Court Opinion

ID: 9688385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:45:09.101575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:37.939230
License: Public Domain

McGehee,
(dissenting).
The majority opinion herein contains a fair and accurate statement of the salient facts in connection with the commission of the homicide in this case from the time that the victim thereof came into the presence of the *252.accused in the woods on, the occasion of the killing. It also correctly reveals what transpired after the body of the game warden, Prank W. Stuart, had been found; the prominence ■ and influence of the Stuart family in Pearl River County; the size of the special venire ordered/for the trial of the case; the number of special veniremen who were excused because of illness or other like causes ; and the number who were excused because they stated that they had fixed opinions as to the guilt or innocence of the accused which could not be changed by evidence— a nonexistent state of mind for any person of fair intelligence. and sound judgment to have, if the assertion of such a fixed opinion is to be taken literally. However, as stated in the majority .opinion, it is not shown how many of the 150 men ordered summoned for special venire, actually reported for service. And it is not shown, of course, what opinions were entertained by the jurors who were excused because of illness or other like causes, or those who were summoned and did not appear; and, naturally, the record does not disclose what proportion of the fifty-eight men who were excused because they had fixed opinions, which they said could not be changed by evidence, had already decided that the defendant was guilty,, or what proportion of them may have thought that he had acted in self-defense.
The defendant’s statement to the officers and others, giving his own version of the killing a few days thereafter and claiming that he fired the fatal shots at a time ■when the game warden was trying to shoot him, and which version was not being contradicted by any eyewitness, together with the further fact that the pistol of the game warden was found on the ground at the scene of the crime, where it had been either dropped by the game warden when he was shot or had been thereafter placed by the accused, was calculated to cause a good portion of the people of the county to have a fixed opinion before the trial that the killing had been done in self-*253defense. This early version given by the accused to the officers and others as to why the killing took place would naturally have been publicized over the county, along with the State’s theory, when the case was being discussed, and it is not unreasonable to believe' that the accused would have received the benefit of such theory of self-defense when public opinion was being formed in regard to the case prior to the trial.
But assuming, for the sake of argument, that a good majority of the jurors who stated that they had a fixed opinion, including the special veniremen and the other jurors, really intended for the trial judge to understand that they were of the opinion that the accused was guilty, and that they were not merely claiming that they had a fixed opinion in order to get off the jury panel because of the prominence or influence of either or both of the families interested, or for their own personal convenience, nevertheless, the issue as to whether or not there had been such a prejudgment of the case in the public mind against the accused as to prevent him from obtaining a fair and impartial trial was for the determination of the tnal court on the motion for the change of venue, and unless there has been a flagrant abuse of the sound' judicial discretion of the trial court in the premises, then the action of such court should not be disturbed on this appeal.
The proneness of many jurors to seek to get excused from jury services in such cases, for their personal convenience or comfort, or because of the standing and influence of the families interested, and to also try to avoid jury duty without regard to their open-mindedness to decide the case on the real evidence offered at the trial in such a case is well known to every experienced circuit judge,' and was for the consideration of the trial judge in passing upon the motion for the change of venue in this case. - •-
The trial judge in the instant case resides in ¡the county where the trial was had, as shown in the forefront of *254each volume of our own printed decisions for more than the past twelve years, and he has resided there practically all of his life, active in the law practice and later as circuit judge, and this is a matter of general information, at least among the judges of this State so as to be a matter of judicial knowledge, if not of common knowledge.
Therefore, the witnesses who testified on the motion for change of venue, and the jurors, were evidently well known to the trial judge. He was in all probability advised of whatever public sentiment may have existed in this largely rural county in regard to the case, and at least as much so as were the witnesses who expressed their opinions before him on the subject; and it is therefore reasonable to presume that after hearing the numerous witnesses for and against the change of venue, observing their demeanor as they were being interrogated, and knowing the attitude of prospective jurors in regard to serving on the jury, and as disclosed by their testimony on the voir dire examination, he endeavored to exercise a sound discretion and his best judgment in overruling the motion. Unless his decision is manifestly wrong and constitutes an abuse of discretion, his action should not in my opinion be disturbed. But, of course, I would not contend that merely because the trial judge lived in the county where the case was tried we should decline to reverse in a proper case where he has denied a change of venue. On the contrary, we. should not hesitate to do so where the trial court clearly erred in that regard, but we should keep in mind that his local status enabled him to judge better than we as to which witnesses have given the proper version of the local situation involved. Then, too, reversals in criminal cases because of the failure to grant a change of venue, which is in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, are infrequent unless the case presents a close question as to the guilt or innocent of the accused, and such is not the case here.
*255In the case of Magness v. State, 103 Miss. 30, 60 So. 8, 10, as quoted from the majority opinion herein, it is held that: “The defendant is entitled to be tried in a county where a fair proportion of the people qualified for jury service may be used as a venire from which a jury may be secured to try his cáse fairly and impartially, . . . ”. I am unable to say that in the instant case there was not a fair proportion of the people qualified for jury service in the county who could try the accused fairly and impartially. And I fear that a decision, to the contrary, under the facts stated in the majority opinion may serve to enable defendants in a majority of capital cases in the future to obtain changes of venue, at greater expense to the local county, and when unnecessary to a fair and impartial trial, since it is necessarily true that the commission of an atrocious crime and the general discussion thereof that follows in the local county will inevitably have the effect of creating some prejudgment of the case in the mind of a good portion of its citizenry, even though there remains a fair proportion of the people who are qualified to give the accused a fair and impartial trial, and from which proportion an average good jury may always be selected.
The majority opinion expresses some doubt as to the correctness of the ruling of the trial court when he declined to require the prosecution to disclose to defendant’s counsel the names of any contributors to the fund for the employment of a special prosecutor in the case. I think that the ruling complained of was correct, (1) because, when the right of an attorney to appear in a case is not challenged, he should not be required to divulge the facts in regard to his employment, involving the confidential relationship of attorney and client; and (2) we are not to assume that any man would be willing to sit on a jury and try a man for his life after having contributed to a fund for his prosecution.
There are other questions presented by the record which are not dealt with in the majority opinion, since it *256was not necessary to deal with them in view of the conclusion reached by the majority to reverse the case because of the denial of the change of venue,, and I, therefore, am likewise refraining from expressing an opinion on any of the other questions assigned as alleged error.
Perhaps I am influenced, to some extent, in dissenting from a reversal of the case, and especially on the ground stated in the majority opinion, by the fact that in looking back over the completed trial, it does not appear that the denial of the change of venue resulted in the defendant not getting a fair and impartial trial, or in an unjust conviction. In addition to the facts set forth in the majority opinion, it also appears that almost immediately before the shots were fired whereby the game warden was killed, some of the witnesses had heard some shooting in the woods in close proximity to the scene of the crime, and the jury was entitled to conclude reasonably that these previous shots had attracted the game warden to the scene, that he found the accused in possession of game, and was conducting him away in the performance of an official duty for the purpose of preferring charges against him for the violation of the game laws, and that thereupon the accused decided that by leaving the game warden dead in the woods, he would avoid such prosecution; and that this was evidenced by the further fact that the defendant did not at first report the killing as having been done in self-defense, but for six days thereafter he concealed the fact that he had any knowledge of the killing at all. Then too, he was wholly contradicted by the physical facts in saying that he shot the game warden twice while the latter was facing and trying to shoot him, since the first and fatal shot went through the heart of his victim, and the other ranged from immedir ately behind his ear, and downward.
I am' in full accord with the majority view that if a constitutional right of an accused has been violated by the denial of a change of venue, thereby preventing a *257fair and impartial trial of bis case, be would be entitled to a reversal of bis conviction without regard to bow conclusively bis guilt may have been shown. But, under all of the facts and circumstances,, I am of the opinion that the ruling of the trial court on the motion for a change of venue did not have the effect of violating any constitutional right of the accused, and that the case should not be reversed on that account.