Court Opinion

ID: 9688145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:35:19.080607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:10.533938
License: Public Domain

J. W. Fitzgerald, J.
(dissenting). Defendant’s *679jury conviction of voluntary manslaughter1 in Detroit Recorder’s Court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and we granted leave to appeal. Before us is the narrow issue of whether reversible error occurred where the trial court, without objection by defendant, refused to grant the jury foreman’s request that the testimony of two substantive witnesses be repeated for the jury where refusal was based upon an erroneous understanding of the law. In our view, this error was not prejudicial and the conviction is affirmed.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the strangulation death of Marjorie Lathrop appear in the testimony of witnesses Geraldine Bowman and Nora Van Dusen, neighbors of the deceased residing in the same apartment building. Witness Bowman observed the defendant, together with the deceased, in the hallway outside her apartment. Later, from inside, she overheard scuffling and fighting, cries of "help” and "don’t” from the deceased, and defendant’s reference to her as a "no-good red-headed whore”. She further testified that she observed from her apartment window an unknown man place a tire iron in a car and return to the apartment building.
Witness Van Dusen testified that the deceased, attempting to avoid her boyfriend, spent the hours of 8 a.m. to noon and 1 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. in her (witness Van Dusen) apartment. She overheard the deceased request the defendant for assistance in gaining entrance to room #26, just down the hall. The witness’ husband, then approaching, rendered assistance in lifting defendant through the transom. Entrance gained, the witness and her husband left the apartment building, leaving their two-month-old daughter in the care of Miss La*680throp. Returning 45 minutes later, they observed a man ayiting the back door of the apartment building. Defendant opened the front door for the witness and her husband. Upon entering their apartment, they discovered their daughter alone and soon after learned of Miss Lathrop’s death.
The jury deliberated an hour and 20 minutes before requesting a view of the apartment building. This view granted, they resumed deliberations later requesting that the testimony of witnesses Bowman and Van Dusen be repeated for them. The Court responded:
"The Court: I had a request from the foreman of the jury. Would you please give us the transcript of the two women witnesses. The answer is no. I will tell them that I don’t do that. Nothing short of a reading of the entire record. To give jurors bits of testimony puts too much emphasis on it.
"All right. Call the jury.

(Jury returns to the courtroom.)

