Court Opinion

ID: 9777868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:26:11.649497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:02.174666
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
dissenting.
The primary issue presented here is whether a retired judge who sits only by assignment may testify as an expert witness concerning court procedures in a case in which he is not sitting. The court answers this question in the negative. The court holds that: Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits defendants from calling a judge as an expert witness; allowing Judge Blanton to testify would cause further injury to the relators’ counsel's relationship with Judge Blanton; and the appearance of impropriety and partiality cannot be remedied by appeal.
While there is much in the court’s opinion that I agree with, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit judges from testifying as experts. Also, we should not be overly concerned with the relationship between witnesses and opposing counsel. Finally, the image of the judiciary is not so fragile that to allow Judge Blanton to testify would cause irreparable injury to the judiciary. I would hold that relators have not satisfied either prong of the test for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied relators’ request to bar Judge Blanton as a potential witness. Even if he did, relators have an adequate remedy on appeal.1
The underlying lawsuit is a dispute over a family business. Unable to resolve their differences, the family members ended up in court. After a jury was selected to try their case, the parties advised the trial judge that they had reached a settlement, the terms of which were dictated into the record in open court. Judge Godard, the presiding judge, meticulously questioned all parties as to their understanding of the agreement and their willingness to enter into it. The parties acknowledged that they understood it and they pledged to honor its terms. Instead of noting on his docket sheet “Judgment is rendered accordingly,” Judge Godard wrote “Judgment to be entered accordingly.” Thereafter, one of the parties reneged on the agreement. After a hearing, Judge Godard entered a judgment according to the agreement. This matter was appealed and the judgment was reversed by the court of appeals. Buffalo Bag Co. v. Joachim, 704 S.W.2d 482 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Nonetheless, the court of appeals chastised the reneging party and said:
Although this court is of the opinion that appellants abused the judicial process by allowing a jury to be impanelled, consenting to a settlement agreement whose terms were read into the record and then reneging on the very same agreement, and even though it is certain that the trial court meant to render judgment at the time the agreement was presented *242and approved, we hold that the docket language by itself does not constitute a rendition of judgment.
704 S.W.2d at 484. Thereafter, instead of presenting the underlying case to another judge or jury, relators again settled the case. They claim that the terms were less favorable than the previous settlement so they sued their lawyers for malpractice.
According to the majority opinion, rela-tors’ theory of the case is that their lawyers “were negligent in not requesting Judge Godard to render judgment in the earlier case based upon the terms of the settlement agreement when they were announced in open court and before opposing parties withdrew their consent.” 815 S.W.2d at 235. The defendants in the legal malpractice suit desired to depose or obtain an affidavit from Judge Godard, but he died before they had this opportunity. Defendants then obtained an affidavit from Judge Blanton in which he stated that:
the docket entry is an action of the Court and not an action of an attorney. It is the function of the Court to select the proper terminology for docket entries. If error was made in using the docket entry “Judgment to be entered accordingly,” rather than “Judgment is rendered,” then that would be a judicial error and not an error on the part of any of the attorneys involved in the case.
“Docket entries” are the judge’s personal journal. They are in the exclusive domain of the judge presiding over a case. It is common knowledge to those trained in the law that lawyers have nothing to do with their wording or preparation.
The “error,” if any, made by Judge Godard is not uncommon. Judges often use the word “entry” and “render” interchangeably. While they are not synonymous,2 we ourselves at times use “entry” of judgment when “render” would be more appropriate. See Emerson v. Tunnell, 793 S.W.2d 947, 948 (Tex.1990); Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 559 (Tex.1989).
The majority holds that Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits defendants from calling Judge Blanton as an expert witness3 and that Judge Chambers (respondent here) clearly abused his discretion in refusing to bar Judge Blanton as a witness. I disagree.
Canon 2 provides in pertinent part:
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself or herself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
B. ... A judge should not lend the prestige of his or her office to advance the private interests of himself or herself or others.... A judge should not testify voluntarily in an adjudicative proceeding as a character witness. (Emphasis added).
Since the Code of Judicial Conduct expressly addresses the propriety of judges testifying at trial and merely prohibits them from testifying voluntarily as character witnesses, we may infer that the canons permit judges to testify as experts, just as they may testify as fact witnesses. If such testimony is prohibited, it is simple enough to say so specifically.
In 1989, Canon 3(A)(8) provided in part: A judge shall abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court, and shall require similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to the judge’s direction and control.
This subsection does not prohibit judges from explaining for public information the procedures of the court. As further support for the contention that judges are permitted to testify is the fact that Canon 3(A)(8) was amended effective December 19, 1989, to state as follows:
A judge shall abstain from public comment about a pending or impending pro*243ceeding which may come before the judge’s court in a manner which suggests to a reasonable person the judge’s probable decision on any particular case. (Emphasis added).
Given these changes, if the intention were to restrict a judge from commenting or testifying, the Code of Judicial Conduct would not have been amended to expand the permitted scope of comment.
Further, Rule 605 of the Rules of Civil Evidence provides that “[t]he judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness.” By specifically limiting a judge’s incompetency as a witness to trials in which he or she is presiding we implied that a judge was competent to testify in a trial in which he or she is not presiding. At the very least, we left this question open.
If Judge Chambers had consulted the annotation cited by the majority, he would have learned that courts have not uniformly rejected judges as expert witnesses. See Department of Highways v. Hess, 420 S.W.2d 660 (Ky.1967) (testimony as to value of real property); La Dow v. State, 23 Ohio App. 288, 155 N.E. 502 (1925) (testimony as handwriting expert), collected in Annotation, Judge as Witness in Cause Not on Trial Before Him, 86 A.L.R.3d 633 (1978).
A trial judge abuses his or her discretion when he or she renders a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. As we said in Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals:
A relator who attacks the ruling of a trial court as an abuse of discretion labors under a heavy burden. The relator must establish, under the circumstances of the case, that the facts and law permit the trial court to make but one decision. This determination is essential because mandamus will not issue to control the action of a lower court in a matter involving discretion.
700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, under our constitution, the State Commission on Judicial Conduct is charged with enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Tex. Const, art. V, § 1-a(6). A judge who wilfully violates the Code of Judicial Conduct, may be disciplined, censured, suspended or removed from office. Thus, whether a judge should testify is left to his or her better judgment. I do not think that Judge Chambers clearly abused his discretion in not barring Judge Blanton from testifying. But even if Judge Chambers committed a legal error in his ruling, we ought not interfere with the trial of cases whenever we believe that the trial judge has made an error in an incidental legal ruling when there is an adequate remedy on appeal.
The majority sees incurable error in the possible straining of the relationship between the plaintiffs’ attorney and Judge Blanton, and the possible taint on the judiciary because of perceived partiality. Neither reason is a realistic concern here.
Hard feelings between an attorney and an adverse witness is not the kind of harm that can be assuaged by either appeal or mandamus. Rather, the majority’s concern is that an attorney should not have to balance the demands of zealous advocacy for his client against the desire to not antagonize a judge who may preside in the attorney’s cases in the future. As the majority observes, however, the plaintiffs’ attorney was hardly timorous in the cross examination of Judge Blanton. 815 S.W.2d at 236 n. 4. Furthermore, the attorney need not fear for his future clients, because Judge Blanton is retired and he presides in a court only by assignment. Should the attorney ever find himself in Judge Blanton’s court he may exercise the right of preemp-tory recusal of visiting judges found in the Government Code. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.053(b) (Vernon Supp.1991).
I agree with the court of appeals that relators failed to demonstrate that an appeal would be inadequate. See Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Walker, 787 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex.1990); Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 566-67 (Tex.1985). The error, if any, is of such a nature that it can be fully preserved for appellate review on the merits. Thus, there is no basis for the *244issuance of this “extraordinary” writ. Today’s opinion further relaxes the standards for issuing writs of mandamus.
Mandamus and sanctions are two of the greatest problems in our legal system in Texas today. See Herring, The Rise of the ‘Sanctions’ Tort, Texas Lawyer, January 28, 1991 at 22-23; Jacks, 25 Tex.Trial Law Ass’n Forum 3 (1991). Since Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.1984), there has been a veritable explosion in the number of mandamus filed in our courts.4 Today’s opinion exacerbates this problem. On what rational basis are we to deny mandamus regarding nonjudge expert witnesses? The lesson of this opinion is that writ of mandamus is the appropriate vehicle to contest a trial judge’s decision whether a witness may testify in a particular case. If this is not an incidental trial ruling, I am not sure what is. Surely, tomorrow we will be asked to issue mandamus regarding other witnesses and thereafter regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence at trial. Is there no end? The better question, the question which had always been the basis for granting mandamus relief, is “does relator have an adequate remedy by appeal?” It is imperative that we not yield to temptation to interrupt trials to correct incidental trial rulings. We should heed the words of this court from 1969: There is sound reason why appellate courts should not have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to control or to correct incidental rulings of a trial judge when there is adequate remedy by appeal. Trials must be orderly; and constant interruption of the trial process by appellate courts would destroy all semblance of orderly trial proceedings. Moreover, with this type of intervention, the fundamental concept of all American judicial systems of trial and appeal would become outmoded. Having entered the thicket to control or correct one such ruling, the appellate courts would soon be asked in direct proceedings to require by writs of mandamus that trial judges enter orders, or set aside orders, sustaining or overruling (1) pleas to the jurisdiction, (2) pleas of privilege, (3) pleas in abatement, (4) motions for summary judgment, (5) motions for instructed verdict, (6) motions for judgment non ob-stante veredicto, (7) motions for new trial, and a myriad of interlocutory orders and judgments; and, as to each, it might logically be argued that the petitioner for the writ was entitled, as a matter of law, to the action sought to be compelled.
Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex.1969).
The need to return to strict standards for the granting of mandamus relief is as *245great as ever. In 1984 a member of our court prognosticated as follows:
Less than one year ago this court observed that over the past twenty-five years it had been flooded with mandamus actions to either compel or deny discovery. Today’s decision effectively insures that this flood will continue and increase into a rampage. The majority has failed to heed the warning echoed by our predecessors against “entering the thicket” by constant interruptions of the trial process. We have now not only “entered the thicket,” we have become totally enshrouded in that thicket.
Jampole, 673 S.W.2d at 578 (Barrow, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). With our ruling in this case today, we further blur the standards for granting mandamus relief and expand the basis for seeking mandamus by granting relief from a mere potential error in an incidental trial ruling. Justice Barrow’s prophecy is now reality. For all of these reasons, I dissent.
GAMMAGE, J., joins in this opinion.

. The majority misses the point in concluding that mandamus should issue in this case based on its sense of “propriety.” Heretofore, this was not the test for issuing writs of mandamus. This opinion blurs the standards for issuing writs of mandamus.

. The distinction is that judges render judgments; clerks enter them on the minutes. Burrell v. Cornelius, 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex.1978); Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 151 S.W. 1040 (1912).

. Defendants’ counsel informed the trial court that he did not intend to use Judge Blanton’s deposition but that he did plan for him testify live at the trial.

. From 1983 to 1990 the supreme court experienced an 81% increase in filings seeking mandamus relief. 1983 Tex.Jud.SysAnn.Rep. 97; 1990 Tex.Jud.Sys.Ann.Rep. 137. The increase at the court of appeals level is even more dramatic.
An informal survey conducted by the Office of Court Administration yielded the following statistics for mandamus filings for the calendar or fiscal years 1984 and 1990;
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Overall mandamus filings in the courts of appeals have increased from 234 to 816 per year. *245See also Ray & McKelvey, The Mandamus Explosion, 28 S.Tex.L.Rev. 413 (1987).