Court Opinion

ID: 9715980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:22:01.972292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:40.355850
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE EGAN, specially concurring: I concur in the opinion of Justice Rakowski that the judgment of conviction should be affirmed. I concur specially because I wish to make my position clear on certain arguments raised by the State and to explain why I must part company with Justice LaPorta in her view that a new trial is required. I agree that the judge's comments in the presence of the jury were improper but did not constitute reversible error in view of the evidence. Fish testified that the blood found in the victim’s apartment was “consistent” with samples of blood taken from the defendant’s trousers. There was also blood spattered on other clothing of the defendant. The witnesses heard a sound like a body falling within 20 minutes or one-half hour after a man went up the stairs. The defendant’s own statement identifies him as that man. The defendant told a preposterous story. In addition to the story’s inherent incredibility, it is most unlikely that the alleged unidentified Puerto Ricans would have escaped the notice of the women who lived in the building and who saw the defendant and his companion. The State’s case was not overwhelming, but it was strong enough to withstand the argument that any hostile attitude displayed by the judge toward the assistant public defender requires a new trial. I so conclude even if we were to disregard completely the testimony of Sergeant Jones that the defendant told him, “I didn’t mean to do it. She was like a mother to me.” It would unnecessarily prolong my opinion to explain why, but suffice it to say that, in my judgment, Jones’ testimony is susceptible to many arguments against its acceptance. The defendant argues that the “judge’s hostility toward defense counsel was apparent on several occasions” in and out of the presence of the jury. The State’s response is that the “defendant’s attorney invited the court’s admonishments by his trial tactics” and that the defendant cannot be prejudiced by remarks made out of the presence of the jury. The State has referred us to specific parts of the record allegedly to show that the judge was repeatedly required to inject himself into the proceedings because the assistant public defender “persisted in interrupting and ignoring the court’s suggestion.” The State concludes that any “admonishment *** was well deserved since that conduct during trial was certainly not totally professional.” It is appropriate at this point to turn to the opinion of Justice Rakowski in which he says that it was “improper for the trial judge to comment in the presence of the jury on defense counsel’s unprofessional conduct, particularly where he had already admonished counsel on that very issue outside the presence of the jury.” (209 Ill. App. 3d at 720.) A reader might infer from that statement that the defense counsel’s conduct was, in fact, unprofessional. I disagree with the State’s contention and with any implication that the assistant public defender acted unprofessionally at any time. As I expect to show later, the instances called to our attention by the State buttress the position of the defendant and the observations made by Justice LaPorta in her dissent. The defendant first refers us to what occurred out of the presence of the jury before the trial began when the judge expressed his displeasure over the filing of a large number of motions he considered untimely. He asked to see the public defender himself. It was during the colloquy at that time that the judge characterized the assistant public defender’s statement as “supercilious” as noted in the dissent. The defendant next points to what transpired after the judge excused the jury and before he characterized the assistant public defender’s conduct as “unprofessional” the first time. The following occurred in open court: “THE COURT: All right. Let the record reflect that the jury is out, witness is out. Mr. [Assistant Public Defender], for some reason you choose to engage in a line of cheap, histrionic questioning. Take a seat, Mr. [Assistant Public Defender]. When I need to hear from you I’ll ask.' Cheap, histrionic questioning that has absolutely nothing to do with this case, and in spite of the fact I continue to sustain objections along that line, you continue the line of questioning. As I told you previously, when there is an objection, stop talking until I get a chance to rule on the objection. [ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER]: May I make a comment? THE COURT: No, you may not. Bring out the jury, please. [ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Will I have an opportunity to spread something of record? THE COURT: You’re spreading manure of record right now. [ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER]: I’d like to spread something specific. THE COURT: Shut up. Shut up. You’ll be allowed to spread it of record later. Right now you shut up. Attempt to conduct yourself as a professional. I’m telling you right now, when there is an objection, stop talking.” I return to what precipitated that exchange. The following occurred in the presence of the jury: “[ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Before they came in and tore your apartment apart looking for things— [ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Objection. [ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER]: (continuing)-they didn’t didn’t [sic] ask to [sic] you sign this consent to search form?” Under no circumstances, in my judgment, may it be said that the assistant public defender was guilty of unprofessional conduct at that point nor does it necessarily show that he violated any rule of procedure. It is true that questions can be manifestly improper before they are completed, but it is also true that judges have sometimes ruled that an objection itself is premature before a question is completed. If the assistant public defender was guilty of a deviation from the rules, it was trivial. It certainly did not justify what followed. Who of us that has ever participated in strongly contested trials has not been guilty of the same trivial deviation? I know that I have in the heat of the fray; and I would have deeply resented to be damned as “unprofessional” by a judge in or out of the presence of the jury. I suspect that it was the judge’s displeasure with the question itself that precipitated his censure of the assistant public defender. It was the question that the judge described as “unprofessional.” I turn now to the other instances in the record to which the State refers in support of its claim that the assistant public defender’s conduct was unprofessional. When the assistant State’s Attorney was cross-examining, the following occurred: “Q. Did you subsequently tell what you just told us to Chicago police detectives or Chicago— [ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Objection. THE COURT: Grounds? [ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER]: There has been no indication that this woman has ever told any other story. It’s an attempt to introduce a prior consistent statement. THE COURT: Overruled. Please just simply state your grounds, the evidentiary grounds. Don’t argue the objection. Overruled.” The assistant public defender did nothing more than respond to the court’s invitation, and his answer was a proper one. When the assistant public defender was cross-examining a police witness the following occurred: “[ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Now perhaps, Detective, I was misleading, and I apologize to you and the ladies and gentlemen of the jury— THE COURT: Counsel, when witnesses need to be admonished, it will be done by the court. You ask questions of the witness, he gives you answers. I am the judge, you are the lawyer. Ask questions. [ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Fine, Your Honor. Q. Detective, in fact, there was a conversation had by either yourself or brother detectives in this case, with a woman by the name of Mary Scott, is that not correct? [ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Objection. THE COURT: Grounds? [ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: It doesn’t go to impeachment. He didn’t author this report. [ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER]: I’m not offering it for the— THE COURT: Another rule in this courtroom is that objections are not argued unless they are invited by the court. Objection overruled. You may answer that question.” The prefatory statement made by the assistant public defender before the judge injected himself could not be construed to be an admonishment of the witness nor any attempt on the part of the assistant public defender to usurp the function of the judge. Moreover, I note, as does the dissenting opinion, that the State’s Attorney did, without chastisement, exactly what the assistant public defender had done and was criticized for. Another instance called to our attention by the State occurred while the assistant public defender was again cross-examining a police witness: “[ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Now, detective, you do recall that it was put into your police report that there were no signs of forced entry, is that correct? A. That’s correct. [ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Objection, asked and answered. THE COURT: Sustained. [ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Do you recall- THE COURT: Counsel, counsel, counsel. Do you remember when you said you’re talking too fast the officer should mention it? I’m going to mention it. When there is an objection, you stop until the court directs you to start again. You understand? [ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Yes, sir.” That exchange does not show any improper conduct on the part of the assistant public defender. Moreover, I have never before heard of a rule that requires a questioner to stop asking questions after the judge rules on an objection until the judge directs him to start again. In short, I repeat that those portions of the record called to our attention by the State do not support the State’s contention that those instances justified the court’s remarks later, which Justice Rakowski and I agree were improper. As previously noted, the State argues that remarks out of the presence of the jury may not be considered by a reviewing court in determining whether prejudice occurred. I wish to make it clear that I do not subscribe to the view that, in determining whether the trial court has manifested a hostile attitude toward a defense lawyer, a reviewing court is restricted to what occurred only in the presence of the jury. I am aware that in People v. Connor (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 532, 532 N.E.2d 520, the court expressed the view that what occurred outside the presence of the jury did not prejudice the defendant. We do not know from the opinion what was said out of the presence of the jury; moreover, the appellate court held that the “two minor incidents [that occurred in the presence of the jury] can hardly have suggested to the jury that defense counsel attempted to present the case in an improper manner.” (177 Ill. App. 3d at 539.) That is not true in this case. In People v. Zaccagnini (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 408, 194 N.E.2d 286, the court reversed a conviction saying this: “A reading of the record leaves no doubt that the trial judge harbored feelings of hostility and prejudice against defendant and his counsel. We will not, except for two examples which occurred before the jury, detail the number of occasions during which these feelings were exhibited both within and outside the presence of the jury.” (Emphasis added.) 29 Ill. 2d at 409. To me, therefore, the issue is reduced to this: Does the record show that the judge displayed such hostility toward the defendant’s attorney in or out of the presence of the jury that the defendant’s right to a fair trial was impaired? The dissent observes that “the court’s treatment of defense counsel must have adversely affected his performance during the trial.” (209 Ill. App. 3d at 726.) If I agreed with that observation of the dissent, I would vote to reverse the conviction. I do not agree; but I do recognize that things were said to the assistant public defender that should not have been said and that might have cowed some lawyers to the extent that effective representation might have been diminished. Lawyers, like judges, are not automatons. This is not a petty theft case; this is a case of a brutal murder of a woman in her own home committed during the commission of a robbery. The assistant public defender was charged with the sleep-killing responsibility of defending a person the State wanted to execute. It is my judgment that, in the face of that responsibility, the assistant public defender never did anything but act with fortitude and respectful persistence under trying circumstances. Consequently, I do not believe that the assistant public defender’s performance was affected. He continued throughout to represent his client ably and with vigor. I do not agree with Justice Rakowski’s description of Fish’s testimony as establishing that the samples of blood taken from the defendant’s trousers “matched” samples of blood taken from the victim’s apartment. Fish testified that the electrophoresis test looks for nine specific enzymes in blood. She found that four (or perhaps five) of those enzymes were present in both the blood found at the scene and the blood on the defendant’s pants. Fish was unable to determine whether the other five (or four) enzymes were present. Her findings of the presence of the enzymes were the basis of her ultimate conclusion that the blood samples were “consistent” with each other. Testimony that the samples were “consistent” is not the same as testimony that the samples “matched.” I concur with Justice Rakowski’s opinion in all other respects.