Court Opinion

ID: 9729089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:26:20.015159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:55.373053
License: Public Domain

Dissenting opinion by
Justice SCOTT.
Appellant was advised at length of the potential consequences of presenting false testimony, not only by counsel, but twice by the court. Yet, he still persisted. Because of this conduct, the trial court imposed a “limited forfeiture” of his right to the assistance of counsel, at Appellant’s counsel’s request, designed solely to keep counsel’s hands away from the false evidence. Because, I believe this “limited forfeiture” of Appellant’s right to the assistance of counsel was appropriate under our constitutional jurisprudence and ultimately more protective of Appellant’s constitutional rights to testify and to a fair trial than the alternative mandated by the majority, I must respectively dissent.
The American Criminal Justice System grants the rights of an accused more preeminence than any other system of justice on earth. This grant is premised upon the belief of our founders, bequeathed for posterity to us today, that, “it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1077, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). It is this standard, bounded by an earnest search for the truth, which guides our jurisprudence. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980) (“There is no gainsaying that arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system.”); Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1764 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964) (“We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement, which comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will, in the *89long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.”); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1964) (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
This belief is reflected in the Bill of Rights of our United States Constitution, as well as the Constitution of this Commonwealth. As these constitutional principles have been our beacon of truth for over two hundred years, we would do well to steer the same course today.
During the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Appellant’s counsel advised the court that after several discussions with Appellant, a conflict had arisen between them. Because of the nature of the conflict, counsel discussed the conflict with the court outside the presence of the Commonwealth and advised the court that he and Appellant had discussed what the evidence will and won’t be and that the theory Appellant now wanted to present to the jury through his testimony was not consistent with what had been disclosed during counsel’s investigation of the case.
Counsel further advised that he was now in a dilemma, that Appellant wanted to testify, had a right to testify, but counsel could not ethically assist in his testimony. Counsel also acknowledged that normally he would tell the jury what Appellant’s testimony was, but he could not do that in this case because he could not use Appellant’s testimony.1
The court then discussed the matter at length with Appellant and his counsel, advised Appellant extensively of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and that he had a right to testify, but if he testified falsely, he did not have a right to have counsel assist him in presenting the testimony to the jury. The court then directed Appellant and counsel to discuss the matter further during the lunch break. Following lunch, Appellant’s counsel advised the court that they were still in the same predicament and thus, after examination of the remaining officers, he would request permission to leave the courtroom.
The case then continued with cross-examination of the officers, after which the Commonwealth announced a close of their case in chief. Counsel for the Appellant then moved for various directed verdicts, which were denied. He also previewed the instructions the court would ultimately give in the “guilt phase” and advised the court he had no objection to them.
The trial court then excused defense counsel, but kept him on call in the event of a guilty verdict.2 The jury, of course, was not aware of this, as the court told the jury that Appellant had chosen to represent himself from that point forward. Appellant then took the stand, gave his testimony in a narrative fashion, and was cross-examined. His cross-examination lasted seventeen minutes and produced no significant disclosures.
Being the only witness for his defense, Appellant closed his case. After instructions, he gave a closing argument, which consisted of all the evidence given in his *90narrative.3 The case was submitted to the jury which took seven hours to reach a verdict, finding Appellant (1) not guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine), while in the possession of a firearm; (2) not guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine); (3) not guilty of illegal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine) while in the possession of a firearm; and (4) not guilty of tampering with physical evidence. He was found guilty of illegal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine) and driving on a permit without a licensed operator, a misdemeanor.
Following the verdict, Appellant’s counsel returned to the courtroom and resumed representation of Appellant for the sentencing phase. At the conclusion, the jury fixed Appellant’s punishment at five years for the illegal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine), but found him guilty of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree and increased his punishment to eighteen years. On appeal, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court was unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This Court granted discretionary review and now reverses the conviction on the basis of a denial of Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.4
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court summarized the right to counsel as follows:
The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.
466 U.S. at 685, 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). “[A] fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding.” Id.
