Court Opinion

ID: 9580676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:07:30.817569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:26.352708
License: Public Domain

SNELL, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
I believe the evidence in this ease is insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest and search defendant Horton. It has long been the law that mere proximity to illegal drugs is not enough to sustain a conviction for possession of those drugs. A distinction is now made by the holding in this case. That holding establishes that proximity to contraband in plain view in a car satisfies the test for probable cause to arrest and search the car’s passenger.
The missing element to establish probable cause in this case is that there is not a nexus between Horton and the marijuana cigarettes in the car’s ashtray. Although as a passenger she was near the ashtray, there is no evidence that she had possession of the illegal drugs. Articulable suspicion is not enough to justify an arrest and conduct a lawful search. Here, the evidence at the scene as measured by a totality of the circumstances standard falls short of providing probable cause to arrest Horton. As such, the arrest and search violated her constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.... ” U.S. Const, amend. IV. “Evidence that is obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible, no matter how relevant or probative the evidence may be.” State v. Manna, 534 N.W.2d 642, 643-44 (Iowa 1995); accord Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090 (1961). Because the general rule of the Fourth Amendment is that a warrantless search is per se unreasonable, the State has the burden by a preponderance of the evidence to show that an exception to that rule applies. State v. Moriarty, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1997). The exception relied on by the State and the majority is “search incident to a lawful arrest.”
Our court has never directly addressed the issue of a search of a passenger upon finding contraband in the car when that is the sole reason to suspect the passenger of wrongdoing. We have, however, addressed the rights of passengers in other situations. See State v. Ceron, 573 N.W.2d 587, 593 (Iowa 1997); State v. Becker, 458 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa 1990). In Becker, we dealt with a similar traffic stop and subsequent passenger arrest and held the officer lacked articulable suspicion to order the passenger out of the vehicle. See Becker, 458 N.W.2d at 606-08. Because of this violation of the passenger’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search, the subsequent search of the passenger was unlawful.
The vehicle was stopped for speeding. In this context, we remarked:
The fact that a [traffic violation has occurred] authorizes the officer to stop the vehicle in which the passenger is riding. The resulting intrusion on the passenger which flows from the initial stop is an unavoidable consequence of action justifiably taken against the driver. Further intrusion on the passenger is not justified, however, unless some articulable suspicion exists concerning a violation of law by that person, or unless further interference with the passenger is re*369quired to facilitate a lawful arrest of another person or lawful search of the vehicle.
Id. at 607.
In the case at bar, pursuant to Becker, the officers were justified in ordering Horton out of the vehicle to conduct a lawful search of the vehicle given the fact they had found marijuana in the vehicle, the ownership of which had not been determined. However, Becker’s holding is limited to the question of a police officer’s right to order a passenger out of the vehicle with nothing more than articulable suspicion or the need to conduct a lawful search. As our jurisprudence makes clear, more than articulable suspicion is needed to conduct a search of an individual. See, e.g., State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 205-06 (Iowa 1996). As such, police needed probable cause to arrest and search Horton once outside the ear.
We have said:
Probable cause ⅛ not determined by observation of and reliance on any particular factor. Probable cause to make an arrest turns upon the circumstances of each case. The facts must give rise to something more than a mere suspicion, but they need not be so strong as to convince officers involved in the arrest of a suspect’s guilt. Probable cause exists if the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable and prudent person would lead that person to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the arrestee committed or is committing it.
State v. Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Iowa 1990) (citations omitted); accord Predka, 555 N.W.2d at 205-06.
The facts on which the officers were operating were that Horton was a passenger in a car owned by another. They knew that she was sitting within reach of two used marijuana cigarettes in the car’s ashtray. Ownership of the marijuana cigarettes was not known by the officers. In this circumstance, the State argued that the doctrine of constructive possession is implicated.
We have previously recognized that there are three elements of constructive possession: (1) dominion and control of the illegal substance; (2) knowledge of its presence; and (3) knowledge of its nature. State v. Rudd, 454 N.W.2d 570, 571-72 (Iowa 1990) (citing State v. Reeves, 209 N.W.2d 18, 21-22 (Iowa 1973)). Recently, we addressed this doctrine in an analogous situation. See State v. Atkinson, 620 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2000). The car in which the defendant was a passenger was detained for a traffic violation. The officer placed the driver under arrest for driving with a suspended license. Upon search of the vehicle, the officer found a fanny pack containing methamphetamine under the driver’s seat. Although the driver at all times admitted the pack and the drugs belonged to him, the passenger was convicted of possession with intent to deliver the drugs. The passenger testified that she knew the pack probably contained drugs, but that she had no right to exercise control over it.
On appeal, we were persuaded that the passenger did not have constructive possession, even though
we ... assum[ed] the defendant knew the fanny pack was under the driver’s seat and that she knew it contained methamphetamine. For purposes of resolving the issue of control, we ... even assume[d] she knew it contained a substantial amount of methamphetamine .... The problem with the State’s case [was] it did not show that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the drugs. A defendant’s close physical proximity to contraband, as vir*370tually all authorities agree, is insufficient in itself to constitute dominion and control.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added). In Atkinson, we reversed the conviction of the defendant because there was not substantial evidence to support the verdict. The reason the State’s evidence was not sufficient to meet this standard was because the State failed to prove that Atkinson had constructive possession of the drugs contained in the fanny pack under the driver’s seat. We held that the State failed to prove that Atkinson had dominion and control over the fanny pack and thus failed to prove constructive possession of the methamphetamine.
