Court Opinion

ID: 9736134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:44:57.71318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:04.601571
License: Public Domain

ROTH, P. J.
Appellant Bland, a steel worker employed by Southwest Steel Rolling Mills was injured on November 6, 1962 in the course of his employment for which he was awarded $8,683.10 by the Industrial Accident Commission. He was a member of the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, District 33. one of the respondents.
James H. Reed, the other respondent, was an employee of the union. Bland sued both respondents in two causes of action, one predicated on negligence and the other on fraud, allegedly chargeable to respondents because the conduct, • direction or advice (given by employee Reed) caused Bland to omit filing a lawsuit against California Oxygen Company, a corporation, whose negligence, he asserts, caused the injuries for which he received the above award.
A demurrer to appellant’s second amended complaint was sustained without leave to further amend. This appeal is from the judgment of dismissal which followed.,
*448It is clear from the allegations of the complaint that Reed was not a lawyer and appellant knew it. Nothing in the complaint shows that any officer of the union or anyone who had authority or who had ostensible authority to act for the union gave Reed authority to give legal advice or that he at any time gave any, other than the remarks made to appellant upon which he predicates the action before us. Nothing in the complaint shows that Reed held himself out as a lawyer or even as an expert on industrial accidents or that he had the ability or authority to give legal advice or do anything other than file claims for union members with the Industrial Accident Commission.
Further, although appellant sets out generally the nature of his lost cause of action against Oxygen, in his complaint against respondents there is nothing which alleges or suggests that Bland stated even these very general ultimate facts to Reed or that Reed knew the particulars of the accident or any of the particulars in respect of Oxygen’s alleged negligence or that appellant or anyone else generally or specifically called any of these facts to Reed’s attention.
Bland does allege that unnamed members of the union and a former unnamed committeeman (the nature of the committee is not disclosed) told Bland that “if you are injured in the plant . . . Reed will take care of your interest. ’ ’
There is no allegation that Reed knew these statements had been made or that any of the union members or the committeeman referred to told Bland that Reed was a lawyer, gave legal advice, or said anything other than the quoted excerpt above.
The thrust of the first cause of action is that “ [o]n or about September 18, 1963, plaintiff went to . . . Reed ... to consult him about the accident. . . . Reed knowingly . . . and negligently advised . . . [him] he should not file a lawsuit against California Oxygen Company, . . . when he knew or should have known that plaintiff had to file an action ... on or before November 5, 1963, or . . . [it] would have been barred by the one-year statute of limitations. ...”
Eagle Indemn. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1933) 217 Cal. 244, 247-248 [18 P.2d 341] holds that representation of claimants before the Industrial Accident Commission constitutes the performance of legal services. Thus, practice by non-lawyers is specifically authorized by the Legislature. (Lab. Code, § 5700.)
The first cause of action requires us to decide whether respondents shall be held to a lawyer’s standard of care. *449Attorneys who delay bringing an action until the statute of limitations has run may be guilty of negligence. (Drury v. Butler (1898) 171 Mass. 171 [50 N.E. 527]; Parker-Smith v. Prince Mfg. Co. (1916) 172 App.Div. 302 [158 N.Y.S. 346]; Gagne v. Bertram (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481 [275 P.2d 15].) Such negligence may or may not be actionable when the attorney acted solely with a view to promote the interest of his client. (Cox v. Livingston (Pa. 1841) 2 Watts & S. 103 [37 Am.Dec. 486] (may not); Morgan v. Giddings (Tex. 1886) 1 S.W. 369 (may).)
At most respondent expressed an opinion on a matter of tactics concerned only with appellant’s claim before the Commission.  It clearly appears from Eagle, supra, that one purpose for the legislative decision to authorize non-lawyers to appear before the Commission was that “numerous claimants for compensation are indigent and their claims are of such a character and the eompsenation allowed by the Commission is so small as not to justify the engagement or service of a member of the bar, and that without the right to have a lay representative the claimant would ofttimes be unrepresented. ’’ (At page 249.) The court said further: “Whatever view may be urged as to the policy of the law in such matters, the legislature has declared the policy and we do not feel warranted in this instance in setting it aside." (At page 249).
It is clear from Eagle, supra, that the Legislature has been made aware of the dangers of non-lawyer practice before the Commission. The Legislature, however, has not changed its policy. In these circumstances, we consider it improper to hold a non-lawyer practicing before the Commission to a lawyer’s degree of care—particularly when the negligence charged is not in respect of any misfeasance, nonfeasance or malfeasance in respect of the claim before the Commission.
