Court Opinion

ID: 9950582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 15:08:19.412733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:26.165233
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
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RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
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BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN
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COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG
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THE ACTION.
                                                   RENDERED: MARCH 14, 2024
                                                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                    2022-SC-0554-MR

SHIRLEY VICKERY                                                          APPELLANT

V.                   ON APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
                     HONORABLE JOHN T. ALEXANDER, JUDGE
                                NO. 19-CR-00435

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                   APPELLEE

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                      AFFIRMING

      This case comes before the Court on appeal as a matter of right 1 by

Shirley Vickery, the Appellant, from the judgment and sentence of the Barren

Circuit Court. Vickery was charged with one count of first-degree sodomy,

victim under twelve, continuous course of conduct. After a one-day trial, she

was convicted by a jury and sentenced to thirty years in prison. Vickery argues

on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict and in failing to

instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of sexual abuse in the first

degree. Upon review, we affirm the trial court.

      1   Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
      I.     Facts
      Vickery is the great-grandmother of the victim, A.C. 2 In July 2019, after

A.C.’s stepmother and step-grandfather had independently observed sexually

inappropriate behavior by A.C., her stepmother and her step-grandparents had

a conversation with A.C. to see if A.C. had been touched inappropriately. Her

stepmother believed that might be a cause of her behavior. During this

conversation, A.C. disclosed that Vickery, her great-grandmother on her

biological mother’s side, had touched her. After informing her husband later

that day, A.C.’s parents contacted local police to see what they needed to do.

A.C. was taken to the hospital, an evaluation was conducted, and a forensic

interview was arranged. No medical evidence was ever submitted at trial.

      Vickery lived in Glasgow, and she was interviewed by Sergeant Charlie

Eubank. He testified about his interview with Vickery which was recorded

using a body camera. The video of this interview was played at trial. In that

interview, Sergeant Eubank read Vickery Miranda warnings. 3 After this,

Sergeant Eubank informed Vickery that A.C. had alleged Vickery had stuck her

finger inside A.C.’s butt on multiple occasions. Although Vickery initially acted

shocked and defensive, Sergeant Eubank prevailed upon her that this was not

his “first rodeo,” and asked, “How many times did it happen?” Vickery

answered “twice,” and stuck up two of her fingers. After reviewing the broad

details of these incidents—such as the where, when, how, and why—Sergeant

      2 We use initials to protect the identity of minor victims.

      3 Vickery has not challenged the admission of this video at trial.

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Eubank then suggested that the abuse had occurred numerous times. He then

asked Vickery exactly how many times it happened, suggesting the numbers

ten or fifteen. Vickery responded, “probably about ten.”

      At the time of trial, A.C. was ten years’ old. She testified the sodomy

occurred when she was six and seven years old. During direct examination, the

Commonwealth engaged her in the following colloquy:

      Commonwealth: Did she ever do anything to you that made you feel
      uncomfortable.
      A.C.: Yes.
      CW: And what was that?
      A.C: She stuck her finger down in my butt. 4
      CW: Okay. She stuck her finger in your butt?
      A.C.: [Nods head affirmatively.]
      CW: Okay. Let’s talk about the first time that happened to you. Do you
      remember how old you were the first time she stuck her finger inside
      your butt?
      A.C.: I was six.
      CW: Do you remember anything about what time of year it was?
      A.C.: No, I don’t.
      CW: Anything about the weather? Was it cold or warm outside?
      A.C.: It was cold outside.
      CW: Okay. You said you were six years old. Where were you spending
      time with her the first time that this happened?
      A.C.: Um, well, it was either at her work or her house or whenever she
      was watching me.

