Court Opinion

ID: 9404569
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Date Created: 2023-06-23 15:01:14.543763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.544236
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(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2022                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

             SAMIA, AKA SAMIC v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                 THE SECOND CIRCUIT

      No. 22–196.      Argued March 29, 2023—Decided June 23, 2023
Petitioner Adam Samia, along with Joseph Hunter and Carl Stillwell,
  were arrested by the U. S. Drug Enforcement Administration and
  charged with a variety of offenses related to the murder-for-hire of
  Catherine Lee, a real-estate broker. The Government tried all three
  defendants jointly in the Southern District of New York. Prior to trial,
  the Government moved to admit Stillwell’s postarrest confession in
  which he admitted that he had been in the van in which Lee was killed,
  but he claimed that Samia had shot Lee. Since Stillwell would not be
  testifying on his own behalf and the full confession implicated Samia,
  the Government proposed that the confession be introduced through
  the testimony of a DEA agent, who would testify to the content of Still-
  well’s confession in a way that eliminated Samia’s name while avoid-
  ing any obvious indications of redaction. The District Court granted
  the Government’s motion with additional alterations to conform to its
  understanding of this Court’s Confrontation Clause precedents.
     At trial, the Government’s theory of the case was that Hunter had
  hired Samia and Stillwell to pose as real-estate buyers and visit prop-
  erties with Lee and that Samia, Stillwell, and Lee were in a van driven
  by Stillwell when Samia shot Lee. As part of the Government’s case
  in chief, a DEA agent testified that Stillwell had confessed to “a time
  when the other person he was with pulled the trigger on that woman
  in a van that he and Mr. Stillwell was driving.” (Emphasis added.)
  Other portions of the agent’s testimony recounting Stillwell’s confes-
  sion used the “other person” descriptor to refer to someone with whom
  Stillwell had traveled and lived and who carried a particular firearm.
  Both before the agent’s testimony and again prior to deliberations, the
  District Court instructed the jury that the agent’s testimony about
  Stillwell’s confession was admissible only as to Stillwell and should not
2                      SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                                  Syllabus

    be considered as to Samia or Hunter. Samia and his codefendants
    were convicted on all counts. On appeal, Samia argued that the ad-
    mission of Stillwell’s confession was constitutional error because other
    evidence and statements at trial enabled the jury to immediately infer
    that the “other person” described in the confession was Samia himself.
    The Second Circuit, pointing to the established practice of replacing a
    defendant’s name with a neutral noun or pronoun in a nontestifying
    codefendant’s confession, held that the admission of Stillwell’s confes-
    sion did not violate Samia’s Confrontation Clause rights.
Held: The Confrontation Clause was not violated by the admission of a
 nontestifying codefendant’s confession that did not directly inculpate
 the defendant and was subject to a proper limiting instruction. Pp. 5–
 17.
    (a) Stillwell’s formal, Mirandized confession to authorities is testi-
 monial and thus falls within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment’s Con-
 frontation Clause, which forbids the introduction of out-of-court “testi-
 monial” statements unless the witness is unavailable and the
 defendant has had the chance to cross-examine the witness previously.
 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 52–54. The Clause, how-
 ever, applies only to witnesses “against the accused.” Id., at 50. And
 “[o]rdinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced at a joint trial
 is not considered to be a witness ‘against’ a defendant if the jury is
 instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant.”
 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 206. This general rule is con-
 sistent with the Clause’s text, historical practice, and the law’s reli-
 ance on limiting instructions in other contexts. Pp. 5–9.
       (1) Longstanding practice permitted a nontestifying codefendant’s
 confession to be admitted in a joint trial so long as the jury was
 properly instructed not to consider it against the nonconfessing de-
 fendant. This practice is identified in early treatises, see, e.g., S. Phil-
 lipps, Law of Evidence 82; in the early cases of this Court, see, e.g.,
 Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 58; United States v. Ball, 163 U. S.
 662, 672; and in many States with a similar constitutional right of con-
 frontation, see, e.g., State v. Workman, 15 S. C. 540, 545. Notably,
 none of these treatises or cases suggests that a confession naming a
 codefendant must in all cases be altered to refer to “another person”
 (or something similar). Thus, while it is unclear that any alteration to
 Stillwell’s confession was necessary, historical practice suggests that
 altering a nontestifying codefendant’s confession not to name the de-
 fendant, coupled with a limiting instruction, was enough to permit the
 introduction of such confessions at least as an evidentiary matter.
 Pp. 6–8.
       (2) This historical practice is in accord with the law’s broader as-
 sumption that jurors will “ ‘attend closely the particular language of
                    Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)                        3

                                Syllabus

[limiting] instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand,
make sense of, and follow’ ” them. United States v. Olano, 507 U. S.
725, 740. And the presumption that jurors follow limiting instructions
applies to statements that are substantially more credible and incul-
patory than a codefendant’s confession. See, e.g., Harris v. New York,
401 U. S. 222, 223–225. To disregard or to make unnecessary excep-
tions to this principle “would make inroads into th[e] entire complex
code of . . . criminal evidentiary law, and would threaten other large
areas of trial jurisprudence.” Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 562. Pp.
8–9.
    (b) The Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, “recognized
a narrow exception to” the presumption that juries follow their instruc-
tions, holding “that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a
nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial,” even with
a proper instruction. Richardson, 481 U. S., at 207. In Bruton, the
prosecution introduced a confession by Bruton’s codefendant that im-
plicated Bruton by name. The Court held that the confession’s intro-
duction substantially threatened Bruton’s right to confront the wit-
nesses against him, reasoning that “there are some contexts in which
the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great,
and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the prac-
tical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” 391
U. S., at 135.
    In Richardson v. Marsh, the Court “decline[d] to extend [Bruton]
further” to “confessions that do not name the defendant.” 481 U. S., at
211. Richardson involved a redacted confession that “was not incrim-
inating on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence in-
troduced later at trial.” Id., at 208. In such cases of inferential incrim-
ination, the Court posited that “the judge’s instruction may well be
successful in dissuading the jury from entering onto the path of infer-
ence.” Ibid.
    The Court in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U. S. 185, 194, later qualified
Richardson by holding that certain obviously redacted confessions
might be “directly accusatory,” and thus fall within Bruton’s rule, even
if they did not specifically use a defendant’s name. Gray involved
whether admission of a co-defendant’s confession altered “by substi-
tuting for the defendant’s name in the confession a blank space or the
word ‘deleted’ ” violated the Confrontation Clause. Id., at 188. The
Court in Gray concluded that, when a redacted confession “simply re-
place[s] a name with an obvious blank space or a word such as ‘deleted’
or a symbol or other similarly obvious indications of alteration,” the
evidence “so closely resemble[s] Bruton’s unredacted statements that
. . . the law must require the same result.” Id., at 192. Pp. 9–14.
4                       SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                                   Syllabus

       (c) The Court’s precedents in this area distinguish between confes-
    sions that directly implicate a defendant and those that do so indi-
    rectly. Accordingly, neither Bruton, Richardson, nor Gray provides li-
    cense to flyspeck trial transcripts in search of evidence that could give
    rise to a collateral inference that a defendant was named in an altered
    confession. Here, the District Court’s admission of Stillwell’s confes-
    sion, accompanied by a limiting instruction, did not run afoul of this
    Court’s precedents. Stillwell’s confession was redacted to avoid nam-
    ing Samia, satisfying Bruton’s rule. And, it was not obviously redacted
    in a manner resembling the confession in Gray; the neutral references
    to some “other person” were not akin to an obvious blank or the word
    “deleted.” Pp. 14–16.
       (d) Expanding Bruton in the way Samia proposes would be incon-
    sistent with longstanding practice and this Court’s precedents, would
    work an unnecessary and imprudent change in law, and would require
    federal and state trial courts to conduct extensive pretrial hearings.
    Because it would be impractical to fully police juror inferences, the
    likely practical consequence of extending Bruton here would be to
    mandate severance whenever the prosecution wishes to introduce the
    confession of a nontestifying codefendant in a joint trial. But, as the
    Court has observed, that is “too high” a price to pay. Richardson, 481
    U. S., at 210. Samia’s proposal is not compelled by the Confrontation
    Clause, and it ignores both the “vital role” joint trials play in the crim-
    inal justice system, and the fact that confessions are “ ‘essential to so-
    ciety’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those
    who violate the law.’ ” Id., at 209–210. Pp. 16–17.
Affirmed.

  THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined, and in which BAR-
RETT, J., joined as to all but Part II–A. BARRETT, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment. KAGAN, J., filed a dis-
senting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and JACKSON, JJ., joined.
JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
                        Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)                              1

                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 22–196
                                   _________________

       ADAM SAMIA, AKA SAL, AKA ADAM SAMIC,
          PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                                 [June 23, 2023]

   JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
   Prosecutors have long tried criminal defendants jointly in
cases where the defendants are alleged to have engaged in
a common criminal scheme. However, when prosecutors
seek to introduce a nontestifying defendant’s confession im-
plicating his codefendants, a constitutional concern may
arise. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
states that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.” And, in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S.
123 (1968), this Court “held that a defendant is deprived of
his rights under the Confrontation Clause when his nontes-
tifying codefendant’s confession naming him as a partici-
pant in the crime is introduced at their joint trial, even if
the jury is instructed to consider that confession only
against the codefendant.” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S.
200, 201–202 (1987).
   Here, we must determine whether the Confrontation
Clause bars the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s
confession where (1) the confession has been modified to
avoid directly identifying the nonconfessing codefendant
2                 SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

and (2) the court offers a limiting instruction that jurors
may consider the confession only with respect to the con-
fessing codefendant. Considering longstanding historical
practice, the general presumption that jurors follow their
instructions, and the relevant precedents of this Court, we
conclude that it does not.
                               I
  Petitioner Adam Samia traveled to the Philippines in
2012 to work for crime lord Paul LeRoux. While there,
LeRoux tasked Samia, Joseph Hunter, and Carl Stillwell
with killing Catherine Lee, a local real-estate broker who
LeRoux believed had stolen money from him. Lee was
found dead shortly thereafter, shot twice in the face at close
range.
  Later that year, LeRoux was arrested by the U. S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and became a cooper-
ating witness for the Government. Hunter, Samia, and
Stillwell were arrested thereafter. During a search of Sa-
mia’s home, law enforcement found a camera containing
surveillance photographs of Lee’s home as well as a key to
the van in which Lee had been murdered. And, during Still-
well’s arrest, law enforcement found a cell phone containing
thumbnail images of Lee’s dead body. Later, during a
postarrest interview with DEA agents, Stillwell waived his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and
gave a confession. Stillwell admitted that he had been in
the van when Lee was killed, but he claimed that he was
only the driver and that Samia had shot Lee.
  The Government charged all three men in a multicount
indictment. Samia and Stillwell were each charged with
conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, in violation of 18
U. S. C. §1958(a); murder-for-hire, in violation of §1958(a);
conspiracy to murder and kidnap in a foreign country, in
violation of §956(a)(1); causing death with a firearm during
and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of
                     Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)                   3

                         Opinion of the Court

§§924(c)(1)(A) and (j); and conspiracy to launder money, in
violation of §1956(h). Hunter was charged with all but the
money-laundering count. Thereafter, the Government
tried all three men jointly in the Southern District of New
York. While Hunter and Stillwell admitted that they had
participated in the murder, Samia maintained his inno-
cence.
   Prior to trial, the Government moved in limine to admit
Stillwell’s confession. But, because Stillwell would not tes-
tify and the full confession inculpated Samia, the Govern-
ment proposed that an agent testify as to the content of
Stillwell’s confession in a way that eliminated Samia’s
name while avoiding any obvious indications of redaction.
The District Court granted the Government’s motion but
required further alterations to ensure consistency with its
understanding of this Court’s Confrontation Clause prece-
dents, including Bruton.1
   At trial, the Government’s theory of the case was that
Hunter had hired Samia and Stillwell to pose as real-estate
buyers and visit properties with Lee. The Government also
sought to prove that Samia, Stillwell, and Lee were in a van
that Stillwell was driving when Samia shot Lee. During its
case in chief, in accordance with the court’s ruling on its
motion in limine, the Government presented testimony
about Stillwell’s confession through DEA Agent Eric
Stouch. Stouch recounted the key portion of Stillwell’s con-
fession implicating Samia as follows:
     “Q. Did [Stillwell] say where [the victim] was when she
     was killed?
     “A. Yes. He described a time when the other person he
——————
  1 This Court has never opined as to whether rewriting a confession may

serve as a proper method of redaction. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481
U. S. 200, 203, n. 1 (1987). Because the parties do not argue that the
District Court’s imposition of further redactions was inappropriate in
this case, we do not consider the issue here either.
4                 SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                     Opinion of the Court

    was with pulled the trigger on that woman in a van
    that he and Mr. Stillwell was driving.” App. 76 (em-
    phasis added).
Other portions of Stouch’s testimony also used the “other
person” descriptor to refer to someone with whom Stillwell
had traveled and lived and who carried a particular fire-
arm. During Stouch’s testimony, the District Court in-
structed the jury that his testimony was admissible only as
to Stillwell and should not be considered as to Samia or
Hunter. The District Court later provided a similar limit-
ing instruction before the jury began its deliberations.
   The jury convicted Samia and his codefendants on all
counts, and the District Court subsequently denied Samia’s
post-trial motions. The District Court then sentenced Sa-
mia to life plus 10 years’ imprisonment.
   Samia appealed to the Second Circuit. On appeal, and as
relevant here, he argued that the admission of Stillwell’s
confession—even as altered and with a limiting instruc-
tion—was constitutional error because other evidence and
statements at trial enabled the jury to immediately infer
that the “other person” described in the confession was Sa-
mia himself. He noted that, during opening statements, the
Government had asserted that Stillwell drove the van while
Samia “was in the passenger seat,” and that Samia pulled
out a gun, “turned around, aimed carefully and shot [Lee].”
Id., at 52. He also pointed out that the Government had
stated that “Stillwell admitted to driving the car while the
man he was with turned around and shot [Lee].” Id., at 58.
So, even though Samia’s position in the van and shooting of
Lee were relevant to the Government’s theory of the case
with or without Stillwell’s confession, Samia argued that
those statements would allow the jury to infer that he was
the “other person” in Stillwell’s confession.
   Samia made the same argument with respect to several
pieces of trial evidence. For example, he pointed out that
                 Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)            5

                     Opinion of the Court

the Government had elicited testimony that Samia and
Stillwell coordinated their travel to the Philippines and
lived together there. Samia noted that there was testimony
that he had the type of gun that was used to shoot Lee. And,
he emphasized that, in its closing argument, the Govern-
ment argued to the jury that video evidence showing
Hunter speaking about hiring two men to murder Lee was
“admissible against all three defendants,” allowing the jury
to infer that Samia and Stillwell were co-conspirators. Id.,
at 199. Finally, Samia argued that, while discussing Still-
well’s confession, the prosecution had recounted how Still-
well “described a time when the other person he was with
[in the Philippines] pulled the trigger on that woman in a
van that Stillwell was driving.” Ibid.
   The Second Circuit rejected Samia’s view, holding that
the admission of Stillwell’s confession did not violate Sa-
mia’s Confrontation Clause rights. Applying Circuit prece-
dent, it pointed to the established practice of replacing a
defendant’s name with a neutral noun or pronoun in a non-
testifying codefendant’s confession. The Second Circuit
also noted that its inquiry considered the altered confession
separate from the other evidence that had been introduced
at trial.
   We granted certiorari to determine whether the admis-
sion of Stillwell’s altered confession, subject to a limiting
instruction, violated Samia’s rights under the Confronta-
tion Clause. 598 U. S. ___ (2022).
                               II
  The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guaran-
tees the right of a criminal defendant “to be confronted with
the witnesses against him.” As we have explained, this
Clause forbids the introduction of out-of-court “testimonial”
statements unless the witness is unavailable and the de-
fendant has had the chance to cross-examine the witness
previously. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 53–
6                 SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

54 (2004). Because Stillwell’s formal, Mirandized confes-
sion to authorities, which the Government sought to intro-
duce at trial, is testimonial, it falls within the Clause’s am-
bit. See id., at 52 (“Statements taken by police officers in
the course of interrogations are . . . testimonial under even
a narrow standard”); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U. S. 305, 329 (2009) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (explaining
that “the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudi-
cial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial ma-
terials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nonethe-
less, the Confrontation Clause applies only to witnesses
“against the accused.” Crawford, 541 U. S., at 50. And,
“[o]rdinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced at a
joint trial is not considered to be a witness ‘against’ a de-
fendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony
only against a codefendant.” Richardson, 481 U. S., at 206.
This general rule is consistent with the text of the Clause,
historical practice, and the law’s reliance on limiting in-
structions in other contexts.
                              A
   For most of our Nation’s history, longstanding practice
allowed a nontestifying codefendant’s confession to be ad-
mitted in a joint trial so long as the jury was properly in-
structed not to consider it against the nonconfessing de-
fendant. While some courts would omit the defendant’s
name or substitute a reference to “another person” (or the
like), it is unclear whether any courts considered such al-
terations to be necessary as a categorical matter. In any
event, the combination of such alterations and an appropri-
ate limiting instruction was generally sufficient to permit
the introduction of such confessions.
   One early treatise explained that, when “some part of [a
confession] concerns other prisoners who are tried on the
same indictment,” “all that can be done is to direct the jury
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                      Opinion of the Court

not to take into their consideration such parts as affect the
other prisoners.” S. Phillipps, Law of Evidence 82 (1816).
Another noted that, in English practice, where confessions
were not admissible against third persons, “the names of
such persons were by most judges ordered to be omitted,”
but “by other judges the names were ordered read and the
jury instructed not to use the confession against them.” 3
J. Wigmore, Evidence §2100, p. 2841, and n. 5 (1904). “In
the United States[,] the latter practice [was] favored.” Id.,
n. 5.
   Considerable authority supports this approach. In Sparf
v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 58 (1895), the Court held
that, because codefendant declarations “were not, in any
view of the case, competent evidence against” another de-
fendant, the trial court should have admitted them as evi-
dence only against their respective declarants. Just one
year later, in United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 672
(1896), a case involving a joint murder trial of three defend-
ants, the Court approved the use of a limiting instruction to
restrict the jury’s consideration of one defendant’s incrimi-
natory statements made after the killing had occurred. Cit-
ing Sparf, the Court emphasized that the trial judge had
“said, in the presence of the jury, that, of course, [the one
defendant’s declarations] would be only evidence against
him.” 163 U. S., at 672. State practice was in accord, per-
mitting the introduction of nontestifying codefendants’ con-
fessions subject only to a limiting instruction. See, e.g.,
State v. Workman, 15 S. C. 540, 545 (1881); Jones v. Com-
monwealth, 72 Va. 836, 839–840 (1878). And, though the
Federal Confrontation Clause did not apply to these pro-
ceedings, state constitutions contained similar terms. See
5 J. Wigmore, Evidence §1397, pp. 155–158, n. 1 (J. Chad-
bourn rev. 1974) (noting that virtually every state constitu-
tion during the relevant period contained a provision sub-
stantially equivalent to the Federal Confrontation Clause).
   Notably, none of the early treatises or cases to which the
8                 SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

parties have referred, or that we have discovered, suggests
that a confession naming a codefendant must in all cases be
edited to refer to “another person” (or something similar)
such that the codefendant’s name is not included in the con-
fession. Accordingly, while it is unclear whether alteration
of any kind was necessary, historical practice suggests at
least that altering a nontestifying codefendant’s confession
not to name the defendant, coupled with a limiting instruc-
tion, was enough to permit the introduction of such confes-
sions at least as an evidentiary matter.
                               B
   This historical evidentiary practice is in accord with the
law’s broader assumption that jurors can be relied upon to
follow the trial judge’s instructions. Evidence at trial is of-
ten admitted for a limited purpose, accompanied by a limit-
ing instruction. And, our legal system presumes that jurors
will “ ‘attend closely the particular language of [such] in-
structions in a criminal case and strive to understand,
make sense of, and follow’ ” them. United States v. Olano,
507 U. S. 725, 740 (1993).
   The Court has presumed, for example, that jurors will fol-
low instructions to consider a defendant’s prior conviction
only for purposes of a sentence enhancement and not in de-
termining whether he committed the criminal acts charged.
Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422, 438, and n. 6 (1983).
This presumption works in tandem with a defendant’s Fifth
Amendment right not to testify against himself, by ensur-
ing that jurors do not draw an adverse inference from his
choice not to testify. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U. S. 333,
338–341 (1978). It also applies to situations with poten-
tially life-and-death stakes for defendants: A limiting in-
struction may be used to instruct jurors to consider mitigat-
ing evidence for purposes of one defendant and not another
at the sentencing stage of a joint capital trial. Kansas v.
Carr, 577 U. S. 108, 124–125 (2016).
                 Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)            9

                     Opinion of the Court

    Of particular relevance here, the presumption that jurors
follow limiting instructions applies to statements that are
often substantially more credible and inculpatory than a
codefendant’s confession. For example, this Court has held
that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of Mi-
randa can be used to impeach the defendant’s credibility,
provided the jury is properly instructed not to consider
them as evidence of guilt. Harris v. New York, 401 U. S.
222, 223–225 (1971). Such statements, elicited from the de-
fendant himself, are often some of the most compelling evi-
dence of guilt available to a jury. By contrast, jurors may
cast a critical eye on accomplice testimony—and, in partic-
ular, self-serving accomplice testimony like Stillwell’s that
accuses another of the most culpable conduct.
    The presumption credits jurors by refusing to assume
that they are either “too ignorant to comprehend, or were
too unmindful of their duty to respect, instructions” of the
court. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451, 459 (1880).
Moreover, to disregard or to make unnecessary exceptions
to it “would make inroads into th[e] entire complex code of
. . . criminal evidentiary law, and would threaten other
large areas of trial jurisprudence.” Spencer v. Texas, 385
U. S. 554, 562 (1967). As explained below, we have no rea-
son to do so here.
                              III
   In Bruton v. United States, this Court “recognized a nar-
row exception to” the presumption that juries follow their
instructions, holding “that a defendant is deprived of his
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially
incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is
introduced at their joint trial,” even with a proper instruc-
tion. Richardson, 481 U. S., at 207. In Richardson v.
Marsh, the Court “decline[d] to extend [Bruton] further” to
“confessions that do not name the defendant.” Id., at 211.
Gray v. Maryland, 523 U. S. 185, 194 (1998), later qualified
10                 SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

Richardson by holding that certain obviously redacted con-
fessions might be “directly accusatory,” and thus fall within
Bruton’s rule, even if they did not specifically use a defend-
ant’s name.
  Thus, the Court’s precedents distinguish between confes-
sions that directly implicate a defendant and those that do
so indirectly. Under these precedents, and consistent with
the longstanding historical practice discussed above, the in-
troduction here of Stillwell’s altered confession coupled
with a limiting instruction did not violate the Confrontation
Clause.
                               A
                                1
   In Bruton, the Court considered the joint trial of George
Bruton and William Evans for armed postal robbery. 391
U. S., at 124. During two pretrial interrogations, Evans
confessed to a postal inspector that he and Bruton—whom
he implicated by name—had committed the robbery. Ibid.
The confession was introduced at trial, coupled with a lim-
iting instruction that it not be used against Bruton. Id., at
124–125, and n. 1. This Court held that, “because of the
substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the
contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial state-
ments in determining [Bruton]’s guilt, admission of Evans’
confession in this joint trial violated [Bruton]’s right of
cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment.” Id., at 126.
   The Court acknowledged that a defendant is “ ‘entitled to
a fair trial but not a perfect one’ ” and conceded that “[i]t is
not unreasonable to conclude that in many . . . cases the
jury can and will follow the trial judge’s instructions to dis-
regard [certain] information.” Id., at 135 (quoting Lutwak
v. United States, 344 U. S. 604, 619 (1953)). It even
acknowledged that, “[i]f it were true that the jury disre-
garded the reference to [Bruton], no question would arise
                  Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)            11

                      Opinion of the Court

under the Confrontation Clause.” 391 U. S., at 126. Yet,
the Court reasoned that “there are some contexts in which
the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions
is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the
defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the
jury system cannot be ignored.” Id., at 135. Accordingly, in
the Court’s view, “the introduction of Evans’ confession
posed a substantial threat to [Bruton]’s right to confront the
witnesses against him.” Id., at 137.
                                2
   Later, in Richardson, the Court declined to expand the
Bruton rule to a redacted confession that inculpated the de-
fendant only when viewed in conjunction with other evi-
dence. There, Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and
Kareem Martin were each charged with assault and mur-
der. 481 U. S., at 202. Marsh and Williams were tried
jointly for the crime. Ibid. And, at trial, the State intro-
duced Williams’ confession, taken by police shortly after his
arrest. Id., at 203. As introduced, however, “[t]he confes-
sion was redacted to omit all reference to [Marsh]—indeed,
to omit all indication that anyone other than Martin and
Williams participated in the crime.” Ibid. The confession
largely corroborated the victim’s testimony and addition-
ally described a conversation between Williams and Martin
as they drove to the scene of the crime: “[A]ccording to Wil-
liams, Martin said that he would have to kill the victims
after the robbery.” Id., at 204. Following the confession’s
admission, the trial judge instructed the jury not to use it
against Marsh in any way, an instruction reiterated in the
jury charge at the conclusion of trial. Id., at 204–205. In
her testimony, however, Marsh volunteered that, during
the drive to the crime scene, she “ ‘knew that [Martin and
Williams] were talking’ but could not hear the conversation
because ‘the radio was on and the speaker was right in [her]
ear.’ ” Id., at 204 (alternations in original). Both Marsh and
12                    SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                          Opinion of the Court

Williams were convicted. Id., at 205.
  In considering the introduction of Williams’ confession,
this Court noted that, “[o]rdinarily, a witness whose testi-
mony is introduced at a joint trial is not considered to be a
witness ‘against’ a defendant if the jury is instructed to con-
sider that testimony only against a codefendant,” empha-
sizing the “almost invariable assumption of the law that ju-
rors follow their instructions.” Id., at 206. It then explained
that Bruton represented a “narrow exception to this princi-
ple.” 481 U. S., at 207. Whereas the confession in Bruton
had “ ‘expressly implicated’ the defendant and his accom-
plice,” the confession in Richardson “was not incriminating
on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence
introduced later at trial.” 481 U. S., at 208 (citing Bruton,
391 U. S., at 124, n. 1). The former evidence, the Court ex-
plained, is “more vivid” and thus “more difficult to thrust
out of mind.” 481 U. S., at 208. Additionally, in the case of
inferential incrimination, the Court posited that “the
judge’s instruction may well be successful in dissuading the
jury from entering onto the path of inference,” leaving “no
incrimination to forget.” Ibid.2
                              3
   Gray then confronted a question Richardson expressly
left open: whether a confession altered “by substituting for
the defendant’s name in the confession a blank space or the
word ‘deleted’ ” violated the Confrontation Clause. 523
U. S., at 188; see also Richardson, 481 U. S., at 211, n. 5. In
Gray, the Court considered Anthony Bell’s confession to
Baltimore police, implicating himself, Kevin Gray, and co-
——————
   2 The Court ended on a cautionary note, explaining that the prosecutor

had linked Marsh with Williams’ confession in his closing argument.
Thus, the Court observed, “the prosecutor [had] sought to undo the effect
of the limiting instruction by urging the jury to use Williams’ confession
in evaluating [Marsh’s] case.” 481 U. S., at 211. If a claim of error on
this count were preserved, the Court suggested that relief could be ap-
propriate. Ibid.
                     Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)                   13

                          Opinion of the Court

conspirator Jacquin Vanlandingham in a murder. 523
U. S., at 188. The prosecution sought to introduce the con-
fession at trial, and the trial judge required that it be re-
dacted to use the word “deleted” or “deletion” whenever
Gray’s or Vanlandingham’s names appeared. Ibid. At trial,
the prosecution had a police detective read the confession
aloud to the jury verbatim, substituting the words “deleted”
or “deletion” for Gray’s or Vanlandingham’s names.3 Ibid.
“Immediately after” the detective finished reading the con-
fession, “the prosecutor asked, ‘after he gave you that infor-
mation, you subsequently were able to arrest Mr. Kevin
Gray; is that correct?’ The officer responded, ‘That’s cor-
rect.’ ” Id., at 188–189. In instructing the jury at the close
of trial, the judge specified that Bell’s confession was evi-
dence only against Bell, admonishing the jury not to use the
confession as evidence against Gray. Id., at 189. The jury
convicted Bell and Gray.
   This Court held that the confession was inadmissible un-
der Bruton. It first noted that, “unlike Richardson’s re-
dacted confession, [Bell’s] confession refer[red] directly to
the ‘existence’ of the nonconfessing defendant.” 523 U. S.,
at 192. The Court then concluded that, when a redacted
confession “simply replace[s] a name with an obvious blank
space or a word such as ‘deleted’ or a symbol or other simi-
larly obvious indications of alteration,” the evidence “so
closely resemble[s] Bruton’s unredacted statements that . . .
the law must require the same result.” Ibid. The Court
reasoned that such “obvious blank[s]” would cause the ju-
rors to speculate as to whom the omitted individual may be,
“lift[ing their] eyes to [the nonconfessing defendant], sitting
at counsel table, to find what will seem the obvious answer,”
as the judge’s “instruction will provide an obvious reason

——————
  3 The prosecution also introduced a written copy of the confession with

Gray’s and Vanlandigham’s names omitted, “leaving in their place blank
white spaces separated by commas.” Gray, 523 U. S., at 189.
14                SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

for the blank.” Id., at 193. It also reasoned that “state-
ments redacted to leave a blank or some other similarly ob-
vious alteration” were “directly accusatory,” “point[ing] di-
rectly to the defendant . . . in a manner similar to Evans’
use of Bruton’s name or to a testifying codefendant’s accu-
satory finger.” Id., at 194.
  While the Court “concede[d] that Richardson placed out-
side the scope of Bruton’s rule those statements that incrim-
inate inferentially,” it explained that “inference pure and
simple cannot make the critical difference, for if it did, then
Richardson would also place outside Bruton’s scope confes-
sions that use shortened first names, nicknames, [and] de-
scriptions as unique as the ‘red-haired, bearded, one-eyed
man-with-a-limp.’ ” Id., at 195. The Court elaborated:
     “That being so, Richardson must depend in significant
     part upon the kind of, not the simple fact of, inference.
     Richardson’s inferences involved statements that did
     not refer directly to the defendant himself and which
     became incriminating ‘only when linked with evidence
     introduced later at trial.’ 481 U. S., at 208. The infer-
     ences at issue here involve statements that, despite re-
     daction, obviously refer directly to someone, often obvi-
     ously the defendant, and which involve inferences that
     a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were
     the confession the very first item introduced at trial.”
     Id., at 196.
Finally, the Court stressed that its holding, which ad-
dressed only obviously redacted confessions, was suffi-
ciently narrow to avoid “unnecessarily lead[ing] prosecu-
tors to abandon the [relevant] confession or joint trial.” Id.,
at 197.
                            B
  Viewed together, the Court’s precedents distinguish be-
tween confessions that directly implicate a defendant and
                  Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)            15

                      Opinion of the Court

those that do so indirectly. Richardson explicitly declined
to extend Bruton’s “narrow exception” to the presumption
that jurors follow their instructions beyond those confes-
sions that occupy the former category. 481 U. S., at 207.
Gray qualified but confirmed this legal standard, reiterat-
ing that the Bruton rule applies only to “directly accu-
satory” incriminating statements, as distinct from those
that do “not refer directly to the defendant” and “bec[o]me
incriminating only when linked with evidence introduced
later at trial.” 523 U. S., at 194, 196 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, neither Bruton, Richardson,
nor Gray provides license to flyspeck trial transcripts in
search of evidence that could give rise to a collateral infer-
ence that the defendant had been named in an altered con-
fession.
   Here, the District Court’s admission of Stillwell’s confes-
sion, accompanied by a limiting instruction, did not run
afoul of this Court’s precedents. Stillwell’s confession was
redacted to avoid naming Samia, satisfying Bruton’s rule.
And, it was not obviously redacted in a manner resembling
the confession in Gray; the neutral references to some
“other person” were not akin to an obvious blank or the
word “deleted.” In fact, the redacted confession is strikingly
similar to a hypothetical modified confession we looked
upon favorably in Gray, where we posited that, instead of
saying “ ‘[m]e, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys,’ ” the
witness could easily have said “ ‘[m]e and a few other guys.’ ”
523 U. S., at 196. Accordingly, it “fall[s] outside the narrow
exception [Bruton] created.” Richardson, 481 U. S., at 208.
   Moreover, it would not have been feasible to further mod-
ify Stillwell’s confession to make it appear, as in Richard-
son, that he had acted alone. Stillwell was charged with
conspiracy and did not confess to shooting Lee. Conse-
quently, the evidence of coordination between Stillwell and
Lee’s killer (whether Samia or not) was necessary to prove
an essential element of the Government’s case. In addition,
16                 SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                      Opinion of the Court

editing the statement to exclude mention of the “other per-
son” may have made it seem as though Stillwell and Lee
were alone in the van at the time Lee was shot. Such a
scenario may have led the jurors—who sat in judgment of
both Samia and Stillwell—to conclude that Stillwell was
the shooter, an obviously prejudicial result.
                              IV
   As described above, expanding the Bruton rule in the way
Samia proposes would be inconsistent with longstanding
practice and our precedents. It would also work an unnec-
essary and imprudent change in law, resulting in precisely
the practical effects that the Court rejected in Richardson.
The Confrontation Clause rule that Samia proposes would
require federal and state trial courts to conduct extensive
pretrial hearings to determine whether the jury could infer
from the Government’s case in its entirety that the defend-
ant had been named in an altered confession. See Brief for
Petitioner 16. That approach would be burdensome and
“far from foolproof,” 481 U. S., at 209, and we decline to en-
dorse it.
   Indeed, it would be impractical to fully police juror infer-
ences in the way Samia seems to suggest; in a criminal trial,
all evidence that supports the prosecution’s theory of the
case is, to some extent, mutually reinforcing. Thus, the
likely practical consequence of Samia’s position would be to
mandate severance whenever the prosecution wishes to in-
troduce the confession of a nontestifying codefendant in a
joint trial. But, as this Court has observed, that is “too
high” a price to pay. Id., at 210. Joint trials have long
“play[ed] a vital role in the criminal justice system,” pre-
serving government resources and allowing victims to avoid
repeatedly reliving trauma. Id., at 209; see also United
States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 480, 482–483, 485 (1827)
(Story, J.) (recognizing the crucial role of joint trials). Fur-
ther, joint trials encourage consistent verdicts and enable
                  Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)                 17

                      Opinion of the Court

more accurate assessments of relative culpability. See Bru-
ton, 391 U. S., at 143 (White, J., dissenting) (“[S]eparate tri-
als are apt to have varying consequences for legally indis-
tinguishable defendants”). Also, separate trials “randomly
favo[r] the last-tried defendants who have the advantage of
knowing the prosecution’s case beforehand.” Richardson,
481 U. S., at 210.
  Samia offers, as an alternative, that the Government may
choose to forgo use of the confession entirely, thereby avoid-
ing the need for severance. But, this ignores the fact that
confessions are “ ‘essential to society’s compelling interest
in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the
law.’ ” Ibid. And, as described above, Samia’s proposal is
not compelled by the Confrontation Clause.
                         *    *    *
   The Confrontation Clause ensures that defendants have
the opportunity to confront witnesses against them, but it
does not provide a freestanding guarantee against the risk
of potential prejudice that may arise inferentially in a joint
trial. Here, the Clause was not violated by the admission
of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession that did not di-
rectly inculpate the defendant and was subject to a proper
limiting instruction.
   We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

                                                   It is so ordered.
                  Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)             1

                     BARRETT,of
                     Opinion  J.,Bconcurring
                                  ARRETT, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                           No. 22–196
                          _________________

      ADAM SAMIA, AKA SAL, AKA ADAM SAMIC,
         PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                         [June 23, 2023]

   JUSTICE BARRETT, concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.
   I agree that the admission of Stillwell’s modified confes-
sion, together with a limiting instruction, did not violate the
Confrontation Clause. But in my view, the historical evi-
dence described in Part II–A, ante, is beside the point.
   First is a timing problem. The evidence is largely from
the late 19th and early 20th centuries—far too late to in-
form the meaning of the Confrontation Clause “at the time
of the founding.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 54
(2004). The Court seems to agree, because it does not sug-
gest that the history is probative of original meaning. But
nor does it explain why this seemingly random time period
matters. For whatever reason (the parties only speculate),
there appears to be little founding-era evidence illustrating
how courts handled the admission of a codefendant’s con-
fession. So why not simply say that the history is inconclu-
sive? And if we are going to pick up the thread in 1878, why
drop it in 1896? Ante, at 7. Are cases from 1896 that much
more important than cases from, say, the 1940s? While the
Court makes a claim about “longstanding practice” for
“most of our Nation’s history,” ante, at 6, it describes only a
snapshot.
   That brings me to my second problem: the substance of
the snapshot. The cited cases address the rules of evidence
2                 SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                    BARRETT,of
                    Opinion  J.,Bconcurring
                                 ARRETT, J.

rather than the Confrontation Clause. Ante, at 6–8. On top
of that, the two federal cases do not discuss the effective-
ness of limiting instructions, much less any need for redac-
tion. Sparf v. United States holds that the co-conspirator
exception to the hearsay rule does not apply to statements
made after the conspiracy has ended. 156 U. S. 51, 56
(1895). Emphasizing the trial court’s error in admitting the
statements against both defendants, the Court explained
that the trial court should have admitted them against the
speaker and excluded them against his codefendant. Id., at
58. Neither limiting instructions nor redaction came up.
United States v. Ball is similarly tangential to Samia’s case.
163 U. S. 662 (1896). There, the Court held that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in trying three codefend-
ants together. Id., at 672. As support for that point, the
Court noted that when the Government introduced the ad-
missions of one defendant, “the [trial] court at once said, in
the presence of the jury, that, of course, it would be only
evidence against him, if he said anything; and the court was
not afterwards requested to make any further ruling upon
this point.” Ibid. The Court assumed in passing that the
limiting instruction was effective—but the codefendants
did not argue otherwise, and they did not ask the court to
alter the statements.
   The two state cases at least address (and endorse) the use
of a limiting instruction after the admission of a codefend-
ant’s confession. State v. Workman 15 S. C. 540, 545 (1881);
Jones v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. 836, 839–840 (1878). One
even holds that a trial court should not alter a statement by
redacting a codefendant’s name. Workman, 15 S. C., at 545.
Like the federal cases, though, the state cases make no
mention of the confrontation right. Same for the treatises
cited by the Court. See S. Phillipps, Law of Evidence *82–
*83 (1816); 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2100, p. 2841, and n. 5
(1904). So for all we know, the cases cited by the Court and
the treatises proceed from the premise that an ordinary
                  Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)            3

