Court Opinion

ID: 9576164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:21:22.577047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:26.756659
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). I would deny leave to appeal from the interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeals, and dissent from the peremptory reversal of the Court of Appeals. I could join in an order granting leave to appeal to consider the jurisprudentially significant issue, decided without oral argument or plenary consideration in the majority opinion.
i
While the majority prefers the assessment of the circuit judge, who granted the defendant summary disposition, the determination of the Court of Appeals was not so devoid of reason as to justify peremptory reversal. The majority’s decision to peremptorily reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals belittles its efforts, in the disposition of this case, as reflected in its carefully written opinion,1 and deprives Joe H. Stroud and his counsel of an opportunity to fully brief and orally argue in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Today’s peremptory order reflects an increasingly common method of deciding cases, a method that does not provide safeguards against hasty and ill-considered decisions, a method that is unsafe.
When this Court grants leave to appeal, there is an opportunity to educate the justices concerning *553the state of the record and the law through oral argument, as well as visually through briefs. A justice who may have missed a significant point of law or fact on perusal of the materials considered before voting for peremptory reversal might be enlightened and persuaded in the course of oral argument.
Also lost, when this Court acts without plenary consideration, is the opportunity for conference discussion after oral argument.
Peremptory disposition, without plenary consideration, full briefing, oral argument, and an opportunity for the profession to file briefs as amici curiae, should be reserved for cases in which the law is settled and factual assessment is not required.2 In the instant case, factual and legal *554assessment is required. Peremptory disposition is not appropriate.
ii
The majority states that it "appears that the plaintiff’s 1989 motion [seeking a reduction in alimony] was actually a tardy attack on the original judgment of divorce,”3 which "was agreed upon by the parties.”4Put another way, the changes [in the circumstances of the parties] were not unanticipated changes,” and "the original agreement clearly was written with future contingencies in mind.”5 The majority restates the truism that the "judgment' was agreed to by the parties” and assumes that it "likely reflected a compromise of the parties’ respective positions at the time,” and states that "it is possible that the defendant accepted less property at the time of the judgment, relying instead on the promise of significant alimony in years to come.”6
*555I suppose that most petitions for a change in alimony could be characterized by the opposing party as a "tardy attack on the original judgment of divorce.” It is well settled, however, that "[t]he circuit court retains the power to alter the terms of alimony specified in a prior decree” except alimony in gross.7 This rule of law applies although the parties agreed to the terms of alimony specified in the decree, and such terms reflected a compromise of the parties’ respective positions before the alimony terms were agreed upon.
The judgment of divorce in this case does not provide that the alimony terms are not subject to modification. It appears that where there is such a *556provision "[t]here is a split of authority about whether the court still retains jurisdiction to modify and amend a decree that concerns alimony and support.”8 The majority errs in equating the judgment of divorce in the instant case with one providing that the alimony terms are not subject to modification, and in appearing to decide peremptorily the jurisprudentially significant question concerning which there is a split of authority.
The alimony terms in this case include an escalator clause,9 but our attention has not been drawn to a decision of the Court of Appeals or of this Court holding that an agreed-upon escalator clause should be deemed to be an agreement, or should be read as if the parties had agreed, that the alimony terms are not subject to modification.
Peremptory disposition is not appropriate in this case. Leave to appeal should either be granted or denied.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J.

 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 9, 1994 (Docket No. 148641).

 People v Wright, 439 Mich 914, 914-915 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Roek v Chippewa Valley Bd of Ed, 430 Mich 314, 322; 422 NW2d 680 (1988) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Grames v Amerisure Ins Co, 434 Mich 867, 868-875 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 769-770; 456 NW2d 237 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Wrenn, 434 Mich 885, 885-886 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Harkins v Northwest Activity Center, Inc, 434 Mich 896, 899 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Dep’t of Social Services v American Commercial Liability Ins Co, 435 Mich 508, 515; 460 NW2d 194 (1990) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Yahr v Garcia, 436 Mich 872, 872-873 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Universal Underwriters Ins Co v Vallejo, 436 Mich 873, 873-874 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Stephens, 437 Mich 903, 903-910 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Berkey, 437 Mich 40, 54; 467 NW2d 6 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Turner v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 437 Mich 35, 38-39; 467 NW2d 4 (1991) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Lepior v Venice Twp, 437 Mich 955, 956-966 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Rochester Hills v Southeastern Oakland Co Resource Recovery Authority, 440 Mich 852, 852-856 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); In re Reinstatement of Elston (Grievance Administrator v Eston), 440 Mich 1205, 1205-1207 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); In re Reinstatement of Callanan, 440 Mich 1207, 1207-1209 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); McFadden v Monroe Civil Service Comm, 440 Mich 890, 890-891 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Holly Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources (Holly Twp v Holly Disposal, Inc), 440 Mich 891, 891-893 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Marzonie v ACIA, 441 Mich 522, 535-539; 495 NW2d 788 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Waleed, 441 Mich 902, 902-903 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Hardison, 441 Mich 913, 914-916 (1993) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Justice, 441 Mich 916, 917-919 (1993) (Levin, J., *554dissenting); People v LaClear, 442 Mich 867, 867-871 (1993) (Levin, J., dissenting); Auto-Owners Ins Co v City of Clare, 446 Mich 1, 16-18; 521 NW2d 480 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting); Weisgerber v Ann Arbor Center for the Family, 447 Mich 963, 964-969 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting); Howard v White, 447 Mich 395, 405-410; 523 NW2d 220 (1994) (Levin, J., dissenting).
See Schweiker v Hansen, 450 US 785, 791; 101 S Ct 1468; 67 L Ed 2d 685 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error”); Leis v Flynt, 439 US 438, 457-458; 99 S Ct 698; 58 L Ed 2d 717 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Summary reversal 'should be reserved for palpably clear cases of . . . error.’ Eaton v Tulsa, 415 US 697, 707 [94 S Ct 1228; 39 L Ed 2d 693 (1974)] [Rehnquist, J., dissenting]”).

 Ante, p 551.

 Id., p 550.

 Id.

 Id., p 551.
The majority states:
As the circuit court observed, the alimony provision found in *555the original judgment of divorce was agreed upon by the parties. While the circuit court correctly observed that there have been changes in the circumstances of the parties, the original agreement clearly was written with future contingencies in mind. [Emphasis added.] Even though the parties could not have foreseen the exact income levels that were reached during the 1980s, the changes were of a kind that fit neatly within the formulae upon which the parties agreed. Put another way, the changes were not unanticipated changes. [Emphasis in original.]
Further, the changes of the 1980s were not disadvantageous to the plaintiff. Though the dollar amount of his alimony obligation rose during the 1980s, that increase occurred only as the result of the very favorable situation in which he found himself at his place of employment. While the plaintiff finds the current situation not to his liking, there is no sign that it is working a hardship on him, or causing him difficulties that could not readily have been foreseen at the time of the consent judgment.
It thus appears that the plaintiff’s 1989 motion was actually a tardy attack on the original judgment of divorce. That judgment was agreed to by the parties, and likely reñected a compromise of the parties’ respective positions at the time. For example, it is possible that the defendant accepted less property at the time of the judgment, relying instead on the promise of significant alimony in years to come. [Ante, pp 550-551. Emphasis added.]

 2 Curtis, Bassett & Collins, Michigan Family Law (4th ed), § 13.38, p 13-29.

 Id.

 See id., § 13.39, p 13-30.