Court Opinion

ID: 9909688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 21:01:02.793287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:54.834588
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11826     Document: 59-1       Date Filed: 12/13/2023     Page: 1 of 14

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                   No. 22-11826
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

        MATTHEW WHITEST,
        CURTIS LUCAS, JR.,
                                                          Plaintiﬀs-Appellees,
        CRANDALL POSTELL,
                                                          Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        CRISP COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
        BECKY PERKINS,
        in her oﬃcial capacity as Elections’ Supervisor
        of the Crisp County Board of Elections and
        Registration,
        JUSTIN POSEY,
        in his oﬃcial capacity as a member of the
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11826

        Crisp County Board of Education,
        DR ELIZABETH MADDOX,
        in her oﬃcial capacity as a member of the
        Crisp County Board of Education,
        LELEE PHINNEY,
        in her oﬃcial capacity as a member of the
        Board of Education of Crisp County, et al.,

                                                      Defendants-Appellees.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-00109-LAG
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, JORDAN, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                 On June 14, 2017, Crandall Postell and numerous co-plain-
        tiffs, represented by Bryan L. Sells and ACLU-affiliated attorneys,
        filed a lawsuit against the Crisp County School District and the
        Crisp County Board of Elections and Registration (BOE) challeng-
        ing the existing at-large election method as a violation of Section 2
        of the Voting Rights Act 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301. Early in the liti-
        gation, Plaintiffs found themselves at odds in their pursuit of an ap-
        propriate remedy. This misalignment reached an impasse.
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        22-11826                Opinion of the Court                           3

                Because Plaintiffs could not resolve their disagreement, the
        district court allowed Plaintiffs to split their efforts and pursue their
        interests separately. The ACLU withdrew from representing Plain-
        tiffs in their entirety and continued to represent two plaintiffs,
        Mathew Whitest and Curtis Lucas Jr. (referred to as, Whitest Plain-
        tiffs). Postell, on behalf of himself and four other plaintiffs, pro-
        ceeded with the litigation pro se.
                Postell now brings this consolidated appeal challenging nu-
        merous district court orders. The first order devised a remedy to
        the violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and re-
        quired the Crisp County School District and BOE to adopt a legis-
        latively enacted remedial plan. The remaining orders being chal-
        lenged on appeal concern Plaintiffs’ disagreement and the granting
        and denial of numerous motions filed throughout the course of the
        litigation in an attempt to cure alleged harms resulting from the
        split.
                After careful review, we find that the district court did not
        abuse its discretion in adopting the legislative remedy, nor did the
        district court abuse its discretion in ruling on all challenged mo-
        tions. We first address the Section 2 remedy, before turning to a
        review of the various motions.
                                I.     Voting Rights Act
               In 2017, Plaintiffs brought a complaint alleging that the at-
        large election system used by the BOE violated Section 2 of VRA
        by diluting the voting strength of Black voters in Crisp County. At
        the time, the system consisted of six at-large members. According
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11826

        to Plaintiffs, the at-large system made it difficult for Black voters to
        elect the candidates of their choosing.
                In February 2018, the parties filed a consent motion to refer
        the case to mediation, which the district court granted. Defendants
        did not admit liability but proposed a remedy for the alleged viola-
        tion. This remedy presented a plan with four single-member dis-
        tricts and one at-large district. According to this plan, two of the
        single-member districts would contain a Black majority. Whitest
        Plaintiffs and their attorneys supported this plan, with modifica-
        tions. Postell opposed this remedy and supported a six-member
        district plan.
               In February 2021, Whitest Plaintiffs and Defendants filed a
        joint motion for entry of a consent order, recommending that the
        court adopt the plan involving four single-member districts and
        one at-large district. Whitest Plaintiffs moved for summary judg-
        ment in July 2021, stating that Defendants did not contest liability.
        Defendants stipulated to the preconditions for a vote-dilution claim
        under Section 2 and stipulated that the at-large method lacked pro-
        portionality. Whitest Plaintiffs then proposed a remedial plan that
        included ordering Defendants to confer with Crisp County’s legis-
        lative delegation to determine whether the Georgia General As-
        sembly could address the issue in time for the 2022 elections. De-
        fendants responded, seeking to join Whitest Plaintiffs in their mo-
        tion for summary judgment.
               In August 2021, the district court determined that there was
        a clear Section 2 violation, finding that there was no genuine issue
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        22-11826               Opinion of the Court                          5

        of material fact as to whether Black voters in Crisp County had less
        opportunity than white voters to elect candidates of their choice to
        the Board of Education, and granted Whitest Plaintiffs’ motion for
        summary judgment.
               The district court issued an order requesting that all parties
        confer and file a joint report within two weeks of the order identi-
        fying a date by which a remedy or interim remedy would need to
        be in place for the 2022 election under the new plan.
               In December 2021, the district court directed the parties to
        prepare and submit proposed remedial plans. Postell submitted a
        plan with six single-member districts. Whitest Plaintiffs submitted
        draft legislation—House Bill 956 and House Bill 1430—that mir-
        rored Defendants’ previously suggested remedy, outlining a four-
        one plan whereby there would be four single-member districts and
        one at-large member. The Georgia General Assembly passed HB
        1430 and the bill was signed into law in March 2022.
               Following the bill’s passage, the district court issued an order
        in which it recognized HB 1430 as an appropriate remedy for the
        existing Section 2 violation. The district court held that the bill
        would be adopted, subject to approval from Crisp County voters.
        In doing so, the district court rejected Postell’s six-member plan,
        finding that he had not provided the requisite information ensuring
        that his proposal would remedy the Section 2 violation.
                                   a. Standard of Review
                Mootness is a question of law we review de novo. Hall v.
        Sec’y, Ala., 902 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2018). A case is rendered
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11826

        moot and must be dismissed if and where events occur during liti-
        gation that deprive the court of its ability to provide meaningful
        relief. United States v. Georgia, 778 F.3d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015).
               Prior to adopting a remedial plan intended to cure a Section
        2 violation, it is important for courts to inquire as to whether the
        plan at issue “completely remedies the prior dilution of minority
        voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity for minority
        citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice.”
        United States v. Dall. Cnty. Comm’n, 850 F.2d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir.
        1988) (quoting S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in
        1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.News 177, 208).
               In the presence of an alleged Section 2 violation, “[p]rinci-
        ples of federalism and common sense mandate deference to a plan
        which has been legislatively enacted.” Tallahassee Branch of NAACP
        v. Leon Cnty., 827 F.2d 1436, 1438 (11th Cir. 1987). District courts
        should “afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet
        constitutional requirements” while devising its own substitute
        plan. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978). Still, deference to
        the legislature does not equate to blanket approval. In adopting
        any remedy—even a plan proposed and enacted by the state—
        courts must ensure that the new plan is also valid under Section 2.
        Dall. Cnty. Comm’n, 850 F.2d at 1437–38.
                                        b. Discussion
                The district court did not abuse its discretion in adopting HB
        1430, a legislatively enacted plan. In deciding whether to adopt the
        legislative remedy at issue, the district court clearly explained that
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        22-11826                   Opinion of the Court                                 7

        HB 1430 was an appropriate remedy because it provides Black vot-
        ers an equal opportunity to participate in elections and elect their
        candidates of choice. 1 See Wise, 437 U.S. at 540 (explaining that dis-
        trict courts are entitled to adopt a legislative plan as its remedy of
        choice in the presence of a Section 2 violation). Nothing in the rec-
        ord supported a finding that HB 1430 violated the Constitution or
        the VRA.
               Our finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
        also leads us to conclude that Postell’s appeal is not moot. Postell
        appropriately challenged the district court’s chosen remedy, which
        so happened to be a legislatively enacted plan. The legislative rem-
        edy did not deprive the district court of devising meaningful relief;
        the legislative remedy was adopted as the meaningful relief. See
        Georgia, 778 F.3d at 1204.
                                         II.     Motions
               On appeal, Postell also challenges numerous district court
        rulings on motions filed throughout the course of litigation. All
        challenged motions stemmed from tensions that emerged between
        Postell and his co-plaintiffs during the initial mediation with De-
        fendants. The timeline and events concerning all motions follows.
               When Judge Gardner first referred this case to mediation,
        she required the parties to issue a status report on the results within

        1 Courts should exert caution when reviewing multi-member or at-large vot-

        ing schemes because they may “operate to minimize or cancel” the voting
        strength of racial minorities. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (quot-
        ing Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966)).
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11826

        fourteen days of the mediation. Once issued, the status report
        noted that Postell refused to engage in meaningful mediation,
        which prevented the remaining plaintiffs from exploring a mutu-
        ally agreeable remedy with Defendants. After repeated efforts to
        resolve their differences, attorneys for Whitest Plaintiffs moved to
        withdraw as counsel for Postell, citing a “fundamental disagree-
        ment” between Postell and Whitest Plaintiffs. In response, Postell
        filed a motion for sanctions against former counsel. The motion
        for sanctions was based in part on Postell’s belief that counsel knew
        of Postell’s positions on all case-related issues and disclosed said po-
        sitions in the joint status report, in violation of the Georgia Rules
        of Professional Conduct.
               In September 2018, Postell filed a motion for an evidentiary
        hearing on the motions to withdraw and his motion for sanctions.
        The motions to withdraw were granted. The district court granted
        an evidentiary hearing as to the motion for sanctions, which was
        held in July 2019 and the motion was subsequently denied. In June
        2019, shortly prior to the evidentiary hearing, Postell moved to
        drop Whitest Plaintiffs from the suit while simultaneously moving
        to disqualify their attorneys. This consolidated motion was denied
        in August 2020.
                In August 2021, Postell filed a motion for Judge Gardner to
        recuse herself for illegal and discriminatory acts. He argued that
        Judge Gardner was biased toward Whitest Plaintiffs, discriminated
        against him because of his pro se status, and violated his due-pro-
        cess rights based on its rulings. The alleged bias stemmed from the
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        22-11826                  Opinion of the Court                         9

        fact that Judge Gardner’s sister is Stacey Abrams, a prominent
        Georgia politician and voting rights activist who has collaborated
        with the ACLU. Postell alleges that this connection manifested in
        Judge Gardner’s desire to protect Abrams’s interests with the
        ACLU. Postell filed a second motion for recusal in September 2021,
        arguing that the district court failed to rule on his previous motion,
        violating his constitutional right to due process.
               In December 2021, Postell filed a third motion for recusal.
        This third motion was filed alongside a Motion to Stay. In March
        2022, the district court issued an order denying all of Postell’s mo-
        tions for recusal and the motion to stay. 2 The following analysis
        addresses all motions on appeal, in the order in which they were
        filed.
                              a. Motions to Withdraw as Counsel
               We review decisions regarding an attorney’s motion to
        withdraw as counsel for abuse of discretion. See Mekdeci v. Merrell
        Nat. Lab’ys, 711 F.2d 1510, 1521–22 (11th Cir. 1983). This court
        gives significant deference to the district court’s interpretation and
        application of local rules. Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291,
        1302 (11th Cir. 2009). In doing so, this court will defer to the district
        court’s grant of a motion to withdraw as counsel provided a show-
        ing of good cause. Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1521–22.
              The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
        various motions to withdraw put forth by Postell’s former counsel.

        2 The motion to stay is not challenged by Postell on appeal.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                      22-11826

        We rely on the district court’s well-reasoned explanation for grant-
        ing the motions to withdraw as counsel. The district court relied
        on Local Rule 83.1.4 of the Middle District of Georgia which states
        that “an attorney may withdraw from representation if there is a
        ‘compelling reason to withdraw.’” M.D. Ga. L.R. 83.1.4. The dis-
        trict court found that each motion at issue here was supported by
        compelling reasons to withdraw. Postell’s former counsel moved
        to withdraw in part because of the previously discussed disagree-
        ment between Postell and his co-plaintiﬀs. The district court found
        that continued representation of Postell would prevent counsel
        from providing “sincere legal recommendations” to Whitest Plain-
        tiﬀs.
               A later motion was brought by another attorney who moved
        to withdraw from this case because of a change of employment; a
        separate motion was brought because the attorney ﬁling had de-
        cided to retire. Both reasons are wholly unrelated to the subject of
        this lawsuit. We consequently cannot say that the district court
        abused its discretion in granting the various motions to withdraw
        as counsel.
                             b. Motions to Disqualify Counsel and
                                     Motions for Sanctions 3
               Decisions regarding motions to disqualify counsel fall within
        the district court’s interpretation of the rules of ethics and are

        3 While filed separately, the motions to disqualify counsel and the motions for

        sanctions are reviewed together here as they both fall under a similar legal
        standard.
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        22-11826                Opinion of the Court                          11

        reviewed de novo, while the applicable findings of fact are re-
        viewed for clear error. Bayshore Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor
        Co., 380 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Schlumberger Techs.,
        Inc. v. Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553, 1557–58 (11th Cir. 1997). The party
        bringing a motion to disqualify bears the burden of proving the
        grounds for disqualification. In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 961
        (11th Cir. 2003). The imposition of sanctions similarly fall within
        the district court’s inherent power and are reviewed for an abuse
        of discretion. Johnson v. 27th Ave. Caraf, Inc., 9 F.4th 1300, 1310 (11th
        Cir. 2021).
                Rule 1.9 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct re-
        quires courts to consider whether a lawyer’s interests in a case
        would prove materially adverse to the interests of any of the in-
        volved parties, particularly where former clients are involved. Ga.
        R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(a)–(b). Meanwhile under Rule 1.6, “[a] law-
        yer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the pro-
        fessional relationship with a client, including information which
        the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of
        which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the
        client, unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclo-
        sures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the repre-
        sentation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order
        of the court.” Ga. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(a).
              Here, the district court did not err in applying the Georgia
        Rules of Professional Conduct, nor in denying Postell’s motion to
        disqualify Whitest Plaintiffs’ attorneys. Although the attorneys
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11826

        formerly represented Postell, the district court found that the inter-
        ests of both parties were not “materially adverse.” See Ga R. Prof
        Conduct 1.9(a). While Postell and Whitest Plaintiffs did disagree
        as to what would be the most effective and appropriate remedy,
        both parties agreed that Defendants were in violation of Section 2.
        The district court found the disagreement pertaining to the appro-
        priate remedy neither materially adverse to Postell’s underlying in-
        terests nor compelling enough to override Whitest Plaintiffs’ coun-
        sel of choice, which we have stated should only be done sparingly.
        See In re Bellsouth Corp., 334 F.3d at 961.
                Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
        denying Postell’s motion to sanction his former counsel because,
        as the district court properly found, the attorneys did not violate
        any ethical obligations owed to Postell. The information at issue
        here was disclosed in a status report pursuant to a district court or-
        der—conduct that explicitly falls under an exception carved out by
        Rule 1.6 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. To the ex-
        tent that Postell could argue that the attorneys divulged too much
        information in this status report, the disclosure did not rise to a
        level where sanctions would be appropriate, nor did it rise to a level
        where we could confidently overrule the district court and find an
        abuse of discretion in denying the motion. We therefore affirm the
        district court’s denial of sanctions.
                           c. Motion to Drop Whitest Plaintiffs
              We review the district court’s decision on a motion to dis-
        miss a party for an abuse of discretion. Fritz v. Am. Home Shield
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        22-11826               Opinion of the Court                         13

        Corp., 751 F.2d 1152, 1154 (11th Cir. 1985). We find that the district
        court did not abuse its discretion in denying Postell’s motion to
        drop Whitest Plaintiffs. The district court clearly explained that
        dropping the parties was not appropriate here because all plaintiffs
        shared the same claim. Keeping the suit together was found to pro-
        mote judicial economy and prevented Postell, Whitest Plaintiffs,
        and Defendants from litigating the matter in separate actions. We
        therefore affirm the district court on this issue as well.
                                   d. Motions for Recusal
                This court reviews decisions concerning recusals for an
        abuse of discretion. United States v. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299, 1309 (11th
        Cir. 2023). A party may move to disqualify a judge where that
        judge has a personal bias or prejudice against said party or in favor
        of any adverse party. 28 U.S.C. § 144. Meanwhile, § 455(a) states
        that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States
        shall disqualify [themselves] in any proceeding in which [] impar-
        tiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); see also
        United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). The
        identified impartiality must also generally stem from extrajudicial
        sources; any conduct stemming from the judicial context must
        demonstrate pervasive bias. See Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co.,
        293 F.3d 1306, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002).
               Additionally, because ex parte communications are gener-
        ally not tolerated while adjudicating the merits of a case, this court
        may consider the presence of ex parte communications when as-
        certaining a judge’s impartiality. Vining v. Runyon, 99 F.3d 1056,
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11826

        1057 (11th Cir. 1996). In contrast, “a judge’s rulings in the same or
        a related case may not serve as the basis for a recusal motion.”
        McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990).
               Here, we are unable to find that the district court abused its
        discretion in denying Postell’s various motions for recusal given
        that the district court clearly articulated how Postell failed to meet
        the requirements of §§ 144 and 455, as detailed in its March 3, 2022,
        order denying all three motions for recusal. As the district court
        explained, Postell did not allege facts that demonstrated impartial-
        ity that rose to a level of concern as required under statute, nor did
        the facts demonstrate pervasive bias as required by circuit prece-
        dent. Mere disagreement with the district court’s rulings and man-
        agement of the case is insufficient to warrant recusal. See Tenneco
        Packaging Co., 293 F.3d at 1329. Accordingly, we affirm the district
        court here as well.
                                  III.   Conclusion
               For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
        well-reasoned decisions as to all orders on appeal.
               AFFIRMED.