Court Opinion

ID: 9891681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 15:02:50.661241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:08.076618
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1150   Document: 50     Page: 1    Filed: 10/19/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

  COSMIC CRUSADERS LLC, LEWIS J. DAVIDSON,
                Appellants

                            v.

            LAVERNE JOHN ANDRUSIEK,
                      Appellee
               ______________________

                       2023-1150
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No.
 92064830.
                  ______________________

                Decided: October 19, 2023
                 ______________________

    JOSEPH J. WEISSMAN, Johnson, Pope, Bokor, Ruppel &
 Burns, LLP, Tampa, FL, for appellants.

    VERNE ANDRUSIEK, SR., Vancouver, British Columbia,
 Canada, pro se.
                 ______________________

     Before DYK, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
Case: 23-1150    Document: 50     Page: 2    Filed: 10/19/2023

 2                       COSMIC CRUSADERS LLC v. ANDRUSIEK

     Appellants Cosmic Crusaders, LLC and Lewis Da-
 vidson (collectively, Appellants) appeal the final order of
 the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) granting
 the pro se petition of Respondent Laverne J. Andrusiek
 (Andrusiek) seeking cancellation of Appellants’ registra-
 tion of the mark CAPTAIN CANNABIS for comic books.
 Andrusiek v. Cosmic Crusaders LLC, Cancellation No.
 92/064,830, 2022 WL 4103636, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 6,
 2022) (Decision).
     Appellants argue that the Board procedurally erred by
 considering Andrusiek’s allegedly unpled theory of priority
 (based on his own prior use of the same mark), and alter-
 natively urge that substantial evidence does not support
 the Board’s finding that Andrusiek had priority over Ap-
 pellants. Because the Board did not abuse its discretion in
 construing Andrusiek’s petition, and because substantial
 evidence supports the Board’s findings regarding An-
 drusiek’s prior use, we affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
     Both Andrusiek and Appellants “sell[] comic books un-
 der the mark CAPTAIN CANNABIS, which also serves as
 the name of a fictitious character.” Decision, 2022 WL
 4103636, at *5. On April 2, 2014, Appellants filed for and
 eventually received Registration No. 4,782,920 for the
 mark CAPTAIN CANNABIS on comic books in Interna-
 tional Class 16. Id. at *1, *7.
      After learning of Appellants’ registration, Andrusiek
 filed a petition for cancellation pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
 § 1052(d), citing his own prior use of the same mark reach-
 ing back into the 1970s and asserting that Appellants’ later
 use was likely to confuse consumers. Id. at *1. Given that
 both parties used the same mark on the same goods, the
 parties agreed that “the only issue in dispute under Trade-
 mark Act Section 2(d) is priority.” Id. If Andrusiek could
 prove that he had priority based on his earlier use of the
 trademark, Appellants’ registration would be canceled. Id.
Case: 23-1150    Document: 50     Page: 3    Filed: 10/19/2023

 COSMIC CRUSADERS LLC v. ANDRUSIEK                         3

 Conversely, if Andrusiek failed to show he had priority, his
 petition for cancellation would be denied. Id.
     As relevant to this appeal, Appellants relied on their
 April 2014 registration date to prove their priority date.
 Id. at *7. Because Andrusiek “does not own an existing
 registration,” his amended petition instead detailed his
 prior use of the CAPTAIN CANNABIS mark, alleging pri-
 ority based on his:
    common law usage of the CAPTAIN CANNABIS
    trademark in U.S. interstate trade since at least
    January 25, 1999 when [Andrusiek] engaged in
    sales activities at the NATPE trade fair in New Or-
    leans, Louisiana and bona fide commercial trade in
    Comic Books starting September 25, 2006 by way
    of direct sale of a 420/Captain Cannabis comic book
    to a customer in the state of Florida.
 Id. at *6. Andrusiek “also claimed priority based on his
 alleged ‘sales and marketing activities through his
 CAPTAINCANNABIS.COM web portal since April 22,
 1999.’” Id.
      On October 12, 2020, Andrusiek filed a trial brief de-
 tailing his theories of priority and evidence therefor. J.A.
 735–71; Opposition No. 92/064,830, 43 TTABVUE (An-
 drusiek Tr. Br.), https://tinyurl.com/2xkzhpwd. He ex-
 pressly and repeatedly asserted that he “may prove priority
 by proving prior trademark (or analogous) use of the
 CAPTAIN CANNABIS mark in the United States.” An-
 drusiek Tr. Br. at 15 (emphasis added); see also id. at 16–
 24. In response, Appellants’ trial brief set forth positions
 on the merits and asked the Board to strike certain por-
 tions of Andrusiek’s evidence as procedurally improper,
 J.A. 790–97; see also id. at 806–08, but did not challenge
 Andrusiek’s reliance on, or the evidence underlying, his
 analogous use theory.
Case: 23-1150     Document: 50     Page: 4    Filed: 10/19/2023

