Court Opinion

ID: 9382082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 20:03:20.66902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.906075
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 210091-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                       NOTICE
 Decision filed 03/24/23. The
                                                                            This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-21-0091
                                                                            Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                               not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                               IN THE                       limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                  under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,      )     Appeal from the
                                          )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                 )     Jackson County.
                                          )
v.                                        )     No. 17-CF-577
                                          )
REBECCA VALENTINE,                        )     Honorable
                                          )     Ralph R. Bloodworth III,
      Defendant-Appellant.                )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Cates and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: The circuit court did not err when it denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw her
               guilty plea where the defendant did not provide sufficient evidence of a
               misapprehension of law or fact, a defense worthy of consideration by a jury, or the
               ends of justice would be better served by allowing the withdrawal.

¶2       On June 27, 2019, the defendant, Rebecca Valentine, entered a fully negotiated plea of

guilty to the offense of first degree murder. Under the terms of the agreement, she was to serve a

term of 25 years’ imprisonment at 100%, followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised release

(MSR), with credit for 582 days served in custody. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to

withdraw her guilty plea. The circuit court denied this motion and found that the defendant entered

into the guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. This appeal followed.

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¶3                                        I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On November 23, 2017, the defendant called law enforcement to an apartment in

Carbondale, Illinois. When police arrived, they found Mr. Glispie unresponsive and covered in

blood. He was transported to a hospital where he was pronounced dead. The defendant was

arrested that same night. During a post-Miranda interrogation, the defendant admitted to police

that she stabbed the victim in the chest with a kitchen knife. She was subsequently charged via

information and indicted by a grand jury with first degree murder.

¶5     Sometime later, the defense requested that the defendant be evaluated for her mental health

and to determine her fitness to stand trial. Initially, the evaluations concluded the defendant was

incompetent to stand trial then but that she could be restored to fitness. Three months later, a

fitness hearing was held. Based on a stipulation by the parties and a review of a new progress

report, the circuit court found the defendant was fit to stand trial.

¶6     A month later, the defendant entered into a fully negotiated plea of guilty to the offense of

first degree murder. She was to serve a term of 25 years’ imprisonment at 100%, followed by 3

years of MSR, with credit for 582 days served in custody. At the outset of the plea hearing, the

court admonished the defendant regarding the nature of the offense, the possible range of

punishment, and her rights that she would be waiving. The defendant acknowledged that she

understood and did not have any questions. At the end of the hearing, the court accepted the

defendant’s guilty plea as knowing and voluntary, and entered judgment against her. Shortly after,

the defendant filed a timely motion to withdraw her guilty plea. The motion requested new counsel

be appointed to present and amend the motion, and Ms. Celeste Korando was appointed to

represent her in the postplea proceedings.

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¶7     A hearing was held on the motion in September 2020. Counsel declined to amend or

supplement the motion to withdraw and relied on the original motion. At the hearing, the defendant

was called to testify. The defendant testified that, when she pleaded guilty, she was not in her right

state of mind, was overwhelmed, and stressed. She stated that she was not thinking clearly at that

time and was on medications including trazodone, Abilify, and another drug she could not

remember. She also stated that had she been in her right state of mind, she would have never

accepted the negotiated plea offer or pleaded guilty. She admitted that she did not express these

feelings to either her attorney or the circuit court on the date of the plea hearing.

¶8     The defendant then testified about the nature of her relationship with the victim. She

explained that she went through a lot with him in the past and described the relationship as

stressful. She testified that he previously beat her and that she had gone to a domestic violence

shelter or been made to sleep outside on the streets. She also stated that there was alcohol involved

and stated that she and the victim would drink every day. When asked whether she ever told

anyone about the alleged abuse, she said, “I’m sure I told somebody. I just didn’t tell the right

person.” She said she never called the police, but she had gone to a woman’s shelter four or five

times. On cross-examination, the defendant recalled that when the incident occurred, she was

angry with the victim and stated, “I probably was angry because it was a lot of stuff he put me

through.”

¶9     After oral argument, the circuit court found that the guilty plea was entered knowingly and

voluntarily and denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Thereafter, the

defendant filed a motion requesting leave to file a notice of appeal outside the 30-day window,

which was granted. Notice of appeal was then timely filed, and we granted leave to file a late

notice of appeal.

