Court Opinion

ID: 9628357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:17:43.765399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:27.933798
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
Taking this case on an individual basis, I concur in the Court’s opinion that no error was committed in the court below. That opinion, however, refers to a companion case involving the same defendant, State v. Powers, 100 Idaho 290, 596 P.2d 802 (1979), in which we heard oral argument at Lewiston in May of this same year.
The State had earlier moved that the two appeals be consolidated for argument.1 We denied the motion on an objection raised by counsel for Powers.2 It appears all too clearly now that the State’s motion should have been granted, and the two appeals heard at the same time.
The appeal heard in May involved the sale of a small quantity of marijuana; this appeal involves the sale of a small quantity3 of an amphetamine. The sales both took place three years ago in 1976, the marijuana being sold in one county, the amphetamine in another; both sales were made to State undercover agents.
While both appeals were pending Powers was at liberty under rather heavy bond, $25,000 in each case, paying an annual premium of $5,000. In January of 1979, on Powers’ application we reduced the bond on each appeal to $10,000. Powers made a showing which included proof that since the convictions he had materially changed his life style, having married, had one child, expecting another, and having become steadily employed in helicopter logging (with a goodly share of his income being diverted to repay those who had advanced the premiums for his bail bonds).
As Justice Bakes wrote in affirming on the first appeal, 100 Idaho at 292, 596 P.2d at 804, Powers’ “counsel4 convincingly argued that Powers’ law abiding conduct in *617the two years since his conviction indicates that he would be a good candidate for probation.” His counsel argued primarily the facts presented to this Court in seeking the bond reduction, which also included a “fine” of approximately $10,000 in bond premiums, plus counsel’s own strong personal recommendation of and faith in the new Powers. But, as Justice Bakes then wrote, matters taking place after the sentencing could not be considered on appellate review of the sentence imposed.
The argument on the first appeal was not only convincing, but eloquently presented. The thought occurred to me then, and I voice it now with this second appeal now disposed of, that there is a shortcoming in our criminal appeal procedures, that is, it seems inherently wrong that a defendant can be out on bond for two years, as in this case, waiting for his appeals to be heard, and, notwithstanding a complete turnabout for the better, be hustled off to prison to serve his terms without any opportunity for establishing that he no longer is in need of a penitentiary sentence. As Justice Bakes pointed out, counsel’s convincing argument before this Court was well received, but could be of no avail here for reasons stated.
All of which brings me to suggest that 'the legislature consider an amendment to I.C. § 19-2601(4) which would confer jurisdiction upon a district court to reconsider the imposed sentence where the appeal has not been heard and disposed of within one year. A defendant so situated should have such a right, and here there was good reason to believe that the eloquence and sincerity of Powers’ counsel on the first appeal, with proper substantiation of the facts, very well might have caused the district court to see no benefit to society or to Powers in putting Powers in prison as against utilizing the procedures already made available by the legislature in I.C. § 19-2601.
I am further brought to remark that these two cases alone, and there have been others, present the Court with sufficient grounds for devising a summary appellate procedure whereby the original district court record can forthwith be transmitted to this Court, and appeals disposed of entirely on oral argument alone — perhaps with 14 days prefiling of issues to be presented and statement of authorities relied upon. Such appeals should be disposed of within 30 days after the entry of the district court judgment. Similar procedures obtained in other jurisdictions.
Had Powers’ activities been confined to one county, resulting in one information with two counts, or, had there been a consolidated appeal, it seems likely to me that in district court he might have received only the three years on each, concurrently, which was meted out to him on the first conviction, or, on appeal, that such might have been done here by modification. All considered, a three-year sentence for his total activity would have been more than sufficient. Being unable, however, to fault the rationale of a majority of the Court, in this appeal individually taken and pursued, I reluctantly concur, my hesitance being occasioned by the peculiar circumstances of these two cases.

. Appeal No. 12635 heard in May was filed in this Court on May 31, 1977. Appeal No. 12639, this case, was filed on June 1, 1977.

. The objection, which we should have overruled out of hand, was simply a conclusionary statement that there was a diversity of issues in the two cases, and possible prejudice to Powers.

. Counsel at oral argument asserted that the quantity was so miniscule that after the State tested it, not enough remained for a second test by the defense.

. Mr. Kenneth Anderson on that appeal.