Court Opinion

ID: 9962124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 19:10:11.938527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:52.990130
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Powers, 2024-Ohio-1521.]

                                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                          TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                             BUTLER COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

        Appellee,                                  :     CASE NO. CA2023-09-100

                                                   :          OPINION
     - vs -                                                    4/22/2024
                                                   :

 JOHN LINCOLN POWERS,                              :

        Appellant.                                 :

     CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                        Case No. CR2022-11-1540

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Greer, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Christopher Bazeley, for appellant.

        S. POWELL, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, John Lincoln Powers, appeals his conviction in the Butler County

Court of Common Pleas after a jury found him guilty of one count of second-degree felony

endangering children. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm Powers' conviction.

        {¶ 2} On December 12, 2022, the Butler County Grand Jury returned an

indictment charging Powers with one count of endangering children in violation of R.C.
                                                                            Butler CA2023-09-100

2919.22(B)(1), a second-degree felony in accordance with R.C. 2919.22(E)(1)(d), and

one count of murder, an unclassified felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B). According to

the bill of particulars, these charges arose after it was alleged Powers caused serious

physical harm to his two-month old infant daughter, Kiara, that resulted in the child's death

while she was in his sole custody sometime between April 4 and May 10, 2022. The bill

of particulars alleged that an autopsy was thereafter performed on Kiara's body that

revealed the child had suffered a "massive head injury" that "killed her" while she was in

Powers' care on the morning of May 10, 2022. The bill of particulars also alleged that

Kiara's autopsy revealed "healing brain injuries" and "signs of historical injuries commonly

associated with abuse" to her body.

       {¶ 3} On June 20, 2023, a seven-day jury trial began on the matter. Following

the presentation of the evidence, which included several unobjected to photographs taken

during Kiara's autopsy, the jury returned a verdict finding Powers guilty of endangering

children, but not guilty of murder. Several weeks later, on August 10, 2023, the trial court

held a sentencing hearing where it sentenced Powers on that endangering children

charge to an indefinite term of eight to 12 years in prison, less 235 days of jail-time credit.1

The trial court also ordered Powers to pay $1,750 in restitution to Kiara's mother and

notified Powers that he would be subject to a mandatory postrelease control term for up

to three years, but not less than 18 months, upon his release from prison. The trial court

issued its judgment of conviction entry on August 16, 2023. Powers filed a timely notice

of appeal from the trial court's judgment of conviction entry on September 13, 2023.

       {¶ 4} Powers' appeal now properly before this court for decision, Powers has

raised three assignments of error for review.

1. The record indicates that Powers has an anticipated prison release date of December 16, 2030.
                                                   -2-
                                                                   Butler CA2023-09-100

      {¶ 5} Assignment of Error No. 1:

      {¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY ALLOWING

GRUESOME AUTOPSY PHOTOGRAPHS TO BE SHOWN TO THE JURY.

      {¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, Powers argues the trial court committed plain

error by admitting into evidence seven photographs taken during Kiara's autopsy. To

support this claim, Powers argues the introduction of those photographs was unfairly

prejudicial to him due to their "gruesome" nature in that they "graphically show her with

her scalp pulled back, brain exposed, blood oozing from her head, and her inverted brain

on a cutting board." We disagree.

      {¶ 8} Normally, this court "will not reverse a trial court's decision regarding the

admission of evidence absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Buell, 12th Dist. Warren

No. CA2015-11-102, 2016-Ohio-5477, ¶ 32. Powers, however, concedes that he did not

object during trial to the admission of any of the seven challenged photographs. By failing

to object, Powers has forfeited all but plain error on appeal. State v. Shouse, 12th Dist.

Brown No. CA2013-11-014, 2014-Ohio-4620, ¶ 20. Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), "[p]lain

errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not

brought to the attention of the court." "'By its very terms, [Crim.R. 52(B)] places three

limitations on a reviewing court's decision to correct an error' that was not raised in the

trial court." State v. Garrett, 171 Ohio St.3d 139, 2022-Ohio-4218, ¶ 63, quoting State v.

Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002).

      {¶ 9} "To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show (1) that there was an

error, (2) that the error was 'plain,' i.e., obvious, and (3) that the error affected the

appellant's 'substantial rights,'" State v. Drain, 170 Ohio St.3d 107, 2022-Ohio-3698, ¶

52, which the Ohio Supreme Court has "interpreted to mean that the error affected the

outcome of the trial." State v. Brinkman, 169 Ohio St.3d 127, 2022-Ohio-2550, ¶ 45. "The

                                             -3-
                                                                      Butler CA2023-09-100

elements of the plain-error doctrine are conjunctive: all three must apply to justify an

appellate court's intervention." State v. Bailey, 171 Ohio St.3d 486, 2022-Ohio-4407, ¶

9. It is the second part of that three-part test that "gives teeth" to the Ohio Supreme

Court's belief that "the plain-error doctrine is warranted only under exceptional

circumstances to prevent injustice." Id. at ¶ 15, citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91

(1978), paragraph three of the syllabus ("[n]otice of plain error under Crim.R. 52[B] is to

be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a

manifest miscarriage of justice").

       {¶ 10} Given these principles, for Powers to prevail under a plain error standard of

review, Powers must establish: (1) that the trial court erred by admitting the seven

challenged photographs taken during Kiara's autopsy into evidence; (2) that the error was

obvious; and (3) that there is a reasonable probability that the admission of those

photographs affected the outcome of his trial. Yet, in his appellate brief, Powers merely

argues that the trial court committed plain error by admitting those photographs into

evidence because there was "no indication that the trial court made any effort to minimize

the impact of the photographs or limit the jury's exposure," and because there was "no

need for the photographs because Powers did not dispute that Kiara died as a result of a

serious head injury."

       {¶ 11} However, in cases where the defendant is being tried for murder, the Ohio

Supreme Court has determined that "autopsy photographs depicting a victim's injuries

'[are] probative of the manner of death and [the defendant's] specific intent to kill.'" State

v. Nicholson, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-604, ¶ 148, quoting State v. Shine, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 105352, 2018-Ohio-1972, ¶ 87, citing State v. Craig, 110 Ohio St.3d 306,

2006-Ohio-4571, ¶ 93. The Ohio Supreme Court has also "upheld the admission of

gruesome photographs when the photographs 'supported the coroner's testimony and

                                              -4-
                                                                              Butler CA2023-09-100

provided a perspective of the victims' wounds.'" Id., quoting State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d

512, 2011-Ohio-4215, ¶ 142.2 That is exactly what occurred here. Therefore, while it

may be true that the Ohio Supreme Court has criticized the admission of "excessive

crime-scene and autopsy photographs in a murder trial, because gruesome photographs

expose the jurors to horrific images and might serve no useful purpose except to inflame

the passions of the jurors," id., citing State v. Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139, 2019-Ohio-4539,

¶ 257, the trial court did not commit error, plain or otherwise, by admitting the challenged

photographs into evidence in this case. Powers' claim otherwise lacks merit.

        {¶ 12} Alternatively, even if we were to find the trial court's decision to admit the

seven challenged photographs into evidence was error, which we do not, there is nothing

in the record to indicate the photographs' admission affected the outcome of Powers' trial.

That is to say, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Powers was prejudiced by the

photographs' admission into evidence. See State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-

Ohio-2459, ¶ 22 (noting that when reviewing for plain error, "even if the error is obvious,

it must have affected substantial rights," thus requiring "[t]he accused * * * to demonstrate

a reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice"); see also State v. Perry, 101

Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, ¶ 23 (rejecting the notion that there is any category of

forfeited error that is not subject to the plain error rule's requirement of prejudicial effect

on the outcome).

        {¶ 13} Had that been the case, thereby inflaming the jurors' passions against

Powers, the jury certainly would have found Powers guilty of murdering Kiara rather than

awarding Powers with an acquittal on that charge. As for the offense that Powers actually

2. Photographs are deemed to be "gruesome" where they depict "actual bodies or body parts," because
"photos of blood stains or fire damage to property do not have a shock value equivalent to the photograph
of a corpse." State v. DePew, 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 281 (1988).

                                                    -5-
                                                                     Butler CA2023-09-100

was convicted of, endangering children, Powers' "substantial rights cannot be prejudiced

where the remaining evidence, standing alone, is so overwhelming that it constitutes

appellant's guilt, and the outcome of the case would have been the same regardless of

evidence admitted erroneously." State v. Davis, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-579, 2002

Ohio App. LEXIS 1700, *13 (Apr. 18, 2002). As discussed more fully below in Powers'

third assignment of error, that is certainly the case here with respect to Powers' conviction

for child endangering in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) and (E)(1)(d). Therefore, because

Powers cannot establish error, plain or otherwise, stemming from the trial court's decision

to admit into evidence the photographs taken during Kiara's autopsy, Powers' first

assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.

       {¶ 14} Assignment of Error No. 2:

       {¶ 15} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED

POWERS       THE    OPPORTUNITY        TO    PRESENT       FAVORABLE       EVIDENCE       IN

REBUTTAL.