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¶ 10                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11    On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying her

motion to withdraw her guilty plea for first degree murder. She argues the court should have

granted her motion because she had a defense worthy of consideration and the ends of justice favor

a trial on the merits.

¶ 12    In considering a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, a trial court should grant

the request and vacate the plea if it “was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law,”

if a defendant “has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury,” or if “the ends of justice will be

better served” by allowing a defendant to withdraw the plea. People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. 528,

531-32 (1952). Whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests in the circuit

court’s sound discretion. People v. McIntosh, 2020 IL App (5th) 170068, ¶ 36. An abuse of

discretion will be found only where the court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable or

where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. People v. Delvillar,

235 Ill. 2d 507, 519 (2009). The defendant has the burden of demonstrating sufficient grounds to

allow withdrawal of the plea. People v. Kokoraleis, 193 Ill. App. 3d 684, 691-92 (1990).

¶ 13    The State contends that Illinois no longer recognizes that “a defense worthy of

consideration” is grounds for withdrawing a guilty plea. One appellate court district has noted that

our supreme court has not used it as a basis for withdrawal since 1993. People v. Nieto-Roman,

2019 IL App (4th) 180807, ¶ 33. However, our supreme court has never explicitly stated that this

basis can no longer be used to withdraw a guilty plea.

¶ 14    “To vacate a plea based on a misapprehension of law or fact, the defendant must establish

that her mistaken beliefs or impressions were reasonably justified under all the circumstances when

those circumstances are judged by an objective standard rather than by the defendant’s own

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subjective impression.” People v. Christensen, 197 Ill. App. 3d 807, 812 (1990). Absent

substantial objective proof that a defendant’s mistaken impressions were reasonably justified, a

defendant’s subjective impressions are insufficient grounds on which to withdraw a guilty plea.

People v. Hale, 82 Ill. 2d 172, 176 (1980).

¶ 15   In her motion to withdraw guilty plea, the defendant asserts that she was not aware she was

pleading guilty. At the hearing on her motion, the defendant testified that she was not “in my right

state of mind,” that she was “overwhelmed and under a lot of stress,” and that she was “not thinking

clearly.” The defendant also testified that, when she made her plea, she was on trazodone, Abilify,

and another drug she could not recall. The defendant stated that had she been in a clear state of

mind, she would not have pled guilty nor accepted the negotiated plea deal.

¶ 16   The record does not support this contention; rather, the record indicates that the defendant

knowingly and voluntarily entered her plea. The circuit court advised and admonished the

defendant as required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 2012). The defendant

indicated that she understood her rights and that she would be giving up her rights by pleading

guilty. When asked, the defendant also stated that she was not under the influence of any substance

“that might affect [her] ability to understand what’s going on in the Court.” The defendant asserted

that she was not forced or threatened to enter her plea, and that it was her decision alone to plead

guilty. The court asked her several times throughout the hearing whether she had any questions;

however, each time she indicated she had none.

¶ 17   The defendant was also found fit to stand trial, and thus, was fit to plead guilty. See People

v. Tapscott, 386 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1075 (2008). The defendant’s defense counsel stated that he

visited the defendant numerous times since she had returned from Alton Mental Health and had

no doubt as to her fitness. The attorney recounted that he and the defendant had numerous

                                                 5
discussions about her decision to plead guilty. Therefore, based on the record before us, we cannot

conclude that the defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty.

¶ 18   It is undisputed that the defendant was involved in the killing of the victim given that she

confessed to the offense upon her arrest; however, the defendant now asserts that she has a defense

worthy of consideration which should allow her to withdraw her guilty plea. The defendant argues

that additional evidence was presented that sheds light on her relationship with the victim.

Specifically, the defendant testified that the victim physically beat her and abused her for the four

years they were together. The defendant argues this is evidence she suffered from battered woman

syndrome. Battered woman syndrome refers to “a type of post-traumatic stress syndrome which

describes a pattern of severe physical and psychological abuse inflicted upon a woman by her mate

and helps to explain actions of a woman subjected to such abuse.” People v. Evans, 271 Ill. App.

3d 495, 497 n.1 (1995).

¶ 19   The defendant asserts that she was a victim of domestic violence for years. She testified

that the victim would frequently beat her, and on occasion, she would stay at a domestic violence

shelter or outside the shelter if it was closed. She also stated her relationship with the victim was

stressful because he would be with other women. She said she never called the police to report

anything, but she went to the women’s shelter four or five times. Based on all of this, the defendant

contends that, although battered woman syndrome is not a legal defense, it could serve as the basis

for a self-defense argument, or alternatively, to reduce her conviction from first degree murder to

second degree murder. We turn first to the self-defense contention.

¶ 20   To establish the need for self-defense, six elements must be established: (1) that unlawful

force was threatened against the defendant, (2) that the defendant was not the aggressor, (3) that

the danger of harm was imminent, (4) that the use of force was necessary, (5) that the defendant

                                                 6
actually and subjectively believed that a danger existed that required the use of force that he

applied, and (6) that the defendant’s beliefs were objectively reasonable. People v. Lee, 213 Ill.

2d 218, 225 (2004); People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 533 (1999). If the State negates any one

of these elements, the claim fails. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d at 225.

¶ 21   The defendant cites to People v. Evans, 259 Ill. App. 3d 195 (1994), in support of her

argument. In Evans, the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder, and on appeal, she

argued that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was not acting in self-

defense. Id. at 197. The court applied 10 factors to the facts of that case:

       “(1) the attacker’s apparent mental state and sobriety, (2) the woman’s apparent mental
       state and sobriety, (3) the difference between the physical attributes and apparent strengths
       of the attacker and the woman, (4) whether the attacker has physically or verbally abused
       and threatened the woman on prior occasions and to what extent the threats were carried
       out, (5) whether the attacker was the apparent aggressor, (6) what recourse and what
       options were readily available to the woman to quell the attack during the course of the
       attack, and to escape, (7) the nature and extent of the attack, (8) the weapon that was used
       by the woman to stop the attack, (9) the apparent escalation or diminishment of the attack
       at the time the woman resorted to deadly force, and (10) the reasonable apprehension of
       the woman at the time the deadly force was used, which encompasses the fact that she is a
       victim of battered woman’s syndrome.” Id. at 210.

¶ 22   After analyzing these factors, the circuit court held that defendant’s use of deadly force

was necessary and reasonable to save herself from serious bodily harm. Id. The court found that

the victim was physically larger than the defendant, it was close to midnight when the incident

occurred, the victim looked like a “wild man,” his eyes were bugged, he was sweating, his hair

was standing straight up, he looked mad, and he was drunk. Id. Moreover, there was a long history

of verbal and physical abuse by the victim to defendant. Id. at 211. The defendant testified that,

on the night of the incident, the victim spit in her face and hit her repeatedly. Id.

¶ 23   In the present case, the record before us is much leaner than that in Evans. Although the

defendant may have shown that she suffered from battered woman syndrome, the record does not

                                                  7
show that she would have a successful self-defense claim worthy of consideration. She testified

that she and the victim got into an argument about him cheating on her. She also testified, “Soon

‘it got crazy’ and ‘blood was everywhere.’ ” However, lacking from the record is any evidence as

to the victim’s mental state or sobriety, the difference between the physiques of the defendant and

the victim, whether the victim was the attacker or apparent aggressor, what recourse the defendant

had readily available, or the nature and extent of the altercation. In sum, the self-defense claim

would lack merit.

¶ 24    The defendant also argues that she could present evidence to reduce her conviction from

first degree murder to second degree murder based on an “imperfect self-defense” or a provocation

theory. The defendant has not shown any evidence of provocation in this case. Thus, these

arguments also fail for the same reasons the self-defense claim fails; the record fails to show that

these would be defenses worthy of consideration.

¶ 25    In sum, because the record before us does not present sufficient evidence that could support

a defense worthy of consideration, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when

it denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea. Furthermore, we agree with the State

that because the defendant did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in her motion to

withdraw plea or in her opening appellant brief, she has waived it, and as such, we will not address

it here. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

¶ 26                                       III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27    For the reasons stated, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea.

¶ 28    Affirmed.

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