Court Opinion

ID: 9734045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:23:42.344964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.278673
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLS, dissenting: This record — to my view — is too weak a reed to support a finding of incompetency of counsel. I must dissent. Krankel’s pro se post-trial motion essentially adopts the issues raised by attorney O’Rourke and then adds: “(5. The Public Defender, Michael O’Rourke erred in his representation of the defendant by refusing to file the affimative [sic] defense of an alibi. (6. That the defendant was denied proper counsel pretaining [sic] to through [sic] investagation [sic] by the Public Defenders Office as to the whereabouts of the defendant at the time the alleged offense was supposedly comitted [sic].” At the post-trial motion hearing, Krankel was given unrestrained opportunity to address the court and during his extensive comments his sole reference to the question of ineffective assistance of counsel was as follows: “On the ineffective assistance of counsel, the Defendant feels had he received proper counsel he would have had a defense that would have kept the jury from bringing a verdict of guilty back for the reasons as follows: The court appointed a Public Defender for the Defendant’s being financially unable to acquire counsel, that Public Defender being Michael O’Rourke. Approximately five months prior to the Defendant’s trial by jury, he informed hi[s] attorney of the affirmative defense and how to obtain his alibi. The Defendant even contacted the witness to tell him his attorney would be contacting him. Mr. O’Rourke failed not only to contact the alibi witness but to even claim the affirmative defense which the Defendant learned of after the State had rested their case at trial. It is believed by the Defendant the affirmative defense was a very crucial part of his defense, and so on the grounds of the Defendant’s having ineffective assistance of counsel, he asked the court to grant his motion for a new trial.” With reference to this issue, the only other comments in the record are as set forth in the majority opinion. The only attack here on attorney O’Rourke’s competency is that he failed to investigate an alibi witness. Yet the four corners of the record before us simply do not bear this out. If anything, the only deficiency of counsel was that he didn’t say enough on the record to explain what he did or was unable to do. All that defense counsel said was: “I did not talk to the man, I was never able to contact him.” This does not imply to me a failure to investigate. All we have in this record are the bald assertions of the defendant. Mere allegations. No witness was produced in court at the post-trial hearing. No affidavit of the witness was proffered reciting what he would testify to. No adequate offer of proof at all. Surely the burden is upon the defendant to present specific identification of the witness, the witness himself, an affidavit of the -witness or some other sufficient proof. We still don’t even know the name of the witness! All we have asserted is “Tazewell Towing Co.” Even if O’Rourke did fail to investigate, such failure is insufficient to reverse a criminal conviction unless it is shown that the testimony the witness would have produced was favorable to the defendant and its absence was prejudicial to him. Greer. In People v. Davis (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 461, 424 N.E.2d 630, the defendant argued on appeal that his attorney failed to call an alleged alibi witness and he was therefore denied effective assistance of counsel. “However,” said the Davis court, “defendant does not disclose the identity of this witness, and there is nothing to indicate how this unknown witness could have established an alibi defense.” (98 Ill. App. 3d 461, 466, 424 N.E.2d 630, 635.) And in Greer, Justice Underwood wrote: “In this case, however, the defendant does not point to any potentially favorable testimony which his trial counsel failed to investigate, nor does defendant contend that anyone would have contradicted the testimony of Linda Creemens, or that her testimony could have been excluded. Although defense counsel may have been surprised by Creemens’ testimony, there has been no showing of a prejudicial effect without which the outcome of the trial would probably have been different.” 79 Ill. 2d 103, 123, 402 N.E.2d 203, 213. Davis and Greer on this issue are strikingly similar to the case at bench. I cannot conclude from this puny record that defense counsel was incompetent.