Court Opinion

ID: 9686721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:03:33.62624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:21.748780
License: Public Domain

*41Dethmers, C. J.
{dissenting). I am not in accord with Mr. Justice Voelker’s opinion for reversal. In ■disagreeing, I do not deem it essential to my position to differ with what he has written about the negligence or wrongdoing of defendant or to the effect that the Court ought not to take such a charitable view of defendant’s testimony as to construe it in the light least favorable to plaintiff, although it is to be noted that this Court has heretofore held, consistently, that when plaintiff calls a defendant for cross-examination under the statute (CL 1948, § 617.66 [Stat Ann § 27.915]) plaintiff is bound by defendant’s testimony which is not inherently incredible and not contradicted by other proofs. Tel-Craft Civic Association v. City of Detroit, 337’ Mich 326; Cherry River National Bank v. Wallace, 329 Mich 384; Hall v. Korak, 329 Mich 16; Dahlerup v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 319 Mich 96; Schaupeter v. Schaupeter, 317 Mich 84; Brkal v. Pletcher, 311 Mich 258; In re Estate of Taylor, 271 Mich 404; Fleegar v. Consumers Power Co., 262 Mich 537; Swank v. Croff, 245 Mich 657. Neither is it necessary to my position in this ease to invoke that portion of my much maligned opinion in Schillinger v. Wyman, 331 Mich 160, to which Mr. Justice Voelker takes exception in this case, as did Mr. Justice Black in Kelt v. Duffy, 346 Mich 456. That portion of my opinion in Schillinger was an attempted analysis of inconsistent previous decisions of this Court on the question of whether the benefit of a presumption of due care, accorded a plaintiff’s decedent in cases of accidental injuries to him to which there were no eyewitnesses, should be denied him if the defendant was present at the accident, survived it and was available at trial. It was designed to show that this Court had held in the negative from Adams v. Iron Cliffs Co., 78 Mich 271 (18 Am St Rep 441), to Gembolis v. Rydeski, 258 Mich 521, and then had executed an *42about-face, answering in the affirmative, starting with Foote v. Huelster, 272 Mich 194, and Buchel v. Williams, 273 Mich 132, which were decided after trial bnt before this Court’s consideration of Collar v. May croft, 274 Mich 376, in which the decisions in Foote and Buchel on the point in question were followed, to the considerable disappointment of the writer of this opinion, whose name appears in the official report of the Collar Case as one of the attorneys for the plaintiff. Having pointed to this change of position by this Court, with which this writer was never satisfied, decision in Schillinger was not planted on it. That is to say, it was not predicated on denial of the benefit of the presumption to plaintiff’s decedent at the outset of the case because of defendant’s availability as an eyewitness, but, rather, on the overcoming of that presumption of decedent’s freedom from contributory negligence by proofs in the case of undisputed physical facts which affirmatively showed plaintiff’s decedent therein to have been guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. It is on this same ground that I hold for affirmance in the instant case.
In so doing, I am not oblivious of the holding in Breker v. Rosema, 301 Mich 685 (141 ALR 867), that the presumption of due care in favor of a plaintiff’s decedent in cases where there were no eyewitnesses, applies equally in the case of a plaintiff suffering from amnesia traceable to the accident as shown by clear and undisputed medical testimony. I shall proceed on the assumption that plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of the presumption here, despite the lack of medical testimony or any other direct proof connecting plaintiff’s alleged amnesia to injuries sustained in the accident, although the propriety of such assumption, under this state of the proofs, is brought into considerable doubt by language in Breker v. Rosema, supra; Thompson v. Southern *43Michigan Transportation Co., 261 Mich 440; and Gapske v. Hatch, 347 Mich 648, 650.
I agree with Mr. Justice Voelkeb, as this Court has long held, that for the purpose of .passing on the trial court’s directed verdict for defendant, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Such view cannot, for reasons stated in my opinion in Van Gilder v. C. & E. Trucking Corp., 352 Mich 672, obviate the undisputed facts which constitute the only proofs in the record as to how the accident happened, namely: that defendant’s automobile was travelling, after dark, at 20 miles per hour (plaintiff’s declaration alleged 20 to 25 miles per hour), with headlights on, going north, on the east half of a north and south, 72-foot, paved street, without swerving and in a straight course, with its right side about 20 to 22 feet from the east-curb line; that plaintiff entered upon the pavement from the east, at a point north of the nearest intersection and outside of any established crosswalk, to walk westerly across the street; that there were no parked automobiles nearby or other obstructions to prevent plaintiff from seeing defendant’s oncoming automobile, the atmospheric condition being hazy but such that headlights of an automobile could be seen from 1 to 2 blocks distant; that plaintiff was thrown to the right of defendant’s automobile so that after the accident she was lying about 10 feet west of the east curb; that there was small damage to the right fender, headlight and hood of defendant’s automobile. It will be noted that this is not a case in which the plaintiff undertook to cross a street at an established crosswalk, under protection of a traffic control light or stop sign as in Barron v. City of Detroit, 348 Mich 213, and other, similar cases with which this Court recently has labored.
The undisputed physical facts, as just recounted, overcome any presumption of due care on plaintiff’s *44part and establish her guilt of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In Champaign v. Detroit United Railway, 181 Mich 672: Molby v. Detroit United Railway, 221 Mich 419; Molda v. Clark, 236 Mich 277; Richman v. Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co., 254 Mich 607; DePotty v. City of Detroit, 258 Mich 657; Heintselman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 260 Mich 688: and Rybarczyk v. New York Central R. Co.. 276 Mich 131, this Court held that when a plaintiff driver testified that he had looked and had seen no approaching vehicle such testimony was overcome by undisputed physical facts to the effect that plaintiff had had a clear and unobstructed view of the approaching vehicle and could have seen it in time to avoid the accident had he looked properly and given heed to what was there to be seen and that, hence, plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law for failure to maintain a proper lookout, entitling defendant to a directed verdict.
In Rushford-Surine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 239 Mich 19, 24, 25, Mr. Justice Fellows, speaking for the majority of this Court, said:
“But my Brother McDonald reasons that because there was no witness to the accident a presumption arises that they exercised due care and looked but did not see the train. Such a presumption could not make a stronger case than would testimony that they looked. Had there been such testimony in the case, it would not take the case to the jury where the undisputed physical facts establish that had they looked with the slightest degree of care they could not have failed to see the oncoming train. Champaign v. Detroit United Railway, 181 Mich 672; Molby v. Detroit United Railway, 221 Mich 419; Bradley v. Davis, 223 Mich 275; Downey v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 230 Mich 243, 246. In the last cited case, it was said by Mr. Justice Nelson Sharpe, speaking for the Court:
“ ‘His testimony that he did look and did not see the locomotive is so opposed to the undisputed physi*45cal facts that it cannot he said to raise a question for a jury. He either did not look when first in a position to see down the track, or else after he saw the approaching train he concluded that he had time to cross. In either event, he was guilty of such contributory negligence as bars his recovery.’ ”
In Thomas v. New York Central R. Co., 267 Mich 396, 398, this Court said:
“The presumption obtains unless the physical facts demonstrate that decedent failed to look for trains when she should have looked, failed to see what she should have seen, or having seen what a reasonably prudent person would have seen, failed to act upon it with due care.”
“Prima facie presumption that decedent motorist, whose car was struck on highway crossing railroad by engine of a passenger train, was exercising due care is not applied where known facts prevent it as where decedent had unobstructed view of approach of train for upward of a mile.” Tomczyk v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry. (syllabus), 267 Mich 474.
To the same effect, see Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich 410, and 2 cases therein followed, namely, Kwiotkowski v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 70 Mich 549; and Guntermann v. Michigan Central R. Co., 168 Mich 37; also, Elrich v. Schwaderer, 251 Mich 33; Waterstradt v. Lanyon Dock Co., 304 Mich 437; and Pomeroy v. Dykema, 256 Mich 100. All of these cases hold, in effect, that the presumption of due' care on the part of a plaintiff’s decedent is overcome by undisputed proofs of physical facts from which it can only be concluded that decedent could have seen defendant’s vehicle in time to avert an accident and that, therefore, he either negligently failed to look and see or to give heed to what was there to be. seen and.to act accordingly to avoid the ' accident as he could have done. This is in accord *46with the concurring opinions of Mr. Justice'Smith and Mr. Justice Black in Hett v. Duffy, supra.
In the instant case, the undisputed physical facts are that plaintiff could have seen defendant’s automobile coming in sufficient time to have avoided the collision between herself and the right front of the áutomobile. The inescapable conclusion is that she either did not look or see or failed to give proper heed to what she saw or could have seen had she looked and that this was a proximate cause of the accident. This is supported by the testimony of the police officer that, on the same evening on which the accident occurred, plaintiff told him that she had not seen defendant’s automobile approaching. This testimony stands undisputed. I do not agree that the rule that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff requires elimination of this undisputed testimony of plaintiff’s own witness from our consideration, nor that it is explained out of the case by plaintiff’s testimony that, at the time of trial, she could not remember the accident or attending circumstances.
The averments of plaintiff’s declaration concerning defendant’s driving while intoxicated do not make out a case of nuisance (State of New Jersey v. Rodgers, 91 NJL 212 [102 A 433]). Such conduct having its origin in negligence, this claim is in the same situation as the one planted on negligence, namely, that it is defeated by plaintiff’s contributory negligence. Denny v. Garavaglia, 333 Mich 317.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs to defendant.
Carr and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Dethmers, C. J.
Kavanagh, J., took no part in the decision of this case.