Court Opinion

ID: 9956914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 14:06:48.738276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:58.741417
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-569

                                 JAMES MORETTI

                                       vs.

                             LAURIE A. BRUMGARD.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The plaintiff, James Moretti, appeals from an order

 allowing the motion of the defendant, Laurie A. Brumgard, for a

 directed verdict on Moretti's unjust enrichment and quantum

 meruit claims. 1    We affirm.

       Background.     We summarize the core facts in the light most

 favorable to the plaintiff.         See Nickerson v. Flynn-Morris, 103

 Mass. App. Ct. 703, 704 (2024).          In 2007, Moretti and Brumgard

 met, and Brumgard moved in with Moretti about five months later.

 In October 2009, Brumgard bought a home in Wakefield.               Moretti's

 name was not on the title, and he did not contribute to the down

 1 Moretti also appeals the judgment on the jury verdict on his
 conversion claim, speculating that the jury might have found
 that Brumgard converted his property if the judge had not
 granted the motion for a directed verdict on his unjust
 enrichment claim. Because we conclude that the judge did not
 err by directing the verdict, we do not reach this argument.
payment on the home.    Moretti contributed $1,000 per month to

the mortgage payments for seven to eight months. 2   Brumgard paid

over $150,000 toward the mortgage during the time they lived at

the Wakefield home.

     Moretti orally promised that he would renovate the

Wakefield home to compensate for Brumgard's financial

investment.    He did not formalize this arrangement because it

was motivated by his love for Brumgard and desire to make the

Wakefield property "a nice home for [her] to live in."    He

renovated parts of the home, including replacing the front

walkway, re-flooring the living room, and installing new

cabinets.   All building materials were purchased with Brumgard's

credit card.    Moretti testified that he reimbursed Brumgard for

the cost but did not specify an amount or produce any

documentary evidence to buttress his testimony.

     In January 2013, Brumgard sold the Wakefield home and

bought a home in Middleton for about $525,000.    Moretti was not

listed on either the purchase and sale agreement or the mortgage

settlement statement for the Middleton home.    Brumgard made the

down payment, at least in part, using proceeds from the sale of

2 Moretti testified that he paid up to $8,000, but he did not
produce any documentary evidence and Brumgard testified he paid
nothing. We recite the evidence in the light most favorable to
Moretti.

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the Wakefield home.   Moretti made some renovations to the

Middleton home, including painting, landscaping, and re-tiling.

     In or around 2015, Moretti and Brumgard's relationship

became strained.   Brumgard eventually moved to Canada for work,

while Moretti continued to live at the Middleton home without

paying rent until the relationship ended in 2018.    Moretti

retrieved some of his personal property from the Middleton home

and left other personal property.

     Discussion.   "In reviewing a motion for a directed verdict,

we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and disregard that favorable to the moving

party."   Nickerson, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at 708.   We evaluate

"whether anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived,

any combination of circumstances could be found from which a

reasonable inference could be made in favor of the [nonmovant]."

Id., quoting Parsons v. Ameri, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 96, 105 (2020).

     "A claim in quantum meruit is closely related to a claim

for unjust enrichment."   Sugarman & Sugarman, P.C. v. Shapiro,

102 Mass. App. Ct. 816, 820 n.7 (2023), citing Salamon v. Terra,

394 Mass. 857, 859 (1985).   However, they are two distinct

causes of action with different requirements.     We agree with the

trial judge that the evidence was insufficient to support either

claim.

                                 3
     1.   Unjust enrichment.   "Unjust enrichment occurs when a

party retains the property of another against the fundamental

principles of justice or equity and good conscience" (quotation

and citation omitted).   Bonina v. Sheppard, 91 Mass. App. Ct.

622, 625 (2017).   "The plaintiff must establish not only that

the defendant received a benefit, but also that such a benefit

was unjust.   Whether the benefit was unjust turns on the

reasonable expectations of the parties."    (Quotations and

citations omitted.)   Id.   Further,

     "[i]f two persons have formerly lived together in a
     relationship resembling marriage, and if one of them owns a
     specific asset to which the other has made substantial,
     uncompensated contributions in the form of property or
     services, the person making such contributions has a claim
     in restitution against the owner as necessary to prevent
     unjust enrichment upon the dissolution of the
     relationship."

Id., quoting Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust

Enrichment § 28(1) (2011).

     Here, Moretti argues that his renovations to the two homes

were "substantial contributions" that more than compensated

Brumgard for the value of his living in the homes, thus unjustly

enriching her at his expense.    He claims that his renovations

resulted in a higher sale price for the Wakefield home, as well

as an increase in value for the Middleton home.    However, the

evidence does not support Moretti's assertions.

                                  4
      Moretti presented no evidence to establish either the value

of his labor or what he spent out-of-pocket for the materials,

purchased on Brumgard's credit cards, used to renovate the

homes.    Nor did he present competent evidence that any

appreciation in value to either home was due to his

contributions.    Instead, he merely offered photographs of the

homes and his own opinion of the Middleton home's value.    On the

other hand, there was uncontroverted evidence that Brumgard

spent an estimated $450,000 on mortgages, utilities, and

building materials for the two homes.    Even if we accept that

Moretti paid $1,000 per month for the first eight months at the

Wakefield home, he otherwise lived rent free for roughly eight

years in Brumgard's homes.    Moreover, there was no evidence that

Moretti expected to be compensated for any services he rendered.

To the contrary, Moretti testified repeatedly that he renovated

Brumgard's properties because he "love[d] her," not because he

thought that the renovations entitled him to a stake in the

home. 3   Cf. Bonina, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 622-626 (plaintiff

professional contractor contributed "countless hours" of his own

3 Moretti asserts that the judge erroneously imposed an
additional element on his unjust enrichment claim because the
judge referred to Moretti's lack of expectation of compensation.
We conclude that the judge applied the correct standard and
properly considered Moretti's expectations at the time he
rendered his services. See Bonina, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 625.

                                  5
labor and over $250,000 in renovations, maintenance, and

mortgage payments).

     We therefore discern no record evidence to support a

reasonable inference that Brumgard retained Moretti's property

"against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and

good conscience" (citation omitted).    Santagate v. Tower, 64

Mass. App. Ct. 324, 329 (2005).

     2.   Quantum meruit.   To recover under a theory of quantum

meruit, the plaintiff must prove that (1) he conferred a

measurable benefit upon the defendant; (2) he reasonably

expected compensation from the defendant; and (3) the defendant

accepted the benefit with the knowledge, actual or chargeable,

of the plaintiff's reasonable expectation.    Finard & Co., LLC v.

Sitt Asset Mgt., 79 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 229 (2011).

     Here, there was evidence that Moretti conferred a benefit

on Brumgard.   Although Brumgard paid professional contractors

and landscapers who contributed to many of the renovations,

Moretti himself renovated parts of the homes, including

landscaping, painting, and tiling.    However, as discussed above,

Moretti did not expect to be compensated for his labor, rather

he did the work because he loved Brumgard and wanted the homes

they shared to be "nice."    To the extent Brumgard accepted the

benefit of Moretti's contributions to the homes, there was no

expectation of monetary compensation for his work of which she

                                  6
should have been aware.      Thus, Moretti could not recover under a

theory of quantum meruit.

       The judge did not err by allowing the defendant's motion

for a directed verdict on the unjust enrichment and quantum

meruit claims.

                                        Judgment affirmed.

                                        By the Court (Hand,
                                          Hershfang & Brennan, JJ. 4),

                                        Assistant Clerk

Entered:    April 3, 2024.

4   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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