Court Opinion

ID: 9385514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 00:00:34.58101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:02.456412
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10758         Document: 00516703747             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/06/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 22-10758
                                     Summary Calendar                                   FILED
                                     ____________                                     April 6, 2023
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
   Patrick Lewis,                                                                      Clerk

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Greenwood Motor Lines, Incorporated; R&L Carriers
   Shared Services, L.L.C.,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 3:21-CV-1161
                      ______________________________

   Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Patrick Lewis filed this employment-discrimination lawsuit against
   Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc., and R&L Carriers Shared Services, LLC,
   alleging discrimination and harassment based on race and disability, and
   retaliation for engaging in protected activity, in violation of Title VII of the
   Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10758      Document: 00516703747          Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/06/2023

                                    No. 22-10758

   § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. When the defendants moved for summary
   judgment on all claims, Lewis did not file a response or seek an extension of
   time to do so. Based on the evidence submitted by the defendants in support
   of their motion, the district court deemed the material facts undisputed and
   granted the motion. We find no error and AFFIRM.
          As an initial matter, by failing to raise the issues in his opening brief
   Lewis forfeited any challenge to the court’s grant of summary judgment on
   his disability-discrimination and § 1983 claims. As a result, we review only
   those claims relating to race discrimination and retaliation.
          With respect to Lewis’s race-discrimination claims, the uncontested
   summary-judgment evidence confirms that Lewis was fired not on the basis
   of his race or in retaliation for filing an EEO complaint, but because he
   violated his employer’s attendance policy. Separately, Lewis points to no
   record evidence supporting the existence of a similarly situated comparator
   outside his protected class. See Ernst v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 1 F.4th 333, 339
   (5th Cir. 2021) (one element of a prima facie Title VII case under McDonnell
   Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), is a “similarly situated”
   comparator outside the protected class who was treated more favorably); see
   also Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., LP, 427 F.3d 987, 992 (5th Cir. 2005) (same
   for § 1981 claims).
          And as for Lewis’s retaliation claims, he offers no evidence that he
   was fired in retaliation for filing an EEO complaint. See Cabral v. Brennan,
   853 F.3d 763, 766–67 (5th Cir. 2017) (a plaintiff claiming retaliation must
   show a “causal connection exists between the protected activity and the
   adverse action” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although temporal
   proximity can sometimes satisfy the causation element of a retaliation claim,
   “once the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason that
   explains both the adverse action and the timing, the plaintiff must offer some

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Case: 22-10758      Document: 00516703747           Page: 3     Date Filed: 04/06/2023

                                     No. 22-10758

   evidence from which the jury may infer that retaliation was the real motive.”
   Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th Cir. 1997). Here,
   Lewis was fired the very day of his third unexcused absence, having been
   warned previously that any future absences would result in his termination.
   The record lacks evidence supporting a retaliatory motive.
          Lewis’s arguments on appeal are unpersuasive. He first argues that
   the district court erred by granting summary judgment solely because he failed
   to respond to the defendants’ motion. But he is wrong. Indeed, the district
   court was careful to explain that it was not basing its decision solely on that
   ground and, instead, would simply accept the defendants’ facts as
   undisputed. The court was right to do so. See Eversley v. MBank Dall., 843
   F.2d 172, 173–74 (5th Cir. 1988). Next, Lewis suggests the allegations in his
   pleadings overcome the defendants’ summary-judgment evidence. This, too,
   is incorrect. See Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir.
   2007) (a party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon allegations
   in the pleadings”).
          Finally, Lewis draws our attention to excerpts from his own
   deposition, which is in the record, to make the case that his absences should
   be excused and that retaliation was a motivating factor in his termination. But
   even assuming the materiality of such facts in the relevant legal analysis, they
   were not brought to the attention of the district court. Reversal on this basis
   is thus improper because that court was not required to review the entire
   summary-judgment record to search for fact disputes supporting Lewis’s
   opposition to the defendants’ summary-judgment motion. Ragas v. Tenn. Gas
   Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998); see United States v. del Carpio
   Frescas, 932 F.3d 324, 331 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Judges are not like
   pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the record.” (quoting Albrechsten v. Bd. of
   Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys., 309 F.3d 433, 436 (7th Cir. 2002))). That was
   Lewis’s job. He may not use his briefs in this forum as a substitute

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Case: 22-10758   Document: 00516703747      Page: 4   Date Filed: 04/06/2023

                             No. 22-10758

   memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary
   judgment below.
         AFFIRMED.

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