Court Opinion

ID: 9487874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:28:45.563998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:32.046193
License: Public Domain

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because I believe that Stewart’s 24-day detention in connection with a parole violation on an underlying nine-year sentence was “imprisonment on a sentence,” as used in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e), I would.affirm the distinct court’s enhancement of Stewart’s sentence based on that section.
In July 1987 Stewart was paroled in connection with his nine-year 1983 state sentence. Shortly after his parole, he was arrested for burglary and, two days later, for trespassing. Both charges were placed on the “stet” docket in Baltimore City, a procedure by which the charges were allowed to remain dormant. Because of the arrests, the government issued a warrant charging Stewart with violating the terms of his parole granted in connection with the 1983 sentence by (1) having been arrested for two crimes while on parole, (2) not reporting for parole supervision, (3) not reporting his two arrests, and (4) havixig been terminated from a drug *126program to which he had been assigned. For an unexplained reason, that warrant was not served on Stewart for four years. When, in May 1992, the warrant was served, Stewart was detained 24 days pending a hearing.
At his parole violation hearing, Stewart was represented by counsel and offered no testimony in defense. The Maryland Parole Commission found Stewart “guilty” of three of four charges and decided “to close the case unsatisfactory,” but not to impose further incarceration. As the reasons for its decision, the presiding Commissioner stated,
I took into consideration the nature of Mr. Stewart’s offense. I also took into consideration the fact that he had not been convicted of any crime as of this date while on parole. I also took into consideration the fact that the ease had expired on 7/13/91.
Accordingly, on June 22, 1992, Stewart was released after having been detained since May 29, 1992.
The issue presented is whether Stewart’s 24-day detention pending his parole hearing was “imprisonment on a sentence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e).
While the answer is a matter of federal law, it is helpful to look to state law for guidance in determining whether the nature of his incarceration was imprisonment on a sentence. Under Maryland law, parole is a conditional release from imprisonment during which the paroled prisoner remains “in legal custody.” Md.Ann.Code art. 41, § 4-501(5) (1993). If a condition of parole is violated, parole may be revoked and the prisoner may be required to serve the entire remainder of the sentence originally imposed in prison mthout credit for the period served on parole, unless the Maryland Parole Commission determines otherwise. Md.Ann. Code art. 41, § 4 — 511(d) (1993 & Supp.1994). Thus, the prisoner, whether remaining in prison or in the community on parole, is serving his sentence throughout the full period of the sentence originally imposed. As long as the period of the sentence- served while on parole is not forfeited by reason of a parole violation, the sentence is neither abated nor suspended during the period of parole. See Gantt v. State, 81 Md.App. 653, 569 A.2d 220 (1990); Alvarado v. McLaughlin, 486 F.2d 541, 544 (4th Cir.1973). Conceptually, parole effects “an extension of the prison walls” during which the prisoner on parole remains in the custody of the Maryland Parole Commission. Id. It therefore follows that when a prisoner is returned from the community to prison because he violated his conditions of parole, even after his original term of parole has expired, he is imprisoned on his original sentence.
In this case, even though Stewart’s parole was not formally revoked and he was not given additional imprisonment following his parole violation hearing, he nevertheless remained in prison for 24 days because of a violation of parole granted in connection with his original nine-year sentence. His detainment was for criminal conduct and it was served in a prison. Thus, in the plain words of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, his detainment was “imprisonment on a sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(e).
In determining the criminal history of a defendant for purposes of sentencing, Chapter 4 of the Sentencing Guidelines draws liberally on a defendant’s criminal past. “A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of greater punishment.” U.S.S.G. Ch. 4, intro, comment, (emphasis added). The criminal history points added by U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e), which is the section relevant here, are attributable not only to the fact of past criminal behavior of a defendant, but also to the recency of such behavior (points added only if instant offense committed within two years after release from imprisonment on a sentence). See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) comment, (backg’d). Thus, when a defendant is recently released from prison for criminal conduct, defendant’s repeated criminal conduct is treated more seriously. The combination of these elements, i.e. (1) imprisonment (2) for criminal behavior (3) in the recent past, is the essence of a § 4A1.1(e) enhancement. It is also characteristic of Stewart’s 24-day detainment in 1992.
While I recognize that “imprisonment” as used in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) refers to imprisonment on a sentence, the Sentencing Guide*127lines has taken an expansive approach in defining what constitutes a sentence. Thus, for example, a diversionary disposition resulting from a finding or admission of guilt is considered a sentence, even if a conviction is not formally entered. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f); cf U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(m). As the Application Note observes, section 4A1.2(f), treating a diversionary disposition as a sentence, “reflects a policy that defendants who receive the benefit of a rehabilitative sentence and continue to commit crimes should not be treated with further leniency.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f) comment, (n.9) (emphasis added).
The same sentencing policy applies to the circumstances before us. Just because Stewart received no additional time from the state commissioner for his probation violation does not lead to the conclusion that his prior incarceration was not “on a sentence.” Stewart was found guilty of violating his . parole imposed as part of his 1988 sentence, a sentence which clearly qualifies under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a). Moreover, the disposition of no additional prison time that the commissioner chose to give should not relieve Stewart of the negative implications flowing from his behavior and the 24 days he was detained for it. Indeed, if the commissioner had revoked Stewart’s parole and imposed additional prison time, Maryland law would require that he be given credit for the prehearing period served. See Md.Ann.Code art. 27; § 638C (1992). That probation was not revoked in order to give additional prison time does not change the character of Stewart’s 24-day imprisonment prior to the hearing. The letter and spirit of § 4A1.1(e) require an enhancement for this incarceration, or Stewart will improperly receive a further benefit from a rehabilitative sentence which he intentionally flouted. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f) comment, (n.9).
Because Stewart’s 24-day detention constituted imprisonment on his 1988 sentence and that imprisonment was served within two years of the instant offense, the district court properly added two points to Stewart’s criminal history category under U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(e). Because I would affirm the judgment of the district court, I dissent.