Court Opinion

ID: 9893487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 14:07:22.196837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:16.834888
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 20, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                              TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                                 Court of Appeals
                                  NO. 2022-CA-1054-MR

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                            APPELLANT

                      APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT
v.                    HONORABLE TERESA WHITAKER, JUDGE
                           ACTION NO. 21-CR-00588-001

BILLY LETNER                                                          APPELLEE

                                       OPINION
                                      REVERSING

                                     ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: The Commonwealth appeals from the Pulaski Circuit Court’s

order dismissing its indictment against Billy Letner (“Letner”), finding KRS1

218A.133 exempts Letner from prosecution for trafficking in a controlled

substance. We reverse.

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
                                     BACKGROUND

              On June 25, 2021, Letner called 911 to report a female had overdosed

in the apartment where he was staying. When police arrived, they found a young

woman unconscious in the bathroom and several used syringes, including one

containing suspected heroin. While in the house, police also noticed small, clear

plastic baggies on the kitchen table. Based on their observations (and other

information available to the officers),2 they applied for a search warrant for the

premises. Police recovered methamphetamine and fentanyl, and Letner was later

indicted on two counts of first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance.

              Letner moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing he was exempt from

prosecution pursuant to KRS 218A.133, Kentucky’s Medical Amnesty Statute.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. It reasoned that since one

of the definitions of “trafficking” includes “possession with intent,” and since

trafficking in a controlled substance necessarily includes possession of the

substance, KRS 218A.133 should be construed liberally to include trafficking

within the statute’s immunity from prosecution for possession of controlled

substance crimes. This appeal followed.

2
 According to the hearing, the affidavit in support of the search warrant alleged the overdose
victim had recently been indicted on a trafficking charge, and emergency personnel had recently
been called to Letner’s address about an intoxicated person believed to be using heroin.
However, this affidavit was not included in the record on appeal.

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                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

              We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, giving no

deference to the trial court’s conclusions. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d

132, 140 (Ky. 2021) (citation omitted). On appeal, the Commonwealth argues the

trial court erred in concluding KRS 218A.133 bars prosecution for trafficking in a

controlled substance. Letner did not file a responsive brief.3

                                        ANALYSIS

              KRS 218A.133 provides in relevant part:

              (2) A person shall not be charged with or prosecuted for a
              criminal offense prohibiting the possession of a
              controlled substance or the possession of drug
              paraphernalia if:

                      (a) In good faith, medical assistance with a drug
                      overdose is sought from a public safety answering
                      point, emergency medical services, a law
                      enforcement officer, or a health practitioner
                      because the person:

                             1. Requests emergency medical assistance
                             for himself or herself or another person;

                             2. Acts in concert with another person who
                             requests emergency medical assistance; or

3
 Pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 31(H)(3), this court may impose
penalties when an appellee fails to file a brief. However, the decision to impose penalties is
within our discretion. Roberts v. Bucci, 218 S.W.3d 395, 396 (Ky. App. 2007). In this instance,
we decline to do so.

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                            3. Appears to be in need of emergency
                            medical assistance and is the individual for
                            whom the request was made;

                   (b) The person remains with, or is, the individual
                   who appears to be experiencing a drug overdose
                   until the requested assistance is provided; and

                   (c) The evidence for the charge or prosecution is
                   obtained as a result of the drug overdose and the
                   need for medical assistance.

             (3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall
             not extend to the investigation and prosecution of any
             other crimes committed by a person who otherwise
             qualifies under this section.

KRS 218A.133(2)-(3).

             “[T]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the intention of

the legislature should be ascertained and given effect.” MPM Fin. Group, Inc. v.

Morton, 289 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Ky. 2009) (citation omitted). When the words of a

statute “are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is no

room for construction or interpretation and the statute must be given its effect as

written.” McCracken County Fiscal Court v. Graves, 885 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Ky.

1994). Furthermore, “[w]here there is an apparent conflict between two statutes,

the Court is obliged to attempt to harmonize the interpretation of the law so as to

give effect to both statutes.” Commonwealth v. White, 3 S.W.3d 353, 354 (Ky.

1999) (citation omitted).

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             The language of KRS 218A.133 is clear and unambiguous. The

statute explicitly grants immunity from prosecution for criminal offenses

prohibiting the possession of a controlled substance (or paraphernalia). There is no

exemption from prosecution for trafficking in a controlled substance, a distinct

statutory offense. Compare KRS 218A.1412 with KRS 218A.1415. Trafficking is

separately defined as “to manufacture, distribute, dispense, sell, transfer, or possess

with intent to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or sell a controlled substance[.]”

KRS 218A.010(56). Had the legislature wanted to exempt trafficking offenses

from prosecution, it could have easily done so. “[W]e assume that the Legislature

meant exactly what it said, and said exactly what it meant.” Commonwealth ex rel.

Brown v. Stars Interactive Holdings (IOM) Ltd., 617 S.W.3d 792, 798 (Ky. 2020)

(citation omitted).

             Because the language of KRS 218A.133 is plain, the trial court erred

in construing the statute liberally to “embrace the legislative intent of preventing

overdose deaths[.]” August 19, 2022 Trial Court Order at p. 5. See Revenue

Cabinet v. O’Daniel, 153 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Ky. 2005) (citation omitted) (“[I]f the

[statute’s] meaning is plain, then the court cannot base its interpretation on any

other method or source.”); Shawnee Telecom Resources, Inc. v. Brown, 354

S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 2011) (citations omitted) (“Only if the statute is ambiguous

or otherwise frustrates a plain reading, do we resort to extrinsic aids such as the

                                          -5-
statute’s legislative history; the canons of construction; or, especially in the case of

model or uniform statutes, interpretations by other courts.”). Further, had the

statute been ambiguous, the legislative history of the larger statutory scheme, of

which KRS 218A.133 is a part, supports our reading that KRS 218A.133’s

immunity only applies to possession of controlled substance crimes, not

trafficking.

               As summarized by our Supreme Court in Wilson, 628 S.W.3d at 138-

39, “KRS 218A.133 was enacted in March of 2015 as a component of Senate Bill

192 (S.B. 192), a comprehensive ‘anti-heroin bill.’” “Following its passage,

former Governor Steve Beshear remarked that S.B. 192 was a ‘muscular approach

[to the heroin epidemic] designed to impact users, sellers, law enforcement and

public health.’” Id. at 139 (citing Kentucky Governor’s Message, 2015 Ky. Acts

ch. 66, § 11 (S.B. 192) (eff. Mar. 25, 2015)). Thus, S.B. 192 was designed “to

reduce [both] the trafficking and abuse of heroin.” Id. (citing Kentucky

Governor’s Message, 2015 Ky. Acts ch. 66, § 11 (S.B. 192) (eff. Mar. 25, 2015)).

Construing KRS 218A.133 to grant immunity to traffickers would frustrate the

bill’s purpose. “[W]e must assume that the General Assembly intends that a

statute be read as a whole such that each of its constituent parts have meaning.”

Wilson, 628 S.W.3d at 140 (citation omitted). By its plain language, KRS

218A.133 grants immunity to drug possessors, not drug traffickers, and in so

                                          -6-
doing, strikes a balance between the statute’s twin goals of reducing both

trafficking and abuse of heroin.

                                   CONCLUSION

             Therefore, the order of Pulaski Circuit Court dismissing Letner’s

indictment is reversed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      NO BRIEF FILED FOR APPELLEE.

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky

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