Court Opinion

ID: 9949858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 19:06:48.384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:06.334235
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/12/24 P. v. Maldonado CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081541

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.
                                                                     (Super. Ct. No. SCE408470)
THOMAS MALDONADO,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.
         Matthew A. Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Eric A. Swenson and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
      A jury convicted Thomas Maldonado of arson of property (Pen. Code,

§ 451, subd. (d)),1 together with other offenses not relevant to this appeal.
      Maldonado appeals. He contends (1) the evidence does not support his
arson conviction; and (2) the trial court committed instructional error by
failing to instruct the jury as to “wrongful act.” We disagree with the first
contention and conclude he forfeited the second by failing to offer a pinpoint
instruction in the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm.
                                    FACTS
      Maldonado lived on a piece of property that was managed by his
mother, R.M., and owned by a third party. He lived rent-free at the property
in exchange for helping out as needed, including yard work. At least on one
occasion, he had received a tax form (form 1099) for his work on the property.
Many months before the date of the charged incident, while doing yard work
on the property, R.M. and her sister had piled up branches and shrub
cuttings in the backyard, intending to remove them at some future date.
      On August 28, 2021, a neighbor called R.M to let her know about smoke
on the property. R.M. promptly drove there and saw white smoke coming
from the back. When she ran to the backyard, R.M. saw Maldonado pouring
lighter fluid on some of the dead shrubs in the yard. R.M. testified that she
had never instructed Maldonado to burn anything in the yard. She saw some

areas that had already been burned, and she saw smoke but not flames.2
Hoses were running and the ground was wet. No structures had burned, and
there was no property damage. Maldonado told her to “get the hell out of

1     Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
specified.

2     Deputy Sheriff Anel Rodriguez testified that R.M. told him that she
had seen flames.

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here.” Then he ran towards her, picked up a pipe, and struck the fence she
was standing behind. Maldonado told R.M., “If you don’t get out of here I’m
going to kill you.” R.M. testified that Maldonado “walked back to the stuff he
was burning, almost like he was going to start the fire, and [she] said, ‘If you
start the fire, I’m going to call the police.’ ” Maldonado tried to take R.M.’s
phone from her, but she ran from him and called 911. The arresting officers
found a Bic lighter at the scene and observed a “smoldering” section of dry
vegetation in the yard, approximately 10 feet by 10 feet in size.
      Maldonado was charged in an amended complaint with one count of
arson, in violation of section 451(d), along with other offenses not relevant to
this appeal.
      At trial, the prosecution had proposed an instruction to accompany the
arson instruction, namely that “[b]urning trash that does not belong to the
defendant is arson. There’s no requirement for arson that the property
belong to anyone.” The defense objected to the proposed instruction,
contending that there was no evidence that the burned items were “trash.”
The court instructed the jury with arson, together with the prosecution’s
proposed instruction, as follows:
         “Mr. Maldonado is charged in Count 1 with arson. This is
         a violation of Penal Code Section 451(b). To prove this
         crime the People have to prove the following: One, the
         defendant set fire or burned or caused the burning of
         property; and, two, he acted willfully and maliciously. To
         set fire to or burn means to damage or destroy with fire
         either all or part of something, no matter how small.
         Someone commits an act willfully when he does it willingly
         or on purpose. [¶] Someone acts maliciously when he does
         a wrongful act or an act with unlawful intent to defraud,
         annoy, or injure someone else. Property means personal
         property or land other than forest land. A person does not
         commit arson if the only thing burned is [his] or her own
         personal property unless he acts with intent to defraud or

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         the fire also injures someone else or someone else’s
         structure, forest land, or property.”

      As requested by the prosecution, the court also instructed the jury that
“[b]urning trash that does not belong to the defendant is arson. There’s no
requirement for arson that the property belong to anyone.” The court
redacted a case citation that had been included with the proposed instruction.
      During deliberations, the jury sent a note that read, “Count 1 –
‘Someone acts maliciously when he or she intentionally does a wrongful act.’
Wrongful act definition?” (!CT 58)! After consulting with counsel, the court
responded, “You are referred to jury instruction 200, wherein it is stated:
‘words and phrases not specifically defined in these instructions are to be
applied using their ordinary, everyday meanings.’ ”
      The jury convicted Maldonado of all counts, including the arson count.
                                DISCUSSION
                                       I
                          Sufficiency of the Evidence
      On appeal, Maldonado argues that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that he acted maliciously, because he was paid to maintain the
property and therefore “the debris piled in his yard was effectively his to
dispose of.” Put another way, by virtue of his work status on the property,
Maldonado “exercised some dominion and control over the property, including
effectively taking ownership of the yard debris he burned” and therefore he
could not have acted maliciously when he set fire to it.
      “ ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine
“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] “ ‘ “[O]ur
role on appeal is a limited one.” [Citation.] Under the substantial evidence

