Court Opinion

ID: 9705223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:00:10.308164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:09.006780
License: Public Domain

Shea, J.
(dissenting in part). I have no disagreement with the conclusion reached by the majority that General Statutes § 53-303e violates the establishment clause but I would not have reached that issue in the procedural posture in which it is presented by this case. I would find error in the refusal of the board of mediation and arbitration to decide this constitutional issue. I would find that the board of mediation and arbitra*352tion has “imperfectly executed” its powers by refusing to decide this constitutional issue, which is critical to a proper determination of the lawfulness of the plaintiffs discharge. See General Statutes § 52-418 (a) (4). For this reason I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant’s application to vacate the award, but I would also direct a rehearing in accordance with General Statutes § 52-418.
I disagree with the majority that the “quasi-judicial” power of the board “does not encompass a decision as to the constitutionality of § 53-303e.” I am not aware of any decisions by the higher courts1 of this country which support a distinction between constitutional issues and other questions of law with respect to the competency of arbitrators or administrative agencies to decide them. The majority appears to rely upon the separation of powers doctrine as precluding the delegation of “judicial power” outside the court system. A decision by a nonjudicial authority upon other legal questions, the propriety of which the majority opinion does not challenge, is an exercise of judicial power of the same kind as that involved in resolving a constitu*353tional question. Not only is the distinction made by the majority wholly unprecedented, but it is also thoroughly impractical in the adjudication processes of arbitrators and public agencies where constitutional issues frequently arise. Will it be necessary hereafter to adjourn such proceedings until a judicial determination of the constitutional issue can be obtained as a kind of advisory opinion? To impose such a burden upon dispute resolution procedures, judicial or nonjudicial, is a wholly unwarranted extension of the separation of powers principle.
Accordingly, I dissent.

 The only authority cited in the majority opinion which even considers the competency of a nonjudicial agency to declare a law unconstitutional is Zelvin v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 30 Conn. Sup. 157, 163, 306 A.2d 151 (1973), which contains the following: “Jurisdiction over such issues rests solely with the judiciary. Riley v. Liquor Control Commission, 153 Conn. 242, 250 [215 A.2d 402 (1965)]; Preveslin v. Derby & Ansonia Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 145 [151 A. 518 (1930)].” The citation oí Riley refers to a dictum that “we prefer, if possible, to decide” constitutional issues, but this court, nevertheless, refused to decide the constitutional issue raised because the requirements for a declaratory judgment had not been met. In Preveslin this court found an attempt by the legislature to overturn the effect of a prior decision of the court to constitute an unconstitutional encroachment upon the judicial authority. Neither case dealt with the power of an administrative agency or arbitrators to decide a constitutional issue which arises in the course of an adjudication within the scope of its delegated authority.