Court Opinion

ID: 9947081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-02 00:01:57.966829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:46.465022
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/1/24 P. v. Johnson CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085013
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. DF014632A)
                    v.

 ARMAH VICTOR JOHNSON,                                                                    OPINION
           Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Michael G. Bush,
Judge.

         Cynthia J. Zimmer, District Attorney, and Anthony Yim, Deputy District
Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         William Paul Melcher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
         Armah Victor Johnson (defendant) was convicted by jury of multiple felony
offenses. After the jury was discharged, it was discovered that something unusual had
occurred during jury selection. Following a screening process involving the use of
questionnaires, those remaining in the jury pool were randomly assigned numbers
corresponding to locations on a seating chart. The individual who later served as the

                                          SEE CONCURRING OPINION
foreperson originally sat in seat 17, but he reportedly should have started out in a higher
numbered seat. The prospective juror who should have initially occupied seat 17 also sat
in the wrong place. The record does not explain exactly how or why this happened, but
there is no dispute it was accidental.
       The parties had full opportunity to voir dire both individuals, but apparently
neither were singled out for questioning by counsel. However, to the extent counsel may
have relied on their questionnaires, they could have mistaken one person for the other.
Voir dire concluded with none of the remaining venire being challenged for cause. As a
result of subsequent peremptory challenges, the person who had mistakenly sat in seat 17
was moved down to seat 10 and thus became part of the 12-person jury.
       Upon learning of the above-described circumstances, defendant moved for a new
trial on grounds of juror misconduct. The trial court found there was no misconduct.
Nevertheless, it felt “forced” to grant the motion in light of defendant’s averred “right to
know exactly who the jurors are.” Prejudice was not discussed in the ruling, and by all
indications the trial court believed a structural error had occurred. The People appealed.
       As we explain, there is no constitutional right “to know exactly who the jurors
are.” On the contrary, “even an anonymous jury is constitutional when warranted by the
facts, and any prejudice in the ability to select a jury is not assumed but must be
established, principally by analysis of the voir dire.” (People v. Goodwin (1997) 59
Cal.App.4th 1084, 1092.) Defendant was convicted by 12 sworn jurors who underwent
an extensive initial screening process for bias; were observable for body language and
other nonverbal indicators; were subject to questioning by counsel; were passed over for
cause; and were not peremptorily challenged. The seating error should be scrutinized for
prejudice, but it does not constitute a structural defect in the trial process.
       “Usually, when a trial court applies the incorrect legal standard in exercising its
discretion, the appropriate disposition is to remand for the court to apply the proper

                                               2.
standard.” (Doe v. Atkinson (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 667, 679.) Such is the case here.
The cause will be remanded for the motion to be decided based on the applicable law.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Defendant has been serving a life sentence in prison since 2001. In December
2019, he was charged with committing multiple felonies while incarcerated. For reasons
not relevant to this appeal, the case did not go to trial until June 2022.
       Defendant was tried before a jury on charges of battery upon a nonprisoner (Pen.
Code, § 4501.5), resisting an executive officer (id., § 69), and possession of a controlled
substance (heroin) in a penal institution (id., § 4573.6, subd. (a)). The jury returned
guilty verdicts on all counts. Defendant was further alleged to have suffered a prior strike
conviction (second degree murder) for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12). The strike allegation was found true in a bifurcated bench trial.
Jury Selection
       Jury selection began on June 29, 2022, with a panel of 35 prospective jurors. The
trial court initially said only 33 people were available, but the clerk’s transcript and
subsequent remarks by the judge confirm the initial panel comprised 35 individuals. The
panel members filled out two questionnaires: a two-page version addressing hardship
and a 10-page version aimed at detecting grounds for removal for cause. The attorneys
were told they could request individual questioning of any prospective juror, outside the
presence of other panel members, based on the written responses.
       What we will call “round one” of the preliminary screening process began with a
hardship excusal based solely upon the responses to a questionnaire. Thus, the panel
immediately shrank from 35 to 34 prospective jurors. Next, the trial court individually
questioned 14 panel members for potential hardship and one panel member for potential
bias. The attorneys were permitted to ask additional questions and occasionally did so.
This resulted in eight more excusals for hardship and one for cause. At the end of the
day, the trial court noted, “[W]e lost ten [panel members].”

                                              3.
       Round one continued the following morning, June 30, 2022, with further
preliminary screening of the now 25-person venire. The trial court proposed a stipulation
from counsel to remove three people for cause based on their questionnaires. The
prosecutor agreed to removing all three, but defense counsel elected to question two of
them. In the end, one was removed by stipulation, another was removed for cause
without objection, and the third person remained on the panel over the prosecutor’s
objection.
       The trial court decided to individually question eight more people, three of whom
had also been questioned the previous day. The attorneys were asked, “[W]as there
anyone else you wanted to talk to individually?” No requests were made. The further
examinations resulted in one more panel member being removed for cause.
       At the conclusion of round one, the trial court noted they had “lost 13 overall” and
announced, “We only have 22 of you left.” The court then explained it would be
“bringing over another panel to go through the same [screening] process.” Next, all but
two of the remaining panel members were excused until later in the afternoon. The trial
court spoke to both individuals about their scheduling concerns, and it excused one of
them for hardship. This brought the total number of hardship excusals to 10, leaving only
21 people on the panel after accounting for the four removed for cause.
       All told, 23 of the original 35 panel members appeared individually before the trial
court and counsel for questioning or to be informed of their release based on
questionnaire responses. Another panel member was excused for hardship before that
process began. The record does not indicate whether the eventual foreperson, i.e., the so-
called “wrongly empaneled juror,” was among the 11 people who were not individually
questioned in round one.1

