Court Opinion

ID: 9891402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 15:09:26.371893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:15.726131
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Cottrill v. Skivers, 2023-Ohio-3784.]

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                             FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   MEIGS COUNTY

MARK COTTRILL, ET AL.,                           :
                                                 :   Case No. 22CA7
        Plaintiffs-Appellants,                   :
                                                 :
                                                 :
        v.                                       :   DECISION AND JUDGMENT
                                                 :   ENTRY
LEORA SKIVERS,                                   :
                                                 :
        Defendant-Appellee.                      :   RELEASED: 10/11/2023
                                                 :

                                            APPEARANCES:

Robert W. Bright, Law Office of Robert W. Bright, Middleport, Ohio, for
Appellants.

Jonathan E. Robe, Robe Law Office, Athens, Ohio, for Appellee.

Wilkin, J.

        {¶1} Mark Cottrill, Tina Carter, and Vicki Starner (“appellants”) are

appealing a Meigs County Court of Common Pleas judgment entry that

dismissed their complaint that sought an implied easement over, or adverse

possession of, a portion of appellee, Leora Skiver’s (“appellee”) property.

        {¶2} In November 2021, appellants filed a complaint seeking an implied

easement, prescriptive easement, or adverse possession of a road that crossed

appellee’s property for purposes of appellants having access to a public road.

Subsequently, appellants dismissed their claims for a prescriptive easement and

adverse possession. Appellee filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. The trial

court issued a judgment entry that granted appellee’s motion finding that
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                                2

appellants’ complaint failed to establish sufficient facts to prove the unity-of-

ownership element required for an implied easement.

       {¶3} On appeal, appellants assert that the trial court erred in dismissing

their complaint for an implied easement. Appellee has filed a brief in response.

Having reviewed the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal.

               I.     BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶4} Appellants’ complaint alleged that appellee owned three acres of land

in Meigs County, Ohio. Appellants also owned land in Meigs County, Ohio that is

adjacent to appellee’s property and has no “road frontage” to any public road.

For almost 50 years, appellants and their predecessors in title have used a road

that crosses appellee’s property to gain access to a public road.

       {¶5} Appellants claimed that their use and maintenance of the road across

appellee’s property was open, notorious, and continuous, until appellee recently

denied appellants use of the road. Appellants stated that neither appellee nor

her predecessors objected to appellants’ open, notorious, and continuous use of

the road.

       {¶6} Despite searching real property records, appellants claimed they

were unable to locate any recorded easement or right of way that afforded them,

or their predecessors in title, use of the road that crossed appellee’s property.

However, because they had no reasonable access to their property except using

the road that crossed appellee’s property, appellants asserted that they were

entitled to an implied easement based on necessity.
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                                 3

       {¶7} Alternatively, appellants argued that they, and their predecessors in

title, possessed the road over appellee’s property by prior, open, notorious,

adverse, and continuous use for more than 21 years without objection by

appellee. Appellants maintained that this conduct supported a prescriptive

easement over, or adverse possession of the road that crossed appellee’s

property, as well as an implied easement based on prior use.

       {¶8} Appellee filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss appellants’

complaint. Appellee first alleged that appellants could not establish an implied

easement based on prior use or necessity because they could not show the

unity-of-ownership element required for an implied easement. Consequently,

appellee maintained that appellant’s claim for an implied easement by prior use

and necessity should be dismissed.

       {¶9} Appellee also asserted that appellants failed to set out a valid claim

for a prescriptive easement over, or adverse possession of, the road that crossed

her property. Appellee claimed that appellants’ initial demand letter

acknowledged that appellants’ use of the road over appellee’s property was by

permission. Consequently, appellants could not prove that their use of the road

was “adverse” to appellee’s desire, which is an element required for a

prescriptive easement or adverse possession of property.

       {¶10} Therefore, appellee moved the trial court to dismiss appellants’

complaint in its entirety.

       {¶11} Appellants filed a response to appellee’s motion to dismiss that

focused upon appellee’s allegation that appellants could not prove prior unity of
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                              4

ownership of the two properties. Despite searching Meigs County records,

appellants acknowledged that they were unable to locate either an easement or

deeds to their property or appellee’s property prior to 1880 because such records

were not available. Nevertheless, appellants claimed that they had discovered

“relevant and useful information.” Specifically, appellants discovered a map from

1880 that

               clearly shows a road/right of way branching off the main
        road and running adjacent to/between the two (2) parcels that are
        currently owned by the parties to this suit. That road/right of way
        gave access to (what would eventually become) [appellants’] - and
        it gave access to (what would eventually become) [appellants’]
        property more than 140 years ago.

      The appellants continued: “the 1880 map appears to show the road

possibly being on what was then property owned by a certain James (then

Francis) McGhee (which appears to be the property owned by [appellee] over

which [appellants] seek an easement.” Appellants searched that property “back

to the year 1879 in an attempt to find an express right of way and/or unity of

ownership with the property currently owned by [appellants].” Appellants stated

that they found two 1879 deeds that both described the “McGhee property,”

which referenced the “Ohio Company Purchase.” Appellants maintain that the

Meigs County Recorder could find no “official book” pertaining to the “Ohio

Company Purchase.”

      {¶12} However, appellants discovered a “graphic” from Wikipedia that

purported to show land holdings by the Ohio Company in Meigs County Ohio.

Appellants opined that the graphic “appears [to show] that the final dimensions of

the Ohio Company Purchase included the entirety of Meigs County.” Appellants
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                                 5

further claimed that both the deed to appellee’s property, and the legal

description in the certificate of transfer for appellants’ property referenced the

“Ohio Company Purchase.” (Italics sic.). Therefore, appellants argued that it was

clear that the two properties herein were previously unified under a single owner,

and “[b]ecause there was unity of ownership then an implied easement can exist,

as can an easement by necessity.”

       {¶13} However, appellants alleged that they could not determine precisely

when the unity of ownership was initially severed because records in Meigs

County do not have maps before 1880. Appellants then informed the trial court

that older maps of Meigs County were allegedly stored in Washington County,

Ohio; thus, appellants moved the court for additional time to allow counsel to

search Washington County’s records.

       {¶14} Appellee filed a reply stating among other assertions that appellants

have no valid claim for an implied easement because appellants cannot prove

prior unity of ownership of the two properties at issue, including that appellants

had not alleged, let alone, submitted evidence that there was a use/necessity

that existed at the time that any prior unified parcel would have been severed.

Appellee also claimed that appellants had abandoned their claims for a

prescriptive easement and adverse possession.

       {¶15} The trial court issued an entry granting appellants 14 additional days

to conduct research in Washington County.

       {¶16} After expiration of the 14-day period, the appellants filed a

supplemental response to appellee’s motion to dismiss. Appellants
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                                    6

acknowledged that their research was unable to discover “the exact time when

the unity of the ownership of the property in question that existed at the time of

the Ohio Company were severed.” Appellants alleged that they were unable to

discover that date because either “[t]he express easement and/or time of

severance of unity of ownership occurred before the year 1820 - the earliest

deed of index that is available in Meigs County; [ ] or a break in the chain of title

of both properties sometime between 1820 and 1880.” Regardless, appellants

recognized that their counsel had “run into a dead end” they would be “unable to

confirm either the existence of an express easement or the exact time of the

severance of the unity of ownership of the properties.” Nevertheless, the

appellants moved the trial court to deny appellee’s motion to dismiss because

appellee has not established that appellants’ “case cannot possibly succeed.”

       {¶17} Shortly after appellants filed their supplemental response, the

parties executed a “Joint Notice and Supplement to Court’s Entry” that notified

the court that appellants had withdrawn their claims for a prescriptive easement

and adverse possession.

       {¶18} Appellee filed a “Response” to appellants’ “Supplemental

Response.” Appellee claimed that appellants had no valid claim for an implied

easement because their complaint ignored the unity-of-ownership element

required for an implied easement, and they also could not prove that a necessity

arose at the time the unity of ownership was severed.
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                             7

       {¶19} After considering the parties pleadings, the trial court issued a

judgment entry that initially recognized appellants’ claims for a prescriptive

easement and adverse possession of appellee’s property had been withdrawn.

       {¶20} The trial court also found that appellants’ claim for an implied

easement failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because they

could not prove the unity-of-ownership element required for an implied easement.

The court reasoned that appellants

                admit they can find no unity of title between [appellants’]
        and [appellee’s] properties, other than both coming from the Ohio
        Company’s Purchase. There needs to also be proof that at an
        exact moment in time, immediately prior to the separation of a
        larger or combined partial from the subject property took place,
        there was a commonality of title; and that by severance of the
        properties the [appellants’] property was left landlocked and
        without any access to a public roadway. Additionally, the use that
        gives rise to the easement must have been so long continued and
        obvious or manifest as to show that it was meant to be permanent.
        Since the [appellants] state[ ] the inability to establish when,
        exactly, there was a severance of one parcel from the other, there
        is no way to establish whether at the time of the severance there
        had been a long or continued, obvious or manifested showing that
        such access was meant to be permanent.
                Also, without the ability to establish exactly when and how
        the two properties were severed (other than both being within
        Meigs County at the time of the Ohio Company’s Purchase) the
        strict requirement that such an easement is necessary for the
        beneficial enjoyment of the land granted or retained cannot be
        met. It has not been established whether these two parcels were
        ever on a common tract beyond the time of the Ohio Company’s
        Purchase. Therefore, the Court cannot find the easement is
        necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of those two unknown or
        unestablished tracts.
                Likewise, without the ability to see whether these two
        properties were at one time combined in single ownership and that
        when severed any use of the rights across the servitude property
        was intended to be continuous (as opposed to being only
        temporary or occasional) there is no basis for the claim.
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                                        8

          {¶21} Therefore, the trial court dismissed appellants’ complaint. It is this

judgment that appellants appeal, asserting a single assignment of error.

                                II.     ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FILED BY
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS FOR AN EASEMENT BASED ON PLAINTIFF’S
ALLEGED FAILURE TO ESTABLISH UNITY OF TITLE

                                      A. Appellants’ Argument

          {¶22} Appellants argue that they have proven unity of ownership of the

properties herein in the late 1700s because documents pertaining to both the

parties’ properties reference prior ownership by the Ohio Company Purchase,

which included the entirety of Meigs County. Appellants’ argument relies in part

on this court’s decision in Blanton v. Eskridge, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 16CA3783,

2017-Ohio-9366.

          {¶23} Appellants maintain that this court in Blanton “held open the

possibility” that the two properties therein “being part of the French Grant DID

establish the unity of title requirement” for purposes of proving an implied

easement by prior use or necessity.1 The appellants argue that, similar to the

French Grant in Blanton, they have submitted evidence that the parties’

properties herein were owned in unity pursuant to the Ohio Company Purchase,

and consistent with Blanton appellants have satisfied the unity-of-ownership

element to support an implied easement.

1
    The court in Blanton stated that “The French Grant was one of the many land divisions
established in the late eighteenth century in what is now Ohio.” Blanton at fn 2, citing
www.ohiohistorycentral.org.
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                                  9

       {¶24} However, appellants continue to admit that they cannot “prove more

recent unity of title between the specific smaller pieces of property owned by

[appellee] and [appellants]” “because the records are not available.”

