Court Opinion

ID: 9352957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 17:00:20.457445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:06:10.583687
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 21-2658
                         ___________________________

                             United States of America

                                       Plaintiff - Appellee

                                         v.

                              John Willard Greywind

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                        for the District of North Dakota
                                 ____________

                             Submitted: June 13, 2022
                              Filed: January 10, 2023
                                   [Unpublished]
                                  ____________

Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

PER CURIAM.

       John Greywind is currently serving a sentence of 120 months of imprisonment
after pleading guilty to voluntary manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112
and 1153. As part of his sentence, Greywind was also required to pay $4,184.54 in
restitution through installment payments based on inmate earnings “and not less than
$25 per quarter.” In June 2021, the government filed a motion to release funds,
seeking turnover of funds from Greywind’s inmate trust account under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3613(a) and 3664(n). Greywind objected, claiming the funds in question were
“Economic Impact Payment[s]” provided through various COVID-related tax relief
provisions and therefore exempt. The district court1 granted the government’s
motion and ordered the Bureau of Prisons to turn over approximately $3,100 from
Greywind’s trust account for application toward his outstanding restitution
obligations. The district court concluded the funds were not exempt under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3613(a)(1) and there was a valid lien against the funds.

       Greywind argues on appeal (1) the government lacked authority to collect
more than the scheduled installment payments, (2) the district court failed to
adequately identify the source of the funds to avoid collecting exempt funds, and (3)
the release was not justified under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k). Because the installment
schedule does not preclude release under § 3664(n) and no dispute exists about the
sources of the funds, we affirm.

       We review a district court’s order to grant the turnover of funds from an
inmate’s trust account for abuse of discretion and its statutory interpretation de novo.
See United States v. Robinson, 44 F.4th 758, 760 (8th Cir. 2022). However, this
court applies a plain error standard when reviewing arguments raised for the first
time on appeal. See United States v. Beston, 43 F.4th 867, 873 (8th Cir. 2022).
Under plain error review, we reverse only if there is “(1) an error, (2) that was plain,
(3) affects substantial rights,” and (4) “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Rush-Richardson, 574
F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).

      Greywind argues, for the first time on appeal, the district court erred by
ordering the release of funds in excess of the amount required in the oral
pronouncement during sentencing for restitution installment payments. Greywind

      1
       The Honorable Peter D. Welte, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the District of North Dakota.

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is correct that “when an oral sentence and the written judgment conflict, the oral
controls.” United States v. Bertucci, 794 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting
United States v. Mayo, 642 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2011)). Here, however, the oral
sentence’s general payment scheme only sets a minimum payment and must defer
to the statutory mandate of § 3664(n). Under its plain language, § 3664(n) triggers
a mandatory payment requirement to satisfy restitution obligations still owed
without a limitation as to whether an installment payment plan exists or the
defendant is in default. See United States v. Kendrick, No. 10-CR-6096-FPG, 2022
WL 1819390, at *4 & n.4 (W.D.N.Y. June 3, 2022) (slip op.) (noting § 3664(n)
triggered by receipt of a windfall during imprisonment without a statutory
requirement for default); but see United States v. Raifsnider, 846 F. App’x 423, 424
(8th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (noting clear authority must exist to override payment
plan to obtain funds representing sixteen years of inmate’s savings).

      Generally, “[f]unds held in an inmate trust account are not exempt from
enforcement” of a lien, such as a restitution order. Robinson, 44 F.4th at 760.
Rather, as the plain language of § 3664(n) requires, money within an inmate trust
account will be applied to a defendant’s restitution obligations if it qualifies as
“substantial resources from any source.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n). Greywind does
not dispute the tax relief payments are substantial resources. But because not all
funds contained in a trust account may be considered as such, we must determine
the composition of trust account funds. See United States v. Kidd, 23 F.4th 781, 787
(8th Cir. 2022) (noting “substantial resources” do not include the accumulation of
funds from prison wages); see also United States v. Evans, 48 F.4th 888, 892 (8th
Cir. 2022) (noting this circuit has not decided the issue, but “[t]he few courts to
consider the issue have concluded that COVID-19 stimulus payments are the ‘receipt
of substantial resources’ under § 3664(n)”); see, e.g., United States v. Wade, 580 F.
Supp. 3d 661, 665 (D. Neb. 2022) (“An influx of stimulus funds represents receipt
of substantial resources [ ] that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) must be applied to
outstanding restitution obligations.”).

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      The source of funds here is not disputed. Greywind admitted $3200 came
from COVID-related tax relief payments, noting he had spent some of the funds.
Unlike the situations in United States v. Woodring, 35 F.4th 633 (8th Cir. 2022), and
Evans, 48 F.4th at 891−92, meaningful appellate review is possible because the
record indicates the amount of the tax relief payments. Accordingly, the district
court had evidence, coming from Greywind himself, that the money was not an
exempt accumulation of wages, but was instead a non-exempt “windfall or
substantial financial injection.” See Kidd, 23 F.4th at 785 (quoting United States v.
Hughes, 914 F.3d 947, 951 (5th Cir. 2019)). This allowed the district court to
consider turnover of the funds under § 3664(n).

       The district court did not commit plain error. Because we determine the
restitution installment schedule does not bar turnover of the funds, whose source was
undisputed, in Greywind’s inmate trust account under § 3664(n), there is no need for
us to address the remaining issues raised on appeal. The judgment of the district
court is affirmed.
                         ______________________________

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