Court Opinion

ID: 9632330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:10:43.536582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:13.276388
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, J.,
dissenting.
In my opinion, the Attorney General’s certified ballot title substantially complies with all applicable legal requirements. ORS 250.085(5). Accordingly, this court should certify it.
A proceeding to review the Attorney General’s ballot title is not an occasion to refine a ballot title or sharpen its message. ORS 250.085(5) provides that, on judicial review of a ballot title,
“[t]he court shall review the title for substantial compliance with the requirements of ORS 250.035, and shall certify a title meeting this standard to the Secretary of State.” (Emphasis added.)
Substantial compliance by the Attorney General with the drafting standards stated in ORS 250.035 is all that is required. See Nelson v. Keisling, 313 Or 212, 214, 830 P2d 591 (1992) (statute requires “no more” than substantial compliance with statutory requirements); June v. Roberts, 307 Or 270, 274, 767 P2d 70 (1988) (“there is more than one way to skin a ballot title”; court may review the Attorney General’s ballot title only for substantial compliance); Kafoury v. Roberts, 303 Or 306, 313, 736 P2d 178 (1987) (“It is not this court’s function to substitute a ballot title of its own choosing for that provided by the Attorney General unless we can say affirmatively that the ballot title provided by the Attorney General ‘does not substantially comply with the requirements of ORS 250.035.’ ”).
Petitioner and the Attorney General are in sharp disagreement about the subject, the result of potential enactment, and the major effects of the measure before the court. On the one hand, petitioner argues that the measure principally concerns legal definitions or concepts of what constitutes, or should constitute, a “family.” Petitioner assumes *132that the legal consequences, for state government and individuals, of adoption of the measure are secondary in importance, as a description of the measure’s subject, to the definitions and concepts of family described in the measure.
On the other hand, the Attorney General argues that the measure’s subject is best described in terms of the legal consequences for state government and individuals of the potential adoption of the measure’s definitions and concepts of a “family.” The Attorney General urges the court to recognize that legal definitions and concepts about virtually any subject are abstractions unless a voter understands their actual impact on government and individuals.
That fundamental disagreement forms the basis for the parties’ dispute over the Attorney General’s choice to incorporate the phrase “governments may approve” into the caption and result statements. Even petitioner’s claim that the Attorney General’s ballot title is “confusing” is little more than an assertion that the ballot title will “confuse” voters because it does not convey petitioner’s view of the measure’s subject.
The court’s task on review is not to decide which side, petitioner or the Attorney General, should prevail in that debate. Rather, in accordance with ORS 250.085(5), the court’s task is to determine whether the Attorney General’s choice to use the phrase “governments may approve” substantially complies with ORS 250.035. Given that standard of review, this court should affirm the Attorney General’s choice.
The phrase “governments may approve” accurately summarizes the substance of section 1 B(l) of the measure, which provides:
“All state and local governments are, therefore, limited in that they may express approval of, promote, sanction or otherwise make acceptable only the will of the people as established in this section.”
In addition to that express restriction, the measure would enact restrictions on the behavior of public employees (section 4) and the operation of public libraries (section 5), and further states in section 6:
*133“The Courts, Legislature and Governor are to most strictly protect the intent of the concepts, and stringently apply the limitations established in this section, resolving any doubt in favor of the concepts and in enforcing the limitations.”
The measure’s incorporation in section 1 B(l) of an explicit textual limitation on the types of families that Oregon “governments * * * may express approval of’ (or “promote, sanction or otherwise make acceptable”) amply supports the Attorney General’s phrasing. In my view, the whole point of this proposed initiative measure is to limit what Oregon governments may do with respect to relationships other than the “family” relationships that the measure identifies. The other textual restrictions cited above serve only to reinforce the measure’s limitations in section 1 B(l) on governmental approval of families that do not fall within the measure’s definitions. Consequently, those additional restrictions simply underscore the correctness of the Attorney General’s choice of words.
The majority sides with petitioner, but its cursory explanation of its reasons for doing so is unpersuasive. The majority rejects the Attorney General’s ballot title because “the thing from which all else flows [ ] is the measure’s definition of‘family.’ ” 325 Or at 127. With respect, that begs the key question: What flows from the measure’s “definition” of family? The Attorney General correctly argues that, in law, “definitions” and “concepts” of sensitive subjects take on genuine significance to voters and petition signers when they learn how new legal “definitions” and “concepts” actually will affect their lives and their government.1 The majority fails to explain why the Attorney General’s choice to disclose the actual impact of the measure, rather than its more abstract definitional features, is a choice unavailable to him under the substantial compliance standard of review in ORS 250.085(5).
*134Apart from the defects in what the majority says about the measure’s subject, I also disagree with how the majority says it in the revised ballot title. ORS 250.035(2)(a) provides that a caption shall consist of “not more than 10 words,” not counting the words “Amends Constitution.” The majority certifies a caption of only 8 words, including the words “specifies effects.” The Attorney General’s caption uses all of the available 10 words. Significantly, the Attorney General also identifies the measure’s principal legal consequence, i.e., the limitation on government approval of other family relationships. The majority’s phrase, “specifies effects,” communicates nothing about the measure’s subject matter or legal consequences. The majority provides no explanation for its use of the uninformative phrase “specifies effects” instead of a true description of the measure’s subject matter. For this additional reason, the Attorney General’s caption better serves to “reasonably identifiy]” the measure’s subject matter in the format contemplated by ORS 250.035(2)(a).
I would certify the Attorney General’s ballot title. Accordingly, I dissent.

 To illustrate the point, consider hypothetical ballot measures that would redefine other terms that carry significant legal and social import, such as “civil rights,” “local control of public schools,” “affirmative action,” “endangered species,” “old growth forest,” “religious freedom,” “equal privileges and immunities,” “aggravated murder,” and “private property.”