Court Opinion

ID: 7814689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:31:27.397798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:34.201122
License: Public Domain

Ed. F. McFaddin, Associate Justice (Concurring). I completely concur with the result reached in this case; but on the matter of the title, I follow a different method of reasoning from that expressed in the majority opinion. The first question decided by the majority is that the appellees were entitled to a rescission of the contract, because the description contained in the deed, proffered by the appellant to the appellees, was indefinite. To me, the description matter seems immaterial. The fact that the appellees went into possession of certain lands clearly showed that they knew what lands they were getting. It would have been very easy to have caused the lands to be surveyed while the appellees were in actual possession. In short, I think the possession taken by the appellees constituted a waiver of any question of insufficiency of description. But, I think the appellees were entitled to a rescission of the contract of purchase because the uncontradicted evidence shows that there was an outstanding one-half interest in the mineral rights; that there was nothing in the written contract that exempted this one-half outstanding mineral interest; and that the appellants failed to prove by the quantum of proof required in such cases— that is, by evidence clear, cogent and convincing — that the original oral agreement was that half of the mineral rights would not go to the appellees. In Orlicek v. Dockins, 224 Ark. 593, 275 S. W. 2d 630, there was an outstanding mineral interest which the seller did not tender to the buyer, and we said: “We do not think that a merchantable title was tendered. ’ ’ So, in the case at bar, there was an outstanding mineral interest that was not tendered by the appellant, and thus the appellant failed to tender a merchantable title. On the reduction of the damages, I thoroughly agree with the majority.