Court Opinion

ID: 9568039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:00:13.103458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:17.498759
License: Public Domain

*501Beasley, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the trial court was correct. Applying the principles of contract construction, the entire provision and the whole contract must be considered and not only the words “not to exceed.” See OCGA § 13-2-2 (4); Denise v. Paxson, 261 Ga. 846, 847 (413 SE2d 433) (1992). The salary is expressly geared to a 24-month plan, additional compensation is designated for the 24-month period, and the manager is given the right to negotiate a new contract at the end of that 24-month period, implying that an initial 24-month period is expected and intended. The “subject 24 months” referred to in the contract is clearly the 24 months’ employment. The duration of the contract is as certain as the compensation. In fact, it is even more specific.
“[N]ot to exceed,” in the context of this entire provision and the contract as a whole, merely emphasizes that it is not for a period longer than 24 months. No party is bound beyond that, and express provision is made with respect to what is to occur thereafter. Considering the entire contract, it is just as definite a period of time as that construed as definite in its context in Wojcik v. Lewis, 204 Ga. App. 301, 303 (1) (419 SE2d 135) (1992): “ ‘for a period of not less than three years.’ ” In that instance, the definite period was from the commencement of employment until the end of three years. If the employment in fact continued thereafter, it would be on an indefinite basis.
In the case before us, the definite period is from the commencement of employment until the end of 24 months. Employment thereafter would have to be on the basis of a new contract. As contemplated by OCGA § 34-7-1, wages were paid “at a stipulated period,” i.e., monthly, but “the hiring was for a longer term,” i.e., 24 months. As evidenced, the contract did not constitute, in the words of that Code section, “[a]n indefinite hiring” so as to be terminable at will by either party.
The parties’ intentions when they made the contract, as memorialized in it, should be honored. DeKalb County v. Rockdale Pipeline, 189 Ga. App. 121, 124 (2) (375 SE2d 61) (1988); Robinwood, Inc. v. Baker, 206 Ga. App. 202, 203 (2) (425 SE2d 353) (1992).
Under local law for Harris County, its board is authorized to employ a county manager for a period of up to four years. Ga. L. 1984, p. 3534. The county acknowledges that the minutes of the board’s July 3, 1990, regular meeting reflect that “Mr. Penton presented to Commissioners a contract retaining him as County Manager for two years from the effective date, which would be July 3, 1990.” The contract was accepted by the board. This, and the unequivocal affidavits of the three county commissioners who signed the contract for the county, confirm the 24-month meaning ascribed to the contract by the trial *502court. “ ‘The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties. . . .’ [OCGA § 13-2-3.] . . . ‘ “This is the object of the rules of interpretation, to discover the true intent of the parties, and in doing this we are to take the whole of (the instrument) together, and to consider this with the surrounding circumstances.’” [Cit.]” Brooke v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 113 Ga. App. 742, 744 (2) (149 SE2d 511) (1966). See also Friedman v. Friedman, 259 Ga. 530, 532-533 (3) (384 SE2d 641) (1989): “ ‘look to the substantial purpose which must be supposed to have influenced the minds of the parties rather than at the details of making such purpose effectual.’ ”
Decided December 3, 1993
Reconsideration denied December 20, 1993
Kelly, Denney, Pease & Allison, Ray L. Allison, for appellant.
Robert L. Wadkins, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong joins in this dissent.