Court Opinion

ID: 9857306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:29:17.649894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:26.756329
License: Public Domain

On Petition To Behear
Bituminous Casualty Corporation, the insurer, seeks a rehearing in order to procure a modification of the judgment of the Court below as to the employer, Elkins, to the same extent that this Court’s opinion modified the judgment as to the insurer, Bituminous Casualty Corporation, notwithstanding the fact that Elkins did not appeal, and is not, therefore, before this Court.
The situation which prompted the insurer to file this petition is that the judgment of the insured employer, *22because of failure to appeal, is for a considerably larger amount tban is tbe judgment, as modified by tbis Court, against bis insurer, tbe petitioner. Tbe thought of tbe petitioner is that unless it is granted tbis relief, it will have to pay not only tbe judgment awarded against it, but, in addition, also have to pay tbe judgment awarded against tbe employer by being required to pay the -difference between tbe amount of that judgment and tbe judgment against it, tbe insurer.
The theory upon which petitioner bases bis prayer that tbe judgment against tbe employer be so modified is that where a judgment in a trial court is not severable as between two defendants, a reversal or modification in favor of that defendant who has appealed authorizes tbe Court to likewise reverse or so modify tbe judgment of tbe Court below as to tbe defendant who has not appealed where such reversal or modification seems necessary or proper to assure tbe appealing party tbe rights to which be has been adjudged entitled by tbe Appellate Court.
Tbe compensation statute contemplates payment to an injured employee or bis dependents of only tbe amount fixed by that statute. In order that such employee or bis dependents may be assured tbe payment of whatever that amount is, tbe statute requires an employer coming within tbe statute to procure insurance. Tbe employee may sue the insurer alone, section 50-1209 T.C.A., or jointly with tbe employer. Douglas v. Sharp, 194 Tenn. 11, 17, 249 S.W.2d 999. However, but one recovery is contemplated, that recovery being only tbe amount to which the employee is entitled by tbe provisions of the statute. He is not entitled under tbe statute to a judgment for one amount against the employer, and *23for a different amount against the insurer. So it is that the judgment intended by the statute is one which is not severable as between the employer and the insurer.
Such being the situation, if this were a broad appeal from a decree in Chancery, there would be no question, probably, of the authority of this Court to modify the judgment so as to make the award against the employer the same as that which this Court has adjudged should be entered against the insurer, notwithstanding the fact that the employer did not appeal, as evidenced by the cases which petitioner cites. Grubb v. Browder, 58 Tenn. 299, 302-303; Parsons v. Kinser, 71 Tenn., 342, 351; State ex rel. Weaver v. Bolt, 130 Tenn. 212, 217, 169 S.W. 761; Riley v. Shumate, 176 Tenn. 436, 439, 440, 143 S.W.2d 525.
But an appeal from a judgment or decree in proceedings under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, T. C. A. sec. 50-901 et seq., must be an appeal in the nature of a writ of error, and determined accordingly. Section 50-1018 T.C.A. The authority of the Appellate Court on an appeal of such nature is ordinarily more limited. Mullins v. Tennessee Stave & Lumber Co., 155 Tenn. 132, 290 S.W. 975.
The compensation ■ statute ' also' provides, however, that it, the statute, “shall be given an equitable construction by the courts to the end that the objects and purposes of this law may be realized and attained.” Sec. 50-918 T.C.A. One of the objects of the statute is to fix the amount to which the injured employee is entitled, and to limit the liability of the insurer of the employer to that amount. It would be an inequitable construction of the statute to permit an employer, but not joining the insurer in an appeal from the judgment of the Trial *24Court, to thereby increase the liability of the insurer beyond that which the law places upon it.
It is the opinion of this Court, therefore, that it may modify the unappealed from judgment against the employer Elkins to such extent as is necessary to prevent the insurer from paying by reason of said judgment an amount in excess of that to which the insurer is liable under the heretofore announced decision of this Court.
The petition to rehear is accordingly granted to the extent stated. The cause will be remanded and the judgment of the lower Court modified so as to award employee Smith a judgment against the insurer, Bituminous Casualty Corporation, for the amount heretofore determined by this Court, and further modified by providing that its liability, 'either to Smith, the employee, or to Elkins, the employer, shall be fully satisfied when it, the insurer, has paid the amount for which this Court has adjudged it liable, except that the judgment, as so modified, shall provide that it is without prejudice to such right, if any, that Elkins may have against the insurer, Bituminous Casualty Corporation, by reason of sums paid by Elkins for hospital expenses or doctor bills incurred in the treatment of employee, Smith. ( The costs will be adjudged as heretofore directed.