       {¶ 16} In his second assignment of error, Powers argues the trial court erred by

excluding from evidence certain text messages exchanged between himself and Kiara's

mother used to refresh his recollection at trial. Powers also argues the trial court erred

by preventing him from having his brother, James, testify to specific instances in which

he had taken good care of James' children in the past, thereby establishing himself as

someone who was "capable of caring for children without harming them." We disagree

with both of Powers' claims.

       {¶ 17} To support his claims, Powers initially argues that the trial court's decision

to exclude the above referenced evidence "prevented [him] from rebutting the evidence

presented by the state" and "allowed a one-sided picture to be painted to the jury that he,

out of frustration and incompetence, was the only one who could have possibly injured

                                              -6-
                                                                         Butler CA2023-09-100

Kiara." However, as it relates to the text messages exchanged between Powers and

Kiara's mother that Powers used to refresh his recollection at trial, the trial court properly

excluded those text messages from evidence in accordance with Evid.R. 612.

        {¶ 18} Pursuant to Evid.R. 612, "a prior written statement of a witness can be used

at trial to refresh the memory of the witness so long as the adverse party has an

opportunity to inspect the statement during the trial, cross-examine the witness on it, and

introduce the relevant portions of it into evidence." State v. Watson, 11th Dist. Trumbull

No. 2011-T-0053, 2012-Ohio-5929, ¶ 37. Specifically, Evid.R. 612 provides, in pertinent

part:

              If a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the purpose
              of testifying, either: (1) while testifying; or (2) before testifying,
              if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the
              interests of justice, an adverse party is entitled to have the
              writing produced at the hearing. The adverse party is also
              entitled to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon,
              and to introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the
              testimony of the witness.

The rule thus permits a witness "to review the prior statement to refresh [the witness']

memory after [the witness' memory] has been exhausted or nearly exhausted and then

to testify on the basis of [his or her] present knowledge of the facts." State v. Curtis, 12th

Dist. Brown No. CA2009-01-004, 2009-Ohio-6740, ¶ 42.

        {¶ 19} But, while it may be true that Evid.R. 612 permits a witness to review a

writing to refresh his or her recollection at trial, "[t]he writing 'merely serves as a memory

jogging device.'" State v. Thomas, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010-10-099, 2012-Ohio-

2430, ¶ 52, quoting State v. Gunn, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 16617, 1998 Ohio App.

LEXIS 3593, *28 (Aug. 7, 1998).          This means "the statement used to refresh the

witnesses' recollection is not admitted into evidence unless requested by the adverse

party and is not to be considered as substantive evidence." State v. B.C.M., 12th Dist.

                                                -7-
                                                                    Butler CA2023-09-100

Warren Nos. CA2016-07-059 and CA2016-07-062, 2017-Ohio-1497, ¶ 41.                  This is

because, "[t]he testimony of the witness whose recollection has been refreshed is the

evidence, not the contents of the writing." State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-

Ohio-2577, ¶ 57. Therefore, because the state, as the adverse party, did not request the

text messages that Powers used to refresh his recollection be admitted into evidence at

trial, the trial court properly excluded those text messages from evidence in accordance

with Evid.R. 612. Powers' claim otherwise lacks merit.

       {¶ 20} Next, as it relates to the trial court's decision to exclude the testimony of

Powers' brother, James, as to specific instances in which he had taken good care of

James' three children in the past, the trial court properly denied this testimony from being

introduced into evidence in accordance with Evid.R. 405(B). Pursuant to that rule, in

cases in which character or trait of character of a person is an essential element of a

charge, claim, or defense, proof may be made of "specific instances of his conduct." State

v. Stidham, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA92-02-022, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 5225, *5 (Oct.

12, 1992). Therefore, given the plain language of the rule, the method for proving

character by specific instances of conduct under Evid.R. 405(B) can only be done in cases

where character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge,

claim, or defense.

       {¶ 21} In this case, however, the fact that Powers may have taken care of James'

three children in the past without causing them physical harm does not go to any essential

element of either endangering children or murder, the two offenses for which Powers was

being tried. It was also not an essential element to any defense that Powers' either raised,

or could have raised, as part of his defense case-in-chief. Therefore, because the method

for proving character by specific instances of conduct can only be done in cases where

character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or

                                             -8-
                                                                     Butler CA2023-09-100

defense, the trial court properly excluded James' proffered testimony in accordance with

Evid.R. 405(B). Powers' claim otherwise lacks merit. Accordingly, finding no merit to

either of the two arguments raised by Powers' herein, Powers' second assignment of error

also lacks merit and is overruled.

       {¶ 22} Assignment of Error No. 3:

       {¶ 23} THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO

SHOW THAT POWERS CAUSED THE INJURY THAT CAUSED KIARA'S DEATH.

       {¶ 24} In his third assignment of error, Powers argues his conviction for one count

of second-degree felony endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) and

(E)(1)(d) was not supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree.

       {¶ 25} "A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence invokes a due process

concern and raises the question whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the

jury verdict as a matter of law." State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422, 2017-Ohio-9423, ¶

165, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). Such a challenge

"requires a determination as to whether the state has met its burden of production at trial."

State v. Boles, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2012-06-012, 2013-Ohio-5202, ¶ 34. "The

relevant inquiry is 'whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Roper, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2021-

05-019, 2022-Ohio-244, ¶ 39, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991),

paragraph two of the syllabus. "'Proof beyond a reasonable doubt' is proof of such

character that an ordinary person would be willing to rely and act upon it in the most

important of the person's own affairs."       R.C. 2901.05(E).     "[A] reversal based on

insufficient evidence leads to an acquittal that bars a retrial." State v. Gideon, 165 Ohio

St.3d 156, 2020-Ohio-6961, ¶ 27.

                                              -9-
                                                                     Butler CA2023-09-100

       {¶ 26} As noted above, Powers was convicted of one count of endangering

children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), a second-degree felony in accordance with

R.C. 2919.22(E)(1)(d). Pursuant to those two statutes, "no person shall abuse a child

under 18 years of age where the abuse results in serious physical harm." State v. Reed,

12th Dist. Warren No. CA2022-03-012, 2023-Ohio-878, ¶ 37. "[T]he culpable mental

state for endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) is that of recklessness."

State v. Cunningham, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-04-083, 2017-Ohio-4363, ¶ 27, citing

State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151 (1980), paragraph one of the syllabus. "A person acts

recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards

a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain

result or is likely to be of a certain nature." R.C. 2901.22(C). The phrase "serious physical

harm" is defined by R.C. 2901.01(A)(5)(c) to mean "[a]ny physical harm that involves

some permanent incapacity, whether partial or total, or that involves some temporary,

substantial incapacity[.]"

       {¶ 27} Powers argues his conviction for endangering children was not supported

by sufficient evidence because there was no "direct evidence" that he ever acted

recklessly to cause Kiara serious physical harm. However, although the record may not

contain any direct evidence to establish Powers' guilt, such as eyewitness testimony as

to what caused Kiara's injuries, the record contains overwhelming circumstantial evidence

to prove Powers' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That is to say, the record contains

overwhelming circumstantial evidence that it was Powers who acted recklessly in causing

Kiara to suffer serious physical harm to her person sometime between April 4 and May

10, 2022 as alleged in the indictment. This includes the fact that Kiara suffered significant

head trauma during the late evening or early morning hours of May 9 and 10, 2022 that

resulted in Kiara's brain sustaining substantial, life-ending injuries, while she was in

                                             - 10 -
                                                                   Butler CA2023-09-100

Powers' sole custody and care. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2017-

04-049, 2018-Ohio-916, ¶ 65 ("[t]he fact that the infant was healthy until being left alone

in appellant's care is circumstantial evidence that appellant abused the infant and caused

the infant serious physical harm while the infant was in his custody").

       {¶ 28} "'[C]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if that

evidence would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.'" State v. McKnight, 107 Ohio St.3d 101, 2005-Ohio-6046, ¶ 75, quoting State v.

Heinish, 50 Ohio St.3d 231, 238 (1990). "A conviction based on purely circumstantial

evidence is no less sound than a conviction based upon direct evidence." State v.

Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 27 (1987); State v. Zimmerer, 12th Dist. Butler No.

CA2019-10-176, 2020-Ohio-3921, ¶ 26 ("[a] conviction based on circumstantial evidence

is no less sound than one based on direct evidence"). "'It is not unusual that evidence of

shaken baby syndrome [or abusive head injury] may be primarily circumstantial,

especially where a child is in the sole custody of one adult at the time the injuries are

sustained.'" State v. Milby, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2013-02-014, 2013-Ohio-4331, ¶

39, quoting State v. Woodson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85727, 2005-Ohio-5691, ¶ 53.

Therefore, finding Powers' conviction for endangering children in violation of R.C.

2919.22(B)(1) and (E)(1)(d) was supported by sufficient evidence, albeit circumstantial,

Powers' third assignment of error likewise lacks merit and is overruled.

       {¶ 29} Judgment affirmed.

       PIPER and BYRNE, JJ., concur.

                                            - 11 -