Court Opinion

ID: 9916761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 17:04:00.947701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:57.609620
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Jan 10 2024, 9:01 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Brandon E. Murphy                                          Theodore E. Rokita
Cannon Bruns & Murphy                                      Indiana Attorney General
Muncie, Indiana                                            Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Samuel J. Dayton
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jeremy W. Kelly,                                           January 10, 2024
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-CR-1805
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Jay Circuit Court
                                                           The Honorable Brian D.
State of Indiana,                                          Hutchison, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           38C01-2203-MR-1

                                   Opinion by Judge May
                                Judges Bailey and Felix concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1805 | January 10, 2024                           Page 1 of 9
[1]   Jeremy W. Kelly appeals following his sentencing for Level 2 felony voluntary

      manslaughter. 1 Kelly raises a single issue on appeal, which is whether the trial

      court abused its discretion when it denied a morning-of-sentencing motion to

      replace Kelly’s public defender. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On February 25, 2022, Kelly’s father, Gary, was killed in his home. On March

      1, 2022, the State charged Kelly with murder 2 and Level 2 felony robbery

      resulting in serious bodily injury. 3 That same day, the State also filed notice of

      its intent to seek a habitual offender sentence enhancement. 4 During Kelly’s

      initial hearing, the trial court appointed the Public Defender’s Office to

      represent him. Attorney Aaron Henderson (“Attorney Henderson”) appeared

      to represent Kelly. The trial court scheduled Kelly’s trial to begin on June 5,

      2023.

[3]   On the morning of June 5, 2023, Kelly and the State reached a plea agreement.

      Kelly agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge of Level 2 felony voluntary

      manslaughter in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the original charges and

      the habitual offender allegation. The agreement left sentencing to the discretion

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3.
      2
          Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2).
      3
          Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1(a)(2).
      4
          Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1805 | January 10, 2024         Page 2 of 9
      of the trial court, but for an acknowledgement that Kelly’s sentence would “be

      served consecutively to Wayne County Case 89C01-2202-F4-000007.”

      (Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 78.) The agreement also included an

      acknowledgement of the rights being waived by pleading guilty, an

      acknowledgment of Kelly’s “satisfaction with defense counsel’s representation

      and competency[,]” (id.), a waiver of the right to challenge the sentence

      imposed, and a waiver of the right to appear in person, rather than by video, for

      the sentencing hearing.

[4]   The trial court held a change of plea hearing that same day. The trial court

      advised Kelly of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, and Kelly

      confirmed that he understood and still wished to plead guilty to voluntary

      manslaughter. The State provided a factual basis for the plea, and Kelly

      admitted those facts were true. The trial court accepted Kelly’s plea and, on the

      State’s motion, dismissed the original charges. The trial court ordered

      preparation of a presentence investigation report and set the sentencing hearing

      for July 14, 2023.

[5]   On July 13, 2023, Kelly, who was still represented by Attorney Henderson,

      filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In that motion, he asserted

      the plea should be withdrawn because he received ineffective assistance of

      counsel and because the “Plea was entered under duress[.]” (Id. at 113.) On

      July 14, 2023, as the trial court was calling the sentencing hearing to order,

      Kelly announced “I object.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 14.) The trial court admonished

      Kelly to not interrupt, finished calling the trial court to order, and then invited

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1805 | January 10, 2024        Page 3 of 9
Attorney Henderson to address the trial court. The following discussion

ensued:

        Mr. Henderson: Your Honor, given the events of the last 24
        hours I feel that it is necessary that I ask this Court to remove me
        as the attorney of record. I did go to the jail to speak with Mr.
        Kelly yesterday, [to] present him with his pre-sentence
        investigation report. He refused to meet with me and help
        prepare for today’s sentencing hearing. And then later yesterday
        he filed a document with this Court requesting to withdraw his
        guilty plea with several allegations against me, including some
        ethical violations that he believes are accurate. I do not believe
        there is a basis for them but given those events I believe that I can
        no longer adequately represent him in this matter.

        The Court: Okay. Mr. Kelly do you want to represent yourself at
        sentencing?

        Mr. Kelly: No sir. I just need time to prepare a brief to
        (inaudible) and I need to have–get to be appointed an attorney to
        do that for me or give me time to do that.

        The Court: What’s the State’s position here?

        [State]: I’ll leave it to your discretion Judge.

        The Court: As far as the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, it’s
        not in proper form. I don’t see any substantial injustice. It just
        seems like a lot of complaints about counsel. So the court is
        going to deny that pro se motion, even though I shouldn’t even
        consider it because he has counsel. Sentencing is going to
        happen today Mr. Kelly. Do you want to represent yourself, and
        I wouldn’t advise it, or do you want Mr. Henderson to represent
        you?

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1805 | January 10, 2024         Page 4 of 9
              Mr. Kelly: I do not wish to have Mr. Henderson represent me
              and do not wish to represent myself.

              The Court: Well I only gave you two choices.

              Mr. Kelly: I object.

              The Court: I understand. I’m overruling objection. Which
              choice would you like to proceed with?

              Mr. Kelly: I’m not going to make the choice sir.

              The Court: Alright. Mr. Henderson you’re [sic] motion to
              withdraw is—is denied.

      (Id. at 14-15.)

[6]   The trial court then continued with the sentencing hearing. Attorney

      Henderson indicated he was unable to present evidence on behalf of Kelly

      because Kelly would not speak with him to plan. As the State argued for a

      thirty-year executed sentence, Kelly interrupted to say he could “not continue

      with the—without counsel. Proper counsel.” (Id. at 17.) The trial court told

      Kelly: “You have counsel here sir.” (Id.) At that time, Kelly left the video call,

      and the trial court indicated it would finish his sentencing in absentia. Attorney

      Henderson argued for a sentence shorter than the thirty years recommended by

      the State and for a sentence that would provide an “opportunity for

      rehabilitative treatment through an alternative means.” (Id. at 18.) The trial

      court cited Kelly’s criminal history, his juvenile adjudications, his high risk of

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1805 | January 10, 2024        Page 5 of 9
      reoffending, and “the heinous nature” of Kelly’s crime against his father, as

      support for imposing the maximum thirty-year sentence. (Id.) The trial court’s

      written sentencing order indicated the court had not reached the merits of

      Kelly’s pro se motion: “Court does not typically entertain pro se pleadings

      when Defendants are represented by counsel. However, the motion is not in

      proper form therefore it is denied.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 116.)

      Discussion and Decision
[7]   Kelly alleges the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to remove

      Attorney Henderson and assign a new public defender. Before addressing

      Kelly’s argument, we must address the State’s cross-appeal argument that we

      should dismiss Kelly’s appeal because “Kelly improperly seeks reversal of his

      conviction[,]” (State’s Br. at 7), which the State asserts is relief that cannot be

      sought on direct appeal after a guilty plea. The State’s legal argument is correct

      – a conviction entered pursuant to a guilty plea cannot be challenged on direct

      appeal, see Davis v. State, 217 N.E.3d 1229, 1234 (Ind. 2023) (“if Davis wishes to

      challenge his guilty plea, he cannot do so through this direct appeal”) – but the

      State’s application of that law to Kelly is misplaced.

[8]   Kelly has not asked us to overturn his plea agreement. (See Br. of Appellant at

      5) (noting the trial court did not address the merits of his motion to withdraw

      his guilty plea because it was “unverified”). Nor did the trial court take

      evidence regarding Kelly’s motion to withdraw his plea or address that motion

      on its merits. (Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 116) (court order indicated it denied

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1805 | January 10, 2024         Page 6 of 9
      Kelly’s motion because it was not in proper form, rather than on the merits);

      and see Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b) (motion to withdraw guilty plea between entry

      of plea and sentencing must be in writing and verified). Nor could Kelly raise

      that issue in this appeal given his failure to file a verified motion. See Carter v.

      State, 739 N.E.2d 126, 128 n.3 (Ind. 2000) (“A defendant’s failure to submit a

      verified, written motion to withdraw a guilty plea generally results in waiver of

      the issue of wrongful denial of the request.”). Instead, Kelly asks us to void his

      sentencing and remand for assignment of new counsel to assist him with filing a

      proper motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, we reject the State’s

      invitation to dismiss Kelly’s appeal of the procedural decision the trial court

      made on the morning of sentencing.

[9]   To reiterate, Kelly challenges only the trial court’s refusal to replace Attorney

      Henderson on the morning of sentencing. 5 The Sixth Amendment of our

      Federal Constitution guarantees the right to counsel in criminal cases. Bowie v.

      State, 203 N.E.3d 535, 543 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Nevertheless, “an

      indigent criminal defendant is not entitled to the public defender of his choice.”

      Id. at 545 (citing U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006)). When a

      request for a new court appointed attorney is made, a trial court may deny that

      5
        Kelly analogizes his case to Martin v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), in which this court
      remanded for appointment of counsel to assist Martin following the denial of his petition for post-conviction
      relief. We find Martin distinguishable, however, because Martin, whose proceedings had been delayed due to
      his mental illness, was forced to proceed without counsel during a time when he was exhibiting signs of
      delusional thinking. The record before us contains no indication that Kelly has a mental illness and he
      proceeded to sentencing with the assistance of counsel.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1805 | January 10, 2024                              Page 7 of 9
       request “in the exercise of its sound discretion[.]” Luck v. State, 466 N.E.2d 450,

       451 (Ind. 1984). We review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion.

       Id.

[10]   Here, although Attorney Henderson asked to be removed as Kelly’s counsel,

       the trial court was not required to grant that motion on the morning of

       sentencing. See id. (decision left to trial court discretion). Nor was the trial

       court required to remove Attorney Henderson based on Kelly’s last-minute

       expression of displeasure with Attorney Henderson and his guilty plea. Trial

       courts have an obligation to move cases forward, and six weeks had passed

       between Kelly’s change of plea hearing and his sentencing. Nevertheless, Kelly

       waited until the morning of the sentencing hearing to express his displeasure

       with his appointed counsel. “We have several times reiterated our approval of

       the denial of a defendant’s motion to replace counsel during or immediately

       before trial.” Luck, 466 N.E.2d at 451. We see no logical reason why the same

       rule should not apply when Kelly wishes to avoid a sentencing hearing.

[11]   If Kelly wishes to challenge the validity of his plea agreement, he may do so via

       a post-conviction petition pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(c), at

       which time Kelly will have a chance to prove that he received ineffective

       assistance of counsel or that he did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty,

       see, e.g., Davis, 217 N.E.3d at 1234-35 (“if Davis can prove in post-conviction

       proceedings that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal,

       then his conviction can be vacated”), and accordingly Kelly cannot demonstrate

       he has been prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to change his counsel. For all

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1805 | January 10, 2024        Page 8 of 9
       these reasons, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused

       to remove Kelly’s counsel on the morning of sentencing.

       Conclusion
[12]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to grant Attorney

       Henderson’s motion to withdraw on the morning of the sentencing hearing. As

       Kelly has raised no other allegation of error on appeal, we affirm his conviction

       and sentence.

[13]   Affirmed.

       Bailey, J., and Felix, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1805 | January 10, 2024      Page 9 of 9