Court Opinion

ID: 9913431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 21:06:52.566849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:11.064199
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

                                         COURT OF APPEALS
                                     MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

  STATE OF OHIO                                  :   JUDGES:
                                                 :
                                                 :   Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
         Plaintiff-Appellee                      :   Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
                                                 :   Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
  -vs-                                           :
                                                 :   Case No. CT2022-0090
                                                 :
  JAY ARNOLD                                     :
                                                 :
                                                 :
       Defendant-Appellant                       :   OPINION

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                            Appeal from the Muskingum County
                                                     Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
                                                     CR2022-0350

 JUDGMENT:                                           AFFIRMED

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                             December 27, 2023

 APPEARANCES:

  For Plaintiff-Appellee:                            For Defendant-Appellant:

  RONALD L. WELCH                                    APRIL F. CAMPBELL
  MUSKINGUM CO. PROSECUTOR                           Campbell Law, LLC
  TAYLOR P. BENNINGTON                               545 Metro Place South, Ste. 100
  27 North Fifth St., P.O. Box 189                   Dublin, OH 43017
  Zanesville, OH 43702-0189
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

 Delaney, J.

          {¶1} Appellant Jay Arnold appeals from the November 23, 2022 Entry of the

 Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the state of Ohio.

                                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                             Appellee’s evidence

          {¶2} This case arose on August 18, 2016, when Arnold’s Van World reported a

 stolen vehicle to the Zanesville Police Department. At that time, Jim Arnold owned

 Arnold’s Van World but has since passed away. The stolen vehicle was a black 2-door

 2001 Pontiac Grand Prix. Ptl. Landerman took the report and noted the VIN of the Grand

 Prix, which had been parked on the south side of the lot where there were no security

 cameras. No suspects were identified in the vehicle theft.

          {¶3} Jim Arnold’s wife Nancy made the report and didn’t know how long the

 Grand Prix was missing. A few days earlier, the dealership reported thefts of catalytic

 converters and suspected a vehicle was also missing, but couldn’t confirm the vehicle

 theft until an inventory on August 18.

          {¶4} On September 3, 2016, Ptl. Brown of the Zanesville Police Department

 responded to Arnold’s Van World for a report of additional information on the theft of

 catalytic converters. This time, Jim Arnold was present and showed Brown security

 footage of the back lot of the dealership. The video showed a dark car pull into the lot

 and back up to the building. A male in dark clothes got out of the car, walked out of

 camera view, came back, and left. Later, another person entered the camera view

 wearing a white construction helmet and reflective vest. Brown tentatively identified the

                                                                                   December 20, 2023
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

 car as a black Pontiac. Jim Arnold did not identify the person on the video and Brown

 testified he was not told appellant--the son of Jim Arnold--was a suspect.

          {¶5} On September 26, 2016, Ptl. Moore of the Zanesville Police Department

 responded to the Putnam Tavern regarding a complaint of a suspicious male in the

 parking lot looking under cars with a flashlight. The Putnam Tavern happened to be next

 to the “New to You” car lot. Moore arrived on the scene and observed a car parked

 southbound along the roadway, running, with its lights on. Moore parked his cruiser

 directly behind the vehicle, a “primer gray” Pontiac. No one was inside the Pontiac and

 Moore noticed the car had a very old dealer tag which he attempted to run through

 dispatch without success. Moore explained a dealer plate is a generic plate owned by

 dealership and not assigned to a particular vehicle.

          {¶6} Moore observed a man walking toward the Pontiac from the area of the car

 lot, wearing a white hardhat and a reflective vest. The man walked around the Pontiac

 and got into the driver’s seat. Moore exited his cruiser and the man started to drive away,

 so Moore activated the strobe on his flashlight to signal him to stop. Moore approached

 the vehicle and spoke to the man, who was alone in the car. Moore asked the man if he

 was looking under vehicles with a flashlight, and he said no. Moore asked for

 identification and the man provided the driver’s license of appellant, Jay Arnold. Moore

 confirmed that the license matched the individual in the Pontiac, and identified appellant

 at trial as the man he spoke to on September 26, 2016.

          {¶7} Another officer arrived on the scene and Moore walked around the back of

 the Pontiac to speak to him. At the same time, Moore ran appellant’s license through

 dispatch and learned appellant had at least one valid arrest warrant from Muskingum
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

 County. Moore walked back around to the driver’s side of the vehicle and noticed

 appellant was now very nervous, fidgeting and lighting a cigarette. Moore asked him to

 shut the car off and appellant complied. Moore intended to arrest appellant and reached

 for the door handle to ask appellant to step out of the car.

          {¶8} At that point, appellant started the Pontiac and took off, squealing the tires

 and causing the vehicle’s back end to drift sideways, almost striking Moore. Moore ran

 to his cruiser, activated the lights and siren, and initiated a pursuit. Moore kept up with

 appellant for a few blocks, but appellant ran a red light and went left of center, passing

 cars on a double-yellow line. Moore lost visual contact with appellant because he had to

 stop for the red light.

          {¶9} Moore returned to the New to You car lot to check the area and noticed a

 jack under one of the cars. Dispatch advised the Pontiac turned into an alley, crashed

 into a pole, and had a flat tire. Moore went to the crash scene and appellant was not

 located with the Pontiac. Moore ran the VIN and discovered it was reported stolen from

 Arnold’s Auto Sales.1 He collected the white hardhat from the front passenger seat of the

 vehicle and entered it into evidence, along with appellant’s driver’s license, which Moore

 was holding when appellant fled.

          {¶10} The driver of the vehicle—appellant—was not located after the Pontiac was

 found, despite searches including K-9 tracking from the crash site.

 1
  “Arnold’s Auto Sales” was used interchangeably by witnesses with “Arnold’s Van World”
 to refer to the dealership owned by appellant’s father, Jim Arnold.
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

                                             Defense case

          {¶11} Melissa Arnold is appellant’s sister and Jim Arnold’s daughter. Melissa

 testified that in 2016, she worked at the car lot with her father and she in fact “ran the

 place.” T. 169. When asked what was the role of Nancy Arnold, Jim’s wife and Melissa’s

 stepmother, Melissa said Nancy was “in and out, getting her nails done.” Melissa testified

 that in July 2016, Jim Arnold “gave” appellant a 2001 Pontiac Grand Prix and a $50 bill to

 put gas in the car. Melissa testified she was present when Jim handed the keys to

 appellant, early in the morning before the dealership opened for business. Nancy was

 not present and may not have known that Jim gave appellant the car. Melissa testified

 she was so busy running the car lot she had no idea what her brother did with the car and

 couldn’t provide any further information. Nancy reported the Pontiac stolen and Melissa

 didn’t know how or why she did that.

          {¶12} Upon cross examination, Melissa said Jim Arnold was the owner and

 operator of the car lot and frequently “gave” cars to family and friends to drive on dealer

 plates. She testified there “was no set time” for appellant to return the Pontiac. She

 doesn’t know anything about how or why the Pontiac was reported stolen; Melissa agreed

 her father would remember if he “gave” appellant a car from the lot, and would have put

 a valid plate on the vehicle. However, she said, sometimes plates went missing and

 registration stickers fell off.

          {¶13} The next defense witness was Teresa Arnold, appellant’s mother. Teresa

 testified that in July 2016, she went to Florida to take care of her stepmother and asked

 appellant to come down and help her. Teresa testified appellant came to Florida in

 September. She presented a Florida driver’s license for appellant which was issued on
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

 February 19, 2016. Teresa stayed in Florida for three years but couldn’t remember where

 or when appellant was with her; she “thinks” he may have been working in Cape

 Canaveral or Cocoa Beach in 2018.

          {¶14} Upon cross examination, Teresa said appellant traveled to Florida in early

 September 2016 but she wasn’t sure of exact dates. When asked how he got to Florida,

 whether he flew or drove, Teresa responded that “someone brought him down” but she

 didn’t know who. She was certain, however, that appellant was in Florida with her on

 September 26, 2016.

          {¶15} Teresa acknowledged police came to her house in July 2022 looking for

 appellant and she said he was in Florida, denying he was in her house. Teresa let police

 search her house and appellant was found in a crawl space under her kitchen floor.

          {¶16} Upon redirect, Teresa insisted appellant came to Florida in early September

 2016 and stayed until after Christmas 2016.

          {¶17} The next defense witness was Jeanette Aber, a friend of Teresa, who

 testified she went to Florida with Teresa sometime around September 3, 2016, remained

 in Florida for 5 weeks, and saw appellant frequently during that time. Upon cross

 examination, Jeanette said she didn’t recall where she was on September 26, 2016, or

 whether appellant was present.

                                             Appellee’s rebuttal evidence

          {¶18} Appellee then called two rebuttal witnesses.

          {¶19} Detective Don Bates is an evidence technician with the Zanesville Police

 Department. On September 27, 2016, he photographed the “New to You” car lot by

 Putnam’s Tavern. He then went to Harper’s Auto Body to photograph the crashed Pontiac
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

 and encountered Jim Arnold, who was also at Harper’s looking at the car. Jim Arnold told

 Bates he believed his son took the Pontiac from his car lot. The Pontiac was black when

 it left the car lot; the crashed vehicle was “tricolor” with gray primer on the back, gold on

 the front, and black on the roof. Jim Arnold did not indicate he gave appellant permission

 to take the car.

         {¶20} Detective Steve Welker of the Zanesville Police Department testified he was

 investigating a separate matter and contacted Teresa Arnold in July 2022 because he

 had reason to believe Jona Perry and appellant were in Teresa’s house, in connection

 with a separate investigation. Police obtained a search warrant but Teresa gave them

 permission to search. Appellant and Perry were found in her house and Teresa claimed

 to have no idea how they got there.

