Court Opinion

ID: 9643612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:35:39.941923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:01.940367
License: Public Domain

*839SUE WALKER, Justice,
dissenting on rehearing en banc.
I respectfully dissent. The general rule is that an investigative stop can last no longer than necessary to effect the purpose of the stop. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). Once an officer concludes the investigation of the conduct that initiated the stop, continued detention of a person is permitted only if there is reasonable suspicion to believe another offense has been or is being committed. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). To establish reasonable suspicion justifying a continued detention, an officer must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989).
In other words, if a driver is stopped on suspicion of driving while intoxicated, once the police officer determines that the driver is not impaired and completes routine traffic stop duties' — such as checking the driver’s license and car registration and running a computer check on that information — the driver should be promptly released. Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63-64. At this point, the traffic-stop investigation is fully resolved; the detention must end and the driver must be permitted to leave. Id.; Herrera v. State, 80 S.W.3d 283, 289 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd). An investigative detention must be temporary, must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and cannot be utilized as a “fishing expedition” concerning unrelated criminal activity. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 41, 117 S.Ct. 417, 422, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (stating that scope of search must be limited because “a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope”). “A stop based on a violation of a traffic regulation will not justify detention to await the arrival of a drug detection dog ... [which] is necessarily a greater imposition on a motorist than conducting a search immediately upon the arousal of a reasonable suspicion.” $217,590.00 In U.S. Currency v. State, 54 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
Texas Department of Public Safety troopers stopped Appellant Mikel Wayne Lambeth, Jr. The entire stop was recorded on a videotape that was introduced into evidence at the suppression hearing and is part of our record. Trooper Randall Wilson testified that the videotape truly and accurately depicts the stop.
The videotape shows the troopers stop Lambeth for speeding. During the next twenty-four minutes the troopers talk with Lambeth, ask Lambeth where he is going and request permission to search the vehicle, conduct field sobriety tests on Lam-beth (all of which he passes), conduct a pat down search of Lambeth (which uncovers nothing), obtain the information they need to run computer checks on Lambeth and on the vehicle, and to write Lambeth citations. At this point in time the troopers had concluded their investigation of the speeding offense and of all other possible offenses that they reasonably suspected Lambeth may have committed — those being driving with an expired license, with no registration sticker, and while intoxicated. The troopers’ reasonable suspicions had been fully resolved; at this point the troopers should have written any necessary citations to Lambeth, Lambeth’s detention should have ended, and he should have been permitted to leave. See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63-64.
Although both troopers testified at the suppression hearing, neither of them was *840able to articulate any facts they possessed at this point in the stop that would give rise to any suspicion that Lambeth had been or might be engaging in some other criminal activity. They both testified only that they were suspicious because Lam-beth was nervous and “slightly evasive in his answers,” but they both agreed that nervousness during a traffic stop was not uncommon. In short, at this point in the stop the troopers possessed nothing more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch that “something” might be in Lambeth’s car because he was nervous and had repeatedly declined to give them consent to search the car. Nonetheless, Trooper Wilson decided to continue Lam-beth’s detention; he called dispatch and requested Canine Officer Robert Young be sent to the scene, stating, “We need a dog to run on a vehicle.”
The troopers then continued to detain Lambeth to wait for the arrival of the canine unit to conduct a “free air” search of the vehicle. It was during this continued detention that Trooper Hatfield said he smelled marijuana on Lambeth. The majority claims that while waiting for a canine unit the troopers continued to ask legitimate questions related to matters within the scope of the traffic stop, including whether he had outstanding warrants, where he was going, why his vehicle was not registered, and who owned the vehicle. The problem with the majority’s position is that the video tape of the stop establishes that these questions had already been asked and answered.1 We cannot agree with the majority that the repetitive questioning of Lambeth may justify his subsequent continued detention to await a canine unit.
Lambeth’s continued detention to await the arrival of a canine unit after the completion of the traffic stop investigation and after the completion of the investigations into the troopers’ other reasonable suspicions — that Lambeth was driving with an expired license, had no registration sticker, and was driving while intoxicated — violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63-64; Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244-45. When Trooper Hatfield said he smelled marijuana — approximately twenty-four minutes after the troopers stopped Lambeth for speeding, after the troopers had completed their investigation of all possible offenses they reasonably believed Lambeth could have been committing, after the troopers had obtained all the information they needed to write Lam-beth citations, and after Trooper Wilson had called for a canine unit — the stop should have already been concluded and citations should have already been issued. Because Lambeth’s detention should have ended prior to the point in time when Trooper Hatfield said that he smelled marijuana on Lambeth, this fact cannot retroactively justify Lambeth’s unauthorized, continued detention. See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244-45; $217,590.00 In U.S. Currency, 54 S.W.3d at 924 (explaining that traffic stop will not justify continued detention to await the arrival of a drug detection dog). Cf. Coleman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 708, 719 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (holding officer’s articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellant’s contin*841ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellant’s prior arrests for drug offenses, appellant’s lie about his prior criminal history, and appellant’s possession of small jeweler’s bags used in cocaine trafficking), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 502, 166 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006).
I would sustain Lambeth’s first issue and hold that the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the law to the undisputed facts reflected in the videotape and confirmed by the troopers’ testimony. See McQuarters v. State, 58 S.W.3d 250, 258 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref d) (reversing trial court’s denial of motion to suppress and holding officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain defendant after traffic stop for canine search). Because the majority does not, I dissent.
LIVINGSTON and DAUPHINOT, JJ„ joined.

. For example, one minute into the stop, before Lambeth had even exited the vehicle Trooper Wilson states, "You don’t have it [the vehicle] registered? ... "Why is it not registered?” Lambeth states, "Here is the title.” Two minutes into the stop, Trooper Wilson can then be heard calling in Lambeth's license plate. And eight minutes into the stop dispatch can be heard providing the requested information back to Trooper Wilson. And after the canine unit had been called Trooper Wilson asks Lambeth what his address is. But the video tape shows Trooper Wilson asking for and writing down Lambeth’s address on a form on his clipboard approximately eleven minutes into the stop.