Court Opinion

ID: 9403686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 15:13:32.6834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:08.725495
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
             In The Supreme Court

Anthony Allan Jones, II, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000188

            ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

           Appeal from Charleston County
          Robert E. Hood, Circuit Court Judge

                 Opinion No. 28164
     Submitted May 16, 2022 – Filed June 21, 2023

 AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART

Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, of Elizabeth Franklin-Best,
P.C., of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr.,
both of Columbia, for Respondent.

Allison Krause Elder and Katherine Weaver Patterson,
both of Greenville, for Amici Curiae Root & Rebound, SC
Commission on Indigent Defense, Dr. Kate Kleinfelter,
Justice 360, and Cornell Law School Juvenile Justice
Clinic; Hannah Lyon Freedman, of Columbia, for Amicus
Curiae Justice 360; Dr. Aleksandra Boguslawa Chauhan,
               of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae SC Commission on
               Indigent Defense; and John H. Blume, III, of Ithaca, NY,
               for Amicus Curiae Juvenile Justice Clinic and Cornell
               Law School.

       CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY: Petitioner Anthony Jones pleaded guilty on
December 12, 2016 to first-degree burglary and armed robbery, crimes he committed
at the ages of sixteen and seventeen, respectively. Pursuant to subsection 63-19-
20(1),1 the definitional statute of chapter nineteen in the Juvenile Justice Code, the
circuit court had jurisdiction over Jones's charges, rather than the family court. 2 The

1
    At the time of Jones's crimes and his plea, the subsection provided as follows:
         "Child" or "juvenile" means a person less than seventeen years of age.
         "Child" or "juvenile" does not mean a person sixteen years of age or
         older who is charged with a Class A, B, C, or D felony as defined in
         Section 16-1-20 or a felony which provides for a maximum term of
         imprisonment of fifteen years or more. However, a person sixteen years
         of age who is charged with a Class A, B, C, or D felony as defined in
         Section 16-1-20 or a felony which provides for a maximum term of
         imprisonment of fifteen years or more may be remanded to the family
         court for disposition of the charge at the discretion of the solicitor. An
         additional or accompanying charge associated with the charges
         contained in this item must be heard by the court with jurisdiction over
         the offenses contained in this item.
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-20(1) (2010) (emphasis added).
2
    The General Assembly amended the provision, effective in 2019:
         "Child" or "juvenile" means a person less than eighteen years of age.
         "Child" or "juvenile" does not mean a person seventeen years of age or
         older who is charged with a Class A, B, C, or D felony as defined in
         Section 16-1-20 or a felony which provides for a maximum term of
         imprisonment of fifteen years or more. However, a person seventeen
         years of age who is charged with a Class A, B, C, or D felony as defined
         in Section 16-1-20 or a felony which provides for a maximum term of
         imprisonment of fifteen years or more may be remanded to the family
         court for disposition of the charge at the discretion of the solicitor. An
         additional or accompanying charge associated with the charges
circuit court judge sentenced Jones to ten years in prison for armed robbery and
fifteen years for first-degree burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. Jones
did not file a direct appeal. Instead, he filed an application for post-conviction relief
("PCR") on several grounds, including a challenge to the constitutionality of
subsection 63-19-20(1). After a hearing, the PCR court dismissed the application,
finding the constitutional challenge was not a cognizable PCR claim and, even if it
were, the statute was constitutional. We granted Jones's petition for a writ of
certiorari to consider whether the PCR court erred.
      We conclude Jones properly brought this challenge in his PCR application
and subsection 63-19-20(1) is constitutional. However, in keeping with our prior
decisions regarding sentencing juveniles, circuit court judges must consider the
mitigating factors of youth as identified in Aiken v. Byars 3 when sentencing.
Consideration of these factors can be done at sentencing; therefore, a separate Aiken
hearing is not required. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
                    I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       On June 7, 2015, Jones entered a home in Dorchester County through an
unlocked door. The victim had left her patio door unlocked for neighbors to return
furniture. When the victim returned home, she noticed her firearm was missing from
her nightstand and her cat was outside. Investigators found fingerprints inside the
victim's residence that matched Jones's fingerprints.
       Jones used the stolen firearm in an armed robbery in Charleston County on
June 28, 2015. Jones contacted the robbery victim regarding a Craigslist
advertisement for a laptop. He and a co-defendant met the victim for the purported
sale. The co-defendant opened the victim's car door, grabbed the laptop, and pointed
a revolver at the victim. Jones and the co-defendant fled with the laptop.
      After police identified the vehicle from the victim's description, a high-speed
chase ensued. The vehicle crashed into a tree, and Jones and the co-defendant fled.
Police eventually arrested Jones and the co-defendant, and they found the laptop in
the vehicle and the revolver in a nearby yard. Police also discovered the vehicle

      contained in this item must be heard by the court with jurisdiction over
      the offenses contained in this item.

S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-20(1) (Supp. 2021) (emphasis added).
3
 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014).
belonged to Jones's father. Later, the co-defendant gave a statement implicating
Jones as the person who planned the robbery and provided the weapon.

      The State indicted Jones for first-degree burglary in Dorchester County on
October 1, 2015, and for armed robbery in Charleston County on October 20, 2015.
Jones appeared before the circuit court because armed robbery (subsection 16-11-
330(A)) is defined as a Class A felony. 4 S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-90(A) (2015 &
Supp. 2021); id. § 63-19-20(1) (2010) (excluding a person sixteen years of age who
committed a Class A, B, C, or D felony from the definition of "child" or "juvenile").5

      Jones agreed to plead guilty to both charges during the plea hearing held in
Charleston County on December 12, 2016. After negotiations, the Dorchester
County Solicitor recommended to the court that Jones receive the statutory minimum
sentence of fifteen years in prison for the first-degree burglary charge. The
Charleston County Solicitor did not make a sentencing recommendation.
      At the time of his plea and sentencing, Jones was eighteen years old and had
previously been adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for second-degree burglary, a
weapons charge, and shoplifting. The plea court sentenced him to fifteen years in
prison for first-degree burglary 6 and ten years for armed robbery, 7 to run
concurrently.
      Following his sentencing, Jones did not pursue a direct appeal. However, on
April 14, 2017, Jones simultaneously filed identical applications for PCR in
Dorchester County and Charleston County. In these applications, Jones sought to

4
  First-degree burglary is exempt from the classification system. S.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-1-10(D) (2015 & Supp. 2021).
5
 In both the 2010 and 2021 version, the subsection allows for remand to the family
court at the discretion of the solicitor.
6
 See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311(B) (2015) ("Burglary in the first degree is a felony
punishable by life imprisonment. For purposes of this section, 'life' means until
death. The court, in its discretion, may sentence the defendant to a term of not less
than fifteen years." (emphasis added)).
7
 See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-330(A) (2015) ("A person who commits robbery while
armed . . . is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be imprisoned for a
mandatory minimum term of not less than ten years or more than thirty years, no part
of which may be suspended or probation granted." (emphasis added)).
vacate his pleas. By order dated June 22, 2017, a circuit court judge granted Jones's
motion to merge the applications into one action for PCR.

       Jones raised two arguments in his PCR application. First, Jones alleged his
plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective according to Strickland v. Washington,
46 U.S. 668 (1984) because counsel did not properly investigate the mitigating
circumstances of Jones's youth and failed to engage in meaningful plea negotiations.
Second, Jones contended subsection 63-19-20(1), 8 which transferred him from
family court to circuit court as an adult, was unconstitutional. Specifically, Jones
asserted the statutory provision is unconstitutional because it does not allow
discretion in sentencing for a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the crime,
which deprived him of due process. Further, Jones claimed his sentence is also cruel
and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, sections 3 and 15, of the South Carolina Constitution.

       The PCR court conducted the hearing on November 18, 2019 and
subsequently dismissed Jones's application in an order dated January 29, 2020. The
court relied on two principal reasons in dismissing the application.
       First, the court ruled that Jones did not meet his burden under Strickland in
alleging constitutional ineffectiveness for failing to investigate mitigating
circumstances of youth because Jones was sentenced to the mandatory minimum for
both crimes. In support of this, the PCR court found that plea counsel noted Jones's
youth and the plea court considered Jones's age. Jones did not appeal the Strickland
ruling to this Court.

        Second, the PCR court ruled counsel was not deficient in failing to challenge
the constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1) because "[a]t the time of [Jones's]
plea, and to date, South Carolina's automatic waiver provision and [Jones's]
mandatory minimum sentence are considered constitutional." The court found, even
if the court interpreted Jones's claim as a Strickland challenge, "[i]t is a long-standing
rule that an attorney is not required to be clairvoyant and anticipate or discover
changes in the law which were not in existence at the time of trial." Further, the
court noted that "[a]ny allegation that the waiver provision was unconstitutional or

8
  The parties and the lower courts refer to the provision as the "automatic waiver
provision." This, however, is a misnomer. As we will explain, we construe
subsection 63-19-20(1) as a definitional statute. We refer to it here exclusively as
"subsection 63-19-20(1)."
that [Jones's] sentence was unconstitutional could and should have been raised either
in a direct appeal or through the Federal Habeas procedures."

       Jones appealed the dismissal of his PCR application for the sole purpose of
challenging the constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1). See Rule 243(a),
SCACR; Rule 243(l), SCACR. This Court granted the petition because it involves
a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. See Rule 203(d)(1)(A)(ii), SCACR.

                          II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
      In an appeal from a PCR court, "[q]uestions of law are reviewed de novo, and
we will reverse the PCR court's decision when it is controlled by an error of law."
Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610, 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016).

      "This Court has a limited scope of review in cases involving a constitutional
challenge to a statute because all statutes are presumed constitutional and, if
possible, will be construed to render them valid." Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 569,
549 S.E.2d 591, 597 (2001). "Further, a legislative act will not be declared
unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the Constitution is clear and beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 570, 549 S.E.2d at 597.
                                 III. DISCUSSION

       Jones argues subsection 63-19-20(1) is unconstitutional. In support, Jones
contends the provision restricts a judge's ability to consider the mitigating factors of
youth as articulated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) because a family
court is in a better position to adjudicate juveniles. In Jones's view, the provision
prevents judges from exploring the full impact of a defendant's youth on the record
before a juvenile is "automatically waived" to the circuit court. Jones maintains that
"adult court" delivers more severe sentences to defendants.

       Conversely, the State argues that the provision is constitutional and, therefore,
the PCR court did not commit an error of law dismissing Jones's PCR application.
The State contends that Jones has no constitutional right to have his case adjudicated
in family court. Additionally, the State asserts that any right a person may have to
be in the family court's jurisdiction is statutorily created.

      Because Jones appeals the PCR court's order of dismissal, we must consider
whether Jones brings a cognizable PCR claim in his application and whether
subsection 63-19-20(1) is constitutional.
      A. Cognizable PCR Claim

      The PCR court characterized Jones's constitutional claim as a trial court error,
not cognizable for PCR. We conclude the PCR court erred in this holding.

      A person who has been convicted of a crime can initiate a PCR proceeding
when he alleges his conviction or sentence violated either the United States
Constitution or South Carolina Constitution. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(A)(1)
(2014) ("Persons who may institute proceeding; exclusiveness of remedy. (A) Any
person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims:
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution or laws of this State.").

       In Simmons v. State, this Court indirectly distinguished constitutional PCR
claims and claims that the parties could have addressed before trial, during trial, or
on direct appeal. 264 S.C. 417, 423, 215 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1975) ("Errors in a
petitioner's trial which could have been reviewed on appeal may not be asserted for
the first time, or reasserted, in post-conviction proceedings." (citations omitted)).

