Court Opinion

ID: 9738570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:56:34.39127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:06.973124
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, J.
(concurring). In this case, the mistakes of the sheriff’s department have resulted in setting aside the conviction of an obviously guilty defendant. Let us hope they have cost the people of this state nothing more than the expense of a new trial. I agree that the defendant’s request for counsel before further questioning was not scrupulously honored. I agree that his confession must be excluded for this reason, even though it was freely and voluntarily given as a matter of fact. The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) are directly in point and controlling. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s discussion of the Mosley time factor as applied to the facts of this case. I also disagree with the factors which the majority requires to be considered “in addition” to the five Mosley factors. '
The majority says that no significant period of time elapsed between the times the defendant requested counsel and the time that the questioning resumed. The evi*301dence shows that Lundgren left the interrogation room to convey the defendant’s request for counsel to a sheriff’s officer. He was gone 10 to 20 minutes. In Leach v. State, 83 Wis.2d 199, 265 N.W.2d 495 (1978) this court approved a waiver of counsel which was given after a 10 to 20 minute break in questioning. The purpose of the Mosley time factor, as I understand it, is to allow the defendant a cooling-off period before he again waives his right to remain silent. The majority acknowledges that the Mosley factors are not to be woodenly applied; yet, by its failure to determine whether the defendant’s will was in fact undermined, it applies the time factor as if carved in stone.
The majority introduces, I hope for prospective application only, alternative rules for determining whether the authorities have scrupulously honored the defendant’s request for counsel before renewing interrogation. The defendant must be allowed to call an attorney, or the authorities shall call one for him. If the authorities choose the second alternative, they must advise him of the steps they have taken to accommodate his request. Suppose a defendant is indigent. Who is to pay for the stationhouse consultation? Suppose a defendant is not indigent. Is he to pay for a lawyer not of his own choosing, or are the authorities required to contact the lawyer he requests? Further, if the defendant is the subject of a criminal inquiry in an unfamiliar area, are the authorities to choose a lawyer’s name indiscriminately from the phone book and thus be subject to a future ineffective counsel challenge if the lawyer proves to be unacceptable? Could the officer also then be suspect of ambulance chasing or soliciting legal representation for the accused? It is my firm conviction that law enforcement officers, for their own protection, in light of the myriad of lawsuits, accusations and challenges *302that they have been subjected to, should stay clear of any such implications and avoid the appearance of impropriety. This problem arises under the language used in the majority opinion if law enforcement officers are to aid in the securing of legal assistance for any prisoner. Furthermore, is the defendant then forced to pay for a lawyer not of his choosing? Consider the predicament of the lawyer who is contacted. Is the attorney, under his oath, obligated to come to the station without knowing the client, without knowing who will pay for his fee or what difficulties he may incur when attempting to collect the same ?
The new factors announced by the majority do not complement the Mosley factors. They are replacements. In effect, they constitute a per se rule that no further questioning take place after a suspect has requested an attorney. These factors are not required by any decision of the United States Supreme Court. I do not feel they are necessary to this decision. They should not be adopted by the majority as the law of this state.
I am authorized to state that Justice CONNOR T. HANSEN joins in this concurrence.