Court Opinion

ID: 9906188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 15:01:42.828913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:09.302595
License: Public Domain

Rel: December 1, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2023-0058
                                _________________________

                        Eli Global, LLC, and Greg Lindberg

                                                  v.

  Ronald Cieutat; Todd Vereen; Deborah Simison, as personal
representative of the Estate of David Glenn Finnegan, deceased;
Floyd Slay, Jr.; Timothy Andrews; Tyla Fowlkes; Mark Bier and
 Shawn Bier, as personal representatives of the Estate of Debra
     Little, deceased; Thomas Williams; Erin Bailey Kelso;
 Jan Wheeler; Eugene Dreher IV; Nancy Dreher; Joseph Moose;
   Phillip Epstein; Michael Dandurand; William McFarland;
    Angela Clark; Carol Jean Moorhead; and Michael Rudge

                        Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
                                 (CV-20-900993)
SC-2023-0058

MENDHEIM, Justice.

      Eli Global, LLC, and Greg Lindberg appeal, challenging a summary

judgment entered against them by the Mobile Circuit Court in an action

commenced by Ronald Cieutat, Todd Vereen, and multiple other

plaintiffs involving Eli Global's alleged failure to fulfill its obligations on

a promissory note and Lindberg's alleged failure to fulfill his obligations

on a guaranty of that promissory note. Eli Global and Lindberg also

challenge the circuit court's award of attorney fees and expenses to the

plaintiffs. We affirm the circuit court's summary judgment, but we

remand the case to the circuit court for it to enter an order articulating

its reasons for the award of attorney fees and expenses.

                                   I. Facts

      In 2002, Cieutat and Vereen founded Hemophilia Preferred Care,

Inc., a company focused on treating individuals with hemophilia. The

company eventually expanded its business via several affiliated entities

to include patients with conditions such as Crohn's disease, hepatitis C,

multiple sclerosis, rheumatoid arthritis, and other specialized conditions.

The flagship entity became HPC, LLC ("HPC"), and its affiliated entities

were: Hemophilia Preferred Care of Memphis, Inc.; HPC Biologicals, Inc.;

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HPCNC, Inc.; HPC Specialty Rx West Virginia, Inc.; HPC Speciality Rx

of Kansas, Inc.; Hemophilia Preferred Care of Oklahoma, Inc.; HPC

Specialty Rx Reed, Inc.; and Hemophilia Preferred Care of Mississippi,

Inc. Cieutat and Vereen served as the chief officers of those entities, and

together they owned a majority stake in HPC and its affiliated entities,

but 21 other individuals held smaller shares of HPC and its affiliated

entities (Cieutat, Vereen, and the other owners are collectively referred

to as "the Sellers").

      In mid-2017, Eli Global agent Michael Pereira approached Cieutat,

who was serving as chief executive officer ("CEO") of HPC and its

affiliated entities, about Eli Global's interest in purchasing HPC and its

affiliated entities.1 On November 16, 2017, Eli Global formed Specialty

Pharmacy Investments, LLC, which later changed its name to HPCSP

Investments, LLC ("HPCSP"), for the express purpose of acquiring HPC

and its affiliated entities.

      1In an affidavit submitted by Pereira in this litigation, Pereira
explained that "Eli Global, LLC, [is] the trade name for a group of
affiliated companies operating in various industries throughout the
United States and other countries."
                                    3
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     On January 19, 2018, HPCSP entered into an "Equity Purchase

Agreement" with the Sellers in which HPCSP agreed to purchase a 100%

interest in HPC and its affiliated entities. The Equity Purchase

Agreement designated Cieutat as the "Sellers' Representative" for the

transaction, provided that the "Sellers' Representative shall have the

power and authority to receive from [HPCSP] any and all amounts

payable by [HPCSP] to Sellers under this Agreement, the Sellers' Note

and the Equity Equivalence Agreement,[2] on behalf of Sellers," and

stated that the "Sellers' Representative agrees … to allocate and

distribute such payments to Sellers in such amounts, at such times and

on such terms as may be separately agreed by Sellers and Sellers'

Representative." One of the "Conditions to Closing" provided in the

Equity Purchase Agreement was: "Sellers' Representative shall have

received a promissory note issued by Eli Global, LLC, in an aggregate

original principal amount of $12,200,000, in substantially the form of,

     2The parties do not discuss the Equity Equivalence Agreement in

their briefs. By its terms, the Equity Equivalence Agreement gave the
Sellers "certain contingent, deferred consideration in return (and as an
additional inducement) for the Sellers' agreement to sell the Acquired
Shares (as defined in the [Equity] Purchase Agreement), which
additional consideration will be determined based on the [new]
Company's future financial performance in accordance therewith."
                                    4
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and having the terms set forth on, Exhibit D (the 'Sellers Note'), duly

executed by Eli Global, LLC." Indeed, the Equity Purchase Agreement

defined the "Purchase Price" for the transaction to be "the Closing

Payment, plus the Equity Equivalence Agreement Payments, plus the

Sellers' Note." The Equity Purchase Agreement provided that it was to

be "governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of

the State of New York without giving effect to the principles of conflict of

laws."

      As part of the acquisition of HPC and its affiliated entities, HPCSP

also executed on January 19, 2018, an "Executive Employment

Agreement" with Cieutat to retain Cieutat as CEO of HPCSP for an

initial term of five years.

      The sale of HPC and its affiliated entities closed on April 13, 2018.

It is undisputed that, on that date, Eli Global executed a "Promissory

Note" in the amount of $12,200,000 that Cieutat received as the Sellers'

representative on behalf of all the Sellers. Because the terms of the

Promissory Note are integral to the arguments in this appeal, we set out

here the key provisions of the Promissory Note:

           "For value received, the undersigned, Eli Global, LLC, a
      Delaware limited liability company ('Maker'), hereby
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    promises to pay to the order of Ron Cieutat (on behalf of
    Sellers (as defined below)), as Sellers' Representative
    ('Payee'), at such place, or to such other party, as the legal
    holder of this Promissory Note may from time to time
    designate in writing, in lawful currency of the United States
    of America, the principal sum of Twelve Million Two Hundred
    Thousand Dollars ($12,200,000), together with interest upon
    the principal amount at the rate of 4.0% per annum, in
    immediately available funds. The principal balance of this
    Promissory Note and all accrued interest thereon will be
    payable as set forth below. This Promissory Note is being
    issued pursuant to Section 9.2(c) of that certain Stock
    Purchase Agreement, dated as of January 19, 2018 (the
    '[Equity] Purchase Agreement'), by and among [Cieutat], as
    Sellers' Representative, HPCSP Investments, LLC, a North
    Carolina limited liability company, as buyer (' Buyer'), and the
    individuals party thereto as sellers ('Sellers'). Capitalized
    terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the
    meanings set forth in the Purchase Agreement.

          "1. Payments; Maturity Date. [Eli Global] will repay this
    Promissory Note in five (5) equal annual installments of
    principal in the amount of $2,440,000 each, plus all accrued
    interest to the date of each such payment, with such payments
    due and payable on the first five anniversaries of the date
    hereof (such final payment date, the 'Maturity Date'). If not
    sooner repaid, the principal amount of this Promissory Note
    and all accrued interest thereon will be due and payable in
    full on the Maturity Date. All payments of principal and
    interest and any other charges due hereunder shall be
    payable to [Eli Global] through any recognized means
    designated by [Cieutat, as the Sellers' representative,]
    including, without limitation, electronic transfer, wire
    transfer and/or debit. [Eli Global] agrees that the obligations
    to make the payments set forth in this paragraph are
    guaranteed pursuant to the Guaranty attached hereto as
    Exhibit A.

                                   6
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          "….

          "5. Right of Offset. In accordance with Section 11.10 of
    the [Equity] Purchase Agreement, [Eli Global] is authorized,
    at any time and from time to time, to the fullest extent
    permitted by Law, to set-off and apply any and all amounts
    payable by [Eli Global] to [Cieutat, as the Sellers'
    representative,] under this Promissory Note against any
    amounts payable by [Cieutat, as the Sellers' representative,]
    to [HPCSP] under Article XI of the [Equity] Purchase
    Agreement or otherwise. In the event of such offset, [Eli
    Global] will provide notice to [Cieutat, as the Sellers'
    representative,] of such setoff amount and promptly deliver a
    replacement Promissory Note reflecting the new principal
    amount owed thereunder to [Cieutat, as the Sellers'
    representative]. [Cieutat, as the Sellers' representative,]
    agrees, in exchange for such replacement Promissory Note
    and upon receipt thereof, to return this Promissory Note to
    [Eli Global] for cancellation.

          "6. Default. A default under this Promissory Note will
    exist if any of the following occurs (each an 'Event of Default'):

               "(a) If [Eli Global] fails to perform any
         obligation or covenant under this Promissory Note
         and such failure continues for at least fifteen (15)
         business days after the date on which [Eli Global]
         has been given notice of such failure to perform ….

                "….

          "7. Acceleration. Upon any Event of Default under this
    Promissory Note, the entire principal sum hereof may, at the
    sole option of [Cieutat, as the Sellers' representative], be
    declared at once due and payable, without demand or notice,
    the same being expressly waived, time being of the essence of
    this obligation .... [Eli Global] shall pay all reasonable and
    actual costs and expenses incurred by [Cieutat, as the Sellers'
                                    7
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     representative,] in connection with collecting or attempting to
     collect any sums due under this Promissory Note or enforcing
     any provision of this Promissory Note, including but not
     limited to reasonable attorneys' fees and disbursements and
     applicable statutory costs, whether incurred out of court or in
     litigation, including pre-trial, appellate and bankruptcy
     proceedings.

           "8. No Waiver; Remedies Cumulative. The failure of
     [Cieutat, as the Sellers' representative,] or [Eli Global] to
     exercise any right or remedy provided hereunder or available
     at law shall not be a waiver or release of such rights or
     remedies or the right to exercise any right or remedy at
     another time. The remedies provided [Cieutat, as the Sellers'
     representative,] in this Promissory Note and the [Equity]
     Purchase Agreement shall be cumulative and concurrent, and
     shall be in addition to every other right or remedy now or
     hereafter provided by law or equity. Such remedies may be
     pursued singly, successively or together against [Eli Global],
     any guarantor of this Promissory Note, or any other security
     for this Promissory Note at the option of [Cieutat, as the
     Sellers' representative]. [Eli Global] hereby expressly waives
     any right to make a claim for or relating to the marshaling of
     assets. The failure to exercise or delay in exercising any such
     remedy shall not be construed as a waiver or release thereof.

          "….

           "13. Governing Law. This Promissory Note shall be
     governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with the
     laws of the State of New York without giving effect to the
     principles of conflict of laws."

     It is also undisputed that on the same date, April 13, 2018, and

pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Note, Lindberg executed a

"Guaranty" of payment on the Promissory Note. Because the terms of the
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Guaranty are also integral to the arguments in this appeal, we set out

here the provisions of the Guaranty:

          "This Guaranty ('Guaranty'), dated as of April 13, 2018,
     is made by Greg Lindberg ('Guarantor') in favor and for the
     benefit of Ron Cieutat (on behalf of Sellers), as Sellers'
     Representative ('Payee').

          "Reference is made to that certain Promissory Note, in
     an aggregate original principal amount of $12,200,000, issued
     by Eli Global, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company
     ('Maker'), to [Cieutat, as the Sellers' representative,] on the
     date hereof (the 'Promissory Note').

           "By his signature below [Lindberg] hereby irrevocably
     and unconditionally guaranties for the benefit of [Cieutat, as
     the Sellers' representative], as primary obligor and not merely
     as surety, the due and punctual payment in full of all
     obligations owing by [Eli Global] under the Promissory Note
     when the same shall become due, whether at stated maturity,
     by required prepayment or otherwise (collectively, the
     'Guarantied Obligations').

           "This Guaranty is a continuing guaranty and shall
     remain in effect until all of the Guarantied Obligations shall
     have been paid in full. This Guaranty is a guaranty of
     payment when due and not of collectability. [Cieutat, as the
     Sellers' representative,] may enforce this Guaranty upon the
     occurrence of a failure by [Eli Global] to pay any of the
     payments due pursuant to the Promissory Note.

          "This Guaranty is not intended, and will not be
     construed, to create any rights in any parties other than
     [Cieutat, as the Sellers' representative,] and no other person
     may assert any rights as third-party beneficiary hereunder.

                                   9
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          "This Guaranty shall be governed by, construed and
     enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of New York
     without giving effect to the principles of conflict of laws."

     It is undisputed that in April 2019 Eli Global made its first of the

five installment payments pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Note

to Cieutat, as the Sellers' representative,3 but that Eli Global failed to

make its 2020 installment payment even after Cieutat, on behalf of the

Sellers, sent Eli Global and Lindberg a written notice of default. Eli

Global likewise has not made any subsequent installment payments. It

is undisputed that Lindberg made no payments pursuant to the

Guaranty.

     On October 15, 2019, Cieutat's employment as CEO of HPCSP was

terminated by HPCSP portfolio manager Michael Pereira. In a

termination letter Pereira sent to Cieutat, Pereira stated that Cieutat

was being fired for cause based on an allegedly severe decline in the

company's financial health and because of Pereira's determination that

Cieutat had "engaged in discriminatory conduct based on gender,

     3Eli Global did not make its first installment payment in a timely

manner, but it cured the default within 15 days of being notified of its
failure to make the payment.
                                  10
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including but not limited to, gender discrimination, pregnancy

discrimination, and pay discrimination."

     On May 6, 2020, Cieutat, Vereen, and the other 21 Sellers filed a

complaint in the Mobile Circuit Court against Eli Global and Lindberg.4

The Sellers asserted a claim of breach of contract against Eli Global for

its failure to make payments pursuant to the Promissory Note. The

Sellers asserted a claim against Lindberg for breach of the Guaranty.5

Cieutat, on behalf of the Sellers, attached signed and executed copies of

the Promissory Note and the Guaranty to the complaint.

     On July 27, 2020, Eli Global filed an answer to the complaint and

counterclaims against Cieutat. Eli Global's counterclaims against

     4On February 18, 2020, the Sellers filed a separate lawsuit against

HPCSP and Lindberg in the Mobile Circuit Court alleging that HPCSP
and Lindberg had failed to properly allocate the purchase price in tax
filings as required by the Equity Equivalence Agreement, resulting in
higher tax liability on the Sellers. HPCSP subsequently removed that
case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama, but it was later remanded to the Mobile Circuit Court.

     5During the course of the litigation below, two of the Sellers died,

and the personal representatives of their estates were substituted as
plaintiffs, and four of the Sellers voluntarily dismissed their claims
against Eli Global and Lindberg at certain points in the litigation, thus
leaving only the individuals identified as appellees in the style of this
case.
                                   11
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Cieutat alleged fraud, intentional/negligent misrepresentation, and

unjust enrichment. Eli Global alleged that Cieutat had failed to disclose

during the negotiations to purchase HPC and its affiliated entities that

Cieutat had engaged in employment discrimination as CEO of HPC,

behavior that substantially reduced the value of the company. On

September 4, 2020, Lindberg filed an answer to the complaint and

counterclaims against Cieutat, which were almost identical to Eli

Global's answer and counterclaims.

     On October 5, 2020, Cieutat filed a motion to dismiss the

counterclaims asserted against him by Eli Global and Lindberg. In that

motion, Cieutat asserted, among other things, that,

     "[s]hortly before the first installment payment was due [on
     the Promissory Note], Mr. Lindberg was indicted based on
     evidence that he attempted to bribe the North Carolina
     Insurance Commissioner. … Strapped for cash, Eli Global
     terminated Mr. Cieutat under the guise that he had been
     engaging in unidentified discriminatory conduct.

           "[Eli Global and Lindberg] failed to make the second
     installment payment under [the] Promissory Note in April
     2020. A federal jury found Mr. Lindberg guilty of bribery in
     May 2020, and he was sentenced to seven years in prison."

On November 19, 2020, Eli Global and Lindberg filed a response in

opposition to Cieutat's motion to dismiss their counterclaims. On

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December 8, 2020, the circuit court denied Cieutat's motion to dismiss,

but the circuit court treated the motion as a motion for a more definite

statement with respect to the counterclaims alleging fraud, which the

circuit court granted. On January 22, 2021, Eli Global and Lindberg filed

an amended counterclaim against Cieutat in which they offered more

detailed allegations of fact concerning Cieutat's alleged discriminatory

conduct. On February 1, 2021, Cieutat filed an answer to Eli Global and

Lindberg's amended counterclaim. 6

     On December 6, 2019, Cieutat commenced a lawsuit in Mobile

Circuit Court against Eli Global, HPCSP, and Pereira asserting claims of

breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, and intentional interference

with contractual relations ("the employment lawsuit"). On January 19,

2021, Cieutat, Eli Global, HPCSP, and Pereira executed a "Settlement

Agreement and Mutual Release" that precipitated a dismissal of the

employment lawsuit. A portion of the settlement agreement contained a

mutual release of parties and claims to the extent described therein. In

pertinent part, that portion of the settlement agreement provided:

     "C. MUTUAL RELEASE OF PARTIES

     6On   December 22, 2021, Cieutat filed an amended answer to
Eli Global and Lindberg's amended counterclaim.
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           "For and in consideration of the obligations and
     agreements set forth herein, consideration which the
     Parties[7] acknowledge is sufficient, the Parties hereby agree
     to the following:

           "Except as expressly outlined in Section C(vi) and C(vii),
     the Parties hereby irrevocably and unconditionally release
     and forever discharge each other and their representatives,
     attorneys, affiliates, officers, directors, successors, heirs and
     assigns ('Released Parties') with respect to any and all claims
     and causes of action of any nature whatsoever, both past and
     present, known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen, at
     law or in equity, which were or could have been asserted by
     the Parties or on behalf of the Parties by any person,
     government authority, or entity, arising in connection with,
     resulting from, or relating in any way to the Lawsuit, or
     relating, directly or indirectly, to Cieutat's employment with
     Employer Parties,[8] and any affiliates. …

                 "….

                  "vi. Anything contained in this Agreement to
            the contrary notwithstanding, the terms of Section
            C shall not apply to any claims or defenses brought
            in the following lawsuits currently on file:

                      "(i) Ronald Cieutat et al. v.
                 HPCSP Investments, LLC and Greg E.
                 Lindberg, in the Circuit Court of
                 Mobile County, Alabama, Case No.
                 02-CV-2020-900422.00; and

     7The "Parties" are defined earlier in the settlement agreement to be

HPCSP, Eli Global, Pereira, and Cieutat.

     8The "Employer Parties" are defined earlier in the settlement
agreement to be HPCSP, Eli Global, and Pereira.
                                14
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                     "(ii) Ronald Cieutat et al. v. Eli
                Global, LLC and Greg E. Lindberg, in
                the Circuit Court of Mobile County,
                Alabama,     Case    No.     CV-2020-
                900993.00.

                "vii. Anything contained in this Agreement
          to the contrary notwithstanding, the terms of this
          Section C shall not apply to any claims Cieutat, the
          Employer Parties, or others have or may have in
          the future with respect to any of the following:

                     "(i) The    Equity    Purchase
                Agreement executed January 19, 2018;

                      "(ii) The Equity Equivalence
                Agreement executed on our about
                April 13, 2018; and

                     "(iii) The Promissory Note
                executed on or about April 13, 2018.

            "Except as expressly outlined in Section C(vi) and C(vii),
     it is understood and agreed that the release set forth herein
     is intended as and shall be deemed to be a full and complete
     release of any and all claims that the Parties may have arising
     out of Cieutat's employment with Employer Parties and/or the
     Employment Agreement, arising on or before the date of
     execution of this Agreement, and said release is intended to
     cover and does cover any and all causes of action thereof and
     arising out of or in connection with any occurrence arising on
     or before the Effective Date of this Agreement."

     On December 22, 2021, the Sellers filed a summary-judgment

motion and a brief and exhibits in support thereof. On August 11, 2022,

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the Sellers supplemented their summary-judgment motion. In their

supplement, the Sellers attempted to refute Eli Global and Lindberg's

allegations asserting that the reason Eli Global refused to make further

payments on the Promissory Note was because Eli Global had been

fraudulently induced to execute the Promissory Note without being

informed of Cieutat's alleged discrimination against women employed by

HPC. The Sellers argued that Eli Global had defaulted on the Promissory

Note because of financial difficulties with the loan it had obtained to help

finance the purchase of HPC and its affiliated entities. The Sellers also

alleged that Eli Global was "cash strapped and trying to fund the

criminal defense of Lindberg from approximately March 2019 until the

fall of 2019."

      On August 23, 2022, Eli Global and Lindberg filed a response in

opposition to the Sellers' summary-judgment motion along with exhibits

in support thereof. In their opposition, Eli Global and Lindberg continued

to assert that "Cieutat had a long-standing history of discriminating

against women and women with children, abusing employees by cursing

at and threatening them, and conducting his business by instilling fear

and intimidating others," but that such behavior had been concealed from

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Eli Global and Lindberg until after the sale of HPC and its affiliated

entities. They argued that

     "had [Eli Global and Lindberg] known they were purchasing
     a company with such corrupt leadership they would not have
     agreed to execute the Promissory Note and Guaranty or would
     not have agreed to the amount set forth in the Note.
     [Eli Global and Lindberg] did not pay for the company they
     were led to believe they were getting and were forced to re-
     structure and overhaul the company as a result of Cieutat's
     damaging behavior. Consequently, [Eli Global and Lindberg]
     were justified in any alleged non-payment and a fact issue as
     to that justification remains."

     On August 24, 2022, the Sellers filed their reply to Eli Global and

Lindberg's opposition to the summary-judgment motion along with

several exhibits in support thereof.

     On September 21, 2022, the circuit court entered its initial order

addressing the Sellers' summary-judgment motion. In that order, the

circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of the Sellers

     "on the claims asserted by [the Sellers] and all counterclaims
     asserted against [Cieutat].

           "Judgment is hereby entered in favor of [the Sellers] in
     the principal amount of $9,760,000.00 plus interest of
     $1,450,989.60 through September 21, 2022. Additional
     interest per diem of $1,626.67 shall accrue beginning
     September 22, 2022, until the judgment is satisfied.

          "[The Sellers] have thirty (30) days from the date of this
     Order to submit an affidavit and fee bills setting forth their
                                       17
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     request for attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs. [Eli Global
     and Lindberg] have 14 days to object, following which date,
     the Court will enter judgment for reasonable attorneys' fees,
     expenses, and costs."

(Footnote omitted.)

     On October 5, 2022, the Sellers submitted a "Motion to Enter

Attorneys' Fees and Costs Award." In that motion, the Sellers noted that

the Promissory Note contained a provision requiring Eli Global to pay

attorney fees and expenses incurred by the Sellers in connection with

attempting to collect sums due under the Promissory Note. They

explained that Cieutat and Vereen had split attorney fees and expenses

in this case, that two law firms and a separate attorney had been engaged

for the case, and that the total amount of attorney fees was $208,491.75,

and the total amount of expenses was $15,853.38. The Sellers attached

affidavits from Cieutat, Vereen, and one of their attorneys, Jennifer S.

Holifield, in support of their motion. Holifield testified in her affidavit to

the hourly rate charged by herself, by the other attorney in her firm who

worked on the case, and by her firm's paralegals. Holifield stated that

she had reviewed the invoices from the other attorneys for the Sellers

and that their "rates are standard for the areas in which they were

charged, and were fair and reasonable for the work that was performed."
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She also testified that she was familiar with and had considered the

factors to be considered when determining the appropriate amount of an

award of attorney fees, which were set forth in Peebles v. Miley, 439 So.

2d 137 (Ala. 1983). After listing those factors, Holifield stated: "[I]t is my

professional opinion that the attorneys' fee and expenses of $224,345.13

charged to [the Sellers] in this matter is fair, standard and reasonable,

was necessary, and is due to be awarded against [Eli Global and

Lindberg], jointly and severally, under the promissory note and

guaranty." The Sellers also submitted slightly redacted copies of a large

number of invoices from their attorneys that documented charged fees

and expenses.

      On October 7, 2022, the circuit court entered an order awarding the

Sellers $224,345.13 in attorney fees and expenses to be paid by Eli Global

and Lindberg "jointly and severally." On October 11, 2022, the circuit

court set aside its October 7, 2022, order, and it gave Eli Global and

Lindberg until October 20, 2022, to file an objection to the Sellers' motion

for payment of attorney fees and expenses.

      Shortly thereafter, Eli Global and Lindberg obtained new counsel

to represent them in this case. On October 20, 2022, Eli Global and

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Lindberg filed their "Opposition and Objections to Plaintiffs' Motion to

Enter Attorneys' Fees and Costs Award." In that opposition, Eli Global

and Lindberg argued that the requested attorney fees and expenses were

"unreasonable and unsupported." Specifically, they contended that some

fees were redundant, that internal law-firm billing records were

insufficient to demonstrate the actual cost of incurred expenses, and that

some of the attorney fees and expenses were for "unsuccessful motions or

motions necessitated by [the Sellers'] own conduct," such as when the

Sellers switched law firms during the litigation.

     On October 21, 2022, Eli Global and Lindberg filed a Rule 59(e),

Ala. R. Civ. P., postjudgment motion requesting that the circuit court

alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgment entered for the Sellers.

In that motion, for the first time, Eli Global and Lindberg contended that

the summary judgment should be vacated because the Promissory Note

was a negotiable instrument under New York's version of the Uniform

Commercial Code ("the New York UCC") and the Sellers never presented

"any evidence that they are (or any of them is) the owner and holder of

the negotiable instrument underlying their note and guaranty claims."

Because of that alleged lack of evidence, Eli Global and Lindberg insisted,

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the summary judgment should be vacated. Eli Global and Lindberg also

argued, for the first time, that Cieutat had released Lindberg from any

liability on the Guaranty in the settlement agreement executed in the

employment lawsuit. Finally, the postjudgment motion contended that

the circuit court's summary-judgment order was unclear as to whether

the judgment amount was due to be paid only to Cieutat on behalf of all

the Sellers or whether "each existing [Seller] is entitled to judgment

against Eli Global and Lindberg in the specified amounts."

     On December 13, 2022, the Sellers filed a response to Eli Global and

Lindberg's postjudgment motion. In their response, the Sellers first noted

that Eli Global and Lindberg's main arguments were entirely new. They

further contended that the Promissory Note was not a negotiable

instrument under the New York UCC; that, even if it was, there was

never any dispute that Cieutat held the Promissory Note; that such an

objection was an affirmative defense that Eli Global and Lindberg never

pleaded; and that Cieutat never released Lindberg from his obligation

under the Guaranty.

     Also on December 13, 2022, the Sellers filed a reply to Eli Global

and Lindberg's opposition to the Sellers' motion for payment of attorney

                                   21
SC-2023-0058

fees and expenses. The Sellers responded to each of the arguments from

Eli Global and Lindberg in detail. In particular, the Sellers discussed the

applicability of the Peebles factors at length. Additionally, the Sellers

submitted along with their reply a second affidavit from attorney

Holifield in which she provided further explanation for why she believed

the fee award was reasonable. Eli Global and Lindberg responded by

submitting an affidavit from one of their attorneys, Abigail R.S.

Campbell, asserting that Eli Global and Lindberg's production of

discovery was appropriate and that all requested depositions were

necessary.

     On December 21, 2022, the circuit court entered an order it titled

"Final Judgment." Because the details of that order are integral to

arguments in this appeal, we set out the substance of the December 21,

2022, order here:9

           "The Court on December 14, 2022, heard [the Sellers']
     Motion to Enter Attorneys' Fees and Costs Award; [Eli Global
     and Lindberg's] Opposition and Objections to [the Sellers']
     Motion to Enter Attorneys' Fees and Costs Award; [the
     Sellers'] Reply to [Eli Global and Lindberg's] Opposition and
     Objections to [the Sellers'] Motion to Enter Attorneys' Fees
     and Costs Award; [Eli Global and Lindberg's] Rule 59(e)
     Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate Judgment; and [the

     9The circuit court's record citations are omitted.

                                    22
SC-2023-0058

    Sellers'] Objection to [Eli Global and Lindberg's] Rule 59(e)
    Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate Judgment. The court
    considered the above motions, responses, replies, materials
    submitted; the pleadings on file; and counsel's arguments and
    concludes as follows:

          "1. The Court's prior order on [the Sellers'] Motion for
    Summary Judgment should be amended to clarify that the
    judgment awards Ronald Cieutat in his representative
    capacity only a single judgment amount (for the purposes of
    collecting the judgment), instead of awarding each [Seller] an
    independent judgment against Eli Global, LLC and Greg
    Lindberg; however, nothing herein shall be construed as
    removing or altering each [Seller's] right as between
    themselves to their share of the judgment;

          "2. [The Sellers'] motion to enter attorneys' fees and
    costs award is granted; and

          "3. Except as stated in the preceding paragraph number
    one, [Eli Global and Lindberg's] Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter,
    Amend, or Vacate Judgment is denied.

          "Accordingly, judgment is hereby entered in favor of
    Ronald Cieutat in his representative capacity on behalf of all
    of [the Sellers], jointly and severally against Defendants
    Eli Global, LLC d/b/a Global Growth and Greg Lindberg,
    (a) in the principal amount of $9,760,000.00 plus interest of
    $1,450,989.60 through September 21, 2022, and additional
    interest per diem of $1,626.67 beginning on September 22,
    2022, until the judgment is satisfied; (b)(i) $61,330.00 in
    attorneys' fees and $4,446.96 in expenses with the Baker
    Donelson firm, (ii) $17,575.00 in attorneys' fees with Bob
    Clute, and (iii) $138,211.75 in attorneys' fees and $11,406.42
    in expenses with the Speegle Hoffman firm; and (c) all of
    which shall accrue post-judgment interest at the highest
    lawful rate.

                                 23
SC-2023-0058

            "This is a final and appealable judgment, and all other
     relief not expressly granted in this judgment is denied."

     Eli Global and Lindberg appeal from the circuit court's

December 21, 2022, order.

                         II. Standard of Review

           "This Court's review of a summary judgment is de novo.
     Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74
     (Ala. 2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial
     court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the
     movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
     of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a
     judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue
     Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949,
     952-53 (Ala. 2004). In making such a determination, we must
     review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
     nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758 (Ala. 1986).
     Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is
     no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the
     nonmovant to produce 'substantial evidence' as to the
     existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v.
     SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98
     (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12. '[S]ubstantial
     evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-
     minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can
     reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.'
     West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So. 2d 870, 871
     (Ala. 1989)."

Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004).

           " ' "The determination of whether an attorney fee is
     reasonable is within the sound discretion of the trial court and
     its determination on such an issue will not be disturbed on
     appeal unless in awarding the fee the trial court exceeded that
                                   24
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     discretion. State Bd. of Educ. v. Waldrop, 840 So. 2d 893, 896
     (Ala. 2002); City of Birmingham v. Horn, 810 So. 2d 667,
     681-82 (Ala. 2001); Ex parte Edwards, 601 So. 2d 82, 85 (Ala.
     1992), citing Varner v. Century Fin. Co., 738 F.2d 1143 (11th
     Cir. 1984)." ' "

Regions Bank v. Lowrey, 154 So. 3d 101, 108 (Ala. 2014) (quoting Kiker

v. Probate Court of Mobile Cnty., 67 So. 3d 865, 867 (Ala. 2010), quoting

in turn Pharmacia Corp. v. McGowan, 915 So. 2d 549, 552 (Ala. 2004)).

                              III. Analysis

     Eli Global and Lindberg seek a reversal of the summary judgment

entered against them, and they challenge the amount of the award of

attorney fees and expenses. We will examine those arguments in

separate parts of our analysis.

A. The Circuit Court's Summary Judgment in Favor of the Sellers

     Eli Global and Lindberg's sole argument for reversal of the

summary judgment entered against them is the one they presented in

their postjudgment motion: they contend that the Promissory Note is a

negotiable instrument under the New York UCC and that the Sellers

never presented conclusive evidence that Cieutat -- or any other Seller --

possessed the Promissory Note at the time the Sellers initiated this

action. Eli Global and Lindberg assert that the foregoing failure of proof

                                   25
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dooms the Sellers' claim seeking payment on the Promissory Note

because the New York UCC requires such proof in order for a claimant to

enforce a negotiable promissory note. They further argue that because

the Sellers' promissory-note claim fails, Lindberg owes no duty to pay

them under the Guaranty.

     The Sellers' first objection to the foregoing argument is that

Eli Global and Lindberg never presented it in response to the Sellers'

summary-judgment motion. Indeed, Eli Global and Lindberg never

raised an issue concerning possession of the Promissory Note in their

answers to the complaint, and throughout the lengthy discovery --

interrogatories to each Seller and depositions of all the Sellers -- Eli

Global and Lindberg never once inquired about who possessed the

Promissory Note. The first time any issue was raised concerning

possession of the Promissory Note was in Eli Global and Lindberg's

postjudgment motion. Therefore, the Sellers argue, Eli Global and

Lindberg waived that argument.

     Eli Global and Lindberg respond by noting that the circuit court

had discretion to consider new arguments presented in the postjudgment

motion.

                                  26
SC-2023-0058

     " ' "[A] trial court has the discretion to consider a new legal
     argument in a post-judgment motion, but is not required to do
     so." ' Special Assets, L.L.C. v. Chase Home Fin., L.L.C., 991
     So. 2d 668, 678 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Green Tree Acceptance,
     Inc. v. Blalock, 525 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Ala. 1988))."

Espinoza v. Rudolph, 46 So. 3d 403, 416 (Ala. 2010). Eli Global and

Lindberg further assert that the circuit court's December 21, 2022, order

demonstrates that the circuit court did consider, but rejected on the

merits, their new arguments presented in their postjudgment motion.

For support, Eli Global and Lindberg cite the opening paragraph of the

circuit court's December 21, 2022, order, in which the circuit court stated,

in part: "The Court on December 14, 2022, heard … [Eli Global and

Lindberg's] Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate Judgment ….

The court considered the above motions, responses, replies, materials

submitted; the pleadings on file; and counsel's arguments and concludes

as follows: …."

     The foregoing statement from the circuit court's December 21, 2022,

order certainly indicates that the circuit court "considered" the new

arguments Eli Global and Lindberg presented in their postjudgment

motion, but it does not tell us whether the circuit court considered the

merits of those arguments as opposed to rejecting them because they

                                    27
SC-2023-0058

were not raised earlier in the litigation. See Espinoza, 46 So. 3d at 416

(concluding that "[t]here is no indication that the trial court considered

the merits of the legal argument raised for the first time in Jabez's

postjudgment motion, and we will not presume that it did"). We are

dubious of Eli Global and Lindberg's extremely belated assertion of

arguments based on the New York UCC. However, because the circuit

court may have considered the merits of Eli Global and Lindberg's new

postjudgment arguments, we will address them on the merits.

     1. Is the Promissory Note a Negotiable Instrument?

     New York law applies with respect to the Promissory Note because

the Promissory Note contains a choice-of-law provision that states as

much. As we have already noted, Eli Global and Lindberg argue that the

Sellers failed to prove who was the holder/possessor of the Promissory

Note, a fact that, they say, is a requirement under the New York UCC for

a claimant to be able to enforce a negotiable instrument. See Eli Global

& Lindberg's brief, p. 15.

     Under New York law, "[a] 'promissory note [is] a negotiable

instrument within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code'

(Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Coakley, 41 AD3d 674, 674[, 838

                                   28
SC-2023-0058

N.Y.S.2d 622] [2007]; see UCC 3-104[2][d]; US Bank, N.A. v Zwisler, 147

AD3d 804, 806[, 46 N.Y.S.3d 213] [2017]." Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC

v Kelly, 166 AD3d 843, 845, 87 N.Y.S.3d 569, 571 (2018). According to the

New York UCC:

           "(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within
     this Article must

                "(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and

                 "(b) contain an unconditional promise or
           order to pay a sum certain in money and no other
           promise, order, obligation or power given by the
           maker or drawer except as authorized by this
           Article; and

                 "(c) be payable on demand or at a definite
           time; and

                "(d) be payable to order or to bearer." 10

N.Y. U.C.C. Law § 3-104.

     10N.Y. U.C.C. Law § 3-111 provides, in part:

            "An instrument is payable to bearer when by its terms
     it is payable to

                "….

                "(b) a specified person or bearer …."
                                    29
SC-2023-0058

     Eli Global and Lindberg contend that the Promissory Note "is a

negotiable instrument because it is made 'payable to the order of' a payee

-- Cieutat as the Sellers' representative -- and its payment obligation --

the amount due and payment date -- is discernable on its face." Eli Global

& Lindberg's brief, pp. 15-16. There is no dispute that the Promissory

Note was signed by Eli Global, that it was payable at a definite time, and

that it was payable to Cieutat, as the Sellers' representative. The Sellers

argue, however, that the Promissory Note was not an "unconditional

promise" under the New York UCC because it was subject to, or

dependent upon, the Equity Purchase Agreement.

     The Sellers observe that the opening paragraph of the Promissory

Note states, in part:

     "This Promissory Note is being issued pursuant to
     Section 9.2(c) of that certain Stock Purchase Agreement,
     dated as of January 19, 2018 (the '[Equity] Purchase
     Agreement'), by and among [Cieutat], as Sellers'
     Representative, HPCSP Investments, LLC, a North Carolina
     limited liability company, as buyer ('Buyer'), and the
     individuals party thereto as sellers ('Sellers')."

     Section 9.2(c) of the Equity Purchase Agreement states:

                              "ARTICLE IX

                         "Conditions to Closing

                                    30
SC-2023-0058

            "….

            "9.2. Conditions to the Obligations of Sellers. The
      obligations of Sellers to consummate the transactions
      contemplated by this Agreement are further subject to the
      satisfaction or the waiver by [Cieutat, as the Sellers'
      representative,] at or prior to the Closing of each of the
      following conditions:

            "….

            "(c) Sellers' Note. [Cieutat, as the Sellers'
      representative,] shall have received a promissory note issued
      by Eli Global, LLC, in an aggregate original principal amount
      of $12,200,000, in substantially the form of, and having the
      terms set forth on, Exhibit D (the 'Sellers Note'), duly
      executed by Eli Global, LLC."

In other words, the Promissory Note declared that it was being issued

because delivery of the executed Promissory Note to Cieutat, as the

Sellers' representative, was a condition of closing the sale of HPC and its

affiliated entities.

      The Sellers also point to paragraph 5 of the Promissory Note, which

states:

            "5. Right of Offset. In accordance with Section 11.10 of
      the [Equity] Purchase Agreement, [Eli Global] is authorized,
      at any time and from time to time, to the fullest extent
      permitted by Law, to set-off and apply any and all amounts
      payable by [Eli Global] to [Cieutat, as the Sellers'
      representative,] under this Promissory Note against any
      amounts payable by [Cieutat, as the Sellers' representative,]
      to [HPCSP] under Article XI of the [Equity] Purchase
                                    31
SC-2023-0058

    Agreement or otherwise. In the event of such offset, [Eli
    Global] will provide notice to [Cieutat, as the Sellers'
    representative,] of such setoff amount and promptly deliver a
    replacement Promissory Note reflecting the new principal
    amount owed thereunder to [Cieutat, as the Sellers'
    representative]. [Cieutat, as the Sellers' representative,]
    agrees, in exchange for such replacement Promissory Note
    and upon receipt thereof, to return this Promissory Note to
    [Eli Global] for cancellation."

    Section 11.10 of the Equity Purchase Agreement states:

                            "ARTICLE XI

                   "Survival and Indemnification

          "….

          "11.10. Set-Off. Sellers hereby acknowledge and agree
    that [HPCSP] is authorized, at any time and from time to
    time, to the fullest extent permitted by Law, to set-off and
    apply any and all amounts payable by [HPCSP] to any Seller
    or Sellers' Representative (on behalf of Sellers) (including
    amounts outstanding under the Sellers' Note or any amounts
    payable to any Seller pursuant to the Equity Equivalence
    Agreement or under Article VII[11]) against any amounts

    11Article VII of the Equity Purchase Agreement concerns the
payment of taxes on the sale. Section 7.11 states:

          "7.11. Right of Offset. Without limiting their respective
    rights under this Article VII in any respect, (a) Sellers'
    Representative (on behalf of Sellers) may (but shall not be
    obligated to) offset amounts owed by [HPCSP] to Sellers'
    Representative (on behalf of Sellers) under this Article VII
    against amounts otherwise payable by Sellers' Representative
    (on behalf of Sellers) to [HPCSP] under this Article VII and
    (b) [HPCSP] may (but shall not be obligated to) offset amounts
                                   32
SC-2023-0058

     payable by any Seller or by Sellers' Representative (on behalf
     of Sellers) to [HPCSP] under this Article XI, under Article VII
     or otherwise upon providing at least 10 days' prior written
     notice."

(Emphasis added.) The Sellers contend that the foregoing references in

the Promissory Note to the Equity Purchase Agreement demonstrate

that the Promissory Note is not an unconditional promise to pay and that,

therefore, it is not a negotiable instrument under the New York UCC.

     Eli Global and Lindberg counter by arguing that the Promissory

Note's references to the Equity Purchase Agreement are "informational,"

rather than "conditional," and therefore do not render the Promissory

Note nonnegotiable. Eli Global & Lindberg's reply brief, p. 6. For support,

Eli Global and Lindberg cite N.Y. U.C.C. Law § 3-105 and its Official

Comment. In pertinent part, § 3-105 provides:

         "(1) A promise or order otherwise unconditional is not
     made conditional by the fact that the instrument

                 "….

     owed by Sellers' Representative (on behalf of Sellers) to
     [HPCSP] under this Article VII in accordance with Section
     11.10. The Parties agree that the exercise of such right of
     offset will not constitute a breach of a covenant under this
     Agreement, and that neither the exercise of nor the failure to
     exercise such right of offset will constitute an election of
     remedies or limit a Party in any manner in the enforcement
     of any other remedies that may be available to it."
                                   33
SC-2023-0058

                "(b) states its consideration, whether
           performed or promised, or the transaction which
           gave rise to the instrument, or that the promise or
           order is made or the instrument matures in
           accordance with or 'as per' such transaction; or

                 "(c) refers to or states that it arises out of a
           separate agreement or refers to a separate
           agreement for rights as to prepayment or
           acceleration; or

                "….

           "(2) A promise or order is not unconditional if the
     instrument

                "(a) states that it is subject to or governed by
           any other agreement; or

                 "(b) states that it is to be paid only out of a
           particular fund or source except as provided in this
           section."

The relevant portions of the Official Comment to § 3-105 explain:

           "2. Paragraph (b) of subsection (1) is an amplification of
     Section 3(2) of the original act. The final clause is intended to
     resolve a conflict in the decisions over the effect of such
     language as 'This note is given for payment as per contract for
     the purchase of goods of even date, maturity being in
     conformity with the terms of such contract.' It adopts the
     general commercial understanding that such language is
     intended as a mere recital of the origin of the instrument and
     a reference to the transaction for information, but is not
     meant to condition payment according to the terms of any
     other agreement.

                                    34
SC-2023-0058

           "3. Paragraph (c) of subsection (1) likewise is intended
     to resolve a conflict, and to reject cases in which a reference
     to a separate agreement was held to mean that payment of
     the instrument must be limited in accordance with the terms
     of the agreement, and hence was conditioned by it. Such a
     reference normally is inserted for the purpose of making a
     record or giving information to anyone who may be interested,
     and in the absence of any express statement to that effect is
     not intended to limit the terms of payment. Inasmuch as
     rights as to prepayment or acceleration has to do with a
     'speed-up' in payment and since notes frequently refer to
     separate agreements for a statement of these rights, such
     reference does not destroy negotiability even though it has
     mild aspects of incorporation by reference. …

           "….

            "8. Paragraph (a) of subsection (2) retains the generally
     accepted rule that where an instrument contains such
     language as 'subject to terms of contract between maker and
     payee of this date,' its payment is conditioned according to the
     terms of the agreement and the instrument is not negotiable.
     The distinction is between a mere recital of the existence of
     the separate agreement or a reference to it for information,
     which under paragraph (c) of subsection (1) will not affect
     negotiability, and any language which, fairly construed,
     requires the holder to look to the other agreement for the
     terms of payment. The intent of the provision is that an
     instrument is not negotiable unless the holder can ascertain
     all of its essential terms from its face. In the specific instance
     of rights as to prepayment or acceleration, however, there
     may be a reference to a separate agreement without
     destroying negotiability [As amended 1962]."

(Emphasis added.)

                                    35
SC-2023-0058

     Eli Global and Lindberg contend that the reference in the first

paragraph of the Promissory Note to the Equity Purchase Agreement is

exactly the kind of reference the Official Comment to § 3-105 states is "a

reference to the transaction for information, but is not meant to condition

payment according to the terms of any other agreement." We agree. The

reference to the Equity Purchase Agreement in the first paragraph of the

Promissory Note simply observes that the execution of the Promissory

Note was one of the conditions of the sale closing.

     However, Eli Global and Lindberg also insist that "there are no

conditions to payment not stated in the note and a payee need not look

elsewhere to discern the payment terms." Eli Global & Lindberg's reply

brief, p. 7. That position is difficult to square with paragraph five of the

Promissory Note concerning the right of set off, which is determined by

references to the Equity Purchase Agreement. The sections of the Equity

Purchase Agreement implicated by paragraph 5 of the Promissory Note

indicate that Eli Global could be entitled to reductions in the amounts it

owed under the Promissory Note due to taxes or indemnification paid in

accordance with the Equity Purchase Agreement and the Equity

Equivalence Agreement. Eli Global and Lindberg assert that those

                                    36
SC-2023-0058

provisions merely refer to "possible early discharge of the note in whole

or in part without suggesting an external payment condition let alone one

that would extend payment beyond the payment dates." Eli Global &

Lindberg's reply brief, p. 7. But the reality is that paragraph five of the

Promissory Note makes payments under the Promissory Note potentially

contingent upon factors provided in the Equity Purchase Agreement.

     Moreover, on a broader level, the fact is that the Promissory Note

is a part of the Equity Purchase Agreement. In addition to the fact that

a required condition of closing the sale was Eli Global's providing the

Promissory Note to the Sellers, Article I of the Equity Purchase

Agreement defines the "Transaction Documents" as including "this

Agreement, the Equity Equivalence Agreement, the Employment

Agreements and the Sellers' Note …." Paragraph 12.2 of the Equity

Purchase Agreement also states:

          "12.2 Entire Agreement. This Agreement (including the
     Schedules and Exhibits hereto) and other Transaction
     Documents constitute the entire agreement among the
     Parties and supersede any prior understandings or
     agreements by or among the Parties, written or oral, to the
     extent they related in any way to the subject matter hereof
     and thereof."

                                    37
SC-2023-0058

(Emphasis added.) The Promissory Note was an exhibit to the Equity

Purchase Agreement. Additionally, paragraph eight of the Promissory

Note provides that "[t]he remedies provided [Cieutat, as the Sellers'

representative,] in this Promissory Note and the [Equity] Purchase

Agreement shall be cumulative and concurrent …." (Emphasis added.)

Finally, Eli Global and Lindberg themselves argued in their response to

the Sellers' summary-judgment motion that that the Promissory Note

was part of the Equity Purchase Agreement. That argument was integral

to their original (but abandoned on appeal) defense to the Sellers' claims:

     "[Eli Global and Lindberg] clearly assert that they relied on
     information Cieutat provided to Eli Global in negotiating the
     terms of and executing the Guaranty Agreement, Promissory
     Note and overall transaction.

           "Cieutat's duty to disclose or to correct misinformation
     does not arise as part of the [Equity Purchase Agreement]
     alone. Rather, because [Eli Global and Lindberg] requested
     information from Cieutat and relied on information from him
     in taking an action -- i.e. executing the Promissory Note and
     Guaranty -- he had a duty to not mislead [Eli Global and
     Lindberg]."

(Citations omitted.) In short, because the Promissory Note was part of a

larger transaction, all of its essential terms were not contained therein,

meaning that the Promissory Note was not a negotiable instrument.

