Court Opinion

ID: 9680806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:38:58.231357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:30.599281
License: Public Domain

LUKOWSKY, Justice,
dissenting.
Section 121 of the Constitution of Kentucky provides that judges may be disciplined by the Commission for good cause, that the Commission is a state body and that its actions are subject to judicial review by this court. It is unlike the Bar Association which has life, form and a disciplinary function in regard to lawyers only by grace of the rules of this court. Kentucky Constitution, Sec. 116; SCR 3. In the former case the Commission is charged by the people to maintain discipline. In the latter case this court is charged by the people to maintain discipline.
This independent creation, life and charge make it perfectly clear to me that we must measure the Commission’s actions with a totally different yardstick than we use in disciplinary cases involving lawyers. We are not directly charged with the duty to discipline, consequently, we are not the ultimate finders of fact. See Kentucky Bar Association v. Franklin, Ky., 534 S.W.2d 459 (1976). We are not privileged to treat the findings of the Commission as advisory and find facts for ourselves.
The Commission found that Judge Nicholson granted Bell’s RCr 11.42 motion not because of any improper action by the Parole Board as his order stated, but for the unarticulated reason that the agreement which induced Bell to waive his right to file a motion and grounds for a new trial and appeal his conviction had not been carried out. As a result, those who might consult the record would be misled as to the grounds for his decision. The Commission concluded that judges can not be allowed to be dissemblers and that conduct of this nature brings the judicial office into disrepute.
The Commission saw and heard the witnesses and had the opportunity to evaluate their credibility and assign appropriate weight to all or parts of their testimony. Giving due regard to these factors it can not be said that its finding is clearly erroneous.1
Its conclusion is neither arbitrary nor capricious. Its action is within its jurisdiction and the discipline imposed is permissible and not excessive. SCR 4.300, Canons 1 and 2 A; SCR 4.020(l)(b)(v).
I would affirm the final order of the Commission.
I am authorized to state that STEPHENSON, J., joins in this dissent.

. The majority finds that the standard of review to be applied by this Court to the Commission’s actions is “clear and convincing.” Clearly, this is the standard of proof the Commission is to use in making its findings and is not the standard to be applied by this Court in reviewing the Commission’s actions. SCR 4.160. The standard to be applied on judicial review of the Commission’s findings is whether such findings are “clearly erroneous.” SCR 4.290(1); CR 52.01.