Court Opinion

ID: 9403581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 15:03:03.288503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:08.088662
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1359   Document: 36     Page: 1   Filed: 06/05/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                SOLENA Y. HAMPTON,
                  Claimant-Appellant

                            v.

       DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
              VETERANS AFFAIRS,
               Respondent-Appellee
              ______________________

                       2022-1359
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
 Veterans Claims in No. 20-4075, Judge Scott Laurer.
                 ______________________

                  Decided: June 5, 2023
                 ______________________

     SEAN A. RAVIN, Miami, FL, argued for claimant-appel-
 lant.

     AMANDA TANTUM, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented
 by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY; EVAN SCOTT GRANT, Y. KEN LEE, Office of Gen-
 eral Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Af-
 fairs, Washington, DC.
                  ______________________
Case: 22-1359     Document: 36      Page: 2    Filed: 06/05/2023

 2                                    HAMPTON    v. MCDONOUGH

     Before TARANTO, CLEVENGER, and HUGHES, Circuit
                        Judges.
 HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
     Solena Hampton appeals a decision from the Court of
 Appeals for Veterans Claims denying an earlier effective
 date for a total disability rating based on individual unem-
 ployability and for dependents’ educational assistance. Be-
 cause the Veterans Court properly interpreted the new and
 material evidence rule in 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b), we affirm.
                               I
      Ms. Hampton served in the U.S. Navy from June 1985
 to November 1989. In April 1997, she filed a claim for vet-
 eran’s disability compensation for migraines. The regional
 office (RO) initially granted her an evaluation of 10 percent
 for service-connected migraines. In September 1998, the
 RO increased Ms. Hampton’s rating to 30 percent, effective
 from the 1997 claim date.
     In February 1999, Ms. Hampton applied for a total dis-
 ability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU)1
 effective as of her initial 1997 claim due to “migraine[s],
 bladder, [and] reflux.” J.A. 309. In March 1999, 2 the RO
 denied TDIU. Ms. Hampton never filed a notice of disagree-
 ment with this denial.
   Shortly after her 1999 TDIU claim was denied, Ms.
 Hampton filed a new claim for increased compensation

     1   Along with her TDIU claim, Ms. Hampton also
 sought dependents’ educational assistance. For simplicity,
 and because an award of dependents’ educational assis-
 tance is derived from an award of TDIU, we refer to the
 claims together as her 1999 TDIU claim.
     2   In other parts of the record, this decision is referred
 to as the April 1999 decision, rather than the March 1999
 decision. The two are the same.
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 HAMPTON   v. MCDONOUGH                                      3

 based on her migraines. This claim was denied in June
 1999, and Ms. Hampton filed a notice of disagreement for
 this claim. Ms. Hampton appealed her increased compen-
 sation claim to the Board. In November 2000, the Board
 agreed with the RO in relevant part and denied her request
 for an increased rating above 30 percent for migraines.
     In September 2003, Ms. Hampton filed a new claim for
 increased compensation for her migraines. At the same
 time, she also filed a second application for TDIU. After
 various rounds of appeals, the Board ultimately granted
 Ms. Hampton TDIU for her migraines and the RO effectu-
 ated that decision, thereby granting TDIU effective from
 September 2003. The RO did not extend Ms. Hampton’s ef-
 fective date back to 1997, which was the date of her original
 claim for migraines and the date sought by her 1999 TDIU
 claim.
                               II
     Arguing she was entitled to an earlier effective date of
 May 1997, Ms. Hampton appealed the RO’s decision as to
 the effective date of her TDIU. She argued that her 1999
 TDIU claim was still pending because she submitted addi-
 tional evidence within the one-year appeal window of her
 claim being denied, but she never received a determination
 about whether this evidence was new and material to the
 1999 TDIU claim. Ms. Hampton identified the following ev-
 idence as new and material: (1) her May 1999 statement,
 where she stated her migraines had worsened and for
 which the RO opened a new claim for increased compensa-
 tion, and (2) a May 1999 3 Department of Veterans Affairs

     3  Ms. Hampton refers to this as the “June 1999” VA
 examination report, presumably because there is a June 4,
 1999 date on the top left of the report. We refer to it as the
 “May 1999” report because the date of the examination was
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 4                                   HAMPTON   v. MCDONOUGH

 (VA) examination report, where she reported daily head-
 aches lasting from 2–24 hours. 4 Ms. Hampton argued she
 was entitled to an explicit new and material evidence de-
 termination for this evidence under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b).
      In February 2020, the Board denied entitlement to an
 earlier effective date. It reasoned that Ms. Hampton was
 not entitled to claim an earlier effective date based on the
 1999 TDIU claim because that claim was not still pending
 when Ms. Hampton filed her new claims in September
 2003. Rather, the Board found that its November 2000 de-
 cision denying Ms. Hampton’s claim for increased compen-
 sation for migraines was an implicit denial of the 1999
 TDIU claim.
     Ms. Hampton appealed to the Veterans Court, arguing
 that the Board erred by (1) not discussing whether her May
 1999 statement and May 1999 exam constituted new and
 material evidence under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b), and (2) find-
 ing that its November 2000 decision was an implicit denial
 of her 1999 TDIU claim. The Veterans Court rejected both
 arguments and affirmed the Board’s decision. In

 May 27, 1999 and because it is referred to as the May 1999
 report at other places in the record. The two are the same.
     4   Ms. Hampton also identifies a December 1999 VA
 neurology clinic note, where she reported increased fre-
 quency of headaches and that she sometimes experienced
 a tingly sensation, and an April 2000 neurology clinic note.
 But, despite acknowledging the clinic notes in her sum-
 mary of the facts, Ms. Hampton’s appeal to the Veterans
 Court did not argue that either was new and material evi-
 dence received by the RO within the one-year appeal win-
 dow. Thus, Ms. Hampton forfeited any such argument, and
 we do not consider these two clinic notes on appeal. Gant v.
 United States, 417 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Argu-
 ments not made in the court or tribunal whose order is un-
 der review are normally considered waived.”).
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 HAMPTON   v. MCDONOUGH                                      5

 particular, the Veterans Court held that (1) the Board’s
 2020 decision satisfied § 3.156(b) by including “statements
 after the April 1999 rating decision and before the Novem-
 ber 2000 Board decision do not re[-]raise the issue of
 TDIU,” Hampton v. McDonough, No. 20-4075, 2021 WL
 4952747, at *3 (Vet. App. Oct. 26, 2021), and (2) alterna-
 tively, the Board’s 2000 decision satisfied the regulation
 because it was an implicit denial of Ms. Hampton’s 1999
 TDIU claim. Ms. Hampton appeals.
                              III
     Our jurisdiction to review Veterans Court’s decisions is
 limited by 38 U.S.C. § 7292. Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d
 1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (superseded by stat-
 ute on other grounds by Pub. L. No. 107–330, § 402(a), 116
 Stat. 2820, 2832 (2002)). Under § 7292, we “may review the
 validity of the Veterans Court’s decision on ‘a rule of law or
 of any statute or regulation’ or ‘any interpretation thereof’
 that the Veterans Court relied on in making its decision.”
 Bond v. Shinseki, 659 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a)). But we may not review: (1)
 “a challenge to a factual determination,” or (2) “a challenge
 to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular
 case,” unless the challenge raises a constitutional issue. 38
 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).
     On appeal, Ms. Hampton argues the Veterans Court
 misinterpreted 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b). Section 3.156(b) is a
 VA regulation that provides: “[n]ew and material evidence
 received prior to the expiration of the” period for appealing
 a decision “will be considered as having been filed in con-
 nection with the claim which was pending at the beginning
 of the appeal period.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b). Ms. Hampton
 argues this regulation requires the RO to review any evi-
 dence submitted during the appeal period and explicitly
 state whether that evidence is new and material to any
 claim still within the appeal period. By holding that
 § 3.156(b) was satisfied in Ms. Hampton’s case, even
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 6                                    HAMPTON   v. MCDONOUGH

 though the RO did not make such an explicit determination
 for her 1999 TDIU claim, Ms. Hampton argues that the
 Veterans Court misinterpreted § 3.156(b). Thus, we have
 jurisdiction to address the proper interpretation of
 § 3.156(b) under 38 U.S.C. § 7292.
     We are not persuaded by the government’s arguments
 that Ms. Hampton’s appeal only challenges the Veterans
 Court’s factual findings and facts as applied to law, and
 therefore falls outside our jurisdiction. To the contrary, Ms.
 Hampton’s challenge raises a § 3.156(b) interpretation is-
 sue that is similar to previous § 3.156(b) challenges over
 which we have exercised our jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bond,
 659 F.3d at 1367 (“Whether § 3.156(b) requires the VA to
 determine if a submission filed during the appeal period
 constitutes new and material evidence relating to a pend-
 ing claim is a legal question divorced from the facts of this
 case.”). Here, too, we have jurisdiction over Ms. Hampton’s
 appeal. We review the Veterans Court’s interpretation of
 this regulation de novo. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c); Breland
 v. McDonough, 22 F.4th 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
                               IV
     Ms. Hampton’s appeal raises the following question of
 interpretation: whether § 3.156(b) requires the VA to ex-
 plicitly state whether submitted evidence is new and ma-
 terial to a claim, even where that claim is implicitly denied
 after consideration of the evidence. Following our recent
 opinion in Pickett v. McDonough, we hold that it does not.
 64 F.4th 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
     In Pickett, the veteran filed an initial claim for benefits
 in April 2004. Id. at 1343. In 2010, he was granted service-
 connected compensation for post-traumatic stress disorder
 (PTSD) and coronary artery disease (CAD) effective April
 2004. Id. Mr. Pickett appealed the 2010 decision, seeking a
 higher rating for CAD. Id. Within the appeal window,
 Mr. Pickett also filed an application for TDIU (VA Form 21-
 8940). Id. In denying Mr. Pickett’s TDIU claim, the RO: (1)
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 HAMPTON   v. MCDONOUGH                                   7

 listed the VA Form 21-8940 as evidence considered, (2) ad-
 dressed TDIU entitlement due to CAD, and (3) denied
 TDIU on the merits. Id. at 1343–44. Mr. Pickett never ap-
 pealed that decision. Id. at 1344. Later, when he filed an-
 other TDIU claim in 2017, Mr. Pickett argued that his 2004
 claim was still pending because the RO did not explicitly
 state whether VA Form 21-8940 was new and material ev-
 idence to his claim seeking a higher CAD rating. Id. at
 1344. We disagreed, holding that “an implicit finding” that
 a submission is new and material evidence satisfies
 § 3.156(b) “so long as there is some indication that the VA
 determined whether the submission is new and material
 evidence, and if so, considered such evidence in evaluating
 the pending claim.” Id. at 1347.
      The facts here are similar to those in Pickett.
 Ms. Hampton filed additional evidence within a year of her
 1999 TDIU claim being denied: her May 1999 statement to
 the RO seeking a higher rating for migraines and a
 May 1999 VA examination report. The RO’s June 1999 de-
 cision, and later the Board’s 2000 decision, indicated that
 the RO considered the May 1999 evidence and did not find
 reason to increase Ms. Hampton’s rating for migraines. But
 like the veteran in Pickett, Ms. Hampton argues this was
 not enough. She argues that the RO was required to make
 an explicit finding that her May 1999 statement and
 May 1999 VA examination report were new and material
 evidence to her 1999 TDIU claim.
     This is not what § 3.156(b) requires. Following our
 precedent in Pickett, all that was required to satisfy
 § 3.156(b) was some indication that (1) the VA had deter-
 mined that the May 1999 statement and May 1999 VA ex-
 amination report were new and material, and (2) the VA
 considered that evidence as to her 1999 TDIU claim. See
 id. Both are satisfied here.
    First, in denying Ms. Hampton’s claim for increased
 compensation for migraines, the RO’s decision and the
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 8                                   HAMPTON   v. MCDONOUGH

 Board’s 2000 decision each made “some indication that the
 VA determined whether the submission[s] [were] new and
 material evidence.” Id. Similar to the RO decision in
 Pickett, the RO decision here (1) listed the May 1999 VA
 examination report as evidence considered, (2) addressed
 what was necessary to warrant an increased rating for mi-
 graines, and (3) denied an increase in rating for migraines
 on the merits. J.A. 301. Although the RO decision did not
 explicitly list Ms. Hampton’s May 1999 statement as evi-
 dence considered, it implied that the RO considered this
 statement new and material evidence because it acknowl-
 edged receiving Ms. Hampton’s May 1999 statement in
 support of her claim and necessarily issued the RO decision
 in response to that statement.
      Similarly, the Board’s 2000 decision addressed the May
 1999 VA examination report and concluded that the medi-
 cal evidence did not warrant an increased rating for mi-
 graines. Although the Board’s 2000 decision did not
 explicitly cite to Ms. Hampton’s May 1999 statement, it
 acknowledged that it had considered her opinions and
 views generally. J.A. 274 (“[Ms. Hampton’s] views as to the
 etiology of her pain complaints and/or the extent of func-
 tional impairment are specifically outweighed by the med-
 ical evidence of record cited above.”). Thus, by considering
 the May 1999 evidence and addressing the merits of that
 evidence, the RO’s decision and the Board’s 2000 decision
 both made the implicit finding that the May 1999 evidence
 was new and material.
     Second, the decisions also indicate that the VA consid-
 ered the May 1999 evidence as to Ms. Hampton’s 1999
 TDIU claim. They do so, not explicitly, but implicitly. When
 a veteran has more than one pending claim but only one of
 those claims is explicitly denied, a related pending claim
 may still be deemed implicitly denied. Deshotel v. Nichol-
 son, 457 F.3d 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Here, the Veter-
 ans Court found that “[t]he Board, by denying the
 increased evaluation for migraines, on a schedular and
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 HAMPTON   v. MCDONOUGH                                      9

 extra[-]schedular basis, also implicitly denied any higher
 ratings.” J.A. 28. We see no legal error with this conclusion.
 Because the RO’s and the Board’s decisions indicate that
 they considered the May 1999 evidence as new and mate-
 rial, and because those decisions implicitly denied TDIU, it
 follows that the VA considered the May 1999 evidence as
 to Ms. Hampton’s TDIU claim—not just as to her increased
 rating claim for migraines. Nothing more was required to
 satisfy § 3.156(b).
      We are not persuaded by Ms. Hampton’s arguments to
 the contrary. Ms. Hampton primarily objects to the Veter-
 ans Court’s conclusion that the Board’s 2020 decision made
 an explicit new and material evidence determination that
 satisfied § 3.156(b). We agree with Ms. Hampton that the
 Board’s 2020 decision did not satisfy § 3.156(b) by finding
 “statements after the April 1999 rating decision and before
 the November 2000 Board decision do not re[-]raise the is-
 sue of TDIU.” J.A. 27. Determining that later submissions
 did not re-raise TDIU is different from determining that
 those submissions are not new and material evidence. But
 our disagreement with the Veterans Court’s conclusion on
 that point does not change the outcome of this appeal. As
 discussed above, § 3.156(b) had been satisfied by the RO’s
 1999 and the Board’s 2000 decisions, which implicitly
 found the evidence to be new and material, see Pickett, 64
 F.4th at 1347, and considered that evidence before implic-
 itly denying Ms. Hampton’s TDIU claim, see Deshotel, 457
 F.3d at 1261.
     Ms. Hampton also argues that the Board cannot make
 a new and material evidence determination in the first in-
 stance—only the RO can. We need not decide that issue
 here. 5 As explained above, the RO did make a new and

     5    Even so, our precedent appears to allow the Board
 to make a new and material evidence determination in the
 first instance to satisfy § 3.156(b). See Bond, 659 F.3d at
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 10                                  HAMPTON   v. MCDONOUGH

 material evidence determination in its June 1999 decision.
 It just did so implicitly. The Board made that same decision
 in November 2000. Thus, the Board in its 2020 decision, by
 finding the 2000 decision an implicit denial of TDIU, was
 not making a new and material evidence determination in
 the first instance. The RO was the first to consider that ev-
 idence, and it did so in 1999.
     We have considered Ms. Hampton’s remaining argu-
 ments and find them unpersuasive. Because we agree with
 the Veterans Court that the VA’s implicit denial of TDIU
 satisfied § 3.156(b), we affirm.
                        AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.

 1368 (noting that the government conceded “nothing in the
 record indicates that the RO or Board made a determina-
 tion as to whether the February 1998 submission contained
 new and material evidence” (emphasis added)); Beraud,
 766 F.3d at 1406 (citing Bond for the proposition that “the
 Board” must include a written statement of its findings,
 and so we cannot presume that the Board made a new and
 material evidence determination absent some indication to
 that effect (emphasis added)).