Court Opinion

ID: 9738023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:40:52.962823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:03.272321
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). The challenge here is to a single sentence in the instructions to the jury by the judge in this case. The claim of error is that this single sentence was incorrect and confusing to the jury. Considering such challenge and claim, we are not to excise such single sentence and limit appellate review to its soundness. Rather, the instructions given by the judge to the jury are to be considered “. . . in their entirety.” 1 As this court has said, “. . . it is well settled that, in determining whether there has been any error in instructions to a jury, they must be considered as a whole. ...” 2
Here the defendant was found guilty by the jury of second-degree murder. Second-degree murder and man*752slaughter were the two charges submitted to the jury. As to both charges, the defendant asserted the defense of self-defense. The faulting of the instructions goes solely to the trial judge’s instructions as to the right to act in self-defense. The defendant was entitled to what this court has termed “special defensive instructions” as to self-defense, this being the “legal theory” of the defense.3 The test on review is whether, in the instant case, “. . . the legal theory of the defense was adequately covered by the instructions. ...” 4
As to the issue of self-defense on the charge of second-degree murder, the trial judge correctly instructed the jury:
“Self-defense is an issue in this case.
“The Criminal Code of Wisconsin provides that a person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what he reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his person by such other person. However, he may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as he reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. He may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself.
“For the defendant’s conduct to be privileged under the law of self-defense, the defendant must have reasonably believed that there was an actual or imminent unlawful interference with his person. This requires that he actually believed such interference to be unlawful. The fact that this belief may have been erroneous does not deprive the defendant of his privilege to use force in defense of his person if a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence under the same circumstances, would have believed such interference to be unlawful.”
*753Then followed two paragraphs, included in the instructions given by specific request of the defendant through his trial counsel:
“You are instructed that an unlawful interference is a criminal act committed upon the person of another. As it applies to the facts in this case the jury might find that there was an unlawful interference if Warren Werner suffered harm and, second, that Russell Karlen [the victim] committed an act which caused bodily harm to Warren Werner, third, that Russell Karlen intended to cause such harm and, fourth, that the act was done without the consent of Warren Werner.
“Bodily harm means physical pain or injury, illness or any impairment of physical condition. Great bodily harm means bodily injury which creates a high probability of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily injury.”
Then follow four additional paragraphs, all dealing with legal requirements for the defendant’s conduct to be privileged under a claim of self-defense as to the charge of second-degree murder. Then follows the sentence, on which the claim of error by defendant is based, with two additional sentences concluding the instructions as to the defense of self-defense with respect to the charge of second-degree murder:
“If you find that the defendant did intentionally cause the death of Russell Karlen, and as charged in the Information, but that he did so under circumstances that under the law of self-defense, as it has been explained to you, such use of force was privileged, then you must find the defendant not guilty, giving to the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt as to whether his conduct was privileged under the law of self-defense. If, however, you’re satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that the defendant killed Russell Karlen by conduct imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human *754life and you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that the use of force by the defendant against Russell Karlen, if force was so used, was not privileged under the law of self-defense, as it has been defined to you, then you should find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder as charged in the Information. If, however, you are not so satisfied you must not find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder and you should consider whether the defendant is guilty of manslaughter in violation of Section 940.05 (2) of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin.”
The first sentence of the above paragraph, taken from the standard jury instructions, is the one claimed to be erroneous. Its use of the word “intentional” derives from the statute defining the right of self-defense,5 which has been approved by this court.6 However, the standard instructions parenthesize three alternative phrases, one of which is to be inserted after the word “intentional.” 7 The claim of error is that the trial court, in inserting the phrase “cause the death of” selected one of the three that was not appropriate to the facts here. Such error in choice would not alone be ground for reversal. The statute, applicable and controlling, provides:
“. . . No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new trial granted in any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, . . . unless in the opinion of the court to which the application *755is made, after an examination of the entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained of has affected the substantial rights of the party seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to secure the new trial.” 8
The defendant in his brief seeks to meet this statutory requirement of an error in jury instructions having actually affected the substantial rights of the party seeking reversal by contending, in his brief, that: “. . . the instruction was confusing to the jury, in that it stated that the defense of self-defense applied only if the jury found that the defendant intended to kill Karlen. . . .” Viewing the instructions in their entirety and considering them as a whole, the writer sees no basis for holding that such actual affecting of the jury verdict here occurred. The instructions given prior to the complained of sentence were entirely correct statements of the law. Moreover, the paragraphs added at the specific request of the defendant applied such correct interpretation of the law to the facts of this case, with the defendant and victim designated by name to impress such application upon the jury. The sentence immediately following the one complained of makes clear that the defendant did have the right to self-defense as to the charge of second-degree murder. What the judge said before and after the challenged sentence is to be considered where instructions *756are reviewed as an entirety.9 Considering- the instructions given as a whole, the writer finds that this jury was made fully aware, not only of each and every element required for a conviction on the charge of second-degree murder, but also of the definite right and limits of the defense of self-defense as to the charge of second-degree murder.
Using the “ordinarily intelligent mind” test,10 the conclusion that no confusion was created by the sentence complained of is strengthened by the fact that, with self-defense the theory of the defense as to both second-degree murder and manslaughter, the trial judge instructed the jury as to the right and limits of the right of self-defense as to the crime of manslaughter. That instruction as to self-defense on the manslaughter charge included this accurate and unchallenged reference to the special defense of self-defense as to second-degree murder:
“If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that the defendant caused the death of Russell Karlen in a manner constituting murder in the second-degree, but you find the defendant committed the act causing Russell Karlen’s death believing *757that his act was necessary in self-defense but that his belief was unreasonable under the circumstances, then you should find the defendant guilty of manslaughter.”
While the writer finds no basis for confusion here having been created in a juror with a reasonably intelligent mind, the statute limiting reversals for misdirected juries further requires that the appellate court, considering such reversal on the ground of trial court error in instructions, make “. . . an examination of the entire action or proceeding . . .” to determine if “. . . the error complained of has affected the substantial rights of the party seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment. ...” 11 Reviewing the entire instructions, the writer concludes that the jury here “was apparently not misled.” 12 To comply with the statutory mandate, we add that nothing deriving from examination of the entire action or proceedings alters the holding that the single sentence error had no actual effect on a substantial right of the party seeking reversal. While the issue raised as to sufficiency of evidence to sustain conviction, rejected on this appeal, required consideration both of evidence supporting the case of the state and evidence produced by and on behalf of the defendant, no detailing of such examination of the record is required to note that neither prejudicial error nor impact upon the verdict reached is found here. The jury instructions, considered in their entirety and as a whole, meet the requirement of adequately covering the legal theory of the defense as to self-defense,13 and did not create confusion in the minds *758of the jurors under the “ordinarily intelligent mind” test.14
If the instructions given this jury, considered as a whole and in their entirety, constituted prejudicial and reversible error, there would remain for this defendant the hurdle of his not having objected at time of trial to the instructions as given. This court has consistently held that such failure to timely object waives the right to object.15 The reason and the rule are well stated in the Mitchell v. State decision, holding: “. . . neither defendant personally, nor through his counsel, should be permitted to listen to jury instructions being presented to the jury which he or his counsel believe to be inaccurate or incorrect and await the return of the verdict and, if unfavorable, then complain as a matter of right.” 16 This is particularly to be the rule where, as in the case before us, the belated objection is made to the standard or uniform jury instructions used throughout this state.17
*759In the case before us, the defendant did not object to the instructions given by the judge when they were given, nor did he object on motions after verdict. He objected, for the first time, six months after the judgment of conviction was entered, on his motion for new trial at postconviction proceedings. Where this exact situation was presented to this court, we held that the defendant had waived his right to object to the instructions as given.18 It is true that the rule of waiver of right to object by reason of failure to timely object . . admits of exceptions in cases of ‘compelling circumstances. . . .’ 19 Such “compelling circumstances” can hardly be that the belated challenge to the instructions given relate to an issue or special defense significant to the defendant. *760The rule of waiver by not objecting to instructions when they are given does not relate to the crucial significance of the issue or defense involved to the defendant. That would almost always be the situation. It is the significance of his not objecting, rather than the significance of the issue involved, with which the rule of waiver, as above noted, deals. The requirement of timely objection is to prevent a defendant from listening to the instructions being given without objecting, thus reserving both right and reason for objecting until he finds out and only when he finds out that the jury verdict has gone against him. This would give a defendant a bomb to be detonated by him only if, as and when a jury verdict turned out to be unfavorable to him. This court has held that where the defendant’s trial counsel “was cognizant” of the issue involved and later challenged, “. . . the defendant has effectively waived any right to such a review [of alleged prejudicial error in the jury instructions] by failure to request a specific instruction or object to the instruction at trial. . . .” 20 Here, the defendant was not only cognizant of the issue, he submitted additional instructions which the trial court accepted and which became the two paragraphs in the instruction immediately preceding the sentence subsequently challenged. Those defendant-requested additions, we have earlier held, were helpful in insuring that the jury understood the defense of self-defense by applying the principles to the defendant and victim by name. However, the helpful addition requested by defendant’s trial counsel makes defendant, by counsel, a coarchitect of the instructions to which he now objects. This goes beyond observing the building of a structure in silence to participation in the building. One who joins in constructing a building ought not be permitted later on, much later, to complain of the way in which it was built.
*761The writer would affirm. I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Hanley joins in this dissent.

 Kimmons v. State (1971), 51 Wis. 2d 266, 268, 186 N. W. 2d 308.

 State v. Davidson (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 177, 190, 170 N. W. 2d 755.

 Id. at page 192.

 Id. at page 192.

 Sec. 939.48 (1), Stats.

 State v. Kanzelberger (1965), 28 Wis. 2d 652, 660, 137 N. W. 2d 419, certiorari denied, 386 U. S. 867, 87 Sup. Ct. 127, 17 L. Ed. 2d 93.

 Wis J I — Criminal, Part I, 806, provides: “If you find that the defendant did intentionally (cause great bodily harm to) (cause the death of) (use force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm against) ... , as (charged) (submitted), but that he did so under such circumstances that under the law of self-defense as it has been explained to you, such use of force was privileged, then you must find the defendant not guilty . . . .”

 Sec. 274.37, Stats. See: Claybrooks v. State (1971), 50 Wis. 2d 87, 94, 183 N. W. 2d 143, quoting State v. Kuick (1948), 252 Wis. 595, 599, 600, 32 N. W. 2d 344, this court stating of this statute: “ ‘This section [274.37] applies to civil and criminal cases alike by its terms. This section has been in force since 1909 and has been considered by the court many times. The section was enacted to enable the court to avoid reversals on account of errors which did not substantially affect the rights of the defendant. . . .
“ *. . . Bare technical error will not justify the disturbance of a verdict even in a conviction of a homicide. Manna v. State (1923), 179 Wis. 384, 192 N. W. 160.’ ”

 See: Wilson v. State (1973), 59 Wis. 2d 269, 291, 292, 208 N. W. 2d 134, this court holding as to an error in trial court instructions: “In the instant ease, although the trial judge twice used the words ‘mental conduct’ instead of ‘criminal conduct,’ he thereafter correctly stated ‘The defendant under the law has the burden that he was not responsible for the criminal conduct at the time of the crimes because he lacked substantial capacity . . . .’ In light of this and the absurdity of the instruction if the trial judge had actually meant ‘mental’ conduct, it is inconceivable that an ‘ordinarily intelligent mind’ would have been misled.”

 Id. at page 291, this court stating: “. . . Because the judge’s true meaning must have been apparent to the ‘ordinarily intelligent mind’ no harm could be said to result from the mistake.” (Citing Butler v. State (1899), 102 Wis. 364, 78 N. W. 590.)

 Sec. 274.37, Stats.

 Wilson v. State, supra, footnote 9, at page 291, this court stating: “Similarly, in civil cases, this court has held inadvertent errors not to be a ground for reversal where the jury was apparently not misled.”

 State v. Davidson, supra, footnote 2.

 Wilson, v. State, supra, footnote 9.

 State v. Schenk (1972), 53 Wis. 2d 327, 333, 193 N. W. 2d 26, this court stating: “This court has consistently held that it would consider the failure to timely object to jury instructions as a waiver of any alleged defects in those instructions [cases cited]. Therefore, since the defendant neither submitted requested instructions, nor objected to those given or requested additional instructions, we conclude that the defendant has waived his right to the instructions as given.” See also: Laster v. State (1973), 60 Wis. 2d 525, 539, 211 N. W. 2d 13, this court holding: “. . . the record is void of any objection by the defendant to the instruction given. Absent a request made prior to the rendition of the verdict, the objection has long since been waived. Kimmons v. State (1971), 51 Wis. 2d 266, 268, 186 N. W. 2d 308.”

 Mitchell v. State (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 695, 700, 177 N. W. 2d 833.

 State v. Kanzelberger, supra, footnote 6, at page 659, this court holding: “The instruction on self-defense given by the court was substantially the same as Wis J I — Criminal, Part I, 805, 810. These instructions are the product of painstaking effort of an eminently qualified committee of trial judges, lawyers, and legal *759scholars, designed to accurately state the law and afford a means of uniformity of instructions throughout the state. They are, as stated by counsel, ‘the general instructions used in cases of this kind.’ These uniform instructions are not infallible. However, their content is readily known and if they are considered inaccurate or prejudicial they should be challenged by written requested instructions or at least objection made on the record at the time they are given so that if they are erroneous, correction can be made before the jury arrives at a verdict. In this instance neither a request for a specific instruction nor objection to the instruction as given appear in the record.” (Quoted in Mitchell v. State, supra, footnote 16, at page 700.)

 State v. Cydzik (1973), 60 Wis. 2d 683, 694, 211 N. W. 2d 421, this court holding: “. . . Defendant now objects to the court’s instruction on first-degree murder. While defense counsel did move for dismissal of the first-degree murder count on grounds of insufficiency of evidence, there was no objection at trial to the instruction as given on elements of the crime. While in post-conviction motions the defendant did generally claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, nowhere were the specific objections raised on appeal raised in the trial proceedings. . . . We conclude that the defendant here has waived his right to object to the trial court instructions as given.”

 Brown v. State (1973), 59 Wis. 2d 200, 214, 207 N. W. 2d 602.

 Langston v. State (1973), 61 Wis. 2d 288, 293, 212 N. W. 2d 113.