Court Opinion

ID: 9567838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:58:16.725496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:46.071103
License: Public Domain

*370PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 85. {concurring in part, dissenting in part). I agree with the majority opinion that the third-party claim for negligence against Attorney Roy C. LaBudde (LaBudde) should be dismissed and that the claims against Attorney E William Haberman should be dismissed as well.1 I write separately for three reasons: (1) I conclude that the plaintiffs' claim against LaBudde, based on aiding and abetting Robert Tensfeldt (Robert) in allegedly violating a provision of a 1974 divorce judgment that required him to will two-thirds of his net estate to his three adult children, fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted because the estate planning provision of the divorce judgment exceeded the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction; (2) I conclude that LaBudde was immune from liability in drafting Robert's 1992 will because LaBudde proceeded in a good faith belief that the provision in the 1974 divorce judgment that required estate planning in favor of the adult children was void from its inception, as a judgment; and (3) I conclude that even if I were to assume, arguendo, that the directive to make a will in the 1974 divorce judgment were enforceable when made, Wis. Stat. § 893.40, a 20-year statute of repose, precluded actions on the divorce judgment after December 5, 1994. Therefore, the divorce judgment had no effect, as a judgment, in 1999 when Robert reaffirmed the will that he made in 1992, and it had no effect at his death in 2000. As a result, the aiding and abetting claim against LaBudde must be dismissed. Because the majority opinion concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that addresses the aiding and abetting claim.
*371I. BACKGROUND
¶ 86. Robert and Ruth Tensfeldt were divorced in 1974. At the time of the divorce, they had three adult children: Christine, Robert William and John (hereinafter referred to as the adult children). As part of the divorce judgment, Robert and Ruth entered into a very detailed stipulation that required many financial accommodations by Robert. One of those financial obligations involved estate planning, in that Robert agreed to make a will that would provide two-thirds "of his net estate outright to the three adult children."2
¶ 87. Robert married Constance in 1975. In 1985, Robert and Constance changed their domicile to Florida. In 1992, LaBudde assisted Robert in drafting a will that did not comply with the requirement to leave two-thirds of his net estate to the adult children. Robert made the estate plan after LaBudde advised Robert that this estate plan did not comply with his 1974 agreement to leave two-thirds of his net estate to the adult children.
¶ 88. In 1999, Robert's estate plan was reviewed again with him, this time by Haberman. Robert decided to make no changes. Robert died on April 22, 2000, survived by his second wife, Constance. In June of 2000, Robert's 1992 will, which he affirmed in 1999, was entered into probate in Florida as Estate of Robert C. Tensfeldt, Deceased, No. 00-809-CP-02.
¶ 89. The adult children did not know of the 1974 divorce stipulation until Robert's 1992 will was entered into probate court in 2000 and Haberman told them of the 1974 stipulation. In November of 2000, the *372Tensfeldt children filed claims in probate court seeking two-thirds of Robert's net estate in accord with the 1974 stipulation. Constance filed a claim for a spousal elective share of the estate, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 732.212 (1997).
¶ 90. The adult children also filed a separate action against Constance, individually, and as personal representative of Robert's estate. In the separate action, the adult children claimed that: (1) they were enforcing the 1974 Wisconsin divorce judgment; (2) if the divorce stipulation were held to be a contract to malee a will, they were third-party beneficiaries of the contract, which had been breached; and (3) Constance's election against the will should be disallowed as untimely made. Constance moved for summaiy judgment dismissing their claims, which the probate court granted.
¶ 91. The adult children appealed to the Florida Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part. Tensfeldt v. Tensfeldt, 839 So. 2d 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The court of appeals held that the divorce judgment could not be enforced because it had never been "domesticated" in Florida, and the statute of limitations to enforce the decree in Florida barred enforcement. Id. at 725.
¶ 92. However, the court of appeals also concluded that the divorce stipulation could be enforced as a contract to make a will and that the children were third-party beneficiaries of that contract. Id. at 721-22. Constance had argued that if the adult children had a breach of contract claim, it accrued on the date of the 1992 will. Therefore, it was barred by Florida's five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims. Id. at 724. The court of appeals rejected that argument, concluding that "a cause of action for breach of a contract requiring the promisor [to] make a will devising a *373percentage of his or her estate does not accrue until the death of the promisor." Id. Therefore, the court sent the matter back to probate court to determine what amount should be paid to the adult children for their claim. However, before doing so, the court also held that the adult children's third-party rights as determined by the probate court could not affect Constance's right under Fla. Stat. § 732.212, which permitted her to elect against the will. Id. at 727. As the court explained, even "[h]ad the children been properly listed as beneficiaries in the will, Constance's elective share would have taken precedence over their bequest." Id.
¶ 93. On remand to probate court, the adult children settled their claims with the estate. In so doing, they agreed that after certain payments in favor of Constance, the distribution to them of "the remaining balance of the estate, outright and free of further trust, [is] in full satisfaction of their claim under the Divorce Decree."3
