Court Opinion

ID: 9941958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 11:09:02.132306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:33.297329
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                      NO. 03-22-00278-CR

                                   Dalana Watson, Appellant

                                                 v.

                                  The State of Texas, Appellee

                FROM THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY
       NO. CR-19-2917-B, THE HONORABLE JACK H. ROBISON, JUDGE PRESIDING

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

               Appellant, Dalana Watson, challenges her conviction for assault on a public

servant. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(1). The jury found Watson guilty and assessed

punishment at five years’ imprisonment. See id. §§ 12.34(a), 22.01(b)(1). Watson contends in

three issues that the evidence of bodily injury was legally insufficient to support her conviction,

that the trial court erred when it denied her requested lesser-included-offense instruction on

resisting arrest, and that the trial court erred when it overruled her objection for speculation to a

witness’s testimony. We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

                                        BACKGROUND

               On October 19, 2019, Deputy Matthew Hayles was responding to a wellness-

check call for a person reportedly passed out in a silver minivan. When he arrived, he did not

see a minivan but he saw a woman standing outside of a silver SUV. He later identified this

person as Watson.
               Deputy Hayles initially believed Watson was the caller of the wellness check and

rolled down his vehicle’s window when he passed her and asked if the SUV was her vehicle.

She responded, “Why are you messing with me?” and “Aren’t there other people you need to go

save?” Deputy Hayles started to drive away in search of the silver minivan when he heard a

woman screaming, looked in his rearview mirror, and saw Watson in the middle of the road,

which had a speed limit of 45 miles per hour.

               Concerned for her safety, Deputy Hayles returned to where Watson was in the

road. Deputy Hayles was joined by Deputy Roy Salazar, who was also in uniform and driving a

marked police car. Deputy Hayles testified that Watson was exhibiting mood swings that went

from being excited to crying and that at one point she stumbled backwards. The officers

confirmed that the vehicle was registered to her. Deputy Hayles walked around the vehicle,

smelled alcohol, and saw an open beer can in the center console. A third officer, Deputy Alyssa

Marley, arrived on the scene.

               At this point, Deputy Hayles believed that Watson was the person who was the

subject of the wellness call that reported a woman passed out in a vehicle. Deputy Hayles

attempted to help Watson find a sober ride but testified that she became increasingly aggressive

and uncooperative with the officers. At this point, the officers attempted to arrest Watson for

public intoxication.

               Deputy Hayles testified that when the other two officers attempted to handcuff

Watson, she refused to put her hands behind her back. The officers decided to “take her to the

ground.” From the ground, Watson rolled onto her back and kicked at the deputies. Deputy

Hayles testified that one of the other officers said, “don’t kick,” and then Deputy Hayles’s body

cam was kicked off him. Deputy Hayles testified that the officers completed the arrest by

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utilizing the “wrap system,” which is “a device used for violent, combative subjects that hampers

their movement.”

               Deputy Hayles testified that when Watson kicked him in the chest it caused him

physical pain. He rated that pain as a one on a ten-point scale and described the pain as “brief.”

On cross, Deputy Hayles agreed that he wrote in his police report, “The kick caused me brief

discomfort, a 1 on a pain scale from 1 to 10.” He clarified that even though he wrote that the

scale was from 1 to 10, the significance of choosing “1” rather than a “0” was because he felt

pain. On redirect, Deputy Hayles explained that when he wrote the report that the sheriff’s office

was using a 0-to-10 pain scale in assessing victim’s pain levels and that an answer of “1” would

indicate that a person felt physical pain and that he would make an arrest for assault based on a

response of “1.”

               Deputy Salazar and Deputy Marley both testified and corroborated Deputy

Hayles’s testimony. Deputy Salazar testified that he saw Watson kick Deputy Hayles and heard

Deputy Hayles grunt when kicked.

               After hearing all the evidence, the jury found Watson guilty of assault on a public

servant and assessed punishment at five years’ imprisonment. 1

                                         DISCUSSION

Legal Sufficiency

               In her first issue on appeal, Watson challenges the legal sufficiency of the

evidence to support her conviction.

       1  Watson was also charged with a second count of assault of a public servant for
allegedly kicking Deputy Salazar during the same arrest at issue here. However, the jury
acquitted Watson on that count and it is not at issue in this appeal.
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                “When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider

whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).      “This standard requires the appellate court to defer ‘to the

responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). “We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for

that of the factfinder.” Id.

                “[J]uries are not permitted to come to conclusions based on mere speculation or

factually unsupported inferences or presumptions.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007); see also Winfrey v. State, 323 S.W.3d 875, 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“[I]f

the evidence at trial raises only a suspicion of guilt, even a strong one, then that evidence is

insufficient.”); Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“If, given all of

the evidence, a rational jury would necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s

guilt, the due process guarantee requires that we reverse and order a judgment of acquittal.”).

“Speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence

presented.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16.

                Although factfinders “may not speculate about the meaning of facts or evidence,”

they are permitted to “draw any reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each inference is

supported by the evidence presented at trial.” See Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 733. “We presume that

the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and

we defer to that resolution.” Id. This is because factfinders are “the exclusive judges of the

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facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony.” Id. “Direct

evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone

may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating

circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Id.

                A person commits assault on a public servant by intentionally, knowingly, or

recklessly causing bodily injury to another person that the actor knows is a public servant while

the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty. Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(1).

“‘Bodily injury’ means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of the physical condition.” Id.

§ 1.07(a)(8).

                Watson contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove that Deputy

Hayles suffered “bodily injury” because his police report documented “brief discomfort” rather

than “pain” and noted that it was a “1” on a 1-to-10-point pain scale. Watson contends that

“brief discomfort” is “mere offensive touching” that does not rise to the level of “bodily injury.”

See Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (describing bodily injury as

including “even relatively minor physical contacts so long as they constitute more than mere

offensive touching”).

                We disagree. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to show that Deputy

Hayles suffered bodily injury. He testified that although the pain was brief, and that it was a “1”

out of 10 on the pain scale, he did feel pain. He clarified that the implication of him rating his

pain at a “1” and not a “0” was because he felt pain. Deputy Hayles also testified that the kick

knocked his body cam off his chest. Deputy Salazar testified that he saw Watson kick Deputy

Hayles and heard Deputy Hayles grunt in response to being kicked. Because pain is included in

the definition of bodily injury, see Tex. Penal Code § 1.07(a)(8), the evidence was sufficient to

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show bodily injury. Watson’s contention that it was only “offensive touching” because the

officer chose the lowest number possible on the pain scale and because the police report

described the result of the kick as “discomfort” is a disagreement with how the jury resolved

conflicts in the evidence and judged the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to

be given to the evidence. See Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 732 (requiring appellate courts to defer to

trier of fact to resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (applying deferential

standard to review of jury verdict).

                We overrule Watson’s first issue.

Lesser Included Offense

                In her second issue on appeal, Watson contends that the trial court erred when it

denied her request for a lesser-included-offense instruction for resisting arrest.

                We review the trial court’s decision to deny the inclusion of a lesser-included-

offense instruction for an abuse of discretion. Steele v. State, 490 S.W.3d 117, 126 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). When reviewing whether an instruction on a lesser included

offense should have been given to the jury, we apply a two-prong test. Cavazos v. State,

382 S.W.3d 377, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). First, we determine whether “the proof necessary

to establish the charged offense also includes the lesser offense.” Id. If we answer the first

inquiry affirmatively, we “must then consider whether the evidence shows that if the Appellant is

guilty, [s]he is guilty only of the lesser offense.” Id.

                We begin our analysis with the first prong: whether resisting arrest is a lesser

included offense of assault on a public servant. We review this first step de novo as “a question

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of law.” Id. To be a lesser included offense of the charged assault of a public servant offense,

resisting arrest must either: (1) be established by proof of the same or less facts required to

establish the commission of the offense charged; (2) differ only by requiring less serious injury

or risk of injury to the same person; (3) differ only by requiring a less culpable mental state; or

(4) be an attempt to commit the charged offense or another included offense. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. art. 37.09.

               We use the cognate-pleadings approach to determine whether the proposed lesser

included offense can be established by proof of the same or less facts required to establish the

commission of the offense charged. Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

“It does not depend on the evidence to be produced at the trial.” Id. Rather, it “must be, capable

of being performed before trial by comparing the elements of the offense as they are alleged in

the indictment or information with the elements of the potential lesser-included offense.” Id. at

535–36.    “[T]he elements of the lesser-included offense do not have to be pleaded in the

indictment if they can be deduced from facts alleged in the indictment.” Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at

383. To determine this, we use the “functional-equivalence concept,” in which we “examine the

elements of the lesser offense and decide whether they are functionally the same or less than

those required to prove the charged offense.” Id.

               Here, the indictment alleged that Watson “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly

cause[d] bodily injury to Deputy Hayles by kicking Deputy Hayles in the chest, and the

Defendant did then and there know that the said Deputy Hayles was then and there a public

servant, to-wit: a peace officer, and that the said Deputy Hayles was then and there lawfully

discharging an official duty, to wit, arresting the Defendant.”            See Tex. Penal Code

§ 22.01(a)(1), (b)(1) (listing elements of assault on public servant).

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                  As relevant here, resisting arrest, occurs when a person “intentionally prevents or

obstructs a person he knows is a peace officer . . . from effecting an arrest . . . of the actor . . . by

using force against the peace officer.” Id. § 38.03(a).

                  Comparing the elements, we conclude that the proposed lesser-included offense

contains at least one element that the charged offense as alleged in the indictment does not.

Resisting arrest contains the “prevents or obstructs” element, while the assault offense does not.

See Gilmore v. State, 44 S.W.3d 92, 96 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, pet. ref’d) (explaining that

“prevents or obstructs” element of resisting-arrest statute is “not functionally the same or

less than” any element of assault-on-public-servant statute); see also Wiethorn v. State,

No. 03-09-00036-CR, 2012 WL 753163, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 7, 2012, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (same). Additionally, “the assault offense includes a

reckless mental state whereas resisting arrest proscribes only intentional conduct.” Gilmore, 44

S.W.3d at 96. Thus, the State was not required to prove an intentional act. Rather, it could

prove a reckless intent. See Tex. Penal Code § 6.03 (defining intentional and reckless culpable

mental states).

                  In Hall, the Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that although the evidence

actually presented at trial may “show a number of other lesser offenses,” to be entitled to a

lesser-included-offense instruction, the proposed lesser-included offense’s elements must be

“established by the same or less than the proof required to prove the allegations in the

indictment.”      225 S.W.3d at 536–37 (emphasis added).           Thus, even though the evidence

presented at trial may have supported a finding that Watson intended to prevent or obstruct her

arrest, the State did not have to prove those elements as part of the charged offense.

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                Having concluded as a matter of law, that as pleaded in the indictment in this

case, assault on a public servant did not include resisting arrest as a lesser-included offense, we

do not reach the second prong of the analysis. See Cavazos 382 S.W.3d at 382 (describing first

prong as “threshold” and directing courts to address second prong only “if this threshold

is met”).

                We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing Watson’s

requested lesser-included-offense instruction. See Steele, 490 S.W.3d at 130. We overrule her

second issue.

Witness Testimony

                In her final issue, Watson contends that the trial court abused its discretion when

it overruled her objection to witness testimony based on speculation. Specifically, Watson

complains of the following exchange:

       A. I asked if that was her Lone Star. When I got my flashlight and was able to see inside
       of the vehicle, I observed an open Lone Star beer can inside the center console area.

       Q. And what was her answer to your question?

       A. She said, “No.”

       Q. Were you able to tell that there was, in fact, a Lone Star in that car, though?

       A. I did observe one.

       Q. Would deception of that kind of give you any additional concerns?

       A. Correct, just her overall behavior. From the moment that I stepped close to her car,
       she started yelling at me to get away from it or not look into it.

       Q. In your training or experience, could that be a tell of something?

       [Watson’s counsel]: Objection, calls for speculation.

                                                 9
        [State’s counsel]: Judge, I asked from his training and experience.

        THE COURT: Overruled.

        Q. [State’s counsel] You may answer the question. I can ask it again, if you remember it.

        A. I remember it. Yeah, it can be seen as a deceptive factor, leading me to believe that
        there may be something illegal inside the vehicle.

                Watson contends that the officer’s testimony was improper because the witness

was not designated as an expert witness in criminal behavior and because the testimony was not

based on reliable scientific evidence. See Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App.

1992) (explaining requirements for establishing that scientific evidence relied on by expert

witness is reliable). The State responds on appeal that the officer did not testify as an expert, but

rather as a lay witness. See Tex. R. Evid. 701(a) (allowing lay witness opinion testimony when

“rationally based on the witness’s perception”); Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2002) (“When a witness who is capable of being qualified as an expert testifies

regarding events which he or she personally perceived, the evidence may be admissible as both

Rule 701 opinion testimony and Rule 702 expert testimony.”). Watson limits her issue to

scientific reliability of expert testimony.

                The State, however, contends that Watson’s expert witness complaint was not

preserved. We agree. To preserve a claim for appellate review, there must generally be a timely,

specific objection that comports with the complaint on appeal as well as an adverse ruling from

the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012) (explaining that complaint on appeal must comport with objection at trial). Further,

the objection must state the relevant grounds for the complaint “with sufficient specificity to

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make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the

context.” Id. R. 33.1(a)(1)(A).

               Here, we conclude that Watson’s “calls for speculation” objection did not make

the trial court aware that she was complaining about the scientific reliability of the deputy’s

testimony, nor that she was complaining that the deputy had not been established as an expert

witness.   See Sartin v. State, 680 S.W.3d 663, 672 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2023, no pet.)

(concluding that objection “calls for speculation” did not identify reason question was believed

to be speculative, and thus, did not preserve the complaint for appellate review); Osbourn,

92 S.W.3d at 536 (“A person with specialized knowledge may testify about his or her own

observations under Rule 701 and may also testify about the theories, facts and data used in his or

her area of expertise under Rule 702.”). Because this complaint was not preserved for appellate

review, we do not reach the merits of this issue. See Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009) (explaining that if issue has not been preserved for appeal, court of appeals

should not address merits of that issue).

                                            CONCLUSION

               Because we have overruled Watson’s first and second issues and cannot reach her

third, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

                                              __________________________________________
                                              Gisela D. Triana, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Kelly

Affirmed

Filed: February 16, 2024

Do Not Publish

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