Court Opinion

ID: 9473554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:32:52.182963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:35.883292
License: Public Domain

POOLE, Circuit Judge:
Ricardo J. Bordallo, Governor of Guam (“Governor”) appeals from a judgment of the District Court of Guam holding that the Guam Visitors Bureau (“Bureau”), as established pursuant to- Public Law 17-32, Article I, Chapter 9, Title 12, Guam Code Annotated, is not an agency or instrumentality of the government, and that section 9106(a) of Public Law 17-32 does not contravene the Organic Act of Guam.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
In November 1983, the seventeenth Guam Legislature passed Public Law 17-32 creating the Guam Visitors Bureau in its *1100present form1 under the Guam Visitors Bureau Act (“Act”). Section 9102 of the Act provides:
There is hereby created a public corporation to be known as the “Guam Visitors Bureau” as hereinafter provided. The corporation shall be a non-stock, nonprofit membership corporation to be governed in accordance with the applicable general corporation laws of the Territory of Guam, except as provided otherwise by this article. No articles of incorporation shall be required; this article shall be its charter.
The Bureau derives its funding partly from government sources and partly from sources within the private sector. Any individual, partnership, corporation or association may become a voting member by paying annual dues of at least $100.00. Under Section 9106(a) of the Act,2 four members of the board of directors were to be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Legislature. Four directors, contributing members in good standing, were to be elected by the membership. These eight directors were to select the ninth by a vote of at least six directors. The Act required the Governor to submit his four nominations for directors by December 15, 1983. The election of directors by the contributing members was to occur on December 28, 1983.3
On December 13, 1983, the Governor brought an action in the District Court of Guam, naming as defendants the four membership directors. The action sought: (1) a declaration that section 9106(a) of the Act violated section 6 of the Organic Act, codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1422, by infringing on the Governor’s responsibility to control all agencies and instrumentalities of the Government of Guam; and (2) a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing the defendants from turning over control *1101of the Bureau to private organizations by the election of directors by contributing members, which was scheduled for December 28.
On January 12, 1984, the district court filed its decision denying injunctive relief and holding that the Bureau was not an agency or instrumentality within the Executive Branch of the Government of Guam. The decision stated that a memorandum order and a judgment would follow. On February 8, the court issued its memorandum order explaining the basis of its holding that the Bureau was not an instrumentality of the government. On the same day, the court also filed a declaratory judgment upholding the validity of the December 28 election and section 9106(a), which provided that the Governor shall appoint four members of the Bureau. This judgment was entered on February 16.
On February 14,1984, the Governor filed a notice of appeal, and on February 21, he filed a “motion for clarification, or in the alternative, a motion for a stay.” The district court entered an order denying the motion for clarification or for a stay on April 6. The Governor appeals, on the same grounds as those tendered to the district court.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction
A threshold issue of timeliness of the notice of appeal must first be resolved. A timely notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 560, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). Appellant’s February 14, 1984, notice of appeal from the district court’s judgment, which was decided on February 8, but not entered until February 16, was timely and is to be “treated as filed after such entry and on the date thereof.” Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(2). However, Rule 4(a)(4) provides that if a timely motion is made to alter or amend the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), a notice of appeal filed before disposition of that motion is a nullity. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 60-61, 103 S.Ct. 400, 403, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982). In such a case, to perfect an appeal, the party must file a new notice of appeal within thirty days after disposition of the motion. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4).
The Governor’s “motion for clarification, or in the alternative for a stay” was filed on February 21, 1984. If that motion was to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), this court would be without jurisdiction, since no new notice of appeal was filed within the prescribed time after the disposition of appellant’s motion. If, on the other hand, the motion is characterized as merely seeking clarification and a stay under Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(c), then the notice of appeal would be valid, and jurisdiction would lie. This court sua sponte raised the issue of its jurisdiction, directing the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the jurisdiction question.
Since “nomenclature is not controlling,” a court must construe whether a motion, however styled, is appropriate for the relief requested. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir.1983); Sea Ranch Ass’n v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’ns, 537 F.2d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir.1976).
With this is mind, we consider the relief sought by the Governor’s February 21 motion. The Governor sought clarification of the third paragraph of the district court’s declaratory judgment, the language of which stated:
* * * pursuant to the provisions of Section 9106(a) of Article 1, four (4) members of the Board of Directors of the Guam Visitors Bureau, designated as “appointed directors” shall be appointed by the Governor of Guam with the advice and consent from the Guam Legislature. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Governor asked the district court to declare that this language was merely declaratory, or in the event the court found it mandatory, to grant a stay of the judgment pending appeal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. *110262(c). There was no request to alter or amend the judgment, an action requiring a “substantive change of mind by the court.” Miller, 709 F.2d at 527. Rather, it invited interpretation, which trial courts are often asked to supply, for the guidance of the parties. The district court treated the motion for clarification or for a stay in that light. It responded by stating that the language of the order clearly directed the Governor to act; hence the stay would be denied.4 The court made no reference to an alteration or amendment of the judgment.
We consider the foundation of Appellate Rule 4 to be the accommodation of the time for lodging appeals with the necessary flexibility accorded to the court and litigants in seeking to know what rights and responsibilities are encompassed in the language of orders and judgments. Therefore, courts examine the real nature of motions so as to sustain jurisdiction on appeal even where it is not altogether free of doubt. E.g., Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031, 102 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed.2d 473 (1981) (motion to retax costs characterized as Rule 59(e) motion to allow for timely filing of notice of appeal); Miller v. Transamerica Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 527-28 (9th Cir.1983) (Rule 59(e) motion characterized as Rule 60(a) motion so as not to destroy pending notice of appeal). This comports with the policy of liberally construing the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to carry out Congress’ desire for fairness in the administration of justice and a just determination of litigation. 9 Moore’s Federal Practice U 201.08[1]. In this case, however, we have no need to recharacterize the Governor's motion since we find that it was indeed a motion seeking either clarification or a stay, and not a motion to alter or amend the judgment. Accordingly, we hold that the Governor’s notice of appeal was timely and that we have jurisdiction.
II. The Merits
The Governor contends that section 9106(a) of the Act violates that part of section 6 of the Organic Act of Guam, 48 U.S.C. § 1422, which provides:
The Governor shall have general supervision and control of all the departments, bureaus, agencies and other instrumentalities of the executive branch of the Government of Guam.
If the Bureau is held to be a department, bureau, agency, or other instrumentality of the executive branch, then section 9106(a) is inconsistent with the Organic Act. The district court determined that it was not. Since the district court’s determination resolved a question of federal law, which arose under the Organic Act of Guam, 48 U.S.C. § 1421, et seq., we review it de novo.5 In re Bialac, 712 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir.1983) (en banc); see also Matter of McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1403 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc) (determination of state law subject to de novo review).
*1103To support his claim that the Bureau is a government entity, the Governor relies principally on section 9(c) of Public Law 17-37, the legislative intent amendment of November 29, 1983, which was passed seven days after the original enactment of the Act. It provides:
Recently the Guam District Court ruled that the Guam Visitors Bureau is a private entity contrary to the general understanding of the Legislature. It is the intent of the Legislature to continue without interruption, the current acts and actions of the Guam Visitors Bureau and to clarify its legal status, duties, powers, and the status of its employees.
The court ruling referred to in this section apparently was the district court’s decision in Laguana v. Guam Visitors Bureau, 725 F.2d 519 (9th Cir.1984), which held that the Bureau was not a public entity, and which this court affirmed. Id. at 521.
The Governor argues that in section 9(c) of the amendment, the Legislature was reaffirming the Bureau’s status as a public entity, as under the previous statute. However, the language of that legislation plainly established the Bureau as a “public corporation.” Section 9(c) does not indicate that the Bureau also was to be an instrumentality of the government. The district court did not discuss the after-the-fact legislative intent in section 9(c), but looked to the language of the new Act which emphasized that the Bureau was chartered as a public corporation.
The district court found that in creating certain public corporations, such as the Guam Airport Authority, the Guam Telephone Authority, the Guam Power Authority, and the Port Authority of Guam, the Legislature had expressly designated each as a public corporation and as an instrumentality of the government. The Legislature also chartered other public corporations which were not designated as instrumentalities of the government. The district court thus concluded that because the Legislature had expressly designated four public corporations as instrumentalities of the government, it did not intend the same characterization to apply to other public corporations, not so designated. Consequently, the Bureau was not a governmental entity since it had not been expressly designated as such.
We agree with the district court that the Bureau was not an instrumentality of the government. Accordingly, we find no conflict between section 9106(a) of Public Law 17-32 and section 6 of the Organic Act. The judgment is
AFFIRMED.

