Court Opinion

ID: 9909166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 17:09:41.317112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:14.227632
License: Public Domain

J-S24035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  COLIN BEST                                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1165 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 2, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-41-CR-0000742-2008,
                         CP-41-CR-0001020-2019

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                     FILED: DECEMBER 12, 2023

       Appellant Colin Best appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of

Lycoming County dismissing his petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief

Act (PCRA).1 Consistent with controlling precedent, we remand for further

proceedings necessary to develop a factual record with respect to Appellant’s

challenge to the legality of his sentence. We affirm the remainder of the PCRA

court’s order denying relief.

       In July 2019, Appellant was charged with two counts of invasion of

privacy at docket CR-41-CR-1020-2019 for taking photographs of young

females (ages 24 and 15) while they tried on bathing suits in a dressing room

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S24035-23

of a department store in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. Appellant was also facing

a violation of probation (VOP) at docket CP-41-CR-0000742-2008.

      On August 19, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se motion for the appointment

of new counsel at both dockets. Thereafter, Appellant filed multiple pro se

documents, indicating he was acting pro se as he was not satisfied with his

counsel’s representation.

      On September 20, 2019, the trial court held a hearing at which Appellant

requested to proceed pro se with the assistance of standby counsel. The trial

court conducted a colloquy on the record and determined Appellant’s waiver

of counsel at both dockets was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial

court appointed Helen Stolinas, Esq. as standby counsel, specifying that her

duties were “solely to answer legal questions raised by [Appellant] in person,

in writing, or while in a court proceeding.” Order, 9/24/19, at 1.

      At a hearing held on October 29, 2019, Appellant made an oral request

that Attorney Stolinas be appointed as his legal counsel for docket 742-2008,

but indicated he would still proceed pro se at docket 1020-2019. Notes of

Testimony (N.T.), 10/29/19, at 32-37. The trial court appointed Attorney

Stolinas to represent Appellant in connection with the VOP matter at docket

742-2008. The trial court directed the Commonwealth to provide discovery to

Attorney Stolinas on both dockets, although Appellant had not requested

Attorney Stolinas’s representation for docket 1020-2019 and Attorney Stolinas

was still standby counsel in that case. Id. at 37-39.

                                     -2-
J-S24035-23

       On January 23, 2020, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to two

counts of invasion of privacy at docket number 1020-2019 and was sentenced

to two consecutive terms of one to two years’ imprisonment resulting in an

aggregate sentence of two to four years’ imprisonment. On the same day, the

trial court revoked Appellant’s probation on docket 742-2008 as a result of

the aforementioned charges and resentenced him to a period of two to four

years’ imprisonment concurrent with his sentence at docket 1020-2019. The

trial court also indicated that Appellant would be deemed a Tier I sex offender,

required to comply with a fifteen-year period of registration under SORNA, but

not considered a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP). Appellant acted pro se in

reaching this plea deal with the Commonwealth.

       On December 14, 2020, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition

listing both captions. The PCRA court appointed Jeana Long, Esq. to serve as

Appellant’s PCRA counsel, but Attorney Long filed a petition to withdraw as

counsel and a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super.

1988) (en banc). After a September 7, 2021 hearing, the PCRA court allowed

Attorney Long to withdraw as counsel based on its finding that Attorney Long

and Appellant had irreconcilable differences.2 Order, 9/7/21, at 1.

       The PCRA court appointed Matt Diemer, Esq. to serve as Appellant’s

PCRA counsel and directed him to evaluate Appellant’s PCRA petition and file
____________________________________________

2 The PCRA court did not evaluate Attorney Long’s request to withdraw based

on the reasoning set forth in her Turner-Finley no-merit letter.

                                           -3-
J-S24035-23

either a supplemental PCRA petition or a motion to withdraw accompanied by

a Turner-Finley no-merit letter. Order, 9/7/21, at 1.

      On February 9, 2022, Atty. Diemer filed a supplemental PCRA petition

raising claims of the ineffectiveness of trial counsel and prior PCRA counsel as

well as a claim that the Commonwealth had withheld material evidence in

violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). On April 11, 2022,

Appellant filed a pro se petition to request review of an additional PCRA issue

raising a challenge to his reporting requirements under SORNA pursuant to

Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020). On April 14, 2022,

the PCRA court forwarded Appellant’s pro se filing to counsel. Counsel did not

file any additional supplemental petitions.

      On May 6, 2022, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing. On August

2, 2022, the PCRA court filed an order denying Appellant’s petition.

      On August 19, 2022, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Atty.

Diemer filed a petition to withdraw along with a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). On August 18, 2023, this Court remanded

the case after concluding that Appellant had been effectively deprived of

counsel for the appeal of his first PCRA petition as Atty. Diemer had not

complied with the requirements of Anders or demonstrated that he

meaningfully participated in the appeal. Thus, this Court remanded for the

appointment of new counsel and denied the petition to withdraw as moot.

      On remand, the PCRA court appointed new counsel, Brian Ulmer, Esq.,

who filed an advocate’s brief, raising the following issues for our review:

                                     -4-
J-S24035-23

      I.     Did the PCRA court err in denying relief, where standby
             counsel was ineffective, depriving Appellant of his right to
             self-representation by taking an active role beyond that
             prescribed for standby counsel and failing to provide all
             information to Appellant to allow for a knowing, intelligent,
             and voluntary guilty plea?

      II.    Did the PCRA court err in denying relief where the
             Commonwealth violated Appellant’s rights by withholding
             material evidence which in so doing undermined the truth
             determining process and elicited a guilty plea which was not
             knowing, intelligent and voluntary?

      III.   Did the PCRA court err in denying relief where Appellant
             received a sentence violative of due process and
             Commonwealth v. Torsilieri?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

      Appellant’s first two claims are closely related. Appellant first argues

that his standby counsel was ineffective in interfering with his right to self-

representation in entering his guilty plea. Appellant claims standby counsel

exceeded the limits of her role when she accepted discovery provided by the

prosecution on Appellant’s behalf for the case at docket 1020-2019 and

provided a minimal amount of exculpatory evidence. Given that Appellant

alleges that he did not receive all relevant discovery materials, Appellant

argues that he would not have entered a guilty plea had he been able to review

all the evidence.

      Our Supreme Court has held that “a defendant who chooses to represent

himself cannot obtain relief by raising a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel or

standby counsel.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 196 A.3d 1021, 1029–30

(Pa. 2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63, 83 (Pa. 2012)).

However, given that the United States Supreme Court has recognized a

                                      -5-
J-S24035-23

defendant’s right to self-representation in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.

806 (1975), a defendant may raise a challenge to the scope of standby

counsel’s role to assure that it does not “supplant [the] defendant’s choice of

self-representation.” Williams, 196 A.3d at 1030.

      The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a defendant’s

right to self-representation recognized in Faretta does not impose an

“absolute bar on standby counsel’s unsolicited participation.” McKaskle v.

Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176 (1984). To determine whether a defendant’s

right to self-representation has been respected, courts must evaluate whether

standby counsel’s participation (1) allows the defendant to “preserve actual

control over the case he chooses to present to the jury” and (2) does not

include participation without the defendant’s consent that “destroy[ed] the

jury’s perception that the defendant is representing himself.” Id. at 177-78.

      Given that Appellant is challenging standby counsel’s participation

outside the presence of a jury, only the first of the two limitations applies. In

evaluating whether Appellant was allowed to preserve actual control over his

case, we note that:

      Faretta rights are adequately vindicated in proceedings outside
      the presence of the jury if the pro se defendant is allowed to
      address the court freely on his own behalf and if disagreements
      between counsel and the pro se defendant are resolved in the
      defendant's favor whenever the matter is one that would normally
      be left to the discretion of counsel.

Id. at 177-79.

                                      -6-
J-S24035-23

      In the guilty plea to the charges at docket 1020-2019 for which

Appellant was represented by standby counsel, the trial court conducted an

oral plea colloquy in which Appellant acknowledged that by pleading guilty, he

was giving up the right to pursue his pretrial claims, which included a request

to compel discovery. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 1/23/20, at 41-42. Before

entering the plea, Appellant had alleged that there was potentially more

discovery materials to be provided by the prosecution.

      Nevertheless, instead of waiting for additional discovery, Appellant

indicated on the record that he had enough time to consider his guilty plea,

wished to plead guilty, declined the opportunity to have further discussion

with standby counsel, and stated that he had no questions or concerns to

address with the trial court or standby counsel. Id. at 44. As such, there is no

evidence in the record to show that standby counsel exceeded her role or

interfered with Appellant’s right to self-representation.

      In Appellant’s second claim, he argues the Commonwealth improperly

withheld material evidence from the defense in violation of Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Specifically, Appellant claims he did not have

the opportunity to review evidence from the Toms River Police Department

from New Jersey, which included police reports, interoffice emails, search

warrants, and video recordings. Appellant’s Brief, at 5.

      Our Supreme Court has provided that, in order to establish a Brady

violation, a defendant has the burden to prove that: “(1) evidence was

suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was

                                      -7-
J-S24035-23

favorable to the defendant, either because it was exculpatory or because it

could have been used for impeachment; and (3) the evidence was material,

in that its omission resulted in prejudice to the defendant.” Commonwealth

v. Willis, 46 A.3d 648, 656 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

      The PCRA court rejected this claim as it found that Appellant failed to

show “how the evidence was material to his case, as evidence from an

investigation in New Jersey pertaining to a New Jersey case would not have

provided him with any sort of recourse in his Lycoming County case.” PCRA

Court Opinion (P.C.O.), 12/7/23, at 7. Appellant has not responded to this

point with any showing of how evidence from the New Jersey investigation

would have been material in this case or favorable to the defense. Further,

Appellant does not make any attempt to explain how the absence of such

evidence resulted in any prejudice.

      As a result, we conclude the PCRA court correctly found that Appellant

was not entitled to any relief on his challenges to the effectiveness of standby

counsel or his allegations that the Commonwealth had withheld material,

exculpatory evidence from the defense.

      In his third claim, Appellant claims his obligation to register as a sex

offender under Revised Subchapter H of SORNA renders his sentence illegal.

Appellant cites to our Supreme Court’s decision in Torsilieri to suggest that

his reporting requirements violate his due process rights and are punitive as

they are based on irrebuttable presumptions that “sexual offenders have a

                                      -8-
J-S24035-23

high risk of recidivism and that tier-based registration protects the public from

reoffenders.” Appellant’s Brief, at 14-15.

      Appellant’s constitutional challenges to Revised Subchapter H are

questions of law. “[W]hen an appellant challenges the constitutionality of a

statute, the appellant presents this Court with a question of law.”

Commonwealth v. Boyd, 287 A.3d 957, 959 (Pa.Super. 2022) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Morgan, 258 A.3d 1147, 1152 (Pa.Super. 2021)). “As

with all questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of

review is plenary.” Boyd, 287 A.3d at 959 (quoting Commonwealth v.

Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 608 (Pa. 2020))

      Appellant’s constitutional challenges are identical to those addressed in

Torsilieri, in which the defendant claimed his registration requirements

pursuant to Revised Subchapter H of SORNA were unconstitutional as they

were based on invalid presumptions that “all sexual offenders are dangerous

and pose a high risk of recidivation, necessitating registration and notification

procedures to protect the public from recidivist sexual offenders.” Torsilieri,

232 A.3d at 573. The trial court agreed, finding inter alia, that Revised

Subchapter H violated due process and the defendant’s right to reputation

through   the    utilization   of   an   irrebuttable   presumption   of   future

dangerousness.

      On appeal, the Supreme Court in Torsilieri recognized that “while

courts are empowered to enforce constitutional rights, they should remain

mindful that the wisdom of a public policy is one for the legislature, and the

                                         -9-
J-S24035-23

General Assembly's enactments are entitled to a strong presumption of

constitutionality rebuttable only by a demonstration that they clearly, plainly,

and palpably violate constitutional requirements.” See id. at 596. Further, the

Supreme Court emphasized that “it will be a rare situation where a court would

reevaluate a legislative policy determination, which can only be justified in a

case involving the infringement of constitutional rights and a consensus of

scientific evidence undermining the legislative determination.” Id. The

Supreme Court ultimately found it necessary to remand the case as the record

was not sufficient to address the issue on appeal. Id.

      In this case, we acknowledge that Appellant is raising these issues for

the first time on appeal. As noted above, while Appellant filed a pro se motion

raising a Torsilieri challenge before the PCRA court, this filing was not

docketed but forwarded to Appellant’s counsel. As counsel never filed an

amended petition with a Torsilieri claim, the PCRA court did not have an

opportunity to rule on this issue. After Appellant was appointed new counsel

on collateral appeal, counsel raised this issue in his advocate’s brief.

      However, as Appellant’s claim challenging the constitutionality of SORNA

implicates the legality of his sentence, it is nonwaivable. Commonwealth v.

Thorne, 276 A.3d 1192, 1194 (Pa. 2022) (holding that the jurisprudence

establishing that challenges implicating the legality of a sentence cannot be

waived “applies equally to constitutional challenges to Revised Subchapter H

of SORNA”).

                                     - 10 -
J-S24035-23

      Where a Torsilieri challenge is raised for the first time on appeal, this

Court has found that remand is appropriate “to allow the parties to address

whether a consensus has developed to call into question the relevant

legislative   policy   decisions   impacting    offenders’   constitutional   rights.”

Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at 595. In Boyd, this Court remanded the case for the

trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Boyd’s constitutional challenges

to Revised Subchapter H as Boyd had raised these arguments for the first time

on appeal, and the trial court had not yet had the opportunity to receive

evidence and argument on these issues. Boyd, 287 A.3d at 960.

      Likewise, in this case, as Appellant has raised his Torsilieri challenges

for the first time on appeal, we do not have the necessary factual record to

review Appellant’s claims. We also note that Appellant has not had the

opportunity to offer any scientific evidence or learned testimony to support

his claims.

      In accordance with Thorne and Torsilieri, we remand for the PCRA

court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s constitutional challenges

to Revised Subchapter H where Appellant will have the opportunity to

supplement his argument with scientific evidence. We affirm the remainder of

the PCRA court’s denial of relief.

      Order affirmed in part. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with

this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.

                                       - 11 -
J-S24035-23

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/12/2023

                           - 12 -