Court Opinion

ID: 9778667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:15:46.274346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:12.458246
License: Public Domain

Paul Ward, Justice. Appellants, Willie Joe Childs, Frankie Matthews, and Tommy Matthews, charged with stealing $500 from Kroger Stores, were convicted of grand larceny on December 5, 1966 and sentenced to serve nine years in the penitentiary. There is no contention by appellants here that they did not commit the crime but they seek a reversal based solely on the grounds that the trial court committed three separate errors during the process of the trial. We have carefully examined each of the alleged errors and, as explained hereafter, find no merit in any of them. One. It is first urged that the court erred in admitting in evidence the confession made by appellants “without the benefit of counsel”. The undisputed testimony of the State Police Investigators (to whom the admissions of guilt were made by Tommy and Frankie Matthews) is that appellants were advised of their rights to have an attorney and to refuse to answer questions, and that if they did make any admission of guilt it might be used against them. Appellants, for a reversal, rely on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, citing the following statement: “If an individual held for interrogation by a law enforcement officer indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. ’ ’ At no time did Tommy or Frankie Matthews in any way indicate they wanted to consult with an attorney. With reference to Childs’ confession the situation was different. Bill Mitchell (a criminal investigator) testified: “I advised him that he didn’t have to tell me anything unless he had an attorney present and that if he did tell me something it might be used against him. That if he didn’t have funds for an attorney I would be glad to get him one.” After a conference in chambers between the court and the attorneys the witness further testified: “Q. When you asked Willie Joe Childs whether or not he wanted an attorney, what was his reply? “A. He said that he did, and he agreed to go ahead and talk to me. "Q. He agreed to go ahead and talk to you? "A. Yes, sir. "Q. After you asked him if he wanted an attorney and you advised him of his other rights you have outlined? “A. Yes, sir.” Following the above the witness testified to what Childs told him. Again, no objection was made to the above testimony, and no exception was saved. Thus, if it be admitted for the purpose of this opinion that the court erred in allowing the confessions in evidence, such cannot be reviewed on appeal. Criner v. State, 236 Ark. 220, 365 S. W. 2d 252 and Norman v. State, 236 Ark. 476, 366 S. W. 2d 891. Also, we point out our holding in the case of Slaughter & Scott v. State, 240 Ark. 471, 400 S. W. 2d 267, where we said: “However, this is a personal right and the accused may knowingly and intelligently waive counsel either at a pretrial stage or at the trial.” Two. It is next contended that the conrt erred in allowing the state to introduce testimony showing appellants were “habitual and consistent criminals”. The question in issue arose in this manner. After the State Investigator had testified at some length regarding his connection with the investigation of the case, he made this statement: “I advised both subjects [Mat-thewses] of their rights, of their right to counsel, of their rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and during the interview were advised that they had committed a till tap . . . .” Thereupon appellants’ attorney objected “. . .unless he can show they had an attorney present when they made the statement”. The trial court overruled the objection and exceptions were saved by appellant. A “till tap”, as explained by the State Investigator, is where one person attracts the attention of the guardian of the “till” while his accomplice takes the money. In other words, that is one way of committing larceny to which these appellants confessed. We find no reversible error for the reason, as previously pointed out, the Matthewses at no time requested an attorney although they were fully advised of their right to have one. Three. Finally, appellants contend the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to declare a mistrial because of a certain statement made by the State’s Attorney in his closing argument to the jury. The essence of the statement was that the defendants do not live in the county, ‘ ‘ they came in here. They stole somebody else’s money, money that other people worked hard for. All you folks worked hard for your money. They didn’t — They don’t; They won’t. Send them to the Arkansas Penitentiary'for 21 years”. We find no reversible error. The jurors were evidently not'too much impressed with the argument — they gave the defendants nine years and not twenty one. No objection was made to the argument at the time, but only after the jury had- announced its verdict. Therefore the trial court had no opportunity to admonish the jury, even had it been necessary to do so and we don’t think it was. In the case of Reynolds v. State, 220 Ark. 188, 246 S. W. 2d 724, we find his statement: “Our rule is that we do ‘not reverse for the mere expression of opinion of counsel in their argument before juries, unless so flagrant as to arouse passion and prejudice, made for that purpose, and necessarily having that effect’ ”. To the same effect see Freeman v. State, 238 Ark. 804 (p. 808), 385 S. W. 2d 156. Affirmed. Fogleman, J., concurs. Byrd and Brown, JJ., dissent.