Court Opinion

ID: 9378236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 19:07:25.767905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:19.716422
License: Public Domain

J-S39021-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 DONALD WAYNE BOWMAN                       :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :    No. 578 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 22, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-18-CR-0000090-2018

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 DONALD WAYNE BOWMAN                       :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :    No. 579 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 22, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-18-CR-0000400-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                         FILED MARCH 09, 2023

      Appellant, Donald Wayne Bowman, appeals from the post-conviction

court’s March 22, 2022 orders denying his timely-filed petition under the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. On appeal, Appellant

primarily raises claims challenging the effective assistance of his trial counsel.

After careful review, we affirm.
J-S39021-22

      On direct appeal, this Court summarized the facts of Appellant’s case as

follows:

      On December 23, 2016, the victims, Brenda Younkin (“Younkin”)
      and Megan Byrnes (“Byrnes”),1 were traveling southbound on
      Coudersport Pike, in Lock Haven, Pennsylvania, when Appellant,
      who was traveling northbound on the same road, veered into their
      lane and crashed head on into their vehicle. Upon arrival to the
      scene of the accident, Corporal Jeffrey Hildebrand observed that
      Appellant exhibited signs of intoxication. Both Younkin and Byrnes
      suffered serious injuries as a result of the accident.
           1   Byrnes’s minor son was also in the vehicle.

Commonwealth            v.   Bowman,     No.   352    MDA     2020,   unpublished

memorandum at *1-2 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 7, 2021).

      Appellant was arrested and charged with various offenses in two

separate cases that were consolidated before trial. On October 3, 2019, he

proceeded to a jury trial, at the close of which he was convicted of two counts

of aggravated assault by vehicle while driving under the influence (DUI), 75

Pa.C.S. § 3735.1(a), aggravated assault by vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732.1, DUI-

general impairment, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802, careless driving, 75 Pa.C.S. §

3714(a), and reckless driving, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736.            He was sentenced on

December 6, 2019, to an aggregate term of 54 to 136 months’ incarceration.

He filed a timely notice of appeal, and this Court affirmed his judgment of

sentence on January 7, 2021. See id. Appellant did not file a petition for

allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court.

      On August 13, 2021, Appellant filed a timely, counseled PCRA petition.

The court thereafter conducted an evidentiary hearing and, on March 22,

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2022, it issued an order denying Appellant’s petition. He filed a timely notice

of appeal at each of his two, separate docket numbers, and this Court

thereafter consolidated his appeals sua sponte.

      Herein, Appellant states five issues for our review:

      I. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by denying
      [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel was ineffective for
      stipulating to the [blood alcohol content (BAC)] results, where
      such stipulation admitted a central element of the DUI charges
      and therefore failed to require the Commonwealth to prove an
      important element of its case, which had a spillover effect on the
      other charges?

      II. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by denying
      [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel was ineffective for
      stipulating to the BAC evidence when he apparently
      misunderstood its import on the introduction of the
      Commonwealth’s expert witness testimony from its forensic
      toxicologist?

      III. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by
      denying [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel was ineffective
      for failing to file a motion to recuse the Clinton County District
      Attorney’s office and/or failing to request that the trial court
      conduct an inquiry into an actual or potential conflict with the
      district attorney’s office when his prior attorney in the case
      withdrew to join the same district attorney’s office prosecuting
      him?

      IV. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by denying
      [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that trial counsel was ineffective for
      providing deficient advice regarding accepting an advantageous
      plea agreement?

      V. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by denying
      [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that his due process rights to a fair trial
      were violated when the court failed to dismiss the jury panel after
      prejudicial unsworn statements by a potential juror irretrievably
      tainted the impartiality of the jury?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

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      Before delving into Appellant’s issues, we note that “[t]his Court’s

standard of review from the grant or denial of post-conviction relief is limited

to examining whether the lower court’s determination is supported by the

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v.

Morales, 701 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v.

Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 356 n.4 (Pa. 1995)). Where, as here, a petitioner

claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, our Supreme Court

has stated that:

      [A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by
      a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence
      resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the
      circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
      determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
      innocence could have taken place.”             Generally, counsel’s
      performance is presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and
      counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing
      by the petitioner. To obtain relief, a petitioner must demonstrate
      that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency
      prejudiced the petitioner. A petitioner establishes prejudice when
      he demonstrates “that there is a reasonable probability that, but
      for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
      would have been different.”        … [A] properly pled claim of
      ineffectiveness posits that: (1) the underlying legal issue has
      arguable merit; (2) counsel’s actions lacked an objective
      reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice befell the petitioner
      from counsel’s act or omission.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532-33 (Pa. 2009) (citations

omitted).

      Appellant first contends that his trial counsel, Patrick Johnson, Esq.,

acted ineffectively by stipulating that Appellant had a BAC that was .15%,

which was almost twice the legal limit.    Appellant maintains that counsel’s

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stipulating to his BAC level essentially conceded Appellant’s guilt to the DUI-

general impairment charge he faced, and it also admitted an essential element

of the charge of aggravated assault while DUI.

      At the PCRA hearing, Attorney Johnson testified that his strategy in

stipulating to Appellant’s BAC was two-fold. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 12/2/21,

at 22. First, he “didn’t want to call the jury’s attention to it” by having the

jury hear hours of evidence regarding Appellant’s high level of intoxication.

Id. Instead, counsel wanted the jury to “pay attention to … the circumstances

of the accident” rather than “fixating” on Appellant’s high BAC and the victims’

injuries.   Id.   Second, Attorney Johnson testified that he believed that, in

exchange for the BAC stipulation, the Commonwealth would not call several

expert witnesses to the stand, including the phlebotomist, a chain of custody

expert, and the toxicologist. Id. at 23. However, despite the stipulation, the

Commonwealth still called the toxicologist to the stand in order to present his

expert opinion that a person with a .15% BAC would be unable to safely

operate a motor vehicle. See N.T. Trial, 10/3/19, at 131.

      On appeal, Appellant claims that Attorney Johnson’s “gloss over

approach” to his BAC was “plainly deficient,” as it “was simply impossible” to

“avoid[] the elephant in the room” of Appellant’s intoxication. Appellant’s Brief

at 20. He further contends that counsel’s strategy of stipulating to the BAC

was unreasonable, where the toxicologist still testified.

      We disagree.      Attorney Johnson reasonably sought to minimize the

discussion of Appellant’s high level of intoxication by stipulating to his BAC

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rather than exposing the jury to multiple witnesses and lengthy testimony on

that issue. While the Commonwealth still called its toxicology expert to opine

on Appellant’s ability to safely operate a vehicle with a BAC of .15%, the

Commonwealth did not call the phlebotomist or chain of custody clerk, thereby

limiting the amount of testimony concerning Appellant’s BAC. Accordingly, we

conclude that counsel expressed a reasonable basis for deciding to stipulate

to Appellant’s BAC.

      We also note that Appellant offers no discussion of how he was

prejudiced by Attorney Johnson’s stipulation. Presumably, even had counsel

not stipulated to Appellant’s BAC, the Commonwealth would have been able

to prove his BAC through the testimony of the toxicologist and/or other

witnesses.    Moreover, as this Court observed on direct appeal, the

Commonwealth presented an “overwhelming body of proof” of Appellant’s

guilt at trial. Bowman, 352 MDA 2020, unpublished memorandum at *12.

In regard to Appellant’s level of intoxication, we noted that:

      [An eyewitness to the accident, Sharon] Cryder[,] testified that
      she detected alcohol emanating from Appellant and that he
      appeared intoxicated. N.T. Trial at 36. Corporal Hildebrand
      testified that Appellant “smelled very, very strongly of alcoholic
      beverages,” that Appellant’s speech was slurred, Appellant’s eyes
      were “red, glassy and bloodshot,” and that Appellant “was
      staggering and swaying” and “unsure of his footing.” Id. at 49-
      50.     Corporal Hildebrand also testified that, in his opinion,
      Appellant was “impaired” and “incapable of safe driving on the
      night of the accident.” Id. at 54-55.

Id. at *12 n.11.      Given this evidence of Appellant’s intoxication, and the

likelihood that the Commonwealth could have presented other proof to

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establish Appellant’s exact BAC, we conclude that Attorney Johnson’s

stipulating to Appellant’s BAC was not prejudicial.      Thus, Appellant’s first

ineffectiveness claim is meritless.

      Next, Appellant contends that Attorney Johnson was ineffective for not

objecting to the testimony of the Commonwealth’s toxicologist on the basis

that it violated Appellant’s agreement to stipulate to his BAC. Just before the

toxicologist testified, the following sidebar discussion occurred:

      [Attorney Johnson]: My understanding of the stipulation was that
      we were going to stipulate to the [BAC] and that was going to the
      be the extent of the toxicology. We stipulate to that, they don’t
      call the toxicology expert, they don’t call the phlebotomist. Now
      they’re calling the toxicologist. I’m just pointing out that was not
      my understanding of the stipulation.

