Court Opinion

ID: 9890819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 16:01:03.764826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:27.525868
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12456    Document: 24-1     Date Filed: 10/16/2023   Page: 1 of 4

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-12456
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       WELLEKSON GONCALVES SILVA,
                                                    Petitioner-Appellee,
       versus
       ADRIENE FERREIRA DOS SANTOS,

                                                 Respondent-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-03371-ELR
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-12456      Document: 24-1      Date Filed: 10/16/2023     Page: 2 of 4

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-12456

       Before ROSENBAUM, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               This is the second appeal in this international kidnapping
       case. In the first appeal, we found that the district court made two
       legal errors. First, “the district court was mistaken when it con-
       cluded that it did not have the choice to consider” the father’s “non-
       credible denials as evidence supporting” the mother’s “testimony.”
       Silva v. Dos Santos, 68 F.4th 1247, 1259 (11th Cir. 2023). And second,
       the district court erred in “concluding that a single witness’s testi-
       mony [was] necessarily insufficient to satisfy the clear-and-convinc-
       ing-evidence standard.” Id. “Because the district court’s reasoning
       did not account for these principles, we vacate[d] the district
       court’s order and remand[ed] for further consideration in light of
       [our] opinion.” Id. at 1261.
               On remand, the district court reviewed and considered the
       testimony and evidence from the evidentiary hearing. Based on its
       review, the district court granted the father’s petition for the return
       of his daughter to Brazil.
               The mother appeals. She argues that we must vacate the
       district court’s order because it violated the mandate rule. Our
       mandate, the mother contends, required the district court to “an-
       nounce how” the application of the rule—that disbelief of a liti-
       gant’s testimony can be substantive evidence against that litigant—
       affected its judgment. And, the mother asserts, our mandate re-
       quired the district court “to consider and explain why” the
USCA11 Case: 23-12456      Document: 24-1     Date Filed: 10/16/2023     Page: 3 of 4

       23-12456               Opinion of the Court                         3

       mother’s testimony “alone failed to support a finding by clear and
       convincing evidence.” But, the mother argues, the district court’s
       order didn’t do the things we required it to do because it was “in-
       sufficient” and “perfunctory.”
              “We review de novo the district court’s interpretation and
       application of” our mandate. Cox Enters., Inc. v. News-J. Corp., 794
       F.3d 1259, 1272 (11th Cir. 2015). Under the mandate rule, “when
       an appellate court issues a specific mandate it is not subject to in-
       terpretation; the district court has an obligation to carry out the
       order.” Id. at 1271 (quotation omitted). It must “implement both
       the letter and the spirit of the mandate taking into account the ap-
       pellate court’s opinion and the circumstances it embraces.” Id.
       (quotation and omissions omitted).
              Here, the district court carried out both the letter and spirit
       of our mandate. In the conclusion section of our first opinion, we
       summarized the two legal principles we instructed the district
       court to consider on remand. First, “when a factfinder does not
       believe an interested witness’s testimony, it may—but is not re-
       quired to—consider that witness’s discredited testimony as corrob-
       orating substantive evidence that the opposite of the testimony is
       true.” Silva, 68 F.4th at 1261. And second, “when a single witness
       provides the only evidence on some point, that testimony, without
       corroboration, can still meet the standard of clear and convincing
       evidence if the factfinder concludes that it is credible.” Id. Then,
       we vacated the original order and remanded for further considera-
       tion of the evidence in light of these two legal principles. Id.; see
USCA11 Case: 23-12456      Document: 24-1     Date Filed: 10/16/2023     Page: 4 of 4

       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12456

       also id. at 1250 (“Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order
       and remand for further consideration.”).
               That’s what the district court did. It “recognize[d]” the two
       legal errors it made in its original order. And, with our guidance in
       mind—“heed[ing]” our opinion—it “again reviewed and consid-
       ered the testimony and evidence” from the evidentiary hearing, in-
       cluding the father’s incredible testimony and the mother’s testi-
       mony. “Upon such renewed review and consideration,” the dis-
       trict court granted the father’s petition to return his daughter to
       Brazil.
               While the order on remand is brief, the district court did
       what we asked it to do. It recognized the errors that it made in the
       original order, and, guided by our opinion in the first appeal, the
       district court considered the evidence in light of the two legal prin-
       ciples. We remanded for “further consideration” based on our
       opinion, see id. at 1261, and the district court “considered” the cor-
       rect legal principles and applied them to the evidence.
               Because we didn’t require the district court to do more than
       that, it did not violate the mandate rule by not saying more. And
       because the district court did not violate the mandate rule, we do
       not have to consider the mother’s arguments about why we should
       enter judgment on the merits in her favor, or why we should “re-
       mand . . . to a different district court judge.”
              AFFIRMED.