Court Opinion

ID: 9444532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:04:28.04499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.895375
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/3/23 P. v. Moustafa CA6
Opinion following rehearing
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H047359
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 Super. Ct. No. B1368888)

           v.

 AHMAD MOUSTAFA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         Following a court trial, appellant Ahmad Moustafa was convicted of multiple
offenses—including torture, sexual penetration, criminal threats, human trafficking, and
spousal battery—against his fiancée and her brother. On appeal, Moustafa argues that his
jury trial waiver was inadequate and that the trial court should have excluded his prior
statements to the police as involuntary or obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona
(1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). Moustafa also argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective because he failed to investigate and present evidence of Moustafa’s mental
disorder, failed to investigate and present evidence of Moustafa’s character for nonsexual
deviancy and nonviolence, and failed to seek sanctions for the police’s failure to retain
the victims’ cell phones. He further argues that the trial court erred under Evidence Code
section 352 by excluding the defense’s proposed expert witness on “black magic” ritual
Islamic practices and evidence that his fiancée’s brother once said that he deserved to be
beaten and that the cumulative impact of his claims of ineffective assistance and the
multiple trial errors require reversal of his convictions. And finally, in a supplemental
brief, Moustafa argues that if the judgment is not otherwise reversed, he is entitled to
resentencing under Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.).
       We consider unreasonable trial counsel’s failure to investigate Moustafa’s known
history of mental illness, given the nature of the charged offenses, but conclude on this
record that Moustafa has not established prejudice. Except for his claim that he is
entitled to resentencing under Senate Bill No. 567, we reject Moustafa’s claims of error.
We reverse the judgment for the limited purpose of resentencing.1
                                   I.    BACKGROUND
A.     The Information and Jury Trial Waiver
       On February 26, 2015, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed an
information charging Moustafa with torture (Pen. Code, § 206; count 1)2, two counts of
sexual penetration by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of bodily injury (§ 289,
subd. (a)(1)(A); counts 2 and 3), human trafficking (§ 236.1, subd. (a); count 4), two
counts of criminal threats (§ 422; counts 5 and 7), and inflicting corporal injury on a
spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 6). As to counts 2 and 3, it was alleged
that Moustafa inflicted aggravated mayhem and torture and personally inflicted great
bodily injury within the meaning of the “One Strike” law (§ 667.61, subds. (a) & (d)).
Moustafa was alleged to have committed counts 1 through 5 against victim John Doe

       1
         We initially filed an opinion in this case on February 28, 2023. On
March 28, 2023, we granted Moustafa’s petition for rehearing and requested
supplemental briefing from the parties. After we granted rehearing, Moustafa filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus (case number H050986), which we have ordered
considered with this appeal. By separate order, we have issued an order to show cause
returnable in the superior court this same day.
       2
           Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                               2
(S.D.) and counts 6 and 7 against victim Jane Doe (A.D.). On November 2, 2017,
Moustafa waived his right to a jury trial and the matter proceeded by way of court trial.
B.     The People’s Case
       1.     S.D.
       S.D. was born in the United States, though his family was originally from
Pakistan. S.D. met Moustafa in 2009 when S.D. was still in high school and living with
his parents in Santa Maria. At the time, Moustafa was dating S.D.’s older sister, A.D.
       Moustafa told S.D. and A.D.’s family that he was from Egypt, but he had
previously lived in France. Moustafa claimed he was a “self-made millionaire” and was
from a prominent family. He said he was the nephew of former Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak, and he had worked for the Egyptian military and the United States Air Force
specializing in interrogating terrorists. He also said he was a United States diplomat and
had diplomatic immunity. Moustafa claimed that he frequently had undercover “men”
surveilling him that protected him and those he cared about. Moustafa described his
“men” as Middle Eastern men who drove SUV’s with black-tinted windows.
       S.D. believed Moustafa’s claims about his family background and employment.
Moustafa sometimes showed him items as proof: a flight suit with Moustafa’s name on
it, a box of M&M’s that had a government seal, and videos of the Egyptian military and
torture. Sometimes, Moustafa would gesture or nod toward men who wore suits, and
S.D. believed that the men made similar hand gestures or nodded back at Moustafa.
       S.D. initially felt some hesitation toward Moustafa—at one point, he falsely
claimed he was in a gang so he could put Moustafa “on guard.” Yet by early 2010, S.D.
started to respect Moustafa and saw him as a mentor or older brother. Moustafa gave
S.D. advice about his personal life and shared that he was then in the process of divorcing
his ex-wife, Lauren.
       After S.D. graduated from high school, he received a scholarship to attend college
in Irvine. During his freshman year in college, S.D. noticed that Moustafa’s “tone”
                                             3
started to change. Moustafa and A.D. frequently broke up and got back together, and
Moustafa seemed angrier—sometimes directing his anger toward S.D. Tensions also
arose between Moustafa and S.D.’s extended family, and Moustafa once threatened to put
a bullet in S.D.’s uncle’s head. Moustafa was violent with S.D. once in November 2011,
when S.D. accompanied Moustafa to an out-of-state marathon. Moustafa became angry
when S.D. failed to meet him at all the marathon checkpoints and, during the drive back,
grabbed S.D.’s neck and slapped him.
      S.D. dropped out of college after a year. His grades were poor, and Moustafa
sometimes lectured S.D. about how he was a disappointment.
      In 2012, Moustafa and A.D., who had graduated from college, moved north to an
apartment in Mountain View. In August of that year, S.D. moved in with Moustafa and
A.D. At the time, Moustafa told S.D. that he was working for the government at the
NASA Ames Research Center and was required to take many trips.
      S.D. initially shared a bedroom with A.D. The room had two beds on opposite
sides of the room. Moustafa slept in a separate room. Over time, S.D. noticed that A.D.
spent more time sleeping in Moustafa’s room instead of in the shared room with S.D.
      Moustafa told S.D. to get a job; otherwise, Moustafa threatened to both kick S.D.
out of the apartment and also keep him under surveillance by Moustafa’s “men.” S.D.
managed to find several jobs, but Moustafa verbally increased his financial pressure on
S.D. He showed S.D. credit card statements and said that S.D. was a burden. All of
S.D.’s paychecks went to Moustafa, and Moustafa started to exercise more control over
S.D., including over his food intake. S.D. was required to call Moustafa “sir,” and
“saeka,” which Moustafa said was an Arabic word for thunder or lightning. Moustafa
called S.D. “Susu,” which Moustafa said meant urine.
      One time, Moustafa force-fed S.D. and afterwards told S.D. he was weak and
should move home. S.D. returned to Santa Maria and lived with his parents for several
weeks. While there, Moustafa called S.D., asked him what he was doing, and told S.D.
                                            4
that his “men” were watching him. Moustafa then told S.D. he was willing to give S.D. a
second chance if S.D. wrote him an apology letter. After S.D. wrote the letter, Moustafa
told S.D. to return to Mountain View, and S.D. complied.
       In January 2013, S.D. came back from work and started to watch a show on his
computer in the room he shared with A.D. S.D. saw that A.D. was sleeping, so he started
to watch pornography and masturbated. When S.D. stood up to change his shorts,
Moustafa opened the door, looked at S.D., and asked him what he was doing. S.D.
replied that he was changing. Moustafa told S.D. to go to bed and closed the door.3
       In February 2013, Moustafa accused S.D. of sexually abusing A.D. He also
claimed that S.D. had “spread[] [S.D.’s] genitals all over [the] living room area,” which
caused Moustafa to develop cancer.4 Moustafa told A.D. to bring him all of S.D.’s
important documents, such as his report cards and identification cards, and shredded
them. Later that same month, Moustafa accused S.D. of having raped A.D. the night that
he saw S.D. changing shorts. After making the accusation, Moustafa punched S.D. in the
chest, abdomen, and ribs. The next day, Moustafa repeated the abuse, which became his
“daily exercise.” Around that time, Moustafa forced S.D. to move out of the bedroom
with A.D. and into the apartment’s second bedroom.
       In March 2013, Moustafa started using tools such as pliers and ratchets to harm
S.D. Moustafa would direct S.D. to remove his clothes or would take them off. He
focused his attacks on S.D.’s genitals. Moustafa used pliers to grab S.D.’s penis and used
his other hand or another tool to squeeze S.D.’s testicles or the shaft of his penis,
including the tip. Moustafa aimed specifically for S.D.’s urethra. Moustafa also used

       3
        S.D. later testified that he was unable to masturbate after 2013 because he had
“no functionality,” but he did masturbate “close to every day” in 2012. S.D. denied that
he viewed any pornography that involved torture, bondage, or sadomasochism.
       4
           Moustafa previously told S.D. and his family that he had prostate cancer.

                                              5
paper matches or lighters to burn parts of S.D.’s body, including his nipples, penis, anus,
buttocks, pubic hair, chest hair, fingers, and toes. Afterwards, Moustafa applied bleach to
S.D.’s wounds. Moustafa also used a hammer to hit S.D.’s toes and fingers, and he once
poured hot wax from candles onto S.D.’s chest.
       Moustafa told S.D. that he was trying to burn S.D.’s urethra so he could “seal” it
because Moustafa believed that S.D. had raped A.D. Moustafa also told S.D. that he
wanted to make sure that S.D. could never have kids or be able to urinate again.
       One time, Moustafa had S.D., who was undressed, hunch over an office chair.
Moustafa told S.D. that since S.D. “like[d] putting your dick in my girl,” he was going to
show S.D. “how it feels.” Moustafa then grabbed either a Statute of Liberty or Eiffel
Tower figurine and inserted it into S.D.’s anus.
       Another time, Moustafa became upset with the way S.D. cleaned the kitchen
stove, so he turned on one of the stove’s coils, pulled S.D. by the hair, and burned his
face on the coils. S.D. ended up with burn marks on his nose, forehead, and hair.
       By late September 2013, Moustafa had moved S.D. out of the bedroom and into
the kitchen and dining area. Around then, S.D. recalled an incident where Moustafa
struck him multiple times with a crowbar while holding his penis with pliers. Moustafa
also used a shoe to strike S.D.’s penis and testicles. Because of the beatings, S.D. had
difficulty walking and had a limp.
       S.D. screamed during Moustafa’s attacks and sometimes Moustafa would take
S.D.’s clothes and stuff them down S.D.’s throat. Moustafa also played loud music to
drown out S.D.’s screams. Moustafa would smile, smirk, and sometimes dance while
hurting S.D.
       S.D. did not always try to resist Moustafa’s attacks. He feared Moustafa and
believed that he was who he said he was—someone who was experienced with torture.
Sometimes A.D. was in the apartment when Moustafa attacked S.D. S.D. also saw
Moustafa attack A.D.; Moustafa choked A.D. until she was unconscious, kicked her ribs,
                                             6
kicked her stomach, and slapped her. S.D. recalled that he once saw Moustafa pull A.D.
and drag her to a room.
       As time progressed, Moustafa’s control over S.D. and A.D. persisted. S.D. still
worked multiple jobs and was required to give Moustafa all the money he earned.
Sometime in early 2013, Moustafa took S.D.’s laptop and directed S.D. to give him the
password. He told S.D. and A.D. to disable their social media accounts, and the siblings
were not permitted to tell their parents where they lived. Moustafa required S.D. to write
a journal documenting what he did each day.
       Because he was often locked in his room, S.D. was frequently late and got into
trouble at work. Sometimes S.D. would have black eyes or choke marks on his neck.
S.D. told coworkers to “stop harassing” him when they asked him about his injuries. He
also sometimes lied and said that he fell off his bicycle.
       Moustafa told S.D. that if S.D. thought he was a monster, S.D. could leave.
Moustafa, however, also told S.D. that he had “men” everywhere and that if S.D. walked
more than a block away from the apartment, S.D. would be shot.
       By October 2013, S.D. was starting to feel suicidal. One morning, Moustafa gave
S.D. an article that explained the consequence of rape in Islamic culture—he would be
tortured or stoned to death and spend his afterlife in hell. Later, Moustafa dropped S.D.
off at work at a grocery store and told him to enjoy his day. Based on Moustafa’s
expression and mannerisms, S.D. became convinced that he would die that day.
       Concerned for his life, S.D. decided to reach out to a coworker, Javier Zaragoza.
S.D. had never told Zaragoza about Moustafa’s abuse, and it took “a little bit of
convincing” to get Zaragoza to help him. S.D. told Zaragoza that if he did not leave
tonight, he would die, and he needed to get to San Luis Obispo. Zaragoza agreed to help
S.D., and the two left that evening in Zaragoza’s car. During the drive, S.D. told
Zaragoza about the abuse that Moustafa inflicted on him and specifically identified
Moustafa by name.
                                              7
          Zaragoza drove S.D. to a family friend’s restaurant in San Luis Obispo. On the
way there, S.D. used Zaragoza’s phone to call his parents and asked them to meet him at
the restaurant. After Zaragoza dropped S.D. off, S.D. told his parents about Moustafa’s
attacks. He did not try to contact A.D. because he felt betrayed by her.
          The following day, the family friend took S.D. to the hospital, where S.D. was
treated by a physician friend of S.D.’s family friend. The hospital staff contacted the
police.
          During trial, S.D. acknowledged that he had made some inaccurate statements in
the past. He had once said during a prior interview that he had been suspended from the
ceiling by his penis. S.D. acknowledged having elsewhere claimed that Moustafa had
threatened him to get him to move to Mountain View and that he had been drugged.
          2.    Dr. Rushdi Cader
          Dr. Rushdi Cader, an emergency physician at a hospital in San Luis Obispo,
examined S.D. in October 2013. Cader examined S.D. “from head to toe,” but some of
the hospital records failed to reflect his full examination. For example, S.D.’s perineal or
genitourinary exam were not documented.
          Cader recalled that he examined S.D.’s genitals, and S.D. had superficial bruising
around the scrotal area and denuding of the skin of his penis that appeared inflamed and
was likely in a stage of healing. S.D., however, was able to urinate which indicated that
his urethra was intact. Cader also observed some mild crusting in the genital area and
inflammation, which could be attributable either to a chemical burn from bleach, from
matches, or some other inflammatory process that occurred after the injury. Cader
opined that the injuries, which he described as “pretty dramatic” and “brutal,” could be
consistent with the application of tools to S.D.’s penis. S.D. also had bruising to his
buttocks and his upper posterior thighs. Cader only performed an external examination
of S.D.’s anus and did not perform a rectal exam, which would have required Sexual
Assault Response Team (SART) professionals.
                                               8
       Cader also examined S.D.’s feet but did not recall seeing bruising to the soles.
The photographs showed S.D. had mild bruising on his ankle and a bit of bruising on his
toe. S.D. also had a contusion on the upper part of his body and an abrasion on his nose.
       3.     Dr. Jon Soble
       S.D. was examined by Dr. Jon Soble, a urologist, in November 2013. At the time
of the exam, S.D. complained of intermittent penile pain and reported a history of trauma
to his penis and urethra. Soble found that S.D.’s penis appeared to be mostly in a state of
healing and had a “fairly near completely normal appearance.” Soble, however, did note
that there was a relatively mild but anormal narrowing of the opening of the urethra
through the tip of the penis and some inflammation and “mild blanching” of the glans.
Because S.D.’s alleged injuries had occurred approximately six or seven weeks prior to
his exam, Soble could neither corroborate nor dispute S.D.’s claims of trauma.
       Soble also examined a report prepared by a defense expert, Dr. Michael Ehlert. In
his report, Ehlert had opined that the injuries “could be self-inflicted, either for self-
pleasure or punishment.” Soble, however, thought it was unlikely that S.D. could have
sustained the injuries either from a penis ring or from excessive masturbation.
       4.     Javier Zaragoza
       Javier Zaragoza worked as a grocery store clerk in October 2013. He knew S.D.
only as a coworker and not a friend. While working together, Zaragoza noticed some
“abnormalities” about S.D. that caught his attention—S.D. sometimes limped, and one
time S.D. had significant marks on his face. S.D. explained his injuries by saying that he
had fallen off his bicycle. Zaragoza, however, thought it had looked like S.D. had been
burned.
       One evening, S.D. told Zaragoza that he was in trouble and that his life was in
danger. S.D. said that his “brother-in-law” was abusing him and asked Zaragoza for help
reaching his parents. Zaragoza agreed to help S.D., and while they were driving, S.D.

                                               9
recounted how Moustafa had beaten him. Zaragoza drove S.D. to a restaurant in San
Luis Obispo and left S.D. with his parents.
        5.    S.D.’s Coworkers
        By stipulation, the parties agreed that one of S.D.’s coworkers, interviewed by
police, said that she had once seen that S.D.’s face was injured when he came to work; he
had a black eye and a swollen lip and face. S.D. claimed to have run into a door. S.D.
was often late or missed his shift, and he was later terminated. And another time in
October 2013, the coworker saw cuts on S.D.’s face.
        The parties also stipulated that the assistant store manager where S.D. worked,
when interviewed, reported noticing on October 2, 2013, that S.D. had scabs on his
forehead and nose. The following day, S.D. called into work and said he was not going
to come in because he had been hit by a car when riding his bicycle. On October 4, 2013,
S.D. came to work with a limp, and he left work early after complaining of pain in his
legs.
        6.    A.D.
        A.D. met Moustafa in 2009 through a mutual friend and started to date him. On
their first date, Moustafa told A.D. that he was an Egyptian diplomat. He also told A.D.
that he was the nephew of former President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, he came from a
powerful family, and he had gone to military school. Moustafa showed A.D. balance
statements on an American Express account that appeared to show that he had more than
a million dollars, and photos of properties abroad which he claimed were owned by his
father. However, during their relationship, Moustafa held various jobs including a
position as a hotel receptionist, which he explained was a cover to protect his real
identity.
        Moustafa told A.D. that he had bodyguards who protected him. One time, when
A.D. was in college, she told Moustafa that she thought someone had been following her.

                                              10
Moustafa responded that the man following her was his bodyguard and was simply
protecting A.D.
         In July 2012, A.D. graduated from college and eventually moved to Mountain
View to live with Moustafa and work at a local bank. Moustafa later invited S.D. to
move in with them.
         After living together for a few months, Moustafa started to exert control over A.D.
and S.D. He told them where to work, what to eat, and what careers they should be
pursuing. At the time, A.D. did not resist Moustafa because she was afraid of him and
believed his claims about his identity. Moustafa started to slap A.D. for little things like
not making the bed properly. He would pin A.D. against the wall if she tried to talk back
to him. He sometimes choked, punched, kicked, and forced A.D. to have sex with him.
He threatened to kill her and her family. He took away her car and started driving her to
and from her workplace himself. One time, Moustafa shredded S.D.’s identification
cards. A.D. had little communication with her parents, and they did not know where she
lived.
         In January 2013, A.D. was sharing a room with her brother, S.D., when she was
awakened by a sound. A.D. saw S.D. standing in front of her, and Moustafa said that
S.D. had tried to “do something” to her. To A.D.’s knowledge, S.D. had never touched
her inappropriately.
         Following the January 2013 incident, A.D. noticed that Moustafa started treating
S.D. in a more aggressive and physically abusive manner. Moustafa punched S.D.
multiple times in the face and kicked him in the legs and chest. Another time, Moustafa
beat S.D. with a tool.
         A.D. recalled that one time, Moustafa inflicted something that looked like burns
on S.D. in the kitchen. She also recalled an incident where it looked like Moustafa was
doing something of a sexual nature to S.D.—she saw S.D. naked and bent over, and
Moustafa was hitting him with a glass Eiffel Tower figurine.
                                              11
       A.D. described the last three months leading up to October 2013 as “brutal” as
Moustafa escalated his physical attacks against S.D. Sometimes Moustafa would put on
loud music during the beatings. One evening in October 2013, S.D. failed to return to the
Mountain View apartment after work. A.D. and Moustafa became concerned and
decided to drive down to Santa Maria to see if they could find S.D. Moustafa was
“extremely angry” that evening, and when they arrived at A.D.’s parents’ house,
Moustafa told A.D. that if he found anyone inside, they were “all going to die.”
       After finding the house empty, Moustafa drove A.D. back to Mountain View and
told her to report S.D. missing. Moustafa coached A.D. to say that S.D. was involved in
gangs and used drugs. Both Moustafa and A.D. later went to the police department to
give statements. Moustafa told A.D. that he was going to be “fine” and that his “people”
would take him back to Egypt, but that if A.D. did not tell the police certain things, he
would kill her and her family. Moustafa told A.D. to tell the police that her brother had
touched her, that he was in a gang, and that he did drugs. Moustafa expressed concern
that the police were going to see injuries on S.D. from the beatings that he had
administered and told A.D. to tell the police that he had nothing to do with any beatings.
When A.D. went to the police station, she relayed to them the story that Moustafa had
coached her to tell.
       A.D. later decided to tell the police the truth about Moustafa’s abuse. By that
time, Moustafa was already in custody.
       7.     Tina Chang
       In 2013, Tina Chang took a class at a community college with Moustafa, and she
and her boyfriend, Luis Mejia, became friends with him. Chang and Mejia also spent
time with A.D., but they were unaware that Moustafa and A.D. were in a relationship.
Moustafa told Chang that A.D. and S.D. were siblings, and that he had taken S.D. “under
his wing.” Moustafa also told Chang that he was married to a woman named Lauren, he
was an Egyptian diplomat and a covert agent, and that he worked for the government.
                                             12
Moustafa said that his house was wired, and there were always people listening in and
conducting surveillance. Chang believed Moustafa and did not confront him about his
statements. Moustafa once showed her a picture of himself in a private jet and a combat
jet. He also showed Chang pictures of cars and a box of M&M’s that he claimed he got
from Air Force One.
      Moustafa told Chang that S.D. was required to give him all the money that he
made. Moustafa had also said that S.D. had been with “bad people” before and had a
history of doing drugs. Oftentimes, Chang and Mejia would be at Moustafa’s apartment
when S.D. returned from work, and Moustafa always told S.D. to go to his room because
S.D. was not permitted to sit in the living room with them. One day, Moustafa told
Chang that S.D. had tried to rape his sister after Chang asked him why S.D. acted the way
he did around the apartment. Chang saw that S.D. called Moustafa “sir” and bowed
down to him.
      Chang was once at Moustafa’s apartment and saw that S.D. had a black eye. And
in the fall of 2013, Chang and Mejia went to the grocery store where S.D. worked and
saw that he had a reddish-brown mark between his eyebrow and his forehead. Because
Moustafa had told her in the past of having “punished” S.D. “for doing bad stuff,” Chang
asked S.D. if Moustafa had caused the injury, and S.D. said that he fell because he was
clumsy.
      Chang and Mejia accompanied A.D. and Moustafa when they went to the police
department to report S.D. missing. Before going to the police department, Chang and
Mejia spent about two hours at Moustafa’s apartment “[j]ust chatting.” Chang did not
hear Moustafa coach A.D. on what to say to the police.
      8.       Detective Mason Motomura
      Mountain View Police Department Officer Mason Motomura was assigned to
investigate Moustafa’s case and interviewed S.D. at the police department on
October 6, 2013. S.D. appeared hesitant and scared to speak with Motomura. At the end
                                           13
of the interview, Motomura asked S.D. to call Moustafa. During the call, Moustafa
generally denied hitting S.D. Motomura later took photographs of S.D. and his injuries.
       That same evening, Motomura interviewed Moustafa. Moustafa said that A.D.
was being abused by her family, and S.D. was “always acting sexually weird toward her.”
Moustafa said he got into a couple of fights with S.D. Moustafa had hit S.D. “really
hard” several times and told him to stop touching A.D. Moustafa said that he caught S.D.
masturbating to A.D.’s clothes. During the interview, Motomura directed Moustafa to
write a short letter of apology to S.D., which he did.
       At trial, Motomura explained that he did not download the content of S.D.’s cell
phone because S.D. was the victim in the case. He also found S.D. credible, and he did
not believe S.D. was hiding anything that would not be found on Moustafa’s devices.
Motomura, however, acknowledged that in general, information from cell phones “can be
valuable for the prosecution just as it could be valuable for the defense.”
       9.     Forensic Evidence
       Following a search, several tools were recovered from Moustafa’s apartment.
S.D.’s DNA was found on the clamp end of a black Husky wrench. A.D.’s DNA was
found on a Crescent wrench. A Crescent ratchet tested presumptively positive for blood
that matched S.D.’s DNA. A piece of carpet from Moustafa’s apartment tested
presumptively positive for blood that also had some yellow stains that might be
consistent with bleach. S.D.’s and A.D.’s DNA matched some of the bloodstains, though
the amount of blood present was not “massive.” Additionally, a bathmat tested
presumptively positive for blood and matched S.D.’s DNA.
       A criminalist examined an Apple laptop bearing a user account with Moustafa’s
name but found no photos or videos of S.D.’s injuries. The criminalist also examined an
HP laptop, which belonged to S.D., and a desktop computer, finding no images of S.D.
on those items. He did, however, later find some images depicting sadomasochism or
torture on both the HP laptop and the Apple laptop.
                                             14
       10.    Intimate Partner Violence Expert
       Richard Ferry, a licensed marriage and family therapist, testified as an expert in
domestic violence and intimate partner violence. According to Ferry, intimate partner
violence can exist even if there is no sexual relationship between the perpetrator and the
victim. Victims of intimate partner violence can have paradoxical behaviors, such as
refusing to cooperate with the investigator or lying under oath about the violence.
Victims sometimes stay with the perpetrator out of dependence or because their self-
esteem has become so corroded that they are unable to leave the abusive situation.
Traumatic bonding—or intense loyalty between the victim and perpetrator—may also
occur. Stockholm syndrome, a subset of traumatic bonding, may also occur, during
which a hostage-taker might offer small acts of kindness toward hostages, stimulating
hope and increasing loyalty.
C.     The Defense
       The defense called several prosecution witnesses, including S.D. and Motomura.
The defense also called several other witnesses on Moustafa’s behalf.
       1.     S.D.’s Family Friend
       S.D.’s family friend socialized with S.D.’s family through a local mosque. One
day, S.D. and his parents came to the family friend’s restaurant. The family friend
noticed S.D. was walking “kind of funny,” and S.D. said that he had been beaten. The
family friend did not see any visible injuries, but he suggested that S.D. and his family go
to the local hospital where they later saw Dr. Cader.
       2.     Officer Joshua Walsh
       San Luis Obispo Police Department Officer Joshua Walsh was dispatched to the
hospital in San Luis Obispo on October 5, 2013, and spoke to S.D. S.D. told Walsh that
his parents had come to pick him up in Mountain View. S.D. also told Walsh that he had
thought about jumping in front of a train to stop the torture, and that Moustafa had stuck a

                                            15
small Statute of Liberty figurine into his anus to cause him pain. S.D. said that Moustafa
had struck his toe with a hammer, causing the toenail to fall off.
          3.    S.D. and A.D.’s Mother
          S.D. and A.D.’s mother did not like Moustafa and was afraid of him; Moustafa
always used angry words and said he wanted to “ ‘kill [them].’ ” She also did not like
that A.D. moved in with Moustafa because they were not married.
          Between August 2012 through October 2013, S.D. and A.D.’s mother saw A.D.
about three or four times a year. Moustafa may have brought S.D. with him once. S.D.
and A.D.’s mother recalled that Moustafa accused S.D. of molesting A.D. And once,
S.D. and A.D.’s mother observed Moustafa discipline S.D. by twisting his ear and
slapping him.
          S.D. and A.D.’s mother tried to dissuade A.D. from marrying Moustafa and tried
to dissuade S.D. from moving in with Moustafa. S.D. and A.D.’s mother may have sent
Moustafa a message apologizing to him and may have left him a voicemail, but she only
did so because Moustafa would not otherwise let her see her children. Moustafa once
said that he was sent from God to protect S.D. and A.D.
          4.    Dr. Charles Moser
          Dr. Charles Moser, a physician, examined S.D.’s hospital records from
October 2013 and testified as an expert in “describing, recognizing, and providing the
likely cause of injuries.” Based on the photographs, Moser opined that the injuries to
S.D.’s nipples could be consistent with the use of pliers, and the injury to the penis
looked like they were in the healing stage. The most serious injury he saw was the
bruising to S.D.’s buttocks. Moser, however, opined that he did not see any injuries that
were consistent with being hit with a crowbar, which would usually leave a more linear
bruise.

                                             16
       5.     Apartment Neighbors
       The former apartment manager at Moustafa’s building did not recall any yelling,
screaming, or loud music coming from Moustafa’s apartment between 2012 and 2013.
None of the other tenants complained about Moustafa. The apartment manager, however,
lived in a separate building and was unaware that anyone else lived in Moustafa’s
apartment.
       Likewise, a neighbor who lived in the apartment next to Moustafa’s did not recall
any screaming or loud noises coming from Moustafa’s apartment. The parties also
stipulated that another neighbor would have testified that the individuals that lived in
Moustafa’s apartment were quiet, and there were never any loud noises or music coming
from the apartment.
       6.     Officer Terry Hoang
       Mountain View Police Department Officer Terry Hoang took down the missing
person’s report filed by A.D. when S.D. failed to return home in October 2013. A.D. did
not mention that S.D. was involved in drugs or in a gang. Hoang also visited Moustafa’s
apartment. During the visit, Moustafa volunteered that S.D. was very clumsy, would
bump into doors “20 times a day,” and would sometimes come home with mysterious
bruises.
       7.     Sheryl Deaconson
       Sheryl Deaconson, a certified legal nurse consultant and administrative nursing
supervisor, testified as an expert in hospital emergency room procedures. After
reviewing S.D.’s hospital records, Deaconson opined that it was unusual that a SART
nurse was not notified when S.D. reported a sexual assault. Deaconson also thought that
the hospital records were oddly worded as they read like a narrative rather than focusing
on S.D.’s injuries. Based on these irregularities, Deaconson opined that the hospital
records were not typical in terms of how medical records are written, and S.D.’s
treatment fell below the general standard of care.
                                             17
       8.     Jeff Fischbach
       Jeff Fischbach, a forensic technologist, testified as an expert in analyzing
computers and data from computers. He examined the HP computer belonging to S.D.
and found that there were issues regarding its examination. At one point, the computer
stopped processing and did not keep image files. There were also controller failure
issues, and a “hash” was canceled. There were also some issues with the examination of
the Apple laptop belonging to Moustafa. Fischbach opined that based on the notes from
the computer analysis, somehow the image files depicting torture were not found in 2014
but were found in 2017. Fischbach believed that unless something had been done to
intentionally alter the computer files, some unintentional errors may have occurred when
the computers were examined.5
       9.     Stipulation
       The parties stipulated that if called to testify, a Mountain View Police Department
officer would testify that he obtained a search warrant for A.D.’s and S.D.’s cell phones,
but the cell phones were returned without further extraction or search.
D.     The Verdict, Motion for a New Trial, and Sentencing
       The trial court found Moustafa guilty of all charges and found true all
enhancements as alleged in the information. The trial court later heard and denied
Moustafa’s motion for a new trial. Subsequently, on June 26, 2019, the trial court
sentenced Moustafa to prison for an indeterminate term of 57 years to life, consecutive to
a determinate term of 14 years and four months.6 Moustafa timely appealed.

       5
        The criminalist that analyzed the computers was later called as a rebuttal witness
by the prosecution. He testified that he had recently “rehashed” the drives again, and the
hash values were the same as the values obtained in 2013 and 2014, meaning that the
image files depicting torture had not been forensically changed in the interim.
       6
          The indeterminate term was composed of two consecutive terms of 25 years to
life for sexual penetration (§§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A), 667.61, subds. (a) & (d); counts 2 &

                                             18
                                    II.     DISCUSSION
A.       Jury Waiver
         Moustafa claims that his waiver of trial by jury was inadequate because it is
unclear whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent and made with full awareness of
the rights that were being abandoned. On the record before us, we conclude that the
totality of the circumstances affirmatively show that Moustafa’s jury waiver was both
voluntary and intelligent.
         1.     Background
         On November 1, 2017, the first day of trial, trial counsel stated that he intended to
present Moustafa’s waiver of his right to a jury trial, that he had discussed the waiver
with Moustafa, and that it was Moustafa’s wish to proceed by court trial. After trial
counsel commenced his voir dire of Moustafa on the jury waiver, the trial court asked if
Moustafa needed some additional time to speak with counsel about the waiver and
thereafter recessed to permit Moustafa to confer further with counsel. Later, the trial
court noted that the defense was not ready to proceed with the waiver and deferred the
issue.
         The following day, Moustafa’s trial counsel indicated again to the court that his
client intended to proceed with a court trial and waive his right to a jury. The trial court
asked Moustafa if it was his “wish to waive [his] right to a jury trial,” and Moustafa
answered yes. The trial court then indicated that Moustafa’s trial counsel would be
asking him several questions about his understanding of what the jury waiver entailed.

3), consecutive to 7 years to life for torture (§ 206; count 3). The determinate term was
composed of the upper term of 12 years for human trafficking (§ 236.1, subd. (a);
count 4), consecutive to 1 year (one-third the midterm of three years) for inflicting
corporal injury on a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 6), and two eight-month (one-third
the midterm of two years) terms for criminal threats (§ 422; counts 5 & 6).

                                               19
       Trial counsel asked Moustafa to explain his understanding of a jury trial.
Moustafa answered, “That the decision about my verdict, guilty or not guilty, would be
based on 12 jurors, would be my peers.” Asked what a court trial was, Moustafa
answered that “[it] means the sole decision of the Judge concerning [sic] my verdict.”
       Trial counsel then asked whether Moustafa understood that a criminal defendant
“has an absolute right to have a jury trial,” and Moustafa answered that he did. Counsel
asked Moustafa if anyone had ever put pressure on him to waive his right to a jury trial,
and Moustafa answered no. Counsel also asked Moustafa if his decision to waive a jury
trial was a “free and voluntar[y] decision,” and Moustafa answered yes. And finally,
counsel asked Moustafa if he had sufficient time to speak with counsel about his decision
to waive his right to a jury trial, and Moustafa answered yes, also thanking the court for
having given him additional time for that purpose.
       The trial court then directly asked Moustafa several questions. The trial court
asked Moustafa if he understood that he had the right to testify or to remain silent,
irrespective of whether the trial was by jury or by the court, and Moustafa answered yes.
He asked for clarification as to whether, if he chose to testify, he would nonetheless be
permitted to stay silent as to individual questions. The trial court explained that if
Moustafa chose to testify, he would be required to respond to “any reasonable question,”
but he could choose to remain silent by not testifying at all. Moustafa said that he
understood this clarification. The trial court asked Moustafa if he understood he had the
right to confront witnesses at either a jury or court trial, and Moustafa said yes.
       The trial court then asked Moustafa if he had any further questions for either his
attorney or the trial court. In response, Moustafa asked only for direction on how to
communicate concerns that might arise during trial “in case something is not accurate or
misstated.” The trial court advised Moustafa to direct such concerns to his attorney.
       Thereafter, the trial court accepted Moustafa’s jury waiver.

                                             20
       2.     Legal Principles
       Under both the federal Constitution and the California Constitution, a defendant in
a criminal prosecution has a right to a jury trial. (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 16; People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 (Sivongxxay).) Nonetheless,
a jury trial “may be waived in a criminal cause by the consent of both parties expressed in
open court by the defendant and the defendant’s counsel.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) A
defendant’s waiver to a right to jury trial must be knowing and intelligent—meaning the
waiver must be made with the understanding of the nature of the right being abandoned
and the consequence of abandoning it—as well as voluntary. (Sivongxxay, supra, at
p. 166.)
       In Sivongxxay, the California Supreme Court offered “general guidance” to help
ensure that a jury waiver is knowing and intelligent, and to facilitate resolution of
challenges to jury waivers on appeal. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 169.) In
particular, Sivongxxay recommended that trial courts advise a defendant of the “basic
mechanics of a jury trial waiver in a waiver colloquy, including but not necessarily
limited to the facts that (1) a jury is made up of 12 members of the community; (2) a
defendant through his or her counsel may participate in jury selection; (3) all 12 jurors
must unanimously agree in order to render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives the
right to a jury trial, a judge alone will decide his or her guilt or innocence.” (Ibid.)
Sivongxxay also recommended that the trial court take “additional steps” (ibid.) to ensure
on the record that the defendant understands what the jury trial right entails by, for
example, “asking whether the defendant had an adequate opportunity to discuss the
decision with his or her attorney, by asking whether counsel explained to the defendant
the fundamental differences between a jury trial and a bench trial, or by asking the
defendant directly if he or she understands or has any questions about the right being
waived” (id. at pp. 169-170, italics added).

                                               21
       Sivongxxay, however, emphasized that its guidance was “not intended to limit trial
courts to a narrow or rigid colloquy” and was “advisory.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th
at p. 170; accord, People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 992-993 (conc. & dis. opn. of
Cuéllar, J.) (Daniels).) Moreover, Sivongxxay reiterated that “a trial court’s adaptation of
or departure from the recommended colloquy in an individual case will not necessarily
render an ensuing jury waiver invalid.” (Sivongxxay, supra, at p. 170.) Thus,
“[r]eviewing courts must continue to consider all relevant circumstances in determining
whether a jury trial wavier was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
       A trial court’s “failure to obtain a waiver of the right to trial by jury is reversible
per se” as it is structural error. (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 311.)
       3.     Analysis
       Moustafa makes no claim that his jury waiver was coerced or otherwise
involuntary but maintains the record does not sufficiently demonstrate his comprehension
of the jury right to establish an effective waiver. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, we are satisfied that Moustafa’s waiver was knowing and intelligent, as
well as voluntary. (See Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 170.)
       Moustafa informed the trial court that he understood that he had an absolute right
to a jury trial as a criminal defendant, that a jury trial would be before 12 of his peers,
that a waiver of his right would mean the trial judge alone would determine his guilt or
innocence. He confirmed his understanding that the exercise of other constitutional trial
rights was not contingent upon his waiver of jury. He further confirmed having had
sufficient time to consult with counsel as to the jury waiver. Although evidence received
after the jury waiver indicated that Moustafa had come to the United States in 2007 and
had no prior experience with the criminal legal system here, there is no indication
Moustafa had any difficulty with the English language (unlike the defendant in
Sivongxxay) or had trouble conversing with his counsel or the court. And although
evidence received posttrial indicated that Moustafa was mentally ill and taking
                                              22
medication at the time of trial, we distinguish mental illness from incompetency on this
record: as the trial court noted in denying Moustafa’s motion for a new trial, the posttrial
psychological evaluation reflected that Moustafa was alert, oriented, communicative, and
appeared to be of above-average intelligence.
       Moustafa argues that his case is similar to People v. Jones (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th
420 (Jones), in which the jury waiver was held to be inadequate. Jones, however, is
inapposite, as the two-question colloquy regarding the waiver there was so conclusory
that it shed no light on what, if anything, the defendant understood of the jury right: the
prosecutor merely asked the defendant if she understood “ ‘[her] right to a jury trial’ ”
and “ ‘agree[d] to waive that right and have [the judge] sitting alone, decide the case.’ ”
(Id. at p. 428.) Thus, “the record [in Jones did] not show whether [the defendant’s]
attorney ever discussed with her the nature of a jury trial,” and the trial court did not
specifically advise the defendant of her right to a jury trial, only asking if she understood
the right. (Id. at p. 435.) Acknowledging that “there is no rigid formula for what a jury
advisement must include,” the Jones court observed, “the record does not show whether
Jones understood that a jury is comprised of individuals from the community instead of,
for example, a collection of judges.” (Id. at p. 423; see also id. at p. 436 [the California
Supreme Court “has consistently emphasized the importance of the defendant’s
knowledge that he or she has ‘ “ ‘the right to be tried by a jury of his [or her] peers.’ ” ’
”].) Therefore, the Jones court concluded that the record did not affirmatively show that
the jury trial waiver was voluntary and intelligent. (Id. at pp. 435-436.)
       In contrast to Jones, Moustafa was not merely asked if he “understood” what a
court trial entails: he explained in his own words his understanding that the verdict in a
jury trial would be decided by “12 jurors, . . . my peers,” whereas in a court trial, the
verdict would be “the sole decision of the Judge.” This alone would distinguish his
waiver from Jones, where the record of the defendant’s understanding of this basic
distinction was silent. Moreover, the record here is more expansive on the issue of
                                              23
Moustafa’s consultation with counsel about the right he was volunteering to waive.
Moustafa affirmatively stated on the record that he had adequate time to discuss his
waiver with counsel. In fact, at the hearing on November 1, 2017, the trial court
interrupted counsel’s colloquy with Moustafa to ensure that Moustafa could confer
further with counsel. Moustafa’s questions of the trial court during the waiver colloquy
further indicated he anticipated active communication with counsel during the trial,
suggesting that his out-of-court interaction with counsel was more than merely passive.
       We note as well that by the time the defense proffered the jury waiver, Moustafa
had been represented by a succession of attorneys. Before the trial court accepted the
waiver, Moustafa demonstrated his readiness to convey—verbally or otherwise—when
he wished to consult further with counsel: he specifically confirmed on the record that he
had sufficient time to discuss the jury right with his counsel, even thanking the court for
deferring consideration of the waiver for that purpose. Trial counsel, in initiating voir
dire as to the waiver, likewise exhibited a clear understanding that the jury right is
personal to the accused and not a matter within counsel’s tactical discretion. And
although Moustafa raised the adequacy of his jury waiver as a critical basis for his new
trial motion, he submitted no evidence suggesting that trial counsel’s advisement as to
any aspect of the jury right or its significance had been incomplete or inadequate, in
contrast to the affirmative evidence he proffered in support of other claims about his trial
counsel’s performance.7
       The record here does not reflect two of the four express advisements “of the basic
mechanics of a jury trial” which the California Supreme Court recommended but stopped

       7
         As we discuss at II.C.3, post, trial counsel’s performance was otherwise marred
by a failure to obtain Moustafa’s known mental health records. We accordingly
considered whether this deficiency in performance as to the merits properly bears on our
evaluation of Moustafa’s jury waiver. For the reasons stated here, on this record and
combination of circumstances, we conclude that it does not.

                                             24
short of requiring in Sivongxxay—that a jury must be unanimous to reach a verdict and
that a defendant has the right to participate in jury selection. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 169.) But “under the totality of the circumstances standard, the presence or
absence of a reference in a colloquy to [the unanimity of a jury], or to the impartiality
requirement, is not necessarily determinative of whether a waiver meets constitutional
standards.” (Id. at p. 168; see also People v. Weaver (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1056, 1072-1074
[failure to advise defendant of right to participate in jury selection did not necessarily
render jury waiver invalid].) As in Daniels, “[t]his case illustrates the difficulties that can
arise on appeal” when the record does not unambiguously reflect an express
“ ‘advise[ment] . . . of the basic mechanics of a jury trial in a waiver colloquy.’ ”
(Daniels, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1028 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.).) But none of the several
opinions in Daniels purported to repudiate Sivongxxay’s totality-of-the-circumstances test
for a bright-line rule.
       Under the totality of the circumstances here, we conclude Moustafa’s waiver was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and there was no violation of his constitutional right
to trial by jury. (See Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 170.)
B.     Admission of Moustafa’s Prior Statements to the Police
       Moustafa next argues that the trial court erroneously admitted his statement to the
police because Motomura continued to question him even after he invoked his right to
counsel and because his statements were induced by promises of leniency. Before trial,
Moustafa’s counsel filed a motion to suppress his statements to Motomura. In part,
Moustafa argued that Motomura failed to honor Moustafa’s invocation of his right to an
attorney. Moustafa also argued that Motomura affirmatively misled Moustafa about the
law and his rights.8 After conducting a hearing, the trial court found that Moustafa’s

       8
        We note that it appears that the specific claim of voluntariness that Moustafa
now raises on appeal—that he was promised leniency by Motomura—was not raised

                                              25
statement was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and denied the motion to suppress.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Moustafa’s statements were properly
admitted.
       1.     Legal Principles
       “ ‘Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, and its progeny protect the privilege
against self-incrimination by precluding suspects from being subjected to custodial
interrogation unless and until they have knowingly and voluntarily waived their rights to
remain silent, to have an attorney present, and, if indigent, to have counsel appointed.
[Citations.] “If a suspect indicates ‘in any manner and at any stage of the process,’ prior
to or during questioning, that he or she wishes to consult with an attorney, the defendant
may not be interrogated.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 551
(Duff).) “To establish a [waiver of Miranda rights], the [prosecution] must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.”
(Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 425.)
       Additionally, “[b]oth the state and federal Constitutions bar the prosecution from
introducing a defendant’s involuntary confession into evidence at trial.” (People v.
Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1176 (Linton).) A statement is involuntary “ ‘ “if it is not
the product of ‘ “a rational intellect and free will.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘A confession may be
found involuntary if extracted by threats or violence, obtained by direct or implied
promises, or secured by the exertion of improper influence.’ ” (People v. McWhorter
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 347 (McWhorter).) However, the presence of coercive police
activity does not necessarily compel a finding that a confession was involuntary—“ ‘the
statement and the inducement must be causally linked.’ ” (Ibid.) The prosecution bears

below in the trial court. Typically, claims of involuntariness not raised below are deemed
forfeited on appeal. (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 435.) However, even if
we assume that there was no forfeiture, we find Moustafa’s claim of involuntariness to be
without merit as explained below.

                                             26
the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant’s confession
was voluntary. (Linton, supra, at p. 1176.)
       “In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a suppression motion on Miranda and
involuntariness grounds, ‘ “ ‘we accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and
inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence. We
independently determine from the undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the
trial court whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.’ ” ’ ” (Duff, supra, 58
Cal.4th at p. 551.) If, as here, the interview was recorded, “the facts surrounding the
admission or confession are undisputed and we may apply independent review.” (Ibid.)
       2.     Invocation of the Right to Counsel
              a.     Background
       Motomura interviewed Moustafa at the police station. Before Motomura started
asking Moustafa any substantive questions, he told Moustafa that he wanted to get
Moustafa’s side of the story and advised Moustafa of his rights as follows: “You have
the right to remain silent. Anything you say may be used against you in court. You have
the right to the presence of an attorney before and during any questioning. If you cannot
afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you free of charge before any questioning if
you want one. You understand?” Motomura also told Moustafa that he would give
Moustafa a written advisement to read and—“if you understand them”—to sign.
       Thereafter, the following colloquy took place:
       “[Moustafa:] So if I want an attorney right now I can’t have one right?
       “[Motomura:] Um, if you—yes. You—you can’t have an attorney physically
present here with you right now. But if you wanna have one before you talk to me, that is
your choice but we’re not gonna talk before you go to jail. If you do wanna talk to me
before you go to jail, then you need to say, um, yes that you understand your rights and
you wanna talk to me.”

                                              27
       Subsequently, Moustafa asked Motomura if he could call his fiancée. Motomura
responded that he would be given the opportunity to use the phone at jail, but he probably
would not have time to use the phone because it was already “very late.” Moustafa
expressed fear about going to jail and asked Motomura if he was going to be “amongst
criminal[s]” and if he was “gonna get raped.”
       Motomura told Moustafa that he just wanted to get to the truth and hear
Moustafa’s side of the story. He then advised Moustafa that in order to ask him
questions, Motomura had to ensure that Moustafa understood the rights he had read
earlier. Moustafa asked, “So if I wanna wait for that attorney, I have to go to jail and
come back or you will visit me in jail?” Motomura replied, “Um, if you wanna wait for
the attorney, either you’re gonna go to jail either way.” Moustafa told Motomura that he
was not from the United States, and he was asking Motomura to help him out.
       The following colloquy then took place:
       “[Motomura:] So well from my point of view, I know that you’re—you’re not a
criminal. I know that you’ve never been arrested before. I know that people make
mistakes. I know there is probably a reason for what happened but like I said, I would
love to know that reason but I just need you to tell me that you understand your rights and
that it’s okay for me to ask you those questions so I can find out what happened.
       “[Moustafa:] Of course I understand you.
       “[Motomura:] Okay.
       “[Moustafa:] If you cannot afford an attorney—I want an attorney but I don’t
wanna wait indefinitely—and then my—my phone, did you go through it?
       “[Motomura:] Um, I have not done anything with your phone.”
       Motomura then went on to explain that Moustafa’s phone had been listed on a
search warrant, which meant that a judge had signed an order and had given permission
to search Moustafa’s phone.

                                             28
       Motomura then asked Moustafa, “Do you have any questions about what’s on the
[Miranda] card?” The following conversation then took place:
       “[Moustafa:] I want to ask for an attorney but I’m just scared.
       “[Motomura:] Okay. The…
       “[Moustafa:] I mean the—what you can, if you ask me a question, can I tell you
after that I want to get an attorney?
       “[Motomura:] Yeah.
       “[Moustafa:] Okay. I, uh…
       “[Motomura:] So for the first stuff that I just need to make sure you don’t have
any questions about the card.
       “[Moustafa:] No.
       “[Motomura:] You understand that? Okay. So yeah. Just sign right there.”
       Subsequently, Moustafa signed the Miranda card. Thereafter, Motomura said: “I
would like to get your side of the story. I just wanna find out the truth. If I ask you any
questions that are uncomfortable, then you can always let me know. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I
don’t wanna talk anymore. I want my attorney. You understand?” Moustafa nodded and
thereafter submitted to the interview.
              b.      Analysis
       Preliminarily, we observe that both Moustafa and the Attorney General analyze
the issue as whether Moustafa’s references to an attorney constituted unambiguous
post-Miranda invocations to the right to counsel. Moustafa argues that his statements
were obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 (Edwards), which
held that once a defendant has validly waived his or her Miranda rights and thereafter
requests counsel, he or she “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to [him or her], unless the accused . . . initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” (Id. at pp. 484-485.)

                                              29
       Edwards, however, is inapplicable. Here, Moustafa did not affirmatively waive
his Miranda rights until he signed the written Miranda advisement, which took place
after he made multiple references to an attorney. Thus, Moustafa’s references to his right
to counsel did not occur postwaiver but during his initial waiver of his Miranda rights.
Our Supreme Court has instructed that whether a suspect has made an initial waiver of
Miranda rights is an inquiry distinct from that contemplated in Edwards. (See Duff,
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 552 [when a “reference to a lawyer occur[s] at the beginning of
questioning, the rules respecting pre-Miranda waiver invocations apply”].)
       Specifically, when a defendant makes an initial reference to counsel, “an officer is
permitted to clarify the suspect’s intentions and desire to waive his or her Miranda
rights.” (Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 553.) The standard for assessing an ambiguous
initial reference to the right to counsel is objective, and “asks what a reasonable officer
would have understood the nature of the suspect’s request to be under all the
circumstances.” (People v. Sauceda-Contreras (2012) 55 Cal.4th 203, 217-218
(Sauceda-Contreras).) “With respect to an initial [Miranda] waiver . . . ‘[a] valid waiver
need not be of predetermined form, but instead must reflect that the suspect in fact
knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda decision.’ ”
(Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 427.)
       In this case, Moustafa concedes his first two references to retaining an attorney
were ambiguous at best because they were prefaced with “if” and concerned whether he
would get an attorney immediately or after he went to jail.9 Moustafa, however, argues
that his latter two references to his right to an attorney were not equivocal at all because
they were not qualified with emotional or conditional language such as “if” or

       9
        Notably, Motomura told Moustafa that he would be going to jail regardless of
whether he requested an attorney.

                                             30
“maybe”—in the latter two instances, Moustafa stated that “I want an attorney but I don’t
wanna wait indefinitely,” and “I want to ask for an attorney but I’m just scared.”
       Although we agree with Moustafa that his first two references to an attorney were
equivocal, we disagree with his assessment that his latter two references to an attorney
were unambiguous. Moustafa takes his own words out of context. When Moustafa
stated that he wanted an attorney but did not want to wait indefinitely, he immediately
followed up his comment by asking Motomura about his cell phone. Motomura
answered Moustafa’s question about his cell phone and asked Moustafa again if he had
any questions about the Miranda card. At that point, Moustafa replied, “I want to ask for
an attorney, but I’m scared.” Motomura started to reply, “Ok,” but Moustafa interjected
and asked, “I mean the—what you can, if you ask me a question, can I tell you after that I
want to get an attorney?” Motomura said “Yeah.” Motomura then asked if Moustafa had
any questions about what was on the written Miranda advisement, and Moustafa replied
no.
       Under these circumstances, a reasonable officer might have been uncertain about
whether any of Moustafa’s references to an attorney were intended to invoke his right to
counsel. (See Williams, supra 49 Cal.4th at p. 429.) And, finding the reference
ambiguous, Motomura was entitled to clarify Moustafa’s intentions. (Duff, supra, 58
Cal.4th at p. 553.) Here, Motomura did not ask Moustafa any substantive questions after
Moustafa referenced obtaining an attorney; Motomura merely continued to speak with
Moustafa and answered questions that Moustafa had about his case and the interview
process. In other words, Motomura lawfully “ ‘proceeded to talk to [Moustafa] to see
whether or not he wanted to talk without having to ask him specifically to clarify his
ambiguous statement any more than he did by continuing to talk.’ ” (Id. at p. 554.)
Moustafa also appeared to later clarify his position on waiving his Miranda rights when
he asked Motomura if he could request an attorney after Motomura started to ask
questions, and Motomura replied yes. Moustafa then signed the written Miranda
                                            31
advisement and started to answer Motomura’s questions, implying that he intended to
waive his rights. (See Sauceda-Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 221 [expressed
willingness to answer questions after acknowledging Miranda rights has been held
sufficient to constitute implied waiver of rights].)
       Arguing otherwise, Moustafa relies in part on People v. Henderson (2020) 9
Cal.5th 1013 (Henderson), which like Edwards involved a post-Miranda waiver
invocation of the right to counsel. In Henderson, after expressly waiving his Miranda
rights both orally and in writing, the defendant later invoked his right to counsel by
stating, “ ‘[w]ant, uh, want to speak to an attorney first, because I, I take responsibility
for me, but there’s other people . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 1020.) The officers conducting the
interview did not acknowledge the defendant’s invocation and continued to ask him
questions. (Id. at p. 120-121.) The California Supreme Court held that the defendant’s
subsequent statements were admitted in violation of Miranda and Edwards. (Henderson,
supra, at p. 1022.)
       We find Henderson distinguishable both because it involved a postwaiver
invocation of the right to counsel and because that postwaiver invocation was
unambiguous.10 Second, in Henderson, the defendant unambiguously stated he wanted
an attorney “ ‘first’ ” and further attempted to explain why he wanted to speak to an
attorney before continuing with questioning. (Henderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1023-

       10
          Likewise, we find unpersuasive Moustafa’s reliance on cases like Sessoms v.
Grounds (9th Cir. 2015) 776 F.3d 615, which also involved a postwaiver invocation of
the right to counsel. As we have stated, when a defendant makes an initial equivocal
reference to counsel, “an officer is permitted to clarify the suspect’s intentions and desire
to waive his or her Miranda rights.” (Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 553.) That is what
was done here—after Moustafa made his statements, Motomura did not proceed to ask
him about what happened with S.D. or A.D. Rather, Motomura continued to answer
Moustafa’s questions about his right to counsel and whether he understood that
questioning could stop immediately and resume only after he had counsel.

                                              32
1024.) The Supreme Court rejected the notion that the defendant’s adding he also wanted
to accept responsibility made this request ambiguous: “There is nothing inconsistent or
ambiguous about wanting to speak to an attorney before taking responsibility, and
defendant made clear that he wanted to speak to an attorney ‘first.’ One can take
responsibility in ways other than giving an uncounseled confession to the police.” (Ibid.)
In contrast, Moustafa qualified his stated desire for an attorney by saying unequivocally
“I don’t want to wait indefinitely” and by asking follow-up questions to Motomura about
whether he would be able to request an attorney after the interview started, suggesting
that he was still evaluating whether to invoke his rights. Unlike Henderson, Moustafa’s
request was ambiguous and did not clearly reflect an intent to request counsel.
        In sum, the record reflects that Moustafa, after having clarified with Motomura
that he could still request an attorney even after the questioning started, was willing to
proceed with the interview without a lawyer present. Under the totality of the
circumstances, we determine that Moustafa’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent. (See Sauceda-Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 221.)
        3.      Voluntariness
                a.      Background
        In the beginning of Moustafa’s interview, before Motomura read him his Miranda
rights, Moustafa said that earlier that night, he had “cried,” “freaked out,” and “prayed.”
Moustafa asked Motomura if he was “gonna get locked up for life,” and the following
colloquy occurred:
        “[Motomura:] Um, I can’t answer that—now ‘cause, uh, not that the court. All
I’m trying to do is gather the truth about what happened. So I’d like to talk to everybody
involved.
       “[¶] . . . [¶]
        “[Moustafa:] Um, am I—am I gonna lose everything? I have like if I go to jail,
like am I gonna be in jail indefinitely?

                                             33
       “[Motomura:] Like I said I can’t answer that ‘cause I’m not the—I’m not the
judge. And that’s up to the Court to decide. All I’m here to do is gather the truth about
what happened.
       “[Moustafa:] And then…
       “[Motomura:] And send my report to the court and then . . .
       “[Moustafa:] From if—if . . .
       “[Motomura:] . . . they’re decide from there.
       “[Moustafa:] From your experience like do people go to life for jail for that?
       “[¶] . . . [¶]
       “[Motomura:] . . . as far as I know what you’ve been accused of no it would not
be a life sentence as you say. [¶] . . . [¶] But as far as the exact years, I don’t know.
That’s again up to the Court and the district attorney.
       “[Moustafa:] You said years?
       “[Motomura:] Yeah I don’t know, I’m letting you know I don’t know the amount.
       “[Moustafa:] Can I know what I’m accused of?
       “[Motomura:] Yes. Um, off the top of my head I’ll say making threats, mmm
sexual assault, battery, there might be more but that’s what I can think of off of the top of
my head.
       “[Moustafa:] And though who put those charges against me?
       “[Motomura:] Um, well I’m not sure what you mean by that.
       “[Moustafa:] No I mean . . . .
       “[Motomura:] I’m—I’m the one who is in charge of deciding what you’re being
charged with.
       “[Moustafa:] No but I mean somebody came to you and told you something to put
me in charge?

                                              34
       “[Motomura:] Yeah. But I’m not, uh, I’m not obligated to tell you who made the
report. We have to protect the—right, the privacy of the people who make a report.
Okay?”
       Motomura subsequently read Moustafa his Miranda rights. Moustafa expressed
concerns about going to jail, stating, “I’m—I’m yeah, sure, am I gonna be, uh amongst
criminal and I’m gonna get raped?” Motomura replied, “Um, all I can say is at the jail,
they treat[,] the people that work there treat the prisoners with the same respect that they
give them. So I would say that you will be kept safe and you won’t be harmed as long as
you’re respectful with them and the same way you’re being respectful with us. And if
you’re put with anybody that you’re concerned about, and you would let them know and
they would separate you from that person.”
       Afterwards, Moustafa said, “I’m not from this country and all I’m asking you is
just to help me out. I-I-I don’t have any background about this. I have never done
anything bad in my life. I’m sure you checked my record.” Motomura replied, “So well
from my point of view, I know that you’re—you’re not a criminal. I know that you’ve
never been arrested before. I know that people make mistakes. I know there is probably
a reason for what happened but like I said, I would love to know that reason but I just
need you tell me that you understand your rights and that it’s okay for me to ask you
those questions so I can find out what happened.”
       Later, during the interview, Moustafa twice referenced Motomura’s statement that
he did not believe Moustafa was a criminal, saying, “I really appreciate that you’re not
calling me a criminal,” and, “Then what you told me I’m not a criminal liar. I appreciate
it but that’s not probably how the court is gonna look at me.” Motomura did not directly
address Moustafa’s comments when he made them.
       Toward the end of the interview, after Moustafa had stated that he had struck S.D.
several times, Moustafa again asked Motomura about what sentence he would face, and
the following colloquy took place:
                                             35
       “[Moustafa]: Do you think—do you think with all those evidence with your
experience, am I like gone for life?
       “[Motomura:] Mmm in my experience the only thing that they would send you to
prison for life at your age was—if you killed somebody. So the best of my knowledge
when you ask me am I gonna go to prison for life, my answer would be no. But how
many months, years, and all that stuff completely up to the court. So it’d be irresponsible
for me to guess for you.”
       And finally, as they were ending the interview, Moustafa asked Motomura if what
he had done was “extremely severe” or “horrible.” Motomura replied, “Um, so the
lowest crime is a misdemeanor, right? So a misdemeanor might be you steal, um, like a
DVD from the store. The highest one is gonna be murder right? Which you could be
sentenced to death, you could be sentenced to life in prison. Yours are in between that.
So that’s about all I can say. You know? Not the worst but it’s not the lowest. And
they’ll take into account your record too so since you have never been in trouble before,
that’ll be to your benefit. Um, they read the report and they think that you’ve been
cooperative. I think that will be to your benefit.”
              b.     Analysis
       Moustafa argues that the trial court erred by admitting his statements to Motomura
because they were not voluntary and were induced by promises of leniency. Moustafa
argues that the interview took place at 4:45 a.m., after he had already been held for three
hours, he was upset and emotional, and he repeatedly demonstrated that he was scared as
he asked whether he would be sent to prison for life. Moustafa insists that Motomura’s
statements expressly and impliedly promised leniency because he assured Moustafa that
he would not get a life sentence and falsely asserted that Motomura was in charge of what
crimes Moustafa would be charged with.
       First, the record does not reflect that Motomura assured Moustafa that he would
not get a life sentence. Moustafa asked Motomura about what his potential sentence
                                             36
would be in the beginning of the interview, but Motomura declined to give an exact
estimate and stated that Moustafa’s eventual sentence would be “up to the Court and the
district attorney.” Although Motomura stated that he did not think Moustafa would
receive a life sentence for his crimes, he qualified his statements by asserting that it was
“as far as [he] knew” and it was to “the best of [his] knowledge” and that ultimately,
again, Moustafa’s sentence would be “up to the Court and the district attorney.” There
was no express or implied promise of leniency in terms of the sentence he would face.
(See People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 993-994 [police made no promise of leniency
by telling defendant that he might qualify for witness protection if he was being
truthful].)
       Moreover, the second time that Motomura said that he did not think Moustafa
would receive a life sentence was at the end of the interview, after Moustafa had already
said that he had hit S.D. As a result, this second statement could not have induced
Moustafa’s prior statements, and we decline to consider it in our analysis of
voluntariness. (See McWhorter, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 347 [“the statement and the
inducement must be causally linked”].)
       Nor was there an express or implied promise that Motomura would decline to
charge Moustafa with crimes if he proceeded with the interview. Moustafa argues that
Motomura’s statement, “I’m the one who is charge of deciding what you’re being
charged with,” combined with Motomura’s later comment that he did not believe
Moustafa was a criminal, necessarily suggested to Moustafa that Motomura would not be
charging Moustafa with crimes because Motomura did not believe Moustafa’s actions to
be criminal. Moustafa, however, takes Motomura’s statements out of context. When
Motomura stated that he did not think that Moustafa was a criminal, Motomura did not
say that he thought that the allegations in the current case did not arise to the level of
criminal conduct. Rather, Motomura specified that, “you’re not a criminal” and qualified

                                              37
that he knew that Moustafa did not have a criminal record, that “people make mistakes,”
and that “there is probably a reason for what happened.”
       And although Motomura erroneously informed Moustafa that he was “in charge of
deciding” what Moustafa would be charged with, Motomura did not suggest that
Moustafa would receive lenient treatment by speaking with Motomura or that Moustafa’s
“mistakes” would somehow not be punishable as crimes. (People v. Holloway (2004) 33
Cal.4th 96, 116 [detective’s suggestion that the killings might have been accidental and
that such circumstances “ ‘make[] a lot of difference,’ ” fall short of being promises of
lenient treatment in exchange for cooperation]; see also Miller v. Fenton (3d Cir. 1986)
796 F.2d 598, 612 [officer’s remark that defendant was not a criminal did not affect
voluntariness of confession].) It is also not “inherently coercive for an interrogator to
attempt to form a rapport with the suspect.” (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 447.)
       Nor was it coercive for Motomura to encourage Moustafa to tell his side of the
story. To the extent, if any, that Motomura implied that Moustafa might receive some
benefit if his actions were unintentional, pointing out the “benefit that might naturally
flow from a truthful and honest course of conduct” does not constitute a promise of
leniency. (People v. Ramos (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1204; see also People v.
Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 174 [no promise of leniency when officers did not
suggest they could influence the district attorney’s decision and merely informed
defendant that full cooperation “might be beneficial in an unspecified way”].) “ ‘No
constitutional principle forbids the suggestion by the authorities that it is worse for a
defendant to lie in light of overwhelming incriminating evidence,’ ” and “law
enforcement officers are permitted to urge that it would be better to tell the truth.”
(Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 444.)
       For example, in People v. Vance (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1212, the First
Appellate District held that it was not coercive for officers to tell a defendant that they are
“ ‘here to listen and then to help you out,’ ” or to tell a defendant that “ ‘the
                                              38
court . . . wants to know what the real story is and you’re the only one to provide that.’ ”
(Ibid.) In that scenario, “the only benefits promised by the officers was the peace of mind
defendant and the others would have after he did the right thing and gave his side of the
story.” (Ibid.) Likewise here, Motomura’s encouragement to Moustafa to tell his side of
the story did not impair the voluntariness of his subsequent statements.
       Moustafa, however, argues that Motomura “assured” him that he was facing less
serious charges. Yet the record belies this claim—when asked by Moustafa, Motomura
responded that Moustafa was facing charges of “making threats, . . . sexual assault,
battery,” but that “there might be more [charges] but that’s what I can think of off of the
top of my head.” In other words, Motomura explicitly qualified that the list of charges he
gave to Moustafa was non-exhaustive, and there might be additional charges that
Moustafa could face. Motomura also did not expressly or impliedly assure Moustafa that
those would be the only charges he would face.
       In part, Moustafa relies on People v. Perez (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 863, which we
find distinguishable. In Perez, the defendant denied knowledge of the murder until one
of the officers told him that if he were honest and told the truth, the officers were “ ‘not
gonna charge [him] with anything.’ ” (Id. at p. 876, italics omitted.) The officer also
gave defendant his “ ‘word’ ” that the defendant would have his “ ‘life’ ” if the defendant
cooperated with the police. (Ibid.) Immediately thereafter, the defendant confessed his
involvement in the crimes. (Ibid.) Unlike Perez, Motomura at no point made an express,
or even an implied, promise that Moustafa would not be charged with any crimes if he
answered Motomura’s questions or told his side of the story.
       For these same reasons, United States v. Lall (11th Cir. 2010) 607 F.3d 1277, upon
which Moustafa relies, is similarly distinguishable. In Lall, the officer expressly assured
the defendant that anything he said would not be used to prosecute him. (Id. at p. 1287.)
No similar assurances were made by Motomura in this case.

                                              39
       People v. Cahill (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 296, is also inapposite. There, an officer
assured a defendant that the death penalty was “inoperative” and gave the defendant
descriptions of the law of murder but omitted a description of felony murder. (Id. at
p. 315.) The Cahill court found this omission “materially misleading” because it made
“more plausible the implicit promise that a first degree murder charge might be avoided if
there was a confession showing no premeditation.” (Ibid.) Motomura in this case did not
claim to provide Moustafa a list of all the charges he was facing. And, as we have stated,
Motomura said he did not think Moustafa would face a life sentence, but he conditioned
his statement by saying that it was only “as far as [he] kn[e]w” and that the exact
sentence would be up to the court.
       Moustafa also points out that coercive tactics can include promises to protect a
suspect from harm, citing to Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279. In Fulminante,
the defendant was receiving “ ‘ “rough treatment from the guys” ’ ” in prison, and an
officer, using knowledge of these threats, offered to protect the defendant in exchange for
a confession to a murder. (Id. at p. 286.) Moustafa analogizes his case to Fulminante
and argues that he expressed concerns about being harmed or raped in jail and Motomura
offered him assurances that he would not be harmed. Motomura, however, did not
promise Moustafa protection during his incarceration in exchange for a confession.
Addressing Moustafa’s concern about his safety in jail, Motomura told Moustafa that
“the people that work there treat the prisoners with the same respect that they give them”
and that Moustafa would be kept safe “as long as you’re respectful with them and [sic]
the same way you’re being respectful with us.” This was no promise of protection in
exchange for a confession; it was a general statement that Moustafa’s safety in custody
would depend on “the people that work there.”
       Finally, Moustafa suggests that his physical state and his characteristics at the time
of the interview contributed to the involuntariness of his statements. He argues that he
was held for several hours before the interview took place at 4:45 a.m. in the morning,
                                             40
and the interview itself took several hours. At the beginning of the interview, Moustafa
claimed that he had been upset, and he wanted to speak with his “fiancé,” but Motomura
later told him that it might be too late to call anyone.
       Although we agree that “[o]ur voluntariness determination rests on an
‘independent’ consideration of the entire record, including ‘ “ ‘the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the encounter,’ ” ’ ” the totality of the circumstances in this
case do not suggest that Moustafa’s will was overborne when he made his statements.
(People v. Mendez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 680, 698-699.) At the beginning of the interview,
officers asked Moustafa if he needed to go to the bathroom or needed water. (See People
v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 83-84 [circumstances of interview weighed against
voluntariness of statement when defendant was confined incommunicado for 24 hours,
was not taken to the bathroom or given water until the next morning and was placed in a
cell without a sink or a toilet].) Although English was not Moustafa’s native language,
there is no indication that he had difficulty understanding Motomura or his questions.
There is also nothing in the record to indicate that Moustafa was of low intelligence or
had minimal education, nor does the record reflect that Motomura badgered or used any
heavy-handed tactics on Moustafa to get him to talk or that Moustafa’s fearfulness
pressured him into the interview. (See People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1067
[detectives described the defendant as stressed or scared but defendant’s answers
appeared coherent and deliberate].)
       Additionally, even if we assume that the general circumstances surrounding the
interview weighed against a finding of voluntariness, “no single factor is dispositive in
determining voluntariness.” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 661.) Having
reviewed the entirety of the interview and given that there was no express or implied
promise of leniency, we conclude that Moustafa’s statements were voluntarily made
based on the totality of the circumstances, as it does not appear that Moustafa’s will was

                                              41
overborne. (See Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 551; Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1176.)
The trial court thus did not err in admitting Moustafa’s statements.
C.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       Moustafa raises multiple arguments pertaining to his trial counsel’s allegedly
ineffective assistance during his trial. He argues that trial counsel failed to adequately
investigate his mental health, which precluded him from presenting a defense of
diminished actuality or pursuing a theory that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. He
also argues that trial counsel failed to investigate and present evidence of his good
character for non-sexual deviancy, failed to investigate and present evidence of his
character for nonviolence, and failed to seek sanctions for law enforcement’s failure to
retain S.D. and A.D.’s cell phones. As we explain, to the extent counsel’s performance
was deficient, Moustafa does not establish prejudice on this record.
       1.     Legal Principles and Standard of Review
       To establish a violation of the right to effective assistance to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s
acts or omissions. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (Strickland).)
A defendant is prejudiced if it is reasonably probable that in the absence of counsel’s
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (Id. at p. 694.)
       Several of Moustafa’s claims of ineffective assistance were previously raised in
his motion for a new trial. Although a claim of ineffective assistance is typically “ ‘more
appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding,’ ” a defendant may also raise a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion for a new trial and “a trial court
should rule [on the motion] ‘[i]f the court is able to determine the effectiveness issue on
such motion.’ ” (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958.) Typically, a trial court has
broad discretion when ruling on a new trial motion and its ruling will not be disturbed on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 730.)
                                             42
However, when we review the trial court’s denial of a new trial motion on the ground of
ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply a mixed standard of review—we defer to the
trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and review de novo the
issue of whether the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance was
violated. (People v. Taylor (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 720, 724-725 (Taylor).)
       “On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if
(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the
challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one,
or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. All other claims of ineffective
assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v.
Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).)
       2.     Evidence of Moustafa’s Mental Health, the New Trial Motion, and
              Supporting Documents
       Before trial, Moustafa filed a motion to set bail, attaching a February 2017
psychological report prepared by Dr. Martin Williams.11 Retained “to carry out an
objective psychological evaluation of Mr. Moustafa with special attention to risk of re-
offending,” Williams reviewed the following documents provided by Moustafa’s defense
counsel: a list of Moustafa’s criminal charges as of February 2015, an April 2014 letter
from the district attorney to Moustafa’s then-counsel “regarding evidence,” and the
Mountain View Police Department’s combined case report. According to Williams,
Moustafa’s mental health history was limited to seeing a therapist in Santa Barbara
between 2009 and 2010, with treatment “focused on stress reduction.” Based on his “one
two hours [sic]” interview with Moustafa in jail as well as his review of the “relevant
documents,” Williams found no basis to diagnose Moustafa with any mental health

       11
         We grant the Attorney General’s unopposed motion to augment the record to
include Williams’s report. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.320(b)(13)(A).)
                                             43
condition. Williams also found Moustafa not to be at risk for reoffending. The trial
court, however, denied Moustafa’s motion to set bail.
       After he was convicted of all the charged offenses, Moustafa filed a motion for a
new trial. In his motion for a new trial, Moustafa argued that there was ample evidence
that he suffered from mental illnesses that would have negated the specific intent required
for his convictions for torture, sexual penetration, human trafficking, and the torture
enhancements alleged in his case and that would have supplied a basis for him to pursue
an insanity defense. He also argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
introduce evidence of his non-sexual deviancy and for failing to investigate and introduce
good character evidence.
       Moustafa attached multiple exhibits to his new trial motion. One exhibit was a
psychological evaluation, dated February 2019, completed by psychologist Dr. Jeremy
Coles. Coles evaluated Moustafa for five hours in January 2019 while he was in custody
and also reviewed Moustafa’s medical history. According to Coles’s report, Moustafa
had previously been on antidepressants, had been diagnosed with major depression and a
panic disorder, and had previously attempted suicide. In November 2013, while
Moustafa was in county jail pending trial on his current convictions, he was referred to
mental health services for anxiety and was later diagnosed with posttraumatic stress
disorder. He was subsequently prescribed medication for depression and for “psychotic
symptoms.”
       Based on the available information, Coles determined that Moustafa was suffering
from bipolar disorder “with a significant psychotic component involving grandiose and
paranoid delusions.” Although Moustafa denied ever physically abusing or torturing
S.D., Coles also determined that the disorder “played a role in the commission of the
controlling offenses” and that in Moustafa’s mind, he was saving A.D. from a sexual
assault. According to Coles, Moustafa “became solely focused on preventing [A.D.]
from being raped and, in his mind, anything he did to prevent this was justified.” Coles
                                             44
also opined that there was “precious little evidence to suggest that . . . Moustafa’s
behavior at the time of the controlling offense was motivated by sexual concerns, i.e., a
deviant sexual arousal pattern . . . .” Coles further found that Moustafa was “a man
[de]void of any signs of sexual deviancy or abnormality in his psychological and sexual
functioning that might otherwise predispose him to commit a sadomasochistic, sexually
motivated assault.”
       Moustafa also attached a declaration prepared by Marlyn Schulz, a paralegal
employed by his new attorney (his appellate counsel here), whom Moustafa retained to
file the new trial motion. According to Schulz’s declaration, appellate counsel discussed
with trial counsel the decision not to pursue a mental health defense at trial. Following
this discussion, appellate counsel drafted a declaration for trial counsel to sign that would
have explained that trial counsel “did not obtain [Moustafa’s] medical and mental health
records before trial” and did not “investigate a mental health defense based upon
diminished intent or insanity.” Trial counsel, however, never signed the prepared
declaration.
       Attached to the new trial motion was a signed letter written by trial counsel that
explained his decision not to pursue a mental health defense. Trial counsel
acknowledged: “I did not investigate a mental health defense because I did not believe
that Mr. Moustafa had either a diminished intent, was legally unconscious or was insane.”
He also stated that he “did obtain [Moustafa’s] medical records” (italics added), which
related to a surgery that Moustafa underwent, and he ultimately concluded that these
records were not relevant to the issues raised at trial. Trial counsel further stated: “The
defense was always that [Moustafa] did not torture [S.D.], that he did not threaten to kill
him or cause serious bodily injury to him or that he was engaged in human trafficking.”
       In the same letter, trial counsel explained his decision not to introduce character
evidence as follows: “I was aware that . . Moustafa was well liked by managers as well
as hotel guests at the various hotels he was employed by in the past. It was my decision
                                             45
not to present any character evidence due to my concern that this would ‘open the door’
to the admission of evidence regarding dishonesty or other damaging evidence.”
       Subsequently, appellate counsel prepared a second declaration incorporating the
assertions made by trial counsel in his letter. As drafted, the new declaration again
reiterated that trial counsel “did not obtain [Moustafa’s] mental health records before
trial” but that trial counsel had “obtained medical records related to [Moustafa’s]
surgery . . . .” Trial counsel did not sign the new declaration but responded by e-mail that
he believed that he had “sufficiently explained [his] thought process regarding certain
tactical decisions made during [his] representation of [Moustafa].”
       Also attached to the motion was a transcript of an interview between Moustafa’s
ex-wife Lauren and the police. In her interview, Lauren stated that Moustafa had severe
depression, had been diagnosed with “other disorders” in the past, and had previously
attempted suicide.
       Later, Moustafa submitted a reply to the prosecutor’s opposition to his new trial
motion that included a letter written by Coles further clarifying his original opinion. In
the letter, Coles wrote that “it is most often the case that mania or any severe emotional
state compromises one’s ability to think rationally.” Coles noted that Moustafa had
“strong delusions that disallowed him from appreciating consensual reality” and that in
such a state, “a person’s decisional capacities are deficient as they are making decisions
based upon a faulty apprehension of reality. Likewise, the planning of one’s actions is
dominated by unrealistic, in this case, delusional concerns and one weighs the
consequences of one’s actions, if at all, i[n] light of these same concerns.” For example,
Coles noted that someone in the midst of a manic episode might engage in activities that
“ ‘have a high potential for painful consequences.’ ”
       After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court denied Moustafa’s motion
for a new trial without holding a further evidentiary hearing. In part, the trial court noted
that it found credible trial counsel’s representation that he chose not to pursue a mental
                                             46
health defense because he believed Moustafa was not legally insane and did not have a
diminished intent. The trial court also stated that it believed a mental health defense
would have “diluted” Moustafa’s defense at trial that he did not inflict the injuries on
S.D. Thus, the trial court held that trial counsel’s tactical choices were reasonable and
that Moustafa suffered no prejudice. As for trial counsel’s failure to introduce good
character evidence, the trial court concluded that trial counsel’s decision not to introduce
the evidence was reasonable given that introducing character evidence could have opened
the door to the admission of evidence regarding Moustafa’s dishonesty.12
       After the trial court denied Moustafa’s motion for a new trial, Moustafa filed a
motion for reconsideration. Attached to the motion for reconsideration was email
correspondence between his then-counsel and Moustafa’s father dated February 2014.13
In an email, Moustafa’s father stated that Moustafa had been a victim of an assault in
2005, after which he spent 10 days in a psychiatric hospital in France. Moustafa’s father
also noted that Lauren had stated that Moustafa “stayed 2 times in a psychiatric hospital
while they were married.” Moustafa’s father suggested that “we can say that [Moustafa]
suffers from psychological problems and that he was not normal in his dispute with

       12
          Moustafa has raised these same claims of ineffective assistance on appeal. As
we have stated, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings as to these claims of
ineffective assistance that were raised in the new trial motion to the extent that they are
supported by substantial evidence. (Taylor, supra, 162 Cal.Ap.3d at pp. 724-725.)
However, the trial court here made few factual findings as there was no separate
evidentiary hearing—the trial court merely credited trial counsel’s explanations for
failing to present a mental health defense and for failing to present good character
evidence, deeming counsel’s omissions to be tactical and reasonable. Thus, we
essentially apply a de novo standard of review to these claims of ineffective assistance, as
we must review de novo the ultimate question of whether the facts as determined by the
trial court (in this case, trial counsel’s written explanations for his omissions)
demonstrate a violation of Moustafa’s right to effective counsel. (Ibid.)
       13
         Moustafa’s trial counsel was in possession of this e-mail, in a folder labeled
with predecessor counsel’s name.

                                             47
[S.D.].” The trial court denied the new trial motion again after considering the additional
arguments.
       3.     Failure to Investigate Mental Health Defenses
       First, we address Moustafa’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to investigate his mental health, which precluded him from pursuing
a defense based on diminished actuality and pursuing a defense of legal insanity. We
conclude that trial counsel’s failure to investigate Moustafa’s mental health constituted
deficient performance but that Moustafa has failed to demonstrate prejudice from trial
counsel’s omissions.
              a.       Deficient Performance
       Moustafa argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because
counsel should have reasonably known that he had mental health issues yet failed to
investigate possible defenses.
       In part, Moustafa points out that shortly after he was incarcerated for his offenses
in 2013, he was diagnosed with depression and prescribed medication for “psychotic
symptoms.” Here, trial counsel did not sign the more specifically worded declaration
prepared by Moustafa’s new counsel that averred that trial counsel “did not obtain
[Moustafa’s] medical and mental health records before trial” and that he did not
“investigate a mental health defense based upon diminished intent or insanity.” Trial
counsel, however, responded to new counsel’s declaration by clarifying only that he did
in fact obtain Moustafa’s medical records—neither specifically addressing nor denying
new counsel’s assertion that he failed to obtain Moustafa’s mental health records.
Presumably, had trial counsel acquired Moustafa’s mental health records, trial counsel
would have said so in his letter. (See, e.g., People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1189
[if a person makes a statement in the presence of a party that would normally call for a
response if the statement were untrue, party’s silence, evasion, or equivocation may be

                                             48
considered as a tacit admission].) The record therefore reflects that trial counsel failed to
obtain Moustafa’s mental health records.
       Under the circumstances, there can be no rational, tactical basis for trial counsel’s
omissions. Trial counsel generally stated in his letter that he did not investigate a mental
health defense because he did not believe “that Mr. Moustafa had either a diminished
intent, was legally unconscious or was insane.” Although at the outset trial counsel
sought a psychological evaluation from Dr. Williams, that evaluation was limited to
Moustafa’s risk of reoffending. Williams ultimately opined that he had no basis to
diagnose Moustafa with any mental health condition, but this opinion was based on a
clinical interview without any of Moustafa’s mental health records, the existence of
which counsel was on notice of.
       In this case, trial counsel was aware—or at least on notice—that Moustafa had a
history of mental illness requiring successive hospitalizations, yet trial counsel did not
investigate that history or evaluate whether it might supply viable defenses or mitigation.
The limited purpose and inadequately informed scope of Williams’s assessment does not
remedy this deficiency. Moustafa’s trial counsel was in possession of correspondence
from Moustafa’s father dated three years before Williams conducted his evaluation, in
which Moustafa’s father raised the issue of Moustafa’s “psychological problems” and
reported that (1) the father had “all the documents” regarding Moustafa’s psychiatric
hospitalization in France and (2) Lauren had knowledge of two subsequent psychiatric
hospitalizations in the United States. The correspondence included a handwritten note on
the letterhead of a Paris-based doctor referencing Moustafa’s “serious psychological
disorders requiring numerous hospitalizations and consultations for anxiety[,]
psychosis[,] and attempted suicide.” And as Moustafa points out, he was diagnosed with
depression and prescribed medication for “psychotic symptoms” shortly after his arrest.
       At the hearing on Moustafa’s motion for a new trial, the trial court concluded that
Moustafa’s trial counsel may have had a valid tactical reason for choosing to dispute only
                                             49
whether Moustafa committed the criminal acts and not whether he had criminal intent.
The trial court reasoned that a mental health defense might have “diluted” Moustafa’s
defense at trial that he did not inflict the injuries on S.D. We agree that adequately
informed trial counsel may develop valid tactical reasons to not present mental defenses
at trial, as such defenses may indeed undercut an alternative defense that Moustafa did
not commit the acts at all. But it is not the objective or relative merit of the trial defenses
that were actually presented or rejected that we evaluate here, but trial counsel’s
antecedent failure to ensure that the choice of trial defense would be informed by an
adequate investigation of Moustafa’s mental health history in the first place. “Counsel’s
first duty is to investigate the facts of his client’s case and to research the law applicable
to those facts.” (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 222.) Thus, “ ‘[c]riminal
defense attorneys have a “ ‘duty to investigate carefully all defenses of fact and of law
that may be available to the defendant . . . .’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Doing so permits trial counsel
to “make an informed recommendation to his client.” (Ibid.)
       We appreciate that trial counsel undertook an evaluation, albeit for a limited
purpose, and we do not suggest that counsel lacked the discretion to make informed
decisions about what evaluations to commission. But without knowing the basis for
Moustafa’s prior psychiatric hospitalizations, trial counsel’s reliance here on his own lay
opinion that Moustafa was not mentally ill was not informed decisionmaking: it was
objectively unreasonable on these facts. The failure to investigate mental health defenses
“deprived [trial counsel] of the reasonable bases upon which to reach informed tactical
and strategic trial decisions.” (People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 163; People v.
Mozingo (1983) 34 Cal.3d 926, 934 (Mozingo).) Williams’s assessment of Moustafa—
given its focus on future dangerousness—did little to inform counsel about available
defenses to allegations of past criminal conduct. To the limited extent that the Williams
evaluation hazarded a diagnosis, counsel’s withholding from the expert known,
accessible, relevant information about Moustafa’s past psychiatric treatment prevents us
                                              50
from treating counsel’s decision to commission the evaluation as a substitute for actually
obtaining those records and properly interpreting them. Nor does Moustafa’s own
participation in the evaluation cure the deficiency in counsel’s performance: in view of
Moustafa’s documented delusions, paranoia, and grandiosity, we are unable to sanction
trial counsel’s reliance on him to inform Williams of his relevant history. (See Mozingo,
supra, at p. 933 [noting referee’s conclusion that “ ‘by its inherent nature, a mental
defense is often beyond the client's understanding’ ”].)
       Accordingly, we conclude that in this case, trial counsel’s failure to investigate
Moustafa’s possible mental health defenses was not a reasonable tactical decision and fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687.)
              b.     Prejudice
       Next, Moustafa argues that trial counsel’s failure to investigate was prejudicial
because it precluded him from pursuing various defenses related to his mental health:
defense of others or legal necessity, diminished actuality, or a plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity. Primarily, Moustafa relies on the psychological report prepared by Coles,
reflecting a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, and argues that the introduction of such
evidence would have resulted in a more favorable verdict. (See Strickland, supra, 466
U.S. at p. 694.) Notwithstanding our concerns regarding trial counsel’s failure of
investigation, we conclude that Moustafa is unable to demonstrate on this record that he
was prejudiced by trial counsel’s omissions.
                     i.     Defense of Others or Legal Necessity
       First, we reject Moustafa’s claim that his mental health diagnosis would on this
record have made viable the theories of self-defense, defense of another (CALCRIM
No. 3470), or legal necessity (CALCRIM No. 3403). Assuming without deciding that

                                             51
such defenses would apply,14 a requirement for self-defense of others is that a person
must believe that a third party was in “imminent harm”—“ ‘[f]ear of future harm—no
matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm—will not
suffice.’ ” (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 (Humphrey).) “ ‘ “ ‘[T]he
peril must appear to the defendant as immediate and present and not prospective or even
in the near future. An imminent peril is one that, from appearances, must be instantly
dealt with.’ ” ’ ” (People. v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 270 (Trujeque).) Similarly,
the defense of legal necessity requires that the defendant prove that there was “ ‘an
emergency situation involving the imminence of greater harm that the illegal act seeks to
prevent.’ ” (Id. at p. 273.) Coles’s report itself focused on the precipitating subjective
motivation or justification for Moustafa’s acts—that he was protecting his girlfriend from
a recurrence of sexual assault. For example, Coles generally opined that “[Moustafa]
became solely focused on preventing [A.D.] from being raped and, in his mind, anything
he did to prevent this was justified.” But Coles in his report stopped short of opining that
Moustafa’s paranoid delusions influenced his perception of the imminence of threatened
harm to A.D. (See People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 773 [on direct appeal, “a
claim of ineffective counsel cannot be established by mere speculation regarding the
‘likely’ testimony of potentially available witnesses”]; cf. People v. Sotelo-Urena (2016)
4 Cal.App.5th 732, 747; see id. at pp. 756-757 [prejudicial to exclude expert opinion that
homeless individual who has been repeatedly subject to violence and the threat of

       14
          We observe that in People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, the California
Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine of unreasonable self-defense is unavailable
when the need to defend oneself is purely delusional. (Id. at p. 130.) “A purely
delusional belief in the need to act in self-defense may be raised as a defense, but that
defense is insanity.” (Ibid.) We discuss Moustafa’s claim regarding trial counsel’s
failure to pursue a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity post, part II.3.b.iii.

                                             52
violence “will experience a heightened sensitivity to such threats and will have a reduced
threshold at which he or she subjectively perceives an imminent threat”].)
       Crediting Coles’s opinion, Moustafa’s paranoid belief that his actions were
justified or that he needed to prevent A.D. from future sexual assaults does not avail him
of either of these defenses—there is no evidence that Moustafa believed A.D. was in
imminent harm or that his actions were solely in response to emergency situations that
necessitated instantaneous responses. (See Trujeque, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 270.) The
evidence at trial was that Moustafa escalated his abuse of S.D. only after he believed he
caught S.D. in the act of sexually assaulting A.D. Although it is true that Moustafa made
statements to the police that indicated he believed that S.D. was continuing to sexually
assault A.D. and that A.D. was at a risk of harming herself, Moustafa’s statements did not
describe emergency situations.15 A.D. was not even at home during some of the attacks
described by S.D. At best, Moustafa’s statements to the police reflected his belief that
A.D. might incur harm in the near future, which is not imminent harm. (Ibid.)
Accordingly, Moustafa has not met his burden to demonstrate that he would have
received a more favorable verdict absent his counsel’s failure to pursue these defenses.
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)

       15
            For example, Moustafa told Motomura that S.D. had confessed many times to
touching A.D. Moustafa also vaguely said that sometimes he would “suddenly catch
[S.D.] by the things opening the—and it was just one time after another after another and
another.” Motomura also specifically asked Moustafa if he had hit S.D. to “prevent him
from doing something to his sister,” but Moustafa stated only that he was afraid A.D.
could “kill herself and [he] just can’t live with that.” Moustafa later said that he had
caught S.D. using A.D.’s clothes to masturbate, which caused him to fear “los[ing][his]
little girl,” which in turn prompted him to punch S.D. hard between the legs. These prior
statements do not establish the existence of an imminent threat.

                                            53
                       ii.   Diminished Actuality
       We also find no merit in Moustafa’s claim that evidence of his mental health
diagnosis would have diminished his specific intent with respect to his convictions for
torture, sexual penetration, criminal threats, and human trafficking, as well as the torture
enhancement alleged under the One Strike law.
       To support a defense of “diminished actuality,” a defendant presents evidence of
voluntary intoxication or mental condition to show he “actually” lacked the mental states
required for the crime. (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1253 (Steele).) Under
section 28, subdivision (a), “[e]vidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental
disorder shall not be admitted to show or negate the capacity to form any mental state,
including, but not limited to . . . intent . . . . Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or
mental disorder is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the accused actually
formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice
aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.” “[T]he failure to discover or
present [evidence of diminished actuality] will be considered prejudicial only if it might
have caused a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant actually lacked the mental
capacity that constituted an element of the charged offense.” (People v. Williams (1988)
44 Cal.3d 883, 937.)
       First, Moustafa was convicted of torture (§ 206) which requires “the specific intent
to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion,
persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose.” (People v. Massie (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 365,
370-371 (Massie).) The enhancement alleged under the One Strike law for a sex offense
committed with torture (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(3)) requires the same specific intent.
Generally, “ ‘[c]ourts have interpreted intent to inflict “cruel” pain and suffering as an
intent to inflict extreme or severe pain.’ ” (People v. Odom (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 237,
246.) For example, the existence of anger does not negate the specific intent to cause

                                              54
cruel or extreme pain that is required for a conviction of torture. (Massie, supra, 142
Cal.App.4th 365, 372.)
       Here, Coles opined that Moustafa’s bipolar disorder may have played a part in his
offenses because he believed that his actions were justified, and he was committed to
protect A.D. from being sexually assaulted. And in his supplemental letter, Coles opined
that a person with a condition like Moustafa’s would be “making decisions based upon a
faulty apprehension of reality,” and that his actions would be “dominated by
unrealistic . . . delusional concerns and one weighs the consequences of one’s actions, if
at all, i[n] light of these same concerns.” However, Moustafa’s belief that his actions
were justified or his failure to appropriately weigh the consequences of his actions does
not negate an intent to cause cruel or extreme pain. And nothing in Coles’s opinion
suggested that Moustafa’s mental disorder prevented him from forming the intent to
cause S.D. pain. Moreover, the fact that Moustafa believed that his actions were a
necessary response to S.D.’s alleged sexual assaults against his sister would have
supplied a basis for the trial court to conclude that Moustafa committed the acts either as
revenge or as a form of persuasion to prevent S.D. from committing further, similar
assaults. Such an intent would satisfy the specific intent for torture under section 206.
(See Massie, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 370-371.)
       Second, Moustafa was convicted of forcible sexual penetration, which requires
that a penetration be committed “for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse
by any foreign object.” (§ 289, subd. (k)(1).) Thus, “the crime of unlawful sexual
penetration requires the specific intent to gain sexual arousal or gratification or to inflict
abuse on the victim.” (People v. McCoy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1538 (McCoy),
italics added.) The intent to inflict abuse has no sexual component and means “ ‘to injure
or hurt badly, not lewdness.’ ” (Id. at p. 1541.)
       Here, although Coles opined that Moustafa’s acts were not sexually motivated,
there is no requirement that Moustafa commit sexual penetration solely for the purpose of
                                              55
sexual gratification—all that is required for a conviction for sexual penetration is the
intent to inflict abuse. (See McCoy, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1541.) In fact, the
prosecutor’s theory of the case was never that Moustafa had the intent to gain sexual
arousal or gratification from his acts—only that Moustafa accomplished his act with
duress, force, and violence. Moreover, as with Moustafa’s torture conviction, the fact
that Moustafa believed his actions were justified or that the planning of his actions was
“outweighed” by his delusional concerns was not evidence that he lacked an intent to
inflict abuse or injury on S.D. Rather, Moustafa’s mental disorder provided him a motive
to commit the abuse.
       Third, Moustafa was convicted of criminal threats (§ 422) against both S.D. and
A.D., which requires that a person “willfully threaten[s] to commit a crime which will
result in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the
statement . . . be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out.”
(Ibid.) Moustafa, however, presents no evidence that his mental disorder prevented him
from intentionally making a threat. (See People v. O’Hearn (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 280,
298 [psychosis disorder could have been used to persuade a jury that a defendant lacked
the “intentionality necessary” for a violation of section 422].) In fact, Moustafa’s
paranoid belief that A.D. was in danger and S.D. was harming her supplied him with a
reason to make a real threat toward S.D. And even if Moustafa believed that he needed
to protect A.D. and that his threats against her were somehow for her greater good, his
bipolar disorder does not negate his intent that his threats be taken seriously.
       And finally, Moustafa was convicted of human trafficking (§ 236.1, subd. (a)),
which requires that a defendant act with the specific intent “to obtain forced labor or
services.” (Ibid.) Even if we assume, as Moustafa argues, that Moustafa possessed a
delusional belief that S.D. owed him some sort of debt or he was sent by God to protect
A.D. and S.D., this belief would not have negated his intent to obtain forced labor from
S.D. as a means to repay that imagined debt. In fact, such a delusion explained why
                                               56
Moustafa would force S.D. to work. Nor would the existence of a real debt have negated
Moustafa’s specific intent to commit human trafficking. Moreover, though there is
evidence that Moustafa believed S.D. owed him money, this evidence does not show that
Moustafa believed that S.D. consented to forced labor as a means of repayment.
       We note that in his supplemental letter, Coles also offered that “it is most often the
case that mania or any severe emotional state compromises one’s ability to think
rationally.” Yet this generalized assertion would not reasonably suggest to a factfinder
that Moustafa actually lacked the requisite mental states—i.e., that he did not intend to
cause S.D. pain, or that he did not intend to inflict injury or abuse. (See Steele, supra, 27
Cal.4th at p. 1253.) In context, Coles’s opinion here goes more toward Moustafa’s
decisionmaking process and his ability to be deterred by the consequences of his crimes,
and whether he was able to think “rationally” about these consequences before acting.
That Moustafa may have been overly influenced by his delusional belief that S.D. was
abusing A.D. did not demonstrate his lack of specific intent.
       Moustafa, however, argues that a diminished actuality defense can be established
by “testimony describing how mental illness generally affects a person’s intent and that it
could have affected the defendant’s required intent at the time of the offense.” To
support his claim, Moustafa cites to People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975 (Reyes),
People v. Cortes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 873 (Cortes) and People v. Herrera (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 467 (Herrera). In these three cases, the Courts of Appeal determined that
the respective trial courts prejudicially erred by excluding individualized expert
testimony as to the defendants’ respective mental health that could have negated a
necessary specific intent or knowledge. (Reyes, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 986; Cortes,
supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 912; Herrera, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 478.)
       We agree that evidence of mental illness may be relevant and admissible in
countering an allegation of specific criminal intent, but it is not the general admissibility
of such evidence that is at issue—at issue is the impact of such evidence on a factfinder
                                              57
and whether it is reasonably probable that such evidence would have resulted in a more
favorable outcome for Mosutafa. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) To that end,
Reyes, Cortes, and Herrera are distinguishable because in each of these cases, the nexus
between the defendants’ respective mental disorders and the specific intent the disorder
might negate was clear.
       In Reyes, the defendant’s mental health was relevant to whether he knew the items
he had were stolen. The Reyes defendant testified that he used controlled substances and
that he did not recall when he obtained the stolen items as he had “ ‘trouble when [he]
use[d] a lot of drugs remembering things of that nature’ ” and that when he was on drugs,
he had a “ ‘compulsion, you know, just to pick, . . . on trash cans.’ ” (Reyes, supra, 52
Cal.App.4th at pp. 980-981.)16 The excluded expert testimony was that the defendant’s
mental health issues could have rendered it “possible for such a person to lack knowledge
of his acts.” (Reyes, supra, at p. 981.)
       In Cortes, the trial court precluded the expert from testifying that the defendant,
who was charged with premeditated and deliberated murder, was in a dissociative state or
even that he exhibited behavior from which a trier of fact could infer that he was in a
dissociative state. (Cortes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at pp. 899-900.) At trial, the
defendant had testified about his prior experiences, including an altercation the defendant

       16
          It also appears that in Reyes, the Court of Appeal may have applied the more
stringent standard of prejudice articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18,
24 (Chapman) (holding that federal constitutional error warrants reversal unless shown to
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). “ ‘As a general matter, the “[a]pplication of the
ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to
present a defense.” [Citations.]’ ” (People v. McNeal (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1183, 1203.)
However, “completely excluding evidence of an accused’s defense theoretically could
rise” to the level of infringing upon a defendant’s right to present a defense—and in that
case, Chapman applies. (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102-1103.) And in
Reyes, the Court of Appeal held that the “total preclusion of evidence” unfairly denied
the defendant of an opportunity to prove he lacked the requisite knowledge. (Reyes,
supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 986.)
                                             58
had at age 12 or 13 with his mother’s then-boyfriend, which generated a “trapped
feeling”—the same feeling the defendant felt when he committed the subsequent murder.
(Cortes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th 873, 886.) It is axiomatic that a defendant in a
dissociative state is not conscious of acting and therefore cannot deliberate or
premeditate.
       And likewise, in Herrera, an expert was permitted to testify only about the generic
definition of trauma and PTSD but was precluded from testifying about the defendant’s
psychiatric impairments at the time he allegedly committed premeditated and deliberated
murder. (Herrera, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 474-475.) At trial, there was evidence
that the defendant had experienced PTSD and had been sexually molested and abused in
the past; the defendant later testified that the victim had grabbed a knife and lunged at
him first, and that the defendant accordingly thought the victim was going to kill him,
which sent the defendant into a “ ‘rage.’ ” (Herrera, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 471-
474.) Thus, in Herrera, the excluded evidence could have supported the defendant’s
theory “that he attacked his friend while under a dissociative, PTSD-induced fog.” (Id. at
p. 479.)
       Here, Coles supplied both a report and a supplemental letter evaluating Moustafa,
but his expert opinion can be distilled to generic assertions that Moustafa’s course of
conduct was set off by his “delusional paranoia” and that his bipolar disorder “clearly
affected his thinking and psychological state and intent at the time he committed the
controlling offenses.” And as we described, ante, these opinions do not suggest that, at
the time of his offenses, Moustafa actually lacked the scienter required for the crimes of
which he was convicted. (Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1253.)
       Although section 29 precludes an expert from testifying “as to whether the
defendant had or did not have the required mental states,” what forecloses a finding of
prejudice on the appellate record here is evidence from which the trier of fact could
reasonably infer not merely that Moustafa suffered from delusions and paranoia in the
                                             59
prolonged time frame over which he abused S.D. and A.D., but that his delusions and
paranoia negated the specific intent “to cause cruel or extreme pain . . . for persuasion”
(§ 206), “to inflict” abuse (§ 289), to have his “statement[s] . . . be taken as a threat”
(§ 422), or “to obtain forced labor or services” (§ 236.1). Taken as a whole, the evidence
at trial and in the new trial motion does not reasonably suggest that Moustafa actually
lacked the requisite mental states at the time he committed the offenses. Far from
suggesting that he was experiencing relevant delusions or paranoia or exhibiting
symptoms of such disorders at or near the time of criminal acts charged, Moustafa
continued, according to Coles, to “den[y] a good deal of the violent behavior he was
convicted of.” This stands in contrast with Reyes, Herrera, and Cortes.
       “In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is not whether a court can be
certain counsel’s performance had no effect on the outcome or whether it is possible a
reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted differently. [Citations.]
Instead, Strickland asks whether it is ‘reasonably likely’ the result would have been
different.” (Harrington v. Richter (2011) 562 U.S. 86, 111.) “The likelihood of a
different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” (Id. at p. 112.) We agree that
it is possible that counsel’s failure to investigate impacted the outcome of Moustafa’s
case. We are unable to conclude on this appellate record, however, that it is reasonably
likely that the result would have been different absent counsel’s failure to investigate.
(Ibid.; Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)
                      iii.   Plea of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
       Next, Moustafa argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately
investigate and pursue a defense that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. We
conclude that even though trial counsel was ineffective, Moustafa has not demonstrated
that counsel’s omissions were prejudicial.
       To prevail on a defense of insanity, Moustafa would have to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that at the time the offense was committed, he was
                                              60
incapable of knowing or understanding the nature of his act or of distinguishing right
from wrong. (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 169-170; § 25, subd. (b).) Here,
Coles’s opinion was that Moustafa believed that his actions were justified, that he was
saving A.D. from a renewed sexual assault, and that he may not have rationally weighed
the consequences of his actions. Coles, however, gave no opinion on whether Moustafa’s
mental disorder prohibited him from being able to distinguish right from wrong or from
being able to understand the nature of his actions.
       For example, there was evidence that though Moustafa may have believed he was
acting for A.D.’s benefit, he nevertheless understood the wrongfulness of his specific
conduct. A.D. testified that Moustafa coached her on what to say to the police—
including that Moustafa was a “good guy” that had “nothing to do with anything with the
beatings.” A.D. also testified that Moustafa expressed concern that the police would see
injuries on S.D., suggesting that he knew that the “beatings” he had administered were in
fact wrong and that he wished to evade criminal prosecution for his actions. During the
pretext phone call between S.D. and Moustafa, Moustafa repeatedly asked S.D. if S.D.
believed that Moustafa beat him, and if S.D. did, Moustafa would “want to go to court”
because if he in fact “did something wrong” he would “need to face justice.” Moustafa’s
comments suggest that he knew that beating S.D. in any capacity could be considered
criminal. Likewise, during his interview with Detective Motomura, Moustafa admitted
that he “hit [S.D.] really hard” several times, in part because he found S.D. masturbating
to a piece of A.D.’s clothes. Moustafa, however, denied any wrongful conduct and
asserted that he did not “abuse” S.D. or “hurt him every day.” Moustafa’s attempt at
minimizing his conduct to Motomura again suggests that he knew that physical abuse
was impermissible.
       On this record, Moustafa therefore fails to meet his burden to demonstrate that had
evidence of his bipolar disorder been admitted, it is reasonably probable that he would

                                            61
have been able to successfully pursue an insanity defense. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at
p. 694.)
       People v. Leeds (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 822, upon which Moustafa relies, is
distinguishable. In Leeds, the Second Appellate District noted in the context of self-
defense that “[a] person suffering from a delusion that causes him to fear that another is
attempting to take his life is legally insane if the facts perceived as the product of his
delusion would legally justify his acting in self-defense.” (Id. at p. 829.) Thus, if a
defendant, as a consequence of his or her delusion, believes that there is imminent peril,
then he or she would be exempt from punishment for acting in self-defense. (Ibid.)
Leeds is inapplicable. As we noted, ante, Moustafa’s paranoid beliefs about S.D.’s
alleged sexual assault of his sister A.D. would not have given rise to a defense of either
defense of others or necessity, as there was no evidence in the trial record or even his
extrajudicial statements in Coles’s report to suggest that he committed the criminal acts
in fear of imminent harm. Unlike Leeds, Moustafa’s paranoid delusions did not legally
justify his actions under a theory of self-defense. (Id. at p. 828 [“ ‘[p]ersons who are
paranoid and believe that the victim is going to get them some time in the future, so they
hunt the victim first, are not’ insane”]; see also Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1082
[“ ‘[f]ear of future harm—no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the
likelihood of the harm—will not suffice ’ ” for claim of self-defense].)17

       17
          Furthermore, “a criminal defendant must enter a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity personally and in open court.” (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 963;
§§ 1018, 1016.) Here, there is nothing in the appellate record to suggest that Moustafa
would have been amenable to such a plea. In fact, the record reflects that Moustafa
maintained his factual innocence. Although Moustafa agreed to participate in Coles’s
evaluation, Moustafa indicated when asked that “he never physically abused or otherwise
tortured [S.D.],” and he “was extremely reticent to acknowledge suffering with
psychological problems and clearly does not believe that he is delusional.” Moustafa
relies on Mozingo, supra, 34 Cal.3d 926, for the proposition that on appeal he need not
establish any reasonable likelihood that he would have been open to an insanity or intent-

                                              62
       4.     Failure to Investigate and Present Stoll Evidence
       Next, Moustafa argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he
failed to investigate or present evidence of his character for nonsexual deviancy,
otherwise known as Stoll evidence. We conclude that Moustafa does not meet his burden
to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient.
       Generally, psychological opinions “ ‘may be admitted as character evidence
tending to show that an individual was or was not likely to have committed a particular
act.’ ” (People v. Fernandez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540, 567; People v. Stoll (1989) 49
Cal.3d 1136, 1153 (Stoll); Evid. Code, § 1102, subd. (a).) Thus, in Stoll, supra, 49
Cal.3d 1136, the California Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it
excluded expert opinion testimony that the defendant had “ ‘a normal personality
function’ ” and had not previously engaged in “sexual deviancy of any kind.” (Id. at
p. 1149.)
       Moustafa argues that Stoll evidence could have raised a reasonable doubt that he
committed the acts of sexual penetration, as Coles opined that Moustafa was not
predisposed to commit acts of sexual deviancy. The record, however, does not reflect

based defense to demonstrate prejudice. Mozingo, however, was a capital habeas
proceeding in which the high court reviewed a fully developed post-conviction record for
substantial evidence in support of a referee’s findings of ineffective assistance of counsel.
(Id. at pp. 934-935.) It was in addressing Strickland’s first prong that the court—like the
referee—rejected the prosecution’s argument that the defendant’s assertion of an alibi
defense and general denial of guilt excused trial court’s failure to investigate diminished
capacity or insanity defenses or mental illness as mitigation. (Mozingo, supra, at
pp. 933-934.) The high court did not discuss the referee’s resolution of Strickland’s
prejudice prong. And recent cases, including the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) ___ U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 1500], have reaffirmed a
defendant’s right to determine the objectives of the defense—such as whether to plead
guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf, forego an appeal, or to
assert innocence. (Id. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at p. 1508]; see also United States v. Read (9th
Cir. 2019) 918 F.3d 712, 719 [applying McCoy to hold that counsel’s presentation of an
insanity defense over defendant’s objection violates the Sixth Amendment].)

                                             63
why trial counsel failed to investigate or present Stoll evidence. Both the unsigned
declaration that was prepared by Moustafa’s new counsel and the signed letter by trial
counsel are silent on the Stoll issue.18 The record thus does not affirmatively disclose that
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for these omissions, or that trial counsel was
asked for an explanation but failed to provide one. (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.)
       Even if we assume trial counsel’s performance was deficient, however, Moustafa
cannot demonstrate prejudice. Coles opined that Moustafa’s actions were not sexually
motivated and that Moustafa had no sexual deviancy or abnormality. Although Coles’s
expert opinion may have been relevant to whether Moustafa committed the sexual
penetration with the specific intent to obtain sexual gratification or arousal, Coles’s
opinion has no bearing on whether Moustafa’s acts were committed with the intent to
inflict abuse on S.D.—which does not require any lewd intent on Moustafa’s part. (See
McCoy, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1541 [intent to inflict abuse for violation of section
289 does not require lewdness].)
       Likewise, we find no merit in Moustafa’s claim that Coles’s opinion would have
raised a reasonable doubt as to the torture charge under section 206. Moustafa argues
that Coles’s report would have demonstrated that he is not a sadist, which is relevant to
torture because the crime requires a specific “intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and
suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose.”
(§ 206.) Coles’s opinion may have been relevant to whether Moustafa committed the
torture for a “sadistic purpose,” but it in no way negated or called into question whether
Moustafa committed the torture for purposes of revenge, extortion, or deterrence.

       18
          In his opening brief, Moustafa argues that his trial counsel “stated that he
strategically decided to forego good sexual character testimony.” Moustafa’s counsel,
however, generally averred in his signed letter that he chose not to introduce “character
evidence” and did not specifically reference evidence of Moustafa’s character for
non-sexual deviancy.

                                             64
       Accordingly, even if this type of evidence had been admitted, Moustafa has not
demonstrated that he would have received a more favorable outcome. (Strickland, supra,
466 U.S. at p. 694.)19
       5.     Failure to Present Evidence of Nonviolent Character
       Moustafa next argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
investigate and present evidence of Moustafa’s good character for nonviolence. Citing
the transcript of Lauren’s interview with the police where she averred that Moustafa had
never been violent with her, as well as several declarations prepared by Moustafa’s
friends and family, Moustafa argues that multiple witnesses could have testified about his
good character. We determine that Moustafa does not meet his burden to demonstrate
counsel’s performance was deficient.
       As stated in trial counsel’s signed letter, counsel was concerned that introducing
character evidence could open the door to the admission of evidence regarding dishonesty
or other damaging evidence. (See Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) For example, although
Lauren told the police that Moustafa had never directed his anger toward her, she
conceded that she saw him get into arguments with A.D. and S.D. Lauren also said that
Moustafa always had a temper and she frequently argued with him.
       Although trial counsel’s explanation leaves unclear whether such rebuttal evidence
existed, trial counsel may have reasonably decided that pursuing testimony from
Moustafa’s close family members may not have been particularly persuasive, as a

       19
          For the first time in his petition for rehearing, Moustafa argued that if Coles’s
report and supplemental letter offering his opinion about Moustafa’s mental health were
insufficient to establish prejudice under Strickland, the trial court should have ordered an
evidentiary hearing. As his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is substantively
distinct from a claim that the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion without an
evidentiary hearing, we conclude that he has forfeited his claim by failing to raise it in his
opening brief. (See Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1092 [arguments cannot
be raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing], abrogated on another ground in
Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 62-66.)
                                             65
reasonable trier of fact could have readily disregarded their testimony as biased. The
declarations prepared by the family members in support of the new trial motion were also
vague—Moustafa’s friend, sisters, brother, and mother generally stated that they had
never seen Moustafa threaten or harm A.D., and that they were of the opinion that he was
not a violent person. Given the slim nature of the record, we are hard pressed to find that
trial counsel had no possible tactical reason for failing to pursue the witnesses as it is not
entirely clear what their testimony would have encompassed. (See People v. Mendoza
Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 267 [appellate court should not “brand a defense attorney
incompetent unless it can be truly confident all the relevant facts have been developed”].)
       Accordingly, we conclude that Moustafa has not met his burden to demonstrate
that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence of his
good character. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 687-688.)
       6.     Failure to Seek Sanctions for the Return of the Victims’ Cell Phones
       Finally, Moustafa argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he did not seek
sanctions for law enforcement’s failure to preserve or analyze data from A.D.’s and
S.D.’s cell phones before returning the cell phones. We conclude that Moustafa cannot
prevail on his claim because he does not demonstrate that counsel’s performance was
deficient, as trial counsel may have reasonably concluded that a motion for sanctions
would have been denied. We also conclude that even if we assume counsel should have
brought a motion for sanctions, Moustafa cannot demonstrate prejudice.
                     i.      Deficient Performance
       At trial, the parties stipulated that, “[i]f called to testify, Mountain View Police
Officer Fernando Maldonado would testify that he did obtain a search warrant for various
items, specifically including cellphones for [A.D.] and [S.D.]. Those two cellphones . . .
were returned to each respective party and there was no extraction or search done for
those two cellphones.” At trial, Motomura testified if the cell phones had been seized
during the search the police continued to retain them but that he had never downloaded
                                              66
the contents of either sibling’s cell phones. The warrant obtained by Maldonado
authorized the seizure of the cell phones of A.D., S.D., and Moustafa, not the download
of data contained therein. Motomura sought a follow-up search warrant to download the
contents of only Moustafa’s phone: it was not his general practice to apply for a warrant
to download the contents of a victim’s cell phone. Motomura stated that he found S.D.
credible during their interview and did not at that time believe he would find anything on
S.D.’s phone that would not be on Moustafa’s devices. Motomura acknowledged that
information from cellphones “can be valuable for the prosecution just as it could be
valuable for the defense.”
       Generally, “[d]ue process requires the state preserve evidence in its possession
where it is reasonable to expect the evidence would play a significant role in the
defense.” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 878.) The “evidence must both
possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be
of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by
other reasonably available means.” (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 489
(Trombetta).)
       However, a different standard applies to evidence that might be exculpatory if
subjected to further analysis or tests. This is because “ ‘[w]henever potentially
exculpatory evidence is permanently lost, courts face the treacherous task of divining the
import of materials whose contents are unknown, and, very often, disputed.’ ” (Arizona
v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (Youngblood).) In Youngblood, the United
States Supreme Court hesitated to read the due process clause “as imposing on the police
an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be
of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.” (Id. at p. 58.)
Therefore, “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police,
failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process
of law.” (Ibid.)
                                             67
       In other words, “there is a distinction between Trombetta’s ‘exculpatory value that
was apparent’ criteria and the standard set forth in Youngblood for ‘potentially useful’
evidence.” (People v. Alvarez (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 761, 773 (Alvarez).) If the
standard of apparently “exculpatory value” is met, due process has been violated if the
evidence has not been preserved. (Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489.) On the other
hand, if the evidence is merely “potentially useful,” the defendant must also establish the
police or prosecution acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence. (Youngblood,
supra, 488 U.S. at p. 58.)
       “ ‘[T]he presence or absence of bad faith by the police . . . must necessarily turn
on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost
or destroyed.’ ” (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 838 (Montes), quoting
Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 58.) Thus, for example, if the police or prosecutor
“ ‘by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the
defendant’ [citation] and fail to preserve it, that shows bad faith.” (Alvarez, supra, 229
Cal.App.4th at p. 777.)
       Here, the exculpatory value of the victims’ cell phones was not apparent, as it is
unknown what the data from the phones might have disclosed. (See Trombetta, supra,
467 U.S. at p. 489.) Thus, to prevail on a motion for sanctions under
Trombetta/Youngblood, Moustafa would have been required to demonstrate bad faith on
the part of the police or prosecution. (See Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 58.)
       Moustafa argues that the apparent failure to adhere to section 1536, which requires
that evidence seized by a warrant be retained “subject to the order of the court to which
he is required to return the proceedings before him, or of any other court in which the
offense in respect to which the property or things taken is triable[,]” categorically
establishes bad faith. Moustafa, however, cites to no authority for this proposition.
       In People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371 (Flores), the California Supreme Court
examined whether a detective’s failure to follow certain optional procedures to retrieve a
                                             68
firearm as described in the Legal Assistance Treaty Between the United States and
Mexico (treaty) demonstrated bad faith. (Id. at p. 395-396.) The defendant in Flores
relied on several cases from other jurisdictions in arguing that a violation of formal
procedures governing the preservation of evidence constitutes bad faith. (Ibid.) The
Flores court, however, did not adopt the reasoning employed by the out-of-state cases—
the California Supreme Court distinguished them by noting that compliance with the
treaty was not mandatory; thus, the Flores defendant was unable to “identify any
violation of ‘clear and unambiguous’ procedures.” (Flores, supra, at p. 396.)
       On appeal, Moustafa relies on the out-of-state cases distinguished in Flores and
argues that unlike the treaty at issue in Flores, compliance with section 1536 is
mandatory as it is state law. None of the cases cited by Moustafa, however, stand for the
proposition that failure to adhere to mandatory policies or procedures, without more,
compels a finding of bad faith. (See United States v. Elliot (E.D.Va. 1999) 83 F.Supp.2d
637, 647 [ “a showing that the Government failed to follow standard procedure [does not]
ipso facto establish bad faith,” though “the failure to follow established procedures is
probative evidence”]; United States v. Montgomery (D.Kan. 2009) 676 F.Supp.2d 1218,
1243 [examining failure to adhere to policies, among other factors, as probative of bad
faith]; State v. Durnwald (2005) 163 Ohio App.3d 361, 369, 837 N.E.2d 1234, 1241
[failure to adhere to certain policy was considered probative as to bad faith].)
       Thus, under Elliot, Montgomery, and Durnwald, the failure to adhere to
section 1536 in this case is just one factor to consider when assessing bad faith. And
here, given Motomura’s testimony that he (1) does not routinely seek to download
victims’ cell phone data, (2) believed that any relevant evidence from S.D.’s phone would
have been found on Moustafa’s devices, and (3) believed, at least until cross-
examination, the police had retained the siblings’ cell phones, trial counsel may have
reasonably believed that making a Trombetta/Youngblood motion would have been futile.
Failing to make a motion that counsel “reasonably determine[d] would be futile” is not
                                             69
ineffective assistance. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387, superseded by statute
on other grounds as stated in People v. Hinks (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1161-1165.)
       Arguing otherwise, Moustafa reasons that because cell phones hold a vast amount
of data and information (see Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 393-397) and
because Motomura generally testified that this vast amount of data “could be valuable” to
the defense and prosecution alike, it must follow that the police knew the cell phone data
had exculpatory value. (See Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 394, quoting Trombetta, supra,
467 U.S. at p. 488.) We do not join Moustafa in equating a general awareness that cell
phones might contain data useful to both parties with either knowledge that specific data
have potential exculpatory value or an intention to deny a defendant the opportunity to
assess its exculpatory potential. Moustafa’s argument is based solely on the probabilistic
inference that the volume of unknown data on a cell phone may include some with
theoretical utility to a defendant. Although the inference has logical appeal, it falls short
of Youngblood’s requirement that bad faith—to warrant the sanction of dismissal—“must
necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory evidence at the time it was
lost or destroyed.” (Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at pp. 56-57; Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th
at p. 838.)
       For these reasons, United States v. Zaragoza-Moreira (9th Cir. 2015) 780 F.3d
971 and People v. Fultz (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 395 (Fultz), upon which Moustafa relies,
are readily distinguishable. In Zaragoza-Moreira, it was established that a law
enforcement agent was actually aware of the potentially exculpatory value of certain
video evidence before the video was destroyed, as the defendant repeatedly told the agent
that the video would have showed conduct that was supportive of her duress claim.
(Zaragoza-Moreira, supra, at p. 979.) And in Fultz, the case against the defendant
largely relied on the testimony of the accomplices; thus, any statements made by the
accomplices were “highly relevant as impeachment evidence.” (Fultz, supra, at p. 428.)
Yet the government intentionally muted the audio while recording the accomplices’
                                             70
interviews, which had been conducted “for the government’s purpose of prosecuting
defendant.” (Ibid.) In this case, Moustafa points to no part of the record where it is
affirmatively shown that officers were made aware that the victims’ phones in fact
contained potentially exculpatory evidence or that the phones were returned to
deliberately avoid any discovery obligations.20
       Accordingly, we conclude that Moustafa has failed to meet his burden on the first
prong of the Strickland test. Under the circumstances presented here, a reasonably
competent attorney may have determined that a motion for sanctions would not have
been granted. (People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 387; Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at
pp. 687-688.)
                     ii.    Prejudice
       Moreover, even if we assume that failing to bring a Trombetta/Youngblood motion
constituted deficient performance, we conclude that Moustafa fails to demonstrate he
would have received a more favorable outcome.
       Moustafa focuses on sanctions as a proper dismissal for the failure to preserve
evidence, but trial courts “ ‘enjoy a large measure of discretion in determining the
appropriate sanction that should be imposed because of the destruction of discoverable
records and evidence,” and not every failure to preserve evidence requires a dismissal of
the charges. (People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 99 (Zamora).) “ ‘The remedies to
be applied need be only those required to assure the defendant a fair trial.’ ” (Ibid.) For
example, the trial court could impose sanctions by “fashioning a suitable cautionary
instruction” to the jury. (People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 894.)

       20
          Moustafa argues that there was no evidence comparable to the data available on
S.D.’s and A.D.’s cell phones available to the defense. It is unclear on this record what
efforts counsel may have explored in the trial court to subpoena corresponding data from
mobile service providers or internet service providers. We note that S.D.’s laptop was
seized and subject to forensic analysis.

                                             71
          The appropriate sanction to impose depends on the circumstances of each
individual case. “[L]awful and proper destruction requires no sanction [citations]; illegal
and malicious suppression of evidence may result in dismissal [citations].” (Zamora,
supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 100.) Moreover, the type of sanction depends on the materiality of
the evidence that was suppressed. “[B]ad faith destruction of evidence which might
conclusively demonstrate innocence could require dismissal. [Citation.] Suppression of
evidence which might impeach a witness for bias, however, may result in a new trial
instead of a dismissal [citation]; suppression of evidence immaterial to the charge invokes
no sanction [citation].” (Ibid.) A court must also consider “the impact of the sanction
upon future cases and future police conduct. If a sanction is to deter suppression of
records and evidence, it must contain a punitive element; it must outweigh the benefit
that the prosecution gains from the suppression. At the same time the court must bear in
mind the public interest in law enforcement, and the harm which may be inflicted by a
sanction which prevents the trial and conviction of possibly guilty future defendants.”
(Ibid.)
          In this case, dismissal of the underlying charges would have been an extreme
sanction, relative to the indeterminacy of harm to Moustafa from the return of the
victims’ cell phones. There was nothing to suggest that the cell phones were returned to
A.D. and S.D. in a malicious effort to conceal evidence; it is unclear whether the cell
phones would have contained any exculpatory evidence in the first place. A more
appropriate sanction may have been to include a cautionary instruction to the jury, but
Moustafa’s case proceeded by way of court trial. And the issue of the returned cell
phones was already raised by trial counsel, who cross-examined Motomura on the subject
at trial. We therefore fail to see how a Trombetta/Youngblood motion would have further
assisted the defense.

                                              72
       Accordingly, we conclude that even if Moustafa had brought a motion for
sanctions, it is not reasonably probable that he would have received a more favorable
verdict. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)
       7.     Cumulative Ineffective Assistance
       Moustafa argues that even if his counsel’s multiple deficiencies were not
individually prejudicial, they were cumulatively prejudicial when considered together.
(See In re Gay (1998) 19 Cal.4th 771, 826-830, overruled on a different point as stated in
People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 425.) We have found or assumed several
instances of deficient performance stemming from counsel’s failure to adequately
investigate defenses related to Moustafa’s mental health, failure to investigate and present
Stoll evidence, and failure to move for sanctions under Trombetta/Youngblood. We
conclude that even if we consider these deficiencies together, it is not reasonably
probable that Moustafa would have received a more favorable outcome absent counsel’s
omissions. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)21
D.     Exclusion of Evidence of “Black Magic” Ritual Islamic Cleansing Practices
       Moustafa argues that he is entitled to a reversal of his convictions because the trial
court erroneously excluded defense evidence linking S.D. to “black magic” ritual Islamic
practices, which he maintains deprived him of his ability to present a defense. He also
argues that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence that S.D. once said that he
believed he deserved the beatings that were inflicted upon him. We conclude that there
was no evidentiary error.

       21
          We note that Moustafa argues only that he was prejudiced at trial by his trial
counsel’s omissions and requests that we reverse his convictions. Moustafa, however,
does not argue that he could have received a more favorable result from a negotiated
disposition in the absence of trial counsel’s alleged omissions. We observe that to the
extent that claims of ineffective assistance may turn on evidence not in the record on
appeal, such claims are more appropriately litigated in a habeas corpus proceeding.
(People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 266.)
                                             73
       1.     Exclusion of Perlmutter’s Testimony
              a.     Background
       Before trial, the defense sought to introduce the testimony of Dr. Dawn Perlmutter
as an expert witness. The prosecutor moved to exclude Perlmutter’s testimony on the
grounds that it lacked foundation and had no probative value. The prosecutor argued that
the defense had represented that Perlmutter’s testimony was relevant to a theory of third-
party culpability—that S.D.’s father had perpetrated the crimes in accordance with
“honor violence and Muslim exorcism rituals.”
       At a hearing before the trial court, Moustafa’s trial counsel explained that
Perlmutter was “a critical witness for the defense . . . because she’s an expert on ritual
practices of various religions” and was familiar with Islam and “the whole concept of
honor violence.” Trial counsel claimed that Perlmutter’s testimony was relevant because
S.D. had made a prior statement to Motomura about how he had once spent a night with
some sheikhs at a mosque in San Luis Obispo and had done “some black magic shit.”
S.D. had also told Motomura that the sheikhs “had this thing that is made up” called
“Ithicoff.”
       Trial counsel proffered that according to Perlmutter, “Ithicoff” is “an Islamic ritual
practice usually performed during the last days of Ramadan,” and S.D.’s reference to
“black magic shit” was consistent with “Ruqyah,” a type of exorcism ritual intended to
remove black magic. Trial counsel argued that Perlmutter believed that S.D. experienced
great shame because of his frequent masturbation and that S.D.’s description of “black
magic shit” was consistent with his going through an exorcism that could have turned
violent and caused injuries similar to the ones he later sustained.
       Trial counsel also argued that Perlmutter’s testimony was relevant because A.D.
had said in prior statements that in Pakistani culture, women are killed because they have
either been raped or lost their virginity. According to Perlmutter, A.D. was “describing a
textbook example of fears and abuse associated with family honor violence.”
                                             74
       And finally, with regards to third-party culpability, trial counsel argued that
Perlmutter’s testimony was relevant because there was evidence that S.D. had previously
complained that his father was “abusive.”
       In response, the prosecutor argued that Perlmutter’s proposed testimony was
“amorphous,” in part because S.D.’s visit to the mosque took place well before the
charged offenses were committed.22
       After considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court found that at least a
portion of Perlmutter’s proposed testimony was not sufficiently relevant to be admitted.
In particular, the trial court expressed concerns over Perlmutter’s proposed testimony
about Islamic rituals, which it characterized as speculative. The trial court, however,
stated that it was inclined to permit Perlmutter to testify as an expert in “a general area of
culture that played a part in this offense.”23
                b.      Legal Principles
       Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350.) Relevant evidence is
“evidence . . . having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) However, a
trial court may exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion, or consumption of time. (Evid.
Code, § 352.) Third-party culpability evidence is treated just like any other evidence, and
is admissible if relevant, unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk
of undue prejudice under Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th
334, 372 (Lewis).) We do not disturb a trial court’s discretionary ruling under Evidence
Code section 352 unless it has abused its discretion. (Lewis, supra, at pp. 372-373.)

       22
            At trial, S.D. testified that he visited the mosque in 2009.
       23
         Despite the trial court’s ruling, Moustafa did not call Perlmutter to testify as a
witness on behalf of his defense.

                                                 75
              c.     Analysis
       Below, Moustafa sought to introduce Perlmutter’s testimony as part of his defense
to either explain how some of S.D.’s injuries could have been sustained as part of some
“black magic” exorcism ritual or as third-party culpability evidence to raise a reasonable
doubt that S.D.’s father was responsible for S.D.’s injuries. We find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of Perlmutter’s testimony.
       Although Moustafa claimed that Perlmutter’s testimony would be relevant to
explain S.D.’s injuries, there is no evidence or suggestion other than S.D.’s reference to
visiting a mosque in 2009 that S.D. was involved in any “black magic” or exorcism
rituals. However, the visit to the mosque took place three years before S.D. moved to
Mountain View with A.D. and Moustafa. S.D. was called as a defense witness, and even
then, trial counsel did not ask him about his familiarity with rituals. In fact, the
prosecutor asked S.D. if he was “a modern Muslim in that you didn’t practice perhaps or
were not familiar with ancient rituals from centuries past,” and S.D. agreed. Moreover,
S.D.’s statements to Motomura about his mosque only vaguely referenced “black magic”
and did not specify that he had been the subject of an exorcism. There was also no
evidence to suggest that S.D.’s father was physically abusive toward him.24 Based on the
record, the trial court reasonably found that Perlmutter’s testimony was speculative and
minimally relevant. In other words, “[t]he trial court simply made a threshold evidentiary
ruling to exclude speculative evidence, the probative value of which did not outweigh its
prejudicial effect.” (Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 373.)
       Moustafa argues that S.D. wrote in his diaries that he focused on a specific Koran
verse that said that those who “decide to change and believe, they will be cleansed of
their difficulties and past sins,” which is consistent with him undergoing cleansing rituals.

       24
          To the contrary, S.D. testified that he never experienced physical discipline from
his father or any other family member from masturbating inside the home.
                                              76
He also argues that there were times that S.D. was away from Moustafa during which
S.D.’s participation in “Ruqyah” rituals could have inflicted injuries upon S.D. These
arguments, however, are again speculative, as there is nothing to tie S.D.’s reference to
the passage in the Koran about cleansing sins to any purported “black magic,” and
likewise no evidence to suggest that any such cleansing rituals took place when S.D. was
away from Moustafa.
       Moustafa next suggests that the trial court’s admission of expert testimony on
intimate partner violence and Stockholm syndrome demonstrates that the trial court
treated the prosecution favorably over the defense because the trial court excluded his
proffered evidence of “black magic,” which he characterizes as similar in nature. We are
not persuaded that any favorable treatment is demonstrated on the record. Moustafa in
this case sought to introduce evidence that was reasonably found to be more prejudicial
than probative. In contrast, the prosecutor sought to introduce relevant expert evidence—
expert testimony on intimate partner violence, which included a subset of traumatic
bonding, Stockholm syndrome—to explain to the trier of fact why victims of abuse may
not, for example, immediately report their abuse or leave their abuser. (See Evid. Code,
§ 1107 [expert testimony on intimate partner battering and its effects are admissible];
People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 903 [expert testimony on intimate partner
violence relevant to victim’s credibility].) Expert testimony on intimate partner violence,
however, is not admissible to prove that abuse occurred; such evidence is admissible
solely to assist the factfinder in determining whether certain conduct is relevant to the
witness’s credibility. (Evid. Code, § 1107, subd. (a); People v. Brackins (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 56, 71.) Excluding speculative evidence on “black magic” offered to prove
culpability of a third party while admitting evidence recognized to bear on credibility of
trial witnesses does not demonstrate bias on the part of the trial court.
       Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s exclusion of
Perlmutter’s testimony.
                                             77
       2.     Exclusion of S.D.’s Prior Statement that He Deserved Beatings
              a.     Background
       Attached to Moustafa’s motion for a new trial was a copy of the police report
prepared by Officer Walsh in San Luis Obispo. According to the Walsh’s report, S.D.
said that “he deserved these beatings [from Moustafa] because they were to make him
better.”
       During trial, on direct examination as a witness for the defense, trial counsel posed
the following question to Walsh: “Do you remember if [S.D.] ever told you that he
deserved the beatings because they would make him better?” The prosecutor objected to
this question on the ground that it was leading, which the trial court sustained. Trial
counsel then asked, “Did [S.D.] ever tell you that he deserved what happened?” Again,
the prosecutor objected to the question on the ground that it was leading, which the trial
court sustained.
       Trial counsel then asked, “Did [S.D.] ever tell you in his mind [the beatings] were
justified?” The prosecutor objected on the ground that the question was leading, which
the trial court sustained. Trial counsel then asked, “Did [S.D.] tell you anything about
how he felt about the beatings?” The prosecutor objected to this question on the ground
that it was leading, which the trial court overruled. Walsh subsequently answered, “That
they caused him pain.”
              b.     Analysis
       Moustafa argues that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence that S.D. had
previously told Walsh that he believed that he deserved the beatings “because they were
to make him better.” Yet as the Attorney General points out, the trial court did not
exclude Walsh’s testimony based on its substance. The trial court sustained the
prosecutor’s objections to trial counsel’s questions based on form—below, the prosecutor
argued that the questions posed to Walsh were leading.

                                             78
       On direct examination, it is generally prohibited to ask a leading question, which
is defined as “a question that suggests to the witness the answer that the examining party
desires.” (Evid. Code, §§ 764, 767.) Here, in attempting to elicit from Walsh a
description of S.D.’s prior statement, trial counsel improperly used leading questions by
suggesting to Walsh that S.D. had said that he deserved the beatings. We discern no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude the questions as leading. (See
People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584 [Evidence Code section 767 vests trial court
with broad discretion to decide when to permit use of leading questions on direct
examination]; but see People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 215 [leading questions
permitted “ ‘to the extent necessary to stimulate or revive [the witness’s] recollection’ ”].)
       Moreover, even if we assume that the trial court erred in barring trial counsel from
asking leading questions, it does not follow that we must necessarily reverse the
judgment. Had Walsh testified that S.D. had previously said he deserved the beatings
and that the abuse was inflicted to somehow make him better, it is not reasonably
probable that Moustafa would have received a more favorable verdict. (Watson, supra,
46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) At trial, S.D. never described the beatings as something he desired.
Walsh’s lone account that S.D. had once said that he thought he deserved the abuse was
minimally probative as to S.D.’s veracity. The evidence would have also been largely
cumulative as there was already evidence in the record from which Moustafa could have
argued and the trial court could have inferred that S.D. thought he deserved to be
assaulted—S.D. had written Moustafa a letter of apology after he was asked to leave the
apartment in December 2012, S.D. continued to stay with Moustafa even after he was
repeatedly attacked, and S.D. even testified that he had been led to believe that Moustafa
would make him a “better person.” Moreover, even if S.D. believed, after the fact, that
he deserved his punishment, this post-hoc rationalization does not retroactively constitute

                                             79
consent to the assault, nor does it otherwise support a defense to Moustafa’s actions.
Thus, Moustafa fails to demonstrate prejudicial error.25
       Finally, we note that to the extent that Moustafa claims that either the trial court’s
exclusion of Perlmutter’s testimony or its ruling on the leading questions posed to Walsh
infringed upon his right to present a defense, “the application of the ordinary rules of
evidence does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.”
(People v. Thomas (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 612, 627.) Accordingly, the trial court’s
application of Evidence Code sections 352 and 767 did not deprive Moustafa of his
constitutional rights.
E.     Cumulative Error
       Moustafa argues that the cumulative effect of all the errors require reversal of the
judgment. “In theory, the aggregate prejudice from several different errors occurring at
trial could require reversal even if no single error was prejudicial by itself.” (In re Reno
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 483.) Here we have found only one error in trial counsel’s failure
to adequately investigate and present a mental health defense. To the extent we have
assumed others—counsel’s failure to present Stoll evidence and to make a
Trombetta/Youngblood motion, and the trial court’s decision to prohibit trial counsel
from asking Walsh leading questions about S.D.’s prior statement—we conclude that
even if we consider these actual and assumed errors together, reversal is not required.
       In part, we observe that although the physical evidence in this case was not
particularly overwhelming, there was ample evidence that Moustafa committed the

       25
          For these same reasons, we reject Moustafa’s claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to elicit Walsh’s testimony through the use of non-leading
questions, which was first raised in his reply brief. Even if this claim was preserved,
Moustafa would be unable to demonstrate prejudice. (See People v. Newton (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005 [Court of Appeal does not consider argument first raised in reply
brief absent showing why the argument could not have been raised earlier]; Strickland,
supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)

                                             80
charged crimes and was sufficiently conscious of his wrongdoing to attempt to minimize
his acts in his account to law enforcement. S.D. and A.D. both testified at trial, and they
largely corroborated each other’s accounts of what transpired, while also acknowledging
their prior misrepresentations. S.D.’s coworker, Zaragoza, also testified and corroborated
S.D.’s testimony. Moustafa’s friend, Chang, testified that she questioned Moustafa about
why S.D. “acted the way that he did when he was at home”—for example, S.D. was not
permitted to freely walk around the apartment—and Moustafa said that S.D. had once
assaulted A.D. Chang also described observing Moustafa engage in controlling behavior
over both S.D. and A.D. S.D.’s wounds were photographed at the hospital in San Luis
Obispo, and Soble, a medical expert witness, testified that he did not believe that S.D.’s
injuries could have been inflicted by masturbation alone.
         “The ‘litmus test’ for cumulative error ‘is whether defendant received due process
and a fair trial.’ ” (People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795.) Even assuming
there were some errors at trial, Moustafa “was entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect
one,” and he received a fair trial below. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926,
1009.)
F.       Senate Bill No. 567
         Moustafa argues in a supplemental brief that he is entitled to remand for
resentencing due to recent amendments made to section 1170 that were effectuated by
Senate Bill No. 567. He argues that he is entitled to resentencing under the new
amendments made to section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2) as well as the
amendment made to subdivision (b)(6). Because we conclude that remand for
resentencing is required under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), we need not reach
Moustafa’s arguments regarding subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2).26

         26
       As amended by Senate Bill No. 567, section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) and (2)
now make the middle term the presumptive term unless “there are circumstances in

                                              81
       Moustafa was sentenced in part to a determinate term of 14 years and four months,
which was composed in part of an upper term of twelve years on count 4 for human
trafficking. At sentencing, the trial court noted that it “appreciate[d] counsel’s recitation
of mitigators in this particular case,” but “[e]ven without the strict accounting the Court
agrees with the probation report that there was a large amount of money taken during the
course of this particular count. And Mr. Moustafa took advantage of a position of trust.”
       Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) now provides that:
“[U]nless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of
justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse,
neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.” The Attorney General concedes, and we agree,
that the new version of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) is retroactive and applies to
Moustafa’s case. (See In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745; People v. Flores (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039.)
       The parties, however, disagree as to whether remand is required. Based on our
review of the record, we believe that it is. As part of his motion for a new trial, Moustafa
attached Coles’s psychological report. According to Coles, Moustafa told him that he
had been beaten “severely” by his father when he was in the third and fourth grades, and
it appears that the physical abuse stopped after Moustafa’s teachers saw his bruises and
reported the injuries to the authorities. Moustafa also told Coles that he had been
molested by a relative when he was around 12 years old.

aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
the middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by
the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)

                                             82
       We acknowledge that Coles did not opine that Moustafa’s mental disorder was
caused by or related in any way to the physical abuse inflicted by his father, or by the
sexual abuse perpetrated by Moustafa’s relative. The trial court, however, did not have
the benefit of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) at the time of the sentencing hearing,
which establishes a presumption of a lower term if its provisions apply. (See People v.
Flores, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039.) And at that time, Moustafa had less incentive
to develop the record about whether his childhood trauma contributed to his current
offenses.
       Generally, when a sentencing court is unaware of the scope of its sentencing
discretion, “the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record
‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it
had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1354, 1391.) Here, we can only speculate as to what the trial court would have decided
had the record been more adequately developed and had section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)
been in effect. Accordingly, we conclude that remand for resentencing is required. On
remand, the trial court may revisit all its sentencing choices and must apply current law,
including the versions of subdivision (b)(1) and (b)(2) of section 1170 that are now in
effect. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)
                                  III.   DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for the sole purpose of
resentencing under the new version of Penal Code section 1170 as amended by Senate
Bill No. 567.

                                             83
                                ____________________________
                                LIE, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
GROVER, ACTING P.J.

_____________________________
WILSON, J.

People v. Moustafa
H047359