Court Opinion

ID: 9404636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 18:00:30.903082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.922021
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40663       Document: 00516797322            Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/23/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                    ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                 June 23, 2023
                                     No. 22-40663                                Lyle W. Cayce
                                    ____________                                      Clerk

   George Martinez,

                                                                  Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                           versus

   Nueces County, Texas; Well Path, L.L.C.,

                                             Defendants—Appellees.
                    ______________________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 2:21-CV-210
                    ______________________________

   Before Smith, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:
          George Martinez appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims
   against Nueces County, Texas, and the denial of leave to amend his § 1983
   claims against Wellpath, L.L.C. 1 Finding no error, we affirm.

                                             I.
          Martinez was incarcerated in the Nueces County Jail in September

          _____________________
          1
            Wellpath is spelled in a variety of ways throughout the record, but because
   defendant spells its name as “Wellpath” in its appellate brief, we adopt that spelling.
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                                             No. 22-40663

   2019. 2 He notified “[d]efendants” 3 that he had severe problems with his foot
   and had been scheduled for surgery. He alleges that he continued to submit
   complaints about “the increasingly horrific condition of his foot” and about
   his medications and antibiotics, but “[d]efendants continually ignored [his
   complaints] over a significant period of time.” “As a result,” Martinez’s toe
   “exploded,” and all his toes on that foot were “unnecessarily
   amputated/removed.”
           Martinez sued Nueces County and Wellpath for “County/Municipal
   [L]iability” under § 1983. Specifically, he alleged that the county was liable
   because it “sanctioned the custom, practice, and/or policy or procedure of
   failing to protect and/or ignoring the serious medical needs of those
   entrusted to [its] care.” The original claim was not specific about how Well-
   path was supposedly liable.
           The county and Wellpath moved to dismiss. The district court
   granted both motions but permitted Martinez to file a “Motion for Leave to
   Amend his Complaint.” Martinez did so and attached a proposed amended
   complaint, but the judge denied the motion, finding that any amendment
   would be futile. Martinez timely appeals the dismissal of his claim against
   Nueces County and the denial of leave to amend as to Wellpath. 4

           _____________________
           2
               All facts in this section are taken from plaintiff’s live complaint.
           3
             Martinez does not specify whom, exactly, he notified. His original complaint
   named as defendants Nueces County, Wellpath, and numerous other individuals who
   “were all medi[c]al person[nel] working for [Nueces] County and/or [Wellpath].”
           4
             Martinez eventually agreed to dismiss the individual defendants. He does not
   appeal his own stipulation of dismissal. It also appears that he does not challenge the denial
   of leave to amend his claims against Nueces County or the original dismissal of his claims
   against Wellpath; he states he is appealing only the “Order Granting Motions to Dismiss as
   it pertains to County; and (b) Order Denying Motion for Leave to Amend as it pertains to
   Wellpath.”

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                                      No. 22-40663

                                            II.
          We begin with the dismissal of the claims against Nueces County.
          We review a dismissal de novo. Lampton v. Diaz, 639 F.3d 223, 225
   (5th Cir. 2011). We ask whether, construing all inferences in favor of the
   plaintiff, there are sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above
   the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
   There is no “heightened pleading requirement” for actions against munici-
   palities. Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir.
   1999) (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination
   Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166–67 (1993)). As with all motions to dismiss, the court
   must determine whether the plaintiff has pleaded “factual content that
   allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
   for the misconduct alleged” such that he has “‘state[d] a claim to relief that
   is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
   Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
          Martinez alleged that Nueces County violated § 1983 by “acting with
   deliberate indifference to a substantial and known risk of harm to [p]laintiff,”
   “ignoring [p]laintiff’s serious medical needs,” and “failing to impose proper
   and sufficient policies and/or procedures as to the screening, reassessment
   and medical treatment of inmates/detainees/arrestees in regard to their med-
   ical needs and/or training concerning same.”
          Nueces County cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless “execution
   of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
   those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
   inflicts the injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
   694 (1978). This is an important distinction: A plaintiff may not recover
   against a municipality via theories of respondeat superior—the municipality
   itself must be responsible for the constitutional violation. To succeed, the

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   plaintiff must show “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy-
   maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a consti-
   tutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.” Pineda v.
   City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Piotrowski v. City
   of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)). Such claims are referred to as
   Monell claims.
           A Monell claim does not require the plaintiff to identify a written pol-
   icy. In some situations, a plaintiff can succeed by pointing to similar incidents
   that are “sufficiently numerous” and have “occurred for so long or so fre-
   quently that the course of conduct warrants the attribution to the governing
   body of knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the expected, accepted
   practice of city employees.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838,
   850–51 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted).
           Martinez has attempted to plead Monell in this way, providing a list of
   examples that he claims support his allegations that Nueces County had a
   policy of “ignoring the serious medical needs of those entrusted to [its]
   care.” 5 In Bond v. Nueces County, No. 20-40050, 2022 WL 4595000, at *5
   (5th Cir. Sept. 30, 2022) (unpublished), we accepted this way of establishing
   a policy. But we cannot accept Martinez’s version: Martinez fails because
   the pattern of examples must have “similarity” and “specificity.” Davidson
   v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 396 (5th Cir. 2017). “Prior indications can-
   not simply be for any and all ‘bad’ or unwise acts, but rather must point to
   the specific violation in question.” McCully ex rel. Estate of Davis v. City of
   N. Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations
   removed).

           _____________________
           5
            He lists 16 sparsely detailed incidents, such as “V.G. suffered from dehydration
   due to medical refusal in or around April of 2018.”

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           Because Martinez’s description of what happened to him is so vague,
   we cannot accept that the proffered examples are sufficiently similar to his
   own incident that the municipality can be found liable. Consider the above-
   referenced Bond, where the mother of the deceased Tami Bond sued Nueces
   County for policies that allegedly caused Tami’s death. This court held there
   was “enough . . . [to] determine whether the past incidents were like Tami’s
   death” because the complaint described what happened to Tami in sufficient
   detail. Bond, 2022 WL 4595000, at *6. For example, we outlined how offi-
   cers “observed that Tami had seemingly become extremely intoxicated,
   stumbling and slurring her speech, but the officers did not have Tami medi-
   cally reassessed or otherwise address the signs of a possible narcotics over-
   dose.” Id. at *2. We noted that Tami was “unwilling or unable to follow
   verbal commands,” but officers put her into a “holding cell” instead of call-
   ing for assistance. Id. at *1. The specificity in that pleading allowed the court
   to say that the occurrence was similar enough to the previous incidents that
   the county’s acquiescence in the pattern of previous incidents was the mov-
   ing force behind Tami’s injury. 6
           Not so here, where the entirety of Martinez’s specific allegations is
   that “despite [Martinez’s] numerous complaints concerning his medica-
   tions, antibiotics, and . . . condition of his foot, Defendants continually
   ignored such over a significant period of time.” The bar to survive a motion
   to dismiss is low, but not that low. On the face of these allegations, we cannot

           _____________________
           6
             It is not the pattern alone that subjects the municipality to liability, but the muni-
   cipality’s action or inaction in the face of that pattern. See Peterson, 588 F.3d at 851 n.4
   (noting that the pattern had not established “a municipal policy of using or condoning
   excessive force”). That action or inaction becomes the necessary ‘policy’ required for a
   Monell claim. “Where a court fails to adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and
   causation, municipal liability collapses into respondeat superior liability.” See Bd. of Cnty.
   Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997).

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                                         No. 22-40663

   say that it is plausible that the county’s policy, as distinguished from the
   isolated acts of the employees who interacted with Martinez, was responsible
   for what happened to Martinez. 7
           Because Martinez has not properly alleged a custom or policy that was
   the moving force of his injuries, the district court was correct to dismiss his
   claims against Nueces County.

                                              III.
           We turn now to Wellpath. Martinez’s initial complaint mentioned
   Wellpath only in passing and couched the rest of the complaint as against
   Nueces County. Accordingly, the district court dismissed the claims against
   Wellpath as failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, but
   the court gave Martinez permission to file a motion to amend his complaint.
   He did so and included a proposed amended complaint along with several
   exhibits related to his allegations against Wellpath.
           The district court denied his request, finding that amendment would
   be futile. Martinez appeals only this denial of leave to amend. We review
           _____________________
           7
             This is also why Martinez’s complaints fail while Balle’s (in Balle v. Nueces
   County, 952 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 2017)) survived. Balle, who had a preexisting back injury
   and diabetes, was kicked twice in the back by the arresting officers and became paralyzed
   over the course of six days. His complaint outlined, in excruciating detail, the numerous
   employees who watched this process, repeatedly logged comments noting that Balle had
   “soiled himself,” was “unable to clean himself,” was “complaining of losing use of legs
   and in pain,” “was paralyzed,” and “could not walk,” and yet refused to provide adequate
   medical treatment. Id. at 555. Martinez’s complaint includes no such details—it is not
   even clear from the face of the complaint how long he was denied medical care.
           We pause, however, to acknowledge that each of these cases involves events that
   occurred at Nueces County Jail. Our dismissal of Martinez’s complaint indicates only that
   Martinez has not pleaded a claim with sufficient detail to survive a 12(b)(6) motion.
   Together, Balle, Bond, and Martinez paint a grim picture indeed of the conditions at Nueces
   County Jail. But this court cannot entertain claims pleaded without sufficient detail, and
   the events alleged against the defendant in other cases cannot affect our decision today.