       4 This is a crucial quotation which we highlight because it is the focus of the

appeal and both Vickery and the Commonwealth have misquoted this specific
sentence by omitting the word in. Our review confirms that we have correctly quoted
the testimony.
                                           3
      CW: Okay, the first time that it happened though do you remember
      where you were?
      A.C.: No.
      CW: Okay. Was anybody else around?
      A.C.: No.
      CW: No one else was around?
      A.C.: [Shakes head in denial.]
      CW: And can you tell me what happened?
      A.C.: Um, she stuck her finger down my butt and she told me not to tell
      nobody [sic].
      CW: Okay. Let’s back up a little bit, okay? Where were you with Shirley?
      Were you sitting by her or sitting on her lap or what were you doing
      when she stuck her finger inside your butt?
      A.C.: I was on her lap.
      CW: And did you have clothes on or clothes off?
      A.C.: Clothes on.
      CW: Can you explain to me, [A.C.], how she was able to stick her finger
      inside of your butt if you had clothes on?
      A.C.: She pulled my pants back and then she just stuck her finger down
      in my butt.
      CW: Okay. And when you say, ‘down in my butt,’ I want to be clear about
      that, what we’re talking about. Did her finger go inside of you?
      A.C.: Yes.
      CW: Okay. Would you be able, were you able to tell if she had her whole
      finger inside your butt or did you know?
      A.C.: No.
      CW: When she stuck her finger inside your butt, did she stick it in and
      take it out or was it there for a while?
      A.C.: It was there for a while.
      Although A.C. continued to testify, this is the only portion of her

testimony highlighted by Vickery and forms the basis of her appeal. After the

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close of the Commonwealth’s case, Vickery moved for a directed verdict,

arguing that A.C.’s testimony was ambiguous about whether there was any

penetration by Vickery’s finger. Defense counsel believed A.C.’s testimony had

only established a finger had gone “down my butt,” and therefore, the evidence

was sufficient for sexual abuse but not for sodomy. The Commonwealth

responded that A.C.’s testimony was clear as to penetration, as well as

Vickery’s own interview with Sergeant Eubank. The trial court denied the direct

verdict motion.

      When it came time for jury instructions, Vickery requested a lesser-

included offense instruction for sexual abuse in the first degree. Largely

repeating the above argument, defense counsel insisted the jury could

reasonably interpret A.C.’s testimony to have supported sexual contact, as

defined by statute, but not that penetration had occurred. The Commonwealth

opposed, again repeating the same argument as above. The trial court declined

to give the instruction. The trial court reasoned that A.C. had testified to a

finger going in her butt, and there was no requirement that she use correct

medical terminology, such as the word anus; nor that she needed to use

correct legal terminology, such as the word penetration. The trial court believed

that the testimony presented an all-or-nothing proposition, and the jury could

either believe sodomy had occurred or believe it had not occurred, but that

there was no evidence to support mere sexual contact.

      We now address the merits of the appeal.

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      II.    Analysis
      The standard of appellate review for a denial of a directed verdict motion

is “if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury

to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of

acquittal.” Eversole v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 209, 218 (Ky. 2020) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991)). The trial court is

required to assume the truth of the evidence presented and give all reasonable

inferences, and resolve all reasonable doubts, in favor of the party opposing the

motion. Id. at 217.

      “Lesser-included offense instructions are proper if the jury could

consider a doubt as to the greater offense and also find guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt on the lesser offense.” Parker v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d

209, 211 (Ky. 1997) (citing Skinner v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 290 (Ky.

1993)). When the evidence presents an “all-or-nothing” proposition, however, a

lesser-included offense instruction is not warranted. Swan v. Commonwealth,

384 S.W.3d 77, 100 (Ky. 2012).

      Sodomy in the first degree requires deviate sexual intercourse. KRS 5

510.070. There are two definitions of deviate sexual intercourse provided by

KRS 510.010(1). The first—"any act of sexual gratification involving the sex

organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another”—does not require

penetration. Mash v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.3d 548, 558 (Ky. 2012). The

second, however, does require penetration by its very definition—"penetration

      5 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                         6
of the anus of one person by any body part or a foreign object manipulated by

another person.” KRS 510.010(1). Sexual abuse in the first degree only requires

sexual contact. KRS 510.110. Sexual contact is defined as “the touching of a

person's intimate parts or the touching of the clothing or other material

intended to cover the immediate area of a person's intimate parts[.]” KRS

510.010(7).

      Vickery relies principally on Mash for her argument regarding the

directed verdict. We stated in Mash that “[f]irst-degree sexual abuse is properly

classified as a lesser included offense of first-degree sodomy. Johnson v.

Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 266, 277 (Ky. 1993).” Mash, 376 S.W.3d at 558.

We clarified that “[t]he distinction between the two offenses is the body part

touched for purposes of sexual gratification[.] The additional element in a

sodomy offense is the specific sexual or intimate parts involved, namely, the

mouth or anus.” Id. This is not the only distinction for the second definition of

sodomy, which requires penetration by a body part or foreign object; therefore,

Mash is not controlling here.

      The fatal flaw in Vickery’s argument is that she contends A.C.’s

testimony established only that Vickery “stuck her finger down her butt, not

in her anus, creating the distinct possibility that Vickery committed a crime

less than Sodomy, 1st degree Victim Under 12 Years of Age in a Continuing

Course of Conduct.” This reasoning stems from the misquotation highlighted in

Section I, where Vickery (and the Commonwealth) have misquoted A.C.’s

statement that Vickery “stuck her finger down in my butt.” By failing to

                                        7
correctly understand A.C.’s testimony and omitting the word in, Vickery has

perceived ambiguity where a correct understanding dispels any doubt. A.C.’s

first statement of criminal conduct against Vickery was that she stuck her

finger in her butt. The Commonwealth correctly understood that testimony in

her colloquy, and frequently re-emphasized it in her questioning. When A.C.

then described the conduct as “down in my butt,” the Commonwealth asked

her to clarify what exactly she meant by that phrase, asking if a finger had

gone inside of her. A.C.’s response was an unequivocal “yes.”

      We have held that a victim need not use anatomical exactitude in their

testimony and found that the use of the word “butt” is sufficient to support a

sodomy charge even though the statute uses the word anus. Miller v.

Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 699 (Ky. 2009). We have also never required

a victim use the word penetration to meet the evidentiary standard; indeed,

“there is no requirement of testimony specifically describing penetration.” Id. at

697. This is because a fact can be inferred as much by circumstances as by

words. Id. Nonetheless, we conclude that A.C.’s use of the word in in her first

statement, and her later affirmation that her phrase “down in my butt” was

meant to be understood as a finger going inside her, certainly satisfies the

evidentiary standard required to find deviate sexual intercourse under KRS

510.070 and 510.010(1). Finally, a victim’s uncorroborated testimony is

enough to support a conviction so long as it is not inherently improbable.

Robinson v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Ky. 1970). A.C.’s testimony

in fact was not uncorroborated, as Vickery’s interview with Sergeant Eubank

                                        8
demonstrated she had confessed to inserting her finger in A.C.’s anus on

numerous occasions, at least twice and up to ten times. Vickery did not testify

in her own defense. Therefore, it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to

find guilt for first-degree sodomy, continuing course of conduct, under the

evidence as a whole. The directed verdict was properly denied. Eversole, 600

S.W.3d at 218.

      As to Vickery’s second argument regarding the denial of the lesser-

included offense instruction; we note that the argument at the trial court was

based on the same argument heretofore addressed, that A.C.’s testimony was

ambiguous. The trial court did not believe so, and we conclude that

determination was correct. Consequently, we agree with the trial court that

there was no evidence presented that supported a lesser-included offense

instruction based merely on sexual contact. The evidence presented an “all-or-

nothing” proposition, and a lesser-included offense instruction was not

warranted. Swan, 384 S.W.3d at 100.

      But Vickery offers a completely different argument before this Court that

the denial of the lesser-included offense instruction created a jury unanimity

issue. Relying on a perception of A.C.’s testimony as ambiguous, Vickery

asserts that because of the failure to include a sexual abuse and sexual contact

instruction, and because some of the acts A.C. described Vickery committing

may have only constituted sexual abuse, it is possible “a juror mistakenly

believed that the possible sexual abuse act was an act of sodomy . . . [and]

chose that particular sexual abuse instance of conduct and an act of alleged

                                        9
sodomy to arrive at the two instances of conduct required under KRS 501.100 .

. . .”

         This alleged juror unanimity issue is not preserved. “On appeal, a party

may only present those issues that were fully presented to the trial court and,

further, may not bring forward new legal grounds on appeal to challenge those

errors. This rule is a keystone of Kentucky appellate practice, and the policies

undergirding it remain strong.” Henderson v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.3d 335,

343 (Ky. 2014) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Nonetheless, even were

we inclined to grant palpable error review, which has not been requested,

under the standard affirmed in Johnson v. Commonwealth, 676 S.W.3d 405,

417 (Ky. 2023), we have no doubt that there is no substantial possibility of a

different result had the lesser-included offense instruction been given. A.C.’s

testimony that Vickery stuck her finger “down in my butt,” her affirmation that

she meant Vickery’s finger went inside her, and Vickery’s own confession, and

the lack of any testimony to the contrary, all militate against that conclusion.

         Vickery’s conviction is affirmed.

         All sitting. All concur.

                                             10
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Ken Garrett

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Joseph A. Beckett
Assistant Attorney General

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