Court Opinion

ID: 9767606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:22:37.000605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.045276
License: Public Domain

BARROW, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree that the trial court properly refused to submit an issue on unavoidable accident. This defense was affirmatively pleaded by appellant, and timely requested by proper issue and definition.
I am fully aware of the rule that if the evidence does not raise the issue that something other than the negligence of one of the parties caused the injuries, then it does not raise the issue of unavoidable accident. See Mason v. Ratcliff, 437 S.W. *9162d 320 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1969, no writ); Miles-Sierra Co. v. Castillo, 398 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1966, writ ref’d n. r. e.). However, it has been uniformly held that a jury issue is raised as to unavoidable accident if the evidence shows rain, wet pavement, or some other specific circumstance or cause other than the negligence of one of the parties. See Blanton v. E & L Transport Co., 146 Tex. 377, 207 S.W.2d 368 (1948); Collins v. Smith, 142 Tex. 36, 175 S.W.2d 407 (1943); Vergauwen v. Parsons, 294 S.W.2d 863 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1956, no writ); Kuykendall v. Doose, 260 S.W.2d 435 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1953, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Blasberg v. Cockerell, 254 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1952, no writ); Hodges, Special Issue Submission in Texas, § 21. It is seen that in the landmark case, Dallas Railway & Terminal Co. v. Bailey, 151 Tex. 359, 250 S.W.2d 379 (1952), the Court held that the trial court’s definition of unavoidable accident properly defined same as “an event which happens without having been proximately caused by the negligence of any party to it.” There was no holding that the weather elements there presented had not raised the issue.
In examining the record to determine whether there is evidence sufficient to raise such issue, we are required to examine same under the “no evidence” test. That is, we must consider only the evidence and the inferences tending to support the finding and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.Sup.1950). Furthermore, it is well settled that in determining whether or not an issue of unavoidable accident was raised by the evidence, we cannot look to the answers of the jury to other issues. C. & R. Transport, Inc. v. Campbell, 406 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.Sup. 1966); Blanton v. E & L Transport Co., supra; Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Kincaid, 19 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1929, writ ref’d).
Here the accident occurred during a heavy rainstorm which had resulted in water over a foot deep running across the pavement. Appellee was familiar with the area and knew, from such familiarity, that water ran over the street during such occasions. From previous experience, he knew that he must slow to cross such water. He slowed for same and was struck by appellant’s automobile crossing said low water. There is no evidence that appellant was aware of this flooding water on the wet pavement.
The majority’s holding is apparently based on the proposition that unavoidable accident was not raised because there was no testimony by appellant and therefore there is no evidence as to what happened to his car. It is true that appellant did not testify, nor was any explanation shown for such failure, although the record does show that he resided in Volusia County, Florida. I do not understand that unavoidable accident is conditioned upon testimony from the defendant or even from an occupant of his car. Here the only testimony in the record came from appellee, an interested witness. Such evidence, even though uncontradicted, presents an issue of fact to be determined by the trier of facts. James T. Taylor & Son, Inc. v. Arlington Ind. School Dist., 160 Tex. 617, 335 S.W. 2d 371, 377 (1960). It is true, as pointed out by the majority opinion, that both negligence and proximate cause may be inferred from the circumstances. However, the same rule recognizes that the trier of facts may find that such circumstances do not show negligence or causation.
It is my opinion that an application of the foregoing rules to the record before us establishes that there is evidence more than a scintilla that the collision sued on herein was the result of an unavoidable accident. I cannot agree that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit this defensive issue which was properly pleaded and timely requested. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.