Court Opinion

ID: 9679778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:06:33.704476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:59.628062
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDS, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
Interpretation of KRS 416.670 by the majority opinion involves an imaginative projection of an express purpose which the legislature did not provide and which it did not have in mind. A recitation of the applicable sections of the statute aforesaid is as follows:
Limitation on condemnation powers— Rights of current landowner. — (1) Development shall be started on any proper*372ty which has been acquired through condemnation within a period of eight (8) years from the date of the deed to the condemnor or the date on which the con-demnor took possession, whichever is earlier, for the purpose of which it was condemned. The failure of the condemn- or to so begin development shall entitle the current landowner to repurchase the property at the price the condemnor paid to the landowner for the property. The current owner of the land from which the condemned land was taken may reacquire the land as aforementioned.
(2) Any condemnor who fails to develop property acquired by condemnation or who fails to begin design on highway projects pursuant to KRS Chapter 177 within a period of eight (8) years after acquisition, shall notify the current landowner of the provisions of subsection (1) of this section. If the current landowner refuses to purchase property described in this section, public notice shall be given in a manner prescribed in KRS Chapter 424 within thirty (30) days of the refusal, and the property shall be sold at auction. Provided, however, that this section shall not apply to property acquired for purposes of industrial development pursuant to KRS Chapter 152.
The words of the statute are clear and we should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute nor from its legislative history.
The majority contends that the statute compels the Cabinet to offer back for repurchase any portion of condemned land which is not developed. The use of the word “any” is broad and general. It is used wherein it excludes either selection or distinction and in construing statutes the word “any” means “all.” Words and Phrases, 3A Permanent Edition, p. 59; Johnson v. Johnson, 297 Ky. 268, 178 S.W.2d 983 (1944); Wadsworth Electric Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Kenton County Airport Board, 509 S.W.2d 270 (1974). It is respectfully suggested that the majority opinion cites with unerring correctness the cases where the word “any” has been and has not been used to mean “all” and brings unwarranted emphasis upon antebellum definitional authority. The appellant contends that the statute compels the Cabinet to offer back for repurchase any portion of condemned land which is not developed. To the contrary, the statute directs only the return of condemned property to the landowner if public development has not been undertaken on the property within eight years.
The statute provides that the failure of the condemnor to so begin development shall entitle the current landowner “to repurchase the property at the price con-demnor paid to the landowner for the property.” The statute recites no formula nor does the wording thereof imply, suggest, involve or comprise a pro rata method of calculating or determining the repurchase price of a portion or an unused slice or sliver of land. It is error to conclude that the calculation of all land prices is a rudimentary computation.
Perhaps it should be reemphasized that the purpose for the taking of appellant’s property was neither disputed nor contested and that over 69% of the 15-acre tract was ultimately used for the development of the construction project. It was only after the acquisition of the fee simple title that the highway plans were altered, resulting in the excess property. The Commonwealth has heretofore been permitted to utilize some latitude in the use of condemned property and may consider design and convenience as well as expense in determining how the land shall be used. Sturgill v. Commonwealth, Department of Highways, Ky., 384 S.W.2d 89 (1964). It is submitted that the question of public use or private use depends on the purpose of the initial taking and not on the nature of the Cabinet’s actual use of any excess acreage. The purpose of the statute is to provide a remedy in a situation where a project has been planned, a taking has occurred, and a subsequent abandonment or complete change of a highway development plan has thereafter occurred. Projects are developed, changed, altered and abandoned for a myriad of reasons and the statute purposefully fills a gap designed for resto*373ration of the whole property to the original party (landowner) or successor. The statute is in derogation of sovereignty and is to be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed and should not be permitted to divest the Cabinet of any of its prerogatives, rights or remedies unless the intention of the legislature to effect this object is expressed. City of Bowling Green v. T & E Electrical Contractors, Inc., Ky., 602 S.W.2d 434 (1980).
I would affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
SPAIN, J., joins in this dissent.