Court Opinion

ID: 9761651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:48:50.920454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:42.615439
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Judge
(dissenting).
In the format of the majority opinion we will first consider the substance of defendant’s appellate argument. In viewing the contention of error in this case it is necessary to view the incidents leading to the trial court’s sua sponte action. All of the comments of which defendant complains took place during the direct examination of Lorenzo Raybon, one of three alibi witnesses called by defendant.
The first incident of which defendant complains follows:
“Q. Was anything said by him— Dwane Embry — [defendant]?
The Court: We’re not going to permit that question. It’s hearsay.”
The second incident arose in the second question thereafter:
“Q. Did Embry, in your presence, ever offer to pay at the show?
The Court: You’re asking for hearsay. We’re not going to permit that question. Objection will be sustained.”
Prior to these incidents on three occasions within two pages of the transcript questions of the same general nature were asked and objections on the part of the State were sustained.1
The other incidents complained of occurred on the fifth and sixth questions propounded thereafter:
“Q. Who paid the money to the cashier?
The Court: It’s leading and suggestive, Mr. Kreisman. Proceed.
Q. After the money was paid, did you all go into the show?
The Court: It’s leading and suggestive. Objection will be sustained.”
Within three pages before these questions were asked the defendant had sought to elicit the same information on five different occasions.2 At no time did defendant make *406an offer of proof with respect to the objections that were sustained, yet he persisted in following the same lines of inquiry.
The comments of the court were not directed toward the defendant nor toward the witness but to counsel’s persistence in following a line of inquiry that had just been ruled upon by the court.
This case can be readily distinguished from State v. Wren, 486 S.W.2d 447 (Mo.1972). The court there stressed the fact that the court had used the expression “ad nauseum” and noted that the court there characterized the “evidence being offered [by the defendant] as absurd.” Here the court’s comments were directed to the form of the questions only, questions which had previously been ruled. The remarks of the court did not indicate a belief in defendant’s guilt, impugn the credibility of defendant’s witness, tend to humiliate defendant or his counsel or indicate a deliberate attempt by the judge to influence the jury. While a judge has the obligation to assure a defendant a fair trial and should act with impartiality; he must also confine the trial within the relevant issues and maintain order and decorum. State v. Hudson, 358 Mo. 424, 215 S.W.2d 441 (1948). When a court has ruled an issue it is improper for counsel to disregard the ruling of the court.3 I would hold that at most the actions of the court were provoked. State v. Headley, 18 S.W.2d 37 (Mo.1929); State v. Hudson, supra. I find no prejudicial error.
Defendant made no objection to the rulings of the court until he filed a general objection to the conduct of the Judge in his Motion for a New Trial.4 As a general rule any impropriety which might attach to a judge’s remarks are waived by the failure to object at the time they are made. State v. Hudson, supra.
I do not believe that this case calls for the application of the “plain error rule” 27.-20(c). In my opinion State v. McCullough, 411 S.W.2d 79 (Mo.1967) is controlling. In McCullough on cross-examination of State’s witness the following occurred:
[Defendant’s attorney]: “Did you see them pay for it?
The Court: What’s the purpose of that?
The Witness: No.
The Court: What’s that got to do with the issues in this case?”
When defendant objected to a question asked by the prosecutor the court said:
“Why don’t you let him ask his question. He just gets started asking * * I don’t know what the question is.”
When the prosecutor objected to questions propounded by defendant’s counsel the court remarked:
“I don’t know what the purpose of it is. Trying to shift the burden? Is that it? What’s the purpose of it?”
The Supreme Court in that case said l.c. 81:
“If a party believes that remarks may prejudice his cause, he should object immediately and afford the court an opportunity to correct any erroneous impression, and the issue is not timely presented when raised for the first time in a motion *407for new trial, (citations omitted) . Nor are these remarks in themselves indicative of ‘manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice’ to invoke consideration of plain error under Criminal Rule 27.-20(c) V.A.M.R.” (citations omitted).
See also State v. Barron, 465 S.W.2d 523[6] (Mo.1971); and State v. Hudson, supra.
This case is readily distinguishable from State v. Dixon, 463 S.W.2d 783 (Mo.1971) in which the jury could reasonably have viewed the comments of the court as reflecting upon the guilt of the defendant. The effect of the comments in Dixon was that prosecutors prosecute only the guilty not the innocent,5 strongly implying that defendant was guilty because he was being prosecuted. The comments by the court in the present case were directed solely to counsel, as the jury could well understand, and were confined to matters upon which the court had already ruled and to a great extent to the form of the question only.
Nor do I feel that State v. Gray, 503 S.W.2d 457 (Mo.App.1973) is authority for the invocation of Rule 27.20(c) in this case. In Gray the trial court made a direct reference to defendant’s failure to testify. This court emphasized the fact that defendant was defending pro se and that neither he nor counsel assigned to sit with him made an objection. The court specifically limited Gray to the cases in which a direct reference is made to the failure of a defendant to testify and clearly distinguished such cases from the case at bar. Referring to McCuliough, supra, and similar eases the court in Gray said, “None of the cases are helpful, and each is distinguishable in that each involved remarks made by the trial court on testimony given before the court.”
I do not here, perceive a “sound substantial manifestation, ... a strong clear showing that injustice or miscarriage of justice will result if the rule is not invoked.” State v. Meiers, 412 S.W.2d 478 (Mo.1967).
For either of the reasons herein I would affirm the judgment.

. “Q. Was anything said there at the time about who would pay for the show?
Mr. Allred: Objection. It asks for hearsay.
The Court: Sustained.
Q. Did Dwane Embry offer to pay any money?
A. No.
Mr. Allred: Objection. That calls for hearsay.
The Court: Sustained.
Q. Was anything said about who would pay?
Mr. Allred: Objection. It’s leading.
The Court: Sustained.”

. “Q. Did Dwane Embry have any money on him that you know of?
Mr. Allred: I’ll object to the form of the question.
The Court: Sustained.

Q. Do you know whether or not he had any money?
Mr. Allred: I’ll object to the question, unless he first lays a foundation of some personal knowledge.
The Court: Sustained.

Q. Did Embry go along with you and your brother? Did he have any money that you know of on him?
Mr. Allred: I’ll object to the form of the question.
The Court: Sustained.
Q. Do you have any knowledge about his financial condition?
*406Mr. Allred: Objection. Only the defendant would know of that.

Q. Why did you and your brother pay for the show?
Mr. Allred: Objection. It asks for a self-serving statement, Your Honor.
The Court: Sustained.”

. Rule 4 DR 7-106(A).

. “That the court erred in inserting itself into the trial of this cause as an advocate on behalf of the State, in that the court did on numerous occasions during the cross-examination of the witnesses and on direct examination of defendant’s witnesses, without any prior objections by the State, ordered the witnesses not to answer the question propounded to such witness and inviting an objection to be made by the State which the court thereafter sustained; that such action by the court was prejudicial to this defendant and indicated to the jury a prejudice against this defendant and in favor of the State;”

. “The Court: He is making an objection, and the objection will be sustained, and the jury will be instructed to disregard that it is the duty of the prosecutor to prosecute persons that are not guilty. His duty is not to prosecute people that are not guilty.
Mr. Howard: I don’t believe I understand that, Your Honor. What was that again.
The Court: I said that it is the duty of the prosecutor not to prosecute persons that are innocent. I used a double negative.
Mr. Howard: Do I gather from that that the prosecutor has the duty to prosecute people who are not innocent?
The Court: He sure does.”

(OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY)
“Mr. Howard: Quite frankly, I am going to ask the Court for a mistrial. I think the Court has given the impression that the prosecuting attorney prosecutes only those persons who are guilty of a crime.”