Court Opinion

ID: 9704783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:46:42.31326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:05.509774
License: Public Domain

*555FLAHERTY, Justice,
concurring.
While I join with the majority opinion that municipal imposition of the Business Privilege Tax on the appellee banks is preempted by the Commonwealth’s comprehensive system of banking legislation, I feel that the issue of whether to distinguish “traditional” from “nontraditional” banking functions warrants further comment. The “traditional” role of banks as receivers of demand deposits has evolved to a present day operation whereby banks provide a wide range of inducing services including the sale of merchandise at bargain prices to attract new depositors, sale of insurance, operation of a travel agency, and sale of computer time. Clearly, banks offer services which compete with those marketed by businesses which are subject to the burden of the Business Privilege Tax. Determination of the wisdom of such a differential tax treatment is, however, solely a matter for our legislative bodies, not the courts.
The Department of Banking Code established a very broad supervisory power over banks to “insure the safe and sound conduct of the business of such institutions, conserve their assets, maintain the public confidence in such institutions and protect the public interest.”1 No exception was provided with respect to “nontraditional” functions. The Banking Code grants to banks “[a]ll powers incidental to the conduct of banking business”2 and the official comment thereto by the Banking Law Commission states:
“The provision covers a wide range and variety of activities in which institutions engage as part of the conduct of their banking business and is intended to cover other activities in which institutions may engage in the future. The variety of such activities appears from the following examples which are merely illustrative and not definitive: the sale of data processing services; the conduct of a travel department; payroll accounting; and the rental of conference rooms for real estate settlements and other business transactions.” (Emphasis added)
*556In an official comment to the Banking Code’s declaration of legislative purpose,3 the Banking Law Commission further stated:
“The premises underlying such policies recognized by this act are that contemporary banking faces, and should have the opportunity fairly to meet, a high degree of competition not only from other banks but also, in virtually all principal functions, from a large number and variety of other financial organizations . . . ” (Emphasis added)
Hence, the General Assembly has made clear its intent that banking institutions be permitted to engage in an extensive scope of activities, and consequently that there be an encompassing power of supervision vested in the Department of Banking. We are not here confronted with a case where legislative intent to occupy a field of regulation is not clearly expressed but rather with one where that intent is so manifestly all-encompassing that preemption is evident. Hence, imposition of the tax burden in question would encroach upon a legislatively preempted area.
LARSEN, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

. Act of May 15, 1933, P.L. 565, § 202, 71 P.S. § 733-202 (1962).

. Act of November 30, 1965, P.L. 847, § 315, 7 P.S. § 315(e) (1967).

. Act of November 30, 1965, P.L. 847, § 103, 7 P.S. § 103 (1967).