Court Opinion

ID: 9895859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:10:38.394389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:43.172440
License: Public Domain

J-A17034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  STEPHEN MOORE                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1638 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 19, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000140-2020

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                              FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2023

       Appellant, Stephen Moore, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury

trial convictions for first-degree murder and two counts of persons not to

possess firearms.1 We affirm.

       The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this

case as follows:

          On May 16, 2022, [Appellant’s] four-day trial commenced
          at which the following facts were established. Sergeant
          Michael Ponto, a patrol sergeant with the Pottstown Police
          Department was conducting speed enforcement on Easter
          Sunday, April 21, 2019. He was situated at Industrial
          Highway in Pottstown. At 12:25 p.m., he [heard] a pop
          sound in the distance, and about 10 to 15 seconds later, he
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a) and 6105(a)(1).
J-A17034-23

       heard a vehicle racing toward him. Sergeant Ponto pursued
       the vehicle, traveling eastbound on Industrial Highway at a
       high rate of speed, and he activated his lights and sirens.
       From a distance, the sergeant observed the Jeep crash into
       a tree. He approached the crash scene, and observed
       [Appellant] jump out of the Jeep. Within seconds after the
       crash, [Appellant] ran away and eventually ran out of the
       sergeant’s sight. Sergeant Ponto went back to the crash
       scene and secured the vehicle. There was a male there,
       later identified as Eugene Cabot, who had found a Taurus
       9mm firearm and two cell phones on the floorboard of the
       vehicle. Mr. Cabot had observed the Jeep go speeding and
       go airborne before crashing into the tree. He got out of his
       own vehicle to check on the crashed Jeep, and found the
       firearm and cell phones. The sergeant retrieved the items,
       and noted that the Taurus firearm was loaded with a round
       in the chamber. A K9 officer also responded to the scene,
       but he was unable to detect [Appellant’s] whereabouts.

       Ian Hood, M.D., an expert in the field of forensic pathology
       performed an autopsy on [the victim, Joshua Smith,
       Appellant’s good friend.] The victim presented as a 25-
       year-old male, 5’11”, and 230 pounds.             The doctor
       determined that the victim died as a result of gunshot
       wounds to the head and neck. The most obvious injury was
       a gunshot wound to the neck, and the doctor opined that
       there would have been a lot of blood loss from this injury.
       Dr. Hood also testified that there was an unusual gunshot
       wound to the back of the victim’s head. There was soot and
       gunpowder on the hoodie that the victim had been wearing,
       indicating that the gun was only a few inches away when it
       was fired. Dr. Hood opined that this execution shot to the
       back of someone’s head would normally cause a victim to
       drop and die, but in this case, the victim had an unusually
       thick skull that the bullet actually bounced off his skull and
       came back out. Putting this physical evidence together, Dr.
       Hood believed that the bullet to the victim’s head was
       probably the first wound, and then the victim was shot in
       the neck, he ran 200 feet, pumping blood out of his severed
       arteries, until he went down where he was found.

       Cynthia Rodriguez lived at 26 North Charlotte Street,
       Pottstown with the victim and her three kids at the time of
       the murder. In the morning on April 21, 2019, at about nine

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       or ten, Ms. Rodriguez argued with the victim about his drug
       use.     When the victim got “a little aggressive,” Ms.
       Rodriguez went to her next-door neighbor’s, Melissa Amey,
       house. At some point, Ms. Rodriguez testified that she saw
       “Pete” pull up outside the apartment.         Ms. Rodriguez
       identified “Pete” as [Appellant], and she stated that
       [Appellant] and the victim were good friends. The victim
       left with [Appellant]. The victim was wearing dark jeans
       and a light blue hoodie at that time. [Appellant] and the
       victim returned about 20, 30 minutes later. The victim
       changed clothes into a black hoodie, black sweatpants, and
       black shoes. He and [Appellant] left again in [Appellant’s]
       Jeep. Shortly thereafter, the victim sent a text to Ms. Amey,
       stating “I am sorry you had to come to this and I’m pretty
       sure you will never see me again. Love ya.” The neighbor
       responded, “Okay Josh. I think you need to calm down.
       Don’t do anything dumb.” The victim replied, “Sorry.” Ms.
       Rodriguez found out that something happened to the victim
       when police arrived at her apartment, around one or two
       o’clock.

       Next to testify was Diane Barto, who was driving her car on
       Industrial Highway on April 21, 2019, in the early afternoon.
       She passed by Roller Mills on Industrial Highway. Roller
       Mills had rental trucks such as U-Hauls and she saw a car
       there. She heard one pop sound, and about four seconds
       later, she observed a man run out a few car lengths in front
       of her car, run around, and collapse in the middle of the
       road. The man was bleeding. Ms. Barto called 9-1-1.

       Detective Edward Schikel, a detective with the Montgomery
       County Detective Bureau-Forensic Services Unit, was called
       to assist in the investigation to obtain forensic evidence. He
       responded to the crash scene, and secured the area. Inside
       the Jeep he located a black and silver revolver in the console
       area. The revolver was loaded with one live round and the
       four other rounds that look to have been fired. He also
       found a green case with an extended handgun magazine
       containing 31 live rounds inside the driver’s side of the car.
       There was a Home Depot receipt dated 4/21/19, which
       reflected a purchase of a slotted screwdriver. Later a search
       warrant was obtained. Additional evidence was uncovered
       including three masks, one full-face cloth mask underneath
       the driver’s seat, a full-faced knit mask on the passenger

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       floor side, and a mask within the center console of the
       vehicle.

       After processing the crash scene, Detective Schikel went to
       the location of Roller Mills at 625 Industrial Avenue. He
       found evidence of a bullet strike on a U-Haul van that was
       in the parking lot.      There was black hair and fiber
       surrounding the bullet strike. The back of the van was
       significantly stained with blood, with blood on the left side
       taillight extending to both doors, traveling left to right.
       There was blood and a screwdriver on the ground and blood
       on the roadway. The blood trail extended about 205 feet.

       Brittni Andaloro, was accepted as a forensic DNA [analyst].
       She received a reference sample for the victim and from
       [Appellant], and she extracted a DNA profile from each. She
       analyzed 13 samples. In relevant part, as to the swabs from
       the Ruger revolver, it contained a DNA mixture that was too
       complex for her lab because it was at least a four person
       mixture, and it was forwarded to another lab for additional
       testing.

       A DNA analyst at Cybergenetics, Jennifer Bracamontes, was
       accepted as an expert in DNA evidence interpretation. The
       statistical association between the swabs from the revolver
       and [Appellant’s] reference sample was that a match
       between [Appellant] and the revolver DNA swabs was 373
       trillion times more probable than a coincidental match to an
       unrelated African American person; 98.4 quadrillion times
       more probable than a coincidental match to an unrelated
       Caucasian person; and 131 quadrillion times more probable
       than a coincidence match to an unrelated Hispanic person.
       The victim’s DNA was a match to the revolver that was 53.6
       billion times more probable than a coincidence.

       Detective Lieutenant William Mitchell, a lieutenant currently
       in charge of the Major Crimes Unit of the Montgomery
       County Detective Bureau, was a detective in the Homicide
       Unit at the time of this murder investigation. He was
       provided four cell phones to download; one from the victim,
       two from [Appellant], and one from Ms. Amey. At trial
       Detective Mitchell testified as to the activity between
       [Appellant’s] two cell phones to the victim’s cell phone
       between the time of 11:17 a.m. and 12:01 p.m.

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       Specifically, starting at 11:17 a.m. on April 21st, the victim
       made an outgoing FaceTime call to [Appellant’s] 484
       number.      A few minutes later the victim received an
       incoming message from [Appellant’s] 484 number. At
       11:41, there was activity on [Appellant’s] second phone, the
       856 number, where there was an outgoing call made to the
       victim, but there was no duration to that call. At 11:41, the
       victim made an outgoing FaceTime call to [Appellant’s]
       phone. A few second later, the victim made an outgoing
       FaceTime call again to [Appellant’s] 856 phone number. A
       few seconds after, the victim received an incoming message
       from [Appellant’s] 856 number. A few seconds after,
       [Appellant made] an outgoing FaceTime call to the victim.
       Seconds later, [Appellant] made an outgoing regular phone
       call to the victim that lasted 26 seconds. A minute later,
       [Appellant] made another outgoing call to the victim from
       his 856 number, which lasted 10 seconds. Looking at Ms.
       Amey’s phone, there were several incoming messages from
       the victim at 11:43. [Appellant] received an incoming
       message on his 484 number at 11:54 and another incoming
       message to his 856 number at 11:59 a.m., both from
       unknown numbers. The last communication between the
       victim and [Appellant] was at 12:01 p.m., where the victim’s
       phone made an outgoing FaceTime call to [Appellant’s] 484
       number. The lieutenant testified that between the victim’s
       text message to Ms. Amey’s phone at 11:43 a.m. and his
       contact [with Appellant], there was no other activity from
       the victim’s phone. The lieutenant noted that the Jeep
       crashed around 12:26 p.m.

       Detective Eric Nelson of the Montgomery County Detective
       Bureau—Forensic Services Unit was accepted as an expert
       in firearm and toolmark identification.         Significantly,
       Detective Nelson testified that the bullet specimen
       recovered from the U-Haul at the crime scene was
       consistent with the Ruger revolver based on caliber and
       rifling dimensions.      However, due to damage to the
       projectile he could not definitively state it was fired from
       that firearm. Detective Nelson also compared the bullet
       specimen taken from the victim at the autopsy and
       compared it to a test fired bullet specimen from the revolver
       and was able to determine with certainty that the bullet
       found inside of the victim was fired by the Ruger revolver.

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       Sharde Moore, [Appellant’s] wife testified that in April of
       2019, they were living on Chestnut Street, Pottstown with
       her children. The morning of the murder, Ms. Moore was
       with [Appellant] at home, and he told her he was leaving
       the house to get French toast. He left in her grey Jeep. He
       did not come back after that. At some point, Ms. Moore
       tracked his phone, and she tracked it to the police station.
       At the police station, she was told that there was a car
       accident and she went to the scene where she saw her Jeep
       on a tree.

       Ms. Moore testified that she did not see [Appellant] until
       sometime after June 8, 2019, but did not remember exactly
       when. At that time, they met up in a New Jersey parking
       lot, where he met his newborn daughter for the first time.
       According to Ms. Moore, her husband moved back to
       Pottstown in July of 2019.       In the interim, Detective
       McGowen was in touch with her and she appeared in front
       of the grand jury, and provided testimony as to whether she
       had seen [Appellant]. At that time, she knew her husband
       was wanted for murder.

       Former Lieutenant James McGowen of the Montgomery
       County Detective Bureau testified that an arrest warrant
       was issued for [Appellant] on April 24, 2019. Attempts were
       made in order to apprehend him, namely, the information
       was disseminated to regional law enforcement sharing
       agencies, [Detective McGowen] disseminated a Wanted
       poster throughout Pottstown and Reading, and he contacted
       Ms. Moore. Surveillance was conducted in Pottstown, at
       the hospital where Ms. Moore was about to give birth to her
       and [Appellant’s] child, and in the area of Ms. Moore’s
       mother’s house. Police were in constant contact with Ms.
       Moore. Grand jury subpoenas were issued in order to elicit
       information as to [Appellant’s] location. These efforts were
       continuous until [Appellant] was finally apprehended on
       December 3, 2019 outside his then residence[.] After his
       arrest, [Appellant] said to Lieutenant McGowen, “So you’re
       McGow[e]n. Every time Sharde got mad she threatened to
       call you.”

       Valerie Thinna was a resident of 859 North Charlotte Street,
       Pottstown at the time of April of 2019. Although she [could
       not] recall the specific date, she stated that [Appellant] lived

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       with her in 2019 while Ms. Moore was pregnant. Ms. Moore
       would visit her husband at [Ms. Thinna’s] house. Ms. Thinna
       testified that [Appellant] always wore a wig when he went
       out of the house, but not inside the house. At some point
       she became aware that [Appellant] was wanted by the
       police, and [Appellant] was present during discussion about
       it that she had with others. There was a stipulation that
       when Ms. Thinna was interviewed by police in November of
       2021, she admitted that she did know [Appellant] was
       wanted prior to his arrest and that she learned that
       information from Ms. Moore.

       Officer Michael Glauner, a detective for the Pottstown Police
       Department, assisted with the execution of a search warrant
       for 859 North Charlotte Street. In the room that [Appellant]
       was staying he located a loaded firearm on his bed
       underneath the pillow. A wig was also found in a separate
       bedroom.

       At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, defense
       counsel made a motion for judgment of acquittal, which was
       denied.

       The defense presented its evidence, and [Appellant]
       testified in his own defense. He testified that he met the
       victim when they both worked for JP Mascaro, a trash
       collection company. He described that they were very good
       friends and had a lot in common. In fact, [Appellant] stated
       that the victim was his only friend. In April of 2019,
       [Appellant] was living in Pottstown on Chestnut Street with
       his wife, Sharde Moore and her two daughters. His wife was
       about 8 months pregnant, and he was going to trucking
       school. [Appellant] earned a certificate of completion and
       diploma on April 11, 2019, which would allow him to work
       as a commercial driver. [Appellant] explained that this gave
       him a feeling that he could now support his family; he felt
       like he was ready to live his dream.

       In the morning of April 21, 2019, he and his wife were
       watching Game of Thrones. At some point he left home to
       go to Redner’s for something to eat. There he ran into his
       wife’s aunt, Aunt Nette, and gave her a ride home. She
       lived on King and Charlotte Street, right across the street
       from the victim. There he saw the victim with his girlfriend

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       on the corner so he pulled over to say a quick hello. Both
       the victim and his girlfriend look[ed] angry. [Appellant]
       went back home, but because he sensed that something was
       wrong, he gave the victim a call. Around 11:41 there was
       back and forth phone calls between the both of them. Based
       on those phone calls, [Appellant] picked the victim up. He
       had told his wife that he was going out for French toast, so
       she [would not] be mad. [Appellant] and the victim parked
       behind [Appellant’s] house. [Appellant] admitted that at
       that point he had a 9mm Taurus firearm in his vehicle, which
       he regularly kept there. [Appellant] denied that the revolver
       was in his car when he picked up the victim. He had never
       seen it before. Based upon their discussions in the car, he
       and the victim went to Home Depot.              According to
       [Appellant], it was the victim’s idea to do so because he
       needed a screwdriver. [Appellant] described the victim as
       being high when he picked him up. After leaving Home
       Depot they got back into [Appellant’s] Jeep, and remained
       there for a while before leaving the parking lot. [Appellant]
       testified that the victim asked him to take him to Roller Mills.
       [Appellant] told the jury that the victim told him what he
       was going to do, and the victim removed the screwdriver
       from its packaging. The victim got out of the car and shut
       the door. The victim was behind the van doing something.
       [Appellant] opened his car door and that was when he heard
       the first gunshot. He heard a few pops, and saw the victim
       take off running between the vans.            At that point,
       [Appellant] did not know whether the victim had been hit or
       not. [Appellant] did see the shooter. In fact, the shooter
       came up to the side of [Appellant’s] Jeep and said, “Pussy,
       who told you to come here?” and smacked him with the gun.
       [Appellant] described a tussle with the shooter and how the
       shooter’s firearm fell into his car where it bounced off the
       dashboard and went into the seat. [Appellant] kicked the
       shooter and the shooter ran away behind Roller Mills out of
       his sight. [Appellant] said that he did not see the victim at
       that point.

       [Appellant] could only describe the shooter as wearing a
       Golden State NBA hoodie jacket and that he was brown-
       skinned. [Appellant] left the area, racing away in an
       attempt to find the victim. Once he got down the road, he
       saw the officer with his lights on trying to pull him over. He
       did not stop because he had two guns in the car, in plain

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       view, and he had too much to lose to go to jail. [Appellant]
       crashed into a tree, got out of the car and ran away.
       [Appellant] only found out later that day that his friend was
       shot and killed, and he put it together, that since he had the
       gun in his car the murder would be pinned on him. He called
       his wife, who told him that the police were looking for him,
       but he did not go home. After a few days, he found out that
       there was a warrant out for his arrest. At the time that the
       police came to arrest him, he had had a gun in his bed
       because he was scared. As to the ski masks found in his
       car, [Appellant] explained that it’s a culture thing. That
       people wear ski masks and that he had several of them
       because after a while they start smelling. He denied that
       they were committing criminal acts.

