Court Opinion

ID: 9716755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:50:14.272449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:48.732145
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Although the majority ostensibly recognizes the plaintiff’s right to amend following summary judgment pursuant to section 2—1005(g) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2—1005(g)), the majority then eviscerates this right by imposing unprecedented and needlessly restrictive limitations on the circumstances in which the plaintiff’s right to amend will be permitted. The majority creates a broad rule that “motions to amend pleadings based on information known to the movant before the hearing should be made before the court reaches the summary judgment stage.” (Emphasis added.) (Loyola, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 803.) The majority then determines that the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s request to amend following summary judgment because the “facts [plaintiff] alleges in the amended complaint were known at the inception of th[e] litigation” and the plaintiff “offered no justification for its lack of alacrity.” (Loyola, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 804.) In so doing, the majority ignores the admonition of the Code of Civil Procedure that its provisions “shall be liberally construed, to the end that controversies may be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive rights of the parties.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 1—106. The majority’s ruling is contrary to Illinois precedent regarding requests to amend following summary judgment (see Siebert v. Continental Oil Co. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 891, 515 N.E.2d 728; Ruff v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 811, 513 N.E.2d 7, relying upon Kupianen v. Graham (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 373, 377, 437 N.E.2d 774; see also Wingate v. Camelot Swim Club, Inc. (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 963), and fails to accomplish substantial justice. Application of the standard already established in Illinois jurisprudence reveals that the trial court should have allowed plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Siebert v. Continental Oil Co. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 891, 515 N.E.2d 728, and Ruff v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 811, 513 N.E.2d 7, are virtually identical to the instant cause and show that the trial court in the case at bar abused its discretion when it denied plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. In both Siebert and Ruff, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denied plaintiffs’ motions for leave to amend. On appeal, the courts determined that the motions for leave to amend should have been allowed despite the plaintiffs’ previous opportunities to amend their complaints. To reach this conclusion, the courts in Siebert and Ruff noted that section 2—1005 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part: “Before or after the entry of a summary judgment, the court shall permit pleadings to be amended upon just and reasonable terms.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2—1005(g).) The courts observed that, according to the Historical and Practice Notes, this provision in section 2—1005 “ ‘reaffirms the power of the court to permit amendments to pleadings at any time, as mandated by section 2—616(a) of the Civil Practice Law, notwithstanding a party’s invocation of the summary judgment procedure and notwithstanding the success of that invocation.’ ” (Emphasis in Ruff.) Ruff, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 817-18, quoting Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2—1005, Historical and Practice Notes, at 21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); see also Siebert, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 895. Having determined that the trial court possessed the authority to vacate summary judgment and permit the plaintiffs’ amendment to their complaint, the court in Siebert turned to a detailed analysis of “what standards the court ‘shall’ use in arriving at its decision as to whether or not the amendment should be permitted.” (Siebert, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 895.) Relying upon Kupianen v. Graham (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 373, 377, 437 N.E.2d 774, the Siebert court concluded that the relevant factors are: “ ‘whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading [citation]; whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment [citations]; the timeliness of the proposed amendment [citation]; and whether previous opportunities to amend the pleadings could be identified. [Citation.]’ ” (Siebert, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 895.) Applying these factors to the case before it, the court in Siebert found that the plaintiff should have been allowed to file an amended complaint: “In the case at bar, the amendment would cure the defective pleading ***. *** The next two elements in the test were addressed by this court in Kupianen in a statement which is applicable to the case at bar: ‘No prejudice or surprise could have resulted to the other parties since the case was still at the pleading stage. The proposed amendment was presented to the trial court at the time the motion to vacate was heard.’ [Citation.] The court in Kupianen, having decided the first three components of the analysis in favor of allowing amendment of the counterclaim, did not apply the final factor when reaching its conclusion that the attempted amendment to the counterclaim should have been permitted. We adopt the same approach. Despite the plaintiff’s having had previous opportunities in the case sub judice to amend the complaint, the only just and reasonable approach now is to allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint.” Siebert, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 896. Siebert, Ruff, and Kupianen are dispositive of the case at bar. As in each of those cases, the proposed amended complaint in the instant cause contained different legal theories than those alleged in plaintiff’s original pleadings. Plaintiff’s proposed amendments were also sufficient to overcome the defects in its original complaint. The record shows that plaintiff promptly sought leave to amend at the court’s last hearing with respect to the merits of plaintiff’s initial complaint. The record also indicates that plaintiff had not previously sought leave to amend, and that plaintiff filed its motion for leave to amend upon the trial court’s express allowance. Permitting the motion to amend would not be unfairly prejudicial to defendants, who have remained actively involved in the litigation since its inception. The court in Siebert reasoned: “ ‘No prejudice or surprise could have resulted to the other parties since the case was still at the pleading stage. The proposed amendment was presented to the trial court at the time the motion to vacate was heard.’ ” (Siebert, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 896, quoting Kupianen, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 377.) The case at bar was also at the pleading stage and, as in Siebert, “[n]o prejudice or surprise could have resulted to the other parties.” (Siebert, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 896.) Also, in the case at bar, as in Siebert and Kupianen, “[d]espite the plaintiff’s having had previous opportunities in the case sub judice to amend the complaint, the only just and reasonable approach now is to allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint.” (Siebert, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 896.) Based upon Siebert, Ruff, and Kupianen, and in order to do substantial justice between the parties, the trial court should have allowed plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. The majority refuses to apply the Kupianen factors to the case at bar on the theory that Kupianen is distinguishable because it pertained to a request to amend following dismissal with prejudice. In place of the Kupianen factors, the majority creates a new, broad rule that “motions to amend pleadings based on information known to the movant before the hearing should be made before the court reaches the summary judgment stage.” (Emphasis added.) (Loyola, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 803.) On this basis, the majority determines that the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s request to amend following summary judgment because the “facts [plaintiff] alleges in the amended complaint were known at the inception of th[e] litigation” and the plaintiff “offered no justification for its lack of alacrity.” (Loyola, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 804.) Thus, the majority relies exclusively upon the factor which the court in Siebert, Ruff, and Kupianen found least significant and readily excused, i.e., whether the plaintiff had prior opportunities to amend the complaint. I find neither logic nor wisdom in the majority’s ruling. Contrary to the majority’s statement that different considerations are applicable depending upon the stage of the proceedings in which the plaintiff first requests to amend its complaint (Loyola, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 803), Illinois courts have applied the factors of Kupianen to motions for leave to amend filed following dismissal with prejudice and those filed after the entry of summary judgment. See, e.g., Wingate v. Camelot Swim Club, Inc. (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 963; Ruklick v. Julius Schmid, Inc. (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 523 N.E.2d 1208. In addition, there is no sound reason to apply one standard when the motion to amend is filed following dismissal with prejudice, and apply a substantially different standard when the motion to amend is made following summary judgment. Both dismissal with prejudice and summary judgment are, in the words of the majority, “significant, potentially dispositive stage[s] of the proceeding^].” (Loyola, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 803.) At each of these points in the litigation, the parties are obligated to know the facts and the law supporting their positions, and to so inform the court. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2—611; 134 Ill. 2d R. 137 (sanctions for failure to make reasonable inquiry into facts and law supporting legal position).) The stage at which the motion to amend is presented is a factor with respect to whether the nonmovant will be unfairly prejudiced by the amendment. Irrespective of whether plaintiff’s request to amend has been filed after dismissal with prejudice or after summary judgment, “ ‘[n]o prejudice or surprise could *** result[ ] to the other parties since the case was still at the pleading stage[,] [provided] [t]he proposed amendment was presented to the trial court at the time the motion to vacate was heard.’ ” (Siebert, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 896, quoting Kupianen, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 377.) As noted above, the parties in the case at bar were still at the pleading stage when plaintiff presented its request to file an amended complaint alleging, not new facts, but different legal theories. The parties have acknowledged that little, if any, discovery was taken prior to the court’s ruling on the defendants’ summary judgment motions. The prejudice to plaintiff is apparent in the court’s refusal to allow plaintiff to file its first amended complaint, but I fail to discern how defendant would be prejudiced by the allowance of the motion to file plaintiff’s first amended complaint, particularly since the parties were still before the court with arguments relating to the pleadings. The cases upon which the majority relies do not support its determination that the plaintiff was properly denied leave to amend because the “facts [plaintiff] alleges in the amended complaint were known at the inception of th[e] litigation” and plaintiff “offered no justification for its lack of alacrity.” (Loyola, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 804.) In Janes v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 398, 312 N.E.2d 605, the Illinois Supreme Court disapproved of hybrid motions that seek both dismissal with prejudice and summary judgment. The supreme court cautioned that the trial court judge should dispose of a motion to dismiss before the court entertains the motion for summary judgment. The Janes decision is not relevant to the issues raised in the instant cause. The majority also relies upon Able v. Pure Oil Co. (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 558, 290 N.E.2d 331. In Able, the plaintiff requested leave to amend pleadings during the course of trial. The appellate court reasoned that plaintiff’s “amendments ought to be allowed when not to do so will prejudice the plaintiff and when to do so will not prejudice the defendant.” (8 Ill. App. 3d at 563.) The Able court’s reasoning depended primarily upon a balancing of the prejudice to both plaintiff and defendant in the event that amendment were allowed or denied. The majority fails to consider the prejudice to either the plaintiff or the defendants that will result if amendment were allowed or denied in the instant cause. Powers v. National Mirror Works (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 592, 367 N.E.2d 763, to which the majority also refers, involved a plaintiff’s attempt to amend his complaint after notice of appeal had been filed and the statute of limitations had expired. Consequently, Powers is inapplicable to the case at bar. The plaintiff in the instant cause did not request leave to amend the complaint after notice of appeal had been filed. Indeed, defendants in the case at bar never argued to the trial court that the motion for leave to amend should be denied on the ground that the amendment included a cause of action on which the statute of limitations had expired. Nor has the plaintiff in the instant cause litigated various theories of recovery “one after another, allowing each particular claim to proceed to final judgment before instituting the next one,” as did the plaintiff in Powers (52 Ill. App. 3d at 599). For these reasons, I disagree with the majority’s refusal to apply the factors set forth in Kupianen and the majority’s determination that the trial court properly denied plaintiff leave to amend its complaint following summary judgment.