Court Opinion

ID: 9561553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:11:40.850081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:54.830208
License: Public Domain

MARTONE, Justice,
dissenting from the opinion, concurring in the judgment.
The court decides a federal and state constitutional issue even though this case can be resolved under a statute and rule. It decides the federal constitutional issue directly contrary to its resolution in each of the United States courts of appeals that has addressed it, including the Ninth Circuit. It immunizes its decision from federal judicial review by relying upon the state constitution and labeling it an independent basis for its decision. For these reasons, I djssent from the court’s opinion. Because the statute and the rule, which the court chooses not to address, support the court’s judgment, I join in it on that basis.
I.
This case illustrates how we can err when we decide a case without briefs or oral argument. The defendant filed a ten-page opening brief in the court of appeals. The state filed a one-sentence opposition to the petition for review. The court granted review without oral argument and without additional briefs. Neither party requested oral argument or the opportunity to file supplemental briefs under Rule 31.19(f), Ariz. R.Crim. P. I believe that had this ease been briefed and argued in this court, we would have discovered that it could have been decided on a statute and rale that squarely address the issue, without venturing into the uncertain world of constitutional adjudication. That the defendant did not raise the nonconstitutional issue is not reason enough to decide the constitutional issue. Were it otherwise, we would leave it to the parties to determine whether, and under what limitations, we would decide constitutional issues. As we said and did in Petolicchio v. Santa Cruz County Fair, 177 Ariz. 256, 259, 866 P.2d 1342, 1345 (1994),
Although we granted review on the statute’s constitutionality, after analyzing the facts and relevant statutes, we find the constitutional issue secondary. Arizona’s courts do not reach constitutional issues if proper construction of a statute makes it unnecessary in determining the merits of the action.
We should follow the traditional practice “of refusing to decide constitutional questions when the record discloses other grounds of decision, whether or not they have been properly raised before us by the parties.” W.W. Neese v. Southern Ry. Co., 350 U.S. 77, 78, 76 S.Ct. 131, 132, 100 L.Ed. 60 (1955). We should decide the “case on nonconstitu-tional grounds even though the petition for [review] presented only a constitutional question.” Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 38, 114 S.Ct. 425, 428, 126 L.Ed.2d 396 (1993).
In our constitutional framework, these prudential considerations are far more important to the orderly administration of justice than the substantive issue raised in this ease. Judicial self-restraint plays an important role in preserving and protecting an independent judiciary, the delicate balance of power among the branches of government, and public respect for legal institutions.
II.
By statute and rale, notice and an opportunity to be heard is required before the period of probation can be extended to accommodate unpaid restitution. A.R.S. § 13-804(1), now § 13-804(K), provides in relevant part:
Before modifying the order pertaining to the manner in which the restitution is paid, the court shall give notice and an opportunity to be heard to the defendant, the state and, upon request, persons entitled to restitution pursuant to a court order.
This case comes squarely within the terms of this statute. Korzuch was thus entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard whether or not the constitution also required it.
Our rules are consistent with the statutory notice provision. Rule 27.2, Ariz. R.Crim. P., provides that the court may modify any condition or regulation of probation “after notice has been provided to the prosecutor and the defendant of proceedings in which the victim has the right to notice pursuant to Rule *19727.10.” Under Rule 27.10, a victim has the right to notice and hearing whenever a probation modification request “affects restitution.” Rule 27.2 also provides that persons entitled to restitution may ask the court at any time prior to discharge to modify the manner in which restitution is paid and “[t]he sentencing court may, where appropriate, hold a hearing on any such request.” Rule 27.2, like A.R.S. § 13-804(1), now § 13-804(K), requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before the modification of any order that affects restitution. This includes extending the period of probation solely to facilitate the payment of restitution.
III.
In light of our statute and rule, it is plain that the resolution of the constitutional claim is unnecessary to our decision. But if it were otherwise appropriate to reach the constitutional issue, I believe the court’s analysis is flawed. The court properly notes that the federal courts of appeals have uniformly rejected the claim that due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before a probation period is extended. Ante, at 193, 920 P.2d at 315. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit just held that “due process does not require the district court to hold a hearing as to an extension of probation.” United States v. Silver, 83 F.3d 289, 292 (9th Cir.1996).
The court says it reaches a contrary conclusion “[bjecause Arizona case law differs from the federal case law.” But this is not the case. The court cites Nieuwenhuis v. Kelly, 164 Ariz. 603, 795 P.2d 823 (App.1990) and Green v. Super. Ct., 132 Ariz. 468, 647 P.2d 166 (1982). Neither of these cases has anything to do with the issue before us— whether a probationer must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before probation is extended. Green, among other things, recognized “the power of a sentencing court to modify probation for reasons that may not otherwise warrant revocation of probation.” 132 Ariz. at 470, 647 P.2d. at 168. Green is a statutory case. In a passing footnote, the court cited Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), but for the proposition that the power of a court to “revoke probation” is limited by “constitutional due process considerations.” Id. at 471 n. 5, 647 P.2d at 169 n. 5. Gagnon, of course, relates to probation revocation, not probation extension, and Green does not suggest otherwise.
Nieuwenhuis erroneously relied upon Green for the proposition that “before a modification can impose a greater burden upon a probationer, there must be a finding that the individual violated the terms of probation.” 164 Ariz. at 606, 795 P.2d at 826. But as noted, Green acknowledged exactly the opposite. Nieuwenhuis is simply wrong and is directly contrary to not only Green, but the express terms of A.R.S. § 13-901 and Rule 27.2, Ariz. R.Crim. P., both of which permit modification of the conditions of probation without requiring the violation of existing conditions. Nieuwenhuis did conclude that generic due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard “on any material modification of the terms of probation.” Id. It relied on an earlier opinion of the court of appeals, Burton v. Super. Ct., 27 Ariz.App. 797, 558 P.2d 992 (1977), the validity of which the court of appeals itself has now drawn into question. State v. Contreras, 180 Ariz. 450, 453, 885 P.2d 138, 141 (App.1994). Like Nieuwenhuis, Burton’s holding that a violation must precede modification is simply wrong. Indeed, we recently denied review in a ease in which the author of Nieuwenhuis acknowledged its error. State v. Gutierrez, CR-96-0138-PR (Rev. denied June 19, 1996).
Relying on Green and Nieuwenhuis alone, the court says, “[bjecause Arizona cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment hold that modifications require notice and a hearing, and because an extension is a modification, it follows that an extension requires notice to the probationer that his term will be extended. We therefore decline to follow the federal cases which have reached a different result.” Ante, at 193-194, 920 P.2d at 315-16. But as we have seen, the two Arizona cases upon which the court relies do not even address the issue. We have never held that Gagnon applies to probation modification or extension. Every federal court that has de*198cided the issue has concluded that it does not.
The court locks its erroneous federal conclusion into the concrete of state constitutional law by holding that state due process also requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before probation extension. The court expressly immunizes its holding from further federal judicial review by citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). But neither Green nor Nieuwenhuis had anything to do with the state constitution.
IV.
According a probationer notice and an opportunity to be heard before the period of probation is extended to accommodate restitution is a good idea, one which our statute and rule embrace. We even ought to consider extending it to probation periods generally, by statute or rule amendment, as has the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 3564(d) and Rule 32.1(b), Fed.R.Crim.P. But this is not the case to find such an idea in the federal and state constitutions.