Court Opinion

ID: 9541299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:24:14.632836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:42.980695
License: Public Domain

*629Dore, J.
(dissenting)—The defendant, John Wicks, having been convicted and sentenced on three counts of assault, asserts he didn't have a fair trial because his primary defense of insanity was withdrawn from jury consideration. I agree and would reverse.
The trial judge ruled, as a matter of law, that Wicks was not insane at the time of the commission of the crimes; and alternatively, if he was insane, it was induced by voluntary drunkenness, which is not a defense.
The evidence concerning the defendant's drinking superimposed upon a preexisting mental disorder is similar to the record presented to this court in State v. Brooks, 97 Wn.2d 873, 651 P.2d 217 (1982). While Brooks involved a premeditation issue, the principles and rationale of that case are useful in the context of the present case.
In Brooks, a defendant convicted of first degree murder appealed from the judgment and sentence, contending it was error for the trial court to refuse to give his proposed instruction on involuntary intoxication and to refuse to admit the opinion testimony of a defense psychologist regarding premeditation. There was evidence at trial as to the defendant's intoxicated condition at the time of the victim's death, and the psychologist had sought to testify as to the defendant's ability to premeditate the intent to kill while in such a state. The trial court rejected the defendant's proposed instruction on involuntary intoxication, stating that there was no evidence that consumption of alcohol affected the defendant's ability to form an intent to kill and that intoxication had no bearing on premeditation.
This court held it was error for the trial court to refuse the instruction and to exclude the psychologist's testimony. Noting that specific intent and premeditation are separable and distinct mental states—the latter involving the mental process of thinking beforehand, deliberation, reflection, and reasoning over a period of time—the court concluded there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to consider whether the amount of alcohol consumed had an effect on the defendant's ability to premeditate. The court further *630stated that, because premeditation is a mental state, the proffered testimony of the psychologist, including his opinion as to the defendant's mental state, was relevant to the issue of the defendant's ability to premeditate, and should have been admitted.
Justice Stafford, speaking for a unanimous court, concluded his opinion in Brooks, stating at page 879:
In the instant case there was considerable lay and medical testimony which, if believed by the jury, would establish that the excessive drinking superimposed upon defendant's mental disorder would interfere with his ability to premeditate. The trial court erred by rejecting this relevant testimony.
(Italics mine.)
In State v. Huey, 14 Wn.2d 387, 395-96, 128 P.2d 314 (1942), this court sets forth the standards when the affirmative defense of insanity can be given against the background of voluntary inducement of intoxication:
In State v. Kidwell, 62 W. Va. 466, 59 S. E. 494, the court quoted from State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 Am. Rep. 799, as follows:
"'In general, insanity is an excuse for the commission of every crime because the party has not the possession of that reason which includes responsibility. An exception is when the crime is committed by a party while in a fit of intoxication, the law not permitting a man to avail himself of the excuse of his own gross vice and misconduct to shelter himself from the legal consequences of such crime.'"
The distinction is further brought out in the cited case by a quotation from Beck v. State, 76 Ga. 452, as follows:
"'If the drunkenness produced a temporary frenzy, madness or unsoundness of mind in the accused, he would not be excused or held irresponsible for the act done by him while laboring under such temporary insanity, madness or unsoundness of mind thus produced, it being his own voluntary act. But if the mania, insanity or unsoundness of mind, though produced by drunkenness, be permanent and fixed, so as to destroy all knowledge of right and wrong, then the person thus laboring under these infirmities would not be responsible."'
*631(Italics mine.)
The testimony of Katherine Bailey, the prosecution's chief witness and a victim of the defendant's assault, constitutes substantial evidence as to defendant's insanity. Bailey testified that the defendant suddenly without warning fired his gun into the air. When she asked him why he did that, the defendant said, "To make him run". Report of Proceedings, at 30. She related how the defendant's brother Mike then apologized to her for the way John acted, saying he didn't usually act this way. She testified she didn't think the defendant knew what he was doing. She thought he was under the influence of alcohol "in addition to something else". (Italics mine.) She related she wasn't fearful of the defendant, as she didn't think he knew what he was doing. Report of Proceedings, at 36.
On a key question, Bailey related, "Yes. He seemed more unnaturally disoriented than a drunk, you know. He wasn't just drunk. It was like he did not know what he was doing. He was disoriented."4 (Italics mine.) Report of Proceed*632ings, at 43.
Dr. Wayne McKay Pidgeon, a psychiatrist, examined *633Wicks on March 23, 1977, and a second time on October 2, 1978, at the request of the State. He testified Wicks had a history of psychomotor epilepsy dating back to an old head injury, and had been in and out of the state hospital in Oregon 18 to 20 times. The doctor then testified as to Wicks' long history of drug and alcohol abuse, for which he had been treated repeatedly. Report of Proceedings, at 206-07.
After a long hypothetical question, Dr. Pidgeon was asked:
Q. . . . Now for my questions, Doctor, based upon those facts, based upon reasonable recent medical probability, Doctor, do you have an opinion as to whether at the time of the alleged acts of assault of which John Wicks is charged with committing on August 28, 1978, whether he was legally sane?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that opinion?
A. My opinion was that he was insane. He was not sane.
Q. In your opinion, did he understand the nature and quality of his acts?
A. He did not, in my opinion.
Q. A second question to you, Doctor, would be do you have an opinion based upon reasonable medical probability whether on the afternoon of August 28, 1978 John Wicks had the particular mental state required to have the specific intent to injure others with a firearm.
A. Yes, I have an opinion.
Q. What is that opinion?
A. That he did not have the intent to harm other people.
Report of Proceedings, at 218-19.
Dr. Pidgeon testified that Wicks was a chronic schizophrenic, whether or not he used alcohol or drugs. Report of *634Proceedings, at 228-29.
Excerpts from Wicks' medical records of the Mental Health Division of Dammasch State Hospital (Dammasch) at Wilsonville, Oregon, in themselves are also substantive evidence of the defendant's insanity. They are also corroborative of the testimony of Bailey and the defense witnesses. The following excerpts are illustrative of his many confinements over a period of 15 years:
5/13/66 Discharge Summary. This 17-year-old single white male was admitted to Dammasch Hospital for the third time on a voluntary basis. He had come under the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court for robbing a store in the Lloyd Center with a toy pistol. He was released to his mother on condition that she would have him placed in Dammasch Hospital. John has always been a behavioral problem. He has been diagnosed as a brain damage syndrome with hyperactivity, low frustration tolerance. This is shown in a poor performance at school and a proclivity for antisocial behavior which included stealing to obtain money for cigarettes, glue sniffing, beer drinking and heedlessness at home. He was released from his second admission to this hospital in September 1965. Since then, he received special education in the Crestón Grade School and he was given a job as a custodian. He was expelled from this school one month prior to admission after he stole a case of beer, got drunk and smashed the window of a police car.
Diagnosis: Chronic brain syndrome of unknown cause with mental deficiency, mild and behavioral reaction.
Dammasch records, at 25.
8/3/67 Discharge Summary: This 18 year old single white male was readmitted to Dammasch State Hospital as a voluntary patient on 6-1-67, because of violent and assaultive behavior at home.
On admission the patient was quite high. He expressed the feeling of restlessness and wishes to kill people. He calmed down after admission to the ward and he was given a job, helping to put elderly patients to bed.
Dammasch records, at 2.
6/15/77 General Impressions of Profile: Type of disorder: Mixed—Anxiety neurosis in schizoid personality *635with somatization. Severity of Disorder: Severe.
Dammasch records, at 5.
10-29-77 Final Diagnosis: Manic depressive illness manic type, episodic excessive drinking, seizure disorder.
Dammasch records, at 8.
2-10-78 Final Diagnosis: Cyclothymic personality; Episodic excessive drinking; Psychomotor seizures.
Dammasch records, at 9.
7-14-78 Admitting Diagnosis: Acute alcohol intoxication. Habitual excessive drinking.
Dammasch records, at 1.
Testimony of the defendant's mother, Rosemary Gurske, again was substantial evidence as to the defendant's insanity. She related that when the defendant was only 14 months of age, he received head injuries which required over 100 stitches to repair. At the time, he lost all coordination and speech. He was unconscious for a period of time and sustained extensive brain damage. As a result of this injury he couldn't walk and he had no bowel or urine control. She related how she sent him to Pioneer School because he had mental problems. He was then sent to Crestón School where he attended a class for the retarded. In the eighth grade, he was sent to the Mental Health Division at Dammasch State Hospital. Later he was sent to a mental hospital in Hastings, Minnesota. Subsequently he was sent to an institution for the criminally insane in Yankton, South Dakota. Wicks' mother testified further that during this time period he suffered from psychomotor epileptic seizures. Report of Proceedings, at 286-90.
She related an incident when his sister called him a kid and he grabbed her by the throat, and she slipped into unconsciousness. Later, he didn't even know where he was. She also described another incident when she suggested he take his medicine, he grabbed her and choked her into unconsciousness. Report of Proceedings, at 290.
When the defendant's mother was asked, "Has John ever had any difficulty knowing right from wrong," she *636responded:
Well, I don't know, he just can't seem to distinguish a lot of times between right from wrong. And like he will work and he will get a paycheck and he knows he will need a pair of shoes or something but he will just go out and he gives his money away.
Report of Proceedings, at 291-92.
She related that he went to California in 1972 and was shot six times, with three of the bullets in his head with several fragments in his left temple. They could not be removed because they were pressing on vital nerves. As a result, he is blinded in one eye and has blackouts. After he was shot in the head, his condition worsened and at times he has difficulty recognizing his brother and sisters. Report of Proceedings, at 293. He attempted suicide four or five times by means of excessive drugs and by cutting his wrists. Report of Proceedings, at 298.
Mrs. Gurske stated her son has been confined to Dammasch Mental Hospital 14 times. Some of the times he has been committed were when he was using alcohol and/or drugs; there were times, however, when he wasn't. When he choked his sister into unconsciousness, he hadn't been drinking. Report of Proceedings, at 299-300.
Mike Wicks testified as to John's condition the morning of the credit union event. Mike stated John rambled in his speech, but he couldn't understand what he was saying. When he was asked about John's eyes, he responded: "They were kind of glazed . . . It's just—he was like a person that lost their mind would be the best way to explain it, is the way, you know, it looked when you looked at him, especially in the eyes. They were just glazed and stuff ... I wanted to keep him right by me for that main purpose alone because there's no telling what he could do. He could go out in the middle of the road and lay down." Report of Proceedings, at 320.
Mike testified that when he heard the shot he ran to John and grabbed him. He related:
*637He was standing there all wild-eyed and stuff and I knew he didn't know what he was doing or even where he was and, you know, if I would have just left him there he would have just sat down and went to sleep probably so I grabbed him and took him with me. . . .
Q. And what did you do then after the shot was fired?
A. I got over to John as quick as I could because I knew he wasn't in his right mind and I didn't want to see him hurt himself or anyone else.
Report of Proceedings, at 322-23.
Conclusion
The Court of Appeals, in denying Wicks' appeal, concluded that even if the jury should believe all of the evidence favorable to defendant's plea of insanity, there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. This is incorrect. If a jury found Wicks not guilty by reason of insanity, no appeal is permitted under our constitution and there would be no need for the appellate courts to determine there was "sufficient evidence to support a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity".
The cumulative testimony of the victim, Katherine Bailey; the defendant's mother, Rosemary Gurske; Mike Wicks; Dr. Wayne McKay Pidgeon, and the medical records of the Mental Health Division of Dammasch State Hospital constitute a mountain of powerful and substantial evidence that defendant Wicks, at the time of the credit union event, couldn't distinguish between right and wrong and was temporarily insane. This issue of "insanity" was factual and should have been submitted to the jury, not ruled on by the judge as a matter of law. The issue of "intoxication" had been rejected by the jury. There is no other explanation for the defendant's actions except temporary insanity. The defendant had a constitutional right to have his fate decided by a jury, not the judge. State v. Brooks, 97 Wn.2d 873, 651 P.2d 217 (1982).
*638I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

 Additional testimony of Katherine Bailey follows:
Q. And then what happened?
A. His brother came running out of the bank and tried to make him stop and they were wrestling around at the window of the truck. His brother tried to pull him back. His brother was apologizing to me for the way he acted because he said that he didn't usually act like that. I told him it was all right, just to take the gun and his brother and leave. And then Fred came back in the pickup and they ran off.
Q. Did he appear to you to know what he was doing?
A. No.
Q. Why do you say that?
A. Because I noticed him and his brother when we first got there they were acting very strange, very disoriented like they were high.
Q. Could you tell or do you have any opinion as to whether he was under the influence of alcohol?
A. I think he was in addition to something else.
Q. What makes you say that?
A. The way he was acting.
Q. During the period of time that you saw him, was he stumbling or swaying or anything of that nature?
A. Yes, it looked like they were staggering around when they first got there and started bumping up against each other like they didn't know where *632they were or what they were going to do.
Q. Was his speech understandable and coherent?
A. Yes.
Q. I believe you told me, in fact you did tell me then, did you not, as I have understood you to say here today, that you were not fearful of being shot when the gun was pointed at you?
A. No.
Q. You just didn't think he intended to do that, is that right?
A. That's right.
Q. And I believe you did say then and I believe you said here today you didn't think he knew what he was doing?
A. That's correct.
Q. At that time, isn't it a fact that you said that it looked like he just felt all was lost because he had shot off the gun?
A. Urn-hum.
Q. As if maybe he didn't really intend to do that, is that a possibility?
A. Yes, it's a possibility. There's a lot of possibilities, you know. I don't think that he was in complete control of himself at the time of what happened and it snowballed. That was the impression I got.
Q. Did not give you any reason why he was pulling on you?
A. Well, I got the impression he wanted me to go with him.
Q. You’re smiling a little bit and I'm wondering, did you also get the impression maybe he was attracted to you rather than tending to hurt you?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And that he didn't know what he was doing?
A. Yes, right.
Q. You didn't think he did?
A. I didn't think he did.
Q. I thought you just said on cross-examination you weren't fearful of being shot?
A. I didn't think he was going to shoot but, of course, I was scared. But if somebody asked me if I thought he was going to shoot me or not, I would say no. But I was afraid anyway because he had a gun pointed in my face, you know. If he was going to shoot somebody he could have shot Fred instead of shooting up in the air.
Q. So on a relative scale he fits somewhere in between then, is that correct?
A. Yes. He seemed more unnaturally disoriented than a drunk, you know. He wasn't just drunk. It was like he did not know what he was doing. He was disoriented.
Q. Did it appear to you that he knew what he was doing when he was pointing *633the gun at Fred?
A. When he was running away it was almost like he was playing a game, you know, when he was doing that. It was just like—I didn't think he was going to shoot him. It was just like he was aiming at him for drill or something, just to follow through with whatever he had started.
(Italics mine.) Report of Proceedings, at 35-44.