Court Opinion

ID: 9943751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 08:11:08.145269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:59.204048
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
      ___________________________
           No. 02-23-00457-CV
      ___________________________

          IN THE MATTER OF A.F.

   On Appeal from the 323rd District Court
           Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 323-121996-23

  Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant A.F. (Arnold)1 is accused of committing capital murder when he was

15 years old by shooting and attempting to rob his Lyft driver. See Tex. Penal Code

Ann. § 19.03(a)(2). He appeals the juvenile court’s order waiving its jurisdiction and

transferring his case to the criminal courts for his prosecution as an adult.2 See Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. §§ 54.02(a), 56.01(c)(1)(A), (h-1). In his sole appellate issue, Arnold

claims that the transfer order was an abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion because

“the weight of the evidence” regarding his sophistication and maturity “established

[that] TJJD3 was the best placement option” for him. See id. § 54.02(f) (requiring

consideration of four factors, including “the sophistication and maturity of the

child”). Because we reject the merits of his argument as well as the implied premises

upon which it is based, we will affirm.4

                                  I. Governing Law

      A juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a child

to the appropriate district court or criminal district court for criminal proceedings if,

      1
       We use a pseudonym to protect the juvenile’s identity. See Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 56.01(j); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(c).
      2
       When the transfer order was signed, Arnold was 16 years old.
      3
       TJJD refers to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department.
      4
       This interlocutory appeal is subject to an accelerated, 180-day deadline for
disposition. Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a)

                                           2
among other things, “the juvenile court determines [1] that there is probable cause to

believe that the child before the court committed the offense alleged and [2] that

because of the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the child the

welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.” Id. § 54.02(a)(3); see In re

T.S., No. 02-20-00353-CV, 2021 WL 733305, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 25,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). The State has the burden to persuade the juvenile court to

transfer the case by a preponderance of the evidence. In re C.F., No. 02-22-00195-

CV, 2022 WL 4545566, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem.

op.). In deciding whether a preponderance of the evidence supports the second

requirement, the juvenile court must consider four nonexclusive statutory factors:

(1) “whether the alleged offense was against person or property”; (2) the record and

previous history of the juvenile; (3) “the prospects of adequate protection of the

public and the likelihood of the [juvenile’s] rehabilitation” through the juvenile-justice

system; and (4) the juvenile’s “sophistication and maturity.”5 Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 54.02(f); see C.F., 2022 WL 4545566, at *1; In re A.K., No. 02-20-00410-CV, 2021

WL 1803774, at *19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 6, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.);

T.S., 2021 WL 733305, at *2. “[A]ny combination of these [factors] may suffice to

support a waiver of jurisdiction and transfer.” C.F., 2022 WL 4545566, at *1 (citing

A.K., 2021 WL 1803774, at *19).

      5
       We have reordered the statutory factors to match the sequence of our analysis.

                                            3
                               II. Standard of Review

      Generally, a juvenile court’s transfer order is subject to a two-pronged review:

first we review the juvenile court’s specific fact-findings under the traditional

evidentiary-sufficiency standards, then we review the juvenile court’s transfer decision

for an abuse of discretion. In re J.D., No. 02-23-00177-CV, 2023 WL 6152620, at *4

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 21, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.); A.K., 2021 WL

1803774, at *18.

      If the juvenile court’s findings are challenged for factual insufficiency, we

consider all evidence presented to determine if the challenged findings are against the

great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be clearly wrong and unjust.

A.K., 2021 WL 1803774, at *18; T.S., 2021 WL 733305, at *3.

      As for whether the transfer decision was an abuse of discretion, a juvenile court

abuses its discretion if, in light of the evidence presented, the decision is arbitrary or

made without reference to the statutory criteria. J.D., 2023 WL 6152620, at *4; C.F.,

2022 WL 4545566, at *1; A.K., 2021 WL 1803774, at *18; T.S., 2021 WL 733305, at

*3. Because the juvenile court sits as factfinder and evaluates the witnesses in person,

it is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their

testimony. T.S., 2021 WL 733305, at *3. The juvenile court may resolve conflicts in

the evidence, and as long as its transfer decision is supported by some substantive and

probative evidence and reflects “a reasonably principled application of the legislative

criteria,” it is not an abuse of discretion. C.F., 2022 WL 4545566, at *1–2.

                                            4
                                     III. Discussion

       Arnold argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by transferring his

case because the weight of the evidence—specifically, the evidence of his immaturity

and lack of sophistication, one of the four statutory factors—showed that he “would

be better served by . . . being adjudicated through the juvenile system.”         This

argument is flawed.

