Court Opinion

ID: 9631685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:46:25.105744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:25.958948
License: Public Domain

Judge DUBOFSKY
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In my view, the guilty plea was rendered involuntary by the repeated warnings of defendant’s counsel that, if defendant was convicted after a trial and sentenced to the penitentiary, he would be repeatedly sodomized and then murdered.
A guilty plea must be entered voluntarily and with proper understanding. People v. Wells, 734 P.2d 655 (Colo.App.1986). A guilty plea is involuntary if it is induced by threats. People v. McClellan, 183 Colo. 176, 515 P.2d 1127 (1973). Also, a plea may be rendered involuntary by mental as well as physical coercion. See Pickens v. United States, 427 F.2d 349 (5th Cir.1970).
A guilty plea is void if shown to be actuated by misleading statements of counsel. Heideman v. United States, 281 F.2d 805 (8th Cir.1960). Further, a guilty plea resulting from false advice from counsel as to the sentence that would be imposed may be set aside as having been unlawfully coerced. United States v. Simpson, 436 F.2d 162 (D.C.Cir.1970).
*1050Absent explicit instructions from his client to the contrary, defense counsel should normally pursue the alternatives to a trial that exist within a case, i.e., dismissal, plea bargain. Furthermore, if counsel receives a plea offer from the district attorney, he is obligated to inform his client both of the offer and his opinion of it. In some cases, defense counsel may refrain from making a recommendation as to whether defendant should accept the plea bargain. In other situations, defense counsel may conclude that the defendant should accept the district attorney’s plea offer.
Here, counsel concluded that the only viable choice for defendant was to accept the plea offer to accessory after the fact of murder. From this record, it appears there were compelling reasons for defense counsel to reach this conclusion and make the recommendation that he did.
Nevertheless, the decision to accept a plea offer belongs solely to the defendant. While counsel may make his position known to defendant in forceful, clear, and certain terms, he cannot cross the line and coerce a defendant into accepting a guilty plea. Cf. People v. Gies, 738 P.2d 398 (Colo.App.1987).
Here, counsel repeatedly told defendant that if he went to trial he would be convicted and sentenced to prison and that once in prison, he would be repeatedly sodomized and then murdered. Because I believe that these repeated “threats” about what defendant would face in prison rendered defendant’s plea involuntary, I conclude that the trial court erred in not setting aside the plea.
I recognize that accurately informing the defendant of the potential hazards of incarceration is a legitimate and responsible act of counsel in advising his client about the implications of a plea or trial. But, here, defense counsel went far beyond merely informing defendant of the hazards of incarceration; he repeatedly and definitively predicted that defendant would be sexually assaulted and killed. These warnings went far beyond a legitimate informational advisement and recommendation and constituted threats and coercion.
Among counsel’s remarks that were beyond the scope of appropriate advice are the following.
So you’re not tough enough for prison. You’re just not tough enough for prison. That’s all there is to it. So that any prison sentence is most probably for you a death sentence or very close. Because things would happen to you in prison that would cause you to wish you were dead or want to kill yourself. So, that’s why, you know, you have to understand the risks.
[[Image here]]
It is my opinion that in the two years or four years or whatever it is, awaiting for the appellate court to decide [your case] that you’ll be dead. You won’t make it through prison. Ok.
[[Image here]]
And it won’t do you any good because you’ll be dead or your [anus] will be the size of a dinner plate ... a jury can say ‘you know, I’m not convinced anyone of them is telling the truth, but I believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Steven Adams committed second degree murder.’ Ok. Then you go to prison and you’re dead.
[[Image here]]
The judge says you’re going to prison and away you go. And you’re dead. Because you’re not tough enough or you’re going to wish you were dead.
[[Image here]]
If we won appeal, you wouldn’t be worth a s..t if you came out of it alive. Ok?
[[Image here]]
I will feel bad if you get convicted of accessory after the fact of manslaughter and go to prison and die, I will be able to say I told you so. Right?
Furthermore, there was another earlier conversation with another public defender in which similar representations concerning defendant’s death were made.
*1051Here, defendant was a young man, age 26, who had never been in the penitentiary and was dependent on the representations of his counsel to assess what prison would be like. In such circumstances, the “browbeating” indulged in by counsel went far beyond just advising defendant of the dangers within the institution and, indeed, in my view became coercive.
The majority appears to give great weight to the fact that at the time of his plea, defendant acknowledged the elements of the offense and stated his plea was voluntary. However, by pleading to the elements of the offense and indicating that he has not been coerced, defendant may have been merely providing the “right” answers to the trial court to effectuate the coerced plea. Certainly, this does not mean defendant has not been coerced. See People v. Cole, 39 Colo.App. 323, 570 P.2d 8 (1977), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 195 Colo. 483, 584 P.2d 71 (1978). See also United States v. Cowin, 565 F.2d 548 (8th Cir.1977) and United States v. Tateo, 214 F.Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y.1963).
If, as suggested by the majority, counsel’s predictions of defendant’s life in prison are not coercive because, inter alia, defense counsel accurately described defendant’s future plight in the penitentiary, then a far graver problem is presented. If young men who have not been previously incarcerated face repeated sexual assaults and murder as part of their sentence to the penitentiary and, in an effort to avoid these assaults, enter guilty pleas to crimes they did not commit, then the constitutionality of the criminal justice system and the penal system are in doubt. Not only does the threat of criminal violence impermissibly coerce defendant in violation of his constitutional rights, but the operation of a penal system where such violence is rampant is also unconstitutional. See Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F.Supp. 122 (D.Colo.1979); McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.1975) (the Eighth Amendment may require a classification system which separates inmates according to offense and physically aggressive tendencies).
Finally, I believe it is of great significance that defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea prior to being sentenced.
In my opinion, absent a showing of detrimental reliance by the district attorney in response to defendant’s guilty plea, i.e., loss of witnesses or evidence, a defendant should be freely and liberally permitted to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. See United States v. King, 618 F.2d 550 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624 (5th Cir.1981).
A defendant has a constitutional right to have the prosecution prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt against him. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). And, an accused’s exercise of that right by insisting upon a trial should be freely permitted, both for the benefit of the individual and for the viability of the criminal justice system itself.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and remand for trial on all charges.