Court Opinion

ID: 9721075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:47:55.925492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:23.295011
License: Public Domain

GILDEA, Justice
(concurring).
I agree with the result reached by the majority, but I reach this result on different grounds. I would hold that the State did not meet its burden of proving that appellant waived his right to counsel, and that therefore the admission of his confession was error.
A.
Before proceeding with my analysis, I first address what in my view is the majority’s departure from our precedent on the standard of review applicable in this case. The majority concludes that the district court’s “determination” of “whether a suspect successfully invoked the right to coun*366sel during a custodial interview” is a mixed question of law and fact. But we have previously held that a determination of “whether an accused invoked his right to counsel” is a “factual finding[]” that “we will uphold ... unless it is clearly erroneous.” State v. Hannon, 636 N.W.2d 796, 804 (Minn.2001); see also State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 139 (Minn.1999) (“In reviewing the trial court’s factual findings, including whether an accused invoked his right to counsel, we will uphold a trial court’s determination unless it is clearly erroneous.”); State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 671 (Minn.1998).1
The majority also concludes that the application of the reasonable officer standard to the facts receives de novo review. The majority cites State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 742 (Minn.2003), for this proposition. I find no support in Ray for the majority’s articulation of the standard of review.
B.
In my view, it is not necessary to depart from precedent to resolve this case. It likewise is not necessary for us to write a new rule. We have repeatedly recognized that the State has the burden to demonstrate that the defendant waived his right to counsel in order for the State to admit the defendant’s custodial statements. E.g., Munson, 594 N.W.2d at 141 (citing State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 168 (Minn.1997); State v. Phelps, 328 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Minn.1982)). The State must prove the defendant’s waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 332 (Minn.2007). I would hold that the State did not meet that burden in this case.2
To prove that appellant waived his right to counsel by a preponderance of the evidence, the State must establish the waiver by the greater weight of the evidence. See Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 169 Minn. 342, 348, 211 N.W. 580, 583 (1926) (“Preponderance means to outweigh; to weigh more; to overcome.”). In my view, the State did not meet that burden in this case because the State-produced transcript of Officer Hanson’s interview with appellant reflects that appellant said “I think I need lawyer.” The State agrees that the transcript so reflects and Officer Hanson himself testified to that effect at the hearing.
It is true that Officer Hanson also testified that he did not hear appellant request a lawyer during the interview, and the *367district court found that it was “difficult to hear what the defendant said.”3 But given the State’s admission that its transcript of the interview was accurate, I would hold that the State did not meet its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that appellant waived his right to counsel. I therefore would reverse and remand.

. The majority attempts to find support for its standard of review in State v. Anderson, 396 N.W.2d 564 (Minn.1986). But the issue for appellate review in Anderson was not whether the defendant, as a factual matter, had invoked his right to counsel, which is the issue under review here. The question for appellate review in Anderson was whether the defendant’s confession was voluntary. Id. at 565. I do not disagree with the majority that the appellate court "independently” reviews the question of voluntariness. Id.

. The majority cites State v. Brown, 209 Minn. 478, 485, 296 N.W. 582, 586 (1941), for the position that “we cannot hold that the State did not meet its burden of proof simply because the record contains conflicting evidence.” The majority’s reliance on Brown is misplaced. The question in Brown was whether statements a homicide victim made shortly before her death were admissible as dying declarations. Id. at 484, 296 N.W. at 586. The trial court determined that evidence as to the victim’s awareness of her impending death was conflicting. Id. at 485, 296 N.W. at 586. The court submitted the predicate fact question — did the victim know her death was imminent when she made the statements — to the jury to decide, and no error was claimed on appeal as to that procedure. Id. at 485, 296 N.W. at 586. Brown is not helpful to the question at issue here because in Brown we did not discuss the impact of the State’s presentation of conflicting evidence on an issue that the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.

. In my view, the court's finding is not clearly erroneous. The majority says that appellant's "reference to wanting a lawyer can be clearly heard.” That appellate judges, with the luxury of listening to the recording over and over, all the while knowing precisely for what to hunt, may hear the request does not make the district court’s conclusion to the contrary clearly erroneous.