Court Opinion

ID: 9640899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:17:47.774499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:33.550868
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On motion for rehearing, Snyder argues that Farm Credit failed to properly plead the issue of attorney’s fees as an affirmative defense and that, therefore, they are precluded from now urging that there is a *716fact issue as to the reasonableness of attorney’s fees. As authority for the proposition that unreasonableness of attorney’s fees must be pled as an affirmative defense, Snyder cites Spring Branch Bank v. Mengden, 628 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dicker v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corporation, 676 S.W.2d 672 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.); International Shelters, Inc. v. Corpus Christi State National Bank, 475 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1971, no writ).
These cases are distinguishable. In those cases the attorney’s fees awarded were based on a fixed percentage of the unpaid balance of the note. Unlike the holder in those eases, Snyder is seeking recovery of “reasonable” attorney’s fees in an amount which is far in excess of the percentage authorized by the note. Since it sought recovery of “reasonable” attorney’s fees, Snyder had the burden of pleading and proving what would be a reasonable fee for the services rendered in collecting the note. Yandell v. Tarrant State Bank, 538 S.W.2d 684 (Tex.Civ.App.—Port Worth 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.), affirmed on other grounds, 561 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1978, no writ). Reasonableness of attorney’s fees in this situation is not an affirmative defense.
Snyder’s motion for rehearing is overruled.