Court Opinion

ID: 9760086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:40:15.170712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:08.217985
License: Public Domain

WOODLEY, Judge,
(dissenting).
*279The offense is burglary. The state proved the burglary in which property of the value of more than $50 was stolen. Appellant signed a confession, which was admitted in evidence, in which he implicated himself in the burglary and admitted his part in the breaking and entry. This, under many authorities, was sufficient to sustain his conviction.
In addition, a billfold or wallet which had been loaned to appellant two or three weeks before was found outside the broken back door.
The record shows that appellant did not desire to apply for suspended sentence. The jury assessed the minimum punishment.
The “complexity of the proceedings” arose through appellant’s successful effort to raise an issue as to the voluntary character of his confession by questions alone, without subjecting himself to cross-examination or to the pains and penalty of perjury. All of the testimony was to the effect that the confession was voluntarily made in accordance with the statute. The questions indicated the contrary. I do not understand that this ordinary burglary case thus became a “complex proceeding” as that term is used in the authorities cited.
I am in full sympathy with the effort of the majority to uphold the principle of law that an accused’s constitutional right to have the benefit of counsel is a valuable right which the courts will strictly enforce. Art. 1, Sec. 10, Constitution of Texas and Constitution of the United States, Sixth Amendment, guarantee such right.
Also I join in the belief that, though not required to do so in noncapital felonies, counsel should be appointed to represent every defendant who has used diligence to secure counsel and, being unable to do so, requests the court to appoint an attorney to represent him.
Appellant is represented by counsel who filed motion for new trial, perfected the appeal and filed brief in appellant’s behalf in this court. There is nothing in this record to show that appellant used any diligence to secure counsel of his own selection earlier; nothing to show that he desired that the court appoint counsel for him, and there is no complaint raised by appellant or his experienced counsel on appeal that he has been denied counsel.
*280The effect of the majority opinion is that, contrary to its prior decisions, this court announces the rule to be that in all felony cases wherein the defendant is not represented by counsel his conviction will be set aside unless the record affirmatively shows that the defendant was financially able to employ counsel, and that he possessed sufficient education and mental alertness to the point of being able to represent himself upon the trial.
Such holding is directly contrary to the presumption on appeal that the trial court’s rulings and acts are correct and fair. It overlooks the fact that an accused has the constitutional right to be heard by himself; that he may waive representation by an attorney; that the accused must use diligence to secure counsel; and that even in capital cases the duty of the court to appoint counsel arises only when the court is apprised of the fact that the accused is too poor to employ counsel.
Appellant was. advised of his rights with reference to application for suspended sentence and stated “I don’t want to ask for suspended sentence.”
The statutes of this state do not require that counsel be appointed to represent a defendant in a non-capital felony who states that he does not desire to file application for suspended sentence. The majority opinion overlooks the limitation in Art. 776 C.C.P. “if desired by defendant.” It also overlooks the holdings of this court that the attorney appointed pursuant to the requirements of Art. 776 C.C.P. is not under the duty to defend generally, but only to prepare and present the plea for suspension of sentence.
Any claim (and there is none) that appellant was too poor to employ counsel would be refuted by the fact that he did obtain counsel who filed his motion for new trial, perfected his appeal and filed brief in his behalf in this court.
It is deemed appropriate, also, to direct attention to the fact that the reversal of the conviction is not founded upon the legal conclusion of a majority of the members of this court that appellant has been denied his constitutional right to be represented by counsel, but upon the belief that an affirmance would be reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States upon appeal.
*281If this be the true function of judges, the law' is indeed uncertain.
Whether by this court or by the Supreme Court, a reversal of this conviction on a constitutional question, upon the record before us, would be without any pleading or proof to sustain the holding. The case cited would not support such a reversal.
I respectfully dissent.