Court Opinion

ID: 9638234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:38:28.882643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:05.052122
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
concurring in result.
Judge Finch argues, with his customary logic and persuasiveness, that the designation by the then governor of an “Acting Director of Finance,” continuing through an entire legislative session and beyond without the tender of his or any other name to the Senate for confirmation, was subversive of Article IV, Section 51, of the Missouri Constitution, which specifies when the authority of a person whose appointment is subject to Senate confirmation begins and terminates. He also demonstrates convincingly that Section 51 was adopted by the voters in 1972 to make impossible the very situation demonstrated by these facts. His argument that Section 4 of Article IV does not apply because of the express provisions to the contrary, which means that the appointment is “otherwise provided by law” within the meaning of that section, is also founded in logic. Missouri voters might remember a situation in which a federal judge and a United States Marshal were kept in office through a series of recess appointments, even though the United States Senate failed, through several sessions, to confirm the *488appointments, and may have reacted against that situation.
The principal opinion can be read as giving the governor carte blanche to evade Section 51 by the mere expedient of designating an appointee as “acting,” and simply not submitting his name to the Senate. I see no escape from Judge Finch’s argument that, under these circumstances, the adoption in 1972 of Section 51 would be totally without effect. The “end of term” limitation suggested by the principal opinion has no meaning in the case of an office which is held at the pleasure of the governor. The governor also could create a vacancy by submitting a name to the Senate, withdrawing it, and then designating another person in an acting capacity.
I am moved, however, by the serious consequences which might ensue from a holding that the functions of the Director of Finance could not be performed by any person other than one appointed in strict accordance with Article IV, Section 51. Chapter 361, RSMo confers numerous powers and imposed sundry duties on the Director of Finance. That official is required, either personally or through deputy, to “visit and examine” every bank and trust company once each year. It would follow from Judge Finch’s argument that a deputy could not act unless there were a functioning incumbent,1 and that, if this Acting Director were wholly without power to act, a bank could have excluded him or his designated deputy as a virtual trespasser. Section 361.260 empowers the Director to call upon banks to restore any impairment of capital. Section 361.300 contains the ultimate power of taking possession of the business and property of a financial institution which is determined to be insolvent. I cannot believe that the state government can be bereft of authority, even for a single day, to exercise the important powers just described. Suppose that a director of finance dies while the legislature is in session. It would not be possible to install a director who meets the requirements of Section 51 without some delay. Yet there must be the authority, somewhere in state government, to seize the assets of a failing bank before they are further dissipated.
Or the Senate, in a dispute with the governor, might delay action on or refuse to confirm an appointment, for Director of Finance or some other office requiring confirmation. How could the governor then take care that the laws be faithfully excut-ed, if no person could act in the absence of Senate confirmation? (Mo. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 2).
There is a solution to the problems presented in the two opinions by reason of which the actions of the purported acting director may be maintained in force, without our giving express sanction to the governor’s action and to similar actions of other governors in the future. Fundamental to the interpretation and application of Constitutional provisions is the proposition that the people of the state have decreed a functioning government, in which each of the three branches is able to perform its assigned role. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed. .579 (1819). Constitutional provisions should not be construed in a way which will bring essential government operations to a standstill. This can be accomplished in the present setting by holding that the grant of the charter by the designated Acting Director of Finance had colorable authority which is not subject to challenge by the general public. There is ample precedent for a holding along these lines.
Manning was, at the time of the resignation of Director Crist, the Deputy Director of Finance, required to possess the same qualifications as the director, but not subject to Senate confirmation. See, § 361.-060.2, RSMo. If a director were to die suddenly, or were to resign finally while the Senate was in session, the Department of Finance would not cease to exist. In *489this situation one would look to the Deputy Director to take charge of the office until the governor should make another appointment. Speculation as to just how long the deputy might continue under these circumstances is not necessary at this point.
There is also the de facto doctrine, which recognizes that the acts of a purported public official may have validity vis-a-vis the general public even though there may be some flaw in the title to the office.2 I need not analyze the various situations in which this doctrine has been applied. Its existence is based on the doctrine of necessity, which the principal opinion recognizes, and which I find compelling as reason for not holding that the actions of the acting director are void. Sometimes this overriding principle must be applied to fill constitutional lacunae.
If the de facto doctrine is to be applied, the challenge here posed gains no force through being posed in the direct proceedings established by law for review of the Acting Director’s grant of a charter. Under this doctrine the challenge must come from the public authorities, by a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto. Boggess v. Pence, 321 S.W.2d 667, 672 (Mo. banc 1959), citing many cases. Members of the general public may not challenge the authority directly or collaterally. One of my qualifications about the principal opinion is that it would apparently foreordain the result of a quo warranto action, by holding that the “acting” designation was entirely appropriate. It is not necessary to do this to resolve the case before us.
The subordinate nature of the Director’s authority is also important in assessing the public interest. The State Banking Board, pursuant to § 361.094.2, RSMo 1978, may hear appeals from upholding the grant of the charter or reversing the director’s action. In Kostman v. Pine Law Bank, 540 S.W.2d 72 (Mo.1976), we emphasized the subordinate role the Director plays with reference to the Board, and held that the director may not appeal the Board’s determinations. Here the ultimate authority possessing discretion under state law has approved the grant. There is no necessity for undoing its decision because of a question about the title of the subordinate official. Cf Cherry v. City of Hay ti Heights, 563 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. banc 1978).
If the legislature is of the opinion that a governor is subverting the constitutional provisions by designating acting officials to positions requiring senate confirmation it has the power of impeachment under Art. VII, Sec. 2, of the Missouri Constitution. In mentioning this remedy I intend no criticism of the governor’s action in the present case, and make no intimation that he acted other than in entire good faith, but mention the availability of impeachment simply to demonstrate that there are remedies for perceived wilful or persistent constitutional violations if the persons possessing the power are disposed to exercise it. It cannot be claimed, then, that there is no remedy for persistent disregard for constitutional provision. The judicial branch is not the sole guardian of the Constitution.
On the other issues presented I agree with Judge Higgins’ opinion. Some of the questions have fallen out of the case because of the merger of the subject bank into another bank which is a part of the same holding company system, but it was represented to us in oral argument that, by means of the incorporation followed by merger, the existing bank obtained authority to operate and maintain a branch which it could not otherwise have established. If so, the case is not moot. I write separately because the case can be disposed of in a satisfactory manner without an outright sustaining of the designation of an acting director. Just as the home run off George Brett’s super pine tar bat was not “void,” the charter issued to the intervenor should not be held “void.” I do not think that the remand to the present Director of Finance for further action is necessary under present circumstances.
*490I agree that the judgment should be affirmed.

. The Deputy Director of Finance holds his office at the pleasure of the Director of Finance. § 361.060, RSMo 1978. A deputation without a fixed term expires with the office on which it depends. 67 C.J.S. Officers § 278 (1978). The authority of a deputy ceases on the death or disqualification of the principal. 67 C.J.S. Officers § 280 (1978).

. Cf. Harbaugh v. Winsor, 38 Mo. 327, 332 (1866); Boggess v. Pence 321 S.W.2d 667, 672 (Mo. banc 1959). Cf. Cherry v. City of Hayti Heights, 563 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. banc 1978).