Court Opinion

ID: 9780992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 15:07:31.524228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:52.984878
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ENVOLVE PHARMACY SOLUTIONS,          )
INC., ET AL.,                        )
                         Plaintiffs, )
                                     )
          v.                         ) C.A. No. N19C-12-214
                                     )          PRW CCLD
                                     )
RITE AID HDQTRS. CORP.,              )
and RITE AID CORP.,                  )
                        Defendants. )

                           Submitted: July 13, 2023
                           Decided: August 30, 2023

                 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Upon Plaintiffs Envolve Pharmacy Solutions, Inc., et al.’s Motion for Judgment
          Notwithstanding the Verdict or, Alternatively, a New Trial,
                                 DENIED,

 Upon Defendants Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp. and Rite Aid Corp.’s Motion for Costs,
                                GRANTED.

Karen Jacobs, Esquire, Alexandra M. Cumings, Esquire, MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT
& TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Keith J. Harrison, Esquire, Christopher
Flynn, Esquire, Daniel W. Wolff, Esquire, Jerome P. DeSanto, Esquire, Jed
Wulfekotte, Esquire, CROWELL & MORING LLP, Washington, D.C., Attorneys for
Plaintiffs Envolve Pharmacy Solutions, Inc., et al.

Corinne Elise Amato, Esquire, Eric J. Juray, Esquire, Jason W. Rigby, Esquire,
PRICKETT, JONES & ELLIOT, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Neil K. Gilman, Esquire,
Christopher J. Dufek, Esquire, Brianne Reese, Esquire, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH
LLP, Washington, D.C.; John B. Shely, Esquire, Courtney B. Glaser, Esquire,
Kelsey J. Hope, Esquire, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP, Houston, Texas, Attorneys
for Defendants Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp. and Rite Aid Corp.

WALLACE, J.
       Plaintiffs filed this action in December 2019. In May 2023, the parties

undertook a two-week jury trial. Plaintiffs’ case involved two breach-of-contract

claims, one unjust enrichment claim, and two claimed exceptions to the statute of

limitations. Defendants’ case involved a voluntary payment defense. The jury

returned a clean sweep verdict for Defendants. Now, Plaintiffs request judgment

notwithstanding the verdict on all claims and defenses. Plaintiffs alternatively ask

for a new trial. Defendants seek costs. For the reasons set forth below: Plaintiffs’

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is DENIED in full; Plaintiffs’

alternative motion for a new trial is DENIED; and Defendants’ motion for costs is

GRANTED.

                                     I. BACKGROUND

       Plaintiffs Centene1 filed this action against Defendants Rite Aid2 in December

2019.3        Originally, Centene          asserted     six    claims:     (1)   fraud/intentional

misrepresentation; (2) breach of the 2003 Contract between Plaintiff Envolve

Pharmacy Solutions, Inc. (“Envolve”) and Rite Aid; (3) breach of the 2003 Contract

1
    “Centene” refers to the Plaintiffs in this action. Plaintiffs are a collective of health plans and
pharmacy benefit managers. For a more detailed explanation of the parties in this action, as well
as the factual background leading up to trial, see the Court’s decision from a few months ago.
Envolve Pharm. Sols., Inc. v. Rite Aid Headquarters Corp., 2023 WL 2547994 (Del. Super. Ct.
Mar. 17, 2023).
2
   “Rite Aid” refers to the Defendants in this action. Those Defendants are Rite Aid Hdqtrs.
Corp. and Rite Aid Corp. See Envolve Pharm. Sols., Inc., 2023 WL 2547994, at *2.
3
    See Complaint (“Compl.”) (D.I. 1).

                                                 -1-
as a third-party beneficiary; (4) breach of the 2013 Contract between Envolve and

Rite Aid; (5) breach of the 2013 Contract as a third-party beneficiary; and (6) unjust

enrichment related to the 1996 Caremark Contract between Caremark L.L.C. f/k/a

PCS Health Systems (“Caremark”) and Rite Aid.4

       On Rite Aid’s earlier motion, the Court dismissed the fraud claim and both

third-party beneficiary breach-of-contract claims.5 The Court also dismissed the

unjust enrichment claim with respect to Envolve, but that claim remained viable with

respect to the other Plaintiffs.6

       Thereafter, Centene filed its Amended Complaint and asserted three causes of

action: (1) breach of the 2003 Contract between Envolve and Rite Aid, (2) breach of

the 2013 Contract between Envolve and Rite Aid, and (3) unjust enrichment related

to the 1996 Caremark Contract for all Plaintiffs except Envolve.7 Discovery ensued.

       After discovery, Centene moved for partial summary judgment on its breach

of the 2003 Contract claim and breach of the 2013 Contract claim.8 Centene also

argued Rite Aid was collaterally estopped from relitigating the meaning of certain

4
    Id. ¶¶ 70-137.
5
    See Envolve Pharm. Sols., Inc. v. Rite Aid Hdqtrs. Corp., 2021 WL 140919, at *11 (Del. Super.
Ct. Jan. 15, 2021), reh’g denied, 2021 WL 855866 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2021).
6
    Envolve Pharm. Sols., Inc., 2021 WL 140919, at *11.
7
    Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 82-149 (D.I. 107).
8
    See Centene’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 31-39 (D.I. 228, D.I. 229).

                                              -2-
contractual language.9 Simultaneously, Rite Aid moved for summary judgment on

the three remaining claims.10 Rite Aid also argued Delaware’s three-year statute of

limitations barred the claims with no applicable exception and the voluntary

payment doctrine defeated Centene’s claims.11

           Ultimately, both motions were denied. But, in its written decision, the Court

made certain determinations relating to the relevant contracts’ language.12         The

Court will briefly highlight the relevant facts known at the time of summary

judgment and the determinations that framed the issues for trial.

           In 2008, Rite Aid launched its Rx Savings Card Program (the “Program”).13

The Program offered discounts on certain generic and brand name drugs.14 The

Program had no enrollment fee.15 To enroll, a person completed a form containing

demographic information, signed a HIPAA waiver, and signed a marketing

authorization.16 The Program permitted one to enroll his or her family members.17

           Additionally, from 2008 to 2015, Rite Aid had a price-matching policy (the

9
     See id. at 29-31.
10
     See Rite Aid’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 25-39 (D.I. 222, D.I. 223).
11
     See id. at 12-25, 39-41.
12
     See Envolve Pharm. Sols., Inc., 2023 WL 2547994.
13
     Id. at *4.
14
     Id.
15
     Id.
16
     Id.
17
     Id.

                                              -3-
“Price-Matching Policy”).18                 The Price-Matching Policy permitted a Rite Aid

pharmacist to match a competitor’s verified price.19 When visiting, a customer

would provide a Rite Aid pharmacist with a competitor’s verified price (subject to

geographical limitations), and that pharmacist, at the his or her discretion, could then

choose to match that lower price.20

           Whether Program prices and Price-Matching Policy prices fit within certain

contractual language was a chief issue in this action.

           Three contracts were relevant for summary judgment and eventually trial: 21

the 2003 Contract, the 2013 Contract, and the Caremark Contract.22 The contractual

definitions of Usual and Customary (“U&C”) price were front and center throughout

this action. The 2003 Contract defines U&C price as: “Those amounts which [Rite

Aid] normally charges its private pay patients for comparable Pharmaceutical

Services and as may be provided to Patient-Beneficiaries of a Third Party Payor, as

provided herein.”23 The 2013 Contract defines U&C price as “the lowest price [Rite

Aid] would charge to a non-contracted, cash-paying customer with no insurance for

18
     Id. at *5.
19
     Id.
20
     See id.
21
     Centene had a fourth claim based on the “Argus Contract,” which Centene withdrew before
trial.
22
    For a detailed overview of these contracts, see Envolve Pharm. Sols., Inc., 2023 WL 2547994,
at *2-5.
23
     Id. at *2 (alterations in original).

                                                    -4-
an identical Pharmacist Service on the date and at the location that the product is

dispensed, inclusive of all applicable discounts, promotions, or other offers to attract

customers.”24 The Caremark Contract defines U&C price as “the lowest price [Rite

Aid] would charge to a particular customer if such customer were paying cash for

an identical prescription on that particular day.       This price must include any

applicable discounts offered to attract customers.”25

           On summary judgment, the Court determined the Program was a contract.

Thus, the Program was excluded from the 2013 Contract’s U&C definition due to

that definition’s “non-contracted” language.26 The Court further determined the

Price-Matching Policy was not a contract.27 The Court observed the Price-Matching

Policy, in general terms, could be considered a discount.28

           The Court denied both motions on the breach of the 2003 Contract claim.29

The Court denied both motions on the breach of the 2013 Contract claim but held

Program prices were excluded from the 2013 Contract’s language, leaving only the

Price-Matching Policy prices for that claim.30 The Court denied Rite Aid’s motion

24
     Id. at *3 (alterations in original).
25
     Id. at *5 (alterations in original).
26
     See id. at *14-16.
27
     Id.
28
     Id.
29
     Id. at *13.
30
     Id. at *14-16.

                                            -5-
on the Caremark Contract claim.31 One pivotal issue left for trial was whether

Program customers and Price-Matching Policy customers fell within the U&C

definitions’ “cash-paying customers” and “customer[s] . . . paying cash” language.32

         In May 2023, the parties and the Court undertook a two-week jury trial.

Centene presented its three remaining claims—two for breach of contract and one

for unjust enrichment. Rite Aid moved for judgment as a matter of law at the

conclusion of Centene’s case in chief.33 Rite Aid argued (a) Centene failed to prove

Rite Aid acted without justification on the unjust enrichment claim, and (b) Centene

failed to prove tolling applied to the statute of limitations.34 The Court denied that

motion.35         On the justification issue, the Court noted “[t]he fact that perhaps

Caremark and its pharmacies, including Rite Aid, . . . acted differently [than the

Caremark Contract might suggest they should] and whether or not that would

provide justification is a question of fact for this jury to determine.”36 On the tolling

issue, the Court found that whether Centene was on inquiry notice and, if so, whether

a diligent inquiry would’ve uncovered facts sufficient to assert the breach claims

31
     Id. at *17-18.
32
     Id. at *16-18.
33
    See Rite Aid’s Motion for JMOL (D.I. 349); May 17, 2023 Trial Transcript (“May 17 Trial
Tr.”) at 4-25 (D.I. 369).
34
     Rite Aid’s Motion for JMOL at 2-6.
35
     May 17 Trial Tr. at 25-29.
36
     Id. at 27.

                                             -6-
were both disputed questions of fact for the jury to decide.37

         During trial, Rite Aid presented two main defenses—statute of limitations

(with no tolling exception thereto) and voluntary payment. At the close of all the

evidence, Rite Aid renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Centene

countered with its own request for judgment as a matter of law on all claims.38 Rite

Aid renewed its previous motion and added arguments relating to price-matching

and damages.39 The Court denied both motions, noting “[s]o much of this [case]

relies on the credibility of the witnesses,” and “the Court simply cannot say as to any

of the claims or defenses that a reasonable jury must find as a matter of law that there

is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to make counter findings.”40 The following

trial day, the parties presented closing arguments and the jury deliberated.

         The jury’s verdict favored Rite Aid. Namely, the jury found Rite Aid

succeeded on both its defenses.41 This finding, in effect, mooted the breach-of-

contract claims.42       The finding also narrowed the time period for the unjust

enrichment claim,43 which the jury found Centene did not prove by a preponderance

37
     Id. at 28-29.
38
     May 19, 2023 Prayer Conference (“May 19 Trial Tr.”) at 3-20 (D.I. 357).
39
     Id. at 22-24.
40
     Id. at 32.
41
     Verdict Form at 33, 37 (D.I. 354).
42
     See id. at 34.
43
     Id. at 36.

                                              -7-
of the evidence.44 In short, the verdict was a shutout for Rite Aid.

           Now before the Court are the parties’ post-trial motions. Rite Aid filed a

limited motion for costs (“Rite Aid’s Motion”).45 Centene filed a motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict on all three of its claims and on Rite Aid’s

defenses (“Centene’s Motion”).46 The Centene Motion alternatively requests a new

trial.

           The above is not an exhaustive recitation of the facts and relevant history. So,

the Court will discuss additional facts and proceedings as they become relevant to

the analysis below.

                              II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

     A. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

           At the close of all the evidence, if a party moves for judgment as a matter of

law under Superior Court Civil Rule 50(a) and the Court does not grant the motion,

that party may renew its motion post-trial by filing a motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) under Civil Rule 50(b).47 When the Court is

44
     Id.
45
     See Rite Aid’s Motion for Costs (“Motion for Costs”) (D.I. 361).
46
    See Centene’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Or, Alternatively, for a New
Trial (“Centene Motion”) (D.I. 362).
47
   See Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50(b) (2023); Chamberlain v. Pyle, 2023 WL 1771013, at *2 (Del.
Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2023).

                                               -8-
presented with a JNOV motion, the “trial judge does not weigh the evidence.”48

Civil Rule 50(b) requires the Court to view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party and determine “whether the evidence and all reasonable

inferences that can be drawn therefrom could justify” the jury’s verdict.49 To find

for the moving party, the Court must determine “there is no legally sufficient

evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to [have found] for the non-movant.”50

Accordingly, “if the jury verdict is supported by palpable evidence, it must be

upheld.”51

     B. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

        Civil Rule 59 permits the Court to grant a new trial for “any of the reasons for

which new trials have . . . been granted in the Superior Court.”52 The jury’s verdict

48
   Deardoff Assocs., Inc. v. Paul, 2000 WL 1211130, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2000) (citing
McCloskey v. McKelvey, 174 A.2d 691, 693 (Del. Super. Ct. 1961) (“[W]hen the Judge considers
a motion to direct a verdict [i.e., JNOV] he is not required to weigh the evidence.”)).
49
   Chamberlain, 2023 WL 1771013, at *2 (quoting Mumford v. Paris, 2003 WL 231611, at *2
(Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2003)); see also Deardoff Assocs., Inc., 2000 WL 1211130, at *2
(“Superior Court Civil Rule 50(b) requires that the Court consider the evidence in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party.” (citing Parks v. Ziegler, 221 A.2d 510, 511 (Del. 1996))).
50
    Mumford, 2003 WL 231611, at *2 (cleaned up) (quoting Brown v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
774 A.2d 232, 245 (Del. 2001)); Deardoff Assocs., Inc., 2000 WL 1211130, at *2 (citing Eustice
v. Rupert, 460 A.2d 507, 508-09 (Del. 1983)).
51
    Deardoff Assocs., Inc., 2000 WL 1211130, at *2 (citing Gannett Co., Inc. v. Re, 496 A.2d 553,
557 (Del. 1985)); Mumford, 2003 WL 231611, at *2 (“Thus, the factual findings of a jury will not
be disturbed if there is any competent evidence upon which the verdict could reasonably be based.”
(emphasis in original) (quoting Delaware Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Pitts, 1993 WL 445474, at *1 (Del.
Oct. 22, 1993))).
52
     Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(a) (2023); Deardoff Assocs., Inc., 2000 WL 1211130, at *4.

                                               -9-
is presumed to be correct.53 “When considering a motion for a new trial, the Superior

Court must give enormous deference to the jury’s verdict, and should not set aside

the jury’s verdict unless a reasonable jury could not have reached the result.”54 The

Court should not set aside a jury’s verdict unless: (1) “it contradicts the great weight

of the evidence”; (2) the “jury disregarded the applicable rules of law”; or (3) “the

jury’s verdict is tainted by legal error committed by the trial court before or during

the trial.”55 To grant a new trial based on evidentiary rulings, the moving party must

demonstrate the rulings were incorrect, and “the mistakes constituted significant

prejudice so as to have denied the [moving party] a fair trial.”56

     C. MOTION FOR COSTS

       Superior Court Civil Rule 54(d) provides that “costs shall be allowed as of

course to the prevailing party upon application to the Court within ten (10) days of

53
    Deardoff Assocs., Inc., 2000 WL 1211130, at *4 (citing Lacey v. Beck, 161 A.2d 579, 580 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1960)); Kelly v. McHaddon, 2002 WL 388120, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 4, 2002)
(citation omitted).
54
    LCT Cap., LLC v. NGL Energy P’rs LP, 249 A.3d 77, 90 (Del. 2021) (cleaned up) (citations
omitted); Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1979) (“[O]n weight of the evidence motions,
we hold that a trial judge is only permitted to set aside a jury verdict when in his judgment it is at
least against the great weight of the evidence. In other words, barring exceptional circumstances,
a trial judge should not set aside a jury verdict on such ground unless, on a review of all the
evidence, the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable jury
could not have reached the result.”).
55
   Kelly, 2002 WL 388120, at *4 (citing Camper, 401 A.2d at 465); Storey v. Castner, 314 A.2d
187, 193 (Del. 1973); DuPhilly v. Delaware Elec. Coop., Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 833-34 (Del. 1995)).
56
   O’Riley v. Rogers, 69 A.3d 1007, 1010 (Del. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

                                                -10-
entry of final judgment unless the Court otherwise directs.”57 Awarding costs is a

matter of judicial discretion,58 but, generally, the prevailing party is entitled to

costs.59

                             III. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

        Centene moves for JNOV on its three claims and Rite Aid’s two defenses. On

the unjust enrichment claim, Centene insists it proved all elements, and, specifically,

Rite Aid had no justification for not reporting Program prices and Price-Matching

Policy prices as U&C.60 Regarding its breach-of-contract claims, Centene maintains

it proved all elements.61 Centene next contends the great weight of the evidence

established the inherently unknowable doctrine and fraudulent concealment doctrine

tolled the statute of limitations.62 Centene finally contends Rite Aid did not prove

its voluntary payment defense because Rite Aid did not introduce evidence that

Centene knew of Rite Aid’s U&C reporting practices.63

57
     Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 54(d) (2023).
58
   Phelps v. West, 2018 WL 1341704, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2018) (citing Olson v. A-
Del Constr. Co., Inc., 2014 WL 1325909, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2014)).
59
     Id. (citing Bodley v. Jones, 65 A.2d 484, 487 (Del. Ch. 1948)).
60
     See Centene Motion at 4-10.
61
     See id. at 11-12.
62
     See id. at 12-14.
63
     See id. at 14-15.

                                               -11-
        Alternatively, Centene moves for a new trial on all issues. Centene contends

Rite Aid’s counsel improperly insinuated this case was “manufactured” by

Centene’s trial counsel, which tainted the verdict.64 Next, Centene contends the

Court prevented Centene from fairly responding to Rite Aid’s “misleading”

testimony and arguments.65

        Rite Aid moves for costs. Rite Aid specifically seeks: (1) “[c]ourt, filing and

e-service fees”; (2) “[s]ervice of process” costs; and (3) “[t]rial technology fees.”66

Rite Aid asks for a total of $15,181.67.67

                                     IV. DISCUSSION

     A. CENTENE IS NOT ENTITLED TO JNOV.

        As Centene properly notes, a motion for JNOV under Rule 50(b) is subject to

the same standard as a motion for a directed verdict made post-trial.68 Centene also

properly notes the Court denied both parties’ motions for judgment as a matter of

law (i.e., directed verdict) at the close of all the evidence.69 In that ruling, the Court

observed “[s]o much of this [case] relies on the credibility of the witnesses.”70 Since

64
     See id. at 15-22.
65
     See id. at 22-34.
66
     See Motion for Costs at 3.
67
     See id.
68
     Deardoff Assocs., Inc., 2000 WL 1211130, at *2; see also Centene Motion at 3.
69
     Centene Motion at 20.
70
     May 19 Trial Tr. at 32.

                                              -12-
then, almost nothing has changed. The facts are the same. The standard is the

same.71 What differs now is that the jury has made the credibility and evidence-

weighing determinations Centene asked of it. And, at this point, the Court must

afford considerable weight to those calls. Accordingly, the Court’s ruling remains

the same—Centene’s motion for JNOV is denied.

        1. No JNOV on the Statute of Limitations Exceptions

        Centene contends it should be granted JNOV that the inherently unknowable

and fraudulent concealment doctrines apply to toll the statute of limitations. 72 Rite

Aid says substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Centene failed to prove

either exception.73

        Regarding the inherently unknowable doctrine, the “statute is tolled where the

injury is ‘inherently unknowable and the claimant is blamelessly ignorant of the

wrongful act and the injury complained of.’”74 If such a circumstance arises, the

statute starts to run “upon the discovery of facts ‘constituting the basis of the cause

of action or the existence of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence

71
   See Deardoff Assocs., Inc., 2000 WL 1211130, at *2 (“Since a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b) is a renewal of a motion for directed verdict made
post-trial, it is subject to the same standard applied to test the latter.” (citation omitted)).
72
     Centene Motion at 12.
73
    Rite Aid’s Answering Brief in Opposition to Centene’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict or, Alternatively, a New Trial (“Rite Aid Answer”) at 14 (D.I. 374).
74
    Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 860 A.2d 312, 319 (Del. 2004) (quoting Coleman
v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLC, 854 A.2d 838, 842 (Del. 2004)).

                                             -13-
and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery’ of such

facts.”75

         By way of example here, Don Nagy, former senior vice president of network

management at a Centene entity, testified for Centene.76 Mr. Nagy was responsible

for contracting with pharmacies, which included “ensuring that the contractual

language was appropriate.”77            Rite Aid’s counsel cross-examined Mr. Nagy

regarding a November 3, 2010 email exchange between Mr. Nagy and an HEB

employee.78 HEB is a regional grocery chain.79 HEB had created a discount card

program and Mr. Nagy inquired about it.80 The HEB employee reported that “[n]one

75
    Coleman, 854 A.2d at 842 (emphasis in original) (quoting Becker v. Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d
353, 356 (Del. 1982)). Centene appears to suggest that Delaware courts have set a low standard
for the inherently unknowable doctrine. See Centene Motion at 12. Centene cites Serviz, Inc. v.
ServiceMaster Co., LLC, 2022 WL 1164859, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 19, 2022). Serviz, Inc.
states that “[n]o doubt, our Supreme Court has set a ‘low threshold for the use of the doctrine of
inherently unknowable injury.’” Serviz, Inc., 2022 WL 1164859, at *5 (quoting Certainteed Corp.
v. Celotex Corp., 2005 WL 217032, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2005)). But both Serviz, Inc. and
Certainteed Corp. dealt with this doctrine at the motion to dismiss stage—where the standard is
reasonable conceivability of success on a claim or defense—not post-trial. See, e.g., Saunders v.
Lightwave Logistics, Inc., 2023 WL 4851630, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. July 28, 2023) (explaining
and applying the “low threshold on what a plaintiff must demonstrate to survive a motion to
dismiss” when finding that plaintiff “ha[d] alleged facts sufficient to put the Defendants on notice
of his claim” of a tolling exception and had “alleged enough facts that it is reasonably conceivable
he might well gain tolling of the statute of limitations he faces”). Centene’s argument is
unavailing; at trial, it had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the exception applied.
76
     May 10, 2023 Trial Transcript (“May 10 Trial Tr.”) at 113-14 (D.I. 348).
77
     Id. at 114.
78
     Id. at 143.
79
     Id. at 135.
80
     Id. at 143-44.

                                               -14-
of the discounts slash pricing related to [HEB’s discount card] program are in the

HEB pricing database dispensing system as they do not represent [HEB’s] U&C.”81

         Thus, there is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to have found

Centene had facts sufficient to put Centene on notice that pharmacies, like Rite Aid,

were not reporting discount card program prices, like Program prices, as U&C as

early as November 2010—nine years before this action was filed. Centene insists

the evidence warrants a contrary result.82 But inquiries into the statute of limitations

and its exceptions are often fact-specific.83                And, if anything, the statute of

limitations exceptions boiled down to credibility determinations, which were the

sole province of the jury.84

         The same is true with respect to Centene’s fraudulent concealment theory.

Centene argued to the jury that Rite Aid sought to “reduce the visibility” of its

Program so Rite Aid could report inflated U&C to Centene.85 Centene, now, cites

81
     Id. at 145.
82
     See Centene Motion at 12-13.
83
   See Van Lake v. Sorin CRM USA, Inc., 2013 WL 1087583, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 15,
2013) (stating that application of the “discovery rule” for statute of limitations is “necessarily fact-
specific”).
84
     See Washington v. State, 4 A.3d 375, 381 (Del. 2010) (Ridgely, J., dissenting) (“Conflicts in
the evidence, the determination of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony are within the peculiar province of the jury.”); Messina v. Sipple, 1993 WL 478080, at
*1 (Del. Nov. 15, 1993) (“Credibility determinations are uniquely within the province of the jury
as the trier of fact and the Court is bound by a jury verdict where there is some evidence to support
it.” (citing Camper, 401 A.2d at 465)).
85
     See Centene Motion at 13-14.

                                                 -15-
not testimony but relies mainly on various joint exhibits—the weight of which was

left to the jury to ascribe.86 The jury could (and obviously did) reject Centene’s

theory of fraudulent concealment if it found that evidence unconvincing.87 As with

any other matter of evidence-weighing, “[i]t is not for the Court to decide [what] the

jury should have chosen to credit or discredit.”88

         2. No JNOV on the Unjust Enrichment Claim

         Centene says the Caremark Contract’s language did not exclude Program

prices and Price-Matching Policy prices from its U&C definition.89 Centene further

says Centene was impoverished, Rite Aid was enriched, and there was no basis for

the jury to conclude Rite Aid had any justification for its actions.90 Rite Aid counters

the trial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Rite Aid’s actions were justified,91

and the jury could have reasonably concluded Centene failed to prove an enrichment

and an impoverishment.92

86
     See id. (citing JX017, JX019, JX072).
87
    See, e.g., Stimson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 2020 WL 7631659, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2020)
(“This Court abides by the principle that a ‘jury is entitled to evaluate the testimony and to accept
the portion it finds to be believable and to reject the balance.’” (quoting Lee v. A.C. & S. Co., 1987
WL 16746, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 22, 1987))).
88
     Id. (citation omitted).
89
     Centene Motion at 5-6.
90
     Id. at 6-10.
91
     Rite Aid Answer at 4-7.
92
     Id. at 7-10.

                                                -16-
        “Unjust enrichment is the ‘unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another,

or the retention of money . . . of another against the fundamental principles of justice

or equity and good conscience.’”93 “The elements of unjust enrichment are: (1) an

enrichment, (2) an impoverishment, (3) a relation between the enrichment and

impoverishment, [and] (4) the absence of justification.”94

        There is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to have found

Centene did not prove its unjust enrichment claim. First, trial produced evidence

that Rite Aid was justified in not reporting its Program prices as U&C under the

Caremark Contract. Brian Correia, senior vice president of network services at

Caremark,95 testified as a third-party witness. Rite Aid’s counsel asked Mr. Correia:

“Does Caremark consider a person who was an enrolled member of the Rite Aid

[Program] to be a customer paying cash under the [U&C] definition of the . . .

Caremark [C]ontract?”96 Mr. Correia responded “[n]o, [Caremark] did not.”97 Rite

93
   Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Hldg. Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *42 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14,
2017) (quoting Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 539 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Del. 1988)).
94
   Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1130 (Del. 2010) (citation omitted). There is a fifth
element—absence of remedy provided by law—that is jurisdictional. See St. Search P’rs, L.P. v.
Ricon Int’l, L.L.C., 2005 WL 1953094, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2005).
95
     May 11, 2023 Trial Transcript (“May 11 Trial Tr.”) at 7 (D.I. 351).
96
     Id. at 22-23.
97
    Id. at 23. Only the Program, not the Price-Matching Policy, is relevant for this analysis. The
statute of limitations bars claims arising before December 23, 2016. See Compl. (having a filing
date of December 23, 2019); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8106(a) (2016) (noting that
contract claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations period); Ocimum Biosolutions
(India) Ltd. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 2019 WL 6726836, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 2019) (“In
Delaware, the statute of limitations for breach of contract or unjust enrichment is 3 years.”). The
                                               -17-
Aid’s counsel next asked whether Caremark considered a Program member to be a

“cash paying customer.”98 Mr. Correia responded Caremark did not.99 Rite Aid’s

counsel asked Mr. Correia: “Did Caremark consider the [Program] to be an

applicable discount under the [U&C] definition of the . . . Caremark [C]ontract?”100

Mr. Correia responded “[n]o, [Caremark] did not.”101

            William Wolfe, a Rite Aid employee from 1998 until 2011 who worked as

Rite Aid’s senior vice president of managed care and government affairs,102 testified

for Rite Aid. Rite Aid’s counsel asked Mr. Wolfe: “Except for the Federal Employee

Program, did Rite Aid and Care[m]ark share the same understanding that . . .

Program prices did not have to be submitted as usual and customary under the

[Caremark] [C]ontract?”103 Mr. Wolfe responded affirmatively to that question.104

Trial produced evidence that Rite Aid was justified when it did not report its Program

prices as U&C under the Caremark Contract.

Price-Matching Policy ended in 2015. May 18, 2023 Trial Transcript (“May 18 Trial Tr.”) at 73
(D.I. 370).
98
      May 11 Trial Tr. at 23.
99
      Id.
100
      Id. at 23-24.
101
      Id. at 24.
102
      May 18 Trial Tr. at 8-9.
103
    Id. at 48. Mr. Wolfe explained that the Federal Employee Program (“FEP”) was different than
the Caremark Contract because the FEP demanded a change to the definition of U&C in the FEP
contract, and such change was “very specific, and for the purposes only of FEP.” Id. at 48-49.
104
      Id. at 48.

                                             -18-
            According to Centene, trial produced “a mountain of evidence and testimony”

showing Program prices were included in the Caremark Contract’s U&C

definition.105 Maybe so, but when the jury is presented with conflicting testimony,

the “jury is entitled to evaluate the testimony and to accept the portion it finds to be

believable and to reject the balance.”106 The jury did that here—the Court doesn’t

decide whom the jury should’ve believed or not.107

            Lastly, there is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to have found

Centene did not prove an enrichment to Rite Aid. Michael Petron testified as

Centene’s damages expert. Rite Aid’s counsel questioned Mr. Petron’s damages

calculations by asking: “[I]s the amount [Centene] paid to Caremark the same as the

amount . . . that Rite Aid received?”108 To which Mr. Petron responded “[n]ot

necessarily.”109 Mr. Petron further responded he “agree[d] with the general premise

that Caremark had a spread which means that the amounts paid to it by [Centene]

were different than the amounts paid ultimately to Rite Aid.”110 This is relevant to

proving enrichment because Mr. Petron evaluated only what Centene paid to

105
      Centene Motion at 7.
106
      Stimson, 2020 WL 7631659, at *3 (quoting Lee, 1987 WL 16746, at *1).
107
      Id. (citing Beatty v. Smedley, 2003 WL 23353491, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 2003)).
108
      May 16, 2023 Trial Transcript (“May 16 Trial Tr.”) at 123 (D.I. 366).
109
      Id.
110
      Id. at 123-24.

                                                -19-
Caremark, not what Rite Aid ultimately received.111 Put in Mr. Petron’s own words:

“[Mr. Petron’s] analysis is based upon how much Centene overpaid, not how much

Rite Aid received as a result of its usual and customary practice.”112 There was

evidence for the jury to conclude Centene did not adequately prove Rite Aid’s

enrichment. What’s more, given the weaknesses demonstrated therein, the jury was

free to discredit Mr. Petron’s analysis altogether.113

          3. No JNOV Regarding Voluntary Payment

          Centene contends Rite Aid failed to prove Centene had full knowledge of Rite

Aid’s U&C reporting practices, and, therefore, Rite Aid failed to prove its voluntary

payment defense.114 Rite Aid maintains substantial evidence supports the jury’s

finding that Rite Aid established Centene’s voluntary payment.115

          The voluntary payment doctrine evolved from unjust enrichment law.116 The

doctrine bars recovery for “payment voluntarily made with full knowledge of the

111
      See id.; see also id. at 122-23.
112
      Id. at 131.
113
    See Washington, 4 A.3d at 381 (Ridgely, J., dissenting) (“Conflicts in the evidence, the
determination of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are
within the peculiar province of the jury.”); see also Beatty, 2003 WL 23353491, at *3 (observing
that even with unrebutted expert testimony, when there is a reasonable basis to conclude the
opinions given were not reliable or credible, the jury may properly exercise its prerogative to reject
that expert’s testimony in whole).
114
      Centene Motion at 14.
115
     See Rite Aid Answer at 14. Rite Aid, for its part, gave the voluntary payment issue short shrift
in its briefing.
116
    Intermec IP Corp. v. TransCore, LP, 2021 WL 3620435, at *15 n.140 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug.
16, 2021) (citing Home Ins. Co. v. Honaker, 480 A.2d 652, 652-54 (Del. 1984)).

                                                -20-
facts.”117      The doctrine prevents the “counterparty from claiming that a

‘misapprehension of its legal rights and obligations’ caused it to make payments by

mistake.”118 Money “paid due to a mistake of law is not recoverable, while money

paid under a mistake of fact may be recovered . . . under an unjust enrichment

theory.”119 This Court has considered voluntary payment to be a defense to unjust

enrichment claims and breach-of-contract claims.120                At bottom, the existence

voluntary payment is a factual inquiry.121

         From the jury’s perspective, based on the verdict form, the voluntary payment

doctrine was relevant to only Centene’s unjust enrichment claim, and only from

December 23, 2016, until the filing of this action.122 Stated differently, because the

jury found the statute of limitations applied, the voluntary payment doctrine stood

to bar only the unjust enrichment claim. As discussed above, the jury had a legally

117
   W. Nat. Gas Co. v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 201 A.2d 164, 169 (Del. 1964); Intermec IP Corp.,
2021 WL 3620435, at *15 (quoting W. Nat. Gas Co., 201 A.2d at 169).
118
    Intermec IP Corp., 2021 WL 3620435, at *15 (cleaned up) (quoting Winshall v. Viacom Int’l,
Inc., 2019 WL 960213, at *15 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2019)).
119
      Home Ins. Co., 480 A.2d at 653.
120
   Intermec IP Corp., 2021 WL 3620435, at *15 n.140 (citing Winshall, 2019 WL 960213, at
*15; Nieves v. All Star Title, Inc., 2010 WL 2977966, at *6-8 (Del. Super. Ct. July 27, 2010)).
121
    See, e.g., W. Nat. Gas Co., 201 A.2d at 169 (“The question is basically one of fact[.]”);
Intermec IP Corp., 2021 WL 3620435, at *16 (“The inquiry looks to the totality of the
circumstances[.]”).
122
     See Verdict Form at 36-37 (noting that if the jury found that no tolling exception applied to
toll the statute of limitations, only claims from December 23, 2016, and forward remained viable,
and also noting that part of Centene’s unjust enrichment claim was the only claim for that
circumscribed time period).

                                              -21-
sufficient evidentiary basis to find Centene did not prove its unjust enrichment claim.

A finding for Rite Aid on voluntary payment was, therefore, not dispositive; rather,

the jury’s finding further buttressed against Centene’s unjust enrichment claim.

         4. No JNOV Regarding the Breach-of-Contract Claims
         Centene contends it should be granted JNOV on both the breach of the 2003

Contract claim and breach of the 2013 Contract claim.123 But, counters Rite Aid, the

jury found the statute of limitations barred both breach claims.124

         The jury never reached Centene’s breach claims on the verdict form because

the jury’s finding on the statute of limitations barred them. To grant Centene’s

JNOV request on the breach claims would in effect upend the entire verdict, reach

questions the jury never did, and wholly accept and substitute in Centene’s view of

its claims. The Court finds no basis to do that. With respect to the claims and

defenses discussed above, the Court has determined the verdict is “supported by

palpable evidence.”125 The verdict, thus, “must be upheld.”126

         Centene’s Motion for JNOV is DENIED.

123
      See Centene Motion at 11-12.
124
      See Rite Aid Answer at 10-11.
125
      Deardoff Assocs., Inc., 2000 WL 1211130, at *2 (citing Gannett Co., Inc., 496 A.2d at 557).
126
      Id. (citing Gannett Co., Inc., 496 A.2d at 557).

                                                 -22-
      B. CENTENE IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL.

         Apart from JNOV, Centene alternatively requests a new trial. Centene says a

new trial is necessary because (1) the jury’s verdict is contrary to the great weight of

the evidence, (2) Rite Aid’s counsel made several improper comments, and (3) the

Court’s evidentiary rulings constitute plain legal errors “that resulted in an unfair

trial and may have tainted the jury’s verdict.”127 Rite Aid responds its comments

were supported by the trial record and the Court’s evidentiary rulings were sound.128

         To reiterate, on a motion for a new trial under Civil Rule 59, “[t]he jury’s

verdict is presumed to be correct.”129 And that verdict is entitled to “enormous

deference.”130 Indeed, the Court cannot set aside a jury’s verdict unless, beyond

doubt: (1) “it contradicts the great weight of the evidence”; (2) the “jury disregarded

the applicable rules of law”; or (3) “the jury’s verdict is tainted by legal error

committed by the trial court before or during the trial.”131

127
      Centene Motion at 15.
128
      Rite Aid Answer at 18.
129
    Galindez v. Narragansett Hous. Assocs., L.P., 2006 WL 3457628, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov.
28, 2006); see also Smack-Dixon v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 2023 WL 525062, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan.
25, 2023).
130
    Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1236 (Del. 1997); see also Crist v. Connor, 2007 WL 2473322,
at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2007) (citing Young, 702 A.2d at 1236).
131
  Kelly, 2002 WL 388120, at *4 (citing Camper, 401 A.2d at 465; Castner, 314 A.2d at 193;
DuPhilly, 662 A.2d at 833-34).

                                             -23-
            1. Centene Is Not Entitled to a New Trial Based
               on the Weight of the Evidence.
            Again, “[e]very analysis of a motion for a new trial must begin with the

presumption that the jury verdict is correct.”132 And the Court simply will not grant

a new trial on weight-of-the-evidence grounds unless “the evidence preponderates

so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable juror could not have reached the

result.”133 The Court has explained through the JNOV discussion, above, that is not

so here. Centene’s first ground for a new trial fails.

            2. Centene Is Not Entitled to a New Trial Based
               on Comments by Rite Aid’s Counsel.
            Centene next contends Rite Aid’s counsel made insinuations that the case was

manufactured by Centene’s trial counsel. Centene complains these insinuations

were improper and prejudicial134 relying on Putney v. Rosin135 for its argument.

            Putney was a personal injury trial.136 In Putney, the plaintiff asserted a claim

for personal injury arising from an assault committed by the defendant. The jury

returned a verdict for the plaintiff in an amount less than expected.137 The plaintiff

132
    Smith v. Lawson, 2006 WL 258310, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2006) (citing Mills v.
Telenczak, 345 A.2d 424, 426 (Del. 1975)).
133
      Amalfitano v. Baker, 794 A.2d 575, 577 (Del. 2001) (quoting Camper, 401 A.2d at 465).
134
      Centene Motion at 15.
135
      791 A.2d 902 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001).
136
      See id. at 903.
137
      Id.

                                              -24-
moved for a new trial on two grounds: the verdict was against the great weight of

the evidence; and the defense counsel made improper, prejudicial comments in his

opening statement and closing argument.138 Centene relies on Putney for the

improper-prejudicial- comments analysis.

            This Court granted a new trial in Putney. There, the defense counsel stated in

closing argument that the plaintiff’s attorney “manufactured” the plaintiff’s claim,

which this Court took as an implication that the plaintiff and his attorney fabricated

the causal connection between the assault and the plaintiff’s resulting health

issues.139 The “manufactured” “argument [was] not supported by the record at

all.”140 And this Court found, in context, the comments were highly improper and

prejudicial.141

            This Court explained further in Putney: (1) the case was “clearly a close one,”

(2) the improper comments affected a central issue of causal connection between the

assault and resulting health issues, and (3) the prejudice to the plaintiff was so strong

that no mitigative efforts would’ve cured it.142           Resultingly, a new trial was

138
      Id.
139
      Id. at 905.
140
      Id.
141
      Id. at 906.
142
      Id.

                                              -25-
granted.143

          Centene contends this case is like Putney and focuses primarily on Rite Aid’s

counsel’s closing argument that included the following:

          • “The beauty of the jury system is that . . . [i]t allows you to judge what the
            parties knew in real time as compared to telling you a whopper of a story
            after being propped up by lawyers with an interest in this case.”144

          • “The only person who cared are these lawyers, and the legal department at
            Centene said let’s turn it into something.”145

          • “It’s really insulting isn’t it, to hear from Mr. Correia and the Rite Aid
            witnesses as to how the contract worked between Caremark and Rite Aid?
            And then to have them come in – dozens of lawyers come in and try to say
            it isn’t what those witnesses say, it isn’t what the contracts say. You should
            throw them out. And by putting no on [the verdict form], you do that.”146

          • “[Centene] might have come in and said they didn’t know everything.
            Come on. They knew plenty. And voluntary payment means you knew
            enough and you kept paying the same way. I’m not going to let you come
            back once you let – once you got lawyers and change that decision. The
            business people were perfectly happy with the deal they cut. Only the
            lawyers don’t like it. So you [write] yes on that [verdict form] when you
            get to Section D.”147

          • “The record shows the Centene-Envolve business people are [ec]static
            with the deal they’ve covered and handled their claims back then. They
            had no complaints. But now after the fact here come the lawyers, not the
            business people.”148

143
      Id. at 907.
144
      May 22, 2023 Trial Transcript (“May 22 Trial Tr.”) at 69 (D.I. 365).
145
      Id. at 92.
146
      Id. at 121.
147
      Id. at 121-22.
148
      Id. at 124-25.

                                                -26-
          • “Tell those lawyers that before you waste a jury’s time read your contracts
            ahead of time. Tell Centene no. It’s a money grab, it’s always been a
            money grab. Now Rite Aid needs your help to tell Centene no.”149

          Interestingly, while these comments are now called out individually and

collectively as grounds for a new trial, not one contemporaneous objection was made

about them during closing argument. The first complaint on such was made via this

new trial motion. So, the Court’s opportunity to cure any supposed error that might

scuttle the work of the parties, the Court, and the jury in real time was wasted.

Instead, Centene’s counsel sat on their hands in the face of what is claimed to be

obvious, verdict-tainting behavior during closing only to pull them out now to pen

this motion when no possible curative action is available.                          That’s not only

disappointing, it’s improper trial and motion practice.150

149
      Id. at 126.
150
   See Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390, 400 (Del. 1992) (“[T]he failure of opposing counsel to
make a contemporaneous objection deprived the trial judge of the opportunity to deal with the
problem when it arose. Such inaction is deemed a waiver of any resulting error for appellate
purposes.” (emphasis added)); Med. Ctr. of Delaware, Inc. v. Lougheed, 661 A.2d 1055, 1060
(Del. 1995) (“A party must timely object to improper statements made during closing argument in
order to give the trial court the opportunity to correct any error.”); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Grenier,
981 A.2d 531, 541 n.27 (Del. 2009) (“This Court has consistently required that any objections be
made contemporaneously.”); see also Cohen-Thomas v. Lewullis, 2016 WL 721009, at *4 (Del.
Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2016):
          Despite their failure to object at trial, Plaintiffs now come before the Court urging
          that a legal error occurred . . . . Were the Court to grant this Motion, the practical
          effect of Plaintiffs’ conduct is that Plaintiffs could make a strategic decision not to
          object at trial with the hope of receiving a favorable verdict, but if Plaintiffs
          received an unfavorable jury verdict, they would be assured of a new trial before a
          new jury with the possibility of a different outcome. The Court will not
          retroactively cure any perceived mistake created by trial counsel’s failure to object
          at trial.

                                                  -27-
         Centene also takes issue with Rite Aid referring to this action in opening as a

“recovery opportunity,”151 and Rite Aid’s reference during trial to “a law firm based

in Washington, D.C., a large law firm.”152

         Centene’s argument that this case is like Putney is off base. In Putney, the

defense counsel’s comment that the claim was “manufactured” was one “not

supported by the record at all.”153 Rite Aid’s counsel’s comments while perhaps not

all praisable were, by contrast, supported by the record.

         Regarding the “lawyer” comments, Michael Baca, Health Net’s former senior

vice president of pharmacy networks and a Centene witness, 154 testified regarding

Centene’s legal department. Namely, Rite Aid’s counsel asked Mr. Baca how Mr.

Broughton v. Wong, 2018 WL 1867185, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2018) (explaining that
“[p]arties must make contemporaneous objections at trial” and noting that granting the relief of
new trial citing unobjected-to evidence or events provides “a retroactive cure that could encourage
gamesmanship”).
Centene’s resort to this Court’s recent decision in Conduent State Healthcare, LLC v. AIG
Specialty Insurance Co., 2023 WL 2256052 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2023), for the proposition it
should be excused from the contemporaneous-objection rule is unavailing. In Conduent, the Court
noted that although plaintiff’s counsel did not object during closing argument, plaintiff’s earlier
objections on the specific issue were preserved in that instance. 2023 WL 2256052, at *5. But
the exceptionality of the circumstances in Conduent are thoroughly explained by the trial judge
and probably best condensed to her simple opening sentence: “In almost 20 years on this bench, I
have never set aside a jury verdict.” Id. at *4-12, *1. This Court’s decisions in Cohen-Thomas and
Broughton are more instructive here.
151
   See Centene Motion at 16; May 8, 2023 Trial Transcript (“May 8 Trial Tr.”) at 129-31 (D.I.
347).
152
   See Centene Motion at 16; see, e.g., May 9, 2023 Trial Transcript (“May 9 Trial Tr.”) at 134,
94-102 (D.I. 367).
153
      Putney, 791 A.2d at 905.
154
      May 8 Trial Tr. at 142.

                                               -28-
Baca heard Rite Aid was excluding its Program prices from its U&C reporting

practices.155 Mr. Baca responded Centene’s “internal legal department came to [Mr.

Baca] with some concerns.”156 Mr. Baca testified he had not heard of any issues and

had no concerns regarding Rite Aid’s reporting practices before that time. 157

Additionally, regarding the “law firm” comments, Mr. Baca agreed Health Net was

assisted by a “large Washington, D.C. law firm” in its negotiations with Caremark.158

Finally, regarding the “recovery opportunity” comments, Tim Emert, Centene’s

corporate representative, agreed Centene “expected a recovery” and agreed this

lawsuit was a “recovery opportunity.”159 Rite Aid’s counsel’s statements were

supported by the record.

            Make no mistake, the Court is not holding up each of Rite Aid’s closer’s

statements (or the delivery thereof) as exemplary or laudable. But even if Rite Aid’s

counsel’s comments were found improper, a new trial is not per se warranted. To

“determine whether a new trial is called for in connection with improper comments,

the trial court must determine whether the improper comments prejudicially affected

155
      May 9 Trial Tr. at 88.
156
      Id.
157
      Id. at 89, 139.
158
      Id. at 134-35, 137-38.
159
      May 10 Trial Tr. at 55-56.

                                           -29-
[Centene’s] substantial rights.”160 The Court must now consider: “(1) the closeness

of the case, (2) the centrality of the issue affected by the improper comments, and

(3) steps taken in mitigation.”161

         It seems in the jury’s collective mind, this case was not close—the verdict

form reflects that. The jury found for Rite Aid in every possible way. Specifically,

the jury found: Centene did not prove an exception tolled the statute of limitations;

Centene did not prove its unjust enrichment claim; and Rite Aid proved Centene’s

claims were barred by the voluntary payment doctrine.162 While Centene posits the

jury’s findings can’t be trusted in light of the complained-of closing statements, there

was real and credible record evidence supporting each facet of those verdicts.

         Centene suggests the Court’s denial of both parties’ motions for directed

verdict at the close of the evidence alone demonstrates this was a close case.163 Not

so. The Court denied those motions because “[s]o much of this [case] relie[d] on the

credibility of the witnesses.”164 The first factor does not weigh in favor of a new

trial.

         The centrality-of-the-issue factor also does not weigh in favor of a new trial.

160
      Putney, 791 A.2d at 905 (citing Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del. 1981)).
161
      Id. (citing Hughes, 437 A.2d at 571).
162
      See generally Verdict Form.
163
      Centene Motion at 20.
164
      May 19 Trial Tr. at 32.

                                               -30-
For its part, Centene’s argument on this factor is unclear. Centene argues Rite Aid’s

defense strategy was to claim this case was “manufactured” by lawyers.165 Rite Aid

never used the term “manufactured”; Centene pulled that word from Putney, which

the Court has stated is distinguishable from this case. Centene says Rite Aid’s

comments were aimed at deflecting from the claims and defenses at issue.166

Centene, again, analogizes Putney and says Rite Aid was playing on the public’s

bias against the legal profession.167 The Court disagrees. At bottom, this was a case

about contracts, breaches, unjust enrichment, and defenses. The comments of which

Centene now complains were not central to the issues before the jury.

         The final factor—steps taken in mitigation—does not weigh in favor of a new

trial. Even though Centene prevented more targeted mitigation (if needed), the jury

was still instructed immediately after the comments now challenged:

             What the attorneys say is not evidence. Instead, whatever they say
         is intended to help you review the evidence presented. If you remember
         the evidence differently from the attorneys, you should rely on your
         own recollection.
             The role of attorneys is to zealously and effectively advance the
         claims of the parties they represent within the bounds of the law. An
         attorney may argue all reasonable conclusions from evidence in the
         record. It is not proper, however, for an attorney to state an opinion as
         to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence. What an attorney
         personally thinks or believes about the testimony or evidence in a case

165
      Centene Motion at 20.
166
      See id. at 20-21.
167
      Id. at 21 (citing Putney, 791 A.2d at 906).

                                                    -31-
            is not relevant, and you are instructed to disregard any personal opinion
            or belief offered by any attorney concerning testimony or evidence.168
            For this factor, Centene again compare this case to Putney, where this Court

stated “[a]n accusation in the presence of the jury that the plaintiff’s attorney has

manufactured the plaintiff’s claim so taints the fairness of the proceeding that no

instruction can dispel the prejudice.”169 But again, this case is unlike Putney. Rite

Aid’s counsel’s comments were tied to trial evidence and were not, from the Court’s

perspective, merely some unmoored attempt to play on any negative public

sentiment against the legal profession. This final factor does not favor a new trial.

            Centene is not entitled to a new trial based on Rite Aid’s counsel’s comments.

            3. Centene Is Not Entitled to a New Trial Based on Its Suggestion
               of Legal Error—i.e., an Improperly Curtailed Cross-Examination.

               a. Brian Correia’s Testimony

            Centene contends it was prevented from fairly cross-examining Mr. Correia.

During trial, Mr. Correia was asked by Centene’s counsel: “And you’re providing

this voluntary testimony for Rite Aid because you and your employer [i.e., Caremark

and its parent, CVS] have decided it’s in your interest to do so; right?”170 Mr. Correia

responded: “I was asked to do so, and I willingly came.”171 It appears Centene was

168
      Jury Instructions at 28 (D.I. 352).
169
      Putney, 791 A.2d at 906.
170
      May 11 Trial Tr. at 69.
171
      Id.

                                              -32-
attempting to elicit an answer to show Mr. Correia, in Centene’s estimation, was

biased for Rite Aid.172 After Mr. Correia responded with the above, Centene sought

to impeach Mr. Correia with a purported prior inconsistent statement from a

deposition in a different case.173 The deposition transcript from the other case

contained the following question and answer: “Q[:] . . . . You and your company

decided that it was in your interest to provide that declaration supporting Rite Aid’s

position in this [i.e., the other] case. Right? A: Yes.”174

         Rite Aid objected, arguing there was no basis to impeach Mr. Correia.175 The

Court sustained the objection, noting the deposition did not demonstrate the bias or

prejudice Centene claimed, and further noting its concern that the deposition was

from a different case with different claims.176

         Delaware Rule of Evidence (“DRE”) 607 states that “[a]ny party . . . may

attack the witness’s credibility.”177 DRE 616 states that “[a] witness’s credibility

may be attacked with evidence of the witness’s bias, prejudice or interest for or

against any party to the case.”178 It’s within the trial judge’s discretion to permit or

172
      See Centene Motion at 23.
173
      May 11 Trial Tr. at 69.
174
      Centene Motion, Ex. 1 at 16.
175
      May 11 Trial Tr. at 69.
176
      Id. at 72-73.
177
      DRE 607 (2023).
178
      DRE 616 (2023).

                                         -33-
deny certain types of cross-examination.179 But, a judge may not “exercise this

discretion so as to defeat a party’s right to effective cross-examination.”180 “To

properly evaluate a witness, a jury must have sufficient information to make a

discriminating appraisal of a witness’s motives and bias. It is an abuse of discretion

for a judge to cut off cross-examination if the opportunity to present this information

is not afforded.”181 As highlighted in Garden v. Sutton,182 the Delaware Supreme

Court “has established criteria to guide judicial discretion in this area.”183 The trial

court must consider:

          (1) whether the testimony of the witness being impeached is crucial;
          (2) the logical relevance of the specific impeachment evidence to the
          question of bias; (3) the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,
          and undue delay; and (4) whether the evidence of bias is cumulative.184
          Mr. Correia’s testimony was, without doubt, important. Rite Aid argued to

the jury that Rite Aid and Caremark both understood Program prices were not

included as U&C under the Caremark Contract. Mr. Correia was the only Caremark

representative to testify in this case. Rite Aid says Mr. Correia’s testimony was less

179
    See Garden v. Sutton, 683 A.2d 1041, 1043 (Del. 1996); Milton v. State, 2013 WL 2721883,
at *5 (Del. June 11, 2013).
180
      Garden, 683 A.2d at 1043.
181
      Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1230 (3d Cir. 1995)).
182
      683 A.2d 1041 (Del. 1996).
183
   Id. (citing Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d 1017, 1025 (Del. 1996); Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674,
681 (Del. 1983)).
184
      Snowden, 672 A.2d at 1025 (quoting Weber, 457 A.2d at 681).

                                               -34-
crucial because other witnesses testified in step with Mr. Correia on this point.185

But those witnesses were Rite Aid employees, not Caremark employees.186

Although Mr. Correia’s testimony was not inconsistent with Rite Aid’s witnesses’

testimony, the Court still finds his testimony was, in Garden terms, “crucial”

because he was the only Caremark representative to testify regarding Caremark’s

understanding of the Caremark Contract.187

         The purported impeachment evidence’s logical relevance to the question of

bias, though, favors Rite Aid. The Court observed when ruling on Rite Aid’s

objection that there might be an argument of “some, quote, positional or subject

matter bias” but naturally then there was grave concern because the excerpt on which

Centene wanted to inquire related to “different claims in a different case.”188

         All agree, Mr. Correia’s transcript from the other case involved different

parties and different claims. And the only potential “bias” that Centene suggests is

that Mr. Correia might—because the parent company (CVS) of his own employer

(Caremark) faces U&C allegations like Centene’s against Rite Aid—take a position

185
      Rite Aid Answer at 29.
186
   Rite Aid cites testimony of William Wolfe, Ruth Lightner, and Luke Barnes. See Rite Aid
Answer at 29.
187
    See, e.g., Adams v. Aidoo, 2012 WL 1408878, at *17 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 29, 2012) (“Where
a witness was the only eyewitness to a cause of action, besides the opposing party, and the parties’
version of events at issue at odds, a case turns on a credibility assessment. In such a case, that
witness’s testimony is crucial to the disposition of the case.” (internal citations omitted)).
188
      May 11 Trial Tr. at 72.

                                               -35-
favorable to Rite Aid on how U&C is interpreted. First, the jury had already heard

the question-and-answer Centene posed.              Mr. Correia’s trial answer here was

consistent with the deposition in the other litigation. Centene wanted to delve

deeper. But in the Court’s view, then and now, the logical relevance of the foreign

deposition in proving either bias or inconsistency was minimal.

         Third, and most important for the circumstances here, the deposition

testimony’s probative value for bias was substantially outweighed by the danger of

confusing the issues. The Court made clear, based on a concern of confusing the

issues, that even though the parties “may have tons of history with these various

cases . . . we’re going to talk about this case.”189 And unlike garden-variety bias

evidence, a limiting instruction would have been inadequate to guide the jury

through the morass that would have been created by entry of this prior deposition

excerpt.190 That’s because any such instruction would have done little to ease the

confusion and possible prejudice that could occur by opening the issue of other U&C

lawsuits against Rite Aid and other pharmacies.

189
      Id. at 72-73.
190
    Cf. Garden, 283 A.2d at 1044 (“Confusion of the issues does not present a problem as long as
a proper limiting instruction is given confining the jury’s consideration of the evidence to the
question of credibility.”). Garden concerned a motor vehicle accident. This case, by contrast,
involved dozens of parties and numerous contractual terms that made the case, on the whole, a
complicated one. For this reason, the Court required the parties to focus on this case, not the
various other cases involving the parties.

                                             -36-
         Fourth, Mr. Correia had already stated he was testifying in this trial voluntarily

because he “was asked to do so [by his employer], and [] willingly came,” so

questioning him on his answer in the earlier unrelated deposition was cumulative.

That said, if, as it has always appeared, Centene again wanted to get aspects of that

other litigation before this jury then that presentation was not strictly speaking

cumulative.

         Giving each factor its appropriate weight, the Court at trial and now finds the

danger of confusing the issues was paramount in excluding Mr. Correia’s deposition

testimony from the other case.            Additionally, the Court finds there was little

relevance to the deposition. Excluding the deposition transcript, therefore, was

proper.191

             b. William Wolfe’s Testimony

         Mr. Wolfe testified for Rite Aid in this case.192 To reiterate, Mr. Wolfe was a

Rite Aid employee from 1998 until 2011 and worked as Rite Aid’s senior vice

191
    Centene also argues that the Court erred in excluding Mr. Correia’s deposition from the other
case for another reason—the deposition somehow demonstrated Mr. Correia’s purported lack of
candor. Centene Motion at 26. Here, Centene charges Mr. Correia essentially lied to the jury.
Mr. Correia was asked why he flew across the country to testify at trial. See May 11 Trial Tr. at
62. Mr. Correia responded: “Well, the document that I believe is relevant to the case, I was the
author of. You know, Centene is one of [Caremark’s] largest clients; Rite Aid is a provider in our
network; I felt I should be here.” Id. at 63. In Centene’s singular view, Mr. Correia came to testify
in a self-serving capacity. Centene Motion at 26-27. But Centene’s own-held conjecture adds
nothing of substance to determining the admissibility of the evidence it claims was wrongly
excluded.
192
      May 18 Trial Tr. at 7.

                                               -37-
president of managed care and government affairs.193 Rite Aid’s counsel asked

Mr. Wolfe if he was aware, when the Program was conceptualized, of possible

challenges to U&C pricing by payors.194 Mr. Wolfe responded:

            I was aware that there was a risk that payors would use any angle they
            could to reduce generic reimbursement, and one of those vehicles
            would be to change the definition of usual and customary, which,
            unfortunately, FEP did, but no other PBMs or payors during my time at
            Rite Aid, before or after or since had suggested that [the Program] was
            U&C.195
            Centene took issue with Mr. Wolfe’s response and sought to question

Mr. Wolfe about a document that purported to show Rite Aid was submitting

Program prices as U&C to State Medicaid agencies, which allegedly contradicted

Mr. Wolfe’s testimony.196 During sidebar, the Court asked Centene’s counsel if the

document related to PBM and/or payor contracts, or if it related to only State

Medicaid agencies’ contracts; in context, the Court’s real-time interpretation was

that Mr. Wolfe was testifying about only PBM contracts.197 Centene’s counsel stated

the document related to State Medicaid agencies’ contracts.198 The Court excluded

the evidence because Mr. Wolfe was referring to contracts with PBMs, not contracts

193
      Id. at 8-9.
194
      Id. at 139-40.
195
      Id. at 140.
196
      See id. at 234-35.
197
      Id. at 236.
198
      Id.

                                             -38-
with State Medicaid agencies that are affected by state regulations.199 In other

words, the contracts with PBMs and the contracts with State Medicaid agencies were

“wholly different.”200

          Centene now argues that it was prevented from “fairly addressing a

misleading inaccuracy” in Mr. Wolfe’s testimony highlighted above.201

          Mr. Wolfe’s testimony was not misleading or inaccurate. Mr. Wolfe testified

about PBMs,202 not State Medicaid agencies. Mr. Wolfe’s testimony, thus, was not

inconsistent, and Centene had no basis to impeach him.

              c. Evidence of Centene’s Business and Client Base

          Centene’s next proffered basis for a new trial is a charge that Rite Aid’s

counsel repeatedly made “inflammatory comments” regarding Centene’s business

and financial position while the Court prohibited Centene from fairly responding.203

Centene complains Rite Aid’s counsel was permitted to call Centene “a large public

corporation” “seeking a huge amount of money,” a “gargantuan insurance company”

199
      Id. at 236-37.
200
      Id. at 237.
201
      Centene Motion at 27.
202
    See, e.g., May 18 Trial Tr. at 61-62; see also id. at 80 (“Well, I [i.e., Mr. Wolfe] think we’ve
already established that there was one program and one program only, FEP, where there was a
specific conversation around U&C including [Program] price, and in all other instances, during
my entire tenure and throughout the PBMs and so forth since I left Rite Aid, in no instance has a
retail discount card that includes enrollment and adjudication been passed as U&C on any PBM
contract that I’m aware of.”).
203
      Centene Motion at 28.

                                               -39-
seeking “a huge windfall,” and a “greedy” company “trying to cash in.”204 Centene

then argues it suffered prejudice because it wasn’t permitted to respond with

evidence that many of its members are Medicaid, Medicare, and Affordable Care

Act members; and Centene provides healthcare services to the elderly and

underprivileged.205

         There are two issues with Centene’s argument. First, as it relates to Rite Aid’s

counsel’s remarks during his opening statement and closing argument, again,

Centene didn’t object once. Because Centene did not object, its argument on these

comments is waived.206 Second, the Court clarified its rulings on this issue the first

day of trial (and before)—Centene could not present generalized argument or

evidence of Centene’s ties to Medicare and Medicaid if the evidence was not relevant

to the issues in this case because doing so implicated the “golden rule.”207

204
      See id. at 30
205
      Id. at 28-29.
206
    See Grenier, 981 A.2d at 541 n.27 (“[The Supreme] Court has consistently required that any
objections be made contemporaneously. Failure to do so waives any claim of error.”); see also
Permint v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 2022 WL 2444755, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 1, 2022) (citing
Wolhar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 1998 WL 472785, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 1, 1998)); Plant v.
Rosado, 2012 WL 2107114, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 4, 2012) (“[T]he Court notes that plaintiffs’
counsel did not object to defense counsel’s closing argument. He has, therefore, waived the
[objection].” (citing Grenier, 981 A.2d at 541)).
207
    See Delaware Olds, Inc. v. Dixon, 367 A.2d 178, 179 (Del. 1976) (“[A] ‘golden rule argument’
is where counsel asks the jury to place themselves in the shoes of a party to the suit in arriving at
a verdict, and to render such verdict as they would want rendered in case they were similarly
situated.” (cleaned up) (citation omitted)).

                                               -40-
         Allowing Centene to present untethered argument or evidence of its customer

base and ties to Medicare and Medicaid, in these circumstances, risked violating now

well-known and accepted proscriptions. On that, our Supreme Court has instructed

“it is universally held that [a golden rule] argument is improper and will constitute

reversible error.”208 In the Court’s view, allowing such argument and evidence—

absent direct tie to the specifics of this case—would also run afoul of DRE 403

because the probative value of Centene’s motives for highlighting its customer base

      The Court explained its particular concern on this issue thusly:
         Well, if there’s a direct contract reason why [Centene’s connection to Medicare and
         Medicaid] is relevant then that will be discussed with the witness at the time. As
         I’ve said before, I think it’s pretty clear what I don’t want to have happen is that all
         of a sudden there is the [suggestion], [“H]ey, folks, you in the box, we’re
         representing you.[”] You’re [Centene] not. You’re representing insurance carriers
         who, or health care plans now, seeking to recoup money. No, there is no individual
         client of those companies that is a party in this case, so I want to be very clear about,
         as I said, backdoor violating [of] the golden rule.
                        *                       *                        *
         Nobody is saying that Medicaid and Medicare are dirty words in this trial. . . .
         [W]hat I want to ensure is I do not want plaintiffs basically up there saying[,
         “W]e’re doing this for you and for all Medicaid and Medicare customers or
         patients[.” B]ecause that’s not true, that’s not happening. You’re not—there is not
         one thing in this complaint about returning money to anyone other than these
         corporations [the PBMs], that’s what this case is about. So, to the extent that things
         have to be mentioned because they are part of the contract, they do. What I don’t
         want is, again . . . somehow trying to place jurors in the place or their loved ones in
         the places [of Centene or its clients] because we never asked them about any of
         that[. W]e never asked them[, “D]o you rely on Medicaid or Medicare or do your
         loved ones do that.[”] This is [] about a contract dispute and it’s about whether or
         not this corporation [Rite Aid] pays . . . those corporations [Centene entities] money
         and that’s it, okay?
May 8 Trial Tr. at 136-37.
208
      Delaware Olds, Inc., 367 A.2d at 179 (citation omitted).

                                                    -41-
was substantially outweighed by the danger of, at least, unfair prejudice and

misleading the jury.209

         Centene’s last legal-error argument takes aim at Rite Aid’s counsel’s

comments during closing relating to the fact that Centene was seeking pre-judgment

interest.210     Centene objected.      The Court sustained the objection, struck the

comments from the record, and instructed the jury to disregard those comments.211

Even so, Centene now argues “the damage was done, the fairness of the trial was

undermined, and no instruction could rectify the prejudice.”212 Not so. “[T]o cure

the prejudicial effect of [] improper comments. . . . [g]enerally, a curative instruction

adequately mitigates any prejudice.”213 That’s what happened here.

         4. Centene Is Not Entitled to a New Trial Based
             on Rite Aid’s Counsel’s Other Comments.
         Centene advances two final grounds for a new trial: (1) Rite Aid’s counsel

used the Court’s March 2023 summary judgment Memorandum Opinion and Order

“as substantive evidence”; and (2) Rite Aid’s counsel, during closing argument,

209
      See DRE 403 (2023).
210
      Centene Motion at 30.
211
      May 22 Trial Tr. at 145.
212
      Centene Motion at 30.
213
    Estate of Swan v. Balan, 956 A.2d 1222, 1226 (Del. 2008) (citing Dunn v. Riley, 864 A.2d 905,
909 (Del. 2004)); Revel v. State, 956 A.2d 23, 30 (Del. 2008) (“We have held that an error can
normally be cured by the use of a curative instruction to the jury, and that jurors are presumed to
follow those instructions.” (cleaned up)); Pena v. State, 856 A.2d 548, 551 (Del. 2004) (holding
that “[p]rompt jury instructions are presumed to cure error and adequately direct the jury to
disregard improper statements”).

                                               -42-
“seized upon” a comment made by the Court during the prayer conference regarding

prescription drug co-pays.214 Either taken alone, or both taken together, “unfairly

prejudiced” Centene, so it says.215 Rite Aid says neither merits relief. On the first

complaint, Rite Aid recounts that: before trial, the Court approved the use of the

phrase “the law applicable to this case” to refer to earlier rulings as necessary; the

Court explained then that it would take up objections on its specific use as presented

during trial; and Centene did not object when Rite Aid used it.216 On the second

point, Rite Aid says the record itself supports its co-pay statement, as does the jury’s

common sense.217

         Centene provides not a single citation to law—in either its opening or reply

brief—in support of this claimed error.

         Regarding Centene’s first argument, Centene fails to identify where it ever

objected when Rite Aid employed the term “the law applicable to this case” at trial.

Centene points out the Court rejected a Centene-proposed limiting instruction

regarding the March 2023 summary judgment Opinion on the first day of trial.218

214
      Centene Motion at 32-34.
  Id.; Centene’s Reply Brief for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Or, Alternatively, for a
215

New Trial at 17-19 (D.I. 378).
216
      Rite Aid Answer at 37.
217
      Id. at 38-39.
218
      Centene Motion at 32.

                                            -43-
True, the Court proposed, instead, the parties create a stipulation for the jury.219

They never did so. But that is neither here nor there. Because what again is

dispositive is Centene never objected to Rite Aid’s use of the phrase “the law

applicable to this case” during trial, despite pretrial instructions to do so if counsel

believed at any specific point in trial it’s use was improper.220 Failure to object then

is fatal to Centene’s argument now.221

         Regarding Centene’s second argument, the trial record and common sense

supported Rite Aid’s counsel’s statement during closing argument that “I’ll bet you

[i.e., the jury] know from your experience $10 is a pretty common co-pay, isn’t

it?”222 Rite Aid’s counsel made that statement in reference to Michael Petron

(Centene’s damages expert)’s testimony.223 Mr. Petron testified his calculation

219
      May 8 Trial Tr. at 19-20.
220
    May 5, 2023 Pretrial Conference at 57, 60-62 (noting that the parties were to use “under the
law applicable in this case” to refer to earlier rulings as necessary, and instructing the parties to
object as necessary during trial so the Court could “make a ruling in the context of what is going
on at the time” because the Court needed to evaluate “an objection made in the context of that
specific witness” and that specific testimony) (D.I. 381).
221
    See supra note 150; see also Tilson v. Lutheran Senior Servs., Inc., 2013 WL 6596959, at *4
(Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2013) (observing on a motion for new trial: “The waiver rule is intended
to afford a trial court the immediate opportunity to correct any trial error. The rule fosters the
efficient trial of cases by ensuring that the Court may contemporaneously address any
objectionable statement or conduct, either with a curative instruction or otherwise.” (internal
citations omitted)).
222
      May 22 Trial Tr. at 103.
223
      See id. at 102-03.

                                                -44-
relied on “the amount paid by the patient at the time of sale,” which was either “the

retail value for cash customers [or] . . . the copay or patient pay amount.”224

Mr. Petron also testified:

          I examined the cash transactions and identified those instances in which
          the amount paid by the individual at the point of sale matched one of
          the known Wal-Mart advertised prices of $4 or $10. . . . There was lots
          and lots of transactions at four and ten dollars, and so those are the
          transactions I considered to be price matching.225

          Additionally, the jury was instructed: “You [i.e., the jury] are allowed to draw

reasonable conclusions from the testimony and exhibits, if you think those

conclusions are justified.        In other words, use your common sense to reach

conclusions based on the evidence.”226

          As this Court has previously explained when resolving an “improper

comments” issue:

          While jurors may generally not substitute their own judgment in areas
          where expert testimony is required, they clearly are allowed to assess
          the credibility of that witness and are free to decide to what extent they
          will accept the testimony. In performing this function, the jury is
          expected to use their common sense and counsel was asking nothing
          more of them. . . . the arguments made by counsel were not improper.227

224
      May 16 Trial Tr. at 86.
225
      Id. at 139.
226
   Jury Instructions at 1-2; see also Smith v. State, 317 A.2d 20, 23 (Del. 1974) (“Jurors are
expected to use all the experience, common sense and common knowledge they possess.”).
227
      Thomas v. Lagola, 2003 WL 22496355, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2003).

                                              -45-
Just the same here. The jury was urged to employ its common knowledge and

common sense when assessing whether Mr. Petron’s analysis might rely on some

faulty assumptions—that every $10 transaction was a price-matched sale. Centene

suffered no unfair prejudice as a result.

         In sum, no legal-error claim Centene forwards in its quest for a new trial

merits one. That is, Centene has not shouldered its heavy burden of demonstrating

that the jury’s verdict is tainted by legal error committed before or during the trial.228

         Centene elected to pursue a jury trial. Centene had just that. “When the

parties activate the jury trial system, they activate the risk inherent in the system.

And, of course, trials by jury implicate the most risky element of dispute

resolution—uncertainty.”229 The Court cannot now rescue Centene from the snares

found along the risky venture it set upon. And “the judicial system cannot and

should not make litigation risk-free.”230

         Centene’s Motion for a new trial is DENIED.

      C. RITE AID IS ENTITLED TO COSTS.

         Rite Aid requests the Court award costs against Centene.231 Rite Aid seeks:

228
    O’Riley, 69 A.3d at 1010 (stating that to grant a new trial on these grounds the Court must first
find legal error and “must then determine whether the mistakes constituted significant prejudice
so as to have denied the [complaining party] a fair trial”).
229
  Dunkle v. Prettyman, 2002 WL 833375, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. May 1, 2002); Galindez, 2006
WL 3457628, at *2 (“That is the nature of the beast.”).
230
      Dunkle, 2002 WL 833375, at *3 (cleaned up) (citation omitted).
231
      See Motion for Costs.

                                               -46-
(1) Court, filing, and electronic service fees; (2) service of process; and (3) trial

technology fees.232 Centene, generally, does not oppose Rite Aid’s Motion.233

Instead, Centene argues Rite Aid’s Motion is premature because Centene believes

it’s entitled to JNOV or a new trial.234 Because the Court has found Centene is

entitled neither to JNOV nor a new trial, it will now address Rite Aid’s request for

costs.

            To reiterate, Superior Court Civil Rule 54(d) provides “costs shall be allowed

as of course to the prevailing party upon application to the Court within ten (10) days

of entry of final judgment unless the Court otherwise directs.”235 Awarding costs is

a matter of judicial discretion,236 but the prevailing party is generally entitled to

costs.237 There are few circumstances where the Court will deny an award of costs

to the prevailing party; for instance, if the jury finds both parties equally or nearly

equally liable.238 Otherwise, the prevailing party is typically entitled to costs as a

232
      See id. at 2-3.
233
   See Centene’s Answering Brief in Opposition to Rite Aid’s Motion for Costs (“Centene
Answer”) at 1 (D.I. 376).
234
      Id.
235
      Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 54(d).
236
      Phelps, 2018 WL 1341704, at *1 (citing Olson, 2014 WL 1325909, at *1).
237
      Id. (citing Bodley, 65 A.2d at 487).
238
    See, e.g., Nelson v. Feldman, 2011 WL 531946, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan 26, 2011) (finding
the defendant 49% liable and the plaintiff 51% liable). Although Nelson is an automobile collision
case, it is illustrative of when this Court may deny costs. See id. at *2.

                                              -47-
matter of right.239

         In this case, Rite Aid ran the table. So, now the Court must consider what

costs to award to Rite Aid.

         Regarding Rite Aid’s Court, filing, and electronic services fees, Rite Aid

requests $2,089.75.240           Court fees, filing fees, and electronic service fees are

generally recoverable.241 Centene does not dispute Rite Aid’s calculations of these

costs, so the Court awards Rite Aid $2,089.75 for these fees.242

         Regarding Rite Aid’s service of process costs, Rite Aid requests $563.17. 243

Service of process fees are also generally recoverable.244 Centene does not dispute

Rite Aid’s calculations of these costs.245 The Court, therefore, awards $563.17 for

these fees.246

         Regarding trial technology fees, Rite Aid requests $12,528.75.247 This Court

239
      Phelps, 2018 WL 1341704, at *1 (citing Bodley, 65 A.2d at 487).
240
      Motion for Costs at 3; see also id., Ex. 1.
241
   In re Bracket Hldg. Corp. Litig., 2020 WL 764148, at *11 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2020) (citing
Dewey Beach Lions Club v. Longacre, 2006 WL 2987052, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 2006)).
242
    See id. (“As Defendants do not dispute [Plaintiff’s] calculations of [court fee, filing fee, and
electronic service fee] costs, the Court will allow them in the [total] amount [requested].”).
243
      Motion for Costs at 3; see also id., Ex. 2.
244
  In re Bracket Hldg. Corp. Litig., 2020 WL 764148, at *12 (citing Moyer v. Saunders, 2013
WL 4138116, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 24, 2013)).
245
      See Centene Answer at 1.
246
    In re Bracket Hldg. Corp. Litig., 2020 WL 764148, at *12 (awarding fees for service of process
costs that the other party did not dispute).
247
      Motion for Costs at 3; see also id., Ex. 3.

                                                    -48-
permits recovery of reasonable trial technology fees.248 Rite Aid’s trial technology

support staff significantly aided Rite Aid throughout the presentation of the evidence

at trial. And Centene does not dispute Rite Aid’s calculations of these costs.249 As

such, the Court awards Rite Aid $12,528.75 for these fees.

         Rite Aid’s Motion for costs is GRANTED. In total, the Court awards Rite

Aid $15,181.67 in costs.

                                    V. CONCLUSION

         For the foregoing reasons, Centene’s Motion for JNOV is DENIED in full;

Centene’s Motion for alternative relief in the form of a new trial is DENIED; and

Rite Aid’s Motion for costs is GRANTED.

         IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                            _______________________
                                                            Paul R. Wallace, Judge

248
     See, e.g., In re Bracket Hldg. Corp. Litig., 2020 WL 764148, at *13 (“This Court will allow
recovery only to the extent of the cost of technology support services that were provided during
trial.”); TranSched Sys. Ltd. v. Versyss Transit Sols., LLC, 2012 WL 1415466, at *5 (Del. Super.
Ct. Mar. 29, 2012) (awarding $14,801 as “technical support staff” costs because plaintiff’s “trial
technology support person was critical to the trial presentation and the viewing of the numerous
exhibits introduced in this case”), superseded on other grounds, Noranda Aluminum Hldg. Corp.
v. XL Ins. Am., Inc., 269 A.3d 974 (Del. 2021); Salt Meadows Homeowners Assoc., Inc. v. Zonko
Builders, Inc., 2023 WL 1370997, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2023) (awarding $16,258.45 as
“computer exhibit operator” fees because the “operator helped to keep the multitude of documents
organized and readily available for witnesses”).
249
      Centene Answer at 1.

                                              -49-