Court Opinion

ID: 9464857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:44:52.835578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:51.336106
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority properly finds that the initial investigatory stop of the rental car was justified and that there was probable cause to search the automobile. It errs, however, in holding that a warrantless search of the suitcase was justified. In my judgment, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), controls. In that case, the Supreme Court states:
[T]he Government insists that the search was reasonable because the footlocker was seized contemporaneously with respondents’ arrests and was searched as soon thereafter as was practicable. The reasons justifying search in a custodial arrest are quite different. When a custodial arrest is made, there is always some danger that the person arrested may seek to use a weapon, or that evidence may be concealed or destroyed. To safeguard himself and others, and to prevent the loss of evidence, it has been held reasonable for the arresting officer to conduct a prompt, warrantless “search of the arres-tee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he *211might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. [752], at 763, [89 S.Ct. 2034, at 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685.] See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889] (1968).
Such searches may be conducted without a warrant, and they may also be made whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the person arrested may have a weapon or is about to destroy evidence. The potential dangers lurking in all custodial arrests make warrantless searches of items within the “immediate control” area reasonable without requiring the arresting officer to calculate the probability that weapons or destructible evidence may be involved. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, [94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427] (1973); Terry v. Ohio, supra. However, warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the “search is remote in time or place from the arrest,” Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. [364], at 367, [84 S.Ct. 881, at 883, 11 L.Ed.2d 777,] or no exigency exists. Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.9
Footnote nine reads as follows:
Of course, there may be other justifications for a warrantless search of luggage taken from a suspect at the time of his arrest; for example, if officers have reason to believe that luggage contains some immediately dangerous instrumentality, such as explosives, it would be foolhardy to transport it to the station house without opening the luggage and disarming the weapon. See, e. g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 630, 639 (CA 2 1972).
Id., 433 U.S. at 15, 97 S.Ct. at 2485.
Here, no exigency existed. The officers had no reason to believe that the suitcases contained dangerous instrumentalities or that the evidence would be concealed or destroyed. The officers had control of the suitcases. They could have conveniently taken them to their headquarters and obtained a search warrant.
I recognize that two justices of the Supreme Court would approve the search made here. My reading of the majority opinion, however, does not convince me that their views represent those of the majority.
I, therefore, dissent.