Court Opinion

ID: 9495396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:01:49.57943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:59.811291
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge,
joined by WIENER and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges, dissenting:
What would a reasonable person think would happen if a police officer in the course of his employment takes a pistol from the evidence locker or from his desk and gives it to a gang member with a *334history of drug involvement who needs it for a confrontation with a drug dealer? Any reasonable person would conclude that the state created or enhanced a dangerous situation when the officer gave the pistol to the gang member. There is no dispute that the gang member, Kevin Lof-tin, used the pistol provided by Detective Carney to shoot the drug dealer, McClen-don.
So how does one read the majority opinion, particularly in light of the fact that the majority does not reject the state-created danger theory outright? The only way to explain the majority opinion is that it clearly reflects a court that aspires to be the only circuit in the country to reject the state-created danger theory but cannot bring itself to admit it. Instead, the Court has embarked on a ten-year course of back-door rejection by assuming arguendo that the theory is viable and then finding that the victim has just not made the case. Far better it would be if this Circuit wants to embrace the extreme position of being the only circuit to reject the theory to simply say so.
In general, the majority correctly identifies two main issues in this case.1 However, these two issues need be addressed only if the state-created danger theory is a viable mechanism for recovery under § 1983 in this Circuit. The majority once again fails to resolve this initial question. Instead, it produces a convoluted opinion, compelling me to dissent.
I. IS THE STATE-CREATED DANGER THEORY A VIABLE THEORY IN THIS CIRCUIT?
The majority’s Achilles’ heel is its unwillingness to either adopt or reject the state-created danger theory as the law of the Circuit. Over the last ten years, at least seven state-created danger cases have arrived in our Circuit, but we have never taken a position on whether the state-created danger theory is a valid one, choosing instead to duck the issue. We simply stated in each case (without explicitly adopting or rejecting the theory) that the evidence is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning one or more of the elements that comprise the theory.2 Our methodological approach— assuming arguendo for the purposes of each case that the state-created danger theory is a valid one but never explicitly rejecting or adopting it — cannot be defended and leaves this area of circuit law in a perpetual state of confusion.3
*335To the untrained eye, the majority’s methodological approach may appear slightly different from the tact taken by the previous seven panels that addressed state-created danger claims. Indeed, the McClendon majority never specifically states that it will assume arguendo, without deciding, that the theory is a viable one. However, that is precisely what the majority has done. It (1) implicitly assumes that the theory is a viable one without accepting or rejecting it outright; and (2) then finds that the facts do not amount to “deliberate indifference” as a matter of law.
Regardless of how the majority chooses to articulate it, this is the same analytical approach we have employed in the previous state-created danger cases and is the same analytical approach the Supreme Court has told us not to employ. The Circuit’s modus operandi in these cases plays like a broken record — same approach, same result, and same confusion created for the district courts, state officials, and the general public concerning the Circuit’s position on this important issue. In choosing to play this broken record yet again, the majority skirts the central issue in the case: Whether the substantive component of the Due Process Clause guarantees a citizen the right to be free from acts of violence inflicted by a third party when the state actor played an affirmative role in creating or exacerbating the dangerous situation that led to the citizen’s injury. In failing to answer this fundamental question, the majority shirks its constitutional duty.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” It is well-established that deprivations of due process can be substantive. The substantive component of the Due Process Clause “protects individual liberty against ‘certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’ ” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992)(quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)). However, the Supreme Court has warned us that “substantive-due-process cases [require] a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (citation omitted). Here, the fundamental liberty interest at stake is McClendon’s interest in his bodily integrity.
It is indisputable that there is a general substantive due process right to bodily integrity. See e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). In a case involving *336sexual abuse of a public school child by her teacher, this Circuit clearly held that “[t]he right to be free of state-occasioned damage to a person’s bodily integrity is protected by the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process.” Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, 15 F.3d 443, 450-51 (5th Cir.1994)(en banc){quoting Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir.1981)). The other circuits have also upheld the constitutional principle that there is a substantive due process right to be free from state-imposed violations of bodily integrity in cases involving rape and sexual harassment by police officers as well as cases involving sexual abuse of public school students by school employees. See Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 796 (8th Cir.1998)(po-lice officer violated a woman’s substantive due process right to bodily integrity when he used his position of power as a police officer to rape her); Plumean v. School District # W County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir.1997)(public school students have a substantive due process right not to be sexually abused by school employees at school).
The particular question presented by the state-created danger theory is whether it is constitutionally permissible to find that a state actor’s egregious conduct which creates a “special danger” that the citizen’s bodily integrity will be physically violated by a third party is tantamount to the state actor “occasioning” the damage to the individual’s bodily integrity even though the state does not commit the actual physical injury itself. In my view, the substantive due process right to bodily integrity can extend to cover such a situation as long as the state actor engages in affirmative conduct which creates the danger.
In Rutera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 651 (D.C.Cir.2001), the D.C. Circuit held that “under the State endangerment concept, an individual can assert a substantive due process right to protection by the District of Columbia from third-party violence when District of Columbia officials affirmatively act to increase or create the danger that ultimately results in the individual’s harm.”4 The implication from this holding is that the constitutional duty to protect the individual’s bodily integrity only arises when the state takes affirmative steps to create the danger for the individual. Thus, the actual constitutional violation occurs when the state fails to protect the individual from the dangers the state has made of its own creation. In other words, the state “occasions” the damage to the individual’s bodily integrity because it fails to protect the individual from a danger of its own creation. The rationale for equating state acts which impose direct physical injury on an individual with affirmative conduct by the state which creates or increases the danger that a private party will impose direct physical injury to an individual is straightforward. As the Seventh Circuit stated, “[i]f the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.” Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir.1982).
Consequently, the linchpin for concluding that a substantive due process violation can be made out under the state-created danger theory is the “affirmative conduct” requirement. The “affirmative conduct” *337requirement prevents the state from being held hable for acts of omission. Similarly, the theory’s requirements that the state actor must know that his actions endanger a specific individual5 and that a direct causal connection must exist between the state actor’s conduct which increases the danger and the actual injury itself6 are commensurate with the Supreme Court’s recognition that the Due Process Clause “is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.” DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989).7
In addition to the D.C. Circuit, the other circuits have confronted this issue and have determined that constitutional liability under § 1983 can exist “where the state creates a dangerous situation or renders citizens more vulnerable to danger.” Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 947, 114 S.Ct. 389, 126 L.Ed.2d 337 (1993). As the majority notes, the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have each accepted the state-created danger theory as a viable means of protecting a citizen’s substantive due process rights.8 My research further indicates that the remaining circuits (i.e., the First and Fourth Circuits) have expressed similar support for the theory.9 Consequently, the state-created danger theory is overwhelmingly accepted in today’s federal jurisprudence.
*338In the face of such overwhelming authority, the majority cowers. It does not have the courage to be the only federal circuit court of appeals in the nation to explicitly reject the state-created danger theory even though that is clearly what it wants to do. Although the majority refuses to take the road less traveled in a principled albeit unpopular way, it is perfectly willing to accomplish its objectives through subterfuge. The majority knows only too well how to play the game. If the Circuit never rules on whether this is a viable theory, the Circuit makes it exceedingly difficult for the district courts to rule that the Circuit law in state-created danger cases is “clearly established” for purposes of a qualified immunity analysis. Thus, state actors who engage in behavior that falls within the confines of the “state-created danger” theory will always escape liability under the majority’s view no matter how egregious their behavior. That is an insidious approach to the law and I reject it outright.
The Circuit should quit hiding the ball from the public and make a decision one way or the other. It has refused.10 However, I favor adopting, as has the rest of the country, the state-created danger theory as a viable mechanism for obtaining Section 1983 relief in this Circuit.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY ANALYSIS
The majority opinion arrives at several conclusions that I believe are patently absurd under the facts of this case. First, the majority concludes that “while Detective Carney’s actions in providing Loftin with a gun were certainly inadvisable ... no rational trier of fact could find that Detective Carney acted with any level of culpability beyond mere negligence.”11 Second, the majority concludes that “Detective Carney’s conduct was not objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of his actions.”12 I will address each baseless conclusion in turn.

