Court Opinion

ID: 9680938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:41:22.724831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.488819
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Misconduct described in the present case should not be tolerated. I cannot agree with the majority that the evidence in the record did not demonstrate fraud in the present case; nor can I agree that § 126.-061, RSMo 1975, is mandatory solely in form or that the genuineness of the petition signers’ signatures is the only important element required by Chapter 126. Procedures set forth in Chapter 126 are not unduly burdensome on the initiative process, but are instead designed to safeguard it.
The statutory language of § 126.061 is mandatory and cannot be ignored. It provides that:
“[E]aeh sheet of a petition containing signatures shall be verified ... by the person who circulated the sheet of the petition, by his affidavit thereon and as part thereof.”
The circulator must attest that each of the signers “signed his name in my presence; I believe that each has stated his name . correctly . . . and that each is a qualified voter of the state of Missouri . .” The circulator/affiant then signs the petition, with such signature being “subscribed and sworn to before” a notary public. Section 126.061 then provides that “[T]he form herein given is mandatory, and if followed in any petition it shall be sufficient, disregarding clerical and merely technical errors.”
The mandatory nature of the form is apparent on its face. Prior to 1971, RSMo 1969, § 126.040 provided that “[T]he forms herein given are not mandatory, and if substantially followed in any petition it shall be sufficient, disregarding clerical and merely technical errors.” RSMo 1939, § 12888. Legislative intent is clear. The form now must be used and must be followed. To have the wording of the form be mandatory, but allow circulators and notaries to disregard the oaths in that form would be to yield the mandatory nature of the form an exercise in futility.
Two types of irregularities were alleged and found to exist by the trial court. First, it is alleged that Betty Miller and Sue Fellows signed as alleged circulators numerous mail-in petitions. Both women were full time office employees in the Freedom to Work office in Kansas City and according to depositions of fellow workers did not work outside the office during office hours. These districts in which the two women purportedly served as circulators stretched from the Iowa border to southern Missouri.
Sue Fellows’ name appeared on 170 separate petitions as circulator, with petitions coming from all three districts. Of the 26 *458petitions from the Fifth District signed by-Sue Fellows on June 15 alone, deposition evidence indicated 10 petitions (for 565 signatures) were either mailed or circulated by someone other than Ms. Fellows. Most of the other petitions were single family petitions or petitions with a small number of signatures. Numerous petitions had the name of the original circulator scratched out, with Sue Fellows’ name inserted in its place.
Betty Miller signed 257 petitions (for a total of 1,116), with 64 petitions from the Fourth District, 77 from the Fifth District and 116 from the Sixth District. Of the 65 people deposed, 52 could be characterized as mail-ins. A total of 1,681 signatures; 505 in the Fourth District, 321 in the Fifth District, and 855 in the Sixth District were involved in the 427 petitions signed by these two women. Because of the highly professional organization of the Freedom to Work Committee, it is apparent that this pattern indicated common practice to swear false affidavits. Ms. Fellows refused to testify and plaintiffs were unable to locate Ms. Miller.
An illustration of the attitude of Freedom to Work Committee (as to compliance with § 126.061) appears in the testimony of the witness, Donald C. Love. He noticed in the Jefferson City office that signed petitions were being received in the mail and he urged those in charge to return the petitions or otherwise take steps to see if they could get the circulator “back in front of a notary.” The response of the person in charge of the office was: “F_it! It’s not important.” What these Freedom to Work Committee workers fail to understand is that: “There is, of course, no affidavit unless there was an actual swearing to the facts which it purported to affirm under oath.” Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Hubert, 352 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Mo.App.1961); Accord, State ex rel. Knapp v. Cowan, 230 Mo.App. 226, 88 S.W.2d 424 (Mo.App.1935).
The second allegation of fraud is in and of itself sufficient to take the Right to Work Amendment off of the November, 1978, ballot. It is alleged that Stanley I. Dale III notarized 3,625 petitions for a total of 26,940 signatures. Of these signatures, 8,009 were from the Fourth District, 10,573 from the Fifth District, and 8,358 from the Sixth District. It is alleged that Dale did not witness the circulators’ signatures (as required by RSMo 126.061), but instead “cleaned up” the petitions by notarizing them after they had been signed and submitted by circulators when such circulators were not in his presence at the time of signing. Seventy-two petition circulators admitted Dale had not notarized their 1,538 petitions in their presence. These 1,538 petitions contained 12,960 signatures! Irregularities cited by the United Labor Committee would eliminate 3,280 names in the 4th District, 6,171 in the 5th District and 3,509 in the 6th District, the result of which would be less than the minimum vote requirement in each of the three districts. The margin over the minimum signatures required in these districts is as follows: 1,962 in the 4th, 3,120 in the 5th, and 1,597 in the 6th. The trial court concluded that the evidence demonstrated these petitions (on their face) appeared to be in full conformity with the statute, but were in fact not executed in compliance with the statutory provisions.
Although the circuit court recognized both the irregularities with the alleged cir-culators and with Dale’s notarization, the court nonetheless found the petitions valid because the underlying petition signatures were found to be valid.
The petitions must stand or fall in their entirety. Finding them not only inadequate, but also legally improper, I must dissent.
A legally sufficient petition must contain all essential elements at the time said petition is filed with the Secretary of State. An initiative petition that does not contain all the required elements when filed is simply not a petition within the meaning of the Constitution or statutes and cannot be made so by the subsequent attempts of the petition sponsors after filing. In this case the filing of the initiative petitions took place on July 6, 1978, the constitutional *459deadline. Therefore, these initiative petitions must stand or fall as of that date.
Section 126.061 establishes four separate, distinct and mandatory elements of a legally sufficient petition:
1. Petitions must be signed by registered voters.
2. Petitions must be signed in the presence of a circulator.
3. Petitions must contain a valid circulator’s affidavit.
4. Petitions must be properly notarized.
While element one is quite important, I cannot agree with the majority that it is the only compelling element. Each of the four elements is mandated by the statute. The simple truth is that the majority opinion eliminates the latter three notwithstanding restrained efforts to suggest otherwise.
Evidence was offered to prove that certain petitions were signed outside the presence of a circulator, that certain petitions were not properly notarized, and that both of these categories a fortiori did not contain a valid circulator’s affidavit. While the statute excuses clerical and technical errors (and perhaps even inadvertent errors), fraud as to any one of the four elements vitiates the validity of the entire petition.
Section 126.061 was enacted pursuant to constitutional mandate, providing the procedure whereby the people may amend the fundamental law of this state. It is a serious matter, not to be accomplished in a haphazard or casual manner. The purpose of these statutes is to prescribe the necessary procedures to be followed so as to safeguard against fraud, abuse and mistake. The formality of the affidavit requirement is expressly directed to this end.
Statutory safeguards against fraud and abuse, generally, are by their very nature deemed to be mandatory and not directory. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 376. Such requirements must be mandatory because they not only preserve the integrity of both the initiative and amendment process but also safeguard the right of initiative for the benefit of all the people.
Second, a consideration of the other terms and provisions of the initiative provisions further compels the conclusion that the affidavit requirement is intended to be mandatory. Section 126.081 provides that the Secretary of State shall examine the petitions to determine that they comply with the provisions of the Missouri Constitution and statutes. In reviewing the Secretary’s duty in this regard, counsel for the Secretary of State repeatedly emphasized in his opening statement that:
“As to the procedures that he followed once the petitions were received in terms of looking at them, we take the position he has no obligation, Your Honor, legally to look behind the individual signature of the circulator; to look behind the signature of the notary public.
“We take the position that if the petition is presented to the Secretary of State, and if that petition, on its face, is prima facie valid; then, the Secretary of State has the authority by statute to commence the count of those signatures. Now, in the course of counting those signatures he may by statute look to local records that may exist relative to the registration of voters.”
The following appears to be standard practice for the Secretary of State:
(Stipulation No. 7)
“(1) The staff of the Notary Commissions Office of the Secretary of State then checked each original petition page as to the proper notarization of said petition page. This check includes
“a. Whether a person had signed the affidavit at the bottom of each original petition page as the circulator.
“b. Whether the notary had signed the affidavit on each original petition page.
“c. Whether the notary seal was affixed on each original petition page, “d. Whether the notary’s commission had expired prior to the notarization of the petition page.
“(2) Unless each requirement a through d above existed, the signatures *460on that original petition page were not counted.”
