Court Opinion

ID: 9741324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:53:33.988931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.547009
License: Public Domain

FOSHEIM, Justice (On reassignment).
Petitioner Richard Marshall was convicted of murder on April 6, 1976, and sentenced to life imprisonment. We affirmed that conviction in State v. Marshall, 264 N.W.2d 911 (S.D.1978). On June 15, 1978, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the circuit court. This appeal is from an order denying such relief. We affirm.
The evidence shows that Martin Monti-leaux, an Indian male, entered the Longhorn Bar in Scenic, South Dakota, sometime in the afternoon of March 1, 1975. He was accompanied by several persons. They gathered at a booth and drank beer throughout the afternoon and evening. During the evening, there were approximately twenty customers in the bar.
At approximately midnight, a group of American Indian Movement members entered the bar and started “milling” around. The group included Richard Marshall and Russell Means. The owner of the bar became concerned and instructed his grandson to call the sheriff.
Shortly thereafter, Martin Montileaux went into the men’s room located in the rear area of the bar. He was allegedly followed by petitioner and Russell Means. Soon afterwards, a “thump” was heard and then a shot. Petitioner and Means then came out of the restroom. After a brief interval, petitioner and the other members of his group left the bar, entered cars, and started toward Rapid City, South Dakota. Petitioner and Means were passengers in a Ford automobile, which was pursued for seventeen miles by the sheriff in a pickup with a red light and by a patrol car with a siren and red lights operating. The Ford proceeded erratically from one shoulder of the road to the other at speeds varying from 40 to 80 miles per hour. The chase ended on the outskirts of Rapid City when the Ford entered a trailer court. As it attempted to leave, the sheriff struck and stopped it with his vehicle. Petitioner and Means were placed under arrest.
In the car occupied by petitioner and Means, the officers found two rifles and three pistols. All were fully loaded, except a “22 long rifle revolver,” which contained five loaded cartridges and one empty cartridge in its cylinder.
Martin Montileaux was found lying on the floor of the restroom with a small hole in his neck. When asked at the scene by a deputy sheriff whether he knew who shot him, he replied, “Russell Means’ friend.” Montileaux died several days later from the effects of the bullet, which had entered the front of his throat, severed his spinal cord, and lodged in the back of his neck. While in the hospital, Montileaux told the deputy sheriff the man who shot him was “shaggy haired” and wore “an army jacket.”
The bullet removed from decedent’s neck and the 22 revolver were sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for examination. The special agent who examined the exhibits testified that the fatal bullet was a 22 long rifle caliber lead bullet containing shearing marks caused by a misalignment, of the cylinder of the weapon from which it had been fired. He also testified that the revolver had a cylinder misalignment that could cause a shearing mark on bullets fired from it. However, he could not state that the bullet removed from the decedent’s neck was fired from the revolver removed from appellant’s car “to the exclusion of all other weapons,” because shearing is a common occurrence in cheaply-made guns.
The petition for post-conviction relief centers on the testimony of Myrtle Poor Bear. She testified at the trial that she attended a party at the Marshall home shortly after he was released on bail. During the course of the evening, petitioner came over to the table where she was sitting and said:
“You know, that guy that got killed at Scenic?” I said, “Yeah.” He said “I *840asked the guy if that was the right one and he said, ‘yeah,’ it was,” so he said, “We waited for him and we followed him in the bathroom,” and then he said, “I pulled the trigger.” He said, “I’ll never forget the look on the son-of-a-bitch’s face as he went down.”
Myrtle Poor Bear stated that petitioner told her at a later party: “I don’t know why I shot him.” She has recanted that testimony-
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a new trial in light of Poor Bear’s recantation. Petitioner also notes a statement made by a United States Attorney to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that Poor Bear was an incompetent witness in federal proceedings1 taking place at approximately the same time as petitioner’s murder trial. In addition, petitioner argues that medical records of Poor Bear, which were not available at the murder trial, together with the testimony of her family, indicate that Poor Bear is a seriously mentally-disturbed woman, who often fantasizes and lies. At the post-conviction hearing, petitioner introduced Poor Bear’s hospital records, which show that she frequently needed medical- attention and had a problem with alcohol and drugs.
In Pickering v. State, 260 N.W.2d 234 (S.D.1977), this Court, for the first time, addressed the standards for granting a new trial based upon a witness’ recantation of testimony. In that case, the petitioner’s brother recanted and confessed that it was he who had committed the homicide. After careful review of the existing standards in different jurisdictions for granting a new trial based upon a witness’ recantation, we adopted the standards set out in Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928), and stated that a new trial should be granted when:
‘(a) The court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false.
(b) That without it the jury might have reached a different conclusion (emphasis added in original).
(c) That the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial.’
Pickering v. State, supra, 260 N.W.2d at 235, quoting Larrison v. United States, supra, at 87-8. See also United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1976); Newman v. United States, 238 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1956); Gordon v. United States, 178 F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1949); cert. denied, 339 U.S. 935, 70 S.Ct. 664, 94 L.Ed. 1353 (1950); State v. Compiano, 261 Iowa 509, 154 N.W.2d 845 (1967); 2 Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 557 (1969).
We further noted in Pickering that verdicts would be insecure if they could always be set aside upon the testimony of witnesses who recant their former testimony. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable and is to be regarded with suspicion, particularly where the recantation involves a confession of perjury.
The record discloses that the State moved to endorse the name of Myrtle Poor Bear as a witness on March 23,1976, six days before the trial was to begin, and that petitioner’s counsel talked to her prior to her testimony. Myrtle Poor Bear was proficiently and effectively cross-examined at the murder trial.
In addition, the recited strong circumstantial evidence indicates that petitioner brought a deadly weapon to the Longhorn Bar and used it to kill Martin Montileaux in the manner of a planned execution. After a cool and calm departure from the Longhorn Bar, the trip to Rapid City quickly turned into a frantic flight from law enforcement officers during which, in an apparent effort at deception, petitioner and Means exchanged jackets and petitioner apparently removed his ponytail. Ordinarily, evidence of flight and deception, standing alone, is insufficient to convict, but when accompanied by other *841evidence, it may justify an inference of guilt. United States v. Pennsylvania, 267 F.Supp. 316 (E.D.Pa.1966), aff’d. 378 F.2d 372 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub nom. Gaspero v. Pennsylvania, 389 U.S. 870, 88 S.Ct. 151, 19 L.Ed.2d 149 (1967). An attempt by the accused to flee following commission of the alleged crime is circumstantially relevant to prove not only commission of the act, but also the intent and purpose with which it was committed. United States v. New Jersey, 405 F.2d 632 (3rd Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom., Yeager v. O’Connor, 395 U.S. 923, 89 S.Ct. 1770, 23 L.Ed.2d 240 (1969). See also: United States v. Blue Thunder, 604 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 902, 100 S.Ct. 215, 62 L.Ed.2d 139 (1979); United States v. Peltier, supra. The 22 caliber pistol found in the vehicle carrying petitioner, which was examined by the F.B.I., was evidence that petitioner possessed or had access to tools, weapons, implements, or other articles with which the crime was or might have been committed and connected the accused with the offense. State v. Schafer, 297 N.W.2d 473 (S.D.1980); State v. Brown, 285 N.W.2d 848 (S.D.1979). That circumstantial evidence was fortified by the solid testimony of witnesses who saw petitioner enter and exit the restroom while it was occupied by the victim and during the time when the shot was heard, thus providing proof of opportunity. Finally, there was the eyewitness statement of the murder victim. Statements made under an obvious sense of impending death are deemed sufficiently reliable as to fall within an exception to the hearsay rule. SDCL 23A-22-12; United States v. Mobley, 421 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1970).
All such evidence is independent of the testimony of Poor Bear that after petitioner was released on bail, he braggingly admitted killing Montileaux. Admittedly, the evidence was not without contradiction. There were discrepancies in the testimony of various witnesses, such as the failure of two of the State’s witnesses to correctly identify petitioner at a preliminary hearing. There were also some discrepancies with regard to the kind of jacket petitioner was wearing the night of the shooting and whether his hair was “shaggy or combed in a pony tail.” These, however, were all matters of credibility, and the weight and value to be given to the testimony was resolved by the jury. Such discrepancies do not reflect upon the credibility of Poor Bear.
With regard to the statement of the United States Attorney in the Peltier case, the trial court noted that the remark was made by an individual in an unrelated proceeding in an effort to justify the disallowance of Poor Bear’s testimony in that case. The trial court further specifically found that:
[Poor Bear’s] testimony at trial was subject to penetrating cross-examination, which clearly revealed significant inconsistencies in her testimony, which diminished its impact ... [upon] the jury.
Myrtle Poor Bear is a very easily led individual of limited intelligence.
Her testimony at the post-conviction hearing is fairly fraught with contradiction and is not credible.
The testimony at the post-conviction hearing is less credible than that produced at the time of trial.
The jury had overwhelming evidence at trial to base a verdict of guilt without the testimony of Myrtle Poor Bear. The jury would have concluded that the defendant was guilty had Myrtle Poor Bear not testified. The Court is not satisfied nor reasonably well satisfied that Myrtle Poor Bear’s testimony at trial was false.
These findings of fact may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. SDCL 15-6-52(a). In re Estate of Hobelsberger, 85 S.D. 282,181 N.W.2d 455 (1970). In Pickering v. State, supra at 236, we said: “At best, it is difficult for an appellate court to assess the veracity of witnesses by reference to a bare record. The trial judge is in a far better position to determine which version of [the recanting witness’] testimony is more likely the truth, having observed the demeanor of the witnesses.”
Petitioner relies heavily on Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1, 1 *842L.Ed.2d 1 (1956). In our view, that reliance is misplaced. In Mesarosh, the Solicitor General of the United States moved to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings because of untruthful testimony given before other tribunals by a Government witness. The Mesarosh decision was based entirely upon the representations of the Government in it's written motion and upon the statements of the Solicitor General during argument on that motion. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial, with this important limitation:
It must be remembered that we are not dealing here with a motion for a new trial initiated by the defense, under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, presenting untruthful statements by a Government witness subsequent to the trial as newly discovered evidence affecting his credibility at the trial. Such an allegation by the defense ordinarily will not support a motion for a new trial, because new evidence which is “merely cumulative or impeaching” is not, according to the often-repeated statement of the courts, an adequate basis for the grant of a new trial.
352 U.S. at 9, 77 S.Ct. at 5, 1 L.Ed.2d at 7. Cf., United States v. Johnson, 142 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1944), appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 806, 65 S.Ct. 264, 89 L.Ed. 643 (1944); United States v. Rutkin, 208 F.2d 647 (3rd Cir. 1953).
In Mesarosh, the Court further distinguished its decision from facts similar to those in this case:
The present situation is different from that in United States v. Flynn (D.C.N.Y.) 130 F.Supp. 412, rearg. den., 131 F.Supp. 742. There the defense moved for a new trial on the basis of an affidavit in which a witness recanted his testimony after the trial. The Government charged that the recantation, rather than the testimony it contradicted, was the lie. Hence there was a factual issue to be determined at the outset, unlike the present case, where there is no conflict between the trial testimony and the subsequent matter brought forward by the Government as bearing on credibility. This difference has been recognized by the courts as calling for the application of different tests in passing on a motion for new trial, even without the added distinction of this case that it is the Government which questions the witness’s credibility. See, e. g., United States v. Johnson (7th Cir.) 142 F.2d 588, 591, 592, cert. dismd., 323 U.S. 806, 65 S.Ct. 264, 89 L.Ed. 643; United States v. Hiss (D.C.N.Y.) 107 F.Supp. 128, 136, affd. (2 Cir.) 201 F.2d 372.
352 U.S. at 12, n. 6, 77 S.Ct. at 7, 1 L.Ed.2d at 8-9.
The Court further noted:
Because the situation raised by the Solicitor General’s motion is quite distinct from that of the ordinary defense motion for new trial, ... we would not consider ourselves bound on a review of the District Court’s ruling in this situation by the limitations expressed with reference to the defense motion in United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 66 S.Ct. 464, 90 L.Ed. 562.
352 U.S. at 12, n. 7, 77 S.Ct. at 7, 1 L.Ed.2d at 9.
The limitations referred to in United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 66 S.Ct. 464, 90 L.Ed. 562 (1946) are stated as follows:
[I]t is not the province of this Court or the Circuit Court of Appeals to review orders granting or denying motions for a new trial when such review is sought on the alleged ground that the trial court made erroneous findings. [Citations omitted] While the appellate court might intervene when the findings of fact are wholly unsupported by evidence, [citations omitted] it should never do so where it does not clearly appear that the findings are not supported by any evidence.
327 U.S. at 111-12, 66 S.Ct. at 466, 90 L.Ed. at 565-6.
It follows that the Mesarosh decision does not apply to the claims of petitioner. As we stated in Pickering, “the moving party has the burden of fulfilling the re*843quirements of all three standards before relief will be granted. Failure to meet any one of the three standards will defeat the movant’s prayer for relief.” 260 N.W.2d at 235. We conclude that petitioner has not met that burden. We are not reasonably well satisfied that Poor Bear’s testimony was false or that, without it, the jury might have reached a different conclusion. We further conclude that petitioner was able to effectively cross-examine Poor Bear at trial. Here, there were factual issues to be decided and the trial court made a determination with regard to the recanted testimony under the Pickering standards. We cannot say that the court’s findings are contrary to a clear preponderance of the evidence, nor are we left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Cunningham v. Yankton Clinic, P.A., 262 N.W.2d 508 (S.D.1978).
Finally, we reject petitioner’s contention that reversal is required due to the prosecution’s failure to comply with the murder trial judge’s order to produce medical records of the witness, Poor Bear. We recognize that the suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); State v. Reiman, 284 N.W.2d 860 (S.D.1979); Geelan v. State, 85 S.D. 346, 182 N.W.2d 311 (1970). It is further clear that the jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959).
Petitioner argues that knowledge of Poor Bear’s history of drug abuse and psychological problems would have greatly affected her credibility before the jury and that the failure to produce her medical records thus amounted to a denial of due process. However, as we indicated in State v. Reiman, supra, not every failure to produce evidence under court order will require reversal, for “implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial.” United States v. Agars, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2398, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 350 (1976). See State v. Sahlie, 277 N.W.2d 591 (S.D.1979). In view of the strong circumstantial evidence of guilt presented at the murder trial, we cannot say as a matter of law that the medical records of Poor Bear would have been outcome-determinative in this case.
We have reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. The order of the trial court is affirmed.
DUNN, MORGAN and HENDERSON, JJ., concur.
WOLLMAN, C. J., dissents.

. Those proceedings involved the case of United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945, 99 S.Ct. 1422, 59 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979).