Court Opinion

ID: 9948667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 17:14:11.697107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:44.858475
License: Public Domain

J-A25028-23

                                   2024 PA Super 40

  IN RE: ADOPTION OF K.B.                      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: A.S. AND P.S.                     :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 738 WDA 2023

               Appeal from the Decree Entered May 25, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Orphans' Court at
                               No(s): 32-21-0264

  IN RE: ADOPTION OF N.M.                      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: A.S.AND P.S.                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 739 WDA 2023

               Appeal from the Decree Entered May 25, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Orphans' Court at
                               No(s): 32-21-0265

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                            FILED: March 7, 2024

       A.S. and P.S. (Foster Parents) appeal from the decrees denying their

petitions to adopt seven-year-old K.B. and five-year-old N.M. (the Children).

They argue the orphans’ court abused its discretion by effectively requiring

them to enter a post-adoption contact agreement with D.O. (Maternal Aunt)

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A25028-23

before it would approve their adoption. Upon review, we reverse and remand

for the court to enter decrees granting the Foster Parents’ adoption petitions.

      The relevant factual and procedural history follows. In February 2020,

Indiana County Children and Youth Services (the Agency) removed K.B. and

N.M. from their biological parents due to drug use and neglect. The Agency

placed the Children with Foster Parents where they have resided continuously

since. At the time of placement, the Children were four and two years old,

respectively.

      While in the care of Foster Parents, the Children were adjudicated

dependent. During the dependency action, Maternal Aunt began visiting the

Children and completed an Interstate Compact to be considered a kinship

home for the Children. Because she resided in Florida, she was not considered

a placement option. Since approximately June 2021, Maternal Aunt had bi-

weekly supervised visits with the Children, both in-person and via Zoom.

      On November 4, 2021, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the

parental rights of the natural mother and father.      On appeal, this Court

affirmed the termination decrees. Foster Parents then filed petitions to adopt

the Children on June 24, 2022.      Maternal Aunt filed counter-petitions for

adoption on July 12, 2022. The court held a consolidated hearing on all the

petitions in April 2023.

      Foster Parents presented expert testimony from Bruce Chambers,

Psy.D., a clinical psychologist. Dr. Chambers completed an assessment and

authored a Psychological Evaluation for Custody.         Foster Parents also

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presented     expert    testimony     from     Carolyn   Menta,   Psy.D.,   a   clinical

psychologist. Dr. Menta authored two bonding assessments for Foster Parents

and for Maternal Aunt. Foster Parents and Maternal Aunt testified as well.

Lastly, the Children’s guardian ad litem gave a statement to the court.

       On May 25, 2023, after the hearing, the orphan’s court issued opinions

and decrees denying both Foster Parents’ and Maternal Aunt’s petitions for

adoption. Foster Parents filed this timely appeal.1 Foster Parents and the

orphans’ court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

       On appeal, Foster Parents present the following four issues:

       1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying [Foster
          Parents’] petition[s] for adoption of the subject [C]hildren,
          where the [Foster Parents] met their burden based on the best
          interest analysis, by showing that the [C]hildren have been
          thriving in their home and have a strong attachment to the
          [Foster Parents], and two psychologists support the adoption
          of the [C]hildren by [Foster Parents]?

       2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Foster Parents’]
          petitions for adoption of the subject [C]hildren, because the
          court determined that there must be continuing contact with
          the [C]hildren’s [Maternal Aunt], which is not required by the
          Adoption Act under the best interests’ analysis?

       3. If the trial court was correct in considering continuing contact
          with the [Maternal Aunt], did the trial court place undue weight
          upon that continuing contact?

       4. Whether the trial court erred in denying the [Foster Parents’]
          petition[s] for adoption of the subject children, which, in effect,
          has made the [C]hildren unadoptable orphans?

____________________________________________

1 It does not appear Maternal Aunt appealed the court’s decision denying her

petitions.

