Court Opinion

ID: 9845017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:13:48.539096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:50.284485
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in all parts of the opinion of the Court, except part I (NEW TRIAL) and part IV (DAMAGES). I dissent from part I because it holds that a motion for new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) may be predicated on the grounds of excessive damages. I concur in part IV as to the I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) porton and dissent from the statements concerning I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). In my view, when read carefully, our prior decisions hold that a new trial on the ground of excessive damages may be considered only under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5).
In 1881, the legislature of the Idaho Territory enacted a code of civil procedure. 1881 Gen. Laws of Terr, of Idaho, p. 1. § 411 of this code provided a procedure for granting new trials. Id. at 88. Subsections 5 and 6 of § 411 provided:
Sec. 411. The former verdict or other decision may be vacated and a new trial granted, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:
5. Excessive damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice;
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law;
The statute became § 4439 of the revised statutes of the Idaho Territory in 1887 and remained in its original form through successive codification of the Idaho laws until it was repealed in 1975, except for the addition of a new subsection 8 in 1931. R.S., R.C., & C.L., § 4439; C.S., § 6888; 1931 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 12, § 1, p. 15 (adding subsection 8); I.C.A. § 7-602; I.C. § 10-602; 1975 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 242, § 1, effective March 31, 1975 (repealing the entire section).
Effective November 1, 1958, this Court promulgated the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. On the subject of motions for new trial, the new rules said: “A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues for any of the reasons provided by the statutes of this *831state.” I.R.C.P. 59(a) (1958). In 1958, I.C. § 10-602 contained subsections (5) and (6) as originally enacted by the territorial legislature in 1881.
Effective January 1, 1975, I.R.C.P. 59(a) was amended to incorporate the reasons for granting a new trial in substantially the form contained in I.C. 10-602, as it then existed, with a few changes. In the new version of the rule, subsections (5) and (6) stated:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action for any of the following reasons:
5. Excessive damages or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law.
I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) and (6) (1975). These portions of the rule have existed in this form since 1975. I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) and (6) (1990).
In 1979, this Court considered a case in which the trial court had denied a motion for new trial brought under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) on the grounds that the verdict was inadequate. Dinneen ¶. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979). In Dinneen, the Court said:
Where a motion for a new trial is premised on inadequate or excessive damages, the trial court must weigh the evidence and then compare the jury’s award to what [the trial court] would have given had there been no jury. If the disparity is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award was given under the influence of passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not stand. It need not be proven that there was in fact passion or prejudice nor is it necessary to point to such in the record. The appearance of such is sufficient.
Id. at 626-27, 603 P.2d at 581-82 (emphasis in original).
In 1986, the Court reiterated this formulation in Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 608, 726 P.2d 706 (1986) and in Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). In Soria, the defendant had moved for a new trial on the grounds that the damages awarded the plaintiffs were excessive. The trial court denied the motion. In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the Court said: “In deciding a motion for a new trial premised upon an allegation of either excessive or inadequate damages, the trial court must weigh the evidence and determine if the verdict was awarded under the influence of passion or prejudice.” 111 Idaho at 608, 726 P.2d at 720 (emphasis in original).
In Quick, the Court considered the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial brought under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) on the grounds that the damages awarded by the jury were excessive and said:
In ruling upon a motion for a new trial premised upon inadequate or excessive damages, the rule the trial court must follow is set forth in Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979):
“Where a motion for a new trial is premised on inadequate or excessive damages, the trial court must weigh the evidence and then compare the jury’s award to what he would have given had there been no jury. If the disparity is so great that it appears to the trial court that the award was given under the influence of passion or prejudice, the verdict ought not stand. It need not be proven that there was in fact passion or prejudice nor is it necessary to point to such in the record. The appearance of such is sufficient.”
111 Idaho at 768, 727 P.2d at 1196 (emphasis in original).
Later in 1986, the Court considered a case in which the trial court had granted a remittitur of a portion of the damages awarded by the jury, or in the alternative a new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) on the grounds that excessive damages had been awarded by the jury. Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 (1986) (Sanchez I). In summarizing the holdings of Dinneen and Quick in Sanchez I, the Court said:
*832In sum, Dinneen and Quick suggest the following course of conduct for a trial court judge pursuant to a motion for new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) and (6): The trial court is not merely to weigh its calculations as against those of the jury. Rather, the trial court is to weigh the evidence to determine if the jury’s verdict is supportable by the evidence and when it thinks not, it should grant a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). If, technically, the verdict is supported by substantial, competent evidence and it still finds the verdict excessive, then it must rule whether in its opinion the jury appears to have acted under the influence of passion or prejudice. In ascertaining whether the jury appears to have so acted, the judge looks to the disparity between the awards and to whether such disparity “shocks the conscience.”
Id. at 615, 733 P.2d at 1240.
While this statement may be read as indicating that a motion for new trial on the grounds of excessive damages may be brought under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), to this extent the statement is dicta. The motion for new trial in Sanchez I was under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) only. There was no motion under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) in Sanchez. Also, the statement in Sanchez quoted above erroneously summarized Dinneen and Quick.
In Dinneen, the Court considered the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial only under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). In holding that the trial court should have granted a new trial, the Court said:
The ... verdict, allowing only $540 over the uncontradicted medical expenses and lost property with apparently no lost wages at all, is so small as to “shock” our collective “conscience.” In our view the trial court should have concluded that such a small award suggested a verdict appearing to have been rendered under the influence of passion or prejudice. Accordingly, we hold there was error in not granting a new trial.
100 Idaho at 627, 603 P.2d at 582.
In Quick, the Court considered the granting of a new trial on the grounds the jury awarded excessive damages only under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). The analysis of the scope of I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) in Quick was in relation to the jury’s apportionment of negligence. In addition, the Court pointed out:
It should be emphasized again that the rule that a verdict will not be set aside when it supported by substantia] but conflicting evidence has no application to a trial court ruling upon a motion for a new trial. As noted in the previous section, this substantial evidence standard is applicable to a trial court’s determination on a motion for judgment n.o.v.
111 Idaho at 770, 727 P.2d at 1198 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Therefore, the statement in Sanchez I indicating that the verdict was supported by “substantial, competent evidence” has nothing to do with the consideration of excessive damages under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). Rather, it refers to the standard for considering a motion for judgment n.o.v.
In summary, Dinneen, Quick, and Sanchez I do not provide authority for the consideration of a motion for new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) on the grounds of excessive damages.
I acknowledge my complicity in fostering the idea that a motion for new trial on the grounds of excessive damages may be considered under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). In Sanchez v. Galey, 115 Idaho 1064, 772 P.2d 702 (1989) (,Sanchez II), I authored the portion of the opinion that affirmed the trial court’s order requiring a remittitur or granting a new trial. Although it is clear that the trial court’s order was affirmed under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5), I did quote the dicta from Sanchez I that refers to the review by the trial court of a verdict under I.R. C.P. 59(a)(6) “ ‘to determine if the jury’s verdict is supportable by the evidence.’ ” Id. at 1070, 772 P.2d at 708. I concluded this portion of the opinion in Sanchez II by stating:
On remand the trial court found that the amount of the verdict did not shock him, but that he did find it unconscionable. The trial court also found that the amount of the verdict indicated that the jury was acting under the influence of passion or prejudice. Based on these *833additional findings, the trial court re-instituted the remittitur. The trial court’s findings fulfilled the condition precedent established by this Court in Sanchez I for re-instituting the remittitur. That condition precedent is the law of this case. I am unwilling to tinker with the exercise of the trial court’s discretion in making these findings. To do so, not only violates the law of this case, but also changes the law in this state concerning the granting of motions for new trials under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) as succinctly stated in Sanchez I.
Id. It is now clear to me that the reference in the last sentence of this paragraph to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) should have to I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). Otherwise, the reference is dicta, because there was no motion under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) in Sanchez I or II.
In my view, it is time for this Court to make clear that motions for new trial on the grounds of excessive or inadequate damages are to be considered only under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) and not under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). There are no clear holdings of this Court since the promulgation of I.R. C.P. 59(a)(5) and (6) that contradict this formulation.
If we are to allow motions for new trial on the grounds of excessive or inadequate damages to be considered under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6), then there will be no purpose in making a motion for new trial under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). In Quick, the Court stated the scope of a trial court’s discretion under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6):
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6) permits the trial court to grant a new trial on all or part of the issues in an action by reason of the “[insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law.” It is well established that the trial judge may grant a new trial based on I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(6) where, after [the trial court] has weighed all the evidence, including [the trial court’s] own determination of the credibility of the witnesses, he concludes that the verdict is not in accord with [the trial court’s] assessment of the clear weight of the evidence.
111 Idaho at 766, 727 P.2d at 1194.
Under this standard, if the trial court concludes that the damages awarded by the verdict are either excessive or inadequate in accord with the trial court’s assessment of the clear weight of the evidence, the trial court is authorized to grant a new trial. On the other hand, if the trial court concludes that the damages awarded by the verdict are not either excessive or inadequate in accord with the trial court’s assessment of the clear weight of the evidence, what is the purpose of weighing the evidence and comparing the jury’s award to what the trial court would have given had there been no jury, as directed under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5)? If the clear weight of the evidence supports the amount of damages awarded by the jury, why should the trial court be allowed to grant a new trial?
As one commentator has noted, the application of the I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6) standard to motions for new trial on the grounds of excessive or inadequate damages “renders I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5), the appearance of passion or prejudice as grounds for granting a new trial, mere surplusage.” Blewett, “Ruling on the New Trial Motion: What Standard for the Idaho Trial Judge?” 17 Idaho L.Rev. 249, 252, n. 17 (1981).
To allow this subject to fester further will be a disservice to not only our trial judges, but to the bar. We need to clarify now whether motions for new trial on the grounds of excessive or inadequate damages may be considered under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(6). If so, we should also declare the demise of I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). I do not understand how we can allow motions for new trial on the grounds of excessive or inadequate damages to be considered under both rules.