Court Opinion

ID: 9962361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 16:00:58.32559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:28.660618
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12760   Document: 30-1    Date Filed: 04/23/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-12760
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       HOLLY RUFFOLO,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       HALIFAX HEALTH, INC.,
       HALIFAX HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS, INC.,
       PATIENT BUSINESS & FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
       DAYTONA AREA SENIOR SERVIES, INC.,
       d.b.a. Halifax Health Care at Home,

                                               Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-12760      Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 04/23/2024     Page: 2 of 7

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-12760

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cv-00871-RBD-DCI
                           ____________________

       Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Holly Ruffolo appeals the district court’s grant of summary
       judgment in her federal False Claims Act and Florida False Claims
       Act retaliation case. Although the procedural history of this case is
       more complex, a simplified version is that Ruffolo had filed a qui
       tam case alleging violations of the federal False Claims Act
       (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq. and the Florida False Claims Act
       (“FFCA”), Fla. Stat. § 68.082, et seq. that included retaliation claims
       against Halifax Health, Inc., Halifax Healthcare Systems, Inc., Pa-
       tient Business & Financial Services, Inc., and Daytona Area Senior
       Services, Inc. (collectively “Halifax”). She subsequently voluntarily
       dismissed the false claims counts and amended her complaint, leav-
       ing only the federal retaliation claims. Halifax moved for summary
       judgment, which the district court granted. Halifax had moved for
       judgment on the alternative grounds: (1) that Ruffolo failed to
       show that she had engaged n protected activity, as required by the
       FCA, relying on Hickman v. Spirit of Athens, Ala., Inc., 985 F.3d 1284,
       1287 (11th Cir. 2021); and (2) that Halifax had legitimate business
       reasons for firing Ruffolo. The district court granted summary
       judgment, relying only on the first ground and did not address the
       second ground. Ruffolo appeals.
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       23-12760                Opinion of the Court                           3

               We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
       all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
       resolving reasonable inferences in her favor. Al-Rayes v. Willingham,
       914 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2019). We may affirm on any ground
       supported by the record, regardless of whether that ground was
       relied upon or even considered by the district court. Kernel Recs. Oy
       v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2012).
               Under the FCA, entities are “prohibited [from] making false
       claims for payment to the United States.” Hickman, 985 F.3d at 1287
       (quotations omitted). Additionally, the FCA allows private plain-
       tiffs “with knowledge of false claims against the government” to
       file “qui tam” actions—recovery lawsuits brought on the govern-
       ment’s behalf. Id. at 1287–88; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). The FCA
       also creates a private right of action for an individual whose em-
       ployer retaliates against her for participating in an FCA action or in
       response to other efforts the employee engages in to oppose a vio-
       lation of the FCA. Id. § 3730(h)(1); see Hickman, 985 F.3d at 1287–
       88.
               In an FCA retaliation case, as in a Title VII retaliation case, a
       plaintiff begins by showing that “(1) she engaged in statutorily pro-
       tected activity, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3)
       the adverse action was causally related to the plaintiff’s protected
       activities.” Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d
       956, 959 (11th Cir. 1997). After these elements are established, the
       defendant has the burden of producing a legitimate, non-discrimi-
       natory reason for the challenged employment action. See, e.g.,
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-12760

       Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 (11th Cir.1997). If such a rea-
       son is produced, a plaintiff then has the ultimate burden of proving
       the reason to be a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. at 1565.
               To avoid a summary judgment, an employee must establish
       a genuine dispute of material fact that the employer’s reason is pre-
       textual. Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 921 (11th
       Cir. 1993). “To prove that an employer’s explanation is pretextual,
       an employee must cast enough doubt on its veracity that a reason-
       able factfinder could find it ‘unworthy of credence.’” Berry v. Crest-
       wood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1307 (quoting Gogel v. Kia Motors
       Manuf. of Ga., Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1136 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc)
       (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The employee
       must address “that reason head on and rebut it” if the employer’s
       stated reason is legitimate, i.e. one that might motivate a reasona-
       ble employer. Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1352 (11th
       Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An em-
       ployee cannot rebut a reason “by simply quarreling with the wis-
       dom of ” it. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
       Rather, she must point to “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsist-
       encies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in the justification. Id. (ci-
       tation omitted).
            Here, the district court did not decide the case on the
       grounds that Ruffolo could not show that Halifax’s reason for firing
       her was pretextual. However, Halifax raised this issue in the
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       23-12760                  Opinion of the Court                               5

