Court Opinion

ID: 9497768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:59:38.72578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:24.475995
License: Public Domain

*1158BERZON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
On March 17, 2003, Pascual Jeronimo filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea due to “inadequate and fraudulent representation by [his] attorney.” At the hearing on this motion, Jeronimo, represented by new counsel, was asked whether, “[djuring the conversations with your attorney, did the phrase ‘career offender’ ever come up?” He answered “No, he didn’t tell me anything about that,” and maintained that “I made a deal with my attorney, I trusted in him, sir, and I signed for 87 months. When I realized that the sentence was longer, if I had realized, if I known [sic] that, I wouldn’t have sign [sic] it.” After a hearing that included a lengthy examination and cross-examination of Jeronimo and argument from counsel on both sides, the district court, noting that the accusation that the “defense attorney blew the career offender issue” was made without evidence from the attorney, determined that the truth or falsity of Jeroni-mo’s account did not matter. Rather, said the district court, “even if that was the case” — that is, even if the defense attorney did “bl[o]w the career offender issue” — “a perfect attorney doesn’t exist, and the question is whether a defendant has been properly informed of the range of consequences that could occur” (emphasis added). The district court then denied Jeroni-mo’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
As the majority recognizes, the appeal waiver “must stand or fall with the agree*1159ment of which [it is] a part,” and is therefore valid only if the plea agreement itself was knowingly and voluntarily made.1 Ante at 1154 (quoting United States v. Portillo-Cano, 192 F.3d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir.1999)). Citing United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635 (9th Cir.1988), the majority also recognizes that attorney misrepresentation or gross mischaracterization can invalidate a guilty plea. Ante at 1155. Given these principles, the validity of the appeal waiver is bound up with the merits question that Jeronimo presents: whether he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because of erroneous advice by his counsel regarding the applicable sentencing provisions.
Yet, the majority never addresses the crux of this case — whether Jeronimo’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily made in light of his lawyer’s representations. Instead, the majority recites that ineffective assistance claims are generally better suited for collateral review, and ducks the central issue. This decision, made despite the fact that the legal question at issue was raised in and decided by the district court after a full hearing, relegates the most salient inquiry to possible — but not certain — resolution on a § 2255 habeas petition.
At bottom, the majority offends logic with a basic “chicken and egg” scenario: It relies on a waiver whose validity is contingent upon the answer to a legal question to preclude the consideration of that very legal question.
Not surprisingly, given the convoluted nature of its reasoning, the majority’s ap-proaeh cannot be reconciled with our precedents. This circuit has dealt with ineffective assistance of counsel issues on appeal in connection with knowing and voluntariness challenges to plea agreements. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I
Before proceeding to the issues regarding Jeronimo’s ineffective assistance claim against his counsel, the majority begins by evaluating the Rule 11 colloquy. Without citing a single authority,2 the majority indicates that the colloquy “on its face ... shows that Jeronimo’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily made.” Ante at 1154.
Jeronimo stated under oath, however, that he did not understand the plea agreement because he was never informed of the fact that he qualified as a career criminal. He also testified that his counsel knew of his prior convictions, and that “I signed for 87 months.” If one believes those representations, and the district court did not state that it disbelieved them, then Jeronimo did not understand the agreement when he talked to his attorney Kolego, or when he began the Rule 11 colloquy with the district court judge, or during the Rule 11 colloquy when the judge asked him if he had discussed the sentencing guidelines with his attorney, or when the government mentioned that this prior conviction could affect his sentence, or after the Rule 11 colloquy. For, as far as the record shows, no one — -not Kolego, not the district court judge, not the prosecutor — ever mentioned that it was manda*1160tory that the career offender provision of the law applied to Jeronimo, and that the minimum sentence he could receive was therefore 151 months.3 Mentioning the maximum statutory sentence did not take care of the problem, nor did informing Jeronimo that his sentence was ultimately up to the judge. The problem was that his lawyer had erroneously informed him that an 87 month sentence was at least a possibility (leaving aside any prediction or “deal” regarding that sentence), when it was not. So Jeronimo had erroneous information, precluding him from accurately evaluating his options and risks. In other words, his decision to plead guilty was not “knowing,” even if it appeared otherwise to the judge who took the plea.
Importantly, the problem here was not just a failure to make an accurate prediction or other assessment of the possibilities. It was an absolute certainty that, under the sentencing guidelines, Jeronimo would qualify as a “career criminal” if he pled guilty. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (2002); supra note 3.
Furthermore, the lawyer had the prior conviction information necessary to so inform Jeronimo.4 This case therefore concerns a defendant whose counsel left him uninformed about his certain legal fate if he accepted a plea agreement, and instead affirmatively indicated that a lower sentence was possible than was actually the case.
II
Given this predicament, one can easily understand why Jeronimo claimed in the district court, as the basis for his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, that the advice of his counsel was ineffective. The majority’s ultimate reason for refusing to hear that claim is that we generally do not hear ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal. The reason for that policy, however, is that normally, the record on appeal is deficient, as there was no litigation on effectiveness of counsel in the district court. In this case, however, the ineffectiveness issue and the merits question, *1161withdrawal of the guilty plea, collapse into one another and turn on identical facts. Consequently, there was a hearing on the ineffectiveness issue, where Jeronimo presented sworn testimony. To suggest that there is no record on the issue is therefore just plain wrong.
During the August 18, 2003, hearing concerning the motion to withdraw Jeroni-mo’s guilty plea, Jeronimo testified under oath. This is what he said:
QUESTION: And did you discuss the merits of the plea offer many times with your attorney?
ANSWER: Yes, a number of times.
QUESTION: And, finally, he convinced you that you should accept the plea offer; is that correct?
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION: And during your discussions with your attorney, did — do you know if he was aware of your prior criminal history?
ANSWER: Yes, he did know.
QUESTION: He knew that you had a prior felony conviction for drug distribution?
ANSWER: Excuse me, I’m sorry?
QUESTION: Your attorney knew that you had a prior conviction for drug distribution?
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION: Your attorney knew of that?
ANSWER: Yes, he knew that.
QUESTION: And he also knew, based upon your discussions with him, that had you [sic] a prior felony assault conviction; is that correct?
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION: In your many discussions with your attorney, did he predict — did you discuss the sentencing guidelines?
ANSWER: Yes, we did.
QUESTION: And did he predict what your sentence would be if you accepted the plea offer?
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION: And what was your understanding of the sentence you would receive based upon the plea offer?
ANSWER: Eighty-seven months.
QUESTION: During the conversations with your attorney, did the phrase “career offender” ever come up?
ANSWER: No, he didn’t tell me anything about that.
QUESTION: If you had known that you would receive a sentence of 151 months, would you have accepted the plea offer?
ANSWER: No, I would not have.
QUESTION: And all your lawyers have told you when it comes to sentencing that that would be left up to the judge, correct?
ANSWER: Yes. But I made a deal with my attorney, I trusted in him, I trusted in him, sir, and I signed for 87 months. When I realized that the sentence was longer, if I had realized, if I known [sic] that, I wouldn’t have sign [sic] it.
QUESTION: In fact, in this particular case, Judge Hogan, the judge you are in front of today, made that clear to you during the course of the plea petition, that it was going to be up to him what sentence you were going to get, correct?
ANSWER: Yes, that’s fine what you say, but what happened to the deal that I made with my attorney?
QUESTION: The deal that you made with your lawyer, sir, did not include what this judge was going to sentence you to, correct?
ANSWER: Yes.
*1162QUESTION: And, in fact, when the court asked you, this judge here, asked you is your guilty plea freely and voluntarily made, with a good understanding of the nature of the charges against you, and the matters in this guilty plea petition and plea bargain letter, and those things we’ve talked about today, you answered yes through an interpreter, did you not?
