Court Opinion

ID: 96726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:41:39+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:55.574996
License: Public Domain

207 U.S. 244 (1907)
EARLE
v.
MYERS.
SAME
v.
SAME.
Nos. 12, 388.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued October 15, 1907.
Decided December 2, 1907.
APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
*247 Mr. Henry E. Davis and Mr. John C. Gittings for appellant.
Mr. T. Percy Myers and Mr. Michael J. Colbert, with whom Mr. S.T. Thomas was on the brief, for appellees.
MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
In making up the account the representative of the Earle estate claimed a credit for the sum of $19,558.05 as part of the proper expenses incurred by or in behalf of defendant in obtaining the appropriations above mentioned. The auditor struck out $13,058.05 of such claimed credit, leaving $6,500 as a proper credit in favor of the administrator of Earle. The thirteen thousand and some odd dollars were stricken out by the auditor because of the fact, as he found, that these moneys *248 were paid for lobbying services, in efforts to secure the appropriation by Congress, which services he held were contrary to public policy and discountenanced by the courts, and therefore not to be allowed as a proper credit. The balance, $6,500, the auditor held that the proof showed had been paid by the defendant for legal services by the individuals named, and that such services were valuable, and the amount paid was not excessive or unreasonable. This amount consisted of three separate items, two items for $2,000 and one item for $2,500.
Upon the argument in the Court of Appeals the defendants' counsel insisted that the whole nineteen thousand dollars should have been allowed as a proper credit, while the plaintiff's counsel asserted that the disallowance of the thirteen thousand dollar credit was right, but that the court erred in admitting the $6,500 as a proper credit. The Court of Appeals, as we have said, affirmed that portion of the decree in which the auditor disallowed the thirteen thousand dollars claimed for credit, but reversed that portion of the decree by which the auditor allowed the credit of $6,500, and directed the decree to be amended by striking out the above credit for that sum. This was upon the ground that the $6,500 claimed was also illegal. The court said that it was impossible to read the record without coming to the conclusion that these alleged services were of the kind known as lobbying services; that, although proof on the subject was meager, yet so far as it went it tended unmistakably to show the illicit character of the services, being personal influence and personal solicitation with members of Congress, and that courts had branded services of a like nature as improper, and for which no recovery would be allowed.
The auditor before whom the case was tried and who heard the witnesses, while holding that certain of the credit claims were illegal as claims for lobbying services, yet held that these particular claims for services performed by members of the bar, and representing the $6,500 allowed, were for proper professional services, and as such should be allowed. The Supreme *249 Court of the District confirmed the report of the auditor, and thereby held that the credit claimed for the payment of these services was proper.
After a careful examination of the testimony in the case we are unable to concur with the Court of Appeals on this question. We cannot find any evidence to justify a reversal of the report of the auditor, confirmed as it is by the Supreme Court. The payments were proved to have been made, and there is no evidence of any illegality connected with the services performed sufficient to justify an appellate tribunal in reversing the finding of the auditor and the Supreme Court upon this question of fact. It is unnecessary to embody in this opinion a reference to the testimony in the case or to make extracts therefrom, but it is enough to say that we are satisfied, from a careful perusal thereof, that we are right in the conclusions which we have come to.
As to the thirteen thousand dollar credit which the auditor and the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have all disallowed, we are of the opinion that there was sufficient evidence to justify its disallowance. The evidence would seem to justify the finding of the auditor that these particular services thus paid for were of the character generally designated as lobbying services, and in such case it is proper to follow the general rule of affirming a finding of fact made and confirmed by the courts below, unless the same be clearly erroneous.
Again, the auditor disallowed in part a claim of some fifteen thousand dollars, which the defendants assert was paid to two other attorneys for their services, under a special agreement which was made between the administrator of the Earle estate and such attorneys. The auditor made a finding of the facts in regard to such employment, and carefully considered the conditions as they appeared in the proof, and stated that he was of the opinion that the services in question did not require the time and attention of these three gentlemen, and that it would not be just to impose the burden of the payment to them upon this case in such a manner as to diminish the small *250 amount which would be found due and payable to the complainant. He therefore in the account allowed a credit for but one-half of the amount, which he said was in his "judgment a liberal allowance for the present account." Counsel for the defendants have failed to show from the evidence in the record that this item was improperly disposed of by the auditor.
As to the alleged laches on the part of the complainant in bringing this suit, we think the courts below have committed no error in their judgments. The evidence showed that during the time of the life of Mr. Earle, although the books of account were quite meager, yet such as there were had been examined by the administrator of Causten, in the office of Mr. Earle, and that objection had been made to the payment of the moneys to these persons in regard to whom the charge of lobbying services was made. There was no account stated, and the failure to bring suit for an accounting until January, 1901, two years after the appropriation act of 1899, from which payment might be made, cannot be regarded as laches to prevent a recovery in this suit.
The objection that there was in reality no liability on the original contract arising out of services performed by the administrator after the death of William E. Earle cannot be sustained. The accounting has been treated by both parties as one proper to be made for the whole period, including that which elapsed subsequently to the death of Mr. Earle. The defendant recognized this right by making the accounting not only for fees received prior to the death of Mr. Earle, but for such fees as were received under the appropriation act of 1899. The account presented by the Earle estate to the Causten estate admits an indebtedness due from the administrator of the former of something over $2,000, and the account purports to be one between the estate of Earle and the estate of Causten, and it embraces not only fees received by William E. Earle in his lifetime under the appropriation act of 1891, but fees received by the estate of Earle under the appropriation act of 1899. Thus both parties seem to have treated the account as *251 one account, with reference to the act of 1891 and also to that of 1899, and we think that under the circumstances the defendants should be held liable to account therefor as indicated.
The account should be restated by allowing credit to the defendant of $6,500, the amount paid the attorneys as already stated. As to all other matters, the decree is right. The proper disposition of the case is to dismiss the appeal in No. 12, because the decree appealed from is not a final one, and to reverse the decree in No. 388, for the purpose of making the proper credit to defendants in the account.
Reversed.