Court Opinion

ID: 9955852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 16:08:39.023245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:26.712356
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Frankowski v. Mahl, 2024-Ohio-1202.]

STATE OF OHIO                   )                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                )ss:                 NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA                )

DAVID E. FRANKOWSKI                                  C.A. No.      2023CA0038-M

        Appellant

        v.                                           APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                     ENTERED IN THE
CRISTINA M. MAHL                                     COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                     COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
        Appellee                                     CASE No.   22CIV0708

                                DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 29, 2024

        STEVENSON, Presiding Judge.

        {¶1}     Appellant David E. Frankowski appeals from the judgment of the Medina County

Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee Cristina M. Mahl. This

Court affirms.

                                                I.

        {¶2}     Mr. Frankowski filed a two-count complaint against Ms. Mahl in the Medina

County Court of Common Pleas on September 1, 2022. The first count of the complaint set forth

a claim for libel and slander. Mr. Frankowski alleged in the first count that, “[o]n or about June

15, 2020 through November 30, 2020, [Ms. Mahl], began making unfounded statements that [he]

was engaging in retail theft;” and that, “[o]n or about November 6, 2020 through February 28,

2021, [Ms. Mahl] continued to contact [Brunswick Hills Police Department] for the sole purpose

of filing false reports against [him][.]”
                                                  2

       {¶3}    The second count of the complaint alleged intentional infliction of emotional

distress. Mr. Frankowski alleged that Ms. Mahl’s defamatory conduct caused him serious

emotional distress.

       {¶4}    Ms. Mahl denied the material allegations of Mr. Frankowski’s complaint and set

forth several affirmative defenses, including a statute of limitations defense. Along with her

answer, Ms. Mahl filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss that Mr. Frankowski opposed. The

trial court denied the motion to dismiss, giving the parties time to file dispositive motions.

       {¶5}    Ms. Mahl filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Mr. Frankowski’s libel

and slander claim was subject to the one-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.11(A). Because

his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was based upon the same conduct as the libel

and slander claim, Ms. Mahl argued that this claim was also subject to a one-year statute of

limitations. Based on the allegations of the complaint, Ms. Mahl argued that the statute of

limitations began to run on February 28, 2021, the last date that she allegedly made defamatory

statements. Mr. Frankowski did not file his complaint until September 1, 2022. Mr. Frankowski

responded in opposition, arguing that Ms. Mahl’s actions are continuing in nature and that Ms.

Mahl failed to meet her Civ.R. 56(C) burden.

       {¶6}    The trial court granted Ms. Mahl’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Mr.

Frankowski’s claims were subject to a one-year statute of limitations and that he failed to timely

commence action against Ms. Mahl. Mr. Frankowski appeals asserting two assignments of error

for review.
                                                 3

                                                 I.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1:

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT
       DISMISSED THE CASE WITH PREJUDICE CLAIMING IT WAS TIME
       BARRED.

       {¶7}    Mr. Frankowski argues in his first assignment of error that the trial court improperly

granted summary judgment on grounds that his complaint was time-barred. Mr. Frankowski

argues that Ms. Mahl’s conduct commenced on or about June 15, 2020, and is continuing in nature.

       {¶8}     We review an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.,

77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Summary judgment is only appropriate where (1) no genuine issue

of material fact exists; (2) the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) the

evidence can only produce a finding that is contrary to the non-moving party. Civ.R. 56(C). Before

making such a contrary finding, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party and must resolve any doubt in favor of the non-moving party. Murphy v.

Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358–359 (1992).

       {¶9}    Summary judgment consists of a burden-shifting framework. To prevail on a

motion for summary judgment, the party moving for summary judgment must first be able to point

to evidentiary materials that demonstrate there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280,

293 (1996). Once a moving party satisfies its burden of supporting its motion for summary

judgment with sufficient and acceptable evidence pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), Civ.R. 56(E) provides

that the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the moving party’s

pleadings. See Id.; Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 114 (1998). Rather, the non-moving

party has a reciprocal burden of responding by setting forth specific facts, demonstrating that a
                                                 4

“genuine triable issue” exists to be litigated for trial. State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75

Ohio St.3d 447, 449 (1996); Mitseff at 115 (“Requiring that the moving party provide specific

reasons and evidence gives rise to a reciprocal burden of specificity for the non-moving party.”).

If the nonmoving party fails to respond with a supporting “affidavit or as otherwise provided in

[Civ.R. 56],” then “summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party.” Civ.R.

56(E); Dresher at 293; Mitseff at 115.

