Court Opinion

ID: 9827782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:51:04.54435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:36.582582
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[10] Appellant, in his motion for rehearing, urges error in our declining to pass on his first assignment of error, and complains of the following statement contained in our opinion:
“The amount which he alleges he is called on to pay is not the registration fee fixed for a commercial vehicle, but is the fee fixed for the other class of vehicles mentioned in said section.”
It is contended that:
“The charge for private vehicles and for commercial vehicles hauling passengers is exactly the same.”
We cannot agree to that! construction of the law. The fees fixed for commercial vehicles, where the carrying capacity ranges from 1,001 pounds per wheel to 10,000 pounds per wheel, are graduated according to the prescribed weight in pounds- per wheel, and other fees are prescribed for commercial vehicles of greater carrying capacity. Those fees apply to commercial vehicles of the classes mentioned, whether engaged in carrying passengers or freight. The fee for motor vehicles other than those mentioned above is 35 cents per horse power. If a particular vehicle of this class is engaged in carrying passengers or freight for hire, it is a commercial vehicle, the fee is 35 cents per horse power, and the' law says that the rate fixed for commercial vehicles may be obtained by the state highway department. If it is a private vehicle, that is, not a commercial vehicle, the fee is tne same, but the law does not give the highway department power to change the rate fixed for this class of vehicles. Appellant’s automobile is of this latter class, and therefore the fee chargeable against it is not subject to change by the highway department.
Appellant’s counsel admits it to be the law that one who has no interest in the subject *233of a statute, and is not injuriously affected by its provisions, cannot attack its validity (for additional authority, see Sweeney v. Webb, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 324, 76 S. W. 766), but he argues appellant’s interest, and that he may 'be injuriously affected, by asking the question, “Can the clause authorizing the department to fix or change the 35 cent rate be separated! from the 35 cent rate?” Pie urges the necessity of our passing upon the question upon the contention that if the section were held unconstitutional the 35 cent rate would 'be destroyed. That would be true if the entire section should be held unconstitutional, but if only the provision giving the Highway Department power to change the rate fixed for commercial vehicles should be held invalid, it would simply deprive the department of the power to change such rates, leaving the fees to be collected as fixed by the statute. We are unable to see the necessity of passing upon the question so far as this case is concerned.
Error is urged in our overruling appellant’s second assignment of error, wherein he called in question the validity of the appropriation of the funds derived from the collection of license fees. Referring to the Ristine Case, cited in our opinion, complaint is made that we apparently overlooked the final, vital declaration of the court, which is quoted as follows: “If the section had specified a fixed sum,” etc. — and a similar partial quotation is contained in his brief. We a.re inclined to think that counsel for appellant did not exactly catch the import of the sentence from which he quoted only a part. The Indiana court had under consideration an act which provided for payment: First, the ordinary expenses of the state; next, the interest on the state debt; and finally, the principal of the debt. The court held it to be a pledge, and not an appropriation, and in discussing the matter, showing that there could be no payment of interest until after payment of the state’s expenses, used the following language, a portion of which was quoted as above shown:
“If the section had specified a fixed sum which might be applied to the expenses of the state, as it would have done had it intended to make an appropriation, especially from year to year, for all time, then the officers could have known, at July, whether there was money in the treasury to meet other and later appropriation for interest,” etc.
Thus it will be seen that these words, simply argument of the court, only show that, because no fixed sum had been stated for the expenses of the state, it was impossible for the officers to determine whether there was any money available for interest until after the state’s expenses had been paid.
[11,12] It is urged for the first time in the motion for rehearing that the caption of chapter 190 does not contain any mention of any appropriation of the funds of the state highway department for the support of said department. The caption provides “that such fees and charges shall constitute a part of the fund for the support of the state highway department.” EVen if this should not be sufficient asi an inclusion of the appropriation in the caption, and if appellant’s other contentions were sound, rendering the appropriation invalid, we conclude, as we might well have said in our original opinion, that such invalidity would not affect the matter of the collection of the fees. In the absence of an appropriation, which would be the case under such circumstances, the funds derived from the collection of the fees would be covered into the state treasury and await appropriation by some future Legislature. We are not disposed, however, to adopt that as a proper disposition of the question. As previously shown, one of the provisions of the caption is “that such fees and charges shall constitute a part of the fund for the support of the state highway department.” In order to carry this provision into effect it was necessary to provide in the act for such use of the funds. Any provision calculated to carry the declared object into effect is unobjectionable, although not specifically indicated in the title. Johnson v. Martin et al., 75 Tex. 33, 12 g. W. 321; Snyder v. Compton, 87 Tex. 377, 28 S. W. 1061. For numerous other authorities, see Rose’s notes, vol. 3, p. 1097. The act is not objectionable as being in conflict with section 35, art. 3, of the state Constitution.
The other matters mentioned in the motion for rehearing are, we think, sufficiently covered in our original opinion. We see no reason why we should not adhere to our former conclusions. The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Motion overruled.
KEY, C. J., disqualified.