Court Opinion

ID: 9892121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 17:04:41.432068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:49.054490
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE                          :    ID No. 1706021079
                                           :
v.                                         :
                                           :
BRETT SCOTT,                               :
                                           :
                      Defendant.           :

                             Submitted: August 30, 2023
                             Decided: October 20, 2023

                                        ORDER

       On this 20th day of October 2023, upon consideration of Defendant Brett
Scott’s motion for postconviction relief, the Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, Mr. Scott’s appeal of the Report, and the record in this case, it
appears that:
       1.       On July 26, 2018, a jury found Mr. Scott guilty of one count of Murder
in the Second Degree, 11 Del. C. § 635(2), as a lesser included offense of Murder in
the First Degree; one count of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, 11 Del C. §
832(c); one count of Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony, 11
Del C. §1447 (A); and one count of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, 11 Del C. §
512.
       2.       After his convictions and a presentence investigation, the Court
sentenced Mr. Scott to an unsuspended 26 years of incarceration, followed by work
release, and then probation. Mr. Scott then filed a direct appeal, and the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.
       3.       Mr. Scott next filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant
to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 accompanied by a motion for appointment of
counsel.     The Court granted the motion, and postconviction counsel filed an
amended motion.         The Court then referred the matter to a Superior Court
commissioner for findings of fact and recommendations pursuant to 10 Del. C. §
512(b), and Superior Court Criminal Rule 62.
       4.     Mr. Scott contends that his trial counsel performed ineffectively, and
that if not for that ineffective assistance, there would have been a reasonable
probability of a more favorable outcome.1              The Commissioner considered the
briefing and issued findings and recommendations in the Report attached and
incorporated as Exhibit A.        In that Report, she recommends denying Mr. Scott’s
motion because he meets neither of the two Strickland requirements.
       5.     Mr. Scott now appeals the Commissioner’s findings of fact and
recommendations.        When considering Mr. Scott’s objections to the Report, the
Court must make a de novo determination regarding whether the Commissioner
erred regarding the portions in her Report to which he objects.2
       6.     The Court has thoroughly considered Mr. Scott’s objections after
presiding over the trial and further reviewing the record de novo. The Commissioner
committed no error.        Namely, (1) the Commissioner did not misunderstand the
applicable standard as he alleges, (2) the record demonstrates that trial counsel’s
representation of Mr. Scott was not deficient as contemplated by Strickland, and (3)
there would have been no reasonable probability of a different outcome had trial
counsel done what Mr. Scott now contends what was appropriate.
       NOW, THEREFORE, after a de novo review of the record in this matter,
and for the reasons stated in the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation dated
July 7, 2023:

1
  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (explaining the standard applicable to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims for postconviction relief).
2
  Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5)(iv).
                                               2
      IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court adopts the Commissioner’s
Report and Recommendation attached as Exhibit A in its entirety. Mr. Scott’s
motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61
is therefore DENIED.

                                                  /s/Jeffrey J Clark
                                                    Resident Judge

JJC/klc

oc:   Prothonotary
cc:   The Honorable Andrea M. Freud
      Jason Cohee, DAG
      Christopher Koyste, Esquire
      Mr. Brett Scott
      Trial Counsel for Defendant

                                        3
Exhibit A

    4
      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

 STATE OF DELAWARE,                :
                                   :           ID No. 1706021079
 v.                                :
                                   :   RK17070467 01 - MURDER 2nd
 BRETT SCOTT,                      :   RK17070468 01 - ATT ROBBERY 1st
 SBI # 00607351                    :   RK17070469 01 - PFDCF
                                   :   RK17100158 01 - CONSP 2nd
            Defendant.             :

         COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
               Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief
                 Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61

Jason Cohee, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, for the State of
Delaware.
Christopher Koyste, Esq.,
FREUD, Commissioner
July 7, 2023

      The defendant, Brett Scott (“Scott”), was found guilty following a jury trial
on July 26, 2018, of one count of Murder in the Second Degree 11 Del. C. § 635(2),
as a lesser included offense of Murder in the First Degree; one count of Attempted
Robbery in the First Degree, 11 Del. C. § 832(c); One count of Possession of a
Firearm during the Commissioner of a Felony 11 Del. C. § 1447 (A); and one count
of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, 11 Del. C. § 512. A presentence investigation
was ordered by the Court. On September 25, 2018, Scott was sentenced to 25-years
of incarceration.
      Through Counsel Scott filed a timely appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.
In the appeal, Scott, raised the following argument as noted by the Delaware
Supreme Court “that at most [Scott] should have been convicted of theft, not

                                        5
robbery.”3

       The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Scott’s conviction on April 29, 2019. On
April 22, 2020, Scott filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief, pro se, in which he
raised multiple grounds for relief, including ineffective assistance of counsel. He
filed a concurrent Motion for Appointment of Counsel. The Court granted the
Motion to Appoint Counsel on April 24, 2020. On November 6, 2020, Christopher
S. Koyste, Esq., was appointed to represent Scott in his Motion for Postconviction
Relief. An Initial Briefing Order was set. Appointed Counsel filed an Amended
Motion for Postconviction Relief after several requests for continuance. Thereafter,
the State requested and was granted additional time to file its Reply. Ultimately, after
Appointed Counsel filed his reply to the State and Trial Counsel, I reviewed the
briefs and determined that the State and Trial Counsel needed to supplement their
responses. The parties all filed Supplemental Responses and Replies, and the matter
is now finally ripe for review.
                                                     FACTS
           Following are the facts as set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in its
order:
                 The evidence at trial, viewed in a light favorable to the State,
           showed that on July 27, 2017, Raymond Ward convinced Lisa
           Wagaman, an acquaintance of Dukes’, to join with him to steal a bag
           from Dukes’ car where Dukes stored drugs and cash. Ward planned for
           Wagaman to get Dukes to park his car in a specific location and distract
           Dukes while Ward stole the bag from the car. Ward also enlisted the
           help of Gregory Sellers and Scott for this scheme. It was not clear from
           testimony why Ward needed two additional men for the plan to grab
           the bag. Nor was it clear how much Scott knew about the initial plan,
           although Sellers testified that Scott was informed of “[p]retty much
           what he picked him up for. Like, what he was going to do.”
                 Later that afternoon Wagaman was with Dukes in his car, but
3
    Scott v. State, Del. Supr. No. 523, 2018 at 2.

                                                       6
            decided she no longer wanted to participate and got out of the car. Scott
            and Ward approached the car. Scott first asked Wagaman for a
            cigarette, and then apparently asked Dukes for one through the
            passenger window. The rest of the conversation is unknown. Sellers
            testified that Scott reached towards his waistband, and then Dukes shot
            at Scott and Scott shot back. Sellers and Ward then took Scott to the
            hospital, where police apprehended Scott. Dukes died from his wounds,
            and Scott was seriously injured.
                    Sellers pled guilty to attempted first degree robbery, possession
            of a firearm during commission of a felony, and conspiracy second
            degree. Wagaman pled guilty to second degree murder and conspiracy
            second degree. Ward went to trial and was acquitted.
                    At Scott’s trial, Scott moved for judgment of acquittal, claiming
            that the plan all along was to commit a theft, not a robbery, and thus
            Scott could not be convicted of attempted robbery first degree. The
            Superior Court ruled that the State introduced sufficient evidence to
            support an attempted robbery conviction:

                     Mr. Scott rode to Pine Grove Apartments, with a weapon
                     at one point that was in his waistband, after an occupant of
                     his car coordinated the stealing of drugs and money from
                     the alleged victim at that location. In the light most
                     favorable to the State, the accumulation of those
                     individuals, and their coordinated movement towards
                     confronting the alleged victim constitutes a substantial
                     step in furtherance of theft and what was to be a robbery
                     attempt. Upon arriving there, evidence supports that Mr.
                     Ward and Mr. Scott together approached the vehicle.
                     Possibly after Codefendant Wagaman has left, that words
                     were exchanged, Mr. Scott reached for his waistband, but
                     was shot at by Mr. Dukes before Mr. Scott was able to
                     shoot his gun and fire.4

                  Evidence of Mr. Scott traveling to the planned theft site with a
            gun, his not sneaking up on a car, but rather approaching and
            confronting the alleged victim with Mr. Ward, exchanging words with
            an alleged victim without committing a snatch-and-grab, and then
            reaching for his waistband before the first gun was discharged, would

4
    State v. Scott, (Tr of Trial July 25, 2018 pg. 48)

                                                         7
      support a rational trier of fact in concluding that both Mr. Scott’s state
      of mind and conduct satisfied all elements of attempted robbery.
             We must presume that Scott was aware of the plan because
      Sellers testified that he was told “everything” by Ward, meaning “what
      he picked him up for. Like, what he was going to do.” While there are
      credibility issues with Sellers’ testimony, we view it in the light most
      favorable to the State. Similarly, Sellers testified that Scott reached for
      his gun during the course of the theft —meaning Scott drew his gun to
      “[p]revent or overcome resistance to the taking of the property” or
      during the “attempt to commit theft or in immediate flight after the
      attempt or commission of the theft.” Scott is correct that the State did
      not present evidence that this was planned as a robbery, as opposed to
      a theft, but that is not dispositive. Scott knowingly assisted in an
      attempted theft, while carrying a weapon, and used the weapon “in the
      course of committing” the theft.
             While the State may have gone too far by suggesting a backup
      plan involving use of force without presenting any supporting evidence,
      Scott does not substantially dispute that a theft was attempted. The use
      of force, even if unplanned, as part of the course of events occurring
      during the attempted theft is sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that
      the force was used in connection with, or while attempting to flee from,
      the attempted theft.

                           SCOTT’S CONTENTIONS
      In Scott’s Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief, he raises the following
ground for relief:
             Claim 1      Mr. Scott’s right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel
                          under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
                          States Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the Delaware
                          Constitution was violated when Defense Counsel failed to
                          obtain evidence crucial to undermining Mr. Sellers’
                          credibility and to supporting the defense trial strategy by
                          failing to adequately investigate Mr. Sellers’ cell phone
                          data.

                                           8
                                               DISCUSSION

        Under Delaware Law, the Court must first determine whether Scott has met
the procedural requirements of the Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before it may
consider the merits of the postconviction relief claims.5                    Under Rule 61,
postconviction claims for relief must be brought within one year of the conviction
becoming final.6 Scott’s Motion was filed in a timely fashion, thus the bar of Rule
61(i)(1) does not apply to this Motion.                  As this is Scott’s initial motion for
postconviction relief, the bar of Rule 61(i)(2), which prevents consideration of any
claim not previously asserted in a postconviction motion, does not apply either.
        Grounds for relief not asserted in the proceedings leading to judgment of
conviction are thereafter barred unless the movant demonstrates: (1) cause for relief
from the procedural default; and (2) prejudice from a violation of the movant’s
rights.7 The bars to relief are inapplicable to a jurisdictional challenge or to a claim
that satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraph (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of
subdivision (d) of Rule 61.8 To meet the requirements of Rule 61(d)(2), a defendant
must plead with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference
that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of
which he was convicted9 or that he pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule
of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United
States or Delaware Supreme courts, applies to the defendant’s case rendering the
conviction invalid.10 Scott’s Motion pleads neither requirement of Rule 61(d)(2).

5
  Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991)
6
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
7
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
8
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
9
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i).
10
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii).

                                                     9
        Scott’s ground for relief is premised on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Therefore, Scott has alleged sufficient cause for not having asserted this ground for
relief at trial and on direct appeal. Scott’s ineffective assistance of counsel’s claim
is not subject to the procedural default rule in part because the Delaware Supreme
Court will not generally hear such claims for the first time on direct appeal. For this
reason, many defendants, including Scott, allege ineffective assistance of counsel in
order to overcome the procedural default. “However, this path creates confusion if
the defendant does not understand that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel
and the test for cause and prejudice are distinct, albeit similar, standards.”11 The
United States Supreme Court has held that:
                 [i]f the procedural default is the result of ineffective
                 assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires
                 that the responsibility for the default be imputed to the
                 State, which may not ‘conduc[t] trials at which persons
                 who face incarceration must defend themselves without
                 adequate legal assistance;’ [i]neffective assistance of
                 counsel then is cause for a procedural default.12

A movant who interprets the final sentence of the quoted passage to mean that he
can simply assert ineffectiveness and thereby meet the cause requirement will miss
the mark. Rather, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
movant must engage in the two-part analysis enunciated in Strickland v.
Washington13 and adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v. State.14
        The Strickland test requires the movant to show that counsel’s errors were so
grievous that his performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.15
Second, under Strickland, the movant must show there is a reasonable degree of

11
   State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961 (Del. Super.)
12
   Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
13
   466 U.S. 668 (1984).
14
   551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988).
15
   Strickland, at 687. See Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996)

                                                       10
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional effort, the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different; that is, actual prejudice.16 In setting forth a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make and substantiate
concrete allegations of actual prejudice or risk summary dismissal.17 Generally, a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel fails unless both prongs of the test have
been established.18 However, the showing of prejudice is so central to this claim that
the Strickland court stated “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that
course should be followed.”19 In other words, if the Court finds that there is no
possibility of prejudice even if a defendant’s allegations regarding counsel’s
representation were true, the Court may dispose of the claim on this basis alone.20
Furthermore, Scott must rebut a “strong presumption” that trial counsel’s
representation fell within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” and
this Court must eliminate from its consideration the “distorting effects of hindsight
when viewing that representation.”21
        Moreover, there is a strong presumption that defense counsel’s conduct
constituted sound trial strategy.22 In Harrington v. Richter,23 the United States
Supreme Court explained the high bar that must be surmounted in establishing an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In Harrington, the United States Supreme
Court explained that representation is constitutionally ineffective only if it so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the defendant was

16
    Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 557 (Del. 1998), citing Boughner v. State, 1995 WL 466465 at *1 (Del. Supr.).
17
   Strickland, at 687.
18
   Id, at 697.
19
   Id.
20
   State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961 (Del. Super.).
21
   Supra, at 689; Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996).
22
   Id., at 668, 689.
23
   Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011)

                                                        11
denied a fair trial.24 The challenger’s burden on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim is to show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. It is not enough
to show that the errors had some conceivable effort on the outcome of the
proceeding. Counsel’s errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial.25
           Counsel’s representation must be judged by the most deferential of standards.
The United States Supreme Court cautioned that reviewing courts must be mindful
of the fact that unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant
proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with his client,
with opposing counsel, and with the judge. In light of this strong precedent, I have
reviewed the file, considered the Trial Counsel’s affidavits, and the arguments of
counsel and I conclude that Scott has failed to meet the burden imposed by
Strickland. Trial Counsel denies Scott’s allegation. I find Trial Counsel’s affidavit
more compelling than Scott’s allegation. I find that Trial Counsel represented Scott
effectively.
           Scott makes several arguments for why he believes his Trial Counsel was
ineffective, all of which, as noted Trial Counsel, adamantly denies. Scott’s claim is
that the photograph of a black presumably26 9mm handgun, with a wood handle
found on Sellers’ cell phone, in a photo sent to him six months prior to the murder,
was the same weapon used by Scott when he shot the victim. Scott claims that had
Trial Counsel investigated this further he could have injected doubt into the jury’s
mind and discredited Sellers. I am not at all convinced that Scott’s argument is valid.
Even if Trial Counsel investigated the photo and was able to lead the jury to believe

24
   Id, at 791.
25
   Id.
26
   The State presented an expert who testified that he believed the gin in the photo was a 9mm, the same caliber
as the bullets found at the scene.

                                                       12
that the gun used to shoot the victim was the same gun pictured on Sellers’ phone,
and therefore presumably Sellers’ gun, I do not see how that would help Scott in any
meaningful way. As Trial Counsel stated it had the potential of seriously
jeopardizing the defense strategy, that Scott knew nothing about a robbery and only
shot in self-defense after the victim shot him. If the gun was Sellers, it begs the
question: how and why was Scott in possession of it? As noted by Trial Counsel,
Sellers clearly could not have given the gun to Scott after Scott was shot by the
victim. Therefore, Sellers or someone else would have had to have given the gun to
Scott before he went to the car where the victim was. I can hardly conceive of any
reason for someone giving the weapon to Scott, under the facts of this case, for
innocent reasons. Consequently, Trial Counsel’s informed and rationally strategic
choice not to highlight the gun photo or do further investigation was certainly well
informed and not in any conceivable way of ineffective assistance of counsel. I refer
to Trial Counsel’s two affidavits where he clearly lays out his strategy and the
reasons for it.
       Another argument Scott advances is that because his co-defendant was
advancing a similar argument that Scott now claims his Trial Counsel should have
made, i.e., the gun was Sellers, that this fact shows Scott’s Trial Counsel was
therefore ineffective for not doing the same thing that Ward did. There are several
obvious flaws with Scott’s reasons. First of all, there was absolutely no evidence at
all that Ward possessed a gun during the incident. It was clear that Ward did not
shoot the victim. Unlike in Scott’s case where there was no question that Scott did,
in fact, have the gun that killed the victim and that he used it to shoot the victim. The
only question in Scott’s case was whether or not he was aware of a planned crime;
not whether he shot the victim. As noted above in Scott’s case, trying to link the gun
used in the murder to Sellers was fraught with danger for Scott since there was no
question that he had the gun and shot the victim. Scott’s case is clearly distinguished
                                           13
from Ward’s and Scott’s attempt to claim otherwise is mistaken. Additionally,
Ward’s trial occurred after Scott’s. So, the fact that Ward was acquitted is irrelevant
to the decisions Trial Counsel made.
           Scott also argues that not “investigating” the gun photo further was per se
ineffective assistance of counsel and not a strategic choice. As noted by Trial
Counsel, he chose not to investigate the photo further because he indicates that any
investigation would not lead to information that would conceivably benefit Scott.
Scott makes much ado over the fact that Sellers identifies the gun as being black
with a wooden grip and argues that an investigation would have provided strong
evidence that the gun was Sellers’ gun. Therefore, discredit Sellers and lead to
Scott’s acquittal. Not only is this argument based entirely on conjecture, but it avoids
the elephant in the room; black guns with wooden grips are extremely common and
it would as Trial Counsel notes, been extremely easy for the State to have proved
that to the Jury had Trial Counsel attempted the strategy Scott now advances. Out of
curiosity, I did a quick Google search for black handguns with wooden grips and
came up with hundreds, if not thousoands, of handguns from all the major handgun
manufacturers in the country in all different calibers. Had the gun in question been
say, neon pink with a leopard skin grip, arguably it would have been ineffective not
to investigate it further. However, to not investigate a gun, that the description
literally could fit hundreds of guns readily available in Delaware, was in no way
ineffective and certainly not per se ineffective, especially in light of the points made
above concerning Trial Counsel’s strategy.
           Turning to the cases Scott argues are indistinguishable from his case, thus
proving Trial Counsel was ineffective, I note that they are all easily distinguishable
from Scott’s case. In U.S. v. Kauffman27 counsel did not pursue an insanity claim

27
     109 F.3d 186 (3d Cir 1997)

                                            14
because he was unaware that an insanity defense existed due to his lack of
investigation. Clearly a valid insanity defense is one that could help a defendant. In
Scott’s case however, as noted, there was nothing to be gained by investigating the
gun photograph further and Trial Counsel was well within his obligation to not waste
time investigating something that would not have led to any information that would
have been beneficial to Scott.
           Likewise, in Rolan v. Vaughn28. Counsel failed to pursue a self defense claim
and did not investigate that claim. Again, this type of claim could lead to beneficial
evidence; unlike in Scott’s case as explained previously. Similarly, Jacobs v. Horn
29
      involved not investigating diminished capacity and mental health factors. Again,
these claims could benefit a defendant, unlike Scott’s case. Scott’s case was not a
complex case. It was clear Scott was the shooter and that he shot after being shot.
The only question was did he know a crime was planned? Consequently, spending
time investigating a photograph of an extremely common handgun from Seller’s
phone would not have yielded any postive benefit to Scott. Trial Counsel’s informed
decision not to investigate the photo was not as Scott claims a “cursory, uniformed
judgment call.” Following a complete and thorough review of the facts and law in
this case, I cannot conclude that Trial Counsel was ineffective or that Scott suffered
any prejudice from Trial Counsel’s actions.
                                       CONCLUSION
           After reviewing the record in this case, it is clear that Scott has failed to avoid
the procedure bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i). A review of his counsel’s
affidavit clearly shows that counsel represented Scott in a competent fashion and
was not ineffective. Additionally, Scott has failed to demonstrate any concrete
prejudice. Consequently, I recommend that Scott’ Motion be denied for failure to

28
     445 F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 2016)
29
     395 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2005)

                                               15
prove ineffective assistance of counsel.

                                                /s/ Andrea M. Freud
                                                  Commissioner

AMF/jan
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Jason Cohee, DAG
    Christopher Koyste, Esquire
    Patrick Collins, Esq.
    Brett Scott, JTVCC
    Resident Judge Jeffrey J Clark

                                           16