Court Opinion

ID: 9942890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 01:00:40.369138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:53.383275
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60054          Document: 125-1           Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/21/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Fifth Circuit

                                  ____________                                      FILED
                                                                             February 21, 2024
                                   No. 23-60054                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                  ____________                                         Clerk

United States of America,

                                                                  Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                         versus

Aaron Matthew Rentfrow; William Glenn Chunn,

                                          Defendants—Appellants.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Mississippi
                           USDC No. 3:20-CR-128-2
                  ______________________________

Before Jones, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Defendants Aaron Matthew Rentfrow and William Glenn Chunn,
who were shown to be members of a white supremacist gang called the Aryan
Circle, appeal their convictions related to the attempted murder of a fellow
inmate. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-60054       Document: 125-1      Page: 2     Date Filed: 02/21/2024

                                 No. 23-60054

                               I. Background
       The Aryan Circle is a white supremacist gang that began in the Texas
state prison system. It now has hundreds of members in and out of American
prisons. It recruits violent men, furthers its goals through criminal activity,
such as drug trafficking and murder, and seeks to spread throughout the
United States.
       Chunn was stated to be one of the five upper board members
governing the Aryan Circle nationally and the leader of its members at the
federal prison in Yazoo City, Mississippi (“USP Yazoo City”), where he was
imprisoned at the time of the relevant events. During that same time,
Rentfrow was also a prisoner at USP Yazoo City and was said to be an Aryan
Circle “prospect.” A prospect is a person undergoing a probationary period
during which he eventually “put[s] in blood work” (a violent act) to achieve
full membership. Once a prospect becomes a full member, he receives an
Aryan Circle tattoo, which is referred to as a “patch.” The tattoo includes a
diamond outline with a swastika inside the diamond and the letters “AC” in
the center.
       On the date of the relevant events, a new inmate, M.M., transferred
into USP Yazoo City. Chunn and Jeremy Dennis, an alleged Aryan Circle
member, went to M.M.’s cell to meet him. Afterwards, they allegedly told
others that M.M. could not stay on the unit because of their belief that he was
homosexual.      Aryan Circle members refuse to share prison units with
homosexual people, so they conduct acts of violence against such individuals
with the goal of forcing the prison administration to remove such individuals
from the unit.
       At trial, multiple witnesses testified that Rentfrow, at Chunn’s behest,
stabbed M.M. 13 times (because “A” and “C” are the first and third letters
of the alphabet) and physically beat him to earn membership in the Aryan

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Circle. M.M. survived the attack but sustained life-threatening injuries. One
witness testified that, as a result of the attack, he tattooed the Aryan Circle
patch onto Rentfrow to display Rentfrow’s full membership in the gang. The
government also presented to the jury a picture of Rentfrow with an Aryan
Circle tattoo. The jury found Rentfrow and Chunn guilty of both counts
against them: (1) violent crimes in aid of racketeering (“VICAR”) assault
with a deadly weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(3) and 2; and (2) VICAR attempted
murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(5) and 2. 1 Both Defendants
timely appealed.
                     II. Jurisdiction & Standards of Review
        The district court had jurisdiction over the underlying federal offenses
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction to review the convictions
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
        We review constitutional challenges de novo and evidentiary
decisions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Asibor, 109 F.3d 1023, 1032,
1037 (5th Cir. 1997). The standard for overturning evidentiary decisions
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is “especially high and requires a
showing of a clear abuse of discretion.” United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704,
716 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
        “Whenever a courtroom arrangement is challenged as inherently
prejudicial, the question” is “whether ‘an unacceptable risk is presented of
impermissible factors coming into play.’” Jones v. Davis, 890 F.3d 559, 567–

        _____________________
        1
         Given the district court’s concern that the two charged offenses were duplicative,
the government elected at sentencing to proceed against the defendants only on the VICAR
attempted murder count and agreed that the court should vacate the convictions on the
other count.

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68 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570 (1986)). We
review factual issues raised by that question for clear error and legal
conclusions de novo. Cf. England v. England, 234 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir.
2000) (stating general rule). If such a risk existed, we review the district
court’s balancing of the risk against safety concerns for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Nicholson, 846 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that the
balancing endeavor “is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court”).
         Finally, “[w]e review a district court’s response to juror misconduct
for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 125 (5th Cir.
2012). Likewise, the denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Nieto, 721 F.3d 357, 369 (5th Cir. 2013).
                                III. Discussion
         A. Cumulative Error
         We first consider Rentfrow’s challenge to his conviction.
         Rentfrow argues that four alleged errors cumulated to deprive him of
a fair trial: (1) failing to limit the number of United States Marshals present
during a former Aryan Circle member’s testimony, (2) permitting testimony
that death is a consequence of treason against the Aryan Circle, (3) admitting
photographs of an Aryan Circle murder victim, and (4) failing to declare a
mistrial after the judge received a juror note expressing fear and indicating
that the author of the note had discussed such fear with at least one other
juror.    We will address each alleged error in turn before addressing
cumulative error.
               1. Courtroom Security
         We disagree with Rentfrow’s assertion that the district court erred by
permitting increased security in the courtroom during the testimony of
Brandon Fritts, a former Aryan Circle member. First, the record indicates

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that there were only two uniformed troopers present during Fritts’s
testimony. Cf. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 571 (holding no unacceptable risk of
prejudice based on the presence of four uniformed officers). Second, even
taking into account the additional plain-clothes officers, 2 there is a “wide[]
range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw” from the presence of
the officers (assuming arguendo they even recognized the plain-clothes
officers as law enforcement). See id. at 569. That is especially true here,
where increased security was only present for Fritts’s testimony, Fritts
admitted to committing murder and other acts of violence on behalf of the
Aryan Circle, death is the punishment for treason against the Aryan Circle
(which Fritts committed), and the Aryan Circle has many members outside
of prison. In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion.
               2. Testimony Regarding Consequences of Treason
       We also disagree with Rentfrow’s contention that the district court
abused its discretion by admitting testimony that death is the punishment for
treason against the Aryan Circle. Before trial, Chunn filed a motion in limine
to prevent the government from “elicit[ing] testimony from any witness that
they are scared to testify . . . because of possible repercussions.” The
government agreed to that restriction but stated that it still intended to offer
evidence that “the Aryan Circle does not permit cooperation with law
enforcement and such cooperation can have serious repercussions including
death.” The district court then granted the motion in limine as confessed
without expanding the language to preclude the evidence that the
government intended to present. We therefore agree with the government
that Fritts’s testimony did not violate the court’s order because he did not

       _____________________
       2
          The record is unclear, and the parties do not agree on how many plain-clothes
officers were present.

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                                    No. 23-60054

say that he was scared to testify due to potential repercussions. In fact, the
expansive nature of his testimony, and his statements that he had also
testified against the gang in earlier cases, indicate that he was not scared to
testify.
                 3. Photos of Fritts’s Murder Victim
           Next, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting two photos of someone whom Fritts had murdered on behalf of the
Aryan Circle. We have previously affirmed the admission of “shocking” and
“gruesome” photos because they had “nontrivial probative value” in that
they helped prove overt acts committed in furtherance of a conspiracy, lent
support to testimony, and established the violence of the crimes committed.
United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 325–26 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143
S. Ct. 463 (2022). Here, the photos had nontrivial probative value because
they provided evidence of the Aryan Circle’s racketeering activity and
corroborated Fritts’s testimony. See United States v. Shows Urquidi, 71 F.4th
357, 374 (5th Cir. 2023) (explaining that photos are not “cumulative” when
they “provide[] support to witness testimony”), cert. denied sub nom. Iglesias-
Villegas v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 268 (2023). Also, without diminishing the
heinousness of Fritts’s murder, the photos are not overly gruesome. The
more graphic of the two photos is taken from a distance, shows two small
blood stains on the victim’s clothing, and does not show the victim’s face.
Cf. Perry, 35 F.4th at 325 (affirming admission of “shocking” photos
depicting dead bodies “with open wounds, blood and gore”). In fact, the
district court demonstrated appropriate consideration of the issues by
sustaining an objection to a third photo that was described as the most
gruesome. We therefore conclude that Rentfrow has failed to establish a

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“clear abuse of discretion.” 3 Curtis, 635 F.3d at 716 (quotation omitted)
(applying Rule 403’s heightened standard).
               4. The Juror’s Note
       Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its handling of
a juror note that expressed fear and indicated that the author of the note had
discussed such fear with another juror. United States v. Nieto is instructive.
721 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2013). Like the present case, Nieto involved jurors
expressing anxiety about the case and talking about it to some extent. Id. at
370. But the alleged misconduct in Nieto was more severe than the present
case because (1) several jurors were involved in the alleged misconduct, and
(2) two jurors “indicated they had formed some opinions . . . before closing
arguments.”      Id.   Nonetheless, we held that the district court, after
conducting interviews with the jurors, “made a reasonable factual
determination from its unique perspective that the remaining jurors could
decide the case impartially.” 4 Id. Similarly, the district court in this case
conducted a thorough investigation, questioned the jurors about their ability
to follow the court’s instructions, and received assurance from the jurors that
they would be able to fairly evaluate the evidence and follow the court’s
instructions. See id. Ultimately, “a district court, based on its unique
perspective at the scene, is in a far superior position than we are to
appropriately consider allegations of juror misconduct.” Id. (quotation
omitted). Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
               5. Cumulative Error

       _____________________
       3
         Because Defendants objected to this evidence under Rule 403, we apply Rule
403’s heightened standard of review.
       4
          The district court in Nieto dismissed one juror who had been extrinsically
influenced rather than intrinsically influenced. 721 F.3d at 370.

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                                   No. 23-60054

       “The cumulative error doctrine provides that an aggregation of non-
reversible errors (i.e., plain errors failing to necessitate reversal and harmless
errors) can yield a denial of the constitutional right to a fair trial, which calls
for reversal.” United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 343–44 (5th Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (alternations adopted) (quotation omitted). Because we have
rejected Rentfrow’s allegations of error, “and non-errors have no weight in a
cumulative error analysis, there is nothing to accumulate.             Thus, the
cumulative error doctrine has no applicability to [Rentfrow’s] allegations of
error.” Id. at 344 (footnote omitted).
       In any event, we have “repeatedly emphasized that the cumulative
error doctrine necessitates reversal only in rare instances and have previously
stated en banc that the possibility of cumulative error is often acknowledged
but practically never found persuasive.” Id. (internal quotation marks,
citation, and footnote omitted). “Its application is especially uncommon
where . . . the government presents substantial evidence of guilt.” Id. As the
government points out, by the end of trial, Rentfrow’s counsel’s only
remaining contention was that Rentfrow did not attack M.M. for the purpose
of promoting his position in a racketeering enterprise. But multiple witnesses
testified that Rentfrow attacked M.M. to join the Aryan Circle. On appeal,
Rentfrow does not even dispute that the government presented substantial
evidence against him on that element. We therefore conclude that even if
there were errors, this is not one of the “rare instances” in which the
cumulative error doctrine requires reversal, let alone one of the “especially
uncommon” instances where the cumulative error doctrine warrants
reversal in the face of “substantial evidence of guilt.” See id.
       B. Confrontation Clause
       We turn next to Chunn’s challenge.

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        At trial, Andy Atwood testified about a conversation that he had with
Rentfrow five months after the attack while they were both in a segregated
unit of the prison. Rentfrow allegedly told Atwood that to receive his patch
he had to stab M.M. 13 times and that when M.M. started crawling out of his
cell, Chunn made Rentfrow go back to “stomp him the rest of the way out.”
        Chunn argues that the district court violated the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) 5 by
permitting Atwood’s testimony because it introduced a testimonial
statement by a co-defendant who did not testify. The government responds
that Chunn’s argument fails because either (1) the relevant statement was
nontestimonial, or (2) the co-conspirator exception applies.
        “The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees the right
of a criminal defendant to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635, 643 (2023) (internal quotation marks
omitted).      “[T]his Clause forbids the introduction of out-of-court
‘testimonial’ statements unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant
has had the chance to cross-examine the witness previously.” Id. “[T]he
basic objective of the Confrontation Clause . . . is to prevent the accused from
being deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about
statements taken for use at trial.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358
(2011). “Thus, the high Court has adopted the ‘primary purpose’ test for
determining whether a statement is testimonial in nature.” United States v.
Noria, 945 F.3d 847, 851 (5th Cir. 2019). “To qualify as ‘testimonial’ under
this standard, ‘a statement must have a primary purpose of establishing or

        _____________________
        5
          In Bruton, the Court held that a trial court denied a defendant his constitutional
right of confrontation by admitting witness testimony about a confession made by a co-
defendant that implicated both defendants. 391 U.S. at 137.

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proving past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’” Id.
at 851–52 (quoting Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 659 n.6 (2011)).
        Rentfrow recapping the attack to Atwood while they were both in
prison does not qualify as a testimonial statement under the primary purpose
test. 6 See United States v. Vasquez, 766 F.3d 373, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2014)
(rejecting on plain error review Bruton challenge to jailhouse confession
between inmates because it was nontestimonial). Rentfrow’s statement to
Atwood in prison was not “taken for use at trial.” Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358.
Even the Supreme Court has classified “statements from one prisoner to
another” as “clearly nontestimonial.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,
825 (2006) (providing examples of nontestimonial statements).                              We
therefore hold that permitting Atwood to testify to Rentfrow’s statement did
not violate the Confrontation Clause.
                                     IV. Conclusion
        For the reasons explained above, we AFFIRM the convictions of
both Defendants.

        _____________________
        6
          Contrary to Chunn’s assertion, the government has not waived its argument that
the relevant statement was nontestimonial. The Supreme Court has explained that
“without filing a cross-appeal or cross-petition, an appellee may rely upon any matter
appearing in the record in support of the judgment below.” Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S.
569, 585 n.24 (1982) (quotation omitted). Moreover, we have accepted an appellee’s
argument for the first time on appeal where, like here, it was “fully briefed by both sides,”
could be decided on the basis of the record below, and “support[ed] a straight-forward
affirmance of the district court’s judgment.” Ford-Evans v. United Space All. LLC, 329 F.
App’x 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Finally, the government’s position on appeal
is not inconsistent with its position in the district court and does not seek to enlarge its
rights under the district court’s ruling. See id. at 524 n.1, 525 n.2 (explaining that appellees
cannot raise new arguments on appeal in such circumstances).

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