Court Opinion

ID: 9813792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 23:20:34.534254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:59.390357
License: Public Domain

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree generally with the reasoning of the majority opinion and concur in the judgment. I write separately to emphasize the unique nature of this case.
When one examines the convoluted procedural history of this matter, an initial reaction might be that Watt has not been diligent in pursuing relief. Indeed, a strong argument can be made that Watt did not exercise diligence in seeking vacatur of his state court convictions as he waited nearly four years from the time the district court entered judgment before filing his state court habeas petition. However, this lack of diligence is not material to our analysis, as the majority implicitly recognizes.
Diligence becomes relevant under an AEDPA analysis only when the normal AEDPA statute of limitations has run. This was the situation in Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 125 S.Ct. 1571, 161 L.Ed.2d 542 (2005), in which the Supreme Court held that a petitioner could receive a new limitations period under AEDPA— one year from the vacatur of a state court conviction used to enhance a federal sentence — if the petitioner had exercised “due diligence” in seeking to overturn the state conviction. Id. at 1581-82 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 116(4)). Unlike the petitioner in Johnson, Watt did not require a new limitations period for his claim to be timely. He filed his initial petition in May 1996, one month after AEDPA’s effective date and within the one-year “grace period.” See id. at 1576 (taking judicial notice of the one-year “grace period” for AEDPA claims supplied by the Courts of Appeals). Thus, Watt’s lack of diligence is not relevant to the outcome of this case. And this court’s decision to grant Watt permission to file a new § 2255 motion in 2001 (as opposed to simply ruling on his appeal), *505even if incorrect, does not render Watt’s petition untimely. Thus, despite the extraordinary delay and lack of diligence on the part of the petitioner in this case, I see no alternative for resolution of this case, other than that reflected in the majority opinion.