Court Opinion

ID: 4048738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 00:45:49.22418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:30:27.734289
License: Public Domain

PD-0675&0676&0677&0678-15                           PD-0675&0676&0677&0678-15
                                                      COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                                                                       AUSTIN, TEXAS
                                                      Transmitted 6/3/2015 12:32:20 PM
                                                        Accepted 6/4/2015 10:11:28 AM
                                                                        ABEL ACOSTA
                          NO. ___________                                       CLERK

               IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

                      FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS

   _____________________________________________________________

                        RODOLFO CISNEROS,
                           PETITIONER

                                VS.

                      THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                           RESPONDENT
   _____________________________________________________________

      APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

       OF THE DECISION IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

   CAUSE NOS. 03-13-00206-CR, 03-13-00207-CR, 03-13-00208-CR and
                           03-13-00209

   _____________________________________________________________

                                 LINDA ICENHAUER-RAMIREZ
                                 ATTORNEY AT LAW
                                 1103 NUECES
       June 4, 2015              AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701
                                 TELEPHONE: 512-477-7991
                                 FACSIMILE: 512-477-3580
                                 LJIR@AOL.COM
                                 SBN: 10382944

                                 ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

        ORAL ARGUMENT IS RESPECTFULLY REQUESTED
                                TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................... 3

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .............................. 6

IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES AND COUNSEL ............................ 6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................ 7

STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE ... 10

GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER ONE ............................................ 11
  THE	
   COURT	
   OF	
   APPEALS	
   ERRED	
   WHEN	
   IT	
   SAID	
   THAT	
   THE	
  
  RECORD	
   DOES	
   NOT	
   REFLECT	
   THAT	
   TRIAL	
   COUNSEL	
   WERE	
  
  GIVEN	
   AN	
   OPPORTUNITY	
   TO	
   EXPLAIN	
   IF	
   THEIR	
   ACTIONS	
  
  COULD	
  BE	
  ATTRIBUTED	
  TO	
  REASONABLE	
  TRIAL	
  STRATEGY.	
  

       ARGUMENT................................................................................. 11

GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER TWO ............................................ 16
  THE	
   OPINION	
   OF	
   THE	
   COURT	
   OF	
   APPEALS	
   FAILED	
   TO	
  
  ADDRESS	
   TRIAL	
   COUNSELS’	
   ERRORS	
   FOR	
   WHICH	
   THERE	
  
  COULD	
   BE	
   NO	
   REASONABLE	
   TRIAL	
   STRATEGY,	
   SUCH	
   AS	
  
  ELICITING	
   EVIDENCE	
   OF	
   EXTRANEOUS	
   SEXUAL	
   OFFENSES	
  
  ALLEGEDLY	
   COMMITTED	
   BY	
   PETITIONER	
   AGAINST	
   THE	
  
  COMPLAINANT,	
   NOT	
   OBJECTING	
   TO	
   THE	
   STATE	
   ASKING	
  
  WITNESSES	
  IF	
  THEY	
  BELIEVED	
  THE	
  ALLEGED	
  VICTIM	
  WAS	
  
  TELLING	
   THE	
   TRUTH	
   IN	
   VIOLATION	
   OF	
   TEX.R.EV.	
   608,	
  
  OPENING	
   THE	
   DOOR	
   AND	
   ENABLING	
   THE	
   STATE	
   TO	
   ASK	
  
  THE	
   STATE’S	
   EXPERT	
   IF	
   SHE	
   THOUGHT	
   THE	
   COMPLAINANT	
  
  HAD	
   BEEN	
   ABUSED,	
   NOT	
   KNOWING	
   THE	
   LAW	
   APPLICABLE	
  
  TO	
   THE	
   CASE,	
   NOT	
   KNOWING	
   THE	
   RULES	
   OF	
   EVIDENCE,	
  
  AND	
   NOT	
   KNOWING	
   THE	
   REQUIREMENTS	
   OF	
   PERFECTING	
  
  ERRORS	
  FOR	
  APPEAL.	
  

       ARGUMENT................................................................................. 16

	
                                               2	
  
GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER THREE ....................................... 24
  THE	
   COURT	
   OF	
   APPEALS	
   FAILED	
   TO	
   PROPERLY	
   ANALYZE	
  
  THE	
  PREJUDICE	
  PRONG	
  OF	
  STRICKLAND	
  V.	
  WASHINGTON.	
  
  	
  
       ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 24	
  

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER.............................................................. 26

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................... 28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................ 29

APPENDIX .............................................................................................. 30

       Cisneros v. State, 2015 Tex.App.LEXIS 2330, No. 03-13-00206-
          CR, No. 03-13-00207-CR, No. 03-13-00208-CR, No. 03-13-
          00209-CR (Tex.App.-Austin, delivered March 12, 2015)

	
                                                            3	
  
                                                      INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES                                                                                                                                                          PAGES

Andrews	
  v.	
  State,	
  159	
  S.W.3d	
  98,	
  102	
  (Tex.Cr.App.	
  2005) ..................... 16	
  
	
  
Barefoot	
  v.	
  State,	
  596	
  S.W.2d	
  875,	
  887-­‐888	
  (Tex.Cr.App.	
  1980).......... 21	
  

Cisneros v. State, 2015 Tex.App.LEXIS 2330, Nos. 03-13-00206-CR,
      03-13-00207-CR, 03-13-00208-CR, 03-13-00209-CR (Tex.App.-
      Austin, delivered March12, 2015) ............................................10, 11

Davis	
  v.	
  State,	
  413	
  S.W.3d	
  816,	
  828	
  (Tex.App.-­‐Austin	
  2013,	
  pet.	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  ref.) ...............................................................................................16,	
  18,	
  23,	
  28	
  
	
  
Ex	
  parte	
  Welborn,	
  785	
  S.W.2d	
  391,	
  396	
  (Tex.Cr.App.	
  1990)................. 27	
  
	
  
Fuller	
  v.	
  State,	
  224	
  S.W.3d	
  823,	
  833	
  (Tex.App.-­‐Texarkana	
  2007,	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  no	
  pet.) .........................................................................................19,	
  20,	
  26,	
  27	
  	
  
	
  
Kjellerson	
  v.	
  State,	
  1999	
  Tex.App.LEXIS	
  5344	
  (Tex.App.-­‐San	
  
                                               Antonio	
  1999,	
  no	
  pet.)................................................................................ 23	
  	
  

Pyles	
  v.	
  State,	
  755	
  S.W.2d	
  98,	
  118	
  (Tex.Cr.App.	
  1988) ............................. 21	
  	
  
	
  
Sandoval	
  v.	
  State,	
  409	
  S.W.3d	
  259,	
  289-­‐290	
  (Tex.App.-­‐Austin	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  2013,	
  no	
  pet.) .......................................................................................... 24,	
  26	
  
	
  
Sessums	
  v.	
  State,	
  129	
  S.W.3d	
  242	
  (Tex.App.-­‐Texarkana	
  2004,	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  pet.	
  ref’d).................................................................................................... 26,	
  27	
  
	
  
Schutz	
  v.	
  State,	
  957	
  S.W.2d	
  52,	
  76	
  (Tex.Cr.App.	
  1997) ...................... 19,	
  20	
  
	
  
Strickland	
  v.	
  Washington,	
  466	
  U.S.	
  668,	
  104	
  S.Ct.	
  2052,	
  80	
  L.Ed.2d	
  
                                               674	
  (1984)....................................................................................................... 24	
  
	
  
Wall	
  v.	
  State,	
  184	
  S.W.3d	
  730	
  (Tex.Cr.App.	
  2006) ...................................... 22	
  
	
  
Yount	
  v.	
  State,	
  872	
  S.W.2d	
  706,	
  708	
  (Tex.Cr.App.	
  1993) ......................... 20	
  

	
                                                                                      4	
  
	
  
CONSTITUTIONS

Sixth	
  Amendment,	
  United	
  States	
  Constitution .....................................22,	
  26

COURT RULES

Tex.R.App.Proc.	
  66.3(a) .................................................................. 23,	
  24,	
  26,	
  27	
  
	
  
Tex.R.App.Proc.	
  66.3(c) ........................................................................................26	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

Tex.R.App.Proc. 66.3(f).................................................................... 15, 24

Tex.R.Ev. 608 ..........................................................................................19

Tex.R.Ev. 608(a) ......................................................................................17

Tex.R.Ev.	
  613.............................................................................................................. 22	
  
	
  
	
  Tex.R.Ev.	
  801(e)(1)(B).......................................................................................... 22

	
                                                                  5	
  
                 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

          Petitioner has raised important questions of first impression in this

Court and believes that oral argument would help clarify the issues presented

in his petition for discretionary review. Therefore he respectfully requests

oral argument.

                IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Trial Judge: The Honorable William Henry, 428th Judicial District Court of
              Hays County, Texas

Parties and Counsel:

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  (a)	
  the	
  State	
  of	
  Texas	
  represented	
  by:	
  
                                    Ms.	
  Cathy	
  Compton,	
  Asst.	
  District	
  Attorney	
  –	
  trial	
  attorney	
  
                                    Ms.	
  Amy	
  Lockhart,	
  Asst.	
  District	
  Attorney	
  –	
  trial	
  attorney	
  
                                    Ms.	
   Angie	
   D.	
   Roberts-­‐Huckaby,	
   Asst.	
   District	
   Attorney	
   –	
  
                                           appellate	
  attorney	
  
                                    Hays	
  County	
  District	
  Attorney's	
  Office	
  	
  
                                    Hays	
  County	
  Justice	
  Center	
  
                                    712	
  South	
  Stagecoach	
  Trail,	
  Suite	
  2057	
  
                                    San	
  Marcos,	
  Texas	
  78666	
  
	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  (b)	
  Mr.	
  Rodolfo	
  Cisneros,	
  represented	
  by:	
  
                                    Mr.	
  Mark	
  Morales	
  –	
  trial	
  attorney	
  
                                    Mr.	
  Carson	
  Guy	
  –	
  trial	
  attorney	
  
                                    307	
  Rock	
  Street,	
  Building	
  2	
  	
  
                                    Georgetown,	
  Texas	
  78626	
  
	
  
                                    Ms.	
  Linda	
  Icenhauer-­‐Ramirez	
  -­‐	
  appellate	
  attorney	
  
                                    1103	
  Nueces	
  
                                    Austin,	
  Texas	
  78701	
  
                                                                        	
  

	
                                                           6	
  
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL

APPEALS:

                  NOW COMES Rodolfo Cisneros, Petitioner in this cause by and

through his attorney, Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez, and, pursuant to the

provisions of Tex.R.App.Proc. 66, et seq.,                                                                                                  moves this Court to grant

discretionary review, and in support will show as follows:

                                                               STATEMENT OF THE CASE

                  In Third Court of Appeals Cause No. No. 03-13-00206-CR, Petitioner

was indicted the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age

of six years by penetrating the child’s anus with his finger or fingers.1 (C.R.

8) On March 1, 2013, after hearing the evidence and argument of both the

State and the defense, the jury found Petitioner guilty of the offense of

aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of six years. (R.R. VI, pp.

85-86; C.R. 64-68)                                                   On March 1, 2013, after hearing the punishment

evidence and argument from both the State and the defense, the judge

assessed Petitioner’s punishment at seventy (70) years imprisonment to be

served concurrently with Petitioner’s other three sentences. Petitioner was

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1	
   This	
   case	
   was	
   joined	
   with	
   three	
   other	
   indictments	
   in	
   a	
   single	
   jury	
   trial.	
   	
   	
   Petitioner	
  

was	
   convicted	
   of	
   aggravated	
   sexual	
   assault	
   in	
   all	
   four	
   cases.	
   	
   	
   This	
   consolidated	
  
petition	
  for	
  discretionary	
  review	
  is	
  being	
  filed	
  for	
  all	
  four	
  causes.	
  

	
                                                                                                           7	
  
sentenced that day.    (R.R. VI, pp. 123-125; C.R. 70-71) Petitioner filed a

motion for new trial on March 7, 2013. (C.R. 73) Notice of appeal was

filed on March 25, 2013.      (C.R. 78)       The trial court’s certification of

defendant’s right of appeal was filed on March 1, 2013.     (C.R. 69)

       In Third Court of Appeals Cause No. No. 03-13-00207-CR, Petitioner

was indicted for the offense of aggravated sexual assault under the age of six

years by penetrating or contacting the sexual organ of a child with his

mouth.      (C.R. 4)   On March 1, 2013, after hearing the evidence and

argument of both the State and the defense, the jury found Petitioner guilty

of the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of six

years. (R.R. VI, pp. 85-86; C.R. 30-35)       On March 1, 2013, after hearing

the punishment evidence and argument from both the State and the defense,

the judge assessed Petitioner’s punishment at seventy (70) years

imprisonment to be served concurrently with Petitioner’s other three

sentences. Petitioner was sentenced that day.      (R.R. VI, pp. 123-125; C.R.

36-37) Petitioner filed a motion for new trial on March 7, 2013. (C.R. 40)

Notice of appeal was filed on March 25, 2013. (C.R. 45) The trial court’s

certification of defendant’s right of appeal was filed on March 1, 2013.

(C.R. 38)

       In Third Court of Appeals Cause No. 03-13-00208-CR,            Petitioner

	
                                    8	
  
was indicted for the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the

age of six years by penetrating the sexual organ of the child with his finger

or fingers. (C.R. 4) On March 1, 2013, after hearing the evidence and

argument of both the State and the defense, the jury found Petitioner guilty

of the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of six

years. (R.R. VI, pp. 85-86; C.R. 30-34)       On March 1, 2013, after hearing

the punishment evidence and argument from both the State and the defense,

the judge assessed Petitioner’s punishment at seventy (70) years

imprisonment to be served concurrently with Petitioner’s other three

sentences. Petitioner was sentenced that day.     (R.R. VI, pp. 123-125; C.R.

35-36) Petitioner filed a motion for new trial on March 7, 2013. (C.R. 39)

Notice of appeal was filed on March 25, 2013. (C.R. 44) The trial court’s

certification of defendant’s right of appeal was filed on March 1, 2013.

(C.R. 37)

       In Third Court of Appeals Cause No. 03-13-00209-CR,          Petitioner

was indicted for the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the

age of six years by penetrating the sexual organ of the child with his finger

or fingers. (C.R. 4) On March 1, 2013, after hearing the evidence and

argument of both the State and the defense, the jury found Petitioner guilty

of the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of six

	
                                    9	
  
years. (R.R. VI, pp. 85-86; C.R. 30-34)       On March 1, 2013, after hearing

the punishment evidence and argument from both the State and the defense,

the judge assessed Petitioner’s punishment at seventy (70) years

imprisonment to be served concurrently with Petitioner’s other three

sentences. Petitioner was sentenced that day.     (R.R. VI, pp. 123-125; C.R.

35-36) Petitioner filed a motion for new trial on March 7, 2013. (C.R. 39)

Notice of appeal was filed on March 25, 2013. (C.R. 44) The trial court’s

certification of defendant’s right of appeal was filed on March 1, 2013.

(C.R. 37)

            STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       On March 12, 2015, the Third Court of Appeals handed down an

opinion in these cases. Cisneros v. State, 2015 Tex.App. LEXIS 2330, Nos.

03-13-00206-CR, 03-13-00207-CR, 03-13-00208-CR, 03-13-00209-CR

(Tex.App.-Austin, delivered March 12, 2015). A motion for rehearing was

filed in each cause. On May 4, 2015, the Third Court of denied Petitioner’s

motions for rehearing.     The petition for discretionary review is due to be

filed on or before June 3, 2015.

	
                                   10	
  
                          GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER ONE
THE	
  COURT	
  OF	
  APPEALS	
  ERRED	
  WHEN	
  IT	
  SAID	
  THAT	
  THE	
  RECORD	
  
DOES	
   NOT	
   REFLECT	
   THAT	
   TRIAL	
   COUNSEL	
   WERE	
   GIVEN	
   AN	
  
OPPORTUNITY	
   TO	
   EXPLAIN	
   IF	
   THEIR	
   ACTIONS	
   COULD	
   BE	
  
ATTRIBUTED	
  TO	
  REASONABLE	
  TRIAL	
  STRATEGY.	
  
                                                                  	
  
        In	
   its	
   opinion	
   the	
   panel	
   of	
   the	
   Third	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   makes	
   short	
  

shrift	
   of	
   Petitioner’s	
   claim	
   of	
   ineffective	
   assistance	
   of	
   counsel	
   by	
  

asserting	
  “the	
  record	
  is	
  silent	
  as	
  to	
  whether	
  there	
  was	
  a	
  strategic	
  reason	
  

for	
   counsels’	
   conduct	
   or	
   what	
   the	
   particular	
   strategy	
   was.”	
   	
   Cisneros v.

State, 2015 Tex.App.LEXIS 2330 *5, No. 03-13-00206-CR, 03-13-00207-

CR, 03-13-00208-CR, 03-13-00209-CR (Tex.App.-Austin, delivered March

12, 2015).            The	
   Court	
   then	
   writes	
   that	
   the	
   assertions	
   by	
   appellate	
  

counsel	
   that	
   there	
   was	
   no	
   reasonable	
   trial	
   strategy	
   for	
   trial	
   counsels’	
  

actions	
   are	
   “mere	
   speculation.”	
   	
   Cisneros v. State, 2015 Tex.App.LEXIS

2330 *5, No. 03-13-00206-CR, 03-13-00207-CR, 03-13-00208-CR, 03-13-

00209-CR (Tex.App.-Austin, delivered March 12, 2015).                                                  The	
   Court’s	
  

opinion	
   goes	
   on	
   to	
   say	
   that	
   because	
   the	
   record	
   does	
   not	
   contain	
   an	
  

explanation	
   of	
   trial	
   counsel’s	
   conduct,	
   the	
   court	
   will	
   presume	
   they	
  

exercised	
   reasonable	
   professional	
   judgment.	
   	
   The	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals’	
  

assertion	
   that	
   trial	
   counsel	
   was	
   never	
   able	
   to	
   explain	
   whether	
   their	
  

conduct	
  amounted	
  to	
  reasonable	
  trial	
  strategy	
  is	
  incorrect.	
  	
  	
  The	
  record	
  

	
                                                          11	
  
in	
  this	
  case	
  is	
  unusual	
  in	
  that	
  it	
  reflects	
  that	
  trial	
  counsel’s	
  performance	
  

was	
  so	
  questionable	
  that	
  on	
  several	
  occasions	
  even	
  the	
  State	
  questioned	
  

trial	
   counsel	
   outside	
   the	
   presence	
   of	
   the	
   jury	
   as	
   to	
   whether	
   trial	
  

counsel’s	
   actions	
   could	
   be	
   chalked	
   up	
   as	
   “trial	
   strategy.”	
   	
   Two	
   of	
   these	
  

instances	
  are	
  set	
  out	
  below:

            	
  

       1.               When	
  trial	
  counsel	
  unwittingly	
  opened	
  the	
  door	
  so	
  that	
  the	
  
                        State	
   could	
   ask	
   the	
   lead	
   detective	
   if	
   he	
   thought	
   Petitioner	
  
                        was	
  guilty.	
  
                        	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  During	
   cross-­‐examination	
   of	
   the	
   lead	
   detective,	
   Petitioner’s	
   trial	
  

counsel	
   began	
   asking	
   the	
   lead	
   detective	
   if	
   he	
   thought	
   he	
   had	
   probable	
  

cause	
   to	
   believe	
   Petitioner	
   was	
   guilty.	
   	
   	
   The	
   State,	
   recognizing	
   that	
  

asking	
  a	
  law	
  enforcement	
  officer	
  his	
  personal	
  belief	
  as	
  to	
  a	
  defendant’s	
  

guilt	
   was	
   totally	
   improper,	
   asked	
   to	
   approach	
   the	
   bench	
   and	
   a	
  

conversation	
   occurred	
   during	
   which	
   trial	
   counsel	
   told	
   the	
   court	
   that	
  

pursuing	
   this	
   line	
   of	
   question	
   was	
   indeed	
   trial	
   strategy.	
   	
   Trial	
   counsel	
  

affirmatively	
  stated	
  to	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  his	
  belief	
  that	
  this	
  line	
  

of	
   questioning	
   was	
   not	
   improper.	
   	
   	
   Counsel	
   then	
   resumed	
   his	
  

questioning	
   of	
   the	
   detective	
   and	
   ended	
   up	
   asking	
   the	
   detective	
   point	
  

blank:	
   	
   “So	
   you	
   don’t	
  –	
   do	
   you	
   have	
   a	
   belief	
   regarding	
   my	
   client’s	
   guilt?”	
  	
  

The	
  detective	
  knowing	
  this	
  was	
  an	
  improper	
  question,	
  side-­‐stepped	
  the	
  

	
                                                               12	
  
question	
   in	
   his	
   answer.	
   	
   	
   (R.R.	
   III,	
   p.	
   127-­‐131)	
   	
   A	
   few	
   minutes	
   later	
   on	
  

redirect,	
  the	
  prosecutor	
  asked	
  the	
  detective	
  if	
  he	
  had	
  formed	
  an	
  opinion	
  

as	
  to	
  whether	
  the	
  defendant	
  was	
  guilty	
  and	
  the	
  detective	
  replied	
  that	
  he	
  

believed	
  Petitioner	
  was	
  guilty.	
  	
  	
  (R.R.	
  III,	
  pp.	
  174-­‐175)	
  

	
         In	
   its	
   opinion	
   in	
   footnote	
   3,	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   attributes	
   this	
  

line	
   of	
   questioning	
   to	
   Petitioner’s	
   trial	
   counsel’s	
   possible	
   strategy	
   in	
  

trying	
  to	
  demonstrate	
  the	
  bias	
  of	
  the	
  State’s	
  witnesses.	
  	
  	
  However,	
  if	
  this	
  

was	
   true	
   and	
   if	
   trial	
   counsel	
   had	
   truly	
   wanted	
   that	
   information	
   before	
  

the	
  jury,	
  they	
  would	
  have	
  asked	
  the	
  detective	
  directly	
  what	
  his	
  opinion	
  

was	
  as	
  to	
  Petitioner’s	
  guilt	
  or	
  innocence.	
  	
  That	
  never	
  happened.	
  	
  Rather	
  

trial	
   counsel’s	
   inartful	
   questioning	
   opened	
   the	
   door	
   so	
   that	
   the	
   State	
  

could	
  put	
  this	
  inadmissible	
  evidence	
  before	
  the	
  jury.	
  

           Again,	
  footnote	
  3	
  of	
  the	
  Court’s	
  opinion	
  rationalizes	
  that	
  it	
  might	
  

have	
   been	
   trial	
   counsels’	
   strategy	
   to	
   elicit	
   this	
   information	
   in	
   order	
   to	
  

show	
  the	
  bias	
  of	
  the	
  State’s	
  witnesses.	
  	
  However,	
  the	
  record	
  reflects	
  that	
  

when	
   the	
   State	
   asked	
   the	
   detective	
   if	
   he	
   had	
   formed	
   an	
   opinion	
   as	
   to	
  

whether	
  the	
  defendant	
  was	
  guilty,	
  trial	
  counsel	
  realized	
  the	
  mistake	
  he	
  

had	
   made	
   and	
   tried	
   to	
   prevent	
   the	
   detective	
   from	
   answering	
   the	
  

question	
  by	
  voicing	
  an	
  objection	
  of	
  “leading”	
  to	
  the	
  State’s	
  question.	
  	
  The	
  

trial	
   court	
   overruled	
   trial	
   counsel’s	
   objection	
   and	
   the	
   witness	
   was	
  

	
                                                                13	
  
allowed	
   to	
   testify	
   that	
   he	
   believed	
   Petitioner	
   was	
   guilty.	
   	
   (R.R.	
   III,	
   pp.	
  

174-­‐175)	
   	
   Certainly,	
   if	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   was	
   correct	
   in	
   analyzing	
  

trial	
  counsel’s	
  strategy,	
  trial	
  counsel	
  would	
  not	
  have	
  voiced	
  an	
  objection	
  

to	
  this	
  testimony.	
  

       2.     When	
   trial	
   counsel	
   began	
   questioning	
   the	
   lead	
   detective	
  
              about	
  the	
  inadmissible	
  topic	
  of	
  polygraphs.	
  
	
  
            During	
   his	
   cross-­‐examination	
   of	
   the	
   lead	
   detective,	
   Petitioner’s	
  

trial	
   counsel	
   began	
   asking	
   the	
   detective	
   if	
   it	
   was	
   common	
   for	
   law	
  

enforcement	
   to	
   ask	
   defendants	
   to	
   take	
   polygraph	
   examinations.	
   	
   The	
  

State	
  immediately	
  asked	
  to	
  approach	
  the	
  bench	
  and	
  then	
  asked	
  defense	
  

counsel	
   if	
   he	
   was	
   trying	
   to	
   provoke	
   a	
   mistrial.	
   	
   Trial	
   counsel,	
   totally	
  

oblivious	
  to	
  the	
  error	
  is	
  his	
  line	
  of	
  questioning,	
  responding	
  to	
  the	
  issue	
  

of	
  whether	
  he	
  was	
  trying	
  to	
  provoke	
  a	
  mistrial,	
  says:	
  

                    “Are	
   you	
   kidding	
   me?	
   	
   	
   I	
   think	
   we	
   are	
   doing	
   great.”	
  	
  
          (R.R.	
  III,	
  pp.	
  154-­‐155)	
  	
  
                    	
  
A	
   discussion	
   then	
   ensued	
   which	
   showed	
   that	
   trial	
   counsel	
   had	
   no	
   idea	
  

that	
  the	
  topic	
  of	
  polygraph	
  examinations	
  is	
  inadmissible.	
  	
  	
  (R.R.	
  III,	
  pp.	
  

155-­‐157)	
   	
   Certainly	
   a	
   strategy	
   premised	
   on	
   ignorance	
   of	
   the	
   law	
   cannot	
  

be	
  deemed	
  reasonable.	
  	
  	
  	
  

	
          The	
   panel	
   of	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   was	
   in	
   error	
   when	
   it	
   said	
   that	
  

Petitioner’s	
   trial	
   counsel	
   was	
   given	
   no	
   opportunity	
   to	
   explain	
   whether	
  

	
                                                              14	
  
his	
  actions	
  were	
  reasonable	
  trial	
  strategy.	
  	
  	
  As	
  shown	
  above,	
  at	
  least	
  in	
  

two	
   instances	
   during	
   the	
   trial,	
   Petitioner’s	
   trial	
   attorneys	
   were	
  

questioned	
   by	
   the	
   State	
   and	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   as	
   to	
   whether	
   their	
   course	
   of	
  

conduct,	
   while	
   highly	
   improper,	
   was	
   trial	
   strategy.	
   	
   In	
   both	
   of	
   those	
  

instances,	
  Petitioner’s	
  “trial	
  strategy”	
  was	
  not	
  reasonable,	
  was	
  improper	
  

and	
  resulted	
  in	
  severely	
  harming	
  Petitioner’s	
  case.	
  

          Here the failure of the panel of the Third Court of Appeals to conduct

a thorough review of Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

and to hide behind the statement that Petitioner’s trial attorneys did not have

an opportunity to explain their strategy is indefensible.                                         In employing this

excuse and failing to address the merits of Petitioner’s claim, the Court of

Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial

proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals’

power of supervision.                     Tex.R.App.Proc. 66.3(f). This ground for review

should be granted.

	
                                                            15	
  
                    GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER TWO
THE	
   OPINION	
   OF	
   THE	
   COURT	
   OF	
   APPEALS	
   FAILED	
   TO	
   ADDRESS	
  
TRIAL	
   COUNSELS’	
   ERRORS	
   FOR	
   WHICH	
   THERE	
   COULD	
   BE	
   NO	
  
REASONABLE	
   TRIAL	
   STRATEGY,	
   SUCH	
   AS	
   ELICITING	
   EVIDENCE	
   OF	
  
EXTRANEOUS	
   SEXUAL	
   OFFENSES	
   ALLEGEDLY	
   COMMITTED	
   BY	
  
PETITIONER	
   AGAINST	
   THE	
   COMPLAINANT,	
   NOT	
   OBJECTING	
   TO	
  
THE	
   STATE	
   ASKING	
   WITNESSES	
   IF	
   THEY	
   BELIEVED	
   THE	
   ALLEGED	
  
VICTIM	
  WAS	
  TELLING	
  THE	
  TRUTH	
  IN	
  VIOLATION	
  OF	
  TEX.R.EV.	
  608,	
  
OPENING	
   THE	
   DOOR	
   AND	
   ENABLING	
   THE	
   STATE	
   TO	
   ASK	
   THE	
  
STATE’S	
  EXPERT	
  IF	
  SHE	
  THOUGHT	
  THE	
  COMPLAINANT	
  HAD	
  BEEN	
  
ABUSED,	
  NOT	
  KNOWING	
  THE	
  LAW	
  APPLICABLE	
  TO	
  THE	
  CASE,	
  NOT	
  
KNOWING	
   THE	
   RULES	
   OF	
   EVIDENCE,	
   AND	
   NOT	
   KNOWING	
   THE	
  
REQUIREMENTS	
  OF	
  PERFECTING	
  ERRORS	
  FOR	
  APPEAL.	
  
	
  
	
  
         The	
   opinion	
   of	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   also	
   fails	
   to	
   discuss	
   those	
  

errors	
   that	
   are	
   so	
   egregious	
   that	
   there	
   could	
   be	
   no	
   reasonable	
   trial	
  

strategy	
  that	
  would	
  justify	
  trial	
  counsels’	
  actions.	
  	
  As	
  the	
  Third	
  Court	
  of	
  

Appeal	
  recently	
  wrote	
  in	
  Davis	
  v.	
  State,	
  413	
  S.W.3d	
  816,	
  828	
  (Tex.App.-­‐

Austin	
   2013,	
   pet.	
   ref.)	
   “’when	
   no	
   reasonable	
   trial	
   strategy	
   could	
   justify	
  

the	
   trial	
   counsel’s	
   conduct,	
   counsel’s	
   performance	
   falls	
   below	
   an	
  

objective	
   standard	
   of	
   reasonableness	
   as	
   a	
   matter	
   of	
   law,	
   regardless	
   of	
  

whether	
   the	
   record	
   adequately	
   reflects	
   the	
   trial	
   counsel’s	
   subjective	
  

reasons	
   for	
   [his	
   actions].	
   	
   Andrews	
   v.	
   State,	
   159	
   S.W.3d	
   98,	
   102	
  

(Tex.Crim.App.	
   2005).’”	
   	
   The	
   record	
   in	
   Petitioner’s	
   case	
   shows	
   that	
   his	
  

trial	
  counsel	
  committed	
  several	
  of	
  those	
  errors	
  and	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  

	
                                                       16	
  
failed	
   to	
   address	
   them	
   on	
   Petitioner’s	
   direct	
   appeal.	
   	
   	
   These	
   errors	
  

include	
  the	
  following:	
  

       1. Trial	
   Counsel	
   Eliciting	
   Evidence	
   of	
   Petitioner’s	
   Own	
  
          Extraneous	
  Offenses	
  
          	
  
          During	
   cross-­‐examination	
   of	
   Petitioner’s	
   wife,	
   Petitioner’s	
   trial	
  

counsel	
   asked	
   her	
   if	
   Petitioner	
   had	
   ever	
   shown	
   “any	
   proclivities	
  

towards	
   any	
   sexually	
   deviant	
   behavior.”	
   	
   The	
   State	
   fearing	
   that	
   once	
  

again,	
  counsel	
  was	
  about	
  to	
  commit	
  further	
  error,	
  asked	
  to	
  approach	
  the	
  

bench	
   and	
   warned	
   defense	
   counsel	
   that	
   if	
   the	
   witness	
   answered	
  

affirmatively,	
  she	
  would	
  then	
  be	
  able	
  to	
  describe	
  additional	
  extraneous	
  

offenses.	
  	
  	
  Defense	
  counsel,	
  apparently	
  realizing	
  the	
  big	
  mistake	
  he	
  was	
  

about	
   to	
   make,	
   told	
   the	
   court	
   that	
   he	
   would	
   move	
   on.	
   	
   	
   (R.R.	
   IV,	
   pp.	
   114-­‐

116)	
   	
   But	
   a	
   little	
   while	
   later,	
   defense	
   counsel,	
   in	
   what	
   could	
   only	
   be	
  

described	
  as	
  very	
  unreasonable	
  trial	
  strategy,	
  asked	
  the	
  following:	
  	
  

       	
  “So	
   would	
   it	
   be	
   fair	
   to	
   say	
   that	
   prior	
   to	
   these	
   allegations	
  
       that	
  brought	
  us	
  here	
  today,	
  you	
  never	
  suspected	
  that	
  Rudy	
  
       had	
  ever	
  done	
  anything	
  inappropriate	
  with	
  A____?”	
  	
  	
  (R.R.	
  IV,	
  
       pp.	
  120)	
  
       	
  
Petitioner’s	
   wife	
   then	
   proceeded	
   to	
   tell	
   the	
   jury	
   about	
   two	
   other	
  

instances	
   she	
   saw	
   where	
   she	
   believed	
   that	
   Petitioner	
   was	
   having	
   sexual	
  

contact	
  with	
  the	
  child.	
  	
  	
  (R.R.	
  IV,	
  pp.	
  120-­‐121,	
  129-­‐130,	
  134-­‐135)	
  

	
                                                                 17	
  
	
         The	
  opinion	
  of	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  did	
  not	
  address	
  this	
  lapse	
  by	
  

trial	
   counsel.	
   	
   	
   Petitioner	
   asserts	
   again	
   as	
   he	
   did	
   on	
   direct	
   appeal	
   that	
  

there	
   can	
   be	
   no	
   reasonable	
   trial	
   strategy	
   that	
   would	
   justify	
   defense	
  

counsel	
   eliciting	
   two	
   more	
   extremely	
   damaging	
   extraneous	
   offenses	
  

from	
   a	
   State’s	
   witness.	
   	
   	
   There	
   was	
   no	
   need	
   to	
   have	
   Petitioner’s	
   trial	
  

attorneys	
  attempt	
  to	
  explain	
  their	
  trial	
  strategy	
  with	
  respect	
  to	
  this	
  part	
  

of	
   their	
   performance.	
   	
   	
   Case	
   law	
   is	
   clear	
   that	
   defense	
   counsel’s	
  

representation	
  is	
  deficient	
  when	
  he	
  elicits	
  extraneous	
  offense	
  evidence	
  

against	
   his	
   own	
   client	
   which	
   would	
   otherwise	
   not	
   have	
   been	
   admissible	
  

during	
  the	
  guilt-­‐innocence	
  phase	
  of	
  the	
  trial.	
  	
  	
  Davis	
  v.	
  State,	
  supra.	
  

       2.	
  Trial	
  Counsel	
  Failing	
  to	
  Object	
  to	
  the	
  Admission	
  of	
  Extraneous	
  
                Offenses	
  
                	
  
             During	
   the	
   State’s	
   case-­‐in-­‐chief,	
   Petitioner’s	
   wife	
   testified	
  

nonresponsively	
   that	
   Petitioner	
   had	
   a	
   habit	
   of	
   smoking	
   pot.	
   	
   	
   Trial	
  

counsel	
   voiced	
   no	
   objection	
   to	
   this	
   testimony.	
   	
   	
   Instead	
   the	
   State	
  

approached	
   the	
   bench	
   and	
   asked	
   the	
   judge	
   to	
   admonish	
   the	
   witness	
  

about	
   testifying	
   about	
   Petitioner’s	
   bad	
   acts.	
   	
   	
   The	
   State	
   (and	
   not	
  

Petitioner’s	
   trial	
   counsel)	
   also	
  asked	
  the	
  judge	
  to	
  give	
  the	
  jury	
  a	
  limiting	
  

instruction.	
   	
   (R.R.	
   IV,	
   pp.	
   78-­‐79)	
   	
   	
   How	
   can	
   Petitioner’s	
   trial	
   counsels’	
  

	
                                                            18	
  
failure	
   to	
   object	
   and	
   protect	
   their	
   client	
   be	
   reasonable	
   trial	
   strategy?	
  	
  	
  

The	
  opinion	
  of	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  did	
  not	
  discuss	
  this	
  lapse	
  at	
  all.	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

       3.     Trial	
  Counsel	
  Failing	
  to	
  Object	
  When	
  the	
  State	
  Asked	
  Several	
  
              of	
   its	
   Witnesses	
   if	
   They	
   Believed	
   the	
   Alleged	
   Victim	
   was	
  
              Telling	
  the	
  Truth	
  in	
  Violation	
  of	
  Tex.R.Ev.	
  608.	
  
	
  
            The	
  opinion	
  of	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  failed	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  instances	
  

raised	
   in	
   Petitioner’s	
   brief	
   when	
   Petitioner’s	
   trial	
   counsel	
   failed	
   to	
  

object	
  to	
  the	
  State’s	
  repeated	
  violation	
  of	
  Tex.R.Ev.	
  608.	
  	
  	
  This	
  occurred	
  

when	
   the	
   State	
   asked	
   the	
   child’s	
   mother	
   if	
   she	
   believed	
   the	
   child	
   was	
  

telling	
   the	
   truth	
   (R.R.	
   IV,	
   p.	
   180)	
   and	
   when	
   the	
   State	
   asked	
   the	
   child’s	
  

father	
  if	
  he	
  believed	
  the	
  child	
  was	
  telling	
  the	
  truth	
  (R.R.	
  IV,	
  p.	
  186).	
  	
  	
  The	
  

law	
   is	
   clear	
   that	
   a	
   lay	
   witness	
   may	
   not	
   testify	
   to	
   the	
   complainant’s	
  

truthfulness.	
   	
   	
   Schutz	
   v.	
   State,	
   957	
   S.W.2d	
   52,	
   76	
   (Tex.Cr.App.	
   1997);	
  

Fuller	
  v.	
  State,	
  224	
  S.W.3d	
  823,	
  833	
  (Tex.App.-­‐Texarkana	
  2007,	
  no	
  pet.);	
  

Tex.R.Ev.	
  608(a).	
  	
  

            	
  	
  	
  Trial	
   counsel	
   also	
   failed	
   to	
   object	
   when	
   the	
   State	
   asked	
   the	
  

complainant’s	
   counselor	
   Stephanie	
   Watts	
   if	
   she	
   saw	
   any	
   red	
   flags	
   that	
  

indicated	
   that	
   the	
   complainant	
   was	
   fabricating	
   the	
   allegations	
   against	
  

Petitioner.	
   	
   	
   	
   (R.R.	
   V,	
   pp.	
   77-­‐80,	
   85)	
   	
   	
   Once	
   again	
   this	
   was	
   not	
   a	
  

reasonable	
   trial	
   strategy.	
   	
   	
   Had	
   Petitioner’s	
   trial	
   counsel	
   wanted	
   this	
  

information	
   before	
   the	
   jury,	
   he	
   would	
   have	
   asked	
   it	
   of	
   the	
   witness.	
  	
  	
  

	
                                                               19	
  
Instead,	
  he	
  stood	
  quietly	
  by	
  and	
  allowed	
  Watts	
  to	
  testify	
  in	
  response	
  to	
  

at	
  least	
  four	
  different	
  questions,	
  that	
  she	
  believed	
  the	
  complainant	
  was	
  

telling	
   the	
   truth.	
   	
   	
   This	
   was	
   in	
   clear	
   violation	
   of	
   the	
   law.	
   	
   	
   See	
  Yount	
   v.	
  

State,	
   872	
   S.W.2d	
   706,	
   708	
   (Tex.Cr.App.	
   1993);	
   Fuller	
   v.	
   State,	
   supra;	
  

Schutz	
  v.	
  State,	
  supra.	
  	
  	
  	
  Certainly	
  there	
  can	
  be	
  no	
  reasonable	
  strategic	
  

reason	
   to	
   allow	
   the	
   State	
   to	
   violate	
   this	
   clear	
   rule	
   and	
   introduce	
   such	
  

damaging,	
  improper	
  evidence.	
  	
  

       4.     Trial	
  Counsel	
  Opening	
  the	
  Door	
  and	
  Enabling	
  the	
  Prosecutor	
  
              to	
  ask	
  the	
  State’s	
  Expert	
  if	
  She	
  Thought	
  the	
  Complainant	
  Had	
  
              Been	
  Abused.	
  
	
  
            On	
   page	
   51	
   of	
   Petitioner’s	
   brief	
   on	
   original	
   appeal,	
   Petitioner	
  

asked	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   to	
   address	
   the	
   instance	
   where	
   Petitioner’s	
  

trial	
   counsel	
   began	
   cross-­‐examining	
   the	
   State’s	
   expert	
   Melissa	
  

Rodriguez	
   about	
   the	
   complainant’s	
   truthfulness	
   and	
   opened	
   the	
   door	
   so	
  

that	
   the	
   State	
   was	
   able	
   to	
   ask	
   if	
   she	
   believed	
   that	
   the	
   complainant	
   was	
   a	
  

victim	
  of	
  child	
  abuse.	
  	
  	
  The	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  opinion	
  did	
  not	
  address	
  this	
  

lapse,	
   instead	
   relying	
   on	
   the	
   umbrella	
   theory	
   that	
   perhaps	
   it	
   was	
   the	
  

trial	
  attorney’s	
  strategy	
  to	
  argue	
  that	
  of	
  course,	
  all	
  the	
  State’s	
  witnesses	
  

would	
   believe	
   the	
   complainant	
   and	
   therefore	
   were	
   biased.	
   	
   	
   Petitioner	
  

would	
   assert	
   that	
   there	
   was	
   no	
   such	
   reasonable	
   strategy	
   behind	
   trial	
  

counsel’s	
   actions.	
   	
   	
   If	
   that	
   was	
   the	
   strategy,	
   trial	
   counsel	
   would	
   have	
  

	
                                                                    20	
  
asked	
  the	
  State’s	
  expert	
  witness	
  the	
  ultimate	
  question	
   –-­‐	
  did	
  she	
  believe	
  

that	
   the	
   complainant	
   was	
   being	
   abused	
   by	
   Petitioner.	
   	
   	
   Trial	
   counsel	
   did	
  

not	
  do	
  so.	
  	
  	
  

       5.	
  	
  Failing	
  to	
  Know	
  and	
  Apply	
  the	
  Rules	
  of	
  Evidence.	
  
	
  
	
             Beginning	
   on	
   page	
   39	
   of	
   his	
   brief	
   on	
   original	
   appeal,	
   Petitioner	
  

presented	
   two	
   examples	
   from	
   the	
   record	
   that	
   demonstrated	
   that	
  

Petitioner’s	
   trial	
   counsel	
   did	
   not	
   understand	
   the	
   Rules	
   of	
   Evidence	
   or	
  

the	
   law	
   applicable	
   to	
   the	
   case.	
   	
   	
   The	
   first	
   involved	
   one	
   of	
   Petitioner’s	
  

trial	
   attorneys	
   asking	
   a	
   hypothetical	
   question	
   to	
   a	
   non-­‐expert	
   witness,	
  

specifically	
   Petitioner’s	
   wife.	
   	
   	
   The	
   law	
   is	
   clear	
   that	
   hypothetical	
  

questions	
  are	
  to	
  be	
  used	
  only	
  in	
  the	
  examination	
  of	
  experts.	
  	
  See	
  Pyles	
  v.	
  

State,	
   755	
   S.W.2d	
   98,	
   118	
   (Tex.Cr.App.	
   1988);	
   Barefoot	
   v.	
   State,	
   596	
  

S.W.2d	
   875,	
   887-­‐888	
   (Tex.Cr.App.	
   1980).	
   	
   	
   An	
   attorney	
   needs	
   to	
   be	
  

familiar	
  with	
  the	
  rules	
  of	
  trial	
  procedure	
  and	
  evidence	
  if	
  they	
  are	
  going	
  

to	
  effectively	
  represent	
  their	
  clients.	
  

       6.	
  	
  	
  Failing	
  to	
  Know	
  and	
  Apply	
  the	
  Law	
  Applicable	
  to	
  the	
  Case.	
  

               The	
  second	
  example	
  involved	
  the	
  same	
  attorney	
  trying	
  to	
  make	
  an	
  

objection	
   when	
   the	
   State	
   offered	
   into	
   evidence	
   State’s	
   Exhibit	
   25,	
   the	
  

actual	
   interview	
   of	
   Petitioner’s	
   wife.	
   	
   	
   A	
   review	
   of	
   the	
   record	
   shows	
   that	
  

trial	
  counsel’s	
  objection	
  was	
  improper	
  in	
  that	
  the	
  case	
  law	
  cited	
  by	
  the	
  

	
                                                            21	
  
attorney	
   was	
   not	
   applicable	
   to	
   the	
   situation	
   at	
   hand.	
   	
   	
   Trial	
   counsel	
  

objected	
   to	
   the	
   evidence	
   on	
   the	
   basis	
   of	
   Petitioner’s	
   Sixth	
   Amendment	
  

right	
   to	
   confrontation	
   and	
   cited	
   the	
   case	
   of	
   Wall	
   v.	
   State,	
   a	
   2007	
   case	
  

from	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Criminal	
   Appeals.	
   	
   	
   (R.R.	
   IV,	
   pp.	
   127-­‐128)	
   	
   His	
  

objection	
   was	
   overruled.	
   	
   	
   Trial	
   counsel’s	
   objection	
   was	
   not	
   correct	
  

because	
   there	
   was	
   no	
   denial	
   of	
   cross-­‐examination	
   and	
   confrontation.	
  	
  	
  

Petitioner’s	
   wife	
   was	
   on	
   the	
   stand	
   and	
   trial	
   counsel	
   had	
   just	
   finished	
  

cross-­‐examining	
   her.	
   	
   	
   A	
   reading	
   of	
   Wall	
   v.	
   State,	
   184	
   S.W.3d	
   730	
  

(Tex.Cr.App.	
  2006)	
  shows	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  not	
  applicable	
  to	
  Petitioner’s	
  case	
  

because	
   it	
   actually	
   involved	
   introducing	
   a	
   statement	
   of	
   a	
   nontestifying	
  

witness.	
   	
   	
   There	
   was	
   a	
   correct	
   objection	
   to	
   make	
   –	
   namely	
   that	
   the	
  

admission	
   of	
   Petitioner’s	
   wife’s	
   statement	
   was	
   a	
   violation	
   of	
   Tex.R.Ev.	
  

613	
  and	
  Tex.R.Ev.	
  801(e)(1)(B).	
  	
  	
  However,	
  trial	
  counsel	
  failed	
  to	
  make	
  

the	
  proper	
  objection	
  and	
  error	
  was	
  not	
  preserved	
  for	
  appeal.	
  	
  

       7. 	
  	
  Failing	
   to	
   Know	
   How	
   to	
   Object	
   and	
   Preserve	
   Error	
   For	
  	
  	
  	
  
          Appeal.	
  	
  	
  
	
  
           On	
  page	
  45	
  of	
  Petitioner’s	
  brief,	
  Petitioner	
  pointed	
  out	
  an	
  instance	
  

during	
   trial	
   where	
   trial	
   counsel	
   failed	
   to	
   preserve	
   an	
   error	
   for	
   appeal	
  

when	
   the	
   State	
   elicited	
   improper	
   hearsay	
   testimony	
   from	
   Melissa	
  

Rodriguez,	
  the	
  director	
  of	
  the	
  local	
  child	
  advocacy	
  center.	
  	
  	
  Once	
  again,	
  

	
                                                           22	
  
there	
   can	
   be	
   no	
   reasonable	
   trial	
   strategy	
   for	
   a	
   defense	
   attorney	
   not	
   to	
  

preserve	
   error	
   for	
   appeal.	
   	
   	
   And	
   case	
   law	
   holds	
   that	
   failing	
   to	
   make	
   a	
  

motion	
   for	
   mistrial	
   and	
   thus	
   preserve	
   a	
   point	
   of	
   error	
   for	
   review	
   on	
  

appeal	
   “fall[s]	
   below	
   norms	
   of	
   professional	
   conduct.”	
   	
   	
   Kjellerson	
   v.	
  

State,	
   1999	
   Tex.App.LEXIS	
   5344	
   (Tex.App.-­‐San	
   Antonio	
   1999,	
   no	
   pet.).	
  	
  	
  

Despite	
  this	
  holding,	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  opinion	
  failed	
  to	
  address	
  this	
  

lapse	
  by	
  trial	
  counsel.	
  

          These	
   errors	
   were	
   so	
   egregious,	
   there	
   was	
   no	
   way	
   that	
   they	
   could	
  

ever	
  be	
  considered	
  reasonable	
  trial	
  strategy.	
  	
  	
  The	
  opinion	
  of	
  the	
  Court	
  

of	
   Appeals	
   was	
   wrong	
   when	
   it	
   failed	
   to	
   address	
   Petitioner’s	
   claims	
   of	
  

ineffective	
  assistance	
  of	
  counsel	
  due	
  to	
  trial	
  counsel	
  not	
  being	
  given	
  an	
  

opportunity	
   to	
   explain	
   if	
   their	
   actions	
   were	
   part	
   of	
   a	
   reasonable	
   trial	
  

strategy.	
   	
   	
   The	
   opinion	
   of	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   in	
   this	
   case	
   directly	
  

conflicts	
   with	
   another	
   opinion	
   of	
   the	
   Third	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals,	
   Davis	
   v.	
  

State,	
   413	
   S.W.3d	
   816,	
   828	
   (Tex.App.-­‐Austin	
   2013,	
   pet.	
   ref.)	
   and	
   the	
  

Court	
   of	
   Criminal	
   Appeals	
   needs	
   to	
   address	
   this	
   conflict	
   and	
   give	
  

guidance	
   to	
   the	
   Third	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals.	
   	
   	
   Tex.R.App.Proc.	
   66.3(a).	
   	
   	
   In	
  

addition,	
  by	
  failing	
  to	
  review	
  Petitioner’s	
  claims	
  of	
  ineffective	
  assistance	
  

of	
   counsel	
   when	
   there	
   could	
   no	
   explanation	
   of	
   a	
   reasonable	
   trial	
  

strategy,	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  has	
  so	
  far	
  departed	
  from	
  the	
  accepted	
  and	
  

	
                                                            23	
  
usual	
   course	
   of	
   judicial	
   proceedings	
   as	
   to	
   call	
   for	
   an	
   exercise	
   of	
   the	
  

Court	
   of	
   Criminal	
   Appeals’	
   power	
   of	
   supervision.	
   	
   	
   Tex.R.App.Proc.	
  

66.3(f). This ground for review should be granted.

                          GROUND FOR REVIEW NUMBER THREE
THE	
   COURT	
   OF	
   APPEALS	
   FAILED	
   TO	
   PROPERLY	
   ANALYZE	
   THE	
  
PREJUDICE	
  PRONG	
  OF	
  STRICKLAND	
  V.	
  WASHINGTON.	
  
        	
  
        In	
   its	
   opinion,	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   wrote	
   that	
   the	
   Petitioner’s	
  

claims	
  of	
  prejudice	
  were	
  speculative	
  and	
  without	
  support	
  in	
  the	
  record.	
  	
  	
  

Petitioner	
  urges	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  	
  Criminal	
  Appeals	
  to	
  examine	
  the	
  prejudice	
  

prong	
   of	
   the	
   inquiry	
   into	
   ineffective	
   assistance	
   of	
   counsel	
   in	
   his	
   case.	
  	
