Court Opinion

ID: 9675520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:56:15.693031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:35.086702
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge,
dissenting.
*506Art. 580, C.C.P., requires that in all prosecutions for a felony or a misdemeanor when the punishment or any part thereof is imprisonment in jail “the defendant must be personally present at the trial.”
The hearing of the motion for new trial is a part of the trial, within the meaning of the statute. Phillips v. State, 163 Texas Cr. Rep. 13, 288 S.W. 2d 775.
This record affirmatively reflects that appellant was not present when his motion for new trial was presented and acted upon and that he did not waive his right to be present at that time.
The order of the trial court overruling appellant’s amended motion for a new trial reads as follows:
“On this the 7th day of November, 1956, came on regularly and at a time prescribed by law and fixed by the Court to be heard the defendant’s first amended original motion for a new trial; the State and the defendant appeared solely by their attorneys, Joe R. Carroll, County Attorney of Anderson County, Texas, for the state and C. S. Farmer and E. T. McCain, Jr., for the defendant; no right or privilege guaranteed, allowed or granted by the constitution and laws of the United States of America or the constitution and ¡or law of the State of Texas was waived by either the State and the defendant, or either of them; said first amended original motion for a new trial was at the time prescribed by laws presented to the court for its determination and the court after hearing said motion for a new trial and argument of counsel and after having duly considered said motion for a new trial is of the opinion, and so finds that said motion should be in all things denied and refused and overruled. [Emphasis, supplied.]
“It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that the defendant’s first amended original motion for a new trial be, and the same is hereby, in all things denied and overruled, to which action and ruling of the court the defendant by and through his counsel, C. S. Farmer and E. T. McCain, Jr., then and there in open court seasonably and at the time and in the manner prescribed by law duly and legally excepted and gave notice of appeal to the court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas, which exception and notice of appeal is here now entered of record as required by law.”
*507To me, it is apparent that such order affirmatively reflects (a) that appellant was not personally present when his motion for a new trial was presented and acted upon by the trial court; (b) that he did not waive his right to be present at that time; and (c) that his counsel, who were present at the hearing of the motion, duly excepted to the trial court’s action in overruling the motion.
The conclusion is, to my mind, inescapable that this record affirmatively reflects that a direct, positive, and unequivocal mandate of the legislature was violated and disregarded by the trial court, in the violation of which the appellant was deprived —without fault, waiver, or negligence on his part — of a valuable right. See Henderson v. State, 137 Texas Cr. Rep. 18, 127 S.W. 2d 902; Phillips v. State, 163 Texas Cr. Rep. 13, 288 S.W. 2d 775 (supra).
My brethren do not suggest to the contrary, but acquiesce, agree, and affirm the trial court’s action — not because the appellant was deprived of a valuable right conferred by statute, but because his counsel did not, in addition to the exception reserved and pointed out in the order overruling the motion for new trial, also file and present an independent bill of exception to the very matter covered by the order overruling the motion for new trial.
A bill of exception could have added nothing which was not reflected by the order of the court and the certificates contained therein, for the trial court certified that appellant was not present when his motion for new trial was acted upon and had not waived his right to be present. A bill of exception could have reflected nothing more.
So then, the error here shown is apparent from the record in the case. In the commission of that error appellant was deprived of a right made mandatory by the legislature of this state. The error, therefore, was fundamental, and no bill of exception was required to warrant a review by this court.
In addition, Art. 667, Vernon’s C.C.P., expressly authorizes consideration of the question here presented, for it is there provided:
“Where the matter about which complaint is made and the trial court’s ruling thereon reasonably appear from any formal *508or informal bill of exception, same shall be considered upon appeal, regardless of whether or not the bill of exception is multifarious or relates to more than one subject, complaint, or objection.”
Surely the exception reserved in the order overruling the motion for a new trial and the facts certified therein constituted, at least, an informal bill of exception which, under the facts mentioned, was entitled to be considered by this court.
My brethren justify the affirmance of this conviction in the face of the positive disregard of the statutory mandate, by saying:
“Had appellant complained in the trial court or there questioned the validity of the court’s action in hearing and overruling his motion for new trial in his absence, the trial court would have had the opportunity to set aside his order and rehear the motion in appellant’s presence.”
Surely my brethren cannot be serious in that statement, for, if appellant had been present to question the validity of hearing the motion in his absence, he was then present for the hearing and the mandate of the statute had been complied with.
So, appellant is held liable for not personally calling attention to the fact that he was not present when the court heard the motion for new trial.
Appellant’s personal presence being required when his motion for new trial was heard, he alone, could waive that requirement. His counsel could not do so for him.
In addition to the direct certificate of the trial court that appellant did not waive his right to be present at the hearing, I call attention to the further fact that there is not the least intimation from this record that appellant voluntarily absented himself from court or that he knew or had prior notice that the motion for new trial was to be heard at the time.
So long as the legislature has declared that a defendant must be personally present at his trial, under certain conditions, it is the duty of the courts to obey and carry out that declaration.
If the courts may — as here shown — openly violate and dis*509obey that statute, then all other statutes may be equally disobeyed, and we have left only law by judicial decree.
I respectfully dissent.