Court Opinion

ID: 9700184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:15:15.25729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:02.216057
License: Public Domain

Cotter, J.
(dissenting). It is difficult to perceive how the analysis of the separation of powers issue and the authorities relied upon in the majority opinion support the conclusion that G-eneral Statutes *525§ 54-86b is an unconstitutional encroachment of an exclusive judicial power. The majority acknowledges the principle that judicial and legislative powers overlap and that “ ‘ [i]t is the province of the legislative department to define rights and prescribe remedies: of the judicial to construe legislative enactments, determine the rights secured thereby, and apply the remedies prescribed.’ Atwood v. Buckingham, 78 Conn. 423, 428, 62 A. 616,” and states that “[t]o be unconstitutional in this context, a statute must not only deal with subject-matter which is within the judicial power, but it must operate in an area which lies exclusively under the control of the courts.” The majority opinion continues: “[SJtatutes purporting to control discovery were part of Connecticut law for many years after the constitution of 1818,” citing cases which delineate areas in which the judicial power has been held to be exclusive. Those eases do not relate, however, to discovery or production of documents for cross-examination, the specific issue before us, but, on the contrary, decided, e.g., that the power over the administration of charitable trusts is now exclusively in the judicial department, not an incident of the legislative branch; Second Ecclesiastical Society v. Attorney General, 133 Conn. 89, 92, 48 A.2d 266; that the appointment of a successor trustee is purely a judicial function; Macy v. Cunningham, 140 Conn. 124, 132, 98 A.2d 800; that the admission of attorneys is a judicial function not subject to control by the legislature; Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 185, 169 A.2d 652; and that the fixing of court fees is clearly a legislative, not a judicial or administrative, function. Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 175, 251 A.2d 49. From the foregoing, without attempting to analogize the rationale of these cases *526to the statute, § 54-86b, the majority opinion concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that discovery is an exclusive judicial power and, therefore, § 54-86b is unconstitutional as a violation of article second of the Connecticut constitution.
The relevant applicable principles in determining the constitutionality of § 54-86b are clear. One claiming that a legislative enactment is invalid because violative of the constitutional separation of powers must establish its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; and a court should make every proper presumption and intendment in favor of the legislation, adopting a construction which will uphold the statute, even though that interpretation may not be the most obvious one. Adams v. Rubinow, supra, 152-53; Snyder v. Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 390, 161 A.2d 770, appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299, 81 S. Ct. 692, 5 L. Ed. 2d 688; 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 109, 175. It is beyond the judicial realm to pass upon the necessity and wisdom of any legislative enactment, the court’s only duty being to determine whether a statute is within the legislative power and does not contravene any constitutional provision. Patterson v. Dempsey, 152 Conn. 431, 444-45, 207 A.2d 739; State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Service Commission, 139 Conn. 102, 111, 90 A.2d 862.
Discovery was regulated by statute until 1931 when the legislature, inter alia, granted authority to the judges of the Superior Court to effectuate the provisions of the disclosure statute. Public Acts 1931, c. 252, Cum. Sup. 1935, § 1659c.1 Until now that power of the General Assembly to enact such legislation has never been challenged as either be*527yond the legislative domain or in contravention of article second of the Connecticut constitution. This legislative sanction has been continued until the present statute which authorizes the judges of the Supreme Court to “effectuate” the statutory provisions. General Statutes $ 52-197.2 Subsequent to the 1931 delegation by the General Assembly of the power to promulgate discovery rules to the Superior and then the Supreme Court, this court has recognized statutory discovery rules, as well .as court rules, as governing the extent of discovery. Stanley Works v. New Britain Redevelopment Agency, 155 Conn. 86, 93, 230 A.2d 9; Peyton v. Werhane, 126 Conn. 382, 386-87, 11 A.2d 800; May v. Young, 125 Conn. 1, 9, 2 A.2d 385. We have said: “It is true that means for the production of evidence and for disclosure generally under our statute and practice afford a measure of relief. See Rev. 1958, §§ 52-143, 52-148, 52-149, 52-152, 52-153, 52-154.” Pottetti v. Clifford, 146 Conn. 252, 262, 150 A.2d 207.
*528In re Appeal of Dattilo, 136 Conn. 488, 492, 72 A.2d 50, fails to support the proposition that discovery is an exclusive judicial power since the source of the inherent rule-making authority was acknowledged to be the common law; id., 493; whereas discovery was an original and inherent power of a court of equity, unknown to the common law. Carten v. Carten, 153 Conn. 603, 611, 219 A.2d 711; Downie v. Nettleton, 61 Conn. 593, 596, 24 A. 977. Consequently, legislation was enacted which did not change the scope of discovery but enabled the courts of law to administer by motion a clearly-defined power of a court of equity. Statutes, 1838, p. 76; Public Acts 1889, c. 22; Downie v. Nettleton, supra.3 It has been stated that because discovery was unavailable at common law, the right to discovery is strictly statutory. Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 2d 449, 459, 81 P.2d 150; DeCourcy v. American Emery Wheel Works, 89 R.I. 450, 453, 153 A.2d 130; 27 C.J.S., Discovery, §69. This is not meant to imply that the constitutional courts in Connecticut are powerless to compel the production of documents at trial absent specific statutory authorization, which production is distinguished from pretrial discovery; Banks v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 79 Conn. 116, 121, 64 A. 14; Katz v. *529Richman, 114 Conn. 165, 171, 158 A. 219;4 but rather to demonstrate that discovery is not an inherent common-law power of the court and that legislative participation in discovery has been recognized in this state for over 150 years since the constitution of 1818, and such participation has never been challenged as violative of the principle of constitutional separation of powers. “A practical construction placed upon a constitutional provision immediately after its adoption and consistently and repeatedly followed by the legislature for over a century thereafter is most persuasive.” Snyder v. Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 386, 161 A.2d 770, appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299, 81 S. Ct. 692, 5 L. Ed. 2d 688; Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 190, 198 A. 746.
Many statutes in Connecticut, other than discovery enactments, affect the inherent discretion of the Superior Court in its control of matters arising during the course of trial. The General Assembly originally changed the prior common-law rule by removing the disability of interested parties to testify and by permitting parties to compel their adversaries to testify. Public Acts 1848, c. 44, 45; Banks v. Connecticut R. & Lighting Co., supra; Bissell v. Beckwith, 32 Conn. 509, 516; Buckingham v. Barnum, 30 Conn. 358, 359; Eld v. Gorham, 20 Conn. 8, 13. One hundred years later this court continued to recognize the legislature’s original *530authority in this area, its power to modify its statutes and its ability to change the rules applied by a judge during trial; despite the fact that these enactments may affect the admissibility of evidence or allow cross-examination in legislatively defined instances. Such statutes have been recognized as binding upon the court. General Statutes §§ 52-145, 52-178; Mendez v. Dorman, 151 Conn. 193, 196-99, 195 A.2d 561; Martyn v. Donlin, 151 Conn. 402, 406, 198 A.2d 700; State v. Marquez, 160 Conn. 47, 49-52, 273 A.2d 689; State v. Bitting, 162 Conn. 1, 9, 10, 291 A.2d 240; State v. Hall, 165 Conn. 599, 605, 345 A.2d 17. Similar observation may be made concerning legislatively-created exceptions to the hearsay rule.5 These statutes have not been viewed, as unconstitutional invasions of judicial power or *531considered as interfering with judicial functions by unreasonably removing or narrowing the traditional discretion of the trial judge.
This court was confronted with the classic separation of powers problem under article second, the possible imposition of nonjudicial duties upon a Superior Court judge in Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 251 A.2d 49. Norwalk Street Ry. Co.’s Appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 582, 593-96, 37 A. 1080. In this context we upheld the statute which prescribed certain administrative and regulatory duties for a superior court judge as probate court administrator. We construed the duties imposed as judicial and stated that “if the Superior Court finds itself significantly interfered with in the orderly conduct of its judicial functions, it has the inherent power to refuse to acquiesce in this imposition on a judge of its court, and in that event, of course, the attempted delegation would fall as an unconstitutional interference with the proper performance, by the Superior Court, of its judicial functions.” Adams v. Rubinow, supra, 160-61. We cited cases therein which have followed Norwalk Street Ry. Co.’s Appeal, and which concluded that the separation of powers issue under article second was the preservation of the judiciary’s independence by disallowing legislative interference in areas long understood to be peculiarly judicial.6 While the language in Adams v. Rubinow is broad, the holding of that case and its supporting precedent do not *532compel the result that merely because .a legislative enactment be deemed procedural, it is not binding on a constitutional court.
It is significant that in many instances this court has acknowledged the validity of procedural legislation. “The legislature unquestionably has the power to enact laws relating to procedure and affecting pending cases.” Lew v. Bray, 81 Conn. 213, 217, 70 A. 628. Against the challenge that a statute which changed the burden of proof in a particular instance amounted to an invasion by the legislature into the field of judicial power and was, therefore, unconstitutional, we noted that “its enactment was fully within the power of the legislative department, notwithstanding its application may, as in this case, vary the ordinary rule of procedure.” Johnson County Savings Bank v. Walker, 79 Conn. 348, 351-52, 65 A. 132; Norwalk Street Ry. Co.’s Appeal, supra, 602; Dawson v. Orange, 78 Conn. 96, 100, 61 A. 101; Atwood v. Buckingham, 78 Conn. 423, 427-28, 62 A. 616; State v. Torello, 103 Conn. 511, 519-20, 131 A. 429; LeBlanc v. Grillo, 129 Conn. 378, 384-85, 28 A.2d 127; Kelsall v. Kelsall, 139 Conn. 163, 168, 90 A.2d 878; and see cases in preceding paragraphs relating to discovery, admission of evidence and cross-examination. The history of legislative authorization for judicial rule-making, the legislature’s authority to make procedural rules and its relation to the court’s inherent rule-making ability were discussed in In re Appeal of Dattilo, 136 Conn. 488, 492, 494, 72 A.2d 50, in which it was indicated that the statute in question was within both the legislative power and the court’s inherent rule-making ability. The court stated (p. 494): “The statute makes admissible in evidence on the hearing of an appeal by the Superior Court the reports of *533the investigation it directs to be made; General Statutes § 2815 [Eev. 1949]; and the rule merely amplifies that provision to include reports of investigations made for the use of the Juvenile Court.”
The Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he fine between the legislative and judicial function is often hard to definitely ascertain”; Preveslin v. Derby & Ansonia Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 145, 151 A. 518; and has reviewed the practice which our court has pursued in this area, succinctly describing its “long crystalized views of the proper limits of the judicial field in its relation to the other co-ordinate branches of government,” as follows: “Our courts have carefully avoided encroachments upon the functions of the legislature, and the rules of practice and procedure under the Practice Act and its amendments have been strictly limited to carrying this legislation into effect, and giving full practical operative force to its provisions. Neither new remedies, nor the extension or curtailment of existing ones have been attempted or suggested by the rules, and this is in manifest harmony with the restrictions which furnish the working method of our practice. ... If the courts are to exercise broader powers in this respect, the enlargement of their authority should come from legislative sanction rather than from judicial initiative.” Ackerman v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 91 Conn. 500, 505, 100 A. 22.
In an article entitled “The Eule-making Powers of the Judges,” which served as an introduction to the 1951 Practice Book and is cited in Adams v. Rubinow, supra, 157, and Kelsall v. Kelsall, supra, 166, the late Chief Justice Maltbie attempted to reconcile this court’s statement in Ackerman v. Union & New Haven Trust Co. with the court’s *534inherent rule-making authority. He wrote: “Between these two statements there is no essential conflict. In this state, by immemorial usage, the courts have recognized the right of the general assembly to control the causes of action which can be maintained and the procedure which is to be followed in them, although the basis of many recognized actions is to be found solely in the common law. As far as procedure is concerned, the judges have not adopted rules which run counter to laws enacted by the general assembly; but on the other hand, they have not hesitated, and have the inherent right, to promulgate rules in the absence of controlling legislation. Nor should it be forgotten that the independence of the three great departments of our government, the executive, the legislative and the judicial, precludes action by any one of them which prevents another from the proper performance of constitutional functions ; and should the general assembly ever pass an act which unreasonably interferes with the administration of justice in the courts, they would have the constitutional right to disregard it. ‘In the establishment of three distinct departments of government the Constitution, by necessary implication, prescribes those limitations and imposes those duties which are essential to the independence of each and to the performance by each of the powers of which it is made the depositary.’ McGovern v. Mitchell, 78 Conn. 536, 547; State v. Stoddard, 126 Conn. 623, 627.”7 (Emphasis supplied.) Practice Book, 1951, p. XVII.
It is the position of the majority that the fact that the federal Jencks Act, 71 Stat. 595, 18 U.S.C. *535§ 3500, was promulgated by Congress has no bearing on this case because in the federal system the legislative branch has long been held to have the power to make rules of court. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9, 61 S. Ct. 422, 85 L. Ed. 479; Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 253. This contention is not persuasive for two reasons: as demonstrated, legislative participation in procedural rule-making in Connecticut has long been recognized and Congress, like the General Assembly, is subject to the dictates of the principle of the constitutional separation of powers. Compare article second and article fifth, § 1 of the Constitution of 1818, as amended, with articles I and III of the United States constitution. The separation of powers principle applies equally to the United States Supreme Court and to any inferior courts ordained and established by Congress.
While much less detailed than its federal counterpart and thereby arguably allowing the trial court greater discretion in its application, § 54-86b is patterned after the federal act. See 13 H.E. Proc., Pt. 13, Spec. Sess. July, 1969, pp. 31-38.8 9We have stated that where .a state legislative enactment is patterned after a federal statute, the judicial interpretation of the federal act is of great assistance and persuasive force in the interpretation of the state’s statute and that the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of a similarly-worded federal statute is particularly pertinent.9 United Aircraft Corporation v. International Assn, of Machinists, *536161 Conn. 79, 85, 285 A.2d 330; Windsor v. Windsor Police Department Employees Assn., Inc., 154 Conn. 530, 536, 227 A.2d 65. The federal statute has not been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as unconstitutionally circumscribing the discretion of the trial court. Despite its more detailed procedural provisions and similar mandatory language requiring the court to order the prosecution to turn over to the defense related prior statements of prosecution witnesses, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, stated, “[f]inal decision as to production must rest, as it does so very often in procedural and evidentiary matters, within the good sense and experience of the district judge guided by the standards we have outlined, and subject to the appropriately limited review of appellate courts.” Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353, 79 S. Ct. 1217, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1287. In a footnote, the court discussed federal congressional rule-making power, remarking, “[t]he statute as interpreted does not reach any constitutional barrier.” Id., n.ll. Concurring in the result, Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas, stated: “Congress had no thought to invade the traditional discretion of trial judges in evidentiary matters beyond checking extravagant interpretations of our decision in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 [77 S. Ct. 1007,1 L. Ed. 2d 1103].” Id., 361.
Although § 54-86b cannot readily be characterized as either procedural or substantive, it is nonetheless true that an enactment in the area of substantive law would be within the legislative domain. Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 157, 251 A.2d 49. The legislative history of the statute, entitled “An Act *537Concerning the Rights of Accused Persons to Examine Statements,” which is patterned after the federal .act10 and the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Jencks Act in Palermo v. United States, supra, demonstrate that the General Assembly intended to confer upon a criminal defendant a right which would enable the defendant to exercise more effectually his constitutionally guaranteed right of confrontation.11 The act in question, arguably procedural in some contexts, appears distinguishable from a rule which is designed merely to regulate the size of briefs or form of pleadings. Since this statute reasonably can be construed as an attempt by the legislature to confer a substantive statutory right, and the issue herein is the act’s constitutionality, “courts should adopt the construction which will uphold the statute even though that construction may not be the most obvious one. Carilli v. Pension Commission, 154 Conn. 1, 8, 220 A.2d 439; Ferguson v. Stamford, 60 Conn. 432, 447, 22 A. 782; Wilton v. Weston, 48 Conn. 325, 338.” Adams v. Rubinow, supra, 153.
In view of the foregoing, there is a reasonable basis upon which the authority of the General Assembly to enact § 54-86b can be sustained. The record reveals that the defendants moved for the statements of the prosecution witnesses in reliance *538upon the statute. State v. Clemente, supra. No claim has been made that the statements did not relate to their testimony on the witness stand.12 The defendants should have had access to the statements of the prosecution witnesses.

 For a discussion of the development of discovery in Connecticut, see 1 Stephenson, Conn. Civ. Proc. (2d Ed.) § 137.

 The promulgated rules begin at chapter 11, § 72 of the 1934 Practice Book, p. 38, and asterisked to the heading “Disclosures” is a footnote which reads, in part: “*These rules are made under authority given, Gen. Stat. § 5635 [Rev. 1930], as amended; see also §§ 5636-5638.” The statute, Cum. Sup. 1935, § 1659c, was an amendment to Rev. 1930, § 5635. The 1951 Practice Book, chapter 9, § 70, p. 49, wherein the promulgated rules begin, has a similar footnote which reads, in part: “*These rules are made under authority given by Gen. Stat., § 7949; see also §§ 7950-7952.” Rev. 1949, § 7949, stated, inter alia: “[T]he judges of the superior court shall make rules to effectuate the foregoing provisions.” The “foregoing provisions” list in general terms the items discoverable. The present Practice Book discovery rules begin at chapter 8, § 166, p. 114. The footnote contained in the previous two editions is gone but following § 167, a general discovery rule, are parentheses within which reads “See Gen. Stat., § 52-197 and annotations; 1963.” General Statutes § 52-197 reads, inter alia: “The judges of the supreme court shall make rules to effectuate the foregoing provisions.” According to the preface to the Practice Book, p. IV, “[t]he origin of each rule appears in parentheses at the end of it.”