¶ 94. On June 8, 2005, the adult children filed a complaint in Dane County Circuit Court against LaBudde, Haberman and Michael Best & Friedrich, alleging numerous intentional torts. Aiding and abetting was asserted against LaBudde, based on the alleged violation of the divorce judgment that LaBudde's drafting of the 1992 will brought about. It is the drafting of the 1992 will that the adult children assert aided and abetted an "unlawful act," i.e., violation of the 1974 divorce judgment.4
*374¶ 95. LaBudde, Haberman and Michael Best & Friedrich answered, denying wrongdoing and raising affirmative defenses such as the failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, statute of limitations, and claim and issue preclusion based on prior judicial proceedings in Florida.
¶ 96. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court held against LaBudde on the adult children's aiding and abetting claim, on which it concluded that the adult children should prevail as a matter of law. The circuit court based its decision on its conclusion that it was unlawful for LaBudde to draft the 1992 will because it aided Robert in contravening the 1974 judgment that was still effective in 1992. The majority opinion agrees, and it remands only the claim of aiding and abetting the violation of the 1974 divorce judgment to the circuit court for further proceedings.5
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 97. Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction to take a particular action is a question of law, requiring independent review. State v. Smith, 2005 WI 104, ¶ 20, 283 Wis. 2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 508. Whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity under undisputed facts is also a question of law that we decide independently. Arneson v. Jezwinski, 225 Wis. 2d 371, 384, 592 N.W.2d 606 (1999). Finally, we independently review as a question of law whether a statute of repose bars an action on a judgment. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, ¶ 14, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832.
*375B. Aiding and Abetting
¶ 98. Aiding and abetting is the only claim that the majority opinion sends back to the circuit court for further proceedings.6 A civil claim for aiding and abetting has two elements: "(1) The person undertakes conduct that as a matter of objective fact aids another in the commission of an unlawful act; and (2) the person consciously desires or intends that his conduct will yield such assistance." Winslow v. Brown, 125 Wis. 2d 327, 336, 371 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1985). According to the majority opinion, the "unlawful act" that LaBudde aided and abetted by drafting Robert's 1992 will is the violation of the 1974 divorce judgment.7
C. The Parties' Positions
¶ 99. LaBudde claims that he did not aid and abet an unlawful act in drafting the 1992 will because Robert's promise was not enforceable as a judgment. LaBudde maintains that the stipulation to make a will was a contractual obligation, as the Florida Court of Appeals concluded.8 He also contends that he proceeded in a good faith belief that his acts did not assist Robert in violating an enforceable judgment.9 Furthermore, LaBudde contends that even if the stipulation to make such a will were enforceable against Robert as a judgment when the stipulation was made, it ceased to be enforceable on December 5, 1994, 20 years after the *376divorce judgment was entered.10 Therefore, no judgment required Robert to make a will of any type, either in 1999 when Robert reconfirmed the 1992 will, or in 2000 when he died.11
¶ 100. The adult children acknowledge that "LaBudde contends that Robert's divorce judgment was unenforceable from its inception."12 However, the adult children never examine the judgment at its inception. Instead, they rely on dicta of the court of appeals in Estate of Barnes v. Hall, 170 Wis. 2d 1, 486 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1992), wherein the court speculated about possible extensions of our opinion in Rintelman v. Rintelman, 118 Wis. 2d 587, 348 N.W.2d 498 (1984).13 Barnes, 170 Wis. 2d at 13. The adult children do not note that Barnes specifically examined whether "the statutes in force in 1973 allowed divorcing spouses to agree to some sort of estate planning, as part of the divorce judgment, to benefit their children." Id. at 9. Barnes concluded that the statutes did not. Id. at 10.
D. The 1974 Divorce Judgment
¶ 101. The majority opinion concludes that LaBudde is liable for aiding and abetting an unlawful act based on LaBudde drafting Robert's 1992 will that was subsequently entered into the Florida probate proceedings.14 The majority opinion concludes that the 20-year statute of limitations on enforceability of judgments had not run when the 1992 will was made. Its focus on *377the drafting of the will misses the legal principle on which this case turns. This case requires analyzing whether Robert's stipulation to make a will in favor of the adult children was enforceable as a judgment in 1974.
1. Void judgments — general principles
¶ 102. If that portion of the divorce judgment that required Robert to make a will in favor of his then adult children was rendered in excess of the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction in the divorce action, that part of the judgment is void. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 29 (instructing that a judgment is void if it is in excess of a court's subject matter jurisdiction). Contravening a void judgment is not an unlawful act because a void judgment can be lawfully ignored. Cowie v. Strohmeyer, 150 Wis. 401, 440, 136 N.W. 956 (1912). Accordingly, LaBudde's drafting the 1992 will contrary to a void provision in the divorce judgment does not support a claim for aiding and abetting because drafting such a will is not aiding and abetting an "unlawful act."
¶ 103. It is black letter law that a "judgment pronounced by a tribunal having no authority to determine the matter in issue is necessarily and incurably void, and may be shown to be so in any collateral or other proceeding in which it is drawn in question." Fischbeck v. Mielenz, 162 Wis. 12, 18, 154 N.W. 701 (1916) (quoting 1 Freeman on Judgments, § 120). As we have explained:
If the court exceeded its jurisdiction of the subject matter, then the judgment is no protection whatever. It may be ignored altogether. ... The rule is elementary, that if the matter dealt with by the judgment in this case was entirely outside of the court's jurisdiction, *378then,... the result was not merely erroneous and so, binding on all parties which the court had jurisdiction of, and their privies, till set aside in some of the ways appointed by law, not including collateral attack, but was a usurpation and . .. void in the broadest sense of the term.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Cowie, 150 Wis. at 440-41).
¶ 104. Furthermore, parties cannot create subject matter jurisdiction for a court by waiver, consent or the application of estoppel. As we explained in Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 84 Wis. 2d 504, 267 N.W.2d 609 (1978), this has long been the law in Wisconsin:
It is fundamental that parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court by their waiver or consent. Sec. 801.04, Stats.; Gelatt v. DeDakis, 77 Wis. 2d 578, 584, 254 N.W.2d 171 (1977); Joint School v. Wisconsin Rapids Ed. Asso., 70 Wis. 2d 292, [296-97,] 234 N.W.2d 289 (1975); Vishnevsky v. U.S., 418 F. Supp. 698[, 699 n.2] (E.D. Wis. 1976). Nor can subject matter jurisdiction be conferred by estoppel. Wisconsin E. R. Bd. v. Lucas, 3 Wis. 2d 464, [472,] 89 N.W.2d 300 (1958); State ex rel. Gaudynski v. Pruss, 233 Wis. 600, [606,] 290 N.W. 289 (1940)....
Id. at 515-16.
¶ 105. The subject matter jurisdiction of circuit courts in divorce actions is limited to the authority granted by statute. Stasey v. Miller, 168 Wis. 2d 37, 48, 483 N.W.2d 221 (1992). As we have explained, "the jurisdiction [of a circuit court] in divorce actions is entirely dependent on legislative authority." Id. (citing Groh v. Groh, 110 Wis. 2d 117, 122, 327 N.W.2d 655 (1983)).
*379¶ 106. When an argument is raised that a portion of a divorce judgment is void for want of jurisdiction, "all that is needed is the determination that, in fact, jurisdiction was not acquired in the proceedings that led up to the entry of the judgment." West v. West, 82 Wis. 2d 158, 166, 262 N.W.2d 87 (1978). While circuit court jurisdiction is generally broad, that is not the case when a circuit court sits in a divorce proceeding. Stasey, 168 Wis. 2d at 49. In divorce proceedings, the legislature has limited the court's jurisdiction to actions affecting the family, id., which actions are specifically described in the statutes, id.15
*3802. Void provision in the 1974 judgment
¶ 107. Recognizing when a portion of a judgment is void is particularly important in this case because if the will provision in the 1974 judgment is void, then contravening that provision is not an unlawful act. As explained above, if there is an "absence of an express statutory grant of jurisdiction to the circuit court," then that portion of a judgment was made in excess of the court's subject matter jurisdiction, id. at 57; and orders made in excess of a court's subject matter jurisdiction are void, Cowie, 150 Wis. at 440-41.
¶ 108. Furthermore, "[j judgments are construed at the time of their entry." Weston v. Holt, 157 Wis. 2d 595, 600, 460 N.W.2d 776 (Ct. App. 1990). In 1974, when the divorce judgment was entered, the Jefferson County Circuit Court sitting in the divorce proceedings had not been given jurisdiction by the legislature to order Robert to make a will in favor of the adult children. Barnes, 170 Wis. 2d at 13 (concluding that a court in a divorce proceeding did not have a grant from the legislature to take an estate planning action in favor of adult children and suggesting that any remedy was for the legislature, not the courts). Barnes interpreted the same version of the Wisconsin divorce statutes as were in effect in 1974 when Ruth and Robert were divorced.
*381¶ 109. In Barnes, the court of appeals examined jurisdiction in regard to estate planning for adult children. The court explained that: "The real issue is whether the statutes in force in 1973 allowed divorcing spouses to agree to some sort of estate planning, as part of the divorce judgment, to benefit their children." Id. at 9. In reliance on Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 67 Wis. 2d 477, 227 N.W.2d 62 (1975), and ch. 247 of the 1973-74 Wisconsin Statutes, the court concluded that "property division can be made only between husband and wife." Barnes, 170 Wis. 2d at 10 (quoting Vaccaro, 67 Wis. 2d at 483).
¶ 110. I have independently reviewed the statutes in effect in 1974 when Ruth and Robert were divorced. Chapter 247 of the 1973-74 Wisconsin Statutes contained the legislative grant of authority to circuit courts in "Actions Affecting Marriage." The legislature granted jurisdiction as follows:
Jurisdiction. (1) The county courts, and circuit courts,. .. have jurisdiction of all actions affecting marriage and of all actions under s. 52.10... ,16
Wis. Stat. § 247.01 (1973-74). Actions affecting marriage were listed with specificity by the legislature:
Actions affecting marriage. (1) Actions affecting marriage are:
(a) To affirm marriage.
(b) Annulment.
(c) Divorce.
(d) Legal separation (formerly divorce from bed and board).
*382(e) Custody.
(f) For support.
(g) For alimony.
(h) For property division.
Wis. Stat. § 247.03 (1973-74). In regard to property division, the legislature specified that "[t]he court may also finally divide and distribute the estate, both real and personal, of either party between the parties and divest and transfer the title of any thereof accordingly." Wis. Stat. § 247.26 (1973-74) (emphasis added).
¶ 111. Property division during a divorce is expressly limited to the parties to the action. The adult children were not parties to Ruth and Robert's divorce action. Therefore, there was no grant of jurisdiction to the divorce court to award the property of either party to the adult children. Barnes was correctly decided under the statutes then in effect. The majority opinion's overruling of Barnes17 has no foundation in the statutory grant of authority to circuit courts sitting in divorce proceedings in 1974.
¶ 112. The Jefferson County Circuit Court was without subject matter jurisdiction to order Robert to will two-thirds of his property to his adult children; therefore that part of the judgment is void and of no effect, as a judgment. Cowie, 150 Wis. at 440.
¶ 113. One cannot be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with a judgment that has been held to be void. State v. Ramsay, 16 Wis. 2d 154, 165, 114 N.W.2d 118 (1962) (citing State v. Marcus, 259 Wis. 543, 553, 49 N.W.2d 447 (1951); Seyfert v. Seyfert, 201 Wis. 223, 229, 229 N.W. 636 (1930)). "On the other hand, *383disobedience of an order made by a court within its jurisdiction and power is a contempt, although the order may be clearly erroneous." Ramsay, 16 Wis. 2d at 165 (citing Wis. Employment Relations Bd. v. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, 238 Wis. 379, 400, 299 N.W. 31 (1941)). Accordingly, violation of a void provision in a judgment cannot he an "unlawful act." Cowie, 150 Wis. at 440.
¶ 114. However, the adult children must establish that LaBudde aided and abetted an "unlawful act" in order to meet the first element of their aiding and abetting claim. Winslow, 125 Wis. 2d at 336. Because that part of the judgment requiring Robert to will the adult children two-thirds of his net estate is void as a judgment, and Robert's violation of that provision cannot be unlawful, although it has been held to be a breach of contract, the adult children have failed to state a claim for aiding and abetting as a matter of law. Accordingly, that claim should have been dismissed on the cross-motions for summary judgment.
¶ 115. The majority opinion heavily relies on Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d 635, 178 N.W.2d 35 (1970), to support its argument that the subject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court sitting in divorce proceedings may be expanded by stipulation of the parties under Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1973-74).18 However, the majority opinion's reliance on Bliwas is misplaced in regard to LaBudde.
¶ 116. In Bliwas, the parties entered into a post-judgment stipulation, which was incorporated into a court order, to reduce the amount of child support that Arnold Bliwas would pay for his son's support, in exchange for Arnold's agreeing to contribute to his son's educational expenses beyond the boy's twenty-first birthday. Id. at 636-37. Both parties agreed that if there *384had been no stipulation, the divorce court would have been without jurisdiction. Id. at 637. However, we did not conclude that the subject matter jurisdiction of the court determined whether the stipulation that was incorporated into a court order would be honored.
¶ 117. To the contrary, in reviewing the legal principles that we would apply, we affirmed the legislative jurisdictional limitation by explaining that a "trial court's jurisdiction to make provisions for the care, custody, maintenance and education of children of the parties is limited to minor children." Id. (emphasis in original). We did enforce the stipulation, but not because the subject matter jurisdiction of the divorce court had been expanded by agreement of the parties. Rather, we estopped Arnold from making arguments by which to overturn the order that required him to continue to pay support for his son's educational expenses. We explained:
"[W]here the court disposes of the property of the parties by stipulation in a manner in which it could not have disposed of the property in an adversary proceeding, the general rule applies that a party who procures or consents to the entry of the decree is estopped to question its validity, especially where he has obtained a benefit from it."
Id. at 640 (quoting 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 907, at 1030). We also relied on the reasoning of a Kansas decision to further explain:
"A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction and power of a court for the purpose of securing important rights from his adversary through its judgment, and, after having obtained the relief desired, repudiate the action of the court on the ground that it was without jurisdiction."
Id. at 641 (quoting Bledsoe v. Seaman, 95 P. 576, 578-79 (Kan. 1908)).
*385¶ 118. And finally, we affirmed that" '[t]he parties cannot by stipulation proscribe, modify or oust the court of its power to determine the disposition of property, alimony, support, custody, or other matters involved in a divorce proceeding.'" Id. at 639 n.4 (emphasis added) (quoting Miner v. Miner, 10 Wis. 2d 438, 442-43, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960)). Bliwas never concluded that Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1973-74) permitted the parties to stipulate to expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the divorce court.19
¶ 119. Instead, Bliwas turns on the estoppel of a party. That is, Arnold Bliwas was prevented (estopped) from challenging the validity of the order in the first place. In relation to the circumstances of this case, if Robert were alive and trying to avoid an obligation to which he stipulated, Bliwas could be raised to estop Robert from arguing that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to award the parties' property to non-parties.20
*386¶ 120. However, LaBudde was not a party to the Tensfeldt divorce. He did not make a promise that he is trying to avoid. Accordingly, there is no basis upon which to estop LaBudde from challenging the estate planning portions of the judgment as being void for lack of circuit court subject matter jurisdiction.21 Stated otherwise, there is no legal impediment to LaBudde's asserting that the portion of the judgment that attempted to do estate planning for the benefit of the adult children was void from its inception. Our conclusion in Bliwas turned on the estoppel of Arnold Bliwas; here, LaBudde cannot be estopped. Therefore, Bliwas cannot be applied to preclude LaBudde's defenses to the adult children's aiding and abetting claim.
¶ 121. Furthermore, as the Florida Court of Appeals concluded, Robert's promise is enforceable as a contractual obligation that was not breached until Robert died without a will that was in accord with the *387stipulation.22 Tensfeldt, 839 So. 2d at 724. The adult children have been fully paid for their third-party contractual rights through the Florida proceedings.23
¶ 122. I recognize that appellate courts on occasion have concluded that a circuit court in a divorce action was without statutory authority to enter some portion of the judgment without explaining that that part of the judgment was void because of the restricted jurisdiction of a circuit court in a divorce action. Barnes is a good example of that. However, in Barnes, there was no need to explain that the lack of subject matter jurisdiction made that part of the divorce judgment void. All that was needed was to determine whether that part of the judgment was enforceable.
¶ 123. By contrast with Barnes, our discussion in Stasey was more complete, even though all that was needed was to determine whether the portion of the divorce judgment awarding attorney fees as between an *388attorney and client was in excess of the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Stasey, 168 Wis. 2d at 39-40. We concluded that the divorce court had exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 57. Furthermore, we went on to explain the resulting effect on the portion of the judgment made in excess of the court's subject matter jurisdiction when we said, "We have concluded that that part of the judgment awarding attorney fees is void." Id. at 61.
¶ 124. Stasey is of significance for the case now before us because here there is a need to understand why the 1974 divorce judgment is not enforceable as a judgment. Stasey helps my analysis in two major respects. First, Stasey clearly explains that the subject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court sitting in a divorce action is limited to the express grant of authority by the legislature. Id. at 48. Second, Stasey confirms that when a divorce court acts in excess of its subject matter jurisdiction, that portion of the judgment is void. Id. at 61. Because the violation of a void judgment is not an unlawful act, LaBudde did not aid and abet an unlawful act. Accordingly, the aiding and abetting claim against LaBudde should be dismissed.
E. Qualified Immunity
¶ 125. An attorney who acts in a professional capacity has qualified immunity for the actions he takes in assistance of his client. Stern v. Thompson & Coates, Ltd., 185 Wis. 2d 220, 242, 517 N.W.2d 658 (1994) (citing Strid v. Converse, 111 Wis. 2d 418, 429, 331 N.W.2d 350 (1983); Goerke v. Vojvodich, 67 Wis. 2d 102, 105, 226 N.W.2d 211 (1975); Langen v. Borkowski, 188 Wis. 277, 301, 206 N.W. 181 (1925)). "An attorney is immune from liability to third parties so long as the *389attorney pursues in good faith his or her client's interests on a matter fairly debatable in the law." Id.
¶ 126. Here, LaBudde drafted the 1992 will with the good faith belief that a provision in the 1974 judgment was not enforceable as a judgment, but rather, that it was a contractual obligation.24 It is important for the reader to note that in June of 1992, the court of appeals decided Barnes, which concluded that a circuit court has no authority to order estate planning in a divorce judgment. LaBudde drafted Robert's will in November of 1992. Therefore, at the time LaBudde drafted Robert's 1992 will, the most recent decision on whether the estate planning provisions of the divorce judgment were valid was established in Barnes. Based on the law then in effect, LaBudde concluded that Robert had only a contractual obligation to make a will bequeathing two-thirds of his estate to his adult children. I agree with that conclusion, as I have explained above.
¶ 127. The majority opinion asserts that "it was not fairly debatable that a client must follow a court judgment."25 The majority then asserts that "Robert was obligated to follow the court's judgment unless it was modified in a proceeding in the circuit court or on appeal."26
¶ 128. The law on one's obligation to follow a judgment to which one is a party is not so absolute as the majority asserts. One does not have an obligation to follow a void provision in a judgment. Cline v. Whitaker, *390144 Wis. 439, 442, 129 N.W. 400 (1911). Rather, a void provision may be challenged at any time, in any "proceedings in which it is drawn in question." Fischbeck, 162 Wis. at 18. Here, the will provision in the 1974 divorce judgment has been drawn into question. As I have explained above, that provision is void as a judgment, having been made in excess of the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction. Stasey, 168 Wis. 2d at 61. Robert could not be required by contempt proceedings to follow that part of the divorce judgment, unless he were estopped from arguing that the circuit court had no subject matter jurisdiction to order estate planning in favor of the adult children, as we concluded Arnold Bliwas was.27 Cowie, 150 Wis. at 440-41. The provision could also be enforced as a contract provision, as was done in the Florida courts. Tensfeldt, 839 So. 2d at 722.28 The law in regard to the effect of void judgments and Barnes' recently released conclusion provided LaBudde with at least a good faith belief that assisting Robert in the estate plan he chose was not aiding and abetting an unlawful act, although LaBudde may have been assisting a breach of contract.29 In my view, it is patently unfair of the majority opinion to overrule Barnes, which was decided only a few months before *391LaBudde drafted the 1992 will, and then to declare there was no law on which LaBudde could have based a good faith belief that he assisted Robert only in a potential breach of contract.
¶ 129. The majority opinion cites Ramsey and Cline.30 However, those cases do not support the position the majority opinion has taken. In Ramsey, we examined Wis. Stat. § 256.03(3) (1961-62), which provides:
Every court of record shall have power to punish, as for a criminal contempt, persons guilty of either of the following acts and no other:
(3) Wilful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued or made by it.
(Emphasis added.) We explained that § 256.03(3) was a codification of the common law. Ramsey, 16 Wis. 2d at 165. In our discussion of the common law, and therefore our interpretation of § 256.03(3), we further explained that the first order of business was to determine whether the court order had been "lawfully issued or made." Id. We explained that this was important because "[t]he universal rule is that the failure of a person to obey an order that [a court has held] is void for want of jurisdiction in the issuing court is not punishable as contempt." Id. (citations omitted).
¶ 130. I agree that the first question to be addressed when it is claimed that a court order has been violated is whether the court that made the order had *392subject matter jurisdiction to do so.31 Because the divorce court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order Robert to maintain a will leaving two-thirds of his net estate to the adult children, Ramsey actually supports my position that Robert did not act unlawfully when he did not comply with that portion of the divorce judgment. Therefore, LaBudde's drafting of the 1992 will did not aid and abet an unlawful act. Cline is similar to Ramsey, in that its discussion is qualified by first providing that the court must have subject matter jurisdiction to enter a lawful order. Cline, 144 Wis. at 442.
¶ 131. It has been LaBudde's position throughout these proceedings that the will provision in the 1974 divorce judgment was unenforceable as a judgment, from its inception.32 Certainly, given the many cases cited above, LaBudde had at least a good faith belief *393that his assistance to Robert did not violate a lawful provision of the divorce judgment. Therefore, I conclude that LaBudde has immunity from liability for the legal representation he provided.
F. Statute of Repose
¶ 132. The majority leaves open the question of what statute of limitations applies to LaBudde's act of drafting the 1992 will.33 I leave that question unaddressed as well. However, I write to point out that even if I were to assume, arguendo, that drafting the 1992 will aided and abetted an unlawful act, Robert reconfirmed that will in 1999. On December 6,1994, 20 years after the judgment was entered, the 20-year statute of repose found in Wis. Stat. § 893.40 established a bar to an action to enforce the judgment. Hamilton, 261 Wis. 2d 458, ¶ 27.
¶ 133. LaBudde raises Wis. Stat. § 893.40 as a bar to the adult children's claims.34 Section 893.40 provides:
Action on judgment or decree; court of record. Except as provided in ss. 846.04(2) and (3) and 893.415, action upon a judgment or decree of a court of record of any state or of the United States shall be commenced within 20 years after the judgment or decree is entered or be barred.35
¶ 134. In Hamilton, we addressed Wis. Stat. § 893.40 relative to a divorce judgment. We were asked *394to examine whether the State, as the real party in interest, could seek to collect unpaid child support on a divorce judgment entered in 1970 and modified in 1977, through an action the State commenced May 22, 2000. Hamilton, 261 Wis. 2d 458, ¶ 15. In order to answer that question, we examined § 893.40, which we concluded was a statute of repose, rather than a statute of limitations. Id., ¶ 28.
¶ 135. We explained that "[sjtatutes of repose operate differently from statutes of limitations. A statute of limitations usually establishes the time frame within which a claim must be initiated after a cause of action actually accrues." Id., ¶ 29 (citing Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶ 26, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849). We contrasted this with the operation of a statute of repose, which actually "limits the time period within which an action may be brought based on the date of an act or omission." Id. Most importantly for my analysis here, we explained that "[a] statute of repose does not relate to the accrual of a cause of action. In fact, it may cut off litigation before a cause of action arises." Id. (emphasis in original). We also explained that the "act" that triggers Wis. Stat. § 893.40 is the entry of the judgment. Id.
¶ 136. In the adult children's aiding and abetting action, they necessarily seek to enforce the terms of the divorce judgment because their damages for aiding and abetting are dependent on their recovery had the judgment been enforceable. That is, there can be no recovery for aiding and abetting if there can be no recovery for violation of the divorce judgment. 74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 60 (instructing that "[o]ne who.. . aids[] or abets a wrongful act by another is regarded as being as responsible as the one who commits the act, so as to impose liability upon the former to the same extent as *395if he had performed the act himself'); see also, e.g., Abramian v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 731 N.E.2d 1075, 1088 (Mass. 2000) (concluding that because the underlying claim was dismissed, the aiding and abetting claim based on that underlying claim could not be maintained); Tate v. Dep't of Mental Health, 645 N.E.2d 1159, 1164 n.2 (Mass. 1995) (explaining that because "plaintiff would not be able to satisfy her burden of proof that the Association discriminated ... summary judgment should be granted on the plaintiffs claim that the department and the commission aided and condoned the actions of the Association"). LaBudde, by aiding and abetting Robert, can be no more liable than Robert himself would be. Therefore, because Wis. Stat. § 893.40 bars enforcement of the judgment against Robert subsequent to December 5, 1994, the claim for aiding and abetting is necessarily barred as well.
¶ 137. The act that started the running of Wis. Stat. § 893.40's statute of repose was the entry of the divorce judgment on December 5,1974. Id. Accordingly, no action could be brought to enforce the terms of the judgment, as a judgment, after December 5, 1994. In 1999, Robert reaffirmed the will that was probated at his death in 2000. At that time, Robert was no longer constrained by the judgment, as a judgment, in regard to what posthumous distribution he chose for his property. As we have noted throughout, Robert had contractual obligations that remained. However, those obligations were litigated and payment was made for them in the Florida probate proceedings. Accordingly, the adult children's action now before us is precluded by § 893.40.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 138. I write separately for three reasons: (1) I conclude that the plaintiffs' claim against LaBudde, *396based on aiding and abetting Robert in allegedly violating a provision of a 1974 divorce judgment that required him to will two-thirds of his net estate to his three adult children, fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted because the estate planning provision of the divorce judgment exceeded the circuit court's subject matter jurisdiction; (2) I conclude that LaBudde was immune from liability in drafting Robert's 1992 will because LaBudde proceeded in a good faith belief that the provision in the 1974 divorce judgment that required estate planning in favor of the adult children was void from its inception, as a judgment; and (3) I conclude that even if I were to assume, arguendo, that the directive to make a will in the 1974 divorce judgment were enforceable when made, Wis. Stat. § 893.40, a 20-year statute of repose, precluded actions on the divorce judgment after December 5, 1994. Therefore, the divorce judgment had no effect, as a judgment, in 1999 when Robert reaffirmed the will that he made in 1992, and it had no effect at his death in 2000. As a result, the aiding and abetting claim against LaBudde must be dismissed. Because the majority opinion concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that addresses the aiding and abetting claim.
¶ 139. I am authorized to state that Justice ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence/dissent.

 Majority op., ¶ 84.

 The stipulation that was incorporated into the 1974 divorce judgment is attached to the complaint.

 The Settlement Agreement for the Estate of Robert C. Tensfeldt is attached to the affidavit of Robert William Tensfeldt in support of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

 Claims were made against Haberman in the complaint, but because I agree with the resolution of those claims by the majority opinion, I do not list them here.

 Majority op., ¶¶ 83-84.

 Id.

 Id., 1 3.

 Cross-Appellants' brief at 31-32.

 Id. at 31, 33.

 Id. at 12.

 Id.

 Cross-Respondents' brief at 19.

 Id. at 24.

 Majority op., ¶ 3.

 The majority opinion concludes that because Wis. Stat. § 247.10 (1973-74) permitted the divorce stipulation that is under review here, that statutory provision expanded the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court to comport with the terms of the parties' stipulation. Majority op., ¶¶ 34-35. The majority opinion's conclusion is erroneous for at least two reasons: (1) it ignores at least 69 years of precedent, which uniformly has concluded that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a court by agreement of the parties, see Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 84 Wis. 2d 504, 515-16, 267 N.W.2d 609 (1978); State ex rel. Gaudynski v. Pruss, 233 Wis. 600, 606, 290 N.W. 289 (1940); and (2) it ignores Wis. Stat. § 247.26 (1973-74), which specifically directed to whom property division may be made. Section 247.26 (1973-74) provided that a circuit court sitting in a divorce action "may also finally divide and distribute the estate, both real and personal, of either party between the parties." § 247.26 (1973-74) (emphasis added). Nothing in § 247.10 (1973-74) even implies that the division of property in a divorce can be made in favor of one who is not a party to the divorce action, an interpretation that would otherwise trump the explicit directive of § 247.26 (1973-74). Rather, § 247.10 (1973-74) simply permitted the parties to present to the court their agreement on how their property should be divided between them.
*380The majority opinion's careless conclusion that a stipulation between the parties can expand the subject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court sitting in divorce is particularly troubling because stipulations continue to be permitted in divorce judgments. Wis. Stat. § 767.251(1) (2007-08). Therefore, the majority opinion's conclusion in this case will affect a dramatic sea change in Wisconsin, if the majority opinion truly means to conclude that parties can expand the subject matter jurisdiction of a circuit court by agreement.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 52.10 (1973-74) contained the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968.

