Court Opinion

ID: 9606100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:46:53.803911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:32.679279
License: Public Domain

Mowbray, C. J.,
concurring in the result:
I concur in the result reached by the majority because I believe that, in this case, appellant was provided with adequate access to legal materials to present an effective defense. Wolfe *668v. State, 95 Nev. 240, 591 P.2d 1155 (1979). I write separately in order to express my disagreement with the breadth of the majority’s holding.
The majority recognizes that an accused has a constitutional right to defend himself without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. Ante at 1-2. Yet, when an accused voluntarily and intelligently decides that he requires access to legal materials in order to present that defense, the majority, without citation, holds that a judge “should not allow the defendant to dictate the terms upon which he is willing to waive counsel, for when that occurs it is reasonably certain that an assertion will be made following conviction that the terms of the waiver were not fulfilled.” I cannot endorse such a far reaching proposition.
Furthermore, the majority’s statement that when a defendant “elects to conduct his own defense he relinquishes the benefits associated with the right to counsel,” ante at 2, sweeps too broadly. Certainly, a defendant who chooses to represent himself relinquishes the right to have an experienced, or at least competent, professional present his case, as well as the advantages of secretarial and investigative services. But it is equally clear, as in the instant case, that the defendant does not necessarily give up the right to present the most effective defense of which he is capable. Of course, access to legal materials is essential to the preparation of any defense. The majority seems to suggest that a defendant may “knowingly and intelligently” waive his right to counsel with no assurance that he will be provided with access to any legal materials at all. With this I cannot agree.
I see no reason to distinguish this case from Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). Although Bounds dealt with a post-conviction situation, it does not seem logical to grant access to law libraries to prisoners, so that they may attack their convictions collaterally, but not to defendants in criminal trials. As I read Bounds, the states are required “to provide indigent inmates with access to a reasonably adequate law library for preparation of legal actions,” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 578-79 (1974), whether they are being held after conviction or awaiting a trial in which they will be representing themselves. The demands of equal protection of the laws cannot be satisfied with less.
Gunderson, J., concurs.