Court Opinion

ID: 9927245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 16:09:57.28441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:11.064376
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Krista Rogers                      :
                                   :
              v.                   : No. 161 C.D. 2023
                                   : Argued: December 6, 2023
Lycoming County Board of           :
Commissioners, Tony Mussare,       :
Scott Metzger, and Rick Mirabito,  :
                                   :
                        Appellants :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
             HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
             HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                        FILED: January 26, 2024

             The Lycoming County (County) Board of Commissioners, and
Commissioners Tony Mussare, Scott Metzger, and Rick Mirabito (collectively,
Commissioners) appeal the order of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas
(trial court) denying their motions for post-trial relief and entering judgment in favor
of Krista Rogers (Controller) on her Complaint seeking declaratory relief. We
affirm.
                                                 I.
               On April 10, 2021, the Commissioners initiated an action against the
Controller based on their dissatisfaction with the performance of some of her duties.
On July 10, 2021, the trial court dismissed the case, and the Commissioners did not
appeal the trial court’s order.
               On April 13, 2021, the Commissioners and the County’s Salary Board
also took action to return the responsibility for payroll, accounts payable, and general
ledger functions to the County’s Office of Budget and Finance (Finance Office,
formerly named the Fiscal Office). This included the reassignment of the employees
whose positions were responsible for performing the payroll, accounts payable, and
general ledger functions from the Controller’s Office to the Finance Office.1

       1
         At the September 22, 2022 hearing, the parties stipulated that the testimony of
Commissioners’ witness Brandy Clemens, the Director of the County’s Finance Office, “exactly”
described how the Controller’s Office and the Finance Office performed their respective functions.
See Tr. 9/22/22 at 80:25-81:1-10. The trial court summarized Clemens’ relevant testimony as
follows:

               Clemens testified that the actual accounts payable work is done in the
               Finance Office; the Controller is kept apprised routinely and has the
               power to act as a “check[] and balance[],” but is not involved in most
               of the processes involved with the day-to-day tasks required to
               perform the accounts payable. [Tr. 9/22/22] at 19:23. Clemens
               further affirmed that the Controller has unfettered access to the
               financial system used by the Finance Office to perform the accounts
               payable as well as the payroll and general ledger. Id. at 20:12-25.
               Additionally, the Controller has the ability to change who has access
               to the fiscal system. Id. at 21:1-4.

                      Clemens additionally testified that the payroll process is
               presently done in the [Finance] Office and explained in detail how the
               payroll function works.       Id. at 21:18-20; 21:18-26:3.           The
               Commissioners’ attorney summed the process up well: “So just so
               we’re clear, [the Finance Office] prepare[s] the [payroll] edit, the edit
(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                                 2
              goes to the Controller . . . the Controller’s Office gets to check that,
              [and] nothing is moved forward until that occurs.” Id. at 26:8-11.
              [Clemens] further testifie[d] that the payroll function uses the same
              financial system as the accounts payable function, which allows the
              Controller to view the payroll information and [Finance] Office’s
              payroll reports. Id. at 26:21-5.

                      Regarding the general ledger function, Clemens testified that
              “currently all of the general ledger is maintained and all of the work
              pertaining to it is done in our office.” Id. at 27:14-6. Clemens also
              confirms that the Controller has the “ability to review, change,
              modify, question, delete, [and] alter any general ledger entry,” as well
              as monitor who is making general ledger entries using the financial
              system. Id. at 28:17-24. The Controller does not have custody of the
              General Ledger documents. Id. at 34:11-12. Clemens further
              impliedly confirmed that the general ledger function is not performed
              in the Controller’s Office. Id. at 34:16-22. The Controller would not
              have access to the physical ledger documents unless the Finance
              Office [was] to grant it to her. Id. at 34:25-35:4; [b]ut see [i]d. at
              38:20-22 (the [Finance] Office has never denied the Controller access
              to any information).

                       The fiscal system used to perform all three of these functions
              is a software that has been used by the County for more than 20 years.
              Id. at 29:11-5. The Controller has full access to the fiscal system as
              granted by the [Information Technology (IT)] department[,] which is
              ultimately supervised by the Commissioners. Id. at 31:25-32:14. The
              County has a “core financial group” who has ultimate authority as to
              how the financial functions are processed; the Controller does not
              have the authority to change the way the financial functions are
              processed unilaterally. Id. at 32:14-34:2; but see [i]d. at 38:2-5
              (explaining that the reason the financial function processes can only
              be changed through cooperation within the core financial group is to
              account for the budget). The [c]ore [f]inancial group includes the
              Commissioners as well as the Controller. Id. at 33:5-7.

Trial Ct. 1/25/23 Opinion and Order at 2-3.

                                                3
                On December 10, 2021, the Controller filed the instant Complaint under
the Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA),2 seeking a declaration that “the Controller’s
statutory powers entitle and require her to be responsible for the general ledger,
payroll, and accounts payable functions (financial functions) of the Lycoming
County Government . . . and further declare that the Commissioners illegally
transferred the employees from the Controller’s office in violation of [T]he County
Code.”3 Complaint at 14.4 On February 11, 2022, the Commissioners filed an
Answer with New Matter denying all of the material allegations raised therein. On
March 1, 2022, the Controller filed a Reply to the New Matter.
                On July 5, 2022, the trial court filed an order entering judgment on the
pleadings in the Controller’s favor. However, on July 15, 2022, the Commissioners
filed post-trial motions requesting discovery and an evidentiary hearing. As a result,
on July 26, 2022, the trial court issued an order vacating its prior order, and issued
an August 16, 2022 order scheduling a hearing on September 22, 2022. Following
the hearing, the parties filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
                Ultimately, on December 1, 2022, the trial court entered an Opinion and
Order: (1) granting judgment in the Controller’s favor and against the
Commissioners; (2) determining “that the actions of the Commissioners in removing
responsibility, functions, and personnel from the Controller’s [O]ffice violated [T]he
County Code[]”; (3) directing the Commissioners to “forthwith return all ledgers,

       2
           42 Pa. C.S. §§7531-7541.

       3
           Act of August 9, 1955, P.L. 323, as amended, 16 P.S. §§101-3000.3903.

       4
          The Complaint also sought preliminary injunctive relief as well as any other relief that
the trial court deemed “just” under the circumstances including the award of attorney fees.
However, the Controller withdrew the request for injunctive relief at the hearing before the trial
court.
                                                4
accounts, payroll[,] and all related documentation to the Controller, and facilitate the
return of her employees to her office, all of the same being necessary for the
Controller to perform her statutory duties[]”; (4) denying “[a]ny injunctive relief” as
moot; and (5) awarding the Controller “the costs of suit.” Trial Ct. 12/1/22 Opinion
and Order at 8. On December 9, 2022, the Commissioners filed post-trial motions
preserving the claims raised in this appeal.
              On January 25, 2023, following a hearing, the trial court filed an
Opinion and Order denying the post-trial motions in which it explained, in relevant
part:

                    In this [c]ourt’s December 1, 2022 [O]pinion and
              [O]rder, this [c]ourt decided the statutory responsibilities
              of the Controller and the Commissioners of Lycoming
              County. This [c]ourt laid out the specific responsibilities
              of each party as set forth under the relevant statutes as
              follows:

                      The [County Code] carves out separate
                      powers related to the fiscal affairs of the
                      [C]ounty to both the Commissioners and
                      Controller. [Section] 1701[5] assigns the
                      Commissioners as the managers and
                      administrators of the fiscal affairs of the
                      [C]ounty while [Section] 1702(b) enables the
                      Commissioners to organize an audit to
                      supplement the official acts of the Controller.
                      On the other hand, [Section] 1702(a) assigns
                      the responsibility for supervision of the fiscal
                      affairs of the [C]ounty, including supervision
                      of employees related to the fiscal affairs of

        5
         16 P.S. §1701. Section 1701 states: “The county commissioners shall be the responsible
managers and administrators of the fiscal affairs of their respective counties in accordance with
the provisions of this act and other applicable law.”

                                               5
                      the [C]ounty to the Controller.[6 Section]
                      1705[7] requires the Controller to select and

     6
         Section 1702(a)-(b) states:

               (a)(1) Subject to the power and duty of the county commissioners
               to manage and administer the fiscal affairs of the county, the
               controller shall supervise the fiscal affairs of the county including
               the related accounts and official acts of all officers or other persons
               who shall collect, receive, hold or disburse, or be charged with the
               management or custody of, the public assets of the county. The
               discretionary powers of the controller shall be applicable to matters
               or official acts involving the accounts and transactions of officers or
               other persons of the county including those indicated in [S]ection
               1705. The discretionary policies of the controller shall not be
               applicable to the establishment and adoption of the fiscal policies of
               the county commissioners.

               (2) The controller may only refuse to authorize any fiscal transaction
               which is, by law, subject to his or her supervision or control where
               it appears that such transaction is not authorized by law, or has not
               been undertaken according to law, or has not received approval
               according to law, or as to which the controller desires upon
               reasonable grounds to investigate for or has already discovered any
               fraud, flagrant abuse of public office or any criminal act or neglect
               of any officer or other person of the county relating to their public
               accounts and transactions. The controller may at any time require
               from any such officers or other persons, in writing, an account of all
               assets which may have come into their control. Immediately, on the
               discovery of any default or delinquency, the controller shall report
               the same to the commissioners and to the district attorney of the
               county for such prosecution as may be warranted and shall take
               immediate measures to secure the public assets.

               (b) Pursuant to subsection (a), the county commissioners, for the
               purpose of meeting Federal or State requirements, may issue a
               request for proposals for and contract with an independent certified
               public accountant or employ a public accountant for the purpose of
               preparing or conducting a report or audit of the fiscal affairs of the
               county, independent of and/or in addition to, that conducted by the
               county controller or auditors. The controller shall be afforded an
               opportunity to comment on the request for proposals prior to
(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                                 6
                        administer the form and manner of
                        maintaining financial records connected with
                        the fiscal affairs of the [C]ounty.

                [Trial Ct. 12/1/22 Opinion and] Order at 4. Here[,] there
                are sufficient stipulated facts to show that [Section]
                1702(a) and [Section] 1705 of [T]he County Code are
                being violated in Lycoming County. The fiscal affairs of
                the [C]ounty and the supervision of employees related to
                the fiscal affairs of the [C]ounty are currently being
                performed in the [Finance] Office–not by the Controller.
                Further, the Controller does not have complete control
                over, nor administers the form and ma[nn]er of

                issuance and the contract prior to execution. The contracts shall
                supplement, but not replace, the official acts and audits of the
                controller.

16 P.S. §1702(a)-(b).

       7
           16 P.S. §1705. Section 1705 states:

                The controller shall maintain a full and regular set of financial
                records, including the general ledger, in electronic form or
                otherwise, which support financial statements in accordance with
                generally accepted accounting principles of all the fiscal operations
                of the county, embracing as many accounts, under appropriate titles,
                as may be necessary to meet Federal and State reporting
                requirements and to show distinctly and separately all the property
                of the county, its revenue and expenditures, and all debts and
                accounts due by the county officers or others, and the amount raised
                from each source of revenue, and the expenditures in detail, and
                classified by reference to the objects thereof. The controller shall
                select and administer the form and manner of maintaining the
                official financial records in connection with the fiscal affairs of
                the county. Where the controller prescribes a change in the form
                and manner of maintaining the official financial records, any
                costs necessary for implementation shall be subject to the approval
                of the county commissioners. In counties without a controller, the
                requirements of this section shall be fulfilled by the office of the
                county commissioners.

(Emphasis added.)
                                                 7
               maintaining financial records connected with the fiscal
               affairs of the [C]ounty. Id. Regardless of the reason, the
               Controller does not have the power to unilaterally change
               the fiscal software used by the [C]ounty to perform the
               financial functions. Id. To change (i.e., select) the form
               and ma[nn]er of maintaining financial records, the
               Controller must petition the core financial group to decide
               as to whether such a change would be made, and the core
               financial group would have to cooperatively decide to do
               so. Id. Further, the level of access that the Controller has
               to the fiscal system is determined by the IT department,
               which is ultimately supervised by the Commissioners. Id.
Trial Ct. 1/25/23 Opinion and Order at 5.8 The Commissioners then filed the instant
appeal of the trial court’s order.

       8
         In its December 1, 2022 Opinion and Order, the trial court also addressed the application
of Sections 1620 and 1750 of The County Code, explaining:

               The salaries and benefits of employees are determined by the
               Commissioners[,] but “[t]he exercise of such responsibilities by the
               county [c]ommissioners shall in no way affect the hiring,
               discharging and supervising rights and obligations with respect to
               such employes as may be vested in the judges or other county
               officers.” 16 P.S. §1620. Except in counties where there is no
               Controller, [the] Controller is responsible for claims and demands
               against the county. 16 P.S. §1750.

Trial Ct. 12/1/22 Opinion and Order at 4.

       In turn, in relevant part, Section 1750 of The County Code provides:

               The controller or the county commissioners in counties having no
               controller shall scrutinize, audit and decide on all bills, claims and
               demands whatsoever against the county, except such as are
               otherwise provided for in this subdivision. All persons having such
               claims shall first present the claims to the controller or to the county
               commissioners and, if required, make oath or affirmation before the
               controller or commissioners to the correctness of the claims. The
               controller or the commissioners, as the case may be, may require
               evidence, by oath or affirmation, of the claimant and otherwise that
(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                                  8
                                                   II.
                On appeal,9 the Commissioners assert: (1) the trial court erred in
awarding declaratory relief to the Controller, despite her failure to sustain her burden
of proving the presence of an actual controversy based on the stipulated facts alone,
and in failing to evaluate all of the facts as presented; (2) the trial court erred in its
interpretation of the statutory scheme under The County Code that requires the
Controller to exclusively perform the payroll, accounts payable, and general ledger
functions for the County, and in concluding, by implication, that the Commissioners
have no authority to control those functions or employees; (3) the trial court erred in
prohibiting discovery as required by Section 7539(a) of the DJA when the issues that
they raised were not solely conclusions of law;10 and (4) the trial court erred and
abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of the Controller’s expert, Michael

                the claim is legally due and that the supplies or services for which
                payment is claimed have been furnished or performed under legal
                authority.

16 P.S. §1750 (emphasis added). Likewise, Section 1751(a) of The County Code states, in
pertinent part, that “in counties having a controller, the controller shall date, upon receipt, all bills,
claims and demands which the controller approves, and shall forward the bills, claims or demands
along with checks therefor to the county commissioners for their approval.” 16 P.S. §1751(a)
(emphasis added).

        9
         When reviewing the trial court’s denial of the Commissioners’ post-trial motions, our
review is limited to determining whether that court abused its discretion or committed an error of
law. Linder v. City of Chester, 78 A.3d 694, 696 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (citation omitted). “An
abuse of discretion occurs if, in reaching a conclusion, the law is overridden or misapplied, or the
judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable or is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill
will.” Luzerne County Children & Youth Services v. Department of Human Services, 203 A.3d
396, 398 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citation omitted).

        10
           42 Pa. C.S. §7539(a). Section 7539(a) states: “(a) General rule.--Relief may be granted
under this subchapter notwithstanding the fact that the purpose or effect of the proceeding, in whole
or in part, is to resolve or determine a question of fact.”
                                                    9
Clapsadl, and denying the Commissioners the opportunity to conduct pretrial
discovery.11

                                              III.
               The Commissioners first claim that the trial court erred in awarding
declaratory relief to the Controller because she did not meet her burden of proving
the existence of an actual case or controversy, and because the relief is based solely
on the erroneously recounted “stipulated” facts. Specifically, the Commissioners
assert that the Controller failed to demonstrate an actual case or controversy
warranting the grant of relief because she did not demonstrate any alleged invasion
of a legal right that she purports to have under The County Code, and the facts, to
the extent that they are “stipulated,” fail to support any purported infringement upon
her purported authority under that statute.
               However, as pointed out by the Controller, this argument is based on
the Commissioners’ limited reading of the relevant sections of The County Code and
their assertion that these provisions do not confer the authority asserted by the
Controller in the Complaint. See Brief for Appellee at 13 (“[T]he Commissioners
apparently contend that their role as managers and administrators [under Section
1701 of The County Code] grants them authority to completely usurp the
independently-elected Controller of her supervisory responsibilities on a whim.
However, as the trial court noted, management and administration is distinct from
supervision, and to accept [the Commissioners’] interpretation would require this

       11
           To the extent that the Commissioners assert claims that are not fairly comprised in the
Statement of Questions Involved portion of their appellate brief, those claims have been waived
for purposes of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated
in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”).
                                               10
Court to ignore the full language of Section 1702, as well as other Controller-specific
sections such as Sections 1705 and 1750.”) (footnote omitted).
             As this Court has explained:

                     Petitions for declaratory judgments are governed by
             the provisions of the [DJA]. Although the [DJA] is to be
             liberally construed, one limitation on a court’s ability to
             issue a declaratory judgment is that the issues involved
             must be ripe for judicial determination, meaning that there
             must be the presence of an actual case or controversy.
             Thus, the [DJA] requires a petition praying for declaratory
             relief to state an actual controversy between the petitioner
             and the named respondent.

                    Declaratory judgments are not obtainable as a
             matter of right. Rather, whether a court should exercise
             jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment proceeding is a
             matter of sound judicial discretion. Thus, the granting of
             a petition for a declaratory judgment is a matter lying
             within the sound discretion of a court of original
             jurisdiction. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
             stated:

                    The presence of antagonistic claims
                    indicating imminent and inevitable litigation
                    coupled with a clear manifestation that the
                    declaration sought will be of practical help in
                    ending the controversy are essential to the
                    granting of relief by way of declaratory
                    judgment. . . .

                          Only where there is a real controversy
                    may a party obtain a declaratory judgment.

                          A declaratory judgment must not be
                    employed to determine rights in anticipation
                    of events which may never occur or for
                    consideration of moot cases or as a medium
                    for the rendition of an advisory opinion
                    which may prove to be purely academic.

                                          11
Brouillette v. Wolf, 213 A.3d 341, 357-58 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citations omitted).
             Moreover, as we have observed:

              Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial
             verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the trial
             court are supported by [substantial] evidence and whether
             the trial court committed error in any application of the
             law. The findings of fact of the trial judge must be given
             the same weight and effect on appeal as the verdict of a
             jury. We consider the evidence in a light most favorable
             to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court only
             if its findings of fact are not supported by [substantial]
             evidence in the record or if its findings are premised on an
             error of law. However, [where] the issue . . . concerns a
             question of law, our scope of review is plenary.
Newman & Co., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 249 A.3d 1240, 1244 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2021) (citation omitted).
             The Commissioners’ allegations of error in this regard are based solely
on their preferred version of the facts underlying this matter and their preferred
interpretation of the relevant provisions of The County Code. Contrary to the
Commissioners’ assertions, such claims do not establish the absence of an actual
case or controversy precluding the grant of declaratory relief but, rather, demonstrate
such a case or controversy is currently extant. Our review reveals that the facts
underlying the trial court’s order in this matter are amply supported by substantial
evidence of record, and the trial court’s interpretation of The County Code is not
erroneous. In short, the Commissioners’ claims in this regard are without merit and
do not compel reversal of the trial court’s order in this case.

                                          IV.
             The Commissioners next claim that the trial court erred in its
interpretation of the statutory scheme relating to the Controller’s authority under The
                                          12
County Code in granting the requested declaratory relief.            Specifically, the
Commissioners contend that the trial court erred in discounting their authority under
Section 1701, and over emphasizing the Controller’s powers under the remaining
provision of The County Code, in determining that they acted beyond their authority
in moving the payroll, accounts payable, and general ledger functions and employees
from the Controller’s Office to the Finance Office.
             However, the Commissioners overlook that the Controller is as much a
constitutional county officer as are they. See article IX, section 4 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, Pa. Const. art. IX, §4 (“County officers shall consist of
commissioners, controllers or auditors, district attorneys, public defenders,
treasurers, sheriffs, registers of wills, recorders of deeds, prothonotaries, clerks of
the courts, and such others as may from time to time be provided by law.”) (emphasis
added).
             Indeed, as this Court has previously acknowledged:

             These county offices provided for in [a]rticle IX, [s]ection
             4 have unique constitutional standing, aptly described as
             follows:

                    With minor exceptions[,] county row offices
                    have constitutionally protected status. They
                    cannot, for example, be locally or even
                    legislatively abolished.         They were
                    established not by the legislature, but by the
                    Pennsylvania Constitution . . . .         One
                    manifestation of this constitutional status is
                    that their offices cannot be abolished. See
                    Lloyd v. Smith, [35 A. 199, 201 (Pa. 1896)].
                    Section 1620 of [T]he County Code is written
                    with the purpose and result of acknowledging
                    and protecting the constitutional status of
                    these officers.

