Court Opinion

ID: 9736027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:40:50.276059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:03.459107
License: Public Domain

SIMS, J.
I dissent. I agree with the conclusions of the majority that the jurisdiction of the Board of Permit Appeals *183of the City and County of San Francisco—in the sense of authority to determine a cause in a particular way as distinguished from authority to entertain the cause—is circumscribed insofar as variance matters are concerned by the provisions contained in section 117.3 of the City Charter and in sections 302 and 303 of the City Planning Code. We are also in agreement that the Board’s determination must be sustained if it is supported by substantial evidence.
The facts as set forth in the opinion correctly and fairly set forth the evidence before the administrative body. Differences arise in the interpretation and the legal effect to be given to those facts. These differences are engendered and promoted by the amphibological phraseology used by the Board in complying with its mandate to “specify in its findings the facts relied upon in making” a determination different from that of the Zoning Administrator. (Planning Code, § 303(d).)
“The Board of Permit Appeals finds that there was error on the part of the Zoning Administrator pertaining to the five conditions of Section 302(d) of the Planning Code as set forth below and for the facts and reasons herein specified with regard to each condition:
“(1) That there are exceptional or extraordinary circumstances or conditions applying to the property involved, or to the intended use of the property, that do not apply generally to other property or uses in the same class of district:
“The appellants purchased the property in 1952 when it was located in an R-2 area. They were never given notice of any change, and they presumed justifiably that on the basis of the character of the neighborhood no rezoning would take place. The Zoning Administrator in his opinion indicates appellants gave evidence relating to the question whether the entire ‘block should be reclassified R-2 rather than R-l. ’ ...”
The majority concedes that the applicants have never contended that the failure of the city to give or the failure of the applicants to acquire actual notice of the introduction and passage of the 1960 ordinance was violative of any constitutional safeguards or other statutory requirements. The authorities cited establish that no such notice is necessary where the entire city is embraced in the new ordinance as was the case in 1960. The opinion thereupon correctly concludes that the applicants’ failure to receive personal notice of the change in his zoning classification cannot constitute an “exceptional or extraordinary circumstance or condition” within the meaning *184of the provisions of the Charter and of the Code because everyone in San Francisco was similarly affected.
I would read more into the first finding. It states that the property was purchased in 1952 at a time when the requested use was permitted. (The finding erroneously states that the applicants’ property was located in an area which was zoned R-2 at the time, when in fact it was one of four parcels excepted from the 1948 “first residential” zoning by a special stipulation.) It refers to the character of the neighborhood and to the fact that the Zoning Administrator had received evidence from the applicants relating to the question of whether the entire “ ‘ block should be reclassified R-2 rather than R-l.’ ” I construe this as an imperfect attempt to show that the character of the neighborhood was also a factor giving rise to the circumstances and conditions on which the Board relied. Reference should be made to the findings as a whole.
The second finding reveals the character of the neighborhood. It recites in part: “. . . the lot is located at the fringe of an R-l area. The north portion of the block is R-3. The southern half of the block to the south is R-3. The block to the east is R-3. Immediately to the rear is an apartment house. The properties immediately adjacent to the east and west are two-family dwellings, and the property directly across the street is a two-dwelling unit. ’ ’
The majority acknowledges the possibility of the foregoing integrated interpretation of the facts, but rejects the competency of the facts found to sustain the conclusions predicated thereon. It is stated: “In any event, the fact that the subject lot may be on the fringe of a zone in which all of the dwellings conform to the ‘R-l’ classification and the fact that there may be multiple dwellings in the zone in which the subject lot is located are not exceptional or extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of condition (1) of section 302, subd. (d), because these circumstances apply generally to other parcels of property located in this zone. ’ ’
The facts show that the block on which the property is situated is a wedge or bastion intruding into the general areas of less restrictive zoning which encompass the lots abutting on the block on the south, on the north and on the east. This condition does not necessarily apply generally to other property in the district to the west of the block. Concededly it applies generally to all lots within the block and alone would' not suffice to justify the action of the Board. Examination of *185the situation within the block discloses that the subject property itself is surrounded by existing two-family uses, which, although rendered nonconforming by the 1960 zoning, constitute circumstances and conditions which do not apply generally to all of the property on the block, much less the district.
In short, there are sufficient criteria to satisfy the provisions found in section 117.3 of the Charter, and in section 302(d) of the Code and re-echoed in finding “ (1) ” as set forth above. These criteria cannot be rejected, as the majority attempt to do, on the basis that "[w] ere the Board empowered to rule otherwise, a tightening of zoning regulations by legislative decree could always be invalidated by administrative fiat.” If the legislative body desired no exceptions it would be easy to so provide. It is recognized that in comprehensive city-wide zoning, mistakes may be made and hardship unnecessarily imposed. The variance procedure was provided for just such a purpose. Someone must make the decision as to when a variance should be granted. Though the courts may agree with and approve of the ruling of the Zoning Administrator, they cannot substitute their judgment for that of the Board which reversed him where there is, as here, sufficient evidence to sustain its conclusion.
