Court Opinion

ID: 9892810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 21:06:33.98735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:46:30.757120
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 220153
                                  No. 2-22-0153
                          Opinion filed October 24, 2023
______________________________________________________________________________

                                             IN THE

                              APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of De Kalb County.
                                       )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     ) No. 13-CF-898
                                       )
DEMOND L. HUNT,                        ) Honorable
                                       ) Marcy L. Buick,
      Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
       Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                            OPINION

¶1     Defendant, Demond L. Hunt, appeals from an order of the circuit court of De Kalb County

granting the State’s motion to dismiss his amended petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing

Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020)), which sought relief from his conviction of

armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2012)). Defendant claims that we must remand the

cause because he did not receive reasonable assistance from counsel in the postconviction

proceedings. Specifically, defendant claims that postconviction counsel failed to attach to the

amended petition an affidavit from defendant substantiating a claim that trial counsel did not honor

his request to have the jury instructed on the lesser included offense of theft. For the following

reasons, we affirm.
2023 IL App (2d) 220153

¶2                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶3     Defendant had a jury trial on two counts of armed robbery and a single count of aggravated

battery (id. § 12-3.05(f)(2)). The evidence established that, on November 27, 2013, Beth Keller

and Britany Garcia were working in the University Heights apartment complex office at 1120

Varsity Boulevard in De Kalb. Shortly after 4 p.m., a woman came into the office while Keller

was on the phone. Keller asked if she could help the woman, and the woman replied that she had

a question. Keller asked the woman to wait a moment, but, before Keller got off the phone, the

woman left.

¶4     Shortly after the woman left, a man wearing a rubber mask entered the office. Keller

testified that she could tell that the man was black from the skin visible through the mask’s

eyeholes. Garcia, who was five feet, four inches tall, testified that the man was a little taller than

her, was “a little bit heavier set,” and had a voice like that of a black man. The man was carrying

a handgun. Keller hit a “panic button” to summon police. The man hit her in the face with the

handgun. He asked for money, but Garcia told him they could not open the safe. The man then

took Keller’s purse, which contained her wedding band, engagement ring, Social Security card,

driver’s license, and some credit cards, cash, and cigarettes. The man also took Garcia’s phone.

¶5     Mariah Romero testified that, on the incident date, she lived with defendant in an apartment

at 1120 Varsity Boulevard. She, too, had been charged with armed robbery in connection with the

incident. However, she agreed to testify truthfully at defendant’s trial, in exchange for the

opportunity to plead guilty to a reduced charge and receive a sentence of conditional discharge. At

trial, Romero admitted she was the woman who tried to speak with Keller but left while Keller

was on the phone. After she left the office, Romero returned briefly to her apartment and then went

to a neighbor’s apartment in the same building. After a few minutes, she saw defendant in the

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hallway. Two police officers entered the hallway, and defendant fled. One of the officers asked

Romero her name, but she gave a false name because she had a pending warrant for retail theft.

The officers took her to the police station and questioned her about the robbery. She initially lied,

saying she knew nothing about it. She later falsely implicated Edcedric Williams and someone

named “John-John.” Edcedric Williams was a black male “[s]omewhere between 5 foot 4 [inches]

and under 6 foot tall.”

¶6      When a detective interviewing Romero said he knew she was lying, she disclosed her real

name. She identified defendant from a photo lineup as the person who committed the robbery.

However, she falsely stated that his name was Demond Oliver. Romero testified that defendant

had asked her if she would “scope out” the apartment complex’s office to see where the money

was kept.

¶7      Romero consented to a search of her apartment. Police discovered several items bearing

defendant’s name and other items that Romero testified were defendant’s. Police also discovered

a handgun. When shown a photograph of the handgun at trial, Romero recognized it as defendant’s.

Garcia testified that the handgun in the photograph appeared to be the same size and color as the

robber’s gun. The police also recovered Garcia’s cell phone from the apartment. Following

defendant’s arrest, he was taken to the De Kalb County jail, where a diamond engagement ring

was found in one of his pants pockets. At trial, Keller was shown a photograph of the ring and she

identified it as hers.

¶8      During closing argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that Romero was not a credible

witness. However, he argued that the items found in Romero’s apartment and the engagement ring

found in defendant’s pants pocket proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the

robbery.

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¶9      The jury found defendant guilty on all three counts. At sentencing, the trial court

determined that the counts merged and imposed a 23-year prison term on one count of armed

robbery. Defendant appealed, and we affirmed. People v. Hunt, 2016 IL App (2d) 140786, ¶¶ 1,

67.

¶ 10    On October 24, 2019, defendant filed his pro se postconviction petition. Defendant

claimed: (1) “counsel wrongfully advised [defendant] not to take the stand on his own behalf,”

(2) defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel refused to subpoena video

of the search that allegedly led to the recovery of Keller’s engagement ring from defendant’s pants

pocket, (3) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear false testimony from Romero,

(4) defendant did not receive a fair trial, and (5) defendant’s right to due process was violated when

law enforcement officials refused to investigate any of the initial “suspects” whom Romero named.

The trial court docketed the petition for further proceedings (see 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West

2018)) and appointed counsel to represent defendant.

¶ 11    On April 29, 2021, postconviction counsel filed an amended petition, claiming that trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to (1) request a jury instruction on accomplice

testimony, (2) subpoena video of defendant’s search while in custody, (3) move to quash the

warrant for defendant’s arrest, (4) investigate suspects listed in police reports, and (5) file a motion

to reduce defendant’s sentence.

¶ 12    The amended petition also claimed that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by

failing to request a lesser included offense instruction on “possession of stolen property,” i.e., theft.

See 720 ILCS 5/16-1 (West 2020) (providing that a person commits theft when that person

(1) knowingly “[o]btains control over stolen property knowing the property to have been stolen or

under such circumstances as would reasonably induce him or her to believe that the property was

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2023 IL App (2d) 220153

stolen” and (2) “[i]ntends [thereby] to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the

property”). The pertinent allegations appeared in paragraphs 26 through 29 of the amended

petition:

                  “26. While preparing for the trial, counsel refused to allow *** Defendant to argue

        [the] lesser included offense of [theft].

                  27. It was *** Defendant’s desire to have the lesser included offense of [theft]

        argued to the jury and included in the jury instructions.

                  28. Although, [sic] the record indicates that trial counsel informed the court that

        they were not going to present lesser included offenses[,] this was done unilaterally and

        without the consent of *** Defendant.

                  29. As such, trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to provide a jury

        instruction which included a lesser included offense of [theft].” 1

¶ 13    The amended petition also claimed that counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing

to raise the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Postconviction counsel filed a

certificate of compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 14    Defendant executed an affidavit verifying the amended petition, as required by section 122-

1(b) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2020)). The verification affidavit stated that defendant

“read the allegations contained in the Amended Post-Conviction Petition and affirm[ed] that they

are true and correct.” However, the amended petition was unaccompanied by an affidavit from

        1
            We note that the decision, when appropriate, to request an instruction on a lesser included

offense belongs to the defendant, not his or her attorney. People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224,

229 (1994).

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defendant, or any other affidavits or evidence, substantiating his claim that trial counsel

unilaterally refused to request an instruction on the lesser included offense of theft.

¶ 15   The State successfully moved to dismiss the amended petition, arguing that it was

untimely—as the petition was filed on October 24, 2019, and the appellate mandate issued on

January 10, 2017—and that all claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were either forfeited

or barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Regarding defendant’s claim stemming from trial

counsel’s alleged failure to honor defendant’s request for an instruction on the lesser included

offense of theft, the State argued that whether to request such an instruction was a matter of trial

strategy, which would not support an ineffective assistance claim. The State also argued that the

failure to instruct the jury on the offense of theft was not prejudicial.

