Court Opinion

ID: 9845578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:24:38.647423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:14.837014
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur in the holding that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the claim that the defendants negligently induced an identification of Kramer. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the claim that Cherokee County and its sheriff negligently failed to protect Mrs. Feise from Kramer’s attack.
One of the functions of government is to provide police protec*24tion for citizens within its jurisdiction. Thus, the police have a general duty to protect citizens from criminal attack by third persons, whereas a private individual generally has no affirmative duty to aid the victim of such an attack. Nevertheless, the general governmental duty to protect the public is not alone a sufficient basis to support a tort action against the government for failure to protect its citizens from harm caused by a third party’s assault or other criminal activity.
. When a claim is made that police negligently failed to protect a member of the public, the threshold issue is whether in the exercise of this general duty, a special relationship was created between the claimant and the police sufficient to establish a specific duty for the police to protect the claimant from the particular harm. See Jordan v. City of Rome, 203 Ga. App. 662 (417 SE2d 730) (1992) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (cert, granted). “[I]n the context of a tort claim that the [county’s] police negligently failed to furnish police protection to [Mrs. Feise], the application of a duty limited in scope by the type of relationship between the claimant and the [county] police is a traditional tort law concept applicable to both government and private entities.” Id. at 671-672. In general, A has no duty to prevent B from harming C, unless A has a special relationship with B which imposes a duty on A to control B, or a special relationship exists between A and C which gives C a right to protection. Associated Health Systems v. Jones, 185 Ga. App. 798, 801 (366 SE2d 147) (1988); Restatement, Law of Torts 2d, § 315.
Limiting the scope of the government’s duty under these circumstances is not a resurrected form of sovereign immunity, otherwise waived to the extent of insurance coverage, but involves a question of law on the threshold tort issue of duty. See generally Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 200 (296 SE2d 693) (1982) (setting forth “a legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct raised by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks of harm” as the threshold element in a cause of action for negligence). Ultimately, defining the scope of legal duty in any setting involves unavoidable policy decisions. In cases of the present kind, it is proper to some degree to consider the unique functions undertaken by government in providing police protection, and the limited resources allocated to the performance of these functions. The duty analysis undertaken in these cases, however, is not based on any special status given to government, but on the same tort principles which would be applied to private individuals in like circumstances. The task is to fairly apply traditional duty analysis to the often unique circumstances presented by tort claims for negligent failure to perform a governmental function. Limiting the scope of duty in terms of the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is not a novel concept. In premises liability actions the duty owed by the owner of the premises to one enter*25ing varies according to whether the relationship to the owner of the one entering is that of trespasser, licensee or invitee. See Adams & Adams, Georgia Law of Torts, § 4-1 (1989).
It is reasonable, therefore, to limit the scope of the legal duty imposed on police for claims that they negligently failed to provide protection. When police know, or reasonably should know, that there is a substantial likelihood a particular citizen is in immediate danger of being subjected to an unreasonable risk of serious physical harm by the actions of a third person, this is sufficient to create a special relationship giving rise to a specific duty for the police to exercise reasonable care to protect the citizen from the harm.1 Whether a special relationship giving rise to a specific legal duty exists under the peculiar facts of each case is generally a question of law for the court. See First Fed. &c. Bank of Brunswick v. Fretthold, 195 Ga. App. 482, 485-486 (394 SE2d 128) (1990) (while issues of negligence are ordinarily for the finder of fact, the question of duty is for the court). In the absence of such a duty, the defendant is not liable; if such a duty does exist, the issue of negligence is for the trier of fact.
An argument may be made that by framing the trial court’s duty analysis in general terms of a special relationship and foreseeable risk, this duplicates part of the factfinding process that is normally reserved for the jury in negligence cases. However, given the unique function of providing police protection for the general public, the limited resources given to perform the task, and the potential for limitless numbers of negligence claims, it is necessary to clearly address the scope of the duty before exposing the police to potential liability for breach of such duty. Nevertheless, when duty is defined in terms of a special relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, its existence or non-existence will be based on the facts of the case. The special relationship-duty question is a threshold issue, and should be resolved by the court as a matter of law where the facts support such a determination. See Trammell v. Baird, 262 Ga. 124, 125 (413 SE2d 445) (1992) (plaintiff had relationship of trespasser as a matter of law). Where the trial court is unable to conclude as a matter of law whether or not a special relationship existed, it properly becomes a factual question for resolution by the jury along with other negligence issues. See Murray Biscuit Co. v. Hutto, 119 Ga. App. 377, 385-386 (167 SE2d 182) (1969) (question of fact as to whether plaintiff stood in relationship of trespasser or licensee).
After Kramer was identified by the Feises’ daughter and a neighbor’s daughter and arrested on peeping tom charges, he was released *26from custody the same day. About six weeks later, Mrs. Feise and her neighbors received anonymous threatening phone calls. Kramer was not identified as the caller, although Mrs. Feise feared that it was him because she knew of no one else who would have a motive to harm them. The calls sounded as though they were made from a pay phone, but police were unable to locate the caller by checking local stores and phone locations. The police were unable to arrest Kramer for lack of probable cause.2 The next day Kramer assaulted Mrs. Feise in front of her residence.
Decided December 4, 1992
Reconsideration denied December 18, 1992
Gerard J. Lupa, for appellants.
Drew, Eckl & Farnham, William T. Mitchell, Theodore Free*27man, for appellees.
*26In my view, no special relationship existed as a matter of law between the police and the plaintiffs in this case, therefore the police had no specific duty to prevent the harm. There was no claim that Kramer had previously assaulted the plaintiffs, nor was there any direct evidence that Kramer was the threatening caller. The threatening calls, in conjunction with all the other circumstances, did not establish a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of an attack. I am unable to conclude that learning of the anonymous calls under these circumstances was sufficient to inform the police that there was a substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs were in immediate danger of being subjected to an unreasonable risk of serious harm at the hands of Kramer. To conclude that a special relationship giving rise to a duty to protect exists in this case would be tantamount to subjecting police to potential liability for the failure to provide personal 24-hour protection to citizens under these or like circumstances. The trial court correctly held, as a matter of law, that the defendants had no specific legal duty to protect Mrs. Feise from the attack, and properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

 I agree with the majority that the four-part test for establishing a special relationship set out by the dissent in Jordan v. City of Rome, supra, was sufficient under the facts of that case, but not here.

 The lack of probable cause in this case illustrates the type of dilemma in which police officers may be placed when a duty creating potential tort liability is imposed for failure to protect a citizen from a criminal act. The imposition of such a duty under these circumstances “puts police officers in the precarious position of choosing between potential claims for false arrest, or potential tort liability to injured third parties for failure to arrest. . . [and may have the added effect of] discouraging] the reasonable exercise of discretion by police officers, and encouraging] arrests in marginal cases supported by only slight evidence of criminal conduct.” Landis v. Rockdale County, 206 Ga. App. 876 (427 SE2d 286) (1992) (Andrews, J., dissenting).