Court Opinion

ID: 9627486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:45:11.948682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:03.617306
License: Public Domain

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I am writing in dissent because I believe that we should remand the case as a result of the ALJ’s failure to give any indication in his decision as to whether he performed the requisite inquiry under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563. That section gives the ALJ discretion as to whether to place a claimant falling within a borderline age category into the next higher age category but mandates that the ALJ “not apply the age categories mechanically in a borderline situation.” § 404.1563(b). Because Bowie’s age at the time of the ALJ’s decision was less than two months from fifty years old, § 404.1563(b) required the ALJ to consider first whether Bowie falls within a borderline age category and, if so, whether Bowie should have been placed within the “approaching advanced age” category.
I believe that the majority opinion mistakenly concludes that the guidelines set forth in the Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law Manual of the Social Security Administration (“HALLEX”) negate the extensive precedent requiring ALJs to discuss whether a potential borderline case falls within that category. Instead, I believe that we should follow the lead of the Tenth Circuit decision in Daniels v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir.1998), and hold that in potential borderline cases, ALJs must provide some record of their thought process regarding the requirements of § 404.1563(b). See also Russell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 20 F.Supp.2d 1133, 1135, 1136 (W.D.Mich.1998) (holding that “when a borderline situation is presented a factual determination must be made as to the appropriate age category ... [and that] the ALJ’s failure to explain his choice of age category in a borderline situation ... impedes judicial review”); Pickard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 224 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1169 (W.D.Tenn.2002) (adopting the Tenth Circuit’s rationale in Daniels and recommending that the case be remanded because “[t]he ALJ’s failure to address the borderline issue and to explain his choice of age category ... impede this court’s ability to review his application of § 404.1563(a)”); see also Bush v. Astrue, No. 5:06-00766, 2008 WL 867941, at *7-8 (S.D.W.Va. Mar.28, 2008) (citing Russell, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1136, and remanding the case because the ALJ’s failure to explain his choice of age category made review impossible); Smith v. Barnhart, No. 00 C 2643, 2002 WL 126107, at *4 (N.D.Ill. Jan.31, 2002) (adopting the holding in Daniels that the determination of whether a claimant presents a borderline case is a factual determination and that the Commissioner has the burden of proof regarding whether a claimant presents a borderline case); Barrett v. Apfel, 40 F.Supp.2d 31, 39 (D.Mass.1999) (describing Daniels as the “best analysis” of the § 404.1563 *404and following the reasoning of that decision).
I also find persuasive the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Daniels that the Commissioner and not the claimant has the burden to establish whether a claimant in a potential borderline situation should be placed in an age category higher than that technically warranted by the claimant’s chronological age. First, the plain language of § 404.1563(b) states that the Commissioner “will not apply these age categories mechanically”; placing the burden on the claimant would rewrite the language of the regulation. Daniels, 154 F.3d at 1134. Second, “[application of § 404.1563(a) is a step-five issue, and the burden generally is on the Commissioner at step five.” Id.; see also Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 238 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that the burden of proof rests with the Commissioner at step five).
Additional support for the holding of Daniels rests with 20 C.F.R. § 404.953, which requires that “[t]he administrative law judge shall issue a written decision that gives the findings of fact and the reasons for the decision.” § 404.953(a). In a case in which the claimant’s age indicates that he or she might well fall within a borderline age category, the ALJ’s failure to note that the ALJ has considered whether a claimant falls within a borderline category and, if so, whether bumping the claimant up is warranted, constitutes a failure to offer findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Russell, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1136.
That the HALLEX guidelines do not require the ALJ to give an explanation for his discretionary decision not to bump up the age of a claimant with a borderline age status does not mean that §§ 404.1563 and 404.953 do not require an ALJ to note whether he has even considered the claimant’s potential borderline status. Once the claimant falls within a borderline status— that is, his or her age is near that of the next category and bumping him or her up a category would result in a finding of disability— § 404.1563 mandates that the ALJ not apply the grid mechanistically. We cannot review on appeal whether the ALJ did so if the ALJ gives absolutely no indication whether he or she even considered the claimant’s borderline status. The ALJ does not have to explain why he decided not to exercise his discretion and bump up the age of a borderline claimant, though this would be preferable, but at a minimum he has to note that he considered whether to do so in a non-mechanistic manner.