Court Opinion

ID: 9409987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 00:00:32.773483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:54.765140
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10575   Document: 00516826622   Page: 1   Date Filed: 07/19/2023

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                     Fifth Circuit

                           ____________                            FILED
                                                               July 19, 2023
                             No. 22-10575                     Lyle W. Cayce
                           ____________                            Clerk

   In the Matter of Highland Capital Management, L.P.

                                                               Debtor,

   NexPoint Advisors, L.P., Appellant/Creditor/Party in
   Interest 11 U.S.C. 1109(b),

                                                           Appellant,

                                versus

   Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones, L.L.P.,
   Appellee/Retained Professional; Wilmer Cutler
   Pickering Hale and Dorr, L.L.P.; FTI Consulting,
   Incorporated; Teneo Capital, L.L.C.; Sidley Austin,
   L.L.P.,

                                                            Appellees,
                          _____________

   NexPoint Advisors, L.P.,

                                                           Appellant,

                                versus

   Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, L.L.P.,

                                                             Appellee,
                          _____________
Case: 22-10575    Document: 00516826622       Page: 2    Date Filed: 07/19/2023

   NexPoint Advisors, L.P.,

                                                                 Appellant,

                                    versus

   Teneo Capital, L.L.C.,

                                                                   Appellee,
                             _____________

   NexPoint Advisors, L.P.,

                                                                 Appellant,

                                    versus

   Sidley Austin, L.L.P.,

                                                                   Appellee,
                             _____________

   NexPoint Advisors, L.P.,

                                                                 Appellant,

                                    versus

   FTI Consulting, Incorporated,

                                                                   Appellee.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Texas
                  USDC Nos. 3:21-CV-3086, 3:21-CV-3088,
                        3:21-CV-3094, 3:21-CV-3096,
                                3:21-CV-3104
                 ______________________________

                                      2
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                                    No. 22-10575

   Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
          The bankruptcy court, administering a complex bankruptcy,
   dismissed NexPoint Advisors, LP’s objection to professional fees paid to
   myriad organizations. NexPoint appealed to the district court, sitting as an
   appellate court. The district court dismissed for lack of standing to appeal.
   NexPoint appeals. We AFFIRM.
                                         I.
          Highland Capital Management filed for bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.
   § 301 in October 2019 in Delaware. The following month, the Delaware
   bankruptcy court issued an Order Establishing Procedures for Interim
   Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses of Professionals, providing a set
   of procedures for professionals involved in the bankruptcy to seek payment,
   and for other related parties to challenge their applications. The order reads
   in relevant part:
          Neither (i) the payment of or the failure to pay, in whole or in
          part, interim compensation and/or reimbursement of or the
          failure to reimburse, in whole or in part, expenses under the
          Interim Compensation Procedures nor (ii) the filing or failure
          to file an Objection will bind any party in interest or the Court
          with respect to the final allowance of applications for payment
          of compensation and reimbursement of expenses of
          Professionals. All fees and expenses paid to Professionals
          under the Interim Compensation Procedures are subject to
          disgorgement until final allowance by the Court.

   On the same day, the Delaware bankruptcy court transferred the bankruptcy
   to the bankruptcy court of the Northern District of Texas.
          By February 2021, the Texas bankruptcy court had approved the
   Debtor’s reorganization plan and granted related relief, providing in part that

                                         3
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                                          No. 22-10575

   final professional fee claims were to be filed within 60 days. Five
   organizations timely did so: (i) Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones, LLP
   (“PSZJ” 1), (ii) Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr (“WilmerHale” 2 and,
   together with PSZJ, the “Debtor’s Professionals”), (iii) Sidley Austin, LLP
   (“Sidley” 3), (iv) FTI Consulting, Inc. (“FTI” 4), and (v) Teneo Capital,
   LLC (“Teneo” 5 and, with FTI and Sidley, the “Committee Professionals”
   and, with the Debtor’s Professionals, the “Appellees”).
          NexPoint timely objected, urging “failure to properly serve the Final
   Applications and provide notice of the applicable objection deadline(s)
   thereto” as established by the bankruptcy court’s order. NexPoint also
   requested leave to supplement the record if an extra inspection found
   additional grounds for opposition. The Debtor’s Professionals and the
   Committee’s Professionals filed their respective replies.
          At the Final Fee Hearing, the bankruptcy court denied NexPoint’s
   requests for discovery and review. The bankruptcy court first took issue with
   the timing of NexPoint’s objections and request. Conceding that “no one is
   bound by an interim fee approval order,” the court expressed its concerns
   that NexPoint objected “at the end of the case,” observing that “now we
   need much more time because there’s so much to review [requiring] a fee
   examiner.” Turning to the merit of the objection, the judge observed:
          The fees are high, but they’re not eye-popping. They’re not
          Purdue Pharma. They’re not Boy Scouts. They’re not PG&E.
          _____________________
          1
              Debtor’s general bankruptcy counsel.
          2
              Debtor’s regulatory and compliance counsel.
          3
            Counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in Debtor’s
   bankruptcy (the “Committee”).
          4
              The Committee’s financial advisor.
          5
              The Committee’s litigation advisor.

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                                     No. 22-10575

          You know, for a case where there were well over a billion
          dollars of claims asserted, if they in the aggregate are
          approaching $50 million, I’m not terribly surprised, given what
          I’ve seen.

   The bankruptcy judge orally approved Appellees’ fee applications at the
   hearing and entered the five final orders approving the fee applications days
   later. NexPoint timely appealed to the district court.
          After consolidating the appeals, the district court dismissed
   NexPoint’s challenge for lack of appellate standing in bankruptcy appeals.
   First, the district court rejected NexPoint’s challenge to this Court’s
   “aggrieved person” standard and concluded that NexPoint lacked standing
   by that standard despite its administrative fee claims and status as a
   defendant in an adversary proceeding. The district court then rejected
   NexPoint’s alternative argument that, the “person aggrieved” standard
   aside, it had standing to appeal the orders under Sections 330 and 1109 of the
   bankruptcy code and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This appeal
   followed.
                                         II.
          NexPoint forwards several arguments in support of its standing to
   challenge the district court’s orders: (1) that its status as a defendant in a
   related adversary proceeding confers standing under the “person aggrieved”
   test; (2) that prudential standing considerations such as the “person
   aggrieved” standard did not survive Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
   Components, Inc., 6 and that it meets traditional Article III standing
   requirements; (3) that by a prior ruling of this Court, the “person aggrieved”
   standard is more capacious than its application here and confers NexPoint

          _____________________
          6
              572 U.S. 118 (2014).

                                          5
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                                             No. 22-10575

   standing to seek review of the challenged orders; and (4) that related
   bankruptcy provisions confer standing. 7 None persuade.
                                                   A.
           “In ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial
   and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the
   complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining
   party.” 8 “Standing is a question of law that we review de novo.” 9
           “Bankruptcy courts are not authorized by Article III of the
   Constitution, and as such are not presumptively bound by traditional rules of
   judicial standing.” 10 Rather, standing was governed by statute, which read:
   “A person aggrieved by an order of a referee may . . . file with the referee a
   petition for review . . . .” 11 Congress expressly removed this provision when
   it enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. 12 Despite its removal, we have
   affirmed that the “person aggrieved” test continues to govern standing in
   bankruptcy proceedings. 13

           _____________________
           7
             NexPoint presents its arguments in a different order and using different
   organizational headings. However, we disentangle these arguments to evaluate and
   adjudicate them based on the separate legal principles and considerations each engenders.
           8
              In re Coho Energy Inc., 395 F.3d 198, 202 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rohm & Hass
   Tex., Inc. v. Ortiz Bros. Insulation, Inc., 32 F.3d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1994)).
           9
             Matter of Technicool Sys., Inc. (In re Technicool), 896 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (citing Fortune Nat. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 806 F.3d 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2015)).
           10
                In re Coho, 395 F.3d at 202 (citing Rohm, 32 F.3d at 210 n.18).
           11
                Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1976) (repealed 1978)).
           12
                See id.
           13
                See id. (citing Rohm, 32 F.3d at 210 n.18).

