Court Opinion

ID: 9779537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 22:05:41.824388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:27.673030
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
In addressing the single ground for review in this cause, see opinion of the Court at 592-93, we will see that adhering to judicial *603gloss sometimes may unwittingly undermine a precious constitutional principle and pervert a doctrine designed to safeguard it. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-444, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2363-2364, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974).
The Fifth Amendment privilege “serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)
“[Wjithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” Ibid.1
“In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.” Ibid.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court formulated the “Miranda warnings.” When a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, the threshold requirement is that “he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.” Id., 384 U.S. at 467-468, 86 S.Ct., at 1624.
Now, twentytwo years later, we are told by the court below that the right to “remain silent ” means just a right to “cut off questioning.”2
In Michigan v. Mosley, supra, in the early afternoon of April 8, 1971, Detective James Cowie of the Armed Robbery Section of the Detroit Police Department, acting on a tip, arrested Mosley in connection with robberies that had recently occurred at the Blue Goose Bar and the White Tower Restaurant. Detective Cowie brought Mosley to his bureau on the fourth floor of departmental headquarters building. He advised Mosley of his Miranda rights and, after filling out necessary arrest papers, Cowie began to question Mosley about the robbery at the White Tower Restaurant. When Mosley “declined to answer any questions” about the robberies, Cowie promptly ceased the interrogation. That bit of business took approximately twenty minutes, during which Mosley never indicated a desire to consult with a lawyer. Mosley was then taken to a cell block on the ninth floor. 423 U.S., at 97, 96 S.Ct., at 323.
Shortly after 6 p.m., Detective Hill brought Mosley from his cell block to the Homicide Bureau on the fifth floor for questioning about the fatal shooting of one Leroy Williams on January 9, 1971, during an attempted holdup outside the 101 Ranch Bar, also in Detroit. Mosley had not been arrested on that charge or interrogated about it by Cowie. Detective Hill advised Mosley of his “Miranda rights;” Mosley read the notification form, Hill read and explained the warnings to him and had him sign the form. At first Mosley denied any *604involvement in the Williams murder, but when told that Anthony Smith had named him as “shooter” in a confession, Mosley made a statement implicating himself in the killing. That exchange lasted some fifteen minutes, during which Mosley did not ask to consult with a lawyer or indicate he did not want to discuss the homicide. Id., 423 U.S., at 97-98, 96 S.Ct., at 328-324.
Before trial on an information charging him with first degree murder, Mosley moved to suppress his incriminating statement taken by Detective Hill on grounds, inter alia, that under the doctrine of the Miranda case it was constitutionally impermissible for Detective Hill to question him about the Williams murder after he had indicated to Detective Cowie that he would not answer any questions about the robberies. The trial court denied his motion, the statement was admitted in evidence at trial, a jury found him guilty as charged and the court imposed mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.
On appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals held that Hill’s interrogation of Mosley was a “per se violation of the Miranda doctrine,” and reversed, People v. Mosley, 51 Mich.App. 105, 214 N.W.2d 564 (1974);3 further review was denied by the Michigan Supreme Court, 392 Mich. 764 (1974). Id., 423 U.S., at 98-99, 96 S.Ct., at 324.
Having granted certiorari, the Supreme Court framed its issue as follows:
“[Wjhether the conduct of the Detroit police that led to Moisey’s incriminating statement did in fact violate the Miranda ‘guidelines,’ so as to render the statement inadmissible in evidence against Mosley at his trial.”
Id., 423 U.S., at 100, 96 S.Ct., at 325. Resolution of the question turned “almost entirely” on its own interpretation of that now ubiquitous “passage” in the Miranda opinion, viz:
“Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege as been once invoked.”
Miranda, supra.
The Supreme Court began an analysis of that passage by noting it states “that ‘the interrogation must cease’ when the person in custody indicates that ‘he wishes to remain silent,’ ” but “it does not say under what circumstances, if any, a resumption of questioning is permissible.” Id., 423 U.S., at 101, 96 S.Ct., at 325.
