Court Opinion

ID: 9663141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:29:09.354487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:46.032526
License: Public Domain

WOLLE, Justice
(dissenting).
I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant. There is no more merit in this plaintiff’s attack on the constitutionality of Iowa Code section 613A.5 than in the many challenges we previously have rejected. See Argenta v. City of Newton, 382 N.W.2d 457, 460-62 (Iowa 1986) (due process and equal protection challenges rejected); Harryman v. Hayles, 257 N.W.2d 631, 634-35 (Iowa 1977) (facial due process challenge rejected and equal ' protection challenge blunted by granting incapacitated persons sixty days from termination of incapacity to give notice); Shearer v. Perry Community School District, 236 N.W.2d 688, 692-93 (Iowa 1975) (minor’s due process and equal protection challenges rejected); Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 906-08 (Iowa 1973) (minor plaintiff’s equal protection challenge rejected). I would follow those relatively recent decisions of this court, not overrule them.
I agree with the first two steps the majority takes in analyzing this plaintiff’s argument based on the equal protection provisions in the Iowa and United States Constitutions. The requirements of state and federal equal protection clauses are in this instance the same and call for similar interpretation. Also, the traditional rational basis test, not heightened or strict scrutiny, is the appropriate standard for us to apply. The classification challenged here is not based upon sex, race, alienage, or national origin, and no other suspect classification or fundamental right is involved. See MRM, Inc. v. City of Davenport, 290 N.W.2d 338, 340-42 (Iowa 1980).
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this statute does not satisfy the appropriate rational basis test. That test has perhaps most clearly been articulated by our court in City of Waterloo v. Selden, 251 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa 1977), where we said:
All presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of the statute and it will not be held invalid unless it is clear, plain and palpable that such decision is required. The legislature may pass any kind of legislation it sees fit so long as it does not infringe the state or federal constitutions. Courts do not pass on the *782policy, wisdom, advisability or justice of a statute. The remedy for those who contend legislation which is within constitutional bounds is unwise or oppressive is with the legislature.... Plaintiffs have the burden to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt the act violates the constitutional provision invoked and to point out with particularity the details of the alleged invalidity. To sustain this burden plaintiffs must negative every reasonable basis which may support the statute. Every reasonable doubt is resolved in favor of constitutionality.
Id. at 508 (citations omitted); accord John R. Grubb, Inc. v. Iowa Housing Finance, 255 N.W.2d 89, 95 (Iowa 1977) (“One who challenges a statute on this [equal protection] ground must negate every conceivable basis which may support the classification, and the classification must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.”). Our task is to determine whether the plaintiff met her burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute classification attacked is “wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, 557-58 (Iowa 1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 399 (1961)).
The classification which the majority finds unacceptable arose in 1968 when the legislature enacted Iowa Code chapter 613A, “Tort Liability of Governmental Subdivisions,” and subjected those tort claims to limitations different than the limitations in chapter 614. Injured victims of torts committed by private persons ordinarily have two years from when their causes of action accrue within which to commence their actions, and they may have twenty years or longer in the case of an infant or mentally ill person for whom the limitation period is tolled. Iowa Code §§ 614.1(2), .8 (1985). Victims of similar torts committed by governmental subdivisions must either file suit within six months or serve written notice of claim within sixty days and file suit within two years, except for persons incapacitated by the injury. Id. § 613A.5 (1985). That was precisely the same classification at issue in Lunday, where we affirmed dismissal of a minor’s late-filed claim after holding section 613A.5 constitutional. 213 N.W.2d at 907. The sound reasoning in Lunday bears repeating, even though today it is overruled:
The fundamental motivation attributed to legislatures which have enacted such notice requirements is that where a governmental subdivision is involved the public has an interest it does not have as to claims against private persons in seeing prompt and thorough investigation of claims is made. This protects the public treasury from stale claims. Thomann v. City of Rochester, 230 App.Div. 612, 245 N.Y.S. 680 (1930). It permits prompt settlement of meritorious claims and facilitates planning of municipal budgets. King v. Johnson, 47 Ill.2d 247, 265 N.E.2d 874 (1970). The notice requirement also ensures that notices reach the public officers with responsibility to deal with them and in many instances should enable such officers to remedy defects in far-flung municipal property before other persons are injured.
We are unable and unwilling to say § 613A.5 is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Plaintiff has not met his burden to prove the statute is unconstitutional.
Id. at 907-08.
The majority opinion includes observations on the several governmental interests quoted above from the Lunday rationale. I offer quite different observations which lend support to my view that section 613A.5 bears a rational relationship to several legitimate governmental interests and satisfies our traditional rational basis test.
There is a close interrelationship among the first three public interests mentioned in Lunday and discussed in the majority opinion — avoidance of stale claims, planning of budgets, and settling of valid claims. My observations on each apply to all.
*783There is certainly a rational connection between section 613A.5 and all three of those factors. We have long recognized that statutes of limitation have been enacted “to afford security against stale demands, after the true state of the transaction may from a variety of causes, be either forgotten, or rendered incapable of explanation.” Penley v. Waterhouse, 3 Iowa 418, 441 (1856). “The public has a legitimate interest in limiting time for bringing suits.” Conner v. Fettkether, 294 N.W.2d 61, 63 (Iowa 1980). By fixing at six months the time within which most victims of governmental subdivision torts must submit a written notice or file suit, the legislature has declared that other claims are stale — too easily forgotten, more difficult to investigate and settle fairly— and certainly more difficult to work into the governmental subdivision’s annual budget. See Argenta, 382 N.W.2d at 461 (emphasizing importance of written notice to promote accurate reporting and prompt investigation); Farnum v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 339 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Iowa 1983) (emphasizing importance of budgeting requirements and fiscal constraints).
The majority opinion comments that the general statute of limitations would protect local governments from stale claims in the same manner it protects the private sector. I am not sure that is true either as a matter of fact or law. Plaintiff offered no evidence, nothing even in the way of a Brandéis brief, from which we might compare factually the problems private tort-feasors and governmental subdivisions have in dealing with stale claims, investigation of claims, and the budget process. The heavy burden to prove an unconstitutional classification was of course on the plaintiff. Moreover, enterprising counsel may well assert that as a matter of law Iowa Code chapter 614 offers no protection whatsoever to governmental subdivisions because the legislature intended section 613A, rather than any part of chapter 614, to provide applicable limitations on bringing suit. See Iowa Code § 614.1 (chapter inapplicable “when otherwise specially declared”).
The majority suggests there is no budget problem for the public treasury because local governments carry liability insurance and rarely budget for claims. This summary judgment record does not mention liability insurance. It does not even show whether this defendant, Boone County Hospital, had liability insurance covering this 1983 incident. Plaintiff has demonstrated nothing about the extent to which Iowa’s many governmental subdivisions have purchased liability insurance, how the costs of liability insurance may affect annual budgets of governmental subdivisions, or how the demise of section 613A.5 may impact the costs or availability of insurance. Purchase of liability insurance by governmental subdivisions in Iowa is permissive, not mandatory. See Iowa Code §§ 347.14(9), 517A.1, 613A.7 (1985). We do know our legislature this year enacted legislation which recognizes that governmental subdivisions, as well as certain other public and private institutions, face a serious financial problem resulting from exposure to risks, including tort claims. See 8 Iowa Legis. Serv. 16 (West 1986) (comprehensive legislation amending several statutes concerning liability insurance and self-insurance for governmental units and establishing commission “to study the issues involved in liability and liability insurance concerns”). That legislation constitutes a legislative finding that the problems of risk exposure facing governmental subdivisions are different, and call for different solutions, than the risk exposure facing other potential tort claim defendants. When the legislature has found from its investigations and studies that the exposure of governmental subdivisions to risks is of a different character than the exposure of private persons or entities, we are bold indeed to declare— in a case whose record is devoid of evidence — that the general statute of limitations would protect local governments from stale claims in the same manner it protects the private sector.
Unlike the majority, I must express my concern about “the carry-over to subsequent [governmental subdivision] adminis*784trations of responsibility for accidents that may have previously occurred-” Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 30, 492 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1972) (emphasizing problems with stale claims and budgeting concerns in rejecting by 4-1 vote minor victim’s equal protection challenge to thirty-day notice provision). Two separate categories of unreported claims immediately concern me. Iowans living in governmental subdivisions in Iowa twenty years or more from now will be required to investigate and settle or litigate claims arising from today’s torts that are unreported until after the turn of the century. Moreover, the majority opinion apparently is to be given retrospective as well as prospective effect, so the second category of carried-over claims will be those occurring in years past that were thought barred but now may be dropped upon today’s unsuspecting administrators and taxpayers.
In addition to these concerns about stale claims and governmental subdivision budgets which section 613A.5 addresses, the public has a real interest, listed in Lunday, in ensuring that public officers receive early written notice of claims so they can “remedy defects in far-flung [public] property before other persons are injured.” 213 N.W.2d at 908. Not just the public treasury but individual members of the public are protected by this statute when it results in notices and corrective action sooner rather than later. Governmental subdivisions have the authority and responsibility to take remedial action concerning their own activities and property, but they have no such authority and responsibility concerning tortious activities and defects in property of private entities. The classification here attacked — disparate notice and suit limitations governing actions against public and private tortfeasors — is rationally related to that public interest apart from fiscal concerns of governmental subdivisions.
The majority states “experience teaches” that local governments regularly react to, discover, and repair defective conditions without regard to whether and when a notice of lawsuit is filed. Nothing in the record supports that statement, and I would not take judicial notice that it is true. The majority also declares that if repair of defective conditions were a legitimate concern the legislature would have enacted a different and more far-reaching statutory obligation imposed on all victims of torts. I believe, however, our obligation is to determine whether section 613A.5 itself is rationally related to and serves legitimate public interests, not whether a different and arguably more effective statute should have been enacted. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511, 517 (1976) (“In short, the judiciary may not sit as a super-legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines ...”).
In its overview of these public interests served by Iowa Code section 613A.5, the majority opinion observes that “in light of present day conditions” these purposes “no longer furnish any rational basis justifying the classification resulting from section 613A.5.” When the majority states that the interests are “totally lacking in substance in today’s circumstances,” it implies that yesterday’s circumstances were different and did provide a rational basis for the requirements of section 613A.5. This record provides no factual basis whatsoever for the majority to conclude that relevant circumstances have changed. The statute has been in effect only since 1968. What circumstances have changed since then? Do governmental subdivisions investigate and settle claims differently today than in 1968? Governmental subdivisions have the same authority to purchase liability insurance today that they had in 1968, but this record does not demonstrate that more are now insured or that liability insurance is more available or less costly today than when section 613A.5 was enacted.
A majority of other jurisdictions have rejected equal protection challenges to statutes like Iowa Code section 613A.5, finding a rational relationship between such stat*785utes and the public interests here discussed. See Farnum, 339 N.W.2d at 397 (cataloging cases from other jurisdictions which constitute “persuasive authority for upholding the differential treatment” of section 613A.5); Budahl v. Gordon & David Assoc., 287 N.W.2d 489, 492 (S.D.1980) (“We believe we follow the weight of authority in saying that the [60 day statute] does bear a rational relationship to the legislation’s purpose”). In the most recent case addressing this issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected an equal protection argument against the classification created by a claim notice statute, finding a rational basis even after determining that it should apply not the ordinary rational basis test but “heightened scrutiny.” James v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 505 Pa. 137, 148, 477 A.2d 1302, 1307 (1984).
Although several jurisdictions have found all or parts of written notice statutes like Iowa Code section 613A.5 constitutionally infirm, those cases represent a minority view and I disagree with their reasoning. See Tafoya v. Doe, 100 N.M. 328, 331-32, 670 P.2d 582, 585-86 (Ct.App.1983) (application of notice provision of Tort Claims Act to infant was violative of due process, at least in absence of provision in statute for notice to be given on infant’s behalf); O’Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 160 W.Va. 694, 237 S.E.2d 504, 508-09 (1977) (notice of claim provision facially violative of due process and equal protection rights); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash.2d 810, 814-20, 539 P.2d 845, 848-51 (1975) (municipal tort claims statute facially violates equal protection); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 234-36, 510 P.2d 879, 882-83, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079, 94 S.Ct. 598, 38 L.Ed.2d 486 (1973) (notice of claim requirements in statute requiring the presentation of a claim against county within six months of occurrence facially denies equal protection and violates right of minor to due process); Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 622-24, 194 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1972) (sixty day notice provision of tort claim statute facially violates equal protection). It is noteworthy that the majority holds section 613A.5 unconstitutional on its face and does not accept the plaintiff’s alternative invitation to declare the statute unconstitutional only as it would apply to claims of minors. We previously followed the latter course in holding this statute facially constitutional but invalid as applied to a plaintiff whose incapacity extended beyond ninety days. Harryman, 257 N.W.2d at 634-35.
In my view the plaintiff’s other assignments of error are equally without merit. This eighteen month old infant’s injuries did not create a condition incapacitating him from giving notice because he plainly could not have given written notice regardless of his injuries. His due process arguments are not unlike those challenges we recently rejected in Koppes v. Pearson, 384 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Iowa 1986) (holding Iowa Code § 614.1(9) constitutional), and Argenta, 382 N.W.2d at 461-62 (holding section 613A.5 satisfied due process).
Our precedents upholding the facial constitutionality of Iowa Code section 613A.5 are sound and should be followed, not overruled. We should require more persuasive reasons than those presented in this record before we overrule very recent cases and in the process invalidate a statute which rationally furthers important public interests of governmental subdivisions in Iowa.
I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant Boone County Hospital.
McGIVERIN, SCHULTZ and CARTER, JJ., join this dissent.