Court Opinion

ID: 9396183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 19:00:50.647989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:14.570257
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11754     Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 05/19/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                  No. 22-11754
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

       BFMM COMPANY, LLC,
       a Florida limited liability company,
       BRUNO MICELI,
       an Individual,
                                                     Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
       versus
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                            ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11754      Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 05/19/2023     Page: 2 of 6

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11754

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cv-60617-AHS
                           ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food and Nutrition
       Service, which administers the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
       Program (SNAP), permanently disqualified BFMM Company,
       LLC, and its sole owner, Bruno Miceli, from participation in the
       program in 2015 after it found that they had illegally trafficked ben-
       efits. BFMM and Miceli sued to contest the disqualification, but the
       district court granted summary judgment to the government.
              We requested supplemental brieﬁng on the question
       whether this matter became moot following BFMM’s dissolution
       in 2019. After careful review, we conclude that the appeal is moot
       as to both BFMM and Miceli, and that Miceli lacks standing to con-
       test any imagined future enforcement. Accordingly, we DISMISS
       the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
                                          I
              “The mootness requirement―as derived from the Consti-
       tution’s case-or-controversy limitation―‘goes to the heart of our
       constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers and the proper
       role of the judiciary.’” Djadju v. Vega, 32 F.4th 1102, 1108 (11th Cir.
       2022) (quoting Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach Cnty.,
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       22-11754                Opinion of the Court                          3

       Fla., 382 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2004)). “To qualify as a case ﬁt
       for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual controversy must be ex-
       tant at all stages of review.’” Arizonans for Oﬀ. Eng. v. Arizona, 520
       U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401
       (1975)). A case is moot when “no justiciable controversy is pre-
       sented,” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968), or when a court can-
       not aﬀord “eﬀectual relief,” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S.
       153, 161 (2016).
              All seem to agree that this case is moot as to BFMM, which
       was voluntarily dissolved in 2019. Detail by FEI/EIN Number, Fla.
       Dep’t of State Div. of Corps., https://perma.cc/4GKL-6S97.
       BFMM has conceded that “the Court cannot reinstate the SNAP
       license to a store that doesn’t exist,” so no eﬀectual relief is availa-
       ble. Supp. Br. of Appellants at 6.
              The case is also moot vis-à-vis Miceli, although explaining
       why requires a bit more doing. Miceli ﬁrst contends that the case
       might be moot with respect to him, but only because, he says, the
       statutes and regulations governing SNAP beneﬁts “clearly limit dis-
       qualiﬁcations” to ﬁrms and stores, not individual owners. Id. So,
       he contends, the “Agency’s determination should speciﬁcally not
       extend” to him. Id. at 9. He is incorrect. Under the plain language
       of the governing statute, “[t]he disqualiﬁcation period . . . shall
       continue in eﬀect as to the person or persons who sell or otherwise
       transfer ownership of the retail food store or wholesale food con-
       cern . . . .” 7 U.S.C. § 2021(e)(1). Miceli has admitted that he sold
       BFMM some “four years ago.” Doc. 27-3 at 4. So BFMM’s
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                    22-11754

       permanent disqualiﬁcation “continue[s] in eﬀect as to [Miceli,] who
       s[old]” the store. There is thus no reason to consider the matter
       moot simply because Miceli is no longer involved.
                Second, and in the alternative, Miceli asserts that if he is per-
       manently disqualiﬁed, then the case is not moot because he would
       like to be able to open another store that accepts SNAP beneﬁts in
       the future. But the caselaw is clear that absent any “deﬁnite plans
       to reopen [his business] as a regulated entity,” Miceli’s mere desire
       to do so is insuﬃcient to save his case from mootness. Munsell v.
       Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“No order from
       this court is assured more than a speculative chance of giving any
       relief to these appellants, because Munsell has no deﬁnite plans to
       reopen [his business] as a regulated entity.”); cf. City News & Novelty,
       Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 284 (2001) (observing that the
       “speculation” that a “business ‘could again decide to operate’
       . . . standing alone . . . did not shield the case from a mootness de-
       termination” (quoting Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000)));
       Board of License Comm’rs of Town of Tiverton v. Pastore, 469 U.S. 238,
       240 (1985) (“‘Such speculative contingencies aﬀord no basis for our
       passing on the substantive issues the petitioner would have us de-
       cide’ in the absence of ‘evidence that this is a prospect of immedi-
       acy and reality.’” (alterations accepted) (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396
       U.S. 45, 49 (1969) and Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109 (1969),
       respectively)). Compare, e.g., White River Amusement Pub., Inc. v. Town
       of Hartford, 481 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a case was
       not moot when a business’s premises had been “destroyed by a ﬁre”
       but the “Corporation ha[d] a renewable lease on the premises,
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       22-11754               Opinion of the Court                          5

       which it d[id] not intend to terminate”); Southern Or. Barter Fair v.
       Jackson Cnty., Or., 372 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
       case was not moot because a business had “attempt[ed] to raise
       funds” and sought a site for gathering after it had lost its corporate
       status years earlier).
               Finally, Miceli states that he continues to suﬀer two ongoing
       injuries that sustain a live controversy: (1) the threat of future ﬁ-
       nancial sanctions based on BFMM’s past SNAP violations and (2)
       so-called “name and shame” sanctions, whereby the agency could
       publish his name as a store owner who has been disqualiﬁed from
       receiving SNAP beneﬁts. Miceli is correct that the agency has the
       authority to do either of those things. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2021(e);
       7 C.F.R. § 278.6(f )(3) (“At any time after a civil money penalty im-
       posed . . . has become ﬁnal . . . the [FNS] may request the Attorney
       General institute a civil action to collect the penalty from the per-
       son or persons subject to the penalty . . . .”); Doc. 24-1 at 122 (ex-
       plaining the agency’s statement that it “may disclose information
       to the public when a retailer has been disqualiﬁed or otherwise
       sanctioned for violations after the time for any appeals has ex-
       pired”). But Miceli has proﬀered no evidence that there is any “ac-
       tual or imminent” risk―one that is more than “conjectural or hy-
       pothetical”―that either is likely to occur. Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
       life, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). He has
       shown no “history of past enforcement,” and the agency’s mere
       acknowledgement of its authority to take one or both of those
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       6                           Opinion of the Court                        22-11754

       actions does not suﬃce to create a live case or controversy. Cf. Su-
       san B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 164 (2014). 1
                                               II
             For these reasons, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of sub-
       ject-matter jurisdiction.

       1 Miceli also asserts that even if the case is moot, it qualifies under the “capable

       of repetition, yet evading review” exception. We disagree. In support of his
       argument, Miceli states that in practice, the agency simply refuses to process
       applications from store owners who have been permanently disqualified.
       That practice, he says, will deprive him of the ability to obtain administrative
       and judicial review of any future application denial. But as evidence of the
       agency’s practice, Miceli offers only a single anonymized letter that his lawyer
       received in another case. The Supreme Court has been clear that the capable-
       of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception entails two requirements: “(1) the
       challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its
       cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the
       same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Wein-
       stein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). As this appeal makes clear, Miceli’s
       permanent disqualification is not too short to be fully litigated. And we do not
       think that a single anonymized letter provides a sufficient basis to conclude
       that Miceli will be precluded from judicial review during any future attempt
       to open a store.