Court Opinion

ID: 9637624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:12:47.362782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:58.005755
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Cercone, J.:
I must dissent.
I.
I think this court should today recognize that little, if anything, is gained by anyone in permitting appointed counsel to withdraw in cases involving allegedly frivolous appeals. I, therefore, suggest that we discontinue the practice.
It is apparent that many of the county defenders’ offices across the Commonwealth have simply ceased *123requesting to withdraw in Anders-Baher situations. The reason is that so long as they are required to research and prepare an advocate’s brief for appellant’s use, they might just as well submit it for the purposes of an ordinary appeal, and not orally argue the case. In fact, this practice is supported by the American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Criminal Appeals, §3.2 (Approved Draft, 1970), which provides:
“3.2 Counsel on appeal
“(b) Counsel should not seek to withdraw from a case because of his determination that the appeal lacks merit.
“(i) Counsel should give his client his best professional estimate of the quality of the case and should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a wholly frivolous appeal, or to eliminate particular contentions that are lacking in any substance.
“(ii) If the client wishes to proceed, it is better for counsel to present the case, so long as his advocacy does not involve deception or misleading of the court. After preparing and filing a brief, on behalf of the client, counsel may appropriately suggest that the case be submitted on briefs.” See also Commonwealth v. Jones, 451 Pa. 69, 73-74, n. 1, 301 A. 2d 811, 814, n. 1 (1973).
It therefore appears that the better practice, both practically and theoretically speaking, is simply not to permit the withdrawal of appointed counsel when the only reason for so doing is the frivolous nature of the appeal. This would also remove the confusion concerning what is meant by a wholly frivolous, yet arguable, issue — the very problem which apparently troubles the Philadelphia Public Defender’s Office.1
*124I would therefore deny in this case, and future cases, all requests to withdraw based upon the frivolous nature of the appeal.
II.
However, even though the court retains the practice of permitting the withdrawal of counsel, the instant request should nevertheless be denied. The brief filed by the Philadelphia Public Defender’s Office in the instant case is indistinguishable from the one most recently condemned by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Greer, 455 Pa. 106 (1974), and should be rejected. Even a cursory examination of it demonstrates that its sole function is to support counsel’s request to withdraw. It completely fails to refer to anything in the record which arguably supports the underlying appeal. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-45 (1967); Commonwealth v. Baker, 429 Pa. 209, 212 (1968). The brief, which should be designed to be useful to appellant when he subsequently proceeds in propria persona, states the “Argument” as follows: “There are no issues in the record in which counsel could reasonably base an argument with a chance of securing relief on behalf of appellant.” Counsel then raises four general areas of appellate inquiry which he argues and resolves against his client in an effort to demonstrate the hopelessness of appellant’s situation. The brief then concludes by reiterating counsel’s statement of the argument. There is no separate request to withdraw in accordance with the preferred practice under the Anders-Baker line of cases. Com*125monwealth v. Baker, 429 Pa. at 214. There is also no statement by counsel that he deems the appeal to be wholly frivolous. Commonwealth v. Greer, 455 Pa. at 109.
Although past efforts to clarify the conditions precedent to our granting counsel’s request to withdraw have apparently not aided the Philadelphia Public Defender’s Office, we should again attempt to do so.
First, counsel should submit a separate request to withdraw in the form of a petition which avers the following: (1) That counsel has thoroughly examined the record of the proceedings below and has determined that any appeal he might pursue would be wholly frivolous; (2) That counsel has informed his client of his intention to withdraw, and has forwarded a copy of the attached brief in sufficient time to allow his client to prosecute his appeal in propria persona or to request the appointment of new counsel.
Second, counsel should include as an appendix to his petition a copy of the advocate’s brief which he forwarded to his client. By an advocate’s brief I mean one which raises arguments in favor of his client’s interests, not a brief arguing in support of his request to withdraw. While the arguments may be frivolous in a legal-logical sense, they still may be valid arguments when measured by some less circumscribed standard of rational debate.
At least if this procedure is followed the client will not feel wholly abandoned and lost in, what must necessarily appear to him to be, a complex legal maze. He will not be able to rationally maintain that he has been denied that measure of justice which our constitutional system requires — the right to be assisted by counsel on his first direct appeal. As the Supreme Court stated in Anders at p. 744: “The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in *126behalf of Ms client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae. The no-merit letter and the procedure it triggers do not reach that dignity.” A fortiori, a brief which “effectively amounts to an argument in support of affirmance . . . does not satisfy the constitutional standard.” Commonwealth v. Greer, 455 Pa. at 110.
I would, therefore, reject counsel’s request to withdraw and order counsel either to proceed with the appeal on behalf of his client, or file a proper “AndersBaker Petition” according to the procedure outlined above.

 As Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out in Ms dissenting opinion in Anders: “The Court today holds this procedure unconstitutional, *124and imposes upon appointed counsel who wishes to withdraw from a case he deems ‘wholly frivolous’ the requirement of filing ‘a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.’ But if the record did present any such ‘arguable’ issues, the appeal would not be frivolous and counsel would not have filed a ‘no-merit’ letter in the first place.” 386 U.S. at 746.