Court Opinion

ID: 9370097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 19:08:01.952979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:19.323463
License: Public Domain

J-S43004-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    NADIR SIMPKIN                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 499 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 29, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0004943-2019

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                            FILED FEBRUARY 10, 2023

       Appellant Nadir Simpkin appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on September 29,

2021.1 Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying

his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea and asks this Court to

reverse and remand for trial. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of

sentence.

       The Commonwealth charged Appellant in this case and a companion

case with numerous crimes in connection with the sexual assault of two

minors.2 The instant case involves A.L. (“Victim”), a thirteen-year-old girl,
____________________________________________

1 This Court corrected the caption to reflect that the appeal lies properly from
the judgment of sentence imposed on September 29, 2021.

2 The docket number for the instant case is CP-51-CR-0004943-2019, while
the companion case is CP-51-CR-0004944-2019. The trial court initially
consolidated these cases.
J-S43004-22

who was a family friend that was staying with Appellant’s family.        Victim

alleged that Appellant, then twenty-five years old, sexually assaulted her on

four occasions in June 2019, including a final assault on June 30, 2019.3 She

asserted that he “forcibly held [her] down” and “subjected her to anal, vaginal,

and oral sex.”4 Victim reported the June 30th assault to Appellant’s mother

the morning after it occurred, and Appellant’s mother called 911. A rape kit

performed on Victim the same day matched Appellant’s DNA to DNA on a

rectal swab.

        The companion case involves Appellant’s half-sister, who alleged that

Appellant sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions between 2011 and

2018, when she was between eight and fifteen years old. She did not report

the abuse until the day of Victim’s allegations, when she was sixteen.       In

contrast to Victim’s case, the companion case did not include DNA evidence

because of the delayed report.

        The Commonwealth arrested Appellant on July 1, 2019. The trial court

initially scheduled a jury trial for February 10, 2020. However, after various

delays and continuances, the trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty pleas in

both cases on April 14, 2021. In this case, Appellant pled guilty to one count

each of Rape by Forcible Compulsion and Unlawful Contact with a Minor -

____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth charged Appellant with nineteen criminal counts related
to his “sexual intercourse/contact” with Victim. Compl., 7/1/19; Criminal
Information, 7/17/19.

4   Tr. Ct. Op., 6/6/22, at 2.

                                           -2-
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Sexual Offenses, and the Commonwealth nolle prossed the remaining

seventeen charges.5 During his plea hearing, the trial court emphasized that

the hearing was Appellant’s “last opportunity to say that [he] did not commit

these crimes.”6

          On July 4, 2021, three days before his scheduled sentencing, defense

counsel informed the trial court and the Commonwealth that Appellant was

“not able to proceed with sentencing[.]”7 Subsequently, Appellant filed his

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea in both cases, “newly asserting his innocence

of the charges.”8 In the motion, he claimed to have initially expressed doubts

about his plea to counsel approximately ten days after entering it but did not

make the “final decision to seek to withdraw his guilty plea” until days before

sentencing.9 He did not provide any support for his claim of innocence, instead

asserting only that the Commonwealth would suffer minimal prejudice as a

result of the five month delay in the start of trial.

          During the August 11, 2021 plea withdrawal hearing, defense counsel

asserted that Appellant was “extremely insistent and adamant that he [was]

____________________________________________

518 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(a)(1), 6318(a)(1), respectively. Appellant also plead
guilty to Unlawful Contact with a Minor in the companion case, which is not
before this Court.

6   N.T., 4/14/21, at 10.

7   Tr. Ct. Op. at 3.

8   Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 7/12/21, ¶ 2.

9   Id.

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not guilty of these crimes and that it was a mistake” to enter the guilty plea.10

Appellant, however, did not provide any additional testimony or evidence in

support of his claim of innocence. Instead, he emphasized the absence of

eyewitnesses other than the victims.

        The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea in

the instant case finding Appellant’s assertion of innocence “not plausible” in

light of Victim’s prompt complaint and the DNA evidence.11 In contrast, the

court granted Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea in the companion case,

which involved neither a prompt complaint nor DNA evidence.

        On September 29, 2021, the court sentenced Appellant to concurrent

terms of four to eight years of incarceration on each charge.        Appellant’s

convictions additionally require his life-time registration as a sex offender.

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to withdraw his plea, which was denied

by operation of law on February 9, 2022.

        Appellant timely filed his Notice of Appeal. Subsequently, Appellant and

the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.12        Appellant presents the

following question on appeal:

____________________________________________

10   N.T., 8/11/21, at 6.

11   Id. at 10.

12 Prior to the submission of Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of
Matters Complained of on Appeal, the trial court granted defense counsel’s
petition to withdraw and appointed new counsel.

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       Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion when it denied
       defendant's written and properly filed pre-sentence motion
       seeking leave to withdraw his guilty plea where defendant
       asserted his innocence prior to imposition of sentence, that claim
       of innocence is plausible and thus constitutes a fair and just reason
       to permit withdrawal of the plea, and the Commonwealth did not
       establish that it would suffer any prejudice as a result of the
       withdrawal of the plea?

Appellant’s Br. at 4.

                                               A.

       Before this Court, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea.        The courts of this

Commonwealth liberally allow withdrawal of guilty pleas when sought prior to

the imposition of sentence pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 591.13 To evaluate pre-

sentence plea withdrawal motions, the Supreme Court set forth the following

guidelines:

       (1) there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea; (2) trial
       courts have discretion in determining whether a withdrawal
       request will be granted; (3) such discretion is to be administered
       liberally in favor of the accused; and (4) any demonstration by a
       defendant of a fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a
       grant, unless withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the
       Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d 112,116 (Pa. 2019) (emphasis added;

citation and quotation marks omitted).

____________________________________________

13 Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(a) provides, “At any time before the imposition of
sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion of the
defendant, or direct, sua sponte, the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere and the substitution of a plea of not guilty.”

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J-S43004-22

      Prior to 2015, prevailing law effectively viewed a defendant’s “bare

assertion of innocence as a fair-and-just reason” for withdrawal of a plea.

Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1292 (Pa. 2015).                In

Carrasquillo, however, the Supreme Court rejected this rule and clarified

that “the proper inquiry . . . is whether the accused has made some colorable

demonstration, under the circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of

the plea would promote fairness and justice.”      Id.   In regard to claims of

innocence, the Court explained that the claim “must be at least plausible to

demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentence withdrawal

of a plea.” Id. The Court, however, reiterated that trial courts should continue

to grant pre-sentence withdrawal of guilty pleas liberally but emphasized that

trial courts had discretion in assessing the motions to withdraw. Id.

      Accordingly, we review a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a

plea for abuse of discretion. “An abuse of discretion will not be found based

on a mere error of judgment, but rather exists where the [trial] court has

reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the law, or where the

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,

prejudice, bias or ill-will.”   Norton, 201 A.3d at 120. (citation omitted).

Appellate courts should remember that “trial courts are in the unique position

to assess the credibility of claims of innocence and measure, under the

circumstances, whether defendants have made sincere and colorable claims

that permitting withdrawal of their pleas would promote fairness and justice.”

Id. at 121.

                                      -6-
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      Our decision is this case is controlled by clear precedent. Pennsylvania

appellate courts have repeatedly applied the Carrasquillo paradigm and

affirmed a trial court’s denial of plea withdrawal motions in cases such as the

instant case where a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea based solely on an

assertion of innocence despite the Commonwealth’s strong evidence to the

contrary.    Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d 1103, the

companion case of Carrasquillo, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, where the defendant’s unsupported claim of

innocence,   asserted   at   sentencing,   was   implausible    in   light   of   the

Commonwealth’s evidentiary proffer.        Id. at 1105; see also Norton, 201

A.3d at 122 (affirming denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw plea based

upon “bare assertion of innocence”).

      In a case involving a similar constellation of facts as the case at bar, this

Court in Commonwealth v. Williams, 198 A.3d 1181 (Pa. Super. 2018),

affirmed the trial court’s denial of a plea withdrawal motion where the

defendant asserted his innocence in contradiction to his statements made

during his guilty plea colloquy and DNA evidence from a rape kit. Given this

evidence, the trial court found the defendant’s assertions of innocence

“implausible,” and this Court concluded that the court did not abuse its

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J-S43004-22

discretion.14 Id. at 1186; cf. Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1190

(Pa. Super. 2017) (reversing the trial court’s denial of withdrawal and instead

concluding that the defendant provided a plausible assertion of innocence by

testifying to specific factual challenges in a case where the defendant sought

to withdraw his plea two months prior to his scheduled sentencing after

receiving the advice of new counsel).

                                               B.

       In the instant case, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea based

upon what he views to be a “colorable” assertion of innocence and the absence

of any claim of prejudice by the Commonwealth. Appellant’s Brief at 21-23.

Defendant additionally attempts to rebut the Commonwealth’s DNA evidence,

asserting that the evidence could have resulted from “DNA transference,”

given that both he and Victim were living in the same home. Id. at 26-29.

       In its 1925(a) opinion, the trial court rejected Appellant’s claims. The

court found that Appellant failed to “produce anything in his motion to

withdraw or statement of errors that would illustrate that [his] new assertion

of innocence is plausible.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 7. In contrast, the court emphasized

that, as in Carrasquillo and Hvizda, the Commonwealth had strong evidence

in the form of the DNA evidence collected the morning after the alleged rape.

____________________________________________

14 The Court in Williams additionally held that the trial court properly denied
plea withdrawal based upon the defendant’s agreement that “withdrawal
would substantially prejudice the Commonwealth.” Id. at 1185.

                                           -8-
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It found that the “DNA evidence is completely inconsistent with Defendant's

belated assertion that the DNA transfer could have occurred as a result of the

victim and Defendant simply residing in the same home together.” Id. at 8.

The court opined that it did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon review, we agree.

      Before this Court, Appellant alleges several flaws in the trial court’s

reasoning for denying his plea.      First, he contends that the trial court

erroneously concluded that Victim’s allegation was prompt. Appellant’s Br. at

24-26. He argues that Victim did not report the first three June 2019 assaults

until July 1, 2019, the morning after the final assault. Id. at 24-25. This

argument fails on its face, given that Appellant recognizes that Victim reported

the June 30th rape the day after it occurred.        Indeed, Victim’s prompt

reporting allowed for the collection of the DNA evidence.

      Second, Appellant challenges the trial court’s reliance on the forensic

evidence which revealed Appellant’s DNA on the rectal swab of Victim’s rape

kit. He argues that DNA could have resulted from “secondary DNA transfer.”

Id. at 26-29. He explains that it is “scientifically plausible that DNA from one

individual can be detected on another through secondary transfer even when

the two do not come into direct contact,” citing several scientific studies. Id.

at 26. However, even assuming these studies provide evidence of secondary

DNA transfer, Appellant fails to explain how this theory would apply to the

existence of his DNA in Victim’s rectum based solely on their living in the same

house. Moreover, it does not appear that Appellant provided the scientific

                                     -9-
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studies to the trial court. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in discounting Appellant’s secondary DNA transfer

argument.

       Finally, Appellant asserts a totality of the circumstances argument,

claiming that “[t]he confluence of scientific study, [his] good character, an

assertion of innocence, and the lack of a true prompt complaint leads

inexorably to a conclusion that the lower court abused its discretion.”15

Appellant’s Br. at 17. He contends that his plausible assertion of innocence

constitutes the requisite fair and just reason for withdrawing his plea. We

disagree and instead conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

       In this case, the trial court carefully considered the facts of the

consolidated cases before it, denying Appellant’s petition to withdraw his plea

in the instant case but granting it in the companion case. In distinguishing

between the instant case and the companion case, the court relied upon the

strength of the Commonwealth’s evidence.           While both cases involved

Appellant’s request to withdraw his plea months after pleading guilty and on

the eve of sentencing, the instant case, unlike the companion case, included

DNA evidence linking Appellant to the rape, which corroborated Victim’s

____________________________________________

15 The Commonwealth observes that Appellant failed to raise his character
before the trial court or present any evidence of his “good character” other
than the absence of an arrest record. Commonwealth’s Br. at 9. We agree
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider an
argument that Appellant did not raise or develop. Commonwealth v. Baez,
169 A.3d 35, 41 (Pa. Super. 2017) (finding appellant waived an argument in
support of plea withdraw by failing to present it to the trial court).

                                          - 10 -
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allegations, which she had reported promptly in contrast to the victim in the

companion case. Moreover, unlike the defendant in Islas, Appellant failed to

provide testimony or evidence to support his assertion of innocence.

      Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion

in denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/10/2023

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