Court Opinion

ID: 9753934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:35:35.671659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:45.318541
License: Public Domain

Jacobs, J:
(dissenting). Our old judicial system was enmeshed in technicalities and its judges freely disposed of cases on procedural grounds which had no relation to justice or the merits of the controversy between the parties. Those who in 1948 originally implemented our new judicial system were fully aware of this and they quickly fixed, as one of their high goals, the elimination of the “archaic procedural requirements which had so often frustrated just and expeditious determinations on the ultimate merits.” See Tumarkin v. Friedman, 17 N. J. Super. 20, 21 (App. Div. 1951), certification denied 9 N. J. 287 (1952); Ciocca v. Hacker, 4 N. J. Super. 28, 33 (App. Div. 1949). They zealously set about their task and in 1951 Professor Schnitzer was able to record that “almost every reported case was decided upon the merits.” See Schniizer, “Civil Practice and Procedure” 6 Rutgers L. Rev. 351 (1951). In 1955 Chief Justice Vanderbilt, while summarily rejecting an objection to the standing of the County of Bergen and its county judges to review an order of the Department of Civil Service, noted that it was “discouraging to have such technicalities of procedure solemnly argued when this court has uniformly sought for seven years under the new Constitution to dispose of every case before it on the substantive merits of the controversy.” See Vanderwart v. Department of Civil Service, 19 N. J. 341, 347 (1955). It seems safe to say that if he were here now he would be greatly saddened to observe that not only are such technicalities of procedure *317still being solemnly argued but, worse yet, they are being embraced by a majority of the court.
The controversy between the County of Bergen and the Port of New York Authority involves important legal issues which should, in the public interest, be determined justly and expeditiously; indeed it is difficult to understand why a public body such as the Port of New York Authority, instead of extending its efforts towards obtaining an early determination on the merits, has chosen to seek to avoid it on procedural grounds. Apparently the Port of New York Authority is constructing a building in the Borough of Moonaehie, County of Bergen, which it has leased for 20 years to a private corporation for the manufacture of metal windows and doors and is claiming that under L. 1947, c. 43, § 5 (N. J. S. A. 32:1-35.5) it is not required to pay taxes or assessments on the leased property. The county contends (1) that the Port of New York Authority has no legal power to make the aforementioned lease and (2) that if L. 1947, c. 43, § 5 purports to grant a tax exemption on the leased property it is unconstitutional and void. The county might well have instituted a proceeding in lieu of prerogative writ (B. B. 4:88) instead of a proceeding under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (N. J. S. 2A : 16-50 et seq.) but this should be of no present concern for the substance of the controversy remains the same regardless of the form of the action. Cf. Carls v. Civil Service Commission of N. J., 17 N. J. 215, 220 (1955), where the court noted that “refusal to determine the ultimate merits because the appellants mistakenly proceeded by petition for declaratory judgment under Buie 3:81-10 would be unjust and would do violence to the very purposes underlying our new judicial system.” While the county might well have joined the Borough of Moonaehie as a party defendant, this likewise should be of no present concern, for while failure to join the borough might warrant a suitable order of joinder in the Law Division, it would not justify dismissal of the county’s action. Cf. R. R. 4:34. And the doctrine of *318exhaustion of administrative remedies, though mentioned by the majority, would appear to have no significant bearing here since no administrative expertise whatever is involved and the issues sought to be raised by the county are strictly legal and constitutional in nature. See Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, etc., 31 N. J. 514, 523 (1960); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 9 N. J. 477, 484 (1952) ; Ward v. Keenan, 3 N. J. 298, 302 (1949).
The majority evidently takes the position that the action was properly dismissed because the county does not have sufficient standing or interest in the controversy. But, as Justice Proctor’s dissenting opinion points out, and as indeed appears from a discerning reading of the majority opinion itself, the county is in no realistic sense an interloper or stranger but on the contrary is seeking to protect the legitimate interests of itself and its people who are “naturally and properly represented by the County.” See Vanderwart v. Department of Civil Service, supra, 19 N. J., at page 348; Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, supra, 9 N. J., at page 484; cf. Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N. J. 433, 474 (1952), certiorari denied 344 U. S. 838, 73 S. Ct. 25, 97 L. Ed. 652 (1952), rehearing denied 344 U. S. 888, 73 S. Ct. 181, 97 L. Ed. 687 (1952); Abbott v. Beth Israel Cemetery Ass’n of Woodbridge, 13 N. J. 528, 541 (1953).
When dealing with problems of standing and other procedural matters, the pervading judicial attitude perhaps plays a more important part than the formal court rules. See Meszaros v. Gransamer, 23 N. J. 179, 189 (1957). Since the inception of our new system and until today the judicial attitude has been a very wholesome one, resulting in the rejection of many attacks on the standing of plaintiffs who sought to obtain determinations as to the legality of the conduct of public officials and public agencies. Thus in Haines v. Burlington County Bridge Commission, 1 N. J. Super. 163 (App. Div. 1949) the court entertained proceedings which attacked the acquisition by the Burlington County Bridge Commission of toll bridges across the Dela*319ware River between points in Burlington County and Pennsylvania; it overruled the contention that since the tax burden of the plaintiffs would not be increased they could not maintain the action as taxpayers and citizens of the County of Burlington and pointed out that “the interests of complete and effective justice to the public as well as the parties” required that the proceedings be heard and determined on the merits. Later cases have adhered to the approach in Haines and have sustained the right of various taxpayers to institute proceedings designed to determine whether challenged conduct by public officials and public agencies was lawful and proper. See Koch v. Borough of Seaside Heights, 40 N. J. Super. 86, 93 (App. Div. 1956), affirmed 22 N. J. 218 (1956); cf. Garrou v. Teaneck Tryon Co., 11 N. J. 294, 302 (1953); Salomon v. Jersey City, 12 N. J. 379, 383 (1953); Kozesnik v. Montgomery Twp., 24 N. J. 154, 177 (1957).
When dealing with proceedings by plaintiffs other than taxpayers, our courts have displayed comparable liberality in rejecting attacks on their standing, particularly where the public interest coincided with the desire of the plaintiffs to obtain just and expeditious determinations on the merits. Thus in New Jersey State Bar Ass’n v. Northern New Jersey Mortgage Associates, 22 N. J. 184 (1956), it was held that the State Bar Association had standing to obtain a determination as to whether the conduct of the defendants constituted the unlawful practice of the law; in Greenspan v. Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 12 N. J. 456 (1953), it was held that a dealers association had standing to attack an allegedly illegal issuance of a liquor license; in Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N. J. 584 (1955), it was held that the City of Jersey City had standing to bring proceedings against former city officials who allegedly had extorted moneys from city employees; in Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., supra, it was held that the Governor and Attorney General had standing to attack the acquisition of bridges by the Burlington County Bridge Commission; in Abbott v. Beth *320Israel Cemetery Ass’n of Woodbridge, supra, it was held that the State Highway Commissioner, as a representative of the people of the State, had standing to bring a proceeding to determine whether land being condemned by him was eligible or authorized for cemetery use; in Vanderwart v. Department of Civil Service, supra, the standing of county judges, and the county itself as representative of the people of the county, was upheld in an action relating to the appointment of a county probation officer; and in Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, supra, the court, in dealing with the requisition of funds by the Boulevard Commissioners of the County of Hudson, remarked that the “defendant board of chosen freeholders, like any taxpayer within the county, has the standing to attack the annual requisition directly in the courts either because of the illegality of any item therein or on the ground that any item is excessive or unnecessary.” 9 N. J., at page 484.,
Law should be based on reason and I know of no sound reason which would in any wise justify precluding the county from obtaining determinations on the legal issues it has sought to raise. The majority suggests that sustaining the county’s standing to sue would “invite confusion” but this is difficult to follow in view of the acknowledged right of an individual taxpayer to maintain the action. The majority also suggests that there would be “a diversion of public funds from the purposes for which they were entrusted.” The county’s action was instituted through its regularly engaged county counsel and so far as appears there would be no substantial expenditure of county funds; furthermore in no fair or just sense could it be said that the county’s maintenance of a proceeding challenging the legality of the Port of New York Authority’s conduct within the county was not in fulfillment of the county’s public functions; on the contrary its action was in faithful discharge of its responsibilities and truly advanced the public interest. See Elizabeth Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Howell, 24 N. J. 488 (1957) where the court, in sustaining the *321standing of competitors to challenge an order of the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance permitting the opening of a branch bank, quoted with full approval these remarks by Professor Schwartz:
“ ‘The courts, in holding, as they sometimes do, that someone like a competitor or a consumer has no standing, have lost sight of the overriding need in our system—to make sure that someone shall in fact be able to secure review of administrative action. It is only if this need is satisfied that the principle of administrative legality can truly be enforced. It is in the interest of the community as a whole that illegal agency action be not left untouched. It is for the judiciary to vindicate this interest by ensuring that there are no unnecessary obstacles in the path of those seeking to challenge the legality of administrative action. To construe the standing requirement as our courts sometimes do is to place an unnecessary obstruction on the road of justice.’ ” 24 N. J., at page 502.
See Frank v. Clover Leaf Park Cemetery Ass’n, 29 N. J. 193, 209 (1959).
In Al Walker, Inc. v. Borough of Stanhope, 23 N. J. 657 (1957), the court recently pointed out that in our State, perhaps' more than any other, legal proceedings have been made available as safeguards against “wrongful official action.” There an attack on a municipal ordinance regulating house-trailers was brought by a plaintiff who was neither a taxpayer nor citizen of the municipality but was a dealer in house-trailers with a place of business in another municipality. In rejecting an objection to the plaintiff’s standing the court cited the Haines doctrine and its liberality in sustaining the standing of a plaintiff, particularly where such approach coincides with the public interest in having an early and dispositive judicial determination of the legality of legislative or administrative action; in concluding its opinion the court made the following comments which bear repetition here:
“We are satisfied that, under the particular circumstances presented in the instant matter, the plaintiff may fairly be deemed to have a sufficient standing to maintain its action. There has been real and substantial interference with its business and the serious legal questions it has raised should, in the interest of the public as *322well as the plaintiff, be passed upon without undue delay. We are not disturbed by the Borough’s spectre that continued logical liberalization of the standing requirement might bring a flood of litigation which would tax our judicial facilities and unduly burden our governmental subdivisions. Justice Holmes long ago pointed out that experience rather than logic is the life of the law—there should be little doubt as to this court’s capacity to deal fairly and effectively with the suggested eventuality. In the meantime, justice would appear to dictate that the plaintiff be afforded an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the claim it has been diligently seeking to assert since the institution of its action in the Law Division.” 23 N. J., at page 666
I would reverse and remand the cause for further proceedings in the Law Division.