Court Opinion

ID: 9909513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 17:06:04.650977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:31.939037
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of
Appeals.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-41220

D. MCCALL and CCC&S FAMILY, LLC,

      Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THE MONEY SOURCE, INC.,

      Defendant-Appellee,

and

AUCTION.COM and FIDELITY NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,

      Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Lisa Chavez Ortega, District Court Judge

Western Agriculture, Resource and
Business Advocates, LLP
Jared R. Vander Dussen
A. Blair Dunn
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellants

Vance, Chavez & Associates, LLC
James A. Chavez
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

YOHALEM, Judge.

{1}     Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s order denying their motion to reconsider the
ruling on costs and attorney fees and the district court’s order denying their motion to
reconsider summary judgment. We issued a notice proposing to summarily affirm.
Plaintiffs have filed a memorandum in opposition to our notice. After due consideration
of the materials before us, we affirm.

{2}     Our notice proposing affirmance informed Plaintiffs that their docketing statement
inadequately described the claimed error on appeal and failed to provide a summary of
the evidence and arguments presented in favor of summary judgment and opposing
summary judgment. [CN 1-3] See State v. Talley, 1985-NMCA-058, ¶ 23, 103 N.M. 33,
702 P.2d 353 (explaining that a docketing statement is intended to serve as a fair
substitute for the complete record on the summary calendar). The notice further
explained that if Plaintiffs wished to achieve a different result in this Court, in any
response they may file, Plaintiffs must explain what Defendant presented to establish
that it owned the property and possessed the legal authority to sell the property at the
time it entered into the purchase and sale agreement with Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs must
explain how they presented a material factual dispute in response to Defendant’s
showing. [CN 3-4]

{3}     In response to our notice, Plaintiffs merely recount their claims in numerous
conclusory statements, mostly without citation to the record [MIO 4-6], and those
citations provided include large portions of the record that do not relate to Plaintiffs’
claims [MIO 4]. Plaintiffs also fail to describe the evidentiary support that was presented
in district court to support their claims and provide no targeted citations to the record.
See Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 72, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104 (“We will not
search the record for facts, arguments, and rulings in order to support generalized
arguments.”); In re Estate of Heeter, 1992-NMCA-032, ¶ 15, 113 N.M. 691, 831 P.2d
990 (“This [C]ourt will not search the record to find evidence to support an appellant’s
claims.”). Also, contrary to the instructions in our notice, Plaintiffs’ response does not
provide an explanation of the grounds on which Defendant sought summary judgment,
the evidence presented to support Defendant’s claims, the grounds on which the district
court ruled, or how Plaintiffs’ evidence and argument in district court responded to
Defendant’s showing in order to defeat summary judgment. [CN 2-4] As we warned in
our notice, these omissions, alone, constitute grounds for affirmance, and do not
affirmatively demonstrate error. See State v. Chamberlain, 1989-NMCA-082, ¶ 11, 109
N.M. 173, 783 P.2d 483; Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-
100, ¶ 8, 111 N.M. 6, 800 P.2d 1063.

{4}    Although we are not required to address the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims under
these circumstances, our independent review of the record also supports affirmance.
The record indicates that Defendant made a prima facie showing that it was selling the
subject property and that it owned and possessed the legal authority to sell the subject
property at all material times. [1 RP 190-93, 207-11, 213-14, 216-17, 219] The record
also shows that the parties entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the sale of
the property at issue, under which Defendant had the absolute and unilateral right to
terminate the contract with Plaintiffs at any time and for any reason, even after closing,
and that Plaintiffs’ sole remedy was to receive the return of Plaintiffs’ earnest money
deposit. [RP 222] Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, Defendant exercised its right to
terminate the agreement and returned the earnest money to Plaintiffs. [2 RP 347] Thus,
we see no showing of a breach of contract or actual damages that Plaintiffs suffered
from the termination of the agreement.

{5}    We agree with the district court that these facts also undercut Plaintiffs’ claims for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and fraud, given the
following: “the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to
overcome or negate an express term contained within a contract,” see Sanders v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 2008-NMSC-040, ¶ 8, 144 N.M. 449, 188 P.3d 1200,
and Plaintiffs failed to show a misrepresentation of fact, evidence of Defendant’s
knowledge and intent to deceive, or evidence of detrimental reliance, see generally Cain
v. Champion Window Co. of Albuquerque, LLC, 2007-NMCA-085, ¶ 22, 142 N.M. 209,
164 P.3d 90 (stating the elements of a fraud claim). [1 RP 199-202; 2 RP 347] See also
Cont’l Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 1993-NMSC-039, ¶ 67, 115 N.M. 690,
858 P.2d 66 (holding that because “[i]t would be incongruous to hold that the
defendants acted in bad faith in acting in accordance with an express contractual
provision[,] . . . the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding and enforcing implied
covenants against the defendants that were inconsistent with the provisions of the
written agreements”).

{6}     In light of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that Plaintiffs met their burden “to
demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts” that required a trial on merits by
filing a single affidavit that concluded without a factual basis that Defendant’s property
at issue was not actually available for sale. [2 RP 322] See generally Bank of N.Y.
Mellon v. Lopes, 2014-NMCA-097, ¶ 6, 336 P.3d 443 (“The movant need only make a
prima facie showing that [it] is entitled to summary judgment. Upon the movant making
a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to
demonstrate the existence of specific evidentiary facts which would require trial on the
merits.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Lotspeich v. Golden Oil Co.,
1998-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 12, 19, 125 N.M. 365, 961 P.2d 790 (indicating that affidavits
submitted in opposition to motion for summary judgment should be “neither conclusory
nor without a factual base”).

{7}     Lastly, to the extent Plaintiffs contend in their memorandum in opposition that the
contract is not valid and that provisions within the contract are not enforceable [MIO 4],
Plaintiffs do not explain how these arguments were raised below and no document that
falls within the broad citation to the record that Plaintiffs provide shows that they
challenged the enforceability of the contract or any specific provision therein. [1 RP 1-4;
2 RP 347-84] See Crutchfield v. N.M. Dep’t Tax’n & Revenue, 2005-NMCA-022, ¶ 14,
137 N.M. 26, 106 P.3d 1273 (“[O]n appeal, the party must specifically point out where,
in the record, the party invoked the court’s ruling on the issue. Absent that citation to the
record or any obvious preservation, we will not consider the issue.”). Accordingly, we do
not address this matter further.

{8}    For the reasons stated above, we hold that Plaintiffs have not established that
the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant. We
therefore affirm.

{9}    IT IS SO ORDERED.

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge

WE CONCUR:

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge