Court Opinion

ID: 9723635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:23:50.518404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:12.051111
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion in Which Draper, Judge, Concurs
Bobbitt, J.
I dissent from the majority opinion and decision for the following reasons:
First: This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court denying appellant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis by which proceeding appellant at*39tempted to show that he did not have a fair trial when he was convicted for the commission of rape upon a female child 11 years of age. No appeal was taken from the judgment in that case. The sole error assigned here is that the decision is contrary to law “in that the entire evidence adduced at the hearing was such as should have sustained a finding and judgment for appellant.”
The judgment attacked by appellant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis is valid on its face and the presumption is that it was procured by due process of law. The burden was upon appellant to overcome this presumption by a fair preponderance of the evidence in order to maintain his petition. State v. Lindsey; State v. Carroll (1952), 231 Ind. 126, 136, 106 N. E. 2d 230; Sells v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 137, 142, 107 N. E. 2d 264; Souerdike v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 204, 206, 108 N. E. 2d 136. He failed to sustain that burden.
Second: If the evidence was such as should have compelled a finding and judgment for appellant, the finding is contrary to law. However, the judgment herein should be set aside only if the evidence is without conflict and can lead to but one conclusion, and the trial court has reached an opposite conclusion. Burns v. State (1953), 231 Ind. 563, 570, 108 N. E. 2d 626, 345 U. S. 958, 97 L. Ed. 1379, 73 S. Ct. 943; Souerdike v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 204, 206, 108 N. E. 2d 136, supra; Pokraka v. Lummus Co. (1952), 230 Ind. 523, 532, 104 N. E. 2d 669.
An examination of the record discloses a conflict in the evidence on all the material questions raised in appellant’s brief.
The appellant testified that he was struck and beaten by the police and that the confession which was intro*40duced on Ms trial was obtained by threats and duress. This was denied, under oath, by three police detectives who questioned appellant at the time of, and after, his arrest.
Appellant further testified that he gave his attorney the names and addresses of several witnesses who would testify in his behalf. The attorney testified that appellant gave him the name of only one witness but did not know his address, that he made an effort to locate the witness but was unable to find him.
Appellant further testified that he was not advised of his right to a trial by jury at any time after his arrest. His attorney testified that on September 14, 1953, he explained to appellant his constitutional rights and asked him if he wanted a jury trial, and appellant replied that he did not; that again, on September 19, he told appellant that he could have the option of trying the matter before the court or jury, and that he had the right, if he wanted it, to have a jury called. That on a subsequent time, on September 19, appellant said he didn’t want a jury. That he talked with appellant at the county jail on Saturday afternoon in the conference room and discussed with him the right to a trial by jury. That he told him he could have a jury if he so requested, and he said he did not want a jury because he was innocent of the matter.
Appellant’s attorney further testified; “On October 7, 1953, I told this defendant that he was going on trial, what the charge was, and that it was for an offense for which he might be given a sentence of life imprisonment. He understood that. I talked with him and so told him. ... On October 7, 1953, I again brought up the subject of a jury with him. I told him he could still have a trial by jury if he so requested.
“Q. He fully understood that?
*41“A. Yes, to which Mr. Thomas A. Hillman said he was not guilty of the charge in the affidavit.
“Q. And, therefore, he didn’t want a jury because he was not guilty?
“A. That is correct.”
This court has consistently and without exception held that when the evidence is in conflict on the material allegations of the petition for writ of error coram nobis, this court will not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. Burns v. State (1953), 231 Ind. 563, 108 N. E. 2d 626, supra; Dillon v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 396, 108 N. E. 2d 881; Lykins v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 258, 108 N. E. 2d 270; Souerdike v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 204, 108 N. E. 2d 136, supra; Sells v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 137, 107 N. E. 2d 264, supra; State v. Lindsey; State v. Carroll (1952), 231 Ind. 126, 106 N. E. 2d 230, supra; Abraham v. State (1950), 228 Ind. 179, 91 N. E. 2d 358; Thompson v. State (1947), 225 Ind. 78, 72 N. E. 2d 744, 331 U. S. 842, 91 L. Ed. 1853, 67 S. Ct. 1525; Bolton v. State (1945), 223 Ind. 308, 60 N. E. 2d 742, 158 A. L. R. 1057; Sessler v. State (1944), 222 Ind. 608, 56 N. E. 2d 851; Garrett v. State (1939), 216 Ind. 52, 22 N. E. 2d 981; Power v. State (1936), 210 Ind. 435, 4 N. E. 2d 178; Quinn v. State (1936), 209 Ind. 316, 198 N. E. 70.
Nor will the decision of the trial court be disturbed if there is evidence of probative value to sustain it. Burns v. State (1953), 231 Ind. 563, 565, 108 N. E. 2d 626, supra.
It is evident from the summary of evidence and direct testimony set out hereinabove that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding and judgment of the trial court. We have many times affirmed on much less.
*42Third: The result reached by the majority could be obtained only by (1) weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of the witnesses; and (2) by searching the record in an effort to find reversible errors. Both are directly contrary and repugnant to rules which are as old and as well established as the court itself. That this court will not search the record for causes on which to reverse a judgment is as well settled and as sound as the rule that we will not weigh the evidence.
The decision of the majority that appellant’s trial does not comport with the due course of law provision of the Indiana Constitution, §12, Art. 1, or the due process of law provision of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution, is apparently based upon two reasons: (1) That appellant was not represented by competent counsel; and (2) that the trial was held in the judge’s chambers and not in the courtroom. In my opinion the evidence is not such as to lead only and inescapably to the conclusion of the majority that appellant’s constitutional rights were violated because of the incompeteney of his counsel.
The question of holding the trial in the judge’s chambers instead of in the courtroom is neither mentioned nor discussed in the argument section of appellant’s brief as required by Rule 2-17 (e) and (f) of this court and it must, therefore, be deemed waived. Rudd v. State (1952), 231 Ind. 105, 113, 107 N. E. 2d 168.
I will now consider the points advanced by the appellant in support of his assignment of errors.
Fourth: Appellant discusses four questions in the argument section of his brief: (a) Why the evidence was such as should have sustained a finding and judgment for appellant; (b) Alleged inadequacy of counsel *43furnished him for his trial by the court; (c) The alleged failure of appellant to waive his right to trial by jury; and (d) The failure of his counsel to require a court reporter at the original trial.
(a) As to this question appellant attempts to sustain his assigned error by asserting that evidence favorable to him is uncontroverted. As has already been pointed out in this opinion, the record conclusively disproves such assertion.
(b) It appears from the argument section of appellant’s brief that the charge of inadequacy of counsel is based upon the assertion that his court-appointed counsel failed or refused to secure the attendance of appellant’s witnesses at the trial. As was stated above, appellant’s attorney testified at the coram nobis hearing that the appellant gave him the name of only one witness but did not know his address or how, when, or where he could be located.
In addition to the testimony of appellant’s trial counsel hereinabove set out, he testified further as follows:
“I discussed with him the matter of a signed confession at this conference on September 19th. I asked if he signed a statement to the police officers, and he answered ‘No.’ I did not know that the police officers had obtained a statement from him. I did not know from him there was a statement signed by him. I asked him if at anytime he had signed a statement. He said he did not. I said, ‘Did you sign any papers concerning the facts contained in this affidavit?’ He said he did not. I first learned about this exhibit that was introduced in evidence at the time of the trial on October 7, 1953, by Sergeant Frank King. The day of the trial was the first intimation I had that he had signed a statement. I read it that day. I talked with the petitioner about it. I asked if this was his statement, if the facts in here were true and if he signed it—to which he said it was. *44He did not say anything to me about being abused by any member of the Port Wayne Detective Bureau. That was on October 7, 1953, or anytime prior to that. October 7, 1953, he did not make any statements as to how his signature appeared on this statement. I asked him if it was his statement, and if the facts were true, and if he signed it; and he answered all that in the affirmative. He did not say to me at that time why he signed it. He said, ‘That’s my statement, that’s how it happened, and that’s my signature.’
“Q. How did you on that day reconcile that statement, signed confession, confessing the alleged charge, when he had repeatedly told you he was innocent?
“A. I asked Thomas Hillman whether he had signed the statement, and he said ‘Yes.’ I said, ‘You told me you never signed any statement.’ He said, ‘That’s all right, I signed it,’ and that’s all he said, (end of answer). He did not say anything at anytime about George Nine or anyone else abusing him. I never heard anything of any abuse in this case until just recently. There was nothing said about it on the day of trial. On September 28, 1953, I entered a plea of not guilty. I did not change the plea on that day. Nothing was said on that day about him not taking the witness stand. The only thing I asked him was whether he wanted to take the witness stand. He said he did not want to take the witness stand.”
(c) Appellant’s trial counsel testified that on three different occasions he advised appellant that he was entitled to a trial by jury, and that appellant replied that he did not want a jury trial. There appears in the Order Book an entry on October 7,1953, as follows:
“Comes now the State of Indiana, by John G. Reiber, Prosecuting Attorney, and comes now the defendant, Thomas A. Hillman, in person and by counsel, Frank Celarek, and this cause now being at issue, the same is submitted to the Court for trial,...”
*45The statute implementing the constitutional provision1 for trial by jury is as follows:
“The defendant and prosecuting attorney, with the assent of the court, may submit the trial to the court. All other trials must be by jury.” Acts 1905, ch. 169, §258, p. 584, being §9-1803, Burns’ 1942 Replacement.
It is evident from the record that appellant, being present in court with his attorney on the day set for trial, knowingly and voluntarily submitted himself to the court for trial without a jury. By thus freely and understandingly submitting his trial to the court on the evidence, he waived his constitutional right to a trial by jury. Murphy v. State (1884), 97 Ind. 579; Ewbank’s Criminal Law, 2d Ed., §555, pp. 371, 372.
(d) There is no evidence in the record before us that appellant ever attempted or contemplated an appeal from his conviction in the original case, or could have been in any way prejudiced by the failure to have a court reporter take down the testimony at his trial.
The absence of a court reporter does not necessarily preclude the making of a bill of exceptions for the purpose of an appeal. The substance of the testimony given may be set forth in lieu of a bill of exceptions in question and answer form. McDonald v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 441, 118 N. E. 2d 891.
The non-attendance of a court reporter to take down the testimony at his original trial was in no way prejudicial to the appellant who never appealed or attempted to appeal that case.
Fifth: I have been unable to find any evidence in the record pertaining to alibi witnesses, and if, as it appears, the appellant never informed his attorney *46of the existence of any such, the fact the attorney failed to give notice of alibi as required by statute cannot be considered as evidence that he was incompetent.
The record in this case does not approach a showing of a set of circumstances such as were present in Wilson v. State (1943), 222 Ind. 63, 51 N. E. 2d 848, and in my opinion the reasons for reversal in that case have no application whatever to the case at bar.
Is this court to sit in judgment upon every defense lawyer in a criminal case and pronounce him incompetent because he failed to produce witnesses in behalf of the defendant, even though it appears that none were available?
Is a lawyer presumed to be condemned as incompetent because he failed to make an opening statement, or cross-examine the state witnesses, or make objections to questions propounded by the prosecuting attorney regardless of how much damage he might do to his own client’s cause by venturing to do so?
Is this court going to castigate a lawyer as being incompetent because he did not insist upon a jury trial for his client when the client told him on more than one occasion that he did not want a jury trial, and did so with full knowledge of his right thereto ?
Is it conclusive proof of incompetency when a lawyer, after advising his client that he had a right to take the witness stand and testify in his own behalf and the client refuses to do so, does not attempt to compel or coerce such client to take the witness stand and testify?
It is common knowledge among lawyers that there are many instances in which, in the defense of a person charged with crime, the most capable, experienced and seasoned defense counsel would purposely, for valid *47reasons apparent to him, pursue a similar course and do and refrain from doing the very things which have in the opinion of the majority rendered appellant’s trial counsel incompetent in this case.
It is presumptious on the part of this court to “second guess” the judgment of an attorney in deciding the policy and strategy which should best be followed in conducting the defense of persons charged with crime. We are not competent to do so, nor is it a part of our function.
A pronouncement by this court that appellant’s counsel was incompetent and inept and by his acts, or failures, prevented appellant from having a fair and impartial trial, in view of the entire record before us, can be based only upon speculation, conjecture and “second guessing.” This is not sufficient.
For the reasons above stated, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Draper, J., concurs.
Note.—Reported in 123 N. E. (2d) 180.

. Section 13, Article 1, Constitution of Indiana.