Court Opinion

ID: 9829896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:42:47.016409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:08.507464
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
[8-10] Upon further consideration of this appeal we have concluded that we erred in holding that the refusal of the court below to instruct the jury that the burden was upon appellee to establish his case by a preponderance .of the evidence was, under rule 62a, not reversible error. The general rule is that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting a fact essential to his right of action or defense and put in issue by the pleadings of the adverse party. As stated in our original opinion, the controlling issues upon trial were: Did the fire originate from cinders ejected from appellant’s engines, and, if so, were the engines in good condition and equipped with the most approved spark arresters carefully operated? As to the first issue we yet think the refusal to instruct upon the burden of proof did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment, since there was in substance no testimony tending to contradict that offered by appellee showing the origin of the fire to be from sparks thrown from appellant’s engines. A careful examination of the evidence on the other issues, however, develops a sharp conflict upon the issue of the condition of the engines of appellant, the character of the spark arresters, and the operation of the engines at the time the fire was set out; but in view of another trial we omit, for obvious reasons, comparative discussion of the evidence, contenting ourselves with the statement that there was a sharp and decided conflict.
We now conclude the charge should have been given for the reason that we believe that had the charge been allowed it might have produced a different result. The jury are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to their testimony, and the courts have repeatedly held that their conclusions in that respect are final. Accordingly, upon a closely contested issue where the evidence is sharply conflicting, a charge upon the question of the burden of proof is often necessarily decisive of the issues and is so' closely related to and so much a part of the function to be exercised by the jury that it is nearly impossible for judges of appellate courts, who do not hear the witnesses nor observe their manner of testifying, to fairly and intelligently approximate even what might have been the result had the charge been given. In illustration of the importance of such a charge it is said in Highland v. Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co., 65 S. W. 649,. similar by analogy with the instant case:
“But on the issue of proper equipment, proper repair, or careful handling, the burden is still upon plaintiff, so that, if the proof upon these issues should be evenly balanced, the verdict should be for defendant” — cfiting Mex. Cen. Ry. Co. v. Lauricella, 87 Tex. 279, 28 S. W. 277, 47 Am. St. Rep. 103.
And as illustrating the fact that the application of rule 62a in such eases would in ef-*1017feet be invading tbe prerogative of tbe jury, and as showing tbe force of tbe rule and tbe contemplated influence tbe rule exercised in that case, we cite Clark v. Hills, 67 Tex. 141, 2 S. W. 356. Tbe jury in returning verdict against plaintiff stated they did so in deference to tbe court’s charge that tbe burden of proof was on plaintiff, since they were unable to agree upon any other basis, because of tbe sharp conflict in tbe evidence.
Believing our original order affirming the judgment was, for the reasons stated, erroneous, we now sustain that portion of tbe motion for rehearing that ■ complains ' of the refusal of tbe trial court to instruct on the burden of proof and reverse and remand the cause on that issue alone.
Reversed and remanded.