Court Opinion

ID: 9524087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:49:55.223231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:49.640309
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE APPLETON, dissenting: For two reasons, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority’s opinion holding that the actuarial assessments were inadmissible under Frye: (1) the actuarial instruments were not a scientific test; and (2) even if they were a scientific test, they were not novel. Frye applies to deductions from a purportedly scientific principle, technique, or test. Frye, 293 F. at 1014; Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 77, 767 N.E.2d at 324. The actuarial instruments that Buck and Reidda used do not purport to be a scientific principle, technique, or test. See In re Commitment of R.S., 339 N.J. Super. 507, 540, 773 A.2d 72, 92 (2001), aff’d, 173 N.J. 134, 801 A.2d 219 (2002). “Rather, they are simply actuarial tables — methods of organizing and interpreting a collection of historical data.” R.S., 339 N.J. Super. at 540, 773 A.2d at 92. By observing what a large number of reoffenders have had in common, one can compile a list of “risk factors.” In re Detention of Isbell, 333 Ill. App. 3d 906, 916, 777 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (2002); R. Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment?, 4 Psych. Pub. Pol. & L. 50, 56-58 (1998). One can then calculate the relative frequency with which sex offenders with those “risk factors” have reoffended and thereby assess the probability that other sex offenders with the same “risk factors” will reoffend. Isbell, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 916, 777 N.E.2d at 1002. The actuarial tools merely help the psychologist draw inferences from historical data or the collective experience of other psychologists. They are not a purportedly scientific device, like a polygraph. In this regard, the tests at issue are no different than actuarial tables for life expectancy admitted as evidence to a jury for the determination of the gross amount awarded for future pain and suffering or used by an economic expert to determine the present cash value of a pension. In State v. Russell, 125 Wash. 2d 24, 30-35, 882 P.2d 747, 756-58 (1994), the defendant had posed the bodies of his three murder victims (put a pinecone in the hand, a book under the arm, et cetera). To prove that the murderer of the three victims was probably the same person, the State’s experts analyzed two computer databases consisting of “forms, filled out by local law enforcement officers, listing the various characteristics of homicides in Washington and the nation.” Russell, 125 Wash. 2d at 69, 882 P.2d at 776. On the basis of that analysis, the experts testified to “the rarity of posed murder victims.” Russell, 125 Wash. 2d at 69, 882 P.2d at 776. The defendant argued that the testimony was inadmissible under Frye because the experts “improperly relied on unproven scientific methodologies in determining that the same person committed all three murders.” Russell, 125 Wash. 2d at 68, 882 P.2d at 776. The Supreme Court of Washington held that Frye was “clearly *** inapplicable” because the computer programs were “nothing more than sophisticated record-keeping systems” (Russell, 125 Wash. 2d at 70, 882 P.2d at 776, quoted in Bachman v. General Motors Corp., 332 Ill. App. 3d 760, 780, 776 N.E.2d 262, 281-82 (2002), appeal denied, 202 Ill. 2d 598, 787 N.E.2d 154 (2002). Like the experts in Russell, Buck and Reidda merely drew an inference of probability from a sophisticated record-keeping system. Even if the actuarial tools in this case were, properly speaking, scientific methodologies, they were not novel scientific methodologies. Frye bars the use of a scientific methodology only if it is “novel,” i.e., “ ‘[sjtrikingly new, unusual, or different.’ ” Harris v. Cropmate Co., 302 Ill. App. 3d 364, 372, 706 N.E.2d 55, 63 (1999), quoting American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 898 (1975). The majority in this case acknowledges Doren’s testimony that psychology has been using actuarial tools for almost 100 years. The majority dismisses that testimony, however, as “too general to be of any significance. The particular methodologies employed in this case are of recent development,” the majority says. (Emphasis added.) 343 Ill. App. 3d at 1230. The supreme court has explained: “We recognize that a ‘new’ or ‘novel’ scientific technique is not always easy to identify, especially in light of constant scientific advances in our modern era. Generally, however, a scientific technique is ‘new’ or ‘novel’ if it is ‘original or striking’ or does ‘not resembl[e] something formerly known or used.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 79, 767 N.E.2d at 325, quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1546 (1993). Thus, the question is not simply whether the MnSOST, MnSOST-R, VRAG, PCL-R, Static-99, and Hanson and Bussiere Meta-analysis themselves are of recent development. We must ask whether they “resemble something formerly known or used.” Our society uses actuarial methods to predict human behavior all the time (in liability insurance, for example, and economics). Such methodologies are not strikingly new, unusual, or different. See W. Grove & P Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 Psych. Pub. Pol. & L. 293, 293 (1996) (in 1928, the Illinois State Board of Parole published the results of what was apparently the first attempt to predict recidivism through actuarial data). Defendant’s own expert, Davis, used an actuarial technique, although he did not explicitly say so. In support of his opinion that defendant was unlikely to reoffend, Davis testified to a consensus “among the experts in the field that the reoffense rate for incestuous sexual molesters [was] lower than [that for] nonincestuous molesters.” He also testified that because defendant’s victims were female, defendant had a lower likelihood of reoffending than if they had been male. The “experts in the field” could not have determined the “reoffense rate” without an actuarial analysis. See J. Becker & W Murphy, What We Know and Do Not Know About Assessing and Treating Sex Offenders, 4 Psych. Pub. Pol. & L. 116, 125 (1998) (“offenders against unrelated females had a recidivism rate of 18.3%, unrelated males 35.2%, and incest cases 8.5%”). The majority endorses an actuarial approach when it says: “Psychologists are permitted to give statistical testimony, for example, that experience has shown that certain categories of offenders are reincarcerated at a certain rate.” 343 Ill. App. 3d at 1230. Apparently, Davis is permitted to do haphazardly what the State’s witnesses are forbidden to do more thoroughly and systematically. Even those who favor using the actuarial tools have criticized them or pointed out their limitations, such as a lack of comprehensiveness in the factors they consider. See, e.g., R. Rogers, The Uncritical Acceptance of Risk Assessment in Forensic Practice, 24 L. & Human Behavior 595, 595-96 (2000) (emphasis on risk factors to the exclusion of protective factors, such as social relations, self-esteem, and religious beliefs); Hanson, 4 Psych. Pub. Pol. & L. at 65 (emphasis on static risk factors to the exclusion of dynamic factors). Those criticisms, however, are aimed not at the actuarial approach to predicting recidivism but, rather, at the failure to properly and rigorously follow the actuarial approach. The actuarial tools that Buck and Reidda used might be, for whatever reason, an inadequate application of actuarial methodology, but that shortcoming (which defendant could bring out in cross-examination) would go to the weight of the actuarial assessments, not to their admissibility under Frye. See People v. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d 695, 702, 672 N.E.2d 1321, 1326 (1996). The two cases on which the majority chiefly relies, Taylor and Hargett, fail to appreciate the distinction between the well-established, underlying methodology of actuarial prediction and the particular use of that methodology. In Taylor, the Second District cited no case holding that psychological or psychiatric testimony relying on actuarial assessments was inadmissible under Frye. In Hargett, the Third District cited no such case, other than Taylor. It appears that Taylor is the first reported decision in the United States to bar the use of actuarial tools to predict recidivism. It appears that courts in other jurisdictions have uniformly allowed the use of such tools. In re Detention of Strauss, 106 Wash. App. 1, 6-9, 20 P.3d 1022, 1025-26 (2001) (the relevant scientific community generally accepts the MnSOST and the VRAG and, therefore, a Frye hearing is unnecessary); In re Detention of Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 619 (Iowa App. 2002) (MnSOST, MnSOST-R, and Static-99 are admissible); State ex rel. Romley v. Fields, 201 Ariz. 321, 328, 35 P.3d 82, 89 (App. 2001) (Frye is inapplicable to the use of actuarial models by mental health professionals); R.S., 173 N.J. at 136, 801 A.2d at 220 (use of actuarial instruments to predict future dangerousness of sex offender is widely accepted within the meaning of Frye); Garcetti, 85 Cal. App. 4th at 543, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 238 (psychiatrist’s prediction of future dangerousness is not subject to Frye, regardless of whether the psychiatrist used clinical or actuarial models). The majority, without citation beyond Taylor, says that the actuarial tools in this case “are controversial and have been frequently criticized.” 343 Ill. App. 3d at 1230. Any approach to predicting human behavior will be controversial and frequently criticized, because the task is so complex and daunting. Yet the law requires such predictions. If psychiatrists or psychologists, on the basis of their examination of defendant, can predict his likelihood of reoffending, I do not see why they cannot at least consider actuarial assessments — which, according to the unrebutted evidence, the profession widely uses and which are less subjective than the unaided clinical judgment. It would appear that the majority would prefer the statutorily required testimony of psychologists to be based on sense and conjecture rather than a methodological analysis of data, imperfect as it may or may not be. I would point out that it is exactly the existence of the actuarial models here used that led to the Illinois General Assembly, as well as the legislatures of 14 other states that have adopted similar sexually-violent-person legislation, to conclude that it could, with good conscience, mandate postincarceration detention for those sexual offenders who demonstrated a risk to society. In addition, the majority’s comparison of the expert testimony here to the use of psychological expert testimony in child custody cases is unwarranted and inappropriate. First, there is simply no comparison between acceptance of psychological testimony that is statutorily required and such testimony that is proffered by a party as support for his or her position. If the majority and Gitlin have a problem with trial courts abdicating their judgment to a mental health professional, their problem is properly with judges who do so, not the psychologists who, after making such investigation as they are bound to do by their charge, provide facts and factors upon which a competent trial judge may place varying weight in making a judicial decision.