Court Opinion

ID: 9735436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:15:26.438391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:58.623655
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Workers’ Compensation Judge properly penalized Ronald Johnakin by the forfeiture of over eight months of interest due him because of his failure to timely file a brief after the close of the record and within the time frame prescribed by the WCJ. While not excusing Johnakin’s failure to file his brief, I do not believe that the WCJ should have allowed that failure to delay the disposition of this case for over eight months, and, accordingly, I do not believe that Johna-kin’s failure can be considered the cause of the delay.
It is important to recall that allowing Johnakin to collect the interest due him is not tantamount to charging the City of Philadelphia (Employer) for the delay. Interest payments compensate the claimant for the loss of the use of the funds during the contest. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 62 Pa.Cmwlth. 424, 437 A.2d 771 (1981). They are not a penalty to the employer; rather interest payments put the claimant in the same position as if no contest had been made. Id. Thus the question before the Court is not which party should be forced to pay for the delay. Rather, the question is whether Joh-nakin should be penalized. Notably, the Court in Fisk v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (General Electric), 169 Pa.Cmwlth. 542, 633 A.2d 1305 (1993), held that the imposition of penalties for delay in payment of compensation was improper against an employer who, among other things, failed to timely file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law within the time frame that the referee prescribed. The Court affirmed the Board’s decision to reverse the referee’s imposition of penalties because no evidence was presented to establish that the employer violated the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Johnakin’s failure to file a brief cannot be considered the cause of the delay within the meaning of Section 435(d)(iii) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, added by the Act of February 8, 1972, P.L. 25, 77 P.S. § 991(d)(iii), because the WCJ should never have allowed that failure to delay the proceeding. The WCJ certainly should not have allowed it to delay the proceeding in excess of eight months. Instead, the WCJ was authorized and empowered to dispose of the proceeding without further notice or consideration of a brief from Johnakin, and that is all that the WCJ should have done. That is precisely the result provided for in the Board’s regulations at 34 Pa.Code § 131.101, which state in pertinent part as follows: “Failure to comply with this subsection [concerning the failure to timely file briefs] will result in disposition of the proceeding without further notice or consideration of the brief or findings of fact of the party failing to comply.”
As the majority correctly notes, a WCJ has “broad powers and responsibilities to expeditiously conduct and dispose of cases.” Miller v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Fischbach & Moore), 139 Pa.Cmwlth. 393, 590 A.2d 1325, 1326 (1991). I cannot agree, however, that a WCJ correctly exercises those powers and responsibilities by allowing a proceeding to languish over eight months and then pe*955nalizing the claimant for the delay. Moreover, no evidence was presented to show that the claimant violated the Workers’ Compensation Act in failing to file his brief within the time prescribed by the WCJ. Fisk. For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.