If the first finding is properly sustained the others fall into place. The unnecessary hardship is in requiring the applicants to suffer, not a less profitable use along with every other lot owner in the district, but a less profitable use than that enjoyed by their nonconforming neighbors on either side and across the street. The finding that ” [t]here- is no likelihood that anyone would employ the property for a single family dwelling” must be viewed in its context. It must refer to the situation which would exist if there were any choice in the matter. Conversely if the zoning is upheld it is reasonable to conclude that a lot sandwiched in between two nonconforming uses will be less desirable than one on another block which is uniformly developed by single-family residences.
The property right of the applicants which is to be preserved is the right which they enjoyed before the 1960 zoning and which in enjoyed by their nonconforming neighbors. It is here that the actual notice to and knowledge of the applicants as to the enactment of a new zoning ordinance becomes material. A property owner who purchased after the enactment of the new ordinance could not contend that he had been *186deprived of a substantial property right. Moreover, if it were shown that the applicants had actual notice of the 1960 changes and the moratorium period provided therein, it could be claimed that by their failure to improve the property within the time so provided they had waived any right to assert deprivation of a property right.
The opinion relies on the increase in value of the lot since the applicants purchased it as rebutting any showing of hardship or deprivation. Reflection indicates that it is not the increase or decrease in value of the lot over a period of time which is relevant and material, but the relative value of the lot, situated as it is, as compared with similar lots not so hemmed in.
The finding “ [t]hat the granting of the variance will not be materially detrimental to the public welfare or materially injurious to the property or improvements in the vicinity; and it will be completely consistent with the employment of properties on this particular block” is not attacked. The treatment given the property in the 1948 zoning, the character of the neighborhood, and the fact that the construction of the improvements sought was expressly countenanced in the period from 1960 to 1962 all reflect support for these conclusions.
Finally, it is stated that there is no support for the fifth finding which reads: "That the granting of such variance will be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this Code and will not adversely affect the Master Plan.” This conclusion is predicated upon the premise that the variance is not sustained in the other particulars. If those findings are, as contended herein, adequately buttressed by the unquestioned circumstances and conditions applying to the property involved, the requisite harmony would exist.
The conclusion that the application should not be granted is int onsistent with the principles expressed by this court in Kappadahl v. Alcan Pac. Co. (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 626 [35 Cal.Rptr. 354], Therein it is stated: “Appellants contend that the granting of the variance constitutes ‘spot zoning.’ However, spot zoning does not apply to a variance. As shown in Rubin v. Board of Directors (1940) 16 Cal.2d 119 [104 P.2d 1041], the variance ‘procedure has been devised in order to minimize the acknowledged evils of “spot zoning” by amendment of the zoning ordinance. It provides the opportunity “for amelioration of unnecessary hardships which, owing to special conditions, would result from literal enforcement *187of the restrictive features of the ordinance.” (Thayer v. Board of Appeals of City of Hartford, 114 Conn. 15 [157 A. 273].) Of even more importance is the fact that in granting a variance, municipal authorities may usually attach conditions controlling the excepted use in accordance with the spirit and purposes of the general zoning plan. . . . Unlike the “spot zoning” obtained by amendment of the general zoning ordinance, a variance or exception sanctions a deviation from the standard under the dispensing power vested in the administrative body. ’ (P. 124.)” (222 Cal.App.2d at p. 638; and see Allen v. Board of Supervisors (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 158, 163-164 [50 Cal.Rptr. 444]; Flagstad v. City of San Mateo (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 138, passim, and cases cited at p. 142 [318 P.2d 825] ; cf. Criticism, Gaylord, Zoning: Variances, Exceptions and Conditional Use Permits in California (1958) 5 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 179, at pp. 188-189.)
The precedent of the Board’s ruling in this case can at most affect two lots, namely, the subject property and the other lot which remains unimproved in the 100-foot strip. It is possible to deftly dissect the factors that may be said to create the characteristics or conditions attributable to a given piece of property and in the disjunctive find that no one of them will justify a variance. The true test should be an assay of the conglomerate characteristics and conditions in the conjunctive.
Finally, it should be noted that to find no abuse of administrative discretion in the granting of the variance is not to say that it would have been an abuse of administrative discretion for the Board to deny the variance on the same facts. The granting or denying of a variance is generally a matter of grace. In the instant case the net result of the Board’s action is to rule that it is proper under the circumstances to permit the same use to be made of the property in 1965 as the legislative body acknowledged would have been proper during the period from 1948 through 1962. The controls imposed by the 1960 ordinance are not eroded to any greater extent.
I would reverse the judgment with instructions to dismiss the petition for a writ of mandate.
Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 16, 1966.