Court Opinion

ID: 9942963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 15:07:39.854521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:26.300666
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                            APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
  internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                     SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                     APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                     DOCKET NO. A-2844-21

IN THE MATTER OF S.D.,
TOWNSHIP OF FREEHOLD
POLICE DEPARTMENT.
_________________________

                Argued January 30, 2024 – Decided February 22, 2024

                Before Judges Mayer, Enright and Paganelli.

                On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
                Commission, Docket No. 2021-1768.

                Christopher A. Gray argued the cause for appellant
                (Sciarra & Catrambone, LLC, attorneys; Christopher A.
                Gray and Deborah Masker Edwards, of counsel and on
                the briefs).

                Brian J. Chabarek argued the cause for respondent
                Township of Freehold Police Department (Davison
                Eastman Mu noz ֮    Paone, PA, attorneys; Brian J.
                Chabarek, of counsel and on the brief; Timothy C.
                Moriarty, on the brief).

                Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission
                (Brian D. Ragunan, Deputy Attorney General, on the
                statement in lieu of brief).

PER CURIAM
        Appellant S.D. appeals from a March 7, 2022 final agency decision by

respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission (Commission), adopting a

January 21, 2022 initial decision by an administrative law judge (ALJ),

upholding S.D.'s termination as a police officer with respondent Township of

Freehold Police Department (Department). We affirm.

        We recite the facts from the hearings conducted by the ALJ judge. S.D.

is married and has three children. S.D.'s wife was enrolled in New Jersey's

Medicinal Marijuana Program to treat various medical conditions.                  On

November 30, 2020, S.D.'s wife filled a prescription for cannabis in a smokable

form.

        On December 15, 2020, S.D.'s wife informed S.D. she did not want to

smoke prescribed cannabis alone. S.D. agreed to remain with his wife while she

smoked. Because the couple had three young children, S.D. and his wife sat in

their car so the children would not see their mother smoking.

        The couple sat inside their car for thirty to forty minutes while S.D.'s wife

smoked. Given the cold weather, they initially sat inside the car with the

windows closed and the heater running. When the car began to fill with smoke,

they "cracked [the] window[s] a little bit[,] just to get the air flow [] moving."

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The next evening, December 16, S.D. again sat inside the car with his wife so

she could smoke prescribed cannabis.

      On December 17, 2020, the Department selected S.D. for a random drug

test. S.D. signed the required forms for the drug test and provided a urine

sample. The Department sent the sample to the New Jersey State Toxicology

Lab (NJSTL) for testing and retained a second "split" sample.

      About a month later, the NJSTL reported S.D.'s sample contained

cannabis metabolites in a concentration of 16.3 ng/ml, exceeding the 15 ng/ml

threshold and yielding a positive result. Because the NJSTL testing indicated a

positive result, S.D. sent the split sample to a different laboratory, NMS Labs,

for independent testing.   The results of the split sample revealed cannabis

metabolites in a concentration of 14.68 ng/ml.

      Based on the NJSTL positive drug test, on February 17, 2021, the

Department issued a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (PNDA),

suspending S.D. without pay. The charges against S.D. in the PNDA included

the following: insubordination; inability to perform duties; conduct unbecoming

a public employee; neglect of duty; and other sufficient cause, including

violations of rules contained in the Department's Manual.

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       On May 12, 2021, the Department issued a Final Notice of Disciplinary

Action, terminating S.D.'s employment as of February 17, 2021. S.D. waived

his right to a departmental hearing on the charges and appealed his termination

directly to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL). As part of the OAL

proceedings, the parties stipulated to the validity of the process by which S.D.'s

sample was selected, acquired, transported, retained, and tested.

       The ALJ held hearings on three dates in September 2021. Dr. George

Jackson, executive director of laboratories for the Office of the Chief State

Medical Examiner, testified as a forensic toxicology expert on behalf of the

Department. Dr. Daniel Isenschmid, a forensic toxicology expert with NMS

Labs, testified on S.D.'s behalf. The ALJ also heard testimony from Detective

Lieutenant Scott Hall with the Department's Internal Affairs Unit, the

Department's Chief of Police, S.D., S.D.'s wife, and S.D.'s character witnesses.

