Court Opinion

ID: 9445069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:19:04.976281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:06.916887
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The verdicts rendered in these cases were inordinately large, but it is probable that I would not file a dissent if I did not feel that a vital mistake had been made in applying the doctrine res ipsa loquitur. In my opinion, this salutary rule was never intended to take sides in a swearing match such as we have here so as to assist one litigant and prejudice the other.
“It is, after all, a ‘rule of necessity to be invoked only when necessary evidence is absent and not readily available.’ ”1
The same rule is stated in these words by 38 American Jurisprudence, Negligence, Sec. 303, p. 999:
“Limitations.' — The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application where all the facts and circumstances appear in evidence. Nothing is then left to inference and the necessity for the doctrine does not exist. Being a rule of necessity, it must be invoked only where evidence is absent and not readily available. It is not to be invoked when the evidence is available, and certainly not when it is actually presented. * * ”
It is certain that no necessary evidence was absent here, but all of the evidence was available and was actually presented. Plaintiffs put on the stand all of the members of the crew of the forward engine, and also placed in evidence a number of photographs taken inside this engine. Each man testified what he was doing and what the others were doing, and they pointed out on the photographs the various mechanical devices by which such an engine was operated. All of these witnesses testified that the rear engine ran into the forward engine without receiving any signal and without warning and at an excessive rate of speed, about ten miles per hour. Plaintiffs proved that such an action was negligence and was the sole proximate cause of their injuries.
Plaintiffs further proved that Buckles was fireman, and Stanley was switchman on the forward engine, and that neither of them had any duty to perform in connection with the attempted coupling. Plaintiffs further showed that, as the result of the negligence thus established, they were thrown violently from their respective positions and were injured.
The crew of the rear engine, while admitting that the impact between the two was rather unusual, testified that it was not sufficient to cause injury to anyone. This crew further stated that it was customary at times to couple engines together for convenient movement and without giving any notice to the forward engine. All of them testified that the speed at which the rear engine was being operated was about four miles an *266hour. In other words, the crew of the rear engine disputed all of the facts and charges of negligence established by the crew of the forward engine. Every material fact was placed before the jury by eyewitnesses and the jury was confronted with the duty of determining which set of witnesses it would believe.
What possible place, then, did a presumption of law of any description have in such a controversy? The majority opinion cites no case to support the giving of such an instruction, and none is called to our attention. Most cases in which the doctrine is applied give the instruction in the words of Sweeney v. Erving, 1913, 228 U.S. 233, 240, 33 S.Ct. 416, 418, 57 L.Ed. 815: “In our opinion, res ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference; that they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where direct evidence of it may be lacking, * The key words of that statement are those which have by us been placed in italics. They furnish the sine qua non of the propriety-of the instruction.
The case chiefly relied upon as justification for applying the doctrine here is Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 1947, 329 U.S. 452, 67 S.Ct. 401, 404, 91 L.Ed. 416. But that case is replete with acknowledgement that the doctrine applies only to “unusual happenings”, to “unusual accidents”, and the decision quotes the clause above emphasized, “ ‘where direct evidence of it may be lacking.’ ” That case, moreover, involved a derailment, which has always been a favorite field for the application of res ipsa. The rationale of the rule is well illustrated by the facts of that case. The Railroad claimed that the decedent negligently threw a switch while the lead car of a four-car movement was straddle the switch. If so, his negligence alone produced his death.
feut there were circumstances which repudiated that theory.;. If decedent was not so negligent, what did cause the derailment? Direct evidence was lacking. Any number of things, such as excessive speed, loose spikes, a broken rail, a defective switch spring, a faulty flange on a wheel might have been the cause. Derailments do not occur in the ordinary course of things. The very operation of railroads depends on an absence of derailments. When one does occur, it is highly unusual and it is difficult to make precise proof of negligence; doubly so where the only witness for the plaintiff has been killed. The situation here is the other extreme from that one.
This Court has correctly appraised and applied res ipsa loquitur in a series of decisions and consistency has been observed until the present case. In Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McClanahan, 5 Cir., 1949, 173 F.2d 833, 837, we considered the doctrine from a historical point of view and delineated its nature and defined the kinds of cases where it would logically apply. Both the opinion of the Court and the concurring opinion illuminate the subject. We quoted from modern and ancient writing, and limited the doctrine to those situations where an accident does not happen if those who have the management control use proper care, such as instances where barrels of flour or pots have fallen from upper windows. “ ‘It is the duty of persons who keep barrels in a warehouse to take care that they do not roll out * * *.’ ”
We amplified the discussion in Geotechnical Corp. v. Pure Oil Co., 5 Cir., 1952, 196 F.2d 199, and illustrated the rule’s applicability by giving it sway as to one party to the litigation and denying it with respect to another. We carried the development of the doctrine further and along consistent lines in Whalen v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 5 Cir., 1955, 220 F.2d 78, rehearing denied 5 Cir., 222 F.2d 121, where we applied the doctrine in a typical case. Two linoleum rugs, each weighing twenty-six pounds, fell over on the plaintiff while she was in a squatting position. Like the barrels in the warehouse, properly stacked or *267placed linoleum rugs would not normally fall over where the clerks were required to work. It would have been extremely difficult for the plaintiff there to point to any specific act of negligence by any particular person as causing the rugs to fall. The owner of the store had it within his power to make full and complete proof on the subject. It was proper that res ipsa loquitur shift the burden on him to go forward with the proof.
In the present case it is not necessary to decide between the English rule, which treats the doctrine as one of substantive law, or the rule recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, which contemplates only that the doctrine be used as shifting to the defendant the burden of going on with the evidence. Under any theory res ipsa loquitur had no place in this case. It is easy to visualize the effectiveness with which the instruction could be used in the jury room. A juror favorable to the plaintiff could confront the others with this sort of argument: “Here we have five credible witnesses swearing that the moving engine proceeded at a speed of ten miles per hour; five other credible witnesses testified that its speed was only four miles an hour. But the Court has told us that we are permitted to infer that the railroad was negligent from the mere fact that the accident happened.”
By placing this inference in the scales on the side of plaintiffs, it was possible to resolve this conflict with strict fidelity both to the facts and to the law as given by the Court. It was not proper for the Court to place res ipsa loquitur in the scales on one side when all of the facts were fully developed. To do so was to cast the appellant under a prejudicial burden which the law does not sanction. Brady v. Southern R. Co., 1942, 222 N.C. 367, 23 S.E.2d 334, affirmed 320 U.S. 476, 64 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed. 239. For the reasons stated, I think the judgments should be reversed and the cases remanded.
Rehearing denied: CAMERON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

. Cooley, Torts (4 Ed.) Sec. 480, as quoted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Johnson v. United States, 1948, 333 U.S. 46, 53, 68 S.Ct. 391, 395, 92 L.Ed. 468.