Court Opinion

ID: 9475667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:34:51.990782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:51.549947
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge.
In this case we consider whether an organized group of anti-abortion activists may be prevented from picketing in front of the private residence of a physician who performs abortions as part of his medical practice. These picketers challenge, on constitutional grounds, a municipal ordi*1340nance prohibiting all picketing in residential areas. The suit was filed by two members of the group against the municipality and its officers. After a hearing the district court enjoined the enforcement of the ordinance, ruling that it probably offended the first amendment. Schultz v. Frisby, 619 F.Supp. 792 (E.D.Wis.1985). On appeal the decision of the district court is affirmed.
I
The Town of Brookfield, the situs of the controversy, is located in Waukesha County, Wisconsin, not far from Milwaukee. The Town covers an area of about five and one-half square miles and has a population of approximately 4300. State Highway 18, also known as the West Bluemound Road, is the Town’s sole commercial thoroughfare. The remainder of the Town is residential. Brookfield’s homes are grouped into subdivisions graced by their developers with imaginative names. One of those subdivisions is called the “Black Forest.” It consists of fourteen homes and is zoned exclusively for single-family residences. The streets are thirty feet wide; there are no sidewalks, curbs, gutters, or streetlights.
One of the private residences in Black Forest is owned by Benjamin Victoria, M.D. Dr. Victoria performs abortions at clinics in Appleton, Wisconsin and Milwaukee. Dr. Victoria does not practice medicine in Brookfield. The house in Brook-field is the Victoria family’s principal residence.1
Plaintiff-appellee Sandra Schultz is a former elementary schoolteacher who describes herself as a full-time housewife and mother. She believes that abortion is a “tragic and immoral injustice.” In January of 1984 she helped found the Milwaukee Coalition for Life, a group dedicated to stopping abortion through sidewalk counseling, picketing, and leafleting. Schultz is currently president of the Coalition.2
Plaintiff-appellee Robert Braun is a self-described “community activist” and “advocate on behalf of the poor and unemployed and other needy people.” Braun strongly opposes abortion and believes in “caring and supportive alternatives” to the problems posed by an unwanted pregnancy.3
On April 20, 1985 the Milwaukee Coalition for Life sponsored the first of several picket lines in front of the Victoria residence to protest Dr. Victoria’s performance of abortions. Between April 20 and May 20 the Victoria residence was picketed on at least six separate occasions. Schultz was present at picketing occurring on April 20, May 9, and May 20. Braun was present on May 16 and May 20. Estimates of the number of picketers on each occasion varied, but the number was never less than ten nor more than fifty. The picketing received extensive press coverage.4
The parties disagree as to the conduct of the picketers. The Town submitted sworn affidavits indicating that the picketing was not always calm and orderly. One of the Town’s police officers stated that on April 27, 1985 he was called to the Victoria residence by Mrs. Victoria and observed that red ribbons had been tied onto the bushes and door of the house. Red ribbons are a symbol of the pro-life movement in Wisconsin. The ribbon-tying incident took place only minutes after a crowd of picketers had left the Victoria home.5
Another Town police officer stated that on April 20 he observed picketers singing “God Bless America” and carrying signs that said “baby killer.” At the conclusion of the song the picketers shouted at the *1341house, “Baby killer, Dr. Victoria, you’re a killer, save our children,” or words to that effect.6 At other times the picketers carried signs inscribed with various anti-abortion themes such as “Stop Abortion Now,” “Aborted Babies Sold for Cosmetics,” “Abortion is Legal Murder,” and “Forgiveness is Yours for the Asking.”7
The family of a five-year-old boy, residing down the street from the Victorias, stated that on April 20 they saw a group of people marching on the street carrying signs about abortion and that one member of the group, “a lady with a cross,” told the little boy that there was a man who lived up the road who killed babies and that the boy should not go there. The child became frightened and asked if the man would kill him too.8
A family living one block from the Victo-rias stated that their six-year-old daughter was told by picketers that Dr. Victoria was killing babies, that she had become frightened, and that they had been forced to explain abortion to her.9
The Victorias’ son, age sixteen, stated that the picketers took his picture, shouted at him, and temporarily blocked his exit from his home.10 Mrs. Victoria stated that she was blocked from entering her home and that the picketers placed a sign stating, “You are a shame to the United States,” on her front door. She further stated that the picketers took photographs of her home and backyard pool and published them in their organization’s newsletter.11
Schultz and Braun have sworn that the picketing was entirely peaceful. They claim that the picketers confined themselves to the street, did not block traffic, and did not generate excessive noise. The plaintiffs submitted affidavits which supported their contention that the picketing was polite and restrained.12 No arrests were made. Indeed, the defendants’ own proposed statement of uncontested facts cited an article published in the Milwaukee Sentinel of May 21, 1985 that quoted a “neighbor of Victoria” as objecting more to Dr. Victoria’s abortion activities than to the picketing.13 The district court found that the picketing had been conducted, “for the most part,” in a peaceable and orderly fashion.14
Schultz has stated that picketing of the Victoria residence is necessary because:
Picketing at locations at which Victoria performs abortions would not accomplish what picketing on the public street by his house can accomplish. Such picketing would not serve to inform those dwelling in Victoria’s neighborhood. Moreover, the greater media coverage of residential picketing allows us to reach audiences who might not otherwise receive our messages. As an additional concern, we do not wish to interfere with efforts of sidewalk counselors to contact prospective abortion clients; picketing near the Victorias’ residence (away from the site *1342of the abortions) removes the possibility of such problems, while more effectively conveying our messages to the abortionist and those in his community.15
On May 7, 1985, after the picketing had started, the Town of Brookfield enacted an ordinance that prohibited picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual, except for picketing during a labor dispute of the place of employment involved in the labor dispute. The Town Attorney became convinced that the new ordinance conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980), and instructed the Town Chief of Police to withhold enforcement. Picketing continued and the ordinance was repealed. On May 15, 1985 the Town passed a new ordinance, section 9.17 of the General Code. The key provision of the new ordinance reads: “It is unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield.” The Town also set forth its rationale for the ordinance:
It is declared that the protection and preservation of the home is the keystone of democratic government; that the public health and welfare and the good order of the community require that members of the community enjoy in their homes and dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy, and when absent from their homes and dwellings, carry with them the sense of security inherent in the assurance that they may return to the enjoyment of their homes and dwellings; that the practice of picketing before or about residences and dwellings causes emotional disturbance and distress to the occupants; obstructs and interferes with the free use of public sidewalks and public ways of travel; that such practice has as its object the harassing of such occupants; and without resort to such practice full opportunity exists, and under the terms and provisions of this chapter will continue to exist for the exercise of freedom of speech and other constitutional rights; and that the provisions hereinafter enacted are necessary for the public interest to avoid the detrimental results herein set forth.
There has been no picketing of the Victoria residence since May 21, 1985, the effective date of the picketing ordinance.
On July 2, 1985 Schultz and Braun brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from an alleged deprivation of their rights under the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. The defendants are Russell Frisby and George Hunt, Supervisors of the Town Board; Robert Wargowski, Chairman of the Town Board; Harlan Ross, Chief of Police; Clayton Cramer, Town Attorney; and the Town of Brookfield. A hearing on plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction was held on August 13, 1985. Finding that the picketers were likely to prevail on the merits, on October 7, 1985 the district court issued its decision granting the picketers a preliminary injunction and providing that the injunction would become permanent, absent an appeal or request for a trial, within sixty days. The basis of the district court’s decision was that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to advance the Town’s asserted interests in protecting the privacy of its citizens and the unobstructed use of the streets and sidewalks. The defendants appealed.
II
It is well-settled law that: “To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he has no adequate remedy at law or will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (2) that the harm he will suffer is greater than the harm the defendant will suffer if the injunction is granted; (3) that the plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) that the injunction will not harm the public interest.” ON/TV v. Julien, 763 F.2d 839, 842 (7th Cir.1985). The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction *1343will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Burlington Northern RR v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 793 F.2d 795, 804 (7th Cir.1986); Maxim’s Ltd. v. Badonsky, 772 F.2d 388, 390 (7th Cir.1985).
In American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir.1986), a divided panel of this court seemed to cast doubt upon the continuing validity of this traditional approach. Building upon an earlier decision of this court, Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir.1984), American Hospital appeared to suggest that these traditional considerations could be encapsulated in an algebraic formula. 780 F.2d at 593. Subsequent decisions of this court have clarified the meaning of the American Hospital decision. In Lawson Products v. Avnet, 782 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1986), this court re-examined the doctrinal underpinnings of the law of preliminary injunctions and concluded, in light of the issues raised by the American Hospital formula, that “despite possible contrary readings of recent precedent, the granting of injunctive relief remains a discretionary equitable remedy.” 782 F.2d at 1430. The court in Lawson explicitly endorsed the traditional approach to injunctive relief. “[T]his opinion represent[s] a continued affirmation of the traditional equitable factors governing injunctions and the classic roles of both district and appellate courts.” Id. at 1441. “Roland and American Hospital did not change any of the law governing preliminary injunctions.” Id. at 1437. A subsequent decision of this court agreed with the position taken by the panel in Lawson. See Brunswick Corp. v. David Jones, 784 F.2d 271, 1330 n. 1 (7th Cir.1986) (“American Hospital does not set forth a new standard for granting preliminary injunctions.”); see also Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1346 (7th Cir.1986) (Will, J., concurring).
It should be obvious then, that concerns about the continuing validity of the traditional approach to preliminary injunctive relief in this circuit are misplaced. The law remains unchanged. Applying the law to the facts of this case, we conclude, for the reasons set forth below, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.
Ill
The first amendment prohibits governmental bodies from enacting laws “abridging the freedom of speech” or “the right of the people peaceably to assemble.”16 These words, by themselves, seldom serve to illuminate the precise contours of protected expression in cases such as the present one. Picketing, for example, is not an instance of “pure speech” because it usually involves conduct of some sort and may not include verbal utterances at all. Conduct is not always entitled to the same level of protection as pure speech. Shut-tlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152, 89 S.Ct. 935, 939, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969).17 Nevertheless, “[tjhere is no doubt *1344that as a general matter peaceful picketing and leafletting are expressive activities involving ‘speech’ protected by the First Amendment.” United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1706, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983).
The Supreme Court has often stated that speech on issues of public concern occupies the “highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values” and is entitled to “special protection.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1689, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 913, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3425, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2293-94, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980). The Court has characterized freedom of speech as a fundamental personal right, Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150-51, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939), and “as the essence of self-government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964).18 The right to picket, however, like all other forms of expression, is not absolute and is subject to reasonable regulation. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). “[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.” Heffron v. International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2564, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981).
There are several important limitations on the scope of the first amendment. The expressive activity for which a claim of protection is made must be appropriate to, or not incompatible with, its location. “The existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at issue.” Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3448, . 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,106, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2297-98, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). In evaluating the appropriateness of expressive activity to a particular location courts employ the “public forum” doctrine. In places which by tradition have been devoted to assembly and debate the state’s ability to limit expressive activity is “sharply circumscribed.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 955. In places not traditionally devoted to assembly or debate the state may nevertheless create a public forum by intent or custom. In these limited public forums a state may not enforce exclusions even if it need not have established the forum to begin with. Id. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 955. In addition, certain government properties, *1345even if “public” in other respects, are nonpublic forums for first amendment purposes. United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129, 101 S.Ct. 2676, 2685, 69 L.Ed.2d 517 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 1216, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47, 87 S.Ct. 242, 247, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966).
Regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech on the basis of its content “presumptively” violate the first amendment. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 925, 928, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986).19 Content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations, however, are permitted if they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest and leave open ample alternative avenues of communication. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. at 3069.20 In City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1552 (7th Cir.1986), we stated that a time, place, and manner restriction on expressive activity may be sustained only if the Government can show that the restriction (1) is content neutral, (2) serves a legitimate governmental objective, (3) leaves open ample alternative channels of communication, and (4) is narrowly tailored to serve the governmental objective. To establish that a regulation is narrowly tailored the Government must show that there is a “significant relationship between the regulation and the governmental interest ... and that less restrictive alternatives are inadequate to protect the governmental interest.” Id.
IV
We must first decide whether the street fronting Dr. Victoria's home is a public forum for purposes of the first amendment.21 We begin with the proposition that streets have historically been considered particularly appropriate locations for public assembly and debate.
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16, 59 S.Ct. 954, 963-64, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939). The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the Hague principle. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177, 103 S.Ct. at 1707 (“public places historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, *1346and parks, are considered, without more, to be ‘public forums’ ”); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 315, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 1607, 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1968) (“streets ... are so historically associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights that access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely”); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 460, 100 S.Ct. at 2290; Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 515, 96 S.Ct. 1029, 1034, 47 L.Ed.2d 196 (1976); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. at 152, 89 S.Ct. at 939.
It is not intuitively obvious, however, that all streets, in all places, must automatically be considered public forums. There are no doubt thousands of subdivisions scattered throughout this country, like the one involved in this case, on whose streets little, if any, first amendment activity has ever taken place. Homes like the Victo-rias’ were conceived, built, and purchased as private residences, havens from our loud and contentious inner cities. It seems incongruous to decide that this particular street is a public forum simply because streets in general have historically been centers of expressive activity.22
In Pursley v. Fayetteville, 628 F.Supp. 676 (W.D.Ark.1986), the district court upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance essentially identical to the ordinance involved in this case. In Pursley the ordinance was also challenged by anti-abortion picketers wishing to picket the residence of a doctor who performed abortions as part of his medical practice. The Pursley court held that streets and sidewalks located in residential areas are not public forums. 628 F.Supp. at 679-80.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has always placed all streets, regardless of their differing characteristics, into the same privileged category for first amendment purposes. Twice, for instance, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of demonstrators to picket the streets fronting the private residence of the Mayor of Chicago. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. Ill, 89 S.Ct. 946, 22 L.Ed.2d 134 (1969). In neither case was the residential character of the neighborhoods sufficient to transform the streets at issue from public to non-public forums. In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981), the Court rejected the respondents’ attempt to equate, for first amendment purposes, streets and the state fairgrounds at issue in that case. “[I]t is clear that there are significant differences between a street and the fairgrounds. A street is continually open, often uncongested, and constitutes not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a locality’s citizens, but also a place where people may enjoy the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed environment.” Id. at 651, 101 S.Ct. at 2566. Justice White’s description of a hypothetical “street” entitled to characterization as a quintessential public forum serves as an accurate description of the Brookfield street in this case. The public forum status of streets and sidewalks may not be altered by legislative fiat. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 180, 103 S.Ct. at 1708-09; Greenburgh, 453 *1347U.S. at 133, 101 S.Ct. at 2687. Despite the tremendous changes in the patterns of residential life since the Hague decision, streets remain proper and natural places for the dissemination of ideas.
A holding that streets located in residential areas are not public forums would represent a radical departure from the general direction of first amendment jurisprudence. Such a holding would effectively place vast areas of this country out of the reach of the protection of the first amendment. Indeed, if streets like that fronting Dr. Victoria’s home are not protected by the first amendment, then primarily residential towns, like Brookfield, may effectively confine the right of their citizens to be exposed to a diversity of views on issues of public concern to those tiny areas of the community classified as “commercial” or “governmental.” The importance of free expression to our constitutional scheme of government makes this result inconceivable.
We think that if the issue were squarely presented to the Supreme Court it would hold that all streets, regardless of their situs, are public forums, and we therefore conclude that the Brookfield picketing occurred in a public forum.23
V
This conclusion, however, does not answer the vexing questions that remain. We must also consider whether the Brook-field ordinance leaves open ample alternative channels for communication. Cf Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. at 3069. For “a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate.” Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2133, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). And “one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.” Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. at 163, 60 S.Ct. at 151-52.
There are no clear guideposts to assist courts in determining when an alternative forum is “adequate.” The thrust of the cases seems to be that an alternative forum will not be judged inadequate because it restricts the quantity of the means of expression. See, e.g., Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 803, 104 S.Ct. at 2128. The Supreme Court seems to have analyzed the issue in terms of its effect on the quality of the means of expression. The restricted forum must constitute a “uniquely valuable or important mode of communication.” Id. at 812, 104 S.Ct. at 2133.
In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 106 S.Ct. at 925, the Court rejected claims that a zoning ordinance which prohibited motion picture theatres from locating within 1000 feet of a residential zone, church, park, or school did not allow for reasonable alternative avenues of communication where five percent of the land area of the city remained open to unrestricted use as adult theatre sites. In Taxpayers for Vincent the Court upheld a ban on the posting of signs on public property because the ban did not “affect any individual’s freedom to exercise the right to speak ... in the same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited.” 466 U.S. at 812, 104 S.Ct. at 2133 (emphasis added). But in Linmark Associates v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977), the Court struck down a town ordinance that banned the posting of “For Sale” signs on real estate because the ban *1348forced sellers to employ entirely different kinds of advertising, such as the newsme-dia.
There is no question that picketing per se is a valuable form of communication. The more difficult question is whether picketing in a residential neighborhood is an essential, “uniquely valuable,” element of the message Schultz and Braun seek to communicate. The question we must answer is whether the plaintiffs may effectively deliver their message elsewhere without, at the same time, changing the character of that message. The Brookfield ordinance restricts picketing to the commercial strip along West Bluemound Road, the Town’s main thoroughfare. We think it clear that in so doing the ordinance significantly impacts upon the quality of the means of expression Schultz and Braun have chosen to communicate their message. Forcing Schultz and Braun to picket in non-residential areas would be, in effect, to force them to engage in an entirely different form of expressive activity. Consigned to the “safe” and busy area along Bluemound Road, they may be conveniently ignored by passersby. They may be written off as eccentric and irrelevant nuisances. Residential picketing, however, does not permit the citizens of Brookfield to ignore or trivialize the message the picketers wish to communicate. Residential picketing, quite literally, brings the message home. More importantly, the fact that the message may reach and disturb families and children is clearly part of the point of the picketing, for, to a certain extent, the picketers seek to communicate their concerns about a perceived assault on the family and on childhood itself. There can be no better place to convey those concerns than in a residential area. The disturbance occasioned by the residential picketing in this case is actually one measure of its unique value as a means of communicating Schultz’ and Braun’s concerns. We conclude, therefore, that the Brookfield ordinance does not provide ample, alternative channels of communication.
VI
