Court Opinion

ID: 9854148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:02:00.755288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:57.153204
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Justice
(dissenting):
I dissent. Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides that “[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to ... appeal in all cases.” The question before this Court is whether a new trial constitutes an “appeal” within the meaning of that constitutional provision. I grant everything that the majority opinion has said about the history of the constitutional language and the statutory definitions of jurisdiction. I point out, however, that this Court is both the ultimate source of content for the meaning of constitutional language and the promulgating agency for rule 26(13)(a).1 That being the case, I see no reason for us to maintain a semantically and conceptually illogical and confusing premise merely because it has its roots in history. The majority is correct in saying that “in Utah ... it is settled that the right to an ‘appeal’ from a court not of record is satisfied by provision for a trial de novo in a court of record.” That is true, however, only because of peculiar constitutional language that has now been removed from the judicial article, i.e., the former constitutional provision calling trials de novo “appeals.” 2 Now that the anomalous language has been removed from the constitution, it should no longer be “settled” as a matter of constitutional law that the requirement of appellate review may be satisfied by a new trial in a court of limited, or even general, jurisdiction. I would conclude that the 1984 amendments to article VIII do indeed require that a defendant be entitled in every case to one plenary review on the record.
I have no quarrel with the notion that the Legislature may bestow both original and appellate jurisdiction on any court. I do contest the implicit assertion of the majority, however, that the Legislature, rather than this Court, may decide what is adequate to constitute an “appeal” within the meaning of article VIII of the constitution. I also maintain that contemporary understanding of the concept of criminal appeals mandates at least review of convictions upon a record by a superior tribunal for purposes of detecting procedural and evidentiary errors, as well as constitutional ones. The principle that the Legislature might have the power, for example, to grant new trials in felony criminal cases in satisfaction of the right-to-appeal provisions of our constitution is disturbing and anomalous and would not, I suspect, be upheld by the majority. Yet the majority’s *520logic must embrace that result.3 I submit, rather, that the following doctrine regarding the definition of an “appeal” should be accepted as being constitutionally required by this Court in all criminal cases:
The standard rule is that appellate jurisdiction is the authority to review the actions or judgments of an inferior tribunal upon the record made in that tribunal, and to affirm, modify or reverse such action or judgment.
Peatross v. Board of Comm’rs of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976).

. This Court, in “In re Rules of Procedure and Evidence to be used in the Courts of this State,” filed January 13, 1989, provided per curiam:
Pursuant to the provisions of article VIII, section 4 of the Constitution of Utah, as amended, and rule 11-101(3)(E) of the Code of Judicial Administration, the Court adopts all existing statutory rules of procedure and evidence contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-35-1 to -33 (1982 & Supp.1988) not inconsistent with or superseded by rules of procedure and evidence heretofore adopted by this Court, with the exception of section 77-35-12(g) {see State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) and section 77-35-21.5(4)(c) and (d)) (see State v. Copeland, [765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) ]). Effective as of January 1, 1989.

. See old article VIII, section 9.

. This result would of course not have been possible under old section 9 because there the constitution itself limited new trials as “appeals” to justice court proceedings, which did not in-elude felony criminal cases. There is now no such constitutional limitation, and the majority opinion offers no way of distinguishing so-called appeals at any level.