Court Opinion

ID: 9763722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:53:49.208083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:38.132275
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING ON COURT’S MOTION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

[Filed June 29, 1994]
MILLER, Judge.
Appellant was charged in three separate counts with having illegally manufactured a controlled substance, to wit: Amphetamine.1 The trial court instructed the jury to convict Appellant if it found that Appellant had intentionally and knowingly manufactured amphetamine, by aggregate weight, including any adulterants and dilutants, of more than 400 grams. The jury so found and Appellant was convicted of aggravated manufacturing of amphetamine.
While the Court of Appeals acknowledged that just 76.20 grams of “amphetamine base” were present, it found the evidence sufficient “to prove manufacture of amphetamine over 400 grams” because it believed that “the 704.89 grams of solution in the flask was a compound, mixture or preparation containing a quantity of amphetamine” within contemplation of Article 4476-15, 4.02(d)(3), R.C.S. Dowling v. State (Tex.App. — Waco, No. 10-88-099-CR, delivered November 17, 1989).
On original submission and on Appellant’s motion for rehearing, we addressed a theory of prosecution under the Act, viz: that the “amount” of “any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of [amphetamine]”, former 4.02(d)(1)(A), may be included in determining the “aggregate weight” of the controlled substance, along with’ “adulterants or dilutants”, under former 4.032(a), (c), and (d)(2). See and compare on motion for rehearing: ma*121jority opinion, Part III, at 108-109; concurring opinion of Judge Miller; concurring opinion of Judge Clinton, at 112-113; see also Reeves v. State, 806 S.W.2d 540, at 545, n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).
To aid the Court in resolving those narrow issues before reaching its ultimate disposition of the cause, we granted rehearing on the Court’s own motion and directed respective counsel to brief and then to present oral argument on the following questions in context of the applicable statutory provisions in effect in September 1983, viz:
May a prosecution for manufacture of amphetamine be based on the theory that alleging the description of controlled substance containing any quantity of amphetamine under § 4.02(d)(1)(A) (Penalty Group 3), in an amount that is, by aggregate weight, more than 400 grams, properly states an aggravated offense under § 4.032(a), (c) and (d)(2)?
In a prosecution for manufacture of amphetamine under § 4.032(a), (c) and (d)(2), may the aggregate weight alleged be proved by showing the weight of the “material, compound, mixture or preparation” containing a quantity of amphetamine base, without also showing that such matter is, or contains, identified adulterants or dilutants?
The parties having complied with the order of the Court and the cause having been submitted on briefs and oral argument, we will first provide a brief background of legislative and judicial developments, and then proceed to address the issues seriatim.
I.
The Texas Controlled Substances Act was originally enacted twenty years ago. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., Ch. 429, p. 1132 (H.B. 447), effective August 27, 1973. Section 4.02 of that Act prescribed criminal classifications in order to establish penalties for “violations of a provision of this Act” according to “penalty groups” of controlled substances. H.B. 447 at 1148.2 Penalty Group 3, § 4.02(d)(1) lists under that description: “Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a potential for abuse associated with a stimulant effect on the central nervous system: (1) Amphetamine ...” H.B. 447, at 1151.
Section 4.03(a) [with § 4.04(a)] defined certain offenses violative of the Act, in terms that a person “knowingly or intentionally manufactures, delivers, or possesses with intent to manufacture or deliver [or possesses] a controlled substance listed in Penalty Groups 1, 2, 3, or 4”.
Six years later, the Legislature revised the penalty groups to change the classification of certain controlled substances, and to add others, leaving amphetamine in Penalty Group 3. Acts 1979, 66th Leg., Ch. 598, p. 1278 (S.B. 322), effective August 27, 1979.
To be noted is that so far the Legislature had not taken cognizance of “adulterants and dilutants” for any purpose, nor included them as a component of any offense. The reason, of course, is that the weight of a controlled substance was irrelevant so long as it was more than a trace sufficient to be analyzed and identified. See, e.g., Shults v. State, 575 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Cantu v. State, 546 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). The only exceptions were made for offenses involving “limited quantities” of narcotic drugs in § 4.02(d)(6) and (e)(1). See Benoit v. State, 561 S.W.2d 810, 812-815 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).
