Court Opinion

ID: 9690372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:09:29.704196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:55.959617
License: Public Domain

Betty C. Dickey, Chief Justice, dissenting. Because the majority stice, not fit within the Gipson v. Brown, 288 Ark. 422, 426, 706 S.W.2d 369 (1986), exception, I respectfully dissent. In Gipson, this court reviewed an interlocutory order compelling discovery of a church’s financial information. Id. This court held that the release of financial data was subject to discovery but would not be required until the final ruling was obtained because the information sought was the object of the lawsuit. Id. Therefore, to compel discovery in that case would be the equivalent of a ruling on the merits, and the appeal was reviewable. Id. This court stated: If appellants comply with the discovery order and the trial court concludes after the trial that appellees were not entitled to the information they sought, appellants could not be placed in their former condition. See Johnson v. Johnson, 243 Ark. 656, 421 S.W.2d 605 (1967), rehearing denied. Therefore, since we find the discovery order is the equivalent of a decision on the merits, the appellants need not release.the information that is the subject of this lawsuit until a final ruling is obtained. Gipson, supra. While there may be distinctions between Gipson and the case at hand, Gipson still controls. In Gipson, the church claimed a constitutional interest in keeping its financial data confidential, because if the financial information were disclosed, the church’s ability to administer itself would suffer as a consequence. Id. In the present case, the information sought is not so important as to impair any possible function of the AID or to implicate any constitutional rights. The Gipson case was a dispute over the corporate structure of a non-profit organization and its finances. Here, the case involves possible violations of a statute enacted solely for the public interest, the FOIA, which this court has mandated must be construed liberally to encourage the public good for which it was enacted. Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 432 S.W.2d 754 (1968). I disagree with the majority as to whether this case falls under the Gipson exception. If the Commissioner and the AID are required to disclose who sent the emails, Baker has won this case without it ever being heard. Therefore, the only real issue involved in this lawsuit is appellee’s attempt to discover the name of the individual who forwarded the ATLA Listserv to appellant Pickens. Because receiving the name of the sender of the email is the ultimate issue in this case, the appellants are left in the same untenable position as the church in Gipson. The majority opinion states that there are issues yet to be resolved by the trial court in this case, such as whether there was an intentional impeding of access to the email under the FOIA. However, I see no real remedy in what appellees are seeking. The Arkansas Insurance Commission is already aware that they are required to follow the FOIA. The interrogatory of appellee Baker requesting disclosure of the full name, address, occupation, telephone number and email address of the sender of the email definitely goes to the ultimate issue of this case. By answering a question that goes to the ultimate issue, the merits of the case are determined. In other words, by requiring a party to answer such an inquiry, the discovery order is equivalent to a decision on the merits. While Baker premises his case on the FOIA, it is really a means by which to determine the identity of the person who outed the private ATLA Listserv discussion. Consequently, the sender of the email’s identity is the ultimate issue in this case, and the trial court’s Order requiring disclosure is tantamount to a decision of this case on the merits. While there are many valid Freedom of Information Act requests, following the majority in this case will lead to abuse and misinterpretations of the FOIA. This Listserv discussion was supported and maintained by a private group of Arkansas lawyers. The forwarded email merely stated the opinions of various attorneys regarding tort reform. All that is really requested is the name of the person who forwarded the email to appellants. This court should not be placed in the middle of a frivolous lawsuit when the name of the sender is not relevant to any public record issue. Corbin, J., joins in this dissent.