Court Opinion

ID: 9866745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 13:44:22.801511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:31.899142
License: Public Domain

Miller, J.—[Dissenting.]
The defendant was tried and convicted on March 30, 1876, for obtaining the sum of $575 from one W. H. Meeker by false pretenses. The indictment charged that the defendant, on the day named, represented that he had previously bought for the said Meeker one hundred shares of the capital stock of the Hew York Central and Hudson Biver Bailroad Company, and that he then and there held the said stock for the benefit of the said Meeker; that the stock had been purchased on a margin, by paying a part of the purchase price; and that the defendant still had it, to be delivered to Meeker on the receipt of the balance of the purchase price. The indictment then alleged that Meeker, believing said false piretenses and representations, was induced thereby to deliver to the defendant the $575 before named, and also other sums of money, aggregating over $8,000, whereas in truth and fact, although the defendant had, at Meeker’s request, bought this stock for Meeker’s account on April 9, 1873, yet he had sold it on March 11, 1874, without informing Meeker, but on the contrary falsely pretended and represented, and particularly on the day named, that he still held the stock and would deliver the same over to Meeker when he h?„d paid to him the balance of the purchase price thereof, and that these pretenses were false and untrue, which was known to the defendant at the time of making the same. The counsel for the defendant claims that the conviction was erroneous upon the ground that no case was made out establishing that the money was obtained by false and fradulent pretences. The alleged false ■pretense was that the defendant had represented that he had purchased, and that, at the time when the money was paid, he held for Meeker one hundred shares of the capital stock of the New York Central Railroad Company. There was evidence upon the trial which established an agreement between Meeker and the defendant in March, 1873, by which Meeker was to send the defendant the sum of two thousand dollars, *233upon receipt of which defendant was to buy for Meeker one hundred shares of the stocks named and. hold the same until Meeker had sent him the whole purchase price. After this time money was sent to the defendant by Meeker in different amounts, in reliance on the defendant’s promise to purchase the stock, and to hold the same, when the two thousand dollars had been furnished.
On April 9,1873, the defendant' informed Meeker by letter that he had bought for him one hundred shares of Mew York Central stock at a cost of $10,175.80, and'inclosed in the letter a statement to that effect. Meeker continued making payments on account of the stock, and up to March 30, 1876, when the payment was made for the obtaining of which the defendant was indicted, had paid $6,633.72. During this period the defendant wrote to Meeker stating that he had credited him with the dividends on the stock and stating the amount thereof, and also, on March 15,1875, sent him a statement of the sums received from him, which, exclusive of dividends, amounted to $5,233.27. In January, 1876, defendant sent Meeker another statement, which he declared to be Meeker’s credits from January, 1875, to January, 1876, and which contained five items of dividends received by him and credited to Meeker, amounting to the sum of $1,000 in that single year. The money sent to defendant was paid by Meeker, as he testifies, in reliance upon the representations made by the defendant that he had purchased the stock and in the belief that he held it for him. The correspondence up to .March 8, 1879, clearly showed that defendant held the stock for Meeker. While thus treating the stock as belonging to Meeker, the proof shows that the defendant had sold the same on March 11, 1874, and that, between that time and the time he received the $575 stated in the indictment, although he had credited the dividends as already stated, he had in fact only received a single dividend on the stock. The statements made, already referred to, were representations to the effect that the defendant still held the stock: they were relied upon by Meeker, as he positively testifies, and he parted with his money in the belief that they were true. They were utterly false, as the defendant had sold the stock before the money stated in the indictment was obtained from Meeker. In good faith and in common honesty, before he received any *234more money from Meeker, the defendant was bound to disclose to him that he no longer held the stock after he had sold the same, and in failing to do this he deceived and defrauded Meeker. Had Meeker understood that he no longer held the stock it is not unreasonable to suppose that he never would have parted with his money. His evidence shows that he paid his money in entire reliance upon the fact that the stock was held by the defendant for his benefit. It is also a fair inference, to be drawn from the evidence, that the representations were made for the purpose of obtaining the money of Meeker with an intent to defraud.
