Court Opinion

ID: 9838543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 19:01:52.730256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:31.374828
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11214    Document: 32-1     Date Filed: 09/06/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11214
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       JOHN DUNCAN FORDHAM,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES,
       GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,

                                                 Defendants-Appellees.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00121-DHB-BKE
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                23-11214

                           ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               After a jury convicted John Duncan Fordham of healthcare
       fraud, the district court imposed a prison sentence and ordered him
       to pay, jointly and severally with his codefendants, over one mil-
       lion dollars in restitution to the Georgia Department of Adminis-
       trative Services and Great American Insurance Company. More
       than a decade after his conviction, President Trump granted Ford-
       ham a full and unconditional pardon. Fordham now seeks reim-
       bursement of the restitution payments he made before his pardon,
       arguing that his presidential pardon requires the Department and
       Great American to refund his money. We disagree and affirm the
       district court’s dismissal of his claim.
                                     I.

               The seeds of this controversy were sown when a jury con-
       victed Fordham of one count of healthcare fraud, in violation of 18
       U.S.C. § 1347. The district court sentenced Fordham to fifty-two
       months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Rele-
       vant here, it also ordered Fordham, jointly and severally with his
       codefendants, to pay $1,021,888 in restitution to the Department
       and its insurer, Great American, the victims of Fordham’s artifice.
       After ordering the seizure and liquidation of Fordham’s assets, the
       district court disbursed the resulting proceeds to the Department
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       23-11214                Opinion of the Court                          3

       and Great American. Fordham also made monthly restitution pay-
       ments following his incarceration, as required by the district court.
             More than fifteen years after his conviction, President
       Trump granted Fordham a full and unconditional pardon. With
       pardon in hand, Fordham moved for an accounting of all his resti-
       tution payments, which the district court granted. The district
       court also relieved Fordham of any additional restitution obliga-
       tion.
              Fordham then sued for a return of all past restitution pay-
       ments to the Department and Great American, which totaled over
       five hundred thousand dollars, alleging that his presidential pardon
       entitled him to such relief. The district court dismissed the claim
       for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, failure
       to state a claim. Fordham timely appealed.
                                       II.

              We review questions of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.
       Williams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007). A district
       court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim also receives de novo re-
       view. Luke v. Galley, 975 F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 2020). And we
       may affirm on any basis supported by the record, “even if not relied
       upon by the district court.” United States v. Chitwood, 676 F.3d 971,
       975 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184,
       1189 (11th Cir. 2008)).
                                       III.
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11214

              Fordham argues that the full and unconditional pardon from
       President Trump compels the Department and Great American to
       refund all restitution payments. The district court resolved this case
       primarily through the lens of subject-matter jurisdiction, but we
       believe the better approach is to ask whether Fordham has stated a
       plausible claim for relief. We start by sketching the Rule 12(b)(6)
       standard and then turn to Fordham’s argument.
                                       A.

              The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a plaintiff
       must “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ.
       P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) applies in tandem with Rule 8, which re-
       quires a claim for relief to include “a short and plain state-
       ment . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. 8(a)(2).
       The complaint must state a claim to relief that is more than con-
       ceivable—it must be plausible. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
       544, 570 (2007). In other words, a facially sufficient complaint pre-
       supposes “some viable legal theory” for relief. Id. at 562 (quoting Car
       Carriers v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). “[A]
       formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not”
       suffice. Id. at 555. In short, if a complaint does not provide legal
       grounds for entitlement to relief, a court must dismiss. See id. at
       555. And “the tenet that . . . [we] must accept as true all of the alle-
       gations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”
       Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added).
               With these principles in mind, we address Fordham’s argu-
       ment.
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       23-11214                Opinion of the Court                          5

                                       B.

              Fordham posits that a presidential pardon is much more
       than a badge of forgiveness. Rather, a presidential pardon, he as-
       serts, entitles its recipient to recoup property that has vested in
       third parties. We disagree.
                The Constitution provides that the President “shall have
       Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the
       United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” U.S. Const., art.
       II, § 2, cl. 1. The pardon power gives the President “plenary author-
       ity . . . to ‘forgive’ the convicted person in part or entirely, to re-
       duce” a prison sentence, or to amend a penalty “with conditions
       which are in themselves constitutionally unobjectionable.” Schick
       v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974). “The pardon . . . shuts out from
       sight the offending act.” Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39, 66 (1877).
       A full pardon “releases the punishment and blots out of existence
       the guilt,” rendering the offender innocent “in the eye of the law.”
       Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866). But a pardon
       does not affect any property rights “vested in others directly by the
       execution of the judgment for the offence, or which have been ac-
       quired by others whilst that judgment was in force.” Knote v. United
       States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877). Though a pardon “releases the of-
       fender from the consequences of his offence,” including asset for-
       feiture, that release must not impair the accrued property rights of
       others. See Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474, 477 (1875). In this
       sense, the only limitation on the presidential pardon is that it does
       not reinstate “offices forfeited, or property or interests vested in
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                   23-11214

       others in consequence of the conviction and judgment.” Garland,
       71 U.S. at 381.
              Everyone agrees that the district court has already distrib-
       uted to the Department and Great American the proceeds from the
       sale of Fordham’s assets and the monthly restitution payments.
       And the financial administrator for the district court confirmed as
       much, stating that all restitution payments “have been sent out the
       to the victims, Department of Administrative Service and Great
       American Insurance.”
               No doubt, the Supreme Court has long held that, as long as
       proceeds from a restitution order remain in the court’s possession,
       they fall within a pardon’s grasp. See Osborn, 91 U.S. at 476; cf. Knote,
       95 U.S. at 154 (holding that forfeited property does not vest when
       it “remain[s] under control of the Executive, or of officers subject
       to his orders, or . . . in the custody of the judicial tribunals” and
       “will be restored . . . to the original owner, upon his full pardon”).
       Thus, the district court properly concluded that Fordham’s pardon
       discharged his obligation to make future restitution payments. But
       the federal “government can only release what it holds,” Osborn, 91
       U.S. at 477, and here, it holds nothing. The district court transferred
       all restitution monies to the victims, so the property rights to those
       funds have fully vested in the Department and Great American. See
       Knote, 95 U.S. at 154 (holding that, when monetary proceeds “have
       been paid to a party to whom the law has assigned them,” the
       party’s “rights . . . have become vested, and are as complete as if
       they were acquired in any other legal way”). In short, the money
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       23-11214              Opinion of the Court                        7

       Fordham seeks is long gone. Allowing him to claw back past resti-
       tution payments under guise of a presidential pardon would impair
       the Department and Great American’s accrued property rights in
       that money, an outcome plainly proscribed by the Supreme Court.
       See Osborn, 91 U.S. at 476; Garland, 71 U.S. at 381.
              Fordham’s claim that his presidential pardon entitles him to
       a refund of money vested in the Department and Great American
       directly contradicts Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, his
       complaint did not advance any viable legal theory or a plausible
       basis for relief, and the district court correctly dismissed it. See
       Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 570; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
                                     IV.

             The district court is AFFIRMED.