Court Opinion

ID: 9892360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 17:11:59.901585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:26.258743
License: Public Domain

J-S21024-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MATTHEW ALLEN LAPOINT                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1638 MDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 1, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-36-CR-0000630-2022

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                          FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2023

       Appellant Matthew Allen Lapoint appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his conviction for possession of firearm prohibited.1

Appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of a 911 call.

We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of

this matter as follows:

       On December 14, 2021, police were called to 38 Conestoga Manor,
       Leola, PA 17540, following a domestic dispute between Appellant
       and his wife. The couple’s fifteen-year-old daughter, K.L., called
       911 because Appellant and his wife were engaged in a verbal and
       physical altercation, where Appellant’s wife allegedly struck him
       in the face.    Shortly thereafter, Appellant’s wife exited the
       residence, and the couple’s eleven-year-old daughter, G.L.,
       witnessed Appellant with a shotgun in his hand as he left the home
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).
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      through the front door. When police arrived, it was determined
      that Appellant had been convicted of a second-degree felony[FN1]
      in Florida, and as such, he was a person not to possess a firearm.
      After a search, police recovered two shotguns and one shotgun
      shell. Appellant was then arrested and subsequently charged with
      one count of possession of firearm prohibited.[FN2]
            [FN1] [Appellant] was convicted of Aggravated Battery in
            Florida, [] FLA. STAT. §784[.]045 (1995), on May 11, 1995.

            [FN2] 18. Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).
                                          Appellant was also charged
            with terroristic threats, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1) and
            endangering the welfare of children 18 Pa.C.S. §
            4304(a)(1), however, [the] charges [of terroristic threats
            and endangering the welfare of children] were later
            withdrawn.

Trial Ct. Op., 1/20/23, at 1-2 (some citations omitted and some formatting

altered).

      On August 23, 2022, a jury found Appellant guilty of possession of a

firearm prohibited. On November 1, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant

to a term of six to twelve months of incarceration. Appellant filed a timely

appeal, and both the trial court and Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue:

      Did the trial court err in admitting K.L.’s 9-1-1 call to police where
      K.L.’s statements during the call were double hearsay, as she did
      not witness [Appellant] carrying a gun from the house but was
      only repeating what her sister, G.L., had told her?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

      Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting

the 911 call because the call consisted of K.L.’s statements concerning not

what she had observed, but rather what was relayed to her by her sister G.L.

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Appellant contends that this 911 call constituted double hearsay and no

exception applied. Appellant’s Brief at 13-15. Further, Appellant asserts that

he preserved his objection to the admission of the 911 call by filing a motion

in limine. See id. at 11-13.

      The Commonwealth responds that Appellant waived this issue because

in addressing Appellant’s pretrial motion in limine, the trial court did not rule

on the admissibility of the 911 call, but rather informed the parties that he

would defer his ruling and that the issue would be addressed at trial.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 7-9. The Commonwealth further posits that because

the trial court deferred its ruling on defense counsel’s pretrial motion in limine

objecting to the admission of the 911 call, defense counsel was required to

renew his objection when the Commonwealth sought to play the 911 call at

trial, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 103. Id. at 8-9. The Commonwealth argues that

because defense counsel failed to renew its objection at trial, the issue was

not preserved for appeal and is waived. Id.

      Additionally, the Commonwealth contends that even if Appellant

properly raised and preserved his objection, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the 911 call because the present-sense-impression

exception to the hearsay rule applied in that G.L., who saw Appellant holding

the firearm, also spoke to the 911 operator, along with her sister, K.L., who

did not see the firearm. Therefore, G.L’s statements fall under the present

impression exception in that her statements described or explained an event

or condition, made while or immediately after she perceived it, pursuant to

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Pa.R.E. 803(1). See id. at 9-10. Alternatively, the Commonwealth asserts

that even if the statements of K.L. in the 911 call did not satisfy the present-

sense-impression exception to the hearsay rule, any error was harmless

because K.L.’s statements in the 911 call were cumulative and substantially

similar to the properly admitted evidence at trial, including G.L.’s testimony

that she saw Appellant leaving the house carrying a firearm. See id. at 11-

12.

        We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings using the abuse of discretion

standard of review.      Commonwealth v. Luster, 234 A.3d 836, 838 (Pa.

Super. 2020).     A finding of abuse of discretion “may not be made merely

because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but

requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias,

or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.”

Commonwealth v. Saez, 225 A.3d 169, 178 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).

        As noted, Appellant’s issue concerns hearsay. Our Supreme Court has

explained: “Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth

of the matter asserted.” Commonwealth v. McCrae, 832 A.2d 1026, 1034

(Pa. 2003) (citing Pa.R.E. 801(c)). “Hearsay evidence is not admissible except

as provided by the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, [the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court], or by statute.” McCrae, 832 A.2d at 1034 (citing Pa.R.E.

802).

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      Moreover, an out-of-court statement containing another out-of-court

statement is double hearsay or hearsay within hearsay. Commonwealth v.

Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1060 (Pa. 2001); Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 738

A.2d 406, 417 (Pa. 1999). “In order for double hearsay to be admissible, the

reliability and trustworthiness of each declarant must be independently

established. This requirement is satisfied when each statement comes within

an exception to the hearsay rule.” Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060 (citation omitted);

see also Pa.R.E. 805 (stating “[h]earsay within hearsay is not excluded by

the rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms

with an exception to the rule.”).

      The present-sense-impression exception to the rule against hearsay

provides as follows:

      The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay,
      regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:

         (1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or
         explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately
         after the declarant perceived it.   When the declarant is
         unidentified, the proponent shall show by independent
         corroborating evidence that the declarant actually perceived
         the event or condition.

Pa.R.E. 803(1). “For this exception to apply, declarant need not be excited or

otherwise emotionally affected by the event or condition perceived.       The

trustworthiness of the statement arises from its timing. The requirement of

contemporaneousness, or near contemporaneousness, reduces the chance of

premeditated prevarication or loss of memory.” Id., cmt.

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      However, we must first determine whether Appellant’s issue was

properly preserved for appellate review. The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence

provide, in relevant part, as follows:

      (a) Preserving a Claim of Error. A party may claim error in a
      ruling to admit or exclude evidence only:

         (1) if the ruling admits evidence, a party, on the record:

            (A) makes a timely objection, motion to strike, or motion in
            limine; and

            (B) states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from
            the context; or

         (2) if the ruling excludes evidence, a party informs the court of
         its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was
         apparent from the context.

      (b) Not Needing to Renew an Objection or Offer of Proof.
      Once the court rules definitively on the record—either before or
      at trial—a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to
      preserve a claim of error for appeal.

Pa.R.E. 103(a)-(b) (formatting altered and emphasis added). The failure to

offer a timely and specific objection results in waiver of the claim.

Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 671 (Pa. Super. 2007). “The rule

is well settled that a party complaining, on appeal, of the admission of

evidence in the [c]ourt below will be confined to the specific objection there

made.”    Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1041 (Pa. 2007)

(citation omitted). “Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot

be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

      The notes of testimony from the hearing on Appellant’s motion in limine

concerning the admissibility of the 911 call reflect, in relevant part, as follows:

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     [Counsel for Appellant]: The admissibility of the 911 phone --
     phone call, if it is going to be attempted to be brought in to
     corroborate the child’s statements. I listened to it. It was about
     six minutes and 45 seconds. The child indicated that she didn’t
     see anything. She told the police that. But she was talking to the
     -- the operator, and she relayed that she saw her -- her dad with
     the shotgun but it was coming from the younger child. So it’s
     hearsay. So that -- I think the 6th Amendment, the right of
     confrontation of that child would be applicable.

     THE COURT: So the -- the child is saying what another child saw?

     [Counsel for Appellant]: That’s correct.

     THE COURT: What another child told that child what they saw?

     [Counsel for Appellant]: That’s correct. That’s what I -- I listened
     to the tape, the 911 call, about three or four times. And that’s
     exactly -- and the officer confirmed that by pulling the children
     apart and did talk to them individually. And K.L. is the child that
     made the phone call. She’s the oldest one. And G.L., who is 11
     years old -- K.L. is 15. G.L. is the one who said that she saw my
     client with the shotgun, but she didn’t make the phone call. She
     wanted K.L., her sister, older sister, to make the phone call. But
     during the investigation the police found out that K.L. did not see
     anything, and it’s in the discovery material.

     THE COURT: Okay. But the other child apparently saw something
     and confirmed that with the police afterwards, correct?

     [The Commonwealth]: Correct.

     [Counsel for Appellant]: That is correct.

     THE COURT: Okay. What’s your position?

     [The Commonwealth]: Your Honor, it’s the Commonwealth’s
     position -- that is partly accurate, the younger child is telling the
     older child. However, you can actually hear at points the younger
     child saying things. It’s also a present sense impression. The kids
     are in the home and you can hear them say, we locked the door,
     we locked him out. And then you can hear [Appellant] banging
     on the door saying, let me in the fucking house. It’s all a present
     sense impression. It’s literally as it’s unfolding.

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     [Counsel for Appellant]: And while he was banging on the door
     attempting to get in, the police were there. They had their guns
     drawn.

     [The Commonwealth]: That doesn’t make it not a present sense
     impression.

     [Counsel for Appellant]: And he -- he -- he had a cell phone in his
     hand, not a gun and complied with the officers with their
     commands for the arrest. But as far as the statement on the 911
     call, that was from an individual that did not see my client with
     the gun, and she confirmed that with the officer with the interview.
     There --

     THE COURT: All at the time -- all at the time that this is occurring
     though, correct? This isn’t afterwards, this is all at the time that
     this is occurring?

     [The Commonwealth]: Correct. It’s ongoing.

     THE COURT: At the same time, this child can hear the other child,
     her sister, saying this is what she’s seeing?

     [Counsel for Appellant]: Yep, this is what she has seen. Yes. But
     it’s not the other child that’s –

     THE COURT: I got it.

     [Counsel for Appellant]: She does -- you can hear her in the
     background, but it’s very, very brief.

     [The Commonwealth]: You can actually hear her having an
     emotional response to being afraid of [Appellant] taking the gun
     out of the home.

     THE COURT: Well, at this point we’ll permit it. But we’ll deal with
     this again when we get to the point that they’re gonna play it.

     [Counsel for Appellant]: Very good. And maybe if we can just
     even listen to it prior to the ruling. It’s only six minutes and 45
     seconds.

     THE COURT: That’s fine.

     [Counsel for Appellant]: Thank you.

     THE COURT: Anything else? Nothing else?

     [The Commonwealth]: No, Your Honor.

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      [Counsel for Appellant]: No, Your Honor

N.T., 8/22/22, at 7-11 (some formatting altered).

      Further, at trial, after the Commonwealth authenticated the recording

of the 911 call, which was marked and admitted as Commonwealth’s Exhibit

#3, the Commonwealth requested to play the 911 call for the jury, and the

following exchange occurred:

      [The Commonwealth]: Judge, with that I’d ask to play the 911 call
      for the jury.

      [Counsel for Appellant]: No objection.

      THE COURT: Thank you.

      (Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 3 was played to the jury.)

Id. at 77.

      Based on this exchange, the trial court concluded: “When counsel

advised the court that he had no objection to the Commonwealth introducing

the call, the motion in limine was effectively withdrawn, and the issue was

waived for appeal.” Trial Ct. Op., 1/20/23, at 9.

      After review, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion. The notes of

testimony confirm that the trial court did not make a “definitive ruling” during

the hearing on the motion in limine, and Appellant’s counsel understood that

fact. See N.T., 8/22/22, at 11. The trial transcript reveals that when the

Commonwealth played the 911 call, Appellant stated that he had “no

objection.” See id. at 77.     Indeed, Appellant made no further objection

concerning the 911 call. On this record, we are constrained to conclude that

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the issue is waived. See Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Bruce, 916

A.2d at 671. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief, and we affirm the

judgment of sentence.

      In any event, even if Appellant had properly objected and preserved the

issue for appeal, we would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion. The trial court opined that if the issue had been preserved, there

was no abuse of discretion in admitting the 911 call. The trial court stated:

      Assuming, arguendo, that the issue was properly preserved, the
      911 call is not inadmissible hearsay. Appellant asserts K.L. did
      not witness Appellant carrying a firearm, and [K.L.] was only
      repeating the observations of her sister, who did not speak on the
      call, to the operator. Appellant is mistaken.

         Commonwealth: [G.L.], do you remember also talking to the
         dispatcher, the person on the other end of the phone of the
         911 call?

         G.L.: I do remember.

         Commonwealth: Okay. And were you telling that person
         what was happening at the time?

         G.L.: Yes.

      [N.T., 8/22/22,] at 98. The fact that K.L. did not witness Appellant
      with a firearm is undisputed, as is the fact that K.L. spoke to the
      dispatcher about G.L.’s observations. Regardless, K.L. did not
      merely repeat what her sister told her; G.L. relayed her own
      observations of the unfolding event directly to the
      dispatcher. [Id.]

      All statements made by K.L. and G.L. to the 911 dispatcher were
      out-of-court statements, including K.L.’s statements reiterating
      G.L.’s observations.     Further, the record reflects that the
      Commonwealth sought to admit and publish the call to the jury
      for the truth of the matter asserted, that Appellant was in fact in
      physical possession of a firearm. As such, the call is hearsay if it
      does not meet the requirements for an exception to the rule
      against hearsay.

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                                  *     *      *

       Here, K.L. and G.L. did not call for help after the events of
       December 14, 2021, concluded. When Appellant walked out of
       the house, shotgun in hand, G.L. ran to her older sister, told her
       what happened, and together, they immediately called 911.
       Here, the possible hearsay satisfies the requirements for the
       present sense impression exception.       The statements and
       observations communicated between K.L. and G.L., K.L. and the
       dispatcher, and G.L. and the dispatcher, were all made
       contemporaneously, or as near to as possible, and the timing of
       the call was immediately preceding G.L.’s observation of her
       father leaving the house with a shotgun. All other statements or
       observations made to the dispatcher by K.L. and G.L. were given
       as the events took place. The 911 call and its contents meet the
       requirements for the exception to the rule against hearsay,
       present sense impression, and as such the call was properly
       admitted and published to the jury.

Trial Ct. Op., 1/20/23, at 9-11 (some citations omitted and some formatting

altered).

       After review, we note that the record reflects that Kristie Burkett, the

quality assurance supervisor from the Lancaster Countywide Communications

911 call center, authenticated the recording of the 911 call and testified that

two girls spoke during the 911 call. See N.T., 8/22/22, at 79. Moreover,

the trial court concluded that both K.L. and G.L. spoke on the 911 call and

expressed the events at or near the time they were perceiving them. Trial Ct.

Op., 1/20/23, at 9-10. Further, the record reflects that both K.L. and G.L

testified that they spoke during the 911 call concerning their observations at

or near the time they were perceiving them. See N.T., 8/22/22, at 98; 102-

103.

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       Review of the 911 call confirms that both K.L. and G.L., while

experiencing the events of December 14, 2021, explained and described the

event as they perceived it,2 and they both spoke during the 911 call.3 Indeed,

K.L. relayed to the 911 dispatcher what was occurring at the house at the time

the events were occurring, and at one minute and twenty-one seconds into

the 911 call, G.L. stated: “I don’t know where Mom went, and I don’t know

where [Appellant] went.        All I--the last time I saw [Appellant] was with a

shotgun, and he told me to leave him alone after I asked him what he was

doing with the shotgun.” Commonwealth Exhibit #3.4

       On this record, had Appellant properly preserved this issue, we would

conclude that no relief is due, and we would agree with the trial court’s

alternative rationale from its Rule 1925(a) opinion finding that K.L.’s and

G.L.’s statements concerning what they saw and recorded in the 911 call were

____________________________________________

2 See Pa.R.E. 803(1).

3 On February 15, 2023, the parties stipulated that the disposition of
Appellant’s appeal would require consideration of Commonwealth Exhibit #3,
the 911 call, and police video marked as Commonwealth Exhibit #6. See
Stipulation, 2/15/23.

4 Additionally, the audio from Commonwealth Exhibit #6 reveals that at twelve

minutes and six seconds into the dash-cam recording, the police provided
Miranda warnings, Appellant was asked if he had possessed a gun during the
incident, and Appellant responded in the affirmative. Commonwealth Exhibit
#6. Further, at fifteen minutes and thirty-six seconds into the recording,
Appellant also stated that he hid the gun that he possessed, and the police
located a gun inside a shed where Appellant said he placed it. Id.; see also
N.T., 8/22/22, at 133, 137, 151.

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admissible under the present-sense-impression exception to the general rule

against hearsay. See Pa.R.E. 803(1) & cmt.5

       For these reasons, we agree with the trial court that Appellant waived

his claim that the 911 call constituted inadmissible hearsay.      Accordingly,

Appellant is due no relief, and we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/23/2023

____________________________________________

5 To the extent that K.L.’s statement concerning what G.L. said constitute
double hearsay, both levels of hearsay fall within the present-sense
impression exception. See Laich, 777 A.2d at 1060; Pa.R.E. 805.

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