       Dr. Jackson testified S.D.'s first sample underwent initial screening at

NJSTL. The initial screening test identified the presence of cannabinoids at 53.2

ng/ml which was above the 20 ng/ml threshold for a presumptive positive result.

This    presumptive    positive    test       necessitated   a   follow   up      gas

chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) test.               The GC/MS test is a

qualitative and quantitative analysis for the presence of 11-Carboxy-THC (THC)

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and measures for THC concentrations above the 15 ng/ml threshold to report a

positive result. The 15 ng/ml level is an industry standard used by the State of

New Jersey and designated to include a testing subject's accidental exposure to

THC. According to the GC/MS test performed by the NJSTL, S.D.'s sample

contained cannabis metabolites in a concentration of 16.3284 ng/ml. While Dr.

Jackson testified a positive finding may be attributable to a medication listed on

a subject's medication information sheet, he stated S.D. reported no medications.

      The ALJ also considered Dr. Isenschmid's testimony.            The doctor

explained NMS Labs conducted a liquid chromatography tandem mass

spectrometry (LCMS) test on S.D.'s split sample. According to Dr. Isenschmid,

the LCMS test of S.D.'s split sample contained cannabis metabolites in a

concentration of 14.68 ng/ml, which was below the threshold for a positive

result.

      However, Dr. Isenschmid further testified the result obtained by NMS

Labs fell within the margin of error of the first sample's test and "confirmed the

results of the first test" by the NJSTL. Thus, Dr. Isenschmid testified both

results were "considered analytically the same." Despite the difference in the

concentration of cannabis found by each laboratory, the doctor testified the

results from the NJSTL were valid and S.D.'s sample above 15 ng/ml constituted

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a positive result.      S.D. never challenged the accuracy of the Department's

sampling methods or procedures or the NJSTL's test results.

      Dr. Isenschmid also testified regarding a 2015 study on passive inhalation

exposure to cannabis and resulting positive drug screens.        Dr. Isenschmid

conceded the 2015 study was performed under "extreme conditions" and he

"d[id]n't pretend to know what conditions . . . were present at the time of . . .

[S.D.'s] smoke exposure."

      Dr. Isenschmid explained he was unable to opine on S.D.'s passive

inhalation of cannabis smoke leading to a positive test result without additional

information. The doctor testified he required critical information, such as the

duration between exposure to the marijuana and the timing of S.D.'s test sample,

the environment where the marijuana was smoked, the ventilation in the area the

marijuana was smoked, the amount of marijuana smoked, and the potency of the

marijuana smoked to offer an opinion on passive inhalation by S.D. and his

positive test result.

      Detective Lieutenant Hall, who was in charge of the Department's random

drug testing policy and familiar with the Attorney General's directives regarding

random drug testing from 2018 to the present, also testified. Hall testified the

Attorney General's drug testing policy in effect when S.D. submitted a urine

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sample required termination for any officer receiving a positive test result. Hall

explained officers are required to sign an acknowledgement regarding the

consequences flowing from a positive test result and S.D. did so on December

17, 2020. Additionally, Hall stated the Department had a policy requiring

random drug screening for officers and S.D. signed the policy. Hall further

testified the Department required officers to list medications taken fourteen days

prior to a random drug screen on a medication information sheet.

      Upon receipt of S.D.'s positive test result, Hall notified the Department's

Chief of Police and the Monmouth County Prosecutor's Office.            S.D. also

received notice of the result. Hall testified S.D. offered no explanation for the

positive test at that time.

      The ALJ also heard live testimony from several character witnesses on

S.D.'s behalf.   Further, the ALJ accepted and considered written character

witness statements. The character witnesses described S.D. as a respected

member of the Department with no prior disciplinary history.

      S.D. also testified. S.D. explained he signed the Department's drug testing

policies, acknowledging termination as a police officer if he tested positive for

marijuana. S.D. also described the many treatments, medications, and therapies

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prescribed to address his wife's medical issues, including Lyme disease,

rheumatoid arthritis, fibromyalgia, and gastrointestinal issues.

      S.D. further testified he was present when his wife smoked medicinal

cannabis on December 15 and 16, 2020 and felt no effects from the smoke on

either night.

