Court Opinion

ID: 9882042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 21:01:01.360526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:30.046559
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-1860

        JOSHUA BROWN,

                            Plaintiff - Appellant,

                     v.

        WHOLE FOODS MARKET GROUP, INC., d/b/a Whole Foods at Sharon Square,

                            Defendant - Appellee.

                                              No. 22-1915

        JOSHUA BROWN,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        WHOLE FOODS MARKET GROUP, INC., d/b/a Whole Foods at Sharon Square,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
        at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:20-cv-00401-MOC-DCK)

        Submitted: September 26, 2023                                 Decided: October 3, 2023
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        Before KING, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Preston O. Odom, III, JAMES, MCELROY & DIEHL P.A., Charlotte, North
        Carolina, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. John Michael Durnovich, POYNER SPRUILL
        LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina; Melody H. Demasi, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN,
        CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        PER CURIAM:

               Joshua Brown appeals the district court’s order entering judgment in favor of Whole

        Foods Market Group, Inc. (“Whole Foods”), following a jury trial on Brown’s claim of

        racial discrimination. Brown originally filed suit in North Carolina state court, alleging

        that the actions of a Whole Foods employee—who called the police about Brown, a Black

        man—amounted to racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and intentional infliction

        of emotional distress (“IIED”) under North Carolina law. Whole Foods removed the action

        to the district court, and the court granted summary judgment to Whole Foods on Brown’s

        IIED claim. Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial on Brown’s § 1981 claim, and the jury

        returned a verdict in Whole Foods’ favor. On appeal, Brown argues that the court erred in

        granting summary judgment to Whole Foods on his IIED claim, denying his Fed. R. Civ.

        P. 59 motion for a new trial, and admitting certain testimony. Finding no error, we affirm. *

               We first address Brown’s challenge to the district court’s summary judgment ruling.

        “We review de novo a district court’s award of summary judgment, viewing the facts in

        the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Chapman v. Oakland Living Ctr., Inc.,

        48 F.4th 222, 228 (4th Cir. 2022). “Summary judgment is appropriate only when ‘the

               *
                Whole Foods noted a cross-appeal, but it acknowledges in its response brief that
        the arguments it raises in its cross-appeal are offered solely as an alternative basis for
        affirming the district court’s judgment. In light of our decision to affirm, we decline to
        reach the merits of Whole Foods’ cross-appeal. See Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459,
        1465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting appellate courts decline to consider protective cross-
        appeals unless “the main appeal results in modification of the judgment”).

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        movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

        entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

               To succeed on his claim of IIED under North Carolina law, Brown was required to

        prove “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) which is intended to cause

        and does cause (3) severe emotional distress to another.” Turner v. Thomas, 794 S.E.2d

        439, 446 (N.C. 2016) (cleaned up). “[E]xtreme and outrageous conduct is that which

        exceeds all bounds of decency tolerated by society . . . and is regarded as atrocious.” Id.

        (cleaned up). Here, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Brown, a Whole Foods

        employee suspected Brown of shoplifting based on his race and called the police.

        However, the employee’s encounter with Brown was calm and polite.                  Further, he

        accurately informed the police that, although he was worried Brown would leave without

        paying for his food, Brown had not actually stolen anything. And after the police resolved

        the situation and left the store, the employee did not pursue the matter further. Thus,

        viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Brown, the employee’s motivations may

        have been morally suspect, but his actions were not so atrocious as to be “utterly intolerable

        in a civilized community.” Id. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in

        granting summary judgment to Whole Foods on Brown’s IIED claim.

               Turning to the district court’s denial of Brown’s motion for a new trial, we review

        the court’s decision for abuse of discretion. Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 997 F.3d 526,

        535 (4th Cir. 2021). “A district court may grant a new trial only if the verdict: (1) is against

        the clear weight of the evidence; (2) is based upon false evidence; or (3) will result in a

        miscarriage of justice.” EEOC v. Consol Energy, Inc., 860 F.3d 131, 145 (4th Cir. 2017).

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               On appeal, Brown argues that the jury’s verdict is internally contradictory and

        inconsistent with the applicable law. In particular, he asserts that the jury’s finding that he

        was treated differently than similarly situated White customers cannot be reconciled with

        its ultimate conclusion that his race was not the “but for” cause of the differential treatment.

        However, in order to prevail upon a § 1981 claim of race-based discrimination, a plaintiff

        must prove more than differential treatment. Rather, the plaintiff must “ultimately prove

        that, but for race, [he] would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.”

        Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020).

        The verdict was both consistent with this legal principle and internally consistent, as it

        reflected that the jury found that Brown proved differential treatment but failed to meet the

        causation element of his claim. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying

        Brown’s motion for a new trial.

               Lastly, Brown challenges the district court’s admission of the Whole Foods

        employee’s testimony that other store employees told him that Brown had previously

        shoplifted from the store. Brown contends that this testimony was inadmissible hearsay.

        However, this testimony was offered not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show

        the employee’s state of mind and motive for approaching Brown and calling the police.

        Therefore, the testimony was not hearsay, and the court did not err in admitting the

        statements. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay as an out-of-court statement offered

        “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement”); United States v. Galecki, 932

        F.3d 176, 194 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding statements “offered not for their truth, but solely for

        their effect on Defendants’ state of mind” were not hearsay).

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              Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                     AFFIRMED

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