Court Opinion

ID: 9731445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:45:56.289241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:18.176462
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting: The majority affirms the decision of the Will County circuit court denying plaintiff Acme Markets, Inc., relief on its tax objection. For the reasons that follow, I respectfully dissent. I would tend to agree with the majority and with the Second District in In re Application of the Du Page County Collector for the Year 1993, 288 Ill. App. 3d 480, 681 N.E.2d 135 (1997) (hereinafter 1212 Associates), that the language of section 18 — 190 of the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL) (35 ILCS 200/18 — 190 (West 2006)) is plain and unambiguous. However, I think we would all be wrong in reaching that conclusion because I believe plaintiff is correct that it, in fact, has a completely different meaning than that advanced by the majority. That different reading is, in my opinion, at least equally reasonable, thus rendering the language ambiguous. The majority finds, as did the court in 1212 Associates, that “authorized by statute” refers to and somehow serves to define “new rate” or a “rate increase.” I think plaintiffs are correct and that it refers to the language that follows it, so that it reads “authorized by statute to be imposed without referendum” rather than “[i]f a new rate is authorized by statute.” 35 ILCS 200/18 — 190(a) (West 2006). I believe that what the statute says and means is: if a taxing body wants to levy a “new rate” after January 1, 1994, pursuant to a statute that had authorized levying such a tax without referendum or had made it subject to a backdoor referendum, it must now submit the proposed new rate to direct referendum. First, such an interpretation makes perfect syntactical sense. Section 18 — 190 does not refer to a “new tax,” but rather a “new rate.” The applicable section of the County Shelter Care and Detention Home Act (55 ILCS 75/5 (West 2006)) originally authorized the annual levy and collection of “a tax not exceeding .015% or the rate limit in effect on July 1, 1967, whichever is greater *** for the purpose of *** providing, establishing, supporting and maintaining such a shelter care or detention home.” Counties with more than 300,000 but less than 1 million inhabitants were authorized to levy and collect a larger tax (.04% for construction and .02% for operation) “without adoption of this Act by the legal voters of the counties and without a referendum.” 55 ILCS 75/5 (West 2006). The statute then authorizes increases to “a rate not exceeding .10%.” (Emphasis added.) 55 ILCS 75/5 (West 2006). The interpretation developed by 1212 Associates and adopted by the majority in this case appears to require a new taxing statute for section 18 — 190 to apply, and I do not believe that that is what the legislature either said or intended. Second, the purpose of the PTELL is to provide greater citizen control over the levy of the taxes they are required to pay. It would be contrary to that purpose (or would at least not be fully consistent with it) to exclude from its protection any new increases under previously authorized taxing statutes that allow their imposition without referendum. Third — and this is a logical extension of the second — section 18— 190 would be unnecessary if it does not apply to legislation predating its enactment. The legislature could simply make all new taxing statutes subject to referendum; there would be no need for a remedial provision such as PTELL. Fourth, submitting as I do that the statute must be ambiguous because reasonable minds differ on what it actually says, I would find that the Illinois Department of Revenue’s definition of a “new rate” is fully consistent with the reading of the plaintiffs (and mine) and should be dispositive of the question before us. The Department’s definition states: “When a levy for a specific fund is made for the first time, this is a new rate under Section 18 — 190 without regard to whether it is a new statutory authorization.” (Emphasis added.) 86 Ill. Adm. Code §110.190(b)(4), amended at 20 Ill. Reg. 13611 (eff. October 3,1996). The majority acknowledges that the regulations of the Department of Revenue construing “new rate” or “new tax” as well as the section just cited from the manual support the statutory construction advanced by plaintiff in this action and which I am advocating by way of this dissent. The majority discounts these regulations and directions, however, saying: “the regulations of the Department of Revenue in the Administrative Code or its manuals are not binding on this court if they conflict with the governing statute. See United Technical Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 107 Ill. App. 3d 1062,1067, 438 N.E.2d 535, 539 (1982).” 378 Ill. App. 3d at 681. It appears, however, that Justice McLaren’s uncertainty about the continued validity of 1212 Associates is similarly based. The regulatory/statutory conflict on which the majority relies is only with what I believe to be a flawed construction of the statute, not the statute itself. In the face of what seems to be a clear ambiguity, we should be able to utilize those regulations to inform our decision on how the language of the statute is properly construed to effect the legislative intent. In summary, I believe that: the statutory language is ambiguous, the construction of that language in 1212 Associates is flawed, the interpretation of the Department charged with the implementation of the statute is available to us for consideration, and that interpretation is quite persuasive and should be followed by this court. Because this analysis differs from that of the majority, I dissent.