Court Opinion

ID: 9913599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 16:00:56.793725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:58:15.547706
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13984    Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 12/28/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13984
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       TAMMY OHNECK,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Alabama
                    D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00962-NAD
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13984      Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 12/28/2023     Page: 2 of 8

       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13984

       Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Tammy Ohneck appeals the district court’s affirmance of
       the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her claim for
       supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits, under 42 U.S.C.
       § 405(g), and disabled widow’s benefits (“DWB”), under 42 U.S.C.
       § 405(e). Ohneck first argues that she properly preserved her argu-
       ments on appeal as to the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) con-
       sideration of her treating physician’s opinion, because she is not
       raising a new issue on appeal, but rather making a new argument.
       Second, she argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate and ar-
       ticulate the “supportability” and “consistency” factors in its assess-
       ment of her treating physician’s, Dr. Pascual Herrera, opinion, as
       required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. For the reasons stated below,
       we affirm the district court’s decision.
                                         I.
              In a social security disability case in which the Appeals Coun-
       cil (“AC”) has denied review, “we review the ALJ’s decision as the
       Commissioner’s ﬁnal decision.” Viverette v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
       13 F.4th 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2021). “Our review is the same as that
       of the district court, meaning we neither defer to nor consider any
       errors in the district court’s opinion.” Henry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
       802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and
       citations omitted).
USCA11 Case: 22-13984      Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 12/28/2023     Page: 3 of 8

       22-13984               Opinion of the Court                         3

              Arguments not raised before the administrative agency or
       the district court are forfeited and generally will not be considered
       on appeal. Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999). For-
       feited issues will not be addressed absent extraordinary circum-
       stances. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872-73 (11th Cir.
       2022) (en banc).
               We have noted that there is a diﬀerence between raising new
       issues and making new arguments on appeal. In re Home Depot Inc.,
       931 F.3d 1065, 1086 (11th Cir. 2019). We have held that “[i]f an issue
       is ‘properly presented, a party can make any argument in support
       of that [issue]; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they
       made below.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Yee v. City of Es-
       condido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992)). In In re Home Depot Inc., we held
       that Home Depot made new arguments on appeal, rather than
       raise a new issue, where it relied on a new line of precedent but did
       not change its requested relief. Id. at 1071, 1086.
              We have applied this same principle in both the criminal and
       immigration contexts. In United States v. Brown, a criminal case, the
       government argued before the district court that Brown had the
       intent to cause bodily injury when he used a Taser during the un-
       derlying oﬀense. 934 F.3d 1278, 1307 (11th Cir. 2019). We held that,
       because the government preserved the speciﬁc ground for review
       implicated by its claim before the district court, it could oﬀer new
       arguments to support that position on appeal. Id. at 1306-07. In
       Bourtzakis v. United States Attorney General, an immigration case, we
       held that, because Bourtzakis argued before the district court that
USCA11 Case: 22-13984      Document: 25-1      Date Filed: 12/28/2023    Page: 4 of 8

       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13984

       his drug conviction was not an aggravated felony, he could make
       any argument as to that claim on appeal, including oﬀering new
       arguments as to how the Washington statute was broader than the
       federal act. 940 F.3d 616, 620-21 (11th Cir. 2019).
               We conclude that Ohneck suﬃciently preserved the issue
       she is raising on appeal. Before the district court, Ohneck did not
       have the beneﬁt of the Harner v. Social Security Administration, Com-
       missioner, 38 F.4th 892 (11th Cir. 2022), decision, and argued that,
       regardless of the new regulations, the “treating physician rule” re-
       mained applicable under Circuit precedent. Moreover, Ohneck
       did, although cursorily in her reply brief, argue that even under the
       new regulations, her challenge against the ALJ’s decision was mer-
       itorious. In any event, Ohneck’s argument throughout her appeals
       has remained the same—that the ALJ did not suﬃciently articulate
       his reasons for discrediting Dr. Herrera’s opinions. Thus, we re-
       view the merits of Ohneck’s appeal.
                                         II.
              We review the ALJ’s decision to determine whether it is
       “supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal
       standards.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th
       Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We re-
       view de novo whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards.
       Viverette, 13 F.4th at 1313-14.
              When “reviewing for substantial evidence, we ‘may not de-
       cide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judg-
       ment for’” the ALJ’s. Id. at 1314 (quoting Winschel, 631 F.3d at
USCA11 Case: 22-13984      Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 12/28/2023     Page: 5 of 8

       22-13984               Opinion of the Court                         5

       1178). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence, greater than a
       scintilla, that “a reasonable person would accept as adequate to sup-
       port a conclusion.” Walker v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 987 F.3d
       1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted)
       (quoting Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178). However, a decision is not
       based on substantial evidence if it focuses on one aspect of the ev-
       idence while disregarding contrary evidence. McCruter v. Bowen,
       791 F.2d 1544, 1548 (11th Cir. 1986).
              An individual claiming SSI or DWB must prove that she is
       disabled on or before the last date on which she was insured to be
       eligible for beneﬁts. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th
       Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). The
       ALJ uses a ﬁve-step, sequential evaluation process to determine
       whether a claimant is disabled. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178. This
       process includes an analysis of whether the claimant: (1) is unable
       to engage in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe and medi-
       cally-determinable impairment; (3) has an impairment, or combi-
       nation thereof, that meets or equals the severity and duration of a
       speciﬁed impairment as deﬁned in the regulations; (4) can perform
       past relevant work, in light of her residual functional capacity
       (“RFC”); and (5) can make an adjustment to other work, in light of
       her RFC, age, education, and work experience. Id.; 20 C.F.R.
       §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
              In Harner, we recognized that for claims ﬁled before
       March 27, 2017, ALJs “were instructed to defer to the medical opin-
       ions of a social security claimant’s treating physicians” under the
USCA11 Case: 22-13984      Document: 25-1      Date Filed: 12/28/2023     Page: 6 of 8

       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13984

       “treating physician rule.” 38 F.4th at 896. The relevant regulation
       required ALJs to generally give more weight to the opinions of
       treating physicians unless there was good cause not to do so. Id. at
       896-97.
               For claims ﬁled on or after March 27, 2017, the ALJ must
       “not defer or give any speciﬁc evidentiary weight, including con-
       trolling weight, to any medical opinion(s) . . . including those from
       [a claimant’s] medical sources.” Id. at 897 (quoting 20 C.F.R.
       § 404.1520c(a)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ
       should consider medical opinions “using the factors listed in para-
       graphs (c)(1) through (c)(5)” of the respective regulations. 20
       C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Those factors are: (1) support-
       ability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant, including
       length of the treatment relationship, frequency of examinations,
       purpose of the treatment relationship, extent of the treatment re-
       lationship, and examining relationship; (4) specialization; and (5)
       “other factors that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion
       or prior administrative medical ﬁnding.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(c),
       416.920c(c).
               The most important factors ALJs must consider when eval-
       uating the persuasiveness of medical opinions are supportability
       and consistency. Id. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). For supportabil-
       ity, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and sup-
       porting explanations presented by a medical source are to support
       his or her medical opinions . . . the more persuasive the medical
       opinions . . . will be.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). For
USCA11 Case: 22-13984      Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 12/28/2023     Page: 7 of 8

       22-13984               Opinion of the Court                         7

       consistency, “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) . . . is with
       the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources
       in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior
       administrative medical ﬁnding(s) will be.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2),
       416.920c(c)(2). The ALJ must explain how he analyzed the support-
       ability and consistency of a medical source’s opinion but is not re-
       quired to explain the other factors in paragraph (c). Id.
       §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
               Here, Ohneck argues that the ALJ failed to adequately state
       its reasons for discrediting Dr. Herrera’s opinions, speciﬁcally, that
       the ALJ did not suﬃciently articulate the supportability and con-
       sistency factors outlined in the regulations. However, the record
       shows that the ALJ did thoroughly evaluate the evidence and pro-
       vided his reasons for discrediting Dr. Herrera’s opinion. Moreover,
       Ohneck’s challenge fails because there is substantial evidence that
       supports the ALJ’s decision.
              As to supportability, the ALJ determined that Dr. Herrera’s
       own treatment notes undermined the doctor’s ultimate opinion as
       to whether Ohneck was disabled. Although in Ohneck’s SSA appli-
       cation Dr. Herrera reported signiﬁcant limitations to her mobility,
       his treatment notes indicated otherwise. For example, Dr. Herrera
       opined that Ohneck had severe pain because of her damaged rota-
       tor cuﬀ and that her range of motion was severely reduced, but he
       did not suggest any kind of major treatment. In fact, Dr. Herrera’s
       recommendation was that she avoid any overhead reaching on her
       right side to account for her shoulder limitations and his overall
USCA11 Case: 22-13984     Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 12/28/2023   Page: 8 of 8

       8                     Opinion of the Court                22-13984

       treatment was conservative. The ALJ concluded that, based on her
       medical records, Ohneck’s physical condition did not infringe on
       her ability to engage in work activity albeit with some modest lim-
       itations.
              As to consistency, the ALJ again pointed to the record as a
       whole including Dr. Herrera’s treatment notes and the opinions of
       other physicians. In particular, the ALJ contrasted Dr. Herrera’s
       physical examination of Ohneck, which included multiple “nor-
       mal” ﬁndings on her physical examination with the more serious
       limitations he suggested in support of her SSA application. In the
       end, the ALJ considered the opinions of two other physicians to be
       more persuasive. Moreover, substantial evidence supports the
       ALJ’s decision to reject Dr. Herrera’s opinion. Therefore, we
       AFFIRM the district court’s decision.