Court Opinion

ID: 9404503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 06:00:14.905828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:14.788516
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     WINNETT KNOX,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DA-0752-22-0199-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,                          DATE: June 22, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Winnett Knox, Baytown, Texas, pro se.

           Patricia Washington, Falls Church, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her appeal of her termination for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons
     discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the
     initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Dallas Regional Office for further
     adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The record in this appeal is sparse but appears to set forth the following
     facts. According to the appellant, she is a preference eligible who was employed
     with the agency’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) for
     approximately 5 years. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1. As of June 2021,
     she was employed with the EOIR’s Office of the Chief Immigration Judge at the
     Houston-Greenpoint Park Immigration Court as a Legal Assistant, GS -07, in the
     competitive service. Id. at 4. Following her voluntary application and selection,
     the appellant was promoted to the position of Legal Administrative Specialist,
     GS-09, effective August 15, 2021.       Id. at 4, 7.    With this promotion, the
     appellant’s appointment was converted from the competitive service t o the
     excepted service, and she was subject to a 2-year trial period because her
     selection was from a Veterans Recruitment Appointment (VRA) authority.          Id.
     at 4. Effective February 17, 2022, the agency terminated the appellant from her
     Legal Administrative Specialist position based on the charge of conduct
     unbecoming an employee, which concerned a verbal altercation with a coworker
     and disrespectful behavior during a subsequent meeting about the altercation . Id.
     at 4-5.
¶3         On March 10, 2022, the appellant appealed her termination to the Board,
     arguing that she “was never given an opportunity to rebut[] any of the
     allegations” against her. IAF, Tab 1 at 8. She did not request a hearing. Id. at 2.
     Recognizing that the Board may not have jurisdiction over the appellant’s appeal,
     the administrative judge informed the appellant of what a preference eligible in
     the excepted service must show to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over her
     termination, and he ordered her to file evidence and argument constituti ng a
     nonfrivolous allegation that the termination action is within the Board’s
     jurisdiction.   IAF, Tab 2 at 2-6.   After the appellant failed to respond to the
     jurisdictional order, the administrative judge issued an order to show cause,
     providing the appellant with an additional opportunity to establish the Board’s
                                                                                             3

     jurisdiction and ordering her to file evidence and argument constituting a
     nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction.       IAF, Tab 7.      The appellant did not
     respond to the order to show cause.
¶4         On April 29, 2022, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     dismissing the appeal.     IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID).        He found that the
     appellant failed to establish that she is an “employee” under 5 U.S.C.
     § 7511(a)(1)(B) who is eligible to appeal her termination to the Board. ID at 4-5.
     He also found that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege any fact
     supporting a regulatory right to an appeal under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806. ID at 5-6.
     Accordingly, he dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 6.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, wherein
     she argues that she had been a Legal Assistant with the agency since 2017 and
     that she is, therefore, a “[p]ermanent employee” with Board appeal rights. 2
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4. She also reasserts that she was not
     provided with an opportunity to respond to the allegations against her, and she
     continues to argue the merits of her termination. 3 Id. at 5-7. The agency has

     2
       The appellant also argues on review that, at the time she was terminated from her
     Legal Administrative Specialist position, her appointment was pending conversion to
     the competitive service and that she would submit to the Board an updated Standard
     Form 50 (SF-50) reflecting such change when she received it. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4.
     Although a conversion to the competitive service would alter the statutory requirements
     that the appellant would need to meet to establish the Board’s jurisdiction, she filed an
     appeal of her termination from a position in the excepted service. It is well settled that
     the Board’s jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the agency’s action against the
     appellant at the time an appeal is filed with the Board. See Pupis v. U.S. Postal
     Service, 105 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 4 (2007). Accordingly, any such conversion from the
     excepted service to the competitive service would not change the outcome arrived at in
     this Order and discussed below.
     3
       With her petition for review, the appellant also submits a certificate of release or
     discharge from active duty, SF-50s concerning a pay increase and health benefits
     coverage, performance appraisals from 2017 regarding her Legal Assistant position, the
     termination notice, and the personal statement included in her initial appeal. Id.
     at 9-23.
                                                                                               4

     responded to the appellant’s petition for review, and the appellant has replied to
     the agency’s response. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6         The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary, and it is limited to matters over
     which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or re gulation. Maddox v. Merit
     Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985).               An appellant is
     entitled to a jurisdictional hearing if she presents nonfrivolous allegations of
     Board jurisdiction. Coleman v. Department of the Army, 106 M.S.P.R. 436, ¶ 9
     (2007). The appellant bears the burden of proving, by preponderant evidence,
     that the Board has jurisdiction over her appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A).
¶7         Only an “employee” can appeal to the Board from an adverse action. See
     5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1); Mfotchou v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R.
     317, ¶ 8 (2010). As set forth above, the appellant’s appointment to the Legal
     Administrative Specialist position was made pursuant to VRA authority. IAF,
     Tab 1 at 4. VRA appointments are excepted service appointments made without
     competition to positions otherwise in the competitive service.             See 38 U.S.C.
     § 4214; 5 C.F.R. § 307.103. A preference eligible in the excepted service, such
     as the appellant, is an “employee” with Board appeal rights if she has completed
     1 year of current continuous service in the same or similar positions. 4 5 U.S.C.

     4
       As set forth above, in the initial decision, the administrative judge also stated that the
     appellant may have a regulatory right to appeal under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806. ID at 5-6. It
     appears that he did so based on the agency’s inclusion of such appeal rights in its
     termination notice. IAF, Tab 1 at 6. However, the Board has found that an individu al
     appointed in the excepted service, such as the appellant, has no regulatory right to
     appeal under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 because that provision applies only to individuals in
     the competitive service. See Ramirez-Evans v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     113 M.S.P.R. 297, ¶ 10 (2010); Allen v. Department of the Navy, 102 M.S.P.R. 302, ¶ 6
     (2006). It is well settled that the Board’s jurisdiction cannot be expanded by an
     agency’s erroneous notice of appeal rights. See Barrand v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, 112 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 13 (2009). Because the appellant was a preference eligible
     in the excepted service, the Board has jurisdiction over her appeal only if she was an
     “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B), as set forth above.                  See Allen,
     102 M.S.P.R. 302, ¶ 6.
                                                                                           5

     § 7511(a)(1)(B); Maibaum v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 234,
     ¶ 9 (2011).
¶8         In the initial decision, the administrative judge stated that it was undisputed
     that the agency converted the appellant’s appointment to the excepted service on
     August 15, 2021, and terminated her effective February 17, 2022, before she
     completed 1 year of current continuous service. ID at 5; IAF, Tab 1 at 4. He also
     observed that the appellant did not allege that any of her prior Federal service
     constituted “current continuous service” under section 7511(a)(1)(B). ID at 5.
     Accordingly, he found that the appellant failed to establish that she is an
     “employee” eligible to appeal her termination to the Board pursuant 5 U.S.C.
     § 7511(a)(1)(B). Id.
¶9         On review, the appellant argues that she had been a Legal Assistant with the
     agency since 2017, and that the Legal Assistant position was “the same position”
     as the Legal Administrative Specialist position from which she was terminated.
     PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. She alleges that the agency “just changed the title of the
     position.” Id. The appellant did not raise this argument below. 5 IAF, Tab 1.
     Although the Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first
     time on review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence
     that was not previously available despite the party’s due diligence, Clay
     v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016), the appellant’s new
     argument concerns whether the Board has jurisdiction over her ap peal, a question

     5
       Although the record below suggests that the appellant had been employed with the
     agency since 2017, the appellant did not allege before the administrative judge that her
     prior service was in a same or similar position to the position from which she was
     terminated. IAF, Tab 1. This is presumably the basis for the administrative judge’s
     finding that the appellant failed to nonfriovlously allege that her prior service
     constituted “current continuous service” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B). ID at 5.
     Thus, her argument in her petition for review that she held the Legal Assistant position
     since 2017 and that that position and the Legal Administrative Specialist position are
     the same is new.
                                                                                        6

      that is always before the Board, see Lovoy v. Department of Health and Human
      Services, 94 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶ 30 (2003). Therefore, we consider it here.
¶10        We acknowledge that the appellant’s assertion on review that the Legal
      Assistant and Legal Administrative Specialist positions are “the same” is terse
      and lacks supporting detail. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. However, fundamental fairness
      requires us to construe a pro se appellant’s allegations liberally.    See Farooq
      v. Corporation for National and Community Service, 109 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶ 11
      (2008) (stating that, because a pro se appellant is not expected to plead issues
      with the same precision as would be expected of an attorney, the Board will
      construe her claims liberally); Melnick v. Department of Housing and Urban
      Development, 42 M.S.P.R. 93, 97-98 (1989) (same), aff’d, 899 F.2d 1228 (Fed.
      Cir. 1990) (Table). Therefore, we construe the appellant’s claim as one alleging
      that, because she was a Legal Assistant with the agency since 2017 and the Legal
      Assistant position was “the same” as the Legal Administrative Specialist position,
      she had at least 1 year of current continuous service in a same or similar position
      when she was terminated. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. Such an assertion constitutes a
      nonfrivolous allegation that the Board has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to
      5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B). See Newman v. U.S. Postal Service, 79 M.S.P.R. 64,
      67 (1998) (finding that an allegation that two positions are “materially the same”
      constitutes a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction). Further, the Board
      has explained that an appellant’s nonfrivolous allegation that two positions are
      the same or similar “creates a legitimate factual issue” as to whether she had
      1 year of current continuous service in the same or similar positions.      See id.
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant is entitled to a jurisdictional hearing on
      this issue where she must prove jurisdiction by preponderant evidence. See id.
      at 68; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A).
                                                                                             7

                                             ORDER
¶11         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this appeal to the Dallas
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order. 6
      Although the appellant did not request a hearing in her initial appeal, and there is
      no statutory requirement that the Board hold a hearing on the threshold issue of
      jurisdiction, if the administrative judge concludes that a determination cannot be
      made based on the documentary evidence, an evidentiary hearing should be held
      to resolve the jurisdictional question. 7 See Walker v. Department of the Army,
      119 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 6 (2013).

      FOR THE BOARD:                                       /s/ for
                                                  Jennifer Everling
                                                  Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      6
        After the close of record on review, the appellant filed a “Motion to Accept Late
      Filing,” in which she requested to submit new evidence and argument in support of her
      petition for review. PFR File, Tab 6. Because we are remanding this appeal, we deny
      this motion. The appellant will have the opportunity to submit additional evidence and
      argument on remand, and, to the extent it is relevant to the issues in this appeal, the
      administrative judge should consider it.
      7
        If the administrative judge finds that the appellant failed to establish that she is an
      “employee” pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B) with Board appeal rights, we note that
      the agency’s failure to inform her that she would lose her Board appeal rights after
      voluntarily transferring from the Legal Assistant position in the competitive service to
      the Legal Administrative Specialist position in the excepted service does not confer
      Board jurisdiction. See Williams v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 892 F.3d 1156,
      1162-63 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that an agency’s failure to inform an employee of the
      consequences of a voluntary transfer cannot confer appeal rights to an employee in a
      position which has no appeal rights by statute).