injury caused by the breach one that is difficult or incapable of accurate estimation at the time of contract? and (3) Are the stipulated damages a reasonable forecast of the harm caused by the breach?
Recent discussions of the test of reasonableness have generally discarded the first factor, subjective intent of the parties, because subjective intent has little bearing on whether the clause is objectively reasonable. The label the parties apply to the clause, which might indicate their intent, has some evidentiary value, but it is not conclusive.
The second factor, sometimes referred to as the "difficulty[-]of[-]ascertainment" test, is generally viewed as helpful in assessing the reasonableness of the clause. The greater the difficulty of estimating or proving damages, the more likely the stipulated damages will appear reasonable. If damages are readily ascertainable, a significant deviation between the stipulated amount and the ascertainable amount will appear unreasonable. The. "difficulty [-] of [-] ascertainment" test *77has several facets, depending on whether the stipulated]!-]damages clause is viewed from the perspective of the time of contracting or the time of breach (or trial). These facets include the difficulty of producing proof of damages at trial; the difficulty of determining what damages the breach caused; the difficulty of ascertaining what damages the parties contemplated when they contracted; the absence of a standardized measure of damages for the breach; and the difficulty of forecasting, when the contract is made, all the possible damages which may he caused or occasioned by the various possible breaches.
The third factor concerns whether the stipulated [-] damages provision is a reasonable forecast of compensatory damages. Courts test the reasonableness of the parties' forecast, as they test the "difficulty of ascertainment" by looking at the stipulated[-]damages clause from the perspective of both the time of contracting and the time of the breach (or trial).
The second and third factors are intertwined, and both use a combined prospective-retrospective approach. Although courts have frequently said that the reasonableness of the stipulated[-]damages clause must be judged as of the time of contract formation (the prospective approach) and that the amount or existence of actual loss at the time of breach or trial is irrelevant, except as evidence helpful in determining what was reasonable at the time of contracting (the retrospective approach), the cases demonstrate that the facts available at trial significantly affect the courts' determination of the reasonableness of the stipulated!-] damages clause. If the damages provided for in the contract are grossly disproportionate to the actual harm sustained, the courts usually conclude that the parties' original expectations were unreasonable. Our prior decisions indicate that this court has employed the prospective-retrospective approach in determining the reasonableness of the stipulated!-] damages clauses and has looked *78at the harm anticipated at the time of contract formation and the actual harm at the time of breach (or trial).
As the above discussion demonstrates, the various factors and approaches to determine reasonableness are not separate tests, each of which must be satisfied for a stipulated[-]damages clause to stand. Reasonableness of the stipulated[-]damages clause cannot be determined by a mechanical application of the three factors cited above. Courts may give different interpretations to or importance to the various factors in particular cases.
In ruling on the reasonableness of a stipulated [-] damages clause, the trial judge should take into account not only these factors but also the policies that gave rise to the adoption of the reasonableness test as the test for distinguishing between enforceable liquidated[-] damages provisions and unenforceable penalty provisions.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
¶ 42. In the instant case, the circuit court correctly noted that, for purposes of measuring the sufficiency of the amended complaint, "we have to assume that [the $5.00 late fee is] liquidated damages," and "we have to assume that. . . the real cost is really about 48 cents, and that there's a reasonable likelihood these are unreasonable and unconscionable liquidated damages." Nevertheless, without carrying out any fact-finding under the Wassenaar test, and without explaining its implicit conclusion that the voluntary payment doctrine applied to the customers' unlawful-liquidated-damages claim, the circuit court dismissed that claim as well.
¶ 43. If the Heileman rationale does not apply to Time Warner, the circuit court erred. Consistent with Wassenaar, the circuit court would have been required *79both to fulfill its "duty to consider evidence," see Wassenaar, 111 Wis. 2d at 524, and to "inquire into all relevant circumstances," see id. at 525.
¶ 44. I have considered whether the voluntary-payment-doctrine rationale for affirming the dismissal of the customers' other claims to recover past payments could apply to the unlawful-liquidated-damages claim as well. After all, one might ask, would not the same considerations regarding duty to inform, fraud, and economic duress undercut any claim that the liquidated damages were unreasonable? I think not.
¶ 45. The unlawful-liquidated-damages claim, as measured by the supreme court's extensive discussion in Wassenaar, implicates law and public policy considerations that are quite distinct from those coming into play under the voluntary payment doctrine. Simply stated, the voluntary payment doctrine exposes whether the customers paid voluntarily; the unlawful-liquidated-damages claim, however, tests whether the amount they paid was reasonable and lawful.
¶ 46. Therefore, while it is conceivable that the fact that customers voluntarily pay the late fee could be among "all [the] relevant circumstances" affecting the circuit court's determination of the reasonableness of the $5.00 fee, see Wassenaar, 111 Wis. 2d at 525, the voluntary payment doctrine, as a matter of law, would not preclude the customers' unlawful-liquidated-damages claim, unless the Heileman rationale applies. If the Heileman rationale does not apply, the circuit court would need to conduct fact-finding, consistent with Wassenaar, to determine the merits of the customers' unlawful-liquidated-damages claim.4
