Court Opinion

ID: 9947843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 19:03:33.224822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:37.992231
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/5/24 P. v. Cooper CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085004
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF103655A)
                    v.

 COYETTA LYNN COOPER,                                                                     OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Michael G. Bush,
Judge.

         Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A.
Martinez and Joseph Penney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

         *Before Levy, Acting P. J., Peña, J. and Snauffer, J.
                                     INTRODUCTION
       In 2004, defendant Coyetta Lynn Cooper pleaded no contest to second degree
murder (§ 187, count 1). After the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), defendant filed a Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now
§ 1172.6) petition for resentencing. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.) The court denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause. Defendant
previously challenged the denial of her petition and we reversed the court’s order and
remanded for further proceedings. Thereafter, the court issued an order to show cause
and held an evidentiary hearing after which it again denied defendant’s petition,
concluding she was the actual killer.
       Defendant now appeals from the order denying her petition after the evidentiary
hearing. She argues insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding she was the
actual killer.
       We affirm the court’s order denying defendant’s petition.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Charge and Plea
       In September 2003, a complaint was filed against defendant alleging she
committed first degree murder (§ 187, count 1) on or about August 4, 2003; assault of a
child under the age of eight by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury that
resulted in the death of the child on or about August 4, 2003 (§ 273ab; count 2), and
felony child endangerment between January 1, 2003, and May 9, 2003 (§ 273a, subd. (a);
count 3). Defendant’s husband, Keithen Cooper, was also alleged to have committed
felony child endangerment as alleged in count 3.1

       1In October 2003, a separate complaint was filed against Keithen Cooper and defendant
(No. 104170) alleging Keithen Cooper committed an aggravated sexual assault on a child under
14, on or about and between October 22, 1993, and December 31, 1998 (§ 269, subd. (a)(3);
count 1) and aggravated assault on a child under 14, on or about and between October 22, 1993,
and December 31, 1998 (§ 269, subd. (a)(4); count 2) with multiple prior conviction

                                              2.
       In 2004, following an amendment to the complaint, defendant pleaded no contest
to second degree murder (§ 187; count 1) and the remaining charges were dismissed.2
She was sentenced to 15 years to life imprisonment.
Presentence Probation Report
       The presentence probation report submitted to the court included a summary of the
circumstances of the offense taken from a report completed by the Kern County Sheriff’s
Department, which stated in part:

               “On August 4, 2003, at approximately 6:40 a.m., the victim … age
       1, was taken to Kern Medical Center for medical treatment by his caretaker,
       the defendant, Coyetta Cooper. [The victim] was possibly dead upon
       arrival at the hospital and medical staff noted there was apparent trauma to
       his abdomen and rectum. At that time homicide proceedings were initiated.

              “Upon their arrival at the hospital, detectives first made contact with
       Coroner Investigator Madelaine Kaiser. Kaiser informed the detectives [the
       victim] had several visible injuries on his body and his anus appeared to
       have trauma and human tissue was visible in his diaper.”
       According to the probation report, defendant reported to police she was the
victim’s caretaker; she also cared for his four other siblings. She informed officers she
had bathed the victim the night before his death and he did not act like he was hurt.
Defendant “was insistent she never saw any injuries on the victim and she never saw any
blood.” She stated the morning of the victim’s death, she told him to get up. He replied
“‘Okay Momma’” and then he laid down and stopped breathing all of a sudden.
Defendant reported she began screaming and her neighbor ran over to defendant’s

enhancement allegations (a strike prior and four prison prior allegations). It was also alleged
Keithen Cooper engaged in substantial sexual conduct with multiple children under the age of 14
(§ 288.5, subd. (a); counts 3, 4, 5 & 6) and that Keithen Cooper and defendant committed a lewd
or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 on our about and between July 1, 1994, and
December 31, 2000 (§ 288, subd. (a); count 7) with multiple related prior conviction allegations.
Defendant was also alleged to have committed a lewd or lascivious act upon another child under
the age of 14 on our about and between January 1, 1995, and December 31, 2000 (count 8) and
felony child endangerment (§ 273a; count 9).
       2Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw her plea. The request was denied.

                                               3.
apartment. Defendant and the neighbor got in the car to take the victim to the hospital;
but they first went looking for defendant’s husband, Keithen Cooper. They located
Keithen, and he drove them to the hospital.
       Defendant denied she or Keithen hurt the victim. She further clarified Keithen had
not seen any of the children in three days. She stated she did not know how this could
have happened, and denied ever seeing Keithen molest any of the children in her care.
She reported her apartment was secure and no one could have gotten into her residence
and harmed the victim. “[S]he informed officers she understood [the victim]’s death
occurred during her watch, but she did not cause his injuries intentionally or accidentally
and she was not covering up for anyone either. She informed the officers she never
crossed the line of child abuse while disciplining any of the children and she would cry
often afterwards if she did have to discipline the children.”
       The probation report also stated the officer contacted the neighbor and Keithen
Cooper. The neighbor denied ever seeing defendant or Keithen abuse the children.
Keithen informed the police he was not currently living in the home. He denied
defendant would hurt the victim. He also denied that any of the other children would
have hurt the victim; Keithen stated, “‘I don’t know what happened. Just strange.’”3
       The probation report further noted, “[d]uring the course of the investigation
regarding the death of [the victim], the defendant and her husband, Keithen Cooper, were
also being investigated regarding possible molest of several children who resided in their
home beginning in 1993 to the present day.” Keithen was subsequently arrested and
booked into the Kern County jail. The defendant was also arrested for molesting children
and failing to prevent the abuse of a child at the hands of her husband.

       3According to the probation report, “officers arranged to conduct computer voice stress
analysis interviews with Keithen and [defendant]. Throughout the interview, Keithen and
[defendant] denied any involvement in causing the blunt force trauma which had killed [the
victim]. The voice stress analysis indicated deception on the answers to the relevant questions
by both Keithen and [defendant].”

                                               4.
Petition for Resentencing
       In 2019, defendant submitted a petition for resentencing pursuant to former section
1170.95 (now § 1172.6). She checked boxes stating she pleaded guilty or no contest to
first or second degree murder in lieu of going to trial because she believed she could have
been convicted of first or second degree murder pursuant to the felony-murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine and that she was convicted of second degree
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or second degree felony
murder doctrine and could no longer be convicted of murder because of changes to
section 188, effective January 1, 2019. She also checked a box requesting she be
appointed counsel during the resentencing process.
       In the People’s opposition to the petition, they derived their statement of facts
“primarily from the pre-sentence [probation] report.” They argued those facts established
defendant was the actual killer and, accordingly, she had failed to meet her burden of
making a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief. They also argued defendant could
not have been prosecuted under the felony-murder rule because felony child
endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a)) or an assault crime such as that charged pursuant to
section 273ab could not form the basis for a prosecution for felony murder.
       The court appointed defendant counsel who filed a reply to the People’s
opposition brief. Defendant’s reply brief also included a statement of facts containing
many of the facts included in the factual summary in the probation report. Defendant
acknowledged she “was the only person charged with the murder of [the victim].”
However, she argued “the theory relied upon for her murder conviction is not necessarily
clear as [she] did not proceed to preliminary hearing and the facts ascertained within the
police reports and probation report do not clearly establish that [she] directly caused the
injuries to [the victim].” And, given defendant’s husband’s history of molestation—
including forced anal penetration—it could be argued he injured the victim during an act
of molestation that resulted in the victim’s death. Accordingly, defendant could have

                                             5.
been prosecuted as the actual killer or as an aider and abettor of her husband under the
natural and probable consequences theory.
       After the parties submitted briefing, the court denied the petition without issuing
an order to show cause or holding an evidentiary hearing. Our court reversed the court’s
order on the grounds the record of conviction did not conclusively establish defendant
was categorically ineligible for relief. Accordingly, we remanded the matter to the court
with instructions for it to issue an order to show cause and to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Evidentiary Hearing
       Thereafter, the court held an evidentiary hearing during which retired officer
Bryan Armendariz and forensic pathologist Dr. Eugene Carpenter Jr. testified on behalf
of the prosecution. The prosecution also submitted documentary evidence including
excerpts from the transcript from defendant’s parole hearing “relevant to her being the
actual killer,” specifically defendant’s testimony that she was the victim’s sole caregiver;
she fell on the victim the night before his death when going to the bathroom; he did not
look good in the morning; she was not sure he was alive when they arrived at the
hospital; and Keithen had been kicked out of the house three days before the victim’s
death. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the parole hearing transcript without
stating a basis for the objection. The court noted recent case law concluding statements
made at a parole hearing are admissible in evidentiary hearings and held the offered
excerpts were admissible.
       Officer Armendariz testified he spoke with defendant on August 4, 2003, in
relation to the death of the victim, a one-year-old child. Defendant told him she was
watching the victim along with other children for her friend Margo and she had been the
de facto mother of the victim. Defendant told Armendariz, the night before the victim’s
death, she was alone at home with the victim and a six-month-old child; there was no
other person present. She stated, the victim had a good dinner and was fine that night.
She gave him a bath and then put him down to sleep on a “pallet” on the floor in the

                                             6.
living room. In the morning, she got up around 7:00 a.m. and told the victim it was time
to get up. He said, “‘Okay, mama,’” but then was unresponsive all of a sudden. It scared
defendant, so she screamed and her neighbor came running over because she heard her.
Defendant did not call 911; she stated she thought she could get the victim to the hospital
quicker than waiting for an ambulance. They got in the car and went looking for
defendant’s husband, Keithen, and then went to the hospital after picking Keithen up.
Defendant told Officer Armendariz that Keithen had not been at her house in three days;
she had kicked him out that Friday. When asked what happened to the victim, defendant
reported that “he had been born a drug baby.” She also told Armendariz that other
individuals or adults had been in and out of her house over the three-day period before
the victim’s death. In an interview on August 30, 2003, defendant reported an individual
named Gloria Ragsdale was at her house on August 1st and 2d, 2003, and alone with the
children for a period of time while defendant got her car battery changed. Defendant
reported to Armendariz that she was responsible for the victim’s death in that “it occurred
on her watch,” but she did not inflict the injuries. She did not report who inflicted the
injuries or give any explanation as to how the victim incurred them.
       Dr. Carpenter testified he reviewed the report from the pathologist who conducted
the autopsy on the victim—who was one year and ten months old at the time of his
death—and a diagram of the victim’s injuries; Dr. Carpenter prepared his own diagrams
of the injuries, including the described bruises to the victim’s diaphragm at the central
upper abdomen and pancreatic injuries with a resultant hemorrhage into the abdominal
space. He explained as a result of the injuries, the victim would have suffered chemical
burns created by leaking pancreatic enzymes from the torn pancreas. He opined the
victim died from blunt abdominal trauma, a type of injury that causes rapid shock but not
immediate death. He explained, “this is a severe lethal injury and there is a continuity
between the injury and … death.” A child with such injuries would be “obviously
dying.” That is, “[i]mmediately after and between the time of injury and the time of

                                             7.
death, the child is not going to appear normal.” Rather, “[t]here is no lucid interval such
as the child appearing normal and playing and then collapsing later from this type of
injury.” He explained, it is “extremely difficult” to determine the age of a bruise based
on its color so he could not verify when the bruise on the victim’s abdomen occurred;
“the best that one can say is that it occurred within two days of the death.” The defense
did not present any evidence.
       Following the presentation of evidence and argument the court denied defendant’s
petition. It reasoned: “Obviously, [the victim] was a victim of a homicide. There’s no
question about that. The question is who did it. In the facts presented to the Court today,
the defendant admitted she was the care giver, she took the young boy to the hospital, she
was the only one with him during the night in question…. [T]here’s no evidence to point
fingers at anybody other than she. She was the actual killer. Therefore, the petition is
denied.”
Parole Hearing Transcript
       At the July 21, 2017, parole hearing, in explaining what happened to the victim,
defendant stated: “All I know, he was asleep, and I was going to the bathroom. The …
house is dark, and I fell on him, but then … I went to the bathroom, came back, and I
asked him was he okay. He said he was okay so I went back to bed. When I got up that
morning, he didn’t look good,” so she called her friend, they got in the car, they picked
up Keithen, defendant’s husband, and went to the hospital where they told her the child
had died. She explained the victim was sleeping on a pallet on the floor when she tripped
over him at around 4:00 a.m. She stated she was “320-something pounds.” The child
had fallen asleep while watching television and was “in the middle of the way.”
Defendant stated she understood the child died of blunt force trauma to his abdomen and
what happened to him was her “fault.” She denied ever hitting the child, stating she was
“pretty sure [she] would have killed him if [she] hit him, but [she] never hit them.” She
explained she had kicked her husband Keithen out because he was on drugs and she

