Court Opinion

ID: 9695676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:27:07.247352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:15.758179
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
Because I believe the lower court’s actions in the instant case indicate that it had a reasonable doubt as to appellant’s guilt, I dissent.
The appellant was found guilty of robbery and rape by Judge Biunno, sitting without a jury. Upon further re*40flection, however, Judge Biunno determined that there was a reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s guilt, and thus granted appellant’s motion in arrest of judgment. Judge Biunno based the latter decision on “the fact that observation by the Court at trial and observation under better lighting conditions at argument on the Post Trial Motions, disclosed that the defendant was smooth skinned and had no pockmarks, acne or other facial blemishes or residual scars therefrom. The primary factor for consideration was the proof of the identity of Mrs. Jordan’s assailant. In this case, the alleged assailant was not arrested until four months after the crimes occurred. The fact that the defendant did not meet with Mrs. Jordan’s initial description of her assailant when coupled with the circumstances that the defendant lived in the same housing project building as the complainant for two years prior to the rape and up to the time of trial, and apparently used the same two elevators as complainant during this entire period and yet was not identified by her until four months after the rape, convinced the Court that there was a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.”
The above explanation makes it clear that Judge Biunno, the fact-finder in the instant case, believed that he acted prematurely when he found the appellant guilty. While the Majority technically is correct when it notes that our task in reviewing a trial court’s grant of a motion in arrest of judgment is to determine whether the Commonwealth offered sufficient evidence, see e. g., Commonwealth v. Meadows, 232 Pa.Super. 292, 331 A.2d 827 (1974), I believe that the application of that standard in light of Judge Biunno’s subsequent determination of reasonable doubt would be a gross miscarriage of justice. While Judge Biunno indicated his doubts somewhat belatedly, it is nonetheless a clear manifestation of reason*41able doubt. Legal technicalities must not prevent our system of justice from acquitting a criminal defendant who is not thought guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, I would affirm Judge Biunno’s grant of appellant’s motion in arrest of judgment.