Court Opinion

ID: 9768158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:44:38.564527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:36.998055
License: Public Domain

CORNYN, Justice,
joined by ENOCH, SPECTOR and ABBOTT, Justices, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I.
Whole I agree with a majority of the Court that the assessments levied by the Foundation are not an unconstitutional occupation tax and also do not violate the growers’ right to equal protection, I disagree with Chief Justice Phillips’s opinion that Subchapter 74D of the Texas Agriculture Code is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in violation of article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. Neither does Subchap-ter 74D violate the growers’ right to due process or the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution.
In striking down this statute, the Court commits four major errors that ultimately threaten the heretofore established role of quasi-govemmental entities under Texas law. Repeatedly, we have recognized that legislative delegations of authority are an essential part of modern governance in an increasingly complex society. See, e.g., National Ass’n of Indep. Insurers v. Texas Dep’t of Ins., 925 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.1996); Texas Ass’n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 451 (Tex.1993). The Court’s decision in this ease, ironically enough, tends to prove rather than refute the arguments of those administrative law scholars who contend that state delegation eases lack a defining principle. See, e.g., Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctnne in the States, 8 Admin. L.J. 567 (1994) (citing Mandelker, et al., State and Local Government in a Federal System 599 (2d ed.1983)).
That is not to say that the concerns embodied in the nondelegation doctrine are trivial; just the opposite is true. There can be no doubt that when lawmaking power is delegated to an administrative agency to carry out the Legislature’s policy goals, that agency is necessarily given the power to give substance to that legislative policy. But as the United States Supreme Court has said, given proper safeguards, this delegation is both proper and necessary:
So long as Congress “shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” [citing J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 352, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928) ].
... [0]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372, 109 S.Ct. 647, 655, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989).
Given that the same concerns and conditions exist in our state system, it is not surprising that we have likewise acknowledged the propriety of legislative delegation to carry out legislative purposes, as long as there are established reasonable standards to guide the agency to whom those powers are delegated. See e.g., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 740 (Tex.1995). We do not require these standards to *492be comprehensive. To the contrary, we have said that “[Requiring the legislature to include every detail and anticipate unforeseen circumstances ... would defeat the purpose of delegating legislative authority.” Railroad Comm’n v. Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.2d 679, 689 (Tex.1992).
My fundamental objection to the Court’s approach is that while the nondelegation doctrine has undergone at least five stages of development in our national jurisprudence, see Greco, Standards or Safeguards, 8 Admin. L.J. at 569 (categorizing these as “the Early Stage, the Public Interest Stage, the ‘Strict’ Standards Stage, the ‘Loose’ Standards Stage, and the Procedural Safeguards Stage”), the Court’s approach instead represents a stage of arrested development. The Court’s extraordinary skepticism of this particular delegation emanates from two Supreme Court eases, dating back to the Court’s “Strict” Standards Stage during the first half of this century, both of which, although never expressly overruled, have been limited to their facts. Id. at 572 n. 31; Davis, AdministRative Law Treatise § 3:8 (2d. ed.1978). Not surprisingly, this strict nondelegation approach is followed by only a minority of the states. See Greco, Standards or Safeguards, 8 Admin. L.J. at 578. It is on this flimsy foundation that the Court’s public policy arguments are erected.
Second, though the Court acknowledges the correct standard for review of a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, it does not correctly apply that standard. Under a facial challenge, like that made here, the challenging party must prove that the statute, by its terms, “always operates unconstitutionally.” Texas Workers’ Compensation Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 (Tex.1995) (emphasis added); see also Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 625 (1996). That burden has not been met here.
Third, the Court strains to conclude that the Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation is a “private” entity.1 Characterizing the Foundation as a “private” agency is the lynchpin of the Court’s decision—only by using this approach can the Court feel itself justified in declaring that “this is an extraordinary case,” 952 S.W.2d at 475, in a effort to limit both the known and unknown ramifications of its opinion.
It is the unknown ramifications of the Court’s new test that ought to be of the most concern to the Court. The Court’s new test will no doubt apply to delegations ranging from “school choice”2 to private prisons.3 In fact, “private” delegations are used extensively in Texas government, have been routinely upheld by this and other Texas courts, and given proper standards and oversight by the delegating authority, these delegations raise no constitutional concerns. For instance, the Court does not consider whether or how this new test might affect the continuing viability of the Relinquishment Act, which dedicates revenue from state-owned oil and gas reserves to the Permanent School Fund, the constitutionality of which this Court upheld against a delegation challenge in Greene v. Robison, 117 Tex. 516, 8 S.W.2d 655, 656 (1928) (allowing private persons to sell or lease oil and gas owned by the state *493“upon such terms and conditions as such [private person] may deem best” subject only to minimum prices set in the statute). Similarly, in Texas Workers’ Compensation Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.1995), this Court upheld the constitutionality of the Workers’ Compensation Act against an open courts, equal protection, and a substantive due course of law challenge arising out of the use of the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment for determining injured workers’ impairment ratings. Clearly, the Act delegates to the American Medical Association (AMA), a private national association of physicians, the' task of promulgating standards for translating a worker’s job-related injury into an impairment rating to determine compensation benefits. Although no separate delegation argument was advanced in that case, the constitutional complaints that were urged involve many of the same considerations that arise in a delegation challenge. Yet the Court had no trouble upholding the use of the AMA Guides. Cf. Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250, 256-259 (1996) (upholding the use of the AMA Guides against a constitutional non-delegation challenge).
We also recently declined to disturb the decision of the Third Court of Appeals upholding a legislative delegation to the Texas Automobile Insurance Plan Association in Office of Public Insurance Counsel v. Texas Automobile Insurance Plan, 860 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993, writ denied). The Association, which is charged with administering the Safety-Responsibility Act’s scheme for providing motor vehicle liability insurance to high risk drivers, is composed exclusively of private insurance companies authorized to do business in Texas. Finding adequate safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of power under the statutory scheme, the court of appeals had no apparent trouble upholding this particular private delegation. Id. at 237.
Nor does the Court consider the impact of its decision on the Legislature’s common practice of delegating eminent domain powers to private entities. See, e.g., Tex. Nat. Res.Code § 111.019 et seq. (granting common carriers power of eminent domain when “necessary for the construction, maintenance, or operation of the common carrier pipeline”); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 1417 (granting telegraph corporations the power to condemn property “for the use of the corporation”); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 1435a (granting certain private oil and gas companies the power of eminent domain); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 1439 (granting power of condemnation to sewer companies “whenever it be made to appear that the use of any such private property is necessary for the successful operation of such sewer system, and when it also be made to appear that such sewer system is beneficial to the public use, health or convenience”); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 6535 (granting certain railroad corporations right of eminent domain “for the purpose of acquiring rights of way upon which to construct and operate their lines of railways and sites for depots and power plants”); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 1433 (providing that “[w]hen deemed necessary to preserve the public health” a water company shall have the right of eminent domain to condemn private property “necessary for the construction of supply reservoirs or standpipes for water work”). Ironically, Justice Hecht argues that the Foundation “wields more legislative power than any other privately chartered nonprofit corporation in Texas, or, as far as I can tell, in the history of Texas.” 952 S.W.2d at 479. But not only have similar delegations to similar private organizations been upheld in other states, see, e.g., Dukesherer Farms, Inc. v. Ball, 405 Mich. 1, 273 N.W.2d 877 (1979) (upholding the Michigan Cherry Promotion and Development Program against a constitutional challenge based, in part, on improper delegation), it is difficult for me to imagine a more profound delegation of governmental power than that given by the Texas Legislature to numerous private entities to take private property for public use under the sovereign power of eminent domain. How these delegations would fare under the Court’s new test is uncertain at best.
Even this Court delegates to a private entity the task of approving the law school course-of-study requirements for would-be Texas lawyers. Rather than engage in the *494laborious, expensive, and specialized task of assessing the nation’s law schools ourselves, we delegate this function to the American Bar Association, a voluntary national association of lawyers. See Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Texas, Rule 111(a)(1) (requiring graduation from an “approved law school”); Rule 1(a)(3) (defining “Approved law school” as one “approved by the American Bar Association”); see also Rules IV, VII, VIII, and X (allowing Board of Law Examiners and District Committees on Admissions to determine whether applicants for bar possess good moral character and fitness). Not surprisingly, the Legislature has also embraced this model for a host of other certifications and licenses. See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code § 441.007 (requiring graduation from privately accredited library school for permanent certification as county librarian); Tex. Health & Safety Code § 142.006 (allowing Department of Health to issue license to a privately accredited home and community support services agency), § 222.024 (exempting hospitals accredited by Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organization, the American Osteopathic Association, or other national accreditation organization from licensing inspections), § 401.425 (allowing alternative certification of privately accredited mammography systems), § 824.002 ( exempting zoos accredited by the American Association of Zoological Parks and Aquariums from regulation under Chapter 824); Tex. Human Res.Code § 50.015 (requiring graduation from accredited program for certification as a social worker); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 4495b-l § 2(3)(defining “physician assistant” as a person who graduated from a program “accredited by the American Medical Association’s Committee on Allied Health Education and Accreditation and who has passed the certifying examination administered by the National Commission on Certification of Physician Assistants”); Tex. Nat. Res.Code § 113.052 (allowing agency to adopt the published codes of the National Board of Fire Underwriters, the National Fire Protection Association, the American Society for Mechanical Engineers, and other nationally recognized societies as standards applying to storage, delivery, and handling of liquefied petroleum gas); see also Dudding v. Automatic Gas Co., 145 Tex. 1, 193 S.W.2d 517, 519 (1946) (upholding adoption of standards recommended by National Fire Protection Association and National Board of Fire Underwriters regarding liquefied petroleum gas). Significantly, “private” delegations offer vast and varied expertise to Texas government at no additional cost to taxpayers and without bloating an already sizable bureaucracy.
Finally, only by leapfrogging a nearly unbroken string of decisions from this Court and the United States Supreme Court upholding legislative delegation of authority to various agencies, many with far less legislative' guidance than was provided here, is the Court able to apply its new, stricter “private delegation” test in place of long-established Texas law. In my view, this Court’s decisions provide more than sufficient guidance—and certainly more authority—for evaluating the propriety of the delegation in this case. Our decisions also compel a determination that Subchapter 74D is not facially unconstitutional.
II.
Relying primarily on Louis Jaffe’s sixty-year-old law review article, Law Making By Private Groups, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 201 (1937), the Court concludes that entities like the Foundation are wholly “private.” At the same time, the Court concedes that they do “not find it easy to categorize the Foundation as either a public or private agency.” 952 S.W.2d 470. The Court also fails to adequately explain why this largely fictional distinction, which leads it to propose an “either/or” choice, is so important that this entire statute should turn on it. I submit that the Foundation is neither wholly public nor wholly private, but rather it has attributes of each.
But as it turns out, this distinction does not really matter. What does matter more than drawing strained and artificial distinctions between public and private actors is whether the Foundation has been given adequate legislative guidance and whether its discretion is subject to appropriate oversight and other legal constraints. Ultimately, the legitimate constitutional concerns for un*495checked abuse of power giving rise to the nondelegation doctrine are the same whether the Foundation is characterized as public or private. Thus, the Court’s creation and application of a new test for private delegations is simply unnecessary.
III.
As I have previously noted, we have repeatedly held that the Legislature may delegate authority to agencies to carry out legislative purposes so long as it establishes “ ‘reasonable standards to guide the entity to which the powers are delegated.’” Edgewood, 917 S.W.2d at 740 (quoting Railroad Comm’n v. Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.2d 679, 689 (Tex.1992)). “ ‘Such standards may be broad ... [when] conditions must be considered which cannot be conveniently investigated by the legislature,”’ Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.2d at 689 (quoting State v. Texas Mun. Power Agency, 565 S.W.2d 258, 273 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1978, writ denied)), and at the same time, they should be “reasonably clear and hence acceptable as a standard of measurement.” Jordan v. State Bd. of Ins., 160. Tex. 506, 334 S.W.2d 278, 280 (1960). The Court has recognized six categories of allowable delegations:
(1) delegations when the Legislature cannot practically and efficiently exercise powers (such as determining rail rates, questions of public convenience and necessity, and granting permission to drill oil wells);
(2) delegations to administrative bodies of the authority to make rules to implement statutes;
(3) delegations to find facts and ascertain conditions upon which an existing law may operate (for example, the authority given the Railroad Commission, the Public Utility Commission, the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission);
(4) delegations of legislative authority that set up broad standards, leaving to the delegate to make rules and determine facts to which the legislative policy is to apply, when the conditions to be considered cannot be easily investigated by the Legislature;
(5) delegations of the power to fix rates within prescribed limits to cover specified items of cost; and
(6) delegations of the power to determine the question of necessity of taking land for public use.
Housing Auth. v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 143 S.W.2d 79, 87 (1940).
In testing the reasonableness of a particular delegation, we have required varying degrees of specificity in standards depending on the nature of the power conferred, the recipient of the power, and the subject matter. See, e.g., Edgewood, 917 S.W.2d at 740 (upholding delegation to Commissioner of Education to adopt rules “necessary for the implementation of’ Chapter 36 of the Education Code); Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.2d at 685 (upholding delegation to Railroad Commission of authority to, among other things, “do all things necessary for the conservation of oil and gas and prevention of waste of oil and gas and ... [to] adopt rules and orders as may be necessary for those purposes”); Jordan v. State Bd. of Ins., 160 Tex. 506, 334 S.W.2d 278, 280-281 (1960) (upholding delegation to the State Board of Insurance to determine whether any officers or directors of an insurance carrier seeking a Certificate of Authority were “not worthy of the public confidence” and noting the general terms that have been held sufficient as administrative standards by other courts, including “just and reasonable,” “public interest,” “unreasonable obstruction” to navigation, “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable,” “public convenience, interest, or necessity,” “[materials] of inferior quality,” “unfair methods of competition,” “reasonable variations,” “unduly or unnecessarily complicate the structure” of a holding company system, and “unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power among security holders”); Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Falkner, 160 Tex. 417, 331 S.W.2d 917, 920 (1960) (upholding right of Banking Commissioner to ascertain “whether the public convenience and advantage will be promoted ... and whether the [neighboring] population ... affords a reasonable promise of adequate support ” before granting approval of a branch office); *496Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d at 81, 83, 86 (upholding statute giving housing authority right to condemn property after determining that the city has “insanitary or unsafe inhabited dwelling accommodations” and to set rental rates that are “the lowest possible rates consistent with its providing decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling accommodations” at “no higher rates than it shall find to be necessary in order to produce revenues ... sufficient [to meet certain expenses and create a reserve]” and to select housing for tenants that is “within the financial reach of [low income] persons,” and which it deems “necessary to provide safe and sanitary accommodations”). As these cases demonstrate, we have upheld numerous delegations with far more general grants of authority than that in Subchapter 74D.
Notwithstanding the Court’s assertion that Subchapter 74D lacks sufficiently specific standards, the statute contains relatively comprehensive standards to guide both the Commissioner of Agriculture (a statewide elected official) and the Foundation in their joint efforts to execute the legislative mandate to “suppress and eradicate boll weevils and other cotton pests.” Tex. Agrio. Code § 74.101(c). Initially, the Commissioner is required to select a nonprofit organization that “can best carry out the purposes of [Subchapter 74D]” and must certify that the organization’s petition “complies with [Sub-chapter 74D]” and “can adequately represent the interests of cotton growers in the proposed eradication zones.” Id. § 74.103(d)-(e). The Commissioner may revoke the certification if it “fails to meet the requirements of [Subchapter 74D].” Id. § 74.104(b). Apparently, this includes the power to revoke the Foundation’s certification for its failure to conduct or abide by the results of Board elections or assessment referenda pursuant to the requirements of sections 74.105 (eradication zone referenda), 74.106 (Board elections), 74.113 (assessment referenda), and 74.114 (procedures for Board elections and referenda), or its failure to obtain the Commissioner’s approval for changing the voting status of a Board member, see id. § 74.107(b) (requiring Commissioner approval to “change the number of board positions or the eradication zone representation on the board”), or otherwise comply with the requirements of the statute. Additionally, the statute requires that the Board use revenue collected “solely to finance programs approved by the commissioner as consistent with [Subchapter 74D] and applicable provisions of the constitution.” Id. § 74.109(h) (emphasis added).
The Court refuses to acknowledge that sections 74.104(b)and 74.109(h) confer such broad oversight powers upon the Commissioner. Section 74.104(b) can, however, be reasonably read to give the Commissioner the power to revoke the Foundation’s authority to operate under certain circumstances. Similarly, the statute clearly requires Commissioner approval of Foundation expenditures. The procedures for implementing these duties are subject to the broad rule-making power that the Legislature has conferred upon the Commissioner. See Tex. Agric. Code § 74.120. Simply stated, the statute repeatedly requires the Foundation to operate in accordance with both statutory standards, see, e.g., id. §§ 74.108, 74.113, and the Commissioner’s explicit grants of oversight authority. See, e.g., id. §§ 74.107, 74.109.
The Legislature has also specified the powers of the Board. These include the power to “conduct programs consistent with the declaration of policy ” stated by the Legislature, to “borrow money as necessary to execute this chapter,” and to take other action and exercise other authority “as necessary to execute any act authorized by [Subchapter 74D] or the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act.” See id. § 74.108(a)(4), (6), and (7) (emphasis added). The statute also specifies when the Board may add an area to an eradication zone and when and how assessments can be collected in those added areas. See id. § 74.108(b)-(e). In proposing assessments, the Foundation must determine the assessment “needed” to “finance programs of marketing, promotion, research, and education calculated to increase the production and use of cotton” and the Foundation may use the funds only for eradication in that zone, operating costs (including payments of debt), and “other programs consistent with the declaration of policy” as stated by the *497Legislature in the statute. Id. § 74.113(a), (f); see also id. § 74.101.
The statute also contains guidelines for how the Foundation should implement eradication programs. As the Court has noted, the statute requires the Foundation to use the “best available integrated pest management techniques.” Id. § 74.101(a)(3). What the Court fails to acknowledge, however, is that the phrase “integrated pest management” is expressly defined by statute as “the coordinated use of pest and environmental information with available pest control methods to prevent unacceptable levels of pest damage by the most economical means and with the least possible hazard to people, property, and the environment.” Id. § 74.102(12) (emphasis added). This definition surely contains sufficiently specific standards to pass muster under this Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence. Similarly, the definitions of “eradication” and “infested” contain additional specific guidance. “ ‘Eradication’ means elimination of boll weevils or pink bollworms to the extent that the Commissioner does not consider further elimination of boll weevils or pink boll-worms necessary to prevent economic loss to cotton growers.” Id. § 74.102(6) (emphasis added). “‘Infested’ means the presence of the boll weevil or pink bollworm in any life stage or the existence of generally accepted entomological evidence from which it may be concluded with reasonable certainty that the boll weevil or pink bollworm is present.” Id. § 74.102(11) (emphasis added).
Thus, the delegation to the Foundation fits the description of at least four types of allowable delegation outlined in Higginbotham. First, the Legislature cannot practically and efficiently exercise many of the powers delegated to the Foundation, such as determining the level of assessments needed to achieve the statute’s goals. Second, the statute delegates to the Foundation and Commissioner the authority to make rules to implement the statute. Third, the Foundation and Commissioner are given the power to find facts and ascertain conditions upon which Subchapter 74D may operate, such as determining when a field is infested and what crops present a threat to the program. Fourth, the statute sets up broad standards, leaving to the delegate to make rules and determine facts to which the legislative policy is to apply, when the conditions to be considered, such as level of infestation and which types of integrated management practices to use, cannot be easily investigated by the Legislature. See Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d at 87.
IV.
Not only does the Court wrongly apply the correct legal standard to decide the constitutionality of the statute, it reaches several erroneous conclusions even under its own new test. Though the Court purports to limit its new test to “private” delegations, it does not explain why our long-standing test for improper delegations is inadequate, nor does it explore the potential negative ramifications of this new standard to other delegations. If, as the Court recognizes, broad delegations of lawmaking authority without adequate safeguards are a threat to democratic government, what difference does it make whether the delegation is to a bureaucrat, an appointed commission, or a quasi-governmental entity like the Foundation? Given adequate standards and oversight, such as that imposed on the Foundation under Subehapter 74D, this delegation is both constitutionally permissible and in the public interest.
Though the Court’s decision does not ultimately rely on the Foundation’s authority to promulgate rules, the violation of which constitutes a criminal offense (a Class C misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed $600, see Tex. Agric. Code § 74.126; Tex. Penal Code § 12.23), the Court asserts that this authority “strongly suggests an improper private delegation.” I disagree. The prospect of invalidating a delegation on this basis jeopardizes innumerable other statutes covering a multitude of subjects in which the Legislature has directed that a violation of agency rules is a criminal offense. See, e.g., Tex. Agric. Code §§ 18.008 (certification of organic produce), 61.018 (labeling and sale of seed), 71.058 (florists), 75.022 (herbicides), 121.010 (grading of roses), 134.023 (aquaculture licensing); Tex Eduo.Code §§ 37.102 (school safety), Tex. Health & Safety Code *498§§ 81.085 (quarantines), 145.013(tanning facilities licensing), 361.221, 361.2215, 361.2225 (solid waste disposal), 361.563 (transportation of medical waste), 438.005 (sale of unpack-aged food), 753.011 (flammable liquids), Tex. Nat. Res.Code §§ 91.002 (conservation and regulation of oil and gas), 131.305 (waste discharges from uranium surface mines), Tex PARKS & Wildlife Code §§ 12.607 (possession of wild animals), 43.077 (private bird hunting); Tex. Trans. Code § 548.604 (vehicle inspection); Tex. Water Code §§ 26.2121 (water quality permits), 60.078 (navigation district regulations). These grants of authority to promulgate rules punishable by a fíne are no more expansive than necessary to allow the enforcement of an agency’s rules. In this ease, why would the Legislature delegate authority to administer a boll weevil eradication program and yet withhold from the Foundation the power to enforce its rules? Of course, no growers complain that they have been prosecuted for violating the rules of the Foundation. And, although I would not strike down the statute on this basis, even the Court recognizes that the proper course of action would be to strike down the particular penalty provisions, and sever them from the rest of the statute. See Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex.1990); Sharber v. Florence, 131 Tex. 341, 115 S.W.2d 604, 606 (1938); Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 62 Tex. 630, 634 (1884). If this is so, then the fifth factor of the Court’s test is simply unnecessary.
That the delegation is to a quasi-govem-mental entity as opposed to a “pure” administrative agency is irrelevant when, as in this ease, the entity is required to promulgate rules consistent with the statute conferring its authority and consistent with rules promulgated by the Commissioner. See Tex. Agrio. Code § 74.120. The Board is given the authority to set penalties, after reasonable notice, for a grower’s failure to pay assessments. Id. § 74.115(a). But it is the statute itself, and not the Board, that determines the circumstances under which a grower’s crop may be destroyed for nonpayment of assessments and the specific procedures that must be followed before destroying the crop. See id. § 74.115(b). Only the Commissioner, and not the Foundation, is given the authority to establish rules regarding when planting of cotton may be prohibited “if there is reason to believe planting will jeopardize the success of the program or present a hazard to public health or safety,” and to order destruction of cotton when such rules are violated. See id. § 74.118. Only the Commissioner, and not the Foundation, is given the authority to destroy and treat volunteer or noncommercial cotton and to determine when destruction of commercial cotton is “necessary to carry out the purposes of [Subchapter 74D].” Id. § 74.119. Notably, the statute requires that the initial zone referendum include a summary of the penalties for noneompliance with rules adopted under the statute. Id. § 74.105(c)(3). The growers, therefore, may vote down a zone referendum if they consider the penalties to be too severe. Notwithstanding the “David v. Goliath” characterization by Chief Justioe Phillips and Justice Hecht, each cotton grower, no matter how large or how small, is eligible to vote in any election. See id. §§ 74.102, 74.114; 4 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.1. In other words, one grower, one vote. Under these circumstances, the danger of large-grower domination in an election is minimal.
While the Court argues that there is a significant difference between the requirement that the Commissioner promulgate rules in some instances and the authority of the Commissioner to promulgate rules in other instances, as I have already noted, we have long held that it is not necessary for an administrative agency to establish detailed rules before carrying out its statutory duty when the statute provides a sufficiently definite standard. See Jordan, 334 S.W.2d at 280-81 (citing Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Falkner, 331 S.W.2d at 917). The Commissioner is himself politically accountable, and is certainly capable of promulgating additional rules consistent with the statute as he deems necessary. Even so, in those instances in which the statute allows, but does not require the Commissioner to promulgate rules, the statute provides sufficiently definite standards to pass constitutional muster.
The Court also errs in its conclusion that Subchapter 74D lacks adequate procedures for the growers to contest Foundation ac*499tions. Rather, the cotton growers are provided with ample opportunity to challenge Foundation and Commissioner decisions and to seek redress in the courts when necessary. The statute itself repeatedly requires that notice be provided to those subject to its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Tex. Agrio. Code §§ 74.106, 74.115, 74.116, 74.118, 74.119, 74.120. The statute also subjects any rule-making by the Commissioner and the Foundation to the general requirements of Texas law governing administrative procedure. See Tex. Agric. Code § 74.120(c); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001. et seq. (Administrative Procedure Act). This includes judicial review of such rules if it is alleged that a rule or its threatened application interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, a legal right or privilege. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.038. In addition, any person against whom the Department of Agriculture has assessed a penalty is entitled to an appeal, including a hearing in accordance with the Texas Administrative Procedure Act. See 4 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.57. The Foundation is also required to appoint an assessment appeals committee to adopt policies and procedures for grower appeals of the amount of assessments. See 4 Tex. Admin. Code § 196.1(i). Supplementing these administrative safeguards, however, Texas law has long recognized that even in the absence of an express right to judicial review of agency actions, such a right is implied when the complainant alleges that the statute has been unconstitutionally applied. See Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 326 S.W.2d 699, 714-715 (1959); Board of Ins. Comm’rs v. Title Ins. Ass’n, 153 Tex. 574, 272 S.W.2d 95, 97-98 (1954); see also Central Power & Light Co. v. Sharp, — S.W.2d -(Tex.1997) (per curiam) (trial court had jurisdiction over constitutional challenge to statute despite party’s failure to raise issue of constitutionality before agency). Plainly, meaningful administrative and judicial review is available to the growers.
Finally, the Court erroneously relies on violations of the statute to demonstrate the statute’s lack of safeguards, reasoning that since the statute did not prevent what happened,4 the safeguards are insufficient. That the Commissioner or the Foundation could violate Subchapter 74D, however, does not render the statute unconstitutional, especially under a facial challenge. Ultimately, the Court’s reasoning “defeatfs] the purpose of delegating legislative authority” by “[r]equir-ing the legislature to include every detail and anticipate unforeseen circumstances.” Railroad Comm’n v. Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.2d 679, 689 (Tex.1992) (citing Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961, 964 (1945)); cf. Bullock v. Calvert, 480 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex.1972) (grant of authority to the Secretary of State to finance party elections with state money could not be implied, despite recognized principle that “every specific, permissible act of a public officer need not be expressed in a statute,” because it would be a violation of separation of powers).
V.
As previously noted, the United States Supreme Court has used the delegation doctrine to strike down a statute only three times in our nation’s history: Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1936),5 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry *500Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935), and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935). All three cases were decided over sixty years ago, during the heyday of the Court’s hostility to President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. See Horwitz, The TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 206-08 (1992). Although this Court has stricken statutes based on improper delegation in a few instances, we have never done so under circumstances like those in this ease. See Bullock v. Calvert, 480 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.1972); Davis v. City of Lubbock, 160 Tex. 38, 326 S.W.2d 699 (1959); Daniel v. Tyrrell & Garth Inv. Co., 127 Tex. 213, 93 S.W.2d 372 (1936).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld delegations in which, as in this case, the ultimate decision-making authority is vested either with a government agency or with the regulated community through referenda. For example, in Currin v. Wallace, the Supreme Court upheld the Secretary of Agriculture’s authority to designate markets where tobacco could be bought and sold at auction upon receiving approval of two-thirds of the growers voting in a prescribed referendum.6 306 U.S. 1, 6, 59 S.Ct. 379, 382-383, 83 L.Ed. 441 (1939). In so holding, the Supreme Court stated, “This is not a case where Congress has attempted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which its is vested by the Constitution.” Id. at 15, 59 S.Ct. at 386. (citations omitted). The Court quoted Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 421, 55 S.Ct. at 248:
The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instru-mentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power which in many circumstances calling for its exertions would be but a futility.
Currin, 306 U.S. at 15, 59 S.Ct. at 387. The Court characterized the required referendum as but a restriction placed upon Congress’ own regulation and not a delegation of legislative authority. Id. at 15, 59 S.Ct. at 386-387. The Court also distinguished the statute from that involved in Carter Coal, noting that, rather than “a group of producers ... [making] the law and forcing] it upon a minority,” Congress had exercised its legislative authority in making the regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its application, one of which was the required favorable two-thirds vote. Id. at 15-16, 59 S.Ct. at 386-387.
That same year the Court also upheld a statute that required any order of the Secretary of Agriculture to be approved by interested producers before it could become effective. United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 59 S.Ct. 993, 83 L.Ed. 1446 (1939). The Court held that, whether or not a referendum is necessary, inasmuch as Congress could put the order into effect without approval of anyone, requiring such approval is not an invalid delegation. Id. at 577-578, 59 S.Ct. at 1014-1015. See also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672-673, 96 S.Ct. 2358, 2361-2362, 49 L.Ed.2d 132 (1976) (holding that nondelegation doctrine is inapplicable to a city ordi*501nance requiring changes in zoning approved by City Council also be approved by 55 percent of eligible voters via referendum because “all power derives from the people, who can delegate it to representative instruments which they create. In establishing legislative bodies, the people can reserve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might otherwise be assigned to the Legislature”) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has always upheld statutes in which the regulated community has been delegated considerable authority so long as the statute contains “intelligible principles” upon which decisions could be made and when an administrative agency is vested with authority to oversee the private delegates’ exercise of power. For example, in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940), the Supreme Court upheld the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 as a valid delegation despite the fact that the Act allowed organized boards composed of member coal producers to recommend minimum prices to the Commissioner. The only governing standards for establishing the minimum prices related to such concerns as the “just and equitable” price as between producers within a district, “due regard to the interests of the consuming public,” the relative market values, and “fair competitive opportunities.” Id. at 397, 60 S.Ct. at 914. Noting that the standards in the Act “far exceed in specificity others which have been sustained,” the Court concluded that,
“[cjertainly in the hands of experts the criteria ... supplied [were] wholly adequate for carrying out the general policy and purposes of the Act. To require more would be to insist on a degree of exactitude which not only lacks legal necessity but which does not comport with the requirements of the administrative process.”
Id. at 398, 60 S.Ct. at 915. Because the Commission had ultimate responsibility for setting prices, after the Board’s recommendation, and had authority over the activities of the industry members, the Court held the delegation was “unquestionably valid.” Id. at 399, 60 S.Ct. at 915.
Similarly, in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928), the Court upheld Congress’ delegation to the President of the power to increase or decrease import duties to equalize the differences in costs of production in the United States and competing countries. The Court recognized that
Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to determine exactly when its exercise of the legislative power should become effective, because [the need to exercise the power] depend[s] on future conditions, and it may leave the determination of such time to the decision of an Executive, or, as often happens in matters of state legislation, it may be left to a popular vote of the residents of a district to be [affected] by the legislation. While in a sense one may say that such residents are exercising legislative power, it is not an exact statement, because the power has already been exercised legislatively by the body vested with that power under the Constitution, the condition of its legislation going into effect being made dependent by the legislature on the expression of the voters of a certain district.
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If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not [an unconstitutional] delegation of legislative power.
Id. at 407, 409, 48 S.Ct. at 351, 352 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in these cases is particularly applicable to the present case. Under the statute, the Foundation is allowed to take action only upon the voters’ approval of the creation of the zone and the assessments. As in Currin and Rock Royal, the people subject to these assessments have the ultimate veto power. Inasmuch as the Legislature could impose a regulatory assessment to be collected for purposes of boll weevil eradication, a requirement that assessments proposed by the Foundation be approved through a referendum of growers cannot be an invalid delegation. See Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. at 577-578, 59 S.Ct. at *5021014-1015; Currin, 306 U.S. at 15, 59 S.Ct. at 386-387. Nor is the delegation of the authority to establish the level of assessments to the Foundation an improper delegation because the Legislature has provided for sufficient oversight by the Commissioner of Agriculture and has provided reasonably comprehensive guidance for the remaining discretionary authority of the Foundation, particularly given the expertise of the Foundation Board members. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal, 310 U.S. at 397-400, 60 S.Ct. at 914-916, Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. at 574-578, 59 S.Ct. at 1013-1015. The Court contends that the statute “fails to meet the seventh factor” of its new test because there are no guarantees that the Board members are “experts.” This is an audacious assertion indeed.7 Perhaps the Legislature recognized that the cotton growers who earn their living by producing cotton and who elect the Board members are the best judges of the qualifications of the Board members they choose to represent them.
VI.
Finally, I disagree that the State has violated the growers’ rights to procedural due process and abridged their right to open courts.
We addressed a similar challenge in R Communications, Inc. v. Sharp, 875 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.1994). There, a taxpayer challenged a statute that 1) barred any form of declaratory relief, 2) conditioned suit attacking the validity of an assessment on prior payment of the taxes, 3) barred injunctive relief without prior payment of the taxes or posting of a bond, and 4) authorized summary collection procedures without the State filing suit. See id. at 314-315. Yet we found it necessary to invalidate only the first of these elements to remedy the system’s constitutional infirmity. See id. at 318. “Without the recent legislative elimination of a declaratory remedy, R Communications would appear to have available a means of obtaining timely access to the courts.... ” Id. at 318.
As the Legislature has not purported to limit the growers’ right to declaratory relief, they have a means of obtaining timely access to the courts. Moreover, as mentioned previously, even if the Legislature has not expressly provided a right to judicial review of Foundation actions, such a right would be implied under these circumstances. See Davis, 326 S.W.2d at 714-715; Board of Ins. Comm’rs, 272 S.W.2d at 97-98.
Obviously, the threat of destruction is a powerful collection tool for the Foundation. Even so, the penalty and collection measures in Subchapter 74D do not violate the growers’ right to procedural due process or open courts. While Subchapter 74D does not expressly provide a procedure for challenging the assessments, the Commissioner has mandated the establishment of such procedures. See 4 Tex. Admin. Code § 196.1(i). The statute does not limit the growers’ existing remedies nor attempt to condition them on the growers’ prepayment of the assessment. Thus, an aggrieved grower may pursue an action for declaratory or injunctive relief and may include a claim to recover erroneous or invalid assessments paid under protest. Indeed, the current lawsuits, in which the growers obtained a judgment in the trial court refunding the assessments and enjoining further collection, demonstrate the availability of meaningful judicial review.
VII.
Accordingly, I would hold that Subchapter 74D represents a constitutionally valid delegation of power and that petitioners’ facial challenge fails. The statute’s “reasonable standards,” see Edgewood, 917 S.W.2d at 740, provide adequate guidance to the Commissioner and Foundation in implementing those aspects of the statute that “cannot be conveniently investigated by the Legislature.” See Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.2d at 689. Moreover, the statute provides adequate safeguards against the Foundation’s abuse of power, most importantly the growers’ right to judicial review and their right to opt in and out of the program. Therefore, because *503I also believe the assessments are valid regulatory fees and that the statute does not violate the growers’ equal protection rights, their procedural due process rights, or their right to open courts, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and uphold the statute as constitutional in all respects.

. The Legislature designated the Foundation a "governmental unit.” Tex. Agric Code § 74.109(f). It also conferred official immunity on the Foundation Board members, see id. § 74.110, exempted the Foundation from taxation, see id. § 74.109(d), afforded indemnification to the Foundation and Board(presumably from the state treasury), id., and specified that the Foundation must exercise its rulemaking authority in compliance with state requirements. Id. § 74.120.

. See Colona, The Privatization of Public Schools—A Statutory and Constitutional Analysis in the Context of the Wilkinsburg Education Association v. Wilkinsburg School District, 100 Dickinson L. Rev. 1027, 1048 (1996) (arguing that delegation of public education to private entities is an unconstitutional delegation); Egle, Comment: The Constitutional Implications of School Choice, 1992 Wis. L.Rev. 459, 505-07 (1992) (questioning whether delegation to parents and students of the power to assess the quality of school performance with state playing minimal role violates nondelegation doctrine).

.See Blakely and Bumphus, Private Correctional Management: A Comparison of Enabling Legislation, 60 Fed. Probation 49 (1996); Dipiano, Private Prisons: Can They Work? Panopticon in the Twenty-first Century, 21 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 171, 172, 196, 199 (1995).

. For example, the Commissioner’s certification of a plan containing provisions for appointed rather than elected board members, see Tex. Agric. Code § 74.103(d)(1) (requiring the Commissioner to certify that the organization's petition for certification comply with the requirements of subchapeter 74D); § 74.106 (requiring that Board members be elected), and the Foundation’s incurrence of debt, apparently without the Commissioner’s approval and before passage of any assessment referenda, see id. § 74.109(h) (requiring that Foundation use revenue solely to finance programs approved by the Commissioner as consistent with Subchapter 74D and the Texas Constitution); § 74.113 (requiring assessment referenda), might constitute violations of the statute.

. Whether Carter Coal is a nondelegation case at all is debatable. In Mistretta, the Supreme Court recognized Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining as the only two statutes it had ever stricken down for improper delegation. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373, 109 S.Ct. at 655. As a federal district court judge, Justice Scalia maintained that Carter Coal rested primarily upon a denial of substantive due process rights. See Synar v. United States, 626 F.Supp. 1374, 1383 n. 8 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986). *500In any event, its precedential value is dubious at best. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123, 61 S.Ct. 451, 462-462, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941).

. With regards to one market, one of the disputed orders in Currin was approved by a referendum in which only 25 percent of the growers cast a vote. Id. at 9, 59 S.Ct. at 384. Over ninety percent of those voting, however, approved the referendum. Id. By contrast, voter turnout in the Board elections and assessment referenda in this case ranged from 35-85%, depending on the zone. In addition, the Court concludes that because the elections are limited to eligible growers, thus is not "popular,” thus supporting its conclusion that the delegation is private. This conclusion ignores the fact that under our form of government, the franchise is ordinarily limited to those subject to the governing body’s jurisdiction. For example, suffrage in elections for city council, commonly understood to be "popular elections,” are limited to city residents. Were this not the case, grave constitutional objections would no doubt arise.

. That the Court then proceeds to "excuse” this "failure” does not excuse the audacity of this assertion.