Court Opinion

ID: 9666469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:16:43.7715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:29.186446
License: Public Domain

MAEKMAN, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that plaintiffs notice of intent was sufficient with regard to defendant Kristyn Murry and that defendant Huron Valley Radiology, EC. (HVR) was entitled to a notice of intent. However, I disagree that the notice of intent was sufficient with regard to HVR. The notice of intent did not contain a statement of “[t]he applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant” with regard to HVR, as is required by MCL 600.2912b(4)(b). As this Court explained in Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp (After Remand), 470 Mich 679, 693-694; 684 NW2d 711 (2004) (Roberts IT), a notice of intent must include a “particularized standard for each of the professionals and facilities named in the notices,” which necessarily must indicate “whether plaintiff [is] alleging that [the] defendants were vicariously or directly liable to [the plain*453tiff].” Because the notice of intent here did not include such a statement, it was clearly defective with regard to HVR.
We held in Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57; 642 NW2d 663 (2002) (Roberts I), that a defective notice of intent does not toll the statute of limitations. Because the period of limitations in a medical malpractice action is two years, MCL 600.5805(6), and because the alleged malpractice in this case occurred on June 7, 2001, and the complaint was not filed until November 4, 2003, the complaint was untimely filed, and thus the action against HVR is barred by the statute of limitations. I would affirm the portions of the Court of Appeals opinion that held that the notice of intent was sufficient as to defendant Murry and insufficient as to defendant HVR, but reverse the portions of that opinion that held that the defective notice of intent tolled the statute of limitations and, thus, that a dismissal without prejudice was appropriate. The action against HVR should be dismissed with prejudice.
I. FACTS AND HISTORY
The alleged medical malpractice occurred on June 7, 2001. Plaintiff alleges that Murry, a radiologist working for HVR, “failed to properly interpret and report back the true and correct results of the MRI....” He further alleges “[t]hat as a result of the. . . delay in surgical [intervention, he] has suffered permanent neurologic injury and deficit.” On May 30, 2003, just eight days before the expiration of the two-year period of limitations, plaintiff served defendants Murry and HVR with a notice of intent to file suit. On November 4, 2003, plaintiff filed his medical malpractice complaint against defendants.
*454The trial court denied defendants’ motion for summary disposition. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that because plaintiffs affidavits of merit were defective, the complaint had to be dismissed with prejudice. Potter v McLeary, 274 Mich App 222; 732 NW2d 600 (2007). This Court reversed “the portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint with prejudice, because the dismissal should have been without prejudice as to the affidavit of merit issue.” Potter v McLeary, 480 Mich 915 (2007) (emphasis in the original). We remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendants’ remaining issues. On remand, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs notice of intent was sufficient as to defendant Murry, but insufficient as to defendant HVR. However, the Court of Appeals held that the defective notice of intent tolled the statute of limitations, and thus dismissed without prejudice as to HVR. Potter v McLeary, 278 Mich App 279; 748 NW2d 599 (2008).
In Docket No. 136336, plaintiff appealed the portion of the Court of Appeals decision that held that the notice of intent was defective as to HVR, and in Docket Nos. 136338 and 136339, defendants appealed the portion of the Court of Appeals decision that held that the defective notice of intent tolled the statute of limitations, and, thus, that a dismissal without prejudice was appropriate, and the portion that held that the notice of intent was sufficient as to defendant Murry. In Docket No. 136336, we granted plaintiffs application “limited to the issue whether defendant Huron Valley Radiology, EC., is a ‘health facility or agency’ to which a plaintiff is required to provide notice under MCL 600.2912b(l).” 482 Mich 1004 (2008). In Docket Nos. 136338 and 136339, we held defendants’ application for leave to appeal in abeyance pending the decision in Docket No. *455136336. 756 NW2d 85 (2008).1 Subsequently, in Docket No. 136336, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing “whether, if a defendant professional corporation is not an entity to whom notice is required to be provided under MCL 600.2912b, the applicable statute of limitations, MCL 600.5805(6), was nonetheless subject to statutory tolling provided in former MCL 600.5856(d).” 483 Mich 922 (2009).
II. STANDARD of review
“Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v *456Swafford, 483 Mich 1, 7; 762 NW2d 902 (2009). A trial court’s determination regarding a motion for summary disposition is also reviewed de novo. Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 466; 760 NW2d 217 (2008).
III. ANALYSIS
A. NOTICE OF INTENT
I agree with the majority that HVR was entitled to a notice of intent. The majority concludes that HVR was entitled to a notice of intent because “the action is one sounding in medical malpractice.” Ante at 403. Although I agree that the action here is “one sounding in medical malpractice,” this is only the first step in the analysis to determine whether a notice of intent was required.
MCL 600.2912b(l) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility unless the person has given the health professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.
Because § 2912b(l) only applies to an “action alleging medical malpractice,” the majority is correct that “the first step in the analysis” is to determine whether the action is one “alleging medical malpractice.” Ante at 414. It is undisputed that the action at issue here is such an action, because it “allege[s] an action that (1) occurred within the course of a professional relationship and (2) poses questions of medical judgment outside the realm of common knowledge and experience.” Kuznar v Raksha Corp, 481 Mich 169, 176-177; 750 NW2d 121 (2008), citing *457Bryant v Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr, Inc, 471 Mich 411, 422; 684 NW2d 864 (2004).2
However, despite the majority’s initial recognition that whether this action is one “alleging medical malpractice” is only the “first step in the analysis” in determining whether a notice of intent was required, ante at 414, the majority does not address the second step. Rather, it concludes that “[b]ecause § 2912b(l) clearly requires a claimant to provide a timely NOI before commencing a medical malpractice action, plaintiff was required to provide this [professional corporation] with a timely NOI.” Ante at 419. However, § 2912b(l) requires a notice of intent only if: (a) the action is one “alleging medical malpractice”; and (b) the defendant is a “health professional or health facility.” Despite this clear language, the majority does not address whether HVR is a “health professional or health facility.”3
Nevertheless, I believe that HVR is a “health professional” for the purposes of § 2912b. I reach this conclusion on the basis that plaintiff is seeking to hold HVR vicariously liable for its employee’s alleged malpractice and such employee is unquestionably a “health professional.” In Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp Managers, 467 Mich 1, 11; 651 NW2d 356 (2002), this Court explained that *458under the principle of vicarious liability, “the principal ‘is only liable because the law creates a practical identity with his [agents] (Citation omitted.) Subsequently, in Nippa v Botsford Gen Hosp (On Remand), 257 Mich App 387, 391-392; 668 NW2d 628 (2003), on remand from this Court for reconsideration in light of Cox, the Court of Appeals explained:
For all practical purposes the hospital stands in the shoes of its agents (the doctors).
Thus, we opine that with regard to vicarious liability, medical-malpractice law applicable to a physician is also applicable to the physician’s hospital.... All procedural requirements are applicable to the hospital in the same manner and form as [they are to] the doctor .... This is so because the law creates a practical identity between a principal and an agent....
. . . Vicarious liability imposes a legal fiction on defendant hospital providing that the principal is only liable because the law creates a practical identity with its agents .... The law treats the principal and the agent as sharing a single identity ... [4]
Because, with regard to vicarious liability, “[t]he law treats the principal and the agent as sharing a single identity,” and because, in the instant case, plaintiff is seeking to hold HVR vicariously liable for its employee’s alleged malpractice, and because such employee is unquestionably a “health professional” entitled to a notice of intent, the law treats HVR as also being a “health professional” entitled to a notice of intent.4 5 Therefore, *459plaintiff was required to provide a notice of intent to HVR before commencing a medical malpractice action in accordance with § 2912b.
B. SUFFICIENCY
As discussed above, § 2912b(l) provides, “a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility *460unless the person has given the health professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.” (Emphasis added.) MCL 600.2912b(4) provides:
The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following:
(a) The factual basis for the claim.
(b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant.
(c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility.
(d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged standard of practice or care.
(e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice.
(f) The names of all health professionals and health facilities the claimant is notifying under this section in relation to the claim. [Emphasis added.]
In Roberts II, 470 Mich at 700-701, this Court explained:
Under MCL 600.2912b(4), a medical malpractice claimant is required to provide potential defendants with notice that includes a “statement” of each of the statutorily enumerated categories of information. Although it is reasonable to expect that some of the particulars of the information supplied by the claimant will evolve as discovery and litigation proceed, the claimant is required to ... provide details that are responsive to the information sought by the statute and that are as particularized as is consistent with the early notice stage of the proceedings. .. . This is not an onerous task: all the claimant must do is specify what it is that she is claiming under each of *461the enumerated categories in § 2912b (4). Although there is no one method or format in which a claimant must set forth the required information, that information must, nevertheless, be specifically identified in an ascertainable manner within the notice. [Emphasis in the original.]
In Roberts II, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against a hospital, a professional corporation, an obstetrician, a physician’s assistant, and an emergency room physician. This Court held that the plaintiff must “aver the specific standard of care that she is claiming to be applicable to each particular professional or facility that is named in the notice.” Id. at 692 (emphasis in the original). Because the notice of intent “fail[ed] to indicate whether plaintiff was alleging that these defendants [the hospital and professional corporation] were vicariously or directly liable to her,” the plaintiffs notice of intent failed to allege “a standard specifically applicable to the defendant facilities . ...” Id. at 693. For this reason, Roberts II held that the notice of intent was insufficient as to the defendant hospital and the defendant professional corporation.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals similarly held that the notice of intent was insufficient as to HVK because it did not state the applicable standard of practice or care as is required by § 2912b(4) through (b).61 agree. The notice of intent completely fails to indicate what standard of practice or care plaintiff believes is appli*462cable to defendant HVR, and it does not indicate whether plaintiff is alleging that defendant HVR is directly or vicariously liable to him. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals held, “[t]he standard of care completely fails to make any reference to defendant Huron Valley Radiology.” Potter, 278 Mich App at 284. In fact, the notice of intent as a whole only references HVR twice: once on the first page where it lists the health care professionals and entities to whom the notice of intent is intended to apply, and then again on the last page, where it lists the health care professionals and entities being notified of the action. Because the notice of intent does not contain a statement indicating what standard of practice or care is allegedly applicable to HVR, as is required by § 2912b (4) (b), I agree with the Court of Appeals that the notice of intent is insufficient as to defendant HVR.
Although the majority “question[s] whether Roberts II was correctly decided,” ante at 424 n 32,7 it does not expressly overrule Roberts II because it concludes that this decision is not “dispositive.” It is not dispositive, *463says the majority, because “Roberts II opined that because there was confusion with regard to whether the claim was for direct or vicarious liability, the [professional corporation] was unable to understand the nature of the claims being asserted,” but, “[i]n the case before us, no such potential for confusion exists . . . Ante at 424 n 32. First, that is not what Roberts II held; rather, it held, 470 Mich at 693, 702, that because the plaintiffs notice of intent did not include a statement “indicating] whether plaintiff was alleging that these defendants were vicariously or directly liable to her,” “plaintiff did not fulfill her obligation under § 2912b . . . .” Second, as with Roberts II, a “potential for confusion,” ante at 424 n 32, does exist here because HVR could be sued on the basis of either direct or vicarious liability, or both, and the notice of intent does not indicate on which basis plaintiff intended to sue HVR.
Furthermore, that Roberts II involved a situation in which the notice of intent may have implied that the plaintiff was seeking to hold the defendants directly liable, while the complaint implied that the plaintiff was seeking to hold the defendants vicariously liable, whereas in the instant case nothing can be implied from plaintiffs notice of intent regarding direct or vicarious liability, while the complaint seeks to hold HVR vicariously liable, is a distinction utterly without any significance in this case. The issue here is whether the notice of intent was sufficient as to HVR. Being a professional corporation, HVR could be sued on the basis of either direct liability or vicarious liability. See Cox, 467 Mich at 11, stating that “[a] hospital may be 1) directly liable for malpractice, through claims of negligence in supervision of staff physicians as well as selection and retention of medical staff, or 2) vicariously liable for the negligence of its agents.” MCL 600.2912b(4)(b) requires the notice of intent to contain a statement of “[t]he *464applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant.” Obviously, the “applicable standard of practice or care” would depend on whether the claimant is suing the professional corporation on the basis of direct liability or vicarious liability. Accordingly, a notice of intent must indicate whether the claimant is suing the professional corporation on the basis of direct liability, vicarious liability, or both.
The majority holds that “when vicarious liability is the only claim asserted,” it is unnecessary to “specifically set forth the legal theory of vicarious liability within the [notice of intent].” Ante at 422. However, if the notice of intent does not indicate that the plaintiff is planning on suing the defendant professional corporation on the basis of vicarious liability, how will the defendant know that “vicarious liability is the only claim asserted”? The majority fails to recognize that the whole point of the exercise of a notice of intent is to apprise the defendant of the claims that the plaintiff plans to bring before a complaint is filed. Here, because the notice of intent was silent on the subject, HVR did not know until plaintiff filed his complaint that plaintiff was suing on the basis of vicarious liability. That is, HVR did not know what “standard of practice or care” plaintiff was alleging that HVR breached until plaintiff filed his complaint against HVR. This is most clearly a violation of § 2912b(4)(b).8
*465The majority misunderstands the issue. Contrary to its contention, ante at 425, the issue is not whether HVR “could reasonably be held to comprehend the nature of the claims being asserted against it.” Instead, as Justice YOUNG explains, ante at 446-447, the issue is whether the notice of intent “ (provide[s] details that are responsive to the information sought by the statute ....’” Ante at 446-447, quoting Roberts II, 470 Mich at 701 (emphasis in the original). More specifically, the issue here is whether the notice of intent contains a statement of “[t]he applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant,” as is required by § 2912b(4)(b). Boodt v Borgess Med Ctr, 481 Mich 558, 560-561; 751 NW2d 44 (2008) (“Although the instant notice of intent may conceivably have apprised [defendant] of the nature and gravamen of plaintiffs allegations, this is not the statutory standard; § 2912b(4)[b] requires something more.”). Because the notice of intent at issue here did not contain a statement of the “applicable standard of practice or care” with regard to HVR, the notice of intent did not comply with § 2912b(4)(b).9
*466c. TOLLING
The period of limitations in medical malpractice cases is two years. MCL 600.5805(6). At the time the complaint was filed in this case, MCL 600.5856, in pertinent part, provided:
The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled:
(d) If, during the applicable notice period under section 2912b, a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose, for not longer than a number of days equal to the number of days in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given in compliance with section 2912b. [Emphasis added.][10]
*467In Roberts I, 466 Mich at 59, this Court held that “the statute of limitations cannot be tolled under MCL 600.5856(d) unless notice is given in compliance with all the provisions of MCL 600.2912b.”11 As Roberts 7, 466 Mich at 64, explained, “Section 5856(d) clearly provides that notice must be compliant with § 2912b .. . .” “As a result, the tolling of the statute of limitations is available to a plaintiff only if all the requirements included in § 2912b are met.” Section 2912b(4) states that the notice of intent “shall contain a statement of at least all of the following. . . .” (Emphasis added.) The term “shall” “denote[s] a mandatory, rather than discretionary action.” Roberts I, 466 Mich at 65. The term “all” exemplifies that each and every one of the statements required by § 2912b(4)(a) through (f) must be contained in the notice of intent. Therefore, only a notice of intent that is “in compliance with section 2912b” tolls the statute of limitations and a notice of intent must contain all of the statements required by § 2912b (a) through (f) in order to be “in compliance with section 2912b.”
Because, as discussed earlier, the notice of intent in this case does not contain the statements required by § 2912b (4) (a) and (b) with regard to HVR, it is not “in compliance with section 2912b.” Because the notice of intent is not “in compliance with section 2912b,” the notice of intent does not toll the statute of limitations. And because the period of limitations in a medical malpractice action is two years, MCL 600.5805(6), and the alleged malpractice in this case occurred on June 7, 2001, and the complaint was not filed until November 4, *4682003, the complaint was untimely filed, and the action against HVR is barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, the action against HVR should be dismissed with prejudice.
The Court of Appeals relied on Kirkaldy v Rim, 478 Mich 581; 734 NW2d 201 (2007), to support its conclusion that a defective notice of intent tolls the statute of limitations, and thus a dismissal without prejudice is appropriate. However, this case is significantly distinguishable from Kirkaldy. In Kirkaldy, 478 Mich at 586, this Court held that the filing of a complaint and a defective affidavit of merit tolls the statute of limitations until the affidavit of merit is successfully challenged. This is so because nothing in MCL 600.5856(a), which provides for tolling upon the filing of a complaint,12 or MCL 600.2912d, which requires an affidavit of merit to be filed with a complaint,13 limits tolling to an affidavit that is in compliance with § 2912d. However, § 5856(d) does limit tolling to a notice of intent that is “in compliance with section 2912b.” Therefore, *469while the filing of a complaint and a defective affidavit of merit may toll the statute of limitations, the serving of a defective notice of intent does not.
Justice YOUNG contends that the statute of limitations was tolled with regard to HVR because, although the notice of intent was insufficient as to HVR, it was sufficient as to defendant Murry. That is, he concludes that as long as a notice of intent is sufficient as to one of the defendants, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all of the defendants. I respectfully disagree.
As discussed above, § 5856 provided at the time of the filing of the complaint, in pertinent part:
The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled:
(d) If during the applicable notice period under section 2912b, a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose, for not longer than a number of days equal to the number of days in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given in compliance with section 2912b. [Emphasis added.]
Justice YOUNG is correct that § 5856 does indicate that “more than one statute of limitations can be tolled .. . .” Ante at 442. For example, if multiple defendants receive a notice of intent that is sufficient as to all of them, all of their statutes of limitations are tolled. However, this does not mean that “more than one statute of limitations” is always tolled. Obviously, if there is only one defendant, only one statute of limitations would be tolled, and such a conclusion is not contrary to the reference in § 5856 to the “statutes of limitations.” See MCL 8.3b, which provides that “every word importing the plural number may be applied and limited to the singular number.” Similarly, concluding that a notice of intent only tolls the statute of limita*470tions that applies to the defendant who has actually received a sufficient notice of intent, but not the statute of limitations that applies to the defendant who has not received such a notice, is also not inconsistent with the reference in § 5856 to the “statutes of limitations.” Further, such a conclusion is required by the reference in § 5856(d) to “the applicable notice period under section 2912b,” and “the applicable notice period after the date notice is given in compliance with section 2912b,” because there is no “applicable notice period under section 2912b,” if the notice of intent is not “in compliance with section 2912b.”
As discussed earlier, § 2912b states, in pertinent part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility unless the person has given the health professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.
(4) The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following ....
Accordingly, as this Court held in Roberts I, 466 Mich at 64, a notice of intent only tolls the statute of limitations if the notice contains all the statements required by § 2912b(4). In addition, as this Court held in Roberts II, 470 Mich at 692, the notice of intent must contain all of the statements required by § 2912b (4) as to “each particular [defendant] named in the notice.” (Emphasis added.) That is, the notice of intent only tolls the statute of limitations as to each particular defendant if the notice contains all the statements required by § 2912b(4) as to each particular defendant. Thus, if a *471notice of intent contains all the required statements as to the defendant physician, but does not contain all the required statements as to the defendant professional corporation, the statute of limitations would only be tolled as to the defendant physician because a notice “in compliance with section 2912b” has not been served on the defendant professional corporation and thus there is no “applicable notice period” as to the defendant professional corporation.
Contrary to Justice YOUNG’s contention, § 5856(d)’s reference to “a claim” does not alter the outcome.14 The language “a claim” must be read in context. To which “claim” is § 5856(d) referring? When § 5856(d) is read in its entirety, it is clear that the “claim” to which it is referring is the “claim” that “would be barred by the statute of limitations” “during the applicable notice period under section 2912b.” However, “a claim” would *472not be “barred by the statute of limitations” “during the applicable notice period under section 2912b” where a sufficient notice of intent had not yet been served upon the defendant. Where a sufficient notice of intent had not yet been served upon the defendant, there would be no “applicable notice period under section 2912b” and, thus, there would be no claim that would be “barred by the statute of limitations” “during the applicable notice period.”15 Because I believe that “a claim” in § 5856(d) is referring to “a claim” that would be “barred by the statute of limitations” “during the applicable notice period,” and the claim against HVR would not have been “barred by the statute of limitations” “during the applicable notice period” (because there was no “applicable notice period”), I conclude that the statute of limitations was not tolled as to plaintiffs claim against HVR.16
Moreover, under Justice Young’s analysis, although HVR is not even entitled to a notice of intent because it is a professional corporation, he would hold that under § 5856(d) a notice of intent that does not comply with § 2912b tolls the statute of limitations applicable to *473HVR. That is, he concludes that, although HVR is not entitled to a notice of intent, plaintiff still gets the benefit of notice of intent tolling. This conclusion, in which the defendant is denied the benefit of a notice of intent, and yet the plaintiff is afforded the benefit of an extended period of limitations, is illogical and inconsistent with the statute.17 The whole reason for providing a plaintiff with notice of intent tolling is to compensate for the fact that he or she must file a notice of intent 182 days before filing a complaint. If, however, a plaintiff does not have to file a notice of intent and then wait 182 days before filing a complaint, why should the plaintiff be afforded 182 more days in which to file the complaint?
