Court Opinion

ID: 9905525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:11:09.979776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:40.228486
License: Public Domain

J-A17035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: R.C.A., JR.                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: R.C.A., JR.                       :      No. 1850 EDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Decree Entered June 20, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
                     Orphans' Court at No(s): 0452-2021-O

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2023

       Appellant, R.C.A., Jr., appeals from the decree entered in the Delaware

County Court of Common Pleas Orphans’ Court, which granted the petition for

payment of counsel fees filed by Appellee, J. Michael Considine, Jr. We affirm.

       The Orphans’ Court opinion set forth the relevant facts and procedural

history of this appeal as follows:

          On September 15, 2021, Douglas Oakford, Executor of the
          Estate of [M.A.] (“Decedent”), filed a petition to adjudicate
          [Appellant] incapacitated and to appoint a plenary
          guardian.[1] [Appellant] is the son of Decedent. Decedent
          passed away on September 9, 2020. At the time of
          Decedent’s death, she owned a residence located at 1608
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 “The court, upon petition and hearing and upon the presentation of clear and

convincing evidence, may find a person domiciled in the Commonwealth to be
incapacitated and appoint a guardian or guardians of his person or estate.”
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5511(a).
J-A17035-23

       Winton Avenue in Havertown, PA 19038 (“the Property”).
       According to Decedent’s will, her home was to be sold six
       months after her death and the proceeds were to go into a
       trust for Appellant’s benefit. Mr. Oakford was also the
       trustee of the testamentary trust created for the benefit of
       Appellant.

       During his entire life and after Decedent’s death, Appellant
       resided in the Property. According to the guardianship
       petition, Appellant was refusing to leave the Property,
       refusing to grant access to anyone, including professional
       social workers, and refusing to cooperate in the process of
       selling the home and relocating. Appellant was also in a
       living situation that appeared to involve extreme hoarding
       over decades. [Appellee] was initially retained on April 13,
       2021 by Appellant to represent him in the matter involving
       his mother’s estate. The guardianship petition stated that
       [Appellee] was retained to establish a logical distribution of
       the inheritance and to relocate Appellant into a new
       financially sound home using the inheritance funds.
       [Appellee] attempted to work with Appellant, despite his
       refusal to cooperate, and in doing so, [Appellee] became
       concerned for his welfare and that he would be susceptible
       to financial exploitation.    During his representation of
       Appellant, [Appellee] suggested that Appellant be examined
       by an expert to see if a guardian of his person and/or estate
       would be necessary. The guardianship petition was then
       filed by the executor of the estate on September 15, 2021,
       and a hearing on the petition was scheduled for October 25,
       2021.     In addition, a guardian ad litem (“GAL”), Ms.
       Jacquelyn Goffney, was appointed on behalf of Appellant on
       October 19, 2021. GAL Goffney and the executor’s attorney
       have acknowledged that there was a need for Appellant to
       vacate the Property.

       Attorney James Cunilio entered his appearance on October
       20, 2021 for representation of Appellant in the guardianship
       matter and filed an answer to the guardianship petition on
       October 22, 2021. A continuance request of the October
       25th court date was granted for the parties to have additional
       time in working out the matter and due to an alleged dispute
       over whether [Appellee] was in fact discharged from further
       representation of Appellant. Appellant signed a letter dated
       November 18, 2021 to be sent to [Appellee] to discharge

                                   -2-
J-A17035-23

          him from his duties, as Appellant’s attorney. [Appellee]
          denied that he received said letter.2 [Appellee] filed an
          answer to the guardianship petition on November 22, 2021,
          on the same date as the second hearing, and agreed to do
          no further work. At the hearing held on November 22, 2021,
          GAL Goffney confirmed that Appellant has selected who he
          wants to be his attorney and has released other counsel.

          On April 26, 2022, [Appellee] filed a petition for counsel fees
          in the guardianship matter. Monthly invoices were included
          as exhibits to his petition for counsel fees in which he
          calculated his attorney’s fees and costs to total $6,384.99.[3]
          A hearing was held on June 20, 2022 to address the petition
          for counsel fees. Upon review, the Orphans’ Court properly
          concluded that the fees and costs incurred up until
          [Appellee] learned that he was discharged as Appellant’s
          attorney were reasonable and the award of $6,202.03 was
          equitable.[4]

          When [Appellee] was asked by the court why he believes he
          should be paid for legal fees pursuant to the retainer
          agreement, he stated the following:

              I tried to represent this client’s best interest. We did
              many things at his house to try to get him to
              cooperate with the will. He wouldn’t do it. We
              brought in a social worker. There is over $200,000
              [in an] account that he had a right to. He wanted me
              to do bills. He wanted me to do a lot of things. I did
____________________________________________

2 The record on appeal includes a copy of the letter, as well as an affidavit of

service from Attorney Cunilio’s legal assistant. In the affidavit, the legal
assistant stated that she sent the letter to Appellee via first class mail and
email. Nevertheless, we observe that Appellee’s physical and email addresses
set forth in the affidavit and letter do not match the addresses for Appellee on
this Court’s docket.

3 On May 23, 2022, the executor of Decedent’s estate withdrew the petition

to adjudicate Appellant incapacitated and appoint a plenary guardian.

4 As discussed infra, the court reduced the total amount of counsel fees to
ensure that Appellee was compensated only for work done prior to his
discharge.

                                           -3-
J-A17035-23

              all that.

          The work that [Appellee] completed for Appellant is reported
          in his multiple invoices attached to the petition for counsel
          fees. At the June 20th hearing, [Appellee] testified that after
          the filing of the guardianship petition, [Appellee] wanted to
          have Appellant evaluated by an expert. Before this could be
          done, [Appellee] was discharged from representing
          Appellant, and he “did not do anything more in the case
          because [he] didn’t want to run up the hours unnecessarily.”

          At the hearing, [Attorney] Cunilio alleged that most of the
          charges from [Appellee] were for the guardianship matter.
          While [Appellee] argued that the estate matter and the
          guardianship matter are one matter, [Attorney] Cunilio
          argued that they are two separate matters. [Appellee]
          offered the retainer agreement signed by Appellant on April
          13, 2021 into evidence during the hearing held on June 20,
          2022.[5] [Attorney] Cunilio claimed that Appellant only hired
          [Appellee] in the estate matter and not in the guardianship
          matter.

          Appellant testified at the hearing held on June 20, 2022.
          Appellant moved out of the Winton Avenue Property and
          moved into his own apartment on or about May 13, 2022.
          Appellant testified that he originally retained [Appellee] to
          represent him regarding his mother’s estate matter.
          Appellant wanted assistance in determining what the trust
          was and how much was supposed to go into it, as well as
          what his legal rights were. There were several insurance
          annuities that were going to be deposited into the trust, and
          Appellant sought out [Appellee] to retrieve copies of said
          annuities.   Appellant testified that [Appellee] did not
          complete what he believed he had asked [Appellee] to
          complete. Appellant testified that he had this belief because
          [Appellee] was providing him with inaccurate amounts of
          money to be distributed to him and his siblings. Appellant
          testified that he had never authorized [Appellee] to
          represent him in the guardianship matter.
____________________________________________

5  The agreement specified that Appellant permitted “the trustee of
[Decedent’s] estate to pay the law firm out [of Appellant’s] portion of the
proceeds of the estate.” (Exhibit P-1, submitted 6/20/22).

                                           -4-
J-A17035-23

                                       *       *   *

          On June 20, 2022, the court determined that [Appellee] is
          to be awarded for all of his work done in representing
          Appellant up until he learned that Appellant was discharging
          him as his attorney at the November 22, 2021 hearing.
          [Appellee] confirmed that $6,202.[03] was the total amount
          due up until November 22, 2021 when he filed his answer
          and agreed to do no more work for Appellant.

(Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 2/28/23, at 1-6) (internal record citations and

some capitalization omitted).

       Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on July 14, 2022. On July 26,

2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed his Rule

1925(b) statement on August 2, 2022.6

       Appellant now raises six issues for this Court’s review:

          Did Appellant … waive the 13 issues set forth in his concise
          statement of matters complain[ed] of on appeal when the
          trial court addressed each of these issues separately and
          noted that the other 32 paragraphs of the statement are
          mere statements which require no response?

          Notwithstanding the holding in Hempstead v. Meadville
          Theological School, [286 Pa. 493, 134 A. 103 (1926),] can
          an Orphans’ Court award counsel fees when the attorney’s
          services did not protect a common fund for distribution or
          administration of the court?

          Did the trial court have authority to award counsel fees
          pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Orphans’ Court Rule 14.4
          and Delaware County Orphans’ Court Rule 14.2 when an
____________________________________________

6 On August 4, 2023, Appellee filed an application for leave to submit cases

partially cited at oral argument. We now grant Appellee’s application.

                                           -5-
J-A17035-23

         incapacitated person’s estate was never created?

         Did the trial court abuse its discretion by finding that
         [Appellee’s] fees were reasonable?

         Did the retainer agreement signed by [Appellant] for
         [Appellee’s] services in [Decedent’s] estate [case], five
         months before the guardianship petition was filed, satisfy
         the requirements of Pennsylvania Rule of Orphans’ Court
         Rule 14.4?

         Were the fees awarded to [Appellee] proper when
         [Appellee] never claimed he was retained by [Appellant] to
         represent him in the guardianship matter?

(Appellant’s Brief at 5-6) (issues reordered for ease of disposition; some

capitalization and quotation marks omitted).

      In his first issue, Appellant complains about the court’s conclusion that

Appellant’s prolix Rule 1925(b) statement did not preserve any issues for

appellate review. Appellant insists that the “court was able to address the

thirteen issues it recognized,” and Appellant subsequently “narrowed the

appeal issues from the thirteen identified in his Rule 1925(b) statement to six

issues in his … brief.” (Id. at 34). We agree with Appellant, as our review of

the record does not reveal a basis to support waiver. See Eiser v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 595 Pa. 366, 383, 938 A.2d 417, 427-28 (2007)

(encouraging lower courts to recognize that on rare occasions party may, in

good faith, believe that large number of issues are worthy of pursuing on

appeal; explaining that number of issues raised in Rule 1925 (b) statement

does not, without more, provide basis upon which to deny appellate review

where appeal otherwise complies with mandates of appellate practice).

                                     -6-
J-A17035-23

Accordingly, we proceed to address Appellant’s remaining claims.

       In his remaining issues, Appellant advances multiple theories regarding

why the court should not have granted Appellee’s petition for counsel fees.

Citing Hempstead, supra, Appellant maintains that an Orphans’ Court can

award counsel fees “where the fees protect a common fund for the

administration or distribution under the direction of the court.” (Appellant’s

Brief at 17). Appellant insists that Appellee did not provide services related

to the creation or protection of a fund for the “incapacitated person’s estate,”

because the court did not deem Appellant incapacitated.           (Id. at 18).

Likewise, Appellant maintains that Appellee did nothing to create or protect

Decedent’s estate where Appellee merely helped Appellant to move out of

Decedent’s residence.7 To the extent that Appellee’s petition for counsel fees

cited state and local rules governing Orphans’ Court proceedings, Appellant

reiterates that such rules apply only in circumstances where an incapacitated

person’s estate is created.

       Appellant acknowledges the Orphans’ Court’s finding that Decedent’s

estate and Appellant’s guardianship matter were effectively intertwined.

Appellant asserts, however, that the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code

does not allow “counsel fees in a decedent’s estate matter to be considered

____________________________________________

7 Thus, Appellant continues to advance the argument he raised in the Orphans’

Court, which is that the guardianship and estate matters must be evaluated
separately.

