Court Opinion

ID: 9378327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 23:02:22.231855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:20.365833
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/9/23 P. v. Norman CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B318560

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. NA031863)
         v.

DANIEL MONROE NORMAN,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Judith L. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.

      Sandra Gillies, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Michael C. Keller, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                             ******
      Daniel Norman (defendant) was convicted of murder in
1997 when he and a friend conducted an armed robbery of a drug
supplier’s apartment. In 2019, defendant sought to vacate his
sentence under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section
1170.95).1 After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied the petition because it found, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that defendant had acted with reckless indifference to human life
(defendant conceded that he was a major participant in the
robbery). Defendant argues that the trial court’s finding was not
supported by substantial evidence. He is incorrect, so we affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Facts2
      A.    The underlying crime
      In early April 1997, defendant and Bobby Renfroe Jr.
(Renfroe) conducted a home-invasion robbery of Jeff Perry
(Perry), whom they believed to be involved in selling illegal
drugs. Renfroe self-identified as a member of the Dodge City

1     Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10). For simplicity’s sake,
we will refer to the section by its new numbering only.
      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2     We draw the facts from our review of the trial transcript.

                                 2
Crips, and defendant was “associated” with the same gang.
      Prior to the robbery, defendant and Renfroe questioned a
friend who was a known drug user about where Perry, as his
supplier, lived with his fiancée and their son. When they were a
block away from Perry’s apartment, defendant and Renfroe put
on ski masks to cover their faces and armed themselves—Renfroe
with a .38 revolver and defendant with an Uzi. They encountered
Perry’s fiancée on the stairs just outside Perry’s apartment;
Renfroe kept walking, but defendant grabbed her, put his Uzi to
her head and warned her, “Don’t scream.”
      While defendant was holding the fiancée at gunpoint,
Renfroe entered the apartment. Upon entering, he encountered a
man—later identified as Giacomo Candela (Candela)—in the
apartment’s front room and shot him in the chest. After the shot
was fired, the fiancée ran away and defendant stepped into the
apartment’s front room. Hearing the shot, Perry emerged from
the apartment’s back rooms. Walking past Candela’s prone form
on the floor, defendant put his Uzi to Perry’s head and demanded
that Perry give him the money in his safe. Perry led defendant
and Renfroe to a safe, which contained $4,800 in cash and a
loaded gun.
      One of the two robbers then pushed Perry to the ground
and demanded to know where the “other money” was. They
pulled Perry up, said, “Let’s go,” and started pushing Perry
toward his Jeep in a nearby parking lot. Perry managed to
escape after defendant and Renfroe climbed into the Jeep before
Perry, and Perry locked the doors and ran.
      Defendant and Renfroe got out of the Jeep and gave chase.
When they were unable to catch Perry, they went to a friend’s
house to count the cash they got from Perry’s safe.

                               3
      Candela died from the gunshot wound a few hours later.
      B.     Charges, conviction and appeal
      The People charged defendant and Renfroe with (1) the
murder of Candela (§ 187, subd. (a)), (2) first degree residential
robbery (§ 211), (3) assaulting Perry’s fiancée with a firearm (§
245, subd. (a)(2)), and (4) first degree residential burglary (§
459).3 The People also charged defendant with being a felon in
possession of a firearm (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The People
alleged the special circumstance that the murder occurred during
the commission of the residential burglary and residential
robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)); alleged that defendants
personally used a firearm during the commission of the offenses
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)); and alleged, as to the robbery and
burglary counts, that defendants personally inflicted great bodily
injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
      The jury found defendant guilty of all charges, and found
true all allegations.
      The trial court sentenced defendant to life without the
possibility of parole (for the murder and special circumstance)
plus 31 years in state prison (for the remaining counts).
      Defendant appealed, and we affirmed the judgment in an
unpublished opinion.
II.   Procedural Background
      In August 2019, defendant filed a petition seeking to vacate
his murder conviction under section 1172.6 on the ground that he
was not the actual killer, did not aid and abet the actual killer,
and was not a major participant in the robbery who acted with

3      The People also charged defendant with a second count of
first degree residential robbery, but dismissed that count prior to
trial.