A. Carney’s actions constitute deliberate indifference

I agree with the majority that in order to survive summary judgment on his substantive due process claim McClendon must produce sufficient facts from which a rational fact-finder could conclude that Detective Carney acted with culpability beyond mere negligence. Because Detective Carney had plenty of time to “deliberate” as to whether he could properly give Loftin the gun, McClendon is only required to prove that Detective Carney acted with deliberate indifference.13 For two *339main reasons, I find that McClendon has produced sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could not avoid concluding that Carney acted with deliberate indifference to McClendon’s substantive due process right.
First, McClendon gave Loftin a gun at a time when he knew the dispute between McClendon and Loftin was “at a boiling point.” Detective Carney knew that Lof-tin wanted the gun because he desired to use it as a weapon in any altercation with McClendon. He knew that Loftin and McClendon were likely to meet at some point in time. It is true that he had no specific knowledge that they would see each other at the Hendrix Street Apartments on the night in question. However, this fact is largely irrelevant to our analysis. The “knowledge” inquiry under a deliberate indifferent analysis does not require such a level of specificity. Clearly, Detective Carney had actual knowledge that Loftin and McClendon would likely have an altercation and that violence would almost certainly ensue between the two.14
The majority inexplicably states that “While Detective Carney was informed that McClendon potentially posed a threat to Loftin’s safety, there is no indication that Loftin had any violent intentions toward McClendon.”15 What does the majority think Loftin intended to do with the gun provided to him by Detective Carney — place it on his wall as a souvenir? Of course not, gang members who ask for guns typically have violent intentions as any competent police officer knows. The majority implies that Detective Carney was not aware that Loftin had any violent intentions towards McClendon because Detective Carney merely “loaned” the gun to Loftin for self-protection. However, the majority’s suggestion that Detective Carney believed that Loftin only intended to use the gun for self-protection belies common sense and is not a fact which a rational jury would be required to accept as true. On the contrary, the record evidence indicates that Detective Carney did not give Loftin any specific instructions as to when and under what circumstances he could rightfully use the gun. Detective Carney does not appear to have placed any limitations on Loftin’s use of the gun.
In short, Loftin is a gang member who serves as a confidential informant because he is involved in the drug scene. McClen-don is a drug dealer. Any officer with enough sense to be entrusted with a gun knows that if he gives a gun to a gang member with a history of drug involvement who is anticipating a confrontation with a drug dealer, there is a strong likelihood that should an altercation arise the gang member will use that gun to shoot the drug dealer, with or without provocation.
Second, Detective Carney took property held by the City of Columbia(i.e., the gun) and gave it to a confidential infor*340mant. The majority characterizes this act as “inadvisable” or perhaps, “negligent.” I characterize the act as criminal. My determination that Detective Carney’s actions violate Mississippi criminal law completely undermines the majority’s conclusion that no rational trier of fact could find that Detective Carney’s actions amount to deliberate indifference.
Mississippi law criminalizes embezzlement by police officers. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-11-25 (West 2001) makes it a crime for a city police officer to “unlawfully convert to his own use any money or other valuable thing which comes to his hands or possession by virtue of his office or employment.” A conviction under this statute carries with it the possibility of as much as twenty (20) years incarceration.16
In my view, Detective Carney’s action in taking the gun from the. evidence drawer/locker and giving it to Loftin constituted embezzlement by a public official in violation of § 97-11-25.17 Detective Carney’s position as a police officer made him a “public official” as defined by § 97-11-25. The gun was a “valuable thing” for purposes of § 97-11-25. Detective Carney had possession of the gun “by virtue of his employment” as a “public official” as required by § 97-11-25. Finally, Detective Carney “unlawfully converted” the gun to his own use when he gave the gun to Loftin because this act was adverse to the City’s ownership interests in the gun. See Board on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Training v. Rushing, 752 So.2d 1085, 1087 (Miss.Ct.App.1999)(deputy sheriff who took a firearm that was the property of the county and pawned it for $250 committed an act that was sufficiently adverse to the county’s ownership rights in the property to constitute an act of embezzlement).

B. Qualified Immunity

Because the majority determines that McClendon has not adduced sufficient facts to prove “deliberate indifference,” the majority’s opinion should come to a screeching halt at that point. On the contrary, however, recognizing that its conclusion that no rational jury could find the deprivation of a constitutional right defies common sense, the majority seeks to further justify its decision by alternatively *341holding that Detective Carney is entitled to qualified immunity because the contours of the state-created danger theory were not “clearly established” at the time of the incident.
The majority reasons that Detective Carney should not have known that giving the gun to Loftin was unlawful because (1) we did not explicitly adopt the state-created danger theory in Salas; (2) our sister circuits which had recognized the theory by 1993 had slight variations concerning the mental state required to hold a state actor liable for harms inflicted by third parties; and (3) these circuits had not applied the theory to this precise factual situation. I address each point in turn.
First, it is true that we had not explicitly adopted the state-created danger theory in July of 1993. However, as the majority notes, we have indicated in the past that we will look to the overall weight of authority in determining whether the law is clearly established. See Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177, 1185 n. 8 (5th Cir.1989). The Supreme Court has blessed this approach. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)(indieating that a consensus of cases of persuasive authority is sufficient to put a police officer on notice of the lawfulness of his actions).
Second, the majority contends that the numerous cases which had adopted the state-created danger theory by 1993 do not constitute a “consensus of cases of persuasive authority” on this point of law because slight variations existed among the circuits concerning the level of culpability required to hold the state actor constitutionally liable. This conclusion strikes me as plainly inconsistent with the more liberal approach to the “clearly established law” inquiry as set forth in Wilson.
Third, the majority’s suggestion that the law cannot be “clearly established” if no prior case exists which found the exact behavior engaged in by the police officer to be unlawful misconceives the purposes which underlie the “clearly established law” inquiry and is incongruent with our precedent. We explained in Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir.1998):
[F]or a right to be “clearly established” we require that its “contours ... must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” It is not necessary, however, that prior cases have held the particular action in question unlawful; “but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” (internal citations omitted).
By July of 1993, a consensus of cases of persuasive authority existed to put reasonable police officers on notice that they may violate the Constitution if (1) they create or increase a danger to a known victim; and (2) act with deliberate indifference towards the known victim during the creation of such danger. The majority’s conclusion that the unlawfulness of Detective Carney’s actions should not have been apparent to him in light of the clearly established law in July of 1993 simply cannot be justified given the fact that (1) the majority of circuits had adopted the state-created danger theory by July of 1993; and (2) Detective Carney’s actions violated Mississippi criminal law.
There are certain things any police officer should know will violate the Constitution even if no reported case exists which finds the action in question unlawful. As stated previously, any reasonable officer in Detective Carney’s position would understand that providing Loftin with a gun created a danger that Loftin would shoot McClendon. In fact, any officer with enough sense to be entrusted with a gun knows that giving a gun to a gang member *342with a history of drug involvement who is anticipating a confrontation with a drug dealer is creating a dangerous situation. Thus, a reasonable officer would recognize that this type of action could result in a violation of McClendon’s constitutional rights. Consequently, I would also hold that Detective Carney is not entitled to qualified immunity from McClendon’s § 1983 action.
I dissent.

. First, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to McClendon, has McClendon raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning each of the elements of his state-created danger claim. Second, if so, was it “clearly established” law at the time of the incident that a police officer who did what Carney did could be subject to liability for violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 584 (5th Cir.2001 )("Piotrowski II"); Randolph v. Cervantes, 130 F.3d 727, 731 (5th Cir.1997); Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir.1997); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 515-17 (5th Cir.1995)("Piotrowski I"); Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir.1994); Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 530 (5th Cir.1994); Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 309 (5th Cir.1992).

.The majority's methodological approach would perhaps be defensible if (1) this was the first time we were presented with the state-created danger theory, the theory was clearly without merit and as a consequence unlikely to be asserted again in the district courts; and (2) little or no legal authority existed on the viability of the theory. However, neither of these circumstances are present here. First, the state-created danger claim has been asserted by litigants in the district courts in our Circuit for more than a decade and will likely continue to be asserted absent our ex*335plicit rejection of it. In fact, we ourselves have addressed this theory on at least seven different occasions. Second, a wealth of federal authority exists in our sister circuits concerning the viability of this theory. The majority's approach is further questionable given my conclusion that a couple of the Circuit's prior decisions which analyze whether a plaintiff has made out a valid state-created danger claim are not above reproach. For example, while it is true that this case presents the worst state-created danger claim we have ever seen, the behavior of the police in the Piotrowski case was similarly galling. The Piotrowski facts were so bad that a jury awarded the plaintiff $20 million, however, we had no qualms reversing. See Piotrowski II, 237 F.3d at 572. Moreover, in Johnson, we affirmed the dismissal of a state-created danger claim on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion even though further discovery could have shed light on the actual knowledge and level of culpability of school district officials in creating an allegedly dangerous environment in which a high school student was shot and killed by a non-student in the school hallways during normal school hours. See Johnson, 38 F.3d at 205-08 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).

. The D.C. Circuit is the last circuit to explain the rationale for recognizing a substantive due process right based upon the slate-created danger theory. The Butera opinion is lengthy, well-reasoned and constitutes persuasive authority.

. See Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066 (6th Cir.1998)(finding that the state must have known or clearly should have known that its actions specifically endangered an individual).

. See Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3rd Cir.1996)(the harm ultimately caused by the state-created danger must be foreseeable and fairly direct).

. In the case at bar, the "affirmative action” element, "knowledge” element, and "causation” element are satisfied. First, Detective Carney knew that Loftin intended to use the gun in any altercation with McClendon. Thus, he had actual knowledge that McClen-don was at substantial risk of injury. Second, Detective Carney engaged in affirmative conduct because he gave Loftin a deadly weapon which Loftin could use to shoot McClendon. Third, there is a direct causal connection between the injury suffered and the affirmative conduct. Detective Carney created the danger that McClendon would be shot in the face by giving Loftin the gun. If Carney had not given Loftin the gun, Loftin would only have had his bare fists to use as weapons in any potential altercation with McClendon. Thus, but for Carney giving Loftin the gun, Loftin likely could not have caused McClendon to suffer such severe injuries.

. See Majority Opinion, supra, at notes 6-7.

.The First Circuit has adopted the state-created danger theory as a viable means of obtaining Section 1983 relief in rare and exceptional cases. See Frances-Colon v. Ramirez, 107 F.3d 62, 63-64 (1st Cir.1997)(substantive due process interest in "bodily integrity" can support a personal injury claim under Section 1983 in the rare and exceptional cases when a government employee affirmatively acts to increase the threat of harm to the claimant). In addition, the Fourth Circuit considered a state-created danger claim and noted that there may be some "point on the spectrum between action and inaction” in which the state would be implicated in the harm caused by third parties. See Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1175(4th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 994, 116 S.Ct. 530, 133 L.Ed.2d 436 (1995). This observation suggests the Fourth Circuit accepts the notion that a state actor who affirmatively acts to create a danger could be subject to constitutional liability. Indeed, in a subsequent unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit analyzed a state-created danger claim and indicated that the state can be liable for the acts of third parties when the state itself creates the danger. See Stevenson v. Martin County. Bd. of Educ., No. 99-2685, 2001 WL 98358, *5, 3 Fed.Appx. 25 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 54, 151 L.Ed.2d 23 (2001).

. In refusing to make this decision, the majority attempts to create the illusion that no Circuit split exists in hopes of avoiding Supreme Court scrutiny.

. See Majority opinion at 326-27.

. See Majority opinion at 326-27.

. The majority correctly states that a plaintiff who asserts a substantive due process violation is required to show that the state’s conduct "shocks the contemporary conscience." However, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998), the Supreme Court intimated that the point of conscience shocking may be reached in some circumstances by proving "something more than negligence but less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or gross negligence.’ ” (citation omitted). The Court noted that the level of culpability which can constitute "conscience shocking” is a "matter for closer calls." Id. It then indicated that a state official's deliberate indifference can be "constitutionally shocking” in the context of a custodial prison situation if "actual deliberation is practical." Id. at 851, 118 S.Ct. 1708. Thus, whether the deliberate indifference standard should be ap*339plied to the instant case depends upon whether Detective Carney had actual time to deliberate. See Butera, 235 F.3d at 652. Because deliberation was practical for Detective Carney, the deliberate indifference standard is applicable.

. The record reflects that Loftin asked Carney for a gun because his own gun had been seized by the City of Columbia police department as the result of an incident in which an individual either borrowed or stole Loftin’s gun and used Loftin’s gun to shoot McClen-don's friend. Indeed, the genesis of the dispute between McClendon and Loftin appears to have been the fact that Loftin’s gun was used by another person to shoot McClendon’s friend. In any event, Carney did not give Loftin his own gun back, but instead gave him a different gun that had allegedly been seized by the City of Columbia as evidence pursuant to an unrelated investigation.

. See Majority Opinion at pp. 326-27.

. § 97-11-25 states in total: "If any state officer or any county officer, or an officer in any district or subdivision of a county, or an officer of any city, town or village, or a notary public, or any other person holding any public office or employment, or any executor, administrator or guardian, or any trustee of an express trust, any master or commissioner, or receiver, or any attorney at law or solicitor, or any bank or collecting agent, or other person engaged in like public employment, or any other person undertaking to act for others and intrusted by them with business of any kind, or with money, shall unlawfully convert to his own use any money or other valuable thing which comes to his hands or possession by his virtue of office or employment, or shall not, when lawfully required to turn over such money or deliver such thing, immediately do so according to his legal obligation, he shall, on conviction, be committed to the department of corrections for not more than twenty (20) years, or be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00).”

. As noted earlier, the gun had been seized as evidence in an unrelated investigation by the City of Columbia police department. Thus, the City exercised proper control over the gun but held it on behalf of the rightful owner of the gun and/or the public. See Re: Inventory of Evidence Vaults, Miss. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 2000-0081, 2000 WL 530411 (March 10, 2000)(noting that evidence held in the custody of a law enforcement department is held in trust for the rightful owner of such evidence, and/or ultimately for the benefit of the public should such evidence become the subject of a forfeiture). Because the gun belonged to the City, Detective Carney had no legal right to dispossess the gun from the City’s, control.