Court Opinion

ID: 9558668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:15:11.295785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:30.593149
License: Public Domain

CHIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s holding that an agreement to arbitrate a claim under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA or Act) (Civ. Code, §§ 1750-1784)1 is enforceable to the extent a consumer filing a CLRA claim seeks actual damages, restitution, or punitive damages. Like the majority, in reaching this conclusion, I have not considered issues that are beyond the scope of our order granting review, including plaintiffs’ contention that defendant failed to establish the existence of an agreement requiring arbitration of the CLRA claim. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1073, fn. 2.) Those issues may be raised in subsequent proceedings. Thus, for purposes of deciding the question before us—whether an *1089agreement to arbitrate a CLRA claim is valid and enforceable—I assume the parties made such an agreement and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) applies.
However, I dissent from the majority’s holding that an agreement to arbitrate a CLRA claim is unenforceable to the extent the consumer seeks “[a]n order enjoining the [unlawful] methods, acts, or practices.” (§ 1780, subd. (a)(2).) As a matter of federal law, the FAA and the supremacy clause of the federal Constitution prohibit us from enforcing the CLRA as the majority interprets it. As a matter of statutory construction, nothing requires us to adopt the majority’s constitutionally suspect interpretation. The public policy of this state, which the Legislature has expressly declared through the arbitration statutes, requires that we enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms. The majority’s conclusion frustrates this public policy. Moreover, I find nothing in the CLRA indicating, either explicitly or implicitly, that the Legislature intended to override this statutorily declared public policy and prohibit arbitration of CLRA injunction requests. On the contrary, both the structure and language of the CLRA suggest the Legislature viewed arbitration of injunction requests as consistent with the CLRA’s goals.
Of course, at first glance, the majority’s interpretation may seem appealing, because the facts alleged in this case are tragic and plaintiffs do not want to arbitrate. However, the majority’s holding extends beyond this setting; it prevents full enforcement of an arbitration agreement even between parties who desire and expressly agree to arbitrate all aspects of a CLRA claim in order to avoid costly and often slow court proceedings. As I will explain, I conclude that an agreement to arbitrate a CLRA claim is enforceable in its entirety.
I. Under the Majority’s Construction, the CLRA Conflicts With the FAA and Is Unconstitutional in Part.
In enacting the FAA, Congress “intended to ‘revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements,’ [citation], by ‘placing] [them] “upon the same footing as other contracts.” ’ ” (Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon (1987) 482 U.S. 220, 225-226 [107 S.Ct. 2332, 2337, 96 L.Ed.2d 185] (Shearson).) Section 2 of the FAA provides: “A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving [interstate] commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) This provision “requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their *1090terms” (Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. U. (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 478 [109 S.Ct. 1248, 1255, 103 L.Ed.2d 488] (Volt)), and “mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate,” even if they include “statutory claims.” (Shearson, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 226 [107 S.Ct. at p. 2237].) “The ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,’ [citation], manifested by this provision and the [FAA] as a whole, is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements: the [FAA] simply ‘creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate.’ [Citation.]” (Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth (1985) 473 U.S. 614, 625 [105 S.Ct. 3346, 3353, 87 L.Ed.2d 444], fn. omitted (Mitsubishi).)
The United States Supreme Court has demonstrated the primacy and scope of this duty by repeatedly invalidating, under the supremacy clause of the federal Constitution, state statutes that attempt to limit the enforceability of arbitration agreements. For example, in Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 491 [107 S.Ct. 2520, 2526, 96 L.Ed.2d 426] (Perry), the court held the FAA preempts a California statute that prohibits enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate an action to collect wages. It reasoned in part that “ ‘[section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.’ ” (Perry, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 489 [107 S.Ct. at p. 2525], italics added.) And, in Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1, 16 [104 S.Ct. 852, 861, 79 L.Ed.2d 1] (Southland), the high court invalidated a California statute that we had construed to prohibit arbitration of claims under the California Franchise Investment Law. According to the court, in enacting section 2 of the FAA, “Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements” (Southland, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 16 [104 S.Ct. at p. 861], fn. omitted) and “withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” (Id. at p. 10 [104 S.Ct. at p. 858].) The court recently both reaffirmed Southland and heightened its impact by holding that the FAA’s purpose and Congress’s expansive intent require a broad reading of section 2 that extends the FAA’s reach to the limits of congressional power under the commerce clause. (Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 268-277 [115 S.Ct. 834, 836-841, 130 L.Ed.2d 753] (Allied-Bruce).) The court then applied this broad reading of the FAA to nullify an Alabama statute that made predispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable. (Allied-Bruce, supra, 513 U.S. at pp. 268-277 [115 S.Ct. at pp. 837-841]; see also Volt, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 478 [109 S.Ct. at p. 1255] [“FAA pre-empts state laws which ‘require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.’ ”].)
*1091In my view, the majority’s conclusion that the CLRA prohibits enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate a CLRA injunction request runs afoul of these high court decisions. Under the majority’s interpretation, the Legislature, through the CLRA, has “singl[ed] out arbitration provisions for suspect status,” which Congress, through the FAA, has specifically prohibited. (Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto (1996) 517 U.S. 681, 687 [116 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 134 L.Ed.2d 902].) States may not “decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause. The [FAA] makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’ directly contrary to the [FAA’s] language and Congress’ intent. [Citation.]” (Allied-Bruce, supra, 513 U.S. at p. 281 [115 S.Ct. at p. 843].)
Rejecting this conclusion, the majority maintains the FAA permits the Legislature to prohibit enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate a CLRA injunction request. Although acknowledging that the high court “has stated generally” that only Congress has this prohibitory power and has recognized an “inherent conflict” exception to the FAA only in determining whether Congress intended to preclude arbitration, the majority nevertheless asserts that the court “has never directly decided whether a [state] legislature may restrict a private arbitration agreement when it inherently conflicts with a public statutory purpose that transcends private interests.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1083.) “[I]t would be perverse,” the majority reasons, “to extend the policy [of enforcing arbitration agreements] so far as to preclude states from passing legislation the purposes of which make it incompatible with arbitration, or to compel states to permit the vitiation through arbitration of the substantive rights afforded by such legislation.” (Ibid.)
I conclude that binding federal authority forecloses the majority’s attempt to base an FAA exception for state laws limiting enforcement of arbitration agreements on the “inherent conflict” analysis applicable to congressional action. As I have shown above, the high court’s pronouncements regarding the preemptive effect of the FAA on such state laws have been broad and emphatic. They do not appear to permit any exception. But we need not speculate on that question, because in Southland the high court declared: “We discern only two limitations on the enforceability of arbitration provisions governed by the [FAA]: they must be part of a written maritime contract or a contract ‘evidencing a transaction involving commerce’ and such clauses may be revoked upon ‘grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ We see nothing in the [FAA] indicating that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under state law.” (Southland, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 10-11 [104 S.Ct. at p. *1092858], italics added, fn. omitted; see also Perry, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 489-490 [107 S.Ct. at pp. 2525-2526] [quoting Southland].) Absent one of these two exceptions, we must enforce an agreement to arbitrate “unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.” (Mitsubishi, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 628 [105 S.Ct. at pp. 3354-3355], italics added.) As the high court recently put it in simple, clear, and unequivocal terms, “state courts cannot apply state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements.” (Allied-Bruce, supra, 513 U.S. at p. 272 [115 S.Ct. at p. 838].) The Supreme Court’s view could hardly be clearer.
Indeed, Southland belies the majority’s assertion that the high court “has never directly decided whether a legislature may restrict a private arbitration agreement when it inherently conflicts with a public statutory purpose that transcends private interests.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1083.) In Keating v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 584, 598-599 [183 Cal.Rptr. 360, 645 P.2d 1192] (Keating), we held that the Legislature, through Corporations Code section 31512, had prohibited enforcement of agreements to arbitrate claims under the California Franchise Investment Law. We also held that this statutory prohibition did not violate the FAA’s “general principle of arbitrability,” which we construed to include an “exception[]” for state statutes expressing a legislative “determination that the public interest is best served by maintaining access to the [judicial] remedies which the Legislature has provided.” (Keating, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 602.) In words reminiscent of the majority’s, we reasoned: “That Congress intended, through the FAA, to override state policies of that nature seems highly improbable.” (Ibid.) In Southland, the high court rejected our reading of the FAA and held that, under our interpretation, the California statute “directly conflicts with § 2 of the [FAA] and violates the Supremacy .Clause.” (Southland, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 10 [104 S.Ct. at p. 858].)
Justice Stevens dissented from this part of the majority opinion in South-land, invoking the FAA exception to arbitrability “based on ‘such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ ” (Southland, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 18 [104 S.Ct. at p. 862] (conc. and dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) He reasoned that, because a contract void as contrary to public policy is revocable at law or in equity, this exception “leaves room for the implementation of certain substantive state policies that would be undermined by enforcing certain categories of arbitration clauses.” (Ibid.) More specifically, he argued that, through Corporations Code section 31512, the Legislature had declared an agreement to arbitrate a claim under the Franchise Investment Law to be “void as a matter of public policy” and that “this declaration of state policy [was] entitled to respect.” (Southland, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 20 *1093[104 S.Ct. at p. 863] (conc. and dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) He also asserted that the FAA did not override “public policy” limits on enforcing arbitration agreements “simply because the source of’ the public policy “is a State rather than the Federal Government,” and was not “ ‘so unyielding as to require enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate a dispute over the application of a regulatory statute which a state legislature . . . has decided should be left to judicial enforcement.’ ” (Id. at p. 21 [104 S.Ct. at p. 864] (conc. and dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).)
The Southland majority disagreed with Justice Stevens, explaining: “If we accepted this analysis, states could wholly eviscerate congressional intent to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other contracts’ [citation] simply by passing statutes such as the Franchise Investment Law. We have rejected this analysis because it is in conflict with the [FAA] and would permit states to override the declared policy requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements.” (Southland, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 17, fn. 11 [104 S.Ct. at p. 861].) Southland thus establishes that the FAA invalidates a state statute that limits enforcement of arbitration agreements even where the state legislature expressly declares that arbitration “inherently conflicts with a public statutory purpose that transcends private interests.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1083.) A fortiori, Southland also establishes that the FAA prohibits a court from refusing to enforce an agreement to arbitrate a CLRA injunction request by inferring, as the majority does, a legislative intent to prohibit arbitration based on a purported inherent conflict with the alleged public purpose of such a request.
Southland is significant for another reason; the high court there refused to do precisely what the majority now does, i.e., apply legal principles for determining whether Congress established an FAA exception to validate state laws limiting enforcement of arbitration agreements. In Wilko v. Swan (1953) 346 U.S. 427, 437 [74 S.Ct. 182, 188, 98 L.Ed. 168] (Wilko), overruled in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp. (1989) 490 U.S. 477, 484-486 [109 S.Ct. 1917, 1921-1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 526], the Supreme Court concluded that, because “the protective provisions of the [federal] Securities Act require the exercise of judicial discretion to fairly assure their effectiveness, . . . Congress must have intended” to prohibit enforcement of agreements to arbitrate securities claims. In reversing our Keating decision, the high court explained in Southland: “The California Supreme Court justified its holding by reference to our conclusion in Wilko .... The analogy is unpersuasive. The question in Wilko was not whether a state legislature could create an exception to § 2 of the [FAA], but rather whether Congress, in subsequently enacting the Securities Act, had in fact created such an exception.” (Southland, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 16, fn. 11 [104 S.Ct. at p. *1094861].) Thus, contrary to the majority’s analysis, the Supreme Court in Southland told us that the legal principles governing the scope and exercise of Congress’s authority to establish exceptions to the FAA may not serve as the basis for reading into the FAA an exception for state laws that limit enforcement of arbitration agreements.
Finally, I note that federal appellate courts applying the “inherent conflict” analysis even in its proper context—to congressional conduct—have rejected the “public injunction” exception the majority now creates. In Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith (D.Mass. 1998) 995 F.Supp. 190, 212, a federal district court held that Congress intended to preclude enforcement of predispute agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). In reaching this conclusion, the court stressed the “primacy of public rights” under title VII, as evidenced by provisions that allow plaintiffs who “would . . . not be entitled to reinstatement or backpay” nevertheless to “vindicate the rights of others through seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and punitive damages.” (995 F.Supp. at p. 205.) On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district court’s analysis and conclusion, explaining that “the district court [had] overlooked” the high court’s view “that public rights may be enforced through arbitration.” (Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith (1st Cir. 1999) 170 F.3d 1, 11, citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (1991) 500 U.S. 20 [111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26] (Gilmer).) In my view, the majority’s analysis suffers from the same analytical error; its holding puts the CLRA in conflict with the FAA’s commands and renders the CLRA unconstitutional and unenforceable under the federal supremacy clause to the extent it prohibits arbitration of injunction requests.
II. CLRA Injunction Requests Are Arbitrable Under California Law.
In adopting a constitutionally suspect construction of the CLRA, the majority violates a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation. “If a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction is equally reasonable. [Citations.] The basis of this rule is the presumption that the Legislature intended, not to violate the Constitution, but to enact a valid statute within the scope of its constitutional powers.” (Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 *1095Cal.2d 818, 828 [142 P.2d 297].) Thus, we should not adopt a construction of the CLRA that renders it partially unconstitutional absent statutory language requiring that we do so. Because, as I explain below, the CLRA does not contain such language, I reject the majority’s conclusion that agreements to arbitrate CLRA injunction requests are unenforceable under California law.
A. Public Policy Expressly Favors Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements.
The majority correctly observes that California’s public policy strongly favors enforcement of arbitration agreements. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1074.) Through enactment of “a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating private arbitration . . . , the Legislature has expressed a ‘strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution.’ [Citations.]” (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, 832 P.2d 899] (Moncharsh).) More than 80 years ago, we explained that “[t]he policy of the law in recognizing arbitration agreements and in providing by statute for their enforcement is to encourage persons who wish to avoid delays incident to a civil action to obtain an adjustment of their differences by a tribunal of their own choosing.” (Utah Const. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry. Co. (1916) 174 Cal. 156, 159 [162 P. 631].) Thus, California law, like federal law, establishes “a presumption in favor of arbitrability.” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 938 P.2d 903] (Engalla).) The Legislature established this statutory presumption “to overcome earlier judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” (Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 830 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 366, 982 P.2d 229] (Vandenberg).)
Perhaps the clearest and most unequivocal expression of this public policy favoring arbitration appears in Code of Civil Procedure section 1281. It declares that “[a] written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” This section establishes the “fundamental policy” of California’s arbitration scheme: “that arbitration agreements will be enforced in accordance with their terms.” (Vandenberg, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 836, fn. 10, original italics.) To implement this policy, Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 directs that, on petition, a court “shall order” arbitration “if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that” one of only three specified exceptions applies: (1) the petitioner has waived the right to compel arbitration; (2) grounds exist for revoking the agreement; or (3) a party to the agreement is also a party to a *1096pending legal proceeding with a third party that arises out of the same transaction, and a possibility exists of conflicting rulings on common legal or factual issues.
Of course, the Legislature is free to establish additional exceptions to this statutory command. (Cf. Shearson, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 226 [107 S.Ct. at p. 2337] [FAA’s statutory mandate “may be overridden by a contrary congressional command”].) The question before us, then, is not whether we think arbitration of CLRA claims is a bad idea, but whether the Legislature has established an additional exception to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281 and 1281.2 that precludes arbitration of CLRA claims, either in whole or in part. Moreover, in light of our strong public policy favoring arbitration and the statutes expressly reflecting that public policy, the burden of showing this intent should be on the party opposing arbitration. (Shearson, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 227 [107 S.Ct. at pp. 2337-2338].) I conclude that plaintiffs have not met, and cannot meet, this burden.
B. The CLRA. Does Not Establish an Exception to the Statutory Duty to Enforce Arbitration Agreements.
In concluding that the Legislature has established an exception to the courts’ statutory duty to enforce arbitration agreements, the majority does not maintain that the language of the CLRA expressly creates an exception. On the contrary, the majority declares that “the CLRA does not address the question of arbitrability directly . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1084.) Nor does the majority assert that the CLRA’s legislative history reveals a legislative intent to create an exception. Notably, the majority does not even consider this traditional indicator of legislative intent. Rather, adopting one aspect of the analysis federal courts apply in determining arbitrability under the FAA, the majority begins by asking whether “there [is] an inherent conflict between arbitration and the CLRA.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1077.) Finding that such a conflict exists, at least as to injunctive relief, the majority then concludes that the Legislature must have intended to prohibit full enforcement of agreements to arbitrate CLRA claims. (Id. at pp. 1082-1083.) For several reasons, I disagree.