In its next session, the Legislature adapted the concept of “aggravated offenses” to the Texas Controlled Substances Act, as part of “declared war on crime, especially drug related crime”. Wedorf, The War on Crime: 1981 Legislation, 33 Tex.Tech.L.Rev. 765. It made no change in content to “criminal classification” by penalty groups, but did revamp definitions of all existing offenses previously stated in §§ 4.03 and 4.04 (see H.B. 447, ante) to provide punishment according to “aggregate weight, including adulterants and dilutants.” Acts 1981, 67th Leg., Ch. 268, p. 696 (H.B. 730), effective September 1, 1981.
After the Austin Court of Appeals held H.B. 730 unconstitutional in Ex Parte Crisp, *122643 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.App. — Austin 1982), judgment affirmed, 661 S.W.2d 956 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), the Legislature revised, codified and reenacted many substantive and procedural laws previously enacted separately, including, of course, the late H.B. 730. Again, however, that legislation did not modify penalty groups. Acts 1983, 68th Leg., Ch. 425, p. 2361 (H.B. 1191), effective August 28, 1983.
Not until the next regular session did the Legislature separately add and reclassify certain substances in schedules and penalty groups, inter alia, moving amphetamine from Penalty Group 3, where it had been ever since first designated a controlled substance, to Penalty Group 2; and this time there was no modification of existing offenses as previously defined in H.B. 730 in 1981 and H.B. 1191 in 1983, both supra, directly involving manufacture, delivery and possession of controlled substances. See Acts 1985, 69th Leg. Ch. 227, p. 1102, at 1119 (S.B. 639), effective September 1, 1985 (now Y.T.C.A. Health and Safety Code, § 481.103(a)(3). The legislative history of S.B. 639 indicates that the transfer of amphetamine from Penalty Group 3 to Penalty Group 2 was done in order to increase the penalty for unlawful delivery of amphetamine and its immediate precursors to equal the penalty then imposed for the manufacture of methamphetamines (then in Penalty Group 2).3 However, the definition for this controlled substance was not altered during the transfer from one penalty group to the other.4
II.
With the advent of the prosecution of aggravated drug cases, this Court has been faced with an increasing number of difficult issues related to the measure of the aggregate weight of a controlled substance. In only two cases have we even alluded to the language at issue in this case.
In 1988, this Court, in McGlothlin v. State, 749 S.W.2d 856 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), grappled with the definition of “adulterant” and “dilutant”, in determining whether the State had proved that the defendant had possessed more than 400 grams of amphetamines. In that opinion, we noted in dicta that Penalty Groups 1 and 2 included only the prohibited controlled substance while Penalty Groups 3 and 4 included not only “the prohibited controlled substance, but also ‘[a]ny material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances McGlothlin, at 861. We observed that other states had statutes barring possession of any mixture (emphasis in original opinion) containing a controlled substance and opined that such language would have included the water in which the amphetamine had been found in the McGlothlin case. Id., at 860. We also indicated that Texas provided a similar comprehensive “mixture” prohibition for items penalty groups 3 and 4. Id., at 861. Finally, we stated that Penalty Groups 1 and 2 were limited to the controlled substance only and noted that Amphetamine was in penalty group 2.
That final statement was imprecise in that although amphetamine was, by the time McGlothlin was rendered, in Penalty Group 2, it still retained the comprehensive “[a]ny material, compound, mixture or preparation” language that this Court had noted was in penalty groups 3 and 4. However, since that language was not at issue in the case, we did not directly address it.
The Court did address such language, albeit in passing, in the case of Reeves v. State, 806 S.W.2d 540 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Defendant Reeves had been charged with aggravated delivery of amphetamine. The evi*123dence at trial indicated that the defendant had given an undercover officer a bag of “wet” amphetamine. The entire contents of the bag weighed 29.76 grams and contained some amphetamine although the percentage of amphetamine in the material was not determined. On appeal, this Court held that the State had neither shown that the entire 29.76 grams was pure amphetamine nor shown that the portion which was not amphetamine fit the legal definition of “adulterants” or “dilutants”.
In a footnote to that case, we observed that, although neither party had raised the particular theory, under the wording of § 4.02(c) [which placed amphetamine in Penalty Group 2], the “controlled substance” was the material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing some quantity of a “listed controlled substance”, such as amphetamine. Reeves, at 545, fn. 5. We stated that the State could seek a conviction for possessing, manufacturing, or delivering either the “pure” amphetamine or the material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing the amphetamine. Id. However, we did not pass on the issue directly as no charge under that theory was presented to the jury. Id.
III.
A.
This case was tried and Appellant convicted on the theory that he “did intentionally and knowingly manufacture a controlled substance, to wit: Amphetamine, by aggregate weight, including any adulterants and dilu-tants, of more than 400 grams as set forth in the indictment.”
The Department of Public Safety chemist described the material which the prosecution claimed and the Court of Appeals found to be “amphetamine” viz:
“[The 5000 milliliter flask of dark liquid] contained 704.89 grams of amphetamine, including adulterants and dilutants.... [T]he solution in the flask contained 76.20 grams of amphetamine base; that the remainder of the solution was reaction mixture containing bi-products of the manufacturing process and unused precursors; and that the amphetamine in the liquid had not been extracted, distilled or separated from the other substances. * ⅜ ⅜ [TJhat the solution in the flask was not ready for distribution as amphetamine had not been extracted, distilled or separated from the other substances in the flask.”
Dowling v. State, supra at 2, 3. The chemist further explained that after amphetamine is extracted, distilled or separated and “powdered out”, the “remaining chemicals and liquids” left in the flask would be “just waste material”. (Statement of Facts, Volume 3, p. 282).
B.
As stated previously, this case is governed by the 1983 version of the Texas Controlled Substances Act. Under that Act, controlled substance was defined as “... a drug, substance, or immediate precursor listed in Schedules I through V and Penalty Groups 1 through 4 of this Act.” § 1.02(5).
“Amphetamine” along with other substances was listed in Penalty Group 3, viz:
“Penalty Groups 3. Penalty Group 3 shall include the following controlled substances:
(1) Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a potential for abuse associated with a stimulant effect on the central nervous system:
(A) Amphetamine.... ”
§ 4.02(d)(1)(A)
Proscribed conduct involving amphetamine was defined as an offense or an aggregated offense only in §§ 4.032(a) and (e) [manufactures, delivers with intent, et cetera], and 4.042(a) and (c) [possesses], respectively. Thus, as pertinent here, a “person commits an offense if he knowingly or intentional manufactures ... a controlled substance listed in Penalty Groups 3”; “a person commits an aggravated offense if he commits an offense under Subsection (a) of this section and the amount of the controlled substance manufactured ... is by aggregated weight, including any adulterants and dilutants, 200 grams or more.”
*124To “manufacture” meant the production, preparation, compounding, conversion or processing of the a controlled substance (other than marihuana), “either directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging or repacking of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container!)]”. § 1.02CL6).5
rv.
A.
On rehearing the majority said that “the legislature intended to prohibit the possession, delivery or manufacture of materials, compounds, mixtures, or preparations containing amphetamine,” and noted the dicta in Reeves, supra; accordingly the majority held that the indictment “must allege that the accused possessed, delivered, or manufactured a material, compound, mixture, or preparation if the State is to proceed under such theory.” Opinion, at 109.
We reaffirm this holding with a slight clarification regarding the measure of the “material, compound, mixture, or preparation” in cases involving the manufacture of a controlled substance. In construing the language of a statute, it is presumed that the Legislature intended that every word of a statute is used for a purpose. Polk v. State, 676 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). The plain language of the statute in question states that a “material, compound, mixture, or preparation” containing any quantity of amphetamine is a controlled substance. [HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 4.02(d)(1)(A) (1983 version) ]. (emphasis added). See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Accordingly, it is the weight of this entire entity which is aggregate weight of the “controlled substance” and a person may be charged with possession, transfer or manufacturing of any “material, compound, mixture or preparation which contains any quantity of ... amphetamine”, if such theory is alleged in the indictment.
This reading is also consistent with our analysis of this type- of language in McGloth-lin 6 and Reeves7. Further, this reading is not inconsistent with the notion of adulterant and dilutants. By the very definitions of adulterants and dilutants8, as announced in McGlothlin, the theory of adulterants and dilutants would not apply to materials, compounds, mixtures or preparations as adulterants and dilutants would already be subsumed in the “entity”. Therefore it would not be necessary to show that the there are any “adulterants” or “dilutants” if prosecuting under material, compound, mixture, or preparation theory (hereafter referred to as the “entity” theory).
