Court Opinion

ID: 9569442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:13:48.938078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:58:11.468881
License: Public Domain

ELDER, J.,
dissenting.
The Commonwealth stipulated that the replica used by appellant in the commission of the robberies was not designed to be an operable firearm capable of firing a projectile by any means. Therefore, I believe this Court’s decision in Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 548, 453 S.E.2d 303 (1995), compels the conclusion that the replica was not a “firearm” under Code § 18.2-53.1, and I respectfully dissent. Because I would reverse the conviction on these grounds, I would not reach the issue of whether appellant displayed the item in a threatening manner.
The evolution of the term “firearm” as used in Code § 18.2-53.1 has taken a peculiar course, as the Supreme Court has relaxed the quantum of proof needed to sustain a conviction. The Court shifted the focus away from the actual firing capability of the object to the “deterrence] of criminal conduct.” Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 196, 198, 269 S.E.2d 356, 358 (1980). However, the Court has limited this principle by requiring proof “that the accused actually had a firearm in his possession.... ” Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 215, 218, 441 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1994). Subsequent decisions have sustained convictions based solely on circumstantial evidence.4
*793In Sprouse, this Court acknowledged that the focus of “preventing actual physical injury or death” and “discourag[ing] criminal conduct that produces fear of physical harm” must give way where the evidence affirmatively proves that the instrument used during the commission of a felony was not a firearm. Sprouse, 19 Va.App. at 550, 453 S.E.2d at 305 (quoting Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 358). The object admitted into evidence provided such affirmative proof because “the Commonwealth conceded that it was a toy pistol.” Id. While convincing in appearance, the toy could not “expel a projectile by force of gunpowder” and thus could not be a firearm.5 Id.
Relying on Wubneh v. Commonwealth, 51 Va.App. 224, 656 S.E.2d 418 (2008), the majority attempts to distinguish the present case from Sprouse by stating that the replica “retains enough of its original parts that it has not lost its appearance as a firearm.” I disagree with this reasoning in several respects. First and foremost, the language the majority cites from Wubneh comes not from a principle of law grounded in existing precedent, but from a jury instruction given without objection that was determined to be the law of the case. While this Court analyzed the portion of the instruction relating to whether an instrument firing a projectile by spring mechanism or pneumatic pressure could be a firearm, it did not hold that appearance could overcome a lack of firing capability. See Wubneh, 51 Va.App. at 228, 656 S.E.2d at 420. Quite the opposite, it acknowledged that Sprouse provided a caveat to the physical appearance rule and held that the BB gun was “ ‘designed’ as a ‘weapon’ to ‘expel a projectile.’ ” Id. at 230 n. 5, 656 S.E.2d at 421 n. 5 (quoting Virginia Model Jury Instructions, Criminal No. 18.702). Thus, Wubneh did not hold that an object fell within the definition of “firearm” if it contained a certain quantity of original parts. The only *794pertinent analysis is whether the instrument had the capacity to fire a projectile.
Second, the majority’s factual characterization that the replica has firing capability contradicts the stipulated facts in the record. While an instrument that originally had the capability to fire a projectile does not later “los[e] its identity as a firearm,” Miller v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.App. 208, 213, 475 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1996), the replica used by appellant never had an identity as a firearm in the first place. The majority places too much weight on the description of the grip safety in the “Care and Handling Instructions” to infer that the replica had “firing capacity if the grip safety was compressed while the trigger is being squeezed.” This is merely a description of one feature of the replica that does not reconcile with the rest of the record. For example, the “Official Version of the Offense” states “because the weapon was a replica, the manufacturer did not include a firing pin or other mechanical device necessary to fire a projectile by explosion.” (Emphasis added). Moreover, the Care and Handling Instructions, while referring to the grip safety, clearly indicate that the “recreation will not permit chambering or firing of ammunition.” When viewed as a whole, the record does not suggest that the manufacturer altered an existing weapon capable of firing a projectile.6 Rather, this language indicates that the replica was designed from its inception to lack a firing pin, and thus never capable of firing a projectile, whether by explosion of gunpowder, spring mechanism, or pneumatic pressure.
Finally, the majority seems to suggest that the replica’s appearance is more important than its actual firing capability or lack thereof. This is plainly contrary to the holding in *795Sprouse. While victim perception and physical appearance can provide compelling circumstantial evidence that the defendant used a firearm, Sprouse’s holding is limited to situations where the alleged instrument is not introduced into evidence. Where the instrument is provided to the fact finder, or the parties stipulate to its description, circumstantial evidence cannot overcome direct proof that the instrument is not, or never was, capable of firing a projectile. See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 681, 686-87, 492 S.E.2d 460, 468 (1997) (holding that an item’s visual appearance can be evidence it is a firearm where the instrument in question actually has the ability to fire projectiles).
For these reasons, I would hold that the evidence is insufficient to prove that the replica used by appellant in the commission of the robberies was a firearm under Code § 18.2-53.1. Thus, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of appellant’s convictions.

. Although the Court initially forbade conviction based solely on a victim's perception that the perpetrator possessed a firearm, see Yarborough, 247 Va. at 219-20, 441 S.E.2d at 344, it has subsequently held a conviction may be based upon circumstantial evidence that the perpetrator possessed a firearm, including evidence of the victim's belief or perception that the accused had a firearm, Powell v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 233, 237, 602 S.E.2d 119, 121 (2004); McBride v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 603, 605, 484 S.E.2d 165, 166 (1997), the accused's representations, Elmore v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 424, 430, 470 S.E.2d 588, 590 (1996), and the instrument's physical appearance, Thomas v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 681, 687, 492 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1997).

. Of course, an instrument capable of firing a projectile by a method other than explosion of gunpowder is also a firearm. See, e.g., Holloman, 221 Va. at 197, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (spring-loaded BB gun); Wubneh v. Commonwealth, 51 Va.App. 224, 226, 656 S.E.2d 418, 419 (2008) (gas-propelled BB gun).

. The Official Version of the Offense and the Care and Handling Instructions are silent as to whether the replica was modified from an operational firearm or merely a non-operational facsimile. The parties chose not to introduce expert opinion testimony regarding the replica or even the replica itself to clarify the evidence. We must therefore base our analysis on the descriptions provided, keeping in mind that “ambiguity or reasonable doubt as to the meaning of a penal statute must be resolved in favor of an accused[.]“ Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357.