Court Opinion

ID: 9925342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 15:07:48.253528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:02.277333
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-808

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                              GEORGE SHURTLEFF.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The defendant was convicted of three counts of indecent

 assault and battery of a child under fourteen, G. L. c. 265,

 § 13B; rape of a child aggravated by age difference, G. L. c.

 265, § 23A; and two counts of indecent assault and battery on a

 person over fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13H.            During the pendency

 of his direct appeal, he brought a first motion for a new trial

 alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.              That motion

 was denied.     The appeal of his convictions and the appeal of the

 denial of the motion for a new trial were consolidated and the

 judgments and order were affirmed by this court (consolidated

 appeal).    See Commonwealth v. Shurtleff, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1116

 (2020).

       The defendant subsequently filed, pro se, a second motion

 for new trial (second motion for new trial).             That motion was
denied without an evidentiary hearing and, in the instant

matter, the defendant has appealed.

     The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural

history of the case and they will not be repeated here.    The

defendant’s primary argument is that trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to interview, investigate, and call two

possible defense witnesses, the defendant’s sister, Eva Jones,

and his wife, the mother of the victim, Heather Shurtleff. 1     The

defendant also argues that appellate counsel, who litigated the

first motion for a new trial, was ineffective in failing to

raise these claims in the first motion for a new trial and the

consolidated appeal (and in failing to investigate, interview,

and call them himself as witnesses at the evidentiary hearing on

the motion), and that the judge erred and abused his discretion

in denying the second motion for new trial.

     We turn first to the defendant's primary argument.    "When

evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we

consider 'whether there has been serious incompetency,

inefficiency, or inattention of counsel –- behavior of counsel

falling measurably below that which might be expected from an

ordinary fallible lawyer –- and, if that is found, then,

1 For convenience, given the shared last name of the defendant
and Heather Shurtleff, the latter will be referred to by her
first name.

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typically, whether it has likely deprived the defendant of an

other wise available, substantial ground of defence.'"

Commonwealth v. LaBrie, 473 Mass. 754, 771 (2016), quoting

Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).   "'In cases

where tactical or strategic decisions of the defendant's counsel

are at issue, we conduct our review with some deference to avoid

characterizing as unreasonable a defense that was merely

unsuccessful' and ask whether the decision was manifestly

unreasonable when made."   Labrie, supra, quoting Commonwealth v.

Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 673-674 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189

(2017)."   Commonwealth v. Gomes, 478 Mass. 1025, 1025-1026

(2018).

     The defendant argues that Jones could have provided

evidence that the complainant recanted a first allegation of

abuse against the defendant.   According to the testimony at the

hearing on the first motion for a new trial, as well as the

affidavit of trial counsel provided in that proceeding, Jones

provided only a secondhand report that she had been told by a

neighbor, Shelinda Freemantle, of a recantation.   That testimony

would have been inadmissible hearsay at trial.   In any event,

trial counsel testified in that prior proceeding, his

investigator having discovered this, he interviewed Freemantle,

and that he and the investigator concluded that what had

occurred was not, in fact, a recantation.   Even if it was,

                                 3
though, and even if it had been manifestly unreasonable not to

call Jones, a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance

of counsel cannot be ordered unless the conduct of the attorney

that falls measurably below what one might reasonably expect of

an ordinary lawyer also likely deprived the defendant of an

otherwise available, substantial ground of defense.    See

Saferian, 366 Mass. at 96.    As the judge concluded in denying

the first motion for a new trial (that alleged ineffective

assistance for trial counsel's failure to call Freemantle as a

witness), if evidence of this "recantation" were to come in, the

"jury would also likely have learned what [the victim] told the

police:    that she had, in March of 2013, first reported the

sexual abuse to Heather but later denied it after the defendant

implored her to do so and after he threatened [to commit]

suicide.    That evidence gave a credible explanation for why [the

victim] felt pressured to recant."    Given this, the failure to

call Jones not only was not manifestly unreasonable, it did not

deprive the defendant of a substantial ground of defense.

     The defendant also argues that Jones could have provided

evidence that on the night when the complainant made her first

complaint of abuse, she later insisted on going with the

defendant, who was inebriated, to a hotel.    Trial counsel,

again, explained in connection with the first motion for a new

trial his tactical decision not to present evidence the jury

                                  4
might have found inculpatory of the drunken defendant taking the

alleged victim, his minor stepdaughter, alone to a hotel.    That

tactical decision also was not manifestly unreasonable. 2

     As for the testimony of Heather, as the motion judge noted,

she was, at the time, charged with child endangerment, and so

had a motive not to testify truthfully about the events at issue

at trial in this case.   Even assuming she would not have invoked

the privilege against self-incrimination, this renders the

decision of trial counsel not to call her not manifestly

unreasonable.

     Further, the failure to call her did not deprive the

defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of

defense.   Heather did in fact subsequently testify at her own

trial, at which she was convicted of child endangerment.    That

trial was held before the same judge who heard the trial and

both new trial motions in this case.   His conclusion that the

testimony, which was not helpful to Heather, who was convicted,

would not have been helpful to the defendant, is due deference.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 459 Mass. 538, 550 (2011) (findings of

fact of motion judge due special deference where that judge also

2 Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, evidence he was in fact
inebriated and went to a hotel with the complainant the night
she first revealed the abuse is not propensity evidence barred
by the trial judge’s order in limine prohibiting the use of past
bad acts of drug use or alcohol consumption.

                                 5
presided over trial).   Although the reasonableness of an

attorney's conduct must be judged as of the time it occurred,

there is no limitation on the use of evidence subsequently

obtained in determining whether any failure on counsel's part

was prejudicial.

     Finally, given what was before the motion judge, there was

no abuse of discretion in the judge's failure to hold an

evidentiary hearing on the second new trial motion, as there was

no serious issue as to the adequacy of counsels' representation,

the resolution of which required such a hearing.   See

Commonwealth v. Mercado, 466 Mass. 141, 148 n.8 (2013).

     Where trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance

of counsel, appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue

cannot amount to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

The judge did not err in concluding that the actions of counsel

                                 6
were not manifestly unreasonable, or in, as a consequence,

denying the second motion for new trial.

                                      Order entered September 3,
                                      2021, denying defendant's
                                      motion for new trial
                                      affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Rubin, Neyman &
                                        Walsh, JJ. 3),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    January 19, 2024.

3   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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