      THE COURT: [Commonwealth,] where are you headed with this
      witness?

      [The Commonwealth]: Just … that he would testify [that] at that
      rate[,] somebody would be impaired.

      THE COURT: Okay.

      [Attorney Johnson]: I thought that’s what we were getting away
      from when we stipulated to the BAC.

      THE COURT: Well the – I can’t speak to your subjective
      understanding, but the stipulation was to the BAC.

      [Attorney Johnson]: Okay.

N.T. Trial at 126.

      Appellant now claims that Attorney Johnson should have formally

objected to the testimony of the toxicologist. Appellant stresses that, at the

PCRA hearing, counsel conceded that “had he known [the toxicologist’s]

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testimony was coming in[,] he would likely not have stipulated to the BAC.”

Appellant’s Brief at 24 (citing N.T. PCRA Hearing at 26).

      Initially, in the portion of Attorney Johnson’s testimony cited by

Appellant, the following exchange occurred:

      Q[:] And if you had known that [the toxicologist’s] testimony was
      coming in, would you have still stipulated to the BAC?

      [Attorney Johnson:] That’s a good question. … [F]rom the
      beginning, I had wanted to avoid the topic of the DUI as much as
      I could, so I guess I can’t answer that question. I can tell you
      that my understanding that he would not was certainly a strong
      reason why I did that.

N.T. PCRA Hearing at 26 (emphasis added).            Contrary to Appellant’s

characterization on appeal, counsel did not say that he would “likely not” have

stipulated to the BAC had he known the toxicologist would testify anyway.

Appellant’s Brief at 24. Instead, Attorney Johnson testified that he could not

answer that question.

      Moreover, Appellant once again offers no discussion of how he was

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to formally object to the toxicologist’s

testimony. Even without the toxicologist’s opinion that a BAC level of .15%

would render a person incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle, the

Commonwealth had other evidence demonstrating that Appellant was

intoxicated. Namely, Sharon Cryder and Corporal Hildebrand testified that

Appellant was visibly intoxicated, was slurring his speech, had glassy and

bloodshot eyes, and was staggering and swaying.             Corporal Hildebrand

testified that Appellant was impaired to the point of being incapable of safely

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driving.   Thus, Appellant has not proven that he was prejudiced by the

admission of the toxicologist’s cumulative testimony.      Additionally, for the

reasons stated supra, Appellant has not established that the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different had Attorney Johnson not stipulated to

his BAC. Thus, his second ineffectiveness claim warrants no relief.

      Next, Appellant argues that Attorney Johnson was ineffective for failing

to file a motion to recuse the Clinton County District Attorney’s Office

(hereinafter “DA’s Office”), and/or failing to request that the trial court

conduct an inquiry into whether there was an actual or potential conflict with

that office’s prosecuting Appellant. The basis for Appellant’s allegation of a

conflict is the fact that his initial trial counsel in this case, Thom Rosamilia,

Esq., sought to withdraw after he had represented Appellant during “critical

stages of the prosecution[,] … including multiple preliminary hearings, the

filing of multiple pre-trial motions, and pre-trial hearings.” Appellant’s Brief

at 28. Attorney Rosamilia then “assumed a position as a part-time district

attorney” with the DA’s office and Attorney Johnson was appointed to

represent Appellant. Id. at 9.

      Appellant contends that Attorney Johnson acted ineffectively by not

filing a motion to recuse the DA’s Office from prosecuting him where there

was clearly an appearance of a conflict based on Attorney Rosamilia’s

employment with that office after representing Appellant.         Id. at 27-28.

Alternatively, Appellant claims that Attorney Johnson should have at least

requested that the court inquire into whether a conflict existed under these

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circumstances. Id. at 28. Appellant concedes that “[t]he testimony presented

at the PCRA hearing established … that there were no discussions amongst

[Attorney] Rosamilia and the [DA’s] Office about [Appellant’s] case.” Id. at

30. He complains, however, that he only learned this “after the fact” and, “at

the time it mattered most to [Attorney Johnson] and [Appellant], the

appearance of a conflict existed and something more was required than simply

ignoring it.” Id.

      Appellant’s argument is unconvincing. This Court has explained:

      Where an actual conflict of interest exists, the defendant is
      entitled to have the conflict removed without any further showing
      of prejudice. On the other hand, a mere allegation or appearance
      of impropriety is insufficient to establish an actual conflict of
      interest.

      The mere fact that an attorney or employee of the [Public
      Defender’s (PD)] Office has moved to the DA’s Office does not
      necessarily compel disqualification of the entire DA’s Office.
      Rather, courts will look closely at the specific facts of the case and
      any remedial measures to determine whether any actual conflict
      of interest exists. Commonwealth v. Faulkner, … 595 A.2d 28,
      38 ([Pa.] 1991) (no conflict of interest where DA’s Office hired the
      defendant’s private investigator, where the investigator did not
      actually speak to anyone in the DA’s Office about the defendant’s
      case), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 989… (1992); Commonwealth v.
      Harris, … 460 A.2d 747, 749 ([Pa.] 1983) (no conflict of interest
      where Chief Public Defender, who did not represent defendant at
      trial, became DA at the time that defendant filed post-conviction
      relief petition); Commonwealth v. Boring, … 684 A.2d 561,
      564-[]65 ([Pa. Super.] 1996) (no conflict of interest where
      attorney and investigator for PD’s Office joined the DA’s Office,
      because they did not work on defendant's case in either
      office)…; see also, Commonwealth v. Ford, 650 A.2d 433, 443
      ([Pa.] 1994) (no conflict of interest where defendant’s trial judge
      became DA of the county while defendant’s case was pending,
      because DA “disqualified and screened herself from any
      participation” in the case after becoming DA), cert. denied, 514

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      U.S. 1114 … (1995). Our Supreme Court has recognized the
      “enormous burden upon the already strained resources of the
      District Attorney’s staff” that would result if the Court allowed
      disqualification based on a “mere assertion of impropriety.”
      Harris, 460 A.2d at 750.

Commonwealth v. Sims, 799 A.2d 853, 856–57 (Pa. Super. 2002) (some

internal citations omitted).

      Here, there is no support in the record for Appellant’s allegation that the

entire DA’s Office had a conflict of interest that warranted its removal from his

prosecution. At the PCRA hearing, Attorney Rosamilia testified that when he

started working for the DA’s Office, he was told he would “have nothing to do

with [Appellant’s] cases.” N.T. PCRA Hearing at 73. He stated that he never

had any “substantive discussions” about Appellant’s cases with anyone in the

DA’s Office, and he did not handle any aspect of the cases. Id. While counsel

admitted there was not a “written policy … in terms of … a firewall” between

himself and Appellant’s prosecution, nothing in the record suggests that

Attorney Rosamilia was in any way involved in the handling of Appellant’s

cases. Id.

      Attorney Rosamilia’s testimony makes this case distinguishable from a

decision on which Appellant relies, Commonwealth v. Ford, 122 A.3d 414

(Pa. Super. 2015). There, this Court remanded for a hearing to determine if

the trial court should have ordered the recusal of the entire Clinton County

DA’s Office based on Ford’s former counsel’s employment with that office. Id.

at 418. In reaching this decision, we stressed that the “[t]he record [did] not

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indicate whether [Ford’s former counsel] disclosed confidential information to

other members of the Clinton County District Attorney’s Office.” Id.

      Here, in contrast, Attorney Rosamilia testified that he had no discussions

about Appellant’s cases with anyone in the DA’s Office. Thus, the evidence

demonstrates there was no actual conflict, and Appellant was not prejudiced

by Attorney Johnson’s failure to pursue the DA Office’s recusal from his

prosecution.

      In Appellant’s fourth issue, he argues that Attorney Johnson was

ineffective for “providing deficient advice regarding [Appellant’s] accepting an

advantageous plea agreement….” Appellant’s Brief at 33 (emphasis omitted).

Appellant explains that, prior to trial, the Commonwealth offered him a

sentence of 9 to 23 months’ incarceration if he pled guilty to the aggravated

assault by vehicle charges, with the remaining charges being dismissed. See

N.T. PCRA Hearing at 11.      Appellant acknowledges that Attorney Johnson

“advised [Appellant] that he should take the offer….” Id. at 35. He complains,

however, that counsel ineffectively told him that he “had a shot” of winning if

he went to trial, despite counsel’s knowledge that “[t]here was a mountain of

threatening evidence against” Appellant.        Id.   Appellant also insists that

counsel “did not review the full scope of his sentencing exposure” or the “full

ramifications if [Appellant] lost at trial….”   Id. at 36.   Based on Attorney

Johnson’s “unreasonably positive prognosis about [Appellant’s] chances of

winning at trial[,]” and his failure to fully advise Appellant of the consequences

if he proceeded to trial and lost, Appellant rejected the favorable plea deal.

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Appellant now maintains that counsel’s advice surrounding the plea was

ineffective.

      Preliminarily, we have observed that,

      a post-conviction petitioner seeking relief on the basis that
      ineffective assistance of counsel caused him or her to reject a
      guilty plea must demonstrate the following circumstance:

         [B]ut for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a
         reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been
         presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have
         accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have
         withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the
         court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction
         or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have
         been less severe than under the judgment and sentence
         that in fact were imposed.

Commonwealth v. Steckley, 128 A.3d 826, 832 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted).

      Instantly, Appellant asserts that, but for Attorney Johnson’s telling him

he had a chance to win at trial and failing to fully advise him of the

consequences of proceeding to trial, he would have accepted the plea offered

by the Commonwealth.       The record does not support Appellant’s claim.

Attorney Johnson testified at the PCRA hearing that he conveyed the

Commonwealth’s plea offer to Appellant “[m]any times” throughout his

representation of Appellant, and again on “[t]he morning of trial.” N.T. PCRA

Hearing at 11, 12.     Counsel believed the plea offer was favorable, and

conveyed that fact to Appellant “[m]any times.” Id. at 12. Attorney Johnson

testified that on the night before trial, he met with Appellant and “again

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reinforced [his] opinion that … [Appellant] should take the plea deal….” Id.

at 15.

         Attorney Johnson testified that while he could not specifically recall the

exact conversations he had with Appellant, it is his standard practice to discuss

the sentencing guideline ranges, and the prospect of consecutive and

concurrent terms. Id. at 16. Thus, he was “sure he went over the standard

… ranges” of Appellant’s potential sentences and “what would happen if he

lost” at trial. Id. at 15-16. Attorney Johnson testified that he repeatedly told

Appellant that there would be “a significant penalty if he were to lose at trial.”

Id. at 16-17. Attorney Johnson also believed that he had advised Appellant

that if he lost at trial, he “would be looking at a state sentence[.]” Id. at 19.

         Attorney Johnson further testified that he and Appellant had “talked [at]

length” about the likelihood of Appellant’s winning if he went to trial. Id. at

17. Counsel stated that he told Appellant that “he had a shot” based on the

possible defense “that the other vehicle came into his lane and that he

essentially had gone … to the left of that vehicle in an effort to miss them.”

Id. at 17, 20. However, Attorney Johnson stressed that he advised Appellant

“numerous times in the month leading up to the trial that [he] thought

[Appellant] should take the plea[,]” and that even on the morning of trial, he

“went back to [Appellant] again and reinforced [his] opinion that the plea was

the best route.” Id. at 18, 19.

         Based on this testimony, the PCRA court disagreed with Appellant’s

claim that Attorney Johnson “gave him an unreasonably positive prognosis as

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to his chances at trial.” PCRA Court Finding of Fact, Discussion, and Order on

Defendant’s PCRA Petition, 3/22/22, at 4 (unnumbered). The court found that

Appellant had been advised about the favorable plea agreement multiple

times, and he had also been notified of the sentencing guidelines. Id. The

PCRA court concluded that Appellant “was not interested in any plea that

involved a jail sentence[,]” as Appellant had testified that he would lose his

job if he went to jail. Id. at 5 (unnumbered); see also N.T. Trial at 54-55.

The record supports the court’s factual findings and credibility determinations.

Based thereon, we discern no error in its conclusion that Attorney Johnson did

not act ineffectively in advising Appellant regarding whether to plead guilty,

and the ramifications of deciding to proceed to trial.

      Finally, Appellant argues that his due process rights to a fair trial under

the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions were violated when the trial

court failed to dismiss the entire jury panel after one potential juror, during

jury selection, twice stated that she could not be fair and impartial because

her husband had been killed by an impaired driver. This issue was previously

litigated and rejected on direct appeal.      See Bowman, 352 MDA 2020,

unpublished memorandum at *14-18. Consequently, Appellant is ineligible

for post-conviction relief on this claim. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) (stating

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that, to be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner must prove the claim was not

previously litigated or waived).1

       Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/09/2023

____________________________________________

1 Appellant argues that our decision on direct appeal was erroneous. See
Appellant’s Brief at 44 n.8. However, “[i]t is beyond the power of a Superior
Court panel to overrule a prior decision of the Superior Court, except in
circumstances where intervening authority by our Supreme Court calls into
question a previous decision of this Court.” Commonwealth v. Pepe, 897
A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted). Appellant does not
identify any intervening caselaw by our Supreme Court that would impact the
validity of our prior decision in this case. As such, we are bound to uphold it.

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