Court Opinion

ID: 9363857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 21:00:27.274683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:34.534660
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                             No. 21-10360
             Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                        D.C. No.
    v.                                               2:20-cr-00176-
                                                         WBS-1
ELIGIO MUNOZ, AKA Eligio Nunez,
AKA Elisio Munoz,
               Defendant-Appellant.                     OPINION

         Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Eastern District of California
         William B. Shubb, District Judge, Presiding

          Argued and Submitted December 8, 2022
                 San Francisco, California

                      Filed January 11, 2023

     Before: Susan P. Graber and Paul J. Watford, Circuit
       Judges, and Joseph F. Bataillon, * District Judge.

                   Opinion by Judge Watford

*
 The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the
District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
2                    UNITED STATES V. MUNOZ

                          SUMMARY **

                          Criminal Law

    The panel affirmed the sentence imposed on Eligio
Nunez (aka Eligio Munoz), who was convicted of being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), in a case in which the district court imposed a
two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
2K2.1(b)(1)(A) on the ground that the offense involved three
firearms.
    One of the firearms that formed the basis of the
enhancement was a Polymer80, which is typically sold
online as a kit of component parts and need not be
serialized. Nunez argued that the Polymer80 could not be
counted because it did not qualify as a “firearm” as that term
is defined within the meaning of § 2K2.1(b)(1).
    Under Application Note 5, for a firearm to be counted,
the defendant must have “unlawfully possessed”
it. Rejecting Nunez’s argument that a firearm is “unlawfully
possessed” under Application Note 5 only if the defendant
possessed the gun in violation of federal law, the panel held
that a firearm may be counted under § 2K2.1(b)(1) when the
defendant’s possession of it violates a specific prohibition
under state or federal law.
    The panel disagreed, for two reasons, with the district
court’s finding that Nunez’s possession of the Polymer80
violated California Penal Code § 29180(c). First,

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                    UNITED STATES V. MUNOZ                      3

§ 29180(c)’s requirement that the owner of an unserialized
firearm apply for a serial number or other identifying mark
does not render the owner’s possession of the gun
unlawful. Second, the government presented no evidence
that Nunez was in fact the owner of the Polymer80, much
less that he owned the gun "as of July 1, 2018," as the statute
then required.
    The panel nevertheless agreed that the enhancement was
proper under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) because Nunez unlawfully
possessed the Polymer80 in violation of a different
California statute, Penal Code § 29800. That statute, which
is California’s analogue to § 922(g)(1), prohibits any
“person who has been convicted of a felony” from having
“any firearm” in his possession or under his custody or
control. The panel noted that the district court necessarily
found that the Polymer80 qualified as a firearm under the
definition set forth in California Penal Code § 16520(a),
which governs both § 29180(c) and § 29800, because it
found that Nunez’s possession of the firearm violated
§ 29180(c). In August 2020, § 16520(a) defined the term
“firearm” to mean “a device, designed to be used as a
weapon, from which is expelled through a barrel, a projectile
by force of an explosion or other form of combustion.” The
panel held that the district court did not err in finding that the
Polymer80 qualified as a firearm under California law, as the
facts establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Polymer80 was capable of expelling “a projectile by the
force of an explosion or other form of combustion.”
4                  UNITED STATES V. MUNOZ

                         COUNSEL

Timothy Zindel (argued), Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Sacramento, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Justin L. Lee (argued) and Jason Hitt, Assistant United
States Attorneys; Camil A. Skipper, Assistant United States
Attorney, Appellate Chief; Phillip A. Talbert, United States
Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Sacramento,
California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

                         OPINION

WATFORD, Circuit Judge:

    The defendant in this case, Eligio Nunez (also known as
Eligio Munoz), was convicted of being a felon in possession
of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On
appeal, he argues that the district court abused its discretion
by imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement under
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). We
conclude that the court properly imposed the enhancement.
    In August 2020, Nunez was arrested after officers
attempted to pull him over for traffic violations. He led
officers on a high-speed chase before abandoning the car at
the end of a dirt road and fleeing on foot. Dry grass beneath
the car soon caught fire, engulfing the vehicle in flames. The
next day, officers searched the burned-out car and found two
9-millimeter handguns inside a backpack near the front
passenger seat. Nunez’s possession of those firearms
formed the basis of his § 922(g)(1) conviction.
                   UNITED STATES V. MUNOZ                    5

    On the front passenger seat of the car, officers also found
the partially destroyed remains of a third gun, known as a
“Polymer80.” The lower portion of the gun was made of
polymer, or plastic, and had melted in the blaze. The gun
lacked a serial number. An officer testified at trial that
Polymer80s are typically sold online as kits of their
component parts. As a result, they need not be serialized and
are colloquially known as “ghost guns.”
    At sentencing, the parties disputed whether Nunez’s
offense level should be increased under Sentencing
Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(1). That provision directs sentencing
courts to increase the defendant’s offense level “[i]f the
offense involved three or more firearms.” Id. The
government argued that Nunez’s felon-in-possession offense
involved three firearms—the two 9-millimeter handguns
found in the backpack and the Polymer80 found on the
passenger seat. Nunez argued that the Polymer80 could not
be counted because it did not qualify as a “firearm” as that
term is defined within the meaning of § 2K2.1(b)(1). The
district court agreed with the government and found that
Nunez’s offense involved three firearms. The court
therefore imposed a two-level enhancement under
§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), which applies when the offense involves
between three and seven firearms. That enhancement
increased Nunez’s sentencing range from 84–105 months to
100–120 months. The court ultimately sentenced Nunez to
108 months in prison.
    On appeal, Nunez renews his contention that the
Polymer80 does not constitute a “firearm” under
§ 2K2.1(b)(1) and that his offense therefore involved only
two firearms, not three. To resolve that contention, we must
turn to the application notes to § 2K2.1. See United States
v. Lambert, 498 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2007). Application
6                  UNITED STATES V. MUNOZ

Note 1 states that, for purposes of this guideline, “firearm”
“has the meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).”
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. Section 921(a)(3), as relevant
here, defines “firearm” to mean “any weapon (including a
starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be
converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.”
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A). Nunez did not contest below, and
does not contest on appeal, that the Polymer80 found in his
possession qualifies as a firearm under that definition.
    Application Note 5 further narrows the category of
firearms that may be counted when applying the
enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(1).        It provides: “For
purposes of calculating the number of firearms under
subsection (b)(1), count only those firearms that were
unlawfully sought to be obtained, unlawfully possessed, or
unlawfully distributed, including any firearm that a
defendant obtained or attempted to obtain by making a false
statement to a licensed dealer.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.5
(emphasis added). The issue here is whether Nunez
“unlawfully possessed” the Polymer80.
    Nunez first contends that a firearm is “unlawfully
possessed” under Application Note 5 only if the defendant
possessed the gun in violation of federal law. The
government conceded that it could not prove Nunez
possessed the Polymer80 in violation of federal law because
it could not show that the gun had traveled in interstate
commerce, an element of the felon-in-possession offense
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Nunez cites no authority
supporting the proposition that Application Note 5’s
reference to unlawful possession refers only to possession
that is unlawful under federal law, and nothing in the text of
Application Note 5 supports such a narrow reading. We
therefore hold that a firearm may be counted under
                   UNITED STATES V. MUNOZ                    7

§ 2K2.1(b)(1) when the defendant’s possession of it violates
a specific legal prohibition under federal or state law. See
United States v. Gill, 864 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th Cir. 2017)
(per curiam) (so holding); see also United States v. Jones,
635 F.3d 909, 919–20 (7th Cir. 2011) (same).
    The government argued below, and the district court
found, that Nunez unlawfully possessed the Polymer80 in
violation of California law. We agree with the district
court’s finding but for slightly different reasons. We are free
to affirm the imposition of a sentencing enhancement “on
any ground supported by the record even if it differs from
the rationale of the district court.” United States v. Cortez-
Arias, 403 F.3d 1111, 1114 n.7 (9th Cir. 2005); see Gill, 864
F.3d at 1280.
    The district court found that Nunez’s possession of the
Polymer80 violated California Penal Code § 29180(c). At
the time Nunez possessed the Polymer80 in August 2020,
that statute provided in relevant part:

       By January 1, 2019, any person who, as of
       July 1, 2018, owns a firearm that does not
       bear a serial number assigned to it pursuant
       to either Section 23910 or Chapter 44
       (commencing with Section 921) of Part 1 of
       Title 18 of the United States Code and the
       regulations issued pursuant thereto, shall do
       all of the following: (1) Apply to the
       Department of Justice for a unique serial
       number or other mark of identification
       pursuant to Section 29182.

Cal. Penal Code § 29180(c) (2019). Section 29180(g) made
the failure to obtain a serial number for a handgun
8                  UNITED STATES V. MUNOZ

punishable by up to one year in jail and a fine not to exceed
$1,000.
    Section 29180(c) does not support finding that Nunez
“unlawfully possessed” the Polymer80 under § 2K2.1(b)(1)
for two reasons. First, § 29180(c) does not prohibit the
possession of any class of firearms by anyone. Instead, it
requires the owner of an unserialized firearm to apply for a
serial number or other identifying mark. Failing to comply
with that requirement in no way renders the owner’s
possession of the gun unlawful under § 29180(c). Second,
the government presented no evidence that Nunez was in
fact the owner of the Polymer80, much less that he owned
the gun “as of July 1, 2018,” as the statute then required.
    Nevertheless, we agree with the government that the
two-level enhancement was proper under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A)
because Nunez unlawfully possessed the Polymer80 in
violation of a different California statute, Penal Code
§ 29800. That statute is California’s analogue to 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). It prohibits any “person who has been
convicted of a felony” from having “any firearm” in his
possession or under his custody or control. Cal. Penal Code
§ 29800(a)(1).
    Nunez does not dispute that at the time he possessed the
Polymer80 he had been convicted of a felony. Nunez instead
argues that the Polymer80 does not qualify as a “firearm”
under California law. In August 2020, California law
defined the term “firearm” as used in Penal Code § 29800 to
mean “a device, designed to be used as a weapon, from
which is expelled through a barrel, a projectile by the force
of an explosion or other form of combustion.” Cal. Penal
Code § 16520(a). The district court necessarily found that
the Polymer80 qualified as a firearm under this definition
                   UNITED STATES V. MUNOZ                  9

because it found that Nunez’s possession of the Polymer80
violated Penal Code § 29180(c). As noted earlier, that
provision applies to anyone who owns a “firearm” without a
serial number, and the same definition governs under both
Penal Code § 29180(c) and Penal Code § 29800.
    The district court did not err in finding that the
Polymer80 qualifies as a firearm under California law.
Officers found the Polymer80 on the front passenger seat of
the car Nunez was driving, near the backpack containing the
two 9-millimeter handguns. Inside the backpack, officers
found a loaded magazine that fit the Polymer80 but did not
fit either of the other two 9-millimeter handguns. These
facts establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Polymer80 was capable of expelling “a projectile by the
force of an explosion or other form of combustion.” Cal.
Penal Code § 16520(a); see United States v. Charlesworth,
217 F.3d 1155, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating the
applicable standard of proof). The Polymer80 therefore
qualifies as a firearm under California Penal Code
§ 29800(a), and Nunez’s possession of it was unlawful under
that statute. The district court properly imposed a two-level
enhancement         under         Sentencing      Guidelines
§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A).
   AFFIRMED.