Court Opinion

ID: 9943432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 16:04:58.114845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:00.552855
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                        Case No. 5D23-221
             LT Case No. 16-2021-CF-008102-AXXX-MA
                  _____________________________

AVERY DESEAN JAMES,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Mark Borello, Judge.

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Megan Long, Special
Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christina Piotrowski,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

                        February 23, 2024

HARRIS, J.

    Avery James was observed by a law enforcement officer
walking in an area where two gunshots had been recently heard.
When the officer began following James in his patrol car, James
began to jog, then sprint away from the officer. Eventually James
stopped running and threw a firearm behind a nearby fence. He
was arrested and charged with Possession of a Firearm by a
Convicted Felon (count one), Possession of Cocaine while Armed
(count two), Unlicensed Carrying a Concealed Firearm (count
three), Discharging Firearm in Public (count four), and Resisting
Officer Without Violence (count five). The State initially proceeded
to trial on count one only. At trial, James stipulated that he was a
convicted felon, leaving as the only issue remaining whether
James possessed a firearm. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
found James not guilty.

     Following his acquittal, James moved to dismiss the
remaining counts pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.151(c), arguing that the offenses were related to count one, for
which he was acquitted. The court held a hearing on the motion to
dismiss, after which it dismissed counts three and four and allowed
the State to proceed on simple possession of cocaine, a lesser-
included offense (count two), and on count five. James pled guilty
to counts two and five, reserving his right to appeal the court’s
order partially denying his motion to dismiss.

    This Court reviews de novo James’ claim that he was entitled
to dismissal on counts two and five pursuant to rule 3.151(c).
Brown v. State, 251 So. 3d 973, 975 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (reviewing
de novo court’s denial of motion to dismiss pursuant to rule
3.151(c)). In this appeal, James argues that because counts two
and five were related offenses to count one, the trial court erred in
partially denying his motion to dismiss. We agree.

      Rule 3.151, provides in part:

      Rule 3.151. Consolidation of Related Offenses

      (a) Related Offenses. For purposes of these rules, 2 or
      more offenses are related offenses if they are triable in
      the same court and are based on the same act or
      transaction or on 2 or more connected acts or
      transactions.

            ....

      (c) Dismissal of Related Offenses after Trial. When a
      defendant has been tried on a charge of 1 of 2 or more

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      related offenses, the charge of every other related
      offense shall be dismissed on the defendant’s motion
      unless a motion by the defendant for consolidation of
      the charges has been previously denied, or unless the
      defendant has waived the right to consolidation, or
      unless the prosecution has been unable, by due
      diligence, to obtain sufficient evidence to warrant
      charging the other offense or offenses.

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.151(a), (c).

     “The purpose behind rule 3.151(c) is to allow the defendant a
means to protect himself (by motion to dismiss) from multiple
trials on charges of related offenses when he has already suffered
a prior trial on a related offense.” Dixon v. State, 486 So. 2d 67, 69
(Fla. 4th DCA 1986). “Dismissal under Rule 3.151(c) is rare and is
required only where the offenses arise out of a single criminal
episode.” State v. Varnum, 991 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 4th DCA
2008). In Paul v. State, 385 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 1980), our
Supreme Court adopted Judge Smith’s dissent below, which
explained that rule 3.151 “refer[s] to ‘connected acts or
transactions’ in an episodic sense” rather than charges that “are
‘connected’ only by similar circumstances and the accused’s alleged
guilt in both or all instances.” “To aid in this inquiry, “[c]ourts may
consider ‘the temporal and geographical association, the nature of
the crimes, and the manner in which they were committed.’”
Varnum, 991 So. 2d at 921 (quoting Garcia v. State, 568 So. 2d 896,
899 (Fla. 1990)).

       We find that the trial court erred in allowing the State to
proceed on the reduced charge of possession of cocaine and on the
resisting an officer without violence charge. In addition to the
firearm-related charges, we agree with James that these two
counts should have been dismissed as well. All counts were
charged in the same information, triable in the same court, and
were based on two or more connected acts or transactions. The
events    were     connected    episodically,    temporally    and
geographically, and under rule 3.151(c), James was entitled to a
dismissal of all remaining counts following his acquittal on count
one.

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    REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to dismiss all
charges that remained following James’ trial.

WALLIS and JAY, JJ., concur.

                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
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