Court Opinion

ID: 9703465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:57:50.894108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:49.236062
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
Initially I dissent because I would hold that appellants have waived their contentions.1 If I were to reach the *235merits, I would join the majority opinion on the issues on plaintiff’s contributory negligence and the negligence of appellants O’Herron and Peoples.2 However, I disagree with the majority opinion on the very difficult proximate cause issue.3
The relevant facts are as follows. On the morning of Saturday, September 25, 1971, plaintiff Thomas A. Grainy and five other Boy Scouts were marching easterly along the northern berm of Saltsburg Road in Plum Borough, Pennsylvania. The berm, which was unpaved, was about four feet wide in between the road and the private lawns of abutting home owners. Saltsburg Road is a two-lane highway running east and west. As the boys marched in single file, they approached an excavation ditch dug by defendant-appellant M. O’Herron Company (O’Herron) under contract with defendant-appellant Peoples Natural Gas Company (Peoples). The excavation was about three or four feet deep, and about four by four feet in area, covering the entire width of the berm, and completely obstructing pedestrian traffic thereon. The excavation was visibly marked with metal horses and piles of dirt on either side of the excavation.
A westbound truck driven by defendant Bruce A. Campbell approached the excavation. Campbell was approximately 300 feet away when he observed the Boy Scouts approaching the excavation. The first four Scouts passed *236the excavation by walking onto the private lawns of the abutting homeowners. Campbell drove his truck into the center of the highway, partially encroaching on the eastbound lane (there was no oncoming traffic) in order to stay clear of the Scouts and the excavation. The fifth Scout in line, Bruce Grinder, noticed this and decided that since the truck driver had seen them, it would be safe to pass the excavation on the road surface. Plaintiff, bringing up the rear of the line, followed Grinder out onto the northern edge of Saltsburg Road, no more than a foot onto the road.
At this point Campbell’s truck swerved back into the westbound lane towards the two boys. Grinder jumped onto the easterly dirt pile, but the truck hit plaintiff and knocked him into the excavation. As a result of this accident, plaintiff suffered various injuries for which he sought to recover damages in this lawsuit.
At the close of the evidence, O’Herron submitted one request for binding instructions, which read: “1. Under all the law and evidence your verdict must be in favor of the defendant, M. O’Herron Company.” This was refused. Peoples requested a similar binding instruction: “1. Under the facts of this case and the applicable law, your verdict must be for the Peoples Natural Gas Company.” This was also refused. Peoples also submitted other binding instructions that: (1) Peoples was not liable for any negligence of O’Herron, (2) in any event O’Herron was obligated to indemnify Peoples for Peoples’ liability for the negligence of O’Herron, and (3) Peoples was not negligent as a matter of law.4
On March 25, 1977, the jury returned a verdict of $68,000 in favor of plaintiff against all defendants. On March 30, 1977, O'Herron filed a paper which read in full as follows:
“MOTION FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V.
“AND NOW to wit this 30th day of March, 1977, the defendant, M. O’Herron, by its attorneys, Wayman, Irvin *237and McAuley, having presented a Point for Binding Instructions, in its favor in writing, at the trial of the case and it having been refused, moves the Court to have all of the evidence taken upon the trial of the case duly certified and filed so as to become part of the record, and for judgment in favor of the defendant above named, Non Obstante Veredicto, upon the whole record, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Assembly approved April 22, 1905, P.L. 286, and its Amendments”.5 Peoples the next day filed a substantially identical paper, i. e., denominated a motion for judgment n. o. v. but not stating any reasons or grounds in support of the motion.
Prior to Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974), cases cited by the Majority such as Koerth (1946) and Liquid Carbonic (1909) held that a motion for judgment n. o. v. comprehended any defense apparent in the record. Thus it has been stated that “[t]he failure to elaborate on reasons in support of the motion for judgment n. o. v. is not fatal if there is a refusal or reservation of a point for binding instructions upon which to base the motion.” 6A Standard Pennsylvania Practice 206-07.
However, our Supreme Court has already stated quite explicitly that the waiver doctrine of Dilliplaine applies to n. o. v. motions. Broxie v. Household Finance Co., 472 Pa. 373, 377-79, 372 A.2d 741, 743-44 (1977).6 Generally, a naked motion for relief, • which does not state any grounds in support thereof, is insufficient to preserve any issues for review. See Commonwealth v. Austin, 484 Pa. 56, 398 A.2d 941 (1979). It can no longer be disputed that an issue is waived if the moving party failed to raise the issue in a submitted request for binding instructions. Frank v. Peckich, 257 Pa.Super. 561, 577, 391 A.2d 624, 632 (1978); Beh*238rend v. Bell Telephone Co., 242 Pa.Super. 47, 66, 363 A.2d 1152, 1162 (1976).
Here, appellants neither stated any grounds for the relief requested in their motion for judgment n. o. v. nor raised any of their present contentions in their requests for binding instructions.7 Catch-all requests such as “under all the facts and the law, the verdict must be for us,” obviously do not alert the trial judge to the specific reasons why judgment n. o. v. should be granted. See Frank v. Peckich, supra 257 Pa.Super. at 577, 391 A.2d at 632. As it stands, we have been presented with a very difficult question of proximate cause which was not presented to the court below. Thus, I would hold that appellants have not preserved their contentions for appellate review.
However, I will discuss the merits of the proximate cause issue because it is an important and difficult question, and I disagree with the result reached by the Majority. Appellants argue that because Campbell was aware of the obstruction and the approaching Scouts in sufficient time to avoid the danger and took steps to allow them safe passage, but then negligently allowed his truck to swerve back to the right and strike plaintiff, this negligent act was a superseding intervening cause of plaintiff’s injuries breaking the chain of proximate cause from appellants’ negligence to plaintiff’s injuries. Appellants rely on Klena v. Rutkowski, 432 Pa. 509, 248 A.2d 9 (1968) and Kline v. Moyer and Albert, 325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 43 (1937). The Kline opinion stated the following rule in determining whether an intervening act of negligence would act as an efficient superseding cause excusing the first negligent actor from liability.
“Where a second actor has become aware of the existence of a potential danger created by the negligence of an original tort-feasor, and thereafter, by an independent act of negligence, brings about an accident, the first tort-feasor is relieved of liability, because the condition created by him was merely a circumstance of the accident and not its *239proximate cause. Where, however, the second actor does not become apprised of such danger until his own negligence, added to that of the existing perilous condition, has made the accident inevitable, the negligent acts of the two tort-feasors are contributing causes and proximate factors in the happening of the accident and impose liability upon both of the guilty parties.” Kline, supra, 325 Pa. at 364, 191 A. at 46. In Klena v. Rutkowski, 432 Pa. 509, 248 A.2d 9 (1968), on facts similar to the case at bar,8 the Supreme Court cited the Kline rule in reversing the refusal to enter a judgment n. o. v. on behalf of the defendant. The Kline rule was also found to be the law of Pennsylvania in a federal diversity case, Humphrey v. Lovejoy, 250 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1957). We have recently upheld jury verdicts in favor of defendants by relying on the Kline rule. See Reese v. Hughes, 223 Pa.Super. 311, 299 A.2d 653 (1973); Boyd v. Hertz, 219 Pa.Super. 488, 281 A.2d 679 (1971). We have also recently denied a request for a new trial where plaintiff alleged an erroneous charge on the issue of superseding cause, stating that the Kline instruction given “complies with the law of Pennsylvania.” Churchill v. Eakin, 233 Pa.Super. 466, 471, 335 A.2d 378, 382 (1975).
If the Kline rule was still the law in Pennsylvania on superseding cause, we would have to reverse and order a judgment n. o. v. for appellant Peoples and O’Herron. The evidence in the record shows that Campbell became aware of the risk created by appellants’ negligence before the accident was inevitable. In fact, he took steps to avoid the risk, but negligently failed to do so. Under the Kline rule, this is *240a superseding cause. These facts are also very close to the facts decided in Klena (see note 8 supra).
However, in 1973 our Supreme Court in Flickinger Estate v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 74, 305 A.2d 40, 43 (1973) explicitly adopted the Restatement (2d) of Torts § 447 as the controlling rule of law in Pennsylvania on the issue of superseding intervening cause.9 Section 447 states:
“The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause of the harm to another which the actor’s negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if
“(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a third person might so act, or
“(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or
“(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor’s conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent.”
The Restatement rule on superseding cause thus states a different principle than the Kline rule. Where the Kline rule focuses on the timing of the intervenor’s awareness of the antecedent risk, the Restatement rule focuses on the foreseeability to the first negligent actor of the risk created by the intervenor. See Klages v. General Ordnance Equipment Co., 240 Pa.Super. 356, 367 A.2d 304 (1976) (reasonably foreseeable risks are not superseding causes); Pushnik v. Winky’s Drive-In Restaurant, 242 Pa.Super. 323, 363 A.2d 1291 (1976) (risk which was made obviously likely to occur because of two previous similar accidents cannot be superseding cause). In determining whether an intervening cause is reasonably foreseeable, it is not necessary that the particular manner in which the accident occurred is foresee*241able, but rather whether the general type of risk created by the antecedent actor is foreseeable. Noon v. Knavel, 234 Pa.Super. 198, 212-13, 339 A.2d 545, 552-53 (1975).10
Applying Section 447 and the cases interpreting it to the facts at bar, we should find that Campbell’s negligence was not a superseding cause relieving appellants of liability for their antecedent negligence. Appellants obstructed the berm of the road to pedestrians. This created a reasonably foreseeable risk that a pedestrian, after walking around the obstruction onto the road, would be hit by a negligently driven vehicle. This is no less foreseeable than other negligent acts which have been held not superseding causes. See Miller v. Checker Yellow Cab Co., 465 Pa. 82, 348 A.2d 128 (1975) (motorist drove through obvious physical obstruction); Flickinger Estate, supra (motorist blindly drove onto highway from behind obstruction); Noon v. Knavel, supra (automobile repairman fails to make adequate temporary brake repair). Although under the Kline rule it would be significant that Campbell’s negligence in swerving his vehicle back into the westbound lane occurred after his awareness of the risk created by appellants’ antecedent negligence, under Section 447 liability continues because the general risk of the accident was reasonably foreseeable.11 Restatement [2d] Torts, § 447(a).
I must conclude that the Kline rule is no longer the law in Pennsylvania on superseding cause since it conflicts with *242Section 447. I note that since the explicit adoption of Section 447 in 1973 in Flickinger Estate,12 supra, the Kline rule has been followed only once, in Churchill v. Eakin, supra, and there without any extensive discussion. Otherwise since Flickinger, we have consistently applied Section 447. Because under the standards of the Restatement, Campbell’s intervening negligence was not a superseding cause, appellants’ negligence remained a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
I would affirm the order below.

. I join that part of the majority opinion, supra at note 1, holding that appellants have waived their claim regarding requested instructions *235on the safety regulations of the Pennsylvania Highway Department. For the reasons which follow, I would also agree that appellant Peoples has preserved the contention that it was not negligent as a matter of law. See note 7 and accompanying text infra.

. I would also note that appellants seek to characterize plaintiffs behavior as violative of the “choice of paths” doctrine because plaintiff walked in the road while a safe path on the private lawn was available to him. However, plaintiff’s choice was reasonable because, Campbell had already pulled his truck onto the opposing lane, and thus there was no apparent hazard on the road. See Downing v. Shaffer, 246 Pa.Super. 512, 518, 371 A.2d 953, 956 (1977).

. Appellants also argue that their excavation was not the cause in fact of plaintiff’s injuries. However, this contention is without merit as obviously plaintiff would not have walked in the road but for appellant’s obstruction of the berm. See Bacsick v. Barnes, 234 Pa.Super. 616, 623, 341 A.2d 157, 161 (1975).

. In a supplemental filing, Peoples also made three requested points for charge to the jury which were not requests for binding instructions. ■

. See 12 P.S. § 681. This statute has since been repealed by the Act of April 28, 1978 P.L. 202, No. 53 § 2(a) [891], eff. June 27, 1980.

. The boilerplate request for binding instructions used by Peoples and O’Herron here was rightfully condemned in Broxie, 472 Pa. at 375 n.1, 372 A.2d at 743 n.1, and Frank v. Peckich, 257 Pa.Super. 561, 577, 391 A.2d 624, 632 (1978).