  	
  

Strickland	
   v.	
   Washington,	
   466	
   U.S.	
   668,	
   104	
   S.Ct.	
   2052,	
   80	
   L.Ed.2d	
   674	
  

(1984).	
   	
   	
   In	
   the	
   recent	
   case	
   of	
   Sandoval	
   v.	
   State,	
   409	
   S.W.3d	
   259,	
   289-­‐

290	
   (Tex.App.-­‐Austin	
   2013,	
   no	
   pet.),	
   the	
   Third	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
  

discussed	
  the	
  “he	
  said,	
  she	
  said”	
  nature	
  of	
  these	
  types	
  of	
  cases.2	
  	
  	
  	
  Just	
  as	
  

in	
   Sandoval,	
   the	
   only	
   direct	
   evidence	
   of	
   a	
   sexual	
   assault	
   in	
   Petitioner’s	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2	
  Interestingly	
  Sandoval	
  was	
  a	
  child	
  sexual	
  abuse	
  case	
  tried	
  in	
  the	
  same	
  county	
  and	
  

with	
   the	
   same	
   prosecutors	
   as	
   in	
   appellant’s	
   case.	
   	
   	
   The	
   Third	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
  
reversed	
  Sandoval’s	
  case	
  because	
  of	
  errors	
  very	
  similar	
  to	
  the	
  errors	
  that	
  occurred	
  
in	
   appellant’s	
   case.	
   	
   	
   	
   The	
   only	
   difference	
   is	
   that	
   in	
   Sandoval,	
   Sandoval’s	
   attorneys	
  
did	
  not	
  commit	
  the	
  error	
  or	
  by	
  their	
  actions,	
  open	
  the	
  door	
  so	
  that	
  the	
  State	
  could	
  
commit	
   the	
   error.	
   	
   It	
   was	
   the	
   State	
   engaging	
   in	
   the	
   improper	
   conduct.	
   	
   Sandoval’s	
  
attorneys	
   preserved	
   the	
   error	
   for	
   appeal	
   and	
   effectively	
   advocated	
   for	
   their	
   client.	
  	
  	
  
In	
  Petitioner’s	
  case,	
  Petitioner’s	
  trial	
  attorneys	
  actually	
  aided	
  and	
  abetted	
  the	
  State	
  
in	
   obtaining	
   a	
   conviction	
   based	
   on	
   improper	
   evidence.	
   	
   	
   	
   It	
   is	
   very	
   hard	
   to	
  
understand	
   how	
   the	
   Third	
   Court	
   can	
   reconcile	
   the	
   result	
   in	
   Petitioner’s	
   case	
   with	
  
the	
  result	
  in	
  Sandoval.	
  	
  	
  	
  Tex.R.App.Proc.	
  66.3(a).	
  

	
                                                                                                        24	
  
case	
   was	
   the	
   complainant’s	
   account	
   in	
   her	
   testimony.	
   	
   	
   Thus	
   the	
   main	
  

issue	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  was	
  the	
  complainant’s	
  credibility.	
  	
  	
  Trial	
  counsel’s	
  task	
  

then,	
   was	
   to	
   present	
   a	
   case	
   which	
   attacked	
   the	
   child’s	
   credibility.	
   	
   	
   What	
  

happened	
   was	
   just	
   the	
   opposite.	
   	
   The	
   complainant’s	
   testimony	
   was	
  

improperly	
  bolstered	
  by	
  trial	
  counsel	
  opening	
  the	
  door	
  for	
  the	
  State	
  to	
  

elicit	
   from	
   the	
   lead	
   detective	
   that	
   he	
   thought	
   Petitioner	
   was	
   guilty,	
  

failing	
   to	
   object	
   when	
   the	
   prosecutor	
   asked	
   both	
   the	
   complainant’s	
  

mother	
   and	
   father	
   if	
   they	
   believed	
   their	
   child	
   was	
   telling	
   the	
   truth,	
  

failing	
   to	
   object	
   when	
   the	
   State	
   elicited	
   from	
   the	
   complainant’s	
  

counselor,	
   Stephanie	
   Watts,	
   that	
   she	
   believed	
   the	
   child	
   was	
   telling	
   the	
  

truth,	
   and	
   opening	
   the	
   door	
   for	
   State’s	
   expert	
   Melissa	
   Rodriguez	
   to	
  

testify	
   on	
   redirect	
   that	
   she	
   believed	
   the	
   complainant	
   had	
   been	
   abused	
  

and	
   then	
   allowing	
   her	
   to	
   continue	
   to	
   express	
   that	
   opinion	
   on	
   cross-­‐

examination.	
  	
  This	
  prejudice	
  was	
  compounded	
  by	
  trial	
  counsel	
  actually	
  

eliciting	
   from	
   a	
   State’s	
   witness	
   (Petitioner’s	
   wife)	
   that	
   Petitioner	
   had	
  

committed	
   two	
   additional	
   extraneous	
   sexual	
   offenses	
   against	
   the	
  

complainant	
   and	
   then	
   failing	
   to	
   object	
   to	
   evidence	
   of	
   the	
   extraneous	
  

offense	
  of	
  smoking	
  marijuana.	
  

          Petitioner	
  urges	
  the	
  Court	
  of	
  Criminal	
  Appeals	
  to	
  grant	
  review	
  in	
  

his	
  case	
  and	
  take	
  a	
  good	
  look	
  at	
  the	
  prejudice	
  he	
  suffered	
  as	
  a	
  result	
  of	
  

	
                                                            25	
  
his	
   attorneys’	
   performance.	
   	
   	
   Petitioner	
   asserts	
   that	
   the	
   opinion	
   in	
   his	
  

case	
  directly	
  is	
  in	
  direct	
  conflict	
  with	
  the	
  Third	
  Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  opinion	
  

in	
  Sandoval	
  v.	
  State,	
  409	
  S.W.3d	
  259,	
  289-­‐290	
  (Tex.App.-­‐Austin	
  2013,	
  no	
  

pet.)	
   and	
   so	
   the	
   Court	
   of	
   Criminal	
   Appeals	
   needs	
   to	
   step	
   in	
   and	
   speak	
   to	
  

this	
  conflict.	
  	
  	
  Tex.R.App.Proc.	
  66.3(a).	
  	
  	
  Petitioner	
  also	
  asserts	
  that	
  the	
  

opinion	
   of	
   the	
   Third	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   has	
   decided	
   an	
   important	
  

question	
   of	
   state	
   and	
   federal	
   law,	
   the	
   question	
   of	
   a	
   defendant’s	
   Sixth	
  

Amendment	
   right	
   to	
   effective	
   assistance	
   of	
   counsel,	
   in	
   a	
   way	
   that	
  

conflicts	
   with	
   the	
   applicable	
   decisions	
   of	
   the	
   Texas	
   Court	
   of	
   Criminal	
  

Appeals	
  and	
  the	
  United	
  State’s	
  Supreme	
  Court.	
  	
  	
  Tex.R.App.Proc.	
  66.3(c).	
  	
  	
  

In	
   Petitioner’s	
  case,	
  the	
  most	
  damaging	
  and	
  prejudicial	
  evidence	
  against	
  

him	
  was	
  admitted	
  only	
  because	
  of	
  trial	
  counsels’	
  mistakes.	
  	
  	
  The	
  State’s	
  

case	
   was	
   not	
   tested	
   by	
   Petitioner’s	
   trial	
   counsel	
   in	
   any	
   way.	
   	
   	
   An	
  

attorney	
  just	
  standing	
  up	
  and	
  going	
  through	
  the	
  motions	
  of	
  a	
  trial	
  does	
  

not	
  equate	
  with	
  effective	
  assistance	
  of	
  counsel.	
  	
  	
  And	
  as	
  can	
  be	
  seen	
  in	
  

Petitioner’s	
  case,	
  can	
  lead	
  to	
  a	
  total	
  collapse	
  of	
  the	
  adversarial	
  process.	
  	
  	
  

This	
  ground	
  for	
  review	
  should	
  be	
  granted.	
  

                                             CONCLUSION	
  AND	
  PRAYER	
  

          In	
   his	
   brief	
   on	
   original	
   appeal,	
   Petitioner	
   argued	
   that	
   his	
   case	
   was	
  

eerily	
  similar	
  to	
  the	
  cases	
  of	
  Fuller	
  v.	
  State,	
  supra	
  and	
  Sessums	
  v.	
  State,	
  

	
                                                             26	
  
129	
   S.W.3d	
   242	
   (Tex.App.-­‐Texarkana	
   2004,	
   pet.	
   ref’d),	
   both	
   of	
   which	
  

involved	
   sexual	
   assaults	
   against	
   children.	
   	
   	
   In	
   both	
   cases,	
   on	
   direct	
  

appeal,	
   defense	
   counsel	
   was	
   found	
   to	
   have	
   rendered	
   ineffective	
  

assistance	
  of	
  counsel	
  where	
  counsel,	
  like	
  Petitioner’s	
  trial	
  counsel,	
  failed	
  

to	
   object	
   to	
   evidence	
   of	
   the	
   complainant’s	
   truthfulness	
   and	
   where	
  

counsel,	
   like	
   Petitioner’s	
   trial	
   counsel,	
   elicited	
   harmful	
   extraneous	
  

offense	
   evidence	
   against	
   their	
   own	
   clients.	
   	
   	
   The	
   appellate	
   courts	
   in	
  

those	
  cases	
  found	
  that	
  there	
  was	
  no	
  reasonable	
  trial	
  strategy	
  that	
  would	
  

have	
  justified	
  such	
  testimony	
  being	
  admitted	
  into	
  evidence	
  where,	
  just	
  

as	
  in	
  Petitioner’s	
  case,	
  the	
  main	
  issue	
  in	
  the	
  case	
  was	
  the	
  credibility	
  of	
  

the	
   complainant.	
   	
   	
   The	
   opinion	
   of	
   the	
   Third	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   did	
   not	
  

even	
  address	
  these	
  cases	
  or	
  try	
  to	
  distinguish	
  them	
  in	
  any	
  way.	
  	
  	
  Petition	
  

for	
   discretionary	
   review	
   should	
   be	
   granted	
   in	
   this	
   case	
   because	
   the	
  

decision	
   of	
   the	
   Third	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   conflicts	
   with	
   the	
   Texarkana	
  

Court	
  of	
  Appeals	
  in	
  Fuller	
  v.	
  State,	
  supra,	
  and	
  in	
  Sessums	
  v.	
  State,	
  supra	
  

on	
  this	
  same	
  issue.	
  	
