Court Opinion

ID: 9700099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:10:26.733837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:04.430629
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
Once again, a majority of this Court condones failure to comply with Pa.R.Crim.Proc. 1123(a) and Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975). Blair made clear that, consistent with the mandate of Rule 1123(a), this Court will consider only those issues raised in written post-verdict motions. In Commonwealth v. Roach, All Pa. 379, 381, 383 A.2d 1257, 1258 (1978), I expressed the view that Blair must be given effect beginning March 1, 1975, the effective date of Blair’s publication in the Atlantic Second advance sheets. See also Commonwealth v. Hitson, 482 Pa. 404, 408, 393 A.2d 1169, 1171 (1978) (Roberts, J., joined by Nix, J., concurring). Appellant filed boilerplate post-verdict motions on March 12, 1975. I would hold under Rule 1123(a) and Blair that appellant has failed to preserve his objection to admission of evidence that appellant committed another rape.
*382I must also disagree that evidence of the other rape was inadmissible. The plurality is correct that admissibility of the testimony concerning the subsequent rape depends upon a “logical connection” with the alleged rape. But the plurality incorrectly concludes that no such connection exists here. Both offenses occurred within five days, near the intersection of 47th Street and Chester Avenue, Philadelphia, and at the same early morning hour. Each assailant trailed his victim, confronted the victim with a dangerous weapon, and, once the attack began, sought to take the victim to a nearby alley. Despite the suggestion of the plurality, it is wholly irrelevant to this crime of violence that “ ‘the victims were of totally different ages and sexual attractiveness.’ ” 484 Pa. at 380, 399 A.2d at 127, quoting opinion of the trial court. Proof of the subsequent rape in this case “ ‘will naturally tend to show that the accused is the person who committed the other,’ ” Commonwealth v. Fortune, 464 Pa. 367, 373, 346 A.2d 783, 786 (1975), and was properly allowed.
I dissent and would affirm the order of the Superior Court.