Court Opinion

ID: 9747521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:19:17.589038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:24.285132
License: Public Domain

Clifford, J.,
concurring and dissenting. The issue before the Court in this case is skewed slightly from the direction of State v. Powers, 72 N. J. 346 (1977), also decided this day. The question there as I saw it was whether the hearsay statements were inculpatory of the declarant in the sense of so far exposing him to criminal liability that but for their truth the declarations would not have been made. My view was that the trial judge’s conclusion that they *343were not so inculpatory represented an unexceptionable exercise of his discretion. Therefore, the occasion was not presented in Powers to take the next step, squarely presented here in view of the obvious inculpatory nature of declarant’s admission that she sold cocaine to the undercover agent. That next step calls for inquiry into whether the exculpatory part of the statement (or separate exculpatory declaration) should be permitted to “tag along” with the inculpatory part under the doctrine of continuing trustworthiness. See, e. g., 5 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1974), § 1465 at 339-43; Model Code of Evidence rule 509(2) (1942).
Under the circumstances of this case I would leave that inquiry with the sound discretion of the trial judge. I therefore concur in Judge Conford’s opinion, which would direct the trial judge to determine admissibility of the statement (s) in keeping with the language and purpose of Evid. R. 63(10).
Justice Schreiber joins in this opinion.