Nevertheless, appellants cite “very important facts” that support an implied

easement in their favor despite the absence of a more recent unity of title:

        1. [Appellee] and her now-deceased co-owner, Ensminger,
           allowed [appellants] and [their] predecessors in title to use the
           road across [appellee’s] property as an easement to access
           [appellants’] property uninterrupted from at least 1983 to 2021;
        2. [Appellants] property has no road frontage on any County,
           State, Federal, or other government owned and maintained
           road;
        3. [Appellants’] property has no other easement or access road
           across any other adjacent property;
        4. The oldest available plat map on which the properties appear
           is the 1880 map. The road which [appellants] [have] used to
           access [their] property appears on that 1880 map as a hand-
           drawn notation;
        5. Given that the 1880 plat map shows the road that [appellants]
           and [their] predecessors in title have been using to access his
           property since at least 1983, it is hardly unreasonable to
           assume that whoever owned the properties in question from
           1880 to 1983 considered the road an easement to access what
           is now the [appellants’] property at least as long as 142 years
           ago.
        6. Thus, it appears that property that has not been landlocked for
           142 years has now been landlocked because Mr. Ensminger
           passed away and [appellee] decided not to allow [appellants]
           to access the property anymore.

Appellants opine that these facts justify a finding of an exception to the unity of

title requirement for an implied easement. Appellants maintain that 142 years of

using the road for access to appellants’ property is sufficient to satisfy the

requirement that the use is “permanent in character” as discussed in Trattar v.

Rausch, 154 Ohio St. 286, 95 N.E.2d 685 (1950).
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                                10

       {¶25} Appellants urge this court to adopt the dissenting opinion in Tiller v.

Hinton, 19 Ohio St.3d 66, 71, 482 N.E.2d 946 (1985) in which Justice Brown

maintained that even in the absence of proof of the elements required for an

easement by necessity, “[a]n exception should be made for cases such as the

one at bar where failure to imply an easement of necessity will result in

landlocking of real property preventing ingress and egress from the property to a

public road.”

       {¶26} Therefore, appellants move this court to reverse the trial court’s

judgment that dismissed their complaint.

                               B. Appellee’s Response

       {¶27} Appellee claims that appellants have the burden of “pleading and

proving that any alleged use/necessity arose at the time that the Ohio Company

of Associates severed its ownership and not afterwards.” (Emphasis sic.)

Appellee claims that appellants have not even alleged that they can prove unity

of ownership, and, in fact, concede, in their brief and prior pleadings that they

cannot prove unity of ownership of the properties. Appellee asserts that “based

on the title records that do exist, there was a lack of unity of ownership at least as

far back as 1900.” Because appellants have not, and cannot, produce evidence

that the need (i.e., access to a public road because their property is landlocked)

for an implied easement did not arise until “long after” the unified property was

severed, their claim for an implied easement fails as a matter of law.

         {¶28} Appellee claims that Blanton does not support appellants’ appeal.

Blanton held that the “French Grant” was insufficient to establish prior unity of
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                                  11

ownership. Blanton also held that even if the properties therein originating from

the “French Grant” had established prior unity of ownership, plaintiff still had to

show that a necessity arose at the time that the ownership of the “French Grant”

property was severed, not later. Thus, Blanton affords appellants’ claim no

support.

       {¶29} Appellee argues that appellants “attempt to minimize their admitted

inability to plead and prove prior unity of ownership as nothing more than an

inability to prove an ‘exact’ time of severance of ownership.” However, because

appellants cannot establish the time of severance of the prior ownership,

appellants cannot establish that an alleged use/necessity arose at or before the

time of severance.

       {¶30} Appellee asserts that even if appellants had presented evidence

that in the 1880s appellants’ property had access to a road, then their property

was not landlocked at that time. Appellee opines that appellants’ property would

have become landlocked only long after the unity of ownership was severed.

Consequently, Appellants’ claim still fails because they cannot prove

use/necessity at the time of severance.

       {¶31} Therefore, appellee maintains that we should affirm the trial court’s

dismissal of appellants’ complaint.

                                      III.   LAW

                  A. Standard of Review of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Dismissal

       {¶32} “An order granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is subject to

de novo review.” Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St. 3d 79, 2004-Ohio-
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                                12

4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5, citing Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d

416, 2002-Ohio-2480, 768 N.E.2d 1136, ¶ 4-5. In a de novo review, “we afford

no ‘deference to the trial court’s decision.” State v. Mirkin, 4th Dist. Jackson No.

20CA7, 2022-Ohio-2229, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Mills, 4th Dist. Ross No.

