Court Opinion

ID: 9548616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:06:06.796429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:11.875949
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J.
I respectfully dissent.
By its terms, Penal Code section 22, subdivision (b) (section 22(b)) does not apply to aider and abettor liability. An aider and abettor’s mental state is not a “specific intent” within the meaning of section 22(b). Moreover, the very language of section 22(b) limits the admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication to situations in which “a specific intent crime is charged.” I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
At the outset, Valdez and the majority encounter the general rule that “[n]o act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is *1139less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental states for the crimes charged, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act.” (Pen. Code, § 22, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 1982, ch. 893, §2, p. 3317.)
The sole exceptions to this rule are stated in former section 22(b), which provided: “Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.” (§ 22(b), as amended by Stats. 1982, ch. 893, § 2, pp. 3317-3318.) The parties agree that of the mental states enumerated in section 22(b) only “specific intent” is potentially relevant to Valdez’s culpability. Hence, by the terms of the statute, Valdez must demonstrate that aider and abettor liability is a “required specific intent” and that “a specific intent crime is charged.” He has failed to do so.
The majority first concludes that the mental state for aiding and abetting is a “required specific intent” within the meaning of section 22(b). (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1131.) I disagree. Aiding and abetting “may be a specific mental state, but it is not a specific intent.” (People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272] (cone, and dis. opn. of Baxter, J.).)
'Rather, as Justice Broussard correctly stated, “Accomplice liability depends upon a general criminal intent, not upon shared intent to commit the target offense.” (People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 797 [254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419] (cone, and dis. opn. of Broussard, J.).) The definition of aiding and abetting does not mean that the “aider and abettor must be prepared to commit the offense by his or her own act should the perpetrator fail to do so, nor that the aider and abettor must seek to share the fruits of the crime.” {People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].) An aider and abettor’s intent is only the intent to encourage and facilitate the perpetrator in his or her commission of a crime. {Id. at p. 561.) The law is satisfied when the aider and abettor, with knowledge of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose, commits an act of encouragement or facilitation of the crime, intending to do so. The law does not require the aider and abettor “to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence,” as is required for a crime to be deemed one involving specific intent. {People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 457 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370].)
In this respect, the intent for aiding and abetting is akin to the general intent required for assault. An aider and abettor who hands the perpetrator a *1140rock to commit the general intent crime of assault has no more specific intent than the perpetrator who uses that rock. The perpetrator’s intent to batter the victim, although arguably a “further act” or “additional consequence,” is still a general intent. (People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 457.) The same is true for the aider and abettor.
The majority further concludes that the knowledge element of aiding and abetting is a “specific intent” within the meaning of section 22(b). (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1131-1132.) In so doing, it relies in part on the following language from People v. Whitfield: “Although implied malice may not fall literally within the Hood formulation of specific intent, the element of implied malice that requires that the defendant act with knowledge of the danger to, and in conscious disregard of, human life, is closely akin to Hood s definition of specific intent, which requires proof that the defendant acted with a specific and particularly culpable mental state.” (7 Cal.4th at p. 450.) However, Whitfield’s analogy between knowledge and specific intent was undoubtedly precisely the reasoning which the Legislature overruled when it made clear in its 1995 amendment to section 22(b) that voluntary intoxication evidence was inadmissible on the issue of implied malice. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1126-1127.) Moreover, the Legislature deleted any reference to “knowledge” when it amended section 22(b) in 1982.
Finally, the majority concludes that while by its express terms section 22(b) applies only “ ‘when a specific intent crime is charged,’ ” this phrase “refers to the same ‘required specific intent’ for which the statute allows evidence of intoxication, including the intent requirement of an aider and abettor.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1132.) I would agree that when a specific intent crime is charged, the “required specific intent” is that intent required by the charged specific intent crime. I disagree, however, that this correlation eviscerates the express requirement that “a specific intent crime [be] charged” prior to voluntary intoxication evidence becoming admissible. Aiding and abetting murder and attempted murder is not a “specific intent crime.” Indeed, aiding and abetting is not a crime at all; it is a theory of liability.
Here, there are only two possible resolutions to the issue presented: Either voluntary intoxication evidence may always be considered, as the majority concludes, or it may never be considered, as I would conclude, on the existence of the mental state required for aiding and abetting liability, no matter what the charged or target crime might be. Clearly, the latter option is more consistent with the statutory language. Under the majority’s approach, voluntary intoxication evidence may be considered for aider and abettor liability even when the target offense is a general intent crime. (Maj. opn., *1141ante, at pp. 1131-1132.) This result violates the legislative intent and the plain language of section 22(b).
Hence, section 22(b) withholds voluntary intoxication as a defense to aider and abettor liability. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, such a resolution does not violate his due process rights by denying him the opportunity to prove he did not possess a required mental state. (See Montana v. Egelhoff (1996) 518 U.S. 37, 40, 56 [116 S.Ct. 2013, 2016, 2023-2024, 135 L.Ed.2d 361] (plur. opn.) [statute disallowing consideration of voluntary intoxication evidence in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of a criminal offense does not violate due process]; id. at pp. 58-59 [116 S.Ct. at pp. 2024-2025] (cone. opn. of Ginsburg, J.).) The prosecution must still prove the knowledge and intent of the alleged aider and abettor. While the defendant cannot disprove that claim simply by asserting he or she was intoxicated, the defendant can disclaim it by presenting other evidence. For example, in this case Valdez could argue that he never heard any mention of a gun, or that he urged Valencia not to bring a gun. Likewise, in the majority’s example of a parent handing a child a baseball bat, the parent could present evidence of the circumstances under which this occurred, for example, at a Little League game. In other words, a defendant may assert such evidence as would be relevant if he or she were sober. What a defendant may not do is rely on his or her own intoxication to deny knowledge and intent.
Moreover, as the Attorney General states, “No claim of unfairness may be based on a premise that the actual perpetrator is necessarily more culpable than the aider and abettor.” The aider and abettor is not always less culpable than the perpetrator. Here, it is extremely unlikely Valencia, who was at home sleeping, would have committed the murder and attempted murders absent Valdez’s intervention. Moreover, the reverse is also true. Under the majority’s approach, if the perpetrator commits a general intent crime, the perpetrator cannot introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication, but the aider and abettor can. In any event, our goal is to first ascertain not what is fair in each individual situation, but what the Legislature intended.
In sum, section 22(b) does not authorize the use of evidence of Valdez’s voluntary intoxication to disprove either the intent or knowledge element of the People’s theory that he aided and abetted Valencia. As the Court of Appeal stated, “Such evidence should not have been admitted for that purpose, and it follows that Valdez had no right to instructions as to the significance of the evidence for that purpose. The evidence that was admitted, and the instructions the court gave concerning the evidence, could not have prejudiced Valdez.”
*1142I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Baxter, J., concurred.