Court Opinion

ID: 9900418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:12:38.289048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.362200
License: Public Domain

648                   June 28, 2023                No. 328

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

              In the Matter of the Estate of
              Nettie Schoolcraft, Deceased.
                 Maycie WILLIAMSON,
                       Appellant,
                            v.
                   Eddie ZIELINSKI,
                      Respondent.
               Lane County Circuit Court
                  21PB02226; A177895

  Lauren S. Holland, Judge.
  Argued and submitted March 16, 2023.
   Philip M. Wasley argued the cause for appellant. Also on
the briefs was Wasley Law Office, P.C.
   Robert Cole Tozer argued the cause and filed the briefs
for respondent.
   Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  JOYCE, J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 326 Or App 648 (2023)                              649

        JOYCE, J.
        This probate proceeding involves competing claims
to the estate of Nettie Schoolcraft. In March 2021, Maycie
Williamson, decedent’s granddaughter, filed a petition for
the probate of a will executed by decedent in 2018. Eddie
Zielinski, decedent’s son, petitioned the court to admit a will
executed by decedent in 2020. Williamson filed an objection,
alleging that (1) decedent lacked the testamentary capacity
to execute the 2020 will and (2) that the will was a product
of undue influence. The trial court found that Zielinski met
his “burden of production and proof as to the testamentary
capacity of the decedent and that there was no undue influ-
ence with regard to the September 1, 2020 Will.” The court
admitted the 2020 will into probate.
         Williamson appeals. In her first assignment of error,
Williamson challenges decedent’s testamentary capacity,
arguing that the trial court erred in finding decedent knew
the nature and extent of her property. In her second through
fifth assignments of error, Williamson raises several chal-
lenges related to the court’s determination that Zielinski
did not exert undue influence over decedent in the procure-
ment or execution of the 2020 will.
         Under ORS 19.415(3), unless we exercise our discre-
tion to review the matter de novo, we are bound by the trial
court’s findings of historical fact that are supported by any
evidence in the record; we review the court’s dispositional
conclusions for errors of law. Hammond v. Hammond, 246
Or App 775, 777, 268 P3d 691 (2011). In this case, we decline to
exercise our discretion to engage in de novo review, ORAP
5.40(8)(c), and affirm.
                TESTAMENTARY ABILITY
         Williamson argues that the trial court erred in
finding that decedent had testamentary capacity when
she executed the 2020 will, because, in Williamson’s view,
decedent had insufficient knowledge about the nature and
extent of her property. See Kastner v. Husband, 231 Or 133,
136, 372 P2d 520 (1962) (to have testamentary capacity, the
testator must, at time of making the will, know the nature
and extent of the property which makes up the estate).
650                                   Williamson v. Zielinski

         The burden of proof to establish that a testator had
testamentary capacity is upon the proponent of the will,
Zielinski in this case. Clauder v. Morser, 204 Or 378, 386,
282 P2d 352 (1955). However, when a will is executed in
due form, as in this case, Zielinski is entitled to the benefit
of a presumption that the testator is competent. Id. After
reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did
not err in determining that Williamson failed to rebut the
presumption of decedent’s competency.
         The trial court found that both attesting witnesses,
attorney Thomas Hoyt and Jeannie Salyer (Hoyt’s execu-
tive assistant who processed the will), testified credibly that
decedent was competent at the time of execution of the will.
See Covic v. Roso, 24 Or App 629, 634, 546 P2d 773, rev den
(1976) (giving great weight to the attesting witnesses in
determining the testamentary ability of the testator).
          In contrast, the primary evidentiary support that
Williamson provides to overcome the presumption of com-
petency is that the parties stipulated to the fact that the
full amount of the net sale proceeds of decedent’s real prop-
erties “were deposited into [decedent’s] Oregon Community
Credit Union accounts” at or near to the time of the sales.
In Williamson’s view, that stipulation proves that dece-
dent’s belief that Williamson had misappropriated her
money was false and, concomitantly, reflect that decedent
did not understand the nature and extent of her property.
But the stipulation that the sale proceeds were deposited
into decedent’s bank accounts by no means excludes a pos-
sibility that Williamson could have later misappropriated
some of the funds for her own benefit. Moreover, regard-
less of whether Williamson spent decedent’s money for her
own personal benefit, evidence in the record supports the
trial court’s finding that decedent knew the nature and
extent of her properties: She knew that her real proper-
ties had been sold by Williamson, and that at the time of
making the 2020 will, decedent had been receiving bank
statements from her credit union accounts and was aware
of the total amount of money she had left in the bank. The
trial court thus did not err as to decedent’s testamentary
capacity.
Cite as 326 Or App 648 (2023)                             651

                   UNDUE INFLUENCE
         Williamson also argues that the trial court erred
in concluding that the 2020 will was not a product of undue
influence by Zielinski. A will is a product of undue influence
when the influencer’s conduct “gained an unfair advantage
by devices which reasonable [people] regard as improper.”
Harris v. Jourdan, 218 Or App 470, 491, 180 P3d 119, rev den,
344 Or 558 (2008) (quotation marks omitted). A contestant
of a will—here, Williamson—bears the burden to establish
the existence of “a suspicion of undue influence,” meaning
that (1) a “confidential relationship” exists between the tes-
tator and the beneficiary, “such that the beneficiary held a
position of dominance over the testator”; and (2) there are
“suspicious circumstances surrounding the procurement or
execution of the will.” Knutsen v. Krippendorf, 124 Or App
299, 308, 862 P2d 509 (1993), rev den, 318 Or 381 (1994).
When the contestant of a will establishes that a confiden-
tial relationship existed and is coupled with suspicious cir-
cumstances, an inference of undue influence arises; in such
a case, the burden shifts to the beneficiary to produce evi-
dence to overcome that inference of undue influence. Id. at
308-09; see also Ramsey v. Taylor, 166 Or App 241, 262, 999
P2d 1178, rev den, 331 Or 244 (2000) (describing the burden
shifting process).
         On appeal, Zielinski does not dispute the trial
court’s conclusion of the existence of a confidential relation-
ship. We thus turn to the question of whether suspicious cir-
cumstances were present. See In re Reddaway’s Estate, 214
Or 410, 421-27, 329 P2d 886 (1958) (identifying seven fac-
tors to evaluate if suspicious circumstances of undue influ-
ence are present in a will contest case). Williamson relies
on three factors in support of her argument that suspicious
circumstances were present.
A.   Change in the Testator’s Plan of Disposing of Her Property
         Suspicion of undue influence can be aroused by “a
change in the testamentary plan that ignores the natural
objects of the testator’s bounty or disregards the continuity
of purpose running through former testamentary disposi-
tions.” Walker v. Roberds, 182 Or App 121, 127, 47 P3d 911
(2002).
652                                     Williamson v. Zielinski

         Decedent executed six wills during her life. As the
trial court observed, of all the wills executed by her, the 2018
will “was the only [w]ill that didn’t leave everything to the
children and left—without explanation, left 40 percent of
the estate to—of the residue of the estate to three grandchil-
dren.” In comparison, the 2020 will returned to decedent’s
previous disposition of her property—leaving her estate to
her children (though excluding Judy Steers, Williamson’s
mother, as a beneficiary), which had been decedent’s testa-
mentary plan in the four wills preceding the will executed
in 2018. In preparing the 2020 will, decedent expressly
articulated that she did not want to include Steers as a ben-
eficiary because she believed that Steers had already ben-
efited from the money that Williamson had taken from her
bank accounts. Under the circumstances, we agree with the
trial court’s conclusion that decedent’s decision to disinherit
Steers does not “ignore[ ] the natural objects of the testa-
tor’s bounty or disregard[ ] the continuity of purpose run-
ning through former testamentary dispositions.” Walker,
182 Or App at 127.
B.    Testator’s Susceptibility to Influence
         “The physical and mental condition of the [testa-
tor] is regarded as a factor of importance in determining
whether a disposition of property was the result of undue
influence.” Reddaway, 214 Or at 426. Decedent suffered
from dementia, mobility problems, had difficulties in read-
ing, and suffered a stroke about a year before signing the
2020 will. Even assuming that those facts weigh in favor of
her susceptibility to influence, Zielinski provided sufficient
evidence to overcome an inference of undue influence.
         Several disinterested witnesses testified at trial
that decedent was of her sound mind. The trial court took
particular note that Williamson herself testified that dece-
dent was not particularly easily led and that “everything
was done at the direction of [decedent].” Comparing the con-
ditions of decedent making the will in 2018, the court found
that decedent’s independence and susceptibility to influence
had not changed at the time of her signing the 2020 will.
         Williamson nevertheless argues that decedent’s
disposition of her property in the 2020 will was a result of
Cite as 326 Or App 648 (2023)                             653

undue influence exerted by Zielinski because he made
false representations to decedent about Williamson’s mis-
handling of the real properties’ sale proceeds. However,
decedent had been concerned about Williamson’s potential
misappropriation of her money well before there was any dis-
cussion of making a new will. At the request of decedent (not
Zielinski) and upon investigation, attorney Richard Roseta
found numbers of bank transactions and expenditures made
by Williamson that decedent had not authorized. Roseta
believed that Williamson had misappropriated decedent’s
funds, and he had discussed his findings with decedent
in a private meeting between himself and decedent. After
that discussion, decedent approached him about a new will.
We thus agree with the trial court’s determination that
Zielinski did not exert undue influence over decedent about
the extent to which she understood how Williamson han-
dled her money.
C. Independent Advice
         Lastly, Williamson argues that the trial court erred
in finding decedent had independent advice. When a bene-
ficiary is in a confidential relationship with a testator, the
beneficiary has a duty “to see that the testator receives inde-
pendent and disinterested advice.” Reddaway, 214 Or at 422
(quotation marks omitted). Here, as the trial court found,
decedent received independent and disinterested advice.
Both attorneys Hoyt and Roseta had no prior relationship
with Zielinski. Although there were times that Zielinski
was present at attorneys’ meetings with decedent, at various
other times, decedent had private conversations with Roseta,
and at the time of will execution, Zielinski was not present.
Importantly, no evidence suggests that Zielinski spoke to
or instructed Hoyt about the content of the contested will.
Rather, the record shows that decedent approached Roseta
to get a new will and gave specific directions to Hoyt regard-
ing the content of the will.
        Affirmed.