                                          13
Dauphin County Commissioners v. Teamsters Local No. 776, 34 A.3d 864, 869 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Lloyd, 35 A. at 201 (“The only tenable
construction of [the predecessor to article IX, section 4] is that the county auditor is
a constitutional officer only in the alternative, and that, so far as the office is
concerned, it may be abolished at any time by the legislature, provided that the
constitutional alternate, a county controller, is put in the place.”); Pennsylvania State
Association of Jury Commissioners v. Commonwealth, 74 A.3d 333, 340 (Pa.
Cmwlth.), aff’d, 78 A.3d 1020 (Pa. 2013) (“Unlike the county row offices
enumerated in [a]rticle IX, [s]ection 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the elected
office of jury commissioner is neither one of rule-making by our Pennsylvania
Supreme Court nor one enumerated in and thus afforded special protection under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.”).
                 As recounted above, Sections 1702, 1705, 1750, and 1751 of The
County Code confer specific powers upon the Controller that cannot be impaired or
contravened by the general supervisory authority conferred upon the Commissioners
by Section 1701.           Any other construction of The County Code would be
unconstitutional under article IX, section 4 as beyond the General Assembly’s
authority.12 Moreover, under Section 1933 of the Statutory Construction Act of
1972,13 it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where a general

       12
           See, e.g., Section 1922(2) and (3) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C.S.
§1922(2) and (3) (“In ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a
statute the following presumptions, among others, may be used: . . . (2) That the General Assembly
intends the entire statute to be effective and certain[; and] (3) That the General Assembly does not
intend to violate the Constitution . . . of this Commonwealth.”).

       13
            1 Pa. C.S. §1933. Section 1933 states:

(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                                14
statutory provision is in conflict with a special provision, the special provision
controls as an exception to the general.
               In fact, the Controller’s duties in this regard have been summarized as
follows:

                      Next to the commissioners[,] the controller is
               probably the most important official concerned with
               county financial administration. In financial control per
               se, [s]he is probably the most important. It is h[er]
               responsibility to supervise the accounts of all county
               officers who deal with public moneys. In addition to
               annually auditing, adjusting and settling their accounts, the
               controller authorizes all fiscal transactions. At any time
               [s]he can require officers to account for all public money
               and property under their jurisdiction. It is in h[er] power
               to investigate for fraud or any flagrant abuse of public
               money, and [s]he reports any such abuse of the public trust
               to the county commissioners and the district attorney with
               h[er] approbation of legal proceedings to be instituted
               against the officer involved.

                     The controller is the official bookkeeper for the
               county. [Sh]e keeps a regular set of double entry books of

               Whenever a general provision in a statute shall be in conflict with a
               special provision in the same or another statute, the two shall be
               construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both. If the
               conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable, the special
               provisions shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the
               general provision, unless the general provision shall be enacted
               later, and it shall be the manifest intention of the General Assembly
               that such general provision shall prevail.

Thus, the general provision, can only trump the specific if the general was enacted at a later date
and it is “the manifest intention of the General Assembly that such general provision shall prevail.”
Id. Here, Sections 1701, 1702, 1705, 1750, and 1751 of The County Code were all enacted at the
same time in 1955, and although Section 1701 has not been subsequently amended, Sections 1702,
1705, 1750, and 1751 have all been amended, most recently in 2018. Furthermore, there is no
“manifest intention of the General Assembly” that Section 1701 “shall prevail” over the provisions
of Sections 1702, 1705, 1750, and 1751.
                                                15
               all fiscal transactions of the county and prescribes the
               manner in which all books and forms dealing with county
               fiscal affairs should be designed and maintained. From
               h[er] records [s]he prepares and submits a monthly report
               to the commissioners depicting the financial condition of
               the county and the current status of the budget
               appropriation accounts. . . . Annually, [s]he prepares a
               comprehensive report of the financial status of the county
               as per the end of the year detailing the revenues and
               expenses for the year. This financial report is submitted
               to the court of common pleas . . . and the public.[14] The

       14
          See Section 1720(a) and (b) of The County Code, 16 P.S. §1720(a) and (b), which states,
in relevant part:

               (a) The controller . . . shall, at the end of each fiscal year, complete
               the audit, settlement and adjustment of the accounts of all county
               officers. The controller . . . shall, before the first day of July in every
               year, make a report, verified by oath or affirmation, to the county
               court of common pleas, unless upon due cause shown the court shall
               grant an extension of time, of all receipts and expenditures of the
               county for the preceding year, in detail, and classified by reference
               to the object thereof, together with a full statement of the financial
               conditions of the county.

               (b) Within ten days after making a report to the court of common
               pleas, notice that the report is available for public inspection shall
               be published one time in at least one newspaper of general
               circulation in the county as the controller . . . may direct and shall
               be posted on the official publicly accessible Internet website of the
               county, but the aggregate cost of newspaper publication shall not
               exceed fifteen hundred dollars ($1500) in any one year in any
               county, to be paid for out of the county treasury. The entire report,
               which shall include a concise summary, shall be available for public
               inspection in the office of the controller . . . during regular business
               hours and on the official publicly accessible Internet website of the
               county.

See also Section 1703 of The County Code, 16 P.S. §1703 (“The controller shall furnish the
commissioners of the county, whenever required by them, a detailed account of any officer or other
person having in that individual’s possession or under that individual’s control funds belonging to
the county, and shall, during regular office hours, give information respecting any of said accounts
(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                                  16
                controller is also required to give information about the
                fiscal affairs of the county to any citizen desiring such
                information.

                      The controller may be said to perform both a pre-
                audit and a post-audit. [Sh]e performs the pre-audit
                through a daily check on purchases, through daily reports
                from the treasurer as to the status of all county funds and
                through monthly reports from all fee officers. [Sh]e
                performs the post-audit by virtue of h[er] authority to audit
                the books of any county office at any time.

                       The function of pre-audit, as will be pointed out
                below, is a most important one indeed. Here the controller
                scrutinizes, checks the status of appropriations and decides
                on the propriety of all bills, claims and other demands
                brought against the county. If [s]he approves the
                expenditure, [s]he draws and certifies vouchers for
                payment; if [s]he disapproves, [s]he sends a notice to the
                county commissioners stating the reasons for h[er]
                disapproval. H[er] disapproval can only be overridden by
                a court order obtained by the commissioners.[15] There is

to any taxpayer of the county demanding the same.”); id. (“The controller shall have power and
authority to require each and every county officer to make a quarterly statement with respect to
moneys in the officer’s possession or control as a county officer, showing the amount of cash on
hand and the amount deposited in banks, banking institutions and trust companies, together with
the names of such institutions.”); Section 1730(a) of The County Code, 16 P.S. §1730(a) (“The
reports of the controller . . .shall be filed among the records of the court of common pleas of the
county.”).

       15
            See Section 1752 of The County Code, 16 P.S. §1752, which provides:

                 If, upon receipt, the controller does not approve a claim, bill or
                demand, the controller shall within fifteen days forward it to the
                county commissioners together with notice that the controller has
                disapproved the claim, bill or demand or is unable to approve the
                same and the reasons therefor. The county commissioners shall
                consider the claim, bill or demand and, if they consider that it should
                be paid by the county, they shall so notify the controller. If the
                controller thereafter continues to refuse approval no payment shall
                be made thereon by the county except pursuant to an order of court
(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                                 17
                  no similar pre-audit control in counties which do not have
                  a controller.

                                                  ***

                         The post-auditing duties of the controller include
                  not only the audit of county moneys but also all taxes,
                  penalties, fines, costs, etc., collected by the county
                  treasurer and belonging to any of the county’s political
                  subdivisions.[16] The controller has custody of the county’s
                  titles to real estate, contracts, paid bonds and
                  obligations . . . .[17] Finally, the controller also audits the
                  accounts of parole and probation officers who receive any
                  moneys paid under the sentence, order or judgment of any
                  court, reporting the audit to that court.[18] To facilitate the

                  upon a proper issue thereto directing the controller to approve
                  payment.

        16
             See supra note 12.

        17
             See Section 1704 of The County Code, 16 P.S. §1704, which states:

                   The controller shall have custody of and retain in original or other
                  acceptable form, as provided in the most recent edition of the
                  County Records Manual issued for the County Records Committee
                  by the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, all title
                  deeds to real estate owned by the county, and all executed contracts
                  entered into by or on behalf of the county, and all records relating to
                  its financial affairs, and all bonds and other obligations issued by the
                  county, when paid. Such bonds and other obligations, when so paid,
                  shall be monitored by the controller, a ledger of which shall be
                  maintained by . . . her in a book or an electronic file dedicated for
                  that purpose and retained according to the most recent edition of the
                  County Records Manual.

        18
           See Section 1720.1(a)(1) of The County Code, added by the Act of October 24, 2018,
P.L. 931, 16 P.S. §1720.1(a)(1) (“It shall be the duty of the controller . . . to audit, settle and adjust
the accounts of . . . [e]very parole and probation officer, appointed by the court under law, who
shall receive from any person money paid under any order, sentence or judgment of any court, and
to report the results of the audits to the court which has appointed the officer.”).
                                                    18
               performance of h[er] duties, the controller may appoint a
               deputy, clerks and a solicitor.[19]
Dr. John Wesley Cook, Fiscal Administration in Pennsylvania Counties 17-19
(1966).
               Likewise, in this case, the trial court summarized the interplay between
the relevant provisions of The County Code as follows:

                      The [C]ounty [C]ode carves out separate powers
               related to the fiscal affairs of the [C]ounty to both the
               Commissioners and the Controller. [Section] 1701 assigns
               the Commissioners as the managers and administrators of
               the fiscal affairs of the [C]ounty while [Section] 1702(b)
               enables the Commissioners to organize an audit to
               supplement the official acts of the Controller. On the other
               hand, [Section] 1702(a) assigns the responsibility for
               supervision of the fiscal affairs of the [C]ounty, including
               supervision of employees related to the fiscal affairs of the
               [C]ounty to the Controller. [Section] 1705 requires the
               Controller to select and administer the form and manner of
               maintaining financial records connected with the fiscal
               affairs of the [C]ounty.

                      Sections 1701 and 1702(a) are not in conflict and,
               as statutorily required, the court reads them in harmony.
               [Section] 1701 assigns the Commissioners as the general
               managers and administrators of the fiscal affairs of the
               [C]ounty whereas [Section] 1702(a) assigns responsibility
               for the supervision of the fiscal affairs of the [C]ounty.
               This [c]ourt must presume that the legislature selected
               different language for these consecutive provisions
               purposely. It follows that the separate offices have
               separate roles in overseeing those affairs. This reading is
               reinforced by the limiting language “[] in accordance with
               the provisions of this act and other applicable laws,” in
               [Section] 1701. The legislature clearly intended for

       19
            See Section 603(a) of The County Code, 16 P.S. §603(a) (“The controller in counties of
the second class A, third, fourth and fifth classes shall appoint a deputy controller and clerks, and
in counties of the sixth, seventh and eighth classes may appoint a deputy controller and
clerks . . . .”) (emphasis added).
                                                19
            [Section] 1702(a), among other provisions, to limit the
            authority granted to the Commissioners in [Section] 1701.
            The broadly worded [Section] 1701 must be read in the
            context of other sections of [T]he [County C]ode,
            including those relating to an elected [C]ounty Controller.
            Why else would the legislature provide a mechanism for
            the Commissioners to audit the fiscal affairs of the
            [C]ounty and include specific language stating that the
            audit supplements but does not replace the official acts and
            audits of the Controller? If [Section] 1701 truly provided
            broad discretion of the fiscal affairs of the [C]ounty, [T]he
            [County C]ode would not need to provide permission for
            the Commissioners to act in a manner [in which] they are
            already entitled to act. The legislature narrowed the scope
            of the authority it provided the Commissioners to
            undermine the Controller under [Section] 1702(b) by
            specifying that the Commissioners may “supplement but
            not replace” the acts of the Controller.

                   In simple terms, the interplay between [Section]
            1702(a) and [Section] 1701 places the responsibility for
            supervision of the fiscal affairs of the [C]ounty with the
            Controller and gives agency to the Commissioners to act
            as a check to ensure, generally, that the fiscal affairs of the
            [C]ounty are being managed adequately.                     The
            Commissioners are the general overseers of the fiscal
            affairs of the [C]ounty, whereas the Controller is the
            supervisor who controls the everyday management of
            those affairs, including its employees. This reading is
            consistent with [the] statutory construction canon
            requiring the court to read separate provisions in harmony
            and to give precedence to the specific provision over the
            general provision. [Section] 1750 for example, delegates
            everyday management of a specific aspect of fiscal affairs
            to the Commissioners only in the absence of a Controller.
            This is similarly consistent with [Section] 1705 which
            gives authority to the Controller to select and administer
            the form and manner of maintaining the official financial
            records of the [C]ounty.
Trial Ct. 12/1/22 Opinion and Order at 4-5 (emphasis in original).

                                          20
              As exhaustively outlined above, the trial court properly analyzed the
provisions of The County Code outlining the respective roles of the Commissioners
and the Controller with respect to the Commissioners’ removal of the payroll,
accounts payable, and general ledger functions and employees from the Controller’s
Office to the Finance Office. Thus, contrary to the Commissioners’ assertions, the
trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting the requested declaratory
relief based on the Commissioners’ improper and unauthorized actions in this regard.

                                              V.
              The Commissioners next claim that the trial court erred in prohibiting
discovery as required by Section 7539(a) the DJA. Specifically, the Commissioners
submit that because there are disputed material facts, “those issues must be
determined as in other civil actions.” Regis Insurance Company v. All American
Rathskeller, Inc., 976 A.2d 1157, 1162 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing Section 7539 of the
DJA).
              However, the Commissioners are reading Section 7539(a) of the DJA
too broadly.20 Indeed, as the trial court noted, this Court has observed:

                     The respondent further argues that because certain
              factual allegations in the petition for review are disputed[,]
              a declaratory judgment is not a proper remedy. Our
              Supreme Court has held, however, that the mere existence
              of a factual question does not divest a court of discretion
              in permitting a declaratory judgment action and that even
              if the dispute is wholly a factual one[,] an action is not

        20
          Discovery matters are within the discretion of the trial court and the appellate court
employs an abuse of discretion standard of review. Luszczynski v. Bradley, 729 A.2d 83, 87 (Pa.
Super. 1999). Because challenges to discovery orders do not raise factual questions but, rather,
legal questions, our scope of review is plenary. In re Hasay, 686 A.2d 809, 812 (Pa. 1996).
                                              21
             necessarily precluded. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
             S.G.S. Co., [318 A.2d 906, 909 (Pa. 1974)].
Delaware Valley Apartment House Owner’s Association v. Department of Revenue,
389 A.2d 234, 238 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978).
             Herein, although there are disputed facts relating to whether the
Controller can perform her required duties under The County Code, the thrust of the
Commissioners’ argument is based on their misapplication of the various grants of
authority under The County Code. As outlined above, the trial court properly
analyzed the respective powers delegated under the relevant provisions of The
County Code, and it is undisputed that the Commissioners moved the payroll,
accounts payable, and general ledger functions and employees from the Controller’s
Office to the Finance Office. Because the trial court could properly dispose of the
Controller’s Complaint as a matter of law in spite of any purported factual conflicts,
that court did not err in prohibiting discovery under Section 7539(a) of the DJA and
the Commissioners’ claim to the contrary is without merit.

