Court Opinion

ID: 9390308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 15:05:29.711031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.543852
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
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                                                      RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2023
                                                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                    2021-SC-0495-MR

JOSHUA TURNER                                                            APPELLANT

V.                   ON APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
                       HONORABLE KATHLEEN LAPE, JUDGE
                                NO. 20-CR-01275

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                   APPELLEE

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                      AFFIRMING

      This case comes before the Court on appeal as a matter of right1 by

Joshua Turner, the Appellant, from the judgment and sentence of the Kenton

Circuit Court. Turner was convicted by a jury of first-degree rape (victim under

twelve); two counts of first-degree sodomy (victim under twelve); and three

counts of incest. He was sentenced to life in prison. He now appeals for two

alleged errors. First, the trial court failed to give lesser-included offense

instructions for sexual abuse in the first degree under the two greater offenses

of first-degree sodomy. Second, that the prosecutor committed misconduct in

his closing argument. For the following reasons, we affirm.

      1   Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
                                          I. Facts
      Rachel Irwin was the longtime girlfriend of Turner, and the couple had

two children together, one of whom is A.T.,2 one of Turner’s victims. Turner

had another daughter, B.H., by another woman and who did not live with the

family but visited regularly. She was his second victim. B.H. was eleven years

old at the time of the abuse and A.T. was eight years old. In September of 2020,

Turner began to sell the belongings of his two children by Irwin. Irwin wanted

to see if she could identify the buyers and get those possessions back, so she

took an opportunity to look through Turner’s phone while he was asleep. It was

then she discovered videos on the phone that showed Turner engaging in

sexual acts with A.T. and B.H. Turner was identifiable due to distinguishing

tattoos on his hands. A.T. and B.H. were identifiable due to underwear Irwin

knew to be theirs from doing the laundry. A.T. was also identifiable due to her

bedsheets.

      Irwin took the phone to the Park Hills Police Department. A search

warrant was executed on Turner’s home and the underwear and bedsheets in

the videos were gathered into evidence. Detective Nick Klaiss was assigned to

the case and testified to finding photographs and videos on Turner’s phone

depicting his abuse. One video of A.T. depicts Turner thrusting his penis in

between her buttocks. Another video of B.H. depicts the same conduct. Again,

the underwear the girls were wearing are what made the victims identifiable,

      2   We use initials to protect the identity of the victims.
                                              2
and Turner’s tattoos made him identifiable. These two videos predicated the

counts of first-degree sodomy.

      After the close of evidence, Turner submitted three lesser-included

instructions of first-degree sexual abuse: two for the counts of sodomy and one

for the count of rape. The Commonwealth conceded the lesser-included

instruction was justified for the count of rape, but it opposed the instructions

for the counts of sodomy. Turner first argued that the videos did not show

penetration, which his counsel believed was a necessary element. Informed

penetration was not a necessary element of sodomy, trial counsel then argued

for the lesser-included instructions on the basis of the presence, or lack

thereof, of sexual gratification, arguing it was an issue for the jury. The

Commonwealth argued that the lesser-included instructions were not merited

by the evidence and the trial court agreed. The trial court concluded, “The

videos speak to themselves. To the sodomies, there’s no facts that support the

lesser-included [offenses].”

      Finally, Turner alleges during closing arguments for the penalty phase of

the trial the Commonwealth stated to the jury, “It’s no secret that victims of

sexual abuse look forward to a life of mental health issues, substance abuse

[and] depression.” Turner concedes he did not object to this statement at trial

therefore it is unpreserved. He now argues, however, that neither victims

testified to their mental state nor did an expert testify as to mental issues

involving sexual abuse victims; thus, the statement had no evidentiary basis

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nor was it a reasonable inference from the evidence and therefore palpable

error.

                                          II. Analysis

         A. Lesser-included Instructions not Justified
         “An instruction on a lesser included offense is required only if,

considering the totality of the evidence, the jury might have a reasonable doubt

as to the defendant's guilt of the greater offense, and yet believe beyond a

reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the lesser offense.” Mash v.

Commonwealth, 376 S.W.3d 548, 559 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Miller v.

Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 699 (Ky. 2009)). We review for an abuse of

discretion in the failing to give a requested jury instruction. Thus, we will not

disturb the ruling unless it is arbitrary, unfair, or not based on sound legal

principles. In the civil context—though equally applicable in the criminal law as

well—we have admonished that

         Appellate courts must be careful to avoid the sort of unfettered
         review of the record and of the trial court's rulings that indicates a
         de novo review. And appellate courts must recognize the
         unfortunate but necessary corollaries of deference to the trial
         court: that it is possible for a trial court to rule contrary to what an
         appellate court would rule without abusing its discretion or being
         clearly erroneous, and that an appellate court is powerless to
         disturb such rulings.

Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 917 (Ky. 2004).

         In Mash, we had occasion to discuss the difference between sodomy and

first-degree sexual abuse, stating

         Pursuant to KRS 510.110(1), “[a] person is guilty of sexual abuse
         in the first degree when . . . [h]e or she subjects another person to

                                            4
      sexual contact by forcible compulsion . . . .” KRS 510.110(1).
      Sexual contact is statutorily defined as “any touching of the sexual
      or other intimate parts of a person for the purpose of gratifying the
      sexual desire of either party.” KRS 510.010(7).

      …

      First-degree sexual abuse is properly classified as a lesser included
      offense of first-degree sodomy. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 864
      S.W.2d 266, 277 (Ky.1993). The distinction between the two
      offenses is the body part touched for purposes of sexual
      gratification. Sexual abuse requires “sexual contact,” KRS 510.110,
      which means “touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a
      person,” KRS 510.010(7). Sodomy, on the other hand, requires
      “deviate sexual intercourse,” KRS 510.070, which means “any act
      of sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one (1) person
      and the mouth or anus of another,” KRS 510.010(1). The
      additional element in a sodomy offense is the specific sexual or
      intimate parts involved, namely, the mouth or anus.

376 S.W.3d at 559. Turner ostensibly argues the trial court abused its

discretion when it refused to give the lesser-included offense instructions of

sexual abuse in the first degree for the two counts of sodomy because the jury

could view the video evidence predicating those charges and conclude that

while his penis touched the buttocks of the victims, it did not touch their

anuses. Turner’s argument, however, is disingenuous. Elsewhere in his brief he

states plainly, “It [the videos] does not show Mr. Turner’s penis touching AT’s

anus, or deviate sexual intercourse under KRS 510.070. Commonwealth’s

Exhibit 58 shows Mr. Turner’s penis touching BH’s buttocks, which are ‘other

intimate parts,’ not her anus.” In other words, Turner’s argument establishes

an all-or-nothing proposition—the videos either demonstrate sodomy, or they

do not.

                                        5
      Generally, “[w]e permit a trial court to not instruct on lesser-included

offenses only where the evidence presents an all-or-nothing proposition,

allowing only a single account of the degree of the offense or demanding an

acquittal.” Swan v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 100 (Ky. 2012). See also

Gordon v. Commonwealth, 214 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Ky. App. 2006). In this

instance, by Turner’s own reasoning, either the video evidence establishes

sodomy by showing penile contact with the anuses of his victims or it

establishes no sodomy by showing no penile contact with the anuses of his

victims. Because this is an essential element of sodomy, Mash, 376 S.W.3d at

559, Turner’s argument is an all-or-nothing proposition—he is either guilty of

sodomy or the Commonwealth has failed to establish a necessary element

beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, having reviewed the opening and closing

arguments of Turner’s defense, he at no point conceded to mere sexual contact

with his victims as opposed to sodomy. After making a motion for directed

verdict at the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, he once again did not

concede to mere sexual contact with his victims as opposed to sodomy. Finally,

Turner did not testify in his own defense, nor did he call any witnesses or put

on any evidence whatsoever. Therefore, the trial court acted properly in

refusing to give a jury instruction on the lesser-included offenses of first-degree

sexual abuse.

      Secondly, we note that that we will not consider arguments raised for the

first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Ky.

