Court Opinion

ID: 9375144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-25 00:02:12.147845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:56.314032
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/24/23 P. v. White CA1/3

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                       A164227
 v.
 SAMUEL RAY WHITE,                                                     (Del Norte County
                                                                       Super. Ct. No. CRF21-9278)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Samuel White pleaded guilty to felony resisting arrest
causing great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 148.10, subd. (a)), and he was placed
on probation for two years. On appeal, he challenges some of the probation
conditions as unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, or as improperly
delegating judicial authority to the probation department. Defendant also
asserts the trial court impermissibly imposed $370 in fines and fees without
ascertaining whether he had the ability to pay them. We agree with
appellant as to several of the probation conditions he challenges and remand
for the sentencing court to narrow or strike those provisions, but otherwise
affirm.

                                                               1
                               BACKGROUND
      On the afternoon of July 14, 2021, defendant was lawfully detained by
a pair of National Park Service rangers in Jedediah Smith State Park.
According to the presentence investigation report, the rangers came upon
defendant while investigating reports of gunshots or explosions. They
instructed defendant to leash his dogs, and he refused. They asked for his
driver’s license, and he reached into, or perhaps entered, his vehicle to
retrieve it. “[O]ne thing led to another,” as the prosecutor explained, and in
extracting defendant from the vehicle one of the rangers badly injured his
back. Defendant later told the rangers he had struggled with them only
“because he was terrified and thought they were going to kill him.”
      In a subsequent interview with the probation department, defendant
reported past diagnoses of several mental health disorders, including
paranoid delusions. He explained he did not take medication, and he refused
to pursue other mental health care because he believed providers only
wanted to medicate him. Defendant reported having consumed alcohol and
experimented with illegal narcotics only in years past, but currently using
marijuana at the level of two joints per day.
      In a negotiated resolution, defendant pleaded no contest to the felony
charge. A misdemeanor count was dropped, and he was placed on two years
of formal probation, with a short period in the county jail, a requirement to
perform community service, and various supervision terms. As relevant here,
defendant’s probation includes the following conditions, proposed pursuant to
a pre-printed form:
            3. . . . Report any law enforcement contact to the Probation
      Officer within 24 hours for any reason. [¶]
            4. Cooperate with the Probation Officer in a plan for
      psychological, psychiatric, or substance abuse treatment, or other

                                       2
      rehabilitation, and follow all directions of the Probation Officer.
      [¶] . . . [¶]
              24. Provide a copy of any medical prescription to the Probation
      Department within 2 business days of its receipt. [¶] . . . [¶]
              26. Refrain from associating with persons known to you to be
      engaged in criminal activities, or persons designated to you by the
      Probation Officer. [¶] . . . [¶]
              38. Report to [a mental health] agency . . . and undergo an
      assessment. . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Comply with all recommendations
      contained in said assessment and as directed by the Probation Officer
      or as approved by the Court.

      At sentencing, defendant objected to condition No. 38. “I don’t want to
set myself up for failure,” he told the court. Defense counsel explained that,
in his experience, a court-ordered mental health assessment “almost
invariably” leads to a requirement for medication. And because of negative
side-effects, defendant did not want to medicate. Counsel also asserted that
defendant’s conduct in this case was not the result of a mental health
condition, although the probation officer countered by pointing to a couple of
statements defendant made after his arrest that could be considered evidence
of paranoia. For example, defendant claimed he was being stalked by people
online who knew he does not like people with badges and who may have set
him up to be arrested. The trial court imposed condition 38, but not before
telling defense counsel that if issues arose on the probation terms, counsel
could put the case back on calendar. The court cautioned, however, that as a
judge not a doctor he tends to follow the advice of professionals in the field.
      Defendant lives on less than $1,000 per month in Supplemental
Security Income (SSI). He has a physical disability that leaves him
constantly in pain, which the Social Security Administration recognizes as
100 percent disabling. At the time of his arrest and again at sentencing,
defendant was homeless and living in his van. Defense counsel therefore

                                        3
requested “that the court order only the minimal fines necessary by law.”
The court asked whether defendant could pay $25 per month toward required
fines, to which defendant responded, “Your Honor, I don’t even make it
through the month on what I make . . . .” The court then imposed the
minimum $300 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4), a $40 court operations
assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), and a $30 criminal conviction
assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), for a total of $370, payable at a rate of $25
per month. The judge told defendant, “[i]f you fall delinquent in [payments],
you can file a DN-101 [form] with the clerk explaining why and requesting
appropriate relief.”
      Defendant accepted probation on these terms.1 This timely appeal
followed.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I.
      The legal principles that govern this case are well established. Chief
among them is that, while a sentencing court has broad discretion in setting
probation conditions, that discretion is not unlimited. (People v. Lopez (1998)
66 Cal.App.4th 615, 624 (Lopez).) Under state law, “[a] term of probation is
invalid if it: ‘ “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was
convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3)
requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future
criminality.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486
(Lent).) Moreover, “[a] probation condition that imposes limitations on a
person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the

      1 “Defendant’s ultimate acceptance of the conditions of probation does
not preclude him from challenging them on appeal.” (People v. O’Neil (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355, fn. 1 (O’Neil).)

                                        4
purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally
overbroad.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K.).)
      When a probation condition is challenged as unconstitutionally
overbroad, “[t]he essential question . . . is the closeness of the fit between the
legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the
defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection
in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some
infringement.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153 (E.O.).)
      When a probation condition is challenged as unconstitutionally vague,
the question is whether the condition is “ ‘sufficiently precise for the
probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to determine
whether the condition has been violated.’ ” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at
p. 890.) The probationer must have “ ‘fair warning’ . . . of the conduct
proscribed.” (E.O., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1153.) But we will “ ‘rely on
“context and common sense” ’ ” to interpret a probation condition,
invalidating it as unconstitutionally vague only if no “ ‘ “ ‘ “reasonable and
practical construction can be given to its language.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Rhinehart (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1123, 1129 (Rhinehart).)
      Setting the terms of probation is a judicial function. “[C]ourts may not
delegate the exercise of their discretion to probation officers.” (In re Pedro Q.
(1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1372–1373.) A court may, however, “leave to the
discretion of the probation officer the specification of the many details that
invariably are necessary to implement the terms of probation.” (People v.
O’Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1358–1359.) The court exceeds the
appropriate bounds of this delegation when it imposes a condition that is
“entirely open-ended.” (Ibid.)

                                         5
      With the exception of condition No. 38, our review of defendant’s
probation conditions is de novo. “[W]hile we generally review the imposition
of probation conditions for abuse of discretion, we review constitutional
challenges to probation conditions de novo.” (People v. Appleton (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 717, 723.) Defendant’s challenges to probation conditions other
than No. 38 are framed as constitutional challenges raising pure questions of
law. His challenges would otherwise be forfeited, as defendant did not object
to condition Nos. 3, 4, 24, or 26 in the trial court. (See Sheena K., supra, 40
Cal.4th at pp. 888–889; In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.)
Our standard of review on condition No. 38 is de novo to the extent the
challenge is constitutional, and abuse of discretion otherwise. (See In re
Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118 (Ricardo P.).)
                                        II.
      Defendant challenges condition No. 3 as unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. Condition No. 3 includes a requirement that defendant “[r]eport
any law enforcement contact to the Probation Officer within 24 hours for any
reason.”
      Courts have found similar provisions unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. In People v. Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188, the court of appeal
considered a condition requiring the defendant to “ ‘report to the probation
officer, no later than the next working day, any arrests or any contacts with
or incidents involving any peace officer.’ ” (Id. at p. 1196.) The portion of this
condition requiring a probationer to report “ ‘any contacts with . . . any peace
officer’ ” was determined to be vague and overbroad because it potentially
could be “triggered when defendant says ‘hello’ to a police officer or attends
an event at which police officers are present.” (Id. at p. 1197.) Relying on
Relkin, this division then struck down a similar requirement “ ‘to report any

                                        6
police contacts’ to the deputy probation officer.” (In re I.M. (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 929, 936 (I.M.)).
      The Attorney General concedes that condition No. 3 “suffers from the
same defect as the conditions in Relkin and I.M.” He asks that we modify the
condition to remedy its constitutional flaw (citing People v. Brand (2021) 59
Cal.App.5th 861, 871) or remand so the trial court can address the error. On
reply, defendant asks that we modify the condition in a somewhat different
manner. We will remand for the trial court to hear the arguments of both
parties and narrow or strike condition No. 3. (See In re I.M, supra, 53
Cal.App.5th at p. 936.)
                                       III.
      Defendant challenges condition No. 4 as unconstitutionally vague and
an improper delegation of judicial authority. Condition No. 4 requires
defendant to “[c]ooperate with the Probation Officer in a plan for
psychological, psychiatric, or substance abuse treatment, or other
rehabilitation, and follow all directions of the Probation Officer.” Defendant
attacks this condition on two grounds, one of which has merit.
      First, defendant contends condition No. 4 is vague because it is unclear
whether defendant “must ‘follow all directions of the Probation Officer,’
period, or only those directions concerning a ‘plan for psychological,
psychiatric, or substance abuse treatment, or other rehabilitation.’ ” We
think context and common sense require the latter of these interpretations.
(See Rhinehart, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1129.) The context is that “follow
all directions” is immediately proceeded by detailed language about
cooperating in a treatment program. And common sense tells us the court’s
order should be understood as limited to directions relating to these
programs. Otherwise, this condition would be an unlimited—and clearly

                                        7
improper—delegation of judicial authority to the probation department. We
agree that the language of this condition could be clearer, for example by
referencing “all related directions of the Probation Officer,” but we decline to
strike condition No. 4 for falling short in this regard, instead construing it to
contain that limitation.
      Defendant’s second contention is that condition No. 4 allows the
probation department to insist defendant participate in any type of plan for
his rehabilitation, including but not limited to psychological, psychiatric, or
substance abuse treatment. Defendant persuasively identifies this condition
as an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority to defendant’s
probation officer. Case law holds that a court may validly order a probationer
to participate in an unspecified residential drug treatment program, leaving
the choice as to which program to the probation department. (People v.
Penoli (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 298, 307–308.) The Attorney General relies on
Penoli in attempting to defend condition No. 4. But here, the trial court has
not determined that defendant needs a substance abuse program, and it did
not check the box on the form order for a probation condition that would have
required defendant to submit to a substance abuse assessment. Nor has the
trial court identified any other type of rehabilitative program as appropriate
in this case. Yet the language of condition No. 4 clearly allows the probation
department to insist on a substance abuse program or some “other
rehabilitati[ve]” program that the trial court did not order. This is a much
broader delegation to the probation department than occurred in Penoli, and
it leaves to the probation officer far more than the “details that invariably are
necessary to implement the terms of probation.” (O’Neil, supra, 165
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1358–1359; see also In re Debra A. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d
327, 330 [improper delegation of authority where choice of custodial program

                                        8
is left to probation department].) Condition No. 4 is too open-ended to stand.
(O’Neil, at p. 1359.) On remand, it must be narrowed or stricken.
                                       IV.
      Defendant challenges condition No. 24 as facially overbroad. Condition
No. 24 requires defendant to “[p]rovide a copy of any medical prescription to
the Probation Department within 2 business days of its receipt.”
      Invoking his state and federal right to privacy for medical information
(see Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479, 485; Cal. Cost., art. 1, § 1),
defendant contends there is no conceivable reason the probation department
needs to know whether he is prescribed antibiotics, blood pressure
medication, or drugs related to reproductive health. He asserts there is no
relationship between such information and the government’s compelling
interest in reformation and rehabilitation, and that the probation condition is
therefore constitutionally overbroad. (See People v. Hackler (1993) 13
Cal.App.4th 1049, 1058 [probation condition that impinges on right to privacy
“must be narrowly drawn” to be “reasonably related to a compelling state
interest in reformation and rehabilitation”].)
      The Attorney General responds that “holistic rehabilitation” requires
the probation officer to be aware of all existing and future prescriptions that
defendant receives. The truth of this proposition is not self-evident. The
probation officer is not a doctor, and we see no reason he or she needs to
understand the specifics of defendant’s medical care, except to the extent it
affects defendant’s rehabilitation. The Attorney General explains that
condition No. 24 allows the probation officer to check on whether defendant is
filling any new prescriptions issued as part of his rehabilitation plan. We
accept that, in an appropriate case, a requirement to disclose prescriptions
for psychotropic drugs may promote rehabilitation, but “[a] probation

                                        9
condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must
closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition.” (Sheena K.,
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) Since condition No. 24 is not limited to
prescriptions for psychotropic drugs or any other drugs that might be
connected to defendant’s rehabilitation, we conclude no such constitutionally
required tailoring occurred in this case, and we agree with defendant that
condition No. 24 is facially overbroad. On remand it must be narrowed or
stricken.
                                       V.
      Defendant also challenges condition No. 26 as facially overbroad, an
infringement on his right of association, and an unconstitutional delegation
of authority to the probation department. Condition No. 26 requires
defendant to “[r]efrain from associating with persons known to you to be
engaged in criminal activities, or persons designated to you by the Probation
Officer.” Defendant challenges only the second portion of this condition,
which prohibits him from associating with unspecified “persons designated
. . . by the Probation Officer.”
      Case law establishes that the trial court may limit a probationer’s right
of association, in an effort to both enhance his rehabilitation and protect the
public. (O’Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356.) For example, in a drug
case “a properly drawn condition prohibiting defendant from associating with
known drug users would be entirely reasonable.” (Id. at p. 1357.) Similarly,
those involved in gang crimes may be prohibited from associating with
persons they know to be gang members. (Lopez, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 637–638.) But the court may not simply prohibit a probationer from
associating with any “ ‘person, as designated by your probation officer.’ ”
(O’Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1354–1355.) Such an open-ended

                                       10
delegation to the probation department, “[w]ithout a meaningful standard . . .
to provide the necessary specificity,” renders a probation condition
unconstitutionally overbroad. (Id. at p. 1358.)
      The Attorney General attempts to salvage condition No. 26 by reading
it narrowly. The Attorney General asserts that the provision “can be
reasonably read as directing a probationer not to associate with people he
knows—or who the probation officer knows—to be engaged in criminal
activity.” We think this an unreasonably narrow reading of condition No. 26,
which is more naturally understood as prohibiting defendant from
associating with two different classes of person: those he knows to be
engaged in criminal activities and those who, for whatever reason, are
“designated to [him] by the Probation Officer.” Nothing in the language or
structure of condition No. 26 suggests that the probation officer can only
designate as prohibited persons those the probation officer knows to be
engaged in criminal conduct. Under O’Neil, condition No. 26 is thus
unconstitutionally overbroad. (See O’Neil, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1354–1355.) On remand, it must be narrowed or stricken.
                                      VI.
      Defendant challenges condition No. 38 as unreasonable under Lent,
facially overbroad, and an unconstitutional delegation of authority to the
probation department. Condition No. 38 requires defendant to undergo a
mental health assessment and “[c]omply with all recommendations contained
in said assessment and as directed by the Probation Officer or as approved by
the Court.” We conclude this probation condition is reasonable and
sufficiently respects defendant’s constitutional rights, but only because we
read condition No. 38 narrowly.

                                      11
      Defendant attacks the portion of condition No. 38 that he contends
requires him “to follow ‘all recommendations’ stemming from the mental
health assessment.” Defendant argues this requirement is unreasonable
under Lent, and that it is a facially overbroad infringement of his right to
privacy, in that it effectively requires him to take psychotropic medications.
If condition No. 38 were read to require defendant to “[c]omply with all
recommendations contained in [the mental health] assessment,” full stop, we
would agree with defendant’s challenge. Likewise, if the condition were
construed to require compliance with all the assessment’s recommendations
as directed by a probation officer. “[A]dults have a state constitutional
privacy right and a fundamental due process freedom to refuse to take
antipsychotic medications.” (People v. Petty (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1410,
1417 (Petty).) Those interests are significantly impaired by a probation
condition that requires a probationer to take such medications at the
direction of a mental health worker or a probation officer. (Id. at pp. 1412,
1417.) Like the Petty court, we would strike down such a provision as
unreasonable in this case. (Ibid.) The record currently contains no
“[m]edically informed justification for insisting upon defendant’s compliance
with his mental health worker’s medical decisions.” (Id. at p. 1420.)
      But defendant’s rendering of condition No. 38 omits important
language that, in our view, preserves the viability of the condition.
Defendant is only required to comply with recommendations in the
assessment “as directed by the Probation Officer or as approved by the
Court.” (Italics added.) This last phrase anticipates judicial oversight over a
probation officer’s decision to impose a recommendation in the mental health
assessment. In the same vein is the court’s advisement to defense counsel at
sentencing that, should issues arise regarding probation terms, counsel could

                                       12
put the case back on calendar. In context, we therefore construe condition
No. 38 as requiring defendant to comply with recommendations made in the
mental health assessment, to the extent directed by his probation officer
except that if defendant challenges any such direction in the trial court, he
need not follow the recommendation unless and until it is “approved by the
Court.”
      So understood, probation condition No. 38 is reasonable under Lent and
not constitutionally defective. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion
that defendant’s criminal conduct here may have been caused or exacerbated
by paranoia or other mental health issues. For example, defendant accused
the rangers of targeting him, accused members of the public of stalking him
online and, after the rangers had subdued him, warned that he would commit
“ ‘suicide by cop’ ” when released from custody. We conclude that requiring a
mental health assessment is reasonably related to the crime of which
defendant was convicted and sufficiently tailored to the government’s interest
in preventing future criminality. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486; Ricardo
P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122; Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 881–882.)
We trust that, if a mental health assessment results in a recommendation
that defendant take medication to which he is opposed, the trial court will
carefully weigh the medical evidence and defendant’s constitutional interests,
as set forth in Petty, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th 1410, before deciding whether
the constitutional standard is met. Only because condition No. 38 keeps the
trial court involved in determining whether defendant may, after the
assessment, be compelled to take medication, does this probation condition
pass muster.

                                       13
                                       VII.
      Defendant challenges as a violation of due process the imposition of
$370 in fines or fees without a determination that he has the ability to pay
them. He relies on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas).
The Attorney General, for his part, asserts that whether a restitution fine is
constitutionality excessive must be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment,
not the Due Process clause (citing People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th
1055, 1069–1071), although defendant insists he brings no Eighth
Amendment challenge. We need not resolve the weighty legal dispute
between the parties as to which constitutional provision applies because,
even on defendant’s theory, we see no constitutional violation on the facts of
this case. Dueñas is easily distinguished.
      In Dueñas the trial court imposed, on an indigent defendant caught
driving with a suspended license, a $300 fine plus penalty and assessment, in
addition to a court facilities assessment, court operations assessment, and
restitution fine. (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1162.) The court gave
defendant Dueñas the option of spending nine days in the county jail instead
of paying the $300 fine, and over the course of several past cases Ms. Dueñas
had served 51 days in jail solely because she was unable to pay imposed fines.
(Id., at pp. 1161–1162.) The facilities and court operations assessments and
the restitution fine the court did not stay or waive, indicating “it would
neither consider Dueñas’s inability to pay the restitution fine nor relieve her
of it at the close of probation” but would send any unpaid balance to
collections at the close of probation. (Id. at p. 1172.)
      Here, by contrast, when the trial court imposed a restitution fine and
assessments totaling $370, it set a payment schedule of $25 per month and
instructed defendant that if he fell behind on payments he could “file a DN-

                                        14
101 with the clerk” and seek “appropriate relief.” Defendant does not explain
what relief is available with a DN-101 form, nor does he contend that such
relief would be inadequate, in the event that defendant is unable to make the
payments the trial court ordered. The context of the court’s remark suggests
that the court thought community service work could be a way to work off the
fine, and that it could be arranged through this form. Unlike in Dueñas,
there is no suggestion defendant will serve time in jail if he is unable to pay
the imposed fine, nor that unpaid fines will necessarily be sent out for
collection. (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1162, 1172.) Also, the
Attorney General points out that defendant somehow affords a two-joint-per-
day marijuana habit, and defendant offers no reply as to why this is not
substantial evidence he could pay $25 per month toward fines and fees.
Defendant has accordingly failed to carry his burden on appeal of
establishing a Due Process violation under Dueñas.
                                 DISPOSITION
         The matter is remanded so the trial court can narrow or strike
probation conditions numbered 3, 4, 24, and 26, but the judgment is
otherwise affirmed.
                                             TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

People v. White (A164227)

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