Court Opinion

ID: 9667169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:37:12.129257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:35.521266
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Judge,
dissenting.
I write in dissent for two reasons. First, I believe that the majority’s/plurality’s analysis of the distinction between investigative detentions and warrantless arrests, under Texas law, is wholly inadequate and provides no guidance to our lower courts to properly analyze and characterize police detentions. Second, I would find that probable cause to support a warrantless arrest, pursuant to Tex.Crim.Proc.Code art. 14.04, did exist at the time Officer Jachna detained appellant, and that the subsequent searches of appellant’s automobiles were valid inventory searches of vehicles subject to impoundment.
I. CHARACTERIZATION OF DETENTIONS UNDER TEXAS LAW
The United States Supreme Court, under the Fourth Amendment, authorized a police officer to conduct a carefully limited search for weapons of persons who the officer has stopped based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and who the officer reasonably believes may be armed and presently dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In a later case involving the so-called “stop and frisk” doctrine, the Supreme Court upheld, with little discussion, the validity of a pre-search non-arrest detention. “A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); see also Johnson v. State, 658 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (It is well established that an officer may briefly stop a suspicious individual in order to determine identity or maintain status quo while obtaining further information).1 Thus, investigative detentions and custodial arrests are both considered to be seizures under the Fourth Amendment.2
Tex.Crim.Proc.Code art. 15.22 provides that “[a] person is arrested when he has been actually placed under restraint or taken into custody by an officer or person executing a warrant of arrest, or by an officer or person arresting without a warrant.” This Court has previously characterized detentions or seizures as arrests within the “placed under restraint” provision of article 15.22. This Court has held *418that the actual physical taking of the suspect into custody is not necessary to constitute an arrest. Rather, an arrest is complete when a person’s liberty of movement is restricted or restrained. Some distinction between actual custody and physical restraint is recognized. Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375, 379 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Brewster v. State, 606 S.W.2d 325 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Hardinge v. State, 500 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Woods v. State, 466 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).3
In Hoag, supra, a burglary victim gave a general description of the burglar and his car, and tentatively identified Hoag from a photo array. Officers placed Hoag under surveillance. After following him to two houses and an apartment complex, police had not observed criminal activity or found signs that a burglary had been committed. When Hoag returned to his car from the apartment complex, he appeared to place something on the floorboard. Hoag was stopped a few blocks away. An officer approached Hoag and asked him to get out of the car. Hoag was then taken at gunpoint to the rear of his car, where officers read him his Miranda4 warnings. The arresting officer testified that he believed Hoag was under arrest at that time. The officers on the scene did not conduct a patdown search of Hoag. With Hoag still surrounded by officers, one officer went back and looked inside the passenger compartment of Hoag’s car and saw a diving knife sticking out from under the driver’s seat and lumps under the floormat. The officer flipped back the mat and found jewelry and coins. This Court held that the seizure of Hoag was in fact a warrantless arrest not supported by probable cause.
In Hoag, we relied on the meaning of “placed under restraint” within article 15.-22, and primarily considered three factors in finding that Hoag was “placed under restraint.” First, we considered the opinion of the arresting officer. While acknowledging that “the question of whether a person is under arrest is not to be determined solely by the opinion of the arresting officer,” see Ruth v. State, 645 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), we concluded that “the officer’s opinion is a factor to be considered, along with the other facts and circumstances of the detention, in determining whether an arrest has taken place.” Hoag 728 S.W.2d at 379. Second, we relied on the forced movement of Hoag to the rear of his car. Finally, we recognized that several officers on the scene had displayed weapons.
