Court Opinion

ID: 9688590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:57:29.61614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:40.529385
License: Public Domain

Rogosheske, Justice
(concurring specially).
While I agree with the disposition reached, I fail to comprehend the basis thereof.
I believe it must be accepted, as defendant concedes, that plaintiff sufficiently pled strict liability. The third count of plaintiff’s complaint alleged:
“That Defendant Rupp Manufacturing, Inc. manufactured, sold and through their representations induced Plaintiff to purchase a defective and dangerous machine; that Defendant is strictly liable for any and all injuries, loss and damages caused by said defective machine, including injuries to the Plaintiff as hereinbefore set forth.
“That by reason of said strict liability Defendant is responsible to Plaintiff for all injuries and damages resulting from said defective and dangerous machine.
“That as a direct and proximate result of the manufacture and sale of said defective and dangerous machine, Plaintiff suffered serious disfiguring, painful and permanent injuries * *
While this language might be improved, it contains all of the elements necessary to state a strict liability claim. See, Greeno v. Clark Equipment Co. (N. D. Ind.) 237 F. Supp. 427.
In order to establish a prima facie case of strict liability against a manufacturer, a plaintiff merely need introduce evidence showing (1) that the product he purchased was in a defec-*47five condition unreasonably dangerous for its use,1 (2) that such defective condition existed when the product left the hands of the manufacturer,2 and (3) that the defect was the proximate cause of the injury he suffered.3 Where the evidence introduced would reasonably support a finding of these three elements, plaintiff is entitled to a jury instruction on strict liability.4
Here plaintiff introduced testimony to the effect that (1) the design of the snowmobile was defective and unreasonably dangerous because it provided for an unsafe, unguarded spark plug which protruded toward the rider;5 (2) this defect existed when the snowmobile left the hands of the manufacturer; and (3) plaintiff’s injuries resulted from coming into contact with the protruding spark plug as the snowmobile came to a sudden stop while he was operating it. Had plaintiff made clear to the trial court his theory of strict liability, before submission to the jury, this evidence standing alone would have been enough to require the court to submit the issue of strict liability. However, as the *48majority opinion emphasizes, strict liability is not absolute liability. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. (2d) 443, 155 N. W. (2d) 55. There are a number of defenses to a prima facie case of strict liability which are based upon the plaintiff’s conduct. Dippel v. Sciano, supra. See, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 59 Cal. (2d) 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P. (2d) 897, 13 A. L. R. (3d) 1049; Bushnell, Illusory Defense of Contributory Negligence■ in Product Liability, 12 Cleveland-Marshall L. Rev. 412; Keeton, Assumption of Products Risks, 19 S. W. L. J. 61; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791, 824-826, 838-840.
Two such defenses to strict liability are assumption of risk and contributory negligence or contributory fault. If the plaintiff himself knew of the defect, realized the hazard it presented, yet voluntarily chose to use the product in such a manner that he encountered the hazard, he should not be permitted to recover. See, Dippel v. Sciano, supra; Bushnell, Illusory Defense of Contributory Negligence in Product Liability, 12 Cleveland-Marshall L. Rev. 412.
In this case, plaintiff was a trained mechanic wdio not only noticed that this spark plug protruded toward the rider, but also had done extensive repair and replacement work on it, removing the insulator which covered it. Thus, in my opinion, a reasonable mind functioning judicially would be compelled to conclude that plaintiff knew of the defect in design. Further, it is undisputed that plaintiff voluntarily chose to operate this defectively designed snowmobile at high speeds over unfamiliar terrain in pursuit of a fox. It must be conceded, however, that the record reveals insufficient evidence from which a trier of fact would be compelled to conclude that plaintiff subjectively realized the nature of the risk or danger. Thus, this is not a classic case of assumption of risk as a matter of law.6
*49But, while contributory negligence in the sense of an unreasonable failure to notice or to take precautions against the possible existence of a defect is not a defense to strict liability,7 it has been held that when a person is aware of the defect, and the hazard involved in using the product in a particular way would be obvious to a reasonable man, the plaintiff should not be able to recover on the theory of strict liability. See, Martinez v. Nichols Conveyor & Engineering Co. 243 Cal. App. (2d) 795, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842; Dippel v. Sciano, supra; Restatement, Torts, (2d) § 402A, comment n. Keeton, Assumption of Products Risks, 19 S. W. L. J. 61; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L. J. 1099, 1147-48; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791, 839; Annotation, 13 A. L. R. (3d) 1057,1100-1103. It makes no difference whether this defense is called contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or contributory fault.
In this case it is undisputed that plaintiff was a trained, experienced mechanic. He had repaired and replaced the protruding spark plug which in essence was the basis upon which plaintiff’s expert witness predicated his opinion that the design of the snowmobile was defective. In addition, plaintiff removed the protective insulator from the spark plug.8 Under these circumstances, plaintiff voluntarily chose to operate the snowmobile *50at high speed over rough terrain in pursuit of a fox. I cannot escape the conclusion that a reasonable person of ordinary prudence who knew of the defect must be charged with knowledge of the danger of serious injury which would result from a sudden stop of the snowmobile. Accordingly, I am compelled to conclude that the risk was so obvious and that plaintiff’s decision to encounter it was so unreasonable that he must be precluded as a matter of law from recovering on his strict liability claim. Although the trial court correctly concluded that the evidence established a prima facie case of strict liability, a denial of plaintiff’s new trial motion was required because under the evidence a defense to plaintiff’s recovering under the theory of strict liability was established as a matter of law.

 Ilnicki v. Montgomery Ward Co. (7 Cir.) 371 F. (2d) 195 (applying Indiana law); Suvada v. White Motor Co. 32 Ill. (2d) 612, 210 N. E. (2d) 182; Olney v. Beaman Bottling Co. 220 Tenn. 459, 418 S. W. (2d) 430; Restatement, Torts (2d) § 402A.

 Suvada v. White Motor Co. supra; Allen v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (Ky.) 403 S. W. (2d) 20; Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420 P. (2d) 855; Restatement, Torts (2d) § 402A.

 Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co. (Fla. App.) 205 So. (2d) 307; Seely v. White Motor Co. 63 Cal. (2d) 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P. (2d) 145; Restatement, Torts (2d) 402A.

 In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 59 Cal. (2d) 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P. (2d) 897, 13 A. L. R. (3d) 1049, the court seemed also to require plaintiff to establish that he was using the product in the manner in which it was intended to be used. In this case, defendant’s engineer testified that the snowmobile was designed to be used at high speeds over rough ground.

 A manufacturer’s strict liability in tort may be based upon a defect in design as well as a defect in manufacture. Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc. 68 111. App. (2d) 70, 215 N. E. (2d) 465; McCormack v. Hankscraft Co. Inc. 278 Minn. 322,154 N. W. (2d) 488.

 Assumption of risk in the classic sense does not involve a failure to use reasonable care. Instead, it is based on a subjective analysis and may he found whenever the plaintiff (1) had knowledge of the risk, (2) appreciated the risk, and (3) had a choice to avoid the risk and volun*49tarily chose to chance it. Parness v. Economic Laboratories, Inc. 284 Minn. 381, 170 N. W. (2d) 554; Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros. Co. 275 Minn. 408, 147 N. W. (2d) 561.

 Restatement, Torts (2d) § 402A, comment n. See, Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L. J. 1099, 1147-48; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791, 838.

 While in this case there was evidence to support a finding that the snowmobile was defective in design when it left the manufacturer before plaintiff removed the insulator, the utter failure of defendant to explain the purpose of the insulator justifiably could compel the conclusion, as the majority opinion points out, that plaintiff substantially changed the design of the snowmobile so that it was not in the same condition as when it left the manufacturer. In such a case, the manu*50facturer cannot be held strictly liable in tort. Erickson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 240 Cal. App. (2d) 793, 50 Cal. Rptr. 143.