Court Opinion

ID: 9712103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:46:24.74832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:09.997575
License: Public Domain

Abrams, J.
(dissenting). I would affirm the Superior Court’s judgment in favor of Mullen. General Laws c. 254, § 4 (1986 ed.), provides that, if a subcontractor furnishing labor or materials for a building wishes to have a lien on the property, the subcontractor should file in the registry of deeds a notice of contract. This notice sets forth a projected completion date for the contract. The subcontractor must also provide a copy of the notice of contract to the owner of the land. Warren Bros. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 719, 723 (1979).
The notice of contract itself creates the mechanic’s lien. G. L. c. 254, § 4. The lien can continue to exist, however, only if the subcontractor “shall, within thirty days after the date on which the contract of said sub-contractor is to be performed, file ... a statement [of account]” (emphasis supplied). G. L. c. 254, § 8 (1986 ed.). The statement of account records the amount of money owed to the subcontractor. An action to enforce the lien must be brought “within sixty days after the filing of the statement required by section 8” (emphasis supplied). G. L. c. 254, § 11. Nothing in § 8 prohibits the filing of more than one statement of account. As I read the statutory framework, the only statement required by § 8 is the last one filed by thirty days after the completion date specified in the notice of contract filed under § 4.
In my view, the controlling provision is the completion date specified in the notice of contract. See G. L. c. 254, § 4. The statute makes the completion date the critical date. “This results inevitably from the absolute requirement for the statement of such date in the notice, from the fact that that date is the point of time from which run the several statutory limitations of the *758act.... One plain object of the present statute was to require the placing on record in the registry of deeds of certain information, for the benefit of prospective purchasers of land and other interested persons, touching the incumbrances created ... by liens, including the time limit within which the furnishing of material and labor under written contracts must be performed.” Adams & Powers Co. v. Seder, 257 Mass. 453, 454-455 (1926), quoting Pratt & Forrest Co. v. Strand Realty Co., 233 Mass. 314, 317 (1919). See Blount Bros. v. Mondev Mass., Inc., 22 Mass. App. Ct. 96, 100 (1986), S.C., 399 Mass. 632 (1987). The court’s construction, by contrast, frustrates the legislative intent of establishing the date set for completion as the preeminent date for figuring the various time limitations set by the statute. The court’s construction makes the final date for bringing a foreclosure action depend on the date the subcontractor happens to file an early statement of account.
In Hilliard v. Allen, 4 Cush. 532, 535-536 (1849), on which the court relies, we did not consider the filing of a second statement of account. In that case, we applied a “statute [which] pro vide [d], in express terms,. . . that the lien shall be dissolved . . . unless a suit for enforcing the lien shall have been commenced within the six months” of establishment of the lien. Because the statute of limitations had run, we simply found that the statute required the conclusion that the lien had been dissolved. Id. The court does not consider the fact that the current mechanic’s lien statutes contain no similar language mandating dissolution of the lien sixty days after the filing of the first statement of account. See G. L. c. 254, § 11.
According to my reading of the terms of the statute, a subcontractor may continue to file numerous statements of account until thirty days after the date set for completion. The sixty-day period during which the subcontractor must bring an action to enforce the lien starts running from the last timely filing of a statement of account. Under this construction, any third party interested in the property would always investigate possible liens in the following manner. Thirty days after the date set for completion, the third party would look up the property in *759the registry of deeds. He would note the last statement of account filed by the subcontractor, and count sixty days from that statement of account. The third party would know that after those sixty days, the subcontractor could not bring an action to enforce.
The court’s construction assumes that the statute is to be strictly construed in favor of homeowners and interested third parties and is designed for their protection. I disagree. “The Mechanic’s Lien Act is in derogation of common law and therefore to be strictly construed as to its provisions giving rise to the lien, but the provisions relating to the enforcement of the lien are liberally construed to effect the statutory remedy subjecting the land and building of the benefited and noticed owner to a lien for work performed and materials furnished.” Sikkema v. Packard, 79 N.J. Super. 599, 602 (1963). Because the statute makes the completion date the critical date, see Adams & Powers Co. v. Seder, supra, and Mullen brought its action within sixty days of its last filing of a statement of account, and before the date set for completion, I think Mullen complied with the statutes.
The construction announced by the court today forces subcontractors who finish the work early to choose between two unappealing courses of action. The subcontractor must either delay filing statements of account until a late date, thus providing no early public notice to interested third parties about the money owed on the property; or, if the subcontractor files an early statement of account, the subcontractor must not give the debtor a chance to pay the debt, but must within sixty days bring an enforcement action or lose its rights.
The first choice — delaying until a late date to file a statement of account — is unfortunate, for until now the permissible practice of filing multiple statements of account provided greater notice to interested third parties. For example, when a contract became due in parts, the subcontractor could file a statement of account when the first part was due. See Lock Joint Pipe Co. v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 346 (1954). The court’s construction severely discourages this salutary practice.
*760The second option available to a subcontractor — filing an early statement of account and then being forced to bring an action to enforce the lien within sixty days — is also unfortunate. Public policy is not served by forcing the subcontractor to foreclose on its lien rather than being allowed to negotiate flexibly with the debtor for payment.
A majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue reject the court’s construction and allow subcontractors to bring actions to enforce liens based on the last filing of statements of account, rather than on the first, a result consistent with our statutory requirements. Sikkema v. Packard, supra at 602-603 (“[T]he cases on this point in other jurisdictions ... all indicate [that] an action may be maintained on a second lien although a former related lien has been filed and abandoned, or expired, provided the second lien conforms with the statutory requirements”). Berger Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, 206 N.Y. 24, 32-33 (1912). In re Cohen, 209 A.D. 413 (N.Y. App. Div. 1924). T.A. Maloney Contracting Corp. v. Blume, 85 Misc. 2d 838 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). Graybar Elec. Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 92 R.I. 120, 123 (1961). West v. Jarvi, 44 Wash. 2d 241, 251 (1954). This rule is followed even when the last statement of account is identical to the first. See Sikkema v. Packard, supra at 603; Graybar Elec. Co. v. Providence Journal Co., supra. See also Berger Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, supra at 33.1 The only case cited by the parties which supports the court’s construction is an 1862 case from Missouri. Mulloy v. Lawrence, 31 Mo. 583 (1862).2
*761Subcontractors, reasonably relying on the construction from other jurisdictions, may have formulated the practice of routinely filing more than one statement of account in Massachusetts. The court’s construction, conflicting as it does with the rule in surrounding States, precludes a uniform practice which may be followed by the subcontractors who do work in a number of other States. See Sikkema v. Packard, supra; Berger Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, supra. Graybar Elec. Co. v. Providence Journal Co., supra.3
No reasonable policy consideration supports the court’s construction of the statutes. Because of the procedural rule announced by the court today, Lore prevails, and there will be no lien to secure payment of the money he owes Mullen, his subcontractor. In the future, however, those to suffer from this construction will be not only the subcontractor but the interested third parties and the property owners whom the court attempts to protect. Interested third parties in Massachusetts may no longer have early notice of money owed under a mechanic’s lien, for subcontractors will be careful not to file early statements of account. Owners of property may suffer by having the liens foreclosed by subcontractors who do file early statements of account when otherwise the owners would have been *762allowed more time and leeway to negotiate the debt. Because the date set for completion is the linchpin of the statutory framework, I would affirm the Superior Court judgment.

