Court Opinion

ID: 9775900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:12:21.709183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:31.958066
License: Public Domain

GRANT, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority except for its reduction of the monetary attorney’s fees sanctions against George Neely.
The succinct portion of the majority opinion addressing the open courts violation suggests that any type of injunctive sanction that prohibits the filing of pleadings or other documents in any State court would be a violation of Article I, § 13 of the Texas Constitution.
The open courts provision of the Texas Constitution declares that our state government shall not ration justice but shall provide an open forum to right wrongs and provide remedies for legitimate claims. This broad policy provision, however, does not prohibit sanctions against those who abuse the judicial process. Such sanctions, however, should be specific and should be limited to penalties and prohibitions having a reasonable relationship to the harm committed. Injunctive relief should be tailored to protect the courts and innocent parties, while preserving the legitimate rights of the litigants. Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358 (5th Cir.1986). A broad order may be appropriate if a litigant is engaged in a wide-spread practice of harassment against different people. See In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir.1984). Such generalized sanction against Peggy Glass was not warranted in the present case because the only abuse that was shown involved this case and the parties, attorneys, and others involved herein. Thus, the injunctive sanction was overly broad and violated Article 1, § 13 of the Texas Constitution.
The majority opinion emphasizes that the original divorce proceeding involved an estate of about $60,000. They further condemn the sanction proceeding for having seven costly lawyers from one firm to counter the frivolous pleadings. It must be pointed out that after the amended pleadings were filed, this was no longer a simple divorce action; numerous respondents, including attorneys, a CPA, and American National Bank had been named in the suit, which requested damages and judgment from them for more than five million dollars.13 To say that one attorney *691should have continued to represent all of the parties is contrary to the fundamental right of each party to be represented by counsel of choice.
Because of the multiplicity of filings by petitioners and the responses and cross-motions by respondents, the hearing lasted for four days. The court heard and disposed not only of matters raised by petitioners, but also the motions for sanctions and costs raised by the respondents. The transcript contains almost 1,200 pages and the statement of facts almost 700 pages. The joining by the appellant of three lawyers, a CPA, two law firms and a bank as parties directly contributed to the length and complexity of the proceedings and justified the appearance of counsel representing the various respondents.
The trial court dismissed with prejudice plaintiff’s first amended original petition for divorce as sanctions for violation of Tex.R.Civ.P. 13. This amendment was filed under the same file number as the original divorce proceeding. The amended petition alleged numerous causes of action against the various respondents, including fraud, conspiracy to defraud, violation of fiduciary relationship, breach of obligation of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, credit defamation, conversion, professional malpractice, and violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
The majority opinion states that, “There is no evidence that a $45,000.00 fee was incurred.” To so state is to ignore the record. Exhibit 18 is a detailed summary of the hours worked by the various attorneys for the appellees in the case, the hourly rate for each attorney, the total amount claimed for each attorney, and a total of the combined claim, which amounted to $31,875, plus expenses of $373. Later in the hearing, there was testimony about additional hours worked and expenses incurred by the attorneys as a result of the hearings then in progress. The testimony raised the total attorney’s fees for the Pope firm to $45,863.
Thomas K. Robinson, an attorney who initially represented Dale Glass in this matter, testified that he had performed legal services for Dale Glass, as had other attorneys in his firm of Miller, Miller & Robinson. He further testified about the hourly fees involved, the total time spent in repre*692senting Dale Glass, the type of work he performed, and the amount of other expenses. These totalled $9,250 in attorney’s fees and $353.47 in expenses. Neely and Glass do not complain about the additional attorney’s fees awarded to Thomas K. Robinson and his law firm.
The appellants challenged the admissibility of respondents’ Exhibit 18, and that contention should be addressed. Exhibit 18 detailed the legal billing incurred by appel-lees as a result of appellants’ filing the motion for new trial and other documents and motions after the decree of divorce. Neely and Glass contend that Exhibit 18 was not admissible because one of the elements specified for admissibility of a business record was omitted. Appellants specifically complain that the appellees did not prove that it was the regular practice of the business to make this record. Tex. R.Civ.Evid. 803(6) includes a requirement that the record be kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and that it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation.
The record shows that Dale Glass’s attorney, De Nisco, laid the predicate required by Rule 803(6) by asking Hendershot, Dale Glass’s counsel, whether the invoice was a part of Pope, Shoemake, Selwyn, Kerr & De Nisco; whether it was maintained in the regular course of business for that firm; whether the entries contained in the invoice were made by persons having knowledge of the facts contained therein; and whether the entries were made at or near the time of the occurrence. The witness answered in the affirmative to each question. This evidence sufficiently shows that the document was kept in the course of regularly conducted business activities and that it was a regular practice to make this kind of document. The trial court properly admitted Exhibit 18.
I would affirm the attorney’s fees sanction against Neely.

. The following is an excerpt from the First Amended Original Petition of Peggy Glass:
5.6 Petitioner requests judgment of, from and against the Respondents, jointly and severally, as delineated hereinbelow:
(1) Judgment of, from and against Respondents Glass, Hendershot, the Pope firm, Robinson, and the Miller firm, for commission of fraud, in the amount of $100,000.00, jointly and/or severally; together with, or in the alternative,
(2) Judgment of, from and against Respondents Glass, Hendershot, the Pope firm, Robinson, Robinson, and the Miller firm, for commission of conspiracy to defraud, in the amount of $100,000.00, jointly and/or severally; together with, or in the alternative,
(3) Judgment of, from and against Respondents Lou Glass and/or American National Bank for commission of fraud, in the amount of $100,000.00, jointly and/or severally; together with,
(4) Judgment of, from and against Respondents Lou Glass and/or American National Bank for commission of conspiracy to defraud, in the amount of $100,000.00, jointly and/or severally; together with, or in the alternative,
(5) Judgment of, from and against Respondents Lou Glass and/or American National Bank for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, in the amount of $100,000.00, jointly and/or severally; together with, or in the alternative,
(6) Judgment of, from and against Respondents Lou Glass and/or American National Bank for commission of conversion, in the amount of $100,000.00, jointly and/or severally; together with, or in the alternative,
(7) Judgment of, from and against Respondent Peterek for commission of professional *691malpractice, in the amount of $100,000.00; together with,
(8) Judgment of, from and against Respondents Lou Glass and/or American National Bank for common law and statutory breach of obligation of good faith and fair dealing, in the amount of $100,000.00, jointly and/or severally; together with, or in the alternative,
(9) Judgment of, from and against Respondents Lou Glass and/or American National Bank for breach of contract, in the amount of $100,000.00, jointly and/or severally; together with, or in the alternative,
(10) Judgment of, from and against all Respondents hereto for the intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, in the amount of $100,000.00, jointly and/or severally; together with,
(11) Judgment of, from and against Respondents Lou Glass and/or American National Bank for commission of credit defamation, in the amount of $100,000.00, jointly and/or severally; together with, or in the alternative,
(12) Punitive and/or exemplary damages against Respondent Glass in the amount of $500,000.00; together with,
(13) Punitive and/or exemplary damages against Respondent Hendershot in the amount of $500,000.00; together with,
(14) Punitive and/or exemplary damages against Respondent the Pope firm in the amount of $500,000.00; together with,
(15) Punitive and/or exemplary damages against Respondent Robinson in the amount of $500,000.00; together with,
(16) Punitive and/or exemplary damages against Respondent the Miller firm in the amount of $500,000.00; together with,
(17) Punitive and/or exemplary damages against Respondent Lou Glass in the amount of $500,000.00; together with,
(18) Punitive and/or exemplary damages against Respondent American National Bank in the amount of $1,000,000.00; together with,
(19) Moratory interest on all damages to Petitioner from the date recognized by law as the date of accrual of said damages through the rendition of a final judgment herein; together with,
(20) Costs of court incurred by Petitioner herein; together with,
(21) Post-judgment interest at the maximum lawful rate from the entry of judgment until same be paid, en toto; together with,
(22) Attorney's fees in the amount of $50,-000.00; together with,
(23) Such other and further relief, whether at law or in equity, to which Petitioner may be justly entitled.