2013). This rule does not merely apply to the general issue at stake, but to the

                                         6
specific arguments raised for or against that issue. Id. “Error is not preserved if

the wrong reason is stated for the objection.” Young v. Commonwealth, 50

S.W.3d 148, 168 (Ky. 2001). And when a new reason in support of an

argument appears for the first time on appeal, the “Appellant is precluded from

raising that question . . . because it was not raised or relied upon in the court

below.” Combs v. Knott County Fiscal Court, 141 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Ky. 1940).

      Turner never argued at trial that the videos in question did not

demonstrate the crime of sodomy by failing to show penile contact with the

anus. In his argument for the lesser-included instructions of sexual abuse in

the first degree, trial counsel first mistakenly argued that sodomy required

penetration, which it does not. Bills v. Commonwealth, 851 S.W.2d 466, 469

(Ky. 1993). The trial court properly rejected that argument. Counsel’s next

argument was that there must be some difference between sodomy and sexual

abuse, or, in the language of the statutes, between deviate sexual intercourse

and sexual contact. Turner’s counsel then stated that difference was the

presence or lack thereof of sexual gratification. The trial court was

unpersuaded by this argument. As we stated in Mash, “[t]he distinction

between the two offenses” is not the presence of sexual gratification per se but

“is the body part touched for purposes of sexual gratification.” 376 S.W.3d at

559. The trial court properly rejected the second argument as well. Therefore,

the trial court’s refusal to give the lesser-included offense instructions for

sexual abuse in the first degree is affirmed.

                                         7
      B. Commonwealth did not Commit Flagrant Misconduct in Penalty-
         phase Closing Argument
      Next, Turner argues the Commonwealth committed prosecutorial

misconduct in its closing argument for the penalty phase, wherein counsel

made a statement that “It’s no secret victims of sexual abuse look forward to

nothing but a life of mental health issues, substance abuse, [and] depression.”

This statement was not objected to and will only be reviewed for palpable error,

as requested and briefed by Turner. RCr3 10.26. “A palpable error must be so

grave in nature that if it were uncorrected, it would seriously affect the fairness

of the proceedings.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006).

In Hannah v. Commonwealth, we set down the test whereby appellate courts

must first determine whether the Commonwealth’s statements or actions were

misconduct, and if so, then assess whether the misconduct was flagrant. 306

S.W.3d 509, 518 (Ky. 2010), superseded on other grounds by statute, KRS

503.055 and KRS 503.050(4), as recognized in Commonwealth v. Hasch, 421

S.W.3d 349 (Ky. 2013). To determine whether misconduct is flagrant, we look

to four factors: “(1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to

prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether

they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the

strength of the evidence against the accused.” Id. (quoting United States v.

Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1385 (6th Cir. 1994)).

      3   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
                                          8
      In closing arguments, lawyers may make those arguments which are

either directly supported by the evidentiary record, or reasonably deducible

from the record. They may not make arguments which have no evidentiary

foundation or are not reasonably deducible therefrom. Newcomb v.

Commonwealth, 410 S.W.3d 63, 89 (Ky. 2013). Neither of the victims in this

case testified and there was no medical testimony about their mental health,

nor expert testimony regarding the trauma sexual abuse victims can typically

expect to undergo throughout their lives. The statement of the prosecutor had

no evidentiary foundation. Child abuse cases are already highly emotional

affairs as it is, and references to the distraught lives victims potentially have in

store, without evidentiary basis, can only exacerbate the piteousness natural to

such cases. For that reason, we hold the statement was misconduct.

      Having made that determination, we must proceed to the Hannah

factors. As to the third factor, the statement was clearly deliberate and there’s

no argument it was not. As to the second factor, the comment was neither

isolated nor extensive. The theme of the Commonwealth’s closing was for the

jury to do what was fair and just, and this focused on the impact of Turner’s

crimes upon his children. The Commonwealth argued that Turner had not just

physically harmed the girls but had “robbed” them of the father they should

have had; robbed them of their virginity and negatively affecting their future

love life; and then the Commonwealth mentioned the mental health and

substance abuse issues but did not dwell on them. These two factors weigh in

favor of Turner.

