Court Opinion

ID: 9930052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 23:14:57.425452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:58:10.823074
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                          No. 83837-7-I
                        Respondent,
                                                          DIVISION ONE
                v.
                                                          UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 RENE MAYA ESTRADA,

                        Appellant.

       MANN, J. — Rene Maya Estrada 1 was convicted of first degree rape. He appeals

and argues that the (1) the lack of a Petrich 2 instruction violated his constitutional right

to a unanimous jury, and (2) the admission of multiple hearsay statements violated

Evidence Rule (ER) 802 and his constitutional right to a jury trial. We affirm.

                                                   I

       In October 2019, 17-year-old B.S.G.’s 3 parents allowed Maya Estrada, who was

homeless at the time, to stay in the living room of their apartment. Shortly after Maya

       1 The trial court caption and record sets out the defendant’s last name with a hyphen.

Defendant’s appellate brief omits the hyphen. As hyphens are not associated with traditional naming
conventions in Spanish-speaking communities, we refer to him by his complete unhyphenated last name.
         2 State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572, 683 P.2d 173 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by

State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403, 756 P.2d 105 (1988).
         3 We use the victim's initials to protect her privacy and dignity. RCW 7.69.010.
No. 83837-7-I/2

Estrada came to stay, B.S.G. came home from work and was alone with Maya Estrada

in the apartment. While B.S.G. was in her bedroom, Maya Estrada approached her

from behind with a knife. Maya Estrada instructed B.S.G. to do what he said or he

would kill her. Maya Estrada then covered B.S.G.’s mouth and held the knife to her

stomach. Maya Estrada removed B.S.G.’s shirt, bra, pants, and underwear. He then

told her not to shout and threw her on the bed while he continued to hold the knife.

Maya Estrada then got on top of B.S.G. and covered her face with a pillow so that she

couldn’t scream. Maya Estrada told B.S.G. to do as he said then put his penis in

B.S.G.’s mouth, kissed her, and touched her body with his mouth and hands. These

events took about 30 to 45 minutes.

      After Maya Estrada heard sounds coming from the stairs outside the apartment,

he left the bedroom to take a look. Maya Estrada then returned to B.S.G.’s bedroom,

tossed some clothes at her, and demanded that she get dressed and come with him. In

fear for her life, B.S.G. put on a shirt and shorts but no bra or underwear and went with

Maya Estrada to the laundry room located downstairs from the apartment. In the

laundry room, Maya Estrada took out his penis; B.S.G. started to cry and said no. Maya

Estrada then hit B.S.G. in the chest and put his penis in her mouth.

      When the headlights of a car parking at the apartment building shone into the

laundry room, Maya Estrada left and went upstairs. B.S.G. ran from the laundry room

and approached a woman nearby, later identified as Martha Ramirez, asking for help.

Ramirez testified that B.S.G. was running and crying and appeared “all stressed out,

like in shock.” B.S.G. was wearing only one sock and no shoes. Ramirez took B.S.G.

to her apartment where B.S.G. asked to use the bathroom because she wanted to throw

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No. 83837-7-I/3

up and was feeling very nauseous. Ramirez testified that B.S.G. was trying to throw up,

but couldn’t so instead rinsed her mouth out with water. Ramirez and her son then

called 911 and reported that there was a girl there that said someone is going to kill her.

The caller told the 911 operator that the girl reported that the person was touching her

breast and had a knife. B.S.G. talked to the responding police officers and was then

taken to the hospital where she had a sexual assault examination.

       A few days later, Maya Estrada approached B.S.G. while she was at work.

B.S.G. called 911 and Federal Way Police officers responded and arrested Maya

Estrada.

       Maya Estrada was charged with rape in the first degree under RCW

9A.44.040(1). Maya Estrada was also charged under RCW 9.94A.825 and

9.94A.533(4) with being armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, at the time of the rape.

       A jury trial was held over nine days in the fall of 2021. The jury heard testimony

from the responding police officers and Federal Way Police Detective Mathew Novack.

The sexual assault nurse, Chelsea Reed, testified about her examination of B.S.G. on

the night of the rape. She testified that B.S.G. answered a battery of question. B.S.G.

told her that Maya Estrada put a knife on her stomach and put his penis in her mouth in

the bedroom, and then, after dragging her down to the laundry room, threatened her

again with the knife and again put his penis in her mouth. Reed testified that B.S.G.

answered “no” as to whether she had washed her mouth out or vomited since the

incident.

       The neighbor, Ramirez, testified about her encounter with B.S.G. and calling 911.

Ramirez testified that B.S.G. told her that when she got home there was a man inside

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No. 83837-7-I/4

her house, and that he threatened her and forced her with a knife to the laundry room

and forced her to perform oral sex.

       B.S.G. testified to the following events. She explained that when she arrived

home she went to her bedroom and felt Maya Estrada come up behind her with a

kitchen knife and then covered her mouth and put the knife toward her stomach. He

then undressed her and threw her onto the bed while holding the knife, climbed on top

of her, and then put his penis in her mouth and that it tasted salty. B.S.G. testified that

after hearing noises outside, Maya Estrada got up and left to go look. After he came

back, he threw some clothes at her and told her to get dressed. B.S.G. testified that

she was still scared he was going to kill her, but didn’t remember if she saw a knife.

B.S.G. testified that she could not remember how she got to the laundry room, but once

there he hit her in the chest and put his penis in her mouth again. B.S.G. testified that

she did not remember too well the events that took place in Ramirez’s apartment and

said, “The thing is that I don’t remember well. I remember that I threw up in her

bathroom, but I don’t remember if she was or not with me.”

       Maya Estrada did not testify or present witnesses. He instead denied the

allegations and focused on B.S.G.’s credibility.

       The jury was instructed that “to convict” Maya Estrada for first degree rape under

RCW 9A.44.040(1) each of the following must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

             (1) That on or about October 12, 2019, the defendant engaged in
       sexual intercourse with B.S.G.;
             (2) That the sexual intercourse was by forcible compulsion;
             (3) That the defendant used or threatened to use a deadly weapon
       or what appeared to be a deadly weapon; and
             (4) That any of these acts occurred in the State of Washington.

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No. 83837-7-I/5

               If you find from the evidence that elements (1), (2), (3), and (4),
       have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your duty to
       return a verdict of guilty. On the other hand, if, after weighing all the
       evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to any one of elements (1), (2),
       (3), or (4), then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.

The jury instructions did not include a Petrich unanimity instruction.

       The jury found Maya Estrada guilty of rape in the first degree. The jury did not

decide the deadly weapon enhancement special verdict.

       Maya Estrada moved for a new trial first arguing that a Petrich instruction was

required because a reasonable juror could have believed the rape happened at one

location, but not the other, and in believing so they may not have been unanimous

about which incident met the first degree rape requirements. Maya Estrada also argued

that his due process rights were violated because the jury did not decide the deadly

weapon enhancement special verdict thus proving he was not convicted beyond a

reasonable doubt of every element of the crime charged.

       The trial court denied Maya Estrada’s motion for a new trial. Maya Estrada

appeals.

                                             II

       Maya Estrada was charged with one count of rape. He asserts that because the

State presented evidence of two distinct acts, the State should have elected which act

they were relying on or, the jury should have been instructed to agree on a specific

criminal act. Maya Estrada argues that his constitutional right to a unanimous jury was

violated by the lack of a Petrich instruction. We disagree.

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No. 83837-7-I/6

                                              A

       Criminal defendants have a right to a unanimous jury verdict. W ASH. CONST. art.

I, § 21; State v. Ortega-Martinez, 124 Wn.2d 702, 707, 881 P.2d 231 (1994). When the

State presents evidence of multiple acts that could constitute the crime charged, it

generally must either tell the jury which act to rely on in its deliberations, or the court

must instruct the jury that it has to unanimously agree on which specific act supports the

conviction. State v. Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d 403, 409-11, 756 P.2d 105 (1988). The former

is known as an “election” and the latter is known as a Petrich instruction after the case

in which the instruction originated. State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 572, 683 P.2d 173

(1984), abrogated on other grounds by Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d at 403. Whether a Petrich

instruction was required is reviewed de novo. State v. Boyd, 137 Wn. App. 910, 922,

155 P.3d 188 (2007).

       Failure to make an election or give a Petrich instruction can be constitutional

error because of “the possibility that some jurors may have relied on one act or incident

and some another, resulting in a lack of unanimity on all of the elements necessary for a

valid conviction.” Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d at 411. Neither an election by the State nor a

Petrich instruction is required where multiple acts form a continuing course of criminal

conduct. State v. Handran, 113 Wn.2d 11, 17, 775 P.2d 453 (1989).

       To determine whether criminal acts are a continuing course of conduct, facts are

evaluated using common sense. Handran, 113 Wn.2d at 17. We consider “whether the

evidence shows conduct occurring at one place or at many places, within a brief or long

period of time, and to one or multiple different victims, and whether the conduct was

intended to achieve a single or multiple different objectives.” State v. Lee, 12 Wn. App.

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No. 83837-7-I/7

2d 378, 393, 460 P.3d 701 (2020). Typically, a continuing course of conduct is “an

ongoing enterprise with a single objective.” State v. Love, 80 Wn. App. 357, 361, 908

P.2d 395 (1996). On the other hand, different times, locations, and parties suggest

multiple acts. State v. Brown, 159 Wn. App. 1, 14, 248 P.3d 518 (2010).

       In Handran, for example, Handran was seen climbing in the window of his ex-

wife’s apartment. 113 Wn.2d at 13. The victim woke to find Handran leaning over her,

nude, and kissing her. Handran, 113 Wn.2d at 13. After she demanded he leave, he

pinned her down, offered her money, and hit her in the face. Handran, 113 Wn.2d at

13. Handran argued on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to give a unanimity

instruction because the jury could have found that the assault was his kissing the victim

or his hitting her. Handran, 113 Wn.2d at 17. Our Supreme Court disagreed,

explaining:

       Handran’s alleged criminal conduct occurred in one place during a short
       period of time between the same aggressor and victim. Under a
       commonsense evaluation of these facts, the actions evidence a continuing
       course of conduct to secure sexual relations with his ex-wife, whether she
       consented or not, rather than several distinct acts.

Handran, 113 Wn.2d at 17.

       This court has recently addressed the need for a Petrich instruction in two

opinions. In Lee, the defendant Lee strangled the victim in the kitchen while verbally

threatening her. Lee then stopped only to continue the same actions in the living room

then again in the bedroom where the defendant penetrated the victim digitally and with

his penis. 12 Wn. App. 2d at 384-85. Lee argued that because there were multiple

distinct acts of penetration and the prosecution did not make an election at trial, there

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No. 83837-7-I/8

should have been a Petrich instruction. Lee, 12 Wn. App. 2d at 396. This court

disagreed, explaining,

      Lee’s acts of sexual penetration involved the same victim, K.H., occurred
      in one place, K.H.’s bed, occurred within a brief period of time, less than
      10 minutes, and occurred for the single purpose of Lee’s sexual
      gratification. Lee’s acts were plainly a continuing course of conduct, and
      no election or unanimity instruction was required.

Lee, 12 Wn. App. 2d at 397.

      In contrast, in State v. Aguilar, 27 Wn. App. 2d 904, 911-13, 534 P.3d 360

(2023), Aguilar broke into his ex-girlfriend’s apartment and embarked on an overnight

binge of emotional, physical, and sexual violence. On appeal, Aguilar argued that the

testimony described two distinct incidents of rape—his sexual assault of the victim on

the couch, and the later sexual intercourse in the bedroom—but the jury was not given a

unanimity instruction. Aguilar, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 922. This court agreed, explaining:

      We conclude that the facts here are consistent with multiple acts rather
      than a continuing course of conduct. The relevant conduct occurred in
      A.B.’s apartment and A.B. was the only victim, facts that admittedly
      indicate a continuing course of conduct rather than multiple acts. But the
      timeline of events, although uncertain, indicates that numerous activities
      may have intervened between the events on the couch and in the
      bedroom. Some of these activities—searching for and doing drugs,
      pretending to sip wine—appear to have been somewhat prolonged
      endeavors. And Aguilar’s state of mind does not demonstrate the
      existence of “an ongoing enterprise with a single objective.” [State v.
      Garman, 100 Wn. App. 307, 313, 984 P.2d 453 (1999)]. Instead he acted
      erratically under the influence of intoxicants, his focus shifting rapidly from
      one thing to another.

Aguilar, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 926.

      The facts here appear more like Lee and Handran than Aguilar. The events

occurred between the same defendant and victim, in the same general vicinity, and over

a length of time. While, like Aguilar, there was an intervening event where Maya

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No. 83837-7-I/9

Estrada became worried about getting caught and forced B.S.G. to dress and move

downstairs to the laundry facility; unlike Aguilar, the intervening event was short and

there was no change in activity. Maya Estrada simply stopped what he was doing,

forced B.S.G. to change locations, and then continued the same activity previously

interrupted. Under a commonsense evaluation of the facts, Maya Estrada’s actions

evidence a continuing course of conduct to threaten B.S.G. with a knife and forcibly

secure oral sex without her consent.

                                             III

       Maya Estrada also challenges the trial court’s admission of three hearsay

statements made by responding officers testifying at trial. First, he argues that the trial

court erred by admitting the statements because the purpose for which the statements

were admitted was irrelevant. He also contends that the statements were improperly

admitted because they spoke to the ultimate issue of guilt and invaded the province of

the jury. While we agree that the statements were both hearsay and irrelevant, any

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                             A

       Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

asserted. ER 801(c). “Where an out-of-court statement is offered for the truth of what

someone told a witness, the statement is hearsay.” State v. Rocha, 21 Wn. App. 2d 26,

31, 504 P.3d 233 (2022). Hearsay statements not offered for their truth but for another

relevant purpose may be admitted. State v. Aaron, 57 Wn. App. 277, 280, 787 P.2d

949 (1990). That said, hearsay statements not offered for their truth are inadmissible if

the purpose for which they are offered is irrelevant. Rocha, 21 Wn. App. 2d at 31-32.

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No. 83837-7-I/10

Whether a statement is hearsay is reviewed de novo. State v. Heutink, 12 Wn. App. 2d

336, 356, 458 P.3d 796 (2020). Whether the admission of hearsay violates a

constitutional right is reviewed de novo. State v. Price, 158 Wn.2d 630, 638-39, 146

P.3d 1183 (2006).

                                              B

       Officer Nicholas Wong was asked what information he had “from dispatch as to

what had occurred?” Maya Estrada objected based on hearsay. After the State argued

that the statement was not offered for the truth, the trial court instructed the jury that

they could not consider the response for the truth of the matter:

       The answer to this question is going to be hearsay, so it’s not substantive
       evidence. You can’t consider it for the truth of the matter. You can only
       consider it for the impact on the here or the person that heard it.

Officer Wong then responded: “I believe the dispatcher had spoken of a sexual assault

involving a knife.” (Emphasis added.)

       Officer Christopher Cabrera was asked how he got involved in the incident. He

responded:

       A dispatch basically to the sector vehicles as a—it originally came out, I
       believe, as a suspicious subject, and eventually a little bit more
       information started coming out due to the language barrier, they had to
       translate over to a Spanish translation and to be able to get any more
       information that’s coming out.

       So, sometimes any type of information that comes out towards us and
       dispatch is not always up to date and current until they get that extra
       translation when it comes out to that. So, once the translation came out
       where it came of an incident that occurred the night prior and it was
       matching the same subject as that incident, that’s when multiple units
       throughout the whole city actually started responding to that location,
       because of the seriousness of the offense that occurred the night prior.

(Emphasis added.)

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No. 83837-7-I/11

        After Maya Estrada objected and moved to strike Officer Cabrera’s last comment,

the trial court again instructed the jury that it could not consider the statement for the

truth of the matter asserted:

        So, I’ll instruct the jurors that you can only consider it for that basis as to
        why the police responded the way they did, and not for the truth of the
        matter asserted.

        Officer Hilary Mariana was then asked how her involvement started. She

responded that “the call came out as a sexual assault with a weapon.” (Emphasis

added.) In response to Maya Estrada’s objection, the trial court again instructed the

jury:

        Any reference by this officer to what she heard from some other person, at
        least in this answer, is hearsay and is not substantive evidence. You
        cannot consider it as evidence. You can only consider it for what this
        officer did next.

                                                C

        Maya Estrada first relies on Rocha and argues that why officers did what they did

was irrelevant and thus the statements were improperly admitted hearsay testimony. In

Rocha, the trial court allowed officers to testify about information received from dispatch

and that their response to the location was based on a “domestic situation.” 21 Wn.

App. 2d at 30. On appeal, the court concluded that the statements were irrelevant and

allowed in error because why officers went to the gas station was of no consequence at

trial and could only be relevant to support that the defendant fought with the victim thus

he acted with malice which was an element of the crime. Rocha, 21 Wn. App. 2d at 32.

        Here, the trial court similarly allowed police officer statements that they

responded to a “sexual assault” not for the truth but to explain why they did what they

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No. 83837-7-I/12

did. Like Rocha, why officers went to the scene and their state of mind at the time were

not at issue at trial. Because the specific information received from dispatch was

irrelevant, we conclude the statements that they were responding to a “sexual assault”

were irrelevant and improperly admitted hearsay.

       Maya Estrada also contends that the testimony of a “sexual assault involving a

knife,” that there was a “serious[] . . . offense that occurred,” and that there was a

“sexual assault with a weapon,” amounted to opinion testimony on the ultimate issue of

guilt and invaded the province of the jury in violation of article I, sections 21 and 22.

WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 21, 22. It is unclear from Maya Estrada’s arguments how the

officers’ hearsay statements amounted to opinions of his guilt. While the statement

might opine that a sexual assault occurred with a weapon, and that the crime was

serious, none of the testimony concluded that Maya Estrada committed the crime. We

generally do not address unsupported constitutional arguments. Havens v. C & D

Plastics, Inc., 124 Wn.2d 158, 169, 876 P.2d 435 (1994). But here, as discussed below,

even if the statements were improper under Washington’s constitution, they were

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                              D

       Nonconstitutional error is harmless if ‘there is a reasonable probability that,

without the error, the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected.” Rocha,

21 Wn. App. 2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Gower, 179

Wn.2d 851, 854, 321 P.3d 1178 (2014)). “Constitutional error is harmless only if the

State establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have

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No. 83837-7-I/13

reached the same result absent the error.” State v. Quaale, 182 Wn.2d 191, 202, 340

P.3d 213 (2014). Both standards are met here.

         Maya Estrada relied on a general denial and focused on the lack of any semen in

the swabs taken from B.S.G.’s mouth and breast, and the lack of DNA evidence in

B.S.G.’s mouth swab. But the lack of DNA evidence in B.S.G.’s mouth swab is at best

inconclusive. B.S.G. only testified that Maya Estrada’s penis in her mouth tasted salty,

she never claimed that Maya Estrada ejaculated. Also, the State’s DNA expert,

Christine Vo, explained that because of the high turnover rate of cells in a person’s

mouth due to the constant making of saliva and swallowing, it is highly unlikely for DNA

from external sources to stick around in the mouth for a long time. And as such, it is

“rare to get DNA from another person on oral swabs if those swabs haven’t been

collected very quickly after the alleged incident, and if not very much, DNA is left

behind.” And further, there was mixed testimony as to whether B.S.G. vomited or rinsed

her mouth after the event. B.S.G. testified that she thought she vomited at Ramirez’s

apartment, but she told the sexual assault examination nurse that she did not. Ramirez,

however, testified that B.S.G. tried to vomit but could not and rinsed her mouth out with

water.

         More importantly, the swab taken from B.S.G.’s breast revealed the presence of

saliva, and DNA testing overwhelmingly revealed that Maya Estrada was a contributor

to the DNA mixture. 4 Further, B.S.G. testified in detail to the event, including identifying

        4 Forensic scientist Dr. Gina Dembinski explained that assuming B.S.G. was one of the

contributors to the DNA mixture found on her own breast, it was 710 octillion times more likely that the
mixture came from B.S.G. and Maya Estrada as opposed to B.S.G. and an unrelated individual selected
at random.

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No. 83837-7-I/14

Maya Estrada in court, and was subject to cross-examination. Her testimony was also

supported by the testimony from the sexual assault examination nurse and responding

neighbor. Considering the untainted evidence, any error in admitting the officers’

statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

      We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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