Court Opinion

ID: 9949086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 19:03:01.414744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:36.745758
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/8/24 P. v. Hepokoski CA1/5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
            Plaintiff and Respondent,                             A167527
 v.
 STEVEN MARCUS HEPOKOSKI,                                         (Solano County Super. Ct. No.
            Defendant and Appellant.                              VCR238361)

       Steven Marcus Hepokoski appeals after he pled no contest
to possessing a firearm as a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd.
(a)(1))1 and was granted probation. He argues that his pre-plea
motion to suppress was erroneously denied (§ 1538.5, subd. (m)).
We agree and reverse the judgment.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                               A.
      Officer Christopher Francis of the Benicia Police
Department testified at the preliminary hearing that, at about
10:00 p.m. on August 28, 2021, he was on patrol, with a police
dog, in a marked patrol car. Officer Francis saw Hepokoski, in a
gas station parking lot, riding a motorcycle without wearing a
helmet.

       Officer Francis radioed dispatch that he was about to make
a traffic stop at the gas station. However, Hepokoski parked his

        1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                                1
motorcycle in one of the gas station’s parking spots in the
interim. Thus, Officer Francis testified that “[t]here was no
traffic stop,” and he merely “contact[ed]” Hepokoski to talk to him
about the dangers of riding a motorcycle without a helmet.

       Officer Francis parked his patrol car about nine to 12 feet
behind Hepokoski’s parked motorcycle, which faced a concrete
curb and, beyond that, a landscaped area. The adjacent parking
stalls (to the left and the right) were open. The left-hand stall
was similarly bordered on two sides by a concrete curb and
landscaping. The area, where Hepokoski and a female
companion were eating fast food and listening to music, was
illuminated by two streetlights and the headlights of Officer
Francis’s patrol car.

      Two additional officers, Corporal Woodlief and Officer
Stafford, arrived. All three officers were in uniform. Officer
Francis initially approached Hepokoski together with Corporal
Woodlief, while Officer Stafford stood a few feet behind and
recorded the interaction on his body camera.2 Officer Francis
stood no closer than two to three feet from Hepokoski. Corporal
Woodlief and Officer Stafford both shined flashlights on
Hepokoski and his motorcycle.

       Officer Francis testified, “I believe one of the first things I
asked about . . . was where is his helmet at or why isn’t he
wearing a helmet.” Officer Francis then asked Hepokoski if he
had his identification. At this point, the three officers stood
around Hepokoski and his motorcycle in a triangle shape.
Corporal Woodlief and Officer Stafford continued shining their
flashlights on Hepokoski and his motorcycle. Corporal Woodlief
was positioned towards the left of the motorcycle, standing on the
concrete curb facing the open, left parking stall. Officer Francis

      2The recording captures neither the officers’ approach nor
the audio for the first 30 seconds.
                                  2
was positioned at the other end of the left parking stall, and
Officer Stafford was standing towards the right of the motorcycle,
in the open, right parking stall.

      In response to Officer Francis’s question about his
identification, Hepokoski checked his pockets, moved around the
parking spaces, and then started to eat again. The officers spoke
to Hepokoski and his companion in a friendly tone about fires in
El Dorado County and their recent evacuation. Hepokoski moved
past Officer Francis on at least one occasion, and Officer Francis
did not stop him. Corporal Woodlief also walked back and forth
between the two open stalls.

       Officer Francis testified that Hepokoski was not
surrounded because “[there was] plenty of room for [him] to
leave” on his motorcycle. Officer Francis eventually
acknowledged that Hepokoski would not have been able to back
straight out of the parking stall—because of where the patrol car
was parked. Hepokoski’s only way to exit would have been to
back up the motorcycle as much as he could, turn its wheel to the
left or right, go around Officer Francis or Corporal Woodlief, and
drive out through the adjacent parking stall. Officer Francis
said, “I would move.”

      After about a minute, Officer Francis asked a second time if
Hepokoski had identification. When Hepokoski began looking in
belongings secured to the motorcycle, Corporal Woodlief and
Officer Stafford focused their flashlights on those items.

      Hepokoski indicated that he would need to unload his
belongings to locate his identification. Officer Francis said,
“Yeah, absolutely. . . . I appreciate you offering.” Shortly
thereafter, Officer Francis pulled out a pad of paper and asked
Hepokoski if he knew the number by heart. He also asked for
Hepokoski’s first and last name. Hepokoski told Officer Francis
his name was “Steven Yancey.”

                                3
      After Officer Francis asked dispatch to run that name and
the motorcycle’s license plate, he was informed that “[t]here was
no match on Steven Yancey” but that the motorcycle was
registered to a Steven Hepokoski, who was on probation and
subject to a “full search” condition. Dispatch also sent a
photograph of the motorcycle’s registered owner, which matched
Hepokoski’s appearance.

      Officer Francis again asked Hepokoski what his last name
was. Hepokoski repeated, “Yancey.” Shortly thereafter, Officer
Francis reminded Hepokoski that their interaction was being
videotaped. At that point, Hepokoski admitted his true last
name.

       Officer Francis commanded Hepokoski and his companion
to sit down on the curb. Asked to explain why he gave a false
name, Hepokoski said, “I just wanted you guys to move along.”
After Hepokoski was placed under arrest, the officers searched a
backpack on the motorcycle and found an unloaded gun.

                                B.

      Hepokoski moved to suppress the gun, along with his
statements and the officers’ observations, on the ground that the
evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. In its written opposition to the
motion to suppress, the prosecution argued that Hepokoski’s
detention was supported by Officer Francis’s reasonable
suspicion that he violated Vehicle Code section 27803—by riding
his motorcycle without a helmet—and that the subsequent search
was lawful based on the officers’ knowledge of his probation
search condition.

      At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution withdrew the
former argument, acknowledging Vehicle Code section 27803
does not apply in a parking lot. (Id., subd. (d).) Instead, the

                                4
People argued Officer Francis’s interaction with Hepokoski began
as a consensual encounter, not a detention.

      The magistrate denied Hepokoski’s motion to suppress.
The magistrate expressly found that Officer Francis’s patrol car
was parked directly behind Hepokoski’s motorcycle, but that
Hepokoski was not blocked because there was “some room to back
up and get around.” The magistrate also stated that, while a
“reasonable person would feel impinged by the position of” the
patrol car, “the manner in which the officers positioned
themselves was not so overbearing [or] intrusive that it
undermined a reasonable person’s ability to believe that they
were free to go.” The magistrate also stated, “there’s nothing else
whatsoever in the engagement between the officers and
[Hepokoski] that appeared particularly coercive or investigatory.”

       The trial court later heard Hepokoski’s motion to set aside
the information (§ 995) on the same grounds. The trial court
denied the motion after reviewing the evidence from the
preliminary hearing. Hepokoski entered a plea of no contest to
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The
trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed
Hepokoski on probation for two years.

                           DISCUSSION
                                A.
      It is undisputed that Officer Francis had no reasonable
suspicion Hepokoski was engaged in criminal activity before he
gave a false name. Thus, the only question before us involves the
timing of Hepokoski’s detention. Hepokoski argues that his
motion to suppress should have been granted because he was
unlawfully detained as soon as Officer Francis parked his patrol
car behind Hepokoski’s motorcycle, the three officers approached
with flashlights shining on him, and Officer Francis began
questioning him. The People, on the other hand, contend that

                                 5
Hepokoski was not detained until “after the police discovered he
had lied about his identity and that he had a probation search
condition.” Although it is a relatively close question, we agree
with Hepokoski.

                                 1.
      In reviewing a suppression ruling, we defer to the
magistrate’s factual findings, express or implied, if supported by
substantial evidence. We then independently determine
whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure violates the
Fourth Amendment, applying federal constitutional standards.
(People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 242 (Tacardon).)

         “For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, there are
. . . three different categories or levels of police ‘contacts’ or
‘interactions’ with individuals, ranging from the least to the most
intrusive. First, there are . . . ‘consensual encounters’ [citation],
which are those police-individual interactions which result in no
restraint of an individual’s liberty whatsoever . . . and which may
properly be initiated by police officers even if they lack any
‘objective justification.’ [Citation.] Second, there are what are
commonly termed ‘detentions,’ seizures of an individual which
are strictly limited in duration, scope and purpose, and which
may be undertaken by the police ‘if there is an articulable
suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a
crime.’ [Citation.] Third, and finally, there are those seizures of
an individual which exceed the permissible limits of a detention,
seizures which include formal arrests . . . , and which are
constitutionally permissible only if the police have probable cause
to arrest the individual for a crime.” (Wilson v. Superior Court
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 784; accord, In re Manuel G. (1997) 16
Cal.4th 805, 821.)

     Police “officers may approach someone on the street or in
another public place and converse if the person is willing to do so.
There is no Fourth Amendment violation [if the] circumstances

                                  6
are such that a reasonable person would feel free to leave or end
the encounter.” (People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 309.) In
contrast, a detention occurs when the police, by physical force or
show of authority, communicate to a reasonable person, in view of
all the circumstances, that they are not free to leave, or otherwise
terminate the encounter, and if the person actually submits to
the show of authority. (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 241-
242; accord, Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 439 (Bostick).)
“The test’s objective standard -- looking to the reasonable man’s
interpretation of the conduct in question -- allows the police to
determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will
implicate the Fourth Amendment.” (Michigan v. Chesternut
(1988) 486 U.S. 567, 574.)

        “Relevant circumstances may include: the presence of
multiple officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, the use of siren
or overhead emergency lights, physically touching the person, the
use of a patrol car to block movement, or the use of language or of
a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s
request is compelled.” (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 241-
242.) We also consider “the time and place of the encounter,
whether the police indicated the defendant was suspected of a
crime, whether the police retained the defendant’s documents,
and whether the police exhibited other threatening behavior.”
(People v. Linn (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 58 (Linn).) If the
police uncover evidence during an illegal detention, the
unlawfully obtained evidence generally must be suppressed as
“ ‘ “fruit of the poisonous tree.” ’ ” (People v. Kasrawi (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 751, 761.)

                                 2.

       Hepokoski’s argument—that he was detained before the
false identification came to light—is based on several factual
assertions: (1) that Officer Francis’s patrol patrol car blocked
Hepokoski’s exit; (2) that three officers were present and

                                  7
surrounded him; (3) that Corporal Woodlief and Officer Stafford
spotlighted Hepokoski with their flashlights throughout the
encounter despite the area being well-lit; (4) that Officer Francis
questioned him accusatorily about his failure to wear a helmet;
and (5) that Officer Francis’s repeated requests for his
identification suggested he was required to comply. Hepokoski’s
first assertion is at odds with the superior court’s express
findings, which we are required to accept if supported by
substantial evidence. (Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 242.)
Nonetheless, after independently applying the law to the
magistrate’s supported findings and other undisputed facts (id. at
pp. 241-242, 255), we agree that a reasonable person in
Hepokoski’s position would have believed he was not free to leave
or to otherwise terminate the encounter.

       First, Hepokoski insists he was detained because Officer
Francis’s patrol car was parked behind his motorcycle. A
detention is not established by the mere fact that an officer parks
behind or near the defendant’s vehicle, if the defendant has room
to drive away. (See Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 247; People
v. Perez (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1492, 1494.) Here, the magistrate
expressly found that Hepokoski was not blocked in and had
“some room to back up and get around” Officer Francis’s patrol
car. These findings are supported by Officer Francis’s testimony
and the body camera recording. Hepokoski does not challenge
the sufficiency of this evidence.

      This is where our agreement with the magistrate’s ruling
ends. After finding that Hepokoski’s ability to exit was not
physically blocked, the magistrate explicitly stated, “there’s
nothing else whatsoever in the engagement between the officers
and [Hepokoski] that appeared particularly coercive or
investigatory.” To the extent that this is a finding that no other
circumstances indicate a show of authority to which an
objectively reasonable person would feel compelled to submit, it is

                                 8
contradicted by the undisputed facts. (See Tacardon, supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 241-242, 251; People v. Paul (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
832, 840 (Paul); Linn, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 58.)

