Court Opinion

ID: 9620247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:40:14.895847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:48.716724
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, District Judge (dissenting).
Historically, all courts have been reluctant to call upon judicial remedies to treat ailments properly allocable to the executive or legislative branches of government. And, the federal judiciary, in *545addition, to • holding in high régard the separation of powers,' has been peculiarly aware of the coexistence of local and national law, and the need to carefully avoid unnecessary clashes between the two. Yet pursuant to the evolution of our law where it has become apparent that federal constitutional rights have been violated at the local level and only the federal judiciary stands in a position to safeguard such rights, federal intervention takes place even at the risk of local disapproval.1
Unquestionably, the inaction of the Oklahoma Legislature has resulted in denying the plaintiff, and others similarly located, “equal protection of the laws” just as much as if discrimination because of race, color or creed had occurred. In this case the discrimination is geographic.2 Although the Federal Constitution does not give rise to the individual citizen’s right to vote, since this franchise springs from the bosoms of the individual states, nonetheless, where state law grants such a right each citizen must be equally protected in the operation of such law.
The Attorney General, although conceding that the plaintiff has been deprived of a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,3 urges that the United States Supreme Court in Colegrove v. Green 4 has- unmistakably indicated that.the federal judiciary will not, under any circumstances, officiate over gerrymander disputes. However, I do not -so strictly read the Colegrove case. The critical issues there in view were not focused upon a state deprivation of equal protection of the laws. The majority opinion therein reached its con-, elusion based upon two factors: (1) the Federal fteapportionment Act of June 18, 1929, 46 Stat. 21, as amended, 2 U.S. C.A. § 2a had no requirements as to compactness, contiguity and equality in population of congressional districts; 5 and, (2) the districting issue was “of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination” and should be corrected by Congress (or the State legislature).6 By making reference to the.State legislature’s ability to deal with the problem of congressional districting, the Colegrove opinion inferentially touched upon the issue now before this court. However, a careful reading of the majority' opinion makes it amply clear that the Supreme Court was primarily concerned with faithfully adhering to the separation of powers doctrine, and desired to defer to the Congress, a co-equal branch of the federal government, to deal with the matter of congressional districting.7 A complete remedy lay within the control of another *546branch of the' federal government, and inasmuch as Congress possessed the basic right to pass upon the qualifications of its own members, the Federal Judiciary was not going to become embroiled in such controversy. From the Colegrove action the instant suit is sharply distinguishable. Here, Congress has no authority to remedy the complained of wrong; and, all other remedies have been exhausted. Unless this court intervenes it is obvious no relief will ever be obtained. With no threatened conflict between the Congress and the Federal Judiciary, the question simply is, “Will the Federal Judiciary stand idly by and permit the mastication of a federally guaranteed constitutional right?” At such point the question of “political issue” or “delicacy of federal-state relationship” becomes secondary. It seems inconceivable to this court that where no other relief is available that the Federal Court does not have the power, as well as the duty in the face of admitted State violation to preserve the integrity of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The other cases cited by the Attorney General are also inapplicable. South v. Peters,8 although recognizing the Federal court’s basic jurisdiction, merely reiterates the policy of refusing to exercise equity powers in cases posing political issues arising from a state’s geographical distribution of electoral strength among its political subdivisions. In the South case the complaint was against the manner in which the local law chose to distribute its electoral strength, admittedly a fundamental right retained by all states. Here, the controlling local law itself, in the form of a State constitutional provision is being ignored with the result that plaintiff is being denied “equal protection of the laws.” Remmey v. Smith,9 was dismissed because the action was premature in view of an untried state court remedy. Significantly, the court therein recognized that if the case had not been premature, a novel, and not yet decided question of law as to the Fourteenth Amendment existed.10
Clearly, this court does not have the right to grant the requested mandamus relief; however, apart from formal pleading the court can, and must, grant that relief which plaintiff’s proof demonstrates him to be entitled. If the plaintiff can establish at the trial upon the merits the unconstitutionality of the presently effective apportionment provi*547sions, such apportionment provisions should be struck down. Although such a declaration may result in some local inconvenience, the basic responsibility will remain upon the state to enact apportionment provisions which are not constitutionally offensive.11 As recognized in the Colegrove majority opinion, no court can “affirmatively remap” the political districts of a state; however, we could “declare the existing electoral system invalid.” 12
The evil pointed up by the instant complaint is not new. Our would-be republican form of government has long been stigmatized by this same die-hard political parasite. The refusal of a legislature, such as the one in view, to voluntarily comply with the clear mandates of the state constitution to which such body owes its existence, is inexcusable; and, demonstrates anarchic contempt for the ideal that this government continue as one of high-principled laws rather than degenerate into one of unprincipled men.13 The plaintiff and others similarly situated have previously been denied effective relief by all available local government forums; and, I, sitting as a court of equity, cannot turn a deaf ear to the complainant with the paradoxical pronouncement, “You do have a federal constitutional right, but you just don’t have any remedy!”
Respectfully, I dissent.

. e. g., Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1954, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873.

. In the recent decision of Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, D.C.Hawaii 1956, 138 F.Supp. 220, 236, the court after referring to the recent segregation decisions remarked : “ * * * The assumed delicacy of state-federal relations bowed to the principles of the Constitution. A classification which discriminates geographically has the same result. It deprives a citizen of his constitutional rights. Reasons of delicacy should no longer stay the judicial hand. The people of Hawaii need no court intervention to insure a democratic school system. They do need judicial aid in achieving a democratic legislature. Any distinction between racial and geographic discrimination is artificial and unrealistic. Both should be abolished.” (Emphasis supplied.)

. “Section 1. * * * No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Amendment XIV; (Emphasis supplied.)

. 1945, 328 U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct. 1198, 90 L.Ed. 1432.

. This was the sole import of Wood v. Broom, 1932, 287 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 1, 77 L.Ed. 131.

. Footnote 4, supra, 328 U.S. at page 552, 66 S.Ct. at page 1199.

. “ * * *• The short of it is that the Constitution has conferred upon Congress exclusive authority to secure fair *546representation by the States in the popular House and left to that House determination whether States have fulfilled their responsibility. If Congress failed in exercising its powers, whereby standards of fairness are offended, the remedy ultimately lies with the people. Whether Congress faithfully discharges its duty or not, the subject has been committed to the exclusive control of Congress. An aspect of government from which the judiciary, in view of what is involved, has been excluded by the clear intention of the Constitution cannot be entered by the federal courts because Congress may have been in default in exacting from States obedience to its mandate.
“The one stark fact that emerges from a study of the history of Congressional apportionment is its embroilment in politics, in the sense of party contests and party interests. The Constitution enjoins upon Congress the duty of apportioning Representatives ‘among the several States * * * according to their respective Numbers, * * Article I, § 2. Yet, Congress bas at times been heedless of this command and not apportioned according to the requirements of the Census. It never occurred to anyone that this Court could issue mandamus to compel Congress to perform its mandatory duty to apportion. * * * To sustain this action would cut very deep into the very being of Congress. Courts ought not to enter tliis political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers of Congress. * * * ” Colegrove v. Green, footnote 4, supra, 328 U.S. at pages 554, 555, and 556, 66 S.Ct. at pages 1200, 1201.

. 1950, 339 U.S. 276, 70 S.Ct. 641, 94 L.Ed. 834.

. D.C.Pa.1951, 102 F.Supp. 708.

. Ibid, at pages 710, 711.

. The dissenting opinion in the Colegrove case footnote 4, supra, 328 U.S. at page 574, 66 S.Ct. at page 1213, in discussing the practical effect of striking down an unconstitutional apportionment division noted: “ * * * It is said it would be inconvenient for the State to conduct the election in this manner. But it has an element of virtue that the more convenient method does not have — namely, it does not discriminate against some groups to favor others, it gives all the people an equally effective voice in electing their representatives as is essential under a free government, and it is Constitutional.”

. Footnote 4, supra, 328 U.S. at page 553, 66 S.Ct. at page 1200.

. “The time has come, and the Supreme Court has marked the way, when serious consideration should be given to a reversal of the traditional reluctance of judicial intervention in legislative reapportionment. The whole trust of today’s legal climate is to end unconstitutional discrimination. It is ludicrous to preclude judicial relief when a mainspring of representative government is impaired. Legislators have no immunity from the Constitution. The legislatures of our land should be made as responsive to the Constitution of the United States as are the citizens who elect the legislatures.” Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, footnote 2, supra, 138 F.Supp. at page 236.