Court Opinion

ID: 9955787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 15:01:00.590599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:21.633209
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
         FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 17, 2023             Decided March 29, 2024

                       No. 22-3058

               UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                       APPELLEE

                             v.

                 JOEY GREEN-REMACHE,
               ALSO KNOWN AS JOEY GREEN,
                      APPELLANT

        Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the District of Columbia
                   (No. 1:20-cr-00124-1)

    Stephen C. Leckar, appointed by the court, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

     Anne Y. Park, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause
for appellee. With her on the brief were Matthew M. Graves,
United States Attorney, Chrisellen R. Kolb, Elizabeth H.
Danello, Kimberly L. Paschall, Ryan H. Creighton, and Emory
V. Cole, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

   Before: HENDERSON and CHILDS, Circuit Judges, and
EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.
                              2
   Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
EDWARDS.

     EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: On August 2, 2021,
following a jury trial, Appellant, Joey Green-Remache, was
convicted on a charge of interstate violation of a protective
order in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(2). The jury hung on
two other charges against Appellant: first-degree burglary and
kidnapping. On November 8, 2021, after Appellant entered a
guilty plea to the charge of first-degree burglary, the
Government agreed to dismiss the kidnapping charge.
Following sentencing by the District Court, Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal.

     The charges against Appellant are predicated on the
Government’s claim that he “[broke] into his on-again and off-
again girlfriend’s apartment and forcibly [took] her from D.C.
to Maryland, in violation of a civil protective order.”
Appellant’s Brief (“Br.”) 3. At trial, “[t]he Government
presented a Clinical Psychologist who testified without
objection as an expert witness. [The Psychologist] described
[to the jury] the characteristics of so-called coercive control
relationships between sexual partners.” Id. And, according to
Appellant, “Defense counsel [was aware] before trial that [the
Psychologist] knew nothing about this case, had never met or
interviewed the victim—who at trial recanted almost all her
prior statements—her family members, or any witnesses, nor
examined any underlying records.” Id. Appellant argues that
the jury was likely heavily influenced by the Psychologist’s
“opinion testimony,” which improperly relied on profiling
unconnected to the circumstances of this case. Id. Thus,
according to Appellant, this case should be remanded to
determine whether counsel’s failure to object to the
Psychologist’s testimony was ineffective assistance that
prejudiced Appellant. Id.
                               3

   We deny Appellant’s request for a remand of the case. As
we explain below, the record decisively shows that Appellant
was not prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged errors. As a result,
we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

                      I.      BACKGROUND

A. Facts

     The charges against Appellant and his ultimate conviction
emanated from events that occurred on April 12, 2020. The
Government alleges that on that day, Appellant abducted his
sometimes girlfriend, B.P., forced her across state lines in
violation of an existing Civil Protection Order, and raped her.

     Before a grand jury, B.P. testified that, on April 12, 2020,
Appellant forced his way into her Washington, D.C., apartment
and then proceeded to grab, choke, and punch her. She further
testified that Appellant then forcibly took her from the
apartment, threatened her to get into a car with him, and drove
her to Maryland. B.P. told the grand jury that, while in
Maryland, Appellant raped her. B.P. also provided a
substantially similar account of events to a 911 responder, law
enforcement officers, and the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner
(“SANE”) who examined B.P. the day after the alleged rape.

     In the months following her grand jury testimony and
interviews with law enforcement, B.P. grew reluctant to testify
at Appellant’s trial. At the trial, the Government subpoenaed
B.P. and noted during its questioning that B.P. had attempted
to avoid receiving the subpoena for some time. On the stand,
B.P. recanted most of her grand jury testimony as well as her
911 call and her statements to law enforcement officers and the
SANE. B.P. testified that she voluntarily left her apartment
                               4
with Appellant, that Appellant did not hit, grab, or threaten her
while in her apartment or when leaving, and that Appellant did
not rape her. She explained that she had lied during her grand
jury testimony and to law enforcement and the SANE because
she had been angry at Appellant at the time.

     The Government presented a broad swath of evidence to
impeach B.P.’s trial testimony and support its theory that
Appellant pushed his way into B.P.’s apartment, choked and
punched B.P., and forced B.P. to leave her apartment. The
Government introduced B.P.’s grand jury testimony and played
her 911 call and interviews with law enforcement officers for
the jury. In her grand jury testimony and the recordings, B.P.
states that Appellant forcibly dragged her from her apartment,
drove her to Maryland, and raped her. The Government
additionally presented the testimony of the SANE, who saw
visible signs of assault on B.P.’s body, including abrasions,
lacerations, and bruising on her neck, throat, upper chest, and
back. At trial, the Government also played recordings of
several phone calls between B.P. and Appellant which took
place while Appellant was incarcerated at the D.C. Jail,
including one in which Appellant stated his intention to
apologize to B.P. and B.P. accepted his apology.

    Additionally, the Government called two eyewitnesses.
These eyewitnesses were B.P.’s neighbor and her roommate.
B.P.’s neighbor told the jury that she saw Appellant push B.P.’s
door open and immediately start yelling at B.P. B.P.’s
roommate testified that Appellant pushed his way into the
apartment, yelled at and punched B.P., and then grabbed B.P.
around the waist as he forced B.P. out the door.

    As further support for its case, the Government called a
Clinical Psychologist, Dr. Chitra Raghavan, as an expert
witness. Dr. Raghavan stated that her testimony was limited to
                                 5
the theory, research, and frameworks used to understand
domestic violence. She made it clear that her testimony did not
reach “any particular behaviors” of Appellant or B.P. and that
she was not attempting to diagnose either. Her testimony
discussed “coercive control,” a term psychologists use to
describe abuse dynamics, as well as common tactics used by
abusers, including physical and sexual violence.

     Dr. Raghavan’s testimony also covered the circumstances
in which a domestic violence victim reports a crime by their
abuser. She stated that, at first, a victim may feel relief, and that
this is typically “followed by guilt, fear and shame of various
different kinds.” Dr. Raghavan stated that victims may
subsequently try to get the charges against the abuser dropped,
that they may recant their prior statements, lie, testify on behalf
of the abuser, or refuse to testify at all. Dr. Raghavan also
discussed a study regarding calls made by incarcerated abusers
to their victims. Dr. Raghavan told the jury that, according to
this study, incarcerated abusers attempted to manipulate their
victims into lying, recanting, or trying to get the charges
dropped with three common tactics: by creating a sense of guilt
in their victim; by emphasizing how much they love their
victim; and by threatening their victim.

B. Procedural History

     On November 3, 2020, Appellant was indicted on charges
of kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), interstate violation of a
protection order causing travel of victim, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2262(a)(2), and first-degree burglary, 22 D.C.C. § 801(a).
Several months later, Appellant was tried by a jury in the
District Court. The jury convicted Appellant of interstate
violation of a protection order and hung on the kidnapping and
burglary counts. To be guilty of interstate violation of a
protection order, a defendant must “cause[] another person to
                                6
travel in interstate or foreign commerce . . . by force, coercion,
duress, or fraud” in violation of a protection order. 18 U.S.C. §
2262(a)(2).

    Appellant subsequently pled guilty to the burglary charge.
In exchange for his guilty plea, the Government agreed to
dismiss the kidnapping charge. Appellant retained the right to
appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Appellant was sentenced to consecutive terms of 51
months of imprisonment on the interstate violation charge and
60 months of imprisonment on the burglary charge. Appellant
was also sentenced to concurrent terms of 36 months of
supervised release on the interstate violation charge and 60
months of supervised release on the burglary charge. In total,
Appellant was sentenced to 111 months of imprisonment and
60 months of supervised release. Appellant now appeals his
sentence, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.

                         II.     ANALYSIS

     A defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel
must demonstrate two things: “(1) that counsel’s performance
was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense.” In re Sealed Case, 901 F.3d 397, 404 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (quotation omitted). On the first prong, the defendant
must show that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). With regard to the second prong, a “defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. at 694.
                                7
      We typically remand “colorable and previously
unexplored claim[s] of ineffective assistance” for an
evidentiary hearing, including those raised, for the first time,
on appeal. United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 908-09 (D.C.
Cir. 2003). The rationale for this practice lies in “the fact-
intensive nature of the Strickland inquiry and the likelihood,
when a defendant asserts his sixth amendment claim for the
first time on direct appeal, that the relevant facts will not be
part of the trial record.” Id. at 909; see also Massaro v. United
States, 538 U.S. 500, 504-05 (2003) (“When an ineffective-
assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel
and the court must proceed on a trial record not developed
precisely for the object of litigating or preserving the claim and
thus often incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.”).

     However, this court does not remand every ineffective
assistance of counsel claim that is initially raised on appeal. See
United States v. Sitzmann, 893 F.3d 811, 831 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(“[T]his Court has ‘never held that any claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, no matter how conclusory or meritless,
automatically entitles a party to an evidentiary remand.’”)
(quoting United States v. McGill, 815 F.3d 846, 945 (D.C. Cir.
2016)). Rather, “we decline to remand when the record
‘conclusively shows’ the defendant is not entitled to relief.”
United States v. Marshall, 946 F.3d 591, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(quoting Rashad, 331 F.3d at 910).

     There are three categories of cases with respect to which a
remand is inappropriate. First, remand is not required in cases
involving “claims that are vague, conclusory, or insubstantial.”
Id. at 596. Second, we do not remand “when the record
conclusively shows the defendant was not prejudiced,
[because] no factual development could render the claim
meritorious.” Id. Finally, we do not remand in situations “when
the record conclusively shows counsel did not err by falling
                                8
below an objective standard of reasonableness, [because] there
is no deficient performance to form the basis of a Sixth
Amendment violation under Strickland.” Id.

    In this case, Appellant was convicted by the jury only of
interstate violation of a protection order, and it is with respect
to this conviction that he focuses his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. See Appellant Br. at 29. Accordingly, our
analysis is limited to whether trial counsel’s performance was
constitutionally deficient and prejudicial to Appellant on this
charge.

    Given the record in this case, Appellant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim must fail because he cannot show
that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged errors. The
Government introduced ample evidence to support its theory
that Appellant caused B.P. to travel with him to Maryland by
“force, coercion, duress, or fraud,” See 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(2),
quite apart from Dr. Raghavan’s testimony. This evidence
included B.P.’s own grand jury testimony in which she testified
that Appellant forcibly removed her from her apartment; two
recorded interviews of B.P. by law enforcement officers, in
which B.P. states that Appellant choked and beat her and forced
her to leave her apartment; a recording of B.P.’s 911 call, in
which she again states that Appellant beat her and forced her to
leave her apartment; testimony from the SANE who examined
B.P. and saw clear signs of assault on B.P.’s body, including
abrasions, lacerations, and bruises; and testimony from two
eyewitnesses who saw Appellant push his way into the
apartment and start yelling at B.P., as well as further testimony
from one of the eyewitnesses who saw Appellant punch B.P.
and drag her out of her apartment.

   This “overwhelming” evidence against Appellant
undercuts any claim that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the
                               9
outcome of the trial would have been different. See United
States v. Brodie, 524 F.3d 259, 273 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United
States v. Smoot, 918 F.3d 163, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding no
prejudice where the evidence against the defendant was
“overwhelming”). In such circumstances, our precedent
requires us to decline Appellant’s request for a remand on his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See United States v.
Grey, 891 F.3d 1054, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (no remand based
on counsel’s failure to object to certain evidence in light of
other “extensive evidence” of defendant’s guilt); United States
v. Udo, 795 F.3d 24, 30-33 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (no remand where
defendant could not show prejudice given the “overwhelming”
evidence of defendant’s guilt).

    As the record conclusively shows, the Government offered
a substantial amount of evidence demonstrating Appellant’s
guilt on the interstate violation charge. This evidence stands
irrespective of the contested expert testimony. Thus, even if we
were to find that counsel erred in failing to object to Dr.
Raghavan’s testimony – a question we do not reach – there is
nothing to indicate that Appellant would have been acquitted
of the charge relating to interstate violation of a protection
order. The evidence against him is simply too great.

    Appellant nevertheless argues that Dr. Raghavan’s
purported expert testimony likely unduly influenced the jury.
The record, however, does not substantiate this. At trial, the
jury only convicted Appellant of interstate violation of a
protection order; the jury hung on the kidnapping and burglary
charges against him. The Government’s theory for these latter
two charges relied significantly on refuting B.P.’s trial
testimony, and, by extension, on Dr. Raghavan’s account of the
behavior patterns of domestic violence victims. By contrast, the
Government’s case in support of conviction on the interstate
violation charge included considerable evidence of Appellant’s
                              10
guilt that was independent of B.P.’s testimony. Thus, on the
two charges with respect to which the Government heavily
relied on Dr. Raghavan’s testimony, the jury failed to convict
Appellant. However, on the sole count on which the jury
convicted Appellant, the Government’s case was well
supported without Dr. Raghavan’s testimony. The jury’s
verdicts indicate that Dr. Raghavan’s testimony, “even if
admitted in error, had no substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Grey, 891 F.3d at
1061 (quotations omitted). The lack of influence of Dr.
Raghavan’s testimony on the jury is consistent with our
conclusion that Appellant was not prejudiced by counsel’s
alleged error.

    Because the only error Appellant alleges concerns the
inclusion of Dr. Raghavan’s testimony, an evidentiary hearing
on Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim would
lend no meaningful support to his case. No further factual
development can surmount the “mountain of evidence” against
Appellant. Udo, 795 F.3d at 32. “[G]iven the extensive
evidence of [Appellant’s] guilt, we think it obvious that
counsel’s errors, if any, were not so serious as to deprive
[Appellant] of a fair trial.” Grey, 891 F.3d at 1062 (quotation
omitted).

                      III.    CONCLUSION

    For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment of
the District Court.