Court Opinion

ID: 9726408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:47:47.142464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.846669
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.
(dissenting). Plaintiff filed an action for divorce alleging extreme and repeated acts of cruelty by the defendant as the basis for the action. Defendant, although properly served, failed to appear and the plaintiff was granted a default judgment on June 16, 1969. At that time the trial judge heard testimony of both the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s sister-in-law. The plaintiff testified that defendant had been associating and corresponding with a younger man and that defendant had informed the plaintiff that she would no longer remain his wife when this man returned from Vietnam. The plaintiff further testified that under the circumstances the parties could not continue to live as husband and wife. The testimony of plaintiff’s sister-in-law substantially corroborated the plaintiff’s testimony and further indicated that she felt there would be no chance of reconciliation between the two parties.
On July 7,1969, defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment and to present a counter-claim. The defendant’s motion alleged, among other things, that the plaintiff had committed a fraud upon the court in that plaintiff and defendant had continued to cohabit as man and wife up until the time the divorce judgment was in fact granted. Plaintiff, in his answer to the motion to vacate the judgment, denied this allegation. A hearing on this motion to vacate *557was held on July 28, 1969, at which time only the defendant testified. On cross-examination, defendant admitted writing to another man. The defendant’s testimony on cross-examination was at times inconsistent, especially with regard to whether the defendant had in fact contacted her attorney prior to the entry of the default judgment. In addition, defendants’ testimony on cross-examination was in direct conflict with an allegation in her motion to vacate the judgment which had stated that plaintiff intentionally suppressed matters which he knew had a material bearing upon the settlement of property rights. Defendant had alleged in her motion that the plaintiff suppressed the fact that for the entire period of this marriage the defendant had given to the plaintiff each and every paycheck which she earned. On cross-examination the defendant admitted that she had not given the plaintiff her paycheck for a two-year period immediately preceding the instant suit. Defendant continued to maintain, however, that both parties had continued to live together as man and wife in the same residence. Prom a denial of the motion to vacate the judgment, defendant appeals.
The basic question in this case is whether the divorce judgment and related orders should be vacated for fraud upon the court. The complaint stated that cohabitation ended about March 25,1969. At the July 28, 1969 hearing the defendant testified that she and plaintiff lived together and continued to cohabit after March 25,1969, and in fact had been living as husband and wife just before the July hearing. The plaintiff, in his answer to the motion to vacate the judgment, denied this allegation. Neither version is corroborated by extrinsic evidence.
The power to set aside a judgment of divorce for fraud upon the court is unquestionable. DeHaan v. *558DeHaan (1957), 348 Mich 199; Linn v. Linn (1955), 341 Mich 668; Allen v. Allen (1954), 341 Mich 543; Lantinga v. Lantinga (1947), 318 Mich 78.
Cohabitation which continues after a complaint for divorce has been filed may operate as a fraud upon the court. In Curtis v. Curtis (1930), 250 Mich 105, 109, the Court stated:
“The question of whether there was cohabitation between the parties after the filing of the bill cannot be decided upon the petition and answer, but commands the taking of proofs.
“If, after filing the bill for divorce, plaintiff resumed marital relations with defendant and assured her that the suit was abandoned when he had no such intention, he perpetrated a fraud upon defendant, and, by proceeding to decree thereafter and concealing from the court the fact of such resumption of marital rights, such fraud, being extrinsic, will authorize the court to vacate the decree. See McGuinness v. Superior Court (1925), 196 Cal 222 (237 P 42, 40 ALR 1110).” (Emphasis added.)
The instant case is distinguished from the Curtis decision on two grounds. First, the defendant does not state, as was the case in Curtis, that the plaintiff had assured her that his suit for divorce had been abandoned. Gombasy v. Gombasy (1947), 318 Mich 139, 145. Second, and perhaps more important, proofs were in fact taken in the instant case. The defendant was allowed to testify and was also subjected to cross-examination by the plaintiff’s counsel.
It is well recognized that fraud is never presumed and must be proven by a preponderance of the testimony. Farley v. Farley (1936), 278 Mich 361; Steele v. Shaffer (1928), 241 Mich 632. In Jewell v. Jewell (1959), 358 Mich 1, 3, the Court stated:
*559“It has been generally held that a decision to set aside a divorce decree on the ground of fraud is discretionary with the trial court, and in the absence of a clear showing of fraud it will not be set aside.”
See Kinek v. Kinek (1951), 331 Mich 54.
I conclude, after a careful examination of the record, that while there are implications of fraud in the record, the evidence was not sufficient to establish fraud. The mere allegation by the defendant that the parties had continued to cohabit subsequent to the plaintiff’s complaint for divorce does not necessitate the conclusion that this in fact did occur. As mentioned previously, the defendant’s testimony was somewhat inconsistent and the trial judge evidently chose not to believe the defendant on this issue. This factor, coupled with the plaintiff’s denial of the allegation in his answer to the motion to vacate, together with the testimony in the original hearing, is sufficient to sustain the trial court’s determination. This Court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge unless the finding is clearly erroneous. The trial judge is in a better position to test the credibility of the witnesses by observing and hearing them in open court. Johnson v. Johnson (1961), 363 Mich 354.
The disposition of the litigants’ property in a suit for divorce is not governed by rigid rules. I cannot conclude that I would have reached a different determination under the circumstances or that the record discloses a manifest abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Billingsley v. Billingsley (1946), 315 Mich 417; Cavanagh v. Cavanagh (1969), 17 Mich App 585.
The instant record, reviewed in its entirety, supports the factual findings, discretionary decisions, and the judgment rendered. There is insufficient proof of material fraud or collusion to absolve de*560fendant from the responsibility of filing an answer within the allotted 20 days. The “good cause shown the court” in GCR 1963, 520.4 has not been demonstrated. The property settlement developed at the proceedings below is, under the circumstances, sufficiently reasonable as not to require appellate interference.
I would affirm the trial court.