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                                            No. 22-10575

           The test—which we have repeatedly described as “‘more exacting’
   than the test for Article III standing” 14—holds that an appellant must show
   it was “directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the order of the
   bankruptcy court.” 15 “In essence, bankruptcy standing requires ‘a higher
   causal nexus between act and injury’” than traditional standing, 16 one that
   we have repeatedly deployed 17 and that best deals with the unique posture of
   bankruptcy actions:
           Bankruptcy cases often involve numerous parties with
           conflicting and overlapping interests. Allowing each and every
           party to appeal each and every order would clog up the system
           and bog down the courts. Given the specter of such sclerotic
           litigation, standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order is, of
           necessity, quite limited. 18

           NexPoint pointed to two different sources of “aggrievement”: (1) its
   administrative claim, and (2) its role as a defendant in a pending adversary

           _____________________
           14
             In re Technicool, 896 F.3d at 385 (quoting Matter of Delta Produce, L.P., 845 F.3d
   609, 619 (5th Cir. 2016)).
           15
               Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Fortune Nat. Res., 806 F.3d at 366); see also Dean
   v. Seidel (In re Dean), 18 F.4th 842, 844 (5th Cir. 2021) (observing that bankruptcy standing
   “is an even more exacting standard than traditional constitutional standing” (quoting
   Fortune Nat. Res., 806 F.3d at 366)); In re Coho, 395 F.3d at 203 (using identical “more
   exacting” language).
           16
                In re Technicool, 896 F.3d at 385–86 (quoting Fortune Nat. Res., 806 F.3d at 366).
           17
            See, e.g., In re Coho, 395 F.3d at 202–04 (using the “person aggrieved” standard);
   Di Ferrante v. Young (In re Young), 416 F. App’x 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (per
   curiam) (using this “high bar for standing” vis-à-vis Di Ferrante); Schum v. Zwirn Special
   Opportunities Fund LP (In re Watch Ltd.), 257 F. App’x 748, 749–50 (5th Cir. 2007)
   (unpublished) (per curiam) (evaluating an appellant’s standing under the same test).
           18
                In re Technicool, 896 F.3d at 385 (emphasis added).

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                                             No. 22-10575

   proceeding. 19 Regarding the administrative claim, the district court reasoned
   that because it was “extremely remote” that NexPoint’s claim would not be
   paid, NexPoint lacks standing because its theory of harm is too remote or
   speculative. And regarding the adversary proceedings, the district court
   concluded that because this pertains to a separate proceeding, “[a]t most,
   [NexPoint] could be indirectly impacted by the Fee Application Orders, but
   only if [NexPoint] was to be found liable in the Adversary Proceeding,”
   meaning the harm was again too “speculative” and “not sufficient to confer
   standing.” 20 The able district court’s assessments are sound.
           The bankruptcy court disallowed NexPoint’s administrative expense
   claim, denying it recovery from the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate. This alone
   takes the legs from NexPoint’s argument, for if it is not entitled to
   administrative expenses the payout of professional expenses to others cannot
   impact its finances. Accepting this reality, it shifts gears, observing that
   “[a]lthough [the district court’s] holding[] [is] incorrect, NexPoint’s
   arguments here will focus principally on the Adversary Proceeding.”
           Turning then to the adversary proceeding, NexPoint fares no better.
   As there is at present no judgment or order or process to require NexPoint to
   pay any fees as a result of the adversary proceeding, “the speculative
   prospect of harm is far from a direct, adverse, pecuniary hit,” 21 particularly
   so when such a harm would be felt indirectly via a separate proceeding. 22

           _____________________
           19
            Notably, NexPoint also relied upon their prepetition claims, but, as the district
   court observed, “all of [them] have been either expunged or withdrawn,” meaning
   arguments relying thereupon are effectively moot.
           20
                Emphases added.
           21
                In re Technicool, 896 F.3d at 386.
           22
            See id. at 384 (“Furlough’s indirect interest in the order fails to meet the strict
   requirements for bankruptcy standing.”).

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                                              No. 22-10575

   Indeed, as Appellees’ counsel observed at oral argument, no less than seven
   different “ifs” must come to pass for the bankruptcy’s order in this action to
   impact NexPoint. 23 And the adversary proceeding upon which those “ifs”
   rest has since been stayed, further diminishing the likelihood NexPoint will
   be harmed by the bankruptcy court orders. 24 In sum, NexPoint fails to
   establish that the adversary proceeding “directly, adversely, and financially
   impact[s]” it beyond anything other than mere speculation. 25
                                                  B.
           NexPoint then pivots, urging that the “person aggrieved” standard
   did not survive the Supreme Court’s Lexmark decision. We disagree.
   Lexmark addressed standing in false advertising claims under the Lanham
   Act. 26 The Supreme Court reminded that courts may not “limit a cause of
   action that Congress has created merely because ‘prudence’ dictates.” 27
   NexPoint runs with this language, arguing that it nullifies the “person
   aggrieved” test for prudential standing in bankruptcy actions.

           _____________________
           23
               As represented at oral argument, these “ifs” include: (1) certain related parties
   filing certain claims against parties related to NexPoint; (2) a different court proceeding to
   adjudicate those claims, (3) that proceeding resulting in a judgment against the related
   entities; (4) a separate proceeding to determine that NexPoint is an alter-ego of those
   entities against whom the judgment was entered; (5) the court then ruling to include fees
   from this bankruptcy case in that judgment; (6) the same court concluding that NexPoint
   is foreclosed from arguing the reasonableness of these fees; and (7) additional courts
   unanimously upholding these decisions.
           24
               See Notice of Supplemental Authority at 1, NexPoint Advisors v. Pachulski Stang
   et al., No. 22-10575 (5th Cir. Apr. 19, 2023) (Dkt. No. 84).
           25
                In re Dean, 18 F.4th at 844 (quoting In re Technicool, 896 F.3d at 384).
           26
                See generally 572 U.S. 118.
           27
                Id. at 128.

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           But it is settled that “[f]or a Supreme Court decision to override a
   Fifth Circuit case, the decision must unequivocally overrule prior precedent;
   mere illumination of a case is insufficient,” 28 that “an intervening change in
   the law [cannot be] a mere ‘hint’ of how the [Supreme] Court might rule in
   the future.” 29 Yet Lexmark focuses solely on standing under the Lanham
   Act, 30 and the year after Lexmark was decided, we expressly held in Superior
   MRI Services Inc. v. Alliance Healthcare Services, Inc. that Lexmark “deals only
   with the zone-of-interests test and not with the requirement that a party
   assert its own rights.” 31 In other words, this Court found Lexmark to reach
   only circumstances analogous to those at issue in Lexmark, rather than
   broadly modifying—or undermining—all prudential standing concerns, such
   as the one animating the “person aggrieved” standard in bankruptcy appeals.
   And post-Lexmark, this Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the “person
   aggrieved” standard in analogous situations, implicitly affirming its life post-
   Lexmark. 32

           _____________________
           28
              Gahagan v. U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs., 911 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Petras, 879 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 2018)); see
   also Carter v. S. Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 1990) (requiring adherence to a prior
   panel’s interpretation “unless that interpretation is irreconcilable with” a later Supreme
   Court decision).
           29
               Hines v. Quillivan, 982 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2020) (second alteration in
   original) (quoting United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013)); Petras, 879
   F.3d at 164 (holding that “mere illumination of a case is insufficient” to abrogate our circuit
   precedent).
           30
                See generally 572 U.S. 118.
           31
                778 F.3d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
           32
             See Azby Fund v. Wadsworth Ests., L.L.C., No. 22-30092, 2022 WL 17582273, at
   *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 12, 2022) (unpublished) (per curiam) (“Typically, ‘[t]o determine
   whether a party has standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order, this court uses the
   “person aggrieved” test.’” (quoting In re Dean, 18 F.4th at 844) (alteration in original));
   In re Mar. Commun./Land Mobile L.L.C., 745 F. App’x. 561, 562 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (unpublished) (per curiam) (citing and deploying the “person aggrieved” test); Kingdom

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                                           No. 22-10575

              We are yet to address directly the “person aggrieved” standing in
   light of Lexmark. Superior MRI concerned a contractual claim following a
   Chapter 7 bankruptcy rather than a district court’s appellate review of a
   bankruptcy court order, and other published precedent has not explicitly
   addressed this argument. 33 As Superior MRI’s reasoning applies with equal
   force and certitude here, we do so now: Lexmark does not expressly reach
   prudential concerns in bankruptcy appeals and brought no change relevant
   here. 34
                                                C.
              NexPoint also argues that the current law of “person aggrieved” is
   unsound, pointing to this Court’s 1995 decision in Cajun Electric Power
   Cooperative v. Central Louisiana Electric Cooperative. 35 There, we held: “To
   have standing to appeal a bankruptcy order, a party must show that it was

