Court Opinion

ID: 9704882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:49:13.394089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:06.268949
License: Public Domain

FRIEDLANDER, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe the post-conviction court properly granted the State’s Motion for Summary Disposition and therefore respectfully dissent from reversing that ruling.
I wish to clarify from the outset that I agree with the majority’s conclusion that a petitioner may obtain relief from a guilty plea on the basis of newly discovered evidence. I part with the majority, however, on the question of whether Norris’s petition for post-conviction relief is based on a cognizable claim of newly discovered evidence sufficient to warrant a fact-finding hearing. The majority concludes that it is, or at least that he has done enough to create a question of fact requiring a hearing, which in turn renders summary disposition inappropriate. I do not believe that a hearing is required; the affidavits of Norris’s sister and father do not qualify as newly discovered evidence.
*699Our Supreme Court has enunciated nine criteria for determining whether newly discovered evidence warrants a new trial. Admittedly, those criteria arose in a different context than the one before us, but it seems clear to me that we should evaluate a claim of newly discovered evidence in either context utilizing the same criteria. Thus, to determine whether Norris’s claim is viable in this context and can survive summary judgment, we should measure it against the aforementioned criteria established by our Supreme Court. Thus, to set aside a guilty plea on the basis of newly discovered evidence, Norris must demonstrate such evidence (1) has been discovered since the guilty plea hearing; (2) is material and relevant; (3) is not cumulative; (4) is not merely impeaching; (5) is not privileged or incompetent; and that (6) due diligence was used to discover it in time for trial; the evidence (7) is worthy of credit; (8) can be produced upon a retrial of the case; and (9) will probably produce a different result at retrial. See Carter v. State, 738 N.E.2d 665 (Ind.2000). We should receive claims of newly discovered evidence “with great caution” and carefully scrutinize the alleged newly discovered evidence. McVey v. State, 863 N.E.2d 434, 446 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied. Finally, and importantly, “[t]he burden of showing that all nine requirements are met rests with the petitioner for post-conviction relief.” Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 330 (Ind.2006) (emphasis supplied).
In my view, a hearing is not necessary in order to determine that the “newly discovered evidence” upon which Norris’s claim is based cannot satisfy elements (4) and (7) above. The affidavits of Norris’s sister and father are merely impeaching. Focusing specifically on the far more significant of the two, i.e., Colleen’s affidavit, it represents nothing more than a recantation of her previous claim that Norris molested C.R. As such, it cannot meet this criteria. See, cf., McVey v. State, 863 N.E.2d at 446 (the appellate court concluded that the recanting affidavit did not constitute newly discovered evidence because it “would merely serve to cast doubt on [the affiant’s] trial testimony. As such, it would not destroy or obliterate her earlier testimony, but rather place her credibility at issue”) (internal citation to authority omitted). The affidavits suffer the same fatal flaw with respect to element (7). As we observed in McVey, any value the recantation affidavits might have is “seriously limited” by the original statements that they contradict. Id. at 446.
Upon my conclusion that Norris’s alleged newly discovered evidence does not on its face satisfy the Carter criteria, I would affirm the grant of summary disposition in favor of the State.