Court Opinion

ID: 9588630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:36:32.454021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:59.759848
License: Public Domain

*794BEA, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s holding that Anderson unambiguously invoked his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Anderson repeatedly invoked his right to remain silent — “I don’t even want to talk about this no more”; “I’m through with this” and “I plead the fifth” — yet the police did not honor Anderson’s right to remain silent until he finally requested an attorney. Only at that point did the police do what they should have done in the first place — cease the interrogation.1 Given that Anderson requested that the interrogation cease three times in rapid succession, no reasonable officer could have understood anything other than that Anderson wanted the interrogation to stop. Further, I agree with Judge Silverman that Officer O’Connor’s response, “Plead the Fifth, what’s that?” was not a genuine attempt to clarify whether Anderson wanted to invoke his right to remain silent.
Where I part company with the majority’s analysis is section V, where the majority concludes:
We cannot simply suppress the portion of the interrogation that occurred after the invocation of the right to silence and before Anderson’s purported reinitiation of the interrogation. Doing so would eviscerate the mandate to “scrupulously honor[ ]” the invocation of Miranda rights. We understand the phrase “scrupulously honor” to have practical meaning. For the “right to remain silent” to have currency, there must be some silence. The interrogation must stop for some period of time. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602; Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04, 96 S.Ct. 321. Although the Supreme Court has yet to tell us how long the break in questioning must last, in this case there was no cessation at all. Because the interrogation was continuous to that point, we need not determine whether Anderson waived his right to counsel after viewing a videotape of his alleged accomplice nor do we need to address his coercion claim.
Majority Op. at 792.
The reason I disagree is that the record shows the police did stop the interrogation after Anderson requested an attorney, and before Anderson himself re-initiated the conversation, as explained below. All this occurred before Anderson confessed to the murder. Thus, I conclude it was not error at all to admit his confession at trial, and the California Court of Appeal’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Approximately two hours and fifteen minutes into the interview, after Anderson was shown the videotape of his codefen-dant Abe Santos saying Anderson was the one who shot Robert Clark, Anderson said, “I’d like to have an attorney present.” The interrogating officers then did what they should have done back when Anderson first said, “I don’t even wanna talk about this no more”: they stopped the *795interrogation and turned the tape recorder off. Anderson had not confessed to the murder of Clark at this point.
But then Anderson changed his mind and re-initiated the conversation himself. The police advised Anderson four separate times that they could not speak with him because he had invoked his right to counsel, and five separate times Anderson insisted he wanted to talk to Lt. Harry Bishop saying, in relevant part:
Anderson: Oh, man, I want to talk to you. I need, I need to talk to you Harry_Okay, I — I was just jokin’. I don’t wanna talk — Or I want to talk to Harry, the bishop. You know the thing about the attorney, is ... is wrong or whatever, I don’t need an attorney. Is that fair to say so [you] guys don’t get busted outta your jobs? ... I don’t want an attorney, I’ve changed my mind.
The officers were careful to ask clarifying questions to discern whether Anderson was making a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his rights to counsel and to remain silent:
Officer Brad McDonald: Okay. Has anybody in this room promised you anything?
Anderson: No, sir.
McDonald: Has anybody in this room threatened you for anything at all? Anderson: No, sir.
McDonald: Do you feel intimidated by anybody in this room?
Anderson: No, sir.
McDonald: Do you feel that — Has anybody in this room, told you that if you didn’t talk with us, or you did talk to us, that somethin’ good was gonna happen?
Anderson: No, sir.
McDonald: Okay, so you’ve made the decision, that you want to talk to us and you do not want an attorney, is that correct?
Anderson: [Pause] Yes, sir.
McDonald: That’s absolutely correct, now you kinda hesitated a little bit
Anderson: Well ...
McDonald: You don’t want an attorney
Anderson: Yes, sir.
McDonald: ... right here in this room
Anderson: Yes, sir.
McDonald: ... right now, is that correct?
Anderson: Yes, sir.
McDonald: Okay. An’ my name is Brad McDonald, an’ these guys have probably told ya’ I’m the boss, right?
Anderson: Uh, no, sir, it’s not.
McDonald: Okay, but I am.
Anderson: Okay.
McDonald: Okay. Then I think we’re okay, I think he’s unlawyer ed [sic]. Now what do you want to talk to Harry about?
Anderson: About ... I guess the murder of Robbie Clark.
Anderson then eventually confessed to fatally shooting Robbie Clark.
This was a clear waiver of both Anderson’s right to counsel, and his right to remain silent. Two cases are instructive. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-84, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), Edwards was convicted of robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder after his confession was entered into evidence. After being read his Miranda rights, Edwards stated, “I want an attorney before making a deal.” At that point, all questioning ceased. Id. at 479, 101 S.Ct. 1880.
The next day, two different detectives came to question Edwards in jail. When *796he was told they were there, Edwards told the jail guard, “he did not want to talk to anyone.” Id. The guard told Edwards he was obligated to talk to the detectives. Id. The detectives then advised Edwards of his Miranda rights again, and he agreed to talk to them, but said he did not want the discussion taped. Edwards then implicated himself in the crime after being confronted with the statement of a codefen-dant who had implicated him. Id.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and held Edwards had invoked both his right to remain silent and his right to counsel, but had waived both rights when he voluntarily gave his statement to the detectives after they informed him again of his Miranda rights. Id. at 480, 101 S.Ct. 1880.
The Supreme Court reversed and held the use of Edwards’s confession violated his Fifth Amendment rights as construed in Miranda. The Court held that when an accused requests an attorney, he may not be questioned unless an attorney has been made available or “the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversation with the police.” Id. at 485, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Any waiver after an invocation of the right to remain silent or the right to an attorney must not only be voluntary, but must also “constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id. at 482, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Although the police appeared the day after Edwards had requested an attorney, the time elapsed between interrogations was not a factor the Court considered in determining the admissibility of his confession. The crucial factors were whether the second interrogation was initiated by Edwards (it was not); and, whether such initiation was voluntary (it was not, because the jail guard told Edwards he was required to speak to the police).
On the other hand, the later case of Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983), clarifies how an accused who has invoked his right to counsel can initiate a discussion and validly waive his rights to counsel and to remain silent. During the investigation of the death of a person whose body had been found in Bradshaw’s wrecked pickup truck, Bradshaw was questioned at the police station. Bradshaw was advised of his Miranda rights. He was arrested for furnishing liquor to the victim, a minor, and again advised of his Miranda rights. Id. at 1041-42, 103 S.Ct. 2830. Bradshaw denied he was driving the truck and asked for an attorney. Id.
Later that same day, while being transported in custody from the police station to a jail, Bradshaw asked a police officer, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?” Id. at 1042, 103 S.Ct. 2830. The officer answered that Bradshaw did not have to talk to him and Bradshaw said he understood. They then discussed where Bradshaw was being taken and the offense with which he would be charged. The officer suggested that Bradshaw take a polygraph examination, which he did, after another reading of his Miranda rights. Id.
When the polygraph examiner told Bradshaw he did not believe Bradshaw was telling the truth, Bradshaw recanted his earlier story and admitted that he had been driving the truck in question and that he had consumed a considerable amount of alcohol and passed out at the wheel of the truck before it left the highway. Id. Bradshaw was charged with first-degree manslaughter, driving while under the influence of intoxicants, and driving while his license was revoked. His motion to suppress his statement was denied, and he was found guilty after a bench trial. Id.
*797The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, holding the inquiry Bradshaw made of the police officer while being transferred to jail did not “initiate” a conversation with the officer and therefore the statements growing out of this conversation should have been excluded from evidence under Edwards v. Arizona. Id. at 1042-43. The Oregon Supreme Court denied review, without writing an opinion on the merits.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that by asking “Well, what is going to happen to me now?”, Bradshaw “initiated” a further conversation. Id. at 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830. His statement evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation. Id.
Because there was no violation of the Edwards initiation rule, the next inquiry was whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, Bradshaw made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to have counsel present. The trial court, based on its first-hand observation of the witnesses, found a waiver and the Supreme Court found no reason to dispute that finding. Id. at 1045-47, 103 S.Ct. 2830.
Here, Anderson himself initiated the conversation when, after being told by the police that they could no longer talk to him, he said, “Oh, man, I want to talk to you. I need, I need to talk to you Harry [Lt. Bishop].” Anderson also made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to have counsel present when he said, “I don’t want an attorney; I’ve changed my mind” and he wanted to talk to the police officers “about the murder of Robbie Clark.”
It is unclear how long the interrogation was stopped after Anderson requested an attorney, and before Anderson asked to speak with Lt. Bishop. The record implies it did not appear to be a long period of time. Although the Supreme Court has held the interrogation must stop for some period of time before a suspect can waive a properly invoked Miranda right, that amount of time has never been specified. In Bradshaw, we know the time was not long because when he re-initiated the conversation with the officer, Bradshaw was being transported from the police station to the jail shortly after he had requested an attorney. 462 U.S. at 1042, 103 S.Ct. 2830. Even though not much time had elapsed since Bradshaw had requested an attorney, the Court had no problem finding Bradshaw was the one who re-initiated the conversation. There is no clearly established federal law mandating a particular amount of time the break in the interrogation must last. We have recently been reminded that where there is no such clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, we are not allowed to invent such law. See Carey v. Musladin, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) Hence, the relevant fact here is that Anderson re-initiated the conversation, not the duration of the break in the conversation.
Given that Anderson validly waived his right to counsel and his right to remain silent before he confessed, the admission of his confession was not error, and the California Court of Appeal’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). For this reason, I respectfully dissent.

. Specifically, the conversation went as follows:
Defendant Jerome Anderson: I’d like to have an attorney present.
Lt. Harry Bishop: Okey [sic]
Detective Ron Clemens: OK fine.
Anderson: Sorry, man.
Bishop: No, don't apologize.
Detective Tom O’Connor: okay, 7-12-97, about 22:45, ten fortyfive, uh, p.m. on Saturday. This is it.
The police then turned the tape recorder off and stopped the interrogation.