Court Opinion

ID: 9673852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:19:23.987326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:35.539273
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
SMITH, Justice.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with relator’s theory that any information which is obtained during the course of an investigation is forever privileged and immune from discovery. According to relator’s theory, regardless of what actions Moses Byrd takes against Lender, he would never be able to ascertain the real name of Jane Doe. The counsel for petitioner also represent Lender. One of the attorneys for Hanlon made a statement to the trial judge that “[i]f Mr. Lender is not to be a party, and if counsel is willing to furnish a release as to Mr. Lender I think we can finish our controversy pretty promptly.” Counsel for Moses Byrd addressed the Court, in reply, that “ * * * without knowing all of the facts I can not state either that we will or we will not present a claim against Mr. Lender. I am trying to find out what happened out there and once I find out what happened then a decision will be made as to whether we will or will not proceed in a separate suit against Mr. Lender. I do know on the basis of what information I have that we very well may have a cause of action against Jane Doe, if we can just find out who Jane Doe is, and that is all that I am interested in doing here."
Thus, we have what I consider an admission that if Lender can be released, then the real name of Jane Doe will be forthcoming Under the circumstances, no conscientious lawyer would bind himself to release Lender. How can withholding Jane Doe’s real identity aid Lender ? Moses Byrd contends, and correctly so, that the situation disclosed by the present record constitutes an exception to the provisos of Rule 186a. I take the position that Moses Byrd proceeded in good faith when he moved the Court to be permitted to take the deposition of Hanlon. The trial court has adjudged the petitioner in contempt. This Court must assume in support of the trial judge’s order that he found that the motion to take the deposition of Hanlon was filed in good faith and that in order to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice it was essential that Hanlon make known the identity of the prospective defendant, Jane Doe. The doctrine or principle relied upon by Byrd is highly important to any scheme of administering justice. In the recent case of Lehnhard v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.Sup.1966), this Court considered the policy of disclosure of facts in a somewhat different context from that presented here and quoted with approval the following from Dean Wigmore’s work on Evidence, viz:
“[N]o man is to be denied the enforcement of his rights merely because another possesses the facts without which the right cannot be ascertained and enforced.” 8 Wigmore, (3rd Ed.) § 2213.
Admittedly, the facts of the present case are highly unusual, and I have been unable to find any controlling or persuasive authority relating to the situation. The provisos in Rule 186a seem .to be peculiar to the Texas practice. Cf. Ex Parte Ladon, 160 Tex. 7, 325 S.W.2d 121 (1959) relating to Rule 167. Ordinarily, the provisos of Rule 186a leave no room for the exercise of a discretion of a trial judge. Shirley v. Dalby, 384 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.Civ.App.1964, ref. n. r. e.). However, this Court should hold that such provisos, having for their obvious purpose the protection of a work product, were never intended to protect a witness from giving the name of a prospective defendant, where a trial judge finds that a prospective plaintiff after a good *209faith investigation has been unable to ascertain the name of a prospective defendant and knows of no one except the witness who is possessed of such information.
It is clear that this is not a case where one party is attempting to usurp the results of an investigation of another. Moses Byrd is not attempting to obtain the names of another party’s witnesses. It is a case in which the trial court has found that under the unusual circumstances presented here, Moses Byrd is entitled to the limited information which he seeks.
The trial court had jurisdiction of the subject matter. The judgment entered is not void. This Court has strictly construed the rule to the extent of holding that the pertinent provisions leave “little or no room’’ for the exercise of discretion by a trial judge and that the “wording of the provisos is unambiguous and covers the exact situation we have before us. * * * ” I cannot agree with this unfair, unjust and untenable construction of the rule.
Furthermore, the trial court’s order was entered by virtue of that power ancillary to the exercise of the duties of a court of equity as a means for the attainment of justice. The trial court’s judgment is not only authorized by Rule 186a, but is also authorized by Rule 737. This latter rule contains no restrictive provisions except the discretion of the trial court “in accordance with the usages of courts of equity.” See Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Company, 149 Tex. 416, 234 S.W.2d 389 (1950).
The relator has advanced no equitable reason or justification for the withholding from Moses Byrd, an injured party, the true name of Jane Doe, which, if known, would afford Moses Byrd an opportunity to enforce his rights. See Lehnhard v. Moore, supra. If the rules of our Court are to be so strictly construed, as here, then our adversary system cannot long survive. The holding of this Court in the present case fosters and encourages the suppression of truth and denies an injured person, Moses Byrd, the opportunity to pursue his legal rights in a court of law. If this is to be the result, then the Court should modify the rule by Court decision in this very case rather than to await the approval of an advisory committee before formally changing the rule by the Court.
Unless prompt action to change the rule is taken it is entirely possible that Moses Byrd’s cause of action against Jane Doe will be barred by limitation. To avoid confusion and to permit justice to prevail, this Court should construe the statute to mean that it was never intended to protect a witness from giving the name of a prospective defendant. If this course were followed, then there need be no change in the rule. Since the Court has declined to accept my view, it should seriously consider immediately changing the rule to reach the result herein expressed.
I would remand the relator, Hanlon, to the custody of the Sheriff of Travis County, Texas.