Court Opinion

ID: 9735864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:33:27.125268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:28.896207
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I cannot agree with the majority’s refusal to permit plaintiff to recover as costs the professional fees charged by Dr. Wolin, nor do I see the need to remand the cause for further consideration as to whether Wolin’s deposition was necessarily used at trial. Whether a trial court may grant a prevailing plaintiffs motion to tax as costs the professional fees charged by the plaintiffs treating physician for testifying at an evidence deposition is not a question of first impression. It has been considered on numerous occasions by our appellate court. Although that court has not spoken with a single voice on the matter, the various districts have recognized, as the Third District recognized in the case before us today, that such fees may be recovered by plaintiff where the plaintiff can show that the evidence deposition was “necessarily used at trial.” See Irwin v. McMillan, 322 Ill. App. 3d 861, 865-67 (2d Dist. 2001); Boehm v. Ramey, 329 Ill. App. 3d 357, 366-67 (4th Dist. 2002); Woolverton v. McCracken, 321 Ill. App. 3d 440 (5th Dist. 2001); Perkins v. Harris, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1076 (5th Dist. 1999); see also Physicians Insurance Exchange v. Jennings, 316 Ill. App. 3d 443, 464 (1st Dist. 2000) (distinguishing circumstances in that case from Fifth District’s opinion in Perkins v. Harris). With the exception of a badly splintered disposition by the Fourth District in Myers v. Bash, 334 Ill. App. 3d 369 (2002), no court of review in Illinois has suggested that the professional fees charged by a treating physician to testify at an evidence deposition can never be taxed as costs against a losing defendant. To the extent that there is any disagreement among the various districts, that disagreement concerns when and under what circumstances an evidence deposition can be regarded as having been “necessarily used at trial.” The Second District has taken the view that the standard is only met where the plaintiff shows that the witness who was deposed has subsequently died or disappeared. See Irwin v. McMillan, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 866. The Third District in this case and the Fifth District in Perkins v. Harris, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1076, have opined, however, that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it taxes as costs the professional fees charged by a treating physician to testify at an evidence deposition where the physician is unavailable to appear at trial due to his demanding work schedule. In my view, the position taken by the Third and Fifth Districts is a sound one. Contrary to the majority’s view, the case before us does not present a situation where the physician was deposed solely for his own convenience or the convenience of the parties. Considering the distance between the physician’s practice in Chicago and the place of trial in Will County as well as the burdens of the doctor’s workload, the circuit court could certainly have concluded that plaintiff would not have been able to obtain the doctor’s testimony voluntarily absent the evidence deposition. Because the doctor was plaintiff’s treating physician and the only person who could testify regarding plaintiffs injuries and treatment, there can be no serious question that his testimony was indispensable at trial. For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the circuit court did not err when it included in the costs taxed against defendant the professional fees charged by plaintiffs treating physician to appear at the evidence deposition. Consistent with that view, I would further hold that there is no need to set aside the award of fees for the videographer and court reporter who served at that deposition pending remand to determine whether the doctor’s evidentiary deposition was necessarily used at trial. The judgment of the appellate court should be affirmed outright without further delay. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.