Court Opinion

ID: 9892856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 06:09:10.027406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:51.320186
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED as MODIFIED; and Opinion Filed October 18, 2023

                                    S  In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-01289-CR
                  VINCENT ODELL MCKENZIE, Appellant
                                 V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. F19-58247-M

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                    Before Justices Carlyle, Smith, and Kennedy
                            Opinion by Justice Kennedy
      Appellant, Vincent Odell McKenzie, pleaded guilty to the felony offense of

assault family violence breath/circulation, and the trial court placed him on deferred

adjudication community supervision for five years. Thereafter, the State moved to

revoke appellant’s community supervision alleging appellant had violated various

conditions of his community supervision. At the hearing on the State’s motion,

appellant pleaded not true to the State’s alleged violations and the State struck one

of its asserted bases for revocation. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

revoked appellant’s community supervision, adjudicated appellant guilty of assault
family violence impeding breath/circulation, and assessed punishment at ten years’

confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

                                        Anders

      Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief and a motion to

withdraw, stating that she had made a thorough review of the entire appellate record

and that, in her opinion, there are no meritorious issues on appeal. See Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel certified that she delivered a copy of

the brief to appellant, and by letter dated April 18, 2023, we advised appellant of his

right to file a pro se response by June 20, 2023, and cautioned that failure to file a

pro se response by that date would result in the case being submitted on his appointed

counsel’s Anders brief. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–21 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2014) (noting appellant has right to file pro se response to Anders brief filed

by counsel). Appellant has not filed a pro se response, and the State has filed a letter

brief concurring with appellant’s counsel’s assessment of the appeal and joining in

her request that the judgment be reformed to reflect appellant’s plea of not true,

rather than true.

      An Anders brief must “contain a professional evaluation of the record

demonstrating why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to be advanced.” High

v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). This evaluation

requires that counsel refer the court to anything in the record that might arguably

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support the appeal, citing applicable authorities. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503,

510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

      After court-appointed appellate counsel files an Anders brief asserting that no

arguable grounds for appeal exist, we must independently examine the record to

determine whether an appeal is “wholly frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744

(emphasizing that reviewing court—and not counsel—determines, after full

examination of proceedings, whether case is “wholly frivolous”). An appeal is

wholly frivolous when it lacks any basis in law or fact; an argument is frivolous if it

cannot “conceivably persuade the court.” See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407

n. 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

      If, after conducting an independent review of the record, we conclude either

that appellate counsel has not adequately discharged his or her constitutional duty to

review the record for any arguable error, or that the appeal is not wholly frivolous,

notwithstanding appellate counsel’s efforts,” we abate the appeal and return the

cause to the trial court for the appointment of new appellate counsel. Meza v. State,

206 S.W.3d 684, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

      With these principles in mind, we turn to considering counsel’s Anders brief

after we briefly discuss the factual and procedural background of the case.

                                   BACKGROUND

      On October 29, 2019, appellant was charged by indictment with assault family

violence involving J.K., a woman with whom he had a dating relationship. The

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assault was alleged to have occurred on September 12, 2019. The indictment also

included two enhancement paragraphs. On January 28, 2021, appellant pleaded

guilty to the charged offense pursuant to a plea agreement and, in accordance with

that agreement and upon the motion of the State, the trial court struck the

enhancement paragraphs. The trial court admitted into evidence appellant’s signed

judicial confession and stipulation of evidence and entered an order of deferred

adjudication and imposed conditions for appellant’s community supervision.

      Over time, the State filed various motions to revoke appellant’s community

supervision. The State withdrew several of its motions when orders were entered

modifying the conditions of appellant’s community supervision. On November 2,

2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on the State’s September 29, 2022 amended

motion to revoke community supervision in which the State asserted appellant had

violated the conditions of his community supervision by: (1) violating the laws of

the State of Texas by committing a new assault family violence offense; (2) failing

to follow the rules and regulations of the Drug Patch agreement; (3) using cocaine

as evidenced by a positive urine screen; (4) failing to report to the Supervision

Officer as directed for the months/weeks of June 2022 and July 2022, and any

months thereafter; and (5) failing to refrain from contact with M.P., the woman

appellant was alleged to have assaulted on May 25, 2022. Appellant appeared at the

hearing, was represented by counsel and entered a plea of “not true” to the alleged

violations of the conditions of his community supervision. The State withdrew its

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assertion that appellant had violated the laws of the State of Texas as a basis for

revocation of his community service. Appellant did not testify at the hearing, and

the State called a probation officer assigned to the trial court and an investigator with

the Dallas County District Attorney’s office to testify on its behalf. The probation

officer testified that she was familiar with appellant, that notes indicated appellant

last reported in May 2022, tested positive for cocaine, failed to get the drug patch

and was discharged from the Battery Intervention and Protection Program (BIPP).

