Court Opinion

ID: 9479852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:30:36.963055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:18.486124
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Chief Judge,
specially concurring:
I concur in the affirmance of the judgment of the district court denying habeas corpus relief and in all that Judge Jolly writes. As to Part II, I agree “that if Russell had raised the issue, the Texas court would have held that Russell similarly had waived his right to appeal the point.” However, unlike Judge Jolly, I do not agree that we should rest our decision here solely on procedural by-pass. I would also affirm the excuse of the venireman, Hoover, on the merits.
Both Judge Jolly and Judge Johnson have set out the reporter’s transcript of the pertinent questions and answers from Russell’s jury voir dire. A person present at the time who was trying to understand the feelings expressed would not parse the questions and answers in this fashion. Rather, he would weigh what was said in its surroundings and full context for its ultimate meaning. To aid that understanding, I paraphrase the essence of what was said. In November 1977, the trial judge listening to this exchange heard potential juror Hoover say:
I have long held conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty-
Because infliction of the death penalty would enter into my deliberations on issues of fact in this case, those scruples would affect my deliberations.
Hoover’s statements go beyond saying he would accept his responsibilities with special seriousness. They are far more than a mere honest acknowledgement that he might be affected in his jury service.
Even if Adams and Witt required that this trial judge test Hoover’s 1977 response by the subsequently developed talisman: *1217“prevent or substantially impair,”1 the statements would have met that test. Present case law does not look to precise words alone. We assay the trial judge’s appraisal of the potential juror’s beliefs. None of us reading this one part of the transcript today was present to personally observe Hoover as he answered these questions 12 years ago. The trial judge was. He saw Hoover when he spoke. That observation was made in the context of all that had gone on in the prior exchanges between counsel and other prospective jurors.
In my view, a fair reading of this cold transcript alone reveals that the trial judge could have — indeed, should have — concluded that Hoover’s abiding conscientious scruples against the death penalty would prevent the proper performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath. If that trial judge had had the benefit of the new test phrase, he certainly would have articulated it when excusing Hoover. Given the added benefit of observing the whole voir dire process and Hoover’s demeanor as he answered questions, the trial judge’s unchallenged decision to excuse Hoover is entitled to the statutory presumption of correctness required by § 2254(d). On the merits, I can find no fault with Hoover’s exclusion from this jury panel.

. I would leave unanswered the substantial question as to whether Adams and Witt so clarified Witherspoon as to announce a "new rule” of constitutional procedure. See: Teague v. Lane, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1072-75, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, - U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989); Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273 (5th Cir. en banc 1989).