Court Opinion

ID: 9595142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:36:27.989614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:35.680680
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting.
I must dissent from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur by the majority in this case. Rather than applying that rule of law, the majority clearly extends it beyond the realm of justification. It is my perception that the majority would permit the jury to presume negligence from the happening of the accident and invoke conjecture as the basis of liability. That approach contravenes a well established principle found in the decisions of this court. DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo.1986); Mellor v. Ten Sleep Cattle Company, 550 P.2d 500 (Wyo.1976); Apperson v. Kay, 546 P.2d 995 (Wyo.1976); Jivelekas v. City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419 (Wyo.1976); Elite Cleaners & Tailors, Inc. v. Gentry, 510 P.2d 784 (Wyo.1973).
The reliance by the majority on Rafferty v. Northern Utilities Company, 73 Wyo. 287, 278 P.2d 605 (1955), is misplaced when one recognizes the clear limitation upon the operative facts of that case as described by this language:
“The same may be said in this case, for this plaintiff was shown to have done absolutely nothing to interfere in any way with the functioning of the unit after it was placed in automatic operation by the defendant’s employee.” Rafferty, 73 Wyo. at 308, 278 P.2d at 612.
This quoted language follows immediately after a statement by the court that the plaintiffs conduct had no more legal significance than that of an innocent bystander. The distinction of the facts, and the involvement of the plaintiff, in Rafferty from the facts, and the involvement of Goedert, in this case is apparent to any casual reader. Goedert, and not Newcastle Equipment Co., Inc., had exclusive control over the tractor trailer for at least thirteen hours immediately prior to the accident.
The majority also finds support for its holding in the separate opinion of Justice Blume in Stanolind Oil & Gas Company v. Bunce, 51 Wyo. 1, 62 P.2d 1297 (1936). My interpretation of Justice Blume’s opinion in that case is that he would have invoked a theory of strict liability to justify the reliance by the jury on res ipsa loqui-tur in finding for the plaintiff. However visionary Justice Blume’s approach may be perceived, his view is not the law in Stano-lind and it does not fit Goedert’s theory in this case.
In Stanolind, the majority adopted the statement of the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-tur from 5 D. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2509 (2d ed.1923):
“ ‘(1) The apparatus must be such that in the ordinary instance no injurious operation is to be expected unless from a careless construction, inspection, or user; (2) Both inspection and user must have been at the time of the injury in the control of the party charged; (3) The injurious occurrence or condition must have happened irrespective of any voluntary action at the time by the party injured.’ ” Stanolind, 51 Wyo. at 21, 62 P.2d at 1301-02.
The majority opinion then held that the circumstances did not fit either the second or third requirements of the rule as stated. The second requirement has been main-*162tamed in the law of this state up until this decision. Wood v. Geis Trucking Company, 639 P.2d 903 (Wyo.1982); Langdon v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation, 494 P.2d 537 (Wyo.1972); Hall v. Cody Gas Company, 477 P.2d 585 (Wyo.1970); Sayre v. Allemand, 418 P.2d 1006 (Wyo.1966); North Central Gas Company v. Bloem, 376 P.2d 382 (1962).
I close by noting from the majority opinion that the justification offered by Wig-more for shifting the duty of producing evidence is that the defendant has access to evidence of the true cause of the occurrence and the plaintiff does not. In the majority opinion, it is explained that Wig-more assumed the defendant to be the owner or manager of the apparatus. Later, the majority alludes to the assertion by Justice Blume that the “control” element is more important as a means of determining who was in the best position to explain the accident rather than as a requirement to invoke the doctrine. The utility of these justifications for the doctrine in a situation in which the plaintiff was operating the apparatus at the time of the injury and it was in fact owned by someone other than the defendant somehow escapes me. Goe-dert had equivalent, if not better, access to evidence of the cause of the occurrence as did Newcastle Equipment Co., Inc. In such an instance, the control requirement should not be overlooked simply to shift to a defendant the burden of proving he was not negligent rather than maintaining the burden of the plaintiff to establish his claim.
I would affirm the order of the district court granting the directed verdict.