Court Opinion

ID: 9532946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:26:33.753697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:52.638211
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with all of the Court’s opinion except Part V (DBSI’s Fraud and Misrepresentation Claims Are Barred by the Statute of Limitations), from which I respectfully dissent.
The Court premises its decision barring DBSI’s fraud claim under the statute of limitations on the basis that DBSI could have made a claim for fraud “utilizing circumstantial evidence to show intent to defraud.” The real issue is whether there is a genuine issue of fact concerning when DBSI reasonably should have discovered the facts that constitute fraud. In my view, there clearly is.
In McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991), the Court stated that “our eases have consistently held that where discovery of a cause of action commences the statute of limitations the date of discovery is a fact question for the jury unless there is no evidence creating a question of fact.” Id. at 774, 820 P.2d at 369. In McCoy, the Court pointed out the importance of this principle in summary judgment cases “where all reasonable inferences are resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Id. at 774, 820 P.2d at 371.
The eases cited by the Court are clearly not on point. Sportsco Enterprises v. Morris, 112 Nev. 625, 917 P.2d 934 (1996) is not a summary judgment case. Territorial Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah.Ct.App.1989), is a summary judgment case but did not deal with the statute of limitations or discovery of fraud. Instead, the Utah Court of Appeals overturned a summary judgment dismissing a claim for fraudulent conveyance, concluding that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning proof of fraud. Id. at 462-63. Neither of these cases, nor the rationale stated in them, undermines the well-established standards by which this Court considers whether there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning the discovery of facts that constitute fraud.
Although circumstantial evidence of Bender’s knowledge of the falsity of his representations might be a basis for denying a motion to dismiss DBSI’s claim on its merits, it does not establish the lack of any genuine issue of material fact concerning when DBSI reasonably should have discovered Bender’s knowledge of the falsity of his statements. Therefore, the burden never shifted to DBSI to come forward with evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718-19, 918 P.2d 583, 587-88 (1996).
Even if the burden had shifted, however, evidence presented by DBSI, including the affidavit of its president, Douglas L. Swen-son, created a genuine issue of material fact concerning when DBSI should have discovered the fact of Bender’s knowledge. Among other things, DBSI relied on independent auditors’ certification of the accuracy of Bender’s financial statements.
I would vacate the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing DBSI’s fraud and misrepresentation claims.