Court Opinion

ID: 9784681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:51:09.252635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:57.741869
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL MASSENGALE, Justice,
concurring.
Because the result in this appeal is controlled by the prior memorandum opinion of this court in Kelly v. Harris County Appraisal District, No. 01-09-00996-CV, 2011 WL 497082 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 10, 2011, no pet. h.), I concur in the judgment. I write separately to explain my disagreement with the holdings in Kelly and the sole relevant authority it relied upon, KM TS Spring Cypress L.L.C. v. Harris County Appraisal District, No. 14-09-00978-CV, 2010 WL 3921126 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 7, 2010, pet. denied) (per curiam mem. op.).
This is an appeal from the trial court’s ruling sustaining the appraisal district’s plea to the jurisdiction. The basis for the jurisdictional challenge is the purported existence of an agreement between the property owner’s agent and the chief appraiser. If such an agreement exists, it is final as to any matter on which a protest has been filed but not determined by the board. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 1.111(e)(1) (West Supp. 2010).
In this case, as in Kelly and KM TS Spring Cypress,* the property owner disputes the applicability of Tax Code section 1.111(e) on the basis that the agreement at the hearing was made between the property owner’s agent and an employee of the appraisal district, but not the chief appraiser himself. It is certainly the case that the chief appraiser may delegate authority to his employees, see Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 6.05(e) (West 2008), and it therefore follows that included among the responsibilities that may be so delegated are either or both of the responsibility to represent the appraisal district at a protest hearing, see id. § 41.45(c) (West Supp. 2010), and the power to enter into a binding final agreement concerning appraised value, see id. § 1.111(e).
The chief appraiser’s delegation of authority to his employees to represent the appraisal district at a protest hearing could, but need not necessarily, include a delegation of authority to enter into a final and binding agreement as to appraised value. The factual basis for the appraisal district’s claim of delegation was challenged by the property owner in the trial court, and if it is in fact the case that such authority had been delegated, then it would be plain that section 1.111(e) operates to foreclose further litigation as to appraised value. But the appraisal district produced no evidence to support its claim that the relevant authority had been delegated by the chief appraiser, and the property owner sought discovery to confirm whether there is a factual basis for the appraisal district’s claim. There is no statutory basis for denying discovery into that matter. The statute specifically identifies the chief appraiser as the person empowered to enter into a final agreement for purposes of section 1.111(e). In a large county such as Harris County, a chief appraiser is effectively required to delegate to employees the authority to appear at protest hearings, simply because there are too many hearings for the chief appraiser *438to attend them all. Yet the chief appraiser might still wish to retain the power of personally and finally approving agreements pursuant to section 1.111(e), thereby providing a check against overly generous concessions by the appraisal district’s representatives, collusion with agents for property owners, or any other concern the chief appraiser may have. The presumption in Kelly and KM TS Spring Cypress that such authority may be inferred from the appearance of a representative in lieu of the chief appraiser thus deprives the chief appraiser of the flexibility to tailor which powers he may or may not wish to delegate to his employees. The property owner’s failure to object to the absence of the chief appraiser — an apparently futile objection given the chief appraiser’s power to delegate responsibility for appearing at the protest hearing — adds nothing to the analysis.
When a plea to the jurisdiction turns on disputed jurisdictional facts, the trial court is required to resolve the jurisdictional issues by considering relevant evidence submitted by the parties. See Texas Dep’t. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex.2004); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex.2000). That fundamental concept is violated by the rule of Kelly and KM TS Spring Cypress, which short-circuits the inquiry and improperly assumes jurisdictional facts in favor of the defendant appraisal district.

 See Kelly v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., No. 01-09-00996-CV, 2011 WL 497032, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 10, 2011, no pet. h.); KM TS Spring Cypress L.L.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., No. 14-09-00978-CV, 2010 WL 3921126, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 7, 2010, pet. denied).