       1According to a declaration by the prosecutor, which was filed with the People’s opening
brief, neither the eventual foreperson nor the prospective juror who should have sat in seat 17
were part of the original 35-person panel. This is based on their alleged juror badge numbers,

                                                4.
       What we will call “round two” of the screening process began with a fresh 20-
person panel filling out the same two-page and 10-page questionnaires. Upon review of
the written responses, the trial court excused three people for hardship without further
inquiry. Next, the court individually questioned nine or 10 panel members (the record is
somewhat unclear) regarding potential hardship and/or bias. As before, the attorneys
were permitted to ask additional questions. This process resulted in a fourth excusal for
hardship and one prospective juror being removed for cause.
       Following a lunch recess, round two continued with the individual questioning of
seven panel members, two of whom were returning for a second time to provide updates
on potential hardships. Of those seven prospective jurors, two were removed for cause.
Another person in this group admitted partiality toward the prosecution based on prior
employment with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).
The trial court expressed surprise when defense counsel elected not to challenge this
person for cause. The prosecutor, who had been willing to concede such a challenge,
made his own motion “in the interest of justice.” Given the defense’s position, the trial
court denied the motion.
       By the end of round two, the second panel had been whittled down to 13
prospective jurors. The two panels were then combined, resulting in a 34-person venire.2

which would indicate both were part of the second panel of prospective jurors, and that the
eventual foreperson was twice spoken to about a potential hardship during the preliminary
screening process. However, the information is hearsay and also constitutes evidence outside the
record on appeal. Although we have explained the allegations, we view them as unsubstantiated
and do not consider them in analyzing the dispositive issues. (See People v. Young (1978) 85
Cal.App.3d 594, 608 [“an appellate court cannot properly consider assertions of fact in an
appellate brief when the facts are not of record”].)
       2At the end of round two, the trial court remarked, “We have 35 total. … [¶] … I show 35
[remaining venirepersons].” Later, while addressing the entire group of remaining prospective
jurors, the court said, “There’s 33 of you out here ….” These appear to have been inadvertent
misstatements. The clerk’s transcript and reporter’s transcript show that out of the combined 55
prospective jurors among both panels (35 + 20 = 55), 14 were excused for hardship and seven

                                               5.
As explained, roughly 70 percent of those prospective jurors were individually
questioned during rounds one and two. The attorneys were twice advised they could
request further individual examinations based on the questionnaire responses, but neither
side pursued that option.
       According to the record, court staff “let jury services [know] who was excused,”
and “jury services” proceeded to create a “randomized list” used to assign each
prospective juror to a space on a sequentially numbered seating chart. From that point
on, all venirepersons were addressed by their seat number (e.g., “Juror #17”) rather than
by first and last names. This may explain, at least in part, why the seating mishap went
undiscovered for so long.
       After everyone appeared to have taken their assigned seats, the trial court began its
“general voir dire” of the whole group. The judge peppered the venire with questions,
most of which were directed to specific individuals. Some questions called for the
raising of hands and/or a voluntary response from anyone. Through this process
(documented across 32 pages of the reporter’s transcript), the trial court managed to elicit
verbal responses from all 34 panel members. The person occupying seat 17 was asked
how he would interact with fellow jurors if placed on the jury, and he answered:

       “I would talk with them, give them my reasonings, and then see where they
       are coming from and try to get—just understand both sides, like, have them
       understand my side and understand their side. Just try to come up with
       their reasons.”
       Voir dire continued with questioning by defense counsel. The trial court had
previously said each side would have 15 to 30 minutes depending on the venire’s level of
engagement and whether counsel was eliciting “new information” or a repetition of “the
things they [had already stated in] their questionnaires” or prior answers to the judge’s

were removed for cause (55 - 21=34). All 34 panel members responded to questions in a
subsequent stage of voir dire, and nothing indicates that a 35th seat was ever occupied.

                                               6.
questions. Defense counsel was brief, choosing to individually question only “Juror
#11,” which the record indicates was the CDCR employee who had previously admitted
leanings in favor of the People. The attorney also lectured the panel on basic legal
concepts, e.g., reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence.
       The prosecutor’s voir dire was not much longer than defense counsel’s, but he
utilized the time by actually questioning the panel. Responses were elicited from the
people in seats 2, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 25, 26, and 31. Neither the prosecutor nor
defense counsel asked any questions of the eventual foreperson in seat 17.
       Voir dire ended with defense counsel and the prosecutor both passing for cause.
Only then was the panel informed that those occupying seats 1 through 12 following the
exercise of peremptory challenges would serve as jurors. Although not explained to the
panel in so many words, the trial court used a variation of what is colloquially known as
the “six-pack” method. (Cal. Criminal Law: Procedure and Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2023)
§ 29.15, p. 841.)
       The traditional six-pack method involves 18 prospective jurors at a time; 12 are
seated in the jury box “and the remaining six are seated in temporary chairs in front of the
jury box.” (Cal. Criminal Law: Procedure and Practice, supra, § 29.15, p. 841.) The
group of 18 is questioned prior to the exercise of challenges. If someone in the jury box
is later challenged and excused, “they are immediately replaced by the prospective jurors
in the six temporary seats, in the sequence they are seated. No additional questioning is
permitted.” (Ibid.) If challenges continue to the point where all six temporary seats are
vacated, the clerk calls six additional venirepersons to fill those seats. The six
replacements are then questioned by the court and counsel before any further challenges
are made. The process continues until both sides accept the jury as constituted by the 12
persons seated in the jury box. (Ibid.)
       Here, the trial court modified the traditional method by predetermining the starting
positions of all 34 panel members and questioning them as a group. Whatever variation

                                              7.
is used, the six-pack method allows attorneys to be more strategic with their peremptory
challenges since they know in advance which panel members will replace those in the
jury box who are excused. “The disadvantage is that it often results in less thorough and
individualized voir dire.” (Cal. Criminal Law: Procedure and Practice, supra, § 29.15, p.
841.)
        The prospective juror who originally sat in seat 17 was moved to seat 10 after the
People exercised their third peremptory challenge. At that point defense counsel had
used two peremptory challenges: the first against the CDCR employee who he had
questioned during voir dire, and the second against a person originally located in seat 13.
After using its third peremptory challenge to excuse the original occupant of seat 8, the
defense stated its acceptance of the jury as then constituted by those in seats 1 through
12. The People used three more peremptory challenges, and the defense then chose to
remove the person who had originally occupied seat 21. The defense had six peremptory
challenges remaining when both sides accepted the jury.
Discovery of the Seating Mistake
        Although the jury was sworn on June 30, 2022, opening statements and the
presentation of evidence did not occur until July 5, 2022. Trial continued on July 6,
2022, with closing arguments and submission of the cause. The jury deliberated for
approximately 30 minutes before reaching guilty verdicts on all counts.3 The verdicts
were recorded, and the jurors were excused that day.
        The record contains unverified statements alleging the seating mistake was
discovered on the date the jury was discharged. The attorneys reportedly met with the
trial judge the next day, July 7, 2022, at which time further details were revealed. The

        3The clerk’s transcript indicates the jury retired to deliberate at 10:58 a.m. and returned
with a verdict at 11:47 a.m. However, the record contains a note from the foreperson to the trial
court showing the jury had reached its decision by 11:30 a.m.

                                                 8.
following summary was later provided by the trial judge at the eventual hearing on
defendant’s motion for new trial:

       “During jury selection, my bailiff sat or called in randomly the person that
       should have been on the jury which was a [man with the initials M.B.]. At
       the end of the trial, … we found that a [man with the initials J.H.] actually
       took that seat, and [M.B. took J.H.’s seat]. [¶] They simply got mixed up.
       We found that out when [J.H.] went to the jury services at the end of the
       trial to get proof for his employer that he had sat as a juror and was told he
       had been released.… So instead of [M.B.] … sitting as a juror, [J.H.], [who
       has a very similar sounding last name], sat as a juror.”
Motion For New Trial
       The trial court apparently set a one-month deadline for the filing of a motion for
new trial. According to the transcript from a hearing on August 9, 2022, defense counsel
failed to meet the deadline due to a medical issue. The trial court scheduled sentencing
for September 20, 2022, but evidently gave the defense additional time to file its motion
and agreed to hear the motion first.
       Defendant’s Motion
       Defendant’s motion for new trial was filed on September 16, 2022. It was
supported by an attorney declaration and a two-page memorandum of points and
authorities. The substantive contents of the declaration read as follows: “I am attorney
of record for Defendant herein. [¶] I apologize to court and counsel for not filing this
motion earlier. I have been off due to medical for a few weeks but expect to make a full
recovery soon. [¶] I am informed and believe that each of the factual assertions contained
[in the motion papers] is true and correct.”
       Defendant’s notice of motion stated relief was being sought “on the ground that
[he] was deprived of a fair trial in this matter due to the errors discussed herein,” i.e., in
the supporting papers. The first page of the supporting memorandum contained a
boilerplate recital of generally applicable law. The second page asserted the following
theory of entitlement to relief on statutory grounds of juror misconduct:

                                               9.
              “Penal Code [section 1181, subdivisions 2 and 3,] specifically call
       for a new trial ‘When the jury has received any evidence out of court, other
       than that resulting from a view of the premises, or of personal property’ and
       ‘When the jury has separated without leave of the court after retiring to
       deliberate upon their verdict, or been guilty of any misconduct by which a
       fair and due consideration of the case has been prevented.’

              “The instant case suffers from both errors. Due to a
       misunderstanding, an unauthorized person entered the jury room, became
       the jury foreman, and gave his opinions about the case. This constituted
       evidence out of court, and the jury was separated.

               “A juror who discusses the case with nonjurors commits misconduct
       [citation]. The eleven proper jurors in this case committed misconduct,
       even without intent. [¶] As noted in People v. Weatherton (2014) 59
       Cal.4th 589, a conviction cannot stand if even a single juror has been
       improperly influenced. In the instant case, the foreman, who was not an
       authorized juror, argued for guilt, and the jury returned a quick verdict of
       guilty.”
       People’s Opposition
       The People opposed the motion, arguing there was no misconduct and no evidence
of prejudice. More specifically, “no evidence that the two switched jurors concealed any
pertinent information from the Court or counsel, were biased against the Defendant, or
that the mistake was anything beyond an accidental error.” It was further argued “both
jurors possessed incredibly similar last names and seemingly switched positions
innocently due to the bailiff having only conducted roll call with their last names and
failing to ever confirm the identity of those who entered in response to his call.”
       As part of their opposition, the People asked the trial court to unseal “(1) the
names of the two switched jurors; (2) the questionnaires for the two switched jurors; and
(3) the transcript from voir dire.” The trial court granted the request and evidently
considered the names and questionnaire responses in evaluating the defense motion.
However, it appears the People failed to designate any of the unsealed material for
inclusion in the record on appeal. This court granted a request by defendant to augment
the record on appeal with reporter’s transcripts from the jury selection process.

                                             10.
       Trial Court’s Motion Ruling
       On September 20, 2022, the motion for new trial was heard. Defense counsel
declined to argue the motion, choosing instead to “submit it on our pleading.” The
prosecutor did present argument, briefly reiterating “[t]hat new trials and scenarios
involving issues with the jurors generally require misconduct or some sort of prejudice.”
       The trial court gave the following reasons for granting the motion:

               “[The People] have some really good points, but it’s just so different.
       It’s different [from where] a juror doesn’t reveal something that the juror
       should have because [in that scenario] we can determine whether or not
       prejudice occurred …. In this case, we’re just talking about a different
       individual all together. I do agree with you looking at their questionnaires,
       they are pretty similar. Both from Cal State, both about—one’s about ten
       years older, but I agree with [the People] on those points. However, I
       just—what we have is a situation where we had a juror sitting on the panel
       who is a stranger in one sense. We don’t know who he is. Well, we have
       his questionnaire, but he just shouldn’t have been sitting there, even though
       it was an innocent mistake.

               “And it’s so different than any case that you pointed out or you cited
       to. I think I’m just forced. I don’t think I have a choice. So I think I have
       to grant the motion for a new trial. As much as I don’t want to, as much as
       I think there was a fair trial, I don’t see anything in [M.B.’s] or [J.H.’s]
       questionnaire that would cause me concern, [but] I just think that the
       defendant has a right—as the People do, but the defendant has a right to
       know exactly who the jurors are, and he didn’t in this case. So I think I
       have to grant it.”
       The People immediately appealed the ruling as authorized by Penal Code section
1238, subdivision (a)(3).
                                      DISCUSSION
I.     Applicable Law re: New Trial Motions
       Penal Code section 1181 permits a criminal defendant to move for a new trial on
specified grounds that include juror misconduct. (Id., subds. 2, 3; People v. Ault (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1250, 1260.) Although the statute declares relief is available only on the
grounds stated therein, “new trials may nonetheless be granted on grounds not

                                            11.
enumerated in the statute when necessary to protect a defendant’s constitutional right to a
fair trial.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 158; see People v. Fosselman
(1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 582 [“the statute should not be read to limit the constitutional duty
of trial courts to ensure that defendants be accorded due process of law”].) “[N]ew trials
may be ordered for nonstatutory reasons when an error has occurred resulting in the
denial of defendant’s right to a fair trial, and the defendant has had no earlier opportunity
to raise the issue.” (People v. Mayorga (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 929, 940.)
       A defendant moving for a new trial generally has the burden of establishing both
error and prejudice. (See, e.g., In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 657 [“the initial
burden is on defendant to prove the misconduct”]; People v. Watts (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
102, 117 [where motion is based on nonstatutory ground of deficient representation, “the
defendant has the burden of showing both the ineffectiveness of counsel and the
prejudice it caused”].)
II.    Standard of Review
       “On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial is subject to review for
abuse of discretion.” (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 667.) Such rulings are
accorded great deference. (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 524.) “The trial
court’s factual findings, express or implied, made on a motion for new trial will be
upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Drake (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 92,
97.) Issues of law, on the other hand, are reviewed de novo. (People v. Hinks (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 1157, 1160; see People v. Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 894 [“‘[W]hen a
trial court’s decision rests on an error of law, that decision is an abuse of discretion’”].)
       “Of course, the discretion to grant a new trial, while broad, is not unlimited.
Before ordering a case retried, the trial court must make its independent determination,
under article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, both that error occurred, and
that the error prevented the complaining party from receiving a fair trial.” (People v.

                                              12.
Ault, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1262.) In other words, “the trial court has ‘no discretion’ to
award a new trial where no prejudicial error occurred.” (Id. at pp. 1262–1263; see id. at
p. 1272, fn. 15.)
III.   Juror Misconduct Was Not Established
       Section 1181 permits retrial when the jury has been “guilty of any misconduct by
which a fair and due consideration of the case has been prevented.” (Id., subd. 3.) At the
motion hearing, the trial court described the seating mix-up involving M.B. and J.H. as
“an innocent mistake” and “no one’s fault.” The trial court also said, “I don’t think there
was any misconduct on their part.”
       Defendant does not deny the plain meaning of the trial court’s statements. Yet he
argues that when read in “context …, it is apparent the court was referring to any
intentional misconduct on the part of the jury.” In essence, defendant claims (1) the trial
court failed to consider the possibility of misconduct in the form of unintentional
concealment; (2) that we should infer such concealment occurred during jury selection;
and (3) the supposed concealment “raises a presumption of prejudice.” The argument
fails for multiple reasons.
       First, the issue of concealment was addressed at the motion hearing. After making
its ruling, the trial court granted the prosecutor’s request “to make a more complete
record” of the People’s position. The prosecutor briefly discussed In re Hitchings (1993)
6 Cal.4th 97 and People v. Green (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1001, which were also cited in
the People’s opposition brief. Although Hitchings involved intentional concealment, the
prosecutor cited it for the general principle that concealment can “undermine the jury voir
dire process.” (See Hitchings, at p. 111 [“A juror who conceals relevant facts or gives
false answers during the voir dire examination thus undermines the jury selection process
and commits misconduct”].) The prosecutor then cited Green for the rule that any
presumed prejudice arising from concealment can be rebutted. (See Green, at p. 1017,

                                             13.
citing Hitchings, at p. 119 [“Juror misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice which
‘may be rebutted by an affirmative evidentiary showing that prejudice does not exist’”].)
Basically, the prosecutor argued even if the voir dire process was “undermined,” J.H.
“had no ill will or bias towards the defendant.” The trial court responded, “I agree. I
don’t think there’s any ill will or bias by anyone.”
       Second, the cases upon which defendant relies involved nondisclosure of
information known to the juror. (E.g., In re Manriquez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 785, 794–795
[failure to disclose having been the victim of a crime]; In re Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal.4th at
p. 112 [juror possessed “greater knowledge of the case than she revealed on voir dire”].)
Here, there is no evidence J.H. knew he was in the wrong seat during voir dire. When a
new trial is sought for juror misconduct, “the initial burden is on defendant to prove the
misconduct.” (In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 657.) Defendant did not meet this
burden, nor can we imply any findings by the trial court regarding J.H.’s concealment of
information he should have disclosed.
       Third, defendant’s “presumption of prejudice” argument overlooks the finer points
of law in the cases he cites. “‘Once a court determines a juror has engaged in
misconduct, a defendant is presumed to have suffered prejudice.’” (In re Manriquez,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 797, italics added.) “An unintentional concealment caused by an
honest mistake during voir dire, however, ‘cannot disturb a judgment in the absence of
proof that the juror’s wrong or incomplete answer hid the juror’s actual bias.’” (Id. at pp.
797–798.)
       “‘Although juror misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice [citations], we
determine whether an individual verdict must be reversed for jury misconduct by
applying a substantial likelihood test. That is, the “presumption of prejudice is rebutted,
and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, including
the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates
there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or

                                             14.
more jurors were actually biased against the defendant.” [Citation.] In other words, the
test asks not whether the juror would have been stricken by one of the parties, but
whether the juror’s concealment (or nondisclosure) evidences bias.’” (In re Manriquez,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 798, quoting In re Boyette (2013) 56 Cal.4th 866, 889–890.)
       To summarize, “[a] finding of ‘juror misconduct “raises a presumption of
prejudice that may be rebutted by proof that no prejudice actually resulted.”’” (People v.
Johnson (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1171.) The trial court did not make an express or
implied finding of misconduct; it found there was no misconduct. Assuming we could
nevertheless construe the record as demonstrating unintentional concealment, that
particular form of misconduct is harmless “‘in the absence of proof’” the concealment
somehow “‘hid the juror’s actual bias.’” (In re Manriquez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 797-
798.) Defendant presented no evidence or argument suggesting even potential bias on the
part of J.H. Moreover, the trial court affirmatively opined there was “no ill will or bias
by anyone.” Because defendant failed to establish the asserted statutory basis for
granting a new trial, the trial court’s ruling cannot be upheld on those grounds.4
IV.    The Seating Error Was Not Structural
       “A structural defect is the type of error ‘affecting the framework within which the
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself,’ one that ‘“transcends
the criminal process”’ and ‘def[ies] analysis by “harmless-error” standards.’ [Citation.]
Examples of structural defects include total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial
[citation]; trial before a judge who is not impartial [citation]; and the giving of a
constitutionally defective instruction on reasonable doubt [citation].” (People v.
Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 851.) Put differently, structural errors “go to the very
reliability of a criminal trial as a vehicle for determining guilt or innocence and are

       4Defendant concedes his alternative argument below, based on section 1181, subdivision
2, lacked merit. His appellate brief acknowledges, “This was not a case where misconduct arose
from improper discussions among jurors or consideration of extraneous evidence.”

                                              15.
reversible per se.” (People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 554; accord, Arizona v.
Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310.)
       Case law recognizes “‘at least three broad rationales’ for treating an error as
structural. [Citation] ‘First, an error has been deemed structural in some instances if the
right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but
instead protects some other interest. This is true of the defendant’s right to conduct his
own defense, which, when exercised, “usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome
unfavorable to the defendant.” … Second, an error has been deemed structural if the
effects of the error are simply too hard to measure. … Third, an error has been deemed
structural if the error always results in fundamental unfairness.’” (In re Christopher L.
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1077, quoting Weaver v. Massachusetts (2017) 582 U.S. 286,
295–296.)
       There is a strong presumption that errors are not structural, “and it will be the rare
case where a constitutional violation will not be subject to harmless error analysis.”
(People v. Anzalone, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 554; accord, Neder v. United States (1999)
527 U.S. 1, 8.) “Typically, when an ‘error is purely one of state law, the Watson
harmless error test applies.’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973, citing People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) “However, state statutory error may amount to
structural error if it is ‘“analogous to” … “the total deprivation of the right to counsel at
trial.”’” (Lewis, at p. 973; see Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 579 [“if the defendant
had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that
any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis”].)
       The trial court’s remarks about “a right to know exactly who the jurors are” seem
to imply the seating error was viewed as structural. However, the nonexistence of such a
constitutional right is evident from cases upholding the use of anonymous juries in
criminal trials. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Pica (2d Cir. 2012) 692 F.3d 79, 85, fn. 1 [“prospective
jurors completed a detailed questionnaire, but their names, addresses, and workplaces

                                              16.
were not disclosed”]; U.S. v. Yepiz (9th Cir. 2017) 718 Fed.Appx. 456, 465 [“empaneling
an anonymous jury ‘requires withholding, at least, the jurors’ names from the parties’”].)
“Every court that has considered the issue has held that, when genuinely needed and
when properly used, anonymous juries do not infringe a defendant’s constitutional
rights.” (U.S. v. Ross (11th Cir. 1994) 33 F.3d 1507, 1519.) “Where jury anonymity is
warranted, the defendant’s fundamental right to an unbiased jury is sufficiently
guaranteed by the court’s conduct of a voir dire that can uncover any bias toward issues
in the case or to the defendant himself.” (Id. at p. 1520; accord, People v. Goodwin,
supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092.)
       Code of Civil Procedure section 237 has been interpreted as requiring disclosure
of the names of prospective jurors during jury selection “unless the court determines that
a compelling interest … requires that this information should be kept confidential or its
use limited in whole or in part.” (Id., subd. (a)(1).) But denial of this statutory right is
not a structural error. In the few published decisions involving violations of the statute,
such errors were held to be harmless. (E.g., People v. Lopez (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 484,
489, 501–503; People v. Phillips (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1309–1310.) In Lopez, the
appellate court noted defense counsel “had an extensive opportunity to inquire into any
bias a juror may have had and to elicit additional information that could have revealed the
juror’s withholding of relevant facts.” (Lopez, at p. 502.)
       Defendant contends the seating mistake impaired his ability to exercise informed
peremptory challenges. On the premise that such impairment amounts to a constitutional
deprivation, he reasons the error must be structural because its consequences are
“‘necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate,’” i.e., too difficult to measure by
harmless error analysis. (Quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140,
150.) The argument is flawed.
       Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. (U.S.
Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) This entitles them “to jurors who

                                              17.
are qualified and competent, [but] not to any particular juror.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15
Cal.4th 619, 656.) “The right to voir dire the jury is not constitutional, but is a means to
achieve the end of an impartial jury. [Citation.] In addition, ‘the peremptory challenge is
not a constitutional necessity but a statutory privilege.’” (People v. Ramos (2004) 34
Cal.4th 494, 512; accord, People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 673 [“‘Peremptory
challenges are intended to promote a fair and impartial jury, but they are not a right of
direct constitutional magnitude’”].)
       “The fact that an error implicates important constitutional rights does not
necessarily make it structural.” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 178.) This
is illustrated by the case of Rivera v. Illinois (2009) 556 U.S. 148, which arose from “a
state trial court’s erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge to the seating of
a juror in a criminal case.” (Id. at p. 151.) Appellant Rivera claimed “[t]he improper
seating of a juror … is not amenable to harmless-error analysis because it is impossible to
ascertain how a properly constituted jury—[i.e.], one without [the juror he wanted to
remove]—would have decided his case.” (Id. at p. 157.) He thus argued that “whatever
the constitutional status of peremptory challenges, automatic reversal must be the rule as
a matter of federal law.” (Ibid.)
       Rivera’s claim was unanimously rejected by the United States Supreme Court: “If
a defendant is tried before a qualified jury composed of individuals not challengeable for
cause, the loss of a peremptory challenge due to a state court’s good-faith error is not a
matter of federal constitutional concern. Rather, it is a matter for the State to address
under its own laws.” (Rivera v. Illinois, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 157.) “States are free to
decide, as a matter of state law, that a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory
challenge is reversible error per se. Or they may conclude … that the improper seating of
a competent and unbiased juror does not convert the jury into an ultra vires tribunal;
therefore the error could rank as harmless under state law.” (Id. at p. 162.)

                                             18.
       The California Supreme Court has also declined to classify errors affecting a
criminal defendant’s ability to voir dire and peremptorily challenge jurors as structural.
In People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, the appellant alleged two of his challenges for
cause were erroneously denied. Consequently, he was forced to use “two of his allotted
peremptory challenges to remove the same jurors.” The loss of those peremptory
challenges resulted in the seating of a juror whom he had wanted to remove but could not
because the trial court denied his request for additional challenges. (Id. at p. 914.) It was
held that “[b]ecause no incompetent juror who should have been dismissed for cause sat
on his case as a result of his exhausting his peremptory challenges,” the alleged error was
not prejudicial. (Ibid.)
       The appellant in Black argued he was “entitled to ‘mold the jury’ using the full
complement of peremptory challenges that [Code of Civil Procedure section 231]
affords.” (People v. Black, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 918.) He further claimed, “[w]ithout
citation to authority … that denial of such an entitlement is reversible per se.” (Ibid.)
The California Supreme Court disagreed. “If no biased or legally incompetent juror
served on defendant’s jury, the judgment against him does not suffer from a federal
constitutional infirmity ….” (Id. at p. 917.)
       The majority opinion in Black concludes with these statements: “The record does
not show, and defendant does not contend, that Juror No. 8 was biased and removable for
cause. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) This juror was not subject to removal for any other
qualitative reason that would render his sitting in defendant’s trial unfair or inconsistent
with impartiality. The fact that the trial court refused defendant’s request for an
additional challenge to remove that same juror is not reversible error.” (People v. Black,
supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 921–922.) In a concurrence, Justice Liu opined that “[a]
defendant cannot be said to have suffered substantial disadvantage with respect to the
prosecution from the seating of a single objectionable juror [who is nevertheless qualified
and competent to serve].” (Id. at p. 923.)

