Court Opinion

ID: 9897406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:10.197025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.643795
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                            May 10 2023, 9:30 am

                                                                                  CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                  and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    APPELLEE PRO SE
Michael Roth                                              Kathryn Gillette
Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP                                  Indianapolis, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Imad Shawa, M.D.,                                         May 10, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CT-1667
        v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                          Court
Kathryn Gillette,                                         The Honorable Gary L. Miller,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          49D03-1902-CT-7323

                               Opinion by Judge Weissmann
                              Judges Bailey and Brown concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1667 | May 10, 2023                              Page 1 of 8
      Weissmann, Judge.

[1]   Kathryn Gillette sued the “physician on duty-St. Francis” Hospital for battery.

      Nearly three years after her claim arose, Gillette amended her complaint

      alleging that Dr. Imad Shawa was the physician who touched her arm without

      her permission. Dr. Shawa moved for summary judgment on the grounds that

      Gillette’s amendment did not meet the two-year statute of limitations for

      battery claims. The trial court disagreed, relying on Indiana Trial Rule 17(F),

      which allows for “unknown” parties to be substituted into a complaint at any

      time. We reverse and grant Dr. Shawa’s motion for summary judgment, finding

      he was not unknown to Gillette.

      Facts
[2]   In late February 2017, Gillette’s mother, Joyce, was admitted to St. Francis

      Hospital’s intensive care unit. Joyce suffered from several medical

      complications and had a living will with a “do not resuscitate” order.

      Nevertheless, hospital staff briefly placed Joyce on a ventilator, allegedly with

      the family’s permission. Distraught that her mother’s wishes were not being

      followed, Gillette presented a copy of the living will to hospital staff the next

      day and urged them to follow its instructions. Still, a heated argument arose

      between Gillette and hospital staff over Joyce’s care.

[3]   Gillette later returned to the hospital with a written request for an emergency

      hearing to force the attending physician to honor Joyce’s living will. When

      Gillette found the proper physician, Dr. Shawa, Gillette threatened to sue both

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1667 | May 10, 2023            Page 2 of 8
      him and the hospital “for a lot of money.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 123.

      Concerned over Gillette’s “emotional and aggressive” state, Dr. Shawa led

      Gillette by the arm to a nearby room to discuss her mother’s care. Id. Gillette

      objected to being touched, and Dr. Shawa left the room.

[4]   That same night, Gillette and her husband discussed that she had a potential

      claim for civil battery against the physician who touched her arm. But despite

      knowing certain identifying details about the physician—the hospital where and

      department in which he worked, what he looked like, and the approximate time

      the alleged battery occurred—Gillette did not remember the physician’s name.

      Although Gillette tried to find the name by searching the hospital website, she

      did not discover that Dr. Shawa was the physician who touched her.

[5]   Gillette filed her battery claim just a few days before the two-year statute of

      limitations expired.1 As Gillette still had not learned the physician’s name, her

      complaint named the defendant as “physician on duty-St. Francis.” Appellant’s

      App. Vol. II, p. 24. Nearly a year later, while going through Joyce’s medical

      records obtained through discovery, Gillette learned that the proper defendant

      was Dr. Shawa. At this point, with the trial court’s permission, Gillette

      amended her complaint to substitute Dr. Shawa for the anonymous physician

      on duty.

      1
       In her complaint, Gillette also sued Franciscan Alliance, Inc., and various hospital employees for a variety
      of claims. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 24. This appeal only concerns the battery claim against Dr. Shawa.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1667 | May 10, 2023                                   Page 3 of 8
[6]   Dr. Shawa moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Gillette should not be

      allowed to amend her complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations

      because his identity was not “unknown” during that two-year period. The trial

      court at first granted Dr. Shawa’s motion and dismissed the case. But after

      Gillette successfully moved to reconsider, the court reinstated the case.

      Following additional discovery, Dr. Shawa moved for summary judgment on

      the statute of limitations issue, arguing that Gillette’s deposition testimony

      proved she reasonably should have known his identity before the statute of

      limitations expired. The trial court denied Dr. Shawa’s motion, and he now

      appeals that decision.

      Discussion and Decision

      I. Standard of Review
[7]   We apply the same standard as the trial court when reviewing summary

      judgment rulings. Fox v. Barker, 170 N.E.3d 662, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). The

      moving party bears the burden of showing there are no genuine issues of

      material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Cases

      involving a statute of limitations defense are “particularly suitable” for

      resolution on summary judgment. Myers v. Maxson, 51 N.E.3d 1267, 1276 (Ind.

      Ct. App. 2016). When the moving party establishes a violation of the applicable

      statute of limitations, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish an issue of

      material fact negating the defense. Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc., 730 N.E.2d

      692, 695 (Ind. 2000). Lastly, we note that while Gillette represents herself in

      this appeal, “[i]t is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1667 | May 10, 2023              Page 4 of 8
      standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct.

      App. 2016).

