Court Opinion

ID: 9787256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:13:57.50915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:53.980871
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
Under California law, the death penalty may be imposed for the crime of murder only if the murder is of the first degree and committed with one or more of the statutorily defined special circumstances. (Pen. Code, §§ 190, 190.2.) California law allows a person accused of crime to defend against any criminal charge on the ground that the defendant acted under duress “unless the crime be punishable with death.” (Id., § 26, subd. Six.) Here, defendant contends that, because the death penalty may not be imposed for second degree murder, the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that duress, if proven, was a complete defense to second degree murder.
The majority concludes that the trial court did not err because, under California law, duress is not a defense to second degree murder, or to any form of murder, whether or not the particular form of murder is punishable by death. I disagree. Applying established rules of statutory construction, I would hold that duress is unavailable as a defense only when the offense is capital murder—that is, first degree murder with a special circumstance— and that duress is available as a defense to all noncapital forms of murder, including murder in the second degree. Because no substantial evidence of duress was presented here, however, I agree with the majority that defendant was not entitled to have the trial court instruct the jury on that defense.
I
When deciding what a statute means, courts seek to determine what effect the legislative body that enacted it intended to achieve. (People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 240 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283].) To make this determination, courts begin with the text of the statute, because the words used are the best evidence of legislative intent. (Id. at p. 241; see also Holloway v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 1, 6 [119 S.Ct. 966, 969, 143 L.Ed.2d 1].) Unless there is reason to believe that a special or technical meaning was intended, courts give the words of the statute their usual, *786ordinary meaning. (People v. Trevino, supra, at p. 241.) If the statutory text, viewed in light of the ordinary meaning of its words, is not ambiguous, courts usually accept this meaning as the proper construction of the statute without further inquiry. (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th .605, 621 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713].) If the statutory text is ambiguous, however, courts examine the context of the statute and consider its legislative history and the historical circumstances of its enactment to arrive at the interpretation that is most likely to reflect legislative intent. (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143, 1152 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 947 P.2d 291].)
Here, the provision to be construed, subdivision Six of Penal Code section 26 (section 26), includes among the persons who are incapable of committing crimes “[pjersons (unless the crime be punishable with death) who committed the act or made the omission charged under threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused.” (Italics added.) As applied to the crime of murder, the italicized phrase is ambiguous because some but not all forms of murder are punishable by death.
The crime of murder is divided into first degree murder and second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 189.) Second degree murder is never punishable by death, and first degree murder is punishable by death only if committed under one or more special circumstances. (Id., §§ 190, 190.2; see People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 467-470 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808] [describing California death penalty law].) This court has stated that “[i]n the California scheme the special circumstance is not just an aggravating factor: it is a fact or set of facts, found beyond reasonable doubt . . . which changes the crime from one punishable by imprisonment of 25 years to life to one which must be punished either by death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole.” (People v. Superior Court (Engert) (1982) 31 Cal.3d 797, 803 [183 Cal.Rptr. 800, 647 P.2d 76], italics added.) Thus, it is the pleading and proof of special circumstances that make murder a crime punishable by death. Considering only the ordinary meaning of the words appearing in section 26, making duress unavailable as a defense to a “crime . . . punishable by death,” this could mean either, as the majority concludes, that duress is unavailable as a defense to any form of murder, or, as I conclude, that duress is unavailable only when the crime is capital murder— that is, first degree murder with at least one special circumstance.
This ambiguity is resolved by applying two well-established rules of statutory construction. The first of these rules is used to determine whether a statutory provision mentioned in another provision is incorporated only in its *787contemporary form or instead as it might later be changed from time to time. The rule is this: If the reference to the other law is specific, as to a particular code provision by section number, then the referenced provision is incorporated only as it then existed, but if instead the reference is general, “ ‘such as . . . to a system or body of laws or to the general law relating to the subject in hand, the referring statute takes the law or laws referred to not only in their contemporary form, but also as they may be changed from time to time . . . . [Citations.]’” (Palmero v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53, 59 [195 P.2d 1]; accord, People v. Cooper (2002) 27 Cal.4th 38, 44 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 37 P.3d 403]; Kirk v. Rhoads (1873) 46 Cal. 398, 402; Pearce v. Director, Office of Workers’, etc. (9th Cir. 1979) 603 F.2d 763, 767; 2B Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction (6th ed. 2000) § 51.07, p. 270.)
Section 26, making duress a defense “unless the crime be punishable with death,” implicitly incorporates by reference other statutory provisions defining crimes and prescribing their punishments. Section 26’s reference to other statutory provisions is general rather than specific. A specific reference would identify by name or by the Penal Code section the crimes to which duress is not a defense. By instead referring generally to “a crime not punishable with death,” the Legislature expressed an intention to incorporate the general body of law relating to capital punishment as it might change from time to time.
The question remains, however, whether, as applied to the crime of murder, the phrase “crime . . . punishable with death” in section 26 means murder in all its forms or only capital murder.
This question is best answered by applying another settled rule of statutory construction, long accepted by both this court and the United States Supreme Court: “A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears.” (Ratzlaf v. U.S. (1994) 510 U.S. 135, 143 [114 S.Ct. 655, 660, 126 L.Ed.2d 615]; accord, People v. McCart (1982) 32 Cal.3d 338, 344 [185 Cal.Rptr. 284, 649 P.2d 926]; Hoag v. Howard (1880) 55 Cal. 564, 565.) Here, the Legislature adopted the original Penal Code of 1872 as a single statutory text, and references to crimes “punishable by death” appear in several places in that text. Until now, this court has consistently interpreted this phrase as excluding all noncapital forms of murder.
For example, section 1095 of the original Penal Code provided that “[i]f the indictment is for an offense punishable with death, two counsel on each side may argue the cause to the jury.” This provision has since been *788amended to eliminate the reference to indictment, but its substance remains unchanged. This court has construed Penal Code section 1095 as allowing two counsel to argue for the defendant only in capital cases. (People v. Darling (1962) 58 Cal.2d 15, 19 [22 Cal.Rptr. 484, 372 P.2d 316]; People v. Ah Wee (1874) 48 Cal. 236, 238.) Section 1270 of the original Penal Code provided that “[a] defendant charged with an offense punishable with death cannot be admitted to bail, when the proof of his guilt is evident or the presumption thereof great. ...” In 1880, this court held that a defendant charged with murder was entitled to bail when the evidence showed that the offense was at most second degree murder, because second degree murder was not a capital crime. (Ex Parte Wolff (1880) 57 Cal. 94; see also Ex parte Brown (1885) 68 Cal. 176 [8 P. 829]; 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Pretrial Proceedings, § 82, p. 281.) Section 1272 of the original Penal Code provides for bail on appeal “[a]fter conviction of an offense not punishable with death . . . .” This court has construed section 1272 as giving the court discretion to grant bail on appeal when the defendant is convicted of a noncapital offense like second degree murder. (See In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921, 929 [127 Cal.Rptr. 97, 544 P.2d 1297]; Ex parte Brown, supra, 68 Cal. at p. 182; People v. Superior Court (Roam) (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1230 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 119].)
Thus, two established rules of statutory construction resolve the ambiguity in section 26 concerning the availability of duress as a defense to murder. In making duress unavailable for a “crime . . . punishable with death,” the Legislature intended to bar the defense only as to those murders for which capital punishment was authorized as punishment when the murder was committed. Under current law, the category includes only first degree murders with special circumstances. This conclusion is consistent with every published decision that has in any way spoken to the issue. (See Tapia v. Roe (9th Cir. 1999) 189 F.3d 1052, 1057 [stating that “[a]s defined by California law, duress can excuse crimes, including murder without special circumstances . . .”]; People v. Petro (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 245, 248 [56 P.2d 984] [stating that duress is unavailable “where the crime charged may be punished with death, and the evidence clearly shows that the death penalty may be imposed”]; see also People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 85 [279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311] [quoting with apparent approval a standard jury instruction stating that duress is unavailable “ ‘[w]here a person commits first degree murder with a special circumstance’ ”]; People v. Moran (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 398, 416 [114 Cal.Rptr. 413] [holding evidence failed to prove duress as a matter of law, thereby implying duress can be a defense to noncapital murder]; People v. Son (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 224, 232, fn. 9 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 871], quoting People v. Petro, supra, at p. 248.)
*789II
To resolve the ambiguity in section 26’s reference to a “crime . . . punishable by death,” the majority uses an entirely different reasoning process. The majority traces the history of section 26. Although section 26 was enacted in 1872 as part of the original Penal Code, the majority construes it as a continuation of an even earlier provision, enacted in 1850 as section 10 of the Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments (the 1850 Act).
The majority asserts that the 1850 Legislature intended to codify a common law exception to the defense of duress and to make duress forever unavailable as a defense to the crimes that in 1850 were punishable with death, regardless of any later changes in laws relating to capital punishment. I disagree with these assertions.
