Court Opinion

ID: 9641013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:20:54.254814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:34.459353
License: Public Domain

Allen, C.J.,
dissenting. Because the trial court’s findings are insufficient for this Court to determine whether $500 in permanent maintenance is supported by the record, I dissent.
The purpose of findings is to provide a clear statement as to what was decided and why. Klein v. Klein, 150 Vt. 466, 472, 555 A.2d 382, 386 (1988). Where there is a shortage or absence of sufficient findings, this Court has refused to affirm an order. Strauss v. Strauss, 160 Vt. *46335, 340-41, 628 A.2d 552, 555 (1993); see Scott v. Scott, 155 Vt. 465, 471, 586 A.2d 1140, 1143 (1990) (maintenance award reversed for failure to consider defendant’s expenses); Naumann v. Kurz, 152 Vt. 355, 362, 566 A.2d 1342, 1346 (1989) (inadequate findings cause for reversal); DeGrace v. DeGrace, 147 Vt. 466, 470, 520 A.2d 987, 990 (1986) (findings inadequate to allow Court to determine basis for award); Cleary v. Cleary, 134 Vt. 181, 182, 353 A.2d 334, 335-36 (1976) (shortage of findings requires reversal where award is insupportable on record).
The majority excuses the lack of findings because there were adequate grounds for awarding maintenance and because plaintiff did not appeal the amount. The majority further justifies the order by explaining that neither detailed findings nor mathematical accuracy are required. It also reasons that the court is not required to make findings on factors where no evidence is presented.
First, adequate grounds for supplemental maintenance, 15 V.S.A. § 752(a), do not support a specific amount of maintenance. Id. § 752(b). The majority relies completely on generalities which go to § 752(a) rather than on specifics pertinent to § 752(b) to affirm the amount. We should not presume either the award’s validity or the amount’s reasonableness by relying on the parties’ income disparity or plaintiff’s resort to public assistance. See Cleary, 134 Vt. at 183, 353 A.2d at 336 (support award might be accurate reflection of need but “[wjithout findings to that effect, the issue is in doubt.”). The statute requires more than a generalized justification of need; it requires an individualized assessment of the parties’ needs. See 15 V.S.A. § 752(b); see, e.g., Naumann, 152 Vt. at 360, 566 A.2d at 1345 (maintenance award reversed where trial court did not make findings establishing parties’ reasonable needs).
Second, the order is insufficient not because of a lack of detail or mathematical accuracy but because the few findings that were made do not suggest that the trial court considered the relevant factors required by 15 V.S.A. § 752(b). See Klein, 150 Vt. at 472, 555 A.2d at 386 (remand necessary where no indication of method employed or weight accorded factors in arriving at maintenance decision). For example, it did not make findings on either party’s reasonable needs, Naumann, 152 Vt. at 360, 566 A.2d at 1345, or their expenses, Scott, 155 Vt. at 471, 582 A.2d at 1143.1
*47Third, the majority cannot shrug off the inadequate findings by blaming the parties for the scant evidentiary submissions. While the parties are responsible for introducing evidence on relevant factors, when a factor is clearly relevant to the proper implementation of the statutory scheme and the party fails to submit evidence on that issue, the resulting order cannot stand. In this instance, the most glaring omissions are the lack of evidence on plaintiff’s current expenses and her reasonable needs. Such information is the foundation for any maintenance award. 15 V.S.A. § 752(a). Without it, there is no basis to assess the reasonableness of the award or to determine whether the award comports with the statute’s goals. Instead of determining the parties’ needs or defendant’s ability to pay, the court relied on defendant’s imputed income as the sole factual basis to assess the monthly amount. While defendant’s income was fairly imputed, gross income by itself is factually inadequate to sustain a maintenance award. See DeGrace, 147 Vt. at 470, 520 A.2d at 990 (remanded for clarification where only single finding on plaintiff’s earning capacity supported maintenance award).
Also, I cannot condone the trial court’s reliance on the family court’s child support guidelines to “guesstimate” a monthly maintenance amount. This shortcut is an inadequate substitute for § 752(b)’s individualized assessment of spousal maintenance needs. The guidelines determine child support based solely on mathematical formulas. Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 154 Vt. 103, 113, 574 A.2d 772, 778 (1990). The calculations recognize only the parties’ gross incomes and do not focus on actual expenses. Id. at 107, 574 A.2d at 775. Unlike § 752(b)’s analysis, which considers the parties’ complete financial resources, including the property settlement or the parties’ reasonable needs based on the standard of living established during the marriage, the guidelines focus on the noncustodial parent’s ability to pay. Maintenance awards should not be driven by a party’s ability to pay, but by the thoughtful consideration of § 752(b)’s seven statutory factors. Such consideration ensures a fair resolution.
The lack of findings is also disturbing considering that the court awarded permanent maintenance. In Strauss, we distinguished the purposes of rehabilitative and permanent maintenance, and identified several critical factors that the trial court should consider when fashioning a permanent maintenance award. 160 Vt. at 338-42, 628 *48A.2d at 558-55. There is barely a hint that the trial court incorporated these important factors. The only explanation of the award suggests that it was punitive rather than compensatory in nature. Specifically, the court ordered defendant to pay maintenance “because the plaintiff has had to go on welfare on account of his voluntary underemployment and his refusal to make his [support] payments when he did have the income.” While this reasoning highlights plaintiff’s need for supplemental support, it does not assist this Court in determining whether a permanent or rehabilitative award is appropriate.
This has been a protracted and contentious divorce and is in dire need of finality, but I cannot affirm an order so lacking in support. It is this Court’s responsibility to ensure that the trial court exercises its discretion within the bounds of § 752(b). As is often the case when shortcuts are taken, compromises are made. While a trial court has wide discretion on maintenance issues, it must be exercised within the confines of the statute. There is nothing in this record to indicate that this was done. As a result, this Court cannot decipher whether the permanent award was proper, inadequate or excessive.2
Ordinarily, I would recommend a reversal and remand for the purpose of supplying or correcting findings, but the sparse record convinces me that a new hearing is necessary to cure the deficiencies.

 Defendant had submitted an affidavit of his income, assets, and expenses at the time of trial. Plaintiff submitted the child support worksheet from an earlier, related *47proceeding, which revealed her gross monthly income, but not her actual expenses or needs. The court chose not to make any findings based on these limited submissions.

 The child support guidelines worksheet submitted by plaintiff most likely underestimated her reasonable needs because it determines need based on minimal support requirements rather than plaintiff’s needs in relation to the standard of living established during the marriage.