Court Opinion

ID: 9896958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:04:40.853171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:55.804698
License: Public Domain

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DEREK MAIA v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
                (SC 20786)
                  Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,
                    Mullins, Ecker and Alexander, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to sixty
   years of incarceration, the maximum sentence for that crime, sought a
   writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, M,
   had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise the
   petitioner to accept the trial court’s plea offer of forty-five years of
   incarceration in exchange for his guilty plea. At the petitioner’s habeas
   trial, M testified that he believed that he had advised the petitioner, in
   light of the plea offer, about the strength of the state’s case, the weak-
   nesses of his defenses, statements from witnesses on which the state was
   going to rely at trial, the elements of the charged crime, the petitioner’s
   chances of succeeding at trial and his sentencing exposure if he were
   to proceed to trial. M also testified that he would have told the petitioner
   that his chances of succeeding at trial were not good given M’s evaluation
   of the evidence. In addition, M testified that he never advised clients
   to accept or reject a plea offer but allowed them to decide for themselves.
   On the other hand, the petitioner testified at the habeas trial that M had
   informed him of the forty-five year offer but never advised him that it
   was in his best interest to accept the offer. The petitioner claimed that
   he would have accepted the offer had M advised him to do so. The
   habeas court granted the habeas petition, concluding that, although M
   had adequately advised the petitioner about the strength of the state’s
   case, the weaknesses of his case, his chances of succeeding at trial,
   and his sentencing exposure, M’s performance was deficient and the
   petitioner was prejudiced thereby because M had failed to advise the
   petitioner to accept the court’s plea offer and, if he had done so, the
   petitioner would have accepted the offer. The court reasoned that it
   was very unlikely that the petitioner would have prevailed at trial and
   that the forty-five year offer was the only meaningful opportunity for
   him to receive a sentence that was less than the maximum of sixty
   years. The habeas court thereafter denied the petition of the respondent,
   the Commissioner of Correction, for certification to appeal, and the
   respondent appealed.

Held that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the respondent’s
   petition for certification to appeal, the habeas court having incorrectly
   concluded that M had rendered deficient performance by failing to advise
   the petitioner to accept the forty-five year plea offer:

   This court concluded that there is no per se requirement that defense
   counsel recommend whether a defendant should accept a plea offer,
   and the need to provide a specific recommendation in any particular
   case depends on a number of factors, including the defendant’s chances
   of prevailing at trial, the disparity between the sentence proposed in the
   plea offer and the likely sentence that would be imposed if the defendant
   were found guilty after a trial, whether the defendant has maintained
   his innocence, and the defendant’s comprehension of the various consid-
   erations that will inform his plea decision.

   Moreover, prior Appellate Court cases led this court to conclude that
   defense counsel not only must explain to the defendant the strengths
   and weaknesses of the state’s case, the charges he is facing, and the
   maximum sentence to which he would be exposed if he were unsuccess-
   ful at trial, but also advise on how those strengths and weaknesses relate
   to the state’s likelihood of prevailing at trial and on the challenges the
   defendant would face in putting on his own defense.

   The range of circumstances a particular defendant might face, including,
   for example, a defendant’s health, the effects of incarceration or a trial
   on family members, or the defendant’s assertion of his innocence, also
   informs defense counsel’s decision whether to recommend that a defen-
  dant accept a plea offer.

  In the present case, the habeas court found that M had effectively commu-
  nicated to the petitioner the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s
  case, the evidence on which the state was going to rely, the elements
  of the charged crime, the petitioner’s chances of succeeding at trial, and
  his sentencing exposure, and this guidance provided the petitioner with
  sufficient information to make a reasonably informed decision about
  whether to accept the plea offer.

  Furthermore, the habeas court erred when it relied solely on the fact
  that the forty-five year plea offer was the only meaningful opportunity
  for the petitioner to receive a sentence less than the maximum sentence
  in concluding that M’s representation was ineffective.

  In addition, consideration of the factors for determining whether defense
  counsel should recommend that the defendant accept a plea offer led
  this court to conclude that it would not have been unreasonable for M
  not to have provided the petitioner with a specific recommendation and,
  accordingly, M’s representation of the petitioner was not deficient.

  This court overruled the Appellate Court’s decision in Sanders v. Com-
  missioner of Correction (169 Conn. App. 813) to the extent that the
  Appellate Court determined in that case that trial counsel’s performance
  was deficient because, among other things, counsel failed to provide the
  petitioner with an opinion as to what plea to enter.
         Argued March 23—officially released August 8, 2023

                           Procedural History

  Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Tolland and tried to the court, Parkinson, J.; judgment
granting the petition; thereafter, the court denied the
petition for certification to appeal, and the respondent
appealed. Reversed; judgment directed.
  James A. Killen, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, was Marc Ramia, senior assis-
tant state’s attorney, for the appellant (respondent).
  Kayla R. Stephen, with whom was Alice Osedach Powers,
for the appellee (petitioner).
                         Opinion

   D’AURIA, J. In this certified appeal, we consider
whether trial counsel for the petitioner, Derek Maia,
rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to rec-
ommend that the petitioner accept the court’s pretrial
plea offer of a forty-five year sentence of incarceration,
considering that the court sentenced him to sixty years
after trial. We disagree with the habeas court’s determi-
nation that counsel’s lack of a specific recommendation
amounted to deficient performance pursuant to Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80
L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). As a result, we reverse the habeas
court’s judgment and remand the case to that court
with direction to deny the petitioner’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.
   As reported in the Appellate Court’s opinion in State
v. Maia, 48 Conn. App. 677, 678–80, 712 A.2d 956, cert.
denied, 245 Conn. 918, 717 A.2d 236 (1998), affirming
the trial court’s judgment of conviction, the jury in the
petitioner’s underlying criminal case reasonably could
have found the following facts. In October, 1993, ‘‘a
community newspaper association known as Da Ghetto
held a [fundraising] Halloween party at the Casa Mia
restaurant in Waterbury.’’ Id., 678. Guests paid an admis-
sion price to attend the party. Id. ‘‘The [petitioner]
arrived [at the event] between 11 and 11:30 p.m. Upon
his arrival, the [petitioner] complained about having to
wait outside for a long time before he was admitted
inside. The party had been planned to continue until 2
a.m. . . . At some point, however, Mark Yates, the
senior editor of Da Ghetto, announced that the party
was ending early because of ‘inappropriate conduct.’
. . .
   ‘‘The [petitioner] angrily confronted Yates about end-
ing the party early and demanded his money back. . . .
The [petitioner] then had an altercation with Leroy
Flint, an employee of Casa Mia and the boyfriend of
the restaurant owner, Delores Trudeau, and had further
altercations with his brother and his cousin when they
tried to calm him, and with Yates’ brother. The [peti-
tioner], who was described as acting ‘like a typhoon,’
pushed and shoved anyone who was in his path. Tru-
deau overheard the [petitioner] state that ‘someone was
going to stop breathing.’ The [petitioner] eventually left
Casa Mia with his friend, Brian Brown. The [petitioner]
and Brown drove to the house where Brown’s girlfriend
lived. Once there, Brown went inside and the [peti-
tioner] waited in the car. After about five minutes,
Brown returned and gave the [petitioner] a bag con-
taining a gun. The [petitioner] and Brown then pro-
ceeded back to Casa Mia.
  ‘‘At approximately 1 a.m. . . . Martin Hayre, Michael
Millhouse and the victim, Christopher Love, were leav-
ing Casa Mia together. Hayre and the victim walked out
of Casa Mia and waited on the curb for Millhouse to
come with his car. When Millhouse pulled his car up,
the victim opened the front passenger door and Hayre
opened the right rear door. As they were getting into
the car, the [petitioner] approached, said something to
the victim and then shot the victim in the face. The
victim died of a gunshot wound to the head.
   ‘‘At trial, the [petitioner] admitted that he was respon-
sible for the victim’s death. He testified, however, that
he did not intend to take the victim’s life. The [peti-
tioner] testified that he had been drinking and had
smoked marijuana that night. He testified that he did
not leave the gun in the car when he and Brown returned
to Casa Mia because he had been in previous arguments
at the bar and had been jumped by several people. He
testified that he approached the victim and wanted to
talk to him about the way the party was ended. At that
time, the gun was in the [petitioner’s] shirt pocket, with
the handle hanging out. The [petitioner] testified that
he heard footsteps behind him and that as he was going
to turn around, he was ‘yanked from the back by [the]
hood.’ His arm then went up and the gun went off. The
[petitioner] was convicted of murder and sentenced to
a term of sixty years [of] imprisonment.’’ (Footnotes
omitted.) Id., 678–80. The petitioner appealed to the
Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court’s judgment
of conviction. See id., 690.
   The petitioner later filed this habeas action and, in his
second amended petition, alleged that his trial counsel,
Attorney Alan McWhirter, had rendered ineffective
assistance by ‘‘fail[ing] to adequately advise the peti-
tioner of the strength of the state’s case and the weak-
ness of the petitioner’s possible defenses’’ and ‘‘fail[ing]
to adequately advise the petitioner to accept a plea
offer.’’1 The petitioner argued that McWhirter provided
ineffective assistance because, when he presented the
court’s plea offer of forty-five years to the petitioner,
McWhirter did not advise him to accept this offer, not-
withstanding that the petitioner faced the possibility of
sixty years in prison.
   Despite concluding that McWhirter had adequately
advised the petitioner of the strengths and weaknesses
of the state’s case, the habeas court ruled in the petition-
er’s favor, finding that ‘‘McWhirter rendered deficient
performance by not recommending to [the petitioner]
that he accept the court indicated offer of forty-five
years.’’ The habeas court further concluded that the
petitioner was prejudiced because it was reasonably
probable that, without McWhirter’s deficient perfor-
mance, the petitioner would have accepted the plea
offer and that the trial judge would have accepted the
plea agreement.
  The habeas court found the following additional facts
that are relevant to this appeal. McWhirter had been a
public defender for eighteen years prior to the petition-
er’s jury trial. He had been trial counsel in many criminal
cases, including one dozen or more murder trials. McWhir-
ter began representing the petitioner the night that the
petitioner turned himself in to the police. He began
preparing for trial the moment representation started.
This preparation included using the petitioner’s proba-
ble cause hearing to discover relevant information and
to question witnesses in advance of trial, using investi-
gators to produce evidence to counter the state’s evi-
dence and support his client’s defenses, and receiving
and reviewing all discovery from the state. McWhirter also
explored the possibility of resolving the case via plea dis-
cussions.
   In McWhirter’s opinion, the state’s case against the
petitioner was very strong and would be very difficult
to defend. He testified that the state was very forthcom-
ing in the discovery process, which he took as a sign
that the state was confident in its case. McWhirter’s
defense strategy was to negate the intent element of
murder, resulting in a conviction of the lesser included
offense of manslaughter in the first degree. McWhirter
intended to show that the petitioner accidentally shot
the victim after someone jumped on his back. Other
than the petitioner’s own testimony, the only evidence
to support this theory was the statement of Clyde Wil-
kins. Wilkins told the petitioner’s private investigator
that the petitioner had shot the victim after he was
accosted from behind by Hayre. Critically, Wilkins’
statement contradicted Hayre’s statement. Hayre told
the police that the petitioner had walked up to the
victim, took out a gun, put it to the victim’s head and
fired one gunshot at close range. Hayre stated that the
‘‘scuffle’’ between himself and the petitioner occurred
after the petitioner shot the victim. McWhirter testified
that a potential weakness in the state’s case was that the
eyewitnesses testifying against the petitioner, including
Hayre, were the victim’s friends, which the defense
could use to show bias. According to McWhirter, the
petitioner did not disagree with the defense strategy.
McWhirter anticipated that the state would argue that,
because the petitioner had left Casa Mia and returned
with a gun, he intended to shoot and kill the victim.
He did not expect the jury to consider the petitioner’s
leaving and returning with a gun in a good light.
   About two months after the petitioner’s arrest, the
state offered him a sentence of sixty years of incarcera-
tion in exchange for a guilty plea to the charge of mur-
der. McWhirter communicated this offer to the peti-
tioner and discussed it with him. As this offer presented
no tangible benefit—it was the maximum charge and
maximum sentence—the petitioner did not accept it.
After the initial offer, McWhirter discussed the possibil-
ity of a plea agreement with the state, but the state
made no further offer.
  Almost two years after the initial plea offer, during
a judicial pretrial, the court presented a plea agreement
offering a sentence of forty-five years in exchange for
a guilty plea to the charge of murder. McWhirter com-
municated the court’s offer to the petitioner but could
not recall their specific discussion about it. McWhirter
testified, however, that his normal practice was to
explain to clients that, if they did not accept a plea offer,
the court would withdraw it and not make it available
again. According to McWhirter, he never advised clients
to accept or not to accept a plea offer. It was his practice
to allow his clients to come to that decision indepen-
dently without a specific recommendation. He testified
that, in his opinion, only a client can make the decision
about whether to accept a plea offer. McWhirter could
not recall if the petitioner ever advised him that he did
not want to proceed to trial. Importantly, McWhirter
testified that he believed that, as was his normal prac-
tice, he had advised the petitioner on the strength of
the state’s case, the weaknesses of his defenses, the
witness statements the state relied on, the elements of
the charges, the petitioner’s chances at trial, and his
sentencing exposure going to trial. He also testified that
he would have told the petitioner that the chance he
would prevail at trial was not good given McWhirter’s
evaluation of the evidence and what evidence he antici-
pated the state would present at trial.
   In contrast, the petitioner testified that McWhirter
informed him of the court’s offer but did not advise
him about the strengths of the state’s case or the weak-
nesses of his potential defenses.2 The petitioner testified
that he was uncertain whether McWhirter was going to
argue at trial that he acted in self-defense or that the
shooting was unintentional. The petitioner maintained
that, if McWhirter had advised him that claiming self-
defense was untenable, he would have accepted the
plea offer and pleaded guilty. The petitioner also testi-
fied that, during jury selection, he asked McWhirter if
he could personally speak with the state’s attorney to
negotiate a plea deal, but McWhirter said it was too
late. The petitioner denied that McWhirter informed
him that the court’s offer would be withdrawn if he did
not accept it and that it was unlikely that he would
receive another offer.3 The petitioner indicated that
McWhirter never advised him that it was in his best
interest to accept a plea offer, but that, if he had, he
would have accepted the court’s offer.
   The habeas court did not find the petitioner’s testi-
mony regarding McWhirter’s alleged failures as defense
counsel credible, instead crediting McWhirter’s testi-
mony. In particular, the habeas court concluded that
McWhirter did not fail to adequately advise the peti-
tioner about the strengths of the state’s case, the weak-
nesses of his defense, the petitioner’s chances at trial
and sentencing exposure going to trial. However, the
habeas court concluded that McWhirter’s failure to
advise the petitioner to accept the court’s plea offer
constituted deficient performance. The court noted that
the petitioner’s chances of prevailing at trial were very
unlikely and that the court’s offer of forty-five years was
the ‘‘only meaningful opportunity for [the petitioner] to
receive a sentence less than the maximum sentence [of
sixty years] for murder.’’ The court reasoned that these
considerations, coupled with the court’s finding that the
petitioner never maintained his innocence but claimed
only that he lacked the requisite intent to commit mur-
der, supported the conclusion that McWhirter’s failure
to advise the petitioner to accept the court’s offer
amounted to deficient performance. The habeas court
concluded that this deficient performance prejudiced
the petitioner because the court credited the petition-
er’s testimony that he would have accepted the trial
court’s offer had McWhirter recommended it.
   The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction,
then petitioned for certification to appeal to the Appel-
late Court, which the habeas court denied. The respon-
dent then appealed to the Appellate Court, and we trans-
ferred the appeal to this court. See General Statutes
§ 51-199 (c); Practice Book § 65-2.
   ‘‘Faced with the habeas court’s denial of [a petition
for] certification to appeal, [an appellant’s] first burden
is to demonstrate that the habeas court’s ruling consti-
tuted an abuse of discretion. . . . If the [appellant] suc-
ceeds in surmounting that hurdle, the [appellant] must
then demonstrate that the judgment of the habeas court
should be reversed on its merits.’’ (Citations omitted.)
Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126
(1994). To show that a court abused its discretion in
denying certification to appeal, an appellant must ‘‘dem-
onstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of
reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a differ-
ent manner]; or that the questions are adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.’’ (Emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Castonguay
v. Commissioner of Correction, 300 Conn. 649, 657, 16
A.3d 676 (2011).
   Necessarily, therefore, the respondent first claims
that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying
his petition for certification to appeal because the issue
of whether and when counsel must provide a specific
recommendation as to a plea offer is not settled law. The
respondent argues that the habeas court’s resolution
of the petitioner’s claim of ineffectiveness based on
trial counsel’s failure to advise him to accept the court’s
plea deal is debatable among reasonable jurists. The
petitioner counters that the issue of when counsel is
obligated to recommend that a client accept a plea
offer is settled law in Connecticut. In particular, the
petitioner argues, and the respondent agrees, that each
case requires a fact specific analysis, as there is no
‘‘bright-line’’ rule that counsel must make a recommen-
dation in every case. According to the petitioner, because
the habeas court properly analyzed the facts, the issue
in this case is not debatable among jurists of reason.
   ‘‘In determining whether the habeas court abused
its discretion in denying the petitioner’s petition for
certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of
the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether
the habeas court reasonably determined that the peti-
tioner’s appeal was frivolous.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Meletrich v. Commissioner of Correction, 332
Conn. 615, 626, 212 A.3d 678 (2019). We therefore turn
to the merits of the respondent’s claim, which is gov-
erned by our well established jurisprudence regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel: The sixth and four-
teenth amendments to the United States constitution
guarantee criminal defendants the right to the effective
assistance of counsel for their defense in state prosecu-
tions. Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 685–86;
Helmedach v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn.
