Court Opinion

ID: 9748665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:09:30.938238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:38.192589
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Doyle:
I respectfully dissent. Joseph Maher (Claimant), asserts that the referee applied an erroneous legal standard in determining Claimant’s burden of proof in his claim for disability benefits on the basis of occupational disease due to asbestos exposure. Relative to the burden of proof in occupational disease claims, Section 301(c)(2) of The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act)1 states as follows:
The provisions of this paragraph (2) shall apply only with respect to the disability or death of an employe which results in whole or in part from the employe’s exposure to the hazard of occupational disease after June 30, 1973 in employment covered by the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
The essential issue in this case, therefore, is whether Claimant was exposed to asbestos after June 30, 1973 which resulted “in whole or in part” in his disabling asbestosis. The relationship is cause and effect.
Claimant contends that the Board improperly required him to show some causal relationship between his exposure to asbestos particles after June 30, 1973 and his development of asbestosis. I cannot agree that this was an improper burden as the majority concludes. This Court has interpreted the language of Section 301(c)(2) on numerous occasions in the past to mean that a claimant must show that his exposure after that date contributed in some way to his disability, no matter how slight. Arco Polymers, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 42 *428Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 647, 401 A.2d 609 (1979). A claimant can easily satisfy this requirement by introducing competent, medical testimony which shows that the claimant was exposed to the occupational hazard during the critical period, and that the whole of the claimant’s exposure caused the disability or death. Asbestos Insulating Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (McGovern), 73 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 86, 457 A.2d 1320 (1983). Furthermore, “[tjhere is no requirement that a physician be able to differentiate the causal contribution of exposure during different periods or that a physician must testify and the referee must find that exposure after June 30, 1973 played a discrete causal role in the development of the disease.” McGovern, 73 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 95, 457 A.2d at 1325. But, a claimant’s failure to show any causal relationship between post June 30, 1973 exposure and the subsequent disability, even if it forms only some small part of the cumulative total, is fatal to his claim and in the past we have so held.
The facts as found by the referee on the basis of evidence adduced during nineteen hearings between June, 1980 and January of 1984 are as follows: Claimant worked for Employer as an insulator from 1940 to September 30, 1978, and, in the course of his employment, was exposed to asbestos hazard. By 1970, asbestos materials were no longer used at Employer’s refinery, and only non-asbestos materials were used when new insulation was installed. It was, however, necessary to remove old asbestos-containing materials. By February 1973, Employer had implemented new safety measures to protect its workers from asbestos, viz., wearing masks and coveralls while working around any insulating materials.
Due to a prior diagnosis of lung disease, Claimant was given a direct order by his physician, on or before March 6, 1973, not to participate in the removal of the old insulation materials and to avoid any possible exposure to *429asbestos dust. Claimant was told to police his own assignments, and if he was given an incorrect assignment dealing with asbestos he was to bring it to the attention of his supervisor. The referee found that, despite this direct order, Claimant continued to place himself in a position of exposure to asbestos dust after March 6, 1973 up until the time of his retirement on October 1, 1978.
The referee further found that, although Claimant reported to the nurse in charge of Employer’s medical dispensary on numerous occasions in the 1970’s, there was nothing to indicate that he complained of any symptoms of lung-related disability, nor was there any evidence that Claimant could not do his usual work. In short, up until the time claimant voluntarily retired on October 1,1978, he was not disabled at all. Furthermore, the referee, relying on Employer’s own medical witness, Dr. Jerome Rudnitzky, specifically made a finding (No. 10) that, “he [Dr. Rudnitzky] recommended to Claimant that Claimant continue working since he was not disabled. ” Claimant was first examined by Dr. Rudnitzky on January 3, 1973 at which time he found extensive pleural disease due to asbestos exposure, but the doctor did not diagnose asbestosis until September 17, 1981. Based on Dr. Rudnitzky’s testimony, the referee found that Claimant’s exposure, after June 30, 1973, did not cause his disability.
On October 1, 1978, Claimant voluntarily retired; yet, he was still capable of performing his usual job duties. At the time of his retirement, Claimant was sixty years old which was the pension age for company employees. He gave Employer over one month’s notice of his intent to retire, and at no time did Claimant mention his disability as a reason for his retirement. There was further evidence, specifically found to be credible by the referee, that there was work available for Claimant, and he concluded that “claimant did not leave ... by reason *430of his disability [but] left only on the basis of a voluntary retirement .... Thus, [Employer] has rebutted any presumption to which claimant may be entitled that his exposure to asbestos after July 1, 1973 resulted in his subsequent disability.”
Claimant relies on Marcucci v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (B.P. Oil Co.), 98 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 7, 510 A.2d 1262 (1986), to support his argument that Section 301(c)(2) of the Act does not require any causal connection between post June 30, 1973 exposure and disability. And, as the majority points out, in Marcucci this Court stated:
We have never held that recovery under the Act for an occupational disease requires that the exposure after June 30, 1973 be established as a causative factor, nor could such a ruling be sensibly made in light of the improbability in occupational disease cases of pinpointing the precise period or time in a long-term exposure when in a cancer case the ‘hit’ or onset of malignancy or the metastasis began or became terminal.5 The fact that medical science is necessarily inexact in such cases is the very reason why asbestos diseases and cancer from asbestos exposure are, and can only be, compensable as occupational diseases rather than as regular injuries under Section 301 (c)(1), 77 ES. §411(1). (Emphasis added and footnote omitted.)
