Court Opinion

ID: 9737054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:14:13.986972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:13.751204
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES APPLY TO “GUILTY” AND “INNOCENT”
A careful review of the briefs and record in this case supports this conclusion: That these Appellants did not receive a fair trial as guaranteed to them by the Fourth (freedom from unreasonable search and seizure), Sixth (fair trial and effective counsel), and Fourteenth (due process) Amendments to the United States Constitution and the equivalent provisions of our state constitution. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
It is worthy for us, in our deliberations of this case, to reflect thoughtfully on these words and put them into practice:
The procedural safeguards mandated in the Framers’ Constitution are not admonitions to be tolerated only to the extent they serve functional purposes that ensure that the “guilty” are punished and the “innocent” freed; rather, every guarantee enshrined in the Constitution, our basic charter and the guarantor of our most precious liberties, is by it endowed with an independent vitality and value, and this Court is not free to curtail those constitutional guarantees even to punish the most obviously guilty.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 524, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3066, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1105 (1976) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The substance of the above quotation has since been adopted by the United States Supreme Court: “The constitutional rights of criminal defendants are granted to the innocent and the guilty alike.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586, 91 L.Ed.2d 305, 322 (1986).
APPELLANTS SEIZED WITHOUT PROCESS; THEIR CHILDREN NABBED
In this case, the Appellants were seized from their car and Clayton Iron Necklace was placed in handcuffs. They were transported to Faulkton, thence to Aberdeen.1 There they were held overnight without charges and their children were likewise seized from them and placed in foster care. Foster care means that the State was holding these children so that the mother and father did not have their care and custody.2 The police did not decide to “formally” (as Deputy Albright put it) arrest the defendants until the following day, after further investigation. The initial detention was without probable cause, and the State’s physical evidence, consisting of jewelry in Washington, pawn shop tickets, and post office stubs, should have been suppressed as “fruits of the poisonous tree” under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, *83484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 453 (1963), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that “[t]he exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such [Fourth Amendment] invasions.” The timing of the “formal” arrest, after probable cause was established, does not save the State’s case, as an investigatory seizure, made without probable cause, that is the functional equivalent of an arrest, can taint evidence subsequently obtained by the police. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). Dunaway, building on Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969) (Fourth Amendment protection extends to investigatory seizures), and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (“arrests” for investigatory purposes on less than probable cause violate Fourth Amendment) provided that “detention for custodial interrogation — regardless of its label — intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.” Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216, 99 S.Ct. at 2258, 60 L.Ed.2d at 838. Given the scale of the police intrusion on the Appellants’ freedom in this case, the requirement of probable cause must be satisfied from Appellants’ seizure, not the moment of formal arrest. Examination of the facts dispels the notion that probable cause existed on September 11, 1986.
FACTS DO NOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE
Turning to the facts which the police had available at the time of their seizure of Appellants, the record in this case does not indicate what information the deputies had when they stopped and seized the Appellants. This alone might be enough to reject the trial court’s finding that probable cause existed, for the reasonableness of a search and seizure, under the Fourth Amendment, is to be judged against the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Even if we proceed on the assumption that they received and relied upon all the information possessed by Deputy Albright in Aberdeen, a finding of probable cause still must fail because Albright’s information was insufficient to link the defendants to the theft of rings in Redfield. While police officers may act on the basis of police radio bulletins or information from other officers, once the defendant challenges the police action, the State must demonstrate that the sender or sending agency possessed the requisite knowledge to justify the police action. See People v. Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369, 374-75, 465 N.Y.S. 2d 857, 860, 452 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (1983). See also Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 1037, 28 L.Ed.2d 306, 313 (1971). Albright, we are told by the majority, noticed “striking similarity between the general descriptions” of suspects in the Redfield theft and the Gettysburg bulletin, yet his testimony at the suppression hearing indicates that little physical information was provided by the Gettysburg authorities. How “striking” can a “general” description be?
Albright knew that a vaguely described white woman and an Indian male, accompanied by two young children, may have been involved in a theft of Black Hills Gold rings in Redfield, and that Dorothy Iron Necklace was in an orange Capri near Gettysburg on that day with a vaguely described Indian male and two young children. Clayton Iron Necklace, who was not mentioned by the Gettysburg police as even being in the Capri (they identified the Indian as a Robert Smith), provided the essential bridge in Albright's decision by having been reported as pawning unspecified jewelry at an unspecified time in Mobridge.3 (Neither pawning jewelry nor presence in Mobridge is illegal.) With the information Albright had from the police in Redfield, virtually any white woman with an Indian male and children could have been involved in the theft. The majority opinion itself refers to the vast land area involved in this *84case. Albright’s decision was based, essentially, on suspicion, but probable cause cannot be based on mere suspicion, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). The police detention was, therefore, illegal, and the evidence attained therefrom was tainted. This taint obviously affects the mail stubs, found in the wastebasket, the identification by the postal worker, and the rings located in Washington, as no attenuation of this evidence’s causal link to the illegality or claim of “independent source” is credible on these facts. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed. 2d 441 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). The other eyewitness identifications were facilitated by the “booking” photos considered later in this writing, which photos themselves were fruits of the illegal detention. The remaining evidence, the pawnshop identification and the rings pawned there, is also tainted by the booking photos and if admitted, might not have produced a conviction. Reversal was warranted on Fourth Amendment grounds alone.
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED BY IMPERMISSIBLE SUGGESTIVE PROCEDURES IN IDENTIFICATION OF BOTH DEFENDANTS
A.
Any identifications by the witnesses at either the post office, Stacey Drug, or the pawn shop resulted from an illegal arrest— due to absence of probable cause — and thus a violation of Fourth Amendment rights took place. State v. Gage, 302 N.W. 2d 793 (S.D.1981). In Gage, this Court held that certain pretrial photographic and lineup identifications were inadmissible evidence because they were products of an arrest without probable cause. Inasmuch as the trial court erred in determining there was probable cause, the trial court compounded its error in not holding these identifications to be a violation of Fourth Amendment rights.
B.
Assuming, arguendo, that there was probable cause, these Appellants’ rights were violated when their identification by the State’s witnesses resulted from suggestive “booking” photographs, thus creating a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Any in-court identifications were tainted by the impermissibly suggestive method and manner of the dual “booking” photos.4
When identification is unnecessarily suggestive, and when there is a substantial likelihood of misidentification, an identification denies a defendant due process. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); State v. Reiman, 284 N.W.2d 860 (S.D.1979). In Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), the United States Supreme Court condemned the practice of showing a single photograph for purposes of identification. The trial court erred in permitting this evidence (identification) to go into evidence in light of the United States Supreme Court’s condemnation of such a procedure.
Here, the State concedes that law enforcement officers only displayed photos to four witnesses depicting the Appellants while in the process of being “booked” at the Brown County Sheriff’s Office. This revelation of a dual photograph depicted Mr. and Mrs. Iron Necklace under arrest. No other photographs were shown to these witnesses. Mr. Iron Necklace is an Indian; Mrs. Iron Necklace is a white woman with quite long hair. This was an obviously illegal identification procedure. Once this conclusion is established, the proof shifts to the State to then prove by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification had an independent origin. If the in-court identification had an independent origin, it is admissible providing the clear and convincing platform of proof is established. *85This rule of proof was established, so far as this Court is concerned, in State v. Sahlie, 90 S.D. 682, 245 N.W.2d 476 (1976). There was no trial court determination of the clear and convincing proof requirement. Therefore, stare decisis demands reversal.
Displaying a single photograph, for purposes of identification, has been consistently held as being unnecessarily suggestive. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); Reiman, 284 N.W.2d 860. A so-called “lineup procedure” never took place; it was a display of “booking photographs.” The State’s attempt to rationalize this procedure into a “totality of the circumstances” test under Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), is preposterous.
Let us consider these facts, supported by the trial record:
(1) Witness Foresman actually testified that Mrs. Iron Necklace was concerned with minding the children when she was in his pawn shop and that it actually could have been some other female who signed the pawn tickets;
(2) The owner, witness Stacey, unqual-ifiedly testified that she could not identify Mrs. Iron Necklace;
(3) Not one witness, at Stacey Drug, actually saw any person take the jewelry;
(4) The witnesses could only collectively recall that a white person and an Indian person were in the shop;
(5) Witness Dosch had absolutely no conversation discourse or conversation with Mrs. Iron Necklace and observed her for only a minute or two;
(6) Witness Newman talked to Mrs. Iron Necklace briefly when asked for animal supplies and when aspirin was brought over;
(7) Witness Newman was asked if she had any other opportunity to observe Mrs. Iron Necklace and she testified that yes, she did, when she saw her at another hearing in court;
(8) Startling fact: Witness Newman is married to the sheriff of Spink County and discussed Mrs. Iron Necklace’s case with him and this is borne out by the transcript record at page 615;
(9) Witness Jessen could only remember a white woman with sandy blond hair and glasses; she testified that she did not speak with Mrs. Iron Necklace and this was all she could really recall about the white woman; and
(10) The police showed a booking photo of an Indian male and a white woman together, permitting the witnesses to make an inductive leap that the two (as depicted in the photograph) were together and in the store (after all, they have numbers on the pictures reflecting that they are regular convicts or prisoners).
Conclusion: These identifications are totally inadequate and do not comply with the factors set forth for reliability of identification. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401, 411 (1972). I am overwhelmed with the fact that these witnesses, after the constitutionally infirm lineup took place (only single booking photographs shown), had an opportunity to see the Iron Necklaces at preliminary hearings, suppression motions, and other hearings held prior to trial. In other words, the prosecution started out with a tainted, wrongful procedure; then, as each hearing was held, could shore up the witnesses in their identification. My point is simple: This impermissibly suggestive photo lineup deprived the Iron Necklaces from their due process rights and the tainted in-court eyewitness identifications did not eliminate the constitutional transgressions.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
In State v. Havens, 264 N.W.2d 918 (S.D.1978), this Court observed:
We must however remind prosecutors that it is the foundation of the criminal justice system to see that the defendant and every defendant gets his day in court and a fair trial. This burden weighs as heavily on prosecutors as it does on judge, jury and defense counsel.
*86Havens, 264 N.W.2d at 923 (footnote omitted). “The prosecutor’s overriding obligation is to see that the defendant receives a fair trial.” State v. Ashker, 412 N.W.2d 97, 104 (S.D.1987) (citing State v. Sahlie, 90 S.D. 682, 688, 245 N.W.2d 476, 479 (1976), and State v. Gage, 302 N.W.2d 793, 797 (S.D.1981)). A prosecutor’s duty is not simply to prosecute, but to obtain justice with a fair trial. State v. Brandenburg, 344 N.W.2d 702, 705 (S.D.1984). Attempts by prosecutors to use disingenuous trial tactics which have the effect of endangering or obviating a defendant’s right to a fair trial are decried by this Court. See State v. Kidd, 286 N.W.2d 120, 121 (S.D.1979).
In this case, the prosecutor was playing strictly to win, sidestepping the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. The prosecutor, despite defendants’ request for discovery on September 26, 1986, provided a list of eight additional witnesses, not listed on the indictments or information (Clayton), on Friday, January 23, 1987, three business days before trial was to begin. On January 26, 1987, the prosecutor refused to provide defendants with the substance of Kristina Jessen’s testimony (Jessen was one of the witnesses on the newly revealed witness list).5 On Tuesday, January 27, 1987, Jessen refused to talk to defense counsel, telling them that the State’s Attorney told her not to talk to them (the prosecutor denied this, telling the trial court that she had told Jessen that it was Jessen’s choice, although she, the prosecutor, did not want Jessen to talk to defense counsel). This record of evasion was sufficient to merit reversal, as Jessen’s testimony placed Dorothy Iron Necklace in close proximity to the stolen rings. Given the wealth of unconstitutionally admitted evidence admitted in this case, tainted by a lack of probable cause (see above) this misconduct was not harmless.
The discovery statutes are there to eliminate trial by ambush. Discovery, to be meaningful, must ordinarily be as far in advance as is possible (within practical time constraints) to permit the accused an opportunity to investigate the evidence which is damning to his innocence, or to discover evidence that is helpful to his cause. ■ The trial courts of this state must breathe a vibrant life into the criminal discovery statutes lest disclosures be so tardy that defense counsel is availed little time to prepare his case.
State v. McKee, 314 N.W.2d 866, 869 (S.D.1982) (Henderson, J., concurring specially). The late disclosure, and subsequent evasions by the prosecutor in this case, deprived the Iron Necklaces of fair trial. Simply put, the prosecutor did everything within her power to prevent her adversary from being fairly prepared.6 Is this justice? In Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988), the United States Supreme Court approved the sanction of precluding a defense witness from testifying when the defendant violated discovery rules. The same should have been done here. Defense counsel made a motion to strike Jessen’s testimony: Denied. Defense counsel moved for mistrial: Denied. Defense counsel made a motion, prior to these motions, that Jessen not be permitted to testify: Denied. After the trial began, the court permitted counsel to talk to Jessen. My opinion: Too late! Unfortunately, at this juncture, it was a faint piccolo, and not a trumpet for timely justice.

. Redfield, Faulkton, and Aberdeen are cities located in the northeastern part of South Dakota; Gettysburg is a more centrally located city in this state.

. These children were taken from the parents without process and without any petition to any juvenile judge. This is rather reminiscent of the actions of the Nazi party in Germany which thrust, ultimately, the world into World War II. See State v. Peterson, 407 N.W.2d 221, 225 n. 1 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., dissenting), where I decried the use of public officials “holding” people without benefit of observing their constitutional rights.

. Mobridge is a city located in north-central South Dakota.

. These booking photos included numbers, like prison photos, under each Appellant. The individual photos of the Appellants were mounted side by side. This procedure intentionally honed in on these two Appellants.

. Another written request for witnesses was submitted to the State's Attorney on December 8, 1986.

. What, pray tell, does a new list of the State’s witnesses mean to a defense lawyer about to go into the courtroom — when he has no idea what they are going to say?