Court Opinion

ID: 9966221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 15:01:36.732907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:56.699663
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ARTURO S. LOPEZ,                                DOCKET NUMBER
              Appellant,                        DA-0752-18-0107-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                    DATE: May 3, 2024
            Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Raul B. Castorena , Laughlin AFB, Texas, for the appellant.

      Charles R. Vaith , Esquire, and Caroline H. Greenfield , Esquire, Randolph
        AFB, Texas, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                            Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                   2

administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed.       Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).            After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
clarify the administrative judge’s analysis concerning the appellant’s affirmative
defense of reprisal for whistleblowing, we AFFIRM the initial decision.
      The agency removed the appellant based on a single charge of Falsification
of an Official Government Document in that, on August 10, 2015, he falsely
answered “no” to a question on his Official Form (OF) 306 about being fired from
a position within the last 5 years. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 75, 87. The
appellant completed his OF-306 using the agency’s online e-QIP system, and he
alleged that the system locked him out before he was finished and somehow
recorded an incorrect answer. Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony of the
appellant); Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 9-11. The administrative
judge found that the appellant’s testimony was not credible. IAF, Tab 41, Initial
Decision (ID) at 9-10.    She noted in particular that the OF-306 afforded the
appellant the opportunity to provide additional information to several yes/no
questions and that he in fact had done so for a question about the employment of
his relatives, but not for his own employment history. ID at 9. The appellant has
not proffered a sufficiently sound reason to set aside the administrative judge’s
credibility determinations in this case.    See Haebe v. Department of Justice,
288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .
      On review, the appellant contends for the first time that “[t]he issue they
have brought up concerning the Form 306 is a . . . lie” because he informed his
                                                                                    3

second-line supervisor in October or November 2015 that he had been fired from
his contractor position.      PFR File, Tab 1 at 2, 8.       The appellant, who was
represented by an attorney at the time, did not raise this claim in his response to
the notice of proposed removal, IAF, Tab 6 at 79-81, and he did not raise this
claim before the administrative judge. The Board will not consider an argument
raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based
on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due
diligence. Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980).
         The appellant contended below that the agency violated the collective
bargaining agreement when it failed to interview him during its investigation into
his misconduct.       However, the administrative judge correctly found that the
relevant contract provision required the agency to “ascertain all pertinent facts for
and against the employee,” but did not require an investigatory interview. ID
at 15-16; IAF, Tab 6 at 14.
         The appellant contended below and continues to argue on review that the
agency committed harmful error by failing to serve him with the notice of
removal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. The appellant stated on his appeal form that he
received the decision notice on November 2, 2017, IAF, Tab 1 at 5, a full 3 weeks
earlier than he testified. ID at 17. Moreover, the appellant received his notice
and filed a timely appeal, so any error was not harmful.
         The appellant contends for the first time on review that the agency violated
his due process rights when it did not give him notice and an opportunity to
respond to the Douglas 2 factors that the deciding official considered aggravating.
PFR File, Tab 1 at 8.       The appellant was on notice that the deciding official
completed a Douglas factors worksheet at least since the agency submitted its file
in this case. IAF, Tab 6 at 22-31. He has not, however, explained why he did not
raise this argument below and, therefore, the Board need not consider it.        See
Banks, 4 M.S.P.R. at 271.
2
    Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981).
                                                                                      4

      The appellant contended that the removal action constituted retaliation for
his prior equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity and for filing Inspector
General (IG) complaints (i.e., for whistleblowing).         To establish a claim of
retaliation for protected EEO activity, an appellant must show that the prohibited
consideration was at least a motivating factor in the personnel action at issue.
Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget , 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 21-22.              Here,
the administrative judge correctly found that both the proposing and deciding
officials were aware of the appellant’s relatively recent EEO activity. She also
found that they both testified credibly that the appellant’s EEO activity did not
weigh into their decision to propose and effect the removal action. ID at 14. The
appellant made no effort to elicit testimony from either witness that might have
shown a retaliatory motive, and he introduced no circumstantial evidence of
retaliation. Instead, he relies solely on his supervisors’ awareness of his EEO
complaint as proof of retaliation. The administrative judge correctly found that
the appellant’s unsupported claims did not show EEO retaliation. 3
      In whistleblower claims involving an otherwise appealable action, once the
agency proves its case, as it has done here, the appellant must show by
preponderant evidence that he engaged in protected whistleblowing activity, and
that the disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s personnel
action. Elder v. Department of the Air Force, 124 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 39 (2016). If
the appellant makes a prima facie case of reprisal for whistleblowing, the burden
shifts to the agency to show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
taken the same action absent any protected activity. Id.
      The appellant engaged in two types of protected activity under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C).      He filed several IG complaints and he filed a
complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). The administrative judge

3
  Because we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to show
that any prohibited consideration was a motivating factor in the agency’s action, we
need not resolve the issue of whether the appellant proved that retaliation was a
“but-for” cause of the agency’s decision. See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22, 29-33.
                                                                                   5

found that, assuming that the appellant disclosed information he reasonably
believed evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement,
a gross waste of funds, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety, he failed to show that his activity was a contributing factor in the removal
action. ID at 12. We find that the administrative judge’s reasoning was flawed.
      First, the appellant’s IG and OSC complaints are protected under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C). The protection contained in § 2302(b)(9)(C) is for the
activity of going to the IG or OSC.        Corthell v. Department of Homeland
Security, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 11 (2016), overruled on other grounds by Requena
v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MPSB 39. The subject matter of the
appellant’s complaints need not concern matters protected under § 2302(b)(8) to
be protected under § 2302(b)(9)(C). Special Counsel v. Hathaway, 49 M.S.P.R.
595, 612 (1991), recons. denied, 52 M.S.P.R. 375 (1992), aff’d, 981 F.2d 1237
(Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Special Counsel v.
Santella, 65 M.S.P.R. 452 (1994). Thus, the administrative judge’s mention of
the reasonable belief test and the types of disclosures protected under § 2302(b)
(8) was not germane.
      Second, the administrative judge found that the deciding official was
“unaware of complaints to the Inspector General or Office of Special Counsel,
although he knew the appellant had made some complaints about safety.” ID
at 12. Based on the deciding official’s lack of knowledge, she found that the
appellant failed to prove contributing factor. However, she later found that the
proposing and deciding officials “testified that they knew the appellant had filed
Inspector General and EEO complaints.” ID at 14. This second statement was
incorrect.   The deciding official testified that he was not aware of any IG
complaints, only of some safety complaints.      HCD (testimony of the deciding
official). The proposing official testified that he was aware of EEO complaints
but not IG or OSC complaints and did not mention safety complaints.           HCD
(testimony of the proposing official).
                                                                                 6

        In an October 21, 2016 IG complaint, the appellant reported noncompliance
with various directives and falsifying aircraft maintenance forms. IAF, Tab 23
at 9. In a January 14, 2017 IG complaint, he reported employees falsely signing
off on aircraft maintenance tasks that had not actually been performed. Id. at 8.
In an October 3, 2017 IG complaint, the appellant alleged that an aircraft being
towed crashed into a parked aircraft because management did not properly train
employees how to tow aircraft and did not properly supervise the maneuver. Id.
at 5.   In his OSC complaint, he reported that he disclosed, inter alia, aircraft
safety air-worthiness, jeopardizing pilot safety, and falsifying maintenance
records.    Id. at 10.   The appellant’s IG and OSC complaints are protected
regardless of their subject matter, and we find that they can fairly be
characterized as complaints pertaining to safety, among other things. However,
although the record shows that the deciding official was aware that the appellant
made safety complaints, there is no evidence that he was aware that the appellant
made safety complaints, or any other types of complaints, to either the IG or
OSC.
        An employee may demonstrate that a disclosure was a contributing factor
in a covered personnel action through circumstantial evidence, such as the acting
official’s knowledge of the disclosure and the timing of the personnel action.
Nasuti v. Department of State, 120 M.S.P.R. 588, ¶ 7 (2014). An appellant may
also satisfy the knowledge prong of the knowledge/timing test by proving that the
official taking the action had constructive knowledge of the protected disclosure,
even if the official lacked actual knowledge. Id. Here, because the protection
contained in § 2302(b)(9)(C) is for the activity of going to the IG or OSC, see
Corthell, 123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 11, and because the appellant has not shown that
the deciding official was specifically aware, or had constructive knowledge, of
                                                                                      7

either the appellant’s IG activity or his OSC activity, the appellant has not
established contributing factor through the knowledge/timing test. 4
      When, as here, all of the agency’s charges are sustained, the Board will
review the agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all
the relevant factors and exercised management discretion within the tolerable
limits of reasonableness. Ellis v. Department of Defense, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 11
(2010). In making this determination, the Board must give due weight to the
agency’s primary discretion in maintaining employee discipline and efficiency,
recognizing that the Board’s function is not to displace management’s
responsibility, but to ensure that managerial judgment has been properly
exercised. Id. The Board will modify or mitigate an agency-imposed penalty
only when it finds the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or the penalty
clearly exceeds the bounds of reasonableness. Id.
      As noted above, the deciding official testified that he considered the
appellant’s misconduct to be very serious because it showed that his certification
on aircraft maintenance forms could not be relied upon to show that the
maintenance had been performed and the aircraft was safe to fly.                  HCD
(testimony of the deciding official). The deciding official also considered that
the appellant had, within the previous year, been suspended for 5 days based on
charges of failure to observe safety practices (relating to his part in an accident
that happened when an aircraft was towed improperly) and disregard of
directives. Id.; IAF, Tab 6 at 61-64. The disregard of directives charge concerns
the appellant’s failure to complete aircraft maintenance forms and is therefore
similar to some extent to the misconduct for which he was removed.

4
  An appellant may also establish contributing factor through other evidence, such as
evidence pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the
personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was personally directed at the proposing
or deciding officials, and whether these individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate
against the appellant. Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15
(2012). Even considering these other factors set forth in Dorney, we find that the
appellant has failed to establish contributing factor.
                                                                                   8

      In addition, the deciding official completed a Douglas factors worksheet,
which he affirmed and adopted as his testimony at the hearing. HCD (testimony
of the deciding official); IAF, Tab 6 at 22-32.     Therein, the deciding official
considered the following mitigating factors: The appellant’s 26 months of service
and satisfactory performance record and the absence of any notoriety surrounding
his misconduct. The penalty of removal is consistent with the agency’s table of
penalties. IAF, Tab 6 at 56.
      The appellant reiterates on review his argument below that the agency
should not consider his 5-day suspension as an aggravating factor because he is
still litigating it in the EEO process. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. However, an agency
may consider an employee’s past disciplinary record when setting a penalty for
misconduct, even if it is the subject of ongoing litigation. U.S. Postal Service v.
Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 8-10 (2001); Suggs v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
113 M.S.P.R. 671, ¶ 11 (2010), aff’d, 415 F. App’x. 240 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Further, the suspension meets the Bolling criteria. See Bolling v. Department of
the Air Force, 9 M.S.P.R. 335, 339-40 (1981) (holding that the Board’s review of
a prior disciplinary action is limited to determining whether that action is clearly
erroneous, if the employee was informed of the action in writing, the action is a
matter of record, and the employee was permitted to dispute the charges before a
higher level of authority than the one that imposed the discipline). Therefore, the
agency properly considered the appellant’s prior disciplinary record.      We find
that the deciding official considered the penalty factors most relevant to this case
and that the agency reasonably exercised its management discretion.             The
appellant has not shown any error in the administrative judge’s finding that the
removal penalty was within the tolerable limits of reasonableness.
      The appellant contends that the administrative judge disallowed his
witnesses and evidence, and that this constituted bias. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. The
only witness he identifies is a local law enforcement official who the appellant
alleges investigated his IG complaints when the IG failed to take appropriate
                                                                                 9

action.   Whether the appellant’s IG reports had any merit or whether
their substance concerned anything that would otherwise be protected under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) is not relevant in this appeal. Further, the appellant made
no proffer about the allegedly disallowed evidence. Therefore, he has not shown
that the administrative judge’s rulings constituted an abuse of discretion.
Because his claim of bias rests solely on the administrative judge’s rulings
against him, his claim of bias fails. See Schneider v. Department of Homeland
Security, 98 M.S.P.R. 377, ¶ 7 (2005).
      With his petition for review, the appellant submits a number of documents.
Some of these are annotated versions of documents that are already in the record.
Compare PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-15, 17, 20-21, with IAF, Tab 6 at 93-94, 103,
Tab 25 at 5-6.    Evidence that is already a part of the record is not new.
Meier v. Department of the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980).
      He also submits what he represents to be a video recording of a local
sheriff conducting investigatory interviews of his second- and third-level
supervisors. PFR File, Tab 2. The disc is undated and the appellant does not
provide a proffer of what relevant evidence the disc may contain. The Board will
not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is
of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial
decision. Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980).
      The remaining documents that the appellant submits for the first time on
review all pre-date the close of the record below. The appellant has not explained
why he could not have submitted them prior to the close of the record
below despite his due diligence; thus, the Board need not consider them. Under
5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the Board will not consider evidence submitted for the first
time with the petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable
before the record was closed despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S.
Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980).
                                                                                        10

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.         You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to   the    court    at   the
following address:

5
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   11

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
                                                                                12

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     13

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)
(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       14

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Gina K. Grippando
                                     Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.