Court Opinion

ID: 9536729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:05:54.971266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:08.710602
License: Public Domain

SCHOTTKY, Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the part of the majority opinion which affirms the judgment as it relates to appellants Philpot and Kirtlan, but am unable to agree with the opinion of the majority that the judgment should be reversed as it relates to appellant Wollenberg and devisee Snyder. I shall therefore set forth my views as to the appeal of Gladys Wollenberg.
Item (7) of the will gave'the residue to appellant Philpot, Jessie Snyder and appellant Wollenberg, and the court found that said Item (7) could not be separated from the portions of the will affected by said undue influence without making a will that did not express Harry Stauffer’s intent. The court found also that at the time the will was executed Harry S. Stauffer owned no property which would be disposed of by said residuary clause if the portions of the will affected by undue influence (the devise of the 14th and I Street property to appellants Philpot and Kirtlan) were admitted to probate.
Appellant Wollenberg contends that the undue influence of appellants Philpot and Kirtlan does not invalidate the residuary gift as to the two innocent residuary beneficiaries, herself and Jessie Snyder. In her brief she argues that because undue influence invalidated appellant Philpot’s portion of the residue, she is entitled to one-half thereof instead of one-third, but upon the oral argument her counsel conceded *45that she would be entitled only to one-third of the residue.
Appellant Wollenberg points out that there was no evidence or finding that any undue influence or any other wrong was, in any way, indulged in by either Jessie Snyder or Gladys Wollenberg. The evidence establishes that appellant Wollenberg married the son of decedent in 1926. They were divorced some three years later and during the marriage she had occasion to visit with the Sacramento Stauffer family, including her father-in-law, the decedent, two or three times weekly. There was evidence that after the divorce these reciprocal visits were continued. After Ida’s death and up to ‘‘around 1950” decedent continued to visit Gladys at her home. The decedent was fond of her two sons. Said appellant points out that on the other hand the feeling existing between the Stauffer family and the Henry family was very distant. The last times any of the Henry family had ever seen any of the Stauffers were in 1935 and 1937. Even then they did not see decedent.
The general rule as to partial invalidity is well expressed in 57 American Jurisprudence, section 366, page 266, as follows:
“ While there are authorities which hold that where the execution of a will is shown to be the result of undue influence, the issue is upon the validity of the will as a whole, and testimony which defeats one devise or one legacy defeats all, the general rule is that parts of a will may be held valid notwithstanding other parts are invalid on account of undue influence exercised upon the testator, provided the parts so affected are separable so that the will remains intelligible in itself if the invalid parts are deleted upon probate. In other words, the valid portions of the will may stand and be admitted to probate, although other parts are denied probate, or are set aside, as obtained through undue influence, unless the provisions are so interdependent that the valid cannot be separated from the invalid without defeating the general intent of the testator. . . .
“The general rule as stated above is subject to the limitation that it is not applicable when it will defeat the manifest intent of the testator, interfere with the general scheme of distribution, or work an injustice to other heirs. The doctrine is not applicable where it is impossible to determine to what extent specific legacies have been tainted by the undue influence ; in such a situation the whole will must either be refused probate or admitted thereto.”
*46Appellant Wollenberg cites section 102 of the Probate Code to the effect that an interpretation of a will which will prevent intestacy is preferred, and also quotes from Estate of Webster, 43 Cal.App.2d 6, at page 15 [110 P.2d 81, 111 P.2d 355], as follows:
“The general rule is that if the whole will is the result of the presence of undue influence, probate of the whole will must be refused. If only a part of it is affected by undue influence, that part may be rejected as void, but the remainder, which is the outcome of the free action of the testator, ought to be sustained if it is not inconsistent and can be separated from the part which is invalid, and should be admitted to probate. [Citing cases.] ”
Said appellant also cites Estate of Carson, 184 Cal. 437 [194 P. 5, 17 A.L.R. 239], as holding that a will induced by false representations of the residuary legatee is valid as to the bequests to others in the absence of any showing that such bequests were affected by the representations.
As set forth in the majority opinion, the court found that the will was not the free and voluntary act of Harry C. Stauffer but was the product of the undue influence of appellants Philpot and Kirtlan except as to a bequest of $5,000 to Michael David Littlefield and a devise of certain real property to Jessie Snyder (which property was sold before Harry C. Stauffer’s death, causing said devise to lapse). Appellant Wollenberg argues that “The result of the trial court’s decision is to create an intestacy and thus pass the bulk of decedent’s estate to the very heirs who were, in effect, disinherited by him and for whom he had no affection or regard.” But, as pointed out by respondents, and found by the court, Harry Stauffer owned no property at the time the will was executed which would be disposed of by the residuary clause, and if said clause were permitted to stand as to appellant Wollenberg she would be receiving part of the property which was specifically devised to appellants Philpot and Kirtlan. Furthermore, it is not possible to determine to what extent the undue influence of appellants Philpot and Kirtlan caused the virtual disinheritance of all of the blood relatives of Harry Stauffer other than Myra Henry.
I believe that the trial court’s findings that the residuary clause could not be separated from the portions of the will affected by undue influence and that striking the name of appellant Philpot from said residuary clause and permitting the remainder to stand would be to make a will for Harry *47Stauffer find support in the record. I believe that the instant case comes within the exception to the general rule of partial invalidity, hereinbefore quoted, that “the doctrine is not applicable where it is impossible to determine to what extent specific legacies have been tainted by the undue influence. ’ ’
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
Petitions for a rehearing were denied June 22, 1956, and the petitions of appellants B. N. Philpot and Hilda Kirtlan and of respondents Myra Stauffer Henry, Edna Dyer, Alice Stauffer Taylor and Marjorie Stauffer for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied July 24, 1956.