Court Opinion

ID: 9544683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:59:30.798483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:26.055552
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Vice Chief Justice
(dissenting) .
I am unable to concur in the majority opinion in this case.
It appears to me that up to this moment, counsel for plaintiff in the trial court has succeeded in diverting the attention of the trial court at the hearing upon his request for a new trial and the attention of this court from the issues at law involved at that time in the trial court and here.
In the last portion of instruction number 13 it is noted that the court told the jury:
“In this connection you are instructed that if you find that the third party is guilty of such intervening negligence as charged by the defendants and if you find that the defendants were not guilty of negligence by a preponderance of the evidence, and if you further find that the accident resulted from the intervening negligence of a third party as charged, then you are told that your verdict must be for the defendants.” (Emphasis added)
It is to be observed that the court here instructed the jury to require defendants not merely to prevent plaintiff from showing that they were guilty of negligence, but required them to affirmatively show by a preponderance of the evidence both that they were not guilty of negligence and that the negligence of a third party caused the accident.
The trial court’s description of the negligence of the third party, Mrs. Roberts, as “intervening” was merely by inadvertence. Such is demonstrated by reading the whole of instruction 13. It is further demonstrated by consideration of the matters which transpired at the conclusion of the giving of instructions to the jury by the trial judge.
The judge had orally instructed the jury as to the issues involved in the case. At the conclusion of the giving of all the instructions, defendants’ attorney objected to such oral statement and particularly to the omission by the court of any reference to “unavoidable accident” which was one of the grounds of defense alleged by defendants. The court stated into the record of the trial that he considered unavoidable accident and contributory negligence instructions as being repugnant one to the other but further stated “that in this case the court did not believe there was any evidence *1054showing unavoidable accident, but that the evidence either showed the negligence of an intervening third party or contributory negligence or negligence of the defendants but did not show any unavoidable accident.” (Emphasis added.) As stated in the majority opinion, apparently the trial court merely used the word “intervening”, thinking of any negligence on the part of Mrs. Roberts as being independent of any negligence on the part of defendants.
The majority opinion concedes that the instruction involved herein does not contain any affirmative misstatements of the law. However, the majority feel that “it can be said to be somewhat confusing and misleading and possibly over-emphasizes the effect of the third party’s negligence.” The majority concede “that the instruction is so worded that upon close analysis the third party’s negligence is of no import unless the defendants were free from negligence,” but say “this in itself could be misleading to the jury for the reason above mentioned that if the defendants were not negligent then the third party’s negligence or lack thereof is immaterial.” However, the majority opinion had already conceded that in Cabiniss v. Andrews, Okl., 258 P.2d 180, this court held that it was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury on the question of defendants’ claim that an accident was caused by the negligence of another than himself, though no issue relating to the negligence of a third party was tendered by the pleadings, where such defense was supported in the evidence.
To my notion a suggestion by the majority that the trial court should properly have instructed upon the law of concurring negligence is a bit out of order in this case, since it was defendants who claimed that the negligence of Mrs. Roberts was the cause of the accident, rather than the plaintiff having pleaded that the negligence of defendants caused the accident or concurred with the negligence of someone else in causing the same, especially unless the evidence may be said to have tended to show such concurring negligence. And there appears to be no contention that it did.
The majority conclude that the trial court did not err on a pure and simple unmixed question of law when he decided to grant a new trial because instruction 13 was erroneous. They say “the wording of Instruction No. 13 suggests that the jury must make a choice as to whether defendants’ or third party’s negligence was the cause of the accident.” However, as above noted, the majority’s conclusion appears to me to be incorrect. Defendants were required by instruction 13 to prove Mrs. Roberts was guilty of negligence causing the accident and that they were not.
Further, when considered with the other instructions and particularly number 15, I am unable to agree with the conclusion that the trial court did not err. By instruction number 15 the court told the jury “Should you find from a preponderance of the evidence herein that the defendants were guilty of any of the acts of negligence alleged in plaintiff’s petition and that said negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and the resulting injuries to the plaintiff and that plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff and against the defendants. But if you do not so find or should you find from the evidence that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or the negligence of the defendants was not the proximate cause of the injuries and damages to plaintiff then in either event said latter events your verdict should be for the defendants.” Certainly this was stated simply enough for lay people of common understanding to readily comprehend.
The word “intervening” as modifying the word “negligence” was inserted in the defendants’ requested instruction by the trial court upon his own initiative before inclusion as such instruction number 13 in the charge to the jury. Such insertion was not reversible error when the instruction is considered in its entirety along with the other instructions. When so considered, this instruction number 13 fairly states the rule as to third party negligence. Cabiniss v. Andrews, supra. The incidental use of the word “intervening” as an adjective did not *1055change the purport of the instruction itself. In this circumstance the word must be considered surplusage and its use a harmless error. Liberty National Bank of Pawhuska v. Exendine, 1S6 Okl. 26, 11 P.2d 154. Dippel v. Hargrave, 206 Okl. 26, 240 P.2d 1070.
The test of an instruction is not whether it is as complete or clear as it could have been, but whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly state the law applicable to the case.
In my opinion the instructions when considered as a whole and construed together state the law applicable to the case correctly and without conflict, and submit the vital features of the tenable legal theories of the parties upon the issues of fact involved. Dippel v. Hargrave, supra.
In the case of Cabiniss v. Andrews, supra [258 P.2d 182], this court stated:
“(I)t is apparent that the trial court was required to submit defendant’s theory to the jury and in so doing correctly stated the applicable law to the jury. It necessarily follows that it was error to sustain plaintiff’s motion for new trial upon the ground that the instruction given was erroneous.
“A trial court has a wide discretion in granting new trials, and every presumption will be indulged in favor of the correctness of the trial court’s ruling. However, where the record clearly shows the court erred in some pure, simple and unmixed question of law an order granting new trial will be reversed.”
While it is true that in the case of Ernest Wiemann Iron Works v. Hoerner Boxes, referred to in the majority opinion, we used the language attributed to that case and those cited therein, to my notion the facts in the case at bar do not warrant application of the rules so quoted, as, to my mind, instruction number 13 was not so erroneous as to require reversal. It does not seem to me that the trial court should have a wider latitude in granting a new trial on a pure, simple unmixed question of law than we permit ourselves.
In the trial below defendants vigorously presented testimony of a nature questioning the plaintiff’s claimed damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant. I find no reversible error in the record. To my mind upholding the action of the trial court in giving plaintiff a second cut at defendants which the law of this case to my notion requires they not have, is not justifiable.
It appears to me that it necessarily follows that the trial court erred in sustaining motion for new trial upon the ground that said instruction was erroneous and the granting thereof should be reversed. Cabiniss v. Andrews, supra. Smith v. Hawkins Irr. Equipment Co., Okl., 323 P.2d 373.