Court Opinion

ID: 9636867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:46:16.561161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:50.407768
License: Public Domain

COTTERAL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I agree that this case does not involve the question decided in White v. Steigleder, but I am unable to concur in the holding that the Probation Act does not confer the power, before sentence has begun, to grant probation or suspend sentence, to be effective after a partial service of the sentence.
The power has only the limitation in the statute that it shall be “after conviction or after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” Because after commencement of sentence it would be concurrent with an executive pardon or parole, the interpretation was given to the statute in U. S. v. Murray and Cook v. U. S., that it was not so intended by Congress. The order of probation preceded the sentence term in this ease, when the power to grant it was unlimited, and the punishment was within the discretion of the court. It was the equivalent of a lesser sentence, ending at the date of the probation) where doubtless it was thought by the court to be more prudent, for sufficient reasons. It would be no more persuasive to contend that the original power of pronouncing sentence is in conflict with that of the executive. The latter might have intervened before the probation date as a relief from punishment. But it affords no sound reason why the trial court may not before sentence begins make an order of probation effective in the future. The statute contains no restriction against it. I therefore dissent from the conclusion of the majority.