Court Opinion

ID: 9405853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 15:08:11.193049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:25.281370
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
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THE ACTION.
                                                 RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2023
                                                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2021-SC-0537-MR

JERMAINE BEAMON                                                      APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
V.               HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE
                            NO. 19-CR-01659

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                  AFFIRMING

      On July 29, 2017 Appellant Jermaine Beamon shot and killed Lazuri

Collins while she was sitting in a car on 13th Street in Covington, Kentucky.

Shots fired by Beamon also struck Lazuri’s father Antonio, who was seated

behind Lazuri in the rear passenger seat.

      A jury in Kenton Circuit Court convicted Beamon of murder and first-

degree assault. The trial court sentenced him to fifty years on the murder

conviction and to twenty years on the conviction for first-degree assault,

running consecutively for a total sentence of seventy years. Beamon now

appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). Following a

careful review, we find no error and affirm.
                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Lazuri Collins drove down 13th Street in Covington in the early morning

hours of July 29, 2017. Her friend Marcus Smith rode in the front passenger

seat and her father Antonio Collins sat behind her in the rear passenger seat

next to his girlfriend Brandy Thompson.

      At the time a number of people were gathered outside near the

intersection of 13th Street and Wheeler Street, some participating in or

standing near a dice game in front of a home. Lazuri stopped in the middle of

the street briefly and then began to pull forward in the direction of the dice

game to park the car. As she pulled forward Beamon opened fire on the

vehicle, striking it multiple times. Several shots passed through the vehicle’s

doors. At least one went through a window and the driver’s seat headrest.

Lazuri was shot in the head and died from her injuries several days later.

Antonio was shot in the leg. Though Antonio ultimately survived, he suffered a

broken leg, had to undergo physical therapy, and was unable to walk without

assistance for a year.

      On the day before the shooting Beamon had an altercation with Lazuri’s

on-again, off-again boyfriend Chris Goode in which Goode knocked Beamon

unconscious and stole his money and cell phones. Greg Pritchett, a close

friend of Beamon who considered him family, testified that shortly after this

altercation Beamon told him he wanted to get revenge by killing Goode.

Pritchett testified that he tried to persuade Beamon to retaliate against Goode

                                        2
in a non-lethal manner but that Beamon was adamant about his desire to kill

Goode.

      Pritchett further testified that Beamon met him shortly before the

shooting approximately two blocks from the eventual murder scene. Beamon

showed Pritchett a gun he had obtained and told him he was going to 13th

Street to “post up.” Pritchett testified that Beamon was wearing a dark hoodie

at the time.

      Another witness, Simeon Jones, testified that twenty minutes before the

shooting he saw Beamon hanging out near the dice game and wearing a dark

hoodie. Jones stated that he said “what up” to Beamon, who responded by

raising his index finger to his lips to indicate for Jones to “be quiet.” Jones

testified he then saw Beamon firing shots and was 100% sure Beamon was the

gunman.

      Beamon met with Pritchett the day after the shooting. Pritchett testified

that during this meeting Beamon admitted he shot at the car and that he had

been told Goode was in it. Pritchett took Beamon’s cell phone, attempted to

destroy it in battery acid, and threatened potential witnesses in case they were

considering speaking with police.

      Beamon gave a voluntary statement to police after rumors of his

involvement in the shooting began to spread. He denied involvement in the

shooting, offering as an alibi that he had been in a bar in Cincinnati with his

cousin Andre Sinclair that evening. Beamon told police that Sinclair lived on

“Glenwood” and provided his age and a physical description. Police were

                                         3
unable to locate an Andre Sinclair and ultimately concluded he was a

fabrication based on Beamon’s uncle Deandre Beamon who had once lived on

Glenwood and whose mother’s maiden name was Sinclair. Deandre also told

police Beamon had no cousin named Andre.

      Another witness, Antoinette Malik, told police that the shooter was

wearing a black hoodie and ran past a house after the shooting. The day after

the shooting police traced the path described by Malik and found a black

hoodie next to a Ruger 9 mm firearm in a nearby backyard. Testing revealed

the gun to be the murder weapon and the hoodie to have gunshot residue. A

DNA test of the hoodie also found it to have a mixture of DNA from three

individuals, with Beamon as a major contributor and two other individuals as

minor contributors.

      A jury found Beamon guilty of murdering Lazuri and of first-degree

assault for the shooting of Antonio. The jury recommended a sentence of fifty

years for the murder and twenty years for the first-degree assault to run

consecutively for a total of seventy years. The trial court sentenced Beamon

consistent with this recommendation.

                                   ANALYSIS

      Beamon raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred

in denying his request for an instruction on first-degree manslaughter as a

lesser-included offense of murder; and (2) whether the trial court erred in

denying his motions for directed verdict. We review each issue in turn.

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      I.    The trial court properly denied Beamon’s request for an
            instruction on first-degree manslaughter.

      Beamon first argues the trial court erred in not providing an instruction

allowing the jury to consider first-degree manslaughter as a lesser-included

offense of murder. Beamon tendered an instruction for first-degree

manslaughter and thereby preserved this issue for review. Swan v.

Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 77, 98 (Ky. 2012).

      When a defendant contends the trial court erred either in failing to

provide a requested jury instruction or in providing an unwarranted jury

instruction, we review the decision for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v.

Caudill, 540 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Ky. 2018). We review an allegation of error

regarding the content of an instruction or its accuracy in stating the law de

novo. Id. Here Beamon alleges the trial court erred in denying his request for

an instruction on manslaughter in the first degree and we therefore review that

decision for abuse of discretion.

      A defendant has the right to have every issue of fact raised by the

evidence and material to his defense submitted to the jury on proper

instructions, including instructions as to lesser-included offenses. Allen v.

Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d 252, 255 (Ky. 2011). However, an instruction

regarding a lesser-included offense is warranted if, and only if, under the

evidence presented a reasonable juror could have reasonable doubt as to the

defendant’s guilt for the greater charge but find beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant is guilty of the lesser charge. Id. In determining whether an

instruction as to a lesser-included offense is warranted, the trial court must
                                        5
consider the totality of the evidence presented at trial. See Swan, 384 S.W.3d

at 99. On appeal, we consider whether a trial court erred in refusing a

requested instruction on a lesser-included offense by construing the evidence

in favor of the proponent of the instruction and asking “whether a reasonable

juror could acquit of the greater charge but convict of the lesser.” Allen, 338

S.W.3d at 255.

      KRS1 505.020 provides that a lesser offense is included within a greater

charged offense if the lesser offense “differs from the offense charged only in

the respect that a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its

commission.”2 KRS 505.020(2)(c). First-degree manslaughter requires a

finding that the defendant caused the victim’s death though he intended only

to cause serious physical injury to her or a third person. KRS 507.030(1)(a).

First-degree manslaughter is thus “generally thought of as a lesser included

offense of intentional murder, an offense established by proof that the

defendant caused a person’s death intending to do so, inasmuch as the intent

      1   Kentucky Revised Statute

      2  KRS 505.020 also provides three other circumstances in which a lesser
offense is included within a greater charged offense, namely when the lesser offense is
1) “established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged;” 2) “consists of an attempt to commit the offense
charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein;” or 3) “differs from the
offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the
same person, property or public interest suffices to establish its commission.” KRS
505.020(2).

                                            6
to injure may be deemed a lesser sort of culpability than the intent to kill.”3

Allen, 338 S.W.3d at 256.

      Beamon argues a first-degree manslaughter instruction was warranted

because some of the bullet holes were found on the lower part of the doors of

Lazuri’s car and the jury therefore could have found Beamon intentionally shot

low with a goal of causing only fright or serious injury rather than death. A

review of the totality of the evidence indicates there was no basis on which a

reasonable juror could have reached such a conclusion. Perhaps most

importantly, Pritchett testified that Beamon stated shortly before the shooting

that he wanted to kill Goode, that Beamon adamantly rejected Pritchett’s

efforts to persuade him to consider a non-lethal alternative, and that Beamon

was told Goode was in the car at the time of the shooting.4 We are pointed to

      3 The trial court provided a murder instruction that set forth both intentional
and wanton theories of murder. The verdict form did not differentiate between these
two legal theories and thus the jury simply found Beamon guilty of murder without
any indication as to whether the crime was intentional or wanton. The law is
presently unsettled as to whether first-degree manslaughter is a lesser-included
offense of wanton murder. See Allen, 338 S.W.3d at 257 (declining to “decide if and
when first-degree manslaughter should be deemed a lesser included offense of wanton
murder.”). The parties have not briefed the issue and we therefore decline to resolve it
here. However we will assume for purposes of Beamon’s appeal that first-degree
manslaughter was a lesser-included offense of his murder conviction regardless of
whether the crime was intentional or wanton.

