Court Opinion

ID: 9897571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:16:16.33642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:52.964642
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0099-22

C.A.L.,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.C.,1

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted October 17, 2023 – Decided November 14, 2023

                   Before Judges Whipple, Enright and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,
                   Docket No. FV-12-1696-22.

                   Triarsi Betancourt Wukovits & Dugan, LLC, attorneys
                   for appellant (Marc A. Sposato, of counsel and on the
                   briefs).

                   Lowenstein Sandler LLP, attorneys for respondent
                   (Michael A. Kaplan, Amanda Kate Cirpriano, Claire B.
                   Dronzek and Emily B. Sklar, of counsel and on the
                   brief).

1
     We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant A.C. appeals from an August 23, 2022 final restraining order

(FRO) entered against him and in favor of plaintiff C.A.L., pursuant to the

Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35.

      Plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant

following an incident that occurred between them on January 30, 2022. Plaintiff

alleged the predicate act of assault under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1. On May 18, 2022,

plaintiff amended her TRO complaint (ATRO), adding additional facts to

include the predicate act of sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2,2 and providing a

prior history of domestic violence.

      Following trial, the judge awarded plaintiff an FRO. The trial judge

determined that: (1) plaintiff was a credible witness and defendant was not; (2)

plaintiff had proved that defendant committed the predicate act of assault; (3)

the January 30, 2022 assault was "very serious and egregious"; and (4) an FRO

was necessary to prevent further abuse.

      Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial judge erred by: (1) determining

that he committed the predicate act of assault and (2) failing to conduct the

2
    The trial judge determined that plaintiff did not establish, by the
preponderance of the evidence, that defendant committed sexual assault. That
determination was not appealed, and, therefore, we do not address it.
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                                       2
required legal analysis to enter an FRO under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19, Silver v.

Silver3 and its progeny because: (a) he did not pose an immediate danger to

plaintiff; (b) he and plaintiff did not have a history of domestic violence; and (c)

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29 factors (a)(3) – (a)(5) were nonexistent and not properly

considered by the court.

       Because the trial judge made appropriate credibility determinations, his

factual findings are supported by substantial credible evidence, and those facts

were correctly applied to the law, we affirm.

                                         I.

       Our review of a trial judge's factual findings is limited. Cesare v. Cesare,

154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). "The general rule is that findings by the trial court

are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible

evidence." Id. at 411-12 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65

N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).     Moreover, "[b]ecause of the family courts' special

jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, [we] should accord deference to

family court fact[-]finding." Id. at 413. Such deference is particularly proper

"when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility."

Id. at 412 (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117

3
    387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006).
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                                         3
(1997)). On the other hand, we will review questions of law determined by the

trial court de novo. Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 387 (2016)

(citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378

(1995)).

                                        II.

      The one-day trial was conducted with plaintiff and defendant; both parties

were represented by counsel and provided testimony. The trial judge admitted

photographs into evidence including: a picture of plaintiff's facial injuries,

following the January 30, 2022 incident; plaintiff's text message to her older

brother on the day of the incident; and an anonymous Instagram message

admittedly sent by defendant to plaintiff a few days after the incident.

      The parties had a dating relationship between the summer of 2021 and

January 30, 2022, the date of the incident that gave rise to plaintiff's filing for

the TRO. Plaintiff explained that on the morning of January 30, 2022, she and

defendant were in a hotel room. Defendant was on top of her as she laid face

down on the bed. When defendant got off of her, she wanted to go to the

bathroom and started to put her clothes back on. Defendant asked her why she

was putting her clothes on and, after she ignored him, he "pinned [her] down to

the bed with [her] two arms above [her]." Plaintiff told him to let go, but "then

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                                        4
he covered [her] mouth with his hand." Plaintiff told him she could not breathe

and he then "pinched [her] nose with his other hand," "covering [her] mouth and

. . . nose at the same time." Defendant did this about three to four times. Plaintiff

was "unable to breathe" and "felt really scared and confused."

      After defendant got off of plaintiff, he demanded to see her phone.

Initially, he "looked through her social media and then he . . . looked through

[her] personal notes." Plaintiff became "uncomfortable" and took her phone

back. Defendant persisted in trying to see the phone. Plaintiff refused and

placed the phone on the table. Again, defendant pinned plaintiff down on the

bed with her arms above her and demanded to see the phone. When plaintiff

told him no, he slapped her across the face, on the cheek. She testified the slap

"stung and hurt a lot."

      Plaintiff texted her older brother for help. But then, fearing defendant

would "become even angrier . . . and . . . do something even worse," she texted

her older brother and told him "never mind" and deleted the text. Defendant

saw plaintiff on her phone and "demanded to see [her] phone" again. Plaintiff

refused and defendant put her in a "chokehold."            Plaintiff described the

chokehold as defendant "standing behind [her] and then put[ting] one arm

around [her] neck and squeez[ing] her neck." Plaintiff "could [not] breathe and

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. . . could barely move." Plaintiff stated defendant would choke her "for a few

seconds and then he would let go and . . . ask again or demand again to see [her]

phone and [she] would say no." Defendant did this "three or four times," and

plaintiff testified she could not breathe or do anything.

      The last time defendant choked her, plaintiff passed out. She remembered

"everything going black for a few seconds." She recalled "seeing the hotel room

in front of [her] but not realizing where [she] was and what was happening . . .

[and] then realiz[ing] . . . [defendant] was still choking" her.        Eventually,

defendant let go of her and she "start[ed] to walk toward the hotel room door."

Defendant told her to wait for him, but she ignored him and "kept walking . . .

out the door into the hallway." "Then [defendant] pulled [her] arm back really

hard and it [caused] the hotel room door to hit [her] in the face while he was

pulling [her] back." Plaintiff's nose "hurt a lot" and she "had a bruise and cuts

on her nose after."

      Defendant denied that he ever "attempt[ed] to choke, hit, or suffocate"

plaintiff. He admitted that they had a verbal altercation about the phone and

their relationship and he "kind of snapped" and "called [plaintiff] a fucking

bitch." Further, he denied pulling plaintiff's arm resulting in her hitting the door.

Instead, he explained that he tried to hug her, and when she pushed away, she

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                                         6
struck the door. He testified that plaintiff made these false allegations against

him because she wanted to "cover-up" or "hide their relationship from her

family." However, he admitted that a few days after the incident, he "messaged

[plaintiff], on Instagram, from a fake account." The message stated:

             hey-

                    ....

             please don't tell on me..that will ruin my life…[your
             brother] told me he'd contact the police…I
             understand…can we at the very least talk soon…I will
             listen..I will not argue…You will have my full attention
             without interruption…I will shut up…Your feelings are
             more important than my own.. What you say means the
             world… You deserve the best……I don't want to ruin
             my life, but without you my life is devastated. Without
             you I am empty. Without you I lose purpose…not a
             moment passes by that I don't think of you…every
             waking moment is filled with thoughts of you…the
             truth is I am empty without you…I would do anything
             for us to be on good terms..therapy? alright…space?
             alright…leave the military? alright…Be sweeter?
             alright…I will.

Defendant testified that he sent the message because he was concerned about

getting "kicked out of the military" and his "life being ruined." Plaintiff testified

that this anonymous message "scared" her because defendant "was trying to still

contact" her and he "was not going to stop even if [she] tried to stop him."

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                                         7
      In describing their history of domestic violence, plaintiff testified that in

December 2021, she and defendant were in his car. They were in an argument

and plaintiff was giving him the "silent treatment." Defendant was "really upset

. . . that [she] wasn't talking to him and he . . . threatened to throw [her] phone

out the window if [she] didn't talk to him. . . . And then [defendant] while he

was screaming, telling [her] to talk to him, . . . slapped [her] leg." The slap was

"hard because it hurt and it stung." Plaintiff told defendant that it hurt and he

slapped her leg again. The second slap "was hard and it hurt again." Plaintiff

was "scared."

      Further, plaintiff explained that in the past, defendant "verbally abused

[her] by calling [her] 'retarded,' a 'bitch,' 'stupid bitch,' whenever he [was] upset

with [her] during [their] arguments throughout their relationship."

      Ultimately, plaintiff sought protection so she did not have to "worry about

her safety and well[-]being" and because defendant could "still contact [her]

through social media and through [her] number and he could come back to visit

New Jersey and [she] would [not] know when."

                                        III.

       The trial judge determined that plaintiff was the more credible witness,

stating he "believe[d] . . . [plaintiff's] version of the events more than . . .

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                                         8
[defendant]'s version of the events." The trial judge made additional detailed

credibility determinations based on his observations of the parties during their

testimony. He stated that he did not believe defendant's theory that plaintiff was

"making this up for some payback to be vindictive" because the theory lacked

"context [or] support." The judge also rejected defendant's explanation for

sending the anonymous message to plaintiff and instead found that defendant

"knew that he made a horrible, horrible mistake."          Moreover, the judge

concluded defendant was not credible when he testified that the parties'

relationship went from "great" and "lovey dovey" to "toxic . . . in the span of

five minutes."

      Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in assessing the parties'

credibility. We disagree.

            [F]ew people are able, with any degree of accuracy, to
            judge on a subjective basis alone, the credibility of a
            witness. As a result, critical analysis of the witness'
            interests, motive, and demeanor is important and
            examination of the objective reasonableness of the
            testimony is also highly probative. Moreover, the
            factfinder must not only make the necessary
            observations of all the elements required for an
            assessment of credibility but also must articulate those
            findings in detail for the record.

            [State v. Locurto, 304 N.J. Super. 514, 519 (App. Div.
            1997) rev'd on other grounds, 157 N.J. 463 (1999).]

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      "When the credibility of witnesses is an important factor, the trial court's

conclusions must be given great weight and must be accepted by the appellate

court unless clearly lacking in reasonable support." N.J. Div. of Youth and

Family Srvcs. v. F.M., 375 N.J. Super. 235, 259 (App. Div. 2005) (citing In re

Guardianship of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 382 (1999)). "[T]he trial court . . . has the

opportunity to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who

appear on the stand; it has a 'feel for the case' that can never be realized by a

review of the cold record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Srvcs. v. E.P., 196 N.J.

88, 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Srvcs. v. M.M., 189 N.J.

261, 293 (2007)).

      "We view the task of a judge considering a domestic violence complaint,

where the jurisdictional requirements have otherwise been met,4 to be two-fold."

Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125.

      "First, the judge must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a

preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts

set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125.

4
  The parties both testified to having a "dating relationship" provid ing the trial
court with jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d).
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                                       10
      Here, the trial judge credited plaintiff's testimony and found that that

defendant committed simple assault. Simple assault occurs when a person:

"[a]ttempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury

to another." N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.

      In reaching his conclusion the trial judge found that defendant:

             Grabbed her . . . he choked her . . . he slapped her and
             caused injury to her. And but for him not pulling on
             her arm to restrain her from leaving the room her face
             never would have smacked that door. His actions were
             reckless and [they] caused injury. And she suffered
             injury as outlined in [the photograph of plaintiff's
             nose].

      We accept the trial judge's credibility determinations and are satisfied that

his finding of simple assault is "supported by adequate, substantial, credible

evidence." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12. Accordingly, we are convinced that he

properly found that plaintiff satisfied the first prong of Silver.

      Regarding the second Silver prong, we recognize "[t]he second inquiry,

upon a finding of the commission of a predicate act of domestic violence, is

whether the court should enter a restraining order that provides protection for

the victim." Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126; see also J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J.

458, 475-76 (2011) (explaining that a[n] FRO should not be issued without a

finding that relief is "necessary to prevent further abuse" (quoting N.J.S.A.

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                                        11
2C:25-29(b))). "[T]he Legislature did not intend that the commission of one of

the enumerated predicate acts of domestic violence automatically mandates the

entry of a domestic violence restraining order." Id. at 126-27.

      "[T]he guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon

an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) – 29(a)(6)." Id.

at 127. But because some factors may be irrelevant to a given circumstance,

"N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) does not mandate that a trial court incorporate all of those

factors into its findings when determining whether or not an act of domestic

violence has been committed." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 401-02.

      Here, the judge's analysis included a review of the appropriate statutory

factors.5 The trial judge found that there was a "previous history of domestic

violence" perpetrated by defendant against plaintiff, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

29(a)(1), concluding:

            in December [2021] . . . he slapped her [in] the car just
            like he slapped her in the room that day. I find that and
            I believe that at different times during the relationship
            he would call her "retarded," he would call her a
            "bitch," "a stupid bitch," just like he called her a
            fucking bitch that day.

5
  Defendant contends the judge erred by failing to specifically cite N.J.S.A.
2C:25-29(a)(4) or (a)(5). The lack of an explicit reference to these factors is of
no moment because the judge addressed these factors in the body of his oral
opinion as we note herein.
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                                       12
       Further, the trial judge found that an FRO was in plaintiff's "best interest."

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(4). The trial judge detailed that plaintiff needs an FRO to

"protect her health, safety and well-being" and "[s]he can now move on with her

life without interference, controlling or abusive behavior."

       Moreover, the trial judge found the "existence of immediate danger" to

plaintiff.   N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(5).    The trial judge determined defendant's

"conduct is escalating . . . [i]t goes from a couple of words to a couple slaps to

choking, more slaps, to a chokehold, to recklessly grabbing her arms where her

head smacks a door."

       Importantly, the judge also implicitly recognized that "one sufficiently

egregious action [may] constitute domestic violence . . . , even with no history

of abuse between the parties . . . ." Id. at 402 (see A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 N.J.

Super. 402, 417 (App. Div. 2016)) ("[w]hen the predicate act is an offense that

inherently involves the use of physical force and violence, the decision to issue

an FRO 'is most often perfunctory and self-evident.'").          In fact, the judge

determined that defendant's actions on January 30, 2022, were "very serious and

egregious" when defendant "grabbed," "choked," and "slapped" plaintiff, and

"restrain[ed] her from leaving the [hotel] room."

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                                        13
      Accordingly, we are persuaded the trial judge's determinations on the

second Silver prong are amply supported on the record and that he correctly

found plaintiff established the need for an FRO to "prevent further abuse,"

because "this is the type of case for which the issuance of final restraints [is]

axiomatic or . . . 'perfunctory and self-evident.'" A.M.C., 447 N.J. Super. at 418

(quoting Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127).

      Affirmed.

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                                       14