Court Opinion

ID: 9952062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 17:02:22.719827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:46.992023
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                   DAVID JACOB SANCHEZ, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 22-0406
                               FILED 3-19-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                        No. CR2021-100229-001
                The Honorable Michael W. Kemp, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Bain & Lauritano PLC, Glendale
By Sheri M. Lauritano
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Tanja K. Kelly
Counsel for Appellee

                       MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.
                           STATE v. SANCHEZ
                           Decision of the Court

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1            David Jacob Sanchez appeals his conviction for second-
degree murder, arguing: (1) his trial without peremptory strikes was
unconstitutional; (2) the superior court abused its discretion by not using a
jury selection questionnaire including questions he proposed; and (3) the
superior court abused its discretion by not admitting evidence of the
victim’s behavior the day before the murder. We affirm because there is no
constitutional right to peremptory challenges, the use of jury questionnaires
is permissive, and the evidence was not admissible under Arizona Rule of
Evidence (“Rule”) 404(b).

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       A.    N.F. Had an Argument at AutoZone, During Which He
             Touched, But Did Not Assault, an AutoZone Employee.

¶2            On January 2, 2021, N.F. visited an AutoZone in Peoria over
an issue with his car’s battery. During an argument with an AutoZone
employee, N.F. went behind the sales counter and placed his hands on the
employee. N.F. left when the AutoZone manager mentioned calling the
police. Peoria police arrived after N.F. left and wrote a report of the
incident, reflecting that the AutoZone employee did not want to press
charges. Although the store manager described N.F. as threatening, the
police report asserted that “[t]here was no assault to an employee.”

¶3            That evening, N.F. went to Sanchez’s house to hang out with
Sanchez’s brother. N.F. asked Sanchez if he could borrow money, which
Sanchez declined. Sanchez never learned of the AutoZone incident before
shooting N.F.

       B.    On the Next Day, Sanchez Shot N.F., Who Sanchez Believed
             Might Have Been Trying to Break Into His Car.

¶4            On January 3, 2021, at around 9:00 am, N.F. banged on
Sanchez’s door. Sanchez opened and closed the door twice before N.F.
walked away from the house. N.F. walked towards his car, “grabbed
something from within [it],” wrapped his shirt around his hand, and began
walking towards Sanchez’s car. N.F. then unsuccessfully tried to open
Sanchez’s car. While this was occurring, Sanchez’s brother was watching
N.F. from inside the house and informed Sanchez that N.F. may have been
trying to break into his car.

                                     2
                            STATE v. SANCHEZ
                            Decision of the Court

¶5            Hearing this, Sanchez grabbed a gun and walked out of his
home to confront N.F. Once outside, Sanchez saw N.F. circling his car on
the street and then walking towards the driveway. When N.F. was on the
driveway, they exchanged words and Sanchez shot N.F. twice after N.F.
“reached and made a turning motion,” resulting in N.F.’s death. After
shooting N.F., Sanchez went inside. Neighbors saw these events and called
the police. Once the police arrived, Sanchez told them he shot N.F. twice
after he saw N.F. touching his car.

       C.     The Court Declined to Use a Pretrial Questionnaire After
              Discussions With Counsel and Proceeded with Voir Dire.

¶6            On April 20, 2022, the court held a hearing during which the
judge, State, and defense counsel discussed whether they would select
jurors via questionnaire or through voir dire. The court decided to proceed
with voir dire, finding it could appropriately address any potential issues.

¶7            During a subsequent pretrial hearing, the court considered
the questions it would ask at voir dire and the State’s motion in limine.
Prior to the hearing, Sanchez proposed using a questionnaire with the
following questions: (1) Do you believe a property owner has the right to
protect himself or herself from being assaulted on the property owner’s
property? (2) Do you believe a person has the right to protect himself or
herself when a person is on the person’s property and comes at them in an
aggressive manner? and (3) Do you believe a person has the right to protect
his or her own property from being stolen? The court chose to exclude these
questions after concluding they were “stake-out questions” and
“inappropriate for purposes of voir dire.” At voir dire, neither party moved
to dismiss any juror for cause and trial began the next day on May 10, 2022.

       D.     The Jury Found Sanchez Guilty of Second-Degree Murder
              After a Nine-Day Trial in Which the Superior Court
              Precluded Reference to the AutoZone Incident.

¶8             At trial, the State presented its witnesses, including neighbors
who witnessed the shooting, while Sanchez testified on his own behalf.
Sanchez claimed he shot N.F. in self-defense because N.F. walked toward
him and behaved “aggressively,” while the State argued Sanchez did not
act in self-defense, given that he emerged from his house, approached N.F.
before shooting him, and had time to consider his own actions.

¶9           During the trial, the State moved to preclude evidence of
N.F.’s confrontation with the AutoZone employee on the grounds that it
was not relevant and was not admissible as an other act under Rule 404(b).

                                      3
                           STATE v. SANCHEZ
                           Decision of the Court

Sanchez argued the incident corroborated his theory that N.F. was an
aggressor, making Sanchez afraid, and buttressed his description of N.F.’s
demeanor, making it admissible under Rule 404(b). Sanchez’s counsel
agreed that as between the AutoZone incident and the shooting, “the facts
aren’t entirely similar.” The court precluded the evidence because the
AutoZone incident was very factually distinct from the shooting, time had
passed, establishing its facts would require hearsay, and the AutoZone facts
had very little factual relationship to the shooting.

¶10           The jury found Sanchez guilty of second-degree murder. The
court sentenced him to twenty years. Sanchez timely appealed. We have
jurisdiction under Article VI, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and
Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).

                               DISCUSSION

I.     Trying Sanchez Without Peremptory Strikes Was Constitutional.

¶11            Sanchez argues he has a constitutional right to peremptory
strikes that his trial violated. We review his challenge to the conduct of the
trial for fundamental error because Sanchez did not raise it prior to appeal.
State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140 ¶ 13 (2018) (explaining that we review
a challenge first raised on appeal for fundamental error). To prove
fundamental error, a defendant bears the burden of first showing
fundamental error and then showing the fundamental error was
prejudicial. Id. at 140 ¶ 12.

       A.     There Is No Constitutional Error in Omitting Sanchez
              Peremptory Strikes Because There Is No Constitutional
              Right to Peremptory Strikes.

¶12           Sanchez argues that the use of peremptory strikes is rooted in
tradition and no other state has eliminated their use. While true, none of
that makes peremptory strikes constitutionally required. See Ross v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988) (explaining “[w]e have long recognized that
peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension.”). Indeed,
though George Mason and Patrick Henry urged including peremptory
challenges in the Constitution, the Framers ultimately opted not to do so.
April J. Anderson, Peremptory Challenges at the Turn of the Nineteenth
Century: Development of Modern Jury Selection Strategies as Seen in
Practitioners’ Trial Manuals, 16 Stan. J. Civ. Rts. & C.L. 1, 18 n.108 (2020).
There is no constitutional right to peremptory strikes. There is thus no
constitutional error in omitting them.

                                      4
                           STATE v. SANCHEZ
                           Decision of the Court

       B.     Eliminating Peremptory Strikes Did Not Prejudice Sanchez.

¶13            Sanchez’s argument that without peremptory strikes he did
not receive a fair trial amounts to arguing that Arizona’s regime of for-cause
strikes was insufficient to guarantee him fairness. But Sanchez fails to
identify any prejudice to him from the inclusion of any juror he could have
stricken peremptorily under the old rules, and thus fails to suggest any
prejudice to him from the absence of peremptory strikes. Escalante, 245
Ariz. at 140 ¶ 13.

II.    The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion By Conducting Voir Dire
       Without Using a Questionnaire Including Questions Sanchez
       Proposed.

¶14           Sanchez argues the court abused its discretion by conducting
voir dire without using a jury questionnaire. We review the court’s decision
not to use a questionnaire for an abuse of discretion. State v. Thompson, 252
Ariz. 279, 293 ¶ 45 (2022) (reviewing objections concerning voir dire for an
abuse of discretion). We see no abuse of discretion here for two reasons.

¶15           First, Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.5 gives the superior court
discretion to decide whether to use a questionnaire. Ariz. R. Crim. Pro.
18.5(c) (“Unless the court orders otherwise, the court should require each
prospective juror to complete a case-specific questionnaire in a manner and
form approved by the court.”). Here, the court ordered otherwise. And
even absent an “order[] otherwise,” the rule is merely advisory. It states
that the court should use questionnaires — not that it must.

¶16            Second, Sanchez fails to identify any error in declining to ask
questions he proposed by questionnaire. The court found Sanchez’s
questions were “stake-out questions” that were “inappropriate for
purposes of voir dire,” and Sanchez fails to explain why this was an abuse
of discretion. He thus waived this argument. Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz.
519, 522 ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (holding that a litigant waives issues and
arguments when they are not supported by authority, citations, or
explanations).

III.   The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Granting the State’s
       Motion in Limine Precluding Evidence of the AutoZone Incident.

¶17          Sanchez argues the court abused its discretion by excluding
evidence of the AutoZone incident. Sanchez contends Rule 404(b) allows
evidence of the incident to corroborate his claims of self-defense and that
N.F. behaved aggressively when Sanchez shot him. The State counters that

                                      5
                            STATE v. SANCHEZ
                            Decision of the Court

the AutoZone incident is not admissible because it does not fit within any
of the categories of other acts listed in Rule 404(b)(2). The State also argues
the AutoZone incident does not corroborate Sanchez’s testimony. We
review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Romero, 239
Ariz. 6, 9 ¶ 11 (2016).

       A.     The AutoZone Incident Was Not Admissible Under Rule
              404(b) to Show a Motive or Intent by N.F. to Attack Sanchez.

¶18           As Sanchez correctly notes, prior acts by victims are
admissible under Rule 404(b) to show motive and intent only where the
defendant knew of those acts. State v. Fish, 222 Ariz. 109, 123 ¶ 45 (App.
2009) (“While the [prior act] evidence was arguably offered in part to show
the Victim’s motive and intent to attack the Defendant, this stated purpose
necessarily relates to the Defendant’s state of mind and as such, to be
admissible, the Defendant must have known of the prior specific
conduct.”); Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (explaining that evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts may be used for “purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent.”). But the court found Sanchez did not know of the
AutoZone incident, and he does not appeal that finding. As such, the court
did not abuse its discretion by precluding reference to the AutoZone
incident. Fish, 222 Ariz. at 123 ¶ 45.

       B.     The AutoZone Incident Was Not Admissible Under Rule
              404(b) to Corroborate Sanchez’s Account of N.F.’s Behavior
              When Sanchez Shot Him.

¶19           Sanchez argues the AutoZone incident was admissible under
Rule 404(b) to corroborate his descriptions of N.F.’s behavior relating to the
shooting, citing Fish, 222 Ariz. at 123 ¶ 45. The State argues the incident
does not corroborate Sanchez’s testimony and does not bolster Sanchez’s
credibility.

¶20           The State is correct, for reasons the court cited in precluding
the evidence. The court explained that to be admissible as corroboration,
“the prior acts have to be very similar to the facts of that [criminal] case,
which they were in Fish.” Even Sanchez’s counsel admitted that, as
between AutoZone and the shooting, “the facts aren’t entirely similar.” Yet
that admission understates it. A verbal altercation over a failed car battery
that includes touching a store clerk is not like walking around an
acquaintance’s car and then stepping toward them as they approach you.
We do not see similarity, much less “very similar” facts, as Fish required for
admission of a victim’s prior acts that were unknown to a defendant. See

                                      6
                           STATE v. SANCHEZ
                           Decision of the Court

222 Ariz. at 125 ¶ 49 (allowing admission of victim’s other acts unknown to
defendant because defendant’s description of victim’s unknown other act
was “very similar” to defendant’s claim of self-defense, and because there
were no other witnesses to defendant’s actions).

¶21            The rest of the analysis in Fish shows the superior court did
not abuse its discretion by precluding the AutoZone incident. The court in
Fish reversed the exclusion of the other act evidence to corroborate the
defendant’s claim of self-defense in part because there was an evidentiary
vacuum: “there was no other witness to the shooting who could testify.”
See id. Here, as the superior court noted, four witnesses saw Sanchez shoot
N.F. And the other act evidence had special probative force in Fish, when
the defendant gave a statement immediately after a shooting that very
closely tracked the victim’s other acts that were unknown to the defendant.
Sanchez gave no such statement immediately after shooting N.F. that
precisely matched the AutoZone facts, making them specially
corroborative. Accordingly, Fish does not aid Sanchez.

¶22           In a related vein, Sanchez cites State v. Zaid, 249 Ariz. 154
(App. 2020), which for the same reasons suggests no error in precluding the
AutoZone incident. There, the court affirmed the superior court’s exclusion
of evidence of the victim’s prior violent acts, applying Fish. Id. at 159 ¶ 17
(“Zaid has not established any reason the other violent acts would have
been particularly probative, such as the complete lack of any other
eyewitnesses or the high degree of similarity between the acts as was
present in Fish.”). Sanchez correctly cites the standard in Zaid, which is
drawn in turn from Fish. As explained, the superior court followed Fish in
precluding the AutoZone incident, and thus did not abuse its discretion.

                              CONCLUSION

¶23           For these reasons, we affirm.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

                                        7