Court Opinion

ID: 9385153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 23:02:25.637733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:59.243471
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/5/23 P. v. Trejo CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G062208

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 99NF0024)

 JOHNNY JULIAN TREJO,                                                  OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Jonathan S. Fish. Affirmed.
                   Robert F. Somers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
                   No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
              We appointed counsel to represent Johnny Julian Trejo on appeal. Counsel
filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against his client
but advised the court he found no issues to argue on his behalf.
              Counsel filed a brief following the procedures outlined in People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). The court in Wende explained a Wende brief is one that
sets forth a summary of proceedings and facts but raises no specific issues. Under these
circumstances, the court must conduct an independent review of the entire record. When
the appellant himself raises specific issues in a Wende proceeding, we must expressly
address them in our opinion and explain why they fail. (People v. Kelly (2006)
40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 120, 124.)
              Counsel did not provide the court with information as to any specific issue
that might arguably support an appeal pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
738 (Anders). Counsel only asked that this court independently review the record in
accordance with Wende.
                                1
              We gave Johnny 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf, and
he did. In his supplemental brief, Johnny argues the case must be remanded to consider
                                                          2
recent legislation enacting Penal Code section 1170.03 and amending section 186.22.
These issues were not raised in the trial court.
              We invited Johnny and the Attorney General (AG) to file a supplemental
brief addressing People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Both Johnny
and the AG note Johnny was never notified his appeal could be dismissed as abandoned
if no supplemental brief was received. (Id. at pp. 231-232.) The AG requests this court

1
             Some of the individuals in this case share family names. To avoid
confusion, we use first names.
2
              All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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issue new no-merits orders that comply with the procedures set forth in Delgadillo.
Johnny agrees if this court does not independently review the record.
             We have independently reviewed the record and found no arguable issues
on appeal. We affirm the postjudgment order.
                                         FACTS
             A detailed recitation of the facts is provided in our prior nonpublished
opinion People v. Trejo et al. (Dec. 17, 2003, G028757) (Trejo). A brief recitation will
suffice, which Johnny concedes are accurate.
             Johnny and Rachel Seelke were dating. Rachel knew Johnny and Benito
Trejo were members of the Atwood Street (AS) gang, and Edmundo Juarez was a
member of the Cambridge Street (CS) gang. Johnny invited Rachel to a New Year’s Eve
party hosted by his gang’s members, and asked her to bring her sister, Judah Seelke, and
her friends, including Veronica Manzo. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
             The girls drove two different cars to the street where the party was to be
held. Johnny had told Rachel the street but failed to tell her the house number. Veronica
drove Judah in one car while Melissa Meade drove Rachel and Paula Gano. (Trejo,
supra, G028757.)
             That night, Veronica, who had a shaved head, wore overalls and a
checkered shirt over a white T-shirt. She slowly drove down the street looking for the
party, made a U-turn, spoke to Rachel in the other car, and returned to the same block
searching for parking. Veronica saw several men in baggy clothing running after her
car—three of them had guns in their hands, including Johnny. As Johnny rapidly gained
on her car, Veronica accelerated. The men shot at Veronica’s car hitting it numerous
times. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
             From a distance, Rachel and Paula saw Johnny and Juarez running towards
Veronica’s car carrying guns. Paula also saw Steven Fernandez, a known AS gang
member, sitting on a fence. He whistled when Veronica’s car drove past his location.

