Court Opinion

ID: 9665948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:00:11.938993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:20.988142
License: Public Domain

OWEN, Justice,
filed a dissenting opinion in which CORNYN, Justice, joins.
I respectfully dissent. I would conditionally grant mandamus relief in this case, however the order should be directed to Bruce Rothstein, the district committee' director, not the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State is not empowered to extend the deadlines set out in the Election Code. Where a party official has failed to comply with his or her statutory duties, the Election Code gives the authority to courts of appeals and to this Court to issue writs of mandamus that extend deadlines, but that authority does not reside with the Secretary of State. Tex. Elec.Code § 273.061.
The Court expresses its dismay that the Secretary of State did not simply read our recent decision in Davis v. Taylor, 930 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.1996), and take it on himself to accept the filing of a certificate under section 145.037(e) of the Election Code, even though that filing was not received by the statutory deadline. 930 S.W.2d at 587-588. In Davis, we held that the candidate was *589entitled to a writ of mandamus directing a party official to comply with the statutory requirements for certification, and we extended the deadline otherwise applicable under the Election Code to allow the party official to perform his duties. 980 S.W.2d at 584. We did not mandamus the Secretary of State. The Secretary had no authority to accept a late filing until the deadline had been extended by a court of law. See also LaRouche v. Hannah, 822 S.W.2d 682, 634 (Tex.1992) (declining to issue writ of mandamus against the Secretary of State).
There is no difference between this case and the Davis case. Until there has been a determination that the party official failed to comply with the statutes, and that all the other requirements for the issuance of extraordinary relief are present, mandamus relief cannot be issued by a court, much less the Secretary of State. It was through the extraordinary measure of mandamus that the deadlines in the Election Code were extended in Davis. The Legislature has seen fit to expressly grant mandamus authority to the courts of appeals and to this Court to compel election officials to perform their duties, Tex. Elec.Code § 273.061, but that authority has not been given to the Secretary of State. The kinds of determinations that must be made in cases of this nature historically have been made by courts. The Secretary of State should not be encouraged, much less required, to determine when a court would have issued mandamus and to then sua sponte accept untimely filings.
The Court seems to draw a distinction between this ease and Davis because here, the committee chair did file a certificate in the proper form before the Secretary’s deadline for certifying candidates, which was September 11, fifty-five days before the election. Tex Elec.Code § 161.008. But the missed deadline was not the Secretary of State’s deadline; it was September 6, the deadline applicable to party officials such as Rothstein under section 145.037 of the Texas Election Code. The filing on September 10 came too late for the Secretary of State to place Bird on the ballot. It is difficult to see how these facts distinguish this case from Davis.
In the wake of our decision in Davis and under prior decisions of this Court, it is clear that when circumstances such as the ones present in this case arise, candidates are entitled to mandamus relief against party officials who fail to carry out their statutory duties. The Davis decision does not translate into a directive to or authority for the Secretary of State to accept late filings. The Secretary of State is simply not empowered to do so.
For these reasons, I cannot join the Court’s opinion.