Significantly for our purposes here, the Supreme Court thus moved immediately from the subject of when interrogation must cease to the problem of circumstances under which questioning may be resumed. Because in his session with Detective Cowie Mosley declined to answer questions about robberies, and Cowie promptly ceased his interrogation, just as the Michigan Court of Appeals did, note 3, ante, so *605also the Supreme Court took his conduct to indicate a wish to remain silent.4 The matter of “indicating a wish” never became an issue in the case, and beyond what it regarded as a refusal to answer questions, the Supreme Court was not called on to decide whether some other manner or another may or may not be appropriate to indicate a desire to remain silent.
Neither this Court nor the Fort Worth Court considers that aspect of Mosley. Yet, in context here “declining to answer” or “to talk” is synonymous with “remaining silent.” So, the Supreme Court has answered the basic question posed by appellant in this cause; that is, whether a refusal to speak or to answer questions during police interrogation is any indication of a wish to remain silent. See Slip Opinion, at 11. Now all we have to do is determine whether a resumption of questioning by officers Myer and Shaw was permissible. That is the thrust of Mosley.5
Applying its analysis of Miranda, the Supreme Court found Mosley’s right to remain silent was fully respected. It compared his situation to another, viz:
“This is not a case, therefore, where the police failed to honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind. In contrast to such practices, the police here immediately ceased the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation.”
Id., 423 U.S., 105-106, 96 S.Ct. 327.
Because appellant “refused to talk” or to answer questions through two sessions of interrogation, whereas Mosley declined to answer any questions or to talk about robberies, but later relented on robbery-murder, the Fort Worth Court and then this Court confront a dilemma. The Supreme Court finds that by declining to answer anything about the robberies Mosley communicated his decision to remain silent. Nonetheless, in order to appropriate portions of Mosley, the Ft. Worth Court resorts to a notion that silence can be “insolubly ambiguous,” to find that “to remain silent” is not enough “to cut off questioning,” Watson, supra, at 872-875, while the opinion of this Court bypasses it and opts *606to examine “totality of the circumstances,” opinion, at 597. Those approaches lead us to digress into an exploration of that notion.
The underlying premise is that silence following Miranda warnings is “insolubly ambiguous,” a term from Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2244, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); similar remarks about silence at the time of arrest, even apart from effect of Miranda warnings, were made in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), in the course of weighing its probative value.6
The question in each case involved use of postarrest silence to impeach a testifying accused. In Hale, decided under its supervisory powers, the Supreme Court held that because dubious probative value of such silence after Miranda warnings was outweighed by significant potential for prejudice, it was error to permit such impeachment. Id., 422 U.S., at 180, 95 S.Ct., 2138.7 However, in Doyle, the Supreme Court decided whether use of postarrest silence violates any provision of the Constitution. Id., 426 U.S., at 616, 96 S.Ct., at 2244.
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Powell also noted: “Silence in the wake of these [Miranda ] warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of these Miranda rights.” Id., 426 U.S., at 617, 96 S.Ct., at 2244. But the primary rationale for rejecting the State’s position is that implicit in the warnings is assurance “that silence will carry no penalty.” Id., 426 U.S., at 618, 96 S.Ct., at 2245. Therefore, fully subscribing to views expressed by Justice White, see note 7 above, the Supreme Court held that use of silence for those purposes violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., 426 U.S., at 619, 96 S.Ct., at 2245.
Thus though silence was said to be “insolubly ambiguous” for impeachment purposes, in both cases the Supreme Court expressly recognized that once warned of his Miranda rights to remain silent and that anything he says may be used against him, by remaining silent an arrestee can thereby exercise that right, Doyle, 426 U.S., at 617, 96 S.Ct. 2244, indicating his reliance on the right to remain silent, Hale, 422 U.S., at 177, 95 S.Ct., at 2137.
Doyle is the seminal opinion on this matter of “implicit assurance.” Subsequent opinions by the Supreme Court — none of which is mentioned by the Fort Worth Court — have consistently translated the “implicit assurance” of Doyle “ ‘that silence will carry no penalty,’ ” Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 290, 106 S.Ct. 634, 638, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986), into "a case where the government had induced silence by implicitly assuring the defendant that his silence would not be used against him,” Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 1311, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), and cases discussed therein.
*607In Wainwright v. Greenfield, supra, accused pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, an issue on which the prosecution had the burden of proof; at trial the prosecution introduced postarrest “silence” of Greenfield after he had been warned under Miranda, and during jury argument contended that his refusals to answer questions without first consulting an attorney demonstrated a degree of comprehension inconsistent with his claim of insanity. After his conviction was upheld on appeal and by a federal district court on habeas, the United States Court of Appeals reversed and under the reasoning of Doyle, held Greenfield was entitled to a new trial. 741 F.2d 329 (CA11 1984). Extending the implied promise of Doyle to use of “silence” as affirmative evidence against an accused to overcome his plea of insanity, the Supreme Court rejected all contrary arguments by the Florida Attorney General, and agreed with the Eleventh Circuit.
One contention was that comprehension of Miranda warnings, “as evidenced by his silence,” is more probative of sanity than commission of the underlying offense; he argued that therefore “reliance on the ⅛-solubly ambiguous’ character of the post-Miranda warnings silence in the Doyle opinion [citation omitted], is inappropriate in the context of an insanity defense.” Id., 474 U.S., at 293, 106 S.Ct., at 640. However, the Supreme Court found, “We need not evaluate the probative value of [Greenfield’s] silence to reject this argument.”
"... For the ambiguity of the defendant’s silence in Doyle merely added weight to the Court’s principal rationale, which rested on the implied assurance contained in the Miranda warning. See South Dakota v. Neville, supra, 459 U.S., [553] at 564-565, 103 S.Ct., [916] at 923-924 [74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983)]; Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239-240, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2129-2130, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980). [note omitted]. The Attorney General’s argument about the probative value of silence therefore fails entirely to meet the problem of fundamental unfairness that flows from the State’s breach of its implied assurances.”
Id., 474 U.S., at 294, 106 S.Ct., at 640. The opinion ultimately concludes:
“In Doyle, we held that Miranda warnings contain an implied promise, rooted in the Constitution, that ‘silence will carry no penalty.’ [citation omitted]. Our conclusion that it was fundamentally unfair for the Ohio prosecutor to breach that promise_requires us also to conclude that it was fundamentally unfair for the Florida prosecutor to breach the officers’promise to respondent by using his postarrest, post-Miranda warnings silence as evidence of his insanity, [note excerpted below]”
Id., 474 U.S., at 295, 106 S.Ct. at 641. Before leaving Wainwright v. Greenfield, we should understand the definition of “silence,” as intended and used by the Supreme Court, to wit:
“... With respect to post-Miranda warnings ‘silence,’ we point out that silence does not mean ONLY MUTENESS; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted.”
Id., 474 U.S., n. 13, at 295, 106 S.Ct., n. 13, at 641. Concurring in the result, Justice Rehnquist could not agree that statements of Greenfield following Miranda warnings, such as his request for a lawyer, should be treated “the same as silence.” Id., 474 U.S., at 297, 106 S.Ct., at 642 (emphasis by Justice Rehnquist). His perception is that after being warned Greenfield did not remain silent in saying:
“I understand my rights. I do not want to speak to you. I want to speak to an attorney.” ... [And then] “I appreciate that, thanks a lot for telling me that.”
Id., 474 U.S., at 300, 106 S.Ct., at 643. What he believed constituted a comment on silence in violation of Doyle is the following:
“[E]ven down at the station, accordingly to Detective Jolly — he’s down there. He says, ‘have you been read your Miranda rights?’ ‘Yes, I have,’ ‘Do you want to talk?’ ‘No.’ ‘Do you want to talk to an *608attorney?’ ‘Yes.’ And after he talked to the attorney again he will not speak."

