Court Opinion

ID: 9849085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:34:32.999879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:00.619901
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, P.J.
(dissenting). I would reverse and remand this case for further consideration since the state medical advisor, hearing officer and employees’ retirement board applied the wrong standard in determining whether petitioner is disabled. Petitioner suffered three work-related falls which she claims resulted in disabling back injuries. Her treating physicians, Drs. Badgley and Manohar, found that petitioner was disabled and could handle only the most sedentary work. The state medical advisor declined to recommend petitioner for a duty disability retirement finding that "the evaluation indicates sedentary work is a possibility soon though with some restrictions”. The hearing office concluded "neither the letter of Dr. Manohar nor the deposition of Dr. Badgley indicate that the petitioner is totally incapacitated for further performance of duty in the service of the state in that such incapacity will be permanent”.
In Knauss v State Employees Retirement System, 143 Mich App 644; 372 NW2d 643 (1985), this Court noticed a discrepancy in the language used in the pertinent statutory provisions defining the standard for a duty-related disability, MCL 38.21; MSA 3.981(21) and MCL 38.33(a); MSA 3.981(33)(a). This Court resolved the discrepancy by adopting the intermediate view which regards total disability as a relative term. Under the intermediate definition of total disability a person is *48disabled if she is unable to engage in employment reasonably related to her past experience and training. See e.g., Knauss, supra; Kooker v Benefit Ass'n of Railway Employees, 246 NW2d 743 (ND, 1976); Travelers Ins Co v Stanley, 117 Ga App 445; 160 SE2d 876 (1968); Erreca v Western States Life Ins Co, 19 Cal 2d 388; 121 P2d 689 (1942). See also Anno., Insurance "total disability” or the like as referring to inability to work in usual occupation or in other occupations, 21 ALR3d 1155, 1165-1189, and cases cited therein.
In the instant case, petitioner’s claim for a duty-disability retirement was denied because she was not totally incapacitated for further employment with the state. Since the wrong standard was applied to determine whether petitioner is totally disabled, I would remand for further proceedings to correct this error.