Court Opinion

ID: 9735228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:06:02.006007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:56.194242
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
(dissenting). Because we would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in placing limitations on the voir dire conducted in this case, we respectfully dissent.
i
It is undisputed that on September 28, 1985, defendant Leonard Tyburski inflicted fatal injuries on his wife in the basement of their home. He stored her body in the locked basement freezer for approximately three years, until the body was discovered by one of his daughters on January 2, 1989. Tyburski was arrested on that same day and charged with open murder. Following the preliminary examination on March 2, 1989, he was bound over for trial on a charge of second-degree murder.
Extensive pretrial publicity surrounded the unfolding of these events, stemming mostly from the manner in which the defendant had disposed of the body and the circumstances attending the discovery of the body. Ample media coverage was also given to an alleged affair between the decedent and her daughter’s boyfriend. On the international level, two British tabloids followed the case. On the national level, stories of the case appeared in the New York Times, USA Today, and the National Enquirer. Journalists from Arizona, Florida, and Pennsylvania, among other states, had *647called requesting information about the case. On the local level, stories appeared in the Detroit Free Press, the Detroit News, and the Plymouth Observer, including an article that appeared in the April 23, 1989, Sunday magazine of the Detroit Free Press, entitled, "I found Mom!” On the basis of this pervasive pretrial publicity, defense counsel moved for individual sequestered voir dire and for submission of a questionnaire to all prospective jurors designed to determine the extent of their exposure to such publicity.1 The trial court denied these requests.
At trial, the sole issue was the level of defendant’s culpability. In an attempt to mitigate the crime to manslaughter, defendant raised a defense of provocation. This was premised on the fact that *648the murder occurred following an argument between the defendant and the decedent, an argument precipitated by the decedent’s admission that she was having an affair with her daughter’s boyfriend. Defendant testified that following this admission, the decedent began throwing food containers at him and lunged at him with a knife. This sequence of events triggered his actions in smashing her head against a beam in the basement, resulting in her fatal injuries.
The jury rejected defendant’s defense of provocation and convicted the defendant of second-degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to a term of twenty to forty years. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion in limiting the scope and conduct of voir dire, resulting in a deficient voir dire.2 It held that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s refusal to conduct sequestered voir dire, its failure to allow meaningful participation by defense counsel in the jury selection, and the absence of probing questions on voir dire prevented defendant from receiving a fair trial. Because we disagree with the majority’s affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals, we dissent.
II
The analysis of the lead opinion focuses solely on the conduct of the jury voir dire in the context of the pretrial publicity. Accordingly, we must carefully examine the transcript of the voir dire and the content of the pretrial publicity within the context of the recognized purposes of voir dire.
*649A
Jury voir dire began on Monday, June 19, 1989. As stated above, the court had earlier denied defense counsel’s requests for individual sequestered voir dire and submission of a questionnaire to prospective jurors. The trial judge informed counsel that it was his practice to conduct the voir dire.3 The court responded negatively to defense counsel’s question pertaining to whether follow-up questions by counsel would be allowed. However, the court indicated to counsel that if a juror’s response demonstrated a need for follow-up questions, counsel could submit such questions in writing to the judge and he would present them to the prospective jurors. Additionally, defense counsel requested that the trial court question potential jurors individually if it appeared that many had been exposed to pretrial publicity. The court expressed its intention to comply with this request.
The jury array was composed of eighty persons. After questioning prospective jurors regarding potential bias stemming from previous encounters *650with the law or knowledge of one of the parties or witnesses in the case, the trial judge proceeded to the issue of pretrial publicity. Initially, the trial judge asked to see a display of hands by each person who had heard or seen something about this case. Every prospective juror responded. Beginning with the first juror, the judge asked, "how do you recall hearing something about this case?” When the juror responded that she had read about the case in the paper and had seen news coverage on television, the trial judge stated:
All right. You understand, [name of juror], that if you are selected to sit as a juror in this courtroom, that you have to decide this case on what you hear in the courtroom; you understand that, don’t you.
Following an affirmative response by the juror, the trial judge stated:
All right. If you are selected as a juror, what you are going to have to do, [name of juror], is basically separate what you have heard on tv or on the radio or in the newspaper and judge this case on what you hear in the courtroom. Have you developed any opinions thus far or feelings on this case one way or another as to what you’ve heard or read?
The juror responded that she had and that she tended to think the defendant was guilty. Following this disclosure, the trial judge inquired:
All right. Do you believe everything that you read in the newspaper?
When the juror responded in the negative, the trial judge implored:
*651Okay. Do you think that that is a way to settle disputes as to guilt or innocence by reading the newspaper?
Upon receiving a negative response, the trial judge continued:
Okay. If I were to tell you, [name of juror], that you have to decide this case based on what you hear in the courtroom, will you be able to set aside your beliefs, set aside your opinions and listen to this case and render a fair decision?
The juror responded in the negative. The trial judge followed up with:
No. Do you think what you’ve read thus far has tainted you to such a degree that you do not think that you could be fair to this defendant?
Upon receiving an affirmative response, the trial judge ended this line of questioning (this juror was later excused by the trial judge) and moved on to another prospective juror.
During questioning of the next several prospective jurors, the trial judge inquired whether any feelings or opinions had been developed about the case. An affirmative response triggered a follow-up question by the judge regarding whether the prospective juror could set aside personal opinions and try the case solely on the evidence presented in the courtroom. After having excused several jurors for cause on the basis of their firmly held opinions, this exchange occurred:
The Court: Okay. As a result of what you have heard and read, have you formulated any opinions?
Juror Zimmer: Well, I’m afraid I would have to say I did.
*652The Court: Okay. And these opinions are not favorable toward Mr. Tyburski?
Juror Zimmer: That’s right.
The Court: Okay.
[Defense attorney]: May we approach for a moment, your Honor?
The Court: All right.
(Off the record discussion was had.)
