Court Opinion

ID: 9550017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:27:50.396882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:11.605022
License: Public Domain

KALOKATHIS, District Judge,
concurring, with whom CARDINE, Justice, joins.
I agree with the result of the majority in its thoroughly researched and wide ranging opinion. However, I would reach the same result by a more direct route.
The district court is empowered with continuing jurisdiction to modify and enforce custody and visitation orders. Wyo.Stat. § 20-2-113 (1989). Because one of the contestants, the father, continues to reside in Wyoming, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, did not deprive the district court of its continuing jurisdiction.1 Section (d) of the PKPA states:
The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met [i.e., that the court has jurisdiction under the law of its state] and such State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant.
*48Since the mother did not initiate modification proceedings in Texas under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), that legislation has no bearing on the issue presented for review.2
Under the facts of this case, neither the UCCJA nor the PKPA deprived the district court of continuing jurisdiction. Hence, the only issues which require resolution are those involving the claimed abuse of discretion by the district court, especially the propriety of requiring the mother to present the children in Wyoming. The majority sustains that order and as to the grounds stated, I am in accord. What may happen in the future, and the possible legal ramifications, should the mother decide to defy the order of the district court, is best left for another day.

. Those who are mystified by this field of law may find comfort in Henry H. Foster, Child Custody Jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, 27 N.Y.L.Sch.L.Rev. 297 (1981), particularly at 309-10.

. In a comprehensive and energetic search of the record, the majority sets out its conclusions in footnote 3 that formal modification of the divorce decree was not initiated in Texas.