Court Opinion

ID: 9665032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:37:07.090474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:12.351913
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
¶ 34. (dissenting). In 1980, Anthony J. Zingale, Ann Zingale's husband, borrowed some $96,000 from his friend and co-worker, telling him that he needed the money to buy a home. Over the years, despite continued requests and demands, Mr. Zingale neither repaid the loan nor any of the accumulating interest. When Mr. Zingale died in 1999, he owed several hundred thousand dollars. Relying on Mr. Zingale's acknowledgment of the debt in 1995, and what the trial court saw as Mr. Zingale's renewed promise to pay what he owed — all reified in a formal written 1995 agreement that expressly provided that the agreement was binding on Mr. Zingale's "heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns," — the trial court held that the statute of limitations did not bar this lawsuit to collect the money from Mrs. Zingale. The Majority holds that the tried court was wrong. Although, as noted below, our review of what the trial court did is de novo, I believe that it correctly decided the issues in this case. Accordingly, I would affirm, and respectfully dissent from the Majority's decision to reverse.
I.
¶ 35. On October 24, 1980, Anthony J. Zingale gave a promissory note to Van Engel Commission for $96,141.90, with interest to run at six percent per *800annum. The note was payable on October 24, 1985. According to an affidavit submitted by Van Engel Commission's president, Kurt Van Engel, in support of his company's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Zin-gale both worked for Van Engel Commission and was a stockholder in the company, and Van Engel Commission loaned the money represented by the note to Mr. Zingale so he "could buy a home." Mr. Van Engel's affidavit averred that Mr. Zingale did not pay the note when it matured in October of 1985, and, although Mr. Van Engel "frequently asked" Mr. Zingale to pay what he owed, and Mr. Zingale "said he would repay it when he could," he never did. Mrs. Zingale submitted an affidavit denying knowing about the note, the debt it purported to evidence, or any discussions her husband might have had with Mr. Van Engel, other than averring:
I believe my husband never owed [Van Engel Commission] any money and that the note in question was signed in blank in the mid to late 1970s at a time when Mr. Van Engel [two other persons and her husband] were having problems with the unionization of their business. But because [Van Engel Commission] waited until after my husband's death to bring this collection action, I have no way of proving my husband's position on the note because he never discussed it with me or anyone in our family in detail. He did say to me that he didn't owe Kurt Van Engel anything.1
(Footnote added.) In its oral decision, the trial court *801assumed that the money evidenced by the note went toward the Zingale home, as Mr. Van Engel's affidavit said. Mrs. Zingale has not submitted contrary eviden-tiary material, and her briefs on appeal do not dispute the trial court's conclusion. Thus, I accept it as true. See Charolais Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. FPC Secs. Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 97, 109, 279 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Ct. App. 1979) (matter not refuted deemed admitted). Indeed, Mrs. Zingale's lawyer elicited this from Mr. Van Engel at his deposition one month before Mr. Van Engel executed his affidavit.2 Mrs. Zingale argues, however, that Mr. Van Engel's averment of his understanding of the loan's purpose is hearsay. It is not. There are two reasons.
¶ 36. First, hearsay "is a statement, other than one made by the declarant. . ., offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Wis. Stat. Rule 908.01(3). As phrased by the affidavit, Mr. Van Engel was not reciting in haec verba what Mr. Zingale told him; but, rather, was recounting his understanding of the loan's purpose, which could have been derived from sources other than what Mr. Zingale told him. Second, any inferred statement by Mr. Zingale that inheres in Mr. Van Engel's averment is not hearsay because it is a statement by someone from whom Mrs. Zingale's liabil*802ity is derived and in whose shoes she thus stands for the purpose of the statement-by-a-party opponent exclusions from the hearsay rule in Rule 908.01(4)(b)1 and 4. See Mills v. Damson Oil Corp., 691 F.2d 715, 716 (5th Cir. 1982) (Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) applies to those whose liability is derivative of a predecessor). Insofar as Wis. Stat. §§ 885.16 and 885.17, Wisconsin's Dead Man's Statutes, are concerned, Mrs. Zingale has not objected on that ground, and, accordingly, whatever bar those provisions might erect to receipt of Mr. Van Engel's averment is waived. See Giese v. Reist, 91 Wis. 2d 209, 222-223, 281 N.W.2d 86, 92 (1979).
¶ 37. In March of 1989, Van Engel Commission sued Mr. Zingale seeking to collect on the 1980 note, which, as we have seen, was payable on October 24, 1985. The lawsuit was ultimately settled by the execution of an agreement between Mr. Zingale and Van Engel Commission dated August 15, 1995, and the action was "dismissed without prejudice" as a result. The August 15 agreement is central to the issues on this appeal.
¶ 38. The August 15 agreement was signed by both Mr. Zingale and Mr. Van Engel, the latter in his capacity as president of Van Engel Commission. The document is headed "Collateral Pledge Agreement" (up-percasing omitted) and acknowledged that Mr. Zingale owed Van Engel Commission "the sum of $96,141.90, plus interest, evidenced by the promissory note of [Mr. Zingale] dated October 24, 1980 for this amount." The "Collateral Pledge Agreement" also recites that Mr. Zingale "has agreed to pledge certain stock with [Van Engel Commission] as security for repayment of the loan." The "Collateral Pledge Agreement" then sets out *803the parties' agreement in twelve numbered paragraphs. I discuss these paragraphs as they relate to the issues on this appeal.
¶ 39. Many of the paragraphs describe the collateral, its pledge, and the respective rights of Mr. Zingale and Van Engel Commission in the collateral. The other paragraphs, however, encompass the debt. Paragraph 7 provides that at Van Engel Commission's "option" and "without necessity for demand or notice, all or any part of the indebtedness shall immediately become due and payable, irrespective of any agreed maturity" if, among other things, Mr. Zingale either dies or does not pay the "principal or interest when due."3 Paragraph 6 provides that Van Engel Commission "shall be under no duty or obligation whatsoever to make or give any present*804ments, demands for performance, notices of nonperformance, protests, notices of protest or notices of dishonor in connection. . . with any obligations or evidences of indebtedness that constituted in whole or in part the indebtedness secured under this pledge." Paragraph 10 provides:
This is a continuing security agreement, and all the rights, powers and remedies hereunder shall apply to all past, present and future indebtedness of [Mr. Zin-gale] to [Van Engel Commission], notwithstanding the death... of [Mr. Zingale].... Until all debtedness is paid in full, all rights, powers and remedies granted to [Van Engel Commission] hereunder shall continue in effect and may be exercised by [Van Engel Commission] at any time, even though the right to recover the indebtedness or any part thereof is barred by any statute of limitations or the personal liability of [Mr. Zingale] has ceased.
Paragraph 12 provides: "This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns."
¶ 40. Mr. Zingale died on October 4,1999. Neither Mrs. Zingale nor any of the persons authorized by Wis. Stat. § 856.07(1) filed a petition for the administration of Mr. Zingale's estate. As permitted by § 856.07(2), Van Engel Commission filed the petition in August of 2002.4 On September 25, 2002, Van Engel Commission brought this action against Mrs. Zingale to recover on the $96,141.90 note, plus interest. So far, no letters testamentary have issued in Mr. Zingale's estate.
*805¶ 41. The trial court granted Van Engel Commission's motion for summary judgment for the note's full value plus interest.
II.
¶ 42. Appellate review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo. Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 315-317, 401 N.W.2d 816, 820-821 (1987). In order to survive summary judgment, the party with the burden of proof on an element in the case must establish that there is at least a genuine issue of fact on that element by submitting evidentiary material "set[ting] forth specific facts," Wis. Stat. Rule 802.08(3), pertinent to that element, Transportation Insurance Co. v. Hunzinger Construction Co., 179 Wis. 2d 281, 290-292, 507 N.W.2d 136, 139-140 (Ct. App. 1993). Accordingly, Van Engel Commission had the burden to demonstrate that there were no issues of fact material as to whether Mr. Zingale gave it the note and agreed to the terms of the "Collateral Pledge Agreement." Mrs. Zingale has not submitted any evidentiary material that demonstrates there is any factual dispute on those matters. She asserts, however, that Van Engel Commission's attempt to collect on the note is barred by *806both the applicable statute of limitations and, alternatively, by laches. These are affirmative defenses, see Wis. Stat. Rules 802.02(3) (statute of limitations and laches); 802.06(2)(a)9 (statute of limitations), and she has the burden of showing facts that if true would establish those defenses, see Transportation Insurance Co., 179 Wis. 2d at 290-292, 507 N.W.2d at 139-140. She also claims that she is not liable on the debt by virtue of the Marital Property Act, Wis. Stat. ch. 766. I discuss these matters in turn.
A. Statute of Limitations.
¶ 43. The parties agree that the six-year statute of limitations of Wis. Stat. § 893.43 applies. This provision requires that "[a]n action upon any contract, obligation or liability . . . shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred." The parties also agree that a cause of action on Mr. Zingale's 1980 note accrued when it first became due on October 24, 1985. Thus, if the statute of limitations was neither extended nor tolled, any right to collect on the note would have expired on October 24, 1991. See Wis. Stat. § 990.001(4)(a) ("The time within which an act is to be done or proceeding had or taken shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last."). As we have seen, Van Engel Commission sued Mr. Zingale in March of 1989 seeking to collect on the note. This tolled the running of the six-year statute of limitations. See Wis. Stat. § 893.13(2). Section 893.13(2) provides:
A law limiting the time for commencement of an action is tolled by the commencement of the action to enforce the cause of action to which the period of limitation applies. The law limiting the time for commencement of the action is tolled for the period from the commencement of the action until the final disposition of the action.
*807As noted, Van Engel Commission's suit against Mr. Zingale was dismissed in August of 1995 concurrently with the parties' execution of the "Collateral Pledge Agreement," which, by its terms, was effective August 15, 1995. Van Engel Commission contends that this agreement started anew the running of the six-year statute of limitations. I agree.
¶ 44. In order to determine whether, as Van Engel Commission contends, the 1995 "Collateral Pledge Agreement" re-started the six-year statute of limitations, we have to see what it says to discern the parties' agreement. Eden Stone Co. v. Oakfield Stone Co., 166 Wis. 2d 105, 116, 479 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Ct. App. 1991). This presents a legal issue that, like our review of a trial court's decision on summary judgment, appellate courts decide de novo. Borchardt v. Wilk, 156 Wis. 2d 420, 427, 456 N.W.2d 653, 656 (Ct. App. 1990).
¶ 45. Unambiguous contracts must be enforced as they are written. Dykstra v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 92 Wis. 2d 17, 38, 284 N.W.2d 692, 702-703 (Ct. App. 1979). Contract language is ambiguous only when it is "reasonably or fairly susceptible of more than one construction." Borchardt, 156 Wis. 2d at 427, 456 N.W.2d at 656. Further, courts must give effect to each of the agreement's provisions. Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 126 Wis. 2d 349, 366, 377 N.W.2d 593, 602 (1985) ("agreement should be given a reasonable meaning so that no part of the contract is surplusage"); Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 184 Wis. 2d 247, 258, 516 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Ct. App. 1994) (should interpret contract to give "reasonable meaning to all provisions"). I examine the 1995 agreement in this light.
¶ 46. As material here, the 1995 Agreement did three things. First, Mr. Zingale acknowledged his pre*808existing debt. Second, he gave to Van Engel Commission collateral to secure that pre-existing debt. Third, beyond the debt's collateralization, the Agreement affected the terms of the 1980 note, as we have seen, in the following ways:
• The Agreement provided that Mr. Zingale's debt to Van Engel Commission would "immediately become due and payable" either when he died or on the happening of any of the other specified events set out in paragraph 7 of the agreement, including, as we have seen, Mr. Zingale's "[d]e-fault... in the payment of principal or interest when due" or when he died.
Thus, contrary to Mrs. Zingale's contention, adopted by the Majority, the Agreement did not substitute the collateral in place of the debt both evidenced by the 1980 note and acknowledged, in haec verba, by the Agreement itself. Rather, the Agreement promised that the debt would be "immediately" "due and payable" if:
• Mr. Zingale violated "any" of the Agreement's "terms or provisions";
• Mr. Zingale did not pay the "principal or interest when due";
• The collateral deteriorated, depreciated, or was impaired;
• Mr. Zingale died.
The logical question asked in light of the Agreement's promise that the debt would be paid (that is, as phrased by the Agreement, "immediately become due and payable") is payable by whom? In my view, the Majority ignores this critical question. At oral argument, however, Mrs. Zingale conceded that the debt, by *809virtue of paragraph 7 of the Agreement, would be payable by Mr. Zingale. That is a promise to pay.
• The Agreement provided that until Mr. Zingale's debt to Van Engel Commission was "paid in full, all rights, powers and remedies granted to [Van Engel Commission] hereunder shall continue in effect and may be exercised by [Van Engel Commission] at any time, even though the right to recover the indebtedness or any part thereof is barred by any statute of limitations." (Emphases added.)
