Court Opinion

ID: 2964526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:59.010621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:09.007222
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

        No. 96-1089

                                    JOAQUIM CONDE,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  STARLIGHT I, INC.,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1209

                                    JOAQUIM CONDE,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                                  STARLIGHT I, INC.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Robert B. Collings, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
                                             _____________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Cyr, Boudin and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             Thomas  E.  Clinton, with  whom Kathleen  B.  Carr and  Clinton &
             ___________________             __________________      _________
        Muzyka, P.C. were on brief for Starlight I, Inc. 
        ____________
             David  F. Anderson, with whom  Latti Associates was  on brief for
             __________________             ________________
        Joaquim Conde. 

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                   January 9, 1997
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                          2

                    CYR, Circuit Judge.   Plaintiff-appellee Joaquim  Conde
                    CYR, Circuit Judge.
                         _____________

          sustained a permanent injury to his left hand on August 13, 1988,

          while serving as first mate aboard the commercial  fishing vessel

          F/V  ALENTEJO  which was  navigating  in  rough  waters  east  of

          Nantucket on the  Georges Bank.1   Two days  after the  accident,

          Edward Monteiro, an adjuster for the ALENTEJO's insurer, obtained

          an  oral statement from Conde  in Portuguese.   Since Conde could

          speak little English and was unable to read it, Monteiro purport-

          ed  to translate the written  English statement back  to Conde in

          Portuguese.    Unbeknownst  to  Conde, the  statement  he  signed

          indicated that  the ALENTEJO  had been  travelling at  slow speed

          when  the  accident occurred  and it  makes  no mention  of other

          critical facts  about which  Conde had  informed Monteiro in  his

          interview.  For instance, the written statement  omits any refer-

          ence  to the captain's refusal  to slow the  vessel and lower the

          fishing net to  deck-level so  that Conde and  his fellow  worker

          would not  have to stand  on the slippery deck,  from which tiles

          were missing, while repairing the net.

                    In September 1990, Conde brought the present action for

          negligence and  unseaworthiness  against appellant  Starlight  I,

          Inc., owner  of the ALENTEJO.   See 46 U.S.C.    688 (Jones Act);
                                          ___

          Miles  v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 29 (1990) (unseaworthi-
          _____     _________________

          ness).   At trial, the  defense relied heavily  upon the apparent

          discrepancies  between  Conde's trial  testimony and  the written

                                   
               ____________________

               1Almost  six  years  later,  Conde  obtained  a  nonmaritime
          factory job at a reduced salary.

                                          3

          statement he unwittingly gave to Monteiro, the adjuster.   Conde,

          on the other hand, contended that Starlight and Monteiro, antici-

          pating  litigation,  had collaborated  to  misrepresent  the oral

          statement Conde made to Monteiro.  

                    After the  jury awarded Conde $350,000  in damages, the

          district  court  granted  a new  trial  due  to  improper closing

          argument  by Conde's  counsel.   The second  trial resulted  in a

          $968,500  award  to Conde:    $118,500  for  past economic  loss;

          $50,000 for pain and suffering;  and $800,000 for future economic

          loss.  The  district court denied  Starlight's second motion  for

          new  trial, subject to Conde's agreement to remit all damages for

          future  economic loss  above $254,212.50.   On  appeal, Starlight

          challenges both the denial of its second motion for new trial and

          the amount of the remittitur.2  

          I.   Second Motion for New Trial
          I.   Second Motion for New Trial
               ___________________________

                    Starlight  contends  that four  improper  statements by

          Conde's  counsel in closing  argument warrant yet  a third trial.

          First,  counsel  observed,   without  evidentiary  support,  that

          Monteiro  and  defense  attorney  Thomas  Clinton,  Esquire, were

          "friends"  and  had "been  working  together  for twenty  years."

          Starlight argues that the  veiled reference to possible collusion

          between Monteiro  and Clinton was wholly  immaterial and deliber-

          ately inflammatory.   We find no abuse of  discretion.  See Ahern
                                                                  ___ _____
                                   
               ____________________

               2Since we deny Starlight's appeal, we need not reach Conde's
          contingent  cross-appeal from the  district court  order granting
          Starlight's first motion  for new  trial.  We  assume that  Conde
          would opt for a reduced total remittitur of $364,736, rather than
          reinstatement of the first jury award (i.e., $350,000).

                                          4

          v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 780 (1st Cir. 1996).  
             ______

                    Monteiro  testified  on  redirect  examination  that he

          asked  Conde  to sign  the August  15,  1988, statement  in three

          places for  Conde's own  "protection," to prevent  its alteration

          after  it left Monteiro's  possession.   Later in  his testimony,

          however, Monteiro admitted that  he himself had given the  state-

          ment directly  to Thomas  Clinton, Esquire, Starlight's  counsel.

          When  asked whether  he had  known Clinton  well prior  to August

          1988,  Monteiro  acknowledged that  they  were  on a  "first-name

          basis," and had worked together previously.  

                    We normally presume that a jury follows instructions to

          disregard improper argumentation.  See Greer v. Miller,  483 U.S.
                                             ___ _____    ______

          756, 766 n.8  (1987); Sweeney  v. Westvaco Co.,  926 F.2d 29,  36
                                _______     ____________

          (1st Cir.),  cert. denied, 502 U.S.  899 (1991).  So  it is here.
                       _____ ______

          After  Clinton  objected  to the  remark  by  Conde's  counsel in

          closing argument, the court promptly cautioned  the jury that the

          evidence did  not establish  a "friendship" between  Monteiro and

          Clinton.  Moreover, Monteiro's business relationship with Clinton
                                         ________ ____________

          was in evidence.   Finally, the Monteiro-Clinton relationship was

          at  least somewhat  probative of  the plausibility  of Monteiro's

          testimony concerning  why he  considered it necessary  that Conde

          sign the August 15, 1988, statement in three places.  

                    Second,  Starlight relies  on a  closing remark  to the

          effect  that  the  captain's  consumption  of  several  alcoholic

          beverages as late as the evening meal the day of the accident had

          impaired his judgment, and likely explained his negligent refusal

                                          5

          to slow  the vessel  and lower the  net as  Conde had  requested.

          Although another fishing vessel  captain testified that no vessel

          captain should  consume alcohol while navigating  a vessel, Star-

          light  insists that it was  necessary for Conde  to adduce expert

          toxicological evidence as to how the particular  level of alcohol

          consumption  established by  the evidence typically  would impair

          human judgment. 

                    The authorities cited by Starlight simply stand for the

          thesis that expert toxicological testimony  may be used to estab-
                                                      ___

          lish  the likely  effects of  alcohol.   See Armand  v. Louisiana
                                                   ___ ______     _________

          Power & Light Co., 482 So.2d 802, 804 (Ct. App. La. 1986) ("[A]ll
          _________________

          experts agreed that .30% or .23% [blood alcohol] would impair the

          motor abilities  and judgment  of anyone.");  see also People  v.
                                                        ___ ____ ______

          Modesto,  427 P.2d 788, 790  (Cal.), cert. denied,  389 U.S. 1009
          _______                              _____ ______

          (1967), overruled  on other grounds, Maine v. Superior Court, 438
                  _________  __ _____ _______  _____    ______________

          P.2d 372,  377 n.8 (Cal. 1968).   These authorities in  no manner

          suggest that such  testimony is invariably required.   Cf., e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          United  States v. Hillsberg, 812  F.2d 328, 333  (7th Cir.) ("The
          ______________    _________

          jury  would likely have little knowledge of the effects of mental

          diseases and defects.  Laymen do have occasion, however, to learn

          the effects of alcohol."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). 
                                     _____ ______

                    Third, Starlight contends  that repeated references  to

          Monteiro as an "adjuster," during direct and redirect examination

          and  in  closing remarks  by  Conde's  counsel, violated  Federal

          Evidence Rule 411 ("Evidence that a person was or was not insured

          against  liability is not  admissible upon the  issue whether the

                                          6

          person acted  negligently or otherwise wrongfully.").   We do not

          agree.  

                    For  one thing,  Starlight  did not  object to  Conde's

          repeated  references  to  Monteiro  as  an "adjuster"  throughout

          either the  first or second  trial.   Thus, the tardiness  of its

          objection calls into serious  question whether the litigants, let

          alone the jury, inferred that Monteiro  was an "insurance adjust-
                                                          _________

          er," cf., e.g., NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local
               ___  ____  ____    _________________________________________

          340, 481  U.S. 573,  581 (1987)  (union's "grievance  adjuster or
          ___

          collective  bargainer"); Ferguson  v. Skrupa,  372 U.S.  726, 732
                                   ________     ______

          (1963)  ("debt  adjuster"),  let  alone  that  Starlight  carried

          liability insurance.  In all events, Rule 411 does permit mention

          of insurance coverage, not  to prove negligence, but collaterally

          to show  the  possible "bias  or prejudice  of a  witness."   See
                                                                        ___

          Pinkham  v. Burgess, 933 F.2d  1066, 1072 (1st  Cir. 1991) ("Rule
          _______     _______

          411  itself contemplates  that  evidence that  the defendant  was

          insured  may be  admissible on  issues other  than negligence.");

          Charter v. Chleborad, 551  F.2d 246, 248 (8th Cir.)  ("[T]he fact
          _______    _________

          that defendant's insurer employed  [a witness] was clearly admis-

          sible to show possible bias of that witness."), cert. denied, 434
                                                          _____ ______

          U.S.  856  (1977).     Starlight's  entire  defense  centered  on

          Monteiro's  credibility  in regard  to  the  authenticity of  his

          "translation" of Conde's August 15, 1988 statement.

                    Finally,  Starlight argues  that Conde's  attorney once

          again  argued  facts not  in evidence,  and  invited the  jury to

          engage in rank speculation, by noting that the captain might have

                                          7

          been steaming the ALENTEJO full speed ahead in an attempt to flee

          Canadian waters before Canadian patrol boats detected the vessel.

          On  the contrary, according to Starlight's own expert, based on a

          reverse extrapolation  of its known course  immediately after the

          accident,  the ALENTEJO probably had been on the Canadian side of

          the Hague Line just  prior to the accident.   This circumstantial

          evidence  combined powerfully  with the  captain's  own testimony

          that he previously  served aboard  a fishing vessel  seized by  a

          Canadian patrol boat and that he knew on August 13, 1988 that the

          same  Canadian  patrol  boat  was  within  one-half  mile  of the

          ALENTEJO. II.  The Remittitur
                    II.  The Remittitur
                         ______________

                    Starlight claims that the trial court miscalculated the

          remittitur  at $254,212.50.3   Starlight  first projects  a total

          future economic loss  as low  as $27,199, by  using Conde's  1987

          income, rather than the  higher 1988 income figure, for  arriving

          at a  base annual salary.   As  Conde was injured  in mid-August,

          1988, however, the  jury reasonably could have looked  to Conde's

          higher 1988  income projection as  a more accurate  reflection of

          his  future  earning power  than the  1987  income.   See Eastern
                                                                ___ _______

          Mountain Platform  Tennis, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams  Co., 40 F.3d
          _______________________________    _____________________

          492, 502 (1st Cir.  1994) (in ruling on remittitur  motion, court

          examines evidence "in  the light most favorable to the prevailing

          party");  see also Jones &  Laughlin Steel Corp.  v. Pfeifer, 462
                    ___ ____ _____________________________     _______
                                   
               ____________________

               3Once a district  court has decided to  exercise its discre-
          tion  to grant a remittitur, appellant "must  show . . . that the
          reduced  figure remains so extravagant as  to shock the appellate
          conscience." Sanchez v.  Puerto Rico  Oil Co., 37  F.3d 712,  724
                       _______     ____________________
          (1st Cir. 1994).

                                          8

          U.S. 523,  538 (1983)  ("It is both  easier and  more precise  to

          discount  the entire lost stream of earnings  back to the date of

          injury  --  the  moment  from  which  earning  capacity  was  im-

          paired.").4

                    Starlight next argues that  the 3% per annum adjustment

          for inflation  in "non-agricultural" workers' wages  from 1988 to

          1995 (i.e., 20.25% in aggregate) was  excessive because a commer-
                ____

          cial  fisherman would  not be  classified as  a "non-agricultural

          worker" and  recent federal restrictions upon  commercial fishing

          on  Georges Bank  have  depressed fishermen's  wages.   Starlight

          offers no evidentiary  support for its contention  that a commer-

          cial fisherman  would not qualify as  a "non-agricultural" worker

          (i.e., one who does  not cultivate land) for purposes of the 1995
           ____

          Economic  Report of  the President,  which the  parties otherwise

          stipulated  as  a  source of  the  applicable  "non-agricultural"

          inflation rate.  Nor did Starlight  adduce any evidence as to how

          its suggested offset  to the stipulated inflation rate  should be

          calculated.    We  therefore  conclude  that  it  has  failed  to

          demonstrate any "conscience-shocking"  adjustment in  calculating

          an inflation rate.  See supra note 3. 
                              ___ _____

                    Finally, Starlight argues that the trial court used the

          $118,500  jury  award for  past  economic loss  to  calculate the
                                   
               ____________________

               4Although Conde earned $35,930  in gross income during 1987,
          he  incurred extraordinary  unreimbursed work  expenses ($19,404)
          which effectively reduced his annual income to only $16,526.  See
                                                                        ___
          Jones & Laughlin, 462 U.S. at 534 (recommending that unreimbursed
          ________________
          work expenses be deducted before estimating future lost stream of
          income).   This figure  is substantially lower  than Conde's pro-
          jected 1988 gross income of $22,332.  See infra note 7. 
                                                ___ _____

                                          9

          relevant "base year" salary (i.e., Conde's lost income for  1995)
                                       ____

          with which  to extrapolate his future  (i.e., post-1995) economic
                                                  ____

          loss, rather than predicating the base figure calculation direct-

          ly on the trial  evidence.5  Although neither we  nor the parties

          have been able to reconstruct the exact mathematical calculations

          utilized by  the district court,6  the trial evidence,  viewed in

          the light most  favorable to  Conde, would  yield an  approximate

                                   
               ____________________

               5The court explained its methodology as follows: 

                    In determining  the figure  to which to  remit the
               award  for loss  of  future earning  capacity, I  shall
               endeavor to arrive at the maximum figure which the jury
               could have awarded using as a guide the amount the jury
               awarded the plaintiff  for lost wages from  the date of
               the  accident  to  the   date  of  the  verdict,  i.e.,
               $118,500.   For this purpose, I shall  assume the jury,
               in arriving at the  $118,500 figure, deducted an amount
               for what  was earned  and what  could have  been earned
               after the plaintiff reached  an end medical result.   I
               shall also take into account the fact that the wages of
               non-agricultural workers from 1988 to 1995 rose approx-
               imately 3%  a year  or 20.25%  over the entire  period.
               After  making  these  adjustments,  what  results is  a
               figure of expected earnings for  1995 in the amount  of
               $29,020.  I  shall then  apply a reduction  of 20%  for
               taxes  and a 1% discount  rate to arrive  at the amount
               the plaintiff would have earned over the 26 year period
               of his work expectancy reduced to present value.  Using
               this methodology,  the result is  $254,212.[50]. (Foot-
               notes omitted.)

               6As future loss calculations are multiplex, effective appel-
          late review may be greatly inhibited by any lack of particularity
          in  the trial  court's methodology.   Given these  latent ambigu-
          ities, we could remand  to the district court for  clarification,
          see Jones & Laughlin,  462 U.S. at 546, 552  (refusing invitation
          ___ ________________
          to adopt one calculation  methodology as "the exclusive method"),
          but  for  reasons of  judicial economy  we  opt to  calculate the
          maximum  future  economic loss  based  directly  on the  evidence
          before the jury.  See infra note 7.
                            ___ _____

                                          10

          discounted future economic loss of $196,236.7  

                    The  unknowable and unquantifiable  factors involved in

          calculating  a future stream of lost  income (e.g., future infla-
                                                        ____

          tion rates;  actual work  life), militate  against "a search  for

          'delusive exactness,'" since "[i]t  is perfectly obvious that the

          most detailed inquiry can at best produce an approximate result."

          Jones  & Laughlin, 462 U.S. at 546,  552.  Even viewing the trial
          _________________

          evidence most generously to Conde, however, the $254,212.50 award

          for future economic loss effectively disregards a significant and

          practicably  quantifiable  factor:   the  need  to reduce  future

          economic loss to present value, even if  only by the most conser-

          vative discount figure (1%), see supra note 7, particularly since
                                       ___ _____

          the parties stipulated below  that some "present value" reduction
                      __________

          would be appropriate, albeit  reserving the precise discount rate
                                   
               ____________________

               7Viewing the evidence most  favorably to Conde, the alterna-
          tive remittitur amounts would work out as follows: 

          Annual gross income from 1/88 to 8/88             $    14,106
          Extrapolated income from 8/88 to 12/88            +     8,816
          Unreimbursed work expenses                        -       590
                                                                 ______
          Total projected gross income for 1988                  22,332
          Inflation rate between 1988-95 (20.25)            +     4,522
                                                                 ______
          Adjusted projected annual gross income (1995)          26,854
          Actual gross income for factory job (1995)        -    15,080
                                                                 ______
          Total loss of annual gross income (1995)               11,774
          Taxes on lost income (@ 1988 rate of 16.97%)      -     1,998
                                                                 ______
          Net annual lost income (1995)                           9,776
          Remaining work life in 1995 (26 years)            x        26
                                                                 ______
          Total lost future income stream                       254,176
          Discounted to present value (@ 1%)                    196,236
          Discounted to present value (@ 2%)                    151,890
          Discounted to present value (@ 3%)                    117,860

               Although   the  $254,212.50  remittitur  calculated  by  the
          district court  purportedly factored in  a 1% discount  rate, see
                                                                        ___
          infra note 8, it actually approximates our pre-discount amount of
          _____                                      ___
          $254,176.

                                          11

          (1% or  2%).  Cf. id.  at 548 (noting  that use of  discount rate
                        ___ ___

          between  1% and 3%  in Jones  Act case would  not be  an abuse of

          discretion).8

          III. Conclusion
          III. Conclusion
               __________

                    Given  these somewhat less  "elusive" circumstances, we

          conclude that the 30% discrepancy between the $254,212.50 and the

          $196,236 economic-loss figures  is sufficiently quantifiable  and

          substantial that it ought not stand.   Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil
                                                 _______    _______________

          Co., 37 F.3d 712, 724 (1st  Cir. 1994); cf. Jones & Laughlin, 462
          ___                                     ___ ________________

          U.S. at 552 (noting that jury  awards for pain and suffering  are

          "highly  impressionistic"); Ruiz v.  Gonzalez Caraballo, 929 F.2d
                                      ____     __________________

          31,  34 (1st Cir. 1991) ("After  all, '[t]ranslating legal damage

          [viz., physical effects  of post-traumatic stress  syndrome] into
           ____

          money damages -- especially in  cases which involve few  signifi-

          cant  items of measurable economic loss -- is a matter peculiarly

                                   
               ____________________

               8Using a  "market  interest" rate  (e.g.,  6%) to  reduce  a
                                                   ____
          future-earnings award to present  value recognizes that, at least
          in an inflation-free economy, the plaintiff's immediate accession
          to a lump-sum award  would enable him to  earn interest by  rein-
          vestment, an opportunity not available to him had the same amount
          been earned incrementally over  time.  See Jones &  Laughlin, 462
                                                 ___ _________________
          U.S.  at  536-37  n.20  ("present value"  reduction  premised  on
          plaintiff's  duty  to  mitigate  damages).   In  an  inflationary
          economy,  however, a discount rate (or  offset) below the "market
          interest"  rate (e.g.,  1  or 2%,  instead of  6%)  may be  used,
                           ____
          because  even though Conde did  not adduce specific evidence from
          which  to forecast  actual inflation  rates in  future years,  it
          nonetheless may be presumed  that anticipated future inflationary
          trends will tend  to curtail investment  returns at levels  below
          the market rate.  Id. at  538-39.  Although the Supreme Court has
                            ___
          declined  to mandate  a  single "present  value"  reduction or  a
          single  discount  methodology for  use in  all Jones  Act damages
          calculations, see id. at  550, absent extraordinary circumstances
                        ___ ___
          the  factfinder normally  should essay  some measure  of "present
                                                  ____
          value" reduction. 

                                          12

          within  a jury's  ken.'") (quoting Wagenmann  v. Adams,  829 F.2d
                                             _________     _____

          196,  215 (1st  Cir. 1987)).   Accordingly,  we direct  a further

          remittitur.  See Kolb v.  Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 875  (1st
                       ___ ____     ______________

          Cir. 1982) (appellate court  may order a new trial,  in the event

          claimant rejects  further remittitur, where trial  court error in

          calculating remittitur was clear and mere "mechanical" correction

          is required) (citing Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 608 F.2d
                               _________    _____________________

          571, 574 n.7  (5th Cir. 1979)); Everett v. S.H.  Parks & Assocs.,
                                          _______    ______________________

          Inc., 697 F.2d 250, 253 (8th Cir. 1983). 
          ____

                    The district court ruling denying defendant-appellant's
                    The district court ruling denying defendant-appellant's
                    _______________________________________________________

          motion  for new  trial is  affirmed.   The remittitur  for future
          motion  for new  trial is  affirmed.   The remittitur  for future
          _________________________________________________________________

          economic loss is further  reduced to $196,236.  Upon  remand, the
          economic loss is further  reduced to $196,236.  Upon  remand, the
          _________________________________________________________________

          district court should fix an appropriate time within which plain-
          district court should fix an appropriate time within which plain-
          _________________________________________________________________

          tiff-appellee must either accept the revised remittitur or submit
          tiff-appellee must either accept the revised remittitur or submit
          _________________________________________________________________

          to a new trial on damages  for future economic loss.  The parties
          to a new trial on damages  for future economic loss.  The parties
          _________________________________________________________________

          shall bear their own costs.  
          shall bear their own costs.
          __________________________

                    SO ORDERED.
                    SO ORDERED.
                    __________

                                          13