Court Opinion

ID: 9778995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:31:36.526956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:18.709658
License: Public Domain

Robinson, J., dissenting. In my opinion there are two errors in the record which call for a reversal. Therefore I respectfully dissent. First, the testimony of Brown Calhoun was an expression of an opinion as to one of the principal issues in the case, the question of whether the animal was stolen was admitted over the objection and exception of defendant, and constitutes reversible error. At the time Calhoun expressed his opinion, the evidence of which was allowed to go to the jury, he did not pretend to know anything about the animal as a fact. The record clearly shows his opinion was based on mere suspicion. There is no rule of law permitting the introduction of opinion evidence such as given by the witness Calhoun in this case. He gave as his opinion testimony that the animal involved was “hot”; it is a matter of common knowledge that this is a term frequently applied to stolen property. “Conclusions of law or of fact upon which the decision of the case depends are not permissible to be drawn in evidence by expert witnesses.” Underhill on Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., p. 437. Prof. Underhill also says, in the same volume, page 436. “Ultimate facts directly in issue are for the determination of the jury* and not for an expert witness. ’ ’ " 'Here one of the ultimate issues was whether the animal had been stolen. In Criglow v. State, 183 Ark. 407, 36 S. W. 2d 400, Mr. Justice Frank Smith said: “But . the question whether these witnesses were mistaken in their identification, whether from fright or other cause, was one which the jury, and not an expert witness, should answer, This was a question upon which one man as well ¿s another might form an opinion, and the function of passing upon the credibility and weight of testimony could not be taken from the jury. Dickerson v. State, 121 Ark. 564, 181 S. W. 920; Mitchell v. Lindley, 148 Ark. 37, 228 S. W. 728.” Next, the action of thecourt; in excusing a- juror after all the defendant’s peremptory challenges had been exhausted, when the- juror had' been' accepted previously by both the state and the defendant' was error. In selecting the jury, the second venireman called was Wiley Baker. During his voir, dire examination'it developed' that he had served as a juror at the last term of court. Upon ascertaining this fact, the record shows the following: “By the Court: ‘Do you want to raise that as a question! I seriously doubt he can serve. You are going to have to specifically waive it because under the law now he is not supposed to serve but once every two years.’ By Mr. Merritt: [counsel for defendant] ‘Because of the small number óf jurors we have to select the jury from, we are going to waive it.’ By Mr. Linder: [prosecuting attorney] ‘Mr. Baker is a perfectly good and acceptable juror to the State but I would like to raise the question as to whether or not the defense counsel can waive that.’ By the Court: ‘I am going to tentatively pass him and reserve my ruling. I might take him off for cause later.’ Whereupon the said Wiley Baker is accepted by both sides as No. 2 on the list of jurors to try the case. Thereupon after eleven jurors had been accepted as' ‘Good’ and- after the State had exhausted four challenges and the Defendant eight challenges, the Court makes the following statement in Chambers: By the Court: ‘ As the law says a person is not eligible to serve as a juror except every two years I am going to excuse Mr. Baker. By Mr. Merritt: ‘The defendant agreed to accept the juror and after having exhausted his challenges then the attorney for the State reraised the question with the Court and as a result the juror was excused and we object, and save our exceptions.’ ” It is clear from the record as. above quoted that both the prosecution and the defendant accepted Baker as a juror, but there was some doubt in the mind of the prosecuting attorney as to whether the ineligibility of the juror could be waived by the defendant. With this point under consideration the court reserved a ruling until later, but in. the meantime Baker was accepted as a juror; when he was accepted, the defendant had not exhausted any of his peremptory challenges. After eleven jurors, including Baker, had been accepted and the defendant had exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, the court excused Baker over the objection and exception of defendant. Evidently the court had come to the conclusion that the defendant could not waive the disqualification of a juror, as no other reason is assigned for excusing Baker. In this conclusion the court was in error; this Court has held several times that the disqualification of a juror may be waived; in fact, the disqualification can not be raised after the verdict if the defendant, through failure to exercise diligence failed to discover the disqualification and make proper objection before the jury was impanelled. Daniel v. Guy, 23 Ark. 50; James v. State, 68 Ark. 464, 60 S. W. 29; Doyle v. State, 166 Ark. 505, 266 S. W. 459. The state and the defendant had specifically waived their right to challenge the juror for cause, and had accepted him. An attorney trying a case uses