Court Opinion

ID: 9764988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:47:22.220174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:03.040257
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the Majority opinion except as to attorney fees. Because I would hold that appellee is entitled to recover attorney fees, I respectfully dissent.
The Majority holds that this suit does not involve a claim on a contract. I disagree. Appellee did not institute this lawsuit, but was forced to defend against appellants’ claims for damages or specific performance. The basis of these claims was contractual, and therefore, this suit should fall within the parameters of Tex.Civ.PraC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 38.001 (Vernon 1986).
The Majority reasons that attorney fees are not recoverable because, once rescinded, the Earnest Money Contract no longer existed and could not support a claim for attorney fees under the contract or by statute. In support of this holding, the Majority cites Ferguson v. DRG/Colony North, Ltd., 764 S.W.2d 874, 887 (Tex.App.—Austin 1989, writ, denied). In Ferguson, the purchaser of an apartment complex sued the vendors to rescind the contract. Id. at 877. The plaintiff prevailed and the trial court entered judgment for rescission. Id. The trial court also awarded the purehaser/plaintiff attorney fees. See id. at 887. The defendant/vendors appealed and challenged the award of attorney fees. Id. The appellate court reasoned that rescission annulled the contract and extinguished the parties’ rights under it. Id. Thus, the appellate court held that the plaintiff could not recover attorney fees in his suit to rescind the contract. This is inapposite to the appeal before this court.
In the instant case, the party seeking to recover attorney fees is not the plaintiff, but the defendant, who prevailed on its defense of a suit on the contract. Also, a suit for rescission is “a suit founded upon a written contract within the meaning of Article 2226, TexRev.CivStatAnn., and justifies the award of attorney fees.” NRC Inc. v. Pickhardt, 667 S.W.2d 292 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1984, writ ref. n.r.e.). See also Ellis v. Waldrop, 627 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.App.—Ft. Worth 1982, writ ref. n.r.e.).
Further, the judgment entered by the trial court is a declaratory judgment. An award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in a declaratory judgment is proper. See Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 37.009. The Code specifically gives the trial court the authority to award reasonable and necessary attorney fees.
The contract between the parties provides in Section 21, “Attorneys Fees”, as follows:
Any signatory to this contract who is the prevailing party in any legal proceeding against any other signatory brought under or with relation to this contract or transaction shall be additionally entitled to recover court costs and reasonable attorney fees from the non-prevailing party_ (emphasis added).
The parties not only provided for the prevailing signatory to recover attorney fees when the other wrongfully sued “under or with relation to this contract,” but, the parties also contractually agreed the prevailing party could recover reasonable attorney fees on a law suit filed as under or with relation to this “transaction”.
There is clearly a conflict in the caselaw concurring suits involving contract/rescission/attorney fees. I would resolve the conflict in favor of the prevailing party who was forced to defend the lawsuit, and thereby forced to pay reasonable attorney fees in defense of an unreasonable lawsuit.
*272I would hold that the trial court properly awarded attorney fees to appellee as the prevailing party in a suit on a contract.