Court Opinion

ID: 9780791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 02:54:33.807608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:13.692743
License: Public Domain

BRYANT, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Where the majority holds that there exists a material conflict in the evidence regarding whether defendant was in custody at the time he gave his statement and remands for entry of an order including findings of fact and conclusions of law, I disagree, and, therefore, respectfully dissent from this portion of the majority opinion only. I otherwise fully concur in the majority opinion holding no error as to defendant’s remaining arguments.
Preliminarily, I note that in his appeal defendant did not object to the issue at hand; i.e. the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact *427and conclusions of law. Failure to object at trial makes this issue subject to dismissal for failure to properly preserve an issue for appellate review. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1) (“In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make ....”). However, citing N.C.G.S. § 15A-977, defendant avers that his right to appeal this issue is properly preserved because the trial court “acted contrary to a statutory mandate.” Because I do not find that the trial court acted contrary to a statutory mandate, I would dismiss defendant’s appeal of this issue based on failure to properly preserve the issue.
The majority acknowledges that the trial court announced its rationale for denial of defendant’s motion to suppress in open court. In its ruling, the trial court stated, inter alia, that defendant was not in custody, that defendant’s statement was voluntary and denied defendant’s motion to suppress. While the trial court’s order was not set out in a separate writing containing formal findings of fact, conclusions of law, and signature of the trial court, the trial court’s order denying suppression is a part of the record as recorded in the transcript of the hearing. Therefore, I must emphasize that in this case, because the trial court’s findings of fact are clearly, albeit succinctly, a part of the record, requiring remand to clarify the record in writing is elevating form over substance.
“The language of section 15A-977(f) has been interpreted as mandatory to the trial court unless (1) the trial court provides its rationale from the bench, and (2) there are no material conflicts in the evidence at the suppression hearing.” Baker,__ N.C. App. at_, 702 S.E.2d 828-29. See also, State v. Jacobs, 174 N.C. App. 1, 620 S.E.2d 204 (2005) (holding no error where the trial court failed to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its conclusion to deny the defendant’s motion to suppress where the trial court provided its rationale from the bench, (citing State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 685, 268 S.E.2d 452, 457 (1980)) (vacated in part on other grounds, rev’d in part on other grounds, 361 N.C. 565, 648 S.E.2d 841 (2007)).
The critical issue that distinguishes the majority’s reasoning from the reasoning in this dissent: The majority says the conflict in the evidence was material. I strongly disagree. The record supports that there exists conflict in the evidence between what defendant said occurred (officer asked if he could speak to defendant and had him *428get into patrol car where handcuffs were “displayed” on dashboard, defendant did not feel like talking but officer said since you are here we’re going to talk), and what officer said occurred (officer asked if he could speak to defendant and defendant got in patrol car and left passenger door open while they talked; and defendant was told by officer he was not under arrest and not being charged). Again, I disagree that this constitutes a material conflict.
In order to constitute a material conflict, evidence presented must be so controverted as to likely affect the outcome of the matter. Baker,_N.C. App. at_, 702 S.E.2d at 831 (“a material conflict in the evidence exists when evidence presented by one party controverts evidence presented by an opposing party such that the outcome of the matter to be decided is likely to be affected.”). Here, defendant’s evidence needs to be sufficient to support a conclusion that defendant was in custody. I do not believe this evidence is sufficient to do so. Further, the majority cites a number of cases from our Supreme Court and Court of Appeals holding that on similar facts, the defendant was found not to be in custody: Hipps, 348 N.C. 377, 501 S.E.2d 625; Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 543 S.E.2d 823; Rooks, 196 N.C. App. 147, 674 SE.2d 738; Washington, 102 N.C. App. 535, 402 S.E.2d 851; and Turner, 2001 Pa. Super. 79, 772 A.2d 970. With the exception of Washington (where facts showed defendant involuntarily restricted in back seat of patrol car), the majority cites only one Pennsylvania case holding that a custodial interrogation occurred, and in that case defendant was placed in the back seat of a car and questioned by one officer while another stood just behind him. Turner, 2001 Pa. Super. 79, 772 A.2d 970. Therefore, the majority’s reasoning seems to be that the evidence in the instant case presents a material conflict because, based on the cases the majority discusses, defendant’s evidence would be sufficient to support a conclusion that defendant was in custody.
Because I disagree with the basic premise that these facts, if taken as true, would support a conclusion that defendant was in custody, I would hold that the trial court’s summary findings, on the record, though not in writing, were more than sufficient to meet the dictates of N.C.G.S. § 15-977.1 would affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress.