Court Opinion

ID: 9594263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:28:31.843706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:31.402801
License: Public Domain

KLAPHAKE, Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
While I join the majority with regard to Medibus, Olsen, and the evidentiary issues, I must respectfully dissent as to the validity of appellant Rivers’ waiver of separate counsel. Because I believe Rivers was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to obtain an adequate waiver of Rivers’ right to separate counsel, I would reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial.
The supreme court has long expressed “strong disapproval of dual representation.” State v. Wilson, 294 Minn. 501, 502, 200 N.W.2d 185, 187 (1972). The court has noted the “severe” risk of a conflict of interest, enumerated many possible dangers and emphasized the court’s own “disapproval” of joint representation. State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898, 904-05 (Minn.1977). It is against such strong language that we must judge the adequacy of an inquiry and waiver of the right to separate counsel.
The trial court’s inquiry of Olsen and Rivers was not brief, and consisted of appropriate questions. When the nature of the two men’s responses is considered, *94however, I believe the inquiry was inadequate.
The trial court questioned both Olsen and Rivers as to the potential difficulties of joint representation. See id. at 905 (list of potential conflict areas). However, neither defendant’s response indicated that these problem areas had been explored and resolved. In responding to the trial court, Olsen and Rivers emphasized their common business interests as partners in Medibus. This apparent approach to the issue as a business decision would naturally suppress any informed consideration of conflicting legal interests. Although Olsen and Rivers were tried together on charges stemming from their mutual business interests, the charges were brought against them as individuals. The record does not reflect that either Olsen or Rivers understood the distinctions between the cases against them or that they were aware of the other options available. Indeed, the court at one point expressed its concern “that I’m not getting some clear statements from you about how this thing was analyzed by you.”
In addition, the state has failed to show there was no prejudice to Rivers. The supreme court in Olsen approved a standard of prejudice holding that
only where “ ‘we can find no basis in the record for an informed speculation’ that appellant’s rights were prejudicially affected,” can the conviction stand.
Id. at 907-08, n. 17 (citing Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 247 (D.C.Cir.1967)). The state argues there was no prejudice because Olsen and Rivers had the same defense. However, this begs the essential question of whether they should have had the same defense. On this record it is apparent that only Olsen benefitted from a common defense.
The supreme court has noted the potential for conflict where defendants have “differences in degree of involvement in the crime.” Olsen, 258 N.W.2d at 905. Unlike Olsen, Rivers had a potential defense other than the company’s general defense that it had no fraudulent intent and simply relied on doctors’ opinions. Defense counsel in closing argument, however, did not once argue Rivers’ relatively minor role in the Medicare billing process. Counsel never mounted a sustained defense of Rivers individually as a person marginally involved in Medicare billing. This failure, which was in clear contrast to the performance of Sach’s separate counsel, can only be explained by the conflict of interest under which counsel labored, given that such a defense of Rivers could only cast blame on Olsen. This conflict prejudiced Rivers. There is ample basis for an “informed speculation” that Rivers’ rights were prejudicially affected, and I would reverse his conviction.