      4Though Beamon’s intended target may have been Goode rather than Lazuri,
he nonetheless may be found guilty of murder because his intention to kill Goode (or
wantonness) transfers to his killing of Lazuri:

      [U]nder . . . KRS 507.020(1)(a) . . ., the defendant is guilty of intentional
      murder if he intended to kill one person (V-1), but instead killed another
      (V-2). . . . Under KRS 501.060(3)(a), a defendant is guilty of wanton
      murder if, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
      human life, he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of
      death to one person (V-1) and thereby causes the death of another (V-2).
                                           7
no evidence to contradict Beamon’s own stated intention of causing death

shortly before the shooting, such as evidence of Beamon expressing or

manifesting any intention only to cause fright or injury.

      In addition, though bullet holes were found low on the car doors,

Beamon fired on the car multiple times. At least one shot was sufficiently high

to pass through a window and the driver’s seat headrest. Beamon also

manufactured an alibi of being with a non-existent cousin at the time of the

shooting. Taken together, the totality of the evidence, including Beamon’s

stated intent to kill Goode followed shortly by his firing of multiple shots,

including at head-level, at a vehicle he believed to be occupied by Goode,

simply could not support a reasonable conclusion that he merely intended only

to cause fright or injury. He shot directly into a car occupied by four people.

Thus, the evidence in this case precludes reasonable doubt that the shooter

intended to kill, as opposed to merely injure. No reasonable juror could have

entertained reasonable doubt under the evidence presented as to whether

Beamon fired on the car with an intention to kill rather than merely injure.

The trial court properly refused to instruct the jury as to manslaughter in the

first degree. See Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635, 668 (Ky. 2003)

(affirming trial court refusal to give first-degree manslaughter instruction where

the undisputed evidence showed defendant repeatedly struck victim in the

Phillips v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 870, 874 (Ky. 2000).
                                         8
head with a hammer-like object and thus precluded “any reasonable doubt that

whoever attacked [victim] intended to kill, as opposed to merely injure, her.”).

      Our conclusion here in no way lessens our continued recognition that

“[e]ven when death is a natural and probable consequence of an act, there may

exist circumstances which make it reasonable for the jury not to be convinced

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to cause death.” Smith

v. Commonwealth, 737 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Ky. 1987). Such circumstances exist

where the evidence could lead a reasonable juror to conclude the defendant

had some goal other than the death of the victim. See Luttrell v.

Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Ky. 1977) (holding trial court should have

given lesser-included offense instruction where a reasonable juror could

conclude arrestee shot police officer not to kill him but rather only to injure

him and thereby effect an escape). A lesser-included offense instruction is also

warranted where the evidence could support a reasonable conclusion that the

defendant’s mental state prevented the formation of an intent to kill. Hudson

v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Ky. 1998) (holding that because

defendant stated he “went crazy” before strangling victim, a reasonable juror

could conclude he merely engaged in wanton rather than intentional conduct).

Evidence that could support a reasonable finding the defendant was simply

indifferent to life likewise warrants the giving of lesser-included offense

instructions. See Holland v. Commonwealth, 466 S.W.3d 493, 499 (Ky. 2015)

(finding reasonable juror could conclude victim was simply indifferent to the

victim’s life given the lack of testimony or direct evidence as to his intent). An

                                         9
instruction as to a lesser-included degree of homicide is also warranted where

the evidence is “purely circumstantial and does not conclusively establish [the

defendant’s] state of mind at the time he killed the victim.” Commonwealth v.

Wolford, 4 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Ky. 1999).

      The facts here are readily distinguishable from such circumstances.

Beamon points us to no evidence that could have led a reasonable juror to

conclude he had an objective other than death, that he was simply indifferent

to life, or that he lacked a mental ability to intend to kill at the time of the

crime. There is also no evidence the crime might have been unintentional, as

in the case of an accidental killing that occurs during a struggle over a weapon.

      This case also does not involve competing evidence or an absence of

proof as to Beamon’s state of mind. The evidence was that Beamon stated his

express and adamant intent to kill shortly before the shooting. The

circumstances of the crime, namely the shooting of an occupied vehicle

multiple times including at head-level, were consistent with such an intent.

Thus, while some cases involving conduct likely to result in death nonetheless

also involve circumstances warranting the giving of a lesser-included offense

instruction, this is not such a case. Quite simply, no reasonable juror could

have entertained reasonable doubt that Beamon intended to kill rather than

cause fright or injury. The trial court therefore did not err in refusing to

provide an instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the

first degree. At a minimum, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s instructions to the jury.

                                         10
      III.   The trial court properly denied Beamon’s motions for directed
             verdict.

      Beamon next argues the trial court erred in denying his motions for

directed verdict.5 Beamon acknowledges this issue was at most “partially

preserved” and therefore requests palpable error review pursuant to Kentucky

Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 10.26. We therefore review his allegations

of error under that standard.

      Under RCr 10.26, “[a] palpable error which affects the substantial rights

of a party may be considered . . . by an appellate court on appeal, even though

insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be

granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the

error.” In determining whether an error is palpable, we consider

      “whether on the whole case there is a substantial possibility that
      the result would have been any different.” To be palpable, an error
      must be “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable.”
      A palpable error must be so grave that, if uncorrected, it would
      seriously affect the fairness of the proceedings. “It should be so
      egregious that it jumps off the page . . . and cries out for relief.”

Davis v. Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 16, 30 (Ky. 2021) (citations omitted).

Even where an error is palpable, relief is warranted only where it results in

manifest injustice. Caudill, 540 S.W.3d at 367. An error results in manifest

injustice if it “so seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of the proceeding as to be ‘shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable.’” Conrad

       5 Beamon argues the trial court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict

as to both the murder charge and the charge for assault in the first degree. Because
the two charges arise from the same shooting and because Beamon presents the same
arguments as to both, we address them together.
                                          11
v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Martin v.

Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006)).

        In considering a criminal defendant’s motion for directed verdict, the trial

court

        “must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in
        favor of the Commonwealth” and “assume that the evidence for the
        Commonwealth is true, but reserv[e] to the jury questions as to the
        credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.” “If the
        evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe
        beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed
        verdict should not be given.”

Swan, 384 S.W.3d at 102 (quoting Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186,

187 (Ky. 1991)). “On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under

the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find

guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.”

Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).

        Beamon first contends the trial court erred in denying his motions for

directed verdict because a number of witnesses were not credible. In

considering a motion for directed verdict, a trial court generally may not

disregard the testimony of a witness solely because the witness seems entirely

lacking in credibility. Ross v. Commonwealth, 531 S.W.3d 471, 475 (Ky. 2017).

The weight to be afforded to such testimony is best left to the jury “‘since the

triers of fact are particularly adept at judging credibility.’” Id. at 477 (quoting

Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 3.00[2][b] at 239

(5th ed. 2013)). Thus, a trial court may disregard a witness’s testimony only

where “the substance of the testimony, detached from the personal credibility of

                                         12
the witness who bears it, is so laden with doubt and implausibility that it

cannot rationally be regarded as a fact capable of supporting a verdict.” Id. at

475 (emphasis added). Examples satisfying this high bar are where the facts

testified to are “‘inherently impossible and absolutely at variance with well-

established and universally recognized physical laws’” or the testimony is “so

extraordinarily implausible or inherently impossible that it is manifestly

without probative value or patently unworthy of belief.” Id. at 476-77 (quoting

Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Chambers, 165 Ky. 703, 178 S.W. 1041, 1043 (1915)).

      Here, Beamon argues the trial court erred in not disregarding the

testimony of a number of witnesses placing him near the scene of the crime.

Beamon contends the witnesses’ testimony was not credible because it was

inconsistent with statements made to police or was motivated by lenient

treatment or a desire for leniency in the witnesses’ own cases. The jury could

properly consider all those points in assessing the credibility and weight to be

afforded to the testimony. However, Beamon points to no testimony that was

so extraordinarily implausible or inherently impossible that the trial court was

free to disregard it. As such, the trial court did not err in denying motions for

directed verdict on grounds of the witnesses’ lack of credibility, much less did it

commit any error sufficient to warrant palpable error relief.

      Beamon asserts the trial court also erred in denying his motions for

directed verdict because the black hoodie containing his DNA and found near

the murder weapon also contained the DNA of other persons and could have

been left where it was found sometime before the shooting. In considering the

                                        13
motion for directed verdict, the trial court was required to draw all fair and

reasonable inferences from the evidence in the Commonwealth’s favor. At least

two witnesses testified they saw Beamon wearing a dark hoodie on the night of

the shooting. The hoodie was found next to the murder weapon along the path

Antoinette Malik described the shooter taking as he fled. Testing revealed both

Beamon’s DNA and gunpowder residue on the hoodie. One fair and reasonable

inference from this evidence is that Beamon was wearing the hoodie at the time

of the shooting and discarded it along with the murder weapon as he fled from

the scene. The evidence at trial in any event also included other significant

proof of Beamon’s involvement in the shooting, including Beamon’s own stated

intention to kill Goode, Jones’ testimony that he was 100% sure he saw

Beamon shooting, and Beamon’s invention of a false alibi and efforts to destroy

cell phone evidence after the crime. As such, we find no error in the lack of a

directed verdict in Beamon’s favor.

                                  CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the

Kenton Circuit Court.

      All sitting. Vanmeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell,

JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

                                        14
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Julia Karol Pearson
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Matthew Robert Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General

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