Court Opinion

ID: 9715357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:01:06.437349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:33.837739
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: I dissent because the opinion in this case permits the party primarily responsible for plaintiffs’ injuries, the manufacturer who created the defective product, to effect a settlement and thereby place the major portion of the financial burden on one who must be considered only secondarily liable. Our contribution act should not be applied to bring about such an inequitable result. I voted for the majority opinions in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 1, Stevens v. Silver Manufacturing Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 41, and Robinson v. International Harvester Co. (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 47, which established the principle of contribution among tortfeasors in this State, because I believed that the holdings in those cases made it possible to place the responsibility on the parties who actually caused the damage. However, the holding in this case permits the party who is primarily responsible for plaintiffs’ injuries to manipulate the Contribution Act (which supposedly codifies the holding in Skinner) so that the major burden is shifted to one who is not primarily responsible. Everything that I stated in my dissent in Stewart v. Village of Summit (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 23, 31 (Ryan, J., dissenting) about the inequitable results arising from the application of the Contribution Act applies equally to this case. The opinion notes that the jury found that Munster-man was negligent, and held that it would be unfair to permit Munsterman, through an action for implied indemnity, to shift the entire loss to another. I would agree with this conclusion if Munsterman’s negligence were something other than the failure to discover the defect in the product. If Munsterman had been negligent in the manner in which it attached the trailer hitch, or if it had performed some act of negligence independent from the defective product, I would agree that prior holdings of this court and the Contribution Act would bar Munster-man’s right to recover from others. Here, however, Munsterman simply failed to discover a defect in the trailer hitch, which was manufactured and placed in the stream of commerce by another. In Coney v. J. L. G. Industries, Inc. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 104, 119, this court held that a consumer’s failure to discover or guard against a defect in a product cannot be compared in the apportionment of damages. Why then should the failure to discover a defect in the product by one in the chain of distribution insulate the creator of the defective product from an implied indemnity action? There is no logical reason why this court, in an attempt to follow the holding in Allison v. Shell Oil Co. (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 26, should create this inequitable result. The rationale for permitting upstream indemnification in products liability cases was that the ultimate responsibility should be placed on the person placing the defective product in the stream of commerce and on the one who profited from its sale. Upstream indemnification is not a joint tortfeasor concept and indemnity should not therefore be precluded by the application of the Contribution Act. The parties should not be permitted to circumvent the right of indemnity by playing games and placing the liability of one in the chain of distribution (Munsterman) in terms of “negligent failure to discover the defect,” instead of in terms of strict liability. Such tactics harken back to the pre-1963 era, when courts were casting around for different theories to support liability for injuries caused by defective products. Finally, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963), 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, Justice Traynor cut through the tortured reasoning and said that we should call this cause of action what it really is, a new tort based on strict liability. See W. Prosser, Torts §98, at 656-58 (4th ed. 1971). Plaintiff’s cause of action in this case is based on injuries caused by a defective product. Munsterman’s alleged negligence is that it failed to discover this defect. Whether Munsterman’s liability is phrased in terms of negligence or strict liability, it, nonetheless, stems from the defective product. This is a products liability case, whether it is based on the concept of negligence or strict liability. It is, in truth, not a case where Munsterman was jointly liable in tort with the manufacturer of the product, and the Contribution Act should not be applied. Munsterman’s right of “upstream” indemnity should be preserved.