Court Opinion

ID: 9393525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 15:05:15.105428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.750944
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 21-1727
                               Filed May 10, 2023

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF SHAUNA LEA KERBY
AND SHAWN MICHAEL KERBY

Upon the Petition of
SHAUNA LEA KERBY,
      Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning
SHAWN MICHAEL KERBY,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Randy V. Hefner,

Judge.

      Shauna Kerby appeals orders reinstating her children’s visits with their

father following a period of suspension while he was incarcerated for federal drug

crimes. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      Christina I. Thompson of Phil Watson, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

      Cynthia D. Hucks of Box and Box Attorneys at Law, Ottumwa, for appellee.

      Heard by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
                                          2

VAITHESWARAN, Judge.

       A mother of three children appeals orders reinstating visits with the

children’s father following a period of suspension while he was incarcerated for

federal drug crimes.

I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       Shauna and Shawn Kerby divorced in 2015. The district court granted the

parties joint legal custody of their three children and granted Shauna physical care,

subject to visits with Shawn for six overnights per fourteen-day period. In the

intervening years, the parties engaged in extensive litigation, much of it addressing

the consequences of Shawn’s addiction to opiates. That litigation informs the

orders that are the subject of this appeal.

       A year after the divorce, Shawn moved for temporary modification of his

child-support obligation. He attested that (1) his dentistry practice was shut down

following a federal “investigation into questioned prescriptions for pain narcotics”;

(2) he voluntarily surrendered his dentistry license pending the outcome of the

investigation; and (3) he began outpatient treatment for his dependence on

hydrocodone.      Shauna countered with a contempt application.         Following a

hearing, the district court found Shawn in contempt for failing to pay his child

support obligation of $4000 per month and for violating the dissolution decree in

other respects.

       Meanwhile, Shauna moved to Minnesota. A stipulation was drafted stating

Shauna would retain physical care of the children, with Shawn exercising some of

his weekend visits in Minnesota rather than Iowa. The parties further agreed that

Shawn would be subject to random drug testing and would provide the results to
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Shauna. The stipulation covered possible ongoing substance abuse by Shawn as

follows: “If Shawn fails any test, or is arrested for any drug or alcohol related

offense during that time, his parenting time provided for herein may be suspended

by the Court, and the custodial provisions herein may be modified, upon

application filed by Shauna.” The stipulation also addressed Shawn’s possible

conviction, as follows:

              The parties will continue to share joint legal custody of the
       children. However, in the event that Shawn is convicted of any
       criminal offense in excess of a misdemeanor, such event shall
       constitute a material and substantial change in circumstances, and
       the court may have grounds to modify any order concerning the legal
       custody and/or parenting schedule provided for herein.

Shawn and his attorney signed the stipulation and filed it with the district court,

together with an application to enforce it. Shauna resisted on the ground that

Shawn knowingly concealed his indictment and arraignment on federal charges,

rendering her participation in negotiations “not knowing and informed.” She sought

an order overruling the application and requiring Shawn’s visits to be supervised

in Minnesota pending final resolution of the federal charges.

       The district court adopted the stipulation, except a provision delegating

authority to a parenting coordinator. By this time, two years had elapsed since the

parties’ divorce.

       Toward the end of 2017, Shauna filed an application to suspend visitation

or grant supervised visitation on the ground that Shawn pled guilty to two federal

charges, both felonies.    Shawn resisted.     The district court noted Shawn’s

convictions for (1) obtaining hydrocodone by misrepresentation, fraud, deception

and subterfuge and (2) unlawful user and addict of a controlled substance in
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possession of a firearm.       The court also referenced his pretrial arrest and

incarceration for violation of pretrial release terms and his twenty-month sentence

and post-discharge supervised release.             The court concluded Shawn’s

“incarceration constitut[ed] an emergency permitting immediate suspension of the

parenting schedule.” Shawn was granted authority “to seek reinstatement of his

visitation/parenting time . . . upon written application.”

       Twenty-one months later, Shawn applied to modify the order suspending

visitation time. He alleged he “ha[d] achieved and maintained sobriety, ha[d]

achieved stability, and ha[d] been released from prison,” and it was in the children’s

best interests that “parenting time be reinstated.” The district court denied the

motion but stated the ruling would be reconsidered at a hearing in two months.

       Two months later, the district court found that Shawn “continue[d] to suffer

from significant substance abuse issues.” The court cited a discharge summary

from a sobriety institute Shawn attended diagnosing him with “[a]lcohol [u]se

[d]isorder-[s]evere” and stating Shawn “appear[ed] to have replaced his drug of

choice, opiates, with alcohol.” Also of concern to the court was a positive alcohol

reading two weeks after his discharge from the facility, despite the facility’s

requirement of total abstinence. In the court’s view, Shawn’s lack of contact with

the children for more than two years meant that initial contacts with them, “even

telephonic contacts,” would “be unsettling, at best, or traumatic, at worst.” The

court concluded Shawn was “not yet prepared to engage in those initial contacts.”

His request for temporary telephonic contact was denied.

       Trial on Shawn’s application to permanently modify the suspension order

was held nine months later. Shawn testified he last had contact with the children
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in 2018 and, in light of his lengthy absence, it “would be best” to have some sort

of reunification process. He stated he “wouldn’t have an issue” with in-person

supervised visits. Shauna countered that reinstatement of visits was not in the

children’s best interests given the anxiety the children experienced when they had

contact. She also cited Shawn’s unsafe visitation practices, his convictions, and

the potential for relapse.

       In a March 2021 order, the district court granted Shawn’s request to

terminate the emergency suspension of his parenting time, subject to

implementation of a professionally-supervised family reunification plan. Under the

plan, the professional was to “work with this family to restore within a reasonable

time [Shawn’s] parenting time with the children.” The court stated “any schedule”

would have to “provide [Shawn] with substantial time with the children.” The court

ordered the parties to submit a proposed parenting schedule within two and one-

half months.

       That time frame came and went without updates from either party.

Ultimately, Shauna filed a report recommending a Minnesota counseling service.

She noted that Shawn was informed of the recommendation three weeks earlier

but failed to respond. The district court scheduled the matter for hearing.

       A status conference was conducted later in the summer of 2021. The court

noted that the services of the identified counseling agency were retained but

sessions had not yet commenced. The court scheduled another status conference

for about two months later. Before the status conference, Shawn informed the

court that intake sessions had been scheduled with both parties. At the status

conference, the court found that the counseling service was “preparing a treatment
                                           6

plan” but a draft of the plan had yet to be provided to the parties. The court

scheduled “[a]nother status conference for October 5, 2021.” The order stated, “It

is the court’s intent that upon approval of a treatment plan that is intended to reunite

the children with their father, the court will enter a final order terminating active

court supervision over the reunification process.”

       The final status conference occurred as scheduled, six months after the

March 2021 order granting Shawn’s request to modify the suspension of his

visitation rights and ordering the retention of a family-reunification counselor. The

conference was conducted remotely, lasted nineteen minutes, and was non-

evidentiary. The parties discussed a reunification plan proposed by the retained

counselor two weeks earlier. Although Shawn’s attorney offered the plan as an

exhibit, the exhibit was not formally admitted and is not part of our record.1

Shauna, who represented herself and was not placed under oath, stated she made

some “safety-related” revisions as well as other revisions to ensure she was “able

to meet the needs of the counseling considering [her] other obligations.” She said

the counselor expected the reunification “might take six months to two years.”

       The district court expressed frustration with the pace of implementing the

reunification plan. The court told Shawn’s attorney to “prepare an order.” Just

then, Shauna dropped off the call, apparently without the court’s knowledge. The

court required the order to specify that the parties would obtain the treatment

1 We believe its non-inclusion in the record was inadvertent. The parties included
the reunification plan in the appendix. It contains a file-stamp, but our pleading
and exhibit binders do not contain a corresponding document. While we could
request correction of the record, our remand order renders such a request
superfluous.
                                         7

specified in the plan. The court then asked a question of Shauna.            Shawn

responded, “She’s gone.” The court continued, “Well, they shall comply with the

provisions of that treatment plan. A violation, a failure to comply with the terms of

the reunification plan may result in a finding of contempt of Court.” The court also

told Shawn’s attorney to specify “a drop dead date” for completion of the

reunification plan—possibly December 31, 2021—and include a “proposed

visitation schedule.” Counsel sought clarification as to whether the plan had to be

completed by December 31, 2021. The court stated that was not what was meant

and “[r]eunification therapy can continue past December 31, [2021].”

       An order captioned, “[d]ecree [m]odifying [v]isitation” was filed on

October 14, 2021.      The order stated, “The proposed reunification therapy

treatment plan should be approved and the court’s active supervision over the

reunification process should terminate.” The order further stated the reunification

plan would be made part of the decree and stated, “The parties shall immediately

implement this treatment plan and continue with such treatment until maximum

benefits have been attained,” on pain of contempt. “Consistent with the treatment

program,” the parties were to “cooperate to provide [Shawn] with reasonable time

with the children.”   Immediately following that portion of the order, the court

included the following paragraph: “Regardless of status of reunification therapy,

beginning on December 26, 2021, Shawn shall be entitled to in-person,

unsupervised visitation with the minor children . . . .”    The order specified a

visitation schedule of every third weekend, holidays, every spring break, and five

weeks in the summer. The order stated it was final. Shauna appealed.
                                          8

II.    Modification of Visitation

       “The parent seeking to modify child visitation provisions of a dissolution

decree must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a

material change in circumstances since the decree and that the requested change

in visitation is in the best interests of the children.” In re Marriage of Salmon, 519

N.W.2d 94, 95-96 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (citing In re Marriage of Frederici, 338

N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983)). There is no dispute that Shawn’s release from

prison constituted a material change of circumstances.         The only question is

whether the October 2021 order was in the children’s best interests.2

       Shauna argues the order was contrary to the children’s best interests. In

her view, it afforded Shawn “extremely liberal and unfettered access to the children

approximately three months from the date of the hearing regardless of the

pro[gr]ess made on the reunification therapy outlined in the detailed [reunification]

plan . . . and adopted by the Court.” Although Shauna requests reversal of the

visitation orders in their entirety, she does not alternatively challenge the

requirement or contents of the reunification plan which, as noted, is not in our

record.

       The plan, imposed at Shawn’s behest, was submitted after trial on his

application to modify the visitation order. We have no doubt about the court’s

authority to require it. See Iowa Code § 598.41(1) (2021) (allowing the placement

2 Shuana asks us to review the March 2021 order as well. She concedes it is an
interim order but argues that, together, they constitute “two halves of a final
decision.” We agree the March 2021 order informs the October 2021 order. But
the order subject to review is the October 2021 order. Cf. In re Marriage of Denly,
590 N.W.2d 48, 50 (Iowa 1999) (stating “temporary custody orders should not be
considered final judgments for purposes of appeal”).
                                           9

of conditions on a parent’s visitation rights to prevent “direct physical harm or

significant emotional harm to the child”); see also In re Marriage of Rykhoek, 525

N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (“Any conditions which are so imposed must be

in the best interests of the child.”); In re Marriage of Makela, No. 22-0304, 2022

WL 16985441, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2022) (stating testimony drawn from

father’s history “supported the district court’s gradual implementation of a visitation

plan”); Kettler v. Kettler, No. 21-0418, 2021 WL 4891086, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct.

20, 2021) (concluding modifications of decree provisions regarding a parent’s

“drug-testing” and “suspension of visitation” were “necessary to ensure the safety

of the children”). There is also no question that the court had authority to enforce

compliance with it, particularly in the face of the parties’ halting efforts to abide by

the March 2021 order.

       That said, key portions of the October 2021 order lack evidentiary support.

Even if we had the reunification plan before us, our de novo review reveals no

testimony from the counselor or parents on (1) how or when “maximum benefits”

would be attained under the plan, (2) what conduct could lead to a contempt

finding, or (3) the circumstances under which Shawn should be afforded

“reasonable time with the children” while complying with the reunification plan.

Most critically, the record lacks evidentiary support for the seemingly contradictory

provision categorically authorizing unsupervised visits within three months of the

order. Because the polestar of a visitation-modification action is the best interests

of the children and we have no evidence to support a conclusion that categorical

unsupervised visits are in the children’s best interests, we reverse the October
                                       10

2021 order.       We remand for an evidentiary hearing to address the matters

contained in the October 2021 order based on present circumstances.

       In light of the reversal and remand, we find it unnecessary to address

Shauna’s contention that the district court engaged in ex parte communications

with Shawn and his attorney after she dropped off the remote proceeding. As for

both parents’ requests for appellate attorney fees, we conclude neither is the

prevailing party, and we deny both requests. See Iowa Code § 598.36 (“In a

proceeding for the modification of an order or decree under this chapter the court

may award attorney fees to the prevailing party in an amount deemed reasonable

by the court.”)

       REVERSED AND REMANDED.