Court Opinion

ID: 9375622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 15:05:46.157869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:00.430132
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                        COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  21-P-1002

                                       C.F.

                                       vs.

                                       J.F.

                MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       J.F. (mother) appeals from an amended judgment of divorce

 nisi.      On appeal she contends that the judge erred in awarding

 C.F., the father and former husband, legal custody and primary

 physical custody of their daughter, and erred in dividing the

 marital estate.        We affirm.

       1.    Custody.     On appeal, the mother, who appeared pro se at

 trial and in this court,1        maintains that she was a victim of

 domestic violence in the marriage, that the father's conduct had

 an adverse impact on the child, and that she should be awarded

 sole legal and physical custody of the child.             The father

 testified that an ex parte abuse prevention order had issued

 1 At the outset of the litigation the mother was represented by
 counsel. That attorney, and two others, withdrew with the
 permission of the judge.
previously, and was extended once by agreement, but that he had

not hit or assaulted the mother.      The mother testified that she

had been hit and punched, and that she was in fear of the

father.   The trial judge, who also was the judge who issued the

ex parte and extension orders, did not explicitly resolve the

credibility issue presented by the diverging testimony regarding

abuse.    In the judgment, the judge noted that there was no

extant abuse prevention order at the time of trial and stated

that the mother had not established grounds for divorce on the

basis of cruel and abusive treatment.

    The judge awarded sole legal and primary physical custody

to the father for the reason, among others, that the mother had

moved and enrolled the child in a different school system

without informing the father or the court, and that the mother

interposed this and other obstacles to effective communication

between the parents.    The judge found that shared legal custody

was not in the child's best interests, and that her best

interests were served by remaining in the community to which she

was accustomed with the father as her primary caregiver.       See

generally Macri v. Macri, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 362, 370 (2019)

(discussing breakdown in communications as obstacle to shared

parenting).

    After oral argument we remanded the case for findings

regarding domestic violence in accordance with Malachi M. v.

                                  2
Quintina Q., 483 Mass. 725, 738-740 (2019), and Custody of

Vaughn, 422 Mass. 590, 599-600 (1996), and retained jurisdiction

over the appeal.   On remand, the judge entered additional

findings, which we now have before us.        We review the judge's

findings for clear error, and his determination of custody for

an abuse of discretion.    See Schechter v. Schechter, 88 Mass.

App. Ct. 239, 245 (2015).    "The determination of which parent

will promote a child's best interests rests within the

discretion of the judge . . . [whose] findings . . . must stand

unless they are plainly wrong" (quotation omitted).       Hunter v.

Rose, 463 Mass. 488, 494 (2012).       The touchstone of our inquiry

is the best interest of the child.      Id.   See G. L. c. 208, § 31.

    In his supplemental findings the judge found that the

mother's allegations of violence were not credible, and that the

father was not physically abusive during the marriage.       The

judge further credited the father's account of the mother's

"erratic and volatile behavior."       The judge's credibility

determinations are entitled to deference, and we will not

disturb them.   Malachi M., 483 Mass. at 741.      See J.S. v. C.C.,

454 Mass. 652, 657 (2009), quoting Mason v. Coleman, 447 Mass.

177, 186 (2006) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless

clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the

opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the

witnesses").    See also Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 52 (a).     We cannot

                                   3
say that the judge abused his discretion in awarding sole legal

custody and primary physical custody to the father.

    The mother also appears to make a general argument

regarding her fitness as a parent by reference to a report of a

guardian ad litem.   The report was not admitted in evidence at

the trial and is not part of the record before us.    See Chokel

v. Genzyme Corp., 449 Mass. 272, 279 (2007).    The mother also

argues that we should apply the real advantage test articulated

in Yannas v. Frondistou–Yannas, 395 Mass. 704 (1985).     The real

advantage test is used when the custodial parent with the

majority of custodial responsibility wants to move with the

child outside of the Commonwealth, and is inapplicable here.

    Read more broadly, we understand the mother's argument to

be that she is the better parent.    In view of the trial judge's

factual finding that the mother moved with the child to another

town and enrolled her in a different school system without

informing the father or the court, we see no error in the

judge's factual finding that the child's best interests are

better served by remaining with the father in her home community

of many years and granting legal custody to the father.

    2.   Division of marital property.    a.   Timeshares.   The

mother claims that the trial judge did not properly consider and

divide timeshares that were part of the marital estate and erred

in the distribution of the proceeds of the marital home.

                                 4
Typically, "[o]ur review of a judgment pursuant to the equitable

distribution statute, G. L. c. 208, § 34, proceeds under a two-

step analysis.   First, we examine the judge's findings to

determine whether all relevant factors in § 34 were

considered. . . .   The second tier of our review requires us to

determine whether the reasons for the judge's conclusions are

apparent in his findings and rulings. . . .   A judge's

determinations as to equitable distribution will not be reversed

unless plainly wrong and excessive" (quotations omitted).

Calvin C. v. Amelia A., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 714, 722–723 (2021).

The record here is inadequate to permit us to make this inquiry

in full.   However, we are able to review the mother's argument

by reference to the judge's findings, which summarized the

parties' assets, liabilities, financial statements, and

contributions to the marriage.2

     The judge considered the § 34 factors.   At the time of the

filing of the complaint the parties had been married for five

years and eleven months.   The father worked as a truck driver

and stagehand.   At the time of the divorce, the mother was

2 The parties, both of whom make arguments based on the financial
statements, provided us with the judge's decision but no
financial statements. The judge took judicial notice of the
financial statements, which were not introduced in evidence by
either party, and summarized them in his decision. Neither
party suggests that the judge's factual findings regarding the
parties' assets and liabilities were erroneous.

                                  5
working as a hairdresser, and had worked for some period of time

during the marriage.     The judge divided the husband's pensions

equally and allocated one car to each party.    He ordered that

each party remain responsible for any debt held in his or her

name, individually.    The judge found that the timeshares, which

were unvalued, were held in the father's name alone and were

acquired before the marriage, and that the mother no longer had

any real property acquired before the marriage.    The judge

awarded the assets held in each party's name to that party,

including the timeshares held in the father's name.

    The judge correctly treated the property acquired before

the marriage as part of the marital estate, see Williams v.

Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 626 n.4 (2000), but ultimately made the

decision that each person in this relatively short-term marriage

should take from the marriage the liabilities and assets (except

the pensions) that each brought to the marriage.    We discern no

abuse of discretion in this division of the timeshares.     See

Richman v. Richman, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 659-660 (1990)

(describing marriage of seven years as short-term); Bacon v.

Bacon, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 117, 119-121 (1988) (affirming on

equitable grounds trial judge's decision to permit wife to

retain premarital property).

    b.   Marital home.    The judge had previously ordered the

sale of the marital home, but the home had not been sold at the

                                  6
time of trial.    The judge found that the father paid the

mortgage on the marital home without living there for one year

and nine months, and that while he did not pay child support

during this time, the amount of the mortgage payment exceeded

any child support he might have paid.      Based on his finding that

the father contributed more to the preservation of the marital

estate, the judge ordered that the first $20,000 of the proceeds

of the sale of the marital home be paid to the father and that

the sale proceeds be split equally thereafter.       The mother

objects to the $20,000 carve out, but we have nothing in the

record (or the briefs) to suggest that this figure was either

erroneous or inequitable.     On the record before us, the judge

did not abuse his discretion.

       Conclusion.   For these reasons, the amended judgment of

divorce nisi is affirmed.     The father's request for an award of

his appellate attorney's fees is denied.

                                       So ordered.

                                       By the Court (Sullivan,
                                         Shin & Hodgens, JJ.3),

                                       Clerk

Entered:    February 28, 2023.

3   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                   7