Court Opinion

ID: 9568566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:05:15.914531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:53.933895
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 220653-U
                                                                                FIRST DISTRICT,
                                                                                FIRST DIVISION
                                                                                August 21, 2023

                        Nos. 1-22-0653, 1-22-0654, 1-22-0655, 1-22-0656 (cons.)

     NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
     limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
     _____________________________________________________________________________

                                         IN THE
                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
     _____________________________________________________________________________

      IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF           )     Appeal from the
      THE COUNTY TREASURER AND EX-OFFICIO           )     Circuit Court of
      COUNTY COLLECTOR OF COOK COUNTY,              )     Cook County, Illinois.
      ILLINOIS FOR ORDER OF JUDGMENT AND            )
      SALE, ET AL                                   )     Nos. 2018COTD004235,
                                                    )     2018COTD004236,
      (Village of Maywood,                          )     2018COTD004237, &
                              Petitioner-Appellant, )     2018COTD004238
      v.                                            )
                                                    )     Honorable
      LLC 1 07CH12487,                              )     Paul Karkula,
                              Respondent-Appellee). )     Judge Presiding.
     _____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Lavin and Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment.

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: (1) Failure to obtain leave of court to file amended tax deed petition did not deprive
                  circuit court of jurisdiction to adjudicate said petition. (2) Tax deed petitioner’s
                  failure to obtain leave of court to extend the period of redemption after filing a tax
                  deed petition did not render subsequently issued tax deeds void.

¶2          LLC 1 07CH12487 (“respondent”) filed a section 2-1401 petition to void tax deeds

     issued to the Village of Maywood (“Village”) regarding properties to which respondent held
     Nos. 1-22-0653, 1-22-0654, 1-22-0655, 1-22-0656 (cons.)

     legal title. Respondent alleged the tax deeds were void because the Village failed to obtain leave

     of court to file an amended tax deed petition and to extend the period of redemption. The circuit

     court granted summary judgment to respondent. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

¶3                                                BACKGROUND

¶4             The subject property, located at 415 Roosevelt Road in Maywood, Illinois (“property”)1,

     is commercial property with a “vacant and abandoned” structure and a paved lot. Due to

     nonpayment of taxes for 2011, the property was offered for sale at the 2013 Cook County annual

     tax sale, but it was not sold and was forfeited to the State of Illinois. Cook County purchased the

     delinquent taxes and was issued a tax certificate which it assigned to the Village on February 27,

     2018.

¶5             The original period of redemption was set to expire on June 12, 2018. Prior to filing any

     petition for tax deed, the Village extended the period of redemption twice: once on May 1, 2018,

     to June 12, 2018, and again on May 30, 2018, to December 12, 2018. On July 13, 2018, the

     Village filed its initial petition for tax deed, alleging that it was “entitled to the issuance of a tax

     deed if [the property] is not redeemed *** within the time allowed by law.”

¶6             Pursuant to section 22-10 of the Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS 200/22-10 (West

     2016)),

               “[a] purchaser or assignee shall not be entitled to a tax deed *** unless, not less than 3

               months nor more than 6 months prior to the expiration of the period of redemption, he or

               she gives notice of the sale and the date of the expiration of the period of redemption to

               the owners, occupants, and parties interested in the property.”

               1
               This appeal was consolidated with three other appeals filed by the Village, each concerning a
     different parcel of real property that was subject to the tax sale and tax certificate of purchase issued to
     the Village. The legal issues are identical in each case. For purposes of clarity, we shall refer only to the
     property that is the subject of the initial appeal.
                                                           -2-
     Nos. 1-22-0653, 1-22-0654, 1-22-0655, 1-22-0656 (cons.)

     Since the property’s redemption date was December 12, 2018, the statutory period for providing

     section 22-10 notices ran from June 12 to September 12, 2018. On August 8, 2018, the Village

     delivered the requisite notices to the clerk of the circuit court to be sent by certified mail to the

     relevant parties. On September 24, 2018, the Clerk’s Office sent the Village an email advising

     that the notices had not been “mailed out by the Clerk’s Office in a timely manner.” It is

     undisputed that the Clerk’s office mailed the notices on September 18, 2018, six days after the

     statutory period ended.

¶7           On October 2, 2018, despite the fact that the original petition for tax deed had been filed

     on July 13, 2018, the Village unilaterally extended the redemption date to March 12, 2019

     without leave of court. On November 19, 2018, the Village unilaterally extended the redemption

     date again to March 30, 2019. On November 30, 2018, the Village filed a pleading styled

     “Amended Petition for Tax Deed” stating that it would be entitled to the issuance of a tax deed if

     the property was not redeemed by the extended redemption date of March 30, 2019. It is

     undisputed that the Village did not request or obtain leave of court to file an amended petition.

     The Village additionally directed that statutory notices be sent to all interested parties reflecting

     the extended period of redemption and the filing date of the amended petition.

¶8           The property was not redeemed by March 30, 2019. Following a hearing, on August 26,

     2019, the circuit court issued an order directing the issuance of a tax deed to the Village for the

     property. The Cook County Clerk issued a tax deed to the Village on the same day.

¶9           On November 18, 2019, respondent filed the petition which is the subject of the instant

     appeal, styled as a “Petition to Void Order Directing Issuance of Tax Deed” under section 2-

     1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)). Respondent raised two

     contentions of error: First, the Village failed to obtain leave of court to file its Amended Petition

                                                       -3-
       Nos. 1-22-0653, 1-22-0654, 1-22-0655, 1-22-0656 (cons.)

       for Tax Deed. Citing In re Estate of Zander, 242 Ill. App. 3d 774, 776 (1993), respondent argued

       that “[a]mendments filed without leave of court are said to be a nullity which should be

       stricken.” According to respondent, the amended petition was “a nullity,” there was no valid

       petition pending, and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to issue a tax deed.

¶ 10          Respondent also argued that the Village had failed to obtain leave of court to extend the

       period of redemption, in violation of section 21-385 of the Code. 35 ILCS 200/21-385 (West

       2018). Finally, respondent argued that the section 22-10 notices sent out in connection with the

       Village’s Amended Petition for Tax Deed (which reference the extended period of redemption)

       were “invalid[].”

¶ 11          The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On April 13, 2022, the trial court

       granted summary judgment to respondent, stating:

              “It appears to me that the Village of Maywood just kind of unilaterally decided to change

              the whole procedure here, and you can’t do that. If I allow you to continue to do that back

              and forth, back and forth, it wouldn’t make any sense because people are left in the dark.

              Without leave of Court and proper procedure everyone has to do on my call. I will grant

              LLC1’s petition and—rather their motion, and that’s that basically.”

       Subsequently, on May 6, 2022, the trial court entered an order finding that the August 26, 2019

       order for tax deed and the subsequent tax deed granted to the Village were void.

¶ 12                                               ANALYSIS

¶ 13          We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo (Williams v. Manchester,

       228 Ill. 2d 404, 417 (2008)), keeping in mind that summary judgment is appropriate where “there

       is no genuine issue as to any material fact and *** the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

                                                        -4-
       Nos. 1-22-0653, 1-22-0654, 1-22-0655, 1-22-0656 (cons.)

       matter of law” (735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 2018)) and construing the record strictly against the

       movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party.

¶ 14          Normally, the grounds for section 2-1401 relief in tax deed proceedings are limited to

       those enumerated in section 22-45 of the Code, namely, proof that (1) the taxes were paid prior

       to sale, (2) the property was exempt from taxation, (3) the tax deed was procured through the tax

       purchaser’s fraud or deception, or (4) the owner “was not named as a party in the publication

       notice as set forth in Section 22-20, and *** the tax purchaser or his or her assignee did not make

       a diligent inquiry and effort to serve that person or party with the notices required by Sections

       22-10 through 22-30.” 35 ILCS 200/22-45 (West 2018). Respondent does not allege that any of

       these grounds for relief exist. Rather, respondent relies on the language of section 2-1401 stating

       that “[n]othing contained in this Section affects any existing right to relief from a void order or

       judgment, or to employ any existing method to procure that relief.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West

       2018). See also Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 103 (2002) (“[a]

       judgment, order or decree entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties or of the

       subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved,

       is void, and may be attacked at any time or in any court” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶ 15                                     The Village’s Amended Petition

¶ 16          Respondent argues that the circuit court’s tax deed order is void because the Village’s

       amended petition, filed without leave of court, was “a nullity” and, without a valid petition

       pending, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to issue a tax deed. Illinois law does not support this

       proposition. On the contrary, “[t]he idea that the filing of an amended [pleading] was a void act

       ***, was a nullity, and constituted error that was ‘jurisdictional’ has been rejected by this court.”

       Fischer v. Senior Living Properties, L.L.C., 329 Ill. App. 3d 551, 555 (2002).

                                                        -5-
       Nos. 1-22-0653, 1-22-0654, 1-22-0655, 1-22-0656 (cons.)

¶ 17           In Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 353-55 (1998), our supreme

       court found that a party’s failure to gain leave to amend its complaint to add a prayer for

       prejudgment interest did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction to award such interest. The

       Ragan court reasoned that interpreting the failure to obtain leave to amend as a jurisdictional

       defect would frustrate the liberal pleading provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure aimed at

       doing justice between the parties despite technical defects in the pleadings. Id. at 354; see also

       VC & M, Ltd. v. Andrews, 2013 IL 114445, ¶ 22 (reaffirming Ragan).

¶ 18           Respondent argues that Ragan’s jurisdictional analysis is mere dicta because the court

       did not rely solely upon that analysis, but also found that the defendant waived its jurisdictional

       argument by failing to raise it in the trial court. Id. at 355. However, it is well established that

       “an expression of opinion upon a point in a case argued by counsel and deliberately passed upon

       by the court, though not essential to the disposition of the cause,” is a judicial dictum that is

       “entitled to much weight.” Exelon Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 234 Ill. 2d 266, 277-78 (2009); see

       also Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 237 (2010) (“Our opinion on this

       matter can hardly be considered an ‘aside’ and, if a dictum, is a judicial dictum. Accordingly, it is

       entitled to much weight and should be followed unless found to be erroneous”). Similarly, the

       Ragan court’s detailed analysis of the jurisdictional issue can hardly be considered an “aside”

       and is entitled to much weight. Subsequent appellate court cases have followed Ragan in holding

       that failure to obtain leave to amend a pleading does not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction

       over the controversy. See, e.g., Fischer, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 555; Johnson v. Ingalls Memorial

       Hospital, 402 Ill. App. 3d 830, 841 (2010).

¶ 19           In support of its argument that the Village’s amended filing was “a nullity,” respondent

       relies primarily on the 1993 case of Zander, in which Zander’s estate appealed the trial court’s

                                                         -6-
       Nos. 1-22-0653, 1-22-0654, 1-22-0655, 1-22-0656 (cons.)

       ruling in favor of the Department of Public Aid, arguing that “the amended claim, on which the

       trial court granted judgment, was a nullity, since the Department failed to seek leave of court to

       file it.” Zander, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 776. In this context, the Zander court stated: “Amendments

       filed without leave of court are said to be a nullity which should be stricken.” Id. However, the

       court did not find the amendment to be a nullity but held that the estate waived any such claim

       by failing to raise it in the trial court. Id. at 777. Citing section 2-616 of the Code of Civil

       Procedure, which provides that “[a]t any time before final judgment amendments may be

       allowed on just and reasonable terms” (735 ILCS 5/2-616 (West 2018)), the court explained that

       “[t]he provisions of section 2-616 *** requiring leave of court are directory, not mandatory, and

       accordingly may be waived by the parties. An adverse party is not harmed by a failure to obtain

       leave if there is no element of surprise or prejudice because of that failure.” Zander, 242 Ill. App.

       3d at 777. Thus, Zander does not support the proposition that an amended petition filed without

       leave of court is a nullity. Moreover, any such holding would be overruled by our supreme

       court’s decision in Ragan.

¶ 20           Although we do not condone the Village’s failure to obtain leave of court before

       amending its petition, it is well established that “[a]n order is rendered void not by error or

       impropriety but by lack of jurisdiction by the issuing court.” Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee

       Construction, 96 Ill. 2d 159, 165 (1983). As our supreme court has explained, “a tax-sale

       proceeding is in rem and the court acquires jurisdiction over the land when the county collector

       makes his application for judgment and order for sale.” Id. Once acquired, the court retains

       jurisdiction to issue all necessary orders to effectuate the tax sale and to issue tax deeds. Id.

       Since, as discussed, the Village’s failure to obtain leave to file its amended petition did not

                                                         -7-
       Nos. 1-22-0653, 1-22-0654, 1-22-0655, 1-22-0656 (cons.)

       render its petition “a nullity,” the circuit court retained jurisdiction to hear the amended petition

       and issue tax deeds for the subject property.

¶ 21                                   Extending the Period of Redemption

¶ 22          In the trial court, respondent raised a second ground for voiding the Village’s tax deed

       order, namely, that after filing its petition for tax deed, the Village extended the period of

       redemption without first obtaining leave of court. Section 21-385 of the Code, which governs

       extensions to the period of redemption, provides:

                      “The purchaser or his or her assignee of property sold for nonpayment of general

              taxes or special assessments may extend the period of redemption at any time before the

              expiration of the original period of redemption, or thereafter prior to the expiration of any

              extended period of redemption, for a period which will expire not later than 3 years from

              the date of sale[.] *** If prior to the expiration of the period of redemption or extended

              period of redemption a petition for tax deed has been filed under Section 22-30, upon

              application of the petitioner, the court shall allow the purchaser or his or her assignee to

              extend the period of redemption after expiration of the original period or any extended

              period of redemption, provided that any extension allowed will expire not later than 3

              years from the date of sale.” 35 ILCS 200/21-385 (West 2018).

¶ 23          Here, after filing its petition for tax deed, the Village unilaterally extended the period of

       redemption on two occasions without making an application to the court. The trial court clearly

       considered this to be in contravention of section 21-385, stating that the Village “just kind of

       unilaterally decided to change the whole procedure here” and, as a result, “people are left in the

       dark.” The court’s statements are consistent with the language of the statute, which provides that

                                                        -8-
       Nos. 1-22-0653, 1-22-0654, 1-22-0655, 1-22-0656 (cons.)

       “[i]f *** a petition for tax deed has been filed,” an extension of the period of redemption shall be

       granted by the court “upon application of the petitioner.” Id.

¶ 24          However, assuming arguendo that the Village violated section 21-385, this procedural

       impropriety does not render the tax deed order void. See Vulcan, 96 Ill. 2d at 165 (“An order is

       rendered void not by error or impropriety but by lack of jurisdiction by the issuing court”). As

       discussed, the court in a tax sale proceeding acquires in rem jurisdiction over the land when the

       county collector makes his application for judgment and order for sale, and thenceforth retains

       jurisdiction to issue all necessary orders to effectuate the tax sale and to issue tax deeds. Id. At

       most, the Village’s procedural impropriety would render the trial court’s order voidable, but not

       void, as would be necessary for respondent to obtain relief under section 2-1401. See 735 ILCS

       5/2-1401(f) (West 2018) (“[n]othing contained in this Section affects any existing right to relief

       from a void order or judgment” (emphasis added)).

¶ 25                                                   Notice

¶ 26          As an alternative ground for affirming the trial court’s judgment, respondent argues, for

       the first time on appeal, that the amended petition and the resulting tax deed are void because the

       Village did not notify respondent of the filing of the amended petition. Citing In re Custody of

       Ayala, 344 Ill. App. 3d 574, 586 (2003), respondent argues that “due process of law requires that

       a party be accorded procedural fairness, i.e. given notice and an opportunity to be heard.

       [Citation.] Parties who have properly appeared in an action are entitled to notice of any

       impending motions or hearings.”

¶ 27          Although the Village did not notify respondent of the filing of the amended petition, the

       record reflects that it subsequently sent respondent statutory notices advising that “THIS

       PROPERTY HAS BEEN SOLD FOR DELINQUENT TAXES,” that the period of redemption

                                                         -9-
       Nos. 1-22-0653, 1-22-0654, 1-22-0655, 1-22-0656 (cons.)

       would expire on March 30, 2019, and that a petition had been filed for a tax deed which would

       transfer title and right to possession of the property if redemption was not made by March 30,

       2019. Respondent was further advised that redemption could be made at any time prior to March

       30, 2019 by applying to the County Clerk of Cook County and that the matter was set for hearing

       on April 5, 2019. Thus, respondent was advised of the impending loss of its property if not

       redeemed within the period of redemption and given an opportunity to appear and be heard at the

       April 5 hearing.

¶ 28           More importantly, respondent provides no support for its assertion that, in a tax deed

       proceeding, a tax purchaser’s failure to notify a property owner of the filing of an amended

       petition renders the trial court without jurisdiction to issue a tax deed. Ayala, 344 Ill. App. 3d

       574, which involves a custody dispute, is inapposite. Pursuant to Vulcan, 96 Ill. 2d at 165, the

       trial court retained jurisdiction to issue the tax deed notwithstanding the Village’s alleged

       procedural impropriety.

¶ 29           Respondent finally argues that the Village’s statutory notices were inadequate because

       they referenced only the filing date of the amended petition and not the filing date of the original

       petition. Respondent cites no authority for the proposition that the Village was required to

       reference the filing date of its original petition in its notices and has therefore forfeited this

       contention. See Gakuba v. Kurtz, 2015 IL App (2d) 140252, ¶ 19 (appellant forfeited issue by

       failing to cite legal authority).

¶ 30                                              CONCLUSION

¶ 31           For the foregoing reasons, we find that the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter the

       orders directing issuance of tax deeds to the Village. We reverse the judgment of the circuit court

       granting summary judgment in favor of respondent on grounds that the tax deeds issued to the

                                                         -10-
       Nos. 1-22-0653, 1-22-0654, 1-22-0655, 1-22-0656 (cons.)

       Village were void. This matter is remanded to the circuit court for the entry of orders consistent

       with this decision.

¶ 32          Reversed and remanded.

                                                      -11-