Court Opinion

ID: 9571537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:32:31.579697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:33.533410
License: Public Domain

JACKSON, Justice
(concurring specially)-
In this case the plaintiffs were employed on a contingent fee basis. No understanding was had between the parties as to whether clients or attorneys would pay the cost of the litigation. The defendants ádvanced or paid such, costs as they were called upon to pay during preparation for trial and during the trials. At the conclusion of the trial the plaintiffs billed the defendants for costs and personal expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in preparing for and in trying the case. Defendants objected to paying the bill and objected especially to the items of personal expenses.
The pleadings as drawn by the parties in the instant case did not clearly define the issues to be tried.
It is clear from the testimony of the Colbys that they were trying the case upon the legal theory that plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover their personal expenses absent an express contract between the parties. However, the casé was not submitted to the jury on that theory, and it is not briefed in this court on that theory.
The question submitted to the jury in Instruction No. 5 was whether plaintiffs incurred expenses in handling the litigation; whether such expenditures were of benefit to the litigation; and whether such expenditures were reasonable. In Instruction No. 4, the court told the jury that an attorney is entitled to be reimbursed for his expenses, as a matter of law, even though his employment is on a contingent basis. It should be clearly understood that the majority opinion does not approve Instruction No. 4, and it is doubtful if Instruction No. 5 meets the real issue sought to be tried by the Colbys. However, the Colbys did not object to Instructions Nos. 4 and 5,. and in defending the verdict on appeal say:
“We submit that the court’s instructions were proper and there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the jury.”
The evidence is undisputed that plaintiffs’ incurred expenses in handling the litigation; undisputed that such expenditures were of benefit in the trial of the case; and undisputed that the expenditures were reasonable. But even So, does it follow as a matter of law that an attorney operating under a contingent fee contract is en*900titled for his personal expenses where the agreement is wholly silent upon the matter. I do not believe so, and this question is not briefed by the parties.
It is the duty of a trial court to give proper instructions upon fundamental issues, National Tank Co. v. Scott, 191 Old. 613, 130 P.2d 316, and where it fails to do so this court may review the instructions even though exceptions were not taken.
In this case the defendants had paid substantial sums for court costs, expert witnesses, and other charges without protest. It is an accepted rule that the courts will construe ambiguous contract as the parties have construed them. In these circumstances plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial to recover, at least, actual court costs expended by them.
I am authorized to state that DAVI-SON and IRWIN, JJ., concur with the views herein expressed.