Court Opinion

ID: 9377621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 16:00:56.205446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:15.333381
License: Public Domain

22-612-cv
Hamilton v. Commissioner of Social Security

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                         SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
8th day of March, two thousand twenty-three.

Present:
            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
                   Chief Judge,
            SUSAN L. CARNEY,
            JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
                   Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________

BECKY SUE HAMILTON,

                         Plaintiff-Appellant,

                 v.                                                     22-612-cv

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

                  Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________________

For Plaintiff-Appellant:                        LARS PRESSLY MEAD and Scot G. Miller, Coughlin &
                                                Gerhart, LLP, Binghamton, NY.

For Defendant-Appellee:                         MOLLY E. CARTER, Special Assistant United States
                                                Attorney, and Michael J. Pelgro, Regional Chief
                                                Counsel, Social Security Administration, for Carla B.
                                                Freedman, United States Attorney for the Northern
                                                District of New York, Boston, MA.

                                                     1
         Appeal from a judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York

(Sannes, J.).

         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case is REMANDED to

the district court with instructions to remand the matter to the Commissioner for further

proceedings consistent with this order.

         Plaintiff-Appellant Becky Sue Hamilton (“Hamilton”) appeals from the February 2, 2022

judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Sannes, J.).

The district court granted the motion of the Commissioner of Social Security (the

“Commissioner”) for judgment on the pleadings based on a determination that substantial evidence

supports the conclusion of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) that Hamilton is not disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 423.       Hamilton argues that the

ALJ erred in evaluating the medical evidence and that her application for Social Security disability

insurance benefits was improperly denied.          We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

                                          *       *      *

         We review a district court’s judgment on the pleadings de novo.      Jasinski v. Barnhart,

341 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2003). When reviewing a disability benefits determination, the “focus

is not so much on the district court’s ruling as it is on the administrative ruling.”   Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).        We review the administrative record “to determine

whether there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner’s decision and whether the

Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir.

2002).

                                                  2
       Under the treating physician rule, an ALJ must give “controlling weight” to the opinion of

a claimant’s treating physician, so long as it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical

and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in

[the] case record.”   Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (2007)). 1      If the treating

physician’s opinion is not well-supported or is contradicted by substantial evidence, then “the ALJ

must articulate ‘good reasons’ to rebut the presumption of controlling deference conferred on the

treating physician’s opinion.”      Colgan v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 353, 360 (2d Cir. 2022).

Additionally, the ALJ

       must determine how much weight, if any, to give it. In doing so, it must explicitly
       consider the following, nonexclusive Burgess factors: (1) the frequency, length,
       nature, and extent of treatment; (2) the amount of medical evidence supporting the
       opinion; (3) the consistency of the opinion with the remaining medical evidence;
       and (4) whether the physician is a specialist. . . .
               An ALJ’s failure to explicitly apply the Burgess factors when assigning
       weight . . . is a procedural error. . . . If, however, a searching review of the record
       assures us that the substance of the treating physician rule was not traversed, we
       will affirm.

Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and

citations omitted); see also Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (2007)).

       Hamilton challenges the ALJ’s assignment of “little weight” to the opinion of Dr. Edward

Mehrhof (“Dr. Mehrhof”).        See A-17.    As an initial matter, Hamilton did not forfeit this

argument because, even assuming a different emphasis on appeal, she advanced the legal argument

before the district court that the ALJ erred in assigning little weight to Dr. Mehrhof’s opinion.

       1
          Because Hamilton filed her claim before March 27, 2017, the older regulations for claims
filed before that date apply. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.

                                                 3
See A-54; see also Estrella, 925 F.3d at 97 n.1 (explaining that this Court will review factual

arguments in support of a preserved claim of legal error, even where those factual arguments were

not raised before the district court). Accordingly, we consider her argument on the merits.

       As to the merits, Hamilton argues that the ALJ’s failure to discuss the Burgess factors

requires remand to the agency.     We agree. The ALJ failed to discuss the frequency, length,

nature, and extent of treatment that Hamilton received from Dr. Mehrhof, or the amount of medical

evidence supporting the opinion. We cannot be confident, moreover, that notwithstanding this

procedural error, the substance of the treating physician rule was not traversed.    Hamilton saw

Dr. Mehrhof on a monthly basis between August 2016 and March 2019, for a total of 33

appointments.    The record also contains a May 2017 medical source statement from Dr. Mehrhof,

synthesizing his observations from prior appointments.     In the absence of any evaluation of this

evidence by the ALJ, we cannot confidently conclude that the agency would have reached the

same determination as to how much weight to afford Dr. Mehrhof’s opinion if all of the Burgess

factors had been taken into account. Indeed, it is generally the consideration of these factors in a

systematic manner that affords us the assurance that the ALJ has given careful and full

consideration to the record. 2

       2
          The ALJ similarly failed to consider relevant factors in the treatment of the opinion of
licensed clinical social worker Maureen Kiely (“Kiely”).           See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)
(explaining that the adjudicator considers the same factors when assigning weight to a nonmedical
opinion as to a medical opinion from a non-treating source); id. § 404.1527(c) (listing those
factors). The ALJ failed to explain her rationale for assigning great weight to Kiely’s opinion
despite: (1) Kiely’s status as a nonmedical source; (2) the absence from the administrative record
of any other notes from Kiely; and (3) the fact that most of Kiely’s interactions with Hamilton
occurred before Hamilton’s alleged onset date of July 8, 2016. See A-17. We express no view
as to the ultimate weight to be assigned this non-treating source, observing only that the agency
on remand should consider the applicable factors in considering this evidence.

                                                 4
       Because the ALJ failed to discuss the Burgess factors in evaluating Dr. Mehrhof’s opinion,

leaving us without confidence that the substance of the treating physician rule was observed, we

VACATE the judgment of the district court, and REMAND to the district court with instructions

to remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this order.   In light of the

deficiencies in the ALJ’s analysis of the weight to be afforded the opinion of Dr. Mehrhof, we do

not address Hamilton’s additional arguments, including the question whether the ALJ’s decision

not to give controlling weight to Dr. Mehrhof’s diagnoses was supported by substantial evidence.

                                                    FOR THE COURT:
                                                    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

                                               5