Court Opinion

ID: 9760187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:42:30.946826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:09.047585
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge,
dissenting.
The indictment in this cause alleged that Jones did
“... knowingly and intentionally threaten to harm Glenda Jones, a witness, by an unlawful act, namely, threatening to kill, in retaliation for and on account of the service of Glenda Jones, a witness in a criminal assault upon her, the said Glenda Jones by the above named defendant, ...” (Emphasis supplied)
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, shows that appellant, having called the complainant, his former common-law spouse, to arrange a meeting, did meet her at a bus station. They went into the cafeteria of that station, where, after a brief argument with the woman who manages the cafeteria, appellant slapped the manager and the complainant got up to leave.
Appellant then hit Glenda Jones over the head with a glass ashtray which shattered, cutting appellant’s hand and showering Glenda Jones’ hair with glass.
Appellant fled and was apprehended nearby by policemen who had been called to *56investigate a robbery at the bus station. In his hand was found $50, the amount of money which Glenda Jones discovered missing from her breast pocket after the assault.
After being returned to the bus station, appellant shouted threats and insults from the sidewalk by the police car, and later from the back seat of the car. Glenda Jones, who was standing nearby reporting her knowledge of the assaults upon the manager and herself, heard him say he was “going to get [her].” Officer Harold Henley heard appellant say, “That goofy bitch called the police and I’m going to kill her for it,” and saw appellant lean out the window, point at Glenda Jones and say, “Yes, you goofy bitch, you’re the one." Those statements are the gravamen of this cause.
Appellant contends that “witness”, as contemplated by Section 36.06, means a witness in an official proceeding, and that, because the State offered no proof that Glenda Jones was a witness in an official proceeding, the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment.
In Ulmer v. State, 544 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), we stated, quoting from the Explanatory Commentary to Section 36.06, Retaliation, of Volume 3, Branch’s Texas Annotated Penal Statutes, Third Edition:
“The purpose of this section is to raise the punishment for other offenses, such as assaults (Sec. 22.02) when the conduct is retaliatory. The section is not limited to criminal matters, but sufficiently broad to cover all public servants, witnesses, and informants involved in legislative, administrative, and other proceedings.
“It should be noted that the service of a public servant or witness is not limited to governmental functions while the informant is by virtue of the definition in Subsection (b).” (Emphasis added)
We went on to hold that, as applied to the facts in that case, the term “witness” included one who testified before a federal grand jury because the term was not limited by the statute and because the gravamen of the offense was the retaliatory act committed or threatened.
Because the term “witness” is not defined in the Penal Code, we must rely on its commonly accepted meaning in applying it to the facts of the case. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, defines witness as both:
(1) “In general, one who, being present, personally sees or perceives a thing, a beholder, spectator, or eyewitness, (citations omitted)
(2) “One who testifies to what he has seen, heard, or otherwise observed.” (Citations omitted)
We should hold that, as applied to the facts of the instant case, the term “witness” includes one who perceives an event and relays the information gained to the police.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Before the court en banc.