  	
  Tex.R.App.Proc.	
  66.3(a)	
  

          Likewise,	
  the	
  Texas	
  Court	
  of	
  Criminal	
  Appeals	
  has	
  recognized	
  that	
  

although	
   a	
   single	
   error	
   might	
   be	
   insufficient	
   proof	
   of	
   counsel’s	
  

ineffective	
   assistance,	
   counsel’s	
   performance	
   taken	
   as	
   a	
   whole	
   may	
  

compel	
   such	
   a	
   holding.	
   	
   	
   Ex	
   parte	
   Welborn,	
   785	
   S.W.2d	
   391,	
   396	
  

	
                                                         27	
  
(Tex.Cr.App.	
  1990);	
  Davis	
  v.	
  State,	
  supra.	
  	
  Petitioner	
  asserts	
  that	
  his	
  case	
  

is	
   just	
   such	
   a	
   case.	
   	
   Petitioner	
   asks	
   the	
   Court	
   to	
   grant	
   his	
   Petition	
   for	
  

Discretionary	
   Review	
   and	
   either	
   review	
   the	
   merits	
   of	
   his	
   argument	
   or	
  

remand	
   the	
   case	
   back	
   to	
   the	
   Third	
   Court	
   of	
   Appeals	
   so	
   that	
   it	
   can	
  

conduct	
  a	
  full	
  and	
  complete	
  analysis	
  of	
  his	
  arguments	
  on	
  direct	
  appeal. 	
  

                                                                  Respectfully submitted,

                                                                  /s/ Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez
                                                                  LINDA ICENHAUER-RAMIREZ
                                                                  ATTORNEY AT LAW
                                                                  1103 NUECES
                                                                  AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701
                                                                  TELEPHONE: 512-477-7991
                                                                  FACSIMILE: 512-477-3580
                                                                  ljir@aol.com
                                                                  SBN: 10382944

                                                                  ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

                                CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

       I hereby certify that excluding the following: caption, identity of
parties and counsel, statement regarding oral argument, table of contents,
index of authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues presented,
statement of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, signature, proof of
service, certification, certificate of compliance, and appendix, this petition
for discretionary review contains 3,679 words, as calculated by the word
count function on my computer and is prepared in Times New Roman 14
point font.

                                                                  /s/ Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez
                                                                  LINDA ICENHAUER-RAMIREZ

	
                                                             28	
  
                     CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Petition for
Discretionary Review was e-served to the office of the State Prosecuting
Attorney and to the Hays County District Attorney’s Office on this 3rd day
of June, 2015.

                                     /s/ Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez
                                     LINDA ICENHAUER-RAMIREZ

	
                                 29	
  
                             APPENDIX

Cisneros v. State, 2015 Tex.App.LEXIS 2330, No. 03-13-00206-CR, 03-13-
00207-CR, 03-13-00208-CR, 03-13-00209-CR (Tex.App.-Austin, delivered
March 12, 2015)

	
                               30	
  
Get a Document - by Citation - 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2330                                                                        6/1/15 3:46 PM

                                                           2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2330, *

                                    Rodolfo Cisneros, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee

              NO. 03-13-00206-CR, NO. 03-13-00207-CR, NO. 03-13-00208-CR, NO. 03-13-00209-CR

                                     COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, THIRD DISTRICT, AUSTIN

                                                            2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2330

                                                              March 12, 2015, Filed

    NOTICE: PLEASE CONSULT THE TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE FOR CITATION OF
    UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS.

    PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY, 428TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    NOS. CR-12-0432, CR-12-0433, CR-12-0434, & CR-12-0435, THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HENRY,
    JUDGE PRESIDING.

    DISPOSITION: Modified and, as Modified, Affirmed.

     CASE SUMMARY:

     OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS: [1]-Where defendant was convicted of four counts of aggravated sexual
     assault of a child under Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B), (2)(B), he failed to prove that he
     was denied the effective assistance of trial because the record was silent as to why trial counsel
     made certain decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence; [2]-As defendant did not
     raise the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a motion for new trial, neither defense counsel
     nor the State had been given an opportunity to respond; [3]-The appellate court had the authority
     under Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b) to modify the incorrect judgments to reflect the correct Texas Penal
     Code sections.

     OUTCOME: Modified; and affirmed as modified.

     CORE TERMS: trial counsel, ineffective assistance of counsel, bias, trial strategy, deficient
     performance, putting, sexual, finger, guilt, counsel's conduct, counsel's performance, private part,
     failed to demonstrate, modified, modify, prong, sexual acts, trial record, judgments of conviction,
     clerical errors, failing to object, opportunity to explain, competent attorney, corroborating evidence,
     police investigation, affirmatively, truthfulness, penetrating, probability, speculation

     LEXISNEXIS(R) HEADNOTES
     Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Tests
     Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Burdens of Proof > Preponderance of Evidence
     HN1 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate by a
           preponderance of the evidence both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice
           suffered by the defendant. The appellant must first demonstrate that counsel's

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              performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
              professional norms. The appellant must then show the existence of a reasonable
              probability—one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome—that the result of the
              proceeding would have been different absent counsel's deficient performance. Failure to
              make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats
              the ineffectiveness claim.

     Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Deferential Review > Ineffective
     Assistance
     Governments > Courts > Court Records
     Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > Presumptions > Rebuttal of Presumptions
     HN2 Appellate review of counsel's representation is highly deferential; the appellate court must
           indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was not deficient. To rebut that
           presumption, a claim of ineffective assistance must be firmly founded in the record and the
           record must affirmatively demonstrate the meritorious nature of the claim. Rarely will the
           trial record by itself be sufficient to demonstrate an ineffective-assistance claim. If trial
           counsel has not been afforded the opportunity to explain the reasons for his conduct, the
           appellate court will not find him to be deficient unless the challenged conduct was so
           outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.

     Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > General Overview
     Governments > Courts > Court Records
     HN3 Counsel's deficiency must be affirmatively demonstrated in the trial record; the court must
           not engage in retrospective speculation.

     Governments > Courts > Court Records
     Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > General Overview
     Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > Presumptions > General Overview
     Evidence > General Overview
     HN4 Absent record evidence regarding counsels' strategy or reasoning, the appellate court will
           presume they exercised reasonable professional judgment.

     Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Trials
     HN5 The mere fact that another attorney might have pursued a different tactic at trial does not
           suffice to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

     Governments > Courts > Court Records
     Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Trials
     HN6 Unless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel's conduct was not the
           product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should presume that
           trial counsel's performance was constitutionally adequate unless the challenged conduct
           was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.

     Evidence > Testimony > Credibility > General Overview
     Evidence > Testimony > Lay Witnesses > Ultimate Issue
     HN7 Witnesses are not permitted to testify as to their opinion about the guilt or innocence of a
           defendant, or the credibility of a complainant or the truthfulness of a complainant's
           allegations.

     Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Tests
     HN8 An appellant's failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court's need to
           consider the other prong.

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     Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials > Defendant's Rights > Right to Fair Trial
     Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Tests
     HN9 Even if an appellant shows that particular errors of counsel were unreasonable, he must
           further show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense. It is not sufficient
           that a defendant show, with the benefit of hindsight, that his counsel's actions or omissions
           during trial were of questionable competence. Merely showing that the errors had some
           conceivable effect on the proceedings will not suffice. Instead, he must prove that
           counsel's errors, judged by the totality of the representation, not by isolated instances of
           error or by a portion of the trial, denied him a fair trial.

     Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > General Overview
     HN10 An accused is not entitled to entirely errorless representation, and the appellate court
            looks to the totality of the representation in gauging the adequacy of counsel's
            performance.

     Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Procedures > Records on Appeal
     Governments > Courts > Authority to Adjudicate
     HN11 The appellate court has authority to modify incorrect judgments when the necessary
            information is available to do so. Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b).

    COUNSEL: For Appellant: Ms. Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez, Attorney At Law, Austin, TX.

    For State: Ms. Angie D. Roberts-Huckaby, Assistant Criminal District Attorney Hays County
    Government Center, San Marcos, TX.

    JUDGES: Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin, and Field.

    OPINION BY: Melissa Goodwin

     OPINION

    MEMORANDUM OPINION

    A jury found appellant Rodolfo Cisneros guilty of four counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child for
    sexually abusing his step granddaughter, A.D., when she was five.1 See Tex. Penal Code § 22.021(a)
    (1)(B), (2)(B). The trial court assessed appellant's punishment at confinement for 70 years in the
    Texas Department of Criminal Justice for each count, ordering the sentences to be served concurrently.
    See id. §§ 12.32, 22.021(f)(1). In a single point of error on appeal, appellant complains that he
    suffered ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.2 We find no reversible error. However, through our
    own review of the record, we have found non-reversible error in the written judgments of conviction.
    We will modify the judgments to correct the clerical errors and, as modified, affirm the judgments.

     FOOTNOTES

     1 The jury heard evidence that appellant perpetrated various sexual acts against A.D. on multiple
     occasions, including performing oral sex on her ("putting his tongue on her private [*2] part" or
     "licking her hoo ha"), penetrating her sexual organ with his finger ("touching inside her private part
     with his finger"), penetrating her sexual organ with his penis ("putting his private part in her

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Get a Document - by Citation - 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2330                                                                        6/1/15 3:46 PM

     private part" or "putting his hoo ha in her hoo ha"), and penetrating her anus with his finger
     ("putting his finger in her bottom" or "putting his finger in her tail"). Because the parties are
     familiar with the facts of the case, its procedural history, and the evidence adduced at trial, we do
     not recite them in this opinion except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court's decision and
     the basic reasons for it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1, 47.4.

     2   Appellant was represented by two different attorneys at trial.

    DISCUSSION

    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    In his sole point of error, appellant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at
    trial. He complains of multiple actions or inactions on the part of trial counsel, including propounding
    certain questions to the investigating detective, failing to object to or eliciting extraneous misconduct
    evidence, failing to preserve error regarding hearsay evidence, lacking familiarity "with the Rules of
    Evidence, Proper Trial Procedure, and [*3] the Law in General," and eliciting, failing to object to, or
    purportedly opening the door to testimony from the State's witnesses about appellant's guilt or A.D.'s
    credibility.