       Most importantly, it is undisputed that Officer Francis
approached Hepokoski and initially asked “where is [your]
helmet at or why [aren’t you] wearing a helmet[?]” “[Q]uestions
of a sufficiently accusatory nature may by themselves be cause to
view an encounter as a nonconsensual detention[,] . . . and the
degree of suspicion expressed by the police is an important factor
in determining whether a consensual encounter has ripened into
a detention.” (People v. Lopez (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 289, 292-
293, italics added; accord, Wilson v. Superior Court, supra, 34
Cal.3d at pp. 790-791.) Even without explicit mention of Vehicle
Code section 27803, these questions would lead a reasonable
person to believe that they were suspected of unlawful activity,
and thus not free to merely leave or ignore Officer Francis’s
questions. (See Linn, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 58, 64-65.)

       “The same is true for commands or directions issued in the
course of an encounter.” (Linn, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 58.)
Here, Officer Francis testified that he merely asked if Hepokoski
had his identification. The body camera recording corroborates
Officer Francis’s account and shows that his tone was cordial.
The Fourth Amendment is not necessarily implicated when a
police officer asks a person for identification, “as long as the police
do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is
required.” (Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at pp. 434-435, italics added;
accord, People v. Leath (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 344, 353.) Here,
unlike in Bostick and Leath, Officer Francis’s repeated requests
for identification came after he had communicated to Hepokoski
that he was suspected of unlawful activity. The distinction is
crucial. (See Linn, supra, at pp. 64-65 & fn. 7.)

     Furthermore, Officer Francis repeated his request after
Hepokoski gave an ambiguous response to the initial question

                                  9
about identification. The first time he was asked, Hepokoski
checked his pockets, moved around the parking spaces, and then
resumed his meal. At this point, Officer Francis did not verbally
inform Hepokoski, or otherwise indicate, that he was free to leave
or to decline to answer his questions. (Cf. Bostick, supra, 501
U.S. at p. 432; People v. Franklin (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935, 941
[“citizen participant in a consensual encounter may leave, refuse
to answer questions or decline to act in the manner requested by
the authorities”].) Instead, Officer Francis repeated his request
for identification—indicating to an objective person in
Hepokoski’s position that, although the officer’s tone was polite
and his voice was not raised, Officer Francis was not going to let
the matter drop until he completed further investigation. Officer
Francis’s tone of voice alone does not determine whether
Hepokoski was detained. (Paul, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 841
[“[i]f the officer’s tone and words had been aggressive, it would be
an additional reason for a reasonable person to believe that he or
she was being detained” but “[t]he converse is not necessarily
true”].)

       Next, we consider the significance of Corporal Woodlief’s
and Officer Stafford’s use of flashlights. At one point, there was a
recognized split among the courts of appeal on whether an
officer’s use of a spotlight communicates the same show of
authority as an officer’s activation of emergency lights.
(Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 243-245.) But our Supreme
Court has since settled the question and decided that spotlights
and emergency lights generally convey different meanings.
(Tacardon, supra, at p. 246.) Tacardon explains: “[A] reasonable
person would understand that spotlights can have a practical
function that differs from the essentially communicative function
of emergency lights. A spotlight can be used to illuminate the
surrounding area for safety or other purposes unrelated to the
projection of authority.” (Ibid.)

                                10
      Tacardon did not state a bright-line rule. We still “must
consider the use of a spotlight together with all of the other
circumstances. It is certainly possible that the facts of a
particular case may show a spotlight was used in an
authoritative manner. These may include flashing lights at the
driver to pull the car over or attempting to blind the driver,
which would be relevant considerations under the totality of the
circumstances. [Citation.] But use of a spotlight, standing alone,
does not necessarily effect a detention.” (Tacardon, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 247.)

       Here, the body camera recording shows two of the three
officers (Woodlief and Stafford) using their flashlights to
illuminate Hepokoski and his motorcycle from multiple angles.
They did so even though the parking lot where Hepokoski parked
was already illuminated by two streetlights and the headlights
on Officer Francis’s patrol car. In the absence of any other
explanation, the only inference to be drawn is that the officers
used flashlights as a display of authority that would lead an
objective person to believe they were not free to leave. (See
Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 247 [“facts of a particular case
may show a spotlight was used in an authoritative manner”];
Paul, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 840 [objective person would
believe they were suspected of wrongdoing when two officers
approached parked car from both sides and shined flashlights
into it from both sides].)

