Court Opinion

ID: 9849149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:35:20.756239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:02.402187
License: Public Domain

Brown, J.
(dissenting) — I agree with the majority opinion on all points but the critical one. I disagree there was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in denying *362the challenges for cause for jurors 6 and 32. It is not relevant to the critical issue that the trial judge excluded in limine (even correctly) evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts under either ER 404(b) or ER 609(a). Our focus is on jury voir dire and juror impartiality, not evidence admissibility, or change of venue based on pretrial publicity. Today we should be deciding solely whether the trial judge manifestly abused his discretion by denying the challenges for cause and thereby denied the defendant a fair trial.
Prior knowledge of the defendant’s prior conviction or involvement in a recent similar murder does not automatically disqualify a juror. State v. Coe, 109 Wn.2d 832, 840-41, 750 P.2d 208 (1988). The Coe court relied on the trial court’s assessment of jurors’ assurances of impartiality when rejecting the defendant’s claim the jurors knew of Mr. Coe’s prior recent convictions or the related convictions of his mother, Ruth. Id. at 841.
At worst, jurors 6 and 32 equivocated when answering on the subject of their partiality. Accordingly, this is a case of claimed actual bias, not implied conclusively presumed bias. Our standard of review for equivocal answers by prospective jurors is stated in State v. Rupe, 108 Wn.2d 734, 749, 743 P.2d 210 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988):
Equivocal answers alone do not, however, require that a juror be removed when challenged for cause. The question is whether a juror with preconceived ideas can set them aside. The trial judge is best situated to determine a juror’s competency to serve impartially. The trial judge is able to observe the juror’s demeanor and, in light of that observation, to interpret and evaluate the juror’s answers to determine whether the juror would be fair and impartial.
(Citations omitted.)
The same standard was applied in State v. Noltie, 116 Wn.2d 831, 844, 809 P.2d 190 (1991) (relied upon by the majority), where a challenge for cause was rejected based upon a juror’s equivocal answer.
Washington cases have consistently held that the denial of a *363challenge for cause lies within the discretion of the trial court and will not constitute reversible error absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. Actual bias differs from implied bias in that where implied bias exists, it is conclusively presumed from the facts shown; whereas, in cases where actual bias is claimed, it must be established by proof.
State v. Noltie, 116 Wn.2d at 838. Removal is not required, rather the question is whether the juror with prior knowledge or preconceived ideas about a case can set them aside and render a fair and impartial verdict. Id. As noted in Noltie, this becomes a preliminary question of fact for the trial court involving the state of mind of the challenged juror. Ottis v. Stevenson-Carson Sch. Dist. No. 303, 61 Wn. App. 747, 753, 812 P.2d 133 (1991). The trial judge exercises fact-finding discretion to weigh the inferences related to the evidence and decide the credibility of the juror. Id. at 753-54. I would not disturb this exercise of trial court discretion. We are in no position to judge the credibility of these jurors; that is for the trial judge.
Here, the trial court denied the challenge for cause for juror 32 saying: “She said more than once that she believed she could be fair. But she also said she preferred not to sit on this case. And that isn’t sufficient for disqualification.” And the trial court also said in denying the challenge to juror 6: “he was—quite forthcoming. And rather talkative. I think those—both attorneys elicited a lot of information from [juror 6]. My recollection of his testimony, if you will, was that he could be fair. Balancing all of those things. And while he did have, as did [juror 32], some knowledge of the other crime, I don’t believe that disqualifies him as a juror.” The majority relies on State v. Parnell, 77 Wn.2d 503, 463 P.2d 134 (1969). Mr. Farnell’s case was reversed because a juror sat in on a preliminary hearing in the very case where he served as a juror and was in a position to acquire facts in the case outside of the jury’s view. The Parnell court was, therefore, examining a dissimilar and far different issue than examined here and in Coe. Furthermore, it is my view that pretrial publicity about unrelated albeit *364similar matters is generally likely to be less harmful than publicity about a case at bar.
Likewise, the majority has misplaced reliance in State v. Pam, 98 Wn.2d 748, 659 P.2d 454 (1983), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wn.2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988), aff’d on reh’g, 113 Wn.2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013, 80 A.L.R.4th 989 (1989). In Pam the majority examined, in part, the admissibility of the defendant’s prior convictions under ER 404(b) and ER 609(a) and found no error in the rulings allowing them. Justice Utter’s concurring opinion focused on his view that the Pam majority failed to recognize the potential for prejudice from permitting impeachment evidence of similar past crimes. However, even Justice Utter concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Pam, 98 Wn.2d at 760 (Utter, J., concurring). It is significant for our analysis here there was no juror impartiality question raised by Mr. Earn.
I do not believe the trial judge abused his discretion when deciding the preliminary fact questions related to weighing the credibility of jurors 6 and 32. The jurors indicated they could be fair and impartial and the trial court agreed. The trial court thus properly acted when rejecting the challenges for cause using the Coe, Rupe, Noltie, and Ottis standards. I respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority opinion holding to the contrary. I would affirm in all other respects.
Review denied at 136 Wn.2d 1002 (1998).