Court Opinion

ID: 9574788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:08:25.52085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:13.251798
License: Public Domain

Buchanan, J.,
dissenting.
The will of Annie C. Leece devised the land in question in this case to her son, John S. Leece, “during his lifetime, and if he dies without heirs,” then to be sold and divided among three named grandchildren of the testatrix. As is conceded, John S. Leece took a life estate, with remainder to his heirs, if he had an heir.
•The statutes alone determine who are the heirs of a person dying. The adoption statutes fix the status and rights of an adopted child, and provide that “to all intents and purposes” he is the child of the adopter, and “entitled to all the rights and privileges * * of a child *492* * born in lawful wedlock”. Code 1950, § 63-357. And a legally adopted child inherits from and through the adopting parents according to the statute of descent and distribution. Section 63-358, as amended.
* Considered in connection with the broad and comprehensive language employed, they [the adoption statutes] emphasize the specific intention to put an adopted child on the same footing as the natural child, thus giving him the right to take by representation what his adopting parent would have taken had he been alive, or what the natural child would have taken, had there been one, upon the death of his father intestate.” McFadden v. McNorton, 193 Va. 455, 462, 69 S. E. 2d 445,450.
It is our duty, so it seems to me, to give effect to the plain language of the adoption statutes as they are written, and that where a will gives a remainder to a life tenant’s heirs, the word “heirs” includes an adopted child unless it is clear from the language of the will that the testator intended otherwise.
In Dickenson v. Buck, 169 Va. 39, 192 S. E. 748, the testator devised his farm to his son, Henry P. Dickenson, “during his life and at his death to his ‘legal heirs’ ”. The son had no children of his own but ten years after the death of the testator he adopted a son. The main contention in the case, says the opinion, was that the adopted son was not in the contemplation of the testator when the will was made “and that the testator never intended his estate to pass from his blood to a stranger,” 169 Va. at 41, 192 S. E. at 749. We held:
“The broad language of the statute has made the appellant the heir of the adopting parent just as though he were a child by birth. The adopted child and the child by birth stand alike and equally as the heirs of the foster parent. Therefore, the appellant was the sole heir at law or ‘legal heir’ of Henry P. Dickenson, the foster father and life tenant at the time of the latter’s death. Being such, he necessarily was the remainderman intended by the testator to take the estate, if we give effect and meaning to the clear and unambiguous language of the testator, which, of course, we must do.
“* * When we consider the devise and the adoption statute together, it is obvious that the devise in remainder is to the legal heirs of Henry P. Dickenson and the adoption statute creates the legal heir of the life tenant and places the appellant in that position.” 169 Va. at 44, 192 S. E. at 750-51.
*493That case is not distinguishable from this and in my view the decision here should be controlled by it rather than by Newsome v. Scott, 200 Va. 833, 108 S. E. 2d 369, cited in the court’s opinion. In that case a majority of the court was able to find in the language of the will and the circumstances an intent of the testator not to include an adopted child in the word “heir” used in that will.
There is less in this case than in that to serve as a basis for a similar conclusion. The court says that the word “heirs” in this will should be construed to mean “heirs of the body” or “issue”. But that is not what this testatrix said. Those are the words of the court, not of the testatrix. We should construe wills as they are written. “The ‘intention of the testator must be gathered from the language used by him and not from facts and circumstances which tend to show he intended to say something else.’ ” Spicely v. Jones, 199 Va. 703, 706, 101 S. E. 2d 567, 569. The true inquiry is not what the testator meant to say but what the words he used do say. We have said so many times. 20 Mich. Jur., Wills, § 81, p. 252.
I would reverse the case and hold that the adopted child took under the will.
Mr. Justice Spratley joins in this dissent.