Court Opinion

ID: 9655253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:03:54.899692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:19.712866
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
¶ 31. (concurring). I join fully in the Majority opinion, but write briefly to respond to the *930Dissent's contention that William A. Silva should have, and his victim should have to endure, a new trial.
¶ 32. The Dissent complains that Silva's trial lawyer conceded too much in his closing argument to the trial court in this nonjury, bench trial. The Dissent also complains that Silva's lawyer gave no opening statement and called no witnesses. I address these matters in turn.
¶ 33. The State also did not give an opening statement. It is common for lawyers to dispense with opening statements in bench trials. Thus, the mutual eschewal of opening statements in a trial to the court sitting without a jury by both the State and the defense is hardly beyond the realm of "reasonably effective representation," which, as the Majority notes, is the standard we must apply. See State v. McMahon, 186 Wis. 2d 68, 80, 519 N.W2d 621, 626 (Ct. App. 1994).
¶ 34. It is also true that Silva's lawyer did not call any witnesses. The Dissent does not tell us, however, how this was ineffective legal representation: the Dissent neither points to what witnesses should have been called, nor tells us how this prejudiced Silva. See State v. Flynn, 190 Wis. 2d 31, 48, 527 N.W.2d 343, 349-350 (Ct. App. 1994) (defendant who alleges that his lawyer was ineffective because the lawyer did not do something, must show with specificity what the lawyer should have done and how that would have either changed things or, at the very least, how that made the result of the trial either unreliable or fundamentally unfair).
¶ 35. The Dissent complains that Silva's trial lawyer gave a perfunctory closing argument, which conceded technical guilt. He did more, however. I, as does the Majority opinion, set out the trial lawyer's closing argument in full:
*931Your Honor, it's very difficult to cross-examine a six-year-old child. I — I also believe that the child was being truthful, to some extent.
Um, I'm concerned about the fact that, ah, when she was asked questions about time by the District Attorney — ah — this is after she had testified that the incident, ah, lasted approximately one minute — whether we can give credibility to that statement, whether it was longer or not. The fact still remains is that, um, she said it took one minute.
First[-] degree sexual assault is a very, very serious —■ very serious crime. I would assume that the State's case is based upon the fact that this young girl was 13 — under 13 years of age. I tried to have the Court find out from the witnesses what the extent of the sexual contact was. The extent of the sexual contact was the fact that he had rubbed her buttock, not her vaginal area, and, ah, that, ah, he had his clothes on. Ah, at no time was he exposed. Um, that evidently is substantiated by, ah, our Exhibit No. 1, which the police officer recorded by stating that he was clothed.
Um, I suppose technically this is a case of first Hdegree sexual assault. I don't like to say that, however, I believe it's of such insignificant proportions as to what we generally would call first[-] degree sexual assault, and that is that, um, I don't believe the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt, ah, the fact that, ah, the elements have been proved.
¶ 36. The postconviction court found that the evidence was such "that if [the closing argument] was a deficiency it did not contribute unfairly or inappropriately to the conviction [in] that [the closing argument] was not a material factor in the [trial] Court's decision" finding Silva guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Of *932course. The trial court sat through the testimony; it, unlike a jury, did not need to have the evidence masticated and marshaled.
¶ 37. Moreover, as the Majority opinion points out:
given the strength of the State's case, the attorney's closing argument was also not beyond the realm of 'reasonably effective representation,1 which is the test we must apply. The six-year-old girl was a very articulate witness. She reported the attack to her mother as soon as she was able to get her mother's attention, which was the next day. Another significant consideration is the fact that the girl's father testified that when he confronted Silva, his half-brother, Silva not only displayed all the signs of guilt, but also did not deny the accusation.
Majority op. at ¶ 20. (Emphasis in original, citations omitted.) In light of this, for the Dissent to suggest that Silva's trial lawyer should have flatly denied everything, which is the essence of what the Dissent is saying, borders on advocating emulation of the tactic that will forever be associated with the former Iraqi Minister of Information, Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf.1
¶ 38. Had Silva's trial lawyer cannonaded his closing argument with explosions of denial, as the Dissent seems to suggest, I bet Silva would be arguing on appeal that such a strategy was "ineffective." Indeed, when a finding of guilt by a court sitting as the fact-finder in a bench trial is certain, as it was here, a strategy of candid amelioration of the bad facts is powerful advocacy; why should a lawyer be believed when he or she argues mitigation on sentencing when the lawyer was just, *933perhaps moments earlier, denying vigorously the irrefutable? Yet, this is the suicidal "advocacy" the Dissent commends. I respectfully disagree.

 Examples of absurd statements made by Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf can be found at http://64.39.15.171 (last accessed July 24, 2003), and, most likely, a cursory search of the internet.