Court Opinion

ID: 9960416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 14:02:00.126336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:26.565000
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

             IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.V., E.V., AND I.V.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 23-0058
                                FILED 4-16-2024

            Appeal from the Juvenile Court in Maricopa County
                              No. JD534301
               The Honorable Ashley V. Halvorson, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Denise L. Carroll, Scottsdale
By Denise L. Carroll
Counsel for Appellant/Father

John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale
By John L. Popilek
Counsel for Appellant/Mother

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Dawn R. Williams
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
                  IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.V. et al.
                          Decision of the Court

David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Mesa
By David W. Bell
Counsel for Children

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate
By Tiffany Mastin
Guardian Ad Litem

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Anni Hill Foster and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1            Jose V. (“Father”) and Gabriella P. (“Mother”) appeal from
the juvenile court’s order finding their minor children S.V., I.V., and E.V.
dependent as to them. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2             Mother and Father are the biological parents of three children,
S.V., born in January 2020, and twins E.V. and I.V., born in June 2021. The
twins were born prematurely and remained in the intensive care unit for a
couple of weeks. After the twins were discharged, the parents had concerns
about bruising that appeared on the twins’ bodies and faces, which they
addressed with the children’s pediatrician.

¶3            In September 2021, I.V. was taken to Phoenix Children’s
Hospital (“PCH”) because she seemed “unresponsive” and “limp.” Upon
examination, she was found to have intracranial bleeding and multiple rib
and hand fractures. The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) and law
enforcement began an investigation into I.V.’s injuries. DCS also requested
that S.V. and E.V. be examined for injuries. After the additional
investigations, E.V. was also found to have multiple fractures while S.V.
had no injuries. As part of the criminal investigation, the parents were
prohibited from contacting the children and accessing their medical
records. Ultimately, however, no criminal charges were filed.

¶4          Later that month, DCS filed a dependency petition alleging
Mother and Father abused or failed to protect their children from abuse.

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                  IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.V. et al.
                          Decision of the Court

The juvenile court then assigned counsel and a guardian ad litem (“GAL”)
for the children.

¶5           The trial took place over twenty-one nonconsecutive days
between June and December 2022. During trial, the juvenile court heard
testimony from medical providers and experts regarding the injuries and
examinations of the twins.

¶6            The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent.
Mother and Father timely appealed from the dependency order. While their
appeal was pending, the court dismissed the dependency at DCS’s request.
We have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 8-235,
12-120.21, and 12-2101(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

I.     Parents’ Appeal Remains Reviewable Under the Collateral
       Consequences Exception to Mootness.

¶7            As a matter of judicial restraint, “we will dismiss an appeal as
moot when our action as a reviewing court will have no effect on the
parties.” Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, 617 ¶ 5 (App. 2012). However, we
may “review an otherwise moot order if the consequences of that order will
continue to affect a party.” Id. ¶ 9.

¶8             Here, the parents filed their appellate briefs more than two
months after the juvenile court dismissed the dependency. However, we
decline to find the parents’ appeal moot based on the collateral
consequences exception. See id.; see also A.R.S. § 8-804(A); Phillip B. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 253 Ariz. 295, 296 ¶ 1 (App. 2022) (explaining that DCS
maintains a central registry of substantiated reports of child abuse and
neglect, which can disqualify individuals from obtaining or maintaining
licenses, certifications, or employment in working with children and other
vulnerable individuals). We, therefore, consider the merits of the parents’
arguments.

II.    Sufficient Evidence Supports Dependency.

¶9             Mother and Father both claim insufficient evidence
supported the dependency finding. “We review an order adjudicating a
child dependent for an abuse of discretion, deferring to the juvenile court’s
ability to weigh and analyze the evidence.” Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
239 Ariz. 47, 50 ¶ 13 (App. 2016).

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                  IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.V. et al.
                          Decision of the Court

¶10            Dependency must be established by a preponderance of the
evidence. A.R.S. § 8-844(C)(1). “Dependent child” includes a child “who has
no parent or guardian willing to exercise or capable of exercising [proper
and effective parental] care and control.” A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a)(i). The
juvenile court must consider “the circumstances existing at the time of the
adjudication hearing” and not just past circumstances. Francine C. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 249 Ariz. 289, 300 ¶ 35 (App. 2020) (citation omitted). Denial
of responsibility for past abuse and neglect may support a finding that
“children do not have parents presently willing to or capable of exercising
proper and effective parental care and control.” Shella H., 239 Ariz. at 51 ¶
16 (quoting Pima Cnty. Juv. Dependency Action No. 96290, 162 Ariz. 601, 605
(App. 1990)).