726, 732–33, 189 A.3d 1173 (2018). A defendant seeking
habeas relief for ineffective representation must prove
two elements. ‘‘First, the defendant must show that
counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires [a]
showing that counsel made errors so serious that coun-
sel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the
defendant by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.’’4 (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390, 120 S.
Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000), quoting Strickland
v. Washington, supra, 687.
   In reviewing ineffective assistance claims, ‘‘we are
mindful that [t]he habeas court is afforded broad discre-
tion in making its factual findings, and those findings
will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.
. . . The application of the habeas court’s factual find-
ings to the pertinent legal standard, however, presents
a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to
plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 325 Conn. 640,
666–67, 159 A.3d 1112 (2017).
   The respondent claims that the habeas court improp-
erly found McWhirter’s representation deficient solely
because he did not specifically recommend to the peti-
tioner that he should accept the court’s plea offer.5 The
respondent first argues that binding case law did not
require McWhirter to directly advise the petitioner to
accept the court’s plea offer. Rather, he asserts that
prior case law supports a conclusion that McWhirter’s
performance was not deficient in the present case. Second,
the respondent argues that the habeas court’s holding
is out of line with federal precedent regarding whether
trial counsel is required to provide a specific recommen-
dation as to whether to accept a plea deal. Finally, the
respondent argues that whether to recommend that a
client accept a plea offer should be left to counsel’s
‘‘ ‘wide discretion . . . .’ ’’ He specifically contends
that trial counsel should be hesitant to make recommen-
dations because only a criminal defendant can measure
and account for certain factors that might necessarily
impact his decision of whether to accept a plea offer,
including health and family concerns, his relationships
with others, and his prior experiences with prison life,
including his belief in his ability to adapt to it. Addition-
ally, the respondent asserts that trial counsel is in a
‘‘far better position than a reviewing court, twenty-five
years later, to gauge firsthand exactly the type of advice
that [the] client was seeking and otherwise needed’’
when advising a client on a plea offer.
  The petitioner responds that the habeas court cor-
rectly concluded that he was denied the effective assis-
tance of counsel because his attorney did not specifi-
cally recommend whether he should accept the court’s
offer of forty-five years. He argues that Appellate Court
case law indicates that professional advice and assis-
tance concerning a plea offer, as well as trial counsel’s
evaluation of the plea, are necessary to render compe-
tent performance. He argues that McWhirter should
have ‘‘given the petitioner his advice as to the best
course of action since the petitioner was not likely to
prevail at trial . . . there was a likelihood of disparity
in sentencing after a full trial compared to the offer,
the petitioner did not maintain his innocence and the
petitioner’s level of comprehension of pertinent fac-
tors.’’ We agree with the respondent that McWhirter’s
performance was not deficient in the present case.
   A defendant’s right to effective representation applies
to all ‘‘ ‘critical stages’ ’’ of a criminal prosecution, including
any plea negotiations. Helmedach v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 329 Conn. 733, quoting Missouri v.
Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 182 L. Ed. 2d
379 (2012). ‘‘In today’s criminal justice system . . . the
negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding
of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defen-
dant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v.
Commissioner of Correction, 338 Conn. 330, 340, 258
A.3d 40 (2021). ‘‘Precisely defining counsel’s duties dur-
ing plea negotiations is, however, a difficult task’’;
Helmedach v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 734;
because ‘‘[t]he proper measure of attorney performance
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing profes-
sional norms.’’ Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466
U.S. 688. Counsel performs effectively and reasonably
when he provides a client with adequate information
and advice on which the client can make an informed
decision as to whether to accept the state’s plea offer.
See Melendez v. Commissioner of Correction, 151
Conn. App. 351, 359, 95 A.3d 551, cert. denied, 314 Conn.
914, 100 A.3d 405 (2014).
 There is no per se requirement that defense counsel
must recommend whether a client should accept a plea
offer. See Moore v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
338 Conn. 341 n.6 (clarifying that appellate case law
’’require[s] counsel to provide advice on plea offers,
but [does] not mandate that counsel make specific rec-
ommendations in all circumstances’’). This is because
providing a specific recommendation implicates two
critical and sometimes conflicting rights: ‘‘On the one
hand, defense counsel must give the client the benefit
of counsel’s professional advice on this crucial decision
of whether to plead guilty. . . . As part of this advice,
counsel must communicate to the defendant the terms
of the plea offer . . . and should usually inform the
defendant of the strengths and weaknesses of the case
against him, as well as the alternative sentences to
which he will most likely be exposed . . . . On the
other hand, the ultimate decision whether to plead
guilty must be made by the defendant. . . . And a law-
yer must take care not to coerce a client into either
accepting or rejecting a plea offer.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Purdy v. United
States, 208 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2000). The need to pro-
vide a specific recommendation in any particular case
depends on a number of factors, including ‘‘the defen-
dant’s chances of prevailing at trial, the likely disparity
in sentencing after a full trial as compared to a guilty
plea . . . whether the defendant has maintained his
innocence, and the defendant’s comprehension of the
various factors that will inform his plea decision.’’ Id.,
45; see also Moore v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 338 Conn. 343 (adopting factors set forth in
Purdy). Thus, ‘‘whether an attorney’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness’’ by fail-
ing to provide a specific recommendation requires a
case-by-case, fact specific analysis. (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Moore v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 341–42. Although this court has not yet consid-
ered whether trial counsel performs deficiently by fail-
ing to recommend that a client accept a plea offer, the
Appellate Court has addressed this issue several times.
A review of this case law, and a resolution of its incon-
sistencies, is beneficial for our analysis in the pres-
ent case.
  In Vazquez v. Commissioner of Correction, 123
Conn. App. 424, 1 A.3d 1242 (2010), cert. denied, 302
Conn. 901, 23 A.3d 1241 (2011), after a jury found the
petitioner guilty of assault in the first degree, the trial
court sentenced him to a term of sixteen years of incar-
ceration, execution suspended after eight years. Id.,
427. The petitioner filed a habeas action on the ground
that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance
by failing to adequately counsel him regarding the advis-
ability of accepting the state’s plea offer of ten years
of incarceration, execution suspended after four years.
Id., 425–26. The habeas court denied the petitioner’s
habeas petition. Id., 427. On appeal, the Appellate Court
held that trial counsel’s failure to recommend that the
petitioner accept the plea offer did not constitute defi-
cient performance under Strickland. See id., 439–40.
Specifically, the Appellate Court upheld the habeas court’s
finding that counsel had ‘‘fully advised the petitioner
concerning the state’s plea offer . . . .’’ Id., 439. The
court noted that, although counsel believed that the
petitioner had a viable self-defense claim, which they
communicated to the petitioner, and that defense
proved unsuccessful, counsel performed adequately by
fully informing the petitioner of the risks associated
with trial, ‘‘the charges against him . . . the merits of
the state’s case and the petitioner’s claim of self-
defense, including the fact that the jury had to believe
that the petitioner’s use of force was not excessive and
was reasonable under the circumstances.’’ Id., 436. The
court also emphasized that the petitioner consistently
had maintained his innocence and was adamant that
he wanted to go to trial because he believed that had
a viable self-defense claim. Id., 439. Under these circum-
stances, the court in Vazquez determined that the lack
of a specific recommendation to take the plea offer was
not constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id.
   In Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, 150 Conn.
App. 781, 93 A.3d 165 (2014), the Appellate Court again
addressed whether trial counsel rendered constitution-
ally deficient performance by failing to ‘‘give the peti-
tioner her professional advice and assistance concern-
ing, and her evaluation of, the court’s [pretrial] plea
offer.’’ Id., 802. Counsel testified that it was her practice
to refrain from giving advice on plea offers to protect
herself from habeas and grievance actions in which
clients could claim that they were coerced into pleading
guilty. Id., 788. The habeas court found that trial counsel
had informed the petitioner about the offer but had not
given him any advice on the offer. Id., 795–96. The habeas
court went on to conclude that counsel had not ren-
dered constitutionally deficient performance, however,
as she had ‘‘fully apprised the petitioner as to the terms
of the plea offer . . . the strengths and weaknesses of
the prosecution and defense cases, and the possible
outcomes after trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id., 795. The habeas court also noted that convic-
tion in that case was not a foregone conclusion because
the petitioner’s guilt hinged on the believability of
coconspirator and circumstantial evidence. Id. As a
result, the habeas court concluded that defense counsel
had not performed deficiently by not recommending
that the petitioner accept the plea offer. See id.
  On appeal, the Appellate Court in Barlow agreed with
the habeas court that, under the circumstances of that
case, counsel had no obligation to recommend that
the petitioner accept the court’s plea offer. Id., 796.
However, the court held that counsel had ‘‘an obligation
to provide advice and assistance to the petitioner
regarding that plea offer, [which she] admittedly failed
to do.’’ Id., 796–97. The court noted that the petitioner’s
trial counsel had testified that she refrained from giving
the petitioner any advice as to the plea offer but that
she ‘‘merely gave [the petitioner] the facts of the offer,’’
which the Appellate Court interpreted to mean that she
provided ‘‘no assistance or advice as [the petitioner]
weighed his options.’’ Id., 801.6 Because of this, the
Appellate Court concluded that trial counsel’s perfor-
mance was deficient. See id., 796–97. The court empha-
sized that, although the decision to accept or reject a
plea offer must ultimately be made by the defendant,
this decision ‘‘should be made . . . with the adequate
professional assistance, advice, and input of his . . .
counsel.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 800.7
   The year after deciding Barlow, the Appellate Court
decided Andrews v. Commissioner of Correction, 155
Conn. App. 548, 110 A.3d 489, cert. denied, 316 Conn.
911, 112 A.3d 174 (2015). After rejecting a plea offer
of twenty years of incarceration, execution suspended
after twelve years, the petitioner in Andrews was con-
victed of assault of a peace officer, attempt to commit
assault in the first degree, attempt to commit assault
of a peace officer, and possession of a sawed-off shot-
gun. Id., 550. The court sentenced him to a total effective
term of forty years of imprisonment. Id. Upholding the
habeas court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, the Appellate Court distin-
guished the facts of Barlow, explaining that, ‘‘[u]nlike
trial counsel in Barlow, who provided no advice or
assistance to her client on the plea offer, trial counsel
in [Andrews] explained to the petitioner the strengths
and weaknesses of the state’s case, the charges he was
facing, and the maximum sentence he would be exposed
to if he was unsuccessful at trial. Trial counsel explained
that the petitioner would likely receive a significantly
higher sentence than twelve years if he was convicted
at trial, that he believed that the state had a strong case
against the petitioner, and that it would be a difficult
case to win because most of the witnesses were police
officers . . . one [of whom] had sustained permanent
serious injury. Although trial counsel left the ultimate
decision of whether to accept or to reject the offer to
the petitioner, he provided the petitioner with adequate
professional advice on [his] options and the best course
of action . . . given the facts of the case and the peti-
tioner’s potential total sentence exposure.’’ (Emphasis
added.) Id., 554–55. The court held that counsel’s assis-
tance was not ineffective despite counsel’s failure to
specifically recommend that the petitioner accept the
plea offer. Id.
   The facts in Sanders v. Commissioner of Correction,
169 Conn. App. 813, 153 A.3d 8 (2016), cert. denied, 325
Conn. 904, 156 A.3d 536 (2017), differed only somewhat
from those in Andrews, but, in Sanders, the differences
compelled the opposite conclusion. The petitioner in
Sanders was charged with two counts of assault in
the first degree and with being a persistent dangerous
felony offender. Id., 815. The charges stemmed from an
incident in which the petitioner had shot the victim
multiple times in the presence of the victim’s girlfriend.
Id. Both the victim and his girlfriend identified the peti-
tioner as the shooter. Id., 815–16. The state offered the
petitioner eight years of incarceration in exchange for
a guilty plea, which he declined. Id., 816. Like McWhirter
in the present case, and trial counsel in Barlow, trial
counsel in Sanders testified that his general practice
was to ‘‘[present] his clients with the positive [and] the
negatives of going to trial—the risks of trial [and] the
maximum exposure,’’ but that he does not specifically
recommend that a client accept or reject a plea offer.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 817. The peti-
tioner was convicted on all charges, and the court
imposed a sentence of forty years of imprisonment. Id.,
816. The habeas court found that counsel ‘‘did in fact
adequately explain the pretrial offer, discuss the case,
discuss the maximum punishments, discuss the pros
and cons of pleading guilty or not guilty, but left, as he
should have, the final decision as to whether to accept
or reject such offer to [the petitioner].’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 819. Despite these findings,
the Appellate Court held that ‘‘advising the petitioner
on the strengths and weaknesses of his case, alerting
him to his potential exposure and explaining to him the
terms of the plea offer is insufficient . . . .’’ Id., 831.
The court distinguished its holding in Andrews, reason-
ing that, unlike counsel in Andrews, counsel in Sanders
had not provided the petitioner with his opinion as to
whether the state would prevail at trial; id., 833; or his
‘‘professional advice as to the best course of action
. . . .’’ Id., 831. Although the court concluded that trial
counsel’s performance was deficient, it ultimately ruled
against the petitioner, as he had failed to prove that
he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.
Id., 838.
   Fulfilling counsel’s constitutional duty to provide suf-
ficient advice while not overstepping and potentially
coercing a client can be a fine line to walk. Ultimately,
we conclude that the Appellate Court’s conclusion in
Sanders concerning the effectiveness of counsel’s assis-
tance falls on the wrong side of the line, and we must
overrule it. Although the court recognized that there is
no per se rule obligating counsel to provide recommen-
dations regarding plea offers, it interpreted Barlow to
establish ‘‘an obligation for defense counsel to provide
professional advice, assistance and an ‘informed opin-
ion as to what pleas [to] enter’ and to make ‘an informed
evaluation of the options and determine which alterna-
tive will offer the [petitioner] the most favorable out-
come.’ ’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 832, quoting Barlow v.
Commissioner of Correction, supra, 150 Conn. App. 798.
In our view, requiring that counsel provide an ‘‘opinion’’
as to what plea to enter cannot be distinguished from
requiring counsel to provide a specific recommendation
to either accept or reject a particular plea offer. Neither
is required in every case for counsel to have rendered
constitutionally effective assistance, as ‘‘[t]here is no
per se rule requiring specific conduct of defense attor-
neys during plea negotiations.’’ Moore v. Commissioner
of Correction, supra, 338 Conn. 341. The approach taken
by the court in Sanders is not consistent with the
approach Strickland and the cases that have followed
it have directed, which is to consider counsel’s perfor-
mance ‘‘in light of all the circumstances’’; Strickland v.
Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 690; see also Jordan v.
Commissioner of Correction, 341 Conn. 279, 287, 267
A.3d 120 (2021); and is at odds with the fundamental
governing principles that this court has established,
namely, that ‘‘[t]he parameters of appropriate advice
required during plea negotiations are determined by a
fact specific inquiry in which we consider whether an
attorney’s performance fell below ‘an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness.’ ’’ Moore v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 338 Conn. 341–42.
   Most recently, in Carrasquillo v. Commissioner of
Correction, 206 Conn. App. 195, 259 A.3d 1182, cert.
denied, 339 Conn. 907, 260 A.3d 1227 (2021), the Appel-
late Court reiterated that ‘‘there is no requirement that
counsel specifically recommend that [a defendant]
accept a plea offer.’’ Id., 209, citing Barlow v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, supra, 150 Conn. App. 794–95.
After rejecting a plea offer of twenty-five years of incar-
ceration—the mandatory minimum sentence for the
crime of murder—the petitioner in Carrasquillo was
found guilty of murder and carrying a pistol without a
permit and sentenced to thirty-five years of incarceration.
Carrasquillo v. Commissioner of Correction, supra,
196–97. The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, claiming in relevant part that trial coun-
sel had failed to ‘‘explain the strength of the state’s
case against him, advise him of the maximum possible
sentence for murder, or make a recommendation as to
whether he should accept the proposed plea bargain.’’
Id., 208. The habeas court disagreed with the petitioner,
concluding that trial counsel had not rendered deficient
performance after the court found that she ‘‘had exten-
sive discussions with the petitioner about the strengths
and weaknesses of the case, expressed her belief as to
the likelihood of success after trial and told him that, in
the end, it was his choice to make.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 202, 209. The court also found that
there was evidence to suggest that counsel had, in fact,
recommended that the petitioner plead guilty. Id. The
Appellate Court upheld the habeas court’s judgment,
holding that ‘‘counsel’s duty is to provide an informed
opinion regarding the plea offer under the circum-
stances of the case,’’ which does not always require a
recommendation to accept a plea offer. Id., 209.
Because the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that
counsel’s advice fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, her performance was not deficient. Id.,
207–208.
   This case law informs our conclusion that counsel
must not only explain to the defendant the strengths
and weaknesses of the state’s case, the charges he is
facing, and the maximum sentence he would be exposed
to if he were unsuccessful at trial, he also must advise
his client on how those strengths and weaknesses relate
to the state’s likelihood of prevailing at trial and on the
challenges a defendant would face in putting on his own
defense. See Andrews v. Commissioner of Correction,
supra, 155 Conn. App. 554–55. This is because ‘‘[a]
defendant relies heavily [on] counsel’s independent
evaluation of the charges and defenses, applicable law,
the evidence and the risks and probable outcome of
a trial.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Ebron v. Commissioner of Correction, 120
Conn. App. 560, 572, 992 A.2d 1200 (2010), rev’d in part
on other grounds, 307 Conn. 342, 53 A.3d 983 (2012),
cert. denied sub nom. Arnone v. Ebron, 569 U.S. 913,
133 S. Ct. 1726, 185 L. Ed. 2d 802 (2013). ‘‘Instead of
failing to meet a prescribed, mechanical standard, coun-
sel’s performance has been held to be constitutionally
deficient when counsel failed to provide his client with
sufficient information about the client’s sentencing
exposure to allow the client to make a reasonably
informed decision [regarding] whether to accept a plea
offer.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moore v.
Commissioner of Correction, supra, 338 Conn. 343.
Although trial counsel must leave the ultimate decision
of whether to accept or to reject a plea offer to a defen-
dant—and must avoid coercing the defendant into tak-
ing a particular plea—he must also provide the peti-
tioner with adequate professional advice on his options.
   This standard is consistent with the standard federal
courts apply. Under federal precedent, an attorney’s
performance is deficient if the attorney communicates
a plea offer to a client but fails to render ‘‘ ‘professional
advice’ ’’ or guidance. Purdy v. United States, supra,
208 F.3d 44, 47. This advice includes ‘‘communicat[ing]
to the defendant the terms of the plea offer . . . and
. . . usually inform[ing] the defendant of the strengths
and weaknesses of the case against him, as well as the
alternative sentences to which he will most likely be
exposed . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 45; see Barnes
v. United States, Docket Nos. 13 Civ. 1226 (SAS) and
09 CR 1053 (SAS) 2013 WL 3357925, *7 (S.D.N.Y. July
2, 2013) (counsel provided effective assistance by
explaining risks of trial and benefits of plea and by
advising petitioner of potential sentencing exposure).
   Federal courts also have found an attorney’s perfor-
mance constitutionally deficient when the attorney
communicates a plea offer to a client, discusses the
strengths and weaknesses of the state’s case and the
defense but fails to recommend whether to accept the
offer when the state has a virtually unassailable case
and the offer is for significantly less prison time than
the maximum possible sentence. See, e.g., Boria v.
Keane, 99 F.3d 492, 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1996) (attorney
rendered constitutionally deficient performance by fail-
ing to recommend that petitioner accept proffered plea
bargain of one to three years, when attorney felt it
would be ‘‘suicidal’’ to go to trial, and court ultimately
sentenced petitioner to twenty years to life), cert.
denied, 521 U.S. 1118, 117 S. Ct. 2508, 138 L. Ed. 2d
1012 (1997); Carrion v. Smith, 644 F. Supp. 2d 452,
455, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (counsel provided ineffective
assistance when he conceded that acquittal would be
‘‘virtually impossible’’ on charge that carried a manda-
tory minimum sentence of fifteen years to life, and state
offered plea of ten years to life, when defendant was
ultimately sentenced to 125 years to life), aff’d, 365 Fed.
Appx. 278 (2d Cir. 2010). It would be unreasonable for
counsel to fail to recommend that a client accept a plea
offer if, after considering the circumstances of the case,
he believes that a conviction is virtually inevitable and
the attendant sentence will likely substantially exceed
the pending offer. However, in most cases, the differ-
ence between a plea offer and a defendant’s sentencing
exposure is only one factor that trial counsel should
consider when evaluating whether to advise a client to
accept a plea offer.
   The range of circumstances a particular defendant
might face also informs defense counsel’s representa-
tion, as ‘‘[d]efense counsel is in a much better position
[than a trial judge] to ascertain the personal circum-
stances of his client so as to determine what indirect
consequences the guilty plea may trigger.’’ Michel v.
United States, 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974); see also
McCoy v. Louisiana,         U.S.    , 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508,
200 L. Ed. 2d 821 (2018) (counsel and client ‘‘may not
share’’ same objectives: counsel may consider avoiding
harshest sentence paramount whereas client may ‘‘wish
to avoid, above all else, the opprobrium that comes
with admitting’’ guilt). For example, when deciding
whether to recommend that a defendant accept a plea
offer, defense counsel might have to consider whether
the defendant’s health affects his desire to accept an
offer. See, e.g., Moore v. Commissioner of Correction,
186 Conn. App. 254, 267 n.8, 199 A.3d 594 (2018) (peti-
tioner believed offered plea was ‘‘too high given his
poor health, especially ‘for someone who might not
make it’ ’’), aff’d, 338 Conn. 330, 258 A.3d 40 (2021).
The effects of incarceration or trial on family members
might also impact whether defense counsel should
advise a defendant to accept a plea offer. See, e.g.,
Foster v. Commissioner of Correction, 217 Conn. App.
658, 670, 289 A.3d 1206 (2023) (petitioner pleaded guilty
in part because he ‘‘did not want to put his family
through a trial’’), petition for cert. filed (Conn. March
3, 2023) (No. 220295). Additionally, whether a defendant
maintains his innocence will also affect whether coun-
sel should recommend that he accept a plea offer.
Purdy v. United States, supra, 208 F.3d 45; Vazquez v.
Commissioner of Correction, supra, 123 Conn. App.
439. In addition to all of these considerations, it is of
paramount importance that defense counsel does not
coerce a client into accepting a plea offer the client
would otherwise not have accepted. Purdy v. United
States, supra, 45.
   Applying this standard to the present case, we first
observe that the habeas court found that McWhirter
had effectively communicated to the petitioner the
strengths and weaknesses of the state’s case, the wit-
ness statements the state relied on, the elements of
the charges, the petitioner’s chances at trial, and his
sentencing exposure going to trial. This guidance pro-
vided the petitioner with sufficient information to make
a reasonably informed decision about whether to accept
the court’s plea offer of forty-five years. The sole basis
for the habeas court’s conclusion that McWhirter pro-
vided ineffective assistance is that he did not advise
the petitioner to accept the court’s plea offer. The
habeas court concluded that the petitioner’s chances
of prevailing at trial were ‘‘very unlikely,’’ as the state’s
evidence was strong, and the state’s confidence in its
case was reflected in its own plea offer of sixty years—
the maximum sentence. Despite crediting McWhirter’s
testimony that he informed the petitioner that he was
unlikely to prevail at trial, the habeas court concluded
that McWhirter’s failure to specifically recommend that
the petitioner accept the offer of forty-five years consti-
tuted deficient performance because ‘‘[t]he court indi-
cated offer of forty-five years was the only meaningful
opportunity for [the petitioner] to receive a sentence
less than the maximum . . . .’’ The habeas court erred
in relying on this fact alone to conclude that McWhirt-
er’s representation was constitutionally ineffective. A
reviewing court must remember that ‘‘[n]o particular set
of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily
take account of the variety of circumstances faced by
defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.’’
Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 688–89.
   The present case aligns most closely with Andrews
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 155 Conn. App.
548. In Andrews, trial counsel ‘‘provided the petitioner
with adequate professional advice on [his] options and
the best course of action’’; id., 555; by ‘‘explain[ing] that
the petitioner would likely receive a significantly higher
sentence than twelve years if he was convicted at trial,
that [trial counsel] believed that the state had a strong
case against the petitioner, and that it would be a diffi-
cult case to win because most of the witnesses were
police officers, and one of the police officers had sus-
tained permanent serious injury.’’ Id., 554–55. Trial
counsel in Andrews did not make a specific recommen-
dation regarding the plea offer. Id. McWhirter provided
the petitioner with similar advice in the present case.8
   From our review of the habeas court’s findings, which
credited McWhirter’s testimony regarding his trial prep-
aration, it is clear that, if McWhirter had considered
the factors discussed in Purdy, it would not have been
unreasonable for him not to provide the petitioner with
a specific recommendation. Therefore, under the cir-
cumstances, McWhirter’s representation of the peti-
tioner did not fall below the minimum required for
constitutionally effective representation. Despite our
holding today that McWhirter did not perform defi-
ciently, we caution attorneys against adopting a prac-
tice, similar to McWhirter’s, in which they never advise
a client to accept a plea offer. As is clear from our case
law, as well as federal precedent, counsel must weigh
a number of factors in determining whether to recom-
mend that a client accept a plea offer, as there will
be cases when counsel will have rendered ineffective
assistance by not providing a specific opinion as to
whether the client should accept the offer. See Moore
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 338 Conn. 341
n.6; see also Purdy v. United States, supra, 208 F.3d 44–
45.
  The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction to deny the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
     The petition also alleged that McWhirter had rendered ineffective assis-
tance by failing to ‘‘conduct an adequate factual investigation into the facts
of the case’’; ‘‘adequately research the legal issues’’; ‘‘adequately engage in
plea negotiations’’; and ‘‘adequately pursue a plea offer . . . .’’ Because the
petitioner presented no evidence regarding these claims, the habeas court
considered them abandoned, and none is at issue in this appeal.
   2
     The petitioner testified that McWhirter did not advise him as to why
self-defense was a weak claim given the facts of the case. The petitioner
also testified that McWhirter never advised him about the number of witness
statements supporting the state’s position, that Wilkins’ statement was the
only evidence supporting the petitioner’s rendition of the events or that the
jury might view his leaving the restaurant to obtain a weapon and then
returning in an unfavorable light.
   3
     The petitioner’s uncle was an inspector in the Waterbury state’s attorney’s
office, which the petitioner thought would result in a favorable plea deal.
The habeas court concluded that ‘‘[t]he connection between [the petitioner]
and his uncle, although it led to him turning himself in on the warrant, also
embodied the potential of the state’s having an inflexible approach to ward
off claims of favoritism toward [the petitioner].’’ The habeas court made
no finding that McWhirter was aware of the petitioner’s hope that he would
receive a favorable outcome because of his uncle’s position in the prosecu-
tor’s office.
   4
     To satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test when counsel’s
advice has led to the rejection of a plea offer, the petitioner must establish
that ‘‘(1) it is reasonably probable that, if not for counsel’s deficient perfor-
mance, the petitioner would have accepted the plea offer, and (2) the trial
judge would have conditionally accepted the plea agreement if it had been
presented to the court.’’ Ebron v. Commissioner of Correction, 307 Conn.
342, 357, 53 A.3d 983 (2012), cert. denied sub nom. Arnone v. Ebron, 569
U.S. 913, 133 S. Ct. 1726, 185 L. Ed. 2d 802 (2013). Because we conclude that
trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, we do not address Strickland’s
prejudice prong.
   5
     The respondent also claims on appeal that the habeas court ‘‘erred in
concluding that plea counsel, when advising a client in 1993, was constitu-
tionally required to expressly advise his client whether to accept or reject
a plea offer’’ because it was not settled law at the time—or now—that
counsel had to provide a particular recommendation to function as sixth
amendment ‘‘counsel’’ during plea negotiations. (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Because we reverse the habeas court’s judgment on the respon-
dent’s first claim, we do not address the merits of this second claim.
   6
     The Appellate Court pointed to a line of questioning during which trial
counsel testified that she had advised the petitioner about the specifics of
the plea offer—fifteen years, execution suspended after nine years—but did
not encourage him to accept the plea offer. See Barlow v. Commissioner
of Correction, supra, 150 Conn. App. 801 n.13. The Appellate Court interpre-
ted this as counsel’s not having provided ‘‘the petitioner [with any] profes-
sional assessment of the court’s [pretrial] offer of nine years to serve in the
context of the facts underlying the charges against him and his potential
total sentence exposure.’’ Id., 802.
   7
     This court recently upheld the Appellate Court’s holding that the peti-
tioner in Barlow was prejudiced by his counsel’s ineffective assistance, thus
satisfying the second prong of Strickland. See Barlow v. Commissioner of
Correction, 343 Conn. 347, 360, 273 A.3d 680 (2022). We did not address
whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that counsel was ineffec-
tive, as that issue was not raised on appeal to this court. Id., 361–62.
   8
     The petitioner distinguishes Andrews on the ground that, unlike the
situation in the present case, even if counsel had recommended the plea
offer at issue, the petitioner in Andrews would not have accepted it because
he believed that the offered sentence was ‘‘ ‘too high . . . .’ ’’ The petition-
er’s argument conflates the first and second prongs of Strickland. Whether
the petitioner would have accepted a plea offer if counsel had recommended
that he do so is relevant in determining whether the lack of a recommenda-
tion prejudiced the petitioner, not whether counsel’s representation was defi-
cient.