The Court: You understand, Ms. Zimmer, don’t you, as I’ve discussed earlier that this case is going to be decided in the courtroom; isn’t that correct?
Juror Zimmer: Yes.
The Court: You understand that?
Juror Zimmer: Yes.
The Court: And you don’t believe that case[s] should be decided by the media, do you?
Juror Zimmer: No, I don’t.
The Court: You don’t believe that cases should be decided by what you read in the newspaper, do you?
Juror Zimmer: No.
The Court: You don’t believe that cases should be decided on what you hear or say [sic] on the tv; isn’t that correct?
Juror Zimmer: That’s right.
The Court: Okay. But you are telling me that you’ve developed such a strong opinion that you’d have a hard time being a fair juror; is that correct?
Juror Zimmer: Well, I would have a rough time, I think.
The Court: You’d have a rough time?
Juror Zimmer: Yes, I believe I would.
The Court: Even though you believe that cases shouldn’t be decided on what you heard and read in the newspapers?
Juror Zimmer: I realize that . . .
The Court: You don’t know if what you’ve read is accurate, do you? There’s no way for you to know that; isn’t that correct?
Juror Zimmer: That’s true.
*653At the conclusion of this exchange, juror Zimmer was excused for cause. Immediately following this, juror Louis admitted she had read about the case and formulated an opinion concerning what she had read.4 The following exchange transpired:
The Court: Okay. Do you understand that if you are selected to sit as a juror in this case that you have to decide the case on what you hear in the courtroom?
Juror Louis: Yes.
The Court: And will you be able to do that?
Juror Louis: Yes.
The Court: Will you be able to set aside the opinions that you’ve developed in the newspapers and judge this case on what you hear in the courtroom?
Juror Louis: Yes.
Receiving this response, the trial judge proceeded to question the next prospective juror.5 The morning session of the voir dire continued in similar fashion, with the trial judge asking every potential juror whether he had formed any opinions about this case, and inquiring into the substance of any opinions admittedly formed.
At the conclusion of the morning session, defense counsel filed a motion objecting to the Court’s voir dire procedure. Counsel argued that the Court’s procedure in inquiring into whether any juror had formed an opinion regarding defendant’s guilt and its inquiry into the substance of this opinion served only to taint any prospective juror who either had not yet heard about the case or had failed to form an opinion about defendant’s *654guilt or innocence. Counsel further claimed that the voir dire process "has been more prejudicial to [defendant’s] right to a fair trial by an impartial jury than had the Court asked no questions whatsoever about publicity.” Counsel then requested that any extended questioning of jurors regarding their opinions be conducted individually and outside the presence of every other prospective juror.6
After the lunch break, voir dire continued with prospective juror Rae. Following an affirmative response to an inquiry into whether he had heard about the case, the trial judge queried whether he *655had "developed any opinions that would make [him] an unfair juror?” (Emphasis added.)
The trial judge proceeded to question prospective jurors in this manner, but generally included such additional inquiries into whether a prospective juror would "be able to give this defendant all his constitutional guarantees?” and whether there was any reason why such juror could not sit as an impartial juror, despite having been exposed to pretrial publicity.
At the conclusion of the judge’s questions regarding the effect of the pretrial publicity on the prospective jurors, it appears defense counsel reminded the judge that he had not inquired into whether prospective jurors had read the article published in the Sunday Free Press magazine, entitled, "I found Mom!” It seems defense counsel also requested the judge to probe the source of the prospective jurors’ knowledge of the case.7 The trial judge immediately requested a showing of hands by those prospective jurors who had read this article. He then asked how many prospective jurors had heard about the case only on television and how many had read about it only in the newspapers. Finally, he asked how many prospective jurors had heard about this case on the radio.
After covering other areas of potential bias, the trial judge asked if counsel had any written questions it wished to have submitted to the jury. This colloquy ensued:
[Defense Counsel]: No, your Honor, just the ones that I have submitted.
The Court: All right. I have gone through those. *656Those that I did not ask I did not deem to be relevant. But if you want to make those questions part of the file, I will give you that opportunity, counsel.
Following this, defense counsel passed on challenges for cause.
As peremptory challenges were exercised and new prospective jurors were selected to fill the vacant seats, the trial judge inquired whether any juror had heard about the case. Upon receiving an affirmative response, the judge engaged in an examination designed to determine whether any opinions had been formed that would create the potential for unfairness in a prospective juror. This examination was tailored to accommodate defense counsel’s concern, as expressed in her motion at noon objecting to the voir dire procedures, that the questions posed by the trial judge in the morning session prompted answers that had the effect of tainting the remaining members of the venire. On one occasion, defense counsel requested and was given permission to submit a follow-up question to a juror. On several other occasions, defense counsel successfully interjected desired questions into the voir dire.8
*657After having exercised only eight of the allotted twenty peremptory challenges, defense counsel announced it would have no further challenges. Instead, defense counsel submitted a motion for a mistrial the following day on the basis of the court’s procedure in conducting voir dire.9 Defense counsel argued that requesting prospective jurors to verbalize their opinions in front of other prospective jurors served to taint the panel. Counsel informed the judge that although she did not feel this was an impartial jury, she was declining to exercise further peremptory challenges because such challenges would not have cured the faulty procedure.
B
Analyzing the pretrial publicity in the case at bar, we note, as stated above, that this case attracted both national and international media attention, as well as substantial local publicity. This publicity, however, was mainly factual;10 it focused *658on the bizarre facts of the case, many of which were revealed at trial. Emphasis was placed on the body being found in the freezer, three years after the date of death and on the daughter’s discovery of the body. One article implied that defendant was "severely sociopathic.” Another story was entitled, "Woman may have been alive when locked in freezer.” Although evidence adduced at trial confirmed that the decedent may have had some vital signs when she was locked in the freezer, testimony by the medical examiner revealed that the decedent could not have been alive for longer than several minutes following the severe head injuries she sustained. While there was evidence of some journalistic sensationalism, we note that the stories did not focus substantially on irrelevant information. Additionally, there were no stories of confessions that were later ruled inadmissible. In sum, while the publicity was pervasive, it was not necessarily inaccurate, nor was it prejudicial to Tyburski’s defense.
c
