Court Opinion

ID: 9634913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:28:22.728111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:12.634594
License: Public Domain

NEBEKER, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
If my view were the holding of the court, I am sure an equally as complex rationale as the majority opinion could be written. However, it is hardly worth the candle to undertake such an effort in a dissent. Therefore, I offer a short version of why I would reverse the trial court on the ultimate question of law.
The relevant statute taxes “sale of or charges for ... public stenographic services.” D.C.Code § 47-2001(n)(l)(H) (1981).1 With all due respect to the majority for its wrestling with the word “public” and generating an ambiguity in the statute, I find the critical clause quite clear. It imposes a tax on sales or charges for stenographic services to the public. Similarly, § 47-2001(n)(l)(F) taxes admission charges respecting “public events,” with an exception for admission charges made by a “semipub-lic institution.” There is no mystery in the word public.
That Acme renders stenographic services cannot be gainsaid. That it does so by sale or charge is equally unquestioned. That it does so to the public — not privately or “semipublic[ly]” — is quite clear to me. I would reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment for the District of Columbia.

. It seems to me that the constant use of the term "court reporting services” in Acme’s brief and the majority opinion is quite confusing unless it is understood that it is synonymous with the relevant term "stenographic services.”