Court Opinion

ID: 9940685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 22:04:05.655527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:29.981397
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 230009-U
                                          No. 2-23-0009
                                  Order filed February 14, 2024

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                             IN THE

                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

JOSEPH CHAVEZ,                         ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                       ) of De Kalb County.
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     )
                                       ) No. 16-L-115
VILLAGE OF KIRKLAND, an Illinois       )
Corporate Municipality, and ANDREW     )
HOLMES,                                ) Honorable
                                       ) Bradley J. Waller,
      Defendants-Appellants.           ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Kennedy and Mullen concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1     Held: The trial court erred when it entered judgment for the plaintiff and against the
             defendants on defendants’ affirmative defense of discretionary immunity.
             Defendants are entitled to discretionary immunity as a matter of law. Reversed.

¶2     At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred when it entered judgment in favor of

the plaintiff and against the defendants on defendants’ affirmative defense of discretionary

immunity. On December 6, 2022, the matter proceeded to jury trial and at the close of evidence,

both parties moved for directed verdict on the issue of discretionary immunity under sections 2-

109 and 2-201 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. 745
2023 IL App (2d) 230009-U

ILCS 10/2-109, 2-201 (West 2022). The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and

against the defendants, finding that defendant Andrew Holmes was not entitled to discretionary

immunity when he conducted the TASER training. The jury subsequently returned a verdict in the

amount of $1,402,862.50 for plaintiff. Defendants filed no post-trial motions but filed a timely

notice of appeal from the denial of the directed verdict. For the following reasons, we (1) reverse

the trial court’s judgment entering the jury’s verdict for plaintiff and (2) reverse the trial court’s

judgment on the motion for directed verdict on the issue of discretionary immunity.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On November 8, 2016, plaintiff, Joseph Chavez, filed a civil action against the Village of

Kirkland, for injuries he sustained during a TASER training conducted by Holmes. Plaintiff’s

complaint alleged that the Village was negligent in numerous ways while conducting the TASER

training and, as a result, plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on July 12,

2017, adding Andrew Holmes as a defendant. The amended complaint alleged that Holmes was

negligent in the following ways: (1) by failing to conduct TASER training in a reasonably safe

manner and comply with normative rules for safety that consider its participants’ health and well-

being; (2) by failing to supervise, monitor, and catch the plaintiff after being shot with the TASER

so that he would not collapse onto the solid ground beneath him; (3) by failing to place mats or

other soft surfaces around the plaintiff so that any fall would be protected by a soft, padded surface

rather than a solid surface; and (4) by failing to conduct TASER training in a reasonably safe

manner in consideration for its participants’ safety. Throughout the pendency of the case, the trial

court denied several of defendants’ motions attempting to dispose of the case on the basis of

discretionary immunity and other statutory immunities.

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¶5     On December 6, 2022, the matter proceeded to a jury trial. Plaintiff called Paul Lindstrom,

William Kroncke, David Gibson, Steven Rabin, Joseph Chavez, Laura Lampton, and Melissa

Payne Wagner as witnesses in his case-in-chief. Plaintiff also read the discovery deposition of

Sherry Chavez into the record, as she died before trial. Relevant to this appeal is the testimony of

Paul Lindstrom.

¶6     Lindstrom testified that he was the chief of police for the Village on December 5, 2015. In

his role as chief, he sent Andrew Holmes to be certified to instruct TASER training. It was his

understanding that a TASER instructor would need to follow TASER corporation’s guidelines.

For the TASER training on December 5, 2015, Chief Lindstrom testified that he required the

officers in attendance to be tased, as he “[thought] it [was] important for them to experience what

it is.” He also testified that he was presented with potential dates for the training and approved

opening the training to other departments. Chief Lindstrom testified that he did not control the

specifics of the class. Rather, Sergeant Parker, the head of training at the Village, would handle

the specifics, in accordance with TASER guidelines. Chief Lindstrom further testified that

although Andrew Holmes did not determine police department policies or procedures, he would

determine what equipment was needed for training, how to obtain the equipment needed for

training, where the training was going to take place, how the training would be conducted, and

whether an attendee passed or failed the training. Holmes would also help develop the Village

TASER policies by relaying information he received during his TASER instructor training.

¶7     At the close of plaintiff’s case-in-chief, defendants moved for a directed verdict. In support

of their motion, defendants argued that (1) plaintiff’s claims against defendant Holmes were barred

by the statute of limitations, (2) defendants were entitled to discretionary immunity pursuant to

745 ILCS 10/2-201, (3) plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act as he was

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a borrowed employee loaned to the Village, and (4) plaintiff failed to prove that the absence of a

mat was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. The trial court took the motion under advisement

and defendants proceeded with their case-in-chief.

¶8     Defendants called Chris Hathcoat, Venkat Seshadri, Robert Smith, James Radke, Victoria

Gates, Jerry Staton, and Andrew Holmes. Relevant to this appeal is the testimony of Andrew

Holmes.

¶9     Andrew Holmes testified that he worked as a part-time police officer with the Village and

served as the Village’s TASER instructor. In 2015, the Village sent him to a TASER instructor

certification course to become certified. In his capacity as the Village’s TASER instructor, Holmes

was responsible for reviewing the village’s written policies regarding TASER use and for

organizing and implementing the TASER training program for the Village. This included

determining a location for TASER training that had appropriate classroom space, had the proper

presentation equipment for the classroom portion of the session, and sufficient safe space to

conduct exposures and discharges. Regarding the December 15, 2015, TASER training, Holmes

testified that he determined that the fire department had all the capabilities necessary to conduct

the TASER training. He also testified that he chose to use alligator clips on plaintiff. Holmes

testified that he placed the alligator clips on the back of plaintiff’s shoulder and just below the

waistline. He further testified that as the TASER instructor for the Village, he has discretion to

deviate from TASER guidelines when reasonable. He routinely made discretionary decisions

within the TASER guidelines, such as how many exposures to give, how the exposures would be

given (alligator clips or probes), where on the body to place those exposures, and whether the

exposures would be given while the trainee was standing or kneeling. After Holmes’ testimony,

defendants then rested.

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¶ 10   At the close of evidence, defendants filed another motion for directed verdict. This second

motion was exactly the same as the first. The trial court heard arguments from both parties and

ultimately held that: (1) the statute of limitations affirmative defense implicated a question of fact

to be determined by the jury (specifically whether Andrew Holmes had notice of the lawsuit), (2)

defendants, as a matter of law, were not entitled to discretionary immunity pursuant to 745 ILCS

10/2-201, (3) there was not sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction as to whether or not

Chavez was a borrowed employee, and (4) there was sufficient evidence to warrant a jury

instruction as to whether the absence of a mat was negligent. The jury returned a verdict for

plaintiff, and the trial court subsequently entered judgment. No post-trial motion was filed but

defendants filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 11                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12   As a preliminary matter, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that by not

filing a post-trial motion as required by 735 ILCS 5/2-1202, defendants failed to properly perfect

their appeal and did not preserve any issue for review. We entered an order stating that the motion

to dismiss would be taken with the case. We now deny the motion.

¶ 13   Plaintiff argues that 735 ILCS 5/2-1202 required defendants to file a post-trial motion in

order to properly perfect their appeal. Because no post-trial motion was filed, plaintiff claims that

defendants did not preserve any issue for review. Defendants respond that under Crim by Crim v.

Dietrich, 2020 IL 124318, no post-trial motion was necessary as the jury was never presented with

the issue of discretionary immunity. We agree with defendants.

¶ 14   735 ILCS 5/2-1202 governs the necessity of post-trial motions in jury cases. It reads, in

relevant portion, as follows:

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             “Reserved ruling on motion for directed verdict--Post-trial motions in jury cases.

      (a) If at the close of the evidence, and before the case is submitted to the jury, any party

      moves for a directed verdict the court may (1) grant the motion or (2) deny the motion or

      reserve its ruling thereon and submit the case to the jury. If the court denies the motion or

      reserves its ruling thereon, the motion is waived unless the request is renewed in the post-

      trial motion.

             (b) Relief desired after trial in jury cases, heretofore sought by reserved motions for

      directed verdict or motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in arrest of judgment

      or for new trial, must be sought in a single post-trial motion. Relief after trial may include

      the entry of judgment if under the evidence in the case it would have been the duty of the

      court to direct a verdict without submitting the case to the jury, even though no motion for

      directed verdict was made or if made was denied or ruling thereon reserved. The post-trial

      motion must contain the points relied upon, particularly specifying the grounds in support

      thereof, and must state the relief desired, as for example, the entry of a judgment, the

      granting of a new trial or other appropriate relief. Relief sought in post-trial motions may

      be in the alternative or may be conditioned upon the denial of other relief asked in

      preference thereto, as for example, a new trial may be requested in the event a request for

      judgment is denied.

             (e) Any party who fails to seek a new trial in his or her post-trial motion, either

      conditionally or unconditionally, as herein provided, waives the right to apply for a new

      trial, except in cases in which the jury has failed to reach a verdict.***” 735 ILCS 5/2-1202

      (b), (e) (West 2022).

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2023 IL App (2d) 230009-U

¶ 15    There are two exceptions in which a post-trial motion is not needed to preserve an appeal

following a jury trial. Under the plain language of section 2-1202(e), a post-trial motion is not

needed where the jury has failed to reach a verdict. A second narrow exception has been carved

out where the trial court has directed a verdict on all issues. See Crim by Crim v. Dietrich, 2020

IL 124318, ¶ 26. This exception has been examined by our supreme court in Crim by Crim v.

Dietrich, 2020 IL 124318.

¶ 16    In Crim, the trial court directed a verdict for defendants on the issue of informed consent.

Id. ¶ 7. The trial continued and at the close of evidence, the jury found for defendants on the issue

of professional negligence. Id. Plaintiff did not file a post-trial motion. Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff appealed,

challenging only the directed verdict on the issue of informed consent. Id. ¶ 9. The appellate court

reversed and remanded for proceedings “as required by order of this court.” Id. ¶ 11. On remand,

the parties disagreed as to whether the issue of professional negligence could be retried. Id. ¶ 12.

The parties proposed a certified question pursuant to Rule 308, asking the appellate court whether

its prior ruling required a new trial de novo on all claims. Id. ¶ 14. The appellate court answered

the question in the affirmative and defendant filed a notice of appeal to the supreme court, which

was granted. Id. ¶ 15. The supreme court reversed, finding that the only issue that could be retried

was the issue of informed consent, as that issue was never before the jury, so no post-trial motion

was required to preserve the issue for appeal. Id. ¶¶ 33, 43.

¶ 17    In his motion to dismiss, plaintiff argues that under Crim, a litigant must file a post-trial

motion to preserve an appeal following a jury trial in all circumstances. However, this

interpretation ignores the underlying logic of the opinion. In Crim, our supreme court ultimately

determined that the question of whether a post-trial motion is necessary to preserve alleged error

“turns on the question of whether the jury rendered a decision on an issue being challenged before

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a reviewing court.” Crim, 2020 IL 124318, ¶ 33. Applying this rationale here, we determine that a

post-trial motion was unnecessary. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in

directing a verdict on the issue of discretionary immunity. This issue was never before the jury.

Accordingly, the jury never rendered a decision on this issue, and no post-trial motion was

required.

¶ 18   Plaintiff additionally argues that “[d]efendant cannot apply for a new trial now after

ignoring compliance with 5/2-1202.” (Emphasis added). However, plaintiff again misses the mark.

Defendants here are not attempting to apply for a new trial. Rather, they are asking for review of

the trial court’s ruling on the motion for directed verdict on the issue of discretionary immunity.

Reversing this ruling would not necessitate a new trial; it would instead negate the necessity of a

trial in the first place, as defendants would be immune from any liability. We therefore determine

that this argument is misplaced and agree with defendants that no post-trial motion was required.

¶ 19   As no post-trial motion was required, defendants did properly preserve their appeal and

therefore, we turn to the merits. At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court correctly entered

judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants on the defendants’ affirmative defense of

discretionary immunity. The trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for directed verdict is

reviewed de novo. Barr v. Cunningham, 2017 IL 120751, ¶ 15. The application of immunity

provisions of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (“Act”)

is also reviewed de novo. Ponto v. Levan, 2012 IL App (2d) 110355, ¶ 61.

¶ 20   Sections 2-109 and 2-201 of the Act, read together, immunize public entities for the

discretionary policymaking decisions of their employees. See Monson v. City of Danville, 2018 IL

122486, ¶ 16 (citing Smith v. Waukegan Park Dist., 231 Ill. 2d 111, 118 (2008)). These sections

provide:

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               “A local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission

       of its employee where the employee is not liable.” 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 2022).

               “Except as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position

       involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury

       resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such

       discretion even though abused.” 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2022).

This immunity covers both negligent and willful and wanton conduct. Strauss v. City of Chicago,

2022 IL 127149, ¶ 59 (citing Monson, 2018 IL 122486, ¶ 29). The public official asserting the

defense bears the burden of proving it is entitled to the immunity. Van Meter v. Darien Park

District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 370 (2003).

¶ 21   In order for 2-201 immunity to attach, two requirements must be met. First, a defendant

must prove that the employee held either a position involving the determination of policy or the

exercise of discretion. 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2022). Second, the act or omission giving rise to

the injury must result from both a determination of policy and an exercise of discretion. Id.;

Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 341 (1998).

¶ 22   A policy decision, for purposes of section 2-201 immunity, requires a public official to

balance competing interests and make a determination as to what course of action best serves those

interests. Id., 342-343. Such interests may include safety, convenience, and cost. Andrews v.

Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 2019 IL 124283, ¶ 28 (citing West

v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992)). Exercising discretion involves engaging in an act that is

unique to a particular public office. Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill. 2d 466, 474 (1995).

“Discretionary acts involve the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment in deciding whether

to perform a particular act or how and in what manner that act should be performed.” Richter v.

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College of Du Page, 2013 IL App (2d) 130095, ¶ 43. It is well established that while public

officials enjoy immunity for their discretionary acts, they do not enjoy immunity for their

ministerial acts. See Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d at 371; Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 474; Richter, 2013 IL

App (2d) 130095, ¶ 36. “The distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions resists

precise formulation, and *** the determination whether acts are discretionary or ministerial must

be made on a case-by-case basis.” Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 474. However, ministerial acts are

generally defined as acts performed on a given set of facts in a prescribed manner, in obedience to

the mandate of legal authority, and without reference to the official’s discretion as to the propriety

of the act. Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d at 562 (citing Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 474).

¶ 23   We turn to the first requirement — whether Holmes’ position with the Village determined

policy or exercised discretion. We find that his position as the Village’s only TASER training

instructor involved the exercise of discretion, as Holmes had to exercise personal deliberation and

judgment in organizing, implementing, and running the TASER training class. During trial, both

Holmes and Chief Lindstrom testified that Holmes was the only TASER training instructor with

the Kirkland Police Department. Holmes further testified that as the only TASER training

instructor with the Kirkland Police Department, he was responsible for organizing and

implementing the TASER training program. Chief Lindstrom also testified that he deferred to

Holmes in how the TASER training class was going to be run as Holmes was in charge of the

class. As part of Holmes’ responsibility in organizing, implementing, and running the TASER

training class, Holmes had to exercise personal deliberation in determining an appropriate location

to conduct the TASER training, how many exposures to give, how the exposures would be given

(alligator clips or probes), where on the body to place those exposures, and whether the exposures

would be given while standing or kneeling. These are all discretionary decisions made by Holmes

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2023 IL App (2d) 230009-U

in his capacity as the Village’s only TASER training instructor. No one else could have made those

decisions because the minutia of the TASER training class itself was solely the responsibility of

Holmes; the decisions were unique to his position as the Village’s only TASER training instructor.

¶ 24   The trial court, in determining that Holmes was not engaged in discretion in conducting

the TASER training, relied heavily on the TASER guidelines. This reliance is misplaced, as the

TASER guidelines do not have the mandate of legal authority necessary to render Holmes’ acts as

ministerial as opposed to discretionary. In Snyder, a municipal defendant was found to be engaged

in a ministerial act when it placed a warning sign on the right side of the road, in direct opposition

to the requirements laid out in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. Snyder, 167 Ill.

2d at 474. The supreme court found that because the Manual had been adopted by reference into

the Illinois Vehicle Code, it had the mandate of legal authority. Id. Here, unlike in Snyder, the

TASER guidelines have not been adopted by any statute or regulation. These guidelines were

created by TASER, for TASER - we cannot find that they have the mandate of legal authority.

Additionally, Chief Lindstrom testified that he deferred solely to Holmes in how the TASER

training class was going to be run. In other words, Holmes alone made the final determination on

how to handle the TASER training; he had unfettered discretion. See Richter, 2013 IL App (2d)

130095, ¶ 44. Therefore, Holmes’ decisions relying on the guidelines were discretionary as

opposed to ministerial and we find that his position as the Village’s only TASER training instructor

involved the exercise of discretion.

¶ 25   Having determined that Holmes’ position involved the exercise of discretion, we turn now

to the second requirement — that the act giving rise to plaintiff’s injuries was both a determination

of policy and an exercise of discretion. Plaintiff, in his complaint, alleges three acts that gave rise

to his injury: the conducting of the TASER training generally, the supervision or monitoring of

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plaintiff after he had been tased, and the failure to place mats around plaintiff while he was being

tased. We find that each of these three acts are both a policy determination and an exercise of

discretion.

¶ 26   First, we look to Holmes’ conducting of the TASER training generally. As previously

discussed, Holmes made many discretionary decisions in his capacity as the Village’s only TASER

training instructor. These decisions also constituted policy determinations, as he had to weigh

various interests and determine what course of action best served those interests. For example, in

determining a location for the TASER training, Holmes weighed competing interests (e.g., safety

and convenience) and made a determination that the fire department would be the safest and most

convenient place to hold the training due to the availability of both a classroom area and a carpeted

area to conduct exposures. He also took into consideration the immediate availability of emergency

medical technicians at the fire department, should anything go awry during the exposures.

Additionally, Holmes made policy determinations when he chose where to place the alligator clips

on plaintiff. He weighed various interests, such as safety of plaintiff, learning objectives of the

training, and convenience. Because Holmes made policy determinations in conducting TASER

training, he is entitled to discretionary immunity.

¶ 27   Plaintiff argues that Holmes’ acts did not involve policy making, as Chief Lindstrom

testified that Holmes did not determine police department policies or procedures. However, this is

not dispositive. There is a very specific definition of policy making under 745 ILCS 10/2-201

(West 2022). We must apply that definition and make our determination based on that, rather than

on the testimony of a chief of police who likely does not have in-depth knowledge of this area of

law. In applying the aforementioned definition of policy making, we find that Holmes, as the

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Village’s only TASER training instructor, made policy determinations in organizing,

implementing, and running the TASER training class.