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rule, we must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
that the trier of fact could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.’ ” (In
re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026 (V.V.).)
      In California, the crime of arson is defined by statute: “A person is
guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns
or causes to be burned . . . any structure, forest land, or property.” (§ 451.)
As noted above, Maldonado contends on appeal that the evidence failed to
show that he acted “maliciously” as used in the statute.
      “ ‘Maliciously’ imports a wish to vex, defraud, annoy, or injure another
person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or
presumption of law.” (§ 450, subd. (e).) “In determining whether the second
type of malice (‘intent to do a wrongful act’) is established for arson, malice
will be presumed or implied from the deliberate and intentional ignition or
act of setting a fire without a legal justification, excuse, or claim of right.”
(V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1028.)
      “[A]rson’s ‘willful and malice requirement ensures that the setting of
the fire must be a deliberate and intentional act, as distinguished from an
accidental or unintentional ignition or act of setting a fire; “ ‘in short, a fire of
incendiary origin.’ ” [Citations.] “Because the offensive or dangerous
character of the defendant’s conduct, by virtue of its nature, contemplates
such injury, a general criminal intent to commit the act suffices to establish
the requisite mental state.” [Citation.] Thus, there must be a general intent
to willfully commit the act of setting on fire under such circumstances that
the direct, natural, and highly probable consequences would be the burning of
the relevant structure or property.’ ” (V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1029; see
Mason v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 773, 785 [“A necessary
consequence is not required.”]; see also People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th

                                          5
76, 89 [arson requires only “a general intent to willfully commit the act of
setting on fire under such circumstances that the direct, natural, and highly
probable consequences would be the burning of the relevant structure or
property”].)
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as
we must, we conclude the jury could reasonably find that Maldonado acted
with malice, i.e. wrongfully, when he intentionally set fire to the lawn debris.
All of the evidence showed that he had acted intentionally when he burned
the brush debris in the yard; and any suggestion that his action was not
malicious, i.e. not a wrongful act, is belied by his angry, defiant and
aggressive response to R.M., his supervisor and mother, when she instructed
him to desist. Certainly Maldonado could have argued to the jury that he did
not act wrongfully when he burned the yard debris, even though he did not
seek or obtain permission from the property owner or from R.M. before
starting to ignite the piles of debris. Nonetheless, the jury may have
reasonably inferred that angrily telling R.M. to leave and then acting as if he
intended to resume the burning despite her orders to stop showed
Maldonado’s wrongful intent to conduct the burning against the wishes and
direction of the property owner.
      Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence support’s
Maldonado’s conviction for arson.
                                        II
                  Instructional Error / Response to Jury Note
      Maldonado further contends that the trial court committed
instructional error by failing to instruct the jury as to “wrongful act”.
Specifically, Maldonado argues that “the trial court had a sua sponte duty to

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instruct the jury on what constitutes a wrongful act and in turn, how to
determine legal justification, excuse, or claim of right to burn property.”
      We review instructional error using a de novo standard of review.
(People v. Fiore (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1378; People v. Manriquez
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 584.)
      Respondent points out that Maldonado did not request an instruction
as to “wrongful act,” either in the initial jury instruction conference or in
response to the jury’s question, and further, that Maldonado acquiesced in
the court’s response to the jury’s question. As a result, Respondent contends,
Maldonado has forfeited this argument on appeal. However, if, as Maldonado
contends, the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on “wrongful act,” then
it cannot be said that he forfeited the argument. (See People v. Delgado
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 480, 488 [even in the absence of a request, the court must
instruct the jury on relevant issues necessary for the jury’s understanding of
a case].)
      Contrary to Maldonado’s assertion, the court did not have a sua sponte
duty to further define the prosecution’s burden to prove a wrongful act.
Maldonado cites to no authority in support of this proposition, and we are not
aware of any such authority. Instead, when a defense is in effect a dispute as
to the sufficiency of the evidence as to an element of the offense, the court
does not have a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense. (People v.
Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261, 269 [“ ‘ “when a defendant presents
evidence to attempt to negate or rebut the prosecution’s proof of an element
of the offense, a defendant is not presenting a special defense invoking sua
sponte instructional duties” ’ ”].)
      Absent a sua sponte instructional duty, the defense is free to offer a
pinpoint instruction, Hussain, supra; but no such instruction was offered to

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the trial court (or articulated in this appeal). Thus, we agree with
Respondent’s contention that Maldonado has forfeited this argument. (See
People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal. 4th 616, 675.)
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                   KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

DATO, J.

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