Court Opinion

ID: 9756115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:08:01.019368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:12.474010
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
¶26 I agree with sections II, IV, V, and VI of the majority opinion and concur therein. However, I cannot agree with the majority's conclusions that res judicata barred the district court from considering the effects of Corey's bankruptey on Lisa and that Corey was improperly ordered to pay half of the children's reasonable school expenses. Neither of these issues was adequately preserved in the district court, precluding our review of them, but even if they had been preserved I cannot agree with the majority's substantive treatment of them. I would affirm the district court's 2010 modification order in its entirety, and I respectfully dissent from those portions of the majority opinion that reverse the district court's order.
¶27 As a preliminary matter, we should not address either the res judicata issue or the school expenses issue because Corey has failed to preserve these specific issues for appeal.1 The preservation requirements set out by the Utah Supreme Court are clear:
[In order to preserve an issue for appeal{,] the issue must be presented to the trial *532court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] and (8) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. Issues that are not raised at trial are usually deemed waived.
438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Corey did not raise the relevant issues with specificity, nor did he support his arguments with relevant legal authority.
¶28 As to the res judicata issue, I agree with the majority that Corey generally raised the concept of res judicata below by asserting that his bankruptcy had been discussed and ruled on in the 2005 trial. However, the district court made it quite clear that it was not relying on the fact that the bankruptey had occurred but rather on the effects of the bankruptey on Lisa's finances, effects that only occurred after the 2005 trial. Corey never alerted the district court to any argument that the future consequences were fixed at the time of the 2005 trial and therefore could have and should have been fully and fairly litigated at that earlier time.
¶29 Corey's school expenses argument was similarly unpreserved. Corey never informed the district court that an award of school expenses constituted an increase in child support under Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah Ct.App.1994), nor did he object to the district court's failure to enter specific findings justifying its departure from the child support guidelines, see generally In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 60, 201 P.3d 985 ("[A party] waive[s] any argument regarding whether the district court's findings of fact were sufficiently detailed when the [party] fails to challenge the detail, or adequacy, of the findings with the district court." (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In light of Corey's failure to preserve these issues, I would decline to address them. However, the majority opinion does reach the substance of these issues, and in each case reaches what I believe to be an incorrect conclusion.
¶30 The majority applies the general rule of res judicata to the district court's finding of changed cireumstances based on the subsequent effects of Corey's 2003 bankruptcy. However, in light of the district court's "continuing jurisdiction to modify child support obligations," Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct.App.1990), a modification petition need not satisfy the normal rules of res judicata. Rather, a petitioner need only make "a showing of a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself." Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, ¶¶ 11-13, 997 P.2d 903.2
"The fact that the parties may have anticipated [a substantial material change in circumstances] in their own minds or in their discussions does not mean that the [prior order] itself contemplates the change. In order for a material change in cireumstances to be contemplated in a [child support order,] there must be evidence, preferably in the form of a provision within the decree itself, that the trial court anticipated the specific change."
Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, ¶ 13, 997 P.2d 903 (first alteration in original) (quoting Durfee, 796 P.2d at 716). "Accordingly, if both the [prior order] and the record are bereft of any reference to the changed cireumstance at issue in the petition to modify, then the subsequent changed cireumstance was not contemplated in the [prior order]." Id.
¶31 I do not agree with the majority that the 2010 consequences of Corey's bankruptcy were foreseeable with a sufficient degree of certainty at the time of the 2005 trial. But even if they were foreseeable, they were not "contemplated" in the 2005 order because *533"both the [prior order] and the record are bereft of any reference to" the likely effect of Corey's bankruptcy on Lisa's finances.3 See 4d. Accordingly, the district court's decision that the bankruptey's effects on Lisa constituted a substantial change in circumstances is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata and should be affirmed.
¶32 As to the district court's order that Corey reimburse Lisa for half of the children's reasonable school expenses, I agree with the majority that such reimbursement must be treated as additional child support for purposes of compliance with the child support guidelines. See Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955, 959 n. 3 (Utah Ct.App.1994) ("[Wle believe the private school costs are part and parcel of the child support award and have found no authority to the contrary"). However, Utah's child support guidelines merely provide a "rebuttable presumption" of the proper amount of child support, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-210(2)(a) (2008), and the presumption is rebutted by "[a] written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion that ... ordering an award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case," id. § 78B-12-210(8) (emphasis added).
¶33 Looking at the totality of the circumstances of this case, it is clear to me that the district court acted within its discretion in implicitly concluding that limiting Corey's child support payment to the guideline amount would not have been in the children's best interests. The court found that Lisa's annual income was just $15,286, while Corey's was $74,980. The court also found that, due to Corey's bankruptey, "creditors are now seeking to recover funds from [Lisal," that the bankruptey had "materially affected [Lisa's] financial condition," and that, as a result, Corey had "effectively taken from [Lisa] the benefit of her bargain in arriving at the stipulation which forms the basis of the original decree." The district court's clarification of Corey's duty to reimburse medical expenses also suggests that the court credited Lisa's testimony that Corey had delayed or refused to reimburse her for various medical expenses due to a documentation dispute. The school expenses that the district court awarded-lab fees, advanced placement fees, and other such education-related fees-are also clearly reasonable and appropriate. In light of the total picture presented to the district court in this case, it seems to me a fair inference that the district court looked at Lisa's financial condition, as worsened by Corey's actions, and determined that the children would likely be deprived of valuable educational opportunities if Corey's support amount was limited to the amount provided by the guidelines. Such a conclusion surely satisfies the statutory requirement relating to the best interests of the children.4
¶34 To the extent that an express finding that the guidelines do not adequately serve the children's best interests in this case is necessarily required by section 78B-12-210(8), the proper remedy for the district court's failure to make such a finding is not simply reversal, but reversal with remand for the entry of the requisite finding. See Brooks, 881 P.2d at 960. Although I do not believe that Corey preserved this issue, nor do I believe that the district's actual findings were inadequate, if we are to reach the issue then the district court should be allowed an opportunity to explain why it departed from the guidelines and required the shared payment of educational expenses.5
I 35 For these reasons, I would affirm the district court's order in its entirety. Accordingly, I dissent from the portions of today's majority opinion that reverse the district *534court on the res judicata and school expenses issues. I concur in the remainder of the majority opinion.

. There may be preservation problems with Corey's other arguments as well. For example, as to the medical expenses reimbursement issue, the district court informed Corey at the hearing, "Your obligation, both of you, to pay half has nothing to do with the bill actually being paid. The obligation arises from the bill being incurred." Corey raised no objection to this statement. Further, at no time did Corey direct the district court to the language of Utah Code seetion 78B-12-212 regarding "written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses." See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-212(8) (Supp. 2011).

. This rule is "grounded in principles of res judicata." See Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, ¶ 11 n. 3, 997 P.2d 903.

. The only reference to Corey's bankruptcy in the 2005 order is a statement that Corey had "received a discharge in bankruptcy in regard to the debts and obligations he was ordered to pay under the Decree of Divorce." See supra 112 note 5. There is no mention of the possible effects of the bankruptcy on Lisa.

. A similar argument could likely be made that limiting Corey's support payment to the guideline amount would be "unjust" under the circumstances of this case. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-210(3) (2008).

. This is particularly true here, where any lack of adequate findings is the direct result of Corey failing to ask for them in the district court.