      S.D. then explained he was selected for a random drug test upon reporting

to work on December 17, 2020. Prior to providing a urine sample, S.D. signed

the required consent forms. Under the Department's policy, S.D. was required

to complete a "Drug Testing Medication Information" form prior to providing a

urine sample. The Department's policy required S.D. to "identif[y] medications

(prescription and non-prescription [i.e. over-the-counter]) . . . ingested in the

past fourteen days . . . ." S.D. listed no medications on his form.

      On February 16, 2021, Hall informed S.D. of the positive drug test result.

Hall gave S.D. an opportunity to provide an explanation for the positive test.

S.D. explained he was "blown away" by the positive result because he did not

use marijuana. The Department suspended S.D. and advised there would be an

Internal Affairs investigation.

      S.D. then met with a representative from the Police Benevolent

Association (PBA). The PBA representative told S.D. to get a lawyer because

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                                        8
S.D. did not appear to grasp the impact of the positive test result. About a half

hour into this meeting, S.D. told the PBA representative the positive drug test

may have been the result of sitting in the car with his wife while she smoked

medically prescribed cannabis on December 15 and 16, 2020.

      During cross-examination, S.D. confirmed he was aware of the drug

testing policies promulgated by the Department and the Attorney General. He

further acknowledged he knew these drug testing policies required termination

from the police force upon a positive test result.

      On cross-examination, S.D. also explained he did not list any medications

on the medication information sheet because he had not taken any medications.

S.D. testified he did not indicate his wife was enrolled in the medicinal cannabis

program because that information was not requested on the form.

      After completing the testimony, the parties stipulated to the following

facts: S.D. was not challenging the random drug testing process or acquisition

of the samples; S.D. was not challenging the chain of custody of the samples;

S.D. waived his right to a departmental hearing; and S.D.'s suspension

commenced February 17, 2021.

      On January 21, 2022, the ALJ issued a detailed written decision denying

S.D.'s appeal and upholding his termination. The ALJ found all witnesses to be

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                                        9
credible.   However, the ALJ explained "this [was] not a situation where

credibility [was] a factor, but a situation where the test results, not challenged

by either party, must govern." The ALJ rendered the following factual findings:

            [O]n December 15, 2020, and December 16, 2020,
            [S.D.] accompanied his wife in a closed vehicle for
            approximately thirty to forty minutes on each occasion
            while [she] smoked marijuana medically prescribed for
            her. On December 17, 2020, [S.D.] reported for work
            and was directed to submit a urine sample for random
            drug testing. As part of that process, he did not report
            any drug or other substance use on the prescribed
            document[,] which is a part of the random drug-
            screening process. He submitted a sample, which was
            divided into two parts. On February 16, 2021, [S.D.]
            was notified that testing of the urine sample . . .
            revealed that his urine was positive for cannabinoids
            (THC) in excess of the [fifteen] ng/m[l] cutoff under
            the [Office of Attorney General] and [Department]
            policies.

      Additionally, the ALJ noted S.D. sent his split sample for testing at an

independent laboratory and that laboratory concluded S.D.'s sample tested

positive for cannabinoids in a concentration of 14.680 ng/ml. Regarding the

split sample, the ALJ stated:

            [t]he positive-level threshold cutoff concentrations are
            expressly to be excluded from consideration by the lab
            because the purpose of the split-specimen test is merely
            to confirm the presence of the drug metabolite in the
            specimen. That is, a split specimen shall be reported as
            a "positive result" when the laboratory result confirms

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                                       10
            the presence of the metabolite in the split specimen
            without regard to the threshold level.

Relying on prior decisions issued by the Commission, the ALJ explained "in the

absence of any evidence, or even a suggestion, that the initial test produced an

inaccurate result, the value of the split sample is significantly decreased."

      The ALJ further determined:

            While [S.D.]'s motive in supporting his wife [was]
            admirable, as a police officer he showed a lack of
            perspicacity in dealing with the situation. As a law-
            enforcement officer, he knew (or should have known)
            that being subject to marijuana smoke (whether directly
            or indirectly inhaled) in a closed, confined space two
            times in two days for periods of thirty to forty minutes
            each may have resulted in adverse results in his system,
            fitness for duty, and ability to react in a work or
            emergency situation—whether or not he felt any effects
            from the exposure.

            Legality of marijuana does not necessarily demand a
            corresponding adjustment to the strict, zero-tolerance
            standards to which law-enforcement personnel are held.

      The ALJ also found S.D.'s signing of the consent and acknowledgment

forms put S.D. on notice that a positive drug test result would lead to termination

as a law enforcement officer. The ALJ noted the testing policies adopted by the

Department and the Attorney General "require[ed] random drug testing with a

zero-tolerance-for drug-use," and "S.D. was aware of and knew the requirements

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                                       11
of the [Department] and the [Attorney General's] Guidelines regarding illegal

drug use."

      The ALJ also rejected S.D.'s argument he was not required to list his wife's

medicinal cannabis use on his medication information sheet prior to the random

drug test. S.D. claimed he did not need to list cannabis because it was not his

medication. The ALJ found "common sense regarding the circumstances should

have led [S.D.] to note his exposure to his wife's medicinal marijuana on the

disclosure form."

      Further, the ALJ rejected S.D.'s request for assessment of progressive

discipline. The ALJ determined:

             there [was] no dispute that, intentionally or
             inadvertently, [S.D.] was subject to marijuana smoke.
             He knew it was illegal, knew the policies and
             procedures of the Department, and knew he was held to
             a higher standard as a law enforcement officer. Further,
             while testimony reflects that [S.D.] ha[d] no
             disciplinary record, test results documenting illegal
             drugs in the system of someone in a safety-sensitive
             position is a serious offense, and the penalty should
             reflect the same.

      Based on S.D.'s status as a police officer, the ALJ concluded S.D. was

held to a higher standard of conduct than ordinary public employees. Given

S.D.'s sample tested above the 15 ng/ml threshold limit, as conceded by S.D.'s

own toxicology expert, the ALJ sustained the Department's charges against S.D.

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The judge explained whether S.D. exposed himself to cannabis "intentionally or

inadvertently, he did not comply with the policy."        Accordingly, the ALJ

concluded the sustained charges "[we]re sufficiently egregious to warrant

termination of [S.D.] from his position as a police officer." The ALJ expressly

concluded the positive test result mandated S.D.'s termination from the

Department.1

      In his written decision, the ALJ stated: "If the . . . Commission does not

adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless such time

limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final

decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-204."

      On March 2, 2022, the Commission considered S.D.'s motion to modify

the penalty imposed by the ALJ to a six-month suspension rather than

termination. At that time, only four persons constituted membership of the

Commission. Two members voted for and two members voted against the

1
  When he issued his written decision, the ALJ noted "the regulations for sale
and distribution of marijuana to the public [had] not been perfected, nor [had]
any changes been made to the [Attorney General's] policies regarding [the]
usage of marijuana by law-enforcement officers." Not until about a month after
the ALJ's decision did the Legislature legalize the recreational use of marijuana.
See N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56. Not until almost four months after the ALJ's
decision did the Attorney General issue a memorandum related to the
legalization of marijuana.

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                                       13
motion. As a result of the Commission's tie vote, S.D.'s motion failed and the

Commission did not render a decision. Thus, under N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c), the

ALJ's decision became final on March 7, 2022.

       On May 17, 2022, the Commission denied S.D.'s request for

reconsideration. The Commission declined to address the motion "since the

Commission did not render a decision and could not have made 'a clear material

error.'"

       On appeal, S.D. argues the ALJ's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and

unreasonable and unsupported by credible evidence in the record. S.D. also

challenges the imposed sanction of termination rather than progressive

discipline. S.D. further contends the Commission erred in denying his request

for reconsideration. We reject these arguments.

       We accord deference to agency decisions even in circumstances where, as

in this case, the ALJ's decision was "deemed adopted" by the Commission as a

final decision due to an insufficient number of Commission members to review

the decision. In re Hendrickson, 235 N.J. 145, 157 (2018). "An agency's

determination on the merits 'will be sustained unless there is a clear showing

that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the

record.'" Saccaone v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369,

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                                         14
380 (2014) (quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J.

14, 27 (2011)).

      When reviewing an agency decision, we consider: (1) whether the agency

action violated "express or implied legislative policies"; (2) whether there was

substantial evidence in the record to support the agency's decision; and (3)

whether in applying the law to the facts, the agency reached a conclusion "that

could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors."

Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018)

(quoting In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).

      We apply a deferential standard to the review of disciplinary sanctions.

In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007). An agency's sanction will be reversed

only if the "punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the

circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness."        Id. at 28-29

(quoting In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)). "The threshold of 'shocking' the

court's sense of fairness is a difficult one, not met whenever the court would

have reached a different result." Id. at 29. We may not substitute our own view

whether a particular penalty is warranted. In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 486 (2007).

However, we are not "bound by [an] agency's interpretation of a statute or its

determination of a strictly legal issue." Allstars, 234 N.J. at 158 (alteration in

                                                                            A-2884-21
                                       15
original) (quoting Dep't of Children & Fams., Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.

T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 302 (2011)).

      We first address S.D.'s argument that the Commission's decision

subjecting him to termination was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. S.D.

argues the Department failed to present evidence supporting, let alone proving,

any of the levied charges. We disagree.

      The charges issued by the Department against S.D. included conduct

unbecoming a police officer and other good and sufficient cause based on S.D.'s

positive drug test.

      Police officers commit conduct unbecoming when their conduct "has a

tendency to destroy public respect for municipal employees and confidence in

the operation of municipal services." Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 152 N.J.

532, 554 (1998) (quoting In re Appeal of Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. 136, 140 (App.

Div. 1960)). Additionally a finding of conduct unbecoming may be determined

where the conduct "offends accepted standards of decency." Id. at 557. Such

conduct "need not 'be predicated upon the violation of any particular rule or

regulation. . . .'" Id. at 555 (quoting Hartmann v. Police Dep't of Ridgewood,

258 N.J. Super. 32, 40 (App. Div. 1992)).

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      Here, the ALJ found S.D. was a police officer and his testing positive for

marijuana tended to destroy the public's trust regarding law enforcement officers

who took an oath to uphold the law. The ALJ properly concluded termination

for conduct unbecoming a police officer was necessary to uphold the public's

respect for, and confidence in, its police officers. A "violation of the implicit

standard of good behavior which devolves [around] one who stands in the public

eye as an upholder of that which is morally and legally correct" is sufficient to

discipline a police officer for conduct unbecoming. See Emmons, 63 N.J. Super.

at 140. We discern no error in the ALJ's decision to terminate S.D. for conduct

unbecoming S.D based on his positive drug test.

      The Department also charged S.D. with conduct constituting other good

and sufficient cause for imposing discipline. This charge was premised on S.D.'s

testing positive for drugs contrary to the Attorney General's and the

Department's zero-tolerance drug testing policy and in violation of provisions in

the Department's Manual. Under the policies and Department's Manual, there

was sufficient credible evidence in the record in support of other good and

sufficient cause to impose discipline against S.D.

      We also reject S.D.'s passive inhalation argument to explain the presence

of cannabis metabolites in his system.         Whether S.D. intentionally or

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unintentionally had cannabis in his system above the threshold level was

irrelevant under the drug testing policies in effect in 2020. Under the policies,

a positive drug test result required termination of a law enforcement officer.

This is particularly true where, as here, S.D. submitted no evidence challenging

the reliability or validity of the NJSTL's results. Indeed, S.D.'s own expert

testified the NJSTL's positive test result for S.D. was valid.

      Based on the undisputed record, S.D. knew the policies related to

controlled dangerous substances, including cannabis. He also knew a positive

drug test would result in his termination. Further, there was no expert testimony

to support S.D.'s claim that his positive drug test result was attributable to

passive inhalation. The ALJ thoroughly explained his reasons for rejecting Dr.

Isenschmid's citation to a single study related to passive inhalation of marijuana

under extreme circumstances. The ALJ also highlighted Dr. Isenschmid's own

testimony stating the lack of critical information precluded the doctor's ability

to opine S.D.'s positive test was attributable to passive inhalation.

      We also reject S.D.'s argument that termination was too severe a sanction

and progressive discipline should have been imposed.             In support of his

argument for progressive discipline rather than termination, S.D. relies on

several unpublished cases.     Rule 1:36-3 provides no unpublished decisions

                                                                            A-2884-21
                                       18
"shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Even if we were

permitted to consider the unpublished cases cited by S.D., we are satisfied the

cases are distinguishable as they involved charges unrelated to positive drug

tests or positive drug tests for public employees who were not required to carry

a firearm as part of their job duties.

      Regardless of S.D.'s unblemished record, lack of any prior disciplinary

history, and strong support of his fellow police officers and other character

witnesses, the policies promulgated by the Department and the Attorney General

unequivocally mandated termination of employment for law enforcement

officers testing positive for drugs. S.D. never denied his awareness of the

policies mandating termination as a law enforcement officer after a positive test

result.

      Additionally, the public's trust warranted S.D.'s termination as a law

enforcement officer. Adherence to a high standard of conduct is an obligation

that a law enforcement officer voluntarily assumes when entering public service.

See Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. at 141-42. As we explained in Moorestown v.

Armstrong, 89 N.J. Super. 560, 566 (App. Div. 1965):

             [A] police officer is a special kind of public employee.
             His primary duty is to enforce and uphold the law. He
             carries a service revolver on his person and is
             constantly called upon to exercise tact, restraint and

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                                         19
            good judgment in his relationship with the public. He
            represents law and order to the citizenry and must
            present an image of personal integrity and
            dependability in order to have the respect of the public.

      Conduct unbecoming or other good and sufficient cause, two of the

charges against S.D. sustained by the ALJ, need not be limited to an officer's

violation of a policy, rule, or regulation, "but may be based merely upon the

violation of the implicit standard of good behavior which devolves upon one

who stands in the public eye as an upholder of that which is morally and legally

correct." Emmons, 63 N.J. Super. at 140.

      Further, our review is limited to whether the termination decision was

"shocking" to our sense of fairness, not whether we would have reached the

same decision. Here, the policies issued by the Department and the Attorney

General articulated zero-tolerance for drugs. More importantly, these policies

specified that a law enforcement officer who tested positive for drugs resulted

in public loss of confidence in the police.

      We are satisfied S.D. was aware that receipt of a positive drug test would

result in mandatory termination of his employment as a police officer. Nothing

in the policies issued by the Department or the Attorney General authorize

imposition of a lesser sanction than termination after a positive test result. The

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                                       20
absence of any prior disciplinary history does not diminish the fact that S.D., as

a police officer, is held to a higher standard than other public employees.

      We also reject S.D.'s argument that the Cannabis Regulatory Enforcement

Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act (CREAMMA), N.J.S.A. 24:6I-

31 to -56, legalizing the recreational use of marijuana, applied to his matter.

CREAMMA, effective February 22, 2021, applied prospectively per the express

language of the statute. S.D. tested positive on December 17, 2020 , and was

terminated by the Department on February 17, 2021, prior to CREAMMA's

effective date.

      Nor does the Attorney General's revised Law Enforcement Drug Testing

Policy apply to S.D.'s matter. The revised policy became effective in February

2023, and the conduct leading to S.D.'s termination occurred two years before

the Attorney General's revised drug testing policy.

      We also reject S.D.'s argument the ALJ's decision should not have become

final based on the two-two vote before the Commission. The traditional standard

of deference applies to an ALJ's decision timely "deemed adopted" as a final

agency decision. See Hendrickson, 235 N.J. at 149. We will affirm an ALJ's

decision "deemed adopted" as a final agency decision if the ALJ's decision,

particularly in the context of imposing appropriate disciplinary sanctions, is

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                                       21
supported by sufficient credible evidence even if we might have reached a

different decision. Id. at 150.

      Where the Commission is unable to render a final decision due to the lack

of a quorum or, as in this case, there is a split vote of the Commission's

membership, the ALJ's decision is "deemed adopted" as the agency's final

decision. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). Under the circumstances here, we are satisfied

the Commission's adoption of the ALJ's January 21, 2022 decision as a final

agency decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

      We also reject S.D.'s argument that the Commission erred in denying

reconsideration of his appeal.       Because the ALJ's decision was "deemed

adopted" by the Commission as its final agency decision, the Commission could

not have made "a clear material error," warranting reconsideration under

N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.6(b)(2).          There was nothing for the Commission to

"reconsider."

      Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied there is no basis to disturb

the ALJ's determination based on the substantial credible evidence in the record.

S.D. tested positive for cannabis during the Department's random drug test.

S.D.'s toxicology expert failed to rebut the validity of the Department's random

drug testing process or the NJSTL's positive test result. S.D. presented no

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                                        22
evidence that the positive test result yielded by the NJSTL was inaccurate or

flawed.

     Affirmed.

                                                                       A-2884-21
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