Court Opinion

ID: 9718709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:31:14.146718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:01.844944
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, specially concurring: After the incident, Officer Miller questioned Flaherty at Flaherty’s apartment for 15 to 20 minutes. Flaherty was able to provide a description of the perpetrator, but she was unable to identify him. Flaherty did not know the perpetrator, and she did not have the opportunity at that time to pick him out from a lineup or photo array. Nevertheless, Officer Miller was allowed to testify to the content of her 15- to 20-minute interview. The trial court later expressed concern that the testimony should not have been admitted but that any error was harmless. I agree with the trial court. A witness’s prior inconsistent statement has always been allowed into evidence to impeach the witness. Section 115 — 12 of the Code, however, allows the substantive admission of a prior “identification of a person made after perceiving him,” when the declarant (Flaherty in this case) testifies and is subject to cross-examination. 725 ILCS 5/115 — 12 (West 2004). Section 115 — 12 is useful in the situation where a witness identifies a defendant but pressure is brought on the witness and at trial he recants his identification. People v. Miller, 363 Ill. App. 3d 67, 74, 842 N.E.2d 290, 297 (2005). The majority’s interpretation of section 115 — 12 would broaden it to allow the substantive admission of any discussion of a crime between a victim and a police officer. That is improper. An identification may be admitted substantively, but other inconsistent statements may be used only for impeachment, i.e., only for the purpose of deciding the witness’s credibility. Miller, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 79, 842 N.E.2d at 300. A witness’s prior consistent statement is generally inadmissible. Miller, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 80, 842 N.E.2d at 301. The Williams case, relied on by the majority, has been criticized: “A prior statement of identification must follow the perception of the perpetrator again at a time following the incident. Under the [Williams] court’s view, any time a victim identifies an assailant, the statement of identification will be admissible provided the declarant is subject to cross-examination at trial. Thus, if a rape victim five days later told her mother it was Bob Smith who raped her, the statement would be admissible. The purpose of the rule permitting introduction of a prior statement of identification is to permit evidence of an identification made after recognizing the assailant on subsequent observation prior to trial; it is not intended to permit introduction of hearsay statements of the victim ***.” M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence §611.16, at 469 (8th ed. 2004). Professor Graham apparently did not have the situation in mind where the victim knew her assailant. That was the situation in Miller, where the eyewitness knew the shooter before the incident and recognized him at the time of the incident without any subsequent observation. In that situation, the eyewitness’s statement of identification, subsequently recanted, was admitted under section 115 — 12 of the Code. Miller, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 71, 842 N.E.2d at 294. In the present case, Flaherty did not identify defendant during her conversation with Officer Miller. Because Flaherty did not know her assailant, she could not identify him without a subsequent observation, such as a photo array or physical lineup. Miller should not have been allowed to testify to the conversation.