*91What constitutes a fair trial, of course, is necessarily dependent upon the context of the circumstances within which the trial occurs. See, e.g., Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 683, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 2014-15, 161 L.Ed.2d 958 (2005) (“The constitutional requirement, however, is not absolute. It permits a judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, to take account of special circumstances, including security concerns, that may call for shackling.”); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (“We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant ... (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.”); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 160 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Ky.2005) (defendant remained in handcuffs and leg irons throughout trial); Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 233 (Ky.2004) (defendant argued that leg shackles on him throughout the trial violated his constitutional right to be presumed innocent); Hodge v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 824, 839 (Ky.2000) (“We do not view this security force as excessive in view of Appellant’s previous conviction and sentence to death in this case and his previous conviction and sentence to death for a similar burglary/murder committed in August 1985.”); Commonwealth v. Conley, 959 S.W.2d 77 (Ky.1997) (prisoner, who escaped during arraignment, could be shackled to prevent escape during trial); and Tunget v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 834, 836, 198 S.W.2d 785-86 (Ky.1947) (defendant kept in handcuffs during trial).
What Justice Cardozo so aptly pointed out in Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), is still true today: “[n]o doubt [a] privilege may be lost ... by misconduct.” 291 U.S. at 106, 54 S.Ct. at 332.
In Illinois v. Allen, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant can forfeit his Sixth Amendment right to be present at trial so long as a prior warning and discussion of the probable consequences are set forth prior to the defendant’s removal. 397 U.S. at 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057 (“It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order and decorum be the hallmark of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated”). In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the Court noted that a “trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.” 422 U.S. at 834, n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Thus, forfeiture of a constitutional right does not depend upon the consent of the accused, but rather upon his conduct and the necessity of the judicial system to function in a constitutionally envisioned manner.
While it is undisputed that Appellant had a constitutional right to testify, it is “crystal clear that there is no right whatever — constitutional or otherwise — for a defendant to use false evidence.” Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173, 106 S.Ct. 988, 997, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has warned that “when defendants testify, they must testify truthfully or suffer the consequences.” United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980). See also, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (“privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury”).
*92Nor does the right to counsel include a “right to have a lawyer who will cooperate with planned perjury.” Nix, 475 U.S. at 173, 106 S.Ct. 988. “When an accused proposes to result to perjury or to produce false evidence, one consequence is the risk of withdrawal of counsel.” Id. at 174, 106 S.Ct. 988. Plainly, the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants is a necessary mainstay of any civilization that values truth as the arbitrator of consequence. But as noted, “the privilege may be lost ... by misconduct.” Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106, 54 S.Ct. 330.
Of course, there are competing interests in this case that must be balanced. These interests include the protection of the courtroom as a bastion of truth, justice, and decorum, against an individual defendant’s right to counsel, to testify, and to a “fair trial.” But Nix specifically held that “there was no permissible choice to testify falsely” and “the right to counsel includes no right to have a lawyer who will cooperate with planned perjury.” Nix, 475 U.S. at 173, 106 S.Ct. 988 (emphasis added). And what is a “fair trial” is defined within the context of events that occurred. Cf. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. at 633, 125 S.Ct. 2007. Nix also pointed out that “[w]hen an accused proposes to result to perjury or produce false evidence, one consequence is the risk of withdrawal of counsel.” Id. at 174, 106 S.Ct. 988. Havens makes it clear that “when defendants testify, they must testify truthfully or suffer the consequences.” Havens, 446 U.S. at 626, 100 S.Ct. 1912.
Accordingly, when the trial court was presented with the presentation of false testimony, it was required by Nix to respect and uphold the Criminal Justice System’s paramount interest in truth and justice. In fact, when it comes to the presentation of false testimony, there is simply no recognized competing right to present, or have a lawyer assist, in the presentation of such testimony, or its protection.
