Court Opinion

ID: 9665851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:58:16.859825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:19.543137
License: Public Domain

O’CONNOR, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that this case should be reversed because the defendant did not satisfy its burden on summary judgment. I write separately because there is another ground for reversal — I believe the Medical Liability Act1 controls the disposition of this case.
As stated in the majority opinion, Michael’s father, Aubrey D. Martin, filed suit against TWH and the delivering physician on January 9, 1992, which was before Michael’s *724fourteenth "birthday.2 In its motion for summary judgment, TWH argued Aubrey filed suit too late because Michael’s suit was barred by the corporation survival of remedies statute,3 which precludes suits filed more than three years after a corporation’s dissolution.
In point of error one, Michael argues that, because his claims are health care liability claims, they are governed by the Medical Liability Act, which provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other law, no health care liability claim may be commenced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date of the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed; provided that minors under the age of 12 years shall have until their Hth birthday in which to file, or have filed on their behalf the claim. Except as herein provided, this subchapter applies to all persons regardless of their minority or other legal disability.
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (1996) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the claim was filed before Michael’s fourteenth birthday and is therefore timely if the Medical Liability Act controls.
In contrast, TWH asserts that Michael’s claim is governed by the corporation survival of remedies statute contained in article 7.12 of the Texas Business Corporation Act. Article 7.12 provides that dissolution:
shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or against such corporation, its officers, directors, or shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon is commenced within three years after the date of such dissolution.
Act of March 29,1955, 54th Leg., R.S., ch. 64, 1955 Tex. Gen. Laws 239, 294 (amended 1987, 1989, 1991 & 1993). TWH contends that article 7.12 provides the exclusive method by which a plaintiff may sue a dissolved corporation. Thus, TWH argues, because Michael’s suit was not brought within three years of TWH’s formal dissolution, his claim is barred. I find no Texas authority that addresses the interplay between these two statutes.
Historically, Texas has always been protective of its minor children involved in the legal process. Hogan v. Hallman, 889 S.W.2d 332, 339 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied). Texas has continuously provided statutory protection by deferring the time in which minors could file suit for injury to two years after attaining their majority. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex.1983); Hogan, 889 S.W.2d at 339; Act of February 5, 1841, Laws of the Republic of Texas, at 166; 2 H. GAMMEL, Laws of Texas 630 (1898). At one time, the Texas Constitution tolled limitations for minors for seven years after removal of disabilities. Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 663; Hogan, 889 S.W.2d at 339; Tex. Const, art. 12, § 14 (1869). The protection afforded minors now extends to two years after the minor attains majority or disabilities are removed. Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 663 (holding § 10.01 was unconstitutional because it required minor to file medical malpractice suit before 8th birthday); see also Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 318-19 (Tex.1995) (holding § 10.01 of art. 4590i was unconstitutional because it required minor to file medical malpractice suit before 14th birthday). The clear holding of Weiner and Sax is that the Legislature cannot abridge a minor’s right to file suit asserting common law rights before the minor reaches majority.
I would hold the statute of limitations did not begin to run against Michael until he reached his majority. Tex.Civ.PRAc. & Rem. Code § 129.001 (1986); Tex. PROBATE Code §§ 3(t), 601(15) (1996). Aubrey timely filed suit on Michael’s behalf when he sued before Michael’s twentieth birthday. If the Legislature Cannot purposefully curtail a minor’s right to file suit by amendment to the Medi*725cal Liability Act, the Legislature cannot incidentally curtail a minor’s right to file suit by the corporation survival statute.
Because article 7.12 cuts off a minor’s cause of action before the minor is legally able to assert it, and there is no adequate substitute remedy available to the minor, I would hold the article unconstitutional as applied to minors. Battaile v. Yoffe, 882 S.W.2d 13,16 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (making the same statement about article 4590i, § 10.01). I would sustain point of error one.
MIRABAL and ANDELL, JJ., join this opinion.

. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (1996).

. Although not an issue in this case, under article 4590i, § 10.01, Aubrey could have filed suit until Michael reached his 20th birthday. Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d316, 321 (Tex. 1995).

. Act of March 29, 1955, 54th Leg., R.S., ch. 64, 1955 Tex.Gen.Laws 239, 294 (amended 1987, 1989, 1991 & 1993) (current version at TexBus. CorpAct art. 7.12 (1996)).