Court Opinion

ID: 9853141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:43:12.243442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:41.316554
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
1. I agree that Mullins’ first enumeration of error is without merit, but for a different reason. Mullins contends the denial of his motion for new trial without a hearing constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial judge, who was a different judge from the one who had presided at trial.
Mullins’ counsel did not know the court had ruled on the motion on July 5, 1995, when she sought a rule nisi setting a hearing in March 1996. Apparently the court was also unaware of the previous order when it set a hearing for March 22. No hearing was held because it was discovered that the order had been entered.
Instead, on April 23, 1996, Mullins filed a motion to set aside the July 5, 1995 order because the time to appeal had expired, and he sought a new order so he could file a timely appeal. He did not ask for a hearing on the motion for new trial. The court granted the motion to set aside and entered a new order on May 15, thereby affording Mullins precisely what he sought, the opportunity to appeal. The next day he filed his notice of appeal.
Since Mullins did not seek a hearing, and none is required absent a request, Wilkins v. State, 220 Ga. App. 516, 518 (3) (469 SE2d 695) (1996), he cannot complain that the court abused its discretion in not holding one.
I note that Mullins sought, and the court granted, a nunc pro tunc order. We have, rightly, ignored that aspect of the order. Nunc pro tunc means “Now for then. ... A phrase applied to acts allowed to be done after the time when they should be done, with a retroactive effect, i.e., with the same effect as if regularly done.” Black’s Law Dictionary (rev. 6th ed. 1996). The purpose of the order of May 15, 1996, would be defeated if it were given effect on July 3, 1995, because the appeal period had long expired when the order was actu*220ally entered. For this reason, the Court does not consider the appeal untimely.
Decided January 9, 1997.
Cathy M. Alterman, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Phyllis M. Burgess, John C. Culp, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
2. As to the second enumeration, I agree that we cannot review the issue on appeal because we do not know upon what basis the court excluded the evidence or even whether it made a ruling. The State did not give the ground for its apparent objection on the record, and the record does not show whether the court ruled or whether Mullins withdrew the line of questioning. It was Mullins’ obligation to assure that the bench conference at which this matter apparently was addressed was reported. Zachary v. State, 245 Ga. 2, 4 (262 SE2d 779) (1980); Ivory v. State, 199 Ga. App. 283, 284 (1) (405 SE2d 90) (1991). See also OCGA § 5-6-41 (d) and (f). I do not join in the further ruling.