Court Opinion

ID: 9845949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:31:44.244606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:29.783850
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.,* Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the conclusion that “the error in admitting defendant’s extrajudicial statements was not prejudicial for the reason that, in the absence of the error, it is not reasonably probable in view of the totality of the situation [citation] that a result more favorable to defendant on the guilt phase would have been reached.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835-836 [12] [299 P.2d 243].) The majority state “Thus the error does not require reversal of the judgment of guilt.” (Italics added.) (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4½) I would state, more accurately, “Thus the error does not permit reversal of the judgment of guilt”; indeed, on the defined hypothesis, section 4½ forbids reversal.
*178Neither, I add, does the "error in the penalty phase of the trial” permit reversal of the penalty judgment. Here again California Constitution, article VI, section 4%, forbids reversal. This is so for precisely the same reason above articulated in respect to the guilt phase; i.e., “in the absence of the error, it is not reasonably probable in view of the totality of the situation that a result more favorable to defendant on the [penalty] phase would have been reached.” (See People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 652-653 [6a] [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33].)
By reason of the facts above stated, and following the authorities cited, I would affirm the judgment both as to guilt and penalty.
McComb, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied August 11, 1965. Mosk, J., did not participate therein.

Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.