Court Opinion

ID: 9390444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 16:08:52.384386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:34.480173
License: Public Domain

J-S40024-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 RITA ELIZABETH PULTRO                   :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 223 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 28, 2021
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
            Criminal Division at No: CP-23-CR-0007119-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                           FILED APRIL 27, 2023

     Appellant, Rita Elizabeth Pultro, appeals pro se from the December 28,

2021 order dismissing her petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm.

     This Court summarized the underlying facts on direct appeal:

           Appellant’s conviction arises from the killing of Jason McClay
     at a Rite Aid store in the City of Chester, where McClay was a
     manager. The Commonwealth alleged the following. In August
     and September 2013, Tariq Mahmud was employed as loss
     prevention agent at the Rite Aid store. Mahmud, Ashaniere White,
     and Christopher Parks planned to rob the Rite Aid store. Mahmud
     told White and Parks about how much money was kept in the
     store’s safe, who was working, and about blind spots in the store’s
     video surveillance system. Mahmud warned them not to try to
     rob the store when McClay was working, because he was a former
     marine who would fight back.

           On August 19, 2013, White and Parks robbed the Rite Aid
     store when McClay was not on duty. On August 26 and September
     4, 2013, White and Parks again attempted to rob the store, but
     employees recognized White.
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              Mahmud, White, and Parks thereafter sought the assistance
       of new people to rob the store, and brought David Wiggins into
       their plans. Wiggins wanted another individual, Appellant, to
       participate as well. The group planned a robbery for September
       18, 2013, but postponed it until September 19, 2013.

             On September 19, 2013, McClay worked the day shift at the
       Rite Aid store and stayed for the evening shift due to the
       unavailability of another manager, Serita Cottman. Mahmud
       called out from work that day. At approximately 9:45 p.m., an
       employee saw a white female, later identified as Appellant, and a
       black male, later identified as Wiggins, enter the store. Appellant
       retrieved a light bulb and took it to the counter. When the
       employee told her the amount due, Appellant complained that it
       was too expensive, placed the item back on the shelf, and asked
       to see the manager. McClay went back to the aisle, and he and
       Appellant began discussing lightbulbs. Wiggins then grabbed
       McClay and told McClay to take him to the safe. Wiggins and
       McClay began wrestling until Appellant shot McClay at close range
       at the base of his neck and killed him. Appellant and Wiggins fled
       from the store and left the scene in a vehicle driven by Parks.

Commonwealth v. Pultro, No. 1593 EDA 2015, 2017 WL 6199839,

unpublished memorandum at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2017).

       On February 11, 2015, at the conclusion of a lengthy trial, a jury found

Appellant guilty of first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy, and carrying a

firearm without a license.1 On May 1, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant

to life in prison without the possibility of parole.   This Court affirmed on

December 8, 2017.         The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of

appeal on July 24, 2018, and the United States Supreme Court denied

certiorari on May 13, 2019. Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on

March 31, 2020. On November 5, 2021, appointed counsel filed a no merit

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 3701(a)(1)(i), 903, and 6106(a), respectively.

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letter and petition to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.

Super. 1988) (en banc). On November 8, 2021, the PCRA court entered an

order granting counsel’s petition to withdraw and notifying Appellant of the

court's intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing.2 Appellant filed a pro

se response on November 30, 2021. On December 28, 2021, the PCRA court

entered the order before us. Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal

On January 22, 2022.

       Appellant presents six assertions of error:

       A. Did the [PCRA] court err in not granting relief for ineffective
          assistance of counsel?

       B. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying change of
          venue when pretrial publicity prevented a fair and unbiased
          jury?

       C. Did the trial court err in denying severance which prejudiced
          Appellant resulting in a guilty verdict?

       D. Did the prosecutorial misconduct prejudice Appellant’s due
          process rights leading to her convictions?

       E. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress
          evidence, and granting a search warrant with an affidavit of
          probable cause that lacked substantial evidence?

       F. Did [the] trial court’s abuse of discretion and judge’s public bias
          violate Appellant’s constitutional rights?

Appellant’s Pro Se Brief at 4.

____________________________________________

2   See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.

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      Appellant first argues the PCRA court erred in dismissing her claims of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

             In PCRA appeals, our scope of review is limited to the
      findings of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the
      PCRA court’s hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the
      prevailing party. Because most PCRA appeals involve questions
      of fact and law, we employ a mixed standard of review. We defer
      to the PCRA court’s factual findings and credibility determinations
      supported by the record. In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s
      legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 779 (Pa. Super.

2015), appeal denied, 123 A.3d 331 (Pa. 2015).

      Counsel is presumed effective.       To overcome this presumption, the

petitioner must plead and prove that (1) the underlying issue is of arguable

merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis in support of the disputed

action or inaction, and (3) that counsel’s errors prejudiced the petitioner.

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 2013). Failure to

prove any of these three prongs is fatal to the claim. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111

A.3d at 780. Likewise, an appealing petitioner must address all three prongs

in the appellate brief, or this Court will reject the claim. Id. Furthermore,

pursuant to § 9543(a)(3), a petitioner must show that the collateral claims

have not been previously litigated or waived. Id. “At the PCRA stage, claims

of trial court error are either previously litigated (if raised on direct appeal) or

waived (if not).” Id.

      Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in three respects.

First, she claims trial counsel failed to object to the admission into evidence

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of redacted statements from co-defendant David Wiggins, who did not testify

at trial. She relies on Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The

record reveals that Appellant litigated this claim on direct appeal, where she

argued that the trial court should have severed her trial from that of Wiggins

“because [Appellant] suffered a Bruton violation based on the admission of

Wiggins’ confession. She asserts that the trial evidence made clear that she

was the individual referred to in Wiggins’ statement detailing the September

21, 2013 robbery, despite the redactions to that statement.” Pultro, 2017

WL 6199839, at *6. This Court found no merit to Appellant’s assertion that

she suffered a Bruton violation. Id. at *6-*8. Because Appellant previously

litigated her Bruton claim, she cannot raise it under the PCRA.

       Next, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

impeach her codefendants who pled guilty in exchange for a reduced sentence.

Appellant has not supported this argument with citations to the record.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). The failure to support an argument with record citations

results in waiver.3 Commonwealth v. Fransen, 42 A.3d 1100, 1106 n.11

(Pa. Super. 2012).

____________________________________________

3   In any event, the record reflects that the defense attorneys for the
codefendants on trial did cross examine the pleading codefendants about the
nature of their agreements with the Commonwealth. Appellant has not
attempted to explain where or in what respects the cross examinations were
deficient.

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      Finally, Appellant claims counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge

the sufficiency of the evidence.   Again, Appellant’s argument, which spans

only a few sentences, does not include pertinent citations to the record.

Further, Appellant failed to include this issue in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement ordered by the PCRA court. For both reasons, Appellant has waived

this argument. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Fransen, 42 A.3d at 1106 n.11.

      In the remainder of her assertions of error, Appellant does not assert

ineffective assistance of counsel.      Rather, Appellant rehashes various

arguments she raised before the trial court. Each of Appellant’s remaining

arguments is either waived or previously litigated and therefore not eligible

for collateral relief.

      Appellant’s Issue B, addressing the trial court’s denial of her motion for

a change of venue, was litigated before the trial court, and the trial court

rejected it. Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/16, at 19-21. Appellant did not pursue

this issue on direct appeal, resulting in waiver for purposes of collateral

review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3); Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d at 780.

      Issue C, regarding the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s severance

motions, has been previously litigated because it was addressed on the merits

by this court on direct appeal.    Pultro, 2017 WL 6199839, at *5-*8; 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3); Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d at 780.

      Issue D, regarding prosecutorial misconduct, is waived because it was

never raised at trial or on direct appeal. Appellant does not argue that counsel

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was ineffective for failing to raise this issue, nor does she otherwise specify

how it is cognizable under the PCRA.

      Issue E, regarding Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in

denying her pretrial motion to suppress evidence, was litigated before the trial

court and addressed on the merits by this Court on direct appeal. Pultro,

2017 WL 6199839, at *3-*5. Therefore, it is not eligible for collateral relief

because it has been previously litigated. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3); Reyes-

Rodriguez, 111 A.3d at 780.

      Finally, Issue F, regarding the trial court’s alleged bias against Appellant,

was never raised before the trial court or on direct appeal. Appellant does not

argue that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to take appropriate action to

address this issue, nor does she explain how it is otherwise cognizable under

the PCRA.

      In summary, each of Appellant’s arguments is either lacking in merit,

previously litigated, waived, or not cognizable under the PCRA. We therefore

affirm the PCRA court’s order.

      Order affirmed.

      President Judge Panella joins the memorandum.

      Judge King concurs in the result.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/27/2023

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