Court Opinion

ID: 9915356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 15:01:33.713907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:33.108116
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10060    Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 01/05/2024   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10060
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       RAHEEM DASHEEN JACKSON,

                                                  Defendant- Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00194-LGW-BWC-1
                          ____________________
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       2                         Opinion of the Court                   23-10060

       Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Raheem Dasheen Jackson appeals his conviction for posses-
       sion of a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
       § 922(g)(l). He argues that the district court erred by denying his
       motion to suppress all evidence seized after his unlawful arrest.
       Jackson also argues that the government’s evidence, viewed in the
       light most favorable to the verdict, was insufficient to support his
       conviction.
              Jackson also appeals the calculation of his Guidelines offense
       level, under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1), based on the district court’s
       finding that his Georgia convictions for terroristic threats and ob-
       struction of law enforcement were crimes of violence, and thus
       could serve as predicate crimes to enhance the sentence for the in-
       stant felon-in-possession conviction. He argues that, because he
       pled guilty to both crimes under Alford, 1 he did not admit to the
       conduct in the indictments. Further, he argues that because the
       Georgia terroristic threats statute is a divisible statute, and because
       he entered an Alford plea, the court cannot rely on the Shepard 2 doc-
       uments to determine which portions of the statute he was con-
       victed under and must presume it was the least culpable offense,
       which is not a crime of violence.

              1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

              2 Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
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       23-10060               Opinion of the Court                         3

                                         I.
              We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
       evidence under a mixed standard, reviewing the court’s fact-finding
       for clear error and the application of the law to those facts de novo.
       United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006). The
       court’s factual findings are construed in the light most favorable to
       the prevailing party. Id.
               The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
       searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the exclu-
       sionary rule, evidence cannot be used against a defendant in a crim-
       inal trial where that evidence was obtained via an encounter with
       police that violated the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Per-
       kins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003). However, “a warrantless
       arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
       where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has
       been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152
       (2004). “Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reason-
       able conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting
       officer at the time of the arrest.” Id. Unprovoked flight may serve
       as the basis for a reasonable suspicion that the person fleeing is in-
       volved in criminal activity. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25
       (2000).
              Here, the district court did not err by denying Jackson’s sup-
       pression motion. The evidence showed that police had probable
       cause to arrest Jackson because the facts, known to police at the
       time of the arrest, establish that Jackson (1) was a passenger in a
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10060

       vehicle stopped, in a high-crime area, for having improper tags; (2)
       fled after police stopped the vehicle; (3) did not comply with the
       officer’s commands to stop; (4) discarded a liquor bottle; and (5)
       gripped his waistband in a manner that appeared as if he were con-
       cealing a weapon. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152; see also Wardlow,
       528 U.S. at 124-25. Thus, probable cause existed for police to con-
       clude that Jackson was engaged in criminal activity. See Devenpeck,
       543 U.S. at 152.
                                         II.
              We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-
       dence supporting a conviction and the denial of a Rule 29 motion
       for judgment of acquittal, viewing the evidence in the light most
       favorable to the verdict, and making all reasonable inferences and
       credibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v.
       Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497 (11th Cir. 2011). We will uphold the
       denial of a Rule 29 motion unless no reasonable factfinder could
       have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
               We will not upset a jury’s decision to credit a witness’s tes-
       timony unless in the rare circumstance that the testimony is incred-
       ible as a matter of law. United States v. Isaacson, 752 F.3d 1291, 1304
       (11th Cir. 2014). “Testimony is incredible as a matter of law only
       if it concerns facts that the witness physically could not have possi-
       bly observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws
       of nature.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
             Under § 922(g)(1), it is a crime for anyone who “has been
       convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for
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       23-10060               Opinion of the Court                         5

       a term exceeding one year” to possess any firearm or ammunition,
       in or affecting commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). To sustain a con-
       viction under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that: (1) the
       defendant was a felon; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a
       firearm; and (3) the firearm affected or was in interstate commerce.
       United States v. Funches, 135 F.3d 1405, 1406-07 (11th Cir. 1998).
               Here, Jackson only challenges whether sufficient evidence
       showed that he knowingly possessed a firearm. The government
       presented sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Jackson of pos-
       sessing a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gamory, 635 F.3d
       at 497. At trial, Officers Contreras and Altomare testified that they
       witnessed Jackson flee from Raymond Green’s car while gripping
       his waistband in a manner consistent with someone holding a gun.
       Officer Griffie also testified that he recovered a gun along Jackson’s
       flight path and that he believed the gun had been “recently dis-
       carded.” The evidence showed that the gun belonged to Jackson’s
       cousin, Brittney Johnson, and she testified that she left it in the
       glove compartment of Green’s car hours before Jackson was ar-
       rested. Finally, an ATF agent also testified that Jackson communi-
       cated with Johnson from jail via e-mail, and made jailhouse phone
       calls to another woman about the gun, instructing her to tell John-
       son “not to report it stolen” and to “read between the lines about
       what that means.” The agent also testified that 3 weeks after Jack-
       son’s arrest, law enforcement confirmed that the recovered gun be-
       longed to Johnson.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10060

               Although Johnson had trouble remembering the precise de-
       tails of the day that Jackson was arrested, the jury still found her
       testimony credible and the testimony of Raymond Green less than
       credible. This Court does not reweigh the credibility of a witness’s
       testimony unless it pertains to “facts that the witness physically
       could not have possibly observed or events that could not have oc-
       curred under the laws of nature.” Isaacson, 752 F.3d at 1304. Jack-
       son’s interactions with Johnson and Green were observable by her
       and did not violate the laws of nature. See id.
             Therefore we conclude that the district court did not err
       when it denied the motion for acquittal.
                                        III.
              We review de novo whether a defendant’s prior conviction
       qualifies as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.
       United States v. Diaz-Calderone, 716 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir. 2013).
              Under the Guidelines, the base offense level for an unlawful-
       firearm-possession offense is 26 if the offense involved a semiauto-
       matic firearm that could accept a large capacity magazine and the
       defendant committed the instant offense after sustaining at least
       two felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled
       substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1). A “crime of violence” is
       defined, in relevant part, as any offense under federal or state law,
       punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that
       “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
       physical force against the person of another.”               U.S.S.G.
       § 4B1.2(a)(1).
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       23-10060                Opinion of the Court                           7

              “An Alford plea is a guilty plea where the defendant main-
       tains a claim of innocence to the underlying criminal conduct
       charged but admits that sufficient evidence exists to convict him of
       the offense.” United States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F.3d 1267, 1273
       (11th Cir. 2014). Because the collateral consequences flowing from
       an Alford plea are the same as those flowing from an ordinary plea
       of guilty, a sentencing enhancement may be based on an Alford
       plea. Id. In Ramirez-Gonzalez, we held: “Under Georgia law, an
       Alford plea is ‘a guilty plea and places the defendant in the same
       position as if there had been a trial and conviction by a jury.’” Id.
       (quoting Morrell v. State, 297 Ga.App. 592, 677 S.E.2d 771, 772 n. 3
       (2009)).
               In United States v. Oliver, 962 F.3d 1311, 1320 (11th Cir. 2020),
       we held that Georgia’s terroristic-threats statute, § 16-11-37(a)
       (2010), was divisible, “contain[ing] a list of divisible elements in the
       form of alternative threats, each one of which constitutes a sepa-
       rate crime.” And based on the indictment, we concluded that the
       defendant had been convicted “under the divisible portion of § 16-
       11-37(a) that criminalizes a threat[ ] to commit any crime of vio-
       lence . . . with the purpose of terrorizing another.” Id. We held that
       a conviction under this portion of § 16-11-37(a) had as an element
       the threatened use of physical force and therefore qualified as a vi-
       olent felony under the ACCA. See id. at 1320–21.
             Here, Jackson pled guilty under Alford to the violent crimes
       of making terroristic threats. Because the collateral consequences
       flowing from an Alford plea are the same as those flowing from an
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       8                          Opinion of the Court                        23-10060

       ordinary plea of guilty, a sentencing enhancement may be based on
       an Alford plea. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F.3d at 1273. Further, be-
       cause we have held that the collateral consequences of an Alford
       plea are the same as those flowing from an ordinary guilty plea, we
       are permitted to look at the indictment when faced with a divisible
       statute, such as Georgia’s terroristic threats statute. In the instant
       case, that document indicates that Jackson was charged (and con-
       victed pursuant to the Alford guilty plea) under the same subsection
       as in Oliver. And, as noted, we held in Oliver that crime constituted
       a crime of violence. Accordingly, Jackson’s argument is foreclosed
       by our prior precedent. 3

       3 Jackson also pleaded guilty to felony obstruction of an officer three times, on
       two separate occasions. Jackson’s only argument against the use (as predicate
       prior crimes) of these obstruction convictions is that our law regarding the use
       of Alford pleas is erroneous but this argument is unavailing, as noted above.
       Moreover, Jackson has arguably forfeited any challenge to the district court’s
       reliance on the obstruction convictions. In his initial brief on appeal, his only
       challenge to reliance on the obstruction convictions is his Alford argument; he
       fails to argue that the obstruction statute that was violated encompassed not
       only crimes of violence but also nonviolent crimes; and he fails to address
       whether the obstruction statute was divisible or indivisible. Smith as next friend
       of MS v. Crisp Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 985 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2021)(issues not
       raised on appeal are deemed waived). Thus the obstruction convictions alone
       suffice to support the enhancement.
                As an alternative holding (if the foregoing were not enough to affirm
       the judgment below), the district court stated that it would have imposed the
       same sentence, based upon the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors alone. United States v.
       Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding any guidelines calculation
       error is harmless where the sentence would be reasonable even if the district
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       23-10060                  Opinion of the Court                              9

              AFFIRMED.

       court’s guideline calculation was erroneous). Jackson never raised a challenge
       to this and thus any challenge to the sentence’s reasonableness is waived.