Court Opinion

ID: 9762894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:33:33.674631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:38.322523
License: Public Domain

*722
Smith, J.,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.
The majority quotes from Judge Chesnut’s opinion in Aler v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 92 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1950), as to the purpose of the clause here under consideration. They would have done well to have quoted the remainder of the quoted paragraph which stated:
“More specifically the evident intention of the limitation with respect to other automobiles is to prevent a situation in which the members of one family or household may have two or more automobiles actually or potentially used interchangeably but with only one particular automobile insured. That this is the general purpose of the provision is well and clearly stated in the annotation on the subject in 173 A.L.R. 901. And see Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Company v. Pulsifer, D.C. Me., 41 F.Supp. 249; Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 421, 60 N.E.2d 269.” Id. at 623.
This interpretation has been widely accepted. See, e.g., Couch on Insurance 2d § 45:1052 (1965); Pennsylvania T. & F. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 259 F. 2d 389, 393 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 395 U. S. 950 (1959); Continental Casualty Company v. Suttenfield, 236 F. 2d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 1956); Campbell v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 211 F. 2d 732, 736 (4th Cir. 1954), (Judge Soper said for the court, “The great weight of authority is in accord with the interpretation of this provision by Judge Chesnut. . . ,” which he then quoted.); and Boedigheimer v. Taylor, 287 Minn. 323, 328, 178 N.W.2d 610 (1970).
In Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 421, 60 N.E.2d 269 (App. Ct. Ill., 1st D., 3d Div. 1945), quoted by Judge Chesnut in Aler, the court said:
“The exclusion from coverage of other cars owned by the insured as well as cars owned by the members of his household, and the exclusion of cars *723furnished for regular use to the insured or a member of his household would seem to indicate the intention of the company to protect itself from a situation where an insured could pay for one policy and be covered by the insurance in driving any car that he decided to use whether owned by him or members of his family, or cars that had been furnished for his regular use; in other words, cars under his control that he could use at will and might use often.” Id. 274 of 60 N.E.2d (Emphasis added.)
The majority also might well have given further consideration to what was said by our predecessors in Allstate v. Humphrey, 246 Md. 492, 229 A. 2d 70 (1967), from which they quoted. There coverage was afforded the driver of the vehicle as a member of the household of his father-in-law, the named insured. The driver had been living in Baltimore with his in-laws since September 4, 1964. The accident took place on October 1, 1964. On September 28 he had visited his brother in West Virginia at which time his own car broke down. He was advised that repairs would take about three days. It being necessary for him to return to work immediately, he advised his brother of his difficulty. The brother then gave him permission to drive a vehicle which was to be returned in about two weeks. The accident occurred four days after he had borrowed the brother’s car while he was driving that car to work from the residence of his father-in-law. Judge Qppenheimer said that no restrictions had been imposed upon the use of the loaned vehicle, “he used the car as he would have used his own.” Allstate, as Judge Qppenheimer put it, contended “that, under the authorities, the policy should be construed to mean that an automobile is 'regularly furnished’ for use where the bailee has a blanket permission to use the loaned vehicle, uses it as his own during the term of the bailment and has it continuously available for his use during the period. Allstate submits that it is the unrestricted use of the vehicle which is determinative and that the duration of the period in which that use is permitted is immaterial.” After *724quoting from various dictionaries as to the meaning of the term “regular,” as reported in the majority opinion, the Court said:
“There are many decisions in other states which have considered the phrase involved in this case, and, in the majority of them, the period of time for which the use of the automobile was given is considered as one of the elements which determine whether or not there is coverage. Appleman states: ‘The words “regular use” suggest a principal use as distinguished from a casual or incidental use.’ 7 Appleman Insurance Law and Practice § 4455 (1962). See 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile Insurance § 107 and Annot., ‘Exclusion from “drive other cars” provision of automobile liability insurance policy of other automobile owned, hired, or regularly used by insured or member of his household,’ 86 A.L.R.2d 937, 951-56 (1962), and cases therein cited. If Allstate had wished, it could have incorporated in the policy the restrictions on the meaning of ‘regularly used’ which it now asks the Court to find implied in the language actually used. We hold that the period and frequency of the permitted use are elements to be considered in the determination of whether, on the facts, there was coverage under the policy.” Id. at 497-98.
The Court concluded “that the automobile involved was not ‘regularly furnished’ for the use of the appellee and that there was coverage under the policy.”
As is suggested in Humphrey, a number of cases have defined “regular use” as a “principal use as distinguished from a casual or incidental use.” See, e.g., Kindred v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 463, 465, 75 P. 2d 69 (1938); Pacific Automobile Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 56 Cal. App. 2d 597, 600, 132 P. 2d 846, 848 (D. Ct. App., 4th Dist., Cal. 1943); Miller v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 179 Kan. 50, 54, 292 P. 2d 711 (1956); Ricci v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 110 R. I. 68, 80, 290 A. 2d 408 (1972); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. *725v. Sessions, 260 S. C. 150, 155, 194 S.E.2d 877 (1973); and State Farm Mutual v. Smith, 206 Va. 280, 288, 142 S.E.2d 562 (1965). Use of the various vehicles a total of 70 times in a two year period cannot reasonably be designated as a “principal use,” rather use of these fire company vehicles was “incidental” to Winterwerp’s activities as a volunteer fireman and quite incidental to his normal employment and use of the vehicle named in his insurance policy.
Several cases take the position that a continuous, uninterrupted, or methodical use of an automobile is required for “regular use.” See, e.g., Travelers Indemnity Company v. Hudson, 15 Ariz. App. 371, 488 P. 2d 1008 (Div. 1, Dep’t B, 1971), and Hartford Insurance Group v. Winkler, 89 Nev. 131, 508 P. 2d 8, 13 (1973). In Hudson the policy under review contained a clause similar to the one in this case. There an individual by the name of Cooper borrowed a vehicle for “the weekend” from a friend by the name of Norman. Cooper owned an automobile described by the court as “inoperable, the battery being dead and the engine needing timing.” This was pushed into Norman’s yard, where it was left. Cooper delivered the keys to Norman and drove away in Norman’s vehicle. Nothing was said concerning Norman’s use of Cooper’s car. The court stated that “such use [was] neither . . . expressly prohibited nor agreed to.” When Cooper failed to return the vehicle at the agreed time and Norman had need for use of a conveyance the following weekend he proceeded to put Cooper’s car into running condition. “[U]sing the borrowed automobile, [he] began a series of tavern stops that ultimately resulted in his driving the borrowed Cooper automobile into the plaintiffs’ son, killing him.” Travelers Indemnity Company had issued a policy covering the vehicle owned by Norman. In order for there to be coverage it was necessary for the use to have been with the permission of the owner. Permission was found. Travelers then contended that a “finding of implied permission necessarily includes therein a finding that the automobile was furnished to Norman for his ‘regular use’ and therefore coverage was excluded under the policy provision defining a non-owned automobile as one not *726‘furnished for the regular use of either the named insured or any relative.’ ” To this the court said:
“The phrase ‘regular use’ is undefined in the policy. However, the term denotes continuous use; uninterrupted normal use for all purposes; without limitation as to use; and customary use as opposed to occasional use or special use. Eureka-Security Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Simon, 1 Ariz.App. 274, 401 P.2d 759 (1965); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Thomas, 244 Cal.App.2d 204, 52 Cal.Rptr. 910 (1966).” Id. at 1012.
In Wallace Co. v. State F. M. Auto. Ins. Co., 220 Ore. 520, 349 P. 2d 789 (1960), the court said:
“We are of the opinion . . . that the phrase ‘furnished for regular use’ as used in context does not imply the manner of use, that is, putting the automobile to the same uses to which an insured would use his own automobile, but implies a right to the regular use of the automobile in the sense that there is an expressed or implied understanding with the owner of an automobile that the insured could have the use of the particular automobile or perhaps any automobile of the other at such times as he desired, if available.
“The term ‘furnished for regular use’ does not embody the term ‘for temporary use,’ but describes the antithesis thereof. It, therefore, expresses no thought of excluding protection in those situations where the use is but for a single occasion or single purpose.” Id. at 526. (Emphasis added.)
The tests applied in Hudson, Sessions, Winkler, Wallace, and Ricci all focus upon the idea of a day-to-day, predictable, customary use of a vehicle. Under the approach used by these cases the frequency of the insured’s use of the automobile is a significant factor. In the case at bar the insured’s use of one out of the fleet of fire trucks depended on three main factors: a fire in the vicinity, his choosing to *727respond to the call, and his arriving in response to the call early enough to be designated to drive one of the fleet. He was a volunteer without any obligation to so respond. This use is by its nature unpredictable and unmethodical. Use of one vehicle out of the fleet 70 times in two years, an average of less than once every two weeks, is not the kind of day-to-day frequency contemplated by these cases.
In addition to the pattern of use, a second criteria, used by many cases, is the concept of control of the use of the vehicles. The Hudson definition of “regular use” required “use for all purposes.” The extent of control exercised by the owner affects the nature of the use of the automobile by the driver. Both are significant factors in decisions applying this type of exclusionary clause. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 357 F. Supp. 810 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd 477 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1973); Grace v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 324 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd 440 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1971); Waggoner v. Wilson, 31 Colo. App. 518, 524, 507 P. 2d 482 (1972); Lincombe v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 920, 924 (Ct. App., 3d Cir., La. 1964); Glisson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 246 S. C. 76, 85, 142 S.E.2d 447 (1965); and State Farm Mutual v. Smith, 206 Va. 280, 288, 142 S.E.2d 562 (1965). In Southern Ry. the insured at the time of the accident was driving a vehicle belonging to her brother-in-law. The court found the facts did not justify a conclusion that she had a regular use of the car saying:
“She could use the [car] only to go to and from work; and that if she wanted to use the car for any other purpose she would have to get permission either from her sister or her brother-in-law. Furthermore, she was only working . . . during that summer before entering college.
“Therefore, the [car] was not furnished to [the insured] for her ‘regular use’, but only for the restricted use of going to and from a summer job.” Id. at 813-14.
This case strongly suggests that to constitute “regular use” *728one must be able to use the vehicle for any purpose one chooses. This obviously is not the situation with reference to Winterwerp since he could use the fire company vehicles only for the normal purposes of the fire company.
In Waggoner the insured was selling the vehicle in question to an individual pursuant to an oral sales agreement at the time of the accident giving rise to the dispute. Possession had been delivered to the buyer, but title was retained by the insured for security. Apparently, the insured still had some access to the car after delivery of possession, for the trial court found that “the automobile . . . ‘was not used by [the insured] more than two or three times’ in the four month interval between the sale and the accident in which plaintiff was injured.” It also found that the insured “had obtained permission from [the buyer] to use the automobile on the date of the accident.” It concluded that the car was not “furnished or available for the frequent or regular use of the named insured,” reasoning:
“The connotation of the term ‘furnish’ suggests that it refers to instances when the automobile was actually utilized by [the insured]. The terms ‘available’ and ‘furnished’ are not synonomous. With regard to the purpose of the clause, we construe ‘available’ to require that the potential use of the automobile be to a substantial degree under the control of the insured. A car is not ‘available’ where, as here, the keys and specific permission must be obtained each time use of the car is desired.” Id. at 524. (Emphasis added.)
It could not be asserted that Winterwerp exercised control over the fire company vehicles “to a substantial degree.”
In Glisson a clergyman was on temporary duty with the State National Guard. The automobile in question was a jeep furnished to him as “officer of the day.” His regular duties with the National Guard were as a parts clerk in the service battery and as motor officer in the headquarters battery. The accident took place while he was on a courtesy *729patrol. The jeep was dispatched to him for use in performance of his duties as officer of the day. The court analyzed the situation as follows:
“At the time of injury, Cheezem was temporarily engaged in the duty of Officer of the Day, thus performing a different duty than that normally required of him. The ‘jeep’ was not furnished for his regular use but, rather, was assigned to him for use in performing the duty of Officer of the Day. There is no evidence in the record as to how frequently Cheezem used this ‘jeep’; however, his use thereof was necessarily limited as he could only use this vehicle if it was properly dispatched to him.” Id. at 85.
The key to this analysis is control: that Cheezem’s use was not regular was evidenced by the fact that he had no control over the vehicle, but might utilize it only when dispatched to him. This situation is analogous to Winterwerp’s: he uses the brush truck or any other vehicle of the volunteer fire company only if he arrives at the firehouse at the proper time during an emergency — prior to the time when sufficient other volunteers have arrived to operate the vehicles being used.
The mathematical odds were much against Winterwerp’s insurance company’s being obliged to pay a claim by virtue of his operation of one of the fire company vehicles if the non-owned endorsement provision were held to afford coverage. This is so because of the presence of public liability insurance on the part of the fire company providing primary coverage and the fact that there could only be liability on the part of Winterwerp’s company in the unusual circumstance here where a fellow fireman was killed and the fire company policy had a clause excluding liability in such event.
We have here no “situation in which the members of one family or household may have two or more automobiles actually or potentially used interchangeably but with only one particular automobile insured,” to which Judge Chesnut alluded in Aler, nor do we have a situation where, as it was *730put in Eodenkirk, cited by Judge Chesnut in Aler, the vehicles were “under [Winterwerp’s] control [so] that he could use [them] at will and might use [them] often.” Winterwerp’s use of the vehicles in question was not at will nor was his use merely when he desired such use. He had no uninterrupted, normal use for all purposes. There was no personal use by Winterwerp.
We opened the opinion in Prince Geo’s Co. v. Chillum-Adelphi, 275 Md. 374, 340 A. 2d 265 (1975), with the statement:
“As every resident of this State who lives outside of the urban areas of the State knows, volunteer firemen perform an important and necessary service. Without them property in such areas would be unprotected from the ravages of fire and in extinguishing fires people would be reduced to use of the archaic methods of a bygone era.” Id. at 375.
Winterwerp’s use was a special use in the performance of volunteer emergency duty on behalf of his fellow citizens. There could be no use by him in the absence of a fire, his response, and a response early enough for him to be assigned to drive. In Humphrey there was unrestricted use, but the Court held there was coverage. Use of the five vehicles here 70 times in a two year period cannot be reasonably designated or defined as a principal use. Winterwerp’s use in each instance was only for a relatively short period of time since the vehicles were only operated in going to and from a fire in the area of his volunteer fire company. Such use was incidental to Winterwerp’s activities as a volunteer fireman. The use of the fire company’s vehicles falls far short of a regular use by Winterwerp.
I recognize the holding in Humphrey that such a clause was not ambiguous. It occurs to me, however, that what we here see by way of a division on the part of the Court may well indicate that although the clause was not ambiguous in the context of the facts in Humphrey, it is ambiguous as applied to the facts of this case. In such situation, in the words of Judge Hammond for the Court in Penn. etc., Ins. *731Co. v. Shirer, 224 Md. 530, 537, 168 A. 2d 525 (1961), “if the insurance company, in attempting to limit coverage . . . , failed to make its intended meaning clear and drew an ambiguous clause, that ambiguity would be resolved against it as the one who drafted the instrument, as is true in the construction of contracts generally, Ebert v. Millers Fire Insurance Co., 220 Md. 602, 611, and cases cited; Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd. v. Reed’s Refrigeration Service, Inc., 222 Md. 49, 54.”
Coverage should be afforded.
I am authorized to say that Judges Digges and Eldridge concur in this dissent.