Court Opinion

ID: 9570329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:22:21.671577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:45.576891
License: Public Domain

Judge Wynn
dissenting.
Defendant filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from default judgment. The majority correctly holds that the relief defendant is seeking can only be obtained through an appeal of the judgment to this Court. Since defendant did not follow the correct procedure, this case is subject to dismissal. Under Rule 2 of the Rules of Appellate proce*212dure, however, this Court has the power to suspend the rules in order to prevent manifest injustice to a party. I would exercise our Rule 2 authority and conclude that defendant should have been permitted to take a paternity test.
The trial court should have allowed for defendant’s paternity test because “a defendant’s right to a blood test is a substantial right and . . . upon defendant’s motion, the court must order the test when it is possible to do so.” State v. Fowler, 277 N.C. 305, 177 S.E.2d 385, 387 (1970). In the subject case, defendant requested a blood test on three separate occasions, but, on each occasion, he was unable to pay the $225.00 fee. Since defendant’s request was made before the default judgment was entered, the trial court should have ordered the blood test and, following a failure by defendant to take the court ordered test, the court should have then acted. See State ex rel. Hill v. Manning, 110 N.C. App. 770, 431 S.E.2d 207 (1993) (the defendant was allowed to have a blood test performed upon a request made after entry of default but prior to entry of judgment). The court should not have acted, however, based on defendant’s failure take a blood test which defendant personally requested; especially since defendant’s failure was due to his indigency.
Under the circumstances of this case, it is not fair to burden defendant with the financial responsibility of a child that he contends is not his when there is a genetic test that can answer this simple question. The implications of finding him to be the father of the subject child based on an entry of default is not only unfair to him — it is an indignity to the child. Modern science has advanced the accuracy of a blood test for paternity to nearly a point of certainty. Defendant adamantly contends that he is not the father of the subject child, and, because of his indigency, he has been denied the opportunity to have this matter settled by a test that should have been ordered by the trial court. Moreover, should he wilfully fail to obey the trial court’s order for the paternity test, the trial court should exercise its contempt powers, rather than summarily entering a judgment that he is the father of the subject child.