Turning now to the recognized purposes of voir dire, we note there are essentially three functions of voir dire. The primary function is to elicit information from prospective jurors that establishes a basis for a challenge for cause. A second important and related function is to facilitate the intelligent use of peremptory challenges. A third function of voir dire, often viewed as illegitimate, is to educate prospective jurors on the merits and theories of the case, and to develop a rapport between jurors and attorneys. It is here that skill*659ful defense attorneys seek to extract commitments from potential jurors; such commitments produce a biased jury instead of an objective one, and thus serve to negate the purpose of voir dire.
For this reason, the trial judge must be given considerable latitude in determining what questions will be submitted to prospective jurors. It has been stated:
[The trial judge] must be free to exclude those questions which are "intended solely to accomplish such improper purpose” or which are not "phrased in neutral, non-argumentative form.” He must also be able to "restrict the examination of jurors within reasonable bounds so as to expedite the trial.” And he must on occasion be allowed to restrict questioning in order to give some protection to the privacy of prospective jurors.[11]
With this background in mind, we review defendant’s federal constitutional challenge before turning our attention to the abuse of discretion argument.
III
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
The United States Supreme Court cases delineating the requirements of voir dire can be divided into two categories. The first includes cases that were tried in federal courts in which the court’s authority stems from its federal supervisory powers.12 The second includes cases that were tried in state courts in which the court’s authority is limited to enforcing the mandates of the United *660States Constitution.13 While the Supreme Court’s decisions under its federal supervisory power are instructive, they are not binding in this state criminal case. It is only that Court’s constitutional decisions that are necessarily binding upon this Court.
A common theme flowing from the cases under both the federal supervisory powers and the constitution is that much discretion is vested in the trial court to determine what questions to ask on voir dire.14 The reasons underpinning this rule were succinctly stated by the Supreme Court in Rosales-Lopez v United States, 451 US 182, 188; 101 S Ct 1629; 68 L Ed 2d 22 (1981):
Despite its importanee, the adequacy of voir dire is not easily subject to appellate review. The trial judge’s function at this point in the trial is not unlike that of the jurors later on in the trial. Both must reach conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of responses to questions.
Cognizant of the above rule, we turn now to the *661relevant federal constitutional decisions and their application to the case at bar.
A
The United States Supreme Court has grappled with the issue of pretrial publicity and its effect on the requirements of voir dire on several occasions, dating from United States v Burr, 8 US (4 Cranch) 470; 2 L Ed 684 (1807), to its more recent pronouncements in Mu’Min v Virginia, 500 US 415; 111 S Ct 1899; 114 L Ed 2d 493 (1991). In Mu’Min, the petitioner Dawud Mu’Min was convicted of murdering a woman while out of prison on work detail and was sentenced to death. Substantial publicity had surrounded this case, including details of the murder, the petitioner’s prior record, and reports of a confession. Publicity concerning the petitioner’s prior record greatly enhanced the potential for prejudice because it included a first-degree murder conviction for which defendant had been incarcerated at the time of the instant murder. It was noted that the death penalty had not been an option when the petitioner was convicted of the earlier murder; instead, he had received a forty-eight-year sentence. The petitioner’s counsel requested a change of venue, but the trial court declined to rule until an attempt had been made to seat a jury.
Before the trial date, the petitioner submitted sixty-four proposed voir dire questions to the trial judge and presented a motion for individual voir dire. The trial court refused to ask any of the petitioner’s questions relating to the content of the publicity to which prospective jurors had been *662exposed,15 and denied the motion for individualized voir dire. The trial court ruled that, if necessary, the venire would be broken down into panels of four to explore the issue of pretrial publicity.
Sixteen of the initial twenty-six prospective jurors admitted to having acquired knowledge about the case from the media or another source. In response to this, the court asked the following questions:
"Would the information that you heard, received, or read from whatever source, would that information aifect your impartiality in this case?
"Is there anyone that would say what you’ve read, seen, heard, or whatever information you may have acquired from whatever the source would aifect your impartiality so that you could not be impartial?
"Considering what the ladies and gentlemen who have answered in the affirmative have heard or read about this case, do you believe that you can enter the Jury box with an open mind and *663await until the entire case is presented before reaching a fixed opinion or conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused?
"In view of everything that you’ve seen, heard, or read, or any information from whatever source that you’ve acquired about this case, is there anyone who believes that you could not become a Juror, enter the Jury box with an open mind and wait until the entire case is presented before reaching a fixed opinion or a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused?” [500 US 420.]
Following these questions, one of the sixteen prospective jurors who had admitted to having prior knowledge of the case professed an inability to be fair and was excused for cause. The petitioner moved for all prospective jurors who had been exposed to pretrial publicity to be excused for cause. The motion was denied.
The trial court proceeded to divide the prospective jurors into groups of four and conducted further voir dire concerning pretrial publicity. If a potential juror acknowledged having read or heard something about the case, the court would ask whether the juror had formed an opinion and whether the juror could be impartial. One juror was removed by the trial judge sua sponte after having equivocated in her response about whether she could enter the jury box with an open mind. Of the twelve jurors eventually chosen, eight had read or heard about the defendant’s case, but none admitted having formed an opinion or being biased against the defendant.
Following his conviction and sentence of death, petitioner Mu’Min challenged his conviction on the basis of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that in cases involving pretrial publicity of this magnitude, the trial *664court must inquire into the contents of any news reports read by potential jurors. The Supreme Court admitted that such questions would be helpful to a defendant in exercising his peremptory challenges, but declined to make such "content” questions a constitutional requirement in cases engendering substantial pretrial publicity. It recognized that
[t]o be constitutionally compelled, however, it is not enough that such questions might be helpful. Rather, the trial court’s failure to ask these questions must render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair. [500 US 425-426.]
Significantly, the Court noted that
[w]ith respect to pretrial publicity, we think this primary reliance on the judgment of the trial court makes good sense. The judge of that court sits in the locale where the publicity is said to have had its effect and brings to his evaluation of any such claim his own perception of the depth and extent of news stories that might influence a juror. The trial court, of course, does not impute his own perceptions to the jurors who are being examined, but these perceptions should be of assistance to it in deciding how detailed an inquiry to make of the members of the jury venire. [500 US 427.]
The Supreme Court concluded that there is no constitutional right to content-based questions designed to reveal the nature and extent of prospective jurors’ pretrial media exposure in cases involving high publicity.
B
Applying this to the case at bar, we would hold that the trial court’s failure to submit defense *665counsel’s questionnaire to prospective jurors did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment16 right to a fair trial or his Fourteenth Amendment right of due process. Justice Kennedy, dissenting in Mu’Min, asserted that the trial judge must
conduct a sufficient colloquy with the individual juror to make an assessment of the juror’s ability to be impartial. [500 US 452. Emphasis added.]
The trial court did question the prospective jurors individually concerning whether information to which they had been exposed had led them to form opinions that would render them incapable of being impartial. Every prospective juror confessing an opinion that defendant was guilty or an inability to be fair was excused for cause. We think this is all that Mu’Min requires. We recognize that in Mu’Min the trial judge conducted further voir dire concerning pretrial publicity in panels of four. While we feel this is a salutary practice, we believe the same result was obtained in the case at bar, namely, all those jurors professing an inability to be fair were excused for cause.
c
Defendant’s reliance on Irvin v Dowd, 366 US 717; 81 S Ct 1639; 6 L Ed 2d 751 (1961), is similarly misplaced. In Irvin, the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a trial preceded by extensive media coverage that included the defendant’s confession to six murders, and his offer to plead guilty if given a ninety-nine-*666year sentence in lieu of the death penalty. Id. at 725-726. The " 'pattern of deep and bitter prejudice’ ” against the defendant was evidenced by the court’s attempt to seat a jury; 268 of 430 prospective jurors were excused on the basis of their preconceived opinions of the defendant’s guilt. Id. at 727. Eight of twelve jurors who believed the defendant was guilty managed to secure positions on the jury by professing their ability to be impartial. Id. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction, determining that under the circumstances, such a finding of impartiality did not comport with constitutional standards. Id. at 728.
Irvin is similar to the case at bar in that there was extensive pretrial publicity, but distinguishable in that two-thirds of the jurors seated in Irvin admitted having formed opinions regarding the defendant’s guilt, while in the case at bar, none of the seated jurors admitted having formed an opinion regarding defendant’s guilt. The Irvin Court, quoting from Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145, 155; 25 L Ed 244 (1878), stated:
"The theory of the law is that a juror who has formed an opinion cannot be impartial.” [366 US 722.]
Although each of the seated jurors professed to be impartial, the Supreme Court concluded:
No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring such a declaration before one’s fellows is often its father. Where so many, so many times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can be given little weight. As one of the jurors put it, "You can’t forget what you hear and see.”
With his life at stake, it is not requiring too *667much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion and by a jury other than one in which two-thirds of the members admit, before hearing any testimony, to possessing a belief in his guilt. [Id. at 728. Emphasis added.]
In the case at bar, despite the pervasive pretrial publicity that surrounded defendant’s trial, no member of defendant’s jury professed a belief in his guilt before hearing any of the testimony. Consequently, Irvin fails to support defendant’s contention that his federal constitutional rights have been violated.
D
Defendant’s reliance on Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 US 333; 86 S Ct 1507; 16 L Ed 2d 600 (1966), is likewise inapposite. In Sheppard, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the combination of the prejudicial publicity and the trial court’s failure to control disruptive influences in the courtroom deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. That prejudicial pretrial publicity alone did not warrant a finding of a deprivation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial is evident from the Court’s opinion, in which it stated:
While we cannot say that Sheppard was denied due process by the judge’s refusal to take precautions against the inñuence of pretrial publicity alone, the court’s later rulings must be considered against the setting in which the trial was held. In light of this background, we believe that the arrangements made by the judge with the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of that "judicial serenity and calm to which [he] was entitled.” [Id. at 354-355, quoting Estes v Texas, *668381 US 532, 536; 85 S Ct 1628; 14 L Ed 2d 543 (1965). Emphasis added.]
In contrast to the circus-like atmosphere in which the Sheppard trial was conducted, the ambiance of defendant’s trial was one of "judicial serenity.” Accordingly, defendant’s reliance on Sheppard is misplaced, and it cannot be invoked to support his claim of a constitutional violation.
E
Finally, we note that a federal constitutional challenge to voir dire premised upon the failure of the voir dire to conform to ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial by Jury, Standard 15-2.4 (approved August 1993)17 cannot be sustained. In Mu’Min, the United States Supreme Court held that the aba standards embody a stricter standard of juror eligibility than that required under the constitution. It observed:
Under the aba standard, answers to questions about content, without more, could disqualify the *669juror from sitting. Under the constitutional standard, on the other hand, "[t]he relevant question is not whether the community remembered the case, but whether the jurors . . . had such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant.” [Id. at 430 (quoting from Patton v Yount, 467 US 1025, 1035; 104 S Ct 2885; 81 L Ed 2d 847 [1984]).]
Consequently, a failure to adhere to the aba standards, standing alone, cannot support a constitutional challenge to voir dire. Defendant’s argument to the contrary must be rejected.
Accordingly, because there is no constitutional right to content-based questions in high publicity cases or to an individual, sequestered voir dire, and because of the lack of a professed belief of guilt from any one of the defendant’s jurors before the trial or a circus-like atmosphere during the trial, we would reject defendant’s federal constitutional challenge to the conduct and scope of his voir dire.
IV
ABUSE OF DISCRETION
We would also reject defendant’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion in conducting voir dire. The majority concludes that the trial judge abused his discretion by limiting the voir dire in a manner that precluded the defendant from developing an adequate factual basis for the exercise of both peremptory challenges and challenges for cause through his refusal to submit defense counsel’s questionnaire to prospective jurors and his failure to ask sufficiently probing questions. Additionally, the majority concludes that the trial judge abused his discretion by allow*670ing juror self-assessment of bias to go unchallenged.18 We disagree.
A
An abuse of discretion was defined in Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382; 94 NW2d 810 (1959), and reaffirmed in the criminal context in People v Charles O Williams, 386 Mich 565, 572; 194 NW2d 337 (1972).
"The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations. In order to have an 'abuse’ in reaching such determination, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.” [Quoting Spalding v Spalding, supra at 384-385.]
The question before us necessarily becomes whether the limitations imposed on voir dire by the trial judge served to exclude a showing of facts that would provide a sufficient basis for a challenge for cause or would inhibit the reasonable exercise of peremptory challenges. In other words, were the judge’s actions so "palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic” as to evidence perversity of the will, defiance of the exercise of judgment, and an exhibition of passion and bias, instead of reason.
In Fedorinchik v Stewart, 289 Mich 436; 286 NW 673 (1939), this Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s *671request that prospective jurors be questioned during voir dire about whether they were insured in a mutual insurance company and, if so, which company. Such questions were relevant because attorneys from one of the largest mutual insurance companies in the area were conducting the defense, and the company paid dividends each year to its members. In view of the potential prejudice to the plaintiff, we recognized:
It is indispensable to a fair trial that a litigant be given a reasonable opportunity to ascertain on the voir dire whether any of the jurors summoned are subject to being challenged for cause or even peremptorily. In a large measure the scope of examination of jurors on voir dire is within the discretion of the trial judge; but it must not be so limited as to exclude a showing of facts that would constitute ground for challenging for cause or the reasonable exercise of peremptory challenges. So to limit the examination is an abuse of discretion. [Id. at 438-439.]
In People v Harrell, 398 Mich 384; 247 NW2d 829 (1976), this Court was presented with a challenge to the voir dire following the trial court’s refusal to submit 120 questions to prospective jurors that defense counsel had formulated to uncover latent racial prejudice. The defendant, a young African-American, was involved in an altercation with police officers, most of whom were white. He argued that the refusal to submit the proffered questions precluded a meaningful exercise of challenges for cause and an intelligent use of peremptory challenges, thus constituting a denial of his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury.
We held that the defendant’s challenge must fail. Although Ham v South Carolina, 409 US 524; *67293 S Ct 848; 35 L Ed 2d 46 (1973), mandated an inquiry into racial bias under these circumstances, we determined that it did not require the trial judge to ask every question designed to elicit racial bias submitted by defense counsel. We noted that Justice Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Ham, supra at 533, stated:
I do not mean to suggest that a defendant must be permitted to propound any question or that limitless time must be devoted to preliminary voir dire. Although the defendant’s interest in a jury free of prejudice is strong, there are countervailing state interests in the expeditious conduct of criminal trials and the avoidance of jury intimidation. These interests bulk larger as the possibility of uncovering prejudice becomes more attenuated.
The Harrell Court noted that Justice Marshall, in a footnote, had expressed his agreement with the majority’s assertion that "the judge may properly decline to ask the questions in any particular form or ask any particular number of questions on a subject.” Id. at 533, n 2.19
A similar result was obtained in People v Cole, 8 Mich App 250; 154 NW2d 579 (1967), rev’d on other grounds 382 Mich 695; 172 NW2d 354 (1969), in which the trial court refused to submit to the *673prospective jurors twelve of seventeen questions proposed by defense counsel. The Court of Appeals determined that the seventeen questions were designed to elicit only four types of information. It concluded that such information had either been gleaned from the trial court’s questioning of prospective jurors, or that the need for such information was not sufficiently compelling to support a claim of error by the trial court.
An abuse of discretion was found in People v Taylor, 195 Mich App 57; 489 NW2d 99 (1992). In this case, the trial court refused to question prospective jurors about their attitudes toward self-defense and the use of deadly force, despite the fact that the defendant was asserting self-defense as an excuse for shooting her husband in the face. Given the nature of the defense, the prospective jurors’ attitudes on self-defense were critical. Consequently, the court’s refusal was found to be an undue restriction on voir dire constituting an abuse of discretion.
A similar result obtained in People v Sears, 88 Mich App 1; 276 NW2d 496 (1979), in which the defendant’s jury was selected three weeks before trial. During the interval between the date of selection and the date of the trial, various members of the defendant’s jury sat on juries in other criminal cases. Despite this, defense counsel was denied an opportunity to conduct voir dire of the jury on the day of the trial. The Court of Appeals held that this procedure "improperly restricted defendant’s ability to conduct a voir dire of the jurors and engage in the reasonable exercise of challenges.” Id. at 3.
The general rule we would distill from these cases is that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it declines to submit questions to prospective jurors that are designed to reveal sub*674stantial prejudices, or to develop a rational basis for the exercise of challenges, as long as the trial court employs similar questions that adequately cover the area of potential bias.
B
Applying this rule to the case at bar, we would hold that the trial court’s failure to submit the questionnaire to prospective jurors did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Although the questionnaire was designed to elicit information that would have been beneficial to counsel in exercising both its challenges for cause and its peremptory challenges, we cannot conclude that the refusal to submit the questionnaire amounted to a "perversity of the will,” a "defiance of the exercise of judgment,” or the exercise "of passion and bias, instead of reason.” Rather, we believe that the questions propounded by the trial judge were sufficiently probative, and that the trial court’s actions in this matter did not even approach the high threshold marking an abuse of discretion.
Our conclusion is bolstered by an examination of the record. Contrary to the conclusions of the lead opinion and the Court of Appeals, we believe that the questions asked by the trial judge were sufficiently probative. We note that the trial judge did inquire whether each prospective juror had read or heard about the case and did request prospective jurors to raise their hands in response to a question fashioned to identify the source of their information. While lacking the depth of insight that the questionnaire may have provided, these questions produced information similar in kind to that which questions seven and eight on the questionnaire were designed to elicit.
Additionally, the trial court did question prospective jurors about any preconceived opinions *675held by them, with the result that no juror on the actual jury had admitted having formed an opinion regarding defendant’s guilt. Although it is clear that some jurors enjoyed a more abbreviated form of questioning than that endured by their fellow venire persons, this does not necessarily require the conclusion that the abbreviated questioning was sufficiently lacking in probativeness to warrant a new trial.20
