Court Opinion

ID: 9963472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 16:04:57.243475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:49.793162
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Cleveland v. White, 2024-Ohio-1584.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF CLEVELAND,                                :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                             No. 112720
                v.                                :

ANGELA C. WHITE,                                  :

                Defendant-Appellant.              :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 25, 2024

                     Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court
                                Case No. 2002-CRB-007841

                                            Appearances:

                Mark Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, and Aqueelah A.
                Jordan, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, and Kevin Burns,
                Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

                James A. Jenkins, appellant.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J.:

                Appellant Angela C. White (“appellant”) brings this appeal challenging

her conviction for telecommunications harassment by the Cleveland Municipal

Court. After a thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.
                      I. Factual and Procedural History

            This matter arises from unwanted text messages and emails sent from

appellant to the victim in this matter, Andrea Sitler (“Sitler”). At the time in

question, appellant was dating Joe Naples (“Naples”), with whom Sitler had

previously dated and had a child.

            In November 2021, Sitler made a report with the Cleveland Police

Department, alleging that she had received over 50 unwanted text messages and 18

emails from appellant since September 12, 2020.

            Sitler detailed the contact from appellant dating back to September 12,

2020. The first message was a video of appellant scrolling through Naples’s phone

while speaking. Sitler did not respond to this message or the several others she

received on September 15, 2020.

            On September 23, 2020, Sitler received a photo sent to her phone by

appellant. She responded to this message and asked appellant not to contact her.

Appellant replied to the message, and Sitler responded, asking appellant again not

to contact her and mentioned the Ohio law precluding telephone harassment. There

were no further replies from appellant.

            In December 2020, Sitler received two messages to which she did not

reply. In September 2021, she received additional text messages from appellant,

and again in November 2021.

            Appellant was charged with two counts of committing telephone

harassment, in violation of Cleveland Codified Ordinances (“CCO”) 621.10(a)(5) and
(b), respectively. The case was tried to a jury, which found appellant guilty of

violating subsection (a)(5) but was unable to come to a verdict on the charge relating

to subsection (b). The state subsequently nolled the second charge. Appellant was

sentenced to 30 days in jail, with 30 days suspended, one year of community control,

and 20 hours of community work service.

             Appellant then filed the instant appeal, raising six assignments of error

for our review:

      1. The evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for making a
      telecommunication after being told not to contact the recipient.

      2. The trial court plainly erred when it instructed the jury that the date
      of the offense was “September 14, 2022,” and not “September 15,
      2020.”

      3. The trial court erred when it admitted, over objection, testimony
      from the victim that on September 23, 2020, she told the sender of
      telecommunications not to contact her further.

      4. The conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

      5. The trial court plainly erred when it treated the criminal complaint
      as charging two offenses in a single statement that was not divided into
      two separate counts.

      6. Appellant received the ineffective assistance of counsel.

                              II. Law and Analysis

                         A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

             In her first assignment of error, appellant argues that her convictions

were not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, appellant argues that the

state offered no evidence as to who sent the telecommunications to her, and no
evidence as to the telephone number of the device that sent the messages. In

addition, appellant asserts that there was no evidence that the victim told appellant

not to contact her prior to the September 2020 messages.

              When an appellate court reviews a record upon a sufficiency

challenge, “‘the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Leonard, 104

Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 77, quoting State v. Jenks, 61

Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

              Appellant was convicted of telecommunications harassment, in

violation of CCO 621.10(a)(5), which provides that

      [n]o person shall knowingly make or cause to be made a
      telecommunication, or knowingly permit a telecommunication to be
      made from a telecommunications device under the person’s control, to
      another, if the caller * * * [k]nowingly makes the telecommunication to
      the recipient of the telecommunication, to another person at the
      premises to which the telecommunication is made, or to those
      premises, and the recipient or another person at those premises
      previously has told the caller not to make a telecommunication to those
      premises or to any persons at those premises.

              During her testimony, Sitler identified appellant as the person who

was texting her after she had told her to stop. She testified that texts and emails

were sent to her by appellant from September 2020 to August 2022, and that

appellant had been told to stop multiple times. Sitler read into the record the

message that she sent to appellant instructing appellant not to contact her.
              Through appellant’s testimony, the state offered sufficient evidence

that the victim had asked appellant to stop contacting her. After viewing the

evidence in a light most favorable to the state, we conclude that a rational trier of

fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant engaged in

telecommunications harassment in violation of CCO 621.10(a)(5). Appellant’s first

assignment of error is overruled.

                    B. Jury Instruction – Date of Offense

              In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that while

charging the jury, the court incorrectly stated that the date of the offense was

September 14, 2022, rather than on or about September 15, 2020.

              The criminal complaint was made on September 14, 2022, and alleged

that appellant had engaged in telecommunications harassment on or about

September 15, 2020.        The probable cause statement provided that the

telecommunications had occurred repeatedly and were as recent as August 29,

2022. During the trial, the jury was presented evidence of telecommunications that

had occurred between September 2020 and August 2022.

              The court stated the following during jury instructions with regard to

the first count:

      Before you can find the Defendant guilty, you must find on or — you
      must find beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 14th day of
      September 2022 in the city of Cleveland, Cuyahoga County, Ohio the
      Defendant knowingly made or caused to be made the
      telecommunication to Andrea Sitler and the caller had previously been
      told by Andrea Sitler not to make communications to Andrea Sitler at
      the premises.
             It appears that when reading the charges to the jury, the court stated

the date that the complaint was signed rather than the date that the complaint

alleged the offense to have occurred. Appellant did not object to the date stated in

the jury instructions, and thus we can only review for plain error. Even in the

context of jury instructions, “[p]lain error ‘should be applied with utmost caution

and should be invoked only to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice.’” State v.

Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 52, quoting State

v. Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 444 N.E.2d 1332 (1983), syllabus. Plain error as to

jury instructions is proven when the outcome of the trial would have been different

but for the alleged error. State v. Campbell, 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 630 N.E.2d 339

(1994).

              The jury heard the dates of the telecommunications in question stated

throughout the trial.    Moreover, we do not know whether the written jury

instructions that the jury received for deliberations included the date of

September 14, 2022, or the date alleged in the complaint because the jury

instructions were not made part of the trial court record.

              The date stated in the charge to the jury was clearly a mistake by the

court, and we do not find that appellant can demonstrate prejudice from a single

misstatement of the date of the offense in this case. We find that the trial court did

not plainly err, and appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
                              C. Admission of Testimony

                  In her third assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court

abused its discretion when it allowed Sitler to testify about the text message that she

sent on September 23, 2020, where she told appellant not to contact her again and

referenced the Ohio statute regarding telecommunications harassment. Appellant

argues that admitting the testimony was error because the text messages were

“writings” under Evid.R. 1002 and should have been proven by producing the

writing itself.

                  Evid.R. 1002 requires that “[t]o prove the content of a writing,

recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required,

except as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute enacted by the General

Assembly not in conflict with a rule of the Supreme Court of Ohio.”

                  Assuming that the original text messages were available but not

placed into evidence, the admission of Sitler’s testimony regarding their contents

violated Evid.R. 1002. However, any error in the admission of her testimony was

harmless. The outcome of the trial would not have been different because there was

additional evidence admitted — the victim’s testimony that she told appellant to stop

contacting her and the emails submitted into evidence — that would still support

appellant’s conviction. Thus, appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                         D. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

                  In her fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that her

convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, she
contends that her conviction was based upon “paltry evidence, a critical

misstatement by the trial court[,] and a significant evidentiary error in admitting

improper testimony regarding the content of a text message.”

              When reviewing a manifest weight challenge, an appellate court,

“‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of

witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Virostek, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 110592, 2022-Ohio-1397, ¶ 54, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio

App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). A reversal on the basis that a verdict

is against the manifest weight of the evidence is granted “‘only in the exceptional

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’”           State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Martin at 175.

              As this court has previously stated:

      The criminal manifest weight of-the-evidence standard addresses the
      evidence’s effect of inducing belief. State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382,
      2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio
      St.3d at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Under the manifest weight-of-the-
      evidence standard, a reviewing court must ask the following question:
      whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s?
      Wilson at id. Although there may be legally sufficient evidence to
      support a judgment, it may nevertheless be against the manifest weight
      of the evidence. Thompkins at 387; State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d 95,
      2000-Ohio-276, 723 N.E.2d 1054 (2000).

      When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis
      that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the
      appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the fact
      finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. Wilson at id., quoting
      Thompkins at id.

State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108275, 2020-Ohio-269, ¶ 86-87.

               In its role as the “thirteenth juror,” an appellate court must review the

entire record, weigh the direct and circumstantial evidence and all reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, and consider the credibility of the witnesses to

determine “‘whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting Martin.

              In the instant matter, Sitler testified as to the timeline of messages

from and to appellant, including ones where Sitler told appellant to stop contacting

her. Two emails from appellant, dated August 19 and August 29, 2022, were

admitted into evidence, one of which was signed by appellant.

              We cannot find that this is the exceptional case where the trier of fact

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that appellant’s

conviction must be reversed. Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

                              E. Criminal Complaint

              In her fifth assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court plainly

erred when it treated the criminal complaint as charging two offenses in a single

statement rather than being divided into separate counts. Appellant contends that

the single complaint utilized the language of two separate telecommunications

offenses, to wit: (1) sending communications after being told not to do so; and (2)
sending harassing communications. She contends that because the case was tried

as a two-count case, the jury was able to “split the baby” and heard testimony

regarding the victim’s emotional suffering that it would not have heard if the case

had been a one-count case. She asserts this must have provoked sympathy by the

jury.

                Crim.R. 12(C)(2) provides that “[d]efenses and objections based on

defects in the indictment, information, or complaint” must be raised before trial.

The failure to raise these issues before trial results in a waiver of these defenses or

objections. Crim.R. 12(H).

               Similarly, R.C. 2941.29 provides:

        No indictment or information shall be quashed, set aside, or dismissed,
        * * * nor shall any conviction be set aside or reversed on account of any
        defect in form or substance of the indictment or information, unless the
        objection to such indictment or information, specifically stating the
        defect claimed, is made prior to the commencement of the trial, or at
        such time thereafter as the court permits.

               Therefore, the failure to raise any objections based on defects in the

indictment prior to trial results in a waiver of these defenses or objections. See State

v. Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466, 2010-Ohio-3830, 935 N.E.2d 26, ¶ 46, citing Crim.R.

12(C)(2); State v. Mitchell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88977, 2007-Ohio-6190, ¶ 44-

45.

               There are certain exceptions, however, to this waiver. Crim.R. 12

provides for two such exceptions: (1) the indictment fails to show jurisdiction in the

court, and (2) the indictment fails to charge an offense. Crim.R. 12(C)(2). These
objections “shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the

proceeding.” See Crim.R. 12. In this case, neither exception applies because there

were no issues with the trial court's jurisdiction or with the offenses charged within

the indictment.

              Because appellant did not move to dismiss the indictment and instead

chose to go to trial on the charges, she has waived all but plain error. “An error does

not constitute plain error unless, but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly

would have been otherwise.” State v. Hill, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95379, 2011-

Ohio-2523, ¶ 9.

              In the instant matter, appellant is correct that the criminal complaint

does not clearly set forth two separate counts. The complaint simply states both

subsections that it alleged appellant had violated. However, at trial, the criminal

complaint was always treated as though it had stated two separate counts. The trial

court instructed the jury on two separate counts. The jury was specifically instructed

to consider each count separately and arrive at two separate verdicts.

              Appellant appears to be making a joinder argument, arguing that

hearing the testimony regarding the second count impacted the jury’s thinking when

deciding the first count. However, appellant’s brief did not present any argument

or authority in support of a joinder argument, and we decline to craft an argument

for her.

              The jury returned a guilty verdict on the first count but was unable to

reach a verdict on the second, which was subsequently nolled by the state. Thus,
appellant was found guilty of one count, and as discussed above, this conviction was

supported by competent credible evidence. Appellant has not demonstrated how

she was prejudiced by the wording of the complaint, and her fifth assignment of

error is overruled.

                      F. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

                In her sixth assignment of error, appellant argues that her counsel was

ineffective by failing to object to the court’s misstatement of the date of the offense

and by failing to challenge the complaint charging appellant with two offenses in a

single count.

                In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been

different. State v. Jenkins, 2018-Ohio-483, 106 N.E.3d 216, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.), citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674

(1984). The defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test in order to prove

ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109083,

2020-Ohio-4138, ¶ 28, citing Strickland at 687.

                Under Ohio law, “every properly licensed attorney is presumed to be

competent.” State v. Knight, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109302, 2021-Ohio-3674, ¶ 47,

citing State v. Black, 2019-Ohio-4977, 149 N.E.3d 1132, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.), citing State

v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 477 N.E.2d 1128 (1985).             Therefore, when
“evaluating counsel’s performance on a claim of ineffective assistance counsel, the

court must give great deference to counsel’s performance and ‘indulge a strong

presumption’ that counsel’s performance ‘falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.’” Id., quoting Strickland at 689.

              With regard to appellant’s failure to object to the trial court’s

misstatement of the date of the offense, we have already determined that this did

not constitute error. In addition, we also determined that appellant has not shown

any error in the criminal complaint. Appellant has not demonstrated that her

counsel was ineffective or that she was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object.

Appellant’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.

                                     III. Conclusion

              All of appellant’s assignments of error are overruled. The trial court

did not err in misstating the date of the offense, treating the criminal complaint as

charging two offenses, or admitting testimony from the victim regarding the content

of text messages. Appellant’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Finally, appellant did not receive

ineffective assistance of counsel.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

municipal court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction
having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the

trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR