Court Opinion

ID: 9562232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:24:09.945594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:15.466080
License: Public Domain

Hawkins, Justice,
dissenting. 1. The first headnote states a correct principle of law, but I dissent from its application in the present case, and from the first division of the opinion because, as I construe the evidence in this case, it clearly presents the question of voluntary condonation by the plaintiff of the alleged cruel treatment on the part of the defendant. While the plaintiff testified that there had been several separations brought about by the cruel treatment of his wife, and conditional reconciliations and voluntary cohabitation subsequently thereto, based upon her express promise not to repeat the cruel treatment, this testimony was disputed by the wife, she having denied that she was ever guilty of cruel treatment at any time, and thus denied that there had ever been any conditional reconciliation and co*881habitation. Code § 30-109 provides that, “if there has been a voluntary condonation and cohabitation subsequently to the acts complained of, and with notice thereof, then no divorce shall be granted.” It is true that previous acts of cruelty are' revived where the conditional condonation is broken by a repetition of the acts of cruelty, and the injured party again separate's because of them (Harn v. Harn, 155 Ga. 502, 117 S. E. 383); yet voluntary cohabitation as husband and wife, for no matter how short a period after and with knowledge of the acts of cruel treatment, condones the previous acts. ’ Sasser v. Sasser, 69 Ga. 576; Phinizy v. Phinizy, 154 Ga. 199 (114 S. E. 185). The condoning party cannot forgive the acts and cohabit voluntarily with the forgiven one and at the same time reserve the right to assert them as a means of obtaining a divorce. Davis v. Davis, 134 Ga. 804 (68 S. E. 594, 30 L.R.A. (NS) 73, 20 Ann. Cas. 20). Applying the foregoing principles of law, the. issue of condonation was raised by the evidence, and it was the duty of the trial court to give the jury the law of the case to the extent of covering the substantial issues made by the evidence, whether requested or not. Central Railroad v. Harris, 76 Ga. 501, 511; Mobley v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 157 Ga. 658 (122 S. E. 233).
I also dissent from the ruling made in the fourth division of the opinion. The charge complained of in the seventh special ground of the motion for new trial is subject to the criticism that it makes the question of whether or not a trust results in favor of a husband who pays a part of the purchase money of property placed in his wife’s name depend solely upon what may have been an undisclosed intent in the mind of the husband. The charge complained of instructed the jury in effect that the intention of the husband that the wife should hold the property in trust for him, even though it may have been unknown to the wife, would be sufficient to overcome the presumption of a gift, which the law raises where purchase money is paid by the husband and title is taken in the name of the wife. In Kimbrough v. Kimbrough, 99 Ga. 134(1) (25 S. E. 176), this court said: “Where a husband with his own money purchased and paid for a home, and deliberately and intentionally had the same conveyed to his wife., with no understanding or agreement that he was in any event to *882have an interest in the title, the transaction amounted to a gift from the husband to the wife, and as between them the property became absolutely her separate estate.” (Italics ours.) In Vickers v. Vickers, 133 Ga. 383, 384 (65 S. E. 885, 24 L.R.A. (NS) 1043), it is held: “But an absolute gift will not be cut down by implication into a trust merely because the donor hoped and believed at the time the gift was made that the donee would share the beneficial interest of the property with him. . . It must appear from the entire transaction that there is an obligation on the part of the holder of the legal title to hold it for the benefit of someone else. If a husband buys and pays for land and takes a deed in his wife’s name, a presumption arises that he intends to make an absolute gift to her, and in order to overcome this presumption, he must show something which raises an obligation in her to hold the property in trust for him.” See also Williams v. Thomas, 200 Ga. 767 (38 S. E. 2d 603). Under the foregoing authorities, the charge here complained of was erroneous, and for the reasons above stated I dissent from the portions of the opinion here pointed out, and from the judgment, of affirmance.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Chief Justice Duckworth concurs in this dissent.