Neither Schultz nor Braun has been charged with a violation of the ordinance. Nothing in the record indicates that the ordinance has been enforced against anyone else. The general rule is that “constitutional adjudication requires a review of the application of a statute to the conduct of the party before the Court.” Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 798, 104 S.Ct. at 2125. This rule reflects both the personal nature of constitutional rights and prudential limitations on constitutional adjudication. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3360, 73 L.Ed.2 1113 (1982). See generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). In some cases, however, courts have invalidated statutes “on their face” without inquiring into their particular applications to specific facts. An ordinance may be constitutionally invalid on its face “either because it is unconstitutional in every conceivable application, or because it seeks to prohibit such a broad range of protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally ‘overbroad.’ ” Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 796, 104 S.Ct. at 2124. In either case illegitimate enforcement of the statute against the complaining party will not be required. An ordinance is unconstitutional in every conceivable application because “any enforcement carries with it the risk that the enforcement is being used merely to suppress speech, since the statute is not aimed at a substantive evil within the power of the government to prohibit.” Id. at 797 n. 14, 104 S.Ct. at 2125 n. 14 (emphasis in original). This is almost a rule of per se unconstitutionality. Laws invalidated on this basis fail to define a “central core of constitutionally regulable conduct.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 771 n. 26, 102 S.Ct. at 3362 n. 26; Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2563-64, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974); CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-81, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2897-98, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973). See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 844 (1970).
*1349An ordinance may also be constitutionally invalid on its face if it is written so broadly that it may inhibit — have a “chilling effect” on — the protected speech of third parties. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 796, 104 S.Ct. at 2124; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98, 60 S.Ct. 736, 741-42, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). This form of the overbreadth doctrine — the “classic” form of the doctrine — relaxes ordinary standing rules by permitting parties to raise the rights of third parties not before the court.24 Though the Court has cautioned that constitutionally invalid over-breadth must be “substantial” where conduct and not merely speech is involved, and that the doctrine itself should be invoked “only as a last resort,” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 613, 93 S.Ct. at 2916, the Court has often invalidated statutes on the basis of this doctrine. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 1120-21, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965). See generally Monaghan, Over-breadth, 1981 S.CtRev. 1.
These two types of facial challenges to the constitutionality of legislative enactments are often conflated. “ ‘[OJver-breadth’ is not used only to describe the doctrine that allows a litigant whose own conduct is unprotected to assert the rights of third parties to challenge a statute, even though as applied to him the statute would be constitutional. ‘Overbreadth’ has also been used to describe a challenge to a statute that in all its applications directly restricts protected first amendment activity and does not employ means narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” Secretary of State of Maryland v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 965-66 n. 13, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2852 n. 13, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984) (citations omitted); see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2351 n. 8, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). In this case we are not presented with an instance in which the application of the classic overbreadth doctrine is appropriate. The facial challenge to the Brookfield ordinance is of the per se type upheld in J.H. Munson.
The complaint in this case is not that the ordinance might violate the rights of other potential picketers, but rather that the ordinance is unconstitutional and would constitute a direct restriction on protected first amendment activity if applied to Schultz and Braun and would be per se unconstitutional if applied against any type of picketing or picketer. The Supreme Court has frequently invalidated statutes or ordinances that impinged upon protected expression “on their face” on the basis that no conceivable application of the statute could be constitutional. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1948); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938).
The district court based its decision to issue the preliminary injunction in this case on a finding that the picketers were likely to prevail on the merits because the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to advance the Town’s legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens or the public use of the streets and sidewalks. The requirement that a legislative enactment affecting expressive activity be narrowly tailored means simply that the questioned regulation “may extend only as far as the interest it serves.” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565, 100 U.S. at 2351. The state cannot “completely suppress information when narrower restrictions on expression would serve its interest as well.” Id. Since a proposed restriction on expressive activity must be narrowly drawn to further a significant governmental interest, the Government must demonstrate that its objectives will not be served by means less restrictive of first amendment freedoms. ACORN v. *1350Frontonac, 714 F.2d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 1983).25
In Central Hudson, for example, the Court struck down a state regulation that prohibited an electric utility company from advertising to “promote the use of” electricity. The regulation was not narrowly tailored because the state’s interest in encouraging its citizens to conserve energy did not support a ban against a utility that might seek to “promote the use of” more efficient electrical products. In J.H. Munson, 467 U.S. at 965-68, 104 S.Ct. at 2851-53, the Court struck down a state statute that prohibited a charitable organization from spending more than twenty-five percent of solicited funds on administrative costs. “The flaw in the statute is not simply that it includes within its sweep some impermissible applications, but that in all its applications it operates on a fundamentally mistaken premise that high solicitation costs are an accurate measure of fraud.” Id. at 966, 104 S.Ct. at 2852. The means chosen to further the state’s interests were judged “too imprecise” to save the statute from a facial challenge. We hold that the Brookfield ordinance is similarly flawed. The ordinance does not represent a sufficiently narrow and precise response to the concerns motivating its passage. There are less restrictive means available to the Town to address its legitimate concerns. Picketing is not by its very nature an activity inherently disruptive of the coherency of an American neighborhood. Although we do not doubt that the secondary effects of picketing — noise, obstructiveness, trespass, litter, etc. — may be regulated, picketing may not be barred altogether merely because it occurs in a residential area. An ordinance which attempts just that can never be constitutional.
VII
In order to justify an impairment of expressive activity Brookfield must demonstrate the existence of a significant governmental interest. Any number of such interests are imaginable. It is not our place, however, to invent justifications for the Brookfield ordinance. In this case any speculation would be utterly pointless since the Town itself has indicated that it enacted the ordinance to serve two interests: (1) the privacy interests of its residents; and (2) its interest in regulating vehicular and pedestrian traffic patterns. Of these two, it is clear that the privacy issue is the most important justification for the statute and the issue on which the parties and the district court focused their attention. Although the interest in regulating traffic is legitimate, it constituted only a minor part of the Town’s interest in the ordinance. Moreover, there has been no evidence introduced that the picketers in any way interfered with the flow of traffic. Indeed, the Town’s own evidence clearly indicated that the picketing had a negligible impact on traffic. Even the statements of the Victoria family that their egress from their home was impeded must be understood not as impairments to traffic patterns, but as assaults on the physical integrity — the privacy — of the family. We will treat the privacy issue as the sole motivation for the ordinance.
