Court Opinion

ID: 9368235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 15:05:30.336798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:06.476271
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 27, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2021-CA-1228-MR

GREGORY HARRIS
BRANDENBURG, RN, APRN                                                APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE SUSAN SCHULTZ GIBSON, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 21-CI-002188

KENTUCKY BOARD OF NURSING                                              APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Gregory Harris Brandenburg appeals from the order denying his

petition for declaratory judgment entered on September 16, 2021, by the Jefferson

Circuit Court. Following careful review of the record, briefs, and law, we affirm.
           BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

              In 2001, Brandenburg was licensed by the Kentucky Board of Nursing

(“Board”) as a Registered Nurse and Advanced Practice Registered Nurse.

Brandenburg determined he had an alcohol abuse issue and reported it to the Board

in March 2017. Thereafter, in May 2017, the Board discovered that – since May

2015—Brandenburg had issued over 100 controlled substance prescriptions,

exceeding applicable prescribing limits. On August 23, 2017, Brandenburg and

the Board entered an agreed order for the voluntary surrender of Brandenburg’s

nursing licenses for at least two years to satisfy the two actions against him.

              On September 14, 2020, Brandenburg applied for reinstatement of his

licenses. Nine days later, he submitted certain documentation to the Board for his

reinstatement and inquired as to what else was necessary. Brandenburg also,

erroneously, asserted that he surrendered his nursing licenses and privileges “for a

period of two years” and that the “suspension period” had run. Additionally, he

included a report and evaluation by Walter Butler, M.D., to demonstrate that

Brandenburg “discovered the root of his health issues and that the ‘alcohol abuse’

issues discussed in the Agreed Order was [sic] really a manifestation of the

underlying illness[.]”1

1
  The specific “health issue” or “underlying illness” was bipolar disorder. Brandenburg indicated
to Dr. Butler that his primary care physician first noted and diagnosed the bipolar symptoms in
2015 and prescribed medication accordingly. Dr. Butler’s diagnostic impression of Brandenburg

                                              -2-
                Less than one month later, the Board replied by letter enclosing its

Guidelines for Requesting Reinstatement of a Voluntarily Surrendered

License/Credential (“Guidelines”) and providing its assessment – provision by

provision – of whether each of the 18 provisions were met. The Board informed

Brandenburg that it had not received “the required evidence to proceed with the

consideration of the reinstatement” of his nursing licenses. It further stated that if

Brandenburg wished to be “considered for reinstatement, he must satisfy all of the

provisions noted in the Guidelines for Reinstatement and in 201 KAR2 20:225.”

(emphasis, footnote added). It also noted Brandenburg’s application would expire

on September 14, 2021.

                On April 14, 2021, Brandenburg petitioned the Jefferson Circuit Court

for a declaratory judgment regarding the enactment and enforcement of the

Guidelines, to vacate the agreed order, and to reinstate his nursing licenses.

Brandenburg filed a memorandum in support of his petition, the Board responded,

and a hearing was held. The trial court ultimately concluded that Brandenburg had

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and denied his petition. This appeal

followed.

was two-fold: (1) bipolar disorder, in substantial remission, and (2) alcohol use disorder, in
remission.
2
    Kentucky Administrative Regulations.

                                                -3-
                              STANDARD OF REVIEW

              It is well-settled:

              [t]he basic scope of judicial review of an administrative
              decision is limited to a determination of whether the
              agency’s action was arbitrary. Bobinchuck v. Levitch,
              [380 S.W.2d 233 (Ky. 1964).] If an administrative
              agency’s findings of fact are supported by substantial
              evidence of probative value, they must be accepted as
              binding and it must then be determined whether or not
              the agency has applied the correct rule of law to the facts
              so found. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm’n v.
              Landmark Community Newspapers of Kentucky, Inc., [91
              S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2002).] The Court of Appeals is
              authorized to review issues of law involving an
              administrative agency decision on a de novo basis.
              [Aubrey v. Off. of the Att’y Gen., 994 S.W.2d 516 (Ky.
              App. 1998)]. In particular, an interpretation of a statute
              is a question of law and a reviewing court is not bound
              by the agency’s interpretation of that statute. Halls
              Hardwood Floor Co. v. Stapleton, [16 S.W.3d 327 (Ky.
              App. 2000).]

Liquor Outlet, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 141 S.W.3d 378, 381 (Ky.

App. 2004).

                                    LEGAL ANALYSIS

              Brandenburg’s petition seeking declaratory relief was denied by the

trial court based upon the well-established principle that, “[a]s a general rule,

exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to seeking

judicial relief.” Commonwealth v. DLX, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 624, 625 (Ky. 2001)

(citing Goodwin v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 11, 215 S.W.2d 557, 559 (1948)).

                                          -4-
There is no evidence in our record that Brandenburg’s application was ever

actually denied. Rather, the application simply expired because Brandenburg did

not submit proof to the Board that he had fulfilled all the requirements that he –

with the advice of his legal counsel – agreed to complete prior to reinstatement of

his licenses. Brandenburg may still reapply for reinstatement; yet, he has chosen to

prematurely seek relief from the judicial system, now claiming the Guidelines with

which he agreed to comply are illegal. Moreover, Brandenburg has failed to even

comply with requirements that clearly do not run afoul of KRS3 13A.100 or KRS

13A.130 – such as paying his fine.

                In Popplewell’s Alligator Dock No. 1, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 133

S.W.3d 456, 471 (Ky. 2004), the Court explained:

                Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of
                preventing premature interference with agency
                processes, so that the agency may: (1) function
                efficiently and have an opportunity to correct its own
                errors; (2) afford the parties and the courts the benefit of
                its experience and expertise without the threat of litigious
                interruption; and (3) compile a record which is adequate
                for judicial review. In addition, an agency has an interest
                in discouraging frequent and deliberate flouting of the
                administrative process. [T]he exhaustion doctrine does
                not preclude, but rather defers, judicial review until
                after the expert administrative body has built a
                factual record and rendered a final decision. By
                honoring the exhaustion doctrine, courts avoid interfering
                with the administrative process, and the initial reviewing
                court benefits from the specialized knowledge of the

3
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                            -5-
             agency. With increasing case loads and demands upon
             the courts, it is important to note that [t]he rule requiring
             exhaustion also promotes judicial economy by
             resolving issues within the agency, eliminating the
             unnecessary intervention of courts.

                    In 1994, the legislature enacted a comprehensive
             act relating to administrative hearings, which was
             codified as KRS Chapter 13B, that brought together in
             one place the varying grounds for review of an
             administrative decision already recognized in Kentucky
             jurisprudence, and provided that [a] party may file a
             petition for judicial review only after the party has
             exhausted all administrative remedies available
             within the agency whose action is being challenged,
             and within any other agency authorized to exercise
             administrative review. And, the Act specifically
             authorized a reviewing circuit court to grant a stay of a
             final order pending judicial review. Thus, a party
             adversely affected by a final order of an administrative
             agency may seek judicial review and, if necessary,
             request a stay of the order during the judicial review.

(Emphasis added) (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and original emphasis

omitted). The Supreme Court went on to hold “a party need not exhaust

administrative remedies when attacking the constitutionality of a statute or a

regulation as void on its face, . . . a party must exhaust administrative remedies

prior to seeking judicial review of an as-applied constitutional challenge.” Id. at

472 (emphasis added).

             In the case herein, Brandenburg challenges neither a statute nor a

regulation as unconstitutional on its face or as-applied. By contrast, he asserts the

Guidelines he agreed to follow are illegal because they constitute “actual policy”

                                          -6-
of the Board in violation of KRS 13A.100 and KRS 13A.130. Since Brandenburg

is not attacking the constitutionality of a statute or a regulation, the trial court

correctly denied his petition for declaratory relief for his failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies. See id. Accordingly, we need not address any further

issues.4

                                        CONCLUSION

               Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order entered by the

Jefferson Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

               ALL CONCUR.

    BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                          BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

    J. Fox DeMoisey                                Amy Wheeler
    Prospect, Kentucky                             Louisville, Kentucky

4
  In his reply brief, Brandenburg cites Goodwin, 309 Ky. at 15, 215 S.W.2d at 559, which stated,
“The concept of the term jurisdiction embraces action, or contemplated action, by the body
without power and in the given case, it is necessary for the judiciary to restrain the agency in
order to prevent irreparable injury.” Brandenburg asserts he “is suffering irreparable injury
being illegally restrained from the practice of nursing for years.” Yet, irreparable harm is
defined as, “incalculable damage to the applicant . . . either to the liberty of his person, or to his
property rights, or other far-reaching and conjectural consequences,” and, “something of a
ruinous nature[.]” Barnes v. Goodman Christian, 626 S.W.3d 631, 638 (Ky. 2021) (citations
omitted). Brandenburg has failed to provide any specific argument or evidence to support such a
theory. Therefore, he has failed to demonstrate an irreparable injury.

                                                 -7-