Court Opinion

ID: 9795697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:36:33.042596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:30:24.099650
License: Public Domain

KESSLER, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶ 30 I concur with the majority that the State’s appeal is not moot. Supra, ¶ 26. I also concur that if the court is correct in its interpretation of A.R.S. § 13-917(B), this matter must be remanded for a determination of whether there has been a Boykin violation and if so, the superior court should either vacate the plea agreement or allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea to the 2004 charges. Supra, ¶27. I dissent, however, on the jurisdictional issue and on the majority’s interpretation of § 13-917(B). Accordingly, I would affirm the order continuing Botkin on standard probation.
Jurisdiction
¶ 31 The State contends and the majority agrees that the State is merely appealing from the superior court’s February 2007 order continuing Botkin on standard probation. Supra, ¶¶ 8-9. The State contends and the majority agrees that we have jurisdiction of the State’s appeal under A.R.S. § 13-4032(5) *473(2001), permitting the State to appeal from a sentence “on the grounds that it is illegal.”
¶ 32 We lack jurisdiction of this appeal to the extent it challenges the December 2006 order returning Botkin to standard probation. The Legislature has determined that the State may appeal from an adverse decision in a criminal proceeding in only limited circumstances, those listed in § 13-4032. This statute is narrowly construed and any attempts by the State to appeal outside the exact terms of that section are prohibited. State v. Dawson, 164 Ariz. 278, 280, 792 P.2d 741, 743 (1990).
¶ 33 As Botkin has pointed out and is self-evident, if Botkin lawfully was no longer on intensive probation in February 2007 when he was found guilty of the 2004 offense, then the provisions of § 13-917(B) as to mandatory incarceration for violation of intensive probation would not apply. If the State was not appealing from the December 2006 decision placing Botkin on standard probation, then the sentence continuing him on standard probation would not be illegal. Accordingly, to prevail on appeal, the State must be appealing from not only the February 2007 sentence, but also the December 2006 order returning Botkin to standard probation.
¶ 34 As such, the State’s appeal from the earlier order is precluded by State ex rel. McDougall v. Crawford, 159 Ariz. 339, 340, 767 P.2d 226, 227 (App.1989). In Crawford, the defendant was charged in city court with DUI offenses. After that court had accepted a guilty plea, it struck an allegation of a prior DUI conviction and then sentenced the defendant as a first time offender. Id. at 339-40, 767 P.2d at 226-27. The State sought special action relief but the superior court dismissed the petition, holding the State had a right of appeal. Id. at 340, 767 P.2d at 227. We reversed, holding that the State had no right of appeal. Id. As we noted in Crawford, id. at 340-41, 767 P.2d at 227-28, the State’s right to appeal from an illegal sentence does not permit review of a lower court’s pre-sentencing strike of a prior conviction allegation; an appeal is not permitted under that statute “from error committed by the trial judge in the preconviction phase of the trial court proceedings.”
¶ 35 It is unclear to me how the majority solves this problem. The majority merely says that the court did not have authority to avoid § 13~917(B)’s mandatory sentencing requirement once it determined Botkin had committed a felony while on intensive probation. Supra, ¶ 9.1 assume what the majority means is that § 13-917(B) prohibits the superior court from reducing the terms of probation from intensive to standard immediately upon the filing of a petition to revoke intensive probation alleging the commission of a felony. Thus, the appeal would be from an illegal sentence because the superior court could not modify probation once the petition to revoke was filed.
¶ 36 The problem with that argument, however, is that there is no language in § 13-917(B) supporting that conclusion. Rather, that statute provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f a petition to revoke the period of intensive probation is filed and the court finds that the person has committed an additional felony offense ... the court shall revoke the period of intensive probation and impose a term of imprisonment as authorized by law.” (Emphasis supplied). Nothing in the statute provides that the mere filing of a petition to revoke intensive probation alleging commission of a felony freezes the defendant’s probationary status until the court determines if the felony was actually committed.
Merits
¶ 37 Even if we had jurisdiction, which I conclude we do not, I disagree with the majority on its interpretation of § 13-917(B). The key sentence in that statute for this appeal is:
If a petition to revoke the period of intensive probation is filed and the court finds that the person has committed an additional felony offense or has violated a condition of intensive probation which poses a serious threat or danger to the community, the court shall revoke the period of intensive probation and impose a term of imprisonment as authorized by law.
(Emphasis supplied).
¶38 In applying statutes, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative *474intent. Maycock v. Asilomar Dev., Inc., 207 Ariz. 495, 500, ¶ 24, 88 P.3d 565, 570 (App. 2004); State v. Ontiveros, 206 Ariz. 539, 541, ¶ 8, 81 P.3d 330, 332 (App.2003). We look first to the language of the statutes as the best and most reliable indicator of the statute’s meaning. Ontiveros, 206 Ariz. at 541, 118, 81 P.3d at 332. If the statutory language is clear, we do not apply rules of construction. Maycock, 207 Ariz. at 500, ¶24, 88 P.3d at 570. If it is not clear, one of the rules we do apply is to make sure that all the statutory words are given meaning and not are made superfluous or absurd. Pinal Vista Props., L.L.C. v. Turnbull, 208 Ariz. 188, 190, ¶ 10, 91 P.3d 1031, 1033 (App.2004) (citations omitted); In re Maricopa County Super. Ct. No. MH 2001-001139, 203 Ariz. 351, 354, ¶ 17, 54 P.3d 380, 383 (App.2002).
¶ 39 The majority contends that the only way the two subsections of § 13-917 can be harmonized so as to make the statute meaningful is that once a petition to revoke probation is filed alleging a felony offense, the trial court must incarcerate the defendant under subsection (B) if it later finds he committed the felony, while at all other times the trial court has discretion under subsection (A) to modify the terms of probation, including removing the defendant from intensive probation. Supra, ¶¶ 16, 19-22.
¶ 40 The problem I have with the majority’s conclusion is that it makes superfluous the third reference to “intensive” probation in the above-quoted sentence in § 13-917(B). The legislature clearly indicated that if the defendant is on intensive probation at the time the petition to revoke is filed and is still on intensive probation when the trial court finds that he has violated his probation by committing a felony, then “the court shall revoke the period of intensive probation and impose a term of imprisonment____” (Emphasis supplied). The third use of the term “intensive” means that incarceration is required only if a defendant is still on intensive probation at the time the court finds he committed a felony; a court cannot revoke an intensive probation which no longer exists. Under the majority’s approach, the sentence would have to be reworded to permit the court to imprison the defendant even if he is not on intensive probation when the court finds that a felony was committed. The statute would then read,
If a petition to revoke the period of intensive probation is filed and the court finds that the person has committed an additional felony offense or has violated a condition of intensive probation which poses a serious threat or danger to the community, the court shall revoke the period of intensive probation and impose a term of imprisonment as authorized by law.
¶ 41 Nor do I think my conclusion misstates the legislative intent. Our basic source for determining such intent is the language of the statute itself. The majority contends that the legislative intent, based on the language of § 13-917(B) is that if the probationer commits a felony while on intensive probation, then he must be incarcerated. Supra, ¶ 16. That, however, is not quite what the statute says. It provides that such incarceration is required only if and when the court finds that he committed the felony. If for whatever reason the defendant is no longer on intensive probation at the time of that finding, incarceration is not required by the language of the statute. If the legislature intended to require such incarceration regardless of whether the defendant is still on intensive probation, it would have deleted the last use of the term “intensive” as in the theoretical sentence quoted above. The current wording of the statute does not reflect a legislative intent that incarceration is required even if the defendant has been removed from intensive probation after the petition to revoke was filed.
¶ 42 My reading of the statute, finding legislative intent through the words of the legislature, does no violence to the rest of § 13-917. The sentences immediately before and after the key sentence of § 13-917(B) address offenses and other probation violations that are not specifically described as constituting felonies or serious threats or dangers to the community. For less serious probation violations or in situations in which the defendant is no longer on intensive probation, the trial court possesses discretion to revoke probation and/or to incarcerate the defendant. The only exception is when the *475defendant is still on intensive probation at the time he is found guilty of the new felony- — then the court must incarcerate him. This construction is consistent with § 13-917(A), which gives the trial court discretion to reduce probation at any time.
¶43 The majority also contends that its interpretation is consistent with the idea that a specific statute controls over the more general so that the more specific statute (requiring incarceration if a felony is committed while on intensive probation) controls over the rest of § 13-917 (permitting but not requiring incarceration for other probation violations). I agree with the majority’s premise, but not its conclusion. The language of the more specific portions of the statute merely provides that if the court finds that the felony was committed while the defendant was on intensive probation, then the court must revoke intensive probation and incarcerate him. The more specific provision applies only when the defendant is still on ^intensive probation when the court finds that he committed the felony during that same type of probation.
¶ 44 Botkin was placed on intensive probation for a term of seven years. While on intensive probation in 2004, Botkin committed a class six felony offense pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3406(A)(7), (B)(2). A petition to revoke Botkin’s intensive probation was filed a week later. While the petition was pending, the court removed Botkin from intensive probation. Under these circumstances, the legislature did not require the superior court to revoke an intensive probation which no longer existed and incarcerate him upon finding he violated the terms of his previous intensive probation. The court had the discretion to revoke probation and incarcerate Botkin, but did not do so. That was well within the trial court’s discretion.
¶45 Based on the above, I would affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision not to incarcerate Botkin but to continue him on standard probation.