Court Opinion

ID: 9516181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:36:34.538393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:48.678491
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART

Arterburn, J.
Appellant was charged by indictment with first-degree murder of Regina Whitaker, his nine-year-old daughter. He entered a plea of not guilty and also a plea of not guilty by reason of unsoundness of mind. He was tried by jury and found guilty for the crime of murder in the first degree and the penalty was fixed at death. Appellant filed a motion for new trial which was overruled and judgment was entered on the verdict. This appeal is from that judgment.
,One of the points most strongly argued in this case is that the court committed error in overruling appellant’s motions from time to time to keep the jury together and separated from outside influence during the trial. This point is raised in the motion for a new trial. There is, however, no verification or showing made that a condition existed in which the jury was subjected to prejudice and undue influence as a result. On the other hand, the State met this allegation by a verified answer denying the-jury, although they were permitted to separate at adjournment each day of the trial, was' in any way subjected to undue or prejudicial influences during *685the trial. The affidavits of each of the jurors to that effect were also filed on behalf of the State.
We have therefore squarely presented first, whether or not in the overruling of a motion to keep a jury together, prejudice is conclusively presumed without any proof, or whether there must be proof of prejudicial error before it will affect the result. We also have presented the question of whether or not the separation of the jury is discretionary with the court. If it is, then prejudicial error must be shown. .The question may be put in another fashion. Is it mandatory .that a jury be separated upon request or is it discretionary with the court? If the latter be true, then no error is committed unless there is a showing of prejudicial error and an abuse of discretion on the part of the court as a result.
The appellant relies upon the cases of Silverman v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 225, 156 N. E. 549 and Faulkner v. State (1923), 193 Ind. 663, 141 N. E. 514. Each'of these cases, unlike the present case, involved not a capital case but other felonies. The Faulkner Ccose, supra, involved the charge of assault and battery with intent to commit robbery and the Silverman Case, supra, involved the transporting of intoxicating liquors. This Court in each case held that upon request in all felony cases it was mandatory to keep the jury separate during the trial and they should not be permitted to go to their homes upon adjournment each day. The Faulkner Case, supra says (at p. 668) :
“It has been uniformly held in Indiana and has generally been the practice, that in a trial of felony, the jury should not be permitted to separate during the trial, over the objection of the defendant.”
.This is not a correct statement of the law, as an examination of the earlier cases in Indiana will show.
*686The first case, Jones v. State (1831), 2 Blackf. 475, involved a murder case. The statement there is simply made that a defendant is entitled to have the jury kept together. There are no citations of any authority. That case should be limited to the very simple fact that it was a capital or murder case, yet it is cited as authority in the Faulkner and Silverman Cases, supra, for the application of the rule in all felony cases and not merely capital -cases. There is no reason why this early case should be stretched to cover all felonies generally in view of the majority rule outside of Indiana to the contrary. 34 A. L. R., 1115; 79 A. L. R., 821; 21 A. L. R. 2d, 1088; 53 Am. Jur., Trial, §867, p. 629.
Evans v. State (1855), 7 Ind. 271, involved also a capital punishment case, but it repudiates the mandatory duty of the court not to permit a separation of a jury in a murder case. This case considers the statute which says in part: “When the jurors are permitted to separate, after being impaneled, and at each adjournment, they must be admonished by the -court. . . .” (Burns’ §9-1808.) The court says:
“The separation of the jury is expressly permitted, during the trial and before the cause is finally .submitted to them, by this statute, and, of course, they could be kept in care of a sworn officer. The case of Jones v. State, 2 Blackf. 475, can not be regarded as authority.” (Our italics.)
Here is the first interpretation of the statutes we have in Indiana which implies the discretion of the court even in capital cases to decide whether the jury should be kept together or not.
The next case is Quinn v. The State (1860), 14 Ind. 589. It involves a conviction of murder in the second degree and holds a jury must be kept together if requested by the defendant. It is interesting to note that *687it totally ignores the two previous cases that dealt with the question and relies on the case of McCorkle v. The State (1859), 14 Ind. 39, which is not in point and merely holds that if a jury has been impaneled and discharged by the court without the consent of the defendant, jeopardy has attached. There was no question in that case of the right to have the jury kept together. It also ignores the interpretation given to the statute that it is discretionary in Evans v. State, supra.
Then next, in Anderson v. State (1867), 28 Ind. 22, the court holds that it is mandatory to keep a jury together if requested and goes back and relies upon Jones v. State, supra, and says that Evans v. State, supra, did not hold that under the statute it was discretionary with the judge. This is certainly a misrepresentation of what is plainly stated in Evans v. State, supra. (See quote above.)
In Henning v. State (1886), 106 Ind. 386 it is correctly said: (p. 396.)
“. . . Our decisions, however, upon this subject are not entirely harmonious. . . . These cases agree on one point, at least, that a separation of the jury during the trial is not error unless an objection is interposed. It is not necessary for us to decide whether the rule declared in Anderson v. State, supra, and Quinn v. State, supra, is or is not the correct one, for all we need do is to decide that the error, conceding it to be one, is such as may be waived.”
The above statement was the last, so far as we can find, with reference to the condition of the law in this State in permitting the separation of a jury in a capital case. The Faulkner and Silverman Cases of 1923 and 1927, supra, dealt merely with felonies which did not involve capital punishment.
*688It does not appear to be the law, therefore, as stated in the Faulkner Case, that it has “been uniformly held in Indiana . . . that in a trial of felony, the jury should not be permitted to separate” (our italics) over the objections of the defendant. It is further pointed out that these two cases rely upon the McCorkle Case, supra, which is not in point whatsoever. The scope and broadness of the principle as announced in the Faulkner and Silverman Cases, in our opinion, have no legal basis in Indiana law and are contrary to the weight of authority outside this State. 53 Am. Jur., Trial, §867, p. 629; 23 C. J. S., Criminal Law, §1355, p. 1014; 34 A. L. R., p. 1130; 55 Am. Rep. 756; State v. Howard (1918), 117 Me. 69, 102 Atl. 743; State v. Woods (1958), 154 Me. 102, 144 A. 2d 259; The People v. Stowers (1912), 254 Ill. 588, 98 N. E. 986; People v. Konkowski (1941), 378 Ill. 616, 39 N. E. 2d 13.
In ancient times the English law required that a jury “be kept together in some convenient place, without meat, or drink, fire or candle.” 2 Co-Litt. 2272; 1 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (1883), 305, 306; Bishop of N. v. Earl of Kent, 14 Hen. VII (Eng.) chap. 29.
The harshness of such treatment, which amounted to coerced verdicts, has been ameliorated in the years since, with more reasonable treatment of juries. A separation, however, is but rarely permitted over the objection of a defendant in a case involving the death penalty 34 A. L. R., 1115.
In 53 Am. Jur., Trial, §867, p. 629, it is said:
“While at ¡common law jurors in criminal cases were not- permitted to separate even with the consent of the defendant, it is now generally recognized that the trial court may in its discretion, in .the trial of a prosecution for a misdemeanor, permit the jury to separate after the commencement of *689the trial, and in most jurisdictions this discretion exists in prosecutions for felonies as well, with the exception of capital felonies. . . .”
34 A. L. R., 1115 gives quite an extensive commentary upon the law in various jurisdictions in connection with the separation of a jury in a criminal case. It says, at p. 1130, in summary:
“In many jurisdictions it is held that, in the trial of felonies not capital, the jury may, in the discretion of the court, be permitted to separate and disperse after a proper admonition not to converse about the case during recesses and adjournments, unless some sufficient cause is shown why they should be kept together.”
Annotations with the above statements list the many jurisdictions in accordance with the comment.
In Commonwealth v. Tenbroeck (1919), 265 Pa. 251, 108 Atl. 635, p. 637, it is said:
“We deem it proper to say that, in a case where the jurors have in charge the prisoner’s life, no pains should be spared to secure a strict observance of the rule that they be kept together and free from even a suspicion of improper influence.” (See also: State v. Cooper (1958), 4 Wis. 2d 251, 89 N. W. 2d 816.)
It thus appears that the two cases (Silverman and Faulkner Cases, supra) assume to extend the mandatory duty of a judge to keep a jury together and not permit them to separate upon the request of the defendant in all felony cases, is not only unsupported by precedent in this State,' but is entirely out of line with the maj ority rule followed in other jurisdictions. In our opinion, these two cases were founded in error and the error should not be compounded by approving them. "The cases of Silverman v. State and Faulkner v. State, supra, should he overruled.
*690Sometimes cases viewed in retrospect appear so out of line with current law and logic as a whole that they must be overruled. We judicially know that there are many small county seats which do not have adequate facilities for keeping juries in every felony case separated day and night.1 We also judicially know there are many cases which receive no or practically no publicity whatsoever and there is no necessity of making prisoners of the jurors during the trial, thus preventing them from making telephone calls or going back to their respective homes to perform their chores, duties and business affairs at adjournment of the trial each day.
The law is not so helpless and so inconsiderate as to force without reason hardships upon jurors and needless costs and expenses upon taxpayers. It is a recognized fact that it is difficult to get competent persons to serve as jurors and yet the very foundation of the jury system depends upon the willingness and patriotism of the average citizen to accept such duties and responsibilities. The task of these patriotic and dutiful citizens should not be made unnecessarily arduous and difficult. There are times when juries should not be permitted to separate and come under the influence of extensive publicity and contacts relating to the trials in which they are participating. Except in capital cases, trial judges should normally be trusted with the use of discretion in determining the needs for keeping a jury together or permitting them to separate. The abuse of such discretion may be reviewed by this court.
In 21 A. L. R. 2d, p. 1100, with reference to the authority of the trial court to use its discretion in keeping a jury together, this statement is made:
*691“. . . This trend toward increased authority and power in the trial court seems to be in recognition of the fact that separation is a procedural matter, and that the trial judge is closer to the situation, has control over the trial and the parties, often knows the jurors, particularly in the smaller counties, and can determine with reasonable accuracy whether a proposed separation will be harmful, or whether one that has taken place was injurious.”
Some of the previous cases cited above refer to the following statute as a recognition that the trial court is given a discretion during the trial in deciding whether or not a jury should be kept together:
“When the jurors are permitted to separate, after being impaneled, and at each adjournment, they must be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to converse among themselves, nor suffer others to converse with them, on any subject connected with the trial, or to form or express any opinion thereon, until the cause is finally submitted to them.” Acts 1905, ch. 169, §268, p. 584, being §9-1808, Burns’ 1956 Repl.
This statute clearly recognizes the prevailing common law rule which gives a trial court discretion in overruling a request that a jury be kept together during the hearing of evidence in all felony cases except that involving capital punishment. Evans v. State (1855), 7 Ind. 271; Henning v. The State (1886), 106 Ind. 386, 6 N. E. 803, 7 N. E. 4. It is to be noted that this statute does not cover the period during deliberations. This distinction was further emphasized in a following section of the statute:
“After hearing the charge, the jury may either decide in court or retire for deliberation. They may retire under the charge of an officer, who must be sworn by the clerk to keep them together in some private and convenient place, and furnish them food as directed by the court, and not permit any person to speak or communicate with them, nor do *692so himself unless by order of the court, or to ask them whether they have agreed upon their verdict, and return them into court, when so agreed, or when ordered by the court. The officer shall not communicate to any person the state of their deliberations ; and if he does he shall be punished as for a contempt, and shall not be further employed as a bailiff in such court.” Acts 1905, ch. 169, §265, p. 584, being §9-1810, Burns’ 1956 Repl.
Upon the case being submitted to them “for deliberation,” the statute then specifically provides the members shall be kept together. Why did not the act include the proceedings during the trial also if such was intended ?
It is further to be noted that in Burns’ §9-1908 it is provided that:
“The court shall grant a new trial . . .
“Second. When the jury has separated without leave of the court, after retiring to deliberate upon the verdict.” (Our italics.)
At no place in the causes set up for a motion for new trial is there a specification in the statute that a separation of the jury during the trial is a cause for a new trial. There is a provision, however, in the same section of the statute which states: “When the jury has been guilty of any misconduct tending to prevent a fair and due consideration of the case,” a new trial may be granted.
We feel that a defendant in a case involving the death sentence has the mandatory right to require, upon request, that the jury be kept together during the trial and not be permitted to separate. In all other cases the court has the discretion to determine whether or not a jury should be kept together during the trial or be per*693mitted to separate under such directions and instructions as the court may give. The exercise of such discretion is reviewable by this Court for any alleged abuse. In such event, the defendant must show prejudicial error.
The judgment should be reversed.
Note. — Reported in 168 N. E. 2d 212.

. For a recognition of the practical difficulties in small communities, see State v. Ferguson (1939), — Mo. —, 133 S. W. 2d 1023.