Court Opinion

ID: 9656253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:44:30.540375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:30.848323
License: Public Domain

DONIELSON, Presiding Judge
(specially concurring).
I agree with the result the majority reaches, but not its reasoning.
I believe the majority misapplies the third prong of the doctor-patient privilege. Absent the finding of insufficient prejudice to constitute reversible error, the proposition this case stands for, in effect, is that a person being questioned by the police can falsely claim illness so as to “buy time” to fabricate an alibi and receive the full protection afforded by the doctor-patient privilege. The reasoning of the majority as to why the doctor-patient privilege should apply is contrary to what the legislature intended when section 622.10 was enacted.
The reason I believe the doctor-patient privilege does not apply to the unique circumstances of this case is because the record abundantly demonstrates the defendant did not have treatment or diagnosis as his purpose when he went to the hospital; instead, his purpose was to avoid the police long enough to concoct an alibi. By saying he was experiencing chest pains, defendant provided himself an opportunity to delay further questioning.
I agree with the trial court’s ruling not to apply the privilege because there is not even a scintilla of evidence in the record to support defendant’s bald, self-serving assertion that he was experiencing chest pains. I think it is peculiar that defendant told the police he was having chest pains and that an ambulance should be summoned, but then, for an unexplained reason, suddenly did not speak to the ambulance crew, attending nurses, or any doctor about his ailments. Once hospitalized, defendant was fully cognizant and displayed no symptoms whatsoever of the ailment he complained of at the police station. He remained mute and uncooperative throughout his hospitalization. The defendant put *725on no evidence that he suffered from a debilitating psychiatric affliction which would cause him to be silent, yet fully cognizant. I find it difficult to imagine that someone who truly experienced chest pains would behave in a manner consistent with the behavior displayed by the defendant. The only reasonable interpretation of these events is that defendant lied about his chest pains. In view of this evidence, the trial court apparently determined the defendant feigned his illness and properly allowed admission of the testimony.
The policy behind the doctor-patient privilege would be left intact by admitting this testimony because defendants who legitimately seek medical treatment would be allowed to use the privilege. I think that even those persons who believe they are ill, but are not diagnosed as being ill, can still use the privilege so long as their purpose was to legitimately seek treatment. While I am not in complete disagreement with the majority’s analysis of the events which transpired inside the hospital, the predicate that the defendant goes to a medical facility for the purpose of treatment is missing.
I, nonetheless, concur with the majority’s decision that admission of this evidence constituted harmless error.