Court Opinion

ID: 9940700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 23:01:36.692148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:36.453264
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
           C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                       ________________________

                           No. ACM 40327
                       ________________________

                         UNITED STATES
                             Appellee
                                  v.
                      Chase J. STANFORD
           Senior Airman (E-4), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                       ________________________

       Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                     Decided 14 February 2024
                       ________________________

Military Judge: James R. Dorman (motions); Matthew P. Stoffel.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 25 March 2022 by GCM convened at Joint
Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii. Sentence entered by military judge
on 12 May 2022: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 3 months, re-
duction to E-1, and a reprimand.
For Appellant: Major Samantha P. Golseth, USAF.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel J. Peter Ferrell, USAF; Lieutenant
Colonel G. Matt Osborn, USAF; Major Olivia B. Hoff, USAF; Mary Ellen
Payne, Esquire.
Before ANNEXSTAD, GRUEN, and KEARLEY, Appellate Military
Judges.
Judge GRUEN delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior Judge
ANNEXSTAD and Judge KEARLEY joined.
                        ________________________

   This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
   precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                       ________________________
                      United States v. Stanford, No. ACM 40327

GRUEN, Judge:
    Contrary to his pleas, a general court-martial composed of a military judge
sitting alone convicted Appellant of six specifications of negligent dereliction
of duty for failing to register weapons, in violation of Article 92, Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 892; and one specification of wrongful
use of anabolic steroids on divers occasions, in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ,
10 U.S.C. § 912a.1 Consistent with Appellant’s pleas, the military judge found
Appellant not guilty of five other specifications.2 Appellant was sentenced to a
bad-conduct discharge, confinement for three months, reduction to the grade
of E-1, and a reprimand. The convening authority took no action on findings
and approved the sentence in its entirety.
    Appellant raises three assignments of error on appeal which we reordered:
(1) whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the portion of Charge
II and its specification, alleging wrongful divers use of anabolic steroids, which
extends beyond 31 May 2018; (2) whether his sentence was inappropriately
severe; and (3) whether the entry of judgment (EoJ) should be corrected. We
find merit in the third assignment of error, order correction of the EoJ in our
decretal paragraph, and affirm the findings and sentence.

                                  I. BACKGROUND
    Appellant entered active duty in September 2012. Appellant deployed to
Afghanistan in April 2016 and returned to Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland,
Texas, in October 2016. He left Joint Base San Antonio for a permanent change
of station to Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, in May 2018. At the
time of his move, Appellant was married to AS.3 They divorced in August 2019
after approximately one and a half years of marriage.
    In September 2020, AS was contacted by agents from the Air Force Office
of Special Investigations and was asked about Appellant’s steroid use. She

1 Appellant’s convicted offenses spanned from May 2018 to May 2020. Because the

versions of Articles 92 and 112a, UCMJ, in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (2016 ed.) and the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.) (2019
MCM) are substantively the same, all references to the UCMJ in this opinion are to
the 2019 MCM.
2 Appellant was acquitted of one specification of rape in violation of Article 120, UCMJ,

10 U.S.C. § 920; one specification of assault in violation of Article 128, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 928; and three specifications of domestic violence in violation of Article 128b,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 928b.
3 AS was an active Air Force servicemember during this time frame.

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                     United States v. Stanford, No. ACM 40327

stated she was aware of his use and that she had administered steroid injec-
tions to him prior to his move to Hawaii.4
    During Appellant’s trial, AS testified that it was after Appellant returned
from his deployment that he began using anabolic steroids. To her knowledge,
Appellant continued to use steroids until he left Texas in May 2018. When
asked if she knew whether Appellant continued to use anabolic steroids in Ha-
waii, AS replied that while she could not say for certain, they did have conver-
sations about body building competitions and “cruising,” which she explained
as “not coming off of testosterone and going on a low level to ensure that if your
testosterone shuts down, you still have some.”
    MH, a civilian, moved to Hawaii in August 2018 to attend school. She met
Appellant on a popular dating application and their relationship progressed to
living together. They first dated around February 2020 and then moved in with
each other approximately one month later. Their relationship ended in August
2020. MH testified that the topic of anabolic steroids came up early in their
relationship. She stated that she is an athlete and she and Appellant would
often talk about athletic performance and working out. Appellant asked her
opinion on anabolic steroids and during one of their conversations Appellant
stated, “[W]ell, I do them.”
    After Appellant first discussed steroid use with MH, she observed him us-
ing steroids on multiple occasions. MH testified that “[t]here was [sic] a few
times, like after showers at night, he would pull out this box from underneath
the sink in the bathroom and it would have syringes and vials in it with liquids
in it. He would create a dose and inject it into his upper buttocks.” MH further
testified that on a couple occasions she assisted him in injecting steroids into
his buttocks. MH recalled Appellant used steroids in the beginning and middle
of their relationship, but by July and August 2020, she did not recall seeing
him use them.

                                 II. DISCUSSION
A. Factual Sufficiency
   Appellant argues that his conviction for Charge II and its specification—
wrongful use of anabolic steroids on divers occasions between on or about 1
October 2016 and on or about 31 May 2020—is factually insufficient in that
“the evidence in the record does not support the portion of this specification
which extends beyond 31 May 2018.”

4 AS had admitted her own wrongful use of steroids and testified at Appellant’s trial

pursuant to a grant of testimonial immunity.

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                     United States v. Stanford, No. ACM 40327

   1. Law
    We review issues of factual sufficiency de novo. Article 66(d), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 866(d); United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002)
(citation omitted). Our assessment of factual sufficiency is limited to the evi-
dence produced at trial. United States v. Dykes, 38 M.J. 270, 272 (C.M.A. 1993)
(citations omitted).
    The test for factual sufficiency is “whether, after weighing the evidence in
the record of trial and making allowances for not having personally observed
the witnesses, [we are ourselves] convinced of the [appellant]’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987). “In
conducting this unique appellate role, we take ‘a fresh, impartial look at the
evidence,’ applying ‘neither a presumption of innocence nor a presumption of
guilt’ to ‘make [our] own independent determination as to whether the evidence
constitutes proof of each required element beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United
States v. Wheeler, 76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (alteration in
original) (quoting Washington, 57 M.J. at 399).
   The elements which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt for wrongful use of anabolic steroids in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ,
are: (1) that Appellant used a controlled substance and (2) that it was wrongful.
See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.), pt. IV, ¶ 50.b.(2).
   2. Analysis
    Appellant was convicted of wrongful use of anabolic steroids on divers oc-
casions between on or about 1 October 2016 and on or about 31 May 2020.5
Appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support a conviction
for using steroids past on or about 31 May 2018 and requests this court narrow
the conviction time frame to reflect an end use date of 31 May 2018. We decline
to do so as the facts elicited at trial support the time frame in the adjudged
conviction.
    Appellant does not contest the factual sufficiency of the entirety of his con-
viction and has not contested SSgt AS’s testimony about his use of steroids
from October 2016 until the time he moved to Hawaii in May 2018. He instead
takes issue with MH’s testimony alleging her testimony at trial was not credi-
ble, and thus the military judge could not use her testimony to find him guilty

5 Appellant was originally charged with divers wrongful use of anabolic steroids be-

tween on or about 1 October 2016 and on or about 23 August 2020. After hearing the
testimony, the military judge excepted the words and figures “23 August 2020,” and
substituted the words and figures “31 May 2020.” The military judge found Appellant
not guilty of the excepted words and figures and guilty of the substituted words and
figures.

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                      United States v. Stanford, No. ACM 40327

of any uses after 31 May 2018. Appellant contends the only testimony support-
ing his use after he arrived in Hawaii came from MH—since the military judge
found him not guilty of the other charges and specifications to which MH tes-
tified, the military judge must have found MH not credible and so her testi-
mony regarding Appellant’s steroid use must be disregarded as not credible.
We do not concur with Appellant’s assertion.
    The military judge, as the factfinder in this case, assessed the entirety of
the testimony and evidence admitted at trial and determined whether there
was evidence on each specification to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. The fact that the military judge determined some specifications did
not meet this standard, yet the evidence provided regarding the anabolic ster-
oid use supported a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, is not an
anomaly. The military judge had authority as factfinder to accept some of
MH’s testimony as entirely credible and discount other portions of her testi-
mony. “Court members may believe one portion of a witness’s testimony but
disbelieve others.” United States v. Bare, 63 M.J. 707, 713 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 2006) (citing United States v. Harris, 8 M.J. 52, 59 (C.M.A. 1979) (“How-
ever, the factfinders may believe one part of a witness’ testimony and disbe-
lieves another.”)).”
    We have taken a fresh, impartial look at the evidence in the record and
have applied neither a presumption of innocence nor a presumption of guilt to
make our own independent determination as to whether the evidence consti-
tutes proof of each required element beyond a reasonable doubt—to include
the adjudged time frame for the wrongful divers use of anabolic steroids. Af-
ter weighing the evidence in the record of trial and making allowances for not
having personally observed the witnesses, we are ourselves convinced of Ap-
pellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the specification to Charge II as
adjudged.
B. Sentence Severity
     Appellant argues the sentence to a bad-conduct discharge imposed by the
military judge was inappropriately severe in comparison to other cases, specif-
ically United States v. Kerr, No. 202200140, 2023 CCA LEXIS 434 (N.M. Ct.
Crim. App. 17 Oct. 2023) (unpub. op.), which found a bad-conduct discharge
inappropriate.6 Additionally, he argues his service history “provides ample jus-
tification to determine a bad-conduct discharge is an inappropriately severe

6 In Kerr, the appellant pleaded guilty to stealing military property and a Lexus sedan

belonging to another Marine. The fellow Marine was responsible for repaying the Gov-
ernment for the lost property and suffered from loss of use of his personal vehicle. The

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                     United States v. Stanford, No. ACM 40327

sentence” in this case. Appellant further argues that “anabolic steroid use is
extremely common in weight trainers in the United States” and that “there
was no evidence that this use was blatantly reckless.” On the issue of his con-
victions for failing to register six firearms, Appellant argues there was “no ev-
idence [ ] presented that [Appellant’s] failure to register was knowing or delib-
erate.” He further argues that there was a delay in charging and punishment
after the military discovered Appellant’s failure to timely register his weapons
suggesting even the Air Force did not perceive the alleged violations as severe.
    Appellant contends his “sentence to three months’ confinement appropri-
ately addressed the seriousness of the offenses he was convicted of, ensured his
rehabilitation, and provided for specific deterrence, general deterrence, and so-
cial retribution.” Additionally, he cites his more than nine years of service,
which includes combat service, as a basis to find the adjudged bad-conduct dis-
charge inappropriate. While these points are matters for consideration, we do
not agree that Appellant’s sentence was inappropriately severe.
   1. Law
    We review issues of sentence appropriateness de novo. See United States v.
Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing United States v. Cole, 31 M.J. 270,
272 (C.M.A. 1990)). Our authority to review a case for sentence appropriate-
ness “reflects the unique history and attributes of the military justice system,
[and] includes but is not limited to, considerations of uniformity and evenhand-
edness of sentencing decisions.” United States v. Sothen, 54 M.J. 294, 296
(C.A.A.F. 2001) (citations omitted). We may affirm only as much of the sen-
tence as we find correct in law and fact and determine should be approved on
the basis of the entire record. Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ. “We assess sentence ap-
propriateness by considering the particular appellant, the nature and serious-
ness of the offense[s], the appellant’s record of service, and all matters con-
tained in the record of trial.” United States v. Sauk, 74 M.J. 594, 606 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Anderson, 67 M.J. 703, 705 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2009) (per curiam)).
Although we have discretion to determine whether a sentence is appropriate,

United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA) found that
despite the seriousness of the offenses, the appellant’s sentence to eight months’ con-
finement alone reflected “the seriousness of the offenses committed, promote[d] respect
for the law, provide[d] just punishment for the offenses, promote[d] adequate deter-
rence of misconduct, protect[ed] others from future crimes by Appellant, and serve[d]
to rehabilitate Appellant.” The NMCCA further considered the appellant’s exemplary
service and mental health history and ultimately found a bad-conduct discharge inap-
propriate, setting aside that portion of the appellant’s sentence.

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                    United States v. Stanford, No. ACM 40327

we have no power to grant mercy. United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 146
(C.A.A.F. 2010) (citation omitted).
    The predecessor of the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
explained why sentence comparison is a challenge, stating, “From the mere
face of court-martial promulgating orders or similar documents, it is simply
not possible to assess the multitude of aggravating and mitigating sentencing
factors considered in the cases they represent.” United States v. Ballard, 20
M.J. 282, 285 (C.M.A. 1985). Courts of Criminal Appeals are “not required . . .
to engage in sentence comparison with specific [other] cases ‘except in those
rare instances in which sentence appropriateness can be fairly determined only
by reference to disparate sentences adjudged in closely related cases.’” United
States v. Lacy, 50 M.J. 286, 288 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (quoting Ballard, 20 M.J. at
283). Cases are “closely related” when, for example, they involve “coactors in-
volved in a common crime, servicemembers involved in a common or parallel
scheme, or some other direct nexus between the servicemembers whose sen-
tences are sought to be compared.” Id. “[A]n appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that any cited cases are ‘closely related’ to his or her case and
that the sentences are ‘highly disparate.’” Id. A Court of Criminal Appeals may
compare an appellant’s case to other non-“closely related” cases in order to as-
sess the propriety of the sentence, but is not required to do so. United States v.
Wacha, 55 M.J. 266, 267 (C.A.A.F. 2001). However, unless the cases are closely
related, “[t]he appropriateness of a sentence generally should be determined
without reference or comparison to sentences in other cases.” United States v.
LeBlanc, 74 M.J. 650, 659 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (en banc) (citing Ballard,
20 M.J. at 283).
   2. Analysis
    The maximum sentence Appellant faced for his convictions included a dis-
honorable discharge, more than five years’ confinement, reduction to the low-
est pay grade, total forfeitures of pay and allowances, reprimand, and a fine.
Trial counsel recommended a bad-conduct discharge, 12 months’ confinement,
total forfeitures, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The military judge sen-
tenced Appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, three months’ confinement, re-
duction to E-1, and a reprimand.
    Appellant contends this court should compare his case to Kerr and set aside
his bad-conduct discharge. Appellant has failed to meet his burden of demon-
strating that the facts in Kerr are closely related to his case and that the sen-
tences are highly disparate. Appellant and Kerr were not co-actors involved in
a common crime, nor were they servicemembers involved in a common or par-
allel scheme. Furthermore, there is no direct nexus between the servicemem-
bers whose sentences are sought to be compared. While this court may compare

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                    United States v. Stanford, No. ACM 40327

Appellant’s case to other non-closely related cases in order to assess the pro-
priety of the sentence, we are not required to do so and decline to do so in this
case.
    Appellant wrongfully used steroids for almost four years. He involved both
his wife and MH, a civilian, in his use by having them assist in injecting him
with the drugs. He believed he could use without being caught because in his
mind, the Air Force would not test him due to testing being expensive and gen-
erally only accomplished upon command direction. His argument to this court
that “anabolic steroid use is extremely common in weight trainers in the
United States” and that “there was no evidence that this use was blatantly
reckless” demonstrates a lack of appreciation for the illegality of his conduct.
    Furthermore, Appellant disregarded the importance of firearm registration
even given his status as a military member with more than nine years of ser-
vice, to include combat service. While we recognize Appellant received military
recognition, awards, and performance reports that noted he regularly exceeded
expectations, we also note that he was administratively demoted for firing his
weapon in the backyard of his on-base home and he received nonjudicial pun-
ishment for failing to obey a lawful order before his trial on the issues at bar.
    We have conducted a thorough review of Appellant’s court-martial record.
We conclude that the nature and seriousness of the offenses support the sen-
tence as entered. We find that Appellant’s points on appeal largely reiterate
matters that were before the military judge when he decided the sentence, and
we are confident the military judge afforded these points appropriate weight
during his deliberations. Understanding we have a statutory responsibility to
affirm only so much of the sentence that is correct and should be approved,
Article 66(d), UCMJ, we conclude that the sentence is not inappropriately se-
vere and we affirm the sentence as entered.
C. Entry of Judgment
    Appellant argues that the EoJ is incorrect for two reasons. First, the find-
ings for Specification 3 of Charge I in the EoJ reads as follows: “G, except the
figures: ‘AK-74’ and ‘RO.’ Of the excepted figures: NG.” We note the military
judge, when reading his findings at trial, correctly referred to the excepted fig-
ures as “AK-47.” Second, the findings for the Specification of Charge II in the
EoJ reads as follows: “G, except the words and figures: ‘24 August 2020,’ sub-
stituting therefore [sic] the words and figures ‘31 May 2020.’ Of the excepted
words and figures: NG; of the substituted words and figures: G.” We note the
military judge, when reading his findings at trial, correctly referred to the ex-
cepted figures as “23 August 2020.” While the court considers these entries
scriveners’ errors and agree the EoJ requires correction as it fails to properly
reflect the military judge’s findings at Appellant’s court-martial, we find no

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                    United States v. Stanford, No. ACM 40327

material prejudice to Appellant’s substantial rights. We modify the EoJ in our
decretal paragraph below.

                               III. CONCLUSION
     The entry of judgment is modified as follows: for Specification 3 of Charge
I, the findings language “AK-74” is modified by excepting “74” and substituting
“47.” The entry of judgment is further modified as follows: for the Specification
of Charge II, the findings language “24” is modified by excepting “24” and sub-
stituting “23.” The findings and sentence as modified are correct in law and
fact, and no error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant
occurred. Articles 59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). Accord-
ingly, the findings, as modified, and the sentence are AFFIRMED.

                     FOR THE COURT

                     CAROL K. JOYCE
                     Clerk of the Court

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