Court Opinion

ID: 9892205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 23:00:59.817747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:17:48.362644
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TERRANCE TURNER,                               )
                                               )
               Plaintiff,                      )
                                               )       Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-02361 (UNA)
       v.                                      )
                                               )
LYONS, DOUGHTY,                                )
VELDUIS, P.A./P.C., et al.,                    )
                                               )
               Defendants.                     )

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION
       This matter is before the court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se complaint, ECF No.

1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For the reasons

explained below, the IFP application will be granted, and this matter will be dismissed without

prejudice.

       Plaintiff, a resident of Sterling, Virginia, sues what appears to a law firm that has associated

addresses in Ohio, New Jersey, and Delaware. Its formal address of record is unclear. Within the

body of the complaint, Plaintiff also lists several federal agencies, including: the United States

Special Operations Command, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence

Agency, the Secret Service, the Internal Revenue Service, and the United States Securities and

Exchange Commission. It is unclear if these agencies are intended as defendants or if Plaintiff

simply wants them noticed regarding this case. In any event, Plaintiff fails to properly name the

defendants and to specify their contact information, as required by D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1).

       The contents of the complaint fare no better. The allegations are difficult to follow, but it

appears that plaintiff takes issue with his treatment by the defendant law firm, and perhaps other

law firms, alleging that they were generally disrespectful and threatening, and that they would

accept his payment, but then refuse to ultimately file any “federal cases” on his behalf. He also
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alleges that these firms discriminated against him by failing to offer him employment because he

is a Federal Bar Association “appointee.” He demands $10 million in damages. Plaintiff faces

hurdles here that he cannot overcome.

       First, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v.

Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s

jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v.

CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive

fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate

defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D.

497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). When a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither

plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp

harangues and personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v.

D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL

5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). “A confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions

. . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F.

Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s

complaint falls within this category, failing to provide the defendants or this court with notice of

his intended claims or a clear basis for this court’s jurisdiction.

       To that end, the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set

forth generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is

available only when a “federal question” is presented or the parties are of diverse citizenship and

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the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. As discussed, a plaintiff seeking relief in the district

court must at least plead facts that bring the suit within the court's jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a), and failure to plead such facts warrants dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

       Here, plaintiff’s allegations do not raise any federal question. Although he discusses

“discrimination” in passing, “bare assertions” of a “discrimination claim” are “not entitled to be

assumed true[,]” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009). Indeed, plaintiff’s purported

involvement in the Federal Bar Association does not constitute membership in a protected class.

See Jianqing Wu v. Special Counsel, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 48, 54 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, No. 14–

7159, 2015 WL 10761295 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2015), cert. denied, 579 U.S. 904 (2016). Put

differently, federal question jurisdiction “must affirmatively appear clearly and distinctly. The

mere suggestion of a federal question is not sufficient to establish the jurisdiction of federal

courts[,]” Johnson v. Robinson, 576 F.3d 522, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Bilal v. Kaplan, 904

F.2d 14, 15 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam)).

       And, while plaintiff and the defendant law firm may be of diverse citizenship, it is not

entirely clear, because plaintiff has presented several different addresses for that defendant. It is a

“well-established rule” that the diverse citizenship requirement be “assessed at the time the suit is

filed[,]” Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991). Therefore, “the

citizenship of every party to the action must be distinctly alleged [in the complaint] and cannot be

established presumptively or by mere inference[.]” Meng v. Schwartz, 305 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55

(D.D.C. 2004). Moreover, to the extent that he sues the noted federal agencies, they are not

considered “citizens of a state.” Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158, 160 (1922); Commercial Union Ins.

Co. v. United States, 999 F.2d 581, 584–85 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

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        Finally, this matter presents no connection to the District of Columbia whatsoever. Venue

in a civil action is proper only in (1) the district where any defendant resides, if all defendants

reside in the same state in which the district is located, (2) in a district in which a substantial part

of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred (or a substantial part of the property

that is the subject of the action is situated), or (3) in a district in which any defendant may be found,

if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see

also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (providing dismissal for improper venue). The primary defendant is not

located in this District, and to the extent that he intends to sue the federal agencies, he has not

presented any allegations against them. Furthermore, none of the acts or omissions giving rise to

this case, as far as they can even be understood, occurred in this District.

        For all of these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order

accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: October 19, 2023                          ___________________________
                                                        JIA M. COBB
                                                   United States District Judge

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