Court Opinion

ID: 9790470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:53:29.32797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.732167
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J .
I concur in the result. Any error that the superior court may have committed by quashing the subpoenas duces tecum that defendant served on the psychotherapists for the records of their treatment of his former foster daughter does not require reversal. Even if such error should violate the United States Constitution, it would be subject to review under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065], and would pass scrutiny thereunder: Defendant sought the records in question to raise a reasonable doubt whether he had in fact engaged in sexual activity with the girl; subsequently, on the witness stand, he admitted he had.
Beyond the result, however, I do not concur. Without warrant, the majority sweep away what had heretofore been settled law in California—law that was articulated in Presiding Justice Puglia’s opinion for a unanimous court in People v. Reber (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 523 [223 Cal.Rptr. 139] (hereafter sometimes Reber), and was subsequently applied in such decisions as People *1129v. Boyette (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1527 [247 Cal.Rptr. 795], Rubio v. Superior Court (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1343 [249 Cal.Rptr. 419], and People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 282].
Reber holds that a state law evidentiary privilege, like that for communications between psychotherapist and patient, may have to yield to a defendant’s right under-the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against him—which includes a right physically to face such adverse witnesses and a right to subject them to cross-examination (Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 18-19 [106 S.Ct. 292, 293-294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15] (per curiam)).
To the extent that Reber's rule controls the presentation of evidence at trial, it is compelled by Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308 [94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347] (hereafter sometimes Davis). There, the defendant was charged in state court with crimes including burglary. Prior to trial, the state court issued a protective order on the prosecution’s motion prohibiting the questioning of one of its key witnesses concerning both his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent for an unrelated burglary and also his status as a probationer at the time of the burglary with which defendant was charged, evidence of such matters being generally inadmissible under state law in order to preserve the confidentiality of the juvenile delinquent’s record. At trial, on direct examination, the witness inculpated the defendant. On cross-examination, however, he himself was shielded by the protective order. The defendant was convicted. On appeal, the state supreme court affirmed. But, on certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. It held that the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation—which entailed a “right” to conduct the “effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness” and, at bottom, reflected a “right... to seek out the truth in the process of defending himself’ (id. at p. 320 [94 S.Ct. at p. 1112]); The defendant was entitled to attempt to show that the witness was biased because of his vulnerable status as a probationer and his concern that he might be a suspect in the charged burglary; such entitlement was paramount to the state’s interest in preserving the confidentiality of a juvenile delinquent’s record.
To the extent that Reber's rule controls the discovery of information and material prior to trial, it is supported by Davis' s rationale. Under Davis, as stated, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation entails a “right” to conduct the “effective cross-examination . . . of . . . adverse witnesses]” and, at bottom, reflects a “right... to seek out the truth in the process of defending himself.” (Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at p. 320 [94 S.Ct. at p. 1112].) Although he may happen to cross-examine an adverse witness only in the course of trial, to do so effectively he may have to *1130undertake preparations long before. More generally, to defend himself meaningfully, he must usually seek out the truth immediately: He cannot wait until the cause is called to trial. (See People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 879 [277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906].) Reber acknowledges the distinction between the presentation of evidence at trial and the discovery of information and material prior thereto. But this “distinction,” it explains, “is one without a difference. The exercise of the power of a trial court to provide for discovery in criminal cases is consistent with ‘ “the fundamental proposition that [the accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.” ’ . . . One of the legitimate goals of discovery is to obtain information ‘ “for possible use to impeach or cross-examine an adverse witness . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Reber, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 531.)
The majority sweep all this away. To be precise, they do not touch Reber's holding that a state law evidentiary privilege may have to yield to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation at trial. They cannot: It is compelled by Davis. Rather, they disapprove Reber's holding that such a privilege may have to give way to this right in pretrial discovery. Their result is wrong as a matter of practicality. Although they should have continued to promote the “orderly ascertainment of the truth” through disclosure prior to trial (Jones v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 56, 60 [22 Cal.Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919, 96 A.L.R.2d 1213]), they choose instead to ensure the opposite by effectively delaying disclosure until after trial commences and then requiring continuances as they become necessary, as indeed they will. Worse still, their result is wrong as a matter of principle. They do not disapprove Reber's holding because they conclude that it is wrong. Rather, they do so because the United States Supreme Court has not yet concluded that it is right. They rely on Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39 [107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40]. Which means that they rely on nothing. There, Justice Powell expressed the view that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is a “trial right,” and not a “constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery.” (Id. at p. 52 [107 S.Ct. at p. 999] (plur. opn. by Powell, J.), italics in original.) He did not command a majority. For their part, Justice Blackmun and Justice Brennan each expressed a view to the contrary. (Id. at pp. 61-65 [107 S.Ct. at pp. 1003-1005] (conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.); id. at pp. 66-72 [107 S.Ct. at pp. 1006-1009] (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).) Like Justice Powell, neither commanded a majority, nor did both together. It should hardly need mention that “[w]e are under a solemn obligation to interpret and implement the United States Constitution” (People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 449, fn. 1 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 886 P.2d 1193] (cone, and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.))—especially when, as here, the United States Supreme Court has itself defaulted. “We are no less capable of discharging *1131that duty than any other court. We ‘should disabuse [ourselves] of the notion that in matters of constitutional law and criminal procedure we must always play Ginger Rogers to the high court’s Fred Astaire—always following, never leading.’ ” ( Ibid., quoting People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 557-558 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037] (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
And so, the majority, in effect, leave to another day the question whether a state law evidentiary privilege may have to yield to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in pretrial discovery. That day may not come until the United States Supreme Court happens to give an answer. Unless, that is, this court should accept its responsibility to address the matter even in the absence of word from Washington.