What we are really weighing here, is how “critical [truth is] to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685-86, 104 S.Ct. 2052. I believe it is and should remain paramount. If there is any line to be drawn in the sand of jurisprudence, this is it. And since the “search for the truth,” is the ultimate driver of almost every decision we make, whether legal, evidentiary, or procedural, I believe Nix was correct in its pronouncement that, “the right to counsel includes no right to have a lawyer who will cooperate with planned perjury.” Nix, 475 U.S. at 173, 106 S.Ct. 988. (Emphasis added).
“On one hand, the profession of an attorney is of great importance to an individual, and the prosperity of his whole life may depend upon its exercise.... On the other, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of the bar should be main-tained_” In re Taylor, 300 Ky. 448, 189 S.W.2d 403, 405 (1945). As a means of protecting our system of advocacy, we have recognized the play ethical standards have in the advocacy necessary to support our system of justice. For example in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811(1963), the United States Supreme Court, via the Fourteenth Amendment, held that the States must provide indigent persons with counsel on the first appeal as a matter of right. Yet, we recognize limitations on this right, given the ethical obligations required for membership in our bars. See McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 436, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1901, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988) (“An attorney, whether appointed or paid, is therefore under an ethical obligation to refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal”).
*93In this same regard, the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct, SCR 3.130-3.3(a)(3), establish that a lawyer, shall not “offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.” SCR 3.130 — 1.16(a)(1) provides that, where the representation has commenced, a lawyer, “shall withdraw from the representation of a client if ... [t]he representation will result in violation of the rules of Professional Conduct or other law.” (Emphasis added). SCR 3.130-1.6 establishes that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information related to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as in stated in paragraph (b).” SCR 3.130-1.6(b) authorizes the disclosure of such information, but only when the lawyer reasonably believes that it is necessary (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm, or (2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and client, or (3) to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or (4) to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client, or (5) to comply with other law or court order.
Since our ethical rules in this regard are intended to keep members of our Bar safe from the “clutches” of criminal statutes, it is pertinent that we review several. “A person is guilty of perjury in the first degree when he makes a material false statement, which he does not believe, in any official proceeding under an oath required or authorized by law....” KRS 523.020(1). “A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when, with the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he ... aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in planning or committing the offense ... or having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make a proper effort to do so.” KRS 502.020(1). (Emphasis added). And “[a] person is guilty of criminal facilitation when, acting with knowledge that another person is committing or intends to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which knowingly provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission of the crime and which in fact aids such person to commit the crime.” KRS 506.080(1). (Emphasis added).
The official comments to SCR 3.130-3.3 recognize, but do not propose, three possible resolutions to the dilemma presented where the accused insists on testifying when the lawyer knows the testimony will be perjurious.5 The first scenario is to allow the accused to testify by narrative without guidance by the lawyer, but the lawyer stays in the trial. The commentaries acknowledge however, that “[t]his compromises both contending principles; it exempts the lawyer from the duty to disclose false evidence but subjects the client to an implicit disclosure of information imparted to counsel.” SCR 3.130-3.3, Comment 9. The second scenario is that the advocate be entirely excused from the duty to reveal perjury if the perjury is that of the client. Here our official comments acknowledge that this “makes the advocate a knowing instrument of perjury.” Id. The third scenario is that “the lawyer must reveal the client’s perjury if necessary to rectify the situation.” Id. at Comment 10. Here our comments note, “an advocate has an obligation, not only in professional eth*94ics, but under the law as well, to avoid implication in the commission of perjury.” Id. (Emphasis added). We also note that “an accused should not have a right to assistance of counsel in committing perjury.” Id. (Emphasis added). This is consistent with what the United States Supreme Court said in Nix, supra, namely that:
The positive authority on the subject of any such right may be explained by the fact that such a notion has never been responsibly advanced; the right to counsel includes no right to have a lawyer who will cooperate with planned perjury. A lawyer who would so cooperate would be at risk of prosecution for suborning perjury, and disciplinary proceedings, including suspension or disbarment.
Nix, 475 U.S. at 173, 106 S.Ct. 988.
