Court Opinion

ID: 9782512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:54:02.665788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:04.200337
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CARMAN, specially concurring: I have no reservations about the result reached by the court. I write separately only to identify and clarify a point that may lead to misunderstanding of this court’s precedents, specifically, People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62 (2009), and People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1 (2010). In Patrick, after concluding that it was error for the trial court to defer ruling on the defendant’s motion in limine, we considered whether the error was harmless. The first factor we discussed was whether it had been necessary for Patrick to take the stand in his own defense. Our discussion of this factor was brief: “We cannot say that the trial court’s error in Patrick’s case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, Patrick was unjustifiably required to make a tactical decision without the ability to evaluate the impact it would have on his defense. Patrick’s counsel was unable to inform the jury whether Patrick would testify and was anticipatorily unable to disclose Patrick’s prior convictions to lessen the prejudicial effect the convictions would have on his credibility. As a result, Patrick was substantially prejudiced. Patrick’s decision whether to testify was critical because he relied on a theory of self-defense. While his testimony was not absolutely necessary because other testimony corroborated his theory of self-defense, knowing whether his prior convictions were going to be used for impeachment was a vital factor that needed to be weighed. If Patrick had known before testifying that his prior convictions were going to be admitted, he may have decided not to testify, or at least he could have informed the jury earlier of the prior convictions to lessen the negative impact. The impact of the convictions on Patrick’s credibility is clear from the State’s focused and repeated argument urging the jury not to believe a three-time convicted felon. The jury’s verdict of guilty of second degree murder indicates that, to some degree, the jury believed Patrick was justified in his use of force. Applying the Chapman standard, we have no doubt that the error in this case was not harmless to Patrick. Accordingly, we believe a new trial is warranted, and we reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts and remand the cause to the trial court.” People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 75-76. The clear import of these few paragraphs is that the more important it is to the defense theory of the case to have the defendant testify, the more harm is done by improperly deferring the ruling. A defendant who has the urge to tell his story to the jury, but whose testimony is not essential, could choose not to testify. However, a defendant, like Patrick, who must testify if he is to have any chance of having the jury accept his version of events, is placed in a lose-lose-lose situation. First, he may well be convicted if he sits silent. Second, if he testifies and tells the jury about his prior conviction, he may undermine his own testimony and he will never know how the trial court would have ruled, because he will have mooted the question. Third, if he testifies but does not tell the jury about his prior conviction when he has the opportunity, he runs the risk that the court will deny his motion after he has testified and the State will impeach him with his prior conviction. This was our concern in Patrick. We reiterated this concern in Averett, 237 Ill. 2d at 10-11, saying: “[W]e noted that Patrick relied on a theory of self-defense. Although his testimony was not absolutely necessary to establish his claim, it was still important for Patrick to know before testifying whether his prior convictions could be used for impeachment. Patrick may have decided not to testify if he had known he would be impeached with his prior convictions. Alternatively, he could have informed the jury of the prior convictions to lessen their impact. We noted that the impact of the impeachment with Patrick’s prior convictions was established by the State’s repeated argument that the jury should not believe a three-time convicted felon. Further, the guilty verdict of second degree murder, rather than first degree murder, indicated that the jury believed Patrick was justified to some degree in his use of force. Accordingly, we concluded that Patrick was entitled to a new trial because the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” The defendant in the present case misread Patrick and Averett and, thus, argued in his brief to this court that his testimony was not essential to his defense, thinking that this would work in his favor. The opinion correctly notes that his testimony was essential because “there existed significant gaps in defendant’s theory of the case which required that he testify.” Further, the testimony of his so-called “alibi” witness did not eliminate the need for defendant to “provide information regarding his actions” after the alibi witness left the scene. The opinion concludes that “[a]s defendant had no other occurrence witnesses to testify on his behalf as to these points, his testimony denying any wrongdoing at that time and at that location was his only means to present a defense.” 241 Ill. 2d at 24. We then note that his need to testify is “only one factor in determining whether harmless error exists.” Id. The opinion, however, does not state whether this factor weighs for or against a finding of harmless error. Indeed, one could reasonably glean from our opinion that when a defendant’s testimony is essential to his defense, this factor weighs in favor of our finding a Patrick error to have been harmless. This is in direct conflict with Patrick and Averett, which established that the more crucial the defendant’s testimony is to presenting his theory of the case, the more harm results from an improperly delayed ruling on his motion in limine. In the present case, defendant’s argument that his testimony was not absolutely necessary is not only mistaken, it misses the point of Patrick and Averett. To remain consistent with what we have said in these cases, we should acknowledge that despite defendant’s inartful argument, the fact that his testimony was vitally important to his defense, weighs slightly in favor of finding that the error was not harmless. In Patrick, we found reversible error where the defendant’s testimony, while not absolutely necessary, would have been quite important in establishing his theory of self-defense. In the present case, however, given the police testimony and the weakness in defendant’s own explanation of the events, it is clear that even if the jury had never been informed of his criminal record, he would have been convicted. Thus, the error was harmless. JUSTICES THOMAS, KARMEIER, and THEIS join in this special concurrence.