Court Opinion

ID: 9896037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 15:07:50.775542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:21.849497
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                       CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                            NOVEMBER 9, 2023
                                                                        STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                2023 ND 208

State of North Dakota,                                  Plaintiff and Appellee
      v.
Moses Ben Yalartai,                                 Defendant and Appellant

                                No. 20230065

Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District,
the Honorable Stephannie N. Stiel, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice.

Nicholas S. Samuelson (argued), Assistant State’s Attorney, and SheraLynn
Ternes (on brief), Assistant State’s Attorney, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff and
appellee.

Kiara C. Kraus-Parr, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.
                              State v. Yalartai
                               No. 20230065

McEvers, Justice.

[¶1] Moses Ben Yalartai appeals from a criminal judgment entered after he
pled guilty to gross sexual imposition. Yalartai argues the district court
violated his right to self-representation and erred in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm, concluding the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and Yalartai
waived the right to challenge whether the court violated his right of self-
representation by pleading guilty.

                                       I

[¶2] In March 2022, Yalartai was charged with three counts of gross sexual
imposition and one count of contributing to the deprivation or delinquency of a
minor. Attorney Tanya Johnson Martinez was appointed to represent Yalartai.

[¶3] A jury trial was held in November 2022. After the jury was impaneled,
Yalartai stated he did not want his attorney, Martinez, to represent him.
Yalartai asked the district court for a continuance to enable him to hire a
private attorney and to collect evidence not obtained by his attorney. The court
denied the requested continuance and gave Yalartai the option to proceed with
Martinez remaining as counsel or have the court determine whether he was
competent to represent himself. Yalartai repeatedly stated he did not want
Martinez to represent him, but also stated he was not qualified to represent
himself. The district court conducted an inquiry under State v. White Bird,
2015 ND 41, 858 N.W.2d 642, to determine whether Yalartai was competent to
represent himself. The court determined he was not competent and ordered
Martinez to remain as counsel and proceeded with trial.

[¶4] During trial, the State called the victim, E.S., to testify and offered
Facebook messenger conversations between E.S. and Yalartai to be read into
evidence. After E.S. provided the majority of her testimony, the district court
took a short recess. Following the recess, Yalartai chose to change his plea to

                                       1
guilty. Yalartai explained to the court that, over the recess, the State agreed to
a plea agreement—in exchange for pleading guilty to one count of gross sexual
imposition, the remainder of Yalartai’s charges would be dismissed. The court
advised Yalartai of his rights and conducted a colloquy required by
N.D.R.Crim.P. 11 before accepting Yalartai’s plea. After receiving a factual
basis for the plea from the State and Yalartai, the court accepted the guilty
plea, ordered a presentence investigation, and scheduled a sentencing hearing
for January 9, 2023.

[¶5] On January 6, 2023, with the assistance of newly retained counsel,
Yalartai moved to withdraw his guilty plea. On January 24, 2023, a hearing on
the motion to withdraw Yalartai’s guilty plea was held. The district court
denied Yalartai’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea under the totality of the
circumstances after considering a number of factors.

[¶6] In February 2023, a sentencing hearing was held and the criminal
judgment was entered. Following the entry of judgment, Yalartai appealed.

                                       II

[¶7] Yalartai argues the district court erred in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea because a fair and just reason exists to withdraw his
guilty plea.

[¶8] Rule 11(d), N.D.R.Crim.P., governs the withdrawal of guilty pleas and
establishes different standards depending on when the motion to withdraw is
made. “A defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty: . . . after the court accepts
the plea, but before it imposes a sentence if: . . . the defendant can show a fair
and just reason for the withdrawal.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(1)(B)(ii). If the
defendant establishes a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the guilty plea,
the burden then shifts to the State to show substantial prejudice. State v.
Guthmiller, 2019 ND 85, ¶ 8, 924 N.W.2d 785 (citing State v. Lium, 2008 ND
232, ¶ 13, 758 N.W.2d 711). Under Rule 11(d), the standard of review is abuse
of discretion. See Guthmiller, at ¶¶ 6, 11 (discussing the district court’s
discretion to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d)). “A

                                        2
court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unconscionable manner, or it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Id. at ¶ 6.

[¶9] This Court has utilized a non-exhaustive list of factors to determine
whether a defendant has shown a fair and just reason to withdraw a guilty
plea:

      Among the factors that a district court may consider in
      determining whether a fair and just reason exists to withdraw a
      guilty plea before sentencing are: (1) the amount of time that has
      passed between the entry of the plea and the motion to withdraw;
      (2) defendant’s assertion of innocence or a legally cognizable
      defense to the charge; (3) prejudice to the government; (4) whether
      the plea was knowing and voluntary; (5) whether the plea was
      made in compliance with Rule 11, N.D.R.Crim.P.; (6) whether
      adequate assistance of counsel was available to the defendant; (7)
      the plausibility of the reason for seeking to withdraw; (8) whether
      a plea withdrawal would waste judicial resources; and (9) whether
      the parties had reached or breached a plea agreement.

Guthmiller, 2019 ND 85, ¶ 9 (cleaned up). Yalartai argues the nine factors in
Guthmiller weigh in favor of a fair and just reason for withdrawal of his guilty
plea. The district court applied these factors in considering whether Yalartai
met his burden to show a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea.

[¶10] In regard to factor 1, only two months passed between the trial where
Yalartai entered his guilty plea and his filing of the motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. The district court found the time between trial and the motion to
withdraw was not long.

[¶11] In regard to factor 2, Yalartai argues his assertion of innocence at the
motion hearing puts this factor in his favor. Yalartai presented no new evidence
or legal defense to support his claim of innocence at the motion hearing that
was not already discussed at trial. The district court reviewed Yalartai’s
assertion from trial that another cell phone, owned by his nephew, would show
the communications with the victim were not coming from him. The court
specifically considered the testimony of the victim identifying Yalartai at trial,

                                        3
noting it was only after this evidence was received that he pled guilty. The
court analogized Yalartai’s assertion to Guthmiller, finding Yalartai’s alleged
evidence did not reach the level of a fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty
plea. See Guthmiller, 2019 ND 85, ¶¶ 10-11 (concluding the district court did
not abuse its discretion in determining the information claimed as new
evidence—someone else controlling the defendant’s social media account—did
not rise to the level of “fair and just” for purposes of withdrawing a plea).

[¶12] In regard to factor 3, Yalartai argues the State faces no extraordinary
prejudice in subpoenaing their witnesses and bringing them in for another trial
because doing so is a normal burden for the government. The district court
found prejudice to the State because this case involves a child witness who
already testified about the acts done to her and would need to travel from Iowa
to North Dakota to testify again.

[¶13] In regard to factors 4 and 5, Yalartai argues (1) his plea was not
voluntary, and (2) the plea was not made in compliance with N.D.R.Crim.P. 11,
respectively. A plea of guilty must be entered freely and voluntarily. Davies v.
State, 2018 ND 211, ¶ 32, 917 N.W.2d 8. The district court must determine
whether the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or
promises other than promises in a plea agreement before accepting a plea of
guilty. Id.; see also State v. Storbakken, 246 N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 1976); Moore
v. State, 2013 ND 214, ¶ 11, 839 N.W.2d 834. Yalartai argues he did not plead
guilty voluntarily because he was forced to proceed with trial with Martinez as
counsel. At the motion hearing, the court reviewed the transcript from the trial
where Yalartai entered his guilty plea, including the colloquy under
N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b). The court summarized the change of plea proceeding as
follows:

            And we came back into the courtroom and that is when I was
      informed that you wanted to change your plea. So this was after
      the victim identified you, explained the sexual acts that she
      engaged in with you. And I said — and you asserted your right to
      take this to a jury trial, this charge of Gross Sexual Imposition.
      And I said, “We’re here today and we have impaneled a jury and
      we’ve started testimony.” And I said, “And you’ve decided you had

                                       4
      indicated earlier that you wanted more time and I denied that
      request. So I just want to make sure today that you’re doing this,
      you know, voluntarily and freely, that you’re going to be, you know,
      withdrawing your previously entered not guilty plea.” And you
      said, “Yes, Your Honor.” And I said, “I saw that you went back with
      Ms. Martinez. Did you seek her counsel in this regard?” And you
      said, “Yes, Your Honor.” And I said, “Do you feel you’re fully
      informed in making this decision?” and you said “Yes, Your Honor.”
      And I said, “And you understand that you could still proceed to a
      jury trial.” You said, “Yes, Your Honor.” And then I said, “But you
      don’t want to do that. Is that right?” And you said, “Yes, Your
      Honor.” And I said, “Do you understand the charges you’re facing?”
      And you said, “Yes, Your Honor.” And I went through the
      mandatory minimums again and I asked if you understood that
      and you said, “Yes, Your Honor.” And then the State went through
      the factual basis. They talked about the victim’s age. They talked
      about the sexual acts in detail and I said, “Is that what happened?”
      and you said “Yes.” And I asked you, I said, “Now previously [sic]
      didn’t want Ms. Martinez.” I said, “Is it all right with you if
      Ms. Martinez stays your attorney for sentencing?” And you said,
      “Yes,” it was.

At the change of plea, the court asked Yalartai if anyone had promised him
anything or threatened him in order to plead guilty and he responded “no” to
both. The court also asked whether his plea was being freely and voluntarily
made, and Yalartai responded “yes.” Yalartai had the opportunity to consult
with counsel. The record reflects that Yalartai knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered his plea of guilty and that the court substantially complied
with N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b) before accepting his plea of guilty.

[¶14] In regard to factor 6, Yalartai argues he did not want Martinez to
represent him because she would not bring in certain evidence to impeach the
witness. At the motion hearing, the district court considered Yalartai’s
argument stating: “I don’t see this being an issue with ineffective assistance of
counsel at all. . . . [Y]ou even stated that it wasn’t that she was a bad attorney.
You stated that at a few occasions during the proceedings.” The court noted
Martinez, as trial counsel, provided Yalartai with guidance before he entered
his plea of guilty. The court found Martinez was an effective, well-prepared

                                        5
attorney, who advocated for Yalartai at each proceeding, and tried to utilize the
largely inadmissible evidence Yalartai requested to the extent possible under
N.D.R.Ev. 412.

[¶15] In regard to factor 7, Yalartai argues the plausibility of the reason for
withdrawing his plea is evident from his testimony stating he would rather
have no attorney than Martinez and, as a result, was forced to plead guilty.
The district court found Yalartai waited to plead guilty until after he heard the
victim’s testimony—which included personal identification of Yalartai, the
details of how they met, how Yalartai looked different the first time they met,
the acts they engaged in, and how he sent Ubers for the victim to bring her to
his apartment—and after the court admitted evidence of Yalartai’s messages
with the victim.

[¶16] In regard to factor 8, Yalartai argues it is not a waste of judicial
resources to have another jury trial which would allow him to cross-examine
and confront the State’s witnesses. The district court found, when Yalartai pled
guilty at trial, the jury had been impaneled, the witnesses had been
subpoenaed, and the victim had given substantial testimony; however, the
court did not put great weight on this factor stating, “I’m not really focusing
too much on that at this point.”

[¶17] In regard to factor 9, Yalartai argues the State did not follow the terms
of the plea agreement. The record does not reflect there was a written plea
agreement; rather, the State agreed to a sentencing recommendation and to
dismiss several charges. At the change of plea hearing, the State dismissed
Counts II, III, and IV in exchange for Yalartai pleading guilty to Count I as
charged and recommended a sentence. At the motion hearing, the State
informed the district court its recommendation for sentencing was the same as
agreed at the change of plea, but it was higher than what would have been
recommended had Yalartai pled guilty prior to trial. The court did not focus
heavily on this factor at the motion hearing, but acknowledged that there were
some agreements between the parties.

                                       6
[¶18] We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing
the factors outlined in Guthmiller, and did not clearly err in determining on
this record that Yalartai has not met his burden to show a fair and just reason
exists to withdraw his guilty plea. Because Yalartai failed to establish a fair
and just reason to allow withdrawal of his guilty plea, we decline to address
the second portion of the test under Guthmiller. See Guthmiller, 2019 ND 85,
¶ 8 (inquiring into the State’s prejudice only after the defendant establishes a
fair and just reason to withdraw the plea). Therefore, we conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Yalartai’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.

                                       III

[¶19] Yalartai argues he invoked his right to self-representation at trial and
the district court erred by ordering Martinez to remain as his trial counsel. A
defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation. City of Fargo v.
Rockwell, 1999 ND 125, ¶ 8, 597 N.W.2d 406. However, having determined that
the district court did not err in finding Yalartai voluntarily pled guilty, we need
not review separately his argument regarding the alleged violation of his right
to self-representation. Yalartai did not enter a conditional plea under
N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), reserving in writing the right to appeal an adverse
determination by the district court. Defendants who voluntarily plead guilty
waive the right to challenge nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged
violations of constitutional rights that occur before the guilty plea. See State v.
Burr, 1999 ND 143, ¶ 29, 598 N.W.2d 147; see also Tollett v. Henderson,
411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted
in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged,
he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”).

                                       IV

[¶20] The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Yalartai’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea after considering factors and determining
he failed to show a fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea.

                                        7
[¶21] We affirm the criminal judgment.

[¶22] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

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