Court Opinion

ID: 9549979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:27:08.077533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:06.799117
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Judge.
Claimant Agnes L. Trapp appeals from an order of the Industrial Commission denying her claim for attorney fees against the State Insurance Fund. Trapp claims attorney fees under I.C. § 72-804, arguing that the State Insurance Fund contested her claim for compensation “without reasonable ground.” The Industrial Commission denied her claim for attorney fees, finding that the State Insurance Fund did not defend the case unreasonably. We affirm.
The claimant was a volunteer member of the Sagle Fire Department who had been solicited by the fire department to take an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) course in order to qualify the Quick Response Unit (QRU) for emergency medical treatment. On January 4, 1990, the claimant was injured in an automobile accident while she and five other occupants of the car were traveling to the EMT course, in which all of the occupants were enrolled. After the accident, the claimant filed a claim for worker’s compensation benefits, which the employer and surety defended on the ground that her travel at the time of the accident was within the “going-and-coming” rule exception to compensability.
After a hearing, the Industrial Commission concluded that the “special errand” exception to the going-and-coming rule applied and therefore the claimant was within the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident.1 The Commission summarized the relevant law as follows:
*656[W]e deal not so much in mechanical rules but with a series of factors of reasonableness that the Commission must weigh in light of its own expertise. The accident may not occur at the work site, but must be in a place where the worker may reasonably be; it may not occur during scheduled work hours, but must be at a reasonable time; it may not occur while engaged in worker's precise job description, but it must pertain to some act reasonably incidental to the employee’s work; it may not occur while performing work actually ordered by the employer, but must be activity in which the employer has acquiesced. [Citation omitted.] It must not be so personal that it cannot be said to have arisen out of and in the course of employment.
After pointing out that this analysis required a weighing of the evidence in light of the several factors involved, the Commission identified five factors which the appellant had asserted were necessary to evaluate the case.2 The Commission then weighed the evidence in relation to each of the five factors in turn and ultimately concluded that, on balance, the claimant’s accident and injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment with Sagle Volunteer Fire Department. Neither side appealed the Industrial Commission’s decision.
After receiving the Commission’s decision, the claimant filed a motion requesting attorney fees under I.C. § 72-804,3 on the ground that the employer and its surety had defended her claim for worker’s compensation unreasonably. The Industrial Commission referred the matter to a referee, who concluded that “the conduct of the surety in this case was not unreasonable.” The Commission adopted the referee’s recommendation. On petition for reconsideration, the Commission stated that, “The test which was ultimately adopted in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order in this matter was a test which involves applying a series of factors to particular facts, which necessarily vary with each case.” After noting that it was “the Claimant who first directed the Commission’s attention to this authority from the State of Arizona [Johnson Stewart Mining, Co., Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 133 Ariz. 424, 652 P.2d 163 (1982) supra ], which was subsequently relied on to reach the decision favorable to the Claimant in the underlying matter,” the Commission concluded that the surety’s argument as to the state of the law and the application of the evidence to the five factors articulated in the Commission’s earlier opinion was not unreasonable.
This Court held in Quintero v. Pillsbury Co., 119 Idaho 918, 811 P.2d 843 (1991), that:
The decision to award fees pursuant to [72-804] rests with the Industrial Commission. Other than in clear cases we defer to the judgment of the Industrial Commission. [Citation omitted.] The Commission is well experienced in determining what circumstances warrant the imposition of attorney fees.
119 Idaho at 921, 811 P.2d at 846. In Troutner v. Traffic Control Co., 97 Idaho 525, 547 P.2d 1130 (1976), we held that:
The decision that grounds exist for awarding a claimant attorney fees is a factual determination which rests with the Industrial Commission. [Citations omitted.] The conclusion of the Industrial Commission that no grounds existed for allowing attorney fees in this case is *657supported by substantial evidence and will not be set aside on appeal.
97 Idaho at 528, 547 P.2d at 1133.
In this case, the Industrial Commission concluded that Idaho case law relating to the “special errand” exception to the going- and-coming rule was not definitive and that the rule proposed by the claimant from the Arizona case of Johnson Stewart Mining Co., Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, supra, provided the appropriate test. That test required the Industrial Commission to weigh the evidence regarding each of five factors, not all of which were favorable to the claimant in this case, in order to decide whether the claimant was within the course and scope of her employment. After that weighing and balancing, the Commission concluded that the factual and legal issues raised by the surety were not unreasonable and therefore denied the claimant’s motion for attorney fees.
The Commission “is well experienced in determining what circumstances warrant the imposition of attorney fees,” and its determination, which required the weighing of the evidence and the balancing of factors, is supported by the record. Quintero v. Pillsbury Co., supra, and Troutner v. Traffic Control Co., supra. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the Commission’s decision.4
Costs to respondent. No attorney fees allowed.
JOHNSON and McDEVITT, JJ., and SCHILLING, J. Pro Tern., concur.

. As the Commission explained in its order, "[I]t is generally held that employers are not liable for accidents their employees suffer while commuting to and from work. This ‘going-and-coming rule’ exception to compensability has itself spawned exceptions and exceptions to exceptions, one being the special errand rule. Where an employee, although not at her regular place of business, even before or after customary work hours is doing some special service or errand or the discharge of some duty of or under the direction of her employer, an injury arising en route to or from the place of performance of the work is considered arising out of and in the course of employment. Dameron v. Yellowstone Trail Garage, 54 Idaho 646, 34 P.2d 417 (1934).”

. Those five factors were derived from an Arizona Supreme Court case, Johnson Stewart Mining Co., Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 133 Ariz. 424, 652 P.2d 163, 166 (1982), and are: "(1) Did the activity inure to the substantial benefit of the employer? (2) Was the activity engaged in with the permission or at the discretion of the employer? (3) Did the employer knowingly furnish the instrumentalities by which the activity was to be carried out? (4) Could the employee reasonably expect compensation or reimbursement for the activity engaged in? (5) Was the activity primarily for the personal enjoyment of the employee?”

. I.C. § 72-804 reads in part: “If the commission ... determines that the employer or his surety contested a claim for compensation made by an injured employee ... without reasonable ground, ... the employer shall pay reasonable attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided by this law.....”

. Our finding of no abuse of discretion in the Industrial Commission’s determination that the surety did not unreasonably defend the claim is not inconsistent with, nor does it impliedly modify, this Court's holding in Ridgway v. Combined Ins. Cos. of America, 98 Idaho 410, 565 P.2d 1367 (1977), relied upon in the dissenting opinion of Justice Bistline.