Court Opinion

ID: 9560255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:46:02.362639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:32.217345
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, Judge,
specially concurring.
In Part I of today’s opinion, the Court discusses a perceived conflict between legislative and judicial definitions of the types of property that may be seized under search warrants. The Court nullifies the legislative standard by a three-step reasoning process: (1) I.C. § 19-4402 prohibits the seizure of “mere evidence;” (2) Rule 41(b), I.C.R., authorizes the seizure of such evidence; and (3) Rule 41(b) will be given dominant effect because it expresses modem judicial thought and our Supreme Court has held in several cases that rules prevail over statutes. I think the analysis can be stated in an alternative way that accords greater recognition to the proper role of the legislature.
Our system of government is said to embody a separation of powers. Actually, it is more accurate to say that the three branches of government — legislative, executive and judicial — have areas of exclusive and shared authority. Thus, the legislature has exclusive authority, subject to constitutional restrictions, to determine the internal processes by which it will formulate and consider proposed statutes or resolutions. Similarly, the judiciary has exclusive authority, within constitutional constraints, to determine the internal processes by which it will perform fact-finding and law-stating functions of adjudication. These areas of exclusive responsibility often are characterized as “procedure.” On the other hand, the legislature and judiciary share authority to define the rights and duties of private persons vis-a-vis each other or of government vis-a-vis individuals. On such issues, court rules or decisions may coexist with statutes so long as they do not conflict. When there is a conflict, the judiciary defers to the legislature *786unless the issue is governed by the state or federal constitution. In that event the judiciary’s constitutional interpretation will prevail. This area of shared responsibility often is characterized as “substantive law.”
Within this framework, the Idaho Supreme Court decisions cited in today’s decision can be analyzed. In State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 534 P.2d 771 (1975), the Court held that a rule allowing oral testimony in support of applications for search warrants would prevail over a conflicting statute that required “depositions in writing.” Yoder can be explained as an assertion by the judiciary of its exclusive authority to determine the internal process by which it will perform a fact-finding function. Just as the judiciary would not presume to say whether legislative committees must receive testimony orally or in writing, the legislature should not presume to tell the judiciary what form of evidence it may, or may not, consider. That is for the judiciary itself to determine.
However, the other cases cited — State v. Lewis, 107 Idaho 616, 691 P.2d 1231 (1984) and State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 37, 592 P.2d 852 (1979) — are not so easily explained. In each of those cases, the issue was under what circumstances law enforcement officers might enter private property to conduct nighttime searches. This issue does not fall within the exclusive authority of the legislature or of the judiciary. Rather, it is embraced by their shared authority to define the rights and duties of government vis-a-vis individuals. Either the legislature or the judiciary may address such an issue, so long as its pronouncements are consistent with the state and federal constitutions.
That is precisely what the legislature and the judiciary have done. Nighttime searches are not differentiated from daytime searches in constitutional law. However, there is no constitutional impediment to providing greater protection of privacy and tranquility against nighttime intrusions. The legislature has provided, in I.C. § 19-4411, that search warrants may not be executed at night unless affidavits in the warrant applications “are positive that the property is on the person or in the place to be searched____” In contrast, I.C.R. 41(c) is less protective, allowing search warrants to be executed at night “for reasonable cause shown____” Notwithstanding the greater protection afforded by the statute, and the greater particularity of the statutory language, our Supreme Court held in Lindner and in Lewis that the rule would prevail over the statute. In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected a suggestion by the Court of Appeals that the apparent conflict between the statute and the rule could be reconciled by construing them as complementary to each other. See State v. Lewis, 106 Idaho 800, 683 P.2d 448 (Ct.App.1984) (overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision, supra); State v. Fowler, 106 Idaho 3, 674 P.2d 432 (Ct.App.1983).
The message of Lewis and Lindner, as applied to the instant case, is that when a statute and rule conflict, dominant effect will be accorded to the rule even though the issue falls within an area of responsibility shared by the legislature and judiciary. Lewis and Lindner represent a departure from the principle of judicial deference to the legislature on nonconstitutional issues within the sphere of shared authority.
The issue here, as in Lewis and Lindner, involves shared authority. The issue is what kind of property law enforcement officers may take under warrant from private citizens. The statute, I.C. § 19-4402, empowers officers to take property “stolen or embezzled,” property “used as the means of committing a felony,” and property “in the possession of any person with the intent to use it as the means of committing a public offense____” The rule, I.C.R. 41(b), also lists “evidence of the commission of a criminal offense____” Neither the statute nor the rule contravenes the state and federal constitutions. The rule coincides with modem constitutional law; the statute seemingly provides greater protection against takings of tangible property-
Where an issue involves shared authority, every reasonable effort should be made to reconcile apparently conflicting pronouncements of two branches of govern*787ment. Here, the literal language of I.C. § 19-4402 does not necessarily conflict with Rule 41(b). The statute is couched in permissive terms. It lists several types of property for which warrants “may” be issued. Whether the list is illustrative or exhaustive depends upon the underlying legislative intent. As today’s opinion indicates, the territorial legislature, when enacting the precursor to the present statute, apparently endeavored to codify existing constitutional case law regarding searches and seizures. Such legislative intent would not be frustrated by construing the statutory list as illustrative, allowing supplementation later with additional types of property that may be seized under evolving constitutional case law.
This reconciliation approach yields the same result in the present case as does the judicial preemption approach derived from Lewis and Lindner. But the analytical method is more sensitive to the institutional concerns of the legislature on issues of shared responsibility. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by Part I of today’s opinion. I concur fully in the remainder of the opinion.