Court Opinion

ID: 9949119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 20:10:02.30651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:44.040195
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Slayton v. Peterson, 2024-Ohio-863.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    SANDUSKY COUNTY

Amanda Slayton                                       Court of Appeals No. S-23-014

        Appellee                                     Trial Court No. 22 DR 301

v.

Nathan Peterson                                      DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                    Decided: March 8, 2024

                                        *****
        Karin L. Coble, Joseph F. Albrechta, Christopher E. Liebold
        and Joseph A. Urenovitch, for appellant.

                                                *****
        MAYLE, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Nathan Peterson, appeals the April 13, 2023 judgment of the

Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, overruling his

objections to the magistrate’s decision and confirming registration of a foreign parenting

order, as requested by appellee, Amanda Slayton. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                                       I. Background and Facts

        {¶ 2} In 2016, Peterson and Slayton were divorced in North Carolina, where they

lived at the time. The divorce decree included custody orders for their children that gave

them joint legal custody and “equal physical custody and control of * * *” the children.

In 2018, Slayton sought to modify the 2016 custody order. At that point, she lived in
Ohio (and Peterson remained in North Carolina), so equal division of parenting time was

not possible. In September 2020, the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, of

Onslow County, North Carolina, issued an order modifying the 2016 order (the “North

Carolina decree”). The North Carolina decree gave Slayton primary physical and legal

custody of the children and Peterson secondary physical and legal custody with visitation

as outlined in the order.

       {¶ 3} In early 2020, Peterson moved to Missouri, where he currently resides.

When the children were attending school virtually due to COVID-19 shutdowns, Peterson

and Slayton agreed that the children should spend half of their time with each parent.

They followed the equal-time schedule that they agreed on (instead of the visitation

schedule in the North Carolina decree) until December 2021. In December 2021,

Peterson refused to return the children to Slayton because one of the children alleged that

he was sexually abused by a cousin while in Slayton’s custody in Ohio.

       {¶ 4} Peterson reported the abuse allegations in Missouri. As a result, two cases

(the “abuse cases”) were filed in the Family Court of Cole County, Missouri, Juvenile

Division (“Missouri juvenile court”). Peterson did not provide the trial court with much

information from the abuse cases; the record contains only some minimal testimony from

the parties and judgment entries signed January 5 and May 4, 2022.1

1
  None of the many copies of the abuse-case orders that are in the record contains a file
stamp; the only dates on the orders are the dates they were signed.

2.
       {¶ 5} In the January entries, the Missouri juvenile court noted that Peterson

admitted the allegations in the petitions, made factual findings, assumed jurisdiction over

the children pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. 211.031.1(1),2 and set the matter for a contested

adjudication hearing as to Slayton. Most relevant to this appeal, the entries made the

children “ward[s] of the Court,” granted Peterson custody of the children under the

supervision of the “Children’s Division,”3 and ordered that the children stay in Missouri

“pending final disposition of * * *” the abuse cases.

       {¶ 6} The May entries are much shorter. Aside from some boilerplate, the orders

state, in their entirety, “Cause dismissed as to the allegations against mother. Jurisdiction

terminated as to father.”

       {¶ 7} While the abuse cases were pending, Peterson and Slayton each filed an

additional court case. First, in December 2021 (around the same time he reported the

abuse allegations), Peterson filed a custody case in the Circuit Court of Cole County,

Missouri (the “custody case”). Again, not much information from that case is in the

record, but we know that Peterson filed a motion to modify custody, and the custody case

2
 This is Missouri’s statutory grant of jurisdiction to juvenile courts in cases where a
“child is in need of care and treatment because the child is without proper care, custody,
or support[,]” Interest of T.D., 645 S.W.3d 669, 676 (Mo.App.2022), and is essentially
equivalent to a juvenile court in Ohio having jurisdiction over abuse, neglect, and
dependency cases. See R.C. 2151.23(A)(1).
3
 A children’s division is the Missouri equivalent of a children services agency in Ohio.
See Mo.Rev.Stat. 210.109; R.C. 5153.16.

3.
was pending when the magistrate and trial court in this case issued their decisions on

registering the North Carolina decree in Ohio.4

       {¶ 8} Second, in April 2022, Slayton filed the R.C. 3127.35 petition to register a

foreign parenting order underlying this appeal. In her petition, Slayton asked to register

the parties’ 2016 divorce decree and the North Carolina decree, and alleged that the

North Carolina decree had not been modified.

       {¶ 9} Peterson objected to Slayton’s petition. In his initial response, Peterson

argued that Slayton should not be allowed to register the North Carolina decree, and her

petition should be dismissed, because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify

the North Carolina decree. Later, in a separate motion to dismiss—filed in June 2022,

after the Missouri juvenile court dismissed the abuse cases—Peterson objected to Slayton

registering the North Carolina decree under R.C. 3127.35(D)(2) because the abuse-case

orders “effectively stayed” the North Carolina decree.

       {¶ 10} In July 2022, the trial court magistrate held a hearing on Peterson’s

objection to Slayton’s petition. The magistrate specifically limited the hearing to the

issue of whether one of the objections in R.C. 3127.35(D) applied. That is, the magistrate

4
  In November 2023, while this appeal was pending, Slayton (who did not file a brief or
otherwise participate in this appeal) filed two orders from the custody case in the trial
court. The first, signed in July 2023, was a determination by the Missouri court that it did
not have jurisdiction to modify the North Carolina decree. The second, signed in October
2023, dismissed the custody case for lack of jurisdiction. These document are not
properly before us. Salpietro v. Salpietro, 2023-Ohio-169, 205 N.E.3d 1203, ¶ 9-10 (6th
Dist.) (appellate review is limited to the record made in the trial court as it existed when
the trial court issued its judgment).

4.
made clear that the hearing was focused only on whether Slayton could register the North

Carolina decree, not whether the court could enforce or modify it.

       {¶ 11} At the hearing, as relevant to the issue of registration, Slayton testified to

her belief that, following the Missouri juvenile court dismissing the abuse cases in May

2022, the North Carolina decree had not been modified and controlled custody

arrangements for the children.

       {¶ 12} Peterson testified that he had registered the North Carolina decree in

Missouri in December 2021, and his motion to modify in the Missouri custody case was

pending. At the time of the January 2022 hearing in the abuse cases, the Missouri

juvenile court placed the children with him. After the Missouri juvenile court dismissed

the abuse cases in May 2022, Peterson thought that the North Carolina decree was the

only existing custody arrangement, but he believed that it was “unenforceable,”

essentially because he understood that a North Carolina court could not enforce a custody

order against nonresidents. When the magistrate asked Peterson what custody order he

thought was in effect or what order he was following, he said that he and Slayton “are

attempting to follow the North Carolina order as close as [they] physically can * * *.”

       {¶ 13} In her January 2023 decision, the magistrate found that the trial court

should confirm registration of the North Carolina decree. In reaching that decision, the

magistrate rejected Peterson’s argument that the trial court could not register the North

Carolina decree if it was also registered in Missouri. She also explained that neither party

had provided the court with “an order from Missouri that currently vacates, stays or

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modifies the North Carolina Custody Order[,]” and “Missouri’s temporary exercise of

emergency jurisdiction [and] temporary modification of * * *” the North Carolina decree

did not prevent the trial court from registering the North Carolina decree. The magistrate

reasoned that “the custody orders reverted back to the order from North Carolina * * *”

when the Missouri juvenile court dismissed the abuse cases and terminated jurisdiction,

and “[t]o argue otherwise would be illogical as it would place the parties in the situation

of having no current order to govern custody of the children.”

       {¶ 14} Peterson objected to the magistrate’s decision. As relevant to the issue he

raises on appeal, he argued that the magistrate’s decision was contrary to the plain

language of R.C. 3127.35(D)(2) because the Missouri juvenile court’s January 2022

orders in the abuse cases stayed and modified the North Carolina decree at the time

Slayton filed her petition to register. He also argued that “has been vacated, stayed, or

modified” in the statute “is past tense and therefore encompasses any vacation, stay, or

modification which has happened in the past[,]” the legislature “knew the difference

between the past and present tense[,]” and if the legislature intended to limit the statute to

only current stays, it could have used a “grammatical structure to indicate present tense.”

Finally, to refute the magistrate’s contention that Peterson’s interpretation of R.C.

3127.35 was “illogical” and left the parties “in the situation of having no current order to

govern custody of the children[,]” Peterson argued that the Missouri custody case was

ongoing, and “[b]oth parties still have every opportunity to seek redress in Missouri * *

*.”

6.
       {¶ 15} On April 13, 2023, the trial court overruled Peterson’s objections and

adopted the magistrate’s decision to confirm registration of the North Carolina decree.

The court noted that the magistrate’s decision “contains specific detailed findings of fact

and a comprehensive review of the applicable law[,]” and “clearly articulates [the

magistrate’s] reasoning in applying the facts of this case to the statute.” The court

concluded that its independent review of the matter showed that the magistrate “made an

appropriate decision based upon the evidence presented at hearing.”

       {¶ 16} Peterson now appeals, raising one assignment of error:

              The trial court violated the UCCJEA when it granted appellee’s

       motion to register a foreign judgment from North Carolina when appellee

       had only recently registered the North Carolina foreign judgment in

       Missouri and proceedings are still pending in Missouri.

                                   II. Law and Analysis

       {¶ 17} Relevant to the issue of registering the North Carolina decree under R.C.

3127.35, Peterson argues in his sole assignment of error that he sufficiently demonstrated

an exception to registration in R.C. 3127.35(D), so the trial court erred by confirming

registration of the North Carolina decree. Specifically, he argues that the Missouri

juvenile court issued emergency temporary orders that modified the North Carolina

decree, and that modification precludes registration under R.C. 3127.35(D)(2). Although

he acknowledges that the Missouri juvenile court dismissed the abuse cases and

terminated its jurisdiction, he maintains that Slayton cannot register the North Carolina

7.
decree in Ohio because it “‘has been’ modified” by the Missouri juvenile court orders. In

other words, he contends that nothing in R.C. 3127.35 “say[s] that the foreign order must

currently be under a modification * * *” and the legislature could have “include[d] in the

exception only those instances where modifications made by another state were currently

in effect * * *” if it had intended to preclude registration only of currently-modified

orders.

                                    A. Standard of review

          {¶ 18} The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court properly confirmed

registration of the North Carolina decree. Although the parties lived in North Carolina

when they divorced, and Peterson lived there in 2018 when Slayton sought to modify the

custody arrangements in their 2016 divorce decree, Slayton now lives in Ohio, and

Peterson now lives in Missouri. Because the custody battle underlying this case involves

parents who live in different states, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and

Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), R.C. Chapter 3127, controls the enforcement and

modification of the North Carolina decree. R.C. 3127.01(A) (the UCCJEA is “the act

addressing interstate recognition and enforcement of child custody orders * * *”).

          {¶ 19} Generally, we review a trial court’s decision on objections to a magistrate’s

decision only for an abuse of discretion. Baker v. R/A Cab Co., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-

19-1031, 2019-Ohio-4375, ¶ 10. However, when the issue on appeal is solely a matter of

law, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. Lucas v. Ford Motor Co., 2018-Ohio-

3765, 109 N.E.3d 1287, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.); see also Slak v. Strozier, 2024-Ohio-286, ---

8.
N.E.3d ----, ¶ 19 (6th Dist.). Here, Peterson disputes the trial court’s interpretation of

R.C. 3127.35(D)(2). The meaning of a statute is a question of law that we review de

novo. Piazza v. Cuyahoga Cty., 157 Ohio St.3d 497, 2019-Ohio-2499, 138 N.E.3d 1108,

¶ 16.

B. To preclude registration of the North Carolina decree under R.C. 3127.35(D)(2),
     Peterson was required to establish that a past change affected its validity.

        {¶ 20} Our analysis focuses on the only issue that is properly before us: whether

the trial court correctly confirmed Slayton’s registration of the North Carolina decree.

        {¶ 21} In Ohio, anyone can register a child custody determination that was issued

by an out-of-state court, “with or without a simultaneous request for enforcement, * * *”

by providing a clerk of courts with specified documents, information, and fees. R.C.

3127.35. If the person seeking registration provides the required information, the clerk

must (1) file the out-of-state custody order as a foreign judgment and (2) send notice to

anyone the filer named as having parental rights and give them an opportunity to contest

the registration. R.C. 3127.35(B).

        {¶ 22} To contest registration, the opposing party must request a hearing within 30

days, and “[a]t that hearing, the court shall confirm the registered order unless the person

contesting registration establishes one of * * *” three specific circumstances: (1) the

court that issued the out-of-state custody order did not have jurisdiction, as defined by

R.C. 3127.15 to 3127.24 or similar statutes of another state; (2) the custody order “has

been vacated, stayed, or modified * * *” by a court with jurisdiction; or (3) the opposing

party was entitled to, but did not receive, notice of the custody proceedings underlying

9.
the out-of-state custody order. (Emphasis added.) R.C. 3127.35(D). The terms of

section (D) are mandatory; the court is required to confirm the registration of the out-of-

state custody order unless the opponent meets their burden of establishing that one of the

exceptions in (D)(1) through (3) exists. Patton v. Patton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

25346, 2012-Ohio-5798, ¶ 14 (“The language of R.C. 3127.35 requires the trial court to

confirm the registered order if certain filing requirements are satisfied as to the

registration of the foreign decree and if a person opposing registration does not establish

one of the statutory bases for contesting such registration.”).

       {¶ 23} In this case, Peterson does not argue that the North Carolina court lacked

jurisdiction to issue the North Carolina decree or that he did not receive appropriate

notice of the North Carolina proceedings. Thus, the only way he could prevent Slayton

from registering the North Carolina decree was by showing that the North Carolina

decree “has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction * * *.” R.C.

3127.35(D)(2).

       {¶ 24} Peterson argues (without providing much support) that (1) the January

2022 orders in the abuse cases “modified” the North Carolina decree; (2) “this situation

fits precisely the meaning of the phrase ‘has been’ modified, vacated, or stayed[;]” and

(3) it is irrelevant that the May 2022 orders in the abuse cases dismissed the cases and

terminated the Missouri juvenile court’s jurisdiction. The evidence he points to in

support of this argument consists solely of the Missouri juvenile court’s January 2022

orders, which granted him custody of the children—a decision that the Missouri juvenile

10.
court did not specifically address in the May 2022 orders dismissing the abuse cases and

terminating the court’s jurisdiction.

        {¶ 25} Our job when construing any statute is to determine the legislature’s intent.

State ex rel. Horizon Science Academy of Lorain, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 164 Ohio

St.3d 387, 2021-Ohio-1681, 172 N.E.3d 1019, ¶ 14. To do so, we first look to the plain

language of the statute. Id. Undefined words in a statute “shall be read in context and

construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” R.C. 1.42; Horizon at

¶ 14.

        {¶ 26} In R.C. 3127.35(D)(2), the legislature determined that an out-of-state

custody order cannot be registered in Ohio if the person who is “seeking to contest the

validity of * * *” the out-of-state custody order “establishes” that the order “has been * *

* modified * * *.” The UCCJEA does not define “validity” or “modified,” so we look to

their ordinary meanings and read them in context using the rules of grammar. Horizon at

¶ 14. “Validity” means “the quality or state of being valid: such as * * * the state of

being acceptable according to the law[,]” Merriam-Webster Online,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/validity (accessed Mar. 5, 2024), and

“valid” means “having legal efficacy or force[.]” Merriam-Webster Online,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/valid (accessed Mar. 5, 2024). “Modify”

means “[t]o make somewhat different; to make small changes to (something) by way of

improvement, suitability, or effectiveness * * *.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1157 (10th

Ed.2014).

11.
       {¶ 27} The registration statute uses the verb “has been,” which is in the present-

perfect tense. See Garner, The Chicago Guide to Grammar, Usage, and Punctuation,

Section 176, 97 (2016). (“The present-perfect tense is formed by using have or has with

the principal verb’s past participle[, e.g.,] {have walked} {has drunk}.” (Emphasis sic.)).

A present-perfect verb “denotes an act, state, or condition that is now completed or

continues up to the present.” Id. That is, it “refers to (1) a time in the indefinite past * *

* or (2) a past action that comes up to and touches the present * * *.” Id. Further, the

statute talks about an order that has been modified in the context of how a “person

seeking to contest the validity of a registered order * * *” can show that the order should

not be registered in Ohio. (Emphasis added.) R.C. 3127.35(D).

       {¶ 28} Putting it all together, reading the phrase “has been * * * modified * * *” in

the context of methods someone can use to contest the “validity” of an out-of-state

custody order shows that an out-of-state custody order cannot be registered in Ohio if (1)

the order was made different or changed, (2) either at some indefinite time in the past or

at some time in the past that continues to the present, and (3) the difference or change

means that the order is no longer acceptable under the law or no longer has legal force

and effect. Thus, to prevent Slayton from registering the North Carolina decree, Peterson

was required to show that the North Carolina decree was changed at some point and—

critically—that the change rendered the North Carolina decree legally unacceptable or

without any legal force.

12.
              C. Peterson failed to establish an exception to registration.

       {¶ 29} Turning to the facts of this case, on the surface, our reading of “has been

modified” seems to resolve the validity issue: the January 2022 Missouri abuse-case

orders made temporary changes to an otherwise valid custody order in the North Carolina

decree, but the Missouri orders are no longer in effect, so they have no impact on the

legal force and effect of the North Carolina decree. This conclusion is underscored by

Missouri law, which specifically addresses when and how juvenile court custody orders

take precedence over other custody orders and—importantly—what happens when a

juvenile court order is no longer in effect. See Mo.Rev.Stat. 211.093.2. Under that law,

there is no question of the North Carolina decree’s validity for purposes of R.C. 3127.35.

       {¶ 30} In Missouri, a juvenile court has the authority to issue UCCJEA custody

orders in cases where it has jurisdiction over children because they are “in need of care

and treatment,” as provided in Mo.Rev.Stat. 211.031.1(1) (i.e., abuse and neglect cases).

Mo.Rev.Stat. 211.093.2.5 See also Mo.R.Juv.P. 124.11 (“[A] court exercising

jurisdiction over a child under [Mo.Rev.Stat.] 211.031.1(1) * * * may enter an order

regarding custody * * *.”). The statute provides that a juvenile court’s custody order in

an abuse case “shall take precedence over and shall automatically stay any prior orders

5
 The current version of Mo.Rev.Stat. 211.093, which first enacted provisions specific to
abuse and neglect cases under Mo.Rev.Stat. 211.031.1(1), has only been in effect since
August 2018. We were unable to find any Missouri case law discussing the impact of the
amendments or discussing the statute’s interplay with the UCCJEA provisions in
Mo.Rev.Stat. Chapter 452.

13.
concerning custody * * *” and “shall remain in full force and effect after the termination

of juvenile court proceedings unless the court’s order specifically states otherwise.”

Mo.Rev.Stat. 211.093.3. But,

       [i]f the juvenile court terminates jurisdiction without entering a continuing

       custody * * * order under [Mo.Rev.Stat. 211.093.2 and 211.093.3], legal

       and physical custody of the child shall be returned to the * * * parent * * *

       who exercised custody prior to the juvenile court assuming jurisdiction * *

       *, and any custody or visitation orders in effect at the time the juvenile

       court assumed jurisdiction shall be restored.

(Emphasis added.) Mo.Rev.Stat. 211.093.4.

       {¶ 31} Based on the very limited information that Peterson provided the trial court

about the abuse cases, the scenario outlined in Mo.Rev.Stat. 211.093.4 seems to apply.

Although the Missouri juvenile court granted Peterson custody of the children and

ordered that they remain in Missouri while the abuse cases were pending, it later

dismissed the cases against Slayton and terminated its jurisdiction as to Peterson without

entering a custody order intended to be ongoing. In that case, by law, the North Carolina

decree was restored and the parties were once again bound by its terms.

       {¶ 32} Moreover, Slayton testified that she understood, after attending the hearing

at which the Missouri juvenile court dismissed the abuse cases, that the parties were to go

back to following the North Carolina decree. Peterson did not contradict Slayton’s

testimony, except to discuss his understanding that North Carolina could not enforce the

14.
North Carolina decree because neither party lived in the state. Although Peterson did not

admit that the North Carolina decree controlled the parties’ custody arrangements, he

conceded that he and Slayton were “attempting to follow the North Carolina order as

close as [they] physically can * * *.” To be sure, this is not definitive proof that the

North Carolina decree is the order currently governing the parties’ custody arrangements,

but it certainly weakens Peterson’s claim that the North Carolina decree has been

modified.

       {¶ 33} Under R.C. 3127.35(D)(2), Peterson had the burden of “establish[ing]” that

the validity of the North Carolina decree was in question because it “has been * * *

modified * * *.” Based on the information in the record and the applicable statutes in

Ohio and Missouri, he has not met this burden. Although the Missouri juvenile court

clearly “modified” the North Carolina decree while it had jurisdiction over the abuse

cases, under Missouri law, the North Carolina decree was restored when the Missouri

juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction. Peterson did not point to any law, or present

any evidence, to the contrary. Because he failed to establish an exception to registration,

the trial court was required to confirm the registration of the North Carolina decree. R.C.

3127.35(D); Patton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25346, 2012-Ohio-5798, at ¶ 14. Whether

the trial court can now modify the North Carolina decree is a separate issue that has not

yet been decided by the trial court and is not before us in this appeal. See Hays v. Kaelin,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26179, 2014-Ohio-3357, ¶ 15 (“[T]he procedure for modifying

15.
foreign custody orders is separate and distinct from the registration process set forth in

R.C. 3127.35.”).

       {¶ 34} Overall, Peterson fails to recognize the distinction between registration and

modification under the UCCJEA. He spends the bulk of his brief arguing that the trial

court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the North Carolina decree, and,

by extension, Slayton should not be allowed to register that decree in Ohio. But a

registrant’s end-goal is not a proper consideration under R.C. 3127.35(D)(2); that section

is only concerned with whether the validity of the out-of-state order is in question

because the order has been vacated, stayed, or modified. And, as long as the out-of-state

order is not of questionable validity because it has been vacated, stayed, or modified,

registration is mandated by R.C. 3127.35. Patton at ¶ 14. Registration and modification

are separate issues that are controlled by separate sections of the UCCJEA and involve

separate processes. Hays at ¶ 15. Peterson’s jurisdictional arguments are red herrings

that have absolutely no effect on whether registration is proper under R.C. 3127.35.

       {¶ 35} Moreover, the trial court did not decide any jurisdictional issues or take

them into consideration when deciding whether to confirm registration of the North

Carolina decree. In fact, the magistrate was clear at the hearing that whether Ohio is the

children’s “home state”—i.e., whether Ohio has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to

modify the North Carolina decree—was not at issue, the magistrate did not address the

trial court’s jurisdiction in her decision, and the trial court did not address jurisdiction

when it confirmed the magistrate’s decision. Because the trial court has not yet reached

16.
the issue of whether it has jurisdiction to modify the North Carolina decree, and that issue

does not affect whether Slayton can register the North Carolina decree, it is not properly

before us on appeal. See Lycan v. Cleveland, 146 Ohio St.3d 29, 2016-Ohio-422, 51

N.E.3d 593, ¶ 21, 27 (An appellate court must “limit[] its review to issues actually

decided by the trial court in its judgment[,]” although it can “consider a challenge to the

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal * * *.”).

       {¶ 36} So, to summarize, as long as the North Carolina decree’s validity was not

in question because it had been vacated, stayed, or modified, Slayton was entitled to

register it under R.C. 3127.35—regardless of an Ohio court’s ability to modify that order.

See Hays at ¶ 15; R.C. 3127.36(B) (An Ohio court “shall recognize and enforce, but may

not modify except in accordance with [R.C. 3127.15 to 3127.24], a registered child

custody determination of a court of another state.”). The evidence that Peterson

presented did not establish a question regarding the North Carolina decree’s validity

within the meaning of R.C. 3127.35(D)(2), so the trial court was required to confirm the

registration of the North Carolina decree. Patton at ¶ 14 (“The language of R.C. 3127.35

requires the trial court to confirm the registered order if certain filing requirements are

satisfied as to the registration of the foreign decree and if a person opposing registration

does not establish one of the statutory bases for contesting such registration.”).

Therefore, the trial court correctly confirmed registration, and Peterson’s assignment of

error is not well-taken.

17.
                                      III. Conclusion

       {¶ 37} Because Peterson failed to show that the validity of the North Carolina

decree was in question because of the Missouri juvenile court’s January 2022 orders, he

failed to establish that the North Carolina decree has been modified within the meaning

of R.C. 3127.35(D)(2). Consequently, he was not entitled to prevent Slayton from

registering the North Carolina decree in Ohio, and the trial court correctly confirmed the

registration. Whether the trial court can now modify the North Carolina decree is a

separate issue that is not before us on appeal.

       {¶ 38} Therefore, the April 13, 2023 judgment of the Sandusky County Court of

Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed. Peterson is ordered to pay the

costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                              ____________________________
                                                             JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
                                                  ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, P.J.                                      JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                  ____________________________
                                                            JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

18.