Court Opinion

ID: 9705132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:57:37.769639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:08.177546
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.,

dissenting:

I dissent from Part I of the Court’s opinion holding that the bank breached its contract with Mrs. Wright when it deleted her name from the account. The majority opinion does not *160tell us that in fact the husband here gave a written order to the bank to remove his wife’s name from the account. I regard that as the same as his signing a check for the sum on deposit, thus removing the money from the joint account, and then opening a new account in his individual name. The majority implies that had that procedure been followed there would be no breach on the part of the bank. I emphasize that the issue here is not whether as between the parties the husband had the right to take all the funds in the joint account but whether the bank is liable to the wife because it honored the order of the husband.
In Wright v. Commercial & Sav. Bank, 51 Md. App. 398, 445 A.2d 30 (1982), the Court of Special Appeals did not regard Wetzel v. Collin, 170 Md. 383, 185 A. 117 (1936), or Sturgis v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 152 Md. 654, 137 A. 378 (1927), which the majority takes pains to distinguish, as authority for its decision. It did, however, point to the fact that in Wetzel Judge Sloan said for this Court:
"As the entry appeared originally on the passbook and the association’s ledger, the money or deposit was payable at the order of either the nominal trustee, Emma F. Wetzel, or the cestui que trust, Alice H. Collin. Whalen v. Milholland, 89 Md. 199, 43 A. 45 [(1899)]; and Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 A. 43 [(1899)]; Ghingher v. Fanseen, 166 Md. 519, 172 A. 75 [(1934)]; Bollack v. Bollack, 169 Md. 407, 182 A. 317 [(1935)], and the cases cited in the two last named. On these authorities there can be no doubt of the right of either trustee or cestui que trust to so change the account as to appropriate to her own use all the money on deposit in this account, or to transfer it from the names of both into her own name, regardless of whose money it was. On the authority of the cases just cited, if the account had been undisturbed, it would be the absolute property of the appellee by right of her survivorship. If one puts it in the power of another to so dispose of her money, the courts have no way *161to protect her against the betrayal of her confidence or folly, whichever you may call it.” 170 Md. at 387.
In Wright, after that quotation, Judge MacDaniel went on to say for the Court of Special Appeals:
"M.L.E. Trusts, Chap. 10, § 286 'Subsequent Deposits and Withdrawals,’ commenting on the holding in Wetzel, said:
Where an account is subject to the order of either party, each has [the] right so to change the account as to appropriate it to his own use or to transfer it from the names of both into his own name, and the use to which a sum withdrawn was subsequently put is of no concern to the bank.’ (Footnote omitted.)
"We find further reference to the holding in Wetzel in [Annot.] 161 A.L.R. 71 [(1946)] (Power of one party to joint bank account to terminate the interests of the other), at page [93-94] under the subtitle 'Striking name from account.’ Here A.L.R. interprets the language in Wetzel to mean that one joint depositor has a right to strike the name of the other joint depositor from the joint account, as this amounts to no more than a withdrawal of all the funds from the account by one of the joint depositors.” 51 Md. App. at 403-04.
The majority cites no cases in support of its position. In Wright Judge MacDaniel went on to review for the Court of Special Appeals out-of-state cases such as McEntire v. McEntire Ex’r, 267 Ark. 169, 590 S.W.2d 241 (1979); Bealert v. Mitchell, 585 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); and Hoffman v. Vetter, 117 Ohio App. 233, 192 N.E.2d 249 (1962), which do lend some support to the decision made by the Court of Special Appeals.
In Hoffman the Ohio court said:
"In our consideration of the claim of Louise Vetter, with respect to the bank savings account, *162we find that, when the account was established, Louise Vetter signed a blank card giving to the bank a copy of her signature; there was no formal joint account contract signed. The account then was designated on the ledger card as 'Mr. or Mrs. W. G. Vetter.’ There was no withdrawal of this signature card; but after the divorce was granted, the account was changed on the ledger card at the request of Mr. Vetter to 'Wallace G. Vetter.’ When Mr. Vetter remarried, the ledger card was again changed at the request of Mr. Vetter to 'Wallace G. Vetter or Mrs. Wallace G. Vetter or the survivor.’ In no instance was there a formal agreement executed between the bank and the parties. The only indication that such an arrangement had been made is obtained from the typed names on the ledger card. Either party could have requested the bank to make a change in the account, and it would have been granted. The requirement that a copy of the signature be given to the bank was for the protection of the bank, not the parties to the contract.” 117 Ohio App. at 234-35.
The court went on to say that after his remarriage, when the ledger sheet was made to read "Wallace G. Vetter or Mrs. Wallace G. Vetter or the survivor,” the only Mrs. Wallace G. Vetter at that time was the second wife. It observed, as quoted by the Court of Special Appeals:
"When Wallace G. Vetter had his name placed on the ledger sheet, he in effect withdrew the then joint account, and made such account an individual bank account.” Id. at 235.
As to Bealert the intermediate appellate court said:
"The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Bealert v. Mitchell, 585 S.W.2d 417 (1979), was required to determine the ownership of five joint savings certificate accounts opened by Robert L. Erd and Aliene S. Erd. Mr. Erd on April 10, 1975, had Mrs. Erd’s
*163name removed from all joint savings accounts in their names. An officer of the saving association required Mr. Erd to present a general power of attorney and also execute an instrument document before Mrs. Erd’s name was removed from the accounts. On August 14, 1975, Mr. Erd returned to the financial institution and requested that [his] name be removed from the same accounts and directed that they be placed in the name of his daughter by an earlier marriage. Although recognizing that Mrs. Erd consented to the withdrawal of her name, the Court stated at 418:
'It is our opinion that the power of attorney was not necessary because the language of the agreement between the parties clearly provided for the right to withdraw and all necessary rights directly related thereto.’
also on page 418 the Court said:
'Any interest Mrs. Erd had in the accounts was terminated by her husband when he removed her name from the accounts. This action was tantamount to a withdrawal of the funds. The record indicates that the only reason Mr. Erd did not withdraw the money from the accounts was to avoid the loss of interest and a penalty charge. We believe it is obvious that the right to withdraw encompasses the right to delete the name of another on a joint account.’ ”
51 Md. App. at 404-05.
The Court of Special Appeals pointed out that in McEntire there was a signature card for the account permitting either husband or wife to withdraw funds from an account in the sole name of the husband but that subsequently the husband caused a new signature card to be issued in his sole name, withdrawing the authority of the wife to draw funds from the account. The Arkansas court said, as quoted in part by the Court of Special Appeals:
*164"Appellant implies that a withdrawal of authority, or change of authority to draw upon the account should be distinguished from a withdrawal of the funds and establishment of a new account. We have previously established that there is no such valid distinction and it was thus unnecessary for Mr. McEntire to withdraw the funds and establish a new account as opposed to the course he followed in this instance. To require such would have been superfluous and equity regards substance rather than form. Davis v. Jackson 232 Ark. 953, 341 SW 2nd 726.” 267 Ark. at 174.
I regard the action here as the equivalent of withdrawal and establishment of a new account. Thus, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Murphy and Judge Rodowsky concur in the views here expressed.