Court Opinion

ID: 9940229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 18:01:17.198549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:39.660432
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         FEB 13 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LASCHELLE PATTON,                               No.    23-35073

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00050-TOR

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of
Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Washington
                    Thomas O. Rice, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted February 9, 2024**
                                Portland, Oregon

Before: GOULD, BYBEE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

      Laschelle Patton appeals from a district court decision affirming the

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for Social Security

disability benefits. “We ‘review the district court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
of social security benefits de novo and will disturb the denial of benefits only if the

decision contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.’”

Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Tommasetti v. Astrue,

533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

and we affirm.

      1. The ALJ did not err in discrediting the findings of Patton’s examining

psychologist. Because Patton filed her benefits claim after March 27, 2017, the ALJ

was required to evaluate her medical opinion evidence under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c.

See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2022). Under these rules, “‘[t]he

most important factors’ that the agency considers when evaluating the

persuasiveness of medical opinions are ‘supportability’ and ‘consistency.’” Id. at

791 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)). But “an ALJ’s decision, including the

decision to discredit any medical opinion, must simply be supported by substantial

evidence.” Id. at 787. And the ALJ “is responsible for determining credibility,

resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Ford v.

Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d

1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)).

      Here, there was a conflict between the conclusions of Patton’s psychologist,

who found that Patton suffered mostly marked impairments, and the conclusions of

two state psychologists, who found only moderate impairments.              Substantial

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evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to credit the findings of the state’s

psychologists over the findings of Patton’s psychologist. The ALJ explained that

Patton’s psychologist reviewed less evidence than the other psychologists and

determined that her first-hand observations contradicted her own conclusions, which

appeared to be based largely on Patton’s self-reported symptoms. Substantial

evidence supports this reasoning. See id. at 1154.

      2. Patton’s challenge to the ALJ’s step two determination fails. The ALJ

ruled in favor of Patton at step two, and the ultimate disability determination did not

turn on the ALJ’s determination that Patton’s bipolar disorder was not a severe and

medically determinable impairment because the ALJ considered all of Patton’s

limitations when assessing her residual functional capacity and reaching a disability

determination. Because “all impairments were taken into account,” any error at step

two was “harmless.” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017).

      3. The ALJ did not violate due process by not calling a medical expert at the

hearing. “An ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is triggered only when there

is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper

evaluation of the evidence.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459–60 (9th Cir.

2001). The findings of the state psychologists were thorough and thus adequate for

the ALJ to determine that Patton did not have any marked impairment, and they did

not create ambiguity sufficient to trigger the ALJ’s duty to further develop the

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record. Even if there were a duty, Patton’s counsel did not clearly request a medical

expert at the hearing and did not object when the ALJ stated that he did not plan to

call the medical expert. For all of these same reasons, the ALJ did not err at step

three, nor has Patton established any other error in the ALJ’s step three

determination.

      4. The ALJ gave “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for discounting

Patton’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms. Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th

Cir. 2014)).     The ALJ explained that Patton’s self-reported symptoms were

inconsistent with “actual presentation to providers.” See Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc.

Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Contradiction with the medical

record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.”). The

ALJ pointed to Patton’s psychologist’s opinion that Patton’s ability to understand

simple instructions was “unimpaired,” that Patton’s thought processes were

“moderately intact, goal oriented, and organized,” that Patton had “no

comprehension deficit in understanding oral instructions” and “only mild difficulty

with understanding and completing multi-stage, complex instructions,” and that

Patton could recall key pieces of information. The ALJ also noted that Patton’s

psychologist described Patton as “cooperative and pleasant,” without any

inappropriate displays of emotion. Patton’s reported daily activities also suggested

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“some ability to respond to demands, adapt to changes, make plans independently

of others, and take appropriate precautions.” As such, the ALJ provided specific,

clear and convincing reasons to conclude that Patton’s symptoms did not rise to the

level of severity to which she otherwise testified. See Smith, 14 F.4th at 1112.

      5.   For the same reasons that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

determination regarding Patton’s level of impairment, substantial evidence also

supports the ALJ’s determination that Patton has the residual functioning capacity

to perform past relevant work and other work that exists in the national economy.

      AFFIRMED.

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