Court Opinion

ID: 9898535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:21.91029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:44.108195
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                             DIVISION ONE

 In the Matter of the Personal               No. 82156-3-I
 Restraint of
                                             ORDER DENYING MOTION
 LONNIE BURTON,                              FOR RECONSIDERATION,
                                             WITHDRAWING OPINION, AND
                                             SUBSTITUTING OPINION
                           Petitioner.

         On February 10, 2023, Petitioner Lonnie Burton moved for reconsideration

of the opinion filed on February 6, 2023. Respondent Department of Corrections

filed an answer. A majority of the panel has considered the motion pursuant to

RAP 12.4 and has determined that the motion should be denied. But the panel

has determined that the opinion should be withdrawn and a substitute opinion

filed.

         Now, therefore, it is hereby

         ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is denied; and it is further

         ORDERED that the opinion filed on February 6, 2023, is withdrawn; and it

is further

         ORDERED that a substitute opinion shall be filed.
       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of the Personal               No. 82156-3-I
 Restraint of
                                             DIVISION ONE
 LONNIE BURTON,
                                             UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                          Petitioner.

       SMITH, C.J. — Lonnie Burton has been imprisoned since 1992 for rape,

rape of a child, child molestation, sexual exploitation of a child, burglary, and

robbery; he will not be released until at least 2034. Burton initiated this personal

restraint petition (PRP) to challenge the Washington State Department of

Corrections’ (DOC) imposition of sanctions following a disciplinary action. The

action resulted from prison officers’ discovery that that he had a collection of

images of almost entirely unclothed young men and boys—one confirmed to be

underage—on his tablet. As a result of the discovery DOC also, separate from

the disciplinary action, imposed a condition on Burton prohibiting his possession

of visual material involving young/underaged males in any and all stages of

undress.

       Burton initially challenged only the disciplinary sanction. While this

petition was pending, the imposed condition also became ripe to challenge and

Burton did so through a supplement to his PRP. DOC recently vacated its

disciplinary sanction and now contends that the issues Burton raised about the
No. 82156-3-I/2

disciplinary process are moot. We agree. In addition, we conclude that DOC

had the authority to impose the new condition under statute and administrative

rule, contrary to Burton’s contentions that its authority was based only on the

disciplinary sanction or on a recently-held-unconstitutional provision of his

sentence. We therefore deny Burton’s personal restraint petition.
                                       FACTS
                            Burton’s Underlying Crimes

       Burton is incarcerated on two cause numbers. The first, from 1992,

resulted in his conviction of second degree rape of a child, second degree child

molestation, and sexual exploitation of a minor. The second, from 1993, added

convictions of first degree rape, first degree robbery, and first degree burglary.

Burton’s crimes involved the sexual assault and rape of several underage male

victims, one at gunpoint in the victim’s home. He cut a hole in his apartment’s

bathroom door through which to view his victims, took both videos and pictures of

naked boys in his bathroom and at a public shower, and video-recorded assaults.

The judgment and sentence (J&S) in each cause included an appendix H setting

out the conditions of any community custody he would serve after his prison

sentence. Both prohibited his possession of pornographic materials. In 2010,

that provision was stricken from Burton’s 1993 J&S because of cases holding the

term “pornography” unconstitutionally vague. At the time of the events

precipitating this petition, the 1992 J&S still included the provision.

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No. 82156-3-I/3

                           Events Leading to Discipline

       Burton brought this PRP to challenge DOC’s imposition of sanctions

following a disciplinary hearing. Over the course of summer 2020, Burton had

corresponded with a company called Public Record Press. As described in his

PRP, the press provides an internet research, document, and image retrieval

service for inmates. Burton’s communications with the press began with him

requesting images of celebrities, often specifying his desire for pictures depicting

then when they were younger. His requests gradually shifted to focus on

acquiring pictures of young men, aged 18-21, with “swimmers [sic] bodies,”

though he eventually clarified that “they don’t have to be ACTUAL swimmers, but

that’s the body type and age I like. Sexy non-swimming scenes are cool too.”

Later, he requested pictures similar to some he had already received depicting

young men in a bathtub and wearing “just . . . underwear” or “tight swim trunks.”

He repeatedly asked for images as “risqué” or “revealing” as possible without

“going over the line.”

       He received 117 pictures. They all depict young, shirtless males. Many of

the pictures show their subjects in pools, public or private bathrooms, or

bathtubs. Later investigation revealed that at least one of the photos was of a

minor, and that that picture had been taken from the boy’s Instagram1 account.

       Prisoner access to internet sources is heavily restricted. The images

Burton requested were, per DOC policy, examined by officials in the mailroom

before he was permitted to access them. Some of them, as Burton knew even

       1 Instagram is a photo and video sharing social networking service.

                                         3
No. 82156-3-I/4

while he continued to order more pictures, were rejected. But some of those

rejections were overturned by the supervising sergeant.

       Burton’s possession of the images came to staff attention because of an

incident report made by a fellow inmate. The report states that Burton

approached the other man and, having never met him before, asked about his

sexual orientation, asked whether he liked “little boys,” and revealed that he had

pictures of “little boys” on his tablet. The other inmate rejected Burton’s

overtures and told two witnesses about the interaction. They warned him to stay

away from Burton. The incident report conveys that Burton approached the

same man again a few days later and said that although the inmate had friends,

“he had to know that he really was not safe.” His interlocutor took that statement

as a threat, potentially of rape, and reported the events to the shift commander.

Following the report, prison officers searched Burton’s cell and seized his tablet,

finding the pictures.

       The discovery led DOC to respond in several ways. First, it began a

disciplinary action. Second, it instituted proceedings to impose a new restrictive

condition on Burton so that he could not acquire similar pictures again.

Additionally, because of the pending disciplinary action, Burton lost his job in the

prison laundry.

                                 Disciplinary Action

       Burton received notice of the disciplinary hearing on September 21, 2020.

The notice indicated two bases for DOC’s action, (1) a “718” violation and (2) a

“728” violation. Each of these is classified as a “serious violation” under

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No. 82156-3-I/5

WAC 137-25-030. An inmate has committed a 718 violation if they use “the mail,

telephone, or electronic communications in violation of any law [or] court order.”

WAC 137-25-030(1)(c). They have committed a 728 violation if they possess

sexually explicit materials. WAC 137-25-030(1)(c). Sexually explicit materials

are items “reasonably deemed to be intended for sexual gratification” that depict

“nudity,” which includes “exposed/visible (in whole or in part, including under or

through translucent/thin materials providing intimate physical detail)

genitals/genitalia.” WAC 137-48-020(13).

       The hearing took place on October 1, 2020. The hearing officer began by

informing Burton of his rights. He then read the evidence into the record, which

included (1) an infraction report detailing a selection of Burton’s correspondences

with Public Record Press and the investigation into Burton, (2) a search report,

(3) the seized photographs, (4) several witness statements from prison officers,

and (5) Burton’s two J&Ss. The hearing officer also provided his impressions of

many of the pictures. He noted that they depicted scantily dressed males,

judged that many of the pictures’ subjects appeared to be minors, or at least

looked very young, and commented on a number of photographs showing

“bulges” through tight clothing, one of which he characterized as an erection.

       He then gave Burton an opportunity to present his own case. Burton

tacitly admitted possession of the pictures. His self-defense instead focused on:

(1) his lack of intent to acquire pictures of minors; (2) an argument that the

pictures did not qualify as “sexually explicit” because, though they depicted the

shape of genitalia outlined by clothes, the genitalia were covered; (3) an

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No. 82156-3-I/6

argument that any sanction based on the conditions of his J&Ss’ would be

baseless because recent court decisions had concluded that restrictions on

“pornography” are unconstitutionally vague; and (4) an argument that he was

entitled to rely on the mailroom’s screening procedures to determine whether

something was contraband.

       After some time, the hearing officer asked Burton to step out of the room

while he paused the record. Burton says that he watched the hearing officer first

speak on the phone and then write down what turned out to be his final

decisions. After about 20 minutes, the hearing officer invited Burton back in and

restarted the record. He disclosed that he had called Sergeant Wilkinson, the

mailroom supervisor who had reversed a decision to block some of the pictures

from reaching Burton. He then began to state his ruling. Burton protested that

he had more argument to make and evidence to present, and the hearing officer

allowed him to continue. But what followed was less a presentation of evidence

or argument in any traditional sense than a meandering debate about Burton’s

theory of the case, and featured the hearing officer’s frequent interjection and

disagreement.

       The hearing officer dismissed the 718 charge (using the mail in violation of

the law or a court order) because of uncertainty about the pornography

prohibition provisions in Burton’s J&Ss. But he found Burton guilty of the 728

charge (possessing sexually explicit materials). He imposed sanctions of 10

days cell confinement and 30 days loss of computer access, but gave Burton

                                         6
No. 82156-3-I/7

credit for time already served. Burton appealed the decision through the prison

administrative process and lost that appeal.

                                Imposed Condition

      Even before the disciplinary hearing had been held on October 1, 2020,

DOC had pursued another avenue by which to address Burton’s possession of

the pictures: imposing a new condition of confinement via a “classification

hearing.” The relevant review process was initiated on August 27, 2020. It was

memorialized in a document called the “Custody Review Full Version.” A

purpose statement dated August 27 reads: “Implementing [J&S] conditions

regarding incoming graphic images via mail and JPay.”2 (Some capitalization

omitted.) The “narrative” of the review, dated the same day, reads:
      Criteria has [sic] been developed to ensure Offender Burton’s [J&S]
      conditions are appropriately implemented: For the purposes of
      complying with [the 1992 J&S’s community custody pornography
      prohibition], pictures or depictions of minor-aged males (or males
      that appear to be minor-aged) in any state of undress will be
      considered pornographic materials in light of the current
      investigation being conducted by [DOC] . . . [into Burton] receiving
      117 images . . . of young looking males and some underage males
      in various stages of undress with their genitalia visible through
      clothing. Offender Burton [] sought these photos out from the
      sender asking for “the more risqué the better.” This seems to be a
      pattern of behavior for the offender and would be counterproductive
      to his treatment for his sexual offenses against minor aged males
      that cause his incarceration. As a result, Offender Burton is
      prohibited from obtaining or possessing visual material involving
      you/underaged males in any and all stages of undress.

(Some capitalization omitted.) It then specified that violation of the 1992 J&S

      2  JPay is the secure electronics and communications system used by
DOC to facilitate prisoner access to the outside world while allowing DOC review
of those communications.

                                         7
No. 82156-3-I/8

would result in the images’ confiscation and possible disciplinary action under

718 and 728.

      Burton was notified on August 27 of DOC’s intent to hold the review on

September 1. Several comments in the Custody Review Final Version, dated on

and after the day of the hearing, summarize the thoughts of the three individuals

involved in the review: Andrew Andring, Burton’s counselor; Gregory Jones, his

correctional unit supervisor (CUS); and Robert Schreiber, the correctional

program manager (CPM). Andring writes that Burton had “opted to attend the

FRMT meeting by signing . . . [a] Classifications Hearing Notice/Appearance

Waiver.” He then restates the purpose of the review: “to implement an Imposed

Condition based upon [] Burtons [sic] behavior as outlined in the above Program

Narrative.” And he proposes imposing a condition on Burton that he be

“prohibited from obtaining or possessing visual material involving

young/underaged males in any and all stages of undress.”

      CUS Jones provides more detail about the then-pending investigation into

Burton, and adds that Burton’s possession of the images “seems to be a pattern

of behavior for the offender and [allowing it] would be counterproductive to his

treatment for his sexual offenses against minor aged males that caused his

incarceration.” He concurs with Andring’s proposed imposed condition.

      CPM Schreiber’s comment was made on October 8, after Burton’s

disciplinary hearing. He says “Burton does currently have a J&S condition to not

possess pornographic images and was in violation of that condition.” He also

concurs with Andring’s proposed imposed condition.

                                         8
No. 82156-3-I/9

                                History of This PRP

       Burton filed this PRP on December 2, 2020. In the time between that filing

and this decision, outside events, two sets of briefing, multiple motions, and

orders of the court have caused the issues in front of us to shift significantly. We

therefore summarize the procedural history of the case.

       Burton’s PRP raised five issues. First, he challenged the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the hearing officer’s sanction by contending that the hearing

officer had misinterpreted WAC 137-48-020(13), which defines “explicit

materials.” He contended that the hearing officer’s decision had also been

unsupported by sufficient evidence and been arbitrary and capricious because he

concluded that the pictures were explicit even though other DOC officials, the

mailroom staff, had previously determined otherwise. Second, Burton asserted

that his due process rights were violated because he had not received sufficient

notice of what might be considered “explicit.” Third, he contended that the

hearing officer failed to make sufficiently detailed findings. Fourth, he asserted

that the hearing officer violated his due process rights when he took the

testimony of Sgt. Wilkinson outside of Burton’s presence and off the record.

Fifth, he contended that his right to present evidence in his defense, a subset of

his due process rights, was violated when the hearing officer began to issue a

written decision before the close of Burton’s case.

                                         9
No. 82156-3-I/10

       The State responded and Burton submitted a reply brief supporting his

PRP.3 Shortly afterward, Burton also submitted a supplement to his PRP. In it,

he added a sixth issue for this panel’s consideration.

       Burton’s new issue had only recently become ripe for review. In February

2021, King County Superior Court removed the pornography possession

prohibition from his 1992 J&S. Unlike the removal of this provision from his 1993

J&S, the trial court replaced it with an equivalent prohibition requiring that he not

possess, use, access, or view any sexually explicit or erotic material,

incorporating statutory definitions. In his supplement to his PRP, Burton

connected this amendment to the DOC-imposed condition. Burton claimed that

“[t]he entire basis and authority used by [DOC] to impose[] the[] condition[] was

Appendix H, Item 20 of the Judgment & Sentence in” the 1992 case. But despite

his efforts, DOC officials confronted with the changed J&S provision did not

remove the condition they had imposed through the review process. Burton

exhausted his ability to appeal this decision through DOC’s administrative

procedures.

       A December 2, 2021 order referred the PRP to this panel. It limited the

issues on review to: (1) whether the hearing officer’s decision was arbitrary and

capricious because it contradicted the mailroom review; (2) whether Burton’s due

process rights were violated by testimony taken off the record; (3) whether

Burton’s due process rights were violated when the hearing officer made his

       3 Alongside and in response to these briefs came motions by the State to

seal certain attached documents—particularly the pictures at issue—and by
Burton to strike some of the attached evidence, none of which is at issue here.

                                         10
No. 82156-3-I/11

decision before Burton had concluded his argument; and (4) whether DOC had

authority to impose the new condition on Burton after his J&S was amended.

After the case was stayed while Burton unsuccessfully sought discretionary

review from the Washington Supreme Court, this court called for supplemental

briefing.

       Burton, now represented by an attorney, filed a supplemental petition that

focused on his due process arguments and did not address the imposed

condition. The State’s supplemental brief reported that DOC had expunged

Burton’s infraction and argued that this rendered moot all his issues concerning

the disciplinary action. Supporting this factual assertion is the declaration of

Michael Hathaway, DOC disciplinary program manager. Responding for the first

time to Burton’s arguments about his imposed condition, the State asserted that

it was authorized for reasons other than the 1992 J&S pornography prohibition

provision. And it reported that it was in the process of re-writing the imposed

condition to exclude any reference to Burton’s J&S.

       Burton, in his supplemental reply, contended that the issues related to his

disciplinary hearing are not moot because he continues to suffer the collateral

impacts of the hearing. He specifically mentioned his lost job and a denial of 140

days of good time credit in October 2020 as a result of the infraction being on his

record, a denial that has not yet been reversed. He also reasserted his

arguments that the imposed condition was baseless, now not only because the

J&S condition was altered, but also because the infraction was expunged.

                                         11
No. 82156-3-I/12

Finally, for the first time, he contended that the imposed condition is

unconstitutionally vague.4

       We now turn to our analysis of the issues.

                                     ANALYSIS

       We need reach only two of the many issues that have been raised

throughout the life of this case. We conclude that DOC is correct when it argues

that Burton’s attacks on his disciplinary hearing are moot. We therefore do not

address the due process issues he identified. We also conclude that DOC had

the authority to impose the condition prohibiting Burton from possessing images

of young men/boys in stages of undress. Burton’s arguments to the contrary

attack the authority upon which prison officials made their decision, but their

authority finds its source not in the conditions of his J&S or his sanction but

instead in statute and administrative code.

                        Disciplinary Hearing and Mootness

       We first address DOC’s argument that its expungement of the disciplinary

sanction moots Burton’s due process arguments.

       4 On January 1, 2023, after he filed his supplemental reply, Burton

submitted what he termed a statement of additional authorities under RAP 10.8.
It does not contain citation to legal authority. Instead, it addresses an argument
made by the State in its response brief that the imposed condition was justified in
part because Burton had “threatened to rape” a fellow inmate. It attacks that
argument through attachment of messages showing that an investigation into the
matter found the accusation unsubstantiated.
       RAP 10.8 does not contemplate the submission of supplemental evidence,
but rather supplemental legal authority, and cannot serve as a basis for this filing.
See Brewer v. Fibreboard Corp., 127 Wn.2d 512, 531, 901 P.2d 297 (1995)
(document rejected in part because it was “more in the nature of a
supplementation of the record” than an additional authority). Regardless, the
attached documents do not impact our decision.

                                         12
No. 82156-3-I/13

       A case is moot if the court can no longer provide effective relief. State v.

Turner, 98 Wn.2d 731, 733, 658 P.2d 658 (1983). “The appellate court[s can]

only grant relief by a personal restraint petition if other remedies which may be

available to petition are inadequate under the circumstances.” RAP 16.4(d). In

In re Personal Restraint of Sappenfield, an analogous case, the Supreme Court

considered a PRP in which DOC had been collecting restitution payments from

an offender for years after its authority to do so had expired. 138 Wn.2d 588,

595, 980 P.2d 1271 (1999). The court affirmed a decision of the Court of

Appeals ordering DOC to stop its collection. Sappenfield, 138 Wn.2d at 591,

595. But it declined to order DOC to return the payments it had already—

improperly—collected. Sappenfield, 138 Wn.2d at 595. Sappenfield could only

pursue that relief through a civil action. Sappenfield, 138 Wn.2d at 595. This

was because, under the PRP rules, appellate courts “can order only the removal

of the illegal restraint.” Sappenfield, 138 Wn.2d at 595; see RAP 16.3 (PRP rules

designed to “establish a single procedure for proceedings in the appellate court

to obtain relief from restraint”). As a basic principle, then, a PRP is not the

appropriate means by which to challenge the downstream consequences of an

unlawful restraint, as opposed to the restraint itself.

       Burton’s PRP asked this court to “reverse the guilty finding on the 728

infraction, with prejudice, and order that all references to it be removed from [his]

prison records and files.” His supplemental petition asked that we “reverse the

finding of a violation and sanction imposed.” His requested relief has been

granted by DOC’s expungement. That he still suffers the consequences that

                                          13
No. 82156-3-I/14

flowed from his infraction—namely the loss of his job and good time credit—may

potentially be the subject of another action, but it is not appropriately addressed

through this PRP. Much like Sappenfield, Burton must seek relief through other

avenues.

       We conclude that the issues Burton raised related to his disciplinary

hearing are moot and we do not address them.

                                  Imposed Condition

       The issue remains of whether DOC had the authority to impose the

condition prohibiting Burton’s possession of images of young men/boys in states

of undress. We conclude that it did.

       DOC is governed in large part by ch. 72.09 RCW. The statement of

legislative intent for this chapter lays out the legislature’s goals for the

correctional system. RCW 72.09.010. Among them are concerns for public

safety, including the safety of inmates, RCW 72.09.010(1), encouraging personal

responsibility and accountability and discouraging recidivism, RCW 72.09.010(3),

and linking receipt or denial of privileges to responsible behavior and

accomplishments, RCW 72.09.010(5)(d). The statutory scheme grants DOC the

ability “to make its own rules for the proper execution of its powers.”

RCW 72.01.090; see RCW 72.01.010 (including DOC under this section).

       DOC has promulgated a number of rules that guide its actions.

DOC 390.6005 concerns “imposed conditions.” It permits DOC to “impose

       5 All citations are to the policy applicable at the time of Burton’s imposed

condition. That version of the policy is available at https://perma.cc/9VMT-ZVC6.

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No. 82156-3-I/15

appropriate conditions during supervision” of offenders. DOC 390.600 at 2.

Conditions may be imposed to “address or enforce Judgment and Sentence

conditions, safety and security issues within the prison, or community or behavior

issues.” DOC 390.600 at 3. They may also be imposed to address issues “that

relate to the crime of the conviction [and] the offender’s risk to re-offend.”

DOC 390.600 at 3.

       The same policy lays out the process by which conditions are imposed.

The prisoner’s counselor will “[i]dentify the condition(s) to be imposed,” will “[l]ist

the condition(s) and reason for the condition(s) in a Custody Facility Plan,”

provide notice to the prisoner, and forward the plan to a “Facility Risk

Management Team.” DOC 390.600 at 5. These teams include the individual

prisoner, their assigned case manager, their CUS, and in some circumstances “a

custody/security representative.” DOC 300.380 at 5.6 Conditions must be

approved by the facility CPM. DOC 390.600 at 5.

       Here, Burton does not challenge whether DOC followed this rule-based

process when imposing his condition. Nor does he challenge whether DOC

appropriately promulgated the rules themselves. Instead, the argument he

raised in his supplement to his PRP focuses on the effect of the February 2021

King County Superior Court order. That order amended his 1992 J&S’s

unconstitutionally vague pornography prohibition. He asserts that because the

original order was unenforceable, the order was amended only after the

       6 The policy can be found online at https://www.doc.wa.gov/information

/policies/files/300380.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KU2-ZK9S].

                                           15
No. 82156-3-I/16

discipline hearing, and the 1993 order’s similar provision had been entirely

stricken, no J&S provision authorized any sort of imposed condition. And he

contends that the now expunged disciplinary sanction likewise cannot authorize

the imposed condition. He therefore asserts the condition was unauthorized.

       But neither the disciplinary sanction nor either of his J&Ss provided DOC’s

authority to impose a condition. That authority was supplied by DOC 390.600, an

administrative code promulgated under statute. Neither a J&S provision nor the

disciplinary sanction was a necessary precondition for the imposition of the

condition itself.

       Grounds other than the sanction or Burton’s J&S are included in the

admittedly scant notes of the review: “[the possession of sexual images] seems

to be a pattern of behavior for the offender and [it] would be counterproductive to

his treatment for his sexual offenses against minor aged males that cause his

incarceration.” (Capitalization omitted.) This reason alone supports the

condition’s imposition. Burton’s crimes involved creating visual recordings of his

victims, young males, in bathrooms and public showers. His search for pictures

recreating those settings, featuring subjects similar to his victims, is concerning,

and DOC was not acting outside its authority in seeking to correct and limit this

behavior.

       Finally, Burton contends for the first time in his supplemental reply brief

that the terms of the imposed condition—prohibiting him from “obtaining or

possessing visual material involving young/underaged males in any and all

stages of undress”—are unconstitutionally vague. We decline to consider this

                                         16
No. 82156-3-I/17

argument because it was raised too late. See RAP 10.3(c) (“A reply brief should

. . . be limited to a response to the issues in the brief to which the reply brief is

directed.”).7

       We deny Burton’s personal restraint petition.

  WE CONCUR:

       7 After the completion of initial and supplemental briefing in this case, the

State moved to strike Burton’s vagueness argument or, in the alternative, to
permit it to file a surreply. In denying both these motions, the commissioner
wrote:
       [Burton’s] arguments on those matters were a proper response to
       the Department's claim that the petition is moot based on the
       Department's decision to expunge the infraction at issue and the
       Department's arguments regarding the validity of the newly
       imposed condition.
In so saying, the commissioner did not—and could not—comment on the merits
of the case or decide for the panel whether Burton had properly raised a
vagueness challenge. See RAP 17.1(a) (“A person may seek relief, other than a
decision of the case on the merits, by motion.” (emphasis added)). The
commissioner’s order meant only that the State’s motions were denied; it left the
record and briefing as it was before those motions were made.

                                           17