Court Opinion

ID: 9703821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:09:23.874835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:51.953044
License: Public Domain

Dissenting.
Jackson, J.
My dissent herein is based on a philosophical difference of opinion with existing law rather than a disagreement with the majority opinion as written or the cases cited. I readily admit that the law in Indiana, as it exists today, fully supports the majority opinion.
I am of the opinion that, as is well exemplified in the case at bar, a plea of guilty should not be accepted and sentence imposed without independent proof of the corpus delicti. The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at their mid-winter meeting in Chicago approved minimum stand*381ards for the administration of criminal justice. Among those standards was the following relating to Pleas of Guilty, published in February 1968, which in part are as follows:

“Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty.

These standards recognize the value of the practice of negotiating for a guilty plea, and they outline procedures to be followed in entering and accepting pleas of guilty (including nolo contendere) as well as rules covering the practice of negotiating for pleas. The objective of such standards was to formulate procedures which will maximize the benefits of conviction had without trial and at the same time minimize the risk of unfair or inaccurate results. Particular standards provide that a defendant should not be called upon to plead until he has an opportunity to consult with counsel, retained or appointed, and if he waives counsel, until he has had a reasonable time to deliberate concerning such plea. Furthermore, no court should accept a plea unless a verbatim record of the proceedings is made and preserved and unless the court personally addresses the defendant and (a) determines that he understands the nature of the charge; (b) informs him that by his plea he waives his right to trial by jury; (c) informs him of the maximum possible sentence or sentences; (d) informs him of the mandatory minimum sentence, if any; and (e) informs him, if such is the case, that his plea, because of a previous conviction, subjects him to different or additional punishment.”
Further the standards provide this additional safeguard “In accepting any plea, the court must also make on the record an inquiry to insure that there is a factual basis for the defendant’s plea.”
In the case at bar the appellant’s lawyer permitted, perhaps even urged the defendant to enter a plea of guilty to a charge of rape when the lawyer had not seen the defendant’s written confession. After appellant had entered his plea of guilty, the State introduced the written confession of the appellant which showed conclusively that appellant was not guilty of the crime of rape but only of an attempt to commit the crime of rape. Admittedly the intent and the *382attempt to consummate the crime of rape were present, but on account of the small size of the intended victim the appellant was unable to- consummate the rape because of failure to make any penetration of her vagina. Thus in the case at bar the evidence adduced to sustain the plea of guilty tends to disprove rather than sustain the plea.
The doctrine in Indiana, sustained by stare decisis, is well stated in the majority opinion as follows: “Any arguments as to the sufficiency of the evidence are not relevant. When the appellant chose to plead guilty and to waive a trial he also chose to waive the protection of having the charge proved against him.” It is this anomaly in the law to which Í dissent, as in the case at bar there is no factual basis for the appellant’s plea of guilty to the charge of rape.
Motion for new trial should be granted.
Note. — Reported in 241 N. E. 2d 240.