We acknowledge that the trial court’s use of the compound question, "have you developed any opinions that would make you an unfair juror,” invited a single negative response that served only to leave counsel guessing with regard to whether an opinion had been formed by a juror who still felt able to judge impartially, or, alternatively, that no opinion had been formed. Despite this, we would decline to find error requiring reversal in the trial court’s use of this question in the case at bar. Our reasons for this conclusion are threefold. First, we note that only nine jurors were presented with the dilemma of answering this question,21 and of these, only five remained on the final jury.22 Thus, the potential prejudice to the defendant in this situation is minimal. Second, we believe that defense counsel could have mitigated this potential harm by requesting the judge to clarify the question to *676which a negative response applied.23 In light of the trial judge’s earlier treatment of a follow-up question presented by defense counsel, we presume the trial judge would have honored this request.24 Third, and most importantly, we believe that defense counsel’s motions surrounding the voir dire compel the conclusion that, within the context of the trial court’s refusal to grant sequestered voir dire, defense counsel received exactly what she had requested: questions designed to identify those jurors possessing an inability to be impartial without eliciting the information giving rise to the juror’s admitted bias.25 Although defense counsel initially requested a probing voir dire of jurors’ media exposure, counsel appears to have changed tactics following her realization that a sequestered voir dire was not forthcoming. Under these circumstances, we believe appellate counsel’s argument that it was fundamentally unfair to utilize a compound question26 in determining whether pro*677spective jurors possessed preconceived opinions concerning defendant’s guilt is without merit.27 We would not countenance appellate counsel’s attempt to premise error on the trial court’s actions that were precipitated by defense counsel’s motion, and designed to accommodate defense counsel’s concerns.28
Finally, we note that the trial court did allow written submission of follow-up questions by counsel. That counsel failed to utilize this procedure should not now be used to support the conclusion that voir dire was insufficiently probative.29
Accordingly, because we believe the questions propounded by the trial court were sufficiently probative and elicited information similar in kind to that which the questionnaire would have provided, we would reject defendant’s argument and conclude that neither the trial court’s questioning regarding media exposure nor its refusal to submit *678defendant’s proposed questionnaire constituted an abuse of discretion.
c
We would also conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing juror self-assessment of bias to go unchallenged. We are not unmindful of the problems underlying juror self-assessment. In a study of a highly publicized murder case, seventy-five percent of the persons surveyed, whose awareness of the case enabled them to supply details, were no less likely to feel they could hear the evidence with an open mind than those persons who could not supply details.30 This profession of impartiality, however, is undermined to some extent by the revelation that those persons remembering details were more likely to align with the prosecution, although they believed it less likely that the defendant could receive a fair trial.
While we acknowledge that juror self-assessment of bias may be problematic and caution the trial courts to guard against such self-serving or unwitting declarations of impartiality, we note that, in this case, the trial court appeared to be cognizant of the problems inherent in juror self-assessment of bias. This is evidenced by the exchange between the court and juror Shirlen. Juror Shirlen admitted having formed an opinion, but stated she could set aside such an opinion and give the defendant all his constitutional guarantees. Upon further questioning by the trial judge, however, she admitted being morally opposed to killing, and felt that, given her position in a Christian high school for the last twenty-five years, she was “not positive” *679that she could give the defendant "a fair trial.”31 While this illustrates the defendant’s point that judges must carefully guard against inaccurate juror self-assessment, it also establishes that in the case at bar, the trial judge employed such precautions.32
Accordingly, we would reject defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in allowing juror self-assessment of bias to go unchallenged and would conclude that the trial court was in fact cognizant of and attentive to the problems underlying juror self-assessment of bias.
D
We would also hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for a sequestered voir dire. We see little merit in defendant’s argument that the answers given by prospective jurors during voir dire served to taint the entire venire. No information prejudicial to the defendant surfaced during voir dire. *680Only nine of the forty-three prospective jurors admitted having an opinion about the case. Mere admissions by less than one-quarter of the prospective jurors that they had formed an opinion and could not be fair, without more, cannot serve to taint the jury pool. We acknowledge that the absence of a sequestered voir dire in high publicity cases poses a risk of tainting the venire. This risk, however, is greatest when the pretrial publicity has included more prejudicial information.33 A trial court confronted with prejudicial pretrial publicity must be sensitive to the potential taint of the venire engendered by responses during voir dire. It is in this situation that sequestered voir dire should be considered.
E
Finally, we would reject the Court of Appeals conclusion that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s refusal to conduct sequestered voir dire, its prohibition of meaningful participation by defense counsel, and its failure to ask probing questions regarding media exposure served to deny defendant his right to a fair trial. We believe that neither the refusal to conduct sequestered voir dire nor the failure to submit defendant’s proposed questionnaire to prospective jurors constitutes error requiring reversal. Additionally, we believe that the questions asked by the trial court were sufficiently probative; appellate counsel’s attempt to premise error on the leading and superficial nature of the questions propounded fails to consider that such questions were the offspring of defense counsel’s motion regarding the conduct of *681voir dire. Finally, we would not conclude that the combination of these actions by the trial court establishes error requiring reversal.
v
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motions for a sequestered, individualized voir dire and for submission of a questionnaire to prospective jurors. We believe that the questions chosen by the trial judge to assess jurors’ media exposure were sufficiently probative when considered in the context of defense counsel’s motion expressing her belief that questions requiring a prospective juror to expound on the reasons underlying any opinions held served only to taint the panel. Lastly, we would conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing juror self-assessment of bias to go unchallenged, but rather, was in fact cognizant of such potential bias. Accordingly, we would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for consideration of the issues previously briefed, but not yet addressed by that Court.
Riley and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.