ANSWER: Because I made a deal with my attorney. I had spoken to him.
QUESTION: And then when the judge said [“]I’ll accept the guilty plea,[”] I told you something. And what I said was, “Please the court, before accepting the plea, I want to make sure that the defendant” — that would be you, sir — • “understands that under the relevant facts that the government is going to bring to the court’s attention and to probation’s attention is the fact the government will contend he has a prior delivery of a controlled substance conviction in 1994; and a felony assault in the second degree, two counts in 1995; that he was an illegal alien at the time of these drug trafficking crimes, as well as escapee and a fugitive from the Oregon Department of Corrections.”
I just want those relevant facts to be included in this colloquy so that Mr. Jeronimo is aware that that’s something the government may bring up, in fact, will bring up at sentencing before entering voluntarily his guilty plea.”
Do you remember me telling you that?
ANSWER: Yes, sir, I do.
QUESTION: And the court went further, this judge said, and do you understand that if the party (sic) agrees with those facts, it will likely affect the extent of your sentence?
ANSWER: I had talked about that vrith my attorney.
QUESTION: So when you pled guilty, you understood that you could face a maximum sentence of more than 151 months, did you not?
ANSWER: He never talked about — my attorney never talked about that. If I had known that, I would not have plead guilty.
QUESTION: Didn’t the court tell you, “the plea petition says the maximum sentence is 20 years imprisonment”? You heard that, didn’t you?
ANSWER: Yes.
QUESTION: You still pled guilty, right?
ANSWER: Because I had spoken to my attorney, I made a deal.
The government presented no testimony controverting Jeronimo’s sworn testimony. Nor did the judge decide whether the attorney did fail to provide Jeronimo with essential information.
The majority ignores Jeronimo’s sworn testimony. It cannot be the case that because the testimony was uncontroverted, an appellate court, in the absence of any district court credibility determination, can simply assume the opposite is true. Thus, although the majority suggests that Jeron-imo cannot make out an ineffective assistance claim because “the record contains no evidence from Kolego,” ante at 1156, this suggestion is without any basis. The government could have put on such evidence but did not. Jeronimo was not required to, once he told the court his version of events.
Moreover, on the merits of the ineffective assistance claim, a failure to inform one’s client of the mandatory application of a sentencing provision can never qualify as a “strategic, decision.” We are not evaluating this attorney’s decisions in front of a judge or jury. Instead, we are considering *1163only whether the attorney deficiently advised his client, so that his client’s plea was not knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.1986); Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861 (9th Cir.1986).
The very reason for a Rule 11 plea colloquy is to ensure that “the criminal defendant who pleads guilty understands exactly what that plea means.” United States v. Rios-Ortiz, 830 F.2d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir.1987). As this court recognized in Iaea, “ ‘an intelligent assessment of the relative advantages of pleading guilty is frequently impossible without the assistance of an attorney.’ ” 800 F.2d at 865 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 n. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). The majority’s suggestion that an attorney has strategic discretion in advising his client of the consequences of a guilty plea disregards the fundamental tenet that “counsel [has] a duty to supply criminal defendants with necessary and accurate information.” Id. How can the failure to fulfill a fundamental duty — a failure that results in a significantly longer prison sentence than his client would have agreed or pled to — possibly qualify as counsel’s strategic decision?
I conclude that, if Jeronimo’s testimony is credited, the record supports his contention that Jeronimo’s guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, because he was misinformed by his counsel regarding the sentencing options.5
Ill
The majority thus stumbles most fundamentally when it suggests that we cannot review this challenge to Jeronimo’s appeal waiver.
This case is not like most ineffectiveness challenges. In most cases, such a challenge is not made until appeal, so there is no record in the court of conviction concerning the issue. Here, Jeronimo raised the very same knowing and voluntary waiver issue in the district court as the basis for his contention that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea. The district court had a hearing on the issue, at which it took Jeronimo’s sworn testimony on this issue. The government had notice of the ineffective assistance issue in the Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty Due to Inadequate and Fraudulent Representation By Legal Counsel, but did not put on any opposing testimony.
In these special circumstances — where the ineffective assistance issue was properly raised and litigated in the district court — this court does have the evidence necessary to determine whether Jeroni-mo’s plea was “knowingly and voluntarily” made. See United States v. Laughlin, 933 F.2d 786, 788-89 (9th Cir.1991) (explaining that the reason habeas is often a preferable posture for ineffectiveness challenges is to establish “ ‘what counsel did, why it was done, and what, if any, prejudice resulted’ ” (quoting United States v. Pope, 841 F.2d 954, 958 (9th Cir.1988))). Based on Jeronimo’s sworn testimony, we know what counsel did — he failed to advise Jer-onimo that the he would be sentenced as a “career criminal,” and instead informed him erroneously that a lesser sentence was possible. For the reasons discussed supra, we know that Kolego had a duty to *1164provide this information. It was not in Kolego’s strategic discretion to erroneously inform Jeronimo in this manner. Finally, we know what prejudice resulted — Jer-onimo agreed to a plea that, as he testified under oath, .he would not have accepted had he .known of the “career criminal” provision. As no strategic discretion could justify Kolego’s actions, “it is not necessary to expand the record because in determining reasonableness we need go no further than ruling” that such a failure to advise is contrary to law. United States v. Anderson, 850 F.2d 563, 565 n. 1 (9th Cir.1988). Given that there was a hearing in the lower court regarding this issue in which Jeronimo was questioned and testified, this court can and should address Jeronimo’s challenge.6
Notwithstanding the majority’s assertion to the contrary, the Ninth Circuit has considered and decided the question of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to a challenge to a plea. See Signori, 844 F.2d at 638-39 (reviewing a challenge to a plea on direct appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel); cf. Chizen, 809 F.2d at 562 (reviewing a challenge to a plea on direct appeal based on claim of “counsel’s misrepresentations as to what his sentence in fact would be”). The majority’s argument that we cannot consider an ineffective assistance claim is inconsistent with Signori, which reviewed the incompetency challenge directly rather then dismissing the plea challenge to await a § 2255 motion.7
While asserting that this court does not review ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal, the majority fails to cite any case refusing to consider an ineffectiveness issue on direct appeal in which the issue was litigated in district court on a plea withdrawal motion (or for any other reason, for that matter). Every case the majority cites for its central proposition concerns an ineffectiveness claim involving attorney conduct unrelated to any plea withdrawal hearing, or to any other hearing held before the district court. The cases cited thus offer little enlightenment regarding an ineffective assistance claim presented at an evidentiary hearing as part of an effort to withdraw a guilty plea. See United States v. Daychild, 357 F.3d 1082, 1094-95 (9th Cir.2004) (attorney filed pretrial motions to continue when client wanted a speedy trial); United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 845 (9th Cir.) (failure to admit evidence at trial and failure to file motions), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 941, 124 S.Ct. 359, 157 L.Ed.2d 254 (2003); Laughlin, 933 F.2d at 788-89 (attorney conduct during a hearing for revocation of probation); Anderson, 850 F.2d at 565 n. 1 (failure to request a particular jury instruction); United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 669-70 (9th Cir.1984) (failure to request witnesses). Given the unique connection in this case between the ineffec*1165tiveness issue and the merits question on appeal, the majority’s reliance on the court’s general reluctance to address ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal is entirely out of place.
IV
In sum: The majority refuses to consider the appeal of a criminal defendant who, in sworn and uneontradicted testimony, made clear that, due to his attorney’s representations, he never understood the mandatory legal consequences of his plea agreement. By purporting to enforce the appeal waiver, the majority refuses to reach an ineffectiveness of counsel claim that could resolve both the availability of an appeal and the merits of the appeal, and that was litigated below. Its refusal is based on cases in which, unlike here, the district court had no occasion to hold a hearing on the ineffectiveness claim the defendant wishes to raise on appeal. Those cases have no application here. The majority’s insistence on enforcing this so-called meeting of the minds strips Jeroni-mo of the chance to assert many of the basic rights afforded criminal defendants in our adversarial system.8
I respectfully dissent.

. I agree with the majority that the waiver is within the terms of the plea agreement.

. The majority suggests in a footnote at the end of its opinion that its reference to United States v. Portillo-Cano, 192 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir.1999), supports the idea that "a waiver must be honored when the plea agreement is voluntary and taken in compliance with Rule 11.” See ante at 1157-58 n. 5 (emphasis added). The case does stand for that proposition. The question here is not whether the judge complied with Rule 11; it is, instead, whether the plea agreement was voluntary. As the very language quoted by the majority makes clear, both conditions are necessary for a plea agreement to stand.

. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant must be classified as a "career offender” so long as:
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offence of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
U.S.S.G. § 4Bl.l(a) (2002). Additionally, if the specified offense level for a career offender is greater than the offense level otherwise applicable, then the higher offense level “shall apply." Id. § 4Bl.l(b) (emphasis added).
Jeronimo was 34 years old at the time of sentencing, and the offense in this case is "Possession with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine and Heroin,” which qualifies as a "controlled substance offense” because each offense is punishable by up to 20 years imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C); U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2(b) (defining "controlled substance offense”). Previously, Jeronimo was convicted of Assault II, which qualifies as a "crime of violence,” see id. § 4B 1.2(a), and "Delivery of a Controlled Substance,” which qualifies as a "controlled substance offense,” see id. § 4B 1.2(b). Jer-onimo therefore qualified as a "career offender” if he pled or was found guilty of the charges underlying this appeal, and his base offense level was required to be set at 32, with a minimum sentence of 151 months due to his Criminal History category and 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See id. § 4B 1.1(b).

. This case is quite different from one in which the lawyer is not aware of his client's prior convictions when he provides advice concerning pleading guilty. In that circumstance, the attorney’s obligation is to make a reasonable inquiry regarding priors, or to inform the client of the range of possibilities depending on what his client’s record turns out to be.

. The majority does recognize that a defendant's plea may falter based upon an attorney's "gross mischaracterization,” but maintains that Jeronimo "did not give evidence of any misrepresentation or gross mischaracteri-zation by Kolego.” Ante at 1157. I am perplexed to imagine what could be more of a "gross mischaracterization” than telling a client that he could receive a sentence of 87 months, where the client's prior history, known to the attorney, dictates that such a sentence is not possible, and the minimum sentence is 151 months.

. The majority, as discussed supra, seems to deem Kolego's testimony indispensable. I do not agree that an attorney's testimony is necessary for an ineffectiveness challenge where there is no possibility of a proper use of strategic discretion and where the government, as opposing party, could have sought to disprove Jeronimo’s representations by presenting Kolego as a witness but did not. If, however, the majority still believes the testimony is necessary, it should have remanded the case back to the district court for further factfinding, as the question of Kolego’s advice was properly before the district court on the plea withdrawal motion.

. The record here is more developed than in Signori as there is sworn uncontroverted testimony from the defendant, which accounts for my previous conclusion about the merits of Jeronimo's claim. Despite this sworn testimony, the majority goes on, oddly, to decide that because the admitted evidence is not controverted, the record is less developed and the evidence is weaker than in a case like Signori, in which the evidence was disputed. See ante at 1157-58 n. 5.

. The importance of the way we handle plea agreements cannot be understated. During fiscal year 2002 — the year that Jeronimo both signed and challenged his plea agreement— the plea agreement was the central method of conviction in the criminal justice process as 97% of all convictions nationally, 98.3% of all convictions in the Ninth Circuit, and 98.7% of all convictions in Oregon — the state where Jeronimo was arrested — were made by plea bargain. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Federal Sentencing Statistics by State, District, and Circuit (2002), http://www.ussc.gov/JUD-PACK/2002/or02.pdf.