Court Opinion

ID: 9794051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:57:16.443261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:09:56.260877
License: Public Domain

Schultheis, C.J.
(dissenting) — Because the majority erroneously determines that State v. Coss, 87 Wn. App. 891, 943 P.2d 1126 (1997), review denied, 134 Wn.2d 1028 (1998) is distinguishable from the facts of this case and is consistent with State v. Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. 113, 702 P.2d 1222 (1985), I respectfully dissent. Impoundment of the vehicle driven by Mr. Feterson was not reasonable under the facts of this case.
The determinative issue in this case is whether or not the impoundment of the vehicle was justified pursuant to State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) as part of the police function of enforcing traffic regulations if the driver committed a traffic offense for which the Legislature authorized impoundment. The language of former RCW 46.20.4352 indicates the Legislature did not intend that statute to be enforced without reference to the particular circumstances confronting the law enforcement officer. “The use of the word ‘may’ as compared to ‘shall’ suggests those responsible for enforcing [former] RCW 46.20.435(1) are expected to exercise some discretion in deciding whether to impound a vehicle.” Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. at 119. At the suppression hearing Officer Richard Carroll admitted that whether a vehicle would be impounded when the license tabs were expired and the driver was cited for driving with a suspended license would depend on the circumstances.3 Yet here, without considering any alternatives to impoundment, Officer Carroll called for a tow truck and began to search the vehicle. And, this inven*905tory search began before citing Mr. Peterson for the traffic offense.4
When read as a whole, it is clear that former RCW 46.20.435 was promulgated to prevent a continuing violation of certain traffic laws. Accordingly, “[i]f a validly licensed driver is available to remove the vehicle, a reason to impound must be shown.” Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. at 119. This was not accomplished. By his own admission Officer Carroll did not attempt to contact the registered owner of the vehicle or ask Mr. Peterson if there was someone with a valid driver’s license who would be willing to move the vehicle prior to calling for a tow truck. Although an officer is not required to exhaust all possibilities, the officer must at least consider alternatives to impoundment. If no remedy can be found after this deliberation, impoundment is proper. State v. Hardman, 17 Wn. App. 910, 914, 567 P.2d 238 (1977), review denied, 89 Wn.2d 1020 (1978).
Because I believe the officer should have taken some reasonable step toward contacting the owner of the car prior to calling the tow truck, the impoundment was unreasonable and thus unlawful. As such, there was no justification for the inventory search.5 The trial court erred when it did not grant Mr. Peterson’s motion to suppress.

Former RCW 46.20.435 was in effect in May 1996 when the car was impounded.

Verbatim report of proceedings at 9-10.

Verbatim report of proceedings at 7.

See Reynoso, 41 Wn. App. 113.