Court Opinion

ID: 9387501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 12:04:17.902687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:13.925471
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                      No. COA22-385

                                    Filed 18 April 2023

Yadkin County, No. 21 JA 34

IN THE MATTER OF: K.J.M.

       Appeal by respondent mother from order entered 10 February 2022 by Judge

William F. Brooks in District Court, Yadkin County. Heard in the Court of Appeals

21 March 2023.

       James N. Freeman, Jr. for petitioner-appellee Yadkin County Human Services
       Agency.

       J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant-mother.

       Keith Karlsson for appellee guardian ad litem.

       STROUD, Chief Judge.

       Mother appeals from an order that (1) adjudicated her minor child Kevin1 to

be a neglected juvenile and (2) entered an initial disposition. On appeal, Mother only

challenges the trial court’s adjudication of Kevin as neglected. Because (1) clear and

convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact, (2) those findings of fact

support the trial court’s conclusions of law, and (3) the trial court did not err in its

1We use a pseudonym to protect the minor child’s identity. This pseudonym was designated by the
parties in accord with North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b).
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                                              Opinion of the Court

conclusions of law, we affirm.

                                         I.      Background

          According to the unchallenged findings of fact, this case began on 3 August

2021 when the Yadkin County Human Services Agency (“the Agency”) received a

report that alleged neglect of Mother’s minor child, Kevin, who was then age six.

Specifically, the report alleged Mother was incarcerated and the child was in the care

of Mr. S2 who was being arrested for possession of methamphetamine. The record

does not clearly establish Mr. S’s relationship to Kevin, if any, beyond detailing when

he was caring for Kevin. Mr. S is not Kevin’s father. The trial court made an

unchallenged finding that someone else, who “is deceased[,]” is Kevin’s father and

further found there was “no current dispute as to the child’s paternity.” Mr. S also

does not share a last name with Mother or any other relative of Mother mentioned in

the record. The only other place the record discusses Mr. S is in a summary of facts

supporting the allegations in the initial juvenile petition. That factual summary

indicates Mother knew Mr. S in some capacity because she knew Kevin “had been

visiting with” Mr. S and knew Mr. S “use[d] substances but thought he had ‘gotten

clean.’”

          After the Agency received the report of Kevin’s neglect, a social worker went to

Mr. S’s home and found that the initial report was accurate; Mr. S was in the process

2   We do not use Mr. S’s full name to, again, protect Kevin’s identity.

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of being arrested on the possession charge with Kevin present at the home. Further

investigation revealed Mother had been incarcerated “for a few weeks” before this

incident and had placed Kevin in the care of her mother, i.e. Kevin’s grandmother,

who subsequently placed Kevin in Mr. S’s care. The investigating social worker then

“recognized the need to seek an alternative arrangement for” Kevin’s care and visited

Mother in jail to inquire about potential alternative caregivers.         Mother only

suggested her brother and his wife, but they “indicated they would not be able to

provide care for the child.”   Mother did not suggest Kevin’s grandmother as an

alternative placement, and, even if she had, the grandmother “was deemed not to be

an appropriate option as caretaker for” Kevin because she had “already left him in

the care of Mr. [S], leading to the situation at hand.”

      As a result of that situation, on 4 August 2021, the Agency filed a juvenile

petition alleging Kevin was a neglected juvenile. The petition alleged Kevin was

neglected in that he “does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline” from his

“parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker” and he “lives in an environment injurious

to [his] welfare.” In the section of the petition where the Agency was supposed to

“[s]tate facts supporting” the neglect “allegations[,]” the Agency referenced an

attachment that primarily included the same factual basis recounted above. In

addition to this information, the petition included the following relevant facts in

support of the neglect allegation: (a) the initial report to the Agency alleged Kevin

had eczema, “but it looked like open sores in the creases of his arms and legs[;]” (b)

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                                    Opinion of the Court

the social worker investigating the neglect report spoke to Mr. S in the back of a police

car following his arrest and he made a number of statements about his drug use and

where Kevin was during that time; and (c) Mother told the investigating social worker

she thought Kevin was visiting Mr. S, but Mother said Kevin was supposed to have

been returned to the grandmother’s care a week before the incident.

         In the factual attachment to the juvenile petition, the Agency also requested

custody of Kevin with full placement authority and the ability to “seek medical

attention” for Kevin for the “possible exposure to Methamphetamines” and for “his

severe eczema that has gone untreated resulting in open sores on his legs and other

parts of his body.” Kevin later tested negative for “exposure to Methamphetamines.”

After he was in DSS care, Kevin was “assessed for significant Eczema and was

diagnosed with Impetigo[,]” but he was given prescription treatment and he “healed

well.”

         On the same day the Agency filed the juvenile petition, 4 August 2021, the trial

court entered an “Order for Nonsecure Custody” based on a determination Kevin was

“exposed to a substantial risk of physical injury or sexual abuse because the parent,

guardian, custodian, or caretaker ha[d] created conditions likely to cause injury or

abuse or ha[d] failed to provide, or [was] unable to provide, adequate supervision or

protection.” (Capitalization altered.) The trial court granted the Agency custody and

directed it to place Kevin in a “licensed foster home” with a further hearing to take

place on 5 August 2021. (Capitalization altered.)

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       The trial court held the hearing on nonsecure custody on 5 August 2021 and

later entered a written order entitled “Nonsecure Custody Order and Pre-

Adjudication Hearing” on 16 February 2022.3 (Capitalization altered.) After entering

findings of fact on the basis for removing Kevin that largely aligned with the facts

supporting the allegation of neglect and on the Agency’s “reasonable efforts” to

prevent removal, the trial court concluded Kevin’s “continuation in or return to” his

own home was contrary to his “health, safety, and best interests.” The trial court also

entered conclusions on the “reasonable factual basis” for the allegations and the

reasonable efforts made by the Agency. As a result, the trial court: granted the

Agency “temporary legal and physical custody” of Kevin with the authority to place

him “in a foster home or other appropriate placement[;]” set a schedule for visitation

“contingent on the [M]other appearing in a sober state and not being incarcerated[;]”

and scheduled a hearing for adjudication and disposition on 2 September 2021.4

       After a continuance due to Mother’s exposure to COVID-19, the trial court held

the adjudication and disposition hearing on 16 September 2021; the Agency, Mother,

and Kevin’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) were all present and represented by counsel.

3 Our record does not indicate the reason the written order was filed later. We also do not have a
transcript from the 5 August 2021 hearing indicating if the trial court also made an oral ruling on
these matters.
4 While our record only contains this hearing date in a later-filed written order, the adjudication and

disposition hearing took place in September 2021 with Mother and her counsel present, and the trial
court made an unchallenged finding in the adjudication and disposition order that Mother was
“properly served[.]”

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                                  Opinion of the Court

At the hearing, the only two witnesses were a “child protective services supervisor”

and a “foster care social worker” who was handling Kevin’s case.

      The child protective services supervisor testified, in relevant part, about the

initial report the Agency received and its assessment in line with the factual

summary from the unchallenged findings of fact recounted above. In addition, this

witness testified the Agency sought non-secure custody because they could not “locate

another relative or caretaker for” Kevin and that Mother “would be classified as the

non-offending parent” in the situation because the “grandmother was the one that

actually allowed the child into” Mr. S’s care. Finally, this witness also attempted to

testify about statements Mr. S made to the Agency social worker investigating the

neglect report—which the Agency had included in its attachment to the juvenile

petition providing facts in support of the neglect allegation—but the trial court

sustained a hearsay objection to any testimony about Mr. S’s statements.

      The foster care social worker testified, in relevant part, about: Kevin’s

placement; the witness’s interactions with Mother regarding her case plan with the

Agency; Mother’s release from jail by the time of the hearing, albeit with criminal

charges still pending; and the lack of additional alternative placement suggestions

from Mother, beyond the suggestion of her brother and his wife in the initial petition,

in a pre-hearing meeting. The foster care social worker also testified the Agency was

recommending a plan of reunification, with a secondary plan of custody, as well as

“standard visitation[,]” which would be “biweekly” supervised visitation.

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                                    Opinion of the Court

      After attorneys for the parties and the GAL presented arguments on an

adjudication of Kevin as a neglected juvenile, the trial court orally found, by clear,

cogent, and convincing evidence, Kevin was a neglected juvenile. The trial court then

moved onto disposition where the only additional evidence was the Agency’s “Court

Summary[.]”     After hearing from attorneys for the parties and the GAL as to

disposition, the trial court made an oral ruling that the plan would be reunification,

the Agency would have “custody and placement authority[,]” and Mother would have

“minimum biweekly” supervised visitation with discretion for the Agency to

“increase, expand, or modify” that visitation as “merit[ed.]”

      On 10 February 2022, the trial court entered a written “Adjudication and

Disposition Order[.]” (Capitalization altered.) The trial court’s initial findings of fact

discussed:   Kevin’s birthdate and the prior history of the Agency’s involvement

including Kevin’s current placement in a foster home; Mother and her “recent[]

release from incarceration[;]” Kevin’s father being deceased and the lack of dispute

as to paternity; and the witnesses for the Agency at the hearing. Then, in finding of

fact 8, the trial court found, by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence[,]” (1) the facts

set out above and (2) additional facts that Kevin “was not in a safe environment with

Mr. [S] . . . and upon [Mr. S’s] arrest was left without a caretaker of any kind.” The

trial court then made further findings on: the accuracy of the Agency’s court report

and its ability to be used to enter a dispositional order; the “reasonable efforts” the

Agency used to prevent Kevin’s removal and find “relatives and ‘nonrelative kin’” to

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                                   Opinion of the Court

provide care for Kevin; Mother’s “interest in doing what is necessary to reunify with

the child” following her release from jail; and a visitation plan “that would serve

[Kevin’s] best interests[.]” The trial court did not make findings in this order about

Kevin’s potential exposure to methamphetamine or Kevin’s eczema or impetigo,

beyond finding his skin condition “healed well” in a paragraph about his time in foster

care.

        The trial court then made a number of conclusions of law. First, the trial court

concluded North Carolina is the home state and determined it had jurisdiction in the

case. Second, the trial court concluded the “allegations in the Juvenile Petition have

been proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” and determined “[c]lear,

cogent, and convincing evidence exists to support an adjudication of” Kevin “as

neglected” because he “live[d] in an environment that [was] injurious to [his] welfare

and did not receive appropriate care and supervision from [his] parent or caretaker.”

Further, Kevin “suffer[ed] from a physical, mental, or emotional impairment or [was]

at a substantial risk of such impairment as a result of living in the injurious

environment[.]” Finally, the trial court concluded it was in Kevin’s best interest that

the Agency have legal and physical custody with placement authority, and the Agency

had made reasonable efforts to “prevent or eliminate the need for [Kevin’s] placement

outside of the home.”

        The trial court adjudicated Kevin “to be a neglected juvenile” and gave the

Agency custody with placement authority. The trial court further ordered the Agency

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                                     Opinion of the Court

to “continue to make reasonable efforts to reunify” Kevin with Mother, including

examining another person as a potential placement, and set supervised bi-weekly

visitation. On 8 March 2022, Mother filed written notice of appeal from the trial

court’s adjudication and disposition order.

                                     II.   Analysis

      On appeal, Mother argues “[t]he trial court erred when it concluded that Kevin

was neglected[.]” Mother makes three specific contentions within this argument.

First, Mother asserts “[c]ertain statements denominated as findings of fact are in fact

conclusions of law and/or are not supported by clear and convincing evidence.”

Second, Mother argues “[t]he trial court’s conclusion that the allegations in the

juvenile petition have been proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is not

supported by the court’s findings of fact.” Third, Mother contends the trial court’s

“findings of fact do not support a conclusion that Kevin suffered from a physical,

mental or emotional impairment or was at a substantial risk of such an impairment”

as required to adjudicate a juvenile as neglected due to (1) the lack of proper care,

supervision or discipline or due to (2) an environment injurious to the juvenile’s

welfare, which are the two relevant parts of the definition of “[n]eglected juvenile” for

this appeal. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (eff. 1 Dec. 2019 to 30 Sept. 2021)

(defining “[n]eglected juvenile”).

      As an initial matter, because Mother only challenges the adjudicatory portion

of the trial court’s order, she has abandoned any challenge to the disposition portion

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of the order. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(a) (“Issues not presented and discussed in a

party’s brief are deemed abandoned.”). Thus, if we affirm the adjudicatory part of the

order, we will also affirm the dispositional part of the order.

      Returning to the issues with the adjudicatory part of the order on appeal, we

first set out the standard of review. Then, we review Mother’s argument as to the

findings of fact. Finally, we address Mother’s challenges to the conclusions of law.

A. Standard of Review

      “The role of this Court in reviewing a trial court’s adjudication of neglect . . . is

to determine (1) whether the findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing

evidence, and (2) whether the legal conclusions are supported by the findings of fact.”

In re D.S., ___ N.C. App. ___, ____, 879 S.E.2d 335, 343 (2022) (citations and quotation

marks omitted). As to the first part of our review, “[c]lear and convincing evidence is

evidence which should fully convince.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

“It is well settled that in a non-jury neglect adjudication, the trial court’s findings of

fact supported by clear and convincing competent evidence are deemed conclusive,

even where some evidence supports contrary findings.” In re J.A.M., 371 N.C. 1, 8,

822 S.E.2d 693, 698 (2019) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Further, “[u]nchallenged findings of fact are deemed supported by the evidence and

are binding on appeal.” In re K.W., 282 N.C. App. 283, 286, 871 S.E.2d 146, 149 (2022)

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

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                                   Opinion of the Court

      Shifting to the second part of our review, we start by examining whether the

findings of fact support the conclusions of law. See In re D.S., ___ N.C. App. at ____,

879 S.E.2d at 343. Then, “we review [the] trial court’s conclusions of law de novo.”

See In re K.W., 282 N.C. App. at 286, 871 S.E.2d at 150 (“Whether a child is neglected

. . . is a conclusion of law and we review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo.”).

“Under a de novo review, this Court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes

its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” Id. (citation and quotation marks

omitted).

B. Challenges to Findings of Fact

      We first address Mother’s argument “[c]ertain statements denominated as

findings of fact are in fact conclusions of law and/or are not supported by clear and

convincing evidence.” “As a general rule, the labels ‘findings of fact’ and ‘conclusions

of law’ employed by the lower tribunal in a written order do not determine the nature

of our standard of review” because “if the lower tribunal labels as a finding of fact

what is in substance a conclusion of law, we review that ‘finding’ as a conclusion de

novo.” In re V.M., 273 N.C. App. 294, 298, 848 S.E.2d 530, 534 (2020) (citations,

quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

      When deciding whether to classify a determination as a finding of fact or

conclusion of law, we use the following rules. See In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505,

