Court Opinion

ID: 9687363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:26:18.364972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:26.658539
License: Public Domain

GILBERT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which affirms a no-knock entry into a residence pursuant to a search warrant. This case involves the very important balance between the constitutional guarantee of the expectation of privacy and sanctity of the home in the Fourth Amendment and the serious risk of injury to law enforcement officers in executing search warrants. This balance is ensured by enforcing the Fourth Amendment guarantees of reasonableness and United States Supreme Court precedent that require officers to articulate to a neutral issuing judge the “particular circumstances” that support the issuance of a no-knock entry warrant. Generalized fears do not justify dispensing with the constitutional requirement that officers knock and announce their presence and authority pri- or to executing a search warrant. The affidavit relied upon here to obtain the no-knoek warrant was insufficient because it contained merely boilerplate language, speculative generalized statements about drug dealers and the fact that “numerous weapons were, removed” from the residence three months prior to the challenged entry. (Emphasis added.) It did not provide particular facts and circumstances that reasonably justified the officer’s suspicion that a risk of danger existed.
The majority opinion simply augments the facts presented in the affidavit used to support the no-knock warrant in an effort to distinguish this case from Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997), and move away from the admittedly boilerplate language used in the affidavit. The majority states: “However the search warrant affidavit in this case also pointed to a specific, objective piece of information: that weapons were likely present in the house given that numerous weapons were seized from the exact location just three months previously.” This statement assumes that because weapons were removed from the residence three months ago, they were likely present three months later. This supposition made by the majority was not even made by the affiant officer. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the removed weapons had been returned or that any new weapons were present. Likewise, there is no indication in the record as to what type of weapons were previously there or that the resident had any violent or aggressive propensities or history.
It is only by combining speculation and augmentation with overgeneralizations that the majority is able to conclude that the officer’s suspicion is reasonable. Instead of this analysis, our task is to determine on this record whether specific facts justify the no-knock warrant.
In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court made clear that the requirement that officers announce their presence and authority prior to entering a dwelling to execute a warrant is part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. 514 U.S. 927, 934, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995). It is a flexible requirement that can yield to countervailing law enforcement interests; but the Supreme Court did not “attempt a comprehensive catalog” of those interests, leaving it instead to the lower courts to determine the reasonableness of unannounced entries. See id. at 936, 115 S.Ct. 1914.
In Richards, the Supreme Court emphasized that the knock and announce requirement protects interests that are not “inconsequential.” 520 U.S. at 393 n. 5, 117 S.Ct. 1416. Although dispensing with the knock and announce requirement is “less intrusive” than a warrantless search, the individual interests implicated should not *324be “unduly minimized.” Id. The Court further stated that the knock and announce rule should yield when police officers have reasonable suspicion that abiding by the rule would endanger the officers or risk the destruction of evidence. See id. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416. However, the rule should not and cannot yield to the majority’s speculation on the perceived exigencies of today’s drug culture. See id. at 392 n. 4, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (Scalia, J. concurring) (“[T]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness ‘is to preserve that degree of respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of their property that existed when the provision was adopted — even if a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusion reasonable.’ ”)); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 635, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (“History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure. ⅜ * * [W]hen we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it.”).
I agree with the majority that the boilerplate language included in this warrant does not provide specific facts about the risks of this particular search that would justify a no-knock entry. The affiant officer admitted during the omnibus hearing that the language in the affidavit was “boiler plate.” The state also conceded the point during oral arguments before this court. It is the responsibility of the affiant officers to provide the particular facts justifying the no-knock entry. A no-knock entry is only justified when the officers “have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit effective investigation of the crime * * *.” Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court acknowledged that the showing is “not high,” but because knock and announce is a part of the constitutional reasonableness inquiry, “the police should be required to make it whenever the reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged.” Id. at 394-95, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (emphasis added).
We ultimately have the responsibility to find “specific facts” to justify the no-knock entry. “[I]n each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement.” Id. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (emphasis added). We have also held “where there is no averment of specific facts indicating that an unannounced entry is needed in order to safely and successfully execute the warrant,” a no-knock clause in a warrant may never be justified. State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 838 (1978) (emphasis added).
The affiant officer admittedly used boilerplate language and therefore has failed to make a showing of reasonable suspicion “under the particular circumstances.” Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416. This failure means that we cannot fulfill our duty to look at specific facts and assess reasonableness under the Constitution. Therefore, the boilerplate language is insufficient to support the no-knock entry as a matter of law.
In analyzing whether an allegation will suffice to make the suspicion of dangerousness reasonable, the Supreme Court has instructed police and reviewing courts to avoid using “overgeneralizations” about the drug “culture.” Id. 392-93, 117 S.Ct. 1416. The majority attempts to avoid this restriction by pointing to the allegation that “since the execution of the June warrant Meixner had been willing to facilitate the sale of drugs at his residence to at least the CRI and perhaps others.” The majority implicitly concedes that there is *325nothing in the affidavit that would support the conclusion that Meixner himself continued to sell drugs after the June search. The CRI did not state that he had been able to purchase drugs from Meixner after the execution of the June warrant. Rather, the officer reported in his affidavit that the CRI stated that he had been able to purchase drugs from “Homer,” whom the officer stated he knew to be Meixner, “during the course of the last year.” We have no way of knowing whether any of those purchases were made in the period between the June 27, 1997 search and September 26, 1997, the date of the affidavit. Furthermore, we know from the affidavit that the CRI told the affiant on September 25, 1997 — a day before the affidavit was given to the issuing judge — that the CRI had attempted to purchase drugs from Meixner within the previous 72 hours and had been unsuccessful. And although the CRI observed drug paraphernalia commonly used by methamphetamine-users, a hypodermic needle, a burnt spoon and broken Q-tips, Meixner himself did not agree to sell any methamphetamine to the CRI.
Instead, the majority states that the evidence supports the conclusion that Meix-ner was willing to facilitate drug sales because he told the CRI that he might be able to get methamphetamines from another person who might be at his residence on September 26, 1997, the day after the CRI spoke with Meixner. By inclusion of this fact, the affidavit contains a specific allegation involving drugs, but that allegation alone is insufficient to support the necessary showing of a reasonable suspicion of danger. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 393, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (“[Wjhile drug investigation frequently does pose special risks to officer safety * * *, not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree.”). While this allegation may support a finding of probable cause justifying the issuance of a search warrant generally, it does not support the majority’s conclusion that a no-knock entry, which requires a different showing, was reasonable. This obligation to provide the issuing judge and this court with specific facts that reasonably support the officer’s suspicion that this particular drug investigation posed a risk of danger can be fulfilled in advance of the search by the issuance of a no-knock warrant only so long as “sufficient cause” to issue the warrant is demonstrated. See id. at 396 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 1416. Thus, we must determine whether the additional support the majority gleans from the affidavit provides sufficient cause to reasonably suspect that danger still existed at the time of the warrant’s execution.
Any particularized suspicion of a risk of danger relating to the facilitation of a possible drug sale occurring on September 26, 1997, dissipated by the time the search warrant was actually executed on October 3, 1997, seven days after the warrant was issued and seven days after the sale was possibly to take place. See generally. State v. Yaritz, 287 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn.1979) (holding that delay in execution of a search warrant can be a constitutional violation where the supporting probable cause no longer exists). The continuity of the crime is a critical factor in determining the constitutionality of the delay. See id. at 17. In Yaritz, where the affidavit indicated that the sale of drugs was not a “single occurrence crime,” but that the defendant was “in the business of selling drugs and that he had been doing it on a continuing basis,” the probable cause to support the warrant had not grown stale when the warrant was executed six days after its issuance. Id.
In contrast, here there is no evidence in the record to support a suspicion of ongoing danger associated with Meixner allegedly facilitating the sale of drugs on a regular, continuing basis or to the CRI and “perhaps others.” The affidavit contains no reference to other buyers or other sales after the June warrant was executed, to prior arrests for sales or to an ongoing “willingtness] to facilitate” sales. Instead, the majority’s additional support for its finding of reasonable suspicion consists of *326generalized conclusions and speculative assumptions about the dangerous behavior of suspected drug dealers, or, here, facilitators of drug sales. Such generalized conclusions are constitutionally deficient to support a no-knock entry under Richards. 520 U.S. at 393, 117 S.Ct. 1416.
If overgeneralizations about today’s drug culture will not suffice, the broader question presented by the majority’s holding is ■ what type of alleged activity will support conducting an otherwise valid search without complying with the knock and announce requirement. This affidavit had no specific facts to indicate danger, such as the severity of the resident’s prior convictions, the particular danger of the alleged facilitating, or the type or use of weapons found in the prior search. The only convictions mentioned were for possession of controlled substances, not violent crimes. The CRI did not state that Meixner had a violent reputation or even that he had seen weapons at the residence when he was there within the three days before the warrant was issued. This court can neither augment the record nor presume endangerment of officer safety without a showing in the supporting affidavit of particular circumstances supporting a reasonable suspicion of danger in executing the search warrant.
The majority asserts that the “likely” presence of weapons will suffice to connect the alleged drug dealing with a suspicion of danger. The actual allegation as stated in the affidavit is that “numerous weapons had been removed from the residence” during the execution of a search-warrant three months before the issuance of this warrant. On its face, this allegation indicated to the issuing judge that weapons “were removed” from the residence. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, there is no allegation' that weapons “were likely present” at the house. The majority makes that unsupported factual leap even though the officer did not aver that the CRI had seen any weapons at the house. Furthermore, there is no allegation that Meixner was typically armed, that Meixner bought new weapons, that the seized weapons were returned to Meixner, or that Meixner had any propensity to use the weapons to protect his alleged facilitating. As to the prior search, there is no allegation that the weapons were easily accessible to Meixner or that they were brandished. In fact, the affiant officer testified at the omnibus hearing that during the execution of the prior search warrant, the seized weapons were not wielded to threaten officer safety at all. Finally, although one officer later testified that he thought the weapons had been returned, he did not know that fact for certain and he did not present that fact to the issuing judge. The fact that weapons, particularly “common northern Minnesota hunting rifles,”1 were removed, without more information, that cannot support an objectively reasonable suspicion that knocking on that same door would be dangerous. See, e.g., Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 589 n. 7 (6th Cir.1999) (“[T]he presence of a weapon creates an exigent circumstance, provided the government is able to prove they possessed information that the suspect was armed and likely to use a weapon or become violent” but the fact that defendant was engaged in a petty drug transaction by itself is not a reasonable basis to suspect that he was violent.).
The type of weapon involved is also relevant to our determination of the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion because it is circumstantial evidence of dangerousness. In State v. Attaway, the Supreme Court of New Mexico acknowledged that the mere presence of weapons was insufficient to justify a no-knock entry. 117 N.M. 141, 870 P.2d 103, 114 (1994). The court held that violent propensities must *327be shown to justify a suspicion of a risk of danger, but circumstantial evidence can be used because direct evidence of danger is difficult to attain. See id. Possessing “a large cache of illegal or unusually dangerous weapons” would be circumstantial evidence of a propensity for violence, just as possession together with a violent criminal history would be. Id. at 115-16; see also State v. Hider, 715 A.2d 942, 946 (Me.1998) (a post -Richards decision in which the Supreme Court of Maine held that knowledge that the occupants possess a “large quantity of weapons” is sufficient to justify a no-knock entry into a place of business). Similarly, though the court did not have to decide the issue, the government has noted that:
[Wjhile a handgun might commonly be owned by a lawful and non-violent person, federal law outlaws possession of most sawed-off shotguns and TEC-9 machine pistols because they are easy to conceal, extremely dangerous, and particularly suited to close-quarters combat.
United States v. Brown, 69 F.Supp.2d 518, 520 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (citations omitted). “[Cjommon northern Minnesota hunting rifles” can be owned for lawful purposes— hunting. They are not easy to conceal. While these rifles are capable of inflicting great damage, they are not typically associated with the dangers of drug dealing— assaulting or killing police officers. Moreover, although the officer averred that “numerous weapons” had been seized, he did not even tell the reviewing court that they were firearms, nor did he allege that they were associated with Meixner’s alleged drug dealing in any manner.
Furthermore, assuming arguendo that firearms were present, the state failed to present any facts in the record supporting a finding that the owner of the residence at issue could not legally possess the firearms. In Minnesota, when an owner of firearms has committed certain crimes, he is no longer allowed to possess certain weapons. See Minn.Stat. §§ 624.712, subds. 2, 3, 4, 7, 624.718, subd. l(a)-(j) (1998); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (3) (1994). The state did not supply any specific information in the record about the crimes for which Meixner had been2 convicted. We must examine the record as the state presented it. On this record, we cannot conclude that Meixner was illegally in possession of the firearms, if he indeed even had firearms. In fact, the state attempts to justify this search by pointing to the officer’s testimony — not included in the affidavit — that he believed the weapons had been returned to a family member would justify the search. However, the state would have no obligation to return the weapons if they were legally seized and involved in the commission of a drug offense. See generally Minn.Stat. §§ 609.531, subd. 1(d); 609.5314, subd. l(3)(i)-(iii), 609.5315, subds. 1, 3, 4, 609.5316, subd. 1 (1998). Thus, the state is trying to support a no-knock entry based on the presence of weapons, which they believe might have been returned after they may have been illegally seized.
*328While the majority purports to be conducting an analysis of the specific facts available to the issuing judge, it makes the same type of overgeneralizations that Richards rejected. The majority assumes the “likely” presence of weapons based on the fact that weapons were removed three months earlier and on that assumption justifies dispensing with the knock and announce requirement. What the majority loses sight of is that the particular circumstances required to dispense with knocking and announcing are those that connect “armed” with “dangerous” by making the inference that one “armed” is likely to be “dangerous” reasonable or those that connect a drug investigation with a particular risk of danger. See, e.g., Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir.1998) (“We think a reasonable officer would have known that guns do not fire themselves, and that a justifiable fear for an officer’s safety must include a belief, not simply that a gun may be located within a home, but that someone inside the home might be willing to use it.”); Richards, 520 U.S. at 393, 117 S.Ct. 1416. It is not enough to articulate the objective “fact” that one is “likely” in possession of weapons or willing to facilitate drug sales, or even both, and then conclude that there is a reasonable suspicion of danger based on speculation about the return of the weapons and speculative generalizations about drug sales. While it is not necessary to definitively prove danger,3 it is necessary to articulate “specific facts” or “particular circumstances” that make that suspicion of danger reasonable.
The majority opinion also runs afoul of the second concern in Richards. Under the rationale of the majority, a search pertaining to any of the many different types of crimes associated with weapons will justify the issuance of a no-knock warrant. The fact that weapons were once associated with the resident, without any further reasonable allegation that weapons are still present and accessible to the resident or that the resident is likely to use weapons, could now be a sufficient justification for abrogating the knock and announce rule in any later search of that residence. The Supreme Court specifically rejected such a per se approach, citing the extreme example of armed bank robbery: “Armed bank robbers, for example are, by definition, likely to have weapons, and the fruits of their crime may be destroyed without too much difficulty.” Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117- S.Ct. 1416. The Court concluded however, “[i]f a per *329se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a considerable — albeit hypothetical — risk of danger to officers * * ⅜ the knock and announce element of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement would be meaningless.” Id. It seems clear from that example that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard requires more than assumptions and “hypothetical” risks associated with specific types of crimes or the mere presence of weapons, it requires a showing of “particular circumstances,” on a case-by-case basis.
The majority concludes that the appellant’s reliance on pre-Richards ’ case law, which held that the mere presence of weapons alone will not justify a no-knock entry, is unjustified because those cases required the police to have an “objectively reasonable belief’ that the suspect might respond to a knock and announce entry with violence, a standard the majority asserts is “higher” than the “reasonable suspicion” standard articulated in Richards. See, e.g., United States v. Moore4 91 F.3d 96 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Spinelli, 848 F.2d 26, 29 (2nd Cir.1988). For the proposition that “objectively reasonable belief’ is a higher standard than “reasonable suspicion,” the majority cites United States v. Guebara, 80 F.Supp.2d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (D.Kan.1999). In Guebara, a district court respectfully disagreed with the Tenth Circuit decision in United States v. Jenkins, 175 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir.1999), which restated post-Richards the principle announced in United States v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96, 98 (10th Cir.1996), that the mere presence of firearms is insufficient to qualify as an exigent circumstance and justify a no-knock entry. See Guebara, 80 F.Supp.2d at 1228 n. 2. The district court also acknowledged that the precedent in Jenkins binds it. See Guebara, 80 F.Supp.2d at 1228 n. 2. The court states: “The circuit’s [principle] is predicated upon a showing that the officers held an ‘objectively reasonable belief of the existence of an emergency situation. This would appear to be a higher showing than the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard announced [in Richards ].” Guebara, 80 F.Supp.2d at 1228 n. 2.
I must respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “objectively reasonable belief’ is a different or higher standard than “reasonable suspicion.” There is a distinction, which the majority loses sight of, between that level of suspicion that an officer feels and the role of a reviewing court in analyzing that suspicion. “Objectively reasonable belief’ simply states the role of the reviewing court: to determine whether the officer’s suspicion was reasonably justified. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, * * * the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry * * * is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.”); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (“It is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard.”). We have also recognized that the role of the reviewing court is to assess the objective reasonableness of the suspicion: “The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion * * * will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspi*330cion.” State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 850 (Minn.1998) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)).
The test articulated in Richards is “reasonable suspicion * * * under the particular circumstances.” Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868); see also Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657 (“We have described reasonable suspicion simply as ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity * * *.”). I cannot conclude that by using the term “reasonable suspicion” the Supreme Court intended to adopt a new standard that would not be analyzed by a reviewing court in the context of the particular facts and circumstances of the entry. The term was intended to have its historical, constitutional meaning.
As did the Supreme Court in Richards, I conclude that the “appropriate balance” between law enforcement safety and Fourth Amendment protections requires police officers to articulate “reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile * * »_» Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416. This requirement does not place an undue burden on law enforcement. Still, it requires more than general conclusions about a specific category of crime or unsupported allegations that weapons might be present. Where weapons might be present, courts have required some allegation that indicates a resident’s propensity to use the weapons, such as a past criminal history of violence, reputation of violence, or specific threats to police officers or others, to make the inference that the occupant is dangerous a reasonable one.5 Though the difference between “armed” and “armed and dangerous” may be subtle, it is also determinative. In light of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment as articulated in Richards and Lien, it is not reasonable for the majority to assume the “likely” presence of weapons based solely on the previous removal of weapons and to overgeneralize about the drug “culture” to justify a no-knock entry.6 Therefore, I would reverse the court of appeals and suppress the evidence obtained during the search.

. The affirming officer did not provide the issuing judge with specific information about what type of weapons were at the residence or that they were even firearms. That information was not revealed until the omnibus hearing. At that point, it was revealed that the weapons removed were “common northern Minnesota hunting rifles.”

. Even if Meixner’s crimes came under Minn. Slat. § 624.712, subd. 1(d) (1998), a provision which disqualifies those with certain drug charges from possessing certain types of weapons, "common northern Minnesota hunting rifles" have been specifically exempted by the legislature from the "felon in possession” bar to owning weapons. See Minn. Stat. § 624.711 (1998) ("It is not the intent of the legislature to regulate shotguns, rifles and other longguns of the type commonly used for hunting and not defined as pistols or semiautomatic military-style assault weapons * * *."). Further, without additional information about Meixner’s charges, sentences and drug habits or addictions, we have no way of ascertaining the applicability of the federal firearm laws. See 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) (crime must be punishable by at least one year for federal law to be applicable); 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3) (person must be unlawful user of or addicted to controlled substance for federal law to be applicable); see generally United States v. Edwards, 946 F.2d 1347, 1349 (8th Cir.1991) (holding that Minn.Stat. § 609.165 (1998) can restore a felon's civil rights so as to exempt a federal felon from federal statute proscribing possession of firearms by a felon).

. Contrary to the majority's assertion, we do not suggest that danger must be definitively proven. We agree that Richards rejected boilerplate language to support a no-knock warrant. However, Richards did not posit the rule that any articulated fact about the place ■ to be searched makes the suspicion of danger reasonable. Instead, Richards requires law enforcement officers to offer "particular circumstances” that support their suspicion that knocking and announcing ‘‘would be dangerous or futile.” 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416. It is the "duty of the court” to find "facts and circumstances of the particular entry” that would support the reasonableness of the officer's suspicions. Id. Though we acknowledge that this creates responsibilities for law enforcement officers to articulate some particular facts relevant to danger or futility, not just to the underlying criminal activity, this is precisely what Richards requires: "Th[e reasonable suspicion] showing is not high, but the police should be required to make it * * ⅞.” Id. at 394-95, 117 S.Ct. 1416. Finally, the majority suggests that requiring officers to articulate facts that reasonably suggest dangerousness would result in creating the "rigid rule” shunned in Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934, 115 S.Ct. 1914. That "rigid rule” was one that would require that "every entry” be preceded by an announcement. Id. Just like the court in Wilson, we would reject such a rule. Nor would we require an "airtight case” in order to issue a no-knock warrant. Instead, what we require is what Richards requires: some evidence, summarized but not exhausted by the majority's list, that would allow us to conclude that the officer’s suspicion of danger is reasonable. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416; see also Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936, 115 S.Ct. 1914 (holding that the knock and announce rule can yield to “a threat of physical violence” and citing cases with specific facts indicating dangerous — resident had "resolved * * ⅜ to resist even to the shedding of blood” and inhabitant was "firing pistols at [the officers]”).

. It should also be noted that the majority distinguishes these cases partially on the basis that they are pre-Richards ' decisions. However, the Tenth Circuit has reaffirmed its holding in Moore since the Richards' decision. See United States v. Jenkins, 175 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir.1999). In addition, other circuits have also held that the mere presence of firearms will not justify a no-knock entry posi-Richards. See, e.g, United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir.1998); Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir.1998); Ingram, 185 F.3d at 589 n. 7; United States v. Weeks, 160 F.3d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir.1998).

. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 168 F.3d 336, 339 (8th Cir.1999) (no-knock reasonable where police "knew the house likely contained weapons, that it was barricaded, and that defendant had a violent criminal histo- • ry”); United States v. Grogins, 163 F.3d 795, 796-98 (4th Cir.1998) (no-knock reasonable where defendant had "been involved in shootouts and had managed a drug-selling operation,” "intimidated several people who owed him money by shooting into their dwellings,” trained his associates in evidence destruction, and vowed to do "whatever is necessary to avoid going back to jail”); Weeks, 160 F.3d at 1214 (no-knock reasonable where informant told officer that those at "the residence answered the door with guns in their hands, [defendant] had been convicted of a firearm offense, and the front door was braced”); Hawkins, 139 F.3d at 32 (no-knock reasonable where defendant has "copious record of violent convictions” and police officer had personal knowledge of a recent armed action by him, and the officer's "suspicion that [defendant] was aware of the police interest in him”).

. The majority also decides the issues surrounding the threshold reappraisal. This analysis is unnecessary. In Richards, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he practice of allowing magistrates to issue no-knock warrants seems entirely reasonable when sufficient cause to do so can be demonstrated ahead of time.” Richards, 520 U.S. at 396 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 1416. Though our Lien opinion suggests that a threshold reappraisal might be necessary even with advance judicial authorization, it appears that if particular circumstances of an exigency that are not of a time-sensitive nature, and thus will not grow stale, are presented to a issuing judge sufficient to justify the issuance of a no-knock warrant, the reasonable suspicion articulated in the warrant will justify the later no-knock execution. Because the majority is holding that weapons were "likely” present in the residence and thus, created an exigency not likely to diminish before the execution of the warrant, no threshold reappraisal was necessary and its sufficiency need not be assessed.