Court Opinion

ID: 9677189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:45:41.392694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:54.427093
License: Public Domain

SEILER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Because of the reference to defendant’s failure to testify, this case was reversed and remanded by the court of appeals, western district, on the authority of State v. Rothaus, 530 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. banc 1975), State v. Cockrum, 592 S.W.2d 300 (Mo.App.1979), and State v. Reed, 583 S.W.2d 531 (Mo.App.1979), none of which are discussed in the principal opinion. The court of appeals then transferred the case here on its own motion, pointing out there is uncertainty and confusion in the cases on the matter of indirect references by the prosecutor to the defendant’s failure to testify. Notably the principal opinion says nothing about this problem. *480The court of appeals stated that over ninety reported cases can readily be cited which involve, in one form or another, arguments of the nature made in the present case and that an inordinate amount of judicial time is consumed in attempting to resolve these issues. The principal opinion ignores the fact that, whether the prosecutor’s comment is characterized as direct or indirect, the only person in a position to contradict the officer’s testimony as to the confession was the defendant himself, who chose to exercise his constitutional right not to testify. That being so, the jury could not have escaped realizing that when the prosecutor argued that the state’s case was “uncontra-dicted” that meant uncontradicted by defendant personally.
The principal opinion justifies the argument made by the prosecutor on the ground that defendant tried to discredit or impeach the officer’s testimony by cross examination. Cross examination is the testing of the witness by questioning — here the police officer. It does not necessarily constitute contradiction of anything. The principal opinion fails to consider whether, when the prosecutor argued the confession was “un-contradicted,” — which means to deny or assert to the contrary — there was anyone other than defendant whom the jury might think could have contradicted the confession. The principal opinion thus does nothing to clear up the confusion which exists in the law on this point.
A simple, fair, easily applied test would be: if there is someone other than defendant who can testify in contradiction, then the prosecutor’s argument about a confession or whatever the evidence may be being “uncontradicted” is not a comment on defendant’s failure to testify. If there is not, then it is. This test would require reversing and remanding the case before us.
By what we are doing, we are again encouraging the use of devious and slick argument by prosecutors, this time on the ground it was only a response to an attack by cross examination. Such an excuse will always be present in a contested criminal trial. We ought to have the courage to put an end to such business.