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Foster Parents’ Brief at 4-5.

      All these issues require us to resolve the essential question of whether

the orphans’ court erred or abused its discretion in determining that adoption

by the Foster Parents was not in the Children’s best interests. For ease of

disposition, we address the issues together.

      In matters arising under the Adoption Act, “our plenary scope of review

is of the broadest type; that is, an appellate court is not bound by the trial

court’s inferences drawn from its findings of fact and is compelled to perform

a comprehensive review of the record for assurance the findings and credibility

determinations are competently supported.” Interest of K.N.L., 284 A.3d

121, 132-33 (Pa. 2022) (internal quotations and further citations omitted).

Additionally, our standard of review is for an abuse of discretion. This Court

will not conclude that there is an abuse of discretion merely because we would

have reached a different conclusion.    In re K.D., 144 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa.

Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Rather, an appellate court “will find a trial

court abuses its discretion if, in reaching a conclusion, it overrides or

misapplies the law, or the record shows that the trial court's judgment was

either manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or

ill will.” Id. (citation omitted). Where it is shown by evidence of record that

the court’s determination is manifestly unreasonable, we may modify it. Id.

Thus, where the court abused its discretion and the record is sufficiently

developed, this Court may, rather than remand the case, substitute our

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judgment for that of the court’s and decide the merits of the case. K.D., 144

A.3d at 151.

         In adoption matters, the paramount concern is the best interests of the

child.    In re Adoption of A.S.H., 674 A.2d 698, 700 (Pa. Super. 1996)

(citations omitted). This determination is made on a case-by-case basis. Id.

The Adoption Act provides that “the age, sex, health, social and economic

status or racial, ethnic or religious background of the child or adopting parents

shall not preclude an adoption but the court shall decide its desirability on the

basis of the physical, mental and emotional needs and welfare of the child.”

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2724(b). “If satisfied that the statements made in the petition

are true, that the needs and welfare of the person proposed to be adopted will

be promoted by the adoption and that all requirements of this part have been

met, the court shall enter a decree[.]” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902(a).

         At the outset of its opinion, the orphans’ court explained why it believed

it did not need to choose between the competing adoption petitions:

            [T]he [c]ourt faces two separate and distinct questions; the
            two questions are " does granting [Foster Parents’ petition]
            serve the best interests of the [C]hildren?" and "does
            granting [Maternal Aunt’s petitions] serve the best interests
            of the [C]hildren?" This is a best interests analysis in its
            purest form, as the [c]ourt is not constrained to [choose]
            between two equally undesirable options. In other words,
            the [c]ourt is not forced to make a Hobson's choice.

            A Hobson's choice is defined as "the necessity of accepting
            one of two or more equally objectionable alternatives." The
            [c]ourt begins its analysis with this definition for the purpose
            of affirmatively stating the [c]ourt's opinion that a court
            should never face a Hobson's choice when it comes to the
            adoption of a child. Therefore, the [c]ourt finds that it is a

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        fallacy that the [c]ourt must grant either the [Foster Parents
        petitions] or [Maternal Aunt’s petitions]. To find otherwise
        would belie the paramount concern in an adoption
        proceeding, i.e., the best interests of the child.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/25/23, at 5-6 (footnote and citation omitted).

      The orphans’ court then denied the Foster Parents’ petitions for the

following reasons:

        The court acknowledges the need for permanency for these
        Children. However, the court declines to choose the
        lesser of two evils in an adoption matter.              It is
        important to note that denying [Foster Parents’ petition] and
        denying [Maternal Aunt’s petition] will not, in and of itself,
        legally result in the severing of the secure attachment
        between the children and [Foster Parents]. The children will
        remain in the care of [Foster Parents].

        It is the [court’s] strong hope that the Children remain in
        the care of the [Foster Parents], and [they] commit
        themselves to the best interests of the Children, and in
        doing so, begin to foster and promote the Children's
        relationship with [Maternal Aunt] in a meaningful way.
        Should this happen, this court would be in a position to
        conclude that an adoption by [Foster Parents] would be in
        the best interests of the Children. Until then, the court
        cannot make such a finding. Therefore, [Foster Parents’
        petition] must be denied. If [Foster Parents] decide that
        they no longer want to provide foster care for the Children
        if they have to promote and facilitate a relationship with
        [Maternal Aunt], they will be sending a resounding message
        that adoption by them was never in the Children's best
        interests.

Id. at 13 (emphasis added) (style adjusted).

     Similarly, the orphans’ court denied Maternal Aunt’s petitions:

        [D]espite the findings of the court regarding [Maternal
        Aunt’s] fitness as an adoptive parent, the court cannot
        ignore the clear conclusions of Dr. Chambers and Dr.
        Menta. As stated above, Dr. Chambers concludes that the

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        Children have a strong, healthy attachment with [Foster
        Parents] that has been established over the 38 months in
        their care. Dr. Chambers opines that any change to this
        situation would cause undue stress on the Children,
        especially given the fact that they have already endured a
        traumatic removal from their caregivers.

        As stated above, Dr. Menta concludes that disturbing the
        secure attachment with [Foster Parents] would be
        devastating to the Children. Dr. Menta stated that such a
        disturbance could destroy their mental health, and could
        result in the inability to form positive attachments as an
        adult.

        Given the expert testimony received by the court, the court
        cannot find that it would be in the best interests of the
        children to grant [Maternal Aunt’s petition]. This finding
        may appear inconsistent with the court's denial of [Foster
        Parents’ petitions], however, as the court has stated several
        times, a court should never be required to accept the
        lesser of two evils when faced with two adoption
        petitions. Finally, and as stated above, it is the strong
        hope of the court that [Maternal Aunt], with the cooperation
        of [Foster Parents] and Indiana County CYS, begin to enjoy
        the growth of a meaningful relationship with the children,
        which will require periods of unsupervised physical
        "custody" of the children by [Maternal Aunt]. If [Foster
        Parents] decide that they no longer wish to provide
        foster care to the children, the court believes that
        [Maternal Aunt] is in a position to care for the
        children.

Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added) (style adjusted).

     The orphans’ court believed that the Children’s best interests could not

be met under the confines of the Adoption Act:

        The [c]ourt is asked to apply a "child custody" analysis
        construct to this adoption proceeding, however, unlike a
        custody proceeding, the [c]ourt is unable to grant [Foster
        Parents’ petitions] and award [Maternal Aunt] periods of
        partial physical custody. Given these legal constraints, and

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           given the facts of this matter as they presently exist, the
           best interests of the child cannot be achieved.

Id. at 16 (style adjusted).

      On appeal, Foster Parents claim that the orphans’ court abused its

discretion when it denied their petitions to adopt the Children. Specifically,

Foster Parents argue that they presented evidence demonstrating that the

Children had a strong, secure bond and attachment to them and that the

Children were thriving in their care; as such, they established that it was in

the best interests of the Children for the court to grant their adoption petitions.

See Foster Parents’ Brief at 10. Foster Parents argue that, instead, the court

improperly based its decision on the possibility that they, as legal parents,

might terminate contact between the Children and their Maternal Aunt. The

Foster Parents maintain that the court gave this biological relationship undue

weight in its decision; the court did so despite Foster Parents’ testimony that

they would facilitate a relationship with Maternal Aunt.           Id. at 10-11.

According to Foster Parents, the court disregarded the best interests of the

Children and left them unadoptable. Id. at 12. The Foster Parents conclude

that the orphans’ court’s decision constituted an abuse of discretion. Upon

review of the record, we agree.

      In this case, by denying the Foster Parents’ petitions the court ignored

overwhelming evidence that adoption by Foster Parents was in the best

interests of the Children. Both experts supported the adoption by the Foster

Parents.

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      Dr. Chambers opined that adoption by Foster Parents was in the

Children’s best interests. In his report, Dr. Chambers observed that the most

important factors in determining the best interests of the Children are bonding

and attachment. He stated:

      Consistent with previous bonding evaluations, this evaluation
      revealed the [Foster Parents] to have a healthy and strong bond
      with both children. In addition, given the circumstances that the
      [Children faced in their earlier years, [Foster Parents] have done
      a remarkable job of getting the [C]hildren back on track
      developmentally. By all reports, the children are doing well
      academically, emotionally, and have positive peer relationships.

                                     ***

      [T]he bonding and attachment issues are paramount.            The
      children clearly have strong healthy attachments with [Foster
      Parents] due to the fact that they have been in their lives every
      day for the past two years. The daily reciprocal parent-child
      interactions strengthen and support these bonds on an ongoing
      basis.

Dr. Bruce Chambers, Psychological Evaluation for Custody, January 23, 2023,

at 9-10.    Dr. Chambers found “that the [C]hildren are doing so well

developmentally . . . and have a strong, healthy attachment to their foster

parents.” Id. As such, Dr. Chambers concluded: “In my opinion, it is in the

best interest[s] of the [C]hildren for the adoption by [Foster Parents] to take

place.” Id. at 10-11. He further noted that, “the [C]hildren apparently are

thriving in their care” despite claims that the Foster Parents could not manage

biracial children. Id. at 11.

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      We acknowledge that Dr. Chambers also indicated in his report that the

Children did not have a similar relationship with Maternal Aunt, but that

continuing contact with her could help them:

      As stated earlier, there was no compelling evidence that these
      children have a strong attachment or bond with [Maternal Aunt].
      However, having [Maternal Aunt] in the [C]hildren's lives in a
      typical aunt role, I believe, will help them understand their
      backgrounds and may help them with eventually the importance
      of the connection with their mother. To this end, I recommend
      that [Maternal Aunt] be granted contact with the [C]hildren,
      perhaps via Zoom every two weeks.

Id. But his recommendation that the Children maintain contact with Maternal

Aunt did not negate Dr. Chambers’ opinion that it was in the best interests of

the children to be adopted by Foster Parents. Instead, this statement was a

separate recommendation, unrelated to the primary factors determining their

best interests.

      At the hearing, Dr. Chambers testified that the Children should remain

with Foster Parents:

         I think the [C]hildren are doing really well. That’s the most
         important aspect of the evaluation. . . . So that speaks to
         the job [Foster Parents have] been doing. In addition to
         having a strong bond and attachment, the [C]hildren appear
         to be thriving and developmentally on track. Those are all
         very, very positive indicators that suggest that that situation
         should continue. There is no compelling reason for that to
         change as any change at this point in time would certainly
         be an undue stress on these [C]hildren. That clearly would
         not be in their best interest . . . but would also constitute,
         potentially, another traumatic event . . . .

N.T., 4/26/23, at 11.

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      Further, when the orphans’ court asked Dr. Chambers what he would

recommend if the court were convinced that Foster Parents would cut Maternal

Aunt out of the Children’s lives, Dr. Chambers answered: “It’s going to be

difficult in any case to disrupt these children. . . . . all I can say is the major

protective factor for these children has been the attachment and bond and

stability they’ve achieved with [Foster Parents].” Id. at 38. Thus, it is clear

from Dr. Chambers testimony that despite the possibility of Foster Parents not

facilitating a relationship with Maternal Aunt, Dr. Chambers still indicated that

keeping the Children with Foster Parents on a permanent basis was the

preferred outcome.

      Moreover, there was no evidence that Foster Parents were unwilling to

continue the relationship between the Children and Maternal Aunt. Instead,

the evidence showed the opposite. See N.T., 4/26/23, at 125; N.T., 4/28/23,

at 163-164. From our review of the record, it is unclear why the orphan’s

court was “convinced” that Foster Parents would not maintain this

relationship, aside from some hesitancy by Foster Parents to allow

unsupervised visits.

