Court Opinion

ID: 9758836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:52:08.229733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:56.769416
License: Public Domain

WHITE, Judge,
dissenting.
I.
I respectfully dissent. Rule 91 provides that habeas corpus relief is available to any person restrained of his liberty within this state.1 The majority concludes that since Mr. Clay failed to raise the expungement issue in his direct appeal or his subsequent post-conviction relief motion filed under Rule 29.15 that his petition is proee-durally barred.2 However, this Court has held that “[ijnasmuch as habeas corpus jurisdiction springs from the constitution, it may not be eliminated by statute or rule.”3 Procedural default in remedies previously available may provide the basis for denying a petition in habeas corpus, but this limitation may be overcome by establishing the grounds relied on were unknown during the postconviction relief proceedings.4
Rule 91’s committee notes refer to postconviction relief motions filed under Rules 24.085 and 29.15 as being the exclusive remedy in the situations identified by those respective rules.5 However, subsection (d) of both rules require that the movant “shall declare in the motion that the movant has listed all claims for relief known to the movant and acknowledging his understanding that he waives any ground for relief known to the movant that is not listed in the motion.” (emphasis added)
It’s clear from the record that by the time of the second trial, Mr. Clay’s prior conviction had not been expunged as required by statute. The Court notes that “[a] copy of the expungement order came to light only after relator’s direct appeal and postconviction relief motion had been denied.” The principal opinion also acknowledges that as late as 1992, one year after the denial of Mr. Clay’s postconviction relief motion, the circuit court clerk was still incorrectly advising Mr. Clay that his prior conviction had been expunged. Based upon the circuit court’s error, the trial judge inappropriately considered the prior conviction and inappropriately applied section 557.036.2(2), denying Mr. Clay’s right to a jury sentencing.
Mr. Clay’s lack of knowledge of this claim until after all procedural remedies were time-barred was the precise reason the court of appeals granted Mr. Clay’s habeas writ. Curiously, the majority does not address this issue at all, and the only way it can so hold is to impute knowledge of the trial court’s error to Mr. Clay.
Analyzing the rules and prior case law, the court of appeals correctly determined when lack of knowledge of a postconviction claim rises to the level of manifest injustice *220in order to grant habeas relief. In Merriweather v. Grandison,6 the court stated:
The determination of “manifest injustice,” of course, calls for a broader inquiry, into which would figure the prisoner’s own want of diligence, or his deliberate by-passing of an available remedy as a matter of strategy, which might constitute waiver of his habeas corpus remedy.7
Applying this standard, the court of appeals determined that Mr. Clay’s claim had not fingered due to lack of diligence, nor was it a deliberate trial strategy justifying waiver of his habeas remedy. .The court appropriately granted him habeas relief.
Merriweather was not the first case where Missouri courts addressed lack of knowledge to bring forth a claim on direct appeal or by postconviction relief motion. As previously noted, this Court articulated that lack of knowledge could justify habeas relief in White v. State8 and Simmons v. White.9 Following this Court’s dictate, Missouri’s court of appeals has granted habeas relief in these very situations.10 Mr. Clay’s situation is no different. He was unaware that his prior record had not been expunged until after the time-bar for postconviction relief had passed. The majority must have conceded this point otherwise they could have dispensed with Mr. Clay’s claim with a simple application of Rule 29.15(d) as opposed to redefining the manifest injustice standard.
Since the entire issue discussed by the court of appeals has not been addressed, it is not clear how today’s ruling will affect the decisions in White, Simmons, Merri-weather, and Brown. Will those rulings, or their pertinent portions holding lack of knowledge cannot procedurally bar a claim for habeas, be overruled?
While not binding on this Court, the federal courts have had the opportunity to interpret this area of Missouri law. Relying on the language in State v. White and this Court’s rules, the federal courts have determined that Rules 24.035 and 29.15 do not operate as a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Rule 91 remains available to persons confined in Missouri after the time for fifing for relief under the other rules has passed.11 “[A]n issue not known or reasonably discoverable to the petitioner in the period during which he could file for relief under Rule 24.035 or 29.15 can provide the basis for relief under Rule 91.”12
II.
The majority states the only options available to utilize a writ of habeas corpus would be to raise jurisdictional issues or in circumstances so rare and exceptional that manifest injustice resulted.13 The Court then adopts the “actual innocence” standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court to narrowly define what constitutes manifest injustice.14 Under this standard, a habeas petitioner must show that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is *221actually innocent.”15 Additionally, “without any new evidence of innocence, even the existence of a concededly meritorious constitutional violation is not in itself sufficient to establish a miscarriage of justice.” 16 It appears this Court no longer follows prior case law defining “manifest injustice” or the current application of Rules 24.035(d) and 29.25(d).
Immediately fatal to the majority’s utilization of the actual innocence standard with regard to Mr. Clay’s petition is their own observation that it is inapplicable in his situation. Specifically the opinion notes that “[wjith the exception of the penalty phase in capital cases, manifest injustice under the ‘actual innocence’ standard applies only to the issue of guilt or innocence and is of no avail to claims of error committed during the sentencing process.”17 The Court then identifies the standard for habeas relief during the sentencing process but refuses to apply it.
As the principal opinion explains, errors in sentencing in non-capital cases are subject to habeas relief where a court imposes a sentence in excess of that authorized by law18 and where a sentencing court based its decision on a repealed and inapplicable statute.19 Instead of applying the appropriate standard identified, the majority attempts to use some magic thread to weave together these two habeas standards, the actual innocence standard for challenging convictions and the “sentencing in excess of jurisdiction” standard employed for errors in sentencing. Wearing its newly spun cloak of standards on top of the law, the Court dismisses Mr. Clay’s claim by stating he raised no jurisdictional issue and the “mere trial court error” of improperly considering the prior conviction does not concern his actual innocence. The majority simply cannot combine its discarded actual innocence standard with the jurisdictional sentencing issue.
The principal opinion tries to further mask the issue of jurisdiction by stating the trial judge did not exceed his jurisdiction by levying a sentence within the statutory range and that, in any event, jurisdiction was not raised. This Court can, as can any other, raise jurisdiction sua sponte, and jurisdictional defects cannot be waived.20 Clearly, the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction. “A sentence fixed by the court instead of by the jury when the Habitual Criminal Act is not applicable is void.”21 Although the punishment assessed fell within the sentencing guidelines the jury could have fixed, the defendant was still prejudiced because the jury might have imposed a lesser punishment.22
The trial judge ignored statutory and precedential authority by denying Mr. Clay’s right to a jury trial and pronouncing *222sentence himself. Mr. Clay’s situation is analogous with the standard set in State v. Edwards.23 While the trial judge in this instance did not apply a repealed statute, he did apply an inapplicable statute to seize sentencing power that he did not possess. With the judge clearly exceeding his jurisdiction in the sentencing phase of Mr. Clay’s trial, habeas corpus relief is available by this Court’s own standard in Edwards. Even if the Court rejects the previously accepted lack of knowledge claim by redefining “manifest injustice,” the trial judge’s actions exceeded his jurisdiction meeting the standard for habeas relief for errors in sentencing.
III.
Finally, Mr. Clay is granted a writ of mandamus to expunge the prior conviction — an action that should have occurred some sixteen years ago. The majority finds that Mr. Clay has “a clear, unequivocal, specific, and previously-adjudicated right to have his prior conviction expunged from the records of the Department of Corrections.” For some reason the majority has no trouble supporting Mr. Clay’s right to this expungement under section 195.290, RSMo.1978, now repealed; but at the same time cannot find any statutory right under section 557.036.2(2), a currently effective statute, for Mr. Clay to have received a jury sentencing.
While not a constitutionally guaranteed right, Missouri preserves the right to jury sentencing under section 557.036.2(2). Only if one is a prior or persistent offender does he lose this statutory right. “Such a right to jury sentencing has been found to be such a valuable right that our courts have long held that where ... a court has improperly classified a defendant as a pri- or offender for purposes of sentencing, and the evidence is insufficient to support that finding, defendant is entitled to a new trial on all issues.”24
Because defendant’s punishment was improperly fixed, the judgment in his criminal case should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. For these reasons I respectfully dissent.

. Rule 91.01(b). See also section 532.010 (RSMo.1994).

. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 445-46 (Mo. banc 1993).

. White v. State, 779 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. banc 1989). See also Art. 1, section 12 of the Missouri constitution which states "that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus will never be suspended," and Art. V, section 4.

. Id. at 572. See also State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Mo. banc 1993).

. Rule 24.035 allows a person, after conviction based upon a guilty plea, to challenge the conviction on the basis of jurisdictional error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and constitutional and statutory violations. Rule 29.15 allows the same claims to be filed in instances of a trial court conviction.

. 904 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Mo.App.1995).

. Merriweather v. Grandison, 904 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Mo.App.1995).

. White v. State, 779 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. banc 1989).

. State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 445-46 (Mo. banc 1993).

. Brown v. Gammon, 947 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Mo.App.1997).

. Walls v. Delo, 755 F.Supp. 873, 875 (E.D.Mo.1991); Fletcher v. Armontrout, 733 F.Supp. 1348 (W.D.Mo.1990); and Beverly v. Armontrout, No. 89-0014-CV-W-9, 1990 WL 126995 (W.D.Mo. July 27, 1990).

. Id.

. State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 445-46 (Mo. banc 1993).

. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (1986) and Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995).

. Id.

. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993).

. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992).

. State ex rel. Osowski v. Purkett, 908 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Mo. banc 1995).

. State v. Edwards, 983 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Mo. banc 1999).

. Merriweather v. Grandison, 904 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Mo.App.1995), citing to State v. Mitchell, 563 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Mo. banc 1978). Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the cause of action and the relief sought, and exists only when the tribunal has the right to determine the controversy or grant the relief prayed. State Tax Commission v. Administrative Hearing Commission, 641 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Mo. banc 1982), and Rule 55.27(g)(3). The right to pronounce sentencing in a criminal trial falls under subject matter jurisdiction and may be raised sua sponte at any stage in the proceedings.

. State v. Bryant, 375 S.W.2d 107, 110(5) (Mo.1964). Note: The Bryant Court referenced section 556.280 as the Habitual Criminal Act. This act was repealed and replaced with section 588.016 in 1979. The state must plead and prove the defendant was a prior offender under section 588.016 to properly invoke section 557.036.2 and suspend a defendant’s right to a jury trial.

. State v. Wiley, 412 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Mo.1967).

. 983 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Mo. banc 1999).

. State v. McFall, 866 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Mo.App.1993). Accord, State v. Harris, 547 S.W.2d 473, 475-476 (Mo. banc 1977); State v. Blackwell, 459 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Mo. banc 1970); State v. Vermillion, 446 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Mo. banc 1969); State v. Hill, 371 S.W.2d 278, 282-283 (Mo. banc 1963); State v. Olson, 806 S.W.2d 111, 112-113 (Mo.App.1991); State v. Finch, 746 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Mo.App. 1988); State v. Meeks, 734 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Mo.App.1987); State v. White, 710 S.W.2d 934, 937[4] (Mo.App.1986); State v. Tate, 657 S.W.2d 727, 728-729[2-6] (Mo.App.1983); State v. Wickizer, 641 S.W.2d 849, 852-853[9] (Mo.App.1982).