The Secretary’s procedure results in the signatures of admittedly registered voters being thrown out for any one of the four reasons stated. This procedure can only be explained by the fact that the Secretary fully recognizes that § 126.061 is mandatory and that it establishes indispensable elements of a legally sufficient petition — a circulator’s affidavit and proper notarization. A petition, with valid signatures, that had not been signed by a circulator or had not been notarized would not be accepted by the Secretary of State. Valid signatures of qualified voters do not serve to resurrect a petition otherwise fatally defective. Unfortunately, in the instant case the petition sponsors succeeded in deceiving the Secretary of State by attaching counterfeit affidavits and notarizations to the petitions. Sadly enough, under the Circuit Court’s holding, a petition sponsor who through good faith error, but acting honestly, presented petitions with valid signatures but blank circulated affidavits or blank no-tarizations to the Secretary of State would have his petitions thrown out; whereas, a petition sponsor who attaches counterfeit circulator affidavits and notarizations gets his petitions counted as valid by the Secretary of State and the court. This is not just.
The Circuit Court was erroneous in allowing the Secretary to look behind the petitions to find the validity of the signatures to be sufficient compliance with the statute when the circulators’ affidavit and/or notary’s verification were improperly executed.
Testimony at the trial court was to the effect that:
“ We do not believe that the Secretary of State has a legal obligation, Your Honor, to in fact determine by looking behind the signature as to whether or not each individual signature of a registered voter is forged or fraudulent. He may do so if he sees fit, but we would suggest to the Court that the time constraints within which the Secretary of State operates makes it practically impossible for him to in fact take whatever steps would be necessary to check each individual signature, when you realize that there are some two hundred and thirty thousand signatures, or thereabouts, that were submitted on these various petitions.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The above analysis of the Secretary’s responsibilities supports the conclusion that the affidavit requirement is mandatory. Specifically, the Circuit Court stated:
“The Secretary was entitled to, and did, rely on the prima facie validity of the petitions submitted.”
This means, of course, that the Secretary of State is perfectly free to simply count signatures on petitions — with no reference to voter registration lists — and certify the results of his count, even though the signatures in the present case were checked against voter registration lists. The result would then be that each petition signed would appear to be registered because of the prima facie validity of the petitions, and counted without any determination having been made as to the genuineness of the signature. Under these circumstances it would be a simple matter for an unscrupulous circulator or group of circulators to determine by a telephone call or through the mail whether a person is registered and then sign said person’s name to a petition. Theoretically, the Secretary of State, taking the petitions at face value, would count the signatures thereon, when, in fact, the signatures would be forged. Obviously, what could be done by a single circulator, could be done by a well-organized and well-financed group on a massive scale.
Within this framework and under these circumstances, the critical mandatory nature of the affidavit requirement becomes apparent. The verification of the circulator attests to the Secretary of State that the signatures contained on the petitions are genuine in that they were signed in the circulator’s presence and that the person who signed the petition stated that he was a registered voter at the time he so signed. Upon receipt of a verified petition, the Secretary then attempts to determine the num*461ber of registered voters that appear on said petition. As previously noted, such determination may or may not include a determination as to the genuineness of each signature. Clearly, the legislature intended that the affidavit requirement, whereby circula-tors verify that the signatures were placed thereon in their presence and that by this sworn statement the circulator would be the subject of a possible perjury prosecution, would provide the realistic mechanism to eliminate fraudulent signatures and would eliminate the probability of a large number of names being placed on petitions by a few people. See Williams v. Butler, 35 Ill.App.3d 532, 341 N.E.2d 394 (1976). Affidavits by Sue Fellows and Betty Miller, as alleged circulators on mail-in petitions, are contrary to the statutory intent.
The legislature realized that the affidavit not only constituted the first safeguard, but could constitute the only safeguard as to the genuineness of the signatures contained on initiative petitions because of the absence of any express statutory language specifically compelling the Secretary of State to verify by independent check the genuineness of each and every signature on a petition. Indeed, to the extent that one realizes that the Secretary’s duty in this regard is permissive only, the mandatory nature of the circulator’s affidavit becomes that much more compelling.
An interpretation that deemed the affidavit requirement permissive would not only render the statute meaningless, but would emasculate the entire statutory framework enacted by the legislature to safeguard the constitutional right of initiative.
It is a well settled rule of statutory construction that in ascertaining the legislative intent as to the applicability or effect of a statute, the courts should give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used. In this case, the use of the word “shall” in the first paragraph manifests a clear and certain intent that the affidavit requirement contained in § 126.061 is mandatory, especially in the absence of any language, express or implied, that in any way qualifies, limits or modifies the mandatory impact intended. Generally, the use of the word “shall” is indicative of a mandate calling for compliance. State ex rel. Scott v. Kirkpatrick, 484 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Mo. banc 1972); State ex rel. Dreer v. Public School Retirement System, 519 S.W.2d 290 (Mo.1975); Howard v. Banks, 544 S.W.2d 601 (Mo.App.1976); State v. Paul, 437 S.W.2d 98 (Mo.App.1969). Moreover, not only does § 126.061 dictate that there shall be a verification by affidavit, but it now specifically sets out the mandatory form to be followed. The inclusion in this Section of a mandatory form further supports the proposition that this is a mandatory provision, for it would make little sense to provide a mandatory form if the underlying duty or requirement were otherwise. This would be absurd.
The mandatory nature of the affidavit requirement is recognized by the Missouri courts. In Kaesser v. Becker, 295 Mo. 93, 243 S.W. 346, 352 (banc 1922), the Supreme Court stated in discussing the verification requirement:
“We are not here concerned with the merits of the legislative act sought to be referred. But, when a solemn legislative act is sought to be set aside, it is our duty to see that the constitutional and statutory requirements have been substantially met by those seeking to refer the act. The referendum is a safeguard against legislation which is deemed unwise and the law must not be so construed as to destroy its effectiveness. On the other hand, full observance of substantial requirements must be exacted lest the referendum be made the instrument of injustice or oppression by a militant and well-organized opposition . . . ” (Emphasis supplied.)
Kaesser was decided prior to the legislature’s amendment making the form of the affidavit mandatory. As persuasive as the above language is, it is even more compelling today in light of the legislature’s amendment of the affidavit requirement. Even Kaesser implied that the standard which permitted the proponents with an *462opportunity to demonstrate the validity of the signatures by outside means only applied when no fraud existed. Here we have what I consider to be massive fraud.
Presence before the officer administering the oath is an essential element of a valid affidavit. Where an affidavit is subscribed and sworn to out of the presence of the officer signing the jurat, who neither administers the oath nor sees the subscribing witness, the affidavit is invalid. 2A C.J.S. Affidavit § 30.
A verification is a confirmation or substantiation of the correctness, truth or authenticity of something'already done, which must include both an actual swearing by the affiant and the certification thereto by a notary or other officer authorized by law to administer oaths. 92 C.J.S. Verifications.
As declared in 48 Corpus Juris, 855: “to constitute a valid oath, there must be, in the presence of a person authorized to administer it, an unequivocal act by which affiant consciously takes upon himself the obligation of an oath.”
As the undisputed evidence demonstrated, and as the Circuit Court found, initiative petitions from the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Congressional Districts were not properly notarized by the notary; and, therefore, did not contain lawful and valid circulators’ affidavits. Although the circu-lators’ affidavits had been filled in, and appeared to be properly notarized, they were, in reality, legally blank. In light of its determination regarding the facts and the applicable law, the Circuit Court clearly erred in failing to declare said petitions legally insufficient.
Fraud, be it legal or actual, negates the entire petition. See Elliott v. Hogan, 315 S.W.2d 840, 848 (Mo.App.1958). The fact that cases following the Elliott rationale are cases of voter fraud (as opposed to fraud on the part of another official vital to the election process) should not distinguish this case.
The legislature in no uncertain terms has expressed its intention that the affidavit requirements are mandatory and absolute. An initiative petition must have attached the circulator’s valid and lawful affidavit at the time it is offered for filing. Nothing more is required; nothing less constitutes compliance. Had the legislature intended otherwise, it could have so provided. This conclusion is supported not only by the express language of the statute, but also by consideration of its stated purpose and the subject matter to which it relates. For any court to conclude otherwise, places it in the untenable position of totally disregarding the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, as well as the purpose and intended effect of the statutory requirement.
The will of the people is broader than the concept of initiative. Just as initiative is seen as the vehicle through which a sufficient number of voters can present an issue they claim important to the populous for a vote, the procedures established to make that initiative process function are procedures instituted at the will of the people through their legislative representatives. These procedures are designed to insure that the will of the people is not easily subverted. To allow the statutorily mandated procedures to be ignored invites haphazard amendment of our Constitution — a phenomenon which ultimately thwarts the will of the people. I am not denying Right to Work proponents their opportunity to present the issue for a vote of the people; I am merely concluding that they must comply with statutory procedures. If the Right to Work proponents comply with initiative procedures by gathering, certifying and verifying the proper number of signatures in accord with statutory requirements, their issue could come before the people for a vote in a future election. We should not sanction the presentation of this issue before the voters in the present election, because sufficient petitions exist only if we count many which were fraudulently prepared.