Court Opinion

ID: 9841212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 17:00:59.256554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:37.500090
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KIM CARTER MARTINEZ, on                           No. 22-35305
behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated,                                 D.C. No.
                                                 3:21-cv-05725-
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                  MJP

    v.
                                                    OPINION
ZOOMINFO TECHNOLOGIES,
INC., a Delaware corporation,

                 Defendant-Appellant.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Western District of Washington
         Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding

            Argued and Submitted April 14, 2023
                    Seattle, Washington

                   Filed September 21, 2023

    Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Roopali H. Desai,
     Circuit Judges, and Roslyn O. Silver,* District Judge.

*
 The Honorable Roslyn O. Silver, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
2                MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.

                 Opinion by Judge McKeown;
               Concurrence by Judge McKeown;
                 Concurrence by Judge Desai

                          SUMMARY**

               California Anti-SLAPP Statute

    The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of
ZoomInfo Technologies, Inc.’s motion to strike Kim Carter
Martinez’s complaint under California’s anti-SLAPP law on
the alternative ground that Martinez’s complaint fell within
the public-interest exemption to the anti-SLAPP law.
    Martinez asserted that ZoomInfo did not obtain her
permission or compensate her when it used her name and
likeness in its online directory to promote its product, in
violation of California’s Right of Publicity statute and her
common-law privacy and intellectual property rights.
ZoomInfo moved to strike the complaint under California
anti-SLAPP statute.
    The panel held that it had appellate jurisdiction under the
collateral order doctrine to review the denial of ZoomInfo’s
anti-SLAPP motion. The panel also held that, at this stage,
Martinez has plausibly pleaded that she suffered sufficient
injury to establish constitutional standing to sue.
   Before engaging in a merits analysis, a court must
consider any claims by the plaintiff that a statutory

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
               MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.               3

exemption to California’s anti-SLAPP law applies.
Although the district court did not address the exemptions,
the panel held that her case fell within the public-interest
exemption to the anti-SLAPP law. Martinez met the three
conditions for the public interest exemption: Martinez
requests all relief on behalf of the alleged class of which she
is a member and does not seek any additional relief for
herself; Martinez’s lawsuit seeks to enforce the public
interest of the right to control one’s name and likeness; and
private enforcement is necessary and disproportionately
burdensome.
    Concurring, Judge McKeown wrote separately to
question the propriety of the court reviewing on
interlocutory appeal denials of anti-SLAPP motions to
strike.
    Concurring, Judge Desai, joined by Judge McKeown,
wrote separately to urge the court to reconsider its precedent
that the district court’s denial of anti-SLAPP motions to
strike are collateral orders subject to interlocutory appeal.
4             MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.

                       COUNSEL

Jeffrey A. Lamken (argued), Lucas M. Walker, Lauren M.
Weinstein, and Jennifer E. Fischell, MoloLamken LLP,
Washington, D.C.; Eugene A. Sokoloff, Jordan A. Rice, and
Kenneth E. Notter III, MoloLamken LLP, Chicago, Illinois;
Alexandra C. Eynon, MoloLamken LLP, New York, New
York; Shon Morgan, Daniel C. Posner, and John W.
Baumann, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Los
Angeles, California; Cristina Henriquez, Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, Redwood Shores, CA; for
Defendant-Appellant.
Ben R. Osborn (argued), Law Office of Benjamin R. Osborn,
Brooklyn, New York; Michael F. Ram and Marie N. Appel,
Morgan & Morgan Complex Litigation Group, San
Francisco, California; Sam Strauss and Raina Borrelli, Turke
& Strauss LLP, Madison, Wisconsin; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Mark A. Lemley, Stanford Law School, Stanford,
California; Rebecca Tushnet, Harvard Law School,
Cambridge, Massachusetts; for Amicus Curiae Intellectual
Property and First Amendment Law Professors.
John Nadolenco, Jennifer M. Chang, and Daniel D. Queen,
Mayer Brown LLP, Los Angeles, California; Nicole A.
Saharsky, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, D.C.; Benjamin
D. Bright, Mayer Brown LLP, New York, New York; for
Amici Curiae Spokeo Inc., PeopleFinders LLC, and
BeenVerified LLC.
Megan Iorio and Tom McBrien, Electronic Privacy
Information Center, Washington, D.C.; Ellen Noble, Public
Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae Electronic
Privacy Information Center and Public Justice.
               MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.               5

                         OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
     Countless websites offer access to personal information,
ranging from phone numbers to residence data, employment
information, and more. One such website is ZoomInfo, an
online directory of professionals and their employment
information. Clicking on a ZoomInfo link in a search
engine—or searching the ZoomInfo website itself for a
specific professional—produces a redacted “teaser profile,”
offering the individual’s name, employer, and job title. On
the same page are links inviting the viewer to sign up for a
trial subscription or subscribe to ZoomInfo to view the full
profile.
    Kim Martinez, a California citizen and political director
for a local union, objects to ZoomInfo providing such a
“teaser profile” of her information along with these
subscription links. Her complaint asserts that, because
ZoomInfo did not obtain her permission or compensate her,
the directory is using her name and likeness to promote its
product in violation of California’s Right of Publicity statute
and her common-law privacy and intellectual property
rights.
    In the district court, ZoomInfo moved to dismiss the
complaint and to cut off the claims at the pleading stage
under California’s anti-SLAPP—strategic lawsuits against
public participation—law, a statute that restricts suits aimed
at repressing free speech. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss and rejected
ZoomInfo’s special motion to strike the complaint under
California anti-SLAPP statute.
6              MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.

    At this stage, we have interlocutory jurisdiction solely
with respect to the motion to strike. We do not address the
district court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss. We affirm
the district court’s denial of ZoomInfo’s motion to strike
under California’s anti-SLAPP law.
                      BACKGROUND
    ZoomInfo maintains a database of 125 million business
professionals and their employment information. When
someone searches for an individual professional, either
through a search engine or on ZoomInfo’s website,
ZoomInfo displays a “teaser profile,” which shows partially
redacted information about the individual. The profile also
includes several “buttons,” offering “Get Access to
[Name’s] Full Info,” “Get Email Address,” “We have who
you are looking for: View [Name’s] Full Org-Chart,” and
“See more information about [Name].” Clicking on one of
these buttons leads the user to a page detailing options to
subscribe to ZoomInfo before viewing the individual’s full
profile. As pleaded, a paid ZoomInfo subscription costs a
minimum of $10,000 annually. Alternatively, a user can
register for the “Community Edition,” a free subscription in
which the subscriber provides ZoomInfo with the names and
contact information of everyone with whom the subscriber
has emailed.
    Kim Martinez is the Political and Legislative Director of
the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees (“AFSCME”), Local 51, a labor union that
represents public sector employees. ZoomInfo has a profile
of Martinez in its database, and an internet search for
Martinez reveals a teaser profile stating her job title,
employment at AFSCME, the contact information for
AFSCME’s national headquarters, and the names and job
                  MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.                         7

titles of Martinez’s colleagues.1 The teaser profile includes
the above-referenced subscription buttons offering full
access to Martinez’s profile to subscribers. Martinez, who
has never used ZoomInfo, objects to “ZoomInfo using her
name and personal information” without her consent “to
advertise subscriptions to zoominfo.com.”
    Martinez filed suit in September 2021, on behalf of
herself and a proposed class of California citizens whose
information is included in ZoomInfo’s directory and
provided in teaser profiles. Her complaint asserts that
ZoomInfo’s use of the class’s information to advertise
subscriptions is a tortious misappropriation of their names
and likenesses under California law and violates California’s
Right of Publicity Statute, California Civil Code § 3344.
Martinez pleads that ZoomInfo’s nonconsensual use has
injured her and the class by unlawfully taking their
intellectual property, invading their privacy rights, profiting
from their names and information, and harming their peace
of mind. Martinez seeks a declaration that ZoomInfo
infringes on her state-law privacy and intellectual property
rights, injunctive relief, restitution, and damages.
    ZoomInfo moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
Article III standing under Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). ZoomInfo also moved to
strike Martinez’s claims pursuant to California’s anti-
SLAPP statute, California Civil Procedure Code § 425.16.
The district court denied ZoomInfo’s motions to dismiss,

1
  ZoomInfo makes much of the fact that, in its view, much of Martinez’s
professional information is publicly available on other websites.
Because our review is limited to the complaint and Martinez’s teaser
profile, of which the district court took judicial notice, we do not address
that argument here.
     8              MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.

     finding Martinez had sufficiently pleaded her alleged
     injuries to have standing to sue and that the conduct alleged
     did not fall within the publicity statute’s exception for “use
     of a name . . . or likeness in connection with any news [or]
     public affairs,” Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d). The district court
     also denied ZoomInfo’s special motion to strike the
     complaint, holding that California’s anti-SLAPP law did not
     require throwing out the case because the speech at issue is
     commercial in nature and therefore not protected under the
     statute and because Martinez showed a reasonable
     probability of prevailing on the merits of her claims.
     ZoomInfo filed a notice of appeal regarding the denial of its
     anti-SLAPP motion. In its briefing on appeal, ZoomInfo
     now asks us to decide not only the anti-SLAPP issue, but
     also to review the district court’s ruling on whether Martinez
     has standing to bring this action.
                              ANALYSIS
I.       Jurisdiction
         The parties take polar opposite positions on whether this
     court has jurisdiction over Martinez’s appeal. Neither is
     wholly correct. ZoomInfo raises two issues on interlocutory
     appeal: (1) whether the district court erred in denying
     ZoomInfo’s anti-SLAPP motion; and (2) whether the district
     court erred in concluding that Martinez has standing to sue.
     Martinez asserts that we lack jurisdiction to review either
     issue. We conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction under
     the collateral order doctrine to review the anti-SLAPP issue
     and assure ourselves of our subject matter jurisdiction to
     reach that issue.
               MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.             9

   A. Jurisdiction Over Interlocutory Appeal of Anti-
      SLAPP Motion
    In general, our jurisdiction is limited to appeals from a
district court’s final order. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Under the
collateral order doctrine, however, we may review a district
court’s ruling if it (1) is “conclusive,” (2) “resolve[s]
important questions separate from the merits,” and (3) is
“effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment
in the underlying action.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter,
558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty.
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)). Consistent with our
precedent in Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1025–26 (9th
Cir. 2003), we recently held that an order denying a motion
to strike under an anti-SLAPP law is a collateral order
subject to immediate interlocutory appeal. Langer v. Kiser,
57 F.4th 1085, 1104 (9th Cir. 2023). Accordingly, the
district court’s denial of ZoomInfo’s anti-SLAPP motion is
properly before us on appeal.
    Martinez challenges our appellate jurisdiction on the
ground that statutory exemptions remove this case from the
scope of California’s anti-SLAPP law. This is incorrect. As
California law provides—and we have held—if a district
court denies an anti-SLAPP motion based on one of the
statutory exemptions, that denial may not be appealed. Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 425.17(b)–(e); see also Breazeale v.
Victim Servs., Inc., 878 F.3d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 2017). Here,
the district court did not deny ZoomInfo’s anti-SLAPP
motion on the exemptions, but rather based on ZoomInfo’s
failure to establish the elements for SLAPP relief. See Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b). Therefore, the exemption from
appeal is not applicable and we have jurisdiction over the
interlocutory appeal from the denial of the anti-SLAPP
motion. See Langer, 57 F.4th at 1104.
10                MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.

     B. Jurisdiction        Over     Interlocutory        Appeal       of
        Standing
    Although this is an interlocutory appeal, we first ensure
that we have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this appeal,
including the threshold question of constitutional standing.2
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–
95 (1998) (“Every federal appellate court has a special
obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction,
but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review.”)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). At this
stage, Martinez has plausibly pleaded that she suffered
sufficient injury to establish standing to sue. ZoomInfo’s
arguments to the contrary primarily attack fact and merits

2
   We recognize that, in some circumstances, a few circuits have
addressed subject matter jurisdiction in interlocutory appeals using
pendent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d
1195, 1200–01 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that resolving subject matter
jurisdiction over the underlying claim was necessary to ensure
meaningful review of the collateral order denying Eleventh Amendment
immunity on that claim); Merritt v. Shuttle, 187 F.3d 263, 267–69 (2d
Cir. 1999) (same conclusion regarding subject matter jurisdiction and
order on qualified immunity). We also recognize that a few circuits have
declined to address standing under pendent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Indus.
Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Dobson, 68 F.4th 155, 166–68 (4th Cir. 2023)
(holding that the standing analysis was not inextricably intertwined with
or necessary to ensure meaningful review of the Eleventh Amendment
immunity claim); Freyre v. Chronister, 910 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir.
2018) (same). And other cases on interlocutory review reference
standing without discussion of pendent jurisdiction. See Vt. Agency of
Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771–78 (2000)
(addressing the purely legal question of whether a private party has
standing when bringing a qui tam action without discussing pendent
jurisdiction); Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 904 n.6 (9th Cir.
2010) (noting that “the jurisdictional elements of standing . . . are
unarguably present here” without analyzing standing through pendent
jurisdiction). None of these cases involved SLAPP statutes.
                MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.                11

