Court Opinion

ID: 9750250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:40:15.318895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:12.168208
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Bell:
The road on which plaintiff was injured was blocked off by barriers at each end; “No trespassing” signs were posted; even a child could see the road was under construction. Everyone approaching it necessarily realized that he should not enter and that if he did enter, he would certainly assume the risks which every prudent man knows arises when road construction work is being carried on in a prohibited area. The driver of defendant’s truck looking behind him did not and, because of the construction of the truck, could not see the plaintiff in the position where he stood; and the driver had no reason to anticipate that plaintiff or any other person, ignorant of the work thus carried on, would be standing in the roadbed in violation of the barriers and the signs prohibiting entrance.
What was the defendant’s duty under the facts and circumstances of this case? The majority having, laid down’ in a .learned opinion the standard of care which *247ja possessor of land owes to a gratuitous licensee where (“active negligence” is involved, namely, “reasonable | care”, disregards that standard in attempting to apply ¡ it to the facts in this case and imposes instead a stand- ! ard which is so impractical and financially burden-Í some as to be highly unreasonable. The majority opin- | ion requires that defendant’s drivers (1) have to blow a horn (to warn an unanticipatable person) every time théy back their truck (25-30 trucks) or wheel their steam shovel; and (2) defendant has to employ another workman on the rear of this (and every other one of the 25) truck(s); and (3) has to employ a flagman to direct traffic for trucks which were backing and for machines which were wheeling. This seems to me to be so impractical and burdensome as to create an intolerable duty or standard of care, which is supported neither by practice, reason or authority.
What clearly distinguishes this case from Davis v. Tredwell, 347 Pa. 341, 32 A. 2d 411 and Caulton v. Eyre & Co., Inc., 330 Pa. 385, 199 A. 136, and other cases cited in the majority opinion, where the Court held that the question of negligence was for the jury, is that this defendant had no reason to anticipate (what the majority calls) “the likelihood” that plaintiff or any person not working there would be standing in the roadbed in violation of the barriers and signs prohibiting entrance. I would therefore hold that there was no failure on the part of the defendant to exercise the care required under the facts in this case and therefore no proof of negligence.
So far as contributory negligence is concerned, the duty of the plaintiff was manifest — he had to watch out for all the machines and trucks which every prudent man knows will likely be intermittently and suddenly driven or swung forward, sideways, and back-, ward, on a construction"job. The plaintiff stopped to *248engage in what the majority imagines was proper conversation. While conjecture cannot take the place of proof, even proper conversation cannot eliminate plaintiff’s duty of vigilance or entitle him to be blind and deaf and dumb. Plaintiff obviously was not watching and could not possibly have been watching, as was his duty, the trucks and machines which he could easily see and hear were working on this job — especially defendant’s truck of which plaintiff had a clear, uninterrupted view for 300 feet. Obviously, therefore, he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
While no citation of authorities seems necessary for such a plain proposition, Biedrzycki v. Schrader, Inc., 347 Pa. 369, 32 A. 2d 31 supports our opinion. In that case the Court in holding that plaintiff’s contributory negligence barred his recovery said (page 371) : “Restatement, Torts, sec. 341: ‘A possessor of land is subject to liability to licensees, [whether business visitors or gratuitous licensees,] for bodily harm caused to them by his failure to carry on his activities with reasonable care for their safety, unless the licensees know or from facts known to them, should know of the possessor’s activities and of the risk involved therein.’” (Italics supplied.)
Comment a of Section 341 further states: “the mere fact that the possessor has consented to his entry gives [the licensee] no right to expect that the possessor will change the method in which he conducts his activity so as to secure the licensee’s safety. If he knows of the nature of the activities conducted upon the land and the manner in which they are conducted, he has all that he is entitled to expect, that is an opportunity for an intelligent choice as to whether or not the advantage to be gained by coming on the land is sufficient to justify him in incurring the risks incident thereto.”
*249Comment d: “Account is also to be taken of the fact that a licensee must accept or reject the possessor’s consent to enter the land under the conditions which are known to him or which he could discover by the use of his senses. The possessor, therefore, is not required either to refrain from or to give warning of activities dangerous to the licensee if they are, to the knowledge of the licensee so customarily carried on upon the land that the licensee should be on the alert to discover and avoid them.” (Italics supplied.)
Under the facts in this case I would hold: (1) that no negligence was proved; and (2) that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
For these reasons I dissent from the majority opinion and would here enter judgment for defendant n.o.v.