Court Opinion

ID: 9629969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:54:45.646966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:31:06.647333
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
dissenting. The findings of this jury convicting six defendants of first degree robbery and two defendants of extortion (robbery in the third degree) are irreconcilably in conflict and should not be permitted to stand.
All defendants were charged in count three of the information with conspiring to commit and committing in concert the crime proscribed by K.S.A. 21-527 (first degree robbery). All took part in the single episode which gave rise to the charges and all obtained checks from the victim by means of intimidation while acting in concert.
The distinguishing feature between extortion and robbery lies in the state of mind of the victim when the felonious act occurs. In 2 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure, § 547, p. 246, the author points out extortion is distinguished from robbery by the fact the property is obtained with the consent of the possessor, whereas robbery demands it be taken against the will and without the consent of its possessor. (See People v. Anderson, 59 Cal. App. 408, 211 Pac. 254; People v. Kruper, 340 Mich. 114, 64 N. W. 2d 629 and State v. Casto, 120 Wash. 557, 207 Pac. 952.)
*34In the crime of murder the degree may depend upon the minds of the perpetrators and separate defendants may be guilty of different degrees but not so in the case of robbery where the degree of the crime depends upon the state of mind of a single victim.
The principal victim in this case, Andrew P. Gutierrez, could have had but a single state of mind when he signed and delivered the checks to these defendants. Either the checks were all obtained without his consent or they were all obtained with his consent. The jury could not logically find in this case that both states of mind existed and that he did not consent as to six of the defendants and did consent as to two.
In State v. Pierce, et al., 205 Kan. 433, 469 P. 2d 308, we pointed out:
“. . . The completed crime commonly known as extortion under our present code is actually that denounced in K. S. A. 21-529 . . .” (p. 435.)
It was under an information charging violation of K. S. A. 21-527 that the defendants, Pierce and Hunt, were found guilty by the jury and sentenced for the lesser included offense, extortion, as defined in K. S. A. 21-529.
Consent is obtained in an extortion through intimidation and an overbearing of will so that the victim chooses to consent with the understanding that thus he is to save himself or others from some personal calamity or injury. In People v. Peck, 43 Cal. App. 638, 185 Pac. 881, this is explained as follows:
“. . . In a legal sense, in a case of this kind, money or property is obtained from a person with his consent if he with apparent willingness gives it to the party obtaining it with the understanding that thus he is to save himself from some personal calamity or injury, notwithstanding that within himself he may still protest against the circumstances requiring him to dispose of his money in that way or for such a purpose. . . .” (p. 645.)
The defendants in the court below asked that the state be required to elect whether it was relying for conviction on first degree robbery or extortion. In State v. Pierce, et al., supra, we said:
“An accusatory pleading in a criminal case may, in order to meet the exigency of proof, charge the commission of the same offense in different ways. In such a situation a conviction can generally be upheld only on one count, the function of the added counts in the pleading being to anticipate and obviate fatal variance between allegations and proof. Thus it is proper to charge by several counts of an information the same offense committed in different ways or by different means to the extent necessary to provide for every possible contingency in the evidence. . . .” (205 Kan. 433, p. 436.)
*35In State v. Gauger, 200 Kan. 515, 438 P. 2d 455, it was held:
“Where a single act of violence or intimidation, which is an essential element of a first degree robbery conviction, is also relied on as constituting the separate crime of assault with intent to rob, two separate offenses cannot be carved out of the one criminal delinquency.” (Syl. § 5.)
In the present case all defendants were accused of conspiring together to commit and committing in concert the crime of robbery in the first degree. A single act of intimidation participated in by all defendants occurred against a single victim. The victim could have had but one state of mind. He either consented or he did not. Two separate offenses cannot be carved out of the one criminal delinquency.
The confusion of the jury in arriving at these conflicting findings which resulted in different verdicts was caused by the instructions of the trial court to which objection was lodged. The instructions set forth count three (robbery in the first degree) under which all eight defendants were found guilty. Six were found guilty of first degree robbery. Two were found guilty under count three of extortion.
Instruction No. 12 reads:
“Count Three of the Information in this case charges the defendants with the crime of Robbery in the First Degree under Section 21-527 of the Statutes of Kansas Annotated. This charge includes not only the charge of Robbery in the First Degree but the offense of Robbery in the Third Degree as defined in Section 21-529 of the Statutes of Kansas Annotated.
“After hearing the evidence, the instructions of the Court and argument of Counsel, and after deliberating upon the case, you determine that one, some or all of the defendants are guilty of robbery but have a reasonable doubt as to which degree — first or third — one, some or all of the defendants are guilty of, in that event the conviction may be only of the lower degree.”
However, the jury was charged under Instruction No. 3 as follows:
“You are further instructed that each count of the Information charges a separate and distinct offense from the offenses charged in the other counts. In determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants upon each one of the offenses charged you must treat and consider it separately from the offenses charged in the other counts.
“In other words, as to Count One of the Information you may, under the instructions herein given, find one, some or all of the defendants guilty or not guilty of the charge contained in said count. As to Count Two of the Information, you may find one, some or all of the defendants guilty or not guilty of the charge contained in said count. In regard to Count Three and Count Four of the Information, as filed by the plaintiff, you are instructed that you cannot find any of the defendants guilty of both Count Three and Count Four, *36but that you may find one, some or all of the defendants guilty or not guilty of the charge contained in Count Three, or you may find one, some or all of the defendants guilty or not guilty of the charge contained in Count Four.” (Emphasis added.)
Count four which is referred to in the above instruction was the charge of blaclanail-extortion under K. S. A. 21-2412. It was defined in Instruction No. 9 as follows:
“Blackmail; Whoever verbally demand of any person, with menaces, any chattel, money or valuable security, or to do an injury to the person or property of any person, with intent to extort or gain from such person any chattel, money, or valuable security, or any pecuniary advantage whatsoever, or with intent to compel the person threatened to do any act against his will, with the intent aforesaid, shall be guilty of a felony. . . .”
This was followed by Instruction No. 11 which defined extortion or third degree robbery under K. S. A. 21-529 as follows:
“If any person shall verbally threaten to do any injury to the person or property of anyone, with a view or intent to extort or gain any money or property of any description, belonging to another, and shall, by intimidating him with said threat, extort or gain from him any money or property, every such offender shall be deemed guilty of robbery in the third degree.”
Instructions No. 9 and No. 11 appear to be substantially the same definition. Both define an extortion.
The instructions given were erroneous as a matter of law. They permitted two separate offenses to be carved out of one criminal delinquency.
The verdict forms submitted to the jury on each of the eight defendants were in such form as to allow one or more of the defendants to be found guilty of first degree robbery under count three and others to be found guilty of extortion under count three.
Clearly these verdicts were improper in form. As to count three all defendants found guilty should have been found guilty of either extortion (third degree robbery) or first degree robbery. Their victim could have had but one state of mind when he parted with the checks.
Under the circumstances Pierce and Hunt cannot again be tried for first degree robbery since the conviction of the lesser offense is an acquittal on the greater degree of the offense. (Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199, 78 S. Ct. 221, 61 A. L. R. 2d 1119; Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323, 26 L. Ed. 2d 300, 90 S. Ct. 1757.)
*37Therefore I would reverse the convictions as to all eight defendants and remand the case for new trials.