Court Opinion

ID: 9594470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:30:17.611802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:25.845238
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur specially with the majority opinion to stress the importance of the specific facts of this case in rendering the majority opinion. During the second term of court, this case was continued from the trial court’s January 10, 1994 calendar, upon the request of Williams’ counsel for a three or four-day continuance. Williams’ counsel requested the continuance because he was on trial in another court which he estimated would take three or four days. Rather than granting the request for a three or four-day continuance, the trial court continued the case for 21 days, until January 31, 1994, and was then unable to try the case.
Such a continuance, not requested by Williams, cannot constitute a waiver of her speedy trial demand. Therefore, the State did not satisfy its burden of proving a waiver of Williams’ speedy trial demand. *111As the trial court found that the speedy trial demand had been properly filed, it was charged with notice of such at the time it continued the case to the last week of the second term. In any event, the trial court was not required to grant Williams’ request for a continuance and could have put her on trial immediately.
Decided January 19, 1995
Herbert Shafer, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Tracy G. Gladden, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
If the trial court was concerned with being able to reach defendant’s case upon the granting of an in-term continuance, it could have conditioned the granting of same upon defendant’s waiver of her speedy trial demand. The trial court controls its calendar and is aware of speedy trial requirements in those cases before it. Under the facts of this case, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment must be reversed.