Id. at 13, 510 A.2d at 1264-65. First, I believe that this statement in its application to the facts here before us misses the point. Section 301(c)(2) very clearly requires a claimant to show that “the disability . . . [has resulted] in whole or in part from the employe’s exposure to the hazard of occupational disease after June 30, 1973.” We should .not ignore the mandate because of the difficulty of *431proof. Medical testimony that Claimant already had the disease prior to July 1, 1973, and that (a) either Claimant was not exposed after that date, or, (b) if exposed, such exposure did not contribute in any way to his disease, likewise very clearly fails to meet the requirement of Section 301(c)(2). Medical testimony may be inexact in pinpointing the precise moment of when a claimant becomes disabled because of asbestosis; it may be, however, and I believe was in this instance, sufficiently definite to establish a period of time that did not contribute to Claimant’s disability. And, the referee came to that same conclusion.
The referee dismissed Claimant’s petition specifically concluding (No. 2) that:
2. Regardless, Claimant’s exposure to asbestos hazard on and after July 1, 1973 was no[t] relevant to the development of his disabling asbestosis and there was no causal relationship between that exposure and the onset of Claimant’s disability.
The Board affirmed this conclusion. How may this Court conclude to the contrary when the referee found that no medical evidence was offered to establish that it was the Claimant’s total cumulative exposure, including exposure after June 30, 1973, that caused Claimant’s disability. To the contrary, the unequivocal, unrebutted testimony of Dr. Rudnitzky establishes that the post June 30,1973 hazard exposure bore no causal effect in bringing about Claimant’s disability. He further testified that asbestosis has a latency period of approximately twenty years, making Claimant’s exposure to the hazard after June 30, 1973 irrelevant to the progress of the disease. It is well settled that the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony is within the province of the referee. Haney v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 65 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 461, 442 *432A.2d 1223 (1982). Therefore, since the expert testimony of Employers witness unequivocally supports the referees findings, it should not be disturbed by this Court on appeal.
Furthermore, Marcucci is flawed as legal precedent when it states that “we have never held that recovery under the Act for an occupational disease requires that the exposure after June 30, 1973 be established as a causative factor” on the reasoning that medical science cannot pinpoint the precise period when, in a long-time exposure, the “hit” becomes terminal. To the contrary, we have held that some causation must be established. We said in McGovern:
Our cases make clear that the statutory requirement in Section 301(c)(2) that a compensable disability . . . must result in whole or in part from occupational exposure to the hazard after June 30, 1973 is satisfied by competent medical testimony that the claimant was exposed . . . during the critical period and that the whole of the claimants exposure caused the disability or death.
Id. at 95, 457 A.2d at 1325. (Emphasis added.) Further, we stated in Arco Polymers “[w]ith regard to his exposure to a hazard after June 30, 1973, all the Claimant was obliged to show was that his exposure after that date contributed to his disability, no matter how slightly.” Id. at 649, 401 A.2d at 610. (Emphasis added.) And, in Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 38 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 466, 393 A.2d 1076 (1978), where the doctor testified that claimant was disabled as the result of his total and cumulative exposure, including the one day of July 3, 1973, we held that an exact finding broken down by dates is not necessary because there was at least a one day exposure post June 30, 1973. Finally, in Commonwealth v. Workmen's Com*433pensation Appeal Board (Klebick), 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 499 at 502, 338 A.2d 758 at 760 (1975), we stated, “Clearly this medical testimony is sufficient to show that the exposure after June 30, 1973, no matter how slight, was in part the cause of claimant’s disability. That is all Section 301(c)(2) requires.” (Emphasis deleted in part and added in part.)
The majority, by holding that “section 301(c)(2) recognizes that in an occupational disease case a medical witness cannot specify what precise period of exposure caused the disease,” (slip op. at 10) erroneously concludes in effect that no medical evidence can be offered to prove that exposure after June 30, 1973 could not, or did not, in any way cause the disease. This is borne out by the statement (slip op. at 12) that “the testimony of the employer’s medical witness, credited by the referee to establish the “fact” that the claimant’s disease was caused by exposure before June 30, 1973, is nothing more than an assertion that an identifiable “hit” took place, before the specified date, without using the word “hit.” Such is the only possible inference from a witness’ confident assertion that exposure after that date had no effect on the origin or the progress of the claimant’s disease.” This is a clear invasion of not only the fact-finding province of the referee, but also the expertise of a medical witness as well. Such a conclusion moreover totally eviscerates the very language of Section 301(c)(2) that we are charged to interpret. While I readily agree that we should interpret the Act consistent with the mandate that it should be liberally construed to effect its object of compensation, see McGovern, to read out of meaningful éxistence the subject language of Section 301(c)(2) far exceeds that mandate.

 Act of June 2, 1915, EL. 736, as amended, 77 ES. §411(2).