Court Opinion

ID: 9929207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 21:11:20.754722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:05:41.813727
License: Public Domain

02/01/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                                October 10, 2023 Session

            STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JORDAN ISAIAH MOSBY

               Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
            Nos. 41300372, 63CC1-2013-CR-374 Robert Bateman, Judge
                      ___________________________________

                            No. M2022-01070-CCA-R3-CD
                        ___________________________________

In 2013, the Defendant, Jordan Isaiah Mosby, pleaded guilty to attempted second degree
murder, and the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence suspended to supervised probation.
In 2019, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant, alleging that the Defendant
had absconded. After a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant had violated his
probation by absconding to Florida. The trial court ordered him to serve his ten-year
sentence in confinement. The Defendant then filed a Rule 35 motion seeking to modify
the revocation order. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion. On
appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence
in confinement, by not granting him credit for time he successfully served on probation,
and by ruling that the Defendant’s custody in the Tennessee Department of Correction
prevented the court from modifying the sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.
CAMPBELL, SR., and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Brennan M. Wingerter (on appeal), Appellate Division Assistant Public Defender,
Franklin, Tennessee, and Shelby S. Silvey (at hearings), Montgomery County Assistant
Public Defender, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jordan Isaiah Mosby.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Assistant Attorney
General; Robert J. Nash, District Attorney General; and Crystal M. Morgan, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                         OPINION
        This case arises from the Defendant’s absconding from a ten-year probation
sentence imposed in 2013. On June 27, 2019, the trial court issued a probation warrant for
the Defendant’s arrest. Eventually, law enforcement located the Defendant in Florida, and
he was extradited back to Tennessee for the probation violation hearing. The trial court
found that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation sentence and ordered the
Defendant to serve his original sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction
(“TDOC”). The Defendant filed a notice of appeal and then a Rule 35 motion asking the
trial court to consider crediting his successful time served on probation toward his ten-year
sentence and the Defendant also requested that he be allowed to start an in-patient
rehabilitation program. The trial court denied the motion, and the Defendant appealed the
denial of the motion. The Defendant’s two appeals were consolidated for our review.

                                         I. Facts
                                  A. Revocation Hearing

        At the hearing, the parties presented the following evidence: Tennessee Department
of Correction Probation and Parole Officer (“PO”) Diva Wilkins testified that the basis of
the Defendant’s violation was Rule 5 for absconding, Rule 6 for not following lawful
instructions, and Rule 9 for failure to pay restitution and court fees. The warrant issued for
this violation reflected that the Defendant began serving his ten-year probation sentence on
October 10, 2013, with the sentence expiring on June 1, 2023.

       PO Wilkins testified that the last “successful” home visit was October 9, 2018. On
April 26, 2019, the Defendant field-tested positive for marijuana, for which the Defendant
was sanctioned to meet with a social worker; however, the Defendant did not meet with
the social worker on May 17, 2019, as required. As of the date of the warrant, June 27,
2019, the Probation and Parole Office did not know the Defendant’s location. Office notes
indicated that the Defendant was arrested on June 2, 2020, in Pinellas County, Florida, for
battery of a law enforcement officer.

        On cross-examination, PO Wilkins agreed that the Defendant successfully reported
for five years of his probation sentence from 2013 to 2018.

       Following this testimony, the State asked that the Defendant serve the balance of
his sentence in TDOC. The Defendant requested reinstatement to his probation sentence
because this was his “first technical violation.”

       The trial court made the following oral findings:

       On . . . October 28 of 2013 a judgment was entered upon the -- filed by the
       clerk, signed by Judge Gasaway [sic] on October 10th, 2013, that references
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       a hearing on August lst of 2013 in which the [D]efendant pled guilty and was
       sentenced to ten years for attempted second-degree murder and was ordered
       to serve that on supervised probation. On -- filed with the court on November
       21st, 2013 is a probation order that is signed by the [D]efendant on October
       28th, 2013, which provides several rules that the [D]efendant was to abide
       by, one of those is that -- Rule 5 is, “I will inform my probation officer before
       changing my residence or employment and get permission from my
       probation officer before leaving my county, residence, or the state. I will
       report immediately within 72 hours of being released from my sentencing
       hearing to my probation officer and provide the address, at that time, to the
       probation and parole office.”

       [T]he violation of probation warrant was taken out on – was sworn to on June
       27th, 2019, and signed by Judge Goodman on July 28, I believe, 2019,
       alleging that -- alleging “the offender has absconded from probation.” That’s
       the words in the warrant. It says, “The violation of Rule 5” and it has, “The
       offender has absconded from probation. Efforts to verify residency, contact
       between the offender, have been unsuccessful.” The Court takes judicial
       notice of the fact that the [D]efendant was located in the state of Florida and
       efforts were made to extradite him from the state of Florida. Or, at least, he
       was transported back by the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office from the
       state of Florida. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
       [D]efendant is in violation of the terms of his probation. The Court finds that
       he was obviously in the state of Florida. There has been no proof as to why
       he was in the state of Florida. No proof that he -- as to why he failed to
       report, did not report, and was outside of the state and not reporting, at least
       until May 14th of 2022 when he was taken into custody. Considering all
       these factors, and considering the appropriate resolutions and sentences in
       other cases, the Court finds that the [D]efendant did abscond, went to the
       state of Florida, no proof as to why he was there, no proof as to what he was
       doing while he was there, and has failed to report since the date the warrant
       was taken out until he was taken back into custody, therefore, the Court finds
       that the appropriate resolution is that the probation be terminated and be
       ordered to serve his sentence in TDOC.

       After the trial court ruled, based upon the transcript, it appears that another attorney
interjected and noted a statutory change allowing the trial court to consider giving the
Defendant credit for time satisfactorily served on probation. This attorney asserted that the
law had changed with respect to sentences that are revoked. He recited a portion of
Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-311, “upon the court having determined the
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defendant has absconded or committed a new felony, the court may cause the [d]efendant
commence the execution of the judgment originally entered and may be reduced by the
amount of time the defendant has successfully served on probation prior to revocation.”
The trial court acknowledged the change to the statute, but noted that the new law provided
that “the Court may upon application.” (emphasis added). The attorney agreed saying,
“That may be something that the trial defense counsel will want to look at. It’s new to us
and may have caught us by surprise.”

                                    B. Rule 35 Motion

       On October 28, 2022, the Defendant filed a Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 35 motion to reduce his sentence. The motion requested that the trial court modify
the probation revocation order to give credit for time the Defendant was on probation
before the warrant was filed, pursuant to the amended statute, Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-35-311. The motion also requested that the Defendant be allowed to attend in-
patient rehabilitation. The trial court held a hearing on November 22, 2022. The trial court
entered an excerpt from the revocation hearing that included testimony that the Defendant
was in good standing with probation from October 10, 2013, until June 27, 2019, five years,
eight months, and eighteen days as calculated by the Defendant’s attorney. The Defendant
also submitted a printout from “TOMIS Offender Sentence Letter,” dated October 8, 2022,
indicating the Defendant’s “street time” of 3139 days.

        The Defendant testified that he had been accepted for in-patient treatment at the
Safe Harbor rehabilitation center in Erin, Tennessee. The in-patient treatment would last
for six months to one year. The Defendant stated that he believed the treatment would help
him with his “problem with marijuana.” He confirmed that he had been working with a
social worker at the Northwest Correctional Facility to arrange the treatment and that he
had “friends in the area” that would be willing to drive him to the treatment center.

       On cross-examination, the Defendant testified that he left Tennessee to go to
Georgia because he and his child’s mother were no longer in a relationship. He stated that
he notified his probation officer and was seeking a transfer of his probation to Georgia. He
said he was “almost homeless” as a reason for his move to Georgia. The Defendant
explained that, after going to Georgia, he went to Florida to see his daughter in “Tampa,
St. Pete.”

        The Defendant testified that he was arrested in Florida during a protest. He claimed
that a police dog “assaulted” him, resulting in two charges of battery on a law enforcement
officer. The Defendant denied trying to enter a gas station to cause a riot and throwing
items at the windows of the gas station. The Defendant “fought” the charges for two years

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but then, ultimately, pleaded guilty and was released for time served. Upon his release, he
was extradited to Tennessee.

       The Defendant testified that he did not call and report to his probation officer while
in Florida because he “didn’t have a way to contact her until, well, around that time.”

       On redirect, the Defendant clarified that he was only seeking application of the time
he served on probation before his violation.

        Following the proof, the Defendant’s attorney argued that the new statute allowed a
trial court to award time for the completion of probation prior to the violation. As such,
the attorney requested that the trial court consider giving the Defendant credit from October
10, 2013 until June 27, 2019, the date the probation violation was filed.

       After hearing the evidence, the trial court made the following findings:

       [P]ending before the Court is a pro se motion for rehabilitation -- to be
       allowed to go to a rehabilitation facility and also initially a pro se motion
       now joined by counsel to modify the revocation order to give the [D]efendant
       credit for the time that he successfully served on probation.

              The Court reviews the new statute, 40-35-311, the amendment to it
       under sub part (D)(2),[sic] to base the decision on whether to grant the
       [D]efendant any time for successfully completing or serving on probation to
       be – doesn’t outline it, but the Court views that to be in the Court’s discretion.

               The Court recalls the hearing entailed in July, and the testimony at
       that time from Miss Wilkins from the Department of Probation was that the
       last successful visit by the [D]efendant was on October 9th of 2018.

               A warrant was taken out July 2019 alleging absconding. The proof
       before the court is that the [D]efendant left the state of Tennessee, went to
       the state of Georgia, went to the state of Florida, and from 2000 -- October
       9th, 2018, failed to report his whereabouts or failed to report to probation.
       The Court considers that in its discretion as reason not to grant your motion.

               The Court does not consider -- the Court believes it could consider,
       but is not considering, the subsequent arrest and convictions in the state of
       Florida in making its decision. The Court does believe that that would also
       justify this reasoning that the Court specifically is ruling that the fact that the
       [D]efendant failed to report after October 9th, 2018, admitted he moved to
                                               5
       the state of Georgia and then admitted he moved to the state of Florida, never
       reported, was an absconder in the Court’s discretion, respectfully denies your
       motion as to credit for time served on probation.

              The court does not believe that it can order a rehabilitation program
       under the present circumstances that he is in the custody of TDOC, so that
       portion of the motion is denied as well.

It is from this judgment that the Defendant appeals.

                                         II. Analysis

        On appeal, the Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s finding that he violated
the terms of his probation sentence by absconding from supervision. He challenges the
trial court’s ruling, however, as to the consequence of his violation. The Defendant asserts
that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to award the Defendant “street time”
credit and by failing to allow the Defendant to attend a rehabilitation program. The State
responds that the trial court properly denied “street credit” and also properly denied a
“furlough” for rehabilitation.

        Appellate courts review a trial court’s revocation of probation decision for an abuse
of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness “so long as the trial court places
sufficient findings and the reasons for its decisions as to the revocation and the
consequences on the record.” State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2022). “A
trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical
conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies
reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d
436, 443 (Tenn. 2010). If a trial court fails to state its findings and reasoning for the
revocation on the record, appellate courts may conduct a de novo review if the record is
sufficiently developed, or the appellate court may remand the case for the trial court to
make such findings. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759 (citing State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316,
324 (Tenn. 2014)).

        Probation revocation is a two-step consideration requiring trial courts to make two
distinct determinations as to (1) whether to revoke probation and (2) what consequences
will apply upon revocation. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 757. No additional hearing is required
for trial courts to determine the proper consequences for a revocation. Id. In probation
revocation hearings, trial courts are required to place “sufficient findings and the reasons
for its decisions as to the revocation and the consequences on the record.” Dagnan, 641
S.W.3d at 759. We note that the trial court’s findings do not need to be “particularly
lengthy or detailed but only sufficient for the appellate court to conduct a meaningful
                                               6
review of the revocation decision.” Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d. at 759 (citing State v. Bise, 380
S.W.3d 682, 705-06 (Tenn. 2012)). Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial
court made sufficient findings and reasons for its decisions as to the revocation and the
consequences on the record.

        “The trial judge may enter judgment upon the question of the charges as the trial
judge may deem right and proper under the evidence adduced before the trial judge.”
T.C.A. § 40-35-311(d)(1). “If the trial judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant has violated the conditions of probation and suspension of sentence, then the
court may revoke the defendant’s probation and suspension of sentence, in full or in part,
pursuant to § 40-35-310.” Id. Notwithstanding subdivision (d)(1), the probation statute
provides for two categories of probation violations, technical and non-technical, with
differing penalties for both. State v. Walden, No. M2022-00255-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL
17730431, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 2022).

       The following are classified as non-technical violations: a defendant’s commission
of a new felony or a new Class A misdemeanor, a zero tolerance violation as defined by
the department of correction community supervision matrix, absconding, or contacting the
defendant’s victim in violation of a condition of probation. T.C.A. § 40-35-311(e)(2).
Once a trial court determines that a defendant has committed a non-technical violation of
probation, the trial court may: (1) order confinement for some period of time; (2) cause
execution of the sentence as it was originally entered; (3) extend the defendant’s
probationary period not exceeding one year; (4) return the defendant to probation on
appropriate modified conditions; or (5) resentence the defendant for the remainder of the
unexpired term to a sentence of probation. See id. §§ 40-35-308(c); -310; -311(e)(2).

        The trial court found that a condition of probation required that the Defendant notify
his probation officer “before changing [his] residence or employment and get permission
from [his] probation officer before leaving [his] county, residence, or the state.” The
Defendant’s last home visit was on October 9, 2018. A warrant was issued June 27, 2019,
because the Board of Probation and Parole did not know the Defendant’s location. The
trial court found that the Defendant left the State of Tennessee and went to Georgia and
then went to Florida where he was arrested and incarcerated for two years. The only
explanation for the Defendant’s departure from Tennessee to Georgia was that he was
“almost homeless.” As to the subsequent trip/move to Florida, the Defendant testified that
he went to Florida to see his daughter. During this time, the Defendant did not notify or
contact his probation officer about his location. The Defendant was extradited from Florida
to Tennessee on May 14, 2022. The trial court found that the Defendant’s leaving the State
of Tennessee from 2019 to 2022 constituted absconding, a violation of the Defendant’s
probation.

                                              7
        Next, at the probation hearing, the trial court considered the appropriate
consequence and found that the Defendant’s leaving the state without notice to the PO
during his probation sentence and failing to report since June 27, 2019, were significant
violations. The Defendant absconded for almost three years. The trial court noted that the
Defendant’s first contact with the State after he absconded was when the Defendant was
taken into custody to be extradited to Tennessee. Given these circumstances, the trial court
found “the appropriate resolution” was to order the Defendant to serve his original sentence
in TDOC. The facts the trial court considered in this case indicate that measures less
restrictive than confinement were unsuccessful for the Defendant, and the Defendant’s
absconding reflects poorly on the Defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. See T.C.A. §
40-35-103(1)(C) & (5).

        Due to the non-technical nature of the violation, the trial court was statutorily
authorized to order the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration.
See T.C.A. § 40-35-311(e)(2). Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion when
it ruled that the Defendant was no longer a good candidate for probation and should serve
his sentence in the TDOC.

        Following the revocation hearing, the Defendant filed a Rule 35 motion. The
Defendant’s motion requested that he be allowed to seek treatment in a rehabilitation
facility. An amended motion requested that “the court [ ] reduce his sentence by granting
[the Defendant credit] for successful completion of probation for the period of October
10th 2013 until June 27, 2019 for a total of 5 years 8 months and 18 days (2,087 days).”
At the hearing, the trial court declined to award “street time” and stated that, because the
Defendant was in TDOC, the trial court did not have the authority to order a “furlough” for
the Defendant to attend a six to twelve-month in-patient rehabilitation program.

       Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, as follows:

       (a) Timing of Motion. The trial court may reduce a sentence upon motion
       filed within 120 days after the date the sentence is imposed or probation is
       revoked. No extensions shall be allowed on the time limitation. No other
       actions toll the running of this time limitation.

       (b) Limits of Sentence Modification. The court may reduce a sentence only
       to one the court could have originally imposed.

       (c) Hearing Unnecessary. The trial court may deny a motion for reduction
       of sentence under this rule without a hearing.

                                             8
       (d) Appeal. The defendant may appeal the denial of a motion for reduction
       of sentence but shall not be entitled to release on bond unless already under
       bond. If the court modifies the sentence, the state may appeal as otherwise
       provided by law.

        According to the Advisory Commission Comments to Rule 35, “[t]he intent of this
rule is to allow modification only in circumstances where an alteration of the sentence may
be proper in the interests of justice.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35, Advisory Comm’n Cmts. This
court reviews a trial court’s denial of a Rule 35 motion under an abuse of discretion
standard. State v. Ruiz, 204 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tenn. 2006); State v. Edenfield, 299 S.W.3d
344, 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009); State v. Hall, No. M2018-00096-CCA-R3-CD, 2019
WL 451368, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2019), no perm. app. filed. “[A]n appellate
court should find that a trial court has abused its discretion only when the trial court has
applied an incorrect legal standard, or has reached a decision which is illogical or
unreasonable and causes an injustice to the party complaining.” Ruiz, 204 S.W.3d at 778
(citing Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 337 (Tenn. 2006)).

       The issue of the change, effective July 1, 2021, to Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-35-311(e)(2), with respect to allowing trial courts to reduce a sentence by the
time successfully served on probation was not raised by the Defendant during the probation
revocation hearing. After the trial court had ruled, an attorney in the court room interjected
and pointed out the change in the statute allowing the trial court to consider crediting to his
sentence the time the Defendant successfully completed on probation. Thereafter, the
Defendant filed a Rule 35 motion, asking the trial court to consider crediting successful
probation time that it had not considered during the revocation hearing.

        After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the Defendant credit for time successfully served on probation. The
statute allows for trial court discretion in whether to credit to a defendant’s sentence the
time successfully served on probation. The trial court found that the Defendant’s act of
absconding after being given an opportunity for an alternative sentence and the seriousness
of an almost three-year flight did not warrant another probation sentence. Furthermore, the
Defendant’s conduct clearly demonstrated his inability to comply with the conditions
required for release into the community. He left Tennessee, went to Georgia, and then
went to Florida for three years with no communication with his probation officer.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
Defendant credit for the time the Defendant successfully served on probation prior to his
absconding. The Defendant is not entitled to relief.

       The Defendant contends that the trial court erred “as a matter of law when it ruled
that [the Defendant]’s location in TDOC custody prevented it from modifying [the
                                              9
Defendant’s] sentence and reinstating him to probation with the condition that he enter a
long-term rehabilitation program.” The Defendant argues that Rule 35 gave the trial court
authority to modify the sentence and, therefore, the trial court should have modified the
TDOC sentence to probation with the requirement that the Defendant “enter a long-term
rehabilitation program.”

        At the revocation hearing, the Defendant requested reinstatement to probation. The
trial court declined to grant the Defendant a second term of probation based upon the
seriousness of his violation and ordered the Defendant to serve his full sentence in the
TDOC. At the Rule 35 hearing, the Defendant testified that he had been accepted to a six
to twelve-month in-patient rehabilitation program. On appeal, the Defendant now contends
that he wanted to be reinstated to probation so that he could enter the rehabilitation
program. However, the record does not indicate that a request for reinstatement to
probation was ever made at the Rule 35 hearing. Moreover, at the Rule 35 hearing, the
State referred to the Defendant’s request as a “furlough,” and the Defendant lodged no
objection to the reference to the request as a “furlough.” The State’s reference to the
Defendant’s request for inpatient treatment as a “furlough” provided the opportunity for
the Defendant to clarify his intent that his probation sentence be reinstated, but no mention
of reinstatement of probation was made at the hearing.

       We agree with the Defendant that the trial court had the authority at the Rule 35
hearing to modify his sentence by reinstating probation. In our view, however, it is
incumbent on the Defendant to request the relief they seek. The trial court considered
probation at the Defendant’s request during the probation revocation hearing and found the
Defendant an unsuitable candidate for reinstatement to probation.

        Although the trial court had authority to modify the Defendant’s sentence from
TDOC to probation, with a condition that the Defendant attend the in-patient rehabilitation
program, the request before the trial court was to allow the Defendant to attend a six to
twelve-month in-patient rehabilitation program during service of his TDOC sentence. In
our view, the trial court did not overlook its authority to modify a sentence under Rule 35.
It ruled upon the request to attend a rehabilitation program during incarceration in TDOC,
and correctly ruled that it did not have authority to grant that request. See T.C.A. § 40-35-
316(a) (authorizing sentencing courts to grant furloughs when a defendant has been
sentenced to a local jail or workhouse); T.C.A. § 41-21-227(a) (authorizing TDOC to grant
furloughs to defendants in its custody); State v. Smith, 909 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1995) (holding that the statutes do not confer upon a sentencing court the authority
to control “how an executive agency charged with the custody and housing of prisoners
treats a defendant who has received a sentence of confinement”).

                                             10
       Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
the Defendant’s request to attend a six to twelve-month in-patient rehabilitation program
while serving his ten-year sentence in TDOC.

                                      III. Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                              ____________________________________
                                                   ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

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