Court Opinion

ID: 9849966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:50:15.42677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:29.801121
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, Judge,
dissenting in part.
I disagree only with that part of today’s opinion which vacates the conviction for delivery of a controlled substance, rather than the conviction for conspiracy. I would vacate the conspiracy conviction instead.
This choice raises an issue of first impression in Idaho. However, in California, where Penal Code § 654 is virtually identical to I.C. § 18-301, the choice frequently has been confronted. The California appellate courts have upheld a conspiracy conviction, while striking down the conviction for the underlying substantive offense, in two well-defined categories of “double punishment” cases. First, conspiracy convictions have been upheld where the scope of the conspiracy exceeded the acts constituting the underlying offense. People v. Cooks, 141 Cal.App.3d 224, 190 Cal.Rptr. 211, (1983); People v. Scott, 224 Cal.App.2d 146, 36 Cal.Rptr. 402 (1964). Second, conspiracy convictions have been sustained where the statutory penalties for such conspiracies exceeded those provided for the substantive offenses. In re Allen, 239 Cal.App.2d 23, 48 Cal.Rptr. 345 (1965); People v. Finch, 216 Cal.App.2d 444, 30 Cal.Rptr. 901 (1963); People v. Keller, 212 Cal.App.2d 210, 27 Cal.Rptr. 805 (1963).
However, the present case fits neither of these categories. As noted in today's opinion, the sole object of the conspiracy was to effectuate the delivery in which Gallatin participated. The statutory penalties in Idaho for delivering a controlled substance and for conspiracy to do so are the same. Consequently, this case falls into a third category — where the conspiracy and the substantive offense are coextensive and invoke the same statutory penalties. In this category of cases, the California appellate courts generally have vacated conspiracy convictions while upholding convictions for the substantive offenses. E.g., People v. Skelton, 109 Cal.App.3d 691, 167 Cal.Rptr. 636 (1980); People v. Birdwell, 253 Cal. App.2d 621, 61 Cal.Rptr. 536 (Cal.Ct.App. 1967); People v. Thomsen, 239 Cal.App.2d 84, 48 Cal.Rptr. 455 (Cal.Ct.App.1965).
I am not persuaded that we should deviate from this approach in applying I.C. § 18-301 to the present case. The conspiracy conviction rests narrowly upon an inference drawn from acts comprising the substantive crime of delivering a controlled substance. Conceptually, I believe it makes greater sense to focus punishment upon the substantive crime than upon the attendant conspiracy unless — as noted in the California cases — the conspiracy goes beyond the substantive offense in question or carries a greater statutory penalty. Here, the social harm of the illicit drug transaction is more demonstrable in the actual delivery of a controlled substance than in the participants’ prior meeting of minds. In addition, from a pragmatic viewpoint, I believe the extent of Gallatin’s participation in the transaction would be communicated more meaningfully to correctional authorities — and to other courts in the future — by a record of the delivery conviction than by a record of conviction for a bare conspiracy. A conspiracy might not— indeed, often would not — be accompanied by overt acts sufficient to comprise the offense of delivery. A delivery conviction connotes more about actual involvement in drug-dealing than does a conspiracy conviction. Accordingly, faced with the choice mandated by § 18-301, I would uphold the conviction for delivery of a controlled substance, while vacating the conspiracy conviction.