Court Opinion

ID: 9740837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:42:36.763638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.080201
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
I concur on the basis that the warrant in question did not authorize the arrest of the defendant and that the statute does not authorize a seizure of an individual as evidence. I write separately to emphasize my view that the proper focus of the inquiry regarding the admissibility of this evidence is whether it was seized in compliance with the command of the Fourth Amendment.
The legislative history of the statute indicates that the Legislature intended to broaden the scope of permissible objects of a search warrant, as defined in Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294; 87 S Ct 1642; 18 L Ed 2d 782 (1967). In Warden, the Court rejected the distinction previously made between the seizure of items of evidential value only and the seizure of instrumentalities, or fruits of a crime or contraband.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan noted the rejection of property premises as the basis for *697application of the Fourth Amendment and observed that the principle object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy afforded by the evaluation of a neutral magistrate. The Court held that "[t]he requirements of the Fourth Amendment can secure the same protection of privacy whether the search is for 'mere evidence’ or for fruits, instrumentalities or contraband,” and that "in the case of 'mere evidence’ probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.” Id. at 306-307.
The predecessor of the statute involved in this case, 1948 CL 776.1, 776.2; MSA 28.1259, 28.1260 authorized warrants only to search for and seize instrumentalities or fruits of crime or contraband.
It is evident that the Legislature broadened the scope of the current statute to permit a search for "[ejvidence of crime or criminal conduct on the part of any person.” Thus, if the warrant in this case had authorized the seizure of already existing photographs of the defendant, the statute would authorize their seizure.
However, just as it is likely that the Legislature intended to expand the search warrant statute to permit the seizure of all evidence that could be obtained in compliance with the constitution, we cannot assume that the Legislature intended to permit a seizure of an individual by process that does not safeguard Fourth Amendment interests. Thus, because we proceed here on the basis that the defendant was arrested1 prior to the photographs being taken, I agree that neither the *698search warrant statute nor the warrant authorized the seizure of the person as evidence.* 2
As Justice Brickley concludes, whether the warrant in this case adequately safeguarded the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment depends on what the warrant authorized the police to do. The warrant embodied a judicial finding that there was probable cause to believe defendant would be found on the premises. However, although the affidavit set forth probable cause for arrest, the warrant did not in terms embody a judicial finding that there was probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a felony. Thus, to paraphrase the language in Steagald v United States, 451 US 204; 101 S Ct 1642; 68 L Ed 2d 38 (1981), while the warrant in this case protected defendant’s privacy interest in being free from an unreasonable search, the magistrate did not determine that an arrest of the defendant was reasonable.3
Recognizing that we do not decide today that the same instrument may not authorize both a search *699and an arrest or that suppression of evidence so obtained is appropriate where evidence is seized in compliance with the constitution, although not specifically authorized by statute, I concur in today’s decision.

 We, therefore, do not reach the issue as to whether a brief detention of an individual on less than probable cause for the purpose of taking photos under the judicial supervision of a warrant establishing probable cause for a search comports with the Fourth Amendment. See dictum in Hayes v Florida, 470 US 811; 105 S Ct 1643; 84 L *698Ed 2d 705 (1985). The Fourth Amendment may permit a seizure for the purpose of fingerprinting if there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a criminal act, "if there is a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect’s connection with that crime, and if the procedure is carried out with dispatch.” Id. at 817. "[T]he line is crossed when the police, without probable cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home . . . and transport him to the police station, where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes. . . . [S]uch seizures, at least where not under judicial supervision, are sufficiently like arrests to invoke the traditional rule that arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause. Id. at 816.

 The Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure which previously authorized the seizure of instrumentalities, fruits, contraband, and property that "constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense” has been amended to permit a search warrant to be issued for a "person for whose arrest there is probable cause . . . .” FR Crim P 41(b).

 1 agree that there was probable cause justifying an arrest without a warrant.