Court Opinion

ID: 9621818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:07:45.064186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:09.816874
License: Public Domain

MELTON, Justice,
concurring specially.
I join all of the majority opinion except for Division 3, in which I concur only in the result. I write separately to emphasize that, although a venue instruction based on the verbatim language of OCGA § 17-2-2 (c) and (h) may not be ideal, it is not improperly burden-shifting as a matter of law and will not support any claim to the contrary.
We made this clear in Napier v. State, 276 Ga. 769, 772 (2) (583 SE2d 825) (2003), where we held:
In criminal prosecutions, due process of law prohibits jury charges that could be interpreted by reasonable jurors as creating either: (1) a conclusive presumption regarding an essential element or a material allegation of the State’s case, or (2) a presumption that shifts the burden of persuasion on an essential element or material allegation to the defendant. Appellants argue the trial court’s jury charges regarding venue suffer from the latter infirmity.
We disagree with appellants’ contention, although we concede the trial court’s charges on venue were taken from poorly drafted legislation. Rather than creating burden-shifting presumptions regarding venue, Code section 17-2-2 was intended by the legislature to provide means by which a jury can ensure that the constitutional mandate of establishing venue beyond a reasonable doubt has been satisfied in cases such as this one, where the State has brought forth evidence to establish venue and the defendant has introduced evidence intended to counter that showing. We note that OCGA § 17-2-2 (c) and (h) instruct juries to “consider” — rather than “presume” — whether, in certain factual scenarios, venue has been properly laid. In normal usage, “consider” means to contemplate, think about, or reflect upon, and thus we do not believe the statute requires any compulsory or permissive presumptions to be drawn regarding whether venue in a particular forum is proper.
(Footnotes omitted.) Therefore, a venue instruction based on the verbatim language of OCGA § 17-2-2 (c) and (h) is neither erroneous nor burden-shifting, although it may not be the clearest in its directives.
Despite this fact, after suggesting an alternative instruction on *830venue in Napier, we observed:
As for this particular case, we are satisfied that the trial court’s charge did not raise any improper burden-shifting presumptions regarding venue. Whenever this Court considers a claim of an erroneous jury instruction, we evaluate the jury charge as a whole. In this case, in addition to the charge quoted above, the trial court instructed that venue is a jurisdictional fact that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as to each crime charged, and even went so far as to instruct the jury to determine whether venue was properly laid before considering the criminal charges set forth in the indictment. The trial court also charged that the presumption of innocence remained with appellants throughout trial; that the burden of proof rested upon the State to prove every material allegation and essential element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt; that no burden of proof is ever placed upon or shifted to the appellants; and that all jury instructions should be considered collectively as a “package.” Accordingly, we reject appellants’ claim that the trial court’s jury charge was burden-shifting with regard to venue.
(Footnote omitted.) Id. at 773. This analysis, however, is both superfluous and ill-suited in this context because a venue instruction based on the verbatim language of OCGA § 17-2-2 (c) and (h) is not erroneous. It is a legally acceptable, though not ideal, instruction on venue. As a result, appellants in cases such as this can succeed on their burden-shifting contentions only if they can show that other parts of the jury charge as a whole contained burden-shifting language. In other words, the appellate burden is on the defendant to show that other aspects of the jury charge were improper, not on this Court to evaluate the jury charge as a whole in light of a proper instruction.
For these reasons, I believe that the majority erroneously concludes that a venue instruction based on the verbatim language of OCGA § 17-2-2 (c) and (h) “will not constitute error where the charge taken as a whole plainly informs the jury that venue is a material allegation to each crime charged and that, as such, the State bears the burden to prove venue as to each crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” This statement requires the trial court to do more than simply read the indictment and inform the jury that the State has the burden of proving all material elements of the indictment. Instead, it requires the trial court to call venue to the jury’s attention, thereby specifically informing them that venue is a *831material element (as opposed to the date of the crime and other non-material elements). The majority’s statement also makes it appear that, although the instruction at issue is not burden-shifting, it may still be erroneous if this additional venue-specific charge is not given. That is simply not the case. If we wished to consider the charge as a whole in cases like this, it would be more accurate to state that the venue charge is not erroneous or burden-shifting, but even if it were, the charge as a whole was appropriate. I think, perhaps, that may have ultimately been the intended effect of Napier, supra.
Decided March 26, 2010.
Smith, Gambrell & Russell, Edward H. Wasmuth, Jr., for appellant.
Peter J. Skandalakis, District Attorney, Lynda S. Caldwell, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Elizabeth A. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Carley and Justice Nahmias join in this special concurrence.