Court Opinion

ID: 9746603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:29:22.258164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:15.218586
License: Public Domain

OPINION OF THE COURT
FLAHERTY, Justice.
Appellant, Ronald Frank Milton, was convicted of robbery and murder of the first degree in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. After denial of post-verdict motions, a direct appeal was taken to this Court whereupon the judgments of sentence were affirmed. 483 Pa. 9, 394 A.2d 512. Subsequently, a claim for post-conviction relief, based on an assertion of ineffectiveness of counsel, was denied and the present appeal ensued.
The ineffectiveness of counsel claim is grounded upon a failure to preserve in post-trial motions an objection made at trial to the jury charge. The asserted defects in the charge are an incomplete definition of voluntary manslaughter and an improper expression of opinion by the judge with respect to the inappropriateness of a voluntary manslaughter verdict. The challenged portion of the charge is the following:
Let me, therefore, turn to the third offense that has been brought against this individual, and that is Voluntary Manslaughter. I just stated to you that Voluntary Manslaughter is a lesser grade than murder. And Voluntary Manslaughter may be defined for you as the intentional and unlawful killing of a human being without malice-without malice-either expressed or implied, but under the immediate influence of sudden passion resulting from serious provocation. Now, the absence of malice is the controlling element which reduces the unlawful killing to manslaughter.
Voluntary Manslaughter also exists where at the time of the killing the defendant believed the circumstances to *616be such that, if they existed, would have justified the killing, but his belief was unreasonable. I don’t believe that this factor is involved in the present case.
As Voluntary Manslaughter is frequently a wilful [sic] act, to reduce a felonious killing to manslaughter it is necessary that the circumstances indicate the absence of malice, either direct or implied. Therefore, Voluntary Manslaughter exists where there was an intentional act which caused death, but it was administered with a sufficient provocation and while the defendant was either in a state of rage or passion, without time to cool, so that he was placed beyond the control of his reason and suddenly impelled to do the deed. Now, if any of these three factors be lacking, if there is provocation but no passion, or if there is passion without sufficient cause or provocation, or if there has been time to cool off and reason has resumed, then, of course, the killing is not Voluntary Manslaughter by Murder.
Now I don’t want to go into what is “sufficient provocation” and what is not “sufficient provocation” because, while I am submitting this count of the indictment to you for your consideration, it is the conclusion of this Court that Voluntary Manslaughter is really not present here, because there was no provocation offered insofar as this victim was concerned. However, it’s only my opinion and, of course, basically it’s your responsibility to make that determination. Therefore, I have covered with you the essential elements of Voluntary Manslaughter. You have a right, if you find, notwithstanding what I may have said about this case, if you find that there was provocation that made this an intentional killing on the part of this accused, then you may find him guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter. But keep in mind that it must be such provocation as would induce a reasonable man to lose control of his reasoning faculties and to enter into an uncontrollable frenzy which leads him to the use of deadly force, (emphasis added.)
*617Appellant’s brief relies on an excerpt from the charge, wherein the judge stated, “I don’t want to go into what is ‘sufficient provocation,’ ” to infer that a full explanation was not given for the elements of voluntary manslaughter. Examination of the charge in its entirety, however, reveals that the elements of such crime were fully explained. Objection to expression of opinion as to the inappropriateness of a voluntary manslaughter conviction was likewise without merit1 since 1) the jury was fully informed of its power to return a verdict of voluntary manslaughter, and 2) the jury was instructed that it was not bound by the court’s opinion of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 470 Pa. 131, 367 A.2d 719 (1976); Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 362 A.2d 217 (1976); Commonwealth v. Bennett, 471 Pa. 419, 370 A.2d 373 (1977). Counsel’s failure to pursue the patently meritless objection to the jury charge cannot constitute ineffectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977). Hence, relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act was properly denied.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
ROBERTS, J., files a dissenting opinion in which O’BRIEN C. J., joins.

. Appellant does not argue that there was, in fact, evidence which would have supported a verdict of voluntary manslaughter.