Court Opinion

ID: 9860909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:36:24.584652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:52.161783
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: I agree with the majority that the facts of this case are analogous to those in People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67 (1999). However, for the same reasons that led me to dissent in Linder, I believe that defendant in this case did not have to move to withdraw his guilty plea before challenging the length of his sentence on appeal. Defendant in this case pled guilty to one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault and three counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. In exchange for this guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss several other charges against defendant. The agreement did not specify the sentence defendant would receive; however, the State did agree not to seek extended-term sentences against defendant. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 20 years in prison on the aggravated criminal sexual assault charge, and concurrent three-year terms on each of the aggravated criminal sexual abuse charges. Defendant then filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court denied. Defendant appealed. The majority today holds that defendant should not be permitted to appeal the length of his sentence without first moving to withdraw his guilty plea. According to the majority, by entering into the plea deal with the State, defendant impliedly agreed not to challenge any non-extended-term sentence which the trial court might impose. The majority relies upon the reasoning of this court’s opinion in People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67 (1999), in which a majority of this court held that a defendant entering into a plea agreement which includes a sentencing cap impliedly agrees not to challenge any sentence falling underneath that cap. I dissented in Linder. In that case, I noted that: “Presumably, if the State and the defendants had been able to agree on an appropriate sentence, they would have decided to recommend that specific sentence to the trial court. In the absence of such agreement, neither party was entitled to expect the entry of any particular sentence within the recommended range. In other words, at the time a plea agreement involving a sentencing cap is accepted by the trial court, the appropriate sentence, as far as the two parties are concerned, has yet to be determined. A defendant thus does not violate any term of such an agreement by seeking reconsideration of the sentence imposed by the trial court. This situation is no different than that where a defendant enters an open or blind plea, thus exposing himself to the maximum statutory sentence. In such a case, the maximum sentence is the cap. In that situation, the defendant may challenge the length of his sentence without moving to withdraw his plea of guilty. [Citation.]” Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 82 (Heiple, J., dissenting). So too, in the instant case, defendant and the State were unable to agree as to the appropriate sentence for defendant’s crimes. Accordingly, at the time the parties entered into the plea agreement, the appropriate sentence was yet to be determined. The parties in this case surely could have expressly agreed that defendant would not challenge any non-extended-term sentence. Indeed, if the parties had so agreed, it would obviously have been in the interest of the State to memorialize that understanding. The fact that the record in this case does not reflect such a meeting of the minds, however, strongly indicates that the State and defendant did not reach that agreement. Under these circumstances, there is no reason why this court should feel compelled to award the State concessions which it was unable to win at the bargaining table. For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that defendant did not violate any term of his agreement by challenging the length of the sentence imposed by the trial court. Accordingly, defendant should have been permitted to appeal the length of his sentence without first moving to withdraw his guilty plea. I therefore dissent.