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Immediately after he whistled, the men in baggy clothing gave chase and started shooting
at the car. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
              When Veronica accelerated, another group of men emerged and began
firing at her car. Rachel recognized Benito as one of the gunmen. Rachel jumped out of
her car and yelled at Johnny that they were shooting at her sister. Johnny was surprised
because he thought it was rival gang members. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
              When Veronica was safe, she noticed her arm was bloody and bruised. She
saw Judah was slumped over motionless in her seat. She touched Judah’s head and
discovered blood on her hand. Judah died of a single gunshot wound to the back of her
head from a bullet of either a .40-caliber or 10-millimeter size. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
              AS gang member Maurice Henao told the police that when Fernandez
warned “vatos” were cruising the street, Johnny suggested they stop the apparent rivals’
cars by shooting at them from the street. After his arrest, Johnny told the detectives
various stories regarding the night’s events ranging from lack of knowledge of the
shooting to shooting twice at the car. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
              Juarez also talked with the police after his arrest. Like Johnny, Juarez told
the detectives various stories regarding the night’s events ranging from lack of
knowledge of the shooting to shooting a .38-caliber handgun about six times over the car.
(Trejo, supra, G028757.)
              Benito told the police he arrived at the party after the shooting, but other
witnesses said Benito was at the party from the very start. Ronnie David Cruz told the
detectives various stories regarding the night’s events ranging from he was with his
girlfriend to firing a single shotgun blast into the air as the suspect vehicle passed his
location. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
              In 2001, as relevant here, a jury convicted Johnny of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and deliberate and premediated attempted murder (§§ 664,
187, subd. (a); count 2). As counts 1 and 2, the jury found Johnny personally discharged

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a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and vicariously discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd.
(e)(1)). We affirmed. (Trejo, supra, G028757.)
              In 2019, Johnny filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section
         3
1170.95. The trial court denied the petition on the sole ground that Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (SB 1437) was unconstitutional. We
reversed. (People v. Trejo (June 8, 2020, G057914) [nonpub. opn.].)
              On remand, Johnny filed a brief in support of his petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. He alleged the jury likely convicted him of first degree
murder and attempted murder based on the now abolished natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
              The trial court ruled Johnny’s petition set forth a prima facie case for relief
and issued an order to show cause. The court heard evidence and argument.
              The trial court denied the petition in a written ruling. The court issued an
amended written ruling again denying the petition. The court ruled the evidence
established Johnny, Benito, and Cruz responded to a perceived gang threat and responded
as gang members. The court further found they were part of a machine that acted in
concert to kill, although without knowing the victims’ identities. The court opined that
although the fatal shooter was unknown, Johnny, Benito, and Cruz aided and abetted in a
classic sense with a shared intent to kill. The court reasoned their response to the
warning about rivals, the immediate forming of groups to shoot at the car from two
different spots, and the sheer volume of shots fired demonstrated premeditation and
deliberation. The court concluded, “The court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that
[Judah] was murdered with premeditation and deliberation and that all three petitioners
aided and abetted in the murder of [Judah] as members of the mass that mobbed and shot

3
              Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the
statute. For clarity, we refer to the statute as section 1172.6 throughout the opinion.

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at the car and enabled the killing. The court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that all
three petitioners had the specific intent to aid and abet and had the specific intent to kill
[Judah]. The court also finds beyond a reasonable doubt that all three petitioners after
premeditation and deliberation and with specific intent to kill did attempt to kill
[Veronica].” Johnny filed a timely motion of appeal.
                                        DISCUSSION
              In Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, our Supreme Court held the
procedures in Wende and Anders do not apply to appeals from the denial of
postconviction relief under section 1172.6. The court instructed that on appeal from an
order denying section 1172.6 relief, a counsel who finds no arguable issue should file a
brief informing the appellate court of that determination and include a concise factual
recitation. (Id. at p. 231.) The appellate court shall send a copy of the brief to the
defendant informing the defendant of the right to file a supplemental brief and that if one
is not filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter. (Id. at pp. 231-232.) If a
supplemental brief is filed, we must evaluate the contentions in it. (Id. at p. 232.) If a
supplemental brief is not filed, we may dismiss the appeal as abandoned without a written
opinion. (Ibid.) However, we retain discretion to independently review the record.
(Ibid.) We exercise our discretion to independently review the record.
              We did not provide Johnny the notice required by Delgadillo as our order
predated Delgadillo. But because we exercise our discretion to independently review the
record, there is no need to advise Johnny of the possibility of dismissal.
              SB 1437 amended sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019, to
eliminate natural and probable consequences liability for murder, and to limit the scope
of the felony-murder rule. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959 (Lewis).)
Under sections 188 and 189, as amended, murder liability can no longer be “imposed on
a person who [was] not the actual killer,” who “did not act with the intent to kill,” or who
“was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless

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indifference to human life.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) SB 1437 also added
section 1172.6 which, as originally enacted, set forth a procedure whereby a “person
convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory” could petition for resentencing relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
              Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-202 Reg. Sess.) (SB 775), effective January 1,
2022, amended section 1172.6, subdivision (a), to expand the individuals entitled to
petition for resentencing. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).) Subdivision (a), of that
section now expressly permits individuals convicted of attempted murder or
manslaughter under a natural and probable consequences theory to file a petition for
resentencing relief. A section 1172.6 petition is required to make “‘a prima facie
showing’ for relief. [Citation.]” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) In Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at page 971, our Supreme Court held “[t]he record of conviction will
necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing
the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless.”
              Johnny stands convicted of both murder and attempted murder, and under
current law, he is entitled to petition for resentencing, which he did. There is no question
he made a prima facie showing for relief and the trial court appointed counsel. It is also
not disputed the court instructed the jury on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. After the filing of the petition for resentencing, the court issued an order to
show cause, allowed briefing by all parties, and held an evidentiary hearing. The only
issue before us is whether the court properly denied the petition on the merits.
              Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), provides the burden of proof shall be on
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing. To sustain its burden, the prosecution may rely on the record of conviction
or offer new or additional evidence and the judge must determine whether the
prosecution has sustained its burden of proof. (Ibid.)

                                              7
              Here, the trial court held the prosecution to the proper standard of proof and
found beyond a reasonable doubt Judah was murdered with premeditation and
deliberation and that all three petitioners aided and abetted in her murder. The court
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that all three petitioners had the specific intent to
aid and abet and had the specific intent to kill Judah. The court also found beyond a
reasonable doubt that all three petitioners, after premeditation and deliberation and with
specific intent to kill, did attempt to kill Veronica.
              Although the trial court independently determines whether the prosecution
met its burden to establish a defendant is not entitled to resentencing under section
1172.6, we review the court’s findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Vargas
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.) “Under this familiar standard, ‘“we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” [Citation.] We determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing
court “presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence.”’ [Citations.] Substantial evidence also ‘“includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.”’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
              The trial court acted as an independent fact-finder to determine Johnny’s
eligibility for relief. The court made its factual finding based on the record of conviction
applying the proper standard and found Johnny was ineligible for relief. This finding was
supported by substantial evidence.
              The facts as to Johnny’s involvement in the killing render him ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6. Relief requires a finding the petitioner was not the actual

                                               8
killer. The actual killer remains unknown, but the petitioner must also show he did not
act with the intent to kill and that he was not a major participant in the underlying felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Johnny cannot satisfy either of those
requirements.
                Johnny was identified as one of the men running towards Veronica’s car
with a gun. Rachel told Johnny they were shooting at her sister, and Johnny admitted he
thought the car was full of rival gang members. Henao, an AS gang member, told the
police that, upon Fernandez’s warning that “vatos” were cruising the street, Johnny was
the one who suggested to others at the party that they stop the apparent rivals’ cars by
shooting at them. Although Johnny gave various conflicting accounts of his involvement,
he ultimately admitted he fired twice at the car and admitted his were the first shots.
These facts demonstrate Johnny was not only a major participant, he was the ringleader.
Based on these facts, it cannot be said Johnny acted without the intent to kill and was not
a major participant in either crime. We find the trial court’s ruling is supported by
substantial evidence.
                The issues Johnny raised for the first time in his supplemental brief are not
properly before the court. In order for an appellate court to make a determination of
whether the trial court erred, there must be a record that demonstrates what the trial
court’s decision-making process was in reaching its conclusion. In cases such as this,
where the issues were not raised in the trial court, we are left without any ability to
evaluate the trial court’s decision. (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 227.)
Neither of the statutory changes were raised in the trial court. Therefore, we do not
address these claims.
                We have reviewed the record pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, and
Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738. We found no arguable issues on appeal.

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                                  DISPOSITION
            The postjudgment order is affirmed.

                                             O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, J.

MOORE, J.

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