Court Opinion

ID: 9657972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:42:52.175594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:50.134561
License: Public Domain

ERICKSTAD, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent.
Although § 16-01-11 of our Code, the statute which was enacted by the legislature in 1925 to facilitate the use of the initiative, referendum and recall provisions of our state constitution, is admittedly vague, I do believe that it should be construed to accomplish its objective, rather than to defeat it.
Less than fourteen years ago this Court, speaking through Judge Morris, said:
The statute was intended by the legislature to safeguard and facilitate the use of the initiative and referendum for the benefit of the people of the state by discouraging fraud and abuse and minimizing mistakes that might occur in the use of the right.
Dawson v. Meier, 78 N.W.2d 420, 424 (N.D.1956).
The tenor of the majority opinion seems to be that unless fraud is alleged and proved our Court should not be too concerned about whether the statute has been complied with for the reason that if the statute is construed to require too much attention to detail it must of necessity fail as contravening that part of § 25 of our state constitution which reads:
Nor shall any law be enacted * * * in any manner interfering with the freedom in securing signatures to petitions.
North Dakota Constitution § 25.
The unfortunate result of such an approach to a review of referendum petitions is that it makes discovery of and prosecution for fraud almost impossible. It may ultimately discredit the referendum. The search for fraud is usually a very time-consuming effort and there is not always a great amount of time intervening between the approval of petitions by the secretary of state and the preparation of the ballot by him.
In Shore v. Meier, 122 N.W.2d 566 (N.D.1963), petitions for the referral of House Bill 771 of the 1963 session of our state legislature were filed with the secretary of state on June 7, 1963, and found sufficient by him on June 12, 1963. On *919June 13, 1963, because the governor had called a special election to be held on July 17, 1963, on other referred measures, the secretary of state prepared and certified to the county auditors the form of the ballot to be used in the special election. On July 1, 1963, a petition was filed with our court asking us to review the secretary of state’s findings of sufficiency and, following a hearing before our court on July 5, we rendered a decision on July 8, 1963, dismissing the petition for review for the reason that the form of the ballot had been submitted by the secretary of state to the county auditors .and we were therefore powerless to act notwithstanding that fraud was obviously present. In that case this court, speaking through Judge Burke, said:
In this proceeding, the • exhibits, beyond any doubt, establish gross and extensive fraud. Visual inspection of the petitions provides additional evidence from which fraud may reasonably be inferred. This lamentable proof of venality on the part of a petition circu-lator, if circulator be the right word, can not justify ignoring the clear mandate of the Constitution.
This is a review of the sufficiency of the referendum petitions. Upon such a review the only question is whether the petitions are sufficient to require the placing of the measure, referral of which is sought, on the ballot. If the request for review is timely and the referendum petitions are found insufficient for any cause, the Court may order the measure excluded from the ballot. If, however, as in this case, the review is not sought until after the ballot is prepared no such relief may be granted. The petition for review is therefore dismissed.
Shore v. Meier, 122 N.W.2d 566, 568-569 (N.D.1963).
In Shore, because the fraud was so patent, pages of telephone directories having been copied on the petitions, disclosing names of deceased as well as of living persons, the petitioners were able to act quickly; but even so, not quickly enough.
With that experience to guide us, I believe that our statute and our constitution should be construed so as to' discourage fraud in future referendums.
It is true that in this case fraud is neither alleged nor proved, but we must realize that the construction we place on our statute and constitution in this case will set the standards of conduct for the circulators of petitions in the future.
In Dawson, fraud was neither alleged nor proved, yet the court set aside a number of signatures because the postoffice address was not followed by the place of residence. It, however, held that the name or number of the precinct was a satisfactory description of residence.
In the instant case, the majority have now found that a reference to a county satisfies the residence requirement of the statute. In so holding they have not facilitated the search for truth, but have delayed it. In their action in this regard the majority have approved many addresses that if used as a mailing address would result in a return of the mailed matter to the sender for lack of a sufficient address. A great many of the signatures carried with them only such information: Burleigh Co., Bismarck, N. D.; Stark Co., Dickinson, N. D.; Morton Co., Mandan, N. D.; Williams Co., Williston, N. D.; Barnes Co., Valley City, N. D.; Stuts-man Co., Jamestown, N. D. How could such vague information facilitate checking by the secretary of state, the public, or our court? It is quite obvious that the construction placed on the statute by our court does not facilitate the legitimate use of the referendum.
I disagree with some of the other holdings of the majority, but shall discuss only one. One thousand six hundred fifteen signatures were allegedly obtained by Mr. *920K. K. Kittler. In his affidavit, as a part of the petitions, he said (1) that he circulated the petitions personally; (2) that he knew that each signature appearing on the petitions was the genuine signature of the person whose name it purported to be; and (3) upon information and belief, that each person whose signature appeared upon the petition was a qualified elector of the state of North Dakota.
Although the secretary of state could not know from the face of the affidavits that they were in any way questionable, and thus properly counted the signatures, it now appears that Mr. Kittler made those affidavits to petitions, many of which were circulated by others under his supervision, so that he did not see the actual signing of all the signatures. In accepting those signatures as genuine we, as a court, not the secretary of state, are condoning a very loose practice and one that will not only encourage fraud but will make the prosecution of it impossible. If what a person says under oath does not bind him the oath is meaningless.
I write this dissent, not because I think it will gain any support from our court either today or in the future, but because I believe that it demonstrates that the law stated in the majority opinion now necessitates both constitutional and statutory reform. It is my hope that those who believe in the right of the people to refer legislation and who at the same time recognize the value of the stability and continuity that come from legislation enacted by the duly elected representatives of the people, will want to consider possible changes in our constitution and our statutes to prevent serious difficulty in the future. For those who are interested, I refer for study a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Barnes v. State ex rel. Pinkney, 236 Md. 564, 204 A.2d 787 (1964).