The "all rights, powers and remedies" clause perforce encompasses the rights granted by paragraph 7 of the Agreement — the right of the Commission to insist that Mr. Zingale pay the debt evidenced by the 1980 note and acknowledged by the Agreement. Thus, by providing— unequivocally — that "all rights" (including the "right" to have the debt "immediately become due and payable," that is paid by Mr. Zingale, survive the running of the statute of limitations, Mr. Zingale promised to pay his long-standing debt even though the statute of limitations might run.
• The provision that Mr. Zingale's "indebtedness shall immediately become due" when he died or the happening of any of other specified events set out in paragraph 7 of the agreement, including his nonpayment of "principal or interest when due," was a "right" granted by Mr. Zingale to Van Engel Commission by the "Collateral Pledge Agreement."
The circle is thus closed: By virtue of their 1995 Agreement, Mr. Zingale agreed that the "rights" granted to Van Engel Commission to have the debt on his death *810or the other events be "immediately. . . due and payable" survive the running of the statute of limitations, and indeed, also promised that the debt would be paid, at the very latest, when he died. Mrs. Zingale is bound by her husband's agreement by virtue of paragraph 12 of the 1995 Agreement, which, as we have also seen provides: "This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns."
¶ 47. Giving effect to Mr. Zingale's promise to pay what he owed Van Engel Commission in return for its forbearance in taking judgment against him is consistent with Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 82 (1979):
(1) A promise to pay all or part of an antecedent contractual or quasi-contractual indebtedness owed by the promisor is binding if the indebtedness is still enforceable or would be except for the effect of a statute of limitations.
(2) The following facts operate as such a promise unless other facts indicate a different intention:
(a) A voluntary acknowledgment to the obligee, admitting the present existence of the antecedent indebtedness; or
(b) A voluntary transfer of money, a negotiable instrument, or other thing by the obligor to the obligee, made as interest on or part payment of or collateral security for the antecedent indebtedness; or
(c) A statement to the obligee that the statute of limitations will not be pleaded as a defense.
Although any of the subsections in § 82(2) would suffice as definitions of what a "promise" is under § 82(1) *811because they are in the disjunctive, the 1995 Agreement between Mr. Zingale and Van Engel Commission satisfies all three. First, it acknowledged Mr. Zingale's debt to Van Engel Commission. Second, it gave collateral security for the debt. Third, it agreed that the expiration of the statute of limitations would not bar any of the rights given to Van Engel Commission by the agreement, which, as we have seen, included the right to have the debt be "immediately become due and payable" on Mr. Zingale's death or the happening of the other events set out in paragraph 7 of the Agreement, including his nonpayment of the "principal or interest when due." At the very least, operation of any of these factors, if any are applicable, started a new six-year statute of limitations on August 15,1995.5 See § 82 cmt. c ("[T]he extended or renewed obligation is subject to the statute of limitations and to other rules appropriate to the form and terms of the new promise."); see also § 82 cmt. £, illus. 16 ("A owes B $500, and writes B 'I cannot pay you now, but I will never set up the statute of limitations against your claim.' B delays bringing an action to collect his claim until more than the statutory period from the time of A's promise not to set up the statute has expired. A may then successfully assert the bar of the statute.").
¶ 48. Mrs. Zingale argues, however, that § 82(2) of the Restatement is not the law in Wisconsin, and points to three 19th-Century decisions by the Wisconsin Su*812preme in support, Pritchard v. Howell, 1 Wis. 118 [131] (1853), and two decisions that follow it, Carpenter v. State, 41 Wis. 36 (1876), and Pierce v. Seymour, 52 Wis. 272, 9 N.W. 71 (1881).
¶ 49. Pritchard involved an oral acknowledgement of, but not a promise to pay, a debt. 1 Wis. at 124 [139]. This was insufficient to extend the statute of limitations:
We hold, therefore, that to take the case out of the operation of the statute, there must be an admission of the debt or obligation and an unqualified promise to pay the debt, or perform the contract made within the time limited by the statute, or what is equivalent to such unqualified promise.
Id., 1 Wis. at 124 [138] (emphasis added).6 Carpenter and Pierce followed Pritchard. Carpenter, 41 Wis. at 41, Pierce, 52 Wis. at 277-279, 9 N.W. at 72-73. Significantly, what Pritchard refers to as that which is "equivalent" to the required "unqualified promise" by the debtor to pay the debt is encompassed by § 82(2) (a) and (b) of the Restatement we have quoted earlier.
¶ 50. Although the Restatement's formulation in § 82 (2) (a) and (b) of what is equivalent to an "unqualified promise" appears sound, it need not be used in this case to fill the interstice left open by Pritchard because in the August 1995 Agreement Mr. Zingale both admits his debt and, as we have seen, promises to pay it *813without qualification. First, the acknowledgement is clear, and Mrs. Zingale concedes that. Second, Mr. Zingale's unequivocal promise to pay the debt is also spelled out in paragraph 7, where, among other triggering events, either Mr. Zingale's death or his nonpayment of the debt's "principal or interest when due" precipitates, as we have just seen, Van Engel Commission's right to demand that "all or any part of the indebtedness shall immediately become due and payable, irrespective of any agreed maturity." And, as we have seen, and as Mrs. Zingale conceded at oral argument, the only payor who could be expected to pay the debt when he was alive was Mr. Zingale. Further, paragraph 10 specifically recognizes both that the debt will be "paid in full" and, also, that Van Engel Commission's rights under the agreement survive the running of the statute of limitations. This is, under any reasonable interpretation of the language, an unqualified promise that the debt will be paid by either Mr. Zingale when he is alive, and, after his death, by his "heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns." Agreement, ¶ 12. Significantly, unlike the contingencies in Carpenter (ascertainment of what may be owed and subsequent legislative agreement, Carpenter, 41 Wis. at 43-44) and Pierce (the debtor's hope that he will have the money to repay, Pierce, 52 Wis. at 279-280, 9 N.W. at 74), death is inexorable and is contingent only as to date.
¶ 51. As noted, Van Engel Commission did not sue Mrs. Zingale in this case until September 25, 2002. Additionally, as also noted, it filed a petition for the administration of Mr. Zingale's estate because no such petition had been filed "by any person named in the will to act as personal representative or by any person interested." Wis. Stat. § 856.07(1). The petition was *814filed on August 12, 2002. Under Wis. Stat. § 893.22, Van Engel Commission thus had until one year after the issuance "of letters testamentary or other letters authorizing the administration of the decedent's estate" to sue on the note.7 So far, no letters testamentary have *815issued in Mr. Zingale's estate. Accordingly, under the agreement and the application of § 893.22, Van Engel Commission has until one year after issuance of letters testamentary to sue on Mr. Zingale's debt.
¶ 52. Mrs. Zingale contends, however, that Wis. Stat. § 893.22 only suspends the statute of limitations for claims against estates, and that it does not apply to a claim asserted against her based on her husband's note. The clear language of that provision is not so limited, and Mrs. Zingale gives me no authority explaining why we should read in limiting language that is not there, especially because the provision is not in the probate chapters of the statutes, Wis. Stat. chs. 851-879, but, rather is in the general limitations-of-actions chapter, Wis. Stat. ch. 893. Moreover, a decision whether an estate may be liable for a decedent's debt, or whether that liability rests on someone as a consequence of his or her derivative liability under a contract clause similar to paragraph 12 of the 1995 Agreement, may be impossible to make until the estate proceedings have been commenced. Thus, it makes sense to apply § 893.22's extension of the statute of limitations to *816those whose liability, like Mrs. Zingale's potential liability, is derivative of that of a decedent. By the unrestricted language it chose for § 893.22, this is what the legislature has done.
¶ 53. Mrs. Zingale also makes much of the fact that the August 15, 1995, agreement is headed "Collateral Pledge Agreement." (Uppercasing omitted.) But, as we have seen, the Agreement encompasses much more than just the collateral Mr. Zingale pledged to secure his debt; it also reaffirms and promises to pay that debt. To ignore that part of the Agreement would violate one of the principles of contract-construction — no part of the contract should be ignored. Koenings, 126 Wis. 2d at 366, 377 N.W.2d at 602 ("agreement should be given a reasonable meaning so that no part of the contract is surplusage"). Moreover, as with the interpretation of statutes, titles are almost never dispositive of parameters of the parties' agreement. See Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6) ("The titles to subchapters, sections, subsections, paragraphs and subdivisions of the statutes and history notes are not part of the statutes."); see PaineWebber Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Private Bank, 260 F.3d 453, 463 (5th Cir. 2001) (heading does not create rights inconsistent with language of agreement). In a sense, the 1995 Agreement and its title is analogous to 18 U.S.C. § 924, which, although titled "Penalties," creates "entirely new crimes." Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 125 (2000). I agree with the trial court that the statute of limitations does not bar this action.
B. Laches.
¶ 54. We recently set out the elements of laches:
"For laches to bar a claim, an unreasonable delay must occur, the plaintiff must know the facts and take *817no action, the defendant must not know the plaintiff would assert the right on which the suit is based, and prejudice to the defendant must occur."
Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund v. City of Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 144, ¶ 20, 246 Wis. 2d 196, 213, 630 N.W.2d 236, 244 (quoted source omitted).
¶ 55. Mrs. Zingale contends that Van Engel Commission's claim against her is barred by laches for four reasons. First, she claims that Van Engel Commission waited too long to seek to enforce the note because, as she puts it in her main brief on this appeal, although Van Engel Commission sued Mr. Zingale on the note in 1989, it not only "allowed it to languish for six years before taking the Collateral Pledge Agreement," but also "waited another seven years — and three years after the death of Anthony Zingale — before bringing the current action." Second, she argues that she "was never put on notice that [Van Engel Commission] would ignore the existence of the collateral and assert the 22-year old note against her personally." Third, she claims prejudice because her late husband is not available to testify. Fourth, she asserts that she is also prejudiced because of the "the accumulation of 22 years worth of interest."
¶ 56. Whether a contention that laches bars a claim presents a question of law for the court, and, therefore, is subject to our de novo review, involves a mixed question of law and fact to which we give the trial court's determination some deference, or requires a discretionary decision by the trial court entitled to great deference, has not yet been resolved. Lohr v. Viney, 174 Wis. 2d 468, 477-478, 497 N.W.2d 730, 734 (Ct. App. 1993). Under any standard of review, however, Mrs. Zingale's contentions are not supported by the *818summary-judgment record, and she has not shown that there are any genuine issues of material fact requiring a trial. I analyze her contentions in turn.
1. Alleged delay in seeking the note's payment.
¶ 57. The note became due in October of 1985. According to the undisputed summary-judgment record, Mr. Van Engel repeatedly sought repayment from Mr. Zingale, and, ultimately, was forced to sue, which Van Engel Commission did in 1989. Again, according to the undisputed summary-judgment record, Van Engel Commission and Mr. Zingale settled the lawsuit in 1995. There is nothing in the summary-judgment record that indicates either that Mr. Zingale sought to have the action dismissed for lack of prosecution, see Wis. Stat. Rule 805.03, or that Van Engel Commission sought to take judgment. A fair inference from the summary-judgment record that is not disputed by Mrs. Zingale is that Van Engel and Mr. Zingale, co-shareholders in Van Engel Commission and co-workers (and, presumably, because of the loan and its home-buying purpose, friends), were trying to work things out. Further, as we have seen, Mr. Zingale specifically reaffirmed his debt in the 1995 Agreement and envisioned that it would be paid, at the latest, after his death. Additionally, whatever post-death delay there was in Van Engel Commission's attempt to collect on the note was, on the undisputed summary-judgment record, largely attributable to Mrs. Zingale's unexplained failure to open a probate estate. Mrs. Zingale has not satisfied her summary-judgment burden of showing that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether there was an "unreasonable delay."
*8192. Notice to Mrs. Zingale that Van Engel Commission would seek to collect on the note rather than the collateral.
¶ 58. Insofar as can be gleaned from the undisputed summary-judgment record, Mr. and Mrs. Zingale were living together from 1980 to the date of Mr. Zingale's death. It is thus a fair inference, and one that is not rebutted by any evidentiary material submitted by Mrs. Zingale, that she was aware of both the 1989 lawsuit against her husband, and her husband's settlement of that lawsuit in 1995. As we have seen, the 1995 Agreement fully envisioned repayment of the debt with interest, either before or after Mr. Zingale's death; it did not even purport to substitute the collateral for the debt. Mrs. Zingale has not pointed to any evidentiary material in the summary-judgment record that permits an inference that she was misled into believing that Van Engel Commission would not seek repayment of the debt, rather than accept the collateral in lieu of such repayment.
3. Alleged prejudice flowing from the unavailability of Mr. Zingale's testimony.
¶ 59. First, the obvious: people die all the time —some unexpectedly, some after long illnesses. It would stretch the doctrine of laches beyond all reasonable utility to hold that the death of a potential witness, by that fact alone, made uncollectible any claim to which that person's evidence might be material. Second, this is a paper case. Neither the 1980 note nor the 1995 Agreement are ambiguous so as to permit the admission of collateral evidence. See Kramer v. Alpine Valley Resort, Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 417, 426, 321 N.W.2d 293, 297 (1982) (absent fraud, mutual mistake, or duress, the *820written terms of a contract that, as reflected by the document, encompass the parties' final expression of their agreement may not be modified or contradicted by an alleged understanding contrary to those written terms). Mrs. Zingale does not tell us why she is "prejudiced" by the inability of her late husband to testify in this case, or how any such potential testimony would be material to the issues here.
4. Accumulation of interest.
¶ 60. Insofar as is revealed by the summary-judgment record, Mrs. Zingale has, at least derivatively, had the use of the $96,000 for close to a quarter of a century. As the trial court pointed out, the time-value of money was not only recognized by the original note, which obligated Mr. Zingale to pay interest on the loan, but also, was acknowledged by him in the 1995 Agreement. Mrs. Zingale has not pointed to any evidentiary material in the summary-judgment record that shows that she is "prejudiced" by the accumulation of interest, as opposed to her natural unhappiness at the looming prospect of having to pay it.
C. Marital Property Act.
¶ 61. In a largely undeveloped argument, Mrs. Zingale contends that Van Engel Commission's proper recourse is against her husband's estate. As Van Engel Commission points out, however, Wis. Stat. § 803.045(2) specifically permits this action against Mrs. Zingale irrespective of whether she is determined at some point, and we do not have to decide this now, to be an "obligated spouse," an "incurring spouse,". or neither. See Wis. Stat. § 766.55. Section 803.045(2) provides: "In an action on an obligation described in s. 766.55 (2) (a) or (b), a creditor may proceed against the *821spouse who is not the obligated spouse or the incurring spouse if the creditor cannot obtain jurisdiction in the action over the obligated spouse or the incurring spouse." The only part of the referenced section that is material here is § 766.55(2)(b): "An obligation incurred by a spouse in the interest of the marriage or the family may be satisfied only from all marital property and all other property of the incurring spouse." Section 766.55(1) presumes that a debt incurred by one spouse during the marriage is "incurred in the interest of the marriage or the family."8
¶ 62. If the Majority's decision is reversed, whatever concerns Mrs. Zingale may have that are subsumed in her passing references to the Marital Property Act are not yet ripe for decision. Wisconsin Stat. § 803.045(3) provides: "After obtaining a judgment, a creditor may proceed against either or both spouses to reach marital property available for satisfaction of the judgment." Section 803.045(4) provides: "This section does not affect the property available under s. 766.55(2) to satisfy the obligation." As potentially material to this dispute, Wis. Stat. § 766.55(2)(c)2 provides:
An obligation incurred by a spouse before, on or after January 1, 1986, that is attributable to an obligation arising before January 1,1986, or to an act or omission *822occurring before January 1,1986, maybe satisfied only from property of that spouse that is not marital property and from that part of marital property which would have been the property of that spouse but for the enactment of this chapter.
If the Majority's decision is reversed, a determination of what property would be available to satisfy the debt owed to Van Engel Commission will have to await further proceedings, including the proceedings now pending in Mr. Zingale's estate. Suffice it to say, however, the Marital Property Act does not, as § 803.045(2) makes clear, bar this action. See St. Mary's Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Brody, 186 Wis. 2d 100, 112-113, 519 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Ct. App. 1994).
III.
¶ 63. For all of the reasons set out above, I would affirm the trial court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

 None of the parties raises Wis. Stat. §§ 885.16 and 885.17, the Dead Man's statutes extant in Wisconsin, in connection with Mrs. Zingale's attempt to relate what her husband may have told her, although the trial court mentioned it briefly during its oral decision granting Van Engel Commission's motion for summary judgment. In a footnote and without further analysis, *801Van Engel Commission asserts that the averment is hearsay. See Wis. Stat. ch. 908. Mrs. Zingale has not controverted this contention.

 The following is an excerpt from Kurt Van Engel's deposition. The question was asked by Mrs. Zingale's lawyer.
Q What did he say to you as to why he needed that amount of money?
A He needed to buy a house.
Q And did he buy a house?
A Yes, he did.