It is also consistent with United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. at 626, 100 S.Ct. 1912, to the effect that “when defendants testify, they must testify truthfully or suffer the consequences.” Id. And “[w]hen an accused proposes to resort to perjury or to produce false evidence, one consequence is the risk of withdrawal of counsel.” Nix, 475 U.S. at 174, 106 S.Ct. 988.
This occurred here, yet the “limited forfeiture” in this case was so well-managed by the court that it protected both Appellant’s rights and the need of the Justice System to preserve its integrity, decorum, and its paramount interest in the search for the truth. I can not conceive of a better solution which addresses all the rights and concerns than what occurred.
The majority, however, adopts a scenario which is somewhat of a hybrid of scenarios one and three as noted in SCR 3.130-3.3, Comments 7-10, that of requiring counsel to apprise the court of impending false testimony followed by a narrative from the client of his testimony without guidance through the lawyer’s questioning. The lawyer will then assist the accused by making appropriate objections to any attempted cross-examination. Moreover, counsel is allowed to make the closing argument, but may not refer to any of the evidence counsel believes, in good faith, with a firm basis in objective fact for such a belief, was false.6 Thus, in this case, the majority finds reversible error because Appellant’s counsel withdrew during Appellant’s narrative and did not present closing argument. The majority is also bothered by the fact that Appellant’s counsel resumed his representation during the sentencing phase of the trial.
The majority finds this conduct disturbing because it may have “tipped off’ the jury that something was wrong. How could that be? The jury took seven hours to reach its verdict and then acquitted the Appellant of four of the five felony charges presented in the guilt phase. Indeed, if the majority’s premise were to be followed to its logical conclusion, then the narrative statement itself, or anything out of the ordinary for that matter, would be impermissible and prejudicial since it too could “tip off’ the jury. The four “not guilty” verdicts here say otherwise. Here, the jury was told by the Court that Appellant was now representing himself. Thus, under these facts, I cannot accept that a “tip off’ to the jury did occur.
“Under any standard of proper ethical conduct an attorney should not sit by silently and permit his client to commit what may have been perjury, and which certainly would mislead the court and the opposing party on a matter vital to the issue under consideration.” In re Carroll, 244 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Ky.1951). One’s duty to *95a client “does not extend to the point of authorizing collaboration with him in the commission of fraud.” Id. at 475. Nor does it obviate the fact that “respondent’s conduct [would have been] unethical and was of the type which impairs public confidence in the high moral standards of the legal profession.” Id. “He is an officer of the court, — a minister in the temple of justice. His high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates his oath of office when he resorts to deception, or permits his clients to do so.” In re Taylor, 300 Ky. 448, 448, 189 S.W.2d 403, 403-04 (1945).
The majority also argues that Appellant was deprived of counsel during the non-perjurious parts of the trial. Specifically, the majority contends that counsel should have stayed to offer objections during the nonperjurious parts of cross-examination and to offer a closing argument. I can not agree to this argument.
First, as set forth above, Appellant’s misconduct effectively forfeited his right to counsel for this limited period. Nix, 475 U.S. at 174, 106 S.Ct. 988 (“When an accused proposes to resort to perjury or to produce false evidence, one consequence is the risk of withdrawal of counsel.”). Second, once the presumably per-jurious testimony was presented to the jury, the presence of counsel for the purpose of presenting a closing argument would have been more prejudicial to Appellant than Appellant presenting the closing argument himself. For example, the inability to argue the false evidence, which, more than likely, will be his best defense (“I wasn’t there!”, etc.) in closing, or even to object to its cross-examination, presents a certainty that the jury will notice and believe that the defendant’s own lawyer does not believe his client’s denials. This, to me, infringes upon a defendant’s right to a fair trial much more so than being told the defendant will now represent himself.
Finally, the majority finds error with the trial court allowing counsel to return once the guilt phase of the trial was concluded. Presumably, the majority believes that when counsel returns, the jury would then have figured out that Appellant lied and thus, would have punished him more severely during the penalty phase. However, this is entirely too speculative in my opinion. Even Appellant did not believe as much since he allowed counsel to resume his representation and did not request either: (1) to continue representing himself during the penalty phase; or (2) request different counsel for the sentencing proceeding.
