Court Opinion

ID: 9723740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:29:37.219302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:51.445794
License: Public Domain

EVANS, Acting P. J.
I dissent.
I have independently listened to the four-hour tape recording, which resulted in some incriminating admissions by the defendant, to determine whether those admissions were voluntarily made. (People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 609 [147 Cal.Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672].) I conclude as did the trial judge that the four-hour interview was not a coercive interrogation but rather a dialogue between defendant and Officer Virgil Lowe of the Stockton Police Department in which Officer Lowe skillfully interrogated and commented on the realities of the molestation allegations made against the defendant by his three step-grandchildren. A careful review of the tapes fails to indicate to me any physical or mental coercion which precipitated the defendant’s incriminating statements. I reach this conclusion readily and beyond any question of doubt, regardless of the standard of review to be applied. The courtesy and politeness of the officer during the interrogation was exemplary. The manner in which he presented the evidence against the defendant compared favorably to that of skilled trial counsel in examination of a witness in court. Neither in tone nor tempo of the questions tendered or statements made does oppressive pressure appear. The conduct of the interview was anything but coercive. At most, the tapes disclose in various form repeated admonitions by the officer to the defendant to tell the truth. Intellectual persuasion is not the equivalent of coercion. (People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 548-549 [58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908].) As stated in People v. Ditson (1962) 57 Cal.2d 415, 433 [20 Cal.Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714], “We do find searching questions and exhortations to help himself by revealing the acts of others. But absent something other than mere questions, or exhortations to tell the truth or clear his conscience or help himself by revealing facts as to the [molestation allegation] . . . there appears to be nothing on the face of the record which would support a finding of overreaching or coercion.”
Viewing the interview in its worst light reveals only questioning which at times could be described at most to have been devious or tricky; however, *606such conduct by an interrogator has not been found to be the basis of rendering a defendant’s statement inadmissible. (People v. Ketchel (1963) 59 Cal.2d 503, 520 [30 Cal.Rptr. 538, 381 P.2d 394].)
The question to be answered is whether the behavior of the law enforcement officer was such as to overbear the defendant’s will to resist. In my view, the contents of the tape recordings overwhelmingly compel a negative answer to that question. For four hours, the defendant steadfastly maintained a position of innocence and denial of any lewd conduct with either Dawn or Stephanie. The questioning produced admissions of two incidents with the older stepgranddaughter Christie. His steadfast denials of all other incidents which had been alluded to by the officer does not reveal a breakdown of the defendant’s will to resist. I would conclude that the limited confession made by defendant was freely and voluntarily made beyond any reasonable doubt.
I also disagree with the majority conclusion that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” rule of People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at page 608, has somehow been transformed to a statutory rule and therefore survives the provisions of article I, section 28, subdivision (d) (Truth-in-Evidence), of the California Constitution. The privilege against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the federal and California Constitutions; the standard by which the voluntariness of incriminating statements is determined is not established by either Constitution or statutory provisions. This is made clear by the California Supreme Court decision in People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d 595. The court stated in overruling all prior California decisions applying the preponderating standard, “that the reasonable doubt standard is required as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. ” (Italics added; id., at p. 605.)
Now by some judicial legerdemain, the court in People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732, 736-742 [212 Cal.Rptr. 644], and the majority in this case seek to abrogate part of the effect of article I, section 28, subdivision (d), and somehow insinuate the provisions of Evidence Code section 940 into the review of extrajudicial statements made by a defendant. I find such a conclusion to be a legally indefensible effort to avoid the obvious effect of the constitutional amendment adopted by the people which adopted the federal standard of a preponderance of evidence to find whether or not a confession was produced by coercion and was voluntary as established in Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 489 [30 L.Ed.2d 618, 627-628, 92 S.Ct. 619].
*607I find the defendant’s remaining contentions to be utterly meritless. I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 22, 1986. Lucas, J., and Panelli, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.