Court Opinion

ID: 9526350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:15:59.465175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:29.688570
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, also concurring: I agree with the majority opinion. However, I raise here two concerns, both related to the questioning, during voir dire, of Susie Esly, Henry Rogers, and Thomas Burdick regarding the defense of insanity. See 152 Ill. 2d at 165-68. I agree with the conclusion that the responses given by Rogers and Burdick indicated that, despite being troubled by the nature of the defense, they could consider the evidence as presented and make a determination of defendant’s sanity. I am less certain of the conclusion, however, that Esly’s responses indicated that she possessed the same ability. See 152 Ill. 2d at 169. Esly revealed that she did not “believe” in the defense of insanity, explaining that she felt the defense was asserted indiscriminately in efforts to avoid the consequences of criminal conduct. (152 Ill. 2d at 166.) Although she thereafter affirmatively responded that she could “probably” listen to the evidence presented and make a decision on the issue, she iterated, as a final remark on the matter, that she did not “think there [was] such a thing as temporary insanity as a defense.” 152 Ill. 2d at 166. Esly’s responses are incongruous. If, as she stated, she could not accept the validity of the defense in the abstract, it seems to me that she could never consider fairly the evidence presented on the issue in this defendant’s case. Esly’s simple acknowledgments that she could listen to the evidence and form an opinion, sandwiched as the acknowledgments were between Esly’s formulated statements that she did not believe the insanity defense existed, are not entirely convincing to me in that regard. I think Esly should have been excused for cause. That said, however, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the failure to excuse Esly on that basis provides no reason to disturb defendant’s convictions. There is no indication that defendant was prejudiced by having to use a peremptory challenge. The second concern I have regards the conclusion that defendant properly preserved for review the issue relating to the failure to exclude Esly, Rogers, and Burdick for cause. The majority finds that the requirements for preserving that issue were satisfied. In so concluding, the majority relies on People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, which is universally cited for the rule that issue preservation requires both a timely trial objection and a written post-trial motion. (Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186.) Although I agree with the ultimate determination here that defendant was not denied his right to an impartial jury, defense counsel never expressly objected to the trial judge’s denial of the requests to excuse the three venirepersons for cause. The record shows only that defense counsel acknowledged having to use a peremptory challenge to remove each from the venire. The bare mention or allusion to some matter cannot suffice as a proper timely trial objection for purposes of the waiver rule. There must be discernible disagreement with respect to the issue documented in the transcript. I would point out in that regard that defense counsel was careful to cause the record to reflect clear objections at other points during voir dire when he so desired. (See, e.g., 152 Ill. 2d at 161-62 (reflecting that defense counsel objected to the exclusion of venireperson Maldonado because he was Hispanic).) Because the record does not contain any objection to the trial judge’s refusal to permit the three venirepersons to be excused for cause, I would have concluded defendant waived the opportunity to raise the issue here. I am more troubled by the language used by the majority in concluding that defendant did not waive the issue regarding the failure to excuse the three venirepersons for cause. I am concerned that the opinion indicates, inaccurately, implicit approval of a relaxed scrutiny to determine whether the requirements for issue preservation have been met. I believe the language used by the court here could be mistakenly read as some departure from those standards. Regarding the required timely trial objection, the majority concludes that defense counsel “undoubtedly objected” during voir dire to the trial judge’s decision not to excuse the three venirepersons for cause. (152 Ill. 2d at 168.) I cannot join in any conclusion suggesting that the allusion to a fact, here, defense counsel’s acknowledgment of the refusal to excuse the three venirepersons for cause, is determinative that an objection to that fact was raised. The transcript shows no expression of voiced disagreement with the trial judge’s decision not to excuse the three venirepersons for cause. The expression of voiced disagreement is all and everything that is required in the way of a trial objection to preserve an issue for review. The objection must appear of record. Whether or not an objection was “undoubtedly” raised is of no consequence to application of the waiver rule. Language used regarding the requisite post-trial motion is similarly problematic but particularly more disturbing given that the majority’s analysis is entirely unnecessary. The statutory requirement of the filing of a post-trial motion is interpreted to require defendants to point out, specifically, the complained-of issue to preserve it for review. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 111—6.) General statements of error will not do. (See, e.g., People v. Thomas (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 883.) However, in People v. Enoch, this court held that defendants in capital cases are not precluded from raising certain issues on appeal in the absence of a post-trial motion where a proper trial objection has been made. (Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190.) Specifically, issues related to deprivation of constitutional rights objected to at trial which may be raised in a post-conviction petition, issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, and issues relating to plain error are, in that sense, automatically preserved regardless of whether a post-trial motion has been filed. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190. For that reason, no purpose is served in analyzing whether a capital defendant’s post-trial motion specifically sets out those limited types of errors. The point should be obvious. It would be illogical to hold any of those issues waived because they were not stated with specificity in a post-trial motion when such a motion was unnecessary to preserve those issues for review. Such a conclusion would be reached only by measuring the capital defendant’s motion against the standards used in a noncapital case. It seems to me that there would actually be a disincentive for a capital defendant to attempt to direct the trial judge, in a post-trial motion, to issues otherwise automatically preserved by objection in addition to other complained-of errors. The capital defendant would risk having the court determine the otherwise automatically preserved issues waived for lack of specificity. Such a result would be contrary to the purpose of a post-trial motion. See People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 23. Defendant’s argument here is that the failure to exclude Esly, Rogers, and Burdick for cause ostensibly deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Assuming a proper trial objection, that issue would be preserved regardless of the failure to file a post-trial motion or despite a nonspecific statement of that error in a filed motion. Nevertheless, the majority analyzes defendant’s post-trial motion here in terms of its specificity, concluding that although the motion was “fairly general” it was “sufficient to alert the court” to the issue. 152 Ill. 2d at 168. In characterizing the motion as “fairly general,” but finding it sufficiently stated to avoid application of the waiver rule, I believe the majority may unintentionally create an impression that the specificity requirement is not seriously considered. That is not the case. Nothing in the majority opinion should be read as a departure from the requirement that post-trial motions must set out, in detail, the complained-of issue where such a motion is required to avoid waiver. Although, again, the consideration is unnecessary in this capital case, I would point out that defendant’s motion did specifically identify the issue as the “failure to excuse various jurors for cause[,] forcing the defendant to exhaust his peremptory challenges.”