Ibid.

8

Thus we have seen that after Doyle through opinions leading to and summarized in Fletcher v. Weir, supra, 455 U.S., at 606, 102 S.Ct., at 1311, and on to Greenfield, the Supreme Court has avoided an “insolubly ambiguous” characterization of “silence” induced by Miranda warnings. As in Greenfield, any argument about the probative value of “silence” is irrelevant in that it “fails entirely” to meet the problem of fundamental fairness flowing from a breach of implied assurances in the warnings. Id., 474 U.S., at 294, 106 S.Ct., at 640. In that context “silence” assured by Miranda is first “muteness.”
In the instant cause, the facts of the custodial interrogation sessions are undisputed. At the outset of each an officer gave appellant the Miranda warnings, as did a magistrate between the first and second sets. In addition to the familiar Miranda litany, the particular warning read to appellant ended with an addition assurance, viz:
“You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements."
II S.P. 57 and 96. It is equally undisputed that throughout two sessions Officer Myer and Detective Shaw put question after question to appellant but he “refused to talk,” he “just sat silent.” Later on in the afternoon, about 3:00 p.m., they took appellant from his cell for more questioning. Myer testified:
“Q Had Mr. Watson said any word or given any indication to you that after having refused to talk on two prior occasions he changed his mind and wanted to talk on the third occasion?
A He did when he answered the questions.”
Appellant was thus thrust into a situation that is strikingly similar to what the Mosley Court envisioned would be offensive to Miranda, viz: officers did persist in “repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind;” they did not “immediately cease[ ] the interrogation;” they did not restrict subsequent interrogation “to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation.”9
Manifestly, the conduct of Grand Prairie police that led to appellant’s incriminating statement did in fact violate assurances of Miranda warnings, so as to render his statement inadmissible in evidence against appellant at his trial.
Accordingly, for the reasons given ante the Port Worth Court of Appeals did indeed err in holding as a matter of law that “an accused has an affirmative obligation to explicitly state his objection to further questioning in those situations [prescribed at 715 S.W.2d at 873],” and thus I would sustain appellant’s ground for review. Because the Court finds error “under the *609circumstances,” I join only the judgment of the Court.

. All emphasis is mine throughout unless otherwise noted.

. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals says:
“In the Mosley decision, the Supreme Court determined that the ‘critical safeguard’ identified in the Miranda passage addressing the accused’s right to silence is the accused’s right to cut off questioning.’ 423 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. at 326, 46 L.Ed.2d at 321.”
Watson, supra, at 871.
This Court is more elaborative, viz:
‘The 'right to cut off questioning’ is among the procedural safeguards established by Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. This particular right, established as a ‘critical safeguard' of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. at 326, requires the police to immediately cease interrogating a suspect once the suspect ‘indicates in any manner, at any time ... during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent.’ Miranda. 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-28; Mosely, 423 U.S. at 100, 96 S.Ct. at 325."
Opinion, at 596.
It must be understood that “critical safeguard” comes only from the opinion in Michigan v. Mosley, which in turn is taking “right to cut off questioning” from Miranda, 384 U.S., at 474, 86 S.Ct., at 1627; in other words, in the Miranda "passage” alluded to in Mosley, the Supreme Court did not use the term "critical safeguard.” Mosley alone applied that gloss.

. The Michigan Court of Appeals stated factually: "According to Cowie, defendant did not request counsel, but did decline to answer 'any questions about the robberies.’” Id., 214 N.W.2d, at 565. It then applied the law to that factual finding, viz:
“When defendant declined to answer Cow-ie’s questions, thus indicating that he wished to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the interrogation should have ceased:
[quoting here the ‘passage’ from Miranda 384 U.S., at 473-474, 86 S.Ct., at 1627-1628, 16 L.Ed.2d, at 723].’’
Ibid. As to the second interrogation, the court said, “[D]efendant was questioned further by Sergeant Hill after defendant had indicated to Cowie that he wished to remain silent." Id., 214 N.W.2d, at‘566. It concluded that exercise of the right to remain silent in the face of questions by Cowie extended to subsequent interrogation by Hill. The Supreme Court would accept the findings of the Michigan Court of Appeals — but not its ultimate conclusion. See post, at 611.

. In note 11, the Supreme Court pointed out that in their briefs to the Michigan Court (and to it), the parties “accepted Detective Cowie’s account of the interrogation as correct, and the Michigan Court of Appeals decided the case on that factual premise;” also in their oral argument before the Supreme Court both counsel “discussed the case solely in terms of Cowie’s description of the events," viz:
“A. I think at that time he declined to answer whether he was involved.
Q. He declined to answer?
A. Yes. Anything about the robberies.”
Michigan represented that “the questioning [by Cowie] ceased when defendant declined to talk about the robberies." Petitioner’s Brief, at 4.
In United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976), writing for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger read Miranda to mean that "a person in police custody has, of course, an absolute right to decline to answer any question, incriminating or innocuous, see Michigan v. Mosley [citation omitted][J”

. Continuing its analysis, the Supreme Court suggested several competing interpretations of the passage, and then rejected them for leading to "absurd and unintended results.” Upon those considerations it concluded:
"... Clearly, therefore, neither this passage nor any other passage in the Miranda opinion can sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer or any subject, once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent.”
Id., 423 U.S. at 102-103, 96 S.Ct., at 326. Because it believed that a reasonable and faithful interpretation of Miranda rests on an intention there “to adopt 'fully effective means ... to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that his exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored,’ ” the Mosley Court "identified” the “critical safeguard” noted in the opinions of the Fort Worth Court and of this Court, see ante, at note 2, and ended this part with the result of its analysis, viz:
"... We therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’ ”
Id., 423 U.S., at 104, 96 S.Ct., 326.

. That part of United States v. Hale, supra, quoted in the opinion of the Court at page 595 is about silence generally — "in most circumstances.” But in context of absolute silence after Miranda warnings, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Marshall, was more direct, viz:
"Respondent, for example, had just been given the Miranda warnings and was particularly aware of his right to remain silent and the fact that anything he said could be used against him. Under those circumstances, his failure to offer an explanation during the custodial interrogation [as to where he got certain money] can as easily be taken to indicate reliance on the right to remain silent as to support an inference that the explanatory testimony was a later fabrication.”
Id. 422 U.S., at 177, 95 S.Ct., at 2137.

. In his concurring opinion Justice White planted the seed of due process that would become the ratio decidendi in opinions subsequently delivered, viz:
"... [W]hen a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda requires, that he may remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him ..., it seems to me that it does not comport with due process to permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention to his silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because he did not speak about the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need not do, an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony, [citation omitted]. Surely Hale was not informed here that his silence, as well as his words, could be used against him. Indeed, anyone would reasonably conclude from Miranda warnings that this could not be the case. I would affirm on this ground.”
Id., 422 U.S., at 182-183, 95 S.Ct., at 2139-2140.

. The prosecutor's allusion to "an attorney" is enigmatic in that neither opinion mentions one. However, the Court of Appeals reports that upon requesting an attorney Greenfield was counseled by a public defender, after which he "again” declined to talk with police. See 741 F.2d., at 330. Thus "silence" Justice Rehnquist would have ruled out is, by common usage, “forbearance from speech ...: MUTENESS.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (G. & . C. Merriam Company 1979).

. The Fort Worth Court acknowledged that United States v. Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1362 (CA5 1978), accepted by this Court as persuasive in significant respects, opinion, at 598, n. 8, and 599, "appears to contradict this holding [that an arrestee has an affirmative obligation to explicity state his objection to further questions in certain situations];” however, it dismissed Hernandez as “not dispositive" in that it believed the Fifth Circuit “was never required to rule specifically on the question of whether silence is indicative of the accused’s right to cut off questioning.” 715 S.W.2d, at 873-874. Yet, writing for the Hernandez Court, Chief Judge Brown pointed out time and time again that Hernandez invoked his right to remain silent "through his refusals to cooperate” — by simply remaining silent. Not only did the Government concede he did “on earlier occasions” that morning, but the Fifth Circuit found: "Clearly Hernandez’s silence was in response to notice that he had the right to remain silent and that any statement he made would be used against him.” 574 F.2d, n. 9, at 1368, and accompanying text; also at 1369: "It is patently obvious that the police ignored Hernandez's repeated invocation of his right to remain silent.”