Court Opinion

ID: 9618943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:19:44.493393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:33.998881
License: Public Domain

PLEICONES, Justice:
I respectfully dissent, and would affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals.
This case presents for consideration a matter wholly governed by S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1330, the language of which has remained unchanged since at least 1871.1 Section 14-7-1330 states:
When a jury, after due and thorough deliberation upon any cause, returns into court without having agreed upon a verdict, the court may state anew the evidence or any part of it and explain to it anew the law applicable to the case and may send it out for further deliberation. But if it returns a second time without having agreed upon a verdict, it shall not be sent out again without its own consent unless it shall ask from the court some further explanation of the law. (Emphasis supplied).
There is no dispute under the facts of this case but that the jury returned a second time without agreeing upon a verdict.
The case thus turns on the question of whether this jury was sent out without its consent since it did not ask for further explanation of the law. Whether the jury has consented is, as found by the majority, a matter for the sound discretion of the *426trial judge, to be exercised after consideration of the totality of the circumstances. Here, it is my judgment that the trial judge abused his discretion in sending the jury out, following its second return, because they neither verbalized nor manifested by conduct their consent to continued deliberations, as required by the statute.
I agree with the majority that a jury’s consent may be implied from circumstances. I do not, however, agree that simply because this jury expressed no unwillingness to continue, its consent can be implied.
Jurors are told from the beginning of a trial that the trial judge’s pronouncements on the law are binding upon them and that their role is to be the sole and exclusive judges of the facts.2 In this case the trial judge instructed the jury to continue its deliberations without in any way seeking to ascertain if they consented. The jury’s mere passive acquiescence to this direction was nothing more than an example of the jury appropriately following the charge of the trial judge, and did not, in and of itself, allow an implication of consent.3
The majority, in finding implied consent, relies in part upon the fact that the jury sent a note to the effect that it was making progress after its second return. This note can just as easily be construed as manifesting the jury’s reluctance to incur the displeasure of the trial judge as it can as an expression of consent. Again, all that the jury’s conduct exhibited was acquiescence to the trial judge’s charge.
While I agree with the majority that there are decisions of this Court which seem to support their view, I do not believe that affirmation of the Court of Appeals’ decision requires overruling of that precedent.4 I believe the Court of Appeals *427has appropriately distinguished Edwards v. Edwards, supra, from the case at bar. In my opinion, the cases relied upon by the majority were each decided upon their unique facts and circumstances which differ markedly from those of this case. Nonetheless, to the extent that Edwards or the other cases cited by the majority may be read to sustain a finding of implied consent solely from the jury’s obedience to the judge’s instruction to continue its deliberation, I would overrule them.
The majority sets forth in its opinion appropriate guidance to the trial bench for its future dealings with the jury in similar circumstances involving this statute.5 I would go further, and require a specific finding by the trial judge setting forth the basis for her conclusion that the jury has consented to continued deliberation.
In the final analysis, this is a matter wholly governed by the statute; the statute says what it says, and the exercise of discretion by the trial judge constituted an abuse. I would therefore affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals and would remand for a new trial.

. 1871 Act No. 419, § 27.

. They are of course told this by the sole authority figure in the courtroom, the trial judge.

. Juries are presumed and bound to follow the instructions of the trial judge. Foye v. State, 335 S.C. 586, 518 S.E.2d 265 (1999); State v. Grovenstein, 335 S.C. 347, 517 S.E.2d 216 (1999); State v. Ard, 332 S.C. 370, 505 S.E.2d 328 (1998); Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992).

. Edwards v. Edwards, 239 S.C. 85, 121 S.E.2d 432 (1961); State v. Drakeford, 120 S.C. 400, 113 S.E. 307 (1922); State v. Freely, 105 S.C. 243, 89 S.E. 643 (1916); State v. Rowell, 75 S.C. 494, 56 S.E. 23 (1906).

. Whether "due and thorough deliberation” was conducted is not before us for review. Nonetheless, I agree with the concurring opinion with respect to this consideration.