Court Opinion

ID: 9735815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:31:53.584386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:01.765684
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring: I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the police did not violate defendant’s fourth amendment rights when they asked to see his identification. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority’s decision to apply the same standard to both the driver and the passenger of a lawfully stopped vehicle. The majority improperly applies the Terry rules to a person not suspected of any wrongdoing, and I cannot join in this analysis. The majority is correct that all of the occupants of a car are in one sense seized when the police stop the driver for a traffic violation. A person is seized “when, by means of physical force or a show of authority,” that person’s freedom of movement is restrained. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980). Where the majority errs is in asserting that the driver and occupants are in the same position after the car has been pulled over. The majority implies that because the driver and passenger were both “seized” at the moment that the car was pulled over, they were both thereafter subjected to a full-blown fourth amendment seizure for the entire duration of the stop. No authority is cited for this proposition. The driver had been pulled over because the police observed a traffic violation. The stopping of the passenger was merely incidental to that of the driver. A traffic violation does not afford probable cause to stop a passenger, as it does for the driver. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 47, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886 (1997). The driver was required to submit to the officers’ lawful authority while they conducted the traffic stop and related investigation. People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 520 (1999). This court has not held that passengers may be required to remain for the entire time that the police conduct their investigation of the driver. In People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 416-18 (1998), this court held that, with respect to passengers of a lawfully stopped vehicle, the police may order the passengers out of the car (Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 117 S. Ct. 882) and may also order a passenger who attempts to exit the car to remain briefly at the vehicle. These procedures are allowed because the public interest in officer safety outweighs the potential intrusion to the passenger’s liberty interests. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d at 418. This court specifically declined to hold, however, that the police could detain a passenger for the entire duration of the stop. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d at 418. The United States Supreme Court has likewise left this question open. Wilson, 519 U.S. at 415 n.3, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 48 n.3, 117 S. Ct. at 886 n.3. Obviously, if the driver and passenger were both seized for the entire duration of the stop, as the majority asserts, this would not be an open question. Further, in reaching its holding in Wilson, the United States Supreme Court specifically stated that the passenger’s situation is different from that of the driver: “While there is not the same basis for ordering the passengers out of the car as there is for ordering the driver out, the additional intrusion on the passenger is minimal.” (Emphasis added.) Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414-15, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 48, 117 S. Ct. at 886. The usual test for determining whether a fourth amendment seizure has occurred is whether “if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877. This obviously applies to the driver, who was not free to leave until the police had finished processing the traffic stop. As noted above, however, defendant was not suspected of any wrongdoing. His freedom to leave was restricted not because the police were investigating him for violating the vehicle code but because he was a passenger in a car that had not yet reached its destination. The Supreme Court has held that there is a different test for situations in which the person’s freedom of movement is restricted by a factor independent of police conduct. In these situations, the appropriate test is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 400, Ill S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (1991). In Bostick, the defendant was a passenger on a bus. Two uniformed officers boarded the bus and requested to see the defendant’s ticket and identification. After these items were returned to defendant, the officers asked to search his luggage. The defendant complied, and drugs were found. The United States Supreme Court held that whether defendant was “free to leave” was not the appropriate test: “When police attempt to question a person who is walking down the street or through an airport lobby, it makes sense to inquire whether a reasonable person would feel free to continue walking. But when the person is seated on a bus and has no desire to leave, the degree to which a reasonable person would feel that he or she could leave is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of the encounter.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435-36, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 399, 111 S. Ct. at 2387. See also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201-02, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242, 252, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2111 (2002). The Seventh Circuit recently summarized this line of cases as follows: “Under the fourth amendment, every search or seizure must be ‘reasonable,’ which normally entails some person-specific basis for suspicion. See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000). But the Supreme Court has held repeatedly that police may approach persons and ask questions or seek their permission to search, provided that the officers do not imply that answers or consent are obligatory. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6, 105 S. Ct. 308, 83 L. Ed. 2d 165 (1984); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552-58, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980). These requests are proper without regard to the absence of reasonable suspicion, the Court made clear in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991), because ‘mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.’ As a result, Taw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen.’ Ibid., quoting from Royer, 460 U.S. at 497, 103 S. Ct. 1319. See also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991) (defining ‘seizure’ as ‘taking possession,’ a category that does not comprise questioning); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989) (‘A “seizure” triggering the Fourth Amendment’s protections occurs only when government actors have, “by means of physical force or show of authority, ... in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen” ’) (quoting from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). Most of these decisions concern questions asked of persons not under arrest (though often as a practical matter not free to walk away, see Bostick and Delgado)." United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2002). I would hold that the rule stated in the above cases applies to a passenger in a car that has been stopped because of a traffic violation. Thus, the proper test is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the encounter. Here, the majority properly notes that the officer’s request for defendant’s identification was facially innocuous and was done in a nonthreatening manner. The officer did not demand to see the identification or convey the impression that defendant was required to comply. The encounter remained consensual and therefore defendant’s fourth amendment rights were not violated. Curiously, this seems to be the same test that the majority follows, although it initially purports to be doing something else. First, as noted above, the majority gets off on the wrong foot by assuming that the initial “seizure” by the police thereafter subjected both the driver and the passenger to a fourth amendment seizure for the entire duration of the traffic stop. Then, instead of applying the Bostick test, the majority holds that the proper test for questioning a passenger is found in the partial concurrence and partial dissent to a Tenth Circuit opinion that involved questioning of a driver. See United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 2001) (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This test looks first to whether the question was related to the initial purpose for the stop or whether there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. If the questioning is not related to the initial purpose of the stop and there is no suspicion of criminal activity, the next inquiry is whether the question prolonged the duration of the stop or changed the fundamental nature of the stop. Once it comes time to apply this test, however, the majority seems to rely on the consensual nature of the encounter. The majority notes that the questioning was nonthreatening and that defendant would have felt free to decline the request. Thus, it appears that the majority is actually applying Bostick rather than the Holt partial concurrence and partial dissent. The lower courts and the police will find the majority’s rule difficult to follow because the majority does not explain what type of questioning would change the fundamental nature of the stop. All we know from the majority opinion is that interrogating a passenger about his identity does not change the fundamental nature of an investigation of a driver for a license plate violation. More explanation is required here. Because in this case the passenger’s identity was in no way relevant to defendant’s violation of the vehicle code, in future cases it will be difficult for the lower courts to determine what does and does not change the fundamental nature of a stop. The majority has created this problem by improperly holding that questioning of the passenger must be viewed as part of the investigation of the driver. In sum, I agree that the police did not violate defendant’s fourth amendment rights by asking him for his identification. I would reach that result, however, by applying the test set forth in Bostick. The majority improperly holds that the questioning of the passenger was restricted by the rules governing the stop of the driver, and thus I cannot join its opinion. JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this special concurrence.