Court Opinion

ID: 9679856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:11:15.718595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:22.125569
License: Public Domain

RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
The “very essence of civil liberty ... consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). For a large number of Missouri workers, this foundational legal principle no longer applies, as the legislature has eliminated or substantially curtailed any right to compensation for workplace injuries. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The plurality opinion holds that nearly all of the appellants’ constitutional challenges are not ripe for review because there has been no judicial interpretation of the individual provisions being challenged. Yet, as the plurality opinion recognizes, this Court has permitted business organizations to obtain a pre-enforcement declaration that a statute is unconstitutional because of “[t]he interest in doing business free from the constraints of an unconstitutional law....” Missomi Health Care Association v. Attorney General of the State of Missouri, 953 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Mo. banc 1997). The appellants in this case, workers and labor organizations, have a similar interest in working free from the constraints of an unconstitutional law. The statutory amendments at issue, without exception, are aimed specifically and expressly at reducing both the availability *682and amount of compensation afforded to injured workers. This is revealed by the plain language of the statutes, independent of the particular facts of any case. No judicial interpretation is required. By declining to address the issues presented, this Court leaves Missourians subject to the still unresolved question of whether their workplace injuries will be compensated in a manner that is even remotely commensurate with the constitutional guarantee to a “certain remedy” for personal injury. This Court should answer the questions presented by this appeal.
The division of workers’ compensation’s position is that article I, section 14 is purely procedural and provides no substantive limitation on the legislature’s authority to alter or abolish common law remedies. This assertion is contrary to the open courts provision of article I, section 14, which states:
“That the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.”
For purposes of this case, the operative phrase is that there shall be “certain remedy afforded for every injury to person. ...” This language limits governmental authority to arbitrarily or unreasonably bar individuals or classes of individuals from accessing the courts in order to enforce recognized causes of action for personal injury. Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Mo. banc 2000).’ There is no doubt that the open courts provision leaves the legislature free to alter or abolish any statutory or common law cause of action. Id. at 550. The authority to abolish a common law cause of action, however, does not necessarily entail the unfettered authority also to abolish all remedies for personal injury. The open courts provision specifically guarantees the right to “certain remedy” for personal injury. If the legislature is free to abolish all remedies for personal injury, then the right to a “certain remedy” for personal injury is not a right at all but, instead, is relegated to the status of a privilege that exists only by virtue of legislative whim.1
In addition to the plain language of the open courts provision, the very nature of article I, section 14 provides strong evidence of a substantive component. The open courts provision is essentially a “second due process clause to the state constitution.” Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 824 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Mo. banc 1992); see also Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, 821 S.W.2d 822, 834 (Mo. banc 1991); Findley v. City of Kansas City, 182 S.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Mo. banc 1990). The due process clause has both a procedural and substantive component. Doe v. Phillips 194 S.W.3d 833, 842 (Mo. banc 2006). Under a due process analysis, “[n]o one would contend that a law of a State, forbidding all redress by actions at law for injuries to property, would be upheld in the courts of *683the United States, for that would be to deprive one of his property without due process of law.” Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303, 5 S.Ct. 903, 29 L.Ed. 185 (1885). If the state cannot deny redress for injuries to property, then surely it cannot deny redress for personal injuries without violating the specific due process guarantee of a “certain remedy” for “every injury to person.”
The existence of a substantive component is confirmed by the case law from other states with constitutional provisions similar to Missouri’s open courts provision. At least 39 state constitutions have a similar open courts provision. David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 Temp. L.Rev. 1197, 1201 (1992). Almost all of these states “apparently recognize the doctrine of a substitute remedy, or quid pro quo, to justify legislative change.” Thomas R. Phillips, The Right to a Constitutional Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1309, 1335 (2003). The requirement of an adequate substitute remedy recognizes that a meaningful state constitutional guarantee of a remedy for personal injury must include a substantive guarantee of an adequate legal remedy for personal injury.2
Consistent with the specific due process guarantee in Missouri’s open courts provision and the well-reasoned decisions from other states, I would hold that article I, section 14 requires the provision of an adequate substitute remedy when the legislature abrogates a common law cause of action for personal injury. Adopting this rule would leave the legislature free to abolish a common law cause of action for personal injury in favor of a statutory enactment that reflects current policy concerns, while preserving the state constitutional right to some form of adequate remedy for personal injury.
Having established that Missouri open courts provision requires an adequate substitute remedy, the next question is whether the amendments at issue in this case so restrict compensation for workplace injuries that they violate article I, section 14. The workers’ compensation law long has been described as a “bargain” in which the employer forfeits common law defenses and assumes automatic liability. In return, the employee forfeits the right to a potentially higher common law judgment in return for assured compensation. Zueck v. Oppenheinier Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Mo. banc *6841991); 1B Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, section 1.04 (2004). The essentials of the workers’ compensation bargain, therefore, are (1) the certainty of “a sure and speedy means of compensation for injuries suffered in the course of employment” and, (2) the availability of compensation irrespective of fault. St. Lawrence v. Trans World Airlines, 8 S.W.Sd 143, 149 (Mo.App.1999).
The 2005 amendments to the workers’ compensation law mark a significant shift in the bargain. Unlike the amendments upheld in other states, the amendments at issue in this case are comprehensive and substantially will reduce the availability of compensation for every injured worker while completely excluding large classes of workers from any remedy at all.3 The plain language of the 2005 amendments reveals that every single amendment disadvantages injured workers and, in various ways, makes it more difficult to obtain compensation, limits compensation or in some circumstances completely eliminates any opportunity for compensation.
One of the most significant amendments redefines the term “accident.” Previously, an “accident” was defined as an “unforeseen identifiable event or series of events ... producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.” Section 287.020.2, RSMo 2000. This definition of the term “accident” included injuries that occurred due to repeated exposure to an injury inducing factor. The amended statute limits the definition of “accident” by requiring proof of “an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence” and producing objective symptoms of an injury “caused by a specific event during a single work shift.” Section 287.020.2, RSMo Supp.2005. The net result of this amendment is that an “accident” no longer includes injuries caused by the cumulative impact of repetitive exposure to some factor that causes a workplace injury. This restrictive definition would apply even if such exposure was a result of the employer’s negligence. This is substantial restriction on the availability of workers’ compensation benefits.
Another significant amendment increases the standard of proof for obtaining compensation. Under the former statute, a work-related injury was compensable if the employee could demonstrate that the accident or exposure was a “substantial factor” in producing the injury. Section 287.020.3, RSMo 2000. The 2005 amendments increase the causation standard by requiring the employee to show that the accident was the “prevailing factor.” Section 287.030.3(1), RSMo Supp.2005. This burden not only is higher than the prior standard, but it also is more stringent than the standard of proximate cause in a common law tort case. In a common law tort action, a plaintiff can establish “proximate cause” by proving that the negligent act was “one of the efficient causes [of the injury], without which injury would not have resulted.” Martin v. Mo. Highway & Tramp. Dep’t, 981 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Mo. App.1998). Consequently, a plaintiff can obtain recovery even if the alleged negligence was one of several causes that, when considered independently, would not constitute a prevailing factor. By increasing the causation requirement to a level beyond that which was formerly imposed by the workers’ compensation law and that also exceeds the common law, the legisla*685ture has erected a substantial practical barrier to the availability of compensation for workplace injuries.4
The 2005 amendments further restrict the availability of a remedy by providing that “[a]n injury resulting directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes is not com-pensable.” Section 287.020.3(3), RSMo Supp.2005. An “idiopathic” cause is one that is unique to an individual. Previously, compensation was available for such injuries provided that workplace conditions were a contributing factor. Alexander v. D.L. Sitton Motor Lines, 851 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Mo. banc 1993). Moreover, in a common law tort action, there is no defense for idiopathic conditions. The complete exclusion of any compensation for an injury that even is caused “indirectly” caused by an idiopathic condition will preclude recovery for large numbers of individuals who, under the former workers’ compensation statute or in a common law tort action, would be entitled to recovery.
Another substantial limitation on the availability of compensation is the new requirement that “objective medical findings shall prevail over subjective findings.” Section 287.190.6(2), RSMo Supp.2005. Objective medical findings are, of course, valuable. However, for those medically recognized injuries, such as soft tissue injuries that result in subjective symptoms of pain or dysfunction, the medical diagnosis may rest on a physician’s subjective determination without “objective” medical findings. This amendment mandates a biased assessment of the evidence and, in some cases, will amount to a preemptive determination of whether the employee has met his or her burden of proof. Neither the previous workers’ compensation law nor the common law provides such a restriction on administrative or jury fact-finding.
The 2005 amendments also inject fault into the previously no-fault workers’ compensation scheme. Section 287.120.6(1), RSMo Supp.2005 mandates a 50 percent reduction in benefits if the injury was sustained “in conjunction with the use of alcohol or nonprescribed controlled drugs....” Under the prior version of this statute, the employee forfeited 15 percent of his or her benefit and this forfeiture was conditioned upon the employer actually informing the employee of the applicable workplace policies. The legislature and employers both have a valid interest in preventing the use of alcohol and drugs in the workplace. However, under the plain language of the amended statute provision, an employee would automatically forfeit 50 percent of his or her compensation even if the drug or alcohol use was not the cause of the injury. Additionally, an accident resulting in injury could occur “in conjunction with” drug or alcohol use even if the injured worker had not consumed any alcohol or drugs. This amendment introduces a concept of fault and attendant benefit reductions that are substantially more restrictive than the previous statute or the common law.
Another example of fault based restrictions on compensation is reflected in section 287.170.4, RSMo Supp.2005. This statute provides that “[i]f the employee is terminated from post-injury employment based upon the employee’s post-injury misconduct, neither temporary total disability nor temporary partial disability benefits under this section or section 287.180 are payable.” This statute punish*686es an employee for post-injury misconduct that, by virtue of being post-injury, could not have been a factor in causing the injury. The statute does not even require that the employer’s decision to terminate the injured employee is reasonable or non-pretextual. There is nothing in the previous workers’ compensation statute or any principle of common law that would deny otherwise available compensation based on post-injury misconduct that has no causal relationship to the injury that necessitated compensation in the first place.
The 2005 amendments raise the employees’ burden or proof, limit the availability of evidence to prove a workplace injury and inject fault into what is purported to be a no-fault system. When the cumulative impact of the 2005 amendments is considered, it is apparent that the result is a fundamental alteration of the equities of the workers’ compensation bargain which effectively bars injured workers from realizing the constitutional guarantee of a “certain remedy ... for every injury to person, property, or character.... ” Although the plurality opinion correctly holds that those workers now excluded from workers’ compensation benefits by the narrower definitions of “accident” and “injury” have a right to pursue a common law cause of action, this is little consolation for those workers still subject to the amended version of the act. If an injury occurs, them right to a certain remedy for personal injury is in jeopardy. Consequently, I would address the issues presented by this appeal and hold that the 2005 amendments violate article I, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution.5

. To date, the cases addressing the Missouri open courts provision have largely dealt with procedural bars to obtaining a recognized remedy. See e.g., State ex rel. Cardinal Glen-non Memorial Hosp. for Children v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. banc 1979) (requirement that a medical malpractice plaintiff submit his or her claim to a professional liability board before filing suit violated open courts provision); Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. banc 1986) (two-year statute of limitations on medical malpractice lawsuits by minors violated the open courts provisions by cutting off the claim before the minor was able to bring suit on his or her own behalf). Although Missouri courts have applied the open courts provision only to procedural bars, the fact remains that there is nothing in the text of the open courts provision that necessarily forecloses a substantive component.

. See Gluba v. Bitzan & Ohren Masonry, 735 N.W.2d 713 (Minn.2007)("the legislature could take many steps to reduce employers' costs, but if these steps resulted in the denial of benefits to a sufficiently large proportion of workers ... the workers’ compensation scheme no longer would represent a reasonable trade off of workers’ common law rights”); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 139 (Utah 2004) (the constitutional right to a remedy is satisfied "if the law provides and injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy”); Mello v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 265 Conn. 21, 826 A.2d 1117, 1124 (2003) ("It is settled law that [the open courts provision) restricts the power of the legislature to abolish a legal right existing at common law ... without also establishing a reasonable alternative to the enforcement of that right ... ”); Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 23 P.3d 333, 356 (2001) ("the legislature may abolish a common law cause of action so long as it provides a substitute remedial process in the event of injury to the absolute right the remedy clause protects”); Injured Workers of Kansas v. Franklin, 262 Kan. 840, 942 P.2d 591, 620 (1997) (upholding workers' compensation amendments restricted notice provisions and reduced compensation for shoulder injuries, but stating that ”[t]he legislature once having established a substitute remedy, cannot emasculate the remedy, by amendments, to a point where it is no longer a viable and sufficient substitute remedy”); Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 521 (Tex.1995) (upholding amendments, but noting that additional restrictions could render benefits "so inadequate as to run afoul of the open courts doctrine.”).

. The amendments upheld in other states were much less restrictive and were held to constitute an adequate substitute remedy. See e.g., Garcia, supra (calculation of disability benefits); Injured Workers, supra, (shortened notice periods, reduction in benefits for shoulder injuries).

. This amendment is similar to the "major contributing cause" requirement that was found to violate the Oregon open courts provision if the employee was not provided a common law cause of action. Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 23 P.3d 333, 362 (2001).

. I concur in Judge Wolff's concerns regarding the delay in deciding this case.