Court Opinion

ID: 9753046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:53:37.983969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:53.896348
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
GANTMAN, J.:
¶ 1 With respect to the majority’s comment on our legislature’s changes to the statutory language of 75 Pa.C.S.A § 6308(b), effective February 1, 2004, I note the amended provision now reads: ‘Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has a reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), however, made clear that the stop of an automobile and the detainment of its occupants constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. Therefore, the Court reasoned, “when there is not probable cause to believe that a driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations — or other articula-*602ble basis amounting to reasonable suspicion that the driver is unlicensed or his vehicle unregistered — we cannot conceive of any legitimate basis upon which a patrolmen could decide that stopping a particular driver for a spot check would be more productive than stopping any other driver.” Id. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d at 672 (footnote omitted). Our Supreme Court in Whitmyer and later in Gleason referenced Prouse directly in their discussion of probable cause as the appropriate standard for vehicle stops. As such, the propriety of the legislative revision is subject to some debate. In any event, I agree with the majority that the revised statute is irrelevant to the disposition of the present case, where Appellant’s offense occurred on May 17, 2008, before the effective date of the amended statute.
¶2 Regarding the facts of the instant case, Office Quinn stopped Appellee based upon 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309, which in relevant part provides:
§ 3309. Driving on roadways laned for traffic
Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others not inconsistent therewith shall apply:
(1) Driving within single lane. — A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1). The facts as presented implicate only subsection (1), which allows for some latitude in practicability. See id.
¶ 3 Officer Quinn also stopped Appellee based upon 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714, the relevant version of which states:
§ 3714. Careless driving
Any person who drives a vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of careless driving, a summary offense.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714.4 The legislature included “careless driving” on the continuum of offenses “to cover driving behavior that is increasingly divorced from prudent driving behavior.” See Commonwealth v. Greenberg, 885 A.2d 1025, 1027 (2005). The offense of careless driving has two elements: “an actus reus — driving a vehicle; and a mens rea — careless disregard. There is no causation or particular result required by the statute.” Commonwealth v. Wood, 327 Pa.Super. 351, 475 A.2d 834, 836 (1984) (stating “careless disregard” is equivalent to culpable negligence). As this Court has explained:
The mens rea of... “careless disregard,” implies “less than willful or wanton conduct.. .[but].. .more than ordinary negligence or the mere absence of care under the circumstances.... ”
Matter of Huff, 399 Pa.Super. 574, 582 A.2d 1093, 1097 (1990) (en banc), aff'd, 529 Pa. 442, 604 A.2d 1026 (1992).5 “The lan*603guage ‘careless disregard,’ as used in this statute, set the level of culpability of the statutory offense at less than willful and wanton conduct, but more than ordinary negligence or the mere absence of care under the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Cathey, 435 Pa.Super. 162, 645 A.2d 250, 251 (1994). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Glassman, 359 Pa.Super. 230, 518 A.2d 865, 869 (1986), appeal denied, 515 Pa. 574, 527 A.2d 535 (1987) (holding evidence that accused drove his car on wrong side of street, through stop signs, with no lights on, and at high rates of speed demonstrated total disregard for all rules of safety and exhibited shocking indifference to persons or other vehicles during his flight from police and also demonstrated careless disregard for all vehicles parked along streets through which police chased accused).
¶ 4 Section 302 of the Crimes Code sets for the general requirements of criminal culpability in pertinent part as follows:
§ 302. General requirements of culpability
(b) Kinds of culpability defined.—
(4) A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and intent of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(4). “The negligence required to merit criminal sanctions under Section 302 is certainly a heightened deviation from the standard of care applicable when civil tort liability is at issue, and it may indeed be convenient to refer to this heightened level of conduct as ‘criminal negligence,’ even though the Code does not employ that terminology.” Commonwealth v. Huggins, 575 Pa. 395, 404, 836 A.2d 862, 867 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1012, 124 S.Ct. 2073, 158 L.Ed.2d 624 (2004) (holding prima facie case of recklessness for charge of involuntary manslaughter, where defendant did more than fall asleep at the wheel; he allowed himself to fall asleep while driving van filled to over-capacity with children who were not restrained with safety belts; defendant was also driving 23 m.p.h. in excess of posted 55 m.p.h. speed limit, when he fell asleep).
¶ 5 Following careful review of the transcript of the suppression hearing, I conclude the trial court gives a more accurate rendition of facts as revealed in the suppression hearing testimony:
Officer Quinn testified that when he first followed [Appellee’s] vehicle on Main Street there was on other vehicle behind [the officer]. However, this is the only testimony regarding a third vehicle on the road and there is no evidence that [Appellee’s] driving posed a hazard to this vehicle. The officer saw no other vehicular traffic and said, “There was nothing that was coming towards us.” [Officer Quinn] confirmed on cross-examination that there was no on-coming traffic as he followed [Appellee] on [East] Main Street. [Officer Quinn] also said that as [Appellee] was driving on Beach Street there was no traffic in the opposing lane.
There is no evidence that [Appellee’s] driving behavior posed a hazard to other *604vehicles on the roadway especially where there were no vehicles in the opposing lanes of traffic on West Main and Beach Streets.
(Trial Court Opinion, dated January 10, 2005, at 2-3) (emphasis added). Additionally, the suppression hearing testimony revealed Appellee was driving well below the speed limit, and there were no parked cars on the roads. Even when Appellee went over the center line on East Main Street, “there was still sufficient room for vehicles to travel in both directions and park along both sides of the street.” (N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/26/04, at 18). The suppression court found no evidence of a safety hazard, citing 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309, which I think is a conclusion of fact, supported by the record. See Klopp, supra.
¶ 6 Moreover, there was no evidence Appellee exhibited the kind of “careless disregard” (culpable negligence) for the safety of persons or property that would provide Officer Quinn with probable cause to execute a traffic stop on the basis of Section 3714. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714; Cathey, supra; Wood, supra.
¶ 7 Since Gleason and Commonwealth v. Baumgardner, 568 Pa. 324, 796 A.2d 965 (2002), this Court continues to review the numerous fact patterns in traffic stop cases largely by comparing the fact pattern of one case to the fact pattern of another case, which frequently leads to blurry analysis and inconsistent decisions. Instead, we should follow our Supreme Court’s example and review the activity alleged in light of the statutes involved, so we can reach more reliable results. See Gleason, supra.
¶8 Under the applicable standard and scope of review, as well as the facts in light of the relevant motor vehicle statutes involved in this case, I would affirm the suppression court’s order, granting Appellant’s omnibus pre-trial suppression motion. Accordingly, I dissent.

. The careless driving statute was amended by making the cited text into subsection (a) and adding subsections (b) through (d); the new version went into effect on May 9, 2005, after Appellee’s stop, and does not apply to this case.

. In Huff and Wood, the charge was "reckless driving,” but the mens rea under the pertinent statute at that time was "careless disregard.” The offense of reckless driving now appears at 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3736 and requires "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3736(a). The new statutes denote a distinct difference as to the intent requirement, with careless driving requiring a lesser intent than reckless driving. Nevertheless, the analysis of the mens rea of "careless disregard” provided in Huff and Wood remains intact.