Court Opinion

ID: 9496897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:38:14.712797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:52.534120
License: Public Domain

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that Lehn’s ETS claim should not have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). However, the majority’s conclusion on Lehn’s access-to-the-courts claim is, I respectfully submit, erro*873neous. That claim should remain dismissed for several reasons, the most important being that on the state of this record, Illinois is not obligated to assist Lehn in defending himself against the Maryland “charges” (whatever form they take and assuming they actually exist).
It’s a little hard to put my finger on exactly what the majority is saying regarding Illinois’ responsibility vis-a-vis the Maryland “indictment” (or, as variously described, either the Maryland arrest warrants or Maryland’s request under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers), but as best I can make out, it is that the Maryland proceedings somehow affect Lehn’s security classification in Illinois, and that keeps him from getting a good prison job and/or better “housing assignments.” Perhaps there’s more here that I don’t see, but if this is the case, I don’t see how it becomes a constitutional denial of access-to-the-courts claim.
The majority tells us, citing Fellers v. United States, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 1019, 157 L.Ed.2d 1016 (2004), that once the Maryland indictment was returned, “Lehn’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached,” and that it is “Maryland’s responsibility to ensure that this right is respected” (page 6). That’s not quite accurate. Lehn’s right to counsel on the Maryland indictment will ripen when he makes an initial appearance in a Maryland courtroom to answer charges against him. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is triggered “at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated ‘whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment,’ ” (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411)). It is the commencement of “judicial proceedings” that gives birth to Sixth Amendment rights. To say that the mere issuance of an indictment starts the ball rolling is rather odd. Think how many people are not in custody when charges (either complaint, indictment, or information) are issued. Is a state required to appoint a lawyer (assuming indi-gency) for someone who has not yet been physically presented in court to answer charges? I think not.
While it is true that Lehn would have a right to counsel (and Fifth Amendment rights as well) if Maryland law enforcement officers wanted to question him after he was indicted but before judicial proceedings actually started (the situation in Fellers), that’s not what is going on here. So the fact that an “indictment” might be out there someplace doesn’t trigger any constitutional “rights” Lehn might have at this time to start working on a defense.
Everything I’ve just said about an indictment is equally true if what we are talking about here are “Maryland arrest warrants.” And that leaves possible proceedings under the Interstate Agreement on Detainer (IAD). The IAD provides procedures for inmates and prosecutors to follow when looking to resolve outstanding criminal charges pending in a noncustodial state. The purpose of the IAD is “to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition” of untried charges pending in states other than where the defendant is presently incarcerated. (IAD, Article 1.) The IAD recognizes that an inmate, subject to a detainer, may not be eligible for certain rehabilitative programs. One underlying purpose of the IAD is, therefore, a reduction in the number of limitations on prisoner participation in rehabilitative programs. Another purpose is the speedy, if requested by an inmate, disposition of criminal charges.
The scheme encompassed in the IAD is really quite simple. The first procedural prerequisite is the filing of a detainer against an inmate. A detainer is just a *874document that puts the officials of the institution where the inmate is incarcerated on notice that the inmate is wanted on charges in another state. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978). Because the detainer is merely a notice, it does not authorize the transfer of the inmate.
Article III of the IAD describes the process an inmate must use to initiate his own transfer. The inmate must notify the prosecuting authority and the court where the charges are pending that he requests the disposition of those charges. The request must be accompanied by a certificate from the official who has custody of the inmate. The certificate describes the length of commitment, time already served, and the time remaining to be served in the state that has the inmate in custody.
Once the prosecutor and the trial court receive the inmate’s request and time certificate, the inmate must be tried within 180 days unless that period is extended for good cause. Article III of the IAD also provides that the request for the disposition of the charges constitutes a waiver of any extradition rights that may be available to the inmate.
Article IV of the IAD describes the procedures associated with the transfer of an inmate at the request of the state where charges are pending. After the detainer is filed, the prosecutor must file a request for temporary custody of the inmate. That request is made to the authority where the inmate is incarcerated. That request must be approved by the court that has jurisdiction over the charges.
When detainers are filed, both an inmate and the state where unresolved charges are pending, have choices. The inmate can ignore the detainer (many in fact do— the lapse of time may make the second state reluctant to prosecute a stale case) or request that he be brought up for trial. If the request is made, the state with pending charges has two options: bring the inmate to court where formal proceedings will be commenced or drop the detainer. The latter option is often pursued if the time and effort to produce and prosecute an inmate will accomplish little or nothing. For example, if Oregon, holding a burglary indictment, files a detainer against an Indiana inmate serving 25 years for second degree murder, chances are slim that it would want to incur the expense of bringing him to Portland where, if ultimately found guilty, he might only receive a short concurrent sentence.
In our case it is not at all clear that there actually is an IAD document filed against Lehn or, if there is, that he has done what he must do to trigger an obligation on Maryland’s part to either drop it or bring him to the east coast for trial. And Lehn certainly doesn’t need “Maryland legal materials” to do this. The problem with the majority’s decision is that we are telling Illinois that it must now have legal materials available or accessible in its prison library from 47 states. For these reasons, I dissent on the access-to-courts issue.