Court Opinion

ID: 9562190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:23:21.816024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:14.865551
License: Public Domain

McFARLAND, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the views expressed by the majority opinion in this case.
I feel that now is the time, and this is the case, to reconsider our past decisions on the question of compensation for impaired access, when applied to the new type of high-speed limited-access highways now being built. The old rules are simply not suitable for these super-highways, and the trend of the more recent cases is to so hold. Thus, in Moses v. State Highway Commission, 261 N.C. 316, 134 S.E.2d 664, we find:
“Ancient doctrines pertaining to roads of the horse and buggy days, when these roads were for the most part trails through the woods and fields, must be applied to modern conditions with caution and sound discrimination. Once ‘ingress and egress’ were practically all such a road afforded, and there is logic in the thought that it is all of such a doctrine which should survive * * * The trend of judicial decision * * * is decidedly toward confining such a right to the necessity of ingress and egress.
“ * * * [A]bsolute equality of convenience cannot be achieved, and those who * * * purchase and occupy *201property in proximity to public roads or streets do so with notice that they may be changed as demanded by the public interest. * * * It is not enough that the vacation results merely in some inconvenience to his access, or compels a more circuitous route of access, or a diversion of traffic from the premises, or a consequent diminution in value. * * * An inconvenience of that nature is held to be no different in kind, but merely in degree, from that sustained by the general public, and is damnum absque injuria.
“Our trunk line highways are built and maintained to meet public necessity and convenience in travel, and not for the enhancement of property of occasional landowners along the route.”
In Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Bingham, 231 Ark. 934, 333 S.W.2d 728, 732, the court said:
“As the problem of regulating motor vehicle traffic on the highways has become more and more complex, new standards of design for highway construction have been adopted * * * to reduce the hazards of travel and expedite the flow of traffic. * * * Such rules and regulations have been recognized by all of the authorities as a valid exercise of the police power.”
As stated by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322:
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.”
I believe that the whole subject should be re-examined in the light of the trend of the cases in other states and the decisions of our own Court. We have set forth rules in a line of cases in regard to this subject, including State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988. I think the majority fails to apply and interpret those rules properly, as far as they prescribe the measure of damages for destroying or impairing an abutting owner’s access rights.
The gravamen of Wilson’s complaint is that motorists no longer come directly from the highway to rent rooms at his guest ranch. He attributes this situation to the fact that the highway is fenced along his property line, and by the time the motorists see the beauty of the area, they have already passed the first interchange, and the second interchange is not seen until after they have passed the property. In my opinion it does not follow that the limitation of access is the cause of Wilson’s decreased revenue, for several reasons: (1) His access to the highway was extremely limited in the before situation, by the natural topography which made it impossible for prospective guests to enter his property from the highway, except at two or three points; (2) The mere fact that the highway was widened, the surface improved, and the speed limit increased, could account for the fact that motorists’ high speeds were the reason for Wilson’s property being by-passed; and (3) There was no showing that other motels in the area had not increased in number, or stepped up their advertising or offered better accommodations than Wilson’s.
There is no proof in the record that the motel operation was profitable. So far as we know, it may have been operating at a loss, in which event the whole theory of the case — that the highest and best use was for a motel — is untenable.
But, conceding for the purpose of the argument that the State’s construction impaired the access of these two condemnees, and that this gave rise to the necessity of compensating them, still the majority opinion fails to recognize that the measure of damages approved in Thelberg, supra, was misapplied and misinterpreted by the trial court in the instant case.
*202In State ex rel. Sullivan v. Carrow, 57 Ariz. 434, 440, 114 P.2d 896, 898, we held that:
“* * * Yet we conclude that appellant seeks compensation for the loss of something he never had, something in which he had no claim of property right or ownership at any time; that something being the right and privilege, as against the state or any one else, to perpetuate the highway along and in front of appellant’s lands. This is his sole loss, and we conclude it to be noncompensable in damages. * * *
* * * [T]he loss occasioned by the Tact that traffic no longer stopped as it fhad, and thus defendants’ improvements -were of no further value, cannot be considered as an element.”
This rule applies whether traffic has been 'diverted by changing the highway’s grade '(Thelberg, supra), by changing its location '((Carrow, supra), or by erecting a divider along the median (Rayburn v. State ex rel. Willey, 93 Ariz. 54, 378 P.2d 496). Depreciation in value of property, caused by loss of traffic, is damnum absque injuria. The same is true of loss of business profits caused by decreased traffic. State v. McDonald, 88 Ariz. 1, 352 P.2d 343.
In Thelberg, supra, we said:
■“The measure of damages for the destruction or impairment of access * * is the difference between the market value •of the abutting property immediately before and immediately after the destruction or impairment thereof. * * * Other means of access * * * may be taken into consideration.”
It is clear to me that Thelberg, supra, in .-prescribing the difference between the be:fore and after values as the measure of < damages for impairing access, did not intend :to change the rules previously established :and to include elements of damage not «otherwise compensable.
The problem is stated in 56 Northwestern Univ.Law Rev. 587, at page 604:
“Since the before-valuation will reflect the value added because of the proximity of heavy traffic, and the after-valuation will reflect the decline because of its absence, this rule compensates the owner for the diversion of traffic, even though compensation would be denied if the highway had been completely relocated a mile or two away.”
E. Coleman Gorman, in 3 Ariz.Law Rev. 48, writes as follows:
“The court [in Thelberg] confined its deliberations to access rights, since there was no question of traffic flow loss before it for consideration. Nevertheless, in reality, traffic flow loss was comingled with access loss in the finding of fact in the trial court. Had the lower court found separate items of damages, as suggested under A.R.S. 12-1122B showing what part of this $10, 750.000 was for access loss and what part for traffic flow loss, the finding would have disclosed that the lion’s share was for the loss of the flow of traffic * * * the diversion of which lowered its highest and best use from commercial to residential property, resulting in a reduction of value not so much for access loss as for diversion of traffic.” [Italics ours.]
In Thelberg, the trial court found that the taking included some of the improvements, and that, after the taking, the highest and •best use went from commercial to residential, so the real question of traffic flow was not clearly presented on appeal.
In Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505, 520, in a 20-page opinion, the Supreme Court of California stated:
“It was contended on behalf of the landowner that because * * * he was entitled to recover for that injury, the damages to his remaining land should be based upon the total depreciation in the value of his remaining property even though that depreciation was caused primarily by an admittedly noncompensable element of damage, that is, diversion of traffic. * * * While diminution in market value [is] ordinarily the test of *203damage to real property, the damages must be limited to those which accrue by reason of the legal injury for which compensation [¿r] due.” [Italics supplied.]
In City of Chicago v. Spoor, 190 Ill. 340, 60 N.E. 540, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
“This being a suit where access to the property was affected, the [trial] court seems to have held that everything resulting from the improvement which affected unfavorably the utility of the property for business purposes was an element of damage * * *_ The evidence of damages resulting from diversion of traffic or changing the method of transportation on the street, was not legitimate for any purpose, and opinions of witnesses based on depreciation from those causes should have been excluded.”
Gorman, in 3 Ariz.Law Rev. 48, 53, says:
“The ‘before and after’ formula in the Thelberg case makes sense if we give the proper weight to non-compensable items * * * by deducting from the gross diminution of market value due to all damages, that portion attributable to noncompensable items such as loss of the king’s traffic.” [Italics supplied.]
In Blumenstein v. City of Long Beach, 143 Cal.App.2d 264, 299 P.2d 347, the court stated:
“ * * * [Although diminution of market value of the subject property caused by the construction of the complained-of improvement is in general a proper measure of damages in condemnation actions, direct or inverse, the decline in market value must be tempered by an exclusion of loss of value due to non-compensable injury. Appellate decisions of this state have made it clear that damages resulting from mere diversion of traffic or inconvenience resulting from circuitry of travel in reaching the subject property are noncompensable.” [Italics ours.]
In Sacramento and San Joachim Drainage District ex rel. Reclamation Board v. Reed, 215 Cal.App.2d 60, 29 Cal.Rptr. 847, 850, the court said: ,
“Where cross-examination reveals that loss-of-value testimony was based on noncompensable items, the testimony will be stricken in response to a proper motion.”
It is contended that even though it is admitted that the diversion of the traffic flow is a noncompensable item, nevertheless the impairment of the owner’s access in the instant case has reduced the highest and best use of the land from commercial to residential. The real question involved, however, is whether — even though this contention is true — the decrease in best use is due to impairment of access, which is compensable, or is due to decreased traffic-flow, which is not.
“ * * * [A] loss occasioned by the diversion of traffic is not compensableIt is not denied in this case that the-lessee’s major loss of business was the-result diversion of through traffic * The right here claimed by lessee is not to> be confused with its right of ingress and egress. The latter right * * * is a property right which is compensable.” Ark. State Highway Commission v. Bingham, 231 Ark. 934, 333 S.W.2d 728.
Thus, it is clear that the rule announced by Thelberg was intended to mean, and should be construed to mean, that the measure of damages, where access is taken or impaired, is that part of the difference in the before and after market values of the remaining property, which is due to the taking of, or injury to the right of access, not including any damages caused by noncompensable factors.
So much for the principal issue of this-case. There are a number of collateral issues on which I also disagree with the majority' — namely, certain rulings on the admissibility of evidence. However, in the interests of brevity I will not discuss them. Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, some-of the evidence admitted was clearly improper.
For the reasons set out above, this case-should be reversed and remanded.