       {¶10} Ms. Mahl argued in her motion for summary judgment that Mr. Frankowski’s libel

and slander claim was time-barred pursuant to R.C. 2305.11(A) and that, because the intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim was based upon the alleged libel and slander, the one-year

statute of limitations was also applicable to that claim. Based on the allegations of the complaint,

Ms. Mahl argued that the last date she made alleged defamatory statements was February 28, 2021,

and that, therefore, the last date for Mr. Frankowski to file his complaint was February 28, 2022.

       {¶11} Mr. Frankowski argued in opposition that Ms. Mahl’s defamatory conduct is

continuing in nature and that his claims are not time-barred. Mr. Frankowski did not respond with

an affidavit or other supporting evidence required by Civ.R. 56(E). Mr. Frankowski failed to

counter Ms. Mahl’s motion with any evidence of the type contemplated in Civ.R. 56 and failed to

raise an issue of material fact. Therefore, this Court’s determination turns on whether the grant of

Ms. Mahl’s summary judgment was appropriate under Ohio’s statute of limitations statute.

       {¶12} Mr. Frankowski asserts a libel and slander defamation claim in the first count of his

complaint. It is undisputed that the one-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.11(A)

applies to defamation claims. R.C. 2305.11(A) provides that “[a]n action for libel, slander * * *

shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued * * *.” Mr. Frankowski

asserts an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in the second count of his complaint.
                                                    5

As this Court recognized in Cleavenger v. B.O., 9th Dist. Summit No. 29875, 2022-Ohio-454, ¶

16, an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is ordinarily subject to a four-year statute

of limitations. “When the essential character of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress consists of conduct that is, in substance, another tort, the statute of limitations for the other

tort governs.” Id. Specifically, “[w]hen a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is

based upon conduct actionable as a claim for defamation, the one-year statute of limitations

applies.” Id. Mr. Frankowski’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is based upon the

same allegations that are the basis for his libel and slander claim. Accordingly, the intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim was also subject to the one-year statute of limitations.

        {¶13} The complaint alleges that “[o]n or about June 15, 2020 through November 30,

2020, [Ms. Mahl], began making unfounded statements that [Mr. Frankowski] was engaging in

retail theft;” and that “[o]n or about November 6, 2020 through February 28, 2021, [Ms. Mahl]

continued to contact [Brunswick Hills Police Department] for the sole purpose of filing false

reports against [him][.]” Based on the complaint, the latest date upon which Mr. Frankowski’s

libel and slander claim could have accrued was February 28, 2021. To avoid being barred by R.C.

2305.11(A), Mr. Frankowski had to commence action against Ms. Mahl by February 28, 2022. As

his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is grounded in the same allegations that are

the basis for the libel and slander claim, Mr. Frankowski had until February 28, 2022, to also assert

his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Ms. Mahl. Cleavenger at ¶ 16. Mr.

Frankowski did not file his complaint against Ms. Mahl until September 1, 2022. Mr. Frankowski’s

claims are time-barred as they were filed outside the applicable one-year statute of limitations.

        {¶14} The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of Ms. Mahl.

Mr. Frankowski’s first assignment of error is overruled.
                                                   6

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 2:

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT
       DISMISSED THE CASE WITH PREJUDICE AND FAILED TO
       CONSIDER THE DISCOVERY RULE.

       {¶15} Mr. Frankowski argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court failed

to properly consider the discovery rule. Mr. Frankowski never argued in the lower court that the

discovery rule applied and that it tolled the running of the applicable statute of limitations. “It is

well-settled that this Court will not address arguments for the first time on appeal.” State v.

Williamson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29935, 2022-Ohio-185, ¶ 31. This Court has recognized that

the failure to raise the discovery rule to the trial court constitutes a waiver and, as such, it cannot

be raised for the first time on appeal. Madvad v. Russell, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 96CA006652, 1997

WL 760898, *2 (Nov. 19, 1987). Accord Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Group, Inc., 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 19AP-760, 2020-Ohio-3291, ¶ 16 ((Emphasis added.) “Insofar as appellant seeks to

raise for the first time on appeal the discovery rule and waiver of the statute of limitations defense,

appellant has waived those arguments.”).

       {¶16} As the discovery rule was never previously raised by Mr. Frankowski and was not

addressed by the trial court, Mr. Frankowski’s second assignment of error is not properly before

this Court on appeal and is therefore overruled

                                                  III.

       {¶17} This Court overrules the first assignment of error. The argument presented in the

second assignment is not properly before this Court on appeal and is overruled. The judgment of

the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                                  Judgment affirmed.
                                                 7

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                     SCOT STEVENSON
                                                     FOR THE COURT

SUTTON, J.
FLAGG LANZINGER, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

DAVID E. FRANKOWSKI, pro se, Appellant.

DAVID L. MCARTOR, KRISTOPHER K. AUPPERLE, and BRADLEY A. NOVAK, Attorneys
at Law, for Appellee.