Court Opinion

ID: 9535975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:52:15.574149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:24.183494
License: Public Domain

Judge CRISWELL,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I am of the view that the very regulation relied upon by the Department of Social Services to deny Old Age Pension benefits to the Peis-*899ters requires that they be granted such benefits without obtaining social security numbers. Hence, although it is obviously necessary to interpret that regulation in light of applicable constitutional principles, it is not necessary, in my view, to address the constitutional issues directly.
In considering the issues presented here, certain preliminary observations should be made.
First, while Colo. Const, art. II, § 4, embodies the same principles of religious freedom as are to be found in the First Amendment, Americans United for Separation of Church & State Fund, Inc. v. State, 648 P.2d 1072 (Colo.1982), it is, nevertheless, the “text and purpose” of the state provision which must be looked to. Conrad v. Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo.1982).
That state provision is specific in providing that “no person shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on account of his opinions concerning religion.” (emphasis supplied) Hence, to the extent that the case relied upon by the majority, Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986), draws some distinction between a government’s penalizing act and one that consists simply in a denial of benefits, such distinction would seem not to be one that can legitimately be drawn under the state constitution.
Second, the findings of the AU here were that the Peisters came to the honest, good faith, sincerely held religious belief that the social security number was the “mark of the beast” as described in portions of the Christian bible. Hence, in early 1976 — some 15 years before they made application for an old age pension — they returned their social security cards and submitted their “resignation” to the Social Security Administration. The AU specifically found that, since that date, the Peis-ters have refused to place their social security numbers “on any document or forms or used [those numbers] in any manner.” (emphasis supplied)
Third, the AU also found that a social security number “is unique to the individual who has it and is used almost exclusively in connection with the receipt and reporting of income. It thus has a dual advantage in the exchange and verification of information which no other currently established system can match.” (emphasis supplied)
It was this latter finding that led the AU, and later the Department of Social Services, to conclude that requiring disclosure and use of a social security number was constitutionally permissible.
It should be emphasized, however, that this finding was only a general one; there was no finding that requiring the Peisters to obtain a social security number would aid in determining their present eligibility for an old age pension. Indeed, given the AU’s explicit finding that they had not made use of such numbers for some 15 years, there is no explanation in either the AU’s finding or the Department’s decision as to how having a social security number assigned to them would aid in determining their present or past financial status.
Of course, requiring the assignment of such a number might aid in the verification of their financial status in the future. This would be true, however, only if they used those numbers on their income tax returns and similar documents where such numbers are normally used.
And, this fact leads to my final preliminary observation. The requirement imposed is not simply to obtain and supply social security numbers. If the purpose of such requirement is to be served, the Peis-ters must in the future use the number in conjunction with all transactions in which such numbers are normally supplied. For, if they do not do so, then those numbers cannot serve for the “exchange and verification of information” that the AU found to be important.
Hence, the requirement imposed upon the Peisters here is not simply a compelled breach of faith in an isolated instance. Rather, if they seek to obtain an Old Age Pension benefit from Colorado, they are required to abandon, for all purposes, their sincerely held religious concept that the use of such numbers are forbidden by God.
*900Given these circumstances, therefore, I am convinced that this record demonstrates, as a matter of law, that there exists “good cause” for the Peisters’ failure to provide social security numbers to the Department, however that term may be interpreted.
The Department concedes that 9 Code Colo.Reg. 2503-3, 3.110.25 (1983) provides for a waiver of the pertinent requirement if there exists “circumstances which are outside [the] control” of the applicant. It concluded, however, that the decision not to supply such numbers “lies well within [the Peisters’] control.”
This latter conclusion is, in my opinion, not only not supported by the evidence, but is in direct conflict with the AU’s specific finding that the Peisters’ decision was compelled by a sincerely held religious belief. Given this explicit finding, I am forced to conclude that, to the Peisters, the word of God is just as much an external influence as are the “acts of God,” which the Department itself recognizes as constituting “good cause” under its regulation. See 9 Code Colo.Reg. 2503-1, § 3.810.21 (1983).
While the Department may be empowered to adopt a requirement for the provision of social security numbers with no exceptions, if, as here, it authorizes an exception for “good cause,” I am convinced that a sincerely held religious belief constitutes such good cause.
I would, therefore, reverse the Department’s determination and remand this matter to it for further proceedings.