Court Opinion

ID: 9905523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:11:08.308129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:40.573475
License: Public Domain

J-S38016-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: A.R., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: C.R., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1508 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered May 18, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-DP-0000292-2021

  IN THE INTEREST OF: A.A.N.R., A              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: C.R., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1509 EDA 2023

               Appeal from the Decree Entered May 18, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000374-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                        FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2023

       In these consolidated cases, C.R. (Father) appeals from the Decree and

Order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial

court) involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his daughter A.R. born

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S38016-23

in November 2020 (Child) and changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption.1

We affirm.

                                               I.

        The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved

with the family when Child was born because of concerns regarding Parents’

ability to care for Child, who was born with extensive health issues. Child has

been diagnosed with CDK-13 (a rare genetic disorder marked by cardiac

issues), sleep apnea and lymphoma in the brain.             She has difficulties

swallowing, is fed through a feeding tube, is at risk for aspiration and needs

constant monitoring. At the time Child was born, Mother resided in an assisted

living facility due to an intellectual disability and mental health issues and

Father did not have stable housing. Child was adjudicated dependent in April

of 2021 and was placed with her current Foster Parents in March of 2021 when

she was four months old. She has been in their continuous care since that

time.

        DHS filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father

and change Child’s custody goal to adoption in June of 2022. The trial court

held hearings and argument on the petitions on August 10, 2022, April 24,

____________________________________________

1 The parental rights of Child’s biological mother, R.O. (Mother) were also
involuntarily terminated and she has filed an appeal. We have issued an
Opinion in that case at J-S38031-23 (1510 & 1511 EDA 2023) terminating
Mother’s parental rights. Mother and Father (collectively, Parents) have
another daughter, G.R., who is not a subject of this appeal.

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2023 and May 18, 2023, at which several witnesses testified including, Mother,

Father, Foster Mother C.S., Dr. William Russell and Caseworkers Janay Pollard

and Michelle Jackson. At the time of the proceedings, Child was about two

years old.   Parents were residing together in a two-bedroom apartment in

North Philadelphia and Foster Parents’ home is located in Perkasie outside of

Philadelphia in Bucks County. Parents had been offered weekly supervised

visits at a Willow Grove facility with Child and her younger sister G.R., who

also resides with Foster Parents.

                                      A.

      At the August 2022 hearing, Mother testified that she and Father had

attended virtual and in-person visits with Child, but they missed some of the

visits because of illness and transportation issues. When Mother was asked

how she interacted with Child during the visits, she stated, “[Child] doesn’t

like me.” (N.T. Hearing, 8/10/22, at 19). Mother indicated that she does not

feed Child because Child eats through a feeding tube.        Although Mother

acknowledged that Child needs a great deal of medical care, she was unable

to identify Child’s specific medical needs. (See id. at 22). With regard to

Child’s numerous medical appointments, Mother explained that she and Father

did not regularly attend them because of problems with transportation. When

asked how she feels towards Child, Mother stated, “I love her to death. You

know, even though she doesn’t like me, I still love her.” (Id. at 36).

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      Father similarly testified that he and Mother did not attend several visits

with Child because of either illness or employment obligations. (See id. at

45-46). Father described Child’s medical condition as serious in that “she can

pass at any time if she doesn’t receive the right medicine.”       (Id. at 48).

However, Father was unable to list Child’s medications and has never fed her

using the feeding tube. At the time of the first hearing, Father had steady

employment at Rite Aid as a cashier. He testified that his parents and siblings

reside close by and are able to provide him with family support. (See id. at

56-57). Father testified that during visits with Child, he interacts with her

using music, books and toys and she has crawled towards him during some

visits. Father stated that he has a bond with Child and that if the trial court

permits reunification, he would be willing to do an in-depth study of Child’s

medical needs. (See id. at 60, 69).

      Caseworker Janay Pollard testified that she began working with the

family in January of 2022 and that she oversees the Foster Parents and

supervises the visits with Parents.     (See id. at 70-71).      For the virtual

sessions, Parents would typically log on for about five to ten minutes and then

log off because of connection issues.     During the in-person visits, Parents

needed prompting to remove soiled items during diaper changes and often did

not arrive with basic items they were expected to bring such as diapers,

change of clothes and toys. During the visits, Father interacted with Child and

Mother only with G.R, and Mother did not talk Child at all. Ms. Pollard relayed

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that there were safety concerns during the visits, including an instance where

Child started to put a toy down her throat and Father insisted that this was

fine. She opined that in the approximate six-month period she had observed

Parents, neither of their interactions with Child had improved and they were

unable to identify safety concerns or appropriately meet Child’s needs. Ms.

Pollard observed no bond between Mother and Child, and when Child cried,

Mother did not attempt to develop a bond with her and simply said “she

doesn’t like me.” (Id. at 87).

      Foster Mother described Child’s medical conditions in depth for the trial

court and explained that Child’s breathing has to be constantly monitored,

“when she sleeps, how she sleeps, when she’s raised.”       (Id. at 107).   An

overnight nurse comes to their home and she and her husband take turns

monitoring Child throughout the day.     Because of her brain abnormalities,

Child is globally developmentally delayed, any changes in her body have to be

monitored because of pituitary gland abnormalities, her heart rate has to be

monitored because of a heart defect, and she takes medications for asthma.

Foster Mother has attended all of Child’s medical appointments and she

estimated that in the last six months Child has had about 17 appointments

wherein Parents have called in only three times and attended in person twice.

(See id. at 113-115). During the appointments, Parents do not meaningfully

engage with the physicians or ask questions. Foster Mother testified on cross-

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examination that she has nine children in her care, five of whom have medical

needs.

                                       B.

      At the April 24, 2023 hearing, Dr. William Russell testified as an expert

in parenting capacity and forensic psychology.         Dr. Russell conducted a

parental capacity evaluation for Mother in September of 2022 and found that

Mother “was aware that she would not be able to handle raising” Child given

her medical needs and that Mother did not think Father was capable of

handling them either. (N.T., 4/24/23, at 9; see id. at 10-11). Dr. Russell

explained that Mother has been diagnosed with an intellectual disability, bi-

polar disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder, and he opined that there

were no services or support that could be put in place to enable Mother to

appropriately care for Child. Dr. Russel clarified that he had not conducted an

evaluation of Father and he, therefore, could not draw any conclusions about

Father’s capacity to parent Child. (See id. at 23).

      Caseworker Michelle Jackson testified that she was assigned to this case

in March of 2021 when Mother was living in an adult facility and Father did not

have housing. Parents have since obtained suitable housing and Ms. Jackson’s

understanding regarding their plans was for Father to work while Mother

stayed at home.     (See id. at 30).        Ms. Jackson indicated that Father’s

employment with Rite Aid had ended and although he had advised her of new

employment at a carpet cleaning business he had not provided paystubs.

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Regarding Parents’ attendance of Child’s medical appointments, she testified

that DHS provided bus passes to them to cover transportation and they were

given lists of all appointment times/doctors’ office locations.     During the

supervised visits, Ms. Jackson observed that Child did not engage with Mother

at all and she recalled one visit where Mother “was very overwhelmed [and]

was upset” and Foster Mother helped to calm Child down. (Id. at 49). Mother

needed prompting throughout the visit as to diaper changes and to begin

activities like reading books. Ms. Jackson testified that Foster Parents provide

Child with all of her basic needs such as food, shelter and clothing, take her

to all medical appointments and care for all of her special medical needs. She

also testified that neither Mother nor Father knows how to care for Child’s

medical needs.

      With regard to Child’s demeanor, Ms. Jackson described her as “very

feisty, very happy.   She is extremely determined . . . she’s accomplishing

more than what was expected at this time. She really has come a very long

way[.]” (Id. at 55-56). During visits, Child approaches and engages with her

Foster Parents and is “very attached and bonded to [Foster Parents], always

laughing, smiling.” (Id. at 56). Ms. Jackson opined that adoption is in Child’s

best interests because Foster Parents have been providing her with a “strong,

loving safe environment” and that termination of Parents’ parental rights

would not cause Child any type of emotional stress because “she does not

have a relationship with either parent.” (Id. at 58, 60).

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      Father testified concerning his employment that he is working at a

carpet cleaning company and that he has been the sole source of financial

support for him and Mother. (See id. at 134). If reunification were permitted,

their plan would be for Mother to be at home caring for Child while he works,

which he believes she is capable of doing. (See id. at 141-42).

                                      C.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court involuntarily terminated

the parental rights of Mother and Father to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

§§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) and changing Child’s permanency goal to

adoption. In doing so, the court noted the difficult circumstances of this case

and found that Mother and Father are unable to parent Child and were unable

to articulate her basic medical needs and diagnoses.

      Regarding Father, the trial court found that notwithstanding Child’s

multiple medical conditions, Father was unable to specify what kind of

medication Child took; could not remember all of the Child’s multiple medical

specialists; despite that Child had a special diet, Father was unsure what she

was fed; and while Father was trained on Child’s G-tube, he had not been able

to practice on Child. It also found that Father, as well as Mother, had only

attended 16 out of 45 visits since April of 2022; had only attended two visits

since September of 2022; DYS did not hear from Parents at all in October of

2022; and no visits occurred in December of 2022 or January of 2023.

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       The trial court also did not find in favor of Father’s plan for reunification

in which Mother was to care for Child while he worked, even though Mother

herself expressed that she could not take care of Child.              Despite this

acknowledgment, Father indicated that there were no issues with Mother

caring for Child while he was working to support the family.

       It also found that termination of Father’s parental rights would not have

any detrimental effect on Child. Although Father and Child share some bond

and positive interaction, termination of his parental rights would not have a

detrimental impact given the missed visits and length of time Child has been

in foster care; Foster Parents have functioned and will continue to function as

Child’s parents; and a goal change to adoption is appropriate for Child given

her complex medical issues, young age and placement in a medical foster

home willing to adopt. (See N.T. Hearing, 5/18/23, at 54-61).

       Father timely appealed and he and the trial court complied with Rule

1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i)-(ii).2

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2

       Our standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
       requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
       credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
       by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
       courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
       or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
       of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
       unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
       court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
       the record would support a different result. We have previously
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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                                               II.

       We begin by outlining the basic legal principles that guide our review.

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs termination of parental rights and

requires a bifurcated analysis:

             Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
       seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
       that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
       termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the trial court
       determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
       or her parental rights does the trial court engage in the second
       part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination
       of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best
       interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare
       analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond
       between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect
       on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

       “A child has a right to a stable, safe, and healthy environment in which

to grow, and the child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the

parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id.

(citation omitted). When a parent has demonstrated a continued inability to

conduct his life in a manner conducive to providing a safe environment for a

child, and the behavior is irremediable as supported by clear and competent

evidence, the termination of parental rights is justified. See id. at 1105.

____________________________________________

       emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
       observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 911 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

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     In this case, the trial court terminated Parents’ rights pursuant to

Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),(8) and (b), which provide as follows:

     (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
     be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
     grounds:

           (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
     six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition has
     either evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim
     to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

           (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
     or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
     essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
     physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the
     incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
     remedied by the parent.

                                 *     *      *

           (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
     by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a
     period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the
     removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent
     cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
     period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
     the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the
     removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of
     time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the
     needs and welfare of the child.

                                 *     *      *

           (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
     by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12
     months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
     placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement
     of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights
     would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

                                 *     *      *

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      (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a) (1), (2), (5), (8) and (b).

                                       A.

      Father first contends that the trial court erred in terminating his parental

rights to Child, given the substantial progress he has made towards remedying

the circumstances that brought Child into placement and his ability to provide

her with a safe, appropriate home. (See Father’s Brief, at 13-19). Father

characterizes the conduct of Foster Parents and DHS during the proceedings

as manipulative, and claims he was left to “fend for himself” to attend medical

appointments and supervised visits with Child. (Id. at 16). With regard to

the trial court’s best interests analysis, Father maintains that he and Child

share a bond and that termination of his parental rights will cause irreparable

harm to Child. (See id. at 18).

      We begin by observing that the goal of the Juvenile Act is to “preserve

the unity of the family whenever possible or to provide another alternative

permanent family when the unity of the family cannot be maintained.” 42

Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1). The Act is additionally intended to “prevent children

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from languishing indefinitely in foster care, with its inherent lack of

permanency, normalcy, and long-term parental commitment.” Interest of

A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).              In

considering Section 2511(b), we are guided by the following tenants:

            Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
      rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
      emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has
      explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding
      analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act.
      Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond,
      if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as
      part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or
      her child is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest
      analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be
      considered by the court when determining what is in the best
      interest of the child.

