Court Opinion

ID: 9630891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:23:39.473824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:45.849629
License: Public Domain

LEESON, J.,
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff failed adequately to serve defendant within the statutory *626period but write separately to address an argument under ORCP 7 D(4) that the majority does not address.
According to plaintiff, service in accordance with ORCP 7 D(4) is presumed to be adequate and in this case service was sufficiently completed to confer jurisdiction on the court within the applicable statutory period. Plaintiff argues that, under ORCP 7 D(4)(alfi),1 when follow-up mailings are required to multiple addresses, service is complete for jurisdictional purposes upon the first mailing to defendant. Thus, plaintiff contends, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over defendant on December 10,1992, when plaintiff mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to the 5300 Parkview address that had been listed with MVD. See ORCP 12.020(2) (allowing plaintiff 60 days from date complaint is filed to complete service sufficient for court to acquire jurisdiction). The majority declines to address plaintiffs argument, because it was made for the first time in his reply brief. 138 Or App at 624 n 4. Because the issue of adequacy of service under ORCP 7 D is the central issue on appeal, I would address it. See State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183, 188, 766 P2d 373 (1988) (essential distinction between raising an issue, identifying a source of law and making a particular argument).
In determining whether service is adequate under ORCP 7, we apply the two-step process originally set forth in Baker v. Foy, 310 Or 221, 228-29, 797 P2d 349 (1990).
“First, if the plaintiff used one of the methods described in ORCP 7, then service is presumed to have been reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the action and to afford *627her a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend. Second, if the defendant rebuts that presumption, or if the plaintiff did not use one of the methods described in the rule, then the court must determine whether service, nevertheless, was adequate, because it satisfied the ‘reasonable notice’ standard set forth in ORCP 7D(1).” Mitchell v. Harris, 123 Or App 424, 427, 859 P2d 1196 (1993); see also Levens v. Koser, 126 Or App 399, 401-02, 869 P2d 344 (1994).
ORCP 7 D(4) creates a special rule for service in any action involving a motor vehicle on roads within the state. Baker, 310 Or at 225 n 7. Under that rule, MVD is an agent authorized by law to receive service for an individual defendant who cannot be served personally or by substituted service as specified in ORCP 7 D(3). Service in compliance with ORCP 7 D(4) is presumed to be adequate under the reasonable notice standard. Mitchell, 123 Or App at 427; see also Hoyt v. Paulos, 310 Or 196, 202, 796 P2d 355 (1990) (MVD service is personal service on defendant’s statutorily appointed agent, a method authorized by ORCP 7 D(l) and 7 D(3)(a)(i)). Therefore, the question is whether plaintiff served defendant in compliance with ORCP 7 D(4)(a)(i) and, if so, whether anything in the record overcomes the presumption of adequacy.
To construe the rules of civil procedure, we use the ordinary principles of statutory construction. Weaver and Weaver, 119 Or App 478, 482, 851 P2d 629- (1993). Consequently, we look to the text of ORCP 7 D(4), read in the context of other related rules and statutes. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).
The plain language of ORCP 7 D(4)(a)(i) states that “ [f]or purposes of computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules,” service is complete upon the first mailing to defendant after service on MVD. The reference to “these rules” clearly refers to the civil rules and does not contemplate time periods specified elsewhere in the statutes, such as limitations periods in ORS 12.020. Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that ORS 12.020(2) — under which an action is deemed commenced on the date the complaint is filed if service sufficient to give the court jurisdiction is completed within 60 days — links to the relevant language in ORCP *6287 D(4) through ORCP 4. ORCP 4 describes the circumstances under which a court has personal jurisdiction “over a party served in an action pursuant to Rule 7.” Plaintiffs argument requires us to read a time computation into ORCP 4.
Under ORCP 4, a court does not acquire personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless there is service of summons pursuant to ORCP 7. Baker, 310 Or at 224. Conceivably, one could find a temporal component in ORCP 4 by constructing an imaginary timeline, on which there is no jurisdiction until service is completed pursuant to ORCP 7 D(4) (a) (i) by the first follow-up mailing to defendant. Any temporal gate implied by ORCP 4, however, is a far cry from “computing [a] period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules,” as specified in ORCP 7 D(4)(a)(i).
Plaintiff also finds support for his argument in the Council on Court Procedures Staff Comment that explains the 1990 amendments to ORCP 7 D(4):
“The Council amendment of ORCP 7 D makes two major changes in motor vehicle service provided by that section: (1) The new language separates the requirements necessary for adequate service of summons from the conditions for securing a default, and (2) service of summons on the Department of Motor Vehicles under ORCP 7 D(4) becomes an alternative form of service which is only available when service cannot be made upon the defendant by any of the methods specified in ORCP 7 D(3).
“The first major change was a reaction to Hoyt v. Paulos, 96 Or. App. 91, 93-94 (1989). In that case, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant’s insurance company was not part of service of summons for limitation purposes. The new language makes clear that under 7 D(4)(a)(i) the actual service of process only requires service upon the Department of Motor Vehicles and supplementary mailing to the defendant. Presumably, this would satisfy the statute of limitations. However, no default is possible under 7 D(4)(c) until 14 days after the defendant takes the added step of mailing to defendant’s insurer if one is known or can be identified. The amended language clearly requires the plaintiff to make inquiry to the Department of Motor Vehicles to determine whether their records show an insurer for the defendant. It also allows service on the DMV to be by mail as well as personal delivery to a DMV office. The new language makes *629clear that if mailing is required to multiple addresses for a defendant, service is complete upon the first mailing.” Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure: 1995-1996 Handbook 27-28 (1995). (Emphasis supplied.)
What the staff thought to be clearly expressed by the amended language in the rule is irrelevant. Because there is no ambiguity in the text or context of ORCP 7 D, the rules of statutory construction constrain us from considering the history of the rule to determine its underlying intent. PGE, 317 Or at 606. According to the plain language of ORCP 7 D(4), plaintiff did not adequately complete service within the limitation period and the trial court therefore lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant.
Even if I were able to conclude that, for purposes of jurisdiction, MVD service is complete after the first follow-up mailing to defendant, plaintiffs attempt to serve defendant was not adequate. Under the analytical framework of Baker, service in accordance with ORCP 7 D(4) merely establishes a presumption that such service is reasonably calculated to apprise defendant of the pendency of the action and to afford him a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend. 310 Or at 229. Under the circumstances of this case, that presumption is rebutted. The record demonstrates that, before the limitation period had expired, plaintiff mailed service only to the 5300 Parkview address listed with MVD, even though plaintiff already knew that defendant did not reside there and that there was no forwarding address listed with the post office. Nothing in the record indicates that, at the time that plaintiff attempted to serve defendant, he knew that the Barnes Road address listed on the police accident report would not provide reasonable notice to defendant.

 ORCP 7 D(4)(a)(i) provides:
“In any action arising out of any accident * * * in which a motor vehicle may be involved while being operated upon the roads, highways, and streets of this state, any defendant who operated such motor vehicle * * * who cannot be served with summons by any method specified in subsection 7 DCS) of this rule, may be served with summons by leaving one copy of the summons and complaint with a feeof$12.50 in the hands ofthe Administrator of [MVD.] * * * The plaintiff shall cause to be mailed by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, a true copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant at the address given by the defendant at the time of the accident or collision that is the subject of the action, and at the most recent address as shown by the [MVD] driver records, and at any other address of the defendant known to the plaintiff, which might result in actual notice to the defendant. For purposes of computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, service under this paragraph shall be complete upon the date of the first mailing to the defendant.” (Emphasis supplied.)