Court Opinion

ID: 9691583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:41:45.185763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:22.322782
License: Public Domain

*426AMUNDSON, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 25.] I respectfully dissent in this case of first impression. It is undisputed the Attorney General is obligated to provide an explanation of the legal effect of a proposed constitutional amendment for dissemination to the electorate. This is a duty delegated by the legislature under SDCL 12-13-9. It is also undisputed, as argued by counsel for applicant/appellee at the trial court level, that the Attorney General is the lawyer for the citizens of South Dakota.
[¶ 26.] Proper deference must be given to matters delegated to the discretion of the Attorney General. In Gormley v. Lan, 88 N.J. 26, 438 A.2d 519, 525 (1981), the New Jersey Supreme Court considering a similar ballot issue stated:
In evaluating the statement drafted by the Attorney General and issued by the Secretary of State we should accord great deference to their determination not only on the basis of settled principles of law, but also because of the glaring inappropriateness of judicial management and supervision of such matters. When within the scope of legislatively-delegated authority, administrative agents’ actions are presumptively valid, and where that authority confers discretion upon those agents, their actions will ordinarily not be overturned by the courts unless they are manifestly corrupt, arbitrary or misleading.
[¶ 27.] As previously noted, this case involves the interpretation of a statute. The rules of statutory construction have been repeatedly set out:
The purpose of statutory construction is to discover the true intention of the law which is to be ascertained primarily from the language expressed in the statute. The intent of a statute is determined from what the legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confine itself to the language used. Words and phrases in a statute must be given their plain meaning and effect. When the language in a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and the Court’s only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed.
Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 14, 576 N.W.2d 535, 539 (citing Moss v. Guttormson, 1996 SD 76, ¶ 10, 551 N.W.2d 14,17 (citations omitted)). Clearly the language “legal effect” cannot be read out of the statute. The question then becomes what is meant by the statutory language “legal effect.” The word “effect” is defined as “[t]hat which is produced by an agent or cause; result; outcome; consequence.” Black’s Law Dictionary 514 (6th ed.1990). “Legal” is defined as “of or pertaining to the law.” Id. at 892. Thus, the plain meaning of “legal effect” includes consequences of or pertaining to the law.5 Informing the citizens of potential litigation arising from implementation of an amendment falls within such language.
[¶28.] Would a client/voter want his/her attorney to advise them of any pitfall perceived in the proposed constitutional amendment? I would think so. In advising a client, should an attorney disclose problems encountered in past cases or experiences? I would again respond in the affirmative. How can this Attorney General not be aware of the problems encountered by his office considering the numerous cases involving the State and SDDS, Inc. with the most recent decision being SDDS, Inc. v. State of South Dakota, et al, 1997 SD 114, 569 N.W.2d 289.
[¶29.] With this in mind, would a competent attorney advise his clients of the potential for litigation which could have an impact on their poeketbook? I would certainly think so.6
[¶ 30.] The majority decision in this case calls the explanation mere conjecture, but it certainly seems to this writer to be based on past legal decisions in cases where the Attorney General was involved, while representing the State. There is no conjecture required to see what happened in those cases. Al*427though voters are presumed to be familiar with the issues on the ballot, all voters are not necessarily familiar with the legal effect of a proposal and all voters are not lawyers (some might say that this is fortunate) who deal with legal effect issues daily. Therefore, giving the appropriate deference to the Attorney General in this case, I would reverse the trial court. To do otherwise, in essence, installs blinders on the Attorney General when performing his statutorily delegated obligation to make full disclosure of the legal effect of a proposal to his clients, the citizens of South Dakota.
APPENDIX
Full text of Constitutional Amendment E: That Article XVII of the Constitution of the State of South Dakota be amended by adding thereto new sections to read as follows:
§ 21. No corporation or syndicate may acquire, or otherwise obtain an interest, whether legal, beneficial, or otherwise, in any real estate used for farming in this state, or engage in farming. The term, corporation, means any corporation organized under the laws of any state of the United States or any country. The term, syndicate, includes any limited partnership, limited liability partnership, business trust, or limited liability company organized under the laws of any state of the United States or any country. A syndicate does not include general partnerships, except general partnerships in which non-family farm syndicates or nonfamily farm corporations are partners. The term, farming, means the cultivation of land for the production of agricultural crops, fruit, or other horticultural products, or the ownership, keeping, or feeding of animals for the production of livestock or livestock products.
§ 22. The restrictions in § 21 of this Article do not apply to:
(1)A family farm corporation or syndicate. A family farm corporation or syndicate is a corporation or syndicate engaged in farming or the ownership of agricultural land, in which a majority of the partnership interests, shares, stock, or other ownership interests are held by members of a family or a trust created for the benefit of a member of that family. The term, family, means natural persons related to one another within the fourth degree of kinship according to civil law, or their spouses. At least one of the family members in a family farm corporation or syndicate shall reside on or be actively engaged in the day-to-day labor and management of the farm. Day-to-day labor and management shall require both daily or routine substantial physical exertion and administration. None of the corporation’s or syndicate’s partners, members, or stockholders may be nonresident aliens, or other corporations or syndicates, unless all of the stockholders, members, or partners of such entities are persons related within the fourth degree of kinship to the majority of partners, members, or stockholders in the family farm corporation or syndicate;
(2) Agricultural land acquired or leased, or livestock kept, fed or owned, by a cooperative organized under the laws of any state, if a majority of the shares or other interests of ownership in the cooperative are held by members in the cooperative who are natural persons actively engaged in the day-to-day labor and management of a farm, or family farm corporations or syndicates, and who either acquire from the cooperative, through purchase or otherwise, such livestock, or crops produced on such land, or deliver to the cooperative, through sale or otherwise, crops to be used in the keeping or feeding of such livestock;
(3) Nonprofit corporations organized under state non-profit corporation law;
(4) Agricultural land, which, as of the approval date of this amendment, is being farmed, or which is owned or leased, or in which there is a legal or beneficial interest, directly or indirectly owned, acquired, or obtained by a corporation or syndicate, if such land or other interest is held in continuous ownership or under continuous lease by the same such corporation or syndicate. For the purposes of this exemption, land purchased on a contract signed *428as of the approval date of this amendment is considered as owned on that date;
(5) Livestock, which as of the approval date of this amendment, is owned by a corporation or syndicate. For the purposes of this exemption, livestock to be produced under contract for a corporation or syndicate are considered as owned, if the contract is for the keeping or feeding of livestock and is signed as of the approval date of this amendment, and if the contract remains in effect and is not terminated by either party to the contract. This exemption does not extend beyond the term of any contract signed as of the approval date of this amendment;
(6) A farm operated for research or experimental purposes, if any commercial sales from the farm are only incidental to the research or experimental objectives of the corporation or syndicate;
(7) Land leases by alfalfa processors for the production of alfalfa;
(8) Agricultural land operated for the purpose of growing seed, nursery plants, or sod;
(9) Mineral rights on agricultural land;
(10) Agricultural land acquired or leased by a corporation or syndicate for immediate or potential nonfarming purposes, for a period of five years from the date of purchase. A corporation or syndicate may hold such agricultural land in such acreage as may be necessary to its nonfarm business operation, but pending the development of the agricultural land for nonfarm purposes, such land may not be used for farming except under lease to a family farm corporation or family farm syndicate or a non syndicate or noncorporate farm;
(11) Agricultural lands or livestock acquired by a corporation or syndicate by process of law in the collection of debts, or by any procedures for the enforcement of a lien, encumbrance, or claim thereon, whether created by mortgage or otherwise. Any lands so acquired shall be disposed of within a period of five years and may not be used for farming before being disposed of, except under a lease to a family farm corporation or syndicate, or a nonsyndicate or noncorporate farm. Any livestock so acquired shall bS disposed of within six months;
(12) Agricultural lands held by state or nationally chartered bank as trustee for a person, corporation or syndicate that is otherwise exempt from the provisions of sections 21 to 24, inclusive, of this Article;
(13) A bona fide encumbrance taken for purposes of security;
(14) Custom spraying, fertilizing, or harvesting;
(15) Livestock futures contracts, livestock purchased for slaughter within two weeks of the purchase date, or livestock purchased and resold within two weeks.
§ 23. If a family farm corporation or family farm syndicate that has qualified under all the requirements of a family farm corporation or a family farm syndicate ceases to meet the defined criteria, it has twenty years, if the ownership of the majority of the stock of such corporation, or the majority of the ownership interest of such syndicate, continues to be held by persons related to one another within the fourth degree of kinship or their spouses, and their land holdings are not increased, to either requalify as a family farm corporation or family farm syndicate or dissolve and return to personal ownership.
§ 24. Any corporation or syndicate that owns agricultural land or engages in farming is required to report information necessary for the enforcement of sections 21 to 24, inclusive, of this Article to the Secretary of State on an annual basis, under rules promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to state law. The Secretary of State shall monitor such reports and notify the Attorney General of any possible violations, and any resident of the state may also notify the Attorney General of any possible violations. If a corporation or syndicate violates any provision of sections 21 to 24, inclusive, of this Article, the Attorney General shall commence an action in circuit court to enjoin any pending illegal purchase of land or livestock, or to force divestiture of land or livestock held in violation of sections 21 to 24, inclusive, of this Article. The court shall order any *429land held in violation of sections 21 to 24 of this Article to be divested within two years and any livestock to be divested within six months. If land so ordered by the court has not been divested within two years, the court shall declare the land escheated to the state. If the Attorney General fails to bring an action in circuit court to enforce sections 21 to 24, inclusive, of this Article, any resident of the state has standing in circuit court to sue for enforcement.

. The Appellee in his brief states, "[i]t must be conceded that the questioned statement broadly fits the dictionary definitions of the words 'legal' and 'effect.' ” Appellee’s Brief at 12.

. The Appellee in his brief states, "[t]his means he must very simply explain what the amendment will do; how it will effect existing law and people's rights and obligations and how it will effect our institutions.” Appellee’s Brief at 13.