Court Opinion

ID: 9565830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:28:42.375417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:54.506601
License: Public Domain

NOONAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment of the court:
Resolution of this appeal turns on how the constitution is conceived to be. For some, the constitution is an unchanging document, speaking now as it did in 1789 except for such amendments as have been duly added to it. The paper and ink of the old document have not altered; neither has its meaning. Stability is the bedrock of our government of laws.
What happens when the Supreme Court, as it not infrequently does, gives a new interpretation of the constitution, overruling an earlier interpretation? From the perspective just outlined, the new interpretation must be seen as a correction. A mistaken reading of the constitution has been replaced. The true meaning, now recovered, must have been the meaning the document always had. From this perspective, the petitioners in this case were sentenced under a system now recognized as constitutionally flawed. As the true meaning of the constitution has now been discovered, the petitioners should be able to be sentenced under the constitutionally correct system. As the constitution doesn’t change, the new system was the only constitutional system at the time of their sentencing. It is unjust to hold them incarcerated under unconstitutional law.
This analysis has some intuitive appeal. A counterexample may suggest that there is something wrong with it. Suppose the penalty for securities fraud is ten years. A man is sentenced to that term. Subsequently, the statute is changed; the penalty becomes five years. Is it unjust to keep beyond five years the man already sentenced to ten? No. When he committed the crime that was the lawful sentence. The new statute does not retroactively reduce his punishment.
Why does this example seem clear and the constitutional case cloudy? It is because of the belief that the constitution, unlike a statute, does not change. Therefore, a new reading of the constitution is necessarily restorative and retroactive. The new reading is what the constitution always said. But perhaps this response rests on a basic mistake. It is my contention that it does.
The mistake is to think of the constitution speaking. The original document is as silent as the paper on which it is written. It is not what speaks. It is the interpreters of the constitution who speak. It is they who give it life and power. In our system of law, the authoritative interpreters are the justices of the Supreme Court. It is their voices that say what the constitution says.
Interpreters of this kind do not have the passivity of paper or the stability of stone. They change as generations change, as the times change, as mores mutate, as new circumstances, needs, and problems arise. Other times, other oracles. Interpreters of this kind are never going to give forever the same meaning to every constitutional text. And they don’t.
As put by Chief Justice Roberts, albeit with the particular sharpness of a dissent, “a dog’s breakfast of divided, conflicting, and ever-changing analyses” may be held by the majority to be “clearly-established law.” Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 1654, 167 L.Ed.2d 585 *895(2007). Chief Justice Roberts went on to observe:
After all, today the author of a dissent issued in 1988 writes two majority opinions concluding that the views expressed in that dissent actually represented “clearly established” federal law at that time. So there is hope yet for the views expressed in this dissent, not simply down the road, but tunc pro nunc. Encouraged by the majority’s determination that the future can change the past, I respectfully dissent.
Of course the constitution changes its meaning with changing majorities. Not as frequently as statutes are changed by legislators, the old foundational document has its speech altered by new authorized interpreters. The Supreme Court is the engine and champion of constitutional change.
In terms of this analysis, the petitioners here were sentenced under a system that was in accordance with the constitution when they were sentenced. It is no more unjust to them to keep them confined under the old system than it would be to keep in prison the man sentenced to ten years when the penalty later becomes five. The crime committed at a given date is penalized under the law in force at that date. No injustice is done.
The Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to the general rule that the constitution speaks as of the time the Supreme Court gives it a meaning: (1) cases where the new decision of the Supreme Court means that earlier conduct of the prisoners would not have been criminal if the new reading had been in place; and (2) cases where the new reading substantially improves accuracy in the determination of guilt. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). The exceptions establish that the Supreme Court has the power to make its reading of the constitution retroactive. The exceptions do not establish that as a matter of justice the Supreme Court must act retroactively — only that there are cases where it is wise and equitable to do so. The instant cases may deserve such equitable and wise treatment. It is not given to us to make it available.
Judge Pregerson eloquently expresses reasons why such retroactivity would be good here, and he offers an escape from a rigid rule of nonretroactivity. Judge Bryan, the district judge who sentenced the petitioners, made clear statements of his belief in the unconstitutionality of the system with which he was compelled to comply. Far from grumbling, Judge Bryan’s statement showed legal perspicacity and prescience and reflected sound judgment and an active conscience. Judge Pregerson, recognizing these values in what Judge Bryan did, finds in them the extraordinary circumstances that would permit this court to withdraw its mandates.
The strength of Judge Pregerson’s position must be acknowledged. It is humane, and humaneness is a necessary quality in humans who are judges. The panel has the power to do what he asks. The panel does not have the authority. Only the Supreme Court has both the power and the authority to create a rule of retroactivity when a new rule of constitutional law, if applied retroactively, would lessen the penalty given.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the judgment of the court.