Court Opinion

ID: 9368719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-06 20:01:03.645498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:10.287340
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10192    Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 02/06/2023   Page: 1 of 14

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10192
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        CENTRY CORKER, JR.,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-00031-AW-MAF-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10192

        Before NEWSOM, TJOFLAT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Centry Corker, Jr. appeals his sentence of 45 months’ impris-
        onment for aiding and abetting bank fraud, possession of 15 or
        more unauthorized access devices with intent to defraud, and aid-
        ing and abetting aggravated identity theft. Corker argues that the
        District Court plainly erred at sentencing in calculating the loss at-
        tributable to him pursuant to the $500-per-access-device rule in Ap-
        plication Note 3(F)(i) to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, and by applying Applica-
        tion Note 3(A), which requires the district court to calculate loss as
        the greater of actual or intended loss. He asserts that these provi-
        sions are inconsistent with the plain meaning of the word “loss” in
        the Guidelines’ text and invalid pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
        decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). We affirm the
        District Court’s decision.
                                             I.
               In December 2015, Corker obtained a $2,500 personal loan
        check from the United States Automobile Association Federal Sav-
        ings Bank (the “USAA FSB”) by calling the bank from a Maryland
        phone number and posing as an individual named W.C. Corker
        also called the United States Automobile Association Savings Bank
        (the “USAA SB”) posing as W.C. and obtained a credit card with a
        $20,000 limit in W.C.’s name using his name, date of birth, and So-
        cial Security number. The loan check was sent to Corker’s
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        22-10192                   Opinion of the Court                                 3

        residence via Federal Express on December 3, 2015, and the credit
        card was sent to Corker’s residence via Federal Express on Decem-
        ber 5, 2015. The loan was stopped before Corker could cash the
        check, but Corker used the credit card to make purchases totaling
        $2,778.01 at Walmart stores in Tallahassee and Pembroke Pines,
        Florida.
               Between September 30, 2015, and January 30, 2016, Corker
        had engaged in a separate credit card fraud scheme. During this
        time, Corker had obtained multiple blank credit cards. Using The
        Onion Router software, 1 Corker went to dark web marketplaces
        such as AlphaBay and BriansClub to purchase credit card infor-
        mation stolen from other individuals. Through his purchases, he
        obtained 78 individuals’ credit card numbers, expiration dates, card
        verification values, and personally identifiable information, and
        Corker stored this information on his personal laptop. He then
        used a magnetic stripe card reader and writer to encode the card
        numbers he received and copy the individuals’ card information
        onto the blank credit cards. He intended to use the credit cards to
        make purchases not authorized by the original card owners, but he
        did not get to use the credit cards.

        1 The Onion Router (“TOR”) software allows users to access the dark web,
        and it protects users’ privacy by encrypting users’ web traffic and clearing their
        browser history automatically after each browsing session. See Theodor
        Porutiu, What Is the TOR Browser? A Guide to the Dark Web Browser, VPN
        Overview (June 27, 2022), https://vpnoverview.com/privacy/anonymous-
        browsing/tor/.
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        4                        Opinion of the Court                    22-10192

               Corker was indicted by the United States District Court for
        the Northern District of Florida on July 7, 2020. For Counts 1
        through 6, Corker was charged with attempting to defraud USAA2
        by using a false name to get a loan from USAA FSB and a credit
        card from USAA SB, and by making purchases using the fraudu-
        lently obtained credit card, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and
        1344(2). Count 7 charged Corker with possession of 15 or more
        unauthorized access devices, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(3)
        and (c)(1)(A)(i). The term “access devices” here refers to the 78
        victims’ names, credit card numbers, card verification values, and
        card expiration dates that were stored on Corker’s personal laptop.
        Finally, for Counts 8 and 9, Corker was charged with unlawfully
        using the identity of another person to commit bank fraud as set
        out in Counts 1 and 2, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1028A(a)(1).
        Pursuant to a plea agreement, Corker pled guilty to Counts 2, 7,
        and 9 on October 12, 2021. The Government agreed to drop the
        remaining charges against Corker as part of the plea agreement.
               A probation officer prepared Corker’s presentencing report
        (“PSR”) on December 1, 2021, and revised it on December 17, 2021.
        The probation officer calculated USAA’s actual loss to be $5,278.01,
        and the officer calculated a total intended loss value of $61,000—
        $38,500 for the 78 victims (including W.C.) whose private credit
        card information was on Corker’s computer and $22,500 for USAA.

        2 Throughout the record, the Government and the District Court collectively
        refer to USAA FSB and USAA SB as “USAA.”
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        22-10192               Opinion of the Court                         5

        For the 78 individuals who had their credit card information stolen,
        the probation officer calculated an intended loss amount of $500
        per card, but the officer subtracted the $500 intended loss for
        W.C.’s card because W.C. suffered an actual loss when Corker ob-
        tained the credit card in W.C.’s name and made purchases totaling
        $2,778.01. The loss value of $500 per card was calculated pursuant
        to Application Note 3(F)(i) to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, which states that, in
        a case involving unauthorized access devices, “loss includes any un-
        authorized charges made with the . . . unauthorized access device
        and shall be not less than $500 per access device.” United States
        Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2B1.1, comment.
        (n.3(F)(i)) (Nov. 1, 1989). USAA’s intended loss value came from
        the loan and credit card that Corker obtained fraudulently—$2,500
        for the USAA FSB loan and $20,000 for the USAA SB credit card
        obtained in W.C.’s name.
               The probation officer calculated a base offense level of seven
        pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1). The probation officer applied
        the following adjustments for specific offense characteristics: (1) a
        6-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(D) because the
        amount of loss was more than $40,000 but less than $95,000; (2) a
        2-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) because the
        offense involved 10 or more victims; and (3) a 2-level increase pur-
        suant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i) because the offense involved
        the possession or use of device-making equipment. The officer also
        applied a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and
        timely assistance to authorities pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                     22-10192

        (b), yielding a total offense level of 14. Based on Corker’s four crim-
        inal history points, he had a criminal history category of III, result-
        ing in a Guidelines sentencing range of 21 to 27 months’ imprison-
        ment for Counts 2 and 7, to be followed by a mandatory consecu-
        tive two-year prison sentence for Count 9. 3
               Corker’s sentencing hearing took place before the District
        Court on January 3, 2022. The Court reviewed the guidelines sen-
        tence range and asked Corker if he objected to the guidelines range
        or anything else in the PSR. Corker replied that he did not object
        to the guidelines sentence range or the PSR. After hearing from
        the parties regarding the conditions of Corker’s supervised release
        and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the Court sentenced
        Corker to 45 months’ imprisonment, $5,278.01 in restitution, and
        five years of supervised release. Immediately after imposing the
        sentence, the Court asked Corker if he had any objections to the
        sentence or the manner in which it was to be imposed, and Corker
        again replied that he did not have any objections.

        3 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) provides that anyone who, during the commission
        of a felony violation contained in Chapter 47 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code,
        “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of
        identification of another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided
        for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.” Corker
        committed a felony violation contained in Chapter 47 of Title 18 of the U.S.
        Code by possessing 78 unauthorized access devices. See 18 U.S.C.
        §§ 1029(a)(3), 1029(c)(1)(A)(i).
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        22-10192               Opinion of the Court                         7

                                             II.
                Corker now appeals his sentence before this Court. He ar-
        gues that the District Court erred in calculating the loss amount
        attributable to him pursuant to Application Note 3(F)(i) to U.S.S.G.
        § 2B1.1. According to Corker, Application Note 3(F)(i)’s require-
        ment that courts assess a minimum loss of $500 per access device
        is invalid because it conflicts with the plain meaning of the word
        “loss” in the Guidelines’ text. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 states that for fraud
        offenses, the offense level should be increased according to the pro-
        vided table “if the loss exceeded $6,500.” Corker argues that the
        commonly understood meaning of “loss” is “the amount of some-
        thing lost,” so “loss” as used in the Sentencing Guidelines refers to
        the dollar amount that the victim actually lost as a result of the of-
        fense. Corker concedes that he is liable for the $5,278.01 that USAA
        actually lost, but he contends that he cannot be liable for the
        $61,000 in intended losses because the Sentencing Guidelines only
        call for sentences to be enhanced based on actual loss.
                Corker also asserts that Application Note 3(F)(i) is invalid
        under Kisor v. Wilkie. The Supreme Court held in Kisor that a
        court should only defer to an agency’s own interpretation of a reg-
        ulation if “a regulation is genuinely ambiguous . . . even after a
        court has resorted to all the standard tools of interpretation.” 139
        S. Ct. at 2414. Corker argues that Kisor abrogates the rule that the
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10192

        Guidelines’ commentary 4 should be afforded significant defer-
        ence—a rule that this Court has followed in the past. See United
        States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2017). Application
        Note 3(F)(i), Corker argues, is not a reasonable interpretation of a
        “genuinely ambiguous” Guideline, as the $500-per-device assess-
        ment is “wholly unrelated” to the victim’s actual loss and “is incon-
        sistent with the unambiguous text of the [G]uideline.”
                We review a sentencing challenge raised for the first time on
        appeal for plain error. United States v. Clark, 274 F.3d 1325, 1326
        (11th Cir. 2001). Plain error lies only where “(1) there is an error in
        the district court’s determination; (2) the error is plain or obvious;
        (3) the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights in that it was
        prejudicial and not harmless; and (4) the error seriously affects the
        fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
        If an issue is not resolved directly by the language of a statute or
        rule, Eleventh Circuit precedent, or Supreme Court precedent,
        there can be no plain error. United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d
        1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003). “Such error must be so clearly estab-
        lished and obvious that it should not have been permitted by the
        trial court even absent the defendant’s timely assistance in

        4 Although Kisor does not explicitly extend its holding to the U.S. Sentencing
        Guidelines, the Supreme Court has stated that “the guidelines are the equiva-
        lent of legislative rules adopted by federal agencies.” Stinson v. United States,
        508 U.S. 36, 45, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1919 (1993).
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        22-10192                Opinion of the Court                          9

        detecting it.” United States v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1325 (11th
        Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted).
                Section 2B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines contains the
        offense level calculation for theft and fraud offenses. U.S.S.G.
        § 2B1.1. Section 2B1.1(b)(1)(D) provides for an offense level in-
        crease of 6 levels if the loss caused by the relevant offense exceeds
        $40,000 but is less than $95,000. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(D). This section
        itself does not provide a definition of “loss.” Id. Application
        Note 3(F)(i) to § 2B1.1 provides a “Special Rule” for cases involving
        counterfeit credit cards or access devices. Pursuant to the “Special
        Rule,” “loss includes any unauthorized charges made with the
        counterfeit access device or unauthorized access device and shall
        be not less than $500 per access device.” Id. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(F)(i).
        Application Note 3(A) to § 2B1.1 directs courts to calculate loss as
        “the greater of actual loss or intended loss.” Id., cmt. n.3(A).
               In Stinson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the
        commentary to the Guidelines is authoritative unless it: (1) violates
        the Constitution; (2) violates a federal statute; or (3) is inconsistent
        with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, a given Guideline. 508 U.S.
        36, 38, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993). Applying this test, the Court
        held that the definition of “crime of violence” in the commentary
        to U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2 was authoritative because it did not
        violate the Constitution or a federal statute and was consistent with
        the Guidelines. Id. at 47, 113 S. Ct. at 1920.
               In Kisor, the Supreme Court clarified when courts should
        defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations. 139 S.
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        10                       Opinion of the Court                    22-10192

        Ct. at 2408. The Court held that such deference is warranted only
        when a court has determined, “based on indicia like text, structure,
        history, and purpose, whether the regulation really has more than
        one reasonable meaning,” and where the interpretation “is of the
        sort that Congress would want to receive deference.” Id. at 2424.
        Although the United States Sentencing Commission is not an exec-
        utive agency, Congress permissibly delegates authority to the Sen-
        tencing Commission to issue Guidelines in the same way it dele-
        gates authority to executive agencies. See Mistretta v. United
        States, 488 U.S. 361, 371, 374–80, 109 S. Ct. 647, 654, 656–59 (1989).
                 We have reversed district courts’ applications of “special
        rules” from Application Notes when they contradict the Guide-
        lines. For example, in United States v. Tejas, 868 F.3d 1242, 1245
        (11th Cir. 2017), a case involving a defendant who stole undelivered
        mail from a postal delivery vehicle, the district court applied a “spe-
        cial rule” set out in Application Note 4(C)(i) to § 2B1.1 for deter-
        mining the number of victims in the offense. The rule provided
        that, when a mail-theft offense “involves a United States Postal Ser-
        vice . . . delivery vehicle . . . [the offense] shall be considered to have
        involved at least 10 victims.” Tejas, 868 F.3d at 1245 (quoting
        U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, comment. (n.4(C)(ii))) (internal quotation marks
        omitted). Application of the rule triggered a two-level enhance-
        ment under § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) for an offense involving ten or more
        victims. Id. Because the evidence clearly demonstrated that the
        offense involved fewer than ten victims, however, we held that the
        special rule’s mandate of ten victims was inconsistent with the
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        22-10192                Opinion of the Court                        11

        plain text of the Guideline, which was based solely on the number
        of victims. Id. We recognized that the special rule might be rea-
        sonable in other instances where there may be doubt about the
        number of victims involved in the offense, but in the instant case it
        produced “erroneous and contrary results when the number of vic-
        tims is readily determined, as it is here.” Id. at 1245–46.
               This Court has not previously addressed whether Applica-
        tion Note 3(F)(i) contradicts the text of § 2B1.1 itself. Nevertheless,
        we have upheld district courts’ applications of § 2B1.1(b)(1) and Ap-
        plication Note 3(F)(i) in making fraud-loss calculations without
        questioning whether the $500-per-device “Special Rule” contra-
        dicted the text of the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Maitre,
        898 F.3d 1151, 1159–61 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Wright,
        862 F.3d 1265, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2017). We have also explicitly
        rejected the argument that Application Note 3(A) to § 2B1.1, in-
        structing courts to calculate “the greater of actual loss or intended
        loss,” contradicts the plain meaning of the Guidelines’ text. See
        United States v. Moss, 34 F.4th 1176, 1190 (11th Cir. 2022) (uphold-
        ing the application of Application Note 3(A) in a case involving
        Medicare and Medicaid fraud).
                                             III.
               Corker has not shown that the District Court plainly erred
        in relying on Application Note 3(F)(i) to calculate the offense’s loss
        amount under § 2B1.1. Regarding Application Note 3(F)(i)’s $500-
        per-device loss measurement, Corker simply asserts, based on two
        standard dictionary definitions, that the term “loss” plainly refers
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        12                         Opinion of the Court                        22-10192

        to the monetary value of “something lost.” However, Corker iden-
        tifies no binding Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit cases that
        clearly establish that Application Note 3(F)(i)’s $500-per-device loss
        measurement is inconsistent with the text of § 2B1.1(b)(1), which
        provides no definition of the term “loss.” To the contrary, this
        Court has repeatedly upheld the application of Application
        Note 3(F)(i)’s $500-per-device measurement without questioning
        whether it was contrary to the plain text of § 2B1.1. See Maitre,
        898 F.3d at 1159–61; Wright, 862 F.3d at 1274.5
               Corker has also failed to show that the District Court com-
        mitted plain error by relying on Application Note 3(A) to § 2B1.1.
        This Court has specifically rejected Corker’s secondary argument
        that Application Note 3(A), which instructs courts to calculate loss
        as “the greater of actual loss or intended loss,” contradicts the text
        of § 2B1.1 itself. See Moss, 34 F.4th at 1190. Accordingly, this
        Court’s decision in Moss forecloses Corker’s argument that the
        District Court plainly erred in applying Application Note 3(A) to
        § 2B1.1. See Clark, 274 F.3d at 1326.
               The decisions from the Supreme Court that Corker cites ad-
        dressed general issues of when courts should treat the commentary
        to the Guidelines as authoritative, Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38–39, 47,

        5 In his brief before this Court, Corker cited a Sixth Circuit case to support the
        proposition that the $500-per-device measurement is not part of “loss” as used
        in the Guideline. See United States v. Ricciardi, 989 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2021).
        However, the Sixth Circuit case that Corker identifies is not binding precedent
        that could establish plain error in this Circuit.
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        22-10192                Opinion of the Court                        13

        113 S. Ct. at 1915–16, 1920, and when agency interpretations of
        rules are authoritative, Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2408. This Court re-
        cently held that Kisor applies to the Sentencing Guidelines, con-
        cluding that the Court may not defer to the commentary “if uncer-
        tainty does not exist in the Guideline.” United States v. Dupree,
        No. 19-13776, slip op. at 12 (11th Cir. Jan. 18, 2023). However, the
        question of whether Stinson and Kisor govern how much defer-
        ence to give to Guidelines commentary is a separate issue from
        whether binding precedent holds that Application Note 3(A) and
        Application Note 3(F)(i) are inconsistent with the Guidelines’
        text—which Corker must show to prove plain error. Lejarde-Rada,
        319 F.3d at 1291. Corker’s assertion that our holding in Tejas sup-
        ports a finding of plain error in this case also fails because Tejas
        involved a different provision from the ones at issue here. Tejas,
        868 F.3d at 1245 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i)).
                                             IV.
               Here, the District Court did not plainly err in applying the
        $500-per-device rule in Application Note 3(F)(i) because no binding
        precedent clearly establishes that Application Note 3(F)(i) is incon-
        sistent with the Guidelines’ text. Further, Corker’s argument that
        the District Court plainly erred in applying Application Note 3(A)
        is foreclosed by this Court’s binding precedent in Moss. Finally,
        the District Court did not plainly err in light of Kisor, as Kisor does
        not resolve the specific question presented in this case—whether
        the District Court’s loss calculations directly contravened binding
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        14                   Opinion of the Court             22-10192

        precedent, as required under the plain-error test. The District
        Court’s decision is accordingly
              AFFIRMED.