       district court, and raises it again on appeal, and we may affirm on
       any ground supported by the record. Kernel Recs. Oy, 694 F.3d at
       1309. 1
               Halifax fired Ruffolo after Michael Morrissey, a manager for
       Halifax’s clinical team, called Ruffolo’s manager, Maryjo Allen, to
       ask if she had requested that Ruffolo place an order for N-95 face
       masks and surgical gowns totaling almost $900,000. Morrissey had
       received the invoice from vendor Medline (a regular vendor for
       Halifax); because of the amount involved, the Medline system au-
       tomatically sent it to Morrissey for approval. Ruffolo had submit-
       ted the order via Halifax’s Medline software system, using her Hal-
       ifax-issued username and password. Halifax placed Ruffolo on ad-
       ministrative leave and began an investigation. During the investi-
       gation, Allen interviewed Ruffolo’s office mate, Jenn Burda. Burda
       reported that she had overheard Ruffolo discussing a plan to order
       the supplies through Medline and that Ruffolo told her there was
       “money to be made” in the PPE transaction. Allen also reviewed
       Ruffolo’s work email, which included emails with Ruffolo’s uncle
       about the order, contrary to Halifax’s requirement that the email
       was to be used for work-related correspondence only. Based on
       her investigation, Allen concluded that Ruffolo was working with
       her uncle to purchase PPE and sell it to China during the pandemic;

       1 We note that Ruffolo does not assert on appeal any claim that Halifax should

       be held liable for transferring and demoting her prior to terminating her. Ac-
       cordingly, any such claim is abandoned. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
       739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014).
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       6                          Opinion of the Court                      23-12760

       Ruffolo was using her connection with Medline and Halifax’s sys-
       tem to do so. Halifax promptly fired Ruffolo.
               On appeal, Ruffolo argues that the timing of the investiga-
       tion of her mileage and a reimbursement check were suspicious.
       She argues that after those investigations, Halifax was merely bid-
       ing its time until it could find a reason to get rid of her. Because
       Halifax’s asserted legitimate business reason for firing Ruffolo—i.e.
       its belief that she had used her connection with Halifax, its relation-
       ship with the vendor, its email system, and its online ordering sys-
       tem to order products for the benefit of a third party and not Hali-
       fax—would certainly motivate a rational employer to terminate
       the employee, Ruffolo bore the burden of proving that Halifax’s
       proffered reason was a pretext and the real reason for her termina-
       tion was retaliation against her for reporting to Allen about possi-
       ble false claims under the FCA.2 In light of Burda’s testimony and
       the corroborating emails and the serious nature of conduct at-
       tributed to Ruffolo, we cannot conclude that there is a genuine is-
       sue of fact about Halifax’s honest belief 3 in its asserted reason for
       terminating Ruffolo. We conclude that Ruffolo has not satisfied

       2 We can assume arguendo, but we expressly do not decide, that Ruffolo did

       engage in protected activity as required by the FCA. We need not decide that
       issue because summary judgement against Ruffolo was appropriate in any
       event on the basis of this pretext issue.
       3 Ruffolo’s conclusory challenge to the credibility of Burda does not under-

       mine the lack of a genuine issue of fact about Halifax’s honest belief.
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       23-12760              Opinion of the Court                       7

       her burden of proving pretext. Accordingly, summary judgement
       for Halifax was appropriate.
             For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
       is
             AFFIRMED.