Court Opinion

ID: 9373660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:06:32.918276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.453735
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KATHY S. CYNOR,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         CH-0752-20-0574-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,                      DATE: May 31, 2022
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Thomas J. Cynor, Esquire, Woodstock, Illinois, for the appellant.

           Joshua N. Rose, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review and the appellant has filed a cross
     petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the agency action
     finding that the agency violated the appellant’s constitutional due process rights.
     For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the petition for review, GRANT the
     cross petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
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     the Central Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this
     Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant is employed as a GS-12 Supervisory Veterinary Medical
     Officer. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 17. On May 12, 2020, the agency
     issued the appellant a notice of proposed removal, charging her with (1) failure
     to enforce    safety   and   health   regulations,   and   (2)   neglect    of   duty.
     IAF, Tab 5 at 16-26.     The proposal notice included an explanation of the
     appellant’s rights, including her right to respond either orally, in writing, or both,
     and explaining that she “may cite extenuating circumstances, make any other
     representations [she] consider[s] appropriate, and/or submit affidavits or other
     evidence” in support of her reply. Id. at 24. The notice directed the appellant to
     submit her written reply to a Human Resources (HR) Specialist, providing both
     a physical address at the agency’s office in Minneapolis, and an email address .
     Id.
¶3         The appellant submitted a written response, consisting of 7 parts, 1 of
     which was a supplemental exhibit file, roughly 91 pages in length, containing
     exhibits supporting her claims and statements.        IAF, Tab 4 at 62-86, Tab 5
     at 4-13.     She sent the documents to the agency via email, except for the
     supplemental exhibit file, which she sent via Federal Express to the Minneapolis
     office. IAF, Tab 4 at 62-64. The appellant also participated in an oral reply,
     during which the deciding official took detailed notes that w ere provided to the
     appellant, and to which she submitted corrections.           IAF, Tab 4 at 27-61.
     Regarding the exhibits sent to the agency’s Minneapolis office, because of the
     COVID-19 pandemic, the agency had limited staffing in the office, and the HR
     specialist, who the supplemental exhibit file was sent to, was not physically
     present in the office and did not retrieve the supplemental exhibit file until
     October 2020, after the appellant had been removed. IAF, Tab 18 at 8 -9.
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¶4         After reviewing the other 6 parts of the appellant’s written reply, as well as
     the information provided during the oral reply, the deciding official issued a
     decision on August 13, 2020, mitigating the proposed removal to a 30 -day
     suspension. Id. at 21-26. The appellant filed a timely Board appeal, and during a
     status conference, it came to light that the deciding official had not reviewed the
     appellant’s supplemental exhibit file prior to issuing the agency decision.
     IAF, Tab 10. Because due process is a threshold issue, the administrative judge
     bifurcated the appeal to address the potential due process violation first, and the
     parties submitted briefing on that issue.     IAF, Tabs 13-14, 16, 18, 21.     After
     reviewing the parties’ submissions, the administrative judge issued an initial
     decision reversing the agency action, finding that the deciding official’s failure to
     consider the appellant’s supplemental exhibit file deprived her of a meaningful
     opportunity to be heard and therefore constituted a due process violation.
     IAF, Tab 23, Initial Decision (ID) at 9-11.
¶5         The agency filed a petition for review, asserting that the administrative
     judge erred in finding a constitutional due process violation because:        (1) he
     failed to apply the proper analysis which requires a balancing of the employee’s
     interests, the government interests, and the actual procedural protections
     provided; (2) under that three-part balancing test, the agency provided the
     appellant with constitutional due process; and (3) the obligation to review the
     supplemental exhibit file is procedural and governed by the harmful error
     standard, which the appellant did not meet because she did not establish that
     reviewing the document would have changed the agency’s decision. Petition for
     Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 7-16.         The appellant responded, opposing the
     agency’s petition for review, and filing a cross petition for review arguing that
     the appeal should be remanded because the administrative judge did not allow her
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     to pursue her affirmative defense of whistleblower retaliation. 2 PFR File, Tab 11.
     The agency replied in opposition to the appellant’s response and cross petition for
     review. PFR File, Tab 13.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The agency did not violate the appellant’s constitutional due process rights.
¶6         In finding a constitutional due process violation, the administrative judge
     reasoned that the appellant did not receive a meaningful opportunity to respond
     because the deciding official failed to consider her supplemental exhibit file,
     which contained “highly relevant” documents “intended to bolster what would
     otherwise be naked allegations.”      ID at 8-9.    He also explicitly rejected the
     agency’s argument that it satisfied due process requirements because it
     considered all of her other submissions, both oral and written, noting that in the
     proposal notice the agency invited the appellant to present documentary evidence,
     and thus the appellant was “entitled to have that evidence considered and afforded
     the proper weight in the deciding official’s deliberations before a decision is
     rendered.” ID at 10 (emphasis omitted).
¶7         The administrative judge’s reasoning is flawed.        An agency’s failure to
     provide a tenured public employee with an opportunity to present a response to an
     agency action that deprives her of a property right in employment constitutes an
     abridgement of her constitutional right to minimum due process of law, i.e., prior
     notice and an opportunity to respond.           Cleveland Board of Education v.
     Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). However, constitutional due process, as
     articulated in Loundermill, does not require that an employee have an opportunity

     2
       The appellant also requested that the Board strike the agency’s petition for review,
     arguing that it was nonconforming with the Board’s regulations because the agency
     submitted exhibits which address the merits of the charges in an attempt to establish
     that the appellant failed to show that any error was harmful. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16,
     Tabs 2-9, Tab 11 at 6-9. Because we are remanding this matter for further adjudication,
     the parties will have an opportunity to submit and respond to evidence regarding
     whether the appellant established harmful error.
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     to respond in writing and orally—it requires one or the other. In other words, due
     process requires that an employee have “[t]he opportunity to present reasons,
     either in person or in writing, why proposed action, should not be taken is a
     fundamental due process requirement.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
¶8         The Board has interpreted minimum due process to require an opportunity
     to respond either orally or in writing. For instance, in Kinsey v. Department of
     the Navy, 59 M.S.P.R. 226, 229 (1993), the appellant sent his written reply, which
     contained a request for an oral reply, before the expiration of the reply period, but
     it was received by the agency after the reply period had ended. The deciding
     official considered the appellant’s written reply, but did not afford him the
     opportunity to present an oral reply as he requested. Id. The Board determined
     that any error by the agency in failing to provide the appellant with an oral
     response was a procedural error, subject to the har mful error standard, and not
     an “error[] of a constitutional dimension warranting reversal of the action for
     failure to provide the appellant with minimum due process.” Id. Thereafter, the
     Board has relied on Kinsey for the proposition that, when an agency has provided
     an employee with an opportunity to make a written reply to a notice of proposed
     adverse action, its failure to afford her with an opportunity to make an oral reply
     does not violate her right to minimum due process. Ronso v. Department of the
     Navy, 122 M.S.P.R. 391, ¶ 13 (2015) (relying on Kinsey for the stated
     proposition); Hamilton v. U.S. Postal Service, 84 M.S.P.R. 635 ¶ 13 (1999)
     (same).
¶9         Thus, minimum due process is satisfied when an employee is afforded with
     an opportunity to present either a written response or an oral response —it does
     not require both. Here, it is undisputed that the appellant presented an o ral reply,
     which was considered by the deciding official.             IAF, Tab 4 at 27-61,
     Tab 18 at 8-9. Therefore, regardless of any errors in the agency’s consideration
     of her written reply, the agency met minimum due process requirements because
     it provided the appellant with an oral reply.      Accordingly, the administrative
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      judge erred in finding that the agency violated the appellant’s due process rights.
      ID at 10.

      On remand, the administrative judge should consider whether the agency’s failure
      to review the supplemental exhibit file constitutes harmful procedural error.
¶10        While the deciding official’s failure to review the supplemental exhibit file
      does not constitute a violation of due process, it may constitute harmful
      procedural error.   See Kinsey, 59 M.S.P.R. 226, 229-30 (applying the harmful
      error standard when the agency denied the appellant an oral reply but offered him
      an opportunity to submit a written reply). Under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A), the
      Board cannot sustain an agency’s decision if the employee “shows harmful error
      in the application of the agency’s procedures in arriving at such decision.”
      Stephen v. Department of the Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 681 (1991). Reversal
      of an action for harmful error is warranted where the procedural error, whether
      regulatory or statutory, likely had a harmful effect upon the outcome of the case
      before the agency. Id.
¶11        Because the record has not been fully developed on this issue, remand is
      required.   On remand, the administrative judge should determine whether the
      deciding official’s failure to consider the supplemental exhibit file constitutes
      harmful error. In order to prove harmful error under the statute and the Board’s
      regulations, an appellant must “prove that any procedural errors substantially
      prejudiced [her] rights by possibly affecting the agency’s decision.” Id. (quoting
      Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 661 (1985)). Harmful error cannot be presumed
      and the appellant bears the burden of showing that the procedural error was likely
      to have caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would
      have reached in the absence of the error. Mattison v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 14 (2016).
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      The administrative judge should have allowed the appellant to pursue her
      affirmative defense of whistleblower retaliation notwithstanding his finding of a
      due process violation.
¶12         The appellant argues in her cross petition for review that the administrative
      judge should have allowed her to pursue her affirmative defense of whistleblower
      retaliation even after reversing the agency action. PFR File, Tab 11 at 17-18. We
      agree.   Notwithstanding the administrative judge’s reversal of the agency’s
      action, the appellant could have been entitled to additional relief if she succeeded
      in proving her allegation that the agency’s action constituted retaliation for
      whistleblowing. Jenkins v. Environmental Protection Agency, 118 M.S.P.R. 161,
      ¶ 13 (2012). If the appellant established her affirmative defense that the agency’s
      action constituted a violation of her rights under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), she could
      have been entitled to further corrective action, such as attorney fees and
      consequential damages. Id. Thus, the appellant’s affirmative defense was not
      rendered moot by the administrative judge’s determination that she was deprived
      of minimum due process, and the appellant should have been allowed to pursue
      the claim.    See id., ¶ 14; see also Walton v. Department of Agriculture,
      78 M.S.P.R. 401, 403-04 (1998) (finding that an individual right of action appeal
      is not rendered moot when the agency completely rescinds the person nel action at
      issue if the appellant still has outstanding claims for consequential damages and
      corrective action).
¶13         Because we have reversed the administrative judge’s finding of a violation
      of the appellant’s constitutional due process rights, this matter is being remanded
      back to the regional office for further adjudication consistent with the decision .
      Regardless of whether the administrative judge determines that the agency
      committed harmful procedural error, he should allow the appellant to pursue her
      affirmative defense of whistleblower retaliation . Furthermore, he should issue
      an initial decision that identifies all material issues of fact and law, summarizes
      the evidence, resolves issues of credibility, and includes the administrative
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      judge’s conclusions of law and his legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on
      which that reasoning rests.      Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management,
      1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980) (explaining that an initial decision must identify all
      material issues of fact and law, summarize the evidence, resolve issues of
      credibility, and include the administrative judge’s conclusions of law and his
      legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on which that reasoning rests).

                                            ORDER
¶14         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Central
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                     /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.