Court Opinion

ID: 9529817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:54:30.279522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:55.637725
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAREN, specially concurring: I believe that this majority has now rendered two decisions that incorrectly analyze the merits of the sundry counts contained in the complaints. I specially concur here because I believe that, in spite of its incorrect analysis, the majority reaches the correct result in this case. In Felzak v. Hruby, 367 Ill. App. 3d 695 (2006), I dissented in part because the majority found subject matter jurisdiction extant. The majority determined that an unconstitutional statutory claim with a distinctive statutory theory of relief did not confer subject matter jurisdiction. However, the majority then reviewed the facts alleged in the statutory claim and determined that those facts alleged a justiciable common-law claim. The majority did so by reinterpreting the facts and determining that there existed an alternative theory of relief, with different elements, relating to grandparent visitation. See Felzak, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 705-12. I noted that the majority allowed the plaintiff to assert that subject matter jurisdiction existed merely on the basis that a claim existed at common law, without requiring the plaintiff to file a separate count alleging such a claim. I pointed out that assuming, arguendo, such a claim existed at common law, it still should be pled as a separate count, as required by section 2 — 613(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 613(a) (West 2004)). By ferreting through the counts of the complaint in the case before us in an effort to find alternative theories of relief, the majority again subverts the rule of procedure that requires parties to plead “as many causes of action *** as they may have, and each shall be separately designated and numbered.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 613(a) (West 2004). Analogically, the majority has determined that the apple is an apple, but it did so by three separate reviews of the same apple, when only one review was appropriate and necessary. See Felzak, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 722 (McLaren, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). I wish to emphasize that I did not and do not declare that the claim must properly state a cause of action that would withstand a motion to dismiss; however, the claim must actually allege a common-law action. “Thus, in order to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court, a plaintiffs case, as framed by the complaint or petition, must present a justiciable matter. See People ex rel. Scott v. Janson, 57 Ill. 2d 451, 459 (1974) (if a complaint states a case belonging to a general class over which the authority of the court extends, subject matter jurisdiction attaches).” Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (2002). See also Felzak, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 723 (McLaren, J., dissenting in part and specially concurring in part). The court in Belleville reviewed the complaint and did not parse words or find a claim at common law integrated into a void statutory claim or in a count subject to jurisdiction in the Court of Claims. I submit that the two-step analysis utilized by the majority in Felzak and this case is incorrect. The majority here erroneously continues to review a count to determine if there is an integrated second or third underlying cause of action contained within it. The majority determines that no count contains any facts that allege a duty outside the supervisors’ employment. The majority also reviews the counts to determine if an independent duty exists that is common to all kitchen supervisors.3 368 Ill. App. 3d at 507-08. Again, the majority fails to comprehend that, if there is no count alleging such an alternative theory of relief, the court should not further consider what the existing counts might contain, other than the stated theory of relief, in order to determine if subject matter jurisdiction exists. The simple fact is that separate theories of relief must be pled in separate counts. The failure of the plaintiffs to comply with this simple fact absolves the majority of its erroneously held belief that it must search amongst the words of the sundry counts for additional interpolations addressing whether or not there is a justiciable matter. The majority in this case has again failed to properly follow the admonitions set forth in my partial dissent in Felzak and has ventured into the land beyond the looking glass. Neither the parties nor the courts should be placed in the position of trying to decipher a count to determine if there is more than one theory of relief in the count and, if so, how many. The majority has again followed the wrong analysis that it created and utilized in Felzak but, despite this failure, has come to the correct conclusion. That is why I specially concur.  I submit that a policy was violated when the grease was ordered to be moved prior to cooling. I see little difference between the violation of this policy and the violation of the policy relating to responding to a call that was not within the trooper’s jurisdiction in Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151 (1992). Also, though not pled, it would seem that the facts may allege wilful and wanton behavior on the part of the supervisors. But I digress.