Court Opinion

ID: 9558496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:10:51.396489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:20.263875
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE LEE
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent to part III of the majority opinion. I would also reverse the murder convictions of defendants Hopper and Valentine and remand for new trial, on the grounds that the trial court erroneously, or at least ambiguously, instructed the jury on the elements of felony murder.
The first paragraph of challenged instruction 16 provides that defendants could be convicted if the victim “died from a gun shot wound inflicted by one or more of the defendants.” Paragraph two instructs that the defendants could be convicted “even if one or more of the defendants did not actually commit the act that caused such death.” Considered alone, paragraph two clearly contradicts our holding in Alvarez, Jr. v. Dist. Ct., 186 Colo. 37, 525 P.2d 1131, that felony murder under 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 40-3-102(l)(b), is limited to deaths directly caused by a participant in the felony transaction.
The majority opinion seeks to read the two paragraphs of instruction in instruction 16 in the conjunctive. As interpreted by the majority, instruction 16 provides that if the victim died from a wound inflicted by any one of the defendants the rest of the defendants may be convicted, although they did not fire the fatal shot.
It is at least equally plausible that the jury read the two paragraphs of instruction 16 as alternative grounds for conviction. The jury could easily have interpreted this instruction to mean that defendants could be convicted if (1) any of them fired the fatal shot, or (2) none of them caused the death, so long as it occurred during the robbery or subsequent flight.
This interpretation is more than idle speculation. The prosecuting attorney apparently adopted this reading of instruction 16 in arguing to the jury concerning appellants’ defense that the deceased accidentally shot himself while pursuing them:
“But he’s running toward the door. And while he is going toward the door, he’s kicked the cylinder out or done something, and then he’s cocked it and it discharges or he pulls the trigger and it discharges. Whatever way they want it, it doesn’t make much difference. Wei1, that’s about as impossible a sequence of events as I can imagine.
“But even if it’s true, ladies and gentlemen, even if it’s true, according to the instructions of the court you may still find the defendants guilty of first degree murder, which is the third charge.
“Instruction No. 16, the middle paragraph, states: [quoting portion stating that defendants may be convicted ‘even if one or more of the defendants did not actually commit the act that caused said death.’
*247“That’s the instruction of the court. Even if the defendants’ wildest speculations have any truth to them whatsoever you must convict the three scum of that third count.”
Nor does instruction 15 cure this error. That instruction sets out the elements of felony murder, including “[cjausing the death of a person.” Similarly, instruction 24 requires that defendants’ conduct proximately caused the victim’s death. But instruction 25 defines proximate cause as merely “that cause which in natural and probable sequence produced the death of the victim.” It does not instruct the jury that one of the defendants must have actually pulled the trigger, as required by Alvarez.
In short, none of the instructions remedy the defect of instruction 16. At the very least, the giving of these confusing and contradictory instructions on the elements of the charge constituted plain error. People v. Archuleta, 180 Colo. 156, 503 P.2d 346; People v. Morant, 179 Colo. 287, 499 P.2d 1173. For these reasons, I would reverse the murder convictions of defendants Hopper and Valentine and remand the cause for new trial.
I am authorized to say that MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON and MR. JUSTICE CARRIGAN join in this dissent.

The common law doctrine applied to felonies generally.