Court Opinion

ID: 9600027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:23:15.01332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:48.868502
License: Public Domain

Justice Webb
dissenting.
I dissent. It is hard to imagine a case in which the plain words of a statute are more easily interpreted than in this case. N.C.G.S. § 97-31 says in part:
In cases included by the following schedule the compensation in each shall be paid for disability during the healing *50period and in addition the disability shall be deemed to continue for the period specified, and shall be in lieu of all other compensation, including disfigurement. . . .
(16) For the loss of an eye, sixty six and two-thirds percent (66-2/3%) of the average weekly wages during 120 weeks.
(19) . . . The compensation ... for partial loss of vision of an eye . . . shall be such proportion of the periods of payment above provided for total loss as such partial loss bears to total loss. . . .
In reading a statute if the plain meaning is clear and unambiguous, we should not look to any other source for interpretation. 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 194 (1974). I do not see how the meaning of the above statute could be any plainer. It says compensation for loss of vision shall be under N.C.G.S. § 97-31 and this “shall be in lieu of all other compensation.” It is difficult to expound on these words in an effort to make them more clear. They speak for themselves. If any definition of “in lieu of’ is needed, Webster’s 3d New International Dictionary defines it as “in place of,” or “instead of.” I can only conclude that the compensation provided by N.C.G.S. § 97-31 was intended by the General Assembly to be the exclusive compensation for the injuries covered by the section. For us to contort the definition of these words so that they do not have their plain meaning is to usurp the function of the General Assembly.
I believe the majority has also violated another canon of construction. If a legislature acquiesces in the construction of a statute by a court we should be able to assume that the court has properly interpreted the intention of the legislature because the legislature could otherwise overrule the court’s interpretation. 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 169 (1974). In Perry v. Furniture Co., 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E. 2d 397 (1978), this Court held that recovery under N.C.G.S. § 97-31 precluded recovery under any other section. The General Assembly has not amended N.C.G.S. § 97-31 since that time. This should settle the issue.
*51The majority has relied on Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Mfg. Co., 318 N.C. 89, 348 S.E. 2d 336 (1986) and Hall v. Chevrolet Co., 263 N.C. 569, 139 S.E. 2d 857 (1965). I agree that Whitley is authority for the majority’s position. I would not be wrong in this case, however, because we were wrong in Whitley. Whitley is as good an example of legislation by the judiciary as is this case. I would overrule Whitley. Hall is not authority for the majority’s position. In that case there was evidence of injury in addition to the injury covered by N.C.G.S. § 97-31. This has always been compensable under the Act. See Perry, 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E. 2d 397.
I vote to affirm the Court of Appeals.