Court Opinion

ID: 9393997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 20:03:58.940473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:56.730092
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
             in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                             2023 IL App (3d) 190533-U

                                 Order filed May 11, 2023
     _____________________________________________________________________________

                                                         IN THE

                                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                                   THIRD DISTRICT

                                                           2023

      TRUDY LAFEVER, Individually, and as   )    Appeal from the Circuit Court
      Special Administrator of the Estate of)    of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
      Steven LaFever, Deceased,             )    Rock Island County, Illinois.
                                            )
            Plaintiff-Appellee,             )    Appeal No. 3-19-0533
                                            )    Circuit No. 15-L-32
            v.                              )
                                            )
      FORD MOTOR COMPANY,                   )    The Honorable
                                            )    Mark A. VandeWiele,
            Defendant-Appellant.            )    Judge, Presiding.
     _____________________________________________________________________________

           JUSTICE PETERSON 1 delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justices McDade and Hettel concurred in the judgment.
     _____________________________________________________________________________

                                                         ORDER

¶1           Held: In an appeal in an asbestos products liability case, the appellate court held that the
                   trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff’s motion for new trial
                   based upon defendant’s violation of a pretrial motion in limine and
                   misrepresentation of certain key facts to the jury. The appellate court, therefore,
                   affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

             1
                This case was administratively reassigned to Justice Peterson for authorship on December 19, 2022.
     Justice Peterson has read the briefs and listened to the recording of the oral argument.
¶2           Plaintiff, Trudy LaFever, individually and as the special administrator of her deceased

     husband’s estate, brought an asbestos products liability action against defendant, Ford Motor

     Company, and several other product manufacturers, relating to the injury and death of her

     husband, Steven LaFever. 2 Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict for defendant and against

     plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court subsequently granted.

     Defendant sought leave from this court to file an interlocutory appeal to challenge the trial

     court’s ruling. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(a)(1) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019) (allowing for a permissive appeal in

     a civil case where the trial court has granted a new trial). We initially denied defendant’s request

     but later allowed it after being directed to do so by the supreme court in a supervisory order. See

     LaFever v. Ford Motor Co., 147 N.E.3d 676 (2020). Upon conducting our review of this case,

     we affirm the trial court’s judgment, granting plaintiff’s motion for new trial.

¶3                                             I. BACKGROUND

¶4           In January 2014, plaintiff’s husband, Steven LaFever, was diagnosed with peritoneal

     mesothelioma, a cancer of the lining of the abdomen. He died from that condition a few months

     later. The following year, in March 2015, plaintiff brought the instant products liability action

     against defendant and several other product manufacturers, alleging that Steven’s injury and

     subsequent death were caused by his exposure to asbestos contained in products that were

     manufactured by defendant and the other product manufacturers. More specifically, as to the

     current defendant, plaintiff’s claim pertained to replacement brakes that were sold under the Ford

     brand name. Plaintiff’s theory of the case was that defendant had negligently failed to provide

     adequate warnings on its product boxes for replacement brakes about brake dust that contained

             2
              In the record on appeal, plaintiff and decedent’s last name is spelled both as “Lafever” and as
     “LaFever.” For the purpose of consistency, we will spell plaintiff and decedent’s last name as “LaFever”
     to match the spelling that was used in the supreme court’s supervisory order on this case.
                                                         2
     asbestos, even though defendant was aware of the danger with that product and had warned its

     own employees and its dealers’ employees to take certain precautions (not to blow the dust off of

     the brakes with a compressor and to use a vacuum with a special filter when cleaning up the

     dust) when working with that product.

¶5             Defendant filed its answer and denied that the brake dust from its replacement brakes

     caused Steven’s cancer and also denied that it had breached any duty to warn of a possible

     danger.

¶6             In April 2018, defendant filed a motion requesting that the trial court enter several orders

     in limine. Defendant’s request No. 29 in that motion pertained to the disclosure of witnesses and

     documents. More specifically, in its request No. 29(c), defendant requested “[t]hat each party

     designate documents forty-eight (48) hours prior to seeking to admit the documents into

     evidence or to elicit testimony from a witness concerning the documents, with the exception of

     documents used for impeachment purposes or for demonstrative purposes.”

¶7             Later that same month, a final pretrial conference was held in this case. During that

     conference, as the trial court and the parties’ attorneys were discussing procedural matters,

     defendant’s attorney spoke up on the record and sought an agreement from plaintiff’s attorney

     regarding pre-disclosure (giving advance notice) of witnesses and exhibits, similar to what had

     been requested in defendant’s motion in limine request No. 29.3 Plaintiff’s attorney indicated that

     he was opposed to a 48-hour pre-disclosure rule and proposed, instead, that each side give prior-

     afternoon notice (in the afternoon in court) of the witnesses and exhibits that the party intended

     to use in direct examination the following day and morning-of notice (at or before the case

               3
                Both sides had multiple attorneys in this case. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to each
     sides’ attorneys as “plaintiff’s attorney” or “defendant’s attorney” without any further distinction.
                                                           3
       resumed in court in the morning) of the exhibits that the party anticipated using in cross-

       examination that day. After further discussion, both sides agreed to that proposal. The written

       order that was later entered, however, merely indicated that defendant’s request No. 29 (and the

       other remaining requests in defendant’s general motion in limine) was “PASSED.”

¶8            Toward the end of April and into the early part of May 2018, a jury trial was held in this

       case. The trial took approximately two weeks to complete. In plaintiff’s case-in-chief, one of the

       witnesses who was called to testify was the decedent’s son, Brandon LaFever. During cross-

       examination, Brandon testified that when he was in high school, he helped his dad, Steven (the

       decedent), do work on the farm, such as replacing the brakes on trucks, tractors, and other

       vehicles. According to Brandon, when Steven was replacing the brakes, Steven would not rough

       up, sand, or grind the brakes or use an air compressor to blow off the brakes. Although Steven

       used Ford replacement brakes on a few occasions that Brandon remembered, Steven also used

       Bendix brand replacement brakes, including on the family’s Ford vehicles and tractors.

¶9            When defendant’s attorney asked Brandon if he had actually handled the Bendix brake

       boxes, Brandon responded that he had, but that he did not remember what the boxes looked like.

       Defendant’s attorney attempted to show Brandon an undisclosed (no pre-disclosure had been

       given) photograph of a Bendix brake box. Plaintiff’s attorney objected because he was not given

       pre-disclosure of the photograph. Defendant’s attorney represented to the trial court that he was

       only seeking to refresh Brandon’s recollection. Plaintiff’s attorney asked to approach, and a

       sidebar conference was held.

¶ 10          During the sidebar conference, plaintiff’s attorney noted that the parties had a rule for

       pre-disclosure of exhibits and that it was a rule that defendant’s attorney had sought. Defendant’s

       attorney commented that he understood what the rule was and that he was only trying to refresh

                                                        4
       Brandon’s recollection so that he could ask Brandon some questions about the Bendix boxes.

       Plaintiff’s attorney reiterated to the trial court that defendant’s attorney had not provided pre-

       disclosure of the photograph. Defendant’s attorney responded, “As it relates to trying to refresh

       his recollection, if I disclose it then they would have shown it to him before and I don’t know

       that I would have had a truthful answer or not. So it’s not really impeachment, but it’s kind of

       like that.” The trial court ruled that defendant’s attorney could show the photograph of the

       Bendix box to Brandon, but that the photograph would not be admitted into evidence and would

       not be shown on the overhead screen or anywhere else where the jury could see it.

¶ 11          When Brandon’s cross-examination resumed, defendant’s attorney showed the

       photograph to Brandon, but Brandon still did not remember what the Bendix replacement brake

       boxes looked like. Defendant’s attorney attempted to show Brandon a second photograph of a

       Bendix brake box, and plaintiff’s attorney again objected based upon the lack of pre-disclosure

       of the photograph. Unlike the first photograph, in the second photograph, the following warnings

       could be seen on the side of the Bendix box:

                              “CAUTION
                      CONTAINS ASBESTOS FIBERS
                      AVOID CREATING DUST
                      BREATHING ASBESTOS DUST MAY
                      CAUSE SERIOUS BODILY HARM[.]”

       After some brief discussion between the attorneys, plaintiff’s attorney told the trial court that the

       attorneys did not need to approach on the second photograph.

¶ 12          Brandon’s cross-examination resumed, and defendant’s attorney showed Brandon the

       second photograph. The following questions and answers ensued:

                                                         5
       “Q. And looking at that box, does that refresh your recollection about any

warnings that may have been on Bendix boxes that you handled when you were

helping your dad do brake jobs?

       A. I don’t remember anything like that on the box.

       Q. Okay.

       A. My job was to open the box usually and hand him [Steven] the brakes.

       Q. And do it quickly; right?

       A. Yep.

       Q. I understand. So as you sit here today, you don’t remember there being

any warnings on the brake box about asbestos?

       A. No.

       Q. The Exhibit CS158, the first one that I showed you, that doesn’t refresh

your recollection about the color scheme on the boxes?

       A. No.

       Q. Or that there were logos, Bendix logos on the boxes?

       A. No.

       Q. Is it possible that there were asbestos warnings on the Bendix brake

boxes that you handled, but you just don’t recall them or you didn’t read them?

       [PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY]: Judge, I’ll object to form on that possible,

I mean.

       THE COURT: I couldn’t hear.

                                  6
                               [PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY]: I object to form on that possible. Is he

                       asking him to speculate?

                               THE COURT: I’ll sustain the objection as speculation. Re[-]ask it.

                               BY [DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY]:

                               Q. Do you recall seeing any warnings on the Bendix brake boxes having to

                       do with asbestos?

                               A. No.

                               Q. And not to use compressed air?

                               A. No.

                               Q. Not to blow off brakes?

                               A. No.”

¶ 13           When the questioning of Brandon had concluded and the jury was not present in the

       courtroom, plaintiff’s attorney raised concerns to the trial court over defendant’s attorney’s use

       of the photographs and the questions that were asked. Plaintiff’s attorney argued that in using the

       two photographs, defendant’s attorney had violated the parties’ agreement and the trial court’s

       order in limine about pre-disclosure of exhibits. In addition, plaintiff’s attorney also asserted that

       through the questions posed, defendant’s attorney had intentionally misrepresented what the

       warnings on the Bendix boxes stated to give the jury a false impression that the warnings that

       plaintiff believed should have been given were provided to the decedent through the Bendix

       boxes, even if they had not been provided to the decedent through defendant’s own products.

       Plaintiff’s attorney asked the trial court to either grant a mistrial or to instruct the jury to

       disregard the defendant’s attorney’s comments that suggested there were warnings on the Bendix

       boxes about not blowing out the brakes or using compressed air.

                                                           7
¶ 14          Defendant’s attorney opposed plaintiff’s request and indicated to the trial court that he

       had prepared the photographs in advance to be used to refresh Brandon’s recollection in case

       Brandon could not remember what the Bendix boxes looked like. Defendant’s attorney pointed

       out that he had only shown the photographs to Brandon, and not to the jury, and that his efforts

       to refresh Brandon’s recollection were not successful. Defendant’s attorney commented that, had

       he not shown the photographs to Brandon, the questions that he had asked about the warnings on

       the boxes would have been “perfectly valid.” In making that comment, defendant’s attorney

       noted that the warnings on the Bendix boxes said to avoid creating dust and that there had been

       testimony “all over this trial” that the way to avoid breathing the brake dust was to not blow off

       the brakes. Defendant’s attorney maintained, therefore, that he had not violated the trial court’s

       order in limine.

¶ 15          After viewing the two photographs and listening to the arguments of the attorneys, the

       trial court decided to reserve ruling on plaintiff’s attorney’s motion for a mistrial and to give the

       jury a cautionary instruction instead. When asked by defendant’s attorney what the cautionary

       instruction would state, the trial court indicated that it was going to remind the jury that what the

       attorneys said during the trial was not to be considered as evidence and that it was also going to

       tell the jury that it was not to consider the references that were made regarding what language

       may or may not have been on the Bendix brake box. Plaintiff’s attorney commented that he

       understood that the trial court was taking his first request—the request for a mistrial—under

       advisement. Plaintiff’s attorney then asked the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not

       consider the references that defendant’s attorney had made about the warnings on the Bendix

       boxes and that the jury was to disregard any suggestion that there was a warning label that said

       anything similar to what defendant’s attorney had implied. The trial court asked plaintiff’s

                                                          8
       attorney if he was moving for admission of the photographs so that he could publish the

       photographs to the jury (presumably, so the jury could see what the warnings on the Bendix

       boxes actually stated), but plaintiff’s attorney declined, stating that doing so would only

       compound defendant’s attorney’s error.

¶ 16           When the jury was brought back into the courtroom, the trial court gave the jury the

       following cautionary instruction:

                       “I need to remind you that what attorneys say is not to be considered as evidence.

                       You may have heard some testimony concerning what warning was or was not on

                       a box. You’re not to consider that. That came from the attorney. You’re not to

                       consider that as evidence. You should disregard that statement.”

¶ 17           As the jury trial progressed, the trial court never ruled upon plaintiff’s attorney’s motion

       for a mistrial. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for defendant and against

       plaintiff. As part of the verdict, the jury also answered “yes” to a special interrogatory that asked,

       “was the sole proximate cause of Steven LaFever’s injury and death something other than the

       conduct of defendant?”

¶ 18           In September 2018, after the time period for filing posttrial motions had been extended

       by the trial court, plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the trial court “declare a mistrial or

       order a new trial in this case” (referred to hereinafter at times as the motion for new trial). In the

       motion, plaintiff raised numerous claims of error, including the matter regarding the photographs

       and the questions asked of Brandon in cross-examination (collectively referred to hereinafter at

       times as the photograph matter). Defendant filed a response and opposed the motion for new

       trial. In its response, defendant asserted that the motion for new trial should be denied because

       defendant was properly attempting to refresh Brandon’s recollection when the photograph matter

                                                          9
       occurred and because plaintiff could not show that it was prejudiced by defendant’s efforts in

       that regard. Plaintiff filed a reply and disputed defendant’s assertions. Plaintiff asserted further in

       her reply that defendant’s conduct was intentional and that the cautionary instruction that the trial

       court gave was insufficient to cure the error that had occurred.

¶ 19           In August 2019, the trial court held a hearing on plaintiff’s motion for new trial. At the

       outset of the hearing, the trial court directed the parties to limit their arguments to the photograph

       matter, stating that if the trial court “should have granted a new trial at that point, then [it] should

       grant a new trial now.” The trial court noted that it was “deeply troubled” when the photograph

       matter occurred and that its thought at that time was to let the matter play out because the matter

       could have ended up being a non-issue.

¶ 20           After listening to the oral arguments of the attorneys, the trial court granted plaintiff’s

       motion for new trial. In so doing, the trial court stated:

                       “I was really troubled by the situation. My inclination at the time was to grant the

                       mistrial at that point, but we were so heavily invested in it I wanted it to play out,

                       thinking it would cure itself. It didn’t. I’m going to grant a new trial.

                               It—and let me further elaborate. When I enter motions in limine, it sets the

                       grounds [sic] rules with which we’re all going to play by, both sides are going to

                       play about. When those rules are violated, they have to have teeth. And in this

                       case, it was a pretty egregious violation, in that the agreement was exchange those

                       exhibits. It put the plaintiffs [sic] at a huge tactical disadvantage not having that.

                       And the situation might have played out differently if they [sic] had. And it could

                       have easily been remedied with a side bar prior to that being utilized. It was not. It

                       was an egregious violation of the order that everybody had agreed to. And—and

                                                         10
                       in my mind, it had the potential to impact the outcome of the trial. And therefore

                       it was—I should have granted the mistrial at the time. I’m correcting that error at

                       this time and I’m going to order a new trial.”

¶ 21           Defendant sought leave from this court to file an interlocutory appeal (see Ill. S. Ct. R.

