Court Opinion

ID: 9664847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:31:47.303067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:10.350478
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Acting Justice
(dissenting).
I agree with the majority on issues I and II and that part of issue III holding that “Latchstring recognized that it had a duty of control over its minor employees and that it had undertaken to exercise that control.” It is my opinion, however, that whether Latchstring was negligent in discharging that duty is a factual question for the jury.
The majority refers to these young people as technically “children.” The legislature has designated the age of minority and the court should not amend that designation. At what age does a real child become a technical, legal child?
Capacities of children vary greatly, not only with age but also with individuals of the same age. The objective standard of the reasonable prudent person does not apply to a minor, but, rather, a special (subjective) standard of care is used which takes into account his age, intelligence, experience, and capacity. Alley v. Siepman, 87 S.D. 670, 214 N.W.2d 7 (S.D.1974); Finch v. Christensen, 84 S.D. 420, 172 N.W.2d 571 (S.D.1969). Because there is a sufficient basis of community experience on the part of those who have been children or dealt with them, the jury should be permitted to make those decisions rather than the court. Only when the minor’s conduct was so unreasonable in view of his estimated capacity may the minor be found contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Alley, supra.
The majority opinion seems to be arguing the contributory negligence theory, but says there was not any evidence that Woodworth was aware, or should have been aware, that on the night in question Wares and his companion were violating the rules prohibiting alcohol or drugs. The argument seems to be that Woodworth was not negligent because the minors were con-tributorily negligent. It is my opinion that the first issue is “duty,” which the majority admits. The second issue is whether Woodworth breached the duty. If not, that is the end of the lawsuit and a discussion of contributory negligence is unnecessary. Further, in my opinion, having assumed a duty, there is a jury issue as to whether Woodworth properly supervised these minors.
Teenage drinking and driving is a national epidemic and disgrace. It is so bad the *173federal government is urging the states to raise the drinking age to twenty-one. Alcohol-related automobile accidents are the number one cause of death among young adults. Every day the national and local media promote alcohol-free graduation parties and other ideas to reduce drinking and driving among teenagers and young adults. I do not believe a parent, guardian, or anybody else assuming a duty, including Latchstring, can tell a teenager “no drinking,” thereby discharging their responsibility like an ostrich with its head in the sand. Perhaps, a jury would decide that Wood-worth discharged her duty; but, perhaps, it would decide that she should have done more, such as an occasional bed check. Woodworth’s negligence, if any, was a failure to properly perform a duty she had undertaken. A jury should decide whether or not she had done enough under the circumstances. If the jury should hold Latchstring negligent, there is still a serious issue of proximate cause and the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, all of which may be submitted to the jury by the appropriate and usual instructions.