Court Opinion

ID: 9479515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:20:38.56646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:05.745341
License: Public Domain

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This case was argued and submitted to the court on July 16, 1987. The arbitrator has had the same dispute under advisement since October 7, 1988, and no doubt awaits our decision.1 Notwithstanding, the court *710ignores the maxim that a dispute over the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement must be resolved not by a court, but as the parties have agreed, by an arbitrator. E.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528, 533, 80 S.Ct. 1326, 1329, 4 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1960). The court today does nothing less than render a decision on the merits of a labor dispute, albeit under a one-sentence disclaimer at the conclusion of its opinion, Court’s Opinion at 709, that will certainly influence if not preempt the arbitrator’s views. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 412, 96 S.Ct. 3141, 3150, 49 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1976). I respectfully dissent.
Amoco’s drug testing program essentially consists of three parts: (1) annual testing, (2) testing for cause, and (3) periodic retesting for employees testing positive in either of the first two instances. The union does not object to testing for cause but rather contends that annual testing and periodic retesting constitute arbitrary invasions of its members’ privacy. For years, however, Amoco has required an annual physical examination of its employees during which both a urine specimen and blood sample are taken. The union has never objected. Thus, Amoco’s acquisition of the urine specimen and blood sample are not disputed. While the Supreme Court has recognized that the “procedures for collecting the necessary samples, which require employees to perform an excretory function traditionally [have been] shielded by great privacy,” Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1418, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), we are not concerned in this case with “procedures.” Only the actual screening of the employees’ urine and blood for drugs is in issue. Still, the union argues that an “arbitrator would find offensive and in violation of the contract such testing policy.” Ap-pellee’s Brief at 15. Yet the arbitrator’s substantive construction of the collective bargaining agreement is not our concern.
To justify its intrusion into the arbitration process, the court focuses largely on the district judge’s finding that the union’s members would suffer irreparable harm via an invasion of privacy if Amoco was not enjoined from implementing its drug testing program pending arbitration. See Court’s Opinion at 707-09. The court correctly notes that such a finding generally may not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, Inc., 809 F.2d 656, 663 (10th Cir.1987). But fact-findings made under an erroneous view of the law or in the absence of a defined legal standard are not binding on appeal. Pullman Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). Although the district judge expressed a belief that his failure to award the union injunctive relief would render arbitration meaningless, he did not adequately explain why. Instead, the judge seemed to have imposed a personal conviction upon the governing law when he stated: “Employees should not be subjected to that [drug testing] in my view, and they would suffer irreparable injury.... This [drug testing program] is essentially based upon a national program that you [Amoco] want to institute, and if you do, you ought to institute it right.” Rec. vol. III at 159-60.
We must begin with the language contained in section one of the Norris-LaGuar-dia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101: “No court of the United States ... shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute....” As construed, section one divests the district court of jurisdiction and precludes the issuance of an injunction where the denial of injunctive relief would not result in frustration of the arbitral process. See Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 404-412, 96 S.Ct. at 3146-50.2 In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail *711Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970), the Supreme Court fashioned a “narrow” exception to the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuar-dia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15. In order to enforce the union’s express promise to arbitrate, the Court enjoined a labor strike in breach of a no-strike obligation under a collective bargaining agreement stating that “a no-strike obligation ... is the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance disputes to the process of arbitration.” Id. at 248, 90 S.Ct. at 1591. Subsequently, in Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 404-12, 96 S.Ct. at 3146-50, the Court further delineated the limits of Boys Markets when it refused to enjoin a union’s sympathy strike where management and labor had agreed to arbitrate whether such a strike was in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The Court explained:
[An injunction] would cut deeply into the policy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and make the courts potential participants in a wide range of arbitrable disputes under the many existing and future collective bargaining contracts, not just for the purpose of enforcing promises to arbitrate, which was the limit of Boys Markets, but for the purpose of preliminarily dealing with the merits of the factual and legal issues that are subjects for the arbitrator and of issuing injunctions that would otherwise be forbidden by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
This is not what the parties have bargained for. Surely it cannot be concluded here, as it was in Boys Markets, that such injunctions pending arbitration are essential to carry out promises to arbitrate and to implement the private arrangements for the administration of the contract. As is typical, the agreements in this case outline the prearbitration settlement procedures and provide that if the grievance “has not been ... satisfactorily adjusted,” arbitration may be had. Nowhere do they provide for coercive action of any kind, let alone judicial injunctions, short of the terminal decision of the arbitrator. The parties have agreed to submit to grievance procedures and arbitrate, not to litigate. They have not contracted for a judicial preview of the facts and the law.... The parties’ agreement to adjust or to arbitrate their differences themselves would be eviscerated if the courts for all practical purposes were to try and decide contractual disputes at the preliminary injunction stage.
Id. at 410-12, 96 S.Ct. at 3149-50 (emphasis added).
Thus, Buffalo Forge cautions federal courts “to stay out of the merits of labor disputes.” Lever Bros. Co. v. International Chem. Workers Union, 554 F.2d 115, 123 (4th Cir.1976). Injunctive relief as an exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act is appropriate only when necessary to enforce an agreement to arbitrate. Local Lodge No. 1266 v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276, 281 (7th Cir.1981). In other words, an injunction in aid of arbitration is necessary when its absence would render the arbitral process a “hollow formality.” Court’s Opinion at 702. But cf. Utility Workers v. Southern California Edison Co., 852 F.2d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 1530, 103 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (district court erred in issuing injunction against implementation of drug testing program where employer did not expressly or impliedly promise to maintain status quo pending arbitration). Because frustration of the arbitral process would constitute irreparable injury to the aggrieved party, courts have focused on the former to determine the latter. E.g., Aluminum Workers Int’l Union v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 443 (6th Cir.1982).
*712This court’s suggestion that we “use a wide focus in assessing the nature of the threatened injury, as well as adopt a broad view of what constitutes irreparable injury,” Court’s Opinion at 709 (emphasis added), is simply wrong. The cases on which the court relies do not stand for such a proposition. For instance, in Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 363 U.S. at 528, 80 S.Ct. at 1327, the Supreme Court approved a district court order preventing the railroad from eliminating the jobs of certain freight crews and changing the home terminals of other crews prior to arbitration. The Court reasoned that because the railroad proposed to discharge or dislocate employees from long held positions, the arbitrator in the absence of a temporary injunction could not “make them whole in any realistic sense,” if they prevailed on the merits. Id. at 534, 80 S.Ct. at 1330. Likewise, in Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 276, the Seventh Circuit upheld an injunction restraining an employer from selling its corporate assets pending an arbitrator’s decision on the union’s claim that the sale violated the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. The court concluded that because the employer’s proposed action threatened a permanent loss of jobs, a damage remedy was inadequate: “Consummation of the sale would have left the arbitrator with no certain and effective means of remedying the breach of contract that the union has alleged.” Id. at 288. Lever Bros., 554 F.2d at 115, presented the Fourth Circuit with a similar scenario. In that case, Lever Brothers sought to transfer its Baltimore, Maryland soap production operation to Hammond, Indiana. The district court enjoined the company from moving pending arbitration and the court of appeals affirmed: “[H]ad there not been an injunction pending arbitration to preserve the status quo, the employees at the Baltimore plant would have been totally and permanently deprived of their employment.’’ Id. at 122 (emphasis in original). Despite this court’s contrary assertions, Court’s Opinion at 709, reinstatement and backpay for the employees in these cases would have been difficult at best given the fundamental change in business structure and operations. Thus, injunctive relief operated to preserve the arbitrators’ jurisdiction “by preventing injury so irreparable that a decision of the [arbitrators] in the unions favor would be but an empty victory.” Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 363 U.S. at 534, 80 S.Ct. at 1330. Such is not the case here. To be sure, those employees who might be accused unjustly of drug use may suffer some stigmatization which backpay and reinstatement cannot fully redress. But “[[Irreparable injury means not simply any injury resulting from a breach of contract that would not be fully redressed by an arbitral award,” Panoramic, 668 F.2d at 278, but rather that which would make arbitration a futile endeavor.
This court expresses grave concern over Amoco’s purported attempt to regulate the private lives of its employees. Relying on the union’s expert, the court claims that the detection levels for alcohol and marijuana are so low that a positive test result “would not correlate to the impairment of an individual at the time of testing,” Court’s Opinion at 705, and thus would exceed Amoco’s legitimate interest in testing. Maybe; maybe not. That merits determination, like the determinations of whether the union should have input into the company’s testing procedures or whether testing at the refinery should be banned outright, is for the arbitrator to decide.
The court does not identify the source of the employees’ right to privacy it directly relies upon for its advisory holding. Because Amoco is not a state actor, the Constitution’s guarantee of privacy is inapplicable. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480-86, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1679-83, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). Moreover, I am unaware of any general federal common law right to privacy. Any right to privacy, therefore, must come from federal labor law for section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, preempts state law, mandating resort to federal law in the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. E.g., Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-104, 82 S.Ct. 571, 576-77, 7 L.Ed.2d *713593 (1962). Because the Constitution is inapplicable in the absence of state action and no general federal common law right to privacy exists, the court must rely on either the express terms of the agreement or industrial common law to find this right of privacy, and in doing so encroaches upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. As Justice Douglas so aptly explained in United, Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1352-53, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960):
The labor arbitrator’s source of law is not confined to the express provisions of the contract, as the industrial common law — the practices of the industry and the shop — is equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it. The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties’ confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment. The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result, its consequences to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished.... The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot similarly be informed.
(emphasis added).
The reason'why the irreparable injury requirement for injunctive relief must be narrowly viewed and the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act given effect is because the expertise of the arbitrator is “foreign to the competence of courts.” Id. at 581, 80 S.Ct. at 1347. Regardless of this court’s ruling, the propriety of Amoco’s drug testing program ultimately rests with the arbitrator. Arbitration would not be rendered a “hollow formality” in the absence of temporary injunc-tive relief, for the arbitrator will structure the plan as required by the contract and industry practice. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Amoco Oil Co., 653 F.Supp. 300, 303 (D.N.D.1986) (holding that no injunction should issue against Amoco’s drug testing plan at North Dakota refinery); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Amoco Oil Co., 651 F.Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.Wyo.1986) (holding that no injunction should issue against Amoco’s drug testing plan at Wyoming refinery). Today the court does little more than advise the arbitrator how this labor dispute should be decided. I can think of few labor disputes where this court’s decision will not be cited for the proposition that a court of law should issue a preliminary injunction pending arbitration when asked to do so. I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to vacate the injunction and dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction.

. Our delay in rendering a decision surely contravenes section 10 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as amended, which states:
Whenever any court of the United States shall issue or deny any temporary injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, the court shall, upon the request of any party to the proceedings and on his filing the usual bond for costs, forthwith certify as in ordinary cases the record of the case to the court of appeals for its review. Upon the filing of such record in the court of appeals, *710the appeal shall be heard and the temporary injunctive order affirmed, modified, or set aside expeditiously.
29 U.S.C. § 110 (emphasis added).

. Because we have adopted a modified interpretation of the “likelihood of success on the merits" requirement, holding that "it will ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, diffi*711cult and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for litigation," City of Chanute v. Kansas Gas and Elec. Co., 754 F.2d 310, 314 (10th Cir.1985), I agree with the court that, in view of article 21 of the collective bargaining agreement, arbitration of the parties’ dispute is not a "futile endeavor.” Court’s Opinion at 704. Similarly, because the record reflects no history of drug-related accidents at the Salt Lake City refinery and no evidence of a drug problem among its employees, I believe the balance of hardships weighs in favor of the union, see id. at 709, despite the lack of irreparable injury. See infra at 712-13.