Court Opinion

ID: 9752550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:14:19.14587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:17.377888
License: Public Domain

GLASSMAN, J.,
with whom Roberts, J., joins, dissenting.
I disagree with the court’s interpretation of the Workers’ Compensation Act and therefore cannot concur with the court’s opinion affirming the Appellate Division’s decisions as to Harvie and Ventry. Accordingly, I would vacate the decisions of the Appellate Division with instructions to remand Harvie’s petition to the Commissioner for further proceedings and to affirm the decision of the Commissioner as to Ven-try.
39 M.R.S.A. § 95 (Supp.1988) in effect for the relevant time period states in pertinent part:
Any employee’s claim for compensation under this Act shall be barred unless an agreement or a petition as provided in section 94 shall be filed within 2 years after the date of the injury, or, if the employee is paid by the employer or the insurer, without the filing of any petition or agreement, within 2 years of any payment by such employer or insurer for benefits otherwise required by this Act.... No petition of any kind may be filed more than 10 years following the date of the last payment made under this Act.
It should be noted that as enacted in 1965, section 95 provided in pertinent part:
Any employee’s claim for compensation under this Act shall be barred unless an agreement or a petition as provided in section 94 shall be filed within 2 years of the date of the accident.... No petition of any kind may be filed more than 10 years following an accident.
P.L.1965, ch. 408, § 9 (emphasis added). Shortly thereafter, the last sentence was amended to set forth the present provision: “No petition of any kind may be filed more than 10 years following the date of the latest payment made under this Act.” P.L.1965, ch. 489, § 8 (emphasis added). In *10261975, the Legislature further amended section 95 by adding the additional language to the first sentence as contained in the present provision:
Any employee’s claim for compensation under this Act shall be barred unless an agreement or a petition as provided in section 94 shall be filed within 2 years after the date of injury, or, if the employee is paid by the employer or the insurer, without the filing of any petition or agreement within 2 years of any payment by such employer or insurer for benefits otherwise required by this Act.
P.L.1975, ch. 372 (emphasis added).
In the instant cases, it is not disputed that Bath Iron Works knew of the work-connected injuries suffered by each employee in 1979 and that no agreement or petition was filed within two years of the injuries. Thus the employees’ claims for compensation will be barred if the employees failed to file their claims “within 2 years of any payment by such employer or insurer for benefits otherwise required by this Act.” 39 M.R.S.A. § 95 (emphasis added). The court interprets this language as if it read “if there is no agreement or petition and at any time after the date of injury there is a lapse of 2 years during which the employer has not paid any benefits to the employee, any claim by the employee on account of that injury is forever barred.” This is in contravention of the clear and unambiguous language of the 1975 amendment to section 95. See Stanley v. Tilcon Maine, Inc., 541 A.2d 951, 952 (Me.1988) (“When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we will give the statute its plain meaning.”).
It is without dispute that when Bath Iron Works made payments for the medical treatments provided to Harvie in the summer of 1979 and for the treatments provided by the same doctor in 1984 and the later arthroscopic surgery performed in 1985, it knew the payments were for the medical treatment of the 1979 work-connected injury suffered by Harvie. These payments fall within the benefits required by the Workers’ Compensation Act. See 39 M.R. S.A. § 51 (Supp.1988) (employee’s entitlement to medical and other services for injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment); see also Johnson v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 551 A.2d 838, 839-40 (Me.1988) (payment of attorney fees and witness fees are benefits referred to in section 95 and can toll limitation period); 3 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation §§ 78.43(h) (medical payment as compensation), 78.43(a) (when employer voluntarily makes compensation payments, period for filing claim runs from date of last payment). If Bath Iron Works were to avoid the effect of the 1975 amendment to section 95, it could have done so by refusing to make payment of the bills for the medical care of Harvie in 1984 and 1985. Its present defense of the statute of limitations would, under such circumstances, be clearly applicable to any petition thereafter filed by Harvie. Because Harvie filed the petition at issue here in 1985, well within the two-year limitation period following the 1984-1985 payments as provided by section 95, I would vacate the decision of the Appellate Division with instructions to remand this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings.
Ventry applied for and received workers’ compensation for his injury in 1979 with the last payment made in 1980. He remained fully employed. On September 14, 1984 he visited the first aid office at BIW and received a bottle of motrin for swelling in the ankle he injured in 1979. The Commissioner found that the swelling was related to the 1979 injury, and the employer clearly recognized that the medical treatment rendered to Ventry on September 14 was for Ventry’s 1979 work-related ankle injury and that the first aid treatment constituted the equivalent of a payment under the Act. These findings were affirmed by the Appellate Division. In December 1984 Ventry filed the present petition. These circumstances present the issue, novel to this court, of whether medical care received by an employee at a first aid facility provided by the employer on the employer’s premises is “any payment by such employer for benefits otherwise required by this Act.” 39 M.R.S.A. § 95. I find no basis *1027under the clear language of the statute to distinguish medical care on the basis of where and to what extent it is administered. See 3 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 78.43(h) (1989) (no longer accepted rule that first aid provided by employer is not sufficient payment of compensation to toll statute). Because Ventry’s petition was filed well within 2 years of payment of benefits to him by the employer, I would vacate the decision of the Appellate Division and affirm the decision of the Commissioner.