Court Opinion

ID: 9473453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:30:25.969377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:32.584733
License: Public Domain

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting:
I agree with the law as announced by the majority: This court disfavors subjective methods of evaluation because they provide a ready mechanism for discrimination. We differ on the application of this rule of law to the facts in this case. I write to illuminate the facts because those who must apply this rule of law in the circuit may better do so when the facts, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, are fully set forth and evaluated.
The facts in this case are more egregious than in any prior case involving subjective standards for hiring, promotion or termination. The majority fails to appreciate the fact that in this case, the claim is not merely that the employer used a subjective standard for termination; the claim is that the employer changed from one subjective standard to another subjective standard “in the twinkling of an eye.” This is a “double dose” of the subjective policy problem.
Until Conner made the left turn (which she denies), the subjective policy was not to fire drivers for traffic violations. Even where the traffic violation resulted in the issuance of a traffic citation, it was the policy of the bus company not to terminate bus drivers. The policy, if sporadic day-by-day events may constitute a policy, was to reprimand the driver; yet even these reprimands were informal. The majority treats this case as a run of the mill subjective policy case without giving weight to the fact that this unwritten and unannounced policy applied to Conner was never applied to any other driver.1 The policy which resulted in Conner’s termination not only had never been applied to anyone else, but was formed by Walton after determining the identity of the bus driver. This case illustrates the reason for this circuit’s strong disfavor for subjective standards when advanced to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken.
A comparison of our cases on the subject of subjective determinations shows how loosely the circuit rule is being applied in this case.
In Miles v. MNC, 750 F.2d 867 (11th Cir.1985), Miles alleged racial discrimination when MNC, her employer, did not rehire her after a temporary layoff. The court found that MNC based its decision solely upon subjective evaluations of Miles’s work performance. Further, “evidence in the case established that there were not guidelines for evaluating performance, written worker evaluations or regular work checks done on the employees’ work habits.” Miles, 750 F.2d at 871. Additionally, the MNC plant manager, conducted all worker evaluations. We found MNC’s subjective evaluations, without more, insufficient to sustain its burden of production, stating: “Subjective and vague criteria may be insufficient reasons given by an employer for its failure to rehire because such criteria do not allow a reasonable opportunity for rebuttal.” Miles, 750 F.2d at 871.
Miles is less egregious than this case. In this case, one management figure, the president, subjectively evaluated Conner’s driving skills after learning her identity.2 The bus company had not developed any guidelines or criteria upon which to assess worker performance. Because the bus company had no objective standards, Conner was unable to ascertain the consequences of her subsequent actions. Like*1503wise, for the same reasons, she is denied a reasonable opportunity for rebuttal.
In Williams v. City of Montgomery, the City of Montgomery Fire Department discharged Williams, a black male, after he committed a felony. 742 F.2d 586 (11th Cir.1984). The city maintained a mandatory policy requiring the discharge of any fire fighter convicted of a felony. Two years earlier, the city had terminated two white males because of their felony convictions; both fire fighters appealed to the Montgomery City-County Personnel Board, which reinstated them. The city did not reinstate Williams. We said: “The city and the Board submitted that the white fire fighters’ offenses were less serious than Williams’s offense and that the white fire fighters received more support from the fire department than did Williams. Besides being subjective, these reasons are irrelevant.” Williams, 742 F.2d at 588 n. 2. We found the city’s articulated reason insufficient to sustain its burden of production. In this case Conner’s making of the left turn became more serious than any of the other many violations committed by other bus drivers. The company president’s distinction between driver violations subject to termination and those rendered harmless remains undefined. As to dangerousness, the company’s president “knows it when he sees it,” and relies on the courts to unquestionably accept his determination. Absent from this record is anything to indicate the facts surrounding the alleged left turn. We are left to believe the company president that the “no firing for violations policy” changed and the turn was dangerous.
In Lee v. Conecuh County Board of Education, Gantt, a black male teacher, alleged racial discrimination because the Conecuh County Board of Education repeatedly failed to promote him to principal. 634 F.2d 959 (5th Cir.1981). We found: “Despite the objective evidence of Gantt’s superior qualifications, defendants contend that they refused to promote him because they consider him unfit for a principal-ship.” Lee, 634 F.2d at 963. The school board based its decision on subjective evaluations of Gantt’s teaching ability, relying on the evaluations of a single supervisor. We stated: “Establishing qualifications is an employer’s prerogative ... but an employer may not utilize wholly subjective standards by which to judge its employees’ qualifications and then plead lack of qualification when its promotion process, for example, is challenged as discriminatory.” Lee, 634 F.2d at 963 (citing Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 358 (5th Cir.1972)). We found the school board’s argument unpersuasive and insufficient to rebut Gantt’s prima facie case.
Likewise, one Fort Gordon management figure terminated Conner based upon his subjective evaluations. Similar to Lee, an employer may not utilize wholly subjective standards by which to critique and discharge an employee and subsequently meet his burden of producing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason by arguing that the employee arguably violated safety standards about which she was totally unfamiliar.
In case after case, we have determined that subjective standard evidence is too unreliable to overcome a prima facie case of discrimination. Because the majority cites the rule, but fails to properly apply it in this case, I dissent.

. The fact that the bus company also fired Sexton, another driver, on the same day it fired Conner is of no moment; the facts of his case are not in this record, and that event without more is irrelevant. What happened in the months and years before the bus company fired Connor is what is relevant.

. Unfortunately, the record is not as clear as we would desire regarding the company president’s knowledge of the identity of the offending bus driver or the president’s method and timing in making that determination.