Court Opinion

ID: 9644942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:09:01.744355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:20.349328
License: Public Domain

Darrell Hickman, Justice, dissenting. I dissent for several reasons. The majority in this case, as in Trotter v. State, 290 Ark. 269, 719 S.W.2d 268 (1984), has forgotten its appellate role which is to review cases and affirm them if possible, rather than look for a reason to reverse a decision. The majority in this case, as in Trotter, has reversed a decision for a reason not raised on appeal. When the officer who had prepared the report testified regarding what the appellant’s mother had told the two officers, no objection was made; that evidence is substantial evidence and can support a verdict. No argument was made below or on appeal whether the statement made to the mother was a “confession.” That is a legal question the majority decided to answer on its own. The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Williams v. State, 281 Ark. 387, 663 S.W.2d 928 (1984). The majority seems to require that there must be a confession plus independent substantial evidence to support a conviction. However, that is not the law. We have held, “The statute does not require the corroborating evidence to be independently sufficient to support a conviction. Instead it requires only corroborating evidence that such an offense was committed.” Morgan v. State, 286 Ark. 264, 691 S.W.2d 164 (1985). That is not a requirement that substantial evidence prove the offense was committed — only evidence that it was committed. The statute reads: A confession of a defendant, unless made in open court, will not warrant a conviction, unless accompanied with other proof that such an offense was committed. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2115 (Repl. 1977). The majority question the absence of evidence to prove the element of intent in the crime of robbery. Evidently the majority requires independent substantial evidence other than a confession of every element of a crime, and that is not the requirement of the statute. See Stickley v. State, 294 Ark. 44, 740 S.W.2d 616 (1987). That fundamental error is compounded when the same approach which was taken in Trotter is taken in this case, and that is that a jury cannot infer intent from the actions of the defendant. That is a marked departure from existing law. We have held, “[i]ntent or purpose behind an act, being a state of mind can seldom be positively known to others, so it ordinarily cannot be shown by direct evidence, but may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the act.” Heard v. State, 284 Ark. 457, 683 S.W.2d 232 (1985). In this case there was evidence offered at trial that two men entered a liquor store. Both went to the wine cooler. After picking up a bottle of wine, the appellant walked to the counter and asked the owner how much it cost. Mr. Mahfouz, the owner, testified that the appellant tried to hit him in the head twice before Mr. Mahfouz shot him in the leg. There was also testimony offered that showed that there was a third man, Tony, who waited outside the store while the other two went inside to buy some “cigarettes.” However, neither man inside the store picked up any “cigarettes” or asked for any. In my judgment the majority is holding a juror cannot use his common sense in deciding cases. The jury was clearly convinced by the appellant’s actions that the appellant intended to rob the store and so was the store owner. This question was asked of Mr. Mahfouz, the store owner: Q. I just heard your testimony and not one. . . but not one time did you say anything about Terry Bishop trying to rob you. A. Well what would you think in that situation with a man trying to hit you in the head. What did he hit me in the head for? Robbers need to tell shopkeepers “stick ‘em up, this is a robbery” to convince the majority a robbery is intended. Only the majority is in the dark in this case. Hays and Glaze, JJ., join in the dissent.