                                           -7-
J-A17035-23

and awarded by the Orphans’ Court in a guardianship proceeding.” (Id. at

22).   Moreover, Appellant contends that the court erred in finding that

Appellee’s fees were reasonable where the court “failed to identify anything

[Appellee] did in the guardianship matter and instead focused only on what

[Appellee] did in regard to the decedent’s estate[.]” (Id. at 23).

       Finally, Appellant attacks Appellee’s retainer agreement, which the

parties executed in April 2021. Appellant complains that the agreement did

not conform to the state Orphans’ Court rule governing representation in

guardianship proceedings. Appellant argues that the agreement related to

Appellee’s representation in the estate case, and the parties executed the

agreement before the executor filed the guardianship petition.         Appellant

further argues that he did not authorize Appellee to represent him in the

guardianship matter, and Appellee’s petition for counsel fees admitted this

fact by implication. For these reasons, Appellant concludes that this Court

must vacate the decree granting Appellee’s petition for counsel fees.       We

disagree.

       The following standard governs our review of an Orphans’ Court decree:

            The findings of a judge of the Orphans’ Court Division,
            sitting without a jury, must be accorded the same
            weight and effect as the verdict of a jury, and will not
            be reversed by an appellate court in the absence of an
            abuse of discretion or a lack of evidentiary support.
            This rule is particularly applicable to findings of fact
            [that] are predicated upon the credibility of the
            witnesses, whom the judge has had the opportunity
            to hear and observe, and upon the weight given to
            their testimony. In reviewing the Orphans’ Court’s

                                     -8-
J-A17035-23

            findings, our task is to ensure that the record is free
            from legal error and to determine if the Orphans’
            Court’s findings are supported by competent and
            adequate evidence and are not predicated upon
            capricious disbelief of competent and credible
            evidence.

         In re Estate of Cassidy, 296 A.3d 1219, 1223 (Pa.Super.
         Jun. 9, 2023) (citation omitted). “However, we are not
         constrained to give the same deference to any resulting
         legal conclusions. … This Court’s standard of review of
         questions of law is de novo, and the scope of review is
         plenary, as we may review the entire record in making our
         determination.” In re Estate of Tscherneff, 203 A.3d
         1020, 1024 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citations omitted).

In re Estate of Schaefer, 300 A.3d 1013, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2023). “When

an appellant challenges a decree entered by the [O]rphans’ [C]ourt, our

standard of review requires that we be deferential to the findings of the

[O]rphans’ [C]ourt.”     In re Staico, 143 A.3d 983, 987 (Pa.Super. 2016),

appeal denied, 641 Pa. 190, 166 A.3d 1221 (2017) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

      “An incompetent is liable for necessaries furnished to him prior to the

adjudication of incompetency.” In re Feely’s Estate, 98 A.2d 738, 741-42

(Pa.Super. 1953). “At common law the incompetent’s estate was liable for

necessaries supplied, on the ground, as was said, that the law implied an

obligation on the part of such person to pay for necessaries out of his

property.” In re Cronin, 326 Pa. 343, 350, 192 A. 397, 400 (1937). “It is,

of course, essential to show that the legal services rendered were reasonably

necessary for the welfare of the incompetent, before a recovery therefor on

                                     -9-
J-A17035-23

the theory that they are necessaries will be allowed.” Feely’s Estate, supra

at 742 (quoting 28 Am.Jur. § 64 at 700).       See also In re Weightman’s

Estate, 190 A. 552 (Pa.Super. 1937) (explaining that services provided to

incompetent by attorneys and medical experts, in good faith, in course of

habeas corpus proceedings instituted to secure release of incompetent from

state hospital may, in exercise of sound discretion by auditing judge, be

considered necessaries properly chargeable in reasonable amount to

incompetent’s estate, regardless of whether incompetent is released from

state hospital).

      Likewise, the award of counsel fees in an action involving the

administration of an estate is within the sound discretion of the Orphans’

Court. See In re Estate of Geniviva, 675 A.2d 306, 313 (Pa.Super. 1996),

appeal denied, 546 Pa. 666, 685 A.2d 545 (1996) (citing In re Estate of

Albright, 545 A.2d 896 (Pa.Super. 1988), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 571, 559

A.2d 33 (1989)).

         What is a fair and reasonable fee is sometimes a delicate,
         and at times a difficult question. The facts and factors to be
         taken into consideration in determining the fee or
         compensation payable to an attorney include: the amount
         of work performed; the character of the services rendered;
         the difficulty of the problems involved; the importance of
         the litigation; the amount of money or value of the property
         in question; the degree of responsibility incurred; whether
         the fund involved was ‘created’ by the attorney; the
         professional skill and standing of the attorney in his
         profession; the results he was able to obtain; the ability of
         the client to pay a reasonable fee for the services rendered;
         and, very importantly, the amount of money or the value of
         the property in question.

                                     - 10 -
J-A17035-23

In re LaRocca’s Trust Estate, 431 Pa. 542, 546, 246 A.2d 337, 339 (1968)

(internal footnote omitted).

      In Hempstead, supra, which Appellant cited in his brief, our Supreme

Court discussed counsel fees in the context of legal services that protect a

“common fund” for administration or distribution:

         As a general rule, in Pennsylvania each party to adversary
         litigation is required to pay his own counsel fees. As stated
         by Gibson, J., in Alexander v. Herr, 11 Pa. 537, ‘If clients
         could pay attorney’s fees out of the pockets of their
         opponents, they would pay most liberally.’ Nor is there any
         law in Pennsylvania which will warrant the payment of such
         fees or expenses incident to the preparation for trial, as
         costs of the case. In the absence of express statutory
         authority, counsel fees cannot be allowed from the adverse
         party.

                                 *     *      *

         There are well-recognized exceptions to this rule. Where
         the    services       protect    a    common      fund   for
         administration or distribution under the direction of
         the court, or where such fund has been raised for like
         purpose, it is liable for costs and expenses, including
         counsel fees incurred. This is the case, even though the
         protection given or the raising of a fund results from what
         may be properly termed adversary litigation. All of our
         cases bearing on the question, the facts concerned, the
         administration of estates, insolvent estates, a common fund
         in existence or to be raised in which the parties interested
         were directly or indirectly benefited as creditors or as
         trustees of the fund which ultimately reached designated
         parties, are illustrated by the following cases….

Hempstead, supra at 495-96, 134 A. at 103 (most internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

      As Appellant notes, our Supreme Court subsequently elaborated on the

                                     - 11 -
J-A17035-23

Hempstead holding as follows:

        The Pennsylvania cases allowing awards of attorneys fees
        and relied upon by the Court in Hempstead in arriving at
        its formulation of the rule involved litigation which protected
        an estate or fund from fraud or illegal claims. [Hempstead,
        supra] at 496, 134 A. at 103, Citing Weed’s Estate, 163
        Pa. 595, 30 A. 272 (1894) (certain unsecured creditors of
        insolvent estate brought suit to set aside conveyance and
        judgments confessed by trustee in fraud of creditors);
        Manderson’s Appeal, 113 Pa. 631, 6 A. 893 (1886)
        (attorney employed on behalf of trustee defended trust
        estate from certain illegal claims).          This element of
        protection of the fund or estate from fraud was also present
        in the United States Supreme Court case of Trustees v.
        Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 26 L.Ed. 1157 (1881), which
        was cited by the Court in Hempstead and relied upon by
        appellant in the instant appeal.

Estate of Tose, 482 Pa. 212, 221, 393 A.2d 629, 633 (1978).

     Instantly, the Orphans’ Court thoroughly evaluated Appellant’s claims

and determined that Appellee’s work on the guardianship matter was in

furtherance of the administration of Decedent’s estate:

        [The Superior] Court has previously held that the Orphans’
        Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees
        to [an] estate’s counsel for his representation of the estate
        during a matter involving former counsel’s mishandling of
        the estate.     [See Estate of Albright, supra].            In
        [Albright], [the a]ppellants argued that fees were
        improperly awarded because most of the fees were awarded
        due to the mishandling of the administration of the estate,
        which is separate from the matter in which attorney’s fees
        were awarded, which was for the petition for accounting.
        Id. In finding that there was substantial and competent
        evidence to support the award of attorney’s fees, [the
        Superior] Court reasoned that “[t]he estate[, as a ‘matter,’]
        was still pending, and the hearings on the petition[, which
        involved accounting for assets of the estate,] were in
        furtherance of [its] settlement.” Id. at 905.

                                    - 12 -
J-A17035-23

         In the instant case, Decedent’s estate matter, in which
         [Appellee] was originally retained to represent Appellant,
         does intertwine with the subsequent guardianship matter.
         The guardianship petition was filed in furtherance of the
         pending estate matter. If there was no estate, there would
         be no guardianship matter. According to Decedent’s will,
         her home was to be sold six months after her death and the
         proceeds were to go into a trust for Appellant’s benefit. In
         the guardianship petition filed by Mr. Oakford (“Petitioner”)
         as executor of the estate, Petitioner averred that Appellant
         continued to reside in the home of Decedent, “refus[ed] to
         leave, refus[ed] to grant access to anyone including
         professional social workers, and refus[ed] to cooperate to
         relocate or prepare the house for sale.” In the guardianship
         petition, Petitioner argued that a plenary guardian was
         necessary for Appellant in order to provide for the proper
         relocation and sound viable financial setting of Appellant to
         receive his inheritance.      Petitioner further stated that
         [Appellee] has attempted unsuccessfully to arrange for less
         restrictive measures but has failed to do so.

         When the guardianship proceedings were underway and a
         hearing was held on April 25, 2022, GAL Goffney asserted
         that due to a finding of capacity for Appellant, “[We] now
         [have a] need [for Appellant] to pack up his belongings and
         move into his apartment.” N.T. 4/25/22 at 4. This implies
         that there was a clear connection between the estate matter
         and the guardianship matter in which the guardianship
         matter allowed the estate matter to move forward. There
         has been substantial evidence provided to the court to
         support the award of attorney’s fees to [Appellee].

(Orphans’ Court Opinion at 13-14) (some capitalization omitted).

      As for Appellant’s additional arguments, the court found that Appellee

submitted credible evidence to establish his actions on Appellant’s behalf:

         [Appellee] attached his monthly invoices to his petition for
         counsel fees, which detailed the legal services rendered and
         the time required to complete said services. [Appellee]
         further explained his duties and activities as Appellant’s
         attorney to support the invoices. As [Appellee] was hired to
         represent Appellant in reference to Decedent’s estate, he

                                    - 13 -
J-A17035-23

        was tasked with the duty of assisting Appellant to move out
        of the Property to comply with Decedent’s wishes under her
        will so that Appellant could receive the proceeds of the sale
        of the Property in a trust for his benefit. One of the very
        first statements [Appellee] made at the hearing held on
        June 20, 2022, was that he “made every effort to try to get
        [Appellant] to cooperate with what the will required.” N.T.
        6/20/22 at 3.       Not only did [Appellee] aver that he
        attempted to make this as inexpensive as possible, but he
        also continued to represent to the court that, during his
        representation of Appellant, he was concerned for the
        welfare of his client and feared someone would take
        advantage of him. Id. at 3, 11. [Appellee] stated that
        Appellant would not cooperate. Id. at 10. [Appellee’s]
        averments that Appellant would not cooperate [are]
        corroborated by both the executor’s attorney as well as the
        guardian ad litem’s pleadings and arguments presented to
        this court. N.T. 4/25/22.

