Court Opinion

ID: 9548360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:02:18.884802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:51.196706
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Presiding Judge,
dissenting:
The appellant was charged with Rape in the First Degree, Forcible Sodomy and Injury to a Minor Child. Appellant objected to this joinder of offenses and requested a separate trial on the charge of injury to a Minor Child. The majority holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request. Supra at 1329. I must respectfully dissent.
The charges in this case were based on two separate incidents. The first incident involved a rape and sodomy of a sixteen year old minor in which both her foster parents, the defendants, were implicated. The second involved an altercation which took place at a public car wash ten days after the incident of rape and sodomy. Again, both foster parents were implicated in the act of physically striking the minor several times in the face. The majority holds that the crimes were properly joined for trial on the ground that they involved the same series of acts or transactions as authorized by this Court’s interpretation of 22 O.S.1981, § 436, Supra at 1328.
This Court has recently had occasion to interpret the application of Section 436. In *1331Glass v. State, 701 P.2d 765 (Okl.Cr.1985), the Court held that several counts of rape, sodomy, robbery and assault with intent to rape were properly joined for trial when the separate incidents which gave rise to the charges occurred within a few blocks of each other on the same street within a three day time span. In each case, the defendant demanded oral and vaginal sex from his victim, forced or attempted to force the victims to give up jewelry and valuable possessions, and accosted the victims at night. In addition, the defendant used the same weapon in the last two incidents. In determining whether the joinder was proper, this Court stated:
Under Section 436, joinder of defendants in one information is permitted only “if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.” It therefore follows, under the analysis employed by Judge Brett in Dodson, that this same standard applies to joinder of offenses as well. Thus, joinder of separately punishable offenses is permitted if the separate offenses arise out of one criminal act or transaction, or are part of a series of criminal acts or transactions. Accord Johnson v. State, 650 P.2d 875, 876 (Okl.Cr.1982) (dicta).
Turning to the facts of this case, it is clear that all of the charged offenses did not arise out of a single transaction; however, they did occur in a series of transactions. We have never had occasion to intepret the phrase “series of criminal acts or transactions” in this context. In so construing the statute, we are obligated to employ the common and ordinary meaning of the statutory term. See State ex. rel. Cartwright v. Georgia Pacific, 663 P.2d 718, 722 (Okl.Cr.1983). The American College Dictionary defines “series” as “a number of things, events, etc. ranged or occurring in spatial, temporal, or other succession; a sequence.” Id. at 1106 (Emphasis added). Accordingly, joinder of offenses is proper where the counts so joined refer to the same type of offenses occurring over a relatively short period of time, in approximately the same location, and proof as to each transaction overlaps so as to evidence a common scheme or plan. Accord United States v. Shearer, 606 F.2d 819, 820 (8th Cir.1979) (construing Rule 8(a), Fed.Rules of Crim.Proc.). Mere similarity of offenses does not provide an adequate basis for joinder under our statute. Accord Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C.Cir.1964).
Id. at 768.
In this case, the proof as to each transaction clearly does not “overlap so as to evidence a common scheme or plan.” The joinder of two such unrelated offenses should be considered to be a violation of due process under the provisions of Section 7 of Article II of the Oklahoma Constitution. I, therefore, would reverse and remand for new trials with instructions to sever the charge of Injury to a Minor Child.