      In   addition    to   Dr.   Chambers’     expert   opinion,   Dr.   Menta   also

recommended that the court grant Foster Parents’ petitions.                Dr. Menta

reported that the Children have a strong, secure attachment to Foster Parents.

She noted that the Children look to them for “guidance and security.” She

further indicated that the Children refer to them as “Mommy” and “Dad.” Dr.

Menta observed that Foster Parents have provided “consistent love, care, and

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positive regard, and this has led to a positive, healthy attachment on the part

of the children.”   Dr. Carolyn J. Menta, Bonding Assessment, January 27,

2021, at 5-6. Dr. Menta opined that:

         [The Children] clearly have a strong, secure attachment
         with [Foster Parents].

                                      ***

         These children have been through significant trauma. They
         have had disrupted attachment due to inconsistent care in
         the past. They are now in a consistent, structured, loving
         home and are strongly attached to their caregivers. It is in
         [the Children’s] best interest to be able to continue to enjoy
         and sustain their positive, consistent, and clearly healthy
         bond with [Foster Parents].

Dr. Carolyn J. Menta, Bonding Assessment, July 25, 2021, at 4.

      At the hearing, Dr. Menta testified about the existence of a secure and

stable bond between the Children and Foster Parents and the Children’s

primary attachment to them. N.T., 4/28/23, at 176. Dr. Menta noted that

the bond is very important as the Children grow and develop over time. Id.

at 177. She further observed that losing a bond like this can be incredibly

devastating for a child and significantly impact their mental health. Id. at

178. Importantly, when questioned by the court, Dr. Menta testified that the

Children’s bond with Foster Parents was the primary consideration.          She

stated: Ultimately, “I think the most harmful of the three options that [the

court] listed would be the third in which you deny both parties’ [petitions] and

then these children would be faced with starting over from ground one.” Id.

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at 192.    In her opinion, the best option for the court was to grant Foster

Parents’ petitions. Id. at 193.

        Foster Parents also testified about their relationship with the Children

and how they have loved and cared for them for the past three years. They

testified about how the Children have improved and grown while in their care.

Foster Parents elaborated on the activities they do with the Children and how

they help them with their education. They talked about their extended family

and indicated that some members are biracial, like the Children.         Foster

Parents expressed their willingness to work on a relationship with Maternal

Aunt.    See N.T., 4/26/23, at 118-126; N.T., 4/28/23, at 156-164.

        Lastly, the guardian ad litem gave a statement to the court

recommending that, in her opinion, the best interests of the Children would

be to remain with Foster Parents and continue to see Maternal Aunt. 2 Id. at

258. Thus, the overwhelming evidence presented at the hearing was that

adoption by Foster Parents was in the Children’s best interests. Paradoxically,

the orphans’ court relied on this evidence to deny Maternal Aunt’s petitions.

        Essentially, the orphans’ court attempted to mandate a post-adoption

contact agreement, which the law only recognizes as a voluntary option when

____________________________________________

2 The guardian ad litem believed that the orphan’s court was limited in its
authority and that the best interests of the Children and the legal system did
not align in this case. The guardian ad litem wanted to ensure the Children
maintained a relationship with their biological family.

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it is in the best interests of the child. Specifically, Section 2731 of the Adoption

Act provides:

          The purpose of this subchapter is to provide an option for
          adoptive parents and birth relatives to enter into a
          voluntary agreement for ongoing communication or
          contact that:

              (1) is in the best interest of the child;

              (2) recognizes the parties' interests and desires for
              ongoing communication or contact;

              (3) is appropriate given the role of the parties in the
              child's life; and

              (4) is subject to approval by the courts.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2731 (emphasis added).

