Court Opinion

ID: 9411892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 14:05:59.695009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:17.050304
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JULY 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-0563-MR

KIMBERLY DERAMOS                                                     APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                  HONORABLE AUDRA J. ECKERLE, JUDGE
                           ACTION NO. 22-CI-000008

ANDERSON COMMUNITIES, INC.                                             APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, GOODWINE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Kimberly Deramos (“Deramos”) appeals the Jefferson

Circuit Court’s order granting dismissal of a lawsuit she filed against Anderson

Communities, Inc. (“Anderson Communities”). We affirm.

                                     FACTS

            In January of 2021, Deramos was living in a Louisville apartment

complex owned and managed by Anderson Communities. One evening, as she

was entering her building with her dog, both she and her dog were attacked by
another dog apparently belonging to a neighboring tenant. Sadly, Deramos’ dog,

Princess, did not survive the attack and Deramos sustained injuries.

             According to the rules of the apartment complex, certain breeds of

dogs and species of animals were not allowed as pets. Deramos alleged that the

dog which attacked her and killed Princess was a pit bull, which is one of the

restricted breeds. Deramos filed a complaint against Anderson Communities,

alleging that it was negligent in “maintaining a safe environment for tenants” and

was “otherwise negligent.” She sought damages for past and future medical

expenses, pain and suffering, and compensation for the loss of Princess.

             Anderson Communities answered and denied liability and sought

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”)

12. After each side filed memorandums concerning the motion to dismiss, the

judge entered an order dismissing the matter, finding that Anderson Communities

could not be considered an “owner” under the statute defining that term Kentucky

Revised Statute (“KRS”) 258.095(5), and therefore Deramos could not recover

against Anderson Communities. We affirm that order.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             The standard of review of a trial court’s determination of a CR 12.02

motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is de novo.

             “It is well settled in this jurisdiction when considering a
             motion to dismiss under [CR] 12.02, that the pleadings

                                          -2-
             should be liberally construed in a light most favorable to
             the plaintiff and all allegations taken in the complaint to
             be true.” Mims v. Western-Southern Agency, Inc., 226
             S.W.3d 833, 835 (Ky. App. 2007) (citing Gall v.
             Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky. App. 1987)). “Since
             a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
             which relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a
             reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court’s
             determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the
             issue de novo.” Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky.
             2010) (citing Morgan v. Bird, 289 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Ky.
             App. 2009)).
Littleton v. Plybon, 395 S.W.3d 505, 507 (Ky. App. 2012) (footnote omitted).

                                     ANALYSIS

             Preliminarily, Deramos complains that the trial court granted

Anderson Communities’ dispositive motion before the discovery process had been

initiated. Deramos cites to Russell v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc. as being supportive

of its position that it was improper to grant dismissal for failure to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted pursuant to CR 12.02(f). 610 S.W.3d 233, 240

(Ky. 2020). However, Russell concerned a motion for judgment on the pleadings

pursuant to CR 12.03, not a motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim under

CR 12.02(f). Here, because the only pleadings filed in the trial court were the

complaint and the answer, the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by

Anderson Communities, and the response to that motion by Deramos, summary

judgment is not appropriate.

                                          -3-
              In fact, and despite its characterization, the trial court
              rendered a summary judgment pursuant to CR 12.03 and
              CR 56. Contrary to the view of some, our decision in
              Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Ctr., Ky., 807 S.W.2d
              476 (1991), does not preclude summary judgment.
              Provided litigants are given an opportunity to present
              evidence which reveals the existence of disputed material
              facts, and upon the trial court’s determination that there
              are no such disputed facts, summary judgment is
              appropriate.

Hoke v. Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Ky. 1995).

              When there is a presentation of some evidence, then summary

judgment pursuant to CR 12.03 or CR 56 is appropriate; but here, where only the

pleadings are before the court, such is properly considered a CR 12.02(f) motion

for failure to state a claim.

              Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim do not require that the

party opposing the motion be granted an opportunity for discovery. CR 12.02(f)

allows a party to “expediently terminate litigation” without discovery upon a

showing that the “plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any statement of

facts which could be proved in support of the claim.” Seiller Waterman, LLC v.

RLB Properties, Ltd., 610 S.W.3d 188, 195 (Ky. 2020) (citing Burkhart v.

Community Med. Ctr., 432 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. 1968)). Without discovery, a circuit

court must determine only “if the facts alleged in the complaint can be proved,

would the plaintiff be entitled to relief?” James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 884

(Ky. App. 2002).

                                          -4-
              Turning to the trial court’s determination that Anderson Communities

could not be considered a “dog owner” under KRS 258.235(4) and KRS

258.095(5), we agree with the trial court. Strict liability for any injuries caused by

a dog is imputed to the “owner” of the dog via KRS 258.235(4): “Any owner

whose dog is found to have caused damage to a person, livestock, or other property

shall be responsible for that damage.” The term “owner” is defined in KRS

258.095(5):

              (5) “Owner,” when applied to the proprietorship of a dog,
              includes:

                    (a) Every person having a right of property in the
                        dog; and

                    (b) Every person who:

                          1. Keeps or harbors the dog;

                          2. Has the dog in his or her care;

                          3. Permits the dog to remain on or about
                             premises owned and occupied by him or
                             her; or

                          4. Permits the dog to remain on or about
                             premises leased and occupied by him or
                             her[.]

              The basis for Anderson Communities’ motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim was that it could not be considered an owner under the statute. Their

argument forwarded that a change in the definition of “owner” passed by the

                                          -5-
General Assembly in 2017 definitively excluded them from being considered an

owner. Deramos cites to Benningfield ex rel Benningfield v. Zinsmeister, 367

S.W.3d 561 (Ky. 2012), as supportive of her position that landlords can be held

liable for the actions of their tenant’s dogs. However, and Deramos fails to point

out, that case was decided before the General Assembly acted to change the

definition of “owner” as described above.1

              Before the statutory change, the third definition of owner in KRS

258.095(5) read “permits [the dog] to remain on or about premises owned or

occupied by him [or her.]” (Emphasis added.) However, the General Assembly

changed that definition to read “permits the dog to remain on or about premises

owned and occupied by him or her.” Thus, under the statute, an owner under this

definition would have to be both the owner of the property and a resident thereof.

As the trial court pointed out in its order, the likely reason for this change could be

that a resident landlord would have occasion to be aware of a dog being upon the

property and would have acquiesced to its presence by not having the dog removed

from the premises.

1
  “It has no ambiguity and plainly states that a person who permits a dog to remain on premises
he owns shall be deemed an owner for purposes of the dog-bite liability statute. This can include
a landlord.” 367 S.W.3d at 567.

                                              -6-
             In responding to the motion to dismiss and arguing it constitutes

evidence of negligence by Anderson Communities, Deramos provided an affidavit

and attached to it a document listing “prohibited breeds” which she alleged had

been provided by Anderson Communities to her when she signed a “Pet

Addendum” to her lease agreement. She alleged that the dog which attacked she

herself and Princess was a “pit bull” and that breed is listed on the list as a breed

which Anderson Communities does not allow on the property and that Anderson

Communities was clearly negligent in failing to enforce its own policy. This, as

noted by the trial court, indicates that Anderson Communities did not allow

dangerous dogs on the property.

             However, Deramos provided no allegation that Anderson

Communities knew that the pit bull (if the dog was, in fact, such breed) was

residing on the property, if it even was so residing rather than visiting. Even had

Deramos alleged that Anderson Communities was aware of the pit bull’s residence

in the building, the definition of “owner” makes it clear that Anderson

Communities would not be subjected to strict liability for the bite of a dog residing

on the property against their rules.

                                          -7-
                                   CONCLUSION

             We agree with the trial court that judgment on the pleadings was

proper as under no theory could Anderson Communities be found to be an owner

and thus liable for the actions of the dog of a tenant.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Grover S. Cox                              J. Michael Wells
 Louisville, Kentucky                       Louisville, Kentucky

                                          -8-