        Appellant alleged that the Orphans’ Court erred in
        disregarding [Appellee’s] admission that he filed an answer
        after the date of Appellant’s letter discharging [Appellee]
        because “[he] wasn’t sure” if he was discharged by
        Appellant. [N.T. 6/20/22 at 33.] [Appellee] argued that
        there was an issue as to whether he was discharged because
        he never received the discharge letter dated November 18,
        2021.     N.T. 6/20/22 at 32-34.         [Attorney] Cunilio
        maintained that his firm sent the letter via email address
        and first-class mail. Id. at 34-35. Further, [Attorney]
        Cunilio stated that he would provide to the court
        confirmation that the email was sent to [Appellee]. Id. at
        35.

        The Orphans’ Court never received correspondence or
        confirmation that the discharge letter was in fact sent to
        [Appellee]. The Orphans’ Court found [Appellee] to be
        credible.   In doing so, the Orphans’ Court properly
        considered and awarded [Appellee] for the services
        rendered up until [Appellee] was aware of his discharge as
        Appellant’s attorney on November 22, 2021.

(Id. at 18-19) (some capitalization omitted).

     The court also concluded that the fees at issue were reasonable:

                                   - 14 -
J-A17035-23

         The Orphans’ Court took into consideration the complexity
         of the matter at issue. The court factored in the specific
         required services and the troubles involved in attempting to
         represent Appellant as an heir in his mother’s estate. The
         importance of [Appellee’s] work was significant in that his
         efforts were to ensure Appellant had a place to live as his
         mother had wished. After a careful analysis of the hours
         claimed by [Appellee] in his petition, the hours of service
         rendered were reasonable and justified. The court took the
         time to ensure [Appellee] was only awarded with reasonable
         fees for services rendered up until the time that he learned
         that he was being discharged as Appellant’s attorney. N.T.
         6/20/22 at 30-32.         Upon careful consideration of
         [Appellee’s] petition for counsel fees, the court actually
         reduced the total amount sought in said petition to make
         certain that [Appellee] was only compensated for the work
         done prior to his discharge as Appellant’s attorney. Id. at
         32.

(Id. at 23-24) (some capitalization omitted).     Regarding the propriety of

Appellee’s retainer agreement, the court emphasized that Appellee “was

retained to represent Appellant in connection with a complicated estate matter

on April 13, 2021, which later developed into a guardianship matter.” (Id. at

15). Because the parties executed the retainer agreement before the filing of

the guardianship petition, the court concluded that the retainer agreement did

not need to comply with the state Orphans’ Court rule governing

representation in guardianship proceedings.

      In reviewing the Orphans’ Court’s decision, we conclude that the record

is free from legal error, and the court’s findings are supported by competent

evidence.   See Estate of Schaefer, supra.           Contrary to Appellant’s

assertions, the record demonstrates that Appellee worked on Appellant’s

behalf to protect Appellant’s share of Decedent’s estate. The invoices attached

                                    - 15 -
J-A17035-23

to the petition for counsel fees highlight specific actions on the part of

Appellee, such as “extensive office conference with client on will, assets in

estate, possible theft of assets, [and] need to get house ready for sale[.]”

(Invoice, dated 5/1/21, at 1).   Appellee’s actions, in some part, served to

protect the “common fund” of Decedent’s estate from fraud or illegal claims.

See Estate of Tose, supra; Hempstead, supra.             While later invoices

evidenced the shift in Appellee’s focus toward litigating the guardianship

petition, we agree with the Orphans’ Court’s characterization of these matters

as being “intertwined,” such that the court possessed the authority to award

fees for Appellee’s work on both matters from the common fund of the estate.

See Estate of Geniviva, supra; Estate of Albright, supra; Feely’s Estate,

supra. Absent more, we decline Appellant’s invitation to second guess the

Orphans’ Court’s credibility determinations and reweigh the evidence. See

Estate of Schaefer, supra.       Accordingly, we affirm the decree granting

Appellee’s petition for payment of counsel fees.

      Decree affirmed.

Date: 11/28/2023

                                    - 16 -