Court Opinion

ID: 9656442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:48:20.441669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:32.331402
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority acknowledges that the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove its damages with as much certainty as the case permits; acknowledges plaintiff simply failed to adduce any evidence on an element required to compute those damages, namely, one of its cost items; and then, having enlightened plaintiff as to the requirements for proving its measure of recovery, blithely remands the cases for new trial on the damages issue.
The case which the majority cites in order to justify forsaking its proper role as adjudicator, and instead joining forces with plaintiff’s counsel, Ridenour v. Kuker, 185 Neb. 321, 175 N.W.2d 287 (1970), supports no such action. The causes in Ridenour were remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages not because plaintiff had failed to prove a necessary element of the damage computation but, *69rather, because the jury went beyond the limits set by the evidence before it.
Suhr v. City of Scribner, 202 Neb. 364, 275 N.W.2d 596 (1979), appeal after remand 207 Neb. 24, 295 N.W.2d 302 (1980), is particularly instructive. Therein, plaintiff failed to adduce evidence from which the jury could determine the damages caused by his wrongful eviction and failed to adduce evidence as to the net rental value of the storage facilities which he was required to move. This court ruled the issue of damages on those matters should have been removed from the jury, and then remanded with directions to enter judgment in the amount of $10 as nominal damages, together with costs, as a consequence of the wrongful eviction. It did not, having instructed plaintiff how to prove damages, then remand for a new trial on that issue.
Thus, if the cases at hand had been tried to a jury, Suhr tells us we would have reversed and dismissed because of a failure of proof on the issue of damages. There is no rational basis for applying a different rule here merely because the trial was to a judge. A lack of evidence is a lack of evidence, regardless of who the trier of fact may be.
We have held that in a breach of contract case the plaintiff must not only show his right of recovery, he must also prove the elements and facts which compose the measure of his recovery. Midlands Transp. Co. v. Apple Lines, Inc., 188 Neb. 435, 197 N.W.2d 646 (1972). Almost, but not quite, proving the measure of recovery should be treated no differently than almost, but not quite, proving the right to recover. See Coco v. Austin Co., post p. 95, 321 N.W.2d 448 (1982), dismissing a workmen’s compensation case because of failure of proof on the issue of causation. The majority opinion in the instant cases does violence both to the Midlands rule and to the concept of an impartial judiciary.
Admittedly, the majority’s action in the present *70case is not without precedent. For example, in Bass v. Boetel & Co., 191 Neb. 733, 217 N.W.2d 804 (1974), this court, Clinton, J., dissenting, reversed and remanded for a new trial because there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s award of damages and because the jury had not been instructed with regard thereto. On the other hand, in Dana F. Cole & Co. v. Byerly, 211 Neb. 903, 320 N.W.2d 916 (1982), a failure of proof as to damages resulted in a judgment being rendered against the plaintiff in that regard, and not in a new trial being ordered on that issue.
It appears our holdings in this regard have not been consistent; accordingly, the bar may be forgiven if it is confused as to exactly what its responsibilities are in proving damages and what the consequences of failing to prove them may be.
I would remove that confusion by reversing and dismissing these cases.
Clinton and White, JJ., join in this dissent.