       The Act does not authorize courts to require parties to enter this type of

agreement as a pre-condition to an adoption, as the orphans’ court attempted

to do here.3 While the preservation of family is a consideration, “the goal of

preserving the family unit cannot be elevated above all other factors when

considering the best interests of the children but must be weighed in

conjunction with other factors.” K.D., 144 A.3d at 153. Consequently, we

____________________________________________

3 In fact, we have held that parents, whose relinquishment of their parental

rights, was conditioned on a post-adoption contact agreement, did not
“intelligently, voluntarily, and deliberately” consent to the termination of their
rights. See In re Adoption of A.W., 230 A.3d 1139, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(citing In re C.M.C., 140 A.3d 669, 711 (Pa. Super. 2016)).

Moreover, we have also found an abuse of discretion when an orphans’ court
denied a petition to terminate a parent’s rights because the pre-adoptive
caregiver refused to enter into a post-adoption contact agreement. In re
K.H.B., 107 A.3d 175, 183 (Pa. Super. 2014).

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have held that it is an abuse of discretion for the orphans’ court to rely

exclusively on the biological nature of a relationship and contact with the blood

relative when considering an adoption petition, rather than considering the

entire record to determine what is in the best interests of a child. Id. at 152.

Again, although the existence of a biological relationship is a relevant factor

to consider when evaluating an adoption petition, it is not a controlling one.

See Adoption of D.M.H., 683 A.2d at 319. By requiring the Foster Parents

to enter such an agreement as a precursor to granting their adoption petitions,

the court changed this type of agreement from voluntary to involuntary and

defied the plain language of the statute.

      The orphans’ court said it refused to make a “Hobson’s choice,” and

declined to pick the “lesser of two evils.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, at 5, 13.

We appreciate the orphans’ court’s sincere attempt to do what it believed was

in the Children’s best interests. But what the court failed to understand is

that the choice was not between two “objectionable alternatives.” Id. at 6.

The choice was between permanency and continued instability, the latter of

which poses irreparable harm to children.

      To be sure, by denying the Foster Parents’ petitions, the orphans’ court

deprived the Children of permanency and left them with what Dr. Menta

opined was the “most harmful” outcome. See N.T., 4/28/23, at 192. As our

Supreme Court has stated, when courts fail to provide children with a

permanent, safe, stable, and loving home, the result is “all too often, []

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catastrophically maladjusted children.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 269 (Pa.

2013) (discussing the dangers of foster care drift).4

       Based on the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the orphans’ court’s

denial of Foster Parents’ adoption petitions was manifestly unreasonable. The

decision was not supported by the record evidence; the court further erred

when it effectively mandated that Foster Parents enter a voluntary post-

adoption contact agreement; and the court’s decision resulted in the Children

being left without permanency and at risk of being separated from the bond

and attachment they have with Foster Parents. As the record makes clear,

adoption by the Foster Parents best serves the Children’s “physical, mental

and emotional needs and welfare.” See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2724(b); see also 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2902(a).       Therefore, we reverse the orphans' court’s denial of

Foster Parents’ adoption petitions and remand for the court to grant these

petitions. See K.D., 144 A.3d at 151.5

____________________________________________

4 It appears the orphan’s court recognized that its decision would keep the
Children in dependency court, under supervision, and in legal custody of CYS,
and would subject them to future permanency review hearings indefinitely.
The court observed, “it is the strong hope of the court that [Maternal Aunt],
with the cooperation of [Foster Parents] and Indiana County CYS, begin to
enjoy the growth of a meaningful relationship with the Children, which will
require periods of unsupervised physical "custody" of the Children by
[Maternal Aunt].” See Orphans’ Court Opinion at 16. (emphasis added).

5 The effect of our decision means that Foster Parents will obtain full parental

rights, including the right to decide whether the Children will continue to have
contact with Maternal Aunt. We note Foster Parents indicated they would
encourage this relationship, and we trust that they will continue to act in the
Children’s best interests.

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      Order reversed. Case remanded for entry of new decrees consistent with

this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.

DATE: 3/7/2024

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