Court Opinion

ID: 3608669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 23:53:26.029606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:48.554352
License: Public Domain

I express my concurrence with the conclusion, which has been reached by the chief judge in his opinion, that the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.
Briefly stated, my view is that the respondents had the legal right to accomplish their object by all methods not condemned by the law. That object was to secure the employment of the members of their own association, in preference to, and to the exclusion of, those of the appellant association They infringed upon no law in declaring to the employers of members of the appellant organization that they refused to work with them; or that they would abandon their work unless the others were discharged; or in preventing the members of the appellant association from being employed as steam fitters. The case is not within the principle of Curran v. Galen, (152 N.Y. 33). Upon the facts of that case, as they were admitted by the demurrer to the complaint, the plaintiff was threatened, if he did not join a certain labor organization, and so long as he refused to do so, with such action as would result in his discharge from employment and in an impossibility for him to obtain other employment anywhere and, in consequence of continuing his refusal to join the organization, his discharge was procured through false and malicious reports, affecting his reputation with members of his trade and with employers. There is no such compulsion, or motive, manifest here. There is no malice found. There is no threat of a resort to illegal methods. We may assume, (and the evidence would justify the assumption), that the action of the respondents was based upon a proper motive, relating to the employment of mechanics whose competency and efficiency had been examined into and approved. The contest is between rival labor organizations, it is true. The respondents have succeeded, through the threat that other workmen would leave their work, if the members of the appellant organization were not discharged, in procuring the *Page 335 
employment of the members of their own association. But no unlawful means were taken; nor were any illegal acts committed in bringing about that result. It was not an effort to compel the members of the appellant organization to join the respondents' association, as a condition of being allowed to work. There is no finding to that effect. On the contrary, it appears that the appellant, McQueed, having failed to pass the required examination to become a qualified member of the respondents' association, proceeded to organize an association of his own. Regarded either as an effort to secure only the employment of efficient and approved workmen, or as a mere struggle for exclusive preference of employment, on their own terms and conditions, from either standpoint how can it be said to be within the condemnation of the law, or of any statute, when there was no force employed, nor any unlawful act committed? Our laws recognize the absolute freedom of the individual to work for whom he chooses, with whom he chooses and to make any contract upon the subject that he chooses. There is the same freedom to organize, in an association with others of his craft, to further their common interests as workingmen, with respect to their wages, to their hours of labor, or to matters affecting their health and safety. They are free to secure the furtherance of their common interests in every way, which is not within the prohibition of some statute, or which does not involve the commission of illegal acts. The struggle on the part of individuals to prefer themselves, and to prevent the work which they are fitted to do from being given to others, may be keen and may have unhappy results in individual cases; but the law is not concerned with such results, when not caused by illegal means or acts.
I concur with the chief judge in his analysis of the decision of the trial court and that the facts, as therein stated, do not compel the legal conclusion which the learned trial judge reached.
I vote for the affirmance of the order of the Appellate Division. *Page 336