Court Opinion

ID: 9736944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:10:48.589125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:55.592625
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice
(concurring in result).
I concur in the result of the majority decision.
I cannot blindly embrace the majority’s statement that “Categories (reimbursement and rehabilitative) are to be used as guidelines by the trial court for setting the method and defining the purpose of such [alimony] payments. Misapplication of a guideline is not reason for reversal except in extreme examples of an abuse of discretion.” (Emphasis added.)
Admittedly, we did note in Hautala v. Hautala, 417 N.W.2d 879, 882 (S.D.1988), that “... the issue is not the name placed on alimony, but whether the record supports the award.” However, that phrase was prefaced by the caveat “we urge the use of careful and consistent language....”
Subsequent to Hautala, we handed down Baltzer v. Baltzer, 422 N.W.2d 584 (S.D.1988). In special writings, Justice Henderson and I reviewed the history of rehabilitative and reimbursement alimony cases in this court. In my special writing (which was joined by Justice Morgan), I opined that a trial court errs in failing to properly designate a special type of alimony it intends to award and in failing to make the appropriate findings to support such award. I still hold to such view.
In this case the trial court awarded alimony, improperly characterizing it as rehabilitative alimony. However, as the majority states, it did make findings which supported the award. Under the specific circumstances of this case, I cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion.
Lastly, although I believe the attorney fee award was excessive, it does appear that the trial court considered and applied the appropriate factors and I cannot state that it abused its discretion.