Court Opinion

ID: 9411247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 14:06:06.602262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:05.716343
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1076

                                 PATRICIA IVAS

                                       vs.

           ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF GLOUCESTER & another.1

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        The plaintiff, Patricia Ivas, appeals from a judgment of

 the Superior Court affirming the decision of the zoning board of

 appeals of Gloucester (board)2 to grant variances and special

 permits allowing defendant FUD, LLC (FUD), to transform a two-

 family property into a three-family property by converting the

 attic into a one-bedroom apartment.           We affirm, although on

 grounds different from those relied on by the judge.               See

 Buffalo-Water 1, LLC v. Fidelity Real Estate Co., LLC, 481 Mass.

 13, 28 n.14 (2018), quoting Gabbidon v. King, 414 Mass. 685, 686

 (1993).

        Background.    The following facts are derived from the

 summary judgment record.        FUD owns a two-family property on

 1   FUD, LLC.
 2   The board has not filed a brief.
Western Avenue in Gloucester (premises).    The premises is a

preexisting nonconforming structure in a high density

residential zoning district, with two residential units.3      FUD

sought to convert an unused attic in the premises into a one-

bedroom apartment.   To do so, in or around November 2019, FUD

applied to the board for special permits and variances.     On

December 12, 2019, the board held a hearing on FUD's

application.   Ivas,4 an abutter, spoke in opposition to the

application; she read a letter to the board expressing her

concerns about her privacy and quality of life if the

application were to be approved.     Ivas said that the area was

already too congested, and due to the proximity of her home to

the premises, she could hear conversations and tea kettles

boiling in the premises; she also said that she kept her blinds

closed at all times because neighbors could see into her home.5

On January 9, 2020, the board resumed consideration of FUD's

3 The premises is nonconforming due to insufficient lot area, lot
area per dwelling unit, lot width, lot frontage, and front and
left yard setbacks. There is also no dedicated parking for the
two existing residential units.
4 Ivas owns property on Lewis Court in Gloucester and resides

therein.
5 A second-floor resident of the premises addressed the board and

expressed concerns over the impact of the construction and
stated that she did not have a car due to lack of parking in
that area.

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application and unanimously approved the special permits with

certain conditions and approved the variances.6

     On February 21, 2020, Ivas filed a complaint in the

Superior Court under G. L. c. 40A, § 17, seeking judicial review

of the board's decision.   She argued, among other things, that

the board denied her the right to speak at the January 2020

hearing, failed to apply the proper standards for filing

requirements, and exceeded its authority in granting FUD's

application.   FUD filed a motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ.

P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), which was denied after a

hearing.   FUD next filed a motion for summary judgment,

contending that Ivas lacked standing to contest the board's

decision and that she did not offer evidence that the board's

decision was legally untenable; Ivas filed an opposition.     After

a hearing, a judge found that Ivas had standing, but that she

failed to produce evidence that the board's decision was based

on a legally untenable ground.   The judge entered summary

judgment in favor of FUD; this appeal followed.

6 There was some discussion whether the board concluded the
hearing in December or whether it remained open. The board
decided that the hearing was closed after the December hearing,
and that the January hearing was solely for FUD to address
concerns that had been raised in the prior hearing. As a
result, Ivas, now represented by counsel, was not permitted to
speak at the January hearing. Resolution of this issue is not
material to our analysis.

                                 3
       Discussion.   "We review a motion for summary judgment de

novo.    In doing so, we must determine 'whether, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all

material facts have been established and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law'" (citations omitted).

Psychemedics Corp. v. Boston, 486 Mass. 724, 731 (2021), quoting

Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991).

See 81 Spooner Rd., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Brookline,

461 Mass. 692, 699 (2012).

       First, we must determine whether Ivas has standing to

challenge the board's decision.    Only a person aggrieved can

challenge a decision of a zoning board of appeals.     See

Murchison v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Sherborn, 485 Mass. 209,

212 (2020).    To be aggrieved, a person "must assert a plausible

claim of a definite violation of a private right, a private

property interest, or a private legal interest" (quotation and

citation omitted).    Kenner v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Chatham,

459 Mass. 115, 120 (2011).

       As a direct abutter to the premises, Ivas is entitled to

presumptive standing.    See 81 Spooner Rd., LLC, 461 Mass. at

700.    FUD "can rebut the presumption of standing by coming

forward with credible affirmative evidence that refutes the

presumption . . . establishing that [Ivas's] allegations of harm

are unfounded or de minimis."     Id. at 702.   One way to rebut the

                                  4
presumption is for FUD to demonstrate that Ivas's "claims of

aggrievement are not within the interests protected by the

applicable zoning scheme."   Picard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of

Westminster, 474 Mass. 570, 574 (2016).   FUD demonstrated, and

the board agreed, that the project would not exacerbate any

existing privacy issues, the project was "in harmony" with the

neighborhood, "there would be little impact on traffic or

utilities," and there was "sufficient off-street parking."

     Once the presumption was rebutted, Ivas was required to

"put forth credible evidence to substantiate [her] allegations."

Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass.

719, 721 (1996).   Toward this end, evidence is credible only

when it is both quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient.

See Butler v. Waltham, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 435, 441-442 (2005).

     "Quantitatively, the evidence must provide specific factual
     support for each of the claims of particularized injury the
     plaintiff has made. . . . Qualitatively, the evidence must
     be of a type on which a reasonable person could rely to
     conclude that the claimed injury likely will flow from the
     board's action. Conjecture, personal opinion, and
     hypothesis are therefore insufficient."

Id. at 441.   Ivas contended that she would be harmed by "(1)

density/overcrowding demonstrated through privacy concerns, lack

of an easement, and diminution in property values; and (2) lack

of authority of the board to grant the relief requested."7    She

7 An alleged "diminution in [property] value itself is not an
interest protected under G. L. c. 40A." Murchison, 485 Mass. at

                                 5
had to prove these contentions by "direct facts and not by

speculative personal opinion -- that [her] injury [was] special

and different from the concerns of the rest of the community"

(citation omitted).   Standerwick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of

Andover, 447 Mass. 20, 33 (2006).   "At that juncture, the

jurisdictional issue of standing [had to] be decided on the

basis of all the evidence, with no benefit to the plaintiff from

the presumption of aggrievement."   81 Spooner Rd., LLC, 461

Mass. at 701.

    Here, summary judgment in favor of FUD was proper, as Ivas

was unable to demonstrate a material issue of fact that would

have supported a legally cognizable injury.   See 81 Spooner Rd.,

LLC, 461 Mass. at 703.   Ivas's alleged harm was not appreciable,

palpable, and significant.   See Kenner, 459 Mass. at 121-122.

Ivas claimed that the board lacked authority to grant FUD a

special permit for one off-site parking spot.   However, Ivas

failed to demonstrate how the permit would harm her personally.

See Murchison, 485 Mass. at 214 (plaintiff must do more than

allege zoning violation).

    Ivas also failed to provide quantitative or qualitative

support for her claims that the addition of the unit would

impact the density of the neighborhood in a harmful way.     See

216. Notwithstanding, Ivas presented no evidence concerning her
property value.

                                6
Butler, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 441-442.    Ivas claimed that the

project would exacerbate harms she already experiences, namely

noise, but she did not present any evidence, beyond her own

opinion, supporting those claims.     Establishing standing

requires a plaintiff to do more than allege a zoning violation,

and where, as here, Ivas presented no evidence of harm beyond

her own opinion, the evidence was insufficient to establish

standing.    See Murchison, 485 Mass. at 214.   Nor was it specific

to Ivas.    See Butler, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 440.   Although Ivas

is an abutter, there are eleven properties that abut the subject

property, five of which are multi-family homes, and an immediate

abutter is a five-family home.    It therefore follows that Ivas

failed to show that the noise she experiences living in a

densely populated area is a particularized harm.     See, e.g.,

Talmo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Framingham, 93 Mass. App. Ct.

626, 631 (2018).

     Ivas also failed to show that the project would change the

status quo in the crowded downtown neighborhood.8    See Marhefka

v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Sutton, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 515, 519

(2011).    In a crowded neighborhood, it is particularly relevant

8 Included in Ivas's density claim was her allegation that there
is no easement to run utility wires over her property. Although
she makes no separate argument about this claim on appeal, we
note that easements are private property issues and not within
the scope of this appeal. See Picard, 474 Mass. at 575.

                                  7
that FUD is not seeking to add an additional structure to its

property.    Rather, FUD seeks to convert a preexisting attic into

a residential unit, and therefore Ivas's property is not being

physically crowded by the addition of new construction.

Contrast Sheppard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Boston, 74 Mass.

App. Ct. 8, 11 (2009) ("[abutter's] house, already subject to

overcrowding . . . now has another three-story structure

fourteen feet behind it, blocking its last relatively open

corridor").    In addition, Ivas did not show, for example, that

the project would block her view, contrast 81 Spooner Rd., LLC,

461 Mass. at 704, or significantly reduce light or air, contrast

McGee v. Board of Appeals of Boston, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 930, 931

(2004).     Although Ivas argued that her privacy rights would be

impacted by the addition of more tenants on the property, she

failed to show the actual harm that would flow from the

conversion of an attic to an apartment, particularly where the

project will not further crowd Ivas's property.    Contrast Dwyer

v. Gallo, 73 Mass. App Ct. 292, 296-297 (2008) (reconstruction

of house and building additional house on substantially small

lot in dense area constitutes harm sufficiently personal to

qualify abutter as aggrieved).    Accordingly, we conclude that

Ivas lacked standing under G. L. c. 40A, § 17, to challenge the

                                  8
board's decision.   Because she lacks standing, we need not reach

the remaining questions raised by Ivas.9

                                     Judgment affirmed.

                                     By the Court (Blake, Walsh &
                                       Hershfang, JJ.10),

                                     Clerk

Entered:   July 26, 2023.

9 We decline to award FUD its appellate attorney's fees and
costs, particularly where FUD has counterclaims that remain
pending in the Superior Court.
10 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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