Court Opinion

ID: 9788689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:15:54.712988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:15.152901
License: Public Domain

LEHMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
[119] I respectfully dissent.
[120] I agree that the inadvertent failure to dismiss the alternate juror violated W.R.Cr.P. 24(e), which specifies, "An alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict." (Emphasis added.) However, while it is surely error to allow an alternate to participate in jury deliberations, I cannot say that the inadvertent presence of an alternate, who is for all purposes as qualified as every other juror in a case, for a portion of the deliberations irretrievably prejudices the regular jury.
[121] -In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 787-88, 118 S.Ct. 1770, 1779-80, 128 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (emphasis added), the Court stated:
The presence of alternate jurors during deliberations is not the kind of error that "affect[s] substantial rights" independent of its prejudicial impact....
. Although the presence of alternate jurors does contravene " 'the cardinal principle that the deliberations of the jury shall remain private and secret, " Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. RuleCrim.Proc. 28(b), 18 U.8.C.App., p. 785 (quoting United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 385 F.2d 868, 872 (C.A.4 1964)), the primary if not exclusive purpose of jury privacy and secrecy is to protect the jury's deliberations from improper influence. "[If no harm resulted from this intrusion [of an alternate juror into the room,] reversal would be pointless." United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1391 (C.A.11 1982).
Such statements suggest a harmless error standard be applied in jury intrusion situations, especially considering that the phrase "substantial rights" appears in both the plain error and the harmless error standard. W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and (b).
[122] In that respect I would embrace the analysis of the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Acevedo, 141 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir.1998). In Acevedo, the alternate jurors were inadvertently sent to deliberate with the regular jury and did, in fact, deliberate with the jury for less than an hour, even reaching a unanimous verdict. Id. at 1422. The judge sealed the verdict, dismissed the alternates, and instructed the regular jurors "to commence deliberations as if anew, taking into consideration all of the instructions I previously gave you." Id. at 1423. The jury deliberated for approximately five more minutes and returned a guilty verdict. Id. Acevedo made a motion for mistrial, which the district court denied. On appeal, Acevedo claimed that the error was reversible as a matter of law and that the prejudice he suffered from the alternates' presence was incurable.
[123] In resolving this issue, the Eleventh Cireuit opined:
The Supreme Court has held that the mere presence of an alternate in the jury room *614during deliberations is not inherently prejudicial to the defendant. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739-41, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1780-81, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). The Court, however, implied that once the alternate participates in any way-whether through words or gestures-prejudice is manifest. See id. at 739, 118 S.Ct. at 1780 (prejudice may arise "either because the alternates actually participated in the deliberations, verbally or through 'body language'; or because the alternates' presence exerted a 'chilling' effect on the regular jurors" (citations omitted)).
Id. at 1424. Nevertheless, the decision then went on to say that the court would assume that the alternates were a prejudicial influence on the jury's deliberations but that a mistrial is only warranted if there is a reasonable possibility that the violation actually prejudiced Acevedo by affecting the jury's final verdict. Id. The Eleventh Circuit further decided that any prejudice caused by such an error is in fact curable. Therefore, the true question becomes whether the district court's instruction eliminates the threat of prejudice to the defendant posed by the alternate's initial participation. Id. at 1426.
[124] In Olano, at least one alternate juror stayed for the entire deliberations. Here, the alternate was in deliberations for only forty minutes and was excused before a verdiet was reached. While time is not nee-essarily determinative of the level of prejudice, it may indicate the extent to which the alternate actually participated. - Furthermore, it must be recognized that an alternate juror is not simply an outside intrusion. I simply cannot equate an alternate juror to a stranger. I agree with the statement made by Justice O'Connor in Olano, when she said:
The Court of Appeals was incorrect in finding error "inherently prejudicial." Until the close of trial, the 2 alternate jurors were indistinguishable from the 12 regular jurors. Along with the regular jurors, they commenced their office with an oath, received the normal initial admonishment, heard the same evidence and arguments, and were not identified as alternates until after the District Court gave a final set of instructions.
Olano, at 740, 113 S.Ct. at 1781 (citations omitted.) I would further add that, under our established rules in Wyoming, the alternate juror was required to go through the same voir dire process, to have the same impartiality, and to have the same qualifications as the regular juror counterparts. Thus, I would hold that whatever prejudice might have resulted from the alternate's presence was minimal in this case.
[125] The ultimate inquiry is whether the trial court's instructions cured the threat of prejudice. We have long held we assume that the jurors followed the court's instructions. Marquez v. State, 12 P.3d 711, 717 (Wyo.2000) (citing Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852, 857 (Wyo.1987)). The jury was instruct, ed to disregard what the alternate had said. The jurors were to "reconsider all of that deliberation without her input." While the instruction was not as explicit as that in Acevedo, explicitly informing the jury that they should begin anew, I would consider it sufficient in this case.
[126] Accordingly, I would hold that, in light of the judge's instruction, the violation of Rule 24(e) did not affect Hoosg' substantial rights and is, therefore, harmless error.