Court Opinion

ID: 9696499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:49:34.33491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:28.674005
License: Public Domain

LEVY, J.,
concurring.
[¶ 23] I join in the Court’s opinion. I write separately to address the dissenting opinion’s claim that today’s decision is contrary to our holding in Smith v. Hawthorne (Smith I), 2006 ME 19, 892 A.2d 438, and results in a construction of 24 M.R.S. § 2858(2) (2006) that may be unconstitutional.
[¶ 24] In Smith I, the Smiths contended that “section 2857 is unconstitutional because it violates their right to a jury trial guaranteed by article I, section 20 of the Maine Constitution.” Id. ¶ 1, 892 A.2d at 434. A majority of this Court agreed, concluding that the trial court’s denial of the Smiths’ request to admit the panel’s findings on negligence and comparative negligence and its allowance in evidence of only the panel’s finding on causation, “was unconstitutional and denied the Smiths their right to a jury trial under the Maine Constitution.” Id. ¶ 25, 892 A.2d at 439-40.
[¶ 25] Smith I focused on the constitutionality of 24 M.R.S. § 2857 (2006) where the trial court had admitted, at Hawthorne’s request, a panel finding that was unfavorable to the Smiths and had excluded the panel findings that were favorable to the Smiths. Smith I did not call upon us to also consider 24 M.R.S. § 2858 (2006) and determine whether a plaintiff has the right to admit the panel findings into evidence in a split-findings case over the objection of the defendant.
[¶26] The dissent’s suggestion that today’s opinion is a change in direction from Smith I is belied by the fact that Smith I did not address the meaning of section 2858(2). Section 2858, entitled, “Effect of findings by panel,” governs how “[a] unanimous finding by the panel of any claim under this subchapter shall be implemented.” 24 M.R.S. § 2858. Section 2858(2) is the statutory provision that is at the center of this appeal because it, not section 2857 at issue in Smith I, governs which party has control over the admission of split unanimous panel findings. In concluding that “nowhere in the law” is there a limitation on the admission of such findings, the dissent overlooks the actual language of section 2858(2): “If the unanimous findings of the panel [with respect to either negligence or causation] are in the negative, the claimant must release the claim or claims based on the findings without payment or be subject to the admissibility of those findings.” (Emphasis added.)
[¶27] The dissenting opinion also suggests that the Court’s construction of section 2858(2) creates a “constitutional problem.” This argument was not raised in the parties’ briefs.
[¶ 28] While it is beyond question that courts must construe statutes to preserve then1 constitutionality, see Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 2002 ME 52, ¶ 9, 794 A.2d 62, 66, this canon of statutory construction presumes that a court has first performed the applicable constitutional analysis, and has concluded that the statute in question is reasonably susceptible to a construction that renders it unconstitutional. The dissenting opinion’s suggestion that the Court’s construction of section 2858(2) creates a “constitutional problem” cannot substitute for a constitutional analysis that asks whether the classification made in *1058section 2858(2) for claimants against whom a panel has rendered a unanimous, adverse finding on negligence or causation, bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state end. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996).
[¶ 29] Today’s opinion provides little justification for the dissent’s invocation of Judge Coffin’s admonition against “the pyramiding of exception upon exception, or distinction upon distinction, [to create] an awesome structure of ratiocination that is medieval in its scholasticism.” FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 270 (W.W. Norton & Co.1994). As with many appeals involving questions of statutory construction, the Court’s analysis interprets statutory language in the context of a specific factual record developed by the trial court, in a manner that is consistent with the statute’s purpose as determined by the Legislature. “Only by seeking that purpose can we avoid the substitution of judicial for legislative will.” Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, — U.S. -, -, 126 S.Ct. 2455, 2474, 165 L.Ed.2d 526 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
[¶ 30] It is regrettable that, on rare occasions, the litigation of a particular claim involving a matter of great importance to the parties generates several costly and time-consuming trials and appeals before it is finally resolved. This is one of those rare cases. It would undoubtedly be more expedient for purposes of resolving the dispute between the Smiths and Dr. Hawthorne to construe the Health Security Act in the manner advanced by the dissent, but it would not be in keeping with the actual language of section 2858(2) and its legislative purpose.