Court Opinion

ID: 9520824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:50:58.352967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:58.568324
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CERDA, dissenting. The circuit court did not find respondent subject to involuntary commitment on the alleged basis, but on the unalleged basis that she was mentally ill and unable to provide for her basic physical needs so as to guard herself from serious harm. Although that finding by the circuit court was not based upon the pleadings, the absence of such pleadings may be waived by an opposing party’s conduct at trial. Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. County of Cook, 71 Ill. 2d 510, 518, 365 N.E.2d 913 (1978); Hemingway v. Skinner Engineering Co., 117 Ill. App. 2d 452, 463, 254 N.E.2d 133 (1969); Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 112 Ill. App. 2d 68, 75, 250 N.E.2d 791 (1969); McKinney v. Nathan, 1 Ill. App. 2d 536, 543, 117 N.E.2d 886 (1954); Continental Concrete Pipe Corp. v. Century Road Builders, Inc., 195 Ill. App. 3d 1, 14, 552 N.E.2d 1032 (1990). I believe that respondent waived the failure to specifically plead that she was mentally ill and unable to provide for her basic physical needs so as to guard herself from serious harm by her conduct at the commitment hearing. At that hearing, respondent not only proceeded without objection, but also maintained throughout that her inability to provide for her basic physical needs so as to guard herself from serious harm was not proved by clear and convincing evidence. Under such circumstances, respondent should not now be heard to complain as she does. Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank, 71 Ill. 2d at 518; McKinney, 1 Ill. App. 2d at 543-45; see In re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 607 N.E.2d 134 (1992). I also believe that unless the respondent is committed and receives treatment, she is reasonably expected to inflict serious harm upon herself in the future, based upon the record. There is no question that respondent is mentally ill and in need of treatment. Respondent contends that her inability to provide for her basic physical needs so as to guard herself from serious harm was not proved by clear and convincing evidence.1  As stated by this court in In re Ingersoll, 188 Ill. App. 3d 364, 544 N.E.2d 409 (1989): "An individual is subject to involuntary admission if the State establishes by clear and convincing evidence that a person is mentally ill and, because of that illness, she is unable to provide for her basic needs so as to guard herself from serious harm. [Citation.] This illness must prevent her from caring for her basic physical needs by substantially impairing her thought process, perception of reality, emotional stability, judgment, behavior, or ability to cope with life’s ordinary demands.” In re Ingersoll, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 368. Moreover, in determining whether an individual is unable to provide for her basic physical needs, a circuit court should consider certain factors, including whether that individual has the ability to secure food, shelter and necessary medical attention; whether that individual has a place to live or a family to assist her; whether that individual is able to function in society; and whether that individual has an understanding of money or a concern for it as a means of sustenance. In re Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 968, 667 N.E.2d 720 (1996); In re Tuman, 268 Ill. App. 3d 106, 112, 644 N.E.2d 56 (1994); In re Winters, 255 Ill. App. 3d 605, 609, 627 N.E.2d 410 (1994); In re Long, 237 Ill. App. 3d 105, 110, 606 N.E.2d 1259 (1992). However, a circuit court need not wait until the inability of an individual to provide for her basic physical needs manifests itself in actual harm before ordering involuntary commitment. In re Carmody, 274 Ill. App. 3d 46, 50, 653 N.E.2d 977 (1995); In re Knapp, 231 Ill. App. 3d 917, 920, 596 N.E.2d 1171 (1992); In re Ingersoll, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 369. A circuit court’s decision to involuntarily commit an individual is accorded great deference and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that decision is shown to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Long, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 109-10. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the record on appeal clearly establishes that a contrary decision was the proper result. In re Knapp, 231 Ill. App. 3d at 919. Here, Philippe testified that respondent’s mental illness prevents her from using good judgment in protecting herself, as evidenced by her extended time outside barefoot and without a coat during the wintertime. The evidence also indicated that, while capable of securing a place to live temporarily, respondent does not have an adequate understanding of money, for she does not budget and consequently is unable to provide for her other basic physical needs. Nor does the evidence indicate that respondent has a family capable of providing assistance. See People v. Sharkey, 60 Ill. App. 3d 257, 265, 376 N.E.2d 464 (1978). It was further shown that respondent does not function well in society, prone as she is to mood swings, trespassing and public outbursts. Under these circumstances, I cannot say that the circuit court’s decision to involuntarily commit respondent was against the manifest weight of the evidence and therefore would not disturb that decision. LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE Respondent lastly contends that involuntary commitment was not proved by clear and convincing evidence to be the least restrictive alternative for treatment of her mental illness. According to respondent, there was no evidence concerning the appropriateness of other less restrictive alternatives, such as an intermediate care facility or out-patient treatment. Pursuant to section 3 — 811 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code: "If any person is found subject to involuntary admission, the court shall consider alternative mental health facilities which are appropriate *** to the respondent, including but not limited to hospitalization. *** The court shall order the least restrictive alternative for treatment which is appropriate.” 405 ILCS 5/3— 811 (West 1996). Here, Philippe testified that a less restrictive alternative to hospitalization would be inappropriate because, in her opinion, respondent cannot "take care of herself outside.” Philippe also stated that respondent would benefit from further hospitalization and that she "needs in-patient treatment.” I believe that testimony was sufficient to justify the hospitalization of respondent. Moreover, I find respondent’s insinuation that her parents may be able to care for her is particularly unpersuasive in light of the fact that her father prepared and signed the petition seeking her commitment. Sharkey, 60 Ill. App. 3d at 265. CONCLUSION For the aforementioned reasons, I would affirm the order of the circuit court.  Respondent also contends that she was not proved by clear and convincing evidence to be an individual reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon herself or another in the near future. However, I need not reach this issue, for I have already found that respondent was not tried or involuntarily committed on that basis.