Court Opinion

ID: 9427330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:20:24.982153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:06.249046
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
In cases involving state legislation affecting private contracts, this Court’s decisions over the past half century, consistently with both the constitutional text and its original understanding, have interpreted the Contract Clause as prohibiting state legislative Acts which, “[w]ith studied indifference to the interests of the [contracting party] or to his appropriate protection,” effectively diminished or nullified the obligation due him under the terms of a contract. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56, 60 (1935). But the Contract Clause has not, during this period, been applied to state legislation that, while creating new duties, in nowise diminished the efficacy of any contractual obligation owed the constitutional claimant. Cf. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590 (1962). The constitutionality of such legislation has, rather, been determined solely by reference to other provisions of the Constitution, e. g., the Due Process Clause, insofar as they operate to protect existing economic values.
Today’s decision greatly expands the reach of the Clause. The Minnesota Private Pension Benefits Protection Act (Act) does not abrogate or dilute any obligation due a party to a private contract; rather, like all positive social legislation, the Act imposes new, additional obligations on a particular class of persons. In my view, any constitutional infirmity in the law must therefore derive, not from the Contract Clause, but from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *252I perceive nothing in the Act that works a denial of due process and therefore I dissent.
I
I begin with an assessment of the operation and effect of the Minnesota statute. Although the Court disclaims knowledge of the purposes of the law, both the terms of the Act and the opinion of the State Supreme Court disclose that it was designed to remedy a serious social problem arising from the operation of private pension plans. As the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated, see Fleck v. Spannaus, 312 Minn. 223, 231, 251 N. W. 2d 334, 338 (1977), the impetus for the law must have been a legislative belief — shared by Congress, see generally Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seg. (1976 ed.) — that private pension plans often were grossly unfair to covered employees. Not only would employers often neglect to furnish their employees with adequate information concerning their rights under the plans, leading to erroneous expectations, but also because employers often failed to make contributions to the pension funds large enough adequately to fund their plans, employees often ultimately received only a small amount of those benefits they reasonably anticipated. See Fleck v. Spannaus, supra, at 231, 251 N. W. 2d, at 338. Acting against this background, Minnesota, prior to the enactment of ERISA, adopted the Act to remedy, inter alia, what was viewed as a related serious social problem: the frustration of expectation interests that can occur when an employer closes a single plant and terminates the employees who work there.1
Pension plans normally do not make provision to protect *253the interests of employees — even those within only a few months of the “vesting” of their rights under the plan — who are terminated because an employer closes one of his plants. See generally Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down: Problems and Some Proposals, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 952 (1963). Even assuming — contrary to common experience — that an employer adequately informs his employees that a termination for any reason prior to vesting will result in forfeiture of accrued pension credits, denial of all pension benefits not because of job-related failings, but only because the employees are unfortunate enough to be employed at a plant that closes for purely economic reasons, is harsh indeed. For unlike discharges for inadequate job performance, which may reasonably be foreseen, the closing of a plant is a contingency outside the range of normal expectations of both the employer and the employee — as is made clear by the fact that Allied did not rely upon the possibility of a plant’s closing in calculating the amount of its contributions to its pension plan fund.2
The Minnesota Act addresses this problem by selecting a period- — 10 years of employment — after which this generally unforeseen contingency may not be the basis for depriving employees of their accumulated pension fund credits, and by establishing a mechanism to provide the employees with the equivalent of the earned pension plan credits. Although the Court glides over this fact, it should be apparent that the Act will impose only minor economic burdens on employers whose pension plans have been adequately funded. For, where, as was true here and as will generally be true, the possibility of a plant’s closing was not relied upon by actuaries in calculating the amount of the employer’s contributions to the plan, an *254adequate pension plan fund would include contributions on behalf of terminated employees of 10 or more years’ service whose rights had not vested. Indeed, without the Act, the closing of the plant would create a windfall for the employer, because, due to the resulting surplus in the fund, his future contributions would be reduced. In denying the windfall, the Act requires that the employer use the money he will save in the future to purchase annuities for the terminated employees.3 Of course, the consequence for the employer may be a slightly higher pension expense; the greater outlay might arise, in part, because the past contributions to the plan would have reflected the actuarial possibility that some of the employees who had served 10 years might not ultimately satisfy the plan’s vesting requirement.
