Court Opinion

ID: 9945377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 19:07:56.585094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:27.917737
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                        Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                                STATE OF MINNESOTA
                                IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                      A23-0117

                                    State of Minnesota,
                                       Respondent,

                                            vs.

                                   Jeffrey Velt Murray,
                                        Appellant.

                                 Filed February 26, 2024
                     Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
                                       Gaïtas, Judge

                              Hennepin County District Court
                                File No. 27-CR-21-18980

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Zachary Stephenson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

       Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge;

and Gaïtas, Judge.

                            NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

GAÏTAS, Judge

       Appellant Jeffrey Velt Murray challenges his convictions, following a court trial,

for second-degree intentional murder, second-degree felony murder, and unlawful

possession of a firearm. Murray argues that the district court judge exhibited bias and made
erroneous factual findings.      Additionally, he contends that the formal judgment of

conviction for second-degree felony murder must be vacated because it is an included

offense of second-degree intentional murder. Lastly, he raises several issues in his pro se

supplemental brief, including that the district court misapplied the law of self-defense and

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Because Murray received a fair trial and

decisive evidence supports his convictions, we affirm in part. We further determine that

Murray is not entitled to relief on the basis of his pro se arguments. But because the warrant

of commitment shows convictions for both second-degree intentional murder and the

included offense of second-degree felony murder, we reverse in part and remand with

instructions to vacate the formal judgment of conviction for second-degree felony murder.

                                            FACTS

       In September 2021, 59-year-old D.B. died after a shooting in a Minneapolis

apartment. Following an investigation into D.B.’s death, respondent State of Minnesota

charged Murray with second-degree intentional murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1)

(2020); second-degree felony murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2020); and

unlawful possession of a firearm, Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020). Murray waived

his right to a jury trial and agreed to have a court trial.

       At trial, there were two very different accounts of the events that led to D.B.’s death.

D.B.’s girlfriend, P.G., testified on behalf of the state that she observed Murray shoot D.B.

without provocation. The state also presented the testimony of police officers, medical

personnel, and forensic analysts, and offered video recordings from the responding

officers’ body-worn cameras, surveillance videos from the apartment building, and

                                                2
ballistics reports, among other evidence. Murray, relying on a theory of self-defense,

testified that D.B. fired the first shot, and that he shot D.B. only to protect himself.

       The evidence presented at trial is summarized as follows. P.G. told the district court

that she and D.B. were in the bedroom of their apartment in the early morning hours. She

testified that Murray, who sold drugs, called D.B. on his cell phone from outside the

apartment building shortly before 2:00 a.m. When D.B. did not answer the call, P.G.

recalled that Murray began yelling up to their bedroom window. P.G. testified that she

urged D.B. not to respond because of the late hour. But, according to P.G., another tenant

admitted Murray to the building, and he soon appeared at their apartment door. P.G.

testified that D.B. answered the door and let Murray into the apartment.

       According to P.G., she was in the bedroom, lying in bed, watching videos with her

face toward the wall. D.B. and Murray came into the bedroom to talk. P.G. testified that

Murray sat in a chair and D.B. sat on the side of the bed. Although P.G. was wearing

headphones, the volume was low enough that she could hear the conversation between the

two men. P.G. testified that Murray asked D.B. whether he could borrow D.B.’s gun. D.B.

responded that his gun was not in the apartment. According to P.G., Murray then “looked

strange[ly]” at D.B. The conversation moved on to other topics, and Murray looked as if

he was getting ready to leave. P.G. testified that D.B. asked Murray to get him some juice

from the kitchen. Then, according to P.G., Murray “got up and took a couple of steps, and

he shot [D.B.].”

       P.G. testified that D.B. said, “He shot me. He shot me,” and Murray responded,

“Give it up. Give it up.” D.B. ordered P.G. to move the pillow on the bed, and she did.

                                               3
Underneath the pillow was D.B.’s gun. According to P.G., D.B. slid the gun partway across

the bed to Murray, who picked it up and shot D.B. one or two more times. P.G. testified

that Murray had two guns at that point—his own gun and D.B.’s gun. She told the district

court that D.B. did not point or shoot his gun at Murray, and that he did not threaten Murray.

       Following the shooting, Murray ran out of the apartment. P.G. testified that she

locked the door behind Murray while D.B.—who was still conscious—called 911 to report

the shooting. D.B. initially spoke with the 911 dispatcher, but P.G. took over the call when

D.B. was unable to continue. Although the 911 dispatcher testified that P.G. said she was

asleep during the shooting and did not know what happened, P.G. told the district court

that she did not recall telling the dispatcher that she had been asleep.

       Minneapolis police officers answered the emergency call at the apartment.

According to the officers’ testimony, P.G. reported that Murray shot D.B. They further

testified that P.G. was “distraught,” in “distress, hyperventilating, [and] having a hard time

speaking.” The state presented video from the officers’ body-worn cameras to corroborate

the officers’ testimony regarding P.G.’s statements.

       D.B. ultimately died as a result of his injuries. A medical examiner testified that

D.B. had been shot twice and that his death was a homicide. A blood sample collected

during the autopsy showed that D.B. had drugs in his system, including benzylamine,

cocaine, morphine, fentanyl, and Trazodone.

       Officers collected evidence from the apartment, including a white residue believed

to be narcotics on the floor and three discharged cartridge casings. A forensic scientist

                                              4
testified that examination of the three cartridge casings revealed that they had been fired

from the same gun.

       A homicide detective questioned P.G. later in the day following the shooting. The

detective testified at trial that P.G. said she saw Murray shoot D.B. According to the

detective, he asked P.G. multiple times to explain the sequence of the events in the

apartment, and in his assessment, her description of the shooting was consistent. P.G. also

viewed a photo lineup and identified Murray as the shooter.

       The police arrested Murray for D.B.’s murder the following month. Murray initially

told the detective that he did not “murder” anyone, but he admitted it was possible that he

had robbed someone. The detective testified at trial that he interpreted Murray’s statement

“as a confession” that Murray had “participat[ed] in the event that led up to the death of

[D.B.].”

       During his trial testimony, Murray told the district court that he shot D.B. to defend

himself. He testified that he went to D.B.’s apartment because he had arranged to sell

heroin to D.B. Murray acknowledged that he was armed with a gun. He testified that he

gave some heroin to D.B. and P.G. But, according to Murray, D.B. asked for more and

was angered when Murray refused to supply him. Murray testified that he was preparing

to leave the apartment when D.B. “aimed a firearm” at him and demanded Murray’s bag

of heroin. According to Murray, he threw a bag of heroin at D.B., and P.G. grabbed the

bag when it fell to the floor. Murray testified that he “tried to run out of the room” but

“saw a flash” when D.B. fired the gun at him. Then, according to Murray, he fired his own

gun at D.B., almost simultaneously. Murray denied P.G.’s claims that he asked D.B. for a

                                             5
gun and ultimately took D.B.’s gun. And, according to Murray, he did not realize that he

shot D.B. or that D.B. had died until nearly a month later. When Murray’s trial counsel

asked why Murray did not report to the detective that he had shot D.B. in self-defense,

Murray responded, “I didn’t want to be linked to the situation and be linked to the other

drug activities and carrying a gun.” He further explained that he did not think the police

would believe him.

       The district court found Murray guilty of the three charged offenses—second-

degree intentional murder, second-degree felony murder, and unlawful possession of a

firearm—and entered convictions for each offense. It adjudicated Murray guilty of the

charges but only pronounced sentences for second-degree intentional murder and unlawful

possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced Murray to 425 months in prison for

second-degree intentional murder and imposed a concurrent 60-month prison sentence for

the firearm offense.

       Murray appeals.

                                       DECISION

I.     Murray is not entitled to a new trial based on the conduct of the trial judge.

       A.     The trial judge’s conduct did not violate Murray’s constitutional right
              to an impartial judge.

       Murray argues that the trial judge violated his constitutional right to a fair and

impartial judge by questioning trial witnesses and the attorneys. The United States and

Minnesota Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial

jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. Although a corresponding right to

                                            6
an impartial judge is not specifically enumerated in the United States or Minnesota

Constitutions, this principle has long been recognized as a component of due process. State

v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 252 (Minn. 2005) (prohibiting a judge from presiding over a

trial if the judge shows “actual bias” against the defendant). But “[t]he mere fact that a

party declares a judge partial does not in itself generate a reasonable question as to the

judge’s impartiality.” State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 156 (Minn. 2020) (quotation

omitted). Indeed, an appellate court must presume that the district court has discharged its

duties properly. McKenzie v. State, 583 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998).

       The reviewing court considers de novo whether a trial judge’s conduct violated a

criminal defendant’s constitutional right to be tried before an impartial judge. Dorsey, 701

N.W.2d at 249. A violation of this right is structural error, which requires a new trial

without regard to prejudice. Id. at 253.

       Murray contends that the trial judge who presided over his court trial was not a

neutral arbiter but acted as an advocate, violating his right to an impartial judge. He argues

that the trial judge violated his right to an impartial judge in two ways—first, by extensively

questioning trial witnesses, and second, by questioning the prosecutor during closing

argument and rebuttal closing argument.

       Murray directs us to several instances of witness questioning. The trial judge asked

a police officer with the crime-lab unit to clarify where a discharged casing was found, and

the officer responded, using a sketch of the apartment to illustrate where the casing was

found. Following up, the trial judge asked whether any bullet holes or fragments had been

found in the bedroom, and the officer testified that there were no bullet holes or fragments.

                                              7
During the detective’s testimony, the trial judge asked whether the detective had “[a]ny

theory” about why there were three discharged casings even though other evidence—

including the medical examiner’s testimony—suggested there were only two shots fired.

The detective responded that he believed Murray fired three shots even though a third bullet

had not been found. Based on this response, the trial judge then asked, “You didn’t see

any evidence that a bullet was fired from the direction of [D.B.] towards Mr. Murray?”

The detective answered, “No.”

       As further evidence of alleged bias, Murray points to an exchange that the trial judge

initiated with Murray following Murray’s direct and cross-examinations.

              COURT: I just need some clarifications on what happened.
              You said that you were talking to [D.B.] while you were seated.
              And he was asking for more drugs, something to that effect.
              WITNESS: Yes, sir.
              COURT: Did you begin leaving the . . . bedroom after you
              saw a gun or before you saw a gun?
              WITNESS: After I saw a gun.
              COURT: And was he pointing it at you?
              WITNESS: Yes.
              COURT: Was he sitting on the bed at that time or standing?
              WITNESS: He was standing.
              COURT: Was he in the middle of the bed or closer to the wall?
              WITNESS: It’s the wall, the mattress, and then another wall.
              He was standing right here at the tip of the mattress.
              COURT: So kind of by the nightstand that was there?
              WITNESS: Yes.
              COURT: And do you remember what kind of gun it was?
              Maybe you didn’t get a good look at it.
              WITNESS: It was a black gun, sir.
              COURT: Revolver or automatic?
              WITNESS: Automatic.
              COURT: Or semiautomatic, I guess it would be?
              WITNESS: Yes.
              COURT: Do you remember if he fired first or if you fired
              first?

                                             8
              WITNESS: I’m going to say simultaneously, sir. As I was
              exiting, I just in my periphery saw a flash. I just was running
              for my life.
              COURT: Are you confident that he shot his gun?
              WITNESS: Yes.
              COURT: And when you shot back, were you shooting across
              your body, or did you turn to face him?
              WITNESS: Across.
              COURT: And was that about when you were at the threshold
              of the bedroom going into the other bedroom and hallway for
              your first shot?
              WITNESS: Yes.
              COURT: And was the second shot immediately after that or
              shortly after that?
              WITNESS: I am going to say rapidly, like boom, boom.
              COURT: Kind of as quick as you can pull the trigger?
              WITNESS: Yes.
              COURT: And [D.B.] was standing as far as you know when
              all of this happened?
              WITNESS: I didn’t look back no more. But last time I seen
              him, he was standing.
              COURT: Did you see if he fell forward, fell backward, or just
              didn’t see him at all?
              WITNESS: I was trying to get out that door, sir.

       In addition to the trial judge’s witness questioning, Murray complains that the trial

judge assisted the state by questioning the prosecutor during closing argument and rebuttal

closing argument. During the prosecutor’s closing argument, the trial judge referenced

P.G.’s initial comment to the 911 dispatcher that she was asleep during the shooting and

stated that P.G.’s inconsistent statements “create[] a gap in credibility that [the state]

need[s] to fill”; challenged the prosecutor’s statement that Murray’s reason for visiting the

apartment was to seek a gun, pointing out that Murray already had a gun; and inquired

about Murray’s motive to fire the second and third shots after D.B. turned over his gun.

                                             9
       Although not discussed in Murray’s brief, we note that the trial judge also

questioned Murray’s counsel during closing argument. The trial judge asked about the

location of D.B.’s gun: “If I accept the fact that [D.B.] had a gun . . . where is it?” Defense

counsel responded that Murray “doesn’t know where that gun went.”

       Based on our careful review of the record, we are satisfied that the trial judge’s

questions to witnesses and the attorneys did not violate Murray’s constitutional right to a

trial before an impartial judge.

       We first address the trial judge’s questions to witnesses. Preliminarily, we note that,

under the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, a trial judge is permitted to question witnesses.

Rule 614(b) allows a district court judge to “interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself

or by a party.” Minn. R. Evid. 614(b); see also Minn. R. Evid. 614 1977 comm. cmt.

(stating that the traditional right of trial courts to call and interrogate witnesses “is

consistent with the responsibility of the Court in insuring a speedy and just determination

of the issues”); Olson v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 269 N.W.2d 697, 702 (Minn. 1978)

(finding that the district court properly exercised its authority in questioning a witness

where counsel’s questioning had “partially covered the same ground”); Teachout v. Wilson,

376 N.W.2d 460, 465 (Minn. App. 1985) (holding that, in a civil court trial, a trial judge’s

clarifying questions to a witness were “a proper exercise of the power granted by Rule

614”), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 30, 1985). Given rule 614(b), there was nothing inherently

improper about the trial judge’s decision to question witnesses.

       Although the rules of evidence allow a district court judge to interrogate witnesses,

a criminal trial is not merely a “search for truth” but is designed to protect a defendant’s

                                              10
liberty by ensuring that the state proves its case. State v. Costello, 646 N.W.2d 204, 213

(Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted). Thus, in a criminal trial, a trial judge must not act in a

manner that intrudes on the state’s burden of proof. See Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 251. With

this concern in mind, we next examine the specific questions that the trial judge posed to

witnesses and the testimony that those questions elicited.

       Murray argues that the trial judge’s conduct here was “not meaningfully different”

than the conduct at issue in Dorsey, which Murray cites to support his argument that the

trial judge’s conduct violated his constitutional right to an impartial trial judge. In

Dorsey—also a criminal appeal following a court trial—the trial judge directed a court

clerk to investigate an incriminating fact that the trial judge independently recalled, but

which the prosecutor had not introduced in evidence. Id. at 243-44. The trial judge then

announced the result of the investigation in open court. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court

reversed Dorsey’s resulting conviction, concluding that the trial judge’s conduct deprived

Dorsey of his constitutional right to an impartial factfinder. Id. at 253.

       Here, unlike in Dorsey, the trial judge questioned witnesses on both sides in open

court. And here, the trial judge’s questions merely confirmed evidence that had already

been introduced or inferences from that evidence. Thus, in questioning the witnesses, the

trial judge clarified witness testimony and did not investigate or produce new evidence for

the prosecution. The trial judge did not abandon his role as an impartial factfinder; rather,

the trial judge used questions to further understand the evidence presented. We therefore

reject Murray’s argument that Dorsey compels reversal of his convictions.

                                             11
       Additionally, we observe that the trial judge’s questions to witnesses did not reflect

bias in favor of either party. Instead, the questions show the trial judge’s concern about

fully understanding the evidence presented.

       Likewise, the trial judge’s questions to the attorneys during closing arguments

reflect this same concern. The trial judge questioned the attorneys representing both

parties. The questions themselves did not assist or favor one party over the other. Rather,

the questions enabled both attorneys to address the trial judge’s concerns about the

implications of the trial evidence. Notably, the trial judge’s questions evinced skepticism

about the positions of both parties.

       The record does not support Murray’s argument that the trial judge engaged in

conduct that helped the prosecution or otherwise demonstrated improper bias.             We

therefore conclude that Murray is not entitled to reversal of his convictions on this basis.

       B.     Murray fails to show that the trial judge had actual bias and was
              disqualified under the Code of Judicial Conduct.

       Separate from his constitutional argument, Murray contends that, by questioning

witnesses and the attorneys during trial, the trial judge demonstrated a lack of impartiality

that violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. “A judge must not preside at a trial or other

proceeding if disqualified under the Code of Judicial Conduct.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03,

subd. 14(3). Additionally, “[a] judge shall disqualify himself . . . in any proceeding in

which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Minn. Code Jud. Conduct

Rule 2.11(A). “Impartiality” is defined as the “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or

against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in

                                              12
considering issues that may come before a judge.” State v. Pratt, 813 N.W.2d 868, 876

(Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). “The prohibition against a judge presiding when his or

her impartiality might reasonably be questioned leaves considerable room for interpretation

and does not provide a precise formula that can automatically be applied.” Id. (quotation

omitted).

       When, as here, an appellant alleging judicial bias did not move to disqualify the

judge during the proceedings below, the reviewing court will reverse only if the judge’s

failure to recuse was plain error that affected the appellant’s substantial rights. State v.

Schlienz, 774 N.W.2d 361, 365-66 (Minn. 2009) (applying plain-error standard of review

where appellant raised judicial bias for the first time on appeal). To obtain reversal based

on plain error, the appellant must first establish that an error occurred, that the error was

plain, and that the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583

N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). If the appellant satisfies these elements, the reviewing

court must consider whether reversal is necessary to ensure the fairness and integrity of the

judicial proceedings. Id.

       In cases of alleged judicial bias, an appellant claiming plain error must show that

the judge harbored actual bias. State v. Plantin, 682 N.W.2d 653, 663 (Minn. App. 2004)

(“After a defendant submits to trial before a judge without objecting to the judge on the

basis of bias, we will reverse the defendant’s conviction only if the defendant can show

actual bias in the proceedings.”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 29, 2004).

       Murray argues that the trial judge showed actual bias by questioning the witnesses

and attorneys during trial. A party’s “subjective belief that the judge is biased does not

                                             13
necessarily warrant removal.” Hooper v. State, 680 N.W.2d 89, 93 (Minn. 2004). And,

based on our review of the record, we discern no actual bias. As discussed, the record

shows that the trial judge, sitting as the finder of fact, asked questions designed to clarify

the evidence and to comprehend the significance of that evidence. We do not interpret the

trial judge’s questions as demonstrating actual bias. And Murray fails to identify any other

conduct suggesting that the trial judge had actual bias. See State v. Burrell, 743 N.W.2d

596, 603 (Minn. 2008) (placing burden on the complaining party to “adduce evidence of

favoritism or antagonism”). 1 Thus, we reject his argument that the trial judge was

disqualified to preside at trial under the Code of Judicial Conduct.

II.    Murray is not entitled to a new trial based on allegedly erroneous factual
       findings.

       Murray argues that he is entitled to a new trial because his convictions are based on

erroneous factual findings.     “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it lacks

evidentiary support in the record.” State v. Lopez, 988 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Minn. 2023)

(citing State v. Roberts, 876 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. 2016)).

       Murray challenges two factual findings as clearly erroneous. First, he contends that

there is no record support for the district court’s finding that he shot D.B. with a gun that

ejected cartridges “to the right of the person firing the weapon.” The district court found

1
  Noting that jurors in Minnesota may not question witnesses in criminal trials, see
Costello, 646 N.W.2d at 211-14, Murray also urges us to extend this principle to judges
presiding over criminal court trials. As an error-correcting court, we decline to do so. See
State v. McCormick, 835 N.W.2d 498, 510 (Minn. App. 2013) (describing the court of
appeals as “an error-correcting court,” which is limited to finding the law and applying it
to the facts (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013).

                                             14
that, because Murray used a semiautomatic pistol, the discharged casings ejected to his

right. Based on this finding, the district court further found that “the final locations of

those [casings] are consistent with Mr. Murray firing three times, including once on his

way out the door.” Murray points out that the finding regarding the direction of casings

discharged by a semiautomatic pistol is contrary to trial testimony that casings can be

ejected to either the right or the left of a such a weapon. Second, Murray argues that the

record directly contradicts the trial judge’s finding that police officers did not find drugs in

the apartment. He notes that an officer testified at trial that police found “some suspected

drugs underneath the bed,” namely “[w]hat appeared to be a white, powdery substance.”

       “A clearly erroneous finding . . . does not require a new trial when independent

findings of fact, decisive of the case, are supported by the record.” Lopez, 988 N.W.2d at

116. Even if we assume that Murray’s challenged factual findings are clearly erroneous,

these facts are inconsequential to the guilty verdicts, which are supported by other

independent factual findings decisive of the case. The district court found that Murray

pointed his gun at D.B. and shot him, and these facts are supported by the record. Indeed,

Murray’s own testimony established these facts—he admitted that he went to D.B.’s

apartment with a gun and shot D.B. Although Murray claimed that he acted in self-defense,

the district court determined that Murray’s statements were not credible given the other

testimony and evidence presented, including the lack of any evidence suggesting that D.B.

fired a gun in Murray’s direction. As a reviewing court, we must defer to the district court’s

credibility determinations. State v. King, 990 N.W.2d 406, 421 (Minn. 2023). Because the

                                              15
district court’s independent factual findings amply support the guilty verdicts, Murray is

not entitled to reversal of his convictions.

III.   Because second-degree felony murder is an included offense of second-degree
       intentional murder, Murray’s felony-murder conviction must be vacated.

       Murray argues that the district court erred by entering judgments of conviction on

both murder charges. “Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either

the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1

(2020). “An included offense may be . . . a lesser degree of the same crime.” Id., subd.

1(1); see also State v. Hannon, 703 N.W.2d 498, 509 (Minn. 2005) (“In Minnesota, every

lesser degree of murder is intended by § 609.04 to be characterized as an included

offense.”). Whether one offense is an included offense of another is a legal question that

an appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540, 552 (Minn. 2012). The

state concedes that the district court erred by entering convictions on both second-degree

murder offenses. We agree.

       The district court found Murray guilty of both second-degree intentional murder and

second-degree felony murder. At sentencing, the district court entered convictions for both

second-degree murder offenses, but sentenced Murray for only second-degree intentional

murder. The warrant of commitment reflects that Murray was convicted of both crimes.

       “Whether an offense is a ‘lesser-included offense’ is determined by examining the

elements of the offense rather than the facts of a particular case.” State v. Lory, 559 N.W.2d

425, 428 (Minn. App. 1997) (citing State v. Roden, 384 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Minn. 1986)),

rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 1997).       After examining the elements of second-degree

                                               16
intentional murder and second-degree felony murder in Lory, we determined that second-

degree felony murder is a lesser-included offense of second-degree intentional murder. Id.

at 426, 428-29. Based on this precedent, we conclude that the district court erred by

convicting Murray of both second-degree murder offenses.              When a district court

erroneously enters a conviction for an included offense, the appellate court remands to the

district court to vacate the conviction for the included offense. State v. Balandin, 944

N.W.2d 204, 222 (Minn. 2020). We therefore reverse in part and remand to the district

court with instructions to vacate count two, the felony-murder conviction, and to amend

the warrant of commitment. See State v. Earl, 702 N.W.2d 711, 723-24 (Minn. 2005)

(recognizing that a finding of guilt remains even when a conviction is vacated by operation

of section 609.04).

IV.    Murray is not entitled to relief based on the arguments raised in his pro se
       supplemental brief.

       Murray filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing that the district court misapplied

the law on self-defense. He further contends that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel. For the reasons discussed below, we determine that Murray is not entitled to relief

on these arguments.

       A.     Jury Instructions

       Murray argues that the district court relied on the wrong jury instruction in

evaluating his self-defense claim. He contends that the district court applied the justifiable-

taking-of-life jury instruction, rather than the general self-defense instruction.

                                              17
       The general law of self-defense permits the use of reasonable force against another

“when used by any person in resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the

person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2020). The justifiable taking of life may be

authorized “when necessary in resisting or preventing an offense which the actor

reasonably believes exposes the actor . . . to great bodily harm or death, or preventing the

commission of a felony in the actor’s place of abode.” Minn. Stat. § 609.065 (2020). “The

Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that it is error to provide the justifiable-

taking-of-life instruction, instead of the general self-defense instruction, when the

defendant asserts self-defense but claims that the [victim’s] death was not the intended

result.” State v. Pollard, 900 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. App. 2017).

       Murray asserts that he did not intend to take D.B.’s life. Accordingly, he contends,

the district court erred by relying on the justifiable-taking-of-life instruction instead of the

general self-defense instruction. But Murray had a court trial, rather than a jury trial. The

district court did not give a jury instruction. And a review of the district court’s order does

not show an improper interpretation or application of the law. It is true that “[w]hen a

district court misapplies well-established law in a bench trial, it is as if the district court

instructed itself incorrectly on the law.” State v. Spann, 986 N.W.2d 205, 216 (Minn.

2023). However, we discern no error of law here.

       Following a court trial, a district court is required to make written findings of the

essential facts. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 2(b). The purpose of the written-findings

requirement is “to aid the appellate court in its review of [a] conviction resulting from a

nonjury trial.” State v. Scarver, 458 N.W.2d 167, 168 (Minn. App. 1990). In this case, the

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district court issued a detailed memorandum setting out its factual findings and legal

conclusions. A review of the district court’s order reveals that the district court applied the

proper law to Murray’s case. The district court relied on State v. Basting, which articulates

the four elements of a self-defense claim. 572 N.W.2d 281, 285-86 (Minn. 1997). As the

district court noted, Murray had the burden of producing evidence to support his self-

defense claim. State v. Johnson, 719 N.W.2d 619, 629 (Minn. 2006). In weighing the

evidence in the record and applying the Basting factors to its factual findings, the district

court concluded that Murray’s self-defense claim failed because he did not meet his burden

of establishing the elements of this defense. Because the district court relied on the correct

law, and its application of that law was proper, we conclude that no error occurred.

       B.     Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

       Murray argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A defendant

has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions.

U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art I, § 6; Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823

(Minn. 2016). A reviewing court examines ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under

the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). State

v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Minn. App. 2017). Under Strickland, a defendant

“must demonstrate that (1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, and (2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have

been different but for counsel’s errors.” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).

“Application of the Strickland test involves a mixed question of law and fact, which we

review de novo.” State v. Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 715 (Minn. 2019).

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       Murray argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to:

(1) perform an independent investigation, (2) properly impeach P.G.’s testimony, (3) hire

expert witnesses, (4) call a police officer to testify regarding Murray’s gun charge,

(5) assert a speedy-trial violation, (6) challenge the legality of his arrest, (7) challenge the

“malice aforethought” element of the crime, (8) present evidence of mitigating

circumstances at sentencing, (9) object to the trial judge’s conduct at trial, (10) request a

different probation officer, (11) share with him the evidence produced during discovery,

and (12) challenge the guilty verdict or assist him with his appeal.

       The majority of Murray’s claims do not satisfy the first Strickland element because

they are matters of trial strategy. Trial counsel’s decisions regarding what evidence to

present and what witnesses to call are matters of trial strategy. State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d

676, 689 (Minn. 2001). Similarly, an attorney’s decisions concerning trial defenses

typically are a matter of strategy. Voorhees v. State, 627 N.W.2d 642, 651 (Minn. 2001)

(“[M]atters of trial strategy, including which defenses to raise at trial, will not be reviewed

later for competence.”). Generally, we do not “review ineffective assistance of counsel

claims based on trial strategy.” Sanchez-Diaz v. State, 758 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. 2008).

To the extent that Murray’s ineffective-assistance arguments rely on matters of trial

strategy, we do not address them.

       As to Murray’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that do not involve

matters of trial strategy, we decline to address them because the factual record is

insufficiently developed for appellate review. See Dukes v. State, 621 N.W.2d 246, 254-

55 (Minn. 2001) (stating that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims that require

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additional factfinding—such as “claims that require a court to explore conversations

between attorney and client”—should be raised in a petition for postconviction relief).

      Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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