Court Opinion

ID: 9861704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:20:31.778825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:50.332986
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: I would affirm the appellate court’s judgment and allow the jury’s verdict to stand. In reversing as to Bridgeview, the majority focuses on the element of forseeability. In my colleagues’ view, Bridgeview did not know and should not have been expected to realize, before the attack began, that the team’s assistant coaches would intentionally harm John Hills. My colleagues, however, are not the appropriate arbiters of that question. Forseeability is normally a question for the jury. Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d 7, 13 (1974). In this case, a special interrogatory was presented to the jury which asked: “Did the Bridgeview Little League Association, through any of its agents, know or should have it in the exercise of ordinary care have [sic] known that the initial attack and/or further attacks would occur?” The jury answered this question in the affirmative. There is no basis for second-guessing its judgment. Ted Loy was unquestionably Bridgeview’s agent, and George Loy’s extraordinarily abusive language and conduct should have alerted him that violence loomed. But he did nothing. Even after the assault began, he did nothing. It is not true, as the majority suggests, that Ted was powerless to act. While he may not have had any economic leverage over his assistants, he could have threatened to strip them of their authority as' his volunteer assistants, he could have admonished them to desist, he could have asked game officials to intervene. But again, he did none of those things. Instead, he “sneaked away” and then later joined in the attack on Hills himself. Under these circumstances, it was entirely proper for the jury to hold Bridgeview liable for what happened to Hills. There is likewise no merit to the majority’s decision to strip plaintiffs of their verdict against Justice, the host and sponsor of the tournament and owner of the premises where the tournament took place. We have specifically held that a landowner may have a duty to protect others from criminal activity by third persons on its property where a special relationship exists between the parties, such as the relationship between a business invitor and invitee. Rowe v. State Bank, 125 Ill. 2d 203, 215-16 (1988). Such a relationship existed here. My colleagues’ attempt to recast the meaning of Rowe is unpersuasive. The case does hold that the simple relationship between a landlord and a tenant is not a special one imposing a duty to protect against the criminal acts of others. Rowe, 125 Ill. 2d at 216. That holding, however, merely clarifies that the particular relationship between a landlord and tenant presents a special case which is treated differently under Illinois law. Contrary to the majority’s view, nothing in Rowe suggests that a person who conducts business on land he possesses is liable only to members of the general public and not those, such as John Hills and his players, who have paid a fee for the right to be there. By differentiating between members of the general public and tournament entrants such as Hills and his team, the majority’s analysis produces an anomalous result. Under the majority’s view, Bridgeview might owe a duty to spectators who came to watch the tournament and buy refreshments and souvenirs, but it would never have an obligation to those who were actually on the field participating in the games, no matter how egregious the circumstances. By any reasonable standard, game participants should be afforded more protection than the general public, not less. The players and their coaches are the center of events such as this. They are what everyone else comes to see. It is their actions that stir the crowds. It is what they do that generates enthusiasm or derision. As such, they are far more likely than members of the general public to be subject to serious abuse and attack. Amicus Little League, Inc., asserts that “[f]or the most part, Little League baseball does not attract the least savory elements of the communities in which it thrives” and that “the likelihood of injury stemming from participant violence is minuscule in this setting.” The matter before us belies such claims. Indeed, to deny the substantial risks now faced by players and their coaches is to deny everyday experience. Anyone who has ventured beyond the confines of the courthouse knows what sport, even amateur sport, has become. On the best days, it is inspirational. On its worst days, and the day Hills was beaten was surely one of those, it is a reflection of how uncivil and violent our society can be. In the heat of competition, otherwise sensible adults can lose all sense of proportion. Tempers flare. Mayhem can spread in an instant. The unhappy truth is that violence in youth sports has become commonplace. The era of friendly pickup games and sandlot ball where kids made the rules and adults seldom meddled has passed. Accounts of fistfights, beatings and even homicides involving parents, coaches and officials at children’s sporting events are appearing in the media with ever-increasing frequency. Special Report: Out of Control, Sports Illustrated Magazine (July 24, 2000). In these times, we do a disservice when we say that defendants such as Justice owe no duty to plaintiffs such as John Hills. A court’s determination of duty should reflect the policy and social requirements of the time and community. Curtola v. Village of Niles, 154 Ill. 2d 201, 215 (1993). I believe that public policy and social considerations of these times and of our community require that property owners who sponsor youth athletic tournaments on their premises do more than just look away when the physical well-being of tournament participants is threatened. When a player or coach is attacked, as Hills was here, they should at least be required to pick up the phone and summon law enforcement officials. Justice’s agents, the umpires and field announcer, could have managed that easily and without risk or expense to themselves. Requiring such an inconsequential burdén to be placed on landowners who sponsor youth athletic tournaments will not imperil playing opportunities for children or inhibit the ability of youth organizations such as the Little League to function. To the contrary, by providing an incentive for landowner/sponsors to take responsibility for what occurs at their events, it should improve the quality and popularity of youth sporting events by facilitating a safer and more secure playing environment. I cannot see how amicus Little League, Inc., the national supervisory organization for Little League baseball, can possibly take issue with such a result. When the Bridgeview Little League coaches beat John Hills into unconsciousness and the Justice Willow Springs Little League’s agents took no action to stop them, they violated every principle of fair play, good sportsmanship and responsible citizenship. Their conduct has no place in athletics, especially youth athletics. Little League, Inc., should have done everything in its power to disavow what happened here. Instead, it sought and was granted leave to appear before our court and argue that its local affiliates be spared from the jury’s verdict. By adopting Little League, Inc.’s position and overturning the jury’s verdict against Bridgeview and Justice Willow Springs Little League, my colleagues have chosen to look the other way just as Ted Loy and Justice looked the other way while Hills was being beaten. No good can come of this, as the jury here well understood. By exonerating Bridgeview and Justice, the court has placed its imprimatur on what happened to Hills. The thousands of individuals who so generously donate their time to organized youth athletics in Illinois would do well to consider the position in which this has left them. For all practical purposes, it is now open season on volunteer coaches. They should forget about watching the base runners or the catcher’s signals. From now on, they had better just watch their backs.