Court Opinion

ID: 9853008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:41:07.440732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:39.772976
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
As my application of the same authority differs from my colleagues in the majority, I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of summary judgment to defendant Gainesville Bank & Trust (“the Bank”) in Sheriff Vass’ contract action on a letter of credit issued by the Bank to secure the outstanding bail bond obligations of All American Bonding Company, Inc. to Hall County. I further dissent from the denial of summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Vass.
“[I]f from all the documents presented to the issuer . . . there is substantial compliance with the terms of the letter of credit and there is no possibility that the documents submitted could mislead the issuer to its detriment, there has been compliance with the letter of credit. [Cits.]” (Emphasis in original.) First Nat. Bank of Atlanta v. Wynne, 149 Ga. App. 811, 814 (1), 817 (256 SE2d 383). In my view, the failure to allege that the submitted invoices were “still unpaid 30 days after such presentation,” is not a material variance, upon which the issuing Bank proved that it reasonably relied to its detriment. Rather, such a condition precedent is an implied premise, subject to confirmation by amendment as events warrant. Otherwise, an overly strict application of this form of the notice requirement in the Bank’s letter of credit would make it impossible for the Sheriff to comply with that certification during the last 30 days of coverage. This would render the certain date of expiration superfluous and defeat the very purpose of issuing the letter of credit.
According to OCGA § 17-6-15 (b) (1), “the sheriff shall publish and make available written rules and regulations defining acceptable sureties and prescribing under what conditions sureties may be accepted.” These rules and regulations are deemed to constitute a part of the letter of credit issued to a bonding company to secure that bonding company’s obligations to the county, as if fully incorporated. “ ‘ “[W]hatever is included in [such a letter of credit] which is not thereby required must be read out, and whatever is not expressed and ought to have been incorporated must be read in, so as to conform to the requirements of the law.” ’ Home Indem. Co. v. Battey Machinery Co., 109 Ga. App. 322, [325 (2),] 326-327 [(2) (a)] (136 SE2d 193), and cases cited therein.” Wooten v. G. M. H. Auto Sales, 187 Ga. App. 331, 334-335 (2) (370 SE2d 165). In my view, Sheriff Vass reasonably interpreted the Bank’s form of an acceptable certification as permitting an amendment to show that invoices submitted by the certain expiration date were, 30 days thereafter, still unpaid. *263That interpretation gives meaning to the reasonable intentions of all parties and beneficiaries under the letter of credit, and consequently should be read into the letter of credit issued as security for the public obligations owed by All American Bonding Company to Hall County. I conclude that Sheriff Vass, and not the Bank, is entitled to summary judgment, because the Sheriff’s certification was in substantial compliance with the reasonable mutual intendment of the parties. As my colleagues in the majority would nevertheless affirm the unwarranted grant of summary judgment to the Bank, I respectfully dissent.
Decided January 16, 1997
Stewart, Melvin & Frost, William H. Blalock, Jr., for appellant.
Hulsey, Oliver & Mahar, Joseph D. Cooley III, Abbott S. Hayes, Jr., Douglas E. Smith, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews, Presiding Judge Pope, and Judge Blackburn join in this dissent.