Court Opinion

ID: 9453322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:09:46.878641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:36.401518
License: Public Domain

SKELTON, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority. I think that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be granted, because (1) the 18-month period of the contract during which the government could issue orders (calls) under the contract began March 12, 1961 (the day after the contract was approved), and terminated September 11, 1962; (2) the orders (calls) 8, 9, and 10 in controversy here were all issued by the government during such 18-month period; (3) the calls were effective on the days, respectively, they were issued and mailed by the government to the plaintiff; and (4) when the calls were issued and mailed by the government to the plaintiff, the contract, by its express terms, remained in effect “until all items ordered have been accepted by and delivered to the Government.”
The two basic questions in dispute between the parties are: (1) when did the 18-month period begin and end during which defendant could issue calls for items under the contract?; and (2) was a call “issued” under the terms of the contract when prepared in writing, dated, serially numbered, and mailed to the *434plaintiff by defendant’s contracting officer within the 18-month period or did the call have to be received by plaintiff during such period before it could be considered as “issued” under the terms of the contract?
As to the first question, I am of the opinion that the 18-month period should be computed in accordance with the general rule that the first day of a contract or a limitation period is excluded, but the last day is counted in determining the period in question. Cf. Stringer v. United States, 90 F.Supp. 375, 378, 117 Ct.Cl. 30, 48 (1950), and cases cited. See Ct.Cl. R. 9. Applying this rule, the first day of the contract (March 11, 1961) is excluded, and, therefore, the 18-month period began on March 12, 1961, and the last day (September 11, 1962) is counted, so that the period ended on September 11, 1962. Call 10 was prepared and mailed September 10, 1962, and Calls 8 and 9 were prepared and mailed September 11, 1962. Thus, we see that all of the calls involved here were prepared and mailed by the contracting officer to the plaintiff during the 18-month period set forth in the contract. This leads us to the second question.
The defendant says that the acts of the contracting officer in preparing and mailing the calls to the plaintiff within the 18-month period provided in the contract constituted issuance of the calls within the meaning of the contract. The plaintiff initially agreed with the defendant on this point, but after engaging counsel and after filing its appeal with the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (called the Board), and not until then, changed its position and contended, and now contends, that the calls were not “issued” until plaintiff actually “received” them. It says further that the calls were not received until after the expiration of the 18-month period and, therefore, were ineffective. The trial commissioner concluded that the calls were effective on the dates they were mailed, basing his conclusion on the intent of the parties as shown by their acts and conduct. I think the Commissioner was correct, not only because of the interpretation of the contract in this regard by the action of the parties, but also because of the provisions of the contract itself.
The contract provided:
(a) The Contractor agrees to furnish to the Government, when ordered, the supplies or services set forth in the Schedule * * * at the prices set forth in the Schedule.
(b) Orders for supplies or services shall be issued by the Contracting Officer in writing, dated, and serially numbered. * * * [Emphasis supplied.]
The contract further provided:
CONTRACT PERIOD: Any resulting contract * * * shall remain in effect * * * until all items ordered have been accepted by and delivered to the Government. The Government reserves the right to issue orders against this contract for a period not to exceed eighteen (18) months from date of approval of the contract. [Emphasis supplied.]
In my opinion, the above-quoted provisions of the contract gave the government the right to issue orders under the contract during -the 18-month period, and described in detail how the orders should be issued. Nothing more was required of the government. There was no provision which stated or in any way indicated by inference or otherwise that the orders had to be received by the plaintiff during such period before they would be considered as having been issued. The majority is reading into the contract provisions which do not exist by holding that the orders had to be received by the plaintiff during said period before they were “issued.” According to the contract, all the government had to do was to issue the orders within the 18-month period and (by inference) mail them to the plaintiff. (The evidence shows that all orders were mailed the same day they were issued.) When this was done, the contract, by its express terms, provides that it “shall remain in effect * * * *435until all items ordered have been accepted by and delivered to the Government.” This provision clearly and expressly extended the period of the contract until the plaintiff delivered the items ordered and they were accepted by the government. Consequently, when the plaintiff received the orders such receipt was while the contract was in full force and effect. So, we have a situation where the orders were issued during the 18-month period and were received by the plaintiff while the contract was in force. The plaintiff was obligated to fill the orders in accordance with, and for the prices stated in the contract.
I cannot agree with the majority that this contract is an option contract which requires the plaintiff to receive the government’s orders within the 18-month period before they could be considered as having been issued. The authorities cited by the majority are inapposite because they provide “in the absence of an expression of contrary intention” or “unless the parties otherwise agreed,” the receipt of the order is required to make a binding agreement or order. Here we have such an “expression of contrary intention” and a situation where the parties have “otherwise agreed.”
In this case the fact that the parties have “otherwise agreed” and that there is “an expression of contrary intention” is shown not only by the express terms of the contract, but also by the conduct of the parties themselves. All of the correspondence between the parties between September 11, 1962, the last day of the 18-month period, and April 10, 1963, the date on which the plaintiff filed a pro se appeal with the Board, shows without question that both parties interpreted the contract as providing that so long as the government prepared and mailed the orders within the 18-month period, such orders were issued timely under the contract. No thought or importance was given by either of them as to when plaintiff received the orders. The very first letter from plaintiff, dated September 25, 1962, complained only of the fact that call Nos. 8 and 9 had been prepared and mailed after the 18-month period had expired according to plaintiff’s calculation of the period. The plaintiff at that time thought the contract had been approved March 10, 1961, instead of March 11, 1961. No mention was made of the date the calls were received by plaintiff. Also, no mention was made of call 10, as plaintiff obviously assumed that since it was prepared and mailed on September 10, 1962, which plaintiff erroneously assumed was the last day of the 18-month period, it was timely issued. No complaint was registered that it had not been received prior to the end of said period. A second letter from plaintiff stated that the 18-month period terminated September 10, 1962, and therefore, calls 8 and 9 were not timely issued because they were prepared and mailed September 11, 1962. No mention was made of call 10. In this letter, plaintiff did not dispute defendant’s statement in a letter of September 28, 1962, that calls 8 and 9 were issued on September 11, 1962. On October 4, 1962, plaintiff returned calls 8 and 9 to defendant saying both of them had been issued after the expiration of the contract period (that is, on September 11, 1962). Plaintiff did not return call 10, nor dispute its validity, although it was issued September 10 and received by plaintiff after September 11, 1962.
The defendant, by letter of October 9, 1962, informed plaintiff that the contract was not approved March 10, 1961, but became effective on March 11, 1961, and that calls 8 and 9 were issued September 11, 1962, “within the time period defined in subject contract for this issuance.” Call 10 was not mentioned.
Plaintiff answered defendant’s letter on October 23, 1962, admitting its error in assuming the contract was approved March 10, 1961, and saying its “calculations of the time period allowable for the issuance of call orders were based upon the date of 10 March 1961.” By this letter plaintiff again demonstrated its interpretation of the contract and of the intention of the parties as being that as long as the orders were prepared and *436mailed during the 18-month period, they were timely issued. No thought was given to when they were received by plaintiff.
When plaintiff learned that the contract became effective on March 11, 1961, instead of on March 10, 1961, it changed its method of computing the 18-month period from that of excluding the first day and counting the last to a system of counting the first day and excluding the last. By this change in position, it was still able to contend that the last day of the 18-month period was September 10, 1962, which was the same date it had arrived at by its first method of calculation. Accordingly, on January 21, 1963, it wrote defendant that even if the contract became effective March 11, 1961, the 18-month period expired September 10,1962, saying “all calls exercised beyond 12:00 midnight the 10th of September 1962, are, therefore, not within the contract period.” Here again plaintiff’s only concern was when the orders were prepared and mailed and not when they were received. Other correspondence between the parties reaffirmed their contentions. But the only controversy between them was whether orders 8 and 9 were prepared and mailed within the 18-month period. No mention was made as to when plaintiff received the orders. There was no dispute or controversy over call 10, as it was considered by both parties as having been issued within said period as required by the contract, because it was prepared and mailed on September 10, 1962, which was within the period as calculated by both parties, although plaintiff received it after September 11, 1962.
Further evidence of plaintiff’s interpretation of the contract and of the intention of the parties is shown by the fact that on April 10, 1963, plaintiff filed a pro se appeal to the Board claiming that calls 8 and 9 were issued after the time limit had expired, but making no mention of when they were received by plaintiff. Also, no mention was made of call 10. All of this shows that plaintiff believed that if any call (as call 10) was prepared and mailed within the specified period, it was “issued” as required by the contract. Of course, this was the position of defendant from the beginning.
Once the appeal was filed with the Board, plaintiff obtained counsel and, thereafter, it completely reversed its interpretation of the meaning of the contract by contending that the calls must not only have been prepared and mailed within the time limit, but also must have been received by plaintiff before such period expired in order to have been timely issued. This was such a radical departure from the position previously taken by plaintiff that consideration was given by the parties as to whether an amendment containing plaintiff’s new position would have to be filed by plaintiff to its petition before the Board. By agreement of the parties, this was not required.
It is clear that this change of position by plaintiff was an afterthought on its part after it had appealed to the Board. This claim was asserted for the first time seven months after the 18-month period had expired, during which time plaintiff had repeatedly shown its interpretation of the contract and intention of the parties as requiring only that the orders be prepared and mailed within the specified time period.
The majority brushes aside the interpretation of the contract as shown by the conduct of the parties by saying that it cannot be considered because their conduct as evidenced by their correspondence occurred after a dispute or controversy arose between them. This reasoning misses the mark, because during all of this correspondence and while plaintiff was filing its appeal with the Board, there was never any dispute or controversy between the parties except that of whether or not calls 8 and 9 were prepared and mailed before the end of the 18-month period. There was no argument or dispute whatsoever during this period that involved in any way the receipt by plaintiff of the calls during such period as being determinative of their validity. In fact, neither party ever mentioned the receipt of the calls by *437plaintiff as having anything to do with their validity. The parties simply never even thought of such a theory.
Regardless of what may be said as to the existence or not of a controversy between the parties as to calls 8 and 9, one fact is indisputable, and that is that no dispute existed between them as to call 10. During all of the correspondence between the parties, call 10 was recognized by both parties as being timely issued under the contract because it was prepared and mailed September 10, 1962, within the specified time period, although it was received by plaintiff after September 11, 1962. This is positive proof of the uninfluenced interpretation of the meaning of the contract by the parties extending over a long period of time before litigation was instituted. Call 10 was neither in dispute nor was it a subject of negotiation for settlement in the correspondence of the parties. It was regarded by both parties as a valid call that was timely issued. We are not justified in disregarding this clear and convincing evidence of the interpretation of the contract by the parties. As was stated by the majority, the interpretation of a contract as shown by the conduct of the parties is of great weight in interpreting the contract. A.R.F. Products, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d 692, Ct.Cl., decided December 15, 1967.
In my opinion, calls 8, 9, and 10 were “issued” under the terms of the contract when they were prepared in writing, dated, serially numbered and mailed by defendant to plaintiff within the 18-month period specified in the contract, and the fact that plaintiff received the calls after such period did not affect their validity.
Accordingly, I would adopt the recommendation of the commissioner by denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granting defendant’s cross-motion and dismissing plaintiff’s petition.