Court Opinion

ID: 9965248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 21:01:34.166298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:49.387480
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-13416   Document: 10-1    Date Filed: 05/01/2024   Page: 1 of 4

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-13416
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       DAVID Q. WEBB,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       GWINNETT COUNTY GOVERNMENT,
       GWINNETT COUNTY STATE COURT,
       DIVISION S3, CHIEF JUDGE,
       GWINNETT COUNTY GA DISTRICT ATTORNEY,
       GWINNETT COUNTY SHERIFF,

                                               Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-13416      Document: 10-1       Date Filed: 05/01/2024     Page: 2 of 4

       2                       Opinion of the Court                  23-13416

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-03527-WMR
                           ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              In 2023, David Q. Webb ﬁled a pro se complaint arising out
       of his detention at the Gwinnett County Jail more than thirty years
       ago, from September 1990 through February 1991. He claimed
       that he was illegally detained without booking or any judicial pro-
       cess based on his race, color, and national origin as an African-
       American man. Seeking money damages, he raised claims under
       42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 2000d, alleging violations of his Fourth
       and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and under state law, O.C.G.A.
       § 51-2-2. The district court screened the complaint, see 28 U.S.C.
       § 1915(e)(2), and determined it was frivolous because it was plainly
       barred by Georgia’s two-year personal-injury statute of limitations.
               We review a dismissal for frivolity for an abuse of discretion.
       Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008). We “review
       de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the stat-
       ute of limitations.” United States v. Frediani, 790 F.3d 1196, 1199
       (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). “Pro se pleadings are
       held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys
       and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United
       States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
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       23-13416               Opinion of the Court                          3

              As the district court explained, all of Webb’s claims, which
       are based on the same allegations of false arrest and imprisonment,
       are subject to Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations for per-
       sonal-injury claims, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. See Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d
       556, 560–61 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that claims brought under §§
       1983, 1985, and 2000d are “measured by the personal injury limita-
       tions period of the state”); McCullough v. Atl. Reﬁning Co., 177 S.E.
       601, 602 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934) (“Actions for malicious prosecution, for
       malicious abuse of legal process, for false arrest or false imprison-
       ment, or for malicious use of civil process are all actions for dam-
       ages for injuries to the person of the party complainant.”). And
       that two-year period began to run no later than the date of his re-
       lease from jail in February 1991, when “the facts which would sup-
       port a cause of action [were] apparent or should [have been] appar-
       ent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.”
       Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987); see Wallace
       v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007) (“Limitations begin to run against
       an action for false imprisonment when the alleged false imprison-
       ment ends.”) (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Webb’s
       complaint, ﬁled more than thirty years after his release, is barred
       by the statute of limitations.
               Recognizing that his claims are untimely, Webb invokes a
       purported exception for “fraud upon the court” that, in Webb’s
       view, was “inherent within the Oﬃcial Court Record” for his state
       criminal case. He claims that the “savings clause” of Rule 60(d)(1),
       Fed. R. Civ. P., supersedes the statute of limitations and permits his
       late claims. Webb is mistaken.
USCA11 Case: 23-13416      Document: 10-1     Date Filed: 05/01/2024     Page: 4 of 4

       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-13416

              Rule 60 provides for relief from a judgment obtained by
       fraud, if the moving party seeks relief “no more than a year after
       the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). Nonetheless,
       Rule 60(d)(1) preserves the court’s power to “entertain an inde-
       pendent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or pro-
       ceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1). And “[a]n independent action
       does not have to be brought within one year.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
       v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 273 (11th Cir. 1988).
              Because Webb did not seek relief from a judgment or order,
       though, he cannot rely on Rule 60 or establish the elements neces-
       sary to maintain an independent action. See id. (stating that the ﬁrst
       element of an independent action is “a judgment which ought not,
       in equity and good conscience, to be enforced”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60.
       The complaint’s allegations do not reference any judgment in the
       state criminal case, and his brieﬁng on appeal states that no judg-
       ment was entered. Rather, as the district court stated, Webb’s com-
       plaint sought only money damages for violations of his state and
       federal rights arising from his alleged false arrest and imprison-
       ment. Accordingly, neither Rule 60 nor an independent action per-
       mit relief in this case or exempt Webb’s claims from the ordinary
       limitations period.
              For these reasons, we aﬃrm the dismissal of Webb’s com-
       plaint as barred by the statute of limitations.
             AFFIRMED.