Our holding today does not dimmish the import of the theory of adulterants and dilu-tants. The adulterant and dilutant language, while having no effect in cases tried under the “material, compound, mixture, or preparation” language, still applies to the prosecution of offenses involving controlled substances which cannot be prosecuted under the “entity” theory (which are a majority of the listed controlled substances). This is *125consistent with the general precepts of statutory interpretation.
However, in the instant case, the “entity” theory has no place, as the State did not allege such a theory in the indictment, did not submit such theory to the jury and thus cannot rely on such language to support the conviction.
B.
Even if the State had proceeded on an “entity” theory, the conviction would not stand under the facts of this case, because this case involved the manufacturing of a controlled substance.
We are aware that the application of the “entity” theory to a manufacturing case presents particularly difficult problems, primarily related to the issues of what should be considered a “material, compound, mixture, or preparation”. Need the substance be a final, usable entity? Would a suspension of partially processed amphetamine in a liquid in which it is “cooking” be considered a “material, compound, mixture, or preparation” under the statute? What if the amphetamine has been thoroughly “cooked” but is still suspended in “storage” or “waste” liquid? Is that entire “entity” a controlled substance even though most of it is unusable and/or will be discarded before the amphetamine is ingested?
These questions, in relation to the “material, compound, mixture, or preparation” are an issue of first impression in Texas. The only other jurisdiction to consider this particular issue is the federal system. The federal courts (whose controlled substances scheme, admittedly, contains somewhat different language than our own9) are divided on this issue10. There is, however, some support in the federal11 system for a distinction between items which are mere waste products of the manufacture of a controlled substance and items which will add to the ultimate bulk of the controlled substance.12
Carefully considered, Texas statutes proscribing “Unlawful Manufacture” of controlled substance contemplate a finished product. The offense is committed when one “manufactures ”13 a controlled substance; punishment is graded by the amount of the controlled substance “manufactured”. The terms connote a completed product of the manufacturing process. See Goff v. State, 777 S.W.2d 418 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (that 15.2 grams of methamphetamine [suspended for “purification” in ether and acetone solu*126tion for total weight of 4.9 pounds] “had been completed through the manufacturing process” sufficient to show Appellant “manufactured” only 14.2 grams — not more than 400 grams as alleged — of methamphetamine; neither ether nor acetone is an “adulterant” or “dilutant”).
Therefore by-products, waste materials, unused precursors14, etc. should not be part of a definition of a controlled substance in a manufacturing case. Rather, the “material, compound, mixture, or preparation” must be in a usable form in order to be a controlled substance in a manufacturing case. If a substance is not usable, it has either not been fully manufactured (in which case, a charge may be made of attempted manufacture) or else it is not a controlled substance (such as in the case of sludge or waste).
Accordingly, we now hold that in a prosecution for manufacture of “amphetamine,” alleged to have occurred prior to September 1, 1989, the State may not prove the aggregate weight alleged by claiming the entire weight of the “solution” or “product” as a “material, compound, mixture or preparation”, containing a quantity of “amphetamine” unless it is proven that the controlled substance is in a usable form15.
If the controlled substance is not in a usable form, the State may allege attempted manufacture16 of a “material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing amphetamine” and, if it is proven that the liquid or solid portion of the entity, apart from the listed substance, is either a part of, or capable of being made into part of, a usable entity, then that portion may be counted toward the weight of the entire entity.
For example, if 0.5 grams of amphetamine is found suspended in 200 grams of a liquid made up of ingredients which will make more amphetamine or a usable entity containing amphetamine (but in its present state the amphetamine-liquid entity is unusable), that liquid may be counted toward the weight of the entity in an attempted manufacture case and the state may prove that the ingredients would have made “x” grams of amphetamine or of a “material, compound, mixture, or preparation including amphetamine.” Alternatively, the State could charge the defendant with manufacture of the 0.5 grams of amphetamine.
If on the other hand, 0.5 grams of amphetamine is found suspended in 200 grams of a liquid which is a waste or byproduct of the manufacturing process and incapable of being a usable entity or being made into a usable entity, then the State could only charge the defendant with manufacture of 0.5 grams of amphetamine.
This analysis would provide for a heavier punishment for a defendant who has manufactured or attempted to manufacture a large usable amount of a controlled substance than for a defendant who has manufactured or attempted to manufacture a small amount of a controlled substance which is still mixed with unusable by-products and waste products.
In the present case, then, even if the State had alleged that Appellant had manufactured a “material, compound, mixture or preparation ... containing amphetamine”, because there was no proof that the entity was in a usable form, the conviction could not be sustained on that ground.17
*127V.
On rehearing, the majority opinion can be read to say that if the phrase is alleged in the indictment, proof of the “aggregate weight” of a controlled substance must show “the weight of the named substance” and any proven “material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing the substance.” Opinion, at 109. As much as that can be read as our holding, today we modify that holding. As the controlled substance is the “material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any quantity of amphetamine”, it is only necessary to prove, in accordance with our previous admonition about usable form/entity, the aggregate weight of this entire entity and that the entity does in fact contain a quantity of amphetamine. It is not necessary to prove the separate weights of amphetamine and the non-amphetamine portion.
VI.
We note that our holding today will have a very limited effect, applying only to such crimes committed prior to September 1, 1989. In 1989, the legislature amended the then § 4.02 of the Controlled Substances Act [now Health and Safety Code § 481.101]. Prior to such amendment, the section provided that “For the purpose of establishing criminal penalties for violation of this chapter, controlled substances are divided into Penalty Groups 1 through 4”. After the amendment, the section read, “For the purpose of establishing criminal penalties for violations of this chapter, controlled substances, including a material compound, mixture or preparation containing the controlled substance, are divided into Penalty Groups 1 through 4.” Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 776 § 21 (S.B. 29). The bill analysis for S.B. 29 indicates that this amendment was made to “qualify (sic) that violations of this Act can be made with material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing the controlled substance in addition to just the pure controlled substance.” Section 21 was originally part of House Bill 440 from that same session and a review of the original language of that bill and of the tapes of public hearings held on that bill indicate that the intent of the bill was to override this Court’s decision in McGlothlin and change the definition of controlled substance to include a material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any detectable amount of a listed substance. (Tape of 2/20/93 meeting of House Criminal Jurisprudence Committee).
According to the legislative history, the author of H.B. 440 was under the impression that McGlothlin did not allow prosecutions under the “material, compound, mixture, or preparation” language and apparently sought to bring the statute “into line with” the original legislative intent and federal law. (Tape of 2/20/93 meeting of House Criminal Jurisprudence Committee). In some respects, this was a misinterpretation of the existing statutes and a misreading of McGlothlin, as some controlled substances (including amphetamine) already contained the “material” language and this Court never passed on that issue in McGlothlin. It is possible that this Court’s imprecise characterization of amphetamine as a Penalty 2 group controlled substance and thus implicitly not part of the penalty groups that contained the “material, compound, mixture, and preparation” language, may have led to this confusion.
In light of the plain language of the those passages of the Act which refer to “Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any amount of ... [certain listed substances]”, this amendment had the effect of expanding the option of prosecuting under the “entity” theory to all items listed in the Penalty Groups, not just those which already contained the specified language. Thus, for offenses occurring after September 1,1989, prosecutors have the option of charging a person with the possession, delivery, or manufacturing of any material compound, mixtee, or preparation of any substance listed under Penalty Groups 1-418.
*128However, this recent expansion would in no way diminish the State’s authority to prosecute drug offenses which occurred prior to the amendment (such as the instant ease) under the “material, compound, mixture, or preparation” theory for such listed substances such as amphetamine, where such language was already present in the description of such controlled substances.
VII.
Therefore, while clarifying and modifying certain earlier holdings, for reasons developed in this opinion, we adhere to and confirm our ultimate disposition of this cause on Appellant’s motion for rehearing. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal.
McCORMICK, P.J., and WHITE, J., dissent.

