Court Opinion

ID: 9761286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:37:36.209733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:21.758506
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that the first prong of the Aguilar/Spinelli1 test was met by the search warrant affidavit in the instant case. I disagree.
The affidavit stated:
Affiant has received information from a confidential reliable informant, that narcotics can be found in the above residence. Informant also states that during the week of January 9, 1978 he was with an acquaintant [sic] in the above residence and did observe the sale of 2 lb. of marijuana by Mr. Fisher, to the acquaintant.
Informant further states that he again was in the residence on the date of January 25, 1978, with the acquaintant, at which time the acquaintant requested 2 lb. of marijuana from Mr. Fisher, who stated that at this time he had only one lb. and that was sold, but he (Mr. Fisher) would have 20 lbs. delivered to him late in the evening of January 25, 1978.
This information was relayed to the detectives, by the informant on the date of January 24, 1978 at approx. 8:30 p.m.
Informant has proven to be reliable in the past with information that had led to the arrest of the following persons, for violation of the narcotics laws. (Louis Esposito 1/6/78 Marijuana pills, Emmett Rowlett 11/4/77 Heroin/Demeral [sic], Thomas Warren 12/12/77 Marijuana/Cocaine.)
*324The first prong of the Aguilar/Spinelli test is an explanation of the “underlying circumstances” from which the informant received information and reached the conclusion that fruits of a crime would be located in the place to be searched. Commonwealth v. Reisinger, 252 Pa.Super. 1, 380 A.2d 1250 (1977). See also Commonwealth v. Matthews, 446 Pa. 65, 285 A.2d 510 (1971).
When an issuing authority has found probable cause to issue a search warrant, this court should not invalidate that warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical rather than a commonsense manner. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). Rather, we must test and interpret the affidavit in a realistic fashion, resolving doubtful or marginal cases by the preference accorded to warrants. Commonwealth v. Nycz, 274 Pa.Super. 305, 418 A.2d 418 (1980). We must also afford great deference to the issuing authority’s determination of probable cause. Spinelli v. United States, supra. See also Commonwealth v. Edwards, 493 Pa. 281, 426 A.2d 550 (1981).
Unfortunately, my review of the instant affidavit cannot justify its validity through any commonsense analysis.
At the suppression hearing, the suppression judge made the following observations, on the record:
... I am satisfied that there is enough information for the Magistrate to believe that this informant was reliable because of the arrests in a short period of time on related matters. I am not concerned at all about his reliability. The only thing that does concern me, and this comes from the face of it, as far as I’m concerned, is the 24th date of January. And the only reasonable reading, if we are to believe the affidavit, is that paragraph should have been Paragraph 2 and not Paragraph 3. That’s the only way that it makes any common-sense reading, because it’s impossible for me to tell you what’s going to happen tomorrow at 8:30 this evening. That’s impossible. So the only way that whole thing makes sense at all is that we put that paragraph in as Paragraph No. 2, that *325that information was conveyed to the detectives, the information about the 9th sale was conveyed to the detectives on the 24th. So, that’s the only reasonable reading you can give it. I don’t think that’s a strained reading at all. You know, when you first read it, why, you have to be troubled by it.
Notes of Testimony, August 25, 1978, p. 28 (emphasis added).
On the very same issue, the trial judge, in his opinions written pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), supported his denial of post-trial motions with respect to the validity of the search warrant as follows:
With respect to the Application, defendant also complains that serious discrepancies of fact appear on its face. He refers to reference in the body of the Application to January 25, 1978, as the date when the informant was on the premises and the additional reference that the foregoing information was given to the detectives on January 24, 1978, the day before. No doubt this discrepancy was the result of a typographical error. A reasonable, commonsensible reading of the Application must lead to this conclusion.2
As I read the suppression hearing transcript and the opinions filed pursuant to Rule 1925(a), I find it likely that two judges of the common pleas court examined the same application but arrived at somewhat different conclusions. On the one hand, the suppression court felt that the only way the application made sense was to invert the second and third paragraphs. On the other hand, the post-trial motion judge concluded that the discrepancy “was the result of a typographical error.”
While I have no difficulty in agreeing with the majority that a “commonsense” approach must be applied in reviewing an application for a search warrant, the fact that two different trial court judges arrived at different conclusions, *326while each was applying their “common sense,” causes me to pause. I assume that our freedom to apply a commonsense rationale when reviewing the action of an issuing magistrate entails a belief that ordinary men would agree on the interpretation to be given a document under review.
The majority finds “no basis to reject the conclusion of the [suppression judge]” and further determines that the interpretation accorded the affidavit by the suppression judge was “reasonable.” The majority stops short of asserting that the idea of inverting two paragraphs in a sworn affidavit comports with its own “common sense.” Nor does the majority seek to explain the conclusion of the trial judge which, arguably, is at variance with that of the suppression judge on the proper interpretation of the affidavit.
The second paragraph of the affidavit states that the informant had been in Appellant’s residence on January 25th. The third paragraph states that this information was relayed to the affiant on January 24th. I agree with the suppression hearing judge that such a chronology is impossible. As it stands, it cannot be said to be susceptible to any single, commonsense interpretation.
The mere fact that an obvious error exists is not fatal to this affidavit until one acknowledges the importance of the error. If the third paragraph is simply deleted, then the affidavit fails to inform the issuing authority as to when the information was obtained from the informant. On the other hand, if the second paragraph is deleted, then the information that remains is deficient, as it is too remote in time to support the issuance of a warrant. See Commonwealth v. Hagen, 240 Pa.Super. 444, 368 A.2d 318 (1976).
I am not prepared to accept the majority’s suggestion that the magistrate was compelled to either accept the application, as submitted, or “require the affiant to redraft it.” In the first place, nothing would have prevented the affiant from merely correcting the date in the second paragraph to show the presence of the informant in the suspect’s residence on January 24th. This could have been done and the application again tendered to the magistrate. But more importantly, I view the responsibility of the *327issuing magistrate to be limited to finding probable cause prior to the issuance of any search warrant. As an issuing magistrate, his duty does not include insuring that the arresting officials are in no way inconvenienced as they seek to perform their own duties.
The issue before our court should not be whether, applying some balancing test, the magistrate’s action was reasonable, but rather whether the affidavit, as submitted, presented sufficient facts to provide a reasonable and logical basis to believe that marijuana would be found in Appellant’s residence at the time of the application for and execution of the search warrant. Aguilar, supra.
Although I do not view the error in the affidavit to be as severe as that found in Commonwealth v. Purcell, 251 Pa.Super. 545, 380 A.2d 914 (1977), I believe it more serious than the technical errors determined not to be fatal in the affidavits in Commonwealth v. Swint, 256 Pa.Super. 169, 389 A.2d 654 (1978) and Commonwealth v. Chinea, 246 Pa.Super. 494, 371 A.2d 944 (1977).
Since I am unable to conclude that any issuing authority could find probable cause from the statements constituting the affidavit, as they appear, I must respectfully dissent. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 2003(a).

. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

. Commonwealth v. David J. Fisher, No. CC 7800885A, Common Pleas, Allegheny County, Opinion of Lewis, J., filed June 21, 1979, at page 3 (emphasis added). Same paragraph, Commonwealth v. Robert W. Fisher, No. 7800886A, Id., at page 3.