Court Opinion

ID: 9856527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:49:41.727977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:58.398738
License: Public Domain

EaviN, I.,
concurring in the result reached by the majority, but dissenting from certain legal views expressed by them.
I accept without reservation the decision that no error was committed on the trial in the court below. But I find myself in disagreement with the majority in two respects.
The first point of disagreement concerns the interpretation of the record and is inconsequential in nature. As I see it, the accused has been adjudged guilty of this single offense: parking a motor vehicle in a parking space in the City of Raleigh without depositing a coin in the nearest parking meter as required by the city parking meter ordinance.
*13The second point of disagreement involves a question of constitutional law and is fundamental in character. For this reason, I deem it permissible for me to set forth in detail the reasons which leave me with the abiding conviction that there is no conflict between any of the provisions of the parking meter ordinance under review and the organic law.
It seems advisable to advert at the outset to the decision in Rhodes v. Raleigh, 217 N.C. 627, 9 S.E. 2d 389, 130 A.L.R. 311, which has been rather generally misinterpreted by legal text writers. This case turned on the fundamental proposition that a municipality is a creature of the State and has no powers save those conferred upon it by the laws of the State. Green v. Kitchin, 229 N.C. 450, 50 S.E. 2d 545; S. v. Gulledge, 208 N.C. 204, 179 S.E. 883; S. v. Thomas, 118 N.C. 1221, 24 S.E. 535. "When it was argued and decided, the statute then codified as C.S. 2787 (31) gave municipalities power merely “to provide for the regulation . . . and limitation of . . . vehicular traffic” upon their public streets. The only question directly and properly before the court in the Rhodes case was whether or not C.S. 2787 (31) or any other then existing legislative enactment conferred upon the City of Raleigh power to enact an ordinance regulating parking on its streets by the use of coin-operated parking meters. The majority of the court answered that question in the negative. The various statements in the Court’s opinion which were not necessary to the decision of that precise question constitute obiter dicta, and have no effect as declaring the law.
At its first session after the decision in the Rhodes case, the Legislature adopted Chapter 153 of the Public Laws of 1941 for the avowed purpose of amending C.S. 2787 (31). The amendatory act, which is now embodied in G.S..160-200 (31), gives to municipalities in express terms the power “to regulate and limit vehicular parking on streets in congested areas.” Moreover, it specifies that “in the regulation and limitation of vehicular traffic and parking in cities and towns the governing bodies may, in their discretion, enact ordinances providing for a system of parking meters designed to promote traffic regulation and requiring a reasonable deposit (not in excess of five cents per hour) from those who park vehicles for stipulated periods of time in certain areas in which the congestion of vehicular traffic is such that public convenience and safety demand such regulation.” It further provides that “the proceeds derived from the use of such parking meters shall be used exclusively for the purpose of making such regulation effective and for the expenses incurred by the city or town in the regulation and limitation of vehicular parking, and traffic relating to such parking, on the streets and highways of said cities and towns.”
It thus appears that the Legislature has explicitly delegated to municipalities the power to enact ordinances regulating vehicular parking on *14public streets in congested areas by the use of parking meters, and providing for the collection of a meter fee sufficient to cover the expenses of maintaining the parking meters and enforcing parking regulations.
Subsequent to the adoption by the General Assembly of 1941 of the statute now codified as subsection 31 of G.S. 160-200, the City of Raleigh enacted a parking meter ordinance “to regulate and limit vehicular traffic and parking . . . during the hours of 8 :00 o’clock A.M. to 6 :00 o’clock P.M. each day, except Sundays, Independance Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day ... in certain areas of the city ... in which the congestion of vehicular traffic is such that public convenience and safety demand such regulation.”
The ordinance divides the specified areas of the city into three classes of districts designated as twelve minute parking meter zones, one hour parking meter zones, and two hour parking meter zones. Under its provisions, parking spaces are marked off on the streets of the various zones in which motor vehicles may be parked, and parking meters, which are clocks set on posts to measure the time of parking, are installed along the curbing, one to each parking space. The motorist who parks in one of these parking spaces is required to deposit in the nearest parking meter a specified coin for a designated period of parking. The deposit of the coin starts operation of the clock mechanism. Each parking meter bears an inscription showing the legal parking time for the zone in which it is situated, and when operated points out by its dial and hand the duration of the period of legal parking, and on the expiration of such period, indicates illegal or overparking.
Under the ordinance, the motorist is required to deposit in the nearest parking meter “a one-cent coin . . . for a period of twelve minutes” when he parks in a parking space in a twelve-minute parking meter zone; “a five-cent coin . . . for a period of one hour, or a one-cent coin . . . for a period of twelve minutes” when he parks in a parking space in a one-hour parking meter zone; and “a five-cent coin . . . for a period of two hours, or a one-cent coin for a period of twenty-four minutes” when he parks in a parking space in a two-hour parking meter zone. The ordinance expressly establishes the rule that the motorist cannot extend the legal parking time set forth above by depositing additional coins in the parking meter. It permits this solitary exception to this rule: The motorist may “deposit, at separate intervals, one-cent coins for a parking period of twelve minutes within a one-hour zone, or twenty-four minutes within a two-hour zone, the aggregate deposit not to exceed two one-cent coins for two such parking periods.”
