Court Opinion

ID: 9725155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:32:57.292894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:11.375674
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GARCIA, dissenting: Although I agree the trial judge should have done more in discussing with the prospective jurors the “ ‘basic guarantees’ for obtaining a fair and impartial jury” (356 Ill. App. 3d at 401), I cannot agree that the cited portion of Rule 431(a) supports reversing the conviction in this case. The trial court did nothing to restrict defense counsel’s right under Rule 431(a) to request Zehr questions. Nor did the trial court misinstruct the jury at the conclusion of the trial as to the State’s ultimate burden and the defendant’s right not to testify. I agree that the change in Rule 431(a) from “may” to “shall” makes the requirement of acquainting the prospective jurors of their basic duties and responsibilities mandatory; the real question, however, is whether the requirement was met in this case. And, even if I were to agree that the trial court did not satisfy that requirement, the question becomes whether the failure to do so warrants a reversal irrespective of the quantum of evidence presented against the defendant. I submit the trial court met the requirement under Rule 431(a), however minimally, by its questions regarding the verdict forms. The trial court’s inquiry to the prospective jurors as to whether each would sign a verdict of guilty or not guilty depending on whether the State was able to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt minimally acquainted the jurors with their general duties and responsibilities. In fact, the same inquiry was posed twice by the trial court: first, before the selection of the 12 members of the jury, and second, before the selection of the alternates. At no time did any member of the jury even remotely suggest that he or she would not abide by the trial court’s instruction of signing a verdict form based on whether the State was able to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Although I agree that it is a standard practice for “trial judges *** to discuss the presumption of innocence with jurors before jury selection begins.” 356 Ill. App. 3d at 400. A practice does not a rule make. Nor should a deviation from that practice lead inexorably, as the majority holds here, to the reversal of a conviction that is otherwise based on “overwhelming weight of the evidence against [the defendant].” 356 Ill. App. 3d at 398. Interestingly, the only case cited by the majority regarding the import of the final sentences in the civil predecessor to Rule 431(a), Rule 234, Schaffner v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., concluded with our supreme court holding that any violation of Rule 234 by the trial court in addressing matters which might reasonably be argued “ ‘concerned] matters of law or instructions’ ” failed because “any error arising from those comments was not prejudicial to North Western.” Schaffner, 192 Ill. 2d at 35, quoting 107 Ill. 2d R. 234. I submit, absent a showing of prejudice by the defendant in this case, the same result must obtain here. See also People v. Casillas, 195 Ill. 2d at 474 (voir dire comments by trial court were sufficient to ameliorate any prejudice from the failure to instruct on the presumption of innocence). I submit Casillas may also be read as authority that, in a case such as this, where the trial court informed the prospective jurors of the State’s burden and, thus, impliedly, the lack of any burden on the defendant, and where the jury was properly instructed at the conclusion of the trial, reversal is unwarranted without a showing of prejudice. I also cannot agree that “this case necessarily turns on the significance and value we give the rights,” we call principles, otherwise considered “ ‘basic guarantees’ for obtaining a fair and impartial jury.” 356 Ill. App. 3d at 401. Were the question so simple, I would not dissent. To demonstrate that the question is not so simple, I direct attention to the numerous cases that must have been decided before our supreme court’s holding in Zehr that did not include the inquiries now mandated by Zehr, as defense counsel may request. No one would seriously suggest that the outcomes in those cases are somehow suspect without considering the strength of the incriminating evidence in each case. Nor does Zehr or Rule 431(a) stand for the proposition that the Zehr questions must be asked or face a conviction reversal. The holding in Zehr, supported by the qualifying phrase at the beginning of Rule 431(a), can best be understood to stand for the proposition that in our adversarial system of justice, a trial judge has limited discretion to reject questions that go directly to the qualifications of prospective jurors. As the majority readily acknowledges, a review under Zehr turns on whether “a trial court abused its discretion during voir dire *** concerning the State’s burden of proof, the right of the defendant not to testify without penalty, and the presumption of innocence.” (Emphasis added.) 356 Ill. App. 3d at 394; Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d at 475. See People v. Williams, 221 Ill. App. 3d 1061 (reversal not warranted where Zehr questions not asked, in light of overwhelming evidence against the defendant). I also reject the suggestion that “ ‘ “[a]ttitudinal surveys *** [suggesting] that a substantial proportion of persons eligible for jury service *** agree that a person who is brought to trial is probably guilty” ’ ” somehow supports the outcome here. 356 Ill. App. 3d at 401, quoting 48 DePaul L. Rev. at 101 n.142, quoting 1 E. Krauss & B. Bonora, Jurywork § 2.04(2)(a) (1997). Who among us, even as lawyers and judges, has not expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of those charged with crimes of whom we learn in the media. There is a difference, however, between a private opinion unrestrained by the dictates of our criminal justice system and the rejection of those “principles” by members of a jury who are directed to set aside their personal beliefs, follow the instructions of the court, and decide the case solely on the evidence presented. Finally, while I agree that the history of Rule 431(a) makes the majority’s position plausible, as the Zehr addition to Rule 431(a) was made in 1997, as was the change from “may” to “shall” in the final sentence of the rule, I cannot agree that our supreme court would, on the one hand, leave it to defense counsel to decide whether Zehr questions should be asked and, on the other, make the trial court’s failure to ask those questions, in the absence of trial counsel’s request, reversible error. As a postscript, I submit that defense counsel may have simply felt comfortable with the makeup of the jury after exercising a single challenge so there was no need to inquire further about the “principles” we all agree are fundamental and essential to our system of justice. By this I do not mean to suggest that counsel’s failure to request the Zehr questions be asked was part of his trial strategy. That would be a legal fiction. But it is also a legal fiction to presume that because the prospective jurors were not informed of the basic principles of our justice system, they failed to abide by the instructions at the conclusion of the trial and decided this case on other than the overwhelming evidence against the defendant. I would affirm the defendant’s conviction. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.