Court Opinion

ID: 9689887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:49:12.677988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:52.654052
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
SANDERS, Justice.
We granted a rehearing in this case as to Bill of Exceptions No. 1 (limitation on' voir dire examination) and Bill of Exceptions No. 2 (objection sustained during defense counsel’s opening statement to the jury).
Bill of Exceptions No. 1 was reserved when the court sustained the State’s objection to a defense question addressed to William E. Maxey, a prospective juror, *458on his voir dire examination in the following context:
“Q. You understand that there’s no evidence right now in front of this court — I mean, you understand that don’t you?
“A. That’s right.
“Q. The fact that he is here by way of a bill of information, that’s no evidence against him ?
“A. That’s right.
“[District Attorney:] Your Honor, just in the interest of time the State is going to impose an objection to inquiries along this, line, under the rule, State v. Richey. [258 La. 1094, 249 So.2d 143]
“BY THE COURT: (Indistinct) instruction being given to the prospective jurors, before we go into this kind of stuff, Mr. Gravel. I am going to sustain the obj ection.
“[Defense Counsel:] To, Your Honor’s ruling, the Defendant reserves a bill of exception attached to and made part of the bill of exception, the questions asked and the objection of the State, Your Honor’s ruling and make the bill general.
“BY THE COURT: So ordered.”
The defense question pertained to the juror’s understanding of the rule of law that the Bill of Information is not evidence of guilt. As noted by the trial judge, the objection was made and ruled upon after the juror had already answered the question. Hence, as to that question, the ruling was harmless. See LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 921. The ruling, however, may be construed as barring further questions of similar import, that is, questions testing the juror’s understanding of particular phases of the law applicable to the case.
In his Per Curiam, the trial judge states:
“The objection, while not really timely lodged, was aimed more at the type of inquiry being conducted by counsel for the defendant rather than the specific question posed. The objection was sustained, principally because this type of questioning on voir dire amounts to an effort to instruct the jury on the law as interpreted by counsel for the defendant. It can lead on and on and usually does unless stopped either through objection by the State or by the Court on its own motion. Fairly recently in this jurisdiction, the Court has had to limit the scope of examination permitted to counsel for defendant in voir dire. It had reached a point where each juror was given a lecture and quiz on the law of the particular case being tried and general criminal law as understood by defense counsel. This is not, in the Court’s mind, proper and for that reason the objection was sustained.”
*460Prior to the objection, the juror had already stated that he would apply the law given to.him by the judge whether he agreed with it or. not, base his verdict solely on the evidence, afford the defendant the presumption of innocence, and require the state to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As noted in our original opinion, the trial judge fully instructed the jurors at the proper time as to the law applicable to the case.
J For the reasons fully assigned in State v. Shepard, 263 La. 379, 268 So.2d 590, handed down this day, we hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in barring further questions as to the juror’s understanding of particular phases of the law on which the trial judge was to instruct him.
Defense counsel reserved Bill of Exceptions No. 2 when the trial judge sustained the State’s objection to the following portion of his opening statement:
“Gentlemen of the Jury, as Mr. Ware s.tated when he read the statute of armed robbery to you, that through the evidence that he outlined, he must prove to your satisfaction to a moral certainty, that the .Defendant was involved in this take, the Defendant had actual knowledge of what ■Sheppard did. Now, he must prove every plepjenf of this crime to a moral certainty. ■ If he leaves out any evidence— if. .he. leaves out any element, I mean, that doesn’t satisfy your moral certainty, then you must acquit. Now, as I stressed in the Voir Dire examination, the Defendant, Leonard Bell, in this case, does not have to do anything. That as of this time, each of you told me, at this time you convened, the Defendant to be innocent and he is to remain innocent until the State of Louisiana can prove beyond a reasonable doubt or moral certainty, every element of the crime of armed robbery, Now, wc don’t ask for you to make any conclusions now and we know that you haven’t, I didn’t any way because you told me you hadn’t. However, I do ask that when each of these witnesses takes the stand and you are the judge — ”
In the recent case of State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243 So.2d 793 (1971), we set forth the rule governing defense counsel’s opening statement as follows:
“During his opening statement defense counsel began to argue the law of the case relative to burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and failure of defendant to take the stand. When the judge informed counsel that he must confine his opening statement to what he intended to prove and should reserve his argument on the law for the jury at the end of the case, counsel moved for a mistrial. The motion was overruled, and Bill of Exception No. 5 was reserved.
“This court held under former R.S. 15:333 (Article 333 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928), which defined *462the scope of the defendant’s opening statement that if counsel for defendant elected to make an opening statement, it was to be confined to an explanation of the defense and the evidence which would be used in an attempt to prove the defense. Wide discretion was vested in the trial judge in his control of the opening statement to confine it within these limits. State v. Shuff, 198 La. 67, 3 So.2d 278; State v. Boone, 227 La. 850, 80 So.2d 710. Our present Code of Criminal Procedure fails to lay down rules for the "defendant’s opening 'statement. Articles 766 et seq. apply only to the State.' We are of the opinion that this jurisprudence concerning the defendant’s opening statement remains the law and is applicable. We therefore hold that defense counsel who avails himself of the opportunity to make an opening statement under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 765(4) must confine his remarks to an explanation of the nature of the defense and the evidence by which he expects to establish it. The trial court here properly exercised its discretion, and its ruling was correct.”
The foregoing holding controls the disposition of this case. Defense counsel’s opening statement must be confined to an explanation of the nature of the .defense and the evidence he intends to offer.
' The contested statement here included argument relating' to the' State’s burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the credibility of the witnesses. Hence, the trial judge did not abuse- his discretion in sustaining the objection.
For the reasons assigned, our original judgment affirming the conviction and sentence is reinstated and made the final judgment of this Court.
BARHAM, J., dissents for reasons a's': signed in dissent on original hearing.
TATE, J., dissents for the reasons noted by the dissents on the original hearing.
DIXON, J., dissents.