Court Opinion

ID: 9579957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:00:22.981634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:55.494375
License: Public Domain

Nichols, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
Prior to the addition of the so-called "no fault” ground to Code § 30-102, and the decisions construing such statute, the divorce law of Georgia was well settled.
In the first decision of this court construing this amendment, it was held: "An 'irretrievably broken’ marriage is one where either or both parties are unable or refuse to cohabit and there are no prospects for a reconciliation.” (Emphasis supplied.) Harwell v. Harwell, 233 Ga. 89, 91 (209 SE2d 625) (1974).
In McCoy v. McCoy, 236 Ga. 633 (225 SE2d 682) (1976), it was held: "We return to what was said in Harwell v. Harwell, supra, 233 Ga. 89, 91: 'An "irretrievably broken” marriage is one where either or *677both parties are unable or refuse to cohabit and there are no prospects for a reconciliation.’ (Emphasis supplied.) In Harwell, the jury granted the wife a divorce over the husband’s opposition. Implicit in that case is that the husband opposed the divorce; i.e., he felt that the marriage was not irretrievably broken.
"In the case before us, we make explicit that which was implicit in Harwell, to wit: where one of the parties to a marriage refuses to cohabit with the other and testifies that the marriage is irretrievably broken, the fact that the other party maintains hope for a reconciliation will not support a finding under Harwell that there are 'prospects for a reconciliation.’ Just as it takes two consenting parties to make a contract, it takes two consenting parties to make a reconciliation. Just as one party cannot make a contract, one party cannot make a marriage or a reconciliation thereof. If the General Assembly had intended that the thirteenth ground for divorce be consensual, it would have provided that 'The parties agree that the marriage is irretrievably broken.’ ”
In Manning v. Manning, 237 Ga. 746 (229 SE2d 611) (1976), this court in a per curiam opinion reaffirmed the holdings in Harwell and McCoy and expressly held that an affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment in the following language was sufficient to pierce the allegations of pleadings which denied that the marriage was irretrievably broken: " 'The separation between us is complete and permanent. I am unwilling to live with the defendant (wife) at the present time. I am unwilling, and I refuse, to live with her at any time in the future. There is no possibility whatever of a reconciliation ever taking place between us. The marriage ... is irretrievably broken.’ ” Three Justices concurred fully in the majority opinion, another wrote a special concurrence in which he stated, after quoting from Harwell and McCoy: "Under the verified pleadings and the affidavits of record in this case by both parties, there are no real or practical prospects for a reconciliation. Stripped of all conclusions that project a mere glimmer of hope at reconciliation, this record eliminates any fact issue on the subject of irretrievable brokenness, and the trial judge correctly granted summary judgment on this issue.” *678Manning, p. 749.
Another Justice, concurring specially in the opinion, stated: "I concur in the judgment not because I think it is right but because it is based on case law decided by a majority of this court and I am bound by it. This court now holds that the mere assertion by one of the parties to a marriage that the marriage is irretrievably broken is sufficient not just to authorize, but to require the grant of a divorce.” Id., p. 750.
Now, less than six months later, a majority of this court is overruling the Manning decision. Why? Has the law changed? No statute has been enacted authorizing or requiring such change. Was the question on which the present case is being decided overlooked when Manning was decided? Hardly, for the dissent there states in part: "The majority in this case . . . hold that where one party wants and sues for a divorce, it may be granted on summary judgment, without a trial, over the opposition of the other party. The rationale of this case is that where one party seeks a divorce, the marriage is irretrievably broken.” Id., p. 752.
While I originally had grave doubts if the "no fault” or "irretrievably broken” ground of divorce was intended to change the public policy of Georgia, which had always condemned any action tending to promote the dissolution of marriage, yet, in recognition of the trend in this country of the state’s diminishing willingness to be involved in the matter of marriage termination, I could not escape the conclusion that enactment of the "irretrievably broken” ground of divorce by the General Assembly was intended as a change in Georgia’s public policy.
It is inconceivable to me that this court should, less than six months after its decision in Manning, completely reverse itself on an issue of such importance to the bench, bar and public.