 The full paragraph 7 of the 1995 Agreement reads:
Default. At the option of [Van Engel Commission] and without necessity for demand or notice, all or any part of the indebtedness shall immediately become due and payable, irrespective of any agreed maturity, on the happening of any of the following events:
A. Failure of [Mr. Zingale] to keep or perform any of the terms or provisions of this Agreement.
B. Default by [Mr. Zingale] in the payment of principal or interest when due.
C. Any deterioration or impairment of collateral or any decline or depreciation in its value or market price, whether actually or reasonably anticipated, that causes collateral in the judgment of [Van Engel Commission] to become unsatisfactory as to character or value.
D. Levy of attachment, execution or other process against [Mr. Zingale] or any of the collateral.
E. Death, insolvency, failure in business, general assignment for the benefit of creditors, filing of any petition in bankruptcy or for relief under the provisions of federal bankruptcy laws of, by or against [Mr. Zingale].
*804On the happening of any of the foregoing specified events of default, any agreement for further financial accommodations by [Van Engel Commission] shall terminate at its option.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 856.07 reads in full:
*805Who may petition for administration. (1) Generally. Petition for administration of the estate of a decedent may he made by any person named in the will to act as personal representative or by any person interested.
(2) After 30 days. If none of those named in sub. (1) has petitioned within 30 days after the death of the decedent, petition for administration may he made by any person who was guardian of the decedent at the time of the decedent's death, any creditor of the decedent, anyone who has a cause of action or who has a right of appeal which cannot be maintained without the appointment of a personal representative or anyone who has an interest in property which is or may be a part of the estate.

 I need not decide whether any of the elements recognized by Restatement (Second) of ContRacts § 82(2)(b) (1979), could operate as a permanent suspension of the statute of limitations. Van Engel Commission's brief concedes that "the new limitations period triggered by the 1995 Agreement would have expired in 2001."

 The Majority's discussion of Pritchard v. Howell, 1 Wis. 118 [131] (1853), and the early cases relying on Pritchard, ignores this critical component; namely, that "to take the case out of the operation of the statute, there must be an admission of the debt or obligation and an unqualified promise to pay the debt, or perform the contract made within the time limited by the statute, or what is equivalent to such unqualified promise." Id., 1 Wis. at 124 [138] (emphasis added).

 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.22 provides:
If a person entitled to bring an action dies before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement of the action and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced by the person's representatives after the expiration of that time and within one year from the person's death. If a person against whom an action may be brought dies before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement of the action and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced after the expiration of that time and within one year after the issuing, within this state, of letters testamentary or other letters authorizing the administration of the decedent's estate.
(Emphases added.) I have double emphasized the words "within one year after the issuing, within this state, of letters testamentary or other letters authorizing the administration of the decedent's estate" because, in my view, the Majority misreads this statute by ignoring these words, and advances a rational for reversal not advanced by Mrs. Zingale.
The first sentence of Wis. Stat. § 893.22 applies, by its terms, only to situations where the decedent had a cause of action against someone else when he or she died. When that happens, those whose interests flow from the decedent are expected to act timely on their rights. The opposite, however, is true when the decedent dies owing someone money; then, those whose liability may flow from, or whose share of the estate might be diminished by, what the decedent owed have no incentive to start the ball rolling to facilitate the creditor's attempt at collection. That is why, in my view, the legislature sensibly provided that when a debtor dies, his or her heirs may not defeat attempts at collection by the expedience of not opening an estate. Thus, the section permits the creditors to get the collection-ball rolling, by permitting creditors to open the *815decedent/debtor's estate and also by extending the statute of limitations in connection with the decedent's debts for one year after letters testamentary issue. As noted, the Majority ignores the language in § 893.22, which specifically provides that the one-year window opens only once "letters testamentary or other letters authorizing the administration of the decedent's estate" have issued.
Van Engel Commission's action against Mr. Zingale survives by virtue of Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1), which preserves the common-law survival-of-actions rules. See Markman v. Becker, 6 Wis. 2d 438, 441, 95 N.W.2d 233, 236 (1959) ("Causes of action upon contract survived at common law and therefore are expressly designated as surviving under" the predecessor to § 895.01(1)).

 Wisconsin Stat. § 766.55(1) reads in full:
An obligation incurred by a spouse during marriage, including one attributable to an act or omission during marriage, is presumed to be incurred in the interest of the marriage or the family. A statement separately signed by the obligated or incurring spouse at or before the time the obligation is incurred stating that the obligation is or will be incurred in the interest of the marriage or the family is conclusive evidence that the obligation to which the statement refers is an obligation in the interest of the marriage or family, except that the existence of that statement does not affect any interspousal right or remedy.