*80III. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
¶ 47. If Time Warner customers could never seek to recover the allegedly unlawful liquidated damages they paid (unless they had paid under contemporaneous protest, which, of course, assumes that, at the time they paid, they knew of the factual and legal basis for protest), and if they could never gain declaratory and injunctive relief (unless they risked the loss of their cable service by refusing to pay), Time Warner's practices could go unchallenged and even unlawful late fees would go unchecked. Nevertheless, the majority concludes that this matter was not ripe for declaratory and injunctive relief because the customers had not alleged that any of them had refused to pay a late fee. The customers argue that the amended complaint adequately established the ripeness of the dispute by alleging that they "continue to be threatened with paying additional excessive late fees to Time Warner." The customers are correct.
¶ 48. As we recently reiterated: *81Juneau County v. Courthouse Employees, 216 Wis. 2d 284, 293, 576 N.W.2d 565 (Ct. App.), aff'd, 221 Wis. 2d 630, 585 N.W.2d 587 (1998). Moreover, the Act "is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered." Wis. Stat. § 806.04(12) (1999-2000).
*80It has long been held that the purposes of the [Uniform Declaratory Judgments] Act are furthered by authorizing the [circuit] court to take jurisdiction at a point in time that may be earlier than it would ordinarily do so. And in so doing, the Act provides relief, that is to some degree, anticipatory or preventive in nature.
*81¶ 49. Notwithstanding the failure to allege that any customer had either refused to pay a late fee or paid such a fee under protest, the amended complaint's claim for declaratory and injunctive relief sought to "settle . .. uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights ... and other legal relations." See Wis. Stat. § 806.04(12). It alleged not only that the customers had "paid at least one excessive and unconscionable late fee," but also that they "continue to be threatened with paying additional excessive late fees to Time Warner."
¶ 50. Nonetheless, Time Warner argues that the customers ignore "the fundamental distinction under the law between a court adjudicating a concrete future dispute before harm comes to pass and a court merely advising as to circumstances that may never come to pass." (Emphasis added.) Unless Time Warner is suggesting, however, that it does not intend to continue assessing late fees, the circumstances are certain to come to pass. The controversy, therefore, is as ripe as the finest autumn apple waiting to be picked.
¶ 51. One case that might seem to support the dismissal of the customers' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief actually helps to establish the viability of the customers' claim. In Horne v. Time Warner Operations, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 624 (S.D. Miss. 1999), the federal court confronted claims comparable to those in the instant case. The court, after declaring that the *82dismissal of the cable customers' contract claims was appropriate, further concluded that the dismissal of their claim for declaratory and injunctive relief was required as well. Id. at 630. The court explained that claims for declaratory and injunctive relief "do[] not stand alone, but require [] a viable underlying legal claim." Id. Therefore, the court concluded, because the underlying contract claims had been dismissed, the declaratory and injunctive claims could not stand. Id.
¶ 52. Horne, however, was decided under Mississippi law. See id. at 628-30. Mississippi is one of the few states that does not subscribe to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 806.04 table of jurisdictions wherein act has been adopted (1994). Wisconsin law in this area, however, is clear. In sharp contrast to Mississippi law, our supreme court has declared:
The underlying philosophy of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is to enable controversies of a justiciable nature to be brought before the courts for settlement and determination prior to the time that a wrong has been threatened or committed. The purpose is facilitated by authorizing a court to take jurisdiction at a point earlier in time than it would do under ordinary remedial rules and procedures. As such, the Act provides a remedy which is primarily anticipatory or preventative in nature.
Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 307, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976) (emphasis added); see also Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 415, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).
¶ 53. In an extraordinary effort to jettison the customers' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, the majority relies exclusively on a proposition that has been overruled — that " '[c]ourts will not ... declare rights until they have become fixed under an estab*83lished state of facts, and will not determine future rights in anticipation of an event that may never happen.'" See Majority at ¶ 25. That proposition, often repeated in supreme court decisions including those the majority cites, was overruled. Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 413-14 ("We expressly overrule it . . . .").5
*84¶ 54. Wisconsin's Uniform Declaratory Judg*85ments Act, Wis. Stat. § 806.04, provides that "[a]ny person interested under a . . . written contract. .. may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . contract . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." Wis. Stat. § 806.04(2) (1999-2000). And, as we have declared: "We construe [Wis. Stat.] § 806.04(2) liberally as it affords relief from an *86uncertain infringement of a party's rights." Town of Eagle v. Christensen, 191 Wis. 2d 301, 316, 529 N.W.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1995).
¶ 55. Unquestionably, the customers' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief is encompassed by the Wisconsin standards. Even untethered from the other claims, the customers' claim for declaratory and injunc-tive relief requires the circuit court's consideration and, indeed, such consideration would serve all parties by promptly clarifying their rights. Accordingly, on this issue, I respectfully dissent.

