Court Opinion

ID: 9470199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:59:11.441753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:46.683508
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This court ought not affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for “want of prosecution.” His claim was dismissed because he failed to produce the witnesses necessary to prove his ease. The plaintiff failed because he was too poor to pay the required fees and travel expenses for his witnesses. Important considerations in this case are that the plaintiff is a state prisoner pursuing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) claim and that he was allowed by the district court to file his complaint under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1976).
I would hold that the plaintiff should have the right to have necessary witnesses appear in court without advance payment of fees and travel expenses, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c), under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, through statutory construction informed by constitutional considerations.
The constitutional aspect of the question before us is grounded in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). There the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15, 92 S.Ct. 250, 30 L.Ed.2d 142 (1971), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), that the states must protect prisoners’ constitutional right of access to the courts by providing “indigent inmates with access to a reasonably adequate law library for preparation of legal actions.” Bounds, supra, *292430 U.S. at 829, 97 S.Ct. at 1498 (quoting Wolff, supra, 418 U.S. at 578-79, 94 S.Ct. at 2985-2986). The Court stated its holding as follows:
“[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.
Bounds, supra, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498 (footnote omitted).
Currently, an inmate in plaintiffs situation may, if the conditions of section 1915 are met, file his complaint without advance payment of filing fees. He must also be provided with adequate library facilities or adequate assistance from prisoners trained in the law. Bounds, supra. Moreover, there is a developing line of cases which requires, within the discretion of a district court, appointment of counsel for such claimants. See McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir.1982); Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.1981); United States v. McQuade, 579 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir.1978).
It follows directly from Bounds that the constitutional right of access to the courts includes the right to present evidence through necessary witnesses to prove an inmate’s case, especially a case arising under section 1983, without advance payment of fees. There can be no question that marshalling and presenting the facts to support a claim are far more important than the availability of law library facilities or the services of counsel. If a plaintiff is unable to present to the trial court the facts underlying his claim, the furnishing of legal services such as a law library or counsel would have no utility. A pro se litigant before an understanding judge may be able to present his legal theories with a reasonable degree of proficiency. He is helpless, however, and bound to lose if he cannot produce the evidence which is the basis of his claim. This possibility, I believe, would pose a substantial question of whether the constitutionally required meaningful access to the courts had been provided.*
The purpose of section 1915 is to guarantee our indigent citizens access to the federal courts. Section 1915(a) provides in pertinent part:
Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit ... without prepayment of fees and costs ... by a citizen who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs ....
Section 1915(c) provides in pertinent part:
The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, .... Witnesses shall attend as in other cases, and the same remedies shall be available as are provided for by law in other cases.
I agree with Judge Marsh in United States v. Cavell, 171 F.Supp. 417, 423-24 (W.D.Pa.1959), that section 1915 implicitly authorizes the payment of witness fees and travel costs in cases permitted to be brought under that statute. Reason tells us that section 1915(c) can only mean that witness fees and costs may be waived and that whatever costs involved shall be borne by the United States as part of the operational expenses of its courts. As this appeal so poignantly demonstrates, the same remedies will not be available if an indigent person cannot present his witnesses. If this construction of the statute is incorrect, there is no logical meaning which can be given the language of section 1915(c).
Moreover, I am compelled to adopt this construction of section 1915 because of the substantial possibility of constitutional infirmities of a contrary construction. This *293approach is consistent with Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979). Yamasaki concerns a congressional statute governing Social Security overpayment notice and hearing procedures. The Court said:
A court presented with both statutory and constitutional grounds to support the relief requested usually should pass on the statutory claim before considering the constitutional question. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582-583, and n. 22 [99 S.Ct. 1355, 1364, and n. 22, 59 L.Ed.2d 587] (1979); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 110 [68 S.Ct. 1349, 1351, 92 L.Ed. 1849] (1948); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 [56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688], (1936) (concurring opinion). Due respect for the coordinate branches of government, as well as a reluctance when conscious of fallibility to speak with our utmost finality, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 [73 S.Ct. 397, 427, 97 L.Ed. 469] (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result), counsels against unnecessary constitutional adjudication. And if “a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which [a serious doubt of constitutionality] may be avoided,” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 [52 S.Ct. 285, 296, 76 L.Ed. 598] (1932), a court should adopt that construction. In particular, this Court has been willing to assume a congressional solicitude for fair procedure, absent explicit statutory language to the contrary. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507-08 [79 S.Ct. 1400, 1419, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377] (1959).
442 U.S. at 692-93, 99 S.Ct. at 2553. This case is like Yamasaki because it too concerns fair procedures, and I think it is at least as appropriate here as it was in Yamasaki to assume congressional solicitude for fair procedures.
There is precedent and comment besides Cavell that supports my view. In fact, this very court, even though dictum, has said:
We think that it is within the sound discretion of the district court to order the payment of witness fees as well as other normal costs, out of government funds under Section 1915 where the court has made an initial determination that the litigant is without funds in its grant of in forma pauperis status, and upon the further showing that the witness is necessary for the full presentation of the litigant’s ease. Appellant here failed to meet this burden.
Morrow v. Ingleburger, 584 F.2d 767, 772 n. 7 (6th Cir.1978).
Federal administrative consideration of this precise question is also helpful. On February 28, 1974 the Comptroller General issued a decision concerning payment responsibility in forma pauperis proceedings. Decisions of the Comptroller General, 53 Comp.Gen. 638 (File B-139803). The Comptroller adopted the view advanced by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in concluding:
[We] are aware of no legal basis which would authorize either the Department [of Justice] or the [Administrative Office] to pay expenses incurred in obtaining counsel or fact or expert witnesses on behalf of an indigent prisoner who is bringing a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983. Moreover, in view of the broad policy and financial implications of authorizing such payments, we believe that proposals to accomplish the goals of such a program should be considered and authorized, if desired, by Congress.
53 Comp.Gen. at 645.
However, in an exchange of letters between the Department of Justice and the Administrative Office preceding the Comptroller’s decision, the Department of Justice took a view far different from that adopted by the Comptroller. In the course of a letter dated September 21, 1973, addressed to the Comptroller, the Acting Assistant Attorney General for Administration, Glen E. Pommerening wrote:
It is the position of the department that, in the interest of justice, civil rights petitioners proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in forma pauperis should be provided, at the discretion of the court, with counsel and those fees and expenses currently allowed by law to indigents in criminal actions. Such a ruling by the Comptroller General would ... enable counsel appointed by the court to reimbursement, *294and the payment of other expenses. Lack of funds for certain expenses, e.g., to depose a witness, may effectively preclude an indigent from asserting his rights under the Civil Rights Act.
Comp.Gen. File B-139703. I believe that the position of the Assistant Attorney General is correct, that, in the interests of justice, indigent civil rights petitioners, pursuant to section 1915, should be provided witness fees.
A cautionary note is, however, appropriate. A court ought to have discretion, as section 1915 itself admonishes, to allow witnesses to be presented without cost to the petitioner only in meritorious cases and after a preliminary and fair showing of materiality and necessity. Further, the trial court should consider whether a witness’ testimony may as effectively be presented by deposition or interrogatories as by personal appearance in court.

 It seems anomalous to me that our federal constitution requires the states to provide funds for law libraries for indigent prisoners while that same document does not require the federal government to provide funds for witness fees for indigent prisoners. As I have said, the latter requirement involves a more fundamental aspect of meaningful access to the courts. There is no sound reason why federal judges should show any greater hesitancy to hold the federal government to its constitutional responsibilities than to hold state governments to their constitutional duties. Indeed, there are good reasons in our federalist system to avoid even the appearance of imposing greater burdens upon the states than upon the federal government.