Court Opinion

ID: 9849943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:50:02.26278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:29.486946
License: Public Domain

Stolz, Judge,
dissenting. These cases are controlled by Hawes v. Dinkler, 224 Ga. 785 (164 SE2d 799). It may be recalled that, when that case made its appearance in this court (Dinkler v. Jenkins, 118 Ga. App. 239 (163 SE2d 443)), a majority of the court (5-4) held that the prohibition against Sunday sales of liquor by the drink under Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103, did not apply thereto because there was a distinction in classification between licenses for the sale of packaged liquor and liquor by the drink. Headnotes 3, 4 and 5. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in an unanimous opinion, reversed the Court of Appeals. In Dinkler, 118 Ga. App. 239, supra, p. 251, the point was made that the Act (Ga. L. 1964, p. 771) authorizing the sale of mixed drinks in certain counties and cities, did "not purport to change, to repeal, or to fit its provisions into any part of the 1938 Act but deals with a subject matter not previously covered by the Act” and that consequently "the Sunday-sale prohibitions of the 1938 Act did not apply, when enacted, to the sale of liquor by the drink, and that the 1964 Act does not extend the 1938 prohibitions to the sale of liquor by the drink authorized by the latter Act.” Here, the majority seems to be saying that, since there were no licensing provisions in the 1938 Act for sales of liquor by the drink (the same being illegal at that time) and the 1964 Act makes no mention of state licenses or control of such, the State of Georgia, through the Revenue Commissioner, has no authority to license or control in any way *810the sale of liquor by the drink.
In Hawes v. Dinkler, 224 Ga. 785, supra, p. 787, the Supreme Court held that "the right of anyone to sell alcoholic beverages in the State of Georgia whether by the package or by the drink is by virtue of the Act of 1938” and, at p. 789, that "[t]he 1964 amendment must be construed in relation to the original 1938 Act.”
The caption of the 1964 amendment (Ga. L. 1964, p. 771) specifically provides that the same is "An Act to amend an Act known as the 'Revenue Tax Act to Legalize and Control Alcoholic Beverages and Liquors,’ approved February 3, 1938 (Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103).”
The 1964 Act actually substituted its provisions relating to the sale of liquor by the drink as Section 31 of the 1938 Act in lieu of the original Section 31 (repealer clause) and redesignated the repealer clause as Section 32 of the 1938 Act. Clearly, the provisions of the 1938 Act apply to the 1964 amendment thereto.
The 1938 Act states in part on pp. 103, 108: "Section 8. The State Revenue Commissioner shall have the following powers and duties: ... (b) To issue licenses provided for in this Act and to decline to issue any license to any person or corporation who in his reasonable discretion are not proper persons to have such permits. Any person, firm or corporation who after securing a permit as provided in this Act shall be convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction of selling or serving spirituous liquors on the premises in unbroken packages of any size shall immediately have their license revoked and it shall be mandatory on said State Revenue Commissioner to revoke said license, (c) To revoke or cancel for cause after hearing any license issued by him under authority of this Act... (e) To fix standards not in conflict with those prescribed by the laws of this State and of the United States . . . (h) To adopt and promulgate, repeal and amend such rules, regulations, standards, requirements and orders not inconsistent with this Act or any law of this State or of the United States as he may deem necessary to control the manufacture, sale, distribution, storage, or transportation of distilled spirits and alcohol in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and the conditions under which same may be withdrawn from said warehouses and distributed.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The licensing provisions promulgated by the State Revenue Commissioner herein complained of are obviously for the purpose of regulating liquor by the drink sales. The license fee charged is *811merely incidental thereto. Once the sale of liquor by the drink became lawful in this state, the Revenue Commissioner was authorized, empowered, and duty bound to adopt and promulgate rules, regulations, standards, requirements and orders necessary to control the sale thereof. This statutory authority and obligation would of necessity include the implementation of reasonable licensing procedures and standards.
I would affirm the trial court in No. 48272 (Mousetrap) and reverse the trial court in No. 48308 (Blackmon), and therefore dissent. I am authorized to state that Judges Pannell and Deen join in this dissent.