Court Opinion

ID: 9686814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:07:21.908977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:20.253448
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
I respectfully dissent. The principle that this Court recognized in People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672; 299 NW2d 304 (1980), compels the abrogation of the common-law unlawful-act misdemeanor-manslaughter rule. Gross negligence should be recognized as the mens rea standard for all common-law forms of involuntary manslaughter. It is inconsistent with Aaron to make an exception in cases in which the underlying misdemeanor is an assault and battery requiring a specific intent to injure, because proof of a specific intent to injure will not, in all cases, satisfy the gross negligence standard for involuntary manslaughter. In the instant case, the defendant’s conviction must be reversed because the jury instructions did not provide a valid basis for an involuntary manslaughter conviction, and I would find that error prejudicial.
In Aaron, we recognized that it is inherently unjust to presume the existence of the mens rea for murder merely on a showing of the mens rea required for an underlying felony. Specifically, our holdings in Aaron were premised on the following principle of criminal jurisprudence:
"If one had to choose the most basic principle of the criminal law in general ... it would be that *610criminal liability for causing a particular result is not justified in the absence of some culpable mental state in respect to that result . . . [Id. at 708. Emphasis added.]
Applying that principle to the crime of murder, we recognized that culpability for murder should require the establishment of a link between the murder (the result) and the defendant’s mens rea. Stated otherwise, to hold a defendant accountable for murder requires a showing that the defendant had a mens rea with regard to the murder. The felony murder rule violated that principle because the rule, in effect, permitted the intent to commit the underlying felony, in itself, to serve as the mens rea for murder.1 This violation led us to abolish the common-law felony murder rule, and to hold that murder liability could be imposed only on an independent showing that the defendant had a mens rea for murder, which we decided was malice.
Like the common-law felony-murder rule, the unlawful-act misdemeanor-manslaughter rule violates the principle set forth in Aaron, and it too should be abrogated. Pursuant to the unlawful-act misdemeanor-manslaughter rule, a defendant may be convicted of involuntary manslaughter where it has been shown that the defendant committed the unlawful act that proximately caused death. Proof of the mens rea for manslaughter is presumed to exist on the basis of a showing of the mens rea required for the underlying misdemeanor. Contrary to the principle that we endorsed in Aaron, liability for a homicide is imposed without an independent showing of a mens rea with regard to the homicide. To eliminate the perpetuation of such an injustice, this Court should abolish the *611unlawful-act misdemeanor-manslaughter rule. Because the Court has already recognized the suitability of a gross negligence standard for the other forms of common-law involuntary manslaughter, I would now adopt a uniform gross negligence standard to be applied to all forms of common-law involuntary manslaughter.
To recognize an exception, where the underlying misdemeanor is an assault and battery requiring proof of a specific intent to injure, would be inconsistent with the principle of Aaron because the requisite link between the homicide, and the mens rea with regard to the homicide, would not be established in all cases. While such an exception would require the establishment of a culpable mental state, it would not be the mental state required for involuntary manslaughter — which must be gross negligence. I reject the majority’s contention that the gross negligence mens rea standard for involuntary manslaughter is, at the most, comparable to, but no greater than, the specific intent-to-injure mens rea standard for assault and battery. ("Gross negligence does not require a greater level of criminal culpability than the specific intent to injure.” Ante at 603.) In my view, gross negligence would not necessarily be shown in every case simply because there is a showing of a specific intent to injure — to whatever degree, and regardless of whether the injury is physical or mental in nature.
To hold a defendant accountable for involuntary manslaughter on the basis that he was "grossly negligent” requires a showing that the defendant wilfully disregarded not just a high risk of injury, but a high risk of death or serious bodily injury. This understanding of the gross negligence standard for involuntary manslaughter is reflected in *612People v Pavlic, 227 Mich 562, 566; 199 NW 373 (1924), in which we stated:
[N]or is he guilty of manslaughter unless he commits the act carelessly and in such a manner as manifests a reckless disregard of human life. [Emphasis added.]
We elaborated on this view of gross negligence in People v Orr, 243 Mich 300, 307; 220 NW 777 (1928), in which we listed three elements that had to be established to show gross negligence for a lawful-act involuntary-manslaughter conviction:
(1) Knowledge of a situation requiring the exercise of ordinary care and diligence to avert injury to another.
(2) ’ Ability to avoid the resulting harm by ordinary care and diligence in the use of the means at hand.
(3) The omission to use such care and diligence to avert the threatened danger when to the ordinary mind it must be apparent that the result is likely to prove disastrous to another. [Emphasis added.]
Since Orr, these three elements have come to be accepted as the gross negligence standard for lawful-act involuntary manslaughter, and have been incorporated into the current criminal jury instructions for involuntary manslaughter.2
At different times in our discussions of the gross negligence showing specifically required for an involuntary manslaughter conviction, we have indicated that the relevant inquiry includes an assessment whether the defendant demonstrated "an indifference to consequences,”3 an "indifference to *613the rights of others,”4 "a thoughtless disregard of consequences,”5 "the intent to do wrong and inflict some bodily injury,”6 a "reckless disregard of the safety of others,”7 a "culpable indifference to the safety of others,”8 or whether the defendant was "recklessly or wantonly indifferent to the results”9 or failed to exercise such care as to make it "likely to prove disastrous to another.”10 These descriptions must be viewed in their proper context. When we made each of these statements, a homicide was always at issue. Accordingly, any mention of the "consequences,” the "rights,” the "wrong,” the "injury,” the "safety,” the "results,” or the "disaster]” all referred to the harm that resulted —death, or some harm of the same general nature —serious bodily injury. Because the context will always be a homicide in a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, the pertinent risks under the gross negligence standard for involuntary manslaughter will always be death and serious bodily injury. A loss of life will have resulted, and the defendant will have to be shown to have been grossly negligent with regard to human life in order to be held accountable for involuntary manslaughter. The Model Penal Code, the commentators, and the current criminal jury instructions are in accord with this understanding of the gross negligence standard for involuntary manslaughter.11 The majority fundamentally errs when it *614characterizes the risk under the gross negligence standard for involuntary manslaughter merely as a risk that injury — no matter how slight — will occur.12
The majority further errs when it indicates that a specific intent to injure standard for assault and battery is a more stringent standard than the gross negligence standard for involuntary manslaughter. ("Instructing the jury that it must find an intent to injure the victim is therefore a more stringent standard than allowing a conviction on *615the basis of the defendant’s gross negligence.” Ante at 604-605.) The majority does not offer any authority in support of the narrow proposition that a specific intent to injure is always a more culpable mental state than the gross negligence standard required for involuntary manslaughter. Significantly, neither the lower courts, nor the prosecutor recognized that the gross negligence standard for involuntary manslaughter is always a less demanding standard than a specific intent to injure standard. In fact, the prosecutor indicates in its brief that it views the gross negligence standard for involuntary manslaughter as a more difficult standard when it acknowledges that the defendant in this case could not be convicted of involuntary manslaughter under a gross negligence standard.13 Finally, even if one were to accept the majority’s premise that a specific intent to injure would always evidence at least gross negligence, it remains to be explained why there is a need to recognize a special category for the specific intent situation. Surely, the law on common-law involuntary manslaughter would be clearer if the Court simply endorsed a gross negligence standard across the board.14_
*616Imposing a uniform gross negligence standard would not preclude the possibility of an involuntary manslaughter conviction of a defendant who *617commits an assault and battery resulting in death. Depending on the circumstances, proof of a specific intent to injure may also manifest a wilful disregard of a high risk of death or serious bodily injury. However, that would not be true in all cases, making it inappropriate to conclusively presume the existence of gross negligence. For example, a defendant may intentionally inflict bodily harm on another person by a moderate blow with his fist; the person may then fall to the sidewalk, fracture his skull, and unexpectedly die. While the defendant in that situation clearly had a specific intent to injure, the defendant may not have demonstrated a wilful disregard of a high risk of death or serious bodily injury. Both the degree of risk and the defendant’s awareness of that risk would have to be considered before a proper determination regarding gross negligence could be made.
To infer the existence of gross negligence in such an instance, merely on a showing of a specific intent to injure, runs counter to the correlative principle we supported in Aaron. In addition, the defendant would be prevented from offering any defenses with regard to the existence of gross negligence. Finally, the defendant may end up being punished for a homicide merely on the basis of a bad result, and despite the lack of requisite mens rea: if the defendant had intended to injure and death had not resulted, the defendant could be convicted only of assault and battery; but because the defendant intended to injure and death did result, the defendant could be convicted of involuntary manslaughter. To impose liability for homicide solely because of a bad result does not serve to deter homicides or any legitimate purpose under the criminal law; to do so is abusive in itself.
The instant case is another example of a sitúa*618tion in which it could be shown that the defendant had a specific intent to injure, but perhaps could not be shown that the defendant wilfully disregarded a high risk of death or serious bodily injury. The prosecutor’s medical expert testified that the cause of death in this case was "very rare,” and "very unusual,” and that people could receive "similar blows frequently and [not] die and perhaps [not even be] severely injured.”15 This testimony strongly suggests that a high risk of death or serious bodily injury was not created when the "defendant slapped [his wife] once across the face with an open hand.” Ante at 590. Notably, the prosecutor characterizes the victim’s death in this case as "entirely unexpected.”
If a defendant is not shown to have been grossly negligent with respect to human life, but is shown to have had a specific intent to injure and death proximately resulted from his acts, the defendant would not be allowed to escape all punishment— contrary to the majority’s suggestion otherwise. Misdemeanors are crimes, and defendants who commit them are subject to punishment under the law. In this case, the defendant committed an assault and battery. The defendant’s "conduct in causing or intending to cause injury is a crime . . . and should be dealt with as such, i.e., as a crime defined in reference to the specific evil of bodily injury that it portends.”16 In this way, the law ensures that the punishment correlates with *619the crime. For the law to properly impose punishment for a homicide, culpability regarding the homicide must be shown in every case.
In Heflin, supra, Justice Levin accurately observed that the time has come to abolish the common-law misdemeanor-manslaughter rule:
The unlawful-act manslaughter doctrine should be abolished because in most cases it is unnecessary — gross negligence will be sufficient where liability for involuntary manslaughter is warranted — and in a few cases it will lead to unjustifiable results. The rule has been abolished in England and in at least some American jurisdictions, rejected by the Model Penal Code, and criticized by commentators. The misdemeanor-manslaughter rule should be abandoned because there was no good reason for adopting it and there is no good reason for keeping it. [Heflin at 577-578 (Levin, J., dissenting).]
In addition to the reasons cited by Justice Levin, the principle embraced by this Court in Aaron dictates the elimination of the unlawful-act misdemeanor-manslaughter rule. After Aaron, culpability for homicide may not be presumed from the commission of another crime. The majority’s special category is unacceptable because it equates a specific intent to injure — to whatever degree and kind — with a wilful disregard of a high risk of death or serious bodily injury, and, in effect, violates the principles of Aaron. This case provides the Court with an excellent opportunity to abolish the unlawful-act misdemeanor-manslaughter rule once and for all. I would do so now, and thereby ensure that common-law liability for homicide will only be imposed where culpability for death has been proven.
Brickley, C.J., and Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 Id. at 717.

 CJI2d 16.10, 16.18.

 People v Barnes, 182 Mich 179, 198; 148 NW 400 (1914).

 Id.

 People v Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 112; 194 NW 609 (1923).

 Pavlic, supra at 566.

 Id.

 People v Campbell, 237 Mich 424, 428; 212 NW 97 (1927).

 Id. at 429.

 Orr, supra at 307.

 See Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(c), p 226 (a person acts recklessly with respect to the death of another when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause that *614result); 3A Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), § 1658, p 243 ("[I]f [an • act] is in its nature lawful if properly performed, but dangerous to life if improperly performed, and its improper performance results in unintended death, the offense is manslaughter”) (emphasis added); 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 7.12, p 278 (explaining that to convict for criminal negligence-involuntary manslaughter "the defendant’s conduct . . . must involve a high degree of risk of death or serious bodily injury” and "the defendant must be aware of the fact that his conduct creates this risk”) (emphasis added); CJI2d 16.18(4) (elements to prove gross negligence include "that the defendant failed to use ordinary care to prevent injuring another when, to a reasonable person, it must have been apparent that the result was likely to be serious injury”) (emphasis added); CJI2d 16.10 (conviction for involuntary manslaughter is appropriate where the defendant acted "with unreasonable disregard for life” or "was grossly negligent of human life”) (emphasis added). See also People v Heflin, 434 Mich 482, 576, n 63; 456 NW2d 10 (1990) ("the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant’s conduct was grossly negligent with respect to the safety of other persons”— explained, to mean that the "defendant must have been committing an unlawful act which . . . was grossly negligent of human life”) (Levin, J., dissenting).

 In particular, the majority focuses on language from Pavlic indicating that the gross negligence standard will be met "if the unlawful act is 'performed under such circumstances as to supply the intent to do wrong and inflict some bodily injury.’ ” Ante at 599 (quoting Pavlic). That language from Pavlic must be read in context. In Pavlic, the Court began its discussion of the gross negligence standard by setting forth the character of the risk at issue, which it described as a threat to human life: "nor is he guilty of manslaughter unless he commits the act carelessly and in such a manner as manifests a reckless disregard of human life.” Id. at 566. The subsequent comments regarding an "intent to do wrong or inflict some bodily injury” must be understood against the backdrop of that introduction, i.e., the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant intended "to inflict some bodily injury” so as to "manifestf ] a reckless disregard of human life.”

 The prosecutor states:
And even if the act of deliberately hitting someone can come under the broad rubric of negligence, it is an act which, while morally reprehensible, will not usually be the sort of act which would appear to the ordinary person to likely prove disastrous to another .... Under the defendant’s theory, assaulting someone and causing their death would not be manslaughter in the absence of a showing of gross negligence. The most the defendant could be said to be guilty of, under this theory, is aggravated assault. [Emphasis added.]

 To further clarify the parameters of the gross negligence standard that I propose for involuntary manslaughter, and my reason for rejecting the majority’s intent to injure standard, it may be helpful to contrast the mens rea requirement for murder with my understanding of the mens rea requirement for involuntary manslaughter.
*616The mens rea for murder is malice. In People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 728; 299 NW2d 304 (1980), we defined malice as:
[1] the intention to kill,
[2] the intention to do great bodily harm, or
[3] the wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of defendant’s behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.
In my view, the mens rea for involuntary manslaughter is gross negligence. Guided by case law from this Court, I define gross negligence as a wilful disregard of a high risk of death or serious bodily injury. I do not, contrary to the majority’s description, assert that under the gross negligence standard, the "defendant must intend to cause serious injury or death.” Ante at 597, n 12. Serious injury or death are the applicable risks under a gross negligence standard for homicide liability. Because the gross negligence standard is a negligence-based standard, a showing of intent is not required. Further, even if an intent to injure could be shown in a particular case, such intent to injure may or may not constitute gross negligence.
An intent to injure would constitute gross negligence if the intent to injure, under the circumstances, manifests a wilful disregard of a high risk of death or serious bodily injury. Note that an intent to injure that constitutes gross negligence does not have to also manifest "a wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of defendant’s behavior is to cause death or serious bodily injury” — as recognized by the majority, that is the “third leg of the malice requirement for murder.” Ante at 598, n 14. Moreover, and as indicated above, an intent to injure that constitutes gross negligence does not have to be an "intention to kill,” or an “intention to do great bodily harm” — properly understood, those are the first and second legs of the malice requirement for murder.
However, an intent to injure will not constitute gross negligence in all cases merely because death results from the defendant’s act. Specifically, an intent to injure will not constitute gross negligence where the defendant’s act failed to encompass a high risk of death or serious bodily injury, or where the defendant did not wilfully disregard such risks.
It is the majority’s position that "When a person assaults another with the specific intent to injure, and death is caused, the person should be held responsible for some level of homicide.” Ante at 603. It is my position that when a person assaults another with the specific intent to injure, and death is caused, Aaron mandates that a person cannot be held responsible for homicide without showing a mens rea with regard to the homicide. A mere intent to injure — to whatever degree — would not in all cases manifest the requisite mens rea when the homicide is involuntary manslaughter.

 Specifically, Dr. Stephen Cohle testified:
I can say this is a very rare cause of death. It is very unusual. . . . And I will say, early on, I can’t prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the reasons why she did die from this blow, because it is very unusual. And I’m sure people receive similar blows frequently and don’t die and perhaps aren’t even severely injured ....

 Model Penal Code, § 210.3, p 78.