Court Opinion

ID: 9377147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 00:02:12.019403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:12.176672
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/6/23 P. v. Quezada CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E079801

 v.                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. FWV08082)

 ANTONIO GONZALEZ QUEZADA,                                               OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. John Nho Trong

Nguyen, Judge. Affirmed.

         Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             I.

                                                 INTRODUCTION

         Defendant and appellant Antonio Quezada appeals from a postjudgment order

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                             1
denying his Penal Code section 1172.1 (formerly section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) and
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section 1170.03) petition for resentencing. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority

of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386

U.S. 738 (Anders), requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record.

In addition, defendant has had an opportunity to file a supplemental brief with this court

and has done so. Based on our independent review of the record for potential error and

considering defendant’s personal supplemental brief in support of his appeal, we affirm

the trial court’s denial of the petition for relief under section 1172.1.

                                                 II.
                                                                            3
                         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

          On August 14, 1995, codefendant Arturo Aguilar entered a bank wearing

camouflage clothing and hat and holding a revolver. Aguilar pointed the gun at the teller,

told everyone to get on the ground, and instructed the tellers to put all their money on the

counter.

          1
              All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.
          2
         As a result of Assembly Bill No. 1540, effective January 1, 2022 former section
1170, subdivision (d)(1), was substantively amended and redesignated as section
1170.03. (See, e.g., People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1038.) Effective
June 30, 2022, section 1170.03 was renumbered section 1172.1 without additional
substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9.) We cite to section 1172.1 for ease of
reference unless otherwise indicated.
          3
              A summary of the factual background is taken from the probation officer’s
report.

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       Thereafter, defendant walked into the bank with a gun and a bag. After defendant

gave the bag to Aguilar, Aguilar filled the bag with approximately $34,000.00 in cash

from the tellers. A customer’s fanny pack was also taken off a counter during the

robbery. Defendant and Aguilar then fled.

       Officer Fortin heard a dispatch call concerning the robbery and stopped the car in

which defendant and Aguilar were riding because he thought they looked suspicious.

While Officer Fortin was completing a field interrogation card, Aguilar put a gun to the

officer’s forehead and told him he was going to kill him. Defendant grabbed Officer

Fortin’s gun, and the two men ordered the officer not to move and to cancel the backup

unit. They also told Officer Fortin “he was dead.” Defendant and Aguilar then ordered

Officer Fortin to lie on the ground and took the keys to the officer’s patrol vehicle. After

the two men got back into their car and sped away with defendant driving, Officer Fortin

radioed for help.

       Officer Ohlson “observed the suspect vehicle” and began pursuing it. During the

pursuit, Aguilar shot at Ohlson’s car, in which Officers Thouvenell and Mora were also

passengers. No officer was struck by the bullets. Aguilar and defendant eventually

abandoned their car, and officers pursued them on foot. When officers approached

Aguilar, who was lying on the ground, they saw he had a fatal gunshot wound to his

head. Defendant eventually surrendered. Officers found the stolen money from the bank

and “other victim’s property” in the car.

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       At the time of his interview with the probation officer, defendant had been

diagnosed with schizophrenia. He was seeing and hearing voices, and was taking the

medication Haldol.

       On September 18, 1998, a jury found defendant guilty of four counts of second

degree robbery (§ 211; counts 1, 3, 4, & 8); assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd.

(a)(1); count 5); assault on a peace officer or firefighter with a deadly weapon (§ 245,

subd. (c); count 6); criminal threats (§ 422; count 7); and evading a peace officer in

willful disregard for safety (Veh. Code, § 2800.2; count 12). The jury found true the

enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a))

during the commission of counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 12. The trial court declared a

mistrial on counts 9, 10, 11, and 13, and took under submission defendant’s motion to

dismiss these counts. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial on the truth of the prior

conviction allegation, and on whether he was “not guilty by insanity.”

       On November 20, 1998, defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser offenses of assault

with a firearm on a peace officer as charged in counts 9, 10, and 13. He also admitted to

having suffered a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)) conviction. In exchange for his

plea, defendant was to receive a total prison sentence of between 30 and 35 years.

Defendant also withdrew his “‘insanity’ plea,” and the trial court agreed to recommend

initial custody at a medical facility.

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       On December 17, 1998, the court sentenced defendant to 35 years in prison and

dismissed the firearm use enhancements attached to counts 9, 10, and 13. The court

again recommended that defendant “be placed in a state hospital/medical facility.”

       On August 10, 1999, defendant’s sentence was modified with his total sentence

reduced to 34 years in prison. The court again recommended that defendant be housed in

a state hospital.

       In a letter dated July 14, 2022, which was addressed to the Office of the District

Attorney and the San Bernardino Superior Court, defendant appeared to request that the

district attorney or the “CDCR Secretary” recommend to the court that he be resentenced

under former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). Defendant asserted he had “demonstrated

exceptional in-custody behavior,” and that “changed circumstances demonstrat[ed]” his

“continued incarceration is not in the interests of justice.” In support, defendant attached

certificates of completions of educational programs, reference letters, and other

documents showing his performance while in prison. In his letter, defendant also referred

to Senate Bill No. 620, which provided courts with discretion to strike firearm

enhancements.

       On July 22, 2022, the trial court noted receipt of defendant’s letter and appointed

counsel to represent defendant.

                                             5
       At a hearing held on August 12, 2022, the trial court noted that defendant was

relying on former section 1170.03 to support his purported petition for resentencing. The

prosecutor explained that neither the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) nor the Office of the District Attorney had requested recall and

resentencing, and that defendant did not have the ability to independently make the

request. Defendant’s appointed counsel agreed the court did not have the “authority to

resentence [defendant] based on his request.” The court thereafter denied defendant’s

request to be resentenced. Defendant timely appealed.

                                             III.

                                       DISCUSSION

       After defendant appealed, appointed appellate counsel filed a brief under the

authority of Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a

statement of the case and a summary of the procedural background. Counsel considered

potential issues on appeal but found no specific arguments as grounds for relief, and

requests that we exercise our discretion and independently examine the appellate record

for any arguable issues.

       We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, and he

has done so. In his supplemental letter brief, defendant argues (1) the trial court erred in

denying his request for resentencing under section 1172.1; (2) the trial court should

exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancements pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620;

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and (3) he should never have been sentenced to prison because he was mentally unstable

and the court had recommended he be housed in a mental facility.

       Preliminarily, we note that our Supreme Court recently held the procedures set out

in Wende do not apply to an appeal from post-judgment orders. (People v. Delgadillo

(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222.) However, “[w]hen appointed counsel finds no arguable

issues to be pursued on appeal: (1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that

determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing on the denial of the

petition; and (2) the court should send, with a copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the

defendant, informing the defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and

that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter.

[Citations.] [¶] If the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or letter, the

Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and

to issue a written opinion. The filing of a supplemental brief or letter does not compel an

independent review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” (Id. at pp. 231-232.)

Nonetheless, “the Court of Appeal is not barred from conducting its own independent

review of the record in any individual” post-judgment appeals. (Id. at p. 232.)

       The appellate review procedures employed here conform to those required under

Delgadillo. Defendant was served with counsel’s brief indicating no arguable issues

were identified for appeal, this court issued a letter inviting defendant to file his own

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                                      4
personal letter or brief and he did so. In addition to considering the issues raised in

defendant’s personal brief, we have conducted an independent review of the record.

(People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)

       As previously noted, Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) came into

effect on January 1, 2022, and moved the recall and resentencing provisions of former

section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to former section 1170.03. (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, §§ 1-7.)

Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg.

Sess.) that, among other things, renumbered former section 1170.03 as section 1172.1

with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9.)

       Former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) authorized the court, in relevant part, to

“at any time upon the recommendation of the secretary . . . in the case of state prison

inmates, . . . [to] recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence

the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, provided

the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 29,

§ 14.) This provision thus created “an exception to the common law rule that the court

loses resentencing jurisdiction once execution of sentence has begun.” (Dix v. Superior

Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 455.) The trial court may recall a sentence on its own

       4
         This court’s notice to defendant did not inform him the appeal could be
dismissed if he did not file a personal brief. However, since defendant filed his own
personal brief, which we now evaluate and address on its merits, the lack of notice of
potential dismissal had no effect on the disposition of the appeal and caused no harm to
defendant.

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motion within 120 days for any reason rationally related to lawful sentencing. (Id. at p.

456.)

        Newly enacted section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) maintains the language of former

section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) and provides, in pertinent part, that “the court may,

within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own motion, at any time upon the

recommendation of the secretary or the Board of Parole Hearings in the case of a

defendant incarcerated in state prison [or] the district attorney of the county in which the

defendant was sentenced . . . recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and

resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been

sentenced . . . .” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1); see People v. McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th

at p. 1040; People v. Cepeda (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 456, 464.)

        In this case, defendant filed his request for relief on July 14, 2022, well after 120

days following the date of his commitment. Moreover, neither the Board of Parole

Hearings nor the Secretary of CDCR nor the district attorney recommended defendant be

resentenced. Therefore, defendant was not entitled to relief pursuant to section 1172.1.

        As to defendant’s contentions regarding Senate Bill No. 620 and his sentence to

state prison rather than a state mental hospital, those claims are not properly before us.

Because defendant appealed from a denial of his request for resentencing pursuant to

section 1172.1, he could only raise issues related to the denial of that request for relief.

Furthermore, defendant cannot use the resentencing procedures established by section

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1172.1 to challenge his sentence to state prison as opposed to being committed to a state

mental hospital. Thus, defendant’s remaining arguments are improper.

                                           IV.

                                     DISPOSITION

      The judgment is affirmed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                              CODRINGTON
                                                                                            J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
                Acting P. J.

MILLER
                          J.

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