Court Opinion

ID: 9931248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 18:02:57.765845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:56.223195
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/24 P. v. Ruiz CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085818
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. VCF426969)
                    v.

 MICHAEL ANTHONY RUIZ,                                                                    OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Nathan G.
Leedy, Judge.
         Thomas Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A.
Martinez and Joseph Penney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                    INTRODUCTION
       A jury convicted defendant Michael Anthony Ruiz of assault with a firearm (Pen.
Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 1), two counts of exhibiting a firearm (§ 417, subd.
(a)(2)(B); counts 2 & 3), a misdemeanor; and vandalism under $400 in damage (§ 594,
subd. (a); count 4), a misdemeanor.
       On appeal, defendant argues the court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua
sponte on unanimity because the jury could have relied upon two different acts in
convicting him of assault with a firearm (count 1): the hitting of the named victim with a
firearm in the head or the pointing of the firearm at the victim. Relatedly, defendant
asserts his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to portions of the
prosecutor’s closing argument that defendant asserts suggested a conviction could be
based upon either theory. Finally, he alleges the cumulative effect of these errors
prejudiced him.
       We reject all of defendant’s contentions and affirm the judgment.
                              FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       B.W. lived in an apartment in Visalia on February 11, 2022. J.F. lived with B.W.
for two weeks in February 2022; J.F. would sleep on the couch. They knew each other
from Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. Defendant lived in the same apartment complex.
He and B.W. drank beer together sometimes. Before February 11, 2022, B.W. and
defendant never had any issues or arguments.
       On February 11, 2022, B.W. and J.F. were at B.W.’s apartment along with R.I.
According to B.W., he had drank two cans of beer by around 1:30 to 2:00 p.m. that
afternoon when defendant came by. B.W. denied his judgment was clouded at the time.
       B.W. testified the door to his apartment was open and he saw defendant come up
the stairs. Defendant entered B.W.’s apartment and B.W. said, “Hi”; he was standing
facing defendant. Defendant said, “‘What’s up,’” and then hit B.W. over the head with a
gun. B.W. testified defendant hit him with enough force to stun him but not enough to

                                             2.
make him bleed or fall. He testified it felt like the gun was heavy and loaded when it hit
the top of his head. B.W. stated he had a bump on his head afterwards and felt pain for
15 to 20 minutes. B.W. described the gun as a silver or gray semiautomatic pistol. J.F.
was sitting in a chair less than a foot away from B.W.; R.I. was in the bathroom. B.W.
testified, after defendant hit him, defendant pointed the gun at his face. Defendant was
yelling “something like, ‘What’s up? What’s up?’” Then, defendant pointed the gun at
J.F.’s face while J.F. was sitting in the chair. J.F. did not say anything.
       At trial, J.F. identified defendant as the person who pointed a gun at his face. J.F.
had met defendant a few times before the charged incident; they had no issues before that
day. J.F. also testified the door to B.W.’s apartment was open and defendant walked in
with a chrome gun in his hand. J.F. first saw the gun when defendant hit B.W. over the
head with the butt of the gun. J.F. stated B.W. had his back turned when defendant came
in “and clobber[ed] him over the head with a gun.” J.F. testified defendant hit B.W. hard
enough that B.W. “hit the ground.” He described it as a “haymaker throw,” meaning
defendant threw his “whole arm into it.” According to J.F., defendant also walked over
to J.F., kneeled in front of him, and stuck the gun in his face between his eyes.
Defendant did not say a word. J.F. “started talking logic” to defendant. He told
defendant to think about what he was doing, and defendant lowered the gun.
       B.W. testified he felt like their lives were in danger. He asked defendant, “What
are you doing? Why do you have a gun? What’s wrong?” B.W. then ran into the
bedroom to try to distract defendant; he shut and locked the bedroom door. B.W. was
yelling at defendant loudly to try to alert R.I. something was going on so she would not
come out of the bathroom. Defendant was kicking the bedroom door for approximately a
minute and a half and saying in a hostile tone, “‘Let me get at you real quick.’” The
prosecution introduced pictures of B.W.’s bedroom door after the incident; there
appeared to be a hole in the door and wall.

                                              3.
       R.I. testified she was in the bathroom when she heard loud slamming and B.W.
yelling, “Stop!” The noise lasted approximately 20 to 30 seconds. At some point, R.I.
cracked open the bathroom door and peeked out. She saw a man with a gun turn toward
her; he pointed the gun at her head. At trial, R.I. identified defendant as the man with the
gun. R.I. testified she felt scared and threatened and the gun looked real. Defendant told
her not to come out. R.I. backed up against the wall of the bathroom. She waited about a
minute until it was silent and then she stepped out of the bathroom to see what was going
on. She saw J.F. shaking and crying in the living room.
       B.W. opened the bedroom door after a minute and a half because he was
concerned about R.I. and J.F. He saw R.I., who appeared to be scared and in shock. R.I.
testified B.W. told her “that guy” had hit him over the head with something and was
trying to fight him. R.I. saw redness on B.W.’s head, but he was not bleeding or cut.
When R.I. told B.W. defendant had pointed a gun at her, B.W. “acted surprised.” R.I.
was not sure if B.W. was surprised defendant had a gun or that he had pointed it at her.
       B.W. testified he ran out to the balcony to see if he could find defendant. He
wanted to make sure defendant was not still a threat. He saw defendant downstairs;
defendant did not have anything in his hands. Defendant said, “‘Come down here, let me
get at you. I don’t have no gun.’” B.W. testified he told defendant “if he ever came in
[his] apartment again and threatened [his] family that [he] would kill him.” Defendant
eventually walked away towards his own apartment. J.F. left immediately after the
incident. At trial, J.F. testified he did not want to talk to the police. He stated he looked
at B.W.’s head after the incident and it looked like it was bleeding and there was a lump.
       Lorenzo M. lived in the same apartment complex on February 11, 2022. He lived
next door to B.W. Lorenzo M. knew defendant as B.W.’s friend; defendant and B.W.
would hang out “all the time” at B.W.’s apartment and drink beer. Lorenzo M. was at
B.W.’s apartment on February 11, 2022, and went home around 1:00 p.m. He saw B.W.
again around 2:00 p.m. and B.W. was complaining about being injured and had red marks

                                              4.
on his forehead. B.W. said he had been pistol-whipped with a gun; he “looked like he
was gonna cry.” Lorenzo M. did not notice any injuries on B.W., but he saw a red mark
on his forehead. Lorenzo M. saw J.F. in B.W.’s apartment; R.I. was also there. J.F. was
“hysterical” and also looked like he wanted to cry; “[t]hey were scared.” Lorenzo M.
called 911 and J.F. left the apartment. The police arrived a couple of minutes later.
       Mary G., another neighbor in the apartment complex, recalled hearing a
commotion in the courtyard. She saw J.F. in his wheelchair and she asked if he was
okay. J.F. looked “very startled, very pale.” He told Mary G. defendant had pointed a
gun at him and also aimed it at B.W. and R.I. Mary G. recalled that B.W. was yelling at
the rail of the balcony; he was holding a beer. Mary G. testified B.W. gets really loud,
verbal, and can get physical when he is drunk.
       Detective Kyle Kalender spoke with B.W. after the incident. B.W. was hysterical
at times and seemed angry or frustrated; he did not appear intoxicated to Kalender.
Kalender did not notice any injuries on B.W. though he did not touch the top of B.W.’s
head. There was a hat in B.W.’s apartment after the incident that B.W. believed to
belong to defendant. It was a black Raiders hat. The police took the hat to the apartment
they believed belonged to defendant’s mother and left it with her. She denied it was
defendant’s hat.
       B.W. saw defendant walking his dog “off and on” between that day and the
beginning of April; defendant never came to talk to B.W. B.W. called the police more
than once during that time because he “was mad about having to live there with
[defendant] walking around like that.” On March 15, 2022, after reviewing multiple
photographs, B.W. identified a photograph of defendant as the perpetrator for the police;
B.W. admitted he had been drinking the day of the identification. B.W. was angry with
the police because of how long it was taking them to investigate the incident. The police
told B.W. to stop calling 911.

                                            5.
       Mary Amparo Ruiz testified on behalf of the defense. She stated defendant was
her boyfriend and they had been together for 17 years. However, Detective Kalender
testified in rebuttal that, on the day of the incident, she told him three times that
defendant was her son, not her boyfriend. She testified, on February 11, 2022, a police
officer appeared at her door and asked her about a hat and whether it belonged to
defendant; she denied it was his and the police left with it. Defendant was not home at
the time; he had left earlier that day around 8:00 a.m. She denied ever seeing defendant
with a firearm or that he stored one at her house. She also denied hearing yelling that
day.
       The jury convicted defendant of all the charges: assault with a firearm upon B.W.
(Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 1), brandishing a firearm or deadly weapon on R.I.
and J.F. (§ 417, subd. (a)(2)(b); counts 2 & 3), and vandalism under $400 (§ 594, subd.
(a)). It also found true an allegation defendant personally used a firearm during the
commission of count 1 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury further found true the following
factors in aggravation: (1) the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, the
threat of great bodily harm or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness
or callousness; (2) defendant was armed with or used a weapon at the time of the
commission of the crime; (3) defendant had engaged in violent conduct that indicates a
serious danger to society. The court found true an allegation that defendant had suffered
a prior strike conviction qualifying as a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd.
(a)(1)). It sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of seven years: the low term of four
years on count 1 (two years doubled based on the strike prior) and the low term of three
years for the section 12022.5 firearm enhancement. The court imposed “[n]o time” for
counts 2 and 3.

                                               6.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     Unanimity Instruction
       Defendant first argues the court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury
sua sponte on unanimity regarding the assault with a firearm charge. We disagree.
       A.     Relevant Background
       In opening statement, the prosecutor asserted: “[W]e are here ’cause on
February 11, 2022, the defendant … hit [B.W.] over the head with a firearm. The
defendant pointed that same firearm at two other individuals, [R.I.] and [J.F.] He then
kicked and destroyed [B.W.]’s bedroom door.” The prosecutor then detailed the
evidence the jury could expect to hear and stated, “[A]t the end, you’re gonna be asked
three questions: Did the defendant hit [B.W.] over the head with a firearm?” [¶] Did the
defendant point the firearm at [R.I.] and [J.F.] in a threatening manner? [¶] And did the
defendant damage [B.W.]’s bedroom door for less than $400?” Defense counsel also
asserted in her opening statement: “[T]he evidence will show [defendant] has been
accused of hitting [B.W.] over the head with a haymaker motion, like this, as it’s been
described and probably will be reenacted on the stand like this with a metal, loaded
firearm, and you’ll hear that story from [B.W.] and [J.F.].” She stated defendant was
“confident that you will find [defendant] not guilty of assault with a firearm … by
smashing him in the head.”
       In discussing the jury instructions on assault with a deadly weapon (CALCRIM
No. 875), defense counsel stated she was “a little confused about how the instruction’s
going to go because [B.W.] said ‘he pointed a gun at me, and he hit me over the head
with a gun’ …. So that’s two different acts.” She expressed concern that the instructions
said “there doesn’t have to be an injury for an assault that they’re gonna think that
somehow the assault to [B.W.] by going like this, if they believe that he pointed a gun at
everyone, there’s no place to vindicate [B.W.] except to say assault with a deadly weapon

                                              7.
or assault with a gun, firearm.” She attempted to clarify that B.W.’s testimony “was that
[defendant] pointed a gun at him and [defendant] bashed him over the head,” but
defendant was only charged in count 1 with “bashing him over the head.” “It’s not
related to him being pointed at with a gun.” The court and the prosecutor agreed with
defense counsel.
       Defense counsel then stated she was worried the jury would “conflate the two
somehow … because there’s no brandishing charge for [B.W.]” But there was no assault
with a firearm against B.W. in this case if the jury just believed defendant pointed the gun
at B.W. “because there would have to be proof that the gun was loaded. So I don’t know
how to stop them—” The following exchange then took place:

               “THE COURT: What’s the solution. I don’t expect [the prosecutor]
       to get up there and suggest that they can convict him based solely on
       pointing the gun at … [B.W.] alone.

              “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right, but if your argument is he pointed the
       gun, he hit him in the head, he’s guilty, … how do you separate those?

                “THE COURT: Well, there is the language to have present ability to
       inflict injury, the gun must be loaded and operable unless it’s a club or
       bludgeon. [¶] There’s no evidence the gun was loaded. [¶] What would
       you suggest the solution is?

              “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don’t know yet. I just know there was so
       much focus on there doesn’t have to be an injury to prove this, which is
       true, but—

              “THE COURT: I just don’t see a problem. So long as [the
       prosecutor] gets up there and makes it clear his theory is the 245 is based
       on the haymaker.

            “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s fine with me, too, if it’s about the
       haymaker. I’m worried about conflating and confusing.

               “[PROSECUTOR]: I think instructions are clear, and we’re assuming
       that they can distinguish the two. [¶] I have more elements to prove for
       417. You know, is it more likely that a gun exists if it’s pointed at
       somebody? I’m allowed to make that argument that the gun exists, but I’m

                                             8.
         not gonna conflate the two. I mean, there’s completely different elements.
         I mean, I have—

                “THE COURT: So you anticipate making it clear to the jury your
         theory for Count 1 is the—

                “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Haymaker.

                “[PROSECUTOR]: Yes.

                “THE COURT: —strike to the head?

                “[PROSECUTOR]: Yes, of course—

                “THE COURT: Okay.

                “[PROSECUTOR]: —but if I say, like, there’s proof that the gun
         existed because it was so close to [B.W.]’s face. [¶] It’s obvious that it’s
         different, so I just—yeah.

                 “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Where does it say on here about the that
         [sic] part? I know we talked about it.

                “THE COURT: The very end. It’s on Page 46, Line 14 and 15—
         Lines 14 and 15.

                “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right. I see that now. [¶] All right. So
         your plan is to make it clear that that’s your theory?

               “[PROSECUTOR]: I’m gonna argue my theory. It’s obvious—there’s
         elements–I’m gonna talk about the elements.

                “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. All right.”
         As they continued through the jury instruction conference, the court stated it was
not sure CALCRIM No. 3500 on unanimity applied because, as far as it could tell, “the
theory is that the strike to the head is it. There’s not more than one act.” The prosecutor
confirmed that was correct and, accordingly, the court stated CALCRIM No. 3500 was
“out.”
         In closing argument, the prosecutor explained the elements of assault with a
firearm and tied them to the bludgeoning incident. With regard to the element that “the

                                               9.
defendant’s actions with a firearm by its nature directly and probably result in the
application of force to a person,” the prosecutor argued: “You hit someone over the
head, by its nature, or swing a firearm, by its nature, it’s gonna hurt someone over the
head. It’s gonna apply force. The slightest touch is enough. The defendant did this act
willfully.” He also argued he had to prove defendant had “the present ability to inflict
injury, [the] gun must be loaded and operable unless it is used as a club or a bludgeon.
That’s what happened in this case; that the defendant used the gun as a club or a
bludgeon. It does not have to be loaded or operable, just has to be a firearm.”
       The prosecutor also argued that defendant “assaulted [B.W.] with a firearm. What
does our common sense and experience tell us about assaulting with a firearm? That it’s
traumatic. It is an incredibly dangerous act because all it takes for someone’s life to be
ended is a quick pull of the trigger, could be a second. So common sense tells us that the
victims would be traumatized in this case. Their behavior would show by what they saw,
and that’s what happened.” He argued that “[e]veryone was upset”; J.F. and B.W. looked
like they were going to cry; J.F. was shaking and pale. “This is how much of a traumatic
incident it was that they were assaulted with a firearm.” He asserted B.W. consistently
reported that defendant hit him over the head with a gun and defendant pointed the gun at
J.F. and R.I. He argued defendant “assaulted them with a firearm.”
       Defense counsel argued in closing argument that the “main accusation” was that
defendant “hit … [B.W.] over the head with a metal handgun. The blow is described as a
haymaker punch, a punch delivered with great force. That is the main accusation here.”
She relied on inconsistencies between the witnesses’ statements to argue the eyewitnesses
were not credible. She also argued there was no evidence B.W. was injured as a result of
the blow.

                                            10.
       B.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law
       In a criminal case, a jury verdict must be unanimous. (People v. Russo (2001) 25
Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) The jury must agree unanimously the defendant is guilty of a
specific crime. (Id. at p. 1132; see People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 877–
878.) “Therefore, cases have long held that when the evidence suggests more than one
discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or the court must
require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.” (People v. Russo, supra, at p. 1132;
accord, People v. Covarrubias, supra, at p. 878; People v. Brown (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th
332, 341.) “Yet ‘where the evidence shows only a single discrete crime but leaves room
for disagreement as to exactly how that crime was committed or what the defendant’s
precise role was, the jury need not unanimously agree on the basis or, as the cases often
put it, the “theory” whereby the defendant is guilty.’” (Covarrubias, at p. 878; accord,
Russo, at p. 1132.)
       “This requirement of unanimity as to the criminal act ‘is intended to eliminate the
danger that the defendant will be convicted even though there is no single offense which
all the jurors agree the defendant committed.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Russo, 25 Cal.4th
at p. 1132.) “But unanimity as to exactly how the crime was committed is not required.”
(Id. at p. 1135.) “Thus, the unanimity instruction is appropriate ‘when conviction on a
single count could be based on two or more discrete criminal events,’ but not ‘where
multiple theories or acts form the basis of a guilty verdict on one discrete criminal event.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.) “In deciding whether to give the instruction, the trial court must ask
whether (1) there is a risk the jury may divide on two discrete crimes and not agree on
any particular crime, or (2) the evidence merely presents the possibility the jury may
divide, or be uncertain, as to the exact way the defendant is guilty of a single discrete
crime.” (Ibid.) “In the first situation, but not the second, it should give the unanimity
instruction.” (Ibid.)

                                             11.
       “[A] unanimity instruction is not required if ‘the defendant offered the same
defense to both acts constituting the charged crime, so no juror could have believed
defendant committed one act but disbelieved that he committed the other, or because
“there was no evidence from which the jury could have found defendant was guilty of”
the crime based on one act but not the other.’” (People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th
at p. 879 [defense to all takings was to accuse coparticipant of testifying untruthfully so it
was inconceivable a jury would believe coparticipant with regard to one taking and not
the others]; accord, People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679 [“no need for a
unanimity instruction if the defendant offers the same defense or defenses to the various
acts constituting the charged crime”]; see People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1199,
1200 [“Even assuming that two distinct robberies occurred rather than one continuous
robbery, ‘there was no evidence here from which the jury could have found defendant
was guilty of’ the robbery in the car but not the earlier one’”; defense was the same to
both and “this is ‘a case where the jury’s verdict implies that it did not believe the only
defense offered’”].)
       A unanimity instruction is also not required when the acts alleged are so closely
connected as to form part of one continuing transaction or course of conduct. (People v.
Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 682.) Specifically, this “continuous conduct” exception
applies when (1) the defendant’s acts are so closely connected in time as to form part of
one transaction, or (2) when the statute the defendant is charged with violating
contemplates a continuous course of conduct or a series of acts over time. (People v.
Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 679.)
       We apply a de novo standard of review when considering whether the trial court
erred in not giving a unanimity instruction. (See People v. Hernandez (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 559, 568.)

                                             12.
       C.     Analysis
       Defendant argues the court erroneously failed to sua sponte instruct the jurors on
unanimity with regard to count 1. He asserts the prosecutor clearly stated during the
discussion of jury instructions that he would elect the use of the gun as a bludgeon as the
basis for the assault with a firearm charge. He contends, however, in closing argument,
the prosecution “emphasized the possibility of the assault with a firearm being based on
the gun shooting dangerous projectiles.” He relies upon excerpts from the prosecutor’s
closing argument, including but not limited to the prosecutor’s statements: “‘The
defendant assaulted [B.W.] with a firearm. What does our common sense and experience
tell us about assaulting with a firearm? That it’s traumatic. It is an incredibly dangerous
act because all it takes for someone’s life to be ended is a quick pull of the trigger, could
be a second.… [¶] … [Y]ou heard everyone was crying. Everyone was upset.… This is
how much of a traumatic incident it was that they were assaulted with a firearm.’” He
also references the prosecutor’s statement: “‘And then when [B.W.] came out, he got
pointed [at with] a gun. He got surprised. Well, he got angry, got very upset, got very
upset [R.I.] got pointed at [with] a gun….’” He argues there was evidence defendant hit
B.W. over the head and pointed the gun at his face; thus, a unanimity instruction was
needed. Accordingly, he argues, the trial court’s instructions permitted the jury to
convict him of this count without agreeing on a single, specific act as the basis of his
conviction.
       The People respond a unanimity instruction was not required because the
prosecutor communicated to the jury in both opening and closing argument that the
felony assault charge was based upon defendant clubbing B.W. on top of the head with
the gun; thus, he elected the theory upon which this charge was based. They assert, in
closing, “[e]very factual circumstance discussed during the prosecutor’s description of
the elements of the crime related to the strike to the head.” And the prosecutor’s election
“was reinforced by the defense closing” argument and the instructions—“particularly

                                             13.
comparing and contrasting the requirements for the assault with a firearm charge and the
brandishing charges.” The People argue the statements by the prosecutor that defendant
relies upon in his brief did not defeat the prosecutor’s clear election as “the prosecutor
never suggested that any element of the crime against [B.W.] [was] proven by the
pointing.” They further contend no election was necessary in light of the continuous
course of conduct exception. That is, no unanimity instruction was necessary because the
acts of hitting B.W. over the head and pointing the gun at him were “‘so closely
connected that they constitute[d] the same transaction and thus one offense.’”
Additionally, defendant offered the same basic defense to each act; so, there was no
reason to distinguish between the two acts.
       Finally, the People argue any error in failing to give the unanimity instruction was
harmless under both the standard articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818—
it was not reasonably probable defendant would have achieved a more favorable result—
and that articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18—it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons that follow, we conclude a unanimity
instruction was not required and, even assuming it was, the lack of such an instruction did
not prejudice defendant.
       Initially, we reject defendant’s argument the prosecutor did not make a clear
election about the theory upon which the assault with a firearm charge was based.
During his opening statement, the prosecutor expressly stated the theory upon which the
assault charge was based: defendant hitting B.W. over the head with a firearm. He
further asserted defendant “pointed that same firearm at two other individuals, R.I. and
[J.F.] [and] then kicked and destroyed B.W.’s bedroom door.” (Italics added.) He
explained to the jury it would need to determine whether defendant hit B.W. over the
head with a firearm, whether he pointed the firearm at R.I. and J.F. in a threatening
manner, and whether he damaged B.W.’s bedroom door for an amount less than $400.
Defense counsel reiterated in her opening statement that the accusation was defendant hit

                                              14.
B.W. over the head with a firearm. There was no mention of defendant pointing the gun
at B.W. Then, in closing argument, the prosecutor tied the elements of assault with a
firearm to defendant’s actions in hitting B.W. over the head with a firearm to assert he
was guilty of that count. He explained there did not have to be evidence the gun was
loaded in this case because the People were proceeding under the theory it was used as a
club or bludgeon and hitting someone in the head with a gun necessarily results in the
application of force. Similarly, defense counsel argued the “main accusation” was that
defendant hit B.W. over the head with a firearm. Accordingly, the prosecutor clearly
elected in argument the act upon which the assault with a firearm charge was based and
defense counsel reinforced this election in her arguments. (See People v. Mayer (2003)
108 Cal.App.4th 403, 418 [prosecutor’s opening and closing arguments constituted “an
election for jury unanimity purposes”]; People v. Hawkins (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1428,
1455 [“Because the prosecutor’s opening argument elected what conduct by defendant
amounted to the crime charged, we conclude that no unanimity instruction was
required”].)
       We also reject defendant’s contention the prosecutor’s clear election was
undermined by other statements the prosecutor made to the jury during argument.
Specifically, the prosecutor’s comment that an assault with a firearm “is an incredibly
dangerous act because all it takes for someone’s life to be ended is a quick pull of the
trigger,” in no way directed the jury to convict defendant of assault with a firearm based
on the alleged pointing of the gun at B.W. And neither counsel argued the jury could
convict defendant of count 1 based on defendant’s alleged pointing of a gun at B.W., nor
did the jury instructions suggest this as a possible theory to support such a conviction. In
addition, neither counsel asserted the gun was loaded, which would be a necessary
element for conviction of count 1 under the alternative theory of pointing a gun at B.W.
Rather, considering the prosecutor’s clear election, we cannot conclude the court erred in
failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on unanimity. (See People v. Wilson (2020) 56

                                            15.
Cal.App.5th 128, 162 [by making an election in closing argument, “prosecution negated
the need for a unanimity instruction”].)
       Irrespective, even if we assumed, arguendo, the trial court erred in failing to sua
sponte instruct the jury with a unanimity instruction, we conclude the assumed error
would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant’s defense to all the alleged
crimes was to challenge the credibility and reliability of the eyewitnesses’ testimony and
deny the incident occurred. The jury’s verdict reflects it did not believe the only defense
offered—that the victims were not credible. (See People v. Jennings, supra, 50 Cal.4th at
p. 679 [“There also is no need for a unanimity instruction if the defendant offers the same
defense or defenses to the various acts constituting the charged crime”].) Thus, there is
not a reasonable possibility the verdict would have been different if the jury had been
instructed on unanimity. Said differently, on the record before us, we cannot conceive of
a reasonable possibility any juror credited B.W.’s testimony that defendant pointed a gun
at him, concluded the gun was loaded when defendant pointed it at him, but then rejected
B.W.’s testimony and consistent statements along with J.F.’s corroborating statements
that defendant hit B.W. over the head with a firearm during the same incident. (See
People v. Napoles (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 108, 119 [“The erroneous failure to give a
unanimity instruction is harmless if disagreement among the jurors concerning the
different specific acts proved is not reasonably possible”].) Defendant’s contention the
jury could have reasonably believed the pointing of the gun at B.W. occurred but the
bludgeoning with the gun did not occur in light of the alleged “weak” and “contradictory”
evidence B.W. suffered an injury does not persuade us otherwise. There was no injury
requirement to prove this charge. (See generally CALCRIM No. 875 [assault with a
deadly weapon instruction providing “No one needs to actually have been injured by
defendant’s act”]; People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [noting cases have found
harmless error where record indicates jury resolved basic credibility dispute against
defendant and would have convicted him of any of the various offenses shown by the

                                            16.
evidence].) In summary, based on counsel’s arguments, the jury instructions, the
prosecution evidence, and the defense offered at trial, we conclude any error by the trial
court in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte with a unanimity instruction was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. (See generally People v. Hernandez, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th
at p. 576 [noting split of opinion in appellate courts as to whether harmless error standard
of Chapman or Watson applies in a unanimity instruction case].)
       Defendant’s reliance upon People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510 and People v.
King (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 493 is misplaced. In Davis, the California Supreme Court
concluded the trial court erred by failing to give a unanimity instruction regarding a
robbery charge involving the named victim. (Davis, at p. 560.) The court reasoned, the
evidence disclosed two distinct takings—the taking of a car from two people (one was the
named victim who was a passenger in the car but not the owner of it), and the taking of
one of the named victim’s rings from her person. (Id. at p. 561.) The Davis court
concluded the omission of the unanimity instruction was prejudicial as to the robbery
conviction because it was unclear whether some jurors convicted the defendant based on
the taking of the rings versus the taking of the car. (Id. at p. 562.) It rejected the People’s
contention that the takings were so closely connected as to form one continuous
transaction such that it would have been inconceivable for a juror to believe the defendant
committed one robbery, but disbelieve he committed the other. (Ibid.) The Davis court
reasoned, the potential defenses to the two acts of robbery were entirely different: as to
the car, the defense was the named victim was not legally in possession of it; as to the
rings, the defense was that the taking constituted only the lesser included crime of theft
because it occurred after the named victim’s death. (Ibid.) The Davis court thus
concluded it could not be said “no juror could have believed defendant committed one act
but disbelieved that he committed the other,” as in a case where the same defense is
offered to both acts constituting the charged crime. Notably, in Davis, the defenses to the
distinct acts supporting the charged crime were “entirely different.” (Davis, at p. 562.)

                                             17.
Unlike in Davis, here defendant offered the same defense to both acts he alleges could
have formed the basis of the assault with a firearm charge (count 1). Indeed, he offered
the same defense to all the crimes—he challenged the credibility of the victims and
whether the incident had occurred. The jury’s verdict makes it clear this defense was
rejected. Accordingly, in contrast to Davis, on the record before us, no juror could have
believed defendant committed one act—pointing a loaded gun at B.W.—but disbelieved
he committed the other—hitting B.W. over the head with a firearm. (See Davis, supra,
36 Cal.4th at p. 562.)
       In People v. King, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d 493, the defendant was convicted, in
part, of possession of methamphetamine for purpose of sale after the drug was found in
different locations in her residence—in a purse found in the living room, in a syringe in
that purse, and in a bag concealed inside a statue in the kitchen. (Id. at p. 498.) The
defense presented evidence and argument the methamphetamine found in the purse
belonged to another woman who was detained after attempting to flee the scene, and the
methamphetamine in the kitchen belonged to the defendant’s boyfriend. (Id. at pp. 497–
499.) Accordingly, “there was conflicting evidence concerning ownership of the statue
and its contents and reasonable inferences could be drawn that appellant did not have
knowledge of or possession and control over the purse.” (Id. at p. 500.) The King court
concluded it was possible a portion of the jury believed the defendant possessed only the
statue and its contents and the balance of the jury believed the defendant only possessed
the purse and its contents. Thus, without the unanimity instruction, there was no way to
be sure the verdict was unanimous as to a particular criminal act. (Ibid.) The King court
held a unanimity instruction was required because “there was a separation of the
contraband by space and there was conflicting evidence as to the ownership of the
narcotics themselves.” (Id. at p. 501.) But this holding does not apply to the
circumstances here because this is not a possession case related to contraband found in
different places against which the defendant raised different defenses. Thus, King is

                                            18.
inapposite. Rather, the circumstances here establish a unanimity instruction was not
required and, irrespective, the failure to give such an instruction was harmless under any
standard.
II.    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       Defendant next argues his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
object to prosecutorial misconduct or by failing to request a unanimity instruction after
the purported misconduct during closing argument. We disagree.
       A.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law
       A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two-part
test of Strickland v. Washington requiring a showing of counsel’s deficient performance
and prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) As to
deficient performance, a defendant “must show that counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness” measured against “prevailing professional
norms.” (Id. at p. 688.)
       In evaluating trial counsel’s actions, “a court must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689; see People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 541.)
Thus, a defendant must overcome the presumption the challenged action might be
considered sound trial strategy under the circumstances. (Strickland, supra, at p. 689;
Dennis, supra, at p. 541.) “Reasonableness must be assessed through the likely
perspective of counsel at the time.” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 445.)
       The prejudice prong requires a defendant to establish “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” (Ibid.)

                                             19.
       On direct appeal, when no explanation for counsel’s conduct can be found in the
record, “we must reject the claim [of ineffective assistance of counsel] on appeal unless
counsel was asked for and failed to provide a satisfactory explanation, or there simply
can be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212; see
People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1053.)
       B.     Analysis
       Defendant asserts his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor
describing aiming the gun at B.W. as assault with a deadly weapon. He argues the
prosecutor argued in closing argument that assault with a firearm can be based on the gun
as an object that shoots projectiles; thus, he violated his explicit promise to make an
election regarding the act forming the basis of count 1. Defendant again emphasizes the
following passage from the prosecutor’s closing argument:

               “‘The defendant assaulted [B.W.] with a firearm. What does our
       common sense and experience tell us about assaulting with a firearm? That
       it’s traumatic. It is an incredibly dangerous act because all it takes for
       someone’s life to be ended is a quick pull of the trigger, could be a second.
       So common sense tells us that the victims would be traumatized in this
       case. Their behavior would show by what they saw, and that’s what
       happened.…

               “‘Every single witness that came, neighbors, officers, 9-1-1 call, you
       heard everyone was crying. Everyone was upset. Everyone was shaking.
       [Lorenzo M.] said that [J.F.] and [B.W.] looked like they were about to cry.
       [R.I.] and [Mary G.] used these words interchangeably, but they either said
       that [J.F.] was crying. He was shaking. [Mary G.] said that he was pale
       and he was startled. This is how much of a traumatic incident it was that
       they were assaulted with a firearm. You can’t fake this.’”
He argues the prosecutor very clearly describes the dangerous act as being able to end a
life through the pull of a trigger and the prosecutor further argued in closing, “‘[B.W.]
came out, he got pointed a gun. He got surprised. Well, he got angry, got very upset, got
very upset [R.I.] got pointed at a gun….’” He contends there was no tactical reason for
defense counsel to not object to the prosecutor’s misconduct based upon a violation of the

                                             20.
explicit promise to elect a theory of guilt. Again, we disagree with defendant’s
contentions and conclude defendant has not met his burden of establishing ineffective
assistance of counsel.
       As discussed, our review of the record indicates the prosecutor made a clear
election in opening and closing argument regarding the theory upon which the assault
with a firearm charge was based. And, contrary to defendant’s argument, we conclude
the referenced excerpt of the prosecutor’s closing argument in context did not urge the
jury to convict defendant of assault with a firearm based upon defendant’s pointing of a
firearm at B.W. Rather, in closing argument the prosecutor explicitly tied the elements of
assault with a firearm to the use of the firearm as a bludgeon when defendant hit B.W. in
the head with it; he only presented the jury with that theory of guilt in the opening
statement. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the challenged statements constituted
misconduct or that defense counsel’s failure to object to the challenged statements fell
below an objective standard of reasonable performance. Defense counsel could have
reasonably concluded the prosecutor’s statements did not amount to misconduct and that
objections would be futile. (See People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 587
[“Counsel is not required to proffer futile objections”].)
       Moreover, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be disposed of without
inquiry into counsel’s possible tactical reasons for his or her actions if the reviewing
court can determine that even if there was attorney error it was not prejudicial. (People v.
Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 366–367; Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.) Here, we
conclude it is not reasonably probable defendant would have obtained a more favorable
verdict if defense counsel had objected to the referenced argument. That is, “[h]aving
reviewed the record with respect to each of the instances of alleged misconduct, we are
persuaded that there is not a reasonable likelihood that any of the challenged comments
might have been misconstrued by the jurors.” (People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599,
638–639.) Additionally, the jury’s verdict reflects it necessarily resolved the credibility

                                             21.
dispute against defendant. And, as discussed, it is not reasonably probable the jury would
have convicted defendant of assault with a firearm upon B.W. based on the pointing of
the gun at him without also concluding defendant had used the firearm as a bludgeon
against B.W. since the only evidence the firearm was loaded came from B.W.’s
testimony regarding its weight when it hit him. Consequently, defendant has failed to
meet his burden of establishing he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s alleged
ineffectiveness.
       For all of the above reasons, we reject defendant’s contention.
III.   Cumulative Error
       Defendant argues the cumulation of the errors in this case prejudiced him. Here,
however, there is no series of prejudicial errors to cumulate. Accordingly, defendant
cannot demonstrate the cumulative effect of the alleged errors resulted in prejudice. (See
In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 483 [“claims previously rejected on their substantive
merits—i.e., this court found no legal error—cannot logically be used to support a
cumulative error claim because we have already found there was no error to cumulate”].)
                                     DISPOSITION
       We affirm the judgment.

                                                                                 PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

                                            22.