Court Opinion

ID: 9691779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 08:10:01.250694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:12.576262
License: Public Domain

In The

                               Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              __________________

                              NO. 09-21-00232-CV
                              __________________

            IN RE COMMITMENT OF FLOYD WESLEY GIBBS

__________________________________________________________________

               On Appeal from the 253rd District Court
                       Liberty County, Texas
                     Trial Cause No. CV2016553
__________________________________________________________________

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury unanimously determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Floyd Wesley

Gibbs is a sexually violent predator pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predators Act

(“SVP Act”). See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 841.001-.153. As a result, the

trial court civilly committed him for sex-offender treatment and supervision. Gibbs

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable

doubt that he has a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a

predatory act of sexual violence. Having reviewed the record and the arguments

asserted, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and order of commitment.

                                        1
                                 BACKGROUND

       In 2020, the State petitioned to civilly commit Gibbs under the SVP Act,

which permits commitment of individuals upon a finding that (1) they are a “repeat

sexually violent offender” and (2) suffer “from a behavioral abnormality that makes

the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.” Id. § 841.003(a).

Gibbs filed an answer denying the State’s allegations.

      At trial, the State presented testimony from Dr. Christine Reed, a clinical and

forensic psychologist. After detailing her training and experience in sex-offender

risk assessment, Reed described how she met with and evaluated Gibbs for the

purpose of determining whether he suffers from a behavioral abnormality that would

subject him to civil commitment under the SVP Act. Reed testified that a “behavioral

abnormality” is a congenital or acquired condition (i.e., a condition one is born with

or picks up over the course of one’s life) that, by affecting someone’s emotional or

volitional capacity, predisposes them to commit sexually violent offenses. Since the

word “likely” is not defined by the SVP Act, Reed opined that the word “likely”

means “probable.” Predatory act, which is defined in the statute, is “an act directed

toward individuals, for the primary purpose of victimization.”

      Reed explained that when conducting a behavioral abnormality evaluation,

she reviews volumes of records, which can include a referral file, court records,

police reports, jail and prison records, medical records, and evaluations performed

                                          2
by other psychologists. After reviewing the records, Reed meets the individual face

to face. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Reed met with Gibbs using a

video conference. Reed explained that she typically interviews an individual for two

to three hours and obtains information regarding the person’s background and

history. During the interview, Reed gathers information to assist her in completing

questionnaires and psychological assessments, which gives her information about

that individual’s risk of reoffending. After gathering all relevant information, she

forms an opinion as to whether the individual has a behavioral abnormality. Reed

confirmed she followed that methodology in evaluating Gibbs and arriving at her

opinion that he suffers from a behavioral abnormality.

      Reed also employed three testing instruments commonly used by experts in

evaluating sex offenders for potential behavioral abnormalities under the SVP Act:

(1) the Static-99R, which contains a list of ten risk factors that have been studied in

sex offenders and assesses the likelihood of a sex offender to reoffend; (2) the Hare

Psychopathy Checklist (“PCL-R”), which is a measure of psychopathy; and (3) the

Risk of Sexual Violence Protocol, which is a research-based checklist of other

general risk factors known to increase the risk for reoffending. Reed explained that

risk factors are qualities that have been studied and found to correlate to a higher

risk of sexually reoffending.

                                          3
      Regarding Gibbs’s sexual criminal history, Reed testified that in 1978, when

Gibbs was in his twenties, he sexually assaulted a six-year-old girl named Becky.1

Reed explained that Gibbs was dating and living with Becky’s mother when the

incident occurred. Concerning Becky, Gibbs told Reed that he went to the restroom

and that when he came out,, Becky was “buck naked.” According to Gibbs, Becky

asked Gibbs to touch her genitalia. Gibbs also told Reed that he kissed Becky on the

mouth because she wanted him to. Reed testified that police records and victim

statements show that when Becky was left in Gibbs’s care, he told Becky he wanted

her to take off her clothes to play doctor, and after Becky complied, Gibbs took off

his clothes, fondled her genitalia, kissed her on the mouth, and sucked on her breast.

As related to this incident, Gibbs was convicted of indecency with a child and

received a ten-year deferred probation.

      Reed testified that in 1983, Gibbs was in his mid-thirties when he sexually

assaulted his twelve-year-old cousin, Mark. 2 When the second offense occurred,

Gibbs was on probation for the offense against Becky. Reed explained that Gibbs

took Mark and Mark’s friend, Hal, to a family party, and that night all three of them

slept in the living room. Reed testified that during the night, Gibbs took off Mark’s

      1We refer to the victims referred to in the opinion using pseudonyms to protect

their identities. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30 (granting crime victims “the right to be
treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout
the criminal justice process”).
       2
         A pseudonym.
                                            4
pants and performed oral sex on Mark, and after Mark awoke and asked Gibbs to

stop, Gibbs kissed and blew on Mark’s stomach. At some point, Mark’s mother

walked into the room, confronted Gibbs, and told him to leave, and Hal told the

police that he witnessed the incident. Mark was examined by a doctor and that

examination showed that Mark contracted herpes. Gibbs was convicted of

aggravated sexual abuse of a child, was sentenced to ten years in prison, but he was

later released on parole.

      Reed testified that Gibbs recounted a different version of events and reported

that he attended the family party with the boys and slept in the living room, and that

he woke up in the middle of the night to use the restroom, and upon his return, he

found Mark “buck naked” on the floor. Gibbs claimed that Mark asked him to engage

in sexual activity, so he did. Gibbs told Reed that he did not know how Mark

contracted herpes. But Reed testified that when she subsequently asked Gibbs

whether “he ever had a sexually transmitted disease, he acknowledged that he had

herpes.”

      Reed explained that in 1988, Gibbs was on parole for sexually assaulting Mark

when he sexually assaulted another twelve-year-old boy named Daniel, an

acquaintance of Gibbs. 3 Reed explained that after Gibbs took Daniel and his young

brother swimming, Gibbs told Daniel he “wanted to see how big he was, meaning

      3
          Daniel is also pseudonym.
                                          5
his penis” and reached over and touched Daniel’s penis over his clothing. As a result

of this incident, Gibbs was convicted of indecency with a child, and he received a

life sentence. Gibbs told Reed that Daniel and his father lied about the incident, and

Gibbs claimed that Daniel’s father fabricated the offense to punish Gibbs because

he was upset due to a dispute over money.

      Reed testified that there were several sexual allegations made against Gibbs

that did not result in criminal convictions. There were allegations that Gibbs sexually

assaulted Mark and Daniel on more than one occasion. Reed explained that a month

prior to the incident with Mark, which resulted in Gibb’s conviction, Gibbs

performed oral sex on Mark in Mark’s living room, Hal witnessed the incident, and

both boys reported the incident to the police. Reed told the jury that Gibbs sexually

assaulted Daniel under similar circumstances, explaining that when Gibbs was in the

car with Daniel, he pulled over and touched Daniel’s penis over his pants. Gibbs told

Reed that allegation was a lie.

      Reed also testified that in 1982, allegations were made against Gibbs that he

had sexually assaulted a thirteen-year-old boy named Errol, a family friend.4 Reed

explained that the allegations were that Gibbs spent a night in Errol’s bed, rubbed

on Errol’s stomach, and touched his penis. On a second occasion when Gibbs spent

the night at Errol’s home, Errol was allegedly sleeping on the couch when Gibbs

      4
          A pseudonym.
                                          6
told him “you better not mess with me.” When Errol woke up, Gibbs was performing

oral sex on him. Reed testified that Gibbs allegedly sexually assaulted Errol a third

time when Gibbs touched Errol’s penis when Errol was driving Gibbs’s car. Gibbs

denied these allegations during his discussions with Reed.

      In another incident around 1983, Gibbs was reportedly driving with a twelve-

or thirteen-year-old boy named Monty.5 Reed explained that Monty was allegedly

sitting in Gibbs’s lap as he was driving the car when Gibbs put his hand down

Monty’s pants, touched his penis, and told him not to tell anyone. In the 1980’s, yet

another individual, according to Reed, had alleged that Gibbs had sexually assaulted

him, an inmate at the same prison as Gibbs. That inmate reportedly told staff that he

did not want to be in the same facility as Gibbs. The inmate declared that if housed

in the same facility as Gibbs, he might kill him because Gibbs had sexually abused

him when he (the inmate who made the complaint) was a child.

      Reed also testified about Gibbs’s nonsexual criminal history. Reed testified

that at seventeen, Gibbs was arrested for burglary and spent one month in jail before

the case was dismissed. Reed also testified that Gibbs was arrested for simple assault

and paid an $18 fine. Additionally, Gibbs was convicted of driving while intoxicated

(“DWI”) and placed on probation, which was revoked because Gibbs failed to report

to his probation officer and pay the required fees. Reed testified that one of the court

      5
          A pseudonym.
                                           7
documents she reviewed indicated Gibbs was arrested for DWI more than once, but

she could not determine if he was convicted or charged with those DWIs. Reed

opined that if someone has one DWI, they may have substance abuse issues, but she

did not have enough information to determine if Gibbs had a problem with alcohol.

      Reed diagnosed Gibbs with pedophilic disorder and unspecified personality

disorder with anti-social traits. Reed characterized persons with anti-social

personality disorder as aggressive and deceitful people who get into fights and legal

trouble. Reed did not diagnose Gibbs with antisocial personality disorder because

that diagnosis requires evidence of a conduct disorder prior to age fifteen, and she

did not have any evidence that Gibbs had started acting out prior to that age. She

determined Gibbs exhibited enough traits of an anti-social personality to diagnose

him with an unspecified personality disorder with anti-social features. Reed

explained that pedophilic disorder is a sexual attraction to prepubescent children

who are not fully developed. Reed testified that both the pedophilic disorder and

anti-social features are congenital or acquired conditions that affect Gibbs’s

emotional or volitional capacity. Gibbs’s pedophilic disorder is chronic, meaning he

cannot be cured from having those types of sexual urges.

      As part of her evaluation, Reed completed several psychological assessment

tools. Reed completed the Static-99R, which is a test that measures a person’s risk

of reoffending based on certain risk factors as compared to other sex offenders. Reed

                                         8
explained that it is impossible to predict whether an individual will sexually reoffend

in the future, but tests like the Static-99R are useful in determining an individual’s

risk of doing so. Reed testified that Gibbs scored a two on the Static-99R, which

placed Gibbs at an average risk of reoffending, but Reed explained that Gibbs’s score

did not fully capture Gibbs’s risk level because there are other factors that determine

his risk. One tool that assisted Reed in determining Gibbs’s other factors for

reoffending is the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol, which is a list of general risk

factors for sexual reoffending. This measure includes dynamic factors, which means

it accounts for factors that an individual can change to reduce the risk of reoffending.

      Reed also completed the PCL-R, which is a test that determines if an

individual is a psychopath, and she testified that characteristics of psychopaths

include lack of conscience, problems with empathy, lack of remorse, narcissism,

grandiosity, and violating the rights of others. Reed explained that a person’s degree

of psychopathy is relevant in evaluating a person’s behavioral abnormality because

there is a link between sex offending and being high in psychopathic traits. Reed

further testified that Gibbs scored a twenty-eight on the PCL-R, which was two

points below the generally accepted cutoff of thirty to diagnose someone as a

psychopath. Reed noted that Gibbs was “pretty high” in psychopathic traits, as

indicated by his anti-social orientation and lifestyle. Reed also noted that most

pedophiles are not actually psychopaths, so it was unusual that Gibbs scored so high.

                                           9
      Reed testified that a risk factor is anything through research found to be

associated with reoffending. Reed explained that sexual deviance and anti-social

orientation are two of the biggest risk factors for reoffending. Reed defined “sexual

deviance” as “sexual behavior that significantly deviates from the norm” and stated

that Gibbs is sexually deviant because he engaged in sexual behaviors with underage

individuals which suggests an attraction to underage children. Reed also explained

that in addition to Gibbs’s sexual convictions, Gibbs’s convictions for nonsexual

offenses and his sexual offenses for which there were no convictions were important

to Reed’s opinion that Gibbs suffers from a behavior abnormality because those acts

show a pattern of behavior of an anti-social lifestyle. Reed identified several risk

factors for Gibbs using the psychological assessment tools, which included a history

of:

          • Multiple convictions for sex offenses;

          • Recurring incidents of sexual violence over a long period despite being
            sanctioned;

          • Acceptance and approval of sexual behavior with young children;

          • Male victims and non-familial victims, a victim profile associated with
            defendants who carry a higher risk of reoffending;

          • Non-sexual criminal offenses;

          • Violations of the terms of past conditional releases;

                                         10
          • Incident of prison misconduct (threatening inmates, threatening
            officers, some fights, and using indecent or vulgar language);

          • Psychopathic traits;

          • Minimization and denial of sexual violence; and

          • Significant problems in sex offender treatment.

      Reed also considered Gibbs’s positive considerations and protective factors,

which she balanced against his risk factors, and which are used to reduce an

individual’s risk to reoffend. Reed identified two general positive considerations that

applied to Gibbs. The first factor is Gibbs’s age. Reed testified the risk for re-offense

“drops off pretty dramatically” after the age of sixty. However, Reed told the jury

that the fact that Gibbs was seventy-two does not necessarily decrease his individual

risk, because in the weeks and months prior to her evaluation, Gibbs told Reed he

continues to have a sexual attraction to children.

      The second factor Reed identified is participation in sex offender treatment.

However, Reed testified that sex offender treatment was not a protective factor for

Gibbs for the following reasons: he is not participating in treatment in a meaningful

way; believes that being in treatment is harmful because reading the treatment

manuals and materials may somehow make him worse; does not believe that he

needs treatment; and has no insight into why he sexually offends. Reed could not

confirm that sex offender treatment was a protective factor for Gibbs. Reed opined

                                           11
that Gibbs suffers from a behavioral abnormality comprised of pedophilia and an

anti-social lifestyle which are chronic conditions that Gibbs minimizes.

      When Gibbs testified in his trial and addressed his criminal history, he

acknowledged that at seventeen, he was arrested for breaking and entering, but he

denied participating in the crime. He also admitted to being arrested for simple

assault and DWI but denied having multiple DWI arrests. He also denied being

arrested for having a bayonet in his car when he was twenty-four and for fighting

and trespassing. In conclusion, Gibbs said he did not think he hurt his victims,

believed it was safe for him to be around children, and planned to stay out of prison

by “staying honest” and “staying away from anything wrong and doing everything

the right way.”

      When Gibbs turned to his conviction of sexually assaulting Becky, he testified

the offense occurred when he was twenty-nine and Becky was six. Gibbs disagreed

with Reed’s version of events and claimed that he was watching Becky play in the

recreation yard at the apartment complex. Gibbs testified that they both went inside

the apartment and when he came out of the restroom, Becky was standing in the

living room without her clothes on when she asked Gibbs to touch her vagina. Gibbs

testified he touched Becky’s vagina, told her that it was wrong, and then told her to

put on her clothes. Gibbs also told the jury that when he touched Becky, he knew it

                                         12
was wrong to have sexual contact with a child, but believed Satan entered his mind

and made him do it.

      Gibbs related that he did not complete his probation for the sexual offense

against Becky because he was convicted for another sexual offense against Mark.

Gibbs testified that he was thirty-four and Mark was twelve when the offense

occurred. Gibbs denied most of the details Reed told the jury but admitted

performing oral sex on Mark. Gibbs told the jury that Mark’s parents asked Gibbs

to take Mark to a party, and he spent the night at Mark’s house and slept in the living

room with Mark and Hal. Gibbs testified that when he returned from the restroom,

Mark was lying naked on the floor with an erection. Gibbs claimed that Mark asked

Gibbs to put his penis in his mouth, and Gibbs told the jury that Satan entered his

mind and he put Mark’s penis in his mouth for a few seconds.

      Gibbs denied giving a statement to police that he performed oral sex on Mark.

However, when confronted with his signed confession, Gibbs agreed that he tickled

and blew on Mark’s belly and gave Mark oral sex to show Mark that someone cared

for him and to make him feel better. Gibbs also denied exposing his penis to Mark

and asking him to play with it and performing oral sex on another occasion. Gibbs

testified that he was released on mandatory supervision in 1987, and in 1988, he was

accused of fondling Daniel, which Gibbs characterized as a “bald-face lie.” Gibbs

confirmed that he drove Daniel and his younger brother to go swimming but denied

                                          13
doing anything sexual to Daniel. Gibbs recounted that after the boys finished

swimming, Daniel made a sexual remark in the car, and Gibbs responded, “shut up

or I’ll pinch [your] penis off.” Gibbs explained that he reached over and put a

“stomach claw” on Daniel and that if he did touch Daniel’s penis, it was by accident.

Gibbs believed Daniel’s father coached Daniel because Gibbs and Daniel’s father

were involved in a dispute over money.

      Gibbs admitted to fondling Errol’s penis once but denied offending against

Errol on three separate occasions. He also told the jury that he did not molest Monty.

Gibbs admitted that he was confronted by Errol and Monty’s parents, who agreed

not to press charges because Gibbs told them he was seeing a psychiatrist to get help

to stop his behavior. Gibbs also denied molesting a fellow inmate when that inmate

was a child.

      Gibbs testified that he had almost completed a nine-month sex offender

treatment program, which helped him some, but he found the program’s material to

be very offensive because it could cause a person “to keep those filthy thoughts in

his mind.” Gibbs claimed he had improper thoughts every time he went to sex

offender treatment, and he believed that the best help was God.

      The jury found that Gibbs is a sexually violent predator beyond a reasonable

doubt, and the trial court entered a judgment and order civilly committing Gibbs

pursuant to the SVP Act. This appeal followed.

                                         14
                                      ANALYSIS

      In a single issue, Gibbs argues that given his advanced age and the disputed

evidence that a reasonable jury could not have credited in favor of the SVP finding,

the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he is a sexually

violent predator. The State argues that Gibbs failed to cite any authority to support

his argument that his advanced age makes it impossible for him to be a sexually

violent predator.

      In examining the factual sufficiency standard of review in SVP case, the Texas

Supreme Court held that:

      a properly conducted factual-sufficiency review in an SVP case
      requires the court of appeals to determine whether, on the entire record,
      a reasonable factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
      defendant is an SVP. In doing so, the appellate court may not usurp the
      jury’s role of determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight to
      be given their testimony, and the court must presume that the factfinder
      resolved disputed evidence in favor of the finding if a reasonable
      factfinder could do so. If the remaining evidence contrary to the finding
      is so significant in light of the entire record that the factfinder could not
      have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that its finding was true,
      the evidence is factually insufficient to support the verdict.

     In re Commitment of Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tex. 2020). In other
words,

      in an SVP case where the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt,
      the evidence is factually insufficient if, in the light of the entire record,
      the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have
      credited in favor the SVP finding, along with the undisputed facts that
      do not support the finding, is so significant that the factfinder could not
      have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory elements were
      met.
                                           15
Id. at 675.

      In enacting the SVP Act, the Legislature found that:

      a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators
      exists and that those predators have a behavioral abnormality that is not
      amenable to traditional mental illness treatment modalities and that
      makes the predators likely to engage in repeated predatory acts of
      sexual violence. . . . Thus, the legislature finds that a civil commitment
      procedure for the long-term supervision and treatment of sexually
      violent predators is necessary and in the interest of the state.

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.001; see also In re Commitment of Fisher,

164 S.W.3d 637, 639–40 (Tex. 2005).

      To establish that an individual is an SVP, the State must prove that the

individual: “(1) is a repeat sexually violent offender; and (2) suffers from a

behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of

sexual violence.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(a). Under the first

element of the SVP statute, a person is a “repeat sexually violent offender” if “the

person is convicted of more than one sexually violent offense and a sentence is

imposed for at least one of the offenses[.]” Id. § 841.003(b). Indecency with a child

and aggravated sexual assault are sexually violent offenses, and Gibbs does not

challenge the first element on appeal. Id. § 841.002(8)(A); see Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§§ 21.11 (indecency with a child), 22.021 (aggravated sexual assault).

      Under the second element under the SVP statute, a “[b]ehavioral abnormality”

is “a congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a person’s emotional or
                                         16
volitional capacity, predisposes the person to commit a sexually violent offense, to

the extent that the person becomes a menace to the health and safety of another

person.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.002(2).

      Gibbs relies primarily on two facts for his argument that the evidence was

factually insufficient to show he had a behavioral abnormality: (1) his advanced age;

and (2) the disputed testimony from Gibbs regarding the underlying facts of his

offenses. In our opinion, the evidence admitted in Gibbs’s trial provides sufficient

evidence to support Reed’s conclusion that Gibbs suffers from a behavioral

abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.

Although Reed’s age may weigh against the risk that he might reoffend, no expert

witnesses testified on Gibbs’s behalf, and so there’s no opinion testimony in the

record from an expert that contradicting Reeds’ testimony that Gibbs has a

behavioral abnormality and is likely to reoffend. Reed also considered but ultimately

rejected Gibbs’s age as a protective factor in his case, and she explained why she did

so. The jury was entitled to accept her explanation as reasonable, and to credit her

testimony that Gibbs has a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to reoffend.

On this record the jury could have reasonably concluded beyond a reasonable doubt

that Gibbs has a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to reoffend. See

Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at 678.

                                         17
      Additionally, even though Gibbs contradicted some of Reed’s testimony, the

jury was free to disregard his testimony. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 695,

697 (Tex. 1986) (stating the trier of fact “may believe one witness and disbelieve

others”); see also In re Commitment of Mullens, 92 S.W.3d 881, 887 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2002, pet. denied). Faced with two competing narratives, the jury chose

to believe the State’s evidence and disbelieve Gibbs. Because the jury had the right

in its discretion to credit Reed’s testimony and to find it reasonable, we may not

substitute our judgment for that of the jury, as it is the sole judge of the credibility

and the weight to be given to the witnesses’ testimony. See Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d at

678. Based on this record, we cannot conclude that the remaining evidence contrary

to the behavioral-abnormality finding is so significant in light of the entire record

that the jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory

elements were met. See id. We conclude that legally and factually sufficient evidence

supports the jury’s finding that Gibbs is a sexually violent predator. We overrule

Gibbs’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment and order of commitment.

      AFFIRMED.

                                                      _________________________
                                                         W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                              Chief Justice

Submitted on November 4, 2022
Opinion Delivered August 24, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.
                                          18