Court Opinion

ID: 9617731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:00:43.236409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:15.608469
License: Public Domain

PARKER, C.J.,
dissenting: The Southern Province of the Moravian Church had its beginning with the settlement of Bethabara *186in 1753, Bethania in 1760, and Salem in 1766. The Province has grown to include forty-seven Moravian Churches with more than twenty-two thousand members. All the congregations of the churches of the United States which bear the name “Moravian,” with the sole exception of defendant, “The Bible Moravian Church,” are affiliated either with the Northern Province or Southern Province of the Moravian Church in America, and said congregations were organized under the authority of the Synods of the said Provinces and are governed by the Board of Provincial Elders of the Province in which they are located.
The corporate defendant was organized with its principal place of business designated as Winston-Salem, North Carolina, being within the territorial limits of the .Southern Province of the Moravian Church. The said defendant was organized under the name “The Bible Moravian Church” without either the knowledge or the consent of the plaintiff, and the said defendant is not affiliated in any manner whatsoever with the., plaintiff or any of the Moravian congregations represented' by the' plaintiff. . .
In the leading case of Purcell v. Summers, 145. F. 2d 979, the Court held, as stated in-the first headnote: ....
“In order to prevent litigation, confusion, and to • prevent new church from making old church appear as an intruder, the ' Methodist Church, composed of a union of the Methodist Episcopal' Church, the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, ,an-d the Methodist Protestant Church, to which union 37 of the 38 Con-: ferences of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, had assented, as successor of the Methodist'Episcopal Church, South, was en-» -titled to an injunction restraining dissident former members from using the name Methodist Episcopal Church, South, as the name of a new rival church organization.”
I think that what the Court said in that case, speaking through Parker, J., is relevant and controlling -here : •
“Upon these facts, we do not think that there can be any doubt as to the right of plaintiffs to the injunction prayed. The use by one organization of the name of another, for the purpose of appropriating the standing and good will which the other has built up is a well recognized form of the wrong known to the law as unfair competition, against which courts of equity have not hesitated, in any jurisdiction, to use the' full’power of the injunctive process. The geheral rule with adequate citation of *187supporting authority was thus stated by the Supreme' Court of South Carolina in the comparatively recent case of Planters’ Fertilizer & Phosphate Co. v. Planters’ Fertilizer Co., 135 S.C. 282, 133 S.E. 706, 708:
“ 'A court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin the use of the same name by another corporation, or the use of a name so nearly similar as to be misleading, thereby injuring its business. [Citing authority.]’
* ¥r
“We have no doubt that these principles ordinarily applied in the case of business and trading corporations- are equally applicable in the case of churches, and other religious and charitable organizations; for, while such organizations exist for the worship of Almighty God and for the purpose of benefiting mankind and not for purposes of profit,, they are nevertheless dependent upon the contributions of their members for means to carry on their work, and anything which tends to divert membership or gifts of members from them injures them with respect to their financial condition in the same way that a business corporation is injured by diversion of trade or custom. As was well said in the case of Master et al. v. Machen et al., 35 Pa. Dist. & Co. R. 657, which involved the use of the name of one of the branches of the Presbyterian Church:
“ ‘The close similarity raises an inference of resulting confusion. This confusion is bound to react to the disadvantage of the plaintiff. When we say disadvantage, we are not restricting ourselves to the spiritual side alone. We are aware that churches are established for the promulgation of faith under the regulations of definite religious organizations, but we are also aware that such organizations, through some administrative channels, own property, real and personal, and require funds to carry on their purposes. These funds come from contributions, gifts, donations, and bequests. No large church organization could live by faith alone, and if its income were stopped or substantially' reduced, its scope for spreading its religion, as enunciated by its doctrines, would be seriously hampered. Thus, any project or movement of another religious organization using a name so similar to an established one as to create confusion and thereby interfering with the spiritual and final progress of that established church and its agencies is inequitable and will be restrained.’
“The question of protecting by injunction an eleemosynary or charitable organization, as distinguished from a business cor*188poration, from unfair competition in the use of its name, was before us in Grand Lodge I. B. P. O. Elks v. Grand Lodge I. B. P. O. Elks, 4 Cir., 50 F. 2d 860, 862, in which we examined the question thoroughly and laid down the rule, with the supporting authorities, as follows:
“ ‘It is well established that a benevolent, fraternal or social organization will be protected in the use of its name by injunction restraining another organization from using the same or another name so similar as to be misleading. [Citing authority.] The reasons underlying the rule are thus stated in Nims on Unfair Competition and Trademarks (3d Ed.) § 86: “The fact that a corporation is an eleemosynary or charitable one and has no goods to sell, and does not make money, does not take it out of the protection of the law of unfair competition. Distinct identity is just as important to such a company, oftentimes, as it is to a commercial company. Its financial credit — its ability to raise funds, its general reputation, the credit of those managing it and supporting it, are all at stake if its name is filched away by some other organization, ■ and the--two become confused in the minds of the public.” ’
The defendants contend that the word “Moravian” is a generic term and that they have the right.to .use it for that reason. That is a deceptively simple argument.' The defendants are not proposing to use the word in a name, so different from the plaintiff that no confusion would result. The.,word • .‘Bibfe” .in defendants’ corporate name does not tend to distinguish thet defendants from the other Moravian Churches, but,.tends to emphasize .the-similarity by following the pattern of. names- used by the plaintiff in designating its congregations,, such as Advent Moravian Church, Immanuel Moravian Church, Home Moravian Church, etc.
In my opinion it is manifest from the evidence and findings of fact -of the- trial judge that the name “The Bible Moravian Church” adopted by the defendants is so similar to the old and firmly established name of plaintiff that confusion will certainly result to the disadvantage -of the plaintiff. “We are aware that churches are established for the promulgation of faith under the regulations of definite religious organizations, but we are also aware that such organizations, through some administrative channels, own property, real and personal, and require funds to carry on their purposes. These funds come from contributions, gifts, donations, and bequests. No large church organization could live by faith alone, and if its income were stopped or substantially reduced, its scope for spreading *189its religion, as enunciated by its doctrines, would be seriously hampered.” Purcell v. Summers, supra, quoting Master et al. v. Machen et al., 35 Pa. Dist. & Co. R. 657. I believe that the danger of irreparable injury to the plaintiff is real and immediate, and that the defendants should be restrained. Defendants would sustain only slight damage if the injunction were granted. Upon the evidence and the findings of fact of the trial judge, I vote to affirm Judge Johnston’s order restraining defendants, pending a final determination of the matter, “from using the name ‘Moravian’ or ‘Unitas Fratrum’ in connection with any religious or church activity.”
Higgins and Shaep, JJ., join in this dissent.