Court Opinion

ID: 9958036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-06 07:03:56.620835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:42.184153
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DIVISION
                            MERCIER, C. J.,
                     MCFADDEN, P. J., and RICKMAN, J.

                   NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                   physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                   days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                              https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                      April 3, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A24A0475. BUCHANAN v. THE STATE.

      RICKMAN, Judge.

      Following a bench trial, Randall Buchanan was convicted on one count of failure

to register as a sex offender based upon his failure to update his employment

information with the local sheriff.1 He argues on appeal that the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction. We agree and, therefore, reverse.

             On appeal from a bench trial resulting in a criminal conviction, we
      view all evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s verdict,
      and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. We
      do not re-weigh testimony, determine witness credibility, or address
      assertions of conflicting evidence; our role is to determine whether the

      1
        Buchanan was also charged with one count of failure to register based upon his
failure to update his vehicle information, but he was acquitted on that count.
      evidence presented is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find guilt
      beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bell v. State, 349 Ga. App. 621, 621 (824 SE2d

552) (2019).

      So construed, the evidence presented at the bench trial showed that in May

2012, Buchanan was convicted on and received a prison sentence for several sexual

offenses that required, upon his release, that he register as a sexual offender pursuant

to OCGA § 42-1-12 et seq. Buchanan was placed on supervised release from prison

in November 2017 and registered with the Floyd County Sheriff’s Office in

accordance with OCGA § 42-1-12 (a) (16), (f).

      In February 2023, a deputy with the Floyd County Sheriff’s Office went to

Buchanan’s residence in order to verify that Buchanan was complying with the

registration requirements. Although no one was at the residence when the deputy first

arrived, Buchanan’s parents and, eventually, Buchanan himself returned to the

residence while the deputy remained there. Buchanan mentioned to the deputy that

he “worked part-time for his father.” Because Buchanan’s registration forms did not

                                           2
reflect this employment, he was arrested and charged with failing to timely update his

registration information in violation of OCGA § 42-1-12 (f) (5),2 (n) (1).3

      The trial court convicted Buchanan following a bench trial. Buchanan filed a

motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.

      Buchanan argues, in part, that the State failed to prove that sufficient time had

passed so as to establish that he violated the statutory time requirement contained

within the registration statute mandating that he update his employment information.4

We agree.

      2
         “Any sexual offender required to register under this Code section shall . . .
[u]pdate the required registration information [including employment] with the sheriff
of the county in which the sexual offender resides within 72 hours of any change to the
required registration information . . .” OCGA § 42-1-12 (f) (5).
      3
        “Any individual who . . . [i]s required to register under this Code section and
who fails to comply with the requirements of this Code section . . . shall be guilty of
a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than
30 years . . .” OCGA § 42-1-12 (n) (1).
      4
        Buchanan also argues that a part-time job constitutes a “vocation” under
OCGA § 42-1-12 (a) (22) such that the State was also required to prove that he had
worked for his father for either “14 consecutive days” or an “aggregate” of “30-days
during a calendar year” before the statute mandated that he update his registration
information, which the State failed to do. In light of our holding, however, we need
not reach this issue.
                                           3
        Georgia law requires that certain sex offenders register with the sheriff of the

county within which he or she resides within 72 hours of being released from prison.

See OCGA § 42-1-12 (f) (2). The required registration information5 must be renewed

annually within 72 hours prior to the registrant’s birthday. Id. at (f) (4). In the event

of a change to the required registration information, which includes employment, a

registered sex offender must submit updated information to the sheriff “within 72

hours of any change.” See OCGA § 42-1-12 (f) (5); see also OCGA § 42-1-12 (a) (16)

(G).

        During Buchanan’s trial, the State presented evidence that Buchanan admitted

he “worked part-time for his father.” But there was no other evidence presented as

to when Buchanan’s employment began and/or how frequently he worked. The only

evidence the State cited in support of its allegation that Buchanan violated the 72-hour

provision was the deputy’s response that “[he] believe[s] so” when asked if Buchanan

had “ample time to fill out a change form.”

        The 72-hour time frame is an essential element of the crime that a registered sex

offender violates OCGA § 42-1-12 (f) (5) by failing to timely update his or her required

        5
            The “required registration information” is set forth in OCGA § 42-1-12 (a)
(16).
                                            4
registration information with the sheriff. See OCGA § 42-1-12 (f) (5), (n) (1). Because

the State has the burden of proving every essential element of a crime beyond a

reasonable doubt, and it failed to prove that 72 hours had passed since Buchanan

began working part-time for his father, we reverse Buchanan’s conviction. See Lindsay

v. State, 336 Ga. App. 330, 332 (1) (785 SE2d 6) (2016) (reversing appellant’s criminal

conviction because the State failed to prove an essential element of the charged

crime); Terrell v. State, 245 Ga. App. 291, 293 (1) (536 SE2d 528) (2000) (same).

      Judgment reversed. Mercier, C. J., and McFadden, P. J., concur.

                                           5