Court Opinion

ID: 9532936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:26:25.103943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:52.423819
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SCHMIDT, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority opinion with the exception of that portion which remands for further proceedings on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The trial court previously satisfied its obligations under Moore. The defendant filed a pro se motion for a new trial alleging, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence and failing to file a motion to dismiss. When asked to address his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant added that, “I was telling him that I should have had took a bench trial anyway, and he knows that, I don’t know anything about the law, but he knows that, and he didn’t — he didn’t go basically to his law experience and take it to a bench trial instead of jury trial.” There was no further discussion about this. The majority concludes that somehow a trial attorney could have been guilty of neglect for trying defendant’s case to a jury rather than a single judge. Neither Moore nor any other case requires remand in this case. While the defendant’s language makes it appear that his comment to his lawyer about a bench trial was made after the fact, I believe it is legally irrelevant as to when the comment was made. Assuming for the sake of argument that we remand, and it is established that defendant did talk to his counsel before trial and expressed wishes for a bench trial, then what relief could defendant obtain? “The argument defendant makes here could be made in every case in which a defendant is convicted by a jury and the trial court did not explicitly inquire of defendant, before or during the jury selection process, whether he in fact wished to have a jury trial.” People v. Powell, 281 Ill. App. 3d 68, 73, 666 N.E.2d 365, 369 (1996). The record clearly shows that defendant was present in the trial court on October 29, 2004, when his attorney stated, “At this time, your Honor, my client will enter a plea of not guilty, waive reading of the charge, and request a jury trial setting and reciprocal discovery.” Defendant was also present in court on January 24, 2005, when the trial in this case commenced by the court stating, “We’re on the record now and the People of the State of Illinois versus Aaron Holley, 04 — CF—1020, the bailiff is going to get the jurors out of the hallway so that we can begin j ury selection. Mr. Holley is present in open court with his attorney, Mr. Morris, Ms. Patton for the People.” (Emphasis added.) Once the jury venire was called in, the court introduced the defendant and his attorney to the venire and defendant greeted the venire with a “good afternoon.” On January 24, a jury was selected, motions in limine were argued, and opening statements were made in defendant’s presence. The trial continued on January 25. The jury began deliberations at approximately 4:10 p.m. on that date. The jury returned on January 26, 2005, for continued deliberations. The jury returned a guilty verdict on that date. Defendant was present with his counsel for the return of the verdict. Upon entry of the verdict, defendant’s bond was revoked and sentencing and posttrial motions were set for March 23, 2005. At no time during any of these proceedings did defendant ever advise the court that he was objecting to proceeding with a jury trial. Not when his attorney requested a jury trial; not when the case was called for jury trial; not during the arguing of motions in limine; not during voir dire-, not during the jury trial itself; not when the verdict was received. As the appellate court pointed out in Powell, “Even at its most efficient, the process of selecting a jury in a criminal case takes a considerable amount of time — usually at least an hour or more. A defendant sitting in a courtroom watching this process could hardly be confused as to what is taking place. Thus, we have no sympathy for this defendant or any other who sits through that entire process and— while supposedly wishing for a bench trial — says nothing to the trial court even though, as defendant claims here, his trial counsel has failed to request a bench trial in accordance with defendant’s wishes.” (Emphasis in original.) Powell, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 73, 666 N.E.2d at 369.3  Remanding this case for further inquiry into the issue of whether defendant wanted a bench trial is a waste of limited judicial resources. This cannot be ineffective assistance of counsel. Suppose defendant was attempting to obtain a new trial because he had a bench trial but then argued on appeal that he was entitled to a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel because he had told his attorney that he wanted a jury trial. The result would be clear if defendant, like here, had sat through pretrial proceedings and the bench trial without objecting. See People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327, 469 N.E.2d 195 (1984); People v. Johnson, 347 Ill. App. 3d 442, 807 N.E.2d 693 (2004). The majority opinion here sets up the untenable necessity for trial judges to secure bench trial waivers before jury trials. This makes no sense. Under our system, the jury trial is both the “default mode” and the “gold standard.” Furthermore, the trial judge did discuss defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim with defendant, fulfilling any obligations under Moore, at least under the facts of this case. I, therefore, dissent from that portion of the opinion remanding this matter for further proceedings on defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.4   The majority argues that I am citing dicta in Powell. 377 Ill. App. 3d at 813. In the next breath, the majority cites Brocksmith and Ramey in support of its position. 377 Ill. App. 3d at 813. I am content to let the trial bar decide who is citing dicta in support of his position.   At 377 Ill. App. 3d at 812, Presiding Justice Lytton suggests that the trial court did not rule on defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim apparently because it “denied the defendant’s motion generally.” 377 Ill. App. 3d at 812 n.l. This was a ruling on defendant’s motion and the trial court knew everything it needed to know to make the ruling. Defendant does not argue that the trial court did not rule. To the contrary, defendant complains that the trial court erred in denying his motion.