Court Opinion

ID: 9382076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 20:00:40.08516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.913316
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-12800    Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 03/24/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-12800
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        JAMES BATMASIAN,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 0:08-cr-60089-KAM-1
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                 21-12800

        Before BRANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON, ∗ District
        Judge.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
               Pardoned felon James Batmasian appeals the district court’s
        denial of his motion to expunge the records of his criminal
        conviction. Batmasian argues that the district court erred in
        concluding that, (1) it lacked jurisdiction over his claim; and (2)
        even if it had jurisdiction, the merits of his motion did not warrant
        expungement. After oral argument and consideration of the record
        below, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction over
        Batmasian’s motion. However, because the district court assumed
        that it had jurisdiction and evaluated and denied Batmasian’s
        motion on the merits, we vacate and remand with instructions to
        dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
                                   I.     Background
               In April 2008, the United States charged James Batmasian
        with failure to pay federal withholding taxes in violation of 26
        U.S.C. § 7202. Batmasian pleaded guilty, and the district court
        sentenced him to eight months imprisonment, two years of
        supervised release, and a $30,000 fine. After Batmasian completed
        his sentence and paid his fine, Florida Governor Rick Scott restored

        ∗ Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the Middle
        District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        21-12800               Opinion of the Court                         3

        his civil rights in March 2017, and President Donald Trump issued
        him a complete pardon in December 2020.
                In April 2021, after receiving the presidential pardon,
        Batmasian filed with the district court in the same criminal action
        as his underlying conviction a “verified motion to expunge and seal
        judicial records after a Presidential Pardon.” Batmasian, self-
        described as a person of extraordinary wealth with a history of
        charitable giving, alleged that he was denied participation in many
        philanthropic efforts because of his conviction. Despite the
        presidential pardon and the restoration of his civil rights, Batmasian
        claimed that the conviction “continue[d] to cause exceptional
        difficulties and hardships” to his “pioneering philanthropic
        endeavors and the desire to be proactive with . . . charity.” For
        example, he explained that a Florida university had declined his
        offer to endow a “Real Estate Chair,” that a Bill Gates charity called
        “The Giving Pledge” had not processed his application to be a
        participant, that several charities had removed him from their
        boards of directors, and that a charity he founded had not received
        any grant funding. Batmasian alleged that “[o]nly with the
        expungement can [he] exercise his basic legal right of charitable
        giving to the fullest extent possible.”
                In his expungement motion, Batmasian asserted that federal
        district courts have the “inherent equitable power ancillary to their
        criminal jurisdiction” to order the expungement of criminal
        records. The government responded, arguing that the district
        court should deny the motion because it lacked jurisdiction to hear
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                 21-12800

        it, citing the Supreme Court’s analysis of the limited reach of
        ancillary jurisdiction in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co.
        of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994). In reply, Batmasian asserted that
        the district court had ancillary jurisdiction over his request, arguing
        for the first time that his motion to expunge was based, at least in
        part, on constitutional, rather than purely equitable, grounds—
        namely, “his [c]onstitutionally protected rights to dispose of his
        wealth.”
               The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to
        hear the request for expungement. The district court then assumed
        that it had the authority to consider the motion, evaluated the
        motion, and denied the motion on the merits. Batmasian appeals
        the district court’s decision.
                                   II.     Discussion
               Batmasian argues that the district court had ancillary
        jurisdiction to hear his expungement motion because his request
        was “based entirely on the constitutional impairment that his
        [c]onviction causes on his First Amendment rights to give away his
        wealth and participate with the benefitted charities.” We disagree
        and hold the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Batmasian’s
        expungement motion.
              “We review de novo a district court’s determination of
        whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.” Gupta v. McGahey,
        709 F.3d 1062, 1064–65 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Bender v.
        Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (“[E]very
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        21-12800                Opinion of the Court                         5

        federal appellate court has a special obligation to ‘satisfy itself not
        only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a
        cause under review. . . .’” (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S.
        237, 244 (1934))). When an appellant fails to challenge properly on
        appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its
        judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that
        ground. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680
        (11th Cir. 2014).
                As “[a] court[] of limited jurisdiction,” a federal court
        “possess[es] only that power authorized by [the] Constitution and
        statute[s], which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.”
        Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (internal citations omitted). Indeed, “[i]t
        is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction,
        and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party
        asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
                As Batmasian acknowledges, no federal statute authorizes
        district courts to hear the type of expungement motion he brings.
        Instead, Batmasian relies on the doctrine of “ancillary jurisdiction,
        which recognizes federal courts’ jurisdiction over some matters
        (otherwise beyond their competence) that are incidental to other
        matters properly before them.” Id. at 378.
               In Kokkonen, the Supreme Court clarified that ancillary
        jurisdiction can be invoked for two limited purposes: “(1) to permit
        disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects
        and degrees, factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to
        function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                       21-12800

        its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Id. at 379–80 (internal
        citations omitted).
               Although expungement was not at issue in Kokkonen,
        courts have consistently applied the Kokkonen framework to
        requests from defendants to utilize their ancillary jurisdiction to
        expunge criminal records. In doing so, courts have evaluated
        requests for two potential forms of expungement under their
        ancillary    jurisdiction—“equitable”      expungement         and
        “constitutional” expungement.
               We first turn to equitable expungements. While Batmasian
        argued below that his request is for an equitable expungement, he
        expressly disclaims any argument for an equitable expungement on
        appeal. 1 Thus, we need not address whether the district court had
        ancillary jurisdiction to hear a motion for an equitable
        expungement.2 Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.

        1 In fact, Batmasian admits in his initial brief that if his “request for
        expungement was equitable, the District Court below would have been
        correct.”
        2 We note that the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
        Circuits have declined to recognize that they have ancillary jurisdiction to hear
        equitable expungement motions in light of Kokkonen. See United States v.
        Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 48–49, 52 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that “Kokkonen
        forecloses any ancillary jurisdiction to order expungement based on [the
        individual’s] proffered equitable reasons”); Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192,
        199 (2d Cir. 2016) (denying jurisdiction to equitably expunge a criminal
        conviction where the “exercise of ancillary jurisdiction . . . [would serve]
        neither of the goals identified in Kokkonen”); United States v. Dunegan, 251
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        21-12800                   Opinion of the Court                                 7

              Instead, Batmasian’s sole contention on appeal is that his
        request is for a constitutional expungement. At the outset, we note

        F.3d 477, 479–80 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying Kokkonen and holding that “a
        District Court does not have the jurisdiction to expunge a criminal record” on
        equitable grounds); United States v. Lucido, 612 F.3d 871, 874–76 (6th Cir.
        2010) (applying Kokkonen and holding that “federal courts lack ancillary
        jurisdiction to consider expungement motions” on equitable grounds); United
        States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying Kokkonen and
        holding that “ancillary jurisdiction does not include a general equitable power
        to expunge judicial records”); United States v. Meyer, 439 F.3d 855, 860 (8th
        Cir. 2006) (holding “that post-Kokkonen a motion to expunge a criminal
        record that is based solely on equitable grounds does not invoke the ancillary
        jurisdiction of the district court”); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014
        (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Kokkonen and holding that “district court[s] [do not
        have] the power to expunge a record of a valid arrest and conviction solely for
        equitable considerations”).
                To our knowledge, only the Tenth Circuit has come to the opposite
        conclusion post-Kokkonen. See Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d
        1214, 1234–35 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is well settled in this circuit that courts
        have inherent equitable authority to order the expungement of an arrest
        record or a conviction in rare or extreme circumstances.”). But Camfield
        relied on longstanding Tenth Circuit precedent established before the
        Supreme Court’s decision in Kokkonen, and Camfield does not address or
        reference Kokkonen. Further, the issue in Camfield was whether the district
        court had the ability to expunge specific identifying information from a police
        report, so the more general statement about the expungement of arrest
        records or convictions was not central to the Court’s holding and was
        therefore dicta.
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                      21-12800

        that, post-Kokkonen, no circuit has expressly embraced ancillary
        jurisdiction for constitutional expungement requests. 3
               Batmasian is indeed correct that several sister circuits have,
        however, recognized that ancillary jurisdiction might exist for
        constitutional expungements. For example, in United States v.
        Field, the Sixth Circuit alluded to this possibility when it rejected

        3 Although unclear, Batmasian appears to assert that one circuit has held there
        is jurisdiction for constitutional expungement claims. He cites to United
        States v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006), and claims that Rowlands
        held that “a district court has the inherent authority to expunge records to
        preserve basic legal rights.” This argument is disingenuous, as Rowlands was
        an equitable expungement case where the Third Circuit held that the district
        court had no jurisdiction over the appellant’s motion for an equitable
        expungement. Id. at 179. Specifically, the defendant in Rowlands argued that
        the Third Circuit had jurisdiction over his expungement motion based on the
        Third Circuit’s statement in United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 956 (3d
        Cir. 1990), that, “a federal court has the inherent power to expunge an arrest
        and conviction record.” Id. at 176. The Third Circuit explained in Rowlands
        that the defendant had taken the statement from Noonan out of context,
        noting that in Noonan the Court held that it had jurisdiction over
        expungement motions in certain narrow circumstances, which were not
        present in Noonan’s case. Id. at 177. Importantly, Noonan was decided in
        1990, four years before Kokkonen, and, as the Rowlands Court noted, “the
        cases upon which Noonan relied support[ted] [its subsequent] conclusion [in
        Rowlands] that [it had] jurisdiction over petitions for expungement in narrow
        circumstances: where the validity of the underlying proceeding is being
        challenged.” Id. And while the Rowlands Court did state that it might have
        jurisdiction in such situations, the Court ultimately held that there was no
        jurisdiction over the appellant’s expungement motion, so its statement
        regarding Noonan was dicta. Further, while Rowlands was decided after
        Kokkonen, it does not address or reference Kokkonen.
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        21-12800                   Opinion of the Court                                9

        an appellant’s request to invoke ancillary jurisdiction for an
        equitable expungement, stating that, “post-Kokkonen, federal
        courts lack ancillary jurisdiction over motions for expungement
        based on purely equitable considerations, yet retain ancillary
        jurisdiction over motions challenging an unconstitutional
        conviction.”4 756 F.3d 911, 916 (6th Cir. 2014). But the Sixth
        Circuit went on to clarify that, even where an expungement
        motion “challenges an unconstitutional conviction or illegal
        arrest,” such situations nonetheless require the application of the
        Kokkonen framework—that is, “the assertion of ancillary
        jurisdiction must enable the court to ‘manage its proceedings,
        vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.’” Id. (quoting
        Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380).
              In line with that approach, we hereby apply Kokkonen to
        Batmasian’s request for a constitutional expungement. Since the
        proceedings from Batmasian’s underlying tax offense—the offense
        for which Batmasian brings his expungement claim—concluded

        4 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have each similarly noted a possible avenue
        for a constitutional expungement of an unconstitutional arrest or conviction
        through a district court’s ancillary jurisdiction in cases where they expressly
        disclaimed any ancillary jurisdiction for equitable expungement motions. See
        Meyer, 439 F.3d at 861–62 (“A district court may have ancillary jurisdiction to
        expunge criminal records in extraordinary cases to preserve its ability to
        function successfully by enabling it to correct an injustice caused by an illegal
        or invalid criminal proceeding.”); Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014 (“[A] district
        court’s ancillary jurisdiction is limited to expunging the record of an unlawful
        arrest or conviction . . . .”).
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 21-12800

        more than a decade ago, the invocation of ancillary jurisdiction for
        an expungement of his record so that he can more easily donate to
        charity is not necessary “to permit disposition by a single court of
        claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually
        interdependent,” nor is it necessary for the court to “manage its
        proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.”
        Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80.
               We also agree with Field that the only way ancillary
        jurisdiction might exist for a constitutional expungement is where
        the motion challenges an arrest or conviction as unconstitutional.
        Batmasian is making no such challenge. Thus, Batmasian is
        incorrect that we have ancillary jurisdiction over his so-called
        constitutional expungement claim based on First Amendment
        grounds.
                 Seemingly as a fallback, Batmasian points to broad language
        from several circuits that, he appears to argue, suggests that the
        Constitution may directly provide jurisdiction for an
        expungement, outside the realm of ancillary jurisdiction. See
        Wahi, 850 F.3d at 303 (“Expungement authority must . . . have a
        source in the Constitution or statutes.”); Meyer, 439 F.3d at 861
        (holding that a district court did not have jurisdiction to expunge a
        defendant’s criminal record where he did not allege that his
        “conviction was in any way invalid or illegal nor did he rely on any
        Constitutional provision or statute authorizing . . . a district court
        . . . to expunge his criminal conviction”); Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1010
        (explaining that a district court has the authority to expunge a
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        21-12800                  Opinion of the Court                             11

        criminal record where a statute “or the Constitution itself”
        otherwise provide for such authority). However, despite these
        cursory mentions, no court has ever held that the Constitution
        directly provides jurisdiction to hear any expungement motions.
        As best as we can tell, these circuits are simply rephrasing the
        requirement that federal courts “possess only that power
        authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at
        377. Thus, these courts are not opening up ancillary jurisdiction to
        all expungement motions based on some unspecified constitutional
        provision. As such, even if Batmasian was correct that his
        conviction impaired his “First Amendment rights,”5 the
        Constitution nonetheless does not provide the requisite
        jurisdiction for the district court to hear his expungement motion.
               In sum, no court has ever recognized ancillary jurisdiction
        over a constitutional expungement where the alleged
        constitutional violation was the natural result of an otherwise valid
        arrest or conviction. We do not do so today. Because Batmasian

        5 While we cannot reach the merits of Batmasian’s claim, we note that he fails
        to identify a government action that inhibits this First Amendment right. See
        Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019) (“[T]he
        Free Speech Clause prohibits only governmental abridgement of speech.”)
        Instead, any impediments he may face stem from the actions of private
        parties—both the decisions of private charities and foundations and his own
        illicit behavior that led to his conviction for the tax offense. Without an
        unconstitutional government action, there can be no violation of the First
        Amendment.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                21-12800

        has not satisfied Kokkonen, we do not have ancillary jurisdiction
        over his expungement claim.
                                  III.   Conclusion
               Although the district court correctly noted that it lacked the
        requisite ancillary jurisdiction to hear Batmasian’s expungement
        motion, it ultimately impermissibly evaluated and denied the
        motion on the merits. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s
        decision and remand with instructions to dismiss Batmasian’s
        expungement motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
              VACATED AND REMANDED.