¶ 28   Next, plaintiff asserts that Holmes failed to supervise or monitor plaintiff after he had been

tased, giving rise to plaintiff’s injury. The trial testimony and a review of the video evidence show

that plaintiff received TASER exposure via alligator clip. These clips were placed by Holmes onto

plaintiff. When plaintiff was tased, one of the spotters also received exposure and fell to the

ground, unable to support plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that because the spotter was inadvertently

exposed, defendants cannot be entitled to discretionary immunity. Discretionary immunity

requires a conscious decision; a judgment call and weighing of risks and benefits. Andrews, 2019

IL 124283, ¶ 34. Although it is true that exposing the spotter was not a judgment call made by

Holmes, he did use judgment, informed by his training, to make a conscious decision where to

place the alligator clips on plaintiff. He may have been negligent in making that decision, but it

was still a conscious decision where Holmes weighed various competing interests (such as safety

and educational objectives) and reached a conclusion as to what placement best served those

interests. Therefore, Holmes’ supervision and monitoring of plaintiff after he had been tased

constituted both an exercise of discretion and a policy determination.

¶ 29   Addressing plaintiff’s final assertion: Holmes’ failure to place mats around plaintiff while

he was being tased was both a policy determination and an exercise of discretion. In choosing to

not place mats, Holmes had to balance competing interests, such as safety, convenience, and cost.

There were no mats available from either the police department or the fire department – to obtain

them would be potentially inconvenient and potentially costly. In deciding not to place mats,

Holmes weighed competing interests and made a judgment call. Therefore, his decision not to

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place mats was a policy determination. It was also an exercise of discretion, as he personally

deliberated and used his own personal judgment in making the decision not to use mats.

¶ 30   As a final note, the trial court found that because Holmes was not the village president,

chief-of-police, or a fire marshal, that his acts could not constitute policy determinations. However,

it is clear from both the plain language of section 2-201 and existing precedent that a public

employee need not hold a position of power in order to make policy. The plain language of 2-201

reads “a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise

of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy

when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.” (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS

10/2-201 (West 2022). The statute does not limit the immunity to employees in a position of power;

it encompasses all public employees. Under the well-settled principles of statutory interpretation,

we may not read exceptions, conditions, or limitations into the statute. Andrews, 2019 IL 124283,

¶ 24. We decline to read any limitation into section 2-201 or restrict its application only to

employees in “positions of power.”

¶ 31   Moreover, existing precedent has not limited discretionary immunity to public employees

in positions of power. In Richter v. College of Du Page, 2013 IL App (2d) 130095, we found that

a building-and-grounds manager and his employee were determining policy in their handling of a

sidewalk deviation. The fact that the building-and-grounds manager and his employee were not

high-ranking officials within the college did not mean they were incapable of policymaking.

Rather, the fact that they weighed competing interests and made a judgment call as to the handling

of each sidewalk deviation indicated that they were engaged in policymaking. Id. ¶ 41. Similarly

here, it is not conclusive that Holmes was a part-time police officer as opposed to someone with

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more power; he was still engaged in policy-making as the Village’s only TASER training

instructor.

¶ 32    Discretionary immunity is “premised upon the idea that public officials should be allowed

to exercise their judgment in rendering decisions without fear that a good-faith mistake might

subject them to liability.” Harrison v. Hardin Community Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d

466, 472 (2001) (citing White v. Village of Homewood, 285 Ill. App. 3d 496, 502 (1st Dist. 1996).

Holmes is the exact sort of public official the legislature had in mind when it enacted section 2-

201. He exercised his judgment in organizing, implementing, and running the TASER training

class and is therefore immune from plaintiff’s negligence suit.

¶ 33    As the evidence at trial established the required elements for section 2-201 immunity,

defendants were entitled to discretionary immunity as a matter of law. We therefore reverse the

trial court’s judgment entering the jury’s verdict for plaintiff and reverse the trial court’s judgment

on the motion for directed verdict on the issue of discretionary immunity.

¶ 34                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 35    For the reasons stated we (1) reverse the trial court’s judgment entering the jury’s verdict

for plaintiff and (2) reverse the trial court’s judgment on the motion for directed verdict on the

issue of discretionary immunity. Accordingly, on the issue of discretionary immunity, judgment is

entered for defendants.

¶ 36    Reversed.

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