Court Opinion

ID: 9584998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:54:55.267408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:16.548275
License: Public Domain

Ness, Justice
(dissenting):
I disagree.
As the majority points out, the Supreme Court in Geders, supra, held that an order preventing a defendant from consulting with counsel during an overnight recess, when an accused would normally confer with counsel, is constitutionally impermissible. The majority properly attaches particular significance to the words “normally confer,” but then misplaces the analogy.
The majority distinguishes the present case from Geders by observing that counsel is not normally permitted to confer with the defendant between direct and cross-examination. I fail to see the distinction, as the recess in Geders also occurred between direct and cross-examination. Rather, the Geders court recognized a defendant would normally confer with counsel during an overnight recess; likewise, a defendant would normally confer with counsel during a short routine recess.
I agree with the Fourth Circuit decision in State v. Allen, supra, which held the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is so fundamental that it should never be interfered with for any length of time absent some compelling reason. See also Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F. (2d) 1205 (4th Cir. 1982). To allow defendants to be deprived of counsel during court-ordered recesses is to assume the worst of our system of criminal justice, i.e., that defense lawyers will urge their clients to lie under oath. I am unwilling to make so cynical an assumption, *497it being my belief that the vast majority of lawyers take seriously their ethical obligations as officers of the court.
Even if that assumption is to be made, the Geders opinion pointed out that opposing counsel and the trial judge are not without weapons to combat the unethical lawyer. The prosecutor is free to cross-examine concerning the extent of any “coaching,” or the trial judge may direct examination to continue without interruption until completed. Additionally, as noted in Allen, a lawyer and client determined to lie will likely invent and polish the story long before trial; thus, the State benefits little from depriving a defendant of counsel during short recesses.
I think the Sixth Amendment right to counsel far outweighs the negligible value or restricting that right for a few minutes during trial. I would hold that a restriction on a defendant’s right to consult with his attorney during even a brief routine recess is constitutionally impermissible and reverse.
Reversed.