Court Opinion

ID: 9408352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 15:06:55.146034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:53.459646
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                            Docket No. 50056

 STATE OF IDAHO,                                     )
                                                     )    Filed: July 12, 2023
            Plaintiff-Respondent,                    )
                                                     )    Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
 v.                                                  )
                                                     )    THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
 BAILEY JEAN HAMMER,                                 )    OPINION AND SHALL NOT
                                                     )    BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
            Defendant-Appellant.                     )
                                                     )

           Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
           County. Hon. Patrick J. Miller, District Judge.

           Order denying motion for mistrial, affirmed; judgment of conviction, affirmed.

           Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
           Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

           Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney General,
           Boise, for respondent.
                       ________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge
           Bailey Jean Hammer appeals from the district court’s denial of her motion for a mistrial.
We affirm.
                                                     I.
                         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
           Hammer was charged with violation of a no-contact order (NCO), Idaho Code § 18-920(3).
The charge stemmed from Hammer contacting the protected party by leaving a voicemail. The
matter proceeded to a jury trial.
           During voir dire, one of the potential jurors, Juror 9, indicated he knew the protected party,
stating:
           [THE COURT]:           Juror No. 9, do you know Mr. Munson personally?
           [JUROR 9]:             I do, Your Honor. Socially and professionally.
           THE COURT:             Personally and professional [sic]?
           [JUROR 9]:             I bar tend downtown and that’s how we met.

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       THE COURT:              So anything about your knowledge of Mr. Munson that
                               would cause you to feel like you would automatically give
                               greater weight or lesser weight?
       [JUROR 9]:              I think I’ve heard about this has been going on for a while.
       THE COURT:              Why don’t we leave it there. So okay. So you may have
                               heard about--something about this case?
       [JUROR 9]:              Yes, Your Honor.
       THE COURT:              All right.
Following this exchange, the district court dismissed Juror 9 for cause.
       During a recess, a prospective juror reported to the district court that Juror 22 had opined
that Hammer was guilty and a “tweaker” based on her movements and appearance. The reporting
juror indicated that she had hushed Juror 22 and that none of the prospective jurors replied to the
comment. The district court and both parties questioned the reporting juror in chambers. Hammer
then moved for a mistrial. The district court denied the motion. The district court and both parties
then questioned Juror 22 in chambers. Juror 22 admitted to commenting on Hammer’s appearance
and saying something to the effect of: “[W]hat if we think she looks like she’s on drugs and that
affects our opinion on the matter or something like that. Then what? Because I’m not going to
stand up in front of everybody and say that.” Following completion of voir dire, Hammer declined
to pass the panel for cause and, citing the cumulative effect of both jurors’ comments, renewed her
motion for a mistrial. The district court again denied Hammer’s motion.
         Following voir dire, the district court instructed the selected jury to weigh only the
evidence properly introduced at trial. Before deliberations, the district court again instructed the
jury to consider only the evidence presented during trial and to follow the court’s instructions.
Ultimately, the jury found Hammer guilty of violating the NCO. Hammer timely appeals.
                                                 II.
                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW
       In criminal cases, motions for mistrial are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. A
mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant when there occurs during the trial an error
or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial
to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial. I.C.R. 29.1(a). When this Court reviews
the denial of a motion for mistrial in a criminal case, the question
       is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his discretion in light of
       circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question
       must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented
       reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion
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       for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse of discretion” standard
       is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our
       focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the
       mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only
       if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983).
                                                 III.
                                            ANALYSIS
       On appeal, Hammer argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for a mistrial.
Hammer contends that the motion for mistrial should have been granted because the entire jury
panel was tainted by the cumulative effect of prejudicial statements made by Juror 9 and Juror 22.
Hammer asserts Juror 9’s statement “going on for a while,” alongside Juror 22’s “tweaker”
comments informed the jury that Hammer looked guilty, was on drugs, and had violated the NCO
multiple times. The State argues that the district court’s denial of Hammer’s motion for a mistrial
was not in error because Hammer failed to show that the prospective jurors’ comments caused
actual bias in the selected jury and that any prejudice was cured by the district court’s instructions.
        A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST.
amends. V, VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, §§ 7, 13. “[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury
selected from a fair cross section of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual
viewpoints actually represented on the jury.” State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 69, 253 P.3d 727,
743 (2011) (quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988)).              A response to voir dire
questioning must have a lasting impact for there to be prejudice. State v. Laymon, 140 Idaho 768,
771, 101 P.3d 712, 715 (Ct. App. 2004). A juror’s expression of her own opinion of the case
during voir dire does not render her partial. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 69, 253 P.3d at 743. The Idaho
Supreme Court has explained:
       The trial court does not need to find jurors that are entirely ignorant of the facts and
       issues involved in the case. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived
       notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut
       the presumption of a prospective juror’s impartiality would be to establish an
       impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or
       opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.
State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 506, 988 P.2d 1170, 1180 (1999) (internal citations and
quotations omitted); see also State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 688, 85 P.3d 656, 664 (2004).

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        In this case, the jurors’ remarks did not have a continuing impact on the trial that would
warrant a mistrial. Hammer has not overcome the presumption that the impaneled jury was
impartial and cannot show bias or prejudice in any seated juror. The jury did not learn specific
facts and the district court gave adequate curative instructions.
        Responding to standard voir dire questions, Juror 9 indicated he heard something had been
going on for a while. Juror 9 was then dismissed for cause. After the exchange, the district court
stated, “We don’t want jurors who might know something about a case.” The district court found
Juror 9’s innocuous statement only indicated knowledge that the case existed. Questions will
inevitably prompt some jurors to express awareness of the case. Here, the vague statement did not
impart specific facts about Hammer or knowledge of prior bad acts. The statement would not tend
to lead the jury to conclude there had been prior charges, but only indicated awareness of the case.
        Juror 22’s “tweaker” and guilt comments also did not taint the jury pool as these statements
did not impart specific facts. The district court found the statements did not concern guilt, but
instead, whether drug use mattered in the case. The district court noted that, “even during jury
selection it is akin to a juror asked a question aloud, I believe the person is guilty based on the way
they’re acting.” Moreover, Juror 22’s statements did not reveal to the other jurors a reasonable
basis for its veracity.
        In State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 947 P.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1997), a prospective juror in a
sexual abuse case burst out that Kilby was a pedophile. In holding Kilby was not denied a fair
trial, this Court reasoned that the juror was excused and the remaining jurors were instructed to
ignore the comment, which they were presumed to follow. Id. at 751, 947 P.2d at 424. In Kilby,
there was no indication that the prospective juror had any factual basis to make the allegation.
Further, this Court focused on the important fact that the prospective juror was excused and the
impaneled jury properly instructed.
        In Laymon, a prospective juror in Laymon’s petit theft case, stated that she had been
disqualified from the jury pool the week before in Laymon’s trial for possession of controlled
substances and because her son had also been convicted of drug charges. Laymon, 140 Idaho 768,
101 P.3d 712. She said she was biased against Laymon “because of the drug relationship,” and
stated that she thought “he’s guilty already. If he’s guilty last week, he’ll be guilty next week.”
Laymon, 140 Idaho at 769, 101 P.3d at 713. After denying Laymon’s motion for mistrial, the

