Court Opinion

ID: 9408722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 16:01:06.799975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:45.717194
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-11758   Document: 68-1    Date Filed: 07/13/2023   Page: 1 of 30

                                                           [PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-11758
                         ____________________

        CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
        VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY,
                                                  Plaintiﬀs-Appellants-
                                                      Cross Appellees,
        versus
        WINDER LABORATORIES, LLC,
        STEVEN PRESSMAN,

                                                Defendants-Appellees-
                                                    Cross Appellants,

        CONCORDIA PHARMACEUTICALS, S.A.R.L.,
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                21-11758

                                                      Defendant-Appellee.

                            ____________________

                  Appeals from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00016-RWS
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        BRANCH, CIRCUIT JUDGE:
               Continental Casualty Company and Valley Forge Insurance
        Company (collectively, “the insurers”) and Winder Laboratories,
        LLC and Steven Pressman (collectively, “the insureds”) appeal and
        cross-appeal from the district court’s judgment in this insurance
        coverage dispute. In short, the parties’ insurance agreements
        required the insurers to defend the insureds against certain third-
        party lawsuits. After being sued by non-party Concordia
        Pharmaceuticals Inc., S.A.R.L. (“Concordia”), the insureds sought
        coverage under the policies. The insurers agreed to defend the
        insureds against Concordia, subject to a reservation of rights,
        including the right to seek reimbursement of defense costs
        incurred for claims not covered by the policies. The insurance
        agreements themselves, however, did not provide for
        reimbursement.
               This appeal presents two questions.         The more
        straightforward question is whether the insurers had a duty to
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        21-11758                Opinion of the Court                      3

        defend the insureds against the Concordia action. Then, as a
        matter of ﬁrst impression under Georgia law, we must decide
        whether a reservation of rights letter that includes a right to
        reimbursement entitles an insurer to reimbursement of defense
        costs even though the underlying insurance contract does not
        include such a right. The district court granted judgment on the
        pleadings to the insurers on the ﬁrst issue—holding that an
        exclusion in the contract meant there was no duty to defend—but
        granted summary judgment to the insureds on the second issue—
        holding that the insurers had no right to reimbursement. For the
        reasons below, and with the beneﬁt of oral argument, we aﬃrm
        both determinations.
                                 I.    Background
              A.     Facts
               In 2015, Winder Laboratories, LLC (“Winder”)—a generic
        pharmaceutical manufacturer managed by Steven Pressman—
        purchased two insurance policies: a Primary General Liability
        Policy from Valley Forge Insurance Company (“VFI”) and an
        Umbrella Policy from Continental Casualty Company
        (“Continental”). The materially identical policies required the
        insurers to “defend the insured[s] against any ‘suit’” seeking
        damages for “personal and advertising injury.” In pertinent part,
        “personal and advertising injury” was deﬁned to include an injury
        “arising out of ” either “[o]ral or written publication, in any
        manner, of material that slanders or libels a person or organization
        or disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products or
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                      21-11758

        services” or “[t]he use of another’s advertising idea in [the
        insureds’] ‘advertisement.’” 1 The policies also had a “failure to
        conform” provision that excluded coverage for injuries “[a]rising
        out of the failure of goods, products or services to conform with
        any statement of quality or performance made in [the insureds’]
        ‘advertisement.’”      Notably, neither policy included a
        reimbursement provision allowing the insurers to recoup defense
        costs.2
                On January 6, 2016, Concordia sued Winder and Pressman
        in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
        Georgia, asserting various claims under the Lanham Act and
        Georgia law.3 In the Concordia action, the Fourth Amended
        Complaint became the operative complaint after a series of claim
        dismissals and amendments. 4 The crux of Concordia’s Fourth

        1
         Advertisement is also defined in the policy: “‘Advertisement’ means a notice
        that is broadcast or published to the general public or specific market segments
        about your goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers
        or supporters.”
        2
          The policies also did not define the details of the defense. For example, the
        policies did not mention which party would choose defense counsel if the
        insureds were sued.
        3
          We call this lawsuit the “underlying litigation” or “Concordia action”
        throughout this opinion.
        4
         Concordia’s initial complaint included eight claims. After a series of motions
        to dismiss and several amended complaints, the operative complaint (Fourth
        Amended Complaint) asserted the following claims: false advertising in
        violation of Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B); contributory false advertising in
        violation of Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B); common law unfair competition;
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        21-11758                   Opinion of the Court                               5

        Amended Complaint was that Winder “falsely or misleadingly
        advertised their B-Donna product, and subsequently their
        Phenohytro product, as generic [equivalents] to [Concordia’s
        product] DONNATAL directly to the pharmaceutical industry,
        including to potential purchasers.”
               In light of the Concordia action, on February 19, 2016, the
        insurers jointly sent the insureds a letter agreeing to provide their
        defense—subject to a fairly standard reservation of rights to
        disclaim coverage. Importantly, however, the letter also included
        a not-so-standard reimbursement provision: “VFI specifically
        reserves its right to seek reimbursement of defense costs incurred
        on [the insureds’] behalf for all claims which are not potentially
        covered by the VFI Policy.” 5 Pressman—on behalf of the
        insureds—signed and returned an “Acknowledgement of Defense
        under a Reservation of Rights,” that noted “[the insureds] elect to
        retain independent counsel 6 to represent them in the Underlying

        violations of the Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act; and tortious
        interference with contract or business relationships.
        5
          This letter did not specify a similar right to seek reimbursement for
        Continental. But, as the underlying litigation proceeded (eventually reaching
        a Fourth Amended Complaint), the insurers sent updated reservation of rights
        letters that eventually included a right to reimbursement for both insurers (not
        just VFI): “[T]he [insurers] reserve their rights to disclaim coverage and seek
        reimbursement of legal fees and costs.”
        6
         In the reservation of rights letters, the insurers provided the insureds this
        option:
               VFI will retain counsel to represent you and Winder in the
               Underlying Suit. Alternatively, you and Winder can retain
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                     21-11758

        Suit, subject to [VFI’s] reservation of rights . . . .”
               B.     Procedural History
               During the pendency of the Concordia action, on January
        17, 2019, the insurers filed suit in the Northern District of Georgia
        seeking a declaratory judgment that they had no duty to defend or
        to indemnify the insureds under the policies and were entitled to
        “reimbursement of legal costs and fees spent in providing [the
        insureds] a defense” in the Concordia suit under the reservation of
        rights. Following the insureds’ answer denying that both the
        insurers had no duty to defend and that the insurers were entitled
        to reimbursement, the insurers moved for judgment on the
        pleadings. Focusing on the duty to defend, they argued that they
        had no duty to defend the insureds against Concordia’s operative
        complaint because Concordia did not allege a “personal or
        advertising injury,” and—even if there were such an injury—the
        “failure to conform” provision excluded coverage. The district
        court granted the insurers’ motion, holding that Concordia’s
        allegations were “squarely” excluded by the “failure to conform”
        provision because the “operative complaint [was] based entirely
        upon allegations that [Winder] misrepresented the quality” of

               counsel of your choice to represent you in this matter. If
               Winder elects to retain its own defense counsel, please be
               advised that VFI will only agree to reimburse you or Winder
               for necessary and reasonable defense costs incurred by defense
               counsel at a rate charged by commensurate counsel typically
               retained by VFI in the Northern District of Georgia, where the
               suit is pending.
USCA11 Case: 21-11758        Document: 68-1        Date Filed: 07/13/2023        Page: 7 of 30

        21-11758                  Opinion of the Court                              7

        Winder’s products. 7 The court also noted that the insurers had
        “not shown entitlement to reimbursement [for defense costs
        already paid],” and encouraged the parties to confer “in an effort to
        resolve any remaining dispute regarding the reimbursement issue.”
        The insureds moved for reconsideration, which was denied. After
        this ruling, the insurers stopped paying for the insureds’ defense.
              In November 2020, having not reached an agreement, the
        parties cross-moved for summary judgment on the insurers’
        reimbursement claim. The district court denied the insurers’
        motion and granted the insureds’. The district court noted that the
        question presented—whether an insurer had a right to
        reimbursement when that right was included only in a reservation
        of rights letter but not the parties’ insurance contract—was an open
        question under Georgia law. The district court found in favor of
        the insureds, reasoning that an effective reservation of rights
        necessarily required a preexisting contract right: “[A]bsent a
        provision in the insurance policy—or some other express
        agreement—an insurer who issued an otherwise valid, unilateral
        reservation of rights cannot recoup its defense fees or costs.”
               The insurers appeal the district court’s reimbursement
        decision and the insureds cross-appeal the duty to defend
        determination.

        7
         The district court did not address whether Concordia’s allegations presented
        a “personal and advertising injury” because the “failure to conform” exclusion
        was dispositive as to the insurers’ duty to defend.
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        8                         Opinion of the Court               21-11758

                            II.      Standard of Review
               We review a “district court’s grant of judgment on the
        pleadings de novo.” Bankers Ins. Co. v. Fla. Residential Prop. & Cas.
        Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 137 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998) (per
        curiam). Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when “there are
        no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
        judgment as a matter of law.” Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250
        F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). “We must accept the facts alleged
        in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable
        to the nonmoving party.” Id.
               We review a district court’s summary judgment
        determinations de novo. Great Am. All. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 847 F.3d
        1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 2017). In this posture, “[w]e view the evidence
        and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of . . . the party
        opposing summary judgment.” Munoz v. Selig Enters., Inc., 981 F.3d
        1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2020). The moving party must “show[] that
        there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” so that it is
        “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Smith
        v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2017).
               Because this federal action is premised on diversity
        jurisdiction, “Georgia’s substantive law governs.” AEGIS Elec. &
        Gas Int’l Servs. Ltd. v. ECI Mgmt. LLC, 967 F.3d 1216, 1223 (11th Cir.
        2020).
                                   III.   Discussion
              We start with the insureds’ cross-appeal on the duty to
        defend before considering the insurers’ appeal of the
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        21-11758                   Opinion of the Court                                9

        reimbursement decision.
                A.      Duty to Defend
                The insureds argue that because Concordia alleged a
        “personal and advertising injury,” which is a covered claim, the
        insurers were obligated to defend the insureds against the
        Concordia action. Speciﬁcally, the insureds argue that Concordia’s
        complaint alleged a “personal and advertising injury” because it
        included allegations that Winder copied Concordia’s DONNATAL
        label inserts.8 The insurers argue that no “personal and advertising
        injury” was alleged; rather, they contend that Concordia’s
        allegations of false and misleading advertising triggered the “failure
        to conform” exclusion such that there was no coverage under the
        policies. The district court held that the allegations fell under the
        “failure to conform” exclusion, and the insurers had no duty to
        defend. We agree with the insurers and the district court.

        8
         The insureds did not make this label-copying argument until their motion for
        reconsideration. Generally, parties cannot use motions for reconsideration
        “to relitigate old matters, raise argument[,] or present evidence that could
        have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of
        Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005). As the district court noted, it
        was improper for the insureds to make these arguments for the first time in
        their motion for reconsideration. Nevertheless, the district court addressed
        the merits of the new argument. Accordingly, we will consider the merits of
        this argument as well. However, because we are considering the district
        court’s ruling in the context of its denial of the insureds’ motion for
        reconsideration, we review the denial of the motion for reconsideration for
        abuse of discretion and review the underlying legal conclusions de novo. See
        Equity Inv. Partners, LP v. Lenz, 594 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2010).
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                        21-11758

               Whether the insurers have a duty to defend the insureds
        against the underlying litigation hinges on whether Concordia’s
        contributory false advertising claim was based on Winder’s alleged
        label copying.9 If so, the alleged injury arose out of “[Winder’s]
        use of another’s advertising idea”—i.e., Concordia’s labels—and
        the insurers have a duty to defend under the “personal and
        advertising injury” provision. If, however, the claim rested on
        allegations that Winder actively misrepresented its drugs, then the
        alleged injury arose from the “failure of goods . . . to conform with
        any statement of quality or performance made in [the insureds’]
        ‘advertisement,’” and the insurers do not have a duty to defend
        under the “failure to conform” exclusion.
                Georgia law treats insurance as “a matter of contract” so
        that “the parties to the contract of insurance are bound by its plain
        and unambiguous terms.” Lima Delta Co. v. Glob. RI-022 Aerospace,
        Inc., 789 S.E.2d 230, 233 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (quotation omitted).
        “The construction of an unambiguous contract is a question of law
        for the court.” Id. (quotation omitted).

        9
         The series of amendments and dismissals in the underlying litigation left
        contributory false advertising as the only claim that possibly relied on
        Concordia’s label-copying allegations. To make out a contributory false
        advertising claim under the Lanham Act, plaintiffs must (1) “show that a third
        party . . . directly engaged in false advertising that injured the plaintiff,” and
        (2) “allege that the defendant contributed to that conduct either by knowingly
        inducing or causing the conduct, or by materially participating in it.” Duty Free
        Ams., Inc. v. Estée Lauder Cos., 797 F.3d 1248, 1277 (11th Cir. 2015).
USCA11 Case: 21-11758      Document: 68-1       Date Filed: 07/13/2023      Page: 11 of 30

        21-11758                Opinion of the Court                          11

               Under Georgia law, an unambiguous contract “must be
        enforced as written,” and we should not expand “the rights of the
        parties to an insurance policy . . . beyond the terms of the policy.”
        Giddens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 445 F.3d 1286,
        1297 (11th Cir. 2006). This principle is true even for “exclusions in
        insurance policies” that are normally “strictly construed against the
        insurer.” Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. OHIC Ins. Co., 619 S.E.2d
        704, 706 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (quotation omitted). That is, an
        exclusion that is “plain and unambiguous binds the parties to its
        terms and must be given eﬀect, even if beneﬁcial to the insurer and
        detrimental to the insured.” Id. (quotation omitted). Georgia
        courts counsel against “strain[ing] to extend coverage where none
        was contracted or intended.” Id. (quotation omitted).
                An insurer’s duty to defend is determined by “comparing the
        allegations of the complaint with the provisions of the policy.” Pilz
        v. Monticello Ins. Co., 599 S.E.2d 220, 221 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)
        (quotation omitted). Under Georgia law, when the policy uses the
        broad term “suit,” the insurer has a duty “to defend the entire suit
        if any of the individual claims could be covered under the [p]olicy.”
        S. Tr. Ins. Co. v. Mountain Express Oil Co., 828 S.E.2d 455, 458 (Ga. Ct.
        App. 2019); City of Atlanta v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 498
        S.E.2d 782, 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (“If the facts as alleged in the
        complaint even arguably bring the occurrence within the policy’s
        coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend the action.” (emphasis
        added)). If, however, the complaint “does not assert any claims
        upon which there would be insurance coverage, the insurer is
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        12                         Opinion of the Court                       21-11758

        justiﬁed in refusing to defend the insured’s lawsuit.” St. Paul Fire,
        498 S.E.2d at 784.
               With Georgia law in mind, we now look to the operative
        complaint to see if Concordia’s allegations relating to its
        contributory false advertising claim (a) triggered coverage under
        the “personal and advertising injury” provision or (b) triggered the
        “failure to conform” exclusion.10 We hold that the “failure to
        conform” exclusion applied.
               In the contributory false advertising count, Concordia
        focused on Winder’s allegedly false and misleading representations
        about its products:
               [Winder] actively and materially furthered such false
               or misleading, or false and misleading, advertising
               and promotion of [its] B-Donna or Phenohytro
               products by making false or misleading, or false and
               misleading, representations about the products on
               their labels and product inserts, making false or
               misleading, or false and misleading representations to
               the Drug Databases to list [its] B-Donna or
               Phenohytro products with the Drug Databases,
               listing the products with the Drug Databases, and/or
               marketing the products as “generics” that are

        10
          To reiterate a critical point, “personal and advertising injury” was defined to
        include “[t]he use of another’s advertising idea in [the insureds’]
        ‘advertisement.’”
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        21-11758                   Opinion of the Court                              13

                comparable to and/or substitutable for [Concordia’s]
                DONNATAL.
                Thus, Concordia’s contributory false advertising claim
        clearly rested on Winder’s false and misleading representations—
        not its label copying. Accordingly, we conclude that the allegations
        in the complaint do not arise out of a “personal and advertising
        injury” stemming from “[t]he use of another’s advertising idea”—
        i.e., Concordia’s labels—that would have required the insurers to
        defend the insureds against Concordia’s Fourth Amended
        Complaint. See Pilz, 599 S.E.2d at 221; St. Paul Fire, 498 S.E.2d at
        784 (“[W]here the complaint ﬁled against the insured does not
        assert any claims upon which there would be insurance coverage,
        the insurer is justiﬁed in refusing to defend the insured’s lawsuit.”).
               In fact, Concordia’s count-speciﬁc allegation that Winder
        made “false or misleading” representations and statements about
        its products by “marketing the products as ‘generics’ that are
        comparable to and/or substitutable for [Concordia’s] DONNATAL,” is
        a textbook example of an injury “[a]rising out of the failure of
        goods, products or services to conform with any statement of quality
        or performance made in [Winder’s] ‘advertisement.’” 11 Thus,
        contrary to the insureds’ argument, Concordia’s allegation that

         Concordia’s allegations also include that “[s]uch false or misleading, or false
        11

        and misleading, statements about the B-Donna or Phenohytro products by
        Drug Databases, pharmacies, insurers and/or other members of the
        pharmaceutical industry have actually deceived or have the tendency to
        deceive a substantial segment of their audience as to the nature, quality, and
        characteristics of the B-Donna or Phenohytro products.”
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        14                      Opinion of the Court              21-11758

        Winder marketed its products as comparable to Concordia’s brand-
        name drug when it was not in fact equivalent falls squarely within
        the “failure to conform” exclusion of the insurance policy. Under
        Georgia law, we must give eﬀect to this exclusion and cannot
        “strain to extend coverage where none was contracted or
        intended.” Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co., 619 S.E.2d at 706.
              The insureds resist our conclusion with the following
        counter-arguments.
               For one, the insureds maintain that Concordia’s complaint
        involved a “personal and advertising injury” because it included
        allegations of label copying. This statement is true. In the section
        of the complaint containing factual allegations, Concordia did
        reference label copying:
             • “Upon information and belief, the labels and package
               inserts for [Winder’s] B-Donna products have been
               copied from the labels and package inserts for
               [Concordia’s]     DONNATAL,          including     the
               ‘Indications and Usage’ section, which claims that the
               product has been reviewed and classified by FDA.”

             • “Upon information and belief, the labels and package
               inserts for [Winder’s] Phenohytro products have also
               been copied from the labels and package inserts for
               [Concordia’s] DONNATAL.”

             • “Upon information and belief, [Winder’s] copying of
               [Concordia’s] drug labels and product inserts was not
               done as part of a submission to the FDA or other
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        21-11758                  Opinion of the Court                              15

               government agency, nor was it permitted or
               contemplated under any legislative provision
               authored by Congress.”
               But these factual allegations provided the foundation for
        some of Concordia’s previously dismissed claims. The only thing
        tying the label-copying allegations to Concordia’s false advertising
        count is that count’s language incorporating by reference “each
        and every allegation contained in the [preceding] paragraphs.” We
        conclude that this tangential connection—fastened through
        boilerplate language—is inconsequential because, as analyzed
        above, the actual count-speciﬁc allegations for the contributory
        false advertising claim centered on Winder’s allegedly false and
        misleading representations about its products. 12
                 Moving forward, the insureds also argue that the “failure to
        conform” exclusion does not apply because Concordia’s false
        advertising claim stems from (1) false advertisements made by non-
        party drug databases (such that Winder is not responsible), and
        (2) true statements about Winder’s products which cannot
        “fail . . . to conform with any statement of quality or
        performance . . . .”

        12
          This discrepancy between the count-specific allegations, on the one hand,
        and the generalized factual allegations that do not actually go toward
        Concordia’s contributory false advertising claim, on the other hand, is the
        reason the district court called the insureds’ argument an attempt to “distort”
        the Fourth Amended Complaint.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 21-11758

               First, we reject the insureds’ argument that the “failure to
        conform” exclusion does not apply because only the third-party
        drug databases—not Winder—made the allegedly false statements.
        Their argument must fail because Concordia clearly alleged that
        Winder’s initial misrepresentations to the drug databases were the
        “but for” cause of its injuries. See Hays v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
        Co., 722 S.E.2d 923, 927 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (“Claims arise out of
        [t]he excluded conduct when but for that conduct, there could be
        no claim against the insured.” (quotations omitted)). Further, the
        allegations of Winder’s initial involvement were necessary to
        Concordia’s contributory false advertising claim, which required a
        showing that Winder “contributed to” the false advertising. See
        Estée Lauder, 797 F.3d at 1277.
               Second, we also reject the insureds’ argument that the
        “failure to conform” provision does not apply because the
        representations Winder made to the drug databases were true. At
        this juncture, our analysis looks only to the allegations in the
        complaint and the terms of the insurance agreement. See Pilz, 599
        S.E.2d at 221 (“An insurer’s duty to defend is determined by
        comparing the allegations of the complaint with the provisions of the
        policy.” (emphasis added and quotation omitted)).                And
        Concordia’s complaint was littered with allegations that Winder
        misrepresented its drugs which in turn caused the drug databases
        to make misrepresentations. Accordingly, Concordia’s allegations
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        21-11758                    Opinion of the Court                                17

        (albeit not yet proven) triggered the “failure to conform”
        exclusion.13
               In the end, after our close comparison of the complaint and
        insurance policies, we conclude that the “failure to conform”
        exclusion applied such that the district court properly determined
        that the insurers did not have an ongoing duty to defend the Fourth
        Amended Complaint.
                B.      Right to Reimbursement
                The duty to defend determination answers only the ﬁrst of
        the two questions presented in this appeal. In other words, we have
        concluded that the insurers no longer have a duty to defend the
        Fourth Amended Complaint, but that does not mean that the
        insurers never had a duty to defend at earlier stages of the case.
        Rather, because insurers under Georgia law have a broad duty to
        defend when there is “even arguably” a covered claim, see St. Paul
        Fire, 498 S.E.2d at 784, the insurers had an active duty to defend up

        13
          Admittedly, we have not addressed the effect of literal truth on a “failure to
        conform” exclusion. We note, however, that the Eighth Circuit has
        considered an argument that an advertisement being “literally true” means
        that the allegations “do not fall within the scope of the failure-to-conform
        provision because they do not make a ‘statement of quality or performance.’”
        Westfield Ins. Co. v. Robinson Outdoors, Inc., 700 F.3d 1172, 1175 (8th Cir. 2012).
        In rejecting this argument, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that, no matter if
        some statements were true, “[t]he underlying lawsuits allege[d] that Robinson
        misled consumers into buying hunting clothing that did not perform as it was
        advertised.” Id. That is, the truthfulness of certain statements was not
        determinative because, in aggregate, the allegations that supported the claim
        were about deceit or misrepresentation.
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                        21-11758

        until the point when the district court ruled otherwise. 14 Simply put,
        under the facts of this case, the insurers were under a duty to
        defend until the district court ruled that they were not.

        14
          The insurers point to two of our cases as well as dicta from a Georgia case
        to argue that the duty to defend either does or does not exist at the time the
        complaint was filed. These cases are not on point. First, in our cases, there
        was unquestionably no duty to defend from the outset so there was never
        “even arguably” a basis for coverage. See Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Miami River
        Port Terminal, LLC, 713 F. App’x 951, 957 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
        (determining that there was “no duty to defend because [d]efendant was never
        covered by the policy” (emphasis added)); Bandy v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 458
        F.2d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1972) (“The insurance policy excludes coverage for
        injury caused by these cranes while being used for loading. Because the
        allegations ‘unambiguously exclude coverage,’ [e]mployers [were] not under
        a duty to defend . . . .”). The logic underlying these cases does not translate to
        this case in which an arguable duty to defend eroded into non-existence as the
        underlying litigation progressed from an initial complaint to a Fourth
        Amended Complaint with different allegations and claims. Additionally, Mt.
        Hawley, 713 F. App’x at 957, is an unpublished case that has no precedential
        value.
                 Similarly, we put little stock in dicta from Georgia Interlocal Risk
        Management Agency v. City of Sandy Springs, 788 S.E.2d 74, 80 (Ga. Ct. App.
        2016). That case dealt with whether an insurer had a right to reimbursement
        of defense costs after it was determined that the insurer had no duty to defend.
        Id. at 79–80. In addressing the reimbursement issue, the Court of Appeals of
        Georgia stated in passing that if the insurer “actually has a right to recoup
        defense costs in this case, then such a right would have existed [at the time the
        complaint was filed],” and because the complaint was filed four years before
        the insurer attempted to reserve its right to reimbursement, its reservation
        was not timely made. Id. at 80. Contrary to the insureds’ argument, the
        court’s statement does not establish that it did not have a duty to defend from
        the initial filing of the complaint. Moreover, the statement is dicta. See
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        21-11758                  Opinion of the Court                            19

               This determination brings us to the second issue on
        appeal—whether, under Georgia law, asserting a right to
        reimbursement in a reservation of rights letter entitles an insurer
        to reimbursement even if the insurance contract did not
        contemplate a right to recoupment. The district court answered
        that question in the negative and held that the insurers had no right
        to seek reimbursement. The insurers argue that this determination
        was erroneous.
                Following the insurers’ line of argument, we break our
        analysis into two questions. First, did the insurers’ reservation of
        rights letters create a new contract? We conclude that a new
        contract was not created and proceed to the second question that
        is novel under Georgia law: Would the Supreme Court of Georgia
        recognize a right to reimbursement absent a contractual right to
        such reimbursement? See Ga. Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Agency v. City of
        Sandy Springs, 788 S.E.2d 74, 79 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (“The issue of
        whether insurers are entitled to recoup defense costs where there
        is no contractual provision creating such a right is an issue of ﬁrst
        impression in Georgia courts, but we need not reach that issue
        here.”). We conclude that it would not and, therefore, aﬃrm the
        district court.

        Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[D]icta is not
        binding on anyone for any purpose.”).
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        20                         Opinion of the Court                       21-11758

                         i. Did the insurers’ reservation of rights letters
                             including a reimbursement provision create a
                             new contract?
               The insurers argue that the insureds implicitly and explicitly
        agreed to the terms of the reservation of rights letters which
        included the reimbursement provision. This argument centers on
        a day-one principle of contract law: consideration. We must decide
        whether the insurers’ reservation of rights letters created a new
        contract—either explicitly (because one of the letters was signed
        by the insureds) or implicitly (because the insureds accepted the
        defense while aware of the letters’ terms). 15
               Express contracts and implied-in-fact contracts are
        exceedingly similar. See Turfgrass Grp., Inc. v. Ga. Cold Storage Co.,
        816 S.E.2d 716, 721 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018). The only diﬀerence is how
        the parties’ will to be bound is shown—either “expressly in some
        form recognized by law” or “by circumstances from which assent
        may be inferred as a conclusion of fact.” Id. (emphasis added). Both
        must meet the standard contract requirements.

