Court Opinion

ID: 9964445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 22:15:53.807288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:28.413987
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Detention of

W.V.,                                             No. 85322-8-I

                                                  DIVISION ONE

                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION

        CHUNG, J. — W.V. appeals his commitment to 14 days of involuntary

mental health evaluation and treatment. He claims the evidence was too remote

to support the court’s findings and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

support the court’s conclusions that he was gravely disabled and that he posed a

substantial risk of serious harm to others. Because ample, recent, evidence

supports the trial court’s decision, we affirm.

                                       FACTS

        For approximately two years, starting when W.V. was approximately 16

years old, W.V.’s family observed him experience episodes of violent behaviors

accompanied by grandiose, delusional thinking. According to W.V.’s mother, she

began to notice W.V.’s “odd” behaviors, including lying to “[see] if he could,”

around W.V.’s freshman year of high school. During these episodes, W.V.’s

family described his behavior as disconnected from reality.
No. 85322-8-I/2

       In August 2022, W.V. “came after” his mother, father, and 11-year-old

brother with a kitchen knife in their home. W.V.’s family hid by barricading

themselves in a room. W.V. tried to get into the room while “yelling [and]

screaming” and attempting to stab through the door. According to his father, W.V.

told the responding officers that he “was the Lord and a bunch of stuff -- religious

stuff.” W.V. was arrested and charged with felony domestic violence and

hospitalized for nine days in the psychiatric unit of St. Joseph Hospital. W.V. was

diagnosed with bipolar disorder while in the hospital. Since his diagnosis, W.V.

has denied that he has a mental illness and has refused to voluntarily seek help.

       Another incident occurred on March 24, 2023, when W.V. was 18 years

old. W.V.’s escalating behavior prompted his mother, who was home with him, to

run downstairs and lock herself in the bathroom within her bedroom, closing both

doors. From the bathroom, she called W.V.’s father, who was at work, to ask him

to send W.V.’s grandfather to the house for help. From outside the bedroom,

W.V. screamed that his mother “should be decapitated,” that he was “the Lord,”

and that “social media has been raping him.”

       When his grandfather arrived, W.V. claimed the home belonged to him

and that he was going to sue his parents to take it over, and demanded his

grandfather leave. The grandfather told W.V. that he might go back to jail if he

did not calm down. W.V. responded that his grandfather would go to jail because

he and W.V.’s grandmother “bought illegal drugs and physically abused us, or,

me.”1 W.V. then picked up a spray bottle of cleaning product and threatened to

1 W.V.’s grandfather denies ever purchasing drugs or abusing W.V.

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spray it in his grandfather’s eyes. W.V. tried to kick his grandfather, the

grandfather tried to block W.V.’s foot, and W.V. punched him on the back of his

head. W.V.’s mother had come out of the room and witnessed W.V. strike his

grandfather. W.V. then sprayed her in the face with the cleaning solution and hit

her in the arm. She called 911. To the responding police, W.V. expressed that he

was “the Lord” and “the Christ.”

        W.V. was taken into custody and booked into Whatcom County Jail for

assault in the fourth degree, with a domestic violence designation. 2 On April 3,

2023, a designated crisis responder (DCR) investigated W.V. and “decided not to

detain [W.V.] for evaluation and treatment.” On April 12, W.V.’s father filed a

Petition for Initial Detention, requesting the court overrule the DCR’s decision not

to detain W.V. A Whatcom County Superior Court judge granted the petition on

April 18, 2023, finding probable cause to detain W.V. for 72 hours of involuntary

evaluation and treatment following his release from jail.

        Pursuant to the order, W.V. was admitted to North Sound Telecare

Evaluation & Treatment facility (North Sound) in Skagit County on April 20, 2023.

On April 25, 2023, W.V.’s social worker and physician at North Sound filed a

petition to commit him for 14 days of involuntary treatment. A hearing was held

the next day. The trial court heard testimony from W.V.’s father, grandfather,

mother, and a North Sound social worker. The court granted the petition, finding

W.V. was gravely disabled and that he presented a substantial risk of serious

harm to others.

2 It was also ordered by a court that W.V. could not return to live with his parents and brother for

an unknown amount of time after this incident.
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No. 85322-8-I/4

        W.V. appeals.

                                           DISCUSSION

        A person can be involuntary committed to 14 days of inpatient treatment if

the State proves by a preponderance of evidence that, as a result of a behavioral

health disorder, the person is gravely disabled or presents a substantial risk of

serious harm to themselves, others, or property. RCW 71.05.240 (4)(a); In re

Det. of T.C., 11 Wn. App. 2d 51, 56, 450 P.3d 1230 (2019).

        We review a trial court’s commitment order for whether the trial court’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, and whether the

findings support the conclusions of law. 3 In re Det. of A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d 115,

125, 498 P.3d 1006 (2021), review denied, 199 Wn.2d at 1009, 506 P.3d 645

(2022). Findings that are unchallenged by the appellant are treated as verities on

appeal. State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 697, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997).

        The trial court considered testimony regarding W.V.’s history of recent

episodes and found him gravely disabled pursuant to RCW 71.05.020(25)(b) due

to “a decrease in his routine functioning and ability to manage his behaviors” and

evidence that W.V. would not “be taking care of his routine needs” if released

from the evaluation and treatment facility. The court also found that W.V. had no

income and no residence to which to return. Further, the trial court found W.V.

presented a likelihood of serious harm to others due to the March 24 assault of

3 While the 14-day order of commitment has since expired, W.V.’s appeal is not moot. “An
individual’s release from detention does not render an appeal moot where collateral
consequences flow from the determination authorizing such detention.” In re Det of M.K., 168 Wn.
App. 621, 626, 630, 279 P.3d 897 (2012) (involuntary commitment order was not moot, as court
could provide effective relief by vacating the order “to ensure that a trial court will not rely on it in
subsequent involuntary commitment determinations”).
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his grandfather, the evidence provided by his father, grandfather, and mother

regarding other incidents of violence that were “timely enough to be a danger to

others,” as well as violent behaviors that placed his family members in fear of

harm.

          W.V. does not assign error to the trial court’s findings of fact, which are,

therefore, verities on appeal. Rather, W.V. challenges the trial court’s

determinations both that he was gravely disabled and that there was a likelihood

of serious harm to others. We address each in turn.

     I.          Gravely disabled

          The court found W.V. gravely disabled pursuant to RCW 71.05.020(25)(b),

which defines “gravely disabled”’ as

          a condition in which a person, as a result of a behavioral health
          disorder . . . (b) manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning
          evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional
          control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is
          essential for his or her health or safety.

          As an initial matter, W.V. argues that the evidence the court considered to

make its findings was not “sufficiently recent to sustain the commitment order.”

W.V. argues that the evidence of his grave disability is too remote because his

social worker did not testify to seeing any “overt symptoms” during his six days at

North Sound. Further, W.V. argues the evidence was insufficient because of the

lack of evidence of dangerous behavior or decompensation during the month

preceding the hearing.

          W.V.’s claim ignores that for the purpose of determining “whether a person

is gravely disabled, [or] presents a likelihood of serious harm,” “recent” means

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“the period of time not exceeding three years prior to” the hearing on the petition

for involuntary commitment. RCW 71.05.245(1), (3). Instead, W.V. compares his

case to In re Det. of LaBelle, where the court reversed the trial court’s conclusion

that appellant Trueblood had a grave disability because the evidence provided by

his doctor was too remote and insufficient, and the testimony of his social worker

was insufficient. 107 Wn.2d 196, 217-18, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). The social

worker’s recent observations included that Trueblood complained of feeling

threatened and persecuted, but that testimony proved only that Trueblood still

suffered from a mental disorder, not that he was gravely disabled. LaBelle, 107

Wn.2d at 216-17. Trueblood’s doctor testified that 2-3 months prior to the

commitment hearing, Trueblood appeared to be “decompensating,” but the

doctor’s testimony “suggest[ed] that Trueblood was cognitively oriented and

intact” by the time of the hearing. LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 217.

       The same cannot be said for W.V. at the time of his hearing. W.V.’s social

worker testified that at the time of the hearing, W.V.’s “insight [spoke]” to denial of

his mental illness. He told her that he was only at North Sound “because of his

parents.” She further testified that she believed W.V. was at a “very pivotal time”

to address his illness, noting that if the present opportunity to treat him was

missed, “the decline would continue to escalate and I would be concerned for his

safety and others around him.” The social worker testified that W.V.’s issues with

school and social relations, sleep, memory loss possibly associated with mania,

isolation, delusional and grandiose thinking, low frustration tolerance leading to

volatile situations “with any stressors,” lack of motivation, and mood

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No. 85322-8-I/7

dysregulation contributed to her belief that W.V. would continue to decompensate

if he did not continue prescribed treatment. Thus, unlike in LaBelle, testimony

supported that W.V. continued to demonstrate severe deterioration in his routine

function and inability to care for his own health and safety at the time of the

hearing.

       The court’s findings, which are verities on appeal, support the trial court’s

conclusion that he was gravely disabled.

     II.      Substantial risk of serious harm to others

       The court also concluded that W.V. presented a substantial risk of serious

harm to others under RCW 71.05.020(37)(a)(ii), which states that a substantial

risk that “physical harm will be inflicted by a person upon another as evidenced

by behavior which has caused such harm or which places another person or

persons in reasonable fear of sustaining such harm.” The court supported this

conclusion with W.V.’s historical diagnosis of bipolar disorder, for which he was

prescribed Zyprexa, an antipsychotic; his family’s testimony that “some things set

him off in behavior that is a danger to others”; and evidence that W.V. assaulted

his grandfather.

       W.V. argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he posed a

substantial risk of serious harm to others because he did not present a “current

danger” at the time of his commitment. According to W.V., “[t]he evidence of

dangerous behavior . . . was all more than a month old at the time of the

hearing,” as he had not displayed violent behaviors while in jail and at North

Sound. W.V. specifically argues that the March 24 incident was too remote

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No. 85322-8-I/8

because it occurred “slightly more than a month before the hearing on April 26,”

and that despite “the trying circumstances and constant surveillance of his

incarceration and hospitalization, no evidence was presented of any similar

incidents in the intervening time.” Thus, he contends, evidence did not amount to

“a ‘recent overt act . . . which has caused harm or creates a reasonable

apprehension of dangerousness.’ ” Again, we disagree.

       As with the evidence of grave disability, the evidence the trial court

considered in determining there was a substantial risk of serious harm was not

too remote because it occurred within the three years prior to the hearing. See

RCW 71.05.245(3). Moreover, “ ‘the practical effect of being placed in the

hospital will usually eliminate the ‘imminence’ of one’s dangerousness.’ ” LaBelle,

107 Wn.2d at 203 (quoting In re Det. of Harris, 98 Wn.2d 276, 284, 654 P.2d 109

(1982)) (determining that an individual who is hospitalized for treatment prior to

their commitment hearing need to present an imminent, or present danger of

serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for one’s essential health

and safety need to support a grave disability finding). Requiring “imminence”

after or while a person is hospitalized for mental health treatment at the time of

his commitment hearing, “would effectively invalidate commitment as soon as it

occurs and would be inconsistent with the State’s interest in confining those who

pose a substantial risk of harm to themselves or others.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at

203; see Harris, 98 Wn.2d at 284.

       Here, the trial court considered evidence of multiple incidents of W.V.’s

behavior that caused physical harm to others, and placed others in reasonable

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fear of such harm, all of which were sufficiently recent as they occurred in the

three years prior to the hearing. The evidence included the incidents in March

2023, when he struck his grandfather and sprayed his mother in the face with

cleaning solution, December 2022, when W.V. struck his father, and 2021, when

he punched his mother in the face. This evidence was sufficient to support the

conclusion that W.V. presented a substantial risk of serious harm to others.

       Based on the record, the trial court did not err by determining that W.V.

was gravely disabled and posed a substantial risk of harm to others. The court’s

conclusions satisfy RCW 71.05.240 and properly established grounds for a 14-

day involuntary detention.

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

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