It is further shown that, after the money was obtained for which the indictment was found, Meeker continued his payments, in ignorance of the sale until he had paid the defendant the full amount due for the one hundred shares of stock in 1877; that he never received any stock; and that the defendant became insolveut and utterly unable to pay back the money he had obtained from him. It is also shown that in November, 1879, defendant stated to Meeker, in the presence of one Converse, that he had never bought a dollar’s worth of stock for him, .and afterwards, on the December 5, 1879, the defendant wrote to said Converse, sending him a statement of his business with Meeker, and saying that he had bought for Meeker in his own name the stock in question. The evidence on the part of the defendant tended to show, and it was claimed established, that the arrangement between Meeker and the defendant was a mere speculation ; that Meeker was'to furnish a $2,000 margin and Baker was to carry the stock in his own name, as Meeker did not wish to have his name known in the transaction; that after ■ the purchase was made the remaining moneys sent to Baker were to be used by him in speculating in other stocks, and the profits and the moneys sent were to be applied toward paying in full the stock purchased first, and that the whole transaction was left to Baker’s judgment with an unlimited right to buy and sell. The defendant’s counsel further insists that the testimony of the prosecutor, on cross-examination, shows that he relied solely on defendant’s promise to deliver the stock to him when paid for. Although Meeker testified to that effect, his evidence must be considered *235in connection witli liis statement, upon direct examination, that he relied upon the fact that the defendant had purchased and held the stock for him. Admitting' that his last statement differs from the first, both were to be considered by the jury in view of the ignorance of Meeker as to stock transactions, and there was sufficient to justify the jury in the conclusion that Meeker relied, and paid the money, stated in the indictment, upon the representation that the stock had been purchased and was at the time held by the defendant for his benefit. It must be borne in mind in this connection that Meeker may well have relied upon the promise to purchase, the stock until the purchase was actually made, and if it never had been made, there would have been no false pretense, but after it was made and he was advised, from time to time, by Baker’s statements, that lie-held the stock, he had a right to rely upon such statements in making payments upon the same. Conceding that some portion of the above testimony established the defendant’s version of the transaction and tended to show that no false representations were actually made, we think the most that can be claimed for it is that there was a conflict in the evidence in regard to the actual facts, and the question whether the money, stated in the indictment, was obtained from Meeker by the false and fraudulent representations of Baker, that he had purchased the stock and held the same at the time of the payment of the $575 was for the consideration of the jury. .*
As the case stands, there is certainly no ground for claiming that as a matter of law no false representations were made ; and at most there was only a promise on the part of the defendant to purchase the stock, and, when the whole amount of money had been paid which was required for that purpose, to deliver the scrip for the same to Meeker.
It is insisted that no representations were made by the defendant at the time when the money was paid, and that the defendant, by his agreement with Meeker, was to give credit for the dividends on the stock. The answer to this position is, that the evidence does not establish that the defendant was to credit Meeker with the dividends as if actuality paid, without a purchase of the stock, and it does not appear that either de*236fendant or Meeker so understood the arrangement. On the contrary, the statements already referred to indicate, beyond any question, that the defendant treated the matter throughout as if he held the stock for Meeker and had credited him from time to time with dividends, when, in fact, the stock had actually been sold and no dividends received therefrom. Although there were no personal representations at the time, yet tlie written statements and correspondence evince beyond any controversy that many representations were made that the defend-' ant held stock belonging to Meeker, when the truth was, he had sold and disposed of the same after having purchased it for Meeker. The representations actually made amounted to more than a mere concealment of the fact that the defendant had disposed of the stock, and it is no answer to the allegation that they were made, to say that the failure to inform Meeker that he had sold the stock was of no importance to him so long as the defendant remained solvent; for it is a fair and reasonable assumption that, as Meeker relied upon the purchase of the stock for him and the security furnished thereby, he would not have parted with his money upon the mere personal responsibility of Baker alone. There is no force in the argument of the appellant’s counsel that the statements and the correspondence do not evince that the stock was held by Baker for the benefit of Meeker, and that they furnish no ground for claiming that any false pretense was made, in regard to the same. The time which elapsed from tile last communication received by Baker from Meeker is no valid reason for the contention that no representations were actually made. The question arising in consequence of the silence of the parties and the failure of any communication between them between the two dates referred to, and the effect produced thereby, was for the consideration of the jury, and furnishes no ground for claiming that no false representations could have been made. The claim that if fraud was committed the defendant was only guilty of a fraudulent concealment of facts, is not well supported. There was more than a suppression of the truth in the conduct of the defendant. The representations conveyed by his statements and correspondence, that he was in receipt of the dividends on the stock, were direct and positive assertions that he still held *237the same under the alleged arrangement made with Meeker for his benefit, and without which there is every reason to believe such payments would not have been made. Where a party holds property, purchased for the benefit of another, upon which payments have been made under an agreement that the party will hold the same on account of the purchaser and apply moneys received from him in payment of the purchase price, and by his representations conveys the idea that he still holds the property after he has in fact parted with the title thereto, and he receives money on account thereof, he is not in a position to claim that such money was not received under the false pretenses that he still held the property, and that the concealment of the sale relieves him from that charge.
The defendant insists that the court erred in not allowing him to answer the question whether his intention was to defraud when he received money from time to time from Meeker. The court allowed the defendant to answer as to his intention to defraud Meeker when he received the $575 for the obtaining of which he was indicted. This is the extent to which the rule, authorizing parties to testify as to their intent, has ever been carried. There is no authority allowing a party to give evidence of this description as to his general intention in regard to matters which are outside of the particular issue which is upon trial. Where he is tried upon an indictment charging him with fraudulent pretenses he has a right specially to deny the charge and to testify that he Jiad no intention to defraud at the time. The decisions of this court have never gone beyond what the defendant was allowed to state upon the trial of the charge made in the indictment against him. Any other rule would open the door very wide for the examination of matters in regard to which no specific charge was made and would not aid the defendant. The prosecution only had a right to claim an intent to defraud in reference to the specific sum named in the indictment and the defendant was only authorized to contradict such intent in respect to this charge. It follows that there was no error in the exclusion of the evidence offered. It is also insisted that the court erred in allowing the prosecution to prove that the defendant owed another clergyman. The defendant had previously been cross-examined *238in reference to his general indebtedness and as to what he owed upon the 250 shares of stock of the H. Y. C. R. R. Co. which he held at one time, and was then asked how much he owed Mrs. Kimball in 1872, and he answered, he thought about $500. He then said he could not recollect as to the amount he owed in 1874, and that as to 1877 he could not come any nearer than $500, and that he thought he owed him nothing in 1873. He was then asked how much he owed him in 1879, and an objection was made that the question was incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, the objection was overruled and exception taken and the witness answered $600 or $700. Ho objection-was made to the evidence on the ground that Kimball was a clergyman, and the evidence was manifestly introduced for the purpose of showing the condition of the affairs of the defendant at the time referred to. For this purpose we think it was properly received. Hor was any error committed in the exclusion of the evidence offered by tlie defendant that at the time the payment of $575 was made, on March 30, 1876, the defendant was in a condition -to have delivered to Meeker his 100 shares of Hew York Central stock provided it had been paid for by Meeker. ' The offer related to the pecuniary responsibility of the defendant at the time named, and was too broad in its scope. Meeker was not bound to pay for the stock at this time, and did not offer to do so, and the offer to show that he could deliver the stock if it had been paid for assumed that Meeker might have done what was not required of him and could have no effect in relieving the defendant from the consequences of the alleged false pretense. The money was obtained upon the representation that he had purchased and held the 'stock, when the truth was he did not have the stock when the money was obtained but had sold and converted the same to his own use. -It was therefore immaterial whether he could have obtained and furnished other stock at the time named.
The other points made in regard to the admission or rejection of evidence offered are sufficiently considered in the opinion of the General Term and do not require special examination.
Several requests were made to charge the jury by the defendant’s counsel, which were refused and exceptions taken to the rulings in regard thereto. We are unable to see that any *239error was committed by the court in respect to any of them. The most important of these was the request to charge that if the jury find that Baker’s intent at the time the alleged $575 was received by him to transfer -to him any 100 shares of New York Central stock after it had been paid for by Meeker, they must acquit the prisoner, no matter what his subsequent intent may have been. We think it is not material whether when the defendant received the $575, he entertained the idea of transferring to Meeker some 100 shares of said stock when it should be paid for, without regard to the stock which he had purchased for Meeker and had converted to his own use. The evidence offered would be exceedingly vague and would not furnish any light upon the question whether he entertained an intent to defraud Meeker when the false pretence was made. If a party obtain money from another by false and fradulent pretenses it is no answer to the charge established that he intended at the time in some way or at some other time to indemnify the party defrauded. The real question is whether by the false pretenses actually made lie intended to obtain the money paid to him, and not what he meant to do at a future day. It should also be observed that there was no evidence upon the trial which tended to sustain the claim made by the request.
The request to charge that the jury, in determining whether or not Meeker acted upon or was influenced by the representations made by Baker in parting with his money, have no right to consider the evidence as to Baker’s fradulent intent or as to his false representations was also properly refused for ,the reasons stated in the opinion of the General Term. The distinction existing between the case at bar and the case of Therasson v. People (82 N. Y. 242) which is relied upon as authority for the rule laid down in the request, is there distinctly pointed out, and concurring in the views there expressed a further discussion of the subject is not required. The other requests to charge do not demand a special consideration. After a careful examination of the various questions raised, we are of the opinion that no error was committed upon the trial and that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed.
Ruger, Ch. J., and Andrews, J., concur.