Court Opinion

ID: 9471235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:27:43.433949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:19.448204
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with the majority’s holding that this case is controlled by Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 100 S.Ct. 2180, 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980). In my opinion, the district court was correct in granting appellee’s writ of habeas corpus in light of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976).
In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, the Supreme Court ruled that a habeas petitioner’s post-arrest silence after receipt of Miranda warnings may not be used for impeachment purposes. The Court held that it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered.
Thus, the impropriety of the prosecution’s conduct in the present case becomes clear. The original trial record is replete with instances where the prosecution, during cross-examination, rebuttal testimony and closing argument, sought to have the jury draw inferences of guilt from the petitioner’s silence after being arrested. This is exactly the type of prosecutorial misconduct which Doyle seeks to prevent.
Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 100 S.Ct. 2180, 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980), which is cited by the majority as controlling authority, has no application to the present case. Unlike the present case which involves references by the prosecution to the petitioner’s silence, Anderson involved the use of prior inconsistent statements by the prosecution for impeachment purposes. As the district court correctly pointed out, the Supreme Court’s concern in Anderson was that the defendant’s silence was used to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement. This differs from the present case where the prosecution sought to have an impermissible inference of guilt drawn from the petitioner’s silence.
Moreover, the district court was also correct in deciding that the failure of defense counsel to object to the prosecutor’s references to the petitioner’s silence met with the “cause and prejudice” standard of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). See also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). Defense counsel admitted in the evidentiary hearing before the magistrate that his failure to object to the prosecution’s conduct was attributable to his lack of knowledge about Doyle violations. This court has previously held that lack of knowledge meets the “cause” standard of Wainwright. See Rachel v. Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200, 204 (6th Cir.1978).
Finally, the petitioner was sufficiently prejudiced as a result of the prosecution’s misconduct to meet the Wainwright “prejudice” standard. Improper references to an accused’s silence by the prosecution have been previously held to be an error of constitutional magnitude and have provided the basis for the reversal of a guilty verdict. See, e.g., Minor v. Black, 527 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.1975); United States v. Curtis, 644 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir.1981).
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court granting the petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus.