Court Opinion

ID: 9897124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:07:29.062922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:01.305715
License: Public Domain

THIRD DIVISION
                              DOYLE, P. J.,
                 GOBEIL, J., and SENIOR JUDGE FULLER

                   NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                   physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                   days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                              https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                  November 9, 2023

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A23A1259, A23A1623. LAWSON v. WEIDMAN (two cases).

      FULLER, Senior Judge.

      In these related appeals arising out of an action to set aside a conveyance,

defendant Rhonda Lawson challenges: (i) the trial court’s order granting the

plaintiff’s request for a temporary injunction, and (ii) the court’s subsequent order

granting summary judgment to the plaintiff. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss

in part the appeal in Case No. A23A1259 and otherwise affirm the trial court’s rulings

in each case.

      In July 2022, non-party Sanna Weidman executed a general power of attorney

(“POA”) in favor of Lawson. Pursuant to that POA, Lawson executed a quitclaim

deed the following November purporting to convey Sanna’s residence and the 11.36-

acre tract of surrounding land from Sanna to Lawson. County property tax forms filed
by Lawson state that she paid $1.00 for the property. Sanna died two days after the

conveyance. In January 2023, Sanna’s brother, George Weidman, III (as Sanna’s sole

heir at law), and Sanna’s estate filed this action against Lawson to set aside the

conveyance and for injunctive relief and an accounting.

      Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a temporary injunction

in February 2023 that, among other things: (i) barred Lawson from transferring or

encumbering the real property at issue, (ii) prohibited her from making transfers or

withdrawals from Sanna’s accounts, (iii) required Lawson to return any personal

property she removed from the premises and restore all funds transferred from certain

accounts, and (iv) directed her to provide an inventory and accounting. Lawson

appeals from that order in Case No. A23A1259.

      After George was appointed the administrator of Sanna’s estate, the trial court

substituted him as a plaintiff in that capacity. George thereafter moved for summary

judgment on his request to set aside the November 2022 quitclaim deed on the ground

that Lawson lacked the authority to make the conveyance. The trial court granted the

motion and set aside the deed in May 2023. Lawson appeals from that order in Case

No. A23A1623.

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                                 Case No. A23A1259

      1. In this appeal, Lawson challenges the February 2023 temporary injunction.

      (a) George has moved to dismiss this appeal in part, to the extent that the

temporary injunction pertains to the real property at issue. We agree with George that

the trial court’s ruling setting aside the quitclaim deed — which we affirm in Division

2, below — moots the temporary injunction as it relates to the property conveyance.

See generally McClain v. George, 267 Ga. App. 851, 853 (600 SE2d 837) (2004)

(observing that a final judgment superseded an earlier interlocutory injunction in the

same case and thereby rendered an appeal from the injunction moot); accord Cox v.

Smith, 244 Ga. 280, 280, 284 (2) (260 SE2d 310) (1979) (affirmance of judgment

denying reformation mooted temporary injunction of the right of foreclosure); see

also generally Veterans Parkway Developers v. RMW Dev. Fund II, 300 Ga. 99, 102

(793 SE2d 398) (2016) (“The purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the

status quo, as well as balance the conveniences of the parties, pending final resolution

of the litigation.”). We therefore dismiss in part the appeal in Case No. A23A1259

to the extent that it challenges temporary injunctive relief affecting the real property.

      (b) Lawson has not met her burden of establishing trial court error in the grant

of temporary injunctive relief concerning issues other than the real property.

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             Whether to grant a request for interlocutory injunctive relief is
      within the trial court’s discretion, and we will not reverse its decision
      unless the trial court made an error of law that contributed to the
      decision, there was no evidence on an element essential to relief, or the
      court manifestly abused its discretion. The purpose for granting
      interlocutory injunctions is to preserve the status quo, as well as balance
      the conveniences of the parties, pending a final adjudication of the case.

             When deciding whether to issue an interlocutory injunction, a trial
      court should consider whether: (1) there is a substantial threat that the
      moving party will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not
      granted; (2) the threatened injury to the moving party outweighs the
      threatened harm that the injunction may do to the party being enjoined;
      (3) there is a substantial likelihood that the moving party will prevail on
      the merits of its claims at trial; and (4) granting the interlocutory
      injunction will not disserve the public interest.

Denhardt v. Jones, 363 Ga. App. 865, 866 (2) (873 SE2d 234) (2022) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

      Lawson contends that: (i) the trial court erred by “failing to perform any

substantive analysis of the merits or balancing of the . . . equities”; (ii) there was no

evidence of irreparable harm or an inadequate remedy at law; (iii) the threat of harm

to George did not outweigh the threat of harm to Lawson; and (iv) the evidence was

insufficient to show that George likely would prevail on the merits.

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      As to the first of these contentions, Lawson identifies no authority suggesting

that the trial court was required to provide any particular quantum of analysis in its

order under the circumstances of this case. See Brittain v. State, 329 Ga. App. 689,

704 (4) (a) (766 SE2d 106) (2014) (“[A]n appellant must support enumerations of

error with argument and citation of authority, and mere conclusory statements are not

the type of meaningful argument contemplated by our rules.”) (citations and

punctuation omitted); see also Tolbert v. Toole, 296 Ga. 357, 363 (3) (767 SE2d 24)

(2014) (“It is [the appellant]’s burden, as the party challenging the ruling below, to

affirmatively show error from the record on appeal.”). Moreover, because she has not

provided a transcript of the evidentiary hearing that led to the temporary injunction,

we must presume that the evidence supported the trial court’s rulings. See Bollinger

v. State, 259 Ga. App. 102, 105 (2) (576 SE2d 80) (2003) (“[W]here the proof

necessary for determination of the issues on appeal is omitted from the record, the

appellate court must assume that the judgment below was correct and affirm.”)

(citation and punctuation omitted); see also Maree v. Phillips, 274 Ga. 369, 370 (2)

(552 SE2d 837) (2001) (absent a transcript, this Court will presume that the trial court

discharged its duty in compliance with the law); Denhardt, 363 Ga. App. at 867 (2)

(a) (“The trial judge is presumed to know the law and presumed to faithfully and

                                           5
lawfully perform the duties devolving upon him by law. This court will not presume

the trial court committed error where that fact does not affirmatively appear.”)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

      The absence of a transcript similarly dooms Lawson’s remaining challenges to

the temporary injunction. See Maree, 274 Ga. at 370 (2); Bollinger, 259 Ga. App. at

105 (2). Consequently, we affirm that part of the temporary injunction directed

toward issues other than the real property, to the extent that any such rulings were not

mooted by the grant of summary judgment to George.

                                 Case No. A23A1623

      2. In this appeal, Lawson contends that: (i) the trial court erroneously found

that the conveyance at issue here was an impermissible gift; (ii) she fully complied

with her fiduciary duties as Sanna’s agent; and (iii) she had the authority under

OCGA § 10-6B-40 to make the conveyance under the general POA in her favor.1 We

discern no error in the trial court’s ruling that Lawson lacked the authority to deed the

property to herself.

      1
         Sanna’s additional claims that the trial court “fail[ed] to adhere to the
summary judgment standard” and “disregard[ed] material issues of fact” raise no new
factual issues and thus are subsumed into her other arguments.

                                           6
      Our review of the trial court’s ruling involves the construction of OCGA § 10-

6B-40, which is a legal issue that we address de novo. See Hill v. First Atlantic Bank,

323 Ga. App. 731, 732 (747 SE2d 892) (2013). In so doing, “we must presume that

the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman,

294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Thus, absent clear evidence that a contrary meaning was intended by the legislature

(as reflected in the relevant statutory text), “we assign words in a statute their

ordinary, logical, and common meanings.” Turner v. Ga. River Network, 297 Ga. 306,

308 (773 SE2d 706) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted). While neither party

has identified, and research has not revealed, any Georgia appellate decisions

construing the POA statute at issue here, the result in this case follows from the plain,

unambiguous statutory language.

      OCGA § 10-6B-40 addresses various aspects of the authority of an agent acting

under a POA. Subsection (a) of the statute lists several actions with respect to the

disposition of property — including making a gift — that an agent may take only if

expressly granted the authority to do so in a POA. And subsection (b) (1) prohibits

an agent under a POA from creating in the agent an interest in the principal’s property

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where the agent is not related to the principal, absent an express grant of such

authority. The statute provides:

      Notwithstanding a grant of authority . . . [t]o do an act described in
      subsection (a) of this Code section, unless the power of attorney
      otherwise provides, an agent that is not an ancestor, spouse, or
      descendant of the principal, shall not exercise authority under a power
      of attorney to create in the agent . . . an interest in the principal’s
      property, whether by gift, right of survivorship, beneficiary designation,
      disclaimer, or otherwise.

OCGA § 10-60-40 (b) (1). The record contains no indication that Lawson is related

to Sanna. And the POA at issue here contains no language expressly granting Lawson

the authority to create in herself an interest in Sanna’s property, by way of gift or

otherwise.

      For these reasons, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to George

on the issue of Lawson’s authority to convey Sanna’s property to herself,

pretermitting whether the conveyance may be construed as a gift. We therefore affirm

the trial court’s judgment in Case No. A23A1623.

      Judgment affirmed in Case No. A23A1623. Appeal dismissed in part and

judgment affirmed in part in Case No. A23A1259. Doyle, P. J., and Gobeil, J.,

concur.

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