Court Opinion

ID: 9767253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:14:14.829384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:29.836745
License: Public Domain

NYE, Justice
(dissenting).
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court and therefore respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which would reverse and render the trial court’s judgment overruling the pleas of privilege of Maurice P. Hermes and Margaret Hermes.
*185This is a suit on a sworn account in which the plaintiff sued the Hermes Grain Company, a private corporation, and Maurice P. Hermes and Margaret Hermes, husband and wife, defendants jointly. Plaintiff alleged that he dealt with Margaret Hermes concerning the sale of grain to the defendants as buyers. Plaintiff further alleged that at the request of the defendants he sold and delivered to the defendants as buyers in Live Oak County in the regular course of business, shipments of grain for all of which the defendants promised to pay the balance due. Defendants’ pleas of privilege alleged that the domicile of the corporation and the individual defendants was in Lavaca County, Texas. On the hearing of the pleas of privilege, only the plaintiff, J. I. Hailey, and Margaret Hermes, one of the defendants, testified, she being called under the adverse party rule.
Under the general venue statute 1995 the rule is that no inhabitant of this state shall be sued out of the county in which he has domicile except in the following cases: Subsection 23 of this article relative to corporations, permits a suit against a corporation in the county in which the cause of action or a part thereof arose. In order to invoke subsection 23 of this article, plaintiff must plead and prove that defendant is a corporation; that he has a cause of action against the corporation; and that such cause of action arose in venue of county. Appell Petroleum Corporation v. G. W. Townsend Lease Service, 375 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Civ.App., Corpus Christi, 1964, n. w. h.). Proof was presented to the trial court in part, in the form of admissions, whereby the corporation admitted that it had done business with plaintiff in Live Oak County, Texas; that the sale of the grain in question was had in Live Oak County where it was delivered to the corporation; and that after proper credits and adjustments the corporation owed the plaintiff $8,964.38. Appellants, in effect, admit in their brief that proper proof was had relative to plaintiff’s cause of action under subsection 23 in the trial court.
The question to be considered at the pleas of privilege hearing thereafter, and now on appeal in this Court, was in regard to Margaret Hermes and her husband, Maurice P. Hermes, as to whether they are necessary parties-to the claim against Hermes Grain Company, a corporation. Appellants’ contention in this regard is that there was no evidence that Mr. and Mrs. Hermes were necessary parties. It is on this point that I respectfully dissent.
Both parties rely on the Supreme Court case of Ladner v. Reliance Corporation, 156 Tex. 158, 293 S.W.2d 758 and agree that “* * * Every person whose joinder is necessary to afford plaintiff the full relief to which he is entitled in the suit which can thus be maintained in that county is a necessary party within the meaning of Subdivision 29a” of Art. 1995.
Under subsection 29a where the plaintiff, if he recovers, will be entitled to a joint judgment against two defendants, the other party must be a necessary party within the meaning of subdivision 29a. In this connection the plaintiff who relies on subdivision 29a to maintain venue must not only allege the facts which make such a defendant a necessary party to the suit, but must also prove by independent evidence all of such facts except those which are taken as admitted under the pleadings. The appellants in effect admit that plaintiff has plead a joint cause of action against the corporation and the other defendants. The plaintiff plead, and the evidence is undisputed, that the plaintiff’s dealings were conducted entirely with defendant, Mrs. Hermes. The appellants now in effect admit the liability of the corporation, but did not introduce any evidence at the venue hearing to refute the joint dealings between the plaintiff, the corporation and Mrs. Hermes.
The plaintiff-appellee was required to prove venue of the corporation-defendant in Live Oak County, and that the other *186joint defendants were all necessary parties for the full relief to which he was entitled. In this connection it should be noted that there were no findings of fact or conclusions of law filed by the trial court in the record. It is therefore presumed that the trial court found all fact issues raised by the evidence in favor of the judgment. On appeal from an order overruling a plea of privilege, every reasonable intendment must be resolved in favor of the judgment. James v. Drye, 159 Tex. 321, 320 S.W.2d 319 at 323 (1959). It is reasonable to infer from the testimony in the record, that the trial court found a joint sale to the corporation and appellants Margaret Hermes and Maurice P. Hermes.
A review of all the testimony clearly shows that there was evidence of probative force by which the trial court was authorized to hold all of the parties jointly liable on the account. For instance, the plaintiff testified that it was correct that this was a suit based upon a “collection of accounts”. This could mean to the trial court, a joint collection of accounts of the corporation and each of the individual defendants. Other evidence from the testimony referred to the joint operation of the defendants for the purchase of grain. Throughout the record the plaintiff, and in some instances, the defendant Mrs. Hermes, referred to the joint liability of the account by the use of terms in referring to the account which would clearly indicate joint and several liability. For instance the witnesses used the words: “we”, “them”, “her”, “she”, “they”, “Hermes”, “Hermes Company”, and “Hermes Grain Company”. The plaintiff testified that during the negotiations for the initial shipment of grain, he quoted a price to her (Mrs. Hermes) and she quoted a price to him (the plaintiff), and finally Mrs. Hermes told him that she would call him back in a few days. Plaintiff then testified: “A couple of days later she called me and told me ‘they’ would take the grain.” This could logically refer to the liability of the corporation and her husband. Concerning the trucks that came to pick up the grain, plaintiff testified that the trucks belonged to “Hermes” and that the trucks had “Hermes Company” written on them. Later on in the testimony, Mrs. Hermes said that prior to the incorporation she and her husband operated under the name of just “Hermes”. A logical inference would be that when she used the term “Hermes” after the company had been incorporated, it stood for her and her husband as individuáis as opposed to Hermes Grain Company, the corporation. At another time she said, that before the incorporation, that they (referring to Mr. Hermes and herself) called their business “Hermes Grain”, “Hermes” and “Hermes Company” and could, under these circumstances, have meant to the trial court or to the plaintiff, individual or corporate ownership. Again, the plaintiff testified that “she (referring to Mrs. Hermes) sent me a check every week” for the grain. When the plaintiff called her relative to non-payment one particular week, plaintiff testified that Mrs. Hermes said “Well, we are a little behind,” and then she said the feeders “hadn’t paid her”. Plaintiff further testified that “she” (referring to Mrs. Hermes) picked up two or three more loads, and then several loads after that. Plaintiff testified that she (referring to Mrs. Hermes) did not send him a check so “I stopped them from hauling grain.” (apparently referring to all the defendants). Plaintiff did testify that in answer to the question that who did he sell the grain to, he stated “Mrs. Hermes” but it is also apparent from the record that all of his dealings were with “Mrs. Hermes”, one of the defendants. The evidence also shows that Mrs. Hermes was acting, not only for herself, but also for them an inference properly attributable to the corporation and her husband. The testimony further relates that Mrs. Hermes and her husband had been in the grain business occasionally and that she “started helping him (Mr. Hermes) with this.” It is a perfectly logical inference from the allegations of the petition and the testimony as a whole, that the trial court had jurisdiction as *187to defendant Maurice Hermes on the basis that he, along with the corporation, purchased the grain jointly, due to the fact that his wife Margaret Hermes, was actually “helping him” with the purchase of the grain. Although Mrs. Hermes testified at the plea of privilege hearing, she did not deny the account or try in any way to refute or clarify this evidence. The trier of facts in a plea of privilege case may properly consider such inferences as may be drawn from the facts proven.
Another logical inference supporting the judgment of the trial court that all the defendants are jointly liable can be gained from the undisputed fact that the plaintiff’s dealings had all been with Mrs. Hermes. She obstensibly would be a necessary party as agent, undisclosed until trial for her husband, or as agent likewise undisclosed until the evidence was all in for the corporation which bore her last name, or for both. Especially since she did not reveal to the plaintiff, before trial, for whom she was acting. The testimony was that the corporation is not now doing business and that Mrs. Hermes and Mr. Hermes owned 98% of the stock. I believe the trial court would have been justified in concluding from the evidence that Mrs. Hermes was acting in the purchase of the grain for herself as an individual, and/or for her husband, and procured the ratification of the corporation. I would hold that the trial court faced with the parties themselves, and after hearing the testimony as a whole, and observing the demeanor of the witnesses, concluded that all three defendants were jointly liable on the sworn account as plead. 59 Tex.Jur.2d Secs. 104 et seq.,-106-112, pp. 513-538. The individual parties defendant were so intimately connected with the transactions with the corporation which forms the basis of the suit, that each of them were necessary parties and were properly joined together.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.