Court Opinion

ID: 9948801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 22:03:01.404103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:52.940131
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/8/24; pub order 3/7/24 (see end of opn.)

              COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION ONE

                                   STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re P.L. et al., Persons Coming
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                   D082723, D082853
 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
 AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
                                                   (Super. Ct. No. NJ15938AB)
         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

 J.L.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San
Diego County, Nadia J. Keilani, Judge. Affirmed.
         Jill Smith, under appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
         Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Kristen M. Ojeil, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
         J.L. (Father) appeals from orders issued at the contested jurisdictional
and dispositional hearing declaring his 12-year-old son, P.L., and 10-year-old
daughter, L.L. (together, the children), to be dependents of the juvenile court,

placing them with the children’s mother, H.T. (Mother),1 and giving him
liberal supervised visitation. He contends the visitation orders should be
reversed because the juvenile court improperly delegated its visitation
authority to the children. The San Diego County Health and Human
Services Agency (Agency) asserts Father forfeited the issue. We agree with
the Agency and affirm the orders.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      The parents have a child welfare history dating back to 2019 with
multiple referrals regarding Father physically or emotionally abusing the
children. These referrals were previously found to be inconclusive,

unfounded, or evaluated out. The parents divorced in early 20232 and shared
custody of the children. On July 3, the Agency obtained protective custody
warrants for the children based on an incident that occurred on June 22
where Father allegedly punched P.L. in the eye. That same day, the Agency

filed petitions on behalf of the children under Welfare and Institutions Code3
section 300, subdivision (a). P.L. told a social worker that Father disciplines
him by locking him in the garage, punching him, or hitting him with a belt.
P.L. did not want to return to Father, fearing Father would be mad “and hit
us again.” L.L. stated Father disciplined her and P.L. by locking them in the
garage, kicking their legs, or hitting them with a belt.

1     Mother is not a party to this appeal.

2     Undesignated date references are to 2023.

3     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

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         At the July 6 detention hearing, the court placed the children with
Mother. Mother’s counsel and counsel for the children agreed that Father
should receive supervised visitation but requested that the children’s wishes
be taken into consideration. The court ordered liberal supervised visitation
and that the children’s wishes were to be taken into consideration on whether
visits would go forward. Father’s counsel did not object to the visitation
order.
         At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on July 26, Father’s
counsel set the matter for trial but raised no issues regarding visitation. The
court ordered that any expansion of visitation would be with the concurrence
of the children’s counsel. At a special hearing on August 8, the court ordered
that the children were to remain at their current school. Father raised no
issues regarding visitation at this hearing.
         At the contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on August 28,
Father’s counsel never argued that the current order for supervised visitation
should be changed or expressed a concern that the children refused to visit
Father. The court deferred Mother’s request to move to Texas, found the
allegations in the petitions true by a preponderance of the evidence, removed
custody from Father, retained custody with Mother as the non-offending
parent, continued liberal supervised visitation for Father, and gave the
Agency discretion to lift the supervision requirement and begin overnight
visits or a 60-day trial visit with Father upon concurrence of minors’ counsel.
         Father appealed from the orders issued at the contested jurisdictional
and dispositional hearing. At a special hearing on September 20, the court
considered Mother’s request to move to Texas with the children. Minors’
counsel informed the court that the children did not want any contact with
Father. Father’s counsel argued against the move but raised no issue

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regarding the court’s prior visitation order or that the children refused to
visit. The court granted Mother’s request to move to Texas. Father filed a
second notice of appeal from this order. On November 28, we issued an order
consolidating the appeals and gave Father 15 days to file his consolidated
opening brief.
                                  DISCUSSION
      Father contends the juvenile court improperly delegated its authority
at the detention hearing when it ordered that the children could refuse

visitation.4 The Agency contends Father forfeited this challenge by failing to
object to the order in the juvenile court. We agree with the Agency that the
claim has been forfeited.
      “[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling
if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court.” (In re
S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, superseded by statute on another ground
as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 962.) The purpose of the
forfeiture rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the trial court’s
attention so they can be corrected. (In re S.B., at p. 1293.) A second purpose
is to create a record that permits review of the trial court’s ruling to
determine if it was erroneous. (In re A.E. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
“ ‘[E]ven constitutional rights, including those of a minor in the area of
juvenile court procedure, will ordinarily be waived by silence, i.e., by their
nonassertion.’ ” (In re Christopher S. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1344;

4      Although Father also appealed from the September 20 order granting
Mother’s request to move to Texas, his opening brief contains no argument
challenging this order and we deem this issue forfeited. (Dameron Hospital
Assn. v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 971, 982 [“ ‘An appellant . . . forfeits an issue by failing to
raise it in his or her opening brief.’ ”].)

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Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 685–686 [due process
challenge forfeited because visitation issue not raised before juvenile court].)
      Here, Father appeared with counsel at the detention hearing. At no
point during the hearing did Father’s trial counsel object to the juvenile
court’s visitation orders or suggest any modifications to them. Father also
appeared with counsel at all subsequent hearings and failed to raise any
issue regarding the visitation orders, including that the juvenile court had
improperly delegated visitation authority to the children and that his
children refused to visit. On this record, we reject Father’s contention that
an objection would have been futile and conclude Father forfeited his
challenges to the visitation orders.
      In any event, assuming the issue had not been forfeited, we could not
conclude on this record that the juvenile court abused its discretion at the
detention hearing when it allowed the children to decline visiting Father. At
the detention hearing, the juvenile court is required to “determine if contact
pending the jurisdiction hearing would be beneficial or detrimental to the
child, and make appropriate orders.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.670(c)(1).)
Accordingly, “parental visitation can be denied at detention based on a basic
detriment finding. . . . This makes some sense, as the situation at detention
is often very fluid, all of the facts and circumstances are generally not known,
and any out-of-home placement order is, by definition, temporary.” (In re
Matthew C. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1103.) Thus, even if Father had
preserved his challenge to the detention order, on this record, the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion when it temporarily allowed the children to
decide whether they wanted to visit Father. (In re Robert L. (1993)
21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 [juvenile court’s broad discretion in fashioning
visitation will not be disturbed on review absent a clear abuse of discretion].)

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      Additionally, the juvenile court advised the parents that the detention
orders were “temporary” and it would issue “more permanent orders” at a
later hearing. Thereafter, at the contested jurisdictional and dispositional
hearing, the court granted Father liberal supervised visitation and gave the
Agency discretion to lift the supervision requirement and begin overnight
visits or a 60-day trial visit with Father upon concurrence of minors’ counsel.
This order necessarily superseded the temporary visitation orders issued at
the detention hearing. To the extent Father was unhappy because the
children continued to refuse visits, he should have raised this issue with the
juvenile court. “When a child refuses visitation, it is the parent’s burden to
request a specific type of enforcement, or a specific change to the visitation
order. Absent a request, it is not the court’s burden to sua sponte come up
with a solution to the intractable problem of a child’s steadfast refusal to visit
a parent.” (In re Sofia M. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1046.) “The court does
not err by failing to do that which it is not requested to do.” (Ibid.)

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                              DISPOSITION
    The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.

                                                         McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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Filed 3/7/24
                         CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

               COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION ONE

                             STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re P.L. et al., Persons Coming
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH                      D082723, D082853
 AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,            (Super. Ct. No. NJ15938AB)

         v.

 J.L.,                                        ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION
                                              FOR PUBLICATION
         Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT:
         The opinion in this case filed February 8, 2024 was not certified for
publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication
specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to
rule 8.1120(a) for publication is GRANTED.
         IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for
publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
      ORDERED that the words “Not to Be Published in the Official Reports”
appearing on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be
published in the Official Reports.

                                                         McCONNELL, P. J.

Copies to: All parties

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