Court Opinion

ID: 9364353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 01:00:29.858371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:37.594992
License: Public Domain

Case: 19-50343        Document: 00516614756             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/18/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                                      FILED
                                                                                January 18, 2023
                                        No. 19-50343                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                      Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Elizabeth Valles,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 3:19-CV-58
                               USDC No. 3:16-CR-960-1

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Jolly and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
   E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge:*
          In August of 2016, Elizabeth Valles, federal prisoner #72271-380,
   pleaded guilty to drug importation and was sentenced to 70 months of
   imprisonment. After sentencing, she failed to self-surrender to the Bureau of
   Prisons as ordered by the district court. Valles absconded, and while she was

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 19-50343      Document: 00516614756          Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                    No. 19-50343

   a fugitive, her one-year period to file a 29 U.S.C. § 2255 motion expired.
   Valles remained a fugitive until she was arrested in June of 2018.
          Eight months after her arrest, Valles filed this pro se § 2255 motion
   alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. She requested an
   evidentiary hearing. In addition, Valles requested that the district court
   equitably toll the limitations period, asserting that she was “unavailable” to
   file a timely § 2255 motion because she had failed to self-surrender. The
   district court ordered Valles to show cause as to why it should not dismiss
   her motion as time barred. In response to the district court’s order, Valles
   explained that “she had a nervous breakdown after her sentencing and . . .
   eventually self-surrendered but not until 17 months after sentencing causing
   an extraordinary circumstance.” Additionally, she urged that when a
   defendant absconds, “the time of the absence . . . shall not be computed as
   any par[t] to the period within which the action must be brought.”
          The district court dismissed her § 2255 motion as time barred without
   holding an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the motion was not filed
   within one year of the date the judgment became final, nor had Valles
   demonstrated it was timely under any other statutory provision. The district
   court further declined to equitably toll the limitations period because, in its
   view, Valles’s nervous breakdown was not an extraordinary circumstance.
   The district court took special note that Valles failed to explain (1) how her
   mental illness prevented her from pursuing her legal rights or (2) why she
   waited over eight months after her arrest to file her § 2255 motion.
   Accordingly, the district court dismissed the motion with prejudice—and
   thereby denied Valles’s request for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
   equitable tolling.

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          This court, however, granted a certificate of appealability (COA).
   Thus, Valles now appeals that dismissal, contending that she was entitled to
   an evidentiary hearing with respect to her claim for equitable tolling.
                                           I
          The question today is not whether Valles is entitled to equitable tolling
   on the merits; instead, the precise question is whether the district court erred
   in denying Valles’s claim without an evidentiary hearing. We review the
   district court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cervantes, 132
   F.3d 1006, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998).
                                           II
          We begin with the premise that not every petitioner who seeks relief
   pursuant to § 2255 is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. A hearing is
   unnecessary when “the motion and the files and records of the case
   conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
   2255(b). This court has construed this provision to mean that an evidentiary
   hearing is not required when “either (1) the movant’s claims are clearly
   frivolous or based upon unsupported generalizations, or (2) the movant
   would not be entitled to relief as a matter of law, even if his factual assertions
   were true.” United States v. Harrison, 910 F.3d 824, 826–27 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (citing United States v. Guerra, 588 F.2d 519, 521 (5th Cir. 1979)). “A
   defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his § 2255 motion only if
   [he] presents ‘independent indicia of the likely merit of [his] allegations.’”
   United States v. Reed, 719 F.3d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States
   v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 442 (5th Cir. 2008)).
          Thus, to determine whether Valles was entitled to an evidentiary
   hearing, we must first consider the requirements applicable to the underlying
   relief sought, which, in her case, is equitable tolling. Valles was entitled to
   equitable tolling only if she showed that (1) she had been pursuing her rights

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                                          No. 19-50343

   diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance outside of her
   control stood in her way and prevented timely filing. See United States v.
   Wheaten, 826 F.3d 843, 851 (5th Cir. 2016). The extraordinary-circumstance
   prong incorporates a causation requirement; the movant must show that the
   extraordinary circumstance caused the untimely filing. See, e.g., San Martin
   v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011). This court has recognized
   that mental incompetency may qualify as an “extraordinary circumstance”
   that supports tolling of a limitations period. See Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d
   710, 715 (5th Cir. 1999).
           On appeal, Valles points to several facts supporting her request for an
   evidentiary hearing including: this court’s grant of a certificate of
   appealability and the district court ordering her to undergo mental health
   treatment. But, as the district court correctly recognized, Valles’s conclusory
   allegation of a nervous breakdown, without any detail regarding how that
   claimed condition affected her ability or caused her inability to file a timely §
   2255 motion, is insufficient to support equitable tolling or require an
   evidentiary hearing. Reed, 719 F.3d at 373. 1 Instead, her response contained
   only the “unsupported generalization” that her “nervous breakdown”
   constitutes an extraordinary circumstance that “should allow for equitable

           1
             The relevant portion of Valles’s response to the district court’s show-cause order
   reads as follows:
           The Court is correct that a Section 2255 motion is subject to a one-year limitations
           period. The Movant under Coleman v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402-3 (5th Cir.
           1999). There are circumstances that include situations in which a movant is
           prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting [her] rights. In the case of the
           Movant she had a nervous breakdown after her sentencing and called the Probation
           officer. The Movant eventually self-surrendered but not until 17 months after
           sentencing causing an extraordinary circumstance and this should allow for
           equitable tolling for the Movant to be able to bring her 2255 Motion.

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                                    No. 19-50343

   tolling.” Id. (“Conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, do not
   support the request for an evidentiary hearing.”). Further, Valles’s
   contention that absconding tolls the limitations is meritless because delays of
   a petitioner’s own making do not qualify for equitable tolling. In re Wilson,
   442 F.3d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
          Further, Valles has not shown that she pursued her rights diligently,
   as required for equitable tolling. See Wheaten, 826 F.3d at 851. Thus, even if
   the alleged “extraordinary circumstance” of a nervous breakdown prevented
   Valles from filing until she was taken into custody, she has still failed to
   explain the nearly eight-month delay between her arrest and her filing,
   demonstrating that Valles did not act with reasonable diligence. See, e.g.,
   Stroman v. Thaler, 603 F.3d 299, 302–03 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding
   non-diligent a § 2254 petitioner who filed his petition seven weeks after
   learning that his state habeas application had been denied).
          Finally, Valles argues that the limitations period should not be applied
   too harshly because this effort was her first § 2255 motion and her pro se
   submissions in the district court are entitled to liberal construction. Bledsue
   v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 1999). Although she correctly states
   both general principles, she is not convincing in demonstrating that they are
   sufficient to establish an entitlement to an evidentiary hearing.
          Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion
   in denying Valles’s § 2255 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing
   because Valles proffered purely conclusory assertions and unsupported
   generalizations regarding her entitlement to equitable tolling. Finding no
   error, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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                                         No. 19-50343

   James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
           Our court has long agreed with other courts and commentators that
   § 2255(b) must be construed literally, “to mean that a hearing must be held
   ‘(u)nless “the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that
   the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”’” Ferrara v. United States, 547 F.2d 861,
   863 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting § 2255(b)). To that effect, this court has
   instructed that, after reviewing the case’s record in its entirety, a hearing may
   only be denied when “(1) the movant’s claims are clearly frivolous or based
   upon unsupported generalizations, or (2) the movant would not be entitled
   to relief as a matter of law, even if h[er] factual assertions were true.” United
   States v. Allen, 918 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v.
   Harrison, 910 F.3d 824, 826-27 (5th Cir. 2018)). The majority, like the
   district court below, 1 fails to heed § 2255(b)’s command to review “the
   motion and files and records of the case,” instead deciding whether Valles’s
   has made a sufficient case for relief based on the assertions in her pro se
   motion alone. Had the majority reviewed the record, it could not conclude
   with the certainty required to deny an evidentiary hearing that Valles is not
   entitled to relief. Because I would vacate and remand for an evidentiary
   hearing, I dissent.
           The record discloses ample evidence that Valles may be entitled to
   equitable tolling. As the majority acknowledges, mental incompetency has
   been recognized as an “extraordinary circumstance” that supports tolling of
   a limitations period. Supra at 4 (citing Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 715
   (5th Cir. 1999)). It also may satisfy equitable tolling’s second prong because
   a petitioner “simply cannot pursue [her] legal rights during such a period [of

           1
             The district court order denying Valles’s petition as time-barred stated that “it
   appears from the face of [Valles’s] § 2255 Motion that it is untimely and that she is not
   entitled to equitable tolling.”

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                                    No. 19-50343

   mental incompetency].” Fisher, 174 F.3d at 715. Thus, if the record contains
   minimal evidence of mental incompetence, Valles is entitled to an evidentiary
   hearing on her motion. And in fact, the record in Valles’s case shows that she
   suffered sustained and chronic mental illness that rose to a level that, in the
   eyes of both the district court and the Government, required intervention.
   Valles’s PSR noted that she had been experiencing “symptoms of depression
   and anxiety,” for which she voluntarily sought mental health counseling at
   the El Paso Behavioral Center (EPBC). At EPBC, Valles attended counseling
   sessions four times per week. She eventually stopped attending EPBC
   because she lacked childcare for her children, one of whom suffers from
   depression and has attempted suicide. During the presentence interview, she
   was encouraged to return to her counseling sessions. As part of Valles’s
   imprisonment, the district court recommended that she receive mental
   health treatment while in custody, and ordered as a special condition of
   Valles’s supervised release that she participate in a mental health treatment
   program. This is enough to establish that the record fails to “conclusively
   show” that Valles is not entitled to equitable tolling. § 2255(b). See United
   States v. Reed, 719 F.3d 369, 373 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that the movant’s
   burden of showing independent indicia of reliability “must be understood
   practically, in the context of the claim being presented”). The majority faults
   Valles for failing to prove, at this stage, that she is ultimately entitled to
   equitable tolling. But that is the wrong inquiry. The question is not whether
   Valles has established her entitlement to equitable tolling, but whether the
   record supports a prima facie case for relief thus warranting an evidentiary
   hearing, after which the fact-intensive question of equitable tolling may be
   properly decided. See United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 678 F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir.
   2012) (“[W]e can neither credit nor refute Rivas’s allegation of ineffective
   assistance on this record. To determine [that], we would benefit from

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                                        No. 19-50343

   additional facts that should be determined at an evidentiary hearing in the
   district court.”).
          Under the statute, the district court should have held an evidentiary
   hearing on her claim. Because it failed to, I would vacate and remand for such
   a hearing. I respectfully dissent.

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