Court Opinion

ID: 9383053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 15:15:39.423828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.350582
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 22-1841
                              Filed March 29, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF J.D.,
Minor Child,

N.S., Mother,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, Rose Anne

Mefford, District Associate Judge.

      A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.

AFFIRMED.

      Nicole C. Steddom of Heslinga, Dixon & Hite, Oskaloosa, for appellant

mother.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena (until

withdrawal) and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.

      Maddison Audrey Elizabeth Denny of Faulkner, Boerman & Lindgren,

Oskaloosa, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

      Considered by Greer, P.J., Buller, J., and Doyle, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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DOYLE, Senior Judge.

       A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, born in

2019. She challenges the denial of her motion to continue trial and contests the

grounds for terminating her parental rights. She also argues termination is not in

the child’s best interest and asks for more time.           We review termination

proceedings de novo. See In re B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa 2020).

       The events that led to the child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) proceedings

occurred in December 2021. There was an incident involving domestic violence

perpetrated on the mother by the man she identified as the child’s father. The

incident occurred in the child’s presence. There were also concerns that the

mother, who admits she is addicted to methamphetamine, was using again.

Hypodermic needles were kept in the home in a place the child could access them.

When the mother failed to adhere to the safety plan, the juvenile court removed

the child from the home. A CINA adjudication order was entered in February 2022.

       The mother started in-patient treatment in March 2022 but was discharged

unsuccessfully    after   less   than   one   month   and   she   continued   using

methamphetamine. But at the June permanency hearing, the parties agreed to a

three-month extension to allow additional time for reunification and paternity

testing. The test results revealed that the mother named the wrong person as the

child’s father. The mother then offered the names of two other individuals who

could be the child’s father.

       A permanency review hearing was held in September. The court found the

problems that the case permanency plan intended to address had not been solved

and the child could not be returned to the mother’s custody. It denied the mother’s
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request to delay permanency for three more months, ordered paternity testing on

the other possible fathers, and modified the permanency goal to termination and

adoption. The State petitioned to terminate parental rights the next day.

      Three weeks before the termination hearing, the child’s biological father was

identified. The mother moved to continue the proceedings for three months to

“determine whether the minor child may be placed with his biological father” and

“give the mother additional time to engage in treatment and services.” The juvenile

court denied her motion, and the mother challenges that ruling on appeal. We

review the denial of a continuance for an abuse of discretion. See In re M.D., 921

N.W.2d 229, 232 (Iowa 2018). We reverse only if the court acted unreasonably

under the circumstances and caused injustice to the party seeking it. See In re

C.W., 554 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).

      The mother complains that more time was needed to determine whether the

biological father was a suitable placement for the child. She argues that “[h]ad

father been a suitable placement, there would have been no need to terminate the

mother’s parental rights as she could have continued to work towards

reunification.” But we have “consistently rejected challenges to termination of one

parent’s rights based solely on the assertion that the child could or should be

returned to the other parent.” In re C.T., No. 18-2199, 2019 WL 1055897, at *1 n.1

(Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2019) (collecting cases). Thus, the juvenile court did not

abuse its discretion in denying a continuance.

      After the termination hearing, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s

parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (h), and (l) (Supp. 2022).

Although the mother challenges each ground, we may affirm on any ground
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supported by the record. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). To

terminate parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h) the evidence must show:

               (1) The child is three years of age or younger.
               (2) The child has been adjudicated a [CINA] pursuant to
       section 232.96.
               (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
       the child’s parents for at least six of the last twelve months, or for the
       last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been
       less than thirty days.
               (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child
       cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided
       in section 232.102 at the present time.

The mother disputes that the child could not be returned to her care at the time of

the termination hearing.     See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010)

(interpreting the term “at the present time” to mean “at the time of the termination

hearing”).

       Clear and convincing evidence shows the child could not be returned to the

mother’s care at the time of the termination hearing. The mother made no progress

during the CINA proceedings; she did not complete substance-abuse treatment,

she continued to use methamphetamine, her participation in the recommended

mental-health treatment was inconsistent, she struggled to maintain housing, and

her visits with the child remained supervised. The mother’s only argument on

appeal is that the child could be “returned” to the biological father:

       There was nothing in the record to indicate that the child could not
       have been returned to his biological father. Even if that transition
       needed to be slow, the child was in a safe place and receiving loving
       care, and would have continued to receive that care during the
       transition to his father. Such a transition would have prevented the
       need for the mother’s rights to be terminated as the child would have
       been in the care and custody of a parent.

As stated above, this argument is unavailing.
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       Having found the State proved the grounds for termination under

section 232.116(1)(h), we turn our attention to the child’s best interest. In doing

so, we look to the framework described in section 232.116. See In re A.H.B., 791

N.W.2d 687, 690-91 (Iowa 2010). That section requires that we “give primary

consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-

term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional

condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2).

       The mother contends that terminating her parental rights is not in the child’s

best interest because she has a bond with and loves the child, and the child loves

her. But the existence of love and a bond is not determinative. See, e.g., In re

A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 475 (Iowa 2018) (finding termination was in the child’s best

interest even though the mother “unquestionably loves her child and has bonded

with her”). The mother never completed substance-abuse treatment, and she

continues to use methamphetamine. Her methamphetamine use impedes her

ability to meet the child’s needs and presents a safety threat. See In re J.S., 846

N.W.2d 36, 42 (Iowa 2014) (recognizing that “a juvenile court could reasonably

determine that a parent’s active addiction to methamphetamine is ‘imminently

likely’ to result in harmful effects to the physical, mental, or social wellbeing of the

children in the parent’s care”); see also State v. Petithory, 702 N.W.2d 854, 859

(Iowa 2005) (recognizing that leaving a young child in the care of a

methamphetamine user presents a hazard that is “too great”). On this basis, we

concur that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.

       The crux of the mother’s arguments on appeal is that the decision to

terminate is premature and she should be given more time to prove herself. Iowa
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Code section 232.104(2)(b) allows the court to continue the child’s placement for

up to six months if additional time will eliminate the need for the child’s removal.

But to ensure that the court grants an extension only when it is likely to change the

outcome, the legislature requires the court to make specific findings. See Iowa

Code § 232.104(2)(b). The court must “enumerate the specific factors, conditions,

or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination

that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at

the end of the additional six-month period.” Id.

       We cannot find that the child could be returned to the mother’s care in three

months. The mother has a long history of involvement with the juvenile court that

extends before the child’s birth. Permanency was delayed for three months during

the CINA proceedings, and the mother made no improvement. There is no basis

for finding that three more months would benefit the child. See B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d

at 233 (noting a parent’s past performance shows the quality of the future care that

parent can provide). After all, children are not equipped with pause buttons. See

In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 2014) (holding that the court must not

deprive children permanency on the hope that someday the parent will be able to

provide a stable home); In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Iowa 1987) (noting that

if the plan to reconcile parent and child fails, “all extended time must be subtracted

from an already shortened life for the children in a better home”).

       We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

       AFFIRMED.