Court Opinion

ID: 9626134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:03:19.052271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:21.909998
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully but would go back beyond Williams2 and Stephens3 for the foundation of the requirement that the trial court instruct the jury even absent a request. Williams and Stephens established the procedure which the State must follow when it wishes to introduce evidence of similar transactions. Adherence to the curbing requirements is mandated by these cases to assure that the impact of the influential evidence is limited to a legitimate purpose and use.
The reason for the carefully constructed procedure was expressed much earlier, as pointed out with reference to prior authority in Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 262 (71 SE2d 615) (1952). The Supreme Court stated succinctly in Bacon: “It is a fundamental principle in our system of jurisprudence, intended to protect the individual who is charged with crime, and to insure him of a fair and impartial trial before an unbiased jury, that the general character of the defendant and his conduct in other transactions is irrelevant unless the defendant chooses to put his character in issue.” Id. To this end, the general rule of exclusion tolerates only a limited, circumscribed exception, and without the circumscription of a proper jury charge, the “fundamental principle” is lost altogether.
Since the burden is on the State to prove the exception, through the proper means of a hearing pursuant to USCR 31.3 (B) and the strictures of Williams and Stephens, it bears a responsibility to ensure that the jury is properly instructed lest the fundamental principle is offended. Otherwise it runs the risk of reversal, as the omission of such a charge constitutes “a substantial error . . . which [is] harmful as a matter of law regardless of whether objection [is] made ... or not.” OCGA § 5-5-24 (c). Moore v. State, 202 Ga. App. 476, 481-482 (3) (414 SE2d 705) (1992). This point in Moore was overlooked in Bell v. State, 219 Ga. App. 553, 554 (2) (466 SE2d 68) (1995), and the precedent of Moore was not considered at all in Sloan v. State, 214 Ga. App. 784, 785-786 (2) (449 SE2d 328) (1994).
In considering whether it is incumbent on defendant to request a limiting charge, the requirement of such a charge is an implicit step in the procedure for introduction of such evidence when the State successfully negotiates the USCR 31.3 (B) hearing. The charge is *430part and parcel of the procedural due process which must be accorded to a defendant when such evidence is presented to a jury.

 Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642 (2) (409 SE2d 649) (1991).

 Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467 (405 SE2d 483) (1991).