Court Opinion

ID: 9650674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:48:28.934937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:25.084395
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Koberts:
Unlike the majority, I believe that it was reasonable for the trier of fact to conclude that the accident occurred because defendant’s tractor struck the rear of the tractor-trailer rig parked on the side of the highway. Under the circumstances, it seems to me that the damage to the front of the tractor and the rear *339of the rig without question reasonably permits such an inference. The fact that better circumstantial evidence could have been obtained by comparing “the location and extent of damage on the two vehicles” does not alter this observation. Nor does the “strange silence” of the record as to the presence of an occupant of the parked rig.1 Indeed I believe careful analysis shows that the majority’s determination that the trier of fact resorted to conjecture rather than reasonable inference is merely the majority’s dissatisfaction with the quality of evidence produced in light of what appeared to be available. Such a defect, I submit, is not a valid basis for holding as a matter of law that plaintiff failed to make out a case.
Pinpointing “the essential difficulty” with appellee’s case as a reliance on “circumstantial supposition” rather than “circumstantial evidence,” the majority cites as support Johnston v. Dick, 401 Pa. 637, 165 A. 2d 634 (1960). This citation falls woefully short of supporting its conclusion. In Johnston, plaintiff was injured when a mixture of kerosene and gasoline exploded as he was filling a highway lantern. Plaintiff’s theory was that defendant had negligently placed this highly explosive mixture instead of solely kerosene, a much less volatile fluid, in the tank from which plaintiff had drawn his lamplighting fluid. Plaintiff proved only that he was injured by the explosion and that defendant was the individual responsible for filling the tank.
Since in Johnston over 24 hours had elapsed from the time defendant filled the tank to plaintiff’s injury, it was obvious that, absent evidence tending to show that defendant alone had access to the tank, gasoline could have been added to the tank either during that *34024 hour period or even prior to defendant’s last delivery. Accordingly, we held that plaintiff had failed to connect defendant with his injury, and that to permit the factfinder to infer that defendant was negligent would therefore be unreasonable.2 In the instant case, it was reasonable to infer from the location of the damage on the two vehicles that a rear end collision occurred with the parked rig. Moreover, we have held in several cases that a decedent was contributorily negligent a,s. a matter of law when, on a clear night, his- vehicle collided with the rear of another. See Griffith v. Weiner, 373 Pa. 184, 95 A. 2d 517 (1953); Grutski v. Kline, 352 Pa. 401, 43 A. 2d 142 (1945). If such is the case, the location of the damage here should be sufficient to create a question for the fact-finder.
Having concluded that the plaintiff’s theory rests on an inference which could reasonably be drawn, I *341hardly think it is open to doubt in this case that plaintiff’s evidence preponderates so as to sustain the court’s verdict. Defendants introduced no evidence at all. As to plaintiff’s case, as the majority’s review of the evidence suggests, no other explanation of the accident was even faintly indicated.
Finally, even on the majority’s own theory — that appellee failed to prove negligence below — its disposition in my view is improper. Rather than remand for a new trial as the majority does, on its theory of the absence of negligence the court below should have been directed to enter a verdict for appellant. Accordingly, I dissent.
Mr. Justice Musmanno joins in this dissenting opinion.

 Indeed it is perfectly possible that no one was in the parked rig when it was hit. If so, how would it have served the plaintiff to have mentioned the fact the rig was unoccupied?

 A more analogous ease to the present situation than Johnston is Garber v. Great A. & P. Tea Company, 397 Pa. 323, 155 A. 2d 346 (1959). Plaintiff in Garber was injured while shopping when a can of Wesson oil fell on her. The alleged negligence was improper stacking of the cans. Affirming plaintiff’s verdict, we said: “We think that the ease was properly left within the competence of the jury. The cans were so stacked that they were dangerous because their construction would make them likely to fall over, and Mrs. Garber was standing, doing nothing, when one of them did fall on her. Defendant’s responsibility for such an occurrence is an entirely reasonable conclusion under Smith v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 397 Pa. 134 (1959), 153 A. 2d 477, where we said: ‘It is not necessary, under Pennsylvania law, that every fact or circumstance point unerringly to liability; it is enough that there be sufficient facts for the jury to say reasonably that the preponderance favors liability. The judge cannot say as a matter of law which are facts and which are not unless they are admitted or the evidence is inherently incredible. . . . The facts are for the jury in a case whether based upon direct or circumstantial evidence where a reasonable conclusion can be arrived at which would place liability on the defendant.’ ” (397 Pa. at 325, 155 A, 2d at 347-38)