In the instant case, knowledge of the marijuana may be inferred because the cigarettes were in plain view. We may also infer that Horton knew the difference between a marijuana cigarette and a regular cigarette. Notwithstanding, the State failed to provide evidence that Horton had any dominion and control over the contraband. She neither owned the vehicle nor was the driver of it. Plain view of the marijuana cigarettes only allows us to infer knowledge. Proximity alone cannot equal dominion and control. Therefore, in such a scenario, the passenger does not have constructive possession of an illegal substance found within her reach.
The case at bar is significantly different from State v. Cerón, which signaled the quantum of evidence necessary to provide probable cause to search a passenger of an automobile. Cerón, 573 N.W.2d at 592-94. In Cerón, the defendant was a passenger in a car that was stopped for not having a windshield. The driver was arrested for this reason and for failing to produce a registration for the vehicle. The driver was removed from the vehicle, handcuffed and searched. Cerón, the passenger, was ordered from the car and patted down for weapons. None were found. After Cerón was patted down, the officer began searching the car and discovered cigarette papers between the console and passenger seat. Cerón was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia. Pursuant to the arrest, Cerón was searched, and a baggie of methamphetamine was found in his pants.
On appeal, the issue was whether the police officer had probable cause to arrest him for possession of drug paraphernalia. Cerón argued that proximity of the cigarette rolling papers did not provide probable cause for his arrest. The issue involved constructive possession of the rolling papers because they were found in the car, not on Ceron’s person. Our analysis determined that considering all of the factors together would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that Cerón intended to use the cigarette rolling papers to inhale marijuana, a controlled substance, 4n violation of law. Those factors therefore constituted probable cause to support Ceron’s arrest for possession of drug paraphernalia (rolling papers). Thus, the lawful arrest validated the subsequent search that uncovered the methamphetamine.
What were those factors? The probable cause factors in Cerón were not alone the proximity to rolling papers but consisted of the following facts. First, the officer of fifteen years experience had worked six years on a drug investigation unit. Second, he recognized Cerón from prior contacts involving drug activity. The year before, he and another officer found a bag of methamphetamine and rolling papers on Cerón. Cerón had told the officer in the past that he used marijuana and was a member of the “King Boulevard Stoners,” a name describing the group’s use of marijuana. The officer knew that Cerón had a drug conviction and was involved in drug *371trafficking in the Sioux City area. Third, the officer saw that Cerón had red, watery eyes, indicating recent drug use. Fourth, he knew that cigarette rolling papers were used to roll marijuana cigarettes. And lastly, prior to stopping the car, he had seen Cerón moving about with his hands down below the dash, appearing to look back at the officer’s car and then to another officer’s car in an excited manner.
In Cerón, the issue of probable cause turned on Ceron’s constructive possession of drug paraphernalia, i.e., rolling papers. Probable cause of possession was shown by the multiple facts apparent at the scene and known to the officer, not just from the existence of cigarette rolling papers and their proximity to Cerón as a car passenger. The proximity of the rolling papers together with the other factors constituted the probable cause necessary to support Ceron’s arrest for constructive possession of drug paraphernalia and the subsequent lawful search.
The lack of evidence in the case at bar is also apparent when compared to the overwhelming evidence establishing probable cause in State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d at 207. There, factors present were a strong odor of marijuana emanating from the car, defendant’s nervous state and heavy breathing, and the officer’s observation of ashes on the floor of the car near a screen, often used with a marijuana pipe, two zip-lock bags containing urine, and a box of plastic bags often used by drug dealers.
The factual scenarios in Cerón and Pred-ka, stand in stark contrast to the scene surrounding the arrest of Horton. In Cer-ón and Predka, the State produced evidence. of several factors to support a finding of a nexus between a suspected crime and the defendant. Probable cause did not depend for reasonableness on the ar-ticulable suspicion of the officer. Probable cause was clearly established by demonstrable evidence.
In contrast, the case at bar shows that there is no nexus between Horton and the dead roaches in the car’s ashtray. There is no evidence that Horton had smoked one or both of the cigarettes, that the truck cab smelled of marijuana smoke, that Horton’s eyes were bloodshot, that she was making excited movements, that police knew Horton to be a drug user, or of any other fact that might make it not just possible but probable that Horton was the owner or a user of the contraband. Constructive possession of the marijuana cigarettes by 'Horton was not established by probable cause. The mere fact that Horton was sitting within arm’s reach of the marijuana cigarettes cannot establish probable cause to arrest her. The State has not met its burden to show that the search incident to a lawful arrest exception to the warrant requirement applies.
Because no probable cause was present to arrest Horton, a timely motion to suppress the evidence of the illegal drugs, ie., a bag of marijuana, possessed by Horton would have been successful. Prejudice is apparent in such a scenario. State v. Rhiner, 352 N.W.2d 258, 261 (Iowa 1984); State v. Hrbek, 336 N.W.2d 431, 436 (Iowa 1983).
I believe that the Fourth Amendment assurance against unreasonable searches of passengers in automobiles has in this case been violated. I would hold that Horton’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment have been violated, that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue, reverse the conviction, and remand for a new trial.