Court Opinion

ID: 9660254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:08:48.997525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:17.037744
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Chief Justice, concurring. I concur. Whatever may have been the effect of the Criminal Code upon Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-2326, 43-2324 or 41-1208(6) (Repl. 1977), no legislation has in any way impaired or abolished court probation in which the circuit court’s probation postpones acceptance of a guilty plea, retaining jurisdiction, but giving the accused an opportunity to rehabilitate himself. This type of probation was recognized in Cantrell v. State, 258 Ark. 833, 529 S.W. 2d 136, and Maddox v. State, 247 Ark. 553, 446 S.W. 2d 210. As we said in Maddox, we perceived no language in the statutes then in force which limited the power and discretion of the circuit court to delay the acceptance of a guilty plea. The same circuit court whose action was questioned in Maddox and Cantrell is the court from which this appeal is taken. Obviously, that court thinks that subsequent legislation has not affected its powers and discretion in imposing “court probation.” I perceive no language in the statutes adopted after Cantrell was decided that limits that power and discretion. There is no doubt in my mind that the General Assembly could expressly limit or abolish the court probation by postponing a decision whether or not to accept a guilty plea. I insist that it has not. The fact that the imposition of a fine seems inconsistent with the court’s declination to accept appellant’s guilty pleas is immaterial because the court made it clear that if probation was revoked, the guilty pleas would be accepted and he would then be sentenced. The mere fact that appellant’s plea statements indicated that the prosecuting attorney’s recommendation of probation depended upon the payment of a fine in both cases is immaterial. No mention of the fine is included in the statement of the court respecting probation in one of the cases (No. 76-83). Even if there were an apparent inconsistency, the fact would still remain that the pleas of appellants had not been accepted in either case. I have referred to appellant’s pleas as pleas of guilty. The fact that the plea in one case (No. 76-83) was actually nolo contendere is immaterial.