Court Opinion

ID: 9915996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 15:09:46.462833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:23:21.882683
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joseph J. Holloway,                           :
                            Petitioner        :
                                              :
              v.                              :
                                              :
Pennsylvania State Horse Racing               :
Commission,                                   :   No. 817 C.D. 2023
                         Respondent           :   Argued: December 4, 2023

BEFORE:       HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
              HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
              HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                           FILED: January 9, 2024

              Joseph J. Holloway (Holloway) filed a petition for review (Petition) of
the July 27, 2023 Adjudication and Order (Order) of the Pennsylvania State Horse
Racing Commission (Commission).1 The Commission affirmed the decision of the
Meadows Board of Judges (Meadows Judges) suspending Holloway’s horse training
license after a horse under his care tested above the violation threshold for
testosterone.2 Upon review, we affirm the Commission’s Order.

       1
        The Commission’s Order was dated July 25, 2023, signed July 26, 2023, and mailed July
27, 2023.
       2
          Holloway previously filed a motion for stay of the suspension pending the outcome of
the Petition, along with expedited review, both of which this Court granted.
                                       I. Background
               Holloway holds a horse trainer’s license from the Commission.
Reproduced Record (RR) at 543a.3 On June 26, 2021, Perfect Sting, a standardbred
horse trained by Holloway, placed second in a race at Meadows Racing in
Washington, Pennsylvania; through later disqualification of the winner, Perfect
Sting ultimately placed first. Id. After the race, the Commission collected blood
and urine samples from Perfect Sting and tested them for various substances. Id.
The Commission’s testing lab found testosterone in a sample of Perfect Sting’s blood
at a concentration of 3,765 picograms per milliliter (pg/ml) +/- 141.6 pg/ml, and a
follow-up test by an independent lab found testosterone at 3,635 pg/ml +/- 14 pg/ml.
Id. at 544a. Testosterone occurs naturally in horses, but the concentrations found
exceeded the violation threshold testosterone level set by Commission policy for
horses participating in races.4 Id.
               In a December 29, 2021 ruling (Ruling), the Meadows Judges
concluded that Holloway violated the Commission’s regulations due to the
testosterone levels found in Perfect Sting. RR at 544a-45a. The Ruling imposed a
$500 fine, disqualified Perfect Sting as winner, ordered the $74,166 winner’s purse
redistributed, and imposed a 15-day suspension of Holloway’s trainer’s license.
Pet., Ex. A at C-12.

       3
         The pages in the Reproduced Record are improperly numbered using a capital “A” (1A,
2A, etc.). Citations herein to the Reproduced Record use a small “a” as mandated by Rule 2173
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa. R.A.P. 2173.
       4
         The Commission apparently set the testosterone violation threshold via a policy statement
effective October 1, 2008. See Pet., Ex. H at C-23.

                                                2
              Holloway timely appealed the Meadows Judges’ Ruling to the
Commission on January 3, 2022.5 RR at 545a. Holloway argued that the Ruling
was arbitrary and capricious, asserting that testosterone is natural in horses and the
violation threshold set by the Commission is without a scientific basis. Pet., Ex. A
at C-14. The Commission held a hearing over two days, at which the Commission
and Holloway, respectively, presented the testimony of two expert witnesses, Mary
Robinson, VMD/Ph.D (Dr. Robinson) and Stephen Barker, DVM (Dr. Barker).
              The Commission’s expert, Dr. Robinson, described the process through
which the Commission used statistics to determine a violation threshold for
testosterone. See generally RR at 44a-60a. The Commission has set a violation
threshold for testosterone of 2,000 pg/ml for intact male horses in standardbred
racing, which the Commission based on multiple scientific studies. Id. at 549a.
These studies and the violation threshold took into account the effects of seasonal
variations and racing on testosterone levels. Id. at 550a-51a. Follow-up studies
conducted after implementation of the violation threshold measured an “upper limit”
of 1,546 pg/ml of testosterone in racing intact males. Id. at 552a. Tests from a
laboratory in Pennsylvania of 17,780 samples, taken since 2010 from Pennsylvania
racetracks, found only three samples, including that from Perfect Sting, that
exceeded the violation threshold of 2,000 pg/ml. Id. at 554a. Dr. Robinson also
testified that Perfect Sting had previously tested at 567 pg/ml and 443 pg/ml for
testosterone in the summer months, when natural testosterone levels are expected to
be elevated; notably, the 443 pg/ml level was revealed in a test performed just 41
days before the tests that revealed the 3,765 pg/ml level. Id. at 553a-54a. The

       5
         The Commission granted a stay pending appeal for the duration of the proceedings before
it. See Pet., Ex. A at C-15.

                                               3
laboratory conducting the test of Perfect Sting did not specifically test to determine
whether the testosterone detected was exogenous or endogenous, as the applicable
regulation does not make such a distinction. Id. at 555a. However, Dr. Robinson
opined, and the Commission found as a fact, that Perfect Sting’s testosterone level
was so high that it could not have occurred naturally. Id.
             Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Barker, testified critically concerning the
Commission’s testosterone violation threshold, pointing out purported shortcomings
in the scientific research supporting the violation threshold. See RR at 344a-69a &
556a. He stated that some horses have natural testosterone levels at 4,000 or 5,000
pg/ml, and opined that testosterone should not be regulated at all in intact male
horses. Id. at 556a-57a.
             Holloway also presented the testimony of Karl Nagle, DVM (Dr.
Nagle), the veterinarian who treated Perfect Sting. Dr. Nagle testified that Perfect
Sting was consistently very aggressive, high-strung, and frequently biting and
kicking. RR at 556a.
             Holloway himself testified concerning his protection and supervision
of Perfect Sting. Notably, he stated that he had installed security cameras and hired
a security guard for those times when he was not physically present. RR at 81a.
However, as the Commission observes, Holloway produced neither footage from a
security camera from the relevant time period nor the testimony of the security
guard. Id.
             Following the hearing and post-hearing briefing by the parties, the
Commission affirmed the Meadows Judges’ Ruling.              See RR at 569a.     The
Commission concluded the Commonwealth proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that Holloway violated the Commission’s regulations, based on the

                                          4
elevated testosterone levels found. Id. at 510a; see also id. at 508a & 509a. The
Commission found Dr. Robinson’s testimony “persuasive, credible, and trustworthy.”
Id. at 563a. The Commission stated its view of the trainer responsibility regulations
as “essentially making trainers strictly liable for things that happen under their
watch,” such that no direct evidence of any wrongdoing by Holloway was necessary
to find a violation. Id. at 564a. The Commission posited that “it is unrealistic to
require direct evidence of wrongdoing” in horse drugging cases.                          Id.    The
Commission also responded to Holloway’s invocation of the evidentiary standard
for expert testimony first announced in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923),6 by pointing out that it is an evidentiary standard, not a standard for evaluating
regulations. Id. at 566a-67a.
               The Commission rejected Holloway’s argument that the testosterone
violation threshold is arbitrary and capricious, explaining that the violation threshold
was set based on a regulation and therefore “is not the province for adjudicatory
revisit.” RR at 567a. The Commission relied predominantly on case law from other
jurisdictions, but also cited Commonwealth v. Webb, 274 A.2d 261 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1971), in which, notably, this Court rejected a substantial evidence challenge to a
violation, explaining:
               The foregoing study of the facts is not to say that the
               Commission reached its decision . . . by this exact
               interpretation of the facts or that this Court has interpreted
               the facts one way or the other. How we would have
               decided the matter is beside the point because our only
               function is to examine the facts to determine whether

       6
         Under this evidentiary standard, which has been incorporated into the Pennsylvania Rules
of Evidence, “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if . . . (c) the expert’s methodology
is generally accepted in the relevant field.” Pa. R.E. 702(c).

                                                 5
             sufficient evidence exists on which the Commission could
             have based its decision.
Id. (quoting Webb, 274 A.2d at 272) (additional quotation marks omitted).
             Counsel for the Commission informed Holloway that his suspension
would begin August 2, 2023, and that his request to the Commission for a stay
pending adjudication of the Petition had been denied. Pet., Ex. Q. Holloway timely
filed the Petition with this Court, along with an Application for Stay and Motion for
Expedited Decision, which this Court granted in a previous order.
             In our opinion in support of the stay order, this Court observed that
Holloway had not raised before the Commission his due process argument
concerning improper notice via the charging instruments. That observation was
supported by the Commission’s quotation of a stipulation below that the only issues
to be decided were whether the Meadows Judges’ ruling “was proper under the
Commission’s medication/drug regulations and whether the violation threshold for
testosterone established by the Commission is based on sound science.” RR at 561a
(quoting from the parties’ stipulation). Therefore, we concluded that Holloway
waived the due process issue by failing to raise it below. See MEC Pa. Racing, Inc.
v. Pa. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 827 A.2d 580, 592 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), as
amended (July 15, 2003).
             However, we also determined that Holloway raised novel legal
questions regarding the Commission’s testosterone violation threshold. We are not
aware of prior decisions by any court considering whether the Commission’s
testosterone violation threshold policy or the trainer responsibility regulations at
issue are arbitrary and/or capricious. The regulations at issue here became effective
October 19, 2019, see 49 PA.B. 6221 (2019), and have not yet been the subject of
any judicial decisions concerning the proper standard of proof, or the standard of

                                         6
review, when the Commission proceeds under these regulations.                          Thus, we
concluded that the Petition presents novel and substantial questions of law as to the
sufficiency of the evidence before the Commission and the validity of the
Commission’s regulations and testosterone violation threshold policy sufficient to
justify a stay of Holloway’s suspension pending the disposition of the Petition.

                                           II. Issues7
               Holloway presents two legal theories for this Court’s review. First, he
posits that the Commission’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence of
either the presence of exogenous testosterone or the scientific viability of the chosen
regulatory violation threshold testosterone level.8 With respect to the presence of
exogenous testosterone in Perfect Sting, Holloway maintains that the record contains
no evidence of anyone having administered synthetic testosterone to Perfect Sting;
nor does the record of the test results contain any evidence of the presence of any
exogenous testosterone in Perfect Sting.
               Second, with respect to the propriety of the violation threshold
generally, Holloway contends that the scientific community has not set a widely

       7
         “This Court’s scope of review of an adjudication of the Commission is limited to a
determination of whether constitutional rights were violated, whether findings of fact are supported
by substantial evidence of record, or whether an error of law has been committed.” Vaders v. Pa.
State Horse Racing Comm’n, 964 A.2d 56, 58 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (quoting Monaci v. State
Horse Racing Comm’n, 717 A.2d 612, 616 n.15 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (additional quotation marks
omitted)). We review de novo any legal questions raised. SugarHouse HSP Gaming, LP v. Pa.
Gaming Control Bd., 136 A.3d 457, 476 (Pa. 2016).
       8
        “Substantial evidence is such evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Cashdollar v. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 600 A.2d 646, 650 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1991) (citing McKenna v. Pa. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 476 A.2d 505 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1984)).

                                                 7
accepted level of testosterone that is considered normal in horses. Holloway further
suggests the regulatory threshold is improper because it inexplicably regulates
standardbred horses, such as Perfect Sting, but not thoroughbreds. Thus, Holloway
asserts that the violation threshold has not been set using generally accepted
scientific principles sufficient to constitute competent expert evidence, without
which Holloway insists the record is insufficient to support the legal validity of the
violation threshold.
              In a related argument, Holloway asserts that the Commission’s decision
is arbitrary and capricious because it rests upon standards and theories that are
rejected by the scientific community and most other jurisdictions, defy logic and
common sense, and are inconsistent with the regulations the Commission itself
applies to thoroughbred horses. Holloway also challenges the propriety of deeming
a set violation threshold as automatically constituting substantial evidence that a
horse has been administered or exposed to exogenous testosterone, where
endogenous testosterone levels vary daily and there is no evidence of the presence
of anything but endogenous testosterone.         Thus, Holloway argues that the
Commission’s decision misapplied the law as well as being arbitrary and capricious
and, accordingly, was manifestly unreasonable and constituted an abuse of
discretion.

                                   III. Discussion
              Holloway’s violations as found by the Commission related to trainer
responsibilities, a prohibition on drugs, and conduct detrimental to the sport.
              Section 203.22 of the regulations addresses trainer liability and
provides:

                                          8
              (a) The trainer is responsible for the condition of the horse
              entered in an official workout or race and is charged with
              the responsibility to guard and protect the horse at all times
              regardless of the trainer’s location. The trainer shall be
              responsible for the presence of any prohibited drug,
              medication, agent or other substance, including permitted
              medications in excess of the maximum allowable level,
              in the horses. A positive test for a prohibited drug,
              medication or substance, including permitted medication
              in excess of the maximum allowable level, as reported by
              the Commission’s testing laboratory, is prima facie
              evidence of a violation of this rule. In the absence of
              substantial evidence to the contrary, the trainer shall be
              responsible.
               (b) A trainer shall prevent the administration, attempted
              administration or passive contamination by others,
              including the trainers’ [sic] employees and assistants who
              have care, custody and control of the horse from any drug,
              medication or other prohibited substance that may cause a
              violation of these rules.
               (c) A trainer shall immediately report to the Judges and
              the Commission Veterinarian if the trainer knows, or has
              cause to believe, that a horse in the trainer’s care, custody
              or control has received any prohibited drugs or medications.
7 Pa. Code § 203.22.
              Section 401.2(a) of the regulations, regarding prohibited substances,
states in pertinent part:
              (1) A horse participating in a race may not carry in its
              body a prohibited drug, medication, chemical, substance
              or any other substance foreign to the untreated horse,
              except as otherwise provided.
              ....
               (3) In addition to the Commission approved Prohibited
              Substances List and the provisions of Chapter 403
              (relating to equine veterinary practices—temporary
              regulations), the term prohibited substance shall include:
              ....
                                            9
                (iii) Substances present in the horse in excess of
             concentrations at which the substances could occur
             naturally[.]
7 Pa. Code § 401.2(a).
             Sections 401.41, 205.33, and 205.501(14) of the regulations address
procedure and sanctions for violations. Section 401.41 directs the Commission to
investigate the results of a positive test for a prohibited substance and authorizes
boards of judges (in this case, the Meadows Judges) to conduct a hearing on whether
a violation of the regulations has occurred, make findings, consider mitigating and
aggravating factors, and impose penalties on a trainer for violations found. 7 Pa.
Code § 401.41. Subsection (g) specifically authorizes redistribution of a winner’s
purse in the case of a positive test of a race-winning horse. Id. § 401.41(g). Section
205.33 further authorizes boards of judges “to charge any licensee for a violation of
these [regulations],” and, if a violation or attempted violation is found, specifically
authorizes, inter alia, fines and license suspension. 7 Pa. Code § 205.33(a), (b).
Section 205.501 sets forth several specific grounds for which any licensee may be
suspended and fined, including for “[a]ny other act or conduct detrimental to the
sport or reflects negatively on the sport.” 7 Pa. Code § 205.501(14).

    A. Substantial Evidence that Holloway Failed to Protect Perfect Sting
             Holloway first suggests that the Commission improperly imposed strict
liability rather than requiring substantial evidence of exogenous testosterone in
Perfect Sting and of his responsibility for the presence of that substance. We
disagree.
             The pertinent regulation does not impose strict liability; rather, it
allocates the burdens of proof. As quoted above, it provides that “[a] positive test

                                          10
for a prohibited drug, medication or substance . . . is prima facie evidence of a
violation . . . ” and that, “[i]n the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary,
the trainer shall be responsible.” 7 Pa. Code § 203.22(a); see also Brown v. Pa. State
Horse Racing Comm’n, 499 A.2d 1132, 1134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985).
             In Webb, this Court considered whether the Commission had imposed
strict liability in applying the violation threshold. We observed:
             The [] Commission, discreetly speaking, concluded that
             [the trainer] failed “to protect and guard” his horse and
             then cited [former analogous rules] to state the more
             embarrassing particulars that a violation involving
             medicines or drugs had been committed. The Commission
             did not substitute for evidence of guilt a mere fiat (that the
             administering of a drug to a horse entered in a race is
             chargeable to the owner or trainer without regard to his
             knowledge of the fact or ability to prevent it), but instead
             conducted a formal proceeding upon notice with adversary
             parties, with issues on which evidence was adduced by
             both parties, and with ample opportunity for each party to
             be heard.
274 A.2d at 272.
             Likewise, here, although the Commission used language suggesting
strict liability, it actually considered the evidence presented and made findings and
conclusions applying that evidence, as discussed above. It is true that the record
contains no direct evidence proving that Holloway or one of his employees or agents
injected Perfect Sting with testosterone. However, the Commission made findings
of fact demonstrating test results of testosterone levels exceeding the regulatory
threshold for a violation. Those findings established a prima facie case under 7 Pa.
Code § 203.22(a), thus giving rise to a presumption of Holloway’s liability under
Brown. The burden then shifted to Holloway to rebut that presumption by evidence
sufficient to demonstrate that he had satisfied his duty to protect Perfect Sting. When

                                          11
asked whether there were eyes on Perfect Sting “24/7,” Holloway responded, “As
close as possible.” RR at 81a. As set forth above, Holloway testified that he had
security cameras and a security guard at his barn. Id. Notably, however, he did not
present either camera footage or the security guard’s testimony in evidence. Id. He
did not even suggest that anyone checked the security camera video, either regarding
the day in question or in general. See id.
             In Brown, this Court rejected a trainer’s challenge to the Commission’s
finding of a violation based on failure to protect his horse from administration of a
prohibited drug. 499 A.2d at 1134. There, the trainer’s testimony that he hired a
night watchman for the horse was insufficient to rebut the regulatory presumption
of liability, as the horse was not supervised 24 hours a day. See id.
             Here, the Commission was not required to credit Holloway’s testimony
as sufficient proof of 24-hour-a-day supervision of Perfect Sting, particularly in light
of his failure to produce either security video or the testimony of the security guard.
Under this Court’s reasoning in Brown, the Commission was within its discretion in
finding that Holloway failed to sustain his burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that he had provided adequate protection of Perfect Sting. See RR at
568a.

          B. Sufficiency of the Process Setting the Violation Threshold
             Holloway insists that the Commission’s determination of the maximum
testosterone level recognized as naturally occurring in standardbred horses was
faulty and is out of date. However, both expert witnesses testified at length on this
subject at the hearing before the Commission, and there were a number of supporting
exhibits. See generally RR at 27a-325a & 333a-491a. The Commission’s expert,

                                          12
Dr. Robinson, testified regarding the extensive scientific studies that were performed
before setting the violation threshold. RR at 44a-60a. The studies were specific to
Pennsylvania and considered a number of variables, including the time of year, type
of horse, breeding status of the horse, and geographic location. See id. at 276a-94a.
There was also evidence that standardbred horses generally have lower testosterone
levels than thoroughbreds and that of 17,780 standardbreds tested since 2010, only
3, including Perfect Sting, have had testosterone levels exceeding the threshold. Id.
at 554a.
             Holloway strenuously disputes the validity of the studies and Dr.
Robinson’s related expert opinion. However, the Commission is the finder of fact
and the arbiter of witness credibility; “[t]his Court’s limited scope of review on
issues such as this . . . includes neither making findings of fact nor resolving
credibility issues.” McKenna v. Pa. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 476 A.2d 505,
507 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). The evidence supporting the regulatory threshold was not
only substantial, but extensive, as discussed above. The Commission obviously
found that evidence credible. See, e.g., RR at 510a (concluding that “[t]he
preponderance of the evidence supports that the threshold in this matter is supported
by credible, accepted scientific methods”). Notwithstanding the vehemence of
Holloway’s arguments, the Commission’s findings concerning the competing expert
evidence constituted determinations of fact and credibility, which this Court may not
reexamine on review. See McKenna, 476 A.2d at 507.
             We also reject Holloway’s Frye challenge. Frye relates to a rule
concerning the admissibility of expert testimony. However, it is not applicable here.
As this Court has explained, “[t]he Frye test is employed by courts to ensure that
novel scientific evidence has obtained acceptance in the scientific community . . . .

                                         13
However, ‘a Frye analysis is not triggered every time science enters the courtroom;
it only applies when an expert seeks to introduce novel scientific evidence.’” Worley
v. Cnty. of Del., 178 A.3d 213, 236 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Dengler, 843 A.2d 1241, 1243 (Pa. Super. 2004)). Here, there is no suggestion
that Dr. Robinson sought to introduce novel scientific evidence. That Holloway and
his expert dispute Dr. Robinson’s conclusions provides no basis to apply a Frye
analysis. See Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 276 (Pa. 2008) (explaining
that “Frye does not operate to bar disputed conclusions of an expert, so long as the
methodology employed is not novel”).
               Further, Holloway concedes that, under Frye, although an expert’s
methodologies must be generally accepted in the scientific community, the
conclusions reached from the application of those methodologies need not also be
generally accepted. See Walsh v. BASF Corp., 234 A.3d 446, 456 (Pa. 2020) (citing
Trach v. Fellin, 817 A.2d 1102, 1112 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc)).
               Moreover, Holloway did not object to the methodology of the
Commission’s expert, Dr. Robinson, under the Frye standard at the hearing.9 Cf. RR
at 53a (objecting to Dr. Robinson’s testimony concerning certain documents solely
because Holloway’s expert had not seen them previously), 59a (objecting to the form
of certain testimony as lacking foundation) & 60a (objecting to the form of questions
as unclear). Therefore, any such objection is waived. See Cashdollar v. State Horse

       9
         Notably, Holloway’s counsel expressly had no objection at the hearing to Dr. Robinson’s
admission “as an expert and qualified to render an opinion in the field of drug testing, detection,
screening and quantification of the presence of chemicals in race horses, veterinary medical
science and the pharmacological effects of drugs in race horses, including pharmacokinetics.” RR
at 44a.

                                                14
Racing Comm’n, 600 A.2d 646, 649-50 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (citing Man O’War
Racing Ass’n v. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 250 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1969)).
             Finally, we reject Holloway’s suggestion that the absence of a parallel
Commission regulation limiting testosterone levels in thoroughbreds somehow
invalidates the existence of a limit regarding standardbreds. As the Commission
observes, the Commission has separate bureaus regulating thoroughbreds and
standardbreds, each with separate regulations. Compare 7 Pa. Code Subpart D,
Chapters 201- 205 (governing Standardbred Racing), with 7 Pa. Code Subpart E,
Chapters 301- 307 (governing Thoroughbred Racing). Indeed, the record contains
evidence that there are statistically significant differences between average
testosterone levels in the two breeds. RR at 53a. We agree with the Commission
that one bureau’s regulations are not arbitrary and capricious merely because they
are not identical to those of the other bureau.
             For all of these reasons, we reject Holloway’s argument that the
Commission’s regulation limiting testosterone levels in standardbred horses is
arbitrary and capricious.

                                   IV. Conclusion
             Based on the foregoing discussion, the Commission’s Order is
affirmed.

                                        __________________________________
                                        CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

                                          15
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joseph J. Holloway,                     :
                        Petitioner      :
                                        :
            v.                          :
                                        :
Pennsylvania State Horse Racing         :
Commission,                             :   No. 817 C.D. 2023
                         Respondent     :

                                     ORDER

            AND NOW, this 9th day of January, 2024, the July 27, 2023 Order of
the Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission is AFFIRMED.

                                      __________________________________
                                      CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge