Court Opinion

ID: 9897819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:25:31.199669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:03.044361
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Malveaux, Ortiz and Friedman
UNPUBLISHED

              MATTHEW REVELL-WALGORSKI, S/K/A
               MATTHEW REVELL-WALIGORSKI
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0939-22-1                                         PER CURIAM
                                                                               SEPTEMBER 5, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
                                              David W. Lannetti, Judge

                              (Matthew Revell-Waligorski, on brief), pro se. Appellant
                              submitting on brief.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Rachel A. Glines, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on
                              brief.

                     On appeal, Matthew Revell-Waligorski challenges the trial court’s order denying his

              post-conviction motion for resentencing. He argues that the trial court erred in failing to impose

              a period of post-release supervision under Code § 19.2-295.2. The parties waived oral argument.

              Code § 17.1-403(ii). After examining the briefs and record, we find that Revell-Waligorski failed

              to establish that the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider his motion to modify

              or reduce his sentence.

                                                       BACKGROUND

                     Revell-Waligorski pleaded guilty to three counts of obtaining money by false pretenses.

              By order entered October 10, 2017, the trial court sentenced him to 30 years’ imprisonment, with

              all but 2 years and 9 months suspended. The suspended sentences were conditioned on a

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
minimum of 5 years’ probation and restitution of $12,944.68. The trial court also ordered good

behavior for five years or until the full restitution amount was paid, whichever was later.

       On March 28, 2022, Revell-Waligorski, pro se, filed a motion requesting a hearing to

correct the sentencing order. He alleged that the trial court was required to include a period of

post-release supervision under Code § 19.2-295.2 but had failed to do so. He asked that the

Commonwealth be notified and a hearing be set to address the matter. On April 5, 2022, the trial

court denied the motion. Revell-Waligorski timely appealed.

                                            ANALYSIS

       Whether a circuit court has jurisdiction is a question of law that this Court reviews de

novo. Reaves v. Tucker, 67 Va. App. 719, 727 (2017). Jurisdiction “is the power to adjudicate a

case upon the merits and dispose of it as justice may require.” Pure Presbyterian Church of

Washington v. Grace of God Presbyterian Church, 296 Va. 42, 49 (2018). “[F]or a court to have

the authority to adjudicate a particular case upon the merits,” it must possess subject matter

jurisdiction. Id. “Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority vested in a court by constitution or

statute to adjudicate certain categories of disputes.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 464, 467

(2011) (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has recognized that subject matter jurisdiction

“can only be acquired by virtue of the Constitution or of some statute. Neither the consent of the

parties, nor waiver, nor acquiescence can confer it.” Pure Presbyterian, 296 Va. at 49.

       “A circuit court may correct a void or unlawful sentence at any time.” Rawls v.

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 213, 218 (2009). Revell-Waligorski contends that his sentence was

void because the trial court did not impose an additional period of post-release supervision under

Code §§ 18.2-10(g) and 19.2-295.2. We disagree with Revell-Waligorski’s analysis.

       Code § 18.2-10(g) provides:

               For any felony offense committed . . . on or after July 1, 2000, [the
               trial court] shall, except in cases in which the court orders a
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               suspended term of confinement of at least six months, impose an
               additional term of incarceration of not less than six months nor
               more than three years, which shall be suspended conditioned upon
               successful completion of a period of post-release supervision
               pursuant to § 19.2-295.2 and compliance with such other terms as
               the sentencing court may require.

(Emphasis added). Code § 19.2-295.2 provides:

               At the time the court imposes sentence upon a conviction for any
               felony offense [it] . . . shall, in addition to any other punishment
               imposed if such other punishment includes an active term of
               incarceration in a state or local correctional facility, except in cases
               in which the court orders a suspended term of confinement of at
               least six months, impose a term of incarceration, in addition to the
               active term, of not less than six months nor more than three years,
               as the court may determine.

(Emphasis added).

       “Where the legislature has used words of a plain and definite import” we cannot construe

them to hold that “the legislature did not mean what it has actually expressed.” Hall v.

Commonwealth, 296 Va. 577, 582 (2018). “[T]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a

statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction.” Id. (alteration

in original). “By its clear terms, [Code § 19.2-295.2] comes into effect only when a judge

suspends less than six months of a felony sentence.” Alston v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 115,

125 (2006), aff’d, 274 Va. 759 (2007). Revell-Waligorski asks us “to find that the legislature did

not intend what it clearly expressed in Code § 19.2-295.2. This suggestion runs counter to the

basic principles of statutory construction.” Id. at 126. We hold that the sentence

Revell-Waligorski challenges was not void or illegal. Revell-Waligorski had to show some other

basis to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction to reconsider or modify his sentence.

       Absent a statutory exception, “[a]ll final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . remain under

the control of the trial court and may be modified, vacated, or suspended for twenty-one days

after the date of entry, and no longer.” Rule 1:1(a). “In a criminal case, the final order is the

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sentencing order.” Dobson v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 524, 528 (2023) (quoting Johnson v.

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 587, 596 (2020)).

       One such statutory exception is Code § 19.2-303, which “extends a trial court’s

jurisdiction beyond the 21 days specified in Rule 1:1 to consider a motion to suspend or modify a

criminal sentence.” Id. at 529. When, as here, the defendant “has been sentenced for a felony to

the Department of Corrections,” then

               the court that heard the case, if it appears compatible with the
               public interest and there are circumstances in mitigation of the
               offense, may, at any time before the person is transferred to the
               Department, or within 60 days of such transfer, suspend or
               otherwise modify the unserved portion of such a sentence.

Code § 19.2-303. The extension of the circuit court’s jurisdiction for “60 days” after “such

transfer” was added by the General Assembly in 2021. 2021 Va. Acts Spec. Sess. I ch. 176; see

Dobson, 76 Va. App. at 530.1

       Revell-Waligorski was in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC), at the

Haynesville Correctional Center, when he filed his March 2022 motion to modify his sentence to

include post-release supervision. Moreover, the record indicates that he had been in DOC

custody since at least June 2018. For the circuit court to have had jurisdiction over

Revell-Waligorski’s motion, he had to show that he filed it no later than 60 days after his transfer

to the Department of Corrections. Dobson, 76 Va. App. at 530. Based on the record before us,

we cannot find that the circuit court had jurisdiction to modify the sentence. Id. at 531 (quoting

Ziats v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 133, 139 (2003)).

       A court “always has jurisdiction to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction.”

Pure Presbyterian, 296 Va. at 50 (quoting Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 170 (1990)). “Once

       1
        The 2022 amendment to Code § 19.2-303 did not change the language at issue here.
See 2022 Va. Acts chs. 41, 42.
                                          -4-
a court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, ‘the only function remaining to the

court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’” Id. (quoting Ex Parte McCardle,

74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868)). Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider

Revell-Waligorski’s motion to modify his sentence, “we lack jurisdiction to consider his appeal

regarding the denial of that motion.” Minor v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 728, 743 (2016).

                                          CONCLUSION

       The trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant the relief Revell-Waligorski

sought. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the case is remanded with instructions to

vacate the April 5, 2022 order and dismiss Revell-Waligorski’s motion.

                                                                                         Dismissed.

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