Court Opinion

ID: 9493148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:59:25.010389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:40.598613
License: Public Domain

RYMER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment:
Although it is a close question whether a remand under Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966), is required in the absence of evidence that casts doubt on Comer’s competency,1 I do *919not disagree that it is at least an appropriate thing to do. However, the majority’s opinion goes far beyond what is necessary to make this happen. I therefore dissent from all but the bottom line.
All that is necessary is a simple, one-sentence order which states:
We retain jurisdiction to resolve the State’s motion to dismiss this appeal, as well as Comer’s motion to discharge counsel and withdraw his appeal, but remand to the district court for the limited purpose, upon notice to the State and all interested parties, of making a judicial determination as to Comer’s mental competence and rendering a report on the matter to us in accordance with Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966).
Or, at most, a one-paragraph order that states:
Robert Charles Comer was convicted of one count of first degree murder, three counts of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of kidnaping, two counts of sexual abuse, and three counts of sexual assault, for which he was sentenced to death. Following unsuccessful appeals, petitions for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, and petitions for post-conviction relief in the Arizona courts, he filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona challenging the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence. The district court rejected these claims. Comer’s counsel filed an appeal in this court February 18, 1998. Since then, Comer has written letters to the Attorney General of Arizona and to the state trial judge indicating that he did not ask for the appeal to be taken and wishes it to be withdrawn; he filed a “motion for issuance of warrant of execution” with the Arizona Supreme Court; and he has filed a motion in this court to withdraw the appeal and to be represented only by himself. In view of these communications, Arizona moved to dismiss Comer’s appeal. Comer’s counsel2 filed an opposition, asking us to order a “responsible procedure for determining whether Comer’s recent requests to drop his appeals arise from a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision.” Arizona responds that no further proceeding is necessary, given the state trial court’s determination that Comer was competent to stand trial and the absence of any indication in counsel’s opposition that anything has changed in the meantime. However, guided by Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966), we believe the district court is in the best position to determine whether Comer “has the capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.” Id. at 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505. Accordingly, we retain jurisdiction over all pending motions but remand to the district court for the limited purpose, upon notice to the State and all interested parties, of making a judicial determination as to Comer’s mental competence and rendering a report on the matter to us “with all convenient speed.” Id.
Instead of this, we have a fifteen-page opinion, essentially all but the bottom line of which is dicta.
The issue before the district court on remand is whether Comer “has the capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the *920other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.” Rees, 384 U.S. at 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505. There is no cause or basis for us to comment now on whether Comer’s communications are, or are not, “consistent with irrational behavior,” as the majority seems to believe. Maj. op. at 915. There certainly is neither cause nor basis for holding that the presumption of correctness which attends the state court’s determination of competency does not apply here at all because it was made over a decade ago “before indications of Mr. Comer’s delusional and bizarre behavior, demonstrated by his letters, emerged,” as the majority appears to do. Maj. op. at 917. For this the majority relies on Mata v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 324 (5th Cir.2000)—which it characterizes as concluding that the district court could not constitutionally base a finding of competency to waive further federal review on a twelve-year old finding where there was also evidence of recent irrational behavior, see maj. op. at 917' — but its reliance is quite misplaced. In Mata there was “extensive evidence of change” in the petitioner’s condition from the time of his original trial, and the court had before it a thirty year record of the petitioner’s documented mental health problems, repeated suicide attempts, and numerous hunger strikes as well as reports of mental health experts showing delusional disorder with paranoid and erotomanic features and borderline personality organization, and medical records that reflected prescriptions for numerous psychotherapeutic and antidepressant medications to alleviate the symptoms of mental illness. Id. at 332 (emphasis added).3 Nothing of the sort is before this court. Comer was found competent at the time of his trial; he has no record of mental problems; and there is no indication of any change in mental competence since Comer’s competency hearing. While the state court’s competency determination is not necessarily the last word, the record in this case is by no means such as to call for us to obliterate the presumption in advance of consideration by the district court. Rather, the clearly applicable rule is that a state court’s determination of a defendant’s competency is presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. §. 2254(d) (1995) (pre-AEDPA); Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 735, 110 S.Ct. 2223, 109 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990).
Indeed, read as a whole, it is difficult to see how Comer’s communications are so indicative of “delusional and bizarre” behavior as to deprive him of the presumption of competence to which I believe he is entitled. Here, for example, is what Comer says in his pro se motion to this court to withdraw the appeal:
I have made my intentions clear, so why do I still have lawyers trying to represent me in this court? Is it not my right to not only represent myself, but also if I choose, to tuithdraw my appeals? I may not have access to a law library, or a copy machine, or a notary public, or funds to represent myself in a mannor pleasing to the American Bar, but it’s not like I am on trial for a murder. I have been found guilty by a jury of my peer’s. To wave one’s appeals or represent one’s self at this level does not require one to be a rocket scientist, only to be aware, with the bare minimum of legal skills, both of which I am. I cannot understand all this about my competency or the conditions of my incarceration. I am a very open, loving person most of the time. I enjoy seeing the sun when I can. I love hearing a bird chirp. Life is good & dear, even under oppressive conditions. There is nothing lorong in my head. I don’t use ■ drugs, legal or illegal, I know where I am hours a day and I don’t “pre*921tend” to be anytuhere else or somebody else. I don’t talk to myself, I don’t eat thing’s we are not supposed to eat, I can add, I can think, I can even wish, hope & dream. I wish I ivas a law abiding person and I hope to pull this dam appeal and I’m going to dream about my girl when I go to sleep tonight! Now that is a lot more than my victim Larry Pritchard has going for him. The Attorney General has filed motions to, and I’ve seen one thing I disagree with. It’s in there “Appellee’s Reply to Opposition to Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal”. It’s on page # 8 at line 19-20. The “misery” of prison life is not ivhy I’ve pulled (attempting too!) my appeal. A few of the reason’s are of a personal nature and will stay that way. I will say, it is just time to end it. And I don’t want to hurt anybody else. I’ve a lot of hate in me, that is tuhat those lawyer’s mean about the incarceration. But thats for somebody else to worry about, how to quit creating monsters. For us, this court & myself & Larry Pritchard, we need to determine — is Robert C. Comer competent? I say yes, lohat say you? Does the laiv allow me to represent myself & withdraw my appeals if I am competent? I say yes, what say you? Gome on folks, this has gone on long enough. I submit this for your ruling and I ask that you please rule on this as soon as you can.

With respect

Robert C Comer

P.S. Julie Hall or Peter Eckerstrom or any other lawyer does not work for me nor represent me nor my views.

Upon further review, I’d have it be known I would not cooperate in any form with any mental health experts. I’ve about as much use for them as I do lawyers. Shrinks are just another scam to separate weak people from there money. It is human nature to stand back up after being knocked down, don’t need a head doctor to tell you that, just do it. So I also would not be amendable to a SO day delay. I will be seeing Julie Hall on Tuesday, May 2nd, to once again formally fire her & Peter Ecker-strom, hopefully this time they will listen, but somehow I’m not faithful that will hapen.

Your honor’s, these people, my so called counsel, had nothing bad to say about me over the last 13 years. Now, as I attempt to assert my right’s, I have become, “incompetent”, “irrational”, “self-destructive”, “delusional”, “paranoid”, “schizophrenic”, according to my lawyers. I fear what they are gonna call me next week! Since I do not agree with them, there must be something wrong with me! But I’ll tell you, after my short dealings with these lawyer’s, I’d like to ask if they are competent, as they go against there clients wishes, are they delusional because they know for a fact there is nothing wrong with me. It just seems they are the ones with problems. Okay, judges, I’ve had my say, again. It’s up to you now, let’s end this now so I don’t have to spend the next couple of years having to print letters and bug other courts. Once again, thank-you for you consideration.

Respectfully

Robert C. Comer

To me, at least, this does not indicate “delusional and bizarre behavior” such as to rob Comer of his right to have the court presume he is competent until someone with a sufficient interest in the proceedings proves otherwise by clear evidence— or to have the federal court presume that the state court’s determination of competence is correct in the absence of any “meaningful evidence” to the contrary. Suffice it to say, this should all be up to the district court on remand.4
The same is true of the voluntariness discussion. There is neither cause nor *922basis for the majority’s view that the conditions of confinement as described by Comer are “Orwellian” or may put him in a “ ‘Hobson’s choice’ that renders his supposed decision to withdraw his appeal involuntary.”5 Maj. op. at 917-18. Comer anticipated this argument in his motion to withdraw the appeal and flatly states that he is not one of those who has wigged out from the type of incarceration to which he has been subjected. Regardless, it is up to the district court (not us) to determine the voluntariness of Comer’s decision in the first instance. And in making this determination, the district court should not mistake gratis observations for law. We have no law on the extent to which (if at all) a capital inmate’s conditions of confinement factor into the “rational choice” test. Nor is there cause or any basis for supposing that the standard should be, as the majority states, whether “Comer’s conditions of confinement constitute punishment so harsh that he has been forced to abandon a natural desire to live.” Maj. op. at 918. Notably, the only other courts of appeals to consider the effect of prison conditions on a capital inmate’s decision to abandon review have spoken only after a district court determination, and both have upheld determinations that the inmate’s decision was not involuntary. See Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir.1989) (prisoner’s decision to withdraw appeal not rendered involuntary on account of conditions of confinement; he indicated and district court found it was based on quality of life due to the fact, not conditions, of confinement); Smith By and Through Missouri Public Defender Commission v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 1050, 1058 (8th Cir.1987) (the district court was justified in concluding that the inmate’s continued adherence to his decision to withdraw an appeal could be voluntary “even if death row’s conditions were in violation of the Eighth Amendment”).
Finally, it should be clear that we are not ruling on either the State’s motion to dismiss or Comer’s motion to discharge counsel and to withdraw his appeal. In particular, the state argues that Ecker-strom lacks standing and we lack jurisdiction under Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990), and its progeny. However, we cannot make any definitive ruling on either point until we have the district court’s findings in hand as both contentions turn on Comer’s competency. The majority’s discussion about Comer’s presumptive consent to Eckerstrom’s representation and to the filing of papers in this court is beside the point. Assuming that Eckerstrom and Hall have enough standing to interpose an objection to the state’s motion to dismiss *923on the ground of Comer’s lack of competency, Comer has moved to discharge them and to dismiss his appeal. This makes the cases upon which the majority relies6 in-apposite as they arose in very different contexts. Indeed, the procedural posture of this case is not materially different from Rees, where the petition for certiorari was counseled but the petitioner then directed counsel to withdraw the petition and forgo further proceedings. Just as the Supreme Court refrained from instructing the district court on presumptions, so should we.
In sum, both motions remain for plenary consideration after the district court’s Rees determination is completed.

. In Rees itself, a month after a petition for a writ of certiorari had been filed, Rees directed his counsel to withdraw the petition and forgo any further legal proceedings. Counsel indicated that he could not accede to these instructions without a psychiatric evaluation because evidence cast doubt on Rees's mental competency. Counsel then had the petitioner examined by a psychiatrist who filed a detailed report concluding that Rees was mentally incompetent. It was in light of these circumstances that the Supreme Court decid*919ed to enlist the assistance of the district court in determining Rees’s mental competence. See Rees, 384 U.S. at 313, 86 S.Ct. 1505.

. Comer's counsel of record is Peter J. Ecker-strom. He has filed papers in opposition to the state's motion to dismiss this appeal. Julie S. Hall is co-counsel.

. See also Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir.1998) (accepting state court finding that inmate was competent as of last determination but concluding that a subslan-tial issue existed as to present competency in light of third party’s submission of “meaningful evidence” that mental condition had deteriorated since state court hearing).

. See Mata, 210 F.3d 324, 326 (Rees "clearly affords the district court a measure of discretion in determining the type and extent of procedures necessary to decide the issue of competency”).

. It is simply not correct that Comer has conceded the point, as the majority implies by stating that he "concedes in his note to this court that he is not '100% competent' and that the conditions of his confinement cause people to 'wig out.’ " Maj. op. at 916. Comer’s note (received by the Clerk April 12, 2000) reads in full as follows:

I suspect the anti-death penalty people, ie: Julie Hall, will try to call into question my sanity or my competency. I'd like the court to know I have been incarcerated in a sensory deprivation unit for 12 year's now, longer than anyone in the United States according to one study. It is a fact this type of incarceration has been known to cause a few people to wig out. I however am not_ one of those. I am allowed nothing in my cell because of my past attitude toward violence, yet I go on and suivive totally intact. Some might point out that I “pace” my cell from morning to night. I do not, I “walk”. I could sit on my bunk and become a veggie I suppose, but I walk. I do not smell stuff burning, I do not see stuff that is not there, I am well aware of where I am and of what I do. I can recall an hour ago, last week, or last year with no problem. When I can get a crossword puzzle, I don’t have a fight in my brain to find words. I don't escape reality by kidding in my head. I would agree I am not very “competent" in law. Had I known it would have gone on this long, I would have learned some law, but I do know that according to law I am way competent and way sane and I do know that this action will lead to my ceasing to suck air if your court decides in my favor. Now, in a legal sense of sanity or competency, I may not be 100% sane or competent, but I assure you I'm not much less than 90%! Ask anybody! A heart full of hate don’t malte one insane nor incompetent.

Thank you for your considerations

Gypsy

Aka

Robert C. Comer

. Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir.1996) (invoking presumption of consent when a petitioner who sought to avoid the restrictions on second habeas petitions claimed he had not authorized his attorney to file the first petition); Lucky v. Calderon, 86 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir.1996) (indicating that the presumption of consent to petition filed by counsel without the petitioner’s signature is rebutted by petitioner’s failure to respond to counsel but that petitioner could later authorize it by showing that the petition is presently authorized).