510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997). “[A]ny determination requiring the exercise of

judgment, see Plott v. Plott, 313 N.C. 63, [73-]74, 326 S.E.2d 863, [869-]70 (1985), or

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the application of legal principles, see Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, [451]-52, 290

S.E.2d 653, 657-58 (1982)[, superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in

State v. Brice, 370 N.C. 244, 251, 806 S.E.2d 32, 37 (2017)], is more properly classified

as a conclusion of law.” In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. at 510, 491 S.E.2d at 675 “Any

determination reached through ‘logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts’ is more

properly classified a finding of fact.” Id. (quoting Quick, 305 N.C. at 451-52, 290

S.E.2d at 657-58). “[T]he determination of neglect requires the application of the

legal principles set forth in . . . [North Carolina General Statute] § 7B-101(15) and is

therefore a conclusion of law.” In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 283, 582 S.E.2d 255, 258

(2003) (brackets from original omitted and own brackets added).

      Returning to Mother’s arguments, all her challenges focus on a single finding

of fact, finding 8. Finding 8 provides:

                    Pursuant to the aforementioned Juvenile Petition,
             removal of the juvenile was necessary because the juvenile
             was exposed to a substantial risk of physical injury because
             his parent, guardian, custodian or caretakers have created
             conditions likely to cause injury or abuse and have failed to
             provide or are unable to provide adequate supervision and
             protection for the juvenile and lack an appropriate
             alternative child care arrangement. Furthermore, the
             juvenile did not receive proper care and supervision from a
             parent, guardian, custodian or caretaker and lives in an
             environment injurious to his welfare. In this regard, the
             Court finds by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence as
             follows:

                    The [Agency] received a report alleging neglect of
                    [Kevin] on August 3, 2021. The report alleged that
                    the child’s mother was incarcerated and that the

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               Opinion of the Court

child was currently in the care of [Mr. S.] who was
being arrested. Social worker [name omitted]
immediately initiated the report and went to [Mr.
S]’s home to find him sitting in the back of a Yadkin
County Sheriff’s Deputy’s car, arrested for
possession of methamphetamine, with the child on
site. The [M]other was in fact incarcerated in the
Yadkin County Jail at the time and had been for a
few weeks prior to removal. Upon her incarceration,
the [M]other left the child in the care of the
grandmother, [name omitted]. [The grandmother]
subsequently placed the child in the care of [Mr. S].
The child was not in a safe environment with Mr. [S]
at the time and upon his arrest was left without a
caretaker of any kind. [The social worker] assessed
the situation and recognized the need to seek an
alternative arrangement for the child’s care.
[Another social worker] then went to the detention
center to see if the [M]other could offer an
alternative arrangement for the child’s care. The
[M]other suggested [her brother and his wife] who
had provided care for the child during previous
episodes between the [Agency] and family. The
[brother and his wife] indicated they would not be
able to provide care for the child. The grandmother,
[name omitted] was deemed not to be an appropriate
option as caretaker for the child, having already left
him in the care of [Mr. S], leading to the situation at
hand.

[A witness for the Agency] testified that the [M]other
would be classified as a non-offending parent by the
agency. The [M]other’s incarceration lead to her
placing the child in the care of the grandmother
[name omitted] for at least a few weeks’ time. [The
grandmother], in her capacity as the child’s
caretaker, placed the child in an injurious
environment in the care of [Mr. S], who was arrested
for possession of methamphetamine with the child on
site. [The grandmother] failed in providing the child
with proper care and supervision and absent

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                                   Opinion of the Court

                    intervention from the [Agency], the child was without
                    proper care, supervision or a caretaker of any kind.
                    [The grandmother] was not made a party to this
                    action.

(Emphasis added.) Within this finding, Mother challenges the entire first paragraph

and the three italicized sentences from the remaining two paragraphs.

      As to each of these four sections, Mother first alleges some or all of the

statements are actually conclusions of law. Specifically, Mother asserts the entire

first paragraph and the following portions of the three italicized sentences above are

actually conclusions of law:

          •   “The child was not in a safe environment with [Mr. S] at the time[;]”

          •   “[The grandmother], in her capacity as the child’s caretaker, placed the

              child in an injurious environment in the care of [Mr. S;]”

          •   “[The grandmother] failed in providing the child with proper care and

              supervision[.]”

      We agree with Mother the entire first paragraph and those three statements

are conclusions of law because they all relate to a “determination of neglect[.]” See In

re Stumbo, 357 N.C. at 283, 582 S.E.2d at 258 (explaining a “determination of neglect

requires the application of legal principles . . . and is therefore a conclusion of law”).

Under North Carolina General Statute § 7B-101(15), a “[n]eglected juvenile” is

defined, in relevant part, as: “Any juvenile less than 18 years of age . . . whose parent,

guardian, custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, or

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                                   Opinion of the Court

discipline; . . . or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare[.]”

