Court Opinion

ID: 9466137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:06:46.385323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:34.261274
License: Public Domain

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The issue in this case is whether California-equipped automobiles can be sold outside California. Specifically, it is whether the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 were intended to put an end to the right of manufacturers to sell motor vehicles in states other than California when the vehicles are equipped with pollution control devices approved for California which satisfy standards that are “in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards.” In my judgment, the 1977 amendments cannot fairly be read to forbid such sales. If Congress had intended such a restrictive burden on interstate commerce it would have said so. It did not.
I
The Administrator’s position that he is powerless to permit the sale of California-equipped motor vehicles outside California primarily rests on his misconceptions of the impact of the 1977 amendments on section 209, 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (Supp. I 1977), the California waiver provision.
Before 1977, section 209 required the Administrator to waive preemption for California if that State’s standards were “more stringent” then applicable federal standards.1 While this provision was in effect, manufacturers were able to sell California-equipped motor vehicles outside California. Congress was aware of this practice in undertaking to amend the Clean Air Act in 1977.2 The 1977 amendments changed the law to require the Administrator to waive preemption to California if that State’s *1305emission standards will be “in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards.” 3
The intent of this amendment, however, was not to allow California to relax its rigorous emissions program or to abandon the unique role it occupies in emissions control. Quite the contrary, Congress intended California to press its efforts at combatting emissions from motor vehicles and to continue its status as a pioneer in such efforts. The only reason for the change in the language of Section 209 was to permit California to adopt standards for oxides of nitrogen considerably more stringent than the applicable federal standards; Congress recognized the “theoretical possibility” that under the original section 209 (§ 208 of the 1967 Act, 81 Stat. 501) this might not be technologically feasible if California were bound by the stringent carbon monoxide standard.4
The Administrator here focuses solely on the fact that California’s carbon monoxide standard is lower than the federal level and therefore concludes that California-equipped vehicles do not meet federal standards. But this reasoning ignores the more stringent standard for oxides of nitrogen, and, more important, completely neglects the fact that the California standards are in the aggregate held to be at least as protecfive of public health and welfare as the federal standards. The overall (aggregate) protectiveness of the California standards as measured by the overall protectiveness of the federal standards is the key. The Administrator’s decision to waive preemption of the federal standards indicates that he can find no evidence that the California standards are not in the aggregate at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable federal standards. To say that an amendment designed to strengthen California’s emission control program — a program which has consistently run ahead of federal efforts — somehow diminishes the effectiveness of the California standards vis-a-vis the federal standards is to read into the amendments a conclusion that Congress never expressed.
II
If anything, the 1977 amendments indicate that Congress regarded the California standards to be superior to federal standards. In section 177 of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 7507), Congress permits “nonattainment states,” i. e., states which have failed to reach certain air quality levels, to adopt California’s emissions standards.5 The states’ power to opt for California standards is not contingent upon having a different or peculiar problem with oxides of nitrogen, nor is it conditioned upon adherence to federal carbon monoxide levels. In *1306other words, a state’s decision to impose California’s emissions control regulations does not turn on the considerations the Administrator invoked to ban the sale of California-equipped vehicles outside California. The unmistakable congressional assumption underlying section 177 is that states suffering particularly severe air quality problems ought to be able to adopt the emissions control program that is most effective in the aggregate, and Congress turned to California to provide that program.6 Had Congress been concerned about the minimal differences between the specific standards for various pollutants, it would hardly have given the states this option.
Ill
The Administrator regards as “critical” the language in section 209(b)(3), which provides that “[i]n the case of any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine to which State standards apply pursuant to a waiver granted under [§ 209(b)(1)], compliance with such State standards shall be treated as compliance with applicable Federal standards for purposes of this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(3) (Supp. I 1977) According to the Administrator’s view, this provision means that California standards apply only to California-equipped motor vehicles required by California law to meet California standards. This reasoning imports into the section a geographical limitation that is unwarranted by the text or purpose of the section.
The provision refers only to motor vehicles, not to states. Before 1977, all motor vehicles which complied with the California standards adopted pursuant to a waiver could be sold in all fifty states; as between the federal and California standards, the latter applied to these vehicles. If the vehicle is designed and certified to meet California standards, to my mind those standards apply to the motor vehicle, and pursuant to a waiver may be sold outside California. It is reasonable to construe the intent of Congress as recognizing that a motor vehicle that complies in the aggregate with federal standards in California should also be deemed as complying in the aggregate with federal standards elsewhere. The obvious purpose of section 209(b)(3) is to ensure that manufacturers will not be faced with meeting both federal and California standards. Because federal law requires a federal certificate of conformity as a condition precedent to the sale of motor vehicles, and because compliance with California’s superi- or emissions control program may not precisely dovetail with federal requirements, some provision was needed to make a California certificate tantamount to a federal one. Section 209(b)(3) fulfills that need. The Administrator attempts to read the statute as though Congress had enacted that “compliance with such State standards shall be treated as compliance only in California with applicable Federal standards.” But Congress did not so legislate. Congress’ refusal to provide such a geographical limitation indicates it intended the provision to apply generally.
IV
On the Administrator’s reading, California-equipped motor vehicles can only be *1307sold within the geographic area purportedly described in section 209(b)(3), namely, California. Yet in section 177, Congress plainly indicated that it intended that vehicles meeting the California standards be sold in states electing to adopt California standards. This result can only be achieved through section 209(b)(3). The Administrator’s geographically-restricted construction of that provision would prohibit that result. Only if section 209(b)(3) is read to avoid any geographic limitation can the purpose of section 177 be accomplished. Congress saw no problem with the application of section 209(b)(3) to motor vehicles in section 177 states because it recognized that once a waiver had been granted for California standards, those standards would apply to all California-equipped motor vehicles irrespective of where they were sold or driven. Viewed in tandem, sections 209 and 177 mean that only California-equipped motor vehicles can be sold in California and states choosing California standards, but California-equipped motor vehicles can be sold elsewhere.
I respectfully dissent.

. On this subject the Act previously provided:
Sec. 208 “(b) The Secretary shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, waive application of this section to any State which has adopted standards (other than crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, unless he finds that such State does not require standards more stringent than applicable Federal standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions or that such State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent with section 202(a) of this title.
Pub.L.No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 501 (emphasis added).

. See, e. g., S.Rep.No. 95-127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1977); Proposed Amendments to the Clean Air Act as amended: Hearings on S.251, S.252, and S.253 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm, on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Part IV, at 56 (February 15, 1977) (statement of J. Jensen).

. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (Supp. I 1977) (emphasis added).
(b)(1) The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, waive application of this section to any State which has adopted standards (other than crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State determines that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards. No such waiver shall be granted if the Administrator finds that—
(A) the determination of the State is arbitrary and capricious,
(B) such State does not need such State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or
(C) such State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent with section 7521(a) of this title.

. H.R.Rep.No. 95-294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 302 (1977).

. 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (Supp. I 1977).
Notwithstanding section 7543(a) of this title, any State which has plan provisions approved under this part may adopt and enforce for any model year standards relating to control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines and take such other actions as are referred to in section 7543(a) of this title respecting such vehicles if—
(1) such standards are identical to the California standards for which a waiver has been granted for such model year, and
(2) California and such State adopt such standards at least two years before commencement of such model year (as determined by regulations of the Administrator).
July 14, 1955, c. 360, Title I, § 177, as added Aug. 7, 1977, Pub.L. 95-95, Title I, § 129(b), 91 Stat. 750.

. The legislative history of section 177 is replete with statements expressing Congress’ view that the California standards were stricter than corresponding federal standards — and therefore generally more protective of the public health and welfare — despite the change in section 209(b). See, e. g., 123 Cong.Rec. H5061 (daily ed. May 25, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Rogers, Chairman of the Subcommittee handling the bill) (states with “heavy pollution problem[s]” can decide to adopt the “more strict” California standards; section 177 designed to give states the option “to grant greater health protection” to citizens); id. at H5062 (remarks of Rep. Maguire) (states with “tougher” pollution problems should be able to adopt California’s “tougher standards”); id. (remarks of Rep. Wirth) (section 177 poses choice between “the softer [federal] standards or the very tough California standards”).
It is no answer to say that section 177 leaves the choice with the states, not the manufacturers. The choice in section 177 is whether to require California standards. The Administrator’s decision here turns on the facile notion that one California standard might be less stringent than its federal counterpart. The emphasis on section 177 is to show that this did not diminish Congress’ view that California’s standards were in general more protective of public health than the federal standards. Congress’ judgment in that regard should control.