his peremptory challenges in accordance with the number of jurors remaining to be selected. No trial lawyer would exhaust his last peremptory challenge with several jurors yet to be chosen, except in the most unusual circumstances or extreme emergency. But the last peremptory challenge is often used after eleven jurors have been selected; at that point the identity of the last venireman to be called is usually known. It is argued that no prejudice is shown to the defendant in excusing the juror previously selected after all the defendant’s peremptory challenges were exhausted. In that connection in Williams v. State, 63 Ark. 527, 39 S. W. 709, the court said: “It is true that we cannot certainly say just how the discharge of these jurymen was prejudicial to the defendant. Indeed, we may not be able to say positively that it was prejudicial to him at all; but at the same time we cannot say that it was not detrimental to him, and in fact we are rather inclined to think it was. But this uncertainty is, of itself, a strong argument against the propriety of such a procedure.” The cause was reversed by reason of the court’s action in permitting a juror to be excused after defendant’s challenges were exhausted. In McGough v. State, 113 Ark. 301, 167 S. W. 857, the court said: “The defendant exhausted all of his challenges, and after he had done so the State was permitted, over his objection, to challenge three of the jurors who had been previously selected. It has been held that the court may, in its discretion, permit the state or the defendant to exercise peremptory challenges after having accepted a juror; but it has also been held that an election by the State to challenge a juror, after his acceptance by both parties, must be exercised before the defendant has exhausted his challenges, and it can not thereafter be done.” In all the cases in this state we have found, with the exception of one, it is clearly stated or implied that it is reversible error to permit a juror previously accepted to be excused after all of defendant’s challenges have been exhausted. “The record does not show that at the time the court permitted the prosecuting attorney to exercise a peremptory challenge on a juror who had been previously accepted that the appellants’ right to peremptory challenge had then been exhausted. The panel had not been completed, and the appellants at that time still had the right to one peremptory challenge.” Ruloff and Berger, v. State, 142 Ark. 477, 219 S. W. 781. “It is also contended by counsel for defendant that it was error for the court to permit the State to peremptorily challenge the juror G. W. Gunter. The juror was accepted on the first day of the trial and on the next day after the defendant had exhausted all of his challenge but one the State was permitted to exercise a peremptory challenge and excuse Gunter from the jury. Thus it will be seen that the defendant had not exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, and the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, could permit the State to peremptorily challenge the juror after he was accepted on the jury.” Dewein v. State, 114 Ark. 472, 170 S. W. 582. “These cases do not support the defendant in his contention, for there is no showing made that at this time the challenges of the defendant had been exhausted.” Hannah v. State, 183 Ark. 810, 38 S. W. 2d 1090. “It is not shown that the defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges when the jury that tried him was completed; and that he was prejudiced by the discharge of McNew. Unless it so appeared, it was within his power to protect himself against the impanelling of an objectionable juror on account of the discharge of McNew. The record fails to show any reversible error in that respect was committed.” Bevis v. State, 90 Ark. 586, 119 S. W. 1131. Temple v. State, 126 Ark. 290, 189 S. W. 855, is directly in point. There the court said: “It was held in some of these cases that the court, in its discretion, might permit the State to use a peremptory challenge on a juror who had been accepted by both sides where the defendant had not exhausted all his peremptory challenges; but in all the cases in which it was held not to have been error to permit this action, the defendant had not exhausted his peremptory challenges. The test seems to be whether the defendant has remaining as many challenges as. the State is permitted to exercise, and upon the authority of these cases, the judgment of the court must be reversed.” In Collins v. State, 200 Ark. 1027, 143 S. W. 2d 1, the action of the trial court was sustained in permitting the state to challenge a juror after the defendant had exhausted all of his challenges; but in that case the trial court offered to permit the defendant to exercise an additional peremptory challenge, and therefore on that point is distinguishable from all the other cases heretofore cited, and is not in point with the case at bar, because here the trial court did not offer to permit the defendant to exercise an additional challenge. In my opinion the law in this state up to this time has been well settled that it is reversible error to excuse a juror who has been selected by both sides after the defendant has exhausted all of his challenges. Justices Mill wee and George Rose Smith join in this dissent.