Court Opinion

ID: 9526374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:16:20.078167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:34.200306
License: Public Domain

Michael J. Kelly, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result reached by Judge Corrigan, principally because of the uncompelling context within which plaintiff seeks to avoid the immunity afforded the emergency medical technicians by the emergency medical services act.
I believe that viewing the plaintiffs claims in the light most favorable to her, she has failed to supply a factual basis for treating the advanced emergency medical technicians as being guilty of "conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether injury results.” MCL 691.1407(2)(c); MSA 3.996(107)(2)(c). I opt for that definition of gross negligence because that is the only definition that makes sense in the context of emergency medical service. To use a fashionable term, it is ludicrous to attempt to portray human suffering and trauma inflicted by. the forces of nature or society as negligence in order to establish gross negligence as defined by case law. The *724Supreme Court has signaled its intention to set this scheme aright in Burnette v City of Adrian, 414 Mich 448; 326 NW2d 810 (1982), and Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132; 468 NW2d 479 (1991), but I do not anticipate that this is the case that will supply the factual basis for a new "best effort” by the Supreme Court. The most critical fault plaintiff has to offer is that the removal of the oxygen mask was fatal, but the medical reason for that removal is easily explicable as reasonable treatment for hyperventilation, for which the use of oxygen is contraindicated. No testimony supports the inference that the fire department ems team, which were the first arrivals, were any better equipped to afford medical diagnosis and emergency treatment than the advanced ems team; that the latter was misguided, misled, abused, or confused by the former; that the ekg or other tests were grossly misinterpreted, or that Messrs. Latrielle and Newell made anything more than a commonplace medical misjudgment.
I would be gratified to see the Legislature insert the government tort liability act definition of gross negligence in the present version of the emergency medical services act, MCL 333.20901 et seq.; MSA 14.15(20901) et seq. I agree with plaintiff that the pre-Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), case law definitions of gross negligence are obsolete.