      II. Statute of Limitations
[8]   In Indiana, the statute of limitations for battery is two years from the date on

      which the claim arose. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. Neither party contests when the

      clock started on Gillette’s claim or that she filed her complaint within the two-

      year period. Instead, the parties dispute whether Dr. Shawa was “unknown” to

      Gillette before she amended her complaint to name Dr. Shawa as a defendant

      under Indiana Trial Rule 17(F).

[9]   Although Trial Rule 17 generally requires that lawsuits “be prosecuted in the

      name of the real party in interest,” Ind. Trial Rule 17(A), Section F provides:

               Unknown persons. When the name or existence of a person is
              unknown, he may be named as an unknown party, and when his
              true name is discovered his name may be inserted by amendment at
              any time.

      Ind. Trial Rule 17(F) (emphasis added). This ability to insert an unknown

      defendant into a lawsuit at any time creates obvious tension with the rationale

      underlying statutes of limitations—that they “afford[] security against stale

      claims.” Shideler v. Dwyer, 417 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ind. 1981); see also Craven v.

      Craven, 103 N.E. 333, 335 (Ind. 1913) (stating that statutes of limitations “rest

      upon sound public policy,” “tend to the peace and welfare of society” and are

      “essential to the general welfare and wholesome administration of justice”).

      Recognizing this tension, our Supreme Court has “decline[d] to expansively
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1667 | May 10, 2023           Page 5 of 8
       interpret and apply ‘unknown’ as used in” Rule 17(F) to prevent this otherwise

       “unlimited extension of the statute of limitations.” Miller v. Danz, 36 N.E.3d

       455, 459 (Ind. 2015).

[10]   We find this case controlled by Miller v. Danz, in which our Supreme Court

       rejected an attempted amendment based on Rule 17(F). Id. at 459. The plaintiff

       in Miller lost a job opportunity with the Indianapolis Mayor’s Office and filed

       claims against various people connected to the incident, with some defendants

       named anonymously. Before the statute of limitations expired, the plaintiff

       knew the name of the unknown defendant’s husband, where she worked, and

       how she connected to his claim. Despite knowing this information, the plaintiff

       waited until after the statute of limitations expired to amend the complaint

       under Rule 17(F) to include the defendant’s name, claiming to have recently

       discovered the name during a deposition. Although the plain language of Rule

       17(F) allows for the amendment of unknown defendants “at any time,” our

       Supreme Court rejected the amendment after considering “the circumstances of

       [the] plaintiff’s probable knowledge of th[e] defendant’s identity.” Id. In effect,

       because the defendant knew specific facts that had the potential to identify the

       unknown defendant before the statute of limitations expired, the defendant was

       not “unknown” under Rule 17(F). The same situation exists here.

[11]   When Gillette’s claim arose, she knew multiple identifying details about Dr.

       Shawa, including where he worked, the specific department he worked in,

       when he had been working on a specific day, and even what he looked like.

       Despite possessing this knowledge from the moment her claim accrued,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1667 | May 10, 2023            Page 6 of 8
       Gillette’s search for Dr. Shawa amounted solely to scanning the website of St.

       Francis Hospital—a website that included Dr. Shawa’s name and photograph.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 126.

[12]   Gillette highlights that the hospital website lists Dr. Shawa as “Independent—

       Not Employed by Franciscan Health,” a potentially confusing label. But the

       website was not the only way Gillette could have identified Dr. Shawa. Many

       alternative methods of identification existed. At any point, Gillette could have

       returned to the hospital, for example, and located Dr. Shawa using any of the

       several identifying details she possessed. Her failure to do so undermines the

       protection against “litigation of stale claims” that statutes of limitation afford

       both courts and defendants. V. Ganz Builders & Dev. Co. v. Pioneer Lumber, Inc.,

       59 N.E.3d 1025, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Russo v. S. Dev., Inc., 868

       N.E.2d 46, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).

[13]   Much like the plaintiff in Miller, Gillette contends that she diligently searched

       for Dr. Shawa’s existence and quickly moved to amend her complaint after

       learning his name through discovery. But the record shows otherwise. Gillette’s

       main argument is that she could not have reasonably found Dr. Shawa’s name

       through her mother’s medical records earlier because they are voluminous and

       complex.2 Yet, accepting that as true for the purpose of summary judgment, it

       2
        Although we recognize the difficulty Gillette asserts to have had as a pro se litigant in examining the
       evidence in this case, we can afford her no more leeway in conducting discovery than we would a licensed
       attorney. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1667 | May 10, 2023                                Page 7 of 8
       does not excuse Gillette’s failure to take any action aimed at identifying Dr.

       Shawa other than scanning the hospital’s website—which did, in fact, identify

       him.

[14]   Thus, under these circumstances, we find that Gillette’s failure to use her

       “probable knowledge” of Dr. Shawa’s identity “preclude[s] operation of [Trial

       Rule 17(F)’s] unlimited extension of the statute of limitations.” Miller, 36

       N.E.3d at 459. We reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to

       enter summary judgment for Dr. Shawa.

       Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1667 | May 10, 2023           Page 8 of 8