Court Opinion

ID: 9760849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:19:39.754262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:18.087847
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority’s construction of the promiscuity defense statute reaches a result the legislature surely did not intend. I would apply the plain meaning rule to this defense and conclude it has no limitations. I would hold the complainant’s prior promiscuous conduct is admissible, and its exclusion was error. Because the error was not harmless, I would reverse.
APPLICABLE LAW
1. The Defense
The prior promiscuous sexual conduct of a child was a defense to prosecution for sexual assault of a child if that child was fourteen years or older when the offense occurred. See Act of June 19,1983, 68th Leg., R.S., eh. 977, § 3, 1983 Tex.Gen.Laws 5312, 5314 (amended 1993) (current version at TexPe-nal Code Ann. § 22.011 (Vernon Supp.1994)).
2. Statutory Construction
When we interpret statutes, we seek to carry out the collective intent of the legisla*795tors. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). We construe words according to their plain meaning. Ward v. State, 829 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Where the statute is clear and unambiguous, we understand the legislature to mean what it has expressed. We do not add or subtract from the statute. Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785. We will not strain the plain meaning to give the statute a desirable reading. Smith v. State, 789 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).
If a statute is susceptible to more than one construction, we interpret it to secure the purpose or benefit the legislature intended. Ward, 829 S.W.2d at 791. We assume the legislature intended a just and reasonable result. Campbell v. State, 644 S.W.2d 154, 165 (Tex.App.—Austin 1982), pet. ref'd, 647 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). If it is reasonable to interpret a statute in two different ways, we may consider the result of differing interpretations in deciding which interpretation to adopt. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 244 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 116, 126 L.Ed.2d 82 (1993). If one reasonable interpretation yields absurd results and another does not, we prefer the latter interpretation. Muniz, 851 S.W.2d at 244.
3. Standard of Review
a. Exclusion of Evidence
We reverse a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence only if the trial court abused its discretion. Holloway v. State, 751 S.W.2d 866, 870 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). A trial court abuses its discretion when its “decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.” Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 3046, 125 L.Ed.2d 731 (1993). If we decide the trial court erred, we next decide whether that error was harmless. Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 905 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).
b. Harm Analysis
We reverse the trial court’s judgment if the record reveals error, unless we determine beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment. Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2). When we conduct a harm analysis, we must: (1) isolate the error and all of its effects; and (2) determine whether a juror might have reached a different result if the error and its effects had not resulted. Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 588 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).
If the error was such that it disrupted the juror’s orderly evaluation of evidence, no matter how overwhelming the evidence might have been, we must reverse the conviction. Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 588. However, we cannot properly evaluate the error’s impact without examining its interaction with other evidence. Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 686. Unless overwhelming evidence dissipates the error’s effect upon the jury’s function in determining the facts so that it did not contribute to the verdict, then the error is harmful. Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 587.
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
1. The Majority’s Position
The majority cites a case law definition of the word “promiscuity” and concludes promiscuous behavior is necessarily consensual. The majority then relies on the Court of Criminal Appeals’ construing the sexual assault statute to mean victims under age fourteen are legally incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse. See Hernandez v. State, 651 S.W.2d 746, 753 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). The majority then in effect concludes that defendants who choose victims over age fourteen who engaged in sexual activity before age fourteen can never use the promiscuity defense.
Under the majority’s construction, a defendant who sexually assaults a victim two days past her fourteenth birthday may use as a defense any promiscuous behavior in which the victim engaged during the two days since she turned fourteen. That same defendant, however, cannot use as a defense any promiscuous behavior in which the victim engaged three or more days before the assault. This tortured interpretation leads to a result the legislature surely did not intend. The legislature could not intend to give an accused a *796defense, but disallow any evidence to support that defense.
Here, the victim became sexually active at age twelve. She became fourteen on April 8, 1993. The offense occurred on June 5, 1993. Under the majority’s interpretation, appellant could use as a defense only evidence of the complainant’s sexual activity occurring between April 8, 1993 and June 5, 1993. Appellant could not use evidence of her sexual activity in the two years before her fourteenth birthday. The majority adds a limitation to the statute the legislature did not provide.
The legislature could easily have restricted the statute by providing that the promiscuity defense does not apply where the victim was between the ages of fourteen and seventeen and the promiscuous behavior on which the defendant relies occurred before the victim reached age fourteen. The majority strains the plain meaning of the statute to achieve the majority’s desired result. To refuse to admit the victim’s promiscuous sexual conduct before she turned fourteen negates the defense in its entirety for some defendants. This interpretation is not reasonable and could not have been the legislature’s intention.
2. The Dissent’s Position
a. Statutory Construction
Under the plain meaning of the statute, I would hold that the legislature intended the statute to provide a defense to the offense of sexual assault of a child if the child: (1) was fourteen years of age or older when the offense occurred; and (2) engaged in consensual sexual conduct before the offense, whether before or after the child’s fourteenth birthday. The majority’s interpretation ignores the plain meaning of the statute. The majority’s interpretation does not lead to a just and reasonable result. Had the legislature, aware of the statutory scheme for sexual assault offenses against children, intended the result the majority reaches, it could have limited the statute. We are not at liberty to add the limitation. I would hold the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the complainant’s sexual activity before her fourteenth birthday.
b. Harm Analysis
At trial, the complainant admitted to voluntary sexual intercourse with appellant. The State explained in its brief that it proceeded under section 22.011(a)(2) because the alleged sexual assault was consensual. Appellant’s only defensive theory was the promiscuity defense in section 22.011(d). The trial court refused to allow evidence of appellant’s only defensive theory. If that evidence had been before the jury, it might have reached a different result. Because the error may have contributed to appellant’s conviction, exclusion of the evidence of the complainant’s prior promiscuous conduct was harmful. Accordingly, I would reverse this cause and remand it for a new trial.