The investigator testified regarding contact appellant had with M.P. through the jail

SECURUS phone system. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found

appellant violated conditions of his community supervision, revoked appellant’s

community supervision and assessed punishment at ten years’ confinement.

                                     DISCUSSION

      Taking into consideration the posture in which this case reached this Court,

we conclude that, pursuant to the guidelines set forth in High v. State, 573 S.W.2d

807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), appellant’s counsel provided a

thorough recitation of the facts in the record with record references, citations to legal

authorities, and her professional evaluation and analysis of any potential meritorious

grounds for appeal.

      Counsel indicated that she reviewed the entire appellate record to determine

whether appellant might have a complaint, with respect to the original deferred

adjudication proceeding, regarding the indictment, the waiver of a jury trial, the

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voluntariness of his plea, the admonishments given in connection with his plea, the

sufficiency of the evidence to support his plea of guilty, and objections asserted by

trial counsel, and, with respect to the revocation proceeding, regarding the motion

to revoke community supervision, the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear the State’s

motion to revoke, objections asserted in connection with the hearing on the State’s

motion, whether appellant violated a condition of his community supervision, the

punishment assessed, trial counsel’s performance, and the written judgment.

    I.      Original Deferred Adjudication Proceeding1

         Having reviewed the appellate record, appellant’s counsel concluded that, in

the original deferred adjudication proceeding, the indictment contained all of the

elements of the charged offense and conferred jurisdiction upon the trial court. See

TEX. CONST. art. V, § 12; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(B). In addition, she

noted that the trial court’s order of deferred adjudication indicates appellant pleaded

guilty pursuant to a plea bargain and the Certification of Defendant’s Right of

Appeal indicates appellant’s case “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO

    1
      We recognize that a defendant placed on deferred adjudication community supervision may generally
raise issues relating to the original plea proceeding only in appeals taken when deferred adjudication
community supervision is first imposed. Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 662–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
The Texas Court of Criminal has recognized two exceptions to the general rule, the “void judgment”
exception and the habeas corpus exception. See Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
The Court of Criminal Appeals appears to have abrogated the habeas corpus exception but said that a claim
that a sentence is illegal may be raised at any time. See Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2001); see also Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 670.
With respect to appellate counsel’s review of the original deferred adjudication proceeding, we make no
comment regarding whether any of the areas she considered could fall within an exception to the general
rule precluding attack of the original proceeding on appeal from the revocation proceeding, and simply note
her review and analysis here.
                                                   –6–
right of appeal. [or] the defendant has waived the right of appeal.” Thus, concludes

appellant’s counsel, appellant cannot raise a complaint regarding the indictment

conferring jurisdiction unless it was raised by a written motion filed and ruled on

before trial. See Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). No

complaint was made to the indictment, by motion or objection, so appellant’s

counsel concludes appellant may not assert any complaint regarding same on appeal.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b).

        With respect to the jury waiver, appellant’s counsel noted that the waiver was

signed by all parties and the trial court consented to and approved the waiver,

satisfying the requirements of Article 1.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Id.

art. 1.13.

        Appellant’s counsel searched the record for any pretrial motions and found

none.

        With respect to the voluntariness of appellant’s plea, appellant’s counsel noted

that before the trial court accepted appellant’s plea, the court inquired as to the

voluntariness of same and appellant’s understanding of the consequences of same.

Appellant indicated he understood the consequences of his plea. The trial court

accepted appellant’s guilty plea, found him to be mentally competent to enter his

plea and found he made his plea freely and voluntarily. Appellant’s counsel

indicated that after a complete review of the record, she was satisfied that appellant

was competent to enter his plea and that his plea was made both freely and

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voluntarily. See id. art. 26.13(b) (no plea of guilty shall be accepted unless it appears

the defendant is mentally competent, and the plea is free and voluntary).

      Appellant’s counsel pointed out that the record contains written

admonishments, signed by appellant, that comply with the requirements of Article

26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Additionally, the trial court and trial

counsel orally admonished appellant.            Appellant’s counsel concluded the

admonishments were sufficient to substantially comply with Article 26.13 and did

not provide a basis for an appeal. See id. art. 26.13(c) (substantial compliance by

the court is sufficient unless the defendant shows that he was not aware of the

consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of

the court).

      With respect to evidence substantiating appellant’s plea of guilty, appellant

signed a judicial confession and a stipulation of evidence, which were introduced

into evidence. Appellant’s counsel noted that the judicial confession, standing alone,

is sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction. Dinnery v. State, 592

S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (op. on reh’g); Fiori v. State, 918 S.W.2d

532, 533 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.).

      Appellant’s counsel indicated that during the original deferred adjudication

proceeding no objections were made on appellant’s behalf and the record does not

reflect any opportunity where a proper objection could have been interposed on

appellant’s behalf.

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   II.      Revocation of Community Supervision

          With respect to the State’s amended motion to revoke, appellant’s counsel

 noted the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate appellant’s guilt and revoke

 community supervision because all relevant events took place before the

 expiration of his community supervision. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

 42A.108. In addition, appellant’s counsel stated that she reviewed the State’s

 amended motion to revoke and concluded it gave appellant fair notice of the bases

 for the State’s request for revocation of community supervision and thus satisfied

 due process requirements. Appellant did not lodge a complaint concerning the

 State’s motion to revoke, and there is no basis for complaint on appeal. TEX. R.

 APP. P. 33.

          Appellant’s counsel indicated she searched the record to see if any pretrial

 motions were filed in connection with the revocation proceeding, a ruling upon

 which might be a basis for complaint on appeal, and found none.

         With respect to objections appellant made to the admission of certain evidence

at the hearing on the State’s motion to revoke, appellant’s counsel concluded any

argument concerning the trial court’s rulings on same would be frivolous.

         Appellant’s counsel stated she reviewed the record to determine whether an

excessive punishment argument exists. She noted that the punishment assessed was

within the range established by the legislature. We note that, in general, when the

judge’s sentence is within the applicable range of punishment, it will not be disturbed

                                          –9–
on appeal. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Also,

when the punishment assessed is within the statutory range, it is not constitutionally

cruel and unusual and is not a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997,

pet. ref’d). Counsel reviewed the record and concluded the punishment assessed

was not excessive.

      With respect to a basis upon which the trial court was permitted to revoke

appellant’s community supervision and adjudicate his guilt, appellant’s counsel

pointed out that a violation of a single condition of community supervision is

sufficient to support a revocation. Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009). At the hearing on the State’s motion to revoke, the probation officer

testified that she was familiar with appellant, that notes indicated appellant last

reported in May 2022, tested positive for cocaine, failed to comply with the rules of

Drug Patch and was discharged from BIPP. The investigator testified regarding

certain jail calls and identified the participants in the calls as appellant and M.P.

Thus, there is evidence in the record to support revocation of appellant’s community

supervision due to his failure to follow the rules and regulations of the Drug Patch,

use of cocaine, failure to report, and contact with M.P.

      Appellant’s counsel reviewed the performance of trial counsel and concluded

appellant received reasonably effective assistance of trial counsel based on the

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standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and Hernandez v. State,

726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

         Appellant’s counsel indicated that the written judgment accurately reflects the

sentence that was imposed, and that appellant was given proper back time credit.

She pointed out that the judgment incorrectly states appellant entered a plea of

“TRUE” and requested that the error be corrected.

         We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief. See Bledsoe v. State,

178 S.W.3d 824, 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining appellate court’s duty

in Anders cases). We agree the appeal is frivolous and without merit. We find

nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.             However, as

appellant’s counsel pointed out, it does appear that the judgment incorrectly shows

that appellant entered a plea of “TRUE” to the alleged violations of his community

supervision rather than a plea of not true.

         We have the authority to modify the trial court’s judgment to make the record

speak the truth. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1992). Accordingly, we modify the judgment to reflect that appellant’s

plea to the alleged violations of the terms of his community supervision was “not

true.”

   III.     Motion to Withdraw

         In accordance with Anders, counsel has filed a motion to withdraw from the

case. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex.

                                          –11–
App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must

withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the

appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing

the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”). We grant counsel’s motion to

withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel shall send a

copy of the opinion and judgments to appellant and advise appellant of his right to

pursue a petition for discretionary review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4.

                                   CONCLUSION

      Given our review of the record and counsel’s brief, we agree that the appeal

is frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably

and substantively support the appeal of the trial court’s judgment. Accordingly, as

modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and grant counsel’s motion to

withdraw.

                                           /Nancy Kennedy/
                                           NANCY KENNEDY
                                           JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47

221289F.U05

                                       –12–
                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

VINCENT ODELL MCKENZIE,                      On Appeal from the 194th Judicial
Appellant                                    District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. F19-58247-M.
No. 05-22-01289-CR          V.               Opinion delivered by Justice
                                             Kennedy. Justices Carlyle and Smith
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 participating.

   Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

      To reflect appellant entered a plea of NOT TRUE to the alleged
      violations of the terms of his community supervision.

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this18th day of October, 2023.

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