Court Opinion

ID: 9730262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:06:44.678686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:05.289201
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM G. CALLOW, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s decision that preverdict interest should not be awarded in this action. While I agree that preverdict interest should not be awarded on amounts representing future losses,1 I believe that preverdict interest should be awarded for past losses. The majority’s decision is contrary to the current trend supporting the award of preverdict interest and, I believe, is inequitable to tort plaintiffs.
*784As the majority recognizes, the award of preverdict interest is founded on the notion that the plaintiff is deprived of the use of the money he or she is ultimately awarded. (Pages 774-75.) As we noted in Nelson v. Travelers Insurance Co., 102 Wis. 2d 159, 169, 306 N.W. 2d 71 (1981):
“We are no longer firmly convinced that only the un-liquidated or unliquidable character of damages should determine whether interest is payable on the amount due. It is true that the kinds of damages associated with personal injury suits epitomize the concept of unliquidated damages, but the person injured is no less entitled to compensation because his injuries are initially in the nonpecuniary realm of pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of society, or the loss of use of a limb or limbs, to name a few such categories. Moreover, to the extent that those injuries are ultimately compensable, the wrongdoer who must make compensation has the use of the money until payment is made (and he has such use whether he is aware of the amount due or not). Conversely, the plaintiff, who should have the money, does not have it and thus cannot put it to use .... The interest obligation imposed upon the wrongdoer is not an additional penalty for the wrong but is simply the value of the use of the money — a value which should be accruing for the benefit of the plaintiff-creditor but, because of the nature of the debt, was accruing to the defendant-debtor instead.” (Emphasis in original.)
Thus, the award of preverdict interest has the equitable purpose of placing the plaintiff in the same position he or she would have been had he or she had use of the money from the time the injury occurred.
While the majority concedes that plaintiffs may be deprived of the full value of their monetary award, the majority mistakenly concludes that plaintiffs are somehow made whole through the jury award process. The majority asserts that juries make their award in dollar amounts which match the inflated value of money at that *785time. Even assuming that juries consider inflation rates when making their awards, the compensation due the plaintiff for the loss of use of money includes more than the effects of inflation. If a plaintiff were able to invest an award from the date of injury, current interest rates would exceed the rate of inflation. Further, the plaintiff often must bear the additional cost of borrowed money, which usually is subject to high interest rates. Finally, I would question the fairness of permitting juries to exercise their discretion as to how much compensation will be awarded for the lost value of money. This means that some plaintiffs will be compensated and some will not, and that those who are compensated will be awarded at differing rates.
The majority also rejects the award of preverdict interest for lost earning capacity. The majority concludes that, while lost earning capacity is a fairly determinable amount, it should not be subject to preverdict interest because the jury may have taken inflation into account and because the calculation of such interest might lead to overcompensation. As I pointed out above, it is only speculation whether the jury inflated the award, and even if it did, this would not necessarily fully compensate the plaintiff. The majority correctly points out that awarding preverdict interest on the full amount of earning loss might lead to overcompensation because earning losses only accrue over time. However, there are formulas applied by courts to ensure that such overcompensation does not occur. See, e.g., In Re Pago Pago Aircrash of January 30, 1974, 525 F. Supp. 1007, 1021-24 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
Finally, the majority rejects preverdict interest on medical expenses. Medical expenses constitute a liquid-able amount upon which preverdict interest could be calculated with some certainty. In most cases, the amount of medical expenses is fixed fairly early on in the law*786suit, thereby permitting the liable parties to know what amounts are payable.2 Even if the defendants do not know exactly what share each will ultimately have to bear, this should not preclude the plaintiff from recovering preverdict interest to compensate for the lost use of that money.
The majority also asserts that the award of prever-dict interest would thwart the legislative scheme under sec. 807.01, Stats. I disagree with this conclusion. The majority notes that the purpose of this provision is to promote settlement. I believe that an extension of pre-verdict interest to include the period from the time of injury to the time a settlement offer is made under sec. 807.01 would further promote, rather than thwart, the settlement process. If interest were to run from the date of injury, the defendant would have an incentive to make a settlement offer early in the litigation process. I would propose.that, if the plaintiff rejected the offer and recovered an amount less than the offer, interest would run only from the date of injury to the date the settlement offer was made. This system would promote early *787settlement but would still partially compensate the plaintiff for the lost use of his or her money. I do not believe plaintiffs will delay the suit simply to permit interest to accrue. First, most plaintiffs want their money as soon as possible so they can use it for their needs. Second, plaintiffs probably could, if they did not need the money currently, invest the money at an interest rate higher than the statutory rate. Third, plaintiffs would be remiss in not pursuing their claims in a timely fashion because stale claims are harder to prove.
It appears to me that the majority has recognized the basic unfairness of permitting the defendant use of money rightfully owed the plaintiff and the concomitant loss to the plaintiff in not having use of the money. Despite this, the majority “finds” built-in correcting mechanisms in the jury process and then raises problems with administering a compensatory scheme in conjunction with sec. 807.01, Stats. I believe that we can and should fashion a remedy which compensates plaintiffs for lost use of money and which furthers the legislature’s goal of promoting the settlement of cases.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Nathan S. Heffernan joins in this dissenting opinion.

 I agree -with the majority’s analysis -which shows that pre-verdict interest on future losses would lead to overcompensation. So long as the plaintiff has the use of the money, he or she is not being deprived of lost interest. As the majority notes, jury awards representing future losses are discounted to their present value. I believe, however, that if it is proper to discount future losses to account for the plaintiff’s expected interest earnings, we should compensate the plaintiff for the interest earnings he or she could have received on the award of damages for past injuries. Just as equity demands that the future interest be removed from the award, equity also demands that lost interest be replaced.

 The majority uses as an example a property loss of $100 to show the need for compensation (see pp. 779-80). Medical expenses are like such property losses in that the amount, whether it be for surgery to fix a broken arm or work to repair a bent fender on a car, is determinable. Using the majority’s logic, the lost value of an amount representing medical expenses — like property loss — must be awarded to compensate the plaintiff.
The majority, in rejecting an award of preverdict interest on pain and suffering, relied upon Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733, 603 P.2d 1329 (1979). I would note in this regard that Greater West-chester permits the award of preverdict interest on paid medical expenses and lost earnings because on those amounts the plaintiff “has been deprived of the use of his money and ‘the accretion of wealth which [the] money . . . could have produced during [the] period of loss.”’ Id. at 109, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 745, 603 P.2d at 1341. See also In Re Pago Pago Aircrash of January 30, 1974, 525 F. Supp. 1007, 1019 (C.D. Cal. 1981).