Court Opinion

ID: 9959620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:03:13.792559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:28.336421
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

         JON M. HALL COMPANY, LLC, a Florida limited liability
                           company,

                                Petitioner,

                                    v.

         CANOE CREEK INVESTMENTS, LLC, a Florida limited
       liability company; NEAL COMMUNITIES OF SOUTHWEST
      FLORIDA, LLC, a Florida limited liability company; and MML
                II, LLC, a Florida limited liability company,

                              Respondents.

                             No. 2D23-1368

                              April 12, 2024

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Manatee County;
Charles P. Sniffen, Judge.

Robert W. Schrimpf of Roetzel & Andress, P.A., Fort Myers, for Petitioner.

Marie A. Borland, Erik P. Raines, and Andrew Holway of Hill, Ward &
Henderson, P.A., Tampa, for Respondents.

KHOUZAM, Judge.
     Petitioner Jon M. Hall Company, LLC (Hall), timely seeks a writ of
certiorari to quash a circuit court order in favor of Respondents Canoe
Creek Investments, LLC, Neal Communities of Southwest Florida, LLC,
and MML II, LLC (collectively, Canoe Creek). The order grants partial
summary judgment for Canoe Creek on Count II of Hall's complaint (for
foreclosure of a construction lien) and also denies Hall's motion for leave
to amend the complaint to add a new defendant and assert new claims.
     In this court, Hall frames two issues, challenging both of the trial
court's rulings as departures from the essential requirements of the law.
Because Hall has not demonstrated any departure, we deny the petition.
We write to discuss Hall's contention that the trial court misconstrued
sections 713.22 and 713.24, Florida Statutes (2022),1 in concluding that
Hall's claim of lien was extinguished by operation of law.
                              BACKGROUND
     The parties entered into a contract in March 2020, under which
Canoe Creek was to pay Hall to provide construction and other services
at Canoe Creek's property. A dispute arose: Hall contended it performed
all work under the contract; Canoe Creek disagreed and refused to pay.
     On April 14, 2022, Hall recorded a claim of lien on Canoe Creek's
property in the amount of $825,639.46 (the Original Claim of Lien). The
following month, on May 17, 2022, Canoe Creek transferred the Original
Claim of Lien to a lien transfer bond pursuant to section 713.24(1)(b).
Three days later, on May 20, 2022, Canoe Creek recorded a notice of
contest of Hall's lien pursuant to section 713.22(2).
     In late May 2022, Hall recorded an amended claim of lien on Canoe
Creek's property in the new amount of $1,837,516.76 (the Amended
Claim of Lien).
     On June 14, 2022, Hall filed a five-count complaint against Canoe
Creek. Hall's complaint does not name the bond surety as a defendant.

     1 Although these statutes were amended in 2023, the underlying

events occurred in 2022, so the previous versions apply here.
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      Relevant here is Count II for foreclosure of construction lien.
Therein, Hall identified both its Original Claim of Lien and its Amended
Claim of Lien, seeking to foreclose in the amount of the higher Amended
Claim of Lien. Hall's complaint does not mention Canoe Creek's transfer
of the Original Claim of Lien to the surety or Canoe Creek's recorded
notice of contest of Hall's Original Claim of Lien. Hall's complaint does
not mention the transfer bond, much less assert a claim against it.
      About two weeks later, on July 1, 2022, Canoe Creek transferred
the Amended Claim of Lien to a lien transfer bond pursuant to section
713.24(1)(b). The surety was the same as for the Original Claim of Lien.
On the same day that Canoe Creek transferred Hall's Amended Claim of
Lien to bond, Canoe Creek also recorded a notice of contest of Hall's
Amended Claim of Lien pursuant to section 713.22(2).
      On December 19, 2022, five months after Canoe Creek transferred
Hall's Amended Claim of Lien to bond and recorded its notice of contest
of it, Canoe Creek moved for partial summary judgment on Count II,
Hall's claim for foreclosure of construction lien. Canoe Creek asserted
that transferring to bond and recording notices of contest as to both
Hall's Original Claim of Lien and Amended Claim of Lien had shortened
the time for Hall to bring an action against the bond. Hall had failed to
timely do so, thereby resulting in the automatic extinguishment of the
lien as a matter of law. Hall opposed the motion.
      On February 13, 2023, two months after the summary judgment
motion was filed but before it was ruled upon, Hall moved to amend its
complaint. Relevant here, Hall sought to add the surety as a defendant
to Count II, its claim for foreclosure of construction lien.
      Following a hearing on May 9, 2022, the trial court granted Canoe
Creek's motion for partial summary judgment on Count II. The court

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reasoned that under sections 713.22(2) and 713.24(1)(b) and (4), Canoe
Creek's transfer and recording of the notice of contest as to the Amended
Claim of Lien during the litigation shortened the time for Hall to bring a
claim against the bond to sixty days, and Hall's failure to timely do so
extinguished its lien automatically as a matter of law. After the trial
court reduced its ruling to writing, it entered an agreed upon stay
pending appellate review, and Hall's petition timely followed.
                                  ANALYSIS
      Certiorari Jurisdiction and Legal Standard
      As a threshold matter, the parties agree that under this court's
decision in Farrey's Wholesale Hardware Co. v. Coltin Electrical Services,
LLC, 263 So. 3d 168, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018), Hall has satisfied the
jurisdictional requirements for certiorari review. That is because
"potentially losing the benefit of a recovery under a bond on a claim to
enforce a lien constitutes the type of irreparable harm necessary to
entitle a party to certiorari relief." Id. (citing Gator Boring & Trenching,
Inc. v. Westra Constr. Corp., 210 So. 3d 175, 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)).
      Thus, the remaining question is whether the trial court departed
from the essential requirements of the law, which "is something more
than a simple legal error." See Allstate Ins. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d
885, 889 (Fla. 2003) (citing Ivey v. Allstate Ins., 774 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla.
2000)). "A district court should exercise its discretion to grant certiorari
review only when there has been a violation of a clearly established
principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Id.
      Further, "certiorari jurisdiction cannot be used to create new law
where the decision below recognizes the correct general law and applies
the correct law to a new set of facts to which it has not been previously
applied," as in that event, "the law at issue is not a clearly established

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principle of law." Nader v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 87
So. 3d 712, 723 (Fla. 2012) (citing Ivey, 774 So. 2d at 682-83).
     The Parties' Arguments
     Hall contends the trial court departed from the essential
requirements of the law by misinterpreting sections 713.22 and 713.24.
Hall raises several arguments, relying principally on its factual assertion
that Canoe Creek "did not transfer their lien during this proceeding. It
was transferred just prior." (Emphasis added.)
     On that express basis, Hall asserts that the court wrongly applied
section 713.24(4), which addresses circumstances in which the lien is
transferred during litigation. According to Hall, "there was no time limit
on when Hall could bring its claim against [the surety], so long as it had
timely initiated suit on the lien claim against the property owner."
     But as Canoe Creek persuasively responds, this argument ignores
Hall's Amended Claim of Lien, which is more than double the amount of
the Original Claim of Lien and upon which Hall's foreclosure claim seeks
relief. That Amended Claim of Lien undisputedly was transferred to
bond and noticed for contest by Canoe Creek during the litigation.
     Thus, as illustrated by Hiller v. Phoenix Associates of South Florida,
Inc., 189 So. 3d 272 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, No. SC16–711, 2016
WL 3522783 (Fla. June 28, 2016), upon the recording of the notice of
contest of the transferred Amended Claim of Lien, section 713.22(2)
operated to shorten the time for Hall to bring a claim against the bond to
sixty days. As we now explain, because Hall did not seek to bring such a
claim within the sixty-day statutory window—instead, waiting an
additional five months after the window expired—its lien was
"extinguished automatically" as provided by section 713.22(2).

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      Statutory Analysis
     Our supreme court has specified that "[t]he purpose of the fixed
periods provided in such statutory remedies as . . . the Mechanics' Lien
Law was to make definite and certain the time within which the matter
can be considered as ended." Jack Stilson & Co. v. Caloosa Bayview
Corp., 278 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 1973). The legislative remedy "affects
more than the immediate parties in many instances; there are lenders,
buyers and others who rely on the fixed periods of time in the lien law.
This assurance should not be destroyed by an 'open-ended' right of
amendment by a lienor beyond the period provided by statute." Id.
     To that end, "[t]he mechanics' lien law is to be strictly construed in
every particular and strict compliance is an indispensable prerequisite
for a person seeking affirmative relief under the statute." Hiller, 189 So.
3d at 274 (quoting Home Elec. of Dade Cnty., Inc. v. Gonas, 547 So. 2d
109, 111 (Fla. 1989)). In such proceedings, "the trial court does not have
the same discretion to bend time requirements that might be allowed
under the rules of civil procedure." Id. (quoting Dracon Constr., Inc. v.
Facility Constr. Mgmt., 828 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)).
Thus, "[i]t is settled law that recovery may not be allowed where the
moving party does not comply with the time restrictions and notice
requirements of" chapter 713. Id. (quoting N. Am. Spec. Ins. v. Bergeron
Land Dev., Inc., 745 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).
     The two construction lien statutes at the heart of this dispute are
section 713.22 and section 713.24. Section 713.22(1) sets a general one-
year deadline for a party who has recorded a claim of lien to bring an
action to enforce the lien. But subsection (2) of that statute states that
"[a]n owner . . . may elect to shorten the time prescribed in subsection (1)
within which to commence an action to enforce any claim of lien or claim

                                     6
against a bond or other security under . . . s. 713.24 by recording in the
clerk's office a" notice of contest of lien. (Emphasis added.) It provides
further that "[t]he lien of any lienor upon whom such notice is served and
who fails to institute a suit to enforce his or her lien within 60 days after
service of such notice shall be extinguished automatically." Id.
      With respect to transfers, section 713.24(1)(b) provides that "[a]ny
lien claimed under this part may be transferred . . . from such real
property to other security" by, as relevant here, filing in the clerk's office
a bond executed by a surety. The clerk is thereafter obligated to "make
and record a certificate showing the transfer of the lien from the real
property to the security." Id. "Upon filing the certificate of transfer, the
real property shall thereupon be released from the lien claimed, and such
lien shall be transferred to said security." Id.
      Section 713.24(4) provides that where "a proceeding to enforce a
transferred lien is not commenced within the time specified in s. 713.22,"
the clerk must return the security upon request. However, that same
subsection continues:
      If a proceeding to enforce a lien is commenced in a court of
      competent jurisdiction within the time specified in s. 713.22
      and, during such proceeding, the lien is transferred pursuant
      to this section[,] . . . an action commenced within 1 year after
      the transfer, unless otherwise shortened by operation of law,
      in the same county or circuit court to recover against the
      security shall be deemed to have been brought as of the date
      of filing the action to enforce the lien, and the court shall
      have jurisdiction over the action.
(Emphasis added.)
      Construing these two statutes together, this court has expressly
held that the "unless otherwise shortened by operation of law" language
in section 713.24(4) encompasses the time-shortening provision of
section 713.22(2). Hiller, 189 So. 3d at 275 ("Pursuant to the 'unless

                                       7
otherwise shortened by operation of law' language in section 713.24(4),
section 713.22(2) allows the owner to shorten the time period to
commence an action on the security by filing a notice of contest . . . .").
      Thus, under the plain statutory language, where a lien is
transferred to a bond during litigation, and the owner records a notice of
contest, the lienor has "60 days" "within which to commence an action to
enforce any claim of lien or claim against a bond," or else the "lien . . .
shall be extinguished automatically." See §§ 713.22(2), .24(4); Hiller, 189
So. 3d at 275 ("Accordingly, the failure to bring an action against the
surety within [sixty days] after the transfer results in the extinguishment
of the right to make a claim on the bond."); Rabil v. Seaside Builders,
LLC, 226 So. 3d 935, 937 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) ("[The homeowners] posted
a lien transfer bond and recorded a notice of contest of the lien. . . .
Because the contractor did not file suit against the surety within sixty
days, the lien was automatically extinguished by operation of law . . . .").
      Here, it is true that Hall's Original Claim of Lien was recorded,
transferred, and noticed for contest before the litigation commenced.
However, before the June 2022 lawsuit, Hall also recorded an Amended
Claim of Lien, more than doubling the amount claimed. Hall thereafter
filed its complaint, expressly acknowledging and seeking to recover on
the higher Amended Claim of Lien. Two weeks later, Canoe Creek
transferred the Amended Claim of Lien to the bond and recorded its
notice of contest thereof, just as it had with the original one.
      Thus, after Hall commenced litigation on its Amended Claim of
Lien, Canoe Creek's actions in transferring the Amended Claim of Lien to
bond under section 713.24 and then recording its notice of contest of the
Amended Claim of Lien under section 713.22(2) operated to shorten the

                                      8
time period for Hall to bring an action against the surety on the bond to
sixty days. See Hiller, 189 So. 3d at 275; Rabil, 226 So. 3d at 937.
       In the petition, Hall's argument ignores the facts surrounding its
Amended Claim of Lien, asserting unequivocally that Canoe Creek "did
not transfer their lien during this proceeding. It was transferred just
prior," referring only to the Original Claim of Lien. Even though Canoe
Creek's response identifies that the Amended Claim of Lien was
transferred during the suit, Hall continues to rely in reply on the transfer
of the Original Claim of Lien, stating "[t]his lawsuit was commenced
within 60 days of that initial transfer, and thus was timely."
       But that is not the issue at hand; nobody has asserted that Hall's
still-pending lawsuit against Canoe Creek was untimely. Instead, the
summary judgment question is the legal effect of Hall's failure to seek to
bring a claim against the surety on the bond for more than sixty days
after Canoe Creek transferred the Amended Claim of Lien during the
litigation and recorded its notice of contest of lien.
       On that question, the statutory language is quite clear: after Hall
"commenced" this "proceeding to enforce a lien" expressly seeking to
recover on its Amended Claim of Lien, "during such proceeding, the lien
[wa]s transferred" by Canoe Creek. See § 713.24(4). When Canoe Creek,
as the owner of the property, recorded its notice of contest of the
transferred Amended Claim of Lien, that "shorten[ed] the time . . . within
which to commence an action to enforce any claim of lien or claim
against a bond or other security." See § 713.22(2) (emphasis added).
Hall's failure to seek to claim against the bond within sixty days
thereafter caused its lien to "be extinguished automatically" by operation
of law. See id.; see also Hiller, 189 So. 3d at 275; Rabil, 226 So. 3d at
937.

                                      9
     Hall contends "this case is wholly distinguishable from Hiller" on
the basis that Hall's Original Claim of Lien was transferred to bond
before Hall commenced this lawsuit, whereas in Hiller the transfer
occurred after the lawsuit was filed. See Hiller, 189 So. 3d at 273-74.
But like in Hiller, Canoe Creek transferred the operative claim of lien—
Hall's Amended Claim of Lien—after the lawsuit was filed. Hall fails to
persuasively explain why the statutory language as interpreted in Hiller
would not apply with full force to such a claim, particularly where Hall's
foreclosure count sought relief on its higher Amended Claim of Lien.
     Further, even if this distinction were legally relevant in this case, it
was not a departure from the essential requirements of the law for the
trial court to rely on Hiller, which is otherwise directly on point. See
Nader, 87 So. 3d at 723. In fact, had the court declined to follow Hiller,
that may well have been a departure. See Dep't of Highway Safety &
Motor Vehicles v. Walsh, 204 So. 3d 169, 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ("This
failure to follow [controlling case] was a profound error, amounting to a
clear departure from the essential requirements of law . . . .").
     In its reply, Hall acknowledges the postcommencement transfer of
its Amended Claim of Lien, but asserts that the only transfer that
matters was the original because "there can be only one claim of lien,"
citing to Jack Stilson & Co., 278 So. 2d at 283. Although this general
proposition is true, it does not operate to preserve the lien past its
express statutory endpoint.
     In addition to the foregoing plain language analysis of sections
713.22 and 713.24, section 713.08(4)(b) states that claims of lien "may
be amended at any time during the period allowed for recording such
claim of lien, provided that such amendment shall not cause any person

                                     10
to suffer any detriment by having acted in good faith in reliance upon
such claim of lien as originally recorded." (Emphasis added.)
      Hall's argument—that the transfer of the Amended Claim of Lien
was irrelevant because the "only" claim of lien had already been
transferred—would violate this provision by eviscerating Canoe Creek's
statutory rights both to release its property from the Amended Claim of
Lien and to shorten the time for Hall to claim against the bond. Hall
cannot have it both ways: if amending its claim of lien allowed Hall to
encumber Canoe Creek's property and seek more money in foreclosure,
then Canoe Creek was likewise allowed to take "advantage of these
special statutory lien rights by posting a transfer bond thereby
transferring the lien on the real property to a surety bond and removing
the cloud on [the] property's title." Hiller, 189 So. 3d at 273-74.
      Hall also asserts that both of Canoe Creek's notices of contest of
lien were invalid because they were recorded after Canoe Creek had
already transferred the claims of lien to bond. But Hall has not cited,
nor have we found, any support for this claim. Indeed, the only case Hall
cites for this proposition involved the same order of events, without
suggesting there was anything improper about it. See Woolems, Inc. v.
Catalina Caststone Creations, Inc., 358 So. 3d 1265, 1266-67 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2023) (lien transfer bond filed June 22, 2021; first notice of contest
of lien filed June 29, 2021). Other cases likewise follow this pattern.
See, e.g., Hiller, 189 So. 3d at 273-74 (stating that Hiller "post[ed] a
transfer bond thereby transferring the lien on the real property to a
surety bond and removing the cloud on her property's title. Hiller then
filed a notice of contest under section 713.22(2)" (emphasis added));
Rabil, 226 So. 3d at 936 ("The homeowners subsequently posted a lien
transfer bond and recorded a notice of contest of lien.").

                                     11
      Hall contends in the alternative that, even if Canoe Creek's transfer
of the Amended Claim of Lien was relevant and appropriate, Hall's lien
was not extinguished because it "commenced" this suit against Canoe
Creek within sixty days of the transfer of the Original Claim of Lien.
According to Hall, "there was no time limit on when Hall could bring its
claim against [the surety], so long as it timely initiated suit on the lien
claim against the property owner." Hall is incorrect.
      To begin with, this argument was rejected in Hiller. Acknowledging
"the nature of this special statutory proceeding," this court dismissed the
"contention that there was no deadline to bring a claim against the
surety." 189 So. 3d at 275. Rather, "the fact that [the lienor] had a
proceeding pending against the lien at the time of the transfer did not
excuse compliance with the other provisions of chapter 713." Id.
      Further, even though Hall had already "commenced" this action
against Canoe Creek, that does not mean it was also "commenced" as to
the nonparty surety. Rather, this court has held that an existing action
is not "commenced" as to a party until that party is named in the
lawsuit. See Arizone v. Homeowners Choice Prop. & Cas. Ins., 313 So. 3d
913, 915-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (holding lawsuit initiated March 2016 by
one plaintiff was not "commenced" as to another plaintiff until August
2016 upon filing of amended complaint naming second plaintiff as party).
      Hall also relies on Woolems, in which the Third District affirmed a
ruling that an amended counterclaim to enforce a lien "was timely filed,
although it was filed outside the limitations period provided by sections
713.22 and .24," based on the relation-back doctrine. 358 So. 3d at
1268. Although Hall maintains it is "not making a 'relation-back'
argument" here, it nonetheless says Woolems shows "that a plaintiff
could pursue its claim to foreclose a mechanic's lien even though that

                                      12
claim was filed well after the 60-day period as construed by the trial
court."
      But unlike Hiller, Woolems is truly distinguishable on a
fundamental point: there, the "amended counterclaim filed outside the
limitations period did not introduce a new party; the real parties,
interests, and essential elements of controversy remained the same." Id.
(emphasis added). The Third District then emphasized the point, saying
although "[g]enerally, 'the relation-back doctrine does not apply when an
amendment seeks to bring in an entirely new party defendant to the suit
after the statute of limitations period has expired[,]' [t]hat is not the case
here." Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting
Caduceus Props., LLC v. Graney, 137 So. 3d 987, 994 (Fla. 2014)). Thus,
Woolems does not support renewing an extinguished lien, nor does it
support Hall's alternative request to add a new party defendant.
      Ultimately, because Hall has not established a departure from the
essential requirements of the law, we deny the petition.
      Denied.

CASANUEVA and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.

                        __________________________

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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