Court Opinion

ID: 9382936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 07:00:11.746452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.607547
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JOHN DOE,                                       DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  DA-0752-16-0100-I-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                    DATE: March 28, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           John Doe, Enid, Oklahoma, pro se.

           Jeremiah Crowley, Esquire, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his removal based on one charge of conduct unbecoming. On petition

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
     2
       Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board
     completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure.
                                                                                         2

     for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in finding the
     following: that he was less credible than the individual who accused him of the
     conduct for which he was removed; that the agency proved the charge, nexus, and
     the reasonableness of the penalty; and that he waived or failed to establish his due
     process affirmative defense.    He further argues that the administrative judge
     failed to consider his argument that his removal resulted from unlawful command
     influence. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
     address the probative value of certain hearsay evidence, we AFFIRM the initial
     decision.
¶2         We MODIFY the initial decision to find that the police department’s
     December 8, 2014 supplemental narrative report is hearsay evidence that does not
     have a high probative value and that the statements attributed to the appellant in
     the report do not lessen his relative credibility. See Borninkhof v. Department of
     Justice, 5 M.S.P.R. 77, 87 (1981) (setting forth the factors that may affect the
     probative value of hearsay evidence). Notwithstanding this slight modification to
     the administrative judge’s credibility analysis, the appellant has not provided
     sufficiently sound reasons to overturn the administrative judge’s other credibility
                                                                                           3

     determinations,   including    his   demeanor-based     findings,    or   his   ultimate
     determination that the appellant was less credible than the individual who stated
     that he engaged in the conduct for which he was removed.                  See Haebe v.
     Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (providing that the
     Board must defer to an administrative judge’s findings regarding credibility when
     those findings are based on the demeanor of the testifying witnesses and may
     overturn demeanor-based credibility findings only if the Board has sufficiently
     sound reasons for doing so).      Therefore, we do not disturb the administrative
     judge’s determination that the agency proved the charge of conduct unbecoming. 3
¶3         Although the appellant argues on review that the administrative judge failed
     to consider his unlawful command influence defense, it does not appear that he
     raised it below. Therefore, we need not consider it for the first time on review.
     Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). Even if he
     did raise it below, he waived or abandoned it by, among other things, failing to
     object to the administrative judge’s order and summary of the issues, which did
     not identify this defense as one that would be adjudicated. See Thurman v. U.S.
     Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 21, ¶¶ 18-25 (setting forth the factors to be
     considered in determining whether an appellant has waived or abandoned an
     affirmative defense). In any event, the appellant’s unlawful command influence
     defense, which is derived from Article 37 of the Uniform Code of Military
     Justice, is misplaced in this Board proceeding.        See 10 U.S.C. § 837; United
     States v. Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 149-51 (C.A.A.F. 1999).             The administrative
     3
       The administrative judge characterized the agency’s charge as involving “a he said,
     she said, scenario,” citing Faucher v. Department of the Air Force, 96 M.S.P.R. 203,
     ¶ 7 (2004) and Vicente v. Department of the Army, 87 M.S.P.R. 80, ¶ 7 (2000). ID
     at 5-6. We agree that the resolution of the case depends on an assessment of the
     relative credibility of two individuals. However, we note that this requires no special
     credibility assessment and such cases are no different than any other case involving
     conflicting testimony. See, e.g., Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453,
     458 (1987). We see no reason to label such matters as “he said, she said,” as that may
     suggest that a different standard applies in the assessment of credibility.
                                                                                           4

     judge considered the appellant’s argument that the deciding official was biased
     and acted in an improper manner in carrying out his duties as a deciding official
     but found no merit to these conditions.        We discern no basis to disturb this
     finding.
¶4         We have considered the appellant’s other arguments on review but conclude
     that they provide no basis to disturb the initial decision.         See Crosby v. U.S.
     Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the
     administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,
     drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on the issue of
     credibility);   Broughton   v.   Department     of   Health   and    Human    Services,
     33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).

                              NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
     Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
     review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
     your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appro priate
     forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
     summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
     provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
     the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
     regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
     this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
     claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
     within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
     chosen forum.

     4
       Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
     the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
     Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        5

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                  6

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                      7

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 5   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                  8

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court a t the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscour ts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.