    HN1   To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate by a preponderance
    of the evidence both deficient performance by counsel and prejudice suffered by the defendant.
    Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Nava v. State,
    415 S.W.3d 289, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The appellant must first demonstrate that counsel's
    performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 307. The appellant must then show the existence
    of a reasonable probability—one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome—that the result of
    the proceeding would have been different absent counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S.
    at 694; Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 308. Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance
    or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700; see Perez v.
    State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

    HN2    Appellate review of counsel's representation is highly deferential; we must "indulge in a strong
    presumption that counsel's conduct was not deficient." Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 307—08; see Strickland,
466 U.S. at 686. To rebut that presumption, a claim of ineffective assistance must be "firmly founded
    in the record" and "the record must affirmatively demonstrate" [*4] the meritorious nature of the
    claim. See Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Goodspeed v. State, 187
S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Rarely will the trial record by itself be sufficient to
    demonstrate an ineffective-assistance claim. Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 308. If trial counsel has not been
    afforded the opportunity to explain the reasons for his conduct, we will not find him to be deficient
    unless the challenged conduct was "so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in
    it." Id. (quoting Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593); Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392.

    In this case, appellant filed a motion for new trial. However, he did not raise a claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel in the motion. Thus, the record is silent as to why trial counsel acted or failed to
    act in the manner that appellant now complains about on appeal. Although at some points during trial
    counsel indicated they were engaging in a particular course of conduct as part of "trial strategy," they
    did not (or were not given the opportunity to) explain what the particular strategy was. Consequently,
    the record before this Court is not sufficiently developed to allow us to evaluate those supposed
    improper actions or failures to act because "[n]either [his] counsel nor the State have been given an
    opportunity to respond to" the claims of ineffectiveness. See Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593. The record

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Get a Document - by Citation - 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 2330                                                                        6/1/15 3:46 PM

    is silent as to [*5] whether there was a strategic reason for counsels' conduct or what the particular
    strategy was. Appellant's repeated assertion that there was no good trial strategy to account for or
    explain counsels' conduct is mere speculation. Such speculation does not constitute a demonstration,
    founded in the record, that no reasonable trial strategy existed. See Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137,
    142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ("HN3 [C]ounsel's deficiency must be affirmatively demonstrated in the
    trial record; the court must not engage in retrospective speculation."); see also Villa v. State, 417
S.W.3d 455, 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ("[C]ounsel's alleged deficiency must be affirmatively
    demonstrated in the trial record.").

    Appellant's trial attorneys were not afforded an opportunity to explain their reasons for the
    complained-of conduct. HN4 Absent record evidence regarding counsels' strategy or reasoning, we will
    presume they exercised reasonable professional judgment. See Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863, 879
    (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref'd); Poole v. State, 974 S.W.2d 892, 902 (Tex. App.—Austin
    1998, pet. ref'd); see also Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 143. Appellant has failed to rebut the strong
    presumption of reasonable assistance because without explanation for trial counsels' decisions, the
    complained-of conduct does not compel a conclusion that their performance was deficient. We cannot
    say that "no reasonable trial strategy could justify" their decision to engage in the complained-of
    conduct.3 See Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 143. [*6] Nor can we conclude that their conduct was "so
    outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it." See Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 592;
    see also Ex parte Jimenez, 364 S.W.3d 866, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ("HN5 The mere fact that
    another attorney might have pursued a different tactic at trial does not suffice to prove a claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel."). Accordingly, we find that appellant has failed to demonstrate
    deficient performance on the part of his trial counsel. See Frangias v. State, 392 S.W.3d 642, 653
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ("HN6 [U]nless there is a record sufficient to demonstrate that counsel's
    conduct was not the product of an informed strategic or tactical decision, a reviewing court should
    presume that trial counsel's performance was constitutionally adequate 'unless the challenged conduct
    was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.'").

     FOOTNOTES

     3 For example, in half of his complaints about trial counsels' performance, appellant criticizes them
     for eliciting, failing to object to, or purportedly opening the door to testimony from the State's
     witnesses regarding their belief in appellant's guilt or A.D.'s truthfulness. Ordinarily, HN7
     witnesses are not permitted to testify as to their opinion about the guilt or innocence of a
     defendant, see Sandoval v. State, 409 S.W.3d 259, 292 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.); Boyde
     v. State, 513 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), or the credibility of a complainant or the
     truthfulness [*7] of a complainant's allegations, see Sandoval, 409 S.W.3d at 292; Schutz v.
     State, 957 S.W.2d 52, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.
     Crim. App. 1993). An argument can be made, however, that counsel engaged in the conduct here
     in order to demonstrate the bias of the State's witnesses. For example, the questions propounded
     to law enforcement officials arguably attempted to highlight the officers' immediate assumption
     that appellant was guilty after hearing about A.D.'s outcry, which led to a failure to conduct a
     thorough or complete investigation. The failure to object to the testimony of A.D.'s family members
     about believing A.D. allowed counsel to emphasize the fact that even though, as they all conceded,
     they trusted appellant and never, throughout their decades-long relationship with him, had any
     reason to suspect he had ever engaged in any inappropriate behavior with children, they
     automatically believed A.D. without any corroborating proof. Opening the door or not objecting to
     testimony from certain experts—the program director from the children's advocacy center, the
     sexual assault nurse examiner, and A.D.'s counselor—afforded counsel the opportunity to highlight
     the limited—and biased—nature of their knowledge and opinions: these individuals admitted they
     were child advocates who were [*8] only familiar with A.D. and her side of the story, having no
     knowledge of appellant or the circumstances of the situation other than from information gained

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     from A.D.

    Because appellant failed to meet his burden on the first prong of Strickland, we need not consider the
    requirements of the second prong—prejudice. Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 144; see also Williams v. State,
    301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ("HN8 An appellant's failure to satisfy one prong of the
    Strickland test negates a court's need to consider the other prong."). Nevertheless, we also find that
    appellant failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice.

    HN9   Even if an appellant shows that particular errors of counsel were unreasonable, he must further
    show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-95; Cochran
    v. State, 78 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.). It is not sufficient that a defendant show,
    with the benefit of hindsight, that his counsel's actions or omissions during trial were of questionable
    competence. Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142-43. Further, merely showing that the errors had some
    conceivable effect on the proceedings will not suffice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; Ex parte Martinez,
    330 S.W.3d 891, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Instead, he must prove that counsel's errors, judged by
    the totality of the representation, not by isolated instances of error or by a portion of the trial, denied
    him a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695.

    In his argument regarding prejudice, appellant [*9] argues that this Court should find prejudice
    because the cumulative effect of the alleged errors demonstrates that his lawyers failed to subject the
    State's case to a meaningful adversarial challenge. He contends that their errors "pervaded and
    prejudiced the entire defense" and their "ineffective performance seriously prejudiced [his] right to a
    fair trial." He claims that "[h]ad defense counsel done their job, the State's case would have been far
    less persuasive and there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the guilt-innocence
    proceeding would have been different . . . [and] a reasonable probability that the trial court would
    have assessed a shorter sentence." These assertions are speculative claims without support in the
    record.

    Appellant maintains that he "did not even receive the minimal standard of advocacy." We disagree.
    During voir dire, trial counsel questioned the members of the jury panel regarding their ability to serve
    on the jury: they discussed important legal concepts such as the presumption of innocence, the State's
    burden of proof, and appellant's Fifth Amendment right not to testify; they explored possible bias or
    preconceptions relating to child sexual abuse cases; they [*10] discussed issues factually relevant to
    the case such as children's knowledge of or exposure to information regarding sex; they asked the
    jurors their views regarding the truthfulness of children; and they discussed potential bias against
    appellant. They also successfully challenged several panel members for cause. Further, the record
    shows that throughout trial counsel presented and developed a defense strategy of a false accusation.
    In support of this defense, trial counsel emphasized, through cross-examination of the State's
    witnesses and in jury argument, the one-sided nature of the State's case, the flawed police
    investigation (including an incomplete SANE exam), the lack of corroborating evidence, inconsistent
    statements from the outcry witness (A.D.'s grandmother), A.D.'s inability to recount details about the
    abuse in her testimony, and the bias of the State's witnesses. Counsel also attempted to provide
    alternative explanations for A.D.'s knowledge of sexual acts, including observing her parents engage in
    sexual acts and obtaining information from her teenage half-brother. During closing argument, trial
    counsel discussed A.D.'s vague responses during her testimony at trial, [*11] the lack of
    corroborating evidence, the rush to assume appellant's guilt by those involved in the investigation of
    the allegations, and the bias of A.D.'s family members and the State's experts. Trial counsel again
    discussed the presumption of innocence, presented sources of reasonable doubt to the jury, and
    reminded the jury that appellant had consistently denied guilt and had cooperated fully with the police
    investigation, even voluntarily providing a sample for DNA testing.

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    HN10   An accused is not entitled to entirely errorless representation, and we look to the totality of the
    representation in gauging the adequacy of counsel's performance. Frangias, 392 S.W.3d at 653. The
    record in this case reveals that trial counsels' trial strategy was to demonstrate that appellant was the
    victim of a false accusation. Counsel focused on the bias of the State's witnesses, the lack of
    corroborating evidence, the inadequate police investigation, and possible alternative sources from
    which A.D. could have obtained information about sex. The fact that this strategy ultimately proved
    unsuccessful—or that appellate counsel disagrees with it—does not render counsels' assistance
    ineffective.

    On the record before us, appellant has failed [*12] to demonstrate deficient performance on the part
    of his trial counsel or that he suffered prejudice because of the alleged errors of counsel. Thus, he has
    not shown himself entitled to reversal based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We overrule
    appellant's sole point of error.

    Clerical Error in Judgments

    On review of the record, however, we observe that the written judgments of conviction in this case
    contain a clerical error. The judgments of conviction state that the "Statute for Offense" is "22.021(a)
    (2), (f)(1) Penal Code." The statute for the offenses as alleged in the indictments here, however, is
    section 22.021(a)(1)(B), (2)(B) of the Penal Code. HN11 This Court has authority to modify incorrect
    judgments when the necessary information is available to do so. See Tex. R. App. P. 46.2(b); Bigley v.
    State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Accordingly, because the necessary information
    is available here, we modify the incorrect judgments to reflect the correct Penal Code section.

    CONCLUSION

    Having concluded that appellant failed to demonstrate that he suffered ineffective assistance of
    counsel, we modify the trial court's judgments of conviction as noted above and affirm the judgments
    as modified.

    Melissa Goodwin, Justice

    Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin, and Field

    Modified and, as Modified, [*13] Affirmed

    Filed: March 12, 2015

    Do Not Publish

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