Court Opinion

ID: 9789548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:38:14.713145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:23.106147
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting):
For the following reasons, I dissent.
In my view, before there can be any discussion of the collateral source rule, the question of jury intent must be addressed. In this case, the jury was instructed the liability of the defendant insurance company extended only to damage to the premises, the result of vandalism or malicious mischief. Defendants Radcliffe, however, aside from the issue of items removed from the premises, were liable in the alternative for either their intentional damage to the premises or for breach of the lease for failure to return the rented property to plaintiff, in proper condition. This regardless of who inflicted the damage.
In his closing remarks, counsel for plaintiff Suniland assured the jury that “if you award damages against the insurance company, nobody is going to collect twice. If you award a damage against the Radcliffes under the lease and an award against the Radcliffes for intentional damage and an award against the insurance company under the policy, that does not mean they are going to recover it three times . Just understand that they will only receive one recovery regardless of the basis for it.”
The jury found defendant Radcliffe liable for breach of the lease in the amount of $1,777.00, but found no cause of action for intentional damage. They also returned a verdict in the same amount against defendant insurance company for damage the result of vandalism or malicious mischief. The jury was polled and discharged without objection. The court entered the $1,777.00 against both defendants individually.
Within a few days, counsel for Radcliffe procured affidavits from three of the jurors which clearly demonstrated that they, and in their opinion, the rest of the jurors, intended that Radcliffe and the insurance company be jointly liable for the $1,777.00. With the support of these affidavits, counsel for Radcliffe filed a motion to amend the judgment. Post trial motions were noticed for further hearing and on that hearing, the court struck the affidavits of the five additional jurors offered by plaintiff and denied the motion to amend the verdict.
Generally, the statements of jurors are not received to impeach their verdict as to *850what was said or done in the jury room.1 This rule has the effect of putting an end to litigation and shields jurors from post-trial harassment from disappointed parties. However, affidavits are permissible to demonstrate what verdict was actually agreed upon. In Moulton v. Staats,2 the jury, through oversight, failed to find a verdict for defendants on their counterclaim. The trial court struck the affidavits of eight jurors and denied a motion to amend the verdict. This Court reversed and stated:
‘The general rule, that the statements of jurors will not be received to establish their own misconduct, or to impeach their verdict, does not prevent the reception of their evidence as to what really was the verdict agreed on, in order to prove that, through mistake or otherwise, it has not been correctly expressed, as the agreement reached by the jury, and not the written paper filed, is the verdict; and a showing that the writing is incorrect is not an impeachment of the verdict itself . affidavits of jurors are admissible to show that the verdict, as received and entered of record, by reason of a mistake, does not embody the true finding of the jury. . . . ’ [Citations omitted.]3
Here, too, the affidavits were filed in an effort to clarify, not to impeach the jury’s verdict and should not have been stricken.
It is also the rule in Utah that a failure to object to a verdict, informal or insufficient on its face, before the jury is discharged, constitutes a waiver of that objection.4 However, it does not appear that the jury’s verdict in this case was so patently insufficient on its face that a waiver has resulted. In Langton, the jury failed to consider all items of damage contained in the court’s instructions, awarding special damages yet excluding amounts for lost wages and pain and suffering. Amounts to which, under the evidence, plaintiff was obviously entitled. In the instant case, it is not as clear that Radcliffe’s counsel could readily ascertain from the face of the verdict that the jury had inadvertently held each defendant individually accountable for the $1,777.00. Apparently this was brought home to him some time after the discharge of the jury, when the court entered the judgment. Furthermore, nothing indicates that from silence would defendant obtain any strategic advantage. The relief sought is not a new trial, but only that relief which would have been available had an objection been raised before the discharge of the jury. Consequently, the case should be remanded with directions to the trial court to receive the remaining affidavits and, if they so warrant, to amend the verdict to conform to the intentions of the jury.

. Stringham v. Broderick, Utah, 529 P.2d 425 (1974).

. 83 Utah 197, 27 P.2d 455 (1933).

. See also Southern Pac. R. R. v. Mitchell, 80 Ariz. 50, 292 P.2d 827 (1956); Glennon v. Fisher, 51 Idaho 732, 10 P.2d 294 (1932); 18 A.L.R.3d 1132.

. Langton v. International Transport, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1211 (1971).