Court Opinion

ID: 9796785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:04:54.273103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:37.429755
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE EID,
dissenting.
In my view, Redgebol's waiver was knowing and intelligent because his Miranda rights were adequately translated to him and because he had the "necessary level of rudimentary understanding" of those rights as required by People v. Al-Yousif 49 P.3d 1165, 1172 (Colo.2002). I would also conclude that after requesting a lawyer, Redge-bol voluntarily initiated further communication with the detective and thereafter validly waived his right to counsel. I therefore respectfully dissent.
1.
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court concluded that "without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of erime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). As a result, the Court devised the now-familiar warnings that must be delivered to a suspect before any custodial interrogation ensues. However, the police are not required to give a "precise formulation" or "talismanic incantation" of the Miranda rights using the language set forth in that opinion. People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849, 851 (Colo.1989) (citing California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 859-60, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981)).
A statement is not "compelled" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment if the suspect "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" waives his rights prior to being interrogated. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The trial court found that Redgebol's statements were made voluntarily. Accordingly, the question is whether Redgebol's waiver was knowing and intelligent under the *101totality of the cireumstances. See, e.g., Al-Yousif, 49 P.3d at 1168.1 We have held that the question is "whether the defendant minimally understood that he did not have to talk to the police, that he could request a lawyer, and that, if he spoke, what he said could be used against him to obtain a conviction." Id. at 1172; see also id. (concluding that the defendant had the "necessary level of rudimentary understanding" of Miranda's three precepts).
A.
The majority invokes our traditional standard of review, stating that "when supported by competent evidence [in the record], the trial court's findings of fact are binding on this court." Maj. op. at 98. It further finds that the trial court in this case "made significant factual findings," to which we must defer. Id. at 92. But the trial court's entire ruling on the translation issue consists of the following statement: "[Because of] the interpreter's lack of understanding of the rights being afforded pursuant to Arizona v. Miranda [sic], [those rights] were not adequately translated to Mr. Redgebol." The court made no findings with regard to any particular translation made in error by Abyei, nor with regard to any particular Miranda right that was not adequately understood by Red-gebol. However, the court did note at the outset of the hearing that "I think we have two very good interpreters available now. But the interpreters early on were limited, and I think they did not do as good a job." (Emphasis added.)
Although the trial court made no findings to support its conclusion that Abyei's translation was inadequate, the majority apparently assumes that the court was persuaded by the argument made by defense counsel (and repeated before us) emphasizing the fact that Abyei had no prior experience in criminal translation and no training in Miranda. The majority cites our decision in People v. Mejia-Mendoza, 965 P.2d 777 (Colo.1998), for the proposition that prior criminal translation experience and training in Miranda are essential. See maj. op. at 94. In my view, the decision establishes no such requirement.
In Mejia-Mendoza, we noted the fact that the "interpreter was untrained in translation and in assisting law enforcement in explaining Miranda rights to arrested persons." 965 P.2d at 781. We did not conclude from that fact alone, however, that the Miranda warnings given were inadequate. On the contrary, we found that the interpreter's lack of training led to specific instances of serious and significant mistranslations. For example, we noted that:
Rather than directly translating the Miranda advisement, the interpreter provided misleading and confusing statements to Mejia-Mendoza regarding his waiver and privilege against self-incrimination. The interpreter told Mejia-Mendoza that "[nlothing is being used against you" and "LJlust because you say something you'll be released."
Id. In other words, the interpreter in Mgjia-Mendoza made two blatantly misleading statements to the defendant: that whatever he said would not be used against him (when it would), and that he would be released if he talked (perhaps inducing him to talk with an untrue promise of release). Id.
Moreover, the interpreter in that case exceeded his role as translator, and instead became an active participant in negotiations between the police and the defendant. We noted that "the interpreter not only mis*102translated the Miranda advisement but also volunteered statements, both to Mejia-Mendoza and on his behalf to the detective, that were inaccurate." Id. For example, the interpreter "improperly told the detective that Mejia-Mendoza had waived his rights when he had said nothing." Id. at 782.
In sum, we concluded that the Miranda rights were not adequately conveyed to the defendant in Mejia-Mendoza because the interpreter in that case made significant mistranslations and improperly involved himself in negotiations. The fact that the interpreter was "uneducated and inexperienced" may have led to these translation problems, id. at 781, but did not in and of itself invalidate the defendant's Miranda waiver. Under a proper understanding of Mgjia-Mendoza, the fact that Abyei lacked Miranda training and criminal experience did not make her translation inadequate per se. Rather, the question is whether Abyei was able "to understand and properly convey the Miranda advisement" to Redgebol. Id.
As to this question, I would conclude that the trial court applied too high of a standard in determining whether Abyei was able to understand and convey the Miranda advisement. For instance, the court started the hearing by commending the interpreters who were interpreting the hearing at the time, and stating that "earlier interpreters"-presumably including Abyei-"did not do as good a job." In Mejia-Mendoza, however, we expressly stated that interpreters of police interrogations did not have to meet the same "exacting standards" that govern in-court interpreters. 965 P.2d at 781. Indeed, we acknowledged that the "exigencies of the moment often dictate that authorities settle for less outside of the court than is required in court." Id. In this case, such an exigency existed: Redgebol needed an interpreter who spoke Dinka, a language that is not commonly spoken by interpreters in Colorado; he had been in custody for a considerable amount of time while the police were attempting to locate a Dinka interpreter; and he had become concerned about the welfare of his children while he was being held. The fact that Abyei may not have been qualified as an in-court interpreter is not determinative here; again, the question is whether her skills were adequate to translate the Mi-ramda advisement to Redgebol.
From a review of the record, they were. Abyei was a certified interpreter. She fluently spoke Redgebol's native language, Dinka, and had been interpreting in that language for several years. She had translated for refugees during the asylum process in Egypt and had been trained in hospital interpretation as well. Abyei testified that although she did not know what the term "Miranda" meant, she did understand what an "interrogation" was. Contrary to the majority's suggestion that Abyei "did not understand the Miranda rights," maj. op. at 94, at no point did Abyei testify that she did not understand the rights that she was required to translate to Redgebol.
More importantly, Abyei's translation of the Miranda advisement was accurate, and was not riddled with the misleading and confusing statements exhibited by the interpreter in Mejia-Mendozsa. Abyei testified that during Redgebol's interview, she literally translated the English words into Dinka as much as possible. If the concept could not be literally translated, she used different words, put the words in a sentence, or gave an example.2 Although she told Redgebol that he had a right to "bring a lawyer" and that if he could not afford a lawyer, one would be "found," these differences do not materially affect the substance of Redgebol's right to provide a lawyer if he wished, or if he could not afford one, to have one provided for him. We "do not require that every *103bilingual effort between an officer and a suspect be perfect in order to withstand serutiny." People v. Aguilar-Ramos, 86 P.3d 397, 402 (Colo.2004); see also Mejia-Mendoga, 965 P.2d at 782 ("acknowledgling] that no translation is perfect"); cf. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 359-60, 101 S.Ct. 2806 (stating that no "precise formulation" or "talismanic incantation" of the Miranda rights is required).
Nor were there communication difficulties between Redgebol and Abyei, such as those present in Aguilar-Ramos, upon which the majority relies. In that case, we invalidated a waiver where the interrogating detective served as the interpreter. We found that the detective's "lack of proficiency in Spanish rendered him unable to effectively communicate with" the defendant; for example, "it took the detective eight attempts to learn his suspect's name." 86 P.3d at 899, 402. Indeed, we noted that "it is evident from the disjointed nature of the questions and answers that each party frequently had no idea what the other was talking about." Id. at 402.3 In contrast, Abyei spoke Dinka fluently, and she and Redgebol communicated effectively with each other. Both Abyei and Frederickson testified to that fact. Unlike in Aguilar-Ramos, the questions and responses in Redgebol's advisement indicated that Abyei and Redgebol understood each other.
Finally, I would find our decision in Al-Yousif to be instructive here, even though the case did not involve an interpreter. In Al-Yousif, the defendant, a native of Saudi Arabia, had lived in the United States for four years and had attended English classes. 49 P.3d at 1167. He was read his Miranda rights in English and waived those rights. Id. The trial court granted his motion to suppress, citing his limited understanding of English and his background as a native of Saudi Arabia as factors influencing his ability to understand and validly waive the Miranda warnings. Id. at 1167-68.
