Court Opinion

ID: 9732565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:25:56.220828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:29.417009
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREIMAN, dissenting: The majority states that “the actions of the police were indefensible.” 319 111. App. 3d at 806. Here the police took the defendant to the police station a little after 1 p.m., placed him in a lineup, questioned him in several different rooms by several different police officers about the tragic beating of Lenard Clark and kept him at the station approximately 21 hours before he was allowed to talk with his attorney. When his attorney arrived on the nineteenth hour, he was refused an audience with defendant and he was advised by the police that they were not sure whether defendant was “going to be a witness or suspect.” While I recognize the distinction urged by the majority between a person being questioned as a witness and a person detained as a suspect to be charged, it is difficult for me to imagine that a defendant or his attorney has any idea of what his status is when the police are unable to sort out whether he is a witness or suspect. The philosophy of People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414 (1994), is certainly broad enough to encompass a person held or restrained under this hazy status. It should be noted that, to the extent that the police refuse to permit an attorney to communicate with the defendant at the station, that is relevant in determining whether defendant is in police custody or not. People v. Finklea, 119 Ill. App. 3d 448 (1983). Additionally, it should be noted that the Illinois General Assembly since 1927 has been concerned with the rights of a party to consult with an attorney. Accordingly, section 103 — 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103 — 4 (West 1998)) provides: “103 — 4. Right to Consult with Attorney. Any person committed, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty for any cause whatever and whether or not such person is charged with an offense shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape, be allowed to consult with any licensed attorney at law of this State whom such person may desire to see or consult, alone and in private at the place of custody, as many times and for such period each time as is reasonable.” If this statute means anything, it means that this defendant, perhaps a witness, perhaps a suspect, but certainly “restrained of his liberty for any cause whatever” should have been allowed to talk with counsel at the police station. Accordingly, I would affirm the thoughtful trial judge who declined to suppress matter that was expressed before counsel’s appearance on the scene and suppressed defendant’s written statement given after counsel’s efforts to talk to his client.