Court Opinion

ID: 9364604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 19:00:20.87588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:39.390952
License: Public Domain

Case: 19-60827         Document: 00516616439             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/19/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                                             FILED
                                                                                      January 19, 2023
                                         No. 19-60827                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                             Clerk

   Karla Yadira Lara Canales,

                                                                                 Petitioner,

                                             versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                                Respondent.

                           Petition for Review of an Order of the
                               Board of Immigration Appeals
                                   BIA No. A099 528 344

   Before Jolly, Dennis, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge:*
          This appeal arises from the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA)
   denial of Karla Yadira Lara Canales’s motion to reopen her removal
   proceedings. The BIA denied her motion to reopen as untimely, leaving the
   order of removal in place. We now VACATE the BIA’s denial of Lara
   Canales’s motion to reopen and REMAND so that the BIA may properly
   consider whether Lara Canales is entitled to equitable tolling.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 19-60827       Document: 00516616439           Page: 2     Date Filed: 01/19/2023

                                      No. 19-60827

                                            I.
          The Attorney General may allow otherwise-removable aliens to
   remain if they have accrued 10 years of continuous physical presence in the
   United States—a discretionary form of relief otherwise known as
   “cancellation of removal.” Under the statutory “stop-time rule,” the period
   of continuous presence terminates when either of two events occurs: (1) an
   alien is served with a notice to appear (NTA), or (2) an alien commits an
   enumerated criminal offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).
          If the BIA orders an alien removed, that alien may file a motion to
   reopen the removal proceedings. This form of procedural relief allows aliens
   to ask the BIA to reconsider its removal decision “in light of newly
   discovered evidence or a change in circumstances since the hearing.” Lugo-
   Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Dada v.
   Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 12 (2008)). These motions, however, must be filed no
   later than 90 days after the entry of a final administrative decision. Id. (citing
   8 U.S.C.§ 1229a(c)(7)).
          The BIA issued its final administrative decision when it ordered Lara
   Canales to be removed in August 2006. 1 As is often the case, Lara Canales
   was not removed. In the meantime, the law changed when the Supreme
   Court decided Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). In Pereira, the Court
   held that a “putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time
   or place of the [alien]’s removal proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under
   section 1229(a),’ and so does not trigger the stop-time rule.” 138 S. Ct. at
   2113–14. Less than 90 days after the Pereira decision, Lara Canales filed a
   motion to reopen, arguing that because her 2006 NTA was defective, she had
   accrued the necessary period of continuous presence to be eligible for

          1
            This removal order arose from a reversal of the immigration judge’s initial
   determination that Lara Canales was entitled to asylum.

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                                          No. 19-60827

   cancellation of removal. Stated differently, because her NTA failed to specify
   the time and date that her removal proceedings would take place, it did not
   trigger the stop-time rule. And although she conceded that her motion to
   reopen was filed more than 90 days after the entry of her removal order in
   2006, Lara Canales argued she was entitled to equitable tolling of the
   limitations period based on the extraordinary circumstance of a change in
   law—that is, the Pereira decision.
           Nevertheless, the BIA denied her motion to reopen as untimely,
   explaining that no statutory or regulatory exception to the general limitations
   period applied. The BIA further noted that, notwithstanding Pereira, Lara
   Canales would still be ineligible for cancellation of removal because of two
   alternative events that triggered the stop-time rule: (1) subsequent service of
   her notice of hearing that “perfected” any defects in the NTA and (2) the
   entry of her final administrative decision in 2006.
           Lara Canales now appeals. She argues, inter alia, that (1) she is eligible
   for cancellation of removal because her defective NTA did not trigger the
   stop-time rule, and (2) her motion to reopen is not barred as untimely because
   she was entitled to equitable tolling. 2 Here, the BIA’s conclusion that Lara
   Canales was not entitled to equitable tolling implicitly rests on its finding that
   Lara Canales was not newly eligible to seek cancellation of removal as a result
   of the Pereira decision. Thus, to address Lara Canales’s equitable tolling
   argument, we must answer an underlying question: Whether the BIA erred
   in concluding that there was no extraordinary circumstance that might
   warrant tolling of the limitations period.

           2
              Lara Canales argues that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over her
   removal proceedings. Lara Canales’s jurisdictional argument is squarely foreclosed by our
   decision in Pierre-Paul v. Barr—a decision in which this court held that Pereira had no effect
   on the immigration court’s jurisdiction over removal proceedings. 930 F.3d 684, 689–90
   (5th Cir. 2019), abrogated on other grounds by Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021).

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                                    No. 19-60827

                                         II.
          We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen under the “highly
   deferential” abuse of discretion standard. Lugo-Resendez, 831 F.3d at 340
   (quoting Barrios-Cantarero v. Holder, 772 F.3d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 2014) (per
   curiam)). Such an abuse of discretion occurs if the BIA’s decision “is
   capricious, irrational, utterly without foundation in the evidence, based on
   legally erroneous interpretations of statutes or regulations, or based on
   unexplained departures from regulations or established policies.” Id.
   (quoting Barrios-Cantarero, 772 F.3d at 1021).
                                         III.
          As we have earlier indicated, a motion to reopen under 8
   U.S.C.§ 1229a(c)(7) must “be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a
   final administrative order.” This deadline, however, is subject to equitable
   tolling. Lugo-Resendez, 831 F.3d at 344. Equitable tolling requires that a
   petitioner establish, “(1) that [s]he has been pursuing [her] rights diligently,
   and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way and
   prevented timely filing.” Id. (quoting Menominee Indian Tribe v. United
   States, 577 U.S. 250, 255 (2016)).
          This court has recognized that changes in law may constitute an
   extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling of the deadline for
   seeking statutory reopening. Id. at 343–44. For example, in Lugo-Resendez,
   this court was presented with an equitable tolling claim based on a change in
   law where an alien’s conviction no longer rendered him deportable. Id.
   Although the court declined to determine if the deadline should have been
   tolled, it remanded the alien’s claim so that the BIA could properly consider
   whether the alien was entitled to equitable tolling based on the change in law.
   Id. at 344.

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                                          No. 19-60827

            Here, Lara Canales concedes that her motion was filed outside the
   90-day deadline, but contends that she is entitled to equitable tolling because
   (1) the Pereira decision was an extraordinary circumstance that rendered her
   newly eligible to seek cancellation of removal and (2) she diligently pursued
   her rights by filing her motion to reopen within 90 days of the Pereira
   decision. In rejecting Lara Canales’s equitable tolling arguments, the full
   extent of the BIA’s analysis was that she “has not shown that any of the
   statutory or regulatory exceptions to the general time limitations on motions
   to reopen apply to her case.” 3
           Usually, we defer “to the BIA’s interpretation of immigration
   regulations if th[e] interpretation is reasonable.” Barrios-Cantarero, 772 F.3d
   at 1021 (citing Hernandez-Castillo v. Moore, 436 F.3d 516, 519 (5th Cir.
   2006)). But in this case, it is not.
           The BIA reasoned that Lara Canales’s continuous physical presence
   had stopped accruing after the service of her defective NTA because it was
   subsequently “cured” by her notice of hearing. Alternatively, the BIA
   reasoned that Lara Canales had not been present in the United States for 10
   years at the time of her removal order because the issuance of her final
   administrative order in 2006 triggered the stop-time rule.
           We begin our review by observing that Pereira made clear that a
   defective NTA will not stop the running of the 10-year continuous time
   period. See 138 S. Ct. at 2113–14 (holding that a putative NTA that fails to
   designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings

           3
             We additionally hold that the single sentence from the BIA, devoid of any analysis,
   is insufficient for us to conclude that the BIA appropriately considered Lara Canales’s
   equitable tolling argument. See Sylejmani v. Sessions, 729 F. App’x 317, 321 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (per curiam) (holding the BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen as
   untimely filed when the BIA did not provide a reasoned explanation for its denial and
   provided only conclusory statements that the motion was untimely).

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                                      No. 19-60827

   does not trigger the stop-time rule). Further, the Supreme Court’s decision
   in Niz-Chavez v. Garland forecloses the BIA’s conclusion that the notice of
   hearing Lara Canales received later “perfected” the deficient NTA. See 141
   S. Ct. 1474, 1486 (2021) (holding that to trigger the stop-time rule, a NTA
   must come in the form of a single document). Thus, the BIA erroneously
   determined that Lara Canales was ineligible for cancellation of removal on
   the basis that her NTA combined with her subsequent notice of hearing was
   adequate to trigger the stop-time rule.
          The BIA’s alternative basis for holding that Lara Canales had not been
   present in the United States for the requisite 10-year period is also legal error.
   As the BIA noted, the final removal order was entered in 2006—around one
   year after Lara Canales came to the United States. The BIA cited its own
   decision in Matter of Garcia, 24 I. & N. Dec. 179, 181 (BIA 2007), as authority
   for the proposition that “continuous physical presence only continues to
   accrue until the entry of a final administrative decision.” But this ruling, too,
   is error: a final order of removal does not trigger the stop-time rule and
   terminate continuous physical presence. Parada v. Garland, 48 F.4th 374, 377
   (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam). This court recently held that the text of the
   stop-time rule is clear: the clock only stops when an alien is served with a
   proper NTA under section 1229(a) or when an alien has committed an
   enumerated offense under section 1229b(d)(1). See id. Neither of the two
   triggering events occurred here.
          Accordingly, each of the BIA’s bases for determining that Lara
   Canales had not accrued the continuous physical presence required for
   eligibility of cancellation of removal was legal error. We now hold that Lara
   Canales is statutorily eligible to seek cancellation of removal. However, this
   holding does not automatically entitle Lara Canales to have her motion to
   reopen heard on the merits. The BIA must, upon remand, engage in the fact-
   intensive determination of whether the 90-day deadline on motions to reopen

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                                   No. 19-60827

   should be tolled because of the extraordinary circumstance presented by
   Pereira. If the BIA determines Lara Canales satisfies the requirements for
   equitable tolling, she may then present her motion for a determination on its
   merits.
          We therefore VACATE the BIA’s denial of Lara Canales’s motion
   to reopen and REMAND this case for further consideration not inconsistent
   with this opinion.
                                             VACATED and REMANDED.

                                         7