Court Opinion

ID: 9761840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:56:40.560953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:27.038385
License: Public Domain

TAMILIA, Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the proper procedure in this case, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Cottman, 327 Pa.Super. 453, 476 A.2d 40 (1984), requires that following resentencing, after vacation of an earlier sentence, a petition to modify be filed within ten days of the second sentence. I would only note that in a subsequent Opinion dealing with the same issue, Commonwealth v. Broadie, 339 Pa.Super. 394, 489 A.2d 218 (1985), our Court treated the matter de novo and held:
A modified sentence constitutes a new sentence from the date of which the time for filing a notice of appeal will begin to run anew. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1410 (comment). The same reasons that supported the filing of a modification motion in regard to the original sentence support the filing of such a motion for the new sentence. If the party who filed the original motion is still dissatisfied with the sentence, a second motion gives the sentencing court the first opportunity to modify the new sentence. Similarly, the trial court will have that opportunity if, as is the case instantly, the party who did not file the original motion is dissatisfied with the new sentence. In both cases, the additional motion will give the *296appellate court the benefit of the sentencing court’s views of the party’s claims of error as to the new sentence. Such an additional motion will be particularly beneficial where, as is also the case instantly, the defendant wishes to challenge some aspect of the modification hearing or the sentencing court’s reasons for the new sentence rather than simply the length of the sentence. Thus, we concluded that Pa.R.Crim.P. 1410 requires that a motion to modify sentence be filed with the sentencing court within ten days after imposition of a modified sentence in order to preserve any sentencing issues. However, since Rule 1410 does not expressly require this procedure, we believe that it would be unfair and would generate unnecessary post-conviction litigation to enforce this requirement retrospectively. Cf Commonwealth v. Holmes, 315 Pa.Super. 256, 461 A.2d 1268 (1983) (applying prospectively only requirements of specificity under Pa.R. Crim.P. 1123). Therefore, we hold that effective 60 days from today the procedure set forth above must be followed in order to preserve sentencing issues under Rule 1410.
Since this case was appealed before either Cottman (1984) or Broadie (1985), and Broadie permitted a direct appeal without a second motion for reconsideration, holding that the requirement for filing a second motion would apply only prospectively, and only after sixty days from the filing of Broadie, this case comes within the Broadie exception and the appeal should not be quashed.
Even if this Court should hold that a waiver existed for failure to file a second motion for reconsideration, the appeal is properly before us and must be heard on the merits because of the issue of the legality of the sentence, which can never be waived. Commonwealth v. Norris, 498 Pa. 308, 319 n. 94, 446 A.2d 246, 251 n. 9 (1982); Commonwealth v. Cooke, 342 Pa.Super. 58, 492 A.2d 63 (1985). The majority would hold that the issue of the legality of sentence is not before us because the trial court, in somewhat ambiguous language, made it unclear, initially, that the *297enhancement factor was to be considered. My view is otherwise.
It is absolutely beyond question that the trial court did consider and include the weapons enhancement factor in sentencing. To conclude otherwise is to permit the trial court, by a play on words, to provide enhancement of the sentence and, at the same time, avoid the legality issue. In a similar fashion, the majority would avoid dealing with the legality of the weapons enhancement section of the sentencing guidelines when that issue was squarely placed before the Court en banc for resolution. The majority would rely on Commonwealth v. Samuels, 354 Pa.Super. 128, 511 A.2d 221 (1986), in holding that we should not be heard on the constitutionality of a statute unless it is absolutely necessary to decide the issue. I believe it is necessary to decide the issue of constitutionality because it is squarely raised in this case, the Court en banc directed counsel to frame and argue the issue and it is a question that has cried out for resolution since Commonwealth v. Taylor, 346 Pa.Super. 599, 500 A.2d 110 (1985) (en banc); numerous lower court cases and appeals require guidance in their determination of the issue. Commonwealth v. McKeithan, 350 Pa.Super. 160, 504 A.2d 294 (1986), which declined to follow Taylor, does not prevent the Court en banc from determining otherwise, particularly when considerations and case law, not considered there, are reviewed here. Accordingly, I would address the merits of the case beginning with appellant’s first allegation of error in its multifaceted form.
This is an appeal from judgment of sentence entered on November 10, 1983 by the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County as modified on November 22, 1983. Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts each of unlawful restraint,1 reckless endangerment,2 terroristic threats,3 and aggravated assault.4 The crimes were committed with a firearm.
*298The facts as accepted by the trial court indicate that on January 29, 1983, the two victims offered the appellant assistance as he was experiencing car trouble along a roadside. Appellant turned on the victims with a gun and fired twice in their direction, narrowly missing them. Then, at gunpoint, the victims were forced to drive the appellant to Delaware. The victims eventually escaped.
On November 10, 1983, appellant was sentenced to pay costs of prosecution, restitution of $20, a fine of $1,000 and to serve not less than eighteen nor more than thirty six months imprisonment and two consecutive sentences of two years probation. On November 17, 1983, the appellant filed a motion to modify sentence. On November 22, 1983, the court vacated the previously imposed sentence and appellant’s minimum sentence was reduced from eighteen to sixteen months with the two sentences of two years probation permitted to run concurrent with each other, but consecutive with imprisonment. Without filing a new motion for reconsideration of sentence, appellant filed this timely appeal from the modified sentence.
Appellant’s Statement of Questions Presented raises the following issues for our review:
I. IS THE DEADLY WEAPONS ENHANCEMENT PROVISION § 303.4—TITLE 204 CHAPTER 303. SENTENCING GUIDELINES UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A VIOLATION OF PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE V, VESTING THE JUDICIAL POWER IN THE COURTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH?
A. Does the Deadly Weapons Enhancement violate the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article V, by usurping the sentencing power of the Courts?
B. Does the Deadly Weapons Enhancement violate the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article V, § 10(c)?
C. Does the lack of Weapons Enhancement Notice in information violate due process of law and deprive the court of Jurisdiction?
D. Does the failure to indicate the burden of proof to be utilized at sentencing violate due process of law?
*299E. Does the failure to adequately and specifically define Deadly Weapon violate due process of law?
(Appellant’s brief at 8-9).5
Other issues raised by appellant need not be considered here in light of the manner in which I would resolve the above issues. We need not consider here what effect Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987) has on such a case as the basis for our decision would not require us to reach the issue as to the discretionary aspect of an enhancement sentence.
As to the first issue, the Commonwealth claims appellant’s failure to specifically raise the constitutional arguments in the trial court constitutes a waiver. I disagree. Although appellant did not raise his constitutional challenges at sentencing or in his motion to modify sentence, his arguments constitute an attack on the legality of the sentence which can never be waived. Norris, supra; Cooke, supra.
Accordingly, the merits of appellant’s first allegations of error will now be considered. As a necessary precursor to determining the constitutionality of the Deadly Weapon Enhancement Provision, we must contend with appellee’s argument that the constitutionality of the provision is not properly before the court at this time because the trial court did not consider or apply the enhancement provision at sentencing. During the hearing to modify the sentence on November 22, 1983, appellant’s counsel requested the court to state its position with regard to whether the enhancement provision was included in the sentence. The court complied, stating:
THE COURT: It’s considered. The guideline speaks to enhancement.
Frankly, I don’t intend to specifically attach it to the sentence that I impose. Well, remember what these *300charges started out being when we were talking about criminal attempt homicide and kidnapping, and things like that. I think an eighteen-month period of imprisonment is rather modest under the circumstances, although we appreciate those charges are not before us. They are the factual contentions out of which this criminality comes, and I think with that in mind, whether or not we had a weapons enhancement, I can’t see a minimum period of certainly any less than sixteen months in any turn of events.
So I rather figure it’s in there, but don’t intend to separately set it forth in any way because I think whether it existed or not, my sentence would be unchanged. (emphasis added)
(S.T. 11/22/83, p. 4).
Earlier the court, in originally imposing sentence, had stated:
THE COURT: That’s right. All right. The aggravated assault charges which I’m reminded are misdemeanor l’s, we there impose five years probation on both the 13th and the 14th Counts, both of which shall run concurrent with the sentences I have previously imposed, those five year probationary terms. I have and 1 state for the record included within the sentence I impose, the firearm enhancement and have done that within the context of the sentence imposed on Count No.’s 5 and 6 that address the unlawful restraint which we’ve imposed sentence on. (emphasis added)
(S.T. 11/10/83, p. 23, 24).
This latter excerpt from the hearing testimony was ignored by the majority, which relies on the resentencing hearing of November 22, 1983, to find that the court did not consider the deadly weapons enhancement in forming the sentence. I believe that while the grant of a modification hearing nullified the earlier sentence, reference may be had to the prior proceeding to determine whether there has in fact been any change in thinking or implementation of sentence. By this comparison, it becomes clearly evident *301that as to the weapons enhancement factor, there was no change in thinking, and with but slight change in wording, the court did precisely the same thing with the same consideration as in the previous hearing. At the November 22 hearing, the court considered the appellant’s arguments and eliminated two years probation and, because of employment considerations, reduced the minimum jail sentence from 18 months to 16 months. Only after the sentence was fixed was there further discussion concerning the application of the weapons enhancement. In stating on November 22, 1983, “So I rather figure it’s in there but don’t intend to separately set it forth in any way because I think whether it existed or not, any sentence would be unchanged,” there is no conceivable difference from the court’s statement of November 10, 1983, "I state for the record included within the sentence I impose, the firearm enhancement and have done that within the context of the sentence imposed on Counts No.’s 5 and 6 that address the unlawful restraint which we have imposed sentence on.” This fully explains the term of imprisonment imposed by the trial court of 16 to 36 months. As a matter of fact, the guidelines permit no discretion in the trial court to determine whether or not consideration should be given to the fact that a deadly weapon was used in calculating the guideline sentence ranges. In Commonwealth v. Johnakin, 348 Pa.Super. 432, 436-437, 502 A.2d 620, 622 (1985), the court stated:
In the case before us, the trial court found that appellee had stabbed her victim, that in doing this she caused serious bodily injury, and that she might easily have killed her victim. N.T. 7/13/84 at 13. The conclusion is inescapable that appellee possessed an instrumentality that she used in a manner calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. Accordingly, the trial court was required to apply the deadly weapon enhancement provision of the guidelines. Commonwealth v. Drumgoole, supra 341 Pa.Super. [468] at 468, 491 A.2d [1352] at 1352 [1985].
*302We cannot, in the face of the law and the judge’s own statement, declare that he did not apply the Deadly Weapons Enhancement. Application of the weapons enhancement to counts 5 and 6 points to a further illegality in that the guidelines provide for only one weapons enhancement in a single transaction, and the trial court indicated he applied it to two counts of that transaction. The comments to Part VI, Deadly Weapon Enhancement, of the Sentencing Guidelines (1st Edition) provide: “Special Situations., Multiple Convictions. Where there are multiple convictions for crimes arising from the same transaction the Deadly Weapon Enhancement is added for only one crime in which the defendant or an accomplice possessed a deadly weapon.”6
I conclude, therefore, the lower court included the Weapon Enhancement Provision in the sentence, by inference as well as directly, and thus the provision is properly before us for review.
Appellant’s first constitutional challenge is that the mandatory nature of the deadly weapon enhancement violates article V, § 1 and § 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution by permitting legislative infringement on the inherent powers of judges to exercise discretion in sentencing.7 This issue was addressed in Taylor, supra, where this Court stated,
This issue has long been laid to rest in the Commonwealth. The legislature has the right to classify crimes, *303to designate the maximum, and likewise can, if it sees fit, name the minimum. Commonwealth v. Wright, et al., 508 Pa. 25, 494 A.2d 354 (1985). The necessity or wisdom of so doing is a question for its determination. The power of determining the extent of punishment to be inflicted was not, and is not now, the subject of constitutional limitation, and the legislature could fix the length of imprisonment upon conviction of a particular offense, making, if it saw fit, the term rigid and invariable, or allowing room for use of good judgment by the judge, made acquainted by the trial with the attending circumstances. Commonwealth v. Sweeney, 281 Pa. 550, 127 A. 226 (1924); Commonwealth v. Glover, 397 Pa. 543, 156 A.2d 114 (1959)....
Id. 346 Pa.Super. at 605, 500 A.2d at 113. Accordingly, appellant’s argument is without merit.8
Appellant also argues that because the Commonwealth did not provide notice in the information that it was seeking application of a deadly weapon enhancement at sentencing there has been a violation of due process of law. This argument has no merit. Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere to all counts which included counts 13 and 14 (aggravated assault). Specifically, both were counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Thus, counts 13 and 14 included, as specific elements of the crime, an allegation of use of a deadly weapon.9 We recognize that the weapons enhancement provision provides for exceptions to its application for those crimes which have as an inherent element to the charge, the use of a weapon, including 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4), aggravated assault, as stated above.10 However, we believe the information filed by the Commonwealth must be read in its totality taking into consideration the interrelated nature of the crimes charged. *304All arose out of the same incident and were to be tried together thereby placing the appellant on notice to prepare a defense with respect to the deadly weapon implicated in the crimes. See Commonwealth v. Bell, 512 Pa. 334, 516 A.2d 1172 (1986) (visible possession of firearm, under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712(b), does not require possession of a firearm as an element of the crime and requires notice of application of the section only at sentencing when it becomes a factor). We conclude this was adequate to give appellant notice of a possible weapons enhancement at sentencing. The record here does not disclose whether such notice was given before the plea, although there was abundant discussion concerning enhancement during the sentencing procedure. Because the informations contained averments of use of a dangerous weapon, the instant case can be distinguished from the situation in Taylor, supra, where the Commonwealth attempted to go beyond the allegations in the information and proceeded to offer proof of the use of a deadly weapon for the first time at sentencing.
Appellant further alleges the Weapons Enhancement Provision, in failing to indicate the burden of proof to be utilized at sentencing, is an unconstitutional violation of due process. The issue of quantum of proof and the timing of its presentation is of crucial importance in this matter. Contrary to the procedure established for mandatory sentencing, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712(b), § 9713(c), § 9714(c), and § 9715(b),11 no mention is made of whether or not possession of a weapon should be required to be proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt as an additional element of the crime charged,' or at least to be established during the *305sentencing proceeding by a recognizable standard of proof, whether it be preponderance of the evidence (as in the mandatory sentencing sections, supra) or beyond a reasonable doubt.
The sections immediately above require proof of visible possession of a firearm during the prohibited behavior, which more precisely delineates the term, possession, and renders it easily capable of proof. (See discussion below on possession of weapon.) The question remains whether proof should be established at trial or at sentencing and what standard applies. To determine these issues requires ascertaining whether the enhancement factors can constitute crimes in and of themselves. “A crime or public offense is an act committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or commanding it, and to which is annexed, upon conviction either, or a combination of ... punishments; (enumerated)____” Black’s Law Dictionary, 334 (5th ed., 1979); Commonwealth v. Dillworth, 431 Pa. 479, 246 A.2d 859 (1968). 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 1, p. 2; § 4, p. 11 (5th reprint 1983). See Commonwealth v. Smith, 266 Pa. 511, 516, 109 A. 786 (1920); Commonwealth v. Shimpeno, 160 Pa.Super. 104, 114, 50 A.2d 39 (1946). If it is a crime or element of a crime, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970); Commonwealth v. Stoffan, 228 Pa.Super. 127, 323 A.2d 318 (1974).12
The reasonable doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for *306cogent reasons. The accused, during a criminal prosecution, has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by his conviction. In re Winship, supra.
The Winship Court went on to hold, “that, where a 12 year old child is charged with an act of stealing which renders him liable to confinement for as long as six years, then, as a matter of due process (even though it was characterized as a civil matter) ... the case against him must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 368, 90 S.Ct. at 1075, 25 L.Ed.2d at 378 (Citation omitted).
Here, it is conceivable that a defendant could be convicted on the charges before the court by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, sentenced to probation on that proof, but then receive a sentence to prison only because the weapon enhancement section required it with no requirement of proof that would comply with due process. Thus, the “matters of extreme importance” detailed in Winship above, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, may under the sentencing guidelines, be disposed of summarily, with no consideration of the standard of proof. This does not comport with our standard of justice. Even when a charge is not designated a crime, if the consequences result in treatment as a crime, procedural due process requires that it be proven as would a crime.
This result conforms with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Commonwealth v. Wright, et al., 508 Pa. 25, 494 A.2d 354 (1985). The Court considered whether the mandatory minimum sentence provisions, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712-9718 (Act. No. 54 of 1982) violated due process by providing for a minimum standard of proof. Finding the preponderance of the evidence standard satisfied the minimum requirements of due process as employed in the legislatures mandatory sentencing scheme, the Court stated:
*307The effect of section 9712 is merely to limit the discretion of the sentencing court in the selection of a minimum sentence where it is determined that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the crime. The maximum permissible term of imprisonment remains unaffected. The defendant has no cognizable right to leniency. Thus although a finding that this particular sentencing factor is present may have serious consequences for the defendant, we do not believe that a defendant subject to a section 9712 proceeding is in a position significantly distinguishable from that of other convicted defendants during the sentencing phase.
Wright, supra, 508 Pa. at 40-41, 494 A.2d at 362.
However, herein lies the crucial distinction between the provision in Wright and the provision before us; the mandatory sentence provision requires a minimum sentence within the term of imprisonment set by legislation, whereas the Guidelines Weapon Enhancement section adds to the guideline sentence and therefore may exceed the term of imprisonment mandated by the legislature. Taylor, supra. The fact that the guidelines, in some instances, go beyond the statutory maximum, and section 303.1(i) provides the sentence imposed should not exceed the maximum time permitted by statute in those cases, offers no relief. As indicated below, the enhancement is added to the sentence, which would have been imposed and, in many cases, this will result in a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, even if the range is limited to the statutory period. The severity of consequences which could ensue from a weapons enhancement is precisely what constitutionally requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt and presents an issue of due process.
Section 303.4 Deadly weapon enhancement, provides: a.) When the court determines that the defendant or an accomplice possessed a deadly weapon ... during the commission of the current conviction offenses; at least *30812 months and up to 24 months confinement shall be added to the guideline sentence which would otherwise have been imposed, (emphasis added)13
In relation to specific crimes and offense gravity scores, at least in the higher aggravated range and in some minimum and mitigated ranges, an analysis of the guidelines shows that in numerous cases the enhancement will cause a sentence beyond the statutory mínimums and máximums *309provided by the legislature.14 It must be remembered that while the instructions of the guidelines provide that when the guidelines ranges call for more than the statutory limit, only the statutory maximum is imposed. There is no limitation on the application of the enhancement, so that, in accordance with the guidelines instructions, the enhancement sentence must be imposed even though the maximum statutory sentence has already been given. If this is the case, the enhancement takes on the effect of a separate crime (improperly), or the elements of a crime producing an additional sentence, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the reasons expressed above. See Winship, Stoffan and Wright, supra.15
Statutory Offense Prior Record Score Permitted Permitted Sentence Excess Over
Classification Gravity Min. Aggrav. Guideline Plus Statutory
Min/Max Sentence Score Range Range Sentence Enhancement Limits
(Months)__(Months) (Months)_(Months)
Fl-120-240_10 0-6_0-6 120_132-144 12-24
Fl-120-240_9_ 5-6 112_124-136_4-16
Fl-120-240_8_-_6_ 112_124-136 4-16
F2- 60-120_8 1-6_0-6_54_66-78_6-18
F2- 60-120_7 4-6_3-6_49_61-73_1-13
F2- 60-120_6 5-6_5-6_49 61-73 1-13
F3- 42-84 6 4-6_3-6_34 46-58_4-16
F3- 42-84_5 6_4-6_34 46-58 4-16
F3- 42-84_4 _5-6_34 _46-58_4-16
Ml- 30-60_5 4-6_4-6__27_39-51 9-21
Ml- 30-60_4 5-6_5-6_27__39-51 9-21
*MIl-12-24_6-3-2 0-6 0-6_12_24-48 12-24
*MIII-6-12_Any 0-6 0-6 6_18-30 12-24
* The misdemeanors have a disproportionate enhancement ratio to the underlying sentence and in most cases the enhancement sentence will be as much, if not greater, than the statutory maximum. This is explained by the Commission as focusing on the fear and danger resulting from the possession of a weapon during a crime, the impact on the victim being the same in a simple assault as in a robbery.
*310The final claim of unconstitutionality has to do with the failure to adequately and specifically define deadly weapon and its possession so as to comport with due process of law.
In Taylor, we affirmed the lower court on other grounds but analyzed this issue in considerable detail. As its application is appropriate to this case and properly raised herein, I adopt the rationale and conclusions of Taylor, and incorporate them as follows.
“A serious question exists concerning the constitutionality of this provision. In applying this section, it is provided at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721, Sentencing Guidelines, § 303.4:
Deadly weapon enhancement:
(a) When the court determines that the defendant or an accomplice possessed a deadly weapon as defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301 (relating to definitions), during the commission of the current conviction offense; at least 12 months and up to 24 months confinement shall be added to the guideline sentence which would otherwise have been imposed.
Section (b) provides for exceptions for those crimes which have as an inherent element to the charge, the use of a weapon, including 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4), aggravated assault, as discussed above.
‘In reading the requirements of this section, the operative term becomes “possessed a deadly weapon.”
“At the outset, there is nothing in the enhancement section which clarifies the meaning of possession. To ascertain the statutory meaning of ‘possession’ we must look to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 301, having to do with culpability. Section 301(c) provides:
Possession as an act.—Possession is an act, within the meaning of this section, if the possesser knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of its control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.
*311This definition is broad and relates to knowledge as well as custody and control. In terms of the breadth of that definition as applied to the deadly weapon enhancement factor, it is far too broad to make the section viable. By virtue of this definition, it is possible to have possession of a deadly weapon when that weapon is in the back seat of a car, in the glove compartment, under the seat of a car, in one’s trousers, concealed in a brief case, or even in a room miles away from the place where a defendant is arrested. The definition is so broad that it could comprehend numerous situations where the weapon was not in hand and was not, in fact, contemplated to be used during the course of the criminal activity, and yet would subject the defendant to the enhancement penalty. This section, therefore, does not meet the constitutional test of preciseness required of a criminal statute and its vagueness is fatal. ‘A statute (guideline) which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of reasonable intelligence must necessarily guess [as to] its meaning and differ as to its application [lacks] the first essential of due process of law.’ (Citations omitted) Commonwealth v. Baggs, 258 Pa.Super. 133, 139, 392 A.2d 720, 723 (1978). The Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, § 9, provides that ‘... the accused hath a right ... to demand the nature and cause of the accusations against him____’, notice of which is lacking here. See Commonwealth v. Broughton, 257 Pa.Super. 369, 390 A.2d 1282 (1978).
“It would appear that a rational weapon enhancement provision would require that the possession be one of immediate physical possession where, in fact, the weapon was being used or threatened in the commission of a crime which did not intrinsically involve the use of a weapon.
[W]hen a criminal statute calls for construction, it is not a construction that is supported by the greater reason that is to prevail but that one which, if reasonable, operates in favor of life and liberty.
Commonwealth v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 162, 89 A. 968, 971 (1914); as quoted in Glover, supra [397 Pa.] at 546, 156 A.2d at 116.
*312As an example of how specificity is required in relating possession to criminal behavior, § 907(b) of the Crimes Code, Possessing instruments of crime, provides:
Possession of weapon.—A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses a firearm or other weapon concealed upon his person with intent to employ it criminally.
Possession is specified in terms of both its location and the intent, and thus provides the type of specificity that every criminal statute requires. Similarly, the Uniform Firearms Act at § 6105 of the Crimes Code, provides:
Former convict not to own a firearm, etc.—No person who has been convicted in this Commonwealth or elsewhere of a crime of violence shall own a firearm, or have one in his possession or under his control.
In order to avoid any possible confusion, the statute speaks of owning a firearm as well as possessing and controlling, giving three alternative possibilities which make it clear that under no circumstances can a convict have any dominion over a weapon. The definition of owning, possessing or controlling is specific enough to cover every apparent eventuality relating to dominion by' a convict over a weapon, thereby eliminating any confusion or question concerning the defendant’s rights or lack of them relating to a weapon. Even with a definition so specific, there is a problem of establishing possession or control. Commonwealth v. Boatwright, 308 Pa.Super. 41, 453 A.2d 1058 (1982) and Commonwealth v. Townsend, 428 Pa. 281, 237 A.2d 192 (1968) held that the mere presence of a defendant in an automobile was insufficient to prove a violation when there was a weapon found in the vehicle. The Commonwealth must prove the defendant had both power to control the firearm and intent to exercise that control.
“Thus, if the weapon enhancement provision were to be construed to define possession as physical control for the purpose of immediate use, it would meet the test of constitutionality more clearly than the broader concept of possession, which could mean control even in a remote place, with *313neither intent nor capability of use at the time the crime charged was being committed.
“In further analogy, § 6103 of the Uniform Firearms Act provides:
Crimes committed with firearms: If any person shall commit or attempt to commit a crime of violence when armed with a firearm contrary to the provisions of this subchapter, he may, in addition to the punishment provided for the crime, be punished also as provided by this subchapter.
This appears closer to the intended purpose of the weapon enhancement provision of the Sentencing Code. However, as can be seen, the provision in § 6103 is much more specific and capable of reasonable interpretation than § 303.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines.5 To further clarify the intent of § 6103, Evidence of intent, § 6104, provides:
In the trial of a person for committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence, the fact that he was armed with a firearm, used or attempted to be used, and had no license to carry the same, shall be evidence of his intention to commit said crime of violence.
These sections do not constitute separate offenses but simply provide that a violation of the weapons offense does not merge with the crime of violence for purpose of sentencing. Commonwealth v. Flynn, 314 Pa.Super. 162, 460 A.2d 816 (1983), Commonwealth v. Simpson, 302 Pa.Super. 287, 448 A.2d 640 (1982). To give them legal effect, it is necessary to relate them to the crimes charged. Thus, they provide an almost identical purpose to that designed by the sentencing commission for the weapon enhancement sections, except they contain the specificity lacking in the guidelines.
“The most recent pronouncement by the Legislature in this regard is the scheme of mandatory minimum sentence provisions relative to certain Crimes Code violations, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9712-9718 (Act No. 54 of 1982). Section 9712, Sentence for offenses committed with firearms, provides:
(a) Mandatory sentence.—Any person ... shall, if the person visibly possessed a firearm during the commission *314of the offense, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary.
“The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently passed on the constitutionality of the mandatory sentence provision above, and ruled it to be constitutional. Wright, supra. The mandatory sentence provision differs from the Guideline Weapons Enhancement section in the following respects.
1) The mandatory sentence applies only to firearms, the guidelines apply to deadly weapons.
2) The mandatory sentence requires ‘visible possession’, the guidelines ‘possession’.
3) The mandatory sentence requires a minimum sentence within the maximum term of imprisonment set by legislation, whereas the guidelines enhancement section adds to the guideline sentence and therefore may exceed the maximum term of imprisonment mandated by the legislature.
4) The mandatory sentence section provides for a minimum standard of proof, preponderance of the evidence, whereas the guidelines provide none.
In Wright, supra, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Nix, held:
The effect of section 9712 is merely to limit the discretion of the sentencing court in the selection of a minimum sentence where it is determined that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the crime. The maximum permissible term of imprisonment remains unaffected.
In the context of a section 9712 proceeding, moreover, the risk of error is slight. Visible possession of a firearm is a simple, straightforward issue susceptible of objective proof. There is scant potential that suspicion and conjecture will enter into the factfinder’s decision. In addition, *315evidence of visible possession is amenable to meaningful appellate review____
Id., 508 Pa. at 40-41, 494 A.2d at 362.
“It is submitted that if the weapon enhancement provision is to meet the test of constitutionality, it must have language to delineate the specific intent of the guidelines and its application, similar to that stated in the Crimes Code for weapons offenses.
“If the broader interpretation of possession was, in fact, intended, then it was obviously unconstitutional because to relate a totally irrelevant activity such as possession of a weapon, which may or may not be a crime, to the criminal activity, requires a nexus that rationally necessitates enhancement of the sentence for the crime committed.
"5In Section 6102, Definitions, ‘Firearm’ and ‘Crime of Violence’ are also clearly defined.”
After detailing numerous findings, wherein the courts have determined everything from dogs to women’s shoes to be deadly weapons, we went on to say,
“In this regard, combining the term ‘possession,’ capable of broad interpretation, and ‘deadly weapon’ which must be construed in relation to use and circumstances, the sentencing commission has succeeded in creating a term incapable of specific definition and much too broad for constitutional certainty. Since the Guidelines do not include the limiting term ‘control’ in defining possession, under those circumstances our appellate courts have required the proof of a ‘knowledge’ or ‘awareness’ element; i.e. the ‘exercise of conscious dominion or control,’ (emphasis added). Thus, proof of (physical) possession is not required pursuant to § 301(c), supra. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rambo, 488 Pa. 334, 337, 412 A.2d 535 (1980). Commonwealth v. Watts, 319 Pa.Super. 137, 139-140, 465 A.2d 1267, 1269 (1983). Cf. Commonwealth v. Burkley, 297 Pa.Super. 400, 443 A.2d 1182 (1982). Also, in every crime delineated in the Crimes Code related to weapons and possession, there is a reasonable and logical nexus between the two and the *316behavior sought to be prevented. Here, we believe the sentencing guidelines fail to provide the certainty and the reasonable nexus to make this provision enforceable.
It is settled that, as a matter of due process, a criminal statute (guideline) that ‘fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute (guidelines)’ (citations omitted), or is so indefinite that ‘it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,’ (citations omitted) is void for vagueness.
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390, 99 S.Ct. 675, 683, 58 L.Ed.2d 596, 606 (1979). Likewise, as stated above, a provision in the permissible term of imprisonment provided by statute, cannot stand. See Wright, supra.”
Taylor, supra, 346 Pa.Super. at 614-22, 500 A.2d at 117-122. I would, therefore, hold that because the deadly weapons enhancement section 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721, Sentencing Guidelines § 303.4 could result in a sentence beyond the maximum imposed by law in many cases, and that because of vagueness in the terms “possession” and “weapon” and lack of specificity as to use or intent, the weapons enhancement section fails to meet the test of constitutionality.
It is evident that the Sentencing Commission is cognizant of problems in the Guidelines, which have by and large been remarkably effective, by the refinement and clarifications provided by the 1986 amendments. As to the Weapons Enhancement provision, I believe the section can be made viable simply by adding a statement that requires proof of visible possession of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime, and providing that upon application of the enhancement factors, if the combined total exceeds the statutory limit, only the statutory limit shall be imposed.16
*317Lastly, appellant contends the sentencing court erred in failing to fully and adequately disclose its reasons for the sentence on the record and also in failing to fully consider the circumstances and all available sentencing alternatives. After careful review of appellant’s motion for reconsideration of sentence and the testimony of the hearing, I am satisfied that both arguments have been waived since only claims raised in the trial court may be considered on appeal. Commonwealth v. Frederick, 327 Pa.Super. 199, 475 A.2d 754 (1984). Commonwealth v. Stufflet, 291 Pa.Super. 516, 436 A.2d 235 (1981); appeal after remand, 322 Pa.Super. 176, 469 A.2d 240 (1981).
For the reasons stated above, I would reverse the judgment of sentence and remand this case to the court below for resentencing.17,18
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PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN. VOL. 12, NO.4. SATURDAY, JANUARY 23,1 M2
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PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN, VOL. 12, NO. 4, SATURDAY, JANUARY 23,1M2

. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902.

. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.

. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706.

. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702.

. We direct appellant’s attention to Rule 2116 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure which mandates that the statement of questions involved must never exceed one page.

. The Sentencing Guidelines Implementation Manual, Second Edition (September 1, 1986) has added similar language to the Code section itself. See section 303.4(c).

. § 1, Unified Judicial System.
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme Court, the Superi- or Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the city of Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of peace. All courts and justices of peace and their jurisdiction shall be in this unified judicial system.
§ 10(c)
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules, governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts, justices of peace and all officers serving process or enforcing orders, judgments or decrees of any court or justice of peace,____

. For the constitutional validity of the Sentencing Guidelines from their inception as to whether their enactment met the constitutional test of presentment, see Commonwealth v. Kuphal, 347 Pa.Super. 572, 500 A.2d 1205 (1985).

. 18 Pa.C.S.A., § 2702(a)(4).

. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721; Sentencing Guidelines, § 303.4(b).

. § 9712 Sentences for offenses committed with firearms.
(b) Proof at sentencing.
§ 9713 Sentences for offenses committed on public transportation.
(c) Proof at sentencing.
§ 9714 Sentence for second and subsequent offenses.
(c) Proof at sentencing.
§ 9715 Life imprisonment for homicide.
(b) Proof at sentencing.

. Commonwealth v. Stoffan, citing: In re Winship. "The Due Process Clause [of the United States Constitution] protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” See also Stoffan, supra, 228 Pa.Superior Ct. at 140-41 n. 10, 323 A.2d at 323 n. 10; Pa. Const. art. I, § 9.

. The Sentencing Commission, in its 1986 amendments, has changed this provision. In the 1982 Guidelines, applicable here, § 303.4(a) reads “... at least 12 months and up to 24 months confinement shall be added to the guideline sentence which would otherwise have been imposed, (emphasis added)
The January 1, 1986 amendment reads "... at least 12 months and up to 24 months confinement shall be added to the guideline sentence range which would otherwise have been applicable, (emphasis added)
The Commission, in its comments to § 303.4 at page 42 Pa.C.Sent.2d (September 1, 1986), recognized the distinction and attempted to eliminate the problem presented in the 1982 version. There it stated:
This original subsection of the guidelines was amended to clarify language and to provide a more logical process for applying the deadly weapon enhancement. Previously, a strict interpretation of the language require a judge to decide on a sentence, and then to add a range of 12 to 24 months to that sentence, and finally to choose a sentence from the range which resulted. The amended language requires the weapon enhancement range to be added directly to the ranges in the sentence range chart. After doing this, the court considers the modified ranges and chooses the appropriate sentence.
It is seriously doubted that this amendment will cure the inherent problem of illegal sentences in those cases, unless the guidelines specifically state that whenever the application of the enhancement would result in a combined sentence in excess of the statutory sentence, the sentence would be the statutory limit, I am aware that in its comments to section 303.1(i), the Sentencing Commission attempts to clarify this problem, adopting the position of Commonwealth v. McKeithan, 350 Pa.Super. 160, 166-68, 504 A.2d 294, 298 (1986) and belatedly applying the sentencing cap to the weapons enhancement. The fact remains that with the language of the enhancement section in the present case, it is not subject to a cap.

. The following is an illustration of this point, see Attachment “A", (all time is computed in months):

. The Sentencing Commission has not dealt with this issue. In the 1986 amendment, Pa.C.Sent.2d (September 1, 1986) p. 47, Commentary, it states:
The commission considered, and rejected, specifying the standard of proof for the deadly weapon enhancement and for all other guideline elements. The commission chose not to specify a standard because it doubted that it had the authority to do so. The *310commission concluded that the standard for this and other aspects of sentencing was a preponderance of the evidence, although in 1982 it could find no case which explicitly held this.

. The legislature has responded to the problems relating to possession raised by this writer in Taylor, supra, and repeated above by the enactment of Act 165 of 1986, signed into law by Governor Thornburg ' on December 11, 1986. In the Pennsylvania Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 51, December 20, 1986, pp. 4867-4868, it is stated:
Act 165 of 1986 also clarifies issues related to the deadly weapon enhancement which had been raised by three of nine judges in their *317plurality opinion in Commonwealth v. Taylor, 346 Pa.Super. 599, 500 A.2d 110 (1985)____ [I]t provides that the guidelines’ deadly weapon enhancement applies “for defendants who possessed a conviction offense”. In doing so, it removes the application of the enhancement to accomplices____ [T]he term “possessed”, as used in the act and in the guidelines, is defined as "on the defendant’s person or within his immediate physical control”.

. I would point out that our distinguished President Judge has argued circuitously in his concurrence, starting with the proposition that a constitutional claim relating to the legality of sentence can never be raised on appeal, or sua sponte, unless raised in the court below but then retreats to accede that in double jeopardy cases " ‘the issue of double jeopardy is similar to an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. It may be raised at any time even initially on appeal. Constitutionally, no court has jurisdiction to try or sentence a person twice, in violation of the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions.’ ” (Concurring Op., Cirillo, P.J., p. 1141, citing Commonwealth v. Walker, 468 Pa. 323, 336, 362 A.2d 227, 233 (1976) (Manderino, J. Concurring) (emphasis added by Cirillo, P.J.). This is precisely the point this writer has attempted to make throughout, that is, in any sentence which is illegal, the court below has no subject matter jurisdiction to enter such a sentence and, therefore, it may be reviewed at any time in the appellate process, whether or not raised in the court below. If we do not face the issue of legality of sentence in the first instance, we will be required to face it in the second or third instance by reason of a P.C.H.A. proceeding. We cannot abrogate the right to review illegal sentences without denying the right to Writ of Habeas Corpus.

. As to the Concurring Opinion by Kelly, J., in commenting on this writer’s evaluation of the manner in which the guidelines are applied to reach the final sentence, including the weapons enhancement, *318Judge Kelly states: "Such a construction of the guideline provisions fails to construe the provisions in pari materia and construe [sic] the provisions so as to give full effect to each ... violates the presumption against constructions which yield absurd, impossible or unreasonable results____ (Concurring Opinion by Kelly, J., p. 1150.) That is precisely the point. The results mandated by the guidelines are absurd when measured against the law and for Judge Kelly to require that we twist and turn to avoid the consequences of what was plainly an erroneously written provision, goes beyond the principle of pari materia or statutory construction. It requires no less than a judicial rewrite of a plainly illegal section to bring it into conformance with stated principles of the law. The trial courts should not be placed in the position of judicial Merlins, nor should we, and defendants and their counsel should be able to look at the law to determine how they should proceed, particularly where there is a question as to whether they should go to trial or negotiate a guilty plea.