Court Opinion

ID: 9625629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:46:12.138658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:12.196042
License: Public Domain

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PRINGLE
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I-do not quarrel with the majority’s statement that where disclosure of an unidentified informer is sought a court must determine on which side the balance must fall between the public interest in protecting the anonymity of an informer as against the need for disclosure to the defendant. That is the rule enunciated by Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639.
What concerns me here is my deep-rooted conviction that it is a fundamental right of one accused of a crime to know and confront any ear-eye witness which the state knows about in the transaction upon which the state brings charges. This is basic if a trial is a search for truth.
If the state would deny that right, it must, in my view, put forth its reason for doing so and then the balancing test comes into play. Here there was no evidence on the part of the state as to why it wished to protect the identity, not of a mere informant, but of an actual participant in *261the transaction upon which the charge is based. Hence, I believe there was nothing in the record here upon which the trial judge could base a conclusion that the public interest in shielding the witness outweighed the right of the defendant to get at the truth. I would therefore reverse, and direct that upon a new trial the judge make his finding regarding disclosure of the witness based on evidence in the record.
MR. JUSTICE DAY authorizes me to say that he joins in this dissent.