Court Opinion

ID: 9776477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:37:13.765121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.136196
License: Public Domain

HIGGINS, Judge,
dissenting.
With due respect for the principal opinion, I find myself in dissent. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court because the sole ground for the new election there ordered is voter qualification, a matter not subject to collateral attack in an election contest proceeding under section 115.553.1, RSMo 1986. Whitener v. Turnbeau, 602 S.W.2d 890 (Mo.App.1980); Gasconade R-III School Dist. v. Williams, 641 S.W.2d 444 (Mo.App.1982).
In this opinion, I draw freely from the opinion of the Honorable Kent E. Karohl for the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District.
The trial court found 11 voters were ineligible to vote because they did not reside within the city on election day. The trial court said in the judgment, “[t]he irregularities which cause the court to enter this new election consist solely of votes cast by persons in the initial election who were not qualified to vote therein.... In order to be qualified to vote at an election the voter must be a resident of the voting precinct where he attempts to vote, and he must be registered to vote in that precinct....”
In a footnote to the judgment the trial court found, in general, that the voters found ineligible are not aware of any wrongdoing on their part. The footnote comment also recognized the “court could not and did not attempt to determine for whom the contested voters actually cast their ballot, however, the law must assume in this lawsuit that all voted for the winner when that may very well not be a true assumption.” It is not necessary to decide whether that assumption is valid.
The judgment of the trial court erroneously applied the law regarding election contests where the issue is voter qualifications, Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976), because the judgment of the trial court is at odds with Whitener and Gasconade R-III School Dist. Whitener was a case of first impression under the Comprehensive Election Act of 1977 involving whether under Missouri law voters’ qualifications may be challenged judicially in an election contest. The court held that the trial court correctly decided that such qualifications may not be challenged as “irregularities” under the authority of section 115.553.1, RSMo 1986, and that the trial court was not authorized by statutory authority to consider voter qualification as a ground to order a new election. In Gasconade R-III School Dist., the court held that the trial court properly found it lacked authority to determine absentee voter qualification in an election contest based on asserted “irregularities.”1 Therefore Whitener and Gasconade R-III School Dist. provide a legal basis to reverse the present judgment, and there is additional support for that result.
First, various sections of the Comprehensive Voting Act of 1977 indicate qualification of a voter is not a contest “irregulari*957ty.” Section 115.577, RSMo 1986, provides procedural guidance where the contest involves a municipal office. It sets a time limit and describes the function of the petition. Section 115.579, RSMo 1986, describes the procedure to be followed after the petition is filed and before a hearing. Section 115.581, RSMo 1986, directs the court to proceed immediately to try the case after the filing of a petition and answer. Section 115.583, RSMo 1986, requires the court to order “a recount of all votes brought in question by the petition or its answer” if it “finds there is a prima facie showing of irregularities which would place the result of any contested election in doubt....” The authority to contest relates to “irregularities [which] occurred in the election.” § 115.553.1, RSMo 1986. Under section 115.583, RSMo 1986, the irregularities to support a contest are those that may be discovered during a mandated recount. Obviously, voter qualifications are not such irregularities because they are not discoverable during the required recount process. An examination of ballots, the function of a recount, will not shed any light on voter qualifications. This suggests that the irregularities that may be alleged under section 115.553.1, RSMo 1986, and would justify, if proven, a recount and a possible new election, do not include voter qualifications or registration. This is true irrespective of whether registration is considered a qualification in addition to qualifications described in section 115.133, RSMo 1986.
Second, the Comprehensive Election Act of 1977, chapter 115, RSMo 1986, provides procedures for preventing an unqualified or unregistered voter from voting. The qualifications of a voter are set forth in section 115.133.1, RSMo 1986. Qualifications for registration are set forth in section 115.135, RSMo 1986. Initially, the voter registration process will determine qualifications and residency. The statute requires registration to be completed not later than the fourth Wednesday prior to an election. § 115.135, RSMo 1986. This allows an interval for a candidate or others to determine facts regarding qualifications of registered voters. The identity or qualifications of any person offering to vote may be challenged before the vote is cast. § 115.429.2, RSMo 1986. Registered voters, and others, may make such challenge, and no ballot will be presented to a voter “until his identity and qualifications have been established.” § 115.429.2, RSMo 1986. Subsequent subsections of section 115.429, RSMo 1986, set forth a procedure for election judges to determine qualifications and registration, subject to immediate appeal to the circuit court by either the voter or election officials. As a result of these provisions, qualifications and registration of a voter are not free from question, but under the statutory scheme the challenge is to be made before, not after, a vote is cast. The statute does not expressly provide for collateral attack on grounds of lack of qualification or currency of registration, and in the absence of statutory authority, there is no authority to contest an election. Wells v. Noldon, 679 S.W.2d 889, 890 (Mo.App.1984).
Contestant-Respondent Marre argues that section 115.583, RSMo 1986, is an express authorization to challenge individual votes. He contends such challenge of votes is different, in some way, from challenging qualifications of voters, a procedure excluded by Wkitener v. Turnbeau, and cases cited. This contention fails because section 115.583, RSMo 1986, does not purport to define the irregularities that will support a challenge to votes or an order for a recount. The procedural section does not address voter qualification. Already noticed is that section 115.583, RSMo 1986, relates only to such irregularities as may be discernible during a recount which “shall" be ordered if the court finds the contested election in doubt. Voter qualifications, however, are not irregularities that may be discovered during a recount. The provisions of section 115.583, RSMo 1986, are not in conflict with the holding in Whitener.
It is inescapable that this election contest proceeding invoked and limited itself to the *958provisions of section 115.553.1, RSMo 1986, a part of the Comprehensive Election Act of 1977. Its only interpretations, Wkitener and Gasconade R-III School Dist., determined that voter qualifications are not subject to collateral challenge as “irregularities” in a proceeding under that section. The same situation exists in this case. In my opinion, the principal opinion strays from the limited question presented by this proceeding under section 115.553.1, apparently to find a “spirit” elsewhere in chapter 115 and to overrule Wkitener as violative of that spirit. I submit that both Wkitener and Gasconade R-III School Dist. are consistent with the scheme, purpose and spirit of the Comprehensive Election Act of 1977.
I submit, also, that the General Assembly has noticed the 1980 Wkitener and the 1982 Gasconade R-III School Dist. decisions and has not amended the Act with respect to those interpretations and applications of section 115.553.1. The statute as thus interpreted has continued in force without change and this Court must presume that the General Assembly is satisfied with the statute as so construed. State ex rel. Howard Electric Cooperative v. Riney, 490 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.1973); 73 Am Jur.2d Statutes, § 322.
Accordingly, I would apply Wkitener and Gasconade R-III School Dist. to the limited question in this case and reverse the judgment of the trial court ordering a new election.

. In affirming the trial court's order of a new election, the court agreed that absentee voters’ failure to execute the statutory ballot envelope affidavit coupled with confusing instructions on the official ballot did constitute irregularities to warrant a new election.