issues that we do not reach. Nonetheless, standing remains
an issue throughout the litigation and we take no position on
whether, upon discovery and further examination, Martinez
will meet the standing requirements. See TransUnion LLC
v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2208 (2021) (“A plaintiff must
demonstrate standing ‘with the manner and degree of
evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.’”
(quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992))).
II. The Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike
    We now turn to the question of whether the district court
should have struck Martinez’s action as a SLAPP, an issue
that we review de novo. Jordan-Benel v. Univ. City Studios,
Inc., 859 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 2017). California’s anti-
SLAPP law was enacted to “protect against ‘lawsuits brought
primarily to chill’ the exercise of speech and petition rights”
and to “encourage continued participation in matters of public
significance.” Film-On.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., 439
P.3d 1156, 1160 (Cal. 2019) (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 425.16(a)). The scope of the law is limited, however, by
two exemptions: it does not apply to “any action brought
solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general public,”
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.17(b), or to causes of action
arising from commercial speech, id. § 425.17(c); Simpson
Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore, 230 P.3d 1117, 1129 (Cal. 2010).
    California law teaches that “[b]efore engaging in [the
merits] analysis, a court must consider any claims by the
plaintiff that a statutory exemption contained in
section 425.17 applies.” Takhar v. People ex rel. Feather
River Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759, 766
(Ct. App. 2018) (quoting San Diegans for Open Gov’t v. Har
Constr., Inc., 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559, 567 (Ct. App. 2015)).
12             MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.

Although the district court put the cart before the horse and
did not address the exemptions, on de novo review we do so
here. This approach is consistent with the analytical
framework adopted by the California courts of appeal. See,
e.g., Xu v. Huang, 288 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558, 561–62 (Ct. App.
2021) (addressing commercial speech exemption after it was
pressed, but not passed upon, below); Takhar, 237 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 766–68 (same for public interest exemption). It is also
consistent with the express language of the statute: if
Martinez’s action satisfies either exemption, her action
cannot be struck as a SLAPP. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 425.17(b)–(c). We hold that, on the face of Martinez’s
complaint, her case is brought solely in the public interest
and therefore is exempt from California’s anti-SLAPP law.
    California’s anti-SLAPP law exempts a case “brought
solely in the public interest or on behalf of the general
public” if three conditions are met:

       (1)   The plaintiff does not seek any relief
             greater than or different from the relief
             sought for the general public or a class
             of which the plaintiff is a member.
       (2)   The action, if successful, would enforce
             an important right affecting the public
             interest, and would confer a significant
             benefit,     whether    pecuniary     or
             nonpecuniary, on the general public or a
             large class of persons.
       (3)   Private enforcement is necessary and
             places a disproportionate financial
             burden on the plaintiff in relation to the
             plaintiff’s stake in the matter.
                MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.               13

Id. § 425.17(b). The California Supreme Court counsels that
the public interest exception is to be narrowly construed and
applies “only when the entire action is brought in the public
interest.” Simpson, 230 P.3d at 1123 (quoting Club
Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, 196 P.3d
1094, 1096 (Cal. 2008)).           The applicability of the
exemptions is evaluated based on the allegations in the
complaint. See Tourgeman v. Nelson & Kennard, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 729, 741 (Ct. App. 2014).
    ZoomInfo’s primary argument regarding the public
interest exemption is that Martinez fails to satisfy the first
criterion because she seeks “individualized” or “personal”
relief. We disagree. While no California Supreme Court
case answers the precise question here, that court has
signaled approval of the result we reach. See Muniz v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 738 F.3d 214, 219 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“Decisions of the California Supreme Court, including
reasoned dicta, are binding on us as to California law.”).
ZoomInfo argues that, by seeking relief that may require an
individualized determination—namely damages, Martinez is
seeking “personal relief,” as forbidden by Club Members for
an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, 196 P.3d 1094, 1098 (Cal.
2008). But in that case, the plaintiff sought certain relief that
would advance solely its members’ own interests. Id. at
1099. For example, the plaintiff asked the court to order the
Sierra Club to give board seats to plaintiff’s members and to
pay to publish an article advancing plaintiff’s view on the
direction of the Club. Id. Therefore, the plaintiff
impermissibly sought “relief greater than or different from
the relief sought for the general public.” Id. (quoting
§ 425.17(b)). The California Supreme Court clarified that
the bar on “any personal relief” prohibits seeking “a more
narrow advantage for a particular plaintiff.” Id. at 1098
14             MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.

(internal quotation marks omitted). In context, “a more
narrow advantage” is most reasonably construed as referring
to relief that applies only to the plaintiff, and not the class.
     Here, a California Court of Appeal decision is the most
relevant authority and our best indication of how the
California Supreme Court would rule. See Muniz, 738 F.3d
at 219 (noting that California appellate decisions are
“persuasive,” not binding, but “[w]e should nevertheless
follow a published intermediate state court decision
regarding California law unless we are convinced that the
California Supreme Court would reject it”). The bottom line
is that seeking individualized relief is permissible and not a
death knell to the public interest exemption. In People ex
rel. Strathmann v. Acacia Research Corp., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d
361 (Ct. App. 2012), the court observed that “[a] claim
brought on behalf of the general public might include some
kind of individual relief, in which case, it would have to be
determined under section 425.17(b)(1) whether that relief is
greater than or different from the relief sought for the general
public.” Id. at 371 (emphasis added). Thus, a request for
individual relief is the starting, not the ending, point for the
§ 425.17(b)(1) analysis.
    No California intermediate appellate authority
undermines this conclusion. ZoomInfo rests its argument on
Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting Services, Inc., where
the court held that an action seeking “recovery of damages
personal to [the plaintiff]” did not fall within the public
interest exemption. 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 933, 937, 943 (Ct. App.
2005). But the important distinction is that the plaintiff in
Ingels sought damages solely for himself and not for
members of the alleged class. Id. Therefore, the court’s use
of “personal” damages is most reasonably understood as
relief sought solely on behalf of the individual plaintiff.
                  MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.                     15

    Similarly, the California appellate courts have found the
public interest exemption does not apply when the plaintiff
seeks damages that apply to a fraction of the class, not its
entirety. Thayer v. Kabateck Brown Kellner LLP, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 17, 29 (Ct. App. 2012), as modified (June 22, 2012)
(noting that Thayer sought damages that were statutorily
available only to senior citizens and concluding that Thayer
sought “relief much greater than the relief sought for the
purported class”).3      Here, by contrast, Martinez has
requested all relief on behalf of the alleged class; she has not
requested any additional relief that would not apply to some
or all of the class. Given this critical difference between the
above cases and the one before us, we cannot reasonably
construe these authorities to prohibit all requested class-wide
relief that might require individualized calculations to award
damages.       Rather, as instructed by Strathmann, the
possibility of “some kind of individual relief” prompts us to
proceed to the § 425.17(b)(1) analysis.
    Martinez’s complaint does not seek relief that is greater
than or different from the relief sought on behalf of the
alleged class. Martinez seeks relief solely on behalf of a
class of which she is a member. She does not seek any
additional relief solely for herself, the fatal flaw for the
plaintiffs in Club Members for an Honest Election and
Ingels. Nor does she seek, at least from the face of the

3
  The court in Thayer also noted that the plaintiff had requested general
damages, which “includes pain and suffering, emotional distress, and
other ‘subjective’ items.” 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 29 (quoting Beeman v.
Burling, 265 Cal. Rptr. 719, 727 (Ct. App. 1990)). But because the court
found fault with the plaintiff’s complaint for seeking “much greater”—
rather than different—relief, Thayer should not be read to mean that
requesting “subjective” damages such as emotional distress on behalf of
the entire class violates § 425.17(b)’s requirements. See id.
16             MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.

complaint, relief that would apply only to a subset of the
class, as at issue in Thayer. Nothing in Martinez’s complaint
suggests that, if her action is successful, her recovery will be
greater than the recovery of other members of the class.
    On the second criterion, Martinez’s action, if successful,
would “enforce an important right affecting the public
interest” and would “confer a significant benefit” on the
general public. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.17(b)(2).
Courts make this determination by “examining [the]
complaint to determine whether [the] lawsuit is of the kind
that seeks to vindicate public policy goals.” Tourgeman, 166
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 743. Martinez’s lawsuit clearly intersects
with California’s public policy goals.
    The birthplace of American cinema and home of
Hollywood, California has long declared a policy of
protecting artists’ and other individuals’ right to control the
use of their persona. California’s original constitution
substantively began by identifying “protecting property” and
“pursuing and obtaining . . . happiness” as “inalienable
rights.” Cal. Const. Art. I, § 1 (1849). Nearly a century ago,
California’s courts enshrined the right to privacy in the state
constitution by interpreting this right to happiness as
“includ[ing] the right to live free from the unwarranted
attack of others upon one’s liberty, property, and
reputation.” Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Ct. App.
1931). In doing so, the court in Melvin concluded that the
right to privacy supported a tort action for using the
plaintiff’s name and biography without her permission. Id.
at 92–93.
   Since then, California has continued to firmly declare its
public policy commitment to protecting its citizens’ property
and privacy rights. Subsequent decisions confirmed that the
               MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.               17

unauthorized use of a person’s name for commercial
exploitation is actionable. Stilson v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n,
Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 581, 582 (Ct. App. 1972); Fairfield v.
Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197 (Cal. Ct. App.
1955) (condemning such exploitation as “one of the most
flagrant and common means of invasion of privacy”). These
decisions underscore the breadth of the privacy protection,
permitting actions not just by celebrities and well-known
corporations, but also by private citizens with no public
reputation. See Stilson, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 582. The California
public has also endorsed the state’s commitment to privacy.
In 1972, California voters explicitly added privacy to the
state’s constitutional rights. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 15 (1994); see also Cal. Const. Art. I,
§ 1.
    This longstanding protection demonstrates that
California considers the right to control one’s name and
likeness to be an important right affecting the public interest.
Although we take no position on the merits, Martinez’s
lawsuit, on the face of the complaint, seeks to enforce this
right. California’s common-law and statutory recognition of
this right suggests that if Martinez prevails, she will confer a
significant benefit on thousands of Californians.
    Finally, Martinez also satisfies the third criterion of the
public-interest exemption because private enforcement is
both necessary and disproportionately burdensome. See Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 425.17(b)(3). California Courts of Appeal
have held that if no public entity has sought to enforce the
right plaintiff seeks to vindicate in the lawsuit, “[t]his fact
alone is a sufficient basis to conclude the action is
‘necessary,’ within the meaning of the public interest
exception.” Inland Oversight Comm. v. County of San
Bernardino, 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884, 887–88 (Ct. App. 2015);
18             MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.

see also Tourgeman, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 744 (citing cases).
There is no indication in the record or briefing here that a
public entity has brought a right-to-publicity,
misappropriation, or similar action against ZoomInfo. On the
relative financial cost, a case is disproportionately
burdensome if “the cost of [Martinez’s] legal victory
transcends [her] personal interest.” Tourgeman, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 744 (quoting Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc., 20
Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 393 (Ct. App. 2004)). As a non-celebrity
who may struggle to demonstrate the economic value of her
name or likeness, Martinez may well recover only the
minimum statutory damages. At $750 per person, these
damages would not even cover the cost of litigating this
action. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a). But, if her class action
is successful, Martinez’s personal recovery would be
dwarfed by the total recovery for the putative class, which
she alleges may number in the millions.
   We therefore conclude that Martinez’s complaint is
exempted from California’s anti-SLAPP law as a suit
“brought solely in the public interest” under § 425.17(b).
Because the public interest exemption applies, it is
unnecessary for us to determine whether the commercial
speech exemption also applies or to reach the merits grounds
on which the district court decided the motion.
    We affirm the district court’s denial of ZoomInfo’s
motion to strike Martinez’s complaint under California’s
anti-SLAPP law on the alternative ground that Martinez’s
complaint falls within the public-interest exemption to the
anti-SLAPP law. Costs shall be awarded to Martinez.
     AFFIRMED.
               MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.              19