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district court gave a curative instruction and the juror who made the comments was removed for
cause. On review of the denial of the motion for mistrial this Court noted:
       [T]here is no evidence that the jury here did not follow the trial court’s instructions.
       The potential juror who uttered the statements at issue was removed, and there is
       no evidence that her statements had but a passing, inconsequential effect on the
       remaining pool members. There is also nothing in the record to show that the
       potential juror’s views about the previous week’s aborted trial had a continuing
       impact on Laymon’s petit theft trial.
Id. at 771, 101 P.3d at 715. This Court determined that the information regarding Laymon’s drug
case, as well as the prospective juror’s opinion of guilt, had a “passing, inconsequential effect on
the remaining pool members” that did not deprive Laymon of a fair trial. Id.
       In Ellington, the district court asked the jury pool if anyone had formed an opinion that
Ellington was guilty. A prospective juror indicated that he had “read about it in the papers” and
believed that Ellington was guilty. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 68, 253 P.3d at 742. Another juror
indicated she had a conversation with the victim’s aunt the day after the incident occurred and was
“on her side of him being guilty.” Id. at 68-69, 253 P.3d at 742-743. A final juror stated that he
had already formed an opinion based on the news he had read in the papers and seen on television
“such that he could not give Mr. Ellington a fair trial.” Id. at 69, 253 P.3d at 743. The Supreme
Court stated that “at worst, the jurors who actually deliberated received a second-hand opinion
from those . . . prospective jurors,” and that “they did not receive any specific facts as to why,
other than that the prospective jurors read about it in the paper and in one instance interacted with
a member of the [victim’s] family.” Id. The Supreme Court looked to “specific facts” learned and
did not engage in a discussion of inference or implication. Id. However, the implication from the
prospective jurors indicated the two jurors who formed their opinion of guilt was based on media
reports and, for one juror, interacting with the victim’s family member. These were not baseless
expressions of opinion. Yet, the Supreme Court stated that “at worst, [some] jurors who actually
deliberated received a second-hand opinion.” Id.
       The jurors’ statements in this case are much less compelling than those found insufficient
to warrant a mistrial in Kilby, Laymon, and Ellington. In combination, neither expression revealed
to the jury personal knowledge of actual events in the case or prior conduct. The district court
noted it was unlikely the comments influenced the jury so early in the proceedings, and other
potential jurors did not respond to Juror 22’s comments. The district court explained, “based upon
the remainder of the instructions to be given to the jury now and at the end of trial,” Juror 22’s

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statements “would not prejudice the other jurors’ ability to fairly and impartially consider the
evidence in this case.” There is nothing in the record to show that the statements of Jurors 9 and
22 had but a passing, inconsequential effect on the remaining prospective jurors.
         Even if the combined statements inferred guilt, the district court’s instructions adequately
directed the jury and cured any possible prejudicial impact. At the conclusion of voir dire, the
district court instructed: “[t]he law requires that your decision be made solely upon the evidence
before you. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in your deliberations.” The
district court instructed the jury to consider only the evidence admitted during trial which consisted
of witness testimony, exhibits, and stipulated or admitted facts. The district court instructed the
jury to follow all the court’s instructions and to wait until deliberations to discuss and decide the
case with other jurors. These instructions were given again before the jury deliberated.
         The Ellington Court expressly noted that “the impaneled jurors were instructed at the end
of voir dire that they were to decide the case only based on the evidence presented in the courtroom.
They were again instructed of this duty before their deliberations.” Ellington, 151 Idaho at 69,
253 P.3d at 743. We presume that the jury follows the district court’s instructions. See Kilby, 130
Idaho at 751, 947 P.2d at 424; State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App.
1996).
         Hammer has not alleged or shown that any juror was influenced by the statements, and
thus, was biased or prejudiced. Consequently, Hammer has failed to overcome the presumption
that the impaneled jurors were impartial or that they followed the district court’s instructions which
ameliorated any potential prejudicial effect. Accordingly, individually or in combination, any
effect the statements from the prospective jurors had, or reasonably may have had in relation to
the evidence presented, was minimal and did not have a continuing impact. Thus, the district court
did not err in denying the motion for a mistrial.
                                                        IV.
                                              CONCLUSION
         The district court did not err by denying Hammer’s motion for mistrial. Therefore, we
affirm the district court’s denial of Hammer’s motion for mistrial as well as Hammer’s judgment
of conviction.
         Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.

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