Court Opinion

ID: 9963999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 18:10:15.562206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.792511
License: Public Domain

J-A13016-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 ANN MARIE SWATT, PERSONAL       :         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF :              PENNSYLVANIA
 MADLYN BLUSIUS                  :
                                 :
                Appellant        :
                                 :
                                 :
            v.                   :
                                 :         No. 1506 MDA 2021
                                 :
 NOTTINGHAM VILLAGE,             :
 NOTTINGHAM MANAGEMENT, LLC,     :
 NOTTINGHAM VILLAGE RETIREMENT :
 CENTER, LLC, NOTTINGHAM VILLAGE :
 HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC.,      :
 LEEDS HEALTHCARE SERVICES,      :
 INC., SYNERGY GRANDVIEW         :
 PHARMACY, LLC AND FREDERICK     :
 KESSLER

             Appeal from the Order Entered October 12, 2021
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Civil Division at
                         No(s): CV-2014-00830

 ANN MARIE SWATT, PERSONAL       :         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF :              PENNSYLVANIA
 MADLYN BLUSIUS                  :
                                 :
                Appellant        :
                                 :
                                 :
           v.                    :
                                 :         No. 1507 MDA 2021
                                 :
 NOTTINGHAM VILLAGE,             :
 NOTTINGHAM MANAGEMENT, LLC,     :
 NOTTINGHAM VILLAGE RETIREMENT :
 CENTER, LLC, NOTTINGHAM VILLAGE :
 HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., AND  :
 LEEDS HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. :

              Appeal from the Order Dated October 12, 2021
J-A13016-23

  In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Civil Division at
                         No(s): CV-2014-00005

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                  FILED: APRIL 26, 2024

       I agree with my esteemed colleagues’ ultimate dispositions of both

appeals, and I fully join the Majority Memorandum insofar as it concludes that

the trial court erred in ruling that Administratrix’s contract claims were barred

by the gist of the action doctrine. See Majority Memorandum at 17-21. I

write separately because I employ divergent analyses in determining that the

Blusius I appeal should be quashed and the entry of judgment against

Administratrix on her tort claims against Synergy in Blusius III should be

affirmed.

       First, like the Majority, I conclude that the appeal taken in Blusius I,

the case initiated by writ of summons, must be quashed.            See Majority

Memorandum at 9 n.8.            However, my basis for quashal is significantly

different. My review of the certified record, particularly the docket entries

contained therein, reveals no notation that notice of the entry of judgment

was served upon Administratrix or her then-counsel. Indeed, the “Service

Information” column of the docket sheet is empty for every entry, and, in

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

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J-A13016-23

contrast to some other entries, the “Comment” column for the judgment has

no reference to the fact or date of service upon anyone.

      An order is entered in a case governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil

Procedure on “the day on which the clerk makes the notation in the docket

that notice of entry of the order has been given as required by Pa.R.Civ.P.

236(b).” Pa.R.A.P. 108(b). Rule 236 imposes the following mandatory duties

for a prothonotary in entering judgments:

      (a) The prothonotary shall immediately give written notice of the
      entry of
            ....

            (2) any . . . order or judgment to each party’s attorney of
            record or, if unrepresented, to each party. The notice shall
            include a copy of the order or judgment.

      (b) The prothonotary shall note in the docket the giving of the
      notice and, when a judgment by confession is entered, the mailing
      of the required notice and documents.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 236.

      Where a prothonotary fails to comply with the dictates of Rule 236, the

judgments at issue are not officially entered. See, e.g., Mumma v. Boswell,

Tintner, Piccola & Wickersham, 937 A.2d 459, 464 (Pa.Super. 2007)

(holding that the trial court erred in refusing to strike non pros judgments that

were never properly entered because the docket entries demonstrated “that

the prothonotary did not provide [the plaintiff] with written notice of entry of

the judgments and failed to note in the docket the giving of such notice”).

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J-A13016-23

This “is a bright-line rule, to be interpreted strictly,” even if the party “did

indeed receive notice[.]” In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 509 (Pa.Super. 2007).

