Court Opinion

ID: 9363332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 21:01:41.225542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:31.208919
License: Public Domain

REL: January 13, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

 ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                   _________________________

                      2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455
                             _________________________

                                                     J.G.

                                                      v.

         Lauderdale County Department of Human Resources

             Appeals from Lauderdale Juvenile Court
    (JU-17-189.04, JU-17-190.05, JU-17-191.06, and JU-17-192.04)

PER CURIAM.

        In appeal number 2210452, J.G. ("the father") appeals from a

judgment entered by the Lauderdale Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court")

in case number JU-17-189.04, terminating his parental rights to J.E.G.,
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

who was born on March 14, 2006. In appeal number 2210453, the father

appeals from a judgment entered by the juvenile court in case number

JU-17-190.05, terminating his parental rights to E.D.G., who was born

on April 22, 2008. In appeal number 2210454, the father appeals from a

judgment entered by the juvenile court in case number JU-17-191.06,

terminating his parental rights to Y.L.W., who was born on August 28,

2013. In appeal number 2210455, the father appeals from a judgment

entered by the juvenile court in case number JU-17-192.04, terminating

his parental rights to S.R.G., who was born on August 25, 2015. This

court consolidated the father's appeals, ex mero motu. We reverse the

juvenile court's judgments.

                          Procedural History

     On June 21, 2021, the Lauderdale County Department of Human

Resources ("DHR") filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of the

father and of M.G. ("the mother") to J.E.G., E.D.G., Y.L.W., and S.R.G.

("the children"). Following a trial, at which the father was not present,

the juvenile court entered separate judgments on February 18, 2022,

which, apart from each child's name, are otherwise identical and state,

in pertinent part:

                                   2
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

          "1. [DHR] failed to meet its burden of proof required to
     prove [that the children] remain[] dependent; therefore, the
     court finds the [children are] not dependent and legal care,
     custody, and control of [the children] is hereby awarded to [the
     mother].

           "2. [DHR's] petition[s] to terminate the parental rights
     of the mother ... [are] hereby DENIED.

           "3. [DHR] is ORDERED to implement a transition plan
     for [the children] to return home to [the mother] by Friday,
     February 18, 2022.

           "4. It is in the best interest of [the children] to terminate
     the parental rights of the father[]; therefore, [DHR's]
     petition[s] to terminate the parental rights of the father ...
     [are] hereby GRANTED.

           "5. The parental rights of the father ... be and the same
     are hereby permanently severed and terminated as to [the
     children].

           "6. The parties may submit legal briefs within seven (7)
     days from the date of this order regarding the severance of the
     father's parental rights in light of the preservation of the
     mother's parental rights."

     On February 28, 2022, the father filed a postjudgment motion in all

four cases, challenging the termination of his parental rights; on that

same date, the juvenile court entered separate orders in each case

denying the father's motion. The father filed a timely notice of appeal in

each case on March 2, 2022.

                                     3
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

                                 Analysis

     In Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 779-80 (M.D. Ala. 1976), the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama

determined that, under the Due Process Clause of the United States

Constitution, U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1, the state can permanently

revoke a parent's fundamental liberty interest only "when the child is

subjected to real physical or emotional harm and less drastic measures

would be unavailing."     Id. at 779.    Our supreme court eventually

acknowledged that concept of constitutional law by holding that a

juvenile court may terminate parental rights only if it finds " 'that there

exists no viable alternