Court Opinion

ID: 9667346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:43:14.134273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:37.251967
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR
W. M. LEECH, Special Justice.
Appellant, Carrie G. Mitchell, has filed a petition to rehear wherein she contends that the instant decision is in direct conflict with Gibson v. Butler, 484 S.W.2d 356 (Tenn. 1972), and that the instant decision fails to consider the “alleged” fact that the position of Supervisor of Instruction and Materials Director was not abolished. The two aforementioned contentions are the only matters raised in the petition.
With the foregoing in mind, it should be reiterated that Supreme Court Rule No. 32 provides in pertinent part that:
“A rehearing will be refused where no new argument is made, and no new authority adduced, and no material fact is pointed out as overlooked.”
Applying said rule to appellant’s petition, we find that Gibson, supra, was fully discussed in appellant’s original brief and thus no new argument is now made and no new authority is now adduced. In addition, this Court did not overlook any material fact and the mere fact that this Court’s interpretation of a given fact differs from appellant’s interpretation does not mean that we overlooked something. Moreover, in the instant case, it is evident from the total record that the position formerly held by the appellant no longer existed at the time of the May 14th meeting of the Board and thus, appellant’s contention that the position was not abolished is erroneous. Thus, pursuant to the authority of Rule 32 this petition should be denied.
Moreover, appellant, in stating that Gibson, supra, is in conflict with the instant case, shows a basic misconception of our holding in both Gibson and the instant case. In Gibson, this Court simply held that under those particular facts that the Claiborne County Board of Education had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in “transferring” certain tenured teachers and therefore said transfer was a demotion. In the instant case, however, we find no arbitrary or capricious action in the Board’s Act of transferring appellant from one supervisory position to another supervisory position. Having so found, there *899was no demotion and appellant’s rights under T.C.A. § 49-1411 were not violated.
The aforesaid being true, it necessarily follows that appellant’s petition to rehear is denied.
DYER, C. J., and CHATTIN, Mc-CANLESS, and FONES, JJ., concur.