Court Opinion

ID: 9885711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:12:42.800997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:56.426713
License: Public Domain

Judge VOGT
specially concurring.
I agree with the majority that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed, but I reach that conclusion for reasons other than those relied on by the majority.
In my view, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003), requires a showing that defendant subjectively intended to make a threat in order for his conviction to pass constitutional muster. Under Block as I read it, speech may not be constitutionally punished simply because a reasonable person would understand it as a threat, if the speaker did not mean for the speech to be so understood.
I reach this conclusion based on the Black Court's statement that "true threats" encompass "those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression *795of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals," and on its statement that "(intimidation in the constitutionally proseribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death." Black, supra, 538 U.S. at 359-60, 123 S.Ct. at 1548. Although the majority suggests that the Court's statement regarding "intimidation" is inapplicable to this case, I believe that the acts of which defendant was convicted may fairly be characterized as intimidation, and I note that, at oral argument here, the People did not disagree with that proposition.
Further, the holding in Black supports the conclusion that the inquiry is subjective rather than objective. It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which an objectively reasonable viewer would not perceive cross burning as a threat; yet the Court struck down, as facially unconstitutional, a statute providing that burning a cross on the property of another, or on public property, was prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate.
I also disagree with the majority's analysis to the extent it suggests that most post-Black decisions have continued to apply an objective standard to determine whether speech constitutes a true threat. As the majority correctly points out, since Black was decided, only a few courts have directly considered whether Black requires proof of the speaker's subjective intent to threaten. One case cited by the majority, United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622 (9th Cir.2005), holds that Black requires such subjective intent; see also United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir.2005)(recognizing that Black requires "an intent to threaten," but holding that defendant's claim that jury instructions erroneously failed to include such requirement was procedurally barred). Of the five cases that the majority cites as standing for the proposition that subjective intent is not required, only two are published decisions. In the first, United States v. D'Amario, 461 F.Supp.2d 298 (D.N.J.2006), the issue was whether the prosecution had to prove that the defendant actually intended to carry out his threat. The court correctly recognized that, under Black, no such intent was required; however, that is not the issue presented here. The other published case cited by the majority, New York ex rel. Spitzer v. Cain, 418 F.Supp.2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), disagreed with the defendants' subjective intent argument, but ultimately concluded that the argument was "irrelevant" because: "Testimony offered at the hearing suffices to establish that defendants' statements were threats under the proposed standard.... Under any standard, objective or subjective, ... the defendants' statements were true threats" Cain, supro, 418 F.Supp.2d at 479-80. Thus, I do not view either D'Amario or Cain as persuasive authority for adhering to an objective standard.
Although I disagree with the majority's conclusion that, notwithstanding Black, speech may be punished without a showing that the speaker subjectively intended to make a threat, I do not believe it is necessary to decide the issue in this case. I am persuaded that the evidence here was sufficient to establish that defendant subjectively intended to threaten the judges, and that his conviction was therefore not unconstitutional.
The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with the intent to alter or affect the judges' decisions, and its finding was supported by defendant's trial testimony conceding that he sent the notices to the judges with the intent to influence them to "change their mind." This finding alone potentially satisfies the subjective intent requirement of Black. After explaining that requirement, the Black Court went on to conclude that "Virginia's statute does not run afoul of the First Amendment insofar as it bans cross burning with intent to intimidate," and that "[a] ban on cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate is ... pro-seribable under the First Amendment." Black, supra, 538 U.S. at 363, 123 S.Ct. at 1549-50.
That a finding of specific intent may obviate First Amendment concerns about "true threats" was recognized in United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir.2005). After discussing the "tension" between Black and its earlier holdings applying an objective *796"true threat" definition, the Stewart court concluded that it need not decide whether the objective or subjective definition should apply because the evidence established that the defendant's statement was a true threat under either definition. In so concluding, the court observed that the statute under which the defendant was convicted contained a specific intent element: it punished only threats against officials made "with the intent to impede, intimidate, interfere with, or retaliate against such officials" on account of their performance of their duties. Thus, the court reasoned,
[A] conviction under that statute could only be had upon proof that the speaker intended the speech to impede, intimidate, interfere with, or retaliate against the protected official. Such proof would seem to subsume the subjective "true threat" definition announced in Black ...; one cannot have the intent required under [the statute] without also intending to make the threat.
Stewart, supra, 420 F.3d at 1017. Similarly here, it is at least arguable that the specific intent requirement of § 18-8-806 subsumes the subjective "true threat" intent addressed in Black.
However, even if it does not, there was ample additional evidence presented at trial that defendant subjectively intended his notices to the judges to be threats. As the majority points out, the notices expressly threatened the judges with arrest by a militia; they referenced a charge of treason, an offense punishable by death; and they were conveyed directly to the judges, as opposed to being mere "political hyperbole" intended for public consumption. Additionally, defendant testified that he wanted to convey to the judges that, if they did not return his gun and bullets and overturn his conviction, they would be arrested.
He also testified regarding a "preliminary militia alert" that he had sent out to members of his militia The alert, which was admitted into evidence, is replete with references to the weapons defendant and the militia would use if defendant were to find himself in a standoff with the government ("As long as I am alive and have ammo, and yes I have lots of ammo, I will hold them at bay.... Onee you take up with force of arms and deploy as an individual or a unit, you are in the game.... I will be well armed. ... I hope all of you will come prepared with force of arms...."). Although the "preliminary militia alert" was sent out before defendant sent his notices to the judges and would not itself rise to the level of a true threat, it was relevant to the determination of defendant's subjective intent in sending out the notices.
The evidence thus establishes that, even assuming subjective intent is required, defendant's notices were "true threats," and, as such, were not protected by the First Amendment. In light of the evidence, I further conclude that the deficiencies in the jury instructions of which defendant complains did not rise to the level of plain error. For these reasons, and because I concur in the majority's resolution of defendant's additional contentions, I agree that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.