Court Opinion

ID: 9570231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:21:18.732732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:10.632284
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice:
I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion which upholds the admission of the co-defendant’s statement. In my opinion, the admission of Altman’s statement, “I wasn’t driving anyway” violated Evans’ Confrontation Clause rights.
Evans was charged with driving the vehicle which killed the children: Altman merely with misprision of felon, that is, the failure to report Evan’s crime. There was physical evidence placing Altman at the scene, and evidence that there were two people in the truck when the children were struck. The trial judge redacted the explicit reference in Altman’s statement naming Evans as the driver, but refused to redact the statement that Altman was not the driver, an indisputable reference to the existence of an additional person. Although not named that person could only be Evans.
A nontestifying codefendant statement need not name the defendant in order to incriminate him. State v. Singleton, 303 S.C. 313, 400 S.E. (2d) 487 (1991) (redaction of appellant’s name but not his general physical description violated appellant’s Confrontation Clause rights); see also State v. LaBarge, 275 S.C. 168, 268 S.E. (2d) 278 (1980) [substitution of “Mr. X” for defendant’s name would not satisfy Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed. (2d) 476 (1968)]. In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed. (2d) 176 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the redaction of any reference to the existence of another defendant satisfies the Confrontation Clause, even if other evidence links the defendant to the crime where a proper limiting instruction is given. Id. (Emphasis added.) Here, the redaction is incomplete and unequivocally indicates the presence of another, more culpable individual. Further, there was no contemporaneous limiting instruction.1 Under the circumstances of this case, Altman’s statement, fairly understood, incrimi*314nates Evans. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed. (2d) 476 (1968). I would reverse on this ground. State v. Singleton, supra.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that neither the admission of the Grandfather’s posthypnotic statement regarding the truck’s color nor the admission of the “expert” testimony of intoxication require reversal, albeit for different reasons. I would hold that a statement obtained, as was the Grandfather’s, in violation of every procedural safeguard outlined in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A. (2d) 86 (1981), is per se inadmissable. The majority holds that a trial judge may admit such a statement if she determines that it is “more accurate,” that is, that it better reflects the “true facts” in the case. Such a determination requires the trial judge to make an inappropriate intrusion into the jury’s province to decide the facts. I would hold that the trial judge erred in admitting the Grandfather’s posthypnotic recollection of the truck’s color because it was obtained without proper procedural safeguards, but that the admission was harmless error in light of Evans’ attorney’s concession in his closing argument that the color of the vehicle which struck the children was simply not a contested issue. State v. Shaw, 258 S.E. 236, 188 S.E. (2d) 186 (1972).
Further, any error in the admission of the “expert” testimony on intoxication is harmless under the facts of this case. Evans was charged with felony DUI but convicted only of the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter.2 The jury was told by the solicitor3 that if it returned an involuntary manslaughter verdict, that would mean it found Evans was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The jury did return such a verdict, and thus obviously did not accept the “expert” testimony. Any error in its admission was harmless beyond any doubt. See State V. Rochester, 301 S.E. 196, 391 S.E. (2d) 244 (1990) (any error in admission of evidence of sexual intercourse harmless where judge directed a verdict on criminal sexual conduct charge).
Finally, the majority finds no error in the trial judge’ re*315fusal to calling an inmate as a Court’s witness. In my opinion, the test for calling a Court’s witness outlined in State v. Anderson, 304 S.C. 551, 406 S.E. (2d) 152 (1991) and Riddle v. State,__S.C._, 443 S.E. (2d) 557 (1994) is simply unworkable where, as here, it is the defense rather than the State which wishes to have the witness called. Despite my reluctance to apply the Anderson test, neither party has questioned its applicability either before us or at trial. Accordingly, I would find no error in the judge’s refusal to exercise his authority because the proposed witness did not meet Anderson prerequisites 2,4, and 5.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent in part and concur in part.

 Under the circumstances of this case, Evans was not under an obligation to request a limiting instruction in order to preserve this issue for appeal. After a statement is properly redacted, a limiting instruction should be given. Since the trial judge refused to redact the statement, Evans was not required to make the futile gesture of asking for an instruction. State v. Bryant, 447 S.E. (2d) 852 (1994).

 This case was tried before we decided State v. Cribb,_S.C.__, 426 S.E. (2d) 306 (1992), in which we reversed our earlier eases, and held involuntary manslaughter was no longer a lesser included offense of felony DUI.

 Arguments of counsel is considered by this Court in interpreting a jury’s verdict. State v. Jefferies, 446 S.E. (2d) 427 (S.C. 1994).