                                   Indictment, trial, conviction, and sentence

         {¶21} Appellant was charged by indictment with one count of receiving stolen

 property (motor vehicle) pursuant to R.C. 2913.51(A), a felony of the fourth degree [Count

 I]; one count of tampering with evidence pursuant to R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a felony of the

 third degree [Count II]; one count of failure to comply (fleeing after felony) pursuant to

 R.C. 2921.331(B), a felony of the fourth degree [Count III]; and one count of failure to

 comply (risk of harm) pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(B), a felony of the third degree [Count

 IV].

         {¶22} Appellant entered pleas of not guilty and the matter proceeded to trial by

 jury. Counts I and II were dismissed prior to trial and the Counts were renumbered.

 Appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A) at the close of

 appellee’s evidence and the motion was overruled. Appellant was thereupon found guilty
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

 as charged upon the original Counts III and IV, both failure to comply. The trial court

 found the counts merge for purposes of sentencing and appellee elected to sentence

 upon [Count IV]. The trial court imposed a prison term of 36 months.

          {¶23} Appellant now appeals from the judgment entry of his conviction and

 sentence.

          {¶24} Appellant raises three assignments of error:

                                       ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

          {¶25} “I. THE STATE’S EVIDENCE THAT ARNOLD COMMITTED THIRD AND

 FOURTH DEGREE FELONY FAILURE TO COMPLY WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT

 FOR TWO REASONS: [1] THE STATE DID NOT PROVE ARNOLD FLED ‘AFTER

 RECEIVING A VISIBLE OR AUDIBLE SIGNAL FOR HIM TO STOP.’ [2] THE STATE DID

 NOT PROVE ARNOLD FLED ‘IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COMMISSION OF A

 FELONY’ FOR FOURTH-DEGREE FELONY FAILURE TO COMPLY.”

          {¶26} “II. BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WEIGHED MANIFESTLY AGAINST

 CONVICTING ARNOLD, THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE HIS CONVICTIONS.”

          {¶27} “III. ARNOLD’S CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE HIS

 TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN A MANNER THAT PREJUDICED ARNOLD.”

                                             ANALYSIS

                                               I., II.

          {¶28} Appellant’s first two assignments of error are related and will be considered

 together. Appellant argues his convictions for two counts of failure to comply are not

 supported by sufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We

 disagree.
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

          {¶29} The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence

 are both quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541, paragraph two of the syllabus. The standard of review

 for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

 St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991) at paragraph two of the syllabus, in which the Ohio

 Supreme Court held, “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

 evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to

 determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the

 defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after

 viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

 could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

          {¶30} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

 evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing the

 entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility

 of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly

 lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must

 be overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387.

 Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence and ordering

 a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

 heavily against the conviction.” Id.

          {¶31} Appellant was found guilty upon two counts of failure to comply pursuant to

 R.C. 2921.331(B); the amended Count I is a felony of the fourth degree pursuant to R.C.
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

 2921.331(B) and (C)(4), and the second count is a felony of the third degree pursuant to

 R.C. 2921.331(B) and (E)(a)(ii). Those sections state:

                           (B) No person shall operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to

                  elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal

                  from a police officer to bring the person's motor vehicle to a stop.

                           (C)(1) Whoever violates this section is guilty of failure to

                  comply with an order or signal of a police officer.

                           * * * *.

                           (4) Except as provided in division (C)(5) of this section, a

                  violation of division (B) of this section is a felony of the fourth degree

                  if the jury or judge as trier of fact finds by proof beyond a reasonable

                  doubt that, in committing the offense, the offender was fleeing

                  immediately after the commission of a felony.

                           (5)(a) A violation of division (B) of this section is a felony of

                  the third degree if the jury or judge as trier of fact finds any of the

                  following by proof beyond a reasonable doubt:

                           * * * *.

                           (ii) The operation of the motor vehicle by the offender caused

                  a substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property.

                           * * * *.

          {¶32} Relevant to both counts, appellant argues there is no evidence appellant

 “receiv[ed] a visible or audible signal from a police office to bring [his] motor vehicle to a

 stop” and that the officer’s flashlight is not an adequate signal. Ptl. Moore testified that
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

 during his first contact with appellant on September 26, 2016, appellant got in the Pontiac

 and began to drive away when Moore pulled out his flashlight, put it in strobe mode, and

 shone it into appellant’s rear window to signal him to stop. T. 127. Appellant did in fact

 stop, and Moore engaged with him to identify him, obtain his driver’s license, and ask

 whether he was looking under cars with a flashlight. When dispatch alerted Moore that

 appellant had an active arrest warrant, Moore walked back toward appellant, told him to

 turn off the car, and noticed appellant appeared nervous. Appellant initially complied, but

 as Moore reached for the door handle to ask appellant to step out of the car, appellant

 “hurried up, started it, and took off.” T. 131. Moore returned to his cruiser, activated lights

 and sirens, and initiated pursuit of appellant. T. 132.

         {¶33} Appellant was therefore signaled to stop with visible lights and an audible

 siren, but eluded police during a pursuit and later crashed the vehicle. Appellant’s

 contention that there is no evidence Moore signaled appellant to stop is belied by the

 record, supra, and we overrule this portion of his argument.

         {¶34} Appellant next argues that there is no evidence appellant fled “immediately

 after the commission of a felony” for purposes of the renumbered Count I, a felony of the

 fourth degree. The felony at issue is receiving stolen property (motor vehicle), the original

 Count I. Appellee’s argument at trial was appellant fled because he was found in the

 Pontiac which was reported stolen. Appellant argues that if he stole the Pontiac, he did

 so several weeks earlier and not immediately before he fled. Appellant was not facing a

 theft charge, however; instead, on September 26, 2016, he “ * * *retain[ed] * * * property

 of another knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the property has been

 obtained through commission of a theft offense.” R.C. 2913.51(A).
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

          {¶35} When Moore made contact, appellant was in possession of a stolen car.

 Appellee presented sufficient evidence appellant fled immediately after commission of a

 felony and we overrule this portion of appellant’s argument.

          {¶36} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues his convictions are

 against the manifest weight of the evidence. Upon a challenge to the weight of the

 evidence, the issue is whether the jury created a manifest miscarriage of justice in

 resolving conflicting evidence, even though the evidence of guilt was legally sufficient.

 State v. Ashcraft, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2021-CA-0024, 2023-Ohio-2378, ¶ 14, citing

 State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In the instant

 case, we find no such manifest miscarriage of justice.

          {¶37} “Weight of the evidence” addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief.

 State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), State v.

 Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 83. When a court of

 appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the

 weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with

 the fact finder's resolution of the conflicting testimony. Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541,

 citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) (quotation

 marks omitted); State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1244,

 ¶ 25, citing Thompkins. The uncontroverted evidence in the instant case established

 appellant fled after questioning by Moore, as Moore was about to apprehend him, leading

 police on a pursuit.

          {¶38} Once the reviewing court finishes its examination, an appellate court may

 not merely substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that “ ‘the jury clearly lost
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

 its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be

 reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387,

 quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721(1st Dist.

 1983). The Ohio Supreme Court has emphasized: “ ‘[I]n determining whether the

 judgment below is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable

 intendment and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment

 and the finding of facts. * * *.’ ” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 334, 972 N.E.2d

 517, 2012-Ohio-2179, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80,

 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review,

 Section 603, at 191–192 (1978).

          {¶39} We find that this is not an “ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

 heavily against the conviction.’ ” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387, 678

 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. Based upon

 the entire record in this matter we find appellant’s convictions for failure to comply are not

 against the manifest weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the jury appears to have

 fairly and impartially decided the matters before them. The jury heard the witnesses,

 evaluated the evidence, and was convinced of appellant’s guilt.

          {¶40} The first and second assignments of error are overruled.

                                                  III.

          {¶41} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues he received ineffective

 assistance of defense trial counsel because counsel failed to renew the Crim.R. 29(A)

 motion for acquittal at the close of all of the evidence. We disagree.
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

          {¶42} To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant must satisfy a two-

 prong test. Initially, a defendant must show that trial counsel acted incompetently. See,

 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). In assessing such claims,

 “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide

 range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the

 presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered

 sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 689, citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158

 (1955).

          {¶43} “There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case.

 Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same

 way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The question is whether counsel acted “outside the

 wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690.

          {¶44} Even if a defendant shows that counsel was incompetent, the defendant

 must then satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. Under this “actual prejudice”

 prong, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

 counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

          {¶45} Defense trial counsel made a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal at the close of

 appellee’s case in chief and the motion was denied. At the conclusion of all the testimony,

 trial counsel did not renew the Crim.R. 29 motion.

          {¶46} Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of

 acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as

 to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Cite as State v. Arnold, 2023-Ohio-4762.]

 State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d 261, 381 N.E.2d 184 (1978), syllabus. We have

 already determined that appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence

 and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, we conclude defense

 trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to renew the motion for acquittal at the close of

 all the evidence because, had the motion been made, it would have been overruled by

 the trial court because the evidence presented by the state was more than sufficient to

 sustain appellant's convictions.

          {¶47} The third assignment of error is overruled.

                                             CONCLUSION

          {¶48} Appellant’s three assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of

 the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

 By: Delaney, P. J.,

 Baldwin, J. and

 King, J., concur.