Court Opinion

ID: 9535019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:44:41.821848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:09.239095
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring.
On studying the first opinion for the Court, now withdrawn in favor of the opinion issued today, it seemed to me self-evident that neither Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 673 P.2d 1067 (1983), nor Wheeler v. McIntyre, 100 Idaho 286, 596 P.2d 798 (1979), supported the holding that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint was not entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of relation back. While I continue to adhere to that belief, on a further review of the trial court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order in granting a summary judgment to DuPont, I am brought to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are reaching too far in their assertion that the complaint and the amended complaint allege nearly identical facts and conduct in respectively alleging:
The Complaint:
Defendant Dupont was negligent in failing to take some action to prevent such misuse in the application of the product. The Amended Complaint:
Defendants ... negligently failed to warn or advise or properly label its product in a manner which would give notice or warning of the dangerous propensities of said product.
Dupont was negligent and careless in failing to give warnings with regard to its chemical product Lexone, and that as a direct result of Defendant Dupont’s negligent failure to warn Plaintiff suffered damages.
Judge Durtschi’s opinion and order make clear the reasons why this Court should this day not utilize a relation back:
Thus, an amendment to a complaint will not be allowed to relate back (1) if the opposing party would not have notice of the new claim from the facts set forth in the original complaint, Raven v. Marsh, [94 N.M. 116, 607 P.2d 654] supra; (2) if the opposing party attempts to raise a new legal theory in its amended complaint which was not envisioned in its original complaint, Barnes v. Callaghan, [559 F.2d 1102] supra; or (3) if the party attempts to raise issues with regard to conduct which is different from, or occurred at a different time, from the conduct specified in the original complaint, Textile Museum v. F. Eberstadt & Co., [453 F.Supp. 72] supra.
In the amended complaint in this action, plaintiffs allege that the containers of Lexone used by former lessees were defective in that they did not provide adequate warnings and that this fact resulted in plaintiffs' injuries. Plaintiffs’ *275original theory was based solely on the alleged knowledge of the DuPont agent, Sam Sherman, of the misuse of the chemical Lexone by former lessees. Plaintiffs’ new theory has nothing to do with the alleged knowledge of DuPont, but rather involves the adequacy of the warning labels on the containers of Lexone. Nowhere in the original complaint is there even a hint that the warning labels on the product Lexone were inadequate or that the product Lexone was in any way defective or inadequate.
Plaintiffs’ amended complaints allege wrongful conduct on the part of DuPont arising at a different time and with regard to a different set of facts than were involved in the original complaint. In the original complaint, plaintiffs’ only allegation against DuPont concerned facts allegedly occurring during the time former lessees were misapplying the chemical Lexone. The amended complaints involve conduct on the part of DuPont with regard to the labeling of its product, such conduct taking place at a different time and at a different location. Hence, the new theory of plaintiffs involves a totally different set of legal issues, facts, time periods, and people and would bring into play “a multiplicity of facts beyond” those brought forth in the original complaint. (See Artman v. International Harvester Co., supra, 355 F.Supp. at 476, 477 (W.D.Pa.1972)).
Since the original complaint did not give notice of the legal theory now' advanced and the new theory is based on entirely different legal issues, facts, time periods and people, the new theory will be deemed to be a new cause of action and will not relate back for purposes of avoiding the statute of limitations.
R., pp. 158-59.