Court Opinion

ID: 9669702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:06:43.354448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:59.854081
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
In Arbach v. Gruba, 89 S.D. 322, 232 N.W.2d 842 (1975), the South Dakota Supreme Court stated:
It is settled law in this state that the violation of a safety statute, unless justified or excused, is negligence per se.
Id., 89 S.D. at 330, 232 N.W.2d at 846, citing Alley v. Siepman, 87 S.D. 670, 214 N.W.2d 7 (1974); Bothern v. Peterson, 83 S.D. 84, 155 N.W.2d 308 (1967).
Arbach was a negligent entrustment case that dealt with the violation of a safety statute which prohibited allowing an unlicensed person to operate one’s automobile, as follows:
SDCL 32-12-72. Allowing unauthorized person to use vehicle. No person shall authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to be driven upon any highway by any person who is not authorized under this chapter or in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter. A violation of this section is a Class 2 misdemeanor.
The present case deals with the violation of a safety statute prohibiting a person against driving without a license, as follows:
SDCL 32-12-22. Prohibition against driving without license — Misdemeanor. No person, ... shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has a valid license as an operator under the provisions of this chapter. Any person convicted for a violation of this section shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.
If it is negligence per se to allow an unlicensed driver to drive a car why isn’t it negligence per se for an unlicensed driver to drive?
Even if not negligence per se, driving without a license is certainly pertinent evidence of negligence and relevant and admissible in respect to competence and experience.
*642As stated by 4 F. Harper, The Law of Torts § 20.2 (2d ed. 1986):
Where the car is entrusted to an unlicensed driver, or where defendant himself drives it without a license, a similar question is presented ... did the harm result from the want of a license, or (more accurately) because of the risk of unskilled driving that the licensing statute sought to prevent? If the car was driven with all the skill and care the law requires, then the harm did not proceed from such a risk; if the car was negligently driven, then it did. The further question then arises: May the want of license be considered as some evidence that unskillfulness contributed to the accident? Some courts say no. But this effectively deprives the victim of any benefit, in a civil case, of a statute con-cededly passed in part for his protection. Nor does the ruling seem theoretically sound. The legislature has decided that the general safety requires the activity in question to be limited to those who can demonstrate at least a minimum of special skill. It is fair to assume that the unlicensed as a class are far less likely than those licensed to have the skill for which a license is required. And it is certainly true that when the unskilled attempt what it takes skill to do, some of the intangible factors that go to make up lack of skill are far more likely than not to have contributed to any mishap that occurs. Frequently they do this in ways that are hard to prove; moreover, what evidence there is in the matter is likely to be in the defendant’s hands. Both probability and policy, therefore, call for the rule that breach of a licensing statute, if it is negligence to the plaintiff at all, should be prima facie evidence that it is the ‘proximate cause’ of any injury that ensues, (emphasis added)
Id., at 112-113.
The trial court recognized the importance and relevancy of this evidence and tried to minimize the damaging effect of its decision by allowing the plaintiff to inquire as to competency and experience. It seems to me that’s like letting the plaintiff into the ring with one arm tied behind his back. Plaintiff should have been allowed to tell the jury that this young defendant was driving on the highways of this state even though she had not cared enough to obtain a driver’s license.
A review of SDCL ch. 19-12 on relevancy of evidence favors admissibility of the absence of a driver’s license. SDCL 19-12-1 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of a consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” SDCL 19-12-2 states in part that “all relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by Constitution or statute_” SDCL 19-12-3 provides that “although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” There is no showing in this case that the probative value of this relevant evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
“ ‘[Prejudice’ does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.”
State v. Iron Shell, 336 N.W.2d 372, 375 (S.D.1983), quoting 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5215 at 274-275 (1978). Here, this evidence may have prejudiced the defendant, but not unfairly; only unfair prejudice is excluded under SDCL 19-12-3.
The arguments advanced by the defendant to exclude this evidence are arguments more properly made to the jury rather than to the court. The effect of the “majority rule” advanced by the majority opinion is harmful to the administration of justice in the long-term because it shows inherent distrust for the jury and prevents them from knowing the full truth. In the short-*643term, it prevented the plaintiff from having a fair civil trial.
Accordingly, I dissent.