Court Opinion

ID: 9539657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:08:01.327658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:08.315398
License: Public Domain

*169ROSSMAN, J.
This is an occupational disease claim in which claimant seeks review of a Workers’ Compensation Board decision which affirmed the referee’s determination that claimant’s mental disorder is not compensable. On de novo review, we reverse.
In February, 1983, claimant, a billing clerk for the city of Myrtle Point, filed a claim form indicating that she was unable to work due to “stress, job harassment and undermining of the city administrator.” The claim was denied.
Claimant testified at the hearing that her troubles at work started in September, 1981, when a new city administrator was hired for the purpose of reorganizing the city offices. He changed her job description, took away certain of her responsibilities and found fault with her work. He ignored her suggestions and, according to her uncontradicted testimony, placed unrealistic expectations on her. He did not allow her to work at home while she was sick, but made her take sick leave. She testified that there was a great deal of tension in the office.
Claimant began receiving treatment for stress from Dr. Reed Gurney and Dr. E. R. Gurney in January, 1982. In January, 1983, they diagnosed “situational stress reaction” and “chronic anxiety and depression” and advised claimant to stop working, because they believed that her job was creating stress and making it difficult for her to function. That is when claimant filed her claim. She did not return to work. Her position was eliminated in June of that year.
Claimant was referred by SAIF to Dr. Holland for a psychiatric examination. He performed psychological tests which he stated indicated a moderate level of depression and a “profile which is diagnostic of paranoid type schizophrenia.” He concluded, however, that there was no clinical evidence of schizophrenia and that claimant’s mental status demonstrated no significant abnormalities. Holland noted that claimant had other stresses in her life. He also found her to have “a significant level of interpersonal dysfunction,” as indicated by a history of six marriages. In his opinion, claimant’s predisposition to psychiatric symptoms was the major contributing cause of her difficulties but he would express no *170opinion as to how her work might have affected her problems. The doctors Gurney referred claimant to Dr. Martin, a psychiatrist. He disagreed with Holland’s conclusion that claimant is predisposed to psychological problems and reported in September, 1983, that claimant’s on-the-job exposure to stress was a major contributing cause of her psychological condition.
The referee determined that claimant had failed to prove that the real events and conditions of her work had caused the problems. In the opinion portion of her order, the referee stated:
“It would appear from the record that the majority of the claimant’s stresses came from a perceived stress source rather than from a real identifiable stress source. It is also difficult for me to accept the fact that when viewed objectively the specific incidents that the claimant testified to would be sufficient to be the basis for a stress claim.”
A claim for a stress-related condition must be supported by proof of objective stress factors on the job. McGarrah v. SAIF, 296 Or 145, 675 P2d 159 (1983). The stress-causing work conditions must be “objective” in the sense that the conditions must be real, as opposed to imaginary; their medical effect on the worker, however, is measured by the worker’s actual reaction, rather than by an objective standard of whether the conditions would have caused disability in the average worker. SAIF v. Shilling, 66 Or App 600, 675 P2d 1081 (1984). Here, even if claimant’s reaction to the real events of a new city manager and changed work duties was psychotic, her condition would still be compensable, if she was reacting subjectively to real, potentially stress-causing events. In Shilling, the claimant sought compensation for a stress-related illness due to what she characterized as “overwork.” SAIF argued that there was no objective evidence that claimant was overworked. We stated:
“* * * The question is not whether claimant’s perception of overwork was accurate, or whether claimant was overworked as judged by a standard of what would constitute overwork to the average person on her job. The question is whether there were stress-causing pressures on her job that were ‘real.’ * * *” 66 Or App at 605.
In studying the record, we found that the claimant’s job in *171general had subjected her to real pressures. She was frequently required to tend the office alone and to deal with long lines of people, sometimes working through her breaks and lunch hour. We stated that her reaction to those real pressures was not a reaction to mere imaginary conditions.
“* * * That she was more susceptible to the conditions than others might be, that she characterized them as ‘overwork’ when someone else would not have or that they were more stressful for her does not preclude her claim.” 66 Or App at 606.
Similarly, here, claimant’s characterization of the events at work as stress and “harassment,” rather than, for example, office tension and a reorganization of office duties, does not preclude her claim. The record contains uncontradicted evidence of many “real factors” which, when viewed objectively, are capable of producing stress: the new administrator took away many of claimant’s responsibilities; he found fault in her work; he did not allow her to be paid for work done at home; he changed her job description; there was tension at the office. Claimant reacted to those events by feeling harassed and “undermined.” Her reaction need not have been reasonable; it need not even have been rational. If claimant reacted to real events, she had a basis for a stress claim. See Leary v. Pacific Northwest Bell, 67 Or App 766, 680 P2d 5 (1984). Although the conditions of claimant’s work may not have been sufficient to give rise to illness in the average person, we are persuaded by both the medical and the non-medical evidence that claimant has proved that the stress of those real events was the major contributing cause of her disability and of her need for treatment for a stress-related mental condition. Cf. Leary v. Pacific Northwest Bell, supra (we found that most of the conditions that allegedly produced stress were imaginary). Although claimant had experienced other stresses in her life, she had always been able to cope in the past. We find, from a preponderance of the evidence on de novo review, that it was the employment-related stress that brought about her disability.
The thrust of SAIF’s argument is that the responsibilities which claimant felt were being taken from her by the new city administrator were not part of her job description as a billing clerk and that, therefore, stress caused by the taking *172away of those responsibilities was not a risk of her employment. The argument is unpersuasive. The conditions of a person’s employment are not defined solely by the job’s description. If claimant was required, before the arrival of the new administrator, to perform tasks outside of her job description, and the record does not indicate otherwise, those tasks were part of her employment.
Claimant seeks the imposition of a penalty and attorney fees under ORS 656.262(10) for denial of her claim. Although SAIF’s denial was wrong, we do not conclude that SAIF acted so unreasonably as to justify the assessment of a penalty. SAIF had in its possession, at the time of the denial, a report of Holland, who suggested that off-the-job stress might also have been responsible for claimant’s condition. On the basis of that opinion, it had a legitimate doubt as to its liability. Norgard v. Rawlinsons, 30 Or App 999, 569 P2d 49 (1977).
Reversed and remanded for acceptance of the claim.