Court Opinion

ID: 9701568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:25:31.383505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:25.381104
License: Public Domain

BROCK, J.
This is an action to. recover damages for personal injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident. Trial before a jury resulted in a verdict in the amount of ten thousand dollars for the plaintiff. The defendant admitted liability before trial and the sole issue on this appeal relates to rulings made by the Trial Court (Mullavey, J.) concerning the measure of damages to be applied by the jury.
The plaintiff, a passenger in a small sports car, suffered numerous injuries when a pickup truck, operated by the defendant, rear-ended the sports car while it was stopped at a blinking traffic light. The plaintiff brought this action alleging that her injuries were the result of the defendant’s "careless, negligent and unlawful operation” of a motor vehicle in that “he failed to maintain a proper look-out, failed to maintain control of his motor vehicle, was operating at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent, was under the influence of an intoxicating liquor at the time of the collision and was otherwise negligent. . . .” At trial, in spite of the fact that the defendant had admitted liability, the plaintiff offered to prove that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident and that *441after the accident he was arrested for D.W.I., second offense and later pled guilty to D.W.I., first offense. In conjunction with these offers of proof, the plaintiff requested that the jury be instructed that they could use this evidence of the defendant’s conduct, if they found it to be “wanton”, and that they could reflect the aggravating nature of that conduct in their award of compensatory damages to the plaintiff. The trial court ruled that the proffered evidence of the defendant’s conduct was not admissible for the purpose of enhancing damages. The plaintiff took a timely exception to this ruling and, after the jury returned its verdict, her exception was reserved and transferred to this court. We affirm.
The plaintiff argues that when a tortfeasor’s conduct is wanton, malicious or oppressive, the measure of damages may be enhanced to reflect the nature of the defendant’s conduct. As support for this contention, the plaintiff relies on Vratsenes v. New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 112 N.H. 71, 289 A.2d 66 (1972). In Vratsenes, we made the following observation:
[N]o damages other than compensatory are to be awarded. However, when the act involved is wanton, malicious, or oppressive, the compensatory damages may reflect the aggravating circumstances.
Id. at 73, 289 A.2d at 68. The tort involved in Vratsenes, however, was trespass, and the plaintiff there alleged that it was a “willful and malicious” trespass, the defendant having previously committed a similar act. Id. at 71, 289 A.2d at 67. Such an allegation is absent in the present case.
 Though the plaintiff admits that wanton, malicious or oppressive conduct was not specifically alleged in her writ, she cites Taylor v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854 (1979) as authority for the proposition that the allegation of driving while under the influence alone amounts to an allegation of wanton or malicious conduct. Id. at 669, 598 P.2d at 859. The act of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence is indeed deplorable and should the legislature determine, as a matter of public policy, that those who cause injuries while driving under the influence should be liable for enhanced damages, it is free to do so. Cf. RSA 466:20 (double damages for dogbite victims). In the context of measuring damages, however, we do not equate the act of driving while under the influence with the term “malice”. Our statement in Munson v. Raudonis, 118 N.H. 474, 479, 387 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1978) is applicable today:
*442If we were to agree with the plaintiff and hold that “malice” for the purpose of measuring damages is the intentional doing of a wrongful act, then every intentional tort would give rise to the larger amount of damages. Instead of allowing an award of damages to be based on implied or legal malice ... we prefer to base such an award only on a showing of actual malice. There must be ill will, hatred, hostility, or evil motive on the part of the defendant.
In Munson, we refused to equate an intentional tort with malice for the purpose of enhancing damages and stated that “liberal compensatory damages will not be allowed without the allegation and proof of wanton, malicious, or oppressive conduct.” Id. at 479, A.2d at 1177 (emphasis added.) (Note, A.2d reporter deleted portion of the quote.) It is only logical that the same rule apply to the unintentional tort of negligence.

Plaintiffs exceptions overruled; affirmed.

DOUGLAS, J., concurred specially; the others concurred.