 The court suggests that these cases are inapposite because the statutes in those States are different from the statutes in Massachusetts. See ante at 755 n.5. Although the statutes may differ in terms of the time the lien is created, the test is not the time the lien is created but the date from which time for enforcement begins to run. Our statute clearly states that the statement of account must be filed within thirty days of the completion date and enforcement proceedings must commence within sixty days thereafter. The fact that prior statements have been filed does not alter the statutory time for commencing enforcement proceedings. The point which the court misses is that every court construing this type of statute recognizes that the legislative intent was that it be construed in favor of protecting subcontractors. Sikkema v. Packard, 19 N.J. Super. 599, 602 (1963).

Two Washington courts, interpreting specific statutory language, have recently modified the rule allowing actions to enforce the lien to be brought *761on a later filing of a statement of account. Those courts announced a position between my position and that of the court: actions may be brought on a second statement of account only if the second statement was filed before the statute of limitations for bringing an action on the first statement of account had run. Airefco, Inc. v. Yelm Community Schools No. 2, 52 Wash. App. 230, 234 (1988). Shope Enters. v. Kent School Dist., 41 Wash. App. 128, 133 (1985). Those cases dealt with the specific statutory language pertaining only to liens on the reserve fund created in connection with public works. See Airefco, Inc. v. Yelm Community Schools, No. 2, supra at 233; Wash. Rev. Code § 60.28.030 (1961 & 1988 Supp.) (“If a claimant fails to bring action to foreclose his lien within the four months period, the reserve funds shall be discharged from the lien”). Cf. West v. Jarvi, 44 Wash. 2d 241 (1954) (discussing Wash. Rev. Code § 60.04.020, which deals with a mechanic’s lien on private building).

I note that the record and representations of counsel on further appellate review suggest that industry practice in Massachusetts currently approves of subcontractors’ filing numerous statements of account prior to bringing an enforcement action.