       306(a)(1) (eff. Oct. 1, 2019) (allowing for a permissive appeal from a trial court’s grant of a new

       trial in a civil case)), and its request, although initially denied, was eventually granted. See

       LaFever, 147 N.E.3d 676 (directing this court in a supervisory order to allow defendant’s

       appeal).

¶ 22                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23           On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for

       new trial. Defendant asserts that in granting the motion, the trial court committed an abuse of

       discretion in the following four ways: (1) by disregarding that plaintiff’s claim of error was

       waived because plaintiff had received the relief she had requested (plaintiff had requested a

       mistrial or a curative instruction, and the trial court gave the jury a curative instruction); (2) by

       finding that defendant had violated the order in limine, even though the trial court had never

       entered such an order and defendant had never committed a violation (if the order did exist);

       (3) by failing to recognize that any perceived transgressions by defendant’s attorney did not

       affect the outcome of the case in light of all of the curative measures (hearing and ruling upon

       plaintiff’s objection to the first photograph in a sidebar conference, offering to hold a sidebar

       conference on plaintiff’s initial objection to the second photograph, and giving the jury a curative

       instruction as requested by plaintiff) that had been taken by the trial court during the trial, which

       removed any potential for prejudice; and (4) by failing to recognize that the trial record

       supported both the jury’s verdict and the jury’s answer to the special interrogatory. For all of the

                                                         11
       reasons stated, therefore, defendant asks that we vacate and reverse the trial court’s grant of

       plaintiff’s motion for new trial and that we reinstate the judgment entered for defendant on the

       jury verdict.

¶ 24           Plaintiff argues that the trial court’s ruling was proper and should be upheld. Plaintiff

       asserts that the trial court correctly granted plaintiff’s motion for new trial because defendant’s

       attorney intentionally violated the motion in limine that defendant’s attorney had sought and

       because defendant’s attorney deliberately made false representations to the jury that struck at the

       heart of plaintiff’s failure-to-warn case against defendant and deprived plaintiff of a fair trial.

       Thus, plaintiff maintains that the trial court’s ruling on the motion for new trial did not constitute

       an abuse of discretion. In response to defendant’s specific contentions on this issue, plaintiff

       asserts that: (1) her claim of error as to defendant’s attorney’s misconduct was not waived

       because she did not receive the relief she had requested during the trial—either a mistrial (her

       preferred form of relief, according to plaintiff) or a curative instruction specifically directing the

       jury to disregard the false suggestion that defendant’s attorney had made; (2) the curative

       instruction that the trial court gave to the jury was inadequate and insufficient and compounded

       the error because it let the jury think that the warnings suggested by defendant’s attorney actually

       existed and that the jury was not supposed to know about those warnings; (3) the order in limine

       existed, was acknowledged multiple times by defendant’s attorney, and was intentionally

       violated; (4) even if the order in limine did not exist, defendant’s attorney’s conduct of

       deliberately giving a false impression to the jury about the warnings contained on the Bendix

       brake boxes was still improper, prejudicial, and deprived plaintiff of a fair trial; (5) the trial court

       was in the best position to determine the effect that defendant’s attorney’s misconduct had on the

       jury and properly found, without speculating, that defendant’s attorney’s misconduct had

                                                         12
       prejudiced plaintiff; and (6) the trial record in this case does not support the jury’s verdict or its

       finding on the special interrogatory in the face of defendant’s attorney’s misconduct and the

       denial of a fair trial for plaintiff. For all of the reasons set forth, therefore, plaintiff asks that we

       affirm the trial court’s grant of plaintiff’s motion for new trial.

¶ 25           A trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial will not be reversed on appeal absent an

       abuse of discretion. Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois, 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 38. The

       threshold for finding an abuse of discretion is a high one and will not be overcome unless it can

       be said that the trial court’s ruling was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or that no reasonable

       person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court. See Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21,

       36 (2009); In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 460 (2008). A trial court’s decision on a motion for

       new trial is given great deference on appeal because the trial court had the opportunity to

       consider the conduct of the trial as a whole and is in a much better position than the reviewing

       court to consider the effects of any errors that occurred, the fairness of the trial to all of the

       parties, and whether substantial justice was accomplished. See Reidelberger v. Highland Body

       Shop, Inc., 83 Ill. 2d 545, 548 (1981); Boren v. BOC Group, Inc., 385 Ill. App. 3d 248, 254

       (2008). It was the trial court, after all, that had the first-hand opportunity to observe the

       appearance of the witnesses, their manner in testifying, and the circumstances aiding in the

       determination of credibility. See Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 456 (1992). A reviewing

       court, therefore, should not overturn a trial court’s grant of a motion for new trial merely because

       the reviewing court would have come to a different conclusion on the facts presented. Boren, 385

       Ill. App. 3d at 254.

¶ 26           In determining whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in ruling upon a

       motion for new trial, the reviewing court will consider whether the jury’s verdict was supported

                                                           13
       by the evidence and whether the losing party was denied a fair trial. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 455.

       Plaintiff’s main assertion in the instant case is that she was denied a fair trial by the conduct of

       defendant’s attorney. Although it is well settled that a party is entitled to a fair trial and not a

       perfect one (see Garest v. Booth, 2014 IL App (1st) 121845, ¶ 48), the misconduct and improper

       argument of an attorney may, under certain circumstances, warrant the grant of a motion for new

       trial (see Gapinski v. Gujrati, 2017 IL App (3d) 150502, ¶ 54). For such a grant to be justified,

       however, the improper conduct of the attorney must have substantially prejudiced the moving

       party. See id. Of more specific relevance to this case, the violation of an order in limine will

       constitute reversible error if the following three requirements have been met: (1) the order was

       specific; (2) the violation was clear; and (3) the moving party was prejudiced by the violation

       (the violation deprived the moving party of a fair trial). Tucker v. Division Sales, Inc., 315 Ill.

       App. 3d 472, 476 (2000); Larkin v. George, 2016 IL App (1st) 152209, ¶ 11.

¶ 27           In the present case, after reviewing the record, we find that the trial court properly

       determined that plaintiff had been deprived of a fair trial by defendant’s attorney’s conduct

       relative to the photograph matter and properly granted plaintiff’s motion for new trial on that

       basis. We reach that conclusion for two reasons. First, the record in this case shows that the

       requirements set forth above were satisfied for the grant of a new trial to be warranted based

       upon the violation of an order in limine. See Tucker, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 476; Larkin, 2016 IL

       App (1st) 152209, ¶ 11. The record in this case established that at the final pretrial conference,

       defendant’s attorney sought and obtained an oral agreement from plaintiff’s attorney on the pre-

       disclosure of exhibits. That agreement was clear, specific, and uncomplicated—prior-afternoon

       notice was required for exhibits that the party intended to use in direct examination and morning-

       of notice was required for exhibits that the party anticipated using in cross-examination. The

                                                          14
parties entered into that agreement on the record in the presence of the trial court, and the

agreement essentially became the trial court’s order in limine as the trial court’s written order

indicated that defendant’s request on pre-disclosure was “PASSED,” presumably in recognition

or acknowledgment of the parties’ agreement.Despite that agreement/order, however,

defendant’s attorney chose not to pre-disclose the two photographs that he anticipated using in

his cross-examination of Brandon LaFever, decedent’s son and an important plaintiff witness,

because defendant’s attorney did not want to give plaintiff’s attorney the opportunity to prepare

Brandon for possible cross-examination questions about the Bendix brake boxes. At the most

basic level, the violation of the agreement/order in limine caused the exact prejudice that

defendant’s attorney had intended—it deprived plaintiff’s attorney of the opportunity to prepare

Brandon for any possible cross-examination that could arise from the photographs, regardless of

whether the photographs were actually admitted into evidence or shown to the jury. In addition

to that basic prejudice, however, the trial court noted when ruling upon plaintiff’s motion for

new trial that defendant’s attorney’s conduct was deeply troubling and egregious, that it put

plaintiff at a huge tactical disadvantage, and that it had the potential to impact the outcome of the

trial. That assessment was not based upon speculation, as defendant contends, but upon the trial

court’s first-hand opportunity to observe the entire trial and to evaluate the error in the context of

those proceedings. See Reidelberger, 83 Ill. 2d at 548; Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 456; Boren, 385 Ill.

App. 3d at 254. Therefore, because the record in this case shows that there was a specific order

in limine on pre-disclosure, that defendant’s attorney clearly violated that order with regard to

the two photographs, and that plaintiff was prejudiced as a result of that violation, the trial court

was well within its discretion to grant plaintiff’s motion for new trial. See Tucker, 315 Ill. App.

3d at 476; Larkin, 2016 IL App (1st) 152209, ¶ 11.

                                                 15
¶ 28          In reaching that conclusion, we disagree with defendant’s assertion that no such order

       in limine existed in this case. The defendant’s attorney who violated the order in limine

       acknowledged the existence of the order during the sidebar conference that was held when the

       photograph matter was occurring. In addition, although the specific terms of the pre-disclosure

       rule were not reflected in the trial court’s written order, they were contained in the parties’ oral

       agreement on pre-disclosure, and the record shows that both sides were well aware of the

       existence of that rule. This is not a case where an order in limine was violated because the

       attorney did not know or was uncertain about the specific terms of the order. Compare

       Reidelberger, 83 Ill. 2d at 550-58 (upholding the reversal of the trial court’s grant of a motion for

       new trial where the trial court’s orders in limine were not clear and the record did not support the

       trial court’s finding that the orders in limine were violated). To the contrary, in this case

       defendant’s attorney understood the order in limine but deliberately chose not to abide by it.

¶ 29          Our second reason for finding that the trial court’s grant of a new trial was proper in this

       case is because of the additional prejudice that was caused to plaintiff as a result of the questions

       that defendant’s attorney asked Brandon regarding Brandon’s knowledge or memory of any

       asbestos warnings contained on the Bendix brake boxes. When defendant’s attorney asked

       Brandon if he remembered any warnings on the Bendix brake boxes about not using compressed

       air or blowing off dust, defendant’s attorney compounded the error that had already occurred by

       improperly suggesting to the jury, under the guise of trying to refresh Brandon’s recollection,

       that the exact precautionary warnings that plaintiff claimed were missing in this case were

       contained on the outside of the Bendix brake boxes, even though defendant’s attorney knew that

       no such warnings existed. The additional prejudice caused by that false suggestion was

       significant because the jury had heard testimony that the decedent had used Bendix brand

                                                         16
       replacement brakes and could have improperly been led to believe that the decedent had received

       the warnings in question, albeit through another product manufacturer. Such skulduggery cannot

       be condoned. Plaintiff’s attorney promptly moved for a mistrial, but the trial court reserved

       ruling on that motion and gave the jury a curative instruction instead. Contrary to defendant’s

       assertion on appeal, that instruction did not comply with what plaintiff’s attorney had

       requested—to tell the jury that it was to disregard any suggestion that there was a warning label

       that said anything similar to what defendant’s attorney had indicated—and was insufficient

       because it left open to the jury the possibility that such warnings existed on the Bendix boxes. In

       hindsight, after having seen the entire jury trial take place and having been able to evaluate the

       error in the context of those proceedings, the trial court determined that a new trial was

       warranted. In so doing, as noted above, the trial court indicated in its comments that defendant’s

       attorney’s conduct was deeply troubling and egregious, that it put plaintiff at a huge tactical

       disadvantage, and that it had the potential to affect the outcome of the trial. Based upon the

       record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s ruling on the motion for new trial was

       arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or that no reasonable person would have taken the view

       adopted by the trial court. See Tucker, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 476-77 (reversing the trial court’s

       judgment and remanding for a new trial where the plaintiff was prejudiced by questions that the

       defendants’ attorney asked of the plaintiff’s expert witness that implied information or arguments

       to the jury that were in violation of the order in limine). We, therefore, find that the trial court did

       not commit an abuse of discretion in granting plaintiff’s motion for new trial.

¶ 30                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 31           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island

       County.

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¶ 32   Affirmed.

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