Court Opinion

ID: 9618163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:07:58.531875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:25.752840
License: Public Domain

Allegrucci, J.,
concurring and dissenting: Although I agree with the majority in affirming the defendant’s conviction, I dissent from the majority’s holding that the evidence of the aggravating circumstance that the defendant committed the crime in order to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or prosecution was sufficient. I agree with the defendant that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant murdered M.T. to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or prosecution. The defendant avoided or prevented arrest or prosecution for what crime by murdering M.T.? Furnishing liquor to a minor? There is no evidence, let alone beyond a reasonable doubt, that he murdered M.T. to avoid or to prevent arrest or prosecution for any other crime. Obviously, his actions following the murder were to prevent arrest and prosecution for the murder. That is not tantamount to committing the murder for the purpose of avoiding or preventing arrest for some other crime. It is the murder itself that is committed to avoid or prevent arrest and not the concealment of the murder that constitutes the aggravating circumstance. The majority responds to the defendant’s argument by relating his alleged sexual acts against M.T. The majority then states: “His actions, if concealment of the body had been successful, would have avoided or prevented a lawful arrest or prosecution for kidnapping or attempted rape.”
The fact is the defendant was not successful in his concealment, and the defendant was not arrested for, charged with, or convicted of attempted rape or any other act other than selling liquor to a minor and murder. The State’s evidence could not possibly support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed M.T. to prevent arrest and prosecution for kidnapping or attempted rape. The error is compounded by the court’s failure to define the terms or clarify the aggravating circumstance to the jury. In addition, the statement by the prosecutor to the effect the defendant’s concealing M.T.’s body was sufficient to find this aggravating circumstance further compounded the error.
I also dissent from the majority’s holding that the instruction requiring the jury to unanimously agree on either a hard 40 sen*570tence or a life sentence with parole eligibility after 15 years was not clearly erroneous. To conclude that there is no real possibility the jury would have reached a different verdict ignores the reality of the effect such an instruction has on jurors and the dynamics of jury deliberation. Further, the verdict form perpetuated the error. The lesser sentence of life with parole eligibility after 15 years is not an alternative sentence for the jury to decide. It is the alternative sentence the court imposes if the jury fails to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance or that the aggravating circumstances are outweighed by the mitigating circumstances. I would set aside the sentence and remand for resentencing.
Holmes, C.J., and Six, J., join in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.