                                         9
      As to the first factor, however, although without evidentiary foundation

in this record, generally speaking it is well-known that sexual abuse victims

tend to suffer a mental trauma as well as a physical trauma, and some struggle

to overcome it. It is not uncommon they do so by turning to substance abuse.

It is going too far to characterize the statement as misleading, with the

connotations of maliciousness implied by that word.4 Instead, it was

pretentious and did presume facts not in evidence, but that does not always

equate to misleading. Despite this, the prejudicial impact of the statement is

dubious. We emphasize that this statement was made in the penalty phase of

the trial and not the guilt phase; guilt had already been determined. The jury

had seen the evidence and the statement by itself could not have inflamed the

jury with undue passion any more than what the evidence itself elicited.

      This leads us to the fourth factor—the evidence of Turner’s guilt is

overwhelming. Dozens of videos and photographs were submitted into evidence

and Turner was readily identifiable as the perpetrator by his tattoos. The trial

judge expressed her own opinion when imposing the sentence, that the

evidence was among the most disturbing she had ever seen. The third factor is,

at worst, neutral to both Turner and the Commonwealth, but the fourth factor

undoubtedly weighs in favor of the Commonwealth. As we said in Brewer, the

essential question for palpable review is whether “the result in the case would

have been different without the error.” 206 S.W.3d at 349. And the Hannah

      4Johnson defines mislead as “to guide a wrong way; to betray to mischief or
mistake.” Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 469 (Barnes & Noble
Books 1994) (1756).
                                        10
factors are to be balanced with one another—it is not a rote checklist. Because

of the overwhelming evidence of guilt and its nature, we are confident that the

sentence imposed by the jury would have been the same even without the

Commonwealth’s statement therefore, there is no palpable error.

                                   III. Conclusion
         Turner’s argument that lesser-included offense instructions for sexual

abuse were justified because the video evidence underlying the sodomy charges

did not show penile contact with the anuses of the victims establishes an all-

or-nothing proposition, so the trial court correctly declined to give lesser-

included offense instructions for sexual abuse in the first degree. Moreover, the

specific argument advanced before this Court was not presented to the trial

court thus, it was not properly preserved for review. The statement of the

Commonwealth during closing arguments in the penalty phase was misconduct

because not based in the evidentiary record. But the statement itself was not

flagrant misconduct and it did not result in a palpable error. The judgment and

sentence of the Kenton Circuit Court is affirmed.

         All sitting. Conley, Keller, Lambert, Nickell, and Thompson, JJ., concur.

Bisig, J., concurs in result only by separate opinion in which VanMeter, C.J.,

joins.

         BISIG, J., CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY: I concur in result only.

Although I agree with the majority that Turner’s conviction should be affirmed,

I disagree with the conclusion that the prosecutor committed misconduct in

closing argument during the penalty phase. While the majority ultimately

                                         11
determines that the statement did not constitute palpable error, I do not

believe the statement was improper.

      In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing

argument, we must remember that “counsel is granted wide latitude during

closing argument[,]” and that “‘[i]t is just that—an argument.’” Murphy v.

Commonwealth, 509 S.W.3d 34, 50 (Ky. 2017) (quotation and citations

omitted). The majority notes that the prosecutor’s statement had no

evidentiary foundation, but prosecutors are permitted to “draw all reasonable

inferences from the evidence.” Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 39

(Ky. 1998). The majority opinion further states that “generally speaking it is

well-known that sexual abuse victims tend to suffer a mental trauma as well as

a physical trauma, and some struggle to overcome it. It is not uncommon they

do so by turning to substance abuse.” These sensible considerations that can

reasonably be inferred from the evidence lead me to conclude that the

prosecutor’s reference to mental health issues as a plausible impact of this

crime was not improper.

      I further emphasize that the prosecutor’s comment occurred during

closing argument of the penalty phase, which directly followed a two-day trial

in which the jury was presented with an abundance of unequivocal evidence

and ultimately found Turner guilty. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the

prosecutor to argue that the victims could suffer from the effects of this abuse

for the rest of their lives.

      VanMeter, C.J., joins.

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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Julia K. Pearson
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Jenny L. Sanders
Assistant Attorney General

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