Court Opinion

ID: 9846310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:39:01.045263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:26.708565
License: Public Domain

Judge DAVIDSON
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority that correcting an illegal sentence in order to reflect the required period of parole does not violate a defendant’s right to protection against double jeopardy. However, I disagree with the majority’s determination that defendant had not been informed by the trial court that he would be subject to a mandatory period of parole in addition to any sentence of incarceration, that he had been induced into accepting an illegal sentence, and that, therefore, the plea bargain must be vacated.
Under Crim. P. 11(b), a trial court is not to accept a guilty plea without first determining, inter alia, that a defendant understands the possible penalty or penalties, including any agreed upon or stipulated sentence. Although the trial court must inform a defendant of any applicable mandatory parole period, People v. Sandoval, 809 P.2d 1058 (Colo.App.1990), there is no requirement that the court specify the length -of such parole or the fact that it is mandatory. See § 18 — 1— 105(l)(a)(V)(A), C.R.S.1998; People v. District Court, 868 P.2d 400 (Colo.1994); People v. Tyus, 776 P.2d 1143 (Colo.App.1989) (mandatory parole term is a consequence of which the court must inform a defendant because of the significant impact on the defendant’s freedom during such term).
No formal litany is required before a court may accept a plea of guilty. Rather, the record as a whole simply must demonstrate *73that the defendant understood the consequences of entering a plea. People v. Drake, 785 P.2d 1257 (Colo.1990) (sufficiency of advisement depends on such factors as complexity of charges, personal characteristics of defendant, and whether defendant is represented by counsel); People v. Orona, 907 P.2d 659 (Colo.App.1995). Cf. Wilson v. People, 708 P.2d 792 (Colo.1985) (reading of charge without further explanation of the terms is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that defendant understand the nature of the charge).
A reviewing court looks at both the provi-dency hearing and the written petition to' plead guilty in determining whether a defendant was advised properly prior to the entry of the plea. People v. Weed, 830 P.2d 1095 (Colo.App.1991).
Because Crim. P. 11 requires only that a defendant be advised of possible penalties, including a mandatory period of parole, I would conclude that, once a defendant is informed in the written plea agreement of such consequences, the trial court’s failure specifically to readvise the defendant of those consequences neither renders the Crim. P. 11 advisement insufficient, ipso facto, nor requires the conclusion that defendant did not understand such consequences. It is enough that the court is satisfied that a defendant has read and understood the written plea agreement, that the defendant’s counsel has reviewed arid explained the agreement "with him, and that counsel acknowledges the defendant’s understanding of the agreement. Such a determination does not relieve the court of its duty to ascertain that defendant understands the agreement nor does it absolve the court of the need to explain further those terms which are complex. See People v. Wieghard, 709 P.2d 81 (Colo.App.1985) (unless the language of the charge is easily understood, the critical elements of the charged offense must be explained in terms understandable to the defendant).
For the same reasons, I also believe the corollary to be true: that is, if the plea agreement does not mention a parole period, but the trial court at the providency hearing specifically advises the defendant, and the defendant acknowledges, the fact of parole, the plea also is valid on that basis.
Here, regardless that the trial court did not specifically readvise defendant orally of the parole consequence of his plea, my reading of the record leads me to conclude that defendant was on notice that he would be required to serve a period of parole in addition to any time he was incarcerated.
Under the written plea agreement, defendant was informed that “in addition to said terms of incarceration, [he] would serve a period of parole.” (emphasis added) Defendant affirmatively acknowledged to the trial court that he had reviewed the document with his counsel and that he understood the agreement. Further, defendant’s counsel certified that he had reviewed the written agreement with defendant and that, in his professional opinion, defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary.
Thus, I cannot agree with the majority either that a term of parole was not a consequence of the sentence to which defendant agreed or that defendant was not properly advised of such consequences of his plea. See People v. Jones, 957 P.2d 1046 (Colo.App.1997) (defendant informed in plea agreement that a period of parole is applicable to sentence is on notice that incarceration after parole violation is a possible consequence); People v. Tyus, supra (because four-year term of incarceration and one-year term of parole were less than the maximum defendant was advised he could receive, no reversible error occurred in the court’s advisement and acceptance of plea bargain). Cf. People v. Allen, 973 P.2d 620 (Colo.1999) (affirmative advisement to defendant concerning the right to testify is not required in hearing to revoke deferred judgment; advisement of rights at first appearance is sufficient).
Furthermore, even if I were to assume that defendant was not advised adequately of the sentencing consequences of his plea, I disagree with the majority that his sentence would, therefore, be rendered illegal.
