Court Opinion

ID: 9649796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:09:37.388936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:27.669723
License: Public Domain

*640Cotter, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree that the affidavit supporting the warrant in this case meets constitutional requirements.
The function of the court reviewing the propriety of the action of the judge or magistrate who issues a warrant to search specific premises for contraband is to determine whether there were facts sufficient to justify his independent determination that the contraband was probably in the premises described by the affiants as the place to be searched. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 533, 84 S. Ct. 825, 11 L. Ed. 2d 887; Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697. A search warrant is issued upon a sworn affidavit establishing the grounds for its issuance, and the reviewing court may consider only information brought to the issuing judge’s attention. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486, 78 S. Ct. 1245, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1503. That affidavit must contain a sufficient description of the place that is to be searched, for in determining what is probable cause to issue a search warrant, “[w]e are concerned only with the question whether the affiant had reasonable grounds at the time of his affidavit and the issuance of the warrant for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises to be searched.” Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441, 45 S. Ct. 546, 69 L. Ed. 1032. As the United States Supreme Court has said, “the issue in warrant proceedings is . . . probable cause for believing the occurrence of a crime and the secreting of evidence in specific premises.” United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723. I cannot agree that the affidavit in this case in support of the application for the warrant to *641search the apartment in question at 584 Berkshire Avenue established the existence of probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity was concealed within that apartment. Accordingly, the Circuit Court judge acted improperly in issuing the warrant, and under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution the defendant’s motion to suppress should have been granted and the items subsequently seized pursuant to the authority of the warrant should not have been admitted in evidence.
A
The affidavit was constitutionally defective for failure to meet the dual standards of sufficiency set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, supra, typically referred to as “Aguilar’s two-pronged test.” United States v. Chaves, 482 F.2d 1268, 1270 (5th Cir.); see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637. Where the information on a particular element, such as the place to be searched, submitted to the judge or magistrate is only derived from an informant’s hearsay and not within the personal knowledge of the affiants, the first part of the Aguilar test requires that the affidavit disclose particular facts or circumstances which justify concluding that the informant is a reliable or trustworthy person; the second then requires specific facts or circumstances tending to demonstrate that the informant gathered his information in the instant case in a reliable manner. Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 114; Spinelli v. United States, supra; United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 492 F.2d 109, 114 (5th Cir.), reh. denied, 494 F.2d 1296; People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129, 133, 250 N.E.2d 323. As applied to the kind of facts presented by this case, the Aguilar *642test is satisfied only where the affidavit discloses underlying circumstances sufficient to enable the judge or magistrate to assess the validity of the affiant’s conclusion that the contraband is where he says it is. United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732, 735 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 930, 94 S. Ct. 2640, 41 L. Ed. 2d 233; United States v. McCoy, 478 F.2d 176, 179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828, 94 S. Ct. 53, 38 L. Ed. 2d 62.
It has been held that a mere recital in the affidavit that the informant has proved to be reliable in the past does not satisfy the requirements of the first part of the Aguilar test; rather, the affidavit must demonstrate that the informant has established a reputation for providing accurate information. United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d 712, 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 850, 81 S. Ct. 95, 5 L. Ed. 2d 74; State v. Dove, 182 N.W.2d 297, 301 (N.D.).1 This requirement can be satisfied by evidence in the affidavit that the information provided by the informant in the past was indeed accurate, Jones v. United States, supra, 271, or that it led to the arrest and conviction of certain individuals. United States v. Acarino, 408 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir.); United States v. Gimelstob, 475 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828, 94 S. Ct. 49, 38 L. Ed. 2d 62, reh. denied, 414 U.S. 1086, 94 S. Ct. 606, 38 L. Ed. 2d 491; United States ex rel. Hurley v. Delaware, 365 F. Sup. 282, 286 (D. Del.); *643People v. Hendricks, supra, 133. In this case, however, the evidence offered by the affiants to satisfy the first prong of the Aguilar test was the statement that the informant had given information in the past which had led to the arrests of four people, “1 of which [sic] is serving a long sentence in Conn. States Prison.” There is no indication, in short, that the information provided by this informant proved to be accurate or that it ever led directly to the conviction of any of the four persons arrested on the basis of this information; the mere fact that one of those persons was “serving a long sentence” does not mean that his conviction was in any way related to the particular arrest triggered by the informant’s information. The affidavit, then, failed to establish that the informant had indeed provided accurate information in the past so that the affiants could justifiably conclude that said informant was “reliable.”
Even if the affiants’ statement could be interpreted as sufficiently demonstrating the reliability of the informant, the second prong of the Aguilar test was also left unsatisfied in this case since the affidavit fails to disclose the underlying circumstances from which the informant had inferred that contraband was being kept in a closet just right of the entrance door to the apartment. Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 113-14; Spinelli v. United States, supra, 416; United States v. Thompson, 495 F.2d 165, 168 (D.C. Cir.); United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, supra, 114; DeAngelo v. Teager, 490 F.2d 1012, 1014 (3d Cir.); State v. Rocheleau, 131 Vt. 563, 569, 313 A.2d 33. The affidavit states that the informant had personally observed the defendant making an illicit mixture of heroin and milk sugar. But nowhere is there any indication as to how the informant learned *644that the contraband itself was being kept in a closet next to the entrance door to an apartment. With respect to this allegation made by the informant to the affiants, there was nothing in the affidavit to guarantee that the informant was reporting anything “more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld.” Spinelli v. United States, supra, 416. There was lacking a statement of the underlying circumstances sufficient to enable the judge to make an independent determination of the validity of the affiants’ conclusion that the contraband was where they claimed it was. United States v. Mulligan, supra; United States v. McCoy, supra.
B
Of course, an affidavit may still be found to be constitutionally sufficient where it fails to meet the Aguilar tests if the information provided by the informant on the element in question is sufficiently detailed or corroborated to justify a conclusion that it is equally trustworthy as information obtained as a result of strict adherence to Aguilar. United States v. Harris, supra, 584; Spinelli v. United States, supra, 415, 423-24 (opinion of White, J., concurring); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 18 L. Ed. 2d 62, reh. denied, 386 U.S. 1042, 87 S. Ct. 1474, 18 L. Ed. 2d 616; United States v. Black, 476 F.2d 267, 269 (5th Cir.); United States v. Marihart, 472 F.2d 809, 812-14 (8th Cir.). Where there is evidence relied upon by the affiants which corroborates the information provided by the informant to the effect that contraband is concealed in certain specified premises, the issuing judge or magistrate may under most circumstances properly conclude that there is probable cause to believe that the contraband is *645indeed in the place to he searched. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 110, 87 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684; Jones v. United States, supra, 269-70; United States v. Sharpe, 322 F.2d 117, 119-20 (6th Cir.). Where, however, there is no such corroboration, the detail required of the information provided by the informant concerning the place to be searched is that much greater. See, e.g., the affidavit approved in United States v. Harris, supra, 584 (informant stated that he personally bought illicit liquor on named and described premises, which premises constituted the place that the affiant wished to search); Rugendorf v. United States, supra, 532 (informant stated he had personally seen contraband fur garments in a particular apartment).
In this case, while there appears to have been evidence tending to corroborate some of the informant’s information on the defendant’s involvement in criminal activity, the affidavit discloses no corroboration of his information concerning the place to be searched. The sufficiency of the affidavit in this respect, then, rests entirely on the statement that items which the informant claimed he once saw the defendant using to make a mixture of heroin and milk sugar “are kept in a closet just right of the entrance door to the apartment.” Despite the constitutional burden which this meagre representation was forced to sustain, the majority conclude that to meet this burden that statement must be read as incorporating the description of the premises at 584 Berkshire Avenue contained in the preliminary statement of the affiants. This doctrine of “incorporation by reference” is invoked primarily only in cases where the actual search warrant issued by the judge is claimed to suffer from too broad a descrip*646tion of the premises to be searched; courts frequently in such circumstances hold that the warrant may “incorporate” the original affidavit of probable cause, but only if the affidavit at a minimum describes the premises with sufficient particularity, and the warrant uses “suitable words of reference” which specifically refer to the affidavit. Moore v. United States, 461 F.2d 1236, 1238 (D.C. Cir.); United States v. Snow, 9 F.2d 978, 979 (D. Mass.). Some courts have actually required that there be an express reference in the warrant to the affidavit in order for the warrant to be sustained as constitutionally valid. United States v. Ortiz, 311 F. Sup. 880, 883 (D. Colo.), aff’d, 445 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993, 92 S. Ct. 541, 30 L. Ed. 2d 545; Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 393 n.7 (D.C. Cir.); United States v. Brooks, 303 F.2d 851, 852 (6th Cir.).
Similarly, courts have allowed a judge or magistrate who issues a search warrant to read an affiant’s preliminary statement and subsequent account of supporting facts together in determining whether there is a substantial basis underlying the affiant’s claim that there is probable cause to believe contraband is where the affiant says it is. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, supra, 267-68 n.2, cited with approval, United States v. Harris, supra, 578, 584; Smith v. State, 56 Okla. Crim. 103, 105, 34 P.2d 280. However, just as search warrants are held to incorporate properly the information in affidavits of probable cause only by specific references thereto, statements of supporting facts appearing-in affidavits of probable cause properly incorporate constitutionally required data such as the description of the place to be searched appearing in the affiant’s complaining statement only where specific *647words of reference, such, as “above described premises” or “above mentioned apartment” are found in the pertinent part of the statement of supporting facts. Ibid. While it is true that the approach to this question adopted in United States v. Meeks, 313 F.2d 464, 466 (6th Cir.), of allowing some latitude in the manner of reference chosen, has been favored by certain courts, Clay v. United States, 246 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 863, 78 S. Ct. 96, 2 L. Ed. 2d 69; Mezzatesta v. State, 166 A.2d 433, 436 (Del.), the affidavit approved in Meeks was treated as constitutionally defective by the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 120-21 (opinion of Clark, J., dissenting) .
Specificity in the words of reference is required so that it is made clear to the judge or magistrate that the informant actually did identify the particular premises sought to be searched as the place where he himself saw the contraband. See United States v. Suarez, 380 F.2d 713, 714-15 (2d Cir.). Such precision is necessary for the judge to make an independent determination of the existence of a substantial basis in fact to support a reasonable belief that contraband is indeed being concealed in the specific premises which the affiants have described as the place to be searched; Dumbra v. United States, supra, 441; Jones v. United States, supra, 271; United States v. Harris, supra, 584; United States ex rel. Hurley v. Delaware, supra, 285; United States v. Jennings, 235 F. Sup. 551-52 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 943, 86 S. Ct. 1465, 16 L. Ed. 2d 541. The lack of such precision, conversely, increases the risk that the judge will issue a warrant to search constitutionally protected premises named by the police acting not *648in reliance upon an actual description of those premises by a reliable informant as the place where the contraband is concealed, or upon their own observations thereof, but upon inadequate information or mere suspicion. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, supra, 109; Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46-47, 54 S. Ct. 11, 78 L. Ed. 159; State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 131, 191 S.E.2d 752.2 Such a risk was present in this case, inasmuch as the testimony at the trial of the police officer who executed the warrant suggested that the apartment which was searched and which was named in the application and in the warrant did not have a closet “just right of the entrance door” as described by the informant. It is because of these factors that the recommended practice is for the affiants to specify in their affidavit that their reliable informant himself identified or described the particular premises sought to be searched. Rugendorf v. United States, supra, 529-30; United States v. Harris, supra, 575; McCray v. Illinois, supra, 302; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 351, 51 S. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed. 374; cf. Dumbra v. United States, supra, 440; United States v. Ventresca, supra, 108; Hagan v. United States, 364 F.2d 669, 673 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 445, 87 S. Ct. 929, 17 L. Ed. 2d 875; Martinez v. State, 504 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. Crim. App.); Markle, “The Law of Arrest and Search and Seizure,” p. 171; Burnett, “Evaluation of Affidavits and Issuance of Search Warrants: A Practical G-uide for Federal Magistrates,” 64 J. Crim. L. & Crim. 270, 278-79.
*649Finally, even if the sentence in the affidavit conld be found to incorporate properly the description of the place to be searched contained in the affiants’ complaining statement, the information on this point provided by the informant would still fall short of the degree of detail required to sustain a conclusion that it is equally trustworthy as information which formally satisfies the Aguilar test, inasmuch as there is no description whatever as to how the informant reached his conclusion that the contraband items were being concealed in the apartment in question. Even the affidavit which met the liberal standards of sufficiency allowed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Harris specified that the informant had personally observed the illicit materials actually being concealed in the premises for which the court determined there was probable cause to search. United States v. Harris, supra, 575; see also State ex rel. Attorney General v. Alabama, 237 So. 2d 640, 643 (Ala.).
It cannot be said that the Circuit Court judge in this case was presented with facts establishing that the informant observed contraband being concealed in the specific apartment for which the warrant was issued. United States v. Suarez, supra, 714-15; United States v. Lassoff, 147 F. Sup. 944, 948 (E.D. Ky.). To paraphrase a statement in an opinion from another court which had occasion to rule upon the sufficiency of an application for a search warrant, no matter how closely and how liberally the affidavit in this case is scrutinized, there is no “common sense” way, nor any other way, of importing into the informant’s statement to the affiants a description of the apartment at 584 Berkshire Avenue as the premises where the contraband in question was being kept. United *650States ex rel. DeNegris v. Menser, 247 F. Sup. 826, 832 (D. Conn.), aff’d, 360 F.2d 199 (2d Cir.). We cannot allow the need to approach affidavits with, “common sense” to abrogate the constitutional requirement of a showing of a factual basis to support the claimed existence of probable cause to believe an element so significant as that contraband is indeed concealed in the very place to be searched. See Spinelli v. United States, supra, 415; Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 535, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930; Dumbra v. United States, supra, 441; Rugendorf v. United States, supra, 533; United States v. Poppitt, 227 F. Sup. 73, 76 (D. Del.); United States v. Innelli, 286 F. 731, 733 (E.D. Pa.); Jones v. United States, supra, 271.
I would reverse.

 Another statement in an affidavit well recognized as tending to establish the reliability of the informant is one that the informant in providing the information in question was also making a declaration against personal interest. United States v. Harris, supra, 583; Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d 714, 726 (3d Cir.). The affidavit in this case, however, does not establish that the informant was making such a declaration.

 The practice of invalidating searches conducted pursuant to warrants issued on the basis of facts set out in an affiant’s request for the warrant which are only loosely referred to in the affiant’s statement of supporting facts is deeply rooted in the New England legal tradition. See, e.g., Humes v. Taber, 1 R.I. 464, 465-66, 470-71.