Court Opinion

ID: 9776562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:39:04.891152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.782544
License: Public Domain

Robert H. Dudley, Justice, concurring. I write separately to concur in the disposition of this case. The appellant was charged with capital felony murder. Robbery was specified as the underlying felony. Under such a charge the appellant could have been convicted of capital felony murder, first degree murder, second degree murder, robbery, or attempted robbery. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-110(b)(1) (1987). Interestingly enough, the State filed a separate count of robbery for the same act. The second count was surplusage since, under the capital murder charge, the appellant could have been convicted of both murder and robbery, or either of them, but sentenced for only one of the convictions. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-110(a) and (b) (1987); see also 1983 Supplementary Commentary, sub-section styled Felony Murder and Underlying Felony, and Wilson v. State, 277 Ark. 219, 640 S.W.2d 440 (1983). The jury found appellant not guilty of capital murder and not guilty of the separate count of robbery. The jury did find appellant guilty of pre-meditated murder, a crime not charged. As set out in the majority opinion, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on felony murder. Accordingly, we must reverse. The real issue is do we remand or do we reduce the judgment to second degree murder? The resolution of that issue turns on whether the information can be amended. The information in this particular case cannot be amended to charge another underlying felony without violating the prohibition against double jeopardy because appellant was acquitted of the separate count of robbery. A second jeopardy for the same offense is prohibited. 21 Am. Jur. 2d § 266.1 cannot think of any other underlying felony which is essentially independent and distinct with which appellant can be charged. Further, none is suggested by the State. Thus, remanding and allowing the State to amend to a different underlying felony would violate the double jeopardy prohibition. Accordingly, I join in reducing the judgment of conviction to second degree murder. Tom Glaze, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Appellant argues that since the jury acquitted appellant of robbery, the underlying felony to the capital murder charge, the jury was certain to have returned an acquittal of the lesser included offense of first degree felony murder. Such a conclusion is based upon sheer speculation. First, the state based the capital murder charge on the enumerated underlying felony of robbery. Under the first degree felony murder charge, the state could have shown appellant killed Bobby Green during the course and furtherance of committing or attempting to commit any felony. In fact, appellant and Bobby Green were in the midst of a felony drug deal when appellant murdered Green. Thus, the jury may well have decided appellant was guilty of first degree felony murder even though it chose to acquit appellant on the greater crime of capital felony murder, which would have carried a penalty of life without parole. In sum, although appellant was entitled to the first degree felony murder instruction, he, at the most, is entitled only to the reversal and remand of this case for a new trial. It is the state’s option and decision, not this court’s, as to how to proceed and what evidence to present upon the remand of this matter. By the same token, appellant is entitled to the felony murder instruction he requested, and the jury should have the opportunity to decide appellant’s culpability under that lesser included offense. Under these circumstances, appellant cannot claim that double jeopardy attached, especially when he asks for the first degree murder offense instruction he was refused. In other words, he should not be able to claim error for the trial court’s failing to give him a first degree felony murder instruction and later assert double jeopardy on that basis. This court is wrong in reducing the appellant’s life sentence to twenty years, which is the maximum term for second degree homicide.