Court Opinion

ID: 9532210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:19:10.174843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:42.374317
License: Public Domain

*817Baker C.J.
(concurring) — I concur because the challenged testimony concerning typical drug transactions related to a subject beyond the experience of the average juror.
The danger of such testimony is that it can convert innocuous conduct or status into criminal conduct via profile testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1992). As in Cruz, some courts have prohibited the use of such testimony unless it is offered in rebuttal to a defense which in some manner claims that the defendant does not fit the stereotype of a drug dealer. See also United States v. Lira, 984 F.2d 331 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2944 (1993).
The Defendant here relies heavily on these cases in support of his characterization of the challenged testimony as profile evidence, and points out that his defense did not "open the door” to the testimony because it was presented as part of the State’s case in chief. Nevertheless, such testimony may properly be admitted when the trial court determines that the subject matter will be of assistance to the jury, which might not otherwise readily grasp the significance of the facts. Because the potential prejudice can be significant, however, trial courts should exercise care (as did the court in this trial) to avoid allowing such testimony to improperly vouch for the credibility of the State’s fact-witness by mirroring his version of events, cloaked in an expert witness’ description of patterns of criminal conduct.