Court Opinion

ID: 9537700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:21:39.649824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:54.349857
License: Public Domain

*443RIGGS, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that this case is controlled by State v. Ohling, 70 Or App 249, 688 P2d 1384, rev den 298 Or 334 (1984). However, the majority so distorts Ohling that I must dissent.
The majority says that
“Ohling does not stand for the proposition that a fence alone is sufficient as a matter of law to exclude casual visitors. Rather, the thrust of our statement in Ohling is that courts must consider all surrounding[1] circumstances, including the existence of a fence, to determine the residents’ intent.” 123 Or App at 440.
The majority does not cite to any page in Ohling, because Ohling says no such thing. Ohling held that
“[gloing to the front door * * * is so common in this society that, unless there are posted warnings, a fence, a moat filled with crocodiles, or other evidence of a desire to exclude casual visitors, the person living in the house has impliedly consented to the intrusion.” 70 Or App at 253.
The majority implies that citizens cannot exclude casual visitors without posted warnings and a fence and a moat filled with crocodiles. The clear import of Ohling, and also of State v. Dixson/Digby, 307 Or 195, 211, 766 P2d 1015 (1988), is that one measure indicating a desire to exclude others can negate implied consent.
Having suggested that property owners who value privacy must take a number of steps to exclude others, the majority next grafts a new requirement onto Ohling: a subjective intent to exclude casual visitors.
“In this society, people may set up a fence with a gate in the front for a variety of reasons. For example, they may want to deny all public access to their property except with consent, by always keeping the gate locked or by posting signs indicating that intent, such as ‘No Trespassing. ’ Or, they may want to keep children or pets off their premises or simply to preserve their seclusion, but nonetheless allow casual visitors to walk through the gate and approach the front door.” 123 Or App at 440-41. (Citations omitted.)
*444Subjective intent plays no role in the Ohling analysis. I may fortify my curtilage with sharpened stakes, cauldrons of boiling pitch and a hundred archers holding crossbows. I may do this for the sole purpose of excluding encyclopedia salespersons or in the mistaken belief that I am the Duke of Northumberland. My subjective intent is irrelevant. The only relevant question is whether I maintain my curtilage in such a way as to imply or express consent to casual visits. That is an objective test. See State v. Dixson/Digby, supra, 307 Or at 211.2
Turning to the facts here, we have neither boiling pitch nor crocodiles, but we do have a trial court finding that defendant had a tall wooden fence and a closed metal gate. Under State v. Dixson/Digby, supra, that is sufficient evidence of a desire to exclude visitors. 307 Or at 211. I would affirm the trial court.

 I assume no pun intended.

 Dixson/Digby concerned the preservation of privacy interests in land outside the curtilage of one’s house. However, when the question is whether a subjective or objective test applies to a landowner’s efforts to exclude casual visitors, no principled distinction can be drawn between Dixson/Digby and this case.