Court Opinion

ID: 9561445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:09:56.155345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:49.112572
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The United States Supreme Court cases cited in the majority are federal court decisions applying federal law. United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 (91 SC 1580, 29 LE2d 85) (1971), and Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323 (60 SC 540, 84 LE 783) (1940), are attempted appeals of federal grand jury subpoenas from the Ninth Circuit. Firestone Tire &c. Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368 (101 SC 669, 66 LE2d 571) (1981), is a civil products liability appeal from the Eighth Circuit. The majority also relies on a number of federal circuit court decisions.
It is well established that state court procedural matters are governed by state and not federal law “The U. S. Supreme Court settled the issue irrefutably in the case of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78 (58 SC 817, 82 LE 1188) where it was held that except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.” Gormong v. Cleveland Elec. Co. &c., 180 Ga. App. 481, 482 (349 SE2d 500) (1986) (service of process). Appellate procedure by its very terms is “procedural.” The procedures of this Court are established by the Georgia Constitution and statutes, our Supreme Court, and our rules, not by Congress or the federal courts. “While we are bound by the United *83States Supreme Court’s interpretation of Rule 56 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we must, of course, follow the decisions of our own Supreme Court with respect to the meaning of Rule 56 (c) of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). [Cit.]” First Union Nat. Bank &c. v. J. Reisbaum Co., 190 Ga. App. 234, 236 (378 SE2d 317) (1989).
Decided March 20, 1997
Reconsideration denied April 4, 1997
Before Judge Goger.
Alembik, Fine & Callner, Lowell S. Fine, G. Michael Banick, Zoe I. Martinez, for appellants.
Butler, Wooten, Overby & Cheeley, James E. Butler, Jr., Joel O. Wooten, Jr., Downey & Cleveland, Y. Kevin Willliams, Smolar, Roseman, Brantley & Seifter, Yehuda Smolar, G. Grant Brantley, James I. Seifter, for appellees.
This Court must follow the Supreme Court of Georgia’s rule established in Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 431 (1) (c) (297 SE2d 469) (1982). Dept. of Transp. v. Hardaway Co., 216 Ga. App. 262 (1) (454 SE2d 167) (1995) is a direct application, not an extension, of the rule established by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The criteria established in Scroggins are clearly stated: (1) the order appealed from must completely and conclusively resolve the issue it addresses; (2) that issue must be “substantially separate from the basic issues presented in the complaint”; and (3) “an important right might be lost if review had to await final judgment.” 250 Ga. at 432 (1) (c). An interim discovery order releasing a privileged document or protected work product meets all these requirements. Hardaway Co., 216 Ga. App. at 262.
Regardless of the origin or underpinnings of the reasoning employed by our Supreme Court, we cannot look behind its clear announcement of a procedural rule to overrule, amend, or modify it on the basis of federal decisions, regardless of how attractive their reasoning may be in terms of limiting appellate caseload.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Johnson join in this dissent.