Court Opinion

ID: 4519673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2020-03-26 14:18:56.628844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:31.914506
License: Public Domain

In The

                               Court of Appeals

                   Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              __________________

                              NO. 09-19-00436-CV
                              __________________

                         IN THE INTEREST OF M.C.

__________________________________________________________________

                On Appeal from the 411th District Court
                      San Jacinto County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. CV15,640
__________________________________________________________________

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Following a hearing, the trial court terminated the parent-child relationship

between Mother and her son, Drew. 1 Mother appealed. But her court-appointed

appellate attorney filed an Anders brief, asserting no arguable grounds can be

advanced to support Mother’s appeal. 2

      1
       To protect the identity of the minor child identified in the trial court’s
judgment, we use a pseudonym. We follow the same convention for the child’s
mother. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(a), (b); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §
161.001(b)(1)(O), (b)(2), (d) (Supp.).
      2
       See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also In re L.D.T., 161
S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (holding that Anders
procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases).
                                         1
      We conclude Mother’s brief complies with the requirements applicable to

Anders briefs. The brief that counsel filed presents counsel’s professional evaluation

of the record and explains why no arguable grounds exist to support overturning the

judgment rendered in the court below. 3 Counsel gave Mother a copy of the brief

counsel filed on Mother’s behalf, notified Mother she could file a pro se brief, and

explained to Mother how she could review a copy of the record that is relevant to

her appeal. The record shows Mother did not respond by filing her own brief.

      We have reviewed the appellate record, including the transcript of the hearing

that resulted in the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s rights to Drew.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude no arguable grounds exist to support

Mother’s appeal and conclude Mother’s appeal is frivolous.4 We note counsel’s duty

to represent her client extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals.

Should Mother desire to appeal further, counsel may satisfy her duty to Mother “by

filing a petition for review [with the Texas Supreme Court] that satisfies the

standards for an Anders brief.” 5 Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

      3
          See In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
      4
        See In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.);
In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d at 850.
      5
       See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27-
28 (Tex. 2016).

                                          2
      AFFIRMED.

                                             _________________________
                                                  HOLLIS HORTON
                                                       Justice

Submitted on February 19, 2020
Opinion Delivered March 26, 2020

Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.

                                         3