Court Opinion

ID: 9565981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:31:27.701653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:30.191382
License: Public Domain

Springer, J.,
concurring:
In my opinion, the legislature’s 1991 amendment to NRS 62.080 was merely a clarification of the meaning of the statute made necessary by our incorrect interpretation of the statute in State v. District Court, 105 Nev. 644, 781 P.2d 776 (1989). In that case we ruled that the statute relating to certification of a “child 16 years of age or older” to be prosecuted in adult criminal proceedings allowed the state to prosecute as adults children who commit felonies prior to their sixteenth birthday. Under this ruling the state could simply wait until an accused child reached the age of “16 years of age or older,” and then proceed to pursue adult prosecution against a child who committed an offense while he or she was still under sixteen years of age. As I said in my Dissent in State v. District Court, 105 Nev. 644, 781 P.2d 776 (1989), the statute provides for certification to the adult court only those underaged persons who commit crimes after they have reached their sixteenth birthday. It makes no sense to me that a child of thirteen or fourteen who commits a felony offense would not be subject to adult prosecution, but would become subject to criminal prosecution after he or she reaches the age of sixteen. The legislature has, rightly or wrongly, drawn the line at sixteen; and the state should not be allowed to override this *548policy simply by waiting for the offender to reach his or her sixteenth birthday. I continue to believe that Castillo’s certification was improper and see the legislature’s amendment of the statute as merely a clarification of this point. However, this court’s prior decision in State v. District Court is now the law of the case in this matter and is binding upon this court in the present proceedings. See, e.g., Andolino v. State of Nevada, 99 Nev. 346, 662 P.2d 631 (1983) (once an issue has been determined in a previous appeal on the same facts it is binding in all subsequent proceedings). On the more narrow question presented by Castillo’s appeal, whether the amended version of NRS 62.080 ought to be applied retroactively, I concur in the Majority’s reasoning. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment affirming the conviction.