Court Opinion

ID: 9382599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 12:08:40.229538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:40.332972
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                      San Antonio, Texas
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                          No. 04-21-00394-CV

                                          Adalgiza GARCIA,
                                              Appellant

                                                   v.

                                          Derly MASCORRO,
                                                Appellee

                          From the County Court at Law, Starr County, Texas
                                     Trial Court No. CC-20-170
                            Honorable Orlando Rodriguez, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Irene Rios, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 22, 2023

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED

           This appeal arises from a final decree of divorce after a bench trial. On appeal, Adalgiza

Garcia argues (1) the trial court erred in characterizing her separate property as community

property; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to order Derly Mascorro to pay her child support,

including retroactive child support. Because we agree the trial court erred in characterizing

Garcia’s separate property as community property, we reverse the portion of the trial court’s final

decree that divides the marital estate.
                                                                                      04-21-00394-CV

                                          BACKGROUND

       Garcia and Mascorro married in 1995 and had three children during their marriage. At the

time of the bench trial on October 22, 2020, only one of their children, D.M., was still a minor. A

month later, on November 25, 2000, D.M. turned eighteen years old. The trial court did not sign

the final decree of divorce until June 20, 2021. In the final decree, the trial court found that

Mascorro was not obligated to pay child support, including any retroactive child support requested

by Garcia.

       With regard to their assets, the trial court ordered their home to be sold, with 75% of the

net proceeds from the sale being awarded to Mascorro and only 25% of the net proceeds from the

sale being awarded to Garcia. This family home, located at 77 Ramirez Road, sits on two lots. It

is undisputed that these two lots were gifted to both Garcia and Mascorro during their marriage.

That is, on July 19, 2000, by gift deed, Mascorro’s mother transferred the two lots to her “beloved

son and daughter-in-law, Derly A. Mascorro and wife, Adalgiza G. Mascorro.” The family home

was then built on the lots during the marriage. Garcia and Mascorro separated in 2015. Garcia left

the family home and went to live with others. Mascorro remained living in the family home, paying

all the house bills and property taxes.

                               CHARACTERIZATION OF PROPERTY

       In her first issue, Garcia argues the trial court erred in characterizing the family home as

community property. She points out that the two lots on which the family home sits were given to

her and Mascorro, and as gifts, they are separate property. Thus, she argues the trial court erred in

mischaracterizing her separate property as community property. In response, Mascorro contends

that because the family home was built with community funds, the real property can be

recharacterized as community property.

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                                                                                        04-21-00394-CV

       “Generally, the characterization of property as separate or community is determined by its

character at inception, often referred to as the ‘inception of title’ doctrine.” Blair v. Blair, 642

S.W.3d 150, 156 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.). Both the Texas Constitution and the Texas

Family Code define separate property as property owned before marriage, or acquired during

marriage by gift, devise, or descent. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 (“All property, both real and

personal, of a spouse owned or claimed before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise

or descent, shall be the separate property of that spouse . . . .”) (emphasis added); TEX. FAM. CODE

3.002 (“Community property consists of the property, other than separate property, acquired by

either spouse during marriage.”); see also Roberts v. Roberts, 402 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (“Separate property includes property . . . acquired by a spouse during

marriage by gift, devise, or descent.”). Accordingly, it is unconstitutional for a trial court to divest

a party of his or her separate property by awarding any portion of it to another party. Blair, 642

S.W.3d at 156. For this reason, a trial court that improperly divests a party in his or her interest in

separate property commits reversible error as a matter of law without the need of a harm analysis.

Id.

       It is undisputed that the two lots on which the family home was built are Garcia’s and

Mascorro’s separate property. Although the family home was built on the separate property during

the marriage, “it is well-established that any improvements made to a spouse’s separate property

during marriage, including the construction of a residence or other buildings thereon, are

considered the spouse’s separate property, and the community receives no ‘right, title or interest

in or to the land.’” Id. at 156-57 (quoting Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1964)); see

also Kite v. Kite, No. 01-08-00643-CV, 2010 WL 1053014, at *2-4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Mar. 11, 2010, no pet.) (holding marital residence built on husband’s separate property was

his separate property). “As the Texas Supreme Court has explained, this is so because the

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‘improvements become attached to the soil, and cannot, in the nature of things, be divisible in

specie when one of the joint owners has no interest in the land upon which they have been

erected.’” Blair, 642 S.W.3d at 157 (quoting Burton, 380 S.W.2d at 561). Therefore, even though

the family home was built during the marriage, because it was built on separate property, the family

home is also characterized as separate property. See id. We hold the trial court erred in this case

by characterizing the family home and land, commonly known as 77 Ramirez Road, as community

property. See id. Further, by awarding Garcia only 25% of the proceeds from the sale of 77 Ramirez

Road, the trial court erred in divesting her of her separate property.

        Having determined that the trial court mischaracterized 77 Ramirez Road as community

property and divested Garcia of her interest in 77 Ramirez Road, we are required to reverse and

remand the issue of property division to the trial court for a retrial on the division of the marital

estate. See Blair, 642 S.W.3d at 161; see also In re Marriage of Case, 28 S.W.3d 154, 161 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (explaining that when a trial court mischaracterizes separate

property as community property, and the mischaracterized property has value that would have

affected the trial court’s just and right division, the appellate court must remand the entire

community estate to the trial court for a just and right division of the property characterized as

community property). 1

                                               CHILD SUPPORT

        In her second issue, Garcia complains the trial court erred in failing to order Mascorro to

pay her child support and retroactive child support. Section 151.001 of the Family Code permits a

trial court to order either or both parents to pay child support. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 151.001.

Additionally, section 154.009 allows a trial court to order a parent to pay retroactive child support

1
 We note that having sustained Garcia’s first issue, we need not address the alternative arguments made in her third
and fourth issues.

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                                                                                      04-21-00394-CV

if the parent (1) has not previously been ordered to pay support for the child, and (2) was not a

party to a suit in which support was ordered. TEX. FAM. CODE § 154.009. We review a trial court’s

decision to award child support or retroactive child support for abuse of discretion. Garza v.

Blanton, 55 S.W.3d 708, 710-11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2001, no pet.). Under this

standard, sufficiency of the evidence is not an independent ground of error but is a factor in

assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. In re A.L.S., 338 S.W.3d 59, 65 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).

       At trial, Garcia testified that after her separation from Mascorro in 2015, the children lived

with her. When asked if Mascorro ever voluntarily paid child support for the children, Garcia

testified he would pay “thirty, forty dollars every now and then.” She also testified that seventeen-

year-old D.M., who had given birth to a baby about three months before trial, would sometimes

take her baby to visit Mascorro, but “the majority of time she lives with [Garcia].” In contrast,

Mascorro testified that since the time of their separation, the children would move back and forth

between him and Garcia: “Well, they would live with me, and then their mother left and she started

renting, and they would go with them and then they would come back with me for school.”

According to Mascorro, when the children were in school, they lived with him the majority of the

time. Mascorro also testified that after he and Garcia separated, he gave Garcia and the children

money. His testimony was not specific as to duration and amount of money he provided. He also

claimed that D.M. and her child lived with him.

       At the end of trial, with regard to whether Garcia’s request for child support and retroactive

child support should be granted, the trial court stated,

       Let me ask both of you all this, why is it that you didn’t call any of the children as
       witnesses to testify where they were living at [sic], because that leaves a big old
       quandary for the court. If the minor child who just had the child was living with
       dad at dad’s house, why should he be obligated to pay child support? But nothing
       was presented, so that leaves me at a loss . . . .

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                                                                                                   04-21-00394-CV

Garcia’s counsel responded that D.M. “continues to live with mom and mom continues . . . [to

take] care of two mouths . . . .” The trial court again emphasized that without testimony from the

children, the court was “in a quandary as far as trying to figure really . . . how to decide retro[active]

child support or anything.” In its final decree, the trial court refused to award any child support or

retroactive child support.

        In reviewing this record, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in failing to award

any child support or retroactive child support to Garcia. There was disputed evidence presented

regarding where the children lived during Garcia and Mascorro’s separation. Garcia testified the

children lived with her. In contrast, Mascorro testified that the children lived at his home the

majority of the time and that he financially supported them during the separation. “The trial court,

as sole judge of the credibility of witnesses, may choose whether to believe a particular witness.”

In re Marriage of Grossnickle, 115 S.W.3d 238, 248 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). Thus,

the trial court was free to believe Mascorro’s testimony and disbelieve Garcia’s testimony. See In

re Marriage of Elabd, 589 S.W.3d 280, 288 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019, no pet.) (explaining that

“[a]n abuse of discretion generally does not occur when a trial court bases its decision on

conflicting evidence” because it is within the fact finder’s province to resolve such conflicts in the

evidence). Accordingly, based on this record, the trial court could have reasonably concluded

Garcia did not meet her burden in proving her claims for child support and retroactive child

support. We hold the trial court did not err in failing to award child support and retroactive child

support to Garcia. 2

2
 Having found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in failing to award Garcia child support or retroactive child
support, we need not reach Garcia’s issue regarding the trial court “prematurely terminating Mascorro’s child support
obligations” on the basis of D.M. being emancipated.

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                                                                                      04-21-00394-CV

                                           CONCLUSION

       Because the trial court erred in characterizing 77 Ramirez Road as community property,

we reverse the portion of the final decree of divorce that determines and divides the marital estate,

and remand the cause to the trial court for it to receive evidence necessary to find what property

comprises the marital estate and render a just and right division of the community property. See

Garcia v. Garcia, No. 04-19-00796-CV, 2021 WL 2556622, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June

23, 2021, no pet.). We affirm the remainder of the final decree of divorce.

                                                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

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