Court Opinion

ID: 9579278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:53:13.549951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:25.155252
License: Public Domain

KLEINSCHMIDT, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I do not agree that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Arizona Constitution need or should be interpreted in conformity with its federal counterpart. For all the reasons set out in the dissents in Dixon, I think the Grady same conduct test is the better test for determining what constitutes the “same offense” within the meaning of the double jeopardy clauses. The test is entirely fair and easy to apply. We are free to apply it in interpreting the double jeopardy clause of the Arizona Constitution, and I think we should do so.1 I would hold that because the proposed prosecution seeks to punish the Defendant for the same conduct for which he was punished in the administrative proceeding, the criminal prosecution is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Arizona Constitution. I would also hold, therefore, that the Defendant could not be punished again under A.R.S. section 13-116 since that statute prohibits a second prosecution for the “same act” to the same extent as does the Arizona Constitution.

. In Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 677 P.2d 261 (1984) our supreme court held, in the context of deciding what standard to apply for deciding when prosecutorial conduct which re-suits in a mistrial will bar retrial, that the double jeopardy clause of the Arizona Constitution need not be read as narrowly as its federal counterpart.