Court Opinion

ID: 9836794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:05.255637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.914383
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
This case reflects the needless litigation that arises when commanders and their chief legal advisors fail to communicate directly in matters relating to the administration of military justice. See Art. 6(b), UCMJ, 10 USC § 806. While “there is nothing in the UCMJ or the Manual for Courts-Martial prohibiting a convening authority from consulting with his subordinate commanders or members of his staff other than his SJA regarding a petition for clemency,” United States v. Cornwell, 49 MJ 491, 493 (1998), personal opinions, such as the one the chief of staff appended to appellant’s post-trial clemency package, are not helpful and can be destructive to our system of military justice. SJAs should remind deputy commanders and chiefs of staff that the decisions as to military criminal law are personal to the convening authority. It would be a far better practice for the SJA to inform these individuals after the commanding general has made his or her decision.
Nonetheless, appellant is entitled to no relief under the facts of this case. While I do not view the chief of staffs gratuitous comments as new matter, these comments are, nonetheless, inappropriate. If the commanding general had given his chief of staff a copy of the staff judge advocate’s recommendation and appellant’s clemency package, and asked the chief of staff for an oral recommendation, the chief of staffs comments would not have been considered new matter under our holding in Cornwell. I do not understand how the non-substantive written remarks of the chief of staff in this case are any different.
Assuming, as does the majority, that the chief of staffs note constituted new matter, I find nothing therein that would have required service on appellant and an opportu*379nity for rebuttal. RCM 1107(b)(3)(B)(iii) provides that “if the convening authority considers matters adverse to the accused from outside the record, with knowledge of which the accused is not chargeable, the accused shall be notified and given an opportunity to rebut.” I view the language used by the chief of staff as a fair inference arising from and based upon the facts contained within the record of trial.
As found by the Court of Criminal Appeals, the staff noncommissioned officer “suffered a fractured skull and a concussion, and he lost his sense of smell and taste.” 50 MJ 856, 859. In stating that appellant was “lucky he didn’t kill the SSgt,” the chief of staff was not attempting to make some extraordinarily revealing medical analysis. In my view, he was merely saying that when one person hits a second person over the head with a baseball bat twice, fractures that person’s skull, and gives the victim a concussion, both parties (assailant and victim) are fortunate that a death did not occur. Accordingly, appellant’s proposed rebuttal (that the victim was never near death, returned to duty, and was fully deployable) is of no consequence.
Contrary to the majority’s view, I do not read the chief of staffs note as saying that the victim was almost killed. Were that the case, I would fully agree that new matter was introduced and appellant would have had the right to comment thereon. There are many people who are “lucky to be alive.” “Lucky to be alive” is not synonymous with “almost killed.”
Accordingly, because I see no substantive new matter introduced by the chief of staff or find any error prejudicial to appellant’s substantial rights, I respectfully dissent. United States v. Cornwell, supra; Art. 59(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 859(a).