Court Opinion

ID: 9540123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:12:59.068187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:39.765730
License: Public Domain

J-A15013-23

                                2023 PA Super 150

  VALERIE GOLIK                                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1110 WDA 2022

              Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 31, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
                        Civil Division at GD-20-011632

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY MURRAY, J.:                                 FILED: AUGUST 7, 2023

       Erie Insurance Exchange (Appellant) appeals from the judgment entered

in favor of Valerie Golik (Mrs. Golik) in this declaratory judgment and breach

of contract action. For the reasons discussed below, we vacate the judgment

in favor of Mrs. Golik, and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment in

favor of Appellant.

       The trial court detailed the underlying facts and procedural history as

follows:

       In 1992, [Mrs. Golick’s husband, Mark Golick (Mr. Golick),]
       received an automobile insurance policy (“the Policy”) from
       [Appellant] through the Fisher Agency (“Fisher”). NJT 32:6-12.
       He was the only individual that the Policy covered at that time,
       and he only had one vehicle on the Policy as well. Id. at 32:18-
       23. In 1998, Mr. Golick replaced the vehicle on the Policy with a
       different one, and the Fisher Agency subsequently sent him a
       stacking waiver. Id. at 32:24-34:9. He signed the 1998 waiver.
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A15013-23

     Id. The Policy still only covered himself and one vehicle. Id. at
     33:15-19.

           Following the Goliks’ marriage in 2000, Mrs. Golik and her
     vehicle were added to the Policy in 2001. Id. at 22:2-9. The
     spouses each testified that this was the first time the Policy
     covered multiple persons and vehicles. Id. at 22:22-25, 34:5-8.
     Mr. Golick did not receive any stacking waivers or discuss stacking
     insurance with their agent in 2001 after Mrs. Golick was added to
     the Policy. Id. at 35:9-19.

            In 2004, [Appellant] or Fisher mailed stacking waivers to
     the Goliks’ residence that Mr. Golik ultimately signed. Id. at
     35:24-36:17. No changes had been made to the Policy. Id. at
     24:6-8. Mr. Golik testified that he believes the waivers had been
     addressed to him only, and upon reviewing the documents at trial,
     he confirmed that only his name appeared printed on the waivers
     themselves. Id. at 36:18-23. He had no specific recollection of
     sharing the waivers with Mrs. Golik, but he testified that it is his
     habit to share mail with his wife whenever it is addressed to []
     both []. Id. at 37:3-22. He further testified that he does not
     recall any cover letter or instructions being included with the
     waivers. Id. at 37:15-19. Mrs. Golik testified that she also does
     not recall either seeing the stacking waivers or having any
     conversations with anyone about stacked motor vehicle insurance
     in 2004. Id. at 24:11-24.

           On October 21, 2019, Mrs. Golik was severely injured in a
     motor vehicle accident when an uninsured motorist made an
     errant turn into the path of her vehicle. Id. at 18:7-20:7. She
     subsequently filed a claim with [Appellant] for [uninsured motorist
     (UM)] benefits, id. at 25:5-10, believing at the time that the Policy
     provided $100,000 per accident in UM coverage. Id. 21:23-22:1.
     [Appellant] responded with a copy of the 2004 stacking waiver
     three months later, id. at 26:13-27:2, and subsequently tendered
     a $50,000 payout per the Policy, which Mrs. Golik did not accept.
     Id. at 30:1-3. This lawsuit ensued.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/22, at 2-3 (unnumbered) (paragraph designations

omitted).

                                     -2-
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       Mrs. Golick filed the instant action on November 10, 2020. Mrs. Golick

averred Appellant “failed its statutory obligation to present her with the

opportunity to stack limits of [UM] and underinsured motorist coverage

[UIM.]”    Id. at 1 (unnumbered).          Mrs. Golick claimed she was entitled to

$100,000 in stacked UM coverage. Id.

       The trial court commenced a non-jury trial on March 1, 2022. On August

11, 2022, the court entered a verdict in favor of Mrs. Golick in the amount of

$100,000. Appellant filed post-trial motions, which the trial court denied on

August 29, 2022. On August 31, 2022, the trial court entered judgment in

favor of Mrs. Golick. This timely appeal followed.1

       Appellant raises three issues for review:

             1.     Whether the trial court erred in determining [Mrs.
       Golick] could recover “stacked” uninsured motorist benefits
       despite the presence of a [UM] benefits “stacking waiver” on the
       subject auto insurance policy executed by the first named insured
       consistent with the language of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738?

             2.    Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in
       determining that 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738 imposes additional
       requirements on insurers beyond securing a statutorily-prescribed
       “stacking waiver” signed and dated by the first named insured on
       the policy to preclude recovery of “stacked” benefits by [Mrs.
       Golick]?

             3.    Whether the trial court erred in disregarding stare
       decisis in Rupert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. [Rupert I], 781 A.2d
       132 (Pa. 2001), wherein a unanimous Supreme Court reasoned
       that a statutorily-prescribed “stacking waiver” signed and dated
____________________________________________

1 The trial court did not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement

and did not issue a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

                                           -3-
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      by the current first name insured effectively binds all other named
      insureds?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

      As Appellant’s issues are related, we address them together. We begin

by recognizing:

      Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts is
      to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported
      by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed
      error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial
      judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the
      verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light most
      favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court
      only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence
      in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law.
      However, [where] the issue ... concerns a question of law, our
      scope of review is plenary.

Metro Real Estate Investment, LLC v. Bembry, 207 A.3d 336, 339 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citations omitted).

      With respect to a declaratory judgment action involving insurance policy

coverage,

      the proper construction of an insurance policy is resolved as a
      matter of law to be decided by the court in a declaratory judgment
      action. Hence, as with all issues of law, our review is de novo.
      Our standard of review in a declaratory judgment action is narrow.
      We review the decision of the trial court as we would a decree in
      equity and set aside factual conclusions only where they are not
      supported by adequate evidence.         We give plenary review,
      however, to the trial court’s legal conclusions. We are limited to
      determining whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion or
      committed an error of law.

Swarner v. Mutual Ben. Group, 72 A.3d 641, 644 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

                                      -4-
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     This case involves interpretation of Section 1738 of the Motor Vehicle

Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1701-1799.7. Section

1738 addresses stacking of UM/UIM coverage and waiver of stacked coverage.

Section 1738 provides:

     (a) Limit for each vehicle.--When more than one vehicle is
     insured under one or more policies providing uninsured or
     underinsured motorist coverage, the stated limit for uninsured or
     underinsured coverage shall apply separately to each vehicle so
     insured. The limits of coverages available under this subchapter
     for an insured shall be the sum of the limits for each motor vehicle
     as to which the injured person is an insured.

     (b) Waiver.--Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), a
     named insured may waive coverage providing stacking of
     uninsured or underinsured coverages in which case the limits of
     coverage available under the policy for an insured shall be the
     stated limits for the motor vehicle as to which the injured person
     is an insured.

     (c) More than one vehicle.--Each named insured
     purchasing uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage
     for more than one vehicle under a policy shall be provided the
     opportunity to waive the stacked limits of coverage and instead
     purchase coverage as described in subsection (b). The premiums
     for an insured who exercises such waiver shall be reduced to
     reflect the different cost of such coverage.

     (d) Forms.—

        (1) The named insured shall be informed that he may
        exercise the waiver of the stacked limits of uninsured
        motorist coverage by signing the following written rejection
        form:

                      UNINSURED COVERAGE LIMITS

           By signing this waiver, I am rejecting stacked limits of
           uninsured motorist coverage under the policy for
           myself and members of my household under
           which the limits of coverage available would be the

                                    -5-
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             sum of limits for each motor vehicle insured under the
             policy. Instead, the limits of coverage that I am
             purchasing shall be reduced to the limits stated in the
             policy. … I understand that my premiums will be
             reduced if I reject this coverage.

     ….

                               Signature of First Named Insured

     ….

          (2) The named insured shall be informed that he may
          exercise the waiver of the stacked limits of underinsured
          motorist coverage by signing the following written rejection
          form:

                      UNDERINSURED COVERAGE LIMITS

             By signing this waiver, I am rejecting stacked limits of
             underinsured motorist coverage under the policy for
             myself and members of my household under
             which the limits of coverage available would be the
             sum of limits for each motor vehicle insured under the
             policy. Instead, the limits of coverage that I am
             purchasing shall be reduced to the limits stated in the
             policy….

     ….

                               Signature of First Named Insured

     ….

     (e) Signature and date.--The forms described in subsection (d)
     must be signed by the first named insured and dated to be valid.
     Any rejection form that does not comply with this section is void.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1738 (emphasis added).

     When interpreting the MVFRL:

     We are guided in our analysis by the Statutory Construction Act
     of 1972 (Statutory Construction Act), 1 Pa. C.S. §§ 1501-1991,

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     which provides that the object of all statutory interpretation “is to
     ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.”
     1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). Generally, the plain language of the statute
     “provides the best indication of legislative intent.” Miller v. Cnty.
     of Centre, 643 Pa. 560, 173 A.3d 1162, 1168 (2017). If the
     statutory language is clear and unambiguous in setting forth the
     intent of the General Assembly, then “we cannot disregard the
     letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”
     Fletcher v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 603 Pa. 452,
     985 A.2d 678, 684 (2009) (citing 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b)). In this
     vein, “we should not insert words into [a statute] that are plainly
     not there.” Frazier v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bayada
     Nurses, Inc.), 616 Pa. 592, 52 A.3d 241, 245 (2012). When the
     statutory language is ambiguous, however, we may ascertain the
     General Assembly’s intent by considering the factors set forth in
     Section 1921(c) of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa. C.S. §
     1921(c), and other rules of statutory construction. See Pa. Sch.
     Bds. Ass'n, Inc. v. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Bd., 580 Pa. 610, 863
     A.2d 432, 436 (2004) (observing that “other interpretative rules
     of statutory construction are to be utilized only where the statute
     at issue is ambiguous”). Additionally, “[w]ords and phrases shall
     be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their
     common and approved usage,” though “technical words and
     phrases and such others as have acquired a peculiar and
     appropriate meaning or are defined in [the Statutory Construction
     Act] shall be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate
     meaning or definition.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1903(a). “We also presume
     that ‘the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd,
     impossible of execution or unreasonable,’ and that ‘the General
     Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.’”
     Berner v. Montour Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 655 Pa. 137, 217
     A.3d 238, 245 (2019) (quoting 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(1)-(2)).

Goodwin v. Goodwin, 280 A.3d 937, 943-44 (Pa. 2022).

     Here, the trial court identified the issue as: “Whether, under Section

1738 of the [MVFRL], only the signature of the first named insured is needed

to execute a valid waiver of stacked UM coverage.”       Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, 8/11/22, at 3. The trial court concluded the answer was

“no.” Id. In so doing, the trial court found there was no “binding case law

                                     -7-
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that answer[ed] the legal issue in this matter.” Id. The trial court turned to

the language of Section 1738 and opined:

      Because there is no relevant, binding case law that interprets
      Section 1738, the [trial c]ourt now interprets Section 1738 itself
      and finds that its plain language is ambiguous as to whether the
      signature of the first named insured alone is sufficient to execute
      a valid waiver of stacked coverage. In light of the tools of
      statutory construction that Pennsylvania courts utilize in such
      cases, the [trial c]ourt here ultimately concludes that Section
      1738 has two discrete requirements that must be met to execute
      a valid stacking waiver: a) The signature of the first named
      insured on the waiver form[; a]nd b) evidence of a reasonable
      effort on the insurer’s part to provide each named insured
      the opportunity to waive stacked coverage.

Id. at 6 (paragraph numbers and some emphasis omitted, some emphasis in

original).

      The trial court focused on Section 1738’s alternating use of “named

insured” and “first named insured,” noting correctly that neither term is

defined in the statute. Id. at 7-8. The trial court stated:

      At first blush, a cursory reading of Section 1738 seems to
      unambiguously suggest that the first named insured’s signature is
      all the statute requires for a valid UM or UIM stacking waiver.

      ….

            The plain language of [subsections 1738(d) and (e)],
      standing alone, strongly point to the conclusion that the General
      Assembly’s intent was to require only the first named insured’s
      signature to execute a valid stacking waiver. Not only do both
      subsections make zero reference to any other named insured’s
      signature, but subsection (d)’s language “for myself and members
      of my household” further suggests that our legislature intended to
      give the first named insured unilateral power to waive stacked
      coverage on behalf of all others on the policy.

                                     -8-
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            Section 1738(c), however, muddies the waters by
      unambiguously stating that “[e]ach named insured purchasing
      uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage for more than one
      vehicle under a policy shall be provided the opportunity to waive
      the stacked limits of coverage.” 75 Pa. C.S. § 1738(c) (emphasis
      added). That language flies in the face of the plain meaning of
      subsections (d) and (e) to suggest the legislature intended for
      each named insured to have an opportunity to waive stacking
      before a waiver would be finalized.

      ….

            Because the plain language of Section 1738 leads to two
      plausible but contradictory interpretations, the [trial c]ourt finds
      the statute ambiguous on its face as to what it requires for a valid
      waiver of stacked UM or UIM coverage.

Id. at 6-8 (paragraph numbers omitted, emphasis in original). Upon review,

we are constrained to disagree.

      Although there is no case law directly on point, our Supreme Court’s

split decision in Rupert I offers meaningful guidance. In Rupert I, Cynthia

Winters (Winters) purchased automobile insurance in 1984, listing her

boyfriend Timothy Rupert (Rupert) as a “driver.” Rupert I, 781 A.2d at 132.

The couple married in 1988. Id. In 1991, Winters signed a waiver of stacked

UM coverage.    In 1993, Winters added Rupert to the policy as a “named

insured.” Id. In 1997, Winters died, and Rupert removed Winters’ name from

the policy; he subsequently renewed the policy. Id. In July 1997, Rupert was

seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident. Id.

      Rupert filed a federal court action, arguing the “waiver form signed by

[Winters] was no longer a valid waiver because, at the time of [Rupert’s]

accident, it did not conform” with Section 1738(e), as Winters was no longer

                                     -9-
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the first named insured. Id. at 135. The United States Court of Appeals for

the Third Circuit certified the case as a question of law to the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court.     Id. at 132.   After one justice recused, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court was evening divided. Id. at 132.

      In an opinion authored by Justice Zappala and joined by two justices,

Justice Zappala opined: “[F]or purposes of Section 1738, the signature of the

first named insured on a valid waiver at the inception of the policy is evidence

that each named insured under the policy was fully aware of the options

regarding stacked policy limits.”   Id. at 135.   Pertinently, Justice Zappala

recognized the statute’s alternating use of the terms “first named insured”

and “named insured,” but found no resulting ambiguity. Id. Justice Zappala

reasoned:

      At first blush, Section 1738 appears to interchange the terms “first
      named insured” and “named insured”. Section 1738(c) allows
      each named insured the option of waiving stacked coverage.
      Section 1738(c) also states that premiums for “an insured” should
      reflect the difference in cost. I see no conflict in terms here,
      as each named insured must categorically be an insured.
      Conversely, any insured that is not a named insured is not entitled
      to the waiver option provided in Section 1738(b).

             Pursuant to Section 1738(d), each named insured must be
      informed of the option to waive stacked coverage. The statute
      mandates the notification be presented in the specific manner of
      the prescribed form described in Section 1738(d)(1). That form
      calls only for the signature of the first named insured. Likewise,
      Section 1738(e) also mandates the signature of the first named
      insured. My reading of the plain meaning of Section 1738(d) and
      (e) is that the signature of the first named insured
      evidences the insurer’s fulfillment of its obligation of
      offering and informing the named insured of his or her right
      to waiver.

                                     - 10 -
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Id. (emphasis added).

      Justice Cappy, also joined by two justices, reached a different

conclusion, opining: “In light of the legislative goal of ensuring knowledgeable

rejection of coverage, and the conclusive effect of the first named insured’s

signature upon other insureds, it is of paramount importance that any new

first named insureds receive the notice prescribed by § 1738.” Id. at 136

(emphasis added).     While disagreeing with Justice Zappala’s conclusion,

Justice Cappy did not disagree that the signature of the first named insured is

sufficient to meet the requirement that other “named insureds” be given

notice of the waiver. Id. at 135-36. Justice Cappy wrote:

      The legislature placed the burden of obtaining a valid rejection of
      stacked coverage on the insurance company: The rejection forms
      in § 1738(d) must be signed and dated by the first named insured,
      or else the rejection of stacked coverage is void. 75 Pa.C.S. §
      1738(e). It is evident that the General Assembly sought to
      ensure that policyholders would be given full information
      regarding availability of stacked coverage before deciding
      whether or not to reject it. Cf. Salazar v. Allstate Insurance
      Co., 549 Pa. 658, 702 A.2d 1038, 1044 (1997) (sections 1731,
      1791 and 1791.1 describe information that insurer must provide
      “in order that the insured may make a knowing and intelligent
      decision on whether to waive [uninsured motorists] benefits
      coverage.”).

            The first named insured’s signature on the form rejects
      “coverage under the policy for myself and members of my
      household ....” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738(d). By employing this
      language, the legislature adopted the fiction of
      “constructive knowledge” as to all other insureds-that is, if
      the first named insured rejected stacked coverage, then it
      would be presumed that all other insureds had knowledge
      of the option[] and acquiesced in the rejection of coverage.

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       Thus, notice to the first named insured is all that the
       statute requires.

Id. (emphasis added).

       The Third Circuit adopted Justice Zappala’s reasoning, stating:

       The Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the [MVFRL] “in large
       part” to check the rapidly rising cost of automobile insurance.
       Huber v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 587 A.2d 333, 334 (Pa. Super.
       1991). The underlying aim of the MVFRL is “to provide broad
       coverage to assure the financial integrity of the policyholder.”
       Danko v. Erie Ins. Exch., 630 A.2d 1219, 1222 (Pa. Super.
       1993), aff’d, 649 A.2d 935 (Pa. 1994). Accordingly, Pennsylvania
       courts have held that “the MVFRL is to be construed liberally to
       afford the greatest possible coverage to injured claimants.”
       Sturkie v. Erie Ins. Group, 595 A.2d 152, 157-58 (Pa. Super.
       1991). Courts should refrain, however, from rewriting the MVFRL
       “‘under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.’” Wolgemuth v.
       Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 535 A.2d 1145, 1151 (Pa. Super.
       1987) (quoting 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b)).

Rupert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. [Rupert II], 291 F.3d 243, 246 (3d. Cir.

2002) (citations modified).2        In adopting Justice Zappala’s view, the Third

Circuit reasoned that Section 1738 “does not explicitly require the valid waiver

form be signed by the current first named insured.” Id. at 247 (emphasis in

original). The court agreed “individuals added to a policy as named insureds

subsequent to the execution of a stacking waiver, such as [Rupert], will

receive adequate notice of the stacking waiver through the first named

insured.” Id. The Third Circuit emphasized that Section 1738(c) supported

____________________________________________

2 Pennsylvania Courts “may look to federal case law for its persuasive value.”

Rudalavage v. PPL Elec. Utils. Corp., 268 A.3d 470, 479 n.7 (Pa. Super.
2022) (citation omitted).

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this interpretation because it stated that each “named insured purchasing …

coverage … shall be provided with the opportunity to waive the stacked limits

of coverage.” Id. at 248 (citation omitted, emphasis in original).

      While neither Rupert I nor Rupert II is binding, both decisions are

highly instructive, particularly when read with prior Pennsylvania case law.

Our Courts have long held that third parties, drivers, and named insureds are

bound by the decisions of the first named insured.

      In Kimball v. Cigna Ins. Co., 660 A.2d 1386 (Pa. Super. 1995), a

daughter was identified as a “driver” under her father’s automobile insurance

policy.   Id. at 1386-87.   The parents divorced in 1984, and the mother

replaced the father as the only “named insured” on the policy. Id. at 1387.

In 1990, the mother executed a form reducing the UM/UIM coverage limits.

Id. Although daughter was identified as a “named insured” under the policy

in 1991, rather than a “driver”, the daughter never executed documentation

regarding the reduction in UM/UIM coverage limits. Id. The daughter was

injured in an accident with an uninsured motorist and sued. Id. The insurance

company argued the daughter was bound by the reduction in coverage form

signed by her mother; the trial court agreed. Id.

      On appeal, this Court discussed prior case law, observing that most of

the cases were “limited to common pleas and federal court cases.” Id. at

1387. However, we discerned a pattern. We ascertained that courts found

other named insureds or drivers to be bound by the decisions of the first

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named insured, absent evidence that the named insureds or drivers

affirmatively acted to either increase the coverage and/or sought to purchase

their own policy.   Id. at 1387-89.    Thus, this Court held that where the

daughter took “no action … to rectify this level of coverage”, she was bound

by the actions of the first named insured. Id. at 1389.

      In General Acc. Ins. Co. of America v. Parker, 665 A.3d 502 (Pa.

Super. 1992), we addressed whether a third-party beneficiary of an insurance

policy was bound by the policyholder’s waiver of UM benefits. The plaintiff

argued that because she was “not a resident relative of the policy holder,

neither [insurer] nor their named insured [could] reject [UM] coverage on her

behalf.” Id. at 504. We disagreed, holding that the plaintiff’s “rights, as a

third party beneficiary, are … subject to the same limitations in the policy as

… the policy holder.” Id.

      In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2000),

the plaintiff married Saverio Buffetta (Buffetta) in 1979. Nationwide Mut.,

230 F.3d at 635.      In 1981, Buffetta obtained the insurance policy and

subsequently added the plaintiff to the policy. Id. The plaintiff and Buffetta

divorced in 1995. Id. at 636. Prior to the divorce, Buffetta elected lower

coverage limits for UM/UIM. Id. Following the divorce, Buffetta transferred

the policy to the plaintiff, who requested the policy be placed in her name.

Id. The plaintiff never signed any authorization regarding the lower UM/UIM

limits. Id. In 1997, the plaintiff’s father, who resided with the plaintiff, was

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killed in a motor vehicle accident. Id. The plaintiff filed suit, arguing her

UM/UIM coverage should not be limited to the lower amount because “she

never executed a writing for that amount[.]” Id. The Third Circuit disagreed.

Id. at 640-42.

      Noting plaintiff’s situation was “not precisely the situation in Kimball,”

the Third Circuit stated:

      [D]rawing on the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s repeated
      references to a later named insured’s being bound by having
      understood the policy limits and acquiesced in them by
      paying lower premiums, we conclude that the instant factual
      setting is sufficiently analogous to Kimball to require the same
      result. …

      While we concede that a policy argument could be made to the
      effect that a new named insured should always have his or her
      voice count as to whether a reduced uninsured motorist coverage
      is requested, this is not evident in the [MVFRL], nor was it
      expressed in Kimball. … [T]he statute requires only that a waiver
      form be provided upon issuance of a policy. There is no statutory
      requirement that an insured be given a reduction authorization
      form without the insured’s having requested one. The [MVFRL] is
      written in permissive terms, leaving it to a named insured, who
      “may” request reduced coverage. The option exists to request
      such a reduction and, we submit, Kimball was decided on the
      basis that a later named insured, upon being added to the policy,
      could have notified the insurance company that she did not
      want to be bound by another’s election of reduced
      coverage.

Id. at 641 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).

      The above cases suggest a named insured, even when subsequently

added to a policy, is presumed to have known about available options and is

bound by the first named insured’s election of lesser coverage, unless the

insured takes an affirmative step to change the coverage. See Rupert I, 718

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A.2d at 135-36; General Acc. Ins. Co., 665 A.2d at 304-05; Kimball, 660

A.2d at 1388-89. See also Rupert II, 291 F.3d at 247-48; Nationwide

Mut. Ins. Co., 230 F.3d at 640-42.

         Here, Mr. Golick purchased the Policy in 1992, and executed a stacking

waiver in 1998. Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/22, at 2 (unnumbered). The parties

married     in   2000   and    added   Mrs.     Golick   to   the   Policy    in   2001;

Mr. Golick executed a second stacking waiver in 2004.               Id.      The Golicks

continued to pay reduced premiums for unstacked UM/UIM insurance. N.T.,

3/1/22, at 31-32, 51.         Mr. Golick, the first named insured, affirmed his

execution of the stacking waiver. Id. at 40. He admitted his annual policy

declaration sheets changed his coverage status from stacked to unstacked

after he signed the waiver.       Id. at 41-51.     Mr. Golick claimed he did not

understand what he was signing. Id. However, he acknowledged he never

asked for assistance or clarification, but signed and returned the forms. Id.

at 51.

         Mrs. Golick testified that she was aware Appellant provided UM/UIM

coverage and she and Mr. Golick were current on their premiums at the time

of the accident. Id. at 21. Mrs. Golick stated she never signed or heard about

the stacking waivers. Id. at 23.

         The record reflects the Golicks enjoyed the benefit of reduced premiums

for more than 20 years. See id. at 51. The record also confirms that despite

claiming he did not understand the waiver, Mr. Golick signed it in 1998, and

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again in 2004, without asking for any explanation or assistance. See id. at

40-51; Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/22, at 2. Prior to, and for approximately one

year after marriage, Mrs. Golick was insured under a separate policy. N.T.,

3/1/22, at 22-23.     During the subsequent 18 years when Mrs. Golick was

insured under the joint policy, she took no affirmative steps to request a

change to the policy to stack the insurance or obtain a separate policy. See

id. at 23-30.      Consistent with the evidence and foregoing case law, we

conclude that Mrs. Golick had constructive knowledge of the stacking waiver

and is bound by the signature of the first named insured, Mr. Golick, on the

stacking waiver.

      Even if we were not persuaded by the above case law, we would not find

Section 1738 of the MVFRL ambiguous. The trial court acknowledged that the

plain language of subsections 1738(d) and (e) only required the signature of

the first named insured for a valid stacking waiver.     Trial Court Opinion,

8/11/22, at 6-7; 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1738(d) and (e).       The trial court found

ambiguity because Section 1738(c) refers to “[e]ach named insured.” Id. at

8; 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1738(c).

      However, when read in context, Section 1738(c) provides:

      Each named insured purchasing uninsured or underinsured
      motorist coverage for more than one vehicle under a policy shall
      be provided the opportunity to waive the stacked limits of
      coverage and instead purchase coverage as described in
      subsection (b).

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75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1738(c) (emphasis added). Critically, the phrase “each named

insured” is modified by the word “purchasing.” See id.

      The word “purchasing” is defined as “to obtain for money or by paying

a price; buy[.]” Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 1181 (5th ed. 2020).

Thus, the plain language of Section 1738(c) only requires notice to the named

insured who purchased the policy, who is the first named insured referenced

in Section 1738(d) and (e). See Rupert II, 291 F.3d at 248 (emphasizing

importance of the word “purchasing” in Section (c); discussing how it supports

Justice Zappala’s conclusion in Rupert I that all that is required for a valid

stacking waiver is the signature of the first named insured at the inception of

the policy). Based on the plain language of Section 1738(c), we conclude the

trial court committed an error of law in finding Section 1738 ambiguous. See

Goodwin, 280 A.3d at 943-44.

      For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the judgment entered in

favor of Mrs. Golick and remand to the trial court for the entry of judgment in

favor of Appellant.

      Judgment vacated.     Case remanded with instructions.       Jurisdiction

relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/7/2023

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