Court Opinion

ID: 9537769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:23:11.512206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:59.236954
License: Public Domain

McCOMB, J.
I dissent.
Defendants appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff after trial before a jury in an action to recover damages for personal injuries.
Viewing the evidence most favorable to plaintiff, the facts in the instant case are:
On June 2, 1946, at about 10 p. m., plaintiff was operating his automobile in a westerly direction on Highway No. 66 when the car stopped. At this point the highway consisted of two marked lanes for traffic in each direction and a parking lane on each side thereof. Plaintiff immediately got out of his automobile with his flashlight and walked to the rear of his car, looking for oncoming traffic and holding the flashlight in his hand. His headlights and taillight were burning. He stood near the left rear fender of his car signaling to traffic until a truck driven by defendant Cordero, and owned by defendant Gonzales, traveling from 20 to 25 miles per hour in a westerly direction on Highway 66, struck and seriously injured plaintiff. At the time of the accident, section 74 of a Pomona City Ordinance read thus:
“It shall be unlawful for any person to stand, or sit, in any roadway. ’ ’
This is the sole question presented for our determination:
Was plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter *212of law in standing in the roadway in violation of the prohibition in section 74 of the Pomona City Ordinance, suprai
This question must be answered in the affirmative. It is the general rule that (1) the violation of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence per se, and (2) it constitutes contributory negligence if the failure to comply with the statute or ordinance contributes directly to the injury. (Hurtel v. Cohn, Inc., 5 Cal.2d 145-147 [52 P.2d 922]; Leek v. Western Union Tel. Co., 20 Cal.App.2d 374 at 376 [66 P.2d 1232]; Reeves v. LaPinta, 25 Cal.App.2d 680 at 681 [78 P.2d 465]; Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal.2d 581 at 588 [177 P.2d 279].)
To the foregoing general rule there is an exception that if the violation of a statute or ordinance under the particular circumstances was justifiable or excusable, such violation may be excused and not constitute negligence per se. (Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., supra, 588; Morris v. Purity Sausage Co., 2 Cal.App.2d 536 at 539, et seq. [38 P.2d 193].) However, the exception is only applicable when the violation of the ordinance or statute results from a cause or thing beyond the control of the person charged with the violation. (Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., supra, 589; Gallichotte v. California Mutual Bldg. & Loan Assn., 4 Cal.App.2d 503 at 506 [41 P.2d 349]; Morris v. Purity Sausage Co., supra.) In the instant case, at the time of the accident, section 74 of the Pomona City Ordinance read:
“It shall be unlawful for any person to stand, or sit, in any roadway. ’ ’
As plaintiff violated a provision of the foregoing ordinance in standing in the highway, he was guilty of negligence per se, and since the accident would not have occurred had he complied with the ordinance, his negligence was one of the proximate causes of the accident and therefore he was guilty of contributory negligence and cannot recover for his injury. The exception to the general rule mentioned above, to wit, that the violation of an ordinance may be justifiable or excusable under the circumstances of a particular ease when the act is done prudently for the purpose of safety of life or limb, is not here applicable for the reason that, as stated in the rule, such exception applies only where the violation of the ordinance results from a cause or thing beyond the control of the person charged therewith. In the present case, plaintiff voluntarily stood in the highway and he was not placed there because of any cause or thing beyond his control.
*213As previously pointed out in Leek v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra, 376, the alarming increase in deaths and injuries resulting daily from violation of traffic ordinances and provisions of the Vehicle Code has become a matter of public concern, demanding the conscientious effort of every individual to prevent accidents by complying with such ordinances and provisions. One of the motivating causes inducing the adoption of the ordinance here in question was to prevent just such an accident as has occurred due to the violation of the ordinance and which accident would not have occurred had plaintiff complied with it. The facts in Reeves v. LaPinta, supra, are analogous to those in the present case. In the cited case, a municipal code provision of the city of Los Angeles read:
“No person shall ride upon the fender, steps, or running board of any street car or vehicle.”
Plaintiff, in violation of the ordinance, rode upon the step of an automobile bus and was injured as a result thereof. It was held that she was guilty of contributory negligence and could not recover for her injuries. The principle of law in such ease and in Leek v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra, are identical and are controlling in the present case.
Graves v. Kern County Transp. Corp., 112 Cal.App. 261 [296 P. 902], Wright v. Ponitz, 44 Cal.App.2d 215 [112 P.2d 25], Shannon v. Thomas, 57 Cal.App.2d 187 [134 P.2d 522], Rath v. Bankston, 101 Cal.App. 274 [281 P. 1081], Giorgetti v. Wollaston, 83 Cal.App. 358 [257 P. 109], are not here applicable for the reason that in such eases there was not a violation of an ordinance the same or similar to the one here involved. Connard v. Pacific Elec. Railway Co., 14 Cal.2d 375 [94 P.2d 567], is likewise readily distinguishable from the facts in the present case. In such case, there was a conflict in the testimony as to whether the plaintiff was riding on the step of the car or merely using the step for the purpose of alighting from the car. This conflict in evidence clearly raised a question of fact, which was properly submitted to the jury. In the instant case, there is no conflict in evidence that the plaintiff was standing in the highway.
The judgment should be reversed.
A petition for rehearing was denied April 22, 1949. McComb, J., voted for a rehearing. Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 9, 1949. Traynor, J., voted for a hearing.