Court Opinion

ID: 9542453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:34:38.45753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:58.086295
License: Public Domain

HARTZ, Judge (specially concurring). {56} I concur in the result. I also concur in the discussion in the majority opinion that supports the holdings. My concerns relate to the extensive discussion in the opinion that is unnecessary to the result. As is often true of such discussion, it creates as much confusion as clarity in the law, even when the underlying reasoning appears to be basically sound. {57} I will restrict my specific remarks to the opinion’s dictum with respect to the inadmissibility in a personal-injury action of evidence that the plaintiff failed to use a seat belt. The majority opinion properly holds that the district court did not err in permitting Chrysler to rebut Plaintiffs’ punitive-damages evidence with evidence that Chrysler encouraged the use of seat belts. But that is all the opinion needs to say about seat-belt evidence. It is unnecessary for the opinion to address whether a defendant may try to reduce or avoid altogether an award of compensatory damages by putting on evidence that the plaintiffs injuries resulted, at least in part, from the plaintiffs negligent failure to wear a seat belt. Moreover, the majority’s views with respect to such evidence are unpersuasive. Contrary to the majority opinion, I believe that our Supreme Court would permit the use of such evidence to reduce the liability of a defendant. I will set forth my reasoning below. To summarize my conclusions, although it would be improper to inform the jury that the failure to use a seat belt violated the New Mexico statute on the subject, the jury should be permitted to determine whether failure to use a seat belt constituted a failure to exercise due care to protect oneself, resulting in a reduction in recoverable damages in accordance with the law governing comparative fault. {58} It is worth considering why Plaintiffs here were so vigorously opposed to the admission of any evidence indicating that they were not wearing their seat belts and that they would not have been ejected from the vehicle if they had been wearing them. The reason for Plaintiffs’ concern, of course, is that a jury would be strongly influenced by the evidence. Most jurors would find Plaintiffs negligent for failing to wear their seat belts and would be likely to reduce any award of damages to Plaintiffs if there was credible evidence that Plaintiffs would not have been ejected from their vehicle had they been wearing the belts. I am confident that the great majority of adults in this state would agree that juries should consider seat-belt usage in a lawsuit arising out of a motor-vehicle collision. Their sense of justice tells them that failure to wear a seat belt is negligence and that such negligence is a proper consideration in deciding how much, if any, damages should be awarded. {59} Yet, according to the majority opinion, the law of New Mexico forbids consideration of a plaintiffs failure to wear a seat belt. When the common law has strayed so far from the sense of justice of ordinary persons (those who are not judges or lawyers), it is time for a change. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 9-10, 14-26, 43-49 (1991). Bringing common sense to this area of the law does not require any radical revision of common-law notions. It requires only a return to long-standing traditions. {60} The general principle is clear. As stated in the Uniform Jury Instructions promulgated by our Supreme Court: “Every person ... has a duty to exercise ordinary care for the person’s own safety[.]” UJI 13-1604 NMRA 1999; see Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 463, 464 (1965) (Restatement). When a plaintiff fails to exercise ordinary care for his or her own safety, the plaintiff is negligent. If that negligence contributes to the plaintiffs injuries, the jury compares the plaintiffs negligence to the negligence of the others contributing to the injury, and the plaintiffs recovery of damages is reduced accordingly. See UJI 13-2218 NMRA 1999; UJI 13-2219 NMRA 1999. {61} On what common-law basis, then, could a court forbid the jury from considering a plaintiffs failure to wear a seat belt? I can see none. Objections to such evidence that may have been persuasive in the past are not persuasive now. {62} Perhaps at one time seat belts were used so rarely, and the advantages of their use were so little known, that a court could say as a matter of law that failure to wear a seat belt was not negligence. After all, years ago most motor vehicles did not include seat belts. But those days are long gone. Although there may still be rational adults who believe that seat belts are not worth the trouble, it would be closer to the mark to say that failure to wear a seat belt is negligence as a matter of law than to say that it is reasonable as a matter of law. {63} Also, perhaps at one time courts could justify refusal to allow seat-belt evidence because such refusal ameliorated the harshness of the doctrine of contributory negligence. Under the now-abandoned rule of contributory negligence, if the plaintiff was negligent in any respect that contributed to the plaintiffs injuries, the plaintiff could recover nothing from a negligent defendant, regardless of how much at fault the defendant may have been. Hence, no matter how badly the plaintiff would have been injured even if the plaintiff had been wearing a seat belt, the plaintiff may not have been able to recover any damages if the jury found that the plaintiff was negligent for failing to wear a seat belt and that the injuries were enhanced because of that failure. But the regime of contributory negligence ended in New Mexico almost two decades ago. See Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981). The adoption of comparative fault in Scott eliminates this justification for excluding seat-belt evidence. {64} A third possible ground for excluding seat-belt evidence is more subtle. Even after the adoption of comparative fault, courts might have feared that seat-belt evidence would make trials unwieldy. Perhaps the plaintiff would have suffered injuries even if wearing a seat belt. Damages for such injuries should not be reduced because of any fault of the plaintiff in not wearing a seat belt. But as the parties try to convince the jury how to apportion the plaintiffs injuries between those that would have been suffered even if the plaintiff had been wearing a seat belt and those suffered as a result of not wearing a belt, the trial could be cluttered with confusing evidence. Better to avoid the problem, the argument goes, by not allowing any evidence regarding seat-belt use. {65} That argument lost all force, however, once courts recognized crashworthiness causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers and distributors. See Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 120 N.M. 372, 902 P.2d 54 (1995) (alleged design defect of failing to include shoulder harness in airplane). A key feature of such cases is the apportionment of the injury between what was caused by the crashworthiness defect and what would have-occurred even if the vehicle had no such defect. New Mexico has not refrained from recognizing this cause of action on the ground that apportionment evidence would be too time-consuming or too difficult to evaluate. Looking at the very case before us, does it make any sense to say that it is appropriate for the jury to assess what injuries resulted from the failure of the latch but not to assess what injuries resulted from the failure to wear seat belts? Surely not. {66} In short, if left to its own devices, the common law of New Mexico would now recognize the relevance in this case of Plaintiffs’ failure to wear seat belts. {67} But what of the argument that a “seat-belt defense” is of such importance that creation of the defense should be left in the first instance to the Legislature? That was the position adopted by our Supreme Court in Thomas v. Henson, 102 N.M. 326, 327, 695 P.2d 476, 477 (1985). Today, however, it is not a position that our Supreme Court could follow without engendering poisonous cynicism about the judiciary. {68} First, it is misleading to speak of a “seat-belt defense.” There is nothing unique about a defendant’s arguing that a plaintiff was negligent in not wearing a seat belt and should therefore receive lower damages. All the defendant seeks is the standard instruction that “[ejvery person ... has a duty to exercise ordinary care for the person’s own safety.” UJI 13-604. The jury can then decide on its own, based on the evidence at trial, whether failure to wear a seat belt was negligence and whether the plaintiffs injuries were caused or aggravated by such failure. There is no more need for the common law to “create” a new “seat-belt defense” than there is a need to create a “don’t walk across the highway with your eyes closed” or a “don’t open the emergency door to an airplane when it is flying above the clouds” defense. Every lawsuit presents unique facts. The common law does not set forth a laundry list of specific conduct that constitutes negligence. Rather, it establishes the general principle of due care. There is no reason not to apply this general principle to failure to wear a seat belt. {69} Moreover, even if the so-called “seat-belt defense” could be considered a new common-law defense, it would be disingenuous for a New Mexico court today to say that creation of such a defense must be left to the Legislature. The New Mexico judiciary has hardly hesitated to embrace major changes to the common law. Four years before leaving the “seat-belt defense” to the Legislature in Thomas, 102 N.M. at 327, 695 P.2d at 477, our Supreme Court abolished contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence, see Scott, 96 N.M. at 683, 634 P.2d at 1235. More importantly, since its decision in Thomas our Supreme Court has recognized a number of new or expanded causes of action for plaintiffs. See, e.g., Wilschinsky v. Medina, 108 N.M. 511, 775 P.2d 713 (1989) (duty of physicians to third persons); Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386, 785 P.2d 726 (1990) (prima facie tort); Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 111 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603 (1991) (wrongful pregnancy); Collins v. Tabet, 111 N.M. 391, 806 P.2d 40 (1991) (duty of guardian ad litem); Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102 (1992) (duty arising from employment of independent contractor to perform inherently dangerous work); Ford v. Board of County Comm’rs, 118 N.M. 134, 879 P.2d 766 (1994) (duty of landowners); Beech, 120 N.M. 372, 902 P.2d 54 (products liability); DeVaney v. Thriftway Marketing Corp., 1998 NMSC-01, 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 277 (malicious abuse of process). Only a few weeks ago our Supreme Court recognized a loss-of-ehance cause of action. See Alberts v. Schultz, 1999— NMSC-15, 126 N.M. 807, 975 P.2d 1279. If, for example, a physician’s malpractice caused the patient to lose a 20 percent chance of survival, the physician would be liable for damages equal to 20 percent- of the value of the patient’s life. See id. ¶ 32. Apparently, if the malpractice caused the patient to lose a 51 percent chance of survival (so that the malpractice probably caused the patient to die), the estate would not be entitled to recover the full value of the patient’s life (as under traditional rules of causation) but only 51 percent of the value of the life. See id. The modification of the law regarding causation resulting from adoption of a loss-of-chance cause of action appears to be a far more profound break with common-law tradition than any “seat-belt defense” would be. {70} To be sure, the above examples of modification of the common law generally expand liability. They mostly favor plaintiffs. A seat-belt defense, in contrast, favors defendants. But no principle says that the common law can move in only one direction. Thus, I am confident that as a matter of common law our Supreme Court would now permit a defendant in a motor-vehicle-accident case to present evidence that the plaintiffs failure to wear a seat belt was negligence and contributed to the plaintiffs injuries. {71} The common law, however, is not always the last word. It can be trumped by a statute. Regardless of what the courts might rule as a matter of common law, the courts must obey a legislative enactment. Therefore, I must also address NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-373(A) (1993). This provision is part of the Safety Belt Use Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 66-7-370 to -373 (1985, as amended through 1993). The heart of the Act is Section 66-7-372, which requires that seat belts be worn by front-seat occupants of a motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight under five tons when the vehicle is traveling on a street or highway. {72} The provision of the Act pertinent to personal-injury litigation is Section 66-7-373(A). It states: “Failure to be secured by a child passenger restraint device or by a safety belt as required by the Safety Belt Use Act shall not in any instance constitute fault or negligence and shall not limit or apportion damages.” Note that this provision does not say that the failure to wear seat belts shall not constitute fault or negligence. It says that “failure to be secured by a child passenger restraint device or by a safety belt as required by the Safety Belt Use Act shall not in any instance constitute fault or negligence and shall not limit or apportion damages.” Id. (emphasis added). Why does the statute include the emphasized language? If the purpose of the statute were simply to eliminate the “seat-belt defense,” then would not the clearest language be “failure to be secured by a child passenger restraint device or by a safety belt shall not in any instance constitute fault or negligence and shall not limit or apportion damages”? What makes the statutory language particularly striking is that the Safety Belt Use Act requires only a front-seat occupant to wear a seat belt. Section 66-7-373(A) says nothing about whether the failure of a rear-seat occupant to wear a seat belt is negligence. (In our case the injured Plaintiffs were in the rear seat.) {73} In my view, the most reasonable interpretation of Section 66-7-373(A) is that a defendant cannot use the Safety Belt Use Act to help prove that a plaintiff was negligent. Absent Section 66-7-373(A), a defendant could argue that a front-seat plaintiff’s failure to fasten a seat belt constituted negligence as a matter of law, because such failure violates Section 66-7-372. The general rule is that “[sjtatutory violations are negligence per se if the statute violated was enacted for the benefit of the person injured.” Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 77 N.M. 769, 773, 427 P.2d 655, 657 (1967); see Restatement, su-' pro, § 286. But the general rule can be overcome by a statutory enactment to the contrary. Section 66-7-373(A) forecloses the negligence-per-se argument. {74} Not only does this interpretation fit the literal meaning of the statutory language, but it also fits the historical context of the enactment. In 1985, the year in which the Safety Belt Use Act was first enacted, our Supreme Court had stated that the common law does not recognize a “seat-belt defense.” See Thomas, 102 N.M. at 327, 695 P.2d at 477. If there was sufficient hostility among legislators to a seat-belt defense, those favoring the Safety Belt Use Act could not obtain passage without a provision making sure that the Act would not affect the outcome of personal-injury litigation. Section 66-7-373(A) accomplishes that. {75} In short, Section 66-7-373(A) has the effect, and apparently had the purpose, of ensuring that the Safety Belt Use Act does not change the common law. But it does not preclude the courts themselves from modifying the common law. We should make that modification at the next opportunity.