Court Opinion

ID: 9906593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 18:03:00.589331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:14.858751
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/4/23 P. v. Valdivia CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A166930
 v.
 MARC J. VALDIVIA,                                                      (Lake County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. CR-964425)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Marc Valdivia appeals from an order granting probation
after he pleaded no contest to one count of felony vandalism. The trial court
imposed a four-year probation term, to which Valdivia specifically agreed
under the plea agreement. Nonetheless, he now challenges that term,
contending that the maximum probation term for his offense is two years
under Penal Code1 section 1203.1, subdivision (a), and the sentence is
therefore unauthorized. We agree with the Attorney General that the appeal
must be dismissed because Valdivia failed to obtain a certificate of probable
cause.

         1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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                                    I.
                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                               BACKGROUND
      The incident giving rise to the charges against Valdivia occurred on
August 9, 2022.2 Briefly, Valdivia broke the windshield of his wife’s van and
rammed the van with his own vehicle, causing approximately $10,000 in
damage. Later that day, Valdivia threatened to stab his 12-year-old son with
a knife. He then told his wife “that when he returned, he would hurt them
all,” apparently also referring to his 14-year-old son.
      Valdivia was charged with two counts of criminal threats and one count
of vandalism, all felonies, and a misdemeanor count of child endangerment.3
In December 2022, under a plea agreement, he pleaded no contest to the
vandalism count. The remaining charges were dismissed, with a Harvey
waiver as to the child-endangerment count.4 Valdivia specifically agreed to
be placed on probation for four years.
      At the sentencing hearing later that month, the prosecutor raised the
issue that even though the parties had agreed to a probation term of four
years, the probation report recommended a two-year term. Valdivia’s trial
counsel responded, “While obviously the defense would prefer two years, we
do acknowledge that four was what was agreed upon.” The trial court then
suspended imposition of the sentence and placed Valdivia on formal

      2 The facts in this paragraph are taken from the preliminary hearing

transcript, which provided the factual basis for Valdivia’s plea.
      3 The charges were brought under sections 422, subdivision (a)

(criminal threats), 594, subdivision (a) (vandalism), and 273a, subdivision (b)
(child endangerment).
      4 A Harvey waiver permits a trial court to consider facts underlying a

dismissed count in imposing a sentence under a plea bargain. (People v.
Munoz (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 160, 166–167, citing People v. Harvey (1979)
25 Cal.3d 754.)

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probation for four years. Probation was conditioned on Valdivia’s serving 265
days in jail, a term he had already served with conduct credits.
      Valdivia filed a notice of appeal in which he checked boxes indicating
that the appeal challenged the validity of his plea and was based on
ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, he requested a certificate of
probable cause, which the trial court denied.
                                        II.
                                   DISCUSSION
      Valdivia contends that the four-year probation term is unauthorized
because the maximum probation term for felony vandalism is two years. We
do not decide the merits of this claim because we agree with the Attorney
General that the appeal must be dismissed.
      Generally, a defendant cannot appeal after entering a no-contest plea
unless “[t]he trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause
for such appeal with the clerk of the court.” (§ 1237.5, subd. (b).) If the trial
court “denies a certificate of probable cause, the appeal will be limited to
issues that do not require a certificate of probable cause.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.304(b)(3).) As relevant here, a certificate of probable cause is
not required if the appeal is based on “[t]he sentence or other matters
occurring after the plea or admission that do not affect the validity of the plea
or admission.” (Id., rule 8.304(b)(2)(B).)
      “ ‘In determining whether section 1237.5 applies to a challenge of a
sentence imposed after a plea of guilty or no contest, courts must look to the
substance of the appeal: “the crucial issue is what the defendant is
challenging, not the time or manner in which the challenge is made.”
[Citation.] Hence, the critical inquiry is whether a challenge to the sentence
is in substance a challenge to the validity of the plea, thus rendering the
appeal subject to the requirements of section 1237.5.’ ” (People v. Buttram

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(2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 781–782.) Where, as here, a defendant agrees to a
specific term—as opposed to agreeing to a maximum sentence that the trial
court will not exceed when exercising its sentencing discretion—a challenge
to the sentence as part of a plea agreement “attacks an integral part of the
plea, [and] is, in substance, a challenge to the validity of the plea” requiring a
certificate of probable cause. (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 73;
Buttram, at pp. 782–785.)
        Valdivia does not contest that the four-year probation term was “an
integral part” of the plea agreement under Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
p. 73. Instead, he claims that “an illegal sentence requires no certificate of
probable cause.” He provides no authority for this position, which we
conclude is incorrect.
        “ ‘ “When a guilty [or nolo contendere] plea is entered in exchange for
specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed
maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the
terms of the agreement.” ’ ” (People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 383.)
This requirement is not affected by a defendant’s claim that the negotiated
term is unauthorized by law. Rather, because a “ ‘[d]efendant’s attack on the
legality of [the] maximum sentence is an effort to unilaterally improve, and
thus alter, the terms of that which was agreed,’ ” such a claim requires a
certificate of probable cause. (Ibid.; People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759,
769.)
        Indeed, even if we were to conclude that no certificate of probable cause
was required, Valdivia would be estopped from challenging the legality of the
four-year term. “The rule that defendants may challenge an unauthorized
sentence on appeal even if they failed to object below is itself subject to an
exception: Where the defendants have pleaded guilty [or no contest] in

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return for a specified sentence, appellate courts will not find error even
though the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in reaching that figure,
so long as the trial court did not lack fundamental jurisdiction. The rationale
behind this policy is that defendants who have received the benefit of their
bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to better
the bargain through the appellate process.” (People v. Hester (2000)
22 Cal.4th 290, 295.)
      Finally, it is hardly clear that Valdivia would end up being better off
even if we considered the appeal on the merits and agreed with him that the
four-year term is illegal, since we would not simply modify that term
downward as he requests. This case does not involve an intervening change
in the law that rendered the sentence unauthorized. Assembly Bill No. 1950
(2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), which amended section 1203.1 to limit the maximum
probation term for most felony offenses to two years, took effect nearly two
years before Valdivia was sentenced. (People v. Rodriguez (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 637, 640.) Instead, if Valdivia’s four-year probation term is
unauthorized, the plea agreement was illegal at the time it was entered, and
the appropriate remedy would be a remand for the People to either accept a
reduced probation term or withdraw from the plea agreement. (See People v.
Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 974.) Valdivia’s strong objection to such a
remand is understandable given the favorable terms of the plea agreement,
which allowed him to avoid further confinement even though he was charged
with three felonies.
      In short, Valdivia’s claim that the four-year probation term is
unauthorized is a clear challenge to the validity of the plea and requires a
certificate of probable cause. Because Valdivia failed to obtain a certificate,
his appeal cannot proceed.

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                               III.
                           DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

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                                           _________________________
                                           Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Margulies, J.

_________________________
Getty, J.*

      *Judge of the Superior Court of the County of Solano, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

People v. Valdivia A166930

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