Court Opinion

ID: 9793918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:55:13.170949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:56.595338
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Justice,
dissenting.
As indicated by this court’s previous freedom of speech and press decisions, there can be little doubt of our relentless concern to avoid abridgments to freedom of expression. But this trivial city ordinance hardly qualifies as a menace to those revered freedoms. It neither suppresses content nor prohibits distribution and, as applied by the trial court, cannot even be said to prohibit The AdviseR from being distributed door to door except when that distribution is so careless as to be littering. Such innocuous regulation of littering is not a speech or press violation and I must dissent.
The record is clear that Laramie punished Mr. Miller for those distributions of his newspaper that were carelessly strewn about neighborhoods.1 The record is also clear that Mr. Miller was acquitted in those instances where the newspaper was placed on the porch of the household. This distinction indicates that, as the record stands, Laramie is neither making a content-based determination of what newspapers shall or shall not be distributed nor unreasonably restricting distribution, but is controlling “litter.”
Appellant contends that the constitutional violations occur when the ordinance is applied to his newspaper distribution and sweepingly states that every law which impinges on free expression is to be strictly scrutinized. In other words, any limitation on freedom of expression is unconstitutional; quite candidly, this is a banal argument routinely rejected by the United States Supreme Court since the 1943 case of Martin v. Strothers, when it recognized that “the peace, good order and comfort of the community may imperatively require regulation of the time, place and manner of distribution.” Martin, 319 U.S. 141, 143, 63 S.Ct. 862, 863, 87 L.Ed. 1313, 1317 (1943). Appellant attempts to assert the ordinance violates Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 20, but finds it of such insignificance that his only reference to the provision is as “passim” in his table of contents. Accordingly, appellant provides no analysis, authority, or cogent argument concerning the state constitutional provision’s application to the issues. Instead, appellant relies on federal case law and does not distinguish between the two provisions of the two constitutions.
This court has previously admonished Wyoming lawyers that it is imperative they properly brief this court on relevant state constitutional questions. Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc. 839 P.2d 903, 909 (Wyo.1992). “To develop and prove [his] position with respect to the state constitutional provision, [Miller], and any other similarly situated litigant, must use ‘a precise, analytically sound approach.’ Counsel must provide this court with proper arguments and briefs to ensure the future growth of this important area of law.” Dworkin 839 P.2d at 909 (quoting Robert F. Utter, Advancing State Constitutions in Court, TRIAL, Oct. 1991, at 45). “Recourse to the Wyoming Constitution as an independent source for recognizing and protecting the individual rights of our citizens *600must spring from a process that is articula-ble, reasonable, and reasoned.” Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 621 (Wyo.1993) (quoting State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (1986)) (Golden, J., concurring). Appellant’s failure to properly brief the state constitutional arguments limits our review to his federal constitutional arguments.
The United States Supreme Court’s modem day jurisprudence requires that in noncommercial speech cases:
The normal inquiry that our doctrine dictates is, first, to determine whether a regulation is content-based or content-neutral, and then based on the answer to that question, to apply the proper level of scrutiny.
Ladue v. Gilleo, — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 2047, 129 L.Ed.2d 36, 50 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
If a regulation is content-neutral, the United States Supreme Court has upheld reasonable “time, place, or manner” restrictions when justified without reference to the content of speech. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753, 105 L.Ed.2d 661, 675 (1989); Martin, 319 U.S. at 143, 63 S.Ct. at 863, 87 L.Ed. at 1316-17.
Although The AdviseR is primarily comprised of commercial speech, I agree with the majority’s initial classification of The AdvisER as noncommercial speech and concur that it is entitled to full first amendment protection. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Sen. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). Although the majority makes no determination of the ordinance’s effect upon free speech, that is, whether it is content-based or content-neutral, the language and level of scrutiny employed forces an assumption that the majority must have concluded it is a content-based regulation. I find no basis for such a conclusion.
I am of the opinion that the ordinance is constitutionally valid as a reasonable, time, place and manner regulation. The United States Supreme Court has upheld justified “time, place and manner” regulations which are narrowly tailored to servé a significant governmental interest and leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 2753, 105 L.Ed.2d at 675. Laramie justifies the ordinance as a means to achieve its significant interest in maintaining clean streets. The United States Supreme Court has stated that cities have a legitimate interest in clean streets. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155, 165, (1939); Martin, 319 U.S. at 143, 63 S.Ct. at 863, 87 L.Ed. at 1316-17.
The Court specifically stated in Schneider that the guarantee of freedom of speech or of the press does not “deprive a municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing literature broadcast in the streets. Prohibition of such conduct would not abridge the constitutional liberty since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or distribute information or opinion.” Schneider, 308 U.S. at 1611, 60 S.Ct. at 151, 84 L.Ed. at 165. Following the instructive advice of Schneider, this court “should be astute to examine the effect of challenged legislation” in each case in which legislative abridgment of the fundamental personal rights and liberties of freedom of speech and freedom of the press is asserted.
Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may * * * be insufficient to justify [regulation which] diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 161, 60 S.Ct. at 151, 84 L.Ed. at 165.
In Schneider, the distributors of literature on a public street had been convicted by the city for littering. The Schneider court’s analysis revealed the facts to indicate that although the distributors were convicted of littering, it was actually the persons receiving the literature who were throwing it down on the streets. Under these facts, the Court explained that “any burden imposed upon the *601city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such distribution results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and press.” Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162, 60 S.Ct. at 151, 84 L.Ed. at 165. (Emphasis added). But, the Court observed that such constitutional protection does not deprive a city of all power to prevent street littering and among the obvious methods of preventing littering is to punish those who actually throw papers on the street. Id.
In significant contrast to the facts of Schneider, an ordinance which punished a citizen who merely handed a leaflet to a passing pedestrian who in turn threw the leaflet on the ground, the facts of the case before us present an ordinance which punished a citizen who was found at trial to have actually thrown papers on “driveways, yards, sidewalks, a window well, the street, and a snow bank.” Thus, in my view, this ordinance falls within that class-of those “obvious methods of preventing littering” which the Court expressly referred to as passing constitutional muster, namely, an ordinance which punishes those who actually throw papers on the ground. Clearly, the Laramie ordinance does not punish the citizen who merely hands the paper to a passing pedestrian; instead, it has punished only that citizen who has thrown the paper on a driveway, yard, sidewalk, the street, or snow bank, or into a window well. Under the facts of this ease, Mr. Miller was not punished when he threw the paper on the residence porch or doorstep. It is clear that the ordinance reasonably regulates the manner of distribution without reference to content, is serving a significant governmental interest and leaves open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. I would hold there has been no constitutional violation and affirm the convictions.

. The newspapers were found in yards, driveways, snowdrifts, the street, and a window well.