Court Opinion

ID: 9539120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:47:08.464235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:27.783516
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice,
with whom, COMPTON, Justice, joins, dissenting in part.
I cannot agree with the court’s holding that the superior court erred in vacating the arbitrator’s interim remedy of suspension without pay.
Our cases have established that the applicable non-statutory standard of review of arbitration decisions is that of “gross error” on the part of the arbitrator.1 We have defined “gross error” to mean “that only those mistakes which are both obvious and significant justify interference with an arbitrator’s award.”2 I believe that this standard was satisfied in the case at bar and thus would affirm the superior court’s vacation of the arbitrator’s Intermediate Award.3
In his Intermediate Award, the arbitrator declined to make a final determination as to whether just cause existed to discharge Harrison. As an interim remedy, the arbitrator “reduce[d] the [Department’s] order of dismissal to an order of suspension without back pay pending the hearing on the charges of misconduct in the Superior Court.” The superior court agreed with Harrison’s and PSEA’s contention that article 7, section l(r) of the collective bargaining agreement was explicit as to the appropriate employment status of a Department employee during the pendency of an investigation for misconduct.4 In reaching this *1099conclusion, the superior court reasoned that the remedy provided for in the arbitrator’s Intermediate Award did not “draw its essence from” the collective bargaining agreement; that the arbitrator did not have wide latitude to fashion an appropriate remedy because the agreement was “neither silent nor ambiguous on the point in controversy;” and that the proper remedy was expressly provided for within the four corners of the agreement.5
In my view the superior court correctly resolved the issue. The criminal investigation in the case at bar served as the “administrative investigation” contemplated by the collective bargaining agreement;6 the arbitrator concluded that because of the criminal prosecution and conviction of Harrison there was a basis (“just cause”) for the disciplinary action (discharge) taken against him by his employer. While there may have been a pre-indictment investigation by the Department prior to Harrison's discharge, the arbitrator determined that this investigation did not provide the basis for the discipline, since he vacated the discharge pending conclusion of the criminal proceeding.
Given the foregoing circumstances, I do not believe that the employee’s right to an administrative investigation and the corresponding bargained-for protections should be deemed eliminated if there is a criminal investigation but no independent administrative investigation. The collective bargaining agreement guarantees the employee full pay pending the determination of the basis for discipline. It would be unreasonable to find the agreement inapplicable when the basis for discipline is being determined in circumstances where criminal charges have been filed.

. Nizinski v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 509 P.2d 280, 283 (Alaska 1973).

. City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 628 P.2d 565, 567 (Alaska 1981) (footnote omitted).

. In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, 1428 (1960), the Supreme Court stated in part:
Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator’s words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.

.Article 7, section l(r) of the collective bargaining agreement states in part that:
[i]f during any investigation, the Employer determines it is necessary to relieve a member of regularly-assigned duties, the member shall be temporarily reassigned to "administrative" duties with full pay, benefits and retention of his classification until the investigation has been concluded and a course of action determined. This temporary reassignment will not be considered as a disciplinary measure, and shall not exceed thirty (30) days unless mutually agreed to.
*1099[Emphasis added.]

. Article 31 of the collective bargaining agreement states:
If there is any conflict between the terms of this Agreement, the Personnel Rules, memo-randa or the OPM, or other directives, the terms of this Agreement shall, in all cases, be controlling.
Article 10, section 5 of the agreement states in part, that:
The arbitrator shall not be empowered to rule contrary to, to amend or add to, or to eliminate any of the provisions of this Agreement.
See City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 628 P.2d 565, 567 (Alaska 1981).

. Article 7, section 1(d) states that:
Definition of "Administrative Investigation" shall be construed as: Any time the Employer initiates an investigation to determine the possibility of, or to establish a basis for discipline, suspension or dismissal, whether such investigation or interrogation is initiated by an internal, external, formal or informal complaint.