Court Opinion

ID: 9588225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:31:32.39866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:40:15.730402
License: Public Domain

SIMMS, Judge
(specially concurring):
Justice Bussey is eminently correct in his conclusion of affirmance of the trial court. Use of the language in his opinion “All *1399cases to the contrary are expressly overruled” obviously relates to dicta in Lee v. Collins, Judge, Vol. 41 O.B.J. 2768, which dicta lead to much confusion at the trial level when the same fact situation led to both the filing of an application to revoke a suspended sentence and an Information or complaint.
A reading of Lee v. Collins, supra, leads one to conclude that a formal adjudication of the criminal offense must occur before a hearing can be had on the application to revoke suspended sentence. Such is clearly not the law.
A reading of both general and specific authorities leads one to the inescapable conclusion that a formal adjudication of guilt of a criminal offense is conclusive evidence of violation of rules of probation and suspended sentence may be revoked on the sole ground of the conviction. The element of conviction deals only with the issue of conclusiveness.
Phillips v. State, Okl.Cr., 483 P.2d 759 (1971) holds pointedly that a suspended sentence imposed on a defendant could be revoked before such time as the offense which was the basis of the revocation was appealed and affirmed. Thus, we see there need be no finality to a conviction arising out of a single criminal transaction which was both grounds to revoke suspended sentence and to separate prosecution.
Title 22 O.S.1971, § 991b, as enacted in 1969, provided in part, “ * * * the suspended sentence of said person may not be revoked for any cause unless competent evidence justifying the revocation of said suspended sentence is presented * * * ” (Emphasis Added) Nothing within the framework of 22 O.S.1971, 991b leads this writer to the opinion that the hearing to revoke suspended sentence is to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal trials.
To the contrary, this court in In re Collyar, Okl.Cr., 476 P.2d 354 (1970) set forth the guidelines under which a hearing to revoke should be conducted. In Collyar, supra, we cited with approval State v. Edelblute, 91 Idaho 469, 424 P.2d 739 (1967), which holds:
“In probation revocation proceedings while the probation violation need not be proved within the strict framework of a criminal trial, nevertheless a probationer is entitled to judicial process which contemplates a hearing.”
The Idaho Court goes ahead to point out that it is only through hearing that the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution may be met.
Finding therefore, that a hearing, as distinguished from a criminal trial, is necessary to meet due process requirements, the next issue which presents itself is what quantum of evidence is necessary to be presented by the prosecutorial authority seeking the revocation.
No Oklahoma decision has been found dealing directly with the quantum of proof issue; however, the general rule is set out, without exception, at 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1572(4), page 505, where in treating the subject of probation revocation, the following language is found:
“The determination by trial court of the facts need not be supported by the quantum or degree of proof required to sustain a conviction of crime; proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not necessary to sustain the trial courts [sic] determination. The preponderance of the evidence, * * * of a violation of the conditions of probation may warrant revocation. * * * ”
This writer feels the law as found in Corpus Juris Secundum, supra, is a proper guideline for the trial judges of Oklahoma.
In specially concurring with Judge Bussey, I must, therefore, conclude that:
(1.) Hearing on revocation may be held prior to trial on an indictment or *1400information for the same act or acts;
(2.) Hearing on revocation is not a criminal trial; and,
(3.) The quantum of proof necessary to revoke a suspended sentence is by a preponderance of the evidence and not beyond reasonable doubt.
To this extent, I agree that all prior cases inconsistent with this ruling should hereby be overruled.