Court Opinion

ID: 9460662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:57:13.35844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:43.764920
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
The district court adopted and quoted the fact summary in the opinion of Presiding Judge Onion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Appendix to this Court’s majority opinion and Pick-ens v. State, 466 S.W.2d 563, 567. The district court then reviewed the contentions made by the State of Texas in its amended motion to revoke Pickens’ probation, and concluded that the Texas trial court found that Pickens had engaged in disorderly conduct in violation of Texas Penal Code, Art. 474. In particular, the Texas trial court made the following remarks in revoking Pickens’ probation:
“Now, much more serious and more substantuating [sic] charge is the last charge against him, in that instead of cooperating and he did engage in unreasonable and disorderly conduct in a manner calculated to provoke disturbance by making the comment that he denied making, but that is testified to by two officers, with reference to overpowering the resistance and getting back into the room, despite the fact that he had been ejected from it at least twice and probably three times, and this sort of thing just cannot be tolerated, because a hospital is a place where people are supposed to be treated and helped, and the fact that these people may have been concerned about whether this man was alive or dead cannot be permitted to disrupt the orderly function of the public hospital.
“I think his action in — in effect, inciting mob violence in this case by advocating that they storm the door of the room is which the nurses and the body and mother of the deceased were, clearly disorderly conduct in a manner to cause or provoke a disturbance. “Therefore, the opinion and judgment of the Court that the defendant has violated the term of his probation, and that his probation should be, and is hereby, revoked.”
With deference, I disagree with the basis of the majority holding — that is, that the state trial court based the revocation on conduct other than that arguably protected by the First Amendment. The above-quoted portion of the opinion of the Texas trial court makes it clear to me that the basis for the revocation of probation was Pickens’ comment concerning rushing into the emergency room.
The federal district court “pretermitted determination of the scope of first amendment rights possessed by a probationer,” stating that,
“The law is well settled that revocation of probation is an exercise of the trial court’s broad discretionary powers and such action will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear show-, ing of abuse of that discretion. Proof sufficient to support a criminal conviction is not required to support a discretionary order revoking probation. All that is required is that the evidence and facts reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions of probation [cases omitted].
“This Court cannot say that the trial judge clearly abused his discretion or in any manner committed error of constitutional dimensions in revoking the probation.”
Since it seems to me that Pickens' comment was the basis for the revocation, I think the district court should have ascertained whether his statement was *988protected by the First Amendment.1 Revocation of probation either for speech protected by the Constitution or for violation of a state law, where such violation is based upon speech protected by the Constitution, would surely constitute an abuse of discretion.
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430, the Supreme Court recapitulated the test for whether speech is protected by the First Amendment:
“These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”
In the present case, Judge Onion made the following relevant observations:
“While the appellant denied making such statement, two officers testified they heard him urge the 15 to 20 people to rush in as they could not be stopped. No such action ever occurred.
“The group of people there was described as ‘orderly,’ many being friends or relatives of the deceased. They remained mostly in the hallway or waiting room of the hospital which was open to the public.”
Judge Morrison in dissent noted that according to both versions of what Pickens said, Pickens “nowhere made the outright assertion that the persons gathered in the lobby should join together and storm the door, he simply stated what appeared to be a fact; i. e., if they all stormed the door they could get in.” 466 S.W.2d 566.2 Judge Morrison also noted that Pickens was not hollering or shouting, that he was at most speaking in a tone of voice which was “loud enough to be heard by apparently several of the people in the vicinity.” After Pickens made the statement in question, one of the persons present said, according to Judge Morrison, “Get out of the way and stop this foolishness.”
In light of the facts revealed by the record in this case, there is serious question whether Pickens’ statement was truly “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.” His statement apparently was in a hypothetical form and was not linked with any other remarks of an inflammatory or persuasive nature. Very possibly his statement was meant simply as an expression of anger at being excluded from the presence of his dying friend. Certainly his statement was not “likely to incite or produce such action.” This is demonstrated by the orderliness of the group at all times and the apparent total failure of anyone in the group to do or say anything supportive of Pickens’ suggestion. In fact, one person present told Pickens to “stop this foolishness.” The law enforcement officials themselves apparently took no action to restrain or to arrest Pickens after he made the statement in question. This suggests that they did not really think his statement was likely to cause any trouble. To be removed from the constitutional guaranty of free speech, Pickens’ advocacy of the use of force must both (1) be “di*989rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,” and (2) be “likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg, supra, 395 U.S. at 447, 89 S.Ct. at 1829; Hess v. Indiana, 1973, 414 U.S. 105, 109, 94 S.Ct. 326, 38 L.Ed.2d 303. Since requirement (2) clearly was not met, and there is considerable doubt about requirement (1), I conclude that Pickens’ statement constituted speech protected by the First Amendment.
Apparently the Texas trial court revoked Pickens’ probation on the theory that his comment constituted an offense against the laws of Texas, and that Pickens had thereby violated a condition of his release.3 Since Pickens’ statement was within the protection of the First Amendment, his statement should not be held against him as a violation of a Texas penal statute. Otherwise, the Texas statute involved, Article 474, must be considered unconstitutional as applied to Pickens’ statement.
Alternatively, the Texas trial court may have revoked Pickens’ probation because his comment in and of itself violated the terms and conditions of his probation, regardless of whether the comment violated a Texas penal statute. It now seems clear that first amendment protections of freedom of expression apply to probationers,4 except possibly where restrictions are justified by government interests similar to those described in Procunier v. Martinez, 1974, - U.S. at---, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224. In cases where some legitimate government interest would justify limitation of a probationer’s first amendment freedom, such limitations should be specifically set out in the terms and conditions of probation so that the probationer is on notice of what is proscribed. In the present case, there is no indication that Pickens was advised that the terms of his probation included curtailment of his first amendment liberties. I therefore conclude that the Texas trial court abused its discretion in revoking Pickens’ probation for speech protected by the First Amendment.

. It is evident from Judge Morrison’s dissenting opinion that Pickens’ first amendment claims were considered by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See 466 S.W.2d at 566. Judge Morrison dissents “because of a violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”

. As reported in the opinion of the majority in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 466 S.W.2d at 565, witness McAdams testified:
“ T was standing with my back to the doorway, and Deputy Sheriff John P. Allen was standing there by the doors with me, and I heard Mr. Pickens make the statement in a loud voice that — I don’t recall the exact wording of it; it was to the effect that there aren’t very many in there, and that if we all rushed them, we can get in; they can’t stop us, I believe that was the ending of it.’ ”
Witness Allen stated: “ ‘And he said there is only three or four of them, and if we storm in the door, there is nothing they can do about it.’ ” 466 S.W.2d 563.

. The majority opinion by Judge Odom in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals seems to proceed on this theory. See 466 S.W.2d at 565.

. Pell v. Procunier, 1974, - U.S. -, -, 94 S.Ct. 2800, -, 40 L.Ed.2d -, where Justice Stewart speaking for the Court said: “ * * * a prison inmate retains those hirst Amendment rights that are not inconsistent wiih his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Also, see Procunier v. Martinez, 1974, - U.S. -, -, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (Justice Douglas concurring, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) and---[94 S.Ct. 1800] (Justice Marshall concurring, joined by Justices Brennan and Douglas in Part II).