Court Opinion

ID: 9965089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 17:05:43.200673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:41.755338
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 240299
                                         No. 1-24-0299B
                                    Opinion filed May 1, 2024
                                                                                    Fifth Division
 ______________________________________________________________________________

                                     IN THE
                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                        )   Appeal from the
                                                             )   Circuit Court of
          Plaintiff-Appellee,                                )   Cook County.
                                                             )
     v.                                                      )   No. 23111491701
                                                             )
 MARQUISE RAMYYEH,                                           )   Honorable
                                                             )   Maryam Ahmad,
          Defendant-Appellant.                               )   Judge Presiding.

          JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court.
          Justices Mikva and Lyle concurred in the judgment.

                                           OPINION

¶1     Defendant Marquise Ramyyeh was charged with armed robbery with a firearm, and upon

the State’s petition, detained while awaiting trial. Ramyyeh now appeals the circuit court’s

detention order and contends that he was denied an opportunity for a fair detention hearing where

the prosecutor failed to tender to the defense certain information, as required by section 110-

6.1(f)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(1) (West

2022)), as amended by Public Acts 101-652 and 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known

as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). Specifically, Ramyyeh argues that he was entitled to: (1) the

video recorded statements of the complaining witnesses, not merely summaries of those
No. 1-24-0299B

statements; and (2) any and all police reports in the prosecutor’s possession at the time of his

detention hearing, including reports from a prior conviction, regardless of whether the defense had

access to those reports through other means. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the circuit

court’s detention order and remand the matter for a new detention hearing.

¶2                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶3     Ramyyeh and three codefendants were charged with armed robbery with a firearm.

Thereafter, the State filed a verified petition to detain Ramyyeh pretrial based on a theory of

dangerousness. At the beginning of Ramyyeh’s detention hearing, his defense counsel noted that

she had received a copy of the State’s petition, the original arrest report, the original case incident

report, supplemental reports, his criminal background, an inventory list from the Chicago Police

Department, three statements made by the complaining witnesses and a statement made by one of

his codefendants. Counsel observed that the complaining witnesses made their statements in video

recorded interviews, but that the prosecutor only tendered written summaries of those interviews.

At the bottom of two of those summaries, they noted: “See interview for the entire statement.”

Although the third summary did not contain that notation, it did note the statement was video

recorded. Counsel argued that, under section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(1)

(West 2022)), the defense was entitled to the entirety of the statements. In response, the prosecutor

asserted that the State did not have access to the video recorded statements and only had access to

the summaries. Therefore, according to the prosecutor, all the State could tender to the defense

were the summaries. The court agreed with the prosecutor that the State’s obligation under section

110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code was to tender only what was in its possession, and thus, the court found

the State complied with the disclosure requirements.

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No. 1-24-0299B

¶4     The prosecutor subsequently proffered that, at around 9 a.m. on December 6, 2023,

Ramyyeh and his three codefendants arrived at a construction site in a stolen black Jeep. Three of

them jumped out of the vehicle wearing black masks and robbed three workers of their equipment

at gunpoint. One piece of equipment contained a GPS tracking device, which led responding

officers to the location of Ramyyeh and his codefendants, who were sitting in the Jeep no more

than 20 minutes after the robbery. After a foot chase, officers detained Ramyyeh and his

codefendants. The officers brought the victims to the scene, and two of them identified Ramyyeh

as one of the armed robbers based on his face and clothing. Upon searching Ramyyeh, officers

recovered a key fob belonging to the Jeep. Officers also recovered one firearm from the Jeep, two

firearms nearby and four black masks.

¶5     Later during the hearing, when the prosecutor discussed Ramyyeh’s criminal history, the

prosecutor asserted that Ramyyeh was on parole for an aggravated unlawful use of a weapon

conviction. As the prosecutor attempted to discuss the specifics of that case, apparently using an

arrest report from the case, defense counsel objected and asserted that she had not received any

information about the specifics of his prior case. Counsel, an assistant public defender, argued that,

while the office of the Cook County public defender might have information about Ramyyeh’s

prior case through past representation, section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code obligated the prosecutor

to tender any police reports in his possession and relied upon in the detention hearing. The circuit

court, however, remarked that adult criminal cases were public and given the resources of the Cook

County public defender’s office, counsel could have obtained the report. As such, the court found

that the prosecutor did not violate section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code. The prosecutor continued and

discussed the facts underlying Ramyyeh’s prior aggravated unlawful use of a weapon conviction,

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No. 1-24-0299B

in which he discarded a firearm during a police chase. The prosecutor also noted that Ramyyeh

had prior juvenile adjudications for burglary and possession of a stolen motor vehicle.

¶6     Ultimately, the circuit court found in a written order that the proof was evident, or the

presumption great, Ramyyeh committed armed robbery. The court concluded that Ramyyeh posed

a real and present threat to the safety of the community because he pointed a gun at three people

and robbed them of their equipment while being on parole for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon

with two prior juvenile adjudications. Finally, the court asserted no condition or combination of

conditions could mitigate that threat because Ramyyeh was part of a robbery crew, who robbed

three people in broad daylight at gunpoint. The court added orally during the hearing that, if being

on parole was “not encouragement enough,” it was “doubtful of any conditions” that would be

appropriate for him. The court therefore granted the State’s petition to detain Ramyyeh pretrial.

¶7     This appeal followed.

¶8                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶9     Ramyyeh contends that he was denied an opportunity for a fair detention hearing where he

was entitled to: (1) the video recorded statements of the complaining witnesses, not merely

summaries of those statements; and (2) any and all police reports in the prosecutor’s possession at

the time of his detention hearing, including reports from a prior conviction, regardless of whether

the defense had access to those reports through other means.

¶ 10   Both issues in this case require us to interpret section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(f)(1) (West 2022)), which provides that, prior to a detention hearing:

       “the State shall tender to the defendant copies of the defendant’s criminal history

       available, any written or recorded statements, and the substance of any oral

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No. 1-24-0299B

       statements made by any person, if relied upon by the State in its petition, and any

       police reports in the prosecutor’s possession at the time of the hearing.”

In interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s

intent. People v. Schoonover, 2021 IL 124832, ¶ 39. In doing so, the best indicator is the plain

language of the statute. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323 (2007). “In determining the plain

meaning of statutory terms, we consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it

addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it.” Id. If the statute’s language is

unambiguous and clear, we must apply the statute as written. Id. “We do not depart from the plain

language of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with

the expressed intent.” Id. at 324-25. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. People

v. Stoecker, 2014 IL 115756, ¶ 21.

¶ 11    Two cases, People v. Chapman, 2024 IL App (1st) 231879-U and People v. Morales, 2023

IL App (2d) 230334, are instructive in discussing the State’s disclosure requirements under section

110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code. 1 In Chapman, 2024 IL App (1st) 231879-U, ¶¶ 6, 9, 20, during the

prosecutor’s proffer in a detention hearing, she referred to surveillance video that was never

tendered to the defense, though she tendered a summary of the video. On appeal, the defendant

contended that he was entitled to the surveillance video itself under section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the

Code. Id. ¶ 18. After noting the language of that subsection, the appellate court asserted that the

subsection was “clear that the State is required to tender only reports and information in its

possession if relied upon by the State in its petition.” Id. ¶ 21. As the prosecutor “represented that

       1
          Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023), unpublished Rule 23 orders
filed on, or after, January 1, 2021, “may be cited for persuasive purposes.”

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No. 1-24-0299B

the video was in police custody, and not in the possession of the State,” the appellate court found

that the prosecutor complied with section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code. Id.

¶ 12   In Morales, 2023 IL App (2d) 230334, ¶ 2, the defendant’s case was being co-prosecuted

by the Lake County State’s Attorney and the Illinois Attorney General. Prior to the detention

hearing, the Lake County State’s Attorney’s Office tendered all information to the defense that it

relied on in filing the detention petition. Id. ¶ 7. On appeal, the defendant contended that the Lake

County State’s Attorney’s Office had to tender not just what it relied on in filing the petition, but

also all relevant documents in its possession or the possession of the Illinois Attorney General. Id.

¶¶ 6-7. The appellate court rejected such a broad disclosure obligation and instead concluded that

the Lake County State’s Attorney’s Office “was required to disclose only the information that it

relied upon in filing the petition to deny pretrial release.” Id. ¶ 8. As the Lake County State’s

Attorney’s Office “disclosed all the information it relied upon in filing its petition,” the appellate

court found that it complied with section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code. Id.

¶ 13   Together, Chapman and Morales instruct that, under section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code, the

State only must tender to the defense “reports and information in its possession” (Chapman, 2024

IL App (1st) 231879-U, ¶ 21) and “relied upon in filing the petition to deny pretrial release.”

Morales, 2023 IL App (2d) 230334, ¶ 8.

¶ 14                              A. Video Recorded Statements

¶ 15   With the construction of section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code, as analyzed by Morales and

Chapman, in mind, we turn to Ramyyeh’s argument that he was entitled to the video recorded

statements of the complaining witnesses, not merely summaries of those statements, under section

110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code. In the present case, as in Chapman, the prosecutor asserted that the State

did not have possession of the video recorded statements and only had possession of the

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No. 1-24-0299B

summaries. As the State did not have possession of the video recorded statements, the prosecutor

had no obligation to tender them. See Chapman, 2024 IL App (1st) 231879-U, ¶ 21.

¶ 16   Nevertheless, Ramyyeh asserts that, based on the plain language of section 110-6.1(f)(1),

the State must tender a video recorded statement if it relies upon that statement regardless of if it

has possession of the statement. However, to construe section 110-6.1(f)(1) as such would be

inconsistent with section 110-6.1(f)(4) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(4) (West 2022)).

Although that section initially discusses the process and standards for the defense to compel the

testimony from a complaining witness, it also provides that: “The State shall tender to the

defendant, prior to the hearing, copies, if any, of the defendant’s criminal history, if available, and

any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by any person,

if in the State’s Attorney’s possession at the time of the hearing.” Id. To find under section 110-

6.1(f)(1) that Ramyyeh was entitled to the video recorded statements from the complaining

witnesses despite them not being in the State’s possession would conflict with the language of

section 110-6.1(f)(4) and prevent the two subsections from being harmonious. See People v. Maya,

105 Ill. 2d 281, 286 (1985) (asserting “it is presumed that statutes which relate to one subject are

governed by one spirit and a single policy, and that the legislature intended the enactments to be

consistent and harmonious”).

