Court Opinion

ID: 9913191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 01:02:23.749954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:45.076722
License: Public Domain

** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER **

                                                       Electronically Filed
                                                       Supreme Court
                                                       SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                       26-DEC-2023
                                                       07:56 AM
                                                       Dkt. 15 OPA

         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

                             ---o0o---

                       STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
                 Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                vs.

                        MICHAEL PICKELL,
                 Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

                         SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX

        CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
           (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 2DTA-21-00138)

                        DECEMBER 26, 2023

        RECKTENWALD, C.J., McKENNA, AND EDDINS, JJ., and
       CIRCUIT JUDGE TOʻOTOʻO AND CIRCUIT JUDGE ASHFORD,
                 ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCIES

               OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.

                        I.    Introduction

    We address whether reasonable suspicion existed for a Maui

County police officer to stop a driver who executed a U-turn at

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a highway intersection lacking signage expressly prohibiting

such turns.      Instead, the intersection had left turn only

markings and signage.        We hold reasonable suspicion existed.

        Maui Police Department Officer Rahul Mehra (“Officer

Mehra”) stopped Michael Pickell (“Pickell”) for making a U -turn

at the intersection.        Pickell appeared to be under the influence

of alcohol.      Based on indicia of alcohol consumption, field

sobriety and breath alcohol tests were performed.              The State of

Hawaiʻi (“the State”) then charged Pickell with operating a

vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant (“OVUII”) in the

District Court of the Second Circuit (“district court”).

        Pickell filed a motion to suppress arguing Hawaiʻi Revised

Statutes (“HRS”) § 291C-82(c) (2020)1 requires an express sign

1       HRS § 291C-82 provides in full:

              291C-82 Turning so as to proceed in the opposite
              direction. (a) No vehicle shall be turned so as to proceed
              in the opposite direction upon any curve, or upon the
              approach to or near the crest of a grade, where such
              vehicle cannot be seen by the driver of any other vehicle
              approaching from either direction within five hundred feet.

                   (b) In addition to the prohibition in subsection (a),
              the director of transportation is authorized to and the
              counties may by ordinance with respect to highways under
              their respective jurisdictions prohibit the turning of any
              vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction on the
              highway at any location where such turning would be
              dangerous to those using the highway or would unduly
              interfere with the free movement of traffic.

                   (c) The director of transportation and the counties by
              ordinance with respect to the highways under their
              respective jurisdictions shall place signs which are
              clearly visible to an ordinarily observant person
              prohibiting the turning of a vehicle to proceed in the

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prohibiting U-turns to make such turns illegal.             He maintained

that, therefore, Officer Mehra lacked reasonable suspicion to

make the traffic stop, requiring suppression of the OVUII

evidence.      The district court2 denied the motion.         Pickell then

entered a conditional no contest plea that allowed him to file

this appeal.

        We hold reasonable suspicion existed for the traffic stop.

Officer Mehra witnessed Pickell execute a U-turn despite the

left turn only markings and signage.           Contrary to Pickell’s

implicit assertion, HRS § 291C-82(c) does not preempt the Maui

County ordinance requiring drivers to adhere to directional

markings and signage.        We therefore affirm Pickell’s OVUII

conviction.

                                II.   Background

A.      District court proceedings

        On February 22, 2021, the State charged Pickell with OVUII

in violation of HRS §§ 291E-61(a)(1) and/or 291E-61(a)(3)

(2020).     Pickell filed a motion to suppress all evidence

relating to the alleged OVUII, contending Officer Mehra’s

traffic stop was an illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,

              opposite direction. The signs shall be official signs and
              no person shall turn any vehicle in violation of the
              restrictions stated on such signs.

2       The Honorable Blaine J. Kobayashi presided.

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section 7 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution.    Pickell pointed out that

the prosecution must show that a warrantless traffic stop falls

within one of the narrowly-defined exceptions to the warrant

requirement.    State v. Prendergast, 103 Hawaiʻi 451, 454, 83 P.3d

714, 717 (2004).    The State responded that Officer Mehra had

reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop and then had

probable cause to arrest Pickell for OVUII.

       At the hearing on Pickell’s motion to suppress, Officer

Mehra, the only witness, testified as follows.

       Officer Mehra was on assignment as an OVUII enforcement

officer at approximately 7:20 p.m. on January 26, 2021.     He

observed Pickell in the left-turn-only lane with his left-turn

signal on at the intersection of Piʻilani Highway and Ohukai

Road.    When Pickell’s light turned green, he made a U -turn

instead of turning left.

       Painted on the ground in Pickell’s lane was a left -turn-

only sign and a left directional arrow.    There was also left -

turn-only signage on the overhanging light directly in front of

him.    When Pickell made the U-turn, he drove across double solid

yellow lines and a skipped-dash white line.

       Officer Mehra then initiated a traffic stop.   Pickell

initially said he was going home but later said he was going to

Safeway.    He also said he thought the U-turn was legal and that

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he was from California and did not know if the U-turn was legal

in Hawaiʻi.

      There were many locations on Piʻilani Highway with signs

prohibiting U-turns from the left lane, and there was no such

sign where Pickell made the U-turn.    But the Maui County Code

requires drivers to abide by lane markings and traffic signage.

     The district court denied Pickell’s motion to suppress,

ruling that Pickell made an illegal U-turn.     Therefore, Officer

Mehra’s observation of the illegal U-turn gave him reasonable

suspicion to stop Pickell’s vehicle.    The district court also

denied Pickell’s motion for reconsideration.

     Pickell then entered a conditional no contest plea,

reserving a right to appeal the district court’s denial of his

motion to suppress and his OVUII conviction.

B.   ICA proceedings

     On appeal to the ICA, Pickell contended the district court

erred by denying his motion to suppress because Officer Mehra’s

traffic stop was based on a legal U-turn.     The State argued

Pickell’s U-turn was illegal because he did not follow the

traffic control signs and lane markings.

     In a summary disposition order, the ICA affirmed the

district court.   State v. Pickell, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2023 WL

1178774 (Haw. App. Jan. 31, 2023) (SDO).    The ICA determined

that even though there was no sign prohibiting U-turns, Pickell

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was required to make a left turn based on the lane markings and

overhead signage.     Id. at 3-4.     The ICA cited HRS § 291C-31(a)

(2020) and Maui County Code (“MCC”) § 10.24.100(E) (1965).             Id.

at 3.   The ICA therefore held that reasonable suspicion existed

and affirmed Pickell’s OVUII conviction.          Id. at 4 (citing State

v. Estabillo, 121 Hawaiʻi 261, 270, 218 P.3d 749, 758 (2009)).

C.   Certiorari proceedings

     On certiorari, Pickell asserts the ICA gravely erred when

it held the district court properly denied his motion to

suppress because Officer Mehra’s warrantless traffic stop was

based on a U-turn not expressly prohibited by a sign as pursuant

to HRS § 291C-82(c).

                        III. Standards of Review

A.   Motion to suppress

     This court reviews

            a ruling on a motion to suppress de novo to determine
            whether the ruling was ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ Factual
            determinations made by the trial court deciding pretrial
            motions in a criminal case are governed by the clearly
            erroneous standard, and conclusions of law are reviewed
            under the right/wrong standard.

State v. Scalera, 139 Hawaiʻi 453, 459, 393 P.3d 1005, 1011

(2017) (cleaned up).

B.   Statutory interpretation

     “Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewable

de novo.”    State v. Milne, 149 Hawaiʻi 329, 333, 489 P.3d 433,

437 (2021).    When reviewing questions of statutory

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interpretation, this court is guided by the following

principles:

              First, the fundamental starting point for statutory-
              interpretation is the language of the statute itself.
              Second, where the statutory language is plain and
              unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain
              and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of
              statutory construction is our foremost obligation to
              ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
              legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the
              language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when
              there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness
              or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an
              ambiguity exists.

