Court Opinion

ID: 9649871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:12:01.01663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:15.553160
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Spaeth, J.:
I dissent for two reasons. First, the order of the court below was conditional only with respect to taking the child to Scotland, not with respect to the award of custody to the mother. Second, even if the order of the court below is conditional in both respects, this court should exercise its discretion to allow the appeal to be decided.
The order reads in relevant part as follows:
“[I]t is Ordered that custody of the minor subject of this proceeding ... is awarded to his mother . . . subject to the following rights of visitation in the father ....
“The mother shall take custody of the boy from the father on August 16, 1973 in order that she can return with him to her home in Scotland, provided she posts *503security ... as well as the submission ... of evidence from the Court. . . in . . . Scotland . . . that such Court recognizes the retention of jurisdiction over both the cause and the parties hereafter.”
I agree with both parties that the first quoted paragraph of this order is final; only the second quoted paragraph is conditional.
It has been the contention of both parties at the hearings before Judges Hoffman and Spaeth on appellant’s petition for supersedeas and at oral argument before this court that this order is final with respect to custody of the child. The father filed this appeal and urged this court to take jurisdiction; in doing so we entered an order forbidding the mother to take the child out of the country. By filing this appeal, the father removed the record from the court below, thus stripping it of its power to act further in the matter. It is clear that if the mother gets complete control over the child she will return with him to Scotland; thus any delay — including the quashing of his own appeal— acts in appellant’s favor.
It should be stressed that even if the order were to be viewed as non-final, and the appeal as interlocutory, since appellee has filed no objection to jurisdiction, this court has discretion to hear the case. See Commonwealth v. Rucco, 229 Pa. Superior Ct. 247, 324 A. 2d 388 (1974) (recognizing that we have jurisdiction which “we may, in our discretion refuse to exercise” when appellee does not object).
“The failure of an appellee to file an objection to the jurisdiction of an appellate court on or prior to the hearing of the appeal, or within such earlier time as may be specified by general rule or rule of court, shall, unless the appellate court shall otherwise order, operate to perfect the appellate jurisdiction of such appellate court, notwithstanding any provision of this act, or of any general rule adopted pursuant to section 505 of this *504act, vesting jurisdiction of such appeal in another appellate court.” The Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, Act of July 31,1970, P. L. 673, No. 223, art. VI, §503(a), 17 P.S. §211.503(a) (Supp. 1974) (emphasis supplied). Appellee has not raised any objection to our jurisdiction. Indeed, like appellant, she has urged us to take jurisdiction.
Our discretion would be better exercised by not quashing this appeal. Our order to quash is itself a final order which can be appealed to the Supreme Court, thus causing added delay. Even if the case is remanded to the lower court and a final order entered immediately, further appellate review might well take at least another year to reach a final determination. I agree with the majority that the “State has [great interest] in supervising and protecting the interests of minor children in custody disputes.” In my view, a decision to quash is not consistent with that interest. We should act with greater dispatch once a complete record has been developed.
This is particularly true when, as here, an examination of the record discloses no issue of substance.
Appellee apparently likes to travel. She once took off on a five-week trip on her own, a fact of which appellant tried to make a great deal. While she was gone the child was cared for by the regular family housekeeper, a mature woman who lives in the home. It is difficult to see how the failure of the court below to find appellee’s conduct shocking or indicative of such immaturity as to render her an unfit parent was error or showed a disregard for the best interests of the child.
Nor was it error for the court to refuse to hear testimony regarding appellee’s allegedly excessive spending habits. As it is, the record indicates liberal spending habits by both parties. There is evidence of the ownership of two expensive foreign cars, annual family *505holidays in Europe (two to four a year), private schooling for the cMld, the large family home in Grladwyne with gardens and a swimming pool, and appellee’s Scottish residence and summer house. Clearly, both parties are well-to-do and accustomed to spending money. To get into the realm of what was “extravagant” under the circumstances was not relevant to deciding the best interests of the child.
Appellant also argues that he should have been allowed to question appellee on the reasons for their separation. There is nothing to indicate that any evidence in this regard relevant to appellee’s lack of ability to raise the child would not have been admitted had it been offered.1 The mere fact of a separation does not necessarily indicate problems in raising a child. Fitness as a parent and fitness as a spouse are two different things, and conduct bearing on the latter is not relevant in a custody case unless it also bears on the former. At no time did the hearing judge limit examination on the issue of appellee’s fitness as a parent.
It is evident that the court below was faced with two good parents and no way of choosing between them. “If, after a full development of the record, the hearing judge finds that the interests of the child would be equally served by granting custody to either litigant, custody should be awarded to the child’s natural mother.” Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Superior Ct. 229, 236, 312 A. 2d 58, 62 (1973).
The fact that appellee intends to take the child to live in Scotland does not compel a different result. In any child custody case in which geography is a consideration with regard to the ability of one parent to see *506the child, the fact that the child may be removed from the Commonwealth is a factor, but it is by no means the controlling factor. Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh, 219 Pa. Superior Ct. 240, 280 A. 2d 621 (1971), rev’d on other grounds, 449 Pa. 105, 296 A. 2d 625 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 204 Pa. Superior Ct. 403, 205 A. 2d 49 (1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Buckner v. Barr, 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 124, 95 A. 2d 355 (1953). The purpose of the general proposition that the court will hesitate to place a child outside its jurisdiction is to insure that a normal relationship with both parents will be maintained. Commonwealth ex rel. Buell v. Buell, 186 Pa. Superior Ct. 468, 142 A. 2d 338 (1958); Commonwealth ex rel. Hubbell v. Hubbell, 176 Pa. Superior Ct. 186, 107 A. 2d 388 (1954); Commonwealth ex rel. Balla v. Wreski, 165 Pa. Superior Ct. 6, 67 A. 2d 595 (1949). In certain cases custody has been granted to a parent living as far away as the State of Washington, Commonwealth ex rel. Buckner v. Barr, supra, Venezuela, Commonwealth ex rel. Skurat v. Gearhart, 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 245, 115 A. 2d 395 (1955), and Spain, Commonwealth ex rel. Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 211 Pa. Superior Ct. 188, 235 A. 2d 455 (1967).
Scotland is neither an uncivilized nor remote area of the world. It is the home of appellee and her family, and the child has lived there. The order of the court below provides that travel expenses for the child to visit appellant are to be borne equally by the parties. Although one may agree with appellant that the normal father-son relationship will probably be weaker if the child lives in Scotland than it would be if appellant were granted custody, the same may be said of the normal mother-son relationship if the child were to live here. To condition appellee’s custody on her remaining here, as appellant suggests, would be to use the child to force appellee into a situation unreasonable as to her *507and of no advantage to the child. There is no evidence that appellee is attempting to alienate the child’s affections for appellant. No doubt the arrangement provided by the order of the court below is not satisfactory to him, but it recognizes his interests and places no financial hardship on him. Custody orders seldom are satisfactory to both parties.
The only remaining issue is with respect to the effect of the condition in the order of the court below that appellee shall submit “evidence from the Court. . . in . . . Scotland . . . that such Court recognizes the retention of jurisdiction over both the cause and the parties hereafter.”
1 have already explained at the beginning of this opinion why in my view this condition should not delay disposition of this appeal. As has been mentioned, appellant appealed before the required assurance from a Scotch court could be obtained. However, pending argument of the appeal appellee received from two barristers in Scotland an opinion to the effect that there is no procedure available under Scotch law whereby a Scotch court can provide “evidence” that it “recognizes the retention of jurisdiction” in a court in another jurisdiction.2 The barristers’ opinion concludes, however, that a Scotch court will regard the jurisdiction of the Montgomery County Court as pre-eminent to its own in questions of custody of this child, and will give its assistance in enforcing any decree of the Montgomery County Court although the child is a resident of Scotland unless there is reason to apprehend immediate danger of injury, physical or moral, to the child while in Scotland. The barristers recite that they are unaware of any reported case in which a Scotch court has refused to give effect to or enforce a decree of the court *508of tbe domicile. This opinion, which appellant has not challenged, is in substantial compliance with the condition imposed by the order of the court below. There appears to have been an attempt to change that order after the appeal to this court was filed. This procedure was technically incorrect, but it is not necessary to delay this case any further over the mere form of the order. We have the power to affirm and modify the order.3 That is what I think we should do.
Watkins, P. J., joins in this dissent.

 The record is not silent on what appellant was trying to prove: “[W]e think that what she intends to do with the child [i.e., to take him to live in Scotland] indicates a present unfitness.” As will be indicated infra., this statement does not accurately reflect the law, and the hearing judge was properly unimpressed by it.

 This opinion became part of the record before this court when it was filed as part of appellee’s Petition to Amend the Supersedeas.

 TMs court has the power to modify any order, including one in habeas corpus, brought before it for review. Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, art V, §504,17 P.S. §211.504; Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437, 443 n.4, 292 A. 2d 380, 383 n.4 (1972).