Court Opinion

ID: 9727320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:30:46.413874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:36.227829
License: Public Domain

*463Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
Evidence had been offered to show that two men had held up a liquor store and appellant had been identified as one of the men who held a shotgun. Detective Sgt. Dunn, who had been in charge of the investigation, had arrested five different men in connection with the case but only two were tried. During cross examination Dunn testified that no attempt had been made to see if appellant’s fingerprints were on the shotgun. The following then occurred:
“Q. Isn’t it a fact that if you had found some prints this was probably the best evidence that one could have to determine whether or not a person was holding a particular object, the most infallible type test that you have in your investigation?
MR. WILSON: Objection, it calls for a conclusion.
THE COURT: Sustained.”
I would hold the trial court erred in sustaining that objection because he unnecessarily curtailed appellant’s right to cross examine the witness.
A criminal defendant has a fundamental, constitutional right to cross examine the witnesses against him. Barber v. Page (1967), 390 U. S. 719, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255; Pointer v. Texas (1964), 380 U. S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923; Rariden v. State (1961), 242 Ind. 689, 177 N. E. 2d 736. The right to cross examine, of course, does not give the right to ask any question at any time, in any manner. The trial court does have the power and the duty to confine the questions to those which could arguably achieve one of the purposes of cross examination, e.g., to persuade the trier of fact to disbelieve certain of the witnesses’ assertions of fact. However, the central importance of the defendant’s right to cross examine the witnesses against him does mean that the reason for the limitation should appear clearly and where there is doubt as to the legitimacy of the question that doubt must be resolved in favor of the questioner.
*464There is no good reason to hold the above question illegitimate. In the first place, the “opinion rule” should not be applied mechanically, like a guillotine, to every question which elicits an answer in the form of an opinion. See the excellent discussion in 1 Wigmore, §§ 1917 to 1929, and McCormack, EVIDENCE, §§ 11 to 15, on this issue. Whatever the merits of the application of the opinion rule in general, it has no application where the defendant on cross examination is attempting to elicit an opinion in order to impeach the credibility of the witness. In Blue v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 394, 67 N. E. 2d 377, this Court said:
“We further suggest that the trial court in its discretion has wide latitude in permitting cross-examination to test the credibility of a witness by disclosing his general attitude toward the circumstances of the case, his interest, his motives, his prejudices, character and other influences which operate upon the mind, and only clear abuse of such discretion demands reversal.” 224 Ind. at 403.
See also Rariden v. State, supra; Bryant v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 274, 118 N. E. 2d 894.
It is clear that the question at issue was intended to probe the witness’ attitude toward the case, and his possible motives and prejudices which might have influenced his testimony. Any evidence which tended to show that appellant had become enmeshed in the criminal process due to Dunn’s bias against appellant, Dunn’s corruption or his incompetence as an investigator would be damaging to Dunn’s credibility with the jury. In answer to appellant’s question Dunn could give his opinion “yes” or “no”. If “yes” then Dunn would have been in the position of explaining why such evidence was not sought in this case. The jury could then have weighed that explanation along with the possible explanation that it was not sought because Dunn was out to get appellant either because he disliked the appellant or to cover up for some other person. If Dunn answered “no” then there was a chance his credibility as an experienced police investigator would be lowered in the *465eyes of the jury. The fact that the witness might have had a plausible explanation of why no fingerprint evidence was sought or that this type of question will often backfire on the questioner is not relevant here. The issue is whether the questioner should have the opportunity to run that risk in attempting to achieve the discrediting effect in the mind of the jury. No reason for the limitation of this type of impeachment appears and any doubt about the legitimacy of this question should be resolved in favor of the questioner.
I believe the above analysis is sufficient to establish the legitimacy of appellant’s attempted cross examination. The majority opinion offers no rebuttal to this argument. It concedes that Dunn was an expert in criminal investigation but says his opinion as to which facts are most persuasive on a particular question usurped the function of the jury to weigh the evidence. In discussing the justification for the “opinion rule” Wigmore says:
“A phrase, often put forward as explaining why the testimony we are concerned with is excluded, declares that the witness, if he were allowed to express his ‘opinion’ would be ‘usurping the functions of the jury.’
* * *
“This phrase is made to imply a moral impropriety or a tactical unfairness in the witness’ expression of opinion.
“In this aspect the phrase is so misleading, as well as so unsound, that it should be entirely repudiated. It is a mere bit of empty rhetoric. There is no such reason for the rule, because the witness, in expressing his opinion, is not attempting to ‘usurp’ the jury’s function; nor could if he desired. He is not attempting it, because his error (if it were one) consists merely in offering to the jury a piece of testimony which ought not to go there; and he could not usurp it if he would, because the jury may still reject his opinion and accept some other view, and no legal power, not even the judge’s order, can compel them to accept the witness’ opinion against their own. That there is no hidden danger of ‘Usurpation’ lurking here, and no need of invoking sentiment to repel it, will be clearly seen if we remember that the improper evidence is equally inadmissible before a judge sitting without a jury. Whatever the organization of the *466tribunal, it is not to waste its time in listening to superflous and cumbersome testimony.”
See also McCormack, § 12, p. 26.
The questioner was not attempting to prove what evidence is in fact best but to get the witness’ opinion on it because in this context merely stating his opinion could affect his credibility in the eyes of the jury. That is legitimate cross examination.
The two cases cited by the majority do indeed apply a general rule that conclusions may not be elicited on cross examination. In Gayer v. State (1965), 247 Ind. 113, 210 N. E. 2d 852, the trial court sustained an objection to the following question:
“Q. And when he [prosecuting attorney] sic called you to the stand he had no idea what you would testify to?”
This Court said:
“We do not feel that error resulted at this point since the question clearly calls for a conclusion on part of the witness. Such questions may be excluded without error. Bramlett v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 662, 87 N. E. 2d 880.” 247 Ind. at 120-121.
The Court offered no reasons for this view and cited only Bramlett v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 662, 87 N. E. 2d 880. In Bramlett the trial court sustained objection to certain questions but they are not set out in the opinion. The Court merely says the questions called for a conclusion and were excludible. The Court offered no reason and cited Powers v. State (1933), 204 Ind. 472, 184 N. E. 549. Powers is not in point at all. In that case this Court held it is not abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude on cross examination immaterial matter. Therefore the cases relied on by the majority offer no reason to support the rule and they rely on an older case which neither discussed nor relied on the opinion rule. There is *467neither authority nor reason to support the majority opinion holding on this issue.
Note. — Reported in 281 N. E. 2d 876.