Court Opinion

ID: 9486398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:46:57.785184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:42.230905
License: Public Domain

NOONAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the judgment of the court that the defendants were entitled to summary-judgment on the contract claims and were not entitled to summary judgment on the Foxes’ claims for violation of the venue provision of the FDCPA and that the defendants’ affirmative defenses must be established at trial.
The Foxes may get before a jury on these two claims. But what mountains have been made of molehills! And the Foxes have sought $10 million punitive damages without in their deposition being able to identify any basis for such an extraordinary request. How this court regards inflated claims for punitives is well-established. Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir.1988). I turn to the claims on which I disagree with the majority:

The Alleged Abusive Conduct.

15 U.S.C. § 1692d sets out six examples of conduct that violates the section:
(1) The use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical person, reputation, or property of any person.
(2) The use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.
(3) The publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts, except to a consumer reporting agency or to persons meeting the requirements of section 1681a(f) or 1681b(3) of this title.
(4) The advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of the debt.
(5) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.
(6) Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.
The statute does not limit its general application to these examples. However, normal rules of statutory construction require that the harassment or abuse condemned be of the same nature as the examples the statute supplies. The Foxes provided no testimony showing that the defendants’ conduct was of this quality. At most, Toni Fox could recall a telephone call from a Citicorp agent whose voice she described as “intimidating,” “aggressive,” “threatening” or “not nice.” At the point she received this call the Foxes had failed for over three years to pay the debts due on their Citibank credit cards. Several months before the telephone call the Foxes had agreed to a stipulated judgment requiring them to pay the full unpaid balance of $2,300.31 in monthly installments of $100 apiece, with the additional stipulation that if the payments were not timely made the entire judgment, plus interest, court costs, and attorneys’ fees would be due. Months went by without the Foxes paying a penny. Under these circumstances a telephone call from a representative of Citibank would have been very intimidating, and her voice would have sounded “not nice.” .It might even have been considered “aggressive.” There is nothing in the statute that restrains a creditor from attempting to collect from a delinquent debtor or makes a reminder to the debtor an act of harassment.

The Alleged Misrepresentations

15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits the use of “any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Sixteen examples are then provided of conduct that would violate the statute. None of the acts that the Foxes say Citicorp performed falls within the conduct described or is comparable to such conduct.
The Foxes had agreed in the stipulated judgment to payment of their debt in full upon failure to pay the monthly installments of $100. Consequently, there was no misrepresentation when Toni Fox was told that the full balance of her debt was due; nor was there any misrepresentation when another agent asked the Foxes to pay $100 per month that they had promised to pay; nor *1519was there any misrepresentation when the agent asked them to make up for the payments that had not been paid. Two of the calls from the Citibank representatives threatened garnishment. It would have been lawful for Citibank to garnish the Foxes’ wages. The Foxes offered no evidence that Citibank did not intend to proceed with garnishment if the Foxes remained delinquent; and, of course, Citibank did in fact proceed with garnishment.
The opinion of the court notes the contention of Aron, the Foxes’ lawyer, that Kaplan would not proceed with garnishment without contacting Aron. There is no indication that Kaplan had in fact agreed. Rather, Aron’s self-serving statement is refuted by Kaplan’s reply to him by fax that he would first like to see the records showing the status of the Foxes’ payments. There is no genuine material fact in dispute, no evidence that Kaplan had promised not to file the garnishment.

The Alleged Unfair Practices.

15 U.S.C. § 1692f prohibits a debt collector from using any “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” Eight examples are furnished of conduct violative of this section. No evidence has been offered of any conduct by the defendants in the least comparable with the conduct condemned.
The opinion of the court takes the position that the filing of an application for a writ of garnishment “when the Foxes were current in payments demanded by Citicorp agents” could be found to be an unfair or unconscionable means of collecting. According to the stipulated judgment, as of March 5,1990, the Foxes should have paid Citicorp $1,000. In fact they had paid nothing from September through October and had given one bad cheek for $400. As of March, 1990, they had paid only $400 of what they had stipulated by judgment to pay. At this time, they were, of course, liable for the full $2,300 plus interest, court costs and attorneys’ fees. In these circumstances the Foxes were not protected from having their wages garnished.