. The Bureau was first established in 1952 under section 4 of Public Law 67, codified at title 34, chapter 1, section 38003 of the Government Code of Guam. That section, as amended by Public Law 8-68 in 1965, provided:
The Guam Visitors Bureau shall be a nonprofit organization formed for the purpose of promoting the establishment of the visitors industry in Guam and whose constitution and by-laws and amendments thereof, shall be approved by the Governor.
In June 1970, the Governor promulgated Executive Order No. 70-24, which characterized the Bureau as a "quasi-autonomous instrumentality of the government” and mandated that the Bureau "operate separate and apart from any department or agency of the Government of Guam.”

. Section 9106(a) of the Act states:
The exercise of the powers of the Bureau shall be directed by the Board of Directors composed of nine (9) members selected in accordance with this Section. Four (4) directors, referred to as "appointed directors" shall be members and shall be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent from the Legislature. One of the appointed directors shall be a commissioner or assistant commissioner selected by the Commissioner’s Council. Four (4) directors, referred to as "elected directors" shall be contributing members in good standing elected by the membership. The four (4) appointed and four (4) elected directors shall then select the ninth (9th) director by a vote requiring concurrence of six (6) of the directors. The ninth (9th) director shall be actively and directly involved in the tourism industry. The Board of Directors shall elect from amongst its body a chairperson and vice-chairperson. The ninth director from a previous board shall not be held over solely to act as the ninth director of a new board. The ninth director of a previous board may be appointed as the ninth director of any subsequent board as set forth herein.

. Section 9114 of the Act, Public Law 17-32 provides that:
(a) The Bureau as organized pursuant to this Article shall commence business on January 9, 1984.
(b) The Governor shall submit to the Legislature the names of nominees of appointed directors no later than December 15, 1983.
(c) The four (4) directors elected by the membership of the existing Guam Visitors Bureau shall call and conduct a meeting of contributing members no later than December 28, 1983 to elect elected directors to serve for a two-year term commencing January 9, 1984. For the first electicn contributing members who have paid contributions for the 1984-1985 bi-annual period on or before December 14, 1983, shall be entitled to one (1) vote for each |200 contributed up to a maximum of ten (10) votes. No contributing member may vote by proxy at the first meeting. The quorum for the first meeting shall be at least fifty percent (50%) of votes of contributing members. The four persons receiving the four highest number of votes shall be elected. In case of a tie, a run-off shall be held.

. The order stated:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. That plaintiffs Motion for Stay of the Declaratory Judgment herein is hereby denied.
2. That the intent and clear language of this Court in its Declaratory Judgment of February 8, 1984 was and is to directly order Ricardo J. Bordallo, Governor of Guam, to appoint four (4) Directors of the Guam Visitors Bureau for confirmation under P.L. 17-32.
3. The above appointments shall be made, and such names submitted to the Legislature on or before April 20, 1984.
We think, in practical effect, the Governor simply asked the district court if its declaration really meant what it said. The Court responded that the judgment really did mean what it said.

. We applied a different standard of review in analyzing a related question in Laguana v. Guam Visitors Bureau, 725 F.2d 519 (9th Cir.1984). There, in response to plaintiffs challenge to the interpretation of Guam law, we held the Guam District Court’s conclusion that the Guam Visitors Bureau was not a governmental instrumentality to be "tenable and sound” and "[not] manifestly erroneous.” Id. at 521. In the instant case, by contrast, the Governor does not challenge the interpretation of Guam law. Rather, he asserts inconsistency of Guam law with respect to federal law, specifically the Organic Act.