Court Opinion

ID: 9740762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:41:24.420594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.167772
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
Is it in keeping with good common sense and civil procedure that a department of *160government, such as the South Dakota Department of Labor, which administers both worker’s compensation claims and unemployment compensation claims, has:
(a) A certain appellate procedure for worker's compensation; and
(b) a totally different type of appellate procedure for unemployment compensation?
Madsen, cited by the majority opinion, is compelling precedential authority in this Court and footnote 3 of the majority opinion establishes the timeliness of Perrine’s appeal. We should reaffirm Madsen, factually similar, and decree that three days is thereby added to the nine-day statutory period prescribed by SDCL 61-7-5 when the Department of Labor opts to make service by mail. Madsen clearly cited SDCL 15-6-6(e) in determining the legal time period for an intra-agency appeal, even though the worker’s compensation statutes do not incorporate SDCL 15-6-6(e) by reference. Through decision, this Court imported SDCL 15-6-6(e) into a statutory scheme to answer a question about the computation of time for an intra-agency appeal. With this decision, we now have ten days, plus three days for mailing, to perfect an appeal in worker’s compensation; and nine days, but not three days for mailing, in unemployment compensation.
If my dissent prevailed, this case would be remanded to the circuit court for a correct decision; ultimately, then, Perrine would be heard on the merits and not be defaulted by state government administrative negligence — yes, because it — government — -failed to prescribe a rule under SDCL 61-7-8. The Department of Labor implemented no separate administrative rule on the time for appealing from an “adjusted determination.” Its failure to act responsibly is exemplified by ARSD 47:06:05.
Appellant is defeated by a technicality. This should not be. Perrine’s case should be decided on the merits. For a collection of cases supporting my viewpoint on statutory construction pertaining to appeal rights, see 3A Sutherland Stat. Const. § 67.08 (4th rev. ed. 1986). These treatise writers conclude by expressing: “Any doubt as to the proper construction of statutes regulating appeal should be resolved in favor of right of appeal.” Supra § 67.08, at 371 (footnote omitted). Two other authorities I wish to rely upon:
1. Red Bird v. Meierhenry, 314 N.W.2d 95, 96 (S.D.1982), which held “the unemployment compensation statutes should be liberally construed in favor of the claimant to afford all the relief the legislature intended to grant.”
2. SDCL 2-14-12, which in pertinent part reads: “[T]he law of this state ... and all proceedings under it are to be liberally construed with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.” (Emphasis added.)
It appears the majority’s holding accomplishes the opposite; this opinion strictly construes the “proceedings” (the procedural law) and the statutes pertaining to relief (the substantive law); due to our Madsen decision, it creates unpredictability in the application of the three-day mailing rule; therefore, I respectfully dissent.