Court Opinion

ID: 9554226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 14:04:13.14804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:25.087303
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

RAYMOND WARNCKE,                         §
                                         §    No. 300, 2022
             Defendant-Below,            §
             Appellant                   §
                                         §
             v.                          §    Court Below—Superior Court
                                         §    of the State of Delaware
                                         §
STATE OF DELAWARE,                       §    Cr. ID No: 2110003724(K)
                                         §
             Plaintiff-Below,            §
             Appellee.                   §

                          Submitted: June 7, 2023
                          Decided:   August 8, 2023

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.

                                         ORDER

      This 8th day of August 2023, after consideration of the parties’ briefs, the

record on appeal, and the argument of counsel, it appears to the Court that:

      (1)    On October 8, 2020, Raymond Warncke, then 40-years-old, asked

Tyrone Henry, a 71-year-old man, for a ride to the liquor store. Upon returning to

the house where he was staying, Warncke grew violent, repeatedly punching the

older man in the face, refusing to calm down once police arrived, cursing the

officers, resisting arrest, and kicking the door of one of the patrol vehicles. As a

result, Warncke was charged with, and ultimately convicted of, assault on a person

over 62 years of age, terroristic threatening, criminal mischief for “intentionally or
recklessly caus[ing] damage in an amount less than $5,000[,]”1 and disorderly

conduct. He was thereafter declared a habitual offender—he had previously been

convicted of three violent felonies; aggravated menacing, resisting arrest, and rape

in the fourth degree—and sentenced on the assault charge to 25 years at level V

supervision suspended after 15 years for probation. Both the terroristic-threatening

and criminal-mischief convictions resulted in one-year sentences suspended for one

year of concurrent probation. And he was fined $575 for disorderly conduct.

         (2)    Warncke appeals his sentence on two grounds. The first is that the

Superior Court erred by treating his criminal-mischief conviction as a class A

misdemeanor despite the jury’s failure to make a specific finding that he had caused

more than $1,000 in pecuniary damage. And the second is that the court failed to

consider mitigation evidence when sentencing him for his assault conviction. For

the reasons set forth below, we affirm Warncke’s fifteen-year-prison sentence for

assault in the second degree and remand his criminal-mischief conviction for

resentencing as an unclassified misdemeanor.

         (3)    Warncke first challenges the validity of his criminal-mischief sentence.

There are three degrees of criminal mischief under 11 Del. C. § 811: it is a felony

when the pecuniary loss exceeds $5,000; a class A misdemeanor when the loss

exceeds $1,000 but is below $5,000; and an unclassified misdemeanor when the loss

1
    App. to Opening Br. at A6.
                                            2
is $1,000 or less. Here, although Warncke was charged with class-A-misdemeanor

criminal mischief, the State failed to introduce evidence at trial—besides the

arresting officer’s report, which, in an effort to process the warrant, estimated the

damages at $3,000—showing the specific amount in pecuniary loss to the vehicle.

But what is more important, the trial court failed to specify the amount in damages

needed to justify a guilty verdict on the charge. As a result, no factual finding was

made as to whether the damage to the patrol vehicle exceeded $1,000.

      (4)    Despite the absence of such a finding, the trial court sentenced Warncke

as if he had been convicted of a class A misdemeanor. The State admits that this

was error and requests that Warncke’s sentence be vacated and remanded for

resentencing as an unclassified misdemeanor. We agree with the State—the jury’s

conclusion that Warncke intentionally or recklessly caused some damage to the

police vehicle, although insufficient to support a class A misdemeanor criminal-

mischief charge, is enough to support the unclassified misdemeanor form of the

charge.

      (5)    Warncke’s second argument challenges the validity of the 15-year

sentence that he received for his assault conviction. Specifically, Warncke argues

that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider mitigation evidence

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during his sentencing, relying heavily on the trial judge’s statement at sentencing

that “there are no mitigating factors found in this case[.]”2

       (6)    “When [a] sentence is within the statutory limits,” as was the case here,

“this Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless it is clear that the sentencing

judge relied on impermissible factors or exhibited a closed mind.”3 “A judge

sentences with a closed mind when the sentence is based on a preconceived bias

without consideration of the nature of the offense or the character of the defendant.”4

Stated differently, a “judge must have an open mind for receiving all information

related to the question of mitigation.”5

       (7)    Warncke believes that the trial judge’s statement—that “there are no

mitigating factors found in this case”—is per se evidence of a closed mind,

particularly when viewed against the myriad mitigating factors the defense pointed

to in its sentencing presentation, which included Warncke’s life-long struggles with

mental health and alcoholism and his abusive and dysfunctional childhood.

       (8)    Although the judge’s statement, when viewed in isolation, might seem

uncharitable, the totality of his comments made at sentencing demonstrate a

thorough consideration of the mitigation arguments Warncke presented.              The

2
  Id. at A103.
3
  Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003).
4
  Id.
5
  Id.
                                               4
sentencing judge acknowledged, for example, Warncke’s claim that he was no

longer a violent person, but nevertheless concluded that his extensive criminal

record and current lack of remorse—demonstrated through his insistence that he

acted in self-defense—weighed against taking him at his word. Warncke’s claim to

non-violence was also undermined by his admission, in a pre-sentencing letter to the

court, that he had recently gotten into a fight at the correction facility in which he

was being held. The judge also recognized Warncke’s mental-health needs, ordering

the Department of Correction to conduct the appropriate evaluations and transferring

him to his preferred prison, the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, where

Warncke believed there to be better treatment options. These considerations, taken

together, lead us to conclude that the court did not sentence with a closed mind and

thus did not abuse its discretion.

      NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court be AFFIRMED IN PART and REMANDED IN PART for resentencing

consistent with this Order. Jurisdiction is not retained.

                                               BY THE COURT:

                                               /s/ Gary F. Traynor
                                                     Justice

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