The majority is wrong in asserting that section 10 of the 1850 Act merely codified a common law exception to the defense of duress for the killing of an innocent person. The majority quotes only the last sentence of the following explanation by Blackstone: “Another species of compulsion or necessity is what our law calls duress per minas (by threats), or threats and menaces, which induce a fear of death or other bodily harm, and which take away for that reason the guilt of many crimes and misdemeanors, at least before the human tribunal. But then that fear, which compels a man to do an unwarrantable action, ought to be just and well-grounded; such, ‘qui cadere possit in virum constantem, non timidum et meticulosum (as might seize a courageous man not timid or fearful),’ as Bracton expresses it, in the words of the civil law. Therefore, in time of war or rebellion, a man may be justified in doing many treasonable acts by compulsion of the enemy or rebels, which would admit of no excuse in time of peace. This, however, seems only, or at least principally, to hold as to positive crimes, so created by the laws of society, and which, therefore, society may excuse; but not as to natural offenses, so declared by the law of God, wherein human magistrates are only the executioners of divine punishment. And, therefore, though a man be violently assaulted, and hath no other possible means of escaping death, but by killing an innocent person, this fear and force shall not acquit him of murder; for he ought rather to die himself than escape by the murder of an innocent.” (2 Jones’s Blackstone (1916) p. 2197, fiis. omitted.)
Thus, as Blackstone explained, under the common law duress was a defense to treason but not to murder because the former was merely a “positive crime” established by the laws of society while the latter was a “natural offense” established by the law of God. But California law has never drawn this distinction between positive and natural crimes, and the *7901850 Legislature, by specifying death as the punishment for both treason and murder, made duress unavailable as a defense to either. “A code section is presumed to be a continuation of the common law only when it and the common law are substantially the same.” (People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 142 [169 P.2d 1], italics added.) Because the availability of the duress defense under the 1850 Act was not substantially the same as under the common law, there can be no presumption that section 10 of the 1850 Act is a continuation of the common law.
Nor do I agree with the majority that the 1850 Legislature intended duress to remain unavailable as a defense to all those crimes, and only those crimes, that in 1850 were punishable with death, regardless of any later changes in laws relating to capital punishment. As explained above, a general rather than specific statutory reference to other law incorporates the referenced law as it may change over time. (Palmero v. Stockton Theatres, Inc., supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 59.) The language of section 10 of the 1850 Act making duress a defense to “a crime not punishable with death,” like the language of current section 26 making duress a defense “unless the crime be punishable with death,” is a general rather than a specific reference to other laws concerning capital punishment. Had the 1850 Legislature wanted to exclude the effects of later changes in the scope of capital punishment, it need only have referred by name to the three crimes that the 1850 Act made punishable by death—murder, treason, and perjury procuring an innocent person’s execution—or to the sections of the 1850 Act defining those crimes.
Attempting to cast doubt on this conclusion, the majority asserts that section 26’s reference to a “crime . . . punishable with death” may be considered a specific reference because it is “far narrower” than the reference found to be specific in Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc., supra, 32 Cal.2d 53. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 779.) At issue there was a provision of the California Alien Land Act (Stats. 1921, p. lxxxiii) as amended in 1923 (Stats. 1923, p. 1021), under which a corporation owned by Japanese nationals could lease land “ ‘to the extent and for the purposes prescribed by any treaty now existing between the . . . United States’ and Japan.” (Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc, supra, at p. 55.) This court said that the question whether this reference to “any treaty now existing” is general or specific “might, as an abstract proposition, admit of different opinions” (id. at p. 59), but that this court was “constrained to hold that reference is specific” because there was “grave doubt whether our Legislature could constitutionally delegate to the treaty-making authority of the United States the right and power thus directly to control our local legislation with respect to future acts” (id. at p. 60).
Section 26’s reference to a “crime . . . punishable by death” is in no way similar to the Alien Land Act’s reference to “any treaty now existing” *791between the United States and Japan. Most obviously, section 26 does not refer to a crime now punishable with death, but simply to a crime punishable by death. The word “now” is a strong indication that the Legislature, when it adopted and amended the Alien Land Act, was referring to treaties then in existence and not to treaties that might later come into force. In addition, the reference to a “treaty” is a reference to a specific legislative act rather to a general body of law. By comparison, section 26 does not refer to a “statute” or “section” or “law” prescribing the penalty of death but instead, more generally and simply, to a “crime . . . punishable with death.” Finally, recognizing that section 26’s reference is general rather than specific does not raise any grave doubts about its validity. Thus, upon examination, this court’s decision in Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc., supra, 32 Cal.2d 53, provides no support for the majority.
