Court Opinion

ID: 9488203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:39:01.286861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:45.233785
License: Public Domain

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge,
concurring in Parts I.E.l and I.E.2:
I concur in this court’s affirmance of the district court in Part I.E.l. However, I write separately because I believe the district court correctly found that Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the parole commission relied on the dismissed counts of his federal indictment when it classified him as an original jurisdiction case. I would therefore not reach this court’s determination whether the original jurisdiction classification adversely effects Petitioner.
Petitioner argues that the district court erred in ruling that the parole commission did not rely on the dismissed counts when it classified him as an original jurisdiction case. Petitioner maintains that after he first litigated the parole commission’s determination of his parole eligibility date in Allen I, the parole commission classified him as an original jurisdiction ease pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 2.17(b)(3) based on the conduct underlying the dismissed counts. The classification vests original jurisdiction to make primary parole decisions regarding Petitioner in the National Commissioners in Washington instead of the local parole commission. See generally 28 C.F.R. § 2.17 (detailing original jurisdiction classification).
The district court ruled that Petitioner faded to identify how the parole commission relied on the dismissed counts when it assigned the original jurisdiction classification. I agree. In its memorandum notice dated February 20, 1991, the parole commission classified Petitioner as an original jurisdiction case because of the “unusual attention given this case by the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado” in Allen I. By classifying Petitioner on this basis, the parole commission merely recited a proper regulatory criterion to grant original jurisdiction over a particular case to the National Commissioners. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.17(b)(3) (parole commission may designate case as original *1542jurisdiction where prisoner has “received national or unusual attention”). Thus, the parole commission classified Petitioner’s case as original jurisdiction because he had successfully litigated against the parole commission in Allen I, not because of the conduct underlying the dismissed counts of his federal indictment. Consequently, I do not agree with this court’s- observation that the original jurisdiction classification was based on the dismissed counts because “the notoriety surrounding Allen I cannot be divorced from the counts dismissed from the original federal indictment.”
In my opinion, Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the parole commission relied on his dismissed counts when it assigned original jurisdiction to his case. E.g., Hernandez, 17 F.3d at 78. I would therefore not reach this court’s determination whether Petitioner has failed to show any adverse effect from the original jurisdiction classification in breach of the plea agreement. However, I .concur in this court’s affirmance of the district court in Part I.E.1.
Next, I concur in this court’s affirmance of the district court in Part I.E.2. I write separately, however, because I believe the district court correctly found that Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Bureau of Prisons relied on the amount of currency involved in the dismissed counts of his federal indictment to support the CIMS SCA designation. I would therefore not reach this court’s determination whether the CIMS SCA designation adversely effects Petitioner.
Petitioner does not identify or present any evidence in support of his claim that the Bureau of Prisons relied on the conduct underlying the dismissed counts to support the CIMS SCA classification. Instead, Petitioner concludes via a process of reverse deduction that the Bureau of Prisons necessarily based the CIMS SCA designation on the dismissed counts. In the absence of evidence showing that the Bureau of Prisons relied on the dismissed counts to support the CIMS SCA classification, I do not believe Petitioner has satisfied his burden of establishing facts that demonstrate a breach of the plea agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. See Hernandez, 17 F.3d at 81 (“The defendant has the burden of proving the underlying facts that establish a breach by a preponderance of the evidence.”). Unlike this court, I do not believe that the inference created by Petitioner’s reverse deduction argument that the Bureau of Prisons relied on the dismissed counts to designate him CIMS SCA is sufficient to satisfy his evidentiary burden. In my view, Petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Bureau of Prisons utilized his dismissed counts to assign him the CIMS SCA classification. I would therefore not reach the determination whether the CIMS SCA designation causes adverse effect to Petitioner. However, I concur in this court’s affirmance of the district court in Part I.E.2.