Court Opinion

ID: 9930029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 23:03:03.766503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:58:00.834997
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 230442-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                         NOTICE
 Decision filed 02/05/24. The
                                                                              This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be              NO. 5-23-0442
                                                                              Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                                 not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                               IN THE                         limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                    under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Jefferson County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 21-CF-101
                                                )
TERRANCE D. WILLIAMS,                           )     Honorable
                                                )     Jerry E. Crisel,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Barberis and McHaney concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: Where the circuit court did not err in finding that the defendant’s postconviction
               petition was frivolous and patently without merit, and no argument to the contrary
               would have merit, the defendant’s appointed appellate counsel is granted leave to
               withdraw, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶2       The defendant, Terrance D. Williams, is serving a 25-year term of imprisonment for armed

violence. The defendant pleaded guilty to that offense pursuant to a fully negotiated agreement

with the State. He did not take a direct appeal. Eighteen months after pleading guilty, the defendant

filed a timely petition for postconviction relief. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022). The

circuit court summarily dismissed the petition. The defendant now appeals from that summary

dismissal.

                                                  1
¶3     The defendant’s appointed attorney on appeal, the Office of the State Appellate Defender

(OSAD), has concluded that this appeal does not present an issue of arguable merit, and on that

basis, it has filed with this court a motion to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Pennsylvania v.

Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), along with a memorandum of law in support thereof. The defendant,

having been properly served with the motion, has filed a response thereto. Having examined

OSAD’s Finley motion and brief, the defendant’s response, and the entire record on appeal, this

court concludes that this appeal does indeed lack merit. Accordingly, OSAD must be granted leave

to withdraw, and the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.

¶4                                    BACKGROUND

¶5     In March 2021, the defendant was charged by information, and subsequently by indictment,

with being an armed habitual criminal, a Class X felony. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2020). The

public defender was appointed to represent him.

¶6                            The Negotiated Plea of Guilty

¶7     On October 12, 2021, the defendant, his public defender, and two prosecutors appeared

before the circuit court and announced that they had reached a plea agreement. One prosecutor

described the terms of the agreement, as follows: the State would file a supplemental information

charging the defendant with armed violence (see 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2022)), which is a

Class X felony; the defendant would plead guilty to that charge, and he would be sentenced

therefor to 25 years in prison, plus 18 months of mandatory supervised release (MSR); he would

receive credit for 188 days of presentencing credit, and he would receive day-for-day good-

conduct credit in prison; and the State would move to dismiss the original armed-habitual-criminal

count, plus all counts in some unrelated felony, misdemeanor, and traffic files, and the State would

                                                 2
agree not to pursue charges stemming from statements the defendant allegedly made during his

pre-plea incarceration. The public defender and the defendant concurred in the agreement as stated.

¶8     The State recited a factual basis for the plea, describing in some detail the anticipated trial

testimonies of the State’s witnesses. Essentially, the factual basis indicated that the defendant

possessed a firearm while committing the offense of aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a

peace officer, in violation of section 11-204.1(a)(4) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-

204.1(a)(4) (West 2020)). The public defender and the defendant stipulated to the factual basis.

The parties waived a presentence investigation report (PSI). According to the State, the defendant

had prior convictions for residential burglary, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and

attempted possession of a weapon by a felon, all in Jefferson County, Illinois, and armed robbery

and attempted unlawful use of a weapon, both in Cook County, Illinois. The armed-robbery charge

was in Cook County case number 10-CR-510601. “That is the extent of his adult criminal history,”

the assistant State’s attorney concluded. The public defender and the defendant agreed that the

criminal history had been accurately stated.

¶9     Then, the court admonished the defendant about the presumption of innocence and the

State’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as his right to plead not guilty,

his right to a trial, whether by a jury or by the judge alone, his right to be represented by counsel,

his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, his right to testify or to remain

silent at trial, and not to have his silence used against him, and that a plea of guilty waives all of

those rights. The defendant expressed his understanding of all those rights and further expressed

his desire to plead guilty to armed violence, pursuant to the plea agreement. The court admonished

the defendant that armed violence was a Class X felony, and that he could possibly be sentenced

to imprisonment for anywhere between 15 years, at a minimum, to 60 years, maximum, followed

                                                  3
by 18 months of MSR, and the defendant indicated his understanding of the sentencing range. The

defendant indicated a continuing wish to plead guilty to armed violence. He acknowledged signing

a written plea of guilty to that offense, and he indicated that nobody had forced or threatened him

into signing it, and nobody had promised him anything, apart from the plea agreement, in order to

persuade him to sign. He also indicated that he had had sufficient time to discuss the written plea

with his public defender, with whose services he was satisfied, and that he wanted the court to

accept his signature on the written plea as his free and voluntary act.

¶ 10   The court accepted the guilty plea, finding that it was “knowing, intelligent and voluntary”

and was supported by a factual basis. The court sentenced the defendant, as agreed, to 25 years in

prison, followed by 18 months of MSR, and specified 188 days of “pretrial incarceration credit.”

In accordance with the parties’ plea agreement, the court dismissed the armed-habitual-criminal

count, as well as the felony, misdemeanor, and traffic counts charged in unrelated files. The court

then admonished the defendant about his appeal rights, including the need for filing a written

motion to withdraw guilty plea within 30 days, and the defendant indicated his understanding.

¶ 11   The defendant did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He did not appeal from the

judgment of conviction.

¶ 12                           The Postconviction Petition

¶ 13   On May 25, 2023, the defendant filed the pleading that is the subject of this appeal—a

petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)).

In his petition, the defendant presented two claims of constitutional deprivation. Both claims

centered on a prior conviction, or adjudication, for armed robbery.

¶ 14   In the first claim of his postconviction petition, the defendant alleged that plea counsel had

provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by advising him to accept the State’s plea offer to

                                                 4
armed violence as a way of avoiding an extended-term sentence for armed habitual criminal.

According to the defendant, the extended-term sentence would have been based on the defendant’s

prior conviction for armed robbery, but the alleged prior conviction was actually a prior juvenile

adjudication, and therefore it could not have been properly used as the basis for extending the term.

¶ 15   In the second claim of his postconviction petition, the defendant alleged that the circuit

court had deprived him of the due process of law and of a fair trial where it had “considered [the

defendant’s] armed robbery conviction when the court accepted [the defendant’s] plea as being an

offense for the extended term when [the defendant] was a juvenile at the time of the offense(s) and

that conviction would have been resolved in delinquency proceedings rather than criminal court

proceedings and would not qualify as an offense for the extended term.”

¶ 16   The petition had several attachments. Most of these were copies of pages from the record

in the instant case. None of the attachments seemed particularly pertinent to the defendant’s two

postconviction claims.

¶ 17   On June 6, 2023, the circuit court entered a written order adjudicating the defendant’s

pro se postconviction petition. The court wrote: “The statute [sic] of which the Defendant

complains was dismissed as part of his plea agreement.” The court found that the petition was

“frivolous and patently without merit,” and it “denied” the petition. This appeal followed.

¶ 18                                  ANALYSIS

¶ 19   This appeal is from an order of the circuit court that “denied” the defendant’s

postconviction petition. Actually, the denial was a summary dismissal. The summary dismissal of

a postconviction petition is reviewed de novo. People v. Brown, 236 Ill. 2d 175, 184 (2010). It can

be affirmed on any basis supported by the record. People v. Durr, 215 Ill. 2d 283, 296 (2005).

                                                 5
¶ 20   As previously mentioned, the defendant’s appointed attorney on appeal, OSAD, has filed

a Finley motion to withdraw as counsel. In his written response to the Finley motion, the defendant

asks this court to deny OSAD’s motion to withdraw. However, the response does not provide a

rationale for not allowing OSAD to withdraw; it does not explain why this appeal has merit.

Instead, the defendant claims to have additional issues that can be raised—if counsel is appointed.

In an appeal from the dismissal of a postconviction petition, the only issues that can be raised are

issues relating to the claims presented in the petition that was filed in the circuit court; a defendant

cannot raise new claims on appeal. See People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140, 148 (2004). For that

reason, the defendant’s response will not be considered further.

¶ 21   The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)) provides

a procedural mechanism through which a criminal defendant may assert that his conviction

resulted from a substantial violation of his federal or state constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-

1(a)(1) (West 2022); People v. Smith, 2015 IL 116572, ¶ 9. A proceeding under the Act is a

collateral proceeding, not an appeal from the judgment of conviction. People v. English, 2013 IL

112890, ¶ 21. A criminal defendant initiates a proceeding under the Act by filing a petition in the

circuit court. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2022). “The petition shall *** clearly set forth the

respects in which [the defendant’s] constitutional rights were violated. The petition shall have

attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why

the same are not attached.” Id. § 122-2. The Act requires the circuit court to examine a defendant’s

postconviction petition, and enter an order thereon, within 90 days after the petition is filed and

docketed. Id. § 122-2.1(a). A circuit court needs to determine within the 90-day timeframe whether

it should summarily dismiss the defendant’s petition as frivolous or patently without merit (id.

                                                   6
§ 122-2.1(a)(2)) or should order the petition to be docketed for further consideration (see id. § 122-

2.1(b)).

¶ 22    A pro se postconviction petition may be dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit

only if its allegations, taken as true and liberally construed, fail to state the gist of a constitutional

claim. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001). In other words, the petition may be

dismissed “only if [it] has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d

1, 16 (2009). “A petition which lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact is one which is

based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” Id. “An example

of an indisputably meritless legal theory is one which is completely contradicted by the record.”

Id. In order to meet the “gist” standard, a defendant “ ‘need only present a limited amount of

detail’ ” in his petition, and he need not make legal arguments or cite to legal authority. People v.

Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (2008) (quoting People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996)).

“However a ‘limited amount of detail’ does not mean that a pro se petitioner is excused from

providing any factual detail at all surrounding the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. The

pleading requirements for a pro se petition certainly are low, but they are real, and they must be

met if the petition is to avoid summary dismissal. See Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 9.

¶ 23    Regardless of what else can be said about the defendant’s petition, it is certain that each of

the defendant’s two postconviction claims hinges on a single factual allegation, namely, that his

adult conviction for armed robbery was, in reality, a juvenile adjudication for armed robbery. This

factual allegation is completely unsupported; none of the attachments to the postconviction petition

relates to it, at all. Furthermore, the record here apparently contradicts the allegation. At the

defendant’s October 2021 guilty-plea hearing, after the parties had waived preparation of a PSI,

the State provided the court with the defendant’s criminal history. Included in that history was an

                                                    7
armed-robbery conviction in Cook County case number 10-CR-510601. (When the year 2010

began, the defendant was already 18 years old, since he was born on November 30, 1991.) After

providing the history, the assistant State’s attorney said, “That is the extent of his adult criminal

history.” In answer to the court’s queries, the public defender and the defendant agreed that the

criminal history had been stated accurately. In short, at the time of the instant guilty plea, there

was no suggestion that the armed robbery conviction was, in fact, a juvenile adjudication, and there

is nothing to suggest it, now. The defendant’s petition was frivolous and patently without merit,

just as the circuit court found.

¶ 24                                  CONCLUSION

¶ 25    For the reasons stated above, OSAD’s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted,

and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 26    Motion granted; judgment affirmed.

                                                 8