Court Opinion

ID: 9851533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:14:37.211788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:20.239545
License: Public Domain

Buchanan, J.,
dissenting:
It is to be remembered that the eight jurors for whose presence on the panel this case is being reversed were not in the courtroom and heard none of the evidence on the trial of Howard.
In response to the motion of the defendant to quash the venire facias with respect to these eight jurors, the court made this highly pertinent statement:
“* # the question of whether any of the panel in this case has made up or formed any opinion of the guilt of the accused or is in any way biased or prejudiced, either from the newspaper accounts or any other way, will have to be determined in the examination of those jurors upon their voir dire. The mere suggestion by counsel that he feels that there may be some prejudice arising from newspaper accounts or from the fact that the eight persons stricken as jurors in the trial of the case against Howard and in the absence of any evidence that there is any prejudice by any of them against the accused, does not warrant this Court in assuming that any such prejudice exists. *
The “mere suggestion by counsel” based on the fact that these jurors were in the courtroom and saw Howard when he was arraigned and pleaded and that the result of his trial had been in the newspapers, was all that was ever offered in support of the motion. There was no evidence even that they saw what was in the newspapers and none that they were biased or prejudiced from any source or in any manner.
*10It is to be presumed that these eight jurors were properly examined on their voir dire to ascertain that they were in fact free from any bias or prejudice or improper influence of any land, and that they could give the defendant a fair and impartial trial. The court’s order affirmatively shows that the jury were “duly summoned, selected, tried and sworn according to law.”
To hold as the majority opinion does that “it may be reasonably inferred” that bias existed on the part of these jurors is exactly the opposite of what we have repeatedly held to be the proper inference.
In Slade v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1099, 1106, 156 S. E. 388, 391, we said:
“The finding of a trial court that a juror is competent after an examination on his voir dire ought not to be set aside unless it is plainly manifest that an error has been committed. The candor, interest, fairness, prejudice and bias of a juror are elements for the consideration of the trial judge in determining a juror’s competency, and only when the juror’s examination shows conclusively that he has a disqualifying opinion should the appellate court reverse the decision of the trial court.”
The same principle was stated and applied in Ballard v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 980, 159 S. E. 222; and in Abdell v. Commonwealth, 173 Va. 458, 2 S. E. 2d 293.
Again in Hevener v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 802, 811, 54 S. E. 2d 893, 898, the above statement in Slade v. Commonwealth, was quoted and approved; and it was reiterated that:
“* * The issue of whether a member of the venire is a proper juror is for the trial court. Its decision on that issue is to be accorded weight. Better than anyone else, it can gauge the candor of the juror and his purpose to give a fair judgment on the evidence. *
In the complete absence of any evidence of any bias or prejudice or pre-existing opinion on the part of these jurors, we ought to adhere to the fair and sensible rule followed in these previous cases and not reverse this case on an inference, as the opinion calls it, that these jurors were biased and prejudiced. Inferences drawn by courts, no less than those drawn by juries, should be based on evidence, and the qualifications of jurors should be determined by fact rather than fancy.