Court Opinion

ID: 9499265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:42:46.201281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:23.102570
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
Although I concur with the result reached by the majority, I write separately because I would follow the Eighth Circuit in holding that the firearm used for enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) need not be mentioned in the indictment. The issue raised by the parties is whether the plain meaning of “any firearm” controls, and not whether possession of the Glock constituted relevant conduct. Thus, I would affirm following the Eighth Circuit’s statutory interpretation, without reaching the question of whether U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(2) serves as an alternative to the application of section 2K2.1(b)(5).
“If the language of a guideline is unambiguous, its plain meaning controls.” United States v. Gonzalez, 262 F.3d 867, 869 (9th Cir.2001). The guideline states that a defendant’s use or possession of “any firearm ... in connection with another felony offense” is grounds for enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2005) (emphasis added). Reading the phrase “any firearm” as meaning “a firearm mentioned in the indictment” contravenes the plain meaning of the statute.
In United States v. Mann, 315 F.3d 1054, 1056-57 (8th Cir.2003), the Eighth Circuit considered and rejected the argument that “any firearm” under section 2K2.1(b)(5) referred to a firearm mentioned in the indictment. The court pointed out that such a reading would have the odd consequence of “benefit[t]ing those criminals ... who have the presence of mind to dispose of whatever firearm they used or possessed in connection with another felony before being apprehended.” Id. at 1057. See also United States v. Jardine, 364 F.3d 1200, 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (relying on Mann and holding that enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2k2.1(c)(l) applies to “any firearm or ammunition, ... even if different from the particular firearm or ammunition upon which defendant’s ... conviction is based”) (later vacated and remanded on other grounds); United States v. Brummett, 355 F.3d 343, 345 (5th Cir.2003) (allowing enhancement for firearms not charged in the indictment). The language of the guidelines is unambiguous. The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Mann is persuasive, and I conclude that the phrase “any firearm” means any firearm, and not “a firearm mentioned in the indictment.” The district court correctly held the same opinion and should be affirmed on that basis. The majority disagrees with the district court holding — I do not.
The majority searches for an alternative method to affirm and rests on a theory embracing relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(2). Since the majority believes Nichols’s possession of the Glock during and after the assault constituted relevant conduct under section 1B1.3, the *1127majority holds that the district court properly enhanced his> sentence under section 2K2.1(b)(5). This will no doubt come as a surprise to the parties, who never raised the issue. The issue has never been briefed. There is an alternative: I would affirm the district court based on the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Mann.