Court Opinion

ID: 9914057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 15:05:34.569299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:57.405170
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0631-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

R.L.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted October 16, 2023 – Decided December 29, 2023

                   Before Judges Gilson and Bishop-Thompson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket
                   No: FO-07-0185-22.

                   R.L., appellant pro se.

                   Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County
                   Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E.
                   Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
                   Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Following a bench trial in the Family Part, defendant R.L. 1 was convicted

of contempt, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2), a disorderly persons offense, for violating

a final restraining order (FRO) issued under the Prevention of Domestic

Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. He moved for reconsideration,

which was denied.     We reverse, concluding that the contemptuous act – a

communication through Our Family Wizard (OFW) – was permitted by the FRO

and the parties' parenting time agreement. The act did not, therefore, constitute

contempt.

      Defendant and R.W. are divorced and have one daughter, L.L. The parties

entered a custody and parenting time agreement, which was annexed to and

incorporated into the marital settlement agreement, in February 2015. The

parenting time agreement permitted the parties to "utilize [OFW] as a means of

communicating and exchanging information including, but not limited to,

requests for exchange/trade of parenting time (and responses thereto)." OFW is

a web-based application that allows parents to coordinate parenting time and

custody issues. As it related to travel, the agreement also provided that "[b]oth

parties shall communicate in writing any travel plans they have with the child,

1
  We identify the parties by initials to protect the identity of the victim of
domestic violence. R. 1:38-3(d)(9), (10) and (13).
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                                       2
setting forth flight/train/auto route details and the location of the hotel or

residence where the child shall stay overnight, [ten] days prior to the scheduled

vacation/travel period."

      An FRO was entered against defendant on August 12, 2016. The latest

amended FRO was entered on August 1, 2019, which included a provision

restraining R.L. from having any form of contact or communication with R.W.,

except for "non-harassing communication concerning minor child via [OFW]"

and permits the parties to "send non-harassing texts in the case of an emergency

with minor child only."

      This appeal arises from communication between defendant and R.W.

regarding the death of R.W.'s father and the attendant travel to the funeral. On

November 9, 2021, R.W. told defendant via OFW that she planned to travel to

Austin, Texas to attend her father's funeral with their daughter. R.W. also stated,

"Thanksgiving [d]etails to be finalized soon and travel details to following in

the next OFW message."        Two days later, defendant sent three messages

expressing his concern that their daughter would be in Texas for one week and

would miss an extended period of schooling due to the school's COVID-19

policy.   In the first message, sent at 7:49 a.m., defendant expressed his

condolences to R.W. and proposed that L.L. "stay in New Jersey," not "miss

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                                        3
school" and "make up" parenting time on her return from Texas. Defendant did

not consent to L.L. missing three weeks of school and asked R.W. to reconsider

her decision. He also asked R.W. to provide the flight information.

      In his second message, sent eight minutes later, defendant iterated his

request that R.W. not take L.L. out of school from "11/14 – 12/7." He then

stated if R.W. proceeded, he "need[ed] make up parenting time for 11/9 – 11/21,

and 11/23 6 p[.]m[.] to p[.]m[.], and 11/16 6 p[.]m[.] – 9 p[.]m[.] and 11/15 5

p[.]m[.] – 8 p[.]m[.]." Defendant renewed his request for R.W. to reconsider

taking L.L. to Texas.

      In his third message, sent at 9:16 a.m., defendant repeated his request that

R.W. reconsider because the school's ten-day COVID policy would require her

to "stay out of school an additional ten days for a total of twenty days out of

school." Further, "as a courtesy," defendant pasted the language that would be

set forth in the proposed order to show cause (OSC) that he intended to file if

R.W. did not agree to leave their daughter in New Jersey. A copy of a blank

OSC was sent to R.W.

      R.W. viewed defendant's messages later that day and informed defendant

that L.L. could attend virtual classes and refused to change her trip. Despite

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promising to provide defendant with the travel details, R.W. failed to do so.

Defendant filed an emergent application at 3:47 p.m. that afternoon.

      On November 12, 2021, the court ordered R.W. to reduce the length of the

trip. Following the hearing, R.W. went to the Essex Fells Police Department

and filed a domestic violence complaint alleging defendant violated the FRO by

"communicating via Family Wizard in a manner that [R.W.] felt was

harassment."

      A bench trial was conducted on June 20, 2022. The State presented the

testimony of R.W., who stated she received the three emails through OFW from

defendant concerning R.W.'s trip to Texas with L.L.        According to R.W.,

defendant "threatened [her] multiple times" and "never filed a motion in OFW"

before this incident. She also stated the OFW messages did not have a copy of

the order to show cause attached.

      Defendant testified that although he wanted his daughter to attend her

grandfather's funeral, he did not "want her out of the state for ten days for a

Saturday funeral" and "two more weeks quarantine." He explained that he asked

R.W. to reconsider out of concern for L.L.'s matriculation to the next grade. He

admitted to telling R.W. that he would file an OSC if she did not change her

travel plans. He then sent R.W. a blank OSC form through OFW. Defendant

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                                       5
filed the OSC to shorten the trip at 3:37 p.m. on November 11, explaining that

the hearing needed to occur the next day because R.W. intended to leave on

November 14.

      On July 15, 2022, the trial court issued a written opinion. Assessing the

credibility of the parties, the trial court found R.W.'s testimony was "supported"

by the OFW messages, whereas defendant was "partially credible." The court

found defendant's concerns about L.L.'s ability to matriculate to the next grade

to be "disingenuous" because he also testified that she was doing well in school.

The court also found defendant's credibility "questionable" because he

responded "no" when he was asked if remote learning was available to L.L.

Thus, the court concluded R.W. was more credible than defendant.

      After hearing the parties' testimony, the trial court found defendant guilty

of contempt. In a written opinion, the court reasoned the communications "was

not an 'emergency' involving L.L." The court found that the third message on

November 11, "threatening litigation if R.W. failed to accede to his demands –

constitute[d] a violation of the FRO." The court elaborated:

            Yet, [the third message] expressly threaten[ed]
            litigation against R.W. if she commenced the
            anticipated travel with minor child. Even if the initial
            messages sent by the [d]efendant [was] determined to
            be permitted under the terms of the FRO, the [c]ourt is
            hard[-]pressed to conclude that threatening litigation

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                                        6
            would find the same refuge from a violation of the FRO.
            Simply put, threatening litigation is not permitted.

The court concluded "beyond a reasonable doubt" that defendant

committed contempt of the FRO by sending the third message.

      The court also reasoned that the third message constituted harassment. It

explained the messages were harassing "because defendant's only purpose . . .

was to intimidate R.W. into changing her plans.'" The court explained that it

"[could not] overlook the number and timing of the messages sent by

[d]efendant." The court concluded, "[r]ather than grant R.W. a reasonable time

to respond to his objections, the [d]efendant engaged in what can only be

described as a rapid-fire text message assault in an effort to bully R.W. into

altering her plans, ultimately under threat of litigation."

      Defendant moved for reconsideration. In a written opinion dated

September 19, 2022, the court denied defendant's motion, finding the "July 15,

2022 decision was neither palpably incorrect nor based upon an irrational basis."

The court determined defendant "still violated the FRO communicating with

R.W. since no emergency existed." The court rejected defendant's argument that

it neglected to consider evidence that defendant's messages were not harassing

and that he had no intent to harass. The court reiterated its finding that the third

message threatening litigation "was not only unpermitted by the FRO but

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                                         7
unnecessary and harassing."      Lastly, the court found defendant's behavior

harassing and restated defendant did not allow R.W. to respond before sending

the third message "if R.W. did not accede to his demands."

      Defendant now appeals contending the trial court committed a series of

errors by applying the incorrection section of the FRO, misapplying the law

regarding harassment, misapplying the law and ignoring competent, probative

evidence, and committing cumulative errors.

      Our scope of review of the factual findings of a judge sitting without a

jury is limited. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71 (1999) (citing State v.

Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62 (1964)). Our review of a trial judge's finding of

guilt in a contempt proceeding is limited to determining "whether the record

contains sufficient [credible] evidence to support the judge's conclusion." State

v. J.T., 294 N.J. Super. 540, 544 (App. Div. 1996) (citing Johnson, 42 N.J. at

161). Moreover, in reviewing a decision of a family court, we "defer to the

factual findings of the trial court," N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P.,

196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008), in recognition of its "special jurisdiction and expertise

in family matters." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J.

328, 343 (2010) (citation omitted).

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      Because a violation of a restraining order is punishable as a criminal act,

a defendant is entitled to the rights of all criminal defendants. We must,

therefore, ensure the State has carried its burden of proving the defendant's guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13(a); State v. Krupinski, 321

N.J. Super. 34, 45 (App. Div. 1999).

      To be guilty of the disorderly persons offense of contempt of an FRO

under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that defendant was served with the FRO and knowingly committed behavior that

violated the FRO. State v. L.C., 283 N.J. Super. 441, 447-48 (App. Div. 1995).

      Applying these principles, we conclude there was insufficient credible

evidence in the record to support defendant's conviction of contempt of the FRO.

The FRO prohibited defendant from contacting R.W. except non-harassing

communication through OFW regarding their daughter.

      The trial judge mistakenly concluded that defendant violated the FRO

when he communicated with R.W. through OFW. Specifically, the last message

when he "threatened" to file an OSC regarding L.L.'s anticipated travel to Texas.

It is these factual findings that are unsupported in the record.

      Contrary to the trial court's findings that focused on only part of the

communications provision, the parties were permitted to communicate through

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                                         9
OFW regarding their daughter's health, safety, and wellbeing and were not

restricted to purely emergent events.

      Even assuming communication was limited to an emergent event, the

record is devoid of facts that R.W.'s father's death was not an unanticipated

emergent event. Moreover, the record shows multiple requests for R.W. to

reconsider her travel plans. Only the third message contained the proposed

language for the OSC "if" R.W. did not reconsider her plans. The trial court

found defendant did not provide R.W. with sufficient time to respond. The

evidence does not support that finding. R.W. twice responded to defendant's

messages concerning the school's COVID-19 protocol and remote learning but

did not address defendant's request for reconsideration. Thus, the documentary

evidence introduced corroborates defendant's account of events.

      Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that defendant acted with

a purpose to harass R.W. Nor did the State prove defendant engaged in "multiple

threats" to R.W. The exchange of messages through OFW does not demonstrate

intimidating, let alone harassing, behavior. The trial court's conclusion that

defendant violated the FRO because he threatened litigation when R.W. did not

capitulate is not sustainable on this record.

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                                        10
      The trial court also relied on general credibility findings to conclude

defendant intended to violate the FRO. R.W.'s testimony concerning "multiple

threats" was not supported by the evidence. The trial court's determination that

defendant was "disingenuous" and "questionable" regarding L.L.'s remote

learning and its effect on her matriculation was not relevant to a finding of

contempt.   While credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if

supported by the record as a whole, Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474, we may intervene

if a trial court's credibility evaluation is "undoubtedly mistaken." Lautek Corp.

v. Image Bus. Sys. Corp., 276 N.J. Super. 531, 541 (App. Div. 1994).

      Given the purpose of the PDVA is to provide maximum protection from

abuse, defendant's conduct in this case cannot reasonably be considered as

constituting criminal or quasi-criminal conduct that would subject him to the

penalties for such conduct. See State v. Wilmouth, 302 N.J. Super. 20, 23 (App.

Div. 1997). Based on the record, we are satisfied that the findings made on

defendant's intent are fettered by the inaccurate material factual findings. We

hold the State's evidence was not adequate to support a finding, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that defendant knowingly violated an FRO. See State v.

Finamore, 338 N.J. super. 130, 138-9 (App. Div. 2001). Therefore, we reverse

defendant's conviction and sentence.

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Reversed and remanded for an order vacating the judgment.

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