Court Opinion

ID: 9956892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 14:00:42.189397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:58.037102
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024   Page: 1 of 72

                                                               [PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                   No. 22-11024
                           ____________________

        In re: TALAL QAIS ABDULMUNEM AL ZAWAWI,
                                         Debtor in a Foreign Proceeding.
        ___________________________________________________

        TALAL QAIS ABDULMUNEM AL ZAWAWI,
                                                        Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        COLIN DISS,
        HANNAH DAVIE,
        MICHAEL LEEDS,
        Foreign Representatives,
                                                    Defendants-Appellees.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024      Page: 2 of 72

        2                       Opinion of the Court                 22-11024

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-00894-GAP
                            ____________________

        Before LUCK, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
        LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
                Does 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) apply to cases brought under Chap-
        ter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code? A lot turns on this question because
        Chapter 15 purports to “provide effective mechanisms for dealing
        with cases of cross-border insolvency,” 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a), and
        § 109(a) would significantly restrict the class of persons and entities
        that could constitute a “debtor” in such cases. The plain text of the
        Bankruptcy Code provides a clear answer: yes, § 109(a) does apply
        to Chapter 15 cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (stating that Chapter 1
        applies to cases under Chapter 15). But when confronted with the
        question of whether debtor eligibility under Chapter 1 was a pre-
        requisite to ancillary assistance under the statutory predecessor to
        Chapter 15, this Court said no. See In re Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562 (11th
        Cir. 1988). Because we are bound by that decision and understand
        its reasoning to be sufficiently applicable to the question presented
        in this case, we are compelled to respond in the same manner to-
        day.
              After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,
        we affirm the bankruptcy court’s determination that, under our
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 3 of 72

        22-11024               Opinion of the Court                         3

        precedent, § 109(a) does not apply to Chapter 15 cases and does not
        establish a prerequisite for the recognition of a foreign proceeding
        under § 1517. We reason as follows.
               I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               The appellant in this case is Talal Qais Abdulmunem Al
        Zawawi (“Al Zawawi”), a citizen of Oman. Al Zawawi owns
        shares in QAPA Investing Corporation NV (“QAPA”), an entity in-
        corporated in Curacao that wholly owns several Florida entities.
        Those Florida entities collectively own around ninety-four million
        dollars’ worth of real estate in or around Winter Park, Florida.
                In 2015, Al Zawawi moved to the United Kingdom with his
        wife, Leila Hammoud, and their children. In 2017, Hammoud pe-
        titioned for dissolution of marriage in the U.K. As part of that pro-
        ceeding, Al Zawawi filed a statement of net worth which indicated
        that, as of April 30, 2017, he owned some assets in the United States.
               In March 2019, Hammoud obtained a divorce decree and a
        judgment in her favor for £24,075,000 from a U.K. court. On April
        2, 2019, the U.K. Court issued a worldwide freezing order against
        Al Zawawi, enjoining him from disposing of any of his assets until
        the judgment is paid in full.
                About a year later, Hammoud petitioned the U.K. Court to
        place Al Zawawi in involuntary bankruptcy, alleging that he had
        failed to make payments on the March 2019 judgment. On June
        29, 2020, Al Zawawi was adjudged bankrupt and, soon after, Colin
        Diss, Hannah Davie, and Michael Leeds (collectively, the “Foreign
USCA11 Case: 22-11024         Document: 53-1    Date Filed: 04/03/2024   Page: 4 of 72

        4                          Opinion of the Court            22-11024

        Representatives”) were appointed joint trustees in connection with
        the case.
               On March 24, 2021, the Foreign Representatives began the
        instant action by filing a Chapter 15 Petition for Recognition of a
        Foreign Proceeding in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
        District of Florida.
                Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code governs ancillary and
        other cross-border cases. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–32. Its stated pur-
        pose is to “incorporate the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
        so as to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of
        cross-border insolvency with the objectives of”: (1) cooperation;
        (2) “greater legal certainty for trade and investment”; (3) “fair and
        efficient administration”; (4) “protection and maximization of the
        value of the debtor’s assets”; and (5) “facilitation of the rescue of
        financially troubled businesses, thereby protecting investment and
        preserving employment.” 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1)–(5).
               One of the mechanisms provided by Chapter 15 is recogni-
        tion of a foreign proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1515–24. Recogni-
        tion of a foreign proceeding can subject a debtor’s assets located in
        the United States to the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay and
        opens the door for foreign representatives to seek discovery and
        other relief related to those assets. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1520–21. The
        requirements for obtaining an order granting recognition are set
        forth in § 1517. 1

        1 Section 1517 states as follows:
USCA11 Case: 22-11024        Document: 53-1        Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 5 of 72

        22-11024                  Opinion of the Court                              5

              In the memorandum of law accompanying their petition for
        recognition, the Foreign Representatives argued that all of the

              (a) Subject to section 1506, after notice and a hearing, an order
              recognizing a foreign proceeding shall be entered if—
                   (1) such foreign proceeding for which recognition is
                   sought is a foreign main proceeding or foreign non-
                   main proceeding within the meaning of section 1502;
                   (2) the foreign representative applying for recognition
                   is a person or body; and
                   (3) the petition meets the requirements of section
                   1515.
              (b) Such foreign proceeding shall be recognized—
                   (1) as a foreign main proceeding if it is pending in the
                   country where the debtor has the center of its main in-
                   terests; or
                   (2) as a foreign nonmain proceeding if the debtor has
                   an establishment within the meaning of section 1502
                   in the foreign country where the proceeding is pend-
                   ing.
              (c) A petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding shall be
              decided upon at the earliest possible time. Entry of an order
              recognizing a foreign proceeding constitutes recognition un-
              der this chapter.
              (d) The provisions of this subchapter do not prevent modifica-
              tion or termination of recognition if it is shown that the
              grounds for granting it were fully or partially lacking or have
              ceased to exist, but in considering such action the court shall
              give due weight to possible prejudice to parties that have relied
              upon the order granting recognition. A case under this chapter
              may be closed in the manner prescribed under section 350.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024         Document: 53-1        Date Filed: 04/03/2024        Page: 6 of 72

        6                          Opinion of the Court                     22-11024

        requirements of § 1517 were met and therefore an order granting
        recognition was warranted.
                Al Zawawi did not dispute that the requirements of § 1517
        had been met but insisted that the petition be denied and the case
        dismissed because § 109(a) was not satisfied. 2 Section 109(a) gov-
        erns “[w]ho may be a debtor” under title 11, i.e., the Bankruptcy
        Code. See § 109(a). It states that, “[n]otwithstanding any other pro-
        vision of this section, only a person that resides or has a domicile,
        a place of business, or property in the United States, or a munici-
        pality, may be a debtor under this title.” 3 Id. Al Zawawi main-
        tained that he did not “reside[] or [have] a domicile, a place of busi-
        ness, or property in the United States” as of the petition date and,
        as a result, could not properly be a debtor under title 11, including
        Chapter 15. The Foreign Representatives, meanwhile, rejected the
        premise that § 109(a) applies to Chapter 15 cases but argued that,
        even if it did, it is satisfied by Al Zawawi’s property interests de-
        scribed above.
                Following briefing and a hearing on the petition for recogni-
        tion, the bankruptcy court issued a ruling from the bench in accord-
        ance with 11 U.S.C. § 1517(c). See id. (“A petition for recognition
        of a foreign proceeding shall be decided upon at the earliest

        2 Al Zawawi also initially raised an improper venue objection to recognition,

        citing 28 U.S.C. § 1410. Al Zawawi has since abandoned that argument.
        3 Chapter 1’s actual definition of “debtor” is provided in 11 U.S.C. § 101(13),
        which states that “[t]he term ‘debtor’ means person or municipality concern-
        ing which a case under this title has been commenced.”
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 7 of 72

        22-11024               Opinion of the Court                         7

        possible time.”). The bankruptcy court granted the petition for
        recognition and, in doing so, determined that § 109(a) does not ap-
        ply to Chapter 15 cases. The bankruptcy court further determined
        that, even if § 109(a) did apply to such cases, the Foreign Represent-
        atives sufficiently showed that Al Zawawi had property interests in
        the United States. The bankruptcy court also provided notice that,
        given the expedited nature of its ruling, it may issue “a supple-
        mental opinion later.”
               The bankruptcy court subsequently entered a written order
        in which it granted the recognition request, recognized the auto-
        matic stay, and prohibited the transfer, encumbrance, and disposal
        of Al Zawawi’s assets pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1520–21. Similar to
        its bench ruling, the bankruptcy court’s written order noted that it
        “may render a supplemental decision to expand on [its] holding.”
               Al Zawawi timely appealed the bankruptcy court’s order
        granting recognition to the district court. While that appeal was
        pending and as contemplated by the initial written order, the bank-
        ruptcy court issued a supplemental opinion that expanded upon
        the ruling offered at the hearing and more thoroughly engaged
        with the arguments presented.
                Following the bankruptcy court’s supplemental opinion, the
        parties filed their appellate briefs with the district court. The dis-
        trict court ultimately affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order grant-
        ing recognition on the basis that § 109(a) does not apply to Chapter
        15 cases. The district court did not address the bankruptcy court’s
        alternative determination that Al Zawawi satisfies § 109(a) due to
USCA11 Case: 22-11024         Document: 53-1    Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 8 of 72

        8                        Opinion of the Court                22-11024

        his property interests in the United States. A corresponding judg-
        ment was entered the next day.
               Al Zawawi then timely appealed to this Court.
                        II.      STANDARDS OF REVIEW
               “In bankruptcy appeals, we act as a second court of review,
        independently examining the decisions of the [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt
        and applying the same standards as the [d]istrict [c]ourt.” In re Nica
        Holdings, Inc., 810 F.3d 781, 785–86 (11th Cir. 2015). We therefore
        consider the bankruptcy court’s decision directly, reviewing find-
        ings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. Id. at 786.
        For their part, jurisdictional issues are reviewed de novo. In re Do-
        novan, 532 F.3d 1134, 1136 (11th Cir. 2008).
                                   III.   ANALYSIS
               As previewed, the central issue on appeal is whether § 109(a)
        applies to Chapter 15 cases and imposes a prerequisite for the
        recognition of a foreign proceeding. Before addressing that issue,
        however, we first must determine whether we have jurisdiction to
        hear this appeal. See Ray v. Edwards, 725 F.2d 655, 658 n.3 (11th Cir.
        1984) (“This court has a duty to review its jurisdiction of an appeal,
        sua sponte at any point in the appellate process.”).
                                  A.      Jurisdiction
               In general, this Court “has jurisdiction over only final judg-
        ments and orders,” In re F.D.R. Hickory House, Inc., 60 F.3d 724, 725
        (11th Cir. 1995) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)), and a judgment or order
        is considered “final” only if it “ends the litigation on the merits and
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 9 of 72

        22-11024               Opinion of the Court                         9

        leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,” Cat-
        lin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). In the bankruptcy con-
        text, however, a judgment or order is considered “final” as long as
        it resolves a “proceeding”—even if it does not resolve the entire
        case. See Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582,
        586–87 (2020); In re Charter Co., 778 F.2d 617, 621 (11th Cir. 1985).
        This is because bankruptcy cases often “encompass[] numerous ‘in-
        dividual controversies, . . . which would exist as stand-alone law-
        suits but for the bankrupt status of the debtor,’” and which are
        “linked, one dependent on the outcome of another.” Ritzen, 140 S.
        Ct. at 586–87 (quoting Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501
        (2015)). Delaying appeal of a decision that resolves a discrete con-
        troversy early on in a bankruptcy case therefore carries a risk of
        substantial inefficiency in the event of a reversal, i.e., the bank-
        ruptcy court could have to “un-ravel” several subsequent adjudica-
        tions “rendered in reliance on [the] earlier decision.” Id. at 587.
                Thus, conducting a finality analysis in the bankruptcy con-
        text naturally involves a tricky task of “considerable importance”:
        correctly delineating the dimensions of a bankruptcy “proceeding.”
        Id. Fortunately, the Supreme Court recently offered guidance on
        how to navigate these waters in Ritzen, where it held that the adju-
        dication of a stay-relief motion in the bankruptcy context consti-
        tutes its own “proceeding” for finality purposes. Id. at 587–92. In
        reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court identified two im-
        portant features of the adjudication of a stay-relief motion: (1) it
        involves “a discrete procedural sequence, including notice and a
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 10 of 72

        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11024

        hearing,” as set forth by statute, and (2) it “occurs before and apart
        from the proceedings on the merits of creditors’ claims.” Id. at 589.
              In this case, we must determine whether an order granting
        recognition of a foreign proceeding resolves a discrete bankruptcy
        “proceeding.” Both sides argue that such an order does resolve a
        “proceeding” and is thus considered “final” under the Ritzen frame-
        work. We agree.
               Like motions to stay relief, petitions for recognition trigger
        “a discrete procedural sequence” that includes “notice and a hear-
        ing.” See 11 U.S.C. § 1517(a). And although the adjudication of a
        petition for recognition does not occur “before” the proceedings
        on the merits, i.e., the foreign proceeding, it occurs “apart” from
        those proceedings in the sense that it introduces for the first time
        and fully occurs in a new legal system, i.e., the federal courts of the
        United States. Moreover, in cases like this one, the entire Chapter
        15 action rests on the initial decision to recognize a foreign pro-
        ceeding. Thus, in such cases, delaying appeal of orders granting
        recognition presents precisely the kind of risk to judicial economy
        highlighted by the Supreme Court. See Ritzen, 140 S. Ct. at 587
        (“Reversal of a decision made early on could require the bank-
        ruptcy court to unravel later adjudications rendered in reliance on
        an earlier decision.”). Lastly, the adjudication of a petition for
        recognition is not a “dispute[] over minor details about how a bank-
        ruptcy case will unfold”—it is what determines whether the parties
        to a foreign proceeding will have access to the judicial resources
        and power of the United States. Id. at 590. That access can have
USCA11 Case: 22-11024         Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024          Page: 11 of 72

        22-11024                    Opinion of the Court                                11

        significant implications for enormous amounts of property held in
        the United States and abroad. For all of these reasons, we are sat-
        isfied that an order granting recognition of a foreign proceeding
        constitutes a final order under the Ritzen framework. Thus, the
        order granting recognition in this case is subject to our jurisdiction
        under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).
                                      B.      The Merits
               Having determined that we have jurisdiction over this ap-
        peal, we turn now to the central issue presented: whether § 109(a)
        applies to Chapter 15 cases and imposes a prerequisite for the
        recognition of a foreign proceeding.
               A plain reading of the Bankruptcy Code—specifically
        § 103(a)—indicates that § 109(a) does apply to Chapter 15 cases.
        Section 103 governs the “[a]pplicability of [the] chapters” of title 11,
        and subsection (a) states as follows: “Except as provided in section
        1161 of this title, chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case
        under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, and this chapter, sections
        307, 362(o), 555 through 557, and 559 through 562 apply in a case under
        chapter 15.” 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (emphasis added). “[T]his chapter,”
        as used above in § 103(a) of Chapter 1 of title 11, refers to Chapter
        1. 4 And unlike Chapters 3 and 5, for which § 103(a) identifies the
        particular sections that apply to Chapter 15 cases, Chapter 1 is ref-
        erenced as a whole, without any indication that certain sections are

        4 The sections of title 11 are numbered in accordance with the chapter in which

        they are included. For instance, § 103 is part of chapter 1, § 307 is part of chap-
        ter 3, and § 555 is part of chapter 5.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024        Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024        Page: 12 of 72

        12                           Opinion of the Court                    22-11024

        excluded from application to Chapter 15. Moreover, nothing in 11
        U.S.C. § 1161—the section cited in the subordinating clause at the
        start of § 103(a)—limits the application of Chapter 1 to cases under
        Chapter 15. Accordingly, § 103(a) plainly provides that the entirety
        of Chapter 1 applies to cases under Chapter 15. It therefore neces-
        sarily follows that § 109(a), as a part of Chapter 1, applies to cases
        under Chapter 15.
               The Second Circuit correctly described this interpretation of
        § 103(a) as “straightforward.” In re Barnet, 737 F.3d 238, 247 (2d Cir.
        2013). In fact, the Second Circuit addressed the same question on
        appeal here and concluded that the plain reading of § 103(a) con-
        trols. Id. at 246–51.
               But we are differently situated from the Second Circuit in
        that we are bound by prior precedent that states that Chapter 1’s
        debtor eligibility language does not apply to cases ancillary to a for-
        eign proceeding. See In re Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1988); see
        also Generali v. D’Amico, 766 F.2d 485, 489 (11th Cir. 1985) (“This
        Court is bound by the case law of the Eleventh Circuit . . . .”). In
        Goerg, this Court dealt with the question of whether the would-be
        debtor in a case brought under the former § 304 5—the predecessor

        5 The former 11 U.S.C.   § 304 was titled “[c]ases ancillary to foreign proceed-
        ings” and read as follows:
               (a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by
               the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under this
               section by a foreign representative.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024       Document: 53-1          Date Filed: 04/03/2024          Page: 13 of 72

        22-11024                  Opinion of the Court                               13

              (b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, if
              a party in interest does not timely controvert the petition, or
              after trial, the court may—
                   (1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of—
                       (A) any action against—
                           (i) a debtor with respect to property in-
                           volved in such foreign proceeding; or
                           (ii) such property; or
                       (B) the enforcement of any judgment against
                       the debtor with respect to such property, or
                       any act or the commencement or continuation
                       of any judicial proceeding to create or enforce
                       a lien against the property of such estate;
                   (2) order turnover of the property of such estate, or the
                   proceeds of such property, to such foreign representa-
                   tive; or
                   (3) order other appropriate relief.
              (c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b)
              of this section, the court shall be guided by what will best as-
              sure an economical and expeditious administration of such es-
              tate, consistent with—
                   (1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or in-
                   terests in such estate;
                   (2) protection of claim holders in the United States
                   against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing
                   of claims in such foreign proceeding;
                   (3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent disposi-
                   tions of property of such estate;
                   (4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially
                   in accordance with the order prescribed by this title;
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024          Page: 14 of 72

        14                       Opinion of the Court                         22-11024

        to Chapter 15—must fall within Chapter 1’s definition of a
        “debtor,” and this Court ultimately said no. 844 F.2d at 1566–68.
                In reaching that answer, this Court first identified a point of
        tension between § 101’s definitions of “debtor” and “foreign pro-
        ceeding.” Id. at 1566–67. The term “debtor” was defined, at the
        time, in the same way that it is defined today: to mean a “person or
        municipality concerning which a case under this title has been com-
        menced.” Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1982), with 11 U.S.C.
        § 101(13). The term “foreign proceeding,” meanwhile, was defined
        as follows:
               [A] proceeding whether judicial or administrative and
               whether or not under bankruptcy law, in a foreign
               country in which the debtor’s domicile, residence,
               principal place of business, or principal assets were lo-
               cated at the commencement of such proceeding, for
               the purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts
               by composition, extension, or discharge, or effecting
               a reorganization.
        11 U.S.C. § 101(22) (Supp. IV 1986). Thus, as this Court high-
        lighted, those two definitions presented the following “anomaly”:
               [A]lthough the inclusion of the term “debtor” in the
               definition of “foreign proceeding” suggests that the
               subject of the foreign proceeding must qualify as a

                  (5) comity; and
                  (6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a
                  fresh start for the individual that such foreign proceed-
                  ing concerns.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 15 of 72

        22-11024                Opinion of the Court                        15

               “debtor” under United States bankruptcy law, the
               [Bankruptcy] Code expressly provides that the for-
               eign proceeding need not even be a bankruptcy pro-
               ceeding, either under foreign or United States law.
        Goerg, 844 F.2d at 1566–67.
             This Court then identified two possible ways to resolve that
        anomaly:
               First, we could adopt the position . . . that the [Bank-
               ruptcy] Code’s narrow definition of “debtor” con-
               trols, notwithstanding the otherwise expansive defi-
               nition of “foreign proceeding.” Alternatively, we
               could adopt the view that the term “debtor” as used
               in the section 304 context incorporates the definition
               of “debtor” used by the forum in which the foreign
               proceeding is pending. Under this alternative view,
               the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to entertain the
               section 304 petition provided that the debtor qualifies
               for relief under applicable foreign law, and provided
               further that the foreign proceeding to which the
               debtor is subject is “for the purpose of liquidating an
               estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension, or
               discharge, or effecting a reorganization.”
        Id. at 1567.
               In deciding between those two options, this Court relied on
        the “purpose” of § 304 to break the tie. Id. at 1567–68. This Court
        identified § 304’s purpose as being “to ‘prevent dismemberment by
        local creditors’ of assets located in this country that are involved in
        a foreign insolvency proceeding” and, more generally, “to help
USCA11 Case: 22-11024        Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024    Page: 16 of 72

        16                        Opinion of the Court                    22-11024

        further the efficiency of foreign insolvency proceedings involving
        worldwide assets.” Id. at 1568 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at
        324 (1977)). In light of that understanding of § 304’s purpose, this
        Court concluded that “it would make little sense to require that the
        subject of the foreign proceeding qualify as a ‘debtor’ under United
        States bankruptcy law,” and that instead it “would make eminent
        sense for Congress to define expansively the class of foreign insol-
        vency proceedings for which ancillary assistance is available.” Id.
                Accordingly, in the end, this Court chose the second option
        for resolving the described tension and held that the debtor in an
        ancillary assistance case under § 304 “need only be properly sub-
        ject” to a “foreign proceeding” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code.
        Id. at 1568. In other words, this Court determined that “‘debtor’
        eligibility under the [Bankruptcy] Code” was not “a prerequisite to
        section 304 ancillary assistance.” Id.
               As relevant here, the Bankruptcy Code’s current definitions
        of “debtor” and “foreign proceeding” present an “anomaly” for
        Chapter 15 that is similar to the one identified and resolved in
        Goerg. This is so because: (1) like the former § 304, Chapter 15 con-
        cerns ancillary assistance for “foreign proceedings” and (2) since
        Goerg, the definition of “debtor” has remained the same 6 and the
        definition of “foreign proceeding” has changed only somewhat.7

        6 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1982), with 11 U.S.C. § 101(13).

        7 At the time Goerg was decided, Chapter 1 defined “foreign proceeding” to

        mean:
USCA11 Case: 22-11024         Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 17 of 72

        22-11024                   Opinion of the Court                                17

        Our decision in Goerg therefore counsels us to consider the purpose
        of Chapter 15 in resolving this definitional anomaly and suggests
        that, if the purpose of Chapter 15 sufficiently tracks that of the for-
        mer § 304, we should reach the same outcome.
              Given the inescapable indeterminacy of a purposive ap-
        proach to statutory interpretation, 8 it is impossible to confidently

                [a] proceeding, whether judicial or administrative and whether
                or not under bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the
                debtor’s domicile, residence, principal place of business, or
                principal assets were located at the commencement of such
                proceeding, for the purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting
                debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or effecting a
                reorganization.
        11 U.S.C. § 101(22) (Supp. IV 1986). Today, Chapter 1 defines “foreign pro-
        ceeding” to mean:
                a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign
                country, including an interim proceeding, under a law relating
                to insolvency or adjustment of debt in which proceeding the
                assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or super-
                vision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or
                liquidation.
        11 U.S.C. § 101(23). Thus, both definitions of “foreign proceeding” include
        the term “debtor” but are not strictly limited to bankruptcy proceedings.
        8 See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal

        Texts 18–19 (2012) (“The most destructive (and most alluring) feature of pur-
        posivism is its manipulability. Any provision of law . . . can be said to have a
        number of purposes, which can be placed on a ladder of abstraction. . . . The
        purposivist, who derives the meaning of text from purpose and not purpose
        from the meaning of text, is free to climb up this ladder of purposes and to ‘fill
        in’ or change the text according to the level of generality he has chosen.”).
USCA11 Case: 22-11024         Document: 53-1          Date Filed: 04/03/2024           Page: 18 of 72

        18                          Opinion of the Court                         22-11024

        determine the degree to which Goerg’s understanding of the pur-
        pose of the former § 304 can be grafted onto Chapter 15. Every
        statute is a compromise of multiple interests, 9 and the purpose of
        any given statute is shaped by both what the statute says and does
        not say. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
        Interpretation of Texts 21 (2012) (“[L]imiting provisions (or the ab-
        sence of more expansive provisions) are no less a reflection of the
        genuine ‘purpose’ of [a] statute than the operative provisions, and
        it is not the court’s function to alter the legislative compromise.”).
        Moreover, the meaning—and therefore the purpose—of any par-
        ticular statutory language is necessarily shaped by its surrounding
        statutory context. See id. § 24, at 167 (“[T]he whole-text canon . . .
        calls on the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in view
        of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many
        parts. . . . Context is a primary determinant of meaning.”); see also
        id. § 39, at 252–53 (“Part of [a] statute’s context is the corpus juris of
        which it forms a part . . . .”). These principles play out in immeas-
        urable ways through the many differences between the former
        § 304 and Chapter 15. For instance, the former § 304 did not entitle
        debtors to the automatic stay, as we highlighted in Goerg, 10 whereas

        9 See Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 345 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[S]tatutes are

        motivated by many competing—and often contradictory—purposes. Con-
        gress addresses these purposes by negotiating, crafting, and enacting statutory
        text. It is that text that controls, not a court’s after-the-fact reevaluation of the
        purposes behind it.”).
        10 See Goerg, 844 F.2d at 1568 (“That the section 304 debtor is denied [the ben-

        efit of the automatic stay] strongly suggests that Congress did not intend that
USCA11 Case: 22-11024        Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 19 of 72

        22-11024                   Opinion of the Court                               19

        Chapter 15 establishes that the automatic stay applies upon the
        recognition of a foreign main proceeding. See 11 U.S.C.
        § 1520(a)(1). Further, the former § 304 was shaped by a version of
        Chapter 1 that did not contain an equivalent of § 109(a)’s restriction
        on who may constitute a debtor or of § 103(a)’s indication that all
        of Chapter 1 applies to cases ancillary to a foreign proceeding,
        whereas Chapter 15 is shaped by a version of Chapter 1 that obvi-
        ously does contain those sections. 11 See id. §§ 103(a), 109(a).
               Despite these diﬀerences, however, we believe that the for-
        mer § 304 and Chapter 15 are suﬃciently similar in terms of their
        purposes such that our decision in Goerg controls our analysis in
        this case. One of the main aims of Chapter 15, according to the
        Chapter’s own “purpose” clause, is to “provide eﬀective mecha-
        nisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency.” 11 U.S.C.
        § 1501(a). In Goerg, this Court interpreted the former § 304 as hav-
        ing the same purpose. 844 F.2d at 1568. And, based on that pur-
        pose, this Court interpreted the deﬁnition of “foreign proceeding”
        and determined that a debtor in a case ancillary to a foreign

        ‘debtor’ eligibility under the [Bankruptcy] Code be a prerequisite to section
        304 ancillary assistance.”).
        11 Another difference between the former § 304 and Chapter 15 is that Chapter

        15 provides its own definition of the term “debtor”—which is nearly identical
        to the definition used in Goerg—whereas § 304 did not. See 11 U.S.C. § 1502(1)
        (defining “debtor,” for purposes of Chapter 15, to mean “an entity that is the
        subject of a foreign proceeding”). Unlike the other differences highlighted
        herein, this difference seems to support applying Goerg’s reasoning to Chapter
        15. But see Barnet, 737 F.3d at 249 (reasoning that § 1502(1) supplants § 101(13)
        but not § 109(a)).
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1     Date Filed: 04/03/2024    Page: 20 of 72

        20                    Opinion of the Court                22-11024

        proceeding “need only be properly subject, under applicable for-
        eign law,” to a “foreign proceeding” as deﬁned in the Bankruptcy
        Code. Id. Given the similarities of the deﬁnitions of “foreign pro-
        ceedings” in both Chapter 15 and the former § 304—e.g., both def-
        initions require a “debtor”—and wary of slicing our binding prece-
        dent too thin, we follow the logic of Goerg and hold that, based on
        the deﬁnition of “foreign proceeding” in § 101(12), as informed by
        the purpose of Chapter 15, debtor eligibility under Chapter 1 is not
        a prerequisite for the recognition of a foreign proceeding under
        Chapter 15. With § 109(a) therefore out of the picture, no dispute
        remains. Al Zawawi is properly subject to a “foreign proceeding,”
        and the requirements for recognition listed in § 1517 are met.
                              IV.    CONCLUSION
               Accordingly, we affirm the bankruptcy court’s order grant-
        ing recognition.
              AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 21 of 72

        22-11024          LAGOA, J., Specially Concurring                   1

        LAGOA, Circuit Judge, Circuit Judge, Specially Concurring:
               For the reasons discussed in the majority opinion, I agree
        that Goerg compels the result reached by the majority opinion. But
        if we were writing on a clean slate, I would reverse the bankruptcy
        court’s determination that 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) does not apply to
        Chapter 15 cases in accordance with the plain text of 11 U.S.C.
        § 103(a). See Maj. Op. at 12–13. I write separately to address the
        Foreign Representatives’ four main arguments supporting the ap-
        plication of Goerg and why I do not believe they are supported by
        the text of the Bankruptcy Code.
                The Foreign Representatives’ first argument for why
        § 109(a) does not impose a prerequisite for recognition is rooted in
        the language of 11 U.S.C. § 1517(a). Section 1517(a) lists require-
        ments for recognition, including the implied requirement that
        there be proper notice and a hearing, and states that, if those re-
        quirements are met, an order granting recognition “shall be en-
        tered.” (Emphasis added). The Foreign Representatives contend
        that the use of “shall” indicates that § 1517(a) sets forth an exhaus-
        tive list of requirements for recognition and, so the argument goes,
        the absence of any reference in § 1517(a) to § 109(a) indicates that
        satisfying § 109(a) is not a prerequisite for recognition.
                The problem with this argument is it overlooks that debtor
        eligibility is baked into the requirements of § 1517(a). The require-
        ments of § 1517(a) expressly contemplate and impliedly depend on
        the existence of some related “foreign proceeding,” see 11 U.S.C.
        § 1517(a)(1)–(3), and the Bankruptcy Code’s deﬁnition of “foreign
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024    Page: 22 of 72

        2                 LAGOA, J., Specially Concurring          22-11024

        proceeding” similarly expressly contemplates and impliedly de-
        pends on the existence of some related “debtor,” see id. § 101(23).
        That is where § 109(a) comes into play: it describes “[w]ho may be
        a debtor.” Thus, when read plainly and together with Chapter 1,
        the requirements of § 1517(a) themselves require satisfaction of
        § 109(a), even though § 1517(a) alone does not spell that out.
                The Foreign Representatives’ second argument purports to
        highlight an irreconcilable conﬂict between § 109(a) and 11 U.S.C.
        § 1502. Section 1502 deﬁnes a list of terms “for purposes of [Chap-
        ter 15],” and subsection (1) deﬁnes the term “debtor” to mean “an
        entity that is the subject of a foreign proceeding.” 11 U.S.C.
        § 1502(1). The Foreign Representatives contend that § 1502(1)’s use
        of the broad term “entity” conﬂicts with § 109(a), which limits
        debtors under title 11 to “person[s] that reside[] or [have] a domi-
        cile, a place of business, or property in the United States” and “mu-
        nicipalit[ies].” See id. § 101(15) (deﬁning “entity” to include “per-
        son[s], estate[s], trust[s], governmental unit[s], and United States
        trustee[s]”). Speciﬁcally, the Foreign Representatives highlight that
        § 1502(1) seemingly allows for estates, trusts, and certain govern-
        ment units to be debtors whereas § 109(a) appears to categorically
        exclude them from being such. Even so, the supposed debtor in
        this case is a person, not an estate, trust, or government unit. And,
        with respect to persons, § 1502(1) neither contains its own, con-
        trary residency/property requirement, nor clearly spurns the pos-
        sibility of any such requirement. Thus, as far as this case is con-
        cerned, § 1502(1) and § 109(a) can easily be read in harmony:
        § 1502(1) recognizes that persons can be debtors in Chapter 15
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 23 of 72

        22-11024          LAGOA, J., Specially Concurring                    3

        cases, and § 109(a) imposes a residency/property requirement that
        must be satisﬁed for a person to be qualify as a debtor. See Antonin
        Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Texts
        § 27, at 180 (2012) (“The provisions of a text should be interpreted
        in a way that renders them compatible, not contradictory.”).
                The Foreign Representatives’ third argument is that applying
        § 109(a) to cases under Chapter 15 would render part of 11 U.S.C.
        § 1528 superﬂuous. Section 1528 states, in pertinent part, that
        “[a]fter recognition of a foreign main proceeding, a case under an-
        other chapter of this title may be commenced only if the debtor has
        assets in the United States.” (Emphasis added). The Foreign Repre-
        sentatives contend that § 1528’s asset requirement has no eﬀect if
        § 109(a) already independently requires that the debtor be either (1)
        a person who “resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or
        property in the United States” or (2) a municipality. See 11 U.S.C.
        § 109(a). But this argument rests on the faulty assumption that any
        debtor who satisﬁes § 109(a) necessarily “has assets in the United
        States.” As noted during oral argument in this case, it is possible
        that an individual debtor might reside in the United States without
        personally owning any assets in the country—for example, he may
        rely exclusively on assets held abroad or owned by a trust. It like-
        wise is possible that a municipal debtor might not itself own any
        assets at all. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(40). Thus, there are potential cases
        where a debtor satisﬁes § 109(a) but not § 1528’s asset requirement.
        In such cases, if a foreign main proceeding has been recognized,
        § 1528’s asset requirement certainly has an eﬀect: it prohibits the
        commencement of a case under any other Chapter of title 11.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1     Date Filed: 04/03/2024      Page: 24 of 72

        4                LAGOA, J., Specially Concurring           22-11024

               The Foreign Representatives’ fourth argument is that apply-
        ing § 109(a) to cases under Chapter 15 would render parts of 28
        U.S.C. § 1410 superﬂuous. Section 1410 is the venue statute for
        Chapter 15 cases and provides:
              A case under chapter 15 of title 11 may be com-
              menced in the district court of the United States for
              the district—
              (1) in which the debtor has its principal place of busi-
              ness or principal assets in the United States;
              (2) if the debtor does not have a place of business or
              assets in the United States, in which there is pending
              against the debtor an action or proceeding in a Fed-
              eral or State court; or
              (3) in a case other than those specified in paragraph
              (1) or (2), in which venue will be consistent with the
              interests of justice and the convenience of the parties,
              having regard to the relief sought by the foreign rep-
              resentative.
        The Foreign Representatives argue that, if § 109(a) applies to cases
        under Chapter 15, every debtor who satisﬁes § 109(a) necessarily
        will have a “principal place of business or principal assets in the
        United States” and therefore satisfy § 1410(1), rendering subsec-
        tions (2) and (3) meaningless in all cases. Like the Foreign Repre-
        sentatives’ § 1528 argument, this argument rests on a faulty as-
        sumption. It is entirely possible that a Chapter 15 debtor might
        satisfy § 109(a) through residence or domicile in the United States
        but not have a principal place of business or principal property in
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 25 of 72

        22-11024          LAGOA, J., Specially Concurring                   5

        the United States and therefore not satisfy § 1410(1). In such cases,
        § 1410(2) and (3) would come into play and determine where venue
        lies.
                                       ****
               In sum, § 103(a) plainly provides that § 109(a) applies to
        cases under Chapter 15, and I do not find any of the Foreign Rep-
        resentatives’ counterarguments based on the text of the Bank-
        ruptcy Code to be persuasive. Regardless, this Court’s reasoning
        in Goerg suggests that § 109(a) does not apply to cases ancillary to a
        foreign proceeding, and we are bound by that precedent. “Under
        the prior precedent rule, we are bound to follow a prior binding
        precedent ‘unless and until it is overruled by this court en banc or
        by the Supreme Court.’” See United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d
        1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Brown, 342 F.3d
        1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003)). But if we were not so bound, I would
        adhere to the plain meaning of § 103(a) and reverse the bankruptcy
        court’s determination that § 109(a) does not apply to Chapter 15
        cases.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024          Document: 53-1       Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 26 of 72

        22-11024            TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                         1

        TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, Specially Concurring:
               I agree with the majority that we are bound by In re Goerg,
        844 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1988), where we held that debtor eligibility
        under the then-applicable bankruptcy code did not limit recogni-
        tion of foreign proceedings. But I write separately because I re-
        spectfully disagree with the majority’s interpretation of In re Goerg
        as abstract purposivism. Rather, I believe we are bound by In re
        Goerg because the current definition of a foreign proceeding1 is sub-
        stantially the same as the one we soundly interpreted in In re Goerg, 2
        and whether a court can recognize a foreign proceeding depends

        1 The current definition of “foreign proceeding” provides, in full:
               The term “foreign proceeding” means a collective judicial or
               administrative proceeding in a foreign country, including an
               interim proceeding, under a law relating to insolvency or ad-
               justment of debt in which proceeding the assets and affairs of
               the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign
               court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.
        11 U.S.C. § 101(23).
        2 The definition of “foreign proceeding” we interpreted in In re Goerg provided,
        in full:
                “[F]oreign proceeding” means proceeding, whether judicial or
                administrative and whether or not under bankruptcy law, in a
                foreign country in which the debtor’s domicile, residence,
                principal place of business, or principal assets were located at
                the commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of liq-
                uidating an estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension,
                or discharge, or effecting a reorganization.
        844 F.2d at 1565 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(22) (1982)).
USCA11 Case: 22-11024         Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 27 of 72

        2                   TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                  22-11024

        on whether the proceeding meets that definition. In any event, the
        current statute contains additional support for the conclusion that
        American courts can recognize foreign proceedings regardless of
        whether the debtor subject to the foreign proceeding is eligible to
        commence a United States bankruptcy proceeding.
                In Part I of this special concurrence, I discuss Title 11 of the
        United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”). I cover the basics of
        how American bankruptcy proceedings work in Part I.A., and how
        they contrast with ancillary proceedings in Part I.B. In Part II.A., I
        discuss our interpretation of “foreign proceeding” in In re Goerg. In
        Part II.B., I explain why the current definition of “foreign proceed-
        ing” is materially the same as the one we interpreted in In re Goerg,
        showing why we are bound by that case.
                In Part II.C., I discuss how § 1502’s definition of “debtor” for
        the purposes of Chapter 15 is broader than § 109(a)’s limit on “who
        may be a debtor.”3 Section 1502(1) 4 covers foreign proceedings in-
        volving “entit[ies],” while § 109(a) only includes “person[s].” See 1
        Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1.01[2][a] (“A ‘person’ may be eligible for
        relief under the Code by virtue of section 109, but one who is an
        ‘entity’ and not a ‘person’”—such as a probate estate, In re Goerg,
        844 F.2d at 1565–66—“would not be eligible.”). I also emphasize

        3 Section 109(a) says: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this section,
        only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in
        the United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under this title.”
        4 Section 1502(1) says: “‘debtor’ means an entity that is the subject of a foreign
        proceeding.”
USCA11 Case: 22-11024        Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 28 of 72

        22-11024            TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                          3

        that Chapter 15 incorporates the UNCITRAL 5 Model Law on Cross-
        Border Insolvency (1997) (the “Model Law”). See § 1501(a) (“The pur-
        pose of this chapter is to incorporate the Model Law on Cross-Bor-
        der Insolvency so as to provide effective mechanisms for dealing
        with cases of cross-border insolvency.”). And interpreting Chapter
        15 in light of its “international origin”—as § 1508 6 requires—con-
        firms that domestic debtor eligibility under § 109(a) is not relevant
        to recognizing a foreign proceeding under Chapter 15. The Guide
        Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
        Cross-Border Insolvency (the “Enactment Guide”) UNCITRAL is-
        sued alongside the Model Law says so directly. 7 I then discuss the
        proceedings in this case, which illustrate why applying debtor eli-
        gibility under § 109(a) to recognition of foreign proceedings

        5 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”).
        6 Section 1508 mandates that, “[i]n interpreting this chapter, the court shall
        consider its international origin, and the need to promote an application of this
        chapter that is consistent with the application of similar statutes adopted by
        foreign jurisdictions.”
        7 UNCITRAL, Guide to Enactment and Interpretation of the UNCITRAL Model Law
        on Cross-Border Insolvency, ¶ 55 (2013), available at https://un-
        citral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/un-
        citral/en/1997-model-law-insol-2013-guide-enactment-e.pdf. The Guide was
        updated in 2013 to help clarify the concept of a “center of main interests” in
        describing a foreign main proceeding. ¶ 18. Paragraph 55 in the 2013 version
        of the Guide appeared as ¶ 60 in the 1997 version. UNCITRAL Table of Con-
        cordance: Guide to Enactment (1997)—Guide to Enactment and Interpreta-
        tion       (2013),    available      at     https://uncitral.un.org/sites/un-
        citral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/table_of_concordance-
        1997-2013-guide-enactment.pdf.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 29 of 72

        4                TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring           22-11024

        encourages fraudulent transfers. That flies in the face of what one
        would expect given the statute’s history and purposes.
                                          I.
                                          A.
                “The principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a
        fresh start to the honest but unfortunate debtor.” Marrama v. Citi-
        zens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365, 367, 127 S. Ct. 1105, 1107
        (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In bankruptcy,
        “through orderly and centralized liquidation or through reorgani-
        zation or rehabilitation, creditors of equal priority receive ratable
        and equitable distributions designed to serve ‘the prime bank-
        ruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors of the
        debtor.’” 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1.01[1] (16th ed. 2023) (quoting
        Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161, 112 S. Ct. 527, 533 (1991)
        (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 at 177–78 (1977)). The goal is to
        settle the debtor’s obligations using the assets he has left before the
        remaining obligations are discharged. Discharge then enables “the
        debtor to begin a new financial life.” 1 Collier on Bankruptcy,
        ¶ 1.02 [1] (16th ed. 2023).
                The bankruptcy process requires collecting the debtor’s as-
        sets into a bankruptcy “estate” created under 11 U.S.C. § 541 “that
        comprises all of the debtor’s interests, legal and equitable, in prop-
        erty wherever located and by whomever held . . . . at the date of
        the filing of the petition.” 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1.03[1] (16th
USCA11 Case: 22-11024         Document: 53-1        Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 30 of 72

        22-11024             TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                       5

        ed. 2023). A representative of that estate, the trustee, 8 then lines
        up the debtor’s creditors by priority to decide which can obtain
        some or all of what the debtor owes them. See 1 Collier on Bank-
        ruptcy ¶ 1.03[2]–[4] (16th ed. 2023). “In liquidation, this equates to
        a pro-rata distribution of the debtor’s nonexempt assets to credi-
        tors; in reorganization, the debtor must pay creditors at least this
        liquidation amount as a condition of reorganization or rehabilita-
        tion.” Id. at ¶ 1.03[1].
                Under the Bankruptcy Code, an individual or business can
        seek the discharge or restructuring of debts by filing a “voluntary”
        bankruptcy petition. 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1.01[1], ¶ 1.04[1]
        (16th ed. 2023). The bankruptcy estate is created under § 541 upon
        the filing of a petition. 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1.03[1] (16th ed.
        2023). “A voluntary petition automatically constitutes an order for
        relief,” and “[t]here are no specific allegations that are required for
        the voluntary petition.” Id. at ¶ 1.04[1] (citing 11 U.S.C. § 301). 9

        8 Under Chapter 7, 11, 12, and 13 proceedings, a trustee is appointed to repre-
        sent the estate. In Chapter 9 proceedings, which concern municipalities, the
        bankruptcy court cannot operate the city’s affairs or, except for limited pur-
        poses specified in § 926(a), appoint a trustee. See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy
        ¶ 1.07[2] (16th ed. 2023) (citing § 903 and the Tenth Amendment). I focus on
        bankruptcy proceedings for individuals and businesses.
        9 Section 301 says, in full:
                (a) A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced
                by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such
                chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under such chapter.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024       Document: 53-1        Date Filed: 04/03/2024        Page: 31 of 72

        6                 TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring               22-11024

        But under § 301, the petitioner must “identify[] the chapter of the
        Code pursuant to which relief is requested,” and “[t]he petitioner
        must qualify as a ‘debtor’ under the selected chapter.” 2 Collier on
        Bankruptcy ¶ 301.01 (16th ed. 2023).
                Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code lays out who is eligible
        to “be a debtor” for the purposes of different types of bankruptcy
        proceedings. Section 109(a) creates a minimum threshold. It pro-
        vides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, only a
        person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or prop-
        erty in the United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under
        this title.” § 109(a). That tracks § 101(13)’s definition of debtor, “a
        person or municipality concerning which a case under this title has
        been commenced.” Then, § 109(b) covers eligibility for Chapter 7
        (Liquidation); § 109(c) covers eligibility for Chapter 9 (Adjustment
        of Debts of a Municipality); § 109(d) covers eligibility for Chapter
        11 (Reorganization); § 109(f) covers eligibility for Chapter 12 (Ad-
        justment of Debts of a Family Farmer or Fisherman with Regular
        Income); and § 109(e) covers eligibility for Chapter 13 (Adjustment
        of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income). Section 109 does
        not discuss Chapter 15 or foreign proceedings. See 8 Collier on
        Bankruptcy ¶ 1517.01 (16th ed. 2023) (“Chapter 15 is not listed or
        mentioned in section 109 because chapter 15 contains a distinct def-
        inition of debtor (the subject of the foreign proceeding) who never
        becomes a debtor under title 11.)”).

               (b) The commencement of a voluntary case under a chapter of
               this title constitutes an order for relief under such chapter.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024         Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 32 of 72

        22-11024            TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                           7

               Creditors can also file an “involuntary” bankruptcy petition
        under 11 U.S.C. § 303. 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1.04[2] (16th ed.
        2023). An involuntary proceeding can only travel under Chapter 7
        or 11. § 303(a). The creditors’ “involuntary petition must allege
        either that a custodian was appointed to take charge of all or sub-
        stantially all of the debtor’s property within the preceding 120 days
        or that the debtor is not generally paying its debts as they become
        due.” 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1.04[2] (16th ed. 2023). Creditors
        typically allege the latter. See id. Creditors—especially secured
        creditors concerned about, for example, the dissipation of collat-
        eral—can benefit from prompt and efficient distribution of the
        debtor’s assets so that they obtain at least some of what they are
        owed.
                At the beginning of a bankruptcy case,10 whether “a volun-
        tary or involuntary case, the debtor must file a schedule of assets
        and liabilities, a schedule of current income and expenses, a sched-
        ule of executory contracts, a statement of financial affairs and, if the
        debtor is an individual, a statement of intention as required” under
        11 U.S.C. § 521. 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1.04[3] (16th ed. 2023).
        A debtor who is an individual must also submit “copies of all ‘pay-
        ment advices’ received from the debtor’s employer within 60 days

        10 Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007, if the petitioner did not
        file the schedules with the petition, he must file them within 14 days thereaf-
        ter, except that if the petition is involuntary, the debtor must file the required
        documents within 14 days of the order for relief. This information is “essen-
        tial” to providing notice to creditors to submit claims for recovery. See 1 Col-
        lier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1.04[3] (16th ed. 2023).
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 33 of 72

        8                TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring           22-11024

        of filing, a statement of monthly net income, itemized to show how
        the amount is calculated and a statement disclosing any reasonably
        anticipated changes in the debtor’s monthly net income during the
        year” following the petition’s filing. Id. And under 11 U.S.C.
        § 109(h), “[i]ndividual debtors must also file with the petition a cer-
        tificate establishing that the debtor has received a credit counseling
        briefing within the 180 days preceding the commencement of the
        case. This certificate is necessary for the individual debtor to estab-
        lish his or her eligibility to file.” 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1.04[3]
        (16th ed. 2023).
               We need not cover all the aspects of the Bankruptcy Code,
        but two main aspects of a full-fledged bankruptcy case under Title
        11 are worth mentioning here. One is the automatic stay under 11
        U.S.C. § 362. The automatic stay is triggered upon the filing of a
        bankruptcy petition. § 362. “The automatic stay bars anyone from
        taking action to recover a debt then owing by the debtor or acting
        to affect property of the debtor or the estate or in the possession of
        the estate. It maintains the status quo and prevents dismember-
        ment of the estate by individual action of creditors and others.” 1
        Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1.05[1] (16th ed. 2023). The court can en-
        force the automatic stay through the contempt power or the impo-
        sition of sanctions. Id.
                The trustee’s duties and powers are also important. The
        trustee in a bankruptcy case “is the representative of the estate,”
        § 323(a), “and as such he owes a fiduciary duty to debtor and cred-
        itors alike to act fairly and protect their interests.” In re Whet, 750
USCA11 Case: 22-11024        Document: 53-1        Date Filed: 04/03/2024          Page: 34 of 72

        22-11024           TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                         9

        F.2d 149, 149 (1st Cir. 1984). Section 521(a)(3) requires the debtor
        to “cooperate with the trustee as necessary for the trustee to per-
        form the trustee’s duties,” which can “include actions necessary to
        locating and disposing of property of the estate.” 4 Collier on Bank-
        ruptcy ¶ 521.01 (16th ed. 2023). The trustee can also avoid various
        kinds of transactions. See 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1.05[5] (16th
        ed. 2023). The avoiding power includes the power to help prevent
        fraudulent transfers. The Bankruptcy Code contains two provi-
        sions to that effect. Under § 544(b), 11 the trustee can assert the
        rights of an unsecured creditor to avoid a pre-bankruptcy transfer
        under applicable state law on fraudulent transfers. And under
        § 548, 12 the trustee can avoid a transfer that fits under the

        11 Section 544(b) says:
               (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may avoid
               any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any ob-
               ligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applica-
               ble law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allow-
               able under section 502 of this title [11 U.S.C. § 502] or that is
               not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title [11 U.S.C.
               § 502(e)].
               (2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a transfer of a charitable
               contribution (as that term is defined in section 548(d)(3) [11
               U.S.C. § 548(d)(3)]) that is not covered under section
               548(a)(1)(B) [11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)], by reason of section
               548(a)(2) [11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)]. Any claim by any person to
               recover a transferred contribution described in the preceding
               sentence under Federal or State law in a Federal or State court
               shall be preempted by the commencement of the case.
        12 Collier on Bankruptcy summarizes § 548 as follows:
USCA11 Case: 22-11024        Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 35 of 72

        10                  TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                22-11024

        Bankruptcy Code’s own definition of fraudulent transfers provided
        in § 548.
                                       *       *       *
               The upshot is that a full bankruptcy proceeding involves,
        early in the case: (1) an initial filing claiming the debtor is eligible
        for the requested relief, (2) an automatic stay on proceedings re-
        lated to the debtor’s assets, (3) the creation of an estate covering
        the debtor’s assets, (4) the appointment of a trustee to administer
        and protect the estate, and (5) detailed review of the debtor’s assets
        and obligations. Recognizing a foreign insolvency proceeding oc-
        curs in a very different context. By the time a petition for recogni-
        tion arrives on our shores, the foreign court has already determined
        the debtor’s eligibility under its own law, and the debtor’s assets
        are already under the control of the foreign proceeding. Nor

               Under section 548, the trustee may avoid a transfer made
               within two years prior to bankruptcy if there was an actual in-
               tent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors. The Code also rec-
               ognizes presumptive fraudulent transfers. For instance, no
               specific fraudulent intent is required if the debtor voluntarily
               or involuntarily received less than a reasonably equivalent
               value in exchange and (1) was insolvent at the time of the
               transfer, (2) “was engaged in business or a transaction . . . for
               which any property remaining with the debtor was an unrea-
               sonably small capital” or (3) “intended to incur, or believed
               that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the
               debtor’s ability to pay[.]”
        1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1.05[5][c] (quoting § 548(a)(1)).
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024    Page: 36 of 72

        22-11024         TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                11

        would there be, for example, § 109(h) credit counseling for a debtor
        in a foreign proceeding before a Chapter 15 case would commence.
                                         B.
                On May 30, 1997, UNCITRAL adopted the Model Law on
        Cross-Border Insolvency. UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON
        INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-
        BORDER INSOLVENCY (1997), https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/in-
        solvency/modellaw /cross-border_insolvency. “The Model Law
        [was] accompanied by a Guide to Enactment and Interpretation. .
        . . directed primarily to executive branches of Governments and
        legislators preparing the necessary enacting legislation, but it also
        provides useful insight for those charged with interpretation and
        application of the Model Law, such as judges.” Id. “That the final
        negotiations [on the Model Law] included thirty-six UNCITRAL
        members—including the United States—representatives of forty
        observer states, and thirteen international organizations evidences
        its widespread support.” Tacon v. Petroquest Res. Inc. (In re Condor
        Ins. Ltd.), 601 F.3d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing 1997 Enactment
        Guide at ¶ 8, which is ¶ 16 in the 2013 version). On December 15,
        1997, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution
        recommending that member states consider incorporating
        UNCITRAL’s Model Law, and that “all efforts be made to ensure
        that the Model Law, together with the [UNCITRAL Enactment]
        Guide, become generally known and available.” General Assembly
        Resolution 52/158 ¶ 3–4. In addition, “UNCITRAL has established
        a reporting system for case law on UNCITRAL texts (CLOUT)”
        and composes a digest of international caselaw on interpretation of
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 37 of 72

        12               TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring          22-11024

        the Model Law to help promote uniform interpretation.
        UNCITRAL, DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL
        LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, ¶ 9–11 (2021), available at
        https://uncitral.un.org/en/case_law/digests (“UNCITRAL Di-
        gest”).
               The Enactment Guide explains that the UNCITRAL Model
        Law is designed to help ensure the “rescue of financially troubled
        businesses” and promote “a fair and efficient administration of
        cross-border insolvencies.” ¶ 5. It also states that “[t]he cross-bor-
        der cooperation mechanisms established by the Model Law are de-
        signed to confront” the “increasing problem” of “[f]raud by insol-
        vent debtors, in particular by concealing assets or transferring them
        to foreign jurisdictions.” Id. at ¶ 6.
               In 2005, Congress adopted the Model Law in Title VIII of
        the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
        2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 801 (2005). Section 1501(a) says:
              (a) The purpose of this chapter [11 USCS §§ 1501 et
              seq.] is to incorporate the Model Law on Cross-Bor-
              der Insolvency so as to provide effective mechanisms
              for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency with
              the objectives of—
                     (1) cooperation between—
                            (A) courts of the United States, United
                            States trustees, trustees, examiners,
                            debtors, and debtors in possession; and
USCA11 Case: 22-11024        Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024    Page: 38 of 72

        22-11024           TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                   13

                               (B) the courts and other competent au-
                               thorities of foreign countries involved in
                               cross-border insolvency cases;
                       (2) greater legal certainty for trade and invest-
                       ment;
                       (3) fair and efficient administration of cross-
                       border insolvencies that protects the interests
                       of all creditors, and other interested entities, in-
                       cluding the debtor;
                       (4) protection and maximization of the value
                       of the debtor’s assets; and
                       (5) facilitation of the rescue of financially trou-
                       bled businesses, thereby protecting investment
                       and preserving employment.
        Section 1508, titled “Interpretation,” tells us that, “[i]n interpreting
        this chapter, the court shall consider its international origin, and
        the need to promote an application of this chapter that is consistent
        with the application of similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdic-
        tions.”
               Chapter 15 applies when “assistance is sought in the United
        States by a foreign court or a foreign representative in connection
        with a foreign proceeding.” § 1501(b)(1). Section 1517 defines
        when a United States court can recognize a foreign proceeding.13

        13 Section, 1517, Order granting recognition, provides in full:
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024          Page: 39 of 72

        14                TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                 22-11024

              (a) Subject to section 1506 [11 U.S.C. § 1506, the public policy
              exception], after notice and a hearing, an order recognizing a
              foreign proceeding shall be entered if—
                      (1) such foreign proceeding for which recognition is
                      sought is a foreign main proceeding or foreign non-
                      main proceeding within the meaning of section 1502
                      [11 U.S.C. § 1502];
                      (2) the foreign representative applying for recognition
                      is a person or body; and
                      (3) the petition meets the requirements of section 1515
                      [11 U.S.C. § 1515].
              (b) Such foreign proceeding shall be recognized—
                      (1) as a foreign main proceeding if it is pending in the
                      country where the debtor has the center of its main in-
                      terests; or
                      (2) as a foreign nonmain proceeding if the debtor has
                      an establishment within the meaning of section 1502
                      [11 U.S.C. § 1502] in the foreign country where the
                      proceeding is pending.
              (c) A petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding shall be
              decided upon at the earliest possible time. Entry of an order
              recognizing a foreign proceeding constitutes recognition un-
              der this chapter [11 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq.].
              (d) The provisions of this subchapter [11 U.S.C. §§ 1515 et seq.]
              do not prevent modification or termination of recognition if it
              is shown that the grounds for granting it were fully or partially
              lacking or have ceased to exist, but in considering such action
              the court shall give due weight to possible prejudice to parties
              that have relied upon the order granting recognition. A case
              under this chapter [11 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq.] may be closed in
              the manner prescribed under section 350 [11 U.S.C. § 350].
USCA11 Case: 22-11024       Document: 53-1          Date Filed: 04/03/2024          Page: 40 of 72

        22-11024           TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                         15

        A representative of the foreign proceeding must file an application
        that meets the requirements of § 1515, 14 see § 1517(a)(3), which in-
        clude attaching a “certified copy of the decision commencing such
        foreign proceeding and appointing the foreign representative,” a
        certified document from the foreign court affirming the legitimacy
        of the proceeding and the representative’s authority, or other evi-
        dence of the proceeding’s legitimacy. See § 1515(b). Section
        1516(a) also provides that, “[i]f the decision or certificate referred

        14 Section 1515 provides:
               (a) A foreign representative applies to the court for recognition
               of a foreign proceeding in which the foreign representative has
               been appointed by filing a petition for recognition.
               (b) A petition for recognition shall be accompanied by—
                       (1) a certified copy of the decision commencing such
                       foreign proceeding and appointing the foreign repre-
                       sentative;
                       (2) a certificate from the foreign court affirming the ex-
                       istence of such foreign proceeding and of the appoint-
                       ment of the foreign representative; or
                       (3) in the absence of evidence referred to in paragraphs
                       (1) and (2), any other evidence acceptable to the court
                       of the existence of such foreign proceeding and of the
                       appointment of the foreign representative.
               (c) A petition for recognition shall also be accompanied by a
               statement identifying all foreign proceedings with respect to
               the debtor that are known to the foreign representative.
               (d) The documents referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) of sub-
               section (b) shall be translated into English. The court may re-
               quire a translation into English of additional documents.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024       Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024        Page: 41 of 72

        16                 TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring               22-11024

        to in section 1515(b) [11 USCS § 1515(b)] indicates that the foreign
        proceeding is a foreign proceeding and that the person or body is a
        foreign representative, the court is entitled to so presume.” 15
               A foreign representative must be “a person or body, includ-
        ing a person or body appointed on an interim basis, authorized in
        a foreign proceeding to administer the reorganization or the liqui-
        dation of the debtor’s assets or affairs or to act as a representative
        of such foreign proceeding.” § 101(24). Upon recognition, the for-
        eign representative can sue and be sued in the United States for the
        purposes of the ancillary proceeding and may apply directly to a
        United States court for appropriate relief. § 1509(b)(1)–(2), § 1510.
        The foreign representative can then “participate as a party in inter-
        est in a case regarding the debtor under” the Bankruptcy Code as
        well. § 1512.
                To recognize the foreign proceeding, the court must find
        that the “foreign proceeding for which recognition is sought is a
        foreign main proceeding or foreign nonmain proceeding within the
        meaning of section 1502.” § 1517(a)(1). Section 1502(4) says
        that “‘foreign main proceeding’ means a foreign proceeding pend-
        ing in the country where the debtor has the center of its main in-
        terests.” Under § 1502(5), “‘foreign nonmain proceeding’ means a

        15 “The term ‘foreign representative’ means a person or body, including a per-
        son or body appointed on an interim basis, authorized in a foreign proceeding
        to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor’s assets or
        affairs or to act as a representative of such foreign proceeding.” § 101(24).
USCA11 Case: 22-11024        Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 42 of 72

        22-11024            TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                         17

        foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, pending
        in a country where the debtor has an establishment.”
               To find the proceeding fits under one of those definitions,
        the court must find the proceeding meets the definition of a “for-
        eign proceeding.” Chapter 1 defines a “foreign proceeding.” Un-
        der § 101(23):
                The term “foreign proceeding” means a collective ju-
                dicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign coun-
                try, including an interim proceeding, under a law re-
                lating to insolvency or adjustment of debt in which
                proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are sub-
                ject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for
                the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.
        Congress adopted this definition of “foreign proceeding” from the
        Model Law in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
        Protection Act of 2005. 16

        16 Article 2(a) of the Model Law defines “foreign proceeding” as follows:
                “Foreign proceeding” means a collective judicial or adminis-
                trative proceeding in a foreign State, including an interim pro-
                ceeding, pursuant to a law relating to insolvency in which pro-
                ceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to con-
                trol or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reor-
                ganization or liquidation.
        Other than replacing “pursuant to” with “under” and adding “or adjustment
        of debt” after “a law relating to insolvency,” § 101(23) uses the same definition
        as the Model Law.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 43 of 72

        18               TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring           22-11024

                Because Congress told us to consider the law’s “interna-
        tional origin” in § 1508, and Congress was presumably aware of the
        UNCITRAL Enactment Guide, we consider the Guide important
        context. According to the Enactment Guide, the definition of “for-
        eign proceeding” is designed to be broad and promote substance
        over form. “The definitions of proceedings or persons emanating
        from foreign jurisdictions avoid the use of expressions that may
        have different technical meaning in different legal systems and in-
        stead describe their purpose or function.” Enactment Guide ¶ 65.
        The definition “avoid[s] inadvertently narrowing the range of pos-
        sible foreign proceedings that might obtain recognition and . . . un-
        necessary conflict with terminology used in the laws of the enact-
        ing State.” Id.
                The Guide says the definition of “foreign proceeding” con-
        tains four elements. They are: (1) a basis in insolvency-related law
        of the originating State; (2) involvement of creditors collectively;
        (3) control or supervision of the assets and affairs of the debtor by
        a court or another official body; and (4) reorganization or liquida-
        tion of the debtor as the purpose of the proceeding. Id. at ¶ 66.
        Essentially, the proceeding must involve a legally authorized entity
        taking control of a debtor’s assets and affairs for the purpose of set-
        tling the debtor’s obligations with his creditors. Moreover, the En-
        actment Guide makes clear that “the Model Law was formulated
        to apply to any proceeding that meets the requirements of article
        2, subparagraph (a) [definition of foreign proceeding], inde-
        pendently of the nature of the debtor or its particular status under
        national law.” ¶ 55.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 44 of 72

        22-11024         TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                  19

                Congress incorporated the elements discussed in the Enact-
        ment Guide into the text of § 101(23). “The phrase ‘under a law
        relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt’ emphasizes that chap-
        ter 15 is available not only to debtors that are technically insolvent
        or facing liquidation but also to debtors who are in financial distress
        and may need to reorganize.” 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 101.23
        (16th ed. 2023). Meanwhile, “the ‘collective proceeding’ require-
        ment excludes from chapter 15 receivership proceedings that are
        for the benefit of a single creditor.” Id. Courts applying § 101(23)
        have interpreted it “broadly.” Id. (citing In re Betcorp Ltd., 400 B.R.
        266 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009), and In re Tri-Continental Exchange Ltd.,
        349 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006), both of which involved wind-
        ing-up proceedings under the foreign country’s corporate law that
        qualified as collective proceedings and in which courts had at least
        some control over the corporations’ assets and affairs).
               As discussed above, Section 1517 provides for recognition of
        one of two types of foreign proceedings: foreign main proceedings
        and foreign nonmain proceedings. The distinction—where the
        debtor has his “center of main interests”—is undefined in Chapter
        15. 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1502.01[4] (16th ed. 2023). Accord-
        ing to the Enactment Guide, the concept of a “center of main in-
        terests” comes from a regulation implementing the European Un-
        ion Convention on Insolvency Proceedings. ¶ 81. That EU Regu-
        lation says: “The ‘centre of main interests’ should correspond to
        the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his in-
        terests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third par-
        ties.” Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000,
USCA11 Case: 22-11024       Document: 53-1        Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 45 of 72

        20                 TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring               22-11024

        Preamble ¶ 13. Paragraph 83 of the Enactment Guide quotes this
        regulation. Chapter 15 also establishes a presumption that the
        country where a debtor has its registered office is its center of main
        interests: “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the debtor’s
        registered office, or habitual residence in the case of an individual,
        is presumed to be the center of the debtor’s main interests.”
        § 1516(c).
               A court can also recognize a proceeding occurring outside
        the debtor's center of main interests if it meets the § 101(23) defini-
        tion of a “foreign proceeding” and “if the debtor has an establish-
        ment within the meaning of section 1502 [11 USCS § 1502] in the
        foreign country where the proceeding is pending.” § 1517(b). Un-
        der § 1502(2), “‘establishment’ means any place of operations
        where the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic activity.”
        Essentially, a nonmain proceeding must occur in a country where
        the debtor has more than just assets. See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy
        ¶ 1517.02 (“By omission, a foreign proceeding that is premised only
        on the presence of assets in the foreign country is not eligible for
        recognition.”).
                When a court recognizes a foreign main proceeding, some
        relief flows automatically under § 1520. 17 One key form of relief is

        17 Section 1520 provides:
               (a) Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding that is a foreign
               main proceeding—
                       (1) sections 361 and 362 [11 U.S.C. §§ 361 and 362] ap-
                       ply with respect to the debtor and the property of the
USCA11 Case: 22-11024       Document: 53-1           Date Filed: 04/03/2024           Page: 46 of 72

        22-11024           TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                           21

        the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362. See § 1520(a)(1). The
        foreign representative also automatically gets “the rights and pow-
        ers of a trustee under and to the extent provided by sections 363
        and 552.” § 1520(a)(3). And the foreign representative gets the
        right to void post-petition transactions concerning property in the

                      debtor that is within the territorial jurisdiction of the
                      United States;
                      (2) sections 363, 549, and 552 [11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 549,
                      and 552] apply to a transfer of an interest of the debtor
                      in property that is within the territorial jurisdiction of
                      the United States to the same extent that the sections
                      would apply to property of an estate;
                      (3) unless the court orders otherwise, the foreign rep-
                      resentative may operate the debtor’s business and may
                      exercise the rights and powers of a trustee under and
                      to the extent provided by sections 363 and 552 [11
                      U.S.C. §§ 363 and 552]; and
                      (4) section 552 [11 U.S.C. § 552] applies to property of
                      the debtor that is within the territorial jurisdiction of
                      the United States.
              (b) Subsection (a) does not affect the right to commence an in-
              dividual action or proceeding in a foreign country to the extent
              necessary to preserve a claim against the debtor.
              (c) Subsection (a) does not affect the right of a foreign repre-
              sentative or an entity to file a petition commencing a case un-
              der this title or the right of any party to file claims or take other
              proper actions in such a case.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024          Document: 53-1        Date Filed: 04/03/2024          Page: 47 of 72

        22                    TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                22-11024

        United States, as a trustee can in a full bankruptcy case under
        § 549. 18 § 1520(a)(2).
               Section 1521 19 outlines discretionary relief available to the
        foreign representative in an ancillary proceeding. Under § 1521(a),

        18 Section 549(a) provides:
                (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section,
                the trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate—
                        (1) that occurs after the commencement of the case;
                        and
                        (2)
                                 (A) that is authorized only under section 303(f)
                                 or 542(c) of this title [11 U.S.C. § 303(f) or
                                 542(c)]; or
                                 (B) that is not authorized under this title or by
                                 the court.
        19 Section 1521 provides, in full:
                (a) Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, whether main or
                nonmain, where necessary to effectuate the purpose of this
                chapter [11 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq.] and to protect the assets of
                the debtor or the interests of the creditors, the court may, at
                the request of the foreign representative, grant any appropri-
                ate relief, including—
                        (1) staying the commencement or continuation of an
                        individual action or proceeding concerning the
                        debtor’s assets, rights, obligations or liabilities to the
                        extent they have not been stayed under section 1520(a)
                        [11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)];
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1           Date Filed: 04/03/2024           Page: 48 of 72

        22-11024          TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                           23

                      (2) staying execution against the debtor’s assets to the
                      extent it has not been stayed under section 1520(a) [11
                      U.S.C. § 1520(a)];
                      (3) suspending the right to transfer, encumber or oth-
                      erwise dispose of any assets of the debtor to the extent
                      this right has not been suspended under section
                      1520(a) [11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)];
                      (4) providing for the examination of witnesses, the tak-
                      ing of evidence or the delivery of information concern-
                      ing the debtor’s assets, affairs, rights, obligations or li-
                      abilities;
                      (5) entrusting the administration or realization of all or
                      part of the debtor’s assets within the territorial jurisdic-
                      tion of the United States to the foreign representative
                      or another person, including an examiner, authorized
                      by the court;
                      (6) extending relief granted under section 1519(a) [11
                      U.S.C. § 1519(a)]; and
                      (7) granting any additional relief that may be available
                      to a trustee, except for relief available under sections
                      522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, and 724(a) [11 U.S.C. §§
                      522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, and 724(a)].
              (b) Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, whether main
              or nonmain, the court may, at the request of the foreign rep-
              resentative, entrust the distribution of all or part of the
              debtor’s assets located in the United States to the foreign rep-
              resentative or another person, including an examiner, author-
              ized by the court, provided that the court is satisfied that the
              interests of creditors in the United States are sufficiently pro-
              tected.
              (c) In granting relief under this section to a representative of a
              foreign nonmain proceeding, the court must be satisfied that
USCA11 Case: 22-11024        Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024           Page: 49 of 72

        24                 TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                   22-11024

        the foreign representative of a nonmain proceeding can request
        that the court provide any relief that automatically flows from
        recognition of a main proceeding under § 1521, including a stay on
        proceedings related to, and transfers and disposals of, the debtor’s
        assets. § 1521(a)(1)–(3). Section 1521(a)(4) enables the foreign rep-
        resentative to take discovery, meaning the court can issue discov-
        ery orders enforceable with the contempt power. But § 1521(a)(7)
        denies the foreign representative the ability to utilize the “avoid-
        ance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code (sections 522, 544, 545,
        547, 548, 550 and 724(a)).” 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1521.02 (16th
        ed. 2023). The court also has the discretion to, at the foreign rep-
        resentative’s request, “entrust the distribution of all or part of the
        debtor’s assets located in the United States to the foreign repre-
        sentative or another person, including an examiner, authorized by

               the relief relates to assets that, under the law of the United
               States, should be administered in the foreign nonmain pro-
               ceeding or concerns information required in that proceeding.
               (d) The court may not enjoin a police or regulatory act of a
               governmental unit, including a criminal action or proceeding,
               under this section.
               (e) The standards, procedures, and limitations applicable to an
               injunction shall apply to relief under paragraphs (1), (2), (3),
               and (6) of subsection (a).
               (f) The exercise of rights not subject to the stay arising under
               section 362(a) [11 U.S.C. § 362(a)] pursuant to paragraph (6),
               (7), (17), or (27) of section 362(b) [11 U.S.C. § 362(b)] or pursu-
               ant to section 362(o) [11 U.S.C. § 362(o)] shall not be stayed by
               any order of a court or administrative agency in any proceed-
               ing under this chapter [11 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq.].
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024      Page: 50 of 72

        22-11024          TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                  25

        the court, provided that the court is satisfied that the interests of
        creditors in the United States are sufficiently protected.”
        § 1521(a)(5).
                                    *      *      *
                Unlike the procedures that begin a full bankruptcy case un-
        der Title 11, the procedures for recognizing and assisting a foreign
        proceeding do not naturally involve consideration of the debtor’s
        eligibility to commence a full case under § 109(a). See Antonin
        Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
        § 24 at 167 (2012) (discussing how the whole-text canon “calls on
        the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its
        structure and the physical and logical relation of its many parts”).
        The focus is on the foreign proceeding’s purpose and legitimacy
        under the foreign law, the foreign debtor’s relationship to the coun-
        try where the proceeding is pending, and the court’s authority to
        grant orders requested by the foreign representative to assist the
        proceeding. But unlike § 301, which requires a debtor-petitioner to
        specify the chapter of the Code under which he seeks relief—a ref-
        erence to the eligibility requirements of § 109—Chapter 15 does
        not explicitly say that commencement of ancillary proceedings
        hinges on eligibility requirements in § 109(a). Rather, the foreign
        representative files for recognition of a foreign proceeding.
               In addition, the relief available in ancillary proceedings is de-
        signed to assist the foreign proceeding. Such relief permits the for-
        eign representative to preserve property in the United States for
        distribution via the foreign proceeding and investigate the debtor’s
USCA11 Case: 22-11024         Document: 53-1          Date Filed: 04/03/2024           Page: 51 of 72

        26                   TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                   22-11024

        American affairs. Discovery is especially important when the for-
        eign representative suspects the debtor has fraudulently transferred
        assets to another country, a problem UNCITRAL set out to address
        in the Model Law.
                But, in an ancillary proceeding, no new bankruptcy estate is
        created, and no new, American trustee is appointed to take custody
        of any American assets the debtor has. The foreign representative
        also cannot avail itself of the Bankruptcy Code’s avoidance pow-
        ers. 20 And the court need not “entrust the distribution of all or part
        of the debtor’s assets located in the United States” to the foreign
        representative unless it “is satisfied that the interests of creditors in
        the United States are sufficiently protected.” § 1521(a)(5).
               The bottom line: Chapter 15 “focus[es] on eligibility of the
        foreign proceeding, not of the debtor.” 8 Collier on Bankruptcy
        ¶ 1517.01 (16th ed. 2023). And “[i]n a chapter 15 case, the debtor in
        the foreign proceeding is not a debtor under title 11.” Id. Requiring
        a court to consider whether a legitimate insolvency proceeding
        that otherwise meets the definition of a foreign proceeding under
        § 101(23) has, as its subject matter, the assets and affairs of a debtor
        who could also file a United States bankruptcy petition puts a
        square peg in a round hole. Common sense tells us Congress
        would not do that in an off-handed manner.

        20 The Fifth Circuit has held the foreign representative can exercise the avoid-
        ance powers available under the foreign law in the United States under § 1521.
        Tacon v. Petroquest Res. Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 601 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 2010).
USCA11 Case: 22-11024        Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024          Page: 52 of 72

        22-11024            TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                        27

                According to the Majority opinion, Congress did so explic-
        itly. It points out that § 103(a) 21 makes Chapter One applicable to
        cases under Chapter 15, and that § 109 is in Chapter One. But the
        statute’s structure and function indicate the debtor subject to the
        foreign proceeding does not become a debtor under the American
        Bankruptcy Code. He remains a debtor subject to the foreign pro-
        ceeding, which the American court helps administer in an ancillary
        proceeding. That means the foreign debtor need not be eligible to
        become an American bankruptcy debtor for the court to recognize
        the foreign proceeding. So, there is no inherent connection be-
        tween debtor-eligibility under § 109 and recognizing a foreign pro-
        ceeding.
              The use of the word “debtor” in the definition of a foreign
        proceeding in § 101(23), which requires that such proceeding is
        “under a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt in which
        proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control
        or supervision by a foreign court,” might be read to create a con-
        nection between § 109(a) debtor eligibility and recognition of

        21 Section 103(a) says:
                (a) Except as provided in section 1161 of this title [11 U.S.C. §
                1161], chapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title [11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et
                seq., 301 et seq., and 501 et seq.] apply in a case under chapter
                7, 11, 12, or 13 of this title [11 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., 1101 et
                seq., 1201 et seq., or 1301 et seq.], and this chapter, sections
                307, 362(o), 555 through 557, and 559 through 562 [11 U.S.C.
                §§ 101 et seq., 307, 362(o), 555–557, and 559–562] apply in a
                case under chapter 15 [11 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq.].
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1       Date Filed: 04/03/2024    Page: 53 of 72

        28               TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring           22-11024

        foreign proceedings. Section 1517(b) also refers to “the country
        where the debtor has the center of its main interests” in describing
        a foreign main proceeding, and where “the debtor has an establish-
        ment” to describe a nonmain proceeding.
                Do these uses of the word “debtor” import § 109(a)’s eligi-
        bility requirements? True, we should ordinarily presume that “[a]
        word or phrase . . . bear[s] the same meaning throughout a text.”
        Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
        Legal Texts § 25 at 170 (2012). But “this canon is particularly defea-
        sible by context.” Id. at 171.
               In In re Goerg, we considered a nearly identical question un-
        der the then-applicable Bankruptcy Code. And we held that, in the
        context of a broad definition of “foreign proceeding” designed to
        allow American courts to assist an expansive set of foreign insol-
        vency proceedings, that definition’s reference to “the debtor” re-
        ferred merely to the entity “properly subject, under applicable for-
        eign law,” to the foreign proceeding. In re Goerg, 844 F.2d at 1568.
                                          II.
                                          A.
               In In re Goerg, we considered whether a United States court
        could recognize and assist a West German bankruptcy proceeding.
        The debtor in the proceeding was a West German decedent’s es-
        tate. Under West German law, and as in many other countries, a
        bankruptcy proceeding could be brought with respect to an insol-
        vent decedent’s estate. In re Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562, 1563 n.1 (11th Cir.
        1988). After the decedent’s death, separate probate proceedings
USCA11 Case: 22-11024       Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024          Page: 54 of 72

        22-11024          TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                         29

        began in West Germany and in Fulton County, Georgia. The West
        German administrator petitioned the local court in Cologne to
        commence bankruptcy proceedings upon ﬁnding the estate was in-
        solvent, and the court appointed Klaus Hubert Goerg to serve as
        bankruptcy trustee. Id. at 1563. Part of his task was to take custody
        of the decedent’s foreign assets. Id. He petitioned the United
        States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia un-
        der 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1982), 22 seeking to enjoin the Fulton County

              22 When we decided In re Goerg, section 304 provided:
                     (a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is com-
              menced by the ﬁling with the bankruptcy court of a petition
              under this section by a foreign representative.
                       (b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this
              section, if a party in interest does not timely controvert the pe-
              tition, or after trial, the court may—
                              (1) enjoin the commencement or continuation
                      of—
                                      (A) any action against—
                                             (i) a debtor with respect to
                                      property involved in such foreign pro-
                                      ceeding; or
                                               (ii) such property; or
                                       (B) the enforcement of any judgment
                              against the debtor with respect to such prop-
                              erty, or any act or the commencement or con-
                              tinuation of any judicial proceeding to create
                              or enforce a lien against the property of such
                              estate;
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1          Date Filed: 04/03/2024          Page: 55 of 72

        30                TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                  22-11024

        probate proceeding and take custody of the decedent’s property
        “for distribution in the West German bankruptcy proceeding.” Id.
        at 1563–64.
               The issue was whether the proceeding ﬁt under the then-
        applicable deﬁnition of a foreign proceeding, which provided:

