Court Opinion

ID: 9827831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:52:50.018967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:37.460312
License: Public Domain

*851On Motion for Rehearing.
It is contended that plaintiff’s cause of action must find its basis in our death statute, and that no other judgment could legally have been rendered than the one appealed from, the theory being that appellees were not guilty of wrongful acts such as would have given Imogene Rishworth a cause of action had she survived the anaesthetic and the operation, and that, therefore, under article 4695 (R. S. 1911) her parents have ho cause of action.
At common law the parent could recover for loss of services of a child, when deprived of such services or part thereof by injuries not resulting in death. Railway v. Brick, 83 Tex. 526, 18 S. W. 947, 29 Am. St. Rep. 675. It also appears that if death did not result at once, or practically so, suit could be maintained for expenses incurred and loss of services between date of injury and date of death. Note, 41 L. R. A. 807. When death resulted instantaneously, or practically instantaneously, no action would lie. Railway v. Beall, 91 Tex. 310, 42 S. W. 1054, 66 Am. St. Rep. 892, and note, 41 L. R. A. 807. True, the courts of some states declined to follow a distinction based upon no satisfactory reason, but in view of the decision in the Beall Case we conclude that plaintiffs herein had no action at common law, and must rely upon the death statute.
We come, therefore, to the test whether administering chloroform and operating upon Imogene Rishworth under the circumstances shown in this case constituted a wrongful act towards her, which, had she survived, would have given her a cause of action against appellees'. This matter was discussed in our opinion upon the first appeal and also in our former opinion upon this appeal, and we stated our conclusion that consent to such acts by a child of the tender age of Imogene Rishworth would not be binding upon her, and must be treated as no consent at all. Knowledge of the effect of anaesthetics and surgical operations and the dangers incident thereto cannot be placed upon a parity with knowledge of everyday dangers plainly apparent to the mind of even a child. Had Imogene survived the anaesthetic and the operation, she would have had a cause of action. The extent of her recovery would have been dependent upon the extent of the injurious consequences resulting from the wrongful acts, but whether her damages would have been nominal or great is not a proper subject of inquiry, for the cause of action given the parents is' not dependent on a determination of such inquiry. Appellees contend, virtually, that we are not only wrong in holding as a matter of law that Imogene’s consent was a nullity, but that we should hold as a matter of law that her Consent would have been binding upon her had she lived, and that she could not have contended that any wrongful act was committed by appellees. We conclude there is no merit in the contention that the parents have no cause of action.
It is also contended that plaintiffs failed to prove any damages recoverable under the rules of law applicable thereto. They say the sums paid out by plaintiffs for funeral expenses, etc., could not be allowed, because there was no proof that the amounts charged were reasonable. This contention is sustained by our decisions. Railway v. Rowell, 92 Tex. 150, 46 S. W. 630; Wheeler v. Railway, 91 Tex. 356, 43 S. W. 876; Railway v. Willis, 117 S. W. 170; Railway v. Hemphill, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 232, 125 S. W. 340; Railway v. English, 178 S. W. 666.
They say that the evidence would not support a verdict of pecuniary loss, because no evidence was adduced of the cost of the support and maintenance of the child, and therefore the jury had no basis for estimating the difference between the value of her services and the cost of support and maintenance. This contention is without merit. We have found no decision by our Supreme Court which requires any more exact character of proof with reference to cost of support and maintenance than the pecuniary value of the services. An expert might indulge in extensive calculations on either subject, taking into consideration probable changes' in value of services and cost of support during the many years to be taken into consideration, but our Supreme Court has expressed the opinion that the jury can make the estimate just as well as the expert, and that these matters are not susceptible 'of accurate proof, and therefore must be left to the jury. Brunswig v. White, 70 Tex. 504, 8 S. W. 85; Railway v. Measles, 81 Tex. 474, 17 S. W. 124. The liberal rule announced in said cases has been often followed, and in many cases verdicts upheld upon testimony not as full as that in this case. Railway v. Yarbrough, 73 S. W. 845; Railway v. Bolen, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 339, 129 S. W. 860; Waters Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U. S. 159, 29 Sup. Ct. 270, 53 L. Ed. 453. We, therefore, overrule the contention that the evidence would not support a verdict for plaintiffs.
Appellees contend, further, however, that if the jury could find either way on the issue of proximate cause or damages, we must overrule assignments 1 and 6, which question the sufficiency of the evidence. This is correct; and, while we find that the testimony conclusively shows that the wrongful acts were the proximate cause of the child’s death, we are unable to find that the jury was bound to return a verdict for some amount of damages. The very fact that the jury is given so much latitude in applying their own knowledge to the facts proven, considered in connection with the testimony regarding Imogene’s health, makes it impossible to say that they were required to allow some damages as the net estimates of the *852difference between the value oí services and the cost of support and maintenance. Practically speaking, we do not believe a jury would find that the dost of support and maintenance would exceed the value of services, but it is, of course, a question of fact in each case, and on account of the wide latitude given the jury, it would be difficult to question its verdict. In this connection it is to be noted that our courts have decided that the death statute limits the recovery to actual damages, to damages purely pecuniary and compensatory, and that the doctrine of nominal damages does not apply. McGown v. I. & G. N. Ry. Co., 85 Tex. 289, 20 S. W. 80; Rader v. Railway, 137 S. W. 718. The contrary view expressed in Brunswig v. White, supra, has never, as far as we find, been expressly overruled, but we take it that the law is now settled in favor of the conclusion stated in the McGown Case. In view of the foregoing, we conclude that we erred in sustaining assignments 1 and 6.
However, we also sustained the third assignment, which complained of the charge of the court. It is contended that the portion of the charge complained of was only a definition, and was abstractly correct, and that no injury resulted therefrom. It is true it is a definition, and that it is not applied to the facts, but it is expressly stated that it is to be used as the law to determine the issue of consent. It may be correct, but is not clear, and would undoubtedly be accepted by the jury as a clear intimation that the case turned on the question of implied authority, and that the court considered that issue to be in the case. It is true that plaintiffs objected to submitting the issue of consent, but they also objected to submitting any issue of implied authority. They should have briefed an assignment complaining of submitting the issue of consent, but their failure to do so does not deprive them of relying on an assignment complaining of .submitting any charge relating to implied authority, which complaint is based on an objection'that there was no evidence justifying such a charge. They might be willing to risk the finding of a jury on whether they consented or not, but unwilling to risk its verdict on implied authority .of an agent. We conclude that we did not err in sustaining that assignment, and, in view of such assignment being sustained, it is immaterial whether the verdict of the jury might possibly have been rendered for defendants on the theory that no pecuniary loss was proven. It is highly probable that it was rendered on the theory that the evidence showed implied authority, and highly improbable that it was rendered on the theory that the testimony showed no damages. We deem it unnecessary to add anything to our discussion of the evidence, having implicit confidence in the correctness of our conclusion that the evidence, conclusively shows that no consent was given, and does not tend to raise any issue of implied authority on the part of the adult sisters to have the operation performed. The error in the charge complained of is material, and requires the reversal of the judgment.
Here, again, we are met by a contention that such error was invited by plaintiffs, by asking a special charge in which a definition of implied authority is given. It is true that plaintiffs, in their second special charge, discourse on what constitutes implied authority, but it is merely an argument leading up to the real request found in the' concluding portion of the charge, wñich is .that a peremptory instruction be given because the evidence fails to show consent or implied authority on the part of the adult sisters to have the operation performed.. The definition, if it can be called one, of implied authority given in said special charge differs so radically from that given by the court that it cannot be contended the court based his charge thereon, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the court did not prepare his charge in the very words used by him, and submit it to the parties and that they then prepared objections and special charges. Such is the course contemplated by articles 1971 and 1973, R. S. 1911, as amended by the Thirty-Third Legislature (Acts 33d Leg. c. 59, § 3 [Vernon's Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 1971, 1973]) and there is nothing in the record to indicate that it was not followed. We see no good reason why, after objections to admitting an issue have been made and overruled, a party should not submit his theory as to the proper wording of such issue, and are not prepared to hold that thereby he waives his objection to the submission of the issue, but in this case it is clear that the part of the special charge relied on was not even submitted on that theory, but as an argument to the court to give a peremptory instruction. Specific objections were made to the charge of the court in writing, and the court appended thereto a statement over his signature that the objections were presented before the charge was read to the jury and overruled. This was sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to urge their objections by assignment of error. Railway v. Dickey (Sup.) 187 S. W. 184. In addition, it is persuasive that the court did not overrule the objections because of any special charges requested, for he would likely have said so. We conclude that the contention, that of invited error, must be overruled.
We wish to state, in justice to appellants, that we believe we were in error in construing their first special charge as a request for the submission of the issue of consent. Upon further examination, we conclude that paragraph 5 thereof evidences an intention to inform the jury that, when an operation is performed without consent, the parties would be liable regardless of whether it was *853skillfully performed or what preparations the operating room was supplied with. It is true the language is appropriate for submitting the issue whether the operation was performed without the knowledge of plaintiff or his wife, or without the consent of either, but in preceding paragraphs of the charge the jury is told that the evidence shows that they had no knowledge that the operation was contemplated, and that there was no evidence of consent; in fact that the evidence showed they had refused their consent. The charge is not well drawn, but, construing it as a whole, we think it shows that plaintiffs wore not asking for submission of the issue of consent, and this is emphasized by their written objections.
What we have said renders it unnecessary to consider the objections urged in the motion to the sufficiency of assignments of error Nos. 1 and 6. They are both defective as pointed out, but each has been sufficient to direct attention to the error complained of, and wo believe that under the amendment to article 1012 made by the Thirty-Third Legislature in chapter 136 (Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1612) they are sufficient.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.