Court Opinion

ID: 9940281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 20:08:28.29922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:42.369395
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Monaco, 2024-Ohio-535.]

                                       COURT OF APPEALS
                                  TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                      JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO                                 :       Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
                                              :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
                         Plaintiff-Appellee   :       Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                              :
-vs-                                          :
                                              :       Case No. 2023AP070040
JASON D. MONACO                               :
                                              :
                    Defendant-Appellant       :       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                          Appeal from the Tuscarawas County Court
                                                  of Common Pleas, Case No. 2020 CR 08
                                                  0318

JUDGMENT:                                         Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                           February 13, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                            For Defendant-Appellant

RYAN STYER                                        NATHAN RAY
Prosecuting Attorney                              137 South Main Street
125 East High Avenue                              Suite 201
New Philadelphia, OH 44663                        Akron, OH 44308
[Cite as State v. Monaco, 2024-Ohio-535.]

Gwin, J.

        {¶1}    Defendant-appellant Jason D. Monaco [Monaco] appeals the June 22, 2023

Judgment Entry setting forth Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law after remand by

this Court for the denial of his Petition for Post-Conviction relief.

                                        Facts and Procedural History

        {¶2}    On August 14, 2020, Monaco was indicted on four counts of Gross Sexual

Imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05, two counts of Sexual Imposition in violation of

R.C. 2907.06, one count of Kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01, one count of Rape

in violation of R.C. 2907.02, one count of Attempted Rape in violation of R.C. 2923.02

and 2907.02, four counts of Disseminating Matter Harmful to Juveniles in violation of

R.C. 2907.31, and two counts of Pandering Obscenity Involving a Minor or Impaired

Person in violation of R.C. 2907.321. The facts underlying the indictment show Monaco

repeatedly sexually abused a minor relative over a period of years. See, State v. Monaco,

5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2021 AP 01 0002, 2021-Ohio-3888, ¶7 [Monaco, I].

        {¶3}    Subsequently, Monaco entered a plea of guilty to the indictment. The trial

court sentenced him as follows: Counts 5 and 6 merges with Counts 3 and 4 for the

purposes of sentencing. Count 1- 60 months in prison; Count 2 - 60 months in prison,

Count 3 - 18 months in prison; Count 4 - 18 months in prison; Count 7 - mandatory 15

years to life in prison; Count 8 - mandatory 10 years to life in prison; Count 9 - 8 years in

prison; Count 10 - 18 months in prison; Count 11 - 12 months in prison; Count 12 - 18

months in prison; Count 13 - 180 days in prison; Count 14 - 8 years in prison; and Count

15 - 8 years in prison. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently for an

aggregate sentence of 15 years to life. See, Monaco, I at ¶2.
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                      3

       {¶4}   Monaco did not file an appeal from his conviction or sentence. Instead, on

October 29, 2020, he filed a pro se motion to change his plea to not guilty and appoint

new counsel. Monaco alleged he was under duress and not of sound mind due to extreme

depression and anxiety when he signed his guilty plea. He also alleged that he did not

understand the evidence against him as his attorney did not go through the discovery

documents with him. Monaco stated he was not guilty of the accusations. Monaco, I, ¶11.

       {¶5}   On November 30, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the pro se request

for Monaco to withdraw his guilty plea. At the hearing, Monaco stated that on the date of

the plea and sentencing he was very shaken. He acknowledged that he discussed with

counsel his plea, the rights he was waiving, and penalties he would be facing. Monaco

stated that he did not review the discovery provided by appellee with his attorney. He

stated that he was suffering from anxiety and depression but was not under the influence

of drugs or alcohol the day of sentencing. Monaco did not submit a professional report to

substantiate his claim of suffering from depression, anxiety, or any other mental health

condition likely to impair his ability to voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly enter a plea

of guilty. Monaco acknowledged that he had reviewed the evidence extracted from his

electronic devices, that he knew the plea offer was for fifteen years to life, and that he

thought he should not have pled guilty because it wasn’t a fair deal. Monaco, I, ¶12.

       {¶6}   During the hearing, the state presented under seal the state’s response to

Monaco’s discovery request [Exhibit A], a four page written statement from the victim

detailing the allegations of sexual abuse, dated July 14, 2020 [Exhibit B], a second two-

page written statement from the victim, dated July 14, 2020 [Exhibit C], a fourteen page

typewritten transcript of a one hour telephone conversation recorded between the victim
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                  4

and Monaco [Exhibit D], a three page handwritten statement by the victim, dated July 30,

2020 [Exhibit E], a thumb drive containing audio and video files of Monaco’s interview by

the police and the one hour phone call between him and the victim. [Exhibit F]. T. Nov.

30, 2020 at 29-30.

       {¶7}   The trial court overruled Monaco’s motion to withdraw his post-sentence

guilty plea and Monaco appealed. Pursuant to an Opinion filed on October 29, 2021 in

State v. Monaco, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2021 AP 01 0002, 2021-Ohio-3888 [Monaco,

I], this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

       {¶8}   Thereafter, on November 18, 2021, Monaco filed a Petition to Vacate and

Set Aside Sentence. State v. Monaco, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2021 AP 12 0035, 2022-

Ohio-2353, ¶ 7. [Monaco, II].

       {¶9}   Monaco, in his petition, alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective.

Monaco again alleged that his trial counsel never reviewed any discovery with him and

that Monaco did not know what the evidence was against him, that while in the county

jail, he had a mental health breakdown due to stress. Monaco added to his claim that

during the time that trial counsel was representing appellant, trial counsel, due to being

investigated by the Board of Professional Conduct for ethical violations, was preoccupied

and failed to provide effective representation. In support of his petition, Monaco submitted

a copy of his handwritten motion previously filed with the trial court on Oct. 24, 2020

[Defendant’s Exhibit A]; Community Mental Health Treatment Summary, dated October

14, 2021 [Defendant’s Exhibit B]; 7 page typewritten Affidavit of Jason D. Monaco

[Defendant’s Exhibit C]; and a Coshocton Tribune article which is titled "Complaint:
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                    5

Attorney accused of having affair with client", "[Attorney] has a complaint pending with

the Board of Professional Conduct,” dated March 12, 2021.

       {¶10} The trial court, pursuant to a Judgment Entry filed on December 2, 2021,

denied Monaco’s Petition. Monaco II, ¶7.

       {¶11} In Monaco II, this Court held the trial court should have reviewed Monaco’s

motion as a motion for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21. Monaco, II, ¶15. As such,

the trial court was required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law when denying

the petition. Therefore, because the trial judge denied the petition for postconviction relief

without stating her reasons for denying the petition, this Court reversed and remanded

the matter to the trial judge to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

       {¶12} Pursuant to the remand, on June 22, 2022, the trial judge issued findings of

fact and conclusions of law in support of the decision to deny Monaco’s Petition to Vacate

and Set Aside Sentence filed November 18, 2021.

                                       Assignments of Error

       {¶13} Monaco raises two Assignments of Error,

       {¶14} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED

PETITIONER APPELLANT MONACO'S TIMELY FILED PETITION FOR POST-

CONVICTION RELIEF PURSUANT TO O.R.C. 2953.21 BY FINDING THAT IT WAS

BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.

       {¶15} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MONACO'S POST-

CONVICTION RELIEF PETITION WHERE HE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

DEHORS THE RECORD TO MERIT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.”
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                     6

                                               I. & II.

       {¶16} In his First Assignment of Error, Monaco argues that the trial court abused

its discretion by finding in part that the petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

In support Monaco argues that his arguments are not barred by the doctrine of res judicata

because he was not represented by counsel in the trial court on his motion to withdraw

his guilty plea and because he had provided the trial court with new evidence outside the

record to support his request for postconviction relief.

       {¶17} In his Second Assignment of Error, Monaco argues that the trial court erred

when the court denied Monaco's petition without a hearing. Specifically, Monaco argues

he provided the court with an affidavit and other documents that set forth operative facts

to establish substantive grounds for relief to establish that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel, and was therefore entitled to a hearing.

       {¶18} Because the assignments of error are inextricably intertwined we shall

address them together.

                                       Standard of Review

       {¶19} We review a decision to grant or deny a petition for postconviction relief,

including the decision whether to afford the petitioner a hearing, under an abuse-of-

discretion standard. State v. Hatton, 169 Ohio St.3d 446, 2022-Ohio-3991, 205 N.E.3d

513, ¶ 38, citing State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77,

¶ 51-52, 58.

                                        Postconviction relief

       {¶20} A postconviction proceeding is a collateral civil attack on a criminal

conviction. State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999); State v.
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                    7

Phillips, 9th Dist. No. 20692, 2002-Ohio-823. R.C. 2953.21(A) states, in part, as follows:

“(1) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense or adjudicated a delinquent

child and who claims that there was such a denial or infringement of the person’s rights

as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution

of the United States may file a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the

grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or

sentence or to grant other appropriate relief”.

           Right to evidentiary hearing in postconviction proceedings is not automatic

       {¶21} In State v. Bunch, 171 Ohio St.3d 775, 2022-Ohio-4723, 220 N.E.3d 773,

the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the standard to be used for determining whether a

hearing should be held on a post-conviction petition and emphasized that it was only

addressing the standard for holding a hearing on a timely-filed post-conviction petition

and not the standard for ultimately granting relief on the petition. Id. at ¶ 22.

       {¶22} Under the post-conviction statutes, a trial court must, before granting an

evidentiary hearing, “determine whether there are substantive grounds for relief.” Id. at ¶

23, citing R.C. 2953.21(D). “If the petition ‘is sufficient on its face to raise an issue that

the petitioner’s conviction is void or voidable on constitutional grounds, and the claim is

one which depends upon factual allegations that cannot be determined by examination

of the files and records of the case, the petition states a substantive ground for relief.’”

Id., citing State v. Milanovich, 42 Ohio St.2d 46, 325 N.E.2d 540 (1975).

       {¶23} The Bunch court further explained that in determining whether there are

substantive grounds for relief, the trial court must consider the entirety of the record from

the trial proceedings as well as any evidence filed by the parties in post-conviction
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                   8

proceedings. Then, “[i]f the record does not on its face disprove the petitioner’s claim,”

the court is required to “proceed to a prompt hearing on the issues.” Id. at ¶ 24, citing

R.C. 2953.21(F).

                   Postconviction review of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims

       {¶24} In order for an indigent petitioner to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing in

a postconviction relief proceeding on a claim that he was denied effective assistance of

counsel, the two-part analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104

S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) is to be applied. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106

S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Lytte, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 358 N.E.2d 623

(1976); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). The petitioner must

therefore prove that: 1). counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonable representation; and 2). there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not

for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different, or he would not have

pled guilty. Id.

        Application of res judicata in postconviction-relief proceedings raising ineffective

                                 assistance of counsel claims

       {¶25} With respect to post-conviction petitions asserting grounds for relief based

on ineffective assistance, res judicata does not bar a post-conviction ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel claim when either (1) the petitioner had the same attorney at trial

and on appeal or (2) he must rely on evidence outside the trial record to establish his

claim for relief. * * * The converse is that when the petitioner had a new attorney on appeal

and the claim could have been litigated based on the trial record, res judicata applies and

the postconviction claim is barred.” State v. Blanton, 171 Ohio St.3d 19, 2022-Ohio-3985,
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                      9

215 N.E.3d 467, ¶ 2, citing State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 113-114, 443 N.E.2d 169

(1982). However, merely providing evidence outside the record is not sufficient to entitle

a petitioner to a hearing. Rather, to secure a hearing, a petitioner “‘must proffer evidence

which, if believed, would establish not only that his trial counsel had substantially violated

at least one of a defense attorney's essential duties to his client but also that said violation

was prejudicial to the [petitioner].’” Id. at ¶ 31, quoting Cole at 114, 443 N.E.2d 169; State

v. Johnson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2022-09-063, 2023-Ohio-879, ¶21.

       Monaco is not represented by the same attorney that represented him in the trial

court or in Monaco, I; however, the attorney representing Monaco in this appeal is the

same attorney who represented him in Monaco, II. Monaco attached his affidavit and

documents to his PCR petition that were not a part of the trial court record.

            Review of affidavits submitted in support of postconviction relief petition

       {¶26} When reviewing a postconviction petition a trial court “should give due

deference to affidavits sworn to under oath and filed in support of the petition, but may, in

the sound exercise of discretion, judge their credibility in determining whether to accept

the affidavits as “true statements of fact” or “discard frivolous claims.” State v. Calhoun,

86 Ohio St.3d 279, 282, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999). In determining the credibility of

supporting affidavits in postconviction relief proceedings, the trial court should consider

all relevant factors, including (1) whether the judge reviewing the post-conviction relief

petition also presided at the trial, (2) whether multiple affidavits contain nearly identical

language, or otherwise appear to have been drafted by the same person, (3) whether the

affidavits contain or rely on hearsay, (4) whether the affiants are relatives of the petitioner,

or otherwise interested in the success of the petitioner's efforts, and (5) whether the
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                     10

affidavits contradict evidence proffered by the defense at trial. Id. at 285, 714 N.E.2d 905.

“Moreover, a trial court may find sworn testimony in an affidavit to be contradicted by

evidence in the record by the same witness, or to be internally inconsistent, thereby

weakening the credibility of that testimony.” Id. “Depending on the entire record, one or

more of these or other factors may be sufficient to justify the conclusion that an affidavit

asserting information outside the record lacks credibility. Such a decision should be within

the discretion of the trial court.” Id.

          {¶27} A trial court that discounts the credibility of sworn affidavits must include an

explanation of its basis for doing so in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id.; State

v. Blanton, 171 Ohio St.3d 19, 2022-Ohio-3985, 215 N.E.3d 467, ¶98; State v. Barron,

12th Dist. Warren No. CA2022-09-059, 2023-Ohio-1249, ¶ 20, appeal not allowed, 170

Ohio St.3d 1517, 2023-Ohio-2771, 214 N.E.3d 590, ¶ 20.

          {¶28} Justice Donnelly recently expressed the following concern about the

treatment of a defendant’s affidavit submitted in support of his petition for post-conviction

relief,

                 It is, of course, possible that Dunlap’s claims would not have been

          borne out by the facts established during an evidentiary hearing. But he

          does not deserve to have his claims dismissed out of hand with the usual

          bromides about relying on a “self-serving affidavit.” A defendant in this

          scenario is rarely ever going to have anything to back up a plea-withdrawal

          motion other than his own claims about what happened. And only an

          evidentiary hearing will establish whether those claims are true. As I stated

          in my dissenting opinion in State v. Bozso, 162 Ohio St.3d 68, 2020-Ohio-
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                      11

       3779, 164 N.E.3d 344, “a defendant cannot be expected to make a record

       of the fact that he has been misinformed about a crucial issue at the time

       he is operating under that misinformation.” Id. at ¶ 44 (Donnelly, J.,

       dissenting). To say that a defendant’s claims in support of withdrawing his

       plea do not warrant an evidentiary hearing because they are not already

       backed up by solid, admissible evidence puts the defendant in an

       impossible position and ensures that an evidentiary hearing is never

       warranted no matter how specific and convincing a defendant’s claims

       might be.

State v. Dunlap, 161 Ohio St.3d 1416, 2021-Ohio-181, 161 N.E.3d 704 (Table), appeal

not allowed, Donnelly, J., dissenting. See also, State v. Blanton, 171 Ohio St.3d 19, 2022-

Ohio-3985, 215 N.E.3d 467, ¶98 (“But sworn affidavits ‘should not lightly be deemed

false.’ [State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279,] 284, [714 N.E.2d 905 (1999)]. And when a

trial court ‘discounts the credibility of sworn affidavits,’ it should ‘include an explanation of

its basis for doing so.’ Id. at 285, 714 N.E.2d 905.”).

                                   Monaco’s Substantive Claims

       {¶29} Monaco’s petition was filed by counsel. As grounds, Monaco claims he

received ineffective assistance of trial counsel contending 1). trial counsel did not meet

with him and go over the discovery provided by the state; 2). That while in jail Monaco

had a “mental health breakdown” and was placed on suicide watch for approximately one

week; 3). That he was on medication and suffering mental health issues when he entered

his plea and was in fear that his trial attorney was not prepared for trial. [Jason D.

Monaco’s Petition to Vacate and Set Aside Sentence Hearing Requested, filed Nov. 18,
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                   12

2021 at 6. [Docket Entry No. 95] [Hereinafter, “PCR petition”]; 4). Trial counsel was under

investigation by the Board of Professional Conduct during the time period during which

he was representing Monaco. Id. at 7.

                                       Monaco’s guilty plea

       {¶30} A plea of guilty constitutes a complete admission of guilt. Crim. R. 11 (B)

(1). “By entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not simply stating that he did the discreet

acts described in the indictment; he is admitting guilt of a substantive crime.” United v.

Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 762, 102 L.Ed.2d 927(1989).

       {¶31} Crim. R. 11 requires guilty pleas to be made knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily. The constitutional rights that the trial court must advise the defendant before

accepting his or her plea are: (1) a jury trial; (2) confrontation of witnesses against him;

(3) the compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; (4) that the state must

prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial; and (5) that the defendant

cannot be compelled to testify against himself. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-

Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 19. If the trial court fails to strictly comply with these

requirements, the defendant’s plea is invalid. Id. at ¶ 31.

       {¶32} The non-constitutional rights that the defendant must be informed of are: (1)

the nature of the charges; (2) the maximum penalty involved, which includes, if applicable,

an advisement on post-release control; (3) if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible

for probation or the imposition of community control sanctions; and (4) that after entering

a guilty plea or a no-contest plea, the court may proceed directly to judgment and

sentencing. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)(b); Veney at ¶ 10-13; State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                13

86, 2008-Ohio-509, 423 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 19-26, (post-release control is a non-

constitutional advisement).

       {¶33} For the non-constitutional rights, the trial court must substantially comply

with Crim.R. 11’s mandates. State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474

(1990). “Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the

defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is

waiving.” Veney at ¶ 15.

       {¶34} Monaco does not argue that the trial court failed to comply with Crim R. 11’s

strict or substantial compliance requirements before accepting his guilty pleas.

                                   Monaco’s written waivers

       {¶35} A written waiver of constitutional rights is presumed to have been voluntary,

knowing, and intelligent. State v. Turner, 105 Ohio St.3d 331, 2005-Ohio-1938, 826

N.E.2d 266, ¶25. In this case, Monaco signed both the original plea agreement and a

revised plea agreement. T. Nov. 30, 2020 at 24. See also, Monaco, I at ¶4. Further, the

trial court conducted a lengthy inquiry concerning each of Monaco’s constitutional rights

during the change of plea hearing. Monaco, I, at ¶6. The trial judge gave Monaco several

opportunities to ask questions or bring any concerns to her attention. Id. Monaco did not.

       {¶36} In the case at bar, the state did not seek consecutive sentences, the

sentence Monaco received was negotiated and was known by him prior to entering his

plea. T. Nov. 30, 2020 at 26. Additional charges were not pursued by the state based

upon the plea negotiations. Id. at 31. Prior to sentencing, the state detailed the evidence

in support of each charge to which Monaco pled guilty on the record. T. Change of Plea

and Imposition of Sentence Hearing, Oct. 21, 2020 at 16 – 26; See also, Monaco, I at ¶7.
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                   14

Monaco did not dispute the recitation, inform the trial judge he was not guilty of some or

any of the allegations, or indicate his confusion or inability to comprehend the evidence

against him.

       {¶37} We find based upon our review of the entire record, the record discloses

that: (1) Monaco’s guilty plea was not the result of coercion, deception or intimidation; (2)

counsel was present at the time of the plea; (3) counsel’s advice was competent in light

of the circumstances surrounding the indictment; (4) the plea was made with the

understanding of the nature of the charges; and, (5) Monaco was motivated either by a

desire to seek a lesser penalty or a fear of the consequences of a jury trial, or both,

therefore the guilty plea has been voluntarily and intelligently made. See, State v.

Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92, 271 N.E.2d 852 (1971), paragraph one of the syllabus.

                                  Monaco’s mental health claims

       {¶38} The Community Mental Health summary attached to Monaco’s PCR petition

as Defendant’s Exhibit B is dated October 14, 2021. The document indicates that intake

was completed on September 22, 2020 with a finding, “Adjustment Disorder with mixed

anxiety & depressed mood & Alcohol Use Disorder, severe.” The recommendation was

for Monaco to attend weekly counseling sessions. The document indicates Monaco

completed five sessions before his transfer to prison.

       {¶39} The mental health assessment does not indicate that Monaco was, or is,

incapable of exercising rational, intelligent thought as a result of his diagnosis. The report

makes no mention of an inability of the intake officer to communicate with Monaco or that

Monaco’s responses were incoherent, unintelligent or indicative that he was unaware of

what was being asked by the intake officer or counselor. Monaco admitted that no special
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                 15

requests in terms of his mental health were made by his counselor while Monaco was in

the jail. T. Nov. 30, 2020 at 17. Monaco saw the counselor the Monday before he entered

his plea and the Monday after he entered his plea and no special requests were made to

the jail by his counselor. Id. Monaco admitted that he had been released from suicide

watch after one week, telling the doctor that he was no longer having suicidal thoughts.

T., Nov. 30, 2020 at 16.

       {¶40} The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized a distinction exists between

being mentally or emotionally ill and not being competent to stand trial. “[A] defendant

may be emotionally disturbed or even mentally ill and yet competent to stand trial.” State

v. Ferguson, 108 Ohio St.3d 451, 2006-Ohio-1502, ¶ 46, quoting State v. Mink, 101 Ohio

St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio 1580, ¶ 38. Stated differently, “Incompetency is defined in Ohio as

the defendant’s inability to understand “* * * the nature and objective of the proceedings

against him or of presently assisting in his defense.” R.C. 2945.37(A). Incompetency must

not be equated with mere mental or emotional instability or even with outright insanity. A

defendant may be emotionally disturbed or even psychotic and still be capable of

understanding the charges against him and of assisting his counsel. State v. Bock, 28

Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 502 N.E.2d 1016 (1986).

       {¶41} Monaco has never raised a claim that he was incapable of assisting his

attorney or that he was unable to understand the proceedings. In fact, his pro se filings in

the case evidence his acumen with respect to the criminal charges, court proceeding, the

role of the prosecutor, defense counsel and the trial judge.

       {¶42} The evidence in the record does not demonstrate a long and continuing

history of pronounced irrational behavior on Monaco’s part that would give rise to a
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                    16

constitutional right to a formal inquiry into his competency to stand trial. Drope v. Missouri,

420 U.S. 162, 180, 95 S.Ct. 896, 908, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Brock, at 110. Nor does

the evidence Monaco submitted in support of his claim that his plea of guilty should be

vacated because he was emotionally disturbed or even mentally ill at the time he entered

his plea, give rise to a claim that he was unable to understand the charges, the effect of

his decision to plead guilty, the court proceedings and the sentence. Monaco points to no

evidence in the record or outside the record that suggests “a reasonable and legitimate

basis for withdrawal of the plea,” or that he has a viable defense to the charges. State v.

Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521 at 584, 584 N.E.2d 715; State v. Cuthbertson, 139 Ohio App.3d

895, 899, 746 N.E.2d 197 (7th Dist. 2000).

       {¶43} Accordingly, we find that the petition, the supporting affidavits, the

documentary evidence, the files, and the records do not demonstrate that Monaco set

forth sufficient operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief. Calhoun, 86 Ohio

St.3d at paragraph two of the syllabus; see R.C. 2953.21(C).

                                         Monaco’s affidavit

       {¶44} Monaco’s affidavit again addresses his claims that he was too mentally

distraught to understand the charges, and that his attorney did not review discovery with

him. The trial court discounted the affidavit because the trial judge found the statements

to be contradicted by the record.

       {¶45} “Not every restriction on counsel’s time or opportunity * * * to consult with

his client or otherwise to prepare for trial violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to

counsel.” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983).

“[T]here is generally no basis for finding a Sixth Amendment violation unless the accused
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                 17

can show how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt.”

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) fn. 26;

Accord, State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032.

       {¶46} “[T]he Sixth Amendment imposes on counsel a duty to investigate, because

reasonably effective assistance must be based on professional decisions and informed

legal choices can be made only after investigation of options.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

680. However, “[i]f counsel does not conduct a substantial investigation into each of

several plausible lines of defense, assistance may nonetheless be effective.... Limitations

of time and money ... may force early strategic choices, often based solely on

conversations with the defendant and a review of the prosecution’s evidence.” Id. at 681.

       {¶47} The right to competent counsel does not require that a criminal defendant

develop and share a "meaningful relationship" with his attorney. Morris v. Slappy, 461

U.S. 1, 13, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617, 75 L.Ed.2d 610(1983); State v. Blankenship, 102 Ohio

App.3d 534, 657 N.E.2d 559(12th Dist. 1995); State v. Burroughs, 5th Dist. Delaware No.

04CAC03018, 2004-Ohio-4769, ¶ 11. When there is no demonstration that counsel failed

to research the facts or the law or that counsel was ignorant of a crucial defense, a

reviewing court defers to counsel's judgment in the matter. State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d

45, 49, 402 N.E.2d 1189(1980), citing People v. Miller, 7 Cal.3d 562, 573-574, 102

Cal.Rptr. 841, 498 P.2d 1089 (1972); State v. Wiley, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-340, 2004-

Ohio-1008, ¶ 21.

       {¶48} Monaco provides no evidence that counsel failed to investigate any line of

defense, or that counsel himself failed to review the evidence provided to him by the state.
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                 18

Monaco does not suggest that counsel overlooked or failed to investigate evidence of

Monaco’s innocence and does not provide any witnesses or other evidence to refute the

compelling and overwhelming evidence of his guilt provided by the state. In the case at

bar, Monaco points to no specific attorney errors that resulted from counsel’s

representation, and he makes no showing of prejudice. We cannot presume that the

defendant has suffered prejudice. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, ¶112, citing, State v.

Coleman, 85 Ohio St.3d 129 at 144, 707 N.E.2d 476 (1999); State v. Sanders, 92 Ohio

St.3d 245 at 277, 750 N.E.2d 90 (2001).

       {¶49} A review of the whole record demonstrates that defense counsel zealously

and effectively negotiated a favorable plea agreement to limit Monaco’s potential prison

sentence and forgo the potential filing of additional charges. Counsel candidly advised

Monaco concerning his appraisal of the case based upon counsel’s review of the

evidence against Monaco.

       {¶50} In the case at bar, Monaco’s trial attorney was retained. Monaco signed two

written acknowledgements of his understanding of the charges, his constitutional rights,

the possible penalties and desire to enter guilty pleas. Monaco told the trial judge that he

understood each one of the rights that he was waiving by entering his guilty pleas without

hesitation, asking questions or confusion. Monaco further acknowledged he had the

opportunity to fully discuss these matters with his attorney. T. Change of Plea and

Imposition of Sentence Hearing, Oct. 21, 2020 at 15. After a defect in the original plea

form was noted, Monaco’s trial counsel told the judge that he had an opportunity to review

the revised version with Monaco. Id. at 11-12. Monaco agreed. Id. When asked if he had
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                   19

any questions or concerns about the changes that were made to the written plea

agreement Monaco responded, “No your Honor.” Id. at 12.

       {¶51} Monaco’s claims in his affidavit are disingenuous in light of his interview

with the police and the hour-long tape-recorded telephone call with the victim in which the

allegations were discussed. T. Nov. 30, 2020 at 29-30; State’s Exhibit F. Monaco can

hardly claim he did not know who is accuser was or what she was alleging. Clearly, having

been interviewed by the police and speaking to the victim by telephone, Monaco was

aware of the allegations being made and who was making them. Further, Monaco

admitted that his trial attorney discussed the child pornography found by the police on his

computer and electronic equipment at his home. T. Nov. 30, 2020 at 23. There is no

evidence in the record, including the affidavit of Monaco, that provides any evidence or

explanation to cast doubt upon the victim’s credibility or motivation in coming forward with

the allegations, or that suggests Monaco has a viable defense to any of the charges.

       {¶52} We find the record supports the trial judge’s decision discounting the

statements made in Monaco’s affidavit as being in conflict with the facts contained in the

record.

       {¶53} Accordingly, we find that the petition, the supporting affidavits, the

documentary evidence, the files, and the records do not demonstrate that Monaco set

forth sufficient operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief. Calhoun, 86 Ohio

St.3d at paragraph two of the syllabus; see R.C. 2953.21(C).

                 Counsel’s investigation by the Board of Professional Conduct

       {¶54} Monaco next contends that his attorney was preoccupied with a pending

disciplinary complaint and therefore did not provide effective representation. PCR Petition
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                20

at 7. He further contends that his attorney was found to be untruthful in the pending

investigation. Id.

       {¶55} In a December 2020 complaint, disciplinary counsel alleged that Monaco’s

trial counsel had committed several ethical violations by engaging in inappropriate sexual

communications and a physical sexual relationship with a client and then lying about that

conduct during the ensuing disciplinary investigation. Disciplinary Counsel v. Cox, 168

Ohio St.3d 78, 2022-Ohio-784, 195 N.E.3d 1018. Counsel was eventually suspended

from the practice of law in Ohio for two years with the second year stayed on conditions.

Id. at ¶ 38.

       {¶56} Counsel was licensed to practice law in the State of Ohio and was not under

suspension at any time that he represented Monaco. The allegations of misconduct did

not involve Monaco and it was not alleged that counsel was implicated in Monaco’s

crimes. Monaco provided no evidentiary materials to suggest that his attorney was not

truthful in any matter related to Monaco’s case.

       {¶57} “[T]he breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial

of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel.” Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S.

157, 165, 106 S.Ct. 988, 993, 89 L.Ed.2d 123, 134 (1986); Bond v. United States 1 F.3d

631, 636-637(7th Cir., 1993). Courts consistently have declined to adopt a per se rule that

ineffective assistance always results when a disciplinary action is pending against the

defendant’s attorney. Id. Accord, State v. Allen, 121 Ohio App.3d 666, 669-670, 700

N.E.2d 682 (8th Dist. 1997). Rather the courts have required the defendant to show “actual

errors and omissions by counsel that prejudiced the defense.” United States v. Williams,

934 F.2d 847, 851-52 (7th Cir. 1991).
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                                   21

       {¶58} Importantly, in the case at bar, counsel’s disciplinary action occurred in an

unrelated case and had nothing to do with his representation of Monaco. Given the

compelling evidence against Monaco, we cannot say that the result would have been

different had Monaco had a different attorney.

       {¶59} Accordingly, we find that the petition, the supporting affidavits, the

documentary evidence, the files, and the records do not demonstrate that Monaco set

forth sufficient operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief. Calhoun, 86 Ohio

St.3d at paragraph two of the syllabus; see R.C. 2953.21(C).

                                            Conclusion

       {¶60} The petition, supporting affidavit and documents, file, and the record do not

demonstrate Monaco set forth sufficient operative facts to establish substantive grounds

for relief concerning.

       {¶61} As Monaco did not establish substantive grounds for relief, the trial judge

was not required to conduct a hearing before overruling his petition for postconviction

relief. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Monaco’s petition for post-conviction

relief without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023AP070040                                    22

      {¶62} Monaco’s First and Second Assignments of Error are overruled.

      {¶63} The judgment of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas,

Tuscarawas County, Ohio is affirmed.

By Gwin, J.,

Delaney, P.J., and

Wise, J., concur