Court Opinion

ID: 9533692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:33:59.403231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:07.488052
License: Public Domain

STERNBERG, Judge,
dissenting.
The plaintiff moved to revive this unpaid judgment some five months before execution would no longer be permitted. See § 13-52-102(2), C.R.S. (1984 Cum.Supp.). Factual questions concerning the amount of the judgment had to be resolved. Thus, the order reviving the judgment was en-. tered six months after the 20-year time period for revival of judgments had run. Finding that the motion was prosecuted in a timely manner, the court entered its revival order nunc pro tunc to the date the judgment would otherwise have expired. The majority interprets C.R.C.P. 54(h) as requiring a revival order to be entered before the expiration of 20 years following the entry of the judgment. The majority also holds that the trial court’s attempt to enter the order nunc pro tunc to a date within the 20-year period was a nullity. Because I disagree with both of these holdings, I respectfully dissent.
To support its ruling that the order reviving the judgment must be entered within the 20-year time limit the majority relies on three old cases, one from Kansas and two from Oklahoma. However, besides their precedential impotence, these cases are concerned with the interpretation of a type of statute far different from the rule here at issue. Those statutes allowed a one-year period in which to revive a judgment after it had become “dormant.” C.R.C.P. 54(h) does not address the revival of a “dormant” judgment. And, the judgment here at issue cannot be considered “dormant” since, under § 13-52-102, C.R.S., execution could issue on such judgment during the entire 20-year period following entry of the judgment.
In any event, more recent, well-reasoned cases from other jurisdictions support the interpretation I urge: Driscoll v. Konze, 322 S.W.2d 824 (Mo.1959); Michael v. Smith, 221 F.2d 59 (D.C.App.1955); see also Smith v. Carlson, 8 Ill.2d 74, 132 N.E.2d 513 (1956); Thompson v. Cook, 61 Cal.App.2d 485, 143 P.2d 107 (1943).
As noted in Michael v. Smith, supra, the rule which the majority adopts places on a judgment creditor an occasionally impossible task: Deciding how long it will take a matter to proceed to disposition through the courts. When one considers the delays in getting to hearing in our overcrowded trial courts plus the problems of appellate delay, the improbability of being accurate in any such prediction becomes painfully apparent.
Additionally, I would hold that § 13-81-107, C.R.S., specifically provides relief to one in the position of the plaintiff. That statute states:
“If any action or proceeding is begun within the period fixed by the applicable statute of limitations or the periods provided for in this article, then such action or proceeding may be prosecuted to final decision notwithstanding the fact that the period of limitation shall expire after the commencement and during the prosecution of such action or proceeding.
In my view, the period specified in C.R.C.P. 54(h) is covered by this statute. The rule *802must be read in conjunction with § 13-52-102(2). Thus, I am not persuaded by the majority’s holding, and its reliance on Clark v. Glazer, 4 Kan.App.2d 658, 609 P.2d 1177 (1980), that the rule is not analogous to a statute of limitations. The rule and statute being remedial in nature, must be liberally construed. Smith v. Carlson, supra.
Finally, regardless of the correctness of the views expressed above, I can visualize no more appropriate situation for entry of an order nunc pro tunc, than that involved here.
I would affirm the order of the trial court.