Court Opinion

ID: 9367718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 19:00:40.541436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:02.897331
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-11141     Document: 00516630862         Page: 1     Date Filed: 02/01/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                      FILED
                                                               February 1, 2023
                               No. 20-11141                      Lyle W. Cayce
                            consolidated with                         Clerk
                               No. 21-10780

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Jackie Phillip Sosebee,

                                                         Defendant—Appellant.

                Appeal from the United States District Court
                  for the Northern District Court of Texas
              USDC Nos. 7:16-CV-80, 7:06-CR-22-1, 7:20-CR-41-1

   Before Higginbotham, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
          Jackie Sosebee pled guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition
   in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(g)(1) and 922(e)(1) and was sentenced to 15
   years’ imprisonment pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act
   (“ACCA”), given his multiple prior violent felony convictions. While on
   supervised release, Sosebee was again convicted of being a felon in possession
   of ammunition, resulting in revocation of his release as well as a separate
   conviction and an attendant sentence of 15 years and 3 months, again
Case: 20-11141         Document: 00516630862              Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                             No. 20-11141
                                           c/w No. 21-10780

   enhanced by the ACCA. Sosebee challenges the ACCA sentencing
   enhancements in both cases. We DISMISS as moot his claim regarding his
   first federal conviction and sentence, and we AFFIRM the sentence of his
   second federal conviction.
                                                  I.
                                                 A.
          Prior to the two federal convictions giving rise to this consolidated
   appeal, Sosebee committed three Texas state crimes. First, a Texas court
   convicted Sosebee of robbery in 1985. Second, Sosebee pled guilty to burglary
   of habitation that year. Third, Sosebee pled guilty to another charge of
   burglary of habitation in 2002.
          In 2007, Sosebee pled guilty to being a felon in possession of
   ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). The district
   court enhanced Sosebee’s sentence under the ACCA and sentenced him to
   180 months’ imprisonment,1 the mandatory minimum under the ACCA, as
   well as three years of supervised release. In July 2019, Sosebee was released
   from prison and began his term of supervised release.
          While on supervised release in January 2021, Sosebee committed
   another crime: a jury convicted him of being a felon in possession of
   ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), resulting in a
   sentence of 188 months’ imprisonment, again enhanced under the ACCA.
   As a result, the district court revoked Sosebee’s term of supervised release
   and sentenced him to an additional 24 months’ imprisonment for the 2007
   conviction—commonly referred to as a “revocation term”—which was to
   run concurrently with the 2021 conviction.

          1
              See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

                                                  2
Case: 20-11141           Document: 00516630862              Page: 3        Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                            No. 20-11141
                                          c/w No. 21-10780

                                                  B.
           In 2016, Sosebee filed a § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
   the sentence imposed following his 2007 guilty plea, which the district court
   denied. In November 2020, Sosebee filed a notice of appeal (the “first
   action”).2 This Court issued a COA as to “whether Texas robbery qualifies
   as a ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA.”3
           Sosebee filed a notice of appeal of his 2021 conviction and sentence
   (the “second action”).4 Sosebee then filed a motion to consolidate the two
   cases,5 which was granted.6
                                                  II.
           “Whether an appeal is moot is a jurisdictional matter, since it
   implicates the Article III requirement that there be a live case or
   controversy.”7 “Under Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, ‘[t]o
   invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be
   threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be
   redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’”8 “This case-or-controversy
   requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial

           2
               Notice of Appeal, No. 20-11141 (5th Cir., Nov. 13, 2020) (Dkt. No. 1).
           3
            Order Granting Motion for Certificate of Appealability, No. 20-11141 (5th Cir.
   Nov. 10, 2021) (Dkt. No. 37-2) (emphasis added).
           4
               See Notice of Appeal, No. 21-10780 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2021) (Dkt. No. 1).
           5
            See Unopposed Motion to Consolidate, No. 20-11141 (5th Cir. Dec. 17, 2021)
   (Dkt. No. 46).
           6
               Order, No. 20-11141 (5th Cir. Dec. 20, 2021) (Dkt. No. 51).
           7
               Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987).
           8
             United States v. Heredia-Holguin, 823 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Lewis
   v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)).

                                                   3
Case: 20-11141           Document: 00516630862              Page: 4        Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                            No. 20-11141
                                          c/w No. 21-10780

   and appellate . . . . The parties must continue to have a personal stake in the
   outcome of the lawsuit.”9 In other words, “[a] case becomes moot only when
   it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the
   prevailing party.”10 “[A]s long as the parties have a concrete interest,
   however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” 11
           Shortly before oral argument, this Court directed the parties to be
   prepared to address whether Sosebee’s appeal of the order denying his
   § 2255 motion is moot.12 In response, the Government filed a Rule 28(j) letter
   detailing additional information regarding Sosebee’s incarceration, averring
   that “Sosebee will have actually served (as of the date of oral argument) 27
   months and 19 days on that aggregate sentence—or 3 months and 19 days
   longer than his 24-month revocation sentence.”13 In other words, Sosebee
   had completed his “term of imprisonment imposed following the revocation
   of his supervised release” and had “no remaining supervised release term
   that may be modified or terminated.”14 As a result, even a favorable
   determination in this action will have no impact on his sentence, meaning it

           9
                Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477–78).
           10
               Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (quoting City
   of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000)).
           11
             Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, Freight
   Handlers, Exp. & Station Emps., 466 U.S. 435, 442 (1984)).
           12
                Order, No. 20-11141 (5th Cir. Nov. 28, 2022) (Dkt. No. 92).
           13
                Letter, No. 20-11141 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2022) (Dkt. No. 98).
           14
              United States v. Nelson, 410 F. App’x 734, 735 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
   (unpublished); see also Order, In re: Moses Smith, No. 16-40952 (5th Cir. July 27, 2016) (Dkt.
   No. 15) (holding that a § 2255 motion was moot where the defendant “is in custody as a
   result of his violation of the terms of his supervised release,” “has completed his term of
   imprisonment[,] and faces no additional term of supervised release”).

                                                   4
Case: 20-11141           Document: 00516630862               Page: 5      Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                            No. 20-11141
                                          c/w No. 21-10780

   is “impossible for [us] to grant any effectual relief” to him. 15 That Sosebee
   cannot obtain any form of relief stands in stark contrast to other cases in
   which a defendant had time remaining in their revocation sentences such
   that, upon prevailing, his sentence could have been reduced pursuant to
   Bureau of Prisons regulations that “credit” time served beyond what was
   appropriate in the initial sentence to the revocation sentence.16 Lacking the
   ability to provide Sosebee any relief, we dismiss his appeal of the § 2255 order
   as moot.
                                                 III.
           The ACCA provides that anyone who “knowingly violates subsection
   . . . (g) of section 922 shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more
   than 15 years, or both.”17 It also provides that any defendant with “three
   previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony . . . shall be fined
   under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years,” 18 thereby
   addressing the “special danger” associated with “armed career criminals.” 19
   The Act defines a “violent felony” as:

           15
                Knox, 567 U.S. at 307 (quoting City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 287).
           16
              See United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 498 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing BOP
   PROGRAM STATEMENT § 5880.28, SENTENCE COMPUTATION MANUAL 1–69 (1999)); see
   also United States v. Penn, 788 F. App’x 337, 340 (6th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (holding a
   prisoner’s case was not moot where there was remaining time left on his revocation
   sentence because prevailing would shorten his sentence by several years); Parker v. Sproul,
   No. 18-1697, 2022 WL 258586, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 27, 2022) (holding that a prisoner’s case
   was not moot where “excess time spent in prison . . . [could] be credited toward a prison
   term for revocation of the supervised release tied to that crime”(citing Jackson, 952 F.3d
   at 498)).
           17
                18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8).
           18
                Id. § 924(e)(1).
           19
                Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008).

                                                   5
Case: 20-11141          Document: 00516630862              Page: 6   Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                             No. 20-11141
                                           c/w No. 21-10780

                any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
          exceeding one year . . . that—

                            (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
                     threatened use of physical force against the person of
                     another; or

                           (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use
                     of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
                     presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
                     another.20

          “Subsection (i) of this definition is known as the elements clause.”21
   The beginning of subsection (ii) is known as the enumerated offenses clause,
   while “the end of subsection (ii)—‘or otherwise involves conduct that
   presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another’—is known as
   the residual clause.”22
          In 2010, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States struck down
   the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague while upholding the remaining
   definitions of the term “violent felony.”23 Last year, the Supreme Court in
   Borden v. United States added another constraint to the definition of a violent
   felony: an offense with a mens rea of recklessness “cannot so qualify.”24 But
   since Johnson, we, along with our sister Circuits, have been adjudicating
   whether a given criminal act is or is not a “violent felony” for purposes of the
   ACCA, navigating Borden and other applicable Supreme Court precedent.

          20
               18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).
          21
               Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120, 123 (2016).
          22
               Id.
          23
               559 U.S. 133, 145 (2010).
          24
               141 S. Ct. 1817, 1822 (2021).

                                                  6
Case: 20-11141            Document: 00516630862              Page: 7       Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                            No. 20-11141
                                          c/w No. 21-10780

           Last year, this Court addressed whether a Texas robbery-by-threat
   conviction is “a valid ACCA predicate for an enhanced sentence” post-
   Borden.25 In United States v. Garrett, we held that we must “look at the statute
   itself and examine the elements of that crime; that is to say, we apply a
   categorical analysis to determine whether the statute itself necessarily and
   invariably requires the ‘use . . . or threatened use of physical force.’”26 The
   Court reasoned that the Texas robbery statute is “divisible,”27 meaning that
   it “create[s] multiple distinct crimes, some violent, some non-violent.”28 We
   further held that robbery-by-injury did not constitute a violent crime for
   purposes of the ACCA while robbery-by-threat did.29
           Sosebee takes issue with Garrett’s reasoning, but as the Government
   correctly notes, “Sosebee’s arguments against Garrett cannot change that
   Garrett is binding precedent and has been uniformly followed by other panels
   of this Court since it was decided.” Indeed, “[w]e are bound by our
   precedent ‘in the absence of an intervening contrary or superseding decision
   by this court sitting en banc or by the United States Supreme Court,’ neither
   of which has occurred.”30 To that end, we have repeatedly relied on Garrett
   to affirm ACCA enhancements predicated upon Texas robbery-by-threat
   convictions,31 just as additional published precedent has relied on Garrett in

           25
                United States v. Garrett, 24 F.4th 485, 487 (5th Cir. 2022).
           26
                Id. at 488 (quoting Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1822).
           27
                Id. at 491.
           28
                Id. at 488 (citing Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 505 (2016)).
           29
                Id. at 491.
           30
             United States v. Montgomery, 974 F.3d 587, 590 n.4 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting
   United States v. Setser, 607 F.3d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 2010)).
           31
               See, e.g., United States v. Senegal, No. 19-40930, 2022 WL 4594608, at *1 (5th
   Cir. Sept. 30, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[A] Texas robbery-by-threat conviction
   satisfies the ACCA’s elements clause.”); United States v. Landaverde-Leon, No. 21-40808,

                                                   7
Case: 20-11141            Document: 00516630862          Page: 8      Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                         No. 20-11141
                                       c/w No. 21-10780

   related retroactivity analysis.32 Recently, a separate panel of this Court made
   clear that it “agree[d] with—and are bound by—Garrett’s reasoning.”33 So
   we apply Garrett’s modified categorical framework and mimic its process to
   determine if Sosebee was convicted of robbery-by-injury or robbery-by-
   threat.
             In Garrett, we “look[ed] to the indictment and the judicial
   confession” to show that the defendant’s offense “pertain[ed] to robbery-
   by-threat” rather than robbery-by-injury, meaning the defendant’s
   conviction “is thus a violent felony under the ACCA and may serve as a
   predicate to an enhanced sentence.”34 The same is true in the instant action.
   Sosebee’s robbery conviction similarly recites the statutory language
   pertaining to robbery-by-threat—“intent to obtain property . . . and there
   intentionally and knowingly threaten and place [the victim] in fear of imminent
   bodily injury.”35 By contrast, the Information makes no mention of robbery-

   2022 WL 2208400, at *1 (5th Cir. June 21, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming
   Garrett’s holding vis-à-vis divisibility and the classification of each robbery as an ACCA
   predicate or not); United States v. Balderas, No. 20-10992, 2022 WL 851768, at *1 (5th Cir.
   Mar. 22, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“We recently decided that Texas simple
   robbery, is divisible into robbery-by-injury, which may be committed recklessly, and
   robbery-by-threat, which may only be committed ‘intentionally and knowingly.’” (quoting
   Garrett, 24 F.4th at 589)); United States v. Lipscomb, No. 18-11168, 2022 WL 327472, at *1
   (5th Cir. Feb. 3, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[T]he issue before us on remand is
   how the Borden decision affects [the defendant’s] sentence. In light of our recent decision
   in United States v. Garrett, the answer is: not at all.”).
             32
             See United States v. Jackson, 30 F.4th 269, 275 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Garrett
   favorably when considering retroactivity of ACCA enhancements, i.e., whether it was
   permissible to apply law as it existed at sentencing rather than as it existed when he
   committed the crime), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 252 (2022).
             33
             United States v. Wheeler, No. 19-11022, 2022 WL 17729412, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec.
   16, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished).
             34
                  Id.
             35
                  (Emphasis added).

                                               8
Case: 20-11141        Document: 00516630862                Page: 9       Date Filed: 02/01/2023

                                          No. 20-11141
                                        c/w No. 21-10780

   by-injury nor does it cite the language from that divisible crime. Sosebee
   acknowledges as much, citing to the Information setting forth offense
   conduct and arguing that this Court should overturn Garrett. Plainly, Sosebee
   does not dispute that he committed robbery-by-threat. Bound by Garrett, and
   on the record facts before us, we affirm Sosebee’s ACCA-enhanced
   sentence.36
                                             ****
           We DISMISS as moot Sosebee’s claim regarding his first federal
   conviction and attendant sentence, and we AFFIRM the sentence attendant
   to his second federal conviction.

           36
               Months after the conclusion of briefing and more than a week after oral argument
   in this action, Sosebee moved to file a supplemental brief, seeking to make a new argument
   premised upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063
   (2022), which was issued in March 2022. The Federal Public Defender’s Office tried to
   make this same motion in Wheeler, again doing so “[m]onths after the conclusion of briefing
   and two weeks after oral argument in this case.” Wheeler, 2022 WL 17729412, at *4 n.3. As
   the Wheeler panel dismissed this motion, so do we:
           [Sosebee] concedes that “he did not raise any challenge to the” different
           occasions determination at the earlier sentencing, the new sentencing, or
           in his initial brief. Moreover, this precedent was available to [Sosebee] at
           the time he filed his reply brief and at oral argument. Yet he failed to raise
           Wooden at any time until now. We thus decline to consider it.
   Id.

                                                 9