Court Opinion

ID: 9493035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:56:07.749059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:36.574032
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Although I concur in the outcome reached by the majority, I do so based upon the rule of lenity. I believe the language of the statute “committed on occasions different from one another” is ambiguous in that though it provides for an enhanced punishment, when the punishment is to be applied cannot be determined by the statute’s plain language. Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). In such a case, the well-established judicial doctrine of “the rule of lenity” applies, “resolv[ing] the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.” Black's Law Dictionary 1332-33 (7th ed.1999).
It is a well settled canon of statutory construction that when interpreting statutes, “[t]he language of the statute is the starting point for interpretation, and it should also be the ending point if the plain *322meaning of that language is clear.” United States v. Choice, 201 F.3d 837, 840 (6th Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989)). However, if the language in the statute is not clear, we may resort to the legislative history to ascertain the meaning of the language. See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir.1998). If the statute remains ambiguous after consideration of its plain meaning, structure and legislative history, the rule of lenity is applied in favor of criminal defendants. See United States v. Hill, 55 F.3d 1197, 1206 (6th Cir.1995).
In United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971) the Supreme Court enunciated the policies behind the time honored axiom of lenity:
This principle [rule of lenity] is founded on two policies that have long been part of our tradition. First, “a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.” Second, because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. This policy embodies “the instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should.”
Id. at 348, 92 S.Ct. 515. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the “policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal statute so as to increase the penalty it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980) (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178, 79 S.Ct. 209, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958)). See United States v. Weekley, 24 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.1994) (affirming the district court’s application of the rule of lenity in interpreting the ACCA); United States v. Blake, 59 F.3d 138, 140 (10th Cir.1995) (stating that rule of lenity may be applied in interpreting Sentencing Guidelines).
In my view, neither the plain language of the statute nor the legislative history is instructive in interpreting the pertinent ambiguous language. In fact, when the language “committed on occasions different from another” was added to § 924(e), both the House and the Senate refrained from submitting a Report with the amendment. See 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5937. Moreover, the case law fails to provide the requisite guidance to resolve the case and permit us to determine the outcome. In attempting to remove the ambiguity, case law interpreting the language “committed on occasions different from one another” has led to inconsistent outcomes in our Court as well as other Circuits. Compare United States v. Brady, 988 F.2d 664, 666, 669 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that two robberies committed at different times and places and against different victims although committed within less than one hour of each other were crimes committed on occasions different from one another) with United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199, 1208 (6th Cir.1997) (holding two convictions for armed robberies of two residences in a duplex were not crimes committed on occasions different from one another); United States v. Graves, 60 F.3d 1183, 1186-87 (6th Cir.1995) (holding the defendant’s burglary of a home and his assault on a police officer in the woods just outside of the home were not crimes committed on occasions different from one another even though the assault upon the officer was at the same location and within moments of the burglary) with United States v. Schieman, 894 F.2d 909, 910-13 (7th Cir.1990) (finding that a defendant who committed a burglary and several minutes later assaulted an officer pursuing him down the street committed crimes on occasions dif*323ferent from one another). Compare United States v. McElyea, 158 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir.1998) (finding two burglary convictions that took place in adjoining stores within a short period of time were not committed on occasions different from one another) with United States v. Washington, 898 F.2d 439, 440-42 (5th Cir.1990) (finding that defendant who robbed same clerk at all-night convenience store twice within a few hours committed crimes on occasions different from one another).
There is no precise test that courts may use in determining whether crimes have been “committed on occasions different from one another.” See United States v. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d 1015, 1021 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that “crimes [] committed sequentially, against different victims, at different times and different locations” were on occasions different from one another); United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095, 1099 (10th Cir.1990) (“The defendant had committed crimes on different occasions because [ajfter the defendant ‘successfully completed’ burglarizing one business, he was free to leave. The fact that he chose, instead to burglarize another business is evidence of his intent to engage in a separate criminal episode.”); see also United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 681 (3d Cir.1989) (en banc) (where plurality concluded that a defendant must have been convicted twice before he committed his third predicate offense in order to be eligible for the enhancement under the ACCA).
Although the issue was not raised by the parties, were it not for the rule of lenity, it is possible that this thoroughly ambiguous statute could be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it is void for vagueness. “[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a [criminal] statute [be] define[d] ... with sufficient definiteness [so] that ordinary people can understand.... ” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); see also Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (vague sentencing provisions which are not clear can raise constitutional questions). However, it is unnecessary under the circumstances of this case to express an opinion as to the constitutionality of the statute, and I expressly refrain from doing so. Because we must save a statute from its constitutional infirmity, and any doubt on the issue of statutory construction should thus be resolved in favor of avoiding the void for vagueness question, under the rule that, “where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, [this Court’s] duty is to adopt the latter.” United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408, 29 S.Ct. 527, 53 L.Ed. 836 (1909).
In this case, where the facts do not lend themselves to a determination of whether the crimes were “committed on occasions different from one another,” the rule of lenity should be deemed to control. Indeed, although there were two different victims who were each raped multiple times in one another’s presence during a continuous episode, the record does not remotely provide us with a clear and definitive answer to the question of whether the acts were “committed on occasions different from one another.” Therefore, because we are confronted with an ambiguous criminal statute and a choice must be made between sentencing Defendant to the harsher mandatory minimum under the ACCA and the more lenient punishment under the sentencing guidelines, the rule of lenity dictates that Defendant be sentenced to the less harsh punishment under the sentencing guidelines.