Court Opinion

ID: 9551672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:57:08.334666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:21.984872
License: Public Domain

BROUSSARD, J.
 I concur. I write separately because I would not rest reversal of the judgment solely on the rule that erroneous denial of a competency hearing is reversible error per se. (See People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 521 [58 Cal.Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942].) Instead, I would emphasize the failure of the trial court to take action to prevent “a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship of such magnitude as to jeopardize the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 215 [85 Cal. Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710]; People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 905 [88 Cal.Rptr. 208, 471 P.2d 1008].)
According to Dr. Glenn, the court-appointed psychiatrist, defendant suffered from a paranoid suspicion of the public defender’s office which prevented him from cooperating with the deputy assigned to represent him. As the Chief Justice points out, the trial court on hearing that testimony could have initiated a competency hearing under Penal Code section 1368. If defendant were then found incompetent, he would be institutionalized for treatment to overcome his paranoia and enable him to cooperate with the deputy public defender. (See Pen. Code, § 1370.) But if, as Dr. Glenn’s testimony indicates, defendant was able to cooperate with private counsel, the costly and time-consuming process of competency hearings, institutionalization, and treatment would be unnecessary; the problem could have been resolved easily by substituting counsel unconnected with the public defender’s office.
The trial court neither substituted counsel nor initiated a competency hearing, but* required defendant to go to trial in a capital case with counsel with whom he could not cooperate (according to the psychiatric testimony) and whom he did not trust. This breakdown in the attorney-*96client relationship led to a defense debacle: counsel would not present the defense of identity which defendant wanted, while defendant would not cooperate with the defense of diminished capacity which counsel preferred—a disagreement so strongly felt that defendant physically struck his attorney when counsel refused to join defendant’s motion to strike testimony in support of the diminished capacity defense.
We know from experience that trust and cooperation between client and counsel are essential, that without them even competent counsel may not be able to present an effective case. Thus, “to compel one charged with grievous crime to undergo a trial with the assistance of an attorney with whom he has become embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to deprive him of the effective assistance of any counsel whatsoever.” (Brown v. Craven (9th Cir. 1970) 424 F.2d 1166, 1170.) In accord with that reasoning I concur in reversing the judgment in order to enable defendant, on trial for his life, to be represented by counsel with whom he is able to cooperate in presenting a defense.