Court Opinion

ID: 9758879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:54:02.453041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:41.384255
License: Public Domain

*382CASTILLE, Justice,

dissenting.

The majority’s interpretation of the pre-nuptial agreement is contrary to this Commonwealth’s established law concerning contract interpretation. Accordingly, I must dissent as I disagree with this Court’s reversal of the Superior Court.
In Pennsylvania, prenuptial agreements are considered contracts and must be interpreted as such. Simeone v. Simeone, 525 Pa. 392, 581 A.2d 162 (1990). When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its express terms will be given effect. Steuart v. McChesney, 498 Pa. 45, 444 A.2d 659 (1982). Where the terms of a contract are not clear, however, the ambiguous language will be interpreted most strongly against the drafter. RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc. v. Graziano, 467 Pa. 220, 355 A.2d 830 (1976). Moreover, unless the parties manifest a clear intent to the contrary, specific terms will be assumed to qualify general terms. In re Alloy Manufacturing, 411 Pa. 492, 192 A.2d 394 (1963). Finally, in interpreting a contract, courts must assume that the contracting parties were aware of the specific legal meanings given to terms used in the contract. Ruzzi v. Butler Petroleum Co., 527 Pa. 1, 588 A.2d 1 (1991).
Here, the pre-nuptial agreement executed by the parties provides that Naomi Musko (‘Wife”) “shall not be entitled to receive any money or property or alimony or support because of the divorce or separation of the parties.” Alimony, support and APL are each defined and governed by the Divorce Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 3101 et seq. Various provisions of the Divorce Code relate to one, two or all three of these financial arrangements. See, e.g., 23 Pa.C.S. § 3104 (courts may maintain jurisdiction over “the order of any spousal support, alimony, alimony pendente lite ... ”); 23 Pa.C.S. § 3505 (courts may enjoin the disposition of property intended to defeat alimony pendente lite, alimony, child or spousal support); 23 Pa.C.S. § 3704 (titled “Payment of support, alimony and alimony pendente lite”).
Alimony is defined as “an order for support granted by this Commonwealth or any other state to a spouse or former *383spouse in conjunction with a decree granting a divorce or annulment.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3103. Alimony is available, based on a court determination of necessity, to either party only after the entry of a divorce decree. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a).
“Support” as relevant to this appeal is an obligation to provide care, maintenance and financial assistance which arises out of a marital relationship. 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3103, 4321. Because the duty to provide spousal support derives from the marital relationship, the duty terminates upon the final dissolution of the marriage by divorce. Horn v. Horn, 388 Pa.Super. 46, 47, 564 A.2d 995, 996 (1989).
APL is defined as “an order for temporary support granted to a spouse during the pendency of a divorce or annulment proceeding.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3103. APL may be awarded, based on need, during the pendency of a divorce decree and throughout the appeal process, including after the entry of a divorce decree. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3702; DeMasi v. DeMasi, 408 Pa.Super. 414, 420, 597 A.2d 101, 104 (1991), alloc. denied, 535 Pa. 619, 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (23 Pa.C.S. § 3706, which bars alimony where the recipient remarries, does not bar APL in the same circumstances). The purpose of APL is to put the parties on an equal footing during litigation surrounding a divorce. Id. at 421, 597 A.2d at 104.
Because the terms “alimony” and “support” each have specific meanings as defined by statute and case law, it must be assumed that the parties used those terms as defined. Ruzzi, supra. These terms as defined do not include APL. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 492 Pa. 118, 121 n. 1, 422 A.2d 501, 502 n. 1 (1980) (“Support is a cause of action separate and distinct from alimony pendente lite”); 23 Pa.C.S. § 3103 (defining alimony and alimony pendente lite separately). Thus, Richard Musko’s (“Husband”) argument, and the majority’s conclusion, that APL comes within the broader terms “alimony” and “support” is incorrect.
Husband alternatively argues that APL is precluded by the *384general term “money.”1 However, that general term is qualified by the specific terms “alimony” and “support,” which follow it. In re Alloy Manufacturing, supra. Because the language does not expressly include APL with alimony and support, APL is not waived merely by the use of a general term which could encompass it. Id. To the extent that the agreement could be read to waive APL under the general term “money,” the language is ambiguous and must be construed against Husband as the drafter. RKO-Stanley, supra. Therefore, in the absence of specific language in the prenuptial agreement which expressly waives APL, Wife has not waived her right to receive APL if a court finds that such an award is merited under the statutory criteria of 23 Pa.C.S. § 3702.2 Cf. Simeone, supra at 397, 581 A.2d at 164 (wife was not entitled to APL because the pre-nuptial agreement specifically stated that APL was relinquished).
For the foregoing reasons, the majority’s interpretation of this pre-nuptial agreement is inconsistent with this Commonwealth’s precedent concerning contract interpretation. Accordingly, I must dissent to the reversal of the Superior Court’s opinion.
CAPPY, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. Despite Husband's repeated assertion that the terms of the pre-nuptial agreement clearly and unambiguously preclude Wife from receiving APL, his reading of the agreement is inconsistent. After arguing that Wife has waived any right to money, "which clearly must be alimony pendente lite,” he states that the terms "money” and "property” refer to Husband's assets while the terms "alimony” and "support" apply to periodic payments in any form.

. Husband also argues in his appellate brief that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding APL because there were no issues in dispute other than the APL claim itself, and therefore Wife did not need financial resources to litigate the case. However, this claim was not raised on direct appeal to the Superior Court or in the Petition for Allowance of Appeal to this Court and is therefore waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302.