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    I write separately to question the propriety of our court
reviewing on interlocutory appeal denials of anti-SLAPP
motions to strike. My particular objection is that a motion
based on California’s anti-SLAPP statute is wholly
grounded in that state’s procedural law, yet we have infused
it with substantive significance. Rusheen v. Cohen, 128 P.3d
713, 717 (Cal. 2006) (“The Legislature enacted Code of
Civil Procedure section 425.16—known as the anti-SLAPP
statute—to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of
lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of
constitutional rights.”); Cal. S. Judiciary Comm., Analysis
of S.B. No. 515 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.), as amended May
1, 2003, p. 12 (“At its core, the anti-SLAPP law is a
procedural device crafted by the Legislature to weed out
certain frivolous lawsuits arising out of the defendant’s valid
(and thus protected) first amendment conduct.”). Over time,
we have turned the statute into a ground for interlocutory
appeal in the federal courts.
    What is more, at odds with the venerable doctrine of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), we have even
decided that we will adopt the California state procedural
rules as to when the denial of a SLAPP motion is appealable.
Breazeale v. Victim Servs., Inc., 878 F.3d 759, 766–67 (9th
Cir. 2017) (holding that the statutory prohibition on
interlocutory appeals of denials of anti-SLAPP motions to
strike on public-interest-exemption grounds, California
Civil Procedure Code § 425.17(e), applies in federal court).
Ironically, we let anti-SLAPP denials jump the line and
become automatically classified as appealable under the
collateral order doctrine, but we decline interlocutory review
of the more draconian result when a trial court grants an anti-
SLAPP motion and ousts a party from court. See, e.g., Hyan
20               MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.

v. Hummer, 825 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding
that the grant of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike is fully
reviewable on appeal from final judgment, and thus not
appealable under the collateral order doctrine). We cannot
justify this discrepancy on the grounds that anti-SLAPP is a
form of immunity from suit. Cf. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d
1018, 1025–26 (9th Cir. 2003), superseded by statute, Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 425.17(e). That line of reasoning has been
soundly rejected by the California Supreme Court, which has
repeatedly insisted that “the anti-SLAPP statute neither
constitutes—nor enables courts to effect—any type of
‘immunity.’” Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 74 P.3d
737, 743–44 (Cal. 2003) (quoting Navellier v. Sletten, 52
P.3d 703, 712 (Cal. 2002)).
    Our jurisprudence on anti-SLAPP statutes places us in
the minority among our sister circuits. The Second, Seventh,
Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits do not recognize the
applicability of SLAPP statutes’ provisions for motions to
strike or dismiss. The Second Circuit put it succinctly:
“[W]e lack appellate jurisdiction to consider the district
court’s order passing on the merits of the defendants’ anti-
SLAPP motions to strike.” Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d 116,
122 (2d Cir. 2016). See also Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel
Action Network,1 791 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding
that Washington’s anti-SLAPP law, as a whole, is
inapplicable in federal court); Los Lobos Renewable Power,
LLC v. Americulture, Inc., 885 F.3d 659, 668–73 (10th Cir.

1
  Before the Seventh Circuit’s decision, the Washington Supreme Court
ruled that the state’s anti-SLAPP statute violated the Washington
Constitution and that its special motion to strike provision was not
severable. Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 864, 871–74 (Wash. 2015) (en
banc), abrogated on other grounds, Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v.
Thurston Cnty., 423 P.3d 223, 248 n.15 (Wash. 2018) (en banc).
               MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.            21

2018) (holding that New Mexico’s anti-SLAPP statute is
inapplicable in a federal diversity action); Carbone v. Cable
News Network, Inc., 910 F.3d 1345, 1349–51 (11th Cir.
2018) (holding that the motion to strike provision of
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute does not apply in federal
court); Abbas v. Foreign Pol’y Grp., 783 F.3d 1328, 1333
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (declining to apply the District of
Columbia’s anti-SLAPP law’s special motion to dismiss
provision). Only two circuits side with the Ninth Circuit
approach—the First and Fifth Circuits. See Franchini v.
Inv.’s Bus. Daily, Inc., 981 F.3d 1, 6–8 (1st Cir. 2020)
(holding the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear an
interlocutory appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss under
Maine’s anti-SLAPP law); Henry v. Lake Charles Am.
Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 180–81 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding
that interlocutory appeal of denial of anti-SLAPP dismissal
under Louisiana law permitted); but see Cuba v. Pylant, 814
F.3d 701, 718–21 (5th Cir. 2016) (Graves, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with circuit’s applying Texas’s anti-SLAPP
law on the basis that, under Erie, such a procedural law is
inapplicable in federal court).
   Several of my colleagues have already registered their
doubts whether it is appropriate to review anti-SLAPP
motions on interlocutory appeal. See Planned Parenthood
Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828,
835–38 (9th Cir.) (Gould, J., joined by Murguia, J.,
concurring), amended, 897 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2018);
Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hirsh, 831 F.3d 1179,
1182–86 (9th Cir. 2016) (Kozinski and Gould, JJ.,
concurring); Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 736 F.3d 1180,
1188–92 (9th Cir. 2013) (Watford, J., joined by Kozinski,
Paez, & Bea, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
22             MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.

banc); Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 272–76
(9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J. & Paez, J., concurring).
    We have turned a blind eye to the incongruity of this
practice—with Erie and with common sense—for too long.

DESAI, Circuit Judge, with whom McKEOWN, Circuit
Judge, joins, concurring:
    As discussed in the panel’s opinion, ZoomInfo’s
interlocutory appeal of the district court’s denial of its anti-
SLAPP motion to strike is properly before us because
binding circuit precedent establishes that denials of such
motions are collateral orders subject to interlocutory appeal.
While I join my colleagues in affirming the trial court’s
denial of ZoomInfo’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike, I write
separately to urge our court to reconsider our precedent
allowing interlocutory appeals of such collateral orders in
the first place.
    In Batzel v. Smith, this court held that denials of anti-
SLAPP motions to strike are immediately appealable
collateral orders. 333 F.3d 1018, 1024–26 (9th Cir. 2003).
Since then, some of my colleagues have challenged the
appropriateness of reviewing denials of anti-SLAPP motions
to strike on interlocutory appeal, urging the court to
reconsider this precedent. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of
Am., Inc. v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 835–38
(9th Cir. 2018) (Gould, J., joined by Murguia, J.,
concurring), amended, 897 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2018). And
several of my colleagues have separately questioned the
propriety of reviewing denials of anti-SLAPP motions to
strike on interlocutory appeal even when they more broadly
urge no federal court review of any action arising under state
               MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.             23

anti-SLAPP laws. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hirsh,
831 F.3d 1179, 1182–86 (9th Cir. 2016) (Kozinski and
Gould, JJ., concurring); Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 736
F.3d 1180, 1188–92 (9th Cir. 2013) (Watford, J., joined by
Kozinski, Paez, & Bea, JJ., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc). Moreover, two of our sister circuits have
reasoned that anti-SLAPP motions are not collateral orders
subject to interlocutory appeal. Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d
116, 122 (2d Cir. 2016); cf. Intercon Sols., Inc. v. Basel
Action Network, 791 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating
in dicta that anti-SLAPP motions to strike are not collateral
orders).
    Because denials of anti-SLAPP motions do not qualify
as collateral orders, this court does not have jurisdiction to
entertain them on an interlocutory basis. For an otherwise
non-appealable, interlocutory decision to be subject to
immediate review by a court of appeals, it must
(1) “conclusively determine the disputed question,”
(2) “resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action,” and (3) “be effectively unreviewable
on appeal from a final judgment.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S.
345, 349 (2006). The denial of an anti-SLAPP motion to
strike does not satisfy the final two elements of the Will
collateral order analysis.
    First, the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike,
which necessarily considers the plaintiff’s likelihood of
success, see Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b), does not
resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits. Nor is the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike
“effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”
Will, 546 U.S. at 349. Courts typically find this factor
satisfied when a decision denies a defendant immunity from
suit, such as denials of absolute or qualified immunity. See
24             MARTINEZ V. ZOOMINFO TECH. INC.

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526–30 (1985). But “the
anti-SLAPP statute neither constitutes—nor enables courts
to effect—any type of ‘immunity.’” Jarrow Formulas, Inc.
v. LaMarche, 74 P.3d 737, 743–44 (Cal. 2003) (quoting
Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 712 (Cal. 2002)). And the
merits of the plaintiff’s claims and the defendant’s defenses
can be reviewed upon a final judgment. That the anti-SLAPP
statute itself may provide for interlocutory appeal of denials
of anti-SLAPP motions to strike in state court does not alter
this analysis in federal court.
    In sum, because anti-SLAPP motions to strike require
the court to assess the merits of a plaintiff’s claims and are
not effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment, I join many of my colleagues and two of our sister
circuits in concluding that the court lacks jurisdiction to
consider denials of such motions on interlocutory appeal
absent certification from the district court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b).