Court Opinion

ID: 9488365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:42:54.543571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:50.234991
License: Public Domain

CONTIE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent. I do not believe the upward departure from a maximum sentence of 235 months (19 years, 7 months) under the applicable guideline range for being a former felon in possession of a firearm to a sentence of life imprisonment is reasonable. It is clear from the record that the district court sentenced defendant on the basis of the state offense he committed while unlawfully possessing the firearm — the sexual assault that occurred in conjunction with defendant’s possession of the gun. The district court’s responsibility in this case was to sentence defendant Little for a federal weapons possession violation. The state court had responsibility for dealing with the sexual offense. The district court was aware that defendant Little would be sentenced for the sexual offense in state court after the district court *455imposed a sentence for the federal weapons possession charge. I believe the substance of the following exchanges is inconsistent with the demarcation of responsibility between the state court and the district court.
THE COURT: He is in state custody for — How did he end up in state custody?
MR. RONEY: The underlying charge [the criminal sexual conduct].
THE COURT: He was taken into state custody?
MR. RONEY: Correct.
THE COURT: Initially?
MR. RONEY: That’s correct.
THE COURT: And indicted over there?
MR. RONEY: That’s my understanding.
THE COURT: What’s going to happen to the—
MR. RONEY: There will be a guilty plea in that case, Your Honor, after this ease is disposed of.
THE COURT: Is he going to receive a state sentence that is concurrent with the federal sentence? Is that what is being contemplated?
MR. RONEY: Of course, Your Honor, I’m not representing him there, but that’s my understanding.
Joint Appendix at 49-51. The following exchange indicates that at the root of the district court’s rationale for upwardly departing from a maximum guideline sentence of 235 months to life imprisonment for a federal weapons possession offense was the district court’s belief that the state court would not impose an adequate sentence for the related conduct — the sexual offense. Defendant Little’s counsel informed the court that:
He [Little] is pending charges for the aggravated rape in state court, if Your Honor please. It’s my understanding — For the record, I’m not representing him ... there, but it’s my understanding that that will result in a guilty plea, and I can tell the Court that any kind of rape charge prior to a defendant being released under Tennessee state parole provisions would require that a competent psychologist or psychiatrist enter a finding that he is no longer a threat to society, so he would not receive parole under the state system until there was such a finding.
Joint Appendix at 60.
The district court responded:
I wish that I could have the faith that Mr. Roney suggests I should have in the state system’s ability to evaluate whether Mr. Little will commit future crimes, but I simply don’t think that I can abdicate the responsibility that I feel in this situation based on a hope that the state system will be infallible in its determination as to when it might be appropriate to release Mr. Little. It is with that realization and consideration that I feel that this sentence [life imprisonment] is the one that I must impose.
Joint Appendix at 72.
I believe this is an impermissible reason for an upward departure from the applicable sentencing guideline range and the imposition of the draconian sentence of life imprisonment. I am of the opinion that the district court abused its discretion by preempting the state court’s authority to sentence Little for the underlying sexual offense. Although the district court did not explicitly state that it was basing the sentence of life imprisonment on relevant conduct (the sexual assault that occurred in conjunction with defendant’s possession of the gun), the court’s statements in this regard make it clear that, in essence, this is what the district court was doing. In imposing such a draconian sentence for weapons possession (a six-level departure from the applicable guideline range), the district court determined that defendant posed a permanent threat to society, relying primarily on the assessment contained in the presentence report of Tom Gesky, who, contrary to the majority’s assertion, has no stated qualifications as a professional psychologist or psychiatrist. The record indicates that Gesky worked with defendant through a twelve-step Alcoholics Anonymous program and that he works at Synergy, a halfway house. There is nothing to indicate that Gesky has any professional credentials. Contrary to the majority, I find no professional opinion in the record with sufficient indicia of reliability to support the district *456court’s conclusion. Therefore, although I believe the circumstances of this case are sufficiently unusual to warrant an upward departure, I do not find that the evidence supports the justifications that were provided for a departure to life imprisonment. There is not one statement in the presentence report by a professional qualified to discuss Little’s psychological status that supports the district court’s conclusion that he poses a permanent threat to society.1
Furthermore, the district court’s six-level increase to a sentence of life imprisonment on the basis of relevant conduct undermines the purpose of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. As this court stated in United States v. Robison, 904 F.2d 365, 373 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 946, 111 S.Ct. 360, 112 L.Ed.2d 323 (1990):
[T]he Sentencing Guidelines were designed to provide more uniformity in sentencing by proscribing ranges appropriate to similar defendants. Whether a judge agrees or disagrees with the Guidelines, it is his duty to abide by those ranges and depart only in the “unusual” cases where the Guidelines do not adequately take into account the nature of the crime. In short, it is the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines, not individual judges, that now dictate the appropriate range of sentences in a case.
I believe the district court violated this criterion for federal sentencing in the present case. Although the court stated that pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, the court was departing upward because defendant’s criminal history category did not adequately reflect the seriousness of defendant’s past criminal conduct, the district court did not base its assessment of the seriousness of defendant’s past criminal history on an objective standard, such as the number of defendant’s criminal history points, but was swayed by the nature of the related conduct. In United States v. Doucette, 979 F.2d 1042, 1048 (5th Cir.1992), the court comprehensively reviewed the occasions for upward departure because of an egregious, serious criminal record. Although in Doucette sentences more than four times greater than the guideline maximum were found to have been approved, there was no case in which there was an upward departure to life imprisonment, and I can find no published opinion upholding such a departure. In cases in which the defendant’s criminal history category is VI (the highest criminal history category under the Sentencing Guidelines), upward departures pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 are primarily made on the basis of a high criminal history score greatly exceeding the 13 points needed to be placed in Category VI. United States v. Thomas, 24 F.3d 829 (6th Cir.) (criminal history score of 43, triple the 13-point threshold for Category VI, warrants upward departure of 30 months), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 453, 130 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); United States v. Eve, 984 F.2d 701 (6th Cir.1993) (because defendant scored only 13 points in criminal history category, upward departure based on district court’s concern with past criminal conduct not warranted); United States v. Osborne, 948 F.2d 210 (6th Cir.1991) (criminal history score of 24 was so high, Category VI did not reflect seriousness of past criminal conduct); United States v. Belanger, 892 F.2d 473 (6th Cir.1989) (29 point criminal history computation, more than double the number of points required to place a defendant in Category VI, warrants upward departure). In contrast, in the present case, defendant’s criminal history score is 15, only two points above the required 13 points needed to be placed in Criminal History Category VI. Therefore, this is not a case in which a high criminal history score, which is an objective criterion of the seriousness of a defendant’s past criminal conduct, warrants departure. The district court departed six-levels from a guideline maximum sentence of 235 months and imposed a life sentence because the court did not trust the state system to adequately protect society from defendant. There is no precedent for such a dramatic six-level departure from the U.S.S.G. guideline range based on relevant conduct. Moreover, I believe the majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent, opening the floodgates to the imposition of unlimited penalties based on relevant conduct, rather than on the federal of*457fense for which the defendant has been convicted.
Horrific as defendant’s conduct may be, the criminal sexual conduct is not the offense the federal court should have focused on, particularly given the fact that defendant was awaiting sentence in state court for the related sexual offense. I object that a federal district court, in effect, has taken on the role of supervisor of the state system through the surreptitious route of imposing a life sentence based on relevant conduct. The district court indicated that it did not trust the state court to adequately sentence defendant for the criminal sexual conduct and, therefore, the court decided to circumvent the impact of any possible state sentence by imposing a sentence of life imprisonment in federal court for weapons possession. I believe this offends principles of comity, and the district court has usurped the state of Tennessee’s authority to sentence defendant to forty years imprisonment for the criminal sexual conduct.2 Because I find that the record does not support the conclusion that defendant poses a life-long threat to society, I do not believe a sentence of life imprisonment is reasonable. For these reasons, I dissent and recommend that this case be remanded to the district court for resentenc-ing.

. Based on the district court's sentence, if defendant lives to be 80 or 90, he will still be in prison. I believe that if defendant reaches this age, it is hard to argue that recidivism will be a concern.

. On August 26, 1994, defendant pled guilty to the criminal sexual conduct in state court and was sentenced to 40 years imprisonment.