                                 4
reckless indifference to human life.
       In February 2022, and after appointing counsel for
defendant, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing regarding
defendant’s eligibility for relief under section 1172.6. Neither the
People nor defendant presented any new evidence. The sole issue
was whether, in the trial court’s independent judgment, the
special circumstance finding was true: Defendant conceded he
was a “major participant,” but argued that he did not act with
“reckless indifference to human life” in committing the robbery
and burglary.
       The trial court denied defendant’s petition. Specifically,
the court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant had
acted with reckless indifference to human life because (1)
defendant knew guns would be used to commit the robbery and
burglary, was armed himself, and twice pointed his Uzi at
people’s heads, (2) defendant was physically present at the scene
of the robbery, and, when defendant entered the apartment after
Renfroe shot Candela, opted to put his Uzi to Perry’s head to
demand money rather than stop to render aid to Candela, (3) the
crime lasted several minutes from the time defendant and
Renfroe approached the apartment, demanded Perry open his
safe, and led Perry to his Jeep, and (4) although defendant did
not know whether Renfroe had a tendency to be violent,
defendant made no efforts to minimize the violence during the
robbery and burglary.
       Defendant filed this timely appeal.
                            DISCUSSION
       Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
petition to vacate his murder conviction and to resentence him
under section 1172.6.

                                 5
       In 2018, our Legislature amended the definition of
“murder” in our State to preclude a jury from “imput[ing]” the
“malice” element of that crime “based solely on [a defendant’s]
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Our Legislature’s
purpose was to ensure that “[a] person’s culpability for murder
[is] premised upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens
rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(g).) As amended, liability for
murder is limited to persons (1) who are the actual killer, (2) who
aided and abetted the actual killer in the murder (that is, who
acted with the intent to kill), or (3) who were a major participant
in the underlying felony that resulted in the killing, but only if
they also acted with reckless indifference to human life. (§§ 188,
subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); e.g., People v. Johns (2020) 50
Cal.App.5th 46, 58-59.)
       Section 1172.6 is the procedural vehicle by which persons
convicted of murder in now-final judgments can seek to vacate
convictions that do not satisfy the now-current definition of
“murder.” Where, as here, a defendant files a facially sufficient
petition and the record does not otherwise foreclose relief as a
matter of law, the trial court must issue an order to show cause
and convene an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) At the
hearing, the People have the burden of proving to the trial court,
as an independent factfinder, that defendant is guilty of murder
under a still-valid theory. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The parties
have the option of introducing “new or additional” evidence, or
they may choose to rely on the record of the prior proceedings.
(Ibid.)
       The trial court in this case found beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant was guilty of murder under the still-valid
theory that he was a major participant in the robbery that

                                 6
resulted in Candela's death and that he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Defendant concedes that the court’s
finding that he was a major participant is supported by the
record, but asserts that the finding that he acted with reckless
indifference to human life is not. As a threshold matter,
defendant argues that we must engage in de novo review of the
evidence presented at trial, including reevaluating the credibility
of witnesses and drawing whatever inferences we find
persuasive; for support, he cites People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th
510 (Vivar). However, Vivar itself confined its rule of
independent review for testimony presented in transcripts
(rather than through in-person testimony) to petitions under
section 1473.7 (id. at pp. 527-528 & fn. 7); not surprisingly, courts
have uniformly rejected the argument defendant now advances
(People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 302; People v.
Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 232-233; People v. Mitchell
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 590-591). We join that chorus. As a
result, our task is simply to assess whether “substantial
evidence”—that is, “evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value”—supports the trial court’s independent finding that
defendant acted with reckless indifference. (People v. Nieber
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 476.) In so doing, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s finding,
drawing all reasonable inferences in support of that finding.
(Ibid.)
I.     Pertinent Legal Principles
       In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), our Supreme Court
more precisely defined when a person acts with “reckless
indifference to human life.”

                                 7
       Under Banks and Clark, a defendant acts with reckless
indifference to human life when he ‘““knowingly engag[es] in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.’””
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801, quoting People v. Estrada
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 577, quoting Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481
U.S. 137, 157-158.) This standard “has a subjective and an
objective” component. (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677
(Scoggins).) To satisfy the subjective component, ‘“[t]he
defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent
manner in which the [underlying felony] is committed,’ and . . .
must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death his or
her actions create.’” (Scoggins, at p. 677, quoting Banks, at p.
801.) The key is whether the defendant evinces “a willingness to
kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even
if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the
outcome of his actions.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) To
satisfy the objective component, the risk of death ““‘must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the [defendant’s] conduct and the circumstances
known to him . . ., its disregard involves a gross deviation from
the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe
in the [defendant’s] situation.””’ (Scoggins, at p. 677,
quoting Clark, at p. 617.)
       Our Supreme Court has identified a number of
considerations bearing on whether a defendant has acted with
reckless indifference to human life. “No one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803); what matters is
the totality of the considerations (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.
677). The considerations are: (1) “Did the defendant use or know

                                  8
that a gun would be used during the [underlying] felony,” and,
relatedly, “[h]ow many weapons were ultimately used?”; (2) “Was
the defendant physically present at the crime,” such that he had
“the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim?”; (3)
“What was the duration of the interaction between the
perpetrators of the [underlying] felony and the victims?”; (4)
“What was the defendant’s knowledge of his . . . confederate’s
propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force?”; and
(5) “What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of
violence during the felony?” (Ibid., citing Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at pp. 618-623.)
II.    Analysis
       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
defendant knowingly engaged in criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death by evincing a willingness to kill that
entailed a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe, and hence acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
       More generally, defendant and Renfroe engaged in conduct
that carries with it a “particularly high risk of violence” because
they executed “a home invasion robbery” of someone they knew to
be a “drug dealer.” (In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999,
1013 (McDowell).)
       And more specifically, the pertinent Banks and Clark
factors confirm that defendant in this case acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Defendant knew that he and Renfroe
would be using guns during the burglary and robbery, and
defendant himself pointed his Uzi at the heads of both Perry’s
fiancée and Perry himself in order to get them to comply with his
demands. Although defendant was not inside the front room of

                                 9
Perry’s apartment at the moment Renfroe shot Candela and
hence may not have been able to stop that shooting, defendant
certainly had the opportunity to aid Candela when defendant
walked into the apartment moments after the gunfire and saw
Candela on the floor; defendant’s decision to step around Candela
and point his gun at Perry’s head—rather than render aid to the
prone Candela—evinced a reckless indifference to human life.
Although the interaction between Renfroe and Candela prior to
Renfroe shooting him was brief, the burglary and robbery started
at the time defendant put a gun the fiancée’s head, and continued
after the shooting as defendant put his gun to Perry’s head, led
Perry to his safe, waited for Perry to open the safe, threw Perry
to the ground and demanded “the other money,” followed Perry
out to his Jeep, and then gave chase after Perry ran away.
Defendant and Renfroe’s time with Perry—while they were both
armed and while Perry’s apartment was littered with firearms4—
only increased the risk to human life. Although there was no
evidence that defendant had advance knowledge of Renfroe’s
penchant for shooting first and asking questions later, defendant
certainly knew of it once he stepped past Candela’s prone form
moments after Renfroe shot him and yet defendant did nothing to
minimize the risk of violence as their burglary and robbery
continued; instead, defendant elevated the risk of violence by
putting a gun to Perry’s head. The totality of these
circumstances supports our conclusion that substantial evidence

4      Perry had an affinity for guns; in addition to the loaded .45-
caliber revolver he kept in the safe, he also had a Glock 9 mm.
semiautomatic pistol on the refrigerator, and a .38 semiautomatic
pistol on a shelf in the front room.

                                 10
supports the trial court’s finding that defendant acted with
reckless indifference to human life.
III. Defendant’s Further Arguments
       Defendant resists our conclusion with a panoply of
arguments, which we are able to group into three different
buckets.
       A.     Banks and Clark factors
       Defendant urges that none of the five Banks and Clark
factors bearing on whether a defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life supports such a finding in this case.
       First, defendant argues that he did not know that guns
would be used because (1) he did not supply Renfroe with the gun
Renfroe brought (and fired), (2) there is no evidence of any
conversation between defendant and Renfroe about how they
would use their guns during the home invasion robbery, (3)
defendant never ended up firing his Uzi, (4) Renfroe later claimed
that he only fired at Candela because he panicked, and (5)
defendant later claimed (during one of his three conflicting
statements to police) that his gun was a “fake Uzi” and was in
fact, a “water gun.” For support, defendant cites In re Moore
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 452-454 (Moore), which found no
substantial evidence when a defendant did not supply or use a
gun during a robbery. We are unpersuaded. Whether or not
defendant supplied Renfroe with the .38 caliber Renfroe used,
defendant was himself armed and himself pointed his gun at two
different people—Perry’s fiancée and then Perry. This case is
therefore unlike Moore. Whether defendant and Renfroe
discussed in advance a “plan” for the use of the guns is more
pertinent to whether defendant was a “major participant” than
whether he acted with reckless indifference; regardless of their

                               11
plan, defendant himself knew Renfroe had a gun and defendant
controlled the Uzi he possessed—and his personal conduct in
pointing that Uzi at multiple peoples’ heads evinced a reckless
indifference separate and apart from whatever defendant and
Renfroe may have planned for Renfroe to do with his revolver.
The fact that defendant did not end up shooting anyone does not
negate the willingness to kill he evinced—not once, but twice—by
putting his Uzi to two victims’ heads. And the trial court was
well within its discretion to reject as not credible Renfroe’s and
defendant’s self-serving statements that Candela’s shooting was
a product of panic and that defendant was never really armed; it
is not our job to second guess the trial court’s credibility findings.
(People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215.) Further, the
circumstances of the robbery and burglary support the
reasonable inference that the Uzi was real and loaded; indeed,
both the drug user and Perry—as someone who regularly used
firearms as part of their involvement in drug trafficking—
identified defendant’s gun as an Uzi (rather than a plastic replica
of one).
       Second, defendant argues that he was not physically
present “at the crime” and had no opportunity to restrain Renfroe
from shooting Candela because defendant was not in the
apartment’s front room when Renfroe fired at Candela. For
support, defendant cites Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 452;
In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 405; People v. Ramirez
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 989-990; and In re Taylor (2019) 34
Cal.App.5th 543, 558-559. Defendant is right that he had no
opportunity to stop Renfroe, but this does not mean defendant
was unable to render aid: Although defendant was not in the
front room and hence was not able to stop Renfroe from shooting

                                 12
Candela, defendant entered that room moments later and
stepped around Candela’s prone form to continue the robbery by
putting an Uzi to Perry’s head. It is this latter failure to render
aid that demonstrates defendant’s reckless indifference. As a
consequence, the cases defendant cites are all inapt because they
involve situations where the felony had stopped by the time the
defendant got to the scene; that is not the case here. Defendant
protests it is inappropriate to count his treatment of Candela
against him because (1) he did not know Candela was shot
because most of the bleeding from the gunshot wound was
internal, and (2) Candela would have died from the wound, even
if defendant had stopped to render aid. We are unpersuaded.
Whether or not the defendant saw blood, defendant walked into
the front room seconds after hearing gunfire and found Candela
on the ground; on these facts, the trial court could reasonably
infer that defendant was aware that Candela had been shot as
other inferences (such as Candela was instead napping on the
floor) appear unreasonable. And whether defendant’s aid would
have causally mattered is irrelevant to whether defendant acted
callously in stepping over a man who had just been shot so he
could put an Uzi to another man’s head. There is no evidence
that defendant ignored Candela’s body on the ground because
defendant had, based on some medical training, determined that
it was too late to render aid.
       Third, defendant argues that the duration of interaction
between himself, Renfroe and the victims was too short to reflect
a reckless indifference because defendant only had a gun to the
fiancée’s head for a “matter of seconds” and because Renfroe shot
Candela rather quickly. But this argument ignores the much
more significant duration—which was part of this ongoing

                                13
burglary and robbery—during which defendant and Renfroe, with
guns out and often pointed at Perry—directed Perry to open his
safe and then to lead them to his “other money.” Defendant
urges that the carjacking portion of the robbery “cannot count” as
part of the duration because there is no evidence that it was part
of defendant and Renfroe’s “plan.” We reject this argument
because the evidence suggested that the defendants here—by
asking “where is the other money?”—knew Perry would have
money beyond that kept in the safe, and that they were ready to
do what was needed to obtain that additional money, including
traveling elsewhere if it was off-site.
       Fourth, there is no evidence that defendant knew of
Renfroe’s penchant for violence. The trial court did not find any
such evidence (and this finding obviates the need to address
defendant’s argument about whether his association with the
street gang means that he knew Renfroe, as a full-fledged gang
member, would be prone to violence). However, the absence of a
single factor is not dispositive.
       Fifth, defendant argues that he had no opportunity to
minimize the risk of violence during the burglary and robbery.
For the reasons detailed above, we disagree. Indeed, after
finding Candela on the floor after being shot, defendant elected to
elevate the risk of violence by pointing his Uzi at Perry’s head to
continue the robbery.
       B.     Other considerations
       Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not
considering or improperly considering three other factors (since
the Banks and Clark factors are not exclusive).
       First, defendant for the first time on appeal argues that the
court erred in not considering his relative youth (he was 20 at the

                                14
time of the crime). Youth can be a relevant factor in assessing
whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life (e.g., Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 453-454 [16-year-
old]; People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, 944, 960 [17-
year-old]; People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 562 (Keel)
[15-year-old]), but it is not, by itself, a dispositive factor. (In re
Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 470.) For starters, because
defendant did not ask the trial court to consider his age, we lack
any evidence beyond the fact of his chronological age (such as any
evidence regarding his relative maturity and the like). But even
if we look solely to his age, although defendant was relatively
young (at age 20), he was not a juvenile like the defendants in
Moore, Harris and Keel; thus, he was not as susceptible to
influence by others and, based on age alone, not as immature as
those juveniles may have been. Further, the other factors
detailed above counsel fairly strongly in favor of a finding of
reckless indifference, such that his age—which, as noted above, is
not dispositive by itself—does not countermand the trial court’s
finding.
        Second, defendant argues that the court was wrong to look
at the general consideration, espoused in McDowell, supra, 55
Cal.App.5th at p. 1013, that participating in a home invasion
robbery of a drug dealer carries “a particularly high risk of
violence,” such that engaging in such conduct involves a reckless
indifference to human life. Specifically, defendant urges that
there was no evidence that he and Renfroe had personally dealt
with Perry in the past. The absence of evidence of this fact seems
to be of no consequence, as defendant believed Perry was a drug
dealer—and it is that fact that makes him aware of the risk (and
indifferent to it by plowing ahead anyway). Whether they had a

                                 15
longstanding social or business relationship is of no consequence.
Defendant also urges that one of the law enforcement witnesses
indicated that drug dealers are “entrepreneurs” and
“businessmen,” but this does not negate the dangerousness they
pose in such an entrepreneurial business; indeed, that witness
also pointed out that they often—though not always—kill people
to stay in business.
       Third, defendant cites the longstanding maxim in the cases
construing Banks and Clark that mere participation in an armed
robbery is not enough to establish reckless indifference to human
life (In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1026; Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 810; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 616),
but he seems to leap from that proposition to the conclusion that
no level of participation is enough. However, that is simply an
incorrect statement of the law because it would mean that armed
robbers are categorically immune from being major participants
who act with reckless indifference to human life. By the same
token, whether or not the robbery as a whole was a “garden-
variety armed robbery” is irrelevant because what matters is
defendant’s particular role in this particular armed robbery.
       C.     Precedent-based arguments
       Throughout his brief, defendant cites a variety of cases
where appellate courts have overturned trial court findings of
reckless indifference as being analogous to this one. Drawing
such analogies is difficult, however, because the finding of
reckless indifference turns on a totality of the pertinent factors;
pointing to one fact in common ignores the multitude that are
not. We have addressed all but one of defendant’s proffered
analogies above.

                                16
       Defendant specifically urges that this case is so similar to
Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 546, that we cannot affirm the trial
court’s finding of reckless indifference. We disagree. In Keel, the
15-year-old defendant and his cohort “unexpected[ly]” bumped
into two men on the sidewalk who were looking to buy drugs; the
defendant and his cohort spontaneously and without any advance
planning decided to rob the man who said he had the money to
buy the drugs by pulling out guns and doing a pat-down search of
the man with the money; the defendant told the other man to
“leave” and “get out of here”; and when the man with the money
resisted, the defendant’s cohort shot him. (Id. at pp. 552-553.)
When the defendant was arrested later that day, the revolver in
his possession was unloaded. (Id. at p. 559.) This case is
different. Here, defendant and Renfroe planned a home invasion
robbery of Perry’s apartment in advance—they asked where
Perry lived, brought and donned ski masks, and armed
themselves with guns (and Renfroe’s gun was real and loaded,
because it was the gun he used to shoot Candela). Defendant was
not able to stop Renfroe from shooting Candela, but both before
and after the shooting held his Uzi to two people’s heads and
stepped around Candela’s body on the floor to put his gun to
Perry’s head. Defendant was also not a 15-year-old. In sum, Keel
does not dictate a different outcome in this case.

                                17
                        DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                     ______________________, J.
                                     HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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