Court Opinion

ID: 9690432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:12:42.164607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:21.573887
License: Public Domain

COOPER, Justice,
dissenting.
On April 17, 2001, I circulated a draft opinion that would have reversed this case for a jury trial because of the failure to follow the procedure mandated by RCr 9.26(1): “Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the Commonwealth.” Alas, there were not four members of this Court willing to enforce our own rule. Now, twenty-eight months later, the majority of this Court has decided to remand this case to the trial court for a “retrospective voluntariness hearing,” compare Thompson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 56 S.W.3d 406 (2001) (retrospective competency hearing), to determine whether Appellant “knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently” made an off-the record, unwritten waiver of his right to trial by jury.
Of course, the burden of proof will be on the Commonwealth; and unless the Commonwealth can find, e.g., a jailhouse informant, the only persons who could testify to the critical fact would be Appellant and his attorneys. No doubt, Appellant, whose conviction is not yet final, will assert his Fifth Amendment right not to testify against himself, U.S. Const., amend. V; and, no doubt, he will assert his lawyer-client privilege to prevent his attorneys from testifying against him. KRE 503. (This is not a malpractice action or an RCr 11.42-type proceeding in which Appellant is claiming ineffective assistance of counsel so as to constitute an automatic waiver. Appellant is claiming that he did not make a written waiver of his right to trial by jury as required by a rule adopted by this Court.)
To preclude any further delay in the resolution of this matter, I simply adopt *137the legal analysis of my original draft opinion (portions of which have been adopted by the majority opinion) as my dissent, viz:
Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to trial by jury. “The ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and the right thereof remain inviolate, ...” The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution also preserves this right: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ....”1 The history of trial by an impartial jury stretches back to the Magna Carta and the early history of England, where juries developed as a means to protect individuals against the arbitrary and oppressive power of the crown. Duncan v. Louisiana, supra note 1, at 151, 88 S.Ct. at 1448; but see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 91, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1901, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (suggesting that juries do not derive from the Magna Carta). Thus, Blackstone termed the right to trial by jury “the glory of the English law.” 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 379 (photo, reprint 1992) (1768). As English colonists settled America, they brought this heralded right with them:
Those who emigrated to this country from England brought with them this great privilege ‘as their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law which had fenced around and interposed barriers on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power.’
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50, 18 S.Ct. 620, 622, 42 L.Ed. 1061 (1898) (quoting 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1779), overruled on other grounds, Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). Thus, the right to a jury trial is imbedded in the history of our nation and our Commonwealth and is fundamental to our system of justice. As the United States Supreme Court has said:
The framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.
Duncan, supra note 1, at 156, 88 S.Ct. at 1451.
So important was this right that not until 1930 was it definitively held that a criminal defendant could waive the right to a trial by jury. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 50 S.Ct. 253, 263, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930), abrogated by, Williams v. Florida, supra; see also Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275, 63 S.Ct. 236, 240, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942). And not until 1975 did Kentucky follow suit and hold that a felony defendant could waive the right to a jury trial. Short v. Commonwealth, Ky., 519 S.W.2d 828 (1975). In that case, our predecessor Court held that, in order to effectuate a valid waiver, the defendant must voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waive the right to an impartial jury, that the Commonwealth must consent, and that the court must approve. Id. at 832-33. See also Patton, supra, at 312, 50 S.Ct. at 263; *138Adams, supra, at 275, 63 S.Ct. at 240. In determining whether a valid waiver has occurred, the same standards apply as are required on the acceptance of a guilty plea; and the record must disclose affirmative “facts which will permit an independent determination of [the waiver’s] validity.” Short, supra, at 833, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
In 1981, we promulgated RCr 9.26(1), which states “[e]ases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the Commonwealth.” (Emphasis added.) This essentially codifies the holding in Short but adds the important proviso that a defendant must waive a jury trial “in writing.” We have not previously addressed whether the “in writing” requirement of RCr 9.26(1) is mandatory or whether, as the Commonwealth posits, some form of oral waiver might suffice.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (FRCP) 23(a) is identical to RCr 9.26(1).2 Under the federal rule, four conditions must be met for a valid waiver. One, the defendant must knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive that right. Two, the government’s attorney must consent. Three, the trial court must agree. Four, the waiver must be in writing. United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1431 (10th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 844 [116 S.Ct. 133, 133 L.Ed.2d 81] (1995). Federal courts have held that the “writing requirement is designed to impress the defendant with the gravity of the right relinquished and provide the best evidence of the defendant’s voluntary consent.” United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 271 (6th Cir.1983). See also Robertson, supra, at 1431; United States v. Guerrero-Peral-ta, 446 F.2d 876, 877 (9th Cir.1971).3 However, most United States Courts of Appeals do not require strict compliance with the “in writing” provision of FRCP 23(a). Robertson, supra, at 1431; United States v. Robinson, 8 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003, 1012 (11th Cir.1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985). But “[t]he only exception [to the “in writing” requirement] is where the record clearly reflects that the defendant ‘personally gave express consent in open court, intelligently and knowingly.’ ” Saadya, supra note 3, at 1420 (quoting Guerrero-Peralta, supra, at 877); Robinson, supra, at 422. This would seem to comport with the pre-RCr 9.26(1) holding in Short v. Commonwealth, supra, at 833, that an inquiry similar to that required for determining the validity of a guilty plea would suffice. See Boykin v. Alabama, supra.
In that regard, all of the United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue strongly urge that federal trial courts engage the defendant in a colloquy concerning waiver of a jury trial to inform the defendant that a jury consists of twelve members of the community, that a defendant can take part in selecting his/her jury, that a jury verdict must be unanimous, and that the court alone will decide a defendant’s guilt or innocence if a jury is waived. *139See Robertson, supra, at 1432; United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852-53 (9th Cir.1985); Martin, supra, at 274-75. This colloquy ensures that the defendant’s waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; that challenges to the waiver are avoided on appeal; and that the defendant truly understands the enormity of the right forfeited. Cochran, supra, at 852. Thus, under federal law, a written waiver is only one factor to consider in determining if the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the right to trial by jury. In addition and of equal importance is whether the defendant personally waived the right in open court and if the trial judge conducted a colloquy with the defendant to ensure a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.
Here, there was no written waiver “to impress the defendant with the gravity of the right relinquished and provide the best evidence of the defendant’s voluntary consent.” Martin, supra, at 271. Nor did the waiver come from Appellant’s own mouth; instead, his counsel informed the trial judge of the waiver as Appellant stood silently by. Thus, even if we were to apply the less stringent federal standard permitting an oral rather than a written waiver, the facts of this case would still require reversal; for Appellant was never asked and never personally acknowledged on the record his consent to the waiver or that he fully understood the gravity of that decision. Waiver of the right to trial by jury will not be inferred from silence or mere acquiescence. We are not persuaded otherwise by the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Page, 661 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 [102 S.Ct. 1713, 72 L.Ed.2d 136] (1982). There, the defendant’s waiver was held valid, despite the absence of a written waiver and despite the fact that, as here, counsel informed the trial judge of the waiver and the defendant merely failed to object. However, the court made much of Page’s education and occupation, a Ph.D. in parasitology and a former university professor of biology; the actual waiver by Page’s counsel: “ ‘[H]e and his client, Dr. Page, had given considerable thought over ... the weekend to the question of whether to try this case to the jury ... [and] they both decided that a bench trial was preferable ...;”’ and the fact that the venire were present in the courtroom when the waiver was made (thus emphasizing the defendant’s right to a jury trial). Id. at 1080-82. Even if we were inclined to follow Page, none of those factors are present here. The record does not reflect that Appellant is a highly educated individual, or that he and his counsel discussed the pros and cons of a bench trial as opposed to a trial by jury, or that the decision to waive jury trial was an informed choice agreed upon by both Appellant and his attorney. Nor, unlike Page, were the venire present in the courtroom and immediately ready to provide a trial by jury when the waiver occurred. Furthermore, not all United States Courts of Appeals would agree with Page. See Guerrero-Peralta, supra, at 877, stating “[a]n assertion by defense counsel that the defendant has consented [to a waiver] is less reliable evidence, even when coupled with the inference of acquiescence drawn from defendant’s failure to protest. Such an assertion is insufficient to show that the defendant’s consent ... was given with the requisite degree of understanding.”
The United States Supreme Court has stated:
*140Trial by jury is the normal and ... the preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases .... Not only must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body in criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant. And the duty of the trial court in that regard is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial ... and with a caution increasing in degree as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity.
Patton, supra, at 312-18, 50 S.Ct. at 263.
This was a one-day trial. This Court has spent three years searching for an excuse to avoid enforcement of our own rule of criminal procedure so as to affirm this conviction. Unable to do so, the majority now remands the case to the trial judge with directions to conduct his own search. I believe we should either enforce RCr 9.26(1) or rescind it. I also believe an appellate court should decide cases on the basis of the record before it, not remand cases to the trial court with the option of either creating a better record that will justify an affirmance or assuming the awkward posture of having to reverse his/her own judgment. It may be just a coincidence, but I do not recall this Court ever remanding a case so that the record could be supplemented on behalf of a criminal defendant. Usually we refer to the defendant’s obligation to preserve the error, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ferrell, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 520 (2000), or to ensure that the record is properly forwarded for review, e.g., Fanelli v. Commonwealth, Ky., 423 S.W.2d 255 (1968).
Accordingly, I dissent.
STUMBO, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. The Fourteenth Amendment makes this portion of the Sixth Amendment applicable to the states. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968).

. FRCP 23(a) states: "Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and consent of the government.”

. Guerrero-Peralta concerned waiver of the requirement of a twelve-person jury. However, other Ninth Circuit cases cite it as applicable to waiver from jury trial to bench trial. E.g., United States v. Saadya, 750 F.2d 1419, 1420 (9th Cir.1985).