Court Opinion

ID: 9467243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:42:37.958227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:14.749878
License: Public Domain

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Respectfully I dissent. This case hinges on the designation of the bond: Is it a recognizance bond, an unsecured appearance bond with special conditions, or a surety bond? The majority, as did the trial judge, concludes it is a surety bond and subject to forfeiture. I disagree.
From the beginning, the circumstances surrounding the matter of bail were marked by confusion and uncertainty. Upon the indictment of Skipper in Atlanta, the prae-cipe and warrant issued by the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia recommended a surety bond in the amount of $10,000, the customary bond for the offense charged (importation of five pounds of a marijuana derivative). The magistrate in Florida where Skipper was arrested instead set a $20,000 surety bond. On motion for reduction of bail, the magistrate granted the motion and set bail at “$50,000-own recognizance.”1 On the magistrate’s removal order the printed word “surety” was crossed out and “recognizance” substituted. A printed form was utilized for the bond. The typewritten words “$50,000-own recognizance” were added in two places and “surety” crossed out. The forfeiture clause, however, was not deleted and appellants signed above the line marked “surety.”2
I agree with the majority that a bond is a contract and should be construed under the applicable state law. United States v. Gon-ware, 415 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1969).
Here, the modifications to the bond form resulted in irreconcilably contradictory provisions: the meanings of “surety” and “own recognizance” are completely different. Where such occurs, under Florida law, the written or typed provisions prevail. Allegheny Mutual Casualty Co. v. State, 176 So.2d 362 (Fla.App.1965). Allegheny also involved a bail bond. There, a typewritten *1182clause and a handwritten clause concerning the limit of a surety’s liability conflicted with language in the standard form on which the former were written. The court observed:
[Tjhere is the rule, applicable and directly controlling here, that where part of a contract is written or typed and part is printed, and the written or typed and the printed parts are apparently inconsistent or there is reasonable doubt as to the sense and meaning of the total instrument, the words in writing or typing will control. The reason for the according of greater effect to the written or typed part as against the printed portion if they are inconsistent is that the written or typed words are the immediate language and terms selected by the parties themselves to express their meaning, while the printed form is intended for general use without reference to particular objects and aims. A court will, however, resort to this rule only from necessity when the written or typed words or clauses and the printed words or clauses cannot be reconciled; otherwise the duty of the courts to give effect to all the terms and language of the agreement is imperative. 17 Am. Jur.2d, Contracts, section 271, Relation and inconsistencies between written, typewritten, and printed matter, page 679. See also 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 310, pages 168, 169, 170; Nat Harrison Associates, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Company, Fla.App.1964, 162 So.2d 298.
Allegheny Mutual, at 365. See also MacIntyre v. Green’s Pool Service, Inc., 347 So.2d 1081 (Fla.App.1977); Ralston v. Miller, 357 So.2d 1066 (Fla.App.1978). In the case before us, the typed words cannot be reconciled with the printed form. Moreover, the only logical interpretation of the magistrate’s act in granting the motion to reduce but changing the bond from “$20,000 surety” to “$50,000-own recognizance” is that although the magistrate increased the amount, he reduced the category from surety to recognizance.3
It should further be noted that the construction of a contract with conflicting provisions is, under Florida law, a question of law, not a question of fact. MacIntyre, at 1084. Thus, this court can make its own construction of the contract. I would hold that as a matter of law this bond is not a surety bond subject to forfeiture.4
Assuming arguendo that the contract is an enforceable surety bond, I believe the court erred in not remitting the bond, if not in whole, then in part. Rule 46(e)(4) Fed.R. Crim.P. authorizes such' remission if it appears that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture. Our standard of review in bond forfeiture and remission cases is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Discretion, however, cannot be exercised arbitrarily or willfully but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and law and directed by reason and conscience of the judge to a just result. United States v. Parr, 594 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1979). The purpose of a bail bond is not punitive. Its object is not to enrich the government or punish the defendant. Dudley v. United States, 242 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1959).
The majority, as did the district judge, rejects any consideration of remission because Skipper has not yet been apprehended and cites cases that remission is usually contingent upon appearance of the defendant. But the usual rule should not govern this case. In the cases cited, the validity of the surety bond was not in dispute. Moreover, Rule 46(e)(2), (4) does not condition remission upon appearance of the defendant.
*1183In view of the questionable nature of the bond, the appellants’ complete cooperation with the government upon the disappearance of Skipper, and the financial hardship which forfeiture will produce,5 the trial court’s refusal to consider these factors in favor of a rigid “no show-no remission” rule constituted an abuse of discretion.
In my opinion, the bond should have been remitted, if not in its entirety, at least to the amount of $20,000 originally set as an unquestioned surety bond. To hold otherwise is contrary to the teachings of Parr, supra, of what is right and just under the circumstances.

. The Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq. provides for release of an accused upon his own recognizance, execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount determined by the judicial officer, but authorizes the officer to require a bail bond with sureties or to impose conditions which he deems necessary to insure appearance. The Bail Reform Act provides:
(a) Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required. When such a determination is made, the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the above methods of release, impose the first of the following conditions of release which will reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trial or, if no single condition gives that assurance, any combination of the following conditions:
(1) place the person in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing to supervise him;
(2) place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the person during the period of release;
(3) require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount and the deposit in the registry of the court, in cash or other security as directed, of a sum not to exceed 10 per centum of the amount of the bond, such deposit to be returned upon the performance of the conditions of release;
(4) require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or the deposit of cash in lieu thereof; or
(5) impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure appearance as required, including a condition requiring that the person return to custody after specified hours.
18 U.S.C. § 3146 (emphasis added).

. The majority points to the language in the order requiring that appellants co-sign the appearance bond. What this means is not made clear in the record. The government construes this to mean appellants were jointly liable for the $50,000 if Skipper did not appear. If this were true, appellants would essentially be sureties, which in turn would mean the bond was “reduced” from a $20,000 surety bond to a $50,000 surety bond. A more reasonable explanation is that appellants co-signed the bond to signify their agreement to an express special condition-that Skipper reside at appellant McQuinn’s residence-and perhaps an unwritten one-that appellants supervise Skipper. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1), (2).

. In addition, the magistrate did not require appellants to “justify by affidavit.” The majority correctly points out that this failure does not prove the bond was not a surety. It is, however, evidence that the magistrate did not intend the bond to be a surety.

. The majority notes that it is too late to appeal the conditions of release. This point is not relevant; at issue here is the proper construction of the bond, not an appeal of the conditions of release. Moreover, the question of remission, discussed infra, is not affected by whether the conditions are currently appeala-ble.

. Appellant Henderson’s sole asset is his home which he co-owns with his aged father; appellant McQuinn, suffering from cancer, has assets of only $9,000.00.