Court Opinion

ID: 9589483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:45:04.766794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:21.321170
License: Public Domain

Barnhill, J.,
concurring in result: The court below rendered judgment on the pleadings. This in itself presents a question worthy of some *153consideration. Tbe answer contains an unequivocal denial that defendant is indebted to plaintiff in any amount. He likewise pleads our three-year statute of limitations, and it appears that this action was instituted more than three years after plaintiff’s cause of action accrued. G.S. 1-15, G.S. 1-52. While the briefs filed and arguments made by counsel disclose that plaintiff is relying on the provisions of G.S. 1-21, plaintiff does not allege in reply that the statute was tolled by the fact defendant was “out of the State” when its cause of action arose and did not become a resident of this State until December 1951, shortly before the institution of this action.
We have consistently held that a litigant must plead the provisions of our prescription statutes upon which he relies. The statute so provides. G.S. 1-15. Why should not that rule apply here? Le Mieux Bros. Corporation v. Armstrong, 91 F. 2d 445.
Decision in the court below was made to turn on our three-year statute of limitations. Since this action was not instituted until almost four years after plaintiff’s cause of action arose, it is apparent the trial judge concluded that the provision of G.S. 1-21, which tolls the statute if the debtor is out of the State at the time the cause of action arose, is controlling. If that he the case, then the beginning date of the three-year period is the date of the debtor’s return to the state rather than the date the cause of action accrued. G.S. 1-15. That is the rationale of the majority opinion.
The majority conclude that G.S. 1-21 applies even when both the creditor and debtor were nonresidents when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued and the cause of action arose in the State of their residence. I find it utterly impossible to concur in this conclusion. While I concur in the affirmance of the judgment, my concurrence is bottomed on the reasons hereinafter stated.
I readily concede that the majority view follows the apparent weight of authority which is the usual practice when the exact question presented has not been decided in this State. However, in my opinion, there has been more unsound, superficial, and illogical writing by the courts in construing provisions somewhat similar to those contained in G.S. 1-21 than on any other subject it has been my privilege to investigate. There has been as much judicial flirtation on this question as on any in the books.
In 1808, Kent, C. J., in his opinion in Ruggles v. Keeler, 3 Am. Dec. 482, construing the New York statute, held that a statute of limitations of a State (Oonn.) in which the cause of action accrued could not be pleaded in a suit instituted in New York; that “out of the State” as used in the New York statute tolling the statute of limitations applies to all foreigners; and that “after the return” embraces those who enter the *154State for the first time. He gave no reason for his conclusions and engaged in no analytical discussion of the New York statute. - .Instead, the statements are more or less categorical in nature.
Since that time the courts of the several States (except Texas, New Jersey, and Kansas) which have applied similar though not identical statutes, have picked up and followed-the opinion in the Buggies case. This has been done in most cases with perfunctory or superficial discussion. •
These cases, relied on by the majority, hold that the term “out of the State” has- a universal meaning, notwithstanding the context of its use, and includes foreigners who have never been within the State; and- “after the return of the person (debtor) into this State” includes not only those who depart and later return-but also any and all who come into the State for the first time. “The word ‘return’ as used in the statutes does not confine the exception to residents, and a nonresident coming into the State for the first time after a cause of action has accrued is regarded as-returning to the state.” 54 C.J.S. 237.
To my mind to say that a man was “out of the State” at a certain time or that he “returned” to the State on a certain date, when theretofore he had never been in the State, gives these terms a connotation which -,is strained, unnatural, and unrealistic, and wholly unsupported by reason or logic.
I must confess that my mental reaction to such conclusions invites much writing. However, I shall attempt to confine my comment to the subject at hand.
It should be noted in the beginning that the. cases .cited and relied on are clearly distinguishable and cannot be considered authoritative on the question here presented. While I may be the.one who is entirely off the beam, I cannot follow the logic of these cases or concede that they are sufficiently in point to be controlling.
Instead, I prefer to follow the well-reasoned opinions in Stone v. Phillips, 176 S.W. 2d 932 (Tex.); Shapiro v. Friedman, 132 N.J.L. 456; 41 A. 2d 10; and Bruner v. Martin, 93 Pac. 164 (Kan.).
In Armfield v. Moore, 97 N.C. 34, and Lee v. McKoy, 118 N.C. 518, plaintiffs were residents of North Carolina and the cause accrued here.In Ewbank v. Lyman, 170 N.C. 507, the action was to vacate a deed for fraud. It was of course necessary to maintain that action in this State. In Hill v. Lindsay, 210 N.C. 694, at least one of the plaintiffs was a resident.
The cases cited from other jurisdictions involve statutes which vary so greatly in their wording that decisions relating thereto must he considered with regard to the particular phraseology employed in creating them. 34 A.J. 173; 83 A.L.R. 272; 17 A.L.R. 2d 503.
*155In many of the cases the plaintiff was a resident of the state of the forum, and the cause of action accrued in that state. With these decisions I am in full accord. A creditor is not required to pursue his debtor from state to state. It is instead the duty of the debtor to seek out his creditor and pay him what is due. If the debtor is a nonresident or is out of the State at the time the cause of action accrues, the creditor may wait-for him to return to the State, and the statute is tolled so long as the debtor Is beyond the jurisdiction of the local courts. To my mind that is the very purpose of the exceptive provisions contained in Gr.S. 1-21.
There are only a few eases in which both plaintiff and defendant were ’nonresidents of the State of the forum when the cause of action accrued, and the plaintiff was a nonresident of the State of the forum at the time suit was instituted. In these few cases the majority of the courts apply the same rule. Apparently only Texas, Stone v. Phillips, supra; New Jersey, Shapiro v. Friedman, supra; and Kansas, Bruner v. Martin, supra; take the opposite view in accord with my way of thinking. See also Skaggs v. Fyffe, 299 Ky. 751, 187 S.W. 2d 280; Wright v. Mordaunt, 27 So. 640; In re Shaffer's Estate, 76 A. 716.
••.Even those eases in which the facts are substantially on all fours with the instant case, in which the majority rule is applied, are factually distinguishable. Here defendant was a resident of plaintiff’s home State and .amenable to process issued out of a court of competent jurisdiction of that State for three years and ten months next after plaintiff’s cause of action accrued. Notwithstanding the fact plaintiff had the .right to sue and defendant was subject to the service of process, it delayed action more,than the three-year period prescribed by our statute.
So then, the question comes to this: Where a cause of action on an ■unsealed promissory note accrues in favor of a Texas bank against a citizen of Texas who continues to reside in Texas thereafter for three years and ten months, amenable to process issued by a Texas court of competent jurisdiction, and then comes into this State where the bank appears and institutes an action on its note just seven days less than four years after its cause of action accrued, does our three-year statute, Gr.S. 1-52, apply and was the running of said statute tolled by reason of the fact the defendant was out of this State when the cause of action accrued and came into this State less than three years prior to the institution of said action, Gr.S. 1-21?
In my opinion the answer should be in the negative. Our statute, when correctly construed, is not controlling. Instead, we must look to the prescription statute of the State in which the parties resided at the time the contract was made and the cause of action accrued to determine whether plaintiff’s claim is barred. That was the statute in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made.
*156The fundamental principle of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature, for the heart of the law is the intention of the lawmaking body. Strict adherence to literalness is the cardinal sin of statutory construction. And so we are not required to accord the language used an unnecessarily literal meaning. Context and purpose are controlling and the right to be protected or the evil to be remedied is to be accorded prime consideration. Statutory provisions should be construed in consonance with the objects and purposes in contemplation at the time of their adoption. Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442; In re Yelton: Advisory Opinion, 223 N.C. 845.
Furthermore, “An inhibition or prohibition usually extends no farther than the reason on which it is founded. Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex.” In re Yelton, supra.
To these general rules I may add with confidence that in proper eases such as this the limitations upon the power of the lawmaking agency in large measure determines the intent, purpose, and scope of the language used, for we may not assume the Legislature intentionally exceeded its lawmaking authority.
G.S. 1-15 provides that “Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute.” G.S. 1-21, which is a part of the same statute and must be considered in pari materia, is in the nature of a proviso and is one of the “special cases” excepted in G.S. 1-15. G.S. 1-15 provides the general rule and G.S. 1-21 sets forth the exceptions thereto.
So then, in effect, the pertinent part of our statute reads as follows: “Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, provided, however, if, when the cause of action accrues . . . against a person, he is out of the State, action may be commenced . . . within the times herein limited, after the return of the person into this State . . .”
The General Assembly in enacting this statute was legislating for the people of this State and regulating their right to maintain actions in our courts. The statute is a declaration of local policy without force or effect beyond the borders of the State. It was designed and inténded to prescribe, regulate, and protect the rights of residents. This was the extent of its legislative authority.
“The object of the section was for the protection of domestic creditors . . . And it was intended to protect them from the inconvenience and loss, to which they would be exposed by the absence of their debtors and consequent immunity of the latter from process and judgment.” Stone v. Phillips, supra; Wilson et al. v. Daggett, 88 Tex. 375, 31 S.W. 618.
*157Its purpose is to secure to plaintiff the same time in which to commence an action against an absent or nonresident defendant that he would have if defendant were an actual resident of the State. 54 C.J.S. 232; McLaughlin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 221 Mich. 479, 191 N.W. 224.
The exceptive provision is based on the premise that the statute was intended to protect or save the action because it accrued here and the debtor is not to be benefited because he leaves this State. Shapiro v. Friedman, supra. It contemplates an absence from the State that will prevent plaintiff from reducing his cause of action to a judgment in personam, Niblack v. Goodman, 67 Ind. 174, and its purpose is to prevent the defendant from defeating plaintiff’s right to prosecute his action. Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U.S. 336, 33 L. Ed. 172.
On the one hand, the statute is intended to limit the right of a plaintiff to institute his action, and it specifies the time limitation in respect to each and every type of action — three years when the action is bottomed on an unsealed promissory note as in this case. On the other hand, it is designed to prevent the debtor from evading the jurisdiction of the court by departing the State either before or after the cause of action accrues. It thus assures the plaintiff the full time stipulated in the statute in which to institute his action.
In construing similar Acts, the courts, in my opinion, have placed undue emphasis upon the terms “out of the State” and “return into the State” and have overlooked or failed to consider the limiting provision, “If, when the cause of action accrues.” That is the key provision of the section. Determine what causes of action it includes and you solve the meaning and purpose of the whole section.
In determining what causes of action are included in this provision, neither the removal of defendant to this State after plaintiff’s cause of action accrued in Texas nor the length of time he had been in this State when this action was instituted is material. The decisive facts are these: The note described in the complaint and plaintiff’s cause of action bottomed thereon are items of property which belong to a nonresident; and the plaintiff is now, and was at the time its cause of action accrued in its home state, a nonresident of this State.
The note held by plaintiff is property. Likewise, the cause of action created by defendant’s default in the payment thereof is property. It is a chose in action. “A vested right of action is property in the same sense in which tangible things are property . . .” Williams v. R. R., 153 N.C. 360.
This property which is involved in this litigation constitutes a part of the mass of property located in the State of Texas. In respect thereto, there was no right to be protected or evil to be remedied by our Legislature. It is no concern of our Legislature as to when a nonresident shall *158institute bis action. Nor is a nonresident disadvantaged because bis debtor is beyond tbe jurisdiction of our courts. Why then should tbe Legislature undertake to provide for tbe tolling of our prescription statute in behalf of one who is not himself within tbe State and has no cause to come to this State to institute bis action so long as bis debtor is “out of tbe State?”
Plaintiff was not inconvenienced by tbe fact defendant was out of tbe State of North Carolina. From tbe date defendant’s cause of action accrued until tbe date defendant established residence in this State, it was unaffected by defendant’s nonresidence here. During tbe full time be was amenable to process and plaintiff was free to prosecute its action in its home state. It was defendant’s departure from Texas that has caused plaintiff inconvenience and loss.
Furthermore, our General Assembly was without authority to legislate in respect to property located in another State or to regulate tbe rights of nonresidents possessing a cause of action against one of its debtors, which cause accrued in tbe State of their residence.
Of necessity tbe absence of any right to be protected or any evil to be •remedied by our Legislature in respect to property located in another State and its want of authority to legislate in respect thereto have a direct bearing on the meaning of the language used.
' Strangely enough, however, no court, so far as I have been able to ascertain, has considered the limitations upon the authority of the lawmaking agency of government in determining the meaning of similar 'language used in prescription statutes.
Our statute was designed and intended to prescribe, regulate, and protect the rights of residents. That was the extent of the legislative authority of the General Assembly. I cannot conceive that it intended to undertake to legislate in respect to Texas property, or regulate the rights of a Texas bank against one of its Texas debtors, or to protect such bank against its inability to procure service of summons on one of its debtors without suffering the inconvenience of going to another State. To my mind there is no conceivable reason why our General Assembly should undertake to provide for the tolling of our prescription statute in behalf of one who is not himself in the State and has no cause to come to this State to institute his action so long as his debtor is “out of the State.” If our General Assembly intended that G.S.' 1-21 should have that force and effect, it was indeed solicitous of the rights of nonresidents.
So then, when we consider the legitimate objective of the statute and the limitations upon the lawmaking power of our General Assembly, the language used, by clear implication, limits the provision's of the statute to a resident creditor possessing a cause of action against one who was in the State when the contract was made or the liability was incurred but *159left tbe State before the cause of action accrued or after its accrual but before the statute of limitations had run its course. Otis v. Bennett, 302 U.S. 727, 82 L. Ed. 561; Banco-Ky’s Rec’r. v. Nat. Bank of Ky's Rec'r., 187 S.W. 2d 357; Daly v. Bower, 59 S.W.2d 10; Carter v. Burns, 61 S.W. 2d 933; 54 C.J.S. 235.
“If, when the cause of action accrues” means “if, when the cause of action accrues in this State.” This meaning is as implicit as if the term “in this State” was actually written in the statute. The other language in the statute fortifies this conclusion. We do not ordinarily speak of a person as being out of the State unless he is customarily in the State, and “return” ordinarily means “come back to.”
At first blush the answer that the statute regulates procedure in the courts of the State and not the rights of the parties would seem to be sufficient, but such is not its purpose or effect. The statute provides that “civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed within this statute after the cause of action has accrued . . .” G.S. 1-15. Since a civil action is a proceeding to enforce a cause of action, and a cause of action is, in a legal sense, property, it would seem to he clear that the statute constitutes a limitation of a property right. Expiration of the time limitation destroys the property. It ceases to exist.
However, the majority hold that our statute applies and is controlling under the lex fori doctrine on the theory it is adjective or procedural law. On this phase of the case, at least, the majority opinion is sustained by the cases cited. If those cases settle any one legal question, it is that th.e prescription statutes of the State of. the forum are procedural in nature and are controlling in cases where the cause of action accrued in some other State. Unfortunately the judicial mind sometimes becomes closed. Apparently on this question it has become closed, clamped down, and padlocked. While some of the cases are distinguishable, there is no escaping the fact that a large majority of the courts wffiich have ruled on the question so hold. There is little, if any, reason advanced in support of the conclusion. The courts, since the decision in Ruggles v. Keeler, supra, have been content to make a categorical statement of the rule as set forth in that case. In this conclusion I am unable to concur.
Our statute prescribes no procedure. It cuts off the right as well as the remedy. It imposes a limitation upon the right of a plaintiff to reduce his claim to a judgment in personam, and G.S. 1-21 merely fixes the beginning date of the limitation in the event the debtor is out of the State when the cause of action accrues.
Strictly speaking, our statute does not create a condition precedent. It does not enter the picture unless pleaded. Yet, when pleaded, it immediately becomes a condition precedent. The plaintiff may recover only in the event he proves that he instituted his action within the time pre*160scribed by the statute. If tbe action was not instituted within the time prescribed, plaintiff’s right to judgment on its claim is destroyed and his action must be dismissed. Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109; Marks v. McLeod, 203 N.C. 257; Southerland v. Crump, 199 N.C. 111; Phillips v. Penland, 196 N.C. 425.
The plaintiff did not come to this State and institute its action under authority of any provision contained in our statutes. It came under authority of the “privileges and immunities” provision of Art. IY, sec. 2, of the United States Constitution. Since its cause of action is a transitory one, it was privileged to institute its action and enforce its rights in respect thereto in the courts of this State where it could procure service of summons. Its claim is unaffected by the laws of this State. The only requirement to which it is subjected is the requirement that in prosecuting its action it follow the procedural law of this State. Clodfelter v. Wells, 212 N.C. 823.
In this connection I may note that plaintiff, a corporation, is not a citizen of the United States within the meaning of Art. IY, sec. 2, of the Federal Constitution. Bode v. Flynn, 252 N.W. 284, 94 A.L.R. 480; Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 43 L. Ed. 432. However, we have always extended to foreign corporations the courtesy of the use of our courts, and I willingly treat plaintiff as a citizen for the purpose of this discussion, for it is immaterial whether it is here by comity or as a matter of right. In either event it is bound only by our law of procedure of which, in my opinion, the statute of limitations forms no part.
The Texas General Assembly which possessed legislative authority over plaintiff and its property has declared that plaintiff must exercise its right to reduce its claim to a judgment in personam within four years after its cause of action accrued. But this Court says no. It had three years from and after defendant established residence in this State, irrespective of the date of the accrual of its cause of action in the State of Texas. In this conclusion I cannot concur. As heretofore stated, in my opinion our statute has no application to the facts in this ease. We must, instead, look to the prescription statute of Texas to ascertain the merits of any contention that plaintiff’s cause of action is now stale. Since the plaintiff brought to this State a live claim and instituted its action within the time allowed by the Texas statute, it has the right to maintain its cause in the courts of this State.
If we adopt the view of the majority opinion, then we open the door for serious discrimination in favor of nonresidents. It makes no difference how old a claim may be or what opportunity a nonresident claimant has had to reduce his claim to judgment, our statute is tolled in his behalf so long as the debtor remains out .of this State, and it begins to run anew so soon as he removes to this State, whether the claim has been stale for *161one year, ten years, or twenty years under the lex domicilii. Thus, we open the doors of our courts for the enforcement of a claim of a nonresident which is barred by the laws of the Státe in which the cause of action accrued. The removal of the debtor to this State resurrects the claim and gives it new life so that it may be enforced in the courts of this State though long since dead in the State of its origin.
It has been suggested, however, that we would not entertain a claim which is stale under the lex loci. But we cannot blow hot and cold on the same question by applying the lex loci in one case and the lex fori in another. That is what that policy would require, for we would be compelled to look to the lex domicilii in every case to determine whether the claim is stale. If so, the lex loci would control decision. If not, our statute would apply. We must choose one course or the other.
The construction of the statute I advocate would establish a sound, consistent, and uniform rule which would not discriminate against citizens of this or any other State. A nonresident possessing a transitory cause of action against a citizen of this State may maintain an action thereon in the courts of this State if it is a live claim under the lex domi-cilii where the cause accrued. If it is stale under such laws, an action thereon cannot be maintained in the courts of this State. Happily at least the decisions of the courts of Texas, New Jersey, and Kansas are in accord with and support my views.
To summarize, I am of the opinion that:
(1) The residence or nonresidence of defendant in this State is immaterial.
(2) The nonresidence of plaintiff and the accrual of its cause of action in the State of Texas are the vital, determinative facts.
(3) Our statute of limitations has no application to the facts in this case. Instead, the rights of the parties are controlled by the prescription statute of the State where the contract was made and the cause accrued.
(4) It is not the intent or purpose of our prescription statute to resurrect and give new life to a cause of action which is stale under the law of the State in which the cause accrued. A construction thereof which would give it that force and effect is unsound and should not be adopted.
(5) Plaintiff’s cause of action is property located in and' subject to the laws of Texas.
(6) Since its cause of action is a transitory one and is not barred by the prescription statutes of Texas, the plaintiff has the right to maintain its action in the courts of this State and is, on the admissions made in the answer, entitled to judgment.
It follows that I vote to affirm for the reason plaintiff’s claim is a live one under the laws of Texas where it now exists as property, and the debt is admitted, and for no other reason.