Court Opinion

ID: 9957724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 00:01:00.575028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:34.786000
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60027      Document: 147-1        Page: 1   Date Filed: 04/04/2024

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                     Fifth Circuit

                            ____________                           FILED
                                                                April 4, 2024
                             No. 23-60027                     Lyle W. Cayce
                            ____________                           Clerk

Citizens for Clean Air & Clean Water in Brazoria
County; Texas Campaign for the Environment; Center
for Biological Diversity; Turtle Island Restoration
Network; Sierra Club,

                                                                   Petitioners,

                                  versus

United States Department of Transportation; Pete
Buttigieg, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Transportation; United States Coast Guard, an agency of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Richard V. Timme; United
States Maritime Administration, an agency of the U.S.
Department of Transportation; Ann Phillips, in her official capacity as
Administrator of the U.S. Maritime Administration; Linda L.
Fagan, in her official capacity as Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard,

                                                                Respondents.
               ______________________________

                Appeal from the Maritime Administration
                   Agency No. MARAD-2019-0011
               ______________________________

Before Wiener, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
      A government agency approved a license to construct and operate a
large deepwater oil facility a few miles from Texas’s coast. Several
Case: 23-60027       Document: 147-1       Page: 2     Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                 No. 23-60027

environmental organizations allege that the approval was unreasonable,
claiming that the reviewing agency failed to support its decision with a well-
reasoned environmental impact analysis. Such a failure, the organizations
assert, was in violation of the Deepwater Port Act and the National
Environmental Policy Act. The question presented is whether the agency’s
approval was arbitrary or capricious. We hold that the agency adequately
considered the environmental consequences of the facility before approving
its deepwater port license and, on those grounds, DENY the petition for
review.
                                       I
       America’s deepwater oil and gas industry was born in the late 1930s
when proprietors discovered oil in the Gulf of Mexico’s open waters. To
access the valuable minerals, workers constructed wooden platforms with
timber pilings and floating decks meant to wash away in the event of storms.
Diane Austin, et al., MMS 2004-049, History of the Offshore
Oil and Gas Industry in Southern Louisiana: Interim
Report 72–74 (U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, vol. 1 2004). Little did anyone
know then that these primitive wooden structures would lay the foundation
for the more than 3,000 deepwater oil facilities in operation today. See Gulf
of Mexico Data Atlas: Oil and Gas Structures, Nat’l Oceanic &
Atmospheric Admin., https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/maps/gulf-data-atl
as/atlas.htm?plate=Offshore%20Structures (last visited Feb. 4, 2023).
       With such an imposing modern infrastructure, it may come as no
surprise that the Gulf leads the nation in producing and exporting domestic
oil to markets worldwide. That reality nevertheless presents challenges the
builders of the first offshore platforms likely never considered. One
challenge, for example, is efficiently exporting the roughly 3.9 million barrels
of crude oil that move from the region daily. Petroleum & Other Liquids,

                                       2
Case: 23-60027        Document: 147-1       Page: 3     Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                  No. 23-60027

Annual-Thousand Barrels per Day (2023), U.S. Energy Info.
Admin., https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_exp_dc_R30-Z00_m
bblpd_a.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2024). The most efficient practice today
is utilizing large tankers capable of carrying over a million barrels at once. Yet
moving these quantities of oil on such large vessels comes with a cost. The
weight of the cargo makes the metal tankers weighty, requiring deep waters
to support their hull. Practically, that means oil facilities near land cannot
load the vessels because the coastal waters are too shallow. To circumvent
this issue, the industry employs a “reverse lightering” process where smaller
ships ferry oil from coastal ports and transfer their cargo to larger vessels in
deeper waters. While reverse lightering addresses the coastal-loading issue,
the process has a few setbacks of its own: It multiplies shipping traffic and
expenses for oil companies.
       The Sea Port Oil Terminal (SPOT or Port) offers a possible
alternative. Billed as the largest deepwater terminal of its kind, SPOT would
directly load a maximum of 365 very large crude carriers (VLCCs) in deep
waters each year. SPOT would operate several miles from the coast of Texas
and connect to existing land-based oil facilities through subsea and onshore
pipelines. Operating at total capacity, SPOT could store and export 18
percent of total U.S. oil production annually. Such a capability would
diminish the need for reverse lightering trips and consequently reduce oil
transportation costs.
       For all its commercial promise, however, SPOT has drawn significant
opposition from Petitioners who constitute local and national environmental
organizations. Among their many concerns, Petitioners argue that the
project’s construction and operation will cause severe and lasting global
consequences. Operating SPOT, Petitioners assert, would produce
emissions on the Gulf Coast equivalent to “more than 80 new coal-fired
power plants.” That staggering quantity of harmful pollutants, they say, will

                                        3
Case: 23-60027       Document: 147-1       Page: 4       Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                 No. 23-60027

not only undercut U.S. and global emission policies but also exacerbate the
detrimental effects of climate change. Another worry is that SPOT could
increase the likelihood of mass oil spills along miles of Texas coastline.
Petitioners believe such disasters would have catastrophic economic impacts
throughout the region.
       As for ecological effects, Petitioners say the project threatens the
Gulf’s marine environment. By encouraging shipping traffic, increasing air
pollution, discharging hazardous substances, and emitting harmful noise,
Petitioners claim that SPOT puts several endangered animals at risk. Of
particular concern is the Rice’s whale, a non-migratory cetacean that lives in
the region’s tropical waters. Sadly, scientists believe that no more than fifty
Rice’s whales remain in the natural world. Petitioners believe that operating
the Port will bring these whales closer to extinction.
       This appeal is not the first occasion that Petitioners raised these and
other concerns about SPOT. For several years, they voiced their criticisms
directly to the government agency reviewing SPOT’s deepwater port
application. Even so, the project is slated to move forward. After conducting
hearings, considering numerous public comments, and drafting a thousand-
page environmental impact statement, the Government approved SPOT’s
license for construction and operation.
       Continuing to believe that SPOT’s dangers far outweigh its benefits,
however, Petitioners appealed the licensing decision. They allege that the
agency failed to conduct the appropriate level of review in its environmental
impact statement and follow relevant statutory provisions during the
approval process. To remedy these alleged failures, Petitioners ask us to
vacate the agency’s decision and remand this case for additional review. We
consider Petitioners’ challenges below. But before addressing them, we must

                                       4
Case: 23-60027            Document: 147-1          Page: 5      Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                       No. 23-60027

first ensure that we have jurisdiction to do so. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
547 U.S. 332, 340 (2006).
                                             II
        The parties disagree about whether Petitioners have standing to
challenge the agency’s licensing decision. Such a dispute invokes the
constitutional limitations rooted in Article III’s “case” or “controversy”
clause. Satisfying the Article III threshold requires Petitioners to
demonstrate their “‘personal stake’ in the case.” Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S.
Ct. 2355, 2365 (2023) (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413,
423 (2021)). To do so, at least one plaintiff must point to some concrete
injury “‘fairly traceable’ to the actions of the defendant,” which will “likely
be redressed by a favorable decision.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162
(1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992)).1
        Enterprise Products Operating, LLC (Enterprise),2 one of SPOT’s
principal designers, argues that Petitioners fail to articulate a cognizable
injury.3 It claims Petitioners offer only their subjective “concerns” without
proof that they or anyone else will suffer the harms alleged. Enterprise

        _____________________
        1
          That Petitioners here constitute organizations adds another level of review to the
standing inquiry: They must show “(1) the association’s members would independently
meet the Article III standing requirements; (2) the interests the association seeks to protect
are germane to the purpose of the organization; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the
relief requested requires participation of individual members.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity
v. EPA, 937 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459
F.3d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 2006)). Despite this added layer of analysis, however, only the first
element is in dispute—that is, whether the organizations here can point to a single member
with standing to challenge the Secretary’s approval of SPOT’s license application.
        2
          Enterprise is appearing as Intervenor in this case along with SPOT Terminal
Services, LLC, another entity who helped design the Port. Although the parties appeared
together on appeal, this ruling refers to both Intervenors as “Enterprise” for clarity.
        3
            The Government does not dispute Petitioners’ constitutional standing.

                                              5
Case: 23-60027       Document: 147-1        Page: 6    Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                  No. 23-60027

stresses that the concerns regarding harmful oil spills, decreased air quality,
and danger to threatened species are all speculative, subjective, and purely
“hypothetical.” Enterprise believes that the same logic extends to
Petitioners’ fears about decreased property values, damage to the local
economy, loud noise from construction, and harmful air emissions from
construction equipment. At most, Enterprise asserts, Petitioners have
managed to identify “possible future injur[ies],” which “will not suffice”
under Article III. See Abdullah v. Paxton, 65 F.4th 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2023)
(per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).
       Enterprise’s claims are unpersuasive. It is true that SPOT’s
construction has yet to break ground. And in that sense, it may not appear
that Petitioners’ alleged injuries are “actual” or “imminent.” But “[t]he
Supreme Court has expressly held that a ‘threatened injury’ will satisfy the
‘injury in fact’ requirement for standing.” Sierra Club Lone Star Chapter v.
Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 556 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Valley Forge
Christian Coll. V. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 472 (1982)). This principle is an important one for environmental
plaintiffs who, like the ones here, challenge “an administrative agency’s
failure to satisfy a procedural requirement.” Ctr. For Biological Diversity, 937
F.3d at 542; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (“When
a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if there
is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing
party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.”).
According to Petitioners, the procedural violation here was the agency’s
approval of SPOT’s deepwater port application without the environmental
review required by statute. See 33 U.S.C. § 1505. Although that allegation
alone is insufficient to prove an injury, Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S.
488, 496 (2009), Petitioners may nevertheless establish standing if the
agency’s unlawful action threatens their “concrete interest,” see Shrimpers

                                        6
Case: 23-60027         Document: 147-1         Page: 7      Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                     No. 23-60027

& Fishermen of RGV v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 968 F.3d 419, 426 (5th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8).
        The relevant question, then, is whether Petitioners have identified a
concrete interest impaired by the agency’s inadequate environmental review.
They have. Consider the sworn statements of Pamela Harris, a Sierra Club
member4 who owns a home near Surfside Beach in Brazoria County, Texas.
SPOT plans to construct a pipeline connecting its offshore terminal to land-
based facilities one mile from her property. Harris claims the proposed
pipelines will carry increased risks of oil spills, unwanted noise, habitat
destruction, and property devaluation. The construction and operation of the
pipelines, she claims, would create an aesthetic and physical nuisance,
negatively affecting her enjoyment of her property, her recreational activities
on Surfside Beach, and her observation of the beach’s migratory birds and
nesting sea turtles. As the Supreme Court has explained, environmental
plaintiffs have a cognizable interest in their “desire to use or observe an
animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563.
So too “when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons ‘for
whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by
the challenged activity.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 735 (1972)).
        Because Harris says she “plan[s] to make use of the specific sites”
where the environmental effects from SPOT would allegedly be felt, she has
identified cognizable interests threatened by the project. See Summers, 555
U.S. at 499. We are also satisfied that the agency’s alleged procedural

        _____________________
        4
          She is a member of Citizens for Clean Air & Clean Water in Brazoria County and
the Sierra Club.

                                           7
Case: 23-60027           Document: 147-1           Page: 8       Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                        No. 23-60027

violations directly relate to Harris’s injuries: The agency approved SPOT’s
license based on an allegedly deficient environmental review, which, in turn,
will lead to the construction of a project causing the injuries claimed above.
See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.8. Harris has thus shown that she has standing
to challenge the agency’s actions.5 And because only “one” plaintiff needs
standing to consider a “petition for review,” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518,
this environmental suit may proceed accordingly, see Biden, 143 S. Ct.
at 2365. Assured of our jurisdiction, we turn next to the heart of Petitioners’
appeal.
                                             III
          To “promote” efficient oil production in ocean waters, the
Deepwater Port Act (DPA) establishes procedures for constructing and
operating “deepwater ports.” See 33 U.S.C. § 1501. Deepwater ports, in
turn, are “fixed or floating manmade structure[s] . . . located beyond State
seaward boundaries . . . that are used or intended for use as a port or terminal
for the transportation, storage . . . of oil or natural gas.” Id. § 1502(9)(A).
The DPA grants the Secretary of Transportation authority to issue licenses
“for the ownership, construction, and operation” of these structures, see id.
§ 1503; the Secretary delegates that reviewing authority to the Maritime
Administration and the United States Coast Guard. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.93(h)(1)–
(h)(2).

          _____________________
          5
           We are likewise satisfied that standing’s traceability and redressability elements
are met. As noted, the Secretary’s alleged procedural failures resulted in approving
SPOT’s license without undergoing the legally mandated review process, which, in turn,
will lead to the construction of a project, causing Harris’s injuries discussed above. See Ctr.
for Biological Diversity, 937 F.3d at 543. And while an adequate environmental impact
statement may not cause SPOT’s “license to be withheld or altered,” it may at least force
the Government to reconsider its decision, which satisfies the redressability element.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.

                                              8
Case: 23-60027        Document: 147-1     Page: 9       Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                 No. 23-60027

       Before approving a deepwater port license, the DPA mandates that
the Secretary undergo several analyses. One mandated evaluation is
considering whether the proposed port would be in the “national interest”
and whether it aligns with “national policy goals and objectives” like
“national security . . . [and] energy sufficiency.” 33 U.S.C. § 1503(c)(3). As
relevant here, the Secretary must also analyze the proposed project’s effect
on “environmental quality.” Id. To do so, the DPA incorporates procedures
outlined in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Id. § 1505.
       Recognizing the “profound impact” of human activity on the
environment, Congress passed NEPA to “create and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331(a). Among its many objectives, a core principle of NEPA is
“fulfill[ing] the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the
environment for succeeding generations.” Id. § 4331(b)(1). Despite these
ambitious goals, however, NEPA does not mandate environmentally
friendly results; it imposes procedural requirements ensuring that the
government considers “the environmental impact of [its] proposals and
actions.” Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757 (2004) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 4332).
       As pertinent here, one of these requirements is the drafting of
environmental impact statements (EIS). NEPA mandates the creation of an
EIS whenever “major Federal actions significantly affect[] the quality of the
human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. In crafting
these reports, the government must collect accurate scientific data and
“disseminate      information   concerning      the   projects’   environmental
consequences.” Sabine River Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 676
(5th Cir. 1992); see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1(b), 1502.24. The review must also,
among other evaluations, discuss the purpose and need of the proposed
action, address reasonable alternatives, and consider the impacts of those

                                      9
Case: 23-60027       Document: 147-1        Page: 10     Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                  No. 23-60027

alternatives. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1, 1502.13, 1502.14, 1502.16. Though
demanding, these procedures are in place to ensure the government takes a
“hard look” at the effects of its decisions before approving projects that alter
our shared environment. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 356 (1989).
                                      IV
       In this case, Petitioners claim that the reviewing agency failed to take
that “hard look” as it crafted the Final Environmental Impact Statement
(FEIS) for SPOT. They contend that the FEIS applied a “flawed”
alternatives   analysis    and    “grossly       underestimate[ed]”    SPOT’s
environmental impacts concerning a host of foreseeable consequences,
including oil spills, harmful impacts on animals, catastrophic ruptures, and
diminished air quality. Compounding issues further, Petitioners say that the
agency failed to follow certain procedures that the DPA mandates—like
approval timelines and energy sufficiency considerations. In their briefing,
Petitioners ask that we remand this case for the agency to engage in more
robust analyses.
                                       A
       We review an EIS under the rule of reason and “must not substitute
[our] judgment for that of the agency.” Miss. River Basin All. v. Westphal, 230
F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). We apply a highly deferential
review standard in these cases because preparing an EIS requires highly
technical knowledge. Id. As we lack such expertise, we must “defer to the
informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies.” Id. (quoting Marsh
v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)). Agencies, however, are
not infallible. And when their decisions are arbitrary or capricious, we have
the power to set them aside. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. An arbitrary or capricious
action is one that relies on improper factors, fails to consider key information,

                                       10
Case: 23-60027       Document: 147-1        Page: 11    Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                  No. 23-60027

offers a decision that the record does not support, or lacks plausibility. See
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
       In applying that standard to an EIS, we are guided by several
principles. Most importantly, we consider,
       (1) whether the agency in good faith objectively has taken a
       hard look at the environmental consequences of a proposed
       action and alternatives; (2) whether the EIS provides detail
       sufficient to allow those who did not participate in its
       preparation to understand and consider the pertinent
       environmental influences involved; and (3) whether the EIS
       explanation of alternatives is sufficient to permit a reasoned
       choice among different courses of action.
Westphal, 230 F.3d at 174 (quoting Isle of Hope Hist. Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 646 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1981)). With these guideposts in mind,
we address each of Petitioners’ challenges in turn.
                                 Oil Spill Risks
       We begin with oil spill risks. Petitioners first contend that “[t]he
FEIS ignores the full scope of probable oil spill locations and sizes expected
to occur throughout SPOT’s network.” Among the omissions, Petitioners
argue that the agency never addressed probable spill analyses for several
miles of pipelines, loading and processing facilities, and Port components
near communities. As Petitioners put it, the agency instead only addressed
“likely” oil spill models with limited releases. As for the spills the FEIS did
consider, Petitioners assert that the agency failed to evaluate the broad effects
to wildlife habitats or marine ecosystems. One prominent oversight, they
note, is the FEIS’s failure to analyze the harmful compounds in the most
likely spills on marine species near SPOT and the effect of those compounds
on endangered sea life. On this argument, Petitioners insist that the agency

                                       11
Case: 23-60027         Document: 147-1          Page: 12      Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                     No. 23-60027

shirked its responsibility and “punt[ed]” direct evaluations in favor of brief
and superficial analyses.
        We disagree. To start, we note that the FEIS includes two thorough
analyses of SPOT’s oil spill risks: one performed by the applicant and the
other by the Coast Guard. The first analysis considered spillage throughout
SPOT’s infrastructure. That review also included oil spill modeling for a
2,200-barrel hypothetical release of three different oil types. In the second
spill analysis, the Coast Guard analyzed the scope and effects of varying oil
spills, ranging from 17.5 to over 600,000 barrels.6 Using these varying ratios,
the agency examined several spill scenarios from SPOT, SPOT’s coastal
pipelines, and SPOT’s possible collision with tankers.
        The FEIS also considered oil spill risks to marine species in similar
depth. It explains, for instance, that spills could cause severe skin and eye
wounds, lung disease, and gastrointestinal injuries to aquatic species. And it
discusses explicitly how a large oil spill could affect threatened and
endangered marine mammals, sea turtles, and fish. To bolster its analysis, the
agency even consulted with the National Marine Fisheries Service, who
produced a report that the EIS incorporates by reference. Considering the
detail and extent of the analysis in the record, the agency adequately
considered the direct and indirect effects of varying spills. In so doing, the
agency’s review did not violate NEPA.
                                 Worst-Case Oil Spill
        Petitioners next argue that the agency’s analysis of SPOT’s worst-
case disasters is deficient. They explain that the FEIS fails to examine
impacts caused by a catastrophic rupture or the broad effects of worst-case

        _____________________
        6
         It discussed the possible effects on groundwater, surface water, soil, wetlands,
vegetation, habitats, onshore oyster reefs, wildlife, and listed and non-listed species.

                                           12
Case: 23-60027       Document: 147-1        Page: 13     Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                  No. 23-60027

scenarios from different points in SPOT’s infrastructure. According to
Petitioners, the agency should have applied data projecting a maximum
possible spill to a worst-case discharge impact analysis. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1500.1(b), 1502.24. But in Petitioners’ telling, the FEIS traded those
considerations for “mere generalization[s]” insufficient to satisfy the “hard
look” standard.
       When promulgating EIS regulations in the 1970s, the Council for
Environmental Quality (CEQ) required agencies to consider a project’s
“worst case scenarios” if “certain information relevant to the agency’s
evaluation of the proposed action is either unavailable or too costly to
obtain.” Robertson, 490 U.S. at 354. In the ensuing decade, however, a new
regulation supplanted the “worst case” guidance: The CEQ modified the
rule to mandate that federal agencies generally consider “significant adverse
impacts” that are “reasonably foreseeable” “even if their probability of
occurrence is low.” See National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 50
Fed. Reg. 32234-01 (Aug. 9, 1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502);
Robertson, 490 U.S. at 354. Today, that modification remains largely
unchanged. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.21(c), (d) (explaining that federal agencies
should generally consider “reasonably foreseeable significant adverse
impacts . . . even if their probability of occurrence is low.”).
       Addressing Petitioners’ argument therefore requires us to ask
whether the agency evaluated SPOT’s reasonably foreseeable significant
adverse effects. Id. Answering that question does not require much heavy
lifting. The record shows that the FEIS indeed analyzed potential effects and
risks of worst-case oil spills in several situations that the agency considered
“reasonably foreseeable.” For example, the agency considered SPOT’s
worst-case discharge for both onshore and offshore components and
simulated the resulting oil dispersion across the Gulf. The agency also
projected the extent of catastrophic oil slick spread by applying

                                       13
Case: 23-60027      Document: 147-1        Page: 14    Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                 No. 23-60027

meteorological conditions such as waves, winds, currents, and solar
radiation. In weighing the data, the agency acknowledged that the worst-case
spill “may harm communities, contaminate the water source, and destroy or
damage sensitive breeding grounds and important species.” It further
referenced a biological assessment that analyzed the largest spill scenario and
the collateral impacts on endangered species. Because the FEIS offered an
in-depth assessment of such adverse effects, its analysis was neither arbitrary
nor capricious.
       Perhaps anticipating such a result, Petitioners alternatively argue that
the FEIS’s worst-case analysis suffers irredeemable formatting flaws. They
explain that the agency confined the relevant examination to the FEIS’s
safety impact portion. In choosing to do so, Petitioners argue that the agency
prevented adequate public disclosure of SPOT’s worst-case environmental
threats. On this argument, Petitioners conclude that the agency’s formatting
was not only confusing, but grounds for vacating the FEIS.
       Stylistic choices within an EIS, however, are not dispositive of
whether an agency took a “hard look” at a project’s environmental
consequences. See Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. Connell, 725 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th
Cir. 2013) (“An agency . . . has discretion in deciding how to organize and
present information in an EIS.”). NEPA does not require that an EIS
strictly adhere to a formal structure. Its own regulations say as much: An EIS
can be valid so long as it includes the substantive discussion required by its
corresponding guidelines. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.10. And because Petitioners
here fail to show how the agency’s formatting decisions affect “the substance
of [the] decision reached,” see United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 930
(5th Cir. 2011) (quoting U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 215 (5th Cir.
1979)), any challenge to the FEIS’s format is meritless.

                                      14
Case: 23-60027      Document: 147-1        Page: 15     Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                 No. 23-60027

                         Impacts on Protected Species
       Petitioners next challenge the FEIS’s review of protected species. Of
principal concern, Petitioners say the agency failed to supplement the FEIS
with new data concerning the habitat of Rice’s whales. As mentioned, the
Rice’s whale is a highly imperiled cetacean with one of the world’s smallest
whale populations. As the agency crafted the FEIS, it was understood that
the Rice’s whale was generally confined near Florida’s coast. But that
understanding was called into question by a recent scientific discovery: After
a period of sea acoustic monitoring in the western Gulf, scientists detected
Rice’s whale vocalizations near the coast of Texas. Scientists outlined these
findings in a research article, which was not published until after SPOT’s
FEIS review. As the FEIS lacks any reference to these new scientific
findings, Petitioners urge us to remand this case to the agency for a
supplemental evaluation.
       We decline to do so. Agencies must indeed supplement their EIS
when “significant new circumstances or information” comes to light. 40
C.F.R. §§ 1502.9(c)(1)(i)–(ii). But not all “new” information is
“significant.” See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 373. And when determining what
information warrants EIS supplementation, courts generally defer to the
agency’s well-informed judgment. Id. at 377. Here, the agency concluded
that the new data on Rice’s whales did not require a supplemental EIS. The
vocalization study, the agency reasoned, did not alter the FEIS analysis
because it already considered possible effects the Port may have on Rice’s
whales in the region. When addressing SPOT’s potential harm to the
species, the FEIS concluded that the whale’s occurrence near SPOT would
be “extremely unlikely” because its core distribution area would still be “in
water depths ranging from 100–400 m[eters]” or 328–1312 feet. The agency
explained that SPOT will be constructed in 115-foot waters, meaning any
encounter with the whale would be “quite rare.”

                                      15
Case: 23-60027         Document: 147-1          Page: 16      Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                      No. 23-60027

        At no point did the FEIS say that an encounter with a Rice’s whale
was impossible; it observed that the whale “could be affected by temporary
changes in water quality and noise” and that the greatest threats to the whale
would be vessel strikes and oil spills. The agency also conducted a post-EIS
Biological Opinion, affirming these conclusions and restating that Rice’s
whales are “most commonly observed along the northeastern [Gulf] . . . off
the west coast of Florida, far from the project site.” These findings are
uncontroverted by the whale vocalization study. Indeed, the relevant article
acknowledged that Rice’s whale populations largely remain confined in the
northeastern Gulf. See Melissa S. Soldevilla et al., Rice’s Whales in the
Northwestern Gulf of Mexico: Call Variation and Occurrence Beyond the Known
Core Habitat, 48 Endang. Species Res. 155–174 (2022). For these
reasons, the agency reasonably determined that it need not supplement its
FEIS,7 and Petitioners’ challenge accordingly fails.
                                 Air Quality Analysis
        Petitioners also say the FEIS was insufficient because the agency
failed to take a “hard look” at SPOT’s direct, indirect, and cumulative air
quality impacts. They begin by arguing that the FEIS does not evaluate the
full extent of the Port’s ozone effects. Ozone is a harmful pollutant that is not
directly emitted but reacts to other compounds or “ozone precursors” often
produced from industrial projects. As it stands, the Port is slated for
construction in a “non-attainment” area, meaning ozone pollution in the
region exceeds levels the EPA deems safe for human health. As Petitioners
note, however, the EPA recently downgraded the region’s non-attainment
        _____________________
        7
          Beyond the Rice’s whale, the FEIS also addressed the cumulative impacts of
SPOT on other protected Gulf species from vessel strikes, underwater noise,
entanglement, marine debris, and oil spills. Perhaps more importantly, it conducted a ten-
page threatened and endangered species review. In sum, the agency’s review was
substantial, and its conclusions were not arbitrary or capricious.

                                           16
Case: 23-60027         Document: 147-1          Page: 17      Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                     No. 23-60027

classification from “serious” to “severe” just before the agency approved
SPOT’s application. Such a downgrade is consequential because it generally
requires that agencies undergo added layers of air quality analyses—analyses
that Petitioners say are absent from the FEIS. For example, Petitioners
assert that the agency should have considered the Port’s “cumulative” air
quality impacts. But it did not. As Petitioners put it, the agency instead relied
on the Port’s single stationary source emissions. In doing so, it concluded in
the FEIS that SPOT would have minimal effects on the region’s air quality
standards. But had the agency instead relied on cumulative ozone emissions,
Petitioners insist that the agency would have reached a different conclusion.
        The Government takes a different view. It maintains that the agency
was correct to look at single stationary source emissions data. In so arguing,
the Government points to the EPA’s own guidance: “If the single-source
analysis shows that a proposed source will not have a significant impact on air
quality, permitting authorities may generally conclude that there is no need
to conduct a cumulative impact analysis to assess whether there will be any
violations of the [national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)] . . . .”
Memorandum: Guidance on Significant Impact Levels for Ozone and Fine
Particles in the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permitting Program,
Env’t Prot. Agency, https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2018-
04/documents/sils_policy_guidance_document_final_signed_4-17-18.pdf
(last visited Mar. 24, 2024); 40 C.F.R. § 51.166. Using these guidelines and
working alongside state officials, the agency produced a report that analyzed
whether SPOT would conform with state and federal air quality standards. 8
The upshot of the report was that constructing the Port would have no

        _____________________
        8
          The Clean Air Act establishes requirements that ensure that actions approved by
federal agencies do not adversely affect a state’s ability to meet the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7506(c)(1).

                                           17
Case: 23-60027         Document: 147-1          Page: 18      Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                      No. 23-60027

negative impacts on the region’s air quality. As a result, the Government says
the agency need not engage in further analysis.
        We agree and conclude that the agency’s air quality review was
sufficient and aligned with government regulations. True enough, the EPA
downgraded the region’s non-attainment rating after the FEIS was issued.
But that downgrade did not alter the agency’s review because the FEIS
determined that SPOT would not increase the severity of any existing
ozone-standard violation in any area. The agency even responded to post-
EIS concerns about the air quality downgrade and mandated that SPOT
meet certain reporting requirements in the agency’s record of decision.
Beyond SPOT’s stationary effects, the FEIS also considered ozone
pollutants from mobile sources, such as ships, that would use SPOT. The
agency compared these findings against the pollution emitted through
current oil export practices, such as reverse lightering. In so comparing, the
FEIS concluded that, in the end, SPOT “could result in fewer overall
emissions” because it would reduce shipping traffic to and from onshore
facilities.9 We agree with the Government that the change in attainment
status, in this case, does not rise to the kind of significant new information
that would have required supplementing the FEIS. See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 1502.9(d)(1)(i)–(ii). On this point, Petitioners’ argument fails.
        Petitioners’ other challenge to the air quality analysis is also without
merit. Their remaining concern is that the FEIS never considered the
cumulative impacts of ozone pollutants alongside other regional deepwater
ports. That omission, Petitioners think, means that the FEIS’s conclusions
        _____________________
        9
         It also referenced a study conducted by SPOT’s applicants that considered
SPOT’s offshore pollutants, which the agency acknowledged “determined that the
operational project would remain in compliance with all applicable air quality standards.”

                                           18
Case: 23-60027      Document: 147-1         Page: 19   Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                 No. 23-60027

on air quality are incomplete and based on erroneous assumptions. But that
is not so. According to the agency, the FEIS considered impacts from a 31.1-
mile radius—a scope of review suggested by EPA regulations. Because the
other offshore terminals and SPOT’s own onshore components do not fall
within a 31.1-mile span, the FEIS omitted a cumulative impact analysis of
other facilities. We find that the agency’s approach was reasonable. Even if
Petitioners might propose another analytical method, “[c]ourts are not in a
position to decide the propriety of competing methodologies . . . but instead,
should determine simply whether the challenged method had a rational basis
and took into consideration the relevant factors.” Silverton Snowmobile Club
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 433 F.3d 772, 782 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Comm. to
Pres. Boomer Lake Park v. Dep’t of Transp., 4 F.3d 1543, 1553 (10th Cir. 1993)).
The record here shows that the agency at least took a “hard look” at the
project’s effects on air quality. As a result, we need not question the agency’s
chosen method of analysis. See Westphal, 230 F.3d at 175.
                             Alternatives Analysis
       Petitioners next fault the FEIS’s alternatives analysis. They first
suggest that the agency failed to address an alternative smaller-sized project
that could meet the primary purpose and need for SPOT with less severe
environmental impacts. According to Petitioners, other than reviewing the
relocation of specific Port components, the agency’s only alternative analyses
involved moving oil at SPOT’s maximum capacity—that is, two million
barrels per day. Without considering anything else, Petitioners contend that
the agency’s review was arbitrary and capricious.
       A core component of an EIS is its discussion of “a reasonable range of
alternatives . . . that are technically and economically feasible, and meet the
purpose and need of the proposal.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii). Agencies must
examine these alternatives in a way that “permit[s] a reasoned choice among
different courses of action.” Westphal, 230 F.3d at 174 (quoting Isle of

                                       19
Case: 23-60027         Document: 147-1          Page: 20      Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                      No. 23-60027

Hope, 646 F.2d at 220). That said, a party who challenges an agency’s failure
to consider a specific alternative usually must alert the agency to the proposed
alternative, which “[g]enerally . . . means raising the alternative in the
comments addressed to the agency.” Shrimpers & Fisherman of RGV v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 56 F.4th 992, 997–98 (5th Cir. 2023). The parties
dispute whether Petitioners ever suggested the specific reduced-capacity
alternative they now raise on appeal. Even assuming Petitioners did,
however, their challenge fails on the merits. This is because agencies need
not consider alternatives “at odds with the [p]roject’s purpose,” Westphal,
230 F.3d at 177; NEPA only requires the consideration of “alternatives
relevant to the applicant’s goals,” which the agency may not define. City of
Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 420 F.3d 440, 450–51 (5th Cir. 2005).
        Put another way, the EIS should only identify “alternatives to a
project which would reduce environmental harm while still achieving the
goals to be accomplished by the proposed action.” S. La. Env’t Council, Inc.
v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005, 1017 (5th Cir. 1980). A primary purpose for SPOT
was to “provide a safe, efficient, and reliable facility to allow full capacity
loading of a maximum of 365 VLCCs per year.” Weighing that objective, the
agency examined nearly two dozen alternatives.10 For instance, it considered
expanding existing terminals’ capacities. The agency found, however, that a
smaller terminal “would not meet the volume that would be exported by the
Proposed Action without substantial design modifications and facility
additions.” In other words, a smaller capacity alternative, like Petitioners
suggest, would not meet the specific goals set by the applicant. Though
        _____________________
        10
           The agency identified an alternative onshore pipeline route, four possible
onshore terminal sites, two onshore terminal design options, three possible deepwater port
locations, three possible deepwater port design options, various possible control
technologies and alternate construction methods, and four options for SPOT’s eventual
decommissioning.

                                           20
Case: 23-60027       Document: 147-1        Page: 21     Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                  No. 23-60027

Petitioners may question the wisdom and purpose of SPOT’s proposed
capacity, they have not shown how the agency’s alternatives evaluation was
arbitrary or capricious.
       Petitioners second challenge to the FEIS’s alternatives analysis fares
no better. According to Petitioners, the agency failed to analyze the “no
action alternative” as NEPA requires. True to its name, this consideration
mandates that agencies analyze the consequences if no action is taken on a
project. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(c). When addressing no action alternatives,
courts have held that the FEIS may consider the reasonably foreseeable
development that would result if the project did not exist. See Gulf Restoration
Network v. Haaland, 47 F.4th 795, 801 (D.C. Cir. 2022). In a world without
SPOT, Petitioners say, the FEIS assumed that federal agencies would
approve other identical ports or that existing ports would export the same
volumes of oil as SPOT proposed. But this conclusion, they claim, is
untethered to reality. They insist that existing Gulf Coast ports are physically
constrained from exporting increasing volumes of oil. To that end,
Petitioners aver that those facilities cannot accommodate the volume of
shipping traffic necessary to expand export capacity through the existing
reverse lightering system.
       In SPOT’s absence, Petitioners say the agency also overlooked
industry forecasts that global oil demand will decline during the project’s
lifetime. If the Port is built, Petitioners claim that the project will induce new
production for export that would not otherwise occur. In fact, Petitioners
contend that SPOT will exponentially multiply oil consumption and demand
by decreasing transportation costs. Because the agency ignored this apparent
reality, Petitioners argue that the no-alternative analysis “frustrated public
review” and “obscured” SPOT’s significant environmental harm analysis,
resulting in an arbitrary and capricious decision.

                                       21
Case: 23-60027      Document: 147-1        Page: 22    Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                 No. 23-60027