Id. (citation omitted).

                                IV. Discussion

        We hold Officer Mehra’s traffic stop was based on

reasonable suspicion and that Pickell’s suppression motion was

therefore properly denied.

A.      MCC § 10.24.100(E) is not preempted by HRS § 291C-82(c)

        Pickell argues his U-turn was legal because there was no

sign expressly prohibiting him from making a U-turn at the

intersection as purportedly required by HRS § 291C-82(c).3                  The

State argues Pickell’s U-turn violated MCC § 10.24.100(E), which

provides, “In all cases where official marks, buttons, signs or

directional arrows painted on the pavement are placed within or

adjacent to intersections, no operator of a vehicle shall

execute a movement at such intersections, otherwise than as

directed and required by such marks, buttons, signs, or arrows.”

3       See supra n. 1.

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     In essence, Pickell argues HRS 291C-82(c) preempts the Maui

County ordinance.   We therefore address preemption.

     1.   The preemption test

     As we stated in Ruggles v. Yagong, 135 Hawaiʻi 411, 353 P.3d

953 (2015):

          A county’s power to promulgate ordinances is governed by
          Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of
          Hawaiʻi, which states, “The legislature shall create
          counties, and may create other political subdivisions
          within the State, and provide for the government thereof.
          Each political subdivision shall have and exercise such
          powers as shall be conferred under general laws.”
          (Emphasis added.) Thus, pursuant to the Hawaiʻi
          Constitution, a county’s powers are limited to those
          conferred by the legislature under general laws. The
          legislature has outlined the “General powers and
          limitations of the counties” in HRS § 46-1.5 (2012). HRS §
          46-1.5(13) [2018] provides

                Each county shall have the power to enact
                ordinances deemed necessary to protect health,
                life, and property, and to preserve the order
                and security of the county and its inhabitants
                on any subject or matter not inconsistent with,
                or tending to defeat, the intent of any state
                statute where the statute does not disclose an
                express or implied intent that the statute
                shall be exclusive or uniform throughout the
                State[.]

Ruggles, 135 Hawaiʻi at 422, 353 P.3d at 964.

     HRS § 46-1.5(13) was intended to mandate “the preemption of

any ordinance that either conflicted with the intent of a state

statute or legislated in an area already staked out by the

legislature for exclusive and statewide statutory treatment.”

Richardson v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 76 Hawaiʻi 46, 60, 868

P.2d 1193, 1207 (1994).

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        A municipal ordinance may be preempted by state law “if (1)

it covers the same subject matter embraced within a

comprehensive state statutory scheme disclosing an express or

implied intent to be exclusive and uniform throughout the state

or (2) it conflicts with state law.”          Richardson, 76 Hawaiʻi at

62, 868 P.2d at 1209 (citations omitted).

        2.   Alternative (1) of the preemption test is not met

        Alternative (1) of the Richardson preemption test requires

us to consider whether MCC 10.24.100(E) “covers the same subject

matter embraced within a comprehensive state statutory scheme

disclosing an express or implied intent to be exclusive and

uniform throughout the state.”         Id.   In this regard, we have

employed a “comprehensive statutory scheme” test.             76 Hawaiʻi at

61, 868 P.2d at 1208.4

4      In In re Application of Anamizu, 52 Haw. 550, 481 P.2d 116 (1971), we
considered whether a city ordinance mandating the certification of electrical
contractors by a municipal agency was preempted by a state statutory scheme
that governed the licensing of all building contractors. Richardson, 76
Hawaiʻi at 61, 868 P.2d at 1208 (citation omitted). We held the ordinance was
preempted by HRS chapter 444, which “established a comprehensive statutory
scheme for regulating the contracting business within” the state. Anamizu,
52 Haw. at 554, 481 P.2d at 118. Local authorities could not enact
additional qualifiers. 52 Haw. at 554, 481 P.2d at 119.

      Similarly, in Citizens Utilities Co. v. County of Kauai, 72 Haw. 285,
814 P.2d 398 (1991), we held that

             a county ordinance regulating the height of utility poles
             was preempted by the combination of HRS § 269-6 (1985),
             which conferred upon the State Public Utilities Commission
             (PUC) the power of “general supervision . . . over all
             public utilities,” and a specific regulation of the PUC
             that governed, inter alia, the minimum requirements for
             utility pole height.

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      The Statewide Traffic Code was enacted in 1971.           Its

legislative history evinces clear legislative intent to allow

counties to enact their own traffic ordinances.           1971 Haw. Sess.

Laws Act 150.       The purpose of the Code was to provide some

uniformity in state traffic regulation.          S. Stand. Comm. Rep.

No. 685, in 1971 Senate Journal, at 1102.          But the legislature

also recognized that “[m]ost traffic regulation . . . is dealt

with by comprehensive traffic ordinances enacted by the several

counties.”    Id.     The legislature explicitly stated it intended

to “have the counties adapt complementary traffic ordinances

which would supplement, rather than duplicate the State Law.              To

achieve this end, this bill allow[ed] provisions to be made in

the various ordinances for situations unique to the particular

county.”     Id.; H. Stand. Comm. Rep. 157, in 1971 House Journal,

Richardson, 76 Hawaiʻi at 61, 868 P.2d at 1208 (citation omitted; emphasis
added). We noted the statutes contained an “overall scheme” which reserved
to the PUC the power to regulate public utilities; the ordinance thus entered
an area that was “fully occupied” by general state law. 76 Hawaiʻi at 62
n.24, 868 P.2d at 1209 n.24. We therefore declared that “a municipal
ordinance, which covers the same subject matter embraced within a [s]tate
statute is invalid if the statute discloses an express or implied intent that
the same shall be exclusive or, uniform in application throughout the
[s]tate.” Citizens Util. Co., 72 Haw. at 288, 814 P.2d at 400.

      By contrast, we held in Richardson that the applicable state laws did
not preempt the ordinance. 76 Hawaiʻi at 61, 868 P.2d at 1208. In that case,
the state laws and ordinance did not cover the same topics; “residential
houselot leasehold interests in the case of state law . . . and condominium,
cooperative, and planned development leasehold interests in the case of [the]
[o]rdinance.” Id. Because the ordinance in Richardson did not concern
residential houselot leasehold interests, the ordinance did not impose
additional requirements regarding the same subject matter as the statutes.
Id.

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at 742 (“Other differences between H.B. No. 33 and H.B. No. 33,

H.D. 1, reflect the intent that counties be allowed to enact

ordinances, which supplement, and in a few clearly expressed

instances, supersede state law.”)

     Thus, legislative history indicates the Statewide Traffic

Code was expressly intended to allow counties to pass

complementary and supplemental ordinances.    Further, in certain

instances, the legislative history indicates an intent to allow

counties to enact ordinances that supersede state law, not the

other way around.

     The legislative intent is manifested by statutes within the

Code.   HRS § 291C-162 (2020) expressly provides that the

Statewide Traffic Code “shall be applicable and uniform

throughout the State and in all political subdivisions therein

provided that any matter not covered in this chapter relating to

rules of the road may be subject to appropriate county

ordinances in any county.”   Further, HRS § 291C-163 (2020)

expressly states that the Code “shall not be deemed to prevent

counties with respect to streets and highways under their

jurisdiction from” “[r]egulating traffic by means of . . .

official traffic-control devices[.]”   HRS § 291C-163(a)(2).

     Moreover, the language and legislative history of HRS §

291C-82 does not indicate “a comprehensive state statutory

scheme with an express or implied intent to be exclusive and

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uniform throughout the state” as to U-turn signage.           See

Richardson, 76 Hawaiʻi at 62, 868 P.2d at 1209.          The original

version of the statute only contained what is now subsection

(a):

           Sec. -82. Turning on curve or crest of grade prohibited.
           No vehicle shall be turned so as to proceed in the opposite
           direction upon any curve, or upon the approach to or near
           the crest of a grade, where such vehicle cannot be seen by
           the driver of any other vehicle approaching from either
           direction within five hundred feet.

1971 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 150, § 82 at 339.

       In 1974, HRS § 291C-82 was amended to add subsections (b)

and (c):

           (b) In addition to the prohibition in subsection (a), the
           director of transportation is authorized to and the
           counties may by ordinance with respect to highways under
           their respective jurisdictions prohibit the turning of any
           vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction on the
           highway at any location where such turning would be
           dangerous to those using the highway or would unduly
           interfere with the free movement of traffic.

           (c) The director of transportation and the counties by
           ordinance with respect to the highways under their
           respective jurisdictions shall place signs which are
           clearly visible to an ordinarily observant person
           prohibiting the turning of a vehicle to proceed in the
           opposite direction. The signs shall be official signs and
           no person shall turn any vehicle in violation of the
           restrictions stated on such signs.

1974 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 133, § 3 at 236.         The purpose of the

1974 amendment was to prohibit U-turns at highway locations

“other than a curve or an approach to or near the crest of a

grade.”    S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No 897-94, in 1974 Senate Journal,

at 1107.

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        HRS § 291C-82 originally only addressed U-turns at curves

and crests.      The amendment required signage prohibiting U-turns

at dangerous highway locations.        The statute does not even

mention intersections.      And HRS §§ 291C-162 and 291C-163(a)(2)

expressly allow for ordinances like MCC § 10.24.100(E).

        Thus, HRS § 291C-82(c) does not preempt MCC § 10.24.100(E)

under the first alternative of the Richardson preemption test.

        3.   Alternative (2) of the preemption test is also not met

        The second alternative to the preemption test asks whether

an ordinance conflicts with state law.          Richardson, 76 Hawaiʻi at

62, 868 P.2d at 1209.      “A test to determine whether an ordinance

conflicts with a statute is whether it prohibits what the

statute permits or permits what the statute prohibits.”             Waikiki

Resort Hotel, Inc. v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 63 Haw. 222,

241, 624 P.2d 1353, 1366 (1981) (citations omitted). 5

5     In Richardson, we acknowledged that even though Waikiki Resort Hotel,
Inc. was not “strictly speaking a preemption case,” it was nonetheless
instructive. 76 Hawaiʻi at 62 n.24, 868 P.2d at 1209 n.24.

      In Ruggles, we addressed whether the Lowest Law Enforcement Priority of
Cannabis (“LLEP”) was preempted in its entirety by state law. 135 Hawaiʻi at
412, 353 P.3d at 954. Passed by voter initiative, the LLEP required law
enforcement activities related to all offenses other than the possession or
cultivation of cannabis for adult personal use be a higher priority than
activities related to the adult personal use of cannabis. 135 Hawaiʻi at 413,
353 P.3d at 955. We affirmed the ICA’s holding that the LLEP conflicted with
and was preempted by state law. 135 Hawaiʻi at 418, 422, 353 P.3d at 960,
964. We held the LLEP also conflicted with state law requiring the state
attorney general and county prosecuting attorney to investigate and prosecute
violations of the statewide penal code. 135 Hawaiʻi at 418, 353 P.3d at 960.
The LLEP could not usurp the attorney general’s duty to prosecute violations
of the statewide penal code. Id. We therefore held the LLEP conflicted
with, and was thus preempted by “state law governing the investigation and
prosecution of alleged violations of the Hawaiʻi Penal Code.” Id.

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     MCC § 10.24.100(E) does not conflict with HRS § 291C-82.

The statute requires signs prohibiting U-turns to be posted at

areas deemed dangerous and that drivers not execute U -turns at

such locations.   As noted, the amendment requiring signage

appears to have been intended to apply to highway locations and

does not refer to intersections.      The ordinance requires that a

driver follow the directional movements exhibited on markings

and signage at intersections.

     Abiding by signs, pavement markings, and traffic signals as

required by MCC § 10.24.100(E) would not cause a driver to

violate HRS § 291C-82(c).   Drivers executing left turns as

required by the signs satisfy MCC § 10.24.100(E); they do not

violate HRS § 291C-82(c) because they are not executing U-turns

against prohibitive signage.    Alternatively, if an intersection

has a sign prohibiting a U-turn as well as a sign and markings

indicating left turn only, a driver could adhere to both by

making a left turn.

     The statute and ordinance can therefore co-exist; neither

permits what the other prohibits.      See Waikiki Resort Hotel,

Inc, 63 Haw. at 241, 624 P.2d at 1366.      There is no conflict.

     Hence, contrary to Pickell’s assertion, MCC § 10.24.100(E)

is not preempted by HRS § 291C-82.

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B.   As Pickell’s U-turn violated applicable law, reasonable
     suspicion existed for the traffic stop

     Article I, section 7 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution ensures the

“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures and

invasions of privacy shall not be violated[.]”         Haw. Const. art.

I, § 7.   “A stop of a vehicle for an investigatory purpose

constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the constitutional

protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”           State

v. Heapy, 113 Hawaiʻi 283, 290, 151 P.3d 764, 771 (2007)

(citation omitted).    A warrantless search or seizure is presumed

invalid “unless and until the prosecution proves that the search

or seizure falls within a well-recognized and narrowly defined

exception to the warrant requirement.”        Prendergast, 103 Hawaiʻi

at 454, 83 P.3d at 717 (citation omitted).

                A stop of a vehicle for an investigatory purpose
          constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the
          constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
          seizures.
                In determining the reasonableness of wholly
          discretionary automobile stops, this court has repeatedly
          applied the standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
          (1968). Guided by Terry, we stated in State v. Barnes[, 58
          Haw. 333, 568 P.2d 1207 (1977)]:

                To justify an investigative stop, short of
                arrest based on probable cause, the police
                officer must be able to point to specific and
                articulable facts which, taken together with
                rational inferences from those facts,
                reasonably warrant that intrusion. The
                ultimate test in these situations must be
                whether from these facts, measured by an
                objective standard, a [person] of reasonable
                caution would be warranted in believing that
                criminal activity was

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               afoot and that the action taken was
               appropriate.

State v. Bolosan, 78 Haw. 86, 92, 890 P.2d 673, 679 (1995) (some

citations omitted; cleaned up).

     Pickell’s U-turn clearly violated MCC § 10.24.100(E).       As

noted by the ICA, it also violated HRS § 291C-31(a), which

provides that "[t]he driver of any vehicle shall obey the

instructions of any official traffic-control device applicable

thereto placed in accordance with law[.]”

     Hence, Officer Mehra had reasonable suspicion to justify

the traffic stop.   Thus, the district court did not err by

denying Pickell’s motion to suppress.

                           V.    Conclusion

     We therefore affirm the Intermediate Court of Appeal’s

February 28, 2023 Judgment on Appeal, which affirmed the

District Court of the Second Circuit, Wailuku Division’s

September 15, 2021 Judgment and Notice of Entry of Judgment.

Jacqueline R. Dyer                     /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
and William H. Jameson, Jr.,
with her on the briefs,                /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
for petitioner
                                       /s/ Todd W. Eddins
Renee Ishikawa Delizo
for respondent                         /s/ Faaunga L. Toʻotoʻo

                                       /s/ James H. Ashford

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