Court Opinion

ID: 9883449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:42:59.469621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:23.387973
License: Public Domain

FOLEY, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. It is my considered opinion that the trial court should be affirmed.
The marriage of the parties was dissolved in 1971 in the state of Missouri. The decree did not provide for disposition of certain Minnesota real estate acquired during coverture and listed in the name of respondent alone. Close to 15 years elapsed before the appellant brought a direct action in Minnesota to have her marital interest in this property determined. The respondent has pleaded laches as an affirmative defense.
The majority holds the action may survive a rule 12.02(5) motion to dismiss on the theory the complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action. The majority applies section 541.02, a 15-year limitation statute for recovery of real estate or possession, to sustain the action. I respectfully submit the majority misses the mark in seeking to sustain the action under this statute. This statute just does not apply in this case. It serves an entirely different purpose, more properly related to adverse possession and prescriptive easements.
This is indeed a strange case. So far as I can tell from the record, no proceedings were held in Missouri to reopen this case at a time when personal jurisdiction was avail-, able to do so and deal with the omitted property, although respondent is currently a resident of Missouri. No fraud is alleged and no reasonable explanation is offered by appellant for the long delay in asserting her rights. As a matter of law, appellant’s action should be barred.
In my view, this case is governed by the doctrine of laches, as well as estoppel. In Corah v. Corah, 246 Minn. 350, 75 N.W.2d 465 (1956), the Minnesota Supreme Court held an ex-wife guilty of laches in an equitable proceeding against her ex-husband for property division when she waited almost 18 years to institute a proceeding: The court stated:
The doctrine of laches is based on grounds of public policy which require for the peace of society the discouragement of stale demands.
Id. at 357, 75 N.W.2d at 469. The delay here is too long for the action to remain viable. See Bredemann v. Bredemann, 253 Minn. 21, 91 N.W.2d 84 (1958) (where plaintiff had full knowledge of the facts but failed to take action for 10 years,^ her delay was unreasonable and constituted laches). The entire philosophy of denying stale claims in divorce matters was expressed by the supreme court in Corah:
*16If we were to say that after about 18 years of inattention or indifference in connection with a situation such as we have here she can now claim relief, we would be confronted in the future with a proposition as to just how many years might elapse under similar circumstances so as to enable an aggrieved party to seek relief.
Corah, 246 Minn. at 358, 75 N.W.2d at 469.
My position on the real estate claim as expressed here supports the denial to appellant of any interest in personal property as well that was not disposed of by the decree.
While the trial court may have misconstrued the case of Larsen v. Erickson, 222 Minn. 363, 24 N.W.2d 711 (1946), dealing with dower rights, it does not lessen the impact of the doctrine of laches under the facts here. The trial court was correct but for a different reason from that expressed by the Larsen decision.
I would affirm.