        15
           On summary judgment at the district court, the insurers did not contend
        that the reservation of rights letters constituted an express contract. Rather,
        the insurers focused on an implied contract theory. As such, there is support
        for waiving the insurers’ express contract argument that was “raised for the
        first time on appeal,” see Finnegan v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 926 F.3d 1261,
        1271 (11th Cir. 2019), but because it fails for the same reason as their implied
        contract argument (lack of consideration), we do not undertake a waiver
        analysis.
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        21-11758                Opinion of the Court                        21

               “To constitute a valid contract, there must be parties able to
        contract, a consideration moving to the contract, the assent of the
        parties to the terms of the contract, and a subject matter upon
        which the contract can operate.” O.C.G.A. § 13-3-1 (emphasis
        added). There is consideration when “a performance or a return
        promise [is] bargained for by the parties to a contract.” Id. § 13-3-
        42(a). To be “bargained for,” the performance or return promise
        must be “sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and
        [] given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.” Id. § 13-3-
        42(b). Importantly, “a promise to perform a preexisting contractual
        obligation does not constitute consideration for a new agreement.”
        Glisson v. Global Sec. Servs., LLC, 653 S.E.2d 85, 87 (Ga. Ct. App.
        2007); see also, e.g., Codner v. Siegel, 271 S.E.2d 465, 466 (Ga. 1980)
        (discussing the need for “new consideration”).
               The original insurance contracts between the parties
        provided that insurers had the “duty to defend the insured[s]
        against any ‘suit’ seeking [] damages” for “‘personal and advertising
        injury.’” The policies did not expound on the details of the defense.
        For example, the policies did not mention which party would
        choose defense counsel if the insureds were sued.
                In a series of reservation of rights letters that the insurers
        sent to the insureds after Concordia brought the underlying
        litigation, the insurers included terms that were not part of the
        original insurance contract. Critically, the ﬁrst letter speciﬁed that:
        “VFI speciﬁcally reserves its right to seek reimbursement of
        defense costs incurred on [the insureds’] behalf for all claims which
USCA11 Case: 21-11758       Document: 68-1        Date Filed: 07/13/2023        Page: 22 of 30

        22                        Opinion of the Court                    21-11758

        are not potentially covered by the VFI Policy.” 16 These letters also
        included more particulars for the legal defense, including that:
        “[The insurers] will retain defense counsel to represent [the
        insureds] in the Georgia Suit. Alternatively, [the insureds] can
        retain counsel of [their] choice.” Pressman—on behalf of the
        insureds—signed and returned to the insurers an
        “Acknowledgement of Defense under a Reservation of Rights” in
        October 2018.
               For the insurers’ implicit and explicit contract arguments,
        the issue of consideration is dispositive. The insurers argue that
        there was adequate consideration stemming from the reservation
        of rights letters in two ways: (1) the insureds were provided a
        defense and (2) the insureds were able to choose their defense
        counsel. We hold that because the parties’ contracts already
        required the insurers to defend the insureds against certain third-
        party lawsuits, there is no new consideration for the reimbursement
        provision in the reservations of rights letters and thus no new
        contract under Georgia law.
                The insurers’ ﬁrst argument is easy to reject. The
        underlying contract required the insurers to defend the insureds
        against certain third-party lawsuits. The reservation of rights
        letters also provided for such defense. That is, the letters were the
        quintessential “promise to perform a preexisting contractual

        16
          This reimbursement language was also “incorporate[d] [] by reference” in
        the later reservation of rights letters, and the second insurer (Continental)
        eventually claimed the right to seek reimbursement as well.
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        21-11758               Opinion of the Court                       23

        obligation” that “does not constitute consideration for a new
        agreement.” Glisson, 653 S.E.2d at 87; see also Codner, 271 S.E.2d at
        466 (discussing the need for “new consideration”).
               The insurers’ second argument is colorable—but still
        inadequate. The underlying contract did not contemplate which
        party would select legal counsel for the promised defense, but the
        reservation of rights letters gave the insureds the ability to either
        (a) choose their legal representation or (b) have it chosen for them
        by the insurers. Boiled down, the insurers went from having to
        provide a defense (under the underlying contract) to having to
        provide a defense through counsel of their own choosing or
        counsel chosen by the insureds (under the reservation of rights).
        Either way, however, the insurers were obligated to provide a
        defense. In other words, because the insurers did not have the
        explicit right to choose counsel for the insureds under the original
        contract, the insurers did not give anything up to reach the new
        arrangement wherein the insureds have the option of selecting
        their own counsel. As such, there is no consideration under
        Georgia law. See O.C.G.A. § 13-3-42(b).
                         ii. Unjust Enrichment
                Alternatively, the insurers contend that the insureds were
        unjustly enriched because they retained the beneﬁt of an expensive
        defense to which they knew they were not entitled. See Campbell v.
        Ailion, 790 S.E.2d 68, 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (“[A] claim for unjust
        enrichment exists where a plaintiﬀ asserts that the defendant
        induced or encouraged the plaintiﬀ to provide something of value
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        24                          Opinion of the Court                         21-11758

        to the defendant; that the plaintiﬀ provided a beneﬁt to the
        defendant with the expectation that the defendant would be
        responsible for the cost thereof; and that the defendant knew of the
        beneﬁt being bestowed upon it by the plaintiﬀ and either
        aﬃrmatively chose to accept the beneﬁt or failed to reject it.”).
        Assuming the insurers’ unjust enrichment argument does not
        immediately fail due to the existence of a written contract, it
        nonetheless fails on the merits. Cf. Bogard v. Inter-State Assurance Co.,
        589 S.E.2d 317, 319 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he existence of the
        contract between the parties precludes [appellant’s] unjust
        enrichment claim.”). Simply put, there is nothing “unjust” about
        requiring the insurers to fulﬁll their contractual obligations and
        imposing such a requirement would not confer a “windfall” on the
        insureds. 17

        17
          Further, there is no one-sided enrichment here. The insurers benefit from
        fulfilling their contractual obligations and following Georgia insurance law to
        avoid a lawsuit and maintain their reputation, among other things. To borrow
        applicable language from another state’s supreme court: “[W]e cannot say that
        an insured is unjustly enriched when its insurer tenders a defense in order to
        protect its own interests, even if it is later determined that the insurer did not
        owe a defense.” Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co.,
        828 N.E.2d 1092, 1103 (Ill. 2005); see also Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887
        F.2d 1213, 1220 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that, in a similar situation, the insurer
        provided a defense “at least as much for [its] own benefit”). And, while the
        insureds undoubtedly benefit from an expensive legal defense, that benefit is
        precisely the bargain the parties agreed to. There is no reason that the insureds
        should “return” or “compensate for” receiving the benefit of their bargain. See
        Wachovia Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Fallon, 682 S.E.2d 657, 665 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)
        (“Unjust enrichment is an equitable concept and applies when . . . the party
        sought to be charged has been conferred a benefit by the party contending an
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        21-11758                   Opinion of the Court                               25

                           iii. Predicting Georgia Law on Reimbursement
               The ﬁnal question we face is whether, under Georgia law, an
        insurer can recoup defense costs when such a right is provided for
        in a reservation of rights letter but not the parties’ operative
        insurance contract. Georgia courts have not addressed this
        question. 18 See Ga. Interlocal, 788 S.E.2d at 79.
                Without any state court guidance, we attempt to “predict
        state law” without “creat[ing] or modify[ing] it.” Salinero v. Johnson
        & Johnson, 995 F.3d 959, 969 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal citations
        omitted); see Bravo v. United States, 577 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir.
        2009) (per curiam) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
        (1938)). As part of this inquiry, we “consider whatever might lend
        [us] insight, including relevant state precedents, analogous
        decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable

        unjust enrichment which the benefitted party equitably ought to return or
        compensate for.” (emphasis added)).
        18
           Federal district courts applying Georgia law have reached different,
        competing results. We note only in passing that most district courts have held
        that insurers do not have a right to reimbursement in these situations. See,
        e.g., Am. Fam. Ins. Co. v. Almassud, 522 F. Supp. 3d 1263, 1269 (N.D. Ga. 2021)
        (adopting a “no-recoupment default rule” because in cases where the contract
        does not allow for recoupment but the reservation of rights letter inserts such
        a right, “the insurer should not be able to unilaterally alter the terms of an
        insurance policy”). Only one district court has held that insurers do have a
        right to reimbursement. See Ill. Union Ins. Co. v. NRI Constr. Inc., 846 F. Supp.
        2d 1366, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (“A right of reimbursement is justified under
        either an unjust enrichment or implied in fact contract theory.”).
        Nevertheless, these decisions do not bind us.
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        26                        Opinion of the Court                      21-11758

        data tending convincingly to show how the [Supreme Court of
        Georgia] would decide the issue at hand.” SA Palm Beach, LLC v.
        Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 32 F.4th 1347, 1357 (11th Cir.
        2022) (quoting GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Old Cutler Presbyterian
        Church, Inc., 420 F.3d 1317, 1326 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005)). We “presume
        that [state] courts would adopt the majority view on a legal issue
        in the absence of indications to the contrary.” Id. at 1358.
                The duty to defend is extremely broad under Georgia law.19
        See, e.g., Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Khan, 705 S.E.2d 707, 710 (Ga. Ct.
        App. 2011) (“[I]f the facts as alleged in the complaint even arguably
        bring the occurrence within the policy’s coverage, the insurer has a
        duty to defend the action. Indeed, to excuse the duty to defend the
        petition must unambiguously exclude coverage under the
        policy . . . .” (quotation omitted)); St. Paul Fire, 498 S.E.2d at 784.
        An insurer “may be obligated to defend, even though it [may not
        be] ultimately liable for any judgment . . . .” Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v.
        Disabled Am. Veterans, Inc., 490 S.E.2d 374, 376–77 (Ga. 1997); see also
        Elan Pharm. Rsch. Corp. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 144 F.3d 1372, 1375
        (11th Cir. 1998) (“[U]nder Georgia law . . . [a]lthough an insurer
        need not indemnify an insured for a liability the insured incurs

        19
          Under Georgia law, the “duty to defend and the duty to indemnify . . . are
        separate and independent obligations.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Somers,
        591 S.E.2d 430, 433 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (quotation omitted); see also Colonial
        Oil Indus. Inc. v. Underwriters Subscribing to Pol’y Nos. TO31504670 &
        TO31504671, 491 S.E.2d 337, 339 (Ga. 1997). The broad duty to defend is
        “broader than [the insurers’] duty to indemnify.” Shafe v. Am. States Ins. Co.,
        653 S.E.2d 870, 873 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
USCA11 Case: 21-11758      Document: 68-1      Date Filed: 07/13/2023     Page: 27 of 30

