Court Opinion

ID: 9537303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:15:33.537518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:24.375064
License: Public Domain

*659BURKE, J.
I dissent. Under the circumstances in this case, the arresting officers were entirely justified in making the limited protective search for weapons undertaken here. Any other course of conduct would have amounted to reckless disregard for their own safety.
The incident occurred at 3 o’clock in the morning in "an area totally devoid of other traffic. Defendant stopped at the intersection where the officers’ patrol car was parked and then drove through a red traffic light at the intersection. The officers pursued defendant for about a quarter of a mile. When the officers approached to within 150 yards of defendant’s car, defendant pulled over to the side of the road and lay down on the front seat with his head toward the passenger side. He remained in this position until the officers approached his car. As there was no other traffic in the area, the officers could reasonably assume that defendant was aware of their presence when he first stopped his car.
The officers told defendant to leave the car, and while one officer was checking defendant’s identification, the other conducted the flashlight “search” in question. The “search” consisted of the officer shining his flashlight on the floorboard in the area where defendant had disappeared from view. This is not a case of rummaging through defendant’s car, opening the glove compartment or trunk, or even searching beneath the seats. The officer testified, “I was looking on the floorboard—didn’t know why he was laying down. Possibility of concealing a weapon or something or other, and this is why I looked at the floorboard.”
The majority rely upon People v. Superior Court (Kiefer) 3 Cal.3d 807, 830 [91 Cal.Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449, 45 A.L.R.3d 559], and Gallik v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.3d 855 [97 Cal.Rptr. 683, 489 P.2d 573], but those cases are distinguishable on their facts. In each case, the arrest took place in “broad daylight,” a factor which was emphasized in those cases. Moreover, in each case, the officer’s avowed purpose for the search was simply exploratory—to see what might turn up; the court noted that his concern for possible weapons was an afterthought. In Kiefer, we set forth numerous additional facts which disclosed that the officer’s conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances. The court stated, however, that when a suspect makes a furtive movement which could indicate concealment of a weapon, “On its face, this concern [for the officer’s own safety] is quite comprehensible.” (3 Cal.3d at p. 830.)
As I pointed out in a recent decision, an officer should not be required to wait until a gun is drawn or fired before he may take the standard minimum precautions for his own safety; in traffic arrest cases, a limited protective search should be permitted whenever the officer has a reasonable *660fear for his safety. (Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.3d 150, 162-163 [98 Cal.Rptr. 649, 491 P.2d 1] [concurring opn. by Burke, J.].) In the instant case, given the time of the occurrence, the absence of other traffic, and defendant’s act of lying down in the seat, after the officers had pulled up behind him, I think the flashlight search was clearly reasonable.
In Kiefer itself, the court acknowledged the great risks which our police officers face and urged the courts to “ ‘do all in their constitutional powers to minimize these risks.’ ” (6 Cal.3d at p. 163.) This case presents such an opportunity and we should uphold the harmless flashlight “search” involved here. As noted in Kiefer, “even a minor traffic citation incident can occasionally erupt into violence.” (3 Cal.3d at p. 829.) I would affirm the judgment.
McComb, J., concurred.