Court Opinion

ID: 9496329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:23:33.380755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:30.141632
License: Public Domain

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result in this case and agree with much of the majority opinion’s *330reasoning. I write separately to note two points.
First, whether the petitioner is a detained alien or a federal prisoner, the weight of authority supports a determination that the Attorney General is not a proper respondent in petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688, 691 (1st Cir.2000) (finding that normally the Attorney General is not the proper respondent in alien habeas cases and noting that a number of courts have held that the Attorney General is not a proper custodian for purposes of a prisoner’s habeas petition); Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500, 507 (3d Cir.1994) (summarily dismissing the idea that the Attorney General might be a proper respondent in an alien habeas case); Blango v. Thornburgh, 942 F.2d 1487,1491-92 (10th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (affirming district court’s dismissal of Attorney General because the prison warden, not the Attorney General, was the proper respondent for the prisoner’s habe-as action); Sanders v. Bennett, 148 F.2d 19, 20 (D.C.Cir.1945) (holding that warden, not Attorney General, was proper respondent in prisoner’s habeas petition); Jones v. Biddle, 131 F.2d 853, 854 (8th Cir.1942) (same); Santiago v. INS, 134 F.Supp.2d 1102, 1104 (N.D.Cal.2001) (finding that Attorney General was not a proper respondent in a habeas action brought by an alien); Pearce v. Ashcroft, No. 301CV1160CFD, 2003 WL 1145468, at *1 (D.Conn. Mar.12, 2003) (concluding that the Attorney General is not a proper respondent to an alien’s habeas action filed pursuant to § 2241); Carvajales-Cepeda v. Meissner, 966 F.Supp. 207, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“It is well settled ... that the Attorney General is not the custodian of INS detainees”); Wang v. Reno, 862 F.Supp. 801, 812-13 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (finding that Attorney General was not alien’s custodian for habeas purposes); Peon v. Thornburgh, 765 F.Supp. 155, 156 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (rejecting argument that Attorney General was alien’s custodian for purpose of alien’s habeas petition). The majority states that the “Attorney General’s relationship to prisoners differs significantly from his relationship to detained aliens” and suggests that the Attorney General has a unique role in immigration matters that makes him more likely to be a proper respondent in a petition brought by a detained alien than a federal prisoner. I am not prepared to reach this conclusion, which seems unnecessary to the result. As the First Circuit stated in Vasquez:
The Attorney General’s role with regard to aliens is not materially different from her role with regard to prisoners at least not different enough to justify a rule that she is the custodian of aliens, but not prisoners, for habeas purposes. After all, the Attorney General is the designated custodian of prisoners to much the same extent as she is the designated custodian of aliens. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 4001(2) with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1). And just as she has the ultimate authority to produce the body of an alien, she has the ultimate authority to produce the body of a prisoner.
233 F.3d at 696.
Second, in its discussion of extraordinary circumstances which may justify departure from the immediate custodian rule, the majority addresses hypothetical situations that are not present here. I would limit our holding on this point to the conclusion that a crowded docket alone cannot constitute extraordinary circumstances, noting of course that as a factual matter, Roman points to no evidence from which one could find the existence of a crowded docket in the Western District of Louisiana.