Court Opinion

ID: 9726815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:09:40.099076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:31.064662
License: Public Domain

YOUNG, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. I do not believe that students who participate in intercollegiate athletics while on scholarship are “employees” within the meaning of Indiana’s Workmen’s Compensation Act.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from the majority’s opinion is that every *90athletic scholarship constitutes a contract for hire and thus creates an employer-employee relationship between the athlete and the school. This is directly contrary to the holding in Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Commission, (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 457, 33 Cal.Rptr. 169, which is relied upon by the majority. “It cannot be said as a matter of law that every student who receives an ‘athletic scholarship’ and plays on the school athletic team is an employee of the school.” Id. at 467, 33 Cal.Rptr. at 175.
I agree that “a measure of liberality should be indulged in by this Court” in applying the statutory definition of employee. Schraner v. State Department of Corrections, (1963) 135 Ind.App. 504, 189 N.E.2d 119. However, the doctrine of liberal construction should not be used to extend the Workmen’s Compensation Act to a situation which it was never designed to cover. I cannot believe that the legislature in defining employee ever intended to include a college student who had an athletic scholarship. “Employee” is defined as including “every person, including a minor, in the service of another, under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied, except one whose employment is both casual and not in the usual course of the trade, business, occupation or profession of the employer.” Ind.Code 22-3-6-l(b). I agree with the majority that Rensing and the Trustees entered into a contract. I do not, however, believe that it was a “contract of hire.” I agree with the holding in State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission, (1957) 135 Colo. 570, 314 P.2d 288, that an athletic scholarship without more does not constitute a contract for hire.
Furthermore, I do not believe that Rens-ing was “in the service of” the Trustees. Rensing’s participation in football may well have benefited the university in a very general way. That does not mean that Rensing was in the service of the Trustees. If a student wins a Rhodes scholarship or if the debate team wins a national award that undoubtedly benefits the school, but does not mean that the student and the team are in the service of the school. Rensing performed no duties that would place him in the service of the university. See State Compensation Insurance Fund, supra.
I would affirm the decision of the Industrial Board.