Court Opinion

ID: 9586790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:15:06.175618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:51.450983
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
It is contended by the plaintiff in error on motion for rehearing that, assuming for the sake of argument that the right of action did vest in the plaintiffs at the time of the damage, such right of action was extinguished in the plaintiffs by their subsequent conveyance of the property to a third person prior to the institution of the suit.
This contention is without merit. While a chose in action arising from a tort is assignable where it involves, directly or indirectly, a right of property (Code § 85-1805; Sullivan v. Curling, 149 Ga. 96, 99 SE 533, 5 ALR 124), such right of action, involving property, does not “run with the land” (Allen v. Macon, Dublin &c. R. Co., 107 Ga. 838 (3), 33 SE 696); and there*471fore does not pass to a subsequent purchaser by deed in the absence of a specific assignment thereof. Patellis v. Tanner, 199 Ga. 304, 314 (34 SE2d 84); Martin v. Medlin, 83 Ga. App. 589, 593 (64 SE2d 73); Swinson v. Jones, 72 Ga. App. 147, 149 (33 SE2d 376).
The cases relied upon by the plaintiff in error in support of its contention are not in point here. In Evans v. Brown, 196 Ga. 634 (27 SE2d 300), it was held that the conveyance of an estate in fee simple vested in the grantee all of the grantor’s rights as to the property, including the right of suit for breach of a conditional limitation contained in the deed, where the breach occurred prior to the conveyance. This case did not involve the assignment of a chose in action arising from a tort involving property. In the case of Sullivan v. Curling, 149 Ga. 96, supra, it was simply held that the allegations of the petition were sufficient, in the absence of appropriate special demurrers, to allege an assignment of the chose in action, as against general demurrer.

Rehearing denied.