Court Opinion

ID: 9682502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:12:17.23713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:39.718548
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. When taken in context with the particular type of business in which Mr. Musser was engaged, the words in the letter are reasonably susceptible to either a defamatory or nondefamato-ry meaning. That is, the words are ambiguous. The trial court was correct in letting the jury decide the effect of the publication upon the ordinary reader.
Where the meaning of the language is “ambiguous and of doubtful import,” the court should submit the question to the jury. Guisti v. Galveston Tribune, 105 Tex. 497, 150 S.W. 874 (1912). Further, the Guisti court held that under such circumstances it was improper for the court to determine the “reasonable and natural meaning of the statement.” See also Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Coker, 428 S.W.2d 710 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and the cases cited therein, for a reaffirmance of the Texas rule that the test is “what effect would the publication have on the mind of the ordinary reader.”
It is a well-established rule in common law that false words that are harmful to one engaged in his particular office, business or profession are actionable per se. Stearns v. McManis, 543 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism’d). In slander cases this means that the plaintiff need not plead and prove actual damages resulting from the spoken words in order to have a cause of action. It is presumed that words that affect one’s business cause damage, while words that are defamatory in general may not cause damage. The per se, per quod distinction is not made when the defamation is in writing, but the concept that the words are to be taken in light of the plaintiff’s particular profession is applicable. To charge an employee with dishonesty in his dealings with his employer is slanderous per se. Butler v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d 510 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1970, writ dism'd).
Mr. Yust & Mr. Yuna testified that one reason they became concerned when they read the letter was that a polygraph examiner must be absolutely trustworthy. The examiner is privy to confidential information. He interviews employees and potential employees on a one-to-one basis. An examiner who lacked integrity could “cut a deal or whatever with the employee or the suspect we were trying to examine and that was a concern to us,” testified Yust. He further testified that the company did not want to subject good employees to unnecessary or unscrupulous interrogation.
I find no authority for ignoring the jury finding or for substituting this court’s majority finding that the statement is not libel as a matter of law. In Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Coker, as in this ease, the language complained of could have been understood by the ordinary person (as was found to be understood by both juries) to be libelous. The meaning of the words was a question for the jury. Id. at 719. This court cannot substitute its finding for that of the jury even though after reviewing the evidence we might have reached a different conclusion. Precision Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 671 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (cite omitted).
Apparently the only reason the majority reversed the jury finding was because Ap-pellee coated his arsenic with sugar and thereby made it more palatable. The fact that a bee may be hiding in a rose blossom does nothing to lessen its sting.
The record contains evidence to support the jury findings and I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.