Court Opinion

ID: 9631787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:50:15.130451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:15.762654
License: Public Domain

Kaul, J.,
(dissenting in part and concurring in part): Because of the rule of stare decisis, which I believe applies with particular force to the decision in this case, I must respectfully dissent from the holdings in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the syllabus and the corre' sponding portions of the opinion which overrule Topeka Presbyterian Manor v. Board of County Commissioners, 195 Kan. 90, 402 P. 2d 802, and all other decisions contrary to today’s holding.
The instant case is disposed of by the court’s declaration:
“The basic reason why an exemption from taxation should be denied in this case is that the record does not disclose the existence of any gift from the plaintiff corporation to the residents of the home or to any one else.”
I fully agree with this reasoning, however, the court proceeds to overrule Topeka Presbyterian Manor wherein $400,000.00 was donated in gifts toward construction, and $59,000.00 received in gifts during the first seven months of the operation; a period during which operation of the institution would have been some $50,000.00 in the red but for the gifts.
In today’s decision the court holds:
“ ‘Charitable’, as used in such constitutional and statutory provisions, denotes gifts to the poor or positive steps taken to relieve distress and suffering of those unable to help themselves.” (Syl. ¶[ 7.)
This holding read together with the declaration that Manor and other decisions of this court contrary to the holding herein are overruled, clearly imports that none but the destitute can be benefited by an institution that hopes to retain tax exempt status. This holding is not only a complete departure from this court’s concept of “charity” in a legal sense, as expressed in Manor, but the broad sweep of today’s strict construction of “charitable” also contravenes much of the rationale of a number of previous decisions dealing with the subject and relied upon in Manor, i. e., Nuns of St. Dominic v. Younkin, 118 Kan. 554, 235 Pac. 869 [1925]; and Ingleside v. Nation, 83 Kan. 172, 109 Pac. 984 [1910].
The same principles enunciated by the court herein, including the holding in Mason v. Zimmerman, 81 Kan. 799, 106 Pac. 1005, were considered by this court and reconciled with or used to *281buttress the decision in the carefully written opinion in Manor, which was filed on June 12, 1965. That decision — good or bad— was concurred in by six members of this court, as it was then constituted, and it became the law of this state.
In the Manor decision this court recognized that charity comprehends the care and attention of aged people. The court said:
“Historically, courts and taxing authorities alike, including our own highest taxing authorities, have generally treated homes for the aged as charitable organizations.” (p. 98.)
Further in the opinion it was stated:
“Traditionally special concern has been shown for the aged. Their peculiar needs arising out of the infirmities of body, mind and spirit that come with advanced age have received the attention of government at all levels and of citizens generally. . . .” (p. 97.)
This was not a new doctrine in this jurisdiction, but actually a projection of the underlying principle involved in Ingleside v. Nation, supra. Neither were the factors of admission fees and monthly payments new matters in the consideration of charitable institutions. In this connection, the court in the Manor decision discussed in depth the rationale of Nuns of St. Dominic v. Younkin, supra, and relied upon it as precedent.
Kansas does not, by any means, stand alone in its categorization of aged with respect to tax exempt status of institutions involved. In recent years, either by case law or constitutionally acceptable statutes, identical or similar concepts have been adopted by many states. (See 37 A. L. R. 3d, Anno., p. 565.) Admittedly, there is a pronounced division of authority and a wide-range of approach to the subject among the various jurisdictions.
The thrust of the Manor decision is brought into sharp focus by the court’s reference to the case of Fredericka Home v. County of San Diego, 35 Cal. (2d) 789, 221 P. 2d 68, wherein it was held:
“ ‘The concept of charity is not confined to the relief of the needy and destitute. Apart from financial assistance, it comprehends the supply of care and attention to aged people.’ ” (Syl. ¶ 2.)
The court compared the Fredericka home to the Manor in this fashion:
“The manner of operation of the Fredericka home was substantially similar to the operation of Manor except Fredericka used a life care contract’ basis for admission, with a more substantial entrance fee. The fees were inadequate to maintain operation of the home without gifts or donations. The court held that in spite of the substantial entrance fee, where the payments were within *282reach of persons of limited means and were not commensurate with the costs of the benefits they received, and there was no element of private gain with all of the organization’s income devoted exclusively to affording a reasonable standard of care to such persons, the home’s property was used exclusively for charitable purposes.” (p.98,99.)
Taking that quoted above to be the guidelines of the Manor holding, I am now convinced, after reexamination, that the holding in Evangelical Village & Bible Conference, Inc. v. Board of County Commrs., 207 Kan. 383, 485 P. 2d 343, was error and that the case was distinguishable as pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Fontron.
I believe it may fairly be presumed that many homes for the aged have been organized, built and financially structured relying on the 1965 Manor decision. Undoubtedly, many aged have paid admission fees, which in numerous cases more than likely constituted the bulk of their life savings. Where a judicial decision has guided numerous people in their conduct or has entered into business transactions, the force of stare decisis, understandably, is particularly strong and courts have been most reluctant to deviate from the established law. (20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 192, p. 528; 21 C. J. S., Courts, § 216, p. 396.)
Admittedly, the rule of stare decisis does not require the perpetuation of a doctrine which may later appear to have been erroneously adopted because of changes in social or economic conditions or for other persuasive reasons. This court, however, has generally justified the reversal of its position within the context of the rule of stare decisis, i. e., Carroll v. Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P. 2d 21; and Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934. In the record herein there is no showing of, nor does the court recognize, any change since 1965 in the economic or social status of aged citizens that warrants this abrupt reversal of the law. In fact, I think it is a matter of common knowledge that inflation has eroded the status of those aged citizens whose situation we are dealing with.
I was not a member of this court when Manor was decided in 1965; however, the mere fact that the composition of a court has changed since it made a previous decision or ruling, is not grounds for deviating from the precedent set by that previous decision. (20 Am. Jur. 2d, Courts, § 187, p. 523.) Whatever my own views may have been on presentation of the issues for the first time, they *283are overshadowed by judicial responsibility dictated by the force of stare decisis on a decision dealing with subject matter as is here involved.