Court Opinion

ID: 9454257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:40:59.883424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:02.473400
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND EN BANC
PER CURIAM:
On petition for rehearing, appellants ask us to reexamine our opinion dated January 9, 1969, with regard to the allegation that one of the jurors in the case expressed an opinion concerning the guilt of defendants during the trial. We stat*941ed in our opinion that the incident referred to happened in the afternoon of September 11, 1967. Appellants contend, however, that during the trial judge’s interrogation of the jury in the afternoon of September 13, 1967, he assumed that the alleged communication by the juror took place on September 12, 1967, and that if, in fact, this assumption were correct, the probability that a juror was implicated would be greater. On this basis, appellants urge that we reverse their convictions or remand the case with directions to conduct a full evidentiary hearing on the juror misconduct issue. See, e. g., Morgan v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 399 F.2d 93. Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive, and we adhere to the conclusions expressed in our prior opinion.
After a careful review of the record, we find that there is no conflict as to the date upon which the conversation between the garageman and the alleged juror occurred. Whatever confusion existed as to this point arose out of the failure to distinguish the communication between the garageman and an alleged juror on September 11, 1967, from the subsequent communication, a day later, between the garageman and a Fifth Circuit judge’s secretary. Furthermore, while it is true that in the afternoon of September 13, 1967, the trial judge referred to the possibility of such an incident as having occurred on the previous afternoon, when he again questioned the jury and specifically asked whether any one of them had made a remark to a garageman at the Forsyth Building garage, we do not believe that this inadvertence, considering the totality of circumstances, should cause us to change our holding that the trial court’s investigation of the alleged juror misconduct was adequate. In the context of a trial that had been going on for only two and one-half days, and the strong likelihood that the specificity of the court’s question would have made any juror who had made the alleged statement remember the incident, and in view of the questions propounded earlier the same day, we conclude that our prior holding was correct. Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the trial judge advised counsel at the time of the motion for a mistrial that
« •>:- * * I’ll take whatever action is indicated should there be a verdict of guilty and should it develop from investigation by [defendants’ counsel] or by the United States Attorney or anyone else regarding it.”
Appellants never came forward with additional evidence nor did they file new post-trial motions or request a further hearing. Indeed, we may infer from this failure to pursue the matter further that appellants were satisfied with the court’s investigation, or alternatively, that their own independent investigation, if they conducted one, corroborated the trial judge’s denial of the motion for a mistrial.
The petition for rehearing is denied and no member of this panel nor judge in regular active service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Local Fifth Circuit Rule 12), petition for rehearing en banc is denied.