Court Opinion

ID: 9498378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:16:15.465194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:48.378282
License: Public Domain

OWEN, District Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I am of the view that as a matter of law the evidence — even with the jury considering the multiple hearsay I believe inappropriately received over initial objections, see infra, was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Mayor Spencer — and through him the City of Yonkers — did anything that was in retaliation against plaintiff Joan Gronowski, one of Spencer’s “chief clerks”, for politically affiliating herself with and giving active support to a competitive mayoral candidate to Mayor Spencer.
This unfortunate matter began in the spring of 2000 when Yonkers found itself facing a substantial budget crisis [JA-144].1 At about the same time, a city document was prepared entitled “JOB ANALYSIS/TEST DEVELOPMENT REPORT FOR SELECTED YONKERS CLERICAL TITLES.” [JA-523] The document’s introduction addressed a problem of overstaffing, reading:
The City of Yonkers currently employs a number of provisionals that is significantly higher than the average percentage of provisionals within New York State municipalities. The New York State Civil Service Commission has directed the City of Yonkers to immediately reduce its provisional count, (emphasis supplied).
Following this, Ernest F. Hart, the Mayor’s Commissioner of Personnel (who happened to be a lawyer) was directed to confer with Finance Commissioner James LaPerche to deal with the elimination and consolidation of titles, eventually involving some 35 employees [JA-173] and Hart recommended among many others the elimination of the four “chief clerks” he felt were overpaid office managers. Thereafter — “after the study” as Hart put it, he reported his list to the mayor. [JA-168-72], Hart never talked about any “particular people” [JA-167].2 He was solely structuring the cutting by “identifying the position” to be terminated.3 Having done *299this analysis, Hart recommended that 30 positions be terminated to comply with the study.4
Thus, on this record, Hart initiated and forwarded the inclusion of the “chief clerks” among those as appropriate for termination. Gronowski happened to be one of those. Mayor Spencer therefore had nothing to do with her termination except to sign off.
The first major problem with this case— which everybody concedes — is that there is no direct evidence that the mayor did anything,5 The second major problem is some multiple hearsay where Gronowski testified that Frank McGovern, one of the Mayor’s aides, told her that the Mayor had told him he was “furious” 6 because of her active support of a competitor for his office. I note that the first two times such inadmissible hearsay was offered defense counsel objected and was overruled by the Court, (JA-54-5 and 78) after which counsel gave up objecting to this type of questioning. The record is replete thereafter with such double, indeed a triple hearsay— and while I feel it should have been excluded even accepting it there is still no showing the Mayor acted.
The majority acknowledges that at no time did Gronowski have a confrontation with the Mayor although they find it of evidentiary weight that beginning in 1997, Gronowski testified the Mayor acted more “aloof’ towards her then he had previously [JA-57]. While this, in my view, is the only evidence competently attributed to the Mayor as to his feelings — not actions — and was, according to Gronowski after Borelli became a potential Democratic candidate for mayor against Mayor Spencer and Gro-nowski had chaired fund-raisers for Borelli and campaigned with him on weekends that she said Mayor Spencer became “a little more aloof’ with her — but what could she have expected at that point, a hug?
Turning to the testimony of union official Angelo Arena called by Gronowski, it *300is filled with material contradictions and limitations that negate the Mayor’s liability. For example, he testified at trial as follows [JA-397]:
Q Am I correct that, other than Joan Gronowski, nobody has told you that her position being abolished had any political motivation?
A You’re correct in that assumption, sir.
Q So the only person to tell you was Ms. Gronowski; is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
But earlier [JA-382] Arena had negated any Mayoral input:
Q Had Joan Gronowski, before the layoffs, ever come to you and talk to you about Frank McGovern; yes or no?
A Yes.
:¡« % :jj ‡ sj:
Q And what did she tell you, in essence?
A Basically that she was approached by Frank McGovern and told that she should lay off her political activities because it was going to come back and hurt her.
Q And did she indicate to you one way or the other whether Mr. McGovern told her he was speaking for the mayor?
A. No.[7]
(emphasis supplied)
Arena’s waffling is further demonstrated by the following four quotes, the first at JA-468:
Q. [This from Arena’s deposition testimony] “As I was being told by some of the members in some phone calls and by Gronowski herself, that the mayor was targeting certain people for political reasons.” Are those the rumors you’re referring to, sir? A. Yes, sir.
This should be compared to the quote from JA-395 above limiting this to Gronowski only.
Then at JA-466, while Arena wrote his International Union President:
Q. Well, the statement said, “it is our opinion that most of these layoffs are political ‘hits,’ ” correct?
A. Yes.
He testified he had no competent basis for this [JA-467]:
Q. Were you basing that on rumors?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that rumor was from Ms. Gro-nowski?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Anybody else?
A. Some members, but only rumors or conjecture, sir.
After giving these answers he then made the startling admission that all these statements were only based on personal opinion or rumor or conjecture and that he would write “anything” to help his union.
Q. “In the second paragraph you wrote, “It is our opinion that most of these layoffs are political,” quote, unquote, ‘hits.’ What are you referring to”?
*301“Answer: I was referring to the 30-some-odd people that I lost at the time. And again, having the reputation this union has had for years and years, I was willing to write anything to the international to make him aware of my personal opinion on these things, plus what I was being told, rumors, whatever you want to call it. I was going to do whatever I can to help this union.”
Do you remember writing those words, saying those words under oath at your deposition?
A. Yes, sir. (emphasis supplied)
This, admission about stretching facts, “■ — write anything — ” to help his union, undercuts Arena’s testimony and Gronow-ski’s case so badly — particularly viewed against his several wafflings as to crucial material matters, supra, — in my view renders his testimony inherently unreliable as any basis for a conclusion against the May- or.
Further, the majority infers that "... the Mayor was actively involved in reversing the layoffs and took responsibility for where employees were placed.” (emphasis supplied). However, the page of Victor Pacheco’s testimony it cites for this inference supports nothing more than that the mayor had the authority in that area. It does not support an inference that he was “actively involved” in a retaliatory exercise of it against Gronowski, or any of the other 30 affected by the budget crisis.
That Pacheco testimony reads [JA-362-3]:
Q. Well, to your knowledge then, the mayor was directly involved in ensuring Mr. Breheny stayed in Parks — when his title — hold on— when his new civil service title was in another department; was that your testimony?
A. Was he directly involved?
Q. I’m asking you, you raised the may- or.
A. I’m just saying, everything falls under the mayor’s hiring authority.
The CouRt: His question is: Do you know, to your knowledge, of your own knowledge do you know that the mayor was involved in the fact that this gentleman stayed in Parks, if, in fact, he stayed in Parks, because you say you don’t know whether he stayed in Parks. The Witness: No, I do not.
The majority opinion relies in part on the assertion that the first letter Gronow-ski received outlining her new grade and salary came on the “day she was instructed to report to work, September 25, 2000.” While the majority does not claim the Mayor had anything to do with this single and “late” communication, factually any inference of retaliation is undermined by several materially different particulars. First the job for her did not come into existence until September 20, five days before she was to report. It was authorized for her alone. [JA-665], She was called about it that very day, September 20, by Pacheco. [JA-113-4]. The next day Hart sent her a letter about it dated September 21 which she acknowledges she got on September 22, [JA-91] three days before she was to report. In addition to the foregoing, Gronowski had been informed the prior June in writing (three months earlier) that her new grade, clerk III, was for her [JA-646] going to be at the same salary as the old grade of chief clerk.8
*302Her trial testimony acknowledging all this at JA-112-3 reads:
Q. There’s an entry that says “chief clerk,” correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And if you go across that line, there’s a salary range; 40,784 to 49,028, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And it says, “nine and ten,” correct?
A. Yes.
Q. But then its says “Clerk III.” You see that?
A. Correct.
Q. And it has the exact— it has the salary range for that position, correct, 37,000 to 49,028, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So you were aware in June of 2000, that the old grade would have been Chief Clerk and the new grade was Clerk III, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So you were aware from this document, in June, long before September, what the salary range was for the Clerk III, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And that, as a chief clerk, the new position was Clerk III, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So when Mr. Pacheco called you on September 20 and said you’re going to get a Clerk III position, you were aware in June— from June what the parameters of that position were, correct.
A. Correct.
All of this satisfies the reasonable notice she was entitled to receive for the availability of the new job at the same level of pay and the same level of job.
As to why she did not take the job, her testimony reads [JA-93]:
Q. At this point, Ms. Gronowski, what were the reasons for not going to the Parks Department?
A. I didn’t know what the job was, primarily.
And she testified that the next day [JA-94] she requested the title and salary of her restored position, and this notwithstanding she had known since June that Clerk III (see JA-643, 646 and JA-112-113 above) paid the same salary she had received when she was let off.
Finally, I observe that the majority, stating that “the City hired other employees to handle Gronowski’s old duties in consumer protection [,]” (emphasis supplied) suggests that the Mayor had an awareness of the efforts taken to get her out, and therefore his participation. However this is contrary to the record. Michael Paulerieio testified at [JA-284]:
Q. Now after Ms. Gronowski left in July 2000, did you come to know a woman named Tashara Moses?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. How did you come to know her?
A. She was put in there, she was an intern.
Q. She was put in there after Ms. Gro-nowski left?
A. I think she was working in there also with Joanie before that.
Q. And directly after Ms. Gronowski left, was she doing any of Ms. Gro-nowski’s work?
A. All of it.
While others from within the department later took over those duties, it was *303not until Ms. Moses proved to be inadequate. This, whatever else, the Mayor had no part in.
Turning to the applicable law, I agree with the majority that to overturn a verdict, there must be “ ‘such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury’s findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the [appellant] that reasonable and fair minded men could not arrive at a verdict against [the appellant].’ ” LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 429 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Song v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1046 (2d Cir.1992)). I submit that exists here, only “rumor” or “conjecture”. (See Arena testimony quoted above).
But I go on and further agree with the majority that for there to be an award of damages, a plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was personally involved — that is, he directly participated — in the alleged constitutional deprivations. “ ‘[D]irect participation’ as a basis of liability in this context requires intentional participation in the conduct constituting a violation of the victim’s rights by one who knew of the facts rendering it illegal.” Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir.2001). I do not reject — implicitly or explicitly — as the majority suggests, any law in Provost at 155 or Morris, 196 F.3d at 110 having to do with an employer’s state of mind or how it can be proved. But I do not on this record find as a factual matter any support for a conclusion of personal involvement or direct participation by the Mayor at any stage of Gronowski’s alleged constitutional deprivation here.
Whatever degree of displeasure the Mayor, being human, understandably felt knowing that one of his senior staffers openly supported a challenger for his very office, or to whatever degree the jury could have found the Mayor was displeased because of this, I do not find any evidence to support this damaging opprobrium visited on this substantial public servant when he did nothing whatever to act against Gronowski because of these feelings.9
Accordingly, I would reverse, and grant the Mayor and the City of Yonkers’ successive Rule 50 F.R.C.P. motions before and after verdict for judgment in their favor as a matter of law.

