Court Opinion

ID: 9900323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:00.718524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.239698
License: Public Domain

790                  November 1, 2023               No. 567

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

 In the Matter of Water Right Application R-87871 in the
                         Name of
          EAST VALLEY WATER DISTRICT,
                        Petitioner,
                             v.
    OREGON WATER RESOURCES COMMISSION,
    OREGON WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT,
        and WATERWATCH OF OREGON, INC.,
                      Respondents,
                           and
                    Joel RUE et al.,
                   Protestants below.
          Oregon Water Resources Commission
                    R87871; A173292

  Argued and submitted November 3, 2022.
   Crystal S. Chase argued the cause for petitioner. Also on
the briefs were Stoel Rives LLP and Kirk B. Maag.
   Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondents Oregon Water Resources
Commission and Oregon Water Resources Department. Also
on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
  Thomas M. Christ argued the cause for respondent
WaterWatch of Oregon, Inc. Also on the briefs were Brian J.
Posewitz and Sussman Shank LLP.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  SHORR, P. J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 328 Or App 790 (2023)   791
792        East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission

           SHORR, P. J.
         Petitioner East Valley Water District (district)
petitions for judicial review of a final order of the Oregon
Water Resources Commission (commission). In that order,
the commission denied the district’s application for a permit
that would allow storage in a reservoir of 12,000 acre-feet of
water annually from Drift Creek, which is a tributary of the
Pudding River. At issue, among other things, was a poten-
tial conflict between the proposed reservoir and an existing
instream water right in Drift Creek, which has the purpose
of “[p]roviding required stream flows for cutthroat trout for
migration, spawning, egg incubation, fry emergence, and
juvenile rearing.” Although the proposed use—storage of
water—would not “injure” the existing water right, the com-
mission determined that the inundation of a portion of the
creek to allow storage of water would frustrate the benefi-
cial purpose of the existing right. The commission concluded
that, “under ORS 537.170(8)(f) the proposed use will impair
or be detrimental to the public interest and so the public
interest presumption is overcome.” It rejected the applica-
tion “because, on this record, there are no modifications that
will allow the proposed use to comport with the public inter-
est to allow for approval.” In other words, the commission
determined that the application for the new water storage
right conflicted with the purpose of the existing instream
water right and therefore the application had to be denied.
         Before us, the district raises seven assignments
of error, contending that we should reverse the final order
because it exceeded the commission’s delegated authority, is
legally erroneous, and is not supported by substantial evi-
dence and reason. The district also requests that we remand
to the commission with directions to issue a final order
and water storage permit to the district that is consistent
with the terms of the Oregon Water Resources Department
Director’s final order, which had approved the permit
with conditions. Respondents Oregon Water Resources
Department (department) and the commission contend
that the commission did not err as alleged by the district.1

     1
       The commission and the department filed a joint brief and we refer to them
collectively herein as the state.
Cite as 328 Or App 790 (2023)                                               793

Respondent WaterWatch of Oregon (WaterWatch) agrees
with the commission’s denial of the district’s application;
however, it disagrees with the commission’s determination
that the proposed permit would not “injure” existing water
rights and raises a cross-assignment of error. As we explain,
we affirm.2
        We are presented both with questions of law and
questions of fact. On questions of law, we review for errors
of law. ORS 183.482(8)(a). On questions of fact, we review
for whether the findings in the commission’s order are sup-
ported by substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(8)(c).
                           I. BACKGROUND
A.    Regulatory Framework
         Under ORS 537.110, “[a]ll water within the state
from all sources of water supply belongs to the public.”
“Subject to existing rights, * * * all waters within the state
may be appropriated for beneficial use, as provided in the
Water Rights Act.” ORS 537.120. “[A]ny person intending to
acquire the right to the beneficial use of any of the surface
waters of this state shall, before beginning construction * * *
or performing any work in connection with the construction,
or proposed appropriation, make an application to the Water
Resources Department for a permit to make the appropri-
ation.” ORS 537.130; see ORS 537.140 (describing informa-
tion to be provided in application for permit). If the “applica-
tion is complete and not defective,” and the proposed use is
not prohibited by ORS Chapter 538, “the department shall
undertake an initial review of the application” and “notify
the applicant of its preliminary determinations.” ORS
537.150(3) - (5). The department must also give public notice
of the application that includes “a request for comments on
the application.” ORS 537.150(6).
         ORS 537.153 contains requirements for the depart-
ment’s review of the application and issuance of a proposed
final order. ORS 537.153(2) provides,

    2
      Based on our disposition of the district’s assignments of error, we need not
reach WaterWatch’s cross-assignment.
794      East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission

       “In reviewing the application * * *, the department shall
   presume that a proposed use will not impair or be detri-
   mental to the public interest if the proposed use is allowed
   in the applicable basin program established pursuant to
   ORS 536.300 and 536.340 or given a preference under ORS
   536.310(12), if water is available, if the proposed use will
   not injure other water rights and if the proposed use com-
   plies with rules of the Water Resources Commission. This
   shall be a rebuttable presumption and may be overcome by
   a preponderance of evidence that either:
      “(a) One or more of the criteria for establishing the
   presumption are not satisfied; or
      “(b) The proposed use will impair or be detrimental to
   the public interest as demonstrated in comments, in a pro-
   test under subsection (6) of this section or in a finding of the
   department that shows:
      “(A) The specific public interest under ORS 537.170(8)
   that would be impaired or detrimentally affected; and
     “(B) Specifically how the identified public interest
   would be impaired or detrimentally affected.”
That is, there is a rebuttable presumption that the proposed
use is in the public interest. The presumption can be over-
come if one or more of the criteria in subsection (2) are not
satisfied or if a preponderance of the evidence shows that the
proposed use will impair or be detrimental to one of seven
statutory public interest factors in ORS 537.170(8). The pro-
posed final order must “cite findings of fact and conclusions of
law” and shall include “[w]hether the rebuttable presumption
that the proposed use will not impair or be detrimental to the
public interest has been established.” ORS 537.153(3)(g).
         If the presumption is rebutted, an application can
still be approved if the director determines that it would
not impair or be detrimental to the public interest. ORS
537.170(8) provides:
      “If the presumption of public interest under ORS
   537.153(2) is overcome, then before issuing a final order,
   the director or the commission, if applicable, shall make
   the final determination of whether the proposed use or
   the proposed use as modified in the proposed final order
Cite as 328 Or App 790 (2023)                                  795

   would impair or be detrimental to the public interest by
   considering:

      “(a) Conserving the highest use of the water for all
   purposes, including irrigation, domestic use, municipal
   water supply, power development, public recreation, pro-
   tection of commercial and game fishing and wildlife, fire
   protection, mining, industrial purposes, navigation, scenic
   attraction or any other beneficial use to which the water
   may be applied for which it may have a special value to the
   public.

     “(b) The maximum economic development of the
   waters involved.

       “(c) The control of the waters of this state for all ben-
   eficial purposes, including drainage, sanitation and flood
   control.

       “(d) The amount of waters available for appropriation
   for beneficial use.

      “(e) The prevention of wasteful, uneconomic, impracti-
   cable or unreasonable use of the waters involved.

      “(f) All vested and inchoate rights to the waters of this
   state or to the use of the waters of this state, and the means
   necessary to protect such rights.

      “(g)   The state water resources policy * * *.”

If a proposed use would “impair or be detrimental to the
public interest, the director shall issue a final order reject-
ing the application or modifying the proposed final order to
conform to the public interest.” ORS 537.170(6). If the “direc-
tor determines that the proposed use would not impair or be
detrimental to the public interest, the director shall issue a
final order approving the application or otherwise modify-
ing the proposed final order.” Id.
         Within 20 days after the director issues a final
order after a contested hearing, any party may file excep-
tions to the order with the commission. ORS 537.173(1). The
commission “shall issue a modified order, if allowed, or deny
the exceptions within 60 days after the close of the exception
period.” ORS 537.173(2).
796        East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission

B. Procedural and Substantive Facts
         The background and procedural facts are undis-
puted unless otherwise specified. In 2000, a group of
Willamette Valley farmers, who were looking for additional
water sources to irrigate their crops, organized themselves
into an irrigation district under ORS 545.025. The district’s
boundaries are in Marion County and its purpose is to
develop a secure source of future agricultural water for its
members. In February 2013, the district filed a water stor-
age application with the department.
         The application requested a permit to build a dam
and reservoir to store, each year from October 1 to April 30,
12,000 acre-feet of water from Drift Creek and unnamed
tributaries of Drift Creek.3 The reservoir would be built
on-channel—in Drift Creek’s streambed. The proposed
height of the dam is approximately 70 feet above the stream-
bed or ground surface at the center of the dam’s crest. The
area submerged by the reservoir when full would be approxi-
mately 384 acres. The application does not require the appli-
cant to provide many details about the container or reservoir
in which water will be stored, explain how the water will be
conveyed, specify the amount of water it will release from
the reservoir on a monthly or yearly basis, or explain how
the project will be financed.4 See ORS 537.140(1). Although
the application asks for it, the district did not provide infor-
mation about the proposed dam’s composition, the locations
and dimensions of its outlet conduits, or its emergency spill-
way. The district responded that, “because it is a water dis-
trict, such plans and specifications are not required before
the Department issues a permit.”
         The application is limited to a storage permit, which
would only allow the district to store water. The district
would need to obtain another water permit from the depart-
ment to use the water. The district would also need to obtain
authority from various state agencies, local agencies, and
federal agencies to build the dam and reservoir, construct a
    3
      Drift Creek is part of the Willamette River Basin, which only allows stor-
age of surface waters from November 1 to April 30. The department advised the
district that its requested storage season would be modified.
    4
      The district estimates the total cost of the project to be $84 million.
Cite as 328 Or App 790 (2023)                                          797

method to convey the water, and use the water.5 Before the
dam could be constructed, its plans and specifications would
have to be approved by the department’s Dam Safety Office;
the dam would also have to be approved by the federal Army
Corps of Engineers. The district indicated in its application
that it did not own the land from which the storage water
would be diverted and transported; nor did it have written
authorization or easements permitting access to that land.
         As of the date of the district’s application, there
were two existing water rights on Drift Creek in the pro-
jected footprint of the reservoir. The water right pertinent to
this petition for review is an instream water right reflected
in Certificate number 72591 issued by the department in
1996, which has a priority date of October 18, 1990. The
instream right was created pursuant to the Instream
Water Act of 1987, under which public agencies, such as
the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW), may
apply for water rights certificates for instream flows to ben-
efit fish habitat, pollution abatement, or scenic attraction
uses. The right in Certificate 72591 allows for specified
monthly amounts of water flow, in cubic feet per second, to
be maintained in Drift Creek from river mile 11, which is
above the proposed dam and reservoir site, to Drift Creek’s
mouth, which is below the site. There are several conditions
that apply to the use of water under the certificate, includ-
ing that “[t]he flows are to be measured at the lower end of
the stream reach to protect necessary flows throughout the
reach.” The certificate states that its “[p]urpose and/or use”
is “[p]roviding required stream flows for cutthroat trout for
migration, spawning, egg incubation, fry emergence, and
juvenile rearing.”
        In July 2014, the department issued a proposed
final order in which it proposed to approve the applica-
tion and issue a water storage permit to the district. In
September 2014, certain individuals, referred to collectively
as the Rue protestants, and WaterWatch, filed protests to

   5
     Those agencies could include the Oregon Department of Environmental
Quality, the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, the Department of State
Lands—which will require a wetlands mitigation permit—the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, and the National Marine Fisheries Service.
798         East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission

the proposed final order.6 The Rue protestants all own or
lease land that would be inundated by the proposed reser-
voir and dam; they would not benefit from the project, in that
the stored water would not be used by them for irrigation.
They asserted that the public interest would not be served
by issuance of the requested permit.7 WaterWatch describes
itself as a “nonprofit membership organization dedicated to
promoting water allocation decisions in Oregon that provide
the quality and quantity of water necessary to support fish,
wildlife, recreation, biological diversity, ecological values,
public health and a sound economy.” WaterWatch asserted,
among other things, several reasons why it believed that the
proposed use would impair or be detrimental to the public
interest.
         In November 2016, the department requested that
the Office of Administrative Hearings conduct a contested
case hearing regarding the proposed final order, and an
administrative law judge (ALJ) was assigned to the mat-
ter. A hearing was held June 18-29, 2018; written testimony
was offered by three of the parties prior to the hearing, and
numerous witnesses testified at the hearing.8 The record
was closed on September 12, 2018, after the parties sub-
mitted closing briefs. The ALJ issued a proposed order in
February 2019, and the parties filed exceptions.
         After reviewing those exceptions, the director of the
department issued a final order dated September 13, 2019,
which affirmed the proposed final order issued in July 2014,
with certain conditions.9 The director concluded as a mat-
ter of law, as relevant here, that “a presumption was estab-
lished under ORS 537.153(2) that the proposed use will not
impair or be detrimental to the public interest” and that the
“[p]rotestants did not demonstrate under ORS 537.170(8)
that the proposed use will impair or be detrimental to the
    6
      The Rue protestants do not appear on judicial review.
    7
      We do not provide details of the Rue protestants’ concerns and specific pro-
tests to the proposed final order as those details are not necessary to explain our
decision.
    8
      The parties to the hearing were the department, the district, the Rue prot-
estants, and WaterWatch.
    9
      The director’s final order is 148 pages in length and contains numerous
factual findings.
Cite as 328 Or App 790 (2023)                              799

public interest.” WaterWatch and the Rue protestants timely
filed with the commission exceptions to the director’s final
order in accordance with ORS 537.173(1).
         At a public meeting of the commission on
November 21, 2019, a subcommittee of commissioners, which
had been created by the commission to review exceptions to
the director’s final order, made recommendations to the full
commission. The full commission allowed oral argument the
following day, deliberated on the disposition of the excep-
tions, and voted unanimously to issue a final order that was
consistent with the subcommittee’s recommendations. The
commission issued a final order dated November 25, 2019.
         The commission adopted and incorporated by
reference, without any modifications, all of the findings
of fact from the director’s final order. It made three ulti-
mate findings of fact: (1) “[i]n-stream water right 72591 is
a certificated right on Drift Creek with a priority date of
October 18, 1990, that provides for specified monthly
amounts of water to flow from river mile 11 to the mouth of
Drift Creek,” (2) “[t]he beneficial purpose of Certificate 72591
is to provide required stream flows as stated on the face of
the water right for cutthroat trout migration, spawning, egg
incubation, fry emergence and juvenile rearing,” and (3) “[t]he
proposed appropriation would inundate a portion of the
reach protected by Certificate 72591.” The commission con-
cluded as a matter of law that the “record establishes that
under ORS 537.170(8)(f) the proposed use will impair or be
detrimental to the public interest and so the public interest
presumption is overcome” and that the “application must be
rejected because, on this record, there are no modifications
that will allow the proposed use to comport with the public
interest to allow for approval.”
         In its analysis, the commission explained that in
the exceptions filed by protestants, they had argued that the
proposed use would not protect Certificate 72591 “because
the in-stream water right requires that the protected flows
be maintained throughout the 11-mile reach of the in-stream
water right, as opposed to only being protected at the mouth
of Drift Creek.” The protestants had also argued that “the
conditions in the Director’s Final Order do not address all of
800           East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission

the expected impacts of the proposed use because the con-
ditions do not ‘make up for’ the inundation of Drift Creek
within the reservoir footprint.” And because the director’s
final order did not fully address the impacts of inundation,
the protestants asserted that the proposed appropriation
will not protect the instream water right.
         The commission explained that the protestants had
raised the issue of inundation, in part, in the context of their
argument that the proposed use would injure the existing
water right, ORS 537.153(2). However, the commission noted
that the department had defined “the term ‘injury’ to mean
that an existing water right would not receive previously
available water to which it is legally entitled”—a quantita-
tive protection—and that the arguments of the protestants
did not focus on that aspect.10 Rather, according to the com-
mission, the protestants’ arguments addressed “competing
types of uses presented by a proposed new appropriation
that inundates an in-stream water right so as to frustrate
the beneficial purpose of the existing vested right.” In sum,
the commission determined under ORS 537.153(2)(b)(A) that
the presumption that the proposed use, i.e., storage of water
in a reservoir, would not impair or be detrimental to the
public interest was overcome when considering the specific
public interest factor in ORS 537.170(8)(f): “[a]ll vested and
inchoate rights to the waters of this state or to the use of
the waters of this state, and the means necessary to protect
such rights.”
        The district petitions for judicial review and seeks
reversal and remand of the commission’s order.
                               II. ANALYSIS
         In its first assignment of error, the district asserts
that the commission erred or acted outside the range of
discretion delegated to it by law by denying the application
based on a perceived deficiency in the director’s final order
that was not specifically raised in the exceptions filed by
the protestants. Respondents contend that the issue was
sufficiently raised for the commission to consider it. We

    10
         The commission confirmed the treatment of “injury” in the director’s final
order.
Cite as 328 Or App 790 (2023)                                  801

agree with respondents and reject that assignment without
discussion.
          The district combines its argument for its second,
third, and fourth assignments of error and we address
them in that manner. In its second assignment of error, the
district asserts that the commission erred in denying the
district’s application based on an erroneous interpretation
of ORS 537.170(8)(f). In its third assignment of error, the
district asserts that the commission erred in denying the
application due to its erroneous interpretation of Certificate
72591 and the statutes governing instream water rights. In
its fourth assignment of error, the district asserts that the
commission erred in denying the application based on its
erroneous conclusion that ORS 537.170(8) requires consid-
eration of only a single public interest factor to determine
whether the proposed use would impair or be detrimental to
the public interest. Respondents argue that the commission
did not err in the ways asserted by the district.
        To the extent those assignments, or portions thereof,
present a question of statutory interpretation, we apply our
familiar methodology, considering the text, context of the
relevant statutes, and any relevant legislative history that
we deem helpful. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206
P3d 1042 (2009).
         The commission’s order states, in part:
       “In light of the arguments that the proposed appropria-
   tion, as currently conditioned, does not protect the portions
   of the in-stream water right that would be inundated by
   the proposed appropriation, the Commission examines the
   public interest factor in ORS 537.170(8)(f), which requires
   consideration of:
         “ ‘All vested and inchoate rights to the waters of this
      state or to the use of the waters of this state, and the
      means necessary to protect such rights.’
       “The direction to assure that new appropriations protect
   vested rights in water is consistent with other provisions
   of the Water Rights Act that require the Commission to
   determine, in addition to its injury determination, whether
   a new appropriation will ‘take away,’ ‘impair,’ or ‘conflict’
   with existing vested rights.
802      East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission

      “For example, ORS 537.120 states:
          “ ‘Subject to existing rights * * * all waters within the
      state may be appropriated for beneficial use as provided
      in the Water Rights Act and not otherwise; but nothing
      contained in the Water Rights Act shall be so construed
      as to take away or impair the vested right of any person
      to any water or to the use of any water.’
            “In addition, ORS 537.160(1) states that the
   Department ‘shall approve all applications made in proper
   form which contemplate the application of water to a ben-
   eficial use, unless the proposed use conflicts with existing
   rights.’
       “Taken as a regulatory whole, in considering all vested
   rights to the waters of this state and the means necessary
   to protect such rights, the Commission must identify the
   attributes of existing vested water rights affected by the
   new appropriation and then examine whether there are the
   means necessary to protect those attributes. The elements
   of a water right that merit protection include not just the
   rate and the priority date, but also the beneficial purpose
   to which the water will be applied. Given this, we examine
   whether the in-stream water right is a vested right that
   merits protection, and if so, whether the Director’s Order
   provides conditions that adequately protect the in-stream
   water right.”
(Footnotes omitted.) The commission referred to a Supreme
Court decision in which the court described the elements
of a water right as part of the basis for its analysis. In Fort
Vannoy Irrigation v. Water Resources Comm., 345 Or 56, 79,
188 P3d 277 (2008), the court stated:
   “The elements of an appropriation of water * * * are:
   (a) Quantity of water appropriated; (b) time, period, or
   season when the right to the use exists; (c) the place upon
   the stream at which the right of diversion attaches; (d) the
   nature of the use or the purpose to which the right of use
   applies, such as irrigation, domestic use, culinary use, com-
   mercial use, or otherwise; (e) the place where the right of
   use may be applied; [and] (f) the priority date of appropria-
   tion or right as related to other rights and priorities.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) From that, the com-
mission concluded that it was appropriate to consider the
Cite as 328 Or App 790 (2023)                                                803

purpose of the water right reflected in Certificate 72591, and
not just the quantity of water as specified in the certificate.
         The district takes the position that the commis-
sion misinterpreted ORS 537.170(8)(f). In its view, the com-
mission should have limited its public interest evaluation
to whether the proposed reservoir and dam would prevent
Drift Creek from having a specific quantity of flow at the
mouth of the stream and should not have considered the pur-
pose or use of the water right contained in Certificate 72591.
In support of that contention, the district argues that the
commission ignored binding precedent, unnecessarily and
incorrectly complicated its analysis by relying on and mis-
construing ORS 537.120 and ORS 537.160(1), and “misap-
prehended the scope of protection afforded to a vested water
right under Oregon law and misconstrued the terms of
Certificate 72591.”
         The district relies on Benz v. Water Resources
Commission, 94 Or App 73, 764 P2d 594 (1988) for the prop-
osition that where a proposed permit would allow use of
unappropriated water consistent with Oregon’s prior appro-
priation system, existing vested rights are sufficiently pro-
tected. In that case, the commission had considered two cri-
teria in what is now ORS 537.170(8) and the concern raised
was the quantity of water available and whether water
would be available for a junior right.11 We stated that “[a]
junior appropriator’s water right cannot be exercised until
the senior appropriator’s right has been satisfied.” Id. at
81. However, in Benz, we did not consider all of the possible
applications of criterion (f), and did not address a situation
like the one before us now, in which the commission held
that the proposed new use would conflict with the beneficial
use of an existing right, as opposed to just the amount of
water available. Benz is not directly on point, nor controlling
on the issue before us.12

    11
       At the time of that decision, the factors were contained in ORS 537.170(5),
but the statute has since been amended. See former ORS 537.170(5) (1985).
    12
       We note that for some types of water use, such as irrigation, it makes sense
to consider the quantity of water that is available when determining whether a
water right is protected. However, not all water uses are consumptive. See ORS
537.170(8)(a) (referring to “highest use of the water for all purposes” including
navigation, scenic attraction, and game fishing).
804     East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission

        Next, the district contends that the commission
incorrectly relied on and misconstrued ORS 537.120 and
ORS 537.160(1) in its analysis. The district argues that ORS
537.120 and ORS 537.160(1) are not referenced or incor-
porated into the public interest analysis required under
ORS 537.170(8) and that they do not require the commis-
sion to “identify the attributes of existing vested water
rights affected by the new appropriation and then exam-
ine whether there are the means necessary to protect those
attributes.” The district interprets the commission’s order
as the commission stating that those statutes created an
additional requirement to the public interest analysis.
         We do not understand the commission’s order the
same way as the district does. As noted above, it is proper
to consider related statutes for context when constru-
ing the meaning of a statute. In our view, the commission
was undertaking its obligation to consider the protection
of existing rights within the broader statutory scheme to
assure that it was applying ORS 537.170(8)(f) consistently
with related statutes. It was considering those statutes for
context, which was proper for it to do.
        The district also argues that the commission’s
analysis drastically expands the scope of rights protected
by an instream water right beyond that protected by Oregon
law. ORS 537.332 contains definitions regarding the statutes
pertaining to instream water rights. That statute states, in
part:
      “As used in ORS 537.332 to 537.360:
     “(1) ‘In-stream’ means within the natural stream
  channel or lake bed or place where water naturally flows or
  occurs.
     “(2) ‘In-stream flow’ means the minimum quantity of
  water necessary to support the public use requested by an
  agency.
      “(3) ‘In-stream water right’ means a water right held
  in trust by the Water Resources Department for the bene-
  fit of the people of the State of Oregon to maintain water
  in-stream for public use. An in-stream water right does not
  require a diversion or any other means of physical control
  over the water.
Cite as 328 Or App 790 (2023)                                  805

      “(4) ‘Public benefit’ means a benefit that accrues to the
   public at large rather than to a person, a small group of
   persons or to a private enterprise.
      “(5)   ‘Public use’ includes but is not limited to:
      “* * * * *
      “(b) Conservation, maintenance and enhancement of
   aquatic and fish life, wildlife, fish and wildlife habitat and
   any other ecological values[.]”
ORS 537.332. Under ORS 537.336(1), ODFW may request
a water right certificate “for in-stream water rights on the
waters of this state in which there are public uses relat-
ing to the conservation, maintenance and enhancement
of aquatic and fish life, wildlife and fish and wildlife hab-
itat” and that request “shall be for the quantity of water
necessary to support those public uses as recommended by
the State Department of Fish and Wildlife.” The district
argues that an instream water right merely guarantees
that the required minimum flows are left instream—and
does not entitle the holder to a particular velocity of stream
flow, particular stream characteristics, a particular stream
channel, or otherwise favorable habitat conditions for fish
and wildlife. And as stated above, the district’s position is
that as long as the flow measured at the lower end meets
the flow designated in the certificate, the water right is
protected.
         WaterWatch argues in response that the right to
be protected by statute is not simply the right to a mini-
mum quantity of water at a certain point on the creek. The
state similarly argues that the water right certificate pro-
tects flows from river mile 0 at the confluence of the Pudding
River up to river mile 11, and although the flow is to be
measured at the lower end of the stream reach, that is to be
done, according to the certificate, “to protect necessary flows
throughout the reach.” (Emphasis added.)
         We agree with respondents that the commission did
not err in its construction of the relevant statutes or of the
certificate. The water right is for the benefit of Oregonians
“to maintain water in-stream for public use.” ORS 537.332(3).
And “public use” here, is “[c]onservation, maintenance and
806      East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission

enhancement of aquatic and fish life, * * *, [and] fish and
wildlife habitat.” ORS 537.332(5)(b). The certificate requires
“stream flows for cutthroat trout for migration, spawn-
ing, egg incubation, fry emergence, and juvenile rearing.”
ORS 537.170(8)(f) requires the commission to consider “[a]ll
vested and inchoate rights to the waters of this state or to
the use of the waters of this state, and the means necessary
to protect such rights.” (Emphasis added.)
         Reading all of those statutory provisions together
and taking into consideration the language of the certifi-
cate itself, we think it unlikely that the legislature intended
that a junior water right would be permitted to frustrate
the actual purpose and use of a senior water right. Multiple
statutes refer to the use of the waters—not just the quantity.
Therefore, we conclude that the commission did not err.
          The district also asserts that the commission erred
by incorrectly interpreting ORS 537.170(8) by failing to con-
sider all of the public interest factors listed in subsections (a)
through (f) and relying only on factor (f). It argues that the
commission should have considered all seven factors with
and against one another, whether the proposed use would
impair or be detrimental to the public interest as a whole.
We disagree with the district.
        ORS 537.153(2) provides that the rebuttable pre-
sumption that a proposed use will not impair or be detri-
mental to the public interest can be overcome by a prepon-
derance of evidence showing that
            “(b) The proposed use will impair or be detrimen-
   tal to the public interest as demonstrated in comments, in
   a protest under subsection (6) of this section or in a finding
   of the department that shows:
      “(A) The specific public interest under ORS 537.170(8)
   that would be impaired or detrimentally affected; and
     “(B) Specifically how the identified public interest
   would be impaired or detrimentally affected.”
That provision requires the commission to identify the spe-
cific public interest that would be impaired or detrimen-
tally affected and to explain how the identified public inter-
est would be affected. The legislature used the word “the”
Cite as 328 Or App 790 (2023)                                                 807

with the singular word “interest.” A plain reading of that
statutory requirement is that only one factor needs to be
identified and explained. The commission was permitted to
rely on a single factor to decide that the presumption was
overcome.13
         In its fifth assignment of error, the district asserts
that the commission improperly shifted the burden of proof
to the district to demonstrate an absence of impairment or
detriment of the public interest, contrary to ORS 537.153(2).
The district bases its contention on a phrase in one of the
conclusions reached by the commission:
    “If a portion of the reach is inundated to allow storage of
    up to 12,000 acre feet of water, and absent evidence to the
    contrary, the Commission concludes that the beneficial pur-
    pose of the flows to support the life stages of cutthroat trout
    is frustrated and the application for the new storage right
    conflicts with an existing in-stream water right.”
(Emphasis added.) The state and WaterWatch argue that
the commission did not improperly shift the burden.
         We agree with respondents that the commission did
not improperly shift the burden of proof. ORS 537.153 cre-
ates a rebuttable presumption that a proposed use is in the
public interest if certain conditions are met; however, under
paragraph (2)(b) of that statute, the presumption does not
apply here, where the commission determined that the pro-
posed use will impair or be detrimental to the public inter-
est. The presumption was overcome. Once the presumption
was overcome, it was the district’s burden to prove that the
reservoir would not impair or be detrimental to the public
interest and that its application should be granted.

     13
        Respondents point out that the commission cited OAR 690-310-0120(5) in
its final order. That rule states,
     “If the Department finds that under section (4) of this rule the presumption is
     overcome, the Department shall issue a final order in accordance with OAR
     690-310-0190 denying the application unless the Department makes specific
     findings to demonstrate that considering all of the public interest factors
     listed in ORS 537.170(8) the issuance of a permit will not impair or be detri-
     mental to the public interest.”
That is, if the commission were going to grant an application after determining
that the presumption had been overcome, it would be required to consider all of
the public interest factors.
808     East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission

         In its sixth assignment of error, the district con-
tends that the commission’s findings and conclusions that
the beneficial purpose of the instream water right will be
“frustrated” by the issuance of the water storage permit are
not supported by substantial reason. Agencies are “required
to demonstrate in their opinions the reasoning that leads
the agency from the facts that it has found to the conclu-
sions that it draws from those facts.” Drew v. PSRB, 322 Or
491, 500, 909 P2d 1211 (1996) (emphases omitted). Here, the
district argues that there is no connection between the fact
that the district would store 12,000 acre-feet of water annu-
ally in an on-channel reservoir and the conclusion that the
minimum amounts required to be measured at the lower
end of the reach will not be maintained. That argument is
premised on its assertion that the commission erred by not
basing its public interest analysis on the quantity of water
to be measured at the lower end of the stream below the pro-
posed dam. As discussed above, we rejected that argument.
We likewise reject this assignment of error.
         In its seventh assignment of error, the district
asserts that substantial evidence in the record does not
demonstrate that the use proposed by the application would
impair or be detrimental to the public interest by somehow
failing to support the life stages of cutthroat trout. Under
ORS 183.482(8)(c), we must set aside or remand the order
if we find that “the order is not supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Substantial evidence exists to sup-
port a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole,
would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.”
“Our review for substantial evidence does not entail or per-
mit [us] to reweigh or to assess the credibility of the evi-
dence that was presented to the factfinding body. As part of
our substantial evidence review, we [also] look at whether
the findings provide substantial reason to support the legal
conclusion reached by the agency.” WaterWatch of Oregon
v. Water Resources Dept., 324 Or App 362, 384, 527 P3d 1,
rev den, 371 Or 332 (2023) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted; second brackets in original).
        The district argues that the commission’s factual
conclusion that the use proposed by the application—an
Cite as 328 Or App 790 (2023)                               809

instream reservoir that would inundate the creek—would
frustrate the protection of flows to support the life stages
of cutthroat trout is not supported by substantial evidence
in the record. The district then points to certain findings
that had been made in the director’s final order, which were
adopted by the commission: (1) Drift Creek’s “temperature
from mid-June to September is too warm for salmon and
trout rearing and migration,” and (2) “Drift Creek’s water
temperature is too warm because of hot weather, reduced
summer water flow, and a lack of trees and other vegetation
to shade the creek water.” The district also points to testi-
mony from its expert that reflected his opinion that the pro-
posed reservoir had the potential to mitigate the primary
factor limiting trout-rearing capacity, i.e., decrease the
water temperature, and improve habitat for cutthroat trout.
The district then asserts that the commission’s “conclusion
that the proposed reservoir would be detrimental to the pub-
lic interest cannot be reconciled with the [c]ommission’s own
factual finding that Drift Creek currently does not support
key life stages of cutthroat trout during summer months.”
(Emphasis in original.) The district’s argument focuses on
certain findings made regarding the limited capacity of Drift
Creek in the summer months. Notably, the district does not
assign error to any of the findings contained in the commis-
sion’s final order and does not assert that there is a lack of
evidence in the record to support the commission’s findings
and conclusions that inundation of a portion of the creek
that is protected by the instream water right will frustrate
the beneficial purpose of the flows to support the life stages
of cutthroat trout.
         The state and WaterWatch both argue that sub-
stantial evidence in the record supports the conclusion that
inundation of a portion of the 11-mile reach of Drift Creek
will defeat the stated purpose of the instream water right.
         The director’s findings, adopted by the commission,
include the following:
  •   “The following fish have been observed in Drift Creek or
      are reasonably expected to spawn or rear in the creek:
      * * * Cutthroat Trout * * *.”
810        East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission

   •    “There are at least two non-listed fish present in
        Drift Creek. These include Cutthroat Trout and Coho
        Salmon. These two species may be impacted by the pro-
        posed use.”14
   •    “Cutthroat Trout and Coho Salmon are members of the
        Salmonid family that live in Drift Creek for portions
        of their lives. Cutthroat Trout and Coho Salmon spawn
        and rear in Drift Creek.”
   •    “* * * Drift Creek’s water quality is impacted by a low
        content of dissolved oxygen. Fish need dissolved oxygen
        to survive.”
   •    “Four months after recommending to the Department
        that it approve [the district’s] application with con-
        ditions, Mr. Murtagh [(the district fish biologist for
        ODFW)] made the following comments in an email mes-
        sage to a colleague at ODWF:
                    ‘… [B]ased on the stream miles lost due to
                    inundation, I remain very skeptical that they
                    will be able to provide us with appropriate
                    mitigation even if they provide passage as
                    they are going to inundate most of the flowing
                    stretch of stream with the 400-acre reservoir.
                    ‘…[C]an we as an agency simply “not support”
                    this project as planned even if they provide
                    mitigation through the waiver process? I
                    think we really stand to lose too much here in
                    terms of function, connectivity, fish and wild-
                    life values etc.’ ”15
         In addition to those findings, there was evidence
that cutthroat trout had been observed in Drift Creek in
the summer months, contrary to the implication in findings
relied on by the district. There is an area above the dam
site that provides summer cold water refugia and where
upstream migration is not blocked by waterfalls or dams.
Trout and salmon from lower elevations in the watershed are
likely to move into those cool water zones during the hottest
part of the summer. There was testimony by Murtagh that
   14
      “Non-listed” refers to fish that are not listed as sensitive, threatened, or
endangered fish species.
   15
      Murtagh never withdrew ODFW’s recommendation that the Department
grant the district’s application with conditions.
Cite as 328 Or App 790 (2023)                                               811

cutthroat trout, and other fish, need running water habitats
with clean gravel beds for spawning and may need a func-
tioning watershed that provides a rearing area to live in for
a period of time. Murtagh explained that cutthroat trout are
fluvial migrating fish; they spend part of their life cycle in
the lower trunks of rivers, including lower Drift Creek, and
in the winter and early spring, move up in order to spawn.
Murtagh was concerned about inundation, as expressed in
his email above, and testified that if there was no fish pas-
sage as part of the dam, seven to ten linear miles of stream
would be lost as habitat.16
          There was testimony that although Drift Creek has
degraded habitat, there are some pockets of habitat above
the proposed dam site that look to be suitable for the repro-
duction of native salmonids. Mr. Gowell, a fellowship direc-
tor with the Native Fish Society, testified that although
fish passage is the impact most focused on when looking at
impacts to fish from a dam, there are other impacts, such as
getting juvenile fish downstream; because of the lack of flow
associated with reservoirs, the fish tend to get lost and can-
not find the outlet to them. In addition, there can be severe
water quality impacts including water temperature modi-
fications, dissolved oxygen, and nutrient changes. Gowell
also testified that the transport of sediments and bedload
is inhibited; “the flow of a stream typically carries rock,
sediment, and other debris downstream, like woody debris
or leaf litter; and when you impound water, those sediment
and bedload transport processes end up in the bottom of the
reservoir instead of being carried downstream into * * * the
waterway.” Gowell explained that those natural processes
are what fish have adapted to living with and depend on
to complete their life cycles. Gregory Apke, the statewide
fish passage program coordinator for ODFW, testified that
he is familiar with the stretch of stream that would be
upstream from the proposed dam and that there is habitat
for native migratory fish up there.17 Apke also testified that

    16
       ODFW’s fish passage coordinator testified that it was his understanding
that the district planned to seek a waiver of the fish passage requirements rather
than build a fish passage structure.
    17
       Apke testified that cutthroat trout are native migratory fish.
812     East Valley Water v. Water Resources Commission

“[r]eservoirs can be problematic for fish migrating upstream
and downstream.”
        We conclude that there is substantial evidence in
the record upon which a reasonable person could find that
the proposed reservoir and resulting inundation of the creek
would conflict with the habitat needs of cutthroat trout, and
the beneficial purpose of the instream water right would
be frustrated. For that reason and the additional reasons
expressed above, we affirm the commission’s final order.
        Affirmed.