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15). For either of those two parts of the definition of neglect,

there must be a “physical, mental, or emotional impairment[,]” some “harm to the

child[,]” or a “substantial risk” of one of those things. In re K.J.B., 248 N.C. App. 352,

354, 797 S.E.2d 516, 518 (2016) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The first

paragraph of finding 8 and the three sentences excerpted above involve

determinations Kevin was not given “proper care, supervision, or discipline[,]” “live[d]

in an environment injurious” to his welfare, or faced a “substantial risk” of harm from

one of those two conditions. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15); In re K.J.B., 248 N.C. App.

at 354, 797 S.E.2d at 518. Most of the challenged language directly mirrors the

language from the statute and caselaw. The only place that does not use that precise

language explains Kevin “was not in a safe environment[,]” which is another way of

saying he was “in an environment injurious” to his welfare. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-

101(15). Because these challenged portions of finding 8 are actually conclusions of

law, we review them as conclusions of law alongside Mother’s arguments on the

conclusions of law discussed below. See In re V.M., 273 N.C. App. at 298, 848 S.E.2d

at 534 (“[I]f the lower tribunal labels as a finding of fact what is in substance a

conclusion of law, we review that ‘finding’ as a conclusion de novo.”).

      The only other portions of finding 8 Mother challenges both relate to a

determination Kevin did not have a caregiver after Mr. S’s arrest.           Specifically,

Mother challenges the portions of the italicized sentences above finding “upon [Mr.

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                                 Opinion of the Court

S’s] arrest [Kevin] was left without a caretaker of any kind[,]” and “the child was

without proper care, supervision or a caretaker of any kind.” Mother argues any

statement Kevin did not have a caretaker of any kind was “not supported by clear

and convincing evidence” because Mother had placed Kevin in grandmother’s care

upon her incarceration and the Agency had only determined grandmother was not

“an acceptable caretaker” due to grandmother’s role in placing Kevin with Mr. S; the

Agency had not shown grandmother was unavailable to be a caretaker. (Emphasis

added.)

      But all the evidence, as well as the other undisputed findings of fact, show

Kevin would have been left home alone—or at least at Mr. S’s home alone—but for

DSS’s intervention. Neither of Kevin’s parents were available to care for him upon

the Agency’s filing of the petition. Mother was incarcerated, and his father was

deceased. Mother had left Kevin with her mother, but the grandmother had placed

Kevin with Mr. S without informing Mother she was doing so. It is also undisputed

Mr. S was arrested for possession of methamphetamine, leaving Kevin with no

responsible adult to care for him. Mother was unable to identify anyone to care for

Kevin other than her brother and his wife, and it is undisputed they were unavailable

to care for Kevin.

      Whether the grandmother was an acceptable caretaker or not, there is no

indication in the evidence the grandmother was available as a caretaker after the

Agency became involved. While the grandmother was initially Kevin’s caregiver upon

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Mother’s incarceration, it is undisputed the grandmother “subsequently placed”

Kevin “in the care of” Mr. S. The fact the grandmother gave up care of Kevin to Mr.

S indicates she was no longer in the caregiver role in which Mother had placed her at

the time the Agency got involved. The fact Mother did not suggest the grandmother

as a placement option when the Agency spoke with her further indicates the

grandmother was not an option as a caregiver.             Finally, the only reason the

grandmother came up is because the Agency reviewed agency information and

interviewed her because Kevin had spent time with her before. The only testimony

about the results from that inquiry was that the Agency “had concerns about” the

grandmother “caring for” Kevin because of her past role in placing Kevin in Mr. S’s

care, who was subsequently arrested for possession of methamphetamine. Notably,

that testimony did not indicate the Agency had determined the grandmother was

available as a caretaker for Kevin before addressing her suitability; the testimony

only established the Agency determined the grandmother was not an appropriate

caregiver option regardless of availability.

      Additionally, to the extent Mother now argues on appeal the grandmother was

an available and appropriate caretaker, we reject that argument because she argued

the opposite before the trial court. Mother did not present evidence at the hearing,

and her counsel argued the grandmother’s conduct had “led to the removal” of the

child. Mother’s counsel argued, “My client made an appropriate plan. The child was

supposed to stay with her mother, not with Mr. [S], with her mother. She did not

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authorize her mother, at least as the testimony has been here today, for Mr.[S] to

have any contact with her son.” To the extent Mother contends on appeal that

grandmother was an appropriate caretaker and she was actually available to care for

Kevin, she is not permitted to “swap horses” on appeal to make an argument she did

not make before the trial court. See, e.g., In re B.C.T., 265 N.C. App. 176, 193, 828

S.E.2d 50, 61 (2019) (“[T]his Court has previously held that parties are not allowed

to make different arguments on appeal than before the trial court to swap horses

between courts in order to get a better mount.” (citation and quotation marks

omitted)).

      Related to this argument, Mother also challenges the findings Kevin “was not

in a safe environment with Mr. [S] at the time and upon his arrest was left without a

caretaker of any kind.” But the evidence supports this finding as well. There was

testimony the environment Kevin was in with Mr. S was “unsafe” and Kevin “would

not have a caretaker there[,]” so “another plan would need to be made.” Further, the

testimony at the hearing indicates the Agency went to speak with Mother, and the

only placement she offered was with her brother and his wife, but they were not able

to care for Kevin.

      Because (1) there was undisputed testimony Mother’s brother and his wife

were not available as caretakers and (2) there was no evidence the grandmother was

available as a caretaker after the Agency became involved, we conclude Mother’s

challenge to these portions of finding 8 are based on a flawed premise. Without

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evidence the grandmother was available as a caretaker, the only evidence was that

Kevin could not stay in the environment he was in with Mr. S due to the lack of

caretaker, and Mother’s brother and his wife were not available. Based on this

evidence, the trial court could “logical[ly] reason[]” no other caretaker was available

for Kevin. See In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. at 510, 491 S.E.2d at 675 (explaining “[a]ny

determination reached through logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts is more

properly classified a finding of fact”). We therefore reject Mother’s challenge to the

portions of finding 8 that state Kevin had no caretaker “of any kind” after Mr. S’s

arrest.

C. Challenges to Conclusions of Law

      Now that we have reviewed all Mother’s challenges to the findings of fact, we

address her challenges to the trial court’s conclusions of law. Mother challenges two

conclusions. First, Mother argues “[t]he trial court’s conclusion that the allegations

in the juvenile petition have been proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is

not supported by the court’s findings of fact.”

      Second, Mother alleges the trial court’s “findings of fact do not support a

conclusion that Kevin suffered from a physical, mental or emotional impairment or

was at a substantial risk of such an impairment[.]” Mother’s challenge to this second

conclusion relates to the trial court’s conclusion Kevin was a neglected juvenile.

Under both parts of the definition the Agency alleged, there must be a “physical,

mental, or emotional impairment[,]” some “harm to the child[,]” or a “substantial risk”

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                                  Opinion of the Court

of one of those things. In re K.J.B., 248 N.C. App. at 354, 797 S.E.2d at 518; see also

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15). As such, we discuss Mother’s second challenge as a

challenge to the conclusion Kevin was a neglected juvenile.

      We examine each of these two challenged conclusions in turn to determine

whether the findings of fact support them. See In re D.S., ___ N.C. App. at ____, 879

S.E.2d at 343. We then review the conclusions de novo. See In re K.W., 282 N.C. App.

at 286, 871 S.E.2d at 150.

   1. Conclusion on Proof of Allegations by Clear, Cogent, and Convincing
      Evidence

      Mother first challenges the trial court’s conclusion that “allegations in the

Juvenile Petition have been proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.”

Specifically, Mother argues “certain allegations in the juvenile petition were not

proven” because the Agency’s “petition includes statements [Mr. S] allegedly made to

[a] social worker” when she interviewed him while he was in the back of the Yadkin

County Sheriff’s car upon his arrest. When the social worker found Mr. S in the

process of being arrested, he made several statements regarding his use of

methamphetamine. Those statements were mentioned in the attachment to the

petition, but Mother argued before the trial court the statements Mr. S made to the

social worker were hearsay, and the trial court excluded the statements on those

grounds. Based on the trial court’s exclusion of the statements as hearsay, Mother

argues the trial court did not have evidence to support any finding about statements

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                                    Opinion of the Court

Mr. S made to the social worker, as were alleged in the petition, so the trial court

could not have concluded all of the petition’s allegations “have been proven by clear,

cogent, and convincing evidence.”

      Reading this conclusion in context of the entire order, we do not consider the

trial court’s conclusion—“the allegations in the Juvenile Petition have been proven

by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence”—as a conclusion that every single word in

the juvenile petition had been proven.              Mother’s argument is based upon a

hypertechnical reading of this conclusion. The trial court did not make any findings

of fact based upon Mr. S’s statements to the social worker upon his arrest as

mentioned in the petition. The trial court’s findings indicate only that the social

worker went to Mr. S’s home and found “him sitting in the back of a Yadkin County

Sheriff’s Deputy’s car, arrested for possession of methamphetamine, with the child

on site.” The social worker also discovered Mother was incarcerated and “had been

for a few weeks prior to removal.” The social worker “assessed the situation and

recognized the need to seek an alternative arrangement for the child’s care.” None of

these findings are based upon the excluded hearsay evidence, and Mother did not

challenge these portions of the findings are unsupported by the evidence.

      Under North Carolina General Statute § 7B-807(a), the trial court is required

to state it has made its findings by “clear and convincing” evidence:

             If the court finds from the evidence, including stipulations
             by a party, that the allegations in the petition have been
             proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall so

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                                   Opinion of the Court

             state.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807(a) (2021). Indeed, the trial court’s conclusion that the

allegations had been proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is simply

confirming that the trial court properly applied the proper standard of proof as

required by law. See id. This Court addressed the requirement for the trial court to

“affirmatively state” it applied the correct standard of proof in In re A.S.:

             With respect to the merits of the trial court’s adjudication
             of neglect, respondent first argues that the order was
             inadequate because the court failed to affirmatively state
             that the allegations in the petition had been proven by
             clear and convincing evidence as required by the Juvenile
             Code. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B–807 (2007), the
             court is required to recite the standard of proof the court
             relied on in its determination of neglect.

             Although the “[f]ailure by the trial court to state the
             standard of proof applied is reversible error[,] . . . there is
             no requirement as to where or how such a recital of the
             standard should be included.” In re O.W., 164 N.C. App.
             699, 702, 596 S.E.2d 851, 853 (2004) (internal citation
             omitted) (holding that court sufficiently satisfied the
             requirement of statement of standard of proof by stating
             the court “CONCLUDES THROUGH CLEAR, COGENT
             AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE”). Here, the court’s order
             contains the following language: “FROM THE
             FOREGOING, THE COURT CONCLUDES THROUGH
             CLEAR, COGENT AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: . . . .”
             We find this language sufficient to meet the requirement of
             N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B–807.

In re A.S., 190 N.C. App. 679, 688, 661 S.E.2d 313, 319 (2008) (capitalization in

original) (emphasis added), aff’d per curiam, 363 N.C. 254, 675 S.E.2d 361 (2009).

Reading the entire order in context, the trial court’s conclusion that the “allegations

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                                   Opinion of the Court

in the Juvenile Petition have been proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence”

is simply indicating the trial court applied the proper standard of proof in concluding

the child was a neglected juvenile. The trial court obviously did not adopt as part of

its findings every single word of the attachment to the petition describing the

situation.

      The only “allegations” in the juvenile petition that the trial court needed to

make findings of fact to support were that Kevin was a “neglected juvenile” in that

he did “not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from [his] parent guardian,

custodian, or caretaker” and “live[d] in an environment injurious to [his] welfare.”

Whether those allegations were “proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence[,]”

as the conclusion states, relates to Mother’s other challenge to the trial court’s

conclusion of law, to which we now turn.

   2. Conclusion Kevin Was a Neglected Juvenile

      Mother also challenges the trial court’s conclusion Kevin was a neglected

juvenile.    As we have already briefly explained above in the section addressing

whether parts of finding 8 were actually conclusions of law, a neglected juvenile is, in

relevant part: “Any juvenile less than 18 years of age . . . [(1)] whose parent, guardian,

custodian, or caretaker does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline; . . . or

[(2)] who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile’s welfare[.]” N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7B-101(15).

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                                      IN RE: K.J.M.

                                   Opinion of the Court

      Our Courts have added an additional requirement for both relevant parts of

the definition of neglected juvenile because the State has “authority . . . to regulate

the parent’s constitutional right to rear their children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.

390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), only when ‘it appears that parental decisions

will jeopardize the health or safety of the child.’” See In re Safriet, 112 N.C. App. 747,

752-53, 436 S.E.2d 898, 901-02 (1993) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-

34, 32 L.E.2d 15, 35 (1972) (discussing additional requirement in relation to the

“proper care, supervision, or discipline” part of the definition); In re K.J.B., 248 N.C.

App. at 354, 797 S.E.2d at 518 (explaining there is a “[s]imilar[]” requirement for the

injurious environment part of the definition). Specifically, there must be a “physical,

mental, or emotional impairment[,]” some “harm to the child[,]” or a “substantial risk”

of one of those things. See In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. at 283, 582 S.E.2d at 258 (requiring

a “physical, mental, or emotional impairment of the juvenile or a substantial risk of

such impairment as a consequence of the failure to provide proper care, supervision,

or discipline” (quoting In re Safriet, 112 N.C. App. at 752, 436 S.E.2d at 901-02)); In

re K.J.B., 248 N.C. App. at 354, 797 S.E.2d at 518 (“Similarly, in order for a court to

find that the child resided in an injurious environment, evidence must show that the

environment in which the child resided has resulted in harm to the child or a

substantial risk of harm.”).

      Mother’s challenge to the conclusion Kevin was a neglected juvenile relates to

this additional requirement.     Mother contends the trial court’s findings did not

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                                   Opinion of the Court

support its conclusion Kevin suffered impairment, harm, or a substantial risk thereof

as a result of (1) the lack of proper care, supervision, or discipline, and (2) living in

an injurious environment.

      We reject Mother’s argument; the trial court’s findings amply support the

conclusion Kevin was at a substantial risk of impairment or harm because of the lack

of proper care, supervision, or discipline and because of the injurious environment.

The trial court found that following Mr. S’s arrest, Kevin, who was only six years old

at the time, “was left without a caretaker of any kind.” The trial court did not put

any timeframe on the period of time Kevin would have been without a caretaker

“absent intervention” from the Agency, but the period of time Kevin stood to be

without a caretaker appeared to be indefinite at the time of the Agency’s intervention

based on the circumstances recounted in the findings. First, the father was deceased

and therefore could not serve as a caretaker. Second, Mother had been incarcerated

from “a few weeks prior to removal” in August 2021 until at least September 2021.

Third, the only other people offered as caretakers, Mother’s brother and his wife,

“indicated they would not be able to provide care for the child.” Thus, Kevin faced, in

early August 2021, the prospect of an indefinite period of time without any caregiver.

      A six-year-old child without a caregiver for an indefinite period of time faces a

substantial risk of impairment or harm due to that lack of proper care, supervision,

or discipline or due to the injurious environment based on our prior caselaw. For

example, in In re D.C., this Court upheld the trial court’s conclusion of law that a

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                                   Opinion of the Court

sixteen-month-old girl was neglected because she was “exposed to an injurious

environment that put her in an unacceptable risk of harm and emotional distress”

when she was left alone in a “motel room for more than thirty minutes at four o’clock

in the morning.” In re D.C., 183 N.C. App. 344, 353, 644 S.E.2d 640, 645 (2007)

(brackets omitted). Absent intervention by the Agency, Kevin faced a much longer

time without a caregiver than the 30 minutes in In re D.C., which also would

necessarily have included many times at night. See id. Further, the differences in

age and location do not distinguish this case from In re D.C. As this Court recently

explained in In re D.S., part of the problem with leaving a sixteen-month-old child, in

contrast to a newborn, alone in a motel room was that the child “was capable of

exploring and encountering various hazards[.]” In re D.S., ___ N.C. App. at ____, 879

S.E.2d at 338, 346 (citing In re D.C., 183 N.C. App. at 351, 644 S.E.2d at 644). Here,

absent the Agency’s intervention, Kevin would also have been “capable of exploring

and encountering various hazards” if left alone without a caregiver, presumably at

the house of Mr. S, who had just been arrested for possession of methamphetamine,

for an indefinite period of time. In re D.S., ___ N.C. App. at ___, 879 S.E.2d at 346.

Therefore, Kevin was also neglected like the child in In re D.C. See In re D.C., 183

N.C. App. at 353, 644 S.E.2d at 645.

      While the Agency’s timely intervention prevented any harm from coming to

Kevin from the lack of proper supervision, the substantial risk of harm alone is

sufficient to show a child is neglected. “It is well-established that the trial court need

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                                   Opinion of the Court

not wait for actual harm to occur to the child if there is a substantial risk of harm to

the child in the home.” In re T.S., III, 178 N.C. App. 110, 113, 631 S.E.2d 19, 22

(2006). As a result, the trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusions of law

Kevin “suffers from a physical, mental, or emotional impairment or is at a substantial

risk of such impairment as a result of living in the injurious environment described

above” and “[c]lear, cogent, and convincing evidence exists to support an adjudication

of [Kevin] as neglected[.]” Since those two conclusions also cover the same ground as

the allegations in the juvenile petition, as discussed above, the trial court’s findings

of fact also support its conclusion the allegations “have been proven by clear, cogent,

and convincing evidence.” Finally, after a de novo review, we conclude the trial court

properly reached those conclusions.        Mother’s arguments do not convince us

otherwise.

      Mother argues “the trial court only found that Kevin had been placed with his

grandmother, who placed him with Mr. [S], who then was arrested for possession of

methamphetamine.” Mother then find its “noteworthy that the trial court did not

make a finding of fact that Mr. [S] was using illegal substances, much less that Kevin

was harmed while in Mr. [S’s] care or was at substantial risk of such harm.” Finally,

Mother contends even if there was a finding Mr. S was using illegal substances,

“evidence of a parent’s substance abuse is not in and of itself clear and convincing

evidence sufficient to support a conclusion that a child is neglected.”

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                                       IN RE: K.J.M.

                                   Opinion of the Court

      Mother’s arguments misidentify the source of the potential harm.              The

substantial risk of harm was not necessarily from Mr. S’s care but rather from the

total lack of care following Mr. S’s arrest. Even if we assume Mr. S was an excellent

caregiver, he was not available to care for Kevin after his arrest. While the trial court

did not make findings about Kevin being harmed from Mr. S’s care, it did find Kevin

“was left without a caretaker of any kind” following Mr. S’s arrest, absent the

Agency’s intervention.     Mother’s focus on potential harm from Mr. S’s care is

misplaced because the substantial risk of harm supported by the trial court’s findings

of fact, with which we agree following our de novo review, is that Kevin faced the

prospect of an indefinite time without a caregiver.

      After our review, we determine the trial court’s findings of fact support its

conclusion of law Kevin was a neglected juvenile. Further, after our de novo review

of the relevant conclusions of law, the trial court did not err.

                                III.    Conclusion

      The trial court did not err in adjudicating Kevin to be a neglected juvenile.

After determining certain findings of fact were actually conclusions of law that

needed to be reviewed as such, we determine all the remaining findings of fact were

supported by clear and convincing evidence. Further, the trial court’s findings of fact

supported its conclusions of law; Kevin was a neglected juvenile and suffered a

substantial risk of impairment or harm because of the lack of proper care,

supervision, or discipline and because of the injurious environment he faced. Under

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                                      IN RE: K.J.M.

                                   Opinion of the Court

our de novo review of the conclusions of law we further find the trial court did not err

in adjudicating Kevin a neglected juvenile. Finally, Mother did not challenge the

dispositional portion of the trial court’s order. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s

adjudication and disposition order.

      AFFIRMED.

      Judges HAMPSON and GORE concur.

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