       However, "[a] violation found to be unconstitutional after the time for appeal
lapses is not a direct appeal issue and is not barred from PCR consideration." Gibson
v. State, 329 S.C. 37, 41, 495 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1998). "In a PCR proceeding, a
defendant collaterally attacks his conviction and may raise any claims of
constitutional violations relating to his conviction." Williams v. Ozmint, 380 S.C.
473, 477, 671 S.E.2d 600, 601 (2008).
       Turning to the instant case, we find Jones properly challenged the
constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1) and his resulting sentences in his PCR
application. Initially, we note that Jones was precluded from raising this issue during
the plea proceeding because conditional guilty pleas are not permitted. See State v.
Truesdale, 278 S.C. 368, 370, 296 S.E.2d 528, 529 (1982) ("[A]ppellant here entered
a conditional plea which is a practice not recognized in South Carolina and a practice
which we expressly disapprove. . . . [A] guilty plea constitutes waiver of all prior
claims of constitutional rights or deprivations thereof."). Further, pursuant to
subsection 17-27-20(A)(1), the PCR court had jurisdiction over this claim, which is
distinct from an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland.

      Having found Jones presented a cognizable PCR claim, we now address the
merits of his constitutional challenge.
      B. Constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1)9

       For reasons that will be discussed, we hold that subsection 63-19-20(1) is
constitutional. However, we are mindful that juveniles are entitled to careful
sentencing under the Eighth Amendment, and we direct circuit court judges to
consider the mitigating factors of youth articulated in Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534,
544, 765 S.E.2d 572, 577 (2014). While consideration of the factors enumerated in
Aiken provides sufficient attention to actual juvenility, circuit court judges are not
required to do so in a separate Aiken hearing when sentencing pursuant to this
subsection. See In re Administrative Order, 415 S.C. 460, 783 S.E.2d 534 (2016)
(establishing procedures for the management and disposition of motions for
resentencing filed pursuant to Aiken).

       We begin by examining the jurisdiction of the family court and the operational
effect of subsection 63-19-20(1). The family court has exclusive jurisdiction over a
child "who is alleged to have violated or attempted to violate any state or local
law." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-510(A)(1)(d) (2010). In general, a "child" or
"juvenile" is defined as "a person less than seventeen years of age," according to the
provision at the time of Jones's sentencing. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-19-20(1)
(2010). However, the General Assembly expressly excluded from this definition "a
person sixteen years of age or older who is charged with a Class A, B, C, or D felony
as defined in Section 16-1-20 or a felony which provides for a maximum term of
imprisonment of fifteen years or more." Id. (emphasis added). Because Jones did
not meet the definition of a "child" or "juvenile," he was subject to the jurisdiction
of the circuit court rather than the family court.

       Further, in our view, subsection 63-19-20(1) operates as a definitional statute,
in both its 2010 form and its 2021 form. The General Assembly created the family
court as a statutory court and determines its jurisdiction through legislation. Because
the subsection exempts Jones from falling within the family court's jurisdiction, in
operation with subsection 63-3-510(A)(1)(d), it cannot "transfer" or "waive" him to
the circuit court. Therefore, we decline to characterize subsection 63-29-20(1) as an
"automatic waiver provision" and view the subsection as definitional in effect.

9
 Before the PCR court, Jones argued the provision violated his rights under both the
United States and South Carolina Constitutions. However, before this Court, Jones
does not argue subsection 63-19-20(1) violates his rights under the South Carolina
Constitution. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to Jones's challenge under the
United States Constitution.
        Turning to the basis of Jones's challenge, the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend.
VIII. 10 "[T]he Eighth Amendment guarantees individuals the right not to be
subjected to excessive sanctions." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
       The United States Supreme Court sequentially has interpreted the protections
of the Eighth Amendment to hold that juveniles are entitled to different treatment in
sentencing when the death penalty or a life-without-parole sentence is imposed. See
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (holding the execution of an offender
under the age of sixteen at the time of the crime violates the United States
Constitution); Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 (ruling the imposition of the death penalty for
offenders under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime violates the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the imposition of a life-without-parole
sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide); Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012) (ruling that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
individuals under the age of eighteen violates the Eighth Amendment and stating the
judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before
imposing the harshest possible penalty). 11

       Most recently, the United States Supreme Court again limited its
interpretation of the amendment in the Roper-Graham-Miller line of cases. See
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (holding, under Miller, a sentencing
court need not make a finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing a life-
without-parole sentence).

      We have followed United States Supreme Court precedent in interpreting the
Eighth Amendment as applied to South Carolina law. See Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C.
534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014) (holding inmates sentenced to life without parole as
juveniles before Miller were entitled to resentencing because their sentences violated
the Eighth Amendment);12 State v. Slocumb, 426 S.C. 297, 827 S.E.2d 148 (2019)

10
  "The provision is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
11
   The United States Supreme Court held the Miller rule applies to the states
retroactively on collateral review. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016).
12
  This Court's decision in Aiken came before the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Montgomery.
(declining to extend Graham's holding to de facto life-without-parole sentences);
State v. Smith, 428 S.C. 417, 836 S.E.2d 348 (2019) (holding mandatory minimum
sentence on those convicted of murder, whether a juvenile or adult, does not violate
the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Miller).

       In Aiken, we held life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders only
satisfied the constitutional requirements articulated in Miller when the sentencing
court conducted an individualized hearing on mitigating factors of youth. 410 S.C.
at 545, 765 S.E.2d at 578. We later limited Aiken's holding by declining to extend
the reasoning to de facto life sentences: "[W]e believe the proper course is to respect
the Supreme Court's admonition that lower courts must refrain from extending
federal constitutional protections beyond the line drawn by the Supreme Court."
Slocumb, 426 S.C. at 314–15, 827 S.E.2d at 157. Again, in Smith, we declined to
extend Aiken and held a mandatory minimum sentence was constitutional as applied
to juveniles. 428 S.C. at 418, 836 S.E.2d at 348. Further, we noted that "[w]e are
again being asked to ignore the confines of the holdings of the Supreme Court and
instead extend the rationale underlying the holdings." Id. at 420, 836 S.E.2d at 349–
50.

       In this case, we find Smith is dispositive. Appellant Smith was convicted of
murder and attempted murder, which he committed just before his eighteenth
birthday. Id. at 418, 836 S.E.2d at 348. South Carolina law provided for a
mandatory minimum sentence of thirty years for murder, whether an adult or a
juvenile. Id. (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(A) (2015)). The circuit court gave
Smith an individualized sentencing hearing pursuant to Aiken. Id. at 419, 836 S.E.2d
at 349. Following the narrow trend of precedent, we declined to extend the reasoning
behind the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment and held the mandatory
minimum sentence was constitutional as applied to juveniles. Id. at 420–21, 836
S.E.2d at 349–50. Because mandatory minimums do not violate juveniles' rights
under the Eighth Amendment, juveniles can be subject to those mandatory
minimums under the operation of subsection 63-19-20(1).

     Considering the confines of these precedents, we again decline to extend the
Roper-Graham-Miller line,13 and Jones cannot rely on their reasonings to support

13
  See State v. B.T.D., 296 So. 3d 343, 354–55 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019) ("Accordingly,
in Alabama, juveniles who have attained the age of [sixteen] years and who are
charged with an offense enumerated in [the similar provision] have neither a
constitutionally nor statutorily protected liberty interest in juvenile-court
adjudication that would entitle them to procedural due process before they can be
his contention that subsection 63-19-20(1) violates the Eighth Amendment.14
Therefore, we hold that subsection 63-19-20(1) does not violate the Constitution.

