Court Opinion

ID: 9557850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:58:41.7434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:34.176467
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.
I dissent. I agree with the statement in the majority opinion that “There is evidence in the record which could be urged in support of an order declaring the child free of appellant’s control, thus eliminating the necessity for her consent to adoption, ’ ’ but I disagree with the holding, which is contrary to the finding of the trial court, that the evidence fails to show appellant’s consent to the adoption which was adjudicated.
*618In my view of the facts and the law, one need go no further than the face of the majority opinion to discover facts which fully support the learned and experienced trial judge in the strict legal probity as well as the wisdom and justice of his holding. It is to be noted that the majority opinion italicizes the language “In signing this consent I understand that it does not become final until it has been accepted by the State Department of Social Welfare after ascertaining that the best interest of the child will be promoted by the proposed adoption. ...” Such opinion then proceeds to construe the consent signed by appellant as though the italicized language were necessarily the controlling sentence of the document. This is contrary to the construction given the document by the trial judge; it ignores the directly conflicting language in the preceding sentence, that “I ... do hereby give my full and free consent to the adoption of said child . . ., it being fully understood by me that I am giving up all my right of custody, services and earnings of said child and that said child cannot be reclaimed by me.” The majority opinion likewise ignores the circumstances shown by the evidence, to the effect that the Social Welfare Department, in accord with its established practice, had investigated the case before it took the signed consent of the appellant; it ignores the implied finding of the trial court, made on ample extrinsic evidence, that the department accepted the mother’s consent at the time it was signed in the presence of the department’s agent.
The action of the majority in construing the consent, upon extrinsic evidence, contrary to the interpretation found by the trial court, is contrary to the well established rule that an “appellate court will accept or adhere to the interpretation [of a contract] adopted by the trial court—and not substitute another of its own— . . . where parol evidence ... is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom.” (4 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1943 Rev.) §192, pp. 146-147; Estate of Rule (1944), 25 Cal.2d 1, 11 [152 P.2d 1003, 155 A.L.R. 1319]; Transportation Guaranty Co. v. Jellins (1946), 29 Cal.2d 242, 255 [174 P.2d 625].)
I think also that in a case such as this, where upon the facts and the law, the choice of this court for an affirmance seems at least as logical as for a reversal, we should hold that the trial judge was eminently correct, and sustain him, in considering the welfare of the child as being paramount in relation both to the belated claim of the appellant and the purely technical contention on behalf of the state administrative agency.
*619For a more complete, and to me entirely satisfactory, treatment of all points involved, reference is made to the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Bray for the District Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reported at  (Cal. App.) 183 P.2d 119.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied April 29, 1948. Schaner, J., voted for a rehearing.