Court Opinion

ID: 9836789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:03.106136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.892981
License: Public Domain

GIERKE, Judge,
with whom
CRAWFORD, Chief Judge, joins (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority that it was error to permit LtCol Kopp to opine on whether the language was “indecent.” I agree with the majority’s holding that it was error to permit LtCol Kopp to testify that appellant’s conduct was service discrediting, but I do not join in the majority’s rationale. In my view, LtCol Kopp may well have been qualified to opine on whether the conduct was service discrediting, but the Government failed to lay a foundation for his testimony by showing that his duties as squadron commander included interaction with the civilian community that would enable him to gauge public reaction to appellant’s conduct.
I disagree with several statements in the majority opinion. First, I disagree with the majority’s holding that it was error to permit LtCol Kopp to opine that appellant’s conduct *355was prejudicial to good order and discipline. By virtue of his position as appellant’s commander, he was clearly competent to gauge the impact of appellant’s conduct on the unit, to know whether appellant’s effectiveness as a noncommissioned officer (NCO) was compromised, and to know the extent to which other NCOs and airmen were affected. The impact on LtCol Kopp’s command was relevant to the question whether appellant’s misconduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline in the larger military community, beyond appellant’s unit. See United, States v. Hullett, 40 MJ 189, 193 (CMA 1994).’ This Court has considered the testimony of unit members in other cases involving prejudice to good order and discipline. See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 40 MJ 420 (CMA 1994). It has considered the testimony of the chain of command on the question whether an officer’s conduct was “unbecoming.” See, e.g., United States v. Guaglione, 27 MJ 268 (CMA 1988).
Second, I do not share the majority’s doubts whether the subject matter of LtCol Kopp’s opinion was “outside the ken of the average military judge or member.” 53 MJ at 353. The average military judge or member would not be a member of appellant’s unit and, thus, not as familiar with the impact of appellant’s conduct on the unit.
Third, I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that LtCol Kopp’s testimony was objectionable because he did not fully articulate the reasons for his opinion. If the defense desired to test the basis for LtCol Kopp’s opinions, they had ample opportunity to cross-examine him about it.
Finally, I disagree with the suggestion that LtCol Kopp’s testimony “could foster the appearance of unlawful command influence in the eyes of the public.” 53 MJ at 353. This case was tried before a military judge who was senior to LtCol Kopp and not in LtCol Kopp’s chain of command. No reasonable observer would see unlawful command influence in this case.
I agree with the majority that an error arising from LtCol Kopp’s testimony was harmless. Accordingly, I concur in the result.