Court Opinion

ID: 9565572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:23:49.985672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:45.518227
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Justice
(dissenting).
I agree that Judge Conder applied the wrong standard in concluding that the presence of the nurse made the attorney-client privilege unavailable.1 A third person’s presence should not avoid an otherwise available privilege if the third person’s presence is reasonably necessary under the circumstances. See McCormick on Evidence § 91, at 217-19 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). The evidence indicates that the nurse’s presence was reasonably necessary for Hofmann’s well-being.2
I disagree with the result reached by the Court, however, and would uphold the ruling below, because I conclude that petitioner has not met the threshold requirement for claiming an attorney-client privilege — ■ petitioner has failed to establish that the communication between the client and the attorney was intended by the client to be confidential. Id. at 217. As Justice Wolfe wrote for the Court in Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 262, 159 P.2d 142, 147 (1945), “The rpere fact that the relationship of attorney and client exists between two individuals does not ipso facto make all communications between them confidential.” Quoting with approval from Wig-more on Evidence, section 2311, he added: “ ‘[T]he circumstances [must] indicate whether by implication the communication was of a sort intended to be confidential.’ ” I think the Court slights this inquiry. By failing to carefully consider the question of the client’s intent, courts may shield from scrutiny communications that the privilege was not created to protect.
There is evidence in the record sufficient to establish that the attorney thought the *218communication was at least private and perhaps confidential. However, I find the record very sparse on the question of the client’s intention. Although the client was available to give an affidavit in support of his claim of privilege, the record is strangely devoid of direct evidence as to the client’s state of mind at the time of the communication. As for the facts and circumstances in the record that constitute indirect evidence of his intent, I find them ambiguous at best. All persons must give evidence, unless they establish a recognized justification for refusing to do so. Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the communication was privileged. On the present state of the record, I conclude that petitioner has not carried this burden. Therefore, I would uphold the trial court’s refusal to find the communication privileged.

. This matter is before us on a petition for an extraordinary writ. I question the appropriateness of that vehicle for determining the correctness of the trial court’s action. However, given the extraordinary public speculation this matter has engendered, it is appropriate that we make every effort to insure that the proceedings are as error free as possible. Therefore, I would treat the petition as an interlocutory appeal under Rule 26(b)(3) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure or Rule 5 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and apply the standard of review appropriate to an appeal. See Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., Utah, 692 P.2d 765, 766 (1984).

. I also conclude that the privilege is not lost if a third person whose presence is not otherwise justified overhears a confidential attorney-client communication without the client’s knowledge, so long as reasonable precautions were taken to protect against overhearing. McCormick, supra, at 213-18 & n. 5. However, because the nurse's presence was justified, the reasonableness of the precautions taken to exclude third parties has no bearing on the question before us.