Moreover, there was no allegation whatsoever by Appellant that the jury was persuaded by such passion or prejudice. It is equally likely that the jury would have presumed that Appellant reconciled with the attorney after a mid-trial disagreement and conviction. And even if there were some prejudice in allowing the attorney to resume his representation, it certainly would present no more unnecessary prejudice than being “shackled” during a trial. See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. at 633, 125 S.Ct. 2007.
Here, only after extensive discussions with both Appellant and counsel and after warnings of the possible consequences were given to the Appellant, did the court allow Appellant’s counsel to withdraw, yet, remain on call, in the event of the need for a sentencing phase. The warnings to the Appellant were extensive as to the probable effects. The court then directed the Appellant and counsel to further discuss the matter over the lunch recess. Only after having assured itself that Appellant desired to proceed with the subject testi*96mony, notwithstanding the forthcoming withdrawal of counsel, did the court impose a “limited forfeiture.” The jury was then told Appellant was now representing himself. They knew nothing of the reasons therefore. Appellant took the stand and gave his “narrative,” was cross-examined by the Commonwealth, and rested. Appellant made his own closing statement and the Commonwealth theirs. He argued all the points of his evidence and was not limited as counsel would now be. The jury then retired and returned their verdict of guilty, whereupon Appellant’s counsel resumed his representation and concluded the sentencing phase of the trial.
When the totality of the circumstances in this case are reviewed, not only do I find no error, but I find the trial court’s handling of this matter to be a model for future attorneys and judges. After exhaustive warnings and several chances for Appellant to be dissuaded from offering false testimony, Appellant simply forfeited his right to counsel for the limited parts of the proceeding that might reasonably be perceived as dealing with his false testimony. The court elected the best possible means of protecting not only Appellant’s right to counsel, but also his right to testify, and to a fair trial. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent since I would affirm the “limited forfeiture” and the convictions.
McANULTY, J., joins this dissent.

. These “cryptic statements” lead to only one conclusion for those experienced in criminal law and professional ethics.

. The trial court did discuss keeping counsel in the courtroom, but was advised by Appellant’s counsel that he and Appellant had discussed this, and counsel felt it would look worse on Appellant.

. In his narrative testimony and closing argument, Appellant pointed out that (1) the cocaine found beside the car he was driving was not his, (2) since he didn’t know where it came from, it must have been planted by the arresting officers; and (3) he did not know there was a gun under the seat of the car, as the car belonged to his girlfriend.

. What we are really dealing with is a premature claim of "ineffective assistance of counsel.” "As a general rule, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will not be reviewed on direct appeal from the trial court’s judgment, because there is usually no record or trial court ruling on which such a claim can be properly considered.” Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Ky.1998). ”[C]laims of ineffective assistance of counsel are best suited to collateral attack proceedings, after the direct appeal is over, and in the trial court where proper records can be made.” Id. This is because SCR 3.130-1.6 prohibits a lawyer from revealing information relating to representation of a client without the client’s consent, unless disclosure is necessary, among other reasons, to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client.
By not treating the matter as one involving the issue of "ineffective assistance of counsel” to be resolved in a post-conviction proceeding, on a record with findings, we are deprived of a procedure where a defendant must raise the issue in a manner which allows an attorney to ethically respond, and thus, for the trial court to make findings upon which we may rely. Thus, the issue is now presented and decided without the corresponding impact of appellant’s conduct; whether it be beneficial or detrimental. Thus, I fear the court’s focus is more on what the court did than what Appellant did.

. There is a significant ethical difference between "thinking” a clients testimony might be false and "knowing" it is. On one, counsel must act, on the other, counsel may not.

. "An attorney may thus continue to represent his client on all parts of the trial not connected to the alleged perjury.” Op. at 84.