Court Opinion

ID: 9397790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 14:05:42.724254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.630724
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 19, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-1148-MR

ALTON FRANKLIN                                                        APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE JOE CASTLEN, SPECIAL JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 21-D-00233-001

JESSICA DAWSON                                                           APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND LAMBERT,
JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Alton Franklin (“Appellant”) appeals from an

amended domestic violence order entered by the Daviess Circuit Court on August

24, 2022, and order entered August 29, 2022, finding Appellant to be in contempt.

Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in entering into evidence an

unauthenticated internet page and speculative testimony. He also asserts that even

if the internet page was properly entered into evidence, he had a First Amendment
right to make the comments it contained. He seeks an opinion reversing and

remanding the orders on appeal. After careful review, we find no error and affirm

the August 24, 2022, and August 29, 2022 orders.

                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             On September 9, 2021, the Daviess Circuit Court entered a Domestic

Violence Order (“DVO”) barring Appellant from having contact with his wife,

Jessica Dawson (“Appellee”), for one year. The marriage produced one child

(“Child”) who was born in 2011. The parties separated and were divorced by way

of a decree of dissolution entered on September 28, 2022.

             On August 8, 2022, Appellee filed a motion in Daviess Circuit Court

to amend the DVO by adding Child as a protected party and extending the term

barring contact. Appellee also moved for an order directing Appellant to appear

and show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with

the DVO.

             A hearing on both motions was conducted on August 24, 2022, where

Appellee testified. Appellant resided out of state and testified at the hearing via

telephone. In support of the motions, Appellee alleged that Appellant had a

YouTube channel on which he posted a claim that an unknown person threatened

to release sexual photographs and videos of Appellant and Appellee. Appellee

asserted that this was a veiled threat intended to intimidate her and coerce her into

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not seeking an extension of the DVO. Appellant acknowledged that the YouTube

channel was his, but testified that the channel was hacked multiple times and the

content complained of by Appellee was not made by him. Appellant objected to

the introduction of the YouTube evidence, claiming that it was not his content, that

it did not identify Appellee by name, and that he did not send it to her by email,

text, or any other means.

              After considering the proof, the Daviess Circuit Court entered an

amended DVO on August 24, 2022.1 The amended DVO added Child as a

protected party, and extended the no-contact provision until August 24, 2025. On

August 29, 2022, the court entered a separate order sustaining Appellee’s show

cause motion. The August 29, 2022 order sentenced Appellant to six months in

jail for violating the original DVO, with the proviso that the court could probate

the sentence at its discretion if Appellant refrained from future direct or indirect

threats against Appellee. This appeal followed.

                           ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

              Appellant, through counsel, now argues that the Daviess Circuit Court

erred in improperly admitting and relying on unauthenticated internet evidence

1
  The amended order was incorrectly designated on form AOC-275.3 as an amended
interpersonal protective order rather than an amended domestic violence order. Per Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 456.060(1), a personal protective order addresses only claims of dating
violence, which is not at issue herein. In addressing the amended DVO, we will use the terms
“amended” and “reissued” interchangeably.

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which was merely speculative in nature. Appellant argues that authentication is a

condition precedent to admissibility, and that the YouTube content at issue was not

shown to be produced by Appellant nor distributed to Appellee. Appellant

maintains that Appellee’s subjective feelings about Appellant’s YouTube channel

do not constitute evidence, and do not demonstrate that the YouTube content was

produced by Appellant nor intended to harass or intimidate Appellee. He asserts

that even if the wrongly admitted evidence was accurate, the error was

compounded because the circuit court used it to improperly curtail Appellant’s

right to free speech and right to bear arms.2 He seeks an opinion reversing the

amended DVO and contempt order and remanding the matter to the circuit court.

              KRS 403.740(4) addresses the reissuance of a DVO and states:

              A domestic violence order shall be effective for a period
              of time fixed by the court, not to exceed three (3) years,
              and may be reissued upon expiration for subsequent
              periods of up to three (3) years each. The fact that an
              order has not been violated since its issuance may be
              considered by a court in hearing a request for a
              reissuance of the order.

              In 2019, a panel of this Court determined that no proof of additional

acts of domestic violence is required before reissuing a DVO. Cottrell v. Cottrell,

571 S.W.3d 590, 592 (Ky. App. 2019). “The trial court may consider all facts and

2
  The amended order required Appellant to surrender his Kentucky license to carry a concealed
firearm.

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circumstances, including the nature, extent and severity of the original acts of

domestic violence, in finding that there is a continuing need for the DVO.” Id.

(citations omitted). Further, neither the statute governing domestic violence orders

nor the constitutional right to due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to

extending the term of a DVO. Id. In the context of a DVO proceeding, “violence”

may be found “when the accumulation of . . . acts over time can subject one

intimate partner to the other’s control.” United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157,

165-66, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1411-12, 188 L. Ed. 2d 426 (2014).

             Further,

                   [i]n its role as factfinder, the trial court may
             necessarily have to consider the credibility of each
             witness. The trier of fact has the right to believe the
             evidence presented by one litigant in preference to
             another . . . [and] may believe any witness in whole or in
             part. The trier of fact may take into consideration all the
             circumstances of the case, including the credibility of the
             witness. On appeal, we are mindful of the trial court’s
             opportunity to assess the credibility of each witness, and
             as such, we would only alter the court’s findings if they
             were clearly erroneous.

Sewell v. Sweet, 637 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Ky. App. 2021) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted).

             In the matter before us, the circuit court conducted a hearing on

Appellee’s motion to amend the DVO and on the motion to show cause. The court

considered the testimony of both parties and found that Appellant was not a

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credible witness. The court was persuaded by Appellee’s testimony that she was

familiar with Appellant’s voice and usage of social media; by exhibits which

demonstrated threats to Appellee of showing explicit videos and photographs; and,

by Appellee’s testimony of her belief that the threats were a means of coercing her

not to continue the domestic violence proceeding.

             We conclude that the Daviess Circuit Court properly considered the

motions before it, and that its rulings are supported by the record and the law. Per

Cottrell, no proof of additional acts of domestic violence was required to extend

the DVO. Arguendo, even if additional proof were required, Appellee’s testimony

and evidence, coupled with the finding that Appellant lacked credibility, would

form a proper basis for extending the term of the DVO. Similarly, the same

testimony and evidence were sufficient to sustain Appellee’s show cause motion,

as this testimony and evidence supported Appellee’s claim that Appellant’s actions

violated the DVO.

             Appellant also briefly argues that the amended DVO infringes upon

his right to free speech and right to bear arms. He has not, however, cited any case

law or statutory law supportive of the argument that the scope or term of the DVO

abridges his constitutional rights. A DVO necessarily restricts the offending

party’s speech and conduct. Our research has revealed no basis for concluding that

                                         -6-
Appellant’s constitutional rights have been improperly infringed by the amended

DVO. We find no error.

                                CONCLUSION

            For these reasons, we affirm the orders of the Daviess Circuit Court.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                     NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.

Evan Taylor
Owensboro, Kentucky

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