Court Opinion

ID: 9733751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:16:29.73487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:43.996609
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(specially concurring).
I take issue with some of the language in the dissent, including: “conceptual folly,” “preposterous conclusion,” “academic violence” and “highly prejudicial.” Such phrases seem exaggerated.
Specifically, the dissent claims that “this contract was approved by both of these lawyers; if the contract is ambiguous, both lawyers were involved in creating an ambiguity.” This statement implies that the ambiguity was the result of a joint effort by both lawyers. That simply is not true.
Even the dissent admits that “[d]ue to the input of Attorney Adam, ... two provisions of the draft were deleted.” The fact is that the two deletions have nothing whatsoever to do with the ambiguity. The ambiguity, which remained in the contract after the deletions, was created by the draftsman, attorney Freiberg, and the trial *485court was required to follow the law and instruct the jury that the ambiguity should be “interpreted most strongly against the party who drafted the contract and caused the uncertainty to exist.” See Forester v. Weber, 298 N.W.2d 96, 97 (S.D.1980).
Secondly, the dissent claims that “SDCL 21-1-11 ... has been shattered by the Amert and Hageman decisions,” that “Beka ... has been torn asunder by Amert and Hageman ” and that “[t]he Amert decision ... is bad law.” Amert v. Ziebarth Const. Co., 400 N.W.2d 888 (S.D.1987), was written by then Chief Justice Wuest. Both Amert and Hageman were unanimous, except for Justice Henderson’s dissents and my special concurrence in Amert concerning “the continuing problem of applying prejudgment interest law, SDCL 21-1-11, to the facts.” 400 N.W.2d at 892 (Sabers, J., specially concurring).
First, the law is known but difficulties continue to exist in applying that law to the multiple and diverse facts which arise from time to time in these cases. Secondly, in the absence of an offer or tender to pay on their part, defendants should not be able to claim that they are prevented by law or by the plaintiff creditor from paying. Thirdly, the right to recover damages capable of being made certain by calculation was not vested in the plaintiff in this case until September 28, 1982, and then in the amount of $95,-505. This is so even though the building was built in 1977 and 1978 and the rust was noticed as early as the spring of 1979. At that time, plaintiffs damages were capable of being made certain by calculation by reference to prevailing markets for labor and materials. All of the above is in line with the letter and the spirit of Meyer v. Dixon, 369 N.W.2d 658 (S.D.1985).

Id.

Finally, the prejudgment interest law as applied in this case accomplishes its purpose to “provide full compensation for an injured party” and to place the defendants in “the same position as if they had paid damages at the time the damages occurred.” Comment, Prejudgment Interest in South Dakota, 33 S.D.L.Rev. 484, 510 (1988).