Court Opinion

ID: 9476320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:52:40.459156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:14.583571
License: Public Domain

CANBY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
I disagree with that part of the majority opinion which holds that Bay’s new sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment did not create a presumption of vindictiveness under North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). If Pearce is applied, then Bay’s 20 year sentence cannot stand unless the reasons for the more severe sentence, based on Bay’s conduct after the first sentence, affirmatively appear in the record. At present, they do not.
It is true that in United States v. Hagler, 709 F.2d 578 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 917, 104 S.Ct. 282, 78 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983), we held that no presumption of vindictiveness arose when a defendant was resentenced to the same total of one year’s imprisonment, a fine of $10,000 and restitution of $77,000 after 5 of the 13 mail fraud counts of which he had been convicted had been reversed on appeal. One of the reversed counts had been the one on which the sentence of imprisonment and fine had been imposed, and we permitted that same sentence to be imposed on one of the surviving counts, on which sentence had originally been suspended. But in Hagler, all of the counts were for mail fraud, and *1516were all part of the same mail fraud scheme. It did not change the character of the conviction when 5 of the 13 counts were reversed upon the government’s concession that the particular mailings charged in those counts did not further the underlying scheme to defraud. United States v. Hagler, 708 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1982). The mail fraud counts were virtually interchangeable; they did not differ in severity with regard either to the facts of commission or the authorized maximum sentences. It was accordingly pure chance that the sentence of imprisonment and fine originally was imposed on one of the counts that was reversed on appeal. There was nothing jarring about the same sentence’s being imposed on one of the other, surviving counts at resentencing. The scheme remained the same, the defendant remained the same, and the “balanced package” sentence could remain the same. Hagler, 709 F.2d at 579.
Here the sentencing situation has drastically changed as a result of the appeal, retrial, and acquittal on the armed robbery counts. Bay was originally sentenced for two armed and one unarmed robberies. Now that he is acquitted of the two armed robberies, his resentencing is addressed to an entirely different situation from the one that was presented at original sentencing. It is simply wrong to treat his new sentence as the same kind of “package” as his original sentence, and to shield it from the Pearce presumption simply because there is no net increase in the total sentence originally imposed. That original sentence included two armed robberies of which Bay is now established not to have been guilty.
The offenses of which Bay was acquitted are not interchangeable with the one of which he was convicted again on retrial. In the original sentencing, a term of 20 years was imposed for one armed robbery, 10 years for a second armed robbery, and 5 years’ probation for the unarmed robbery. If the most severe term, 20 years, was appropriate for armed robbery initially, it stands to reason that something less than 20 years was appropriate for unarmed robbery.
I agree with the majority that the district court should not be restricted on resentencing to the original sentence of probation for unarmed robbery, subject to increase only if the requirements of Pearce are met. The original sentence of probation may well have been imposed on the unarmed robbery count only because a long period of incarceration was already in store for the defendant on the other counts. Some higher sentence than probation ought to be permitted, under the rule of Hagler, before the Pearce presumption is triggered. Pearce permits an increase in sentence only for a reason based upon new facts not before the court at the time of the original sentencing. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 2081; Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 106 S.Ct. 976, 980-82, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986). Yet some upward adjustment in the probationary sentence should be allowable, not because of defendant’s conduct after the original sentencing, but because of the circumstances of the crime itself and the criminal who committed it. The difficulty is to arrive at a formula for an appropriate increase that does not create an appearance of vindictiveness.
Any such formula is likely to be artificial, but I would nevertheless adopt one to cover this case where the surviving count is not interchangeable with the reversed count and resentencing does not constitute essentially the same “package,” as it did in Hagler. Here, the first sentence dealt with three convictions upon which a total sentence of 70 years could have been imposed —25 years for each armed robbery and 20 years for the unarmed robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d). A total of 30 years’ imprisonment was imposed. The sentence deemed appropriate by the district court was three-sevenths of the maximum for the entire package. On resentencing, the authorized maximum was 20 years. I would apply the Pearce requirements to any sentence exceeding three-sevenths of 20 years, or approximately 8.57 years.
I would therefore vacate the 20 year sentence for armed robbery and would remand for resentencing, with instructions that any sentence in excess of 8.57 years be justified on the record by new evidence *1517relating to the conduct of the defendant that was not before the court at the first sentencing, as Pearce requires. In the absence of any such justification, the present 20 year sentence for unarmed robbery gives the appearance of vindictiveness— vindictiveness in the form of punishment, to the extent possible, for taking a successful appeal, or punishment in part for crimes of which defendant now stands acquitted.