      Without a judgment officially entered on the docket, the time for seeking

relief from that judgment does not begin to run. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.3(b)(1)

(“If the petition is filed within ten days after the entry of a judgment of non

pros on the docket, the court shall open the judgment if the proposed

complaint states a meritorious cause of action.” (emphasis added)).

      Hence, the time period for Administratrix to file her petition for relief

from that judgment will not commence unless and until the clerk of courts

enters on the Blusius I docket a notation that service of the non pros

judgment was made upon Administratrix.         Accord Carr v. Michuck, 234

A.3d 797, 806 (Pa.Super. 2020) (“[T]he [ten]-day period in which to file a

post-trial motion without leave of court did not begin to run upon entry of the

non-jury verdict on the trial court’s docket . . . since the prothonotary did not

note on the docket that Rule 236 notice of the trial court’s non-jury verdict

was provided to the parties[.]”).    Consequently, I perceive the Blusius I

appeal as premature and properly quashed on that basis.

      Turning to the Blusius III appeal, I fully agree with the learned Majority

that the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations was a valid basis for

entering judgment in favor of Nottingham on Administratrix’s tort claims.

Unlike the failure to comply with Rule 236, the opening of a new case for her

May 13, 2014 complaint was not a breakdown of the processes of the trial

                                      -4-
J-A13016-23

court or the prothonotary. Rather, it was wholly the fault of Administratrix

herself for submitting a complaint with a blank line for the assignment of a

docket number rather than placing the Blusius I docket number on the

document.     See Majority Memorandum at 14-16.             Her unreasonable

contention that the prothonotary should have somehow divined that the

document was meant to be filed at an existing docket number is rightly

spurned by my colleagues.

      The Blusius III action was commenced against Nottingham and

Synergy more than two years after Decedent died. As a result, the survival

and wrongful death claims raised therein were time barred, as the Majority

aptly holds as to Nottingham.     See Majority Memorandum at 14-17.          The

Majority does not address Administratrix’s corresponding challenge to the

grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Synergy based upon the

expiration of the statute, but summarily rejects the issue on the basis that

Administratrix did not include the earlier trial court order in her notice of

appeal from the final judgment. Id. at 10 n.10.

      Our Supreme Court has held that an appellant does not necessarily

waive challenges to prior orders that are rendered final and appealable by the

appealed-from order by failing to identify them in the notice of appeal.

Specifically, the Court instructed as follows:

      In light of the liberal construction of our appellate rules, we view
      the appropriate inquiry in such circumstance as similar to that
      employed by the federal courts, focusing upon whether the orders
      are related or connected; whether the intention to appeal the

                                      -5-
J-A13016-23

       unspecified order is apparent; and the existence of prejudice to
       the opposing party.

K.H. v. J.R., 826 A.2d 863, 872 (Pa. 2003) (cleaned up) (holding appeal was

sufficient to encompass prior, unconnected summary judgment order where

the issue was raised in post-trial motions and in the Superior Court docketing

statement and the appellee was not prejudiced).

       Here, while Administratrix did less than the appellant in K.H. to put the

affected appellee on notice that they would be implicated in the appeal, she

did include the issue in her docketing statement, and it does not appear that

Synergy, which filed a brief in this appeal, has been prejudiced. Therefore,

instead of deeming the propriety of the judgment in favor of Synergy not

properly before us, I would affirm it on the basis that, even if the substitution

of the proper defendant related back to the filing of the Blusius III complaint,

the tort claims were nonetheless just as untimely as those pled against

Nottingham.1

       It is for the above reasons that I concur in the Majority’s rulings (1)

quashing the appeal at 1507 MDA 2021, and (2) affirming in part and vacating

in part the appealed-from order in 1506 MDA 2021.

____________________________________________

1 As the Majority noted, the contract claims against Synergy were dismissed

when the trial court sustained in part its preliminary objections. See Majority
Memorandum at 5. Administratrix does not challenge that ruling on appeal.

                                           -6-