              _____________________
   Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Stokes Law Office, L.L.P. (In re Delta Produce, L.P.), 845 F.3d 609, 619
   (5th Cir. 2016) (same); Fortune Natural Res., 806 F.3d at 366 (same).
              33
              See Matter of Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 57 F.4th 494, 501 (5th Cir. 2023)
   (affirming that “[t]his circuit uses the ‘person aggrieved’ standard to determine whether a
   party has standing to appeal a bankruptcy court order” without discussing Lexmark
   (citation omitted)); In re Dean, 18 F.4th at 844; In re Technicool, 896 F.3d at 385–86; Lejeune
   v. JFK Capital Holdings, L.L.C. (In re JFK Capital Holdings, L.L.C.), 880 F.3d 747, 751 (5th
   Cir. 2018) (stating that “[w]e use the ‘person aggrieved’ test to determine whether a party
   has standing to appeal an order of the bankruptcy court” without discussing Lexmark
   (citation omitted)).
              34
              As well, among a series of Rule 28(j) letters, Appellant points us to, inter alia, a
   recent Ninth Circuit case that appears to deploy Article III standing as the threshold
   jurisdictional hurdle before resorting to the “person aggrieved” standard. Letter, No. 22-
   10575 (5th Cir. June 20, 2023) (Dkt. No. 92); see Matter of E. Coast Foods, Inc., 66 F.4th
   1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 167
   (2014)). It is not offended by the more exacting “person aggrieved” metric attending the
   disposition of bankruptcy claims like the one at issue.
              35
              Matter of Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., Inc., 69 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Cajun
   Electric”), opinion withdrawn in part on reh’g, 74 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 1996).

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                                           No. 22-10575

   ‘directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by’ the order or that the order
   diminished its property, increased its burdens, or impaired its rights.” 36
   NexPoint focuses on the disjunctive “or” and the latter clause—which, by
   its text, allows for appeals absent monetary harm—arguing that later
   iterations inappropriately distorted the standard for bankruptcy standing by
   requiring such a financial detriment. Appellees counter: (1) NexPoint failed
   to raise this argument to the district court, forfeiting it; and (2) adopting
   arguendo the Cajun Electric standard, NexPoint still fails to meet this
   threshold.
           “An argument not raised before the district court cannot be asserted
   for the first time on appeal.” 37 This, of course, remains true in bankruptcy
   appeals, where this Court “[a]ct[s] as a ‘second review court.’” 38 NexPoint
   replies that it lacked an opportunity to raise its Cajun Electric argument
   below. True, in the Motion to Dismiss stage, Appellees focused on
   NexPoint’s general unsecured and administrative expenses to argue that
   NexPoint lacked standing. But in response NexPoint relied on the adversary
   proceeding to establish that it had standing and made the same argument
   regarding Lexmark’s effect on the “person aggrieved” as well as its argument

           _____________________
           36
                Id. at 749 (emphasis added).
           37
              HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Crum, 907 F.3d 199, 207 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting XL
   Specialty Ins. Co. v. Kiewit Offshore Servs., Ltd., 513 F.3d 146, 153 (5th Cir. 2008)).
           38
               Matter of Lopez, 897 F.3d 663, 668 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Official Comm. of
   Unsecured Creditors v. Moeller (In re Age Ref., Inc.), 801 F.3d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 2015)); see
   also Ries v. Paige (In re Paige), 610 F.3d 865, 871 (5th Cir. 2010) (“As we generally do not
   consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, [the appellant’s] argument is
   waived.”); Crosby v. OrthAlliance New Image (In re OCA, Inc.), 552 F.3d 413, 424 (5th Cir.
   2008) (“A thorough review of the record confirms that [the appellant] did not raise the
   issue of assignment in the bankruptcy court. At oral argument, [the appellant] also admitted
   that it had not raised the assignment issue below. Since this issue was not properly
   presented to the bankruptcy court, it cannot be raised now for the first time on appeal.”).

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                                         No. 22-10575

   regarding the “zone of interests” delineated in 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 1109(b),
   to which we will turn. By failing to raise the Cajun Electric argument
   simultaneously, NexPoint waived its right to do so here.
                                              D.
           Finally, NexPoint argues that Bankruptcy Code §§ 330 & 1109 confer
   appellate standing. 39 We disagree. Section 1109(b) provides that “[a] party in
   interest, including . . . a creditor . . . may raise and may appear and be heard
   on any issue in a case under this chapter.” 40 In lay terms, § 1109(b) speaks to
   one’s standing to appear and be heard before the bankruptcy court, a concept
   distinct from standing to appeal the merits of a decision. As other courts have
   recognized, “[b]ecause Section 1109(b) ‘expands the right to be heard [in a
   bankruptcy proceeding] to a wider class than those who qualify under the
   “person aggrieved” standard,’ courts considering the issue have concluded
   that ‘merely being a party in interest is insufficient to confer appellate

           _____________________
           39
             Because the argument relies upon the identical “party in interest” language from
   both statutory provisions, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 330, 1109, we will refer only to § 1109(b).
           40
                11 U.S.C. § 1109(b).

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                                           No. 22-10575

   standing.’” 41 We agree, as does the “leading treatise on bankruptcy law,
   Collier” 42:
           Although section 1109 speaks broadly of the right of a party in
           interest to raise and to appear and be heard on any issue in a
           chapter 11 case, the section is silent on the subject of a party’s
           standing to take an appeal from an adverse decision, other than
           to expressly prohibit the Securities and Exchange Commission
           from taking an appeal. In general, in order for a person to be a
           proper party to take an appeal, one must be a “person
           aggrieved” by the outcome of a particular proceeding.
           Consistent with the basic purpose of section 1109(b), a party
           qualifies as a “person aggrieved” if the decision in question
           adversely affects the party’s pecuniary interest. 43

           _____________________
           41
              Advantage Healthplan, Inc. v. Potter, 391 B.R. 521, 541 (D.D.C. 2008) (alteration
   in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting In re American Ready Mix, Inc., 14 F.3d 1497,
   1502 (10th Cir. 1994); and then quoting In re Salant Corp., 176 B.R. 131, 134 (S.D.N.Y.
   1994)), aff’d sub nom. Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Found., Inc. v. Potter, 586 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
   2009); see also In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 217 (3d Cir. 2004), as amended
   (Feb. 23, 2005) (“[W]e apply a “persons aggrieved” standard, not a “party in interest”
   standard, to determine bankruptcy appellate standing.”); In re Betteroads Asphalt, LLC,
   Nos. 17-BK-04156, 17-BK-04157, 2020 WL 7048697, at *9 (D.P.R. Nov. 30, 2020)
   (“Pursuant to § 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, ‘merely being a party in interest is
   insufficient to confer appellate standing.’” (quoting Advantage Healthplan, Inc., 391 B.R. at
   540)); In re Prospector Offshore Drilling S.a R.L., No. 17-CV-11572, 2019 WL 1150563, at *6
   (D. Del. Mar. 12, 2019) (“While [§ 1109] ‘confers broad standing at the trial level,’ ‘courts
   do not extend that provision to appellate standing.’” (quoting In re PWS Holding Corp.,
   228 F.3d 224, 249 (3d Cir. 2000)), aff’d sub nom. In re Paragon Offshore plc, No. 19-1627,
   2022 WL 1055574 (3d Cir. Apr. 8, 2022); In re Packard Square, LLC, No. 17-CV-52483,
   2018 WL 2184356, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 11, 2018) (same); In re Victory Markets, Inc., 195
   B.R. 9, 15 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Contrary to Appellant’s interpretation, § 1109(b) does not
   confer appellate standing.”).
           42
                Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 540 (2004).
           43
                7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶ 1109.08 (16th ed. 2022) (footnotes omitted).

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Case: 22-10575          Document: 00516826622              Page: 15        Date Filed: 07/19/2023

                                           No. 22-10575

           And, despite NexPoint’s able effort, case law brings it no comfort. It
   points to Collins v. Mnuchin 44 in which we observed that Lexmark stands for
   the proposition that “[f]or very broad statutory rights like the APA, an injury
   in fact and inclusion in the zone of interests can add up to a right of action,
   even if prudential standing limits would have blocked it.” 45 But as Appellees
   observe, Collins addressed shareholder claims against the Federal Housing
   Finance Agency under the Administrative Procedure Act, and is not a
   bankruptcy case, it “says nothing about Bankruptcy Code § 1109, the person
   aggrieved standard, or anything else even tangentially related to the issues in
   this appeal.” Collins, when read in conjunction with the “party in interest”
   language from Bankruptcy Code §§ 330 and 1109, still fails to engage our
   longstanding precedent that appellate standing in bankruptcy actions is
   afforded only to a “person aggrieved.” 46
                                               *****
           We AFFIRM.

           _____________________
           44
               938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019), reversed and vacated in part on other grounds, Collins
   v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021).
           45
                938 F.3d at 575.
           46
                See supra n.32–33.

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