Court Opinion

ID: 9699310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:19:06.795792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:48.670063
License: Public Domain

HUDOCK, Judge,
concurring and dissenting in a statement.
I join only that portion of the majority opinion which affirms the grant of summary judgment against the Harmottas based on the principle of collateral estoppel. Notwithstanding the ambiguous statement by the trial court in its 1925(a) statement, my review of the record convinces me that the court implicitly made the threshold determination that, absent warnings, the silica sand and/or flour in this case was unreasonably dangerous and thus subject to the rubrics of strict liability. Such a threshold determination need not be express. See Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408 (1986) (en banc) (in the absence of a motion requesting the court to make explicit its ruling on the threshold determination of social policy, it will be presumed that, in permitting the case to go to the jury, the determination was made against the defendant).
Additionally, I cannot concur in the social policy determination conducted by my colleagues by which they reach the conclusion that, despite the latent danger, the strict liability question should not have reached the jury. I would find that the strict liability cause of action was properly submitted to the jury. As Appellants conceded that no warnings were given by them, the next matter placed at issue is whether the sophisticated user doctrine should be recognized as a defense to strict liability. Since the majority found the strict liability issue should not have been submitted to the jury, its “holding” that the doctrine is an affirmative defense is dicta.
Finally, I disagree with the statement in dicta that the sophisticated user doctrine should be allowed as a defense to *187strict liability under the facts of this case. Comment (n) to Section 388 states, “a supplier’s duty to warn is discharged by providing information about the product’s dangerous propensities to a third person upon whom it can reasonably rely to communicate the information to the ultimate consumers ...” My review of the record reveals no evidence that Appellants provided such information to the steel industry. Appellants cannot wholly rely on the “sophisticated user” in discharging their duty.
I would reverse the verdict against Walter C. Best, Inc., in the Harmotta appeal, but otherwise affirm the jury awards to the Harmottas and the Phillipses.