                                             8.
could not handle it. She kicked him out numerous times, including three days before the
victim’s death. She stated she did not see Keithen in those three days before the victim’s
death and he did not come to her apartment during that time. She testified she did not
know if Keithen ever hit the child, but he did discipline the children by spanking them
with a belt or putting them in a corner. When asked about trauma to the victim’s rectum,
defendant denied ever inserting anything into his rectum or knowing what happened to
him despite being his sole caregiver. She denied molesting another child in her care but
stated she did not know if her husband did.
                                         DISCUSSION
       Defendant challenges the denial of her petition for resentencing, asserting
insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion she was the actual killer. We
disagree and affirm the court’s order.
I.     Senate Bill 1437 and Senate Bill No. 775
       On September 30, 2018, the Governor signed Senate Bill 1437, which became
effective on January 1, 2019. Senate Bill 1437 “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) It amended
section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder
to address felony-murder liability. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2–3.)
       Accordingly, section 188 now provides that, “[e]xcept as stated in subdivision (e)
of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with
malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) The change reflects the

                                              9.
Legislature’s intent that “[a] person’s culpability for murder must be premised upon that
person’s own actions and subjective mens rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).)
       Additionally, former section 189 previously stated, “All murder … which is
committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking,
robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable under
Section 206, 286, 288, 288a, or 289, or any murder which is perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the
vehicle with the intent to inflict death, is murder of the first degree.” Senate Bill 1437
amended section 189, in part, by adding subdivision (e), which provides:

       “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony
       listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if
       one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer.
       [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill,
       aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or
       assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
       [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and
       acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision
       (d) of Section 190.2.”
       The legislation also added section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95), which provides a
procedure by which defendants whose cases are final can seek retroactive relief if the
changes in the law would affect their previously sustained convictions. (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 4.) Initially, this section permitted those “convicted of felony murder or murder
under a natural and probable consequences theory [to] file a petition with the court that
sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be
resentenced on any remaining counts ….” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, subd. (a).) In
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature
amended the language of section 1172.6 to clarify and expand the scope of the petitioning
procedure to defendants convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a now
prohibited theory.

                                             10.
       Pursuant to amended section 1172.6, upon receiving a petition, if the petitioner has
requested counsel, the court must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3).) “After the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court
shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) If the petitioner has made such a showing entitling relief,
the court “shall issue an order to show cause.” (Ibid.) “Within 60 days after the order to
show cause has issued, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and to recall the sentence and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner
had not previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater
than the initial sentence.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At the hearing, the burden of proof is
on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by the changes to section
188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The admission of
evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court
may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible
under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters
judicially noticed. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “The prosecutor and the petitioner may also
offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (Ibid.) If, at the
hearing, the prosecution fails to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is
guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by the changes to
section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, “the prior conviction, and any
allegations and enhancement attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the
petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.)

                                             11.
II.     Sufficient Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Finding Defendant Was the
        Actual Killer
        Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion she was the actual killer. We disagree.
        A.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law
        On appeal from a denial of relief following an evidentiary hearing under section
1172.6, subdivision (d), we review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial
evidence. (See People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298; accord, People v.
Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393, 412.) Under that familiar standard, “‘we review the
entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt’” under section 188 as amended. (People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88;
Clements, supra, at p. 298.) To that end, we presume the existence of every fact the court
as factfinder could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the court’s order.
(See People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 626.)
        “‘“Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the
crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”’” (People v Stanley (1995) 10
Cal.4th 764, 793.) “‘“An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the jury
might have drawn from the evidence even if the court would have concluded otherwise.
[Citation.]”’” (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 811–812.) “When as here, the
trier of fact has relied on inferences, those inferences must be reasonable. An inference is
not reasonable if it is based only on speculation.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619,
669.)
        B.     Analysis
        Defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion she was the actual killer. She argues there was no evidence of motive and she

                                             12.
never admitted striking the child. She asserts, if she had committed the crime, the parole
hearing was the place to admit it but she failed to do so, suggesting “she was at least not
the perpetrator of the killing blow.” She also contends there were several people around
the house in the days leading up to the victim’s death, and any of them could have struck
the child. The People respond substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding and
defendant merely urges us to reweigh the evidence and make an alternative credibility
determination. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
defendant was the actual killer and, thus, ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6
(former § 1170.95).
       Here, the trial court had before it evidence that defendant was the victim’s sole
caretaker; she was the only person with access to the victim the day before his death and
potentially for numerous days before. The testimony from the pathologist supported a
conclusion the victim’s fatal injury was inflicted near in time to when the child was
brought into the hospital. There was also evidence defendant reported the victim was
acting normally the night before his death, though the pathologist explained a child with
the type of injuries the victim sustained would not be acting “normally” but rather
“obviously dying” from the time the injuries were inflicted until his death. Defendant
also initially denied having any involvement in the victim’s death or injuries, but years
later admitted she was “responsible” for the child’s death and that she fell on him. There
was also evidence, upon finding the victim unconscious, defendant did not call 911 and
she delayed taking him to the hospital because she was looking for her husband.
       On this record, we cannot conclude “‘“it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’”’” the trial court’s finding
that defendant was the actual killer. (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.)
Rather, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, as we
must, we conclude the court could reasonably infer that defendant was the victim’s actual
killer based upon the circumstantial evidence connecting her to the crime. There was

                                             13.
evidence defendant was the victim’s sole caretaker and the only adult with the child the
day if not days before his death; she failed to immediately seek medical assistance when
finding him unresponsive; the fatal injury was inflicted near in time to the victim’s death
when he was in defendant’s care and custody; he died of catastrophic injuries and he
would have been “obviously dying” following their infliction; defendant admitted
responsibility for his death and asserted in the parole hearing she fell on him; and there
was evidence from which the court could conclude defendant was untruthful when
speaking with the police after the victim’s death in that she stated the child was acting
“normally” the morning of his death and that she had no idea what caused his injuries
though she stated in later inconsistent statements that she was “responsible” for his death
and she fell on the victim at night. (See People v. Jones (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 420, 444
[affirming defendant’s second degree murder of a child conviction, concluding “it is
reasonably inferable that [defendant], who ‘had virtually sole possession and custody of
that child’ and ‘showed a consciousness of guilt,’ caused [the child’s] injuries” where
severe injuries inflicted during period child was in defendant’s primary care and
defendant failed to take child to doctor or call 911]; People v. Wyatt (2010) 48 Cal.4th
776, 784–785 [substantial evidence supported finding defendant committed child abuse
homicide where defendant was child’s caretaker; his own statements established he
struck child; and expert testimony established a child with the sustained injuries would be
expected to react by crying and not be laughing and smiling]; accord, People v. Bloyd
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 347 [noting contradictory statements to police demonstrate
consciousness of guilt]; see generally People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87 [in
determining whether conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, reviewing court must
accept all logical inferences that could be drawn from circumstantial evidence]; In re
James D. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 810, 813 [substantial evidence includes circumstantial
evidence and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom].) Indeed, there was no
evidence anyone else was involved in the victim’s death. (See generally People v.

                                            14.
DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 43 [evidence another person “had some ‘remote’
connection to the victim or crime scene[] is not sufficient to raise the requisite reasonable
doubt”].) And, contrary to defendant’s contention, evidence of motive was not required
to establish intent to kill. (People v Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741.) Rather, the
evidence supported a conclusion defendant was the actual killer, and malice was not
imputed to defendant such that she could no longer be convicted based upon the changes
in the law. Notably, because the circumstances reasonably justify the court’s findings,
“‘reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.] A reviewing court neither
reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness’s credibility. [Citation.]’” (People v. Wyatt,
supra, at p. 781.) Rather, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s
conclusion and the court did not err in denying defendant’s petition on the stated basis.
       We reject defendant’s sole contention.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

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