Court Opinion

ID: 9396549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 22:04:36.782145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:17.775336
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (3d) 220202

                                  Opinion filed May 22, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                        )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                         )       of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
                                                        )       Du Page County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                        )       Appeal No. 3-22-0202
             v.                                         )       Circuit No. 19-CM-1468
                                                        )
      GARRETT S. MERCADO,                               )       Honorable
                                                        )       Robert A. Miller,
             Defendant-Appellant.                       )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE PETERSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
            Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Hettel concurred in the judgment and opinion.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 OPINION

¶1          Defendant, Garrett S. Mercado, appeals his sentence. Defendant argues that the Du Page

     County circuit court erred by imposing a two-year term of probation and two two-year terms of

     conditional discharge, all to be served consecutive to each other. Specifically, he argues that

     section 5-8-4(f)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(f)(2) (West

     2020)) provides that when a defendant is only sentenced for misdemeanors the aggregate

     sentence cannot exceed the maximum for one Class A misdemeanor and his sentences exceed

     that maximum. Defendant further argues his sentences were excessive. We vacate defendant’s

     sentence and remand.
¶2                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶3          The State filed a 28-count misdemeanor complaint against defendant consisting of

     multiple counts of animal cruelty (510 ILCS 70/3.01(a), (b) (West 2018)) and violation of

     owner’s duties (id. § 3(a)). The charges were filed against defendant following an investigation

     after 29 dogs died due to a fire at a kennel defendant operated. Some counts pertained to specific

     dogs in defendant’s care and others related generally to the dogs in his care. Following a bench

     trial, the court found defendant guilty on six counts of violation of owner’s duties and three

     counts of animal cruelty. The court merged various charges and determined that defendant would

     be sentenced on one count of violation of owner’s duties, a Class B misdemeanor, and two

     counts of animal cruelty, Class A misdemeanors. The court sentenced defendant to 20 days in

     jail and 24 months’ probation, followed by a consecutive term of 2 years’ conditional discharge,

     followed by another consecutive term of 2 years’ conditional discharge. Defendant filed a motion

     and amended motion to reconsider requesting, in part, that the court reconsider its order that the

     sentences run consecutively because the consecutive sentences it imposed exceeded the

     maximum aggregate allowed under statute. The court denied the motion and, in doing so, made

     clear its purpose in imposing consecutive sentences was to restrict defendant’s ability to get back

     into a business involving dogs for as long as it could. Defendant appeals.

¶4                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶5          Defendant argues that the court’s imposition of consecutive sentences of one two-year

     term of probation and two two-year terms of conditional charge exceeded the maximum

     aggregate allowed under section 5-8-4(f)(2) of the Code. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(f)(2) (West 2020).

     Defendant also argues that his sentences were otherwise excessive.

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¶6          The instant matter involves an issue of statutory interpretation and the construction of a

     statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Jackson, 2011 IL 110615, ¶ 12.

     “The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the

     legislature. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given

     its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id.

¶7          Sections 5-4.5-55 and 5-4.5-60 of the Code set forth the general sentencing provisions for

     Class A and Class B misdemeanors, respectively. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-55, 5-4.5-60 (West 2020).

     Both sections contain a subsection providing that “[t]he sentence shall be concurrent or

     consecutive as provided in Section 5-8-4 (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4).” Id. §§ 5-4.5-55(g), 5-4.5-60(g).

     Section 5-8-4 of the Code is titled “Concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment.”

     Subsection 5-8-4(f) of the Code provides for the aggregate maximum and minimum of

     consecutive sentences. It states that “[w]hen sentenced only for misdemeanors, a defendant shall

     not be consecutively sentenced to more than the maximum for one Class A misdemeanor.”

     Id. § 5-8-4(f)(2). The maximum sentence for a Class A misdemeanor is a term of imprisonment

     of less than one year and a term of probation or conditional discharge not exceeding two years.

     Id. § 5-4.5-55(a), (d); see also People v. Fretch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151107, ¶ 143 (providing that

     a sentence of 360 days in jail and a consecutive term of two years of probation for a Class A

     misdemeanor offense was authorized by statute because section 5-6-2(f) of the Code, which

     allows for a combination of imprisonment and probation for a single offense, “requires only that

     the prison and probation components of a combined sentence not exceed their respective

     statutory maximums as provided elsewhere in the Code”).

¶8          The State correctly notes that the statutes do not expressly prohibit consecutive terms of

     conditional discharge or a term of conditional discharge consecutive to a term of probation and

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     People v. Wendt, 163 Ill. 2d 346, 353 (1994), allows probation to be consecutive to another non-

     probation sentence. However, although the type of consecutive sentences involved here are not

     prohibited, the aggregate duration exceeds the maximum allowed. Here, the plain language of the

     applicable statutes limits the aggregate of the consecutive sentences imposed on defendant for

     his misdemeanor convictions to the maximum sentence for one Class A misdemeanor.

     Specifically, the general Class A and B misdemeanor sentencing statutes state that the sentence

     shall be concurrent or consecutive as provided in section 5-8-4, and section 5-8-4(f)(2) provides

     that the aggregate maximum of consecutive sentences for misdemeanors is the maximum for one

     Class A misdemeanor.

¶9          Although section 5-8-4 is titled “Concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment” and

     defendant’s sentences involve consecutive terms of conditional discharge and probation, the

     drafters of sections 5-4.5-55 and 5-4.5-60 were presumably aware of section 5-8-4’s title when

     they drafted the language directing the reader to section 5-8-4 and could have included language

     limiting the application of that section to when the misdemeanor sentences were solely terms of

     imprisonment, but they did not. See Kloeppel v. Champaign County Board, 2021 IL App (4th)

     210091, ¶ 16 (“When comparing and construing related statutes, ‘[w]e presume the legislature

     *** acted rationally and with full knowledge of other statutes and judicial decisions concerning

     existing law.’ ” (quoting Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 351 Ill. App. 3d 889, 895

     (2004))). Thus, the apparent intent of the drafters is that section 5-8-4 applies to misdemeanor

     sentences regardless of whether the sentences are terms of imprisonment or other sentences

     allowed under sections 5-4.5-55 and 5-4.5-60. Further, the language providing that misdemeanor

     sentences would be concurrent or consecutive as provided in section 5-8-4, does not limit the

     application of section 5-8-4 to certain subsections contained therein or to certain determinations,

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       such as the decision of whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. Rather, it states

       “as provided in Section 5-8-4” and therefore, the apparent intent based on the plain language is

       that section 5-8-4 applies in its entirety. Thus, section 5-8-4(f)(2) which limits the aggregate

       maximum of consecutive misdemeanor sentences to the maximum sentence for one Class A

       misdemeanor applies to consecutive sentences imposed for misdemeanors regardless of whether

       the sentences include imprisonment, probation, and/or conditional discharge. As such, although

       the court could make defendant’s sentences consecutive to each other, the total could not exceed

       the maximum sentence for one Class A misdemeanor. Because defendant’s sentences exceed that

       maximum, we necessarily vacate them and remand the matter for resentencing. In doing so, we

       note that the court had good intentions in sentencing defendant, and the court was

       understandably of the opinion that defendant’s ability to engage in business involving dogs

       should be restricted for an extended period of time; however, the applicable statutes do not allow

       for the consecutive sentences imposed here, and we are required to vacate them.

¶ 10          In light of our disposition, we need not reach defendant’s alternative argument that his

       sentences were otherwise excessive. As defendant does not challenge his convictions, we affirm

       the convictions, but vacate his sentences and remand for resentencing.

¶ 11                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 12          The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed in part, vacated in part,

       and remanded.

¶ 13          Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

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