Court Opinion

ID: 9897325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:10.891724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:43.928393
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                            Aug 03 2023, 8:42 am

                                                                                CLERK
                                                                            Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                               Court of Appeals
                                                                                 and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Denise L. Turner                                           Theodore E. Rokita
DTurner Legal LLC                                          Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Jodi Kathryn Stein
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Demarcus Nance,                                            August 3, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CR-2581
        v.                                                 Interlocutory Appeal from the
                                                           Marion Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Shatrese M.
Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Flowers, Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           49D28-2009-F2-29100

                                Opinion by Judge Weissmann
                               Judges Bailey and Brown concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023                            Page 1 of 31
      Weissmann, Judge.

[1]   After several law enforcement officers tracked a marijuana odor to Demarcus

      Nance’s home, the officers pulled Nance across the threshold of his home,

      forcibly detained him outside, and then entered his home without a warrant.

      Once inside, the officers observed drug paraphernalia and a gun in plain view.

      Only then did they seek a warrant, relying on evidence they had collected

      through the warrantless entry.

[2]   Nance was charged with dealing in methamphetamine based on the drug

      evidence seized from his home. He moved to suppress that evidence, alleging

      that the officers overstepped federal and state constitutional boundaries. We

      reverse the trial court’s denial of Nance’s motion to suppress, finding that the

      officers had no authority to cross the threshold of Nance’s home without a

      warrant and that the later searches with a warrant were tainted by the earlier

      illegal entries.

      Facts
[3]   While assisting Marion County Community Corrections officers at the home of

      Nance’s next-door neighbor, Indiana Gun Task Force members Gregory Kessie

      and Sergio De Leon detected the smell of raw and burnt marijuana emanating

      from the area of Nance’s home. After Sergeant Kessie confirmed that some of

      the other four to six officers present also smelled marijuana, one of the officers

      ran a license check on the car parked in front of Nance’s home. The license

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 2 of 31
      plate did not match the vehicle and was not registered to either Nance or his

      neighbor.

[4]   Sergeant Kessie and Detective De Leon decided to conduct a “knock and talk”

      at Nance’s home. The smell of marijuana strengthened as they approached

      Nance’s home. Detective De Leon knocked on the front door, which consisted

      of a glass storm door and main door behind that. Nance opened the main door

      and then “cracked” open the storm door with his forearm to speak to the

      officers. Tr. Vol. II, p. 70. At that time, the raw marijuana smell from within

      the home became “overwhelming” to the officers. Id. at 71. A smokey odor also

      was evident.

[5]   Detective De Leon began questioning Nance about the vehicle parked in front

      of his home. Based on the marijuana smell, Sergeant Kessie asked Nance to

      step outside. Nance did not respond but looked over his shoulder. The officers

      could hear movement and other noises coming from inside the home. Sergeant

      Kessie opened the storm door fully and grabbed Nance’s left wrist as Nance

      stood in the threshold. Nance stiffened and started to struggle, prompting the

      officers to pull him from “the threshold of the doorway” to the outside of the

      house to handcuff him. Id. at 89.

[6]   Sergeant Kessie and other uniformed officers who had participated in the

      compliance check next door entered Nance’s home and briefly searched it.

      They saw in plain view a vacuum sealer on the kitchen counter, an AR-style

      rifle just underneath a bed in the front bedroom, a Taurus gun box in another

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023       Page 3 of 31
      bedroom, and a large hydraulic press in the garage. A raw marijuana odor was

      present throughout the home. The officers found no one else in the home. They

      determined that the noise and movement they had heard earlier came from a

      television and a dog caged in a bedroom near the front door.

[7]   Based on the marijuana smell and the items in plain sight, Detective De Leon

      obtained a warrant to search the home. The search revealed loose raw

      marijuana on a game box in the living room, a jar with raw marijuana in a bag

      in a bedroom closet, a kilo mold in the kitchen closet, items used to dilute

      narcotics, two UPS packages containing methamphetamine, and a locked case

      in a closet. After a second search warrant was obtained, the locked case was

      opened, revealing, among other things, 10 pounds of methamphetamine, two

      ounces of marijuana, two grams of cocaine, $23,470 in cash, three cell phones,

      and digital scales.

[8]   The State charged Nance with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine.

      Nance moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the searches of his

      home. He argued that the officers’ detention of him and warrantless search of

      his home were illegal so the officers’ observations during the initial search could

      not support issuance of the two warrants. The trial court denied Nance’s

      multiple motions to suppress, finding the detention and searches lawful under

      both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, §

      11 of the Indiana Constitution.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023       Page 4 of 31
[9]    The trial court granted Nance’s request to certify this case for interlocutory

       appeal, and we accepted jurisdiction.

       Discussion and Decision
[10]   Nance contends the officers’ actions took an unconstitutional turn and violated

       both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution as

       soon as they grabbed him and yanked him out of his home. The officers

       continued on this unconstitutional path, according to Nance, by conducting an

       illegal protective sweep of his home and then seeking warrants based on the

       information they had illegally obtained through that search. Nance argues that

       all the evidence collected by the officers after they detained him was tainted by

       these constitutional violations and should be suppressed.

[11]   When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress in an interlocutory appeal,

       our approach likens that in sufficiency of the evidence claims. We deferentially

       review the trial court’s ruling, construing conflicting evidence in the manner

       most favorable to the ruling. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 365 (Ind. 2014).

       We “consider any substantial and uncontested evidence favorable to the

       defendant” but do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. Any

       constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596

       (Ind. 2008).

       I. Fourth Amendment
[12]   The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in

       their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 5 of 31
       seizures.” U.S. Const., amend. IV. The parties agree that the officers’ initial

       approach of Nance’s home and initial questioning of him did not implicate the

       Fourth Amendment. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013) (ruling that “a

       police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock,

       precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might do’” (quoting

       Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)); Warren v. State, 73 N.E.3d 203, 207

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (ruling that a knock and talk was legitimate police business

       and thus did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes).

[13]   The parties diverge, however, as to the legality of the officers’ actions once

       Sergeant Kessie opened Nance’s door wider and grabbed Nance. We conclude

       that the Fourth Amendment did not authorize Nance’s detention or any of the

       searches of his home that followed.

       A. Detention
[14]   Nance contends the officers first overstepped Fourth Amendment boundaries

       when they crossed the threshold of his home to detain him. In response, the

       State first claims the detention occurred without entry into the home. Even if

       the officers did enter the home to accomplish the detention, the State argues

       that they were justified by the strong smell of marijuana to which they were

       exposed when Nance opened his front door. The State essentially contends the

       “knock and talk” turned into an investigatory stop during which Nance’s

       detention was justified. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (ruling that

       police may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain an individual

       for investigatory purposes if, based on specific and articulable facts, the officer
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023         Page 6 of 31
       has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot”). Finally, the

       State claims that the officers had probable cause to arrest Nance based on the

       smell of marijuana in his home and that exigent circumstances justified their

       entry into Nance’s home to arrest him.

[15]   We find the threshold was crossed. Terry therefore does not apply. We also

       conclude that the State has failed to prove that the marijuana smell flowing

       from Nance’s home, standing alone, created probable cause to arrest Nance or

       exigent circumstances that would justify the warrantless entry.

       i. Threshold
[16]   The record refutes the State’s claim that the officers did not cross the threshold

       of Nance’s home. Sergeant Kessie testified that Nance “cracked the [storm]

       door just a little bit,” remaining behind it. Tr. Vol. II, p. 87. Sergeant Kessie

       then testified that he opened the storm door wider, grabbed Nance, and “pulled

       him out of the threshold of the doorway” before handcuffing Nance and detaining

       him outside. Id. at 89 (emphasis added). Thus, Sergeant Kessie necessarily

       crossed the outer boundary of the home’s threshold to grab Nance and pull him

       from the home.

[17]   The State claims that even if the officers crossed the threshold to detain Nance,

       their warrantless entry to accomplish the detention did not run awry of the

       Fourth Amendment. Relying on United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976)

       and United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1386-87 (7th Cir. 1991), the State

       argues that a person standing in the threshold of his home is outside, rather

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023          Page 7 of 31
       than inside, the home for Fourth Amendment purposes. Under this reasoning,

       the person in the threshold has knowingly exposed himself to “public view,

       speech, hearing, and touch” just as if he were standing in a public place,

       according to the State. Appellee’s Br., p. 20 (quoting Santana, 427 U.S. at 42).

[18]   But Santana involved a home with an open door through which police with

       probable cause entered to arrest a person, who at first was standing in the

       doorway when police arrived and then retreated into the vestibule. 427 U.S. at

       40. The Santana Court found exigent circumstances justified the entry because

       the officers entered the home “in hot pursuit” of the person for whom they had

       probable cause to arrest. Id. at 42-43. By contrast, Nance was inside his home

       when police arrived and only appeared in the threshold due to the officers’

       knocking. Nance only “cracked” the outer storm door to talk to the officers,

       and, unlike Santana, no “hot pursuit” was involved.

[19]   The State offers no basis for finding that the officers had probable cause to

       arrest Nance when the officers opened the storm door wider and crossed the

       threshold to seize him. Tr. Vol. II, p. 87. Officer De Leon stated that the officers

       merely suspected marijuana was in the home due to the burnt and raw

       marijuana odors. The smell of raw marijuana, as detected here by experienced

       and trained officers, may establish a substantial basis for probable cause for a

       search warrant. Bunnell v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1231, 1236-37 (Ind. 2021). The

       smell of marijuana also may generate probable cause in other contexts. See, e.g.,

       Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013) (marijuana smell in a vehicle

       detected by a trained officer may generate probable cause to search at least the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 8 of 31
       vehicle’s passenger compartment); Bell v. State, 13 N.E.3d 543, 546 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2014) (smell of raw or burnt marijuana on a person provides probable

       cause to arrest that person for possession of marijuana).

[20]   But the State cites no authority showing that the smell of marijuana not

       emanating from a person is sufficient, by itself, to establish probable cause for a

       warrantless home entry to detain or even arrest him. At most, the officers had:

       (1) reasonable suspicion to believe Nance possessed the marijuana that the

       officers believed was in the home; and (2) probable cause for a warrant to

       search the home. See Bunnell, 172 N.E.3d at 1236-37.

[21]   Given these important distinctions—that is, probable cause and hot pursuit in

       Santana versus mere reasonable suspicion and a knock and talk here—Santana

       does not require a finding that Nance lost his Fourth Amendment rights by

       standing in the threshold of his home after answering the officers’ knocks. See

       Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 8 (2013) (per curiam) (treating Santana as mainly

       governing “hot pursuit” of a felon); Cox v. State, 696 N.E.2d 853, 857-58 (Ind.

       1998) (suggesting, but not explicitly deciding, that where the suspect is only at

       the threshold to answer police knocking at the door, Santana does not dictate

       that the threshold is a public place to which Fourth Amendment protections do

       not apply).

[22]   Berkowitz also does not advance the State’s argument. In Berkowitz, the United

       States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit approved a slight, warrantless

       entry into a home to complete an arrest announced outside the home when the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 9 of 31
       individual acquiesced and the door was open. 927 F.2d at 1386-87. But, here,

       the State has not established that the officers had probable cause to arrest Nance

       or that the officers announced the arrest before entering to accomplish that

       arrest. And most notably, Nance did not acquiesce in any detention, and the

       outer door to his home was only slightly open.

[23]   Not only is Berkowitz factually distinct, but it eviscerates the State’s argument

       that officers may cross the threshold of a home without consent to accomplish a

       Terry-style detention. The Seventh Circuit ruled:

               [I]t would not have violated the Fourth Amendment for [the
               police] to enter Berkowitz’s house after announcing the arrest,
               and remain near his door, to take Berkowitz under their control.

               It is a different matter, however, for the police to enter a person’s
               home, without his consent, before announcing their authority to
               arrest. In that case, the arrestee has not forfeited his privacy
               interest in the home; he has not relinquished his right to close the
               door on the unwanted visitors . . . . Payton [v. New York, 445 U.S.
               573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)] holds that police
               may not enter a person’s home without a warrant to arrest him ...

               Santana does not require a different result. As far as reasonable
               privacy expectations go, there is a significant difference between
               a person who for no reason voluntarily decides to stand in his
               open doorway, and a person who merely answers a knock on his
               door. The person who answers the knock and stays within the
               house is not voluntarily exposing himself “to public view, speech,
               hearing, and touch as if [he is] standing completely outside [his]
               house.” Santana, 427 U.S. at 42, 96 S.Ct. at 2409.

       Id. at 1387-88.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023         Page 10 of 31
       ii. Terry
[24]   Given that the officers crossed the threshold of Nance’s home, the State’s

       reliance on Terry also is unhelpful. The Fourth Amendment generally requires

       police to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before entering a home

       for a search or seizure without permission. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382

       (2014); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). This is because the

       physical entry of the home is the “chief evil” to which the Fourth Amendment

       is directed. Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 (internal quotations omitted). In other

       words, “the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the

       house” because it places “[t]he home as first among equals.” Id. at 590; Jardines,

       569 U.S. at 6.

[25]   Accordingly, warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively

       unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. King, 563 U.S. at 459. This

       presumption sometimes may be overcome, however, because “the ultimate

       touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” Id. (citing Brigham

       City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). The warrant requirement therefore is

       subject to certain reasonable exceptions where “special needs, beyond the

       normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause

       requirement impracticable.” Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873 (quoting New Jersey v.

       T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)). One

       of these exceptions occurs when police have probable cause to arrest a person

       and exigent circumstances exist. Payton, 445 U.S. at 587-88. When either

       probable cause or exigent circumstances is missing from a non-consensual

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 11 of 31
       warrantless home entry, however, the threshold cannot reasonably be crossed

       by police. Id. at 590, 602.

[26]   A Terry stop provides no exception to these rules requiring: (1) consent to entry;

       (2) a warrant supported by probable cause; or (3) in the absence of a warrant, a

       combination of probable cause and exigent circumstances. Although a warrant

       is never required for a Terry stop, neither is probable cause. A Terry stop is

       authorized based only on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

       Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Given this lesser standard of proof, reasonable suspicion

       may justify an officer’s approach of a home to question its occupants but will

       not justify a warrantless entry into the home. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328

       (1987) (“A dwelling-place search, not less than a dwelling-place seizure,

       requires probable cause.”); United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.

       1991) (“Reasonable suspicion cannot justify a warrantless search of a house.”).

