Court Opinion

ID: 9418052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 21:00:26.040739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:25.711920
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 20-4617      Doc: 47         Filed: 08/01/2023     Pg: 1 of 8

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 20-4617

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        PERCY PARKER, a/k/a Percy Powell,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Wilmington. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (7:19-cr-00185-D-1)

        Submitted: June 22, 2023                                          Decided: August 1, 2023

        Before NIEMEYER, KING, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Marshall H. Ellis, HORNTHAL, RILEY, ELLIS & MALAND, LLP,
        Elizabeth City, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States
        Attorney, G. Norman Acker, III, Acting United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker,
        Assistant United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney,
        Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 20-4617       Doc: 47         Filed: 08/01/2023      Pg: 2 of 8

        PER CURIAM:

               Percy Parker pled guilty to distribution of a quantity of controlled substances, in

        violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced Parker to 151 months’

        imprisonment. On appeal, Parker contends that the district court erred in sentencing him

        as a career offender, that his sentence is unreasonable in light of the small quantity of drugs

        involved in his offense of conviction, and that the court erred by failing to explain two

        special conditions of supervised release. Finding no error, we affirm.

               As part of its investigation of complaints about open air drug transactions in

        Wilmington, North Carolina, the Wilmington Police Department utilized a confidential

        informant to purchase drugs in that area. On September 17, 2019, the confidential

        informant approached Parker and requested his assistance in obtaining drugs. Parker

        agreed to help the informant and accompanied the informant to one location where Parker

        purchased .32 grams of cocaine base and then sold it to the informant and then to a second

        location where Parker purchased .3 grams of heroin that he then sold to the confidential

        informant.

               The probation officer determined that, based on the quantity of controlled

        substances, Parker’s base offense level was 12. But, because Parker had two prior

        convictions for controlled substance offenses—a 2010 conviction for possession with

        intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver a controlled substance and a 2014 conviction for

        possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver heroin—the probation officer

        determined that Parker was a career offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

        § 4B1.1(a) (2018). The career offender enhancement increased Parker’s adjusted offense

                                                      2
USCA4 Appeal: 20-4617      Doc: 47         Filed: 08/01/2023      Pg: 3 of 8

        level from 12 to 32. After the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility,

        Parker’s advisory Guidelines range rose from 24 to 30 months without the career offender

        designation, to 151 to 188 months with the enhancement.

               Parker contends that his 2014 heroin conviction was part of the same course of

        conduct as his current offense and therefore should have been considered “relevant

        conduct” under USSG § 1B1.3, rather than as part of his criminal history. He argues that

        USSG § 1B1.3, application note 5(C), which provides that “offense conduct associated

        with a sentence that was imposed prior to the acts or omissions constituting the instant

        federal offense (the offense of conviction) is not considered as part of the same course of

        conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction,” conflicts with the text of

        USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2) and, therefore, that the district court erred by applying the

        commentary. Accordingly, he maintains that his prior conviction cannot be counted as a

        predicate offense under the career offender Guideline. We have recently rejected this very

        argument. See United States v. Moses, 23 F.4th 347, 357-58 (4th Cir. 2022) (holding that

        USSG § 1B1.3, “Application Note 5(C) authoritatively excludes from relevant conduct the

        [prior] conviction for which [defendant] had been sentenced prior to the acts and omissions

        constituting his offenses of conviction here”), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 640 (2023).

               Parker also asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion for a downward

        variance, contending that his 151-month sentence is substantively unreasonable given that

        his offense conduct involved approximately one-half of a gram of a controlled substance.

        He contends that application of the career offender Guideline to increase his Guidelines

        range from 24- to 30-months to 151- to 188-months for an offense involving such a small

                                                     3
USCA4 Appeal: 20-4617      Doc: 47         Filed: 08/01/2023      Pg: 4 of 8

        quantity of controlled substances fails to comply with the Sentencing Guidelines’ intent to

        retain “a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender’s real conduct.”

        See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005).

               When considering a challenge to the reasonableness of a sentence imposed by the

        district court, “we consider both substantive reasonableness, considering the totality of the

        circumstances, and procedural reasonableness, ensuring that the district court committed

        no significant procedural error, such as miscalculating the sentencing guidelines, failing to

        consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) criminal and personal history factors, or selecting a

        sentence based on erroneous facts.”        United States v. Zelaya, 908 F.3d 920, 930

        (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).          We review for

        procedural errors first and consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence only if

        we find no procedural errors.        See United States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 911

        (4th Cir. 2017).

               “If the sentence ‘is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then consider the

        substantive reasonableness of the sentence,’ taking into account the totality of the

        circumstances.” United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting

        Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). A sentence must be “sufficient, but not

        greater than necessary,” to accomplish the § 3553(a) sentencing goals.            18 U.S.C.

