Court Opinion

ID: 2964505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:39.730072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:56.996688
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                      _________

        No. 95-1814

                              JOANNE JOYCE, INDIVIDUALLY
                          AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
                                   JAMES D. JOYCE,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                          TOWN OF TEWKSBURY, MASSACHUSETTS,
                            JOHN R. MACKEY, ALFRED DONOVAN
                                  AND ROBERT BUDRYK,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. A. David Mazzone, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________
                   Selya, Boudin, Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                                   ______________

                                 ____________________
                                    April 29, 1997
                                           
                                 ____________________

                                   OPINION EN BANC
                                 ____________________

            Robert LeRoux  Hernandez  with  whom  Law  Offices  of  Robert  L.
            ________________________              ____________________________
        Hernandez were on brief for appellant.
        _________
            Larry  W.  Yackle  with  whom  John  Reinstein  was  on  brief for
            _________________              _______________
        American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, amicus curiae.

            Leonard  H.  Kesten  with  whom  Deidre  Brennan  Regan,  Kurt  B.
            ___________________              ______________________   ________
        Fliegauf  and Brody,  Hardoon,  Perkins &  Kestin  were on  brief  for
        ________      ___________________________________
        appellees.

                 Per Curiam.    We are concerned on this  appeal with the
                 __________

            decision of  the district court granting  summary judgment on

            one  of the several claims  that have been  litigated in this

            case, specifically, a  claim that police  entry into a  house

            without  a search  warrant  violated  the  Fourth  Amendment.

            Review is  de novo and the  facts are set forth  in the light
                       _______

            most favorable to  the party opposing  summary judgment.   Le
                                                                       __

            Blanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1993),
            _____    __________________

            cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018 (1994).
            ____________

                 Late on the evening  of August 6, 1989,  officers Alfred

            Donovan and Robert Budryk  arrived at the home of  Joanne and

            James Joyce  ("the Joyces")  in Tewksbury, seeking  to arrest

            the  Joyces' son, Lance Joyce.   Although Lance  did not live

            with his parents, the  police had received a call  earlier in

            the evening from Lance's ex-girlfriend informing them that he

            was  there.   Allegedly, an  outstanding warrant  existed for

            Lance's  arrest  on  a  charge of  violating  a  chapter 209A

            domestic restraining order.  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A,   7.

                 Lance answered  the officers' knock at  the Joyces' side

            door,  opening the interior door but keeping the outer screen

            door closed.  Officer Budryk told Lance that the officers had

            a  warrant for  his arrest,  and asked  him to  step outside.

            Instead,  Lance retorted  "ya  right" and  withdrew from  the

            doorway, calling for his  mother.   The police  followed him.

            Joanne Joyce, who  had been asleep,  then came downstairs  to

                                         -2-
                                         -2-

            find her son and  the police officers standing in  her dining

            room.  Her husband entered the room a few minutes later.

                 The  Joyces asked  the officers  what was  going on  and

            whether they had a warrant; the officers explained that  they

            were there to  arrest Lance and that a warrant for his arrest

            existed,  although they  did not  have it  with them.   James

            Joyce left the  room with  a third officer  (who had  arrived

            separately) to call  the police  department, which  confirmed

            Donovan   and  Budryk's  understanding   that  there  was  an

            outstanding warrant for Lance's arrest.

                 While her husband was gone, a scuffle ensued between the

            police officers and  Joanne Joyce.  Joanne  Joyce admits that

            she protested  Lance's immediate arrest, although  she denies

            pushing  the  police officers  away.    One of  the  officers

            grasped  Joanne  Joyce's  upper  arms and  moved  her  aside,

            allowing them to handcuff Lance and secure his arrest; Joanne

            Joyce  claims that one of the officers threatened to kill her

            unless she got out of the way.  Joanne Joyce was charged with

            assault and battery but acquitted in a state court jury trial

            in February 1990.

                 In April 1990, the Joyces brought suit alleging that the

            officers,  the chief of police  and the town  had violated 42

            U.S.C.   1983  and the Massachusetts Civil  Rights Act, Mass.

            Gen. Laws ch. 12,   11I.   The section 1983 claims were based

            upon  alleged  violations   of  the  Fourth   and  Fourteenth

                                         -3-
                                         -3-

            Amendments  during  the  officers'  entry  without  a  search

            warrant  into the  Joyce home  and  claimed use  of excessive

            force in arresting Lance Joyce.  The Joyces also claimed that

            the officers had  committed assault and  battery, intentional

            infliction  of emotional distress  and malicious prosecution,

            and that the town had negligently trained and  supervised the

            officers in  violation of the Massachusetts  Tort Claims Act,

            Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258.

                 The defendants  moved for summary judgment  on the issue

            of  illegal entry.  Citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S.
                                       _____________    _______

            38 (1976), they  said that  the police had  not violated  the

            Fourth  Amendment  because they  entered  the  Joyce home  in

            pursuit  of  Lance Joyce  whom they  were  in the  process of

            lawfully arresting.   The district court  granted defendants'

            motion  by  margin  order,  explaining that  "[t]here  is  no

            evidence in the  record to  support [that] the  entry was  in

            violation of the Fourth Amendment."

                 A jury trial followed.   The record indicates that  only

            three  of  the remaining  claims were  presented at  trial: a

            section 1983  claim alleging  that the officers  had violated

            the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force to arrest Lance

            Joyce,  causing  his mother  injury; a  malicious prosecution

            claim; and  a Massachusetts Civil  Rights Act claim  based on

            the alleged threat by the officers to Joanne Joyce during the

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                                         -4-

            altercation.  The jury returned a  verdict for the defendants

            on all counts.  

                 Joanne  Joyce then  appealed on  her own  behalf and  as

            executrix of  the estate of James Joyce.   She asked not only

            for reversal  of the  summary judgment  grant on  the illegal

            entry claim but  also for a  new trial  on the other  claims,

            arguing  that  the trial  of  the latter  claims  was tainted

            because the jury was not  allowed to consider unlawful  entry

            as one  of the circumstances incident to the excessive force,

            malicious prosecution and MCRA claims.  A panel of this court

            affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.

                 Joanne  Joyce  then  petitioned for  rehearing  en banc,
                                                                 _______

            supported  by the  American Civil  Liberties Union  as amicus
                                                                   ______

            curiae.  Both urge that the officers' entry, without a search
            ______

            warrant,  violated  the  Fourth Amendment;  they  distinguish

            Santana  on the ground that the suspect there was standing in
            _______

            public space (just outside her house) when the police engaged

            her,  while   Lance  Joyce  was  inside   his  parents'  home

            throughout.   Joyce also argues that  the underlying offense,

            violation of  a  restraining order,  is  not a  felony  under

            Massachusetts law.

                 In considering  the petition  for rehearing en  banc, we
                                                             ________

            concluded  that  the  claim  against the  officers  might  be

            foreclosed by qualified immunity.  Accordingly, we  requested

            supplemental  memoranda.  Having considered the memoranda, we

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                                         -5-

            have decided to grant  rehearing en banc, withdraw  the panel
                                             _______

            opinion, and substitute  this opinion as the en  banc court's
                                                         ________

            resolution of  the appeal.  Because  qualified immunity turns

            primarily on an appraisal of existing case law, oral argument

            has been deemed unnecessary.

                 When the police enter  the home of the person  they wish

            to arrest, the arrest warrant suffices for entry if "there is

            reason  to believe  the suspect  is within."   Payton  v. New
                                                           ______     ___

            York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980).   But even when armed with an
            ____

            arrest warrant,  police must generally have  a search warrant

            to  enter lawfully a third person's home.  Steagald v. United
                                                       ________    ______

            States,  451  U.S. 204,  212-13  (1981).   However,  a  third
            ______

            person's  house  may be  lawfully  entered  without a  search

            warrant if exigent circumstances exist, Steagald, 451 U.S. at
                                                    ________

            213-14,  and  exigent  circumstances include  "hot  pursuit."

            Santana, 427 U.S.  at 42-43; Hegarty  v. Somerset County,  53
            _______                      _______     _______________

            F.3d  1367, 1374  (1st Cir.),  cert. denied,  116 S.  Ct. 675
                                           ____________

            (1995).  

                 Here, the  defendants claim that Santana justified their
                                                  _______

            entrance into the Joyce home because they were in hot pursuit

            of  Lance  Joyce.   Joanne Joyce  and  the ACLU  respond that

            police first  engaged Santana when she was  outside her home,
                                                        _______

            standing directly  on her threshold.   Ultimately, they argue

            that  to uphold  the entry  in this  case creates  a slippery

            slope, allowing the  police to enter without a search warrant

                                         -6-
                                         -6-

            if the police merely suspect that the person sought is inside

            the house.

                 The governing  case law under the  Fourth Amendment does

            not  yield  very  many  bright  line  rules.    This  is  not

            surprising   since  the   ultimate  touchstone   is   one  of

            reasonableness:  the hot pursuit is only one of several well-

            established examples of "exigent  circumstances" that make it

            reasonable for the police to enter without obtaining a search

            warrant.   See Minnesota v.  Olsen, 495 U.S.  91, 100 (1990);
                       ___ _________     _____

            Hegarty, 43 F.3d at  1374.  Conversely, we are  not impressed
            _______

            by the slippery slope argument:  entry where an arrest is not

            already in progress,  or where the offense  is truly trivial,

            would present quite a different case.

                 But  even  within  this  reasonableness  framework,  the

            present  case  is not  entirely  straightforward.   Santana's
                                                                _______

            exception  likely does not turn  on whether the individual is

            standing immediately outside or immediately inside the  house

            when  the police  first confront  him and attempt  an arrest.

            And,  the fact  that  Massachusetts  classifies  the  alleged

            violation  here  as a  misdemeanor does  not  reduce it  to a

            "minor offense,"  see Welsh v.  Wisconsin, 466 U.S.  740, 753
                              ___ _____     _________

            (1984); we  agree with the panel that  "domestic violence and

            violations  of protective  orders  are among  the more  grave

            offenses affecting our society."

                                         -7-
                                         -7-

                 On  the other hand, we have no information as to whether

            Lance  Joyce's conduct that gave rise to the protective order

            involved actual  violence, although  the police may  have had

            some basis  for concern apart from the  protective order.1 We

            have  ourselves suggested  that certain  "mitigating factors"

            may undermine  an exigency showing, including  any inadequacy

            in the opportunity afforded for a peaceable surrender and the

            fact that entry  occurs at  nighttime.  Hegarty,  43 F.3d  at
                                                    _______

            1374.  So, there are arguments to be made on both sides.  

                 The Supreme Court cases,  with Steagald at one  pole and
                                                ________

            Santana at  the other,  do not definitively  resolve our  own
            _______

            case.  Even a quick review of lower court  cases reveals that

            there  is no  settled answer as  to the  constitutionality of

            doorway arrests.  See State v. Morse, 480 A.2d 183, 186 (N.H.
                              ___ _____    _____

            1984)  (collecting cases); 3 W. LaFave,  Search and Seizure  
                                                     __________________

            6.1(e) (3d ed. 1996) (same).  Circuit court precedent is also

            divided,  with some decisions  helpful to the  police in this

            case and others less so.2  

                                
            ____________________

                 1The police officers' testimony at  trial indicated that
            Lance  had   a  drinking   problem  (information  which   was
            corroborated by  Mrs. Joyce's testimony), had  been placed in
            protective  custody ten or eleven  times and arrested once or
            twice by the  Tewksbury police, had resisted  arrest or tried
            to  escape on prior  occasions, and that  officer Donovan had
            been involved in a few of the earlier incidents.

                 2Compare, e.g., United States  v. Rengifo, 858 F.2d 800,
                  _____________  _____________     _______
            804-05 (1st Cir.  1988), cert. denied,  490 U.S. 1023  (1989)
                                     ____________
            and United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1123, 1128 & n.9
            _________________    _______
            (5th Cir. 1987) with  United States v. McCraw, 920  F.2d 224,
                            ____  _____________    ______
            229-30 (4th Cir. 1990)  and United States v. Curzi,  867 F.2d
                                    ___ _____________    _____

                                         -8-
                                         -8-

                 Given  the  unsettled  state  of  the law,  we  have  no

            hesitation in concluding  that the officers in this  case are

            protected  by   qualified  immunity  which   protects  public

            officials  against section  1983  liability so  long as  they

            acted  reasonably.   Hunter  v.  Bryant,  502 U.S.  224,  228
                                 ______      ______

            (1991);  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).  As
                     ________    _________

            the  Supreme Court  has  said,  qualified immunity  "provides

            ample protection to all but the plainly  incompetent or those

            who knowingly violate the  law."  Malley v. Briggs,  475 U.S.
                                              ______    ______

            335, 341  (1986).   The aim  is  to protect  those who  might

            otherwise be deterred  from official duties for fear  that an

            innocent mistake would create personal liability.

                 The  critical point  here is  that officers  Donovan and

            Budryk are "entitled to qualified immunity [so long as] their

            decision was reasonable, even if mistaken."  Hunter, 502 U.S.
                                     ________________    ______

            at  229 (emphasis added); see  Veilleux v. Perschau, 101 F.3d
                                      ___  ________    ________

            1, 3 (1st  cir. 1996).   Thus,  the officers  are not  liable

            unless  in the  circumstances of  this case it  is reasonably

            well-established, and should therefore have been clear to the

            officers,  that  the  entry  without  a  search  warrant  was

            unlawful.   Because  it is  not even clear  that there  was a

            violation--a point that we do not decide--there certainly was

            no  violation so patent as to strip the officers of qualified

            immunity.

                                
            ____________________

            36, 40 (1st Cir. 1989). 

                                         -9-
                                         -9-

                 The  Joyces  also  sued  the town  under  section  1983,

            alleging that its failure to properly train and supervise the

            officers  resulted  in  their  unlawful entry  of  her  home.

            Municipal liability under section  1983 is not vicarious, see
                                                                      ___

            St.  Louis  v.  Prapotnik,  485 U.S.  112,  128  (1988),  and
            __________      _________

            municipalities do not enjoy  qualified immunity, Owen v. City
                                                             ____    ____

            of Independence, 445  U.S. 622, 650 (1980).  Consequently, it
            _______________

            is  not impossible for a  municipality to be  held liable for

            the  actions  of  lower-level  officers  who  are  themselves

            entitled to  qualified immunity.   Walker v.  Waltham Housing
                                               ______     _______________

            Auth., 44 F.3d 1042, 1047 (1st Cir. 1995).  
            _____

                 However,  our  rationale  here  for  granting  qualified

            immunity to the officers--that the unsettled state of the law

            made  it  reasonable to  believe  the  conduct in  this  case

            constitutional--also    precludes     municipal    liability.

            Tewksbury  could not have  been "deliberately indifferent" to

            citizens' rights, Bowen v. City  of Manchester, 966 F.2d  13,
                              _____    ___________________

            18 (1st Cir.  1992), in  failing to teach  the officers  that

            their  conduct  was unconstitutional.    We  need not  decide

            whether the  Joyces have pointed to  evidence suggesting that

            the  officers' conduct  was endorsed  by a  municipal policy.

            See St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20,  29 (1st Cir.
            ___ ___________    _______________

            1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2548 (1996).
                   ____________

                 There is some cost in not deciding the  Fourth Amendment

            issue on the  merits, even in the form of dictum.  But the en
                                                                       __

                                         -10-
                                         -10-

            banc  court is  agreed that  qualified immunity  applies, and
            ____

            there  is less consensus  about the underlying constitutional

            issue.   Indeed, some members  of the en  banc court consider
                                                  ________

            that  Donovan and Budryk's entry  into the Joyce  home was of

            very   doubtful   legality   under   the   Fourth  Amendment.

            Resolution  can properly  await  a case  where  the issue  is

            decisive,  as it could easily be on a suppression claim where

            qualified immunity does not apply.

                 The  panel opinion  is  withdrawn and,  for the  reasons
                                         _________

            given above, the judgment  of the district court  is affirmed
                                                                 ________

            on grounds of qualified immunity.

                                     Concurrence follows.
                                     ___________________

                                         -11-
                                         -11-

                    TORRUELLA,  Chief Judge  (concurring).   Resolving this
                    TORRUELLA,  Chief Judge  (concurring). 
                                ___________

          damages   suit  on   qualified  immunity   grounds  is   entirely

          appropriate,  because  the parties  exercised the  opportunity to

          brief this issue, and because the issue of qualified immunity can

          be "resolved  with  certitude on  the existing  record."   United
                                                                     ______

          States  v.  La  Guardia, 902  F.2d  1010,  1013  (1st Cir.  1990)
          ______      ___________

          (appellate  court has  discretion,  in the  exceptional case,  to

          "reach virgin issues"); see  also  Nat'l Ass'n of  Social Workers
                                  _________  ______________________________

          v. Harwood,  69 F.3d 622, 627  (1st Cir. 1995).   One would think
             _______

          that a Fourth Amendment right cannot possibly be deemed  "clearly

          established"  from the  point  of view  of  the defendant  police

          officers when  a total of  seven judges,  including the  district

          court, the appellate panel, and finally the en banc First Circuit

          court,  are themselves in disagreement as to the precise scope of

          that right.  