10CA3144, 2011-Ohio-377, ¶ 6.

       {¶33} “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted tests the sufficiency of the complaint.” Volbers-Klarich v. Middletown

Mgt., Inc., 125 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010-Ohio-2057, 929 N.E.2d 434, ¶ 11. “In order

for a court to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to

the relief sought.” Tayse v. Erdos, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 22CA3993, 2023-Ohio-

1542, ¶ 9, citing Ohio Bur. Of Workers’ Comp. v. McKinley, 130 Ohio St.3d 156,

2011-Ohio-4432, 956 N.E.2d 814, ¶ 12. When a trial court considers a Civ.R.

12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, it must review only the complaint, accepting all

factual allegations contained in the complaint as true and making all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. State ex rel. Talwar v. State Med. Bd.

of Ohio, 104 Ohio St.3d 290, 2004-Ohio-6410, 819 N.E.2d 654, ¶ 5. “Typically,

‘courts cannot rely on evidence or allegations outside the complaint to decide a

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.’ ” State ex rel. Evans v. Mohr, 155 Ohio St. 3d

579, , 2018-Ohio-5089, 122 N.E.3d 1240, ¶ 6, quoting Jefferson v. Bunting, 140

Ohio St.3d 62, 2014-Ohio-3074, 14 N.E.3d 1036, ¶ 11. “When a Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

motion depends on extrinsic evidence, the ‘proper procedure is for the court to
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                                13

convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and provide

the opposing party with notice and an opportunity to respond.’ ” Id., quoting

Bunting at ¶ 11.

       {¶34} However, “[a] trial court's reliance upon evidence outside the

pleadings for purposes of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) ruling constitutes harmless error

when the complaint should have been dismissed as a matter of law regardless of

the inappropriately considered evidence.” Davis v. Widman, 2009-Ohio-5430,

184 Ohio App. 3d 705, 715, 922 N.E.2d 272, ¶ 16 (3rd Dist.), citing Smith v.

Asbell, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 3CA2897, 2005-Ohio-2310, ¶ 45, 47; Shamansky v.

Massachusetts Fin. Serv. Co., 127 Ohio App.3d 400, 404, 713 N.E.2d 47 (10th

Dist.1998), discretionary appeal not allowed in (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 1435, 699

N.E.2d 949. Further, where both parties submit evidence outside the complaint,

appellant never moves the trial court to convert appellee’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion

to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, and does not raise that issue in

their appeal, an argument that the trial court erred by failing to make that

conversion is waived. See AAA American Const., Inc. v. Alpha Graphic, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 84320, 2005-Ohio-2822, ¶ 4. See also Ohio Env't Dev. Ltd. v.

Ohio Env't Prot. Agency, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP–683.

2010-Ohio-414, ¶ 20, 21.

                                      B. Easements

       {¶35} “An easement is an interest in the land of another that entitles the

owner of the easement to a limited use of the land in which the interest exists.”

Fitzpatrick v. Palmer, 186 Ohio App.3d 80, 2009-Ohio-6008, 926 N.E.2d 651, ¶
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                                14

22 (4th Dist.), citing Parrett v. Penn Cent. Corp., 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 86CA17,

1987 WL 14754 (July 27, 1987); citing Szaraz v. Consol. RR. Corp., 10 Ohio

App.3d 89, 460 N.E.2d 1133 (9th Dist.1983). The plaintiff bears the burden of

proving an easement by clear and convincing evidence. Blanton v. Eskridge, 4th

Dist. Scioto No. 16CA3783, 2017-Ohio-9366, ¶ 7, citing Cadwallader v.

Scovanner, 178 Ohio App.3d 26, 2008-Ohio-4166, 896 N.E.2d 748, ¶ 55 (12th

Dist.). “ ‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is evidence that will produce in the

factfinder's mind a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be

established.” Id., citing State v. Eppinger, 91 Ohio St.3d 158, 164, 743 N.E.2d

881 (2001).

       {¶36} “An easement may be created by specific grant, prescription, or

implication which may arise from the particular set of facts and circumstances.”

Campbell v. Great Miami Aerie No. 2309, Fraternal Order of Eagles, 15 Ohio

St.3d 79, 80, 472 N.E.2d 711 (1984), citing Yeager v. Tuning, 79 Ohio St. 121,

86 N.E. 657 (1908), Ciski v. Wentworth, 122 Ohio St. 487, 172 N.E. 276 (1930),

and Trattar v. Rausch, 154 Ohio St. 286, 95 N.E.2d 685 (1950). In this case, we

are concerned with implied easements, which may be established (1) by

necessity, and (2) by prior use. Wheeler v. McBride, 178 Ohio App .3d 367,

2008-Ohio-5109, 896 N.E.2d 748, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.), citing Trattar at 293.

       {¶37} We begin by recognizing that “[i]mplied grants of easements are not

favored, being in derogation of the rule that written instruments shall speak for

themselves.” Watson v. Neff, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 08CA12, 2009-Ohio-2062, ¶

9, citing Ciski at paragraph one of the syllabus. “An implied easement is based
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                              15

upon the theory that whenever one conveys property he includes in the

conveyance whatever is necessary for its beneficial use and enjoyment and

retains whatever is necessary for the use and enjoyment of the land retained.”

Trattar at 291. “Easements may be implied in several ways-from an existing use

at the time of the severance of ownership in land, from a conveyance describing

the premises as bounded upon a way, from a conveyance with reference to a

plat or map or from necessity alone, as in the case of ways of necessity.” Id., at

291-292, citing 15 Ohio Jurisprudence 37, Section 27.

       {¶38} To prove an implied easement by prior use, the plaintiff must

demonstrate:

        (1) A severance of the unity of ownership in an estate; (2) that,
        before the separation takes place, the use which gives rise to the
        easement shall have been so long continued and obvious or
        manifest as to show that it was meant to be permanent; (3) that
        the easement shall be reasonably necessary to the beneficial
        enjoyment of the land granted or retained; (4) that the servitude
        shall be continuous as distinguished from a temporary or
        occasional use only.

Ciski v. Wentworth, 122 Ohio St. 487, 172 N.E. 276 (1930), syllabus.

       {¶39} “To establish an implied easement by necessity, the party must

present evidence on the same four elements of an implied easement by prior

use, except that for the third element, the party must show ‘strict necessity’ rather

than ‘reasonable necessity.’ ” Bank of Am. v. Stevens, 4th Dist. Hocking No.

16CA4, 2017-Ohio-9040, ¶ 46, citing Fitzpatrick v. Palmer, 186 Ohio App.3d 80,

2009-Ohio-6008, ¶ 35–36 (4th Dist.).
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                            16

                       C. The Unity-of-Ownership Element

       {¶40} Common to implied easements, “[t]he element of severance of unity

of ownership requires the plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

the land in question was [previously] possessed in common ownership and later

severed.” Dunn v. Ransom, 4th Dist. Pike No. 10CA806, 2011-Ohio-4253, ¶ 35,

citing Arkes, Franklin App. No. 05AP-202, 2005-Ohio-6369, ¶ 16.

              The unity of title requirement accords with the principles of
        implied easements. Implied easements are easements read into
        a deed. “An implied easement is based upon the theory that
        whenever one conveys property he includes in the conveyance
        whatever is necessary for its beneficial use and enjoyment and
        retains whatever is necessary for the use and enjoyment of the
        land retained.” In other words, implied easements are those
        easements that a reasonable grantor and grantee would have
        expected in the conveyance, and a court will read the implied
        easement into a deed where the elements of that implied
        easement exist. However, if there is no unity of title, there is no
        grantor who may give an easement to the grantee. It does not
        matter whether a reasonable grantor would have conveyed an
        easement or a reasonable grantee would have expected to
        receive an easement. A grantor simply cannot convey what is not
        possessed. (Citation Omitted)

Neff, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 08CA12, 2009-Ohio-2062, ¶ 9.

       {¶41} There are important factors when considering the severance

segment of the unity-of-ownership element that differ slightly depending on

whether appellant is alleging an implied easement based on prior use, or,

alternatively, on necessity.

       {¶42} “A prior use easement looks retrospectively at how the land was

used before it was severed in order to ascertain what beneficial use the grantor

truly intended to convey.” Arkes v. Gregg, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-202,

2005-Ohio-6369, ¶ 14; see also Anderson v. Fleagane, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 21
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                              17

BE 0020, 2022-Ohio-1120, ¶ 33, appeal not allowed, 167 Ohio St. 3d 1459,

2022-Ohio-2446, 190 N.E.3d 644, ¶ 34.

       {¶43} “An implied easement or way of necessity is based upon the theory

that without it the grantor or grantee, as the case may be, cannot make use of his

land.” Trattar, 154 Ohio St. 286, 95 N.E.2d 685 (1950), paragraph one of the

syllabus (1950). “The necessity that serves as the basis for an implied easement

must exist upon the severance of ownership.” Arkes at ¶ 13; see also Cyrus v.

Melvin, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 1409, 1980 WL 351003 (March 27, 1980) * 3;

Fleagane at ¶ 34, quoting Arkes at ¶ 13.

                                  IV.      ANALYSIS

       {¶44} We begin by finding that Blanton affords appellants’ no support for

their appeal. Rather, it supports the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. In

Blanton this court reversed the trial court’s judgment that granted appellee an

implied easement based on necessity. Blanton, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 16CA3783,

2017-Ohio-9366, ¶ 21. In part, we reasoned:

               Appellees presented no evidence of unity of title between
        their property and Appellants' property. The only comment
        Appellees made with regard to the chain of title is that both
        Appellants' and Appellees' property originated from the French
        Grant. On the other hand, Appellants introduced chains of title for
        each property demonstrating no common ownership of the
        properties as far back as 1930. Further, Appellants presented the
        testimony of Loren Purdom, a land surveyor licensed in the State
        of Ohio, who stated that there was no unity of title between
        Appellants' and Appellees' properties. Thus, Appellees presented
        no evidence proving the first element required in order to establish
        an easement of necessity.
               Further, assuming arguendo that both properties
        originating as part of the French Grant somehow satisfies the unity
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                               18

        of title requirement, which Appellees subtly imply but do not even
        expressly argue, there is no evidence that the Blantons' property
        was landlocked at the time it was originally subdivided out of the
        French Grant. Instead, evidence produced at trial demonstrates
        the opposite, revealing that Blanton's predecessor's in interest
        enjoyed direct access to their property via State Route 52, prior to
        the construction of limited access U.S. Route 52.

Id. at ¶ 13-14.

Therefore, we concluded in Blanton that even if appellees had been able to show

prior unity of ownership of the properties at issue, they “failed to demonstrate that

there was a strict necessity for an easement at the time the properties were

initially severed or subdivided.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 20.

       {¶45} Blanton’s holding is consistent with the proposition that for an

implied easement, evidence of a use or necessity that is proximate in time to

when a property is severed is necessary to prove the unity-of-ownership element.

More specifically, for an implied easement based on prior use, a plaintiff must be

able to prove that the use existed prior to severance of the property unified in

ownership. Arkes at ¶ 14; Fleagane at ¶ 33. For an implied easement based on

necessity, a plaintiff must be able to prove that the necessity “exist[ed] upon

severance” of the property unified in ownership. (Emphasis added.) Arkes at ¶

13; Blanton at ¶ 14; Melvin, at * 3; Fleagane at ¶ 34.

       {¶46} It is unnecessary for this court to determine whether appellee’s and

appellants’ properties were previously unified in ownership pursuant to the Ohio

Company Purchase, or in some other manner. This is because, similar to

Blanton, even assuming arguendo the properties herein were previously unified

in ownership, appellants repeatedly admit in their pleadings in both the trial court
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                                   19

and their appellate brief that the records available for the properties herein go

back only to the 1880s. Based on this admission, appellants cannot prove the

elements required for an easement implied by prior use or necessity.

       {¶47} Appellants’ admissions in this regard were made in court pleadings

subsequent to their complaint. Trial courts typically cannot rely on this extrinsic

evidence when addressing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). We

find, however, that any error due to the trial court's failure to convert appellee’s

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment was

harmless because appellants have admitted that they cannot prove their claim.

Asbell, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 3CA2897, 2005-Ohio-2310, ¶ 45, 47; Shamansky,

127 Ohio App.3d 400, 404, 713 N.E.2d 47 (10th Dist.1998). This is because,

[a]n “admission or statement of a party to an action subversive to such party's

interests is conclusive.” Lieninger, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F 78-16, 1979 WL

207043, *1 (Mar. 23, 1979).

       {¶48} Furthermore, both parties submitted evidence outside appellants’

complaint, appellants never moved the trial court to convert appellee’s motion to

dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, and appellants have not raised the

trial court’s failure to convert in their appeal to his court. Therefore, we find that

any argument that the court erred in failing to convert the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion

to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment is waived. AAA American Const.,

Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84320, 2005-Ohio-2822, ¶ 4; Env't Dev. Ltd., 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 09AP–683, 2010-Ohio-414, ¶ 20, 21.
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                              20

       {¶49} Accordingly, based on appellants’ own admission, they cannot

present any evidence that any previously unified property was subject to a use

that existed prior to the severance, or any necessity that occurred at the time of

severance, which is fatal to their claims for an implied easement.

       {¶50} Nevertheless, appellants maintain that their inability to acquire

records of any unified property at the time that it was severed was not their fault

because said records simply did not exist for any number of reasons, e.g., the

time of severance occurred prior to 1820, which is the earliest deed index

available in Meigs County. Appellants urge this Court to adopt Justice Brown’s

dissenting opinion in Tiller v. Hinton as an exception to unity-of-ownership

element under the circumstances of this case. 19 Ohio St.3d 66, 482 N.E.2d 946

(1985).

       {¶51} In Hinton, the appellants sought an injunction to prevent appellees

from interfering with their right-of-way across appellee’s land based on a

previously executed easement that was never recorded. Id. at 66. The trial court

denied appellants relief and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 69. The

Supreme Court affirmed holding that “[b]ecause neither the deed expressly

granting the easement nor any alleged implied easement of necessity was timely

recorded herein, and because appellee had no actual or constructive notice of

any easement, the subject property is not encumbered.” Id. at 70. Justice

Brown, authored a dissent maintaining that “[a]n exception should be made for

cases such as the one at bar where failure to imply an easement of necessity will
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                                21

result in landlocking of real property preventing ingress and egress from the

property to a public road.” Id. at 71 (Brown, J., dissenting).

       {¶52} To the extent that appellants are unable to prove their case because

of absence of pertinent records, we understand their frustration. However, that

does not alleviate their burden of proving all the elements necessary to prove an

implied easement, including evidence of a use that occurred prior to severance,

or necessity that occurred at the time of severance. By their own admission,

appellants are unable to prove either of those events. And, as part of the judicial

branch of our tripartite system of government, we are compelled to follow the

opinions issued by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Consequently, we decline to

create any exception to the requirements necessary for an implied easement by

adopting Justice Brown’s dissenting opinion. Such exceptions are policy

questions that may be addressed by the General Assembly, but not the courts.

                                     V. CONCLUSION

       {¶53} Based on our de novo review of the trial court’s judgment, we find

that the trial court did not err in granting appellee’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to

dismiss. Therefore, we overrule appellants’ sole assignment of error and affirm

the trial court’s judgment of dismissal.

                                                           JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Meigs App. No. 22CA7                                                               22

                               JUDGMENT ENTRY

       It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and appellant shall pay
the costs.

      The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Meigs County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

       Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the
date of this entry.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                      For the Court,

                                  BY: ____________________________
                                     Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

                             NOTICE TO COUNSEL
      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.