Court Opinion

ID: 9710291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:06:05.917928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:55.678025
License: Public Domain

GERKEN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent.
Today’s decision makes a significant change in the well-founded rule that the “burden of proving a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification is upon the party seeking modification.” Rousseau v. Gesinger, 330 N.W.2d 522, 525 (S.D.1983). This “change in circumstances” is nearly always measured in dollars and cents. Lambertz v. Lambertz, 375 N.W.2d 645 (S.D.1985); Moller v. Moller, 356 N.W.2d 909 (S.D.1984); Herndon v. Herndon, 305 N.W.2d 917 (S.D.1981); Myhre v. Myhre, 296 N.W.2d 905 (S.D.1980); Guindon v. Guindon, 256 N.W.2d 894 (S.D.1977). The majority, equates the recipient spouse’s remarriage with an improved financial or economic condition, thereby mandating the termination of alimony in all but the most “extraordinary” of “circumstances.” I disagree with this conclusion for two principal reasons.
I do not believe remarriage is necessarily more conclusive proof of the recipient spouse’s improved financial or economic condition than many other facts and circumstances which might be demonstrated by the party seeking modification of the alimony decree. Thus, I would not elevate the recipient spouse s remarriage to the position of authority it holds in the eyes of the majority. Instead, I, like the trial court, would view the recipient spouse’s remarriage simply as one of the many factors to be considered in determining whether a modification of alimony is deserving. This approach would allow the trial court to weigh every relevant factor and give each the emphasis it deserves. It is also consistent with the approach taken by several other courts. Cooper v. Cooper, 219 Neb. 64, 361 N.W.2d 202 (1985); Burr v. Burr, 353 N.W.2d 644 (Minn.Ct.App.1984); Hettiger v. Hettiger, 37 Mich.App. 431, 195 N.W.2d 10 (1972).
Furthermore, these parties entered into an agreement regarding property division and alimony which was adopted verbatim by the trial court in its divorce decree. This procedure is not atypical in South Dakota. Connolly v. Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44, 47 (S.D.1978). This procedure also allows the parties to maximize favorable tax consequences by agreeing to make relatively larger alimony payments in return for a greater proportion of the marital assets. When faced with an application for modification of alimony, trial courts should give great weight to the agreements or stipulations of the parties which are incorporated into the divorce decree. Couzens v. Couzens, 140 Mich.App. 423, 364 N.W.2d 340 (1985); Bryant v. Bryant, 102 N.W.2d 800 (N.D.1960). This position would necessitate a modification of current South Dakota precedent which proscribes consideration of these types of underlying agreements. Moller, supra; Blare v. Blare, 302 N.W.2d 787 (S.D.1981); Connolly, supra; Simmons v. Simmons, 67 S.D. 145, 290 N.W. 319 (1940).
I would affirm the trial court’s proper exercise of discretion under the appropriate legal standards.