Court Opinion

ID: 9446357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:52:45.968299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:37.585982
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
The majority opinion herewith, perhaps taking its cue from plaintiff’s brief and argument, makes this case appear quite complex. But to me it seems a simple one where the jury, after full proof and appropriate charge, has performed its historic function of rendering its verdict. If sustained on the evidence, that should stand, even though we may not like it.
The court charged the jury that it must find that defendant had notice of a defect in the boom and/or king post in order to find the defendant negligent. The jury, in answer to a special interrogatory, found that the defendant was negligent. Hence, in the jury’s eyes, defendant must have had actual or constructive notice of the defect. If this finding is supported by the evidence the verdict must stand, for, as the majority implicitly concedes, it is not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant’s failure to warn plaintiff’s employer of a known defect is negligence proximately related to plaintiff’s injury. See Corrado v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 2 Cir., 171 F.2d 73, certiorari denied 336 U.S. 919, 69 S.Ct. 641, 93 L.Ed. 1081; Bruszewski v. Isthmian S. S. Co., 3 Cir., 163 F.2d 720, certiorari denied 333 U.S. 828, 68 S.Ct. 451, 92 L.Ed. 1113; Jensen v. Bank Line, 9 Cir., 26 F.2d 173.
At trial plaintiff introduced evidence that the space plate on the king post was of an inferior type, that rust spots were found on the king post after the accident, and that three months prior to the accident Weber, a seaman aboard defendant’s ship, heard a cracking in the king post when another piece of equipment, a runner, employed in the operation of the boom, fouled during operation. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant had at least constructive notice of some sort of defect in the king post.
The compelling strength of Weber’s testimony in this respect is attested by the manner in which the court below and the majority here seek to avoid it. Judge Bruchhausen, noting that Weber had not mentioned the matter to anyone previous to his consultation with plaintiff’s attorney after the accident and that the boom and king post were in normal use for three months after the alleged cracking was heard, chose not to believe the witness. D.C.E.D.N.Y., 156 F.Supp. 854, 857-858. While the trial judge has a large area of discretion in entering a judgment n. o. v., matters of credibility are always within the province of the jury. So the opinion herewith takes a different tack to steer around Weber’s testimony. It summarily disregards the evidence as irrelevant because “Any knowledge on the part of Weber cannot be imputed to the Mormacsurf.” True, Weber had been discharged on September 8, the day before the cracking incident, and had returned to the ship on September 9 just to pick up his gear. But the question is not whether Weber informed the Mormacsurf’s officers of what he observed. It is whether defendant’s employees in the course of their employment learned of the defect. Weber testified that there were several of defendant’s employees standing and working near him when the incident occurred. Surely it is not unreasonable for a jury to find that if Weber heard the king post crack, defendant’s employees did also, so that their knowledge is properly imputable to the employer. Moreover, it is not admitted, as the majority states, that a visual inspection of the king post would not have disclosed its defect. And Weber’s testimony strengthens the inference drawn from the presence of rust spots on the post after the accident that the defect in the king post was discoverable by inspection.
I shall not repeat at length the concern I have previously voiced at what seems to me a growing judicial tendency to *739invade the province of the jury. See Palermo v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 2 Cir., 246 F.2d 557, 561-563, reversed 355 U.S. 20, 78 S.Ct. 1, 2 L.Ed.2d 3, with the verdict eventually reinstated, 2 Cir., 253 F. 2d 724; Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 2 Cir., 245 F.2d 175, 183, certiorari granted 355 U.S. 902, 78 S.Ct. 335, 2 L.Ed.2d 259. But the vast number of cases where the Supreme Court has had to intervene in recent years to restore verdicts judicially scuttled should be recalled. See Palermo v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., supra, 355 U.S. 20, 78 S.Ct. 1, 2 L.Ed.2d 3; Honeycutt v. Wabash Ry. Co., 355 U.S. 424, 78 S.Ct. 393, 2 L.Ed.2d 380; Stinson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 355 U.S. 62, 78 S.Ct. 136, 2 L.Ed.2d 93; Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U.S. 18, 78 S.Ct. 2, 2 L.Ed.2d 1; Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 354 U.S. 901, 77 S.Ct. 1093, 1 L.Ed.2d 1268; McBride v. Toledo Terminal R. Co., 354 U.S. 517, 77 S.Ct. 1398, 1 L.Ed. 2d 1534; Thomson v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 926, 77 S.Ct. 698, 1 L.Ed.2d 722; Deen v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 925, 77 S.Ct. 715, 1 L.Ed.2d 721; Futrelle v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 353 U.S. 920, 77 S.Ct. 682, 1 L.Ed.2d 718; Shaw v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 353 U.S. 920, 77 S.Ct. 680, 1 L.Ed.2d 718; Arnold v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 353 U.S. 360, 77 S.Ct. 840, 1 L.Ed.2d 889; Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493; Webb v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 352 U.S. 512, 77 S.Ct. 451, 1 L.Ed. 2d 503; Herdman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 352 U.S. 518, 77 S.Ct. 455,1 L.Ed.2d 508; Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 77 S.Ct. 459, 1 L.Ed.2d 515; Cahill v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 350 U.S. 898, 76 S.Ct. 180, 100 L.Ed. 790; Strickland v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 350 U.S. 893, 76 S.Ct. 157, 100 L. Ed. 786; Anderson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 350 U.S. 807, 76 S.Ct. 60, 100 L.Ed. 725; O’Neill v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 348 U.S. 956, 75 S.Ct. 447, 99 L. Ed. 747; Smalls v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 348 U.S. 946, 75 S.Ct. 439, 99 L.Ed. 740; Stone v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co., 344 U.S. 407, 73 S.Ct. 358, 97 L.Ed. 441; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69 S.Ct. 413, 93 L.Ed. 497.
I would reverse and remand for the reinstatement of the verdict.