Court Opinion

ID: 9376234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-02 15:05:11.442511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:05.064353
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-165

                       FRANK N. GOBBI, JR., trustee,1

                                       vs.

                         TOWN OF DEDHAM & another.2

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        The plaintiff, Frank N. Gobbi, Jr., as trustee of the Gobbi

 Revocable Trust, appeals from a Superior Court judgment

 upholding the decision of the Conservation Commission of Dedham

 (commission) to deny his after-the-fact application for a

 stormwater management permit.         On appeal, the plaintiff contends

 that the commission improperly applied revised regulations that

 were adopted while his application was pending and acted

 arbitrarily and capriciously in denying his permit application.

 The plaintiff also appeals from an order denying his

 postjudgment motion to expand the record to include meeting

 minutes that purportedly evince the commission's intent to

 1   Of the Frank N. Gobbi Revocable Trust.

 2   Conservation Commission of Dedham.
exempt pending applications from the revised regulations.     We

affirm.

    Background.    1.   Regulatory framework.   In 1996, the town

of Dedham (town) adopted a stormwater management bylaw (bylaw)

to "protect, maintain and enhance the public health, safety,

environment and general welfare of the Town by establishing

minimum requirements and procedures to control the adverse

effects of soil erosion and sedimentation, construction site

runoff, [and] increased post-development stormwater runoff and

nonpoint source pollution associated with new development and

redevelopment."   To advance that objective, the bylaw requires

residents to obtain a stormwater management permit (permit) from

the commission before commencing any project that alters or

disturbs land area in excess of 500 square feet.    The permitting

process allows the commission to monitor and manage the impact

of such projects on the community.

    Pursuant to its authority under the bylaw, the commission

adopted stormwater rules and regulations governing project

requirements and the permitting process.    Two different versions

of the regulations are relevant here:   the version adopted in

2008 (2008 regulations) and the version adopted on November 15,

2018 (2018 regulations).   Both versions require redevelopment

projects to improve existing conditions at the project site and

comply with stormwater management standards issued by the

                                 2
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP

standards).   DEP standard 3 requires projects to include

infiltration measures that minimize or eliminate the loss of

annual recharge to groundwater.       DEP standard 4 states that

projects must include stormwater management systems designed to

remove eighty percent "of the average annual post-construction

load of Total Suspended Solids (TSS)."       DEP standard 7 states

that redevelopment projects need only comply with DEP standards

3 and 4 to "the maximum extent practicable."

    The 2018 regulations introduced several new requirements

that did not appear in the 2008 regulations.       Specifically,

§ 5.A.3 of the 2018 regulations requires projects be designed to

"[r]etain the volume of runoff equivalent to, or greater than,

two (2) inches multiplied by the total post-construction

impervious surface area on the site" (hereinafter, "the two-inch

storage requirement").   Section 5.A.3 additionally requires all

development projects to include a stormwater management system

that removes eighty percent of TSS, thus negating the exemption

in DEP standard 4 allowing redevelopment projects to remove

eighty percent of TSS to "the maximum extent practicable."

    Under the 2018 regulations, after a permit application is

submitted, the commission "may request the submission of

additional information," including, but not limited to,

information "to describe the site, the work, or the effect of

                                  3
the work on water quality and runoff volume."      The commission is

authorized to approve a permit application "upon finding that

the proposed project will protect water resources and meets the

objectives and requirements" of the bylaw, or to deny the

application "due to non-compliance with Design Standards."

        2.   The project.   The plaintiff owns a commercial property

in the town that consists of a retail building, parking lot, and

plantings.     In June of 2018, the town's building commissioner

learned that the plaintiff planned to regrade and repave

portions of the property's parking lot (project), purportedly to

meet certain requirements of the Americans with Disabilities

Act.3    On June 12, 2018, the town's conservation agent, Elissa

Brown, sent the commissioner an e-mail message stating that she

had determined, pursuant to the commissioner's request, that the

project would require a permit.4

        On August 2, 2018, the plaintiff's project engineer, John

Glossa, of Glossa Engineering, Inc., sent Brown a letter

summarizing the plan for the project (project plan) and stating

his opinion that the work would not trigger the permit

requirements of the bylaw.      On August 8, 2018, Brown sent Glossa

3 The record is unclear as to how the building commissioner
learned of the project.

4 There is no evidence that the plaintiff was informed that Brown
had evaluated the site and determined the project would require
a permit until August of 2018, as discussed infra.

                                    4
an e-mail message explaining that a permit would, in fact, be

required, because the project involved regrading more than 500

square feet of land.   Over the next few days, Glossa and Brown

exchanged several additional e-mail messages disputing the

necessity of a permit, unwavering in their respective positions.

     On August 15, 2018, the plaintiff commenced the project

without a permit.   The commission issued a stop work and

enforcement order to the plaintiff the following day.    On August

17, 2018, the commission received a letter from the plaintiff's

attorney disputing the necessity of a permit and stating that

the plaintiff intended to continue the project without one.

     3.   The application.   On August 28, 2018, the plaintiff

submitted an after-the-fact permit application (application)

seeking retroactive approval of the project.5   The project plan

accompanying the application did not include any proposed

stormwater infiltration measures or indicate how it would

otherwise improve existing conditions.

     The commission held nine public hearings on the application

between September 6, 2018, and March 21, 2019.6   During the

5 The application stated that approximately 18,434 square feet of
the property had already been repaved and regraded and that
another 3,938 square feet of the property would need to be
repaved and regraded to complete the project.

6 The hearings were held on September 6, 2018; September 20,
2018; October 4, 2018; October 18, 2018; November 1, 2018;

                                 5
public hearing process, the plaintiff resisted numerous

directives to incorporate stormwater improvements into the

project plan and failed to comply with the commission's requests

for information it needed to assess whether the project plan was

feasible and consistent with the requirements of the regulations

and bylaw.7

     The plaintiff's resistance to the commission's directives

is perhaps best demonstrated by the way he and his

representatives responded to the commission's requests to add

stormwater infiltration measures to the project plan.   At the

first public hearing, on September 6, 2018, Glossa stated that

infiltration measures would be "a potential liability" given the

property's proximity to railroad tracks and status as a former

coal yard.    At the same hearing, Glossa was informed that even

if there was coal in the soil (the commission noted the absence

of documentation to that effect), it was not considered a

hazardous material that would exempt the plaintiff from the

infiltration requirements of the regulations.   Glossa and the

December 6, 2018; December 20, 2018; February 21, 2019; and
March 21, 2019.

7 The evidence in the record strongly suggests that the
plaintiff's recalcitrance was rooted in a belief that he was, or
should be, exempt from permit requirements. The plaintiff
unsuccessfully raised this issue in his Superior Court appeal
and, in briefing the instant appeal, did not challenge the
Superior Court judge's determination that a permit was required.

                                 6
plaintiff nevertheless continued at subsequent hearings to cite

the potential presence of coal in rejecting the commission's

directives to incorporate infiltration measures.

    At a hearing on December 6, 2018, a representative of the

plaintiff told the commission that infiltration "would not be

impactful" due to the poor quality of the soil at the property.

The commission responded that the regulations did not exempt the

property from infiltration requirements based on its soil type,

and advised the plaintiff and his representative of various ways

the project could be engineered to alleviate concerns about

groundwater breakout and contamination.    Yet at the next

hearing, on December 20, 2018, Glossa stated that due to the

presence of residual coal in the property's soil, "he would not

design the project to the specifications of the Commission," and

that "in his opinion" the commission's recommendation to

incorporate infiltration measures in the upper parking area of

the property "would not be feasible."     In response, a

commissioner told Glossa that Glossa had "a responsibility to do

his due diligence, and prove [his] claims," by using a licensed

site professional to review the soil data and support the claims

of potential contamination.   He never did.

    Glossa submitted a new project plan in early January of

2019, accompanied by a letter stating that the plan did "not

show [the] storm water recharge that was recommended by the

                                 7
Commission" because "[i]t would be extremely expensive . . . to

install a viable recharge system," "[g]iven the impermeable soil

conditions . . . , it is likely that any recharge system will

fail in a short period of time," and, due to the "possibility"

that recharging stormwater would "cause severe problems

including sink holes and a discharge to the ground of harmful

materials."   Following a January 17, 2019, meeting between the

plaintiff's representatives, the commission, and the town's

building and engineering departments, Glossa revised the project

plan again on January 23, 2019 (final project plan).

    At a hearing on February 21, 2019, Glossa pointed out that

the final project plan included a subsurface galley that would

accommodate .10 inches of recharge.     When a commissioner advised

him that the soil type at the property required .30 inches of

recharge and noted that the final project plan did not satisfy

the two-inch storage requirement that had been introduced in the

2018 regulations, Glossa responded that the plaintiff "was

opposed to the 2-inch storage requirement."    At the same

hearing, Glossa told the commission that the plaintiff was

"unwilling" to clean a drainpipe bisecting the property, as the

town's engineering department and commission had requested.     The

plaintiff also refused to comply with the commission's request

that he determine the exact location of the drainpipe, claiming

that it would be an "undue hardship."

                                 8
     On March 21, 2019, the commission voted to close the public

hearing.8    The commission issued a decision denying the

plaintiff's application the same day.

     4.     The commission's decision.   The commission found that

the plaintiff had not met his burden to demonstrate "by a

preponderance of the credible evidence that the work proposed in

the application will not have unacceptable adverse or cumulative

effect on the resource areas protected" by the bylaw, and that

he had likewise failed to submit "adequate evidence to show the

effect the proposed project may have on the surface water or

ground waters of the Commonwealth, and/or the storm drainage

system of the Town of Dedham."     The commission cited, among

other things, the plaintiff's failure to provide evidence of

abutter notification or submit a site plan with a precise

location of the drainpipe bisecting the property.     See 2018

regulations, § 6.B and appendix B.

     The commission also determined that the final project plan

did not comply with the DEP standards as required by § 5.A of

the 2018 regulations.     Specifically, the commission found that

the final plan did not comply with DEP standard 3, because it

did not use infiltration to minimize loss of annual recharge to

8 The decision denying the plaintiff's application says the
hearing was closed on March 7, 2019, but the minutes indicate
the hearing was closed on March 21, 2019.

                                   9
groundwater "to the maximum extent practicable"; DEP standard 4,

because the surface water management system the plaintiff had

proposed only removed forty-four percent of TSS, and therefore,

did not meet the requirement to remove eighty percent of TSS "to

the maximum extent practicable"; DEP standard 7, because the

final plan did not meet the other DEP standards to the "maximum

extent practicable"; and DEP standard 10, because the plaintiff

had failed to file an illicit discharge compliance statement.

    Further, the commission concluded that the final plan did

not meet the requirements of § 5.A.3 of the 2018 regulations

because it did not fulfill the two-inch storage requirement or

remove eighty percent of TSS.   The commission stated that it had

been unable to determine whether the final project plan met the

third requirement of § 5.A.3, for stormwater management systems

to remove sixty percent of the average annual load of total

phosphorus, because the plaintiff had failed to provide any

calculations regarding the removal of total phosphorus at the

property.

    The commission also denied the plaintiff's request for

waivers exempting him from requirements to remove eighty percent

of TSS and to locate all existing stormwater utilities because

the plaintiff "did not provide any supporting information"

concerning the hardship he had alleged those requirements

imposed.

                                10
    5.      Superior Court appeal.    On May 17, 2019, the plaintiff

brought a certiorari action in Superior Court seeking judicial

review of the commission's decision and asserting claims to

quiet title and for trespass related to the drainpipe under the

property.    In turn, the commission asserted counterclaims for

injunctive relief, to enforce the bylaw, and for a civil

penalty.

    On November 6, 2020, a Superior Court judge issued an order

denying the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and

allowing the commission's cross motion with respect to the

plaintiff's certiorari claim and the commission's counterclaim

for injunctive relief.     In his memorandum of decision, the judge

rejected the plaintiff's contention that the commission

improperly applied the 2018, rather than the 2008, regulations,

and held that the plaintiff's application and requests for

waivers had been properly denied.         The parties later agreed to

stay the injunctive order pending the outcome of the instant

appeal and stipulated to the dismissal of the claims for

trespass, quiet title, and a civil penalty.         Judgment entered on

July 28, 2021, and the plaintiff timely appealed.

    In January of 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion in the

Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (4), and Mass. R.

A. P. 8 (e) (1), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1611 (2019), seeking

to expand the administrative record to include minutes of the

                                     11
commission's November 15, 2018, meeting.    In support, the

plaintiff asserted that the minutes evinced the commission's

intent to apply the 2018 regulations prospectively -- that is,

only to applications received from November 15, 2018, forward.

A second Superior Court judge denied the motion on January 31,

2022.   Again, the plaintiff timely appealed.   The two appeals

were consolidated.

     Discussion.   1.   Motion to expand the record.   The

plaintiff challenges the Superior Court order denying his motion

to expand the record and encourages us to consider the November

15, 2018, meeting minutes sua sponte as part of the record in

the instant appeal.9    See Mass. R. A. P. 8 (e) (1) (appellate

court may cure material omissions from record on motion of

parties or on its own motion).    Assuming we obliged, at most,

the minutes would support the proposition that the 2018

regulations applied to new applications, without regard to

pending applications.    Thus, the absence of the minutes from the

record would not be a material omission, as the minutes are

silent on the applicability of the 2018 regulations to pending

applications such as the plaintiff's application.

9 Ordinarily, we would review the order denying the plaintiff's
motion to expand the record for an abuse of discretion. See
Commonwealth v. Roxbury Charter High Pub. Sch., 69 Mass. App.
Ct. 49, 53 (2007). The plaintiff's request that we consider the
minutes sua sponte appears to be an attempt to circumvent this
deferential standard of review.

                                 12
    Nevertheless, the plaintiff's contention that the minutes

should be included in the record is waived because it is

untimely.   "It is implicit in [rule 8 (e)] and in the very

nature of the appellate process that any correction to the

record must take place before the appeal has been decided"

(emphasis added).   Hamed v. Fadili, 408 Mass. 100, 104 (1990).

In this case, the plaintiff did not file his motion to expand

the record until January 5, 2022 -- well over one year after his

appeal of the commission's decision to the Superior Court was

decided (though judgment did not enter until July 28, 2021).

During oral argument, the plaintiff's counsel stated that she

discovered the November 15, 2018, minutes when she began

preparing for the instant appeal and "searched all the different

minutes to see if there was anything for when the actual

regulations were put into place."    The plaintiff has offered no

valid reason why he could not have searched for the minutes, and

moved to expand the record to include them, earlier.    See

Commissioner of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 312-313

(2009).

    Accordingly, the plaintiff's motion to expand the record

was properly denied, and our review of the commission's decision

must proceed on the same record on which the first Superior

                                13
Court judge based his decision.10    See Evancho v. Director of

Div. of Employment Sec., 375 Mass. 280, 283 (1978) (postjudgment

letter advising judge of document omitted from administrative

record "was not timely" and document could not be considered as

part of record on appeal).   Cf. Commonwealth v. Aboulaz, 44

Mass. App. Ct. 144, 147 (1998) ("a rational system of further

appellate review best fulfills its function if both appellate

courts deal with the same record").

     2.   The commission's decision.    a.   Standard of review.

"We review the allowance of a motion for judgment on the

pleadings de novo."   Boston v. Conservation Comm'n of Quincy,

490 Mass. 342, 345 (2022), quoting Kraft Power Corp. v. Merrill,

464 Mass. 145, 147 (2013).   "When considering a case under

certiorari, the standard of review may vary according to the

nature of the action for which review is sought."     Fafard v.

Conservation Comm'n of Reading, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 565, 567

(1996).   "In the context of this review of a conservation

commission denial of a permit, we ask whether the commission's

action was arbitrary or capricious, based upon error of law, or

unsupported by substantial evidence."    Conroy v. Conservation

10We acknowledge the defendants' contention that the plaintiff's
motion was untimely because Superior Court Standing Order 1-96
requires motions for leave to present additional evidence under
G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (6), to be brought within twenty days after
the administrative record is filed.

                                14
Comm'n of Lexington, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 552, 558 (2009).       The

commission's selection between two conflicting evidentiary views

will not be disturbed on appeal as long as that selection was

reasonable.   See Conservation Comm'n of Falmouth v. Pacheco, 49

Mass. App. Ct. 737, 739 n.3 (2000) (Pacheco).

     b.   Application of the 2018 regulations.   We are not

persuaded by the plaintiff's contention that the commission

improperly applied the 2018 regulations and should have instead

applied the 2008 regulations that were in effect when he filed

his application.11   In the absence of a vested right, "[a] change

made in the law pending [an] application for a permit . . .

rather than the law existing at the time of filing is to govern

action on the application."   R.V.H., Third, Inc. v. State

Lottery Comm'n, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 712, 716 (1999), quoting

Selectmen of Topsfield v. State Racing Comm'n, 324 Mass. 309,

11The plaintiff also contends that the 2018 regulations are
invalid because certain provisions conflict with the bylaw and
expand the scope of what the bylaw requires. The only time the
plaintiff raised this issue below was in a footnote of the
memorandum he submitted to the Superior Court in support of his
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Therein, the plaintiff
asserted that the "2018 Regulations are partially or entirely
invalid for reasons including their inconsistency with the
applicable Bylaws." The plaintiff then acknowledged that he had
yet to even examine the issue. Although we conclude that the
issue is not properly before us, see Ten Local Citizen Group v.
New England Wind, LLC, 457 Mass. 222, 232 n.15 (2010), and cases
cited, it is worth noting that the bylaw expressly states that
where there is a conflict between the bylaw and the regulations,
"the more stringent provisions shall apply."

                                 15
314 (1949).   Cf. Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318 U.S. 73, 78

(1943) ("a change of law pending an administrative hearing must

be followed in relation to permits for future acts.    Otherwise

the administrative body would issue orders contrary to the

existing legislation").   As explained below, there is no

evidence that the plaintiff had a vested right to have his

application considered under the 2008 regulations, and

therefore, the 2018 regulations were properly applied.

    In Massachusetts, the mere filing of a permit application

does not give the applicant any vested rights to the issuance of

a permit.   See Caputo v. Board of Appeals of Somerville, 330

Mass. 107, 111 (1953) ("The fact that the plaintiff filed his

application for a permit before the ordinance was amended gave

him no vested rights"); Spector v. Building Inspector of Milton,

250 Mass. 63, 71 (1924) (filing of permit application gave

plaintiff no vested rights because "petitioner held his property

subject at all times to every valid exercise of the police

power"); Albahari v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Brewster, 76 Mass.

App. Ct. 245, 249 (2010) (applicant "acquired no rights simply

by filing the permit application").   Instead, the right to a

permit vests "at the time the applicant is unconditionally

entitled to its issuance."   Albahari, supra at 250.

    Before the 2018 regulations were adopted on November 15,

2018, the commission had already held five public hearings on

                                16
the plaintiff's application.   During each of those hearings,

members of the commission cited deficiencies with the project

plan that needed to be resolved before the plaintiff's

application could be approved.   At the November 1, 2018,

hearing, which was the last hearing before the 2018 regulations

were enacted, the plaintiff had yet to incorporate required

infiltration measures into the project plan and was instructed

to continue working with the town's engineering department to

address its concerns about the drainpipe bisecting the property

and an oil and grit separator the plaintiff had proposed to

install to remove TSS.   Because the plaintiff failed to submit

an acceptable plan before the 2018 regulations were enacted, he

had no vested right to a permit under the 2008 regulations.     See

Albahari, 76 Mass. App. Ct. at 250.

    Although exceptions to the general rule have been made to

prevent "manifest injustice," see Thorpe v. Housing Authority of

Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 282 & n.43 (1969), no threat of injustice

is present here.   Section 246-4 of the bylaw permits the

commission to "adopt, and periodically amend," its rules and

regulations.   Given the commission's authority to periodically

modify its regulations, it was unreasonable for the plaintiff to

assume that his application would be forever immunized from

regulatory changes, particularly where he did not submit his

final project plan until approximately two months after the 2018

                                 17
regulations were adopted.   Additionally, the commission's

request that the plaintiff fulfill criteria that were exclusive

to the 2018 regulations, such as the two-inch storage

requirement, further underscores the fact that the plaintiff

should have anticipated his application would be evaluated under

the 2018 regulations.

     Accordingly, the 2018 regulations were properly applied.12

     c.   Denial of the plaintiff's application.   There is no

merit to the plaintiff's assertion that his application was

improperly denied.   We agree with the first Superior Court

judge's conclusion that the commission's decision to deny the

plaintiff's application was appropriate based on the plaintiff's

failure to comply with § 5.A.3 of the 2018 regulations alone.

Specifically, the final project plan did not fulfill the two-

12The cases the plaintiff relies upon in his brief, Biogen IDEC
MA, Inc. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 454 Mass. 174 (2009), and
Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner of Revenue, 448 Mass. 441
(2007), are readily distinguishable from this case. In Biogen,
454 Mass. at 191, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the
Treasurer of the Commonwealth could not retroactively apply
amended regulations requiring the plaintiff to factor a new
category of funds into its annual payments under abandoned
property laws. In Fleet, 448 Mass. at 450, the Supreme Judicial
Court held that the Commissioner of Revenue could not
retroactively apply a legislative amendment extinguishing the
right of taxpayers to receive interest on overpayments from the
date of the overpayment. Fleet and Biogen thus stand for the
proposition that an amended law cannot be applied to usurp
rights that were conclusively determined under the antecedent
version of the law. In this case, however, the plaintiff did
not vest any rights before the amended regulations were adopted.

                                18
inch storage requirement or remove eighty percent of TSS, and

the plaintiff failed to provide calculations necessary to

determine whether the final plan would remove the required sixty

percent of total phosphorus.

     The plaintiff's contention that the commission's decision

was arbitrary and capricious because it lacked "any evidence" to

conclude that he failed to satisfy DEP standards 3 and 4 "to the

maximum extent practicable" lacks merit.   As an initial matter,

the absence of evidence that the plaintiff failed to meet DEP

standards 3 and 4 did not establish that the plaintiff did, in

fact, satisfy those requirements.   Because the burden of proof

rested with the plaintiff, the commission could reasonably

conclude that the requirements had not been met based on the

plaintiff's failure to submit sufficient evidence that they had.

     With respect to DEP standard 3, which requires the use of

infiltration to minimize or eliminate the loss of recharge, the

Massachusetts Stormwater Handbook (handbook)13 states that

meeting the standard "to the maximum extent practicable" means

that:

     "(1) The applicant has made all reasonable efforts to meet
     the Standard;

     "(2) The applicant has made a complete evaluation of all
     possible applicable infiltration measures, including
     environmentally sensitive site design that minimizes land

13The 2018 regulations require projects to comply with the DEP
standards "and accompanying Stormwater Management Handbook."

                               19
    disturbance and impervious surfaces, low impact development
    techniques, and structural stormwater best management
    practices; and

    "(3) If the post-development recharge does not at least
    approximate the annual recharge from pre-development
    conditions, the applicant has demonstrated that s/he is
    implementing the highest practicable method for
    infiltrating stormwater."

The plaintiff did not satisfy any of the foregoing standards

here.   To the contrary, he repeatedly refused to consider, let

alone evaluate, the additional infiltration measures that were

recommended by the commission.   Further, although the plaintiff

and his representatives cited fears of soil contamination in

rejecting the commission's recommendations, the plaintiff never

submitted evidence substantiating the claim that soil

contamination was a legitimate concern.

    The plaintiff's assertion that Glossa's opinion was

sufficient to prove that he had met DEP standards 3 and 4 "to

the maximum extent practicable" is unpersuasive.   The commission

was not required to credit Glossa's opinion, especially

considering that Glossa failed to hire a licensed site

professional to validate his claims, as the commission had

specifically requested.   A commissioner also noted at one point

that Glossa had provided inconsistent reasons in support of his

opinion, further casting doubt on its validity.    This, coupled

with the failure to hire a licensed site professional, provided

ample reason to doubt Glossa's expertise and reliability.    See

                                 20
Pollard v. Conservation Comm'n of Norfolk, 73 Mass. App. Ct.

340, 349 n.10 (2008) ("An agency may justifiably reject an

expert's opinion on the basis of facts in the record that make

the rejection of the expert evidence reasonable, including facts

of a nontechnical nature . . . [and] where there are flaws in

the methodology or assumptions upon which the opinion depends or

where the opinion is based upon conjecture of guesswork").

     The plaintiff also contends that denying his application

prevented him from "significantly enhanc[ing] stormwater

treatment at the Property," and thus contravened the purpose of

the bylaw.    However, the purpose of the bylaw is not only to

control the effects of stormwater runoff and pollution, but to

"establish[] minimum requirements and procedures" applicable to

measures taken in furtherance of that objective.    Because the

plaintiff failed to satisfy those minimum requirements, the

denial of his application did not contravene the purpose of the

bylaw.

     On the record presented, the plaintiff has not sustained

his burden to establish the invalidity of the commission's

decision.14   See Garrity v. Conservation Comm'n of Hingham, 462

Mass. 779, 792 (2012).

14To the extent that the plaintiff's appeal raises other
arguments not discussed here, such as his challenges to the
commission's findings that he failed to notify abutters and
provide an illicit discharge statement, we have not overlooked

                                 21
    d.   Denial of waiver requests.   We discern no error in the

commission's denial of the plaintiff's waiver requests.      The

plaintiff did not submit any documentation to substantiate his

claims that compliance with TSS removal requirements and

locating all existing stormwater utilities would impose an undue

hardship.   See GreenRoots, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd.,

490 Mass. 747, 756 (2022), quoting Mederi, Inc. v. Salem, 488

Mass. 60, 67 (2021) ("A decision is not arbitrary and capricious

unless there is no ground which reasonable persons might deem

proper to support it").   Moreover, even if the plaintiff had

substantiated his claims of hardship, the commission would still

have had the discretion to decline his request.   See 2018

regulations § 1.E (stating that the commission "may" waive

strict compliance with certain requirements).

    e.   Injunctive relief.   Last, the plaintiff contends that

the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to grant injunctive

relief on the commission's counterclaim.   The counterclaim was

brought pursuant to § 246-8(A) of the bylaw, which empowers the

commission to seek injunctive relief "in a court of competent

jurisdiction" against any person who violates the provisions of

the bylaw, "or any associated regulations, permit, notice, or

order issued thereunder . . . restraining the person from

those arguments, but conclude that they do not merit discussion.
See Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).

                                22
activities which would create further violations or compelling

the person to perform abatement or remediation of the

violation."    Therefore, after the first Superior Court judge

determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to a permit under

the 2018 regulations and bylaw, he could properly order

injunctive relief for the commission on its counterclaim for

enforcement.    See Pacheco, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 744-745.

                                       Judgment affirmed.

                                       Order denying motion to
                                         expand the record affirmed.

                                       By the Court (Neyman,
                                         Desmond & Grant, JJ.15),

                                       Clerk

Entered:    March 2, 2023.

15   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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