                                         VI.
             Finally, the Commissioners claim that the trial court erred and abused
its discretion in permitting the testimony of the Controller’s expert, Michael
Clapsadl, and denying the Commissioners the opportunity to conduct pretrial
discovery. Specifically, the Commissioners argue that his testimony improperly
relates to the ultimate issue; constitutes conclusions of law; addresses issues
irrelevant to the ultimate disposition of this case; and could not be properly
impeached based on the trial court’s refusal to permit pretrial discovery.
             However, as the trial court explained:

                                         22
                   When the Controller called Mr. Clapsadl, the parties
            and the [c]ourt had a discussion where the Commissioners
            objected to Mr. Clapsadl’s testimony, and the [c]ourt made
            it clear that the issue presented is one of statutory
            construction. [Tr. 9/22/22] at 56:5-67:17. The Controller
            asserted that she wanted to offer Mr. Clapsadl’s testimony
            to rebut the Commissioners’ witness’ testimony that the
            Controller is presently able to perform her statutory
            functions. Id. at 59:16-21. This [c]ourt limited Mr.
            Clapsadl’s testimony to whether the Controller can
            perform the functions of her office under the present
            circumstances. Id. at 63:5-10.

                  Because this [c]ourt only allowed Mr. Clapsadl’s
            testimony as to whether the Controller can perform the
            functions of her office, Mr. Clapsadl’s testimony neither
            went to the ultimate issue nor constituted legal
            conclusions. The testimony was relevant to the issues
            before the court in that it rebutted the Commissioners’
            witness’ testimony and that Mr. Clapsadl testified as to
            whether, in his opinion, the Controller is currently able to
            perform the functions of her office.

                   While it is true that the Commissioner[s] did not
            have the opportunity to engage in discovery of Mr.
            Clapsadl prior to the September hearing, this [c]ourt did
            not abuse it discretion is allowing Mr. Clapsadl to testify
            because, as the Commissioners candidly concede[d]
            during the January hearing, this [c]ourt did not need nor
            rely on Mr. Clapsadl’s testimony to make its decision. As
            discussed, ad nauseum above, all of this [c]ourt’s
            decisions in its December Opinion [and Order] were
            grounded in the stipulated facts. Mr. Clapsadl’s testimony
            did not move the needle as to the ultimate determination
            whatsoever. Therefore, the [Commissioners] were not
            harmed or prejudiced by the [c]ourt’s ruling allowing Mr.
            Clapsadl’s testimony.
Trial Ct. 1/25/23 Opinion and Order at 11-12.
            In addition, as noted by the trial court:

                                         23
                    It is well[]established that the admissibility of
             evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, and such
             rulings will not form the basis for appellate relief absent
             an abuse of discretion. Thus, [we] may reverse an
             evidentiary ruling only upon a showing that the trial court
             abused that discretion. A determination that a trial court
             abused its discretion in making an evidentiary ruling may
             not be made merely because an appellate court might have
             reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of
             manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias,
             or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly
             erroneous. Further, discretion is abused when the law is
             either overridden or misapplied.
Commonwealth v. Hoover, 107 A.3d 723, 729 (Pa. 2014) (citations, ellipses, and
quotation marks omitted).
             Moreover, because the trial court explicitly explained that it did not rely
on this testimony in resolving the ultimate issues in this case, any purported error in
this regard is harmless. As a result, even if it is assumed that the Commissioners are
correct in this regard, the trial court’s order granting the Controller relief should not
be disturbed on this basis. See, e.g., Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board
of Dorrance Township, 987 A.2d 1243, 1251 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (“[T]he trial
court’s reference to [a case stating the incorrect burden of proof] in its original
opinion was harmless error since the trial court affirmed the [board’s] decision that
applied the appropriate burden of proof, and the error had no effect on the outcome
of this case.”); Campbell v. Department of Environmental Resources, 396 A.2d 870,
870 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979) (“It is axiomatic that we will not disturb a judgment, order,
or decree on appeal for harmless error. Paley v. Trautman, [177 A. 819, 820 (Pa.
1935).]”). In sum, even if the Commissioners’ allegation of error in this regard is
correct, it cannot provide a basis for the requested appellate relief.

                                           24
Accordingly, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

                          MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

                            25
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Krista Rogers                      :
                                   :
              v.                   : No. 161 C.D. 2023
                                   :
Lycoming County Board of           :
Commissioners, Tony Mussare,       :
Scott Metzger, and Rick Mirabito,  :
                                   :
                        Appellants :

                                 ORDER

            AND NOW, this 26th day of January, 2024, the order of the Lycoming
County Court of Common Pleas dated January 25, 2023, is AFFIRMED.

                                    __________________________________
                                    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge