Court Opinion

ID: 9417408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:14:21.162494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:41.974688
License: Public Domain

*561Mr. Justice Hablan
dissenting.
The present case presents a question not heretofore decided by this court.
The appellant has judgments against the county of Allen, in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, which were rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Kentucky District, for the amount of unpaid interest on bonds issued by that county in payment of its subscription to the capital stock of a railroad company, the subscription having been made and the bonds issued under express legislative authority. The County Court refused to levy a tax to satisfy such judgments, although it was authorized and required by the act, in virtue of which the bonds were issued, to levy “ as listed and taxed under the revenue laws of the State, a sum sufficient to pay the interest on such bonds as it accrues, together with the costs of collecting the same.” It was further provided, by the same act, that the County Court “ may appoint collectors for said tax,” or may require the sheriff to collect the tax.
In 1876 the General Assembly of Kentucky passed a special act releasing the sheriff of Allen County from the duty of giving bond for the collection of any railroad tax, and providing that the “ County Court shall, at the instance or motion of any person, or by request, appoint a special collector^ to collect all taxes or levies on said county for railroad purposes; and shall require bonds, with security, to be approved by the court, for the faithful discharge of all duties incumbent on him.”
Execution upon Thompson’s judgments having been returned “ no property,” and the County Court having refused to levy a tax to pay them, the Circuit Court, upon Thompson’s application, issued a mandamus against the judge and justices constituting the County Court, commanding them to perform the duty, enjoined by statute, of levying and causing to be collected, from the taxable property of the county, a sum sufficient to satisfy the before-mentioned judgments, and the costs of collecting the same. Subsequently, on May 28, 1881, the County Court, in conformity with the foregoing order, made a levy upon the taxable property of the tax-payers of the county “ to pay the judgments in favor of T. W. Thompson against said *562county.” It was further ordered 'by the County Court “ that J. T. Stark be, and is hereby, appointed collector of said levy, upon his executing bond, with approved security, before the County Court, and he will proceed at once to collect said levy, and pay the same over in.satisfaction of the judgments heretofore named in favor -of T. W. Thompson or his attorney.” Stark declined to accept the office of collector. It is alleged in the bill, and admitted in the answer, “that the sentiments and feelings, of a large majority of the citizens and tax-payers of the said Allen County .are very hostile and outspoken against the collection or payment of the.said tax:” The County Court having announced that it was unable ..to find any person who was willing to accept the appointment of collector and undertake the collection of the levy, and Thompson being unable, as he alleges, to find any person within -the county who is willing to qualify as colléctor, the .present suit in equity was commenced against the county, and alarge number of its tax-payers, whose names are given in the bill, together with the amount of their taxable property, as assessed by the proper county authorities, with the taxes due from each, as shown by the public records of the county. The bill sets out the foregoing facts, and asks .that the several tax-payers, who are made, defendants, be required to pay into court the several sums due from them, as shown by the levy made by the County Court, and that other tax-payers, not specifically named as defendants, be required to pay into court, or to some person appointed by it as receiver, the amount due from them respectively — such sums to be applied in satisfaction of Thompson’s judgments. There is, also, a prayer for general relief.
The parties, by their counsel, stipulated at the hearing of the cause, and it is to- be taken as true, that the County Court “ has in good faith and diligently endeavored to find a fit and proper person to act as collector of the railroad taxes in said county, and the special levies of taxes in the bill of complaint set forth ; ” that “ no such fit and proper person can be found who will undertake and perform the office and duty of such collector; ” and that “ the complainant is without remedy for the collection of the debt herein, except through the aid of this *563court in the appointment of a receiver, as prayed for in the-bill, or other appropriate orders of the court.”
Under this state of facts my brethren, affirming the decree below, hold that the Circuit Court, sitting in equity, was entirely without authority, in any way, to cause the tax-payers of Allen County to bring into court the sums due from them, respectively, that the same may be applied in satisfaction of Thompson’s judgments.
In my judgment, there is nothing in our former decisions which prevents a court of equity from giving substantial relief to the complainant. In Walkley v. City of Muscatine, 6 Wall. 482, the application was to a court of equity to compel • the levy of a tax. The only point decided was* that where a municipal corporation refused to levy a tax to satisfy a judgment against it, the remedy of the creditor was a mandamus to compel such levy; and that “ a court of equity is invoked as auxiliary to a court of law in the enforcement of its judgments in cases only where the latter is inadequate to afford the proper remedy.” In Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall. 107, a Federal court, sitting in equity, was asked, in the absence of a levy, to subject the property of the tax-payers of a city to the payment of complainant’s judgments against it, and that the marshal of the district be empowered to seize and sell so much of their property as might be necessary for the satisfaction of such judgments. In other words, the court was asked to make a levy of taxes. And in Heine v. The Levee Commissioners, 19 Wall. 655, it appears that holders of bonds issued by the Levee Commissioners — no judgment at law having been recovered on the bonds, nor any attempt made to colled the amount due by suit in a common-law court — bi’ought a suit- in equity, and prayed that the commissioners be required to assess and collect the tax necessary to pay the bonds and interest, and if, after reasonable time, they failed to do so, that the district judge of the parish, who was by statute authorized to levy the tax -when the commissioners failed to do so, be ordered to make the levy. , It was decided that the power of taxation belonged to the legislative, not to the judicial branch of the government; that, in that case, the *564power must be derived from the legislature of the State; if the body known as Levee Commissioners had, by resignation of their members, ceased to exist, the remedy.was in the legislature either to"assess the. tax by special statute, or to vest the power in. some other tribunal; that, in any event, a Federal court was without power to levy and collect a tax authorised by a State law. That such was the extent of the decision in that case is shown in State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, where, referring to Heine v. The Levee Commissioners, it was said: “ The levy of taxes is not a judicial function. Its exercise, by the Constitutions of all the States and by the theory of our English origin, is exclusively'legislative.” p. 615.
In Barkley v. Levee Commissioners, 93 U. S. 258, the court was asked to compel, by the process of mandamus, a board of leyee commissioners, the members of which.had resigned, to assess and- collect a tax for the payment of a certain judgment against the parish; or, if that could not be done, that the police jury of the parish be required to make such assessment and collection; or, if that could not be done, that the United States marshal should be required to assess at once or by instalments, from year to year, and collect sufficient taxes upon the property subject to taxation for levee purposes to pay the judgment. It was held that a mandamus could not issue, be-' cause the Board of Levee Commissioners had become extinct as a body, and that the court had no general power to commission the marshal to levy taxes for the purpose of satisfying a judgment.
These cases only establish the doctrine that the levying of taxes is not a judicial function.
It seems to me that the granting of relief to Thompson will not, in any degree, disturb the principles announced in the foregoing cases. The bill does not ask the court to usurp the function of levying taxes. That duty has been performed by the. only tribunal authorized to do it, viz., the County Court of Allen County. • Nothing remains to be done, except' to collect from individuals specific sums of money which they are under legal obligation to pay. The collections of these sums will not interfere with any discretion with which *565the Allen County Court is invested by law; for, by its own order, made in conformity with the law of the State, and by the judgment in 'the mandamus proceedings, the sums due. from the individual.defendants, and from other tax-payers, has been set apart for the payment of Thompson’s judgments. Those sums, when collected, cannot be otherwise used. As the County Court cannot find any one who will accept the office of special collector, and as the parties agree that' there is no mode of collecting the sums set apart in the hands of the individual defendants and other tax-payers, for the payment of Thompson; I am unable- to perceive why the’ Circuit Court, sitting in equity, may not cause these sums to be applied in satisfaction of. its judgments at law. The plaintiff has.no remedy at.law; for, the common-law court in rendering judgment has doné all that it can do, and the local tribunal, by levying the required .tax and seeking the aid of a special collector to collect it, has done ali that it can do. There is no suggestion, or even pretence, that the tax-payers who are sued dispute the regularity Of the assessment made against them by the County Court., Admitting their legal liability for the specific amounts assessed against them, and conceding that what they owe must, when' paid, go in satisfaction of Thompson’s judgments, they disputé "the authority of any judicial tribunal to compel them to pay it Over. "With money in their hands, equitably belonging to the judgment creditor, they walk out of the court whose judgments rémain unsatisfied, announcing, in effect, that they will hold negotiations only with.a “special collector,” who has no existence.
That the court below, sitting in equity — after it hp,s given a judgment at law for money, and after a return of nulla bona against the debtor — may not lay hold of moneys, set apart, by the act of the debtor, in the hands of individuals exclusively for the payment of that judgment, and which money, the parties agree, cannot be otherwise reached than'by being brought into that court, under its orders, is a confession of helplessness on the part of the courts of the United States that I am unwilling to make. I, therefore, dissent from the opinion and judgment in this case.