Court Opinion

ID: 9391298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 20:00:47.081075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:40.635698
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12818    Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 05/01/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12818
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       IVAN E. APONTE,
                                                     Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,
       ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
       U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,

                                                 Defendants-Appellees.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Middle District of Georgia
USCA11 Case: 22-12818      Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 05/01/2023     Page: 2 of 9

       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12818

                      D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00193-CDL
                           ____________________

       Before WILSON, ANDERSON, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Ivan E. Aponte, a former civilian employee of the Army,
       sued the Secretary of the Army, the U.S. Attorney General, and the
       U.S. Attorney’s Office for discrimination in violation of Title VII of
       the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in
       Employment Act (“ADEA”). Aponte, proceeding pro se, appeals
       the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for failure to exhaust
       his administrative remedies. On appeal, Aponte argues that
       unforeseen extraordinary circumstances prevented him from
       timely filing his formal complaint with the Equal Employment
       Opportunity (“EEO”) Office. After thorough review, we affirm.
                             I.     BACKGROUND
              On October 1, 2018, the Army hired Aponte to work as an
       internal medicine physician at the Martin Army Community
       Hospital at Fort Benning, Georgia. A few months later, on
       February 15, 2019, the Army terminated Aponte’s employment for
       failure to maintain appropriate clinical privileges.
             On March 6, 2019, Aponte contacted an EEO Counselor in
       the Army’s EEO Office. Aponte alleged that he was discriminated
       against on the basis of his race, sex, age, and national origin and
       subjected to a hostile work environment. On April 4, 2019, the
USCA11 Case: 22-12818     Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 05/01/2023    Page: 3 of 9

       22-12818               Opinion of the Court                        3

       EEO Office held its final interview with Aponte. At that time, the
       EEO Counselor advised Aponte in writing of his right to file a
       formal complaint of discrimination within 15 days.
              On April 20, 2019, Aponte mailed his formal complaint,
       which was received by the EEO Office on April 24, 2019. On May
       2, 2019, the EEO Office advised Aponte that it was dismissing his
       formal complaint because it was not timely filed.
             On December 15, 2020, Aponte, proceeding pro se, filed this
       lawsuit. A few weeks later, on January 8, 2021, Aponte amended
       his complaint. Aponte alleged that, while employed at Fort
       Benning, the Army discriminated against him because of his race,
       sex, national origin, religion, age, and protected conduct and
       created a hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII and
       the ADEA.
              On November 22, 2021, the defendants moved to dismiss
       the amended complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
       Procedure 12(b)(6), for Aponte’s failure to exhaust administrative
       remedies before filing suit. In opposition, Aponte urged the district
       court to apply equitable tolling because (1) his daughter had been
       sexually assaulted in late March 2019, (2) he fully cooperated with
       the EEO Office’s investigation of his discrimination claims, (3) an
       EEO Office employee refused to accept his formal complaint on
       April 19 when he visited the EEO Office and instead told him to
       await an email with “further instructions,” and (4) that same EEO
       Office employee did not respond when Aponte asked if the 15-day
       deadline could be extended because it fell on Good Friday.
USCA11 Case: 22-12818         Document: 17-1   Date Filed: 05/01/2023    Page: 4 of 9

       4                         Opinion of the Court              22-12818

               On May 5, 2022, the district court ordered the parties “to
       conduct very limited discovery on the issue of what
       precisely . . . happened on April 19, 2019—who Aponte met, what
       (if anything) Aponte tried to file, and what Aponte was told.” The
       district court also ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing
       after the close of the limited discovery period. Aponte apparently
       did not participate in discovery, and he filed an untimely
       supplemental brief.
              On July 7, 2022, the district court granted defendants’
       motion to dismiss, finding that (1) Aponte had mailed his complaint
       to the EEO Office on April 20, which was one day after the deadline
       of April 19, and (2) Aponte had shown no extraordinary
       circumstances that warranted the application of equitable tolling.
       The district court entered final judgment, and Aponte timely
       appealed.
                        II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
              “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a Rule
       12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting the
       complaint’s allegations as true and construing them in the light
       most favorable to the plaintiff.” Newbauer v. Carnival Corp., 26
       F.4th 931, 934 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). We
       review de novo a district court’s denial of equitable tolling, but we
       are bound by the district court’s findings of fact unless they are
       clearly erroneous. Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148,
       1153 (11th Cir. 2005).
USCA11 Case: 22-12818      Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 05/01/2023     Page: 5 of 9

       22-12818               Opinion of the Court                         5

                               III.   DISCUSSION
       A.    Time Requirements
              Before an aggrieved federal employee may seek relief
       through the filing of a civil action in federal court, he or she must
       first seek relief in the agency that has allegedly engaged in
       discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b). “This requirement is
       not a technicality; rather, it is part and parcel of the congressional
       design to vest in the federal agencies and officials engaged in hiring
       and promoting personnel primary responsibility for maintaining
       nondiscrimination in employment.” Grier v. Sec’y of Army, 799
       F.2d 721, 724 (11th Cir. 1986) (alteration adopted) (quotation marks
       omitted).
              The EEO Commission has promulgated regulations that
       govern employment at various federal agencies. See 29 C.F.R.
       § 1614.101 et seq. These regulations set forth the procedures and
       time deadlines that employees must follow in presenting
       discrimination claims to federal agencies. Ramirez v. Sec’y, U.S.
       Dep’t of Transp., 686 F.3d 1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2012). These
       regulations provide that an aggrieved employee alleging
       discrimination must consult an EEO Counselor within 45 days of
       the effective date of the alleged discriminatory personnel action. 29
       C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). The purpose of this requirement is to
       allow the agency the opportunity to investigate the claim internally
       and “try to informally resolve the matter.” See id. § 1614.105(a).
USCA11 Case: 22-12818        Document: 17-1        Date Filed: 05/01/2023        Page: 6 of 9

       6                         Opinion of the Court                     22-12818

              Within 30 days of the date the employee first contacted the
       EEO Office, the EEO Counselor must conduct a final interview
       with the employee. Id. § 1614.105(d). If the employee’s claims
       remain unresolved, then the EEO Counselor must notify the
       employee in writing of his right to file a formal discrimination
       complaint. Id. 1 Aponte does not dispute that he received notice of
       that right on April 4, 2019.
              Then, within 15 days of receiving that written notice from
       the EEO Counselor, the employee must file his formal complaint
       with the agency against which he alleges discrimination. Id.
       § 1614.106(a)–(c).
              The employee’s failure to comply with any of these time
       limits requires the agency to dismiss the complaint. Id.
       § 1614.107(a)(2). However, the administrative deadlines are not
       jurisdictional prerequisites and are subject to waiver, estoppel, and
       equitable tolling. Id. § 1614.604(c).
             Generally, equitable tolling of a limitations period applies
       when the plaintiff demonstrates that an inequitable event
       prevented his timely action. Booth v. Carnival Corp., 522 F.3d
       1148, 1150 (11th Cir. 2008). In other words, “equitable tolling

       1 The notice must inform the employee “of the right to file a discrimination
       complaint within 15 days of receipt of the notice, of the appropriate official
       with whom to file a complaint[,] and of the [employee’s] duty to assure that
       the agency is informed immediately if the [employee] retains counsel or a
       representative.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(d).
USCA11 Case: 22-12818      Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 05/01/2023     Page: 7 of 9

       22-12818               Opinion of the Court                         7

       requires the party seeking tolling to prove (1) that he has been
       pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
       circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”
       Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 971 (11th Cir.
       2016) (quotation marks omitted). “In determining whether a
       plaintiff meets this burden, we must keep in mind that equitable
       tolling is an extraordinary remedy which should be extended only
       sparingly.” Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)
       (cleaned up).
       B.    Aponte’s Formal Complaint Was Untimely and Equitable
             Tolling Was Not Warranted
               Aponte’s formal complaint was not timely filed with the
       Army’s EEO Office. Because Aponte received written notice of his
       right to file a formal complaint on April 4, 2019, the 15-day deadline
       for filing a formal complaint was April 19, 2019. See 29 C.F.R.
       § 1614.604(d). Although Aponte completed and signed his formal
       complaint on April 19, it was not postmarked until April 20 or
       received until April 24. Under the regulations, a document is
       “deemed timely if it is received or postmarked before the
       expiration of the applicable filing period.” Id. § 1614.604(b).
       Accordingly, Aponte’s mailing (and thereby filing) of his formal
       complaint on April 20 fell outside the 15-day period and was
       untimely under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(b).
             The crux of Aponte’s appeal, however, is that extraordinary
       circumstances should excuse his late filing. Specifically, Aponte
       argues that (1) he was “very cooperative” with the EEO Office
USCA11 Case: 22-12818         Document: 17-1        Date Filed: 05/01/2023         Page: 8 of 9

       8                          Opinion of the Court                      22-12818

       investigation; (2) the deadline for filing his formal complaint fell on
       a religious holiday (i.e., Good Friday), so he should be given a
       reasonable accommodation; and (3) the Army misled him. 2 Based
       on these reasons, Aponte contends that “there is enough plausible
       data to apply the equitable doctrine in [his] favor.”
              We disagree. In his supplemental brief before the district
       court, Aponte explained that he went to the EEO Office at Fort
       Benning on April 19, and an EEO Office employee expressly
       encouraged him to mail his formal complaint that day. On appeal,
       Aponte again acknowledges that he was told to mail his formal
       complaint on April 19. Yet Aponte did not mail the formal
       complaint that day as he was encouraged to do. Instead, Aponte
       waited until the next day (April 20) to mail it.
              Aponte offers no explanation for why he did not mail the
       formal complaint on April 19. Since Good Friday is not a legal
       holiday, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(6), the U.S. Postal Service was
       open, and Aponte did not show that he was prevented from
       accessing a postal facility on April 19.

       2 In addition, Aponte makes a passing reference to the fact that he started
       “medications due to a disability on April 13, 2019.” To the extent Aponte is
       offering this information as an additional reason in support of his equitable
       tolling argument, we will not entertain it on appeal because he did not raise it
       before the district court. Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009)
       (“[L]egal theories and arguments not raised squarely before the district court
       cannot be broached for the first time on appeal.”).
USCA11 Case: 22-12818      Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 05/01/2023     Page: 9 of 9

       22-12818                Opinion of the Court                         9

             Moreover, Aponte offers no compelling explanation as to
       how the deadline being on a religious holiday prevented him from
       mailing the formal complaint in the 15 days before the April 19
       deadline. See, e.g., Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1272
       (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a party’s equitable-tolling argument
       where the party’s “motion was late because his lawyer sent it by
       ordinary mail from Atlanta less than a week before it was due in
       Miami” and noting that “the problem was one that [the party’s]
       counsel could have avoided by mailing the motion earlier”).
              Lastly, the district court found that Aponte “did not present
       any evidence that the Army misled him in any way or placed
       unreasonable obstacles in his way that prevented him from filing
       his complaint in a timely manner.” That finding is supported by
       the record and is not clearly erroneous.
                              IV.    CONCLUSION
              For these reasons, we conclude that Aponte has not met his
       burden of showing that some extraordinary circumstance stood in
       the way of his timely filing the formal complaint. Therefore, we
       affirm the district court’s dismissal of Aponte’s complaint for failure
       to exhaust his administrative remedies.
              AFFIRMED.