Court Opinion

ID: 9392459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 21:00:39.615319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:46.050618
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 19-7748      Doc: 55         Filed: 05/03/2023      Pg: 1 of 20

                                               PUBLISHED

                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 19-7748

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        ELLIOTT B. GRAHAM, a/k/a Thug,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.
        Terry L. Wooten, Senior District Judge. (4:05-cr-00770-TLW-3; 4:16-cv-02275-TLW)

        Argued: March 9, 2023                                                Decided: May 3, 2023

        Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

        Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Heytens wrote the opinion, in
        which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Agee joined. Judge Wilkinson wrote a concurring
        opinion.

        ARGUED: Emily Deck Harrill, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
        Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. William Jacob Watkins, Jr., OFFICE OF THE
        UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
        Adair F. Boroughs, United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Katherine
        Hollingsworth Flynn, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
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        TOBY HEYTENS, Circuit Judge:

               More than 15 years ago, Elliott Graham pleaded guilty to kidnapping and using a

        firearm during a crime of violence. It is now clear kidnapping is not a crime of violence

        under the relevant statute, and the three “critical record documents” that govern our

        analysis do not show Graham’s plea to the firearm charge was “expressly predicated upon”

        any other offense. United States v. Crawley, 2 F.4th 257, 265, 267 (4th Cir. 2022). We thus

        reverse the district court’s denial of Graham’s motion to vacate his firearm conviction and

        remand for resentencing.

                                                      I.

               In 2005, Graham and three other men decided they wanted the expensive tire rims

        on a nearby parked car. The men approached the car’s owner, who declined their

        unsolicited sales offer. At that point, the men pulled a gun, ordered the owner into the car,

        drove across state lines, and “hit [the owner] with a revolver in the face and threatened they

        would take him in the woods and kill him by burning him with gasoline” unless he helped

        them remove the rims. JA 51. After the victim relented, Graham and his compatriots let

        him go and told him to “run into the woods.” JA 52.

               Graham was originally charged with four federal offenses: (1) carjacking;

        (2) kidnapping; (3) using a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        § 924(c) (the Section 924(c) charge); and (4) possessing a firearm after being convicted of

        a felony. The parties agreed Graham would plead guilty to the kidnapping and

        Section 924(c) charges, and the government would dismiss the carjacking and felon in

        possession charges. Neither the indictment nor the plea agreement specified a predicate

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        “crime of violence” for the Section 924(c) charge, and the plea agreement contained no

        agreed upon factual statement.

               At the plea hearing, the district court asked for “a summary of the plea

        agreement.” JA 38. The prosecutor responded Graham had “agree[d] to plead guilty to

        counts 10 and 11 of this indictment, which charge kidnapping, as well as a 924(c) violation

        in connection with the kidnapping.” Id. In response to questions from the court, Graham

        confirmed those were “the terms of [his] plea agreement” and “represent[ed] the full

        understanding [he] ha[d] with the government.” JA 40.

               The district court then asked the prosecutor for a “factual presentation.” JA 51. After

        summarizing the facts recounted above, referencing Graham’s co-defendants, and stating

        Graham “was the one who had the firearm,” the prosecutor stated: “And the car was made

        outside South Carolina. This is a kidnapping, so it doesn’t matter.” JA 52.

               The district court then asked Graham about the facts. Because this exchange is

        critical to our analysis and has the “merit of brevity,” Foster v. Goddard, 66 U.S. 506, 507

        (1861), we quote it in full:

               The Court:     Mr. Graham, you heard what the Assistant U.S. Attorney says
                              you did in this case. Do you agree you participated in the
                              kidnapping and used the gun?
               Graham:        Yes, sir.
               The Court:     Did you have the gun?
               Graham:        Yes, sir.
               The Court:     You and others kidnapped or took [the victim] into custody or
                              took him, kidnapped him, forced him into a car in an effort to
                              take these rims from him, is that correct?
               Graham:        Yes, sir.

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               The Court:    And you had a firearm in your possession when that was done?
               Graham:       Yes, sir.
               The Court:    Let me ask you, Mr. Graham, are you in fact guilty of this
                             charge?
               Graham:       Yes, sir.
               The Court:    After listening to all that I’ve told you and explained to you,
                             Mr. Graham, and after having answered my questions, how do
                             you now plead to these two charges, kidnapping and the gun
                             charge, guilty or not guilty?

               Graham:       Guilty, sir.

        JA 53. The district court accepted Graham’s plea and sentenced him to 260 months of

        imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release.

               Just over a decade later, Graham filed a handwritten pro se motion to vacate his

        Section 924(c) conviction based on intervening authority. The district court denied

        Graham’s motion. The court acknowledged it is now clear “kidnapping is not a § 924(c)

        predicate offense.” JA 73; see United States v. Walker, 934 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2019)

        (so holding). But the court concluded Graham’s Section 924(c) conviction remained valid

        because “the factual basis for [Graham’s] guilty plea involved both carjacking and

        kidnapping” and “his § 924(c) conviction is related to a carjacking, which the Fourth

        Circuit has held is a valid § 924(c) predicate.” JA 73–74, 76; see United States v. Evans,

        848 F.3d 242, 247–48 (4th Cir. 2017) (so holding about the federal carjacking statute).

                                                    II.

               Federal law allows a sentencing court to vacate a Section 924(c) conviction that was

        not supported by a valid predicate offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); see, e.g., United States v.

        Melaku, 41 F.4th 386, 389–95 (4th Cir. 2022). The government has raised no issues of

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        procedural default or undue delay. Nor is there any question that under these circumstances,

        Graham may rely on (and benefit from) decisions that issued years after Graham pleaded

        guilty. See In re Thomas, 988 F.3d 783, 786, 788–89 (4th Cir. 2021). We thus must decide

        this case the same way we would if Graham had pleaded guilty today.

               The parties agree United States v. Crawley, 2 F.4th 257 (4th Cir. 2022), governs our

        analysis. There, this Court affirmed the denial of relief to a defendant who pleaded guilty

        to a Section 924(c) violation “expressly based” on both a “valid” predicate and an “invalid”

        one. Id. at 263. Indeed, in Crawley, the indictment, plea agreement, and plea hearing

        transcript all referenced a valid Section 924(c) predicate (a drug trafficking offense) and

        an invalid one (conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery). See id. at 260–61, 267. Under

        those circumstances, this Court concluded “Crawley had no reason to expect . . . a windfall

        based on later developments in the law that would invalidate one of the two predicates

        supporting his § 924(c) conviction.” Id. at 267.

               Here, unlike in Crawley, neither the indictment nor Graham’s plea agreement

        “expressly” mentioned any predicate offense for the Section 924(c) count. Standing alone,

        that is not a problem because the government need not “specify a specific § 924(c)

        predicate offense in the § 924(c) charge in the indictment,” nor “separately charge or

        convict the defendant[] of the § 924(c) predicate offense.” United States v. Randall,

        171 F.3d 195, 208 (4th Cir. 1999). But the absence of that information from the indictment

        or plea agreement here means those documents are unhelpful in identifying any predicate

        offenses on which Graham’s guilty plea was “expressly based.” Crawley, 2 F.4th at 263.

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               For that, we must turn to the plea transcript, the only other “critical record

        document[]” either side asks us to consider. Crawley, 2 F.4th at 267. 1 And that transcript

        makes clear—over and over—that Graham’s guilty plea on the Section 924(c) offense was

        “expressly based” on one and only one predicate: kidnapping. Id. at 263.

               The 20-page transcript of Graham’s plea hearing contains 12 references to

        “kidnapping.” Upon being asked “for a summary of the plea agreement,” the first thing the

        government said was “Graham agrees to plead guilty to . . . kidnapping, as well as a 924(c)

        violation in connection with the kidnapping.” JA 38 (emphasis added). The district court

        also repeatedly asked Graham about his possession of a firearm during “the kidnapping.”

        JA 53. In particular, the court said, “You and others kidnapped or took [the victim] into

        custody or took him, kidnapped him, forced him into a car in an effort to take these rims

        from him, is that correct?” Id. (emphasis added). After Graham replied, “Yes, sir,” the court

        clarified, “And you had a firearm in your possession when that was done?” Id. Graham

        confirmed as much—and only as much.

               In contrast, the sole use of “carjacking” during the plea hearing came when the

        prosecutor was describing what Graham had agreed to do in the future—that is, “cooperate

        with the United States Attorney’s office in our investigation of violent crimes and other

               1
                Although the district court briefly referenced proceedings involving Graham’s co-
        defendants, the government concedes any reliance on such proceedings would have been
        error and insists the court did not so rely. See Oral Arg. 13:34–14:20. We take the
        government at its word, and thus consider no such materials. We also do not consider
        Graham’s presentence report, which neither party asks us to do. See Oral. Arg. 15:18–23
        (government counsel confirming it is not relying on the PSR).

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        unlawful activity, including debriefings concerning his knowledge of armed robberies,

        carjacking and other unlawful activity.” JA 39. In addition, when describing Graham’s

        offense conduct, the prosecutor specifically disclaimed any relevance of whether the car

        had been manufactured out of state—a fact that would have been material to any federal

        carjacking charge—by stating: “This is a kidnapping, so it doesn’t matter.” JA 52;

        compare 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (carjacking requires “tak[ing] a motor vehicle that has been

        transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce”), with § 1201(a)

        (kidnapping has no such requirement). Nor was Graham asked at any point during the plea

        hearing whether he possessed a firearm in connection with a carjacking or informed of the

        elements of a federal carjacking charge.

               Seeking to paper over this problem, the government insists the kidnapping to which

        Graham pleaded guilty and the carjacking to which he did not were “inextricably

        intertwined” and “a single event.” U.S. Br. 14–15; see Oral Arg. 31:00–31:03 (describing

        this case as involving “one common nucleus of operative fact”). But Section 924(c)

        requires a predicate “crime” rather than a predicate event, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)

        (emphasis added), and it is a commonplace that the same event can give rise to multiple

        offenses. And Crawley says a guilty plea “expressly based on” an invalid predicate must

        also be “expressly based on” at least one valid “predicate offense.” 2 F.4th at 263 (emphasis

        added).

               For this reason, the government errs in relying on cases involving jury verdicts

        rendered after trials. See U.S. Br. 13–15 (citing six decisions other than Crawley, all

        involving jury trials rather than guilty pleas). In that context, there is a full record, and it

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        makes sense to ask what the jury’s verdict “necessarily” was based on or what any “rational

        juror[s]” would have found based on the evidence before them. United States v. Reed,

        48 F.4th 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2022) (first quotation); United States v. Cannon, 987 F.3d

        924, 948 (11th Cir. 2021) (second quotation). When a defendant pleads guilty, in contrast,

        there is neither an evidentiary record nor a decision by the defendant’s peers. The only

        basis for depriving Graham of his liberty is what he “admitted”—a word this Court used

        eight times in Crawley—not what Graham might have been willing to admit or what the

        court or a jury hypothetically could or would have found had the issue been before them.

        See 2 F.4th at 260–65.

               Shifting gears, the government insists Graham’s Section 924(c) conviction remains

        valid because he “admitted to facts supporting all the elements of the carjacking at his plea

        colloquy.” U.S. Br. 15. But even if that would be enough (a point we need not decide), it

        is not true here. To begin, carjacking requires “tak[ing] a motor vehicle that has been

        transported, shipped, or received in interstate commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (emphasis

        added). Graham’s acknowledgment that he and his confederates drove across state lines

        after taking the car does not satisfy that requirement, which by its plain language focuses

        on the car’s status at the time of the taking. See United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d 319, 321

        (4th Cir. 1998) (“Section 2119 applies only to the forcible taking of motor vehicles that

        have been ‘transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce.’ ”

        (emphasis added)). And, as noted previously, Graham was neither asked nor required to

        admit the stolen car was “made outside South Carolina” because—before he was ever

        asked to speak—the prosecutor said it “doesn’t matter” where the car was made. JA 52.

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               Nor did Graham admit to satisfying the federal carjacking statute’s somewhat

        unusual mens rea requirement. Like most robbery statutes, the federal carjacking statute

        requires that the defendant do a certain thing (obtain another’s property) in a particular way

        (by using actual or threatened force). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (defining robbery

        for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)), with § 2119 (federal carjacking statute). But the

        carjacking statute adds another requirement: To violate it, a defendant must “take[] a motor

        vehicle” “with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm.” § 2119. This requirement

        is satisfied if—but only if—“at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over

        the driver’s automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the

        driver if necessary to steal the car (or, alternatively, if unnecessary to steal the car).”

        Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 12 (1999).

               The problem for the government is Graham never admitted—“expressly” or

        otherwise—to having such intent. Instead, the government relies on Graham’s failure to

        dispute the prosecutor’s statement that he pointed a gun at the victim while obtaining the

        car and both hit the victim with the gun and threatened to kill him by burning him with

        gasoline after the car had been obtained.

               That is reprehensible conduct. And if the question before us was whether Graham

        admitted to the elements of robbery or battery, we would have little trouble in concluding

        he did. 2 But Graham’s admissions about what he did—particularly after he was inside the

               2
                Because the government has never suggested Graham’s Section 924(c) conviction
        was “expressly predicated” on any offenses other than kidnapping or carjacking, we
        consider no such possibilities. Crawley, 2 F.4th at 265.

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        car—do not speak to what he intended “at the moment [he] demanded or took control” of

        the victim’s car. Holloway, 526 U.S. at 12; see United States v. Small, 944 F.3d 490, 498

        (4th Cir. 2019) (emphasizing the “distinct[ion]” between a “‘by force and violence or by

        intimidation’ actus reus requirement” and the federal carjacking statute’s “mens rea

        requirement” (quoting § 2119)). Under the federal carjacking statute standard, that is the

        intent that matters, and it is an issue on which the “critical record documents” contain no

        admission—much less an express one—from Graham. Crawley, 2 F.4th at 267; see Small,

        944 F.3d at 498 (noting a defendant who is “unwilling to follow through on an intimidating

        bluff” has not violated the federal carjacking statute). 3

                                                   *        *        *

               We understand the government’s frustration about the context in which this motion

        arises. At the time of the plea agreement and plea hearing, everyone involved assumed the

               3
                 At oral argument, the government insisted the district court made a “finding of
        fact” that Graham’s “Section 924(c) plea was based in part on carjacking,” which is
        reviewed only for clear error. Oral Arg. 12:19–12:45. That assertion is new, dubious, and
        ultimately beside the point. Beyond quoting a nonprecedential decision for the
        unremarkable proposition that “[i]dentifying the predicate offense supporting a § 924(c)
        conviction is a fact-intensive inquiry,” the government’s brief did not assert the district
        court made any factual findings or that the clear error standard applied. U.S. Br. 9 (quoting
        United States v. Alston, 855 Fed. Appx. 895, 895 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam)). To the
        contrary, the government’s brief repeatedly framed its position as “[t]he district court did
        not err.” U.S. Br. 6, 7, 10, 16, 18. This Court’s opinion in Crawley never mentioned the
        clear error standard, nor has the government cited any case applying that standard to this
        sort of question. At any rate, the government has expressly disclaimed reliance on any
        materials outside the indictment, the plea agreement, and the plea hearing, see note 1,
        supra, and, as already explained, we see nothing in those “critical record documents” that
        could support a finding Graham’s plea was—when entered—“expressly based on”
        carjacking. Crawley, 2 F.4th at 263.

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        kidnapping to which Graham pleaded guilty was also a crime of violence under Section

        924(c) and that nothing concrete turned on whether his plea on the Section 924(c) charge

        was “expressly predicated upon” another qualifying offense as well. Crawley, 2 F.4th at

        265. As the government acknowledged at oral argument, however, procedural fairness

        requires we apply the same rules to both sides. See Oral Arg. 15:50–16:54. Just as the

        government benefits when intervening judicial decisions improve its litigating position

        years after the fact, it must accept when those decisions do the opposite. The judgment of

        the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent

        with this opinion.

                                                                                   SO ORDERED

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        WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

               I concur in Judge Heytens’s thoughtful majority opinion because we are bound by

        past decisions of the Supreme Court and those of this court that necessarily followed from

        them. I worry, however, that those precedents have left an incomplete whole. Worse, they

        run counter to the role that facts are meant to play in criminal sentencing, and they produce

        results that are simply inexplicable.

               In the wake of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), courts are now

        required to employ the so-called “categorical approach” to determine whether an offense

        qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Under this approach, courts must

        “focus[] on the elements of the prior offense rather than the conduct underlying the

        conviction,” United States v. Taylor, 979 F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation

        marks omitted), thereby disregarding “how the defendant actually committed his crime,”

        Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2326.

               The categorical approach comes into play here because Elliot Graham pled guilty

        to a § 924(c) offense predicated on kidnapping. In United States v. Walker, however, we

        held that kidnapping “does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence,” 934 F.3d 375,

        379 (4th Cir. 2019), thus rendering Graham’s original § 924(c) predicate invalid. Graham

        subsequently challenged his § 924(c) conviction, leading to the case before us now.

               The categorical approach thus underlies this entire case. Despite its simple

        articulation, that approach has proven difficult to apply and questions linger regarding its

        attendant consequences. I would suggest only this: While the categorical approach has a

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        preclusive legal effect as to predicate crimes of violence, it need not affect the factual

        foundation of the final sentence.

                                                        I.

               The categorical approach has an undeniable legal effect on the law and sentencing.

        See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588–89 (1990); Johnson v. United States,

        576 U.S. 591, 604–05 (2015); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1216–17 (2018);

        United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2326–32 (2019). A crime of violence enhancement

        is rendered invalid for want of a predicate. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The career offender

        designation cannot be applied in the absence of previous violent felonies. Id. § 924(e)(1).

        An aggravated felony subjects an alien to removal in a discrete set of cases. 8 U.S.C.

        § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). There is no question the categorical approach, regardless of its merits

        or demerits, has definitive legal consequences. Its asserted practical advantage is one of

        efficiency, allowing sentencing determinations to be made without relitigating the

        particulars of long past predicates.

               Should the legal force of the categorical approach affect subsequent non-predicate

        trial court factfinding? I think not. To be blunt, the categorical approach has too often

        thwarted Congress’s attempts to punish the most violent criminal behavior most strictly.

        Take this case for example. After forcing the victim into the backseat of a car at gunpoint,

        Graham hit the victim in the face with his gun. He then threatened to take the victim “in

        the woods and kill him by burning him with gasoline.” J.A. 51. Once the victim submitted

        to their demands, Graham and his confederates released him, telling him to run into the

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        woods. All involved agreed it was Graham who “had the firearm” during these events. J.A.

        52.

               How can this not be a crime of violence? There is something very wrong here. We

        now find ourselves in an exercise far removed from our typical work: Ignore the particulars

        of the case before us and fault the district court for considering them. As this case

        illustrates, the chief beneficiaries of the categorical approach are so often the most violent

        offenders whose own conduct escapes examination because someone else’s far less

        culpable conduct may theoretically be subject to prosecution some other day.

               There are limits to the miles that sentencing practice can travel beyond common

        sense. Whether the benefits of the categorical approach are worth its costs is above my pay

        grade. The Supreme Court has repeatedly determined that this approach is the law.

        Questions yet remain, however, about its effect on the facts where crime of violence

        predicates are not at issue. In cases like this one, what latitude do district judges retain after

        a categorical appellate holding to consider the actual violence of a crime? To what extent

        can trial judges still weigh the facts in crafting a sentence? Or does the categorical approach

        suggest that they downplay facts or even ignore them? I am concerned that district courts,

        when faced with an appellate holding that a crime is not categorically violent, may in some

        ways feel constrained from assessing the facts even outside the specific context of crime

        of violence predicates.

                                                       II.

               There is a way to avoid the problem, one which may reach the same sentencing

        result, but through different means. I do not think the apparent legal focus of the categorical

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        approach has rendered immaterial the facts of the case or diminished the role of the district

        court in finding and weighing them. To that end, the facts of a violent crime remain relevant

        in two important ways: First, facts still matter for calculating an appropriate sentencing

        guidelines range. Second, facts matter in determining whether the violent crime warrants

        an upward departure or variance from this range. A crime’s categorical designation stands

        as no impediment to these traditional district court factfinding functions or to a trial court’s

        ability to impose a sentence that it deems right and just. In saying this, I only point out the

        obvious, but, then again, the obvious can sometimes become the obscure.

                                                      A.

               The sentencing guidelines themselves, the governing statutory framework, and our

        appellate review of sentencing all suggest the categorical approach should not be used to

        detract from the actual facts of the case. In shielding our eyes to facts, the categorical

        approach, notwithstanding its asserted virtues, goes against the grain.

               When district courts calculate sentencing guidelines ranges, as opposed to deciding

        whether a statutory enhancement applies, there is nothing mandating that they apply the

        categorical approach. From their inception, the sentencing guidelines have focused on the

        facts. When the Sentencing Commission first promulgated its guidelines, the Commission

        was sure to “blend[] the constraints of the offense of conviction with the reality of the

        defendant’s actual offense conduct in order to gauge the seriousness of that conduct for

        sentencing purposes.” William W. Wilkins, Jr., Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the

        Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 495, 497 (1990).

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               The statutory provisions governing sentencing likewise require courts to look to the

        facts. Crucially, “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the

        background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of

        the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate

        sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661. In limiting the district court’s factual inquiries, the categorical

        approach comes very close to being a forbidden limitation.

               Further, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) asks the court to determine whether “there exists an

        aggravating or mitigating circumstance” surrounding the offense. Similarly, 18 U.S.C.

        § 3553(f) requires the court to calculate the defendant’s criminal history points, id.

        § 3553(f)(1)(A), examine whether the defendant used violence in connection with the

        offense, id. § 3553(f)(2), determine if the offense resulted in death or serious bodily injury

        to any person, id. § 3553(f)(3), and decide whether the defendant was “an organizer, leader,

        manager, or supervisor of others in the offense,” id. § 3553(f)(4). All of these provisions

        point in the same direction: The sentencing court not only may but indeed must consult the

        defendant’s actual conduct to calculate an appropriate guidelines range.

               Appellate review of the calculated range is justifiably deferential. A sentence within

        that range is considered presumptively reasonable, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347

        (2007), and “a defendant’s disagreement” with the range “is insufficient to overcome the

        district court’s discretion,” United States v. Swain, 49 F.4th 398, 403 (4th Cir. 2022). Our

        review, moreover, requires the sentencing court to conduct “an individualized assessment

        based on the facts before the court.” United States v. Lewis, 958 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir.

        2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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               Rather than invite the categorical approach to distort reality, the sentencing

        guidelines, the governing statutes, and our deferential standard of review all maintain a

        clear focus on the actual conduct of the offense, and for good reason. Facts play an

        indispensable role in sentencing. To serve the ends of justice, our “federal judicial

        tradition” treats “every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study

        in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the

        punishment to ensue.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996).

               The categorical approach is antithetical to this principle, resulting in an inescapable

        tension between sentencing, which demands we consider reality, and the categorical

        approach, which demands we ignore it. In the daily work of calculating sentencing ranges,

        reality must prevail. A sentencing judge should therefore not reduce the guidelines range

        based on the categorical approach where the offense or criminal record was patently

        violent. Of course germane statutory enhancements may not apply due to governing

        precedent, but district courts need not allow categorical holdings to influence sentences

        where the courts have not required it. Given all the infirmities of the categorical approach,

        it should be limited strictly to its particular context lest it further erode the basic factual

        foundation of criminal sentencing.

                                                      B.

               Facts also play an integral part in deciding whether to depart from the calculated

        range. District judges “may impose an upward variance from a defendant’s Guidelines

        range if it is justified by the § 3553(a) factors, as considered under the totality of the

        circumstances,” and any such variance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v.

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        McKinnie, 21 F.4th 283, 288–89 (4th Cir. 2021); see also U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (allowing

        upward departures where “reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal

        history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal

        history”). The Supreme Court has admonished appellate judges not to treat variances as

        presumptively unreasonable, but instead to “give due deference to the district court’s

        decision.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Protecting the ability to deviate

        from the range, based on the facts of the offense and the facts of the defendant’s criminal

        record, evinces a judge’s historic discretion.

               “[F]ully discretionary sentencing” has “prevailed in the federal courts from the

        Founding until enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.” Michael W. McConnell,

        The Booker Mess, 83 Denv. U. L. Rev. 665, 679 (2006). Our judicial system has a “long

        history of discretionary sentencing, which often turns on facts found by judges.” Stephanos

        Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in A World of Guilty Pleas, 110

        Yale L.J. 1097, 1122 (2001).

               Remarking on this discretion, other courts have noted that “district judges may and

        should use their sound discretion to sentence . . . on the basis of reliable information about

        the defendant’s criminal history even where strict categorical classification of a prior

        conviction might produce a different guideline sentencing range.” United States v. Carter,

        961 F.3d 953, 954 (7th Cir. 2020). Thus even when a statutory enhancement is inapplicable,

        the “law leaves much to ‘the judge’s own professional judgment.’” United States v.

        Powers, 40 F.4th 129, 137 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356).

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               A sentencing judge retains wide latitude to impose the sentence he or she deems

        appropriate. Any legal approach that inflexibly limits a judge’s discretion therefore clashes

        with longstanding principles of judicial authority and independence. See United States v.

        Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005) (invalidating mandatory nature of sentencing guidelines

        in part because they limited a judge’s ability to depart from guidelines range). Courts

        remain at liberty to opt for variances that reflect actual conduct rather than artificial

        hypotheticals. A judge may thus impose an upward variance where a predicate crime was

        committed violently even if the categorical approach forbids pertinent statutory

        enhancements.

                                                      III.

               I fear the categorical approach portends a shift in sentencing authority from the

        district to the appellate courts. In changing questions of fact to matters of law, it invites the

        circuit courts to fine tune sentencing decisions.

               That is a mistake. The “sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and

        judge their import . . . in the individual case.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. District judges remain

        the engine of our sentencing scheme for several wise reasons. The district judge sits closer

        to the action, as he or she “sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility determinations,

        has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record.” Id.

        Moreover, the “sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual

        case and the individual defendant before him.” Id. at 51–52. We would do well to remember

        what the legal focus of the categorical approach has obscured: Real facts presented in real

        cases with real people form the bedrock of our criminal justice system. Trial court

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        discretion in sentencing is an attendant consequence of that system, and it is one to which

        we should repair when wayward applications of the law threaten to lead us astray.

               In sum, the categorical approach does not deny the district court its ultimate

        discretion nor does it deprive the facts of their force. Even if a statutory enhancement under

        § 924(c) does not apply because of the categorical approach, as is the case here, judges

        may in their discretion calculate a guidelines range or grant upward variances based on the

        violent nature of the criminal activity. For the reasons discussed above, exercising such

        discretion would be consistent with Supreme Court and circuit precedent. Even if the

        categorical approach renders violent predicates legally invalid, district courts are at liberty

        to sentence on the violent character of the cases that come before them.

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