Court Opinion

ID: 9737954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:38:03.693943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:02.726225
License: Public Domain

REES, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The majority applies § 614.24, The Code, to preclude defendants from enforcing restrictive covenants against plaintiff adjacent property owners. Ironically, these same plaintiffs who would avoid the covenants because defendants failed to comply with the statute are the very persons who created them in the first place.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Presbytery of Southeast Iowa v. Harris, 226 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 1975), I am satisfied § 614.24 is unconstitutional. The majority here extends the reach of that statute on the premise it must be applied liberally to insure the objective of limiting the title search period. I think that rationale is unfortunate.
The true issue here as in Presbytery is due process, not which result will best effectuate a legislative purpose. With that in mind, it seems elementary to me § 614.24 must be applied, if at all, in the narrowest possible manner. Only those interests clearly and specifically covered by the statute should be subject to divestiture for a failure to file.
Trial court correctly held valid the restrictive covenants in question here. It should be affirmed. If not unconstitutional on its face, and I think it is, § 614.24 is unconstitutional as applied.
I would affirm trial court.
REYNOLDSON and HARRIS, JJ., join in this dissent.