Court Opinion

ID: 9957616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 17:15:38.351633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:27.964945
License: Public Domain

J-S01029-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MARK QUINTIN GALLOWAY                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :    No. 623 MDA 2023

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 13, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-36-CR-0003033-2007

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                       FILED: APRIL 4, 2024

       Mark Quintin Galloway appeals pro se from the order denying his

untimely-filed petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

       The pertinent facts and procedural history may be summarized as

follows: On September 8, 2008, Galloway entered an open guilty plea to four

counts of attempted murder, five counts of aggravated assault, and other

charges after he shot at a group of people. On December 22, 2008, the trial

court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 41½ to 100 years in prison.

Galloway filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. Galloway

appealed.     On January 6, 2010, we affirmed his judgment of sentence.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Commonwealth v. Galloway, 991 A.2d 356 (Pa. Super. 2010) (non-

precedential decision). Galloway did not seek further review.

      On June 15, 2010, Galloway filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, and the

PCRA court appointed counsel. On February 22, 2011, PCRA counsel filed an

amended petition. The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on June 9,

2011, at which Galloway and trial counsel testified.      By order entered

September 1, 2011, the PCRA court denied Galloway’s petition.       Galloway

appealed. We affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief on July 19, 2012,

and our Supreme Court denied Galloway’s petition of allowance of appeal on

April 26, 2013.   Commonwealth v. Galloway, 55 A.3d 141 (Pa. Super.

2012) (non-precedential decision), appeal denied, 67 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2013).

      On April 20, 2015, Galloway filed a pro se “Motion for Modification of

Order,” which the PCRA court treated as a second PCRA petition. On April 28,

2015, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss

Galloway’s petition as untimely and establishing no time-bar exception.

Galloway filed a response. By order entered June 24, 2015, the PCRA court

denied Galloway’s petition. Galloway appealed. On July 25, 2015, we affirmed

the   PCRA    court’s   order   denying   Galloway   post-conviction   relief.

Commonwealth v. Galloway, 154 A.3d 869 (Pa. Super. 2016) (non-

precedential decision). On December 28, 2016, our Supreme Court denied

Galloway’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Galloway,

164 A.3d 478 (Pa. 2016).

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     On December 21, 2021, Galloway filed the petition at issue which he

titled: “Petition for Post Conviction Relief Nunc Pro Tunc.”     Thereafter,

Galloway filed a pro se motion for leave to amend his petition, as well as an

amended petition.     The PCRA court appointed counsel.   On July 28, 2022,

PCRA counsel filed a “no-merit” letter and a motion to withdraw, pursuant to

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). In response, Galloway

filed a motion for leave to file an amended petition, which the PCRA court

granted, and Galloway filed an amended PCRA petition on September 26,

2022. In his amended petition, Galloway argued that, although his petition

was untimely, he could establish the timeliness exception of interference by

government officials, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), based upon our Supreme

Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021).

     On March 6, 2023, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of its intent

to dismiss Galloway’s amended PCRA petition without a hearing because it

was untimely filed.    The court also permitted PCRA counsel to withdraw.

Galloway filed a response. By order entered April 13, 2023, the PCRA court

dismissed Galloway’s petition. This appeal followed. Both Galloway and the

PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

     Galloway raises the following two issues on appeal, which we state

verbatim:

     (1)    If the 907/Pitts Rule was created, by the Courts, as a
            method to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of PCRA

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             counsel, then the 907/Pitts Rule is deemed flawed by the
             Courts isn’t that government interference?

      (2)    If the same Court created the 907/Pitts Rule, to raise PCRA
             counsel’s ineffectiveness, rules that the 907/Pitts Rule
             interfered with defendants right to raise an ineffective claim
             of PCRA counsel isn’t that government interference?

Galloway’s Brief at 4.

      Before addressing these issues, we first determine whether the PCRA

court correctly concluded that his 2021 petition was untimely filed, and that

Galloway failed to establish a time-bar exception. The timeliness of a post-

conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d

649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA,

including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the

date the judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner

proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met.

      The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time

on appeal.    Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

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Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of the date

the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

       Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and

proven an exception, “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction

over the petition.      Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal

authority    to   address    the    substantive   claims.”   Commonwealth      v.

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

       Here, Galloway’s judgment of sentence became final on February 5,

2010, thirty days after he failed to file a petition for allowance of appeal with

our Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, Galloway

had until February 7, 2011 to file a timely PCRA petition. 1 As Galloway filed

the petition at issue in 2021, it is patently untimely unless he has satisfied his

burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated exceptions

applies. See Hernandez, supra.

       Galloway has failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s time

bar.   In his amended petition Galloway argued that our Supreme Court’s

Bradley decision, which changed the manner in which a petitioner could raise

a claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness constituted “interference by

government officials.” We cannot agree.

____________________________________________

1 Because the one-year date fell on a Saturday, Galloway had until the
following Monday to file a timely petition for allowance of appeal. See
generally, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.

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     Our Supreme Court has described this time-bar exception as follows:

            The governmental interference exception permits an
     otherwise untimely PCRA petition to be filed if it pleads and proves
     that “the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
     interference by government officials with the presentation of the
     claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
     or the Constitution or laws of the United States[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. §
     9545(b)(1)(i). In other words, [the PCRA petitioner] is required
     to show but for the interference of a government actor “he could
     not have filed his claim earlier.”

Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 955 ( Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).

     Galloway cites no case authority for his proposition that a change in

Pennsylvania decisional law constitutes government interference.       Indeed,

recent persuasive authority from this Court has rejected a claim that our

Supreme Court’s Bradley decision provides a basis for establishing the

governmental interference exception. See generally, Commonwealth v.

Gray, 304 A.3d 732 (Pa. Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision).

     Moreover, as noted by the PCRA court, although Galloway was claiming

governmental interference, he actually wished to rely upon the Brady decision

to raise his PCRA counsel ineffectiveness claims anew. The court explained:

           [Galloway] argues that the Bradley decision operates to
     reset the finality of his judgment [of sentence] to the date of the
     Bradley Opinion. This would effectively give [Galloway] one year
     from October 21, 2021, to file a PCRA. The [PCRA court] does not
     agree with this interpretation of Bradley. There is no indication
     in Bradley, that the Supreme Court intended the decision to reset
     the finality of all judgments [of sentence] decided before its
     Opinion. The [PCRA court] refuses to extend Bradley to allow it
     to operate as a reset to the finality of judgments to the date of
     the Bradley opinion.

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Rule 907 Notice, 3/6/23, at 6. See also Gray, at *3 (explaining that relying

on Bradley is more properly construed as pleading the ‘new constitutional

right’ exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(iii)).

          Our review of recent precedent supports the PCRA court’s conclusions.

This Court has held that “[n]othing in Bradley creates a right to file a second

PCRA outside the PCRA’s one-year time limit as a method of raising

ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel or permits recognition of such a right.”

Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130, 1136 (Pa. Super. 2023).                  The

Stahl court clarified that “our Supreme Court in Bradley unambiguously

rejected the filing of a successive untimely PCRA petition as a permissible

method of vindicating the right to effective representation by PCRA counsel.”

Id.

          In sum, Galloway’s serial PCRA petition is untimely, and he has failed to

establish a time-bar exception. As such, both the PCRA court and this Court

lack jurisdiction to consider his substantive claims. Derrickson, supra. We

therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Galloway post-conviction

relief.

          Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/04/2024

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