Court Opinion

ID: 9741195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:51:21.370196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:22.843087
License: Public Domain

Wright, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent because I cannot conclude that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-2707(1) (Reissue 1994) is unconstitutional. In my opinion, § 81-2707(1) does not violate the separation of powers clause of Neb. Const, art. II, § 1, which prohibits one branch of government from exercising the duties and powers “properly belonging to either of the others.” Rather, it is my opinion that § 81-2707(1) merely tells the State Personnel Board (executive branch) how to proceed in order to effectively carry out a law properly enacted by the Legislature. Such procedural constraints imposed by the legislative branch do not intrude upon the central prerogatives of the executive branch such that the Legislature can be said to be exercising a “power properly belonging” to the executive branch. See Loving v. U.S.,_U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 135 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1996).
The legislative power is set forth in article III of the Nebraska Constitution. The executive power is set forth in article IV. The judicial power is set forth in article V. The personnel board is a body created specifically by legislative enactment. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1318 (Reissue 1994). The manner in which the personnel board is to operate is not controlled by the Public Counsel (also known as the Ombudsman), nor is the power of the personnel board exercised by the Public Counsel.
The Legislature enacted the State Government Effectiveness Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-2701 through 81-2710 (Reissue 1994 & Cum. Supp. 1996), as a means to ensure that the government *534operates in accordance with the law, by protecting public employees who disclose possible illegalities or improprieties. See § 81-2702. The act requires that the Public Counsel (legislative branch) first make an investigation into charges of any possible violation. The Public Counsel then makes a determination as to whether reasonable grounds exist to believe the act has been violated. See § 81-2706.
If the Public Counsel finds reasonable grounds to believe a violation has occurred, a report is forwarded to the personnel board (executive branch), which is then required to hold a hearing to determine whether there has been a statutory violation. Until the personnel board carries out the hearing, however, it is required to stay the action. The personnel board’s determination is subject to review by the district court (judicial branch). See § 81-2707(3).
In my opinion, the required stay is basic procedural due process, which the Legislature may establish in order to effectively carry out a law that was within the Legislature’s power to enact to protect the public welfare.
It is obvious that the Nebraska Constitution, like the federal Constitution, “ ‘contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. . .' " Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1743 (quoting Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). See, also, Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 115 S. Ct. 1447, 131 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1995) (state court decisions in period immediately after ratification of federal Constitution drew little distinction between federal and state Constitutions in their understanding of separation of powers). Separation of powers “ ‘ “d[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul [sic] over the acts of each other.” ’” Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1743 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 647, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989)). A “‘hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.’ ” Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1743 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976)).
*535In my opinion, § 81-2707(1) does not create a legislative exercise of power properly belonging to either the executive or the judicial branch. Instead, § 81-2707(1) is merely an example of the necessary integration of those powers.
Lanphier, J., joins in this dissent.