                                             19.
       In People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, the appellant in a death penalty case
claimed three of his challenges for cause were erroneously denied and further alleged
“the trial court impermissibly curtailed voir dire of prospective jurors regarding their
attitude towards the death penalty.” (Id. at p. 77.) Neither of the alleged errors were
viewed as structural. Regarding the restriction on voir dire, because it “‘did not deprive
the defendant of all opportunity to ascertain jurors’ views on case-specific facts,’” the
alleged error was not reversible per se. (Id. at p. 78; see People v. Cash (2002) 28
Cal.4th 703, 722 [“Error in restricting death-qualification voir dire does not invariably
require reversal of a judgment of death”].) The other claim was rejected for failure to
“demonstrate that any sitting juror was biased and should have been excused for cause.”
(Rices, at p. 77 [“Accordingly, he has not shown prejudice even if we assume the court
should have granted the challenges for cause to the three prospective jurors”].)
       All the cases discussed above treated mistakes occurring in the jury selection
process not as structural defects, but as errors subject to harmless error analysis based on
(1) the protections otherwise afforded to the accused through voir dire and (2) evidence
of bias, or lack thereof, as developed through that process. Framing the issue here in
terms of whether juror J.H. was a “stranger” to defendant or not truly one of the 12
people he knowingly “accepted” as his jury does not make the alleged error structural. In
Rivera and Black, for example, the appellants did not willingly accept all 12 jurors who
decided their fate. (See Rivera v. Illinois, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 159 [“Rivera attempted to
exercise a peremptory challenge against a specific person … whom he perceived to be
unfavorable to his cause”]; People v. Black, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 914 [defendant
argued for reversal “because one of the jurors he objected to sat on his case”], 918
[rejecting structural error argument].)
       “It is clear that knowledge of the composition of the entire panel can be relevant to
the informed exercise of a peremptory challenge against a particular juror.” (People v.
Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 397, disapproved on another ground as stated in People v.

                                             20.
Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459.) However, “the fact that a particular procedure
used might have made exercising initial peremptory challenges less informed does not in
itself require reversal.” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 538, citing Wright, at p.
397.) “Unless the voir dire ‘is so inadequate that the reviewing court can say that the
resulting trial was fundamentally unfair, the manner in which voir dire is conducted is not
a basis for reversal.’” (People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 143.)
       The absence of structural error here is confirmed by scrutiny of the framework in
question. “The United States Constitution ‘does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but
only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury.’” (People v. Avila, supra, 38
Cal.4th at p. 536.) “There is no constitutional right to voir dire per se. Nor is there any
constitutional right to conduct voir dire in a particular manner.” (People v. Contreras,
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 143.) It is largely up to the trial court to determine how juror
qualifications will be assessed, and “neither the state nor federal Constitution requires
individualized voir dire questioning by attorneys.” (People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th
421, 443.) The use of questionnaires is optional and subject to court approval. (Code
Civ. Proc., §§ 205, 223, subd. (e); Cal Rules of Court, rule 4.201.) The parties have a
statutory right to orally question prospective jurors (Code Civ. Proc., § 223, subd. (b)(1)),
which was not curtailed by the jury selection process used in this case.
       As previously explained, all prospective jurors underwent preliminary screening
for bias. This entailed the completion of a 10-page questionnaire and individual
questioning of most panel members, all of which occurred prior to the seating mishap
involving J.H. and M.B. The process resulted in the removal of seven prospective jurors
for cause.
       Although the trial court initially chose which people would be separately
examined based on their written responses, the attorneys had the ability to request
questioning of additional panel members. The defense was thus afforded two distinct
opportunities to ask J.H. about his questionnaire responses: once during the preliminary

                                             21.
screening (prior to the seating error) and again during group voir dire. Both sides had 10
peremptory challenges (Code Civ. Proc., § 231), which provided sufficient incentive to
ask J.H. about anything of concern in his questionnaire regardless of whether counsel
believed J.H. was located higher up in the 34-person seating chart.
       Again, defendants have “a right to jurors who are qualified and competent, not to
any particular juror.” (People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 656, italics added.) When
the framework used to select a fair and impartial jury provides adequate means and
opportunity to detect grounds for removal for cause, errors occurring in that process will
rarely be structural. In People v. Mello (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 511, a trial judge told
prospective jurors that if they were racially biased but afraid to admit it, they should lie
about their bias and answer questions in such a way as to be excused on other grounds.
(Id. at pp. 513–514.) The error was held structural because it “skewed the integrity of the
entire voir dire process and adversely affected the manner in which the jurors would
evaluate the evidence.” (Id. at p. 519.) A “Batson/Wheeler” error is likewise structural
because purposeful racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges is damaging
to “‘the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal.’” (People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1150, 1172; see Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79; People v. Wheeler
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.)
       In cases involving mistakenly seated jurors, whether due to
concealment/nondisclosure or the erroneous denial of a challenge (peremptory or for
cause), the problem is not the structural framework within which the error occurs.
Moreover, the rationale for automatic reversal because prejudice is too difficult to
measure does not apply since the test for prejudice is not what would have happened if
the improperly seated person had not served on the jury. The test for prejudice is whether
the error affected the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury. In other words,
whether the improperly seated juror was biased. (E.g., People v. Ramirez (2022) 13
Cal.5th 997, 1048 [denial of challenge for cause]; In re Manriquez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at

                                             22.
pp. 797–798 [unintentional concealment/nondisclosure]; People v. Black, supra, 58
Cal.4th at p. 920 [denial of challenge for cause/deprivation of peremptory challenge]; In
re Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 118–119 [intentional concealment]; People v. Singh
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1331–1332 [denial of peremptory challenge].)
          In People v. Green, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 1001, the jury foreperson was
discovered to have concealed that he was previously convicted of a felony. (Id. at pp.
1012, 1016.) At the time, all convicted felons were barred from jury service (Code Civ.
Proc., § 203, former subd. (a)(5)), meaning the foreperson was unqualified to serve on the
jury as a matter of law. (Green, at p. 1016, fn. 13.) Nevertheless, the appellate court
upheld the denial of the appellant’s motion for new trial because there was no indication
the juror’s “status as an ex-felon affected his ability to be impartial.” (Green, at p. 1019.)
If the seating of an unqualified juror is not reversible per se, and the erroneous seating of
a juror to whom the defense objected and challenged is not reversible per se (e.g., People
v. Black, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 916–918, 920–921), it stands to reason the seating of
J.H. on defendant’s jury is not reversible per se.
          When mistakes occur that limit the availability of information about prospective
jurors without completely removing the safeguards of voir dire and the ability to exercise
statutorily guaranteed challenges, such mistakes can be harmless. (See People v. Avila,
supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 535–538; People v. Goodwin, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092
[“even an anonymous jury is constitutional when warranted by the facts, and any
prejudice in the ability to select a jury is not assumed but must be established, principally
by analysis of the voir dire”].) The mistake here did not deprive defendant of the “‘basic
protections’ without which ‘a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle
for determination of guilt or innocence.’” (Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. at pp.
8–9.) Therefore, the jury selection process in this case did not suffer from a structural
defect.

                                              23.
V.     Remand is Warranted
       “No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause … for any
error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause … the
court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13, italics added.) Therefore, unless retrial is mandatory
due to structural error, a criminal defendant’s motion for new trial cannot be granted
without a finding of prejudice. This is explained in People v. Ault, supra, 33 Cal.4th
1250. “Before ordering a case retried, the trial court must make its independent
determination, under article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, both that error
occurred, and that the error prevented the complaining party from receiving a fair trial.”
(Id. at p. 1262.) If and when such a determination is made, it is entitled to deference and
will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 1272, fn. 15.)
       The trial court seemingly believed the seating error was reversible per se. Because
of the apparent confusion regarding the scope of its discretion, it should be permitted to
reconsider the motion for new trial on remand. (See Doe v. Atkinson, supra, 96
Cal.App.5th at p. 679; cf. People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 875.) While we have
concluded the error was not structural, we also appreciate that the assessment of prejudice
is challenging given the unique circumstances. “[A]lthough Watson sets forth the test
that generally applies to the prejudice inquiry under state law [citation], not every error is
of the type that lends itself to resolution under a likelihood-of-success test.” (In re K.H.
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 608.) The focus here is on the integrity of the jury process
and its bearing on defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial. As discussed, the
jurisprudence developed in the juror concealment and bias cases provide guidance on the
inquiry and analysis necessary on remand to determine whether the right to a fair trial
was violated.
       For all of the foregoing reasons, we will remand the matter with directions to the
trial court to vacate its order granting the motion for a new trial and reconsider the motion

                                             24.
under the applicable law as discussed herein. We express no opinion as to whether the
motion for new trial should be granted or denied.
                                    DISPOSITION
       The cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, which
shall include vacating the challenged order and reconsideration of defendant’s motion for
new trial.

                                                                      PEÑA, Acting P. J.
I CONCUR:

MEEHAN, J.

                                           25.
SNAUFFER, J., Concurring.
       I agree with the remand to the trial court for further consideration.
       This is a very unusual case that to some extent defies conventional legal analysis.
In my view, the central issue for the trial court to decide on remand is whether the
defendant had a right to know and rely upon the fact that the jurors both defendant and
the prosecutor agreed to decide the case were in reality who they were supposed to be. I
submit that the error in this case occurred when the jury was sworn, with one juror who
not only should not have been present, but was not in fact the person everyone believed
him to be.
       It will be for the trial court, exercising its considerable discretion, to decide
whether this produced a fair trial, or justified the granting of a new trial under the
appropriate legal standards.

                                                                               SNAUFFER, J.