Court Opinion

ID: 9599357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:18:15.751809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:05.670173
License: Public Domain

GOOLSBY, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm, believing as did the trial judge, that the absence of the affidavit mandated by the South Carolina General Assembly in South Carolina Code section 38-77-170 required him to direct a verdict against the appellant Leatrice Williams Collins.1
Section 38-77-170 provides in pertinent part:
*126If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily injury or property damage to the insured is unknown, there is no right of action or recovery under the uninsured motorist provision, unless:
(1) the insured or someone in his behalf has reported the accident to some appropriate police authority within a reasonable time, under all the circumstances, after its occurrence;
(2) the injury or damage was caused by physical contact with the unknown vehicle, or the accident must have been witnessed by someone other than the owner or operator of the insured vehicle; provided however, the witness must sign an affidavit attesting to the truth of the facts of the accident contained in the affidavit;
The following statement must be prominently displayed on the face of the affidavit provided in subitem (2) above: A FALSE STATEMENT CONCERNING THE FACTS CONTAINED IN THIS AFFIDAVIT MAY SUBJECT THE PERSON MAKING THE FALSE STATEMENT TO CRIMINAL PENALTIES AS PROVIDED BY LAW.2
Here, there is no sworn statement in -writing, which is what an “affidavit” is.3 Absent also is the mandated signature of a *127witness on an affidavit “attesting to the truth of the facts of the accident.” Moreover, the mandated warning concerning false statements appears nowhere “on the face of [an] affidavit.” Collins in no way complied with any of the express commands of the statute in question, as easy as they are to be understood and observed.
In interpreting a statute, we, as appellate judges, are to give effect to the language used by the legislature,4 especially if, as here, the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous.5 To do that means we can only hold that the requirement of a certain affidavit, with prescribed language printed in a particular way and appearing prominently on the face of the affidavit, does not include a witness’ mere testimony given in court under *128oath.6
As to any suggestion that to disallow in-court testimony under oath is to elevate form over substance, I can only say that the technical requirement of a signed affidavit containing on its face certain prescribed language is not a mere matter of form; rather, it is one of substance.7 Indeed, it is an express element of the right of action itself.8 The legislature has said there must be a signed affidavit -with certain language that must appear prominently on its face and, if one is not provided, “there is no right of action or recovery.”9 If the legisla*129ture had deemed the in-court testimony of a witness under oath a proper substitute for the particular type of affidavit required by section 38-77-170, then the legislature would have said so in plain and unambiguous language.
I would affirm.

. When granting respondent John Doe's motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge stated:
*126I feel I am compelled to apply the plain language of the statute. While in my mind the sworn testimony of a witness in court is the equivalent of an affidavit from the standpoint of reliability, that is not what the statute clearly requires[.] I feel that I must give effect to the plain language of the legislature. This court cannot legislate. [I]f that is not what the legislature had intended and if they had intended that sworn testimony in court would be sufficient, [it] very clearly could have put that in the statute or the statute could be amended to that effect.
I feel like that while that testimony is just as reliable as an affidavit might be, there may be other reasons that the legislature chose not to include that in the statute____ I think it's clearly a matter for the legislature which I cannot do.
(Emphasis added).

. S.C.Code Ann. § 38-77-170 (Supp. 1999) (Underscored emphasis added).

. See State v. McKnight, 291 S.C. 110, 113, 352 S.E.2d 471, 472 (1987) ("An affidavit is a voluntary ex parte statement reduced to writing and sworn to or affirmed before some person legally authorized to adminis*127ter an oath or affirmation.”); Marine Wharf & Storage Co. v. Parsons, 49 S.C. 136, 157, 26 S.E. 956, 966 (1897) (An affidavit is "a formal written (or printed) voluntary ex parte statement sworn (or affirmed) to before an officer authorized to take it, to be used in legal proceedings.”); see also Youngker v. State, 215 So.2d 318 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1968) (defining an affidavit as a statement in writing under oath administered by a duly authorized person); American Heritage Dictionary 84 (1982) (defining an affidavit as a "written declaration made under oath before a notary public or other authorized officer”).

. See Chestnut v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 298 S.C. 151, 378 S.E.2d 613 (Ct.App.1989) (wherein the court of appeals applied the plain-meaning rule to section 38-77-170 as the statute existed prior to its amendment in 1989).

. See Jones v. South Carolina State Highway Dep’t, 247 S.C. 132, 136, 146 S.E.2d 166, 168 (1966) ("The first rule of construction in the ■ interpretation of statutes is that of intention on the part of the legislature and where the terms of a statute are clear and not ambiguous, there is no room for construction, and courts must apply them according to their literal meaning____ There is no safer nor better rule of interpretation than that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it plainly says.”); see also McKnight, 291 S.C. at 113, 352 S.E.2d at 473 (In holding that oral sworn testimony failed to satisfy the requirements of a statute that required an affidavit, the supreme court stated: "The mandate of the statute is clear. The Court cannot, under the guise of statutory interpretation, overlook [the] plain meaning of the statute to imply instead a wholly different meaning than was intended by the legislature.”); Martin v. Ellisor, 266 S.C. 377, 223 S.E.2d 415 (1976) ("When ... [a] statute is plain and unambiguous, it becomes the duty of the court to apply it literally because the legislative design is unmistakable.... This rule of literal application may be forced to yield, but only when its application would produce an absurd result.”).

. Cf. McKnight, 291 S.C. at 113, 352 S.E.2d at 472-73 (holding that oral sworn statements were not sufficient where search warrant statute required affidavit); United States v. Birrell, 242 F.Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (holding sworn information presented to a commissioner other than that contained in affidavits could not be considered where rule of criminal procedure provided that a warrant shall issue only on affidavit sworn to before a judge or commissioner as the word affidavit referred to a sworn statement in writing made especially under oath); Powelson v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.App.3d 357, 88 Cal.Rptr. 8 (1970) (holding oral sworn statements not an affidavit within a statute requiring sworn statements to be contained in an affidavit before a search warrant could be issued).

. See Soil Remediation Co. v. Nu-Way Envtl., Inc., 323 S.C. 454, 476 S.E.2d 149 (1996) (wherein the supreme court noted the conclusion of the court of appeals that "form should not be elevated over substance” applied the plain-meaning rule of statutory construction to hold that the unambiguous wording of the arbitration statute required notice that a contract is subject to arbitration be typed in underlined capital letters or rubber-stamped on the contract’s first page, and found that the technical requirements of the statute were not met where the arbitration notice on the contract was not underlined); Criterion Ins. Co. v. Hoffmann, 258 S.C. 282, 292, 188 S.E.2d 459, 463 (1972) (wherein the supreme court stated, construing a prior version of the uninsured motorist law, "the procedural obligations that the insured must discharge in order to recover, since they are prescribed by statute, are viewed by the courts as mandatory, and strict compliance with them is a prerequisite to recover”).

. S.C.Code Ann. § 38-77-170 (Supp.1999).

. See Criterion, 258 S.C. at 290, 188 S.E.2d at 462 ("Except for the statute, and endorsements required, no right exists to recover from one’s own insurance carrier. One must look to the terms of the uninsured motorist statute and policy endorsements and comply therewith to get the benefit of the law.... It is the province of the lawmakers to create a right of action, to provide for process and to *129declare the procedure for collecting from one’s own insurance carrier. They did just that.”).