Court Opinion

ID: 9916783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 17:13:43.005673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:59.091847
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                    2024 WY 2

                                                  OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                           January 10, 2024

TODD ANDREW DOMENICO,

Appellant
(Defendant),

v.                                             S-23-0080, S-23-0106

JOSIE DANIEL f/k/a JOSIE DANIEL
DOMENICO,

Appellee
(Plaintiff).

JOSIE DANIEL f/k/a JOSIE DANIEL
DOMENICO,

Appellant
(Plaintiff),

v.                                             S-23-0081

TODD ANDREW DOMENICO,

Appellee
(Defendant).

                   Appeal from the District Court of Teton County
                      The Honorable Kate G. McKay, Judge
Representing Todd Andrew Domenico:
      Anna Reeves Olson, Long Reimer Winegar, LLP, Casper, Wyoming; Elizabeth
      Greenwood and Inga L. Parsons, of Counsel, Greenwood Law, LLC, Pinedale,
      Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Olson.

Representing Josie Daniel:
      Christopher J. King, Apex Legal, P.C., Worland, Wyoming. Argument by Mr.
      King.

Guardian ad Litem:
     No appearance.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] Todd Andrew Domenico (Father) and Josie Daniel (Mother) divorced on April 9,
2018. The Decree of Divorce (Decree) granted joint legal custody of the parties’ two
children to Father and Mother and primary physical custody to Father. In 2020, Mother
filed for a modification of the Decree requesting primary physical custody of the children.
After a trial, the district court continued primary physical custody with Father and
increased Mother’s visitation. Father and Mother filed cross-appeals. We reverse in part
and remand for further proceedings.

                                          ISSUES

[¶2] Mother and Father, while advocating different outcomes, raise some of the same
issues and each raises separate issues. We reorganize and rephrase these issues as follows:

              1.     Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied
              a W.R.C.P. 35 psychological evaluation of Mother and
              prohibited inquiry into Mother’s mental health?

              2.      Did the district court fail to make sufficient findings of
              fact to support its custody and visitation determinations under
              W.R.C.P. 52?

                     a.     Did the district court err in failing to award
                     Mother primary physical custody or a shared custody
                     arrangement?

                     b.      Did the district court err in failing to allocate
                     visitation for the children’s birthdays; extending
                     Mother’s summer visitation for two weeks with no
                     weekend visitation for Father; and removing the
                     requirement that the parents provide qualified
                     caregivers for WGD?

              3.     Did the district court abuse its discretion in failing to
              designate one parent as a final decision-maker on issues of the
              children’s welfare, especially medical decision-making?

              4.    Did the district court violate Mother’s fundamental right
              to parent when it prohibited Mother from obtaining a
              psychological evaluation of her children?

                                              1
              5.     Did the district court abuse its discretion when it refused
              to consider allegations of Mother’s psychological abuse of one
              child after the evidence closed?

                        FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[¶3] Mother and Father have two children, WGD (born in 2007) and SMD (born in
2011). WGD is severely autistic and requires specialized care. In 2018, after lengthy,
hostile litigation, the district court awarded Father and Mother joint legal custody of the
children and gave primary physical custody to Father. In the Decree, the district court
found that Father had been the children’s primary caregiver in a stable home environment
since 2013 and that Mother struggled with her development as a parent because of opiate
addiction and mental health issues. She was awarded supervised visitation every other
weekend, Wednesday evening visitation, and four weeks during the summer vacation. The
Decree placed conditions on Mother’s visitation. Some related to the care of the children,
and others addressed Mother’s rehabilitation.

[¶4]   The Decree required qualified caregivers for WGD. Specifically, the court ordered:

              Mother shall provide [Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA)]
              therapy in her home for WGD during her periods of
              responsibility as recommended by WGD’s therapists, and
              Mother shall employ assistant(s) to assist her with WGD’s
              care. The parties shall cooperate in facilitating SMD’s
              participation in any agreed-upon activity, regardless of which
              parent SMD is with during those activities.

[¶5] In 2020, after completing the rehabilitative conditions, Mother filed a Motion to
Modify Custody, Visitation, and Child Support. She originally sought primary physical
custody of the children but later added an alternative request for a shared custody
arrangement.

[¶6] Prior to trial, Mother filed her Expert Witness Designation. Mother’s designation
named Dr. Amanda Turlington, a licensed psychologist, as a retained expert. According
to the designation, Mother retained Dr. Turlington to conduct psychological examinations
on both children “to determine the predicted effects on each child of a modification to the
current custody and visitation arrangement, as well as other factors.” The designation
asserted the evaluations were scheduled for “early March” and that the designation would
be supplemented when a report was available. Father and the guardian ad litem (GAL)
first learned of Mother’s proposed psychological evaluation of the children from the Expert
Witness Designation. Father filed a motion to strike Mother’s expert and prohibit the
evaluation of the children.

                                              2
[¶7] Father based his objection on two arguments. First, Mother’s designation failed
under W.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). Rule 26 in relevant part requires that the disclosure
of a witness retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony must be
accompanied by a written report. The written report must contain, among other things, “(i)
a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for
them; [and] (ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them[.]” Second,
Mother failed to seek court approval for an evaluation of the children under W.R.C.P. 35.

[¶8] After finding that Mother had failed to submit the required information or show
good cause for the evaluation, the district court granted Father’s motion. It prohibited a
psychological evaluation of the children and struck the witness.

[¶9] The proceedings were bifurcated with the initial hearing limited to the question of
whether there had been a material change of circumstances (First Phase: Material Change
of Circumstances or Change of Circumstances Trial). Once the district court found a
material change of circumstances, the case proceeded to trial on modification of custody
and visitation (Second Phase: Modification of Custody and Visitation or Custody
Modification Trial).

A.     First Phase: Material Change of Circumstances

[¶10] At the July 2021 Change of Circumstance Trial, Mother presented the testimony of
Dr. Sadie Cole Monaghan. 1 Dr. Monaghan conducted a psychological evaluation of
Mother on April 16, 2018, followed by weekly individual therapy sessions with Mother
which continued through the time of the trial. Dr. Monaghan testified that Mother had
shown significant improvement in her parenting skills and mental health issues. Mother
also called her primary substance abuse therapist, Anne Ellingson. Ms. Ellingson’s
participation in Mother’s treatment began shortly after the divorce was filed in 2017 and
continued until 2019. In March 2019, she released Mother from further drug rehabilitation
treatment but recommended continued mental health treatment. Two caregivers who
worked with WGD in Mother’s home testified the children had a close and loving
relationship with Mother. Sara Devon Viehman, Mother’s friend and coworker, testified
about Mother’s likely success in her new job, her personal improvement, and her close
relationship with the children.

[¶11] The district court found a material change of circumstance as follows:

               It was unequivocally established at trial that Mother has made
               vast improvements in personal development and her ability to
               parent since the time of the Decree in 2018. Mother struggled

1
  During these proceedings, Dr. Monaghan changed her name to Dr. Cole and is referred to by that name
later in the record.

                                                 3
              with addiction. She is now well into recovery. She was subject
              to a variety of treatment and testing requirements. She has met
              those benchmarks and completed treatment.             She was
              unemployed. She is now employed. She rented a home. She
              now owns a home. She was faced with a large volume of
              conditions for supervised and unsupervised visitation. She has
              complied with those conditions now for a long period and
              transitioned some time ago to unsupervised visitation. She had
              health issues and physical limitations. Those limitations have
              resolved. It is uncontested that Mother now thrives. Mother
              should be commended for her achievements.

                     It is also not contested that Father has maintained as a
              parent since the entry of the Decree. His life has not been
              stagnant, however. Changes in his life include the addition of
              a new partner who now lives in the home. That partner’s
              daughter also resides at Father’s home. The Court heard
              testimony that the parties’ children continue to do well in the
              new environment at Father’s house.

                    Thus, this is not a case where the custodial parent has
              diminished or remained stagnant. Both parents now appear to
              be on a more even footing as parents when compared to the
              circumstances at the time of trial.

B.     Motions Prior to Second Phase: Modification of Custody and Visitation Trial

[¶12] After the district court’s ruling on the Material Change of Circumstances Trial but
prior to the Custody Modification Trial, the parties filed numerous motions—Father’s
Motion to Dismiss Petition or Alternative to Strike [Mother’s] Experts 2 and for Sanctions
(Motion to Strike); the GAL’s Motion for an Order Requiring [Mother] to Obtain a
Psychological Evaluation Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 35 (Rule 35 Motion); Mother’s Expedited
Motion for Order Regarding Medical Decision-Making Concerning COVID-19
Vaccination for the Minor Children; Father’s Motion for Full Medical Authority to Make
Medical Decisions for the Minor Children; and Mother’s Expedited Motion for Order
Permitting [Mother] to Make Medical Appointment for WGD.

2
  Mother’s experts were Dr. Anthony (physician), Dr. Monaghan (psychologist), and Dr. Collins
(psychiatrist).

                                             4
        1. Motion to Strike

[¶13] Father based his Motion to Strike on Mother’s failure to comply with discovery. 3
He cited many instances where Mother failed to comply with discovery requests entirely,
provided only partial responses, or submitted redacted medical records prior to depositions.
Mother objected to the Motion to Strike asserting that any discovery failures did not
prejudice Father.

[¶14] After a hearing on the matter, the district court found the discovery violations
prejudiced Father and the GAL. The district court struck Mother’s witnesses from
testifying at the Custody Modification Trial, stating that “[i]f this [was] not a best interests
situation, [the] Court would strongly consider . . . dismissal given the inappropriate
behavior.”

        2. Rule 35 Motion 4

[¶15] In a Rule 35 Motion, the GAL asserted Mother’s mental health, as it relates to
parental fitness and competency, continued to be at issue in the Custody Modification Trial.
The GAL claimed there was good cause to conduct a second evaluation as the original
evaluation, conducted by Dr. Monaghan, was not based on objective criteria because

3
  At this juncture in the proceedings, the district court judge assigned to the case retired. A different district
court judge assumed responsibility for the proceedings on January 11, 2022.
4
  W.R.C.P. 35(a) provides:
                  (a)      Order for an Examination.—
                           (1)      In General.—The court where the action is pending may
                           order a party whose mental or physical condition—including
                           blood group—is in controversy to submit to a physical or mental
                           examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner. The
                           court has the same authority to order a party to produce for
                           examination a person who is in its custody or under its legal
                           control.
                           (2)      Motion and Notice; Contents of the Order.—The order:
                                    (A)     may be made only on motion for good cause and
                                    on notice to all parties and the person to be examined; and
                                    (B)     must specify the time, place, manner, conditions,
                                    and scope of the examination, as well as the person or
                                    persons who will perform it.
(Emphasis added.) W.R.C.P. 7(b) provides the requirements for presenting a motion to the court:
                  (b)      Motions and Other Papers.—
                           (1)      In General.—A request for a court order must be made by
                           motion. The motion must:
                                    (A)     be in writing unless made during a hearing or
                                    trial;
                                    (B)     state with particularity the grounds for seeking
                                    the order; and
                                    (C)     state the relief sought.

                                                        5
Mother had not disclosed material information to Dr. Monaghan about her past mental
health treatment. The GAL asserted Dr. Monaghan, Mother’s counselor, was not a neutral
witness and given the parties’ current dispute regarding the veracity and reliability of
Mother’s medical records, a comprehensive psychological evaluation by a neutral, third
party was required. The GAL proposed the name of an independent expert who could
complete the evaluation and report in time to allow the trial schedule to proceed without
change. Father separately joined GAL’s motion, claiming Mother’s mental condition as it
relates to her parenting ability was in controversy. Mother objected, arguing the GAL did
not establish good cause to conduct an evaluation. Mother further objected to the proposed
neutral third-party expert.

[¶16] The district court denied the GAL’s Rule 35 Motion finding:

             1.     Under Wyo. R. Civ. Proc. 35(a), [Mother’s] mental and
             physical condition are placed in issue in this modification
             action, but there is not good cause to order a psychological
             evaluation of [Mother] at this time.

             2.     The Court realizes that the discovery of redactions to
             records and the late ability to take the deposition of some of the
             experts may have interfered with an ability to think through
             whether to request . . . an independent psychological evaluation
             be conducted, but the hearing on the first half of the statute for
             modification occurred eight months ago, although the Court
             acknowledges that the GAL’s Motion . . . was made in
             December.

             3.     The Court does not find that the GAL’s Motion . . . is
             calculated to assist the Court in touching on the best interests
             of the children to determine whether any modification of the
             parties’ Decree needs to be made.

             4.     It is [Mother’s] burden to come forward to show that a
             material change existed and to show that whatever
             modification she seeks is in the best interests of the children,
             considering all the other options about the best interests of the
             children for the Court to examine. That includes the custodial
             arrangement for many years and the stability or instability of
             the children in their environment and under their schedule,
             which the Court would expect to hear testimony and evidence
             regarding, rather than focusing on the reliability of opinions of
             experts who, for the most part, the Court has stricken that

                                             6
                [Mother] intended to call about her psychological and physical
                situation on how those may have affected the children.

                5.     The focus should be on the best interests of the children,
                not on [Mother], but it is [Mother’s] burden to show that her
                proposal to modify the Decree is in the best interests of the
                children overall.

        3. Mother’s Motion for Medical Decision-Making

[¶17] Mother filed an Expedited Motion for Order Regarding Medical Decision-Making
Concerning COVID-19 Vaccination for the Minor Children. The motion stated that
Mother had agreed to have WGD receive the vaccination but objected to the vaccination
of SMD due to the “unknowns that remain surrounding the vaccine.” Mother requested an
order temporarily restraining the parties from vaccinating SMD.

        4. Father’s Motion for Medical Decision-Making

[¶18] Father filed a reply and a Motion for Full Medical Authority to Make Medical
Decisions for the Minor Children. Father requested that Mother’s motion be denied and
sought a hearing on his motion for sole medical authority. He asserted the parties’
discussions regarding the children’s medical care had been unproductive for months. They
were unable to agree on appropriate medications for WGD or on a foot operation ultimately
intended to prevent WGD from being confined to a wheelchair. The GAL also responded
supporting the doctor’s recommendation that the children receive a COVID-19
vaccination. 5

[¶19] Without a hearing, the district court denied the parties’ motions on medical decision-
making. It found the parties’ motions attempted to modify the original Decree without
affording the other parent due process of law and without providing admissible evidence
in support of the motions.

        5. Expedited Motion for Order Permitting [Mother] to Make Medical
           Appointment

[¶20] Several months later, Mother filed an Expedited Motion for Order Permitting
[Mother] to Make Medical Appointment for WGD. Mother alleged WGD had been taking
Adderall since late 2021 but had not been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder (ADD),
5
 Based on the number and tenor of the motions being filed, on January 26, 2022, the district court issued a
Case Requirements Order under Rule 801 of the Uniform Rules for District Courts (Case Requirements
Order) setting conduct requirements for counsel during litigation. It also issued an Order Requiring
Counsels’ Immediate Compliance which stated because the parties were not complying with the Case
Requirements Order, any further violation would result in sanctions.

                                                    7
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), or any similar disorder. She asserted
WGD’s behavior had become more aggressive since taking the drug, and her consent to
his continued use of the medicine was conditioned on her ability to take him to a
psychiatrist to determine whether the drug was suitable. Mother had made an appointment,
but it was postponed due to Father’s disagreement. Mother requested an order permitting
her to take WGD to an appointment.

[¶21] Father objected, claiming WGD’s current medical providers prescribed the
medication and neutral third parties such as school personnel found its effects on WGD
helpful. In addition, Father argued WGD’s severe autism made it unlikely that such an
appointment would result in productive diagnostic information, and that it was
unnecessary, potentially confusing, and traumatic for WGD. Father asserted that the
parties’ disagreements over WGD’s other medications and the recommended surgical
procedures for WGD’s feet should take precedence over any psychiatric evaluation.

[¶22] After hearing argument, the district court denied Mother’s motion.

C.     Second Phase: Modification of Custody and Visitation

[¶23] The Custody Modification Trial began on August 31, 2022. Prior to trial, Father
filed a Request for Written Findings Pursuant to Rule 52(a)(1)(A) (Rule 52). After three
days of testimony and evidence, the trial was continued for a fourth day and completed on
October 20, 2022. The issues at trial were custody, visitation, and modification of the
decision-making authority of the parents.

[¶24] After trial, but before the district court entered its Final Order 6 on January 4, 2023,
the GAL filed an Emergency Motion to Suspend [Mother’s] Visitation Until Further Order
based on events that occurred during Mother’s December visitation. The GAL later
supplemented the motion with written reports from police officers, the hospital counselor,
and school personnel. Mother claimed SMD was experiencing suicidal ideation and over
the course of three days took SMD to school officials, the police department, and the
emergency room. None of the entities found Mother’s reports of SMD’s suicidal thinking
credible. The district court did not separately rule on the GAL’s motion but dismissed it
in its Final Order.

[¶25] The district court issued a Final Order on January 4, 2023. The order did not modify
custody. Mother and Father continue to have joint legal custody of the children with Father

6
 On January 3, 2023, the district court issued an order entitled Trial Order Regarding Best Interests
Modification of Decree of Divorce. There were two subsequent orders—Amended Trial Order Nunc Pro
Tunc filed January 3, 2023, and Second Amended Trial Order Nunc Pro Tunc filed January 4, 2023 (Final
Order).

                                                 8
as the primary physical custodian. 7 The district court addressed but did not modify the
parties’ decision-making authority, stating:

                Neither party shall have the right to make a decision over the
                view or decision of the other parent if the parties are unable to
                make any major joint decisions regarding their children’s
                welfare, education, non-emergency healthcare, discipline, and
                religious training.

[¶26] The summer visitation schedule was modified. Mother’s summer visitation
increased from four to six consecutive weeks. The following provisions of the Decree were
vacated:

                12.   All references in the Decree requiring co-parenting
                counseling or use of a parent coordinator[;]

                13.    All references in the Decree requiring that any party
                must provide qualified assistants, therapists, caregivers,
                supervisors, or specialized therapists, including ABA therapy
                and assistance, for WGD[;]

                14.    All references in the Decree preventing [Mother] from
                driving or operating a vehicle with WGD as a passenger
                without another adult person, a qualified assistant, a therapist,
                a caregiver, a supervisor, or a specialized therapist being
                present[.]

7
  On appeal, Mother claims the judgments entered by District Court Judge Marvin Tyler were void ab initio
because they were not drafted or signed by a sitting district court judge with jurisdiction. Judge Tyler
retired effective January 2, 2023. The original Trial Order Regarding Best Interests was signed by Judge
Tyler on December 30, 2022, and filed on January 3, 2023. The Amended Trial Order Nunc Pro Tunc was
signed by Judge Tyler on January 1, 2023, and filed on January 3, 2023. The Second Amended Trial Order
Nunc Pro Tunc was signed by Judge McKay on January 4, 2023, and filed on January 4, 2023. Even if we
disregard the fact that the original Trial Order Regarding Best Interests and the Amended Trial Order Nunc
Pro Tunc were signed by Judge Tyler prior to his retirement, and the subsequent amended order only
corrected clerical errors, there is no jurisdictional issue here.
         Subject matter jurisdiction resides with the court, not the judge. See Fleet v. Guyette, 2020 WY
78, ¶ 15, 466 P.3d 812, 817–18 (Wyo. 2020) (“The existence or non-existence of a court’s subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Subject matter jurisdiction is ‘the power to hear
and determine the matter in controversy between the parties.’ A district court’s subject matter jurisdiction
is invoked with the filing of a pleading ‘stating a case belonging to a general class over which the authority
of the court extends.’” (citations omitted)); W.R.C.P. 60(a) (“The court may correct a clerical mistake or a
mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the
record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without notice.”). The Second Amended
Trial Order, appealed here, was entered by the then-presiding judge, Judge McKay, on January 4, 2023, the
day after she took office.

                                                      9
[¶27] Both Mother and Father appeal, arguing the district court failed to provide sufficient
reference to the record to support its conclusions and abused its discretion when, among
other things, it failed to designate a final decision-maker to undo the impasse preventing
resolution of WGD’s health issues. Additional facts will be addressed as relevant to the
discussion of the parties’ issues.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶28] “Child custody and visitation are within the sound discretion of the trial court.”
Castellow v. Pettengill, 2021 WY 88, ¶ 7, 492 P.3d 894, 897 (Wyo. 2021) (citing Bruce v.
Bruce, 2021 WY 38, ¶ 12, 482 P.3d 328, 332 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Edwards v. Edwards,
2020 WY 35, ¶ 10, 459 P.3d 448, 450 (Wyo. 2020))). “Judicial discretion is a composite
of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without
doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.” Evans v. Sharpe, 2023 WY 55, ¶ 25, 530 P.3d 298,
307 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Johnson v. Clifford, 2018 WY 59, ¶ 8, 418 P.3d 819, 822 (Wyo.
2018)). “A district court does not abuse its discretion if it could reasonably conclude as it
did.” Sears v. Sears, 2021 WY 20, ¶ 13, 479 P.3d 767, 772 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Johnson,
¶ 8, 418 P.3d at 822).

[¶29] Judicial discretion is not absolute:

              Abuse occurs when a material factor deserving significant
              weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or
              when all proper and no improper factors are assessed, but the
              court makes a serious mistake in weighing them.

Ianelli v. Camino, 2019 WY 67, ¶ 21, 444 P.3d 61, 66–67 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Love v.
Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1291 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 996
(Wyo. 1993))).

[¶30] We review the record to determine if sufficient evidence supports “the district
court’s decision, and we afford the prevailing party every favorable inference while
omitting any consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.” Bruce, ¶ 12,
482 P.3d at 332 (quoting Edwards, ¶ 10, 459 P.3d at 450). “[I]n every case, the record
must support the district court’s determination that the modification is in the children’s best
interests through ‘the proceeding transcripts, by opinion letter, or as findings in the written
order’ to allow appellate review.” Ianelli, ¶ 21, 444 P.3d at 66–67 (quoting Booth v. Booth,
2019 WY 5, ¶ 22, 432 P.3d 902, 910 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Jackson v. Jackson, 2004 WY
99, ¶ 15, 96 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 2004))). “We review the district court’s conclusions of law
de novo.” Castellow, ¶ 7, 492 P.3d at 897 (citing Meiners v. Meiners, 2019 WY 39, ¶ 8,
438 P.3d 1260, 1266 (Wyo. 2019)).

                                              10
                                            DISCUSSION

I.      The district court abused its discretion when it denied a Rule 35 psychological
        evaluation of Mother and prohibited inquiry into Mother’s mental health during
        the Second Phase of trial.

[¶31] Father claims the district court erred when it denied the GAL’s motion for a Rule
35 8 evaluation and found the facts surrounding Mother’s mental health were irrelevant
because the Custody Modification Trial would only focus on the “best interests of the
children, not [Mother].” He also argues the district court abused its discretion when it
denied him the opportunity to present evidence related to Mother’s current mental health
by prohibiting the introduction of evidence grounded in the records of Mother’s stricken
experts.

[¶32] In custody cases, a child’s best interests are paramount, and the district court is
required to consider “[t]he current physical and mental ability of each parent to care for
each child.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(ix).

[¶33] Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” W.R.E. 401; Stevens v. Anesthesiology Consultants
of Cheyenne, LLC, 2018 WY 45, ¶ 47, 415 P.3d 1270, 1286 (Wyo. 2018).

[¶34] Although a custody determination does not create an automatic right to a
psychological evaluation, good cause may exist to compel a psychological evaluation when
there are “verified allegations that the parent in question is having mental problems that
could substantially impact his or her ability to properly raise children.” Wade v. Wade, 124
So. 3d 369, 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citing In re G.D., 870 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (a parent’s mental state is not “at issue” until there are pertinent
allegations of mental insufficiency)).

8
  Father has standing to appeal denial of the GAL’s Rule 35 Motion. W.R.C.P. 10(c) provides:
                 (c)     Adoption by Reference; Exhibits.—A statement in a pleading may
                 be adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other
                 pleading or motion. A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a
                 pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.
         Here the GAL filed a Rule 35 Motion, Father joined this motion by a separate written pleading
where he specifically adopted the history and grounds of the GAL’s motion and separately asked for relief.
Father’s joinder complied with the requirements of Rule 7. Cf., In re Est. of Smith, 555 N.E.2d 1111, 1114
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“Lifecare does not have standing to pursue an appeal of this portion of the circuit
court’s ruling, because the motion was not Lifecare’s but was the executor’s, and Lifecare did not join in
the motion.”); Goodman v. Stancell, 368 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (App. Div. 1975) (Bank did not join in the
motion made by defendant Stancell and has no standing to appeal from the denial of defendant Stancell’s
motion.).

                                                   11
[¶35] The record contains facts and allegations that would support Father’s contention that
Mother’s mental health could substantially impact her ability to properly supervise the
children. These include the GAL’s claims that the original evaluation, conducted by Dr.
Monaghan, was not based on objective criteria, that Mother had failed to disclose material
information about her past mental health treatment to Dr. Monaghan, and the parties’
dispute over the veracity and reliability of Mother’s medical records.

[¶36] Mother’s mental health is directly relevant to whether a change in visitation is in the
children’s best interest. Mother’s motion for modification was based on her mental health
improvement over the time since the divorce decree and relied, in large part, on Dr.
Monaghan’s testimony which was stricken from the Custody Modification Trial. The
district court erred when it found Mother’s mental health was not relevant to the best
interests of the children. On remand, a mental health evaluation should be ordered and
appropriate mental health evidence admitted.

II.    The district court’s Rule 52(a)(1)(A) findings of fact are sufficient as to custody
       but insufficient to support its visitation determinations.

[¶37] Both parties claim the district court failed to comply with Father’s Rule 52 request
for specific findings of fact as they pertained to the district court’s final decisions on child
custody and visitation. They point specifically to the district court’s decisions to continue
joint legal custody of Mother and Father, with primary physical custody to Father, and the
refusal to award either party final decision-making authority. Father separately asserts the
district court failed to comply with his Rule 52 request related to its decision to modify
visitation and removal of the requirement for qualified caregivers for WGD. To determine
sufficient compliance with the requirements of Rule 52, we must look to the rule’s intent
and apply the rule to the factual findings and conclusions disputed by the parties.

A.     Rule 52(a)(1)(A)

[¶38] Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(1)(A) provides:

              (a)     General and Special Findings by Court.—

                      (1)     Trials by the Court or Advisory Jury.— Upon
                      the trial of questions of fact by the court, or with an
                      advisory jury, it shall not be necessary for the court to
                      state its findings, except generally for the plaintiff or
                      defendant. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are
                      unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or
                      56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 52(c).

                                              12
                            (A) Requests for Written Findings.— If one
                            of the parties requests it before the introduction
                            of any evidence, with the view of excepting to
                            the decision of the court upon the questions of
                            law involved in the trial, the court shall state in
                            writing its special findings of fact separately
                            from its conclusions of law[.]

W.R.C.P. 52(a)(1)(A).

[¶39] “The purpose of Rule 52(a) is ‘to indicate the factual basis for the decision on the
contested matters.’” Castellow, ¶ 10, 492 P.3d at 898 (quoting O’s Gold Seed Co. v. United
Agri-Prods. Fin. Servs., Inc., 761 P.2d 673, 676 (Wyo. 1988)).

              To play fair, a trial judge relying on discretionary power should
              place on record the circumstances and factors that were crucial
              to his determination. He should spell out his reasons as well as
              he can so that counsel and the reviewing court will know and
              be in a position to evaluate the soundness of his decision.

Id. (quoting Kimzey v. Kimzey, 2020 WY 52, ¶ 38, 461 P.3d 1229, 1241 n.2 (Wyo. 2020)).
The court’s findings “do not need to be elaborate.” Id. However, they do need to “be clear,
specific and complete in concise language informing the appellate court of the underlying
bases for the trial court’s decision.” Id. (quoting O’s Gold, 761 P.2d at 676).

       1. The District Court’s Factual Conclusions and Reasonable Inferences

[¶40] The factual findings related to the district court’s conclusion that a modification of
the Decree was warranted are:

              6)     Both parties need to play an active, mature role in each
              of [the] children’s lives.

              7)     As to the factor of the quality of the relationship each
              child has with each parent under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-
              201(a)(i):

                     The [Father] is, and has been, the primary caregiver for
              each of the children before entry of the Decree and thereafter
              under the terms of the Decree. He uses this role as a means of
              exerting control over [Mother’s] ability to strengthen her
              relationship with the children. He and each child share a very
              strong, close, and loving relationship.

                                             13
       Certain provisions in the Decree regarding parenting
time have stunted the quality of relationship which has existed
between [Mother] and the children. Also, other provisions in
the Decree have inhibited the quality of relationship [Mother]
has with WGD (e.g., requirements for caregivers, restrictions
upon [Mother] to drive alone with WGD, etc.). Despite these
barriers, [Mother] has a strong, loving relationship with WGD.
She and SMD share a very strong, close, and loving
relationship. The children truly seek to have a good quality
relationship with [Mother].

       The Court finds it is in the best interests of each child
that each child have a close, strong, and loving relationship
with each parent. The Court intends to modify the Decree to
allow [Mother] and each child to improve a better quality
relationship.

8)     Regarding the factor as to the ability of each parent to
provide adequate care for each child throughout each period of
responsibility, including arranging for each child’s care by
others as needed pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a)(ii):

       [Father] has provided adequate and appropriate care for
each child throughout the time that each child has been in his
primary physical custody and control. He and his girlfriend
have lived together for several years. He and the children rely
upon [Father’s] girlfriend to provide care and supervision.
[Father] has employed caregivers to assist in providing for
WGD’s special needs.

       [Mother] is capable of providing adequate care for the
children, however the Decree’s stringent requirements for her
to provide caregivers for WGD have become more onerous
than necessary. The Court intends to modify the Decree in this
respect.

9)     As to the factor of the relevant competency and fitness
of each parent under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a)(iii):

       Both parents are generally fit and competent parents.
[Father] has consistently challenged [Mother’s] competency
and fitness by relying upon testimony and evidence from the

                              14
                divorce trial, suspicion, and conjecture despite the findings and
                conclusions in this Court’s August 19, 2021, Order After Trial
                on Material Change of Circumstances.

                10) As to the factor of each parent’s willingness to accept
                all responsibilities of parenting, including a willingness to
                accept care for each child at specified times and to relinquish
                care to the other parent at specified times under Wyo. Stat.
                Ann. § 20-2-201(a)(iv):

                         Both parties generally comply with the Decree on this
                issue.

                11) Regarding the factor of how the parents and each child
                can best maintain and strengthen a relationship with each other
                pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a)(v):

                        Quite simply, both parties need to recognize that their
                ability to co-parent, communicate, and cooperate are mandated
                to provide for the best interests of each child. Both parents lack
                the insight to do anything about this. The offender need only
                look no further than his or her mirror. The 2018 Decree
                implemented some processes for the parents to accomplish
                this, but instead they persist in widening the chasm. See
                Matters Reviewed, Considered, and Disregarded, supra.[9]

9
 Matters Reviewed, Considered, and Disregarded refers to a provision in the Final Order where the district
court described the parameters of its review. There it affirmed it had considered “all of the matters of
Record in this case pertaining to the second phase of trial” and the “admissible, credible, reliable, and
relevant sworn testimony” and “evidence.” It then generally addressed the matters it did not consider,
saying:
                         At Trial, there was inadmissible evidence and testimony, hearsay
                testimony, and some speculation introduced, or attempted to be
                introduced, by the parties. No inadmissible evidence and testimony,
                hearsay testimony, or speculation were given any weight by the Court in
                reaching its decision(s), and no inadmissible evidence and testimony,
                hearsay testimony, or speculation proved or disproved any material fact in
                controversy. Moreover, the Court did not consider or rely upon any
                extraneous matter, including attachment, document, record, or submission
                which was not “admissible” and/or admitted at Trial.
        Specifically, the district court said it:
                disregarded [Father’s] Motion to Strike [Mother’s] Reply Pleadings Filed
                on December 5, 2022, or, in the Alternative Provide [Father] 10 Days to
                Respond to [Mother’s] Pleadings and the Guardian Ad Litem’s Motion to
                Strike [Mother’s] Pleadings because [Mother] bears the burden of proof

                                                   15
                12) As to the factor of how the parents and each child
                interact and communicate with each other and how such
                interaction and communication may be improved under Wyo.
                Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a)(vi):

                        Quite simply, both parties need to recognize that their
                ability to co-parent, communicate, and cooperate are mandated
                to provide for the best interests of each child. Both parents lack
                the insight to do anything about this. The offender need only
                look no further than his or her mirror. The 2018 Decree
                implemented some processes for the parents to accomplish
                this, but instead they persist in widening the chasm. See
                Matters Reviewed, Considered, and Disregarded, supra.
                Both parties realize that they must cooperate and communicate
                to promote the best interests of each of their children, but until
                they resolve their personal disputes, the Court is skeptical
                regarding their acceptance of their need to do so constructively.

                13) As to the factor of the ability and willingness of each
                parent to allow the other to provide care without intrusion,
                respect the other parent’s rights and responsibilities, including
                the right to privacy under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a)(vii):

                      Quite simply, for years neither parent has been capable
                of demonstrating a willingness to allow the other to provide
                care without intrusion, respect the other parent’s rights and
                responsibilities, including the right to privacy.

                14) As to the factor of the geographic distance between the
                parents’ residences under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a)(viii):

                       [Father] and the children reside in the Jackson area,
                approximately one mile apart. The proximity of the parents to
                each other exacerbates their ability to carry on their personal
                disputes.

                 to show “that the modification [of the Decree] would be in the best
                 interests of the children . . . .”
         Other than the Motion to Strike, the district court does not refer to any evidence or testimony that
it considered or declined.

                                                    16
                  15) Regarding the factor of the current physical and mental
                  ability of each parent to care for each child pursuant to Wyo.
                  Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a)(ix):

                        Each parent generally possesses the appropriate
                  physical and mental ability to care for each child.

                  16) As to any other factors the court deems necessary and
                  relevant under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a)(x):

                        See    Matters       Reviewed,      Considered,      and
                  Disregarded, supra.
                              [10]

                  17) The Court considered other factors the Court deems
                  necessary and relevant, including but not limited to, whether
                  the best interests of each of the parties’ children, considering
                  their special needs and conditions, would be adversely affected
                  or promoted in approving a custody and a visitation
                  arrangement in light of each parent’s present circumstances
                  and living arrangements.

                  18) The Court does not prefer one parent as a custodian
                  solely because of gender.

                  19) Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(c), the Court
                  must consider any evidence of child abuse as being contrary to
                  the best interests of each child. Each party has raised the
                  specter that the opposite parent has engaged in child abuse
                  (particularly involving WGD). None of such claims proved the
                  existence of child abuse under the preponderance-of-evidence
                  standard. There is ample circumstantial evidence that both
                  parents have engaged in emotional abuse of their children,
                  particularly SMD, by embroiling them in this endless, high
                  conflict litigation.

                  20) This record does not support a conclusion that a shared
                  custody arrangement would promote stability in each child’s
                  environment and that it is in each child’s best interests to
                  fashion such a plan.

10
     See supra note 9.

                                                17
[¶41] In Castellow, we found that “[t]he district court set forth the factors at Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 20-2-201(a) that courts are to consider when determining a custody arrangement in
the child’s best interest, but then failed to address them as they pertained to this case.”
Castellow, ¶ 12, 492 P.3d at 899. Here the district court’s findings are lengthy, yet
conclusory. Some of the district court’s findings comply with Rule 52, other key findings
do not. Many lack reference to the record and in some instances the record does not support
them. The findings support the district court’s decision on custody but are insufficient to
support its decisions extending Mother’s summer visitation, removing the requirement that
the Mother provide qualified caregivers for WGD, and failing to designate one of the
parents as a final decision-maker. We address the insufficient findings in detail.

[¶42] In finding 7, the district court provided no facts, and we can find none in the record,
to support its conclusion that Father uses his role as primary caretaker “as a means of
exerting control over [Mother’s] ability to strengthen her relationship with the children.”
Similarly, we are not informed which provisions in the Decree unnecessarily “stunted the
quality of relationship which has existed between [Mother] and the children.” The district
court’s reference to the Decree’s therapeutic requirements for WGD’s caregivers does not
explain how WGD’s needs have changed, and we can find nothing in the record to support
the district court’s conclusion that this requirement should be vacated.

[¶43] Finding 8 details Father’s appropriate care of the children since the time of the
divorce and the children’s close relationship to both parents. It also states that the Decree’s
“stringent requirements for [Mother] to provide caregivers for WGD” have become “more
onerous than necessary.” While the record supports Father’s care of the children and their
close relationship with both parents, it does not directly address Mother’s burden in
providing caregivers. The finding provides no basis for this conclusion, and we are left to
speculate about the district court’s reasons. In finding 9, the district court recites no facts
to support its conclusion that Father relied solely on the divorce trial to challenge Mother’s
competency and fitness and the record contradicts this finding. As discussed in this
opinion, Father challenged Mother’s current competency by joining the GAL’s Rule 35
Motion.

[¶44] Findings 11, 12, and 13 contain conclusions or admonishments relating to the
continued failings of both parents regarding an inability to communicate and work together
in the best interests of the children. Nothing in these paragraphs reveals how the district
court weighed each parent’s transgressions in reaching its modification decisions. In
finding 17, the district court does not identify the “other factors” it “deem[ed] necessary
and relevant” in reaching a decision in the best interests of the children, and we are unable
to review these unidentified factors to determine whether they support the district court’s
decision or are relevant to the best interests of the children. In finding 19, the district court
asserts, “[t]here is ample circumstantial evidence that both parents have engaged in
emotional abuse of their children, particularly SMD, by embroiling them in this endless,

                                               18
high conflict litigation.” The finding lacks any citation to the record, and the record
contains conflicting evidence on this question.

[¶45] Father claims the lack of a sufficient basis for the district court’s conclusions
requires this Court to remand the district court’s Final Order. He specifically challenges
the basis for the decisions on (1) joint decision-making, (2) modification of visitation, (3)
vacating the requirement for qualified caregivers for WGD, and (4) extending Mother’s
summer visitation. Mother agrees that joint decision-making is unworkable and asserts the
insufficient factual findings require a remand on the issue of primary physical custody or
at least a shared custody arrangement. We address the district court’s custody and
visitation decisions here and separately address the issue of medical decision-making infra
¶¶ 54–62.

          a. Sufficient evidence supports the award of physical custody to Father.

[¶46] Mother argues that the lack of sufficient findings under Rule 52 prevents this Court
from determining whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied primary
physical custody to Mother. We disagree.

[¶47] On appeal, Mother did not argue that evidence introduced during trial demonstrated
Father’s ongoing care of the children was deficient nor did she refer to evidence which
supports the conclusion that a major change in the physical custody of the children would
be more beneficial for them.

[¶48] There are sufficient Rule 52 findings supported by the record to sustain the district
court’s determination that a change in physical custody was not warranted. The district
court found Father has been the primary physical custodian of the children since before the
Decree and has provided adequate and appropriate care for each child throughout the time
that each child has been in his primary physical custody and control. While Mother has
improved her parenting skills which, in turn, has improved her relationship with the
children, “[o]ur task is simply to determine whether, examining the record in the light most
favorable to the successful party, the district court could have reasonably concluded as it
did.” Walker v. Walker, 2013 WY 132, ¶ 21, 311 P.3d 170, 175–76 (Wyo. 2013) (quoting
Hanson v. Belveal, 2012 WY 98, ¶ 13, 280 P.3d 1186, 1192 (Wyo. 2012)). On this issue,
Father is the prevailing party.

[¶49] “In custody modification proceedings, the party seeking to modify custody carries
the burden of establishing that a material change of circumstances affecting the child’s
welfare has occurred subsequent to the entry of the initial decree, and that the modification
would be in the best interests of the child affected.” Kappen v. Kappen, 2015 WY 3, ¶ 11,
341 P.3d 377, 381 (Wyo. 2015) (citing Jackson, ¶ 7, 96 P.3d at 23–24). Mother “cannot
use W.R.C.P. 52(a) to challenge the district court’s order on any and all grounds.”
Pettengill v. Castellow, 2022 WY 144, ¶ 21, 520 P.3d 105, 112 (Wyo. 2022). “If [s]he

                                             19
disagreed with the outcome, [s]he should have separately argued why the district court
abused its discretion by awarding [Father] primary physical custody, analyzing the
evidence under the appropriate standard of review.” Id.

[¶50] The Rule 52 findings related to physical custody are sufficient. The district court
did not abuse its discretion when it determined Mother failed to meet her burden to
demonstrate a change in physical custody would be in the best interests of the children.

          b. The district court erred in failing to allocate a specific schedule for
             birthday visitations, in extending Mother’s summer visitation for two
             weeks with no weekend visitation for Father, and in removing the
             requirement that Mother provides qualified caregivers for WGD.

[¶51] Mother and Father assert the district court erred when it modified visitation
requiring the parties to share the children’s birthdays without providing any further
guidance. Father asserts the district court’s findings of fact are insufficient to support its
decision that it is in the children’s best interests to increase Mother’s summer visitation
without providing visitation for Father and in vacating the requirement that Mother provide
qualified caregivers for WGD.

[¶52] The district court’s primary duty in making custody and modification decisions is
to serve the best interests of the children. See Kimzey, ¶ 18, 461 P.3d at 1236.

[¶53] The Rule 52 findings contain no facts in support of the district court’s conclusions
as they pertain to the modification of visitation and vacating the requirements for
caregivers. For these reasons, on remand, visitation and the need for qualified caregivers
must be reconsidered, and on reaching a decision, the district court must set forth sufficient
findings of facts and conclusions of law in support of its decision pursuant to Rule 52.

III.   The district court abused its discretion in failing to designate one parent as a final
       decision-maker on issues of the children’s welfare, especially medical decisions.

[¶54] Mother and Father both claim that the district court abused its discretion when it
failed to resolve the impasse caused by their inability to reach an agreement regarding the
children’s welfare—especially medical care.

[¶55] The record contains abundant evidence of the parents’ inability to agree on many
questions related to the children. Their inability to agree on medical treatment is
particularly harmful to the children, especially WGD. As an example, for over a year,
WGD’s doctors have concluded that his gait, which causes him to fall frequently and has
caused him injury, requires extensive surgery. Mother continues to resist surgical
intervention. WGD has yet to be treated for this problem.

                                             20
[¶56] Mother asserts,

              The Court has basically put a stalemate in place that does not
              allow for either of the parents to understand what steps must
              be taken for medical care for their special needs child when
              they don’t agree. The end result is that if it is non-emergency
              care then it may not happen and this would not be in the best
              interests of the minor child.

We agree.

[¶57] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(d) provides:

              The court shall order custody in well defined terms to promote
              understanding and compliance by the parties. In determining
              custody a court shall not favor or disfavor any form of custody.
              Custody shall be crafted to promote the best interests of the
              children, and may include any combination of joint, shared or
              sole custody.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(d) (LexisNexis 2023).

[¶58] Here, the district court ordered:

                     The Court believes that it is in the best interests of each
              child that the parties shall have joint legal custody of their
              minor children. Joint legal custody means that both parents
              shall share in the responsibility for making major decisions
              about their children’s welfare, education, non-emergency
              healthcare, discipline, and religious training. Neither party
              shall have the right to make a decision over the view or
              decision of the other parent if the parties are unable to make
              any major joint decisions regarding their children’s welfare,
              education, non-emergency healthcare, discipline, and religious
              training.

[¶59] Under Rule 52, the district court must spell out its reasons so that counsel and the
reviewing court will be in a position to evaluate the soundness of its decision. Nothing in
the district court’s findings supports its conclusion that the children’s best interests are
served by its order on decision-making. Throughout these proceedings, the district court
expressed its displeasure with the parents’ failure to reach any agreement over the welfare
of the children. The parties agree animosity exists and has existed since the inception of
the divorce proceedings—a period of more than seven years.

                                             21
[¶60] Despite this evidence and the district court’s well-documented skepticism as to the
parties’ ability to address these issues in the future, the district court refused to resolve the
problem. When two fit parents disagree, the court must provide a resolution to the dispute.
Mills v. Fleming, 2017 ME 144, ¶¶ 7–10, 166 A.3d 1012, 1014–15.

[¶61] We find the Maine Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mills instructive. There, Mother
appealed the district court’s decision to give Father the final authority to determine the
children’s participation in sports, claiming it violated her fundamental right to parent. The
Maine Supreme Court said:

                     When fit parents, who are parenting separately, cannot
              agree on an aspect of their shared parenting responsibilities,
              and cannot agree on a nonlitigation-based method of resolving
              that dispute, the court must undertake its responsibility to
              adjudicate the facts and provide a resolution to the dispute.
              Although a negotiated resolution by caring parents holds the
              potential for the best outcome for the children, the court must
              act when the parents cannot resolve their dispute. Absent the
              court’s availability for that dispute resolution, the uncertainty,
              discord, and continued stalemate between the parents would
              leave children, torn between those parents, in an untenable
              circumstance. Simply put, a court order that allows one parent
              to make the decision on a disputed child-related issue does not
              violate the constitutional rights of either parent.

Mills, ¶ 10, 166 A.3d at 1015. See also Evans, ¶¶ 31–34, 530 P.3d at 309–10 (approving
modification requiring Mother to obtain recommendations from three medical
professionals in the event she and Father cannot agree on a major surgery, and otherwise
final decision-making authority for the children’s healthcare resides with Mother subject
to specific communication and consultation requirements).

[¶62] The district court’s Rule 52 findings do not explain the district court’s decision, and
we find no support for this disposition in the record. We vacate the district court’s Final
Order as it relates to joint legal medical decision-making. On remand, the district court
must resolve the parties’ medical decision-making stalemates.

IV.    The district court did not exceed its jurisdiction or violate Mother’s fundamental
       right to parent when it prohibited Mother from obtaining a psychological
       evaluation of her children.

[¶63] Mother designated Dr. Turlington to conduct psychological examinations on both
children and, without consulting Father, scheduled evaluations for “early March.” Father

                                               22
claimed the designation ran afoul of both W.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B) 11 and 35(a). The district
court granted Father’s motion and ruled that the appropriate remedy was to exclude the
witness and prohibit the psychological evaluation.

[¶64] Mother concedes the district court had jurisdiction to strike the witness and limit the
evidence but argues the district court exceeded its jurisdiction and crossed a constitutional
boundary by prohibiting Mother from obtaining a psychological examination of the
children whether the expert testified or not. Mother cited MBB v. ERW, 2004 WY 134,
¶ 9, 100 P.3d 415, 418–19 (Wyo. 2004) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child[ren] reside first in the parents . . . .” (quoting Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell
Cnty. Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Wyo. 1990))). She claims the district
court’s order denied Mother her fundamental right to care for her children. 12

[¶65] She also claims the district court’s prohibition violated her constitutional due
process right to present expert recommendations to the GAL, citing KES v. CAT, 2005 WY

11
   W.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B) provides:
                 Disclosure of Expert Testimony.—
                                                      .    .    .
                 (B)       Witnesses Who Must Provide a Written Report.—Unless
                 otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, if the witness is one retained
                 or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one whose
                 duties as the party’s employee regularly involve giving expert testimony,
                 this disclosure must be accompanied by a written report prepared and
                 signed by the witness or a disclosure signed by counsel for the party. The
                 report must contain:
                           (i)      a complete statement of all opinions the witness will
                           express and the basis and reasons for them;
                           (ii)     the facts or data considered by the witness in forming
                           them;
                           (iii)    any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support
                           them;
                           (iv)     the witness’s qualifications, including a list of all
                           publications authored in the previous 10 years;
                           (v)      a list of all other cases in which, during the previous four
                           years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition;
                           and
                           (vi)     a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study
                           and testimony in the case.
W.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B).
12
   Mother also asserts the district court’s later ruling on Mother’s Expedited Motion for Order Regarding
Medical Decision-Making and Father’s Motion for Full Medical Authority to Make Medical Decisions for
the Minor Children was a violation of her fundamental rights to parent. The district court denied both
motions. The district court found the Decree did not provide one parent the ability to make a final decision
regarding the health of the children over the protests of the other parent and held that a decision on this
dispute prior to the trial would violate due process. The denial of the motions for medical authority was
based on the Decree’s award of joint legal custody where neither parent was given final decision-making
authority.

                                                    23
29, ¶ 16, 107 P.3d 779, 784 (Wyo. 2005) (“One of the basic elements of due process is the
right of each party to be apprised of all the evidence upon which an issue is to be decided,
with the right to examine, explain, or rebut such evidence.” (quoting Matter of SAJ, 942
P.2d 407, 410 (Wyo. 1997))).

[¶66] The original Decree awarded Mother and Father joint legal custody and required the
parties to consult with each other before executing a medical decision. Mother has no
fundamental or due process right to override the provisions of her Decree.

                     A judgment respecting parental rights and
              responsibilities does not implicate a parent’s fundamental right
              to parent unless it constitutes a state intrusion on that right.
              Such an intrusion may be found to exist when a judgment
              directly and substantially limits the parent’s decision-making
              authority and delegates an aspect of parental rights and
              responsibilities to a third party.

Mills, ¶ 7, 166 A.3d at 1014 (citations omitted). “Courts deciding parental rights matters
are regularly called upon to resolve disputes when dedicated, loving, and fit parents are
unable to reach agreement . . . . Court resolution of [the] dispute[] . . . involve[d] no state
intrusion on the parties’ right to parent.” Id. ¶ 8, 166 A.3d at 1014–15.

[¶67] Mother did not consult with Father before arranging for the evaluation of the
children. Mother’s decision to schedule a psychological examination of the children
without consulting Father was a direct violation of the Decree. Mother’s fundamental right
to parent was not affected when the district court prevented Mother from conducting an
evaluation for the purpose of securing evidence for trial.

V.     The district court abused its discretion when it refused to consider allegations of
       Mother’s psychological abuse of one child after the evidence closed.

[¶68] Father claims the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider the GAL’s
Emergency Motion to Suspend [Mother’s] Visitation Until Further Order filed after trial,
but before the district court entered its Final Order.

[¶69] This motion was predicated on events that began during Mother’s visitation with
SMD on Wednesday, December 7, 2022. On December 8, 2022, Mother sent a text
message to Father and the GAL stating SMD had expressed suicidal thoughts to Mother
during their visit the previous evening (Wednesday). Mother said she had shared this
information with SMD’s school principal. The principal met with SMD and determined
there was no threat of self-harm and notified both parents of this conclusion.

                                              24
[¶70] Dissatisfied with the school’s response, on Saturday, December 10, during Mother’s
weekend visitation, she took SMD to the Jackson Police Department to report that SMD
would be endangered if she returned to Father’s home. While in SMD’s presence, Mother
discussed her “personal history and experiences” with Father including allegations of
physical and psychological abuse. After an investigation of Mother’s concerns, the case
was closed for lack of cause.

[¶71] Dissatisfied with the police response, on Sunday, December 11, 2022, Mother
brought SMD to the emergency room for suicidal concerns, specifically, Mother alleged
SMD would kill herself if she had to return to Father’s home that evening. After an
evaluation by the doctor, an emergency assessment “related to the risk for harm to self and
recommendations for safety planning” by the hospital on-call counselor, and a lengthy
observation, hospital personnel documented their concerns that SMD had been coached to
express suicidal ideation and discharged her to her Father.

[¶72] In each of these interviews, Mother, in front of SMD, discussed Father’s physical
and mental abuse towards Mother (which had been litigated and found unsupported),
Mother’s own attempted suicide, and Mother’s fear that Father was causing harm to SMD.

[¶73] The district court denied the motion in its Second Amended Trial Order. After
discussing the parents’ inability to communicate and chastising the parties for flooding the
district court with numerous motions, the district court stated:

                       Even after the Trial was completed and before the Court
                could make its determinations, the turmoil was further stoked
                with the Guardian Ad Litem’s Emergency Motion to Suspend
                Plaintiff’s Visitation Until Further Order, and the inevitable
                onslaught of Responses, Replies, and Supplements. Needless
                to say, these inane pleas for court intervention are deemed
                automatically denied for reasons which have been previously
                explained to the attorneys[13] and which are well-known to
                them. All of these filings and claims for relief are disregarded.

[¶74] “We review the denial of a post-trial motion for abuse of discretion.” Aimone v.
Aimone, 2023 WY 43, ¶ 50, 529 P.3d 35, 48 (Wyo. 2023), reh’g denied (June 6, 2023)
(citations omitted). At the time the motion was filed, no final order had been entered, and
no judicial determination which might be considered a final order had been made. “[T]he
district court was free to revise its [decision] prior to judgment, and could have heard the
pre-judgment motion . . . .” Parris v. Parris, 2009 WY 44, ¶ 17, 204 P.3d 298, 303–04
(Wyo. 2009) (citing Steranko v. Dunks, 2009 WY 9, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 1096, 1096–97 (Wyo.

13
  Prior to the district court’s final ruling, it had warned the parties that any motion containing the words
“Emergency” or “Expedited” or other words of urgency would “automatically be deemed DENIED.”

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2009); Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo. 1987)). The best interests of
the children are paramount in making custody and visitation decisions. Arnott v. Arnott,
2012 WY 167, ¶ 31, 293 P.3d 440, 454 (Wyo. 2012).

[¶75] Upon review of the materials in the GAL’s supplemental filing, we do not find the
GAL’s motion “inane” or that its purpose was to “stoke” the “turmoil.” The GAL’s
supplemental information describes exigent circumstances calling into question SMD’s
health and safety during Mother’s visitation. The district court abused its discretion in
denying the GAL’s post-trial motion without considering its merits. On remand, the district
court should consider the merits and relevance of the GAL’s motion.

                                     CONCLUSION

[¶76] The district court abused its discretion when it denied the GAL’s motion for a Rule
35 examination, excluded evidence related to Mother’s mental health, failed to designate a
final decision-maker, and refused to consider the GAL’s emergency motion. It did not
abuse its discretion when it declined Mother’s invitation to modify physical custody of the
children, nor did it exceed its jurisdiction when it prohibited Mother from obtaining a
psychological evaluation of the children. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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