Court Opinion

ID: 9864834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:13:30.037852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:10.615385
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Butler
dissenting.
I am unable to agree with the conclusion that a peremptory writ of prohibition should issue. District courts are constitutional courts of general jurisdiction. They possess full power, and exercise it daily, to pass upon demurrers and answers raising the question of the jurisdiction of the court. Their rulings thereon are reviewed by this court on writ of error. To justify this court in departing from the regular course and, by the extraordinary writ of prohibition, preventing a trial court from proceeding in a case pending before it, the case and the occasion should be extraordinary. The mere fact — if it is a fact— that the district court was about to act without or in excess of its jurisdiction is not sufficient to justify this court, in the exercise of its discretion, in awarding the writ. Where a trial court had overruled an objection to its jurisdiction and was about to adjudicate a cause on the merits, we denied an application for a writ of prohibition because the objection could be examined upon review on error. People ex rel. v. District Court, 11 Colo. 574, 19 Pac. 541. We there warned against the danger of permitting prohibition to be substituted for writ of error *329as a method of review. In People ex rel. v. District Court, 32 Colo. 469, 77 Pac. 239, we said: “We shall deny this application, if for no other reason, because by appeal or writ of error from the final judgment in that action, in case of an unfavorable decision, the relief to which plaintiffs are entitled may be awarded. These applications invoking the original jurisdiction of this court*are becoming altogether too frequent, and excepting in extreme cases where the right to the extraordinary relief clearly appears, and the usual remedy is not full, speedy and adequate, we are disposed to remit the parties to their ordinary remedies which, in most cases, prove efficacious.” In People ex rel. v. District Court, 74 Colo. 40, 218 Pac. 745, we held that a writ of prohibition will be denied when a writ of error would furnish an adequate remedy. And see Tomboy Gold Mines Co. v. District Court, 23 Colo. 441, 48 Pac. 537. In the present case a writ of error would afford an adequate remedy.
The application for the writ made a showing that justified this court in ordering the respondents to show cause. It appeared therefrom that the plaintiffs in the equity suit sought to have the assessments of the property of thirty-three corporations declared void, and also prayed for injunctive relief, as stated in the majority opinion; all of which, it was prophesied and feared, would throw the revenues of the state and its several agencies into a chaotic condition. In short, there was presented a case that called for an order to show cause. With the coming in of the return, all that was changed, and it was evident that the fear was groundless. It appeared that counsel, by his statement to the trial court, had so narrowed the demands of the plaintiffs as to remove the apprehended danger and to take away all necessity for prohibiting the district court from proceeding with the suit in the ordinary way. And in their brief filed in this court counsel for the respondents say: “* * * all that will be asked in the case is that the Tax Commission itself be directed to determine, after a full hearing, whether or not any addi*330tional assessments should be made. * * * How can the public be in any way damaged, how can the collection of taxes be in any way endangered, how can the collection of any taxes be indefinitely postponed, how can any prejudice or damage result to the public interest by the district court being permitted to determine whether or not on the'evidence introduced before the court an order should be made directing the Colorado Tax Commission to consider the question as to whether or not additional assessments should be made?” The fact that the prayer of the complaint was broad and comprehensive does not prevent the plaintiffs from thus narrowing their demands and contenting themselves with only a part of the relief originally sought. Hobbs, Commissioner of Insurance, et al. v. Pollock, District Judge, 280 U. S. 168, 50 Sup. Ct. 83, decided in the October, 1929, term.
If upon the application for the writ it was alleged that the plaintiffs in the district court sought only the relief ultimately demanded, it is incredible that we would have ordered the respondents to show cause ; the application would have been, or should have been, dismissed. The equity case should be permitted to take the usual course. The district court may be relied upon to protect fully the rights of all, so far as the law, the facts and the jurisdictional limits of the court permit. If, however, it should fall into error, a review by writ of error would afford adequate relief. The rule to show cause should be discharged and the petition dismissed.
Mr. Justice Burke concurs in this dissenting opinion.