Court Opinion

ID: 9722616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:42:00.940957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:37.890249
License: Public Domain

HERNDON, J.
I dissent. Applying the law as enunciated in People v. Brock, 66 Cal.2d 645 [58 Cal.Rptr. 321, 426 P.2d 889], and in People v. Friend, 50 Cal.2d 570 [327 P.2d 97], and in the numerous other precedents cited and discussed in those two decisions, I conclude that the trial court did not transgress the limits of permissible comment authorized by article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution in its provision that “The court may make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the cause.”
It is my opinion that in the evidentiary context of this case the comment of the trial judge was entirely reasonable. Undoubtedly it was his laudable purpose to avoid the necessity for a retrial of this case of classic simplicity with the attendant cost to the suffering taxpapers of this county and state and the additional burden upon our already failing judicial system, staggering as it is under an intolerable backlog of untried cases.
In People v. Friend, supra, 50 Cal.2d 570, at page 578, the Supreme Court stated: “The extent to which a judge is free to comment on the evidence is shown by the fact that it has frequently been recognized that a judge may express his opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, so long as the province of the jury as defined by the constitutional section is not invaded. [Citations.]”
In People v. Brock, supra, 66 Cal.2d 645, 654-655, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and explained the decision in People v. Friend as follows: “The statement in Friend and the other cases that a judge ‘may express his opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant’ should be understood as meaning that proper comments of the judge as to evidence are not erroneous merely because the jury might conceivably understand such comments as reflecting his opinion as to guilt or innocence, and the quoted language should not be understood as warranting general statements as to guilt or innocence where the evidentiary basis for the comment is not explained to the jury.” (Italics added.)
In this case, as the majority opinion correctly discloses, the trial judge was careful to analyze the testimony of the witnesses and to explain to the jury “the evidentiary basis for [his] comment” as required by Brock. The trial court here did not commit the error which was the major reason given *590for the reversals in Brock and in People v. Smith, 267 Cal.App.2d 155, 160-161 [72 Cal.Rptr. 696], that is, the erroneous instruction that the jury had the “right and duty to exercise the same independence of judgment in weighing the judge’s comment on the evidence as you are entitled to exercise in weighing the testimony of the witnesses. . . .”
I heartily concur in the observations in the majority opinion that no hard and fast rule can be applied in determining the extent to which a judge may or may not comment on the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses and that each case must necessarily turn upon the context and extent of the comments and peculiar circumstances under which comment is made.
Further, I agree that “[a]cting upon a constitutional and statutory right to comment on the evidence, a trial judge may summarize the evidence' critically. (People v. De Arkland, 262 Cal.App.2d 802, 815 [69 Cal.Rptr. 144]; People v. Shannon, 260 Cal.App.2d 320, 330 [67 Cal.Rptr. 207].)” Permissible comment “is not confined to a colorless recital, by way of summing up the facts. Such a conclusion would destroy and render ineffectual the very purpose of the constitutional amendment.” (People v. De Moss, 4 Cal.2d 469, 477 [50 P.2d 1031].)
Further, as the majority point out, errors of the kind asserted here have been held to be nonprejudicial where the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. (People v. Smith, supra, 267 Cal.App.2d 155, 164; People v. Shannon, supra, 260 Cal.App.2d 320, 333; People v. George, 259 Cal.App.2d 424, 431-432 [66 Cal.Rptr. 442]; People v. Thompson, 252 Cal.App.2d 76, 93 [60 Cal.Rptr. 203].)
The testimony of the arresting officer in this case was clear, consistent and convincing. The testimony of appellant, on the other hand, was so inherently improbable in several respects and so self-impeached with contradictions and inconsistencies that when read in its entirety it leads to the unavoidable conclusion that the trial judge was fully justified in regarding it as a poorly woven fabrication although his comment did not characterize it in those terms.
At the hearing on his motion to suppress evidence appellant testified that he “threw away” his bag of groceries when the officer approached him. A few days later at the trial he testified that “the officer took it away from me. He kept it.” On cross-examination appellant was asked what he had in his grocery bag besides the bottle of whiskey. He answered “Toothpaste, soap, and dressing for my hair.” When asked “Isn’t it true that included in that bag were approximately 20 balloons?” he answered, “It would only be if I could look into the bag now to say that that might be true; I don’t know. *591Q. Well, didn’t you know what was in the bag? A. No. Q. Where did you get the bag? A. I bought it. I got it when I bought all that stuff I bought.”
When asked on direct examination whether or not he had been in “possession of any balloon of heroin,” he answered, “No; if I had, I’d have swallowed it.” On redirect appellant gave these further answers: “Q. If you did have something that you shouldn’t have, and it was about the size of that balloon, what would you do with it? A. I would have kept it in my pocket. Q. Or would you have tried to swallow it? A. No. It’s awful big.” In view of this last evidently surprising answer, it is understandable that' defense counsel immediately terminated his redirect examination with the announcement “I have nothing further.”
It is true, of course, that the judge expressed his opinion that the defendant was guilty, but it definitely is not true in my opinion that his comment invaded the province of the jury. On the contrary, in concluding his comment the judge was careful to emphasize the ultimate powers and responsibilities of the jury. He commented that “the reason we have juries is so that we have 12 minds instead of one deciding these cases, and the matter very rightfully is submitted to you.” He made it clear to the jurors that they should feel free to disagree with his comment and that he could “understand how reasonable minds can differ.” Finally, he reiterated the proposition that the defendant was entitled to acquittal unless the jurors were satisfied that his guilt had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ,
The majority acknowledge that “[a] first reading of the trial judge’s comments may indicate that here indeed was an instance where the trial judge assisted the jury ‘in determining what evidence has a bearing on the disputed issues in the case and ... in weighing the evidence.’ (People v. Brock, supra, at p. 650.) Such assistance, we have been told, should not be discouraged. (People v. Ottey, 5 Cal.2d 714, 722-726 [56 P.2d 193].)”
My study of the judge’s comment has confirmed my first impression that what the judge said in this case was reasonably and properly designed to serve the salutary purposes underlying the constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing such comment. The truth that the jury did not construe the judge’s comment as directory in purpose or effect is established by the fact that after hearing it they retired and deliberated some two or three hours before reaching their verdict.
I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 2, 1971, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 14, 1971.