Court Opinion

ID: 9747780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:35:24.631136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:27.232376
License: Public Domain

MOORE, J.
I dissent because I believe the judgment should be affirmed for a reason not discussed in the majority opinion; as a matter of law, *1182defendant could not be convicted because his presence in court was not required. Defendant is charged with violating Penal Code section 1320.5 based on a letter the district attorney sent to defendant’s attorney advising both of them to appear on September 4, 1991, even though there was no court order or agreement to appear on that date, nor was defendant required to appear on that date by virtue of being present in court when that date was set.
Preliminarily, a determination must be made whether a court. can take judicial notice of its own records and files for the purpose of ruling on a demurrer to a criminal complaint.
While it has been said a court hearing a demurrer in a criminal action cannot consider material subject to judicial notice (see Shortridge v. Municipal Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 611, 616 [198 Cal.Rptr. 749])1 , even that court held there were exceptions, including a case where the parties concede the fact judicially noticed. A similar situation is presented here. The district attorney raised the issue of the letter’s sufficiency to establish the requisite notice in his brief, conceding the only notice of the September 4 hearing given to defendant was the letter his office sent to defendant’s counsel.
Furthermore, it was the district attorney who requested that the trial court in ruling on the demurrer take judicial notice of superior court file No. C-73220. The defendant did not object except in regard to the sufficiency and adequacy of the letter. The trial court did in fact take judicial notice of file No. C-73220. Where a trial court takes judicial notice of one of its files at the request of the parties or without objection, certainly an appellate court can do the same, especially when the letter relied upon by the district attorney was contained only in file No. C-73220.
It is certainly in the interest of justice that, where a matter can be resolved by taking judicial notice of the court’s own files, a court should be permitted *1183to do so. (See People v. Heitzman (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1400, fn. 1 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 199].) Any other result, especially under the facts of this case, would be absurd.
Penal Code section 1320.5 provides, “Every person who is charged with the commission of a felony, who is released from custody on bail,'and who in order to evade the process of the court willfully fails to appear as required, is guilty of a felony. . . .” (Pen. Code, § 1320.5, italics added.) The plain language of the statute compels an interpretation that the phrase “to appear as required!’ to refer to the process of court, an order. (See People v. Wesley (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 519, 522 [243 Cal.Rptr. 785].) There was no such order or process here requiring defendant to appear on that date. Surely, a crime cannot be predicated on the district attorney’s mailing of a letter to a defendant’s attorney.
Nevertheless, the district attorney relies on a letter his office sent to defendant’s attorney notifying counsel of the September 4 hearing, and declaring both counsel and defendant should appear. The district attorney’s letter did not invoke nor was it based on any process of court. Defendant’s bail agreement did not contain a return court date. Nor did defendant agree to allow notice to his attorney to serve as his notification when the return court date was set. The lower court failed to order defendant back on a specified date when it received his notice of appeal and admitted him to bail.
The district attorney points to the fact that a bench warrant was issued by the trial judge because of defendant’s failure to appear. But, a bench warrant may not be issued in the absence of a court order giving the specific time and place or an agreement by defendant to return at a specific time and place. (Pen. Code, § 978.5.)
The district attorney argues Penal Code section 977, subdivision (b)2 compelled defendant’s presence on September 4. However, that section does not negate the due process requirement that a defendant be notified his presence in court is required. Nor does that section appear to be a mandate to defendant, but is, rather, a direction to the court regarding the necessity of *1184the presence of defendant in the instances described. Likewise, I am not persuaded by the district attorney’s reliance on cases involving bail bond forfeitures. These cases are easily distinguishable from the case at bar. In each of the bail bond forfeiture cases, the defendant was present when the trial court set the subsequent appearance date.
Therefore, I respectfully submit that the majority discussion and interpretation of the statutory law in this case are unwarranted, untimely, and unnecessary. I would affirm the judgment for the reasons stated herein.

I disagree with Shortridge to the extent that case holds a court cannot take judicial notice of matters in its own records for the purpose of ruling upon a demurrer in a criminal case. The opinion in Shortridge justifies its ruling on the dissimilarities between Code of Civil Procedure section 430.30, subdivision (a) and Penal Code section 1004. Since the former statute expressly states a court may take judicial notice when ruling on a demurrer and the latter statute does not, Shortridge reasons the Legislature intended that a court not take judicial notice in criminal cases.
Code of Civil Procedure section 430.30, subdivision (a) is the result of periodic amendments. But the provision for judicial notice was added in 1967. Prior to that date, the comparable section made no reference to judicial notice. Notwithstanding, the courts held judicial notice could be utilized by the courts in hearing demurrers. (Ferraris v. Levy (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 408, 411-412 [36 Cal.Rptr. 30]; Legg v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Assn. (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 482, 487-488 [7 Cal.Rptr. 595]; Taliaferro v. County of Contra Costa (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 587, 592 [6 Cal.Rptr. 231].) Thus, the amendment providing for judicial notice was declaratory of existing law, not a formulation of new law.

That section as it read prior to January 1, 1993, states in pertinent part: “In all cases in which a felony is charged, the accused must be present at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence. The accused shall be personally present at all other proceedings unless he shall, with leave of court, execute in open court, a written waiver of his right to be personally present, approved by his counsel, which waiver must then be filed with the court; provided, however, that the court may specifically direct that defendant be personally present at any particular proceeding or portion thereof. . . .”