Court Opinion

ID: 9373602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:06:07.734038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:42.451607
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     DUWANE SMITH,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          SF-315H-16-0544-I-1

                  v.

     SOCIAL SECURITY                                 DATE: July 6, 2022
       ADMINISTRATION,
                   Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Duwane Smith, Pacific, Washington, pro se.

           Martha A. Boden, Esquire, Seattle, Washington, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his Board appeal of his probationary termination for lack of
     jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were
     not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and
     the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence
     or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not
     available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
     section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this
     appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under
     section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the
     petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s
     final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         On July 26, 2015, the Social Security Administration (the agency)
     appointed the appellant to the competitive-service Legal Assistant position.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 29.      The appellant’s prior Federal service
     included a 4-year, competitive-service appointment to the Medical Support
     Assistant (MSA) position with the Department of the Army. IAF, Tab 4 at 16;
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 20, 23. That appointment was followed,
     without a break in service, by an excepted-service temporary appointment, not to
     exceed 1-year, as a Student Trainee with the Department of Homeland Security,
     Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). IAF, Tab 4 at 16; PFR File, Tab 1
     at 24. Pursuant to a settlement agreement, the appellant voluntarily resigned from
     the Student Trainee appointment in lieu of termination, effective July 13, 2015,
     and ICE purged his personnel file of the termination record. PFR File, Tab 1
     at 25, 30.
¶3         Unaware of the circumstances of the appellant’s resignation, the agency
     appointed him to the Legal Assistant position, subject to a 1-year probationary
                                                                                            3

     period, 13 days after his separation from ICE. PFR File, Tab 1 at 25-26, Tab 3
     at 20; IAF, Tab 6 at 29. Ten months into the appellant’s probationary period, the
     agency   separated    him    upon    determining    that   he   fraudulently    received
     unemployment benefits after becoming employed by the agency. IAF, Tab 1 at 7,
     Tab 4 at 22.      The appellant filed a timely Board appeal, challenging his
     termination on the merits and procedural grounds. IAF, Tab 1 at 2.
¶4         The administrative judge informed the appellant of his jurisdictional
     burden. IAF, Tab 2 at 2-5. In response, the appellant argued that, because he had
     already served a probationary period during his MSA appointment, the Board had
     jurisdiction over his appeal. IAF, Tab 4 at 7. In the alternative, the appellant
     alleged that the Board had jurisdiction over his appeal because his Legal
     Assistant and Student Trainee appointments jointly yielded 1 year of “current
     continuous service” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii), or because he performed
     the same duties at ICE and the agency, his service as a Student Trainee could be
     tacked onto his service as a Legal Assistant under 5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b). IAF,
     Tab 4 at 5, Tab 8 at 9. As alternative bases for Board jurisdiction, the appellant
     alleged that he was a preference eligible who met the definition of “employee”
     under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C) 2 and that his termination was based on marital
     status or preappointment reasons. IAF, Tab 4 at 5-11, Tab 8 at 5, 12.
¶5         In an initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant was
     not an “employee” with chapter 75 appeal rights. IAF, Tab 10, Initial Decision
     (ID) at 4-7.   She then found that he was a probationer who failed to make a
     nonfrivolous allegation that his termination was based on marital status or
     preappointment reasons and dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction without
     holding his requested hearing. ID at 1, 8-9; IAF, Tab 1 at 1.

     2
       This section applies to “an individual in the excepted service (other than a preference
     eligible).” 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C).
                                                                                      4

¶6        The appellant petitioned for review, rearguing the merits of his claim and
     offering additional evidence and arguments. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-16, 20-22, 24,
     29-34. The agency responded by disputing the appellant’s claims and arguing
     that his additional evidence and arguments are not new under 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115(d) because the information was available to him before the
     issuance of the initial decision and could have been raised with the
     administrative judge below. PFR File, Tab 3 at 8-16.

                        DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7        The agency is correct that the Board generally will not consider an
     argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that
     it is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the
     party’s due diligence. Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268,
     271 (1980). However, we have considered the new evidence and arguments to
     the extent that they are relevant to the issue of Board jurisdiction, a matter that
     can be raised at any time during the Board’s proceedings.             Pirkkala v.
     Department of Justice, 123 M.S.P.R. 288, ¶ 5 (2016).
¶8        An “employee,” as defined under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a), may appeal his
     removal from employment to the Board under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75.           5 U.S.C.
     §§ 7701(a), 7512(1), 7513(d); McCormick v. Department of the Air Force,
     307 F.3d 1339, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2002).       For purposes of the competitive
     service, an “employee” includes an individual “who has completed 1 year of
     current continuous service under other than a temporary appointment limited to
     1 year or less.”    5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii).   “Current continuous service”
     means a period of Federal civilian employment, either in the competitive or
     excepted service, which immediately precedes the adverse action at issue without
     a break in service of a workday. Maibaum v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     116 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶ 14 (2011); see Williams v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
     892 F.3d 1156, 1160 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that the Office of Personnel
                                                                                           5

      Management’s regulation defining current continuous employment at 5 C.F.R.
      § 752.402 is entitled to Chevron deference, along with recognizing that while the
      statute uses the term “service” and the regulation uses the term “employment,”
      the court has treated the regulation as interpreting “current continuous service”);
      5 C.F.R. § 752.402. While “current continuous service” need not be in the same
      or similar position for an individual in the competitive service to qualify as an
      employee under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii), a period of employment that
      contains an intervening temporary appointment cannot qualify as “continuous
      service” under the statute. Ellefson v. Department of the Army, 98 M.S.P.R. 191,
      ¶¶ 10, 14 (2005); Williams v. Department of Defense, 96 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶¶ 12-13
      (2004).
¶9          In contrast, for purposes of regulatory tacking onto prior service to
      complete a probationary period, a prior temporary appointment and a single break
      in service that does not exceed 30 calendar days are permissible, provided that the
      prior service was with the same agency and in the same line of work. Sosa v.
      Department of Defense, 102 M.S.P.R. 252, ¶ 9 (2006); 5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b); see
      McCrary v. Department of the Army, 103 M.S.P.R. 266, ¶¶ 10-12 (2006) (finding
      that competitive-service tacking rules apply to excepted-service appointments),
      called into question on other grounds by Francis v. Department of the Air Force,
      120 M.S.P.R. 138, ¶¶ 17-18 (2013).
¶10         Here, the appellant’s 1-year period immediately preceding his termination
      contained: (1) the last 2 months of his 4-month temporary appointment to the
      Student Trainee position, which qualified as a break in service for purposes of the
      “current continuous service” analysis; and (2) an actual 13-day break in service
      between the Student Trainee and Legal Assistant appointments. 3              Williams,

      3
        The appellant’s reliance on the agency’s confusion about the circumstances of his
      resignation from ICE is misplaced. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11 -12, 26, Tab 3 at 20; see
      Winns v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 17 (2017) (observing that the parties
      cannot confer jurisdiction on the Board if none otherwise exists), aff’d sub nom.
      Williams v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 892 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
                                                                                           6

      96 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶¶ 12-13; IAF, Tab 4 at 16, Tab 6 at 18, 29; PFR File, Tab 1
      at 24-25, 28. Therefore, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant
      did not have 1 year of current, continuous service and was not an “employee”
      under section 7511(a)(1)(A)(ii). 4 ID at 6-7; see Maibaum, 116 M.S.P.R. 234,
      ¶ 14; Williams, 96 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶¶ 12-13.
¶11         Analogously, the appellant cannot rely on 5 C.F.R. § 315.802(b) to tack his
      Student Trainee appointment onto his Legal Assistant appointment. Regardless of
      the appellant’s claim that he performed the same duties at ICE and at the agency,
      IAF, Tab 6 at 29; PFR File, Tab 1 at 11, 24, he cannot meet the regulatory
      requirement because these two appointments were with different agencies.
      Ellefson, 98 M.S.P.R. 191, ¶ 16. Therefore, we agree with the administrative
      judge that the Board lacks chapter 75 jurisdiction over the appellant’s removal .
      ID at 5.
¶12         An individual terminated during a probationary period has the right to
      appeal to the Board if the termination was taken for a preappointment reason or
      was based on marital status or partisan political reasons. 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.805,
      315.806(a)-(c). For claims asserting termination on the basis of marital status,
      the Board has indicated that an appellant must provide supporting facts showing
      that the allegations are not merely pro forma.        Clark v. U.S. Postal Service,
      123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶ 7 (2016), aff’d, 679 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017). If an
      appellant’s claim is limited to conjecture about animus toward him as an
      unmarried male, such a claim does not amount to a nonfrivolous allegation of
      jurisdiction. Bedynek-Stumm v. Department of Agriculture, 57 M.S.P.R. 176, 179

      4
        The appellant’s status as a preference eligible does not alter this analysis. While
      subsections 7511(a)(1)(B) and (C), which govern the excepted service, have different
      requirements concerning preference eligible and nonpreference eligible appointees,
      Martinez v. Department of Homeland Security, 118 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 5 (2012); Maibaum,
      116 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶ 9, the provisions governing the competitive service do not
      differentiate between appointees on the basis of their preference eligibility, 5 U.S.C.
      § 7511(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
                                                                                             7

      (1993).     Here, the appellant asserted below that his supervisor “played
      favoritism” with a married coworker. IAF, Tab 8 at 12; PFR File, Tab 1 at 15.
      Because such a pro forma allegation is insufficient, we agree with the
      administrative    judge    that   the   appellant   failed   to   nonfrivolously   allege
      jurisdiction. 5 ID at 9.
¶13         The appellant also argues that he was terminated for a preappointment
      reason because the unemployment benefits he received after becoming employed
      by the agency resulted from an application he filed prior to his agency
      appointment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-15. We disagree. The agency terminated the
      appellant after receiving notice from the Washington State Employment Security
      Department (ESD) that appellant failed to report his earnings from the agency to
      the ESD and had, after his hire, fraudulently received $2,338.00 in unemployment
      benefits.   IAF, Tab 1 at 7, Tab 6 at 21-22.             Therefore, we find that the
      administrative judge correctly found that the appellant’s termination was not
      based on a preappointment reason. ID at 8.
¶14         Because the appellant has not alleged that his termination was based on
      partisan political reasons, and given that his residual claims of due process
      violation, harmful procedural error, and discrimination do not provide an
      independent source of Board jurisdiction, we discern no reason to disturb the
      initial decision. Penna v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶ 13 (2012)
      (finding that, in the absence of an otherwise appealable action, the Board lacks
      jurisdiction over a claim of harmful error, discrimination, or other prohibited
      personnel practice); Burnett v. U.S. Postal Service, 104 M.S.P.R. 308, ¶ 15 (2006)
      (making the same finding as to a due process claim).

      5
        The appellant’s allegation on review that “the married men on [his supervisor’s] team
      left the agency,” detracts from, rather than supports, his claim that his supervisor
      favored married, male employees over single, male employees. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15.
                                                                                         8

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:

6
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                    9

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so , you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
                                                                                10

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     11

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 7   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov . Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       12

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.