 The customers maintain that "it is a misnomer to even refer to this $5.00 charge as a late fee because Time Warner's *69customers pay for cable service one month in advance." Thus, the amended complaint alleged:
Pursuant to Time Warner's policy, late fees are assessed even if the hill is paid after the due date, hut before the end of the complete service period.
Customers are assessed a late fee even though they have not yet received all of the cable services for which payment is allegedly late.
The majority opinion and I, however, like the parties on appeal, refer to the charge as a "late fee."

 In referring to the claim for "unlawful liquidated damages," the majority opinion and I simply utilize the terminology employed by the parties on appeal. In doing so, however, we should clarify two things. First, we have not reached any conclusion about whether these "liquidated damages" are reasonable and enforceable. Thus, if we were tracking the terminology in Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Wis. 2d 518, 331 N.W.2d 357 (1983), we would be speaking of these as "stipulated damages" unless and until the circuit court concluded that the damages were unreasonable and unenforceable. See id. at 521. Second, and in a similar vein, in referring to the customers' claim as one for "liquidated damages," we should not ignore the amended complaint's reference to liquidated damages or penalties, or presume that the $5.00 late fee was not a penalty. See id. (distinguishing "a valid and enforceable liquidated!!-] damages provision" from "an unenforceable penalty").

 The supreme court clarified that it was "us[ing] the term 'stipulated damages'... to refer to the contract [clause stipulating damages] and the term 'liquidated damages' to refer to stipulated damages which a court holds to be reasonable and will enforce." Wassenaar, 111 Wis. 2d at 521; see also n.2, above.

 At first glance, the $5.00 late fee may seem so modest, and the costs of collection may seem so obvious, that the fee might *80be deemed reasonable without any need for further inquiry. At this juncture, however, the record provides no evidence that could allow a court to reach that conclusion. Moreover, we should be mindful that such fees may mount monthly and affect countless consumers. Further, the lawfulness of the $5.00 monthly late fee may depend on whether, as the customers allege, administrative costs for late payments already have been accounted for in Time Warner's regulated rates.

