Court Opinion

ID: 9760517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:58:38.42536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:13.185876
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
dissenting.
This is not an ordinary case as where litigants come to resolve controversy among themselves. This case requires this Court to define its powers put to question by Judges of the First Judicial District. Any resolution will affect the function of both parties and directly the public interest. The majority has chosen to rest not only upon their power but exclusively upon their own resources in deciding who should prevail.
I dissent because all the resources available by briefing and public argument should be pressed to service. To decide without argument and further briefing on a matter of such importance can prove an uneven contest under such circumstances. I do not question the supervisory authority of the Supreme Court, I believe, however, that that supervisory authority must be exercised under constitutional paradigms. Good intentions are not necessarily constitutional equivalents.
*466In denying the relief sought in the petition of the Board of Judges of Philadelphia County, the majority contends that “petitioners fail to appreciate the distinction between the duties of a president judge and the duties of administrative judges of the divisions of a court of common pleas. Administrative judges have, since 1980, been appointed by the Supreme Court, and are charged with the administration of their respective divisions. To dispel any vagueness in this distinction, this court entered a directive on April 11, 1986, at No. 55 Judicial Administration Docket No. 1, Eastern District, which specifically defined the duties of administrative judges.” Per Curiam Opinion at 6.
After researching the mechanics of the changes in the selection process and duties of administrative judges, I am compelled to conclude, for the reasons set forth below, that on a previous occasion this Court has unconstitutionally changed the structure of the Philadelphia court system, which now form the underpinning which is in part relied upon by the majority.
In 1968, the people of the Commonwealth approved extensive changes to the Constitution of 1874, including the complete repeal of Article V, The Judiciary, and the adoption of a new Article V. The new Article established our current unified judicial system. As part of the new Article, an implementing Schedule was approved by the electorate. The introductory paragraph of the Schedule provides as follows:
“This schedule is a part of this judiciary article, and it is intended that the provisions contained herein shall have the same force and effect as those contained in the numbered sections of the article.” 1
These are obvious words of mandate that should not be abrogated or interpreted without full argument. To do less is to indulge in the exercise of unlimited power. The *467Schedule, for the most part, delineated the particular structures, powers and jurisdictions of the courts of the City of Philadelphia, Allegheny County and the rest of the Commonwealth.
Section 16 of the Schedule addressed the City of Philadelphia and provided, in relevant part, as follows:
Sec. 16 Courts and judges.
Until otherwise provided by law: ...
(g) Each division of the court of common pleas shall be presided over by an administrative judge, who shall be one of its judges and shall be elected for a term of five years by a majority vote of the judges of that division. He shall assist the president judge in supervising the judicial business of the court and shall be responsible to him.... (emphasis supplied)
Pa.Constitution, Schedule Article 5 § 16.
In 1972, this Court adopted the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration, including Rule 706(d) which addressed the office of administrative judge statewide and provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
(d) Divisions of a court. Each division of a court having three or more divisions shall be presided over by an administrative judge, who shall be one of the judges of the division and who shall be selected for a five year term by the members of the court assigned to the division and eligible to vote thereon pursuant to Rule 702.
Pa.RJ.A. 706(d)-1972.
As is readily apparent, the language of Rule 706(d), which was intended to have statewide application, tracked the language of Section 16(g) of the Constitutional Schedule, which only related to the Philadelphia courts. Accordingly, the original Rule 706, adopted in 1973, was harmonious with the Constitutional Schedule because it did not alter the authority of the President Judge.
In 1978, the Legislature passed the Judiciary Act Repeal-er Act (JARA),2 which became part of the Judicial Code.3 A *468portion of JARA purported to suspend and supersede many of the Sections of the Constitutional Schedule including much of Section 16 (dealing with the Philadelphia courts), and specifically Section 16(g) (which addressed the election and duties of administrative judges in Philadelphia). Many, if not most, of the purportedly suspended and superseded Sections of the Schedule were replaced in the Judicial Code with corresponding sections or provisions, presumably intended to be consistent with the provisions of the Schedule. Whether the General Assembly did or did not have authority to abrogate the Schedule is a matter that should be argued. The Schedule delineated the hierarchy of authority in Common Pleas Courts. It is certainly arguable whether the General Assembly or this Court could alter that paradigm by providing authority in either the General Assembly or this Court to run the courts as suits their pleasure. The people in voting for the Constitution apparently thought otherwise. How local courts operate was obviously an important issue and the answer equally clear; they intended that their elected Judges should bear the first responsibility. It is equally arguable that they did not intend this Court or the General Assembly to alter the authority vested in the President Judge by appointment of Administrative Judges invested with power constitutionally reserved to the President Judge.
The Judicial Code did not provide a section or provision corresponding to the selection process for administrative judges in Section 16(g) of the Schedule.4
In 1980, this Court changed Rule 706(d) of the Rules of Judicial Administration to substantially its current form. Rule 706(d) now provides as follows:
*469(d) Divisions of a Court. Each division of a court having three or more judges shall be presided over and administered by an administrative judge, who shall be one of the judges of the court of which the division is a part and shall be selected by the Supreme Court to serve for a term of three years or at the pleasure of the Court. Upon the occurrence of a vacancy in the office of administrative judge, the president judge shall notify the Supreme Court immediately, (emphasis supplied)
Pa.RJ.A. No. 706(d).
Accordingly, by adopting current Rule 706, this Court changed the selection process of administrative judges in Philadelphia from the election process prescribed in the Constitutional Schedule to an appointment process. Subsequently, in 1986, this Court entered the directive referred to by the majority5 which had the effect of changing the constitutionally mandated role of Philadelphia administrative judges from assistants to the president judges to usurpers of their duties and powers. In short, the majority has not only changed the election process to an appointee of their choice, but have clothed him in authority never mentioned in either the Article or its Schedule.
In our constitutional system neither the General Assembly, nor the Courts have the power to adopt laws, rules or regulations in derogation of a constitutional provision. Admittedly, the instant case is complicated by the inclusion of the provisions concerning administrative judges in Philadelphia in a Schedule6 rather than in the main text of the *470Constitution7. However, in Commonwealth v. Pattison, 109 Pa. 165 (1885) we treated a schedule as being of constitutional stature in holding that a contradictory legislative act was invalid: “The single question presented by this record is whether, under the admitted facts, the Constitution prescribes a rule for determining which of the present judges of the Third Judicial District should be commissioned as president of the several courts therein. If it does, every Act of Assembly inconsistent therewith must yield.” Id. at 169.8
In the instant case, under the rationale employed in Pattison, the purported suspension and superseding by the General Assembly of Section 16(g) of the Constitutional Schedule in JARA was invalid, absent the adoption of a legislative provision consistent with the selection provisions of Section 16(g). Similarly, the current form of Rule 706(d) and the 1986 directive are equally infirm because they are in derogation of the original provisions of the Schedule relating to the election of Philadelphia administrative judges by their peers and their constitutionally prescribed role as assistants to the president judges. I am not persuaded by the majority’s argument that the introductory language of the Schedule, i.e. “Until otherwise provided ... ”, permits the General Assembly or this Court to adopt laws or rules inconsistent with the original provisions. If such were the case, then the General Assembly and/or this Court would have carte blanche power to thwart the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. President Judge Blake was elected pursuant to the intention of the Constitution. His authority and responsibility are clearly defined. To select others (administrative judges) to do what *471the Constitution requires from him, is action that in the least of fairness requires a hearing.
NIX, C.J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. Unless a schedule intends its concepts be incorporated in any following action, it is an ambiguous and misleading device. Otherwise, it solicits votes under one flag, to float another after the votes are counted. For any authority to give less than it says and intends is deception.

. Act 1978, April 28, P.L. 202, No. 53.

. Act 1976, July 9, P.L. 586, No. 142, now 42 Pa.C.S. 101 et seq.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 953, however, does address the duties formerly contained in Section 16(g) in a manner consistent with the Schedule, to wit,
"§ 953. Administrative judge of divisions.
Each division of a court of common pleas shall have an administrative judge who shall assist the president judge of the court in supervising and administering the business of the court and shall be responsible to him.” (emphasis supplied)

. April 11, 1986, at No. 55 Judicial Administration Docket No. 1, Eastern District, 509 Pa. XLI, 506 A.2d LI (1986).

. In 1844, this Court held,
“What is this schedule? It is a temporary provision for the preparatory machinery necessary to put the principles of the amendments in motion without disorder or collision. Its purpose was not to control those principles by the happening of an event, but to carry the whole into effect without break or interval. Its use was merely to shift the machine gradually into another track, and, having done its office, it was to be stowed away in the lumber-room of the government."
Commonwealth v. Clark, 7 Watts & Sergeant’s 127, 133 (1844).

. Pennsylvania is almost alone among sister states in using this device.

. The Pattison holding was ultimately overruled in the case of President Judges Determination Cases, 420 Pa. 243, 216 A.2d 326 (1966); however, the court did not contradict the Pattison court's interpretation as to the effect of a constitutional schedule.