Court Opinion

ID: 9740756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:41:21.855977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.153389
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent, and would affirm the decision of the trial court, except for that portion of the trial court’s order which required the $23,000 award of marital property be paid at the rate of $350 per month. Such an installment award is contrary to the "clean break” philosophy of the Act and is justified only in exceptional circumstances. For purposes of reimbursement under section 503(c)(2), there is a difference between improvements and maintenance. If improvements do not in fact improve the property, if they do not increase its value, then they should not give rise to any right to reimbursement. If respondent here had spent his nonmarital funds on improvements which added nothing to the value of his house, and then sold it, he would have wasted his money. The result should be no different if petitioner and respondent together spent marital funds on improvements which added nothing to the value of the home. Parties sometimes make mistakes, or bad investments, with marital funds, and there is usually no way for one party to recover those funds from the other when the marriage is dissolved. Maintenance expenditures are expenditures which are used to keep up or preserve property rather than improve it. Such expenditures are not expected to result in an increase in the value of the house but nevertheless benefit the owner or occupant. If the owner of a house allows another to live in the house without paying rent, upon the condition that the occupant maintain the property in its original condition, the occupant will incur many expenses over the years but the owner will end up with no more than what he had when he started. In that situation, the occupant receives the benefit of the maintenance expenses. Feldman and Fleck recommend that with maintenance expenses the contributing estate be reimbursed the amount of the contribution but only if the estate has not already been compensated. (Feldman & Fleck, Taming Transmutation: A Guide to Illinois’ New Rules on Property Classification and Division upon Dissolution of Marriage, 72 Ill. B.J. 336, 342 (1984).) In contrast, Feldman and Fleck recommend that with improvements the contributing estate be reimbursed for the value added to the recipient property. 72 Ill. B.J. at 340-41. In Adams, this court stated that, with a marriage of short duration, evidence of appreciation in value was not required before reimbursement could be ordered for improvements. (Adams, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 305, 538 N.E.2d at 1292.) Some of the work done in Adams was maintenance: windows and siding, and paneling and wallpaper in the bedroom and kitchen. As to those items, Adams states the correct rule. With a short marriage, the contributing estate may not have had the time to be compensated for its maintenance contributions and there should be some reimbursement even without an increase in value. The test is not increase in value but compensation. There were also improvements in Adams: a new patio and an addition to the basement. As to those items, I disagree with the Adams rule. If the improvements added nothing to the value of the property because they were poorly done, were not a good idea in the first place, or otherwise, then there should be no reimbursement. The decision whether the improvements have value can be made at the time of dissolution even though the marriage is of short duration. It is sometimes difficult to determine whether particular expenses are improvements or just maintenance. The first item listed on petitioner’s exhibit No. 11 is "remodeled kitchen — new cabinets, $2[,]036.03.” Were there cabinets in the kitchen before these were installed? If so, had the old ones worn out or did these just look better? Were these cabinets a replacement or an upgrade? From the fact that the trial court found there was no increase in the value of the home, it appears that these cabinets were replacements and that the old ones were still serviceable. We need consider the expenses claimed here only to the extent that they constituted maintenance. Petitioner argues the couple had expended $14,717.18 for which the marital estate should be reimbursed. The parties had the use of the residence, however, during the approximately six years of the marriage. The trial court may have determined that the marital estate was thereby adequately compensated for its maintenance contributions, or the trial court may have determined that whatever minimal reimbursement was required was adequately handled by its award to petitioner of 52% of the marital property. The fact the new cabinets had many years of life left in them does not mandate reimbursement; compensation may be found in the other household fixtures which deteriorated during the marriage but were not replaced. We do not know that the trial court determined there was adequate compensation here but we may sustain a judgment upon any ground which is called for by the record, regardless of whether the ground was relied upon by the trial court and regardless of whether the reason given by the trial court was correct. (Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 382, 387, 457 N.E.2d 9, 12; Bell v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 135, 148, 478 N.E.2d 384, 389-90; Hall v. Eaton (1994), 259 Ill. App. 3d 319, 321, 631 N.E.2d 805, 807.) A reviewing court will extend all reasonable presumptions in favor of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken, and will not presume that error occurred below. (Village of Cary v. Jakubek (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 341, 345-46, 459 N.E.2d 651, 654; In re Marriage of Frazier (1990), 205 Ill. App. 3d 621, 625, 563 N.E.2d 1236, 1239; In re Marriage of Pitulla (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 103, 114-15, 559 N.E.2d 819, 829.) I would affirm the trial court’s resolution of the reimbursement issue in this case. Section 503(c)(2) of the Act was a legislative response to the supreme court’s decision in In re Marriage of Smith (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239. This area of the law is certainly more complicated since the enactment of section 503(c)(2), particularly if the Feldman and Fleck rules are followed. Nevertheless, I do not see any way to avoid complicated rules. It would be unfair to give a dollar-for-dollar reimbursement for maintenance expenses for which the contributing estate has already been compensated.