      The presence of three uniformed officers further heightened
this show of authority. (See In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at
p. 821; In re J.G. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 402, 412; but see U.S. v.
Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 205 [additional officer’s “position at
the front of the bus . . . does not tip the scale in respondents’
favor” when officer left aisle clear, did nothing to intimidate
passengers, and said nothing to indicate exit was forbidden].)

                                11
       Here, the magistrate explicitly found that the position of
the three officers—in a triangle around Hepokoski—did not
physically block his exit. In particular, the magistrate said that
Corporal Woodlief’s presence in the right parking stall, which led
to the rest of the parking lot, was not “enough to cause a
reasonable person to feel that they have no means of departure”
because “there was an area available where [Hepokoski] was free
to go.” Nonetheless, we are required to independently consider
the legal effect of the presence of multiple uniformed officers,
positioned in a triangle around Hepokoski, for what was
purportedly a casual conversation about helmet safety. (See
Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 241-242; Paul, supra, 99
Cal.App.5th at p. 839 & fn. 2 [independently reviewing mixed
question of whether trial court’s findings support its legal
conclusions].) While we defer to the magistrate’s finding that
Hepokoski’s egress was not physically blocked by the three
officers, we conclude their presence and position in adjacent
parking spaces constituted a show of authority that
communicated Hepokoski was not free to go. (See Paul, supra, at
pp. 839-840 [“[a]n objective person would not believe that [they
were] free to simply start driving away with [a police officer]
standing in the roadway”].)

       True, backup officers, like spotlights, may serve an officer
safety function, as opposed to a communicative function. (Cf.
Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 246.) But there is nothing in
the record that suggests Hepokoski presented any danger to
anyone but himself. And unlike in U.S. v. Drayton, supra, 536
U.S. at pages 204-205 and I.N.S. v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210,
216-218, which involved (respectively) passengers on a bus and
workers in a factory, the presence of additional officers here is
not explained by the sheer number of people that Officer Francis
sought to question. (See Michigan v. Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S.
at p. 573 [“what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a
person to conclude that he is not free to ‘leave’ will vary, not only

                                 12
with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the
setting in which the conduct occurs”].)

      Officer Francis did not activate his emergency lights to pull
over Hepokoski’s motorcycle, touch him, or command him to stop.
However, considering the totality of the undisputed
circumstances—where Hepokoski was surrounded by three
uniformed officers, immediately asked questions indicating
suspicion he had engaged in unlawful activity, illuminated by
multiple flashlights from multiple angles, and then repeatedly
asked for his identification—a reasonable person would not
believe this was an encounter that they were free to terminate.
(See Paul, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 839-841; Linn, supra, 241
Cal.App.4th at p. 65.)

       The trial court erred by failing to consider the totality of
the circumstances. (See Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 241.)
The harmless error rule is inapplicable and the judgment must
be reversed. Hepokoski must be given the opportunity to
withdraw his no contest plea. (See Paul, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th
at p. 841; People v. Wallace (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 82, 95.)

                                 3.

      The People recognize that, in some circumstances, evidence
seized as a result of an unlawful search or seizure is not subject
to exclusion “when the causal connection ‘between the lawless
conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence
has “become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” ’ ” (People v.
McWilliams (2023) 14 Cal.5th 429, 434.) However, they do not
argue that the attenuation doctrine should apply here. (See id. at
p. 438 [prosecution bears burden].) Accordingly, we need not
address the issue further.

                                 13
                            DISPOSITION

      The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded with
directions to the trial court (1) to vacate its order denying the
suppression motion and enter a new order granting the motion;
and (2) to permit Hepokoski an opportunity to withdraw his no
contest plea.

                                                      BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

SIMONS, ACTING P.J.
CHOU, J.

P. v. Hepokoski (A167527)

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