                      I write  separately, however, only because  I believe

          that my  dissenting  brothers,  in  their  efforts  to  show  how

          Steagald v.  United States, 451  U.S. 204 (1981)  is controlling,
          ________     _____________

          have  lost sight of the touchstone of Fourth Amendment law, which

          is reasonableness.  See U.S. Const. Amend. IV ("The right  of the
                              ___

          people  to  be  secure  in  their  persons,  houses, papers,  and

          effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
                           ____________

          violated . . . .") (emphasis added).  Our strong and  deep-seated

          intuitions regarding  the sanctity  of the home  obviously inform

          the determination of  what kinds  of searches are,  and are  not,

          reasonable.    We  follow  the  Supreme  Court's  lead  in  these

                                         -12-
                                         -12-

          difficult determinations, but where the unique facts of a case do

          not fall squarely under any one Supreme Court precedent, as here,

          we cannot help but consider the reasonableness of  the particular

          search at issue.

                      We  know from Santana  that it  may be  reasonable to
                                    _______

          follow  a  fleeing  suspect  from  the  threshold  of  a  private

          residence into that residence, without a  search warrant, for the

          purpose of effectuating an arrest.  Santana, 427 U.S. at 43 ("[A]
                                              _______

          suspect may not defeat an arrest  which has been set in motion in

          a public place, and  is therefore proper under [United  States v.
                                                          ______________

          Watson, 423 U.S. 411  (1976)], by the expedient of escaping  to a
          ______

          private  place.").   We  also  know  from  Steagald  that  it  is
                                                     ________

          certainly  not  reasonable  to   simply  enter  a  third  party's
                     ___

          residence  without a search  warrant, in  the absence  of exigent

          circumstances,  in  the  belief that  the  subject  of  an arrest

          warrant is  inside.   One may  seek to  subsume the  present case

          under  either  Santana  or Steagald    --  but  either way,  this
                         _______     ________

          requires that we draw some conclusions regarding their scope.  In

          drawing  the  outlines of  the  "exigent  circumstances" or  "hot

          pursuit"  exception,   I  find   myself   naturally  turning   to

          reasonableness.

                      The  precise   question,  then,  is  whether   it  is

          reasonable for  police  officers, who  are  acting on  an  arrest

          warrant arising  from the commission  of a jailable  offense, who

          are standing a  few feet  away from, and  face-to-face with,  the

          subject of that  arrest warrant (separated only by  a transparent

                                         -13-
                                         -13-

          outer  screen door), who have  informed the same  subject that he

          must  step outside because he is under  arrest, and who then find

          that  the arrestee  refuses  to cooperate  and retreats  into the

          residence, to follow  that arrestee  into the house  in order  to

          effectuate the arrest.   (And add to this the  fact that although

          the residence  belonged technically to a third party, a suspect's

          parents' residence is often looked upon  as approximating his own

          residence.)    Because  I  believe,  on  these  facts,  that  the

          officers' entry and  arrest was reasonable, I  conclude that this

          case  falls  under  the  "hot  pursuit"  rationale  discussed  in

          Santana.  Let us not lose sight  of reasonableness in our efforts
          _______

          to  follow   precedents  that  are,  on   occasion,  not  clearly

          determinative.

                      This  said, it  may be  that this  particular damages

          suit, with its spotty record, is not the best context in which to

          define those "exigent circumstance" parameters on  the merits.  I

          am confident, moreover, that  these defendants are fully entitled

          to qualified  immunity.  After all,  this is not a  case in which
                                                       ___

          the police  entered an unrelated third-party's home  in search of

          an  arrestee  without any  process at  all  -- such  action would

          clearly  violate Steagald -- although some  members of this court
                           ________

          may  question  whether the  process  that was  followed  here was

          enough to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.