Initially, the majority does not explain what basis exists in California law for adopting the federal “inherent conflict” analysis, which essentially recognizes implied exceptions to the express statutory requirement that we enforce arbitration agreements. The majority cites no case where we have *1097taken a similar approach in applying California’s arbitration statutes.2 Nor do Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281 and 1281.2, which state the only grounds for refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement, appear to authorize a judicial search for implied exceptions to their command. Given that the Legislature has expressly established “a [statutory] presumption in favor of arbitrability” (Engalla, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 971), we have no basis judicially to “presume,” as the majority does, that “the Legislature did not intend” to permit arbitration of CLRA injunction requests.3 (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1082.)
In any event, even applying the “inherent conflict” analysis, because I reject the majority’s two underlying premises, I also reject its conclusion that an agreement to arbitrate a CLRA injunction request is unenforceable. The majority’s first premise is that a CLRA injunction does “not . . . resolve a private dispute but . . . remedies] a public wrong.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1080.) Thus, in the majority’s view, consumers requesting CLRA injunctive relief act merely as “bona fide private attorney[s] general” (ibid.) *1098who “by and large” reap no benefit from an injunction against deceptive practices of which they have already been victims. (Ibid.)
The provisions of the CLRA indicate the Legislature does not share the majority’s view. Under section 1780, only a damaged consumer has standing to file a CLRA claim seeking an order enjoining unlawful practices (or any other form of authorized relief). Moreover, the CLRA gives the damaged consumer complete control over the litigation. Thus, a CLRA plaintiff may decide not to request an injunction, or may abandon a request at any time, or may settle or dismiss the CLRA claim without obtaining injunctive relief. Of course, these litigation decisions would impact any public benefit of injunctive relief far more than would arbitration. The Legislature would not have given the CLRA plaintiff such unfettered control,- and would not have so strictly limited standing to seek injunctive relief, had it viewed a CLRA injunction as only a public remedy that does not resolve a private dispute or benefit the individual CLRA plaintiff. Thus, the provisions of the CLRA belie the majority’s conclusion that because CLRA plaintiffs act merely as private attorneys general insofar as they request injunctions, they may not agree to arbitrate that request. If they may decline to make the request or abandon it, then surely they can arbitrate it.
Notably, applying the federal “inherent conflict” analysis the majority now adopts, the United States Supreme Court has twice relied on similar considerations in rejecting claims that the public nature of a particular remedy precluded enforcement of an arbitration agreement. In Mitsubishi, the high court considered the argument that antitrust claims under the Sherman Act are not arbitrable because of “ ‘the pervasive public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws.’ ” (Mitsubishi, supra, 473 U.S. at p. 629 [105 S.Ct. at p. 3355].) The court recognized that an antitrust claim “ ‘ “is not merely a private matter” ’ ” and that an antitrust plaintiff “ ‘ “has been likened to a private attorney-general who protects the public’s interest.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 635 [105 S.Ct. at p. 3358].) It nevertheless concluded that relief under the Sherman Act “ ‘was conceived of primarily as a remedy for “. . . individuals,” ’ ” explaining: “[T]he antitrust cause of action remains at all times under the control of the individual litigant: no citizen is under an obligation to bring an antitrust suit [citation], and the private antitrust plaintiff needs no executive or judicial approval before settling one.” (Id. at p. 636 [105 S.Ct. at p. 3359].) Six years later, the court again relied on an individual plaintiff’s authority to “settle)] . . . without any [third party] involvement” in rejecting an attack on an arbitration agreement based on an alleged inherent conflict between arbitration and the important public policies furthered by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. (Gilmer, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 28 [111 S.Ct. at p. 1653].) Thus, that the *1099Legislature gave the CLRA plaintiff unfettered control over litigation, including an injunction request, strongly suggests it designed the CLRA to resolve private disputes and provide remedies to the individual consumer, not to protect the public.
Another CLRA provision reinforces this conclusion. Section 1752 declares that the CLRA’s provisions and remedies “are not exclusive,” are “in addition to any other procedures or remedies for any violation or conduct provided for in any other law,” and do not “limit any other statutory or any common law rights of the Attorney General or any other person to bring class actions.” This section further suggests that the legislative focus of the CLRA was to provide remedies to the individual consumer; the Legislature envisioned that public protection would be achieved outside of the CLRA.
The CLRA’s legislative history supports this conclusion. Summaries and analyses of the CLRA emphasized its remedial purpose for the victimized consumer and said little about public protection. For example, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the bill enacting the CLRA stated that the Act “provides specific legal remedies for consumers who suffer damage as a result of’ an unlawful method, act, or practice. (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 292, 2 Stats. 1970 (Reg. Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 223; see also Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46, fn. 9 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 960 P.2d 513] [digests of Legislative Counsel are relevant to statutory interpretation].) Similarly, an analysis by the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary stressed that the CLRA’s purpose was “to provide consumers with remedies as against merchants” because “[n]o such remedies are presently available to the individual consumer in California law.” (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 292 (1970 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 20, 1970, p. 1, italics added; see also id. at p. 2 [“The remedies available to the deceived consumer . . . include damages, injunctive relief . . . .”].) Thus, the CLRA’s provisions and legislative history indicate that the Legislature designed CLRA injunctive relief to resolve private disputes by providing a complete remedy to the individual consumer. The majority does not, and cannot, cite anything to support its contrary assertion that CLRA injunctions were “explicitly designed for public protection.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1082.)
Finally, besides the Legislature’s evident intent, for two additional reasons I disagree with the majority that a CLRA injunction is only a public remedy that does not resolve private disputes or benefit the CLRA plaintiff. First, nothing prevents a CLRA plaintiff from requesting an injunction that merely prohibits a defendant from committing additional unlawful acts against that plaintiff, and only against that plaintiff. This type of limited order would not *1100appear to be a public remedy at all. Second, given the list of practices the CLRA prohibits (see § 1770), a victimized consumer who continues to transact business with a CLRA defendant, either by choice or necessity, will often benefit from an order enjoining the defendant from committing the unlawful practice again. Under these circumstances, the public benefit of a CLRA injunction is only incidental (ór, at best, complementary) to providing the CLRA plaintiff with a complete remedy. The first premise underlying the majority’s conclusion is, therefore, unsound.
The majority’s second premise fares no better. The majority asserts that private arbitration is inferior to the judicial forum “in administering a public injunctive remedy” and will diminish or frustrate the public benefit of a CLRA injunction. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1082.) Specifically, the majority asserts that private arbitration has certain “institutional shortcomings” that are especially problematic when dealing with “public injunctions.” (Id. at p. 1081.)
I need not question the majority’s list of purported institutional shortcomings to reject its conclusion. Initially, as I have already explained, the Legislature designed the CLRA, including its injunctive remedy, primarily to benefit the individual consumer, not to protect the public. Thus, the purported institutional shortcomings of arbitration are no more relevant here than in any other context.
In addition, despite its protestations to the contrary (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1083-1084), the majority’s reliance on the purported institutional shortcomings of arbitration merely resurrects the judicial hostility toward arbitration that we long ago abandoned and that our arbitration statutes were designed to overcome. As the United States Supreme Court stated in rejecting similar arguments, the majority’s qualms about arbitration do “not rest on any evidence, either ‘in the record . . . [or] in the facts of which [we may] take judicial notice,’ ” but instead simply “reflect a general suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and the competence of arbitration tribunals.” (Shearson, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 231 [107 S.Ct. at p. 2340].) The majority’s mistrust of arbitration is “ ‘far out of step with our current strong endorsement of . . . statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.’ [Citation.]” (Gilmer, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 30 [111 S.Ct. at p. 1654]; see also Shearson, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 233 [107 S.Ct. at p. 2341] [mistrust of arbitration “is difficult to square with [the prevailing] assessment of arbitration”].) I thought “we [were] well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.” (Mitsubishi, supra, 473 U.S. at pp. 626-627 [105 S.Ct. at p. 3354].) “We should not now turn the judicial clock backwards to an era of *1101hostility toward arbitration.” (Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 714 [131 Cal.Rptr. 882, 552 P.2d 1178].)
More importantly, given the statutory duty the Legislature imposed on us to enforce arbitration agreements according to- their terms (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1281, 1281.2), it is not our judicial prerogative to decide that “arbitration is not a suitable forum” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1080) or that “judges, rather than arbitrators, are the most appropriate overseers of injunctive remedies explicitly designed for public protection.” (Id. at p. 1082.) As Justice Mosk recently wrote for a unanimous court, the desirability of arbitration “implicates an issue of public policy—an issue that the Legislature has already resolved” through Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2. (Mercury Ins. Group v. Superior Court (1998) 19 Cal.4th 332, 351 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 965 P.2d 1178].) “If [the majority] believes that the law should allow an additional [exception] for [public injunctions],” it should relay its concerns “to the body that can [properly provide] satisfaction—which is the Legislature . . . .” (Ibid.)4
In short, neither of the premises central to the majority’s analysis is valid. Thus, they are insufficient to support the majority’s inference that because an inherent conflict exists between arbitration and the purpose of a CLRA injunction, the Legislature must have intended to exclude CLRA claims from the express statutory rule requiring full enforcement of arbitration agreements.
Moreover, other CLRA provisions suggest that arbitration of CLRA injunction requests does not conflict with, and indeed advances, the CLRA’s goals. I have already discussed section 1752, which declares that the CLRA’s provisions and remedies “are not exclusive,” are “in addition to any other procedures or remedies for any violation or conduct provided for in any other law,” and do not “limit any other statutory or any common law *1102rights of the Attorney General or any other person to bring class actions.” Thus, enforcement of a damaged consumer’s agreement to arbitrate a CLRA injunction request “will not preclude” others, including the Attorney General, “from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief.” (Gilmer, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 32 [111 S.Ct. at p. 1655].) In Gilmer, the United States Supreme Court cited similar considerations in rejecting the claim that an inherent conflict exists between arbitration and enforcement of the important public policies furthered by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. (Gilmer, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 32 [111 S.Ct. at p. 1655].)
In addition, as the majority correctly explains, sections 1782 and 1784 of the CLRA promote informal methods of dispute resolution by establishing a notice and opportunity to cure mechanism that conditions a damaged consumer’s ability to file an action for and recover damages. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1084-1085.) To quote the high court, that a statute directs resort to “ ‘informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion’ [citation] . . . suggests that out-of-court dispute resolution, such as arbitration, is consistent with the statutory scheme” at issue. (Gilmer, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 29 [111 S.Ct. at p. 1654].) Thus, the CLRA’s informal “cure” mechanism suggests that arbitration is consistent with the CLRA’s statutory scheme.
The majority draws this same inference from sections 1782 and 1784, but, citing section 1782, subdivision (d), refuses to apply it to an injunction request. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1084-1085.) Section 1782, subdivision (d), permits a damaged consumer to file an action for injunctive relief without first invoking the CLRA’s informal “cure” mechanism. According to the majority, the separate treatment this section affords an injunction request is consistent with the conclusion that such a request is not arbitrable. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1084-1085.)
I find that section 1782, subdivision (d), is more consistent with the opposite conclusion. Its exclusion of injunction requests from the CLRA’s “cure” mechanism suggests, in my view, a legislative desire for speedy determination of such requests and a speedy end to the unlawful practices being committed. Supporting this inference is section 1760, which declares that one of the CLRA’s purposes is “to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure [consumer] protection.” As I have already explained, our public policy encourages arbitration precisely because it avoids the delays of the judicial forum and offers a relatively speedy and economical method for resolving disputes. (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 9.) Arbitration of a CLRA injunction request would therefore serve a legislative desire for speed and efficiency. By contrast, the majority’s insistence on judicial determination of CLRA injunction requests despite the parties’ *1103agreement to arbitrate hinders those goals, potentially perpetuates unlawful practices, and therefore disserves the very public interest the majority seeks to further. Thus, I find section 1782, subdivision (d), to be more supportive of the conclusion that arbitration of a CLRA injunction request is consistent with the statutory scheme, than of the majority’s contrary conclusion.
Finally, I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that section 1780, subdivision (c), suggests the Legislature intended to prohibit arbitration of CLRA injunction requests. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1082.) Section 1780, subdivision (c), provides in relevant part: “If within the [specified] county there is a municipal court, having jurisdiction of the subject matter, . . . then that court is the proper court for the trial of the action. Otherwise, any court in the county having jurisdiction of the subject matter is the proper court for the trial thereof.” This section is simply a standard venue provision; it specifies which court among those having subject matter jurisdiction is the proper one for trial. In my view, this venue provision, which is similar to the venue provisions of many other statutory schemes, does not indicate a legislative intent to preclude arbitration.
In summary, nothing in the language, structure, or legislative history of the CLRA establishes, or even suggests, that an inherent conflict exists between the Act’s goals and arbitration of a CLRA injunction request. On the contrary, those sources all suggest that arbitration of a CLRA injunction request is consistent with the Act’s goals. Thus, the statutory command to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms fully applies to an agreement to arbitrate a CLRA claim, including a request for an injunction. I therefore cannot join the majority’s holding that an agreement to arbitrate a CLRA injunction request is unenforceable. I would hold that an agreement to arbitrate a CLRA claim is enforceable in its entirety.
Brown, L, concurred.

Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Civil Code.

Keating, supra, 31 Cal.3d 584, is not to the contrary. There, in construing the nonwaiver provision of the Franchise Investment Law to prohibit arbitration, we did not cite an inherent conflict between arbitration and that statutory scheme, or even suggest that mode of analysis. Rather, looking to statutory language and legislative history, we concluded the “Legislature intended the nonwaiver provision . . . to be interpreted in accord with Wilko[, supra, 346 U.S. 427],” which, before passage of the California statute, had interpreted a similar nonwaiver provision to preclude arbitration of certain securities claims. (Keating, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 599.) We did not, as the majority asserts, “reason)]” that this arbitration prohibition “was warranted . . . because ‘the effectiveness of the statute “is lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings” [citation] in part because of the limited nature of judicial review [citation].’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1074.) In the passage the majority quotes from Keating, we were simply describing the Wilko decision, not independently analyzing the relevant California statute. (See Keating, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 596.)
The CLRA contains a nonwaiver provision (§ 1751) that is similar to the nonwaiver provision we construed in Keating, supra, 31 Cal.3d 584. Presumably because Southland, supra, 465 U.S. 1, reversed our Keating decision, the majority does not rely on this CLRA provision in refusing to enforce agreements to arbitrate CLRA injunction requests.

To support its assertion that we should “presume” a legislative intent to prohibit arbitration, the majority cites Gilmer. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1082.) However, Gilmer says nothing about making such a presumption. It simply states that, in applying federal law, any congressional intent to prohibit arbitration “will be discoverable in the text of the [statute at issue], its legislative history, or an ‘inherent conflict’ between arbitration and the [statute’s] underlying purposes.” (Gilmer, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 26 [111 S.Ct. at p. 1652].) Gilmer also states that courts making this inquiry “should . . . ke[ep] in mind that ‘questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the . . . policy favoring arbitration.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) In my view, the majority fails to heed this admonition in applying the federal “inherent conflict” test to the CLRA. Gilmer’s only reference to presumptions is in refusing to presume “ ‘that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators.’ [Citation.]” (Gilmer, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 30 [111 S.Ct. at p. 1654].) As I later explain, in my view, the majority also fails to follow this aspect of Gilmer.

Similarly, in the CLRA, the Legislature has already expressed its view regarding the majority’s concern that “only the parties to [a CLRA] injunction” initially issued in arbitration “would be able to enforce it. . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1081.) As I have already explained, the Legislature gave the CLRA plaintiff sole control over the claim, including the decision to make and pursue an injunction request. Thus, even if the majority is correct that only parties would be able to enforce an arbitral CLRA injunction—an issue that has not been decided and is not before us—this result would be completely consistent with the Legislature’s intent.. Moreover, where a CLRA claim proceeds as a class action under section 1781, all class members would be able to enforce the injunction. Thus, the population of damaged consumers with enforcement power is not necessarily as small as the majority suggests. In any event, the scenario the majority imagines would probably arise rarely, if ever; the CLRA defendant would have to continue to commit the identical practice, despite losing a lawsuit, perhaps paying both damages and punitive damages, and being ordered to stop, and all of the CLRA plaintiffs would have to decline to enforce the injunction they went to substantial effort to obtain. We should not base a general rule prohibiting arbitration of CLRA injunction requests on this seemingly remote possibility.