            In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
      emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
      the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
      the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this
      Court stated that the trial court should consider the importance of
      continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child
      bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

D.R.-W., supra at 914 (citations omitted).

      Here, the record provides no support for Father’s claim that DHS or

Foster Parents acted manipulatively during the course of Child’s placement.

Rather, the record shows that Father did not make a concerted attempt to

fully understand Child’s medical needs in that he failed to consistently attend

her numerous medical appointments or the supervised weekly visits that were

offered. Additionally, bus passes to cover transportation costs and lists of

doctors’ appointments/office locations were provided to Parents by DHS,

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undercutting Father’s argument that Parents were left to fend for themselves.

During the visits Father did attend with Child, he was unable to identity basic

safety risks, in one instance necessitating intervention by the supervisor to

prevent Child from putting a toy down her throat.       Additionally, although

Mother candidly acknowledged her inability to care for Child’s complex medical

needs, Father had no issues with Mother caring for Child while he was at work,

and indicated confidence in her ability to parent Child despite his testimony

that Child’s life can be jeopardized if she does not take the proper medication

and have proper foods.

      Regarding the trial court’s best interests determination, Child has

resided with Foster Parents for more than two years from the time she was

just a few months old and has never been parented by Mother and Father.

Although Father had formed a relationship with Child to some degree, credible

witnesses indicated that termination of his parental rights would have no

detrimental impact on Child. In contrast to Child’s tenuous relationship with

Parents, she shares a close parent/child bond with Foster Parents who have

provided for her highly specialized needs throughout her entire life. Because

the clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that

terminating Father’s parental rights was appropriate under the very difficult

circumstances of this case and would best serve Child’s needs and welfare, we

affirm its decree terminating his parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

§§ 2511(a) (2) & (8).

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                                        B.

       Father next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in

changing the goal of the dependency proceedings from reunification to

adoption, given that he is able to meet all of Child’s needs and the long term

effects of the goal change will be harmful to Child. (See Father’s Brief, at 19-

20).

       However, because we have concluded that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in granting the petition to terminate Father’s parental rights, this

issue is moot. See In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 446 (Pa. Super.

2021) (“The effect of our decision to affirm the orphans’ court’s termination

decree necessarily renders moot the dependency court’s decision to change

Child’s goal to adoption.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the order

changing the permanency goal from reunification to adoption.

       Even if we were to reach the merits of this issue, we would conclude

that no relief is due.

             When deciding whether to change the permanency goal in a
       dependency action, the trial court must consider, inter alia: (1)
       the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
       placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family service
       plan; (3) the extent of progress made towards alleviating the
       circumstances which necessitated the original placement; (4) the
       appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for
       the children; (5) a likely date by which the goal for the child might
       be achieved; (6) the child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has
       been in placement for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two
       months.

            Additionally, a court is required to provide compelling
       reasons why it is not in the best interest of the child to return to

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       his or her parents and to instead be placed for adoption. 42
       Pa.C.S. § 6351 (f.1)(5)(iv)(C). The child’s best interest, safety,
       permanency and well-being must take precedence over all other
       considerations in a goal change proceeding. The parent’s rights
       are secondary and a goal change to adoption may be appropriate,
       even under circumstances where a parent substantially complies
       with a reunification plan. A court cannot subordinate a child’s
       need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claim of progress
       and goals for the future.

Interest of A.M., supra at 1273 (case citations omitted).

       Here, Child was adjudicated dependent shortly after she was born with

a rare genetic condition and Father and Mother did not have appropriate

housing or the ability to care for Child’s extensive medical needs. During her

time in their care, Foster Parents have aided Child in making great progress,

well beyond what was expected by DHS, to the extent that she is described

as “feisty” and “happy.” Child is bonded with Foster Parents and has thrived

in their home.    Accordingly, because the record supports the trial court’s

decision to change Child’s permanency goal to adoption, no relief would be

due.

       Decree affirmed. Order affirmed.

Date: 11/28/2023

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