I emphasize, contrary to the repeated protestations of the Court, that the Act does not impose “sudden and unanticipated” burdens. The features of the Act involved in this case come into play only when an employer, after the effective date of the Act, closes a plant. The existence of the Act’s duties— which are similar to a legislatively imposed requirement of *255severance pay measured by the length of the discharged employees’ service — is simply one of a number of factors that the employer considers in making the business decision whether to close a plant and terminate the employees who work there. In no sense, therefore, are the Act’s requirements unanticipated. While the extent of the employer’s obligation depends on pre-enactment conduct, the requirements are triggered solely by the closing of a plant subsequent to enactment.4
II
The primary question in this case is whether the Contract Clause is violated by state legislation enacted to protect employees covered by a pension plan by requiring an employer to make outlays — which, although not in this case, will largely be offset against future savings — to provide terminated employees with the equivalent of benefits reasonably to be expected under the plan. The Act does not relieve either the employer or his employees of any existing contract obligation. Rather, the Act simply creates an additional, supplemental duty of the employer, no different in kind from myriad duties created by a wide variety of legislative measures which defeat settled expectations but which have nonetheless been sustained by this Court. See, e. g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1 (1976); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 (1915). For this reason, the Minnesota Act, in my view, does not implicate the Contract Clause in any way. The basic fallacy of today’s decision is its mistaken view that the Contract Clause protects all contract-based expectations, including that of an employer that his obligations to his employees will not be legislatively enlarged beyond those explicitly provided in his pension plan.
*256A
Historically, it is crystal clear that the Contract Clause was not intended to embody a broad constitutional policy of protecting all reliance interests grounded in private contracts. It was made part of the Constitution to remedy a particular social evil — the state legislative practice of enacting laws to relieve individuals of their obligations under certain contracts— and thus was intended to prohibit States from adopting “as [their] policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce them,” Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 439 (1934). But the Framers never contemplated that the Clause would limit the legislative power of States to enact laws creating duties that might burden some individuals in order to benefit others.
The widespread dissatisfaction with the Articles of Confederation and, thus, the adoption of our Constitution, was largely a result of the mass of legislation enacted by various States during our earlier national period to relieve debtors from the obligation to perform contracts with their creditors. The economic depression that followed the Revolutionary War witnessed “an ignoble array of [such state] legislative schemes.” Id., at 427. Perhaps the most common of these were laws providing for the emission of paper currency, making it legal tender for the payment of debts. In addition, there were “installment laws,” authorizing the payment of overdue obligations in several installments over a period of months or even years, rather than in a single lump sum as provided for in a contract; “stay laws,” statutes staying or postponing the payment of private debts or temporarily closing the courts; and “commodity payment laws,” permitting payments in certain enumerated commodities at a proportion, often three-fourths or four-fifths, of actual value. See id., at 454r-459 (Sutherland, J., dissenting); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 204 (1819); see also B. Wright, The Contract Clause of the *257Constitution 4 (1938); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 512-513 (1944).
Thus, the several provisions of Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution — “No State shall . . . coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; [or] pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . —were targeted directly at this wide variety of debtor relief measures. Although the debates in the Constitutional Convention and the subsequent public discussion of the Constitution are not particularly enlightening in determining the scope of the Clause, they support the view that the sole evil at which the Contract Clause was directed was the theretofore rampant state legislative interference with the ability of creditors to obtain the payment or security provided for by contract. The Framers regarded the Contract Clause as simply an adjunct to the currency provisions of Art. I, § 10, which operated primarily to bar legislation depriving creditors of the payment of the full value of their loans. See Wright, supra, at 5-16. The Clause was thus intended by the Framers to be applicable only to laws which altered the obligations of contracts by effectively relieving one party of the obligation to perform a contract duty.5
B
The terms of the Contract Clause negate any basis for its interpretation as protecting all contract-based expectations from unjustifiable interference. It applies, as confirmed by consistent judicial interpretations, only to state legislative Acts. See generally Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444 (1924). Its inapplicability to impairments by state judicial acts or by national legislation belies interpretation of the Clause as *258intended broadly to make all contract expectations inviolable. Rather, the only possible interpretation of its terms, especially in view of its history, is as a limited prohibition directed at a particular, narrow social evil, likely to occur only through state legislative action. This evil is identified with admirable precision: “Law[s] impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is nothing less than an abuse of the English language to interpret, as does the Court, the term “impairing” as including laws which create new duties. While such laws may be conceptualized as “enlarging” the obligation of a contract when they add to the burdens that had previously been imposed by a private agreement, such laws cannot be prohibited by the Clause because they do not dilute or nullify a duty a person had previously obligated himself to perform.
Early judicial interpretations of the Clause explicitly rejected the argument that the Clause applies to state legislative enactments that enlarge the obligations of contracts. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380 (1829), is the leading case. There, this Court rejected a claim that a state legislative Act which gave validity to a contract which the state court had held, before the enactment of the statute, to be invalid at common law could be said to have “impaired the obligation of a contract.” It reasoned that “all would admit the retrospective character of [the particular state] enactment, and that the effect of it was to create a contract between parties where none had previously existed. But it surely cannot be contended, that to create a contract, and to destroy or impair one, mean the same thing.” Id., at 412-413.6 Since creating an obligation where none had existed previously is not an impairment of contract, it of course should follow necessarily that *259legislation increasing the obligation of an existing contract is not an impairment.7 See Hale, supra, at 514-516.
C
The Court seems to attempt to justify its distortion of the meaning of the Contract Clause on the ground that imposing new duties on one party to a contract can upset his contract-based expectations as much as can laws that effectively relieve the other party of any duty to perform. But it is no more anomalous to give effect to the term “impairment” and deny a claimant protection under the Contract Clause when new duties are created than it is to give effect to the Clause’s inapplicability to acts of the National Government and deny a Contract Clause remedy when an Act of Congress denies a creditor the ability to enforce a contract right to payment. Both results are simply consequences of the fact that the Clause does not protect all contract-based expectations.
More fundamentally, the Court’s distortion of the meaning -of the Contract Clause creates anomalies of its own and threatens to undermine the jurisprudence of property rights developed over the last 40 years. The Contract Clause, of course, is but one of several clauses in the Constitution that protect existing economic values from governmental interference. The Fifth Amendment’s command that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just *260compensation” is such a clause. A second is the Due Process Clause, which during the heyday of substantive due process, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905), largely supplanted the Contract Clause in importance and operated as a potent limitation on government’s ability to interfere with economic expectations. See G. Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law 603-604 (9th ed. 1975); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 852, 890-891 (1944). Decisions over the past 50 years have developed a coherent, unified interpretation of all the constitutional provisions that may protect economic expectations and these decisions have recognized a broad latitude in States to effect even severe interference with existing economic values when reasonably necessary to promote the general welfare. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, ante, p. 104; Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U. S. 369 (1974); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590 (1962); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374 (1932); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926). At the same time the prohibition of the Contract Clause, consistently with its wording and historic purposes, has been limited in application to state laws that diluted, with utter indifference to the legitimate interests of the beneficiary of a contract duty, the existing contract obligation, W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56 (1935); see United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U. S. 1 (1977); cf. El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S. 497 (1965); Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934).
Today’s conversion of the Contract Clause into a limitation on the power of States to enact laws that impose duties additional to obligations assumed under private contracts must inevitably produce results difficult to square with any rational conception of a constitutional order. Under the Court’s opinion, any law that may be characterized as “superimposing” new obligations on those provided for by contract is to be *261regarded as creating “sudden, substantial, and unanticipated burdens” and then to be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny. The validity of such a law will turn upon whether judges see it as a law that deals with a generalized social problem, whether it is temporary (as few will be) or permanent, whether it operates in an area previously subject to regulation, and, finally, whether its duties apply to a broad class of persons. See ante, at 249-250. The necessary consequence of the extreme malleability of these rather vague criteria is to vest judges with broad subjective discretion to protect property interests that happen to appeal to them.8
