Court Opinion

ID: 9712142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:47:17.035859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:10.244342
License: Public Domain

SAYLOR, Justice,
concurring.
Applying settled principles of statutory interpretation, including consideration of other pertinent statutes and the understanding that express exceptions exclude others not expressed, see 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1921(c), 1924, the majority determines that the government vehicle exclusion conflicts im-permissibly with the provisions of the MVFRL. I agree fully with that determination, and write separately only to address the majority’s observation that, the statutory analysis having proved sufficient, public policy need not be considered.
The term “public policy” may be understood to refer to overarching concerns arising from the laws, long governmental practice, or obvious ethical or moral standards, see Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 538 Pa. 337, 347-48, 648 A.2d 755, 760 *527(1994) (citation omitted), and also to a means of determining the intent underlying (and, indeed, declared by) the statute. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921 (enumerating tools of statutory construction, including reference to the circumstances under which a statute was enacted; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be attained; and the consequence of a particular interpretation). Thus, although I agree with the majority’s decision to forego the broader type of policy analysis, I would expressly include public policy considerations, such as those identified by the Superior Court, in any analysis of the terms of the MVFRL. In my view, such considerations are as pertinent as the other tools of statutory construction utilized by the majority. See id.