Court Opinion

ID: 9457670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:29:28.112525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:27.551090
License: Public Domain

OAKES, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur in so much of the opinion and order as relates to brutality and abuse of the Attica inmates. I dissent as to so much of it as concerns the right to counsel, but on a limited basis.
The Legal Aid Society has on final argument narrowed its request for relief in this proceeding — in order to avoid possible conflicts of interest — from the full right to counsel for each inmate sought at the first argument before this court, to the right of each inmate to consult with counsel from the Legal Aid Society as to whether he should consult with an attorney to be appointed by the appropriate state court before or in connection with interrogation by state officials. Since a number of inmates have returned the state’s forms of Notice (quoted in note 5 of the majority opinion) either blank or with merely a signature and no signification as to whether they want counsel, or not returned the forms at all, it seems to me plain that many inmates have at the very least been inhibited from communicating their true wishes to the state officials. Such inhibition may have been based not only on the harassment and abuse now enjoined, which occurred after the tragic events of the prison riot, but also on the inmates’ fear of future disciplinary reprisal or effects upon parole, as mentioned in the Goldman Panel Report (pages 20-22, 36) quoted in the majority opinion. See Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767 (N.D.Cal.1971).
The often arbitrary deprivation of “good time” credits that has taken place in the New York prison system in the past1 obviously may have an inhibitory effect upon the voluntariness of any choice to seek or not to seek counsel. Thus this is not a case where the remedy of relief by suppression of illegally obtained statements would be sufficient, as the trial judge supposed; it may be that inmates who were unwilling participants in the riot have not wanted to signify that they want counsel out of fear of reprisal from prison officials in one of several ways, including prison disciplinary proceedings, other than criminal prosecution. A given inmate may be on the horns of an insoluble dilemma — if he doesn’t talk he runs a risk of prison discipline; if he does, he runs a risk of prosecution. See Clutchette v. Procunier, sUpra. Thus his need for counsel may exceed that of a person in the usual criminal interrogation.
Nor is this a case in which it is sought to enjoin a state criminal prosecution as in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Here the narrow relief now sought is a consultation to determine whether an inmate who by definition is in custody2 should exercise his right, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758 (1964), to consult counsel before being subjected to interrogation by state officials contemplating prosecution. To grant such relief has considerable precedent. See Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343 (3rd Cir. 1971); Gomez v. Layton, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 289, 394 F.2d 764, 767 (1968); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d *27197 (4th Cir. 1966). Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Thus I take the view that it was error to dismiss the claim for permanent relief on the ground that ample remedies from unconstitutional interrogation lie by way of further evidentiary suppression. This is especially true, I think, in light of Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), which seems to hold that an involuntary confession may be used in impeachment. Since the trial judge’s thinking to the contrary also plainly affected his denial of preliminary relief, I would reverse his order in that respect and remand for findings. In view of the trial judge’s record of prompt and expeditious handling of court business, any suggestion that the hearings on the application for preliminary and permanent relief should be combined and held promptly would be superfluous. I believe that for the foregoing limited purposes (brutality and right to counsel) this action should properly be treated as a class action. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968).

. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (1971); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Katzoff v. McGinnis, Docket No. - (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1970), Kritsky v. McGinnis, 313 F.Supp. 1247 (N.D. N.Y.1970), United States ex rel. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 307 F.Supp. 627 (N.D.N.Y.1969) (pending en banc).

. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968).