                               (2) order turnover of the property of such es-
                      tate, or the proceeds of such property, to such foreign
                      representative; or
                              (3) order other appropriate relief.
                      (c) In determining whether to grant relief under sub-
              section (b) of this section, the court shall be guided by what
              will best assure an economical and expeditious administration
              of such estate, consistent with—
                              (1) just treatment of all holders of claims
                      against or interests in such estate;
                              (2) protection of claim holders in the United
                      States against prejudice and inconvenience in the pro-
                      cessing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
                              (3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dis-
                      positions of property of such estate;
                                (4) distribution of proceeds of such estate sub-
                      stantially in accordance with the order prescribed by
                      this title;
                              (5) comity; and
                              (6) if appropriate, the provision of an oppor-
                      tunity for a fresh start for the individual that such for-
                      eign proceeding concerns.
              11 U.S.C. § 304 (1982).
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1     Date Filed: 04/03/2024    Page: 56 of 72

        22-11024         TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring               31

              “[F]oreign proceeding” means proceeding, whether
              judicial or administrative and whether or not under
              bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the
              debtor’s domicile, residence, principal place of busi-
              ness, or principal assets were located at the com-
              mencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of
              liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by composition,
              extension, or discharge, or eﬀecting a reorganization.
        Id. at 1565 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(22) (1982)). The bankruptcy
        court and the district court found that, because the deﬁnition of a
        “foreign proceeding” included the word “debtor,” a United States
        bankruptcy court could not recognize a foreign proceeding unless
        the debtor subject to that proceeding would qualify as a “debtor”
        for an American bankruptcy proceeding. In re Goerg, 844 F.2d at
        1564. Because a “debtor” under the United States Bankruptcy
        Code must be a “person”—which then, as now, did not include es-
        tates (which are entities but not persons as deﬁned in Chapter 1),
        the lower courts found they could not assist the proceeding. See id.
        at 1564–66.
                We reversed. Because the deﬁnition of foreign proceeding
        “expressly provide[d] that the foreign proceeding need not even be
        a bankruptcy proceeding, either under foreign or United States
        law,” it would have been an “anomaly” to refuse to recognize the
        proceeding because the debtor in the West German proceeding
        was ineligible to commence a United States bankruptcy proceed-
        ing. Id. at 1566–67. We also noted that the deﬁnition of foreign
        proceeding included proceedings “for the purpose of liquidating an
USCA11 Case: 22-11024        Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 57 of 72

        32                  TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                 22-11024

        estate,” which could be read to cover decedents’ estates. 23 Id. So,
        the deﬁnition of foreign proceeding was both broad and ambigu-
        ous as to whether it covered the West German proceeding at issue.
        Id.
               We then reasoned that, given the purpose of the statute to
        “help further the eﬃciency of foreign insolvency proceedings in-
        volving worldwide assets,” and “in light of the comity concerns
        that induced Congress to enact” the ancillary proceedings statute,
        “it would make eminent sense for Congress to deﬁne expansively
        the class of foreign insolvency proceedings for which ancillary as-
        sistance is available.” Id. at 1568. Put another way, in the context
        of deﬁning a “foreign proceeding,” the word “debtor” referred to
        the entity that was already the subject of a foreign insolvency pro-
        ceeding and did not limit the statute’s broad deﬁnition of a foreign
        proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 101(22) (1982).
               We derived the statute’s purpose by outlining how an ancil-
        lary proceeding worked under section 304. We explained: “The ﬁl-
        ing of a section 304 petition does not commence a full bankruptcy
        case; a section 304 case is an ancillary case in which a United States

        23 We explained that the word “estate” as used in the definition of foreign
        proceeding might have referred to bankruptcy estates like those created under
        § 541, which would not necessarily include decedents’ estates, or to decedents’
        estates. Id. at 1567 n.11; see also 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 304.01, at 304–12
        (15th ed. 1987) (“That a foreign administration of a decedent’s estate is . . . a
        ‘foreign proceeding’ is suggested by the expansive language of [section
        101(22)] which includes within its scope proceedings under laws other than
        bankruptcy laws brought for the purpose of liquidating an estate.”).
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024      Page: 58 of 72

        22-11024          TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                  33

        bankruptcy court is authorized to apply its processes to give eﬀect
        to orders entered in a foreign insolvency proceeding.” Id. at 1567.
        An ancillary proceeding’s “focus” under section 304 was “on mak-
        ing United States processes available in aid of foreign proceedings,
        not actual bankruptcy administration.” Id. at 1568. Whether the
        foreign debtor would be eligible to commence a bankruptcy pro-
        ceeding in the United States would be irrelevant to this focus. By
        the time a petition from a foreign representative arrived, the for-
        eign court would have already decided the debtor’s eligibility under
        its own insolvency law, and a trustee or similar entity would have
        taken custody of the debtor’s assets and aﬀairs. And if granting
        relief were inappropriate, the American court retained discretion
        not to grant ancillary relief. See id. at 1568 (“[T]he section 304
        debtor may ultimately receive no relief at all; it is within the discre-
        tion of the bankruptcy court, guided by the factors enumerated in
        section 304(c), to determine what relief, if any, is appropriate.”).
        That meant the foreign debtor did not necessarily have the beneﬁt
        of the automatic stay applicable in full American bankruptcy pro-
        ceedings. See id.
               So, we concluded “it would make little sense to require that
        the subject of the foreign proceeding qualify as a ‘debtor’ under
        United States bankruptcy law.” Id. at 1568. The point of the statute
        was to authorize American courts to recognize and assist foreign
        proceedings involving insolvencies in the various forms in which
        they might arrive. In light of this purpose, the reference to “the
        debtor” in describing the debtor’s relationship to the country where
        the foreign proceeding commenced—“a foreign country in which
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1     Date Filed: 04/03/2024    Page: 59 of 72

        34               TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring        22-11024

        the debtor’s domicile, residence, principal place of business, or
        principal assets were located at the commencement of such pro-
        ceeding”—did not import the debtor eligibility requirements for
        commencing a full bankruptcy proceeding. See Antonin Scalia &
        Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 20
        (2012) (“The evident purpose of what a text seeks to achieve is an
        essential element of context that gives meaning to words.”).
                                        B.
               The reasoning we provided for our holding in In re Goerg an-
        swers the question presented here. While the current deﬁnition of
        “foreign proceeding” in § 101(23) is not identical to the deﬁnition
        applicable in In re Goerg, it contains the same material aspects we
        relied on in interpreting “foreign proceeding” under 11 U.S.C.
        § 101(22) (1982).
               The current deﬁnition of a “foreign proceeding” broadly en-
        compasses “collective judicial or administrative proceeding[s]”
        which are “under a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of
        debt” and “for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation,” as
        long as “the assets and aﬀairs of the debtor are subject to control
        or supervision by a foreign court.” While it does not explicitly say
        the proceeding need not be under bankruptcy law, as § 304 did, the
        use of the phrases “under a law relating to insolvency or adjust-
        ment of debt” and “for the purpose of reorganization or liquida-
        tion” convey the same point that the substance and purpose of the
        proceeding, not its label, control. See Enactment Guide ¶ 65 (“The
        deﬁnitions of proceedings or persons emanating from foreign
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 60 of 72

        22-11024         TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                 35

        jurisdictions avoid the use of expressions that may have diﬀerent
        technical meaning in diﬀerent legal systems and instead describe
        their purpose or function.”). The “anomaly” we identiﬁed in In re
        Goerg was that construing “foreign proceeding” to require a debtor
        that could qualify as an American bankruptcy debtor would make
        no sense given the foreign proceeding did not even need to be un-
        der the foreign country’s bankruptcy law, as long as it was “for the
        purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by composition,
        extension, or discharge, or eﬀecting a reorganization.” 11 U.S.C.
        § 101(22) (1982). The current deﬁnition of a “foreign proceeding”
        broadly covers non-bankruptcy proceedings for the same purposes.
                There are some diﬀerences between the old deﬁnition of
        “foreign proceeding” and the current version, but they are not ma-
        terial to the issue here. The old deﬁnition was not limited to “col-
        lective” proceedings, though it was limited to “judicial or adminis-
        trative” proceedings, as the current deﬁnition is. The old deﬁnition
        did not specify that “the assets and aﬀairs of the debtor [must be]
        subject to control or supervision by a foreign court.” § 101(23).
        There was also no explicit divide between foreign “main” and “non-
        main” proceedings as contemplated in § 1517. The old deﬁnition
        did require that the proceeding occur “in a foreign country in
        which the debtor’s domicile, residence, principal place of business,
        or principal assets were located at the commencement of such pro-
        ceeding,” which is similar to the requirement that a “main proceed-
        ing” occur in the debtor’s “center of its main interests.”
        § 1517(b)(1); see § 1516(c) (“In the absence of evidence to the con-
        trary, the debtor’s registered oﬃce, or habitual residence in the case
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024    Page: 61 of 72

        36               TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring         22-11024

        of an individual, is presumed to be the center of the debtor’s main
        interests.”). Section 1517 also contemplates recognizing foreign
        proceedings pending where the debtor only has an “establish-
        ment.” § 1517(b)(2).
               These diﬀerences may have some impact on the scope of
        proceedings a United States court will recognize under Chapter 15.
        But they do not impact the issue here: whether, in the context of
        describing “a [foreign] law relating to insolvency or adjustment of
        debt in which proceeding the assets and aﬀairs of the debtor are
        subject to control or supervision by a foreign court,” reference to
        “the debtor” imposes § 109(a)’s eligibility requirements. We face
        the same “anomaly” here as we faced in In re Goerg, and we should
        resolve it the same way. See Generali v. D’Amico, 766 F.2d 485, 489
        (11th Cir. 1985) (“This Court is bound by the case law of the Elev-
        enth Circuit.”).
               Nor do any diﬀerences between the procedures and relief
        under section 304 and Chapter 15 change that analysis. For one
        thing, the purpose and function of ancillary proceedings are simi-
        lar. Just as an ancillary proceeding’s “focus” under section 304 was
        “on making United States processes available in aid of foreign pro-
        ceedings, not actual bankruptcy administration,” In re Goerg, 844
        F.2d at 1568, the focus of Chapter 15 is on recognizing and assisting
        foreign insolvency proceedings. See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy
        ¶ 1517.01 (16th ed. 2023). And “[i]n a chapter 15 case, the debtor in
        the foreign proceeding” does not become “a debtor under title 11.”
        Id.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 62 of 72

        22-11024         TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                  37

               As to diﬀerences, some relief, including the automatic stay
        under § 362, ﬂows automatically upon recognition of a foreign
        main proceeding. § 1520(a). That was not so under section 304’s
        discretionary regime. But nonmain proceedings do not necessarily
        beneﬁt from the stay, and regardless, various key aspects of a full
        proceeding—like the trustee’s assumption of avoidance powers
        and immediate custody of the bankruptcy estate—are not part of
        an ancillary proceeding.
                                          C.
               If anything, the current statutory provisions related to ancil-
        lary proceedings should cause us to double down on the reasoning
        we applied in In re Goerg. Chapter 15 provides its own deﬁnition of
        a “debtor” that controls references to “the debtor” in Chapter 15.
        Section 1502(a) says: “For the purposes of this chapter, the term . .
        . ‘debtor’ means an entity that is the subject of a foreign proceed-
        ing.” That deﬁnition aligns with our interpretation of “debtor” in
        In re Goerg.
               This deﬁnition is not reconcilable with § 109’s deﬁnition of
        “who may be a debtor” under Title 11. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan
        A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 28 at 183
        (2012) (“If there is a conﬂict between a general provision and a spe-
        ciﬁc provision, the speciﬁc provision prevails.”). Section 109 says
        “only a person . . . may be a debtor under this title,” while § 1502(1)
        deﬁnes “debtor” as “an entity that is the subject of a foreign pro-
        ceeding.” (emphases added). As we discussed in In re Goerg, an en-
        tity—like a decedent’s estate—is not necessarily a “person” under
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024     Page: 63 of 72

        38               TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring           22-11024

        Chapter 1. Chapter 1 provides: “The term ‘entity’ includes person,
        estate, trust, governmental unit, and United States trustee.” On the
        other hand, “[t]he term ‘person’ includes individual, partnership,
        and corporation, but does not include governmental unit, except .
        . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 101(41). See also 1 Collier on Bankruptcy
        ¶ 1.01[2][a] (“A ‘person’ may be eligible for relief under the Code
        by virtue of section 109, but one who is an ‘entity’ and not a ‘per-
        son’ would not be eligible.”).
                True, statutory provisions presumably “bear the same mean-
        ing throughout a text,” and “[t]he provisions of a text should be
        interpreted in a way that renders them compatible, not contradic-
        tory.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpre-
        tation of Legal Texts §§ 25, 27, at 170, 180 (2012). But “a material
        variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.” Id. § 25 at 170.
        Congress chose to use the word “entity” in deﬁning a “‘debtor’ . . .
        that is the subject of a foreign proceeding” in § 1502(1). “‘Entity’ is
        the broadest of all deﬁnitions that relate to bodies or units” in the
        Bankruptcy Code. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 101.15 (16th ed.
        2023). And so, the deﬁnition of “debtor” for the purposes of Chap-
        ter 15 conﬁrms that, when Chapter 15 refers to a “debtor” subject
        to a foreign proceeding, it means whatever “entity” is the subject
        of that proceeding, independently of the nature of the debtor and
        whether such debtor could be a debtor eligible to commence a U.S.
        bankruptcy case.
              Consideration of the “international origins” of Chapter 15
        pursuant to § 1508 also supports following In re Goerg. The Guide
USCA11 Case: 22-11024       Document: 53-1        Date Filed: 04/03/2024        Page: 64 of 72

        22-11024           TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                      39

        to Enactment of the Model Law says: “the Model Law was formu-
        lated to apply to any proceeding that meets the requirements of
        article 2, subparagraph (a) [deﬁnition of foreign proceeding], inde-
        pendently of the nature of the debtor or its particular status under na-
        tional law.” Enactment Guide ¶ 55 (emphasis added). The Enact-
        ment Guide also tells us exclusions from “foreign proceeding”
        should be clear. It states:
               Article 17 provides that, subject to article 6 [adopted
               in § 1506, Public Policy Exception], when the speci-
               ﬁed requirements of article 2 [adopted as § 101(23)]
               concerning the nature of the foreign proceeding (i.e.
               that the foreign proceeding is, as a matter of course,
               a collective proceeding for the purposes of liquidation
               or reorganization under the control or supervision of
               the court) and the foreign representative are met and
               the evidence required by article 15 [adopted as § 1515]
               has been provided, the court should recognize the for-
               eign proceeding without further requirement.
        Enactment Guide ¶ 29 (emphasis added). And the Guide goes on
        to say, “with a view to making the national insolvency law more
        transparent (for the beneﬁt of foreign users of a law based on the
        Model Law), it is advisable that exclusions from the scope of the
        law be expressly mentioned.”24 Id. at ¶ 60.

