Court Opinion

ID: 9897997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:41.046929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:50.656598
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: SLIP OPINION
                      (not the court’s final written decision)

The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the
written opinions that are originally filed by the court.
A slip opinion is not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions
can be changed by subsequent court orders. For example, a court may issue an
order making substantive changes to a slip opinion or publishing for precedential
purposes a previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally, nonsubstantive edits
(for style, grammar, citation, format, punctuation, etc.) are made before the
opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court
decisions: the Washington Reports 2d and the Washington Appellate Reports. An
opinion in the official reports replaces the slip opinion as the official opinion of
the court.
The slip opinion that begins on the next page is for a published opinion, and it
has since been revised for publication in the printed official reports. The official
text of the court’s opinion is found in the advance sheets and the bound volumes
of the official reports. Also, an electronic version (intended to mirror the
language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of
charge, at this website: https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports.
For more information about precedential (published) opinions, nonprecedential
(unpublished) opinions, slip opinions, and the official reports, see
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions and the information that is linked there.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

                                                                          FILED
                                                                       APRIL 27, 2023
                                                                In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                               WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                                    DIVISION THREE

       KIEMLE & HAGOOD COMPANY, a                    )         No. 38918-9-III
       Washington corporation, as authorized         )
       agent for ST. CLOUD APARTMENTS,               )
                                                     )
                            Respondent,              )
                                                     )
          v.                                         )         PUBLISHED OPINION
                                                     )
       MARIAM P. DANIELS a/k/a PHOEBE                )
       DANIELS, a single person, and all other       )
       subtenants,                                   )
                                                     )
                            Appellant.               )

               PENNELL, J. — Kiemle & Hagood Company (K&H) initiated an action for

       unlawful detainer against Mariam “Phoebe” Daniels, alleging she violated lease

       provisions requiring her to keep her apartment clean and sanitary. Ms. Daniels answered

       K&H’s complaint by disputing the allegations and asserting an affirmative defense of

       failure to reasonably accommodate a disability. The trial court held a show cause hearing,

       after which it granted K&H’s request for a writ of restitution and denied Ms. Daniels’s

       request for a jury trial. According to the court, trial was unwarranted because there were

       no substantial issues of material fact as to K&H’s right to possession. As to Ms. Daniels’s
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       reasonable accommodation defense, the trial court concluded Ms. Daniels had neither

       sufficiently verified she had a disability nor established the requested accommodation

       was necessary or reasonable.

              We reverse. While there is no dispute that K&H was entitled to a writ of

       restitution, material issues of fact precluded the trial court from issuing final judgment.

       Ms. Daniels raised genuine issues of fact regarding whether she was subject to eviction

       on the grounds properly alleged by K&H. Furthermore, Ms. Daniels was not required to

       supply third-party verification of her disability or her need for accommodation, based on

       the obviousness of the condition. This matter should have been set for trial rather than

       summarily resolved.

                                            BACKGROUND

       The parties’ lease

              Phoebe Daniels leased an apartment from K&H. She began with an 11-month

       lease term expiring in May 2021. The parties later agreed to a lease renewal, set to expire

       on February 28, 2022. The lease required Ms. Daniels to keep her apartment “clean and

       sanitary.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 22, 65. Addendums regarding mold and bed bugs

       contemplated specific cleaning routines, including removing clutter, vacuuming, and

       dusting. The lease also required Ms. Daniels to properly dispose of garbage “at least

                                                     2
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       weekly.” Id.

       K&H’s notices to Ms. Daniels

              On August 24, 2020, K&H issued the first of seven notices to Ms. Daniels,

       alleging she had violated her cleaning obligations. Four of the notices demanded

       Ms. Daniels comply with her lease conditions or vacate. See id. at 101, 106, 111, 116.

       Two of the notices directed her to cure the lease violations, or the landlord would enter

       the property and conduct remedial work at cost. See id. at 122, 127. The final notification

       directed Ms. Daniels to quit and vacate the premises. See id. at 134.

              Each notice provided detailed descriptions, citing recent inspections by

       K&H employees. According to the notices, furniture and boxes were stacked inside

       Ms. Daniels’s residence, blocking ingress and egress; garbage had not been disposed of;

       spills and dirty paper towels had accumulated on the floor; and there was an excessive

       amount of personal property throughout the unit, including in the kitchen and bathroom,

       and in proximity to heating fixtures and on the stovetop.

              Two of K&H’s notices were issued on November 3, 2021. 1 One was entitled,

       “Ten (10) Day Notice to Comply or Vacate.” Id. at 116. The other was entitled, “Notice

              1
               One of the November 3 notices expressly “supersede[d] any previous notice.”
       CP at 131.

                                                    3
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       to Cure Lease Non-Compliance.” Id. at 127. The former notice stated Ms. Daniels had

       10 days to comply or her rental agreement would end; the latter stated she had 10 days

       to cure or the landlord could enter the apartment and perform remedial work at cost to

       Ms. Daniels.

              The seventh and final notice was issued on December 27, 2021. See id. at 134.

       This one was entitled, “Notice to Quit and Vacate Due to Nuisance, Waste, and/or

       Unlawful Activity.” Id. This notice stated Ms. Daniels had until January 2, 2022, to

       vacate her apartment. The notice was longer than the previous notices and referenced the

       prior notices to cure. The December 27 notice also advised that on November 29, 2021,

       the landlord had conducted an inspection of Ms. Daniels’s apartment and found it had still

       not been cleaned. The December 27 notice stated if Ms. Daniels did not vacate the

       premises by January 2, she would be deemed in unlawful detainer and K&H would

       initiate legal action. The December 27 notice also advised Ms. Daniels of her right to

       legal representation.

       K&H files suit

              Ms. Daniels did not vacate her unit and on January 10, 2022, K&H initiated an

       unlawful detainer action. K&H’s complaint alleged two independent causes for eviction.

       First, that Ms. Daniels was in “‘substantial breach’” of her tenant obligations. Id. at 13

                                                     4
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       (quoting RCW 59.18.650(2)(b)). Second, that Ms. Daniels had committed “‘waste,’”

       “‘nuisance,’” “‘unlawful activity that affects the use and enjoyment of the premises,’” or

       “‘other substantial or repeated and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of

       the premises by the landlord or neighbors.’” Id. at 13-14 (quoting RCW 59.18.650(2)(c)).

       K&H also requested a writ of restitution restoring it to possession of the premises pending

       the unlawful detainer action. The trial court scheduled a show cause hearing. Ms. Daniels

       obtained appointed counsel, answered the complaint and asserted affirmative defenses, and

       filed a motion to dismiss. Ms. Daniels’s answer argued that if the court did not dismiss

       K&H’s complaint, factual issues remained that “‘must be resolved by trial.’” Id. at 188

       (quoting Hous. Auth. v. Pleasant, 126 Wn. App. 382, 392, 109 P.3d 422 (2005)).

       Ms. Daniels’s accommodation request

              Just before filing her answer, affirmative defenses, and motion to dismiss,

       Ms. Daniels’s attorney sent a letter to counsel for K&H. The letter stated Ms. Daniels

       generally denied the allegations set forth in K&H’s complaint. But to the extent she was

       in violation of her tenant duties, the letter explained it was due to disability. Ms. Daniels

       formally requested she be given an accommodation to allow her “to continue her tenancy

       and avoid homelessness.” Id. at 172.

                                                     5
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

              Ms. Daniels’s accommodation request stated she was 80 years old and suffered

       from several physical disabilities, including “degenerative disc disease, thyroid disease,

       high blood pressure, hypoglycemia, and incontinence.” Id. at 173. She also claimed to

       have lost eight inches of height in recent years: while she used to stand five feet, two

       inches tall, Ms. Daniels currently stood four feet, six inches. As a result of Ms. Daniels’s

       conditions, she had limited strength and tired easily. The accommodation request

       explained that when Ms. Daniels moved into her apartment, the movers did not unpack

       any of her belongings, and Ms. Daniels lacked the strength to do so herself. Ms. Daniels

       lived alone and had no family in the area to help her. Ms. Daniels explained that her

       physical limitations hindered her ability to perform basic housekeeping tasks and that

       she could not afford to hire help.

              The accommodation request reported Ms. Daniels intended to work with her

       attorney to find resources to assist her with housekeeping and unpacking her belongings.

       The request asked K&H to “rescind the eviction notices” and “dismiss the unlawful

       detainer action,” which would “give [Ms. Daniels] time to obtain assistance in addressing

       [K&H’s] concerns.” Id. at 172. The request cited Ms. Daniels’s disability, along with

       state and federal law prohibiting housing discrimination against persons with disabilities.

       It also served as a basis for one of Ms. Daniels’s affirmative defenses to K&H’s

                                                     6
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       complaint.

       Trial court proceedings

              The trial court denied Ms. Daniels’s motion to dismiss and proceeded to the show

       cause hearing. At the outset of the hearing, K&H’s counsel informed the court that his

       client had denied Ms. Daniels’s request for accommodation. The hearing took place over

       the course of two days and involved testimony from three K&H employees, a pest control

       technician, and Ms. Daniels.

              The K&H employees authenticated photographs of Ms. Daniels’s apartment;

       corroborated allegations that had been set forth in the notices; and explained the condition

       of Ms. Daniels’s unit posed a risk to the landlord in the form of potential for infestation,

       damage to surfaces, inadequate airflow, and egress from the unit. K&H’s maintenance

       technician opined that the condition of Ms. Daniels’s apartment posed a risk of mold

       growth, but admitted he had not actually observed mold in the unit. The employees also

       testified Ms. Daniels had told them about having “back issues” that made it difficult for

       her to move items in her apartment. Rep. of Proc. (RP) (Feb. 14, 2022) at 66; see also id.

       at 86-87, 94; RP (Feb. 15, 2022) at 121.

              The pest control technician testified he visited Ms. Daniels’s apartment during

       August 2021. At that time, the overwhelming accumulation of personal items in

                                                     7
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       Ms. Daniels’s unit made it “next to impossible to do an adequate pest inspection.”

       RP (Feb. 14, 2022) at 47. He did not opine that there was a current infestation, but

       testified he found rodent droppings and, due to how messy the apartment was, he was

       unable to find access points where rodents could enter. “I[t] wasn’t a safe environment to

       move around in.” Id.

              Ms. Daniels testified on her own behalf and explained how her impairments

       diminished her strength and caused her to tire easily, impeding her ability to clean

       the apartment, regularly dispose of trash, and unpack boxes. During her testimony,

       Ms. Daniels addressed some of the specifics regarding the state of her apartment.

       She reiterated that the company that had moved her into the apartment had not helped

       her unpack. According to Ms. Daniels, the movers “stacked . . . boxes three high on two

       walls of [the] apartment.” RP (Feb. 15, 2022) at 127. Ms. Daniels could not move the

       boxes “because they were too heavy.” Id. Ms. Daniels explained there was clothing on

       her floor because a closet rod broke and she was unable to fix it. Ms. Daniels also

       explained that her incontinence problem leads to an increase in the amount of garbage she

       produces, and that she had difficulty opening the garbage dumpster at the complex on her

       own. On cross-examination, Ms. Daniels conceded the condition of her apartment was

       unacceptable from a cleanliness standpoint. She also agreed her apartment was “in poor

                                                    8
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       condition.” Id. at 158.

              The trial court not only granted K&H’s request for issuance of a writ of restitution,

       but issued the landlord final judgment, finding Ms. Daniels had failed to properly clean

       and maintain the premises as alleged. The court found there had been “substantial or

       repeated and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the premises by

       the landlord, not necessarily other tenants.” RP (Feb. 22, 2022) at 210. The trial court

       did not find waste or nuisance, concluding there were unresolved issues of fact. With

       respect to Ms. Daniels’s affirmative defense regarding her disability, the court concluded

       K&H was entitled to “third party verification” of Ms. Daniels’s disability and need for

       accommodation and that Ms. Daniels’s requested accommodation was “not reasonable

       in light of [her] past conduct.” CP at 215, 218.

              The court issued an order and judgment granting issuance of a writ of restitution,

       restoring K&H to possession of the premises, and a final judgment. See id. at 219-27.

       Ms. Daniels moved for reconsideration, reiterating her argument that summary resolution

       of K&H’s suit was improper because genuine issues of material fact remained.

       Reconsideration was denied and Ms. Daniels filed a timely appeal.

                             THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER PROCESS

              An unlawful detainer action is a statutory proceeding that provides an expedited

                                                     9
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       method of resolving the right to possession of leased property and related issues such as

       restitution and rent. 4105 1st Ave. S. Invs., LLC v. Green Depot Wash. Pac. Coast, LLC,

       179 Wn. App. 777, 785, 321 P.3d 254 (2014). Washington’s unlawful detainer process is

       set forth in chapter 59.12 RCW and the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973

       (RLTA), chapter 59.18 RCW. Residential tenancies are governed by the RLTA.

       However, the procedures set forth in chapter 59.12 RCW, the generalized unlawful

       detainer statute, continue to apply unless supplanted by the RLTA. Randy Reynolds &

       Assocs., Inc. v. Harmon, 193 Wn.2d 143, 156, 437 P.3d 677 (2019). Because chapter

       59.12 RCW and the RTLA “are statutes in derogation of the common law,” they are

       “strictly construed in favor of the tenant.” Id.

              Before initiating an unlawful detainer action, a residential landlord must first

       issue a written notice to terminate the tenancy that must be served consistent with

       RCW 59.12.040. See RCW 59.18.650(6)(a). The notice must also “[i]dentify the facts

       and circumstances known and available to the landlord at the time of the issuance of the

       notice that support the cause or causes with enough specificity so as to enable the tenant

       to respond and prepare a defense to any incidents alleged.” RCW 59.18.650(6)(b).

              Permissible grounds for termination of a residential tenancy are set forth in

       RCW 59.18.650(2). Two such grounds are relevant here. A tenant may be evicted for

                                                     10
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       “substantial breach” of a material lease obligation, so long as the tenant is given 10 days

       to cure. RCW 59.18.650(2)(b). Eviction may also be premised on “waste,” “nuisance,”

       “unlawful activity that affects the use and enjoyment of the premises,” or “other

       substantial or repeated and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment

       of the premises by the landlord or neighbors of the tenant,” so long as the tenant is given

       at least three days’ notice to quit. RCW 59.18.650(2)(c).

              Where a landlord’s notice specifies a tenant has an opportunity to cure a statutory

       violation or nonconformance with a lease obligation, the notice “expire[s] after sixty days

       unless the landlord pursues any remedy under” the RLTA. RCW 59.18.190.

              A landlord may file an action for unlawful detainer if the tenant remains in

       possession of the premises in violation of the terms of the landlord’s notice. See Randy

       Reynolds, 193 Wn.2d at 156. To physically evict the tenant, “a landlord may apply for a

       writ of restitution at the same time as commencing the action or at any time thereafter.”

       Id. at 157. Under the RLTA, the court will not enter an order directing the issuance of a

       writ of restitution without first conducting a show cause hearing. RCW 59.18.370-.380.

              A show cause hearing is a summary proceeding to determine the question of

       possession pending suit; it is not a final determination of the parties’ rights. Randy

       Reynolds, 193 Wn.2d at 157 (quoting Carlstrom v. Hanline, 98 Wn. App. 780, 788, 990

                                                    11
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       P.2d 986 (2000)). “At the show cause hearing, the court will determine if the landlord is

       entitled to a writ of restitution before a trial on the complaint and answer.” Randy

       Reynolds, 193 Wn.2d at 157 (citing RCW 59.18.380). This opportunity for immediate

       temporary relief makes the show cause process similar to a preliminary injunction

       proceeding. See Faciszewski v. Brown, 187 Wn.2d 308, 315 n.4, 386 P.3d 711 (2016).

              A show cause hearing is a summary proceeding, but it is also fairly substantial.

       At the hearing, “[t]he court shall examine the parties and witnesses orally to ascertain

       the merits” of the case. RCW 59.18.380. The rules of evidence apply. Pleasant, 126 Wn.

       App. at 392. The court may restore the landlord to possession at the close of the hearing if

       it appears the landlord will likely prevail on the merits. See Webster v. Litz, 18 Wn. App.

       2d 248, 250, 252-53, 491 P.3d 171 (2021) (citing RCW 59.18.380). However, if the

       landlord does not convince the court that it is likely to succeed and therefore entitled to

       immediate possession, the court must deny the writ of restitution and hold an expedited

       trial within 30 days. See Meadow Park Garden Assocs. v. Canley, 54 Wn. App. 371,

       373-74, 773 P.2d 875 (1989) (citing former RCW 59.18.380 (1973)).

              Even if a landlord convinces the court of a likelihood of success on the merits and

       obtains a writ of restitution, trial may still be necessary. See IBF, LLC v. Heuft, 141 Wn.

       App. 624, 634-35, 174 P.3d 95 (2007); see also Webster, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 256 (noting

                                                    12
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       the issue of possession pending trial “is entirely distinct from the final resolution” of the

       parties’ rights). There is a distinction between possession and the right to possession.

       Pleasant, 126 Wn. App. at 387. Similar to the summary judgment context, if a tenant

       raises “a genuine issue of . . . material fact” pertaining to a defense against eviction, the

       case must go to trial, even if the tenant has temporarily lost possession pursuant to a writ

       of restitution. RCW 59.18.380; see also Faciszewski, 187 Wn.2d at 315 n.4. The right to

       trial is by jury unless waived. RCW 59.12.130.

                                                ANALYSIS

       Operative notices

              The parties dispute which presuit notices remained viable at the time K&H

       initiated the unlawful detainer action on January 10, 2022. According to K&H, suit was

       based on the November 3 notice to comply or vacate and the December 27 notice to quit

       and vacate. Ms. Daniels counters that the November 3 notice expired after 60 days

       pursuant to RCW 59.18.190. Thus, the only operative notice was the one issued on

       December 27. We agree with Ms. Daniels.

              Under RCW 59.18.190, a notice giving a tenant the opportunity to remedy

       nonconformance with a rental requirement expires after 60 days “unless the landlord

       pursues any remedy under” the RLTA during that time period. The November 3 notice

                                                     13
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       to comply or vacate stated Ms. Daniels was in violation of her lease obligations and gave

       her 10 days to remedy her nonconformance. Thus, RCW 59.18.190 was applicable and

       K&H was required to pursue a remedy within 60 days.

              K&H argues it acted on the November 3 notice within 60 days because it issued a

       notice to quit and vacate on December 27. K&H appears to claim that issuing a notice to

       quit and vacate is a remedy under the RLTA. We disagree with this assessment.

              A “remedy” is generally defined as something “a court can do for a litigant who

       has been wronged.” DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD L. HASEN, MODERN AMERICAN

       REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (5th ed. 2019). The most common remedies are

       damages and injunctions. Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1547 (11th ed. 2019)

       (A “remedy” is a means of enforcing rights or redressing wrongs through legal or

       equitable relief.).

              Under the RLTA, the remedies a court may provide to a party include recovery

       of possession, related damages, and attorney fees. See RCW 59.18.290. The RLTA

       recognizes a landlord’s remedy to independently resolve certain tenant-caused defects

       in a rental unit at cost to the tenant, so long as there has first been adequate notice.

       See RCW 59.18.180(1). However, landlords are not authorized to engage in self-help

       evictions. See Gray v. Pierce County Hous. Auth., 123 Wn. App. 744, 757, 97 P.3d 26

                                                     14
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       (2004) (“[N]o landlord . . . may ever use nonjudicial, self-help methods to remove a

       tenant.”).

              A landlord’s service of a notice to terminate a tenancy is not a remedy. It is a

       legal prerequisite to avail oneself of the superior court’s jurisdiction. See Hall v.

       Feigenbaum, 178 Wn. App. 811, 819, 319 P.3d 61 (2014). Because K&H did not pursue

       a remedy under the RLTA within 60 days of providing Ms. Daniels with a notice to cure

       or vacate under RCW 59.18.650(2)(b), the November 3 notice expired. The only notice

       still operative by the time K&H filed suit on January 10, 2022, was the one dated

       December 27, 2021.

       Sufficiency of the December 27 notice

              The December 27 notice was issued pursuant to RCW 59.18.650(2)(c), 2 which

       allows a landlord to terminate a tenancy with three days’ notice based on “waste,”

       “nuisance,” “unlawful activity that affects the use and enjoyment of the premises,” or

              2
               The notice also cited RCW 59.18.650(2)(b), which authorizes a landlord to
       terminate a tenancy based on a “substantial breach” of a material lease term. However,
       subsection (2)(b) requires a tenant be given 10 days to cure their noncompliance. Because
       the December 27 notice did not provide such a cure period, it cannot fairly be read as
       invoking subsection (2)(b). See Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 372, 173 P.3d
       228 (2007) (noting the time and manner requirements of notice demand strict
       compliance). Thus, subsection (2)(c) was K&H’s only viable cause for eviction.

                                                     15
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       “other substantial or repeated and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment

       of the premises by the landlord or neighbors of the tenant.”

              As recounted above, the December 27 notice was quite lengthy. It cited all four

       bases for termination under RCW 59.18.650(2)(c). It also included a detailed summary of

       Ms. Daniels’s tenancy, including recitations of the other six notices that had been issued

       since August 24, 2020.

              Ms. Daniels criticizes the December 27 notice as both over- and underinclusive.

       According to Ms. Daniels, the notice should not have included all four bases for eviction

       under subsection (2)(c), and instead should have clarified which of the four bases K&H

       was relying on. Ms. Daniels also complains the notice should have included an

       identification of who was injured by her alleged misconduct, be it a specific neighboring

       tenant or the landlord. We disagree with these criticisms.

              A challenge to the adequacy of notice presents a mixed question of law and fact,

       reviewed de novo. Hall, 178 Wn. App. at 819. Washington courts require landlords to

       strictly comply with timing and manner requirements of notice. Id. at 818. But when it

       comes to form and content, substantial compliance is sufficient. Marsh-McLennan Bldg.,

       Inc. v. Clapp, 96 Wn. App. 636, 640 n.1, 980 P.2d 311 (1999). In terms of substance,

       RCW 59.18.650(6)(b) requires any notice under subsection (2) of the statute to “[i]dentify

                                                   16
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       the facts and circumstances known and available to the landlord . . . that support the cause

       or causes with enough specificity so as to enable the tenant to respond and prepare a

       defense to any incidents alleged.” (Emphasis added.) The critical question here is whether

       the landlord’s notice provided enough facts to allow Ms. Daniels to “effectively rebut the

       conclusion reached” by K&H. Hous. Auth. v. Pyrtle, 167 Ga. App. 181, 182, 306 S.E.2d 9

       (1983); see Swords to Plowshares v. Smith, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2002)

       (“[N]otice must enable [a] tenant to prepare a defense or rebuttal evidence . . . .”). 3

              We disagree with Ms. Daniels that K&H should have been clearer regarding the

       four bases for eviction set forth in RCW 59.18.650(2)(c). A fair reading of the notice is

       that K&H believed Ms. Daniels may have violated any of the four statutory clauses, while

       recognizing that only one such violation would be necessary to terminate her tenancy.

       Moreover, the real question regarding notice is whether Ms. Daniels understood the

              3
                The “specificity” requirement in RCW 59.18.650(6)(b), effective since May
       2021, has not yet been interpreted by an appellate court. Ms. Daniels points out that
       federal regulations governing evictions from federally subsidized projects impose a
       comparable requirement. See 24 C.F.R. § 247.4(a)(2) (“The landlord’s determination
       to terminate the tenancy shall . . . state the reasons for the landlord’s action with enough
       specificity so as to enable the tenant to prepare a defense . . . .” (emphasis added)).
       Given the scarcity of Washington authority on point, we may look to foreign cases
       interpreting such federal regulations, such as Pyrtle and Swords to Plowshares, for
       guidance. See In re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wn.2d 114, 119, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).

                                                     17
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       factual allegations against her. See Tacoma Rescue Mission v. Stewart, 155 Wn. App.

       250, 255, 228 P.3d 1289 (2010); see also RCW 59.18.650(6)(b) (requiring landlords

       to “identify . . . facts and circumstances,” rather than legal causes of action, with

       “specificity”) (emphasis added). Here, it was abundantly clear K&H sought to evict

       Ms. Daniels because she failed to keep her apartment clean and sanitary, as documented

       by the various inspections of her property and repeated notices to cure. K&H’s notice

       sufficiently apprised Ms. Daniels of the facts that K&H alleged rose to the level of waste,

       nuisance, or interference with enjoyment of the property. We do not fault K&H for

       including all four components of RCW 59.18.650(2)(c) in its notice. 4

              Ms. Daniels also argues the notice to quit was insufficiently specific as to whose

       rights were allegedly being interfered with by her conduct. An eviction can be justified

       under RCW 59.18.650(2)(c) based on “substantial or repeated and unreasonable

       interference with the use and enjoyment of the premises by the landlord or neighbors

       of the tenant.” But, as noted by Ms. Daniels, K&H’s notice did not specify whether

              4
               Nor are we persuaded by Ms. Daniels’s argument that the notice’s use of slashes
       and the phrase “and/or” rendered it impermissibly vague. Cf. Batchelor v. Madison Park
       Corp., 25 Wn.2d 907, 924-25, 172 P.2d 268 (1946).

                                                     18
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       the victim of Ms. Daniels’s conduct was the landlord or a neighbor and, if a neighbor,

       which one.

              We disagree that identification of a specific victim was necessary to provide

       Ms. Daniels sufficient notice under RCW 59.18.650(2)(c). To be sure, in some cases,

       identifying victims is logically necessary to afford a tenant a meaningful ability to rebut

       allegations, such as where the tenant’s purportedly violative conduct is alleged threats,

       harassment, or violence directed at specific people. See, e.g., Swords to Plowshares,

       294 F. Supp. 2d at 1068 n.1; Tacoma Rescue Mission, 155 Wn. App. at 256-57; Harris v.

       Paris Hous. Auth., 632 S.W.3d 167, 173 (Tex. App. 2021). But here, the information

       supplied to Ms. Daniels made clear that K&H was relying on the generally unsanitary

       condition of her apartment, conduct that could plausibly impair others’ enjoyment even

       when discrete victims are difficult to identify. See Tacoma Rescue Mission, 155 Wn. App.

       at 257 (faulting landlord for failing to name in notice the individuals who reported

       tenant’s excessive noise and threats); see also Midland Mgmt. Co. v. Helgason, 241 Ill.

       App. 3d 899, 911, 913, 608 N.E.2d 643 (1993) (notice sufficient where it apprised tenant

       they were being evicted for allowing “careless leakage of water”), rev’d on other

       grounds, 158 Ill.2d 98, 630 N.E.2d 836 (1994). And the condition of Ms. Daniels’s

       apartment had been extensively documented in prior notices, as referenced in the

                                                    19
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       December 27 notice. See Martinez v. Hous. Auth., 264 Ga. App. 282, 286-87, 590 S.E.2d

       245 (2003) (The notice was sufficiently specific where it cited the tenant’s “‘history of

       lease violations and warnings’” and referred to those prior warnings.). K&H’s notice

       therefore gave Ms. Daniels a sufficient opportunity to defend against its allegations.

       Whether the court should have ordered a trial

              The parties debate whether Ms. Daniels was entitled to a trial at the conclusion

       of the show cause hearing. As previously explained, while a show cause hearing resolves

       the preliminary question of who is entitled to possession of the premises during suit, it

       does not necessarily resolve questions regarding the ultimate right to possession or other

       remedies. Randy Reynolds, 193 Wn.2d at 157. Even if a landlord obtains preliminary

       success through a writ of restitution, trial on the right of possession must be ordered

       if the tenant raises genuine issues of material fact pertaining to a defense or set-off.

       RCW 59.18.380.

              1. K&H’s proof of grounds for eviction

              Pursuant to the December 27 notice, K&H alleged at the show cause hearing that

       Ms. Daniels was subject to eviction under RCW 59.18.650(2)(c). This provision provides

       four possible bases for eviction: (1) waste, (2) nuisance, (3) unlawful activity that affects

       the use and enjoyment of the premises, and (4) substantial or repeated and unreasonable

                                                     20
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       interference with the use and enjoyment of the premises by the landlord or neighbors.

       The trial court issued judgment under the fourth clause of RCW 59.18.650(2)(c). This is

       the only basis for eviction that K&H defends on appeal. We therefore focus our review

       on whether Ms. Daniels should have been afforded a trial on this allegation.

              The standard of review governing this inquiry is not well developed. In the recent

       case of Tedford v. Guy, Division Two of this court stated we review a trial court’s

       decision on whether to order a trial for abuse of discretion. 13 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16,

       462 P.3d 869 (2020). But Tedford’s statement does not draw from the language of the

       applicable statute, nor is it based on Supreme Court precedent. It is not binding on us.

       See In re Pers. Restraint of Arnold, 190 Wn.2d 136, 154, 410 P.3d 1133 (2018). The

       wording of the applicable statute indicates a tenant is entitled to a trial so long as they

       raise a “genuine issue” of “material fact.” RCW 59.18.380. This is nearly the identical

       language that governs summary judgment. See CR 56(c). We review summary judgment

       orders de novo. Staples v. Allstate Ins. Co., 176 Wn.2d 404, 410, 295 P.3d 201 (2013).

       Thus, it appears something close to de novo review should apply, at least when a tenant

                                                     21
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       denies the landlord’s grounds for eviction or raises an affirmative defense. 5

              Ms. Daniels disputes that her conduct substantially or repeatedly and unreasonably

       interfered with K&H’s use and enjoyment of the premises. She makes two arguments.

       We address each in turn.

              First, Ms. Daniels notes that the RLTA defines “premises” as property “held

       out for the use of tenants.” RCW 59.18.030(22). Thus, she argues that in order for a

       tenant’s conduct to interfere with a landlord’s “use and enjoyment of the premises,”

       the landlord must also be a tenant. RCW 59.18.650(2)(c) (emphasis added). We disagree.

       Ms. Daniels’s proposed reading of the statute strains its text. See White v. Salvation Army,

       118 Wn. App. 272, 279, 75 P.3d 990 (2003) (statutes are construed to avoid absurd

       results). Just because a landlord holds out their premises for the use of others does not

       mean the landlord abandons their own right or ability to enjoy their property. See Rental

       Hous. Ass’n v. City of Seattle, 22 Wn. App. 2d 426, 452-53, 512 P.3d 545 (2022) (Out-of-

              5
                The statute indicates a trial is proper if “there is a genuine issue of a material fact
       pertaining to a legal or equitable defense or set-off.” RCW 59.18.380 (emphasis added).
       A tenant’s legal defense might be a claim that the landlord’s basis for eviction is untrue.
       See, e.g., Webster, 18 Wn. App. 2d at 256-57. Or the tenant may have an affirmative
       defense that admits the landlord’s allegations, but nevertheless claims a right of
       possession. See, e.g., Josephinium Assocs. v. Kahli, 111 Wn. App. 617, 621, 45 P.3d 627
       (2002). Either way, the statute suggests the tenant has a right to a trial if the tenant has
       raised a genuine issue of material fact.

                                                      22
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       possession landlords retain a property interest protected by due process principles.). A

       landlord may enjoy their property as an investment free from unreasonable risk. By failing

       to keep an apartment in a clean and sanitary condition, a tenant may interfere with their

       landlord’s right to a secure investment, insofar as they risk permanent damage to the

       apartment or disturbances to the landlord’s other tenants.

              Second, Ms. Daniels argues genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether

       her conduct was a sufficiently severe interference with K&H’s use and enjoyment of the

       property. We note that RCW 59.18.650(2)(c)’s phrase, “unreasonable interference with

       the use and enjoyment of the premises,” echoes a common definition of “nuisance.”

       See Moore v. Steve’s Outboard Serv., 182 Wn.2d 151, 155, 339 P.3d 169 (2014) (“[A]n

       activity is a nuisance only when it ‘interferes unreasonably with other persons’ use and

       enjoyment of their property.’”) (quoting Tiegs v. Watts, 135 Wn.2d 1, 13, 954 P.2d 877

       (1988)) (plurality opinion). However, RCW 59.18.650(2)(c)’s use of this terminology

       must be distinct from the concept of nuisance, since subsection (2)(c) also lists “nuisance”

       as a separate basis for eviction. See State v. K.L.B., 180 Wn.2d 735, 742, 328 P.3d 886

       (2014) (Statutes ordinarily must not be read in a manner that leaves any portion

       meaningless or superfluous.). We interpret RCW 59.18.650(2)(c)’s reference to

       “interference with the use and enjoyment of the premises,” as referring to either

                                                   23
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       “substantial or repeated and unreasonable” conduct that approximates a nuisance, even

       if the steep standard for a nuisance claim is not quite met.

              Reasonableness is typically a question of fact, but a court can resolve a question of

       reasonableness “as a matter of law where reasonable minds could come to only one

       conclusion.” Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wn.2d 909, 924, 296 P.3d 860

       (2013). Here, K&H’s evidence of interference with its enjoyment of the apartment was

       not so strong that it could lead to only one conclusion. The evidence certainly revealed

       Ms. Daniels’s apartment was significantly unkempt. However, there was no conclusive

       evidence her failure to clean the premises had tangibly damaged the property or posed

       an imminent threat of such injury. There was evidence of some rodent droppings, but

       Ms. Daniels testified that those did not evidence a recent infestation because she had

       quelled any problem with mice after the first four months of her tenancy. Nor was there

       evidence the condition of her apartment was noticeable to anyone who did not step foot

       into the unit.

              We disagree with the trial court’s determination that there were no genuine

       issues of material fact as to whether K&H had established substantial or repeated

       and unreasonable interference with its right to enjoy the property. Trial is required.

       As recognized by the trial court’s oral ruling, there are also issues of fact as to other

                                                     24
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       components of RCW 59.18.650(2)(c). Thus, the issue at trial will be whether K&H can

       establish any grounds for eviction under RCW 59.18.650(2)(c).

              2. Affirmative defense—failure to accommodate

              Apart from challenging K&H’s proof of its basis for eviction, Ms. Daniels raised

       an affirmative defense based on federal and state antidiscrimination law. Specifically,

       Ms. Daniels asserted she is disabled due to her age, infirmity, and back conditions.

       According to Ms. Daniels, her disability impaired her ability to remedy the problems

       giving rise to K&H’s grounds for eviction. Ms. Daniels requested K&H accommodate

       her disability by dismissing the current proceedings and giving her time to work with her

       attorney to find resources to help her clean and declutter the apartment.

              Both federal and state law prohibit landlords from discriminating against disabled

       tenants, including the failure to reasonably accommodate a tenant’s disability. 6 42 U.S.C.

       § 3604(f)(2), (3)(B); RCW 49.60.222(1)(f), (2)(b). A tenant’s claim that a landlord has

       failed to accommodate their disability may constitute a defense to eviction. Josephinium

              6
               The federal and Washington provisions requiring reasonable accommodation in
       housing are “virtually identical.” Wash. State Hum. Rts. Comm’n v. Hous. Auth., 21 Wn.
       App. 2d 978, 987, 509 P.3d 319 (2022). Because the Washington and federal statutes are
       analogous, authority interpreting the federal statute properly informs our interpretation of
       both provisions. Cf. Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 491, 325 P.3d 193
       (2014).

                                                    25
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       Assocs. v. Kahli, 111 Wn. App. 617, 626, 45 P.3d 627 (2002). The defense can be

       asserted so long as the failure to accommodate is germane to the landlord’s claim to the

       right to possess the premises. Id.

              A tenant raising failure to accommodate as an affirmative defense must show five

       elements: (1) they have a “disability” as that term is statutorily defined, (2) their landlord

       “knew or reasonably should have known” of the disability, (3) the requested

       accommodation “‘may be necessary’ to afford [the tenant] an equal opportunity to use

       and enjoy their dwelling”, and (4) the landlord denied the request. Giebeler v. M&B

       Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Cal. Mobile Home

       Park Mgmt. Co., 107 F.3d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997)). Further, the tenant is not entitled

       to their requested accommodation unless it is (5) “reasonable.” Id. at 1148.

              The evidence here readily supports the possibility of a jury verdict for Ms. Daniels

       on the first and fourth elements. Ms. Daniels has presented evidence—in the form of

       medical records and sworn testimony—that she has medical conditions constituting a

       disability. And K&H undisputedly denied Ms. Daniels’s requested accommodation. Thus,

       the parties’ dispute centers on whether Ms. Daniels sufficiently showed K&H knew or

       reasonably should have known about her disability, whether her disability is related to the

       grounds for unlawful detainer asserted by K&H, and whether Ms. Daniels’s requested

                                                     26
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       accommodation was reasonable.

                     a. Landlord’s knowledge or constructive knowledge of tenant’s
                        disability

              The trial court ruled in K&H’s favor as to the knowledge element on the basis that

       Ms. Daniels did not provide third-party verification of her disability. But such verification

       is not invariably required. While Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (WLAD),

       chapter 49.60 RCW, requires an interactive verification process in the employment

       context, see RCW 49.60.040(7)(d), there is no similar mandate in the housing context.

       Guidance from the United States Department of Justice and United States Department of

       Housing and Urban Development states:

              If a [tenant]’s disability is obvious, or otherwise known to the [landlord],
              and if the need for the requested accommodation is also readily apparent or
              known, then the [landlord] may not request any additional information
              about the [tenant’s] disability or the disability-related need for the
              accommodation.

       JOINT STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND

       THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE FAIR

       HOUSING ACT 12-13 (May 17, 2004) (Joint Statement) (emphasis added),

       https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/14/joint_statement_ra.pdf

                                                    27
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       [https://perma.cc/SG47-BGKG]. 7 Similarly, the Washington State Human Rights

       Commission has also recognized that “[i]f a person has a visible disability and their

       request is reasonably tied to their disability, then no further verification is needed.”

       Wash. State Hum. Rts. Comm’n, Disability in Housing, https://www.hum.wa.gov/fair-

       housing/disability-housing (emphasis added).

              We agree with Ms. Daniels and amicus curiae the Attorney General of Washington

       that third-party verification of a tenant’s disability is unwarranted when a tenant’s

       disability is obvious or otherwise known to the landlord.

              Ms. Daniels has presented ample evidence of an obvious disability that was known

       to her landlord. Not only did Ms. Daniels testify that she told K&H employees about the

       disability to her back, it would be obvious to anyone who looked at her that she had a

       physical impairment. Although she was not required to do so, Ms. Daniels voluntarily

              7
                The Joint Statement is a policy statement, rather than an authoritative
       interpretation, but it has been recognized as persuasive authority. See, e.g., Bhogaita v.
       Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1286 n.3 (11th Cir. 2014); Sabal
       Palm Condos. of Pine Island Ridge Ass’n, Inc. v. Fischer, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1286 (S.D.
       Fla. 2014); Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109, 1120, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
       Andover Hous. Auth. v. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300, 309 n.14, 820 N.E.2d 815 (2005); Kuhn
       v. McNary Estates Homeowners Ass’n., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1149 (D. Or. 2017).
       K&H does not disagree that the Joint Statement should be referenced as persuasive
       authority. See Br. of Resp’t at 45.

                                                     28
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       furnished medical records in which her physician described her as “markedly kyphotic” 8

       along with noting several other physical impairments. Def.’s Ex. 2, at 2 (emphasis added).

       Moreover, multiple K&H employees testified they knew Ms. Daniels had problems with

       her back because she had told them as much. WLAD broadly defines “impairment" to

       include any “condition . . . affecting” an individual’s “musculoskeletal” system.

       RCW 49.60.040(7)(c)(i). And an “impairment” is a “disability” when it is “perceived to

       exist whether or not it exists in fact.” RCW 49.60.040(7)(a)(iii). Ms. Daniels’s back

       problems readily meet this definition, and K&H’s employees were aware of them.

                     b. Necessity of tenant’s requested accommodation

              The trial court also concluded Ms. Daniels should have provided third-party

       verification of the connection between her disability and her requested accommodation.

       We recognize there are cases where a landlord may require verification of the nexus

       between a tenant’s disability and the requested accommodation, even if the disability

       itself is obvious. See Joint Statement at 13. But this case is not one where verification was

       necessary. K&H’s allegations against Ms. Daniels included concerns that she failed to

       unpack boxes, did not remove garbage, and did not regularly clean. No specialized

              Kyphosis” is “abnormal backward curvature of the spine.” WEBSTER’S THIRD
              8“

       NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1258 (1993).

                                                    29
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       knowledge is needed to understand that an elderly person with significant back problems

       may have trouble engaging in these tasks. And Ms. Daniels expressly premised her

       requested accommodation—a discontinuation of the eviction proceedings—on the fact

       that such a discontinuation would give her time to find resources to help her with those

       tasks.

                The facts were sufficient to require a jury trial on the issue of the necessity of

       Ms. Daniels’s requested accommodation.

                       c. Reasonableness of tenant’s requested accommodation

                K&H argues that even if it knew of Ms. Daniels’s disability and the connection

       between her disability and requested accommodation, the trial court should be affirmed

       because Ms. Daniels has not raised a material issue of fact regarding the reasonableness

       of her accommodation request. Generally, the reasonableness of an accommodation is a

       question of fact demanding case-by-case scrutiny. See Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v.

       Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 1996). And questions of fact are usually proper jury

       issues. Lascheid v. City of Kennewick, 137 Wn. App. 633, 642, 154 P.3d 307 (2007).

       However, a trial court may resolve reasonableness as a matter of law if reasonable minds

       could come to only one conclusion. Boyle v. Leech, 7 Wn. App. 2d 535, 539, 436 P.3d

       393 (2019). “An accommodation is reasonable . . . if it does not cause a ‘fundamental

                                                       30
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       alteration in the nature of a [landlord’s] program’ or ‘undue financial and administrative

       burdens.’” Josephinium Assocs., 111 Wn. App. at 623 (quoting Groner v. Golden Gate

       Gardens Apartments, 250 F.3d 1039, 1044 (6th Cir. 2001)).

              Ms. Daniels’s accommodation request was that K&H stop the eviction proceedings

       to give her time to work with her attorney to find services to help clean her apartment.

       Other courts have recognized that a request for “additional time to clean” can constitute

       a reasonable request. McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1261, 1264, 1269-70

       (9th Cir. 2004); see Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

       (recognizing brief stay in eviction proceedings to allow additional time for disabled tenant

       to conduct cleaning could constitute a reasonable accommodation); see also Andover

       Hous. Auth. v. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300, 311-12, 820 N.E.2d 815 (2005) (rejecting the

       idea that “indefinite” requests for more time are reasonable, but acknowledging that

       delaying the typical eviction timetable can constitute a reasonable accommodation where

       “no neighbors [are] seriously disturbed by the tenants’ behavior”).

              Furthermore, we note that a reasonable accommodation may be requested up until

       the date of physical eviction. See Radecki v. Joura, 114 F.3d 115, 116 (8th Cir. 1997);

       Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1121 (“[A] reasonable accommodation defense will be timely until

       the proverbial last minute.”). This is consistent with landlords’ obligation to reasonably

                                                    31
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

       make accommodations to not only their “rules” but also their “policies, practices, or

       services.” RCW 49.60.222(2)(b) (emphasis added); see Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1127.

              We recognize that halting this unlawful detainer action would have imposed a

       burden on K&H. 9 But those burdens should have been weighed—by a jury—against the

       benefit to Ms. Daniels. See Josephinium Assocs., 111 Wn. App. at 623-24; Marthon v.

       Maple Grove Condo. Ass’n, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2000).

              For the reasons set forth above, Ms. Daniels has presented sufficient facts to allow

       a jury to decide whether her requested accommodation was reasonable. This affirmative

       defense was prematurely rejected.

              9
                Ms. Daniels contends that, even if K&H found Ms. Daniels’s requested
       accommodation vague, objectionable, or flatly unreasonable, K&H should have engaged
       Ms. Daniels in a dialogue to seek clarification or explore other possible solutions. We
       acknowledge there is a split among legal authorities on whether such a dialogue is
       required by the relevant statutes, or merely encouraged. See Joint Statement at 7
       (explaining that landlords “should” open a dialogue with tenants who propose an
       unreasonable accommodation, and that if there is an alternative accommodation that
       would meet a tenant’s needs, the landlord “must” grant it); compare Howard v. HMK
       Holdings, LLC, 988 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2021), and Groner, 250 F.3d at 1047,
       with Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1122 & n.22, 1143-44, and Jankowski Lee & Assocs., 91 F.3d
       at 896. At this juncture, we decline to endorse either side of this split, because we
       conclude the reasonableness of Ms. Daniels’s accommodation should have reached a jury
       either way.

                                                   32
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

       No. 38918-9-III
       Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels

                                  ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

              Ms. Daniels asks for an award of attorney fees and costs, citing RCW 59.18.290

       and RAP 18.1. This request is premature. If Ms. Daniels ultimately prevails on remand,

       she may request attorney fees, to and including fees and costs associated with her appeal.

       See Faciszewski, 187 Wn.2d at 324.

                                            CONCLUSION

              The trial court prematurely issued final judgment in favor of K&H after

       granting the request for writ of restitution at the show cause hearing. Because there

       are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Ms. Daniels is subject to eviction

       under RCW 59.18.650(2)(c) and, alternatively, whether she was entitled to a reasonable

       accommodation based on a disability, this matter should have been set for trial.

              The final judgment in favor of K&H is reversed. This matter is remanded for trial,

       consistent with the terms of this opinion.

                                                    _________________________________
                                                    Pennell, J.

       WE CONCUR:

       ______________________________               _________________________________
       Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.                      Staab, J.

                                                     33