 Majority op., ¶ 34.

 Majority op., ¶¶ 35, 46-48.

 Schmitz v. Schmitz, 70 Wis. 2d 882, 236 N.W.2d 657 (1975), provides further support for my conclusion that the parties to a divorce action cannot stipulate to expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. In Schmitz, the parties stipulated at the time of the divorce that Harold would pay $15 per week per child until each child reached 21 years of age. Id. at 884. Five years later the legislature changed the age of majority to 18. Id. Harold stopped paying for those children who had turned 18, and we upheld his decision, notwithstanding the parties' stipulation that Harold pay for each child until the child reached 21. Id. at 884, 891. In so concluding, we explained that it was the legislature, not the parties, that established the authority of the circuit court sitting in a divorce. Id. at 891.

 The majority also cites to Ross v. Ross, 149 Wis. 2d 713, 439 N.W.2d 639 (Ct. App. 1989), to support the same arguments it makes using Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d 635, 178 N.W.2d 35 (1970). Majority op., ¶¶ 49-50. I do not disagree that under *386these cases Robert likely could have been estopped from contesting the validity of the provision requiring him to execute a will in favor of his adult children. However, neither of these cases estops LaBudde from arguing that that provision of the judgment was void here, and the violation of a void judgment cannot be an unlawful act.

 In order to successfully assert estoppel one must address the following:
(1) Was the promise one which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee?
(2) Did the promise induce such action or forbearance?
(3) Can injustice be avoided only by enforcement of the promise?
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 698, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).

 A lawyer does not act unlawfully when he assists a client with actions that may breach a contractual obligation of the client. Rather, if the contract of a client is breached, the client pays damages. Benderson Dev. Co. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 998 F.2d 959, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (concluding that the Postal Service, "like any contracting party obtains the right to perform or to breach its contractual obligations"); 30 E. End v. World Steel Prods. Corp., 110 N.Y.S.2d 754, 757 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1952) (concluding that the breach of a contract is not "wrongful or unlawful"). Robert's contractual obligations with respect to the adult children have already been litigated, and the adult children have been paid in full for their claim of breach of contract. See supra note 3.

 The adult children agreed that after certain payments to Constance, the distribution to them of "the remaining balance of the estate, outright and free of further trust, [is] in full satisfaction of their claim under the Divorce Decree." Florida Settlement Agreement for the Estate of Robert C. Tensfeldt.

 Cross-Appellants' brief at 31.

 Majority op., ¶ 36.

 Id., ¶ 37 (citing State v. Ramsay, 16 Wis. 2d 154, 165, 114 N.W.2d 118 (1962) and Cline v. Whitaker, 144 Wis. 439, 439, 129 N.W. 400 (1911)).

 In Bliwas, we estopped Arnold Bliwas from contesting the validity of the order that incorporated his stipulation. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d at 640.

 As explained above, LaBudde had advised Robert that the stipulation created only a contractual obligation.

 As I explained above, breaching a contract is not committing an illegal act. When one breaches a contract, one pays damages. See supra note 22. Paying damages for the breach of a contract to make a will is what the Florida court ordered. Tensfeldt v. Tensfeldt, 839 So. 2d 720, 721-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).

 Majority op., ¶ 37.

 The majority opinion says, "there is no claim that the divorce court lacked jurisdiction." Id., ¶ 42. It also opines that "[e]ven if LaBudde believed that the judgment exceeded the divorce court's authority under the 1974 statutes, the only lawful courses of action were to follow the judgment, to ask the court to modify it, or to appeal the judgment." Id. With all due respect, the majority opinion is wrong on the facts and on the law. LaBudde has consistently maintained that the divorce court was without power to order Robert to maintain a will in favor of the adult children, and that Robert's obligation to the adult children was contractual in nature. Furthermore, the law in Wisconsin does not require compliance with a void judgment. Ramsey, 16 Wis. 2d at 165.

 Cross-Appellant's brief at 35-36. The majority opinion asserts that the word "void" does not appear in LaBudde's brief. Majority op., ¶ 43 n.19. However, "void" is an apt term to describe a judgment that was unenforceable as a judgment from its inception, as LaBudde asserts here. Stasey v. Miller, 168 Wis. 2d 37, 61, 483 N.W.2d 221 (1992).

 Majority op., ¶ 58.

 Cross-Appellants' brief at 12, 32.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 846.04 applies to mortgage foreclosures and Wis. Stat. § 893.415 applies to actions to collect child support or family support. Neither provision has any relevance to the claims of the adult children.