Court Opinion

ID: 9636032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:13:36.274381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:40.703194
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Spaeth, J.:
I agree that the order of the court below should be affirmed, but I reach that conclusion by somewhat different reasoning than does the majority.
The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Act of July 8, 1941, P. L. 288, §§1-32, 19 P.S. §§191.1-191.31, sets forth the procedure whereby a person may be extradited. If after investigation the Governor of the sheltering State decides that the demand for extradition should be complied with, he must issue a Governor’s warrant directing that the accused be arrested and delivered to the authorized agent of the demanding State. Sections 7 and 8, 19 P.S. §§191.7 and 191.8. The accused has a right to a hearing before being so delivered. Section 10, 19 P.S. §191.10. The accused may also be arrested without a Governor’s warrant by any peace officer or private person “upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”. Section 14, 19 P.S. §191.14. In the event of such an arrest the accused must be taken before a judge “with all practicable speed”. Id. “If from the examination before the judge ... it appears *201that the [accused] is the person charged . . . and . . . that he has fled from justice”, the judge may commit him to jail “for such a time, not exceeding thirty days, ... as will enable the arrest of the accused to be made under a warrant of the Governor.” Section 15, 19 P.S. §191.15. This commitment may be extended “for a further period, not to exceed sixty days.” Section 17, 19 P.S. §191.17. There is no provision for a further extension. Thus if the Governor's warrant has not been obtained within ninety days, the accused must be discharged.
In the present case the initial arrest of the accused, on February 4, 1972, was not pursuant to a Governor’s warrant but under Section 14 of the Act, 19 P.S. §191.14. When the first petition for habeas corpus was heard, the Governor’s warrant had not been obtained. Since 109 days had elapsed, the hearing judge properly ordered the accused discharged. I do not agree that the hearing judge’s statement that the order was “with prejudice” was superfluous. In my view the statement recognized the fact that the accused could not again be arrested under Section 14, 19 P.S. §191.14. There was accordingly no authority for the New Jersey authorities to lodge a detainer against the accused after he had been discharged, and the Pennsylvania authorities should not have recognized the detainer. The purpose of the speedy hearing and the ninety day period prescribed by Sections 14 and 17 of the Act, 19 P.S. §§191.14 and 191.17, is to prevent prolonged confinement. To give any effect to a detainer lodged after the ninety day period would render these sections meaningless.
It does not follow, however, that the “with prejudice” order made the accused forever immune from extradition, which is the conclusion that counsel for the accused seems to urge upon us. The arrest challenged on this appeal was pursuant to a Governor’s warrant *202issued under Section 7 of the Act, §19 P.S. §191.7. Thus the arrest was not barred by the “with prejudice” order barring further arrests under Section 14 of the Act, §19 P.S. §191.14. Since there is no question that the Governor’s warrant was in order, and that the accused is the person charged and is a fugitive, the court below properly ordered extradition.
Jacobs and Spaulding, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.