Court Opinion

ID: 2964921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:33:01.895703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:03.738491
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 96-2122

                                     SETH BERNER,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                            JUDGE THOMAS E. DELAHANTY, II,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                       [Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
                                          ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                     Aldrich and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                           _____________________

                              _________________________

               Seth Berner, pro se.
               ___________
               Peter J. Brann, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Andrew
               ______________                                        ______
          Ketterer,  Attorney   General,  and   Thomas  D.   Warren,  State
          ________                              ___________________
          Solicitor, were on brief, for appellee.

                              _________________________

                                   October 28, 1997
                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.    Attorney  Seth Berner  claims
                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.
                           ______________

          that  lawyers have  an  absolute right,  protected  by the  First

          Amendment, to wear political buttons  in the courtroom as long as

          the buttons do not disrupt  judicial proceedings.  We reject that

          proposition and affirm the district court's dismissal of Berner's

          action for declaratory and injunctive relief.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    The  facts,   drawn  from   the  plaintiff's   verified

          complaint  and construed  in his favor,  see Dartmouth  Review v.
                                                   ___ _________________

          Dartmouth  College, 889  F.2d  13,  16 (1st  Cir.  1989), can  be
          __________________

          recounted readily.  The defendant, Thomas E. Delahanty, II, is an

          associate justice  of the Maine  Superior Court.  On  October 31,

          1995, Berner  was  seated in  the  gallery of  Judge  Delahanty's

          courtroom,  waiting for  his  turn to  appear  before the  court.

          Berner wore a  circular button pinned to  his lapel.   The button

          was approximately two  inches in diameter and bore  the words "No
                                                                        "No

          on  1  -  Maine  Won't  Discriminate."    This  legend  expressed
          on  1  -  Maine  Won't  Discriminate."

          opposition  to  a  statewide referendum  that  Maine  voters were

          scheduled to consider during the November election.1  Neither the

          pin nor its message were  related to Berner's business before the

          court.

                    At  some point  during  the  day's  proceedings,  Judge

          Delahanty  called Berner  to the  bench.  The  following exchange

          took place:
                              
          ____________________

               1The referendum sought  to prohibit the passage of laws that
          condemned discrimination on the basis  of sexual orientation.  It
          had been the subject of heated debate.

                                          2

                    THE COURT:   Mr. Berner . . .  Can you remove
                    THE COURT:
                    _________
                    the  political pen [sic]  while you're in the
                    courtroom?

                    ATTORNEY BERNER:   Your Honor, what  happened
                    ATTORNEY BERNER:
                    _______________
                    to my right to political speech?

                    THE COURT:   Not in the courtroom.   We don't
                    THE COURT:
                    _________
                    take sides.

                    ATTORNEY  BERNER:    I  want  the  record  to
                    ATTORNEY  BERNER:
                    ________________
                    reflect  that  I  don't  think  there's   any
                    authority for that.

                    THE COURT:   The courtroom is not    that may
                    THE COURT:
                    _________
                    be, but  the  courtroom is  not  a  political
                    forum.

                    ATTORNEY  BERNER:   Your  honor,  I want  the
                    ATTORNEY  BERNER
                    ________________
                    record to reflect that I object to that.

          Reasonably believing that he would be held in contempt if he  did

          not comply  with the  court's order,  Berner removed  the button.

          During  a  chambers conference  later  that day,  the  judge told

          Berner  that he  planned to  perpetuate  the prohibition  against

          lawyers wearing  political buttons  in his  courtroom unless  and

          until he was overruled by a higher authority.

                    Berner took refuge in the United States District Court,

          where he  sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42

          U.S.C.     1983 (1994).    His rifle-shot  complaint  contained a

          single claim:  that the  button ban violated the First Amendment.

          In support of this  claim Berner alleged that his button  had not

          caused any  disruption of the ongoing proceedings  and that Judge

          Delahanty  "routinely permitted the  wearing in his  courtroom of

          other ornamentation  supporting causes,  such  as crucifixes  and

          insignia for armed forces or fraternal orders."

                    A flurry of motions ensued.  The  district court denied

                                          3

          Berner's  motion  for  a   preliminary  injunction,  finding   an

          insufficient likelihood of success on the merits.  The court then

          addressed the defendant's  motions to dismiss the action for lack

          of standing and  failure to state an actionable claim.  The court

          finessed  the former by  assuming, without deciding,  that Berner

          had standing to sue.   See Berner v. Delahanty, 937  F. Supp. 62,
                                 ___ ______    _________

          62 (D. Me. 1996).

                    Turning  to the legal sufficiency of the complaint, the

          court  held that  the controlling legal  standard was  the forum-

          specific analysis of  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal  Defense and Educ.
                                _________    ______________________________

          Fund,  Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800  (1985) (discussing varying levels
          ___________

          of  scrutiny applicable to governmental restrictions on speech in

          different fora).   See Berner, 937 F.  Supp. at 63.   Because the
                             ___ ______

          parties "agree[d] that the state courtroom is a nonpublic forum,"

          Judge  Carter found, consistent with Cornelius, that the decision
                                               _________

          to limit the  wearing of political  buttons "need  only be:   (1)

          reasonable in light of the purpose which the court serves and (2)

          viewpoint neutral."   Id.   Building on  this premise,  the judge
                                ___

          concluded that the  restriction on political paraphernalia  was a

          reasonable attempt to  "shield the courtroom from  the inevitable

          appearance  of politicization," and that there was "no indication

          that [Judge Delahanty]  intended to discourage one  viewpoint and

          advance another."  Id.  Since he perceived the button ban to be a
                             ___

          "reasonable  viewpoint-neutral restriction,"  Judge Carter  ruled

          that the  complaint stated  no claim upon  which relief  could be

          granted.  Id.
                    ___

                                          4

                    On   appeal,  Berner   assails  the   district  court's

          analysis.  He  maintains that the court placed  undue emphasis on

          Cornelius; that  it erred  in gauging  the reasonableness of  the
          _________

          ban; and, finally,  that it failed to give  appropriate weight to

          the  defendant's tolerance of  persons wearing other politically-

          tinged ornamentation.

          II.  SCOPE OF REVIEW
          II.  SCOPE OF REVIEW

                    We evaluate de novo a  district court's dismissal of an

          action  for failure to state  a cognizable claim.   See Aulson v.
                                                              ___ ______

          Blanchard, 83  F.3d 1,  3 (1st Cir.  1996).   In assaying  such a
          _________

          dismissal, the appellate court, like the court that  preceded it,

          must assume that the factual  averments of the complaint are true

          and must draw all plausible inferences in  the plaintiff's favor.

          See Leatherman v. Tarrant  Cty. Narcotics Intell. & Coord.  Unit,
          ___ __________    ______________________________________________

          507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993); Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 16.
                                    ________________

                    In this case, the district court gracefully sidestepped

          the standing inquiry,  preferring instead a pas  de deux directly
                                                      ____________

          with  the  merits of  the  complaint.    While we  recognize  the

          occasional availability  of  such a  terpsichorean  course,  see,
                                                                       ___

          e.g.,  United States v. Stoller, 78 F.3d 710, 715 (1st Cir. 1996)
          ____   _____________    _______

          (explaining  that a court  may bypass a  difficult jurisdictional

          question  and instead dispose of the  case on the merits if doing

          so  favors the party  challenging the court's  jurisdiction); see
                                                                        ___

          also Rojas v. Fitch,  ___ F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir.  1997) [No. 96-
          ____ _____    _____

          2328, slip op. at 7]  (employing Stoller principle to sidestep an
                                           _______

          inquiry   into  standing),  in  this  appellate  lambada  we  are

                                          5

          reluctant to follow suit.  Standing is a threshold issue in every

          federal case and goes directly to a court's power to entertain an

          action.   See Warth  v.  Seldin, 422  U.S. 490,  498 (1975);  New
                    ___ _____      ______                               ___

          Hampshire  Right to Life  Political Action  Comm. v.  Gardner, 99
          _________________________________________________     _______

          F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1996).  Moreover, the general rule is that a

          court should first  confirm the  existence of  rudiments such  as

          jurisdiction  and  standing  before  tackling  the  merits  of  a

          controverted case.  The exception discussed in Stoller is exactly
                                                         _______

          that    an  exception,  which, in  light  of the  danger  that an

          ensuing decision on  the merits might be rendered  sterile by the

          tribunal's lack of authority to  resolve the case, should be used

          sparingly.   Resort should not be made to the exception where, as

          here,  no  substantial  doubt attaches  to  the  threshold issue.

          Hence, we  choose to confront  and resolve the  standing question

          before proceeding to the merits.2

          III.  STANDING
          III.  STANDING

                    The  criteria  for  standing are  well-rehearsed.    To

          establish that  a dispute qualifies  as an Article III  "case" or

          "controversy,"  enabling it to  obtain a federal  court audience,

                              
          ____________________

               2Shortly after the  district court dismissed  Berner's suit,
          Congress amended 42 U.S.C.   1983 to  provide "that in any action
          brought against a  judicial officer for an act  or omission taken
          in  such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
          be   granted  unless  a   declaratory  decree  was   violated  or
          declaratory relief was unavailable."   Pub. L. 104-317,   309(c),
          110  Stat.  3853 (1996).   Judge  Delahanty    presumably because
          Berner's  complaint  seeks  declaratory  as  well  as  injunctive
          redress    neither moved for  dismissal of the appeal  nor raised
          the amendment as  an alternate ground for affirming the judgment.
          Under the circumstances, it would  serve no useful purpose for us
          to set sail, uninvited, on these uncharted waters.

                                          6

          the  party  seeking  to invoke  federal  jurisdiction  must first

          demonstrate that 

                    (1) he  or she  personally has  suffered some
                    actual  or threatened  injury as a  result of
                    the  challenged conduct;  (2) the  injury can
                    fairly be traced to that conduct; and (3) the
                    injury  likely   will  be   redressed  by   a
                    favorable decision from the court.

          New Hampshire Right  to Life, 99 F.3d  at 13.  We  hasten to add,
          ____________________________

          however, that  the Court has placed  a special gloss on  cases in

          which a party seeks exclusively injunctive or declaratory relief.

          In such  purlieus, standing inheres  only if the  complainant can

          show  that he  has suffered  (or  has been  threatened with)  "an

          invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . .  concrete

          and particularized,"  Lujan v.  Defenders of  Wildlife, 504  U.S.
                                _____     ______________________

          555, 560  (1992), together with "a sufficient  likelihood that he

          will again  be wronged in a similar way,"  City of Los Angeles v.
                                                     ___________________

          Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983).   In other words, the complainant
          _____

          must establish that  the feared harm is "actual  or imminent, not

          conjectural or hypothetical."  Lujan, 504 U.S.  at 460 (citations
                                         _____

          and internal quotation marks omitted).   It bears noting that the

          imminence concept, while  admittedly far reaching, is  bounded by

          its Article III purpose:  "to  ensure that the alleged injury  is

          not too speculative."  Id. at 564 n.2.
                                 ___

                    In  addition  to  these  benchmarks  of  constitutional

          sufficiency, standing doctrine "also embraces prudential concerns

          regarding the proper  exercise of federal jurisdiction."   United
                                                                     ______

          States v. AVX  Corp., 962 F.2d 108,  114 (1st Cir. 1992).   Under
          ______    __________

          this rubric, courts generally insist that every complainant's tub

                                          7

          rest on  its own  bottom.   See  id.  (stating that  a  plaintiff
                                      ___  ___

          ordinarily cannot  sue to assert  the rights  of third  parties).

          When  the First  Amendment is  in  play, however,  the Court  has

          relaxed  the prudential limitations on standing to ameliorate the

          risk of washing  away free speech protections.   See Secretary of
                                                           ___ ____________

          State of Md. v.  Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S.  947, 956 (1984).
          ____________     ____________________

          Hence, when freedom of expression is at stake:

                    Litigants  . . . are permitted to challenge a
                    [policy] not because their own rights of free
                    expression  are  violated, but  because  of a
                    judicial  prediction or  assumption that  the
                    [policy's]  very existence  may cause  others
                    not  before   the  court   to  refrain   from
                    constitutionally    protected    speech    or
                    expression.

          Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
          _________    ________

                    Against  this  backdrop,  Judge  Delahanty  strives  to

          persuade us  that, even if  Berner has standing to  challenge the

          button  ban as  a past  violation of  his First  Amendment rights

          (say, by a  suit for money damages),  he has no standing  to seek

          declaratory  and injunctive relief because there is no reasonable

          likelihood that  he will  again face  similar harm.   We  are not

          convinced.

                    Berner is  a member  of the Maine  bar and  a full-time

          practicing  lawyer who  regularly handles  litigation.   Born  in

          1956, much of his career apparently lies ahead of him.  Moreover,

          Maine is  not California.   The superior  court is  the principal

          statewide court of general jurisdiction, see Me. Rev.  Stat. Ann.
                                                   ___

          tit. 4,   105 (West 1989), and its business is handled by a total

          of only 16 active judges.   The law of averages strongly suggests

                                          8

          that vocational demands will bring  Berner before each and all of

          these judges in the months and years to come.

                    To cinch matters, the parties remain philosophically on

          a collision course.  Berner's  passion for political pins has not

          waned,  and he  has  vowed  that, when  once  again afforded  the

          opportunity, he  would not  hesitate, but  for Judge  Delahanty's

          stated policy,  to  wear  a  political  button  in  the  jurist's

          courtroom.     The   judge,  too,   remains   steadfast  in   his

          determination  to prohibit attorneys  from sporting such  pins in

          his bailiwick.

                    On balance, the  combination of facts reflected  by the

          record persuades us that Berner  faces a realistic risk of future

          exposure to the challenged policy.   Such a risk is sufficient to

          satisfy  not  only  the standing  requirements  that  Article III

          imposes,  but also the prudential concerns that sometimes trouble

          courts.  See  DuBois v. United States  Dep't of Agric., 102  F.3d
                   ___  ______    ______________________________

          1273, 1283 (1st  Cir. 1996); see also American  Postal Workers v.
                                       ___ ____ ________________________

          Frank, 968 F.2d 1373, 1377 (1st Cir. 1992) (elucidating doctrinal
          _____

          parameters of Lyons).
                        _____

                    In  any event,  Berner  alleges  that  the  button  ban

          constitutes  a threat  not only  to  his own  right to  political

          speech but also to the rights of "other citizens."  Thus, even if

          these particular parties' paths  were not likely to cross  again,

          Berner  might  well  be  able  to   invoke  the  federal  courts'

          jurisdiction  to seek  equitable relief  based  on the  "judicial

          prediction" that  the policy  may chill  the general  exercise of

                                          9

          free  speech.   Broadrick, 413  U.S. at  612.   Judge Delahanty's
                          _________

          prohibition apparently applies to every court officer, and we are

          not so struthious as to hide our eyes from the  probability that,

          as a result of such a  policy, other attorneys will refrain  from

          expressing  opinions  by  wearing  political  paraphernalia  when

          appearing  before  this  judge.     In  itself,  this  can  be  a

          sufficiently   concrete  and   particularized  injury   to  First

          Amendment  protections  to  ground  a claim  of  standing.    See
                                                                        ___

          Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383,  392-
          ________    ________________________________

          93 (1988).

          IV.  THE MERITS
          IV.  THE MERITS

                    In  attempting to ascertain  whether the district court

          erred  in granting the  defendant's motion to  dismiss the action

          for failure to state a claim,  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we  must

          assume  that the  complaint's  factual  averments  are  true  and

          determine  from  that  coign  of  vantage  whether  the  pleading

          encompasses any set of facts  that would entitle the plaintiff to

          relief.   See Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49,
                    ___ _______________    __________________

          52  (1st Cir.  1990) (explaining  that  an affirmance  of a  Rule

          12(b)(6)  dismissal is appropriate  "only if it  clearly appears,

          according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover

          on any viable theory").  Although this standard is diaphanous, it

          is not  a virtual  mirage.   To survive  a motion  to dismiss,  a

          complaint must set  forth "factual allegations, either  direct or

          inferential,  respecting  each   material  element  necessary  to

          sustain recovery under some actionable  legal theory."  Gooley v.
                                                                  ______

                                          10

          Mobil Oil  Corp., 851  F.2d 513,  515 (1st  Cir. 1988).   It  is,
          ________________

          moreover,  settled that in judging the  adequacy of a plaintiff's

          allegations,  "bald  assertions,   periphrastic  circumlocutions,

          unsubstantiated conclusions,  [and] outright  vituperation" carry

          no weight.  Correa-Martinez, 903 F.2d at 52.
                      _______________

                    These  rules of pleading and practice cannot be applied

          in  a vacuum.   Thus,  to  evaluate properly  the sufficiency  of

          Berner's  complaint, we first construct a template that comprises

          the averments  necessary to  state a claim  for violation  of the

          First Amendment in this context.   We then proceed to measure the

          facts that Berner alleges in his complaint3 against this template

          to ascertain whether those facts, if proven, suffice to establish

          an entitlement to relief.

                          A.  The First Amendment Framework.
                          A.  The First Amendment Framework.
                              _____________________________

                    It is axiomatic that not every limitation on freedom of

          expression  insults the First Amendment.  A curtailment of speech

          violates the Free Speech Clause only if the restricted expression

          is,  in fact, constitutionally  protected, see Chaplinsky  v. New
                                                     ___ __________     ___

          Hampshire, 315 U.S.  568, 571-72 (1942), and  if the government's
          _________

          justification   for   the   restriction   is   inadequate,    see
                                                                        ___
                              
          ____________________

               3Rule  12(b)(6) provides  in pertinent  part that  if, on  a
          motion to dismiss,  "matters outside the pleadings  are presented
          to and not excluded by the court,  the motion shall be treated as
          one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56."
          Here, the parties  submitted affidavits subsequent to  the filing
          of the complaint, but the  district court apparently did not rest
          its   decision  in  any  way  on   these  materials  (and,  thus,
          effectively  excluded them). This course of action lay within the
          court's  discretion, see Garita  Hotel Ltd. Partnership,  Etc. v.
                               ___ _____________________________________
          Ponce Fed. Bank, 958 F.2d 15, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1992), and we guide
          _______________
          our analysis accordingly.

                                          11

          International  Soc'y for Krishna  Consciousness v. Lee,  505 U.S.
          _______________________________________________    ___

          672, 678 (1992).4

                    In  Cornelius,  the Court  articulated  a three-tiered,
                        _________

          forum-based test for  determining when the government's  interest

          in limiting particular property to its intended purpose outweighs

          the  interests  of  those  who  wish  to  use  the  property  for

          expressive purposes:

                    [S]peakers can  be  excluded  from  a  public
                    forum only when the exclusion is necessary to
                    serve  a  compelling state  interest  and the
                    exclusion is  narrowly drawn to  achieve that
                    interest.  Similarly, when the Government has
                    intentionally designated a place  or means of
                    communication  as  a  public  forum  speakers
                    cannot  be  excluded   without  a  compelling
                    governmental interest.  Access to a nonpublic
                    forum, however, can be  restricted as long as
                    the restrictions are reasonable and [are] not
                    an  effort  to   suppress  expression  merely
                    because public officials oppose the speaker's
                    view.

          Cornelius,  473 U.S.  at 800  (citations  and internal  quotation
          _________

          marks  omitted);  accord   Perry  Educ.  Ass'n  v.   Perry  Local
                            ______   ___________________       ____________

          Educators'  Ass'n, 460  U.S.  37,  45-46 (1983).    Thus, when  a
          _________________

          plaintiff seeks to  launch a First Amendment  challenge addressed

          to a policy  or practice  that restricts  expressive activity  on

          public property, he must plead  facts sufficient to show (1) that

          the government has  burdened a protected form of  speech, and (2)

          that  the  restriction  is unreasonable  (which,  in  a nonpublic
                              
          ____________________

               4The adequacy of the  government's justification is measured
          on a sliding scale.  Generally speaking, the  nature of the forum
          in which the speech is  restricted dictates the level of scrutiny
          required.  See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505
                     ___ _____________________________________________
          U.S. at  678-79; United States  v. Kokinda, 497 U.S.  720, 726-27
                           _____________     _______
          (1990).

                                          12

          forum, may involve  showing that the restriction  is biased, and,

          in public or limited public fora,  may involve showing that it is

          not narrowly drawn to further a compelling state interest).

                    The  appeal  before  us arises  in  a  slightly awkward

          posture.    Ordinarily,  a complaint,  standing  alone,  will not

          provide a suitable  vehicle for  evaluating the  adequacy of  the

          government's justification  for  restricting  speech.    In  some

          instances, however,  the government's rationale is either clearly

          stated in  the restriction  itself or plain  from even  a cursory

          examination of the restriction.  If the justification is apparent

          and is plausible on its face, a complainant who  hopes to survive

          a motion to  dismiss must do more than  suggest conclusorily that

          the  state has an  improper or insufficient  motivation.  Rather,

          the complainant must allege facts that, if proven, would support,

          directly  or  by  fair  inference,  a finding  that  the  state's

          justification falls short of the applicable legal standard.

                        B.  The Sufficiency of the Complaint.
                        B.  The Sufficiency of the Complaint.
                            ________________________________

                    We  turn  now   to  the  sufficiency  of   the  instant

          complaint.  As to the nature of the speech, we conclude  that the

          complaint adequately  alleges infringement of  a constitutionally

          protected form of  expression   the plaintiff's right to advocate

          a particular political position by  wearing an emblem.  See Board
                                                                  ___ _____

          of Airport  Commissioners v.  Jews for Jesus,  482 U.S.  569, 576
          _________________________     ______________

          (1987); Tinker v. Des  Moines Indep. Community School  Dist., 393
                  ______    __________________________________________

          U.S. 503,  505 (1969).   Such political expression is  typical of

          the broad spectrum  of symbolic acts that the  Free Speech Clause

                                          13

          of the First Amendment is designed to protect.

                    Berner does not fare as well when the  spotlight shifts

          to the apparent  justification for the restriction.  A courthouse

            and,  especially, a  courtroom    is a  nonpublic  forum.   See
                                                                        ___

          United  States v.  Bader,  698  F.2d 553,  556  (1st Cir.  1983);
          ______________     _____

          Claudio v. United  States, 836 F.  Supp. 1219, 1224-25  (E.D.N.C.
          _______    ______________

          1993),  aff'd, 28 F.3d 1208 (4th Cir.  1994).  A courtroom's very
                  _____

          function  is to  provide  a  locus in  which  civil and  criminal

          disputes can be adjudicated.  Within this staid environment,  the

          presiding judge is charged with the responsibility of maintaining

          proper  order and decorum.  In  carrying out this responsibility,

          the judge  must ensure "that [the] courthouse is a place in which

          rational  reflection  and  disinterested  judgment  will  not  be

          disrupted."  Ryan  v. County of  DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090,  1095 (7th
                       ____     _________________

          Cir.  1995).   We think  it is  beyond serious question  that the

          proper  discharge of  these responsibilities  includes the  right

          (and, indeed, the duty) to  limit, to the extent practicable, the

          appearance   of   favoritism   in   judicial   proceedings,   and

          particularly,  the appearance of political partiality.  Cf. Greer
                                                                  ___ _____

          v. Spock,  424  U.S.  828, 839  (1976)  (finding that  a  ban  on
             _____

          political speeches  and  demonstrations  on  military  bases  "is

          wholly consistent with the American constitutional tradition of a

          politically   neutral  military   establishment  under   civilian

          control").

                    Judge Delahanty's order compelling Berner to remove his

          political-advocacy button while in the courtroom fits comfortably

                                          14

          within   this  apolitical   paradigm.     Emblems   of  political

          significance worn  by attorneys  in the courtroom  as a  means of

          espousing personal  political opinions can reasonably  be thought

          to compromise  the environment  of impartiality  and fairness  to

          which  every  jurist aspires.    As an  officer of  the  court, a

          lawyer's  injection  of  private  political  viewpoints  into the

          courtroom, coupled with  the judge's toleration of  such conduct,

          necessarily tarnishes the veneer of political imperviousness that

          ideally  should cloak a  courtroom, especially when  the partisan

          sentiments are completely unrelated to the court's business.

                    Here,  Judge  Delahanty  stated  clearly  that  he  was

          ordering Berner to  remove the button because participants in the

          judicial  process  ought  not  simultaneously  "take  sides"   in

          extraneous  political  debates.5   This  explanation is  entirely

          consistent with a  desire to  ensure that  the courtroom  remains

          free from the  appearance of political partisanship.   Evaluating

          the professed justification, as we must, "in light of the purpose

          of the forum  and all the surrounding  circumstances," Cornelius,
                                                                 _________

          473 U.S. at 809, we  discern no reason why a judge may  not even-

          handedly prohibit lawyers from wearing political paraphernalia in

          the courtroom.

                    Berner labors mightily to supply  such a reason.   Most

          notably, he asseverates that, regardless of the form and function

          of the courtroom, it  is unreasonable to prohibit  political pins
                              
          ____________________

               5We consider  Judge Delahanty's  statements only insofar  as
          they are reflected in the transcript appended to and incorporated
          by reference in the plaintiff's complaint.

                                          15

          that do not  have the effect of  disrupting judicial proceedings.

          As support for this thesis, he  directs us to the Court's opinion

          in  Jews  for Jesus.    He  emphasizes  that the  Justices  there
              _______________

          invalidated  a  ban   which,  among   other  things,   proscribed

          "nondisruptive  speech    such as  the  wearing of  a T-shirt  or

          button  that contains  a political  message."   482 U.S.  at 576.

          Berner's reliance on Jews for Jesus is mislaid.
                               ______________

                    That  case  involved  an  overbreadth  challenge  to  a

          municipal ordinance which,  on its face, "reache[d]  the universe

          of  expressive  activity,  and,   by  prohibiting  all  protected
                                                             ___

          expression, purport[ed] to create a virtual `First Amendment Free

          Zone' at [a major airport]."  Id.  at 575.  Not surprisingly, the
                                        ___

          Court held  that, even  if an  airport is  a nonpublic  forum, no

          government  interest  could   justify  excluding  all   forms  of
                                                            ___

          protected expression from that locale.   See id.  The prohibition
                                                   ___ ___

          here is hardly of  such unbridled scope, and, in all  events, the

          plaintiff  has  not  attacked  it  as overbroad  or  vague.    In

          addition,  an  airport   terminal,  in   which  free   expression

          presumably   would  have  been   allowed  absent  the  challenged

          ordinance,  differs  substantially  from  a  courtroom,  in which

          "whatever right  to `free  speech' an  attorney has is  [already]

          extremely  circumscribed."  Gentile  v. State Bar  of Nevada, 501
                                      _______     ____________________

          U.S.  1030, 1071  (1991).  For  these reasons, Jews  for Jesus is
                                                         _______________

          inapposite.

                    Stripping  away  the authority  on which  Berner relies

          still  leaves  intact   his  bareboned  contention  that   it  is

                                          16

          unreasonable  to restrict non-disruptive  speech.  As  applied to

          courtrooms, we think that this view is much too myopic.

                    In the first  place, the danger of disturbing a court's

          proceedings is only one acceptable  justification for restricting

          protected  speech.   There  are others.   So  here:   even though

          Berner's button  caused no commotion,  his mere wearing of  a pin

          that advocates a  position regarding a hotly  contested political

          issue  raises  the  specter of  politicalization  and partiality.

          Mindful  of the purposes of the courtroom and Berner's role as an

          officer of the court, we conclude  that it was reasonable for the

          judge to bar  Berner's political statement regardless  of whether

          it created a stir.  See Cornelius,  473 U.S. at 809 (finding that
                              ___ _________

          "avoiding  the  appearance  of political  favoritism  is  a valid

          justification for limiting speech in a nonpublic forum").

                    There  is, moreover, a broader justification.  By their

          nature,  courtrooms  demand  intense concentration  on  important

          matters.    Whether  or  not  disruptive,  buttons  that  display

          political messages are  at the very  least distracting.   Lawyers

          who wear such emblems serve not only as vocal advocates for their

          clients in matters before the court, but also as active promoters

          of their  own political agendas.   If  a presiding judge  turns a

          blind  eye   to  attorneys'  espousals  of  political  sentiments

          unrelated to ongoing proceedings, clarity and continuity may well

          suffer.   Hence, judges may take reasonable prophylactic measures

          to minimize such distractions.

                    As a  fallback  position, Berner  maintains that  Judge

                                          17

          Delahanty's policy is not viewpoint neutral because the defendant

          banned his  button despite having  allowed other  emblems in  the

          courtroom, and that  this lack of  neutrality violates the  First

          Amendment.     We  disagree.    The  essence  of  viewpoint-based

          discrimination is the state's  decision to pick and choose  among

          similarly situated speakers  in order  to advance  or suppress  a

          particular  ideology or  outlook.   See  Lamb's Chapel  v. Center
                                              ___  _____________     ______

          Moriches  Union Free  Sch. Dist.,  508 U.S.  384, 393-94  (1993);
          ________________________________

          Cornelius,  473 U.S. at 806.  Although the Free Speech Clause may
          _________

          not  prevent  government  officials from  restricting  an  entire

          category of  speech based on  its content, it does  preclude such

          officials from  selectively granting  safe passage  to speech  of

          which they approve while curbing speech of which they disapprove.

          See, e.g.,  Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d  668, 676 (8th Cir. 1997);
          ___  ____   _______    _____

          Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543, 1549 (11th
          _____________________________    _____

          Cir. 1997).

                    This requirement of viewpoint neutrality prohibits  the

          state both "from  regulating speech when the  specific motivating

          ideology  or the  opinion or  perspective of  the speaker  is the

          rationale  for the restriction," Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
                                           ___________    _________________

          of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.  819, 829 (1995), and from treating
          ___________________

          differently comparable means of expression when the nature of the

          speech is the  linchpin of the limitation, see  AIDS Action Comm.
                                                     ___  _________________

          of Mass., Inc. v.  Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d  1, 9-12 (1st
          ______________     _______________________

                                          18

          Cir.  1994).6   This  case  does not  implicate  either of  these

          iterations.

                    There is  simply  no  basis in  the  complaint  for  an

          inference that ideology sparked the button ban.  The closest that

          the  complaint comes  is  an  averment  that,  despite  outlawing

          Berner's  pin,  the  "[d]efendant  has  routinely  permitted  the

          wearing  in  his  courtroom  of  other  ornamentation  supporting

          causes,  such as  crucifixes  and insignia  for  armed forces  or

          fraternal  orders."    Taken  as  true,  this  averment  is   not

          sufficient to sustain a claim of viewpoint discrimination because

          Berner does not  allege that the banishment of  his political pin

          had anything to do with  the message emblazoned on his  button or

          that  the  causes  promoted  by  the  permitted symbols  bear  an

          ideological relation to his own button-backed political viewpoint

          such  that  allowing these  other  emblems in  the  courtroom but

          excluding  his pin  rationally may  be  seen as  a discriminatory

          attempt to stifle his opinion.

                    Nor can  the plaintiff  convincingly mount  a claim  of

                              
          ____________________

               6In  AIDS Action Committee,  the defendant, a  state agency,
                    _____________________
          refused  to   allow  the   plaintiff  to   post  public   service
          announcements that used  "sexual innuendo and double  entendre to
          communicate   its  message"  anent  the  use  of  condoms  "while
          simultaneously permitting other  advertisers to communicate their
          messages through these modes of expression."  42 F.3d at 10.  The
          panel  compared  the  permitted  and  prohibited  advertisements,
          focusing  particularly on whether they displayed sexual images at
          equivalent levels  of explicitness,  and concluded  that the  two
          sets  of advertisements were equally suggestive.   The panel then
          ruled that the  defendant's differential  treatment of  similarly
          suggestive  advertisements  constituted  "content  discrimination
          which gives rise  to the appearance of  viewpoint discrimination"
          in violation of the First Amendment.  Id. at 11.
                                                ___

                                          19

          viewpoint bias based  on the prohibition of  his political speech

          in the courtroom without a corresponding disallowance of military

          and religious  ornamentation (which,  in his  view, also  advance

          political causes).   The lesson of AIDS Action  Committee is that
                                             ______________________

          an inference of  viewpoint discrimination sometimes can  be drawn

          when the proscribed speech and  the permitted speech are alike in

          ways  that undermine the justification asserted in support of the

          restriction.  Here, however, the stated justification is to avoid

          the appearance of political  partiality, and Berner's allegations

          do not  in any  way impeach that  justification.   No substantial

          equivalency  exists between political  buttons, on the  one hand,

          and  military and  religious  emblems,  on the  second  hand.   A

          political button has only a single purpose:  to express a view on

          a  political  candidate  or cause.    In  contrast,  military and

          religious  symbols, standing alone,  do not expressly  advocate a

          particular  political position, and, at best, are subject only to

          secondary political connotations.   Such adornments have multiple

          meanings, including but not limited to conveying allegiance to  a

          particular  institution or a  broad band of  convictions, values,

          and  beliefs.  Thus,  because restraining partisan  expression in

          the neutral environ of a courtroom  is a legitimate goal, a judge

          reasonably  may  decide  to  prohibit  pins  that  primarily  and

          expressly champion  specific political  stances and  at the  same

          time permit the  wearing of military and  religious accessories.7
                              
          ____________________

               7This case  does not require  us to address the  question of
          whether, and  if so,  under what circumstances,  a judge  has the
          power to exclude military and  religious insignia.  We leave that

                                          20

          In the circumstances of this  case, the decision not to  bar such

          tokens   does  not  compromise  the  propriety  of  an  otherwise

          permissible prohibition precluding political paraphernalia.

                    To say  more  would be  supererogatory.   Based on  the

          allegations  of  the  plaintiff's  complaint,  no   inference  of

          viewpoint bias reasonably can be drawn.

          V.  CONCLUSION
          V.  CONCLUSION

                    We need go no further.8  An attorney is  free, like all

          Americans, to hold political sentiments.  In a courtroom setting,

          however, lawyers have no absolute  right to wear such feelings on

          their sleeves  (or lapels, for  that matter).   Judge Delahanty's

          policy of prohibiting all political pins is a reasonable means of

          ensuring  the  appearance  of fairness  and  impartiality  in the

          courtroom, and the  plaintiff has made no  supportable allegation

          that  the restriction is viewpoint based.  Consequently, Berner's
                              
          ____________________

          question for another day.

               8In  this venue,  Berner argues,  for  the first  time, that
          Cornelius does  not supply  the appropriate  legal guidepost  for
          _________
          this case.  In Berner's  newly-emergent view, Cornelius should be
                                                        _________
          read to affect limitations on access to public or nonpublic fora,
          but not to affect limitations on speech.  Although we are tempted
          to hold explicitly that  this access/speech dichotomy is made  up
          out  of whole cloth,  we take a  simpler route.   In the district
          court, Berner  acknowledged Cornelius's  suzerainty and  conceded
                                      _________
          relevant  and  substantial  portions  of  the  ensuing  analysis.
          Consequently, he  has forfeited  his right to  argue a  new, much
          different theory on appeal.   See McCoy v. Massachusetts Inst. of
                                        ___ _____    ______________________
          Tech., 950  F.2d 13,  16 (1st Cir.  1991); Clauson v.  Smith, 823
          _____                                      _______     _____
          F.2d 660, 666 (1st Cir. 1987).

                                          21

          complaint  fails  to state  a  claim  upon  which relief  can  be

          granted.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                                          22