 It is pointed out in 1 Stephenson, Conn. Civ. Proc. (2d Ed.) § 137, that by the end of the eighteenth century most equitable jurisdiction had been delegated to the courts of law, prior to the 1818 constitution. Until the 1836 legislation (Statutes, 1838, p. 76), however, the independent bill remained necessary to compel the testimony of adverse witnesses because interested parties were not competent to testify. The ability of interested parties to testify on their own behalf and call adverse witnesses was legislatively authorized and understood to change the prior common-law rule. Public Aets 1848, c. 44, 45.

 The inherent power of the eonrt to compel production of documents at trial was recognized in Banks v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 79 Conn. 116, 121, 64 A. 14, as arising from the powers of courts to ascertain the truth in connection with the enabling statute and its consequences. The enabling statute referred to is the legislative authorization to a party to compel the testimony of his adversary. This case was relied upon in Katz v. Richman, 114 Conn. 165, 171, 158 A. 219.

 The original act concerning entries and memoranda of deceased persons was enacted in 1850; Public Acts 1850, c. 4; and is presently General Statutes § 52-172. The statute has been viewed as remedial, in derogation of the common law and binding upon the courts. The court’s duty has been looked upon as how best to effectuate the legislative intent. Plisko v. Morgan, 148 Conn. 510, 512, 172 A.2d 621; Graybill v. Plant, 138 Conn. 397, 405, 85 A.2d 238; Joanis v. Engstrom, 135 Conn. 248, 251, 63 A.2d 151; Walter v. Sperry, 86 Conn. 474, 477, 85 A. 739; Mulcahy v. Mulcahy, 84 Conn. 659, 662, 81 A. 242; Pixley v. Eddy, 56 Conn. 336, 340, 15 A. 758; Bissell v. Beckwith, 32 Conn. 509, 516; Douglas v. Chapin, 26 Conn. 76, 91, 92. The modern business entry statute, presently General Statutes § 52-180, was originally enacted as Cum. Sup. 1935, § 1675c. The authority of the General Assembly to enact this legislation has not been questioned. The statute has been interpreted as broadening the prior statutorily authorized shop book rule and creating the mechanism pursuant to which, subject to proper judicial construction, business entries are admissible in court. Kelly v. Sheehan, 158 Conn. 281, 284, 259 A.2d 605; Sheary v. Hallock’s of Middletown, Inc., 149 Conn. 188, 195, 177 A.2d 680; D’Amato v. Johnston, 140 Conn. 54, 56-62, 97 A.2d 893; Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., Inc., 125 Conn. 92, 99-103, 3 A.2d 224; and as establishing a general rule of admissibility applicable both to criminal and civil cases. State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 598, 18 A.2d 895.

 Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 185, 169 A.2d 652; State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 231-32, 140 A.2d 863; Bridgeport Public Library & Reading Room v. Burroughs Home, 85 Conn. 309, 339-21, 82 A. 582; Styles v. Tyler, 64 Conn. 432, 444, 448-49, 30 A. 165.

 For a general discussion of the legislative rule-making power in a separation of powers context, see 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 128; 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, §239, and cases cited.

 See Goldberg and Cooper, “The Eight of An Accused to Examine Statements Under Section 54-86b of the General Statutes: The Scope of Its Application,” 45 Conn. B.J., 255, 257.

 Compare General Statutes § 54-86b with 18 Ü.S.C. § 3500, (a), (b) and (d).

See 13 H.B. Proc., Pt. 13, Spec. Sess. July, 1969, pp. 31-38; Goldberg and Cooper, op. eit., footnote 8, supra.

Mr. Justice Brennan, the author of Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 77 S. Ct. 1007, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1103, in his concurrence in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-63, 79 S. Ct. 1217, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1287, stated: “It is true that our holding in Jencks was not put on constitutional grounds, for it did not have to be; hut it would he idle to say that the commands of the Constitution were not close to the surface of the decision; indeed, the Congress recognized its constitutional overtones in the debates on the statute.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Were such a claim made by the state, according to the settled practice under the federal act, the trial judge should make a determination concerning the relevance of the statements. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 354, 79 S. Ct. 1217, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1287; United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536, 546 (2d Cir.); United States v. Sten, 342 F.2d 491, 493-94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 854, 86 S. Ct. 103, 15 L. Ed. 2d 91.