Court Opinion

ID: 9792583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:31:08.059129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:43.724634
License: Public Domain

*540Brachtenbach, C.J.
(dissenting)—In its ardour to explain the relationship of proximate cause to insurance law the majority strays from the basic issues presented by this case. First, what are the express terms of the policy? Second, are any of those terms ambiguous? Third, if the terms of the policy are unambiguous, would application of those terms result in coverage? The majority fails to apply such a step by step analysis. Consequently, it neglects a clear provision of the policy that requires that we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment. I therefore dissent.
This court has long recognized that insurance policies are private contracts. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indent. Co., 50 Wn.2d 443, 449, 313 P.2d 347 (1957). As a private contractor, the insurer is ordinarily permitted to limit its liability unless inconsistent with public policy or some statutory provision. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 97 Wn.2d 203, 210, 643 P.2d 441 (1982). Thus the court's initial task here is to identify fully the terms of this contract. Here the homeowner's policy provided for coverage against, inter alia, fire and explosion. In addition, however, the policy contained an exclusion for earth movement which in turn contained its own exception. That exclusion and exception provide:
We do not cover loss resulting directly or indirectly from:
2. Earth movement. Direct loss by fire, explosion, theft, or breakage of glass or safety glazing materials resulting from earth movement is covered.
The next step is to determine whether any of these provisions are ambiguous. Although this issue was raised by the parties the majority chooses to ignore it and proceeds instead to analyze the case as if it were a question of proximate cause. It then determines that that issue is a question of fact for the jury and reverses summary judgment.
The obvious flaw in the majority's opinion is that it improperly applies the terms of the policy to the chain of events. The facts of this case reveal the following possible *541chain of events which should result in a denial of coverage regardless of proximate cause analysis. As suggested by the majority, on May 18, 1980, earthquakes and moving lava caused earth to move, which caused an eruption (explosion?), which caused earth movement in the form of mudflows. The majority concludes that the exclusion operates to exclude the initial earth movement which preceded the eruption but that the exception for explosion contained in the exclusion brings the incident back within the potential terms of the policy. But if that result is correct, the majority neglects a necessary additional inquiry—that is—should the earth movement exclusion be applied a second time to exclude coverage for mudflows? This last question presents strictly a legal issue involving the proper interpretation of policy terms. I submit that the only logical resolution of this issue is that the earth movement exclusion must be considered a second time. This answer requires, unfortunately, that we deny coverage. To do otherwise, however, would be to use proximate cause analysis to circumvent the clear terms of the policy. In addition, the majority appears to stop its inquiry at a point on the causation chain where coverage would be provided. The majority's analysis requires that we ignore clear provisions in the insurance contract. This we cannot do. As we have said in the past:
Since an insurance policy is merely a written contract between an insurer and the insured, courts cannot rule out of the contract any language which the parties thereto have put into it; cannot revise the contract under the theory of construing it; and neither abstract justice nor any rule of construction can create a contract for the parties which they did not make for themselves.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 50 Wn.2d 443, 449, 313 P.2d 347 (1957).
The interpretation I suggest is necessary to give effect to the expectations that the parties had at the time they contracted for insurance coverage.3 I would therefore deny cov*542erage and affirm the trial court.
Dolliver and Dimmick, JJ., concur with Brachtenbach, C.J.
Reconsideration denied February 10, 1983.

 The fact that the Grahams made a claim and recovered under their Federal Flood Insurance policy for this damage demonstrates that they at least viewed the *542primary cause of the damage as unrelated to the explosion. Transcript of Proceedings, at 43.