Court Opinion

ID: 9778127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:33:42.949954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:03.984645
License: Public Domain

SEILER, Judge,
dissenting.
This is one of those cases where we must bear in mind that “[Njothing we write . can bring back the victim of this tragedy” and that its emotional aspects “do not qualify our obligation to apply the law with the eye to' the future”, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (Stevens, J. concurring), realizing also that it is “equally important that the police, as guardians of the law, fulfill their responsibility to obey its commands scrupulously”, Brewer, supra, at 407, 97 S.Ct. at 1244, (Marshall, J. concurring).
There are two constitutional rights here which the police deliberately and successfully played against each other: the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. By falsely assuring defendant that he could not be convicted on his confession alone (well knowing that they had ample evidence elsewhere of the corpus de-licti), thus inducing a belief that he would not incriminate himself by confessing, the police at the same time encouraged defendant to waive his right to counsel, as there would be no reason to wait for counsel’s advice before speaking if by speaking he would not incriminate himself.
It was clear from the beginning that defendant did not himself know a lawyer to call, but that he had a friend, Greg Woods, who did know some good lawyers and that defendant would decide from talking with Woods whom to call. Many persons, especially in walks of life where resort to a lawyer is something strange and unusual, select a lawyer by obtaining a recommendation from a friend who knows a good lawyer. All lawyers know this to be true. This is what defendant was trying to do here and the police knew it. Corporal Buesing knew it and so did the sheriff, both of whom were key figures in the interrogation of defendant in violation of his constitutional rights. Defendant’s halting attempts and starts toward obtaining a lawyer through the help of a friend were effectively neutralized by the police disregarding his obvious desires while at the same time giving him self-serving advice on the value of his Fifth Amendment interests.
The principal opinion disposes of this by saying that even if trickery were involved it does not follow that defendant’s reply was involuntary and hence inadmissible. But this ignores the fact that even if the response were voluntary, it was brought about by indirectly persuading defendant to forego consulting with counsel and that is not permissible under Brewer v. Williams, supra, which is the leading and most recent opinion on this point by the United States Supreme Court and which is not explained or distinguished in the principal opinion. It makes no difference whether it was voluntary or not, Brewer v. Williams, supra. In Brewer the Court found it unnecessary to consider whether the incriminating statements were involuntary because in any event the judgment granting a new trial had to be affirmed on the ground defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel. Id. at 397-98, 97 S.Ct. 1232.
What the police did in the case before us was improperly to qualify defendant’s belief that he needed a lawyer and then proceed to use this to obtain as much incriminating information as they could.
I therefore respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand.