Court Opinion

ID: 9740374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:33:40.307504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:17.736849
License: Public Domain

Sharpe, J.
(dissenting). Harold-A. Card and his wife, Annette Card, began separate actions for damages growing out of an automobile accident that occurred October 11, 1948, Upon motion of defendants, ■ the causes were consolidated, trial was had, and issues were submitted to a jury resulting in verdicts and judgments for both defendants.
Following the entry of judgments, plaintiffs filed a motion for the entry of orders in their respective cases setting aside the verdict and judgment and granting new and separate trial. The trial court granted the motion for a new trial in the case of Annette Card, but denied the motion for a new trial as to Harold A. Card.
In granting defendants’ motion to consolidate the 2 cases for trial, the trial court in an opinion stated:
“The court has examined the declaration in both eases. The claim of each plaintiff for damages arises out of the same accident. Therefore, the testimony as to the negligence of the defendants, if any, will be exactly the same in both cases. This plaintiff was a passenger in the car which was driven by her husband. There is no reason why the cases cannot be tried at the same time, nor why the jury cannot return a separate verdict for each plaintiff. By doing so, the time of the court, the jury, and the attorneys will be saved to a great degree. There is no advantage to be gained by either party by trying the cases separately.”
Plaintiff Harold A. Card appeals and urges that the trial court was in error in consolidating both cases over the objections of the plaintiffs. The trial ; court recognized its error in consolidating Annette i Card’s case with that of her husband and upon ¡motion granted her a separate trial. Appellant re*624lies upon Bostrom v. Jennings, 326 Mich. 146, as-authority for his claim that it was error to consolidate his case with that of his wife. We do not think the Bostrom Case is controlling of the issues in the case at bar. In the Bostrom Case we held, that the statute relative to joinder of parties does not authorize the joinder of plural plaintiffs unless their causes of action be joint nor “permit plaintiff to join causes of' action in more than one distinct right or capacity.”
We think the real issue in this case is whether appellant was' prejudiced by having his case tried with that of his wife. It is a well-established principle of law that the trial court has discretion in the granting of a new trial and will not be overruled in the absence of an abuse of discretion, see Kellom v. City of Ecorse, 329 Mich 303. In the case at barr appellant’s cause of action arose out of the same accident in which his wife suffered injuries. The testimony as to the acts of negligence on the part of defendant Otto Nemecek should be the same in both cases. In the absence of a showing of error resulting in prejudice to appellant it was not error to refuse a new trial to plaintiff Harold A. Card..
Appellant also urges that the trial court, was in error in admitting testimony on the part of defendants to the effect that the automobile owned by defendant Francis Nemecek. was paid for and used exclusively by and actually owned by defendant Otto Nemecek. The trial court instructed the jury as follows: *
“I think I may say to you, however, that so far as the liability of the defendants is concerned, if you should find for the plaintiffs or either 1 of the plaintiffs, the verdict should be against these 2 defendants, because so far as the law is concerned, the law recognizes that the father who has the title to this *625car was the owner of it at that time and that this young man was the driver of it.”
In our opinion the trial court was in error in permitting the defendants to introduce the evidence, but in view of the instruction given, the error was not prejudicial to the right of appellant.
Appellant also urges that it was error to* charge the jury that it was the duty of Harold A. Card not to drive his vehicle at a greater rate of speed than would permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead,  without also instructing the jury that such instruction applied equally to defendant driver. We think the rule announced in Rogers v. Youngs, 252 Mich 420, where a like situation existed, is controlling. In that case we said:
“Defendant claimed error that the court did not state that it was equally the duty of each party to drive in this manner. The court should have done so. However, there was no request to charge in this regard by defendant, nor did he ask that the charge be corrected or amplified. He cannot now complain.”
In the case at bar, plaintiffs’ counsel presented no .requests relative to the assured clear distance rule and by virtue of the above authority appellant is now precluded from complaining.
Other errors are alleged in the charge to the jury. AVe have examined them, but do not find in them any prejudicial error. We have often said that the charge as a whole must be read in order to determine whether there is error or not. In our opinion the charge fairly presented the issues to the jury.
It is also urged that the trial court was in error in refusing to grant a new trial because of the misconduct of one of the jurors. It appears that dur*626Ing a recess in the trial, Otto L. Nemecek was standing in the corridor with his father, Francis Nemecek,. when one of the jurors came up and asked him if he had insurance, to which no reply was.made. Defendants’ attorney reported the incident, to the trial judge and moved for a mistrial. In the absence ■of the jury, Otto Nemecek was called upon to testify relative to the incident. The following occurred after his testimony was taken:
“Mr. Phelps: May it please the court, on the basis of that I move for a mistrial in this case. T think it is highly improper for jurors to entertain questions of insurance. I am calling it to the court’s attention now so it can’t be charged w'e withheld the information.
“Q. Mr. Nemecek, you immediately came in and told me after it happened?
“A. Yes.
“The Court: The thing I am most concerned in, did you make any reply whatsoever, either in the ■affirmative, an audible reply, nod your head or any reply, affirmative or negative?
“A. I did not: I just walked awav.
“Mr. Phelps: That very fact that he did ask him that and he walked away would of course give the juror some suspicion- that he did have insurance, if the court please. Well the thing just shouldn’t happen: it just shouldn’t happen in a case like this.
“The Court: Well if that is all that occurred, and if the witness states that is all that occurred, I cuestión whether the court can direct a mistrial. What is your attitude, Mr. Mitts ?
“Mr. Mitts: I can see nothing about it that is prejudicial one way or the other. That Question is in the minds of all juries, they know it all the time.
“Mr. Phelps: Well you put it in their minds by the method of examining the jury that you indulged in, I will concede that.
“Mr. Mitts: I grant I could have put it in a lot worse, if you want to know the truth about it; I could *627have asked them whether any one of the jnrors were members of the Automobile Mutual Insurance Company ; I didn’t even go that far.
“The Court: Well, I presume that probably is a question in the minds of most of these jurors in the trial of every personal injury case. I don’t know how you can take curiosity out of their minds. I have cautioned the jury at the very beginning of the term never to go out in the hallway and converse with anyone.
“Mr. Mitts: I suggest that we excuse Mr. Joling, if there is any question about it, and try it with 11.
“The Court: Well of course, if he hasn’t received any information, there probably hasn’t any particular damage been done. Well, you may recall the jury.”
In view of the fact that plaintiffs’ counsel opposed the granting of a mistrial shortly after the incident happened, we are of the opinion that appellant is not now in a position to take an opposite attitude. Moreover, the inquisitiveness of 1 -juror as shown under the facts in this case does not constitute grounds for a new trial.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs to defendants.
Btjtzel and Bushnell, JJ., concurred with Sharpe, J.