                     BARRETT,of
                     Opinion  J.,Bconcurring
                                  ARRETT, J.

hearsay rule, as opposed to a constitutional right, was on
the line. That weakens the importance of these sources, be-
cause courts might have gone to greater lengths (for exam-
ple, redaction) to ensure that a jury did not consider a dec-
laration whose admission would violate the State or
Federal Constitution. Bruton v. United States, after all,
grounds itself in the Sixth Amendment. 391 U. S. 123, 126
(1968).
   At best, the evidence recounted in Part II–A shows that,
during a narrow historical period, some courts assumed and
others expressly held that a limiting instruction sufficiently
protected a codefendant from a declaration inadmissible on
hearsay grounds. In suggesting anything more, the Court
overclaims. That is unfortunate. While history is often im-
portant and sometimes dispositive, we should be discrimi-
nating in its use. Otherwise, we risk undermining the force
of historical arguments when they matter most.
                 Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)            1

                     KAGAN, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                         _________________

                          No. 22–196
                         _________________

      ADAM SAMIA, AKA SAL, AKA ADAM SAMIC,
         PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                        [June 23, 2023]

  JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and
JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.
  Imagine a criminal case involving two defendants—John
and Mary. John and Mary are arrested for robbing Bill.
Before trial, John confesses to the robbery in an interview
with police. But John does more than admit his own in-
volvement; he also points a finger at Mary. John says to
the police: “Mary and I went out Saturday night and robbed
Bill.” Mary, on the other hand, never confesses to the rob-
bery. She maintains that she wasn’t involved—in fact, that
she never left her home on the night in question. The gov-
ernment tries John and Mary together. At trial, it intro-
duces a copy of John’s confession into evidence, and has it
read to the jury by the interviewing officer. But John elects
not to take the stand, leaving Mary’s attorney without an
opportunity to cross-examine him about his confession.
  This Court’s precedent bars the government from using
John’s confession in that way. The Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against” her,
which includes the right to cross-examine those witnesses.
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 404 (1965). So when
two defendants are tried jointly, the pretrial confession of
one identifying the other as involved in the crime cannot be
admitted unless the confessing defendant takes the stand.
2                 SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                      KAGAN, J., dissenting

That is true, we held in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S.
123 (1968), regardless of whether a judge instructs the jury
to consider the evidence only against the confessor (John),
and not against his co-defendant (Mary). Even with that
kind of instruction, a “substantial risk” exists that the jury
will impermissibly rely on John’s confession when deter-
mining Mary’s guilt. Id., at 126.
   Suppose, though, that the government redacts the confes-
sion to eliminate Mary’s name. Mary still sits in the court-
room alongside John. But the version of the confession ad-
mitted into evidence now includes a blank space where
Mary’s name belongs. And when the interviewing officer
reads the confession to the jury, he says “deleted” in place
of Mary’s name. So instead of “Mary and I went out Satur-
day night and robbed Bill,” what the jury hears is “deleted
and I went out Saturday night and robbed Bill.”
   That confession, too, is inadmissible under our precedent.
Though the confession no longer identifies Mary by name,
the implication is obvious: A juror “need only lift his eyes to
[Mary], sitting at counsel table,” to realize to whom “de-
leted” refers. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U. S. 185, 193 (1998).
The redacted confession thus presents the same risk as the
unredacted one—that the jury will consider it as evidence
against Mary even if instructed not to. Because the confes-
sions “so closely resemble” each other, we have held, “the
law must require the same result.” Id., at 192.
   Now consider one last option. The government again
modifies the confession to avoid the express reference. But
this time, instead of swapping Mary’s name out for “de-
leted,” the government replaces it with the words “a
woman.” The line read to the jury thus becomes: “A woman
and I went out Saturday night and robbed Bill.” In the face
of precedent that would bar the government from using ei-
ther of the first two versions of John’s confession, a judge
must decide what to do about this one. Would its admis-
sion, too, violate Mary’s right of confrontation?
                  Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)            3

                      KAGAN, J., dissenting

  The answer should be obvious. A jury is still going to rec-
ognize that John is talking about Mary—for who else could
the mystery “woman” be? This last version of the confession
thus presents the same risk as the first two: that jurors will
rely on John’s confession when assessing Mary’s guilt. Yet
in today’s decision, the Court draws a line of constitutional
significance between the first two examples and the third.
Confessions that use a defendant’s name or a symbol of
omission—clear Confrontation Clause violation. Confes-
sions that replace a defendant’s name with another place-
holder—no Sixth Amendment problem, no matter how ob-
vious the reference to the defendant. In so elevating form
over substance, the majority permits an end-run around our
precedent and undermines a vital constitutional protection
for the accused.
                                I
   Start with Bruton, the foundation of this Court’s prece-
dent on the introduction of confessions at joint trials. The
government, we held in that case, cannot introduce a con-
fession by a non-testifying defendant that names a co-
defendant as an accomplice. Admitting the confession
against the co-defendant would violate her Sixth Amend-
ment right to cross-examine witnesses. See 391 U. S., at
126. And an instruction to the jury to disregard the confes-
sion when assessing the co-defendant’s guilt cannot remove
the constitutional problem. That is because of the effect
that such a “powerfully incriminating extrajudicial state-
ment[ ]” is likely to have on a jury. Id., at 135–136. In this
context, “the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
[the instruction] is so great, and the consequences of failure
so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human lim-
itations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Id., at 135.
   The Bruton rule applies even when an accusatory confes-
sion does not expressly name the co-defendant. Bruton, we
have held, bars the use of confessions “that replace[] a
4                 SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                      KAGAN, J., dissenting

name with an obvious blank space or symbol or word such
as ‘deleted.’ ” Gray, 523 U. S., at 189. (So the Bruton rule
extends beyond the first John-and-Mary hypothetical to the
second.) And similarly, Bruton bars the admission of “con-
fessions that use shortened first names, nicknames, [and]
descriptions as unique as the ‘red-haired, bearded, one-eyed
man-with-a-limp.’ ” Gray, 523 U. S., at 195; accord, ante, at
14. The Court assumed, for example, that at a joint trial of
four defendants—three Black, one white—Bruton required
the exclusion of two of the Black defendants’ confessions be-
cause they referred to the “white guy” as a participant in
the crime. Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250, 252–253
(1969); see Gray, 523 U. S., at 195. Though confessions of
that kind do not expressly name a non-confessing defend-
ant, they still point directly at him. See id., at 194. They
thus raise the same constitutional concern—that jurors will
consider the confession’s accusation in evaluating the non-
confessing defendant’s guilt.
   Until today, Bruton’s application turned on the effect a
confession is likely to have on the jury, as a comparison of
two of our decisions shows. In Richardson v. Marsh, 481
U. S. 200, 211 (1987), we approved the admission of a con-
fession “redacted to eliminate not only [a co-defendant’s]
name, but any reference to his or her existence.” Despite
that complete redaction, the confession served to incrimi-
nate the co-defendant later in the trial, when her own tes-
timony placed her in a car ride that the confession de-
scribed. See id., at 206, 208. But we thought that a
confession that incriminated only “by connection” with sub-
sequent evidence was neither so “vivid” nor so “powerful[]”
as a confession that “incriminat[ed] on its face.” Id., at 208–
209. For that reason, we thought, the jury was more “likely
[to] obey the instruction” to disregard the confession as to
the co-defendant. Id., at 208. But we held in Gray that the
calculus is different when a confession “refers directly to the
‘existence’ of the nonconfessing defendant,” even though not
                  Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)              5

                      KAGAN, J., dissenting

by name. 523 U. S., at 192. Such a confession itself points
a finger at a co-defendant, so that the jury can “immedi-
ately” and “vivid[ly]” grasp how it implicates her. Id., at
196. The impact is so similar to naming the defendant that
“the law must require the same result.” Id., at 192. In both
situations, the confession’s “powerfully incriminating” ef-
fect “creates a special, and vital, need for cross-examination”—
just as if “the codefendant pointed directly to the defendant
in the courtroom.” Id., at 194.
   Consider against that backdrop the facts of this case. Peti-
tioner Adam Samia was tried jointly with two co-defendants—
Joseph Hunter and Carl David Stillwell—on charges re-
lated to a murder committed in the Philippines. According
to the prosecution’s theory of the case, Paul LeRoux, the
head of a transnational criminal organization, ordered the
killing; and Hunter, one of LeRoux’s managers, hired Samia
and Stillwell as hitmen. Before trial, Stillwell confessed to
federal agents that both he and Samia were present at the
murder, but told them that Samia was the triggerman. On
that version of events, Samia shot the victim in a van that
Stillwell was driving. App. 42–43, 45. At trial, one of the
agents testified about Stillwell’s confession, replacing Sa-
mia’s name with placeholders like “somebody else” and “the
other person.” Id., at 75. So, for example, when the prose-
cutor asked the agent what Stillwell had said about his ar-
rival in the Philippines, the agent answered: “He stated
that he had met somebody else over there.” Ibid. And when
asked whether Stillwell had recounted the crime, the agent
testified: “Yes. He described a time when the other person
he was with pulled the trigger on that woman in a van that
he and Mr. Stillwell was driving.” Id., at 76.
   From the jury’s perspective, the identity of the trigger-
man would have been obvious. The jury knew from the
start of trial that there were just three defendants. It knew
based on the prosecutor’s opening statement that those de-
fendants were on trial for offenses related to a death in the
6                  SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                      KAGAN, J., dissenting

Philippines. And it knew the role that each defendant al-
legedly played in the crime: Hunter had hired Stillwell and
Samia as hitmen, and those two men carried out the mur-
der. In fact, the prosecutor began his opening statement
with the exact sequence of events Stillwell had described in
his interview: The prosecutor told jurors that Samia “shot
[the victim] twice in the face” while the victim “was riding
in the backseat of a van driven” by Stillwell. Id., at 52. So
when the federal agent took the stand on day two of the
trial, it didn’t make a lick of difference that he didn’t iden-
tify the shooter by name, but instead used placeholder
terms. Any reasonable juror would have realized immedi-
ately—and without reference to any other evidence—that
“the other person” who “pulled the trigger” was Samia.
   That fact makes Stillwell’s confession inadmissible under
our Bruton precedent. The agent’s testimony about the con-
fession pointed a finger straight at Samia, no less than if
the agent had used Samia’s name or called him “deleted.”
                                II
   So how does the majority reach a contrary result? The
nomenclature it adopts isn’t the problem: In describing Bru-
ton’s scope, the majority distinguishes “between confessions
that directly implicate a defendant and those that do so in-
directly.” Ante, at 10, 14–15. That distinction roughly
tracks the one this Court has recognized between confes-
sions that themselves incriminate a co-defendant (directly
implicate) and those that become incriminating only when
linked with later-introduced evidence (indirectly implicate).
See supra, at 4–5. But the majority distorts that distinction
beyond recognition when applying it to the facts of this case.
In one blink-and-you-miss-it paragraph of analysis, the ma-
jority holds that Stillwell’s confession does not “directly” im-
plicate Samia for two reasons. It “was redacted to avoid
naming Samia.” Ante, at 15. And the redaction was “not
akin to an obvious blank or the word ‘deleted.’ ” Ibid.
                  Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)            7

                      KAGAN, J., dissenting

  That analysis altogether fails to capture what our Bruton
cases care about. This Court has already made clear that
the first fact relied on—that Stillwell’s confession did not
use Samia’s name—is not dispositive. See supra, at 3–4. A
confession redacted with a blank space, after all, also avoids
naming the defendant; yet Gray held that it falls within
Bruton’s scope. So today’s decision must rest on the second
feature of the confession: that the placeholder used (e.g.,
“the other person”) was neither a blank space nor the word
“deleted.” But that distinction makes nonsense of the Bru-
ton rule. Bruton’s application has always turned on a con-
fession’s inculpatory impact. See, e.g., Cruz v. New York,
481 U. S. 186, 193 (1987) (considering “the likelihood that
[a limiting] instruction will be disregarded” and “the prob-
ability that such disregard will have a devastating effect”).
And as the John-and-Mary examples make clear, a confes-
sion that swaps in a phrase like “the other person” for a de-
fendant’s name may incriminate just as powerfully as one
that swaps in a blank space. See supra, at 1–3. So the ma-
jority warps our Bruton precedent by categorically putting
the two on opposite sides of the constitutional line. As the
Court remarked in another case about Bruton, “[t]he law
cannot command respect” if we apply such “inexplicable”—
and indeed unprincipled—line-drawing to a “constitutional
imperative.” Cruz, 481 U. S., at 193.
  Contrary to the majority’s claim, Gray repudiates rather
than supports the distinction adopted today. In holding
that Bruton’s protections extend beyond confessions with
names to confessions with blanks, Gray explained that
what should matter is not a confession’s form but its effects.
A jury, Gray noted, “will often react similarly” to the two
kinds of confessions; the blank space (rather than name) is
“not likely [to] fool anyone.” 523 U. S., at 193. Ignoring
Gray’s forest for one tree, the majority points to a passage
in which the Court described how a confession in the case
could have been further redacted: Instead of saying “[m]e,
8                 SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                     KAGAN, J., dissenting

deleted, deleted, and a few other guys,” the witness could
have said “[m]e and a few other guys.” Id., at 196. But on
Gray’s particular facts, the latter version was unproblem-
atic. The crime was a gang assault involving six perpetra-
tors, while only one other person was on trial with the con-
fessing defendant. The “[m]e and a few other guys” phrase
thus did not point a finger directly at the co-defendant, as
“the other person” phrase here did at Samia. The more rel-
evant reference discussed in Gray was to the “white guy” in
a trial with only one white defendant, as described above.
Id., at 195; see supra, at 4. Gray left no doubt that the con-
fession with that phrase should have been excluded—and
for the same reason as the confession with “deleted.” When
a modified confession has an “accusatory” effect “similar”
to one with names, the Court reasoned, the law “require[s]
the same result.” Id., at 192, 194. Gray could not have
cared less whether the modification takes the form of a
blank space or of a different, but no less accusatory, place-
holder.
   The practical concerns the majority cites in support of its
decision are equally flimsy. On the majority’s view, a ruling
for Samia would require courts to conduct “extensive pre-
trial hearings” reviewing “the Government’s case in its en-
tirety.” Ante, at 16. But that charge is a strawman—and
one that Gray already knocked down. See 523 U. S., at 197.
The Bruton rule—whether applying to confessions with
names, with blanks, or with other placeholders—demands
only that a court consider “in advance of trial” such matters
as the content of the confession, the number of defendants,
and the prosecution’s general theory of the case. Cruz, 481
U. S., at 193; see Gray, 523 U. S., at 197; cf. Richardson,
481 U. S., at 209 (noting that a more demanding inquiry
would be needed if Bruton applied to confessions incrimi-
nating only “by connection” with later-introduced evidence).
                    Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)                   9

                         KAGAN, J., dissenting

Courts have long considered those basic factors when ap-
plying Bruton.1 And the Government has proved unable to
cite a single case—including in Circuits applying Bruton to
confessions like Stillwell’s—in which doing so created “ad-
ministrability” issues, much less “fewer joint trials.” Tr. of
Oral Arg. 93–96.2 In any event, greater “convenience in the
administration of the law,” as Bruton noted, cannot come at
the expense “of fundamental principles of constitutional lib-
erty.” 391 U. S., at 135. “That price,” we recognized then,
“is too high.” Ibid.
   With nothing else to support it, the majority reaches for
two props inconsistent with Bruton itself. One is the “pre-
sumption that jurors follow limiting instructions.” Ante, at
8–9. The majority correctly describes that presumption; it
just forgets that the presumption does not apply when the
evidence at issue is an accusatory co-defendant confession.
Bruton could not have been clearer on the point: “[W]e can-
not accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute
for [a defendant’s] constitutional right of cross-examination.”
391 U. S., at 137; see Gray, 523 U. S., at 192 (stating that
co-defendant confessions are “so prejudicial that limiting
instructions cannot work”); Richardson, 481 U. S., at 208
(noting “the overwhelming probability of [jurors’] inability”
to follow instructions to disregard co-defendant confes-
sions); see supra, at 3. And the majority does no better in
invoking “historical evidentiary practice.” See ante, at 6–8.
One point here is JUSTICE BARRETT’s: There just isn’t much

——————
  1 See, e.g., United States v. Straker, 800 F. 3d 570, 595–601 (CADC

2015); United States v. Hardwick, 544 F. 3d 565, 573 (CA3 2008); United
States v. Vega Molina, 407 F. 3d 511, 520–521 (CA1 2005); United States
v. Williams, 429 F. 3d 767, 773–774 (CA8 2005); United States v. Her-
nandez, 330 F. 3d 964, 973–974 (CA7 2003).
  2 Seriously, the Government’s only proffered complaint when asked to

expound on administrability issues was with one appellate decision that
took “six double-column F. 3d pages” to review the trial court’s Bruton
ruling. Tr. of Oral Arg. 96.
10                SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                     KAGAN, J., dissenting

history helping the majority. See ante, at 1–3 (opinion con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment). But assume
for a moment to the contrary: Suppose with the majority
that at some relevant time, courts conducting joint trials
admitted unredacted co-defendant confessions subject only
to limiting instructions. Ante, at 6–8. If that history con-
trolled, Bruton itself would have been wrongly decided. The
majority’s real views thus come into focus. The point of its
opinion is not to distinguish the confession here from the
one in Bruton. The point is to say why Bruton should go.
                          *      *    *
   And so one might wonder after reading today’s decision
whether Bruton is the next precedent on this Court’s chop-
ping block. The one reason it may not be is that there is
now no need for formal overruling: Under this decision,
prosecutors can always circumvent Bruton’s protections.
Consider once more John’s confession implicating Mary in
a robbery—a confession, I’ll now add, bearing a striking re-
semblance to the one in Bruton. See 391 U. S., at 124 (“A
postal inspector testified that Evans orally confessed to him
that Evans and [Bruton] committed the armed robbery”).
The Bruton rule will still bar the prosecution from using the
original version of John’s confession, expressly naming
Mary. So too the rule will prevent the prosecution from
swapping out Mary’s name for a blank space or the word
“deleted.” But no worries—the government now has a func-
tionally equivalent placeholder at its (Court-sanctioned)
disposal. It can simply replace Mary’s name with “a
woman,” and the Bruton issue will go away. But contrary
to today’s decision, the serious Sixth Amendment problem
remains. Now, defendants in joint trials will not have the
chance to confront some of the most damaging witnesses
against them. And a constitutional right once guaranteeing
that opportunity will no longer. It will become, in joint tri-
als, a shell of its former self. I respectfully dissent.
                  Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)              1

                     JACKSON, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                          _________________

                           No. 22–196
                          _________________

      ADAM SAMIA, AKA SAL, AKA ADAM SAMIC,
         PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                         [June 23, 2023]

   JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting.
   I join JUSTICE KAGAN’s dissent in full, and agree, in par-
ticular, with her insight that the majority’s bottom-line
view is that “Bruton should go.” Ante, at 10. I am writing
to emphasize that most of the force of the Court’s argument
(to the extent that it is at all forceful) comes from the ma-
jority having improperly reframed the constitutional stand-
ard that applies to the admission of incriminating testimo-
nial statements of a codefendant during a joint criminal
trial.
   Under the majority’s approach, the default rule is that a
nontestifying codefendant’s incriminating confession is ad-
missible, so long as it is accompanied by a limiting instruc-
tion. Ante, at 6, 9, 17. Thus, for present purposes, the ma-
jority repeatedly calls Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S.
123 (1968), a “ ‘narrow exception’ ” to this default rule. Ante,
at 9, 12, 15. And the thrust of the majority’s holding is that
the so-called Bruton exception is—and must be—narrow:
Bruton is a pesky deviation that requires the exclusion of
otherwise admissible evidence (hence, the ease with which
the majority contemplates dispensing with that precedent).
   That approach inverts the constitutional principles that
govern this case. Under our well-established Sixth Amend-
ment precedents, the Court’s analysis must, instead, start
2                    SAMIA v. UNITED STATES

                        JACKSON, J., dissenting

from the premise that the introduction of Stillwell’s incul-
patory confession during the joint trial threatened Samia’s
Confrontation Clause rights. The introduction of a “testi-
monial” statement from an unavailable declarant violates
the Confrontation Clause unless the defendant had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford v. Washing-
ton, 541 U. S. 36, 59, 68 (2004). And, here, there is no dis-
pute that Stillwell’s statement to law enforcement was tes-
timonial, that Stillwell was an unavailable declarant, and
that Samia had no opportunity to cross-examine Stillwell.
Therefore, the default presumption in this case should have
been that Stillwell’s confession was not admissible at his
and Samia’s joint trial, because the statement implicated
Samia on its face, and Samia could not cross-examine the
declarant.*
   When the Government attempted to nonetheless intro-
duce Stillwell’s inculpatory confession notwithstanding Sa-
mia’s inability to cross-examine him, it sought an exception
from the Confrontation Clause’s exclusion mandate. Before
today, this Court had never held that a limiting instruction,
combined with a redaction that merely replaces the defend-
ant’s name, sufficiently “cures” the constitutional problem.
In Bruton, the Court rejected the idea of an exception en-
tirely—it entertained permitting such an exception in light
of a limiting instruction given at trial, but the Court ulti-
mately declined to adopt one. 391 U. S., at 137 (“[I]n the
context of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting instruc-

——————
  *Contrary to the Government’s suggestion (see Brief for United States
12, 32), a codefendant’s confession implicates a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights even if it does “not directly accuse [the defendant] of
wrongdoing,” but “rather . . . is inculpatory only when taken together
with other evidence,” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U. S. 305, 313
(2009). That conclusion follows from the text of the Sixth Amendment,
which guarantees the right of the accused to “confron[t]” “witnesses
against him” (emphasis added), not just those witnesses who “ ‘facially
incriminat[e]’ ” him, contra, ante, at 9–10.
                 Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)            3

                    JACKSON, J., dissenting

tions as an adequate substitute for petitioner’s constitu-
tional right of cross-examination”). Then, in Gray v. Mary-
land, 523 U. S. 185 (1998), the Government tried again to
get an exception to the Confrontation Clause—this time
adding an obvious redaction of the defendant’s name in the
confession on top of the limiting instruction—but this Court
once again rebuffed such efforts. Id., at 188. Indeed, the
only prior case in which this Court has permitted an excep-
tion to the baseline confrontation rule of exclusion was one
in which the confession at issue arguably was not even
“against” the defendant in the first place, as it did not in-
criminate the accused in any way until the defendant her-
self introduced evidence that rendered the confession incul-
patory. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 206, 208, 211
(1987).
   Collectively, our precedents properly recognize the neces-
sary narrowness of any exception to the default Bruton
principle that the Government’s introduction of an inculpa-
tory confession during a joint trial poses a substantial con-
stitutional problem. Not anymore. With today’s ruling, the
majority fails to acknowledge what is the default rule and
what is the exception. And it thereby sets the stage for con-
siderable erosion of the Confrontation Clause right that
Bruton protects.
   Properly understood, the Bruton question actually raises
two distinct issues: one about whether there is a Confron-
tation Clause problem in the first place, and a second about
potential cures (like redactions and limiting instructions)
for that constitutional dilemma. The majority skips over
the first question today; its analysis essentially assumes
that there is no Sixth Amendment problem in the first
place, which then allows for an unwarranted expansion of
what should be a narrow exception to the default principle
of exclusion. In other words, the Court has now turned our
Bruton cases on their head in a manner that risks under-
mining a core Sixth Amendment right.