The ordinance specifies that “the proceeds derived from the use of . . . (the) . . . parking meters shall be used exclusively for the purpose of making . . . (the) . . . regulation effective and for the expenses in*15curred by the city ... in the regulation and limitation of vehicular parking, and traffic relating to such parking, on the streets of . . . (the) . . . city.” It provides criminal penalties for its violation.
The defendant was tried and convicted in the City Court of Raleigh upon a criminal complaint and warrant charging that he violated the parking meter ordinance of the City of Raleigh by willfully parking a motor vehicle in a parking space in a one-hour parking meter zone without depositing a coin in the nearest parking meter. He was ordered to pay a nominal fine, and appealed from the judgment imposing it to the Superior Court, where trial was had de novo on the original papers.
When the case was heard in the Superior Court, the jury returned a special verdict, which set out in approved form and specific detail facts showing that the defendant deliberately committed all the acts alleged in the criminal complaint and warrant. The trial judge concluded as a matter of law upon the special verdict that the defendant was guilty as charged, and rendered judgment that he pay a fine of $5.00 and the costs. The defendant excepted and appealed, asserting by appropriate assignments of error that the parking meter ordinance of the City of Raleigh and the underlying enabling act contravene the law of the land clause embodied in Article I, Section 1Y, of the North Carolina Constitution in so far as they undertake to authorize the exaction of a fee or charge for parking on a public street of the city, and that in consequence his conviction and the resultant judgment are void.
It is obvious that the City of Raleigh passed its parking meter ordinance in the exercise of the legislative authority granted to it by the statute now embodied in G.S. 160-200 (31). Manifestly this parking meter ordinance and the underlying enabling act have for their purpose the regulation of vehicular parking, and not the raising of revenue. This being true, they were enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State.
The police power of the State extends not only to regulations promoting public health, public morals, and public safety, but also to those designed to promote public convenience. Wake Forest v. Medlin, 199 N.C. 83, 154 S.E. 29. The only limit to its exercise is that regulations must not violate the law of the land clause embodied in Article I, Section 1Y, of the State Constitution, or any other constitutional provision. Brewer v. Valk, 204 N.C. 186, 167 S.E. 638, 87 A.L.R. 237.
To satisfy the law of the land clause, a regulation adopted in the attempted exercise of the State’s police power must meet these requirements: (1) The regulation must be established for a purpose falling within the scope of the police power; and (2) the measures sanctioned by the regulation must be actually and reasonably adapted to accomplish such purpose. S. v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E. 2d 731, 7 A.L.R. 2d 407.
*16It is too evident to admit of dispute that the parking meter ordinance and the underlying enabling act fulfill the first requisite of the law of the land clause. Their apparent and avowed purpose is to promote public convenience and public safety in the use of public streets in congested areas. S. v. Carter, 205 N.C. 161, 172 S.E. 415; 64 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, section 1762.
This brings us to the crucial question whether the measures sanctioned by the parking meter ordinance and the enabling statute are actually and reasonably adapted to promote public convenience and public safety in the use of public streets in congested areas.
Judges are not required by law to be more ignorant than all other men. In consequence, they know judicially that the advent of the motor vehicle has made the regulation of parking in congested areas of our cities and towns a public necessity; that the only available and practical mode of regulation is the imposition of time limits on parking; that attempts to enforce such time limits by means of the “watch and chalk” method used by police officers in making rounds at appointed intervals proves both costly and unsatisfactory; and that coin-operated parking meters afford public authorities an accurate and inexpensive way to time motorists in their parking and thus to avoid overtime parking. Cassidy v. City of Waterbury, 130 Conn. 237, 33 A. 2d 142; Foster's, Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 118 P. 2d 721; People on Complaint of Bergen v. Littman, 193 Misc. 40, 85 N.Y.S. 2d 48; Owens v. Owens, 193 S.C. 260, 8 S.E. 2d 339. The Supreme Court of "Washington made these well chosen remarks in declaring parking meters admirably designed to facilitate the enforcement of time limits on parking: “We fail to see what difference it can make to either the traveler on the street or the occupant of abutting property whether the time limitations be enforced by a policeman marking-cars with a piece of chalk or by a mechanical device that registers ‘Time’s up’ in a way that all may see. The object of both is to prevent overtime parking, and, of the two, it seems to us that the latter is more effective. With the latter, there are no minutes of grace as there are with the policeman while he is making his rounds ‘marking’ and ‘checking up,’ for the time begins to run when the car is parked, and ends when the meter registers ‘Time’s up.’ ” Kimmel v. City of Spokane, 7 Wash. 2d 372, 109 P. 2d 1069.
The regulations promulgated by the ordinance under the authority of the enabling act classify the congested areas of the City of Raleigh as twelve-minute parking meter zones, one-hour parking meter zones, and two-hour parking meter zones conformable to their respective traffic conditions ; impose time limits on the parking of motor vehicles on streets in the areas so classified to meet the respective regulatory requirements of the several zones; establish a coin-operated parking meter system to meas*17ure and mark the time limits so imposed; exact from motorists wbo park their vehicles on streets in the classified areas a nominal meter fee to cover the expense of maintaining the parking meter system and enforcing parking regulations; and provide criminal penalties for overtime parking and other violations of the regulations.
If a municipality is to regulate the parking of motor vehicles through the agency of parking meters, it must require motorists to deposit coins in them when they exercise the privilege of parking. This is necessarily so for the very simple reason that the parking meters available for use are coin-operated devices. Gardner v. City of Brunswick, 197 Ga. 167, 28 S.E. 2d 135; City of Louisville v. Louisville Automobile Club, 290 Ky. 241, 160 S.W. 2d 663; City of Shreveport v. Brister, 194 La. 615, 194 So. 566; Wilhoit v. City of Springfield, 237 Mo. App. 775, 171 S.E. 2d 95; Owens v. Owens, supra. The meter fees furnish funds to defray the expenses of maintaining the parking meter system and enforcing parking regulations. The meter fee imposed upon the exercise of the privilege of parking a motor vehicle in a parking meter zone, the necessity of moving a motor vehicle parked in a parking meter zone at the expiration of the time limit on parking, and the fear of suffering criminal penalties for overtime parking in a parking meter zone prompt many motorists to park their vehicles at convenient places outside parking meter zones, and thus reduce substantially the number of motor vehicles seeking-parking accommodations on public streets in congested areas embraced in parking meter zones. Bowers v. City of Muskegon, 305 Mich. 676, 9 N.W. 2d 889; Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 501, 51 A. 2d 836. The same factors hasten the departure of parked vehicles from parking meter zones. In re Opinion of the Justices, 297 Mass. 559, 8 N.E. 2d 179; Gilsey Buildings v. Incorporated Village of Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N.Y.S. 2d 694, affirmed in 258 App. Div. 901, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 832; Owens v. Owens, supra.
These things being true, the exaction of the meter fee and the other measures sanctioned by the parking meter ordinance and the enabling act are actually adapted to promote public convenience and public safety in the use of public streets in congested areas. They not only provide the mechanical and financial means essential to the operation and maintenance of the parking meter system and the enforcement of parking regulations, but they also minimize the parking of motor vehicles in the congested areas classified as parking meter zones, prevent the abuse of the privilege of parking by the occupation of the same parking spaces by the same motor vehicles for unreasonable periods of time, distribute the privilege of parking more fairly among the members of the public using streets in such areas, and afford motorists in general better opportunities to transact business with the occupants of property abutting on streets in *18such areas. Andrews v. City of Marion, 221 Ind. 422, 47 N.E. 2d 968; Board of Coms’rs of City of Newark v. Local Government Board of N. J., 133 N.J.L. 513, 45 A. 2d 139 ; Harper v. Wichita Falls (Tex. Civ. App.), 105 S.W. 2d 743.
The measures are likewise reasonably adapted to accomplish the public good in view. The meter fees are modest in amount. Indeed, they are payable in the two coins of lowest value. Nothing indicates that receipts of meter fees are disproportionate to the expense of maintaining the parking meter system and enforcing parking regulations. Cassidy v. City of Waterbury, supra; State ex rel. Harkow v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314; Gardner v. City of Brunswick, supra; City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381 Ill. 347, 45 N.E. 2d 852; Andrews v. City of Marion, supra; City of Louisville v. Louisville Automobile Club, supra; Bowers v. City of Mushegon, supra; Hendricks v. Minneapolis, 207 Minn. 151, 290 N.W. 428; Wilhoit v. City of Springfield, supra; City of Columbus v. Ward, 65 Ohio App. 522, 31 N.E. 2d 142; Ex Parte Duncan, 179 Okl. 355, 65 P. 2d 1015; William Laubach & Sons v. City of Easton, 347 Pa. 542, 32 A. 2d 881; Owens v. Owens, supra; Ex parte Harrison, 135 Tex. Cr. 611, 122 S.W. 2d 314; Webster County Court v. Roman, 121 W. Va. 381, 3 S.E. 2d 631. The regulations operate alike on all motorists. They classify congested areas as twelve minute parking meter zones, one-hour parking meter zones, and two-hour parking meter zones conformable to their respective traffic conditions, and establish limits on parking in each zone to satisfy its peculiar regulatory requirements. They set up varying permissible parking periods and corresponding meter fees in one-hour and two-hour parking meter zones so that a motorist who has occasion to park in such zones may select a parking period reasonably suitable for his individual needs and pay no more than his just proportion of the cost of parking regulation.
In reaching the conclusion that the parking meter regulations and the underlying enabling act represent a valid exercise of the police power of the State, I do not overlook the fact that motorists may frequently avoid detection for overtime parking in parking meter zones by the simple expedient of depositing additional coins in parking meters. This fact does not invalidate the parking meter regulations. Hickey v. Riley, 177 Or. 321, 162 P. 2d 371. No police regulation could stand if the apprehension of all its violators were a sine qua non to its validity.