Court Opinion

ID: 9414642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 15:00:46.193131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:54.538817
License: Public Domain

20-3063
     Barahona v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                                Auh, IJ
                                                                           A205 309 979

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of August, two thousand twenty-
 4   three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
 8              EUNICE C. LEE,
 9              SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   FRANKLIN ARIEL MEJIA BARAHONA,
14           Petitioner,
15
16                   v.                                          20-3063
17                                                               NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                    John H. Peng, Esq.; Karen Murtagh, Executive
 2                                      Director, Prisoners’ Legal Services of New
 3                                      York, Albany, NY.
 4
 5   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Assistant Attorney General;
 6                                      Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director; Tim
 7                                      Ramnitz, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of
 8                                      Immigration Litigation, United States
 9                                      Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

10         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

11   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

12   DECREED that the petition for review is GRANTED.

13         Petitioner Franklin Ariel Mejia Barahona, a native and citizen of Honduras,

14   seeks review of an August 10, 2020 decision of the BIA affirming a February 13,

15   2020 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for protection

16   under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).          In re Franklin Ariel Mejia

17   Barahona, No. A205 309 979 (B.I.A. Aug. 10, 2020), aff’g No. A205 309 979 (Immigr.

18   Ct. Fishkill Feb. 13, 2020). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

19   facts and procedural history.

20         Under the circumstances, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as

21   supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.

22   2005). We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings

                                             2
 1   for substantial evidence.     See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020);

 2   Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 583 (2d Cir. 2021).

 3         An applicant for CAT protection has the burden of showing that he would

 4   “more likely than not” be tortured by or with the acquiescence of government

 5   officials. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a), 1208.18(a)(1); Khouzam v. Ashcroft,

 6   361 F.3d 161, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2004).       In assessing whether an applicant has

 7   satisfied his burden of proof, the agency must consider all evidence relevant to the

 8   possibility of future torture, including “[e]vidence of past torture,” “[e]vidence of

 9   gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of removal,”

10   and “[o]ther relevant information regarding conditions in the country of removal.”

11   8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). “[A]n alien will never be able to show that he faces a

12   more likely than not chance of torture if one link in the chain cannot be shown to

13   be more likely than not to occur. It is the likelihood of all necessary events coming

14   together that must more likely than not lead to torture, and a chain of events

15   cannot be more likely than its least likely link.” Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119,

16   123 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting In re J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 918 n.4 (A.G. 2006)).

17         As an initial matter, the government argues that Barahona waives any

18   challenge to the agency’s determination that he failed to establish a likelihood of

                                                3
 1   torture in Honduras by not raising such a challenge in his brief. We disagree.

 2   Barahona’s brief challenges that determination by arguing that the agency failed

 3   to explain why it discredited evidence that he faces likely death for leaving the

 4   gang, ignored his country conditions evidence, and failed to consider all sources

 5   of harm in the aggregate. Further, those arguments have merit.

 6            First, the agency erroneously concluded that Barahona failed to provide

 7   evidence as to the type of harm he faces for leaving his former gang without

 8   permission.     Indeed, Barahona testified and provided extensive evidence that

 9   gangs kill members who leave without permission. See Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420

10   F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We . . . require some indication that the IJ considered

11   material evidence supporting a petitioner’s claim.”).

12            Second, the agency erred in requiring Barahona to establish that a specific

13   person in Honduras would more likely than not torture him when he was required

14   only to show that someone in “his particular alleged circumstances” would more

15   likely than not be tortured. Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir.

16   2003).      Moreover, Barahona presented evidence that individuals in his

17   circumstances face torture, but the agency failed to adequately evaluate such

18   evidence individually or in the aggregate. See Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 77, 79–80;

                                               4
 1   see also Matter of J-R-G-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 482, 484 (B.I.A. 2018) (“Claims under the

 2   [CAT] must be considered in terms of the aggregate risk of torture from all sources,

 3   and not as separate, divisible, claims.” (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)).

 4   Although Barahona testified that a gang leader had threatened him, the IJ found

 5   that fact irrelevant because the threat occurred in the United States, but the IJ failed

 6   to evaluate material evidence that the gang is a transnational organization and that

 7   a threat from a leader in the United States may be carried out in Honduras. See

 8   Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 77. Further, Barahona presented evidence that the United

 9   States informs Honduran officials when removing deportees who have known

10   gang affiliations, but the agency failed to acknowledge or evaluate country

11   conditions evidence that Honduran officials kill and torture suspected gang

12   members or hand them over to rival gangs. See Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 77; see also

13   Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 336 (2d Cir. 2020) (remanding for further

14   consideration of a CAT claim where the agency failed to give “reasoned

15   consideration to all relevant evidence and all principles of law”); Savchuck, 518

16   F.3d at 123.

17         Because the agency applied an overly stringent standard, failed to

18   acknowledge or evaluate material evidence, and failed to consider all sources of

                                                5
1   torture in the aggregate, we vacate and remand. See Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 77.

2   The petition for review is GRANTED and the case is remanded to the BIA. All

3   pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

4                                        FOR THE COURT:
5                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6                                        Clerk of Court

                                            6