Court Opinion

ID: 9947883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 20:11:24.006118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:40.669520
License: Public Domain

FILED

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE MAR 05 2024
AT KNOXVILLE Rey ‘s the Appellate Courts
November 15, 2023 Session :

BLAKELE BAKKER, M.D. v. CHATTANOOGA-HAMILTON COUNTY
HOSPITAL AUTHORITY D/B/A ERLANGER HEALTH SYSTEM

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County
No. 19C638 W. Jeffrey Hollingsworth, Judge

No. E2022-00872-COA-R3-CV

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant hospital in this
premises liability case, finding that the defendant had no notice of the alleged dangerous
or defective condition on its premises. The plaintiff has appealed. Following our review,
we determine that the plaintiff was not provided notice and a reasonable opportunity to
respond to all issues to be considered by the trial court at the summary judgment stage.
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
Vacated; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL
SWINEY, C.J., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.

G. Brent Burks and Kathleen M. Reed, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant,
Blakele Bakker, M.D.

Daniel M. Stefaniuk and Christopher R. Ramsey, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the
appellee, Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health
System.

OPINION
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On May 30, 2019, the plaintiff, Blakele Bakker, M.D., filed a premises liability

action against the defendant, Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority d/b/a
Erlanger Health System (“Erlanger”), in the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“trial

court”). Dr. Bakker stated that on January 3, 2019, she was employed as a resident
physician providing medical services at Erlanger when she had occasion to treat a patient
in “High Risk Perinatal Room 20.” Dr. Bakker alleged that the patient in Room 20 was
“hooked up to a sequential compression device causing the cords to pool at the foot of the
bed, creating a dangerous pathway for use by ordinary and prudent persons.”! According
to Dr. Bakker, when she attempted to exit the room while exercising reasonable care, her
feet became tangled in the cords or tubes and she fell, suffering severe injury to her right
ankle.

Dr. Bakker averred that Erlanger was aware of the unreasonably dangerous
condition created by the sequential compression device cords and tubing and that
Erlanger had taken no steps to cure or warn of this dangerous condition. Dr. Bakker
therefore alleged that Erlanger was negligent and had caused Dr. Bakker to suffer injuries
and damages, including pain, suffering, and loss of earnings. Dr. Bakker sought
compensatory damages in the amount of $300,000 from Erlanger.

On June 19, 2019, Dr. Bakker filed an amended complaint, adding the assertion
that quasi-governmental immunity should be removed pursuant to the provisions of the
Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), specifically Tennessee Code
Annotated §§ 29-20-203 and -204, because Erlanger owned and controlled the premises
whereupon the dangerous condition existed. Erlanger filed an answer on July 31, 2019,
acknowledging that it was a “public nonprofit corporation and governmental hospital
authority.” Erlanger denied that any negligence occurred, that a dangerous condition
existed, or that it had caused Dr. Bakker’s injuries. Erlanger also asserted that because it
was a governmental entity, as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-102, it was
entitled to all privileges, immunities, and defenses set forth therein. Erlanger further
asserted that Dr. Bakker was more than fifty percent at fault for her injuries and that
Erlanger had neither actual nor constructive notice of the alleged dangerous or defective
condition.

On January 14, 2021, Erlanger filed a motion seeking the trial court’s permission
to file documents under seal. Erlanger stated that it intended to file a summary judgment
motion, which could contain information that might be construed as protected health
information of the patient, who was not a party. Erlanger thus sought to file the summary
judgment motion and any related or responsive documents under seal. On January 26,
2021, the trial court entered a protective order allowing such documents to be filed under
seal in order to protect the patient’s privacy.

| The record demonstrates that sequential compression devices are used in order to prevent blood clots
from forming in the patients’ legs. These devices often require the use of both electrical cords and
pneumatic tubing.

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On February 8, 2021, Erlanger filed a motion for summary judgment and
accompanying memorandum under seal. Erlanger concomitantly filed a statement of
undisputed material facts, also under seal. In its motion, Erlanger asserted that Dr.
Bakker could not establish that a dangerous condition existed on the property controlled
by Erlanger so as to remove governmental immunity. Erlanger contended that during her
deposition, Dr. Bakker was unable to identify exactly what caused her fall and could not
remember seeing the cords or tubes on the floor. Instead, according to Erlanger, Dr.
Bakker merely speculated that the patient had pneumatic tubes connected to a sequential
compression device that may have caused Dr. Bakker’s fall. Erlanger further argued that
because Dr. Bakker had walked around the foot of the patient’s bed to access her monitor
before again traversing that area to leave the room, Dr. Bakker was at least fifty percent
at fault for failing to exercise due care.

On February 14, 2022, Dr. Bakker filed a response in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, as well as a statement of disputed material facts and a response to
Erlanger’s statement of undisputed material facts. Dr. Bakker claimed that although she
had walked around the foot of the patient’s bed to access her monitor and would have
necessarily navigated around the pneumatic tubing when doing so, she did not see the
tubes until after her fall because she was focused on the patient. However, Dr. Bakker
acknowledged that she was aware that the patient was using a sequential compression
device. Dr. Bakker further stated that “[a]ny uncertainty as to the cause of the fall was
meant as to the moment of the fall only” because she “realized in the moments after that
her foot wrapped in the pneumatic tubing causing the fall.”

The trial court conducted a hearing concerning the pending summary judgment
motion on March 14, 2022. On May 25, 2022, the trial court entered a “Memorandum
Order” granting summary judgment in favor of Erlanger. In its order, the trial court
stated in pertinent part:

In its motion, Erlanger cites numerous passages from Dr. Bakker’s
deposition in which she says she does not know what caused her to fall.
She states that she assumed that her foot got tangled in the cords, but she
was not certain that that was what happened. Erlanger argues that
speculation cannot be the basis for an issue of fact that would defeat a
motion for summary judgment.

However, in that same deposition, Dr. Bakker, stated starting on
page 50, line 23

“So I stepped into the pneumatic cords that were looped
between the foot of the bed and the wall... .”
“So I stepped into the looped cords that were on the floor and
fell down.”

Although the testimony in which Dr. Bakker says she does not know
why she fell and the testimony quoted above seems to conflict, it would be
up to the jury to decide which version they believe.

However, another essential element of a slip and fall case is notice.
The plaintiff must prove that Erlanger had actual or constructive notice of
the allegedly dangerous condition that caused the fall. Dr. Bakker has not
submitted sufficient admissible evidence to create a factual issue on that
element.

There is no evidence in the record that Erlanger had actual or
constructive knowledge that the pneumatic tubes or electrical cords in
Room 20 of the Perinatal Unit created a dangerous condition on January 3,
2019. In her response, Dr. Bakker submits her own testimony about tubes
and cords at Erlanger, but none of that testimony deals with Room 20 of the
Perinatal Unit. Neither is any of the testimony on the notice issue
admissible.

Rule 56.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states:

“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be
admissible in evidence...”

In her response, Dr. Bakker, attaches, as Exhibit A, excerpts from
her deposition. On page 110 of her deposition, she relates a conversation in
which a nurse named Linda Rogers told her about a fall Ms. Rogers
suffered after tripping over a cord. That is hearsay and not admissible
evidence,

On page 111, Dr. Bakker relates stories told to her by other
unidentified nurses of cords not properly stored in ORs. Again this is
hearsay testimony and is not related, in any way, to Room 20 on January 3,
2019.

On page 112, she admits that when she saw cords in what she
considered an inappropriate place, she did not report the situation to
anyone.
On page 114, she relates statements by unidentified persons that
more attention was paid to cords to prevent another accident like Dr.
Bakker’s.

In short, there is no evidence that Erlanger had notice of a dangerous
condition in Room 20 of the Perinatal Unit on or before January 3, 2019.

Therefore, summary judgment is Granted and all claims asserted by
Dr. Bakker against Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority d/b/a
Erlanger Health System are Dismissed with prejudice.

On June 3, 2022, Dr. Bakker filed a motion, pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure 52 and 59, seeking reconsideration of the trial court’s findings and ruling. Dr.
Bakker postulated that because the issue of Erlanger’s alleged lack of notice had not been
raised, Dr. Bakker’s obligation to respond had not been triggered. On June 9, 2022,
Erlanger filed a motion to alter or amend, also pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure 52 and 59. In its motion, Erlanger sought an amendment to the court’s opinion
to add as additional bases for the grant of summary judgment: (1) Dr. Bakker’s purported
failure to present any admissible evidence that demonstrated a genuine dispute of
material fact as to the dangerous and defective condition and causation elements of her
claim and (2) Dr. Bakker’s comparative fault.

On June 28, 2022, Dr. Bakker filed a notice of appeal. The following day, the trial
court entered an order denying the parties’ respective post-judgment motions filed
pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 59.

II. Issues Presented

Dr. Bakker presents the following issues for our review, which we have restated
slightly:

ls Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in
favor of Erlanger predicated on Erlanger’s lack of notice of a
dangerous condition without affording Dr. Bakker a reasonable
opportunity to respond.

2. Whether the trial court erred by raising grounds for summary
judgment sua sponte.

34 Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in
favor of Erlanger when genuine issues of material fact existed.
4. Whether the trial court erred by impermissibly weighing the
evidence when considering the summary judgment motion.

Erlanger raises the following additional issues:

a Whether the trial court erred by declining to grant summary
judgment in Erlanger’s favor on the alternate basis that Dr.
Bakker failed to prove that a dangerous or defective condition
existed and caused her injuries.

6. Whether the trial court erred by declining to grant summary
judgment in Erlanger’s favor based on the doctrine of comparative
fault.

Ill. Standard of Review

The grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law;
therefore, our standard of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Rye
v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015); Dick
Broad. Co. of Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 671 (Tenn. 2013) (citing
Kinsler v. Berkline, LLC, 320 S.W.3d 796, 799 (Tenn. 2010)). As such, this Court must
“make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 250. As our Supreme
Court has explained concerning the requirements for a movant to prevail on a motion for
summary judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56:

[W]hen the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the
moving party may satisfy its burden of production either (1) by
affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim
or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the
summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s
claim or defense. We reiterate that a moving party seeking summary
judgment by attacking the nonmoving party’s evidence must do more than
make a conclusory assertion that summary judgment is appropriate on this
basis. Rather, Tennessee Rule 56.03 requires the moving party to support
its motion with “a separate concise statement of material facts as to which
the moving party contends there is no genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 56.03. “Each fact is to be set forth in a separate, numbered
paragraph and supported by a specific citation to the record.” Jd. When
such a motion is made, any party opposing summary judgment must file a
response to each fact set forth by the movant in the manner provided in
Tennessee Rule 56.03. “[W]hen a motion for summary judgment is made
[and] . . . supported as provided in [Tennessee Rule 56],” to survive

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summary judgment, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of [its] pleading,” but must respond, and by affidavits
or one of the other means provided in Tennessee Rule 56, “set forth specific
facts” at the summary judgment stage “showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06. The nonmoving party “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. [574,] 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348,
[89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)]. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the
existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of
fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party. If a summary judgment
motion is filed before adequate time for discovery has been provided, the
nonmoving party may seek a continuance to engage in additional discovery
as provided in Tennessee Rule 56.07. However, after adequate time for
discovery has been provided, summary judgment should be granted if the
nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient
to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Tenn.
R. Civ. P. 56.04, 56.06. The focus is on the evidence the nonmoving party
comes forward with at the summary judgment stage, not on hypothetical
evidence that theoretically could be adduced, despite the passage of
discovery deadlines, at a future trial.

Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264-65. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, the
trial court must “state the legal grounds upon which the court denies or grants the
motion” for summary judgment, and our Supreme Court has instructed that the trial court
must state these grounds “before it invites or requests the prevailing party to draft a
proposed order.” See Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., 439 8.W.3d 303, 316 (Tenn. 2014).
“Whether the nonmoving party is a plaintiff or a defendant—and whether or not the
nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial on the challenged claim or defense—at
the summary judgment stage, ‘[t]he nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of
specific facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the
nonmoving party.’” TWB Architects, Inc. v. The Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 879, 889
(Tenn. 2019) (quoting Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265).

IV. Propriety of Grant of Summary Judgment

Dr. Bakker asserts that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in
favor of Erlanger based on Erlanger’s lack of constructive notice of the purported
dangerous condition presented by the pneumatic tubes or cords. Dr. Bakker argues that
because Erlanger never raised this argument as a basis for summary judgment in its
pleadings, she was not afforded notice of this issue and a reasonable opportunity to
respond. She further contends that it was error for the trial court to raise this issue sua
sponte. Erlanger urges that the grant of summary judgment was proper and also argues

7 -
that the trial court should have found lack of proof of the existence of a dangerous
condition and comparative fault as additional bases for its summary judgment ruling.

At the outset, we note that governmental entities, such as Erlanger, possess
sovereign immunity from lawsuits except as they consent to be sued.? See Hawks v. City
of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn. 1997). The GTLA, codified at Tennessee
Code Annotated §§ 29-20-101, et seg. (2012 & Supp. 2023), governs claims against
governmental entities. See Hawks, 960 S.W.2d at 14. As our Supreme Court has
explained:

[T]he Legislature enacted the GTLA, which reaffirmed generally the grant
of sovereign immunity provided at common law and in the Tennessee
Constitution by stating that “all governmental entities shall be immune
from suit for any injury which may result from the activities of such
governmental entities wherein such governmental entities are engaged in
the exercise and discharge of any of their functions, governmental or
proprietary.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(a). However, in addition to
reaffirming the general grant of immunity, the GITLA also enumerates
certain statutory exceptions where governmental immunity is specifically
removed. Jd. § 29-20-202 [through -205.]

Young v. City of LaFollette, 479 S.W.3d 785, 790 (Tenn. 2015) (additional internal
citations omitted). Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-204(a) (2012),
“lijmmunity from suit of a governmental entity is removed for injury caused by the
dangerous or defective condition of any public building, structure, . . . or other public
improvement . . . owned and controlled by such governmental entity.” In addition,
Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-204(b) provides that “[iJmmunity is not removed for
latent defective conditions, nor shall this section apply unless constructive and/or actual
notice to the governmental entity of such condition be alleged and proven[.]”

The GTLA “codifies the common law obligations of owners and occupiers of
property embodied in premises liability law.” See Lindgren v. Johnson Cty., 88 S.W.3d
581, 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). These obligations include an affirmative duty of care to
“protect against dangers of which one knows or which, with reasonable care, might
discover.” Jd. “Because of their superior knowledge of the condition of the premises,
owners and occupiers of property, including owners and occupiers of public property,
owe persons lawfully on their property the duty of reasonable care under all the
circumstances.” Sears v. Metro. Nashville Airport Auth., No. 01A01-9703-CV-00138,
1999 WL 536341, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 27, 1999) (citing McCormick v. Waters, 594
S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tenn. 1980); see Jones v. Exxon Corp., 940 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1996)). This duty includes the duty either to remove dangerous conditions on their

2 Erlanger concedes that it is considered a governmental entity subject to the provisions of the GTLA.

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premises or to warn persons about dangerous conditions that the owner knows or should
know about. Sears, 1999 WL 536341 at *4, It does not include the duty to remove or to
warn about conditions from which no unreasonable risk could be anticipated or
conditions that the owner or occupier neither knew about nor could have reasonably
discovered. Id.

This Court has identified four elements required for a successful premises liability
claim against a governmental entity:

(1) proof that the governmental entity owns and controls the premises
where the injury occurred;

(2) proof that a dangerous or defective condition, or in the case of
sidewalks and streets an unsafe condition, caused the injury;

(3) proof that the governmental entity had “constructive and/or actual
notice” of the condition; and

(4) proof that the governmental entity breached its duty either to remove
or eliminate the dangerous condition or to provide adequate
warnings of the condition’s existence.

Huskey v. Rhea Cnty., No. E2012-02411-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 4807038, at *5 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2013); Sears, 1999 WL 536341, at *5 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-
20-203(b), -204(b)).

In the case at bar, the trial court concluded in its May 25, 2022 order that Dr.
Bakker had presented a jury question concerning whether a dangerous condition existed
at Erlanger on the date of her injury. The court noted that although Dr. Bakker had
testified at various times in her deposition that she “assumed that her foot got tangled in
the cords, but she was not certain that was what happened,” she had also testified that she
had stepped into the looped cords on the floor and fell down. Accordingly, the court
concluded that “it would be up to the jury to decide which version [of Dr. Bakker’s
testimony] they believe.” Ergo, the court found that Dr. Bakker had satisfied the first two
elements of a premises liability claim at the summary judgment stage.

With regard to the third element of such a claim, proof that the governmental
entity had “constructive and/or actual notice” of the condition, the trial court determined
that Dr. Bakker had presented no evidence that “Erlanger had notice of a dangerous
condition in Room 20 of the Perinatal Unit on or before January 3, 2019.” On appeal, Dr.
Bakker argues that the trial court erred by relying on this element as a predicate for
granting summary judgment in favor of Erlanger when Erlanger did not raise the notice

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element as a basis for summary judgment. Following our review of the appellate record,
we agree.

In Erlanger’s motion for summary judgment, Erlanger failed to raise its lack of
actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition as a basis for summary
judgment. Erlanger also failed to include any statements concerning lack of notice in its
statement of undisputed material facts. During the summary judgment hearing, the trial
court questioned counsel regarding this issue, and the following exchange occurred:

Trial Court: Is notice an issue in this motion? I looked
through it quickly, but —

Dr. Bakker’s counsel: They’ve not alleged it.

Erlanger’s counsel: Your Honor, ultimately, there are a lot of issues

in this case, but this is the—this is where we’re
dealing with as far as summary judgment,
where we have undisputed material facts.

Trial Court: Okay. All right. And notice—if necessary,
notice would be contested at trial?

Erlanger’s counsel: Yeah, there would be—I mean, there are all the
elements that would be the burden for the
plaintiff to prove.

Trial Court: Okay. But it’s not part—it is not—has not been
raised in this motion?

Erlanger’s counsel: Correct, Your Honor.

Trial Court: Notice has not? I thought not, but I wanted to
make sure I hadn’t missed something. Okay.
Thank you.

We emphasize that pursuant to the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 56:

[W]hen the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the
moving party may satisfy its burden of production either (1) by
affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim
or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the
summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s

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claim or defense. We reiterate that a moving party seeking summary
judgment by attacking the nonmoving party’s evidence must do more than
make a conclusory assertion that summary judgment is appropriate on this
basis. Rather, Tennessee Rule 56.03 requires the moving party to support
its motion with “a separate concise statement of material facts as to which
the moving party contends there is no genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 56.03. “Each fact is to be set forth in a separate, numbered
paragraph and supported by a specific citation to the record.” Jd. When
such a motion is made, any party opposing summary judgment must file a
response to each fact set forth by the movant in the manner provided in
Tennessee Rule 56.03.

Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264-65. Moreover, as this Court has clarified:

The statements of material facts submitted by the parties on a motion
for summary judgment are “intended to alert the court to precisely what
factual questions are in dispute and point the court to specific evidence in
the record that supports a party’s position on each of these questions. They
are, in short, roadmaps, and without them the court should not have to
proceed further, regardless of how readily it might be able to distill the
relevant information from the record on its own.”

Holland v. City of Memphis, 125 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Owens
y. Bristol Motor Speedway, Inc., 77 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)).

In this case, Erlanger failed to raise the notice issue in its motion for summary
judgment, and it provided no statements of undisputed material fact concerning its
alleged lack of notice. In addition, Erlanger acknowledged during the summary judgment
hearing that it was not relying on lack of notice as a basis for the grant of summary
judgment, conceding that this was an issue that it would address at trial if necessary. As
such, the trial court erred by relying on Erlanger’s purported lack of notice as the basis
for its grant of summary judgment.

This Court has previously held that a trial court cannot raise issues sua sponte
when granting summary judgment except in “rare cases and with meticulous care.” See
Owens v. Vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr., No. M2021-01273-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL
3522326, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 2023) (quoting Griffis v. Davidson Cnty. Metro.
Gov’t, 164 S.W.3d 267, 284 (Tenn. 2005); Thomas v. Transp. Ins. Co., 532 S.W.2d 263,
266 (Tenn. 1976)). Rather, the nonmoving party “must be ‘given notice and a reasonable
opportunity to respond to all issues to be considered by the court.’”” Owens, 2023 WL
3522326, at *3 (quoting Mar. Grp., Inc. v. Bellar, 908 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1995)).

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In Owens, a health care liability action, the defendant hospital sought a grant of
summary judgment on the sole basis that the plaintiffs proffered standard of care expert
was not competent to testify pursuant to the applicable statute. See Owens, 2023 WL
3522326, at *3. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, determining
that the plaintiff's proffered standard of care expert was not qualified pursuant to the
statute and also that her testimony was inadmissible pursuant to Tennessee Rules of
Evidence 702 and 703. See id. On appeal, this Court found that ruling to be erroneous
inasmuch as the plaintiff “had no notice and no opportunity to respond to an admissibility
challenge to [her expert’s] testimony.” See id.

Similarly, here, Dr. Bakker was provided neither notice of nor an opportunity to
respond to the issue of Erlanger’s alleged lack of actual or constructive notice of the
dangerous condition. Erlanger’s motion for summary judgment relied solely on its
arguments that no liability could attach because no dangerous condition existed and
because Dr. Bakker was more than fifty percent at fault. Erlanger does not mention the
issue of its alleged lack of notice in either its motion or the accompanying statement of
undisputed material facts. Instead, the trial court raised and addressed this issue of its
own accord despite Erlanger’s acknowledgement during the summary judgment hearing
that it was not relying on such as a predicate for summary judgment. Accordingly, the
trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on Erlanger’s alleged lack of notice was
erroneous. See id.

On appeal, Erlanger contends that the issue of notice was “voluntarily injected”
into the summary judgment proceeding by Dr. Bakker’s responsive statement of disputed
material facts wherein Dr. Bakker stated, inter alia, that Erlanger was “aware of the
unreasonably dangerous condition created by sequential compression device tubes and
cords” and “was aware of the need to cure this problem.” We reiterate, however, that
Erlanger did not maintain this position in the trial court. Instead, when questioned about
Erlanger’s reliance on the issue of lack of notice at the summary judgment hearing,
Erlanger’s counsel replied that notice was not an issue and was not being relied on as a
basis for the grant of summary judgment. Erlanger cannot now maintain an inconsistent
position on appeal. See Estate of Schultz v. Munford, Inc., 650 §.W.2d 37, 40 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1982) (holding that a party “cannot take a position on appeal inconsistent with that
taken in the trial of the case.”); Price v. Tenn. Prod. & Chem. Corp., 385 $.W.2d 301,
307 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (“When a cause is brought up for appellate review, a party
cannot assume an attitude inconsistent with, or different from, that taken by him at the
trial.”); Bradley Cnty. v. City of Cleveland, No. E2012-00634-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL
5333555, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2012) (“A party is not allowed to take one
position in the trial court and then take a contrary position on appeal.”).

Erlanger also posits that the trial court erred by declining to grant summary
judgment in Erlanger’s favor on the alternate bases of (1) Dr. Bakker’s alleged failure to
prove that a dangerous or defective condition existed and (2) comparative fault.

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Respecting Dr. Bakker’s proof concerning the existence of a dangerous condition,
Erlanger asserts that the trial court erred in relying on Dr. Bakker’s testimony because it
was in conflict. Erlanger points out that in certain portions of her deposition testimony,
Dr. Bakker testified the pneumatic tubes caused her fall while at other times, she stated
that she was unsure of what caused her to fall. Having reviewed the evidence in the light
most favorable to Dr. Bakker as the non-movant, however, we disagree with Erlanger’s
contentions.

Erlanger relies on what Tennessee courts have termed the “cancellation rule,”
which provides that a witness’s contradictory statements of fact “cancel each other out
and force us to disregard them as a matter of law.” See Ayers by Ayers v. Rutherford
Hosp., Inc., 689 S.W.2d 155, 162 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); see also Tibbals Flooring Co. v.
Stanfill, 410 S.W.2d 892, 896 (Tenn. 1967) (“Contradictory statements of a witness in
connection with the same fact have a result of cancelling out each other.”). However, as
this Court has also explained with regard to the cancellation rule in a summary judgment
context:

Tennessee follows the rule that contradictory statements by the same
witness regarding a single fact cancel each other out. The Tennessee
Supreme Court has characterized mutually contradictory statements by the
same witness as “no evidence” of the fact sought to be proved. See
Johnston v. Cincinnati N.O. & T.P. Ry., 146 Tenn. 135, 160, 240 S.W. 429,
436 (1922). However, in order to be disregarded under the so-called
cancellation rule, the allegedly contradictory statements must be
unexplained and neither statement can be corroborated by other competent
evidence. When the cancellation rule is invoked at the summary judgment
stage to challenge evidence opposing the motion, the courts must view the
challenged evidence in the light most favorable to the opponent of the
motion.

Church v. Perales, 39 S.W.3d 149, 169-70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (other internal citations
omitted).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Dr. Bakker, we conclude that
the trial court did not err in declining to grant summary judgment on the basis that Dr.
Bakker’s deposition statements “canceled each other out.” In her February 2022 affidavit
filed in opposition to the summary judgment motion, Dr. Bakker explained that what she
had attempted to convey in her deposition was that although she was unsure of what was
happening at the “exact moment” of her fall because she was looking at the patient rather
than the floor, she knew that she felt a “tug” on her leg that caused her to trip. Dr.
Bakker further explained that in the moments following her fall when she was lying on
the ground, she determined that the only possible cause of her fall was the tubing running
across the floor from the sequential compression device. As the trial court pointed out in

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its order, Dr. Bakker testified that she “stepped into the looped cords that were on the
floor and fell down.” Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the evidence is
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether a dangerous
condition existed on the date of Dr. Bakker’s injury.

With reference to comparative fault, we note that the trial court made no
determination concerning this issue in its judgment. Accordingly, we cannot address this
issue for the first time on appeal. Appellate courts are courts “of appeals and errors,”
“limited in authority to the adjudication of issues that are presented and decided in the
trial courts.” Dorrier v. Dark, 537 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tenn. 1976). We therefore decline
to address this issue in the absence of the trial court’s adjudication thereof.

Having determined that Dr. Bakker was not “given notice and a reasonable
opportunity to respond to all issues to be considered by the court” at the summary
judgment stage, see Owens, 2023 WL 3522326, at *3, we conclude that the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Erlanger must be vacated.

V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this

Opinion. Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellee, Chattanooga-Hamilton County
Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health System.

Thomas R. Frierson, II

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE

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