Court Opinion

ID: 9930772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 17:08:27.082847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:21.689879
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of
Appeals.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40333

CARLA VALENTINE,

      Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DR. LAURA HEISCH and HIGH
MESA DENTAL ARTS,

      Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LOS ALAMOS COUNTY
Jason Lidyard, District Court Judge

Heather Burke
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

Sommer Udall Law Firm, P.A.
Jack N. Hardwick
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellees

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

DUFFY, Judge.

{1}   Plaintiff Carla Valentine filed a lawsuit against her former employer, Defendants
Dr. Laura Heisch and High Mesa Dental Arts, for unlawful discrimination under the New
Mexico Human Rights Act (NMHRA), NMSA 1978, Sections 28-1-1 to -14 (1969, as
amended through 2023). The jury returned a defense verdict. On appeal, Plaintiff
argues that (1) the uniform jury instruction for NMHRA disability discrimination claims,
UJI 13-2307C NMRA, is erroneous and improper; (2) the district court erred in various
discovery rulings; and (3) the district court erred in denying Plaintiff’s motions for
sanctions against Defendants. We affirm.

DISCUSSION

I.     The NMHRA and UJI 13-2307C

{2}     Under the NMHRA, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for “an employer,
unless based on a bona fide occupational qualification or other statutory
prohibition . . . to discriminate in matters of compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment against any person otherwise qualified because of race, age,
religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity,
pregnancy, childbirth or condition related to pregnancy or childbirth, physical or mental
disability or serious medical condition.” Section 28-1-7(A). In this case, Plaintiff alleged
discrimination based on a serious medical condition.

{3}     Our Supreme Court has adopted two jury instructions for discrimination claims
under the NMHRA: UJI 13-2307C, which is used in cases where the plaintiff alleges
discrimination based on a serious medical condition, and UJI 13-2307A NMRA, which is
used in cases where the plaintiff alleges discrimination based on race, age, or any other
trait enumerated in Section 28-1-7(A). See UJI 13-2307A comm. cmt. Because Plaintiff
alleged discrimination based on a serious medical condition, the jury was instructed in
accordance with UJI 13-2307C and asked to determine whether “Dr. Heisch
intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s breast cancer by
constructively discharging Plaintiff.”

{4}    On appeal, we understand Plaintiff to argue that (1) UJI 13-2307C is inconsistent
with the NMHRA because the NMHRA does not require intentional discrimination; (2)
the UJIs for NMHRA discrimination claims set forth different standards and
impermissibly place a higher burden of proof on plaintiffs alleging disability
discrimination; and (3) UJI 13-2307C improperly requires the jury to find that an
employee’s disability was the sole cause for the defendant’s discrimination, and should
instead require the jury to find only that the defendant’s “adverse employment action
was motivated in part by an illegitimate factor.” See Nava v. City of Santa Fe, 2004-
NMSC-039, ¶ 8, 136 N.M. 647, 103 P.3d 571 (emphasis added).

{5}     “We review jury instructions de novo to determine whether they correctly state
the law.” Benavidez v. City of Gallup, 2007-NMSC-026, ¶ 19, 141 N.M. 808, 161 P.3d
853 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Trial courts are required to instruct
the jury on the applicable rules of law using the Uniform Jury Instructions.” Id.; see Rule
1-051(D) NMRA. This Court may consider error in uniform jury instructions adopted by
the New Mexico Supreme Court when the instructions have not previously “been
considered by the Supreme Court in actual cases and controversies that are controlling
precedent.” McNeil v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 2007-NMCA-024, ¶ 19, 141 N.M.
212, 153 P.3d 46 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
A.     UJI 13-2307C Is Consistent With the NMHRA

{6}     Plaintiff first argues that UJI 13-2307C is inconsistent with the NMHRA because
the statute does not require intentional discrimination. In support of her argument,
Plaintiff cites to Muller v. United States Steel Corp., which held that “a plaintiff in a job
discrimination case need not prove that the employer had a specific intent to
discriminate.” 509 F.2d 923, 927 (10th Cir. 1975) (noting that a superficially neutral
policy may be discriminatory, and to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, “[i]t is
sufficient that the employer’s conduct produced discriminatory results”).

{7}     Defendants correctly point out that Muller was a disparate impact case, which
“differs from a disparate treatment claim in that it does not involve a showing of
discriminatory intent, but rather addresses those situations when an apparently neutral
employment policy has a discriminatory effect.” Gonzales v. N.M. Dep’t of Health, 2000-
NMSC-029, ¶ 30, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550. When, as here, the plaintiff alleges
disparate treatment, the plaintiff is required to show intentional discrimination on the part
of the defendant. See Sonntag v. Shaw, 2001-NMSC-015, ¶ 11, 130 N.M. 238, 22 P.3d
1188 (holding that in order to prevail on a gender-based employment discrimination
claim under the NMHRA, the plaintiff must demonstrate, by direct or indirect evidence,
that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of her sex); Smith
v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 9-11, 109 N.M. 514, 787 P.2d 433 (holding that in a
race and age discrimination lawsuit brought under the NMHRA, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant discriminated against him because of his race or age);
Garcia v. Hatch Valley Pub. Schs., 2018-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 26, 28, 458 P.3d 378 (holding
that in order to prevail on a discrimination claim under the NMHRA, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of
her race and national origin). Consequently, UJI 13-2307C is consistent with the
NMHRA and correctly states the standard for a disparate treatment discrimination claim.

{8}    Notwithstanding that UJI 13-2307C technically contains a correct statement of
the law, we share Plaintiff’s concern that there are two uniform jury instructions for
NMHRA discrimination claims that contain different statements of the plaintiff’s burden.
UJI 13-2307C(5) requires the plaintiff to prove the defendant “intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff because of [the plaintiff’s] disability,” whereas UJI 13-2307A requires
the plaintiff to prove that the plaintiff’s protected classification was a “motivating factor”
in the defendant’s adverse employment action. It is not clear to us why the UJI
committee adopted a separate instruction for disability discrimination claims, or why the
instructions utilize different language.

{9}    We observe that in ADA cases, intentional discrimination is defined to mean that
the plaintiff’s disability was a motivating factor in the defendant’s adverse action against
the plaintiff—essentially combining the concepts set forth in UJIs 13-2307A and 13-
2307C. See Gonzales v. Sandoval Cnty., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1442, 1445 (D.N.M. 1998) (“To
prove general discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that intentional
discrimination was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action.”); Doe v. Deer
Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 324, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that, in
order to prevail on a claim for intentional discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must
prove that their disability constituted a “motivating factor” for the defendant’s adverse
employment action); Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 941 F. Supp. 721, 727
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (noting that to show intentional discrimination in a reduction in force case
brought under the ADA, an employee must produce evidence that their disability was a
motivating factor in the decision to fire them). We also observe that federal courts have
utilized an instruction that likewise combines the concepts set forth in UJIs 13-2307A
and 13-2307C when instructing the jury on the plaintiff’s burden of proof. For example,
in Farley v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 1999), the
jury was instructed in relevant part:

               It is unlawful for an employer to intentionally discriminate against a
       qualified individual with a disability because of that person’s
       disability. . . . In order for the Plaintiff to establish his claim of intentional
       discrimination by the Defendant, he has the burden of proving the
       following essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence that:

              ....

               2.       The Defendant intentionally discriminated against the
       Plaintiff, that is, the fact that the Plaintiff was a qualified person with a
       disability was a motivating factor in the Defendant’s decision to terminate
       the Plaintiff.

Id. at 1334 n.5 (emphases added); see also Model Civil Jury Instruction for the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals ch. 9, § 9.1.1 (2023) (stating that to recover on a disparate
treatment claim under the ADA, “[plaintiff] must prove that [defendant] intentionally
discriminated against [plaintiff]. This means that [plaintiff] must prove that [his/her]
disability was a motivating factor in [defendant’s] decision to [describe action] [plaintiff]”).

{10} We encourage the UJI Civil Committee to consider whether revisions to the jury
instructions for NMHRA discrimination claims are necessary to address the lack of
uniformity and to provide jurors with a clearer statement of the law. See Fleetwood
Retail Corp. of N.M. v. LeDoux, 2007-NMSC-047, ¶ 30, 142 N.M. 150, 164 P.3d 31.

B.     The Instructions as a Whole Adequately Instructed the Jury

{11} Plaintiff also argues that UJI 13-2307C improperly requires an employee to prove
their disability was the sole cause of the defendant’s discrimination, rather than one but-
for cause of the adverse action. As Plaintiff correctly notes, our Supreme Court has
previously held that an employee is not required to prove that their protected trait “was
the sole or primary motivation for the [adverse action]. The employee must only
establish that the adverse employment action was motivated in part by an illegitimate
factor, such as [disability].” Nava, 2004-NMSC-039, ¶ 8. In support of her argument,
Plaintiff refers to the language of UJI 13-2307C(5), which requires the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant “intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of [her]
disability.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff asserts the emphasized language improperly
suggests to the jury that her disability must have been the sole or primary motivation for
the adverse action.

{12} It is not necessary to resolve in this appeal whether UJI 13-2307C, which mirrors
the language of Section 28-1-7(A) of the NMHRA, sets forth an appropriate mixed-
motive causation standard because the jury in this case also received a separate
causation instruction based on UJI 13-305 NMRA, which instructed the jury that

      [a]n act is a “cause” of harm if it contributes to bringing about the harm,
      and if the harm would not have occurred without it. It need not be the only
      explanation for the harm, nor the reason that is nearest in time or place. It
      is sufficient if it occurs in combination with some other cause to produce
      the result. To be a “cause,” the act must be reasonably connected as a
      significant link to the harm.

As a result, the instructions as a whole fairly presented the appropriate causation
standard, and there is no basis to disturb the jury’s verdict. See Sandoval v. Gurley
Properties Ltd., 2022-NMCA-004, ¶ 11, 503 P.3d 410 (“If instructions, considered as a
whole, fairly present the issues and the law applicable thereto, they are sufficient.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{13} For all of these reasons, we conclude the jury was not improperly instructed on
Plaintiff’s NMHRA claims.

II.   Remaining Issues on Appeal

{14} We now consider Plaintiff’s remaining issues on appeal, which concern the
district court’s discovery orders and the court’s denial of her motions for sanctions
against Defendants. We review both matters for an abuse of discretion. See Vanderlugt
v. Vanderlugt, 2018-NMCA-073, ¶ 30, 429 P.3d 1269; Enriquez v. Cochran, 1998-
NMCA-157, ¶ 20, 126 N.M. 196, 967 P.2d 1136. We will not find an abuse of discretion
unless the district court’s ruling can be characterized as “clearly untenable or not
justified by reason,” or “is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable.” Kilgore v. Fuji Heavy
Indus. Ltd., 2009-NMCA-078, ¶ 39, 146 N.M. 698, 213 P.3d 1127 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).

A.    Discovery of Electronic Communications and Devices

{15} Plaintiff devotes several pages of her briefing to her discovery requests regarding
Dr. Heisch’s cell phone and electronic communications. We briefly discuss Plaintiff’s
discovery requests and the district court’s ruling before turning to Plaintiff’s arguments
on appeal.

{16} Plaintiff made three discovery requests seeking to compel the production of
Defendants’ electronic communications and devices. In her interrogatory No. 4, Plaintiff
asked Defendants to “[l]ist all cell/PDA/smart phones, both personal and work issued,
associated with Defendant Heisch and Frankie Gavin from the beginning of their
employment at High Mesa Dental Arts to present.” In requests for production Nos. 10
and 11, Plaintiff asked Defendants to provide “any and all emails, text messages,
instant messages, or other communications between Frankie Gavin and Defendant
Heisch since the beginning of Ms. Gavin’s employment with Defendants,” and “[a]ny
and all emails, text messages, instant messages, or other communications between
Plaintiff and Frankie Gavin and/or Defendants from January 2016 to present.”
Defendants objected to each of these requests on various grounds, and Plaintiff filed a
motion to compel.

{17} The district court granted, but narrowed, Plaintiff’s motion to compel as to
requests for production Nos. 10 and 11, holding that Plaintiff was entitled to
communications concerning Plaintiff or between Plaintiff and Defendants. Plaintiff does
not appear to challenge the substance of those rulings. Thus, this appeal appears only
to concern the district court’s ruling regarding interrogatory No. 4. The district court
ordered Defendants to provide the requested identifying information “for any work only
phone issued to . . . Defendant Heisch during the period April 1, 2018 through May 15,
2019 (six months prior to and through the date of the period of the alleged
discrimination).”

{18} Plaintiff’s arguments on appeal generally concern whether Dr. Heisch’s cell
phone was a personal phone or a work phone. Plaintiff argues that Defendants
improperly claimed Dr. Heisch’s cell phone was a personal phone, and she advocates
that the status of the phone as work or personal should not matter for purposes of
discovering work-related content or communications on the phone. But Plaintiff fails to
acknowledge, much less address, the fact that the district court ordered production of
the substantive communications Plaintiff sought in her requests for production Nos. 10
and 11, without regard to whether they were on work or personal device. As a result, to
the extent Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to obtain requested communications from
Dr. Heisch’s cell phone, the district court granted Plaintiff’s request and there is nothing
further for this Court to do on appeal. To the extent Plaintiff argues the district court
erred in concluding that Defendants need not provide identifying information for Dr.
Heisch’s personal cell phone in response to interrogatory No. 4, Plaintiff has neither
shown error nor prejudice by way of her arguments on appeal, particularly in light of the
district court’s ruling that Plaintiff was entitled to relevant communications.

{19} We note briefly that Plaintiff argues in her reply brief that Defendants did not
produce any text messages following the district court’s order. However, Defendants’
responses to Plaintiff’s requests for production do not appear to be part of the record,
and Plaintiff has not directed us to where she made any argument to the district court
concerning Defendants’ responses to her requests for production after the district court
issued its order on her motion to compel. Accordingly, this is not a matter we will review.
See State v. Jim, 1988-NMCA-092, ¶ 3, 107 N.M. 779, 765 P.2d 195 (stating that it is
the appellant’s burden to provide us with a record sufficient for review of the issues
raised on appeal).
B.     Discovery of Other Employee Evaluations

{20} Plaintiff also argues that the district court erred in declining to compel Defendants
to produce all “reviews, evaluations, and/or disciplinary records . . . for all employees of
Defendants from January 2016 to [the] present” day. Plaintiff argues that by denying this
discovery request, the district court denied her access to evidence necessary to
demonstrate how other employees were treated and whether they were subjected to the
same requirements as her. Plaintiff claims that without this evidence, the district court
prevented her from making any meaningful comparisons between herself and other
employees to establish her disparate treatment claim.

{21} Defendants respond that Plaintiff was able to establish through her examination
of Dr. Heisch that Plaintiff’s job performance before her cancer diagnosis had been
good or excellent, and that Dr. Heisch had created a new performance evaluation form
the night before she reviewed Plaintiff for the purpose of reviewing Plaintiff. From the
portions of the trial record cited by Defendants, it appears Plaintiff was able to examine
Dr. Heisch about the newly-created evaluation during her deposition before trial, as Dr.
Heisch’s deposition testimony was used to impeach her trial testimony. Thus it appears
Plaintiff had the opportunity to obtain evidence that allowed her to show that she was
subjected to a different evaluation process from Defendants’ other employees, and
therefore, to show that she was treated differently in comparison. Plaintiff did not
address these arguments in her reply, nor has she shown how documentary evidence
containing the substance of other employees’ evaluations was necessary to her claims
in light of the foregoing.

{22} Plaintiff makes an additional argument that during trial, Defendants were able to
claim that they later used the same evaluation for other employee evaluations, and
Plaintiff was denied the ability to rebut that claim. However, after reviewing the portion
of the record cited by Plaintiff in support of this argument, we conclude this argument
lacks merit. During the portion of Dr. Heisch’s testimony referenced by Plaintiff, Dr.
Heisch testified only that she evaluated other employees as part of her practice, and not
that she used the same evaluation form she had created for Plaintiff to evaluate other
employees.

{23} In sum, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the district court’s rulings on her
discovery requests amounted to an abuse of discretion.

C.     Motions for Sanctions

{24} Finally, Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in denying her motions for
sanctions against Defendants under Rule 1-037(B) NMRA for alleged discovery
violations. In her first motion, Plaintiff requested that the district court enter a default
judgment against Defendants for their “dishonest responses to discovery, spoliation of
evidence, obstruction of discovery, and failure to comply with the [c]ourt’s [order on
Plaintiff’s motion to compel].” In Plaintiff’s second motion, she again asked the district
court to enter a default judgment against Defendants because they “repeatedly and
purposely lied about the existence of discoverable evidence, lied in written discovery,
failed to produce discoverable evidence, failed to disclose material facts, and more.”
After a hearing, the district court orally denied both motions, finding that Plaintiff had not
shown any intentional misconduct on the part of Defendants or any intentional
noncompliance with the rules of procedure.

{25} Our Supreme Court has previously held that the discovery sanction of entry of
default judgment is “to be imposed only in extreme cases and only upon a clear
showing of willfulness or bad faith.” United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 1980-
NMSC-094, ¶ 396, 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231. A willful violation of Rule 1-037 occurs
when “there is a conscious or intentional failure to comply with the rule’s requirements.”
Medina v. Found. Rsrv. Ins. Co., 1994-NMSC-016, ¶ 6, 117 N.M. 163, 870 P.2d 125. In
conducting our review, “we must be mindful of the nature of the conduct and level of
culpability found by the trial court.” Enriquez, 1998-NMCA-157, ¶ 20. “Because the trial
court’s decision must be based on its conclusions about a party’s conduct and intent,
implicit in the standard of review is the question of whether the court’s findings and
decision are supported by substantial evidence.” Id.

{26} In her briefing on appeal, Plaintiff has not addressed the district court’s finding
that there was no intentional misconduct on the part of Defendants. Instead, she
catalogues a number of examples she claims illustrate Defendants’ discovery abuses.
In the proceedings below, Defendants responded to every single one of Plaintiff’s claims
with evidence to rebut them and show that Defendants did not intentionally fail to
comply with, or act willfully or in bad faith in response to, Plaintiff’s discovery requests.
See United Nuclear Corp., 1980-NMSC-094, ¶ 396. The district court, when weighing
the evidence, accepted Defendants’ version of the facts over Plaintiff’s and declined to
enter a default judgment against Defendants. See Reed v. Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc.,
2000-NMCA-091, ¶¶ 24-25, 129 N.M. 639, 11 P.3d 603 (stating that in a hearing on a
motion for discovery abuse sanctions, the district court sits as a fact-finder). Because
there is sufficient evidence to support the district court’s view, the district court’s
decision-making in this case does not amount to an abuse of discretion. As such, we
will not disturb the district court’s decision.

CONCLUSION

{27}   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

{28}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge