Court Opinion

ID: 9535306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:47:49.919483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:12.981513
License: Public Domain

Neill, J.
(dissenting)—I am in disagreement with the view of the majority that evidence of subsequent changes (the welding of a truncated cone to the centralizer) is admissible to show feasibility when the issue of feasibility has not been raised by the defendant. The admission of evidence of this nature is extremely prejudicial to a defendant which has, in good faith, attempted to prevent recurrence of an accident and injury. The exception we have heretofore permitted (Kennard v. Mountain View Dev. Co., 69 Wn.2d 492, 419 P.2d 154 (1966)), which allowed evidence of subsequent change only when the issue of feasibility is injected by the defendant being charged with negligence, should not be enlarged.
It is not realistic to hope that the jury will make the fine distinctions required to differentiate between evidence of the feasibility of making a change to prevent an injury, and negligence itself. To permit the plaintiff to initially inject evidence of feasibility is to effectively change the rule against admissibility of evidence of subsequent change on the issue of defendant’s negligence, and I dissent from such position.
The evidence that a truncated cone was installed on the centralizer by a third party after the injury to plaintiff is particularly damaging to the defendant manufacturer when viewed under the circumstances of the case. The cone was installed by plaintiff’s employer who is not a party to this litigation. The defendant manufacturer, now charged by jury verdict with the liability, has never denied that the enlarged guard was feasible, but contends the omission thereof was not negligence. The retailer codefendant, which is now absolved from liability, was the one which contended the guard was not practical. As a result, we have a *843defendant which has been found negligent on evidence admitted on an issue which it neither created nor contested. Further, this manufacturer has not acted in concert with the contending retailer nor is it in a. vicarious position to the retailer. Finally, this evidence is heard by a jury which has been subjected to an emotional outburst by plaintiff’s counsel while questioning one of the appealing defendant’s witnesses on this very point. Without burdening this opinion with reiteration of the reasons for my position, I suggest a reading of the dissenting opinion of Justice Robinson in Banks v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 195 Wash. 321, 324, 80 P.2d 835 (1938).
Under the combination of circumstances set forth,- I would grant the defendant a new trial.
July 17,1969. Petition for rehearing denied.