The stated interest of the Town in protecting the privacy of its residents is clearly a significant governmental interest. When the privacy of the homestead itself is in question, the rights of individuals to be *1351let alone sometimes outweigh the rights of others to communicate. In Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970), the Court upheld postal regulations that permitted a householder to request the United States Post Office Department to stop the flow of unwanted or offensive mail. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978), the Court upheld Federal Communication Commission regulations restricting the type of speech that may be heard on the airwaves, and thus, in the home itself. The right to privacy is at its strongest when expression intrudes into the privacy of the home or is aimed at captive or unwilling audiences. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2272, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975). We believe the Town’s interest in protecting the residential character of the community is of the utmost importance. Nevertheless, the right to privacy “must be placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate.” Rowan, 397 U.S. at 736, 90 S.Ct. at 1490. The balance, in this case, tips toward the right of the picketers to disseminate their views.
The conflict between the first amendment and the desire of municipalities to protect the sanctity of the home has occasioned much discussion in the courts of this land. In three cases decided in 1943 the Supreme Court struck down restrictions on the right of religious organizations to engage in door-to-door solicitation for the sale of religious literature and the propagation of their views. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943). These cases involved members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, a religious organization particularly unpopular with governmental officials in the 1940’s. Their literature was described by the Court as “provocative, abusive, and ill-mannered.” Murdock, 319 U.S. at 115-16, 63 S.Ct. at 876. In affirming the right to engage in such communication, the Court observed: “The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance.” Martin, 319 U.S. at 143, 63 S.Ct. at 863. “Plainly a community may not suppress ... the dissemination of views because they are unpopular, annoying or distasteful.” Murdock, 319 U.S. at 116, 63 S.Ct. at 876. Dissenting in both Murdock and Martin and concurring in Douglas, Justice Jackson chastised the Court for “denying the American’s deep-seated conviction that his home is a refuge from the pulling and hauling of the marketplace and the street.” Douglas, 319 U.S. at 181, 63 S.Ct. at 889 (Jackson, J., concurring). Though there are, of course, important differences between those cases and our own, the issues they raise are not fundamentally dissimilar. We note that in Murdock a municipal ordinance that banned all solicitation for orders of merchandise within the town limits had been narrowly construed by the Pennsylvania courts as banning only residential solicitation “door to door and house to house.” Murdock, 319 U.S. at 117 n. 10, 63 S.Ct. at 877 n. 10. The Court nevertheless rejected the constitutionality of the statute even when so constructed. “The ordinance is not narrowly drawn to prevent or control abuses or evils arising from [residential solicitation]. Rather, it sets aside the residential areas as a prohibited zone, entry of which is denied petitioners unless [a] tax is paid. That restraint and the one which is city-wide in scope are different only in degree. Each is an abridgment of freedom of press.... They stand or fall together.” Murdock, 319 U.S. at 117, 63 S.Ct. at 877. We read Murdock as standing for the proposition that the residential situs of expressive activity subject to regulation is of no constitutional significance. The constitutionality of a limitation on communication may not depend on whether the communication is directed at city hall or at the home.
*1352At the same time concerns about the effects on individual privacy that any particular activity may have may be taken into account when enacting legislation. “In the sphere of collision between claims of privacy and those of free speech or free press, the interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society.” Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208, 95 S.Ct. at 2272. Homeowners in communities like Brookfield have some reasonable expectation of privacy. People who care passionately about a particular political or social issue have a right to be heard. On the one hand, “[no]thing in the Constitution compels us to listen or view any wanted communication, whatever its merit.” Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737, 90 S.Ct. at 1490. On the other hand, “the Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.” Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210, 95 S.Ct. at 2273. Of course, to say that a municipal enactment must strike a sensitive balance between the right of free expression and the right to be free from expression is to beg at least two important questions. The first is what our society has come to mean by the use of the term “home.” The second is how courts can determine whether an audience is willing or unwilling to receive a specific message.
No Supreme Court case has defined the outer limits of what is meant by the concept of “home.” Is a home strictly limited to the four walls of a building serving as a private residence? Or does the concept of home somehow encompass an area of peace and security related to, but not strictly limited by, the walls of a house? In Ko-vacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949), the Court upheld restrictions on excessively loud sound amplification in residential neighborhoods. In Kovacs there was no actual physical invasion of the walls of a house, but excessive noise may sometimes serve as a more than adequate substitute for physical intrusion. By the same token, in a long line of cases, the Court has struck down restrictions on door-to-door solicitation or canvassing activities although these activities clearly brought the speaker closer to the actual physical shell of the home. We doubt that any exact definition of home is possible and we shall not attempt one here. The concept of home is tied to social and cultural conditions and those are constantly in flux. Nevertheless, though the cases are difficult to synthesize, it is fair to say that the Court has adopted a rather narrow understanding of the concept of home. In no case has the Court’s understanding of the concept of home extended to encompass quiet and orderly demonstrations on the streets and sidewalks.
It is also unclear how one is to separate conceptually, or actually, willing from unwilling listeners. One person’s heresy is another’s orthodoxy; the tamest discourse may be heard as a thunderous philippic. Maybe all of Dr. Victoria’s neighbors disapproved of the plaintiffs’ picketing, but maybe somewhere in the community the picketers’ chants fell on sympathetic ears. What seems relatively clear is that a municipality may not decide for its citizens what messages they may receive. Privacy, by definition, is a right that adheres to the person, and not to the community. The Town of Brookfield has usurped its citizens’ right to decide for themselves what they shall, or shall not, hear and see. We do not live in a society where that is acceptable.
In Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. Ill, 89 S.Ct. 946, 22 L.Ed.2d 134 (1969), demonstrators pressing for desegregation of the City of Chicago’s schools picketed in front of the mayor’s house. The picketing attracted large numbers of hostile bystanders. Fearful of impending civil disorder, the police ordered the demonstrators to disburse. They refused, were arrested, and were convicted of disorderly conduct. The Court reversed the convictions for lack of evidence that the demonstrators’ conduct was, in fact, disorderly. “This,” wrote Chief Justice Warren for the Court, “is a simple case.” 394 U.S. at 111, 89 S.Ct. at 947.
*1353Justice Black concurred in the judgment of the Court, but could not agree that the case was simple. “Plainly ... no mandate in our Constitution leaves States and governmental units powerless to pass laws to protect the public from the kind of boisterous and threatening conduct that disturbs the tranquility of spots selected by the people ... for homes, wherein they can escape the hurly-burly of the outside business and political world.” 394 U.S. at 118 (Black, J., concurring). Without limitations on speech-related conduct, “homes, the sacred retreat to which families repair for their privacy and their daily way of living, would have to have their doors thrown open to all who desired to convert the occupants to new views, new morals, and a new way of life.” 394 U.S. at 125, 89 S.Ct. at 954.
The force of Justice Black’s views was acknowledged in Carey v. Brown. “The State’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.” Carey, 447 U.S. at 471, 100 S.Ct. at 2296. But the Town’s interest in protecting the privacy of the home cannot justify draconian prohibitions on picketing. The Carey Court, for instance, acknowledged that “[njumerous types of peaceful picketing other than labor picketing would have but a negligible impact on privacy interests.” 447 U.S. at 469, 100 S.Ct. at 2294. Moreover, a certain amount of discord is to be expected, even desired, as a secondary effect of expressive activity. “[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.” Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5, 69 S.Ct. 894, 895-96, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949); see also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237, 83 S.Ct. 680, 684, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963). To an extent, disruption is the price of living in a free society.
Our task would be easier if we had the benefits of an ample body of law addressing the issues raised by this appeal. Unfortunately, no case from this court is directly on point. In Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916, 99 S.Ct. 291, 58 L.Ed.2d 264 (1978), this court held that the Village of Skokie, Illinois could not prohibit a planned demonstration by members of the National Socialist Party of America despite the fact that a clear majority of the Village’s residents would find the demonstration “an invasion, intensely menacing no matter how peacefully conducted.” 578 F.2d at 1206. The court rejected the Village’s attempt to justify restrictions of the planned demonstration on the basis of its citizens’ substantial privacy interests. Id. at 1207. The Skokie demonstration, however, was focused on the Village Hall, with only inevitable, incidental intrusions on peoples’ homes.26
Our research has discovered only two federal appellate decisions on point. In Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971, 95 S.Ct. 1967, 44 L.Ed.2d 462 (1975), the Tenth Circuit rejected the exact constitutional objections raised in this case against a virtually identical municipal ordinance. In Garcia demonstrators picketed the residence of the *1354mayor of the town. The town enacted an ordinance making it unlawful for any person to picket before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual. The court upheld the ordinance holding it to be a “valid exercise of governmental power.” 507 F.2d at 545.
In Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.1968), the Fifth Circuit struck as viola-tive of the first and fourteenth amendments a municipal ordinance making it unlawful for more than two people to picket in front of a residence, a place of business, or a public building. Pursuant to this ordinance demonstrators picketing the local school board building were arrested. The Fifth Circuit held that the ordinance had not been narrowly or precisely drawn to redress proscribable conduct. Id. at 735-36. While the ordinance in Francois is not exactly like the one in the present case,27 it is similar enough to be relevant to our analysis. We think Francois more accurately represents the direction of first amendment law than does the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Garcia.
The defendants rely heavily on the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in City of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis.2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530 (1971). In Wauwatosa the court upheld the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance virtually identical to that struck down in Carey v. Brown. In light of Carey we doubt that Wauwatosa is a viable precedent. Moreover, we do not believe that the Wauwatosa court had a realistic view of the current status of the American family and the American home. “Home,” we are told, “is where the wife expects, in addition to the work of the household and the care of the children, to have some moments of peace and calmness.” 49 Wis.2d at 411, 182 N.W.2d at 537. In State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305, 372 A.2d 1076 (1977), Maryland’s highest court, reviewing a nearly identical statute, rejected the approach of Wauwatosa. “[W]e believe that the statutory ban on all residential picketing is invalid on its face as violative of the right to freedom of speech.” 372 A.2d at 1082.
Finally, in two recent cases, this court struck down far narrower restrictions on expressive activity at least as intrusive on residential privacy as the picketing that occurred in this case. City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir.1986); Wisconsin Action Coalition v. City of Kenosha, 767 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir.1985). In both Watseka and Ke-nosha, relying on a long line of Supreme Court solicitation cases,28 we invalidated limitations on door-to-door solicitation. Yet, in door-to-door solicitation the unwilling target of the message is actually forced to confront the speaker. The householder cannot draw the blinds to shield herself from an unwelcome visage or turn up the stereo to drown out an unpleasant voice. In neither Kenosha nor Watseka did the municipality attempt a total ban on residential solicitation. It would, quite simply, not make analytical sense for us to uphold the ordinance presently under review given the protections we have extended to residential solicitation. Although this is not a case of first impression, neither is it a case whose result is dictated by stare decisis. Nevertheless, we believe our decision is fully consonant with the first amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and with our own previous decisions.
VIII
By deciding this case the way we do, we do not express approval of the alleged conduct of the picketers in front of Dr. Victoria’s home. There is nothing laudable about frightening children or harassing their parents. Sensitivity to the rights of unborn children is not likely to be advanced by insensitivity to rights of already living children. We point out, however, that the *1355charges levelled against the picketers remain merely allegations. We are not asked to pass judgment upon the conduct of the plaintiffs, but rather on the constitutionality of an ordinance banning even peaceful and orderly picketing. If the conduct of anyone within the municipal boundaries of Brookfield is objectionable, then the Town may pass laws directed at that part of the conduct that is legally actionable. To a large extent the Town already has the legal weaponry necessary to defeat disruptive and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Brookfield, for example, has ordinances on its books that prohibit the obstruction of streets and sidewalks, loud and unnecessary noise, destruction of property, littering, criminal trespass to land, criminal trespass to dwellings, and disorderly conduct. 619 F.Supp. at 794-95. Picketers may be prosecuted each time they violate any of those provisions. At oral argument, counsel for the Town asserted that these existing ordinances are difficult to enforce. Any difficulties in the enforcement of these ordinances cannot justify the total ban on residential picketing. Where the first amendment is involved, civil authorities may not take legislative shortcuts.
It is most assuredly not our place to attempt to draft a constitutionally valid ordinance regulating residential picketing. Nevertheless, an ordinance is more likely to be constitutionally acceptable if it does not incorporate expressive activity as part of the definition of the proscribable conduct. An ordinance, for example, making it unlawful to distribute circulars or handbills without the permission of the chief of police would certainly violate the first amendment even if the justification for such an ordinance is the municipality’s legitimate interest in controlling litter. On the other hand, a statute simply making it unlawful to litter would almost certainly not offend the Constitution. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. at 162-63, 60 S.Ct. at 151-52. A municipality’s right to regulate the time, place, and manner of communication necessarily incorporates the duty to balance the right of expression against the homeowner’s right to privacy. The delicacy of that balance can never justify the simple solution of doing away with picketing altogether.
IX
The first amendment, Justice Holmes wrote, “is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 22, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting). It is a test of the proposition that a nation may permit its decisions to be questioned, examined, discussed, and challenged — and yet survive. Persecution for the expression of opinions is, Holmes wrote, “perfectly logical.” Id. “If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent ... or that you do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises.” Id. We live in a society confident of its power and its premises. Our self-confidence has not, however, led us to stifle voices of protest and discontent. Our “profound national commitment” to the principle that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open,” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), is a testament of faith in the good sense and common decency of the American people — a belief that the people, having examined the assumptions of their society, will choose to reaffirm them.
Permitting the premises of our society to be constantly questioned means that there will always be times when people with lost causes and unfulfilled dreams disturb the serenity of our communities. We ought not to be overly troubled by the resulting clamor. It is the inevitable consequence of living in a great and restless democracy.
Affirmed.

. Neither Dr. Victoria nor any member of his family is a party to this action. The record is devoid of reference to any other legal action related to this case.

. Affidavit of Sandra C. Schultz, Record at 16.

. Affidavit of Robert C. Braun, Record at 15.

. Another anti-abortion group, “Project: Save Our Babies," based in Appleton, Wisconsin was involved in the picketing. Nothing in the record indicates why Dr. Victoria was singled out for those demonstrations.

. Affidavit of Reid Brueser, Record at 29.

. Affidavit of Scott M. Heitman, Record at 28.

. 619 F.Supp. at 795.

. Affidavits of Charles Setzke and Mary Setzke, Record at 25-26.

. Affidavits of Paula Smith and Wallace Smith, Record at 20-21.

. Affidavit of Todd Victoria, Record at 23.

. Affidavit of Arlene Victoria, Record at 24.

. Affidavits of William Peterman, Mary Baxa, and Mary Bruders, Record at 32, 33, 34.

. Appellants’ Appendix at 57, 63.

. 619 F.Supp. at 795. Generally, of course, an appellate court is not entitled to pass upon the reliability of evidence presented to the trial court and we need not do so here. One exception to this rule, however, is when a legal dispute centers around the question of whether particular expressions constitute protected or unprotected speech. In these cases appellate courts are permitted a great deal more latitude in their examination of the testimony heard by the district court, despite Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1961, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 n. 10, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1692 n. 10, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 915-16 n. 50, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3427 n. 50, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982).

. Record at 16.

. The first amendment provides in full:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. Const, amend. I.
Though restricted by its terms to the United States Congress, the first amendment was extended to the states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625, 69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925), through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. City ordinances are also covered by the first amendment. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938).
While we treat this case as implicating the free speech rights of the individual plaintiffs, we are not unaware of the collective character of picketing and the “close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.” NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958); see also Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294, 102 S.Ct. 434, 436, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981) ("[T]he practice of persons sharing common views bonding together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American political process.”).

. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 n. 18, 60 S.Ct. 736, 743-44 n. 18, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940), for a thorough survey of the many dif*1344ferent forms picketing may take. Whether conduct may be considered protectible speech depends on whether “in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 2730-31, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581, 85 S.Ct. 453, 470, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965) (Black, J., concurring) ("Standing, patrolling or marching back and forth on streets is conduct, not speech, and as conduct can be regulated or prohibited.")

. It is not clear that the activity engaged in by the plaintiffs is “political speech" in the strict sense of the term. In Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2135, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), for example, the Court distinguished political speech from "a host of other communications that command the same respect.” Among those communications, coincidentally, is the phrase, "Abortion is Murder." It is possible that after the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), opposition to abortion can no longer be characterized as political because, in some sense, the issue has been removed from the political process. In any event, we need not trouble ourselves too much with the proper labelling of the plaintiffs' communications. The Court has stressed that the first amendment fully protects philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, ethical, religious, and cultural matters — indeed, any matter of public interest. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231-32 n. 28, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1797 n. 28, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977); Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 223, 88 S.Ct. 353, 356-57, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967).

. Absolute prohibitions on a particular type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). Because the Brookfield ordinance is limited, at least in respect to place, we shall treat it as a time, place, or manner restriction.

. In the seminal case of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), the Court articulated the constitutional standard by which regulations like the Brookfield ordinance are judged.
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. at 376-77, 88 S.Ct. at 1679 (footnotes omitted).

. The public forum analysis may be less useful in those cases "falling between the paradigms of government property interests." Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 815 n. 32, 104 S.Ct. at 2134 n. 32; Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 132, 101 S.Ct. at 2686.

. In ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 603 F.Supp. 869 (D.Ariz.1985), the court upheld restrictions on solicitation on street intersections and declined to automatically apply the Hague principle merely because the forum in question appeared to qualify as a “street.” In ACORN v. City of New Orleans, 606 F.Supp. 16 (E.D.La.1984), on similar facts, the court held precisely to the contrary. Judge Adams of the Third Circuit has expressed concern that the application of the public forum doctrine may be becoming too mechanical and rigid. “I am concerned that an analysis which relies too heavily on whether an area ... has traditionally been regarded as a public forum fails to come to grips with the fact that legal concepts need to evolve to reflect' underlying social realities.” International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 163 (3d Cir.1982) (Adams, J., statement sur denial of the petition for rehearing). Compare Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw.U.L.Rev. 177 (1966) with Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 167 Nw.U.L.Rev. 153 (1972).

. A time, place, and manner restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech. Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648, 101 S.Ct. at 2564. The Brookfield ordinance on its face bans all forms of picketing without exception. State law, however, prohibits Brookfield from banning labor picketing. Wis.Stat. § 103.-53(l)(e) (1984). Schultz and Braun argue that the Brookfield ordinance thus necessarily incorporates an implied labor exception. In Carey v. Brown, the Supreme Court struck down an Illinois statute that banned residential picketing, but exempted labor picketing. 447 U.S. at 460, 100 S.Ct. at 2290. The district court in the instant case concluded that this claim was mer-itless. On appeal, we decline to reconsider the district court’s decision. Our decision, like the district court’s, is based solely on federal law.

. Declaratory judgments may serve much the same purpose. 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

. The Third Circuit has held that the proponent of a regulation of expressive activity in a nonpublic forum need not prove that there are less restrictive alternatives available, but merely that ample alternative avenues of communication remain open. Pennsylvania Alliance for Jobs and Energy v. Council of Munhall, 743 F.2d 182, 186 (3d Cir.1984). This court has suggested that Munhall creates a conflict with the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Frontonac. Wisconsin Action Coalition v. City of Kenosha, 767 F.2d 1248, 1253-54 (7th Cir.1985). Because we read Mun-hall as being confined to non-public forums, we believe any conflict is more apparent than real. In any case, Kenosha clearly suggested, and City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547 (7th Cir. 1986), conclusively decided, that this court would follow the Eighth Circuit’s view. We note in passing that the analytical task assigned to courts by these two standards are, in any event, closely related.

. In Concerned. Jewish Youth v. McGuire, 621 F.2d 471 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1352, 67 L.Ed.2d 337 (1981), the court upheld restrictions on demonstrations at the Russian Mission to the United Nations relying, in part, on the privacy interests of the people living near the Mission. In Carey v. Brown the Supreme Court specifically declined to decide whether a statute that prohibited all residential picketing could be constitutional. 447 U.S. at 459 n. 2, 100 S.Ct. at 2289 n. 2. This court had previously chosen to do likewise. Brown v. Scott, 602 F.2d 791, 795 n. 6 (7th Cir.1979). The trial court in that case, however, had found it necessary to decide the issue and had held that a total ban on residential picketing was constitutionally permissible. 462 F.Supp. 518 (N.D.Ill.1978); see aiso People Acting Through Community Effort v. Doorley, 338 F.Supp. 574 (D.R.I.1972), rev’d, 468 F.2d 1143 (1st Cir.1972).

. The Francois ordinance is broader as to place, but narrower as to manner, i.e., it is not limited to residences, but neither does it eliminate picketing entirely in the affected areas. See 395 F.2d at 732.

. See Kenosha, 767 F.2d at 1251 (listing Supreme Court solicitation cases).