¶11            Here, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding of
dependency. Medical providers and expert witnesses testified at trial
regarding the injuries and examinations of the twins. Jasmine Knoll, a
clinical geneticist at PCH, who conducted the court-ordered genetic testing
of the children for Ehlers-Danlos syndrome (“EDS”), testified the results
“did not show any variance consistent” with EDS. Dr. Knoll also examined
the children for osteogenesis imperfecta (“OI”). However, she found no
features consistent with OI. Ultimately, Dr. Knoll concluded that no genetic
factors explained the children’s specific injuries.

¶12           Julie Baumgarth, a pediatric nurse practitioner at PCH who
treated I.V. during her initial hospitalization, testified I.V.’s injuries were
not consistent with either EDS or OI. Pamela Smith, a pediatric
endocrinologist at PCH who examined E.V., concluded E.V.’s rib fractures
were most likely not caused by an inherited bone disorder.

¶13           A DCS specialist Karen Chingofor testified DCS pursued
dependency because the children’s injuries were deemed nonaccidental
and the parents had not been able to identify the cause. She also testified
that although S.V. had not suffered an injury, he was at risk for similar
abuse in the parents’ care because he is vulnerable and relies on his adult
caregivers to ensure his safety.

¶14            In response, the parents argue that testimony from their
expert witness, geneticist Gerard Pals, Ph.D., provided an alternative cause
of the twins’ injuries. Dr. Pals, who is not a medical doctor, did not treat the
children, but only reviewed records that were provided to him. On that
basis, he testified the twins could have suffered from meningitis, ruptured
subarachnoid cysts, and aneurysms. He also testified regarding his belief
that the twins had a rare variation of OI known as Cole-Carpenter

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                  IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.V. et al.
                          Decision of the Court

syndrome. Ultimately, he testified the twins suffered from brittle bones
resulting from a combination of OI, EDS, maternal obesity, and preterm
birth. But resolution of conflicting evidence, even in the face of sharply
disputed facts, is the unique province of the juvenile court. See Alma S. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151 ¶ 18 (2018) (internal citations
omitted). We do not reweigh evidence on appeal, id., and “will only disturb
a dependency adjudication if no reasonable evidence supports it.” Shella H.,
239 Ariz. at 50 ¶ 13.

¶15           Based on the trial evidence, the juvenile court “found [that]
the PCH witnesses and records to be competent, compelling, and credible,”
and that the witnesses relied on their examinations and testimony about the
children. By contrast, the court gave “less weight to Dr. Pals’ testimony . . .
given he lacks medical expertise, [and] did not examine the children.” Even
considering Father’s argument that the court made seemingly incongruous
findings such as describing parents’ participation in services as
“exemplary,” the court concluded that although the parents made some
progress by participating in DCS services, “there are ongoing substantiated
and unresolved threats to the children.” We disagree that the court’s
findings are incompatible and unreasonable. Therefore, because reasonable
evidence supports the court’s finding of dependency, it did not abuse its
discretion.

III.   Father’s Due Process Arguments Fail.

¶16            Father argues DCS denied him due process and a fair trial by
preventing the parents from preparing their defense. We review
constitutional issues, such as violation of due process, de novo. Tracy D. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 425, 433 ¶ 31 (App. 2021).

¶17            When the state acts to terminate a parent’s rights, it must
provide that parent with due process. Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251
Ariz. 574, 579 ¶ 8 (2021). “Due process is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Royce C. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 129, 136 ¶ 21 (App. 2021) (cleaned up). Instead,
review of a due process challenge requires that we “discover what
‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular situation by first
considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several
interests that are at stake.” Id. (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of
Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981)). “To determine whether a parent
received a fundamentally fair proceeding, we consider and balance the
parent’s affected interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the parent’s

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                  IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.V. et al.
                          Decision of the Court

interest, and the state’s interest [in protecting the children].” Trisha A. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 84, 90 ¶ 25 (2019).

¶18            A parent’s right to custody and control of her own child,
while fundamental, is not absolute. Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240
Ariz. 96, 97 ¶ 7 (App. 2016). It must be balanced against the state’s interests
in the juvenile dependency context. Those interests include, first and
foremost, the state’s interest in the children’s well-being and best
interests—including the children’s health, stability, safety, security, a
normal family home, and the prompt finality that protects those interests—
accurate and just decisions, and a pecuniary interest in judicial efficiency.
See Royce C., 252 Ariz. at 137 ¶ 22.

¶19           Here, Father raises three issues that he characterizes as due
process violations. First, Father argues DCS should have conducted more
comprehensive genetic testing to explain the cause of the twins’ injuries as
suggested by Dr. Pals. But given the transitory nature of a dependency and
the delay that further testing would require, Father fails to adequately
explain how compelling additional genetic testing outweighs the state’s
interests in an efficient judicial resolution to the dependency, or promote
the children’s best interests through stability, safety, and prompt finality.
Moreover, medical professionals who treated the children concluded
further genetic testing was unwarranted because the proposed rare
conditions suggested by Dr. Pals would not account for the children’s
injuries. The record supports the court’s determination that additional
testing recommended by Dr. Pals was not necessary. On this record, the
balance of these interests does not offend fundamental fairness sufficient to
constitute a violation of Father’s right to due process, and his argument to
the contrary in that regard is unavailing.

¶20           Second, Father claims the “parents were prohibited from
talking to the doctors about the children’s conditions” and “were not
allowed to get second opinions . . . that could explain the injuries.” This
position depends upon a misleading characterization of the record. More
accurately, the parents were only prohibited from speaking with the
medical providers in the initial days of the dependency because of the
criminal investigation. The court ordered the return of the children to the
parents in March 2023 to stay under their parents’ care. And later in the
proceedings, the parents were allowed to attend medical appointments,
and did communicate with medical providers. The parents had ample
opportunity to investigate the cause of the twins’ injuries and they have
failed to show how the initial prohibition substantially impaired the

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                  IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.V. et al.
                          Decision of the Court

fundamental fairness of these proceedings, given the competing interests at
stake. We discern no due process violation.

¶21            Third, Father argues the juvenile court erred in granting
DCS’s motion in limine, precluding Dr. Pals from testifying about new
diagnoses or opinions that had not been previously disclosed. This issue
does not raise a true due process concern, but rather constitutes a challenge
to the court’s evidentiary ruling. “We review a trial court’s ruling to admit
expert testimony for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Favela, 234 Ariz. 433,
434 ¶ 4 (App. 2014).

¶22           Here, Mother provided late disclosure statements in which
she stated that she and Father intended to solicit expert testimony from Dr.
Pals about new diagnoses and opinions concerning the children. DCS
moved in limine to exclude such testimony as untimely disclosed. The
juvenile court partly granted the motion. Because the proposed new
diagnoses and opinions were disclosed “later than 30 days prior to the
contested adjudication,” the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting
Dr. Pals’ testimony as to those late-disclosed topics. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.
315(d)(1), (g) (explaining the court may preclude evidence that was not
timely disclosed).

IV.    The Court Did Not Err by Allowing the GAL to Participate in Trial.

¶23           Mother argues the juvenile court erred in allowing the GAL
to participate in trial contrary to A.R.S. § 8-221(F). She claims the GAL
“acted as if she were a separate and independent attorney for the
[c]hildren” and exceeded her statutory authority. DCS argues Mother
waived this argument by failing to raise it during trial proceedings. DCS
alternatively argues amendments to the Rules went into effect during the
dependency proceedings that permitted the GAL’s involvement at trial.

¶24           During trial, Mother objected to the GAL’s participation in the
proceeding, claiming the GAL is not a party to the dependency under Rule
302(b) and lacks standing. Although the juvenile court invited Mother to
file a motion to state the basis of her claim, she did not do so. Because
Mother did not raise this argument to the court, she has waived it on appeal.
In re MH 2008-002393, 223 Ariz. 240, 243 ¶ 15. Regardless, the court did not
err in allowing the GAL to participate in the trial.

¶25           In cases of alleged abuse or neglect, the juvenile court may
appoint a GAL, who must be an attorney. A.R.S. § 8-221(F). True, as Mother
points out, the statute specifies that the GAL is not the child’s attorney. Id.
But this proviso merely highlights why the two roles are distinct and

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                  IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.V. et al.
                          Decision of the Court

participation of both is permissible and desirable in dependency
proceedings. While the child’s attorney “must maintain a normal attorney-
client relationship with the child” and follow “the child’s need and wishes,”
“[t]he child’s GAL must assist the court in determining what is in the child’s
best interests and is not bound by the child’s expressed preferences.” Ariz.
R.P. Juv. Ct. 306(a)(1)(A). Further, the GAL “must participate in discovery,
file pleadings, and subpoena witnesses.” Id. Because Rule 306(c) authorizes
the GAL to participate in the proceedings and develop a position for each
hearing, the court did not err in allowing the GAL to participate in the trial.

                               CONCLUSION

¶26           We affirm.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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