. Controlled substance was defined as "... a drug, substance or immediate precursor listed in Schedules I through IV and Penalty Groups 1 through 4 of this Act".

. The Revised Bill Analysis for S.B. 639 stated “The manufacture of amphetamines (penalty group 3) has increased by several hundred percent because it is basically the same as methamphetamine (penalty group 2) but with a lower penalty. Since illegal manufacturers have discovered that they can make an almost equally popular drug with less risk, the manufacture of amphetamine has skyrocketed. This bill places the substance in penalty group 2".

. Under both penalty groups, the controlled substance was defined as follows:
“(1) Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of the following substances having a potential for abuse associated with a stimulant effect on the central nervous system:
(A) Amphetamine.... ”

. The trial court instructed the jury that “manufacture” meant "the production, preparation or processing of the controlled substance either directly or indirectly by means of chemical synthesis". Tr. 53. So far as this record and similar cases show, amphetamine is produced "independently” by means of chemical synthesis.

. See McGlothlin, at 860-861, where we discussed the federal scheme ("total weight of mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of a controlled substance”) and the Florida and Georgia schemes ("possession ... of [a controlled substance] or of any mixture containing the [controlled substance]”), stated that under those schemes the water at issue in the McGloth-lin case would be clearly covered, and noted that Texas had a similar scheme in penalty groups 3 and 4 which contained the "any material, compound, mixture, or preparation” language.

. In Reeves, at 545, fn. 5, we stated that from the wording of the statute involving "amphetamine”, the "controlled substance” prohibited could be a) a material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing the listed substance; or b) the listed substance in its pure form since a "material" could consist of 100% of the listed substance.

. (Compounds, substances, or solutions added to the controlled substance with the intent to increase the bulk or quantity of the product without affecting its activity.) McGlothlin, at 860.

. Most notable are the federal guidelines which provide "Unless otherwise specified, the weight of a controlled substance ... refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of the controlled substance”. (Note following Drug Quantity Table; United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1).

. See U.S. v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.1992) (use entire weight of mixture or substance, even if toxic liquid waste material with only small percentage of methamphetamine); U.S. v. Innie, 7 F.3d 840 (9th Cir.1993) (plain language of statues required that entire amount of mixture of substance be used even if impure and poisonous); Compare U.S. v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231, 1238 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that term "mixture” under federal guidelines does not include unusable mixtures); also U.S. v. Newsome, 998 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir.1993); and U.S. v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129, 136 (6th Cir.1991) (inappropriate to consider entire weight of mixture if there was no possibility it could be distributed to consumers and it would not increase the amount of methamphetamine available for distribution).

. Jennings, at 137 (for sentencing purposes, weight limited to amount of methamphetamine the defendant was capable of producing); Newsome, at 1579; Rolande-Gabriel, at 1238.

. We have also indicated some recognition for the propriety of including the weight of items that do or will add to the bulk of a final product. See McGlothlin, at 860, fn. 8 ("The State argues that the legislative intent is clear, 'to see that drug users, pushers and drug manufacturers do not get the benefit of being caught at a ‘lucky’ point in their manufacturing or cutting of the drug for sale or use ... [amphetamine] is always found with other substances — water and other chemicals used in manufacture or added later to facilitate use and sale of the basic drug’. We fail to see how the definition which we have approved would allow an offender to get ‘lucky’ and avoid conviction for an increased offense. If an agent adds to the bulk of the final product it is included in the total weight of adulterants and dilutants. This includes agents added during manufacturing which will increase the bulk of the yet unfinished product.") (emphasis added).

. TEX.HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§481.115, 481.116, 481.117, 481.118.

. However, if the State proves that there are "immediate precursors” their weight could be included in the aggregate weight of the controlled substance as per 1.02(5) [now HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 481.002(5)].

. By a "usable form”, we do not mean that the substance must be "street ready”. Rather, as our examples make clear, our concern is that there must be some final manufactured product which is identifiable as a controlled substance. The fact that the controlled substance may remain suspended in a "carrier” liquid or some other solution does not diminish the finality of the manufacturing process or the “usability” of such substance from a prosecutorial standpoint.

. We note that attempted manufacture of a controlled substance carries the same penalty as manufacture of a controlled substance. See HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE, Section 481.108 (Vernon Pamphlet 1992).

. We note that the State could have prosecuted this as a case of attempted manufacturing, but express no opinion as to whether the State could have proven an aggravated amount as that issue is not before us.

. However, the State would have to specifically charge a person under that theory as the Legislature’s change clearly indicates two modes of prosecution — the controlled substance and any "material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing the controlled substance”. If this "entity” theory is not alleged in the indictment, then the State would be limited to the actual definition of the specific controlled substance *128(plus adulterants and dilutants if they are alleged).