      Despite our conclusion that subsection 63-19-20(1) is consistent with the
Eighth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court's precedent, and our
precedent, we direct circuit courts to consider the mitigating factors of youth in
sentencing juveniles falling under the ambit of subsection 63-19-20(1).

      In Aiken, we enumerated five factors that a court must consider when life
without parole is a possible sentence for a juvenile:
      (1) the chronological age of the offender and the hallmark features of
      youth, including "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate the
      risks and consequence"; (2) the "family and home environment" that
      surrounded the offender; (3) the circumstances of the homicide offense,
      including the extent of the offender's participation in the conduct and
      how familial and peer pressures may have affected him; (4) the
      "incompetencies associated with youth—for example, [the offender's]
      inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea
      agreement) or [the offender's] incapacity to assist his own attorneys";
      and (5) the "possibility of rehabilitation."

subjected to the jurisdiction of the 'adult court.'"); see also United States v. Bland,
472 F.2d 1329, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("[J]udicial consideration of the legitimate
scope of prosecutorial discretion clearly encompasses the exercise of such discretion
where it has the effect of determining whether a person will be charged as a juvenile
or as an adult. . . . [T]he exercise of discretion by the United States Attorney in the
case at bar involves no violation of due process or equal protection of the law."),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973).
14
  We note that some state courts have identified different challenges—either a claim
based on a liberty interest in being "tried as a juvenile" or a right to be "sentenced as
a juvenile." Compare State v. Orozco, 483 P.3d 331, 339 (Idaho 2021) ("[W]e
decline to create a protected liberty interest where the legislature itself has expressly
preempted one."), with State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 170 (Iowa 2018) ("We
conclude the Iowa youthful offender statutes provide the discretionary, posttrial
sentencing that Miller requires."). In theory, the former arises from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the latter from the Eighth Amendment.
However, it appears that the parties here base their claims on the latter.
410 S.C. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78). Courts
have applied these "mitigating factors of youth" to consider the fundamental
differences between juvenile and adult offenders. See supra Section III(B).
       Turning to the specific issue presented, the important distinction between
family court and circuit court pertains to sentencing discretion. The family court has
broad discretion as to adjudication, which is expressly not a conviction. S.C. Code
Ann. § 63-19-1410 (2010 & Supp. 2021). In contrast, a circuit court's discretion in
sentencing is limited to statutorily created parameters. In the instant case, armed
robbery carries a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years, and first-degree
burglary carries a mandatory minimum of fifteen years. Id. § 16-11-330(A) (2015);
id. § 16-11-311(B).

       Jones contends that his transfer to circuit court restricts the court's ability to
consider the Miller factors before a juvenile is automatically waived to adult court
where the sentences are much more severe. We disagree. Although the General
Assembly has bound the circuit court's sentencing discretion by creating statutory
minimums, the circuit court had a range of years in which to appropriately sentence
Jones. Jones does not adequately explain why a family court must consider these
factors over the general sessions court.
        Here, the plea court sufficiently considered the applicable mitigating factors
of youth before imposing Jones's sentences. At the hearing, the circuit court inquired
into Jones's background and characteristics of youth as to the first factor. Jones
achieved his GED. He worked in landscaping, was not married, and did not have
any children. Jones, at the time, was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol,
and he did not have any mental, physical, emotional, or nervous disabilities.15 The
court also inquired into Jones's understanding of his relationship with his attorney.
     As to the second factor, the court heard from Jones's mother, father, and
grandmother before imposing the sentence.

        As to the fourth factor, the court made certain that Jones understood the
severity of his charges and the minimum and maximum penalties. The court also
heard a detailed recitation of the facts underlying the charges and admonished Jones
to "listen carefully to the facts." Further, the court cautioned Jones about the risks

15
  Two years before the hearing, when he was sixteen, Jones was treated for his
marijuana use.
in waiving a jury trial. In our calculation, the court asked Jones if he certainly
pleaded guilty no less than eight times.

       Therefore, the plea court properly considered the mitigating factors of youth
and thoroughly explored Jones's juvenility on the record. We discern no difference
between a circuit court's and a family court's ability to investigate Jones's
background on the record. 16 Additionally, after thorough questioning, the plea court
sentenced Jones to the statutory minimum for each charge. Consequently, accepting
Jones's plea and sentencing him accordingly did not result in a constitutional
infirmity based on the United States Supreme Court's and this Court's interpretations
of the Eighth Amendment.

                                IV. CONCLUSION

       Because Jones properly brought a cognizable PCR claim in challenging his
sentences and subsection 63-19-20(1), we conclude the PCR court erred in
dismissing his application on this ground. As to the merits of Jones's constitutional
claim, we hold that subsection 63-19-20(1) does not violate the Eighth Amendment
beyond a reasonable doubt. However, we direct circuit courts to consider the Aiken
factors of youth when sentencing juveniles subject to this subsection. 17 In the instant
case, given that the circuit court judge sufficiently considered these factors, we
affirm Jones's sentences.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
KITTREDGE and JAMES, J.J., concur. Acting Justice Kaye G. Hearn
concurring in a separate opinion in which FEW, J., concurs.

16
  We note these factors are fact-specific and may weigh differently on a case-by-
case basis in the discretion of the circuit court.
17
  We reiterate our holding does not require a separate Aiken hearing established by
In re Administrative Order, 415 S.C. 460, 783 S.E.2d 534 (2016).
Acting Justice Kaye G. Hearn: I concur with the majority's opinion except for its
conclusion that the hearing before the circuit court fully complied with Aiken v.
Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). While the circuit court judge obviously
could not have been aware that our decision in Aiken would apply to these facts, the
hearing that occurred in no way satisfies what Aiken requires.
      In Aiken, we noted,

      While we do not go so far as some commentators who suggest that the
      sentencing of a juvenile offender subject to a life without parole
      sentence should mirror the penalty phase of a capital case, we are
      mindful that the Miller Court specifically linked the individualized
      sentencing requirements of capital sentencing to juvenile life without
      parole sentences.

Id. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577. Thus, it is apparent that an Aiken hearing is more than
what transpires during typical sentencing. Indeed, we recently heard a challenge
following a resentencing hearing where the primary issue concerned whether the
trial court had imposed a burden on the defendant to prove why the original sentence
violated Aiken. In determining that no such burden of proof or persuasion exists, we
upheld the sentence imposed after recounting the thorough inquiry that occurred.
State v. Smart, Op. No. 28161 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed June 21, 2023) (Howard Adv. Sh.
No. 24 at 17). The trial court in Smart conducted a textbook example of what a
proper Aiken hearing affords—listening to testimony from an expert psychologist
who examined Smart several times and reviewed "thousands of pages of his
records," and receiving testimony from a number of witnesses regarding the
circumstances of the crime and the defendant's background. The trial court weighed
the evidenced, considered counsel's arguments, and analyzed the Aiken factors
before imposing a sentence.

      Conversely, the hearing in this matter involved a guilty plea that included the
same boilerplate questions asked during any plea, regardless of the defendant's age.
For example, the court asked about the defendant's age, his criminal record, his
employment history, any drugs or medication he may have been on, his satisfaction
with his lawyer, and whether he understood the consequences of pleading guilty. I
believe Aiken requires more because these general questions simply do not equate to
the more in-depth and detailed questions that should be asked and answered in order
to analyze the "hallmark features of youth" that Aiken mandates. In my view, it
would be nearly impossible for any hearing where the judge does all the questioning
to comply with Aiken. Nonetheless, I concur in the balance of the majority's opinion
because the circuit court sentenced the defendant to the statutory minimum sentence
for both charges and ran them concurrently; thus, a more thorough hearing in this
case could not have led to a lesser sentence.

FEW, J., concurs.