Court Opinion

ID: 9777782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:24:11.005686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:01.625053
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I disagree with the majority opinion because not only does it hold directly contra to our recent decision in Lasiter v. State, 290 Ark. 96, 717 S.W.2d 198 (1986), more importantly, it further erodes the landmark case of Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 266 S.W.2d 804 (1954). In Alford this Court stated: No one doubts the fundamental rule of exclusion, which forbids the prosecution from proving the commission of one crime by proof of the commission of another. The State is not permitted to adduce evidence of other offenses for the purpose of persuading the jury that the accused is a criminal and therefore likely to be guilty of the charge under investigation. In short, proof of other crimes is never admitted when its only relevancy is to show that that the prisoner is a man of bad character, addicted to crime. The fundamental rule of exclusion has not changed with the enactment of A.R.E. Rule 404(b). However, the exceptions have so proliferated that Alford is no longer a citadel; it is only a skeleton. I do not want to see it obliterated. In the Lasiter case this Court held that it was prejudicial error to allow the accused’s daughter to testify against him at the trial of the allegation that he raped his niece. The daughter testified that her father had raped her on earlier occasions. Relying on Alford, we held that the failure of defense counsel to object to such testimony amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. In the present appeal the accused was on trial for raping his stepdaughter. Evidence that he had raped another stepdaughter was admitted over the appellant’s objection. In both this appeal and Lasiter, the evidence was introduced to rebut the direct testimony of the accused that he had not committed an extrinsic offense. By any fair standard an accused is entitled to be tried only for the offense under consideration. No matter how nice an exception may be carved out, it is usually just another invasion of this fundamental rule of fairness. Soon it will be the practice of the state to ask an accused about any and all convictions, crimes and rumors. This decision today has a chilling effect on the right of an accused to take the stand. How can it be said that the testimony of another of appellant’s stepdaughters that she too had been raped by her father had independent relevance which was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice? See A.R.E. Rule 403. This opinion relies upon the cliché that the state was “fighting fire with fire,” as this evidence was used in rebuttal of the appellant’s direct testimony. The appellant was not on trial for the prior bad act, and I think defense counsel properly objected on the basis of Rule 403. It’s hard to think of any evidence which could have been more prejudicial. See Lasiter, supra. The majority opinion announces a broad and sweeping general statement of law which will no doubt be used in the future to admit the testimony of any other person who is willing to testify that he or she has had sexual relations of any sort with the accused. Presently it is required that the accused must first take the stand and deny such an act before it can be introduced against him. How far is that from allowing such evidence after appellant pleads not guilty? Given the speed with which we are making exceptions to A.R.E. 404(b), it will not be long until we completely eliminate the rule and its intended purpose. In my opinion the majority is using slick words to disguise yet another exception to the fundamental rule of exclusion which prohibits the state from introducing evidence of other offenses for the purpose of persuading the jury that the accused is a criminal and “therefore likely to be guilty of the charge under investigation.” Alford, supra. I believe the exceptions should be restricted rather than enlarged. Soon there will no longer be a rule to exclude the introduction of prior bad acts if offered for the purpose of showing that the accused did it before and he, therefore, probably did it again this time. I would reverse and remand.