Court Opinion

ID: 9706093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:31:26.279797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:19.289993
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE,
Judge, dissenting.
I cannot be certain whether the majority finds the seizure of Lemmon to have occurred when Officer Kane identified himself as a police officer and said “come here,” or later when a third police officer joined the chase and a police cruiser was used in an unsuccessful attempt to block Lemmon’s progress. In either event, I disagree with the result reached by the majority.
Assuming, without conceding, that the officers lacked “reasonable suspicion” to stop Lemmon when they first approached and spoke to him, I do not agree that they “seized” him within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when, from a distance of 25 feet, Officer Kane identified himself as a police officer and said “come here,” and the *382defendant ran away. The police may have intended to seize Lemmon at that point, and if he had submitted to their authority by stopping, a seizure would have been effected. Lemmon did not submit, and the police were wholly unsuccessful in their attempt to stop him at that point. These facts disclose an attempted seizure, not a seizure.
Neither of the police officers had their guns drawn as they approached the two men, nor when Officer Kane said “come here” after Lemmon turned and began to walk away. As the Supreme Court made clear in Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989), a police command to stop, effectively communicated to a defendant, does not ordinarily constitute a seizure when the defendant refuses to submit and instead takes flight. As the Court pointed out, “[violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control.” Id., 489 U.S. at-, 109 S.Ct. at 1381.
In Brower, the Supreme Court approved the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200 (6th Cir.1986). In Galas, a motorcycle officer, by means of emergency lights and siren, signaled the operator of an Oldsmobile to pull over and stop. The motorist, rather than stopping, accelerated, and a high speed chase ensued, ending when the driver of the Oldsmobile lost control and crashed. In holding that these circumstances did not amount to a seizure, the Court of Appeals said:
Clearly, during the initial stages of the pursuit when the minor plaintiff decided to flee rather than to obey the defendant officer’s directive to stop, the minor plaintiff was not restrained. Just as clearly, when the pursuit terminated in an accident with personal injury to the minor plaintiff, he was not restrained by, or as a result of, the officer’s show of authority. Rather, the minor plaintiff’s inability to leave was because he wrecked his automobile, and no seizure occurred.
Id. at 203. The Supreme Court, speaking of an analogous hypothetical situation, said “[w]e agree that no unconstitu*383tional seizure occurs there.” Brower, supra, 489 U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 1381. The Supreme Court explained:
The pursuing police car sought to stop the suspect only by the show of authority represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit; and though he was in fact stopped, he was stopped by a different means — his loss of control of his vehicle and the subsequent crash. If, instead of that, the police cruiser had pulled alongside the fleeing car and side-swiped it, producing the crash, then the termination of the suspect’s freedom of movement would have been a seizure.
It is difficult to reconcile the language of Brower with that of Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988), upon which the majority relies. I would resolve the conflict by accepting the latest word of the Supreme Court on the matter.
Nor do I believe that a seizure was later effected when Officer Atkinson drove his vehicle into the path of the fleeing Lemmon, who simply ran around it.1 Lemmon was seized only when Officer Atkinson, who had by this time joined the foot race, anticipated Lemmon’s probable route and intercepted him. At that point, Lemmon was seized. But the seizure did not produce the contraband — that had been abandoned by Lemmon during the chase and before the seizure.
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, and direct that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.

. If a seizure did occur at that point, there may well have been reasonable suspicion to justify it. Lemmon’s flight added a new and significant factor to the information already possessed by the police.