“[I]f the means of knowledge be at hand, and equally available to both parties, and . . . there be no fiduciary or confidential relation, . . . the injured party must show that he has availed himself of the means of information existing at the time of the transaction before he will be heard to say that he was deceived- by the misrepresentations of the other party." (Champion v. Woods (1889) 79 Cal. 17, 20-21 [21 P. 534,12 Am.St. Rep. 126].)
It is not contended, nor do the allegations establish a confidential relationship. Such a relationship could relieve a party relying on it from diligence in protecting his interests. *450(Bacon v. Bacon (1907) 150 Cal. 477 [89 P. 317]; Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 Cal.2d 481, 489 [275 P.2d 15].)
In Haviland v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1916) 172 Cal. 601 [158 P. 328], the relationship of an employee to his employer through its employee-agent was found not to justify reliance by the employee on representation made by the agent-employee. The court there noted that the employee signing the. paper had full possession of his faculties and had read and considered the instrument he signed, notwithstanding that the employee with whom he was dealing represented to him that the “release” would have no effect on his rights against the company, which statement was a misrepresentation. In Rosenbaum, v. Rosenbaum, 257 Cal.App.2d 193 [64 Cal.Rptr. 632], the court held that not even a husband-wife relationship will excuse lack of diligence of one party where it appears that the party can be held to a knowledge of what should have been done in order to protect his individual rights.
In Rosenbaum, the court said at page 200: “. . . assuming there was a fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and defendant . . . such relationship does not justify reliance where the existence of the relationship is entirely immaterial to the consummation of the transaction involved. ’'
Appellant has not alleged a confidential relationship or other facts to show such justifiable reliance on the alleged representation or opinion of Reed as it affected the independent action to relieve him from a duty of diligence to protect such legal rights as he might have in addition to his claim before the Commission.
Appellant, to support the theory that respondents are responsible because Reed voluntarily assumed a duty and then omitted to perform it, cites Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal.App.2d 938 [41 Cal.Rptr. 508] and Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal.2d 552 [25 Cal.Rptr. 456, 375 P.2d 304], The latter is not persuasive. (Duty of care predicated on voluntarily assumed relationship between real estate salesman and purchaser of house to warn of a concealed danger of which salesman had knowledge.) In Morgan, the court held that a sheriff’s failure to give a promised warning to plaintiff’s decedent of the release on bail of one who had threatened her life was actionable. The court said at page 942:
“This brings the ease into a new category—the negligent omission to perform an act voluntarily assumed. ...” There is nothing in the complaint before us to warrant a finding that Reed voluntarily assumed for respondents some act
*451regarding appellant’s separate claim against Oxygen which implicitly or expressly represented to appellant that he could rely on such act and thus induce appellant not to take the precaution of consulting a lawyer in respect of his rights against Oxygen or otherwise. The representation or opinion about tlie separate action was not a representation or opinion that appellant should not consult an attorney regarding it. The first cause of action does not even suggest that Reed made any kind of promise or did anything other than to undertake the filing of appellant’s claim before the Commission. Appellant has therefore not shown that he comes favorably within the framework set up in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647 at p. 650 [320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358], that “The determination whether in a specific ease the defendant will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.” (Biakanja v. Irving, supra, at page 650.)
The thrust of the second cause of action is that “ [o]n or about September 18, 1963, . . . Reed falsely and fraudulently represented . ; . that plaintiff should not file an action for damages against the California Oxygen Company . . . rather . . . Reed would see that an Industrial Accident Commission application was filed on plaintiff’s behalf and the plaintiff would be much better off financially if the plaintiff’s injury was handled in this manner. ’ ’
Bland then alleges that the representation quoted was false and Reed knew said representations to be false, that he had an excellent cause of action, and that the representations were made with intent to defraud and deceive, that plaintiff was ignorant of their falsity, believed them to be true, in reliance thereon did not file an action against Oxygen and that the statute of limitations has run against his action against Oxygen. There is no allegation in the second cause of action directly or by reference to the first that Reed knew of the facts on which Bland predicated a cause of action against Oxygen, or that the negligence of Oxygen was called to his attention, or that Reed held himself out as a lawyer or that appellant had any reason other than the information received *452from the unnamed committeeman and members to think that Reed could advise with respect to claims against third parties, or that Reed was attempting to give appellant advice in any manner other than with respect to appellant’s claim for Workmen’s Compensation.
None of the allegations made in the second cause of action are an adequate base to show that appellant was justified in relying on the alleged representation or opinion of Reed. Reed’s statement appears to be no more actionable than it would be if Reed had been a male nurse employed to render first aid on an employer’s premises and had suggested to Bland that treatment for injuries suffered should be confined to the services of an internist, and that he didn’t need a surgeon, or that he would be better off if he didn’t go to a psychiatrist or physical therapist.
The judgment is affirmed.
Fleming. J., concurred.