Court Opinion

ID: 9370408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 16:00:19.716125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:21.607534
License: Public Domain

21-6039
     Tamang v. Garland
                                                                      BIA
                                                              Poczter, IJ
                                                             A208 927 763
                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
 2   the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
 3   Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
 4   13th day of February, two thousand twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7             MICHAEL H. PARK,
 8             BETH ROBINSON,
 9             SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
10                  Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   SHURESH TAMANG,
14             Petitioner,
15
16              v.                                        21-6039
17                                                        NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES
19   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20             Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:               Dilli Raj Bhatta, Esq., New York,
24                                 NY.
25
26   FOR RESPONDENT:               Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
27                                 Attorney General; Anthony C. Payne,
28                                 Assistant Director; Lance L. Jolley,
29                                 Trial Attorney, Office of
30                                 Immigration Litigation, United
31                                 States Department of Justice,
32                                 Washington, DC.
1         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board

2    of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED,

3    ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

4         Petitioner Shuresh Tamang, a native and citizen of Nepal,

5    seeks review of a January 8, 2021, decision of the BIA affirming

6    a July 16, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying

7    his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

8    under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).                   See In re Tamang

9    Shuresh, No. A 208 927 763 (B.I.A. Jan. 8, 2021), aff’g No. A 208

10   927 763 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. July 16, 2018).                 We assume the parties’

11   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

12        We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for

13   the sake of completeness[.]”        Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

14   448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).               The applicable standards of

15   review are well established.        See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he

16   administrative   findings      of    fact       are    conclusive       unless   any

17   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

18   contrary[.]”); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir.

19   2018) (reviewing adverse credibility determinations “under the

20   substantial evidence standard[]”).

21        “Considering     the   totality       of   the    circumstances,      and   all

22   relevant   factors,    a    trier   of     fact       may    base   a   credibility

23   determination on” a variety of factors, including “the consistency

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1    between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements

2    (whenever made and whether or not under oath, and considering the

3    circumstances under which the statements were made), the internal

4    consistency     of   each   such     statement,   the     consistency    of   such

5    statements with other evidence of record ... , and any inaccuracies

6    or   falsehoods      in     such     statements     ...      .” 1     8 U.S.C.   §

7    1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).            We     defer   “to       an     IJ’s   credibility

8    determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it

9    is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse

10   credibility ruling.”         Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167

11   (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.                  Substantial

12   evidence supports the adverse credibility determination.

13         The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies and omissions

14   in   Tamang’s   testimony,         application,   and     documentary    evidence

15   regarding the alleged attack on him by Maoists in 2015, while he

16   was living in a monastery, which he contended was in retaliation

17   for his support of the Nepali Congress Party (“NCP”).                 See 8 U.S.C.

18   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).        First, Tamang testified that Maoists said

19   they were attacking him for supporting the NCP, but neither his

     1 An IJ may also rely on an applicant’s “demeanor, candor, or
     responsiveness”   in  evaluating  credibility.    8   U.S.C.  §
     1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). The IJ stated that she had considered those
     factors but, contrary to Tamang’s argument here, the IJ did not
     rely on demeanor as a basis for the adverse credibility
     determination.
                                              3
1    written statement nor the Maoists’ 2017 letter mentioned the NCP.

2    Second, he testified that he spoke out against Maoists at public

3    events at the monastery, but he did not mention that activity in

4    his   written   statement     or   his   initial       testimony.     Third,   he

5    testified that his wife and mother were living at the monastery

6    with him when he was attacked, but their letters do not support

7    that claim.     Finally, he testified that Maoists attacked him at

8    the monastery at 8:00 p.m. after he had distributed earthquake

9    relief materials, but his mother’s letter and a letter from the

10   local NCP committee stated that he was beaten “while” distributing

11   materials to victims of the earthquake.

12         Tamang     was      unable   to        explain     the     omissions     and

13   inconsistencies.       Further, it was reasonable for the IJ to expect

14   some reference to the NCP or political activities in the written

15   statements because that was the only link to a protected ground,

16   which would be required for Tamang to state a claim for asylum or

17   withholding of removal.       See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78 (“[T]he

18   probative value of a witness’s prior silence on particular facts

19   depends   on    whether    those   facts      are   ones   the    witness    would

20   reasonably have been expected to disclose.”); Majidi v. Gonzales,

21   430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than

22   offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to

23   secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder

                                              4
1    would   be    compelled    to   credit       his   testimony.”   (citation      and

2    quotation marks omitted)).

3         These      inconsistencies,     viewed          cumulatively,     constitute

4    substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination.

5    See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven

6    a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that

7    an IJ was compelled to find him credible.”); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d

8    at 167 (“‘[E]ven where an IJ relies on discrepancies or lacunae

9    that, if taken separately, concern matters collateral or ancillary

10   to the claim, the cumulative effect may nevertheless be deemed

11   consequential by the fact-finder.’” (quoting Tu Lin v. Gonzales,

12   446 F.3d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 2006))).                   The adverse credibility

13   determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal,

14   and CAT relief because all three claims are based on the same

15   factual predicate.        See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d

16   Cir. 2006).

17        For     the   foregoing    reasons,       the   petition    for   review   is

18   DENIED.      All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays

19   VACATED.

20                                       FOR THE COURT:
21                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
22                                       Clerk of Court

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