        § 3553(a). A sentence within the properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively

        substantively reasonable. United States v. Smith, 919 F.3d 825, 841 n.12 (4th Cir. 2019)

        (citation omitted). That presumption “can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence

                                                     4
USCA4 Appeal: 20-4617       Doc: 47         Filed: 08/01/2023      Pg: 5 of 8

        is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.

        Gutierrez, 963 F.3d 320, 344 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               As outlined above, the district court did not err in calculating Parker’s advisory

        Sentencing Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months. The district court rejected Parker’s

        request for a variance and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines

        range. Explaining the basis for this sentence, the court specifically acknowledged that

        Parker’s offense conduct involved a small quantity of controlled substances. And the court

        stated that, but for Parker’s “serious criminal history, including a whole history of

        assaultive conduct, [it would] be more inclined to [vary downward].” However, reviewing

        the “totality of the circumstances,” Provance, 944 F.3d at 218, the court also noted Parker’s

        extensive criminal history, which included six assault charges and a number of controlled

        substance offenses. The court also opined that Parker’s recidivism “needs to be punished

        and it needs to be deterred.” The court concluded that a sentence of 151 months was

        sufficient to incapacitate Parker, “to deter others, to promote respect for the law and provide

        just punishment in light of the serious nature of the conduct.” In sum, the district court

        acknowledged that Parker’s offense involved “a small amount of drugs” but determined

        that his serious criminal history and “quick nature of the recidivism . . . notwithstanding

        efforts at intervention” warranted a within-Guidelines sentence.

               We conclude that the district court appropriately considered the sentencing factors

        and the arguments presented by counsel and did not abuse its discretion by imposing a

        within-Guidelines sentence. Further, we conclude that Parker has failed to rebut the

                                                      5
USCA4 Appeal: 20-4617       Doc: 47         Filed: 08/01/2023      Pg: 6 of 8

        presumption that the within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. See Gutierrez, 963 F.3d

        at 344. According, we affirm the 151-month sentence.

               Lastly, Parker contends that the district court erred by not providing an adequate

        explanation for the special conditions of supervised release requiring him to consent to

        warrantless searches and to “support any children” he has. To preserve a challenge to

        proposed conditions of supervised release, objections “must be made with sufficient

        specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the objection.”

        United States v. Elbaz, 52 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks

        omitted), petition for cert. filed, No. 22-1055 (U.S. May 1, 2023). We conclude that

        Parker’s request for a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range was not

        specific enough to preserve a challenge to the proposed special conditions of supervised

        release. Accordingly, our review is for plain error. Id. at 612; United States v. McMiller,

        954 F.3d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 2020). “To establish plain error, [Parker] must show that an

        error occurred, that it was plain, and that it affected his substantial rights.” McMiller, 954

        F.3d at 674. Parker must also show that the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity

        or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               The district court must explain any special condition of supervision.           United

        States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 178 (4th Cir. 2020). Although the court “need not

        robotically tick through an explanation for each supervised release condition,” it “must

        offer enough of an explanation to satisfy us that it considered the parties’ arguments and

        had a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decision-making authority.” United

        States v. Suiero, 59 F.4th 132, 143 (4th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). The reasons for some

                                                      6
USCA4 Appeal: 20-4617       Doc: 47          Filed: 08/01/2023      Pg: 7 of 8

        special conditions of supervision may be “so self-evident and unassailable” that a

        particularized explanation may be unnecessary. Id. Accordingly, a district court must

        specifically explain the reasons for imposing a discretionary condition of supervised

        release unless (1) the reasons are “self-evident,” (2) the defendant raised no nonfrivolous

        objections to the condition, and (3) the court provided an adequate explanation for the

        sentence as a whole. United States v. Boyd, 5 F.4th 550, 559 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

               In denying Parker’s request for a downward variance, the district court provided a

        thorough explanation of the sentence as a whole. Specifically, the court discussed Parker’s

        extensive criminal history and the “quick nature of [his] recidivism.” In view of the nature

        of the crime and Parker’s history of unsuccessful compliance with terms of supervision,

        we conclude that the district court’s reasons for imposing the warrantless search condition

        are self-evident. Accordingly, we find no plain error, see Boyd, 5 F.4th at 559; McMiller,

        954 F.3d at 674, and we affirm the warrantless search condition of supervision.

               Turning to Parker’s challenge to the special condition of supervised release

        requiring him to support his children, he contends that this condition infringes on his rights

        as the father of his children and that the district court failed to explain the reasons for this

        condition. “If the defendant has one or more dependents,” the Sentencing Guidelines

        recommend a special condition of supervised release “specifying that the defendant shall

        support his or her dependents.” USSG § 5D1.3(d)(1)(A), p.s. We conclude that the district

        court’s reasons for requiring Parker to support his children are “self-evident” and thus do

                                                       7
USCA4 Appeal: 20-4617      Doc: 47         Filed: 08/01/2023      Pg: 8 of 8

        not require a particularized explanation. See Boyd, 5 F.4th at 559. We therefore affirm

        this condition of supervised release.

               Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

                                                     8