        21-11758                Opinion of the Court                        27

        outside the terms of the insurance contract, an insurer must
        provide a defense against any complaint that, if successful, might
        potentially or arguably fall within the policy’s coverage.”).
               As an initial matter, we disagree with the insurers’ argument
        that there is a clear “majority” rule favoring recoupment across the
        nation. See SA Palm Beach, 32 F.4th at 1357 (“We therefore consider
        whatever might lend [us] insight, including . . . analogous
        decisions . . . scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending
        convincingly to show how the [Supreme Court of Georgia] would
        decide the issue at hand.” (quotations omitted)). This description
        of a “majority rule” may have been correct in the past, but it is not
        an accurate depiction of the current case law, which appears to be
        more-or-less in equipoise with the recent trend favoring the “no
        recoupment” rule. See Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Driven Sports, Inc., 80
        F. Supp. 3d 442, 461 n.14 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Although the parties
        dispute which is the majority rule in other jurisdictions, both
        parties referred to an article published by the American Bar
        Association in 2011, noting that ‘[t]here is a fairly even split among
        state and federal courts’ concerning recoupment. However, . . .
        there has been a recent trend toward courts rejecting claims for
        recoupment.” (internal citation omitted)); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v.
        Wallerich, 563 F.3d 707, 715 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he most recent
        decisions reﬂect the [no recoupment] position.” (quotations
        omitted)). The Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance
        conﬁrms this switch in trend:
USCA11 Case: 21-11758      Document: 68-1       Date Filed: 07/13/2023       Page: 28 of 30

        28                       Opinion of the Court                   21-11758

               Over the past few decades, the pro-recoupment cases
               have been viewed as stating the majority position,
               while anti-recoupment cases have been labeled the
               minority. But in recent years, several state courts,
               including several state high courts, have faced
               recoupment of defense costs as an issue of ﬁrst
               impression and have rejected a right of recoupment
               for the insurer, unless that right is established
               expressly by contract.
        Restatement of the Law of Liability Insurance § 21, cmt. a (Am. L.
        Inst. 2019). Jurisdictions not allowing recoupment tend to focus on
        the deleterious eﬀect that such a rule would have on the distinction
        between the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify. See, e.g., Am.
        & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 544 (Pa. 2010)
        (“[P]ermitting reimbursement . . . would amount to a retroactive
        erosion of the broad duty to defend in Pennsylvania by making the
        right and duty to defend contingent upon a court’s determination
        that a complaint alleged covered claims, and would therefore
        narrow Pennsylvania’s long-standing view that the duty to defend
        is broader than the duty to indemnify.”). We are persuaded by the
        recent trend of state high courts holding that there is no right to
        reimbursement in similar cases.
               The most important consideration in our predictive analysis,
        however, is the structure of Georgia’s insurance law. See SA Palm
        Beach, 32 F.4th at 1357 (“We therefore consider whatever might
        lend [us] insight, including relevant state precedents . . . and any
USCA11 Case: 21-11758        Document: 68-1        Date Filed: 07/13/2023        Page: 29 of 30

        21-11758                  Opinion of the Court                              29

        other reliable data . . . .”). The broad duty to defend is
        foundational. See, e.g., Landmark Am., 705 S.E.2d at 710. If we were
        to adopt a rule allowing for broadscale reimbursement without any
        contractual provision securing that right, the duty to defend would
        collapse into the duty to indemnify. That is, if the duty to defend
        required insurers to mount a defense but the defense was widely
        reimbursable upon a court’s determination that no ongoing duty
        to defend exists, the duty to defend would simply become the duty
        to indemnify. Simply put, wide-ranging reimbursement is
        necessarily inappropriate in a system—like Georgia’s—that is
        predicated on a broad duty to defend and a more limited duty to
        indemnify. See Shafe, 653 S.E.2d at 873; Penn-Am., 490 S.E.2d at 376–
        77. We ﬁnd the logic of the “no recoupment” cases that illustrate
        this point persuasive, and we predict that the Supreme Court of
        Georgia would follow that logic to adopt a “no recoupment” rule
        to protect its insurance system. 20 See, e.g., Jerry’s Sport Ctr., 2 A.3d
        at 544.
               We think it clear based on Georgia’s substantive law as well
        as its general insurance framework that the Supreme Court of
        Georgia would not allow an insurer to recoup its expenses based
        on a reservation of rights letter without any contractual provision
        allowing for reimbursement. This position comports with the
        national trend that disfavors recoupment in similar circumstances.

        20
          Because we find that there is no right to reimbursement under Georgia law
        in these situations, we need not address the insureds’ additional argument that
        the insurers did not adequately reserve their rights in the first place.
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        30                     Opinion of the Court               21-11758

        While insurers can certainly contract for a right to reimbursement,
        they cannot do so in a subsequent reservation of rights after a
        reimbursement-less bargain has been struck.
                                IV.    Conclusion
               We aﬃrm both of the district court’s holdings. First, we
        agree that the insurers did not have a duty to defend the insureds
        in the underlying action. To supplement this analysis, we hold that
        the duty to defend was extinguished when the district court’s ruling
        was issued. Second, we agree that the insurers do not have a right
        to reimbursement because the reservation of rights letters did not
        create a new contract, the insurers’ unjust enrichment argument is
        untenable, and we do not believe the Supreme Court of Georgia
        would upend the State’s insurance law framework by establishing
        a right to reimbursement for an insurer who has no contractual
        right to recoupment.
               AFFIRMED.