Court Opinion

ID: 9583123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:35:00.391861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:51.423390
License: Public Domain

TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge,
concurring in the result.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in its decision to hold a retrospective competency hearing or its conclusion that defendant was competent at his 11 May 1998 trial. However, because this case involves the Court’s first opportunity to focus on retrospective competency hearings and their requirements, I write separately to emphasize the inherent difficulties associated with retrospective competency hearings and to distinguish this case from those cases where the decision to hold a retrospective competency hearing would be in error.
As the majority points out, in our first inquiry into this matter, we remanded the case to the trial court, whom we concluded was in the best position to determine whether “a meaningful hearing on the issues of the competency of the defendant at the prior proceedings [was] still possible.” State v. McRae, 139 N.C. App. 387, 392, 533 S.E.2d 557, 561 (2000). I believe the difficulties in making such a determination should not be underestimated. Trial judges in this state try hundreds of different cases involving hundreds of different criminal defendants each year and thousands of cases involving thousands of different criminal defendants over the course of their term. Therefore, recollecting with certainty the competence of one particu*373lar defendant tried several years ago is a monumental task, ripe with inherent difficulties that have been repeatedly noted by the United States Supreme Court and other courts in this country. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387 (1966); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960); McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 963 (10th Cir. 2001); Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1556 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992).
In the case sub judice, the trial court was asked to determine the competence of a defendant indicted and tried for murder four years earlier and again tried two years earlier. In September 2002, when the trial court issued its order regarding defendant’s competence at trial, the relevant trial had taken place over four years earlier. In Lafferty, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held a retrospective hearing impractical because the inherent difficulties of the hearing were aggravated by a six-year delay. 949 F.2d at 1556. Similarly, in United States v. Roca-Alverez, 474 F.2d 1274, 1274 (5th Cir. 1973), the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a retrospective competency hearing was impractical because the inherent difficulties of the hearing were aggravated by a two-year delay.
However, the mere passage of time between the trial and a retrospective competency hearing has not been determinative where there has been sufficient evidence made contemporaneous with the trial regarding the defendant’s competency. See United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 904 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1976) (two-and-one-half years between trial and retrospective competency hearing); Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (nine years between trial and retrospective competency hearing); Conner v. Wingo, 429 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 921 (1972) (four-and-one-half years between trial and retrospective competency hearing). In Bruce, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[a] reliable reconstruction of petitioner’s mental status [at the time of trial] depends less on time than on the state of the record. Especially where medical information substantially contemporaneous to trial is available, the chances for an accurate assessment increase.” 536 F.2d at 1057 (citing Holloway v. United States, 343 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1964)); See United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1293 (4th Cir. 1995).
In the case sub judice, I believe there was substantial evidence made contemporaneous to trial that was available to the trial court *374when it made its determination to proceed with the retrospective competency hearing. As the majority points out, the trial court had before it numerous records from defendant’s examiners leading up to three days before trial. The trial court could also consider the testimony of four examining doctors, including defendant’s last examining doctor, Dr. Robert Rollins. Finally, the trial court judge could properly consider the recollections of non-experts as well as his own observations, because even non-experts “had the opportunity to interact with defendant during the relevant period [and] may in some instances provide a sufficient base upon which a factfinder may rest decision that even a belated determination will be accurate.” Makris, 535 F.2d at 905.
While I agree with the decision today, I write separately to underscore the critical significance the sufficiency of the trial court record had upon my conclusion that the trial court acted properly in proceeding with the retrospective competency hearing. As noted supra, the time between the trial and the retrospective competency hearing becomes critical where the record of a defendant’s competency contemporaneous with trial is deficient. Therefore, where a retrospective competency hearing and determination is based upon “conflicting reports, a cold, sparse record, and the recollection of those who saw and dealt with [defendant] . . . years ago,” that hearing will be a “wholly inadequate substitute” for a concurrent hearing, and its determination will be reversed. Silverstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983) (citations omitted). However, because the quality of the record before the trial court when the competency determination was made in the case sub judice was substantial and allowed a detailed inquiry into defendant’s competence on 11 May 1998, I feel that the retrospective competency hearing was an adequate substitute for the concurrent hearing provided by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1002 (2003). Therefore, I conclude that the trial court did not err in its decision to hold a retrospective competency hearing or its conclusion that defendant was competent at his 11 May 1998 trial.