Court Opinion

ID: 9494255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:33:04.545846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:18.340631
License: Public Domain

CONCURRENCE
GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I fully concur with the court’s conclusion that the government’s failure to preserve the electrical evidence recovered from the October 6, 1993 Wal-Mart fire did not violate Wright’s due process right to access exculpatory evidence. I write separately, however, because I believe that this court’s key case on the issue, United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214 (6th Cir.1996), misapplies the tests set forth by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984).
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... makes the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the defendant material exculpable evidence.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57, 109 S.Ct. 333 (emphasis added). To be material and exculpatory, evidence must “possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528.
But the Supreme Court has applied a different test for determining whether the government’s failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence violates the defendant’s right to due process, explaining that “the Due Process Clause requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57, 109 S.Ct. 333 (emphasis added). Specifically, the Court stated that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” Id. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333 (emphasis added).
In Jobson, however, this court misinterpreted Youngblood by creating a new test to determine whether the defendant’s due-process rights were violated when the gov*573ernment destroyed evidence “whose exculpatory value is indeterminate and only ‘potentially useful.’ ” Jobson, 102 F.3d at 218. Jobson sets forth three elements that must be established: “(1) that the government acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence; (2) that the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent before its destruction; and (3) that the nature of the evidence was such that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Id. (citing Trombetta and Youngblood ).
The problem with Jobson is that it conflates the differing tests of Trombetta and Youngblood such that there is no longer any distinction between materially exculpatory and potentially exculpatory evidence. Jobson purports to delineate the test for evidence “whose exculpatory value is indeterminate and only ‘potentially useful,’ ” id. — that is, potentially exculpatory evidence. But the last two parts of the Jobson test — that the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent before its destruction, and that the nature of the evidence was such that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means — are precisely the elements that must be shown to demonstrate that evidence is materially exculpatory. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (stating that for evidence to be materially exculpatory, it “must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means”).
Thus the first part of the Jobson test— good or bad faith — should be irrelevant once the last two parts of the Jobson test are shown, because the Supreme Court has expressly held that the determination of good or bad faith is irrelevant for materially exculpatory evidence. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57, 109 S.Ct. 333 (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... makes the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory evidence.”). Put another way, once a defendant convinces the court that the government acted in bad faith in destroying potentially exculpatory evidence, he does not have to prove the other two elements set forth in Trombetta to establish a due process violation.
The various tests of Trombetta, Youngblood, and Jobson are summarized in the table below:
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) Jobson, 102 F.3d 214 (1996)
Tests for: “Constitutional materiality.” Id. at 489 (later referred to in Youngblood as “material exculpatory evidence”) “Potentially exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 57-58. “Potentially useful” evidenee. Id. at 218.
What must be shown: “[E]vidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” “[I]t [the evidentiary material] could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.” Id. at 57. “(1) [T]hat the government acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence; (2) that the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent before its destruction; and (3) that the nature of the evidence was such that the defendant would
*574Id. at 489. be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Id. at 218.
“[U]nless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” Id. at 58.
Also: “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... makes the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 57.
My disagreement with the Jobson test does not, however, affect my concurrence in the ultimate outcome of the present case. Wright failed to show that the destroyed evidence was materially exculpatory evidence under Youngblood and Trombetta. He is therefore bound by the elements needed to prove “potentially useful” evidence under Jobson, the first of which is proof of bad faith on the part of the government. Because I agree with the court that Wright has failed to show bad faith on the part of the government, I concur in the judgment despite my disagreement with the test set forth in Jobson.