Court Opinion

ID: 9940937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 17:20:00.620737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:03.230657
License: Public Domain

Vermont Superior Court
                                                                                                 Filed 01 1
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 SUPERIOR COURT                                    ﬁ?
                                                          1
                                                         \4                 CIVIL DIVISION
 Washington Unit                                                          Case No. 23—CV—02572
 65 State Street
 Montpelier VT 05602
 802-828-2091                                       EE
 www.verm0ntjudiciary.org

                                   Stanley Reynolds V. State of Vermont

        Opinion and Order on the State’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadingg

        In this case, Plaintiff Stanley Reynolds seeks damages from the State of

Vermont under Vermont’s Innocence Protection Act, 13 V.S.A. §§ 5561—5585 (the

“Act”), for a now-vacated sentence of imprisonment following his conviction for

felony sexual assault. The State has ﬁled a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

It argues that the plain language of the Act, principally 13 V.S.A. § 5572 (right of

action; procedure), demonstrates that Mr. Reynolds cannot be entitled to relief in

this case. Mr. Reynolds, Without addressing § 5572, argues that his complaint

includes all allegations required by 13 V.S.A. § 5573 (complaint) and that no more is

needed to have a Viable claim. The Court makes the following determinations.

        As the Vermont Supreme Court has explained, the question posed by a Vt. R.

Civ. P. 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings “‘is Whether, once the pleadings

are closed, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the

pleadings.’ ‘For the purposes of [a] motion [for judgment on the pleadings] all well

pleaded factual allegations in the nonmovant’s pleadings and all reasonable

inferences that can be drawn therefrom are assumed to be true and all contravening

assertions in the movant’s pleadings are taken to be false.’ ‘A defendant may not

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23—CV-02572 Stanley Reynolds v. State of Vermont
secure judgment on the pleadings if contained therein are allegations that, if

proved, would permit recovery.’” Island Indus., LLC v. Town of Grand Isle, 2021 VT

49, ¶ 10, 215 Vt. 162, 169 (citations omitted).

        The “primary objective when construing a statute ‘is to give effect to the

intention of the Legislature.’ In effectuating that intent, ‘[w]e examine the plain

language of the statute, and if this language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce

the statute according to its terms.’” Maple Run Unified Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Hum.

Rts. Comm’n, 2023 VT 63, ¶ 13 (citations omitted). “As a corollary of this principle,

we resort to other tools of statutory construction—such as legislative history—only

if the plain language of the statute is unclear or ambiguous.” In re 204 N. Ave.

NOV, 2019 VT 52, ¶ 5, 210 Vt. 572, 575; see also H.H., 2020 VT 107, ¶ 18, 214 Vt. 1,

10 (“Where that statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we look no further.”).

        To properly interpret a statute, the Court “will not excerpt a phrase and

follow what purports to be its literal reading without considering the provision as a

whole, and proper construction requires the examination of the whole and every

part of the statute.” TD Banknorth, N.A. v. Dep’t of Taxes, 2008 VT 120, ¶ 15, 185

Vt. 45, 53 (citation omitted); see also Ran-Mar, Inc. v. Town of Berlin, 2006 VT 117,

¶ 5, 181 Vt. 26, 29 (“We construe all parts of the statutory scheme together, where

possible, as a harmonious whole, and ‘[w]e will avoid a construction that would

render the legislation ineffective or irrational.’”) (citations omitted).

        Here, the parties agree that the controversy presented in this case is properly

resolved on the plain language of the Act. Neither argues that the Act is unclear or

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23-CV-02572 Stanley Reynolds v. State of Vermont
ambiguous, requiring resort to collateral rules of construction or legislative history

to determine its meaning.

        The Act consists of 4 subchapters, the first two of which are of central

importance to this case. Subchapter 1 (post-conviction DNA testing, 13 V.S.A. §§

5561–5570) creates a process whereby one convicted of a qualifying crime may

petition a court to require DNA testing of biological evidence from the criminal case.

If the court grants the petition, and the testing produces evidence that undermines

the conviction or sentence, the court is empowered to grant appropriate relief

including, among other things, vacating the conviction, granting a new criminal

trial, or granting a new sentencing hearing. See 13 V.S.A. § 5569(c).

        Subchapter 2 (compensation for wrongful convictions, 13 V.S.A. §§ 5572–

5578) creates a statutory cause of action for damages for certain “wrongful

convictions.” In particular, 13 V.S.A. § 5572(a) provides: “A person convicted and

imprisoned for a crime of which the person was exonerated pursuant to this chapter

shall have a cause of action for damages against the State.” Section 5573 further

requires such a claimant to allege in the complaint that: “(1) the complainant has

been convicted of a felony crime, been sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and

served at least six months of the sentence in a correctional facility; and (2) the

complainant was exonerated through the complainant’s conviction being reversed or

vacated, the information or indictment being dismissed, the complainant being

acquitted after a second or subsequent trial, or the granting of a pardon.” 13 V.S.A.

§ 5573(a).

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        To be entitled to relief, the claimant then must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that:

        (1) The complainant was convicted of a felony crime, was sentenced to
        a term of imprisonment, and served at least six months of the sentence
        in a correctional facility.

        (2)(A) the complainant’s conviction was reversed or vacated, the
        complainant’s information or indictment was dismissed, or the
        complainant was acquitted after a second or subsequent trial; or
           (B) the complainant was pardoned for the crime for which he or she
        was sentenced.

        (3) The complainant is actually innocent of the felony or felonies that
        are the basis for the claim. As used in this chapter, a person is
        “actually innocent” of a felony or felonies if he or she did not engage in
        any illegal conduct alleged in the charging documents for which he or
        she was charged, convicted, and imprisoned.

        (4) The complainant did not fabricate evidence or commit or suborn
        perjury during any proceedings related to the crime with which he or
        she was charged.

13 V.S.A. § 5574(a).

        The above provisions, thus, separately describe: (a) who may have a cause of

action; (b) the necessary allegations in the complaint; and (c) what the claimant

must prove to be entitled to a remedy.

        There can be no doubt that Mr. Reynolds’ complaint in this case includes the

allegations required by 13 V.S.A. § 5573(a). It also includes allegations relevant to

his ultimate burden of proof under § 5574(a): that he is actually innocent and

neither fabricated evidence nor committed or suborned perjury. On that basis, he

maintains that his claim satisfies the Act’s requirements.

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        The State, however, focuses on 13 V.S.A. § 5572(a), which creates the cause of

action and limits it to circumstances in which the claimant “was exonerated

pursuant to this chapter.” (Emphasis added.) Under that provision, to be qualified

to seek damages, one must already have been: (1) exonerated, (2) pursuant to, (3)

this chapter. Exonerated, or exoneration, is not expressly defined in the Act, but

the meaning of the expression is apparent in 13 V.S.A. § 5573(a)(2), which requires

the complaint to include the allegation that “the complainant was exonerated

through the complainant’s conviction being reversed or vacated, the information or

indictment being dismissed, the complainant being acquitted after a second or

subsequent trial, or the granting of a pardon.” Exoneration, thus, refers to a

conviction that was reversed or vacated, an information or indictment that was

dismissed, acquittal at a second or subsequent trial, or a pardon.

        The expression “pursuant to” means “in conformity with,” “according to,” or

“in compliance with.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), pursuant to;

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, pursuant to (online). The phrase plainly refers to a

mechanism through which exoneration occurred prior to the filing of the complaint

for damages. This “chapter” clearly refers to the entirety of the Act, Chapter 182 of

Title 13.

        Importantly, however, the only mechanism through which one might become

“exonerated” of an underlying crime “pursuant to” the Act exists in subchapter

1─via a petition for DNA testing and a resulting change in the defendant’s

conviction. While there are certainly other independent vehicles through which a

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23-CV-02572 Stanley Reynolds v. State of Vermont
defendant may become exonerated, the Act itself provides no other avenue to

achieve that result.

        Plainly read, Section 5572 provides a statutory limitation on the persons who

can seek compensation, and its provisions are not unclear or ambiguous. To bring

an action for damages under the Act, a defendant must have been exonerated

pursuant to the Act.

        Other provisions of the Act, which are to be read in pari materia with Section

5572, lend support to that view. See State v. A.P., 2021 VT 90, ¶ 12, 216 Vt. 76, 81

(“We do not read statutory language in isolation; we read and construe together the

whole and every part of the statute, together with other statutes standing in pari

materia with it, as parts of a unified statutory system.”). Section 5576, specifically

entitled “Limitations,” states that “an action for compensation under [subchapter 2]

shall be commenced within three years after the person is exonerated pursuant to

subchapter 1.” 13 V.S.A. § 5576(a) (emphasis added). Additionally, after

“exonerating a person pursuant to subchapter 1,” courts are required to notify such

person of the available statutory action for compensation. 13 V.S.A. § 5577(a)(1)

(emphasis added). It would make little sense for the Legislature to restrict the

limitations period for and notifications required by the Act solely to exonerations

under subchapter 1 unless such exonerations were the gateway to the Act. Read

together, Sections 5572, 5576(a), and 5577(a)(1), all make unassailably clear that to

bring an action under subchapter 2, one’s exoneration must have occurred by

operation of subchapter 1.

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          Mr. Reynolds’ alleged exoneration did not. His conviction was vacated by the

civil division in a post-conviction relief case due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

To the extent that a conviction vacated for that reason might be characterized as

“exoneration,” there is no indication that it had anything whatsoever to do with

DNA testing, much less a post-conviction petition for DNA testing under the Act.

As a result, he can have no viable claim for damages under the Act, regardless of

whether he filed a complaint otherwise conforming to 13 V.S.A. § 5573(a). He is not

within the statutory class of authorized claimants.

          In opposing the State’s motion, Mr. Reynolds does not claim that any part of

the Act is unclear or ambiguous; offers no competing interpretation of Sections

5572, 5576(a), and 5577(a)(1); and makes no arguments concerning the Act’s

legislative history. The State’s motion is granted based on the plain language of the

Act, without need of any additional analysis. See H.H., 2020 VT 107, ¶ 18, 214 Vt.

at 10.1

1
 Since Mr. Reynolds does not attempt to argue that the legislative history of the Act
might suggest a different outcome in this case, the Court has no need to address
that question. As the State has discussed it, however, the Court notes that some
portions of the history are potentially supportive of a more expansive view of the
Act. But, in the end, the plain language of the existing Act controls. Doncaster v.
Hane, 2020 VT 22, ¶ 22, 212 Vt. 37 (Where “statutory language is unambiguous and
resolves the conflict without doing violence to the legislative scheme, we accept the
plain meaning as the intent of the Legislature without looking further.” (internal
quotations omitted)). Any past amendments simply have not amounted to a clear
and an express broadening of the class of claimants under the Act. And, the Court
agrees with the State that, in addition to the language of the Act being
unambiguous in that regard, any legislative waiver of the State’s sovereign
immunity would have to be explicitly stated in the statutory text to be effective.
Depot Square Pizzeria, LLC v. Dep’t of Taxes, 2017 VT 29, ¶ 9, 204 Vt. 536, 541
(waiver of sovereign immunity must be express); see also F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S.
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23-CV-02572 Stanley Reynolds v. State of Vermont
                                                   Conclusion

        For the foregoing reasons, the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is

granted.

        Electronically signed on Thursday, January 18, 2024, per V.R.E.F. 9(d).

                                                        _______________________
                                                        Timothy B. Tomasi
                                                        Superior Court Judge

284, 290 (2012) (“Legislative history cannot supply a waiver that is not clearly
evident from the language of the statute.”); Manatee Cnty. v. Town of Longboat Key,
365 So.2d 143, 147 (Fla. 1978) (waiver of sovereign immunity must be “clear and
unequivocal”). Other than as to claims arising out of subchapter 1, no such waiver
can be found in the Act.
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