Court Opinion

ID: 9657413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:25:18.465736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:44.855698
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree that Bickel’s failure to complete the NDRCivP (4)(e)(4) mailing requirement probably made the attempted notice of the motion by publication ineffectual. I believe, however, that the proper remedy was to move the trial court for relief, not to appeal. Because I believe our decision on the merits *322could be misunderstood, I would prefer to dismiss the appeal and remand for the trial court to decide what should be done.
This was a non-appealable ex parte order. See NDCC 28-27-02(7): “An order made ... without notice is not appealable, ... [until] after a hearing is had upon notice which vacates or refuses to set aside an order previously made without notice....” See also Matter of Estate of Kjorvestad, 395 N.W.2d 162, 163 (N.D.1986) (NDCC 28-27-02(7) “precludes appeal of an order entered without notice or hearing ‘until such time as the judge who made the order has a chance to reconsider his decision in an adversary proceeding.’”). (Citation omitted). While ap-pealability was not questioned by Bickel, we consider it on our own because it is jurisdictional. City of Fargo v. Casper, 512 N.W.2d 668, 669 (N.D.1994). Since the order amending the judgment can be reconsidered on remand, I believe the preferable procedure would be to let the trial court do it. Moreover, dismissal and remand should have a beneficial effect of discouraging like appeals when the trial court has not acted on the question.
In this case, it is clear the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Jackson for the divorce decree in 1982, when Jackson was ordered to pay Bickel $200 per child, total-ling $400 child support monthly. The trial court has continuing jurisdiction to “modify the same at any time.” NDCC 14-05-22(1). See also NDCC 14-09-08.1; Larson v. Dunn, 474 N.W.2d 34 (N.D.1991). Until properly modified, a decree for periodic child support continues and cannot be retroactively changed. Throndset v. L.L.S., 485 N.W.2d 775, 780 (N.D.1992) (“[P]ast-due and unpaid child support payments are not subject to retroactive modification.”). Thus, Jackson’s unpaid support obligation has continued to accrue, despite Bickel’s ineffectual motion.
Bickel sought to increase Jackson’s monthly child support as she is entitled to do. See NDCC 14-09-08.4 through 14-09-08.10 on periodic review of child support orders. Of course, Jackson needed an opportunity for a hearing on any prospective change in his child support obligation. See McWethy v. McWethy, 366 N.W.2d 796, 799 (N.D.1985) (“proceedings on continuing jurisdiction should follow procedures prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure for notice and hearing”). Jackson could have obtained a hearing from the trial court without this appeal.
On notice by publication, when a party has “had no actual notice or knowledge of the pendency of the [motion] so as to enable the [party] to make application to defend before the entry of judgment therein,” the rules of procedure allow that party to be heard “at any time within three years after entry of judgment on such terms as may be just” if the party shows “to the satisfaction of the court by affidavit, stating the facts, that the [party] has a good and meritorious defense to the action” and proves the lack of actual notice. NDRCivP (4)(e)(7). Here, Jackson apparently acquired actual knowledge of this amended judgment soon after it was entered, since he timely appealed it. Rather than moving for an opportunity to be heard in the trial court, Jackson chose to appeal instead. Since an ex parte judgment is not appealable, I believe we shouldn’t dignify this one by deciding it on the merits.
Also, it is possible the judgment for ar-rearages should be handled differently. Bickel sought a formal judgment for accumulated support arrearages of $22,731.42. Why is not entirely clear. It may have been for the reason that the original support decree preceded enactment of NDCC 14-08.1-05(l)(a): “Any order directing any payment or installment of money for the support of a child is, on and after the date it is due and unpaid ... [a] judgment by operation of law, with the full force, effect, and attributes of a judgment of the district court, including the ability to be entered in the judgment book pursuant to rule 58 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure and otherwise enforced as a judgment.” See 1987 N.D.Laws ch. 181, § 1. But I believe the entire arrear-age here accumulated since this enactment, which may allow entry of a formal judgment without further notice. Since that subject has not been briefed on this appeal, the trial court should consider it before we void the formal judgment for arrearages.
On the judgment for arrearages, too, Jackson’s failure to receive notice largely resulted *323from his own indifference to his duty to support his children. See NDCC 14-09-08.1(2):
The parties subject to the [child support] order shall immediately inform the clerk ... of any change of address or change of any other condition which may affect the proper administration of this chapter [on child support payments].
Bickel repeatedly tried to notify Jackson of her motion, but Jackson evidently changed his address several times without notifying the clerk of court about a new one. I would not immediately reward Jackson by wholly voiding the docketed money judgment, as the majority opinion appears to do, because the lack of notice to him was largely Jackson’s own fault.
While I agree Jackson would be entitled to an opportunity to be heard, I believe that he could have obtained that hearing from the trial court as our rules of civil and appellate procedure expect. This court is not a trial court. Unless Jackson can show patent error in the trial court’s records of support payments and remittances, it is questionable whether he could show good cause to set aside the money judgment. On the other hand, he needs an opportunity to show what his periodic child support payment should be prospectively under current guidelines before it is increased. For that matter, he would need that opportunity before his support obligation is decreased, since Jackson now claims his business failed recently and he is financially strapped to pay support.
I believe that the trial court is more capable of addressing the entire situation than this court. A remand will enable the trial court to act on all related child support matters at the same time. For these reasons, I believe that our disposition should be a dismissal of this appeal with remand to the trial court for Jackson’s opportunity to be heard on the merits.