This Court has characterized an individual’s detention as a warrantless arrest in a variety of factual situations. Hogan v. State, 631 S.W.2d 159 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (Defendant was arrested without warrant, when officers grabbed his left arm and “escorted him outside.” Once outside, defendant was ordered to raise his hands, and was told he was “under arrest for robbery investigation”); Hardinge v. State, 500 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (Arrest took place when reserve officer for Sheriff’s Department “held” defendant for the police); Woods v. State, 466 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) (Defendant, who asked if he was under arrest and was told that he was only under investigation, was arrested when taken outside and ordered to place his booted feet into several boot tracks leading from the scene of the crime to the vicinity of defendant’s house. “It is evident at that time [his] freedom of movement ceased”); White v. State, 601 S.W.2d 364 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (Defendant was under arrest when he was “subdued and *419spread-eagled [sic] against a stock trailer” and one of two officers on the scene was holding a pistol on him. No announcement of arrest was necessary); Maldonado v. State, 528 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Defendant was arrested when taken from inside the courthouse to a room in the Sheriff’s office at the same courthouse, and questioned for three hours. Defendant was under arrest either when first taken to the room or “shortly thereafter”).
Texas courts of appeals have also applied article 15.22 in finding that detentions were in fact warrantless arrests. Pickens v. State, 712 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1986, rev. ref'd) (Handcuffing and placing the defendant in patrol car was equivalent to arrest); Campbell v. State, 644 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.App.—Austin 1982, rev. ref'd, 647 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).) (Defendants were not free to go when they were ordered out of car and instructed to sit on highway guardrail with their hands in their laps); Gilmore v. State, 666 S.W.2d 136 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1983, rev. ref'd) (Appellant’s liberty of movement was restricted and thus under arrest when “held by the U.S. Customs Service”); Jones v. State, 746 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1988, rev. ref'd) (Appellant was arrested when officer placed him in patrol car and drove him to the house appellant had burglarized); but see Burkhalter v. State, 642 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 1982) (Appellant was not under arrest at hospital after wild driving and head-on collision, even when officer previously handcuffed appellant and told him he was under arrest. Appellant had been taken to hospital for blood sample and was not in presence of officer or handcuffed); Snabb v. State, 683 S.W.2d 850 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1984, disavowed in Morris v. State, 739 S.W.2d 63 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (plurality opinion)) (Appellant was not under arrest sifter officers chased down her car, on foot, stopped her, and told her that she was under arrest. Appellant was arrested only after she ran from car and was caught by officer who grabbed her by the arm).
This Court has not articulated a specific standard or test for determining when an investigative detention, valid at it’s inception, becomes so intrusive that it must be considered an arrest under article 15.22. This Court has made clear, however, that any of the following facts and circumstances, standing alone, do not necessarily transform an investigative stop into a war-rantless arrest. We have found that the detaining officer’s opinion is a factor to be considered, along with the other facts and circumstances, but is not solely determinative of the status of the detention. Hoag, 728 S.W.2d at 378-79; Ruth v. State, 645 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). Although the display of weapons may be a critical factor in the showing of an actual arrest, the officer’s use of weapons need not always preclude a valid investigative detention. Marsh v. State, 684 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Ebarb v. State, 598 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
Furthermore, the giving of Miranda warnings may be viewed, in some situations, as more indicative of proper cautiousness than of the officer’s intent to arrest. Dancy v. State, 728 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 975, 108 S.Ct. 485, 98 L.Ed.2d 484. In addition, blocking in the suspect's car does not necessarily indicate an arrest. Ebarb v. State, supra.
Finally, the announcement of an arrest is not required to effectuate an arrest. White v. State, supra. Nevertheless, some combination of the facts and circumstances surrounding a particular detention may signal the onset of an arrest.
The clearest standard arising from the existing cases interpreting article 15.22, is that the characterization of the detention must be made in light of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the stop. Hoag, 728 S.W.2d at 379. Some factors that have been used by various courts to aid in characterizing detentions are; the use of force,5 including the display of weapo*420ns,6 and the use of handcuffs7 to secure the detainee; the length of the detention8; admonitions of the detaining officer9; the reasonable perception of the detainee as to his status10; movement of the detainee 11; the overall intrusiveness of the detention12; and the opinion of the detaining officer as to the status of the detention13. These factors, while not solely determinative, should at least frame the inquiry for characterization of detentions.
This and other Texas courts, when evaluating the facts and circumstances used to characterize a detention, have focused on the actual physical restraint or forced movement of the detainee. In almost all cases deciding that the challenged detention was an arrest under article 15.22, the detainee’s freedom of movement has been restricted or the detainee has been forced to move to a more controlled location. Thus, I would find that the detainee must be actually restrained, such that his freedom of movement is restricted, either
through force or the imminent use of force by the detaining officer, before a detention can be characterized as an arrest under the “placed under restraint” provision of article 15.22.
In the instant case, appellant’s detention is most appropriately characterized as a warrantless arrest under article 15.22. Jachna blocked in appellant’s car, drew his service revolver, ordered appellant out of his car at gunpoint, ordered him to lie face down on the parking lot with his hands behind his back, and told him that he would be shot if he did not obey these orders. The amount of force used, the degree of the intrusion, the admonitions of the officer, and the extent to which appellant’s freedom of movement was curtailed indicate that his detention should be characterized as an arrest under article 15.22. For other analyses see United States v. Ceballos, 654 F.2d 177 (2d Cir.1981); State v. Williams, 102 Wash.2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984).
*421II. PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION
The general rule in Texas is that an arrest must be made pursuant to a warrant. Dejarnette v. State, 732 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Honeycutt v. State, 499 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). However, “it is state law and not federal law that governs the legality of a state arrest so long as that law does not violate federal constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Milton v. State, 549 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
Tex.Crim.Proe.Code art. 14.04 provides for warrantless arrests “where it is shown by satisfactory proof to a peace officer, upon the representation of a credible person, that a felony has been committed, and that the offender is about to escape.” Article 14.04 first requires that the officer have “satisfactory proof” that a felony has been committed by an offender. An officer who does not, himself, have probable cause for making a warrantless arrest, may act on the basis of information relayed to him by another officer requesting that an arrest be made. Pyles v. State, 755 S.W.2d 98 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986, 109 S.Ct. 543, 102 L.Ed.2d 573 (1988); Tarpley v. State, 565 S.W.2d 525 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). Moreover, the individual supplying the information need not be a uniformed police officer. Weeks v. State, 417 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied 389 U.S. 996, 88 S.Ct. 500, 19 L.Ed.2d 494 (1967).
“The legislative provision of what must be ‘shown by satisfactory proof [under art. 14.04] is the legal equivalent of constitutional probable cause.” Earley v. State, 635 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Webb v. State, 760 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3202, 105 L.Ed.2d 709 (1989). The Supreme Court has articulated the probable cause requirement as follows:
[P]robable cause is the sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what they know, and what they observe as trained officers. We weigh not individual layers but the ‘laminated’ total.... ‘In dealing with probable cause, ... as the very name implies, we are dealing with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’
******
Probable cause exists where “the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that” an offense has been or is being committed.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Woodward v. State, 668 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (opinion on rehearing), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181, 105 S.Ct. 939, 83 L.Ed.2d 952 (1985).
To satisfy the second requirement of article 14.04, the facts must show that the suspected offender is about to escape. “From the ‘concrete factual situation’ ... it must be apparent to the arresting officer that the offender is, in fact, ‘about to escape’ ” Stanton v. State, 743 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (citing King v. State, 631 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 928, 103 S.Ct. 238, 74 L.Ed.2d 188 (1982)). The general rule for a showing of escape has been stated as follows:
[I]n order for an arrest to be justified under the Art. 14.04 exception to the warrant requirement, there must be some evidence amounting to satisfactory proof, either related by a credible person to an officer or observed by the officer him/herself indicating that the defendant was about to escape so that there was no time to procure a warrant.
Dejarnette, 732 S.W.2d at 350-51 (citing numerous cases).
In the instant case, I would find that appellant’s warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause and authorized under article 14.04. First, I would consider the following facts and circumstances surrounding appellant’s arrest, and known to *422Jachna at the time of the arrest: there was a reported burglary in progress involving a black male putting something into the trunk of a car at the Square Apartments; Jachna arrived at the Square within one minute of the call; Jachna saw appellant, a black male; Jachna knew no blacks lived at the Square; appellant was in the driver’s seat of a car backed into a parking space; Jachna knew this was a method commonly used by burglars; appellant was the only person on the scene except for Stellmacher, who had filed the report; appellant immediately attempted to drive away when Jachna approached in his patrol car; there was no time to seek a warrant; and finally, Jachna knew that Stellmacher was an extremely reliable source of information.14 Based on the facts and circumstances that developed in his presence and the report from a reliable source present at the scene, Jachna had a reasonable belief that appellant was the burglar in question and that he was about to escape.15
Once probable cause for the arrest had developed, Jachna could search appellant’s person and the area “within his immediate control.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). The interior of a passenger car is normally “within the immediate control of the arres-tee.” New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). “[A]rticles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon’ ...” Furthermore, “the police may examine the contents of any open or closed container found within the passenger compartment.” Id. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864. Thus, Jachna was authorized to conduct the initial limited search of appellant’s car.
Jachna’s continued searches of appellant’s cars were valid inventory searches of impounded vehicles. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Delgado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). When the driver is removed from his car and placed under arrest, his car may be impounded and inventoried, if there are no other alternatives available to insure the protection of the car. Delgado, supra; Evers v. State, 576 S.W.2d 46 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). In the instant case, appellant’s cars were illegally parked on private property and appellant had no alternative means for removing his cars. Thus, the cars were subject to im-poundment and proper inventory.
The majority opinion contends that Stell-macher’s phone call to the police was made anonymously, because neither she nor Officer Jachna testified that she identified herself when she first reported a burglary in progress at the Square. I think it strains credulity to call Stellmacher an anonymous source of information, when she testified to the facts surrounding her call to the police, both at pretrial and at trial. Moreover, while we recognize that the existence of probable cause is a mixed question of fact and law, in most cases the determination of probable cause is necessarily a combination of an examination of the facts and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts. The officer at the scene is not limited to the facts as presented, but must also be allowed to draw reasonable inferences from those facts.16 Jachna’s *423testimony indicates that he was previously familiar with Stellmacher. Furthermore, he knew that she was the manager of the Square, that she had previously reported crimes at the Square, and that he and other officers knew her to be a reliable source. See note 14 supra. From the information received in the radio report combined with his familiarity with the area, the time of the report (early afternoon on a weekday), the absence of other persons on the scene, the absence of other cars in the Square’s parking lot, and with Stellmacher’s history of frequently and accurately reporting crimes at the Square, Jachna could have reasonably concluded that the report in question probably had been initiated by a call from Stellmacher. Thus, I would find that Stellmacher’s reliability was a factor to be considered in evaluating the existence of probable cause at the time of the arrest.
Even assuming arguendo, however, that Stellmacher’s track record of reliability could not enter into the probable cause equation, I would still find that probable cause to arrest existed in the instant case. The majority is correct in finding that “it is well established that neither a police broadcast nor an anonymous phone call is sufficient, standing alone, to establish probable cause for an arrest.” ante at 416. The cases cited by the majority, however, do not necessarily preclude a finding of probable cause in the instant case.
In Rojas v. State, 797 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), the police received an anonymous tip that marijuana would be found in the trunk of Rojas’ car. The anonymous informant gave a detailed description of the car, and told police that the car would be at a particular church and cemetery that afternoon, in connection with funeral services for Rojas’ brother. Officers located the vehicle at the church, followed it to the cemetery, and later stopped the car at a local gas station. We reversed Rojas’ conviction, because most of the information supplied by the informant could have been available to any careful observer. The informant did not supply information to show personal knowledge or additional facts eon-firming that marijuana would be found in Rojas car. In the instant case, the report was of a burglary in progress with a black male putting something into the trunk of a ear at the Square. When Jachna arrived within less than one minute at the reported location, his observations immediately confirmed at least part of the information he had received from the report. Moreover, his conclusion that appellant must be the burglar in question was at least partially confirmed by the fact that appellant was sitting at the driver’s seat of a car backed into a parking space, and by appellant’s immediate attempt to leave upon seeing Jachna’s patrol car. This differs completely from the situation in Rojas where all of the information reported and confirmed could have been supplied by any person who had observed Rojas’ car and read the obituaries in the newspaper.
In Glass v. State, police received an anonymous tip that the occupants of two cars were shooting at each other. The informant gave a general description of the cars and the location of the alleged shooting. Police later stopped a car that matched one description near the reported location. This Court found that this investigatory stop was not supported by “probable cause to investigate.” This Court relied primarily on the lack of a showing of proximity in time between the alleged shooting, the report, and the stop. Without a showing of proximity in time, this Court found that “it would not be reasonable to conclude, solely on the basis of the match of color and make of the car, that the car stopped was the car involved in the reported incident.” Id. at 601. In the instant case, we have a clear showing of an extremely close proximity in time. Thus, Glass is largely inapplicable.
Furthermore, I consider the other anonymous tip eases relied on by the majority to be either inapplicable or unhelpful. See e.g. Ablon v. State, 537 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (A Terry stop case involving an anonymous report describing a suspicious *424person in the backyard of an unattended home in a high burglary area — this Court found the stop and frisk to have been proper under the circumstances where the suspect was stopped a short time later two houses away); Mann v. State, 525 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (An anonymous report by two hitchhikers describing a car and alleging that they overheard the occupants saying they were going to burglarize a place in town did not constitute probable cause).
The majority claims that “there were no additional corroborative facts within [Jaeh-na’s] knowledge, beyond the police broadcast, to give rise to probable cause for an arrest of appellant.” Ante at 416. The majority relies primarily on Colston v. State, 511 S.W.2d 10 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). In Colston, officers received a Department of Public Safety BOLO 17 naming Colston, describing the make and license number of his car, and advising that he was believed to be carrying narcotics and was heavily armed. The BOLO was originated by a Federal narcotics agent in San Antonio. Officers located Colston’s car in the parking lot of a local lounge, and arrested him as he was about to enter his car. This Court found that his arrest was not supported by probable cause because the arresting officers had not observed any unusual conduct on the part of Colston that could corroborate the information contained in the BOLO. Although we concluded that the arresting officers were entitled to rely on another officer’s request to arrest, we found the record did not reflect probable cause, since the federal officer who requested the BOLO was not called to testify about the basis of his information.
In essence, the holding in Colston requires that either (1) the officer requesting an arrest demonstrate his basis for probable cause, or (2) the arresting officers show that the information in the BOLO was corroborated by their observations.
In the instant case, there was no police request for arrest or BOLO. Stellmaeher was a citizen informant who testified at pretrial and at trial as to the basis of her report to the police. Moreover, as previously discussed, the information reported by Stellmaeher was partially corroborated by Jachna’s observations at the scene.
I fail to comprehend what the majority would require the State to show in this case. Officer Jachna was confronted with a situation that surely occurs every day. A citizen reported a crime in progress. The police dispatcher issued a report. An officer was fortunately in close proximity. His observations at the scene partially corroborated the report and his experience told him that the situation could be dangerous. The suspect was attempting to flee. Must he then be required to attempt to ascertain the basis for the report?
I think the majority would attempt to impose an unrealistic and dangerous requirement on the officer faced with this situation. Police officers must be allowed to rely on such radio reports to make arrests when their own observations are corroborative of the information they have received.
I would overrule appellant’s ground for review, and affirm the judgement of the court of appeals. Therefore, I dissent.
McCORMICK, P.J., and WHITE, J., joined.

. The only explicit statutory recognition of investigative detentions apart from arrests is evidenced by the amendment of Tex. Penal Code § 38.04(a):
A person commits an offense if he intentionally flees from a person he knows is a peace officer attempting to arrest him or detain him for the purpose of questioning or investigating possible criminal activity, (changes effective September 1, 1989 underlined.)
Thus, in Texas detained persons may entertain a reasonable belief that they are free to leave after being approached by officers, only when the interaction is voluntary. Whenever an investigative detention is justified the detainee is not free to leave. Practically, the Texas scheme comports with the Fourth Amendment doctrine of "seizure” as explained in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (A person is seized under the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). See and compare Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979).

. For an in-depth Fourth Amendment analysis of Terry, Williams, and their progeny see Ma-clin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L.R. 1258 (1990).

. We note that article 15.22 predates the Supreme Court decisions in Terry v. Ohio, supra and Adams v. Williams, supra. Professor Dix argues that such statutes “purport to characterize arrests by the fact of custody and are of no value in characterizing detentions for purposes of modern analysis.... [W]hether or not a detention took place at all will be resolved in the same way, whatever the nature of the detention. The more difficult task is identifying the appropriate method for categorizing detentions for purposes of review of their validity and related matters.” Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 849, 920-21 (1985) (emphasis original). Article 15.22, however, provides that an arrest is effectuated when a person is "placed under restraint” or "taken into custody.”

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. United States v. Cebados, 654 F.2d 177, 183-84 (2d Cir.1981) (citing numerous cases at 182 n. 7) (Defendant was arrested when police officers blocked the progress of his car and approached *420with drawn guns); United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.1980) (“[A] maximal intrusion, even if technically short of arrest, must be based on probable cause").

. Hoag, 728 S.W.2d at 379; United States v. Wilson, 569 F.2d 392 (5th Cir.1978) (Detainee under arrest when approached by officer with a drawn gun).

. Mays v. State, 726 S.W.2d 937 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079, 108 S.Ct. 1059, 98 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1988) (Use of handcuffs to secure Mays did not effect characterization of his seizure as an investigative detention).

. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (The permissible length of the detention is related to the officer’s diligent pursuit of the investigation); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (An investigative stop cannot continue indefinitely; at some point, a seizure can no longer be considered a non-arrest detention).

. Hogan, 631 S.W.2d at 161.

. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (Seizure occurs, under the Fourth Amendment, only if, in light of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (Seizure effected by "a show of official authority such that ‘a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave”'); Melton v. State, 790 S.W.2d 322, 329 (Tex.Cr.App.1990); Gilbreath v. State, 412 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) (“Whether the accused is or [is] not under arrest is to be determined from the sufficiency of facts to reasonably create the impression on his mind that he is under arrest”).

. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (Petitioner’s seizure was not "even roughly analogous to the narrowly defined intrusions involved in Terry and its progeny, where he was taken from neighbor’s house to a police car, transported to station house, and put in interrogation room); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (Police officers are allowed to order drivers out of their cars after a lawful stop); Hoag, 728 S.W.2d at 379; Hogan, 631 S.W.2d at 160.

. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969) (The Fourth Amendment was “meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed 'arrests’ or 'investigatory detentions’ ’’); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 213, 99 S.Ct. at 2257.

. Hoag, 728 S.W.2d at 379; Ruth v. State, 645 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).

. Jachna testified that he and other officers had received information from Stellmacher before and that it was reliable "99.9% of the time.” Stellmacher testified that she had personally apprehended thirty three burglars at the Square.

. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1657, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) ("The reasonableness of an official invasion of the citizen’s privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as they existed at the time that invasion occurred").

. The majority contends "that it is the objective facts in existence at the time of the arrest and not the subjective conclusions of the officer which the reviewing court must scrutinize to determine the existence of probable cause. Johnson v. State, 112 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (citing Townsley v. State, 652 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).” This view would tend to indicate that reasonable inferences drawn from the objective facts cannot enter into the probable cause determination. We note that Townsley, supra in actuality states: "The mere subjective conclusions of a police officer concerning the existence of probable cause is not binding on this court which must independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the *423existence of probable cause.” Id. at 796 (emphasis added). Townsley merely asserts that the reviewing court is not bound by the police officer’s conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Townsley does not forbid the officer from drawing objectively reasonable inferences from the facts.

. BOLO is an acronym for "be on the lookout.”