Court Opinion

ID: 9600610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:28:47.52035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:28.732246
License: Public Domain

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part.
I dissent from Part II.B.2 of the majority opinion because I believe that we should remand to the district court for an eviden-tiary hearing on Earhart’s first issue: whether his Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense was violated by the trial court’s failure to enforce the movement restrictions against the prosecutor.
I disagree with the majority that the record “belies Earhart’s argument” that “the state trial court allowed the prosecu*352tor to move about the courtroom freely while tightly constraining Earhart’s movements.” Maj. Op. at 350. While the transcript does not record directly the movements of the parties as the jury would have viewed them, it appears that Earhart abided by the district court’s restrictions, and, thus, the stun belt’s effects on Earhart were visible even if the actual belt itself was not. There is no indication in the record that Earhart approached any witnesses — instead, the record indicates that he requested the prosecutor deliver exhibits to witnesses multiple times. See Trial Tr. at 413, 432, 450, 457-58, 472, 474, 485-86, 567-68. The record does indicate, however, that the prosecutor had more freedom of movement during the trial despite the fact that Earhart and the prosecutor were purportedly subjected to the same restrictions. For example, the prosecutor held the mannequin he used with several witnesses because it would not stay on the witness stand after he set it there, Trial Tr. at 408-10, 426, 445-46, 468, 483-84, 503-04, and he also handed it to two child witnesses whom he asked to “step down here” and “come over here” to sit in a chair and hold the mannequin for demonstrative purposes, Trial Tr. at 462-63, 506-07. I also believe that it is questionable whether the prosecutor physically approached witnesses when utilizing exhibits, as he stated several times that he was “showing” or “handing” or “giving” exhibits to witnesses. Trial Tr. at 360-61, 365, 387-89, 404, 423, 441, 466, 481, 496-97, 562-63, 577, 645. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, then, a review of the record shows there could have been a disparity between the movements of the parties during the trial that violated Earhart’s “Sixth Amendment right to act as his own attorney,” rebutting any factual determination to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
A violation of the Sixth Amendment right to conduct one’s own defense is a structural trial error not subject to the harmless-error rule; thus, whether Earhart was prejudiced is irrelevant in determining whether his movement restrictions violated his right to self-representation. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 173, 174, 177, 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (holding an accused has a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment “to conduct his own defense,” and the “primary focus” in determining whether this right was violated “must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way” (citing Faretta, v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975))). If Earhart’s rights were violated, the Ohio Court of Appeals acted “contrary to” clearly established federal law in applying a harmless-error analysis, and habeas relief would be appropriate. Mendoza v. Berghuis, 544 F.3d 650, 653 (6th Cir.2008) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)).
Because the record on appeal is unclear as to whether the prosecutor “did abide” by the restriction — and, if not, how much the prosecutor actually did move about the courtroom while Earhart remained restrained — it is appropriate to remand for an evidentiary hearing on whether Earhart’s Sixth Amendment right to participate fully in his pro se defense was violated.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from Part II.B.2 of the majority opinion.