Court Opinion

ID: 9791254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:08:13.731485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:34.368997
License: Public Domain

HUNTLEY, Justice,
dissenting (dissent written prior to his resignation on August 7, 1989).
I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority because its last two paragraphs and its result are premised *1006upon an allegation by the majority that it did something procedurally which this Court did not do and, in fact, does not have the mechanism to do.
Those paragraphs state that we find no legislative statement of policy for the classification involved and that we have not discovered any reason or rationale. The majority opinion further states that we have engaged in our own independent analysis and we find, no rational basis. WHERE DID WE LOOK TO FIND THAT WHICH WE DID NOT FIND?
The truth of the matter is, there is no basis for either this Court to make any findings or the Industrial Commission to make any findings because no one has taken any evidence on the issue. The Industrial Commission took no evidence on the issue because it has been of the belief that it did not have the power to pass upon constitutional matters. Therefore, had the Department offered testimony in support of a “rational basis,” the Commission would properly have excluded the evidence as being irrelevant as to any issue before the Commission.
This Court did not take any evidence directly, nor did we appoint a Special Master to take evidence for us on what might or might not have been the rational basis for the legislative classifications. Thus, I know not where the majority looked to make its “findings” other than in its genes and hormones.
What I do know is that both the House of Representatives and the Senate of Idaho, by majority vote, concluded that there was a reason and purpose for the classifications which they put into the statute and the incumbent Governor apparently agreed. Upon what foundation is this Court entitled to decide, without the taking of any evidence by any judicial body, that the legislature and the Governor were wrong in determining the classifications provided in I.C. § 72-1316(d)?
I would remand to the Industrial Commission with directions to it to provide a forum for the parties to present testimony on whether the classifications are grounded in some rational basis.
ADDENDUM ON REHEARING TO THIS COURT’S ORIGINAL OPINION FILED AUGUST 31, 1989
BOYLE, Justice.
In this unemployment compensation tax case we are called upon to determine whether employers are required by Idaho law to pay unemployment compensation tax on independent contractors.
Appellant challenges the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-1316(d)(2) on the grounds that requiring employers to pay tax for unemployment compensation for independent contractors is facially unconstitutional.
Appellant, Bon Appetit operates a gourmet food business which contracts with independent contractors to market its products. Following an audit by the Department of Employment, the Department held that the independent contractors were “covered employees” under Idaho Code § 72 — 1316(d)(2) and required Bon Appetit to pay the requisite unemployment compensation tax. The appeals examiner held that although the independent agents were clearly independent contractors, the provisions of I.C. § 72-1316(d)(2) required their inclusion as covered employees. On appeal to the Industrial Commission, the holdings of the appeals examiner were adopted.
Under Idaho Code § 72-1316(d)(2), otherwise independent contractors engaged in distributing meat, vegetables, fruit, bakery or beverage products, or conducting laundry or dry cleaning business are held to be “covered employees” and as such are singled out from all others in the business of door-to-door marketing, and as such their employers are required to pay unemployment compensation tax for each independent contractor.
Bon Appetit asserts that such treatment denies it equal protection under both the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and art. 1 § 2 of the Idaho Constitution. We agree.
In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d *1007659 (1981), the United States Supreme Court stated:
Although parties challenging legislation under the Equal Protection Clause may introduce evidence supporting their claim that it is irrational, (citation deleted) they cannot prevail so long as “it is evident from all the considerations presented to [the legislature], and those of which we may take judicial notice, that the question is at least debatable.”
Id., 449 U.S. at 464, 101 S.Ct. at 724. In Clover Leaf, the Supreme Court held the evidence was conflicting and properly resolved the conflict in favor of upholding the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute. In the case before us, however, we find no conflicting evidence. In fact, as stated in this Court’s original opinion, we are cited to and find no legislative statement of policy or public purpose nor explanation or justification for such legislative distinction.
In the original decision filed August 31, 1989, this Court correctly applied the rational basis test to the statute in question and found the particular provisions of I.C. § 72-1316 to be unconstitutional on its face. We continue to adhere to the views expressed in the original opinion authored by the late Chief Justice Shepard. Bon Appetit Gourmet Foods, Inc., v. State of Idaho, Department of Employment, # 17122, Slip Op. # 128 (filed August 31, 1989).
The order of the Industrial Commission is reversed and remanded. Costs to appellant. No fees allowed.
BISTLINE, JOHNSON and McDEVITT, JJ. concur.