Court Opinion

ID: 9861635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:15:02.556947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:44.931701
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE UNVERZAGT, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The majority reduces the sentences because the trial judge, while giving reasons for imposing a seven-year sentence on Cook, did not explain the reason for a greater sentence imposed on him than on his codefendants. I do not believe every conceivable reason for the sentence has to be included if the trial judge does include sufficient reasons to satisfy the requirements of section 5 — 4—1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 4—1(c)). Besides, this section has been construed not to place an independent duty upon the court to give a statement of reasons. People v. Davis (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 155. In any event, in this case, the defendant and his codefendants did possess serious criminal records. Codefendant Keen had two prior violent felony convictions; codefendant Anderson also had two prior, violent felony convictions and had previously attempted escape from a Wisconsin jail. However, the defendant’s prior criminal record was more extensive, if not more serious, than those of his codefendants. The circuit court noted, and the defendant personally acknowledged, that he spent the majority of the 10-year period prior to sentencing behind bars. The defendant’s prior criminal record includes 21 prior misdemeanor convictions, including traffic, weapons, sex, theft, and battery offenses, felony offenses including theft, forgery, false pretenses (North Carolina), first degree robbery (California), and possession of heroin (Federal). This prior criminal history clearly influenced the circuit court in its imposition of a severe sentence on the defendant, which sentence was nonetheless more lenient than the maximum, consecutive, extended-term sentence requested by the State. I conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its sentencing discretion regarding the seven-year sentence imposed on the defendant on the instant offense. People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482, 492-93; People v. Cox (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 268, 280; People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154. I therefore dissent from the majority opinion.