Court Opinion

ID: 9542328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:33:12.24182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:40.085836
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Although I very much agree in principle with the result reached by the majority, I believe that we are compelled by Willis v. State to reverse Matthew’s conviction. 888 N.E.2d 177 (Ind.2008). In Willis, the defendant’s eleven-year-old son took his mother’s clothes to school without her permission and gave them to a classmate. After his teacher informed Willis of the exchange, Willis confronted her son, who denied taking the clothes. She then warned him that if he did not tell the truth, he would be punished. In response,
Willis instructed J.J. to remove his pants and place his hands on the upper bunk bed. J.J. complied, and Willis proceeded to strike him five to seven times with either a belt or an extension cord. Although trying to swat J.J. on the buttocks, his attempt to avoid the swats resulted in some of them landing on his arm and thigh leaving bruises. J.J. testified that during this exchange his mother was ‘mad.’ Willis countered that she was not angry but ‘disappointed.’
Id. at 179 (footnote and citations omitted). The son showed his bruises to the school *700nurse, who called child protective services, resulting in Willis being charged and convicted of class D felony battery.
To evaluate Willis’s conviction, our Supreme Court adopted and applied the Restatement’s general rule regarding parental discipline: “ ‘A parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his [or her] child as he [or she] reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education.’ ” Id. at 182 (quoting Restatement of the Law (Second) Torts § 147(1) (1965)) (alterations in original). The Restatement also includes a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a parent’s conduct:
“In determining whether force or confinement is reasonable for the control, training, or education of a child, the following factors are to be considered:
(a) whether the actor is a parent;
(b) the age, sex, and physical and mental condition of the child;
(c) the nature of his offense and his apparent motive;
(d) the influence of his example upon other children of the same family or group;
(e) whether the force or confinement is reasonably necessary and appropriate to compel obedience to a proper command;
(f) whether it is disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily degrading, or likely to cause serious or permanent harm.”
Id. (quoting Restatement, supra, § 150). Our Supreme Court cautioned that the relevant factors “should be balanced against each other, giving appropriate weight as the circumstances dictate, in determining whether the force is reasonable.” 888 N.E.2d at 182.
In applying the factors to Willis’s case, the court noted that the child was eleven years old, observing that “ ‘[a] punishment which would not be too severe for a boy of twelve may be obviously excessive if imposed upon a child of four or five.’ ” Id. at 183 (quoting Restatement, supra, § 150 cmt. c). Next, the court considered the severity of the boy’s offense, opining that “most parents would likely consider as serious their eleven-year-old child’s behavior in being untruthful and taking property of others. At the very least a parent might consider that such behavior could set the stage for more aberrant behavior later in life.” 888 N.E.2d at 183. Our Supreme Court also highlighted the Restatement’s comment that
“a more severe punishment may be imposed for a serious offense, or an intentional one, than for a minor offense, or one resulting from a mere error of judgment or careless inattention. The fact that the child has shown a tendency toward certain types of misconduct may justify a punishment which would be clearly excessive if imposed upon a first offender.”
Id. (quoting Restatement, supra, § 150 cmt. c).
The Willis court next considered the force employed by the mother against her son, observing — as noted by the majority herein — that “Willis has used progressive forms of discipline.” 888 N.E.2d at 183. In analyzing whether the boy’s punishment was unnecessarily degrading, disproportionate to the offense, or likely to cause serious or permanent harm, the Willis court made the following observations: “J.J. received five to seven swats on his buttocks, arm, and thigh for what many parents might reasonably consider a serious offense. We find nothing particularly degrading about this manner of punishment. Nor, in context, is it readily *701apparent that the punishment was disproportionate to the offense.” Id. Finally, considering the severity of his injuries, the court noted that although bruising was evident the next day, “there is no indication that the school nurse provided any medical attention or even suggested that medical attention was necessary. In essence it appears from the record that the bruises were neither serious nor permanent.” Id. at 184. After considering all of the above-described evidence, our Supreme Court concluded as a matter of law that Willis’s actions were reasonable and fell within the parental discipline privilege, reversing her conviction.
I will endeavor to apply the Willis analysis to the facts herein. J.M., the child who was punished, was twelve years old— a full year older than the child in Willis. As for the severity of J.M.’s offense, she hit her seven-year-old brother in the face, giving him a bloody nose. When Matthew attempted to intervene, J.M. called her mother a “fucking bitch,” tr. p. 29, acted as if she were going to hit her mother, ran inside the house, and shut herself in the bathroom. If anything, J.M.’s offenses are more severe than those at issue in Willis— striking a sibling in the face, shouting epithets at a parent, and threatening to hit a parent are certainly behaviors that most parents would consider very serious and “could set the stage for more aberrant behavior later in life.” Willis, 888 N.E.2d at 183.
Considering the propriety of the force used by Matthew, the record reveals that the children had been fighting all day and that throughout the day, Matthew had warned J.M. to stop hitting her brother and sister. Thus, as in Willis, Matthew had employed progressive forms of discipline. As for the nature of the punishment inflicted by Matthew, I observe that J.M. received approximately ten blows from Matthew’s hand and a belt. I see no reason to diverge from our Supreme Court’s conclusion in Willis that, in response to a serious offense, there is “nothing particularly degrading about this manner of punishment. Nor, in context, is it readily apparent that the punishment was disproportionate to the offense.” Id. And as in Willis, Matthew’s discipline left bruises and welts, but “[i]n essence it appears from the record that the bruises [and welts] were neither serious nor permanent,” militating “against a conclusion that the punishment was unreasonable.” Id. at 184. Under these circumstances, I do not see how we can avoid the Willis court’s conclusion that Matthew’s actions herein fall within the parental discipline privilege.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sullivan observed that the Willis decision “increases the quantum of effort that the State will be required to expend in its efforts to protect children from abuse. As such, the Court’s opinion constitutes a change in our State’s policy toward child abuse.” 888 N.E.2d at 184 (Sullivan, Justice, dissenting).3 I wholeheartedly agree. I believe that the reasonableness of a parent’s actions should be left for the trier of fact to evaluate. Here — and in Willis — the fact-finder concluded that the respective moth*702ers’ actions went beyond the boundary of reasonableness, and I am uncomfortable with an appellate court second-guessing that conclusion as a matter of law. That said, it is evident that our Supreme Court has instructed us to do precisely that, and given my analysis above, I believe that we are compelled by Willis to reverse Matthew’s conviction and would therefore reverse the trial court herein.

. As an aside, I observe that there are sixteen nations around the world that have taken the initiative to ban all corporal punishment: Sweden, Finland, Norway, Austria, Cyprus, Italy, Croatia, Latvia, Denmark, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany, Ukraine, Iceland, and Israel. Christopher B. Fuselier, Corporal Punishment of Children: California’s Attempt and Inevitable Failure to Ban Spanking in the Home, 28 J. Juv. L. 82, 86 (2007). The United Nations has recommended the adoption of this approach as well. Id. That the State of Indiana is headed so squarely in the opposite direction without a directive from the legislature to do so is troubling, to say the least.