Court Opinion

ID: 9556515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-17 16:04:44.496589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:06.797773
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                            SHEENA W., Appellant,

                                         v.

            DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, B.W., Appellees.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 21-0347
                               FILED 8-17-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                               No. JD27321
                                   JS20790
             The Honorable David O. Cunanan, Judge, Retired

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

John L. Popilek P.C., Scottsdale
By John L. Popilek
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Dawn R. Williams
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
                        SHEENA W. v. DCS, B.W.
                          Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1             On remand from our Supreme Court, we revisit Sheena W.’s
(“Mother”) appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her child (“B.W.”). For the following reasons, we again affirm.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            Not including this case, the juvenile court has twice
adjudicated B.W. dependent as to Mother due to abuse and neglect over the
past eight years. DCS first removed B.W. from Mother’s care in 2013 and
provided reunification services, including substance-abuse testing and
treatment, a psychological evaluation, counseling, parent-aide services, and
parenting classes. Mother completed services and the juvenile court
returned B.W. to her care in early 2016.

¶3             DCS again removed B.W. in May 2016 after Mother hit B.W.
with a belt, resulting in injuries. Mother received services again, including
supervised visitation, multiple parent aides, urinalysis testing, family
therapy, and a psychological evaluation. B.W. also received services,
including behavioral coaching and counseling. Mother completed
reunification services and B.W. was again returned to her care in September
2019. Despite successful completion of some services, however, Mother
physically abused B.W. again less than 18 months later.

¶4            DCS removed B.W. from Mother’s care for the third time in
February 2021 after she hit him with a metal broomstick, resulting in
injuries and requiring treatment at Phoenix Children’s Hospital. After this
third removal, DCS simultaneously moved for dependency and
termination of Mother’s parental rights on willful abuse and prior removal
grounds. Meanwhile, Mother pled guilty to felony child abuse in her
criminal case stemming from the incident.

¶5             Over the next seven months, DCS attempted to assess Mother
for reunification services, but the case manager was unable to successfully
communicate with her. DCS referred Mother for some services, including a

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                         SHEENA W. v. DCS, B.W.
                           Decision of the Court

DCS case aid and a psychological consultation, but her case manager
testified she was unable to effectively communicate with Mother or “have
a full, thorough conversation to be able to address any concerns, any
services, et cetera” due to Mother’s volatile behaviors. Despite this lack of
communication, Mother self-referred for some services including domestic
violence counseling and parenting classes.

¶6            After trial, the juvenile court found DCS proved both grounds
for termination by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was
in B.W.’s best interests. The court further found DCS made reasonable
efforts to reunify Mother and B.W. Mother timely appealed, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 8-235(A).

                               DISCUSSION

¶7            This case returns to us on the Arizona Supreme Court’s order
vacating part of our opinion in Sheena W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 254 Ariz.
296 (App. 2022), as amended (Jan. 26, 2023) (“Sheena W. I”). Sheena W. v.
DCS/B.W., CV-23-0003-PR, 2023 WL 2782747 at *1 (Ariz. Apr. 4, 2023)
(vacating paragraphs 13–17 and 25 of Sheena W. I). In this order, the
supreme court asks that we reconsider the applicability of A.R.S. § 8-846(D)
“in light of the fact [Mother] was convicted of violating A.R.S. § 13-
3623(B)(1), which is not a dangerous crime against children under A.R.S. §
13-705(T)(1)(h).” Id.

¶8            DCS must provide reunification services to parents when it
has removed a child from the parents’ home. A.R.S. § 8-846(A). There are
exceptions to this requirement. See A.R.S. § 8-846(D). Our supreme court
correctly points out that the State did not convict Mother of a dangerous
crime against children. Nor does the record establish by clear and
convincing evidence that B.W. suffered “serious physical injury,” as
defined by A.R.S. § 13-3623(F)(5), or emotional injury. Therefore, under the
circumstances of this case, the exception under A.R.S. § 8-846(D)(1)(d) is not
applicable and we should not have suggested otherwise in Sheena W. I.

¶9            Nevertheless, we conclude another exception applies. See
A.R.S. § 8-846(D)(1)(c) (exception for prior removal of the child by DCS).
And, even if no exception applies, the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in finding DCS provided Mother with adequate reunification
services.

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                         SHEENA W. v. DCS, B.W.
                           Decision of the Court

   I.     DCS was not required to provide Mother with services under
          A.R.S. § 8-846(D)(1)(c)’s prior removal ground.

¶10          The juvenile court’s second basis for terminating Mother’s
parental rights was A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(11), the prior removal of B.W. The
statute exempts DCS from providing services when a child previously
removed due to physical abuse is returned to that parent and removed
again due to physical abuse within 18 months. A.R.S. § 8-846(D)(1)(c).

¶11            Here, the court found DCS removed B.W. after Mother’s
physical abuse in May 2019, and that B.W. was returned to her care in
September 2019. But within 18 months of B.W.’s return to Mother, DCS
again removed him after Mother physically abused B.W. for a second time
in February 2021. The record and the court’s findings therefore demonstrate
Mother was not entitled to services during the third and final dependency.
See A.R.S. § 8-846(D)(1)(c).

   II.    DCS provided Mother with adequate reunification services
          pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-846.

¶12           Assuming Mother was entitled to reunification services, the
record supports that DCS met its obligation of reasonable and diligent
efforts to provide reunification services to parent and child. A.R.S. § 8-
846(A); Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 22 ¶ 47 (App. 2019).

¶13           DCS must “undertake measures with a reasonable prospect
of success,” but need not provide services that would be futile. Mary Ellen
C., 193 Ariz. 185, 192 ¶¶ 34–37 (App. 1999). Moreover, DCS need not
provide “every conceivable service or . . . ensure that a parent participates
in each service it offers.” Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz.
231, 235 ¶ 15 (App. 2011) (citation omitted). Nor is it required to provide
duplicate services. See In re Pima Cnty. Severance Action No. S-2397, 161 Ariz.
574, 577 (App. 1989).

¶14          During B.W.’s first two dependencies, Mother received many
services including visitation, multiple parent aides, substance-abuse
testing, and therapy. Despite successful completion of some services,
Mother continued to physically abuse B.W.

¶15           During B.W.’s third dependency, DCS attempted to refer
Mother for additional services but was unable to successfully communicate
with her, ultimately losing contact with her for several months. When DCS
did reach her, Mother’s own volatile behavior precluded productive
conversations or assessment of Mother’s needs with respect to further

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                         SHEENA W. v. DCS, B.W.
                           Decision of the Court

reunification services. DCS was required to provide Mother only with “time
and opportunity” to engage services, not to ensure her participation. See
Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192 ¶¶ 34–37; Christina G., 227 Ariz. at 235 ¶ 15.
To the extent Mother received services through self-referral or probation,
DCS did not have to duplicate those services. See In re Pima Cnty. Severance
Action No. S-2397, 161 Ariz. at 577.

¶16           Mother argues DCS’s services were insufficient for lack of any
“specialized training” related to B.W.’s Oppositional Defiance Disorder
(“ODD”) diagnosis. This argument fails. Shortly before trial, DCS learned
B.W. had been diagnosed with ODD and he continued receiving individual
therapy. The timing of B.W.’s diagnosis precluded DCS from implementing
services specifically tailored to parenting a child with ODD. But throughout
the prior seven years, Mother received services, including individual and
family counseling, anger-management and domestic violence classes, and
multiple parent aides. B.W. also received services to address his behaviors
during that time. These services were designed to give Mother the tools
necessary to safely and effectively parent B.W. and were tailored both to
B.W.’s specific behaviors and Mother’s reactions to them. And although
those services were not designed specifically for ODD, the parent aide
services Mother received provided family-specific goals and a curriculum
modified to fit her and B.W.’s particular circumstances. Specifically, the
parent aide services were geared towards providing Mother with “new
skills on how to manage [B.W.’s] behavior and avoid reacting impulsively
to [him].” Thus, the evidence supports the juvenile court’s implicit
conclusion DCS provided Mother with sufficient services, and it did not
abuse its discretion in concluding DCS met the statutory grounds for
termination. See Forszt v. Rodriguez, 212 Ariz. 263, 265 ¶ 9 (App. 2006).

¶17         We do not readdress the juvenile court’s best-interests
determination, which we previously affirmed and was not vacated by our
supreme court. Sheena W. I, 254 Ariz. at 300–01 ¶¶ 18–24.

                                CONCLUSION

¶18           We affirm.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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