 Stubbornly, the majority attempts to explain its allegiance to overruled law. See Majority at ¶ 25 n.9. In doing so, however, it multiplies its errors. Thus, I shall try, even more explicitly, and with the help of the supreme court's most recent pronouncement on the law of declaratory judgment, to elaborate the bases for my determination that the law requires reversal of the dismissal of the customers' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.
(1) The majority claims:
It is true that Loy overruled Heller et al. v. Shapiro et al., 208 Wis. 310, 242 N.W2d [sic] 174 (1932), because the supreme court determined that in Heller, the application of the proposition quoted here unacceptably restricted the trial court's exercise of its discretion. Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 413-14. However, the eases we cited have not been criticized, much less overruled.
Majority at ¶ 25 n.9.
Once again, the majority misreads Loy. Whether Heller and the other cases on which the majority relies have been criticized or overruled is incidental to the fact that the proposition on which the majority relies has been overruled. In full context, the supreme court declared:
It appears to us that Heller went too far in its requirement that all adjudicatory facts be resolved as a prerequisite to a declaration of rights. The Heller holding and rationale did not further the purposes for which the Declaratory Judgments Act was adopted by the legislature. Heller, if interpreted in accordance with the tenor of its rationale, would erode substantially the authority of a court to declare rights and status, and, if followed to its logical conclusion, would require that all facts at issue, including the ultimate injury or damage to a party, he determinable *84before declaratory action could be brought. What Heller dictates is a traditional lawsuit after a party is aggrieved. It places undue restraints upon the Declaratory Judgments Act and throttles judicial discretion. We expressly overrule it in respect to the statement therein that:

"[T]he declaratory relief statute [only justifies] a declaration of rights upon an existing state of facts, not one upon a state of facts that may or may not arise in the future."

Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 413-14, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982) (quoted source omitted; emphasis added).
(2) The majority also asserts that declaratory judgment was inappropriate because "the customers are seeking much more than a construction of the validity of the contract or a declaration of their rights thereunder." Majority at ¶ 26. That, however, is not at all unusual; additional claims often accompany actions for declaratory and injunctive relief. In Loy, the supreme court commented that declaratory judgment was appropriate despite the fact that, "[o]f course, it is not conclusive in respect to the entire cause of action." Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 411. And, indeed, the majority's premise is absolutely refuted by the statute itself: "Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Wis. Stat. § 806.04(1) (1999-2000) (emphasis added).
(3) The majority maintains that the circuit court correctly exercised discretion in dismissing the declaratory judgment claim because "the customers failed to allege that any of them had refused to pay a late fee." See Majority at ¶ 22. As explained, however, that only would have been required under the proposition that has been overruled. And recently, the supreme court, reiterating the correct propositions governing declaratory judgments, rejected the argument that a union could not seek declaratory judgment regarding the pension rights of one of its members because he "ha[d] yet to be formally denied a pension." Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, 2001 WI 65, ¶¶ 34, 42, 244 Wis. 2d 333, 627 N.W.2d 866. Concluding that *85"[a]n employee need not have been denied pension benefits to satisfy the ripeness required in this type of action," id. at ¶ 44, the supreme court explained:
By definition, the ripeness required in a declaratory judgment is different from the ripeness required in other actions. For example, in a declaratory action involving a forfeiture statute, "[plotential defendants may seek a construction of a statute or a test of its constitutional validity without subjecting themselves to forfeitures or prosecution." Thus, a plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment need not actually suffer an injury before seeking relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.04(2).
Id. at ¶ 41 (citation omitted; emphasis added).
(4) Finally, the majority searches for a safe shore in the standards showing deference to a circuit court's discretionary decision. See Majority at ¶ 27. But there, too, the majority's rationale crashes on the rocks of the circuit court's legally flawed decision. As the majority notes, the circuit court dismissed the declaratory judgment claim because no customer had yet refused to pay the late fee. As explained, however, such a requirement would only have existed under an overruled legal proposition.
Thus, once we abandon any lingering allegiance to overruled law, and once we apply the law — as clearly and repeatedly stated starting with Loy in 1982 and continuing through Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 in 2001 — we must reverse the dismissal of the customers' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.