 4                        COSMIC CRUSADERS LLC v. ANDRUSIEK

      In its final decision, the Board first found that the pe-
 tition’s priority claim rested on two separate arguments:
 actual trademark use and use of the mark analogous to
 trademark use. Decision, 2022 WL 4103636, at *6. The
 Board alternatively found that the parties had tried the
 analogous use issue “by implied consent,” citing Fed. R.
 Civ. P. 15(b). Id. at *6 n.6.
      As to analogous use, the Board recognized that An-
 drusiek had to prove not only analogous use, but also ac-
 tual trademark use within a commercially reasonable time
 of the analogous uses. Id. at *8–12. Relying on Andrusiek’s
 testimony and extensive corroborative documentation, the
 Board found Andrusiek engaged in analogous use of the
 mark from “2006 to the present, including during 2013–
 14,” and engaged in “actual trademark use in 2017.” Id. at
 *12. The Board also found Andrusiek’s trademark use “to
 be within a commercially reasonable period of time follow-
 ing his analogous use in 2013–14 so as to create a ‘contin-
 uing association of the mark’ with Petitioner’s goods.” Id.
     The Board thus resolved the priority dispute in favor of
 Andrusiek. Id. at *12–13. Given Appellants’ concession
 that there was a likelihood of confusion between An-
 drusiek’s mark and Appellants’ mark, the Board canceled
 Appellants’ mark. Id.
     Appellants timely appealed. We have jurisdiction un-
 der 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B).
                    STANDARD OF REVIEW
            A. Procedural Decisions of the Board
     “Decisions related to compliance with the Board’s pro-
 cedures are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Intelli-
 gent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., 821 F.3d
 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, we give substantial def-
 erence to the Board’s decisions enforcing its own proce-
 dural rules, including case management rules related to
 when and how notice of an argument must be given under
Case: 23-1150     Document: 50     Page: 5    Filed: 10/19/2023

 COSMIC CRUSADERS LLC v. ANDRUSIEK                           5

 the Board’s own rules. See Am. Nat’l Mfg. Inc. v. Sleep No.
 Corp., 52 F.4th 1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (giving “defer-
 ence to the Board’s application of” regulation governing ad-
 equacy of notice provided in inter partes review petition);
 see also Sunbio Corp. v. Biogrand Co., No. 2021-1433, 2021
 WL 5896525, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2021) (“Typically, we
 give deference to the [Trademark] Board’s decisions related
 to a party’s compliance with the Board’s own rules.”); Ger-
 ritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (def-
 erence warranted in “proper recognition to the interest of
 the Board . . . in maintaining control over the management
 of . . . proceedings” before it).
     Given that deference, we will find an abuse of discre-
 tion only if the Board’s “decision: (1) is clearly unreasona-
 ble, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) is based on an erroneous
 conclusion of law; (3) rests on clearly erroneous fact find-
 ing; or (4) involves a record that contains no evidence on
 which the Board could rationally base its decision.” Intel-
 ligent Bio-Sys., 821 F.3d at 1367.
      B. Analogous Use to Show Trademark Priority
      “One valid ground for cancellation is section 2(d) of the
 Lanham Act.” Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308
 F.3d 1156, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2002); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d). Sec-
 tion 2(d) “precludes registration when a mark is likely to
 cause confusion with a mark or trade name previously used
 or registered by another.” Herbko, 308 F.3d at 1161–62.
 “[A] party petitioning for cancellation under section 2(d)
 must show that it had priority and that registration of the
 [new] mark creates a likelihood of confusion” with the pe-
 titioner’s earlier mark. Id. at 1162. “To establish priority,
 the petitioner must show” certain “proprietary rights” in its
 mark. Id. Those rights may be demonstrated by “a prior
 registration, prior trademark or service mark use, [or] prior
 use as a trade name.” Id.
    A party may also try to show that it acquired the rele-
 vant proprietary rights as a result of “prior use analogous
Case: 23-1150     Document: 50      Page: 6    Filed: 10/19/2023

 6                        COSMIC CRUSADERS LLC v. ANDRUSIEK

 to trademark or service mark use.” Id. Analogous uses are
 those which “create an association in the minds of the pur-
 chasing public between the mark and the petitioner’s
 goods,” but which do not constitute “technical” or “actual”
 trademark uses. Id. “Examples of use analogous to trade-
 mark use . . . include prior use of a term: in advertising bro-
 chures; in catalogues and newspaper ads; on a sample
 displayed at a trade show; and in press releases and trade
 publications.” 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
 COMPETITION § 20:16 (5th ed.). These are not examples of
 “technical” or “actual” trademark uses because the mark is
 affixed to something other than the actual trade good—e.g.,
 affixed to a press release promoting a comic book, rather
 than a comic book itself. Herbko, 308 F.3d at 1162. How-
 ever, our precedent considers these uses sufficient to estab-
 lish priority if they “create such an association” that it
 “must reasonably be expected to have a substantial impact
 on the purchasing public before a later user acquires pro-
 prietary rights in a mark.” Id.
     Our precedent also imposes “a reasonable timeliness
 requirement” on analogous uses. Id. at 1162–63. Follow-
 ing an analogous use, the party must then actually use the
 mark in connection with goods within a commercially rea-
 sonable timeframe. Id.
      We review the Board’s factual findings underlying a
 finding of analogous use and reasonable timeliness for sub-
 stantial evidence. See Zheng Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc.,
 901 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2018); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
 “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a rea-
 sonable mind would accept as adequate to support a con-
 clusion.” Zheng Cai, 901 F.3d at 1371 (internal quotation
 marks omitted). “Where two different conclusions may be
 warranted based on the evidence of record, the TTAB’s de-
 cision to favor one conclusion over the other is the type of
 decision that must be sustained by this court as supported
 by substantial evidence.” Id. (cleaned up).
Case: 23-1150    Document: 50      Page: 7    Filed: 10/19/2023

 COSMIC CRUSADERS LLC v. ANDRUSIEK                          7

                         DISCUSSION
  A. The Board did not abuse its discretion by considering
                     analogous use.
      Appellants have not shown that the Board abused its
 discretion when it found that Andrusiek adequately pled
 analogous use. The Board explained that Andrusiek’s pe-
 tition gave fair notice of his analogous use argument when
 the petition distinguished between two distinct bases for
 Andrusiek’s claim: Andrusiek’s “marketing activities” on
 the one hand (which correspond to analogous use), and his
 “bona fide commercial trade” on the other (which corre-
 spond to actual use). Decision, 2022 WL 4103636, at *6.
 Since Andrusiek’s petition explicitly distinguished between
 these two bases for priority, the Board concluded that it
 gave fair notice of both distinct theories. Id. Moreover, the
 parties’ conduct below suggests that Appellants had notice
 of the analogous use issue. Andrusiek’s trial brief before
 the Board expressly and repeatedly asserted priority based
 on “analogous use,” citing much of the same evidence ref-
 erenced in his petition. See, e.g., J.A. 756. Appellants did
 seek to exclude this expressly-asserted “analogous use”
 theory, even as they successfully sought to exclude other
 portions of Andrusiek’s trial evidence as untimely. Deci-
 sion, 2022 WL 4103636, at *2–3.
      Appellants’ reliance on Andrusiek’s reference to “com-
 mon-law usage” fares little better. Whatever the meaning
 of “common-law usage” is in the abstract, the Board read
 Andrusiek’s use of that phrase in context of the entire pe-
 tition and concluded that it was sufficiently clear that An-
 drusiek alleged both actual and analogous use for the
 reasons described above. Reading the petition as a whole,
 we find no abuse of discretion in the Board’s conclusion.
     While we understand Appellants’ argument that An-
 drusiek’s pro se pleading could have been more precise, the
 Board emphasized that it would afford Andrusiek (and all
 parties) “reasonable latitude” in pleading, as long the
Case: 23-1150     Document: 50     Page: 8    Filed: 10/19/2023

 8                        COSMIC CRUSADERS LLC v. ANDRUSIEK

 responding party received “fair notice” of the claims at is-
 sue. Decision, 2022 WL 4103636, at *6. We find no abuse
 of discretion in that decision. 1
 B. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings re-
                 garding analogous use.
      Appellants also challenge the Board’s findings that
 (i) Andrusiek’s prior analogous use was sufficient to impact
 the purchasing public, and (ii) that Andrusiek engaged in
 actual trademark use within a reasonable time of the rele-
 vant analogous use. Substantial evidence supports both
 Board findings.
      On the challenge to Andrusiek’s impact on the applica-
 ble market, Appellants assert that Andrusiek presented
 “no evidence regarding the actual perception of any poten-
 tial consumers” and assert that the Board did not make
 sufficient findings about the specific “size of the comic book
 market or number of marijuana consumers,” which the
 parties appear to agree is the relevant market. Appellants’
 Br. 20; Decision, 2022 WL 4103636, at *11 & n.13 (noting
 that the parties both targeted the “niche” market of “mari-
 juana-related goods and services”). Appellants cite our de-
 cision in T.A.B., asserting that we found no analogous use
 on a record with more evidence than Andrusiek allegedly
 offered in this case. Appellants’ Br. 21 (citing T.A.B. Sys.
 v. Pactel Teletrac, 77 F.3d 1372, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
     We disagree that T.A.B requires reversal here. T.A.B.
 vacated a grant of summary judgment in favor of analogous
 use when the applicable mark was actually displayed only
 to “seven customers,” without “any evidence that any air
 time or any newspaper space was purchased”—nor

     1  Because we affirm the Board’s principal holding
 that Andrusiek sufficiently pled analogous use, we do not
 reach Appellants’ challenge to the Board’s alternate
 ground, regarding trial by implied consent.
Case: 23-1150    Document: 50      Page: 9    Filed: 10/19/2023

 COSMIC CRUSADERS LLC v. ANDRUSIEK                          9

 evidence of any “advertisements,” nor “any indication of
 ‘readership’” for the handful of single-run print news arti-
 cles relied upon by the Board there. T.A.B., 77 F.3d at
 1375, 1377. Without some indication that the seven cus-
 tomers constituted a substantial portion of the market, we
 could not conclude that the evidence of record, without
 more, justified granting summary judgment in favor of
 analogous use. Id. at 1377. But T.A.B. itself emphasized
 that we do not require “direct evidence” of public associa-
 tion. Id. at 1375. Instead, public association may be in-
 ferred by the fact finder “on the basis of indirect evidence
 regarding the opposer’s use of the word or phrase in adver-
 tising brochures, catalogs, newspaper ads, and articles in
 newspapers and trade publications.” Id.
      That is what the Board did in the case before us—it
 cited Andrusiek’s extensive public usage of CAPTAIN
 CANNABIS to promote comic books, which was well sup-
 ported by the record. Decision, 2022 WL 4103636, at *9
 (the Board citing registration and maintenance of cap-
 taincanabis.com); id. at *9–10 (citing Andrusiek’s attend-
 ance at multiple trade shows and conventions and
 distribution of materials at each event); id. (citing attach-
 ment of photocopies of the “premier issue” of the comic book
 titled “420,” which included explicit references to “Captain
 Cannabis” as the “star attraction” of the comic as well as
 the captaincanabis.com URL); id. at *10 (citing An-
 drusiek’s shipping records of “420” comic books featuring
 “Captain Cannabis”); id. (citing statement from a publish-
 ing house reflecting Andrusiek’s comic book sales); id. (cit-
 ing        active       social       media,         including
 www.facebook.com/pages/Captain-Cannabis, which uses
 as its profile picture an image of the screenplay Captain
 Cannabis: The Ultimate Hit); id. at *10–11 (citing multi-
 ple interviews and profiles in trade press, including one
 which called Andrusiek “the George Lucas of the comic
 world” and one which announced him as the “creator of
Case: 23-1150   Document: 50     Page: 10    Filed: 10/19/2023

 10                      COSMIC CRUSADERS LLC v. ANDRUSIEK

 CAPTAIN CANNABIS,” describing a photo of the Captain
 Cannabis character as a “comic book alter ego”).
     Critically, the Board relied also on multiple news and
 magazine articles associating CAPTAIN CANNABIS with
 Andrusiek’s comic books, in periodicals whose apparently-
 undisputed readership totaled approximately 750,000 peo-
 ple per month. Id. at *11 (citing High Times Magazine,
 with an undisputed estimated circulation of ~236,000 per
 month, and Culture Magazine, with an undisputed esti-
 mated circulation of ~500,000 per month).
     The record here is amply greater than the compara-
 tively more modest record in T.A.B. In the deferential pos-
 ture of our present review, we cannot say there is such a
 failure of proof here. Given the additional evidence cited
 by the Board, substantial evidence supports the Board’s
 findings that “more than a negligible portion of the rele-
 vant market” associated Andrusiek with CAPTAIN
 CANNABIS at the relevant times, which is all T.A.B. re-
 quires. T.A.B., 77 F.3d at 1377.
     We similarly reject Appellants’ argument that the
 Board did not make substantively sufficient findings about
 the applicable market. T.A.B. criticized a party who con-
 ducted “utterly” no analysis of the market size. T.A.B., 77
 F.3d at 1377. But here, the Board expressly found that the
 “market for marijuana-related goods and services” was, at
 the relevant time, a “small” and “niche” market because of
 then-existing federal and state criminal penalties related
 to marijuana and drug paraphernalia. Decision, 2022 WL
 4103636, at *11 & n.13. Appellants do not present any rea-
 son why, in the context of this case, the Board’s findings
 are not adequately specific to sustain the Board’s reasoned
 determination that enough of the consuming public associ-
 ates Andrusiek’s comic books with CAPTAIN CANNABIS.
     Appellants’ second argument is that the Board lacked
 substantial evidence to conclude that Andrusiek ever used
 “the CAPTAIN CANNABIS mark as a trademark,” and
Case: 23-1150    Document: 50      Page: 11    Filed: 10/19/2023

 COSMIC CRUSADERS LLC v. ANDRUSIEK                          11

 therefore he did not engage in trademark use within a rea-
 sonable time from the analogous use. Appellants’ Br. at 22.
 Appellants claim that the Board relied on “a single comic
 book” to show actual use and assert that “the title of a sin-
 gle book cannot serve as a source identifier” as a matter of
 law, citing our decision in Herbko. Id. (citing Herbko Int’l,
 Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1162 (Fed. Cir.
 2002)). Accordingly, Appellants assert that even if An-
 drusiek showed analogous use, he did not show a subse-
 quent actual use, and therefore cannot show priority.
      The primary issue with Appellants’ position is that it
 misstates the record. Rather than merely relying on the
 “title” of “a single comic book,” the Board relied on multiple
 independent pieces of evidence showing Andrusiek’s trade-
 mark usage. Decision, 2022 WL 4103636, at *12–13 (citing
 “all of the testimony and documentary evidence . . . consid-
 ered together,” including Andrusiek’s evidence of actual
 use of the mark in connection with a related series of goods:
 a movie, a screenplay, and a comic book called “Captain
 Cannabis: 40th Anniversary”). Appellants do not grapple
 with the screenplay; the animated video; or any of the evi-
 dence or testimony supporting the same. They simply do
 not acknowledge that the evidence exists.
     Our review of the Board’s decision and record confirms
 that it does. Id. Substantial evidence thus supports the
 Board’s finding that Andrusiek engaged in trademark uses
 with the CAPTAIN CANNABIS mark.
                         CONCLUSION
      We have considered Appellants’ remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons above, we
 affirm the Board’s cancellation of Appellants’ mark.
                         AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 Costs to Andrusiek.