                         Concurrence follows.
                         ___________________

                                         -14-
                                         -14-

                      LYNCH,  Circuit  Judge (concurring).    While  I am
                      LYNCH,  Circuit  Judge (concurring).
                              ______________

            sympathetic  to the  very  strong arguments  that the  police

            violated the Fourth Amendment,  I join the per curiam.   That

            the judges  of this court so strongly  disagree about whether

            there  was a Fourth Amendment violation means that the law in

            this  area is  not  so clearly  established  as to  make  the

            officers'   actions  objectively unreasonable.   Anderson  v.
                                                             ________

            Creighton,  483  U.S.  635  (1987); St.  Hilaire  v.  City of
            _________                           ____________      _______

            Laconia, 71 F.3d  20 (1995).   The officers  are entitled  to
            _______

            immunity, given the state of the law in 1989.

                                          Dissent follows.
                                          _______________

                                         -15-
                                         -15-

                      SELYA,  Circuit Judge,  with  whom  STAHL,  Circuit
                      SELYA,  Circuit Judge,  with  whom  STAHL,  Circuit
                              _____________                       _______

            Judge, joins  (dissenting).  Though the  Fourth Amendment has
            Judge, joins  (dissenting).
            _____

            fallen on hard times, a woman's home remains her castle.  The

            en banc court, seeking cover under the doctrine of  qualified

            immunity (a doctrine  which, as I understand  it, was neither

            briefed  nor argued  to the  panel), effectively  condones an

            unconstitutional encroachment  on the  sanctity of  the home.

            Although  I applaud the  withdrawal of  the panel  opinion, I

            cannot in good  conscience join  the opinion of  the en  banc

            court; that  opinion admittedly  edges closer to  the holding

            demanded  by  clearly established  law,  but  stops short  of

            adhering  to  it  and, thus,  perpetuates  a constitutionally

            intolerable result.  Respectfully and regretfully, I dissent.

                      As  the  en  banc  court  faithfully  relates,  the

            doctrine of qualified  immunity protects  state actors  whose

            actions are reasonable, if  mistaken.  But qualified immunity

            does   not   shield   violations   of   clearly   established

            constitutional principles merely because the specific factual

            situation in which a violation arises has novel features.  As

            the  Supreme Court  recently noted  in the  immunity context,

            "general statements  of the law are  not inherently incapable

            of  giving  fair  and   clear  warning,  .  .  .   a  general

            constitutional rule already identified in the  decisional law

            may apply  with obvious clarity  to the  specific conduct  in

            question, even  though the  very action  in question has  not

                                         -16-
                                         -16-

            previously been held unlawful."  United States v. Lanier, 117
                                             _____________    ______

            S. Ct.  1219, 1227  (1997) (citation, brackets,  and internal

            quotation marks omitted).  This is exactly such a case.

                      In the  absence  of  exigent  circumstances     and

            nothing  in the  instant  record suggests  any exigency,  let

            alone demonstrates exigency to an extent that might carry the

            day on summary  judgment   the  Fourth Amendment prohibits  a

            warrantless,  non-consensual  entry  by  the  police  into  a

            suspect's  home in order  to arrest him.   See  Payton v. New
                                                       ___  ______    ___

            York, 445 U.S. 573,  576 (1980).  Of course,  once the police
            ____

            procure  a valid arrest warrant, they may enter the suspect's

            home  for the limited purpose  of effecting the  arrest.  See
                                                                      ___

            id. at 603.  But even then, the police may not enter a  third
            ___                                                  _  _____

            person's  home   without  consent,   a  search   warrant  (in
            ________  ____

            contradistinction   to  an   arrest   warrant),  or   exigent

            circumstances.  See  Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204,
                            ___  ________    _____________

            205-06, 212-15 (1981).

                      In  this case  the police transgressed  the clearly

            established  rule  laid  down by  the  Steagald  Court.   The
                                                   ________

            plaintiff,  Joanne Joyce, was not herself a suspect.  Yet the

            defendant  officers entered  her  home  without her  consent,

            without a search warrant,  and in the absence of  any exigent

            circumstances.   To  be sure,  the defendants  had an  arrest

            warrant for  the plaintiff's son,  Lance Joyce,  but that  is

            scantconsolation becauseLance didnot livein hismother's home.

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                      In  stitching together a qualified immunity defense

            from  this  poor-quality  cloth,  the en  banc  court  relies

            heavily    indeed, almost exclusively    on United  States v.
                                                        ______________

            Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).  The court's reliance strikes me
            _______

            as misplaced.  Santana is an "exigent circumstances" case; it
                           _______

            stands only for the proposition that when the police confront

            a suspect whom they have probable cause to arrest in a public
                                                              __ _ ______

            place, and the suspect subsequently flees into  her own home,
            _____

            they may  pursue and  arrest her.   See id.  at 42-43.   That
                                                ___ ___

            proposition has no application here for  two reasons (each of

            which is independently sufficient to defenestrate the en banc

            court's reasoning).

                      First,  under Steagald,  warrantless non-consensual
                                    ________

            searches of a third person's home are only excused by exigent

            circumstances.  451 U.S. at 205-06.  Santana involved exigent
                                                 _______

            circumstances:  the hot  pursuit of a fleeing suspect  from a

            public place into a private one.  427 U.S. at 42-43.  In this

            case,  by contrast, there is  simply no evidence  of any need

            for  pursuit   hot, cold,  or lukewarm.   Certainly, the mere

            fact  that Lance Joyce, prompted by police action, moved from

            one part of his  mother's home to another did  not create any

            cognizable exigency.   See United States  v. Curzi, 867  F.2d
                                   ___ _____________     _____

            36, 40-43,  43 n.6  (1st Cir.  1989) (explaining  that police

            officers  cannot use  exigent  circumstances that  they  have

            created to justify a warrantless search).

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                                         -18-

                      Second,   and  equally  important,  the  record  is

            pellucid  that Lance  was  not in  a  public place  when  the

            officers first confronted him; although he opened an interior

            door,  he remained  completely within the  house and  kept an

            exterior  weather  door  between  himself  and  the  officers

            entirely shut.  While the en banc court blithely asserts that

            Santana  does not  turn on  whether the  individual  whom the
            _______

            police  desire to apprehend is inside or outside a house when

            the first contact occurs, this distinction makes every bit of

            difference.3   The rule prohibiting  warrantless invasions of

            third  parties'  homes  emerged  in  Steagald,  a  case  that
                                                 ________

            followed  and  interpreted  Santana.   Rather  than extending
                                        _______

            Santana,  Steagald,  451 U.S.  at  214  n.7, 222,  reinforces
            _______   ________

            Payton,  a case  in which  the Supreme  Court concluded  that
            ______

            "physical entry of the  home is the chief evil  against which

            the wording of the  Fourth Amendment is directed."   445 U.S.

            at  585  (citation  omitted).    Consequently,  "the   Fourth

            Amendment  has drawn  a  firm line  at  the entrance  to  the

            house."  Id. at 590.  The Constitution does not equivocate on
                     ___

                                
            ____________________

            3.  Recent Supreme Court case law confirms that police action
            directed at individuals  within the confines of a dwelling is
            subject   to   intense    constitutional   scrutiny.      The
            constitutional   requirement   to   "knock   and   announce,"
            established in  Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S.  Ct. 1914, 1915-16
                            ______    ________
            (1995), pertains  only when the subject of the arrest warrant
            is within a dwelling.   The elevation of this  requirement to
            constitutional status can only be understood  in terms of the
            special  protection granted  those persons  who are  within a
            private home's confines  when the police first arrive  on the
            scene.

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                                         -19-

            this point.  See  United States v. Berkowitz, 927  F.2d 1376,
                         ___  _____________    _________

            1388 (7th  Cir. 1991) ("Payton did  not draw the  line one or
                                    ______

            two  feet into  the  home; it  drew the  line  at the  home's

            entrance."); State v. Morse, 480 A.2d 183, 186 (N.H. 1984); 3
                         _____    _____

            W. LaFave, Search  and Seizure   6.1(e)  (3d ed. 1996).   Nor
                       ___________________

            should we.

                      In  sum, I believe that  the officers' entry into a

            third  party's  home  in  the absence  of  consent,  a search

            warrant, or  exigent circumstances plainly  violated Steagald
                                                                 ________

            and thus violated the homeowner's clearly established  Fourth

            Amendment rights.  See United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224,
                               ___ _____________    ______

            228-29 (4th Cir. 1990) (rejecting use of Santana when door to
                                                     _______

            dwelling was only partially opened from within).  By  hedging

            on  this point,  the  en  banc  court  not  only  denies  the

            plaintiff her day in court but also invites the proliferation

            of such incidents.  Since we will be seen as sanctioning that

            which we are unwilling to condemn, I respectfully dissent.

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