Court Opinion

ID: 9794856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:12:56.887341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:20.291635
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s statement that “the basic right involved in this case is the right to counsel on appeal established in Douglas v. California.” I further disagree with the conclusion that Anders v. California, 386 US 738, 87 S Ct 1396, 18 L ed2d 493 (1967) should be applied retrospectively.①
Douglas v. California, 372 US 353, 83 S Ct 814, 9 L ed2d 811 (1963) held that an indigent defendant was entitled under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to have counsel appointed to prosecute his appeal and that a review of the record by the state appellate court for errors in the trial was not a substitute for the defendant’s right of counsel.
In Fox v. Oregon, 388 US 466, 87 S Ct 2129, 18 L ed2d 1324 (1967) and Elliott v. Oregon, 387 US 571, 87 S Ct 2070, 18 L ed2d 967 (1967) it was held that even where counsel is appointed to' represent the indigent defendant on appeal and counsel withdraws on the ground that he regards an appeal as frivolous the procedure does not satisfy necessary constitutional safeguards. It should be noted, however, that in Fox v. Oregon and Elliott v. Oregon the United States *441Supreme Court vacated our earlier decisions in these cases on the basis of Anders, not upon the basis of Douglas. It is evident, therefore, that both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Oregon have regarded Anders and not Douglas as controlling the issue raised in the present case.
Since Anders rather than Douglas is the basis of petitioner’s claim, he is not entitled to relief unless Anders should be given retrospective effect. It is my opinion that it should not be given this effect.
.We learn from Linkletter v. Walker, 381 US 618, 85 S Ct 1731, 14 L ed2d 601 (1965) that in determining whether a rule is to operate retrospectively the court is to “weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” 381 US at 629. The fact that there is a likelihood of unreliability in the truth-determining process in itself is not enough to call for the retrospective application of a rule.②
As the Court explained in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 US 719, 729, 86 S Ct 1772, 16 L ed2d 882 (1966), the question of whether retrospective application of a principle is to be made is “a question of probabilities” and the court “must take account, among other factors, of the extent to which other safeguards are available to protect the integrity of the truth-determining process at trial.” If, after taking into account these other factors, it appears that the deprivation of the accused’s right did not constitute a “clear danger of *442convicting the innocent,” the principle will not be given retrospective operation. Tehan v. United States ex rel Shott, 382 US 406, 416, 86 S Ct 459, 15 L ed2d 453 (1966).
The failure to provide the safeguard required by Anders does not constitute a “clear danger of convicting the innocent.” In the circumstances under which Anders is applicable the accused has had the advice of counsel on appeal. Counsel’s advice is to the effect that an appeal would be frivolous. If counsel withdraws at this point, the accused has lost only his counsel’s skill in putting together in support of the appeal an argument which we may assume counsel has previously considered and rejected. The probability that such a contrived argument will be of such substance as to warrant a reversal of the judgment of conviction and an acquittal or a new trial is minimal. Certainly the failure to provide the accused with counsel’s talent for imaginative legal argument does not constitute a “clear danger of convicting the innocent.”
The danger in a case such as the present is even less clear than where the appeal is from the original conviction. An habitual criminal proceeding presents the narrow issue of whether the accused has a record of previous convictions. The probability of error in such proceedings is correspondingly narrowed. The likelihood that withdrawing counsel could conjure up an argument which would result in reversal is also correspondingly less.
The majority opinion cites several cases in which it claims that the Supreme Court applied Anders retrospectively. With one exception I interpret these cases to mean only that the principle announced in Anders is to be applied to cases which were pending on appeal *443or could be directly appealed at the time Anders was decided. This was the status of all but one of the cases cited.
Walker v. Wainwright, 387 US 236, 87 S Ct 1708, 18 L ed2d 747 (1967), relied upon by the majority, presents a different problem. In that ease the validity of a judgment was attacked through a petition for habeas corpus. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the state court “for further consideration in light of Anders v. California.” Thus it appears that Anders was applied retrospectively. However, the Court did not discuss the question of retrospectivity. I cannot bring myself to believe that the Court if presented with the question would hold that the rule in Anders is to be applied retrospectively. As I have explained above, the Supreme Court has taken the position that not all constitutional principles are to be applied retrospectively. Of all the constitutional principles which the Court has identified I can think of none that is less deserving of retrospective operation than the principle announced in Anders. I would, therefore, treat Anders as non-retrospective until and unless the Supreme Court expressly holds to the contrary.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Perry, C. J., concurs in this dissent.

 Petitioner’s appeal from the enhanced sentence was dismissed by this court on October 11, 1966. Anders v. California, supra, was not decided until May 8, 1967. We are thus presented with the question whether Anders should be given retrospective effect.

 Although this was the test laid down in Linkletter, it was narrowed by Tehan v. United States ex rel Shott, 382 US 406, 86 S Ct 459, 15 L ed2d 453 (1966). See Traynor, Conflict of Laws in Time: The Sweep of New Rules in Criminal Law, 1967 Duke L J 713, 725-26.