       On     cross-examination,     the  prosecutor     questioned
       [Appellant] and in relevant part, [Appellant] testified that
       when he came back to his house after going to Redner’s he
       changed his clothes into all black. He went to pick up the
       victim, and the Taurus pistol was already in the car. He
       admitted that after he spent time with the victim, the victim
       also changed his clothes into all black. The victim did not
       have a gun, and didn’t bring one into the car. [Appellant]
       reiterated that he went to Home Depot at the victim’s
       request and that he assisted him with the purchase. Then
       at the victim’s direction they traveled to Roller Mills. The
       prosecutor questioned [Appellant] about the three ski
       masks in the Jeep, and [Appellant] acknowledged that one
       ski mask was on the passenger side floor, one was in the
       center console, and one [was] on the floor next to
       [Appellant’s] gun and extended magazine. [Appellant] also
       claimed he did not see the shooter come up behind the
       victim and shoot him in the head or that the victim got shot
       in the base of the neck. [Appellant] insisted that he saw no
       indication that the victim was actually shot when he was
       running in between the vans, then into the street.
       [Appellant] denied seeing blood spurting out of the victim’s
       neck. According to [Appellant] the victim seemed totally
       fine while he was running. [Appellant] reiterated under
       questioning that he hit the gun out of the shooter’s hand
       and it landed in his car. It bounced off the dashboard onto
       the passenger seat.        The shooter took off running.
       According to [Appellant] he did not think about trying to
       shoot at the shooter, although his Taurus pistol was under

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         his seat. [Appellant] was unable to describe the shooter’s
         voice and he could not estimate his height or build.

         The Commonwealth presented rebuttal evidence, and
         entered a stipulation onto the record, namely that
         [Appellant] was convicted of robbery in 2005, and served a
         sentence that ended in 2014.

         At the conclusion of all the testimony and [after] the jury
         was excused, defense counsel made a motion for judgment
         of acquittal, arguing in essence that based on [Appellant’s]
         testimony that there were two equal[ly] possible, believable
         stories, [and] that is prima facie reasonable doubt. The
         [c]ourt denied the motion.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/14/22, at 2-15) (record citations omitted). On

May 19, 2022, the jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder and two

counts of persons not to possess firearms. That same day, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for first degree murder and imposed

concurrent sentences of 7 to 14 years’ imprisonment for the first firearms

conviction, and 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment for the second firearms

conviction.    Appellant subsequently filed a timely post sentence motion

challenging the weight of the evidence, which the trial court denied on June

1, 2022.      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 23, 2022.

Thereafter, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and, following the grant of an

extension of time, Appellant filed his statement on August 10, 2022.

      Appellant raises the following three issues on appeal:

         1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled
         Appellant could not testify about statements made to him
         by the victim that were admissible as exceptions to the rule

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         against hearsay under Pa.R.E. 803(3) and 804(b)(3)?

         2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
         refused to determine whether Appellant would be prejudiced
         by the jury’s fear that someone affiliated with Appellant was
         recording them outside of court?

         3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
         denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion for a new trial
         because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence?

(Appellant’s Brief at 6).

      In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion

when it did not allow Appellant to testify about statements allegedly made by

the victim on the morning of the murder. Specifically, Appellant claims the

court should have permitted him to testify that: 1) the victim asked Appellant

to bring his gun with him when Appellant picked the victim up at his house;

2) the victim found out that his girlfriend had been communicating with a

person who had previously shot the victim; and 3) the victim told Appellant

that he was going to shoot this person and then turn himself in. (See id. at

33). Appellant insists the first and third statements are admissible because

they show the victim’s motive and plan to possess a firearm and use it, and

the second statement was admissible to show victim’s angry state of mind.

Appellant maintains the trial court abused its discretion in excluding these

statements pursuant to the applicable exceptions to the rule against hearsay,

and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

      Our standard of review of a trial court’s admission or exclusion of

evidence is well established and very narrow:

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         Admission of evidence is a matter within the sound
         discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed absent
         a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
         Not merely an error in judgment, an abuse of discretion
         occurs when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the
         judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the
         result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by
         the evidence on record.

Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 604 Pa. 386, 403, 986 A.2d 84, 94 (2009),

cert. denied, 562 U.S. 857, 131 S.Ct. 127, 178 L.Ed.2d 77 (2010) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). “[A] discretionary ruling cannot be

overturned simply because a reviewing court disagrees with the trial court’s

conclusion.”   Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 836 A.2d 966, 968 (Pa.Super.

2003), appeal denied, 577 Pa. 695, 845 A.2d 817 (2004) (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted).

      “Hearsay” is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted. Pa.R.E. 801(c). Generally, hearsay testimony

is inadmissible at trial.   Pa.R.E. 802.    Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803

provides exceptions to the hearsay rule, in pertinent part, as follows:

         Rule 803.       Exceptions to the Rule Against
         Hearsay―Regardless of Whether the Declarant Is
         Available as a Witness

         The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay,
         regardless of whether the declarant is available as a
         witness:

                                  *     *      *

         (3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical
         Condition. A statement of the declarant’s then-existing
         state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional,

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        sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain,
        or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory
        or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
        relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s will.

Pa.R.E. 803(3).

     Our Supreme Court has explained:

        “Pursuant to the state of mind hearsay exception, where a
        declarant’s out-of-court statements demonstrate [his] state
        of mind, are made in a natural manner, and are material
        and relevant, they are admissible pursuant to the
        exception.” [Commonwealth v.] Laich, [566 Pa. 19, 26,]
        777 A.2d [1057,] 1060–61 [(2001)]. Axiomatically, and by
        its unambiguous terms, the exception renders admissible
        only those statements that reflect the “declarant’s then-
        existing state of mind ... or condition,” Pa.R.E. 803(3), not
        someone else’s state of mind or condition. Nothing in the
        plain terms of the exception would allow, for instance, a
        party to introduce an out-of-court statement of one person
        to prove the intent, motive, feelings, pain, or health of
        another person. The bounds of the exception are limited to
        the then-existing state of mind of the declarant only.

Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 255 A.3d 452, 472 (2021)

(some quotation marks and case citations omitted).

     Additionally:

        A statement proffered under the state of mind hearsay
        exception is not per se admissible merely because it is an
        expression of the speaker’s then-existing mindset, with
        nothing more. The statement must also go to a “factor in
        issue”—i.e., it must be relevant to some contested aspect of
        the case. Laich[, supra at 26], 777 A.2d at 1061 (citation
        omitted). “The victim’s emotional state must relate to some
        legitimate issue in the case.” 2 McCormick on Evidence §
        276 (8th ed.). Finding relevance in a victim’s mindset in a
        criminal case is fairly uncommon.        Indeed, a crime
        victim’s state of mind typically is irrelevant and, thus,
        inadmissible. In murder cases in particular, it is the
        defendant’s “state of mind, not that of the victim,

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         which [is] material to establish the degree of guilt, if
         any, on the charge of criminal homicide.”
         Commonwealth v. Thornton, 494 Pa. 260, 431 A.2d 248,
         251 (1981)[.]

Fitzpatrick, supra at ___, 255 A.3d at 474 (emphasis added). “[W]hatever

purpose the statement is offered for, be it to show the declarant’s intention,

familiarity, or sanity, that purpose must be a ‘factor in issue,’ that is, relevant.”

Commonwealth v. Levanduski, 907 A.2d 3, 15-16 (Pa.Super. 2006) (en

banc), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 711, 919 A.2d 955 (2007), cert. denied, 552

U.S. 823, 128 S.Ct. 166, 169 L.Ed.2d 33 (2007). If the declarant’s state of

mind is “not a factor at issue in the case, the declarant’s statement is

immaterial and irrelevant to the prosecution’s case.” Id.

      Instantly, the trial court explained that it denied Appellant’s request to

admit statements that the victim allegedly made, because they were offered

to prove the victim’s state of mind and were inadmissible under our Supreme

Court’s ruling in Fitzpatrick. (See Trial Court Opinion at 24). To the extent

Appellant sought to admit victim’s statements as evidence of a third party’s

motive to kill the victim, the court excluded the proffered statements under

Fitzpatrick because the state of mind exception does not extend to a third-

party. (See id. at 24-25).

      We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the

statements allegedly made by the victim. See Montalvo, supra. Each of the

three proffered statements of the victim’s state of mind was irrelevant.

Notably, Appellant did not argue self-defense or that the victim committed

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suicide; thus, the victim’s state of mind was not directly relevant to the

elements of a specific defense. To the extent Appellant claims the statements

were relevant because they showed the victim’s intent and motive to shoot a

third party, the victim’s alleged motive to commit an unrelated crime is not

relevant to the prosecution against Appellant for killing the victim.        See

Fitzpatrick, supra; Levanduski, supra. Accordingly, Appellant’s first issue

on appeal merits no relief.2

       In his second issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred when it did

not question the jury about whether their concern for their safety—based on

their belief that Appellant’s associates were recording them—factored into the

guilty verdict. Appellant insists the court violated his constitutional right to a

fair trial when the court did not question the jurors to determine whether they

could remain fair or determine whether the jury was prejudiced by their fear

that people associated with Appellant were recording them.              Appellant

concludes that he is entitled to a new trial on this ground. We disagree.

       Preliminarily, we note that “[t]he Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate

Procedure specify that issues that are not first raised in the trial court are

____________________________________________

2 To the extent Appellant claims that the third statement, in which the victim

allegedly stated that he was going to shoot the person who had been
communicating with his girlfriend and then turn himself in, was admissible
under Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3) as a statement against interest, Appellant did not
raise this claim before the trial court.       As such, it is waived.       See
Commonwealth v. Cline, 177 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal
denied, 646 Pa. 735, 187 A.3d 210 (2018) (stating: “A new and different
theory of relief may not be successfully advanced for the first time on appeal”).

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waived on appeal. Even issues of constitutional dimension cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Strunk, 953 A.2d 577, 579

(Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

         It is well established that trial judges must be given an
         opportunity to correct errors at the time they are made.
         See Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272,
         274 (1974).      “[A] party may not remain silent and
         afterwards complain of matters which, if erroneous, the
         court would have corrected.” Id., quoting Commonwealth
         v. Marlin, 452 Pa. 380, 305 A.2d 14, 16 (1973) (citations
         omitted). Even where a defendant objects to specific
         conduct, the failure to request a remedy such as a mistrial
         or curative instruction is sufficient to constitute waiver.
         See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 501 Pa. 162, 460
         A.2d 739 (1983) (claim of prosecutorial misconduct waived
         where defense counsel immediately objected to the
         prosecutor’s conduct but failed to request mistrial or
         curative instructions); Commonwealth v. Chimenti, [524
         A.2d 913, 921 (Pa.Super. 1987)] (issue was waived where
         defense counsel objected to a question posed by the
         prosecutor but failed to ask the trial judge to do anything
         further after the question had been answered).

Strunk, supra at 579-80.

      Further, “[i]n criminal trials, declaration of a mistrial serves to eliminate

the negative effect wrought upon a defendant when prejudicial elements are

injected into the case or otherwise discovered at trial.” Commonwealth v.

Jaynes, 135 A.3d 606, 615 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted). We review

a trial court’s determination of whether prejudicial error occurred and whether

a defendant is entitled to a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Id.

      Here, the trial court accurately summarized the record as it pertains to

this issue as follows:

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       At the start of the third day of trial, the jury informed [the
       trial court] that someone had been trying to film them, or
       was in fact, filming them as they left the courtroom outside
       the courtroom, and out to the parking lot. At that time,
       counsel agreed that the sheriff in charge would get a
       description and try to assure the jurors that the appropriate
       steps would be taken. A sheriff would be tuned in to see if
       anybody was trying to do anything in the courtroom, and, if
       so, the phone would be confiscated. In addition, at the
       lunch break and at the end of the day, the jury would be
       sent out, and no one else would be permitted to leave the
       courtroom until the appropriate time. Neither counsel
       raised anything further on this issue at that time.

       During jury deliberations, this [c]ourt received a
       communication from the jury, “Due to prior recording by
       individuals related to [Appellant] which may include license
       plates, the jury is concerned with safety measures once the
       verdict has been read. Will any measures be taken to
       ensure the jury’s safety after the trial?” On-the-record this
       [c]ourt stated that counsel, the [c]ourt, the sheriff and the
       sheriff’s supervisor, conferred and agreed that the Sheriff
       Deputy Brian Lukens would be permitted to go into the jury
       room and read from a piece of paper with language we
       agreed on that says as follows, “As soon as the verdict has
       been given to the judge, deputies will make sure you are all
       escorted to your vehicles and off the property prior to
       releasing anyone from the courtroom. We will not allow
       anyone to follow you to your cars. Is everyone parked in
       the same lot? If not, where?” It was learned that one juror
       was getting picked up and not in the lot. It further stated,
       “If you have further concerns, please put it in writing signed
       by the foreperson.” Immediately after that communication
       with the jury, this [c]ourt was made aware that the jury had
       reached a verdict. Neither the Commonwealth, nor defense
       counsel had anything to add to what was placed on the
       record.

       At the conclusion of the trial and after the jury was
       dismissed, defense counsel put an issue on-the-record that
       was spoken about when the jury communication was
       received, namely that he believed that the jury should have
       been asked whether or not the conduct was going to have
       or was having any influence on their verdict; or when they

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         rendered their verdict, did that conduct have any influence
         on their verdict. The Commonwealth responded that there
         was no evidence that the jury did anything other than
         deliberate in good faith or that the deliberations were
         compromised in any way by an outside influence. This
         [c]ourt agreed with the Commonwealth that there was no
         evidence that the deliberations were compromised.
         Additionally, the way things developed the jury reached its
         verdict and then they had this concern and they wanted
         their concern addressed before the verdict was announced.
         Finally, this [c]ourt stated that it would not have questioned
         the jury in this manner even if they had not been dismissed.

         Initially, when the issue of [video recording] was brought to
         this [c]ourt’s attention at the start of the third day of trial,
         a proposal of how to handle the situation was set forth and
         agreed to by the Commonwealth and defense counsel. The
         plan was to make sure the jurors[’] safety concerns were
         addressed and to prohibit anyone from further engaging in
         the reported behavior. There is no evidence or allegation
         that this plan was not effective. There were no further
         reports that jurors were being videotaped by those
         observers in the courtroom associated with [Appellant].

(Trial Court Opinion at 30-32).

      Upon review, we conclude that Appellant waived any claim with respect

to the procedure put in place to address the jury’s concern about being

recorded.   Appellant did not raise any objection to the procedure initially

discussed on the third day of trial, nor did he object to the procedure put in

place by the court at the close of jury deliberations, and he did not move for

a mistrial. Instead, Appellant made only a belated request to question the

jurors, after the court had already discharged them.        Therefore, Appellant

waived his second issue on appeal by failing to object at the appropriate stage

of the proceedings. See Strunk, supra.

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      In his third issue, Appellant argues the verdict rendered by the jury was

against the weight of the evidence. Specifically, Appellant claims that there

was no concrete evidence or motive established to support the verdict.

Appellant reasserts his version of the facts in this argument section and

maintains that “[t]his version of the facts should shock one’s sense of

justice[.]” (Appellant’s Brief at 54). Appellant concludes the trial court should

have granted his post-sentence motion for a new trial, and this Court must

grant relief. We disagree.

      When examining a challenge to the weight of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

            The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder
            of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the
            evidence and to determine the credibility of the
            witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute its
            judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we may
            only reverse the…verdict if it is so contrary to the
            evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

         Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight
         claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the
         underlying question of whether the verdict is against the
         weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited
         to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in
         ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408

(2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004)

(internal citations omitted). A “trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial

based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings.”

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 603 Pa. 340, 363, 983 A.2d 1211, 1225 (2009),

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cert. denied, 560 U.S. 909, 130 S.Ct. 3282, 176 L.Ed.2d 1191 (2010). “[I]f

there is any support in the record for the trial court’s decision to deny the

appellant’s motion for a new trial based on weight of the evidence, then we

must affirm.” Commonwealth v. McFarland, 278 A.3d 369, 385 (Pa.Super.

2022), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 291 A.3d 863 (2023) (quoting Corvin

v. Tihansky, 184 A.3d 986, 992-93 (Pa.Super. 2018)).

      Instantly, the record supports the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s post-

sentence motion seeking a new trial based on Appellant’s challenge to the

weight of the evidence.    See McFarland, supra.        Based on the evidence

adduced at trial, as set forth above, we cannot say that the trial court palpably

abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim. See Champney, supra.

Thus, Appellant’s third issue merits no relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 11/8/2023

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