Court Opinion

ID: 9614697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:27:17.570157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:38.293042
License: Public Domain

Smith, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent for several reasons. First, I believe that the legislature intended for OCGA § 17-7-131 to be prospective only. Second, I do not believe that there is a consensus among the people of Georgia that all mentally retarded criminal defendants under all circumstances should be excused from the death penalty. Moreover, I do not believe that the legislature intended for the Georgia Constitution to be used *692to excuse all mentally retarded criminal defendants from the death penalty regardless of the degree of their retardation, blameworthiness, or involvement in crimes past, present, or future.1
When we granted Son Fleming’s application, we directed the parties to address “The impact of the 1988 amendment (Ga. Laws 1988, p. 1003 et seq.) to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131 on the validity of Fleming’s sentence of death.” For the reasons below, I agree with the habeas court that OCGA § 17-7-131 has prospective application only and has no direct application to Mr. Fleming’s death sentence for the murder of Ray City Police Chief James E. Giddens. See Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142 (240 SE2d 37) (1977), and Fleming v. State, 243 Ga. 120 (252 SE2d 609) (1979).
THE LEGISLATURE ACTS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTING LAWS
The legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of the laws and the holdings of the appellate courts of this State. The pertinent laws and holdings are as follows: “Laws prescribe only for the future; they cannot . . . have a retrospective operation.” OCGA § 1-3-5.
It is a general rule, in the interpretation of statutes, that they are to be so interpreted, that they shall not affect any case that was in existence before their passage, unless they expressly, or, by necessary implication, mention that case. [Bond v. Munro, 28 Ga. 597, 601 (1859).]
Kingsbery v. Ryan, 92 Ga. 108 (17 SE 689) (1893). With knowledge of the above, the legislature specifically limited the applicability of the statute to “the trial of any case in which the death penalty is sought which commences on or after July 1, 1988. . . .” OCGA § 17-7-131 (j). The legislative intent was expressly stated. The statute was intended to apply only to those cases tried after July 1, 1988.
The legislature articulates the will of the people when it enacts laws. The judiciary interprets the laws articulated. Attempts by the judiciary to articulate the will of the people are attempts to usurp legislative power. As stated by the majority, “legislative enactments constitute the clearest and most objective evidence of how contemporary society views a particular punishment.” The “clearest and most objective evidence” of the people’s will is the express limitation in the statute. The statute does not apply to cases in which the accused was *693found guilty and sentenced to death prior to July 1, 1988.
The majority found that the legislative decision is a rational one that is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. That decision expresses the will of the people. It expresses the people’s legitimate concern for finality. It is not this Court’s prerogative to determine social policies; the power to determine policy questions rests in the legislative branch, not the judicial branch. Today’s holding not only usurps the legislative power, it also ties the hands of the General Assembly. Despite the majority’s insistence in Division 1 of its opinion that this Court’s
responsibility is not to determine whether the legislature selected the best of possible alternatives, but rather to decide whether the legislative decision is a rational one[,]
it has determined that the legislature has not selected the best alternative. Not only has the majority selected what it determines to be the best alternative, it has held that the “best alternative” must be a “constitutional alternative.”
SENATE RESOLUTIONS ARE NOT THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE
Senate Resolution 388 does not express the will of the people. Hundreds of Senate resolutions are passed each session to provide commendations to specific people, groups, and entities. For example, some of the Senate resolutions passed in 1988, closest in number to S. R. 388, included the following: S. R. 385 commended a high school wrestling team; S. R. 387 expressed regret at the passing of a citizen; S. R. 389 commended a citizen for long and distinguished service to the state; S. R. 390 expressed sympathy at the passing of a citizen. These types of Senate resolutions are political. Often only the captions are read to the Senate for a vote, and many times they are passed without a vote. When there is a vote, only the Senate votes. Senate resolutions do not express the will of the majority of the citizens of this State; they express the will of the Senator or Senators who introduced them.
The highest and best expression of the people’s will is a statutory enactment. The majority’s reliance on Senate Resolution 388 to determine the will of the people is an attempt to nullify and overrule the expressed legislative intent to limit the statute to only those cases tried after July 1, 1988.
SURVEYS DO NOT SPEAK FOR THE CITIZENS
Surveys or public opinion polls do not speak for the citizens of this State; only the legislature has that power. Survey responses re-*694fleet waves of emotion. They often change as quickly in one direction as the other.2 Polls may have a place in the political arena, but they prove nothing more than the mood of the respondents at a particular moment in time.
THE LIMITATION EXPRESSES THE CONSENSUS OF THE PEOPLE
Faced with the express limitation in OCGA § 17-7-131 (j), the majority looked to Senate Resolution 388 (and by footnote to a survey) to find that there is “a consensus against execution of the mentally retarded” in Georgia. If there really is a consensus, then the General Assembly would have sought to amend the constitution to protect all mentally retarded criminal defendants. At the very least, it would have expressly stated that the statute was intended to apply to all mentally retarded criminal defendants, not only those tried after July 1, 1988. The decision to limit the statute to those tried after July 1, 1988 expresses the consensus of the people. The people’s will has been nullified and overruled by the majority’s reliance on Senate Resolution 388 and the survey.
THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A SPRINGBOARD TO EXCUSE ALL MENTALLY RETARDED CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
Our statute was amended in an emotional response to the execution of a mildly retarded defendant.3 This is a new area of law. We are just beginning to understand mental retardation; we should not tie the hands of the legislature. Without a clear mandate from the people, the majority has jumped over the very first legislative enactment in this area and declared that all mentally retarded criminal defendants, past, present, and future, are relieved from the death penalty under the Georgia Constitution.
*695The majority opinion prevents the General Assembly from amending the statute. The interpretation placed upon the statute by the majority of this Court is an “integral part of the statute [,]” Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Moser, 275 U. S. 133, 136 (48 SC 49, 72 LE 200) (1927), and the majority’s interpretation “puts the words in the statute as definitely as if it had been amended by the legislature.” Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 514 (68 SC 665, 92 LE 840) (1948). See also Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715, 717 (261 SE2d 610) (1979), citing with approval Walker v. Walker, 122 Ga. App. 545, 546 (178 SE2d 46) (1970), citing with approval Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Moser, supra, and Winters v. New York, supra. Because of the majority’s holding, the statute has now been amended to state: “Executing a mentally retarded defendant [constitutes] cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Georgia Constitution.” Majority p. 687.
The statute relieves any criminal defendant from the death penalty if he fits within the “medically accepted” definition of mental retardation adopted by the statute. Mental retardation per se should not be the determining factor in relieving a criminal defendant from the death penalty. Over time, the “medically accepted” definition might have proven to be unworkable or undesirable as it relieves all those who fit within the definition. The degree of retardation is not relevant, and there is no requirement that the defendant be unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his conduct.
Prior to the majority interpretation, the legislature could have amended the statute (to provide protection, for example, to only those mentally retarded criminal defendants who need protection, rather than blanket protection for every mentally retarded crinlinal defendant) with a vote of the legislative body; however, after today there can be no valid statutory amendment. Because of the statute’s constitutional eminence, a constitutional amendment is required.
If a majority of the people in Georgia inform their representatives in the General Assembly that they do not want the Georgia Constitution to be used to relieve all mentally retarded criminal defendants from the death penalty, the General Assembly can only do one of two things, both of which involve long time commitments. First, the General Assembly can propose an amendment to the Georgia Constitution; or second, it can attempt to enact a new statute exempting only certain mentally retarded criminal defendants (for example, those whose retardation prevents them from being able to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of their conduct, or those whose involvement in the crime was limited or coerced because of their retardation) from the death penalty. The new statute will be challenged by the first mentally retarded criminal defendant who is no longer relieved from the death penalty. Because “[legislative acts in violation of [our] Constitution ... are void, and the judiciary shall *696so declare them[,]” Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V of the Constitution of Georgia of 1983, this Court will have to declare the newly enacted statute void; it will conflict with the cruel and unusual provision of the Georgia Constitution. Once the statute has been declared void, a majority of this Court, relying on today’s majority opinion, will look to the void statute, a senate resolution, and public opinion polls and declare that the consensus has changed.
The majority should not have found a consensus without a very clear message from the legislature. The message is not clear today, and there are far less drastic methods which could have provided adequate protection to Mr. Fleming and others who may be mentally retarded.
THE BREADTH OF THE HOLDING
Today’s constitutional holding may extend protection to those who neither need nor deserve protection. The majority opinion presumes that no mentally retarded criminal defendant, regardless of the degree of retardation, could ever act with that degree of blameworthiness associated with the death penalty.
In Georgia, a criminal defendant is mentally retarded if he has:
[Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning resulting in or associated with impairments in adaptive behavior which manifested during the developmental period. [OCGA § 17-7-131 (3).]
According to Ellis and Luckasson:
General intellectual functioning is a phenomenon measured, and thus defined, by intelligence tests. It is, therefore, quantifiable as an intelligence quotient (IQ) score. The AAMD’s definition sets the upper boundary of mental retardation at an IQ level of 70, which is approximately two standard deviations from the mean score of 100. [Cit.] For an individual to be classified as mentally retarded, the deficit in intellectual functioning must be accompanied by impairments in adaptive behavior defined as “significant limitations in an individual’s effectiveness in meeting the standards of maturation, learning, personal independence, and/or social responsibility that are expected from his or her age level and cultural group, as determined by clinical assessment and, usually standardized scales.” Thus adaptive behavior is a term of art, which is not synonymous with maladaptive behavior. The inclusion of adaptive behavior in the definition of mental retardation requires that intellectual impairment, *697measured by an intelligence test, have some practical impact on the individual’s life. [Cit.]
Ellis, J., and Luckasson, R., Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 414, 422 (1985). Given our statute and the majority’s constitutional holding, all that is needed to relieve any criminal defendant from the death penalty is the following: an IQ test score of 70 or lower and an expert to testify that the defendant is mentally retarded. There is no requirement that the mentally retarded criminal defendant’s retardation prevented him from appreciating the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his conduct. There is no value attached to any experience in life, i.e., military or other training, jobs held, independent living, family reared, ability to read or write, educational background, licenses held, ability to drive a car and obey the rules of the road, or ability to obey laws generally.
MENTALLY RETARDED INDIVIDUALS VARY IN THEIR ABILITIES
Mentally retarded people are not a homogenous group; they vary considerably in their abilities. Their experiences also vary, and mildly retarded individuals are often able to function successfully in society. A person who is mentally retarded can be any where on a continuum from independent to dependent. “Mentally retarded people are individuals. Any attempt to describe them as a group risks false stereotyping and therefore demands the greatest of caution.” Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, supra, 53 Geo. Wash. at 427. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R) Third Edition-Revised at p. 32:
There are four degrees of severity, reflecting the degree of intellectual impairment: Mild, Moderate, Severe, and Profound. IQ levels to be used as guides in distinguishing the four degrees of severity are:
Degree of Severity IQ
Mild 50-55 to approx. 70
Moderate 35-40 to 50-55
Severe 20-25 to 35-40
Profound Below 20 or 25
317.00 Mild Mental Retardation
Mild Mental Retardation is roughly equivalent to what used to be referred to as the educational category of “educable.” This group constitutes the largest segment of those with the disorder — about 85%. People with this level of Mental Re*698tardation typically develop social and communication skills during the preschool years (ages 0-5), have minimal impairment in the sensorimotor area, and often are not distinguishable from normal children until a later age. By their late teens they can acquire academic skills up to approximately sixth-grade level; during their adult years, they usually achieve social and vocational skills adequate for minimum self-support, but may need guidance and assistance when under unusual social or economic stress. At the present time, virtually all people with Mild Mental Retardation can live successfully in the community, independently or in supervised apartments or group homes (unless there is an associated disorder that makes this impossible).
Mildly mentally retarded individuals, about 85% of the retarded population, can live successfully in the community. Id. Those who are mildly retarded should not be excused from the death penalty under all circumstances.
EXPERT WITNESSES WILL DETERMINE THE ULTIMATE ISSUE
Professionals with specialized training in psychiatry or psychology will have to determine whether the defendant is mentally retarded according to the “medically accepted” definition. A person with an IQ test score of 70 or below is classified as mentally retarded. Id. The experts will be called upon to testify, and according to our rules of evidence:
Expert opinion testimony on issues to be decided by the jury, even the ultimate issue, is admissible where the conclusion of the expert is one which jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves; i.e., the conclusion is beyond the ken of the average layman. [Cits.] [Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619 (277 SE2d 678) (1981).]
Because the “conclusion is beyond the ken of the average laymanf,]” Id. experts will determine the ultimate issue. Once it is shown that the criminal defendant’s IQ test score is 70 or below and the expert has testified that the defendant is mentally retarded, the accused has made a prima facie case and the burden shifts to the State to refute it. However, there is nothing to refute. Once it is established that the IQ test score is 70 or below and the expert testifies that one with an IQ of 70 or below is mentally retarded there is nothing that the State can do. The defendant’s counsel, at this juncture, can make a motion for a directed verdict as to the defendant’s retardation. The fact that *699the expert could and might wish, in some cases, to also testify that the defendant’s mental retardation did not prevent him from being able to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his conduct is irrelevant and will not be allowed. Once the expert states that the defendant is mentally retarded, the inquiry ends.
THERE ARE FAR LESS DRASTIC METHODS AVAILABLE
The majority could call upon less extreme methods to protect Mr. Fleming. Mr. Fleming has presented “newly discovered” evidence of his retardation which raises an issue as to his mental capacity, his ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, and his ability to provide assistance to his counsel to aid in his defense. See Curry v. Zant, 258 Ga. 527 (371 SE2d 647) (1988). The majority need not declare all mentally retarded criminal defendants freed from the death penalty in order to protect Mr. Fleming.
DO GEORGIANS WANT ALL MENTALLY RETARDED CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS RELIEVED FROM THE DEATH PENALTY WITHOUT REGARD TO ANY OTHER FACTORS?
Today there may be a criminal defendant who has been tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for a heinous crime. He may fit within the “medically accepted” definition of mental retardation although he may have functioned in society and, in fact, may have been integrated into society to such an extent that no one considers him unable to act with the degree of blameworthiness associated with the death penalty. His mental retardation may not have prevented him from being able to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his conduct. This criminal defendant may have worked for a living and supported himself, may have a driver’s license, may understand and obey the rules of the road, may have a family, may know the difference between right and wrong, may understand and obey the law generally, and may have planned and carried out a heinous crime that warrants the death penalty. That criminal defendant will not receive the death penalty if he can find “newly discovered” evidence that he is mentally retarded. His degree of mental retardation, blameworthiness, or involvement in the crimes will be of no significance; he will be'relieved from the ultimate penalty based solely upon the expert’s testimony that the defendant is mentally retarded.
CONCLUSION
I do not believe that there is a consensus in this State that all mentally retarded criminal defendants, regardless of their degree of retardation, blameworthiness, and involvement in capital crimes should be excused from the death penalty. I do not agree with the majority that “the people of Georgia [have decided] that the execu*700tion of mentally retarded offenders makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment.” Mental retardation per se does not prevent a person from being capable of acting with the degree of blameworthiness that is associated with the death penalty. I do not agree that we should use the Georgia Constitution to relieve all mentally retarded criminal defendants from the death penalty under all circumstances.
The majority quotes Senate Resolution 388 as follows: “executing a retarded offender destroys public confidence in the criminal justice system.” I believe that excusing all mentally retarded criminal defendants from the ultimate punishment, regardless of the degree of retardation, blameworthiness, and involvement in the crimes, destroys public confidence in the criminal justice system.4 For this rea*701son and those stated above, I dissent.
Decided December 1, 1989
Reconsideration denied December 20, 1989.
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Kenneth Shapiro, Mark E, Olive, Gary A. Alexion, Benna Kushlefsky, for appellant.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Mary Beth Westmoreland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Bondurant, Mixon & Elmore, Emmet J. Bondurant, amicus curiae.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Marshall joins in this dissent.

 It is important to note that the death penalty in Georgia is reserved for only those who kill other humans and who also engage in acts that the people of this state find the most repugnant. Except in cases of aircraft hijacking or treason the jury must find at least one aggravating circumstance. See OCGA § 17-10-30.

 The timing of the poll can create differences in the attitudes of those who respond. According to the amicus, the survey was made after the highly publicized execution of an allegedly mildly retarded criminal defendant. Would the survey produce different results if taken after the public becomes aware of the amicus’ assertion that three mentally retarded defendants have been successful in invoking the statute and have been spared the ultimate penalty? See note 4, infra. Would it make a difference if the respondents knew that the majority of this Court has ruled that all mentally retarded criminal defendants are excused from the death penalty by the Georgia Constitution? Would it make a difference if the question asked was: “Should all mentally retarded criminal defendants, regardless of the degree of retardation, blameworthiness, or involvement in the crimes, be excused from the death penalty?”

 Five years after being convicted and sentenced to death for murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary, Bowden v. State, 239 Ga. 821 (238 SE2d 905) (1977), the defendant offered “newly discovered” evidence of his “mild retardation.” Bowden v. State, 250 Ga. 185 (296 SE2d 576) (1982).

 The amicus states: “[T]hree mentally retarded defendants who were convicted of murders . . . have already successfully invoked the provisions of the 1988 statute. . . .” The three cited are:
1) Jerome Holloway, convicted and sentenced to death for malice murder and armed robbery. Holloway v. State, 257 Ga. 620 (361 SE2d 794) (1987). “Holloway gained entry to the home of his mother’s friend, Corabelle Berry, on the pretext of needing to borrow a cup of sugar, and proceeded to beat her to death with a stick and a kerosene lamp and to take from her residence several hundred dollars, which he used to buy stereo equipment.”
2) George Elder Dungee, convicted and sentenced to death on six counts of murder for the deaths of the Alday family in Donalsonville. Five members of the family were killed as they returned to their home. “Mary Alday was then raped by two or more of the men. . . . She was then taken bound and blindfolded, in her car about six miles to a wooded area where she was raped by two of the men, was beaten when she refused to commit oral sodomy, and her breasts mutilated. She was then killed with two shots. Her watch was then removed from her nude body.” Coleman v. State, 237 Ga. 84, 85 (226 SE2d 911) (1976). “[T]he evidence showed that [Dungee] participated in all the crimes and that he personally caused the death of Mary Alday.” Dungee v. State, 237 Ga. 218 (227 SE2d 746) (1976).
3) Eddie Spraggins, found guilty and sentenced to death for rape and murder. The evidence showed the following: “On the afternoon of January 31, 1977, the semi-nude body of Frances Coe, age about 55, was found in her home in Manchester, Georgia. She had been repeatedly stabbed, slashed and cut, including having her throat cut. There were several wounds to the body which caused the victim to bleed heavily, with the most severe stab wounds being in the upper abdomen and lower chest, including two in the upper abdomen which penetrated the heart. She had been partially disembowelled. Death was attributed to a loss of blood.” There was also evidence of sexual abuse. Spraggins v. State, 240 Ga. 759 (243 SE2d 20) (1978).
Today this Court, in reliance on the majority opinion, has remanded Eli Beck’s case to the trial court for a jury trial on the issue of mental retardation. Eli Beck was convicted and sentenced to death for malice murder, armed robbery, and burglary. Beck and his co-defendant went to the house of their former employer and shot and killed him. “It is clear, however, that Beck . . . entered the victims’ home intending to kill. Not only were they armed, but, significantly, they wore socks on their hands so there would be no fingerprints, but they did not wear masks, notwithstanding that both victims knew Beck. . . .” Beck v. State, 255 Ga. 483, 486 (340 SE2d 9) (1986). Because of today’s holding, the fact that the murder was planned and that Beck attempted to conceal the crime by wearing socks on his hands so that there would be no fingerprints would have no significance if Beck can produce an IQ test score of 70 or less.
I cannot believe that the people of Georgia intended for the Georgia Constitution to prevent all of those criminal defendants who have been sentenced to death to be excused *701from the death penalty based upon an IQ test score of 70 or below.