Court Opinion

ID: 9535907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:46:25.774268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:22.947560
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, P.J.
(dissenting). I dissent.
In several recent opinions, this Court has held that the practice of impeaching a defendant with *253regard to a prior unspecified felony conviction is error. I agree. Where the crime forming the basis of the impeaching testimony is not identified to the jury, then the probative effect of that impeaching testimony is diminished to such a degree that as a matter of law the value of the evidence in assessing the defendant’s credibility is far outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See, People v Vincent, 94 Mich App 626; 288 NW2d 670 (1980), People v Garth, 93 Mich App 308; 287 NW2d 216 (1979), People v Jones, 92 Mich App 100; 284 NW2d 501 (1979).
I repudiate the theory of the majority that a compromise solution of admitting evidence of a prior felony without specifying its nature best serves the interests of justice. Rather, I agree with the statement of this Court in Jones, id. at 113, that:
"[Presentation of evidence of an unspecified 'felony’ conviction for purposes of impeaching the defendant’s credibility says nothing of the conduct that is asserted to bear negatively on the defendant’s reliability as a witness while presenting a very substantial possibility of jury speculation and consequent prejudicial impact upon the rights of the accused. The very difficult questions presented by the use of evidence of prior convictions for impeachment must be decided rather than compromised * * *.”
Indeed, a very persuasive showing by the prosecutor must be made in cases such as the instant one where the impeaching evidence pertains to a crime that is identical to the one for which the defendant presently is standing trial. That is, the more similar the prior crime is to the one for which the defendant is on trial, the more the chance that its admission will result in prejudice to the defendant and, thus, the greater the reason *254for its exclusion. If the impeaching testimony cannot meet the criteria for admission under the traditional test for all such impeaching evidence,1 either because it pertains to a prior crime that is too similar to the present one or for some other reason, that testimony should not be permitted under the tenuous theory that by deleting reference to the identity of the impeaching crime its prejudicial effect will be nullified. Much less can its admission be justified under an argument that it is more unfair for the accuser of a defendant to have his or her testimony matched against the credibility of the defendant without jury knowledge that the defendant previously has been convicted of a felony than it is for the defendant to run the risk of possible prejudice in being convicted by a jury merely because of a prior conviction. Further reliance on this novel argument will effectively eliminate a defendant’s right to a fair trial unencumbered by irrelevant consideration of his past life.
The holding as well as the logic of the majority opinion reflects neither the substance nor the spirit of established Michigan law regarding the impeachment of criminal defendants. Rather, it *255unwisely expands the likelihood of prejudice to a criminal defendant in return for evidence that has only minimal probative value on the question of a defendant’s credibility. I would reverse.

 See People v Crawford, 83 Mich App 35, 39; 268 NW2d 275 (1978): "The factors which the judge must weigh in making his determination include: (1) the nature of the prior offense (did it involve an offense which directly bears on credibility, such as perjury?), (2) whether it is for substantially the same conduct for which the defendant is on trial (are the offenses so closely related that the danger that the jury will consider the defendant a "bad man” or infer that because he was previously convicted he likely committed this crime, and therefore create prejudice which outweighs the probative value on the issue of credibility?), and (3) the effect on the decisional process if the accused does not testify out of fear of impeachment by prior convictions (are there alternative means of presenting a defense which would not require the defendant’s testimony, i.e., can his side of the story be presented, or are there alternative, less prejudicial means of impeaching the defendant?).”