Court Opinion

ID: 9648873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:36:59.579634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:05.954850
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Justice, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. I would affirm the judgment of sentence and uphold the warrantless search of the trunk on the basis of our decision in Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91, 288 A.2d 727 (1972).
The majority opinion misconstrues and misapplies the rule enunciated in Commonwealth v. Lewis, 442 Pa. 98, 275 A.2d 51 (1971) and followed in Commonwealth v. Shaffer. We held in Shaffer that a warrantless search of an automobile is justified where “an officer [has] independent probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed by the occupants of the vehicle. . . .” Commonwealth v. Lewis, 442 Pa. at 101, 275 A.2d at 52, Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. at 104, 288 A.2d at 735. Thus, the threshold inquiry in this case is one of probable cause.
Probable cause, although a somewhat nebulous concept, is a standard which must be approached in a common-sense fashion. We have often stated that probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the police officer at the time of the arrest are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. Commonwealth v. Jones, 478 Pa. 172, 177, 386 A.2d 495, 497 (1978). This test is not one of certainties, nor is it equivalent to a *378prima facie showing of criminality; rather, it is a test of probabilities which are to be evaluated in the context of common sense practical considerations. Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 468 Pa. 599, 605, 364 A.2d 677, 681 (1976); Commonwealth v. Hall, 456 Pa. 243, 317 A.2d 891 (1974).
The facts here clearly support a finding of probable cause.1 The police saw an occupant of the vehicle step out of the car and kneel down beside it. Almost immediately thereafter, an officer discovered a loaded gun and a bag of suspected drugs beneath the car in the same area where the occupant had knelt. The incident occurred in a high crime area, and the police were familiar with the reputations of two of the occupants.2 These facts, when viewed in conjunction with the time of night, the condition of the vehicle and the condition of the operator (as well as his inability to produce either a driver’s license or automobile registration) are more than sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that appellant, as well as the other occupants of the vehicle, were involved in criminal activity. Following Shaffer, once the police had probable cause to believe the occupants were involved in a felony, they were justified in searching the trunk of the car.
The majority’s attempt to draw a distinction between the driver and the passenger is but a thinly veiled attempt to distinguish this case from Shaffer. The distinction has no merit. In Shaffer, as here, the appellant was the driver of the car. In both cases, contraband (stolen jewelry in Shaffer) was discarded from the vehicle by one of the other passengers. Moreover, there, as here, the police were uncertain as to the ownership of the car at the time they searched it.3 The facts of Shaffer are virtually undistinguishable *379from the facts here, yet the majority reaches a completely contrary result. If the majority wishes to overrule Shaffer, then it should at least acknowledge that it is doing so.
In addition to failing to follow Shaffer, the majority totally disregards this Court’s standard of review. “The suppression court, which hears and evaluates the testimony, is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law our responsibility on review is 'to determine whether the record supports the factual findings of the court and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings.’ ” Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 280, 361 A.2d 282, 290 (1976). We are not free to find the facts as we believe they should be, as the majority appears to do today.
The majority states: “The Commonwealth’s argument incorrectly presumes that if one occupant is engaged in a felonious act, here possession of contraband, then all occupants including the driver may also be viewed as participants in the felonious act.” Ante at 115. This is not merely the Commonwealth’s argument. The suppression court specifically found that, considering all the circumstances, there existed “probable cause to believe that a felony [had] been committed by the occupants [of the vehicle].” A determination of the suppression court is certainly entitled to considerably greater deference than that afforded it by the majority. The record fully supports the suppression court’s determination; thus it should not be disturbed on appeal.
Accordingly, I dissent.
LARSEN and KAUFFMAN, JJ., join.

. The suppression court found that the police had independent probable cause to believe the occupants of the vehicles were engaged in felonious activity. See discussion infra.

. The majority opinion omits these two facts.

. The majority characterizes the trunk as “appellant’s” and fails to recognize that at the time of the search, the police had no idea who owned the car. For all they knew, the car may have belonged to *379Booker, the passenger who discarded the gun and heroin. Given this possibility, the police were certainly justified in searching the car.