. These references are to the trial record in the joint appendix.

. [JA-171-2]
Q Now, you recommended, you said in prior accounts, the elimination of the position of chief clerk because you thought the incumbents were like office managers, right?
A Yes.
Q And you thought the incumbents were overpaid, right?
A I did.
Q Did you know what Joan Gronowski was doing on a day-to-day basis when you made that conclusion?
A No clue.
Q Did you ever talk with her about what she was doing?
A No. That’s why we did a study.
Q And when you made this proposal to eliminate the chief clerk position, you did it at a meeting with Mr. LaPerche and Mayor Spencer; is that right?
A Well, I don't remember when I made the proposal, the thing is, after the study, of course at some point I would have to tell the mayor, but pursuant to the study, I recommended the elimination and consolidation of titles like chief clerk, manager of administration, (emphasis supplied).

.[JA-168]
Q So when had you (sic) identified the position you spoke with him about Ms. Gronowski, this is Mr. LaPerche?
A Along with everybody else, yes.
*299Q And what did you say about Ms. Gro-nowski?
A I don’t remember saying anything about her particularly.
Q Now, you came up with the idea of abolishing the clerk's position, didn't you?
A Yes.

. I attach no evidentiary weight, as does the majority, to the fact that staffers Hart and LaPerche, after picking positions and titles to terminate, mentioned among themselves the names of those in those positions, (see fn. 3, supra, which necessarily included Gronow-ski). But that is not evidence that the mayor did anything in selecting her — or any of the others — for discharge.

. The District Judge later in the trial similarly observed in a colloquy with counsel. (A 456).
The Court: I’ve never not (sic) had a concession from the defense the mayor acted under color of are state law, if acted at all. The problem here the mayor did nothing whatsoever. I think that's the problem, right, isn't that the problem?
Mr. Plunkett: Yes, your honor. One of them.

.I note here that McGovern disputed Gro-nowski's testimony, he testifying that the remark ''furious” was never said to him by the Mayor. [JA-445] Indeed, when Arena was called as a witness he confirmed this [JA-382]. But as observed above, even disregarding these denials, there is no evidence that the Mayor ever did anything on account of any “fury”.
Even accepting this double hearsay characterization given by McGovern who regarded himself as a "Dutch uncle” to Gronowski (JA-410), it was in the nature of advice from a friend. "... [w]hy are you getting involved with this stuff, it's just not a smart thing to do. You don’t — I divorced myself pretty much from politics when I came on board, you know, I sort of stayed away from it and you should. I mean, I just, common sense you stay away from that kind of stuff, you don't pick sides or choose sides or anything like that.”

. [Footnote by the Court] As to the double or triple hearsay answers given by Gronowski and Arena, I would note that such are universally recognized as of highly questionable reliability, particularly where it is transmitted through two or three transmitters’ successive recollections and as here uttered by witnesses Gronowski and Arena as highly self-serving declarations. This is particularly so here where I earlier noted McGovern under oath denied that he had said this, and Arena on the trial testified similarly above that Gronowski never told him that McGovern told her he was speaking for the Mayor. [JA-382]

. Plaintiff’s Exh. 20, a letter to Gronowski from the Civil Service Commission, dated June 30, 2000, confirms this and that her name was on a preferred list. [JA-627]. It reads in part: On July 1, 2000 your position of Chief Clerk was abolished. Your name will be placed *302on a Preferred List for this position for a period of four (4) years from July 1, 2000, to be certified in the future for reinstatement to this position.

. Having played no role in Gronowski's inclusion in Hart's list of layoffs, the Mayor can neither be faulted for having failed to remove her name from the list after it was presented to him. Indeed, such an action would have amounted to the very same discrimination improperly deemed to have occurred here,