Court Opinion

ID: 9747636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:24:50.200441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:41.986783
License: Public Domain

TAYLOR, V.C.J.,
with whom OPALA and WINCHESTER, JJ., join, dissenting:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from today's declaratory ruling that a legislative bill adding conditions upon the expenditure of appropriated money constitutes an appropriation bill subject to the Governor's line-item veto. Today's ruling wholly ignores the unambiguous requirements of an appropriation bill set out in the Oklahoma Constitution, art. 5, § 55 and implicitly overrules the time-honored principles governing the line-item veto in the Oklahoma Constitution, art. 6, § 12. Contrary to the separation of powers mandate in the Oklahoma Constitution, art. 4, § 1, today's ruling restricts the Legislature's power to control the state's purse while it enlarges the Governor's veto power over legislation.
«[ 2 Relying on Article 5, § 55, today's decision redefines an appropriation bill to include any bill that places conditions or restrictions on the budgeting and expenditure of money previously appropriated. This definition is inconsistent with the plain language of Article 5, § 55 and the long-standing, untarnished pronouncements on the meaning of "appropriation" under Article 5, § 55 set out in Menefee v. Askew, 1910 OK 47, 25 Okla. 623, 107 P. 159, and Meyer v. Clift, 1912 OK 201, 31 Okla. 793, 123 P. 1042.
18 Article 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution, the article on the legislative department, at § 36, vests legislative authority over all rightful subjects in the state legislature. Article 5, § 55, on the other hand, restricts the exercise of legislative authority to spend the state's money. It requires the state legislature to make an appropriation by law in a specified amount for a specified object before the money may be paid out of the state treasury. In other words, the enactment of an appropriation by law is the exclusive procedure by which the state legislature may authorize money to be paid out of the state treasury, regardless of any other methods that may be devised. Article 5, § 55 reads:
No money shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this State, nor any of its funds, nor any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law, nor unless such payments be made within two and one-half years after the passage of such appropriation act, and every such law making a new appropriation, or continuing or reviving an appropriation, shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated and the object to which it is to be applied, and it shall not be sufficient for such law to refer to any other law to fix such sum.
¶ 4 Menefee v. Askew, 1910 OK 47, 25 Okla. 623, 107 P. 159, defined an appropriation in accordance with Article 5, § 55. Menefee v. Askew, in No. 1 of the Syllabus, concluded:
An "appropriation" in this state is an authority of the Legislature, given at the proper time and in legal form to the proper officers, to apply a distinctly specified sum, from a designated fund out of the treasury in a given year, for a specified object or demand against the state.
¶5 The question in Menefee v. Askew was whether a legislative enactment appropriated money. The legislation in Menefee v. Askew provided that game and fish license fees shall be placed to the credit of the game protection fund and that the Game and Fish Warden's $1,800.00 annual salary, annual travel expense not to exceed $800.00, and necessary office expenses shall be paid out of the game protection fund. Menefee v. Askew held that the legislation, as required by Article 5, § 55, validly appropriated a sum certain for the Game and Fish Warden's salary from the game protection fund but did not make a valid appropriation for the Game and Fish Warden's stenographer because it did not specify a sum certain for necessary office expenses.1
*1065¶ 6 Shortly after Menefee v. Askew, Meyer v. Clift, 1912 OK 201, 31 Okla. 793, 123 P. 1042, determined that a legislative enactment fixing the salary of a stenographer did not constitute an appropriation by law authorizing the payment of money from the state treasury as required by Article 5, § 55. Meyer v. Clift, in the Syllabus, held:
Section 28, c. 69, Sess. Laws 1910, providing that stenographers for the district court and for the superior court shall receive an annual salary of $1,200, the salary of stenographer of the district court to be paid out of the state treasury in the same manner as salaries of district judges, does not constitute an appropriation for the payment of salaries of stenographers for the district court; and by reason of section 2527, Comp. Laws 1909, it is unlawful for the State Auditor to issue a warrant for the salary of a stenographer of the district court for the months of July, August, September, and October, 1911, since there is no appropriation by law for the payment of such salary.
¶7 Under Meyer v. Clift, Article 5, § 55 cannot be read to include all bills that make an appropriation or that add conditions upon the expenditure of money appropriated in some other legislative enactment. The teaching of Meyer v. Clift is that a legislative enactment placing conditions upon expenditures, such as fixing salaries, is not within the meaning of "appropriation" as that term is used in Article 5, § 55.
¶8 The Menefee v. Askew and Meyer v. Clift decisions were handed down shortly after the adoption of the Oklahoma Constitution and Oklahoma statehood. A few years later Riley v. Carter, 1933 OK 448, 165 Okla. 262, 25 P.2d 666, determined that an "appropriation by law" as used in Article 5, § 55 included constitutional appropriations. The dispute in Riley v. Carter arose out of the Legislature's failure to make an appropriation for the salaries of the justices on this Court. Riley v. Carter held that the schedule attached to the Oklahoma Constitution as adopted by the voters made "an appropriation by law" for the justices' salaries. Extending the meaning of "appropriation by law" in Article 5, § 55 beyond the pronouncements in Menefee v. Askew and Meyer v. Clift, Riley v. Carter reaffirmed the principles enunciated in those decisions:
The authors of the opinions in Menefee v. Askew, supra, and Meyer v. Clift, supra, were members of the Constitutional Convention, and the opinions were filed but a short time after the adoption of the Constitution. For these reasons, the opinions are rightfully entitled to great weight in *1066the construction of constitutional provisions.
Riley v. Carter, 25 P.2d at 676.
¶9 The general rules of construction governing the interpretation of our constitution require us to ascertain the intent and purpose of the provision at the time of its adoption2 Carter v. Rathburn, 1922 OK 105, 85 Okla. 251, 209 P. 944, 952. Today's ruling that the legislation or a part of it which adds conditions or restrictions to previously appropriated money constitutes an appropriation disregards the applicable rules of constitutional construction and turns Menefee v. Askew and Meyer v. Clift upside down. It also disregards the doctrine of stare decisis that ordinarily binds this Court to its established precedent. Campbell v. White, 1993 OK. 89, ¶ 14, 856 P.2d 255, 260.
¶10 A year after Riley v. Carter, this Court articulated five requirements of an appropriation bill under Article 5, § 55. State ex rel. Murray v. Carter, 1984 OK 132, 167 Okla. 473, 30 P.2d 700, in No. 3 of the Syllabus, determined:
"Said section 55 of art. 5, supra requires an appropriation bill to meet five requirements, as follows, to wit (a) Make an appropriation of money, (b) provide for its payment within 30 months, (c) specify the sum appropriated, (d) state the object to which said sum shall be applied, and (e) not require reference to any other law to fix the sum appropriated." Menefee Case, supra.
¶11 Guided by the above, long-standing decisions, the two legislative measures at issue in this controversy are not appropriation bills under Article 5, § 55. Neither legislative measure meets Article 5, § 55's threshold requirement of "making a new appropriation, or continuing or reviving an appropriation." Both of them relate to the budgeting of previously appropriated money. Today's decision, however, classifies the challenged legislation as appropriation bills under Article 5, § 55 by redefining appropriation bills to include not only bills that make appropriations of money but also bills that place conditions or restrictions on the budgeting and expenditure of money previously appropriated. Today's expanded meaning of an appropriation bill to include bills related to budgets and expenditures silently overrules Menefee v. Askew, Meyer v. Clift, and Murray v. Carters five fundamental requirements of an appropriation under Article 5, § 55.
T12 Recognizing that appropriation bills are distinct from general legislative measures, the Court declares that this distinction is not determinative of the instant controversy and turns to the language in Section 12 of Article 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Article 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution, the article on the executive department, confers specific authority upon the Governor to participate in the legislative process as set out in §§ 11 and 12. Sections 11 and 12 grant the Governor the power to disapprove legislative measures and prescribe the manner in which the Governor may exercise the power. While § 11 grants the Governor power to veto a legislative measure in toto,3 § 12 *1067grants the Governor power to veto an appropriation item without disapproving of the entire appropriation bill. Article 6, § 12 reads:
Every bill passed by the Legislature, making appropriations of money embracing distinct items, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor; if he disapproves the bill, or any item, or appropriation therein contained, he shall communicate such disapproval, with his reasons therefor, to the house in which the bill shall have originated, but all items not disapproved shall have the force and effect of law according to the original provisions of the bill. Any item or items so disapproved shall be void, unless repassed by a two-thirds vote, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the preceding seetion in reference to other bills: Provided, That this section shall not relieve emergency bills of the requirement of the three-fourths vote.
The Court then looks to North Dakota and Ohio for the meaning of "every," "any" and "all" as used in Article 6, § 12. In so doing, this Court is again overlooking our longstanding jurisprudence.
¶13 Two early decisions from this Court should control today's ruling: Regents of State University v. Trapp, 1911 OK 62, 28 Okla. 83, 113 P. 910, and Carter v. Rathburn, 1922 OK 105, 85 Okla. 251, 209 P. 944. Regents of State University v. Trapp, at No. 1 of the Syllabus, held:
Section 12, art. 6. Constitution, providing that the Governor may disapprove any item of a bill making appropriations of money embracing distinct items, does not apply to a special appropriation bill containing only one item of appropriation for the support and maintenance of the State University; and the act of the Governor approving the bill in part and disapproving other parts thereof, directing how the funds appropriated shall be apportioned, is a nullity.
¶ 14 The special appropriation bill in Trapp made a single appropriation and provided for the expenditure of the single appropriation and appropriations made in other acts of the Legislature for fiscal years 1909-1910 and 1910-1911. Our first Governor disapproved some of the expenditures in the legislative measure, and our first Supreme Court declared that the legislative measure did not become law because the Governor did not approve the entire bill as required by Article 6, § 11. In doing so, the Trapp court said:
The meaning of the foregoing section [Okla. Const., art. 6, § 12] is not obscure, and the object it was intended to accomplish is apparent. Without that provision, all bills of whatever character could be approved or disapproved by the Governor only in their entirety [under Okla. Const., art. 6, § 11]. But by section 57, art. 5, general appropriation bills may embrace more than one subject; and if the veto power were confined to the whole bill, the Governor might often be required to destroy much good legislation in order to defeat one item of a bill that was bad, or, on the other hand, be compelled to approve a piece of legislation vicious in part, in order to obtain the benefits of the salutary provisions of the same act. It was to enable the Governor to approach in a measure the consideration and approval of a bill carrying items of appropriation with the same power that the members of the legislative department are authorized to act upon it, in that he may consider and approve some of the items separately without being required to approve them all. But this power is conferred upon him only as to bills that make appropriations of money "embracing distinct items," and it was contemplated that it should apply only to those bills where more than one item of appropriation was made. Whether the power to approve some of the distinet items of an appropriation bill and to disapprove others carries with it the power to reduce any item to a sum less than provid*1068ed in the act and then approve it, as seems to have been the opinion of the Governor, is not here necessary to determine; for, upon the more serious reason that the act under consideration does not fall within the class of acts embraced in section 12, art. 6, the Governor was without power to approve the bill in part and disapprove it in part.
Tropp, 118 P. at 918.
¶15 The unanswered query in Trapp was answered in the negative in Pesebly v. Childers, 1923 OK 595, 95 Okla. 40, 217 P. 1049, 1053. No. 6 of the Syllabus to Peebly v. Childers invalidated the Governor's line-item reduction of the amount appropriated for University salaries from $700,000 to $500,000 for the 1924 fiscal year and from $750,000 to $500,000 for the 1925 fiscal year. Also, the fundamental principles governing the application of Article 6, §§ 11 and 12 were enunciated in the Syllabus by the Court in Peebly v. Childers:
1. The act of the Legislature involved herein is a bill making appropriations of money embracing distinct items and the governor's veto power in relation to such bill, or any distinct item thereof, is defined by section 12, art. 6, Williams' Constitution.
2. Except as provided in the Constitution of this state, the three departments of government, legislative, executive and judicial, are required to be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the functions properly belonging to either of the others.
3. While engaged in considering bills which have passed both houses of the Legislature and which are presented to him for approval or disapproval, the Governor is acting in a legislative capacity and not as an executive.
4. While exercising this function the Governor is a special agent with powers limited by the Constitution and he can only act in the specified mode and can exercise only the granted powers. If he attempts to exercise them in a different mode, or to exercise powers not given, his act will be wholly ineffectual for any and every purpose.
5. Under section 12, art. 6, Williams' Constitution, which applies in the case at bar, no affirmative action on the part of the Governor is necessary to vitalize an appropriation bill embracing distinct items duly passed by the Legislature. But in order to veto any distinct item of an appropriation bill the governor is required to disapprove the objectionable item in toto.
6. A fair application of the foregoing fundamental principles to the plain provisions of section 12, art. 6, Williams' Constitution leads to the conclusion that the action of the governor in attempting to approve in part and disapprove in part distinct items of the Institutional Appropriation Bill was an unauthorized and futile gesture wholly ineffectual for any purpose.
¶16 A year earlier, Carter v. Rathburn, 1922 OK 105, 85 Okla. 251, 209 P. 944, set out an elementary explanation of the veto powers granted in Article 6, §§ 11 and 12. The Carter v. Rathburn court explained:
Section 11 above applies to all bills as a whole. That is, bills in their entirety. No bill in its entirety becomes a law without compliance with the provisions of said seetion. Any bill becomes a law as a whole when such provisions are complied with. The provisions are plain and, in our opinion, need no construction further than that they mean what they say.
But in section 12, supra, recognizing the difference between a bill as a whole and a general appropriation bill containing separate, independent items, the Constitution makes express provision as to how such a bill may become a law. The Constitutional Convention seems to have taken cognizance of the fact that general appropriation bills are necessarily made up of numerous, separate, independent items, and in order to relieve such a bill from the restrictions imposed under section 11, supra, and to free it from danger of being defeated as a whole, made provisions whereby separate items in such a bill may be disapproved and cut out by the Governor, without affecting the bill in its entirety.
*1069In order to make the provisions of said section 12 applicable, a bill must be one making an appropriation of money and embracing separate and distinct items; it must pass both houses and be presented to the Governor; if the Governor disapproves any item thereof, he must communicate his disapproval, with his reasons therefor, to the house in which the bill originated, and all items not disapproved shall have the foree and effect of law according to the original provisions of the bill find every item so disapproved is void; that is, does not become a law unless such item is re-passed by a two-thirds vote, as provided in section 11, supra. In other words, if an item in a general appropriation bill is disapproved by the Governor, there is no law provided in the Constitution by which it may become a law, except by repassage by a two-thirds vote, as provided in section 11, supra.
209 P. at 946-947.
117 In Carter v. Rathburn, the Legislature sent the Governor a general appropriation bill, and, after the Legislature adjourned sine die, the Governor line-item vetoed a clerk's salary. Rathburn, a clerk in the State Examiner's office, asked for payment of her salary arguing that the line-item veto was ineffective because the Governor did not return the general appropriation bill to the house of origination as required by Article 6, § 12. The Court in Carter v. Rathburn said:
True, the Constitution says, "Any item so disapproved shall be void," and probably true that the phrase "so disapproved" means disapproved while the Legislature is in session, but it does not say that unless it is "so disapproved" it shall have the force and effect of law. And to give such item the force and effect of law is to ... put life into it by a process of abstract reasoning rather than by the plain language of the Constitution. Courts are necessarily vested with the authority to interpret the law and say what it means after it becomes a law. Also they have power to determine that an act has not become a law where constitutional requirements have not been met, but it was never intended that by a mere process of reasoning, however plausible, courts may breathe life into an act which has not been given life by the plain creative provisions of the Constitution.
209 P. at 949.
¶18 The reasoning and the holdings in these early decisions have withstood the test of time. In Johnson v. Waiters, 1991 OK 107, 819 P.2d 694, the Legislature presented the Governor with two bills: 1) a non-appropriation bill that allocated space in the State Capitol Building, relocated various officials, and authorized the sale of surplus water, and 2) a budget reconciliation bill that made multiple appropriations for separate items and contained multiple other general provisions or non-appropriation legislation. The Governor, on the non-appropriation bill, approved only the section relating to the sale of water, and on the budget reconciliation bill, vetoed several general legislation sections. As in this case, the leaders of the Legislature asked this Court to declare the Governor's partial veto beyond his constitutional authority. Johnson v. Walters decided 1) that no part of the non-appropriation bill became law because the Governor's attempt to exercise the line-item veto on a general legislation bill is ineffectual and 2) that all general legislation provisions in the reconciliation budget bill failed to become law by virtue of the Governor's attempted line-item veto of some of the general legislation provisions. While the Court's opinion turned on the one-subject-rule restriction on the Legislature rather than the limited veto power of the Governor, one of the concurring opinions filed in Johnson v. Walters relied upon the teachings of our early decisions-including Regents of State University v. Trapp, Carter v. Ratburn, and Peebly v. Childers-and emphasized that the Governor is not a super-legislator. Johnson v. Walters, 1991 OK 107 at 11 5-7, a. 10-18, 819 P.2d. at 703, n. 10-18 {concurring opinion by Kauger, J.).
¶ 19 In this matter, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed a general appropriation bill for fiscal year ending June 30, 2009, for the expenses of the various agencies in the executive, legislative and judicial departments. The general appropriation bill, Enrolled House Bill No. 2276, made appropriations to the Department of Corrections, in *1070the amount of $483,000,000 from the General Revenue Fund in the State Treasury and $20,000,000 from the Special Cash Fund in the State Treasury or so much thereof as may be necessary to perform the duties imposed upon the Department of Corrections by law and an appropriation to the Ethics Commission in the amount of $667,960 from the General Revenue Fund in the State Treasury or so much thereof as may be necessary to perform the duties imposed upon the Ethics Commission by law. Subsequently, the Legislature sent to the Governor Enrolled Senate Bill No. 1828 (relating to the Department of Corrections)4 and Enrolled House Bill No. 2286 (relating to the Ethics Commission),5 that allocated the previously appropriated money to various budget categories, set full-time-equivalent employee limits, and provided for fiscal year limitations, inter alia.
¶20 The Governor signed both S.B. 1823 and H.B. 2286, but the Governor vetoed by line-item method most of the budget allocations and the fiscal year limitations in S.B. 1328 for the Department of Corrections and a section in H.B. 2286 requiring the Ethics Commissions to expend $50,000 on specified computer software. The line-item vetoes in these two legislative measures are challenged in this original action.
¶21 Neither S.B. 1828 nor HB. 2286 makes appropriations of money from the State Treasury for two or more separate and distinct items so that neither triggers the Governor's line-item veto power granted in Article 6, § 12. Stated plainly, neither S.B. 1323 nor H.B. 2286 of the 2008 Session of the Oklahoma Legislature is an "appropriation bill." The sections in S.B. 1823 and H.B. 2286 which the Governor vetoed by line-item method did not appropriate money. Rather than follow the plain language of Article 6, § 12 and our binding jurisprudence, today, for the first time, we extend the Governor's line-item veto power to general non-appropriation legislation and to general provisions of legislation. Reasoning similar to today's was rejected in Carter v. Rathburn and more recently in Campbell v. White, 1993 OK 89, at ¶ 19, 856 P.2d at 262, when the Court said we are not free to expand the meaning of constitutional provisions. When our jurisdiction is invoked, it is our duty to require both the Legislature and the Governor to strictly comply with our Constitution.
¶22 The Court today confers upon the Governor super-legislator status by its conclusion that the framers of the Oklahoma Constitution clearly intended the Governor to play a critical role at every stage of the appropriations process. This conclusion, grounded neither in the language of Article 5, § 55 or Article 6, § 12, nor in our extant jurisprudence, is in derogation of the fundamental power of the Legislature to make appropriations.
The power to make appropriations, for which the Public must pay the taxes, is one of the most sacred rights delegated to legislative bodies, and the law prescribes the exact manner in which such appropriations may be made, and the courts should jealously guard against straining the provisions of law in order to make an appropriation valid.
Carter v. Rathburn, 209 P. at 950.
¶23 After the petitioners sought to invoke our jurisdiction, the Governor urged that the petitioners have not presented a controversy suitable for this Court's assumption of jurisdiction and declaratory judgment. Yet, the Court in today's decision fails to address this issue. I find it necessary to address this issue based on the petitioners' urging that we grant only prospective relief.
¶ 24 To invoke this Court's original jurisdiction, the petitioners are required to present a justiciable controversy and to show a "sufficient immediacy and reality" as to warrant the pronouncement of judgment. Dank v. Benson, 2000 OK 40, ¶ 9, 5 P.3d 1088, 1092. The petitioners assert that "the Court's pronouncement will provide future guidance for both the Governor and the Legislature." Future guidance in the upcoming legislative session is not the type of urgency which may invoke this Court's original jurisdiction. See id.
*1071¶25 The petitioners in their application state that they are not seeking to "invalidate those two bills, but rather ask the Court to declare the attempted use of the veto unconstitutional and to grant prospective declaratory relief to preclude similar unlawful acts by the Chief Executive in the future." Thus, the petitioners in their application seek only prospective relief so that the two bills at issue here will not be invalidated.
¶26 In Dank v. Benson this Court denied the petitioners application to assume original jurisdiction for lack of a justiciable controversy. Here, as in Dank, the petitioners in their application do not seek to have any specific legislation invalidated but seek to have this Court make a pronouncement to prevent potential future actions by an elected government officer. Evidently because of the Governor's reliance on Dank, during oral argument, the petitioners' made an oral plea that the two bills were invalid. Nonetheless, the petitioners seek to have this Court determine that the bills are invalid, but that the decision not affect their effectiveness by making our pronouncement prospective.
¶27 Because to give the relief requested by the petitioners would weigh against this Court assuming jurisdiction and would fail, in my opinion, to present a justiciable controversy and because of the weight of the matter presented, I think the application should be considered amended to reflect petitioners' assertions made at oral argument urging the bills be declared invalid. As so amended, the application and petition present a controversy involving the highest levels of state government and raising first impression, publict juris questions that are important to the law of state government.
¶ 28 Were I writing for the Court, I would assume original jurisdiction and enter a declaratory judgment. I would find that 1) the two bills under attack here are not appropriation bills, 2) the provisions attempted by the Governor to be vetoed by the line-item method are not items of appropriations, and 3) the Governor's attempted line-item veto of those provisions is ineffective because it is not authorized by the Oklahoma Constitution. I would also find that the Governor placed his approval upon each bill by his signature, although he could have vetoed each bill in its entirety. I would hold the Governor's attempted line-item vetoes are unauthorized and ineffective and did not prevent the two bills from becoming the law of this state when the Governor signed them. I would declare S.B. 1323 and H.B. 2286 of the 2008 Oklahoma Legislature to be valid in toto and to survive intact the attempted line-item veto that is unauthorized by the Oklahoma Constitution.
ATTACHMENT A
*1072PMxonLEt SENATE HILL NO. 1323
By: Jobason (Mike), Crutchfield, Myers and Adslsaun of the Senate and Miiler and Jongg of the BHouge
An aot relaring to the Department of Corrections; requiring budgeting of funds in sertain omategories asd amounts; requiring certain performance neargras; providing fop duties end compensation of employees; limiting salary of the Bicsector:; authorizing employment of certrin percentase of etploymes in the unclassified service; providing budgetary limitariona; authorizing certain agreeqent for sconetrection projects; authorizing purchase of certain bullding,. real property snd mall appurtenances thereto; requiring add prohibiting certain budget prootivers; providing apse dates; providing mn effeczive date; and dsclaring an emergency.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE PBOPLE OP THE STATR Of OKLAHOMA:
SBRCTi(M 1, For the fiscal year onding June 30, 2009. the Department of Corractions shall budget all funds in the following categories and amounts:
Estegotry Appropriarion Tokal administrar fon $ $4,165,.474.30 $ 48,175,238. 0D
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The agency shall develop outcome-based performance measures for exch budget category.
SECTION 2. The dutiss ant compensation of employees, not otherwize prescribed by law, necessary to perform the duties japosed npon the Department of Corrections by law shall be set by the Director of the Department of Correcrions,. The salary of the Director o% the Department of Coppections shall not exceed One mindred Thirty-two Thousand Three Hundred Nine Dollars ($132,309.00) per annum, payable monthly for the fiscsl year ending June 20, 2007. The Depsrtmant of Corrections for the Fiscal ysar endiog Jun« 36, 2005, shall be authorired to employ up to six percent (6%) of its sotal authorized full-time-equivailent «employees in the unclassified service and shall be subjecr :o the following budgetary limrations on full-timg-equivalent amployses and expenditures excluding expenditures for capital and special projects, sxcopt as may bs authorized purtuant to the provisions of Gestion 3603 of Title 44 of the Oklahoma Statutes:
Budgetary Maitation Amount
Full-frime-eguivalent Employaes 5,894.56
Leare-Purchase Agreements $10,400,009
SECTION 1. The Department of Correstions ie hereby authorized to enter into an agreement with the state agencies to utilise prison Anmares for conetyruction projects éubject to written restrierions and conditions regarding security classification and other matters related to the control of inmates and public safecy,. Before
*1074ufjrlizing inmates. the Department of Corrections chall enser into a written agreement conserning,. bus not limited to, liability, funding. pay, public security and Provided further, prison infates shall not be used zo ceplace any current spate agency employees .
SECTION 4. The Department of Corrections, sutject to funds availabls, is authorized to purchase a buil ding cogether with five acres of land and all appurtenances thereto in the City of Healdton, Oklahoma, for a fegotriated price not to excsed One Nundred Seventy-five Thousand Dollars
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SECTICH $. This act shall become effective July 1, 2006.
SZZTION 7T. IL being immediately necessary for the premerviarion of the public pease, health and safety, an emergency is hereby declared to sxist. by reason whereof this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after iss passage and approvai,.
*1075Passed the Sunale the 2ler day of Msy, 2006,
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Passed the Houss of Rcpresentatives the day of May, 7008.
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*1076ATTACHMENT B
HNRROLLEPD HOUSE BILL NOG. 2284 By: Miller and dones of the Rouse
and Johnson (Mike), Crutchfield, Myers and Mielson of the Senate
An Bet relating 10 the Ethics Commission;: requiring bedget=ng zn certain categories and amounts; requiring certain periormance measures: providing for duties and compenqarlog of employees; providing budgetary limitations; specifies maximom amount for certain expendliuces: providing lapse dates; requicing and prohibiting certain budget procedures; providing an effectave daze: and declaring an emergency
BR IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OFT THB STATE OF CGKLAHOHA:
SECTION 1. For the year enfding June 30, 20(S, the Skhiocs Commission shall budget all funds in the following categories and amoupks :
Category Appropriarian Tolal
Atiibnistration/Pol Loy Reviows/Tnugstigat Long $240,030.50 £534, (O7%.00
Registration Servines/Hegsings 327, 860.00 456,289,900
TUTAL $867,958.00 $990,060.02
The agency shall develop outcome based performance measures for tach budget catagory.
*1077SECTION 2. The duties and compensstion of eapipyses, not otherwise preszyibed by law, n#écessory to perfom the duties imposed upon the Ethics Commission by law shall be set by the Executive Director,. The Ethics Commission for the fisral year ending June 10, 2088, shall be aubject to the following budgetary on full-Aimesetivalent employees and expenditeres sxcluding expenditures for capital and special projects, trcupt as may be authorited pursuant to the provisions of Section 3693 of Titles 74 of the Oklahoma Statutes:
Budgetary Limitation Pull-time-eguivalent Bmployeas Lease-Purchase Agreements
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SEZTION 4. Appropristuions made by Section 39 of Enrolled House Bill Ho. 2276 of the ind Session of whe fist Oklzhoms Legislature, not including sppropriations made for capiural sutlay purposes, may be budgeted for the fiscal year ending June 30, 200% (hereafter FY-28}; or may be budgeared for: the isos) year ending June 10, 201% thereafter PY-10}. funds budgeted for FY-08 may be ensumbered only through June 30, 2009, and must be expended by Novemser 15, 2009. Any funds remaining after November 15, 20089, and not budgerad for FY-10, shall lepse to the credit of the proper fund for vhs then current fiscsl year. Paunds budgeted for FY¥-10 may be encumbered only through June 30, 2010. Any funds remaining alter Hovember 15, 2010. ghtll lapse to the credit of the propmr fund for the then cugrent fiscal year. These appropyiations may not be budgeted in both fiscal years sinnplteaensously. Funds budgeted in FY-5%, and not
*1078required to pay obligations for that fiscal year, may be budgeted fox FY-13, after the agency to whish thr funds have besp appropriated has prepared and submitted a budget work progran Tevisinm removing these funds from the PY-P9 budget work program and after such revision has been approved by the Dffice of Stats Finance.
SECTION $. This ack shall become effective July 1, 2008.
SECTION B. Zt being immedlatsly neacessary for the preservation of the public pease, health and safety, an emergency is Rkereby ceclered to exsist, by reason whereof this act shall take effect and be in full force from and after its passage and approval.
*1079Passed the House of Representatives the 15th tay of May, 200%.
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Passed the Genale the 20th day of May, 2008.
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. In the remainder of its syllabus, Menefee v. Askew ruled that Article 5, § 55 does not require the Legislature to use an arbitrary form of expression or any particular words to make a valid appropriation:
*1065No. 2. No arbitrary form of expression or particular words are required by the Constitution in making an appropriation, which may be made by implication when the language employed reasonably leads to the belief that such was the intention of the Legislature.
No. 3. Sections 9, 10, art. 4. c. 19, p. 303, Sess. Laws 1909, in connection with sections 3, 13, art. 6, c.19, constitute a valid appropriation as to the salary of the Game and Fish Warden in the sum of $ 1,800 per annum, and his actual necessary traveling expenses, not to exceed $ 800 per annum, and the salaries of not exceeding eight deputy game and fish wardens each in the sum of $ 800 per year and their each actual, necessary expenses, not to exceed $ 600 per annum, while actually employed under the direction of the State Game and Fish Warden, as controlled by sections 55 and 56, art. 5, of the Constitution, but continue in effect as an appropriation for two years and one-half only after the passage of said act.
No. 4. The provision of section 3, art. 6, providing that the Game and Fish Warden shall be reimbursed for his actual and necessary expenses, including expenses of catching and shipping game for propagating purposes, to be paid monthly and in the same manner as his salary and traveling expenses, does not constitute a valid appropriation, as the sum certain appropriated is not distinctly specified. In this regard, Fent v. State ex rel. Office of
State Finance, 2008 OK 2, 184 P.3d 467, 475, ruled that the transfer of surplus funds constituted an appropriation:
¶ 17 Even though drafted in terms of "transferring" and "allocating," H.B. 1105 unmistakably appropriates nearly 135 Million Dollars from the General Revenue Fund. It is an appropriation bill, and it must satisfy the requirements of an appropriation law set out in art. V, §§ 55 and 56 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
Unlike this case, the legislation involved in Menefee v. Askew and in Fent v. Office of State Finance expressed clear intent to appropriate specific sums of money from designated funds of the treasury to be expended for specific purposes in a given year. The legislation challenged in this case merely directs the budgeting of money that was appropriated in other legislative measures. See Appendices A and B attached hereto.

. The recent opinion in South Tulsa Citizens Coalition, LLC, v. Ark. River Bridge Auth., 2008 OK 4, ¶11, 176 P.3d 1217, 1220, reaffirmed the general rules that the intent of the framers and the people adopting it must be given effect in construing constitutional provisions and that, absent an ambiguity, the intent is settled by the language of the provision itself and the courts are not at liberty to search beyond the instrument for meaning.

. The Oklahoma Constitution, art. 6, § 12 is an exception to the limitations on the Governor's veto power in art. 6, § 11. Section 11 reads:
Every bill which shall have passed the Senate and House of Representatives, and every resolution requiring the assent of both branches of the Legislature, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor; if he approve, he shall sign it; if not, he shall return it with his objections to the house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large in the Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members elected to that house shall agree to pass the bill or joint resolution, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered; and, if approved by two-thirds of the members elected to that house, it shall become a law, notwithstanding the objections of the Governor. In all such cases, the vote in both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the members voting shall be entered on the Jour*1067nal of each house respectively. If any bill or resolution shall not be returned by the Governor within five days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Legislature shall, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not become a law without the approval of the Governor. No bill shall become a law after the final adjournment of the Legislature, unless approved by the Governor within fifteen days after such adjournment.

. Attachment A to this dissent.

. Attachment B to this dissent.