Court Opinion

ID: 9560238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:45:50.782586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:29.464265
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT,
Justice, dissenting.
No matter how clearly determined I may view guilt in this case, that conception should not abrogate principles of criminal-trial fairness or rules of evidence. Over-broad generalizations in the Raynell Jones case can be expected to recur in future cases without the equivalency of predetermined guilt, to then justify a result that I will not now approve.
Prosecutorial overreaching will only be discontinued when the detriment in case reversals exceeds the benefit in excused convictions. The evidentiary tactic of using bad-acts and bad-actor evidence for proof of guilt has continued unreasonably, despite adverse comment by this court. The “do better next time” admonition seldom deters future conduct. See State v. Sorrentino, 31 Wyo. 129, 224 P. 420, 34 A.L.R. 1477 (1924).
“The prosecuting attorney asked the defendant, who testified in his own behalf, as follows: ‘When was it you paid a fine for moonshining in Rawlins?’ The question was objected to and the objection sustained. It is claimed that the asking of the question was misconduct entitling the defendant to a new trial. There can be no doubt that it was misconduct. The question assumed as an affirmative fact that the defendant had been guilty of a distinct crime not in the remotest degree connected with the crime for which the defendant was being tried. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Wagner v. Hazle Twp., 215 Pa. 219, 225, 64 Atl. 405, 407, speaking of a similar situation, says:
“ ‘When an attorney in the trial of a cause willfully and intentionally makes an offer of wholly irrelevant and incompetent evidence * * * it is the plain duty of the trial judge, of his own motion, to act promptly and effectively by reprimanding counsel and with*704drawing a juror and continuing the cause at the costs of the client. In no other way can justice be administered and the rights of the injured party be protected. The imposition of the costs will remind the client that he has an attorney unfaithful to him as well as to the court. The obligation of fidelity to the court which an attorney assumes on his admission to the bar is ever thereafter with him, and when he attempts to defeat the justice of a cause by interjecting into the trial wholly foreign and irrelevant matter for the manifest purpose of misleading the jury, he fails to observe the duty required of him as an attorney and his conduct should receive the condemnation of the court.’ ” 224 P. at 425.
See also MacLaird v. State, Wyo., 718 P.2d 41 (1986); Capshaw v. State, Wyo., 714 P.2d 349 (1986); Westmark v. State, Wyo., 693 P.2d 220 (1984); Richter v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1269 (1982), overruled by Westmark v. State, supra; Barnes v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1263 (1982); Browder v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 889 (1982); Roby v. State, Wyo., 587 P.2d 641 (1978); Jones v. State, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1150 (1978); Valerio v. State, Wyo., 527 P.2d 154 (1974); State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 224 P.2d 500 (1950); Rosencrance v. State, 33 Wyo. 360, 239 P. 952 (1925); Johnson v. State, 29 Wyo. 121, 211 P. 484 (1922).
In this case, the prosecutor was actually using an address-questioning strategy to bring evidence of a misdemeanor arrest without conviction before the jury. The mother’s address compared with another address which defendant had used was entirely without probative status in this young black woman’s trial where the charge was hassling an elderly man by threat of violence. Raynell Jones was not unknown to the Casper police or prosecuting officers,1 and the address had absolutely nothing to do with guilt or innocence except as a mechanism for conviction by extrinsic evidence.
I do not find this prosecutorial action to be harmless beyond any doubt or beyond a reasonable doubt, no matter how incisive proper evidence may have been or how unbelievable the alibi evidence proved to be. By this decision a bad rule for future cases is created. See Richter v. State, supra. What the court countenances is what we will see repeated in future appeals.
The second issue is even more perplexing in potential future adaptation. Presented is a case of a young woman charged with armed robbery of an elderly man, where the court, under Rule 609(a)(2), W.R.E., accepts evidence of some undefined kind of a credit-card misdemeanor offense. Two cases are cited by this court to support the principle that “credit card fraud” falls within the “dishonesty or false statement” criteria of Rule 609. In its brief, the State cited no specific case authority which supports the inclusion of the factually unde-scribed offense within the impeachment admissibility criterion, except State v. Malloy, 131 Ariz. 125, 639 P.2d 315 (1981), which was also used as authority by appellant.
In Malloy, supra, in conviction reversal for trial-court admission of improper Rule 609 impeachment evidence, the prior offense involved was a misdemeanor charge of attempted burglary. The State’s contention that the offense came within the dishonesty or false-statement terminology was rejected, and the conviction was reversed by application of the standard for error after admission of improper evidence. The court stated:
“The test for reversible error is ‘whether there was a reasonable probability under such facts that the verdict might have been different had the error not been *705committed.’ ” State v. Malloy, supra, 639 P.2d at 319.
The second case cited by this court in support of its credit-card-offense rule is United States v. Smith, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 162, 551 F.2d 348, 39 A.L.R.Fed. 539 (1976), where the court considered an attempted robbery for application of Rule 609 impeachment as “dishonesty or false statement.” The appellate court found error, and remanded for the trial court to evaluate the prejudicial effect of the improper evidence. See also United States v. Millings, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 535 F.2d 121 (1976). At best, use of robbery and burglary cases defining dishonesty or false statement as applicable to a credit-card situation is obiter dictum. 3 D. Louisell and C. Mueller, Federal Evidence §§ 317 at 334-335 affords no greater support in stating:
“Post-Rules authority suggests that courts may look at the facts underlying a particular conviction, and may treat such conviction as embraced by Rule 609(a)(2) if the underlying facts indicate falsehood or dishonesty in the narrow sense of deception.” Id. at 340.
The point made by this dissent is that the record was totally insufficient for either this court or the trial court to determine that what Raynell Jones did involving a credit card was blackmail, larceny, embezzlement, false pretense, forgery, or any number of other possible criminal offenses.2 In the interest of proper application of Rule 609(a)(2), the actual charge in the prior offense should control, and not conceptualized possibilities. I am not inclined to accept the generalized rule as invoking a new adjudicative principle that anything that involves credit cards “clearly falls within those crimes involving dishonesty or false statement” under Rule 609(a)(2), W.R.E., when in fact the particular offense may or may not be within the character or characterization clearly defined and considered by the United States Congress in debate. See H.R.Conference Report No. 93-1597, 93d Congress, Second Session, 9 (1974) and general discussion in the appendix, and United States v. Smith, supra, 551 F.2d at 366, for an extensive review.
It is possible to discern from text and cases that theft is not necessarily included within the “falsehood or dishonesty” criteria of the rule, while forgery may be. See 3 D. Louisell and C. Mueller, supra, § 317 at 341, and Appendix at 170; United States v. Yeo, 739 F.2d 385 (8th Cir., 1984).
“Because the crime of larceny or theft is neither enumerated above nor encompassed by the strict meaning of the term ‘crimen falsi,’ an inference arises that Congress intended the term ‘dishonesty’ in Rule 609(a)(2) to mean something more than a man’s propensity to steal what does not belong to him.
“Precisely because of the variance between the common meaning of ‘dishonesty’ and the more restrictive meaning in which Congress apparently used the word, courts have split on the question of whether prior convictions for crimes involving stealing, without more, are admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2).
“As the developing conflict between the Circuits reveals, reasonable men may disagree about whether a witness’s propensity to steal reflects upon his honesty in a manner that bears adversely on his propensity to tell the truth. * * *
“Even the courts that reject the view that stealing, without more, involves ‘dishonesty’ that bears on a witness’s veracity recognize that modern theft statutes may encompass criminal conduct that does fall within the ambit of Rule 609(a)(2), for a theft conviction may well be based on fraudulent or deceitful conduct that would previously have been prosecuted as larceny by trick, embezzlement, or the taking of money or property by false pretenses, etc. Accordingly, *706these courts have adopted the rule that, when the statutory offense of which the witness was convicted does not require proof of fraud or deceit as an essential element of the crime, the prior conviction may yet be admitted under Rule 609(a)(2) if the proponent of the evidence bears the burden of showing that the conviction ‘rested on facts warranting the dishonesty or false statement description.’ ” United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 846-847 (7th Cir.1977).
In evaluating United States v. Smith, supra, as a member of the advisory committee, Judge Robert Van Pelt commented:
“Reason and experience develop much of the law of evidence. Any advisory committee on rules of evidence will soon find itself deeply indebted to the law schools for the collection and discussion of the experience of the bench, as shown by the reported cases, and for the reasoning contained in law review articles, whether supportive or critical of the rulings of the courts.” Van Pelt, The Background of Federal Rules 611(b) and 607, 57 Neb.L. Rev. 898, 907 (1978).
Professor Cleary then noted in an article discussing United States v. Smith, supra:
“ * * * Yet considering the legislative history, which the court examined carefully and in detail, the conclusion that the Congress intended to include only crimes of false statement, and that ‘dishonesty’ was devoid of significant meaning, is difficult to avoid. Illustrative of the legislative history is the Conference Committee Report:
“ ‘By the phrase “dishonesty and false statement” the Conference means crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused’s propensity to testify truthfully.’ ” Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 Neb.L.Rev. 78, 919 (1978).
Smith suggests that Alice in Wonderland invokes the recognition that somehow a characterization trend may follow Rule 609(a)(2) to extend its application from the slick talker to the heavy-fingered miscreant, including all styles of criminal offenses except threatened or committed violence, or momentary impulse. It is hard for me to conceptualize why the paperhanger is less likely to tell the truth than the midnight rapist. See 39 A.L.R.Fed. 570, 596, Witness Prior Conviction, in discussion of Rule 609(a)(2) as to crimes involving dishonesty. Consequently, I would confine this character of impeachment evidence to the obvious intent of Congress. Following submission by the United States Supreme Court, the rule was approved to include deceitful or fraudulent conduct, generally embracing the born or habitual liar. United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir.1978). Such characterization might or might not include credit-card offenses, dependent upon the activity involved in the effectuated crime.
In this case, even with the suggestive but undemonstrated suppositions by cross-examination, the State failed to create a record sufficient to establish the type of activity for which the defendant was convicted,3 and whether that conduct rationally fits the criteria for admissibility under the misdemeanor impeachment rule. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 867, 98 S.Ct. 204, 54 L.Ed.2d 143 (1977).
Lacking adequate factual information to demonstrate (1) that the credit-card offense was actually based on evidentiary rule dishonesty or false statement under Rule 609, or (2) that impeachment by arrest record differentiation of addresses was harmless, I would reverse. If guilt does exist, I have no doubt that in a fair trial with proper *707evidence, a retrial conviction can be obtained.4

. Defendant entered a plea of not guilty, not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency, and not triable by reason of present mental illness. In accord with the commitment that followed, the evaluation report reflected a 25-year-old female prostitute charged with three counts of attempted robbery/burglary during the months of October and November, 1985. The rap sheet record upon which sentence was imposed includes two offenses involving probation, including the illegal use of credit cards and approximately 24 other offenses, none of which, until the present case, ever resulted in a felony conviction.

. The most specific evidence that is reflected in regard to the credit-card charge is found in the presentence investigation report, which data was not available to the court at trial date, and characterized the April 11, 1981 offense as “Forgery (Reduced to Unlawful Use of a Credit Card) [with a] One year probation, [and a] $500.00 fine."

. Credibility differentiation is hard to discern in this case between illegal use of credit cards, and child neglect, each of which earned appellant a probationary responsibility.

. Identification was hardly casual, including the description by complainant about her attire as first seen by him in the broad daylight occurrence and later confirmed by a person to whom he reported the incident who saw the defendant in the same vicinity of Casper, where she was a member of a distinct minority:
“Well she had on a kind of a tan jacket and had large red stripe[s] up about four to six inches wide coming across each shoulder, it was red.

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"And I think had blue trousers * * *. « * * * [b] rajded hair coming down close to her collar * *