Because the Promissory Note was not negotiable, the Sellers were not
                                    38
SC-2023-0058

required to prove who possessed the Promissory Note in order to enforce

it.

      2. Possession of the Promissory Note

      Even if the Promissory Note could be construed as a negotiable

instrument, we believe Eli Global and Lindberg's argument that the

Sellers failed to prove who possessed the Promissory Note also fails.

Eli Global and Lindberg initially contend that the Sellers "had to

conclusively prove that they -- as holders of the note -- possessed the note

when they sued and filed their summary judgment motion." Eli Global &

Lindberg's brief, p. 15. To support that proposition, Eli Global and

Lindberg cite Aurora Loan Servicing, LLC v. Taylor, 25 N.Y.3d 355, 34

N.E.3d 363, 12 N.Y.S.3d 612 (2015). But Eli Global and Lindberg

misconstrue Taylor.

      The Taylor court explained that Aurora Loan Servicing, LLC

("Aurora"), had filed a foreclosure action against the Taylors.

            "The Taylors filed a motion for summary judgment,
      asserting that Aurora did not have standing to bring this
      foreclosure action. Aurora cross-moved for summary
      judgment. In support of its cross motion, Aurora submitted
      the affidavit of Sara Holland (Holland affidavit), Aurora's
      legal liaison, who stated that based on her 'personal
      knowledge' of the facts as well as her 'review of the note,
      mortgage and other loan documents' and 'related business
                                    39
SC-2023-0058

    records ... kept in the ordinary course of the regularly
    conducted business activity,' the 'original Note has been in the
    custody of Plaintiff Aurora Loan Services, LLC and in its
    present condition since May 20, 2010.' Holland also stated
    that, 'prior to the commencement of the action, Aurora Loan
    Services, LLC, has been in exclusive possession of the original
    note and allonge affixed thereto, indorsed to Deutsche Bank
    Trust Company Americas as Trustee, and has not transferred
    same to any other person or entity.' A copy of the note and
    allonge were attached to the affidavit.

         "….

          "The critical issue we must resolve is whether the record
    demonstrates a basis for finding that Aurora had standing to
    commence this mortgage foreclosure action. The physical
    delivery of the note to the plaintiff from its owner prior to
    commencement of a foreclosure action may, in certain
    circumstances, be sufficient to transfer the mortgage
    obligation and create standing to foreclose ….

          "Applying these principles of New York law, Aurora was
    vested with standing to foreclose. The evidence established
    that, as of 2006, Deutsche, as trustee under the PSA, became
    the lawful owner of the note. The Holland affidavit establishes
    that Aurora came into possession of the note on May 20, 2010,
    prior to the May 24, 2010 commencement of the foreclosure
    action. …

          "Contrary to the Taylors' assertions, to have standing, it
    is not necessary to have possession of the mortgage at the time
    the action is commenced. This conclusion follows from the fact
    that the note, and not the mortgage, is the dispositive
    instrument that conveys standing to foreclose under New
    York law. In the current case, the note was transferred to
    Aurora before the commencement of the foreclosure action --
    that is what matters."

                                  40
SC-2023-0058

Taylor, 25 N.Y.3d 355, 359-61, 34 N.E.3d at 365-66, 12 N.Y.S.2d at 614-

15 (emphasis added).

     From the foregoing, it is clear that Taylor does not stand for the

proposition that, to file their summary-judgment motion, the Sellers had

to conclusively prove that a particular one of them possessed the

Promissory Note. Instead, Taylor noted that when the Taylors, the

defendants, raised the issue of Aurora's "standing" to bring a foreclosure

action, Aurora had to provide prima facie evidence that it possessed the

note before commencing the foreclosure action. 12 Taylor's explanation

aligns with several other New York cases, which state that once the

defendant in a foreclosure action has raised the issue of the plaintiff's

"standing" to foreclose, the plaintiff must provide prima facie evidence of

possession of the note in question. Moreover, those cases also state that

a lack of such "standing" initially must be pleaded as an affirmative

defense, or the defense is waived and cannot be raised in response to a

     12We    note that the cases Eli Global and Lindberg cite for the
proposition that the Sellers needed to demonstrate that one of them had
physical possession of the note are, unlike this case, mortgage-foreclosure
cases. It is unclear whether the rule in those cases applies to the type of
promissory note at issue here, but, as we explain in the text, even under
such cases Eli Global and Lindberg's argument fails.
                                     41
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plaintiff's summary-judgment motion. See, e.g., Bayview Loan Servicing,

LLC v. Freyer, 192 A.D.3d 1421, 1422-23, 145 N.Y.S.3d 647, 649 (2021)

(explaining that " '[w]here, as here, the issue of standing is raised as an

affirmative defense, the plaintiff must also prove its standing in order to

be entitled to relief' (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Monica, 131 AD3d

737, 738[, 15 N.Y.S.3d 863] [2015] [internal quotation marks and

citations omitted] …. A 'plaintiff has standing in a mortgage foreclosure

action where it is both the holder or assignee of the subject mortgage and

the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is

commenced' (Citibank, N.A. v Abrams, 144 AD3d 1212, 1214[, 40

N.Y.S.3d 653] [2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted];

see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Verderose, 154 AD3d 1198, 1200[, 63

N.Y.S.3d 579] [2017]). 'Holder status is established where the plaintiff

possesses a note that, on its face or by allonge, contains an indorsement

in blank or bears a special indorsement payable to the order of the

plaintiff' (McCormack v Maloney, 160 AD3d 1098, 1099[, 75 N.Y.S.3d

294] [2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].");

JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Caliguri, 36 N.Y.3d 953, 954, 160

N.E.3d 693, 694, 136 N.Y.S.3d 225, 226 (2020) (same); Wells Fargo Bank,

                                    42
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NA v. Ostiguy, 127 A.D.3d 1375, 1376, 8 N.Y.S.3d 669, 670-71 (2015)

(same).13

     13In a concurrence in US Bank N.A. v. Nelson, 36 N.Y.3d 998, 163

N.E.3d 49, 139 N.Y.S.3d 118 (2020), Justice Rowan Wilson disagreed
with the approach taken by New York courts on this issue, stating:

           "The law governing [whether the plaintiff is the current
     holder of the defendant's note] is not our jurisprudence on
     standing but rather the law of negotiable instruments,
     codified in New York's Uniform Commercial Code. …

            "….

           "In the past decade, New York courts have firmly
     adopted the mistaken use of the word 'standing' to refer to
     questions about whether the plaintiff in a foreclosure action
     holds the defendant's note. The consequence of that
     mislabeling has caused many courts to hold that the note's
     obligor (the homeowner, typically) must plead 'lack of
     standing' as an affirmative defense …."

36 N.Y.3d at 1007-09, 163 N.E.3d at 55-56, 139 N.Y.S.3d at 124-25. Even
so, Justice Wilson still believed that all that was required of the plaintiff
in that case was to present the note with the summary-judgment motion.
See Nelson, 36 N.Y.3d at 1012, 163 N.E.3d at 58, 139 N.Y.S.3d at 127
("When US Bank moved for summary judgment, it attached the Nelsons'
note, indorsed in blank, the mortgage, and the assignment of the
mortgage. Doing so established, prima facie, US Bank's right to judgment
as a matter of law. To defeat US Bank's motion for summary judgment,
the Nelsons were required to adduce admissible facts controverting US
Bank's proof of ownership …. That they utterly failed even to attempt to
do. US Bank, therefore, was entitled to summary judgment."). In this
case, the Sellers fulfilled that requirement because Cieutat, on behalf of
the Sellers, attached a signed and executed copy of the Promissory Note
to the complaint.
                                     43
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      Based on the foregoing New York case authorities -- including

Eli Global and Lindberg's own cited authority, Taylor -- Eli Global and

Lindberg waived in two ways the issue whether the Sellers possessed the

Promissory Note at the time they commenced this action. First, it is

undisputed that Eli Global and Lindberg never asserted a lack of

"standing" as an affirmative defense in their answers to the Sellers'

complaint. Second, Eli Global and Lindberg did not raise the issue of

possession in response to the Sellers' summary-judgment motion.

      In response to the problem that they never raised the possession

issue -- either in their answers or in response to the Sellers' summary-

judgment motion -- Eli Global and Lindberg retreat from their initial

assertion that the Sellers' had to conclusively prove possession and,

instead, posit that the propositions from the foregoing cases do not apply

because in those cases "each plaintiff presented a prima facie case." Eli

Global & Lindberg's reply brief, p. 15. In contrast, they say, the Sellers

      "never presented a prima facie case because they did not plead
      or prove who among them, if any of them, possessed the note.
      That is, [the Sellers] never put possession at issue in the first
      instance .… Because [the Sellers] did not present a prima
      facie case, [Eli Global and Lindberg] were not required to
      assert lack of standing as an affirmative defense."

Id. at 16.
                                     44
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     We note that in making the foregoing argument, Eli Global and

Lindberg have subtly lowered the Sellers' alleged burden of proof on

summary judgment from needing "conclusive proof" of possession to

requiring "prima facie" proof, which suggests that their initial argument

misstated the law. However, Eli Global and Lindberg's updated

argument continues to misstate what New York authorities say. The

cases repeatedly state that possession of a negotiable promissory note

only becomes an issue if that issue is challenged by the defendant.

Eli Global and Lindberg did not raise the possession issue in a timely

manner, and they consequently waived the issue.

     In any event, Eli Global and Lindberg admitted in their answers to

the complaint and in their amended counterclaim that Cieutat, as the

Sellers' representative, entered into the Equity Purchase Agreement

with HPCSP, that Eli Global executed the Promissory Note in

conjunction with the Equity Purchase Agreement, that the Promissory

Note was part of the Equity Purchase Agreement, and that Cieutat

received and possessed the Promissory Note. They also admitted that

Eli Global made the first payment under the Promissory Note to Cieutat

in his capacity as the Sellers' representative. Specifically, in their

                                   45
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"Amended Counterclaim against Ron Cieutat" filed on January 22, 2021,

Eli Global and Lindberg stated:

           "10. The sale of HPC to HPCSP closed on or about
     April 13, 2018, and, under the terms of the [Equity Purchase
     Agreement], Cieutat, on behalf of the Sellers of HPC, received
     a promissory note issued by Eli Global for the amount of
     $12,200,000 to be paid out over five (5) years in equal
     installments of $2,440,000 each, plus interest ('Promissory
     Note'). As further part of the sale, Lindberg signed a Guaranty
     Agreement personally guaranteeing the Promissory note.

           "….

          "22. In or about April 2019, in accordance with the
     Promissory Note, Eli Global made a payment of $2,440,000 to
     the HPC sellers, which included Cieutat."

     Eli Global and Lindberg insist that those admissions are

meaningless.

           "Whether Cieutat received the note in April 2018 does
     not prove that he still possessed it over two years later when
     [the Sellers] sued.

           "….

          "That Cieutat received the first payment is not
     surprising since he is the [the Sellers'] representative. But
     that does not mean he personally possessed the note.
     Somebody had to receive the payment and distribute the
     funds, including to the note possessor."

Eli Global & Lindberg's reply brief, p. 13 (footnote omitted).

                                    46
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      However, Cieutat, on behalf of the Sellers, submitted an executed

copy of the Promissory Note as an exhibit to their complaint, and

Eli Global and Lindberg never denied the legitimacy of the presented

Promissory Note. In fact, in their answers to the complaint, both Eli

Global and Lindberg repeatedly stated that "the Promissory Note speaks

for itself."

      "A plaintiff may establish, prima facie, its standing as the
      holder of the note by demonstrating that a copy of the note,
      properly endorsed 'either to bearer or to an identified person
      that is the person in possession' (UCC 1-201[b][21][A]; see
      [UCC] 3-301), either on the note itself, 'or on a paper so firmly
      affixed thereto as to become a part thereof' (UCC 3-202[2]),
      was among the exhibits annexed to the complaint at the time
      the action was commenced …."

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Carchi, 177 A.D.3d 710, 712, 111 N.Y.S.3d 679,

682 (2019).

      Additionally, New York U.C.C. Law § 1-201(21)(A) defines a

"holder" as "the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is

payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in

possession." The Promissory Note itself states that Cieutat is the holder

of the note whom Eli Global would pay:

           "For value received, the undersigned, Eli Global, LLC, a
      Delaware limited liability company ('Maker'), hereby
      promises to pay to the order of Ron Cieutat (on behalf of
                                     47
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     Sellers (as defined below)), as Sellers' Representative
     ('Payee'), at such place, or to such other party, as the legal
     holder of this Promissory Note … the principal sum of Twelve
     Million Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($12,200,000),
     together with interest upon the principal amount at the rate
     of 4.0% per annum, in immediately available funds."

(Emphasis added.)

     Cieutat's submission of the Promissory Note with the complaint,

Eli Global's first payment on the note to him, and Eli Global and

Lindberg's admissions constituted more than sufficient prima facie

evidence that Cieutat possessed the Promissory Note when the Sellers

commenced this action. See, e.g., Jin Sheng He v. Sing Huei Chang, 83

A.D.3d 788, 789, 921 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130 (2011) ("To establish prima facie

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to a promissory

note, a plaintiff must show the existence of a promissory note executed

by the defendant containing an unequivocal and unconditional obligation

to repay and the failure of the defendant to pay in accordance with the

note's terms …."); Griffon V, LLC v. 11 E. 36th, LLC, 90 A.D.3d 705, 707,

934 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474 (2011) (same). Eli Global and Lindberg fail to cite

any evidence in the record suggesting that Cieutat ever transferred or

lost possession of the Promissory Note. Therefore, even if the Promissory

Note was negotiable, and even if Eli Global and Lindberg had not waived
                                   48
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the possession issue, the fact of possession was sufficiently established

for the Sellers' summary-judgment motion. Accordingly, Eli Global and

Lindberg failed to demonstrate that the Sellers lacked the right to enforce

payment on the Promissory Note.

     3. Did Cieutat Release His Claims Against Lindberg?

     Aside from the argument seeking to escape liability to all the

Sellers for payment under the Promissory Note, Lindberg contends that

he should not have to pay the amount of the judgment that is owed to

Cieutat because, he says, Cieutat released his guaranty claim against

Lindberg in the settlement agreement executed in the employment

lawsuit. As we recounted in the rendition of facts, the settlement

agreement in the employment lawsuit arose from an action commenced

by Cieutat against HPCSP, Eli Global, and Eli Global representative

Michael Pereira, and those parties executed the settlement agreement.

In Part C of that settlement agreement, the parties agreed to

     "irrevocably and unconditionally release and forever
     discharge each other and their representatives, attorneys,
     affiliates, officers, directors, successors, heirs and assigns
     ('Released Parties') with respect to any and all claims and
     causes of action of any nature whatsoever … resulting from,
     or relating in any way to the Lawsuit, or relating, directly or
     indirectly, to Cieutat's employment with Employer Parties,
     and any affiliates. …"
                                    49
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Lindberg contends that he is a representative of the released parties

because he signed the Equity Purchase Agreement as HPCSP's manager

and signed the Promissory Note as Eli Global's manager.

     However, Part C also contained express carveouts from the

generally broad release. We repeat the carveouts for the benefit of this

analysis:

          "vi. Anything contained in this Agreement to the
     contrary notwithstanding, the terms of Section C shall not
     apply to any claims or defenses brought in the following
     lawsuits currently on file:

                 "(i) Ronald Cieutat et al. v. HPCSP
            Investments, LLC and Greg E. Lindberg, in the
            Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, Case
            No. 02-CV-2020-900422.00; and

                 "(ii) Ronald Cieutat et al. v. Eli Global, LLC
            and Greg E. Lindberg, in the Circuit Court of
            Mobile County, Alabama, Case No. CV-2020-
            900993.00.

           "vii. Anything contained in this Agreement to the
     contrary notwithstanding, the terms of this Section C shall
     not apply to any claims Cieutat, the Employer Parties, or
     others have or may have in the future with respect to any of
     the following:

                 "(i) The Equity Purchase          Agreement
            executed January 19, 2018;

                                    50
SC-2023-0058

                 "(ii) The Equity Equivalence Agreement
            executed on our about April 13, 2018; and

                 "(iii) The Promissory Note executed on or
            about April 13, 2018."

     Lindberg contends that although section C.vii(iii) expressly

exempted Cieutat's claims with respect to the Promissory Note,

     "it did not mention Lindberg's guaranty. Stated differently, by
     including the note without mentioning the guaranty, the
     parties excluded the guaranty from the exceptions to the
     release. The parties could have written § C(vii) to exclude both
     the Promissory Note executed on or about April 13, 2018, and
     Lindberg's Guaranty had they agreed to expand the release
     carve out in that manner. But they did not do that. Instead,
     they limited Cieutat's release carve out to only his
     claims/rights vis-à-vis the note and left the release intact as
     to Lindberg's guaranty."

Eli Global & Lindberg's brief, pp. 21-22 (emphasis in original; footnotes

omitted).

     Lindberg's argument entirely ignores the language in section C.vi

of the settlement agreement, which expressly exempts from release "any

claims or defenses brought in" this very case. 14 That carveout obviously

     14Lindberg's neglect of the language in section C.vi of the settlement

agreement on appeal is curious given that he highlighted that language
in the response to the summary-judgment motion:

         "The Settlement Agreement executed by the
     Employment Litigation parties specifically carved out claims
                                51
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implicates Cieutat's claims against Lindberg with respect to the

Guaranty in this case. As the Sellers note, "[t]hese two carve-outs are

separately numbered exceptions to the Release. In fact, the two carve-

outs are referred to conjunctively and cumulatively throughout the

Release." Sellers' brief, p. 27. Thus, there is no reason to read section C.vii

as somehow deliberately releasing Lindberg from claims Cieutat already

had asserted against Lindberg in the present litigation. In short,

Cieutat's claims against Lindberg based on the Guaranty were not

released in the settlement agreement, and Lindberg's suggestion

otherwise is meritless.

B. The Circuit Court's Award of Attorney Fees and Expenses to the
Sellers

      As we noted in our rendition of the facts, paragraph seven of the

Promissory Note expressly provides:

      "[Eli Global] shall pay all reasonable and actual costs and
      expenses incurred by [Cieutat, as the Sellers' representative,]
      in connection with collecting or attempting to collect any sums

      or defenses brought in this litigation (the 'Note Litigation') as
      well as any claims 'Cieutat, the Employer Parties, or others
      have or may have in the future with respect to' the [Equity
      Purchase Agreement], the Equity Equivalence Agreement,
      and the Promissory Note."

(Footnote omitted.)
                                      52
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     due under this Promissory Note or enforcing any provision of
     this Promissory Note, including but not limited to reasonable
     attorneys' fees and disbursements and applicable statutory
     costs, whether incurred out of court or in litigation …."

     In Pharmacia Corp. v. McGowan, 915 So. 2d 549, 552-53 (Ala.

2004), this Court stated:

          "This Court has set forth 12 criteria a court might
     consider when determining the reasonableness of an attorney
     fee:

           " '(1) [T]he nature and value of the subject matter
           of the employment; (2) the learning, skill, and
           labor requisite to its proper discharge; (3) the time
           consumed; (4) the professional experience and
           reputation of the attorney; (5) the weight of his
           responsibilities; (6) the measure of success
           achieved; (7) the reasonable expenses incurred;
           (8) whether a fee is fixed or contingent; (9) the
           nature and length of a professional relationship;
           (10) the fee customarily charged in the locality for
           similar legal services; (11) the likelihood that a
           particular employment may preclude other
           employment; and (12) the time limitations
           imposed by the client or by the circumstances.'

     "Van Schaack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 530 So. 2d 740, 749
     (Ala. 1988). These criteria are for purposes of evaluating
     whether an attorney fee is reasonable; they are not an
     exhaustive list of specific criteria that must all be met. Beal
     Bank v. Schilleci, 896 So. 2d 395, 403 (Ala. 2004), citing
     Graddick v. First Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank of Troy,
     453 So. 2d 1305, 1311 (Ala. 1984).

          "We defer to the trial court in an attorney-fee case
     because we recognize that the trial court, which has presided
                                    53
SC-2023-0058

     over the entire litigation, has a superior understanding of the
     factual questions that must be resolved in an attorney-fee
     determination. [City of Birmingham v. ]Horn, 810 So. 2d
     [667,] 681-82 [(Ala. 2001)], citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
     U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).
     Nevertheless, a trial court's order regarding an attorney fee
     must allow for meaningful appellate review by articulating
     the decisions made, the reasons supporting those decisions,
     and how it calculated the attorney fee. Horn, 810 So. 2d at
     682, citing American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v.
     Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Hensley,
     461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933." 15

     15The Sellers and Eli Global and Lindberg apply Alabama law in

arguing about whether the circuit court's award of attorney fees and
expenses was appropriate. They do not address whether the Promissory
Note's choice-of-law clause has any bearing on the circuit court's
evaluation of the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees and
expenses. The answer to such a question would depend upon whether a
claim for contractual attorney fees is substantive or procedural in nature
because, in an action based on a contract with a choice-of-law provision,
substantive matters are governed by the law of the chosen jurisdiction --
New York in this instance -- but matters of procedure are governed by
the law of the forum. See, e.g., Etheredge v. Genie Indus., Inc., 632 So.
2d 1324, 1326 (Ala. 1994) (" '[A] court will apply foreign law only to the
extent that it deals with the substance of the case, i.e., affects the
outcome of the litigation, but will rely on forum law to deal with the
"procedural" aspects of the litigation.' " (quoting Eugene F. Scoles & Peter
Hay, Conflict of Laws 57 (1992))). However, this Court has not addressed
whether a claim for contractual attorney fees is substantive or procedural
in nature, and reviews by other courts reveal that this is not a settled
issue in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., 1600 Barberry Lane 8 LLC v.
Cottonwood Residential O.P. LP, 493 P.3d 580, 586-87 (Utah 2021);
Boswell v. RFD-TV the Theater, LLC, 498 S.W.3d 550, 557-60 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2016). Because the parties do not ask us to address that question
and because they agree that Alabama law applies to the issue of the
reasonableness of the attorney-fee award, we will apply Alabama law.

                                    54
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     Eli Global and Lindberg contend that the Sellers failed to prove that

the circuit court's awarded attorney fees and expenses are recoverable

because, instead of addressing the foregoing 12 factors that were first

enunciated in Peebles v. Miley, 439 So. 2d 137, 140-41 (Ala. 1983), they

say that the Sellers only presented "conclusory testimony that [the] fee

[was] based on the hours spent and the results achieved." Eli Global &

Lindberg's brief, p. 24.

     We reject Eli Global and Lindberg's contention that the Sellers did

not provide adequate explanations or evidentiary support for their

request for attorney fees and expenses. As we recounted in our rendition

of the facts, the Sellers submitted multiple affidavits -- including two

affidavits from one of their current attorneys -- a large number of invoices

detailing their attorneys' fees and expenses, and arguments that

discussed the Peebles factors in detail. When viewed as a whole, the

Sellers' submissions were more than adequate to allow the circuit court

to determine whether the Sellers' requested attorney fees and expenses

were reasonable.

     However, Eli Global and Lindberg also contend that the circuit

court's order awarding attorney fees and expenses did not "provide for

                                    55
SC-2023-0058

meaningful appellate review by articulating the decision made, the

reasons supporting that decision, and how it calculated the attorneys'

fees." Eli Global & Lindberg's brief, p. 28; see Pharmacia, 915 So. 2d at

553. The Sellers do not really dispute that contention, arguing instead

that the circuit court's order "was supported by facts and analysis" that

they submitted. Sellers' brief, p. 33. Although, as we already have stated,

we agree that the Sellers submitted sufficient facts and analysis in

support of their requested award, that is not the standard we have

applied to a circuit court's order awarding attorney fees and expenses.

See, e.g., Kiker v. Probate Ct. of Mobile Cnty., 67 So. 3d 865, 868 (Ala.

2010) ("In this case, the probate court's December 22, 2009, order

awarding attorney fees and expenses … provides no indication as to

whether the probate court considered the criteria set forth for

determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee as detailed in

Pharmacia, 915 So. 2d at 552-53 …. Additionally, the probate court's

order neither indicates how the probate court calculated the attorney fees

nor provides a basis for ascertaining the exact amount of [the] award

specifically attributable to attorney fees. Although the probate court

stated in its original order of November 24, 2009, that its decision was

                                    56
SC-2023-0058

based on the 'evidence and argument presented,' the probate court

provides no detailed application of the facts regarding the attorney fees

to the factors detailed in Pharmacia."); Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res.

v. T.S., 53 So. 3d 38, 44 (Ala. 2009) ("In this case, the trial court's order

approving an attorney fee … plus litigation expenses … provides no

indication as to whether the trial court considered the criteria set forth

for determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee as detailed in

Pharmacia, nor does it indicate how the trial court calculated the

attorney fee. Although the trial court states that its decision is based on

the evidence, it provides no detailed application of the facts regarding

Fees's fee to the factors set forth in Pharmacia.").

     Concerning attorney fees and expenses, the circuit court's

December 21, 2022, order simply stated:

           "2. [The Sellers'] motion to enter attorneys' fees and
     costs award is granted; and

           "….

            "Accordingly, judgment is hereby entered in favor of
     Ronald Cieutat in his representative capacity on behalf of all
     of [the Sellers], jointly and severally against Defendants
     Eli Global LLC d/b/a Global Growth and Greg Lindberg, …
     (b)(i) $61,330.00 in attorneys' fees and $4,446.96 in expenses
     with the Baker Donelson firm, (ii) $17,575.00 in attorneys'
     fees with Bob Clute, and (iii) $138,211.75 in attorneys' fees
                                     57
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     and $11,406.42 in expenses with the Speegle Hoffman firm;
     and (c) all of which shall accrue post-judgment interest at the
     highest lawful rate."

     The circuit court's order "does not expressly state that the circuit

court considered each of the 12 factors set out in Pharmacia," but as we

noted in Moultrie v. Wall, 143 So. 3d 128, 137 (Ala. 2013), that shortfall

is not sufficient to find error with the award. Still, the order's threadbare

nature does not "allow for meaningful appellate review by articulating

the decisions made, the reasons supporting those decisions, and how it

calculated the attorney fee." Pharmacia, 915 So. 2d at 553. Perhaps

sensing that we might reach such a conclusion, the Sellers argue that

"this Court is authorized to render judgments that it believes the trial

court should have rendered" and, thus, "may enter a reasoned judgment

in the [Sellers'] favor supporting the attorneys' fees and expenses award."

Sellers' brief, p. 47. But as we observed in Pharmacia, "[w]e defer to the

trial court in an attorney-fee case because we recognize that the trial

court, which has presided over the entire litigation, has a superior

understanding of the factual questions that must be resolved in an

attorney-fee determination." Pharmacia, 915 So. 2d at 553. Therefore, we

conclude that the proper course of action is to remand this case to the

                                     58
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circuit court for the entry of an explanatory order articulating the

decision it made, and its reason for that decision, which resulted in the

attorney fees and expenses it awarded to the Sellers. 16 Cf. Kiker, 67 So.

3d at 870; Beal Bank, SSB v. Schilleci, 896 So. 2d 395, 409-10 (Ala. 2004).

                             IV. Conclusion

     The Promissory Note was not a negotiable instrument. Even if we

construed it as such under the New York UCC, the Sellers were not

required to prove who possessed the Promissory Note because Eli Global

and Lindberg waived that argument in the circuit court. Even if

Eli Global and Lindberg had not waived their possession argument, the

Sellers presented a sufficient prima facie case to establish that Cieutat,

as the Sellers' representative, possessed the Promissory Note, and Eli

Global and Lindberg presented no evidence to refute his possession.

Accordingly, the Sellers had the right to enforce payment on the

     16

           "We note that, when an appellate court remands a case,
     the trial court's authority is limited to compliance with the
     directions provided by the appellate court; it does not have the
     authority to reopen for additional testimony except where
     expressly directed to do so. Madison Cty. Dept. of Human Res.
     v. T.S., 53 So. 3d 38 (Ala. 2009)."

Ex parte Shinaberry, 326 So. 3d 1037, 1043 n.3 (Ala. 2020).
                                  59
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Promissory Note, and Eli Global and Lindberg do not dispute the amount

owed under the Promissory Note. Additionally, Cieutat did not release

his claims against Lindberg that are based on the Guaranty. Therefore,

we affirm the circuit court's judgment finding Eli Global and Lindberg

liable based on the Promissory Note and the Guaranty, and we affirm its

award of the principal amount plus interest due based on that liability.

However, because the circuit court's December 21, 2022, order did not

provide sufficient explanation as to how it determined the award of

attorney fees and expenses, we remand the case for the circuit court to

enter an order articulating its reasons for that portion of the order. Due

return shall be made to this Court within 42 days of the date of this

opinion.

     AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

     Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Stewart, Mitchell, and Cook,

JJ., concur.

     Sellers, J., concurs in the result.

                                    60