Court Opinion

ID: 9719368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:49:58.079973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:06.594192
License: Public Domain

EVANS, Acting P. J.
I respectfully dissent from the result only; I fully concur in the rationale of the majority opinion that Pacific Gas and Electric Company (hereafter P. G. & E.) or any commercial supplier of electricity may be subject to strict liability in tort for personal injuries caused by delivery of electricity under certain conditions.
However, I do not view that reasoning to be applicable to the posture in which I view the facts of the case. Nothing in plaintiffs’ pleadings or in the evidence relative to defective electricity was tendered to the defendant prior to or at trial.
Plaintiffs’ complaint did not directly or impliedly assert liability predicated upon a defect in the electricity supplied by P. G. & E.; the complaint was patently clear in its assertion that the plaintiffs considered the defective product to be the transformer and not the electricity. The only evidence presented by plaintiffs on the question of causation was directed to the transformer. Plaintiffs’ only expert, Dr. James Gordon Simes, confined his tes*89timony to the deficiencies of the transformer and not on faulty or defective electricity. Moreover, counsel for plaintiffs conceded during argument on defendant’s motion for nonsuit that, in his opinion, his expert had established product liability on the theory of a defective transformer. In that connection, the evidence was uncontroverted that P. G. & E. was a buyer and user of the transformer, not the designer, manufacturer, or distributor. I would conclude under the factual and procedural circumstances that the question of strict liability in tort for defective electricity involved issues of law and fact dehors the evidence and pleadings, and those issues were not fairly tendered to defendant at trial.
Plaintiffs could have pleaded and presented such a cause and legal theory. They did not. The issue was raised by plaintiffs’ counsel in responding to defendant’s motion for nonsuit. As the majority opinion concludes on the question of implied warranty, I would also conclude on the question of strict liability for defective electricity, that the particulars of that issue, not the question of a defective transformer, was neither “ ‘ “well known to court and counsel” ’ ” nor “ ‘ “thoroughly explored during the course of the trial.’”” {People v. Toomey (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1, 11 [203 Cal.Rptr. 642].) I would conclude that by reason of plaintiffs’ failure to plead or present at trial a strict liability cause of action predicated upon defective electricity supplied by P. G. & E., they are barred from recovery on that basis.
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.