Court Opinion

ID: 9730042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:58:23.835804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:03.435114
License: Public Domain

■CANE, J.
(concurring) The sole purpose of the court-imposed exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct that violates a person’s constitutional rights. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); State v. Hochman, 2 Wis. 2d 410, 419, 86 N.W.2d 446, 451 (1957). To apply the exclusionary rule’s sanction in this case would be to punish the police for doing exactly what the courts have urged them to do; namely, to apply for and obtain search warrants from the courts.
Here, the police and the district attorney went to a full-time court commissioner at the courthouse who *62had been in office for eight years and, in addition to his other court duties, regularly issued search warrants. There is no claim that the court commissioner issued the search warrant without a clear showing of probable cause. Nor is there any claim that the police unreasonably executed the search warrant or conducted themselves improperly. Verkuylen’s sole claim is that, because of a judicial oversight, the court commissioner was not formally delegated the power to issue search warrants and that theref ore the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant must be excluded.
Courts and commentators have suggested that a more flexible approach should be taken before applying the exclusionary rule where police misconduct is absent. See United States v. Williams, 622 F2d 830, 847 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). In United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976), the court refused to apply the exclusionary rule when an arrest and search were made, without police misconduct, under a statute later declared invalid. Because the exclusion would not deter any official misconduct, the exclusionary rule was not applied. Similarly, in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the Supreme Court refused to exclude from a federal civil tax proceeding evidence that had been obtained by state police without any official misconduct and in reliance on a search warrant later found defective because of a defective affidavit. The Supreme Court reasoned that it would be improper to suppress the evidence since it would not deter police misconduct. In United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315, 322 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975), the court admitted evidence obtained in a search although the warrant was technically improper. Again, the court reasoned that the police acted properly in going to a magistrate and seeking a warrant and, because it in*63volved a court procedural error, to apply the exclusionary rule would not serve its deterrent purposes.
Here, when the police go to the judicial branch and the mistake is solely because of an inadvertent judicial administrative oversight, there is no police misconduct. Suppressing the evidence in this case would not serve the exclusionary rule’s purpose. When the reason for the judicially created rule ceases, its application must also cease.
Accordingly, I agree with the majority that under the circumstances of this case, Verkuylen’s constituional rights have not been violated. There was no police misconduct, the exclusionary rule’s purpose has not been violated, and therefore to apply the exclusionary rule would be an unreasonable, unnecessary, and inappropriate sanction.