Court Opinion

ID: 9387212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-16 15:00:24.142215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:12.180948
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50593      Document: 00516712279         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/14/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                FILED
                                                                         April 14, 2023
                                   No. 22-50593                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                Clerk

   Jeff Spano, individual and as next friend of C.S., a minor child;
   Debbie Spano, individual and as next friend of C.S., a minor child,

                                                            Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                       versus

   Whole Foods, Incorporated,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 1:21-CV-748
                  ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Kurt D. Engelhardt, Circuit Judge:
          A child experienced a severe allergic reaction after consuming a
   cupcake allegedly mislabeled as “vegan” by a Whole Foods store. The
   child’s mother subsequently left her job to provide full-time care for her
   traumatized son. The family sued Whole Foods under theories of negligence
   and strict liability, among others. In response to a motion to dismiss filed by
   Whole Foods, the district court held that the suit was preempted by the
   Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) and thus granted
   dismissal. This appeal followed.
Case: 22-50593        Document: 00516712279             Page: 2      Date Filed: 04/14/2023

                                         No. 22-50593

                                   Factual Background
           C.S., a seven-year old at the time of the incident at issue, has “life-
   threatening allergies to dairy, tree nuts, and fish.” Mindful of these allergies,
   the Spano family would on occasion purchase products labeled “vegan” from
   their local Whole Foods store, as those products were held out as not
   containing any of the allergens to which C.S. would react. In September of
   2018, a family friend purchased a “vegan”-labeled cupcake from Whole
   Foods for C.S.’ consumption at a birthday party. 1 C.S. consumed the cupcake
   and had an allergic reaction. Debbie Spano, his mother, promptly
   administered epinephrine. C.S. was then treated by medical professionals
   and released from care later that evening.
           The Spanos allege that the cupcake in question was mislabeled and
   was, in fact, a non-vegan version of the cupcake. C.S. thereafter experienced
   a number of psychological challenges relating to social relations and
   consumption of food. Because of these challenges, Debbie Spano resigned
   from her job and devoted herself to full-time care for C.S.
                                   Procedural History
           The Spanos – Debbie and Jeff, individually and on behalf of their
   minor son – filed suit against Whole Foods, claiming negligence, violations
   of strict liability, manufacturing and marketing defects, breaches of express
   and implied warranties, loss of earning capacity, vicarious liability, and
           _____________________
           1
             The Amended Complaint implies, but does not state, that Debbie Spano bought
   the cupcake herself, and the district court assumed as much. On appeal, the Appellants
   clarify that it was the family friend who purchased the cupcake. There is language deep in
   the complaint that, if read carefully, suggests that the family friend was indeed the
   purchaser (“[t]he purchaser visited [Whole Foods] and … purchase[d] non-allergenic
   cupcakes to provide the following day to C.S. at their child’s birthday party”) (emphasis
   added). Nonetheless, the natural reading of the complaint, as Whole Foods rightly notes,
   is that Debbie Spano purchased the cupcakes at issue.

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Case: 22-50593       Document: 00516712279             Page: 3      Date Filed: 04/14/2023

                                        No. 22-50593

   deceptive trade practices under Texas law. 2 Whole Foods filed a motion to
   dismiss in which it claimed that “Plaintiffs’ claims, which are derived from
   and based on the [FDCA,] are preempted and should be dismissed because
   there is no private cause of action under the FDCA.” The district court
   agreed: “Upon review, the Court finds that all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action
   are entirely dependent upon an FDCA violation. In other words, the only
   reason Whole Foods’s cupcakes were allegedly ‘unlawful’ or deceptive were
   because they failed to comply with FDCA labeling requirements for food
   allergens. This theory of liability is impliedly preempted by federal law.” The
   Spanos filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                  Standard of Review
           A district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo.
   See Cicalese v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2019).
   “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
   matter which, when taken as true, states ‘a claim to relief that is plausible on
   its face.’” Innova Hosp. San Antonio, Ltd. P’ship v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
   Ga., Inc., 892 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
   Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
   plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
   inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
   Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint “does not need detailed factual
   allegations,” but the facts alleged “must be enough to raise a right to relief
   above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).

          _____________________
           2
             This list is taken from the operative complaint, which is the First Amended
   Complaint. The initial complaint listed “loss of consortium” in place of loss of earning
   capacity and also included a claim for deceptive trade practices under New York law

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                                          No. 22-50593

                                          Discussion
          A. Whether the FDCA Precludes Implied Preemption
          Title 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) provides in relevant part that there is no
   private right of action under the FDCA. See also POM Wonderful LLC v.
   Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 109 (2014) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 337) (“Private
   parties may not bring enforcement suits [under the FDCA].”). It is
   indisputable that to the extent that the Appellants seek to enforce the FDCA
   against Whole Foods, they cannot maintain their claims.
          Despite the bar to private enforcement actions, the Spanos claim that
   the FDCA does not impliedly preempt parallel state law actions. In fact, they
   submit that implied preemption is not applicable to claims based on food
   labeling. The express preemption clause of the FDCA provides, subject to
   certain exceptions not relevant here, that “no State … may directly or
   indirectly establish under any authority or continue in effect as to any food in
   interstate commerce … (2) any requirement for the labeling of food of the
   type required by section … 343(w) … that is not identical to the requirement
   of such section.” 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (a). 3 Appellants also point to a
   “Construction” note contained in the relevant act in which it is noted that
   “[§ 343-1] shall not be construed to preempt any provision of State law,
   unless such provision is expressly preempted under section 403A of the
   Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.” Nutritional Labeling and
   Education Act of 1990, 101 P.L. 535, 104 Stat. 2353, § 6(a), (c); 21 U.S.C. §
   343-1, Note. Moreover, the Construction note also states that “[t]he
   amendment made by subsection (a) and the provisions of subsection (b) shall
   not be construed to apply to any requirement respecting a statement in the
   labeling of food that provides for a warning concerning the safety of the food
          _____________________
          3
              21 U.S.C. § 343(w) applies to “major food allergen labeling requirements.”

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                                         No. 22-50593

   or component of the food.” Id. Taken together, the Appellants contend,
   these notes indicate Congress’ clear intent “that implied preemption not
   apply to food labeling claims.”
           Whole Foods contends that this language indicates Congress’ intent
   to disclaim “field preemption” rather than any intent to disclaim implied
   preemption. 4 Whole Foods does not argue that the Appellants’ claims are
   expressly preempted, and the district court did not so hold. Instead, says
   Whole Foods, these provisions indicate “that preemption will only apply to
   state laws implicating labeling requirements found in Section 343-1, not that
   only ‘express preemption’ is permitted.” We adopt Whole Foods’ approach
   – the language of “provision[s] of State law” and “requirement[s] respecting
   a statement in the labeling of food” suggests duly enacted statutes which
   touch upon these issues. For example, a state law requiring warning labels
   concerning an ingredient not addressed by the FDCA would not be
   preempted under this construction. Under this reading, the note does not
   disclaim any preemption, but merely ensures that courts leave room for some
   regulation in this field. This comports with the Supreme Court’s decision in
   Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., in which the Court held that an
   express preemption clause does not “‘bar[] the ordinary working of conflict
   pre-emption principles.’” 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001) (quoting Geier v.
   American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)). In sum, the FDCA
   permits implied preemption. What remains to be seen is whether the claims
   in this case are impliedly preempted.

           _____________________
           4
             In simple terms, Whole Foods claims that Congress did not mean to occupy the
   entire field of food labeling (that is, states can still make regulations concerning, e.g.,
   warning labels) but that Congress did not mean to proscribe implied preemption (that is,
   preemption where the violations at issue are (a) covered by federal regulations and (b) not
   within the scope of express preemption contemplated by the FDCA).

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                                     No. 22-50593

          B. Whether the Appellants’ Causes of Action Are Impliedly Preempted
          The district court held that the Appellants’ claims were preempted
   because they were “entirely dependent upon an FDCA violation” in that
   their “claims could not exist based solely on traditional state tort law”
   because “the standard for allergen labeling under the FDCA is critical to each
   of Plaintiffs’ claims.” The district court’s decision relied heavily on
   Buckman, in which a “fraud-on-the-FDA” claim was impliedly preempted
   because “the existence of … federal enactments is a critical element” of the
   claim. 531 U.S. at 353. The claim was that Buckman had defrauded the FDA
   in violation of its statutory obligations. See id. at 346-47. As the FDA has sole
   “responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Administration’s
   judgment and objectives” under the statutory framework, the Supreme
   Court held a private party could not maintain a state-law fraud case on such
   a basis. Id. at 350. However, the Court left open the possibility that
   “traditional state tort law principles of the duty of care owed” by one party
   to another could support a parallel state-law claim, at least where Congress
   had “‘disclaimed any interest in promoting the [statutory goal] by means that
   fail to provide adequate remedies for those who are injured.’” Id. at 352
   (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984)).
          Relying on that possibility, this court has rejected the argument that
   negligence claims are always impliedly preempted by the FDCA. In Hughes
   v. Bos. Sci. Corp., we held that a “Mississippi tort claim based on the
   underlying state duty to warn about the dangers or risks of product” was not
   preempted by the FDCA even though the plaintiff “[sought] to prove Boston
   Scientific’s breach of the state duty by showing that Boston Scientific
   violated the FDA’s [Medical Device Reporting] regulations.” 631 F.3d 762,

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                                          No. 22-50593

   775 (5th Cir. 2011). 5 Hughes also relied on a later Supreme Court decision in
   which it was noted that the relevant statute “d[id] not prevent a State from
   providing a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA
   regulations; the state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than add to,
   federal requirements.” Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008).
   Therefore, an independent state-law duty may form the basis of a tort claim
   for which violations of the FDCA may be presented as evidence of breach,
   assuming that the state-law claims do not (a) “add to” federal requirements
   or (b) impinge on the FDA’s sole authority over food-labeling requirements. 6
          Those latter requirements appear to be met: no party asserts that the
   Spanos seek to enforce labeling requirements above and beyond those
   imposed by the FDA. Nor is there any claim here – like a “fraud-on-the-
   FDA” claim – that would impinge on the FDA’s authority over food labeling.
   Appellants do not assert that Whole Foods submitted false evidence to the
   FDA, for example, and their claims “do[] not depend on speculation that the
   FDA would have taken any particular regulatory action in response to
   violation of the regulations at issue.” Hughes, 631 F.3d at 775. So the question
   is whether Appellants have pled tort claims which have an independent state-
   law basis.
           They have. Each of their tort claims is “a recognized state tort claim”
   rather than “a freestanding federal cause of action based on violation of the

           _____________________
          5
              Bizarrely, Whole Foods neglects to address Hughes whatsoever in its brief.
          6
            There is no dispute that both Buckman and Hughes are controlling. Both of those
   cases addressed preemption under the FDCA as amended by the Medical Device
   Amendments of 1976 (“MDA”) as both cases involved allegedly defective medical
   equipment. See Hughes, 631 F.3d at 764, Buckman, 531 U.S. at 343. Here, the question is
   about the FDCA’s food labeling requirements. As the statutory provisions on which
   implied preemption is based are similar in both instances, the reasoning in Hughes and
   Buckman applies with equal force here.

                                                7
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                                          No. 22-50593

   FDA’s regulations.” Hughes, 631 F.3d at 775. Appellants ably lay out in their
   brief that each of their allegations is based in state law. In response, Whole
   Foods contends that “[e]very one of the … causes of action is specifically
   based on federally mandated allergen warnings under the FDCA.” While
   each of the causes of action does reference violations of FDA regulations,
   violations can only be, and only are, presented as evidence to “prove [Whole
   Foods’] breach of the state duty by showing that [Whole Foods] violated the
   FDA’s [food labeling] regulations.” Id. If, as the case develops, it becomes
   clear that there is no independent state duty upon which the Spanos can hang
   a particular claim, that claim will be preempted. On the pleadings, none
   appear to contain that fault. Thus, the district court erred in finding their
   claims preempted. 7
                                          Conclusion
           Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of the case
   and REMAND for further proceedings.

           _____________________
           7
             The district court declined to “reach the merits of Whole Foods’s other proffered
   grounds for dismissal.” We likewise decline to reach the merits of the other issues raised
   in the motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Rutila v. Dep’t of Transportation, 12 F.4th 509, 511 n.3
   (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005)) (“But, ‘mindful
   that we are a court of review, not of first view,’ we opt not to seek out alternative grounds
   on which we might uphold the judgment.”); Montano v. Texas, 867 F.3d 540, 546–47 (5th
   Cir. 2017) (noting that we are a “court of review, not of first view” and remanding a matter
   not addressed by the district court for examination in the first instance (quotation
   omitted)).

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