 The questionnaire provided, in pertinent part:
This case has received some news coverage during the past 6 months ....
7. Do you remember reading or hearing about this case at all?
—Did you read articles about it?_;
—How many do you think you read?_;
—Where did the article(s) appear? (Please be specific, if possible)
—What do you remember from reading those articles?
8. Did you see television coverage of this case?_;
—What stands out in your mind about what you saw on tv?
9. Did you talk about this case with family, friends or coworkers?
—What stands out in your mind about what was discussed?
10. After hearing about this case, what was your reaction?
11. Did you form an opinion about anything connected to this case? If so, what was your opinion?
12. Do you understand that none of what you read or heard before coming to trial is evidence in this case?
13. Do you realize that much of what you may have heard or read may not even be true?
14. Have you ever heard the saying, "you can’t believe everything you read in the papers?” Do you agree with this?
15. If selected as a juror, will you promise to refrain from being exposed to any further news coverage during this case?

 196 Mich App 576; 494 NW2d 20 (1992).

 In Michigan, the conduct of voir dire is a matter within the trial judge’s discretion. See MCR 6.412(C), which provides in pertinent part:
(1) Scope and Purpose. The scope of voir dire examination of prospective jurors is within the discretion of the court. It should be conducted for the purposes of discovering grounds for challenges for cause and of gaining knowledge to facilitate an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. The court should confine the examination to these purposes and prevent abuse of the examination process.
(2) Conduct of the Examination. The court may conduct the examination of prospective jurors or permit the lawyers to do so. If the court conducts the examination, it may permit the lawyers to supplement the examination by direct questioning or by submitting questions for the court to ask. On its own initiative or on the motion of a party, the court may provide for a prospective juror or jurors to be questioned out of the presence of other jurors.

 It is unclear from the transcript whether juror Louis had formed an opinion regarding defendant’s guilt.

 Juror Louis was later excused on a peremptory challenge by the defendant.

 Defense counsel’s motion, in its entirety, is as follows:
Now comes Leonard Tyburski, by and through his attorney . . . and hereby vehemently objects to the voir dire procedure employed by this Court thus far during the morning session of the first day of jury selection. The Court’s procedure, in eliciting from each jury [sic] not only whether they have an opinion as to this case, but additionally what that opinion is, has the effect of tainting any juror who had not yet heard news accounts or who had not yet formed an opinion as to defendant’s guilt or innocense [sic].
Given the percentage of panelmembers who have been exposed to news reports (approximately 100 per cent), and given the almost unanimous decision by those persons who have read such accounts that Mr. Tyburski is guilty of murder, to continue this procedure simply cements in the minds of the yet undecided the "consensus” in the community as to the "appropriate” verdict. Moreover, now that potential jurors have been indoctrinated with the community’s perception of the case, they are now under much more pressure to convict Mr. Tyburski.
Mr. Tyburski contends that the Court’s voir dire process thus far has been more prejudicial to his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury than had the Court asked no questions whatsoever about publicity. He requests again that any extended questionning [sic] of jurors regarding opinions they have reached about the case be conducted individually, sequestered from the rest of the panel.
Defendant raises this objection now, prior to the commencement of the afternoon session, rather than at the end of the day (as suggested by this Court) in hopes of shielding any remaining impartial panel members from the enormous taint of this process.

 Because some of these questions were included in defendant’s proposed questionnaire and because the court engaged in this inquiry following a discussion off the record requested by defense counsel, it appears that defense counsel was the impetus behind such questioning. See n 1.

 Questions interjected by defense counsel include the following:
A juror: I have some moral opinions of my own regarding several of those items. I’m not — I can’t judge at this time morally — his moral . . .
[.Defense counsel]: Your Honor, can we break down those topics that you went through so we can . . .
The Court: Okay. Go ahead.
The Court: Okay. Any challenges for cause?
[.Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, before we do that, adolescent daughter.
The Court: Adolescent daughters, teenage daughters?
Juror Moynihan: No. I have a 17 and [a] 20-year old boys [sic].

 The pertinent parts of the motion are as follows:
I do have a motion with respect to the Court’s procedure for conducting voir dire yesterday. I have a motion for mistrial.
I believe that the Court’s procedure and, number one, asking the jurors whether they had an opinion. But more importantly having them to verbalize what their opinion was in front of other jurors tainted the panel.
I have expressed in various briefs how I think that that procedure causes other jurors to maybe hear the opinions of other people on the panel, their fellow jurors and that that taints the process.
We had virtually everybody on this panel had [sic] heard about this story. But I think when a juror says in front of fellow jurors that they have received information about this case and that based upon that information they believe that Mr. Tyburski is guilty. That’s a very, very powerful statement to hear. And I don’t know that any juror can ignore that and be impartial after hearing that.

 The lead opinion takes issue with our characterization of the *658publicity as "mainly factual.” This conclusion, however, is supported by a careful reading of the record. Only four of the twenty articles in the record can aptly be classified as "prejudicial” to the defendant. Many of the other articles were favorable to the defense, detailing an alleged affair between the decedent and her daughter’s boyfriend.

 2 LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 21.3, p 719.

 See Rosales-Lopez v United States, 451 US 182; 101 S Ct 1629; 68 L Ed 2d 22 (1981); Aldridge v United States, 283 US 308; 51 S Ct 470; 75 L Ed 1054 (1931); Connors v United States, 158 US 408; 15 S Ct 951; 39 L Ed 1033 (1895).

 See Turner v Murray, 476 US 28; 106 S Ct 1683; 90 L Ed 2d 27 (1986); Ristaino v Ross, 424 US 589; 96 S Ct 1017; 47 L Ed 2d 258 (1976); Ham v South Carolina, 409 US 524; 93 S Ct 848; 35 L Ed 2d 46 (1973).

 In the federal system, the trial court may conduct the voir dire examination, or it may allow the attorneys to conduct such examination. If the court chooses to conduct the examination itself, then "[t]he court shall permit the defendant or the defendant’s attorney and the attorney for the government to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.” FR Crim P 24(a).
One study of federal judges showed that more than half conducted voir dire themselves, approximately one-third allowed attorneys to ask supplemental questions, and the rest allowed the attorneys to ask all the questions. On the state level, thirteen states follow the federal approach, twenty states give the attorneys primary control of the questioning, and seventeen states provide for the judge to begin the questioning, with the attorneys then asking additional questions. 2 LaFave & Israel, n 11 supra, § 21.3, p 722.

 The following questions were submitted by the petitioner, but disallowed by the trial judge:
"32. What have you seen, read or heard about this case?
"33. From whom or what did you get this information?
“34. When and where did you get this information?
"38. What did you discuss?
"41. Has anyone expressed any opinion about this case to you?
"42. Who? What? When? Where?”
Note, though, that "[t]he trial court did ask several of the requested questions concerning prior knowledge of the case:
"31. Have you acquired any information about this case from the newspapers, television, conversations, or any other source?
"35. Have you discussed this case with anyone?
"36. With whom?
"37. When and where?” [500 US 419, n 2.]

 The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

 Standard 15-2.4 provides in pertinent part:
(d) Where there is reason to believe the prospective jurors have been previously exposed to information about the case, or for other reason are likely to have preconceptions, concerning it, counsel should be given liberal opportunity to question jurors individually about the existence and extent of their knowledge and preconceptions.
(e) Jurors should be examined outside the presence of other jurors on sensitive matters or prior exposure to potentially prejudicial material.
(1) Sensitive matters are those matters which might be potentially embarrassing or intrusive into the juror’s private life, feelings or beliefs, or those matters which, if discussed in the presence of the jury panel, might prejudice or influence the panel by exposing other potential jurors to improper information.

 We note that under Michigan Court Rules, both the conduct and the scope of voir dire of prospective jurors are within the trial court’s discretion. See n 3.

 Numerous Michigan Court of Appeals decisions have applied this principle. See People v Furman, 158 Mich App 302; 404 NW2d 246 (1987) (No error was found in the trial court’s failure to conduct voir dire on the basis of ninety questions submitted by the defendant); People v Prast (On Rehearing), 114 Mich App 469, 482; 319 NW2d 627 (1982) ("[a] trial judge does not err when he fails to ask specific questions requested by a defendant but does cover the area in another manner”); People v Hoffmeister, 52 Mich App 219, 222; 217 NW2d 58 (1974), rev’d on other grounds 394 Mich 155; 229 NW2d 305 (1975) (the trial judge refused to allow twelve of defendant’s forty-two proposed voir dire questions, but the record revealed that similar questions were asked. "[T]he trial judge does not have to allow a voir dire question to be asked in the precise language in which it was submitted by counsel.” 52 Mich App 222.).

 The lead opinion’s reliance on Silverthorne v United States, 400 F2d 627, 631 (CA 9, 1968), is misplaced. A careful reading of Silverthorne compels the conclusion that it was the inadequate nature of the voir dire in light of the prejudicial nature of the publicity that led the court to conclude that an abuse of discretion had occurred. Inadmissible evidence and allegations that the defendant had been charged before the Senate with "certain unspecified crimes” had surfaced in the media before the trial in Silverthorne, while the pretrial publicity in Tyburski contained neither inadmissible evidence nor allegations of uncharged crimes.

 These include jurors Palmer, Lazarski, Goodwin, Caldwell, Rae, Stewart, Wilson, Parker, and Hayden.

 Those remaining on the jury included jurors Goodwin, Wilson, Rae, Caldwell, and Palmer.

 We note that the trial court’s use of this compound question began immediately after defense counsel’s lunchtime motion objecting to the voir dire procedures employed, a motion in which defense counsel argued that the "voir dire process thus far has been more prejudicial to [defendant’s] right to a fair trial by an impartial jury than had the Court asked no questions whatsoever about publicity.” We believe that the use of this compound question may have been an attempt by the trial court to accommodate defense counsel’s concerns about the potential taint to the venire engendered by the responses given to the questions utilized during the morning voir dire. Under these circumstances, it may be that the compound question that the defense now criticizes was in fact acceptable to counsel at the time it was propounded.

 Despite our dissent in this case, we caution that compound questions concerning a potential juror’s preconceived opinions and ability to be fair should not be employed in high publicity cases, where the probability of a prospective juror having formed an opinion is greater than in those cases involving relatively little publicity, and where counsel’s need to be apprised of such an opinion exists independent of his need to know whether a prospective juror can remain impartial.

 Seen 23.

 Namely, "Have you developed any opinions that would make you an unfair juror?”

 The lead opinion suggests that this question is "ambiguous and suggests the answer that the court was looking for.” Ante at 627-628. It neglects to note, however, that this question was employed only after defense counsel criticized the trial court for allowing jurors to elaborate on their opinions regarding defendant’s guilt before the entire venire. Although we recognize that defense counsel was attempting to obtain sequestered voir dire, we believe defense counsel’s motion could be interpreted as containing alternative requests. If sequestered voir dire were not forthcoming, alternatively, defense counsel would prefer that the trial court refrain from asking potential jurors to expound on their opinions in this case.

 The lead opinion asserts that "follow-up questions that were more probing into the source and nature of the exposure of each juror were essentially precluded.” Ante at 626, n 11. We believe that such questions were not precluded by the trial court, but rather, were avoided by defense counsel, who declined to pursue further inquiry along these lines once it had been determined that such inquiry would not take the form of her proposed questionnaire. Our view is consistent with defense counsel’s motions reflecting her belief that such questions served only to taint the panel. See ns 6, 9.

 On one occasion, defense counsel requested that a follow-up question be submitted to a juror. The trial court allowed counsel to submit the question directly to the juror. On several other occasions, defense counsel succeeded in interjecting desired questions into the voir dire. See n 8.

 Carroll, Free press and fair trial: The role of behavioral research, 10 Law & Human Behavior 187 (1986).

 Note also that juror Hayden responded affirmatively to the trial judge’s question that she would be able to give the defendant all his constitutional guarantees, but upon further questioning by the trial judge, indicated that she would have a hard time being impartial, because she had a daughter the same age as the defendant’s daughter who had found the body. Following this admission, she was excused by the trial judge.

 We would caution that the problems inherent in juror self-assessment may be a function of the facts in the case. This can be illustrated by contrasting the potential bias stemming from pretrial publicity with the bias stemming from racial or ethnic prejudice. While a person may feel little hesitation in admitting that his views have been colored by extensive pretrial publicity, such a person may become much more reticent about admitting to a deeply held racial or ethnic prejudice. In this context, trial judges must be judiciously skeptical of such self-declarations of impartiality. This is not to say that potential bias stemming from pretrial publicity merits only cursory attention; it is only to note that, in the pretrial publicity context, the trial court must focus its concern on a juror’s unwitting bias. In the context of cases presenting other potential biases, the trial court must seek also to uncover the juror’s deliberately hidden bias.

 The classic paradigm of prejudicial information is the inadmissible confession. In this case, however, we are not presented with pretrial publication of an inadmissible confession.