Court Opinion

ID: 9710151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:03:09.455323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:54.657962
License: Public Domain

CASTILLE, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority of this Court holds that under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, police lack probable cause to make an arrest when a confidential informant who has provided reliable information to police in the past furnishes police officers with, detailed information about an individual selling drugs and those officers subsequently corroborate most of the information before making a warrant-less arrest. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the United States Supreme Court explicitly and firmly countenanced that the Fourth Amendment precludes this very result. Because the majority’s exegesis of Gates overlooks this reality, I am constrained to dissent.1
*685In Gates, the United States Supreme Court determined that in certain instances, a tip from a reliable informant can be sufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest. The Court began its analysis with a discussion of what “probable cause” entails. The Court stated, “[pjerhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a practical, nontechnical conception.” See id. at 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). Quoting Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court added that probable cause means “less than evidence which would justify condemnation ... it imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.” See id. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348, 11 U.S. 339, 3 L.Ed. 364 (1813)). In elaborating further on the probable cause standard, the Court noted:
Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same — and so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.
Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).
With these general considerations in mind, the United States Supreme Court in Gates set out to determine whether police officers had probable cause for an arrest when they received a letter from an anonymous informant about a couple reportedly engaged in interstate drug smuggling activity. The officers subsequently took steps to corroborate many of the details of the letter. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that under Almiar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), an informant’s “veracity,” “reliability,” and “basis of knowledge” must all be independently established if an informant’s tip is to provide probable cause for an arrest. The Illinois court concluded that under that tripartite standard, the anonymous letter in question did not establish probable cause because the Court concluded that the *686letter provided virtually nothing from which one could conclude that its author was either honest or that his information was reliable. Likewise, the letter gave no indication of the basis for the writer’s predictions regarding the Gateses’ criminal activities. See id. at 227,103 S.Ct. 2317.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the state court and articulated its preference for the “totality of the circumstances” test for probable cause, holding that veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge should not be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case. The Court went on to state that “[i]nformants’ tips doubtless come in many shapes and sizes from many different types of persons ... [r]igid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. One simple rule will not cover every situation.” See id. at 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)).
In explaining the role played by the previous criteria of veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge in determining whether an informant’s tip suffices to establish probable cause under the “totality of the circumstances” standard, the Court instructed:
The informant’s “veracity” or “reliability” and his “basis of knowledge” ... are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis ... a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability ... [i]f, for example, a particular informant is known for the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal activities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause based on the tip.
See id. at 233, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). The Court further explained that where an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity, which if fabricated would subject him to criminal *687liability, rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge is unnecessary. See id. Thus, it is clear that where an informant’s tip bears the requisite indicia of reliability, the tip alone may suffice to establish probable cause for an arrest under the Fourth Amendment.
In view of the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gates, it is clear that in the matter sub judice, the officers had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest of appellant. Here, the police officer testified that the confidential informant had supplied the police with information leading to arrests on fifty (50) prior occasions, many of which involved narcotics activity in the same locality at issue here. Thus, the police knew this informant for “the unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal activities in- [this] locality.” See id.2 Therefore, even if the “basis of knowledge” had not been set forth, under Gates, the police still acted justifiably in relying on a tip from an informant with such overwhelming indicia of reliability. Yet here, the informant did set forth the basis of knowledge, stating that he had *688observed one of the individuals with drugs in his possession at the location in question.3 Finally, with the reliability and basis of knowledge firmly established, the officer here, unlike the officer in Gates, could also be confident in the veracity of the informant, since the police officer was familiar with and knew the identity of the informant. As explained by the Gates Court, veracity is to be inferred when a citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity which, if fabricated, would subject him to criminal liability. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 233, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Consequently, from the standpoint of Gates, the tip itself is unassailable in all respects.4
Nevertheless, the majority insists that under a “totality of the circumstances” analysis, irrespective of how reliable an informant has been in the past, police must also have independent corroboration of the information currently being supplied prior to making an arrest. Even evaluating this matter under the majority’s own corroboration requirement, the police officers here did take substantial steps to corroborate the tip, notwithstanding the majority’s assertions to the-contrary. In fact, they took precisely the steps that the United States Supreme Court has deemed sufficient when the tip itself does not establish probable cause.
*689Recognizing the value of independent corroboration in cases where the tip itself could not sustain a finding of probable cause, the Gates Court referred to its decision in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). There, an informant whom officers had previously found reliable reported that Draper would arrive in Denver on a train from Chicago on one of two days, carrying a quantity of heroin. The informant also supplied a physical description of Draper, and predicted that he would be wearing a light-colored raincoat, brown slacks, and black shoes, and would be walking “real fast.” Id. at 309, 79 S.Ct. 329.
On one of the stated dates, police officers observed a male matching this description exit a train arriving from Chicago. The man’s attire and luggage matched the report and he was walking rapidly. The Court stated:
By this point in his investigation, the arresting officer had personally verified every facet of the information given to him by [the informant] except whether petitioner had accomplished his mission and had the three ounces of heroin on his person or in his bag. And surely, with every other bit of [the informant’s] information being thus personally verified, the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the remaining unverified bit of information — that Draper would, have the heroin with kbmr — was likewise true.
See id. at 313, 79 S.Ct. 329 (emphasis added). Although the corroborated behavior was inherently innocent in nature, the Court recognized that:
Probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity. By hypothesis, therefore, innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause; to require otherwise would be to sub silentio impose a drastically more rigorous definition of probable cause than the security of our citizens demands.
Gates, 464 U.S. at 245,104 S.Ct. 615.
By the majority’s own account, in the matter sub judice, the officers proceeded to the abandoned garage described by the *690informant. As the informant stated they would, the officers found a tall, dark-skinned male appearing to be in his late teens, wearing a long black windbreaker and shorts. The informant’s statement that this male would be accompanied by an hispanic male similarly proved accurate.5 Much like the police officers in Draper (and Gates), the officers in this case corroborated every bit of relevant information in the tip except the prediction that appellant would have drugs in his possession before arresting him. Draper, 358 U.S. at 313, 79 S.Ct. 329. In fact, the precise items of corroboration in Draper — location of the alleged criminal activity, physical description of the suspect, and attire of the suspect — are the very same items that the officers in this case corroborated. As the Court stated in Draper, “surely, with every other bit of [the informant’s] information being thus personally verified, the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the remaining unverified bit of information — that Draper would have the heroin with him — was likewise true.” See id.
The majority discounts the facts which the officers corroborated here by stating that they were all facts easily ascertainable to any casual observer. Citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), the majority asserts that police officers must corroborate facts which “indicate a special familiarity with appellant’s personal affairs.” The majority is confused. In White, the United States Supreme Court set forth the requirements for corroboration of an anonymous informant’s tip. In Draper, however, the Court determined that corroboration of the predicted location, physical attire, and description of the suspects amounted to sufficient corroboration of a tip in which the officers were familiar with the informant. Here, as in Draper, the informant’s identity was known to the officers. Thus, the majori*691ty’s observation that the officers did not actually corroborate a drug transaction before making the arrest is irrelevant. As the Court stated in Draper, surely, with every other bit of [the informant’s] information being thus personally verified, the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the remaining unverified bit of information that Draper would have the heroin with him was likewise true. Draper, 358 U.S. at 313, 79 S.Ct. 329. The reason that “inside information” is not required when a tip is confidential, but not anonymous, is that the tip is more inherently reliable since the caller is exposing himself to criminal liability if he fails to tell the truth after revealing his identity. See Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 233, 103 5. Ct. 2317. Accordingly, the majority’s reliance on Alabama v. White is misplaced.
Over fifty years ago, Justice Jackson keenly observed: “[t]his Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added.” Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943). In the Fourth Amendment context, where the balance between effective law enforcement and the rights of the accused is especially delicate, the temples of which Justice Jackson speaks are particularly susceptible to collapse. The decision by the United States Supreme Court in Gates constitutes a careful and considered attempt to strike the Fourth Amendment balance in a way that shows due regard for the interests of both law enforcement and the rights of the accused. Because I believe that today’s decision dangerously subverts and upsets this balance, I dissent.6
NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.

. Appellant brought his claim under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The majority correctly noted that Article I, Section 8 is satisfied for purposes of determining probable cause for an arrest by the test that the United States Supreme Court set forth in Gates. Therefore, the majority in this case has not afforded Pennsylvania citizens additional protections under Article I, Section 8, but rather has measured this issue exclusively by what it inaccurately believes to be the Fourth Amendment standard for determining "probable cause,” as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Gates.

. The majority states that a police officer’s "bare assertion” that an informant has "provided reliable information in the past” cannot support a finding of reliability. The majority apparently believes that the testimony of a police officer is not to be trusted until supporting documents have breathed credibility into that testimony. This seems to me to flatly ignore the United States Supreme Court’s admonition regarding probable cause determinations that "the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.” Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Unlike the majority, I am willing to give the police officer in this case, who was well versed in the field of law enforcement, the benefit of his experience in dealing with this informant and credit his own evaluation of the information which led to the fifty prior arrests. I am even willing to make the apparently bold assumption that had the information leading to the fifty prior arrests proved suspect, the officer would have had the good sense not to deem similar information reliable here. The majority asserts that it is not questioning the reliability of police officers, but simply requiring "objective” facts by which a reviewing court can conclude that the information provided by officers was reliable. In other words, a police officer who testified that an informant’s prior tips had led to hundreds of convictions would still require independent corroboration if the tip was to support a finding of probable cause. I fail to see how the majority’s conclusion in this regard does not amount to a categorical indictment of the trustworthiness of police officers.

. The majority discounts the informant’s first-hand observation by seizing on the fact that the informant did not state how he had made the observation - whether it was, for example, by looking out of a window or by viewing the drugs in close proximity. I fail to see the relevance of the manner in which the informant made the observation given the police officer’s testimony that he had dealt with the informant repeatedly and always found his asserted observations to be reliable.

. The majority attempts to distinguish Commonwealth v. Jones, 542 Pa. 418, 668 A.2d 114 (1995), in which this Court upheld a finding that probable cause existed on facts virtually identical to the facts in this matter, by noting that a magistrate issued a warrant based on the facts in Jones, whereas here an officer made a warrantless arrest. The majority neglects to heed its own admonition that "the totality of the circumstances test is the same whether used for determining the existence of probable cause for the magistrate’s issuance of a search warrant or a police officer’s determination that a warrantless arrest is justified.” Maj. Opin. at 496. In any event, like the magistrate in Jones, the suppression court in this case heard the testimony of the relevant witnesses and properly determined that the police officer's testimony could be credited, and thus that probable cause to arrest existed as it did in Jones.

. The majority discounts this last fact by stating that the officers saw eight men in the garage, most of whom were hispanic. It is difficult to ascertain how the presence of additional men other than those described by the informant undermines the informant’s veracity. The informant presumably believed that the police were only interested in a description of those people whom he saw engaged in criminal activity. The location and attire of innocent persons is generally not 51 matter of great concern to police officers.

. Although my dissent in this matter is based primarily on the majority’s misinterpretation of Gates, supra, I would be remiss if I did not comment on the majority’s remarkable belief that the conclusion reached by this Court in Commonwealth v. Jones, 542 Pa. 418, 668 A.2d 114 (1995), lacks precedential weight simply because the lead opinion in Jones was a plurality opinion (Zappala, J., concurred in result). Contrary to the majority’s belief, in cases which produce a majority of Justices in support of one result but only a plurality in support of the lead opinion, courts traditionally attach precedential value to the nar*692rawest holding on which the majority necessarily agreed in order to reach the end result. See Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 Duke L.J. 419, 449 (1992) (citations omitted). Applying that reasoning here, it is clear that, in Jones, a majority of the Justices of this Court necessarily agreed that an informant’s tip supplies probable cause for an arrest when the informant states that he has personally observed illegal narcotics sales and a police officer swears under oath that the informant has been reliable in the past. See Jones, supra, 542 Pa. at 424-25, 668 A.2d at 117-18. Thus, under Jones, it is clear that the officers in this matter had probable cause at the time of the arrest. The majority’s discomfort with its own attempt to characterize Jones as non-precedential is evidenced by its concomitant attempt to distinguish Jones on the merits. However, as explained supra, n. 4, this attempt fails.