Court Opinion

ID: 9390665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 06:00:09.883348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.028367
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ROBERT M. COLPITTS,                             DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         PH-0752-17-0398-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: April 27, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Robert M. Colpitts, Peabody, Massachusetts, pro se.

           Michael Potter, Providence, Rhode Island, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his constructive removal appeal for lack of jurisdiction .          For the
     reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for rev iew,

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Northeastern
     Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was the GS-0201-13/8 Chief of Human Resources for the
     agency’s Edith Nourse Rogers Memorial Veterans Hospita l (Bedford VA) in
     Bedford, Massachusetts, from September 2010 until May 29, 2016, when he
     transferred to the Department of the Air Force as a GS -0301-12/10 Resources
     Specialist. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, 7-9, 25-26, Tab 7 at 37. 2 The
     appellant alleges that he had a productive working relationship with his
     second-line supervisor, the Bedford VA Director, until mid-June 2015, after
     which she allegedly created a hostile work environment and intolerable working
     conditions for him until his May 2016 transfer. IAF, Tab 1 at 24-26, Tab 6 at 4-6,
     25, 27.
¶3        Subsequently, the appellant filed an equal employment opportunity (EEO)
     complaint in which he alleged discrimination based on age, race, and sex, and in
     which he alleged that his May 29, 2016 transfer to the Air Force constituted a
     constructive removal. IAF, Tab 1 at 22-39, Tab 6 at 28-31, Tab 7 at 28-34. The
     agency issued a final agency decision on August 8, 2017, in which it found no
     discrimination, no hostile work environment, and that no constructive removal
     occurred. IAF, Tab 1 at 22-39.
¶4        The appellant timely filed this appeal with the Board challenging his
     May 2016 transfer as a constructive removal. Id. at 3. The administrative judge
     informed the appellant that the Board lacks jurisdiction over presumed voluntary
     actions like resignations or removals unless the action was the result of duress,
     coercion, or misrepresentation by the agency.         IAF, Tab 2 at 2.        The

     2
       The appellant’s Executive Career Field Performance Appraisal lists his Chief of
     Human Resources assignment date as September 27, 2009. IAF, Tab 7 at 37. However,
     whether the appellant became Chief of Human Resources in 2009 or 2010 does not
     affect our disposition of this petition for review.
                                                                                            3

     administrative judge ordered the appellant to file evidence that hi s May 2016
     transfer to the Air Force was within the Board’s jurisdiction. Id. at 3; IAF, Tab 4.
     After reviewing the appellant’s jurisdictional submission and the agency’s motion
     to dismiss, IAF, Tabs 6-8, the administrative judge issued an initial decision that
     dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without holding the requested
     hearing, IAF, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 7.        The administrative judge
     found that the appellant, despite his allegations suggesting “a very unpleasant
     relationship with the Director,” failed to nonfrivolously allege facts that would
     establish that his May 29, 2016 transfer resulted from coercion or intolerable
     working conditions. ID at 4-6.
¶5         On review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge should have
     held a hearing at which he would have proven his constructive removal claim and
     that, considering the totality of the circumstances rather than each instance of
     workplace hostility in isolation, intolerable working conditions existed that
     required him to transfer in May 2016. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1
     at 4-8. 3 The agency has filed a response and asserts that there is no basis to
     disturb the administrative judge’s decision. PFR File, Tab 3 at 4-9.

     3
       The appellant includes two documents with his petition for review —a screenshot of
     his Resources Specialist application package status and a June 2016 email to schedule
     his testimony for an Administrative Investigation Board into the Bedford VA Director’s
     alleged creation of a hostile work environment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-11. Both of these
     documents were available to the appellant prior to the close of record before the
     administrative judge. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d), the Board will not consider
     evidence submitted for the first time with the petition for review ab sent a showing that
     it was unavailable before the record was closed despite the party’s due diligence.
     Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980). Thus, we have not
     considered either document as grounds for granting his petition for review. On remand,
     however, the appellant may resubmit these documents consistent with the procedures
     and time limits established by the administrative judge regarding further development
     of the record.
                                                                                            4

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6         The appellant has the burden of proving the Board’s jurisdiction by a
     preponderance of the evidence.        Parrott v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
     519 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A).                An
     employee-initiated action, such as a retirement or resignation, is presumed to be
     voluntary, and thus outside the Board’s jurisdiction. See Vitale v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 17 (2007). Nevertheless, the Board has
     recognized that employee-initiated actions that appear voluntary on their face are
     not always so and the Board may have jurisdiction over such actions as
     constructive adverse actions. Bean v. U.S. Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 7
     (2013). All constructive adverse actions have two things in common:              (1) the
     employee lacked a meaningful choice in the matter; and (2) it was the agency’s
     wrongful actions that deprived the employee of that choice.              Id., ¶ 8.   An
     involuntary resignation is equivalent to a constructive removal and therefore
     within the Board’s jurisdiction.     Garcia v. Department of Homeland Security,
     437 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc).             Similarly, an involuntary
     inter-agency transfer, even without loss of grade or pay, 4 is analogous to a
     constructive removal. Colburn v. Department of Justice, 80 M.S.P.R. 257, ¶¶ 5-6
     (1998); see also Roach v. Department of the Army, 86 M.S.P.R. 4, ¶ 17 (2000).
¶7         In cases such as this one, when the appellant alleges that the agency made
     working conditions so intolerable that he was coerced to resign, the Board will
     find the resignation involuntary only if the appellant demonstrates that the agency
     engaged in a course of action that made working conditions so difficult or
     unpleasant that a reasonable person in his position would ha ve felt compelled to

     4
       Although our involuntary inter-agency transfer precedent does not require the loss of
     grade or pay, here the appellant nonfrivolously alleges that his transfer resulted in the
     reduction in his grade from GS-13, step 8, to GS-12, step 10, and the reduction in his
     pay of approximately $13,000. IAF, Tab 1 at 7-8, 25-26, 35, Tab 6 at 4, 7, 17, 19,
     Tab 7 at 35-37. A constructive reduction in grade or pay is an adverse action within the
     Board’s jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7512(3)-(4); Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 8.
                                                                                             5

     resign. See Vitale, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 20; Colburn, 80 M.S.P.R. 257, ¶ 5. The
     doctrine of coerced involuntariness is “a narrow one” and does not apply if the
     employee resigns or retires because he “does not want to accept [measures] that
     the agency is authorized to adopt, even if those measures make continuation in
     the job so unpleasant . . . that he feels that he has no realistic option but to leave.”
     Staats v. U.S. Postal Service, 99 F.3d 1120, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “[T]he fact
     that an employee is faced with an unpleasant situation or that his choice is limited
     to two unattractive options does not make his decision any less voluntary.” Id.
     The touchstone of the “voluntariness” analysis is whether, considering the totality
     of the circumstances, factors operated on the employee’s decision -making process
     that deprived him of his freedom of choice. Vitale, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 19; see
     also Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶¶ 8, 11 (explaining that the agency’s wrongful
     actions must have deprived the employee of a meaningful choice). The Board
     must consider all of the surrounding circumstances, including events not
     immediately preceding the resignation or transfer, when measuring a resignation’s
     voluntariness. Shoaf v. Department of Agriculture, 260 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed.
     Cir. 2001).     When an appellant raises an allegation of discrimination in
     connection with a claim of involuntariness, the allegation may be addressed only
     insofar as it relates to the issue of voluntariness.         Axsom v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 12 (2009).
¶8         Once an appellant presents nonfrivolous allegations 5 of Board jurisdiction,
     he is entitled to a hearing at which he must prove jurisdiction by a preponderance
     of the evidence. Parrott, 519 F.3d at 1332. In assessing whether an appellant has
     made nonfrivolous allegations that would entitle him to a hearing, the
     administrative judge may consider the agency’s documentary submissions;
     however, to the extent that the agency’s evidence contradicts the appellant’s
     otherwise prima facie showing of jurisdiction, the administrative judge may not
     5
       A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter at
     issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).
                                                                                           6

      weigh evidence and resolve conflicting assertions of the parties and the agency’s
      evidence may not be dispositive. Ferdon v. U.S. Postal Service, 60 M.S.P.R. 325,
      329 (1994).
¶9          The appellant has asserted that the Bedford VA Director created hostile and
      intolerable working conditions from June 2015 until May 2016 by, among other
      things, pressuring his first-line supervisor to downgrade his performance
      appraisal and take administrative action against him, 6 removing him as the
      Bedford VA liaison to the Hanscom Air Force Base Community Partnership
      Committee, scheduling numerous meetings with him and abruptly canceling them
      at the last minute, attempting to embarrass him in front of the Veterans Integrated
      Service Network Director and other senior staff, ordering him to reassign one of
      her direct reports rather than hold that employee accountable for his performance
      because he would file an EEO complaint against her, and calling him a “moron”
      on multiple occasions in front of staff members. IAF, Tab 1 at 24-25, Tab 6
      at 4-6, 8-21, 23-31; PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-8.
¶10         Pro se filings are to be construed liberally.      Farooq v. Corporation for
      National and Community Service, 109 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶ 11 (2008).                      The
      administrative judge correctly noted that an employee is not guaranteed a
      stress-free work environment and must act reasonably, not assume the worst, and
      not jump to conclusions too quickly. ID at 5-6; see Brown v. U.S. Postal Service,
      115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 15, aff’d, 469 F. App’x 852 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Miller v.
      Department of Defense, 85 M.S.P.R. 310, ¶ 29 (2000). Yet, rather than consider
      the appellant’s claims of intolerable working conditions as a whole, the
      administrative judge appears to have evaluated and rejected the appellant’s claims
      individually and in isolation when finding that the appellant failed to assert

      6
        Ultimately, the appellant’s first-line supervisor, the Bedford VA Associate Director,
      did not downgrade the appellant’s performance appraisal and rated him overall
      Outstanding. IAF, Tab 7 at 37-40. Similarly, the record reflects that the Associate
      Director did not propose or effect any disciplinary or adverse action against the
      appellant.
                                                                                         7

      nonfrivolous allegations that the agency coerced his transfer.       ID at 4-6; see
      Shoaf, 260 F.3d at 1342; Ferdon, 60 M.S.P.R. at 329.
¶11         We disagree with the administrative judge and find that the totality of the
      appellant’s allegations constitutes nonfrivolous allegations of intolerable working
      conditions that entitle him to a hearing.        Further, the appellant submitted
      supporting documents that describe and appear to corroborate how the Director,
      who was the highest-ranking official at the Bedford VA, created an allegedly
      hostile work environment for the appellant with day-to-day rude and unfavorable
      treatment for almost a full year. IAF, Tab 6 at 23-27, 32-35. Moreover, the
      appellant encumbered a senior leadership position at the Bedfo rd VA with no
      other positions at the facility reasonably available to him for reassignment. See
      Markon v. Department of State, 71 M.S.P.R. 574, 581-83 (1996) (remanding the
      constructive removal appeal for a hearing after the appellant alleged that she had
      no choice but to retire after day-to-day rude treatment for 7 months without any
      other jobs available to her).
¶12         The appellant asserts that, although the agency reassigned the Director
      shortly after the appellant transferred to the Air Force, at the time he transferred
      there was no reasonable basis to conclude that the agency would conduct an y
      investigation into the Director’s actions or that the agency would reassign her
      pending such investigation. IAF, Tab 6 at 11-12, 17. The appellant also asserts
      the futility of filing a formal grievance against the Director, or that any grievance
      would prompt meaningful change in his working conditions, especially when he
      knew, as Chief of Human Resources, that the agency dismissed other complaints
      against the Director, which led to increased harassment. IAF, Tab 6 at 5, 11-12;
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-7; cf. Axsom, 110 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 17 (noting that a
      reasonable person would not have felt compelled to resign when he had the option
      to stand and fight the alleged discrimination, harassment, and retaliation rather
      than resign).    We find the appellant’s assertions of the agency’s allegedly
      wrongful actions are nonconclusory, plausible, and material to the issues in this
                                                                                        8

      appeal. See Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 8; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). To the extent
      that the agency’s submissions merely contradicted the appellant’s otherwise
      sufficient nonfrivolous allegations of intolerable working conditions, IAF,
      Tabs 7-8, the administrative judge should not have dismissed the appeal for lack
      of jurisdiction without a hearing, see Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1344; Ferdon,
      60 M.S.P.R. at 329.
¶13         Accordingly, we remand this case to the regional office for a hearing on the
      issue of whether the appellant’s May 29, 2016 transfer was the result of coercion
      based on intolerable working conditions and therefore a constructive removal
      within the Board’s jurisdiction. See Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶¶ 8, 11. If, on
      remand, the administrative judge determines that the Board has jurisdiction over
      this appeal as a constructive removal, then the administrative judge shall
      adjudicate the appellant’s affirmative defenses and order appropriate relief. IAF,
      Tab 1 at 3, 5; see Baldwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 111 M.S.P.R. 586,
      ¶ 46 (2009) (noting that when the Board finds a resignation or reti rement
      involuntary, the Board not only has jurisdiction over the appeal, but the appellant
      wins on the merits and is entitled to reinstatement) .

                                            ORDER
¶14         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Northeastern
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                     /s/ for
                                                 Jennifer Everling
                                                 Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.