        24 Section 1501 expressly excludes from the application of Chapter 15, inter
        alia, “a proceeding concerning an entity, other than a foreign insurance com-
        pany, identified by exclusion in section 109(b) [11 U.S.C. § 109(b)].”
USCA11 Case: 22-11024         Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024          Page: 65 of 72

        40                  TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                   22-11024

                The UNCITRAL’s Digest on case law under the Model Law
        helps conﬁrm our conclusion. The Digest states, in commenting
        on In re Barnet, 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013), which held that § 109(a)
        eligibility is required in recognizing a foreign proceeding:
                The [Model Law] does not deﬁne the term “debtor”
                as it is not an element of the recognition regime; the
                [Model Law] provides only for recognition of the for-
                eign proceeding at the request of the foreign repre-
                sentative. Nevertheless, there have been cases in
                which the court has considered whether or not the
                entity subject to the foreign proceeding is a debtor for
                the purposes of the law to be applied by the receiving
                court.
        UNCITRAL Digest ¶ 43 (discussing “Use of the term ‘debtor’” in
        interpreting the deﬁnition of a foreign proceeding). The Digest
        does not mention other international cases reaching the same con-
        clusion as the Second Circuit, and the appellant does not cite any
        such cases here.25

        § 1501(c)(1). Section 109(b)’s exclusion applies to, inter alia, “a domestic insur-
        ance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and loan associ-
        ation, building and loan association, homestead association . . . .” § 109(b)(2).
        That exclusion tracks the Model Law’s suggestion to exclude “types of entities,
        such as banks or insurance companies, that are subject to a special insolvency
        regime” from application of the Model Law. Model Law, Art. I(2). The En-
        actment Guide also explains, “Banks or insurance companies are mentioned
        as examples of entities that the enacting State might decide to exclude from
        the scope of the Model Law.” ¶ 56.
        25 The Digest does mention how, in a British case:
USCA11 Case: 22-11024       Document: 53-1        Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 66 of 72

        22-11024           TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                      41

                And so, the reasonable reading of the word “debtor” in the
        deﬁnition of “foreign proceeding” is that it refers to whatever entity
        is the subject of the foreign insolvency proceeding.
                                             D.
               The course of proceedings below illustrate the problem
        with adopting Appellant’s position: it would reward fraudulent
        transfers of a foreign debtor’s assets in the United States because
        once the debtor sells his American property, the foreign proceeding
        cannot be recognized. The ancillary case began when, on March
        24, 2021, Colin Diss, the representative of a United Kingdom bank-
        ruptcy proceeding, ﬁled a petition under Chapter 15 for recogni-
        tion of the U.K. proceeding as a main proceeding.26 He also ﬁled a
        motion for an order granting recognition. He requested the auto-
        matic relief available under § 1520 and the discretionary relief avail-
        able under § 1521.

               the court said that as to whether the company was a debtor,
               no separate attention had been given to that requirement in
               other cases and the expression [“debtor”] was not defined in
               the [Model Law]. Each of the courts whose decisions on recog-
               nition applications were considered had, the court said, appar-
               ently been content to work on the basis that an entity subject
               to a foreign proceeding was, for that reason alone, within the
               relevant “debtor” concept.
        Digest at ¶ 44 (citing Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2009] EWHC 2129 (Ch)
        ¶ 39, affirmed by [2012] UKSC 46).
        26 The petition used Official Form 401, as required. 9 Collier on Bankruptcy
        ¶ 1002.02[7] (16th ed. 2023).
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024      Page: 67 of 72

        42               TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring          22-11024

               Diss attached a declaration supporting the motion for recog-
        nition. In it, he said he was a “joint trustee in bankruptcy and for-
        eign representative of Talal Qais Al Zawawi.” The declaration ex-
        plained that Al Zawawi moved to London with his then-wife in
        2015, but she petitioned for divorce in 2017. The U.K. court entered
        a judgment in the divorce ordering him to pay his ex-wife
        £24,075,000. The U.K. court then issued a “Worldwide Freezing
        Order” against Al Zawawi on April 2, 2019, enjoining him “from
        disposing of, dealing with, or diminishing the value of his assets
        until the Judgment was paid in full.”
               When Al Zawawi failed to pay the divorce judgment, his ex-
        wife ﬁled an involuntary petition for his bankruptcy on March 19,
        2020. The U.K. bankruptcy court adjudged him bankrupt on June
        29, 2020. The court also appointed Diss and two others as joint
        trustees on July 15, 2020. Diss included certiﬁed copies of the U.K.
        orders ﬁnding Al Zawawi bankrupt and appointing the joint trus-
        tees with the Chapter 15 petition.
              Diss further declared that:
              Upon information and belief, the Debtor has his prin-
              cipal assets in the Middle District of Florida, including
              an ownership interest [in] the following companies:
              (i) Qapa Investing Company U.S.A., Inc.; (ii) Qapa
              Holdings, Inc.; (iii) Hawthorne Village at Port Or-
              ange, Inc.; (iv) Hawthorne Groves Apartments, Inc.;
              and (v) Texas Q Zone, Inc.
        Diss also claimed that he was seeking recognition to recover Al
        Zawawi’s assets and investigate whether his funds were used to
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024    Page: 68 of 72

        22-11024         TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                43

        acquire other assets. Diss then successfully moved the Bankruptcy
        Court for provisional relief under 11 U.S.C. § 1519 to enjoin anyone
        from selling, encumbering, or disposing of Al Zawawi’s American
        assets, and authorizing him to take discovery under Rule 2004 of
        the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
               In an objection opposing recognition, Al Zawawi argued
        that, because he did not ﬁt under § 109(a)’s eligibility requirement,
        the petition needed to be dismissed. He claimed he had no per-
        sonal knowledge that he had any assets in the United States, and
        that Diss’s declaration did not provide factual support that he did.
               Diss ﬁled an amended declaration on April 20, 2021. He
        added declarations stating that Al Zawawi “holds an interest in the
        Companies, indirectly, through a Curaçao company called Qapa In-
        vesting Corporation N.V., which in turn ostensibly owns some or
        all of the Companies” referenced in the ﬁrst declaration. He
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1     Date Filed: 04/03/2024   Page: 69 of 72

        44              TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring         22-11024

        attached an organizational chart 27 mapping out his ownership in-
        terests in the Florida companies. QAPA Holdings, a Florida corpo-
        ration, owns QAPA Investing Company USA, Hawthorne Groves
        Apartments, and Hawthorne Village; QAPA Investing Corporation
        NV, a Curaçao corporation in which he owns an 18.18% share,
        owns QAPA Holdings. His family members own the rest of the
        Curaçao holding company.
              The amended declaration also raised the possibility that Al
        Zawawi fraudulently transferred his interest in Texas Q Zone,
        which Diss had alleged Al Zawawi owned in the ﬁrst declaration.
        Diss declared that, on or about February 24, 2020—less than a
        month before his ex-wife ﬁled an involuntary bankruptcy peti-
        tion—Al Zawawi sold “600 shares (the totality of [his] shareholding

        27
USCA11 Case: 22-11024      Document: 53-1      Date Filed: 04/03/2024      Page: 70 of 72

        22-11024          TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                  45

        interest) in Texas Q Zone, Inc. to his brother, Azzan Qais Abdul
        Munem Al Zawawi, for US$1,582,901.” According to Diss, this sale
        violated the freezing order entered in April 2019.
               In a brief supporting recognition ﬁled on April 20, 2021, Diss
        argued that the Bankruptcy Court should not follow In re Barnet,
        and that regardless, Al Zawawi had American assets. Those assets
        consisted of his beneﬁcial ownership in the Florida companies,
        along with (1) a retainer Sequor Law—the Foreign representatives’
        lawyers’ ﬁrm—“holds . . . in its trust account for the beneﬁt of the
        Debtor’s estate,” and (2) Al Zawawi’s jacket and wallet. Diss ob-
        tained Al Zawawi’s jacket and wallet and brought them to Sequor’s
        Miami oﬃce, according to the brief, “for keeping on behalf of and
        for the beneﬁt of the Debtor.” Diss had declared that he did this in
        the amended declaration.
               Diss attached to the memorandum documents he had ob-
        tained purporting to verify Al Zawawi’s sale of his shares in Texas
        Q Zone. These included: a copy of the stock purchase agreement,
        dated February 24, 2020; a bank record showing Al Zawawi’s re-
        ceipt of the funds for the Texas Q Zone shares from his brother;
        and a copy of a “high importance” email dated April 8, 2021, from
        the ﬁnancial comptroller of the “Zawawi Group” 28 to Alex MacKin-
        non, CEO of Texas Q Zone, stating that Al Zawawi had sold his

        28 The Zawawi Group is a consulting group based in Oman that was founded
        in 1975 by Abdulmunim Al Zawawi, an Omani politician. ZAWAWI GROUP,
        About Us, https://www.zawawigroup.com/about/.
USCA11 Case: 22-11024     Document: 53-1     Date Filed: 04/03/2024    Page: 71 of 72

        46               TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring        22-11024

        60% share in Texas Q Zone to his brother in February 2020. The
        email said that COVID-19 disruptions prevented prompter notice.
               When this transfer actually occurred was crucial, especially
        if § 109(a) limited recognition. At a hearing on the motion for
        recognition in front of the Bankruptcy Court on April 22, 2021,
        Diss’s counsel explained that the trustees only learned of Al
        Zawawi’s transfer of his interests in Texas Q Zone after documents
        were produced under subpoenas issued pursuant to the Bank-
        ruptcy Court’s § 1519 relief order. Alex Mackinnon, Texas Q
        Zone’s CEO, testiﬁed in a deposition taken the day before the hear-
        ing that he also ﬁrst learned about the transfer of Al Zawawi’s in-
        terest on April 6, 2021, after the subpoenas were served. The cor-
        porate records of the company therefore still said Al Zawawi held
        60% of the shares in the company. Diss’s counsel characterized the
        documents reﬂecting the sale as occurring in February 2020 as “self-
        serving.” Counsel also explained that “under English law this trans-
        fer would deﬁnitely be a transfer that would be viewable and po-
        tentially avoidable depending on additional information reﬂecting
        the value or the lack thereof of the alleged consideration, but most
        importantly is the timing.”
               Al Zawawi argued, however, that as of the date of the Chap-
        ter 15 petition, he “had no interest whatsoever in Texas Q Zone.”
        He also argued the interests in the Curaçao holding company that
        owned the Florida companies and the retainer should not qualify
USCA11 Case: 22-11024         Document: 53-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024         Page: 72 of 72

        22-11024            TJOFLAT, J., Specially Concurring                          47

        as property under § 109(a). 29 Accordingly, Al Zawawi had disposed
        of his only assets in the United States, and thus did not qualify as a
        debtor under § 109(a). That meant the petition needed to be dis-
        missed, ending Diss’s investigation. Al Zawawi reiterated the same
        argument on appeal.
               Common sense tells us this result almost certainly cannot be
        correct. The Model Law that Congress adopted had, as one of its
        primary purposes, preventing bankruptcy debtors from fraudu-
        lently transferring and hiding assets. See also § 1501(a)(3) (Chapter
        15 has as a purpose promoting “fair and eﬃcient administration of
        cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of all credi-
        tors”). Yet Appellant’s argument is that, if a United States Bank-
        ruptcy Court ﬁnds a potentially fraudulent transfer of all a foreign
        debtor’s American assets was successfully executed, the Chapter 15
        case is over because the debtor would be ineligible to then ﬁle for
        bankruptcy in the United States. Congress could write such a self-
        defeating statute. But in my view, it did not do so.

        29 As to Al Zawawi’s wallet and jacket, his lawyer said he had not heard of
        Diss’s lawyer’s possession of them until ten minutes before the hearing and
        accused Diss’s counsel of “planting evidence . . . a police tactic of the 1980’s.”
        The lawyer for Diss responded by reminding the Bankruptcy Court that Diss
        mentioned the personal property in paragraph 28 of the amended declaration.