Court Opinion

ID: 9579064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:51:09.000404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:15.213734
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
concurring specially.
I am contented with the result in this case as reached by the majority opinion. It indeed would be an anomaly for this Court to conclude that an action for wrongful death could be barred prior to the time that facts were available to secure the appointment in Wyoming of the personal representative, who must bring the action under the statute. In effect, the Court, while not articulating the proposition, has attached a condition to the two year period, which is that facts necessary to secure the appointment of the personal representative must be known before the two year statute begins to run.
I cannot agree with the rejection by the majority of the discovery rule as it applies to the two year period in the wrongful death statute. I do not agree that the limitation period found in the wrongful death statute is a condition precedent, and would not follow West Virginia law on that proposition. Instead, I believe that the limitation period in this statute correctly is identified as a statute of repose like Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-111, as the majority opinion at page 442. While we have rejected the application of the discovery rule with respect to Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-111, we may be confronted with different policy considerations with respect to wrongful death than we were in connection with damages to property.
I am convinced that, unless some exception, like that found in this case, other than the discovery rule is adopted in future cases, we may be confronted with a constitutional dilemma. The Constitution of the State of Wyoming precisely and succinctly provides in Art. 1, Section 8:
All courts shall be open and every person for an injury done to person, reputation or property shall have justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
We previously have spoken in a prophetic tone with respect to the constitutional struggles of other courts when confronted with a situation in which a remedy, which could be foreclosed by a statute of repose, is lost before the facts that support the remedy are known.
There is a second cluster of constitutionally disposed cases addressing statute of repose where there is the potential for the period for filing a claim to terminate before the incident of damage or loss has actually occurred. See, for example, Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo.1980); Carr v. Broward County, 541 So.2d 92 (Fla.1989); Shessel v. Stroup, 253 *446Ga. 56, 316 S.E.2d 155 (1984); Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982); Daugaard v. Baltic Co-op. Bldg. Supply Ass’n, 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D.1984); Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11 (Tex.1985); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.1984); and Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equipment, Inc., 148 Wis.2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989). Those cases have a logical relevance to this case, where premised on a constitutional right, to be able to assert a remedy before a statutory abnegation of the right occurs. Shessel, 316 S.E.2d 155; Neagle, 685 S.W.2d 11. Although we have no equivalent worker’s compensation precedent which has been presented or found in our research, these cases appropriately direct attention to the same problem of exhaustion of the right to a remedy before the opportunity for its utilization may have occurred, Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St.3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626 (1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1066, 108 S.Ct. 1029, 98 L.Ed.2d 993 (1988), and sometimes before the incident of damage or loss has occurred, Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961 (1984). Although currently centered in the field of medical malpractice,1 Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 33 Ohio St.3d 54, 514 N.E.2d 709 (1987), the cases involve a broad array of statutes where a repose and not a limitation function is introduced as the boundary of time for action by the injured party.2 Jackson v. Mannesmann Demag Corp., 435 So.2d 725 (Ala.1983); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983); Hanson v.Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D.1986); Kennedy v. Cumberland Engineering Co., Inc., 471 A.2d 195 (R.I.1984); Daugaard, 349 N.W.2d 419. Within this class of cases, there is the injured child segment. Strahler v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 7 (Mo.1986); Coffey v. Bresnahan, 127 N.H. 687, 506 A.2d 310 (1986); Mominee, 503 N.E.2d 717; Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.1983). There is also within some of the cases an analytical trend that has developed which avoids the determination of textural [sic] unconstitutionality in the statute of repose situation by denying application of the limitation until a reasonable time after the right might have been pursued following damage and known knowledge of injury. Kohnke v. St. Paul *447Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 144 Wis.2d 352, 424 N.W.2d 191 (1988). This adaptation applies a condition to the statutory language that, despite its terms, if the incident of damage or discovery occurs after the expiration of the period provided, a reasonable time continues to exist for the claim to be made. Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So.2d 1263 (Ala.1983); Kenyon, 688 P.2d at 979, Cameron, J., concurring; Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41 (Colo.1984). See also Coffey, 506 A.2d 310.
The obvious philosophical and sociological concern that a right which actually exists as the result of the misconduct of a person may be lost before anything can be done to pursue attainment of a remedy has authored an obvious trend either in construction to achieve constitutionality or a determination of unconstitutionality in these statute of repose eases. Phillips, 611 P.2d 821; Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 Vand.L.Rev. 627, 644 (1985). A perspective of constitutionality which initially developed a number of years ago when statutes of repose first appeared in the construction and later products liability segments of the law has now developed a clear converse trend in recent result. See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose. Judicial Conscience Versus Legislative Will, 34 Vill.L.Rev. 397 (1989) and most recent examples found in the Utah cases, Horton v. Goldminer’s Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989); Stilling v. Skankey, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989); and Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989). In the Utah cases, the court held that the Utah architect’s and builder’s statute of repose establishing a seven year limitation was unconstitutional under the open court provision of the Utah Constitution. In analysis of the difference between a statute of limitation which provides a period of time after a right accrues to pursue action and a statute of repose which limits the time for a right of action even though the event may not have yet occurred from which the damage accrues, the Utah court in Horton and Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. pursues the national precedent. The critical concern manifested in the whole periphery of statute of repose cases are those circumstances where the time runs out before the opportunity to pursue relief occurs, Funk, 435 N.W.2d 244, either because the event of damage has not yet developed, Note, Oklahoma’s Statute of Repose Limiting the Liability of Architects and Engineers far Negligence: A Potential Nightmare, 22 Tulsa L.J. 85, 105 (1986), or discovery of the injury may not have occurred, Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470, 298 S.E.2d 484 (1983); Carson, 424 A.2d 825; Berry By and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). This problem is magnified in those cases where medical malpractice injuries to minor children are the subject matter of the litigation. Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 6 Ohio St.3d 300, 452 N.E.2d 1337 (1983). See also Young v. Haines, 41 Cal.3d 883, 226 Cal.Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909 (1986). The same thesis is applied here to permit filing the claim after parentage has been established.
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 765-66 (Wyo.1990).
In the light of our specific constitutional language, I would eschew the specific rejection of the discovery rule encompassed in the majority opinion. We decide the case on a different and appropriate ground, an implied condition that the appointment of a personal representative must be possible before the two year period of limitations can be said to bar the wrongful death action. In effect, we declare the statute to be tolled during that period. I am convinced that there may be other appropriate situations in which to toll the statute. Yet the rejection of the discovery rule may be perceived by practitioners and the trial bench as foreclosing the tolling of the statute.

. See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose. Judicial Conscience Versus Legislative Will, 34 Vill.L.Rev. 397 (1989).

. Statutes of repose and statutes of limitations are often confused. They are similar in that both prescribe the time period within which a plaintiff may commence his suit. The distinguishing feature between the two is the time at which the respective periods commence. Generally, in medical malpractice actions, if the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues and the statutory period commences when the injury occurs or, as is most often the case, when the plaintiff is or should be aware that he has been injured, the statute is properly termed a statute of limitations. If the statutory period commences upon the occurrence of an event, regardless of when the injury occurs, at a time when the plaintiff may or may not be aware of any injury, the statute is properly termed a statute of repose. In the latter case the repose period commences upon the occurrence of an event, such as the negligent act or omission of the health care practitioner, but the injury caused by this act or omission may be latent and therefore not manifest itself until after the statutory period has elapsed. Consequently, the plaintiff's claim may be barred before he is or should be aware that he has been injured or has a claim. Note, supra n. 8, 34 Vill.L.Rev. at 400-01 (footnotes omitted). See Com. v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 238 Va. 595, 385 S.E.2d 865 (1989) (differentiation noted when effecting governmental entities). See also McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am.U.L.Rev. 579 (1981). Phillips, 611 P.2d 821 is not directly defined in designation to be a statute of repose case, although in terminology, the differentiation is recognized. "[T]he statute in question, * * *, is not a statute of limitations but is a grant of immunity from suit." Id. at 831. Cases this court cited generally for precedential support include some of the more influential statute of repose decisions, including Overland Const. Co., Inc. v. Sirmons, 369 So.2d 572 (Fla.1979); Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky.1973); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn.1977); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okl.1977); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978); and Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis.2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975). Compare Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816 (Old. 1988), where that court determined the statute was a statute of limitation without the benefit of the discovery rule and was also unconstitutional under the Oklahoma Constitution.