       We disagree. The record here demonstrates that the agency
reasonably concluded that excess crude oil in the United States would be
exported through means other than through the proposed Port. In SPOT’s
absence, the agency reasoned, “it is likely that exports of oil that are already
occurring due to international global demand and domestic excess
production would continue to use shoreside terminals in combination with
offshore ship-to-ship transfers.” And the fact that existing terminals cannot
support SPOT’s proposed capacity supports the agency’s conclusion that
more applicants will apply for licenses to meet the unmet need. As for
projecting crude oil demand, the agency relied on scientific studies from the
Energy Information Administration. Though reasonable minds may disagree
with the conclusions reached in those studies, the court’s task here is not to
ensure that the agency makes the best decision, but only that the decision is
informed. See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351. As the FEIS here makes an
informed no-action conclusion, it does not violate NEPA standards.
       In sum, we hold that the agency took a “hard look at the
environmental consequences” of the Port, offered enough detail for the
public “to understand and consider the pertinent environmental influences
involved,” and evaluated alternatives in a way that “permit[s] a reasoned
choice among different courses of action.” See Westphal, 230 F.3d at 174
(quoting Isle of Hope, 646 F.2d at 220).
                                       B
       Having found that Petitioners’ NEPA claims fail, we next turn to
their remaining challenges under the DPA. Petitioners first contend that the
agency violated the Act by exceeding statutory timelines during SPOT’s
approval process. The DPA incorporates several deadlines relevant to the
review of deepwater port license applications. In total, the statute permits 356
days between when an applicant applies for a license and when the agency
issues its final decision. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1504(c)(1), 1504(g), 1504(i)(1).

                                      22
Case: 23-60027       Document: 147-1        Page: 23   Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                  No. 23-60027

When considering SPOT, the agency exceeded that timeframe by more than
600 days. In consequence, Petitioners say this court should vacate SPOT’s
approval.
       The Government responds that Petitioners lack the statutory
authority to stake such a challenge. It claims the timeline provisions were
meant to ensure that license applications were processed promptly; they
were created to benefit project applicants, the Government says, not groups
challenging the project on environmental grounds. We agree. To understand
why, start with the Act’s citizen suit provision. It allows “[a]ny
person . . . who is adversely affected or aggrieved by the Secretary’s decision
to issue . . . a license” to “seek judicial review” of that “decision in the
United States Court of Appeals . . . .” Id. § 1516.
       Determining whether Petitioners were “adversely affected” by the
agency’s violation of the deadline turns on whether the injury Petitioners
complain of falls within the “zone of interests” the statute in question seeks
to protect or regulate. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990);
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163. Petitioners here, of course, allege environmental
injuries, and the DPA has a broad environmental purpose. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1501. Still, its citizen suit provision is intended to address substantive
decisions made by the agency with respect to licenses. See id. § 1516.
Unfortunately for Petitioners, the DPA’s statutory deadlines do not serve a
substantive purpose in support of the statute’s environmental goals; they are
administrative and for the applicant’s benefit. See id. §§ 1504(c)(1), 1504(g),
1504(i)(1). Indeed, it is unclear how Petitioners were “affected or aggrieved
by” the agency exceeding the review timeline. See id. § 1516. In any case, the
DPA does not provide any indication that it would allow litigants to challenge
the approval of a license if the agency exceeded its mandated review
deadlines. And because “it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress
authorized [Petitioners] to sue” for such a violation, the “legislatively

                                       23
Case: 23-60027      Document: 147-1        Page: 24    Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                 No. 23-60027

conferred cause of action” in § 1516 does not “encompass” Petitioners’
challenge. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S.
118, 127, 130 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
       But the same cannot be said for Petitioners’ second DPA claim.
According to Petitioners, the agency also failed to determine whether the
Port would be consistent with the nation’s energy sufficiency goals. Before
issuing a license under the DPA, the Secretary of Transportation must
conclude that the deepwater port “will be in the national interest and
consistent with national security and other national policy goals and
objectives, including energy sufficiency and environmental quality.” 33
U.S.C. § 1503(c)(3). Though the agency here engaged in that inquiry,
Petitioners say it did so in “conclusory” fashion without a reasoned
determination or record evidence. If true, the agency’s failure relates to the
grant of the license, and Petitioners’ environmental interests are more than
“marginally related to . . . the purposes implicit in the statute.” See Lexmark,
572 U.S. at 130 (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012)). As Petitioners’ argument, in
this regard, challenges a substantive decision, the DPA grants Petitioners the
authority to contest the agency’s action. Id.
       Yet even though Petitioners may have the statutory authority to bring
this claim, it nonetheless fails on the merits. When reviewing an agency’s
determination, we “must give due deference to the agency’s ability to rely on
its own developed expertise.” Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715
F.2d 897, 905 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36
(D.C. Cir. 1976)). So long as an agency’s decision was rational and based on
consideration of the relevant factors, it should be upheld. Contrary to
Petitioners’ allegation, the record shows that the agency did engage in an
energy sufficiency inquiry before licensing SPOT. Indeed, after consulting
with economists from the Department of Transportation, the agency found

                                      24
Case: 23-60027      Document: 147-1       Page: 25   Date Filed: 04/04/2024

                                No. 23-60027

that the Port would support local and national economic growth. It further
found that the project would be “in the national interest and consistent with
other policy goals, including energy sufficiency and environmental quality.”
Even if these conclusions were brief, they were based on consultations with
the agency’s experts and a detailed review of the record. Given that fact, we
cannot say that the agency’s determination here was an arbitrary or
capricious one. Petitioners’ challenge, therefore, cannot serve as a basis to
vacate the agency’s ultimate decision.
                                     V
       After drafting thousands of pages in reports, reviewing lengthy
biological studies, and considering hundreds of public comments, the
government approved SPOT’s deepwater port application. Though
Petitioners may disagree with that decision, it was, at the very least,
informed. And because NEPA and the DPA require nothing more,
Petitioners’ petition for review is accordingly DENIED.

                                     25