Court Opinion

ID: 9909550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 18:00:58.761306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:39.213388
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     DEC 13 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-50178

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                2:21-cr-00112-FLA-1
 v.

ALBERTO PEREZ, AKA Rhino,                       MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Central District of California
                Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted December 11, 2023**
                              Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, CHRISTEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

      Defendant Alberto Perez appeals the sentence imposed by the district court

after he pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). We dismiss the appeal in part

and affirm in part.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      1. Defendant expressly waived the right to appeal most of the issues raised

here because the court imposed a prison term “within or below the range

corresponding to an offense level of 37 and the criminal history category

calculated by the Court, or 120 months, whichever is higher[.]” (Emphases

added). The court found a criminal history of II and sentenced Defendant to 210

months, which is “within . . . the range corresponding to an offense level of 37”

using that criminal history score.

      We review de novo whether a defendant waived the right to appeal. United

States v. Dailey, 941 F.3d 1183, 1188 (9th Cir. 2019). Defendant’s waiver was

made knowingly and voluntarily. See United States v. Medina-Carrasco, 815 F.3d

457, 461 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating the standard for enforcing a waiver). Defendant

argues that the waiver was not made knowingly and voluntarily because he was

sentenced to more than 120 months and a reasonable person in his position would

not have known that he was waiving the appeal of a sentence greater than 120

months. But the clear wording of the waiver in the plea agreement is to the

contrary. The fact that the Guideline range corresponding to offense level 37 is not

spelled out in the plea agreement does not render the waiver uncertain or otherwise

invalid. Nor does the waiver suggest that the Guideline range of a sentence for

offense level 37 could be less than 120 months; the waiver specifies that the court

could sentence Defendant “within or below” that range. (Emphasis added). Had

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the court chosen to sentence “below” the range, in theory the resulting sentence

could have been less than 120 months. Accordingly, Defendant’s waiver is valid,

so his arguments that his sentence is unreasonable and that the district court abused

its discretion in denying a mitigating role reduction are waived.

       2. Defendant argues that the district court’s application of U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines § 2D1.1(c)(1) violated his right to due process. See United States v.

Pollard, 850 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that a valid appellate waiver

does not prevent courts from reviewing a sentence that violates the Constitution).

Defendant’s argument is, in essence, a policy argument, not a constitutional one.

For example, he asserts that the Guideline is “draconian,” that it lacks “any

empirical basis,” and that it is “much maligned.” Accordingly, and also because

Defendant expressly agreed to the application of this Guideline, Defendant’s due

process argument fails.

       3. Finally, Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to argue that the sentencing court should not have followed U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1)

and for failing to call to the court’s attention that other judges have declined to

apply this Guideline. We follow our usual rule and decline to review this claim on

direct appeal. See United States v. Singh, 979 F.3d 697, 731 (9th Cir. 2020)

(“[T]he decision of whether to review [an ineffective assistance of counsel] claim

‘is best left to the discretion of the district court.’” (citation omitted)).

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DISMISSED IN PART and AFFIRMED IN PART.

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