Court Opinion

ID: 9670892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:27:53.412647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.106209
License: Public Domain

Kavanagh, J.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing a summary judgment for plaintiff.
Richard Widling and Sylvia Todd lived in the same household. Defendant Widling was involved in an automobile collision while operating a car owned by Todd. Todd, who was a passenger in her vehicle, suffered personal injuries as a result of the accident, for which she filed suit for damages against Widling.
This action commenced when plaintiff Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange (DAIIE) filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment against the defendant. The complaint asserted that although defendant was a named insured under an automobile policy issued by plaintiff, plaintiff was not liable under the terms of the policy for any damages Todd might recover against defendant on account of the accident.
Defendant moved for summary judgment of dismissal under GCR 1963, 117.2(1) (failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted) on the basis that the "non-owned automobile” exclusion upon which plaintiff relied to avoid liability, was void under the Court of Appeals decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Ruuska, 90 Mich App 767; 282 NW2d 472 (1979). Plaintiff opposed the motion for summary judgment, maintaining the vehicle owned by Todd and operated by defendant is excluded from coverage under the terms of the policy and that the excluding provision is not void.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment and sua sponte granted plain*551tiff summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.3 (no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and plaintiff entitled to judgment as a matter of law), holding the "non-owned automobile” exception valid and applicable to this case.
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that this Court’s decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Ruuska, 412 Mich 321; 314 NW2d 184 (1982), held that such "non-owned automobile” exceptions were unenforceable.
We granted leave to consider whether such clauses should be held absolutely void.
When we first considered this question in Ruuska, three justices were of the opinion that such clauses were violative of the no-fault automobile liability act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq., and therefore absolutely void and unenforceable. 412 Mich 334-337 (Williams, J.). One justice concluded:
"An insurer is not required by the no-fault act to provide portable coverage when the owner drives another insured vehicle.8

"8 Other provisions and policies of the act are implicated where a person insured or covered by a no-fault policy drives an uninsured vehicle. No opinion is intimated in that regard.”