¶ 17   While the State is required to tender the video recorded statements of the complaining

witnesses under the normal rules of discovery (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 412(a)(i) (eff. Mar. 1, 2001)),

“[t]he pre-trial detention hearing is not to be used for purposes of discovery, and the post

arraignment rules of discovery do not apply.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(4) (West 2022). Because the

State did not have possession of the video recorded statements, the prosecutor had no obligation

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No. 1-24-0299B

to tender them. See Chapman, 2024 IL App (1st) 231879-U, ¶ 21. Consequently, the State did not

violate section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code.

¶ 18                           B. Police Reports in the Prosecutor’s Possession

¶ 19   We next address Ramyyeh’s argument that he was entitled to any and all police reports in

the prosecutor’s possession at the time of his detention hearing, including reports from a prior

conviction, regardless of whether the defense had access to those reports through other means. As

noted, under section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(1) (West 2022)), prior to a

detention hearing, “the State shall tender to the defendant copies of *** any police reports in the

prosecutor’s possession at the time of the hearing.” Ramyyeh acknowledges that the Cook County

State’s Attorney’s Office, as the prosecuting entity responsible for all criminal charges in Cook

County, would likely have every single police report from every past criminal encounter with a

particular defendant in its possession. But he does not claim a defendant is entitled to every single

police report from every past criminal encounter. Rather, Ramyyeh posits that, on the day of a

particular defendant’s detention hearing, if the prosecutor handling the hearing has police reports

in his or her possession, all of those reports must be tendered to the defense prior to the hearing.

In turn, Ramyyeh posits that the prosecutor should have disclosed the arrest report of his prior

aggravated unlawful use of a weapon conviction used during his detention hearing.

¶ 20   We agree with Ramyyeh that the prosecutor should have tendered the police report from

his prior aggravated unlawful use of a weapon case. The prosecutor indisputably had possession

of the report and relied on the report during the detention hearing. As such, based on Chapman

and Morales, the prosecutor had an obligation to tender that report to the defense. See Chapman,

2024 IL App (1st) 231879-U, ¶ 21; Morales, 2023 IL App (2d) 230334, ¶ 8. It is true that the

defense may have had access to the report through other means, whether due to the resources of

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No. 1-24-0299B

the Cook County public defender’s office or through the prior representation of Ramyyeh in that

case. But the possibility of access did not obviate the requirement that the prosecutor tender to the

defense a police report that he had in his possession and relied on during the detention hearing.

See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(1) (West 2022). Consequently, the prosecutor did not comply with

section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code.

¶ 21    As for the remedy for the prosecutor’s noncompliance, relying on People v. McCarthy-

Nelson, 2024 IL App (4th) 231582-U, Ramyyeh requests that we vacate his detention order and

remand the matter for a new hearing to determine the least restrictive conditions of release. In

McCarthy-Nelson, the circuit court failed to hold a hearing on the State’s petition for pretrial

detention within 48 hours of the defendant’s initial appearance, as required by the Act. Id. ¶¶ 11-

13. Given this noncompliance, the appellate court concluded that the proper remedy was to remand

the case back to the circuit “court for the purpose of promptly holding a hearing to determine the

least restrictive conditions of [the] defendant’s pretrial release.” Id. ¶ 18. The appellate court noted

that, if it “allow[ed] the State to again petition the court to deny [the] defendant pretrial release on

remand, it would have little incentive to comply with the timing requirements of the statute in other

cases,” and therefore, “[t]here would be no consequence for its failure to comply with the

unambiguous language of the statute.” Id.

¶ 22    We disagree that such a drastic remedy is warranted in this case due to the prosecutor’s

noncompliance with section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code. In People v. Mezo, 2024 IL App (3d)

230499, the appellate court discussed the appropriate remedy for noncompliance with section 110-

6.1(f)(1) of the Code. There, the State failed to tender the defense copies of the defendant’s

available criminal history, as required by section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code, thus rendering the

defendant’s hearing deficient. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. As for the remedy for the State’s noncompliance, the

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No. 1-24-0299B

appellate court reversed the circuit court’s detention order and remanded the case for a new hearing

on the State’s petition. Id. ¶ 11. As such, following Mezo, based on the prosecutor’s noncompliance

with section 110-6.1(f)(1) of the Code, we reverse the circuit court’s detention order and remand

the matter for a new detention hearing on the State’s petition.

¶ 23                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24   For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and

remand for a new detention hearing.

¶ 25   Reversed and remanded.

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No. 1-24-0299B

                    People v. Ramyyeh, 2024 IL App (1st) 240299

Decision Under Review:     Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No.
                           23111491701; the Hon. Maryam Ahmad, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                  Sharone R. Mitchell Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Tressa
for                        Palcheck, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                  Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (David H.
for                        Iskowich, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.
Appellee:

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