Court Opinion

ID: 9884176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:43:59.606651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:03.724307
License: Public Domain

Erancis, J.
(concurring). I concur in the Court’s opinion but since the action is going back for retrial I desire to add additional comments on a matter not directly raised on the appeal.
In charging the jury on the subject of contributory negligence the trial court advised them that the comparative *126negligence of the plaintiff, Emmet J. O’Brien, and the defendant was immaterial. In other words, if the defendant were 90% at fault and the plaintiff only 10% and that 10% concurred proximately or as a substantial factor in producing the accident, no award could be made to the plaintiff no matter how serious his injuries or how large his out-of-pocket losses. And the defendant, whose negligence was the primary cause of the accident, must go scot-free.
The rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery was imported into the common law by judges. Whatever may have been the historical justification for it, today it is almost universally regarded as unjust and inequitable to visit an entire accidental loss on one of the parties whose negligent conduct combined with the negligence of the other party to produce the loss. If fault is to remain the test of liability, then the doctrine of comparative negligence which involves apportionment of the loss among those whose fault contributed to the occurrence is more consistent with liability based on a fault premise.
The principle of comparative negligence represents a more just and socially desirable distribution of loss than that ever achieved by the application of the long-standing rule of contributory negligence. I believe also that if comparative negligence were to be made applicable in our State, pre-courthousesteps settlements would be encouraged; there would be more waivers of jury trial; trial delays would be less of a problem; and calendars would be less clogged.
Since the present bar of contributory negligence is judge-made law, our authority to humanize that law by adopting comparative negligence is not open to reasonable question, and the time seems ripe to make the change. See Haugh, “Comparative Negligence: A Reform Long Overdue,” 49 Ore. L. Rev. 38 (1969); Lambert, “The Common Law is Never Pinished (Comparative Negligence on the March),” 32 ATL L. J. 741, 760-71 (1968); Symposium, “Comments on Maki v. Frelk — Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?” 21 Vand. L. Rev. *127889 (1968). At least 12 states have adopted a form of comparative negligence rule: Arkansas (Ark. Stats. Ann. § 27-1730.1.2 (1962)), Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. § 105-603 (1968)), Hawaii (H. R. S. § 663-31 (1969 supp.)), Maine (14 31. R. S. A. § 156 (1970—71 supp.)), Massachusettts (3Iass. Ann. Laws C. 231, § 85 (1970 supp.)), Minnesota (Minn. Stats. § 604.01 (1971 supp.)), Mississippi (Miss. Code Ann. § 1454 (1956)), Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1151 (1964)), New Hampshire (N. H. Rev. Stats, Ann. § 507:7a (1970 supp.)), South Dakota (S. D. Code § 20-9-2 (1967)), Vermont (Vt. Stats. Ann. T. 12, § 1036 (1970 supp.)), Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.045 (1966)). See Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N. E. 2d 445, 450 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
I realize that there are varying formulas for application of the comparative negligence rule, and that it would be helpful for policy reasons if the Legislature would choose among them, as has been done in the 12 states mentioned.1 But to date that body has not been moved to act. Thus we are free to select a fair formula which has been in operation for some years, such as that of Wisconsin, cited above. The rule there is:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death, or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
the administration of this rule is discussed in the 1967 Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Comparative Negligence, pp. 6-7. A simple special verdict procedure is codified in the Wisconsin Act (Wis. Stats. Ann. § 270.27 (1971-72 supp.)); see Heft and Heft, “Compara*128five Negligence: Wisconsin’s Answer,” 55 ABA J. 127, 129 (1969); and see the procedure set forth in the 1969 Hawaii statute, supra, Act 227 (Session Laws of Hawaii, 1969 Reg. Sess.), Section 663 (b), (c);2 Bissen v. Fujii, 51 Haw. 636, 466 P. 2d 429, 433 (1970). Of course, the Wisconsin rule, if adopted here, would be subject to change by our Court or by the Legislature, if experience demonstrated such a need.
Since the present case is being remanded for retrial, I see no reason why either party may not raise the issue of comparative negligence at the retrial by submission of a request to charge on the subject. Although at the trial now under review the court charged out comparative negligence, no objection was made thereto, and the issue was not argued in the briefs on this appeal.
Justice Proctor joins in this concurring opinion.
Ebancis and Pboctoe, JJ., concur in result.
For reversal and remandment—Chief Justice Weiittbatjb and Justices Jacobs, Ebancis, Pboctoe, Hall and Schet-TINO—6.
For affirmance—None.

The three different types of statutes commonly in use may be found in Arkansas, Mississippi and Wisconsin, cited supra.

The Hawaii statute, supra, provides that in any action where it is applicable the jury shall return a special verdict which shall state:
(1) The amount of the damages which would have been recoverable if there had been no contributory negligence; and
(2) The degree of negligence of each party, expressed as a percentage.
Upon return of the special verdict, “the court shall reduce the amount of the verdict in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or death recovery is made, provided, however, that if the said proportion is equal to or greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, then, in such event, the court will enter a judgment for the defendant.”