¶ 16   The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The court rejected the State’s argument that

the petition was untimely, reasoning that the delay in filing the petition was due to the impact of

mental health issues defendant suffered while incarcerated. However, the court found that the

amended petition

       “[did] not allege[ ] any facts that would allow the Court to find [a] substantial showing,

       [(of a constitutional violation)] and so the Court agrees with the State’s arguments in their

       motion to dismiss that the defendant’s allegations were or could have been raised on direct

       appeal and that there are no facts, only conclusions, in the amended petition.”

The court did not specifically address the claim based on trial counsel’s failure to request a lesser

included offense instruction. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 17                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18   Defendant challenges postconviction counsel’s performance at the second stage of

proceedings under the Act.

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¶ 19   We begin with a brief overview of proceedings under the Act. As we observed in People

v. Pabello, 2019 IL App (2d) 170867, ¶ 20:

               “The Act establishes a three-stage process for the adjudication of a postconviction

       petition. [Citation.] If a petition is not summarily dismissed at the first stage, it advances

       to the second stage, where an indigent petitioner can obtain appointed counsel and the State

       can move to dismiss the petition. [Citation.] If the defendant makes a substantial showing

       of a constitutional violation, the petition advances to the third stage, where the trial court

       conducts an evidentiary hearing. [Citation.]”

Here, defendant’s amended petition was dismissed at the second stage. Defendant does not claim

that the amended petition made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, entitling him to

an evidentiary hearing. Rather, he argues that a remand for further proceedings is required because

postconviction counsel’s representation was deficient.

¶ 20   As our supreme court has explained:

       “The right to counsel in postconviction proceedings is wholly statutory. [Citation.]

       Therefore, a petitioner is entitled only to the level of assistance required by the Act.

       [Citation.] The Act provides for a ‘reasonable’ level of assistance. [Citation.] To assure the

       reasonable assistance required by the Act, [Rule 651(c)] imposes specific duties on

       postconviction counsel. [Citation.] Under Rule 651(c), counsel must: (1) consult with the

       petitioner either by mail or in person to ascertain the contentions of deprivation of

       constitutional rights; (2) examine the record of the trial court proceedings; and (3) make

       any amendments to the pro se petition necessary for an adequate presentation of the

       petitioner’s contentions. [Citations.]” People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 42 (2007).

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When postconviction counsel files a certificate of compliance with Rule 651(c), a rebuttable

presumption arises that counsel provided reasonable assistance. People v. Addison, 2023 IL

127119, ¶ 21. Defendant argues that postconviction counsel failed to properly amend his petition

as required by Rule 651(c), thereby rebutting the presumption of reasonable assistance. According

to defendant, postconviction counsel should have attached to the petition an affidavit from

defendant substantiating his claim that trial counsel violated defendant’s right to decide whether

to request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of theft. When postconviction counsel

fails to comply with Rule 651(c), remand is required, regardless of whether the claims in the

petition were meritorious. Id. ¶¶ 35, 44.

¶ 21   The Act has two distinct affidavit requirements for postconviction petitions. First, section

122-1(b) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2020)) provides that the petition must be verified

by affidavit. Second, section 122-2 provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he petition shall have

attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why

the same are not attached.” Id. § 122-2. Failure to comply with section 122-2 justifies the second-

stage dismissal of a petition. See People v. Spivey, 2017 IL App (2d) 140941, ¶ 17. In People v.

Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 66-67 (2002), our supreme court explained that the requirement that the

petition be verified and the requirement that the petitioner attach “affidavits, records, or other

evidence” serve different purposes:

       “[T]he sworn verification described in section 122-1 serves a purpose wholly distinct from

       the ‘affidavits, records, or other evidence’ described in section 122-2. The former, like all

       pleading verifications, confirms that the allegations are brought truthfully and in good faith.

       [Citation.] The latter, by contrast, shows that the verified allegations are capable of

       objective or independent corroboration. To equate the two is not only to confuse the

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        purposes of subjective verification and independent corroboration but also to render the

        ‘affidavits, records, or other evidence’ requirement of section 122-2 meaningless

        surplusage.”

¶ 22    Here, defendant alleged in his amended petition that (1) he “desire[d] to have the lesser

included offense of [theft] argued to the jury and included in the jury instructions,” (2) trial counsel

refused to request the theft instruction, and (3) trial counsel advised the trial court “unilaterally

and without the consent of *** Defendant” that the defense would not be seeking a lesser included

offense instruction. The amended petition attached the jury instructions that defendant claimed

trial counsel should have presented to the trial court. However, the petition did not attach any

evidentiary affidavits or explain why no such affidavits or other documentation were attached. On

appeal, defendant argues that, since he signed an affidavit affirming that the contents of the petition

were true and accurate, postconviction counsel “reasonably could have gotten [defendant] to

provide the relevant information in another affidavit.” Defendant argues explicitly that

postconviction counsel was “unreasonable where he failed to get an affidavit from [defendant]

detailing the conversations with trial counsel.” This argument is without merit.

¶ 23    Last year, in People v. Moore, the First District explained:

        “A perfectly general rule that a petitioner’s own affidavit satisfies section 122-2 would

        render that section all but meaningless. A petitioner could easily satisfy that requirement

        by transcribing the allegations in his petition into another document called an affidavit. But

        this trivial exercise does not demonstrate that the allegations are ‘capable of objective or

        independent corroboration.’ ” 2022 IL App (1st) 192290, ¶ 27 (quoting People v. Allen,

        2015 IL 113135, ¶ 32).

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Thus, “the sole corroboration of petitioner’s own affidavit is not sufficient to advance [his] petition

to the second stage.” Id. ¶ 30. In this case, even if postconviction counsel had attached defendant’s

own affidavit to the petition, it would not have been sufficient to demonstrate that his allegations

were “capable of objective or independent corroboration” (Collins, 202 Ill. 2d at 67).

¶ 24   The real question before this court is whether any affidavit at all was required. Illinois

courts have long recognized that an exception to section 122-1’s evidentiary affidavit requirement

applies in cases where “the only affidavit [a] defendant could have furnished to support his

allegations, other than his own, was that of his attorney.” People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 333

(2005). As stated, a defendant’s own affidavit is neither independent nor objective, but an affidavit

from a defendant’s trial counsel is also problematic. Our courts recognize that, in postconviction

proceedings alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, postconviction petitions need not attach

counsel’s affidavit attesting to his or her own ineffectiveness, as the “difficulty or impossibility of

obtaining such an affidavit is self-apparent.” People v. Williams, 47 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (1970). Stated

another way, the rationale for the Williams exception is that “[o]bviously, the defendant could not

be expected to obtain an affidavit from his trial counsel stating that the attorney was ineffective.”

People v. Kellerman, 342 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1026 (2003).

¶ 25   In Williams, the defendant challenged his guilty plea because his trial counsel made oral

misrepresentations to him about the State’s plea offer and the defendant’s recourse after

sentencing. Williams, 47 Ill. 2d at 2. Although the petition in Williams lacked affidavits, records,

or other evidence, or an explanation for their absence, the Williams court reversed the dismissal of

the petition. Id. at 2-3, 5. As the Collins court later explained, the Williams court did so because

the petition “contain[ed] facts from which this court easily inferred that ‘the only affidavit that

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petitioner could possibly have furnished, other than his own sworn statement, would have been

that of his attorney.’ ” Collins, 202 Ill. 2d at 68 (quoting Williams, 47 Ill. 2d at 4). 2

¶ 26    In Hall, our supreme court applied the Williams exception where the defendant pleaded

guilty to aggravated kidnapping, based on stealing a car occupied by a child. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d at

327, 333-34. The defendant claimed that the plea was invalid because, when he informed trial

counsel that he was unaware of the child’s presence in the car, counsel erroneously advised him

that his ignorance was not a defense to the kidnapping charge. Id. at 329-30. The Hall court held

that the reason for the defendant’s failure under section 122-2 to attach independent corroborating

documentation or explain its absence could “easily be inferred from the allegations of his petition

and affidavit,” which indicated that trial counsel gave the allegedly deficient advice during “private

consultation” with the defendant. Id. at 333.

¶ 27    Similarly, in Kellerman, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 1023, the defendant submitted a verification

affidavit without attaching an evidentiary affidavit to his postconviction petition, which alleged

deficient oral advice of trial counsel. In a “ ‘Memorandum In Support’ ” of his petition, the

defendant alleged that counsel ignored his allegation that the police had induced his confession by

asserting that the prosecutor was willing to offer a reduced sentence of “ ‘three or four years’ ” in

exchange for his plea. Id. The defendant alleged that counsel instead convinced him to accept the

        2
            The Williams exception did not apply in Collins, where the petition contained no facts

supporting such an inference; rather, the defendant merely alleged, “ ‘I wanted to appeal the case,

which my counsel told me that he will. But never did.’ ” Collins, 202 Ill. 2d at 62, 68 (finding that

the petition lacked “even a single allegation from which [an explanation for the absence of

supporting evidence] could reasonably be inferred”).

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State’s offer of 12 years, which the defendant claimed was ineffective assistance that rendered his

plea involuntary. Id. The Kellerman court found that the facts of the case “fit squarely within the

Williams exception” (id. at 1026) and held that the postconviction petition’s failure to attach

“supporting affidavits, records[,] or other evidence” (id. at 1023) did not justify dismissal of the

petition.

¶ 28    Here, the amended petition alleges that defendant “desire[d]” to present a lesser included

offense instruction on theft and that his trial counsel unreasonably disregarded that wish. Like the

courts in Williams, Hall, and Kellerman, we can easily infer the reason for defendant’s failure to

provide supporting evidence for his ineffectiveness claim. Specifically, defendant’s allegation that

trial counsel defied his wishes that the jury be instructed on the lesser included offense of theft

could have been based only on defendant’s confidential discussions with trial counsel. Therefore,

the only possible evidentiary support to attach to the petition would have been either

(1) defendant’s own affidavit, which our courts hold does not satisfy the “objective or independent

corroboration” standard (Collins, 202 Ill. 2d at 67), or (2) trial counsel’s affidavit attesting to his

own ineffectiveness, which our courts do not require. Thus, the failure to attach either does not

constitute unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel under Rule 651(c).

¶ 29    We note that defendant argues, for the first time in his reply brief, that the amended petition

is “a conclusory[3] suggestion that certain events did happen[,] without actual support to

        3
            The trial court did state, in its oral ruling dismissing the amended petition, that there were

“no facts, only conclusions, in the amended petition.” We disagree, as the plain language of the

amended petition clearly contains factual allegations, including that defendant desired to have his

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demonstrate whether they did or did not happen.” Defendant argues that, although postconviction

counsel “was not obligated to get [trial] counsel’s affidavit, *** that does not excuse the

requirement to get any support, particularly when some support must have existed, either from

[defendant] or [from] some other source, for [(postconviction)] counsel to have presented this issue

in the post-conviction petition.” (Emphasis in original.) For the reasons stated above, this argument

is meritless. To the extent that defendant challenges the sufficiency of the amended petition itself,

he has forfeited that argument because he did not raise it in his opening brief. See Ill. S. Ct. R.

341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued [(in the appellant’s brief)] are forfeited and shall

not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”).

¶ 30   Because defendant was excused from complying with section 122-2, postconviction

counsel’s failure to attach to the amended petition an affidavit from defendant does not refute

postconviction counsel’s certification that he made any amendments necessary to adequately

present defendant’s contentions. Moreover, there is no dispute that postconviction counsel fulfilled

the remaining duties of Rule 651(c), i.e., that he consulted with defendant to determine his

constitutional claims and examined the record of proceedings in the trial court. In this respect, we

also note that postconviction counsel amended defendant’s petition to add the claim that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to request a lesser included offense instruction on theft. We

conclude that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance.

¶ 31   Nominally, the only issue defendant raises on appeal is whether he received reasonable

assistance from postconviction counsel, not whether dismissal of the underlying claim at issue

trial counsel present a lesser included offense instruction to the jury yet counsel ignored him and

acted without defendant’s knowledge or consent in waiving that potential theory.

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(trial counsel’s failure to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense) was otherwise

improper. Although defendant touches on the merits of that claim and the procedural arguments

raised in the State’s motion to dismiss, he does not develop those arguments enough for us to

conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition.

¶ 32   The claim at issue is rooted in defendant’s sixth amendment right to the effective assistance

of counsel at trial. We evaluate ineffective-assistance claims using the two-prong test of Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). Strickland requires a showing that counsel’s

performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that the deficient

performance was prejudicial in that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. Here, to establish

that trial counsel’s failure to request a lesser included offense instruction was prejudicial within

the meaning of Strickland, defendant obviously would have to establish that he was entitled to the

instruction.

¶ 33   Courts use the “charging-instrument” approach to determine whether an uncharged offense

is a lesser included offense of a charged offense. People v. Zarbock, 2022 IL App (2d) 210238,

¶ 42. “Under the charging-instrument approach, a court looks to the charging instrument to see

whether the description of the greater offense contains a broad foundation or main outline of the

lesser offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. If it does, the defendant is entitled to an

instruction on the lesser offense if “the evidence adduced at trial rationally supports a conviction

on the lesser-included offense and an acquittal on the greater offense.” People v. Kolton, 219 Ill.

2d 353, 360 (2006). Although defendant claims that theft is a lesser included offense of armed

robbery, he does not offer an analysis of the charging instrument to determine whether it contains

a broad foundation or main outline of the offense of theft. Instead, he relies on case law applying

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the test developed in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), to determine whether

one offense was a lesser included offense of another such that, under double jeopardy principles,

conviction of the former offense would bar a prosecution for the latter. See People v. Eggerman,

292 Ill. App. 3d 644, 647 (1997). The Blockburger test focuses on the statutory definitions of the

offenses, not on the facts alleged in the charging instrument. Id. at 647. Accordingly, defendant

has neither argued nor established that he would have been entitled to a lesser included offense

instruction.

¶ 34   More importantly, even if defendant were entitled to a lesser included offense instruction

on theft, trial counsel’s failure to request the instruction would not be prejudicial within the

meaning of Strickland unless there is a reasonable probability that defendant would have been

found guilty of theft and acquitted of armed robbery. See People v. Rouse, 2020 IL App (1st)

170491, ¶ 50 (“[T]aking as true defendant’s allegation that he would have elected to have the jury

instructed on attempt had he been informed that the sentences for attempted [aggravated criminal

sexual assault] could have been concurrent, *** we cannot say that there was a reasonable

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different had that instruction been

given.”) Although defendant insists that “it is possible that with a lesser-included instruction

offered the result might have been different” (emphasis added), a mere “possibility” is not a

reasonable probability.

¶ 35                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36   For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County.

¶ 37   Affirmed.

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                          People v. Hunt, 2023 IL App (2d) 220153

 Decision Under Review:       Appeal from the Circuit Court of De Kalb County, No. 13-CF-
                              898; the Hon. Marcy L. Buick, Judge, presiding.

 Attorneys                    James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Drew A. Wallenstein,
 for                          of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
 Appellant:

 Attorneys                    Richard D. Amato, State’s Attorney, of Sycamore (Patrick
 for                          Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Victoria E. Jozef, of State’s
 Appellee:                    Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the
                              People.

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