Court Opinion

ID: 9487708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:24:09.950463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:24.154400
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority opinion with respect to the cross-appeal. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis of the direct appeal pertaining to Rice’s absence *1405from the courtroom when the jury returned the penalty phase verdict. I therefore dissent from this portion of the majority’s opinion.
I
The district court determined that Rice “could not” and “did not” waive his right to be present when the jury returned the penalty phase verdict. It is not clear what the district court meant when it stated that Rice “could not” waive the right. I do not believe that the district court meant that Rice was not competent to waive his right, because that issue was never raised. Indeed, there is no question that Rice was competent to stand trial. His attorney conceded that he was competent to stand trial, and the jury had rejected his insanity defense at the guilt phase. If the district judge thought that Rice “could not” waive his presence at sentencing as a constitutional matter, he was wrong as a matter of law. “There is no principled basis for limiting to noncapital offenses a defendant’s ability knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently to waive the right of presence.” Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 672 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2125, 128 L.Ed.2d 682 (1994).
Whether Rice “did not” waive his right is another question. “We must indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of the constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of the trial.” Id., citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1060, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). The evidence is ambiguous regarding why Rice drank a liquid tobacco substance that resulted in his hospitalization. Because the evidence on this point is unclear, we should not infer that Rice’s absence at a critical stage of his trial was voluntary.
I would not attempt to divine what the district judge meant by his “could not” statement. I agree that the record does not permit us to hold that Rice voluntarily absented himself from this phase of the proceedings, and that therefore the finding by the district court that Rice “did not” waive his right cannot be overturned.
II
But that is where my agreement with the majority ends. The majority goes on to conclude that because the State of Washington allows any one juror to set aside the death penalty, and because the jurors did not have to “look Rice in the eye” during the polling process, the absence of Rice during the reading of the death verdict was structural error mandating retrial of the penalty phase.
Ordinarily, a trial error, even a constitutional one, is subject to harmless error analysis. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The term “structural error” is meant to indicate that some error has occurred that affects “the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (Fulminante). Structural errors are not subject to harmless error analysis. Id.
The question then becomes: does Rice’s absence from the returning of the death verdict constitute an error such that the “criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair”? Id, quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3106, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986). The majority answers this question in the affirmative. I cannot agree.
The majority relies upon the unnecessarily broad language of Hays v. Arave, 977 F.2d 475 (9th Cir.1992) (Hays), where we said that “unconstitutional in absentia sentencing is a ‘structural’ error” that “cannot be affirmed on the basis of harmless error.” Id. at 479. Whether we should follow this dictum is the issue that divides us. I conclude we should not for two reasons.
First, the Hays dictum ignores the Supreme Court’s language in Fulminante that the denial of a defendant’s right to be present at trial can constitute harmless error. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307, 111 S.Ct. at 1263 (discussing harmless constitutional error cases and specifically recognizing that Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-18 & n. *14062, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455 & n. 2, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) held that violation of a right to be present at trial can be harmless error). This reason alone is sufficient for us to employ-harmless error analysis in this case. Language in Hays to the contrary must be ignored because we are required to follow the Supreme Court, even when our prior statements are to the contrary.
Furthermore, Hays is clearly distinguishable. In Hays, the defendant was not just absent from the returning of the verdict. Rather, the defendant was completely absent during the entire sentencing proceeding. In fact, the defendant was physically incarcerated in a different state and was absolutely unable to make an appearance or give a statement at his sentencing hearing. Because of his inability to make a statement on the record, we were concerned that he would have no chance to create a record for appeal. Without being able to tell what he would have said and how the government and his attorney would have reacted to his statements, we were completely unable to evaluate “the impact of the error on the outcome of the proceeding.” Hays, 977 F.2d at 480 & n. 10 (distinguishing Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.1992), on the ground that in Boardman, the denial of the right of allocution was governed by harmless error analysis because the defendant’s request to speak served to establish a record of what he would say). In this case, however, Rice had no role to play at this phase of the trial. He had no right to speak, and could create no record even if he were present.
“Trial errors” are those for which it is possible to make a reasonable evaluation of the likelihood that the error would have affected the outcome. “Structural errors,” on the other hand, are those that so fundamentally undermine the fairness of the proceeding that we are unable effectively to evaluate the effect of the error. In this case, we have all of the information we need to evaluate the likelihood that the outcome would have been different had Rice been present. His absence did not taint other aspects of the trial or sentencing. Indeed, the argument that one of the jurors might have changed his or her mind after looking Rice in the eye is fanciful. A “trial error” is not transformed into a “structural error” simply because there is some conceivable way in which the error might have affected the outcome. To the contrary, because appellate review of the likely consequences of the error is possible, the error should be deemed a “trial error” subject to harmless error analysis.
Therefore, the real question is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I have no question on this issue. Without going into the ghastly, gory details, it is sufficient to state that the jury had portrayed before it crimes that were especially heinous. The mitigating evidence consisted of testimony by four of Rice’s relatives. During deliberations, Rice’s confession was played back for the jury to consider. Rice was present throughout trial except for when the verdict was received. At sentencing, the judge asked Rice if he had anything to say, and he responded that he did not. Applying harmless error analysis to these facts, there is simply no persuasive reason to conclude that Rice’s absence “had substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s sentence.
The majority has ignored binding Supreme Court precedent and, instead, extended the Hays dicta in order to adopt the extremely broad and legally indefensible proposition that a defendant’s absence during the returning of a jury verdict at the penalty phase of trial is structural error. Because I believe it is subject to harmless error analysis, and because I conclude that the error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that holds otherwise.
Because the majority concludes that there was structural error when Rice was not present when the penalty verdict was returned, I respectfully dissent.
Before: WALLACE, Chief Judge.
ORDER
April 10, 1995
Upon the vote of a majority of nonrecused regular active judges of this court, it is ordered that this case be reheard by the en banc court pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3.