Court Opinion

ID: 9882635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:17:47.111723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:38.239598
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Reid v. Reid, 2023-Ohio-3140.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     OTTAWA COUNTY

Jeffrey Reid                                     Court of Appeals No. OT-22-037

        Appellant                                Trial Court No. 20DR084

v.

Christine Reid                                   DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellee                                 Decided: September 1, 2023

                                          *****

        Lorretta Riddle, for appellant.

        Shelly Kennedy, for appellee.

                                          *****

        OSOWIK, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant Jeffery Reid (“husband”) and appellee Christine Reid (“wife”) were

granted a divorce by the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division,

on July 8, 2022. On appeal, husband challenges the trial court’s decision regarding various

support orders and its decision not to disqualify wife’s trial counsel. We affirm.
                           A. Facts and Procedural History

       {¶ 2} The parties were married in 2010 and have three minor children together. In June

of 2020, the parties decided to end their marriage, and wife “immediately” moved out of the

family residence. On July 8, 2020, husband met with Attorney Shelly Kennedy for the purpose

of “find[ing] an attorney who could start the divorce proceedings and represent [husband] in

court.” The meeting was “cordial,” but husband left “dissatisfied,” and decided “not [to] hire”

Kennedy.

       {¶ 3} Husband retained other counsel and filed a complaint for divorce on August 4,

2020. Wife retained Attorney Kennedy to represent her. On August 31, 2020, husband filed a

motion to disqualify Kennedy, arguing that he had provided “confidential communications” to

Kennedy during their meeting and that he would be “irreparably prejudiced” if she was allowed

to represent wife. Following a hearing, husband’s motion was denied.

       {¶ 4} The final hearing in divorce was held before a magistrate on November 5, 2021.

The magistrate issued a decision on a range of issues. Of significance to this case, the

magistrate recommended that mother be named the custodial and residential parent and made

particular findings with regard to support and the division of property. Husband objected. By

Decision and Order dated July 8, 2022, the trial court overruled husband’s objections and

granted the parties a divorce. Husband appealed and raises five assignments of error for our

review:

2.
              ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I: The trial court erred in using

       appellan’ts [sic] income on the date of the final hearing and not appellee’s

       income at the date of the final hearing.

              ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II: The trial court erred in not

       finding appellee under employed.

              ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. III: The trial court erred in not

       determining if appellant has 90 or more over nigths [sic] with the childrena

       [sic] and therefore entitled to a ten percent reduction in child support.

              ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. IV: The trial court erred in finding

       that appelle [sic] was not co-habiting with a paramore and thus not entitled

       to spousal support.

              ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. V: The trial court erred in not

       disqualifying appellee’s attorney Shelly Kennedy.

                                  B. Standard of Review

       {¶ 5} When a trial court reviews objections to a magistrate’s decision, review is de

novo. Not only is the court not bound by the magistrate’s decision, the court has an

obligation to conduct an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain

whether the magistrate has properly determined the facts and appropriately applied the

law. Boersma v. Brancatto, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1271, 2013-Ohio-3052, ¶ 8 citing

Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) and Kovacs v. Kovacs, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-03-051, 2004-Ohio-2777,

¶ 6.

3.
         {¶ 6} When a court of appeals reviews the decision of a trial court overruling

objections to a magistrate’s decision, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. The

trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Boersma citing

Dulany v. Taylor, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-365, 2013-Ohio-1147, ¶ 7. An abuse of

discretion is more than an error of law or lapse of judgment, the term connotes that the

court’s attitude was arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore,

5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). “[T]hat the appellate court merely may

have reached a different result is not enough.” In re S.S.L.S., 7th Dist. Columbiana No.

12 CO 8, 2013-Ohio-3026, ¶ 22.

     C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the parties’ gross
                                         income.

         {¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, husband complains that the trial court erred

by measuring his income “at the time of the final hearing” while measuring wife’s

income at the time of the filing of the complaint. The record does not support husband’s

claim.

         {¶ 8} According to the magistrate’s findings, husband’s annual gross income, “at

the time of the filing of the complaint in 2020 was about $78,657.” As for wife, the

magistrate found that “[a]t the time of the filing of the complaint, [wife’s] annual gross

income from her employment * * * was about $21,112.” (Magistrate’s November 22,

2021 Decision at 3). Following the trial court’s “careful and independent examination

and analysis of the Magistrate’s Decision,” the trial court agreed with the magistrate’s

calculations. The trial court specifically found that the “effective date of this child

4.
support order is: 8/4/2020, which is the filing date of the complaint.” (Emphasis added;

July 8, 2020 Decision and Order at 5). The court’s worksheet, attached to the decision,

lists those amounts under “annual gross income.”

       {¶ 9} Thus, the record establishes that the trial court calculated gross income, as to

each party, as of the date the complaint was filed. Husband’s claim—that the trial court

used one date for husband and another for wife—is unsupported by the record.

Therefore, we find husband’s first assignment of error not well-taken.

            D. The trial court did not err in not imputing income to wife.

       {¶ 10} In his second assignment of error, husband argues that the trial court erred

in not finding that wife is underemployed for purposes of calculating child support.

       {¶ 11} “Income” for child support purposes includes “gross income” and

“potential income” of a parent who is unemployed or underemployed. R.C.

3119.01(C)(5)(b). “Potential income” imputes income to a parent the trial court

determines is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily underemployed from 11 factors.

Basista v. Basista, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-14-076, 2016-Ohio-146, ¶ 19-20, citing R.C.

3119.01(C)(11). “[T]he question [of] whether a parent is voluntarily (i.e., intentionally)

unemployed or voluntarily underemployed is a question of fact for the trial court. Absent

an abuse of discretion, that factual determination will not be disturbed on appeal.”

Funkhouser v. Funkhouser, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-18-039, 2019-Ohio-733, ¶ 33.

       {¶ 12} At trial, wife testified that she was employed “full time” at a residential

care facility. She added that she received two raises in “less than a year,” as a result of

5.
“working [her] butt off.” On appeal, husband speculates that wife “should be” working

40 hours per week, instead of “only” 35 hours, but he offers no evidence that additional

hours were even available.

       {¶ 13} In the absence of any evidence to support his claim, we cannot say that the

trial court abused its discretion in not finding that wife was voluntarily underemployed.

Therefore, husband’s second assignment of error is found not well taken.

     E. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in calculating child support.

       {¶ 14} In his third assignment of error, husband claims that the trial court erred in

failing to determine “if” he had 90 or more nights with his children, which would have

entitled him to a ten percent reduction in child support, under R.C. 3119.051. We review

under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541

N.E.2d 1028 (1989).

       {¶ 15} R.C. 3119.051(A) provides:

              (A) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a court * * *

       calculating the amount to be paid under a child support order shall reduce

       by ten per cent the amount of the annual individual support obligation for

       the parent or parents when a court has issued or is issuing a court-ordered

       parenting time order that equals or exceeds ninety overnights per year.

       {¶ 16} Thus, under R.C. 3119.051(A), a court “shall reduce a parent’s child

support order by 10 percent if the court has issued an order directing parenting time that

equals or exceeds 90 overnights per year.” Combs v. Ellington, 12th Dist. Butler No.

6.
CA2022-01-001, 2022-Ohio-3514, ¶ 21. The downward deviation is provided for on

Line 19(b) of the Ohio Child Support Worksheets. Bohannon v. Lewis, 1st Dist.

Hamilton Nos. C-210316, C-210332, 2022-Ohio-2398, ¶ 44.

         {¶ 17} Here, line 19(b) of the child-support worksheet was left blank, indicating

that the automatic deviation did not apply, which is consistent with the evidence

presented in this case. The temporary orders issued herein provided that husband would

have “overnights on the days that he is not working.” Likewise, the final order provided

for husband to have “liberal parenting time * * * as the parties agree.” But there is no

evidence, and husband does not allege, that his overnight parenting time equaled or

exceeded, or will equal or exceed, 90 nights per year. In the absence of any such

argument, or evidence to substantiate such an argument, we find that the trial court did

not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in not ordering a deviation under

R.C. 3119.051.

     F. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding wife spousal support.

         {¶ 18} In his fourth assignment of error, husband claims that the trial court erred

in not finding that wife was “co-habiting with a paramour and thus not entitled to spousal

support.”

         {¶ 19} The purpose of spousal support is to provide for the financial needs of the

former spouse. Moell v. Moell, 98 Ohio App.3d 748, 751, 649 N.E.2d 880 (6th

Dist.1994). Therefore, if the former spouse is “living with another person [who] provides

support or is supported, then the underlying need for [spousal support] is reduced or does

7.
not exist.” Foster v. Foster, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-1157, 2017-Ohio-4311, ¶ 22-

23 quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 76 Ohio App.3d 482, 485, 602 N.E.2d 385 (10th

Dist.1991). “[C]ohabitation, in the legal sense, implies that some sort of monetary

support is being provided by the new partner or for the new partner. Without a showing

of support, merely living together is insufficient to permit a termination of [spousal

support]. Id. Cohabitation is a question of fact for the trier of fact, and “[e]ach case must

be evaluated on its own particular set of facts to determine whether cohabitation exists.”

Moell at 752.

       {¶ 20} When considering the issue of whether a person is cohabiting, the fact

finder should look to “three principal factors.” These factors are “(1) an actual living

together; (2) of a sustained duration; and (3) with shared expenses with respect to

financing and day-to-day incidental expenses.” Moell quoting Dickerson v. Dickerson,

87 Ohio App.3d 848, 623 N.E.2d 237 (6th Dist.1993), fn. 2. The fact finder may

consider “other relevant criteria” such as the “behavior and the intent” of the parties. Id.

       {¶ 21} On appeal, husband argues that it is “undisputed” that wife was living with

boyfriend “in the same house with [wife’s] parents.” While true, husband put forth no evidence

that the two shared living expenses. To the contrary, wife testified that she paid her parents

$500 per month, including utilities, to live there. She denied that boyfriend “helps” her with any

expenses, though he, too, pays rent to her parents. Wife testified that boyfriend “pays his bills

and he has his own rent [in the amount of $400] that he has to pay.” When asked to confirm that

she got “absolutely nothing” from boyfriend, wife testified, “I * * * told [boyfriend] before he

8.
moved up here [from Texas] that I would never again depend on a man again in my life.”

Husband did not challenge wife’s testimony or present any evidence in rebuttal.

         {¶ 22} Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion

in not finding that wife and boyfriend were cohabiting. Accordingly, husband was not relieved

of his obligation to pay spousal support under the terms of the divorce decree, and his fourth

assignment of error is found not well-taken.

     G. The trial court did not err in denying husband’s motion to disqualify wife’s counsel.

         {¶ 23} Finally, husband alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

disqualify wife’s trial counsel.

         {¶ 24} Disqualification of an attorney is a drastic measure that should not be

imposed unless it is absolutely necessary. Spivey v. Bender, 77 Ohio App.3d 17, 22, 601

N.E.2d 56 (6th Dist.1991).

         {¶ 25} Such a motion requires a party to show that “all of the following applied: (1) [a]

past attorney-client relationship existed between the party seeking disqualification and the

attorney it seeks to disqualify; (2) the subject matter of those relationships was/is substantially

related; and (3) the attorney acquired confidential information from the party seeking

disqualification.” Sachs v. Phillips, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-05-1322, 2006-Ohio-5100, ¶ 14

quoting Bunkers v. Bunkers, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-04-058, 2005-Ohio-1215, ¶ 4. We review

a trial court’s determination regarding a motion to disqualify for an abuse of discretion.

         {¶ 26} “If there is no current or past attorney-client relationship, then the motion

[to disqualify] should be denied.” Henry Filters, Inc. v. Peabody Barnes, Inc., 82 Ohio

9.
App.3d 255, 260, 611 N.E.2d 873 (6th Dist.1992). In deciding whether an attorney-client

relationship exists, “the ultimate issue is whether the putative client reasonably believed

that the relationship existed and that the attorney would therefore advance the interests of

the putative client.” Id. at 261; see also Cuyahoga County Bar Assn. v. Hardiman, 100

Ohio St.3d 260, 2003-Ohio-5596, 798 N.E.2d 369, ¶ 10 (“The determination of whether

an attorney-client relationship was created turns largely on the reasonable belief of the

prospective client”).

       {¶ 27} Here, the evidence firmly established that, at no point, did husband ever

believe that an attorney-client relationship existed between himself and Kennedy.

       {¶ 28} Husband met with Kennedy for a “consultation” on one occasion. His

“purpose” in meeting with Kennedy was “to find an attorney who could start the divorce

proceedings and represent [him] in court.” During their meeting, Kennedy’s “main

focus” was the children. She suggested that husband “file immediately for divorce”

while wife was visiting her boyfriend in Texas “because that would put [wife] in the light

as [having] abandoned her children.” But, husband “did not want to do that” because, in

his words, “my wife did not abandon our children. * * * [A]nd that’s the reason why I did

not hire [Kennedy].” At the conclusion of the meeting, Kennedy provided husband with

a proposed fee agreement, and she suggested that he return it “ASAP while [wife] was

out of town.” Husband concluded that “that’s not going to happen” and did not sign the

agreement or have any further communications with her.

10.
       {¶ 29} Because there are no facts to establish that an attorney-client relationship

existed between husband and Kennedy, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court

to deny husband’s motion to disqualify. Accordingly, husband’s fifth assignment of error

is found not well-taken.

                                         H. Conclusion

       {¶ 30} We find husband’s assignments of error not well-taken, and the July 8,

2022 judgment of the Domestic Relations Division of the Ottawa County Court of

Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. Husband is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal

pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                        Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                            ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
                                                ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J.                                    JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

11.