. The one exception is that Peoples requested a binding instruction that it was not negligent as a matter of law, which contention is also made on appeal here.

. In Klena, the defendant truck company (Company) negligently failed to provide warning lights on a truck rented to plaintiff. The truck broke down on the highway as plaintiff was driving it. He got out to direct traffic around the truck. Defendant Rutkowski saw the truck stopped 100 yards away on the highway, and began to slow down. When plaintiff saw Rutkowski slow down, he turned to direct traffic coming in the opposite direction, and then Rutkowski hit him. Holding that the Company should have a judgment n. o. v., the Court said: “When Rutkowski was apprised of the danger, the accident was not inevitable. Rutkowski’s negligence occurred after he was aware of the danger, and thus became a superseding cause.” Klena, supra 432 Pa. at 514, 248 A.2d at 11.

. Prior to 1973, the Restatement had been cited several times by our Courts. See the cases collected in Flickinger, supra, 452 Pa. at 74 n.6, 305 A.2d at 43 n.6. See especially Whitner v. Lojeski, 437 Pa. 448, 263 A.2d 889 (1970), discussed at note 11 infra.

. Since Flickinger, Section 447 has also been applied as the controlling law in Pennsylvania on superseding cause in Miller v. Checker Yellow Cab Co., 465 Pa. 82, 348 A.2d 128 (1975); Hargrove v. Frommeyer & Co., 229 Pa.Super. 298, 323 A.2d 300 (1974); Scheel v. Tremblay, 226 Pa.Super. 45, 49-50, 312 A.2d 45, 47-48 (1973); Whittle v. Schemm, 402 F.Supp. 1294 (E.D.Pa.1975). Whittle quotes Kline rule in full, but only to support the proposition that any superseding cause under Pennsylvania law must be a negligent act. Whittle, supra at 1297.

. I am aware that in Whitner v. Lojeski, 437 Pa. 448, 461-62, 263 A.2d 889, 896 (1970), a case decided before the explicit adoption of Section 447 by Flickinger, the Supreme Court sought to reconsile Section 447 and the Kline rule. There the Court reasoned that if an actor was negligent after his awareness of the risk created by the antecedent negligence, his negligence was “extraordinary” and there*242fore a superseding cause. Likewise if the intervening actor was merely inattentive, and did not become aware of the risk created by the antecedent actor until his own negligence made the accident inevitable, this was not “extraordinary,” and therefore not a superseding cause. I think there are several problems with this analysis. First, however analytically pat it might sound when stated in the abstract, when applied to facts such as exist in the case at bar, the two rules produce different results, because Kline looks through the eyes of the intervening actor (when did he become aware of the existing risk?) and the Restatement rule looks through the eyes of the antecedent actor (should he have reasonably foreseen the intervenor’s negligence?). Under Section 447, there are three distinct ways in which the liability of the antecedent actor continues, and one of them, § 447(a), is based wholly on foreseeability, regardless of whether the intervenor’s negligence is “extraordinary” or not. Since, three years after Whitner, the Supreme Court in Flickinger expressly adopted Section 447 as the law of Pennsylvania, it is no longer necessary to try to harmonize Section 447 with prior Pennsylvania common law on superseding cause, as the Whitner court apparently felt compelled to do.

. I note that in Flickinger Estate, supra, the Court explicitly rejected the “passive negligence” doctrine of Cotter v. Bell, 417 Pa. 560, 208 A.2d 216 (1965) and Deluca v. Manchester Laundry and Dry Cleaning Co., 380 Pa. 484, 112 A.2d 372 (1955). See also Clevenstein v. Rizzuto, 439 Pa. 397, 403, 266 A.2d 623, 626 (1970) (questioning continued viability of applying the doctrine in pre-trial adjudications). The “passive negligence” doctrine held that as a matter of law, the active negligence of an intervening tortfeasor superseded the passive negligence of an antecedent tortfeasor. Again, under the “passive negligence” doctrine, we would be required to reverse (appellants have cited Manchester Laundry to us), but this rule of law was discarded in Flickinger Estate. While the passive negligence doctrine embodies a different principle of law than the Kline rule, still Flickinger indicates how the adoption of Section 447 has necessitated the abandonment of prior Pennsylvania common law on superseding cause.