"The Court: For the record, ladies and gentlemen, your foreman, Mr. Gordon, has addressed a note to the Court that reads, 'Dear Sir: Would you please give us the transcript of the two women witnesses’. Signed by the foreman of the jury.
"Ladies and gentlemen, this has been a relatively short case. There were very few witnesses, and you will have to remember it. Now, the reason I won’t do it is because the decisions that I am guided by frown upon the practice of having read back and the reporter would have to read it back, portions of the testimony of certain witnesses because it places entirely too much emphasis on the testimony of one witness and you must consider it all, all that bore upon this case. I cannot grant your request because the burden of decisions in this case — in this state frown upon the practice other than reading the whole record and it would take us a long time to read that back, as long as it took the reporter to take it, perhaps, so you will have to rely on your memory. This was a short case.
*681"All right, you may return to the jury room and continue your deliberations.”
Defense counsel did not object to this ruling by the court. The jury continued its deliberations eventually returning a verdict of guilty.
Defendant first argues that a new trial should be granted because the judge’s refusal was not based upon a reasoned exercise of discretion, but rather an erroneous understanding of Michigan law. The identical error occurred in the case of Klein v Wagenheim, 379 Mich 558; 153 NW2d 663 (1967), where the trial court incorrectly considered it improper to read any testimony back to the jury using stenographer notes unless the entire testimony was repeated for them. Citing People v Heard, 388 Mich 182; 200 NW2d 73 (1972), defendant perceives a similar unawareness of the right to exercise judicial discretion where the trial court erred reversibly in ruling that under no circumstances in criminal matters could jurors ask questions of witnesses.
The absolute nature of the refusal which unalterably rejected the jury’s request is advanced as further support in challenging the trial court’s ruling. Unlike Klein, which allowed for the possibility of a subsequent affirmative response to the jury’s request, the trial court here unequivocally precluded such a possibility. It is argued that the possibility of having the testimony read to them at a later time must not be ruled out in order to avoid the charge of abuse of discretion. People v Wright, 41 Mich App 518; 200 NW2d 362 (1972).
In observing that the "burden of decisions in this state frown upon the practice of granting juror requests to repeat testimony other than reading the whole record”, the judge is said by defendant to have ignored a general rule of long standing *682that the reading of any testimony and the extent to which it is read is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Klein, supra, at 561. However, a careful reading of the trial court’s response to the jury request indicates that he did not consider himself absolutely bound to refuse the request. Reference to authoritative precedent as the "burden of decisions” in the trial court’s statement seems to reflect an awareness of decisions holding to the contrary.2 Moreover, while this implication does not serve to rectify the trial judge’s misconception of the law, his observation that the case was short and that few witnesses were involved suggests that his exercise of judicial discretion appears to have resulted in his refusal to have the testimony repeated for the jury. Our review of the record does not disclose any confusion in the minds of the jurors regarding the factual testimony received from the two witnesses. The jurors were provided with a view of the apartment building and had deliberated for more than an hour prior to their request. The verdict was arrived at a short time later without any indication of difficulty or disagreement. The totality of the circumstances *683persuade us that no miscarriage of justice occurred where the verdict was arrived at without repeating testimony once heard.
People v Heard, supra, apparently identically grounded upon judicial misconception of the law, is distinguishable. There, the trial court categorically refused to grant defense counsel’s request that the jury be permitted to ask questions of the witnesses on the basis that such procedure in a criminal trial was unknown to him. However, a difference exists between affording the jury the opportunity of interrogating witnesses to elicit testimony not given previously and having repeated for the jury that testimony which has already been heard. Even if the request sought to clarify matter already testified to, the judge made clear his own view that the limited number of witnesses and the shortness of the trial did not warrant specific testimony being repeated for the jury. Moreover, objection was raised immediately in Heard, where no such objection was made in the instant case. It is well established, and the Court of Appeals properly held that, absent objection below, appellate courts will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal unless manifest injustice results.3
We are not prepared to accept categorically defendant’s interpretation of Klein, supra, appearing in People v Wright, supra. There, no abuse of discretion occurred when, in response to a jury request that certain testimony be repeated for *684them, the trial court directed the jury to deliberate further, yet did not rule out the possibility of having testimony read for them at a later time. Defendant suggests that communication of this possibility to the jury prevents reversible error while failure to do so mandates reversal. With such an inflexible interpretation we disagree.
The preferable view begins with the premise that the decision to comply with a request that selected portions of testimony be repeated for the jury remains solely within the discretion of the trial judge. Where, as here, the court denies such request appellate courts must review the record to determine the context in which the refusal was made, noticing any expression or intimation by the trial court regarding the reasonableness of the request. Where further review of the record discloses no confusion or ambiguity and none is evinced by the jury, it is not prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse a jury request that testimony be repeated. While conceding to the jury that their request may subsequently be granted in the event further deliberations prove fruitless may be appropriate in some circumstances, the failure to do so does not automatically result in reversible error where a review of the record substantiates the trial court’s refusal to grant the jury request.
The circumstances in this case do not warrant a finding of prejudicial error.
Affirmed.
M. S. Coleman, J., concurred with J. W. Fitzgerald, J.

 MCLA 750.321; MSA 28.553.

 A position contrary to that adopted by the trial judge need not take the form of requiring the trial court to repeat portions of testimony requested by the jury. Indeed, no such authority exists. Rather, it logically focuses upon the proper exercise of judicial discretion in determining whether or not the request should be granted. See People v Kasem, 230 Mich 278; 203 NW135 (1925); People v Chivas, 322 Mich 384; 34 NW2d 22 (1948); People v Walker, 371 Mich 599; 124 NW2d 761 (1963). The trial court’s reluctance to honor the jury request was based upon the length of time required and the possibility that undue emphasis will be accorded that portion repeated. This two-fold rationale was set forth in United States v Rabb, 453 F2d 1012 (CA 3, 1971). However, the Court considered it prejudicial error to refuse the jury request that crucial testimony be repeated. The danger of placing undue emphasis upon selected portions of repeated testimony was evidenced in Henry v United States, 204 F2d 817 (CA 6, 1953). There, reversible error occurred where the trial court permitted testimony to be repeated for the jury which included comments by the judge clearly expressing his opinion that the witness was swearing falsely.

 MCLA 769.26; MSA 28.1096 states: "No judgment or verdict shall be set aside or reversed or a new trial be granted by any court of this state in any criminal case, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”