Court Opinion

ID: 9646772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:10:38.698635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:41.746877
License: Public Domain

KELLEHER, Justice,
concurring.
I am of the belief that the arguments made in behalf of Elizabeth have great *1083merit; and if we were at a time when will-construction suits were certified to this court from the Superior Court after the taking of testimony had been concluded and the time had arrived for the entry of final judgment, I might well have taken the position that Elizabeth was entitled to enjoy during her lifetime whatever portion of (j)(I) income the trustees allocated to the female descendents of Prince III. The record clearly indicates that the (j)(I) proviso was a last-minute addition to the trust instrument, and the language used by the draftsman is patently ambiguous. However, we noted in Redmond v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, R.I., 386 A.2d 1090, 1091 (1978), that the General Assembly at its January 1972 session repealed the will-certification provisions formerly found in G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-24-28. See P.L. 1972, ch. 169, § 11. In Redmond, we pointed out that in light of this legislative action the proper vehicle for certifying will-construction litigation was a declaratory-judgment action.
Here, we are confronted with a declaratory-judgment action in which the trial justice has made findings of fact. Consequently, I believe that our consideration of the pending appeal is controlled by our oft-cited principle that holds both that it is the job of the trial justice to draw inferences from the evidence and that we shall not interfere with his or her inferences as long as they are reasonable. See Industrial National Bank v. Isele, 101 R.I. 734, 740 n.3, 227 A.2d 203, 207 n.3 (1967). The inferences drawn by the trial justice from the evidence are reasonable, and on this record I see no reason to disturb them.