Justice YOUNG observes that the “majority’s analysis threatens to render the statutory notice procedure nugatory and undermines, if not overrules, this Court’s precedent,” ante at 432, and that it “threatens to deprive a named defendant of the notice that the statutory procedure is designed to provide,” ante at 450. Although I agree with these observations, I believe that the same possibly can be said of Justice Young’s own analysis.18 He concludes that a notice of intent that is sufficient as to one defendant tolls the statute of limitations for all the defendants, regardless of how defec*474tive the notice of intent is as to these other defendants or whether these other defendants were even entitled to a notice of intent in the first place. That is, although § 2912b(4) and Roberts II clearly require the plaintiff to provide all defendants with a notice of intent that is sufficient as to each, and although § 5856(d) and Roberts I clearly limit tolling to notices that are “given in compliance with section 2912b,” Justice YOUNG concludes that a notice of intent that is clearly not “in compliance with section 2912b” as to multiple defendants nevertheless tolls the statute of limitations as to these defendants as long as at least one defendant is given a notice of intent that is “in compliance with section 2912b.” How are other defendants to receive the “notice that the statutory procedure is designed to provide”?19
*475D. RETROACTIVE AMENDMENTS
Although the majority does not address this issue because it concludes that the notice of intent is sufficient, in Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156, 181 n 44; 772 NW2d 272 (2009), the majority concludes that, pursuant to MCL 600.2301, a plaintiff can simply amend a defective notice of intent and such amendment will “relate back to the time that the original [notice of intent] was mailed” or the courts alternatively can simply “disregard any error or defect” in the notice of intent. I respectfully disagree. See Bush, 484 Mich at 194-195 (MARKMAN, J., dissenting). MCL 600.2301 provides:
The court in which any action or proceeding is pending, has power to amend any process, pleading or proceeding in such action or proceeding, either in form or substance, for the furtherance of justice, on such terms as are just, at any time before judgment rendered therein. The court at every stage of the action or proceeding shall disregard any error or defect in the proceedings which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. [Emphasis added.]
As this Court explained in Boodt, 481 Mich at 563 n 4, “§ 2301 only applies to pending actions.” As discussed above, § 2912b(l) provides, “a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility unless the person *476has given the health professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.” (Emphasis added.) Section 2912b(4) states that the “notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following ....” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, as we explained in Boodt, 481 Mich at 562-563, “a plaintiff cannot commence an action before he or she files a notice of intent that contains all the information required under § 2912b(4).”20 Because plaintiffs notice of intent here did not contain all the information required under § 2912b (4) as to HVR, plaintiff could not have commenced a medical malpractice action against HVR.21 Therefore, § 2301 is inapplicable, and plaintiff cannot retroactively amend the notice of intent and the courts cannot “disregard any error or defect” in the notice of intent.
E. MAJORITY PROCEDURES
As noted in n 1 of this opinion, the majority addresses issues that are not even properly before it. In Docket No. 136336, plaintiff appealed the portion of the Court of Appeals decision that held that the notice of intent was defective as to HVR, and in Docket Nos. 136338 and *477136339, defendants appealed the portion of the decision that held that the defective notice of intent tolled the statute of limitations, and thus that a dismissal without prejudice was appropriate, and the portion that held that the notice of intent was sufficient as to defendant Murry. In Docket No. 136336, we granted plaintiffs application “limited to the issue whether defendant Huron Valley Radiology, EC., is a ‘health facility or agency’ to which a plaintiff is required to provide notice under MCL 600.2912b(l).” 482 Mich 1004 (2008) (emphasis added). In Docket Nos. 136338 and 136339, we held defendants’ application in abeyance for plaintiffs application. 756 NW2d 85 (2008). Subsequently, in Docket No. 136336, we directed the parties to file briefs addressing “whether, if a defendant professional corporation is not an entity to whom notice is required to be provided under MCL 600.2912b, the applicable statute of limitations, MCL 600.5805(6), was nonetheless subject to statutory tolling provided in former MCL 600.5856(d).” 483 Mich 922 (2009). However, we never asked the parties to address the sufficiency of the notice of intent as to either HVR or Murry. As a result, the parties did not, in fact, brief or argue these issues. See n 1 of this opinion.
Thus, despite the fact that the parties have not had an opportunity to brief or argue these issues, and, indeed, despite the fact that the issue regarding the sufficiency of the notice of intent as to defendant Murry has been formally obeyed, the majority nonetheless addresses these issues and implicitly overrules Roberts II in the process.22 The majority implicitly overrules *478Roberts II by refusing to follow its holdings: (a) that a notice of intent must indicate whether the plaintiff is seeking to hold the defendant professional corporation vicariously or directly liable, and instead holding that as long as the plaintiff is only going to sue the defendant on the basis of vicarious liability it does not have to indicate this in the notice of intent; and (b) that a notice of intent must contain all the statements required by § 2912b(4), and instead holding that a notice of intent is sufficient as long as the defendant “could reasonably be held to comprehend the nature of the claims being asserted against it.” Ante at 425. The majority does this without so much as a mention of stare decisis. What happened to the view that “[t]he Michigan Supreme Court should not alter the precedent.. . without first hearing oral argument and inviting briefing on it”? Scott v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 482 Mich 1074, 1076-1077 (2008) (KELLY, J., dissenting). Wfiiat happened to the view that by “fail[ing] to comprehend how the skilled advocates in this case could have added anything insightful in the debate over the proper interpretation of. . . precedent. . . the majority undermines the foundations of our adversarial system”? Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 223; 649 NW2d 47 (2002) (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting). Apparently, these views are only pertinent where precedents with which the majority agrees are at stake.23
*479To summarize my concerns with the majority opin*480ion: (1) it addresses issues that have neither been brief nor argued; (2) it addresses an issue that was formally abeyed; (3) it violates one of this Court’s internal rules by reversing the Court of Appeals on an issue that has neither been briefed nor argued, without the required five votes and in the absence of any emergency circumstances; (4) it concludes that HVK was entitled to a notice of intent simply because this is a medical malpractice action and because the words “professional corporation” can be found in § 5838a, without any discussion of whether HVR is either a “health professional or health facility” under § 2912b(l); (5) it concludes that the requirement of § 2912b(4)(a) that the notice of intent contain a statement of the “factual basis for the claim” does not require a statement indicating that the reason that the defendant professional corporation is being sued is because the defendant physician *481was working at the corporation at the time of the alleged malpractice; (6) it concludes that the requirement of § 2912b (4) (b) that the notice of intent contain a statement of the “applicable standard of practice or care” does not require a statement indicating whether the plaintiff is seeking to hold the defendant professional corporation directly or vicariously liable; (7) it relies upon a distinction without any difference to conclude that Roberts II is not dispositive; (8) it questions whether Roberts II was correctly decided with regard to whether a notice of intent must be particularized, leaving the bench and bar at a loss as to whether Roberts II remains good law on this issue; and (9) it implicitly overrules Roberts II’s holding that a notice of intent must indicate whether the plaintiff is seeking to hold the defendant professional corporation vicariously or directly liable and its holding that a notice of intent must contain all of the statements required by § 2912b(4), without any mention whatsoever of stare decisis.
rv CONCLUSION
Although the notice of intent was sufficient as to defendant Murry, it was insufficient as to defendant HVR. As this Court held in Roberts I, a defective notice of intent does not toll the statute of limitations. Because the complaint was filed more than two years after the alleged malpractice occurred, the action against HVR is time-barred. Accordingly, I would affirm the portions of the Court of Appeals opinion that held that the notice of intent was sufficient as to defendant Murry and insufficient as to defendant HVR, but reverse the portions that held that the defective notice of intent tolled the statute of limitations and thus that a dismissal without preju*482dice was appropriate. The action against HVR should be dismissed with prejudice.

 Despite this abeyance, and despite the fact that the parties have not been given an opportunity to brief or argue the issues raised in defendants’ application for leave to appeal (Docket Nos. 136338 and 136339), or even, given this Court’s limited grant order, the issue raised in plaintiffs application for leave to appeal (the sufficiency of the notice of intent as to HVR), the majority addresses the issue raised in plaintiffs application and one of the issues raised in defendants’ application (the sufficiency of the notice of intent as to Murry), and then announces that it is now denying defendants’ application. Only because the majority addresses these issues in its opinion today do I also address these. Contrary to the majority’s contention, ante at 409, neither one of the parties argued the sufficiency of the notice of intent in their briefs filed after this Court granted plaintiffs application limited to a different issue, and only the plaintiff briefly raised the sufficiency issue at oral arguments; defendants did not say anything at all regarding the issue (which was to be expected given that this Court had not granted leave on that issue). The majority contends that “[djefendant [HVR] addressed the sufficiency of the NOI issue extensively in its brief on appeal.” Ante at 409 n 8. However, page one of defendant’s brief states, “This brief concerns the singular issue of whether Appellee, HVR, is entitled to pre-suit notice pursuant to MCL 600.2912b(l).” The only mention thereafter regarding the sufficiency issue is in the “procedural history” section in which defendant describes its bases for its motion for summary disposition. There is no discussion of the sufficiency issue in defendant’s “Argument” section of its brief. Finally, contrary to the majority’s contention, ante at 409 n 8, defendant’s prayer for relief does not “askQ us to decide the remaining issues in plaintiffs application for leave to appeal.” Instead, defendant expressly states that “Plaintiff-Appellant’s Application For Leave To Appeal should be denied.”

 In the instant case, the services provided were unquestionably professional services rendered by a licensed health care professional, i.e., a radiologist, and thus the claims at issue here allege an action that occurred in the course of a professional relationship. I agree with Justice Young that HVR is “subject to medical malpractice liability because a principal sued for the medical malpractice of its agent is sued in medical malpractice.” Ante at 433 n 5.

 I agree with Justice Young, ante at 437, 440, that the majority errs in concluding that HVR is entitled to a notice of intent simply because the words “professional corporation” can be found in MCL 600.5838a. I also agree with him, ante at 435, that HVR is not a “health facility” because it is not a clinical laboratory, a hospital, a nursing home, or any other type of facility listed in MCL 333.20106(1).

 After the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on remand from this Court, this Court denied leave to appeal. 469 Mich 1005 (2004).

 Justice Young concludes that the action against HVR is a medical malpractice action because plaintiff is seeking to hold HVR vicariously hable for the actions of one of its employees who is a health professional, but then overlooks vicarious liability in terms of determining whether HVR is entitled to a notice of intent. Because a medical malpractice *459action can only be brought against “ ‘a person or entity who is or who holds himself or herself out to be a licensed health care professional, licensed health facility or agency, or an employee or agent of a licensed health facility or agency’ who is engaging in or otherwise assisting in medical care and treatment,” Kuznar, 481 Mich at 177, quoting in part MCL 600.5838a(l), either Justice Young’s position is inconsistent with Kuznar and § 5838a(l) or it is internally inconsistent. That is, pursuant to Kuznar, Justice Young must determine that HVR is a “health professional” in order to conclude that this is a medical malpractice action; however, if he were to determine that HVR is a “health professional” for purposes of concluding that HVR can be sued for medical malpractice, he could not then also determine that HVR is not a “health professional” for purposes of concluding that HVR is not entitled to a notice of intent. It simply cannot be both ways. If HVR is subject to a medical malpractice action on the basis of vicarious liability, HVR is entitled to a notice of intent on the basis of vicarious liability. Contrary to Justice Young’s contention, ante at 437, concluding that HVR is a “health professional” for purposes of § 2912b because plaintiff is seeking to hold HVR vicariously liable for the actions of one of its employees who is unquestionably a “health professional,” is not inconsistent with Kuznar’s conclusion that the defendant pharmacy in that case was not a “health professional” because in Kuznar the plaintiff was seeking to hold the pharmacy vicariously liable for the actions of one of its employees who was unquestionably not a “health professional.” That is, Kuznar did not involve the kind of case that we are dealing with here, in which the plaintiff is seeking to hold the defendant vicariously liable for the actions of its employee, who is unquestionably a “health professional.” Indeed, Justice Young’s position is inconsistent with prior caselaw. See, for example, Roberts I, 466 Mich at 59, and Roberts II, 470 Mich at 693, in which this Court held (in thoughtful opinions authored by Justice Young) that because the plaintiffs notice of intent was defective as to the professional corporation, the statute of limitations was not tolled. Why would it matter that the notice of intent was defective as to the professional corporation if a professional corporation is never entitled to a notice of intent in the first place?

 Defendant Murry argues that the notice of intent does not satisfy the requirements set forth in § 2912b(4)(b) through (d). Although I agree with the majority that the notice of intent is sufficient as to defendant Murry, I cannot say that I agree with the majority’s analysis because it provides none. In my judgment, the notice of intent does satisfy § 2912b(4)(b) because it states, “The standard of care required Dr.[] Murry... to correctly read, interpret and report the correct results to the emergency room under the circumstances.” In addition, the notice of intent does satisfy § 2912b(4)(c) and (d) because it states that defendant Murry *462"failed to properly interpret the MRI images and convey accurate information to the emergency room physicians in charge of the patient that night.”

 Specifically, the majority “question[s] whether Roberts II was correctly decided because it adds a requirement not found in the language of the statute; namely, that statements be ‘particularized.’ ” Ante at 424 n 32. Despite the fact then that § 2912b(l) clearly requires a notice of intent to be sent to each defendant, and § 2912b(4) clearly requires the notice of intent to contain certain statements, the majority apparently would prefer to conclude that the notice of intent is not required to contain each of these statements as to each defendant. For example, the majority apparently would hold that if a plaintiff sues both a nurse and a physician for their own direct malpractice, as long as the notice of intent contains the required “applicable standard of practice or care statement” as to the nurse, the notice would be sufficient as to the physician as well. Fortunately, the majority leaves this issue for another day, one that hopefully will not arrive soon.

 The majority concludes that HVR’s claim that plaintiffs notice of intent was defective because it did not indicate whether plaintiff was planning on suing HVR on the basis of direct or vicarious liability is “troubling” because HVR “openly admits knowing and understanding that it is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee, Dr. Murry.” Ante at 423. What I find to be “troubling” instead is that the majority ignores the significant distinction between (a) knowing and understanding that a professional corporation may be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees; and (b) knowing and understanding that someone is planning on bringing a cause of action against the profes*465sional corporation to hold that corporation vicariously liable for the actions of its employees. The majority erroneously equates knowledge of potential liability with knowledge of an imminent lawsuit.

 Although neither the parties nor the lower courts addressed this issue, the majority concludes that § 2912b does not “require!] a claimant to set forth the nature of the relationship between the parties to be sued.” Ante at 421. While I agree with the majority, ante at 421 n 28, that the notice need not allege the “precise nature of the relationship,” i.e., whether there is an “actual employment relationship with the [professional corporation] or... a complex independent contractor arrangement,” the majority fails to recognize that § 2912b(4)(a) does require the notice of intent to contain a statement of the “factual basis for the claim. ” In this case, plaintiff sued multiple physicians, multiple professional corporations, and a hospital. %t, plaintiff’s notice of intent nowhere includes a “factual basis for the claim” against HVR. That is, the notice of intent does not even indicate that the reason that HVR is being sued is because HVR is where Murry was working at during the time of the alleged malpractice. Because *466§ 2912b(4)(a) requires the notice of intent to include the “factual basis for the claim,” and the notice of intent at issue here did not include the fact that Murry was working at HVR at the time of the alleged malpractice, which, indeed, is one of the most important facts in a case in which the claim is based on vicarious liability, I also agree with Justice Young, ante at 447, that plaintiffs notice of intent fails to satisfy § 2912b(4)(a): Contrary to the majority, ante at 422 n 29, summarily naming “Huron Valley Radiology as well as the three individual physicians and ‘their employees or agents, actual or ostensible, thereof ” in the notice of intent does not indicate what the “factual basis for the claim” is. Because I believe that the notice of intent does not satisfy the requirements set forth in § 2912b(4)(a) and (b), there is no need to address whether the notice of intent satisfies the other requirements of § 2912b (4), and the only reason that I even address § 2912b(4)(a) is to respond to the majority’s incorrect conclusion that § 2912b(4) does not “require!] a claimant to set forth the nature of the relationship between the parties to be sued.” Ante at 421.

 The Legislature has since amended § 5856. However, because plaintiffs complaint was filed (on November 4, 2003) before the effective date of this amendment (April 22, 2004), it has no effect on the instant case. See 2004 PA 87, enacting section 1(1) (“[T]his amendatory act applies to civil actions filed on or after the effective date of this amendatory act.”). For a discussion of the amended version of § 5856, see Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156, 189-193; 772 NW2d 272 (2009). (Markman, J., dissenting).

 This portion of Roberts I was decided unanimously with even the dissenting justices agreeing that “to begin the tolling of the .. . statute of limitations, a plaintiff must fully comply with the requirements of MCL 600.2912b. Compliance with the delivery provision of the notice statute alone is insufficient.” Roberts I, 466 Mich at 72 (Kelly, J., dissenting).

 The amended version of MCL 600.5856 provides, in pertinent part:
The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled in any of the following circumstances:
(a) At the time the complaint is filed, if a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant within the time set forth in the supreme court rules.

 MCL 600.2912d(l) provides, in pertinent part:
[T]he plaintiff in an action alleging medical malpractice or, if the plaintiff is represented by an attorney, the plaintiffs attorney shall file with the complaint an affidavit of merit signed by a health professional who the plaintiffs attorney reasonably believes meets the requirements for an expert witness under [MCL 600.2169]. The affidavit of merit shall certify that the health professional has reviewed the notice and all medical records supplied to him or her by the plaintiffs attorney concerning the allegations contained in the notice and shall contain a statement of each of the following....

 Although Justice Young relies on the language “a claim,” this same language is found in the amended version of § 5856, and yet he recognizes that, under the amended version, the notice of intent has to be sufficient as to all the defendants in order to toll all their statutes of limitations. See ante at 443-444. In light of his view that a professional corporation that is not a “health facility” is not entitled to a notice of intent, combined with his view that the amended version of § 5856 only tolls the statute of limitations if the defendant has received a sufficient notice of intent, Justice Young apparently would conclude that a notice of intent that is sufficient as to the defendant physician would toll the statute of limitations as to the defendant physician, but would not toll the statute of limitations as to the defendant professional corporation. Under this view, a plaintiff would have to serve the defendant physician with a notice of intent and wait 182 days to file suit against the defendant physician, but the plaintiff would have to go ahead and file suit against the defendant professional corporation before the period of limitations expired as to that corporation since the corporation would not be entitled to notice of intent tolling. Therefore, the plaintiff would have to file his medical malpractice action against the professional corporation before he filed a medical malpractice action against the physician, if the period of limitations would have expired within 182 days after the plaintiff served his notice of intent on the physician.

 For further discussion of this point, see my dissenting opinion in Bush, 484 Mich at 192-193.

 Justice Young concludes that “there is no textual basis for restricting tolling to a single claim.” Ante at 442-443. However, under his interpretation, there would also seem to be no basis to limit tolling to only those claims relating to the plaintiffs medical malpractice action. In other words, the statutes of limitations for all claims against all defendants in Michigan would seem to be tolled as long as one plaintiff files a proper notice of intent with one defendant. This could hardly have been the intent of the Legislature. Contrary to Justice Young’s contention, ante at 443 n 24, there is a “textual basis for treating subsection (d) of the tolling statute differently than subsection (a) through (c) of the tolling statute.” That is, as discussed above, subsection (d), unlike subsections (a) through (c), limits tolling to “a claim [that] would be barred by the statute of limitations” “during the applicable notice period” if it were not for the “notice [that] is given in compliance with section 2912b.”

 For the same reason that a notice of intent that does not comply with § 2912b does not toll the statute of limitations, a notice of intent that is not required by § 2912b does not toll the statute of limitations. That is, if a plaintiff serves a defendant with a notice of intent that is not required by § 2912b, notice is not “given in compliance with section 2912b,” the plaintiff does not have to wait 182 days to file his or her complaint, i.e., there is no “applicable notice period under section 2912b,” and thus notice of intent tolling under § 5856(d) is not applicable.

 The saving grace of Justice Young’s analysis with regard to tolling is that it apparently would only apply to the former version of § 5856 that is at issue, not to the amended version that is applicable to all actions filed after April 22, 2004. See ante at 444.

 Justice Young contends that “a plaintiffs failure to provide a defendant with a sufficient [notice of intent] still entitles that defendant to dismissal, tolling notwithstanding.” Ante at 443 n 25. However, this interpretation would seem to create a trap for unwary plaintiffs because MCL 600.2912b(6) prohibits the “tacking or addition of successive 182-day periods ....” As this Court explained in Mayberry v Gen Orthopedics, PC, 474 Mich 1, 3; 704 NW2d 69 (2005), “Section 2912b(6) prohibits a plaintiff from giving presuit notice to a defendant multiple times in order to initiate multiple tolling periods that repeatedly extend the period of limitations.” Accordingly, if a notice that was filed within 182 days before the period of limitations would have expired and that is sufficient as to the defendant physician but defective as to the defendant hospital tolls the statute of limitations as to both, and § 2912b requires dismissal as to the hospital (as a result of the defective notice), the plaintiffs next notice sent to the hospital would not toll the statute of limitations (as a result of § 2912b[6]), and thus the plaintiffs action against the hospital would then be barred by the statute of limitations (since there would be no way for the plaintiff to file a sufficient notice and then wait 182 days to file suit against the hospital without the benefit of another 182-day tolling period). That is, what Justice Young gives with one hand (defective notice tolls), he takes away with the other hand (defective notice requires dismissal and plaintiff cannot refile). Assuming that Justice Young’s response to this conundrum is that the original complaint tolls the statute of limitations applicable to the hospital, under *475§ 5856(a) (although the complaint has been dismissed against the hospital), he would then create a situation in which a plaintiff would have absolutely no incentive to file a notice that complies with § 2912b as to the hospital or any other defendant as long as he files a notice that complies with § 2912b as to one defendant, because the statute of limitations would presumably be tolled indefinitely by the complaint that has not been dismissed. The plaintiff would then apparently have an unlimited period of time in which to file a sufficient notice and to refile the complaint against the remaining defendants (or at least until all the claims were dismissed or otherwise adjudicated).

 For further discussion of Boodt, see my dissenting opinion in Bush, 484 Mich at 195, 199-200.

 In Bush, 484 Mich 170 n 26, the majority mischaracterized Boodt as holding that “because no tolling was afforded in the presence of a defect pursuant to § 5856(d), the plaintiffs action was not commenced under § 2912b(l).” However, it was not the lack of tolling that prevented the plaintiffs action from commencing, it was the lack of a notice of intent in compliance with § 2912b. See § 2912b(l) and (4) (“[A] person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice ... unless the person has given . . . written notice . . . [that] contain[s] a statement of at least all of the following... .”).

 “The Court shall not issue any peremptory order unless it is signed by five Justices, except where a majority of Justices conclude that emergency circumstances warrant the issuance of such an order.” Minutes of the Conference on Administrative Matters, Item 2, 2003-31, Internal Rules, July 24, 2003. The majority violates this rule by reversing *478the Court of Appeals on the issue of the sufficiency of the notice of intent as to defendant HVR without briefing or oral argument, and without the requisite five votes, because, although this issue was raised in plaintiffs application for leave to appeal, we granted leave to appeal only as to a different issue.

 For further discussion on the subject of the majority and stare decisis see Petersen v Magna Corp, 484 Mich 300, 388-396; 773 NW2d 564 (2009) (Makkman, J., dissenting), and Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 223-247; 731 NW2d 41 (2007) (Markman, J., concurring). *479Increasingly, the same regard for precedent evidenced in this case towards Roberts II hy the majority, see 462-463 of this opinion, has been reflected toward other disfavored and inconvenient precedents: they are simply ignored. For illustrations of this phenomenon, see e.g., Vanslembrouck v Halperin, 483 Mich 965 (2009), in which the new majority ignored Vega v Lakeland Hosps, 479 Mich 243, 244; 736 NW2d 561 (2007); Hardacre v Saginaw Vascular Services, PC, 483 Mich 918 (2009), in which it failed to follow Boodt, 481 Mich 558; Sazima v Shepherd Bar & Restaurant, 483 Mich 924 (2009), in which it failed to follow Chrysler v Blue Arrow Transport Lines, 295 Mich 606; 295 NW 331 (1940), and Camburn v Northwest School Dist (After Remand), 459 Mich 471; 592 NW2d 46 (1999); Juarez v Holbrook, 483 Mich 970 (2009), in which it failed to follow Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519; 751 NW2d 472 (2008); Beasley v Michigan, 483 Mich 1025 (2009), in which the majority failed to follow Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197; 731 NW2d 41 (2007); Scott v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 483 Mich 1032 (2009), in which the majority failed to enforce Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643; 391 NW2d 320 (1986), and Putkamer v Transamerica Ins Corp of America, 454 Mich 626; 563 NW2d 683 (1997); and Chambers v Wayne Co Airport Auth, 483 Mich 1081 (2009), in which the majority again failed to abide by Rowland.
Chief Justice Kelly contends that “the accusation that the Court has been ignoring precedent is incorrect.” Ante at 429. As Justice CORRIGAN explained in Beasley, 483 Mich at 1029-1030 (CORRIGAN, J., dissenting), in response to this same contention:
Chief Justice Kelly attempts to explain away the new majority’s actions hy sharing her views regarding the prior caselaw that the new majority has otherwise chosen to ignore. But Chief Justice Kelly’s interpretation of a prior case in a concurring statement is not a decision of the Court. More importantly, her argument overlooks the fundamental problem: the new majority’s continuing failure to explain its apparent disregard of this Court’s precedent undermines the predictability and stability of the rule of law.
[T]he new majority offers no articulable reasons whatsoever for its apparent detours from stare decisis. Instead, the majority declines to explain whether — and, if so, why — it is overruling precedent despite the obvious appearance that it is doing so. If it intends to alter legal principles embedded in this Court’s decisions, then the new majority should explain its reasons clearly and *480intelligibly. Instead, the new majority overrules by indirection, or at least leaves the impression that it is doing so, thereby sowing the seeds of confusion and making it difficult for the citizens of this state to comprehend precisely what our caselaw requires. This appears to be an unfortunate return to our predecessors’ past practice of “frequently palying] little attention to the inconsistencies among its cases and declin[ing] to reduce confusion in [the Court’s] jurisprudence by overruling conflicting decisions.” Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 571 n 19 (2005).
See also Rowland, 477 Mich at 226-227 (Markman, J., concurring), for further discussion of the penchant of some justices to ignore inconvenient precedents, thereby “[leaving] intact precedents that were inconsistent with new decisions, essentially allowing future litigants to choose among inconsistent precedents as in columns A and B of a Chinese restaurant menu.”
In the end, there is no shortcut to resolving whether the majority or the dissenting justices are correct in their characterizations of what the majority is doing. We can only identify what we believe to be the questionable decisions of the majority, identify the relevant precedents, and invite the reader to reach his or her own conclusions. [Petersen, 484 Mich at 392 n 47 (Markman, J. dissenting).]