Court Opinion

ID: 9724659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:07:10.912968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:03.962891
License: Public Domain

*402Riley, J.
I respectfully dissent from the opinions of my colleagues and would affirm the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals in Ignotov v Reiter, 130 Mich App 409; 343 NW2d 574 (1983).
In an action for legal malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving:
"(1) the existence of the attorney-client relationship; (2) the acts which are alleged to have constituted the negligence; (3) that the negligence was the proximate cause of the injury and; (4) the fact and extent of the injury alleged.” Basic Food Industries, Inc v Grant, 107 Mich App 685, 690; 310 NW2d 26 (1981), lv den 413 Mich 913 (1982).[1]
This Court recognized in Grant that the element of proximate cause is often problematic:
" 'The recovery sought is usually the value of the claim in suit in the proceeding in which the negligent act occurred, if the client was a plaintiff in that action, or, if he was a defendant, the amount of the judgment imposed upon him, and, in accordance with general rules as to proximate cause, it is generally held that before such recovery can be had the client must establish that, *403absent the act or omission complained of, the claim lost would have been recovered or the judgment suffered avoided. Accordingly, the client seeking recovery from his attorney is faced with the difficult task of proving two cases within a single proceeding.’ 45 ALR2d 5, § 2, p 10.
* * *
"From the authorities cited above, it would appear that the 'suit within a suit’ concept has vitality only in a limited number of situations, such as where an attorney’s negligence prevents the client from bringing a cause of action (such as where he allows the statute of limitations to run), where the attorney’s failure to appear causes judgment to be entered against his clients[2] or where the attorney’s negligence prevents an appeal from being perfected. In such cases, it is at least arguably true that the suit within a suit requirement serves to insure that the damages complained of due to the attorney’s negligence are more than mere speculation.” (Footnote omitted.) Grant, supra, pp 691, 693. [Ignotov, supra, 411-412. Emphasis added.]
The plaintiffs action clearly falls within the aforementioned emphasized language, "where the attorney’s failure to appear causes judgment to be entered against his client . . . .” It is the defendant’s failure to appear on behalf of the plaintiff that the plaintiff is claiming caused him to suffer *404damages, i.e., loss of parental rights.3 Therefore, I am persuaded that the "suit within a suit” concept is applicable in this instance. Pursuant to the "suit within a suit” concept, the plaintiff must prove, inter alia, that the defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of his damages. Included within the element of "proximate cause” is the requirement that the plaintiff establish cause in fact. Moreover, even if cause in fact is established, there remains the question of proximate cause, whether the defendant should be legally responsible for the injury to the plaintiff. I believe that, restricted to the question of cause in fact, the "but for” test should be implemented in this case: "An act or omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if a particular event would have occurred without it.” Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 41, p 265. Accordingly, pursuant to the "suit within a suit” concept, the plaintiff must establish, as part of the proximate cause element, that, but for the negligence complained of, the plaintiff would have been successful in the defense of the action in *405question. In applying the "suit within a suit” concept to the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals held:
Plaintiff here failed to establish that the proximate cause of his injury was defendant’s failure to appear at the termination hearing. Plaintiff presented no evidence to show that he would have appeared at the hearing willing to work out an alternative settlement to prevent the termination of his parental rights. Although the trial judge concluded that plaintiff might have finally realized that defendant’s advice "was correct and that if he wanted to cease halt [sic] the termination of his parental rights he must recognize the legal fact that he had an obligation to pay back and future support,” there was no evidence in the record to support this contention. [Ignotov, supra, 412-413.]
The particular damage alleged by the plaintiff was the loss of parental rights. Therefore, as part of the plaintiff’s burden of proof to establish liability on behalf of the defendant, the plaintiff had to prove cause in fact, i.e., but for the attorney’s negligence the plaintiff would have retained his parental rights.4 While I disagree with the Court of Appeals use of "the proximate cause” language, I believe that the record clearly shows that the plaintiff has not established causation in this case. Thus, I agree with the Court of Appeals determi*406nation that the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof. I would affirm.
Brickley and Cavanagh, JJ., concurred with Riley, J.
Archer, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 1 agree with Justice Boyle that under element three, the language "the proximate cause” should be, in accordance with Michigan law, "a proximate cause.” Kirby v Larson, 400 Mich 585; 256 NW2d 400 (1977). Nevertheless, I do not believe that this mandates a different conclusion than that reached by the Court of Appeals in the instant case. While the plaintiff is required to prove the defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of his damages, an essential aspect of the element of proximate cause is the requirement that the plaintiff establish cause in fact. Only after it is established that the defendant’s conduct has in fact been a cause of the plaintiff’s damages is it necessary to address the question whether the defendant should be held legally responsible for the damages, i.e., is there proximate cause. See Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425; 254 NW2d 759 (1977), and Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), §§ 41, 42. Consequently, because I believe that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant’s negligence was the cause in fact of his damages, the erroneous application by the Court of Appeals of "the proximate cause” to the facts of this case, instead of "a proximate cause,” does not change the correctness of their conclusion.

 A client’s burden of proving injury as a result of his attorney’s negligence is especially difficult to meet when the attorney’s conduct prevented the client from bringing his original cause of action or the attorney’s failure to appear caused judgment to be entered against him as a defendant. In addition to proving negligence, a client must show that but for his attorney’s negligence he would have been successful in the original litigation; in effect, he must prevail in two distinct suits. [Note, Attorney malpractice, 63 Colum LR 1292, 1307 (1963). Emphasis added. See Basic Food Industries, supra, 692.]

 It appears that Justice Levin considered but did not embrace the "suit within a suit” doctrine, reasoning that damages were awarded because the defendant deprived the plaintiff of the opportunity to settle the case, and not on the basis that the client would have been successful had the case gone to judgment. Ante, p 399. With regard to any lost opportunity to settle this case prior to trial, I am in agreement with Justice Boyle to the extent that "[t]his case did not involve Reiter’s failure to disclose a settlement proposal to Ignotov, or the failure of Reiter to offer an authorized settlement proposal to Ignotov’s ex-wife.” (Citing 87 ALR3d 168.) Ante, p 401. Regarding any lost opportunity of settlement because of Reiter’s failure to appear, I believe Justice Levin’s rationale improperly circumvents the "case within a case” doctrine. In Basic Food Industries, supra, 693, the Court of Appeals stated that the doctrine had limited application but did encompass a situation where the attorney’s failure to appear caused judgment to be entered against the client. Concomitant with the attorney’s failure to appear is also the lost potential for settlement. Thus, I do not believe that an attorney’s failure to appear, causing judgment to be entered against a client, should be distinguished from the loss of any settlement opportunity because of the same failure to appear for the purposes of the "suit within a suit” doctrine.

 The plaintiffs burden of establishing that the defendant’s negligence was a cause in fact of the injury is not affected by the defense of comparative negligence.
There is some debate over what is to be compared under comparative negligence, negligence or causation. The problem in certain respects is one of terminology. Causation in fact is an absolute concept, which by its nature is incapable of being divided into comparative degrees — it either exists or it does not. The adoption of comparative negligence, therefore, should not affect this preliminary determination. [Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 67, p 474. See authority cited in footnotes.]