[27]   We agree with Nance that this was a rogue knock and talk, rather than, as the

       State claims, a knock and talk turned investigatory stop authorized by Terry. See

       Hayes v. State, 794 N.E.2d 492, 496-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that a knock

       and talk “pushes the envelope” and may be misused so as to violate the Fourth

       Amendment). Nance had the right to decline to answer the officers’ questions

       during the knock and talk and to refuse to step outside his home. See Jean-

       Baptiste v. State, 71 N.E.3d 406, 408, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (reversing

       conviction for resisting law enforcement because officer seeking to serve civil

       arrest warrant at defendant’s home “was not lawfully engaged in the exercise of

       his duties when he reached across the threshold of [defendant’s] residence

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 12 of 31
       without permission or legal justification and grabbed” defendant; defendant had

       refused to comply with the officer’s request to turn around and place his hands

       behind his back), summarily affm’d in relevant part, 82 N.E.3d 878 (Ind. 2017).

[28]   This is so because “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be

       free from unreasonable governmental intrusion” stands at the Fourth

       Amendment’s “very core.” Lange v. California, 141 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2021)

       (quoting Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1668, 1670 (2018)). As the United States

       Supreme Court explained:

               When law enforcement officers who are not armed with a
               warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private
               citizen might do. And whether the person who knocks on the
               door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a
               private citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door
               or to speak. When the police knock on a door but the occupants
               choose not to respond or to speak, “the investigation will have
               reached a conspicuously low point,” and the occupants “will
               have the kind of warning that even the most elaborate security
               system cannot provide.” And even if an occupant chooses to
               open the door and speak with the officers, the occupant need not
               allow the officers to enter the premises and may refuse to answer
               any questions at any time.

       King, 563 U.S. at 469-70 (internal citations omitted). Thus, by opening his door

       to answer a knock, Nance neither abandoned his privacy interest in his home

       nor invited the officers knocking to enter. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1387.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023         Page 13 of 31
       iii. Probable Cause to Arrest
[29]   The State also contends the Fourth Amendment authorized the officers’

       crossing of the threshold because they had probable cause to arrest Nance based

       solely on the marijuana smell. As we noted, the Fourth Amendment prohibits

       warrantless arrests in the home absent consent to enter or a combination of

       probable cause to arrest and exigent circumstances. Payton, 445 U.S. at 588-90.

       In advancing this claim that probable cause to arrest Nance existed, the State

       relies solely on Bell v. State, 13 N.E.3d 543, 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[30]   In Bell, this Court found probable cause to arrest the defendant, as well as

       search the defendant incident to that arrest, based on a marijuana smell flowing

       from both the defendant and her vehicle. 13 N.E.3d at 544. Here, there is no

       evidence that the officers detected a marijuana smell on Nance. The State cites

       no authority that would support a finding that the officers had probable cause to

       arrest Nance simply because his home smelled of marijuana. Without probable

       cause to arrest Nance, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by crossing

       the threshold to detain or even arrest him. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638

       (2002) (“As Payton made plain, police officers need either a warrant or probable

       cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry in a home.”);

       Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.

       iv. Exigent Circumstances
[31]   Even if the officers had probable cause to arrest Nance, they lacked the other

       ingredient necessary to justify the first warrantless entry into Nance’s home:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023         Page 14 of 31
       exigent circumstances. See id. at 589 (requiring exigent circumstances to justify

       law enforcement’s entry into a home without a warrant or consent). The State

       claims exigent circumstances existed because any marijuana within Nance’s

       home likely would have been removed or disposed of before the officers

       obtained a warrant. The imminent destruction of evidence is a recognized

       exigent circumstance. King, 563 U.S. at 460. The government has the burden to

       establish “exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of

       unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries.” McDermott v.

       State, 877 N.E.2d 467, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[32]   We agree with Nance that the State failed to show exigent circumstances. In

       determining whether the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant

       requirement applies, courts review the totality of the circumstances to

       determine whether police “faced an emergency that justified acting without a

       warrant.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013). The State argues an

       emergency existed because Nance looked backward over his shoulder, the

       officers heard noise and shuffling or movement from within the home, and any

       marijuana was easily disposable. We are unpersuaded.

[33]   The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement requires

       circumstances presenting a “compelling need for official action and no time to

       secure a warrant.” Id. at 149 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509

       (1978)). Whether exigent circumstances exist is “case-specific.” Lange, 141 S.

       Ct. at 2018. In other words, “[w]hether a ‘now or never situation’ actually

       exists—whether an officer has ‘no time to secure a warrant’—depends upon

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 15 of 31
       facts on the ground.” Id. (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 391 and McNeely, 569 U.S.

       at 149).

[34]   Where, as here, a minor offense and no flight are involved, the kind of

       emergency that can justify a warrantless home entry seldom exists. Lange, 141

       S. Ct. at 2020; see Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a) (classifying as a Class B

       misdemeanor possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana absent enhancing

       circumstances). The United States Supreme Court has therefore cautioned that

       “application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home

       entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that

       only a minor offense . . . has been committed.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.

       740, 753 (1984).

[35]   So far, however, the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed

       whether the smell of marijuana alone can justify a warrantless home entry

       based on concerns that evidence within would be destroyed before a warrant

       could be obtained. In King, the Court sidestepped whether concerns over the

       imminent destruction of evidence justified a warrantless entry into a home from

       which the smell of marijuana was emanating. 563 U.S. at 470-72. Although the

       King Court recognized generally that exigent circumstances could exist in such

       a scenario, the Court remanded to the Kentucky courts for a determination of

       whether they existed under the particular facts of that case. Id. at 472. The

       Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately found the State had proved no exigent

       circumstances. King v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.3d 119, 122-23 (Ky. 2012)

       (finding the State, by only producing evidence that the officer heard movements

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 16 of 31
       within a home after smelling marijuana emanating from it, did not establish the

       exigent circumstance of imminent destruction of evidence). Similarly, the U.S.

       Supreme Court in Lange recognized that exigent circumstances may justify

       warrantless entry into a home based on a suspected misdemeanant’s flight but

       remanded for the exigent circumstances determination. 141 S. Ct. at 2024-25.

[36]   But other United States Supreme Court decisions in drug cases are helpful to

       our analysis. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948), the Court found

       that the dissipation of opium fumes resulting from the delay in obtaining a

       search warrant for the hotel room in which the fumes were present—together

       with movement within the hotel room after police announced themselves but

       before the room’s door was opened—was not a sufficient exigency to support

       the officers’ warrantless entry. Although Johnson was decided 75 years ago, it

       remains a stalwart of modern Fourth Amendment analysis. See District of

       Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 n.5 (2018) (relying on Johnson in

       analyzing whether probable cause to arrest existed); Riley, 573 U.S. at 383

       (quoting Johnson on question of warrantless search).

[37]   In Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754, the Court ruled exigent circumstances—the

       imminent destruction of evidence in the form of declining blood alcohol levels

       in the drunk driving suspect’s body—did not justify a warrantless entry into the

       suspect’s home, given that the suspected crime was merely a civil traffic offense

       in that state. The Court observed that “it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless

       home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment

       when the underlying offense is extremely minor.” Id. at 753.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 17 of 31
[38]   In Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 336-37 (2001), the Court determined that

       no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when law enforcement refused to

       allow McArthur, who was first detained outside his home, to re-enter the home

       unless accompanied by an officer while the warrant was sought. The Court

       found exigent circumstances—that McArthur would destroy marijuana

       evidence that his wife had reported seeing in the home minutes earlier and that

       she said belonged to McArthur—justified the warrantless detention. Id. Noting

       that a home search is a greater intrusion than briefly preventing entry to a

       home, the Court declined to address whether possession of marijuana justified a

       warrantless home entry. Id. at 336 (“Temporarily keeping a person from

       entering his home, a consequence whenever police stop a person on the street,

       is considerably less intrusive than police entry into the home itself in order to

       make a warrantless arrest or conduct a search.”).

[39]   Johnson and Welsh point toward a finding of no exigent circumstances here.

       McArthur, which did not involve a warrantless home entry, does little or no

       damage to such a conclusion. But unlike the United States Supreme Court,

       various United States Courts of Appeals have directly addressed the question of

       exigent circumstances in the context of a warrantless home entry based on a

       marijuana smell. The results have been mixed.

[40]   For instance, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that the smell of burning marijuana

       outside a home, without more, does not create an exigency permitting a

       warrantless entry into a home. White v. Stanley, 745 F.3d 237, 241 (7th Cir.

       2014). The Tenth Circuit found that “if marijuana possession is the only crime

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 18 of 31
       for which the officers in this case had probable cause, the exigency exception

       for destruction of evidence should not apply because marijuana possession is

       not a serious crime.” United States v. Mongold, 528 Fed.Appx. 944, 950 (10th Cir.

       2013).

[41]   The Third Circuit found that the imminent destruction of evidence justified a

       warrantless entry into an apartment when a marijuana smell was in the

       building’s hallway and increased when the apartment door was opened. United

       States v. McMillion, 472 Fed.Appx. 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2012). But one of the

       important factors in McMillion was the defendant’s admission to smoking

       marijuana. Id. (“It was thus reasonable for the officers to suspect that there was

       ongoing drug activity, and, particularly in light of McMillion’s admission to

       smoking marijuana, it was also reasonable for the officers to conclude that

       contraband was being destroyed and would continue to be destroyed or

       removed if they did not act immediately.”).

[42]   And in United States v. Grissett, the Fourth Circuit found the imminent

       destruction of evidence justified a warrantless intrusion into a hotel room

       occupied by three people when officers smelled a marijuana odor coming from

       the room. 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir. 1991) (“Since the police had identified

       themselves before smelling the marijuana, an officer could reasonably conclude

       that the occupants of the room would attempt to dispose of the evidence before

       the police could return with a warrant.”); see United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d

       597, 600 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (“For Fourth Amendment purposes, a hotel room

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 19 of 31
       is treated essentially the same, if not exactly the same, as a home.”) (citing

       Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964)).

[43]   Like our federal counterparts, this Court also has considered exigent

       circumstances in the context of a warrantless home entry based on the smell of

       marijuana. In Ware v. State, 782 N.E.2d 478, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), we

       rejected the State’s claim that exigent circumstances—specifically, the imminent

       destruction of evidence—authorized an officer’s warrantless entry into an

       apartment from which a marijuana smell was emanating. We reasoned:

               Officer Carpenter did not hear Ware yell to anyone inside the
               apartment that the police were there. In fact, when Ware opened
               the door, Officer Carpenter did not see anyone else inside the
               apartment or any drugs in plain view. Additionally, Ware
               cooperated with Officer Carpenter the entire time and returned to
               the door with his identification after his initial encounter with
               Officer Carpenter. Although Ware was gone for approximately
               three minutes before returning with his identification, during that
               time period Officer Carpenter did not hear Ware running through
               the apartment; rather, he just heard Ware “walking around.”
               Furthermore, Officer Carpenter did not hear any toilets flushing
               or anything else indicative of the destruction of the marijuana.

       Id.

[44]   Here, unlike the police in Ware, the officers’ initial entry into Nance’s home

       was to detain Nance for purposes of an investigation based on reasonable

       suspicion of criminal conduct, not because the officers had probable cause to

       believe Nance had committed a crime. Officer Kessie specifically testified that

       when he pulled Nance from the doorway, “[Nance] was not under arrest. He

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023       Page 20 of 31
       was detained for further investigation.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 89. The officers suspected

       someone in the home had either smoked marijuana or possessed it or both, but

       they did not know who. The officers never testified that the marijuana smell

       came from Nance individually, and they never asked Nance whether anyone

       else was in the home.

[45]   Given these particular facts, and with the guidance of Ware, we conclude the

       State failed to prove that the Fourth Amendment authorized the officers’ initial

       warrantless entry into Nance’s home to detain him. Given that the officers only

       had reasonable suspicion that Nance might possess marijuana and no exigent

       circumstances existed, their breach of the threshold of his home violated the

       Fourth Amendment.

       B. Protective Sweep
[46]   Nance argues the officers’ second warrantless entry into his home also violated

       the Fourth Amendment because it stemmed from his illegal detention by the

       officers. Classifying this second entry as a protective sweep, the State asserts

       that the entry and search was justified by Nance’s “arrest” and the need to

       prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. We conclude that the State

       proved no valid exception to the warrant requirement justifying this second

       warrantless entry into Nance’s home.

       i. No “Protective Sweep”
[47]   The State improperly classifies the officers’ second entry into Nance’s home as

       a “protective sweep.” In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990), the United

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 21 of 31
       States Supreme Court ruled that incident to an arrest, police may, as a

       precautionary measure and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion,

       conduct a brief search of areas immediately adjoining the place of arrest from

       which an attack could be immediately launched.

[48]   The State repeats its claim that the officers had probable cause to arrest Nance

       for possession of marijuana. Under the State’s reasoning, the officers’ failure to

       arrest Nance is irrelevant because the officers had authority to do so. We have

       already rejected the State’s assertion that the officers had probable cause for

       Nance’s arrest before they entered his home. Because Buie defined a protective

       sweep as incident to arrest and the State has failed to establish any arrest (or

       even a right to arrest), the officers’ second entry into the home cannot be

       justified as a “protective sweep.”

       ii. Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances
[49]   Although the officers lacked probable cause to believe that Nance possessed

       marijuana, they arguably did have probable cause to believe Nance’s home

       contained evidence of criminal conduct. See Bunnell, 172 N.E.3d at 1235; see

       Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13 (finding the “presence of odors” may establish probable

       cause for a search warrant if two conditions are met: (1) the issuing judicial

       officer “finds the affiant qualified to know the odor;” and (2) the odor “is one

       sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance”).

[50]   But as we noted earlier, probable cause alone is not enough to justify a

       warrantless search of a home. It must be joined with exigent circumstances to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 22 of 31
       dispense with the warrant requirement. Cudworth v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 137-

       38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Therefore, if we ignore for purposes of this analysis

       any impact from the first warrantless entry, the legality of the second

       warrantless entry rests on the existence of exigent circumstances. See id.

[51]   We have already rejected the State’s claim that the imminent destruction of

       evidence justified the officers’ initial warrantless entry. That analysis equally

       applies to this second entry, given that the circumstances facing the officers had

       not changed in the short time between the officers’ detention of Nance and their

       search of the home. The State has therefore failed to establish that imminent

       destruction of evidence justified their second warrantless entry. For all of these

       reasons, we conclude that the second warrantless entry, like the first, violated

       the Fourth Amendment.

       C. Searches Under Warrant
[52]   Nance argues that the officers obtained their first search warrant based on the

       evidence collected during their illegal warrantless search of his home.

       Accordingly, he claims “[a]ny evidence recovered as a result of the

       subsequently issued search warrant was fruit of the poisonous tree and should

       have been suppressed.” Appellant’s Br., p. 22. The State, on the other hand,

       asserts that probable cause to issue the warrant existed even if the observations

       made during the warrantless search are excluded from the search warrant

       affidavit. In essence, the State argues that the warrantless detention and search

       did not taint the search warrant or the later home search that it authorized.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 23 of 31
[53]   “Evidence obtained as a direct result of an unconstitutional search or seizure is

       plainly subject to exclusion.” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984).

       Evidence or information obtained through illegal tactics violating constitutional

       rights also cannot be used to establish probable cause for a search warrant. State

       v. Felker, 819 N.E.2d 870, 873-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

[54]   But additional inquiry is necessary when the search warrant affidavit mixes

       legally and illegally secured information and the defendant claims that evidence

       subsequently seized is tainted. See Segura, 468 U.S. at 804-5. The reviewing

       court must determine whether the challenged evidence was obtained by

       exploitation of the initial illegality or, instead, “by means sufficiently

       distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id. (quoting Wong Sun v.

       United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)). The language in both the search

       warrant affidavit and warrant are relevant to this determination. See, e.g.,

       Esquerdo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1023, 1030 (Ind. 1994).

[55]   The search warrant affidavit here included information obtained during the

       illegal warrantless search of Nance’s home, as well as statements by Nance to

       police that ultimately were suppressed by the trial court due to other police

       misconduct. For instance, the affidavit noted that the officers observed during

       the warrantless search a vacuum sealer, drug press, a rifle, and a gun box. Exhs.

       Vol. I, pp. 9-10. The affidavit sought a warrant authorizing the officers to search

       for “[f]irearms and ammunition,” among other things. Id. at 11-12. The trial

       court issued the warrant as requested. Id. at 11-12.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023           Page 24 of 31
[56]   The only firearm evidence known to the officers arose from their observations

       during the illegal warrantless search of Nance’s home. A reasonable conclusion,

       which the State does not dispel, is that the trial court relied on the illegally

       obtained evidence when it issued the warrant authorizing the officers to search

       not only for marijuana but also for firearms and ammunition at Nance’s home.

       Therefore, the evidence on which the officers relied in establishing probable

       cause—and on which the trial court based its finding of probable cause for the

       warrant—was obtained by exploitation of the prior illegal entry into Nance’s

       home and not by means distinguishable enough to be purged of the primary

       taint.1

[57]   And if the first search warrant was tainted, so too was the second search

       warrant, which was based entirely on evidence arising from the prior illegal

       searches. As the warrants were tainted by the police misconduct, the trial court

       erred in denying Nance’s motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds.2

       1
         We observe that the officers may have been able to obtain a search warrant without entering the home if
       they had not resorted to illegal tactics. See Bunnell v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1231, 1237-38 (Ind. 2021) (ruling that
       officers “who affirm[] that they detect the odor of raw marijuana based on their training and experience may
       establish probable cause without providing further details on their qualifications to recognize this odor”).
       2
         Notably, this result is consistent with the purpose of the exclusionary rule: to deter Fourth Amendment
       violations. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 (2011). Here, the officers committed serial misconduct.
       In addition to the two illegal warrantless entries into Nance’s home, they also illegally questioned Nance
       after he repeatedly asserted his right to counsel, leading the trial court to suppress evidence of his statements.
       “When the police exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment
       rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the results costs” of exclusion. Id. at
       238 (quotations omitted). That is the situation presented here.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023                                  Page 25 of 31
       II. Article 1, Section 11
[58]   Nance also contends his detention and the later searches of his home violated

       Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution. “Although Indiana’s § 11 and the

       Federal Fourth Amendment are textually identical, they are analytically

       distinct.” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014). The Fourth

       Amendment “focus[es] on the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”

       Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).

       Article 1, § 11, however, “employ[s] a totality-of-the-circumstances test to

       evaluate the reasonableness of the officer’s actions.” Id.

[59]   Generally, a warrantless search violates the Indiana Constitution unless the

       search is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Isley v. State, 202

       N.E.3d 1124, 1131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). We consider three non-exhaustive

       factors when determining the reasonableness of the officers’ actions under the

       Indiana Constitution: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a

       violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or

       seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law

       enforcement needs. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005).

[60]   “When weighing these [Litchfield] factors as part of our totality-of-the-

       circumstances test, we consider the full context in which the search or seizure

       occurs.” Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 943 (Ind. 2020). Therefore, “we

       examine, at different points in our analysis, the perspectives of both the officer

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023          Page 26 of 31
       and the person subjected to the search or seizure.” Id. The State bears the

       burden of showing the intrusions were reasonable. Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1002.

       A. Degree of Suspicion
[61]   The degree of suspicion that marijuana was within Nance’s home was high, but

       the degree of suspicion that Nance possessed the marijuana was somewhat less

       so. When considering this factor, “courts consider ‘the reasonableness of the

       officers’ assumptions, suspicions, or beliefs based on the information available

       to them at the time.’” Berry v. State, 121 N.E.3d 633, 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)

       (quoting Duran, 930 N.E.2d at 18). We consider all the information available to

       the officers at the time of the search or seizure. Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 943.

[62]   Multiple officers smelled a strong odor of burning and raw marijuana that

       strengthened as they neared Nance’s front door. When Nance opened the door

       to the officers, those officers determined the smell was emanating from inside

       the home. Raw marijuana, which remains illegal in Indiana, has an

       unmistakable odor unique to that drug. Bunnell, 172 N.E.3d at 1236; see Ind.

       Code § 35-48-4-11. The smell of marijuana in its raw form, as detected by

       experienced and trained officers, can establish probable cause for a search

       warrant. Bunnell, 172 N.E.3d at 1235 (citing Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13). The

       officers’ belief that marijuana was within the home and that Nance might be the

       person possessing it was reasonable under these circumstances.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023       Page 27 of 31
       B. Degree of Intrusion
[63]   The degree of intrusion was also high. As “[h]ouses and premises of citizens

       receive the highest protection[,]” warrantless searches of a home are

       presumptively unreasonable. Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1002 (quoting Moran v.

       State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. 1994)). We evaluate the degree of intrusion

       from the defendant’s point of view, considering “the intrusion into both a

       defendant’s physical movements and privacy” with a focus on how the officers

       conducted the search or seizure. Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 192 (Ind.

       2021). But in examining the search or seizure method, “we continue to consider

       the totality of the circumstances and look at ‘all of the attendant

       circumstances’—not a single aspect of the search or seizure in isolation.”

       Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 945 (quoting Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1196, 1202 (Ind.

       2016)).

[64]   The knock and talk at Nance’s home was minimally intrusive at its inception.

       But it became highly intrusive when police lacking probable cause and exigent

       circumstances pulled Nance from his home and expanded the encounter into a

       handcuffing, a detention, and, ultimately, an arrest. See Govan v. State, 116

       N.E.3d 1165, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“[T]here are few intrusions more

       severe than an arrest.”); Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1002 (finding officers’

       warrantless entry into home through open door was “highly intrusive”).

[65]   The alleged “protective sweep” that followed also was highly intrusive. A true

       protective sweep, standing alone, generally is minimally intrusive if it is legal,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023          Page 28 of 31
       limited to areas of the home where a person reasonably could hide, and lasts

       only a few minutes. See, e.g., Weddle v. State, 989 N.E.2d 371, 378-79 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2013). But the search here does not fall in that category. Instead, it

       evolved from a detention accomplished through a warrantless entry into

       Nance’s home without probable cause or exigent circumstances. And the

       evidence obtained through the two warrantless and highly intrusive entries was

       used to obtain the warrants for the later searches.

       C. Law Enforcement Needs
[66]   The extent of law enforcement needs was minimal. To be sure, police have a

       strong need to investigate criminal activity, including drug offenses. Corbett v.

       State, 179 N.E.3d 475, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied; Austin v. State, 997

       N.E.2d 1027, 1036 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (observing that law enforcement’s need

       to disrupt the illegal drug trade is significant). The officers reasonably suspected

       criminal activity based on the smell of raw and burning marijuana. They

       determined the smell was emanating from Nance’s home when he opened his

       front door.

[67]   That said, this strong need to investigate is tempered by the minor nature of the

       offense that the officers were investigating. Police had no evidence of any

       offense other than possible marijuana possession when they first entered

       Nance’s home to detain him. Possession of marijuana without enhancing

       circumstances is a Class B misdemeanor—one of the more minor offenses in

       the Indiana criminal code. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a). And the officers’

       warrantless entry was unnecessary because they likely could have obtained a
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023        Page 29 of 31
       warrant to search the home based solely on the smell of marijuana before they

       ever knocked on Nance’s door. See Bunnell, 172 N.E.3d 1236-37.

       D. Balancing Litchfield Factors
[68]   Balancing these three Litchfield factors and considering the full context in which

       the search and seizure occurred, see Hardin, 148 N.E.3d at 943, we conclude

       that the State failed to establish the multiple searches of Nance’s home and his

       detention were reasonable under Article 1, § 11. The officers, lacking both a

       warrant and probable cause to believe Nance had committed a crime, seized

       Nance by pulling him from the threshold of his home after he failed to follow

       Sergeant Kessie’s directive to step outside his home. The marijuana offense that

       they reasonably suspected was minor.

[69]   From that unreasonable seizure of Nance flowed further unreasonable police

       conduct: the officers’ continued questioning of Nance after he invoked his right

       to counsel and a second warrantless entry into Nance’s home that we have

       already determined violated the Fourth Amendment. The searches conducted

       under the warrants were no less unreasonable, given that they were based in

       substantial part on observations made during the earlier warrantless searches.

       See Mundy v. State, 21 N.E.3d 114, 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that

       evidence derived through use of information obtained in an unlawful search or

       seizure is inadmissible).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023      Page 30 of 31
       Conclusion
[70]   As all of the challenged searches and seizures violate both the Fourth

       Amendment and Article 1, § 11, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Nance’s

       motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

       opinion.

       Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2581 | August 3, 2023       Page 31 of 31