To permit this level of scrutiny of laws that interfere with contract-based expectations is an anomaly. There is nothing sacrosanct about expectations rooted in contract that justify according them a constitutional immunity denied other property rights. Laws that interfere with settled expectations created by state property law (and which impose severe economic burdens) are uniformly held constitutional where reasonably related to the promotion of the general welfare. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394 (1915) is illustrative. There a property owner had established on a particular parcel *262of land a perfectly lawful business of a brickyard, and, in reliance on the existing law, continued to operate that business for a number of years. However, a local ordinance was passed prohibiting the operation of brickyards in the particular locale and diminishing the value of the claimant's parcel and thus of his investment by nearly 90%. Notwithstanding the effect of the ordinance on the value of the investment, the ordinance was sustained against a taking claim. See also Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272 (1928) (statute required cutting down ornamental red cedar trees because they had cedar rust which would be harmful to apple trees in the vicinity).
There is no logical or rational basis for sustaining the duties created by the laws in Miller and Hadacheck, but invalidating the duty created by the Minnesota Act. Surely, the Act effects no greater interference with reasonable reliance interests than did these other laws. Moreover, the laws operate identically: They all create duties that burden one class of persons and benefit another. The only difference between the present case and Hadacheck or Miller is that here there was a prior contractual relationship between the members of the benefited and burdened classes. I simply cannot accept that this difference should possess constitutional significance. The only means of avoiding this anomaly is to construe the Contract Clause consistently with its terms and the original understanding and hold it is inapplicable to laws which create new duties.
Ill
But my view that the Contract Clause has no applicability whatsoever to the Minnesota Act does not end the inquiry in this case. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits a State's power to enact such laws and I therefore address that related challenge to the Act’s validity.9 I think that any claim based on due process has no merit.
*263My conclusion rests to a considerable extent upon Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1 (1976). That case involved a federal statute that required the operators of coal mines to compensate employees who had contracted pneumo-coniosis even though the employees had terminated their work in the coal-mining industry before the Act was passed. This federal statute imposed a new duty on operators based on past acts and applied even though the coal mine operators might not have known of the danger that their employees would contract pneumoconiosis at the time of the particular employees’ service. Id., at 17; see also id., at 40 n. 4 (Powell, J., concurring in part). While indicating that the Due Process Clause may place greater limitations on the Government’s power to legislate retrospectively than it does on the Government’s ability to act prospectively, the statute was upheld on the ground that Congress had broad discretion to deal with the serious social problem of pneumoconiosis affecting former miners and that it was “a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees’ disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor — the operators and the coal consumers.” Id., at 18.
A similar analysis is appropriate here. The Act is an attempt to remedy a serious social problem: the utter frustration of an employee’s expectations that can occur when he is terminated because his employer closes down his place of work. The burden on his employer is surely far less harsh than that saddled upon coal operators by the federal statute. Too, a large part of the employer’s outlay that the Act requires will be offset against future savings. To this extent, the Act merely *264prevents the employer from obtaining a windfall, an effect which would immunize this aspect of the statutory requirement from attack even under the more stringent standards the Court reads into the Contract Clause. See El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S., at 515 and cases cited. To the extent the Act does more than prevent a windfall, it is simply implementing a reasonable legislative judgment that the expectation interests of employees of more than 10 years’ service in the receipt of a pension but who, as an actuarial matter, would not satisfy the vesting requirements of the pension plan, should not be frustrated by the generally unforeseen contingency of a plant’s closing.
Significantly, also, the Minnesota Act, unlike the federal statute upheld in Turner Elkhorn Mining, is not wholly retrospective in its operation. The Act requires an outlay from an employer like appellant only if after the enactment date of the Act (thus when it may give full consideration to the economic consequences of its decision) the employer decides to close its plant.
Nor, finally, do I believe it relevant that the Act is limited in coverage to large employers. “In establishing a system of unemployment benefits the legislature is not bound to occupy the whole field. It may strike at the evil where it is most felt.” Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 519-520 (1937).
In sum, in my view, the Contract Clause has no applicability whatsoever to the Act, and because I conclude the Act is consistent with the only relevant constitutional restriction— the Due Process Clause — I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.

 Since appellant’s plan remains in force at its other plants, this case does not involve a termination of a pension plan, and I will therefore not discuss the aspect of the statute that involves such contingencies except to observe that it, too, is a sensitive attempt to protect employees’ expectation interests.

 All parties to this case agree that Allied’s actuarial assumptions in calculating its annual contributions to the pension plan did not include the possibility of a plant’s closing.

 Because appellant’s pension plan was, at the time of the plant closing, underfunded by in excess of $295,000, appellant’s pension-funding charge— which the parties stipulate will be between $114,000 and $195,000 — will not in fact be offset by future out-of-pocket savings. But this is incidental. What is critical is that appellant, like all covered employers, will be forced to assume an economic burden only a little greater than that inherent in its original undertaking to set up a pension plan for the benefit of its employees.
Although the Court refers to the fact that, under the terms of the plan, no sanctions could be imposed on appellant for not adequately funding it, no substantial objection can be levied against the Act to the extent that it mandates funding sufficient to meet the employer’s original undertaking. The plan in the present ease can be interpreted as imposing a duty on the employer to fund it adequately, see App. to Brief for Appellant 10a (§10 of the plan), and the employees here surely would have understood it as imposing that requirement. There can be no serious objection to a measure that makes such a promise enforceable.

 Although appellant here apparently decided to close its Minnesota plant prior to the Act’s effective date, appellant had every opportunity to reconsider that decision after the Act was adopted and presumably reached its final decision after weighing the possible liabilities under the Act.

 Of course, as our recent decisions make plain, the applicability of the Clause has not been confined to classic “debtor relief” laws, but has been regarded as implicated 'by any measure which dilutes or nullifies a duty created by a contract. See, e. g., El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S. 497 (1965).

 Satteñee, which was written by Mr. Justice Washington, necessarily rejected the contrary dictum of Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 84 (1823), another of Mr. Justice Washington’s Court opinions.

 In Georgia R. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U. S. 432 (1923), Detroit United R. Co. v. Michigan, 242 U. S. 238 (1916), and in dictum in other cases, see ante, at 244-245, n. 16, this Court embraced, without any careful analysis and without giving any consideration to Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380 (1829), the contrary view that the impairment of a contract may consist in “adding to its burdens” as well as in diminishing its efficacy. Georgia R. & Power Co. v. Decatur, supra, at 439. These opinions reflect the then-prevailing philosophy of economic due process which has since been repudiated. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726 (1936). In my view, the reasoning of Georgia R. & Power Co. and Detroit United R. Co. is simply wrong.

 With respect, the Court’s application of these criteria illustrates this point. First, I find it difficult to understand how the Court can assert that the Act’s attempt to protect the expectation interests of .employees to pension plans does not deal with a “broad, generalized ... social problem” but that the mortgage moratorium in Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934), did. The Court’s suggestion that the Act has a “narrow aim” because it applies only to pension plans overlooks that it is the existence of the pension plan that creates the need for this legislation. Second, the assertion that Minnesota here “invaded an area never before subject to regulation” takes an exceedingly restrictive view of the subject matter of the Act. If it is regarded not as a private pension plan, but rather as the compensation afforded employees by large employers, then the statute operates in an area that has been extensively regulated. The only explanation for the Court’s decision is that it subjectively values the interests of employers in pension plans more highly than it does the legitimate expectation interests of employees.

 I recognize that the only question presented by appellant is whether the Minnesota Act violates the Contract Clause. See Jurisdictional State*263ment 2. However, I think that a due process claim is fairly subsumed by the question presented and, under the circumstances, elementary fairness requires that I address the due process claim. This reasoning does not apply to the other possible challenges to the Act — e. g., ones based on the “Taking” Clause or on the Commerce Clause — for these others involve rather different considerations from those involved in the Contract and Due Process Clause analyses.