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   denials of leave to amend for abuse of discretion bounded by the Federal
   Rules of Civil Procedure, Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 245
   (5th Cir. 1997); but when a court denies leave to amend for futility of amend-
   ment alone, our analysis mimics that of a motion to dismiss. Ariyan, Inc. v.
   Sewage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2022). “If
   the complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal, then amendment
   is futile and the district court was within its discretion to deny leave to
   amend.” Id. As with reviewing an order to dismiss, our review of denial of
   leave to amend is de novo. Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 590
   (5th Cir. 2016).
           We therefore ask whether, in his proposed amended complaint, Mar-
   tinez has pleaded “factual content that allows the court to draw the reason-
   able inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
   556 U.S. at 678.
           We read Martinez’s proposed amended complaint as alleging that
   Wellpath, as a state actor, had a pattern or policy of deliberate indifference as
   to adequate medical care, and that policy was the moving force behind a
   deprivation of Martinez’s constitutional rights that led to his injury.
           Assuming, without deciding, that a nationwide corporation such as
   Wellpath can be sued as a municipality, 8 we proceed to the merits. As with
   his claim against Nueces County, Martinez must show the existence of a
   policy or custom that was the moving force behind the violation of his con-
   stitutional rights. Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 167
   (5th Cir. 1997).
           Martinez has alleged a custom or policy of deliberate indifference.
           _____________________
           8
            See, e.g., Olivas v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 215 F. App’x 332, 333 (5th Cir. 2007) (per
   curiam) (assuming without deciding the same).

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                                         No. 22-40663

   Again, he can show this via a pattern that has “occurred for so long or so
   frequently that the course of conduct warrants the attribution to the govern-
   ing body of knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the expected, ac-
   cepted practice of [Wellpath’s] employees.” Davidson, 848 F.3d at 396
   (quoting Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850). And again, there is not enough detail in
   Martinez’s complaint to clear this bar.
           Martinez’s proposed amended complaint included exhibits describing
   lawsuits, allegations, and investigations against Wellpath for injuries and
   deaths of inmates from medical negligence, along with allegations that Well-
   path continuously prioritizes profit over quality medical care. The complaint
   concludes that “Wellpath, in an effort to make money, has a history of incom-
   petence, failure to train, failure to provide even the basic care and has
   systemically denied, ignored and/or refused to provide medical care.” That
   is not enough.
           Wellpath is a nationwide company that operates in jails and other
   institutions across the country. Plaintiff’s own exhibits state that the com-
   pany operates in more than 500 facilities in 34 states and is responsible for
   around 300,000 people in custody every day. 9 The complaint does not allege
   a single instance of medical negligence (aside from his own) that occurred in
   Nueces County and that was caused by Wellpath. 10 In fact, it is unclear from
   the face of the complaint what exact role Wellpath even played at Nueces
   County. True, a plaintiff is not required to identify the precise policymaker

           _____________________
           9
             See, e.g., Peterson, 588 F.3d at 851–52 (discussing the importance of proportion-
   ality and the number of incidents necessary to establish a pattern against a larger
   organization).
           10
              The incidents listed supra were alleged as evidence of Nueces County’s
   liability—the complaint does not contend that Wellpath was involved, and nothing in the
   complaint states when Wellpath became involved with Nueces County.

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   to make out a Monell claim. Balle, 952 F.3d at 552. But he is required to
   “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” 11 and from the face of
   Martinez’s pleadings, there is no reason to conclude that Wellpath, at an
   organization-wide level, had a policy of deliberate indifference that was the
   moving force of Martinez’s alleged constitutional violation at the Nueces
   County Jail. This is doubly so because of Martinez’s failure to allege, with
   sufficient detail, what happened to him at the jail.
          Martinez’s sparse complaint and conclusory allegations would not
   survive a motion to dismiss. Denial of leave to amend was therefore proper.
          The dismissal of the claims against Nueces County and denial of leave
   to amend the claims against Wellpath are thus AFFIRMED.

          _____________________
          11
               Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

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