We disagreed, instead finding that the relevance of such cultural evidence is "limited":
Whether a defendant had the cultural background to understand the origin or purpose of constitutional rights, or the tactical implications of waiving them, is mot at issue. A particular defendant's length of time in the country, education, religion, background, age, and intelligence certainly bear on his depth of understanding. But the relevance of those factors in the totality analysis here is limited to the simple question of whether the defendant grasped [Miranda's] three precepts....
Id. at 1172 (emphasis added). We thus held that the defendant need only have a "minimal" understanding of his Miranda rights-namely, that "he did not have to talk," that "he could have an attorney present," and that "if he did talk, his statements could be used against him." Id. We made it clear that it is not required for the defendant "to understand the origin or purpose of constitutional rights, or the tactical implications of waiving them." Id. Rather, the defendant need only possess "the necessary level of rudimentary understanding." Id. Redgebol suggests, and the majority finds, that Abyei's translation was inadequate because she literally translated the Miranda advisement to Redgebol and did not have the training to provide a more in-depth understanding of Miranda. In my view, however, such in-depth understanding is not required under Al-Yousif.
B.
While the trial court appears to have rested its decision to invalidate Redgebol's waiver on its belief that the Miranda warnings were not adequately translated for Redgebol, it also made comments regarding whether Redgebol understood the warnings given to him. For example, it noted that although some of Redgebol's answers were "responsive," others were "nonsensical and not directly responsive." From this finding, the majority concludes that given the vast differences between Dinka and American legal *104cultures, it was not possible for Redgebol to understand the Miranda advisement given to him. The majority points out, for example, that in the Dinka culture, there is no right to remain silent (instead, Dinka culture recognizes the "right to tell the truth"); there is no concept of using a statement against a defendant in a court of law; and there are no lawyers. Maj. op. at 98. The majority additionally notes that Redgebol was not informed of the fundamental differences between the American and Dinka systems. Id. at 91.
We considered in Al-Yousif the role that a defendant's cultural background plays in determining whether he adequately understood the Miranda warnings. As noted above, we held that a defendant's cultural background is relevant only to the extent that it bears on whether he "minimally" understood ramda's three precepts-that "he did not have to talk," that "he could have an attorney present," and that "if he did talk, his statements could be used against him." 49 P.8d at 1172. We concluded that he need only have this "necessary level of rudimentary understanding" of Miranda. Id. Applying this standard here, Redgebol had the "necessary level of rudimentary understanding" of Miranda.
Frederickson spent over twenty minutes discussing Redgebol's rights with him. Indeed, on numerous occasions, when Redgebol began to talk about the investigation, Fred-erickson interjected to ensure that Redgebol truly wanted to waive his rights before speaking. Both Frederickson and Abyei testified that they believed Redgebol understood his rights. He understood the seriousness of his predicament and the possibility that he would be going to jail. He understood that a lawyer was "somebody who is [his] defense" and he rejected the idea of remaining silent, stating multiple times that he wanted to talk. In fact, Redgebol grew frustrated with Frederickson for asking again whether he wanted to talk, stating that he had already agreed and had signed the waiver form accordingly.
It is also true that, as the trial court pointed out, some of Redgebol's answers were nonsensical. However, the vast majority of his answers were responsive and demonstrated that he understood what was being said to him. Although Redgebol may have been confused about particular concepts at times during the interview, the relevant inquiry is whether his confusion was resolved and he understood his rights at the time he waived them. For example, Frederickson testified that Redgebol "did express a little bit of confusion" about his right to counsel, but that "he did ask appropriate questions" and that the issue was "cleared up." Redge-bol was initially confused about his right to an attorney and the timing of when the attorney would arrive. He stated that he did not understand how obtaining an attorney would work if he did not have money to pay for the lawyer, and that he did not understand who would be questioning him. Frederickson made it clear that Redgebol could request a lawyer as one of his rights, telling Redgebol that the lawyer would not automatically come unless Redgebol requested one. Frederick son explained that it would be Frederickson who would be doing the questioning, not a lawyer, and that Redgebol did not have to pay for a lawyer or talk to Frederickson without a lawyer present. Redgebol then stated that he understood his rights. It is evident from the dialogue between Freder-ickson and Redgebol that although Redgebol may have been confused at first, his confusion was resolved and he had the "necessary level of rudimentary understanding" of his rights at the time he waived them.
Beyond Redgebol's cultural background, the majority finds that his "limited intellectual ability" resulted in his inability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. Maj. op. at 97-98. In this case, however, the trial court found that Redgebol's intelligence was not an issue, stating that his "mental capacity was [not] so diminished that he was unable to perceive the situation." Because this ruling was adverse to the defendant, we have no jurisdiction to address it in an interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 4.1. See, e.g., People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815 n. 5 (Colo.1985); People v. Barton, 673 P.2d 1005, 1006 n. 1 (Colo.1984).
Moreover, because the trial court found that Redgebol's intellectual ability did not *105affect his capacity to waive his Miranda rights, I disagree with the majority's analogy to the defendant in People v. Jimines, 863 P.2d 981 (Colo.1993). The majority states that "the defendant in Jimines was found to function at a very low cognitive level" and that "Redgebol, although oriented in time and place to his situation and surroundings, was similarly limited in his ability to understand the Miranda advisement." Maj. op. at 98. In Jimines, a psychologist testified that the defendant functioned at the level of a six-year-old child. 863 P.2d at 982. Further, Jiminez had never been to school, had a very limited vocabulary even in his native Kickapoo, understood only some English and Spanish, and did not understand concepts such as "rights," "lawyer," or "jury." Id. In Al-Yousif, we distinguished Jimines on the grounds that in that case, the defendant's difficulty with understanding his rights was not cultural, but was based on his mental disability. Al-Yousif 49 P.3d at 1172 n. 4. That same distinction applies here.
C.
I would conclude that Frederickson did all that he could do to ensure that Redgebol properly understood the situation facing him. To exelude a validly obtained confession would serve no purpose here because there was nothing more that the detective could have done. See Al-Yousif, 49 P.3d at 1170. Ultimately, Redgebol possessed the "necessary level of rudimentary understanding" of Miranda's three precepts and waived his Miranda rights, choosing to speak to Fred-erickson. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court's ruling on this issue.
IL.
I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that Redgebol's request for an attorney was not properly honored. If the suspect invokes his right to counsel, there can be no questioning until an attorney is present, "unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). If the accused initiates further communication with the police, and reinterro-gation follows, then the prosecution must show that subsequent events indicated a waiver of the right to have counsel present. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983). The waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the civreum-stances, including the fact that the suspect, not the police, reopened the dialogue. Id. (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. 1880).
Even assuming, arguendo, that his request for an attorney was clearly made, Redgebol initiated further discussion with the police and thereafter validly waived his right to counsel. See, e.g., Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). A suspect's request for the assistance of counsel is not irrevocable. People v. Martines, 789 P.2d 420, 422 (Colo.1990). He may later rescind that decision by initiating further communication with the police, whenever that communication may take place. Id. An accused initiates further communication when his comments "evince [] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation." Id. (citing Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830).
Here, the majority holds that once Redge-bol requested an attorney, the detective should have left the room until the attorney arrived. Maj. op. at 100. This conclusion overlooks the fact that Redgebol voluntarily initiated further communication with Freder-ickson. As soon as Abyei told Frederickson that Redgebol wanted a lawyer, Frederick son stopped the interrogation and began to leave the room:
Frederickson: He would like a lawyer? Okay. Then I will stop. I forgot to say what time it was when we started this. We began this tape about 5:10 pm. on June 28, 2004, and Sebet has just indicated that he would like a lawyer before any questioning.
Redgebol then initiated further discussion with Frederickson, explaining that he was confused about the process of obtaining an attorney and about the timing of the lawyer's arrival:
[Abyeil: He said, "I don't understand. Will you be questioning me, then after you *106go, the lawyer comes? Or will both of you be here, you and the lawyer?"
Frederickson answered Redgebol's question and again attempted to end the interview:
Frederickson: The lawyer is not here right now, Sebet. So I will question you later, onee a lawyer has been appointed for you.
Redgebol then waived his right to have a lawyer appointed for him:
[Abyei]: He says he can talk with you now.
Despite Redgebol's clear decision to speak with Frederickson without a lawyer present, Frederickson made sure that Redgebol understood what he was waiving:
Frederickson: Without a lawyer?
[Abyei]: Yes, yes. He can talk with you now.
Frederickson then asked clarifying questions to ensure that Redgebol understood that he could request a lawyer and that he did not have to talk without a lawyer present. Red-gebol again stated, "Let him ask me without any lawyer." Frederickson then reread Red-gebol his right to have an attorney appointed for him, and Redgebol again stated that he understood. In my view, under these facts, Redgebol clearly initiated further communication with Frederickson and waived his right to have an attorney present.4
Unlike the majority, I would decline to read into the privilege against self-incrimination a requirement that an officer ignore a suspect's initiation of further communication until a specific period of time has passed since the suspect invoked his right to counsel. Rather, our caselaw establishes that our inquiry is only whether the suspect's comments "evince [] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation," Martines, 789 P.2d at 422, and whether the suspect thereafter validly waives his right to an attorney. Under the facts in this case, Redgebol voluntarily initiated further communication and gave a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. I would therefore find that the trial court erred in suppressing Redgebol's statements on this ground.
HIL
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the trial court. I would hold that Redgebol's waiver was knowing and intelligent because his Miranda rights were adequately translated to him and because he had the "necessary level of rudimentary understanding" of those rights as required by People v. Al-Yousif, 49 P.3d 1165, 1172 (Colo.2002). Further, I would find that after requesting a lawyer, Redgebol voluntarily initiated further communication with the detective and thereafter validly waived his right to counsel. His statements were admissible. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice RICE and Justice COATS join in this dissent.

. In assessing the validity of a waiver, a court may consider a number of non-exclusive factors, including: (1) the time interval between the initial Miranda advisement and any subsequent interrogation; (2) the extent to which a suspect has been informed or is aware of the subject matter of the interrogation prior to its commencement (although it is not incumbent upon officers to inform the suspect of the investigation's subject matter, see Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987); (3) whether the accused or the interrogating officer initiated the interview; (4) whether and to what extent the interrogating officer reminded the suspect of his rights prior to the interrogation by asking him if he recalled his rights, understood them, or wanted an attorney; (5) the clarity and form of the suspect's acknowledgement and waiver, if any; (6) the accused's background and experience in connection with the criminal justice system; and (7) the suspect's language comprehension, age, experience, education, background, and intelligence. See, e.g., People v. Humphrey, 132 P.3d 352, 356 (Colo.2006).

. Abyei testified that she occasionally had to use Arabic, the national language of Sudan, to describe concepts for which no Dinka word existed. I would find this minimal use of Arabic to be reasonable, based on Abyei's testimony that Red-gebol spoke to her in Arabic and appeared to understand the language; on testimony from both Abyei and Redgebol's half-brother that Arabic is commonly spoken in daily life in Sudan; and on Abyei's testimony that it is normal to "mix the languages together sometimes" for "all of [the tribes] in the south," including the Dinka. Redgebol's half-brother's testimony that Redge-bol once looked confused while watching television in Arabic and asked "something relevant, what was going on on the TV," does not indicate that Redgebol was incapable of understanding the few Arabic words that Abyei used.

. We identified several additional problems with the translation, including the fact that the detective told the suspect that he had a right to "carry" silent, rather than to remain silent; that he used the word "designar'"' in describing the right to counsel, which has two meanings in Spanish-to appoint or to design; that he did not know several words in Spanish crucial to the interrogation; and that he did not understand that the suspect was asking him questions about his right to an attorney. Aguilar-Ramos, 86 P.3d at 399.

. Contrary to the majority's finding, see maj. op. at 100, the facts of this case make our recent decision in People v. Bradshaw inapposite. In Bradshaw, which involved a sexual assault investigation, we held that the suspect clearly invoked his right to counsel by saying, "I'm going to have to talk to an attorney about this." 156 P.3d 452, 457 (Colo.2007). The officer then continued the interrogation, asking whether the sexual encounter was consensual. Id. at 454. We held that the officer's failure to stop communication about the investigation violated the suspect's invocation of his right to counsel. Id. at 459. In contrast, when Redgebol requested an attorney, Frederick-son said, "He would like a lawyer? Okay. Then I will stop."