Court Opinion

ID: 9883014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 00:00:32.845796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:18.568291
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30752         Document: 00516922143             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/05/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                       October 5, 2023
                                       No. 22-30752
                                      ____________                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                             Clerk
   Cedric Otkins, Jr.,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Jack Gilboy, Sergeant; Barrett Pearse, Officer; William
   Roth, Officer; Joshua Deroche, Officer; Unidentified
   Parties,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:21-CV-1275
                      ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          This case arises out of the arrest of Cedric Otkins, Jr. Following his
   arrest, Otkins brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
   officers who participated in his detention and the search of his vehicle. The
   officers asserted qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment,
   which the district court granted. Finding that a genuine issue of material fact
          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30752         Document: 00516922143               Page: 2      Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                          No. 22-30752

   precludes summary judgment as to Sergeant Jack Gilboy, we VACATE and
   REMAND. However, we AFFIRM the district court’s order as it relates
   to the remaining defendants.
                                                 I
           In July 2020, Otkins parked his car in the parking lot of the East Bank
   Bridge Park after it had closed, violating St. Charles Parish Ordinance Sec-
   tion 17-2. Spotting Otkins’s car, Sergeant Jack Gilboy of the St. Charles Par-
   ish Sheriff’s Office pulled his patrol SUV behind Otkins’s vehicle to investi-
   gate. Conflicting testimony exists as to what happened next.1 Sergeant Gil-
   boy testified that, as he approached Otkins’ closing car door, the odor of ma-
   rijuana “fann[ed]” towards him. Otkins, however, maintains that Sergeant
   Gilboy approached Otkins while he waited at the back of his vehicle, after the
   door closed. Otkins claims that, because his doors and windows were closed,
   Gilboy could not have detected marijuana.
           Sergeant Gilboy then retrieved Otkins’s driver’s license, conducted a
   computer check, and found an outstanding attachment for Otkins’s arrest.
   Gilboy then called for backup and requested a canine unit, ostensibly because
   he smelled marijuana near Otkins’s vehicle. Officers William Roth and Bar-
   rett Pearse arrived several minutes later, followed by Officer Joshua Deroche
   with a drug-detecting dog. Following an alert from the dog, officers searched
   the vehicle and found approximately twenty grams of marijuana in Otkins’s
   trunk, along with a glass smoking pipe, a digital scale, and a grinder.
           The officers then arrested Otkins. Although exact estimates vary, all
   parties agree that Otkins was arrested less than an hour after the stop began.

           _____________________
           1
            No footage exists of Sergeant Gilboy’s initial encounter with Otkins. Sergeant
   Gilboy activated his dashcam footage when other officers arrived on scene, after their initial
   encounter concluded.

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                                    No. 22-30752

   Otkins was charged under Louisiana law for drug possession, but his charges
   were ultimately dismissed.
          Otkins brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
   officers who participated in the detention and search. He alleges that the
   officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful
   searches and seizures. The officers moved for summary judgment on
   qualified immunity, which the district court granted. Otkins appeals.
                                         II
          “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
   applying the same standards as the district court.” DeVoss v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
   903 F.3d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
   Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the movant shows that there
   is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
   judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine”
   if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the
   nonmoving party. Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir.
   2012). A dispute of fact is “material” if its resolution would affect the
   outcome of the case. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th
   Cir. 2000).
          “In reviewing the district court’s summary judgment decision, we
   must consider the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to
   [Otkins], drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the conclusion that
   [he] has raised a jury issue on his claims.” Boyd v. McNamara, 74 F.4th 662,
   665 (5th Cir. 2023).
                                         III
          To prevail, Otkins must overcome the officers’ qualified immunity
   defense, which “includes two inquiries. The first question is whether the

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   officer violated a constitutional right. The second question is whether the
   right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.”
   Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).
   “We can decide one question or both.” Id. Here, the district court decided
   only the first issue, and concluded that no genuine issues of material fact
   precluded summary judgment. As to Sergeant Gilboy, we disagree.
          The protection of the Fourth Amendment “extends to vehicle stops
   and temporary detainment of a vehicle’s occupants.” United States v.
   Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 832 (5th Cir. 2013). After lawfully stopping a driver
   for a traffic violation, an officer’s actions must be “reasonably related in
   scope to the circumstances that justified the stop of the vehicle in the first
   place.” Id. (quoting United States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509, 517 (5th Cir.
   2011)). The stop may last no longer than necessary to address the traffic
   violation, and constitutional authority for the seizure “ends when tasks tied
   to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”
   Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). During a traffic stop, an
   officer may permissibly check the driver’s license, determine whether there
   are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspect the automobile’s
   registration and proof of insurance. Id. at 355 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440
   U.S. 648, 658-60 (1979)).
          The Fourth Amendment, however, tolerates additional investigation
   unrelated to the safe and responsible operation of the vehicle if that
   investigation is supported by reasonable suspicion of additional criminal
   activity. Id. at 354-55, 358. If the officer develops reasonable suspicion of
   such activity “in the course of the stop and before the initial purpose of the
   stop has been fulfilled, then the detention may continue until the new
   reasonable suspicion has been dispelled or confirmed.” United States v.
   Banuelos-Romero, 597 F.3d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
   Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 431 (5th Cir. 2005)). The smell of marijuana

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   emanating from a vehicle may give officers reasonable suspicion to extend the
   detention and probable cause to search the vehicle. United States v. Conley,
   No. 22-30037, 2023 WL 2327457, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 2, 2023) (per curiam)
   (unpublished) (“When Trooper Langley smelled the odor of marijuana, he
   developed the necessary reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity
   to extend the detention beyond the time it took to investigate Conley’s traffic
   offense.”); United States v. Garcia, 592 F.2d 259, 260 (5th Cir. 1979) (per
   curiam) (holding that reasonable suspicion “was supplied by the smell of the
   marijuana”).
                                         A
          We first address the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to
   Sergeant Gilboy. The parties agree that the initial stop was lawful, but
   disagree on whether Sergeant Gilboy could have smelled marijuana, and thus,
   whether the subsequent detention was lawful. The district court concluded
   that Sergeant Gilboy had reasonable suspicion to extend the detention,
   relying on his testimony that he smelled marijuana. Otkins, however,
   contends there are genuine issues of material fact that call into question
   whether Sergeant Gilboy could have smelled marijuana. Specifically, he
   argues that there are issues concerning the timing of Otkins’s and Sergeant
   Gilboy’s exits from their vehicles, the manner of storage and location of the
   marijuana, and Sergeant Gilboy’s “inability to specify” whether the
   marijuana was raw or burnt. The district court concluded that these disputes
   were immaterial. We do not.
          Both parties agree that Otkins exited his car first. They also agree that
   Sergeant Gilboy was parked approximately fifteen feet behind Otkins. From
   there, the testimony differs. Sergeant Gilboy testified that he “smelled the
   odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle” when he was “three or four

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                                          No. 22-30752

   feet” from it. He further explained that the odor “fann[ed]” towards him
   when Otkins closed his car door.
           Otkins, however, offered evidence that he exited his car and waited
   near the trunk, with his door and windows fully closed, for Sergeant Gilboy
   to approach. Under this version of the facts, Sergeant Gilboy was much
   farther than “three or four feet” from the Otkins’s closing door. Otkins also
   points out the improbable timeline to which Sergeant Gilboy testified. Gilboy
   testified that Otkins opened his door first, and that it took Otkins
   “[a]pproximately two seconds” to close it. In essence, then, Gilboy’s
   testimony is that he opened his door, closed it, and covered the fifteen feet
   between them within the two seconds it took Otkins to close his door, to be
   in a position to smell the “fann[ed]” odor.
           Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Otkins, Sergeant Gilboy
   was up to fifteen feet away from the car door when it closed, not three. We
   agree with the district court that the dueling accounts alter the timeline by
   only a few seconds. We conclude, however, that this distinction presents a
   genuine issue of material fact. A reasonable jury could conclude that
   Sergeant Gilboy could not have smelled the odor of marijuana “fanning”
   from a distance farther than three feet, and accordingly, that he lacked
   reasonable suspicion to further detain Otkins. Summary judgment was thus
   improper as to Sergeant Gilboy.2 See Hayter v. City of Mount Vernon, 154 F.3d
   269, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming denial of summary judgment for

           _____________________
           2
              The parties agree that prolonging an otherwise completed detention to conduct
   a dog sniff, absent reasonable suspicion, violates the Fourth Amendment. See Rodriguez v.
   United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015) (holding that police may not extend an otherwise
   completed traffic stop, in order to conduct a dog sniff, absent reasonable suspicion).
   Because there is a fact issue regarding reasonable suspicion for the dog sniff here, however,
   we cannot say whether Sergeant Gilboy’s actions violated a clearly established right, and
   we must remand.

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                                     No. 22-30752

   qualified immunity where fact issues remained regarding whether officers
   smelled marijuana).
                                           B
          We now turn to the responding officers. The district court concluded
   that qualified immunity applied to Officers Pearse, Roth, and Deroche,
   because Sergeant Gilboy, in its view, smelled marijuana and had reasonable
   suspicion to prolong the detention.
          Whether Sergeant Gilboy smelled marijuana, standing alone, is not
   dispositive of the lawfulness of the other officers’ action, as the district court
   suggested. Rather, the proper inquiry where an officer acts on the oral
   statements of another officer is whether “it was objectively reasonable for
   him to believe, on the basis of the statements,” that he had a sufficient basis
   for his actions. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 166 (5th Cir. 2009)
   (alteration omitted) (quoting Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 455 (3d Cir.
   1997)). In other words, Officers Pearse, Roth, and Deroche are entitled to
   qualified immunity if they “reasonably believe[d]” Sergeant Gilboy’s
   statement that he smelled marijuana. Id.
          For example, we held in Deville that a responding officer was
   qualifiedly immune because he “reasonably believe[d]” another officer’s
   oral statements that there was probable cause to arrest. Id. at 166-67. There,
   the evidence showed that the initial officer communicated the reason for the
   traffic stop to the responding officer, and no evidence showed that the
   responding officer had a “reason to disbelieve” the statements.                Id.
   Accordingly, we affirmed summary judgment as to the responding officer,
   even though we reversed as to the initial officer, because fact issues called
   into question whether he, in fact, had probable cause. Id. at 166.
          So too here. The record reveals that Sergeant Gilboy communicated
   to the responding officers over the radio that he smelled marijuana when he

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                                         No. 22-30752

   requested backup, and nothing in the record indicates that Pearse, Roth, or
   Deroche had any reason to doubt the veracity of Sergeant Gilboy’s statement.
   Otkins suggests that racial animosity played a role in the detention and
   created circumstances “conducive to lying.” Simply put, Otkins’s race has
   no bearing on whether Pearse, Roth, and Deroche reasonably believed
   Sergeant Gilboy’s statement that he smelled marijuana—which he made
   over the radio, well before the responding officers knew Otkins’s race.3
   Otkins also offers excerpts from the officers’ discussion before arresting
   Otkins, but this too says nothing about whether they “had a reason to
   disbelieve” the “account of criminal activity from a seemingly reliable
   witnessing officer.” Deville, 567 F.3d at 167. The cited exchange concerns
   only the pending arrest, and does not reveal their views on Sergeant Gilboy’s
   statement.
           Because Otkins has not identified a genuine issue of material fact
   regarding the reasonable believability of Sergeant Gilboy’s statement,
   summary judgment was proper as to these defendants.
                                              IV
           Having determined that genuine issues of material fact preclude
   summary judgment for qualified immunity as to Sergeant Jack Gilboy, we
   VACATE the district court’s order granting defendants’ motion for
   summary judgment as to him, and REMAND to the district court.

           _____________________
           3
               For example, Otkins suggests that Roth’s use of the term “brother” when
   speaking to him was a “micro-aggression,” charged with racial connotations. Regardless
   of that term’s meaning, Roth’s use of it says nothing about whether he reasonably believed
   Gilboy’s radio call that he smelled marijuana.

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                                         No. 22-30752

   However, we AFFIRM the order granting summary judgment as it relates
   to Officers Barrett Pearse, William Roth, and Joshua Deroche.4

           _____________________
           4
              Several unidentified persons appear on the caption as “Unidentified Parties.”
   The district court granted final judgment in favor of these unidentified parties. The
   appellate briefing, however, does not address these parties. Therefore, we do not consider
   that part of the judgment on appeal.

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