Court Opinion

ID: 9790867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:00:37.071515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:32.284297
License: Public Domain

CARSON, J.,
dissenting
For the most part, I agree with the ballot title certified by the majority. However, I disagree with the approval of the Attorney General’s substitution of the words “pregnant woman” for the word “mother.”
ORS 250.085(4) provides that the court shall review the Attorney General’s ballot title for “substantial compliance” with the requirements of ORS 250.035 and 250.039. The issue is whether the Attorney General’s ballot title “reasonably identifies” the subject matter of the measure, plainly phrases the chief purpose of the measure, and summarizes “the measure and its major effect.” Where the Attorney General goes beyond his statutory authority and needlessly substitutes his language for the language of the measure, he has not substantially complied.
*606The Attorney General argued that “[s]ince without doubt all will agree that the proponents’ ‘mothers’ are pregnant women, the ballot title properly uses the accurate and neutral term.” The majority apparently concurs and allows the Attorney General to decide that the proponents of the measure do not mean what they say, but rather that they mean the measure to apply to a “pregnant woman.”
By simply reasoning that the words “pregnant woman” are “accurate and neutral,” the Attorney General has created a ballot title that textually differs from the proposed measure itself. Whether “pregnant woman” is an “accurate” description of the persons who potentially are subject to the measure’s prohibition is a moral, philosophical, ethical, or biological question. Yet, by accepting the Attorney General’s use of “pregnant woman” in the question and the explanation, the majority decides a legal question.1
Nor is the neutrality of the term “pregnant woman” as evident as the majority suggests. The current debate about abortion is as much a battle of words as it is a battle of ideologies. The Attorney General recognizes as much by asserting “that an important part of the strategy of both ‘pro-life’ and ‘pro-choice’ advocates is to define and redefine terms.” To accept one term for the named person who potentially is subject to the measure’s prohibition is to reject another term and all the belief system that goes with it. There are no neutral terms in this debate, which is why we should adhere to the deliberate language of the proponents of the measure.2
When the language in the measure is unambiguous, it is not the job of the Attorney General or of this court to *607substitute their interpretation of the measure for the language of the measure itself. The term “mother” is “language taken directly from the proposed amendment itself. No paraphrase would serve as well because the term * * * would be the controlling constitutional language in case the measure were adopted.” ACLU v. Paulus, 282 Or 539, 543, 580 P2d 168 (1978). However, in future litigation, a party undoubtedly will argue that the Attorney General’s interpretation, with the majority’s blessing, is the proper interpretation of the wording of the Constitutional Amendment. See State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115, 138-39, 752 P2d 1136 (1988), vacated and rent’d for further consideration 492 US_, 109 S Ct 3235, 106 L Ed 2d 583 (1989) (the ballot title prepared by this court makes “crystal clear” the proper interpretation of a constitutional provision); see also Rogers v. Lane County, 307 Or 534, 539, 541-45, 771 P2d 254 (1989) (discussing the use of material in the official Voters’ Pamphlet as an aid to construction). It will be difficult, if not impossible, for this court to retreat from today’s interpretation regardless of the merits of any argument presented.
Absent a compelling argument by the Attorney General that the substituted term he has chosen will aid voter comprehension, the language in the proposed measure should be used. See Glerum v. Roberts, 308 Or 22, 27, 774 P2d 1093 (1989) (“[wjhere, as here, the measure consistently refers to ‘timber’ rather than ‘logs,’ it is not permissible to reach beyond the unambiguous subject (‘timber’) chosen by the legislature and substitute a [different] word”). The measure says mother and the ballot title should say mother. This court, inadvertently I believe, has entered this important debate and taken sides. Whether the side taken is “right” or “wrong” is not the point: This court should not now be a party to the debate.
Van Hoomissen, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

 The majority is not the first to wander inadvertently into this linguistic thicket. Former ORS 163.060, prior to its repeal in 1969 (see Oregon Laws 1969, chapter 684, section 17) provided:
“163.060 Abortion producing death of child or mother. If any person administers to any woman pregnant with a child any medicine, drug or substance whatever, or uses or employs any instrument or other means, with intent thereby to destroy such child, unless the same is necessary to preserve the life of such mother, such person shall, in case the death of such child or mother is thereby produced, be deemed guilty of manslaughter.”

 Had the Attorney General replaced “abortion” (the measure’s language) with “termination of pregnancy” on the ground that the latter is accurate and neutral, would the majority likewise agree? I would hope not.