Court Opinion

ID: 9907527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 17:08:08.489342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:34.394293
License: Public Domain

J-S33008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JEREMY RANDELL MULLIGAN                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 41 WDA 2023

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 1, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                        CP-25-CR-0003020-2006

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                      FILED: December 6, 2023

       Appellant, Jeremy Randell Mulligan, appeals pro se from the post-

conviction court’s December 1, 2022 order dismissing, as untimely, his

petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-

9546. After careful review, we affirm.

       The PCRA court summarized the pertinent background of Appellant’s

case, as follows:

       On May 16, 2007, following a jury trial, [Appellant] was convicted
       of Attempted Homicide, Aggravated Assault, Recklessly
       Endangering Another Person, Firearms Not to Be Carried Without
       a License, and Possessing an Instrument of Crime.1 On July 2,
       2007, the Honorable William R. Cunningham, now retired,
       sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate of 23½ to 47 years of
       incarceration. On October 17, 2008, the Superior Court affirmed
       the judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v. Mulligan,
       964 A.2d 442 (Pa. Super. 2008) ([unpublished memorandum]).

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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          1 18 Pa.C.S.[] §§ 901(a)/2501(a), 2702(a)(1), 2705,
          6106(a)(1), and 907(b), respectively.

       [Appellant] filed his first two PCRA petitions in 2009 and 2010.
       Counsel was appointed for both petitions. The [c]ourt permitted
       counsel on the second petition to withdraw after the dismissal of
       the petition was under appeal, following a Grazier[1] hearing. The
       PCRA [c]ourt dismissed both petitions, and the Superior Court
       affirmed the Orders dismissing the petitions.                  See
       Commonwealth v. Mulligan, 23 A.3d 597 (Pa. Super. 2010)
       ([unpublished memorandum]); Commonwealth v. Mulligan, 47
       A.3d 1242 (Pa. Super. 2012) ([unpublished memorandum]),
       appeal denied, 50 A.3d 125 (Pa. 2012).

       In May of 2017, [Appellant] filed his third PCRA petition with the
       assistance of counsel. In the third PCRA [petition], [Appellant]
       raised various claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
       including the claim [that] trial counsel was ineffective for failure
       to object to the jury instruction on attempted murder, and
       previous PCRA counsel[s] were ineffective for failing to raise the
       claim of trial counsel’s effectiveness. [Appellant] asserted the
       third PCRA [petition] was timely on the basis of equitable tolling
       of the PCRA statute and [Appellant] had diligently pursued his
       rights through direct appeal and multiple prior PCRA[ petition]s.
       In July of 2017, the PCRA [c]ourt issued a [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 907
       Notice of Intent to Dismiss [the] PCRA [petition]. Inadvertently,
       however, the PCRA [c]ourt did not issue a final Order dismissing
       the PCRA [petition].

       On June 15, 2018, while the third PCRA [petition] was still pending
       and while [Appellant] remained represented by counsel,
       [Appellant] filed a pro se “Petition for Modification of Relief”
       requesting RRRI[2] status. The [c]ourt treated the filing as
       [Appellant’s] fourth PCRA [petition], and on June 20, 2018[, it]
       issued [a] Rule 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss. On July 24, 2018,
       the [c]ourt issued a final order dismissing what it had deemed to
       be the fourth PCRA [petition]. In September of 2018, [Appellant],
       through counsel, filed a notice of appeal from “the RRRI Order[.”]
       The only issues raised on appeal related to the third PCRA

____________________________________________

1 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

2 Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive Act, 61 Pa.C.S. §§ 4501-4512.

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      [petition] which, in actuality, remained pending before the PCRA
      [c]ourt.

      On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the PCRA [c]ourt’s Order
      dismissing the pro se “RR[R]I Petition” (which the PCRA [c]ourt
      had deemed to be the fourth PCRA) on the basis the third PCRA
      [petition] was still pending, and the pro se filings were without
      legal effect because [Appellant] was still represented by counsel.
      The Superior Court remanded the case for further proceedings
      consistent with its memorandum decision. See Commonwealth
      v. Mulligan, [225 A.3d 1148 (Pa. Super. 2019)].

      Accordingly, on March 17, 2020, the undersigned[,] to whom the
      matter had been reassigned[,] issued a final Order dismissing the
      third PCRA [petition] (filed on May 24, 2017) for the reasons set
      forth in the Rule 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss filed by Judge
      Cunningham on July 6, 2017. The Superior Court affirmed the
      dismissal of the third serial PCRA [petition].               See
      Commonwealth v. Mulligan, [262 A.3d 459 (Pa. Super. 2021)
      (unpublished memorandum)].         On February 16, 2022, the
      Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the Petition for Allowance of
      Appeal. See Commonwealth v. Mulligan, [272 A.3d 1291 (Pa.
      2022)].

      On September 19, 2022, [Appellant] filed a pro se PCRA [petition],
      his fourth[, which underlies the present appeal].         Therein,
      [Appellant] relies on Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381
      (Pa. 2021), for the proposition [Appellant] may now raise claims
      of trial and/or prior PCRA counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. See
      PCRA [Petition,] 9/19/22, [at] 6, 9-11, 12.

PCRA Court Rule 907 Notice, 10/5/22, at 1-3.

      On October 5, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of its intent

to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing on the basis that it is

untimely. Appellant filed a pro se response, but on December 1, 2022, the

court issued an order dismissing his petition. He filed a timely, pro se notice

of appeal, and complied with the PCRA court’s subsequent order to file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. On

March 20, 2023, the court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion, concluding that the

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issues raised in Appellant’s concise statement were adequately addressed in

its Rule 907 notice.

      Herein, Appellant does not set forth in his appellate brief any Statement

of the Questions Presented, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2116. That rule makes

clear that “[n]o question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement

of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”      Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).

Thus, he has waived his issues for our review.

      Nevertheless, even if we overlooked Appellant’s briefing error, we would

affirm the court’s dismissal of his untimely petition. This Court’s standard of

review regarding an order denying a petition under the PCRA is whether the

determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is

free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa.

2007). We must begin by addressing the timeliness of Appellant’s petition,

because the PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be

altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of a petition.        See

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the

PCRA, any petition for post-conviction relief, including a second or subsequent

one, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence

becomes final, unless one of the following exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies:

      (b) Time for filing petition.--

         (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
         or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the

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         date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges
         and the petitioner proves that:

              (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
              result of interference by government officials with the
              presentation of the claim in violation of the
              Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
              Constitution or laws of the United States;

              (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
              unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
              ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

              (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
              recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
              or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time
              period provided in this section and has been held by
              that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, section 9545(b)(2) requires that

any petition attempting to invoke one of these exceptions “be filed within one

year of the date the claim could have been presented.”                42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(2).

      Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in 2008, after this

Court affirmed his judgment of sentence and he did not seek further review

with our Supreme Court. Consequently, his present petition, filed in 2022, is

facially untimely and, for this Court to have jurisdiction to review the merits

thereof, Appellant must prove that he meets one of the exceptions to the

timeliness requirements set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b).

      Instantly, Appellant argues that our Supreme Court’s decision in

Bradley permits him to raise, even in his untimely petition, a challenge to the

effectiveness of his prior PCRA attorneys, as well as layered claims of

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ineffectiveness regarding his trial counsel. In rejecting this claim, the PCRA

court reasoned:

     “[W]hen a PCRA petition is not filed within one year of the
     expiration of direct review, or not eligible for one of the three
     limited exceptions, or entitled to one of the exceptions, but not
     filed within one year of the date that the claim could have been
     first brought, the trial court has no power to address the
     substantive    merits    of    a   petitioner’s   PCRA    claims.”
     Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa.
     2000); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1039 (Pa.
     Super. 2007). See also[] 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9545(b)(1), (2). It is
     [Appellant’s] burden to allege and prove one of the timeliness
     exceptions applies. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d
     1263, 1267-1268 (Pa. 2008). A claim of ineffectiveness of counsel
     does not save an otherwise untimely PCRA petition.
     Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999)[;]
     Commonwealth v. Carr, 68 A.2d 1164 (Pa. Super. 2001).

     [Appellant] does not plead or prove an exception to the timeliness
     rule. In the PCRA [petition], [Appellant] implies a new exception
     to the timeliness rule was carved out by … Bradley, supra.
     [Appellant’s] reliance upon … Bradley is misplaced. Bradley did
     not abrogate the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of … Fahy,
     737 A.2d [at] 223 … ([concluding that a] claim of ineffective
     assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise untimely petition
     for review on the merits). As the majority in Bradley stated,
     “[u]nder the PCRA, ineffective assistance of counsel is one of the
     enumerated errors entitling a defendant to relief so long as the
     other conditions of the PCRA are met.” … Bradley, 261 A.3d [at]
     390…. The jurisdictional timeliness requirement is one such
     condition of the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9545(b)(1). As Justice
     Dougherty in the concurring opinion in Bradley explained:

        Importantly, our decision today does not create an
        exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar, such that a
        petitioner represented by the same counsel in the PCRA
        court and on PCRA appeal could file an untimely successive
        PCRA     petition  challenging    initial  PCRA    counsel’s
        ineffectiveness because it was his “first opportunity to do
        so.” The majority’s holding, like any holding, must be read
        against the facts of the case. See Commonwealth v.
        Hale, … 128 A.3d 781, 785 n.6 ([Pa.] 2015) (“This Court

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        oftentimes has explained that the holding of a decision must
        be read against its facts.”); Commonwealth v. Johnson,
        … 86 A.3d 182, 189 ([Pa.] 2014) (“Of course, every decision
        must be read against its facts[.]”). The facts here are that
        [the] appellant filed a timely, counseled first PCRA petition.
        After this petition was dismissed, he filed a timely appeal
        from the dismissal. On PCRA appeal, [the] appellant was
        represented by new counsel, who raised claims of prior
        PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. See Majority Opinion at
        384-85. Thus, under the facts of this case, the “first
        opportunity” to raise claims of ineffective assistance of initial
        PCRA counsel was on a timely appeal from the dismissal of
        a timely first PCRA petition, not in a second PCRA petition
        filed out of time.

                                      ***

        Given the facts of this case, as well as the language of the
        majority opinion, it is clear the Court today has not
        fashioned an exception to the PCRA time-bar for
        untimely petitions representing the “first opportunity” to
        challenge the competence of prior PCRA counsel. Indeed, it
        is well- settled under our precedent that “[t]he PCRA confers
        no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable
        exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those
        exceptions       expressly    delineated    in    the   Act.”
        Commonwealth v. Eller, … 807 A.2d 838, 845 ([Pa.]
        2002). Accord Commonwealth v. Watts, … 23 A.3d 980,
        983 ([Pa.] 2011); Commonwealth v. Hackett, … 956 A.2d
        978, 983-84 ([Pa.] 2008); Commonwealth v. Cruz, … 852
        A.2d 287, 292 ([Pa.] 2004); Commonwealth v.
        Robinson, … 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 ([Pa.] 2003).

     … Bradley, 261 A.3d at … 406-[]07 (Concurring Opinion by
     Justice Dougherty) [(emphasis added)].

     As discussed, for a PCRA [petition] at this docket to be timely, it
     needed to be filed by November 17, 2009, one year after the
     judgment of sentence became final.          See 42 Pa.C.S.[] §
     9545(b)(1). This PCRA [petition,] filed on September 19, 2022,
     is untimely by approximately twelve years and two months. No
     exception to the timeliness rule has been satisfactorily pled and
     proven.

PCRA Court Rule 907 Notice at 4-5.

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     We agree with the PCRA court. As this Court has consistently declared,

     Bradley … did not announce a new constitutional right, much less
     one applicable retroactively. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
     Johnson, [No. 696 EDA 2022, unpublished memorandum at *4]
     (Pa. Super. [filed Mar. 7,] 2023) … (noting [that,] “[a]lthough
     [Bradley] did not specifically address the timeliness exception
     upon which [the] [a]ppellant relies, it is clear Bradley did not
     recognize a new constitutional right[]”…); Commonwealth v.
     Dixon, [290 A.3d 702] (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished
     memorandum) (holding [that] Bradley does not trigger the
     timeliness     exception    of    [s]ection      9545(b)(1)(iii));
     Commonwealth v. Parkinson, [No. 1286 EDA 2022,
     unpublished memorandum at *3] (Pa. Super. [filed Oct. 6,] 2022)
     (holding [that] “Bradley did not create a new, non-statutory
     exception to the PCRA time bar[]”…).

     Furthermore, this Court has continually declined to extend the
     holding of Bradley to cases involving untimely petitions, like the
     instant one. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stahl, [292 A.3d
     1130, 1135-36] (Pa. Super. 2023) (concluding that “[n]othing in
     Bradley creates a right to file a second PCRA petition outside the
     PCRA’s one-year time limit as a method of raising ineffectiveness
     of PCRA counsel[]”…); Commonwealth v. Mead, [277 A.3d
     1111] (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum), appeal
     denied, 284 A.3d 118 (Pa. 2022) (emphasizing that Bradley
     involved a timely first PCRA petition and did not apply to [the]
     appellant’s appeal from order denying his untimely petition);
     Commonwealth v. Morton, [292 A.3d 1075] (Pa. Super. 2023)
     (unpublished memorandum) (holding that [the] appellant’s
     reliance on Bradley does not afford relief in his appeal from the
     denial of his untimely second PCRA petition); Commonwealth v.
     Gurdine, [273 A.3d 1076] (Pa. Super. 2022) [(unpublished
     memorandum)] (same).

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Commonwealth v. Ruiz-Figueroa, No. 1531 EDA 2022, unpublished

memorandum at *2-3 (Pa. Super. filed June 22, 2023).3              Accordingly,

Appellant has failed to prove that any exception applies to his untimely PCRA

petition. Thus, the court did not err in dismissing it.

       Order affirmed.

DATE: 12/6/2023

____________________________________________

3 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating that unpublished non-precedential decisions

of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive
value).

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