Court Opinion

ID: 9791506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:12:34.86861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:33.432518
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I concur in the judgment of reversal and agree that the evidence was sufficient to justify the trier of fact in determining that the H. P. Garin Co. had given its consent to the operation by Cahill of the Ford pickup truck at the time and place of the accident which is the subject of this action. In my opinion it was not necessary for plaintiffs to go further than to establish the fact that the automobile came into Cahill’s possession lawfully, and that he had the permission of the owner to operate it upon the highway, in order to fasten liability upon the owner for damages resulting from its negligent operation.
The language of section 402 of the Vehicle Code is clear and is not susceptible to the interpretation that an owner may give his permission to the operation by a third person of his automobile upon a public highway and restrict his liability for the negligent operation thereof by limiting such operation to time or place. The obvious purpose of the Legislature in the enactment of said section was to protect persons who might be injured as the result of the negligent operation of automobiles by persons other than the owners thereof who are operating the same with the permission of such owners. When a person entrusts the operation of his automobile to a third person out of his presence, he has placed in the hands of such third *326person an instrumentality which may be used to cause injury or death to innocent persons who may become victims of his negligent use of such instrumentality. For this reason, the Legislature wisely saw fit to place liability upon the owner for such negligent operation. If the Legislature had intended that the owner should have the right to limit his liability by restricting the operation of such automobile to a specific time or place, it could have so stated, but it did not do so for obvious reasons. The protection which the statute was designed to afford would be clearly reduced by permitting the owner to so limit his liability. The owner can protect himself by insurance against any risk he may assume by permitting the operation of his automobile by third persons, while a victim of the negligent operation of such automobile suffers the same loss whether the automobile is being operated with or without the permission of the owner.
In my opinion such eases as Henrietta v. Evans, 10 Cal.2d 526 [75 P.2d 1051], and Engstrom v. Auburn Auto. Sales Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64 [77 P.2d 1059], are contrary to the intention clearly expressed by the Legislature by its enactment of section 402 of the Vehicle Code and should be overruled. The views expressed by the court in those cases indicates that the trend of the philosophy of the law at that time was to protect the owner of the automobile who voluntarily permitted a third person to make such use of it that an innocent victim was caused to suffer damages which would not have occurred except for the owner’s voluntary act in permitting the use of such instrumentality by a third person. In my opinion the Henrietta and Engstrom cases were erroneously decided. The basic concept and philosophy underlying these decisions is out of harmony with the purpose and object of the legislation embraced within section 402 of the Vehicle Code, and this court should now declare the law to be that owners of automobiles who voluntarily permit their operation by third persons are liable to persons who suffer injuries as the result of the negligent operation of such automobiles regardless of whether the persons operating such automobiles violate the instructions of the owners as to time, place, or manner of such operation.