Court Opinion

ID: 9638270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:39:15.443271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:05.180708
License: Public Domain

RIDGELY, Justice,
dissenting:
The majority distinguishes our prior cases of Hall and Buckingham by finding two separate legislative intents for the habitual offender statute and the PFBPP statute. In my view, the General Assembly intended that for all mandatory prison terms, an offender must have a chance to reform following a prior conviction before he is sentenced as a second offender. Indeed, the General Assembly expressly said so when enacting an amendment to the Mandatory Sentencing Act in 1980 which provided in relevant part:
WHEREAS, the general intention behind the enactment of a mandatory commitment law for juveniles adjudicated delinquent for violating certain delineated [sic] offenses was to serve as a warning to a first offender of the consequences of a second conviction; and
WHEREAS, mandatory prison terms applied to adults require that an offender has an opportunity to mend his ways after an initial confrontation with the courts before he is sentenced as a second offender; and
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*432WHEREAS, the members of the General Assembly and the members of the Family Court Judiciary desire to establish a mandatory commitment provision triggered only by an offense committed after a first adjudication and within a prescribed period of time.32
Our decisions in Hall and Buckingham in 1984 were consistent with this express intent of the General Assembly that mandatory penalties for a second offense be reserved for those individuals not rehabilitated after an encounter with the criminal justice system and a chance to reform. Our decision in this case should also be consistent with that intention. Such an interpretation would not preclude the sentencing judge from imposing a severe sanction if warranted by the facts of an individual case. Indeed, under this interpretation the Superior Court could impose the same sentence it did, but would have to act deliberatively rather than automatically-
I respectfully dissent.

. 62 Del. Laws 331 (emphasis added).