By statute, the fact of parole is automatic. Neither the fact of parole nor the length of parole can be bargained for or stipulated to by a defendant or the prosecution. Thus, *74unlike the majority, I do not see the period of parole in any way a material part of defendant’s plea agreement here, but instead, as simply a direct consequence of such agreement of which a defendant must be advised.
A court may not impose a sentence that is inconsistent with the terms specified by statute. People v. District Court, 673 P.2d 991 (Colo.1983) (once trial court rejects probation as a sentence, it cannot circumvent existing legislative mandates by imposing and then suspending a sentence to imprisonment subject to conditions authorized only under a sentence to probation).
I agree that, if a recommended sentence under a plea bargain is illegal, it cannot validly be imposed or agreed to because such sentence removes the basis upon which a defendant has entered a plea and draws into question the voluntariness of the plea. Therefore, if a defendant enters into a plea agreement that includes as a material element a recommendation for an illegal sentence and such sentence is imposed, the guilty plea is invalid and must be vacated because the foundation upon which the plea agreement is based includes an impermissible inducement to an illegal sentence. See Chae v. People, 780 P.2d 481 (Colo.1989) (because court was without authority under statute then in effect to suspend the execution of a sentence to imprisonment, such sentence was illegal and plea bargain which provided for illegal sentence was void); People v. Flenniken, 749 P.2d 395 (Colo.1988) (because no statutory authority permitted court to suspend execution of sentence to imprisonment, such sentence was illegal).
I also do not disagree that there may be circumstances in which a sentence would be rendered illegal if conformed to meet the expectations of the plea agreement and that, under such circumstances, instead, the plea must be vacated.
For example, if a defendant is not advised that a mandatory period of parole is applicable to the sentence but the period of parole is greater than the sentence imposed, such sentence cannot be amended without waiving or suspending a portion of the parole period. Because a sentence that ignores any part of the parole period is illegal, the remedy under such circumstances must be to allow the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea. See People v. Jones, 985 P.2d 75 (Colo.App.1999).
Likewise, if a defendant is subject to both a mandatory minimum sentence and a mandatory period of parole, neither of which can be waived or suspended, then a sentence that does not encompass both required periods is illegal and a plea entered into under such circumstances would have to be vacated.
However, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that, if he is not advised fully of the sentencing consequences of his plea, a defendant’s sentence necessarily is illegal. Simply because a defendant receives a sentence to which he has not agreed, but which otherwise is in compliance with statutory requirements, does not render the sentence illegal. Rather, the imposition of such sentence is more properly viewed as a breach of the plea agreement for which certain remedies, other than vacating the plea agreement, exist. See People v. Macrander, 756 P.2d 356 (Colo.1988) (if defendant has reasonably and detrimentally relied on government’s promise in plea agreement, defendant is entitled to performance of such promise); People v. Jones, supra (if parole term was not part of the plea agreement, then imposition of parole was breach of agreement); People v. Sandoval, supra (absent showing that defendant’s plea was entered unknowingly and involuntarily, appropriate remedy for sentence imposed that was longer than the one bargained for is to amend sentence to conform to parties’ expectations under plea agreement).
Here, as described, defendant’s sentence of incarceration followed by a period of parole is not illegal. Indeed, such a sentence is required under the statutes for a defendant, as here, who is sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1993. See §§ 18-1-105(l)(a)(V)(A) & (B); People v. Barth, 981 P.2d 1102 (Colo.App.1999) (sentence consists of both periods of incarceration and parole). See also Bullard v. Department of Corrections, 949 P.2d 999 (Colo.1997) (sentence which ignores the statutory parole period is illegal); People v. Jones, supra (plea vacated *75because sentence imposed was illegal where three-year term of mandatory parole was greater than the two-year term of incarceration and trial court could not amend mittimus without waiving or suspending portion of parole term which it may not do. under the statute).
Also, defendant’s sentence of 3 years imprisonment followed by a two-year period of mandatory parole is less than the maximum sentence he was advised he could receive under the statutes. Consequently, because it complies with statutory requirements, defendant’s sentence, on its face, is legal and does not render his plea, otherwise knowingly and voluntarily entered, invalid.
Thus, contrary to the majority, I do not view Chae v. People, supra, as controlling. If defendant was not fully advised of the sentencing consequences of his plea, then the appropriate remedy would be to amend defendant’s sentence to conform to his expectations under the plea agreement. See People v. Sandoval, supra. Specifically, here, the sentence would reflect a one-year term of incarceration and a two-year term of mandatory parole.
However, because the trial court failed to include the period of parole on the mittimus, it must be amended in order to reflect that defendant is subject to a mandatory two-year period of parole. See People v. Reynolds, 907 P.2d 670 (Colo.App.1995).
Thus, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s Crim. P. 35(c) motion and would remand the case for the court simply to correct the mittimus to include the required period of parole.