Court Opinion

ID: 9675847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:07:23.206233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:40.455118
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
PER CURIAM.
Appellant was convicted by a jury of the offense of burglary of a building. The trial court assessed punishment at forty years confinement. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered an acquittal. Walker v. State, 823 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.App. — Tyler, 1989). We granted review to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction in light of the jury charge. We will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The indictment in this case alleged appellant committed this offense as a primary actor. The court’s charge included an abstract instruction on the law of parties. The application paragraph tracked the language of the indictment but failed to include any reference to the immediately preceding general parties instruction.
The Court of Appeals found that the charge allowed the jury to convict only if they found appellant guilty by his own conduct. The Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a result of appellant’s own conduct. Finding there was no evidence that appellant entered the building the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered an acquittal.
In Jones v. State, 815 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (reh’g denied this day), we held that in order for the jury to be authorized to convict one as a party, the law of parties must be included in the application paragraph of the charge. Jones, 815 S.W.2d at 669. Since the law of parties was not included in the application paragraph in this cause, we must determine whether the evidence is sufficient to find appellant guilty by his own conduct.
The State’s case was based entirely on circumstantial evidence. Police responded to a burglar alarm at a K-Mart store shortly after 1:30 a.m. There were no eyewitnesses and the burglars fled before police could arrive. The store had been entered by shattering a glass door connecting the fenced-in garden center area to the enclosed part of the building. Two televisions were recovered from this garden area. Police found two sets of footprints coming from the store which led them to four shotguns in a grassy area adjacent to the store.
The weapons had been taken by breaking a glass case. One of the burglars cut himself on the glass and bled considerably in and outside the store. Blood was found on the shotguns, on and near the glass case, and outside the store. No blood was found on the televisions. This, combined with the two sets of footprints, led police to believe that at least two people were involved. Samples of the blood were taken. The televisions were dusted for fingerprints. No usable fingerprints were found on the shotguns or inside the store. No blood test comparison was sought for appellant since the officers believed it was the other burglar who cut himself. An anonymous tip led police to suspect appellant. Some of the prints found were made by appellant’s right palm consistent with carrying the television, as opposed to merely handling it as it sat on a sixty-six inch high shelf. Other prints found on the television were not identified.
Appellant was arrested seven weeks later. At the time of his apprehension appellant gave the officer a false name. Officers informed appellant only that the charge was burglary and gave him no details. While appellant was in the booking area of the jail, he spoke with an unidentified individual he knew. One officer overheard appellant say, “They got me in here for the burglary of K-Mart up north but I didn’t do it.”
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find the State proved at most that appellant picked up one of the televisions. None of the State’s *249evidence showed appellant actually entered the building himself, although it can certainly be inferred from the evidence that he did so. When approached by police, appellant lied about his identity and exhibited some guilty knowledge about the offense while at the jail. This allows the inference that appellant knew about the burglary and was somehow involved.
One reasonable possibility is that appellant entered the building and carried the television to the garden area. Another reasonable hypothesis is that appellant waited outside the building and carried the television handed to him by the one who entered the store. This is entirely consistent with the statement made by appellant at the jail, the palm print evidence and the location of the televisions.
The evidence must be reviewed to determine whether it supports the finding that appellant was guilty by virtue of his own conduct. Since this is a circumstantial evidence case, we must determine whether the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of appellant by his own conduct. Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). The evidence does not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that appellant was guilty only as a party. Therefore, the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction when viewed in light of the charge given. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.1
BENAVIDES, J., concurs in the result.

. The Court of Appeals correctly recognized: At trial, the State made no request that the law of parties be applied to the facts of the case; neither did the State object to the court’s failure to do so. Hence, unobjected to error of the trial court in failing to apply the law of parties to the facts cannot be said to transform the insufficiency of the evidence to mere “trial error" that may require reversal, but not acquittal, under jeopardy’s rule, (citations omitted).
823 S.W.2d at 309.