The majority makes no effort to compare section 26’s reference language with other reference language that the courts of this state have found to be general rather than specific. For example, in 1873 this court concluded that a reference in a city’s act of incorporation to “all the provisions of law in force regulating elections” was a general reference incorporating state election law as it might change over time. (Kirk v. Rhoads, supra, 46 Cal. 398, 402-403.) More recently, this court concluded that the reference in Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 to the “maximum term of imprisonment” for an offense was a general reference to the determinate sentencing law. (In re Jovan B. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 801, 816 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 863 P.2d 673].) And the Court of Appeal, in an opinion authored by Justice Chin, concluded that the reference in Welfare and Institutions Code section 3201, subdivision (c), to the “good behavior and participation credit provisions of Article 2.5 (commencing with Section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Penal Code” was a general reference to a system or body of laws. (People v. Eddy (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1098, 1106 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 563].) Finally, this court has construed references to crimes “punishable with death” in other provisions of the Penal Code as referring to the capital punishment laws in effect when the crime was committed, not when the provision was first enacted. (People v. Darling, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 19; Ex Parte Wolff, supra, 57 Cal. 94; In re Podesto, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 929.) Examination of these other decisions further confirms that section 26’s reference to a “crime . . . punishable with death” is general rather than specific.
The majority broadly asserts that the 1850 Legislature must have intended to exclude the effects of later changes in capital punishment law because there is no reason why the Legislature would have wanted the availability of the duress defense to vary over time as the Legislature expanded or contracted the category of crimes punishable with death.
*792The majority’s assertion is belied by the very words of the provision this court is construing. In 1850, when it enacted the 1850 Act, and again in 1872, when it enacted the original Penal Code, the Legislature declared duress to be a defense to all crimes except those “punishable with death.” This language reflects the Legislature’s decision to link the availability of the duress defense with the laws prescribing death as a punishment for crime.
The Legislature’s decisions whether to allow a duress defense and whether to authorize the death penalty both reflect societal judgments about the seriousness of the offense in question. In the first instance, the societal judgment is whether an offense-is so serious that an individual is expected to forfeit his or her life rather than commit it. In the second instance, the societal judgment is whether an offense is so serious that a person who has committed it should forfeit his or her life. The Legislature could reasonably have concluded that the same small category of highly serious offenses that warranted capital punishment could not be excused by a claim of duress. Also, if duress is not a defense to a noncapital crime, then the law has created a situation in which one is better off breaking the law than obeying it because by committing the crime one risks only a prison sentence, while by refusing to commit the crime one risks death or very serious injury from the person imposing the duress. The Legislature may well have concluded that a just system of laws does not place those who obey the law in a worse position than those who break it.
The majority acknowledges that under an established rule of statutory construction a term appearing in several places in a statutory text should be given the same meaning throughout. (See Ratzlaf v. U.S., supra, 510 U.S. at p. 143 [114 S.Ct. at p. 660].) But the majority offers two reasons for not applying the rule here: because section 26 refers to a “crime” that is “punishable with death” whereas other provisions of the Penal Code refer to an “offense” that is so punishable, and because the other provisions define the scope of procedural rights rather than substantive defenses. Neither of these suggested reasons is persuasive.
It makes no difference that the other provisions refer to “offenses” punishable with death rather than to “crimes” punishable with death. This court has stated that “ ‘the word “offense” and the word “crime” hav[e] the same legal significance.’ ” (Doble v. Superior Court (1925) 197 Cal. 556, 571 [241 P. 852]; see also Pen. Code, § 15 [giving a single definition for the words crime and public offense].) The rule of statutory construction that phrases repeated in a statute are presumed to have the same meaning throughout applies not only when the words are identical but also when the words are *793equivalent. (Cohen v. De la Cruz (1998) 523 U.S. 213, 220 [118 S.Ct. 1212, 1217, 140 L.Ed.2d 341].)
Nor is there any support for the majority’s distinction between procedural and substantive purposes of the references in different provisions of the Penal Code to a crime “punishable by death.” The majority bases that distinction on its assumption that although it is reasonable and logical to distinguish capital and noncapital forms of murder for purposes of procedural rights, it is not logical and reasonable to distinguish capital and noncapital forms of murder for purposes of defining when the defense of duress is available and when it is not available. As I have explained, there is nothing unreasonable or illogical about linking the availability of the duress defense to the seriousness of the charge as reflected in the laws governing capital punishment.
Ill
The majority appears to argue that this court must construe section 26 as not permitting the defense of duress to any form of murder because sound considerations of public policy require that no amount of threats or menaces can justify the taking of innocent human life. In my view, such public policy considerations have a very limited role to play in the process of statutory construction. In general, this court may not substitute its public policy views for those of the Legislature under the guise of statutory construction. When the language of a statute is ambiguous, however, this court may prefer a resolution of the ambiguity that avoids absurd consequences or that no reasonable legislative body could have intended. (People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 328 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 735, 1 P.3d 52].)
Here, a construction of section 26 that makes the defense of duress unavailable as to capital murder but available as to noncapital murder does not produce results that are absurd or that no reasonable legislative body could have intended. On the contrary, the question of the proper boundaries or limits on the defense of duress is one on which reasonable minds can differ and have differed, and the construction of section 26 that I have arrived at by applying well-established rules of statutory construction represents a moderate approach in line with mainstream legal thinking.
For example, the Model Penal Code allows the defense of duress to be asserted against all criminal charges, including murder. (Model Pen. Code, § 2.09.) Under the Model Penal Code’s formulation of the defense, duress is a defense whenever “a person of reasonable firmness in [the defendant’s] situation would have been unable to resist.” (Id., § 209, subd. (1).) In the *794official comment to this provision, the American Law Institute explains that “persons of reasonable firmness surely break at different points depending on the stakes that are involved”; it further observes “that even homicide may sometimes be the product of coercion that is truly irresistible, that danger to a loved one may have greater impact on a person of reasonable firmness than a danger to himself, and, finally, that long and wasting pressure may break down resistance more effectively than a threat of immediate destruction.” (Model Pen. Code & Commentaries, com. 3 to § 209, p. 376.)
The states of Connecticut, New York, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah have adopted statutes similar to the Model Penal Code allowing duress as a defense to homicide. (See Rutkowski, A Coercion Defense for the Street Gang Criminal: Plugging the Moral Gap in Existing Law (1996) 10 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics and Pub. Pol’y 137, 205, fn. 332.) Also, the laws of most civil law countries—including Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Sweden—recognize duress as a defense to any crime, including murder. (Swaak-Goldman, International Decision: Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Judgement (1998) 92 Am. J. Internat. L. 282, 284, fn. 14.)
As a leading commentator on the law of duress has stated, “[d]uress always is a matter of line drawing about which reasonable minds can differ” (Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits (1989) 62 So.Cal. L.Rev. 1331, 1367). Indeed, the weight of scholarly commentary favors the Model Penal Code’s definition of duress and its abolition of the common law murder exception to the duress defense. (See Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self Protection (1999) 74 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1475, 1488; Dienstag, Federenko v. United States: War Crimes, the Defense of Duress, and American Nationality Law (1982) 82 Colum. L.Rev. 120, 142, fn. 72; Finkelstein, On the Obligation of the State to Extend a Right of Self-defense to Its Citizens (1999) 147 U.Pa. L.Rev. 1361, 1382, fn. 53; Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law (1995) 37 Ariz. L.Rev. 251, 256 [“the requirement that duress not be pleaded as a defense to murder makes little sense under either of the prevalent rationales for the defense”]; Hill, Moralized Theories of Coercion: A Critical Analysis (1997) 74 Denv. U. L.Rev. 907, 912, fn. 24; Newman & Weitzer, Duress, Free Will and the Criminal Law (1957) 30 So.Cal. L.Rev. 313, 334 [“[t]he defense of duress should be open to all persons regardless of the nature of the crime charge”]; O’Regan, Duress and Murder (1972) 35 Mod. L.Rev. 596, 603-604; Reed, Duress and Provocation as Excuses to Murder: Salutary Lessons from Recent Anglo-American Jurisprudence (1996) 6 J. Transnat'l L. and Pol’y 51, 59; Yee, Prosecutor v. Erdemovic Judgment: A Questionable Milestone for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals of Chamber October 7, 1997 (1997) 26 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 263, 296-297.)
*795I do not here suggest that the Legislature should adopt the Model Penal Code approach, under which duress is available as a defense to any crime, including capital murder. I suggest only that a construction of section 26 under which duress is a defense to noncapital murder, but not to capital murder, represents a moderate, middle-of-the road approach that a legislative body plausibly could have adopted to resolve a difficult and complex issue on which reasonable minds may differ.
The majority’s discussion appears to assume that murder necessarily involves a choice to take an innocent life. Second degree murder, however, does not require an intent to kill. A person who engages in a provocative act (see People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 107-108 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 864, 840 P.2d 969]) or who drives with great recklessness (see People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 297-299 [179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279]) may be convicted of second degree murder under an implied malice theory. Yet, under the majority’s construction, section 26 does not allow a duress defense even in situations of unintentional implied malice killings.
Imagine, for example, this scenario: Two armed robbers fleeing the scene of a store robbery force their way into a car that is leaving the parking lot. One robber holds a gun to the ¿river’s head, while the other places a gun against the head of the driver’s wife. They order the driver to take off at high speed and not to stop or "slow down for stop signs or signal lights, threatening immediate death to the driver and his wife. If the driver complies, and an accident ensues resulting in the death of an innocent person, the driver could be prosecuted for second degree murder on an implied malice theory, and, under the majority’s construction of section 26, the driver could not assert duress as a defense. I doubt that our Legislature intended to withhold the defense of duress under these or similar circumstances.
The majority expresses concern that if defendants can assert a duress defense to noncapital murder, the defense may be used to excuse killings by gang members. But most if not all gang-motivated killings are capital murder because it is a special circumstance that “the defendant intentionally killed the victim while the defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang . . . and the murder was carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang.” (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(22).) Moreover, the defense of duress is not available to a defendant who recklessly or intentionally placed himself in a situation where coercion to commit criminal acts could reasonably be anticipated. Because persons who join criminal street gangs or terrorist organizations can anticipate pressure to commit crimes, the defense would usually be unavailable to those individuals. (See State v. Scott (1992) 250 Kan. 350 [827 P.2d 733, 739-740] [defendant who voluntarily *796joined drug-selling organization barred from asserting duress when coerced into torturing fellow gang member]; Rutkowski, A Coercion Defense for the Street Gang Criminal: Plugging the Moral Gap in Existing Law, supra, 10 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y at p. 186, fn. 239 [“Most jurisdictions hold that intentionally placing oneself in the position where one would likely be the subject of coercion will defeat a duress defense.”].)
IV
Because, as I have concluded, duress is a defense to noncapital murder, a defendant charged with noncapital murder is entitled to a jury instruction on the defense if there is substantial evidence to support it. This means “ ‘evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [people] could have concluded that there was [duress] sufficient to negate the requisite criminal intent.’” (People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 685 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1], quoting People v. Carr (1972) 8 Cal.3d 287, 294 [104 Cal.Rptr. 705, 502 P.2d 513].) Under section 26, the defense of duress is only available to defendants who present evidence of threats or menace sufficient to show a reasonable and actual belief that their life was presently and immediately endangered if participation was refused. (People v. Perez (1973) 9 Cal.3d 651, 657 [108 Cal.Rptr. 474, 510 P.2d 1026]; People v. Quinlan (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 1063, 1068 [88 Cal.Rptr. 125].)
Here, defendant failed to present substantial evidence of duress. He testified that Ron Kiem told him, “Give me the rock or I’ll beat the shit out of you” and that he complied because he feared that Kiem, a stronger and bigger man, would beat him severely. Yet, Kiem did not threaten him with death, and there was no history of violence between the two men despite their long acquaintance. In addition, defendant voluntarily joined Kiem in the initial attack on the victim, thereby placing himself in the situation where he should have anticipated that Kiem would pressure him to commit further acts of violence. Throughout the day, defendant made no use of opportunities to leave Kiem and to obtain help for the victim.
Because defendant presented insufficient evidence of duress to warrant a jury instruction on that defense, I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeal properly affirmed defendant’s conviction.
Conclusion
Under California law, duress is a defense to any criminal charge “unless the crime be punishable with death.” (§ 26.) According to the majority, this means that duress is never a defense to murder, even though California law *797restricts the death penalty to first degree murders with special circumstances. The majority reaches its result largely by applying a maxim—no amount of duress excuses the taking of innocent human life—that it treats as an infallible solution to a profound moral quandary. I cannot agree, not only because the majority’s maxim is not a fair reading of the far different statutory language, but also because the majority oversimplifies a highly complex issue. I would adopt a statutory construction more consistent with the ordinary meaning of the statutory text, barring the defense of duress only as to capital murder and other capital crimes, and leaving to the jury in all other situations the question whether duress excuses an otherwise criminal act.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing ws denied October 2, 2002.