Court Opinion

ID: 9906345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 20:01:44.344875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:15.864973
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
                C OURT OF C RIMINAL A PPEALS
                       ________________________

                           No. ACM 40351
                       ________________________

                         UNITED STATES
                             Appellee
                                  v.
                       Andrew M. DADDARIO
            Staff Sergeant (E-5), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                       ________________________

       Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                      Decided 1 December 2023
                       ________________________

Military Judge: Matthew P. Stoffel.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 24 May 2022 by GCM convened at Hill Air
Force Base, Utah. Sentence entered by military judge on 18 August
2022: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 24 months, reduction to
E-1, and a reprimand.
For Appellant: Major David L. Bosner, USAF.
For Appellee: Colonel Naomi P. Dennis, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel
Thomas J. Alford, USAF; Captain Olivia B. Hoff, USAF; Captain Joce-
lyn Q. Wright, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS, and WARREN, Appellate Military
Judges.
Judge WARREN delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior
Judge RICHARDSON, and Judge DOUGLAS joined.
                         ________________________

    This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
   precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                      ________________________
                     United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

WARREN, Judge:
    A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted Appellant, in
accordance with his pleas and pursuant to a plea agreement, of two specifica-
tions of assault consummated by a battery (one against his spouse SD and one
against his intimate partner KR) and two specifications of domestic violence
(one against his spouse SD and one against another intimate partner TD), in
violation of Articles 128 and 128b, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
10 U.S.C. §§ 928, 928b.1,2 The military judge sentenced Appellant, within the
agreed-upon sentencing parameters established in Appellant’s plea agree-
ment, to a dishonorable discharge, confinement for 24 months, reduction to the
grade of E-1, and a reprimand.3 The convening authority took no action on the
findings or sentence.
    Appellant raises three issues on appeal, which we have consolidated as fol-
lows: (1) whether the military judge erred when he admitted a written victim
unsworn statement from KR during the sentencing hearing; and (2) whether
trial defense counsel was ineffective by (a) failing to object to the admission of
that statement when KR was not physically present to offer it at the court-
martial, (b) referencing the wrong law in his clemency memorandum to the
convening authority, and (c) advising Appellant, after sentence was adjudged
in his court-martial, that Appellant would “automatically” earn two-for-one
post-trial confinement credit for each day spent in the Weber County Jail.4
   Finding no error that materially prejudiced a substantial right of Appel-
lant, we affirm the findings and sentence.

1 The charged time frame for the assault consummated by a battery against SD was

“on or about 14 January 2018.” As such, the applicable punitive article is found in the
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.) (2016 MCM). Unless indicated
otherwise, all other references to the UCMJ and the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.)
are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.) (2019 MCM).
2 The charged time frame for both domestic violence convictions occurred after 1 Jan-

uary 2019; as such, Article 128b, UCMJ, to the 2019 MCM, applies. See National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 532(a)–(b), 132
Stat. 1636, 1759–60 (2018).
3 A total of six charges consisting of 11 specifications were referred against Appellant.

Pursuant to the plea agreement, the convening authority dismissed all remaining
charges and specifications with prejudice after the entry of sentence for the offenses to
which Appellant pleaded guilty.
4 Issue (3) was raised pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A.

1982).

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                     United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

                                 I. BACKGROUND
    Appellant physically assaulted his spouse and two intimate partners on
three separate occasions between January 2018 and August 2020. First, Ap-
pellant kicked his then wife SD in the face in January 2018 (Specification 1 of
Charge IV) and pointed a firearm at her head while he held his finger on the
trigger for 15 seconds in December 2019 (Specification 1 of Charge V)—the lat-
ter incident causing her to have a panic attack. On or about 5 April 2020, Ap-
pellant strangled his then ex-girlfriend TD after Appellant invited TD to his
house claiming he was having suicidal ideations (Specification 3 of Charge V).5
Once TD arrived, Appellant sought to reinitiate their brief dating relationship.
When she declined, Appellant strangled her with a force of “7” on a 1-to-10
scale and with such force that she struggled to get free of his choke hold. As
she struggled to break free, TD heard a “popping noise” in her left ear followed
by pain that persisted for three to four weeks. Finally, over the course of one
evening in August 2020, Appellant forcefully grabbed and held his then girl-
friend KR (a civilian) by the wrists four separate times after an argument
where she informed Appellant that she wanted to end their three-month-long
dating relationship. The wrist grabbing occurred in conjunction with Appellant
repeatedly holding KR on his bed as she attempted to leave the house (Specifi-
cation 3 of Charge IV).
    On 18 May 2022, Appellant entered into a plea agreement and agreed to
plead guilty to Specifications 1 and 3 of Charge IV and Specifications 1 and 3
of Charge V. In exchange for his guilty pleas to the four specifications, the con-
vening authority and Appellant agreed to a dishonorable discharge and agreed
to confinement limitations. The plea agreement specified a sentence limitation
of no less than 4 months and no more than 6 months for Specification 1 of
Charge IV, and no less than 12 months and no more than 24 months for each
of the remaining guilty-plea offenses, with all terms of confinement to run con-
currently. There were no other limitations on the sentence.
                                  II. DISCUSSION
A. Victim Impact Statement
    Appellant contends that the military judge committed plain error when he
did not sua sponte exclude KR’s entire written victim unsworn statement be-
cause neither KR nor an “authorized representative” was physically present at
the court-martial to deliver her statement during presentencing proceedings.
For the first time on appeal, Appellant argues that a victim’s right to be rea-
sonably heard is tethered to the physical presence of the crime victim or de-
signee at the presentencing proceeding pursuant to Rule for Courts-Martial

5 TD was an active-duty military servicemember at the time of this incident.

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                    United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

(R.C.M.) 1001(a)(3)(A). Appellant further argues that even if physical presence
of the victim was not required, the military judge ought still to have refused
admission of KR’s victim unsworn statement at sentencing because surround-
ing circumstances adduced at trial failed to evince KR’s clear intent to have it
offered at Appellant’s court-martial. We disagree. Instead, we hold that Appel-
lant waived this issue when his trial defense counsel made a knowing and tac-
tical decision not to object upon these grounds at trial when given an oppor-
tunity to do so. Further, we choose not to pierce that waiver.
   1. Additional Background
    The military judge received a total of three victim unsworn statements at
trial, one each from SD, TD, and KR. But whereas both SD and TD were rep-
resented by victims’ counsel, KR was not. SD’s counsel offered SD’s written
victim impact statement as a court exhibit on her behalf and SD read it verba-
tim for the court. TD’s counsel admitted TD’s written victim impact statement
as a court exhibit on her behalf, but neither she nor her counsel read it verba-
tim for the court. Trial counsel offered KR’s four-page, signed and dated victim
impact statement to the court-martial. Given the physical absence of KR, prior
to admitting KR’s victim unsworn statement, the military judge asked if there
was “something that would reflect a desire that [KR] be heard in this proceed-
ing through this written statement[.]” Trial counsel then provided Appellate
Exhibit III: an email correspondence between trial counsel and KR on 6 May
2022 containing KR’s submission of her typed, four-page, unsworn statement
as an attachment. That email correspondence reflected trial counsel expressly
advising KR of the trial date, plea negotiations, and of KR’s right to submit a
victim unsworn statement.
    In transmitting her written victim unsworn statement to trial counsel, KR
relayed both her determination to write it and her fear in submitting it. The
entirety of KR’s brief email transmittal to trial counsel reads:
       Hello [trial counsel],
       Here is the statement for this case. Let me know if you could ac-
       cess the document.
       Would [Appellant] read my statement? I would be extremely un-
       comfortable if he can. I just don’t want him to come for me. I
       [had] been putting this off when we first talk[ed] about it be-
       cause of my experiences I have with him. We left [o]n really hor-
       rible terms. I knocked it out to rip off the band-aide [sic]. I know
       there is stuff in place for that not to happen but it scares me to
       the core to [sic] the possibility.
(Emphasis added).

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                     United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

    Trial defense counsel raised no objection to how KR’s statement was pro-
vided to the court (i.e., trial counsel physically delivering it), nor any objection
based on KR’s absence in the courtroom. In his post-trial affidavit concerning
this issue, Appellant’s circuit defense counsel, Major (Maj) AB, explains:
       If I were to object, I believed that the legal office could and would
       find a way to correct the foundational defects mentioned by ap-
       pellate defense counsel. If the legal office were to in fact provide
       live testimony or additional foundation, such testimony would
       be more impactful than the unsworn statement as provided.
    Instead, the only objections to KR’s written victim unsworn statement at
trial concerned some discrete objections to the substance of the statement. To
resolve those objections, trial counsel and trial defense counsel agreed to redact
some portions of the unsworn statement. After noting the resolution of those
objections on the record and without further objection, the military judge ad-
mitted KR’s victim unsworn statement. Trial counsel did not read KR’s written
victim unsworn statement into the record.
    Sentencing arguments by both trial counsel and trial defense counsel fo-
cused primarily on the stipulated facts and Appellant’s statements during his
guilty plea inquiry. Trial counsel made little use of KR’s victim impact state-
ment—it received a passing mention consisting of only three transcribed lines
of trial counsel’s sentencing argument that spanned 111 lines total.6 In the end,
the military judge sentenced Appellant to the minimum period of confinement
permitted under the plea agreement for the offense against KR: 12 months.
   2. Law
       a. Waiver
    When an appellant does not raise an objection to the admission of evidence
at trial, we first must determine whether the appellant waived or forfeited the
objection. See United States v. Sweeney, 70 M.J. 296, 303−04 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
“‘Waiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make
the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.’” United States v. Gladue, 67 M.J. 311, 313
(C.A.A.F. 2009) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (ad-
ditional citation omitted)). While appellate courts ordinarily do not ascribe
waiver based upon mere failure to object, a purposeful decision not to object,
when cognizant of the underlying issue, may constitute waiver. United States

6 The three lines read: “Your Honor, in her statement, [KR] again talks about the small

amount of physical pain of her wrists being held and how it left red marks, but she
goes much deeper into the mental anguish that this caused, how to this day she’s still
terrified of [Appellant].”

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                    United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

v. Davis, 79 M.J. 329, 331–32 (C.A.A.F. 2020) (holding where appellant does
not just fail to object but rather affirmatively declines to object to the military
judge’s instructions, and offers no additional instructions, despite counsel’s
knowledge of applicable precedents, appellant waives all objections to the in-
structions); United States v. Swift, 76 M.J. 210, 217 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (holding
that appellant’s failure to object to admission of his confession constituted
waiver); United States v. Campos, 67 M.J. 330, 332 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (holding
that appellant’s entry into a stipulation of expected testimony at trial expressly
waived objection that witness be physically produced for trial, and to the sub-
stance of the stipulation).
    If the appellant waived the objection, then the appellant is “preclude[d] . . .
from raising the issue before either the Court of Criminal Appeals or [the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF)];” however, we
still have an affirmative obligation under Article 66(d), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 866(d), to examine the entire record to determine whether “to leave
an [appellant’s] waiver intact or to correct the error.” United States v. Chin, 75
M.J. 220, 223 (C.A.A.F. 2016). That said, despite this authority “we will only
ignore waiver in the most deserving cases.” United States v. Blanks, No. ACM
38891, 2017 CCA LEXIS 186, at *22 n.11 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 17 Mar. 2017)
(unpub. op.), aff’d, 77 M.J. 239 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
       b. Plain Error
    Where a discrete objection was not waived, but rather merely forfeited,
then a plain error standard of review applies. See United States v. Tyler, 81
M.J. 108, 113 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (“While the military judge is the gatekeeper for
unsworn victim statements, an accused nonetheless has a duty to state the
specific ground for objection in order to preserve a claim of error on appeal.”).
Thus, for forfeited objections at trial, we review claims of erroneous admission
of a victim unsworn statement for plain error. United States v. Halter, No. ACM
S32666 (f rev), 2022 CCA LEXIS 254, at *10–11 ((A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 4 May
2022) (unpub. op.). Under the plain error standard, an appellant must show
“(1) there was an error; (2) it was plain or obvious; and (3) the error materially
prejudiced a substantial right.” Id. at *11 (quoting United States v. Erickson,
65 M.J. 221, 223 (C.A.A.F. 2007)).
    In assessing for possible error, we review de novo a military judge’s inter-
pretation of R.C.M. 1001(c) as a question of law. United States v. Barker, 77
M.J. 377, 382 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (citation omitted). If there is plain error in the
admission of a victim statement under R.C.M. 1001, the test for prejudice “is
whether the error substantially influenced the adjudged sentence.” Id. at 384
(citation omitted). When determining whether an error had a substantial in-
fluence on a sentence, this court considers the following four factors: “(1) the
strength of the Government’s case, (2) the strength of the defense case, (3) the

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                    United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

materiality of the evidence in question, and (4) the quality of the evidence in
question.” United States v. Bowen, 76 M.J. 83, 89 (C.A.A.F. 2017). An error is
less likely to be prejudicial if the fact was already obvious from the other evi-
dence presented at trial. See United States v. Cunningham, 83 M.J. 367, 372
(C.A.A.F. 2023) (first citing United States v. Edwards, 82 M.J. 239, 241
(C.A.A.F. 2022), and then citing United States v. Harrow, 65 M.J. 190, 200
(C.A.A.F. 2007) (quoting United States v. Cano, 61 M.J. 74, 77–78 (C.A.A.F.
2005) (noting error likely to be harmless where evidence concerned “would not
have provided any new ammunition”)) (affirming a finding of no prejudice
where vast majority of contents of improperly admitted victim impact state-
ment were already presented through admissible trial and presentencing evi-
dence).
   3. Analysis
    This case initially calls upon us to first determine if Appellant waived his
objections to the admission of KR’s unsworn statement. Second, assuming we
were to reach the merits of the issue, Appellant’s assignment of error presents
two discrete inquiries: (1) whether Article 6b, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 806b, or
R.C.M. 1001(c), requires a victim to be physically present at a court-martial in
order to exercise the reasonable right to be heard, and (2) whether it was error
for trial counsel to physically deliver KR’s independently drafted victim un-
sworn statement.
    We conclude that Appellant waived the issue he now wishes to assert for
the first time on appeal, namely: whether there was inadequate foundation for
KR’s unsworn statement because she was not physically present. Trial defense
counsel affirmed under oath in their post-trial declarations that they made a
purposeful and tactical decision not to object to KR’s absence from the court-
martial to avoid a more compelling form of her statement from being offered,
namely: KR potentially delivering the statement telephonically where the emo-
tional impact of the statement would likely be enhanced. Whatever the tactical
merits of that decision (discussed at Section II.B, infra), that was not a failure
to recognize the issue by trial defense counsel—it was an affirmative decision
not to object.
    Our conclusion is the same whether Appellant’s counsel correctly under-
stood the applicable law or not. Circuit defense counsel’s declaration demon-
strates that both he and appellate defense counsel believed that a crime victim
must be physically present to exercise her right to be reasonably heard: “I be-
lieved that the legal office could and would find a way to correct the founda-
tional defects mentioned by appellate defense counsel.” (Emphasis added).
Even assuming Appellant’s counsel are incorrect (see analysis at Section
II(B)(3), infra), that does not change the fact that Appellant’s trial defense
counsel “intentionally relinquished” what they perceived to be a “known right.”

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                      United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

When specifically queried by the military judge as to whether the Defense had
any objections to KR’s written victim unsworn statement, trial defense counsel
made a tactical decision not to object based on KR’s absence at trial or any
purported lack of clear intent by KR to submit her written unsworn statement
for consideration at trial. Trial defense counsel raised only substantive objec-
tions to KR’s unsworn statement with the military judge, and informed the
judge that the parties had come to an agreement to overcome those substantive
objections. In so doing, trial defense counsel waived the issue now raised on
appeal as to the foundational requirements of KR’s victim unsworn statement
because “under the particular facts of this case, . . . ‘counsel consciously and
intentionally failed to save the point and led the trial judge to understand that
counsel was satisfied.’” United States v. Elespuru, 73 M.J. 326, 329 (C.A.A.F.
2014) (quoting United States v. Mundy, 2 C.M.A. 500, 503 (C.M.A. 1953)).
   Finally, we have also evaluated whether to exercise our authority under
Article 66(d), UCMJ, to act despite Appellant’s waiver (Chin, 75 M.J. at 223).
We decline to do so.7
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    Notwithstanding Appellant’s waiver as to the substantive admissibility of
KR’s written victim impact statement, Appellant endeavors to attack that de-
cision by his trial defense counsel, asserting that his counsel were ineffective
by “failing” to object when the victim herself did not physically offer the victim
impact statement at the court-martial. He also makes a separate claim of inef-
fective assistance of counsel relating to clemency, asserting that his trial de-
fense counsel referenced the wrong law in his clemency memorandum to the
convening authority submitted on Appellant’s behalf, wherein counsel re-
quested relief the convening authority had no power to grant. Finally, Appel-
lant personally asserts one of his trial defense counsel was ineffective by ad-
vising him, after sentence was adjudged in his court-martial, that Appellant
would “automatically” earn two-for-one post-trial confinement credit for each
day spent in the Weber County Jail.
    1. Additional Background
   This court received post-trial declarations from both Appellant and his trial
defense counsel in regards to the factual predicate for Appellant’s claims that

7 For the reasons set forth in our analysis of Appellant’s ineffective assistance of coun-

sel claims, infra, we conclude that piercing Appellant’s waiver is unnecessary as there
was no error, plain or otherwise, in permitting a crime victim to submit her inde-
pendently drafted written unsworn statement through the instrumentality of trial
counsel.

                                              8
                      United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

his counsel were ineffective at trial.8 We will summarize these declarations in
turn as they bear on each of Appellant’s claims: (a) trial defense counsel’s de-
cision not to further object to KR’s unsworn statement; (b) trial defense coun-
sel’s clemency submission; and (c) trial defense counsel’s post-trial discussions
with Appellant regarding confinement credit.
        a. Decision Not to Further Object to KR’s Written Victim Un-
           sworn Statement
    Appellant’s post-trial declaration provides no additional facts on this as-
signment of error.
    The circuit defense counsel, Major (Maj) AB, explained his tactical decision
to forego objecting to KR’s victim unsworn statement on the grounds that KR
was not present at trial. Maj AB explained that the Defense made a calculated
judgment to forego objecting to prevent a potentially more effective form of the
statement (see Section II.A.1, Additional Background, supra).
        b. Clemency Submission
    Appellant’s post-trial declaration did not address Captain (Capt) NW’s al-
leged ineffective representation concerning clemency. That is, Appellant pro-
vided no indication in his declaration as to what, if any, different clemency
request he would have made but for Capt NW’s erroneous citation of law in his
clemency memorandum submitted on Appellant’s behalf.
    Capt NW conceded in his post-trial declaration that he cited the wrong ver-
sion of Article 60, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 860, in his clemency memorandum to the
convening authority.
        c. Post-trial Discussions of Confinement Credit
    In his post-trial declaration, Appellant alleges that in a meeting after the
conclusion of his court-martial, his defense counsel told him that “all Air Force
inmates who spend time at Weber County get 2:1 credit for each day at the
facility” given the substandard conditions typically encountered by Air Force
inmates there. Appellant attached a declaration from his fiancée, who also at-
tended this meeting; her declaration echoes Appellant’s recitation of events.
Capt NW disputes, in part, Appellant’s version of their post-trial discussion on
confinement credit. According to Capt NW, all his communications concerning
post-trial confinement credit were highly conditional, emphasizing that if

8 Both of Appellant’s trial defense counsel provided declarations in response to an order

of this court regarding Appellant’s allegations that his counsel were ineffective in their
representation of him at trial.

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                    United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

conditions were sufficiently substandard then Appellant could petition for ad-
ditional confinement credit. He stated:
       During my representation of [Appellant], we had many discus-
       sions about confinement and the calculation of time. Largely
       these conversations took place inside the confines of the attor-
       ney-client relationship. We discussed numerous ways in which
       he might receive additional credit for his time in confinement.
       We discussed the credit he would receive for “good behavior” and
       my understanding that for every eight days he served in confine-
       ment he would receive one day of credit as long he did not have
       any misconduct or behavioral issues.
       ....
       I believe I did advise [Appellant] that if his condition[s] were bad
       enough, he could potentially receive additional confinement
       credit for time served, and I believe I did use 2-for-1 credit as an
       example. I explained my understanding of 2-for-1 credit meant
       that for every 1 day of confinement he could get 2 days of credit
       if his conditions at Weber County were bad enough or in viola-
       tion of Air Force or Department of Defense Standards.
(Emphasis added).
   2. Law
    The Sixth Amendment9 guarantees an accused the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel at all phases of trial and post-trial processing. See United
States v. Datavs, 71 M.J. 420, 424 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (trial); United States v. Gil-
ley, 56 M.J. 113, 124 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (post-trial processing). In assessing the
effectiveness of counsel, we apply the standard set forth in Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and begin with the presumption of compe-
tence announced in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). See Gil-
ley, 56 M.J. at 124 (citing United States v. Grigoruk, 52 M.J. 312, 315 (C.A.A.F.
2000)). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant
bears the burden of demonstrating both deficient performance from defense
counsel, and prejudice. Datavs, 71 M.J. at 424 (citation omitted). Ultimately,
we conduct de novo review for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. (ci-
tation omitted). If an appellant’s factual allegations, even if true, do not con-
stitute prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel, we need not resolve those
issues of fact and instead may resolve the issue based solely upon prejudice.

9 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

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                      United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

Id.10 Indeed, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground
of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.” United States
v. Captain, 75 M.J. 99, 103 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (alteration and omission in original)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; and then citing Datavs, 71 M.J. 424–25).
        a. Deficient Performance
   “An appellate court’s evaluation of attorney performance is made from
counsel’s perspective at the time of the conduct in question.” United States v.
Marshall, 45 M.J. 268, 270 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
    The burden is on the appellant to demonstrate deficient performance.
Datavs, 71 M.J. at 424 (citation omitted). “[C]ourts ‘must indulge a strong pre-
sumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable pro-
fessional assistance.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (additional ci-
tation omitted). We consider the following questions to determine whether the
presumption of competence has been overcome: (1) whether appellant’s allega-
tions are true, and if so, is there a reasonable explanation for counsel’s actions;
(2) whether defense counsel’s level of advocacy falls measurably below the per-
formance ordinarily expected of fallible lawyers; and (3) if defense counsel were
ineffective, whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors,
there would have been a different result. See United States v. Gooch, 69 M.J.
353, 362 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (citing United States v. Polk, 32 M.J. 150, 153 (C.M.A.
1991)); see also United States v. Akbar, 74 M.J. 364, 386 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (ap-
plying same standard for defense counsel’s performance during sentencing pro-
ceedings). When considering the last question, “some conceivable effect on the
outcome” is not enough; instead, an appellant must show a “probability suffi-
cient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Datavs, 71 M.J. at 424 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
    In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we do not look at
the success of the defense attorney’s strategy “but rather whether counsel
made an objectively reasonable choice in strategy from the alternatives avail-
able at the time.” United States v. Dewrell, 55 M.J. 131, 136 (C.A.A.F. 2001)
(citation omitted). In making this determination, courts must be “highly

10 We are cognizant that Courts of Criminal Appeals do not “decide disputed questions

of fact pertaining to a post-trial claim, solely or in part on the basis of conflicting affi-
davits submitted by the parties.” United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 243 (C.A.A.F.
1997). Instead, we review the six principles for determining whether a hearing pursu-
ant to United States v. DuBay, 37 C.M.R. 411 (C.M.A. 1967) (per curiam), is appropri-
ate under Ginn. Id. at 248. Here we determine that the first Ginn factor is applicable:
“if the facts alleged in the affidavit allege an error that would not result in relief even
if any factual dispute were resolved in [the] appellant’s favor, the claim may be rejected
on that basis.” Id.

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                    United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

deferential” to trial defense counsel and make every effort “to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at
the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. This specifically applies to sentencing.
See United States v. Stephenson, 33 M.J. 79, 80 (C.M.A. 1991) (concluding that
it was not deficient performance to decline to call a character witness at a sen-
tencing hearing to avoid harmful rebuttal evidence).
    “When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is premised on counsel’s
failure to make a motion . . . , an appellant must show that there is a reasona-
ble probability that such a motion would have been meritorious.” United States
v. Beague, 82 M.J. 157, 167 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (omission in original) (quoting
United States v. Harpole, 77 M.J. 231, 236 (C.A.A.F. 2018)). Relatedly,
“[d]efense counsel do not perform deficiently when they make a strategic deci-
sion to accept a risk or forego a potential benefit, where it is objectively reason-
able to do so.” Datavs, 71 M.J. at 424 (first citing Gooch, 69 M.J. at 362–63
(holding a decision not to risk a mistrial where counsel had strategic reasons
for keeping the assembled panel was not deficient performance); and then cit-
ing Stephenson, 33 M.J. at 80 (holding to decline to call a witness during sen-
tencing hearing in order to avoid rebuttal evidence is not deficient perfor-
mance)). In reviewing the decisions and actions of trial defense counsel, this
court does not second-guess strategic or tactical decisions. See United States v.
Morgan, 37 M.J. 407, 410 (C.M.A. 1993) (citations omitted). It is only in those
limited circumstances where a purported “strategic” or “deliberate” decision is
unreasonable or based on inadequate investigation that it can provide the
foundation for a finding of ineffective assistance. See United States v. Davis,
60 M.J. 469, 474 (C.A.A.F. 2005). For this reason, defense counsel receive wide
latitude in making tactical decisions. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 195
(2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
       b. Prejudice
   Military appellate courts apply the same prejudice standard as defined by
The United States Supreme Court when assessing claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. To establish prejudice, an appellant must:
       demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s un-
       professional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
       different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
       undermine confidence in the outcome. It is not enough to show
       that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
       proceeding. Counsel’s errors must be so serious as to deprive the
       defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

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                    United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (emphasis added) (internal quo-
tation marks and citations omitted); cited with approval, Datavs, 71 M.J. at
424. Once again, it is an appellant who bears the burden to demonstrate prej-
udice. Id. This general analytical framework for prejudice is then calibrated to
the particular trial phase at issue. Pertinent to this case, “prejudice” for inef-
fective assistance in the sentencing phase of the court-martial requires us to
“look to see ‘whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
error, there would have been a different result.’” Captain, 75 M.J. at 103 (cita-
tion omitted).
   3. Analysis
       a. Admissibility of Victim Unsworn Statement
   Analyzing deficient performance in this case requires considering the un-
derlying substantive law concerning victim unsworn statements, because, if
there was no support in law for defense counsel to raise an issue at trial, there
could be no “deficient performance” as a consequence. See Beague, 82 M.J. at
167.
    In analyzing how a crime victim may exercise their statutory and regula-
tory right to be reasonably heard in sentencing, the CAAF held in Barker that
“the introduction of statements under this rule is prohibited without, at a min-
imum, either the presence or request of the victim.” Barker, 77 M.J. at 382 (em-
phasis added) (footnote and citations omitted). The CAAF then elaborated on
the importance of the independent decision of crime victims to exercise their
rights in United States v. Hamilton, reasoning: “the right to be reasonably
heard requires that the victims be contacted, given the choice to participate in
a particular case, and, if they choose to make a statement, offer the statement
themselves, through counsel, or through a ‘victim’s designee’ where appropri-
ate.” 78 M.J. 335, 339–40 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Read together, Barker and Hamilton essentially require two prerequisites to
admit an absent crime victim’s unsworn statement under R.C.M. 1001A (now
R.C.M. 1001(c)): (1) the crime victim’s knowledge of the court-martial; and (2)
the crime victim’s intent for the statement to be offered for sentencing consid-
eration at the court-martial at the time the statement is offered. See Hamilton,
78 M.J. at 341; Barker, 77 M.J. at 383.
    Applying these principles, we find no deficient performance in this case be-
cause neither Article 6b, UCMJ, nor R.C.M. 1001 require the physical presence
of an unrepresented crime victim at court-martial to be “reasonably heard.” We
find nothing in the plain language of the substantive provisions of law dealing
with admissibility of victim unsworn statements at sentencing (i.e., Article 6b,
UCMJ, and R.C.M. 1001(c)) that requires a victim to personally enter the

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                      United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

courtroom and present their statement to the military judge.11 Those provi-
sions of law merely state that a victim has the right to be reasonably heard.
   Our holding is not novel. This court found no error in a crime victim provid-
ing their oral victim unsworn statement telephonically in United States v.
Clark-Bellamy, No. ACM 39709, 2020 CCA LEXIS 391, at *16–17 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 27 Oct. 2020) (unpub. op.). This court reasoned that physical pres-
ence of the victim at trial is not a prerequisite to admissibility of that victim’s
unsworn statement at sentencing stating: “[W]e disagree with Appellant’s
proposition that a victim (or representative) who is not physically present at
the sentencing hearing forfeits his or her right to make a statement. R.C.M.
1001A conveys a personal right to the victim and does not expressly mandate
physical presence.” Id.
    Indeed, our approach is consistent with that of our superior court. In inter-
preting the prerequisites for presenting a victim unsworn statement at court-
martial, the CAAF proposed two methods: “either presence or the request of
the victim.” Barker, 77 M.J. at 382 (emphasis added). The disjunctive “or” is
significant because it indicates that a “request” need not involve physical pres-
ence.
    Synthesizing CAAF’s reasoning in Barker and the accompanying line of
cases, we see three foundational prerequisites were met for consideration of
KR’s unsworn victim statement in this case: (1) KR created it; (2) KR had
knowledge of Appellant’s court-martial; and (3) KR intended for the statement
to be offered at Appellant’s court-martial at the time the statement was offered.
See United States v. Harrington, 83 M.J. 408, No. 22-0100, 2023 CAAF LEXIS
577, at *20 (C.A.A.F. 10 Aug. 2023); Hamilton, 78 M.J. at 341; Barker, 77 M.J.
at 383. Accordingly, any objection by trial defense counsel would have been
futile.
    Relatedly, there was no deficient performance in trial defense counsel’s de-
cision not to object to trial counsel’s physical “delivery” of the written victim
unsworn statement at trial. Trial counsel was acting as a mere instrumentality
of KR’s independent exercise of her right to be reasonably heard at sentencing

11  Appellant effectively would have us disregard the CAAF’s construction of
R.C.M. 1001(c) in Barker in deference to a related but distinct provision in
R.C.M. 1001(a)(3), to wit: that a military judge has a duty to advise any crime victim
“who is present” that they have a right to be reasonably heard at sentencing. We de-
cline to do so. R.C.M. 1001(a)(3) does not restrict a crime victim’s right to be reasonably
heard; it merely provides an additional mechanism by which the President sought to
ensure that crime victims have actual notice of their right to be reasonably heard. By
contrast, R.C.M. 1001(c) deals with the substantive aspects of admissible forms and
content for victim unsworn statements.

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                      United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

via submitting a written victim unsworn statement under R.C.M. 1001.12 This
is wholly distinguishable from the situation in United States v. Edwards,
where the CAAF found reversible error in trial counsel’s assistance in assem-
bling and creating the unsworn statement in the format of a video, and from
the facts in Harrington where the CAAF found non-reversible error where trial
counsel “assisted” victims in delivering their oral unsworn statements via a
question-and-answer format. See Harrington, 2023 CAAF LEXIS 577, at *26;
United States v. Edwards, 82 M.J. 239, 241 (C.A.A.F. 2022). Each of those cases
turned upon a determination that trial counsel’s substantive involvement in
producing the unsworn statement ran afoul of “the principle that an unsworn
victim statement belongs solely to the victim or the victim’s designee.” Har-
rington, 2023 CAAF LEXIS 577, at *20 (citing Edwards, 82 M.J. at 241). As
none of those predicate circumstances were present here, there was no defi-
cient performance in not raising a futile objection.13
    Second, even assuming R.C.M. 1001(c) did not permit admission of a writ-
ten victim unsworn statement from an absent crime victim at pre-sentencing
proceedings we find that trial defense counsel’s strategic decision not to object
to KR’s statement was one of those tactical decisions which do not fall “meas-
urably below” the standards expected of fallible lawyers. See Dewrell, 55 M.J.
at 133 (quoting Strickland, 446 U.S. at 690) (“strategic defense counsel choices
made after thorough investigation of the facts are virtually unchallengeable”).
We are persuaded by the affidavit from the circuit defense counsel that this
decision was carefully considered and undertaken to avoid a potentially more
persuasive and evocative form of that statement (i.e., that trial counsel would
be able to get in touch with KR to provide her statement orally over the phone,
replete with more emotion and passion than the mere written word). We disa-
gree with Appellant’s suggestion that those assessments and concerns by trial

12 We do not hold that all trial counsel “solicitations” of victim unsworn statements

from unrepresented victims would satisfy what may be identified as the “independent
decision doctrine” of Barker and Hamilton. These cases are highly fact-dependent and
require a case-by-case analysis to determine whether under the circumstances a crime
victim made a knowing and independent decision to submit an unsworn statement.
13 We also decline Appellant’s invitation to interpret our ruling in United States v.

Bailey, No. ACM 39935, 2021 CCA LEXIS 380, at *14–15 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 30 Jul.
2021) (unpub. op.), rev. denied, 82 M.J. 103 (C.A.A.F. 2021), to find deficient perfor-
mance in this case. In Bailey, this court held that the military judge erred in permitting
a trial counsel to read a written victim unsworn statement into the record. Id. We find
Bailey factually distinguishable. Unlike in Bailey, where trial counsel’s act of reading
the written victim unsworn statement aloud literally consisted of a different form of
the statement (i.e., “oral” versus “written”), here trial counsel’s mere offering of the
independently drafted victim unsworn statement did not change the nature of the
statement (i.e., it was offered as a written victim unsworn statement and remained so).

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                    United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

defense counsel were unreasonable. Trial defense counsel’s risk analysis and
subsequent decision—to allow a less impactful form of the evidence in an effort
to neutralize what might otherwise be emotionally impactful statement—in
this case did not fall measurably below standards expected of fallible lawyers.
    In the absence of any “deficient performance” by his trial defense counsel,
Appellant is entitled to no relief for this assignment of error. Datavs, 71 M.J.
at 424 (citation omitted).
       b. Clemency Submission
    Given Capt NW’s concession that he cited to an inapplicable version of Ar-
ticle 60, UCMJ,14 in clemency and, as a consequence, requested clemency relief
that the convening authority was not empowered to give (i.e., reduction in con-
finement from 24 to 12 months), we will assume without deciding that the “de-
ficient performance” prong of the Strickland standard is satisfied and proceed
to a prejudice analysis.
    Appellant failed to demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s error, there would have been a different result. He has failed to
identify what, if anything, he would have changed in his clemency submission
but for counsel’s misstatement of the law. Appellant is silent in his post-trial
declaration about what alternate clemency he was interested in. Appellant’s
burden is not satisfied by counsel merely suggesting what Appellant “could”
have done if given an opportunity to re-submit clemency, but rather what Ap-
pellant would have done absent the initial clemency error. We find Appellant
has failed in his burden to demonstrate prejudice resulting from trial defense
counsel’s purportedly deficient performance in seeking clemency.
       c. Post-Trial Discussions of Post-Trial Confinement Credit
    In turning to address Appellant’s final ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, we opt to resolve this assignment of error based upon the lack of preju-
dice. See Datavs, 71 M.J. at 424–25.
   Appellant essentially argues that he felt a false sense of hope from his trial
defense counsel’s discussions with him concerning post-trial confinement
credit. However, Appellant fails to provide a nexus between that false hope and
any impairment it had on a substantial right.15 Absent that nexus there can be

14 In accordance with the CAAF’s decision in United States v. Brubaker-Escobar, 81

M.J. 471, 474 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (per curiam), it was Article 60, UCMJ (2016 MCM),
which applied during Appellant’s post-trial processing.
15 For example, Appellant does not claim trial defense counsel’s error caused him to

suffer substandard post-trial confinement conditions or affected the exercise of his

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                     United States v. Daddario, No. ACM 40351

no prejudice; no “different outcome” is made possible by the absence of the al-
leged deficient conduct.
                                  III. CONCLUSION
    The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no
error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Ar-
ticles 59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). Accordingly, the find-
ings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                       FOR THE COURT

                       CAROL K. JOYCE
                       Clerk of the Court

right to request relief from any such conditions. Appellant also raises no claim that he
would have entered a different plea or declined to enter into a plea agreement alto-
gether, had he been “properly advised” on what amounts to post hoc advice on a collat-
eral matter. See United States v. Furth, 81 M.J. 114, 117 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (citation omit-
ted) (noting that when ineffective assistance of counsel concerning plea negotiations
and a decision to plead guilty are concerned: “[I]n order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ re-
quirement, [an appellant] must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
the counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial.” (Emphasis added).). We also note that calculations of other forms of potential
confinement credit are generally considered to be collateral matters. See, e.g., United
States v. McNutt, 62 M.J. 16, 19 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (holding issues of good credit time and
parole eligibility are collateral matters). Accordingly, any erroneous advice here would
only be prejudicial if it materially influenced Appellant’s decision to plead guilty.

                                             17