A.     Arnold’s best interest is not the question.

       First, the juvenile court was not asked to determine whether Arnold would be

“better served” by the juvenile-justice system. Rather, the juvenile court was asked to

determine whether “the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings” and

to consider whether the juvenile-justice system could provide “adequate protection

[for] the public and [a] likelihood of [Arnold’s] rehabilitation.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 54.02(a)(3), (f)(4). Arnold’s best interest was not the question, so even if Arnold

“would be better served” by the juvenile system, that would not have made the

juvenile court’s transfer order an abuse of discretion. We overrule Arnold’s issue to

the extent that it relies on this faulty premise.

B.     Not every statutory factor need favor transfer.

       Another faulty premise seemingly underlying Arnold’s appellate argument is his

claim that the “weight of the evidence” was against transfer based on just one of the

four statutory factors: according to Arnold, the evidence showed that his “immaturity

                                              5
and sophistication would be better served by him being adjudicated through the

juvenile system.”

        But even if the evidence of Arnold’s “sophistication and maturity” weighed

against transfer, that would not necessarily have made transfer an abuse of discretion,

as there are four statutory factors, id. § 54.02(f)(2), and no one factor is vital to the

juvenile court’s decision so long as there is sufficient evidence overall. J.D., 2023 WL

6152620, at *4 (noting that juvenile court “does [not] need to find that the evidence

establishes each factor”); A.K., 2021 WL 1803774, at *23 n.19 (“[T]here need not be

evidence in support of every Section 54.02(f) factor weighing in favor of transfer, so

long as there is sufficient overall evidence to justify the juvenile court’s decision.”); In

re C.A.P., 582 S.W.3d 504, 508 (Tex. App.—Waco 2018, pet. denied) (“The juvenile

court must consider all four factors under Section 54.02(f), but it need not find that all

four factors favor transfer when exercising its discretion to waive jurisdiction.”).

Although the juvenile court was required to consider Arnold’s sophistication and

maturity, see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f)(2), and although its transfer order recited

that it had done so, “[n]othing in the statute elevates this prong any higher than the

other factors that the juvenile court must consider.” A.K., 2021 WL 1803774, at *23

n.19.

        Arnold does not address the other three statutory factors, he does not claim

that the evidence was factually insufficient to weigh those factors in favor of transfer,

and he does not explain why his alleged immaturity overshadowed the evidence

                                             6
supporting transfer so as to make the juvenile court’s order an abuse of discretion.

To the extent that Arnold’s sufficiency challenge relies on the assumption that the

juvenile court could not order transfer unless the sophistication-and-maturity factor

supported it, i.e., that an error “on the sophistication-and-maturity prong c[ould ]not

be harmless,” this court has rejected that premise in the past, and we do so again here.

See id. (rejecting implied argument that allegedly insufficient evidence “on the

sophistication-and-maturity prong cannot be harmless” when appellant challenged

sufficiency of only that prong); T.S., 2021 WL 733305, at *9 (noting that “the trial

court was not required to make a finding regarding the likelihood of [the juvenile’s]

rehabilitation in order to transfer his case” because “the trial court’s findings on the

three other factors . . . which [the juvenile] d[id] not contest the sufficiency of, [we]re

sufficient to support . . . transfer”).

C.     Factually sufficient evidence supported transfer, so there was no abuse of
       discretion.

       Even liberally construing Arnold’s brief as challenging the juvenile court’s

discretion to order transfer based on the sufficiency of the evidence overall, a

principled application of the statutory factors shows that the great weight of the

evidence—of each factor and overall—supported transfer.

       1.     Factor 1: Offense Against the Person

       Capital murder is an offense against the person—the first statutory factor. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f)(1); Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 19.03(a)(2) (defining

                                            7
offense of capital murder within Title 5 of the Penal Code), 19.01–22.12 (entitling

Title 5 “Offenses Against the Person”). And there was ample evidence to support a

finding of probable cause that Arnold not only committed this offense against the

person but that he did so by killing an innocent, seemingly random stranger. See Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a)(3), (f)(1).

      The officer who investigated the murder testified that, on the night of July 4,

2022, the victim—a man in his sixties—was found in the driver’s seat of his car with a

gunshot wound to his head.6 The officer found a 40-caliber cartridge casing in the

vehicle, and two witnesses told him that they had observed “a black male and a black

female exit from the rear of the vehicle” and “run away.”7

      The officer later learned that the victim had been driving for Lyft that night,

and using data from the victim’s phone and information from Lyft, he was able to

identify the victim’s final Lyft customer:8    C.W. (Courtney).9    When the police

interviewed Courtney, she admitted that she had ordered a Lyft to go to a block party,

      6
       The victim initially survived, but he later succumbed to his gunshot wound
and died.
      7
       Surveillance video was consistent with the witnesses’ statements.
      8
       Lyft noted that the name and phone number associated with the account had
been changed on the night of the murder. Later, it was determined that the changes
were made approximately 20 minutes after the murder.
      9
       Although the record suggests that Courtney was an adult when the murder
occurred, we refer to her using a pseudonym out of an abundance of caution.

                                          8
and she stated that the person riding with her had pulled out a gun, demanded the

driver’s vehicle, then shot the driver in the head. Courtney initially named a female as

the shooter,10 but later, she admitted that Arnold was the shooter.

      Further investigation revealed that Courtney and Arnold had been dating,11 and

digital records corroborated several details of Courtney’s story, including her

statements that they had been seeking a ride to the block party that night and that they

had visited Arnold’s aunt’s house after the murder.

      Courtney also notified the police that, a few hours before the murder, Arnold

had photographed himself “holding the weapon that was used in the offense” and

that he had posted the photograph on Instagram.             The police recovered the

photograph from Instagram, and they further discovered Instagram messages in

which Arnold had attempted to sell a 40-caliber gun just a few days after the murder.

      Although Arnold initially denied any connection to the murder, he later

admitted to being with Courtney that night and riding in the victim’s Lyft. Arnold

claimed, though, that Courtney “did everything”: that she had the gun, she planned

the robbery, she shot the driver, and she used his Instagram account to sell her gun.

       The female that Courtney initially identified as the shooter had been in
      10

custody at the time of the murder. Courtney later told the police that she had lied
because she was scared of Arnold.
      11
        The police discovered a romantic photo of Arnold in Courtney’s room, and
they observed her making frequent calls to Arnold’s mother’s phone number.

                                           9
       Arnold concedes that the above evidence was sufficient to support “the

juvenile court[’s] determin[ation] that there [wa]s probable cause to believe that

[Arnold] committed the offense alleged” and that the capital murder was committed

“against [a] person.” See id. § 54.02(a)(3), (f)(1). By statute, “greater weight in favor of

transfer [is] given to offenses against the person.” Id. § 54.02(f)(1). Particularly in

light of the “seriousness of the offense” committed against the person—Arnold’s

allegedly murdering a random stranger while the stranger was providing him a service

on a holiday—the juvenile court had factually sufficient evidence to weigh this factor

heavily in favor of transfer. See id. § 54.02(a)(3), (f)(1).

       2.     Factor 2: Record and History

       There was also evidence that this was not Arnold’s first weapons-related

incident—another statutory consideration. See id. § 54.02(f)(3). In fact, when the

murder occurred, Arnold was three months into a six-month probation for unlawful

carrying of a weapon. His juvenile probation officer testified that, in the unlawful-

carrying incident, an individual had been shot in the leg, and Arnold had been found

with a gun tucked inside his clothing.

       The probation officer described another weapons-related incident that Arnold

had been involved in as well. A few weeks after the alleged murder, and while Arnold

was still on probation, he was shot in a dispute over a female. And of course, Arnold

had photographed himself with a gun on the night of the murder, while he was still on

probation for unlawful carrying of a weapon.

                                              10
      Given Arnold’s record of unlawfully carrying a weapon and his history of gun-

related incidents, the juvenile court had factually sufficient evidence to weigh “the

record and previous history of [Arnold]” in favor of transfer. See id.

      3.     Factor 3: Public Safety and Rehabilitation12

      Arnold’s behavior during his probation also shed light on the third statutory

factor: the likelihood of his rehabilitation and the threat to the public if the case

remained in the juvenile system. See id. § 54.02(f)(4). As part of Arnold’s six-month

probation for unlawful carrying of a weapon, he received a rehabilitative “wraparound

service” that included electronic monitoring, therapy, and community service.

Although he had completed some of these services, Arnold’s probation officer

testified that he had “struggled” with other probation requirements, that he had not

completed the required community-service hours, that he had missed appointments,

that he had failed to attend school, and that he had tested positive for marijuana at

least twice.13 Plus, it was during Arnold’s time on probation—while he was actively

receiving rehabilitative services—that he allegedly committed capital murder. The

probation officer thus stated that the juvenile system had “exhausted all of [its]

      12
         In a single sentence in the argument portion of his brief, Arnold alleges that
“there were sufficient safeguards in place for the public and a high probability of
rehabilitation for [Arnold] by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently
available to the juvenile court.” He does not elaborate on this statement or explain
what evidence supports his position.

       The probation officer testified that Arnold had tested positive twice, but the
      13

psychologist’s records indicated that Arnold had tested positive four times.

                                           11
services for [Arnold].” He did not recommend further probation for Arnold and

opined that the only option left was confinement.

       The psychologist who had forensically evaluated Arnold testified to the

contrary. She opined that Arnold could participate in rehabilitation because she was

not aware of him having “been aggressive with any authority figures.” She admitted,

though, that she had not taken the capital murder into account in her evaluation, and

when taking the murder into account, she conceded that Arnold “was a high risk to

potentially harm people again” and was “at risk to commit some sort of violent act in

the future.”

       The juvenile court, as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight

to be given each witness’s testimony, was free to believe the probation officer’s

testimony that Arnold was not amenable to rehabilitation. See T.S., 2021 WL 733305,

at *8 (recognizing that, as the factfinder, “the juvenile court’s role was to evaluate the

witnesses, judge their credibility, determine who to believe or disbelieve, and weigh

the evidence and any inconsistencies”). Given the evidence of Arnold’s gun-related

incidents and alleged commission of murder while on probation, the juvenile court

could have rationally concluded that the juvenile-justice system’s services were

inadequate to protect the public.      There was thus factually sufficient, probative

evidence that this factor weighed in favor of transfer. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 54.02(f)(4).

                                           12
       4.     Factor 4: Sophistication and Maturity

       The same is true of the statutory factor that Arnold challenges on appeal: his

sophistication and maturity. See id. § 54.02(f)(2). Although Arnold claims that this

factor weighed against transfer, there was conflicting evidence, and the juvenile court

was free to resolve the conflict by believing the evidence in favor of transfer. See T.S.,

2021 WL 733305, at *8.

       The purpose of inquiring into a juvenile’s sophistication and maturity “is to

determine whether he appreciates the nature and effect of his voluntary actions and

whether they were right or wrong.” A.K., 2021 WL 1803774, at *19. Here, the

psychologist testified that Arnold had a “very limited” ability to think abstractly, that

he was slower than his peers to process new information, and that he was vulnerable

to manipulation. She expressed concern about Arnold being adjudicated as an adult

due to his “overall IQ,” his “verbal abilities,” and “his [in]ability to think abstractly.”

       But the psychologist’s report—which was admitted into evidence—stated that

Arnold “d[id] not have a mental illness or an intellectual disability which substantially

impair[ed] his capacity to understand the allegations against him . . . and to assist in his

own defense.” And the State presented evidence that Arnold had the maturity to

appreciate the crime he had allegedly committed and the sophistication to try to avoid

blame. It showed that Arnold had fled the scene of the crime, had attempted to sell

his gun after the offense, had initially denied involvement, and had later blamed the

murder on Courtney. The juvenile court noted as much, explaining at the end of the

                                             13
transfer hearing that “[t]he amount of planning that went into this offense, the

seriousness of the offense, and [Arnold’s] efforts to escape culpability of this offense

[we]re not consistent with what juveniles do, [but were] very consistent with adult

criminal behavior.”

       In other words, although Arnold is correct that there was evidence of his

immaturity and lack of sophistication, that evidence was controverted and “subject to

interpretation by the juvenile court.” See C.F., 2022 WL 4545566, at *7 (affirming

transfer order when 16-year-old allegedly committed capital murder and other crimes

and noting that juvenile court could resolve conflicts in evidence related to the

juvenile’s sophistication and maturity).       Much like in C.F.,14 the psychologist’s

testimony regarding the juvenile’s alleged immaturity and low IQ conflicted with the

evidence that he had “demonstrated sophistication through his actions,” including his

“efforts to try to shift blame from himself and to avoid the consequences of his

actions.” See id. at *6–7 (rejecting argument that transfer was abuse of discretion

when there was conflicting evidence of maturity and amenability to rehabilitation,

even though psychologist testified that juvenile had a low IQ, that he was immature,

and that he would likely benefit from juvenile-justice services). As we held there, the

juvenile court was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, and it had the discretion

to resolve the conflicts in the evidence in favor of transfer. See id. at *7.

       14
         Significant portions of Arnold’s appellate brief are nearly identical to the brief
filed for the appellant in C.F.

                                             14
      5.     Overall: Sufficient Evidence; No Abuse of Discretion

      Ultimately, then, factually sufficient evidence of the four statutory factors

supported the juvenile court’s conclusion that, based on “the seriousness of the

offense alleged [and] the background of the child[,] the welfare of the community

require[d] criminal proceedings.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a)(3), (f). The

juvenile court was not required to deny transfer simply because the psychologist

testified that Arnold was unsophisticated and immature. Because there was probative,

factually sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s transfer decision, and

because that decision reflected a principled application of the statutory factors, the

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. See C.F., 2022 WL 4545566, at *1–2, 7.

We overrule Arnold’s sole issue.

                                      IV. Conclusion

      Having overruled Arnold’s sole issue, we affirm the juvenile court’s transfer

order. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

                                                       /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                                       Bonnie Sudderth
                                                       Chief Justice

Delivered: February 22, 2024

                                            15