Court Opinion

ID: 9810711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:56:53.079518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:10.063110
License: Public Domain

MerrimoN, J.,
(concurring in the judgment granting a new trial). I concur with my brother Davis, in the conclusion that there must be a new trial, but I cannot concur in what he says in respect to the right of the execution debtor to have homestead.
In my judgment the Court ought to have instructed the jury to inquire particularly whether or not the land in question was worth more than the debt of the execution creditor, and the costs, including the costs of laying off the homestead of the execution debtor, and if they found that it was, then the plaintiff could not recover, because it appeared that the homestead had not been laid off as the law required, and in that case, the sheriff had no sufficient authority to sell the land, and therefore his deed to the plaintiff was void.
It has been oftentimes said, and it is settled by express decision, that the law favors the homestead — will give and help to give it, when the debtor can have it, and this is so although the debt is of the classes of debts as to which the right of the homestead does not prevail, if the debt can be paid without the sale of it. Hence, it was said in Miller v. Miller, 89 N. C., 402, that, “ if the debt that may, if need be, *373prevail against it, can be paid without selling it, this must be done. The classes of debts that prevail against the homestead do not so prevail necessarily and at all events, but they do so only when it is necessary to pay them.”
It is true that the debt must be paid, at all events, if the property is sufficient for that purpose, but the debtor must have the homestead, if the debt can be paid without selling it, and if the debtor cannot have the benefit of the full measure of it, he is entitled to have the same in such measure as the circumstances will allow. Wilson v. Patton, 87 N. C., 318; Albright v. Albright, 88 N. C., 238; Arnold v. Estes, 92 N. C., 162; Miller v. Miller, supra.
If the debt is of the class that prevails against the homestead, because it was contracted anterior to the present Constitution, then, if need be, the creditor must as in other cases, pay the costs of laying off the homestead, but he will be entitled to be reimbursed in this respect out of the proceeds of the sale of the land, and this is so, because it has been held that such creditor is entitled to be reimbursed the costs of collecting his debt.
The fact that the execution debtor in this case may have sold the land to his sons and sons-in-law, in fraud of his creditors, does not deprive him of the right of homestead— he is entitled to have the homestead, notwithstanding, and as if there had been no fraud, as has been frequently decided. • Crummen v. Bennett, 68 N. C., 494; Dortch v. Benton, decided at this term, and cases there cited. As to that, the sale was not fraudulent — the sale of it did not affect or abridge the rights of creditors — they had no right to or interest in, and they were not concerned to know what might become of it — any question in that respect was between the debtor and those to whom he undertook fraudulently to sell his land.
It is said, how can the homestead in such case be laid off with any degree of accuracy or certainty as to quantity *374or value ? It is insisted that the appraisers cannot know how much of the land will be necessary or sufficient to be sold to pay the debt. It must be conceded that there ismore or less practical difficulty in the way, as suggested. But this must be overcome as far as possible. All that can be done, it seems to me, is to approximate as nearly as practicable the purpose of the law. The appraisers, seeing the amount of the debt and costs to be paid and the land — its quantity and reasonable value — must lay off the homestead in such measure, less than one thousand dollars, as will probably leave land sufficient to pay the debt and costs, and the sheriff will proceed to sell the same. If it turns out that the land so left to be sold is insufficient for the purpose, then he must sell the homestead so laid off, pay the balance of the debt, and any surplus to the execution debtor, or the person entitled to have it. Thus will be done for the debtor all that the law contemplates. The course of procedure thus indicated, though not satisfactory, seems to me, to be that implied and required by the law, in the absence of any express statutory provision on the subject. Cheatham v. Jones, 68 N. C., 153; Wilson v. Patton, supra.
I do not mean to intimate by what I have thus said, that in a proper case, the party entitled to homestead might not apply to the Court, in a proper proceeding for the purpose, to have the land sold as a whole, the debt paid from the proceeds of the sale, and the surplus paid to him, in-lieu of homestead. It seems to me that such a course would be practicable and expedient in many cases that may arise. Wilson v. Patton, supra.
What the value of the land sold and purchased by the plaintiff was, does not appear by the verdict of the jury as it should do, in terms or effect. There was evidence on the trial, tending to prove that it was worth greatly more than the debt to be paid. It was sold for less than that sum — why is left to conjecture.
*375The question was not tried and settled, certainly not satisfactorily, and I therefore concur in deciding that the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial.