Court Opinion

ID: 9676079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:14:03.862373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:43.524755
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING.
DAVIDSON, Judge.
Appellant insists that error is reflected in the action of the trial court in overruling his motion for severance. In this connection, because of the trial court’s qualification to the bill of exception to the effect that it was his “opinion” that the granting of a severance would have necessitated a continuance of the case, appellant challenges the conclusion in our original opinion upholding the trial court’s ruling. He stresses that the “opinion” of the trial court as to this matter is not a certificate, in fact, that the granting of the severance would “operate as a continuance,” as provided by Art. 651, C. C. P.
*579Of course, the “opinion” of the trial court does not constitute such “fact,” and merely the trial court’s “opinion” that the granting of the severance would operate to continue the case does not meet the statutory requirement. But, here, the bill of exception shows that at the time of the hearing of the application for severance evidence was heard which is incorporated in the bill. This evidence warrants the trial court in concluding that the granting of the severance would have operated to continue the case.
We remain convinced that reversible error is not reflected in the overruling of the motion to sever.
Appellant insists that his motion to quash the venire was well taken. The bill of exception presenting this matter shows that, upon the motion of the state, a special venire of two hundred fifty names was ordered drawn in this and another capital felony case. The order was in the usual form and contained no reference whatsoever as to whether the sheriff was to summon the veniremen in person or by first-class mail, as provided by Art. 597, C. C. P., as amended.
The veniremen were summoned by the sheriff by first-class mail. Before overruling the motion to quash, the trial court dictated a nunc pro tunc order, directing the sheriff of Bexar County to summon the veniremen by mail.
There is nothing to show that this nunc pro tunc order was the order that was, in truth and in fact, made by the trial court in the first instance, or that the order as actually then made and entered of record was incorrect and subject to being impeached by the nunc pro tunc order.
Nunc pro tunc means “now for then,” and its purpose is to give effect to and record that which was in fact done but which was not correctly entered of record. It is not the purpose of a nunc pro tunc order to make, nor does it have the legal effect of making, a new and an independent order and entering that new order of record as to a transaction having occurred at a prior date.
Inasmuch as the order for the venire as actually entered herein was not impeached and there was no testimony showing that in fact the trial court did, at the time the special venire was ordered, also direct the sheriff as to the method to be pursued in summoning the veniremen, this question must be de*580termined upon the sufficiency of the order first entered, which made no reference to whether the veniremen were to be summoned in person or by mail.
The mode and manner of service or summoning the venire is a procedural matter, and non-compliance therewith constitutes error only when injury has been shown. Matthews v. State, 156 Tex. Cr. R. 275, 239 S. W. 2d 817. As to this, the bill of exception does not reflect the number of veniremen who actually attended and were present in court in answer to the summons by mail; the bill of exception does reflect that, without appellant’s exhausting all his challenges, a jury was obtained from those who did appear.
We remain convinced that the appellant has failed to show injury in the overruling of his motion to quash the venire.
Believing that a correct conclusion was reached originally, the motion for rehearing is overruled.
Opinion approved by the court.