Court Opinion

ID: 9576945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:30:11.147015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:44.418908
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
I thoroughly agree with the implicit theme of the majority opinion that courts must be ever vigilant to require that any investigative stop of a vehicle by law enforcement officers comply with the criteria enunciated by the United States Supreme Court for the purpose of assuring that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful intrusion into the private affairs of citizens remains inviolate. However, within those parameters, the judiciary has an equally imperative duty to ensure that law enforcement officers are allowed to do their jobs so as to protect the health and safety of us all. It is my opinion that the majority too narrowly applies the applicable Fourth Amendment precepts to the facts of this case and therefore erroneously reverses the trial court’s appropriate denial of the motion to suppress.
The incident that was the focus of appellant’s motion to suppress in this case was clearly and unequivocally a Terry stop, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968), and as recognized by the majority a valid Terry stop requires only a “ ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ that criminal activity may be afoot. [Cit.]” McGaughey v. State, 222 Ga. App. 477, 478 (474 SE2d 676) (1996). The majority also impliedly concedes that, considering the totality of the circumstances, articulable suspicion is “less than probable cause, but greater than mere caprice,” McGaughey v. State, supra, 479.
While the majority accurately recounts the circumstances in existence when Officer McCollum made his decision to stop appellant’s vehicle, I respectfully submit that the majority fails to properly apply Terry jurisprudence to the facts in this case. Police Officer *262McCollum was experienced generally and with regard to the particular neighborhood in which he was patrolling. He was very familiar with the neighborhood, knew all of the residents, and could recognize vehicles that belonged. Officer McCollum had made more than 50 arrests in the neighborhood and the great majority of those arrests involved illegal drugs, particularly crack cocaine. The officer described the patrolled vicinity as a high crime area and he carefully articulated what his personal experience and training demonstrated were the methods generally utilized for the sale and purchase of drugs in the area. Not only did Officer McCollum correctly conclude that neither appellant nor his vehicle belonged in the neighborhood in the early morning hours, the officer observed appellant’s pick-up of a passenger to take place at a particular corner where the officer knew drug transactions had occurred. The ensuing circuitous travel of appellant’s car after the pick-up strengthened the police officer’s suspicion that criminal activity was occurring. Notwithstanding the implication of the majority to the contrary, “the decision to stop [appellant] was based on his behavior, not his race.” Holmes v. State, 222 Ga. App. 642, 644 (476 SE2d 37) (1996). Utilizing the de novo standard of review of the trial court’s ruling based upon uncontra-dicted facts, it is abundantly clear that Officer McCollum acted on the basis of reasonable articulable suspicion and that the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress. See also Merriweather v. State, 228 Ga. App. 246 (491 SE2d 467) (1997).
Decided February 23, 1998
Reconsideration denied April 1,1998.
Ruth P. Marks, for appellant.
Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, Debra H. Bernes, Nancy I. Jordan, Ann B. Harris, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Mary Beth Westmoreland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Carol A. Callaway, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Because I believe that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, I dissent to the majority’s reversal of the judgment in this case.