Court Opinion

ID: 9654045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:03:50.982505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:05.284371
License: Public Domain

DAVIS, Justice
(dissenting).
I concur in the granting of the writ of prohibition in event this court is without authority to grant a writ of mandamus. I dissent from the refusal to grant a writ of mandamus and will file my dissent later, because I think this is a case that needs immediate attention and to hold the decision for dissent will only delay this matter.
DAVIS, Justice.
I dissent from the opinion of the majority in this case in holding that this court *692is without authority to grant the writ of mandamus. In doing so, it is my purpose to point out that in the opinion of Judge Stayton in the case of Grigsby v. Bowles, the Supreme Court had before it for consideration an application for a writ of mandamus by way of an attempted appeal from an order by a district judge refusing to disqualify himself. Then, as now, there is no right of appeal from such order. Naylor v. Naylor, 60 Tex.Civ.App. 606, 128 S.W. 475; Texas Bank & Trust Co. of Dallas v. Clay, Tex.Civ.App., 257 S.W.2d 774, no writ history; Sec. 17:03, McDonald Texas Civil Practice, beginning at top of page 1309, Vol. 4; Pioneer American Ins. Co. v. Knox, Tex.Civ.App., 199 S.W.2d 711, error refused.
I have studied the Grigsby opinion as carefully as I know how, and as I view the opinion of Judge Stayton, he meant to say: “There being no law authorizing appeals to this court from a refusal of a district judge to certify to the governor his disqualification, this court has no jurisdiction (in such attempted appeal) to revise his ruling, and has no power to enforce, by writ of mandamus or otherwise, the performance of such duty (in such attempted appeal). [79 Tex. 138, 15 S.W. 31.]” (Phrases in parentheses added.)
Now, I admit, that neither the Constitution nor the statutes specifically say: “The Supreme Court or the Courts of Civil Appeals have the right, by mandamus, to compel disqualified trial judges to certify their disqualification.” Yet, at the same time, there is no provision of the Constitution nor the statutes that specifically says that the Supreme Court or the Courts of Civil Appeals have any authority to issue a writ of prohibition in such cases; therefore, I contend that there is just as much authority to justify the issuance of the writ of mandamus to complete the certification of disqualification as there is to prohibit the judge from taking further action in the case; and, the ends of justice would be best served by the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
Texas law was adopted from the common law of England, Article 1 of V.A.T.C.S. provides:
“The common law of England, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of this State, shall together with such Constitution and laws, be the rule of decision, and shall continue in force until altered or repealed by the Legislature.”
As will be noted from reading the Article, it provides that the common law, together with the Constitution and laws of this state shall be the rule of decision of the courts of this state. The writ of mandamus had its origin in England under the common law. Its history and purposes are fully discussed in 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 1 et seq., beginning on page 15. At page 17 we find this statement: “Except where it has been otherwise provided by statute, mandamus is essentially and exclusively a common law remedy * * * ”. Beginning on page 19 the writ of mandamus is described as “an extraordinary remedy” that “can be used only in cases of necessity where the usual forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief; where there is no other clear, adequate, efficient and speedy remedy.” At page 21, the writ of mandamus is distinguished from other remedies and it is pointed out that the writ is used to compel action and to coerce the performance of a preexisting duty. It is a writ requiring specific performance. And the writs of mandamus and prohibition are related remedies. See also 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 51, p. 85. The writ of mandamus finding its origin in the Common Law, and that authority not being “altered or repealed” by either the Constitution or the Legislature, all the authority necessary to grant the writ is provided and authorized by the Common Law.
*693In Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063, 1068, Chief Justice Cureton, speaking of the authority of courts to issue the writ of mandamus, had this to say:
“* * * To supersede the remedy by mandamus authorized by the organic law, and specially provided by statute (Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. 1925, art. 1734), there must exist, not only a remedy by appeal, but the appeal provided for must be competent to afford relief on the very subject-matter of the application, equally convenient, beneficial and effective as mandamus. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Muse, 109 Tex. 352, 362, 207 S.W. 897, 4 A.L.R. 613; Spelling on Extraordinary Relief, Vol. 2, § 1375; Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Riggs, 75 W.Va. 353, 83 S.E. 1020, Ann.Cas.1918A, 995, 996. 38 Corpus Juris, p. 561, § (32) 2; High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies (2d Ed.) § 17; Terrell v. Greene, 88 Tex. 539, 31 S.W. 631; International Water Co. v. City of El Paso, 51 Tex.Civ.App. 321, 112 S.W. 816; St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. Co. v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 99 S.W. 171; Gaines v. Rugg, 148 U.S. 228, 243, 13 S.Ct. 611, 37 L.Ed. 432.
“Mr. Spelling correctly states the rule as follows:
" 'In order that the existence of another remedy shall constitute a bar to relief by mandamus, such other remedy must not only be an adequate remedy in the general sense of the term, but it must be specific and appropriate to the circumstances of the particular case. It must be such a remedy as is calculated to afford relief upon the very subject of the controversy. For, if it is not adequate to afford the party aggrieved the particular right which the law accords him, mandanms will lie, notwithstanding the existence of such other remedy. * * (Emphasis added.)
The big question is whether or not this court by granting the writ of prohibition has actually afforded the petitioner any relief at all. If this court does not have the authority to grant a writ of mandamus, it does not have the authority to grant the writ of prohibition. This fact is questioned by Judge Chadick in his majority opinion.
Article 1824, V.A.T.C.S., specifically gives the Courts of Civil Appeals or any judge thereof the authority to issue the writ of mandamus to compel a district or county judge to proceed to trial and judgment. The question arises: Is the certification of disqualification of a disqualified judge a necessary step to a trial and disposition of the case? There can not be any but an affirmative answer. If the certification of disqualification is an essential and mandatory step to securing the trial of a case, why do we not have authority to issue the writ of mandamus to secure the trial of a case by a qualified judge? To hold otherwise creates a purpose to delay justice grossly contrary to the ancient maxim, “Justice delayed is justice denied.”
It has been held in other common-law states that the writ of mandamus is a more expeditious and suitable remedy than the writ of prohibition in determining whether or not a judge is disqualified. Payne v. Lee, 222 Minn. 269, 24 N.W.2d 259. As a matter of fact, the writ of prohibition in this case could accomplish exactly nothing. If the respondent Chandler should continue to refuse to certify his disqualification, the petitioner would have no remedy to get a trial of her case, except to bide the time until she could probably have the respondent Chandler removed by impeachment proceedings; Article 15, Sec. 2, V.A. Tex. Constitution; removed by address of the Governor, Article 15, Sec. 8, V.A.T.C.; or, by petition for removal from office to *694the Supreme Court of Texas; Article 15, Sec. 6, V.A.T.C.; In re Laughlin, 153 Tex. 183, 265 S.W.2d 805.
It is not my purpose to decline to follow precedent as set by the Supreme Court of Texas, but I humbly and earnestly believe that the wrong construction has been placed upon the opinion of Judge Stayton in the Grigsby case. And, too, I believe that the issues involved in the case in the District Court of Panola County are of greater importance than of any issue that could be raised in any other character of case of which the district court has jurisdiction, viz., that of the best interests and welfare of a minor child. The mother of this child has attempted to get that question adjudicated in the normal and legal way provided by the Constitution and. laws of this state since December 6, 1954. The respondent Sid B. Turner, a lawyer, who should recognize his duty to the. legal profession and the judiciary to see that all cases are tried with expediency, has not done anything, as far as the records reveal, except what would prevent an actual trial of the issue of child custody upon its merits, even to the extent of attempting to appeal from a non-appeal-abie order. Turner v. Turner, No. 6909 upon the docket of this court; dismissed December 6, 1956. Such practice is a reflection upon the legal profession, and also invokes unjust criticism upon the judiciary. Respondent Sid B. Turner being a lawyer, he should certainly know whether or not he has a just and legal defense to the petitioner’s cause of action and his delaying tactics create a strong suspicion that he has no faith in his defense to the petitioner’s claim of right to the care, custody and control of the child. Further, the older the child grows, while this litigation is pending, the more capable she will become of comprehending the fact that she is the center of vicious and bitter litigation, and this could have a serious effect upon her.
Under the state of the record, with the writ of prohibition having been granted, there is one other avenue by which the petitioner may be able to get a qualified judge to try her lawsuit. Senate Bill No. 86, Chapter 408, Vernon’s Texas Session Law Service, 55th Legislature, 1957, Reg. Sess., which is an amendment to Article 200a, V.A.T.C.S., gives the presiding judge of an administrative judicial district specific authority to assign district judges to-other districts for the trial of cases, as well as retired district judges who have consented to be subject to assignment. In view of the importance of this litigation, the Presiding Judge of the First Administrative-Judicial District, upon being apprised of' the facts of this case, should immediately assign a qualified judge to try and dispose of the case should respondent 'Chandler fail to certify his disqualification immediately.
Fully recognizing my limitations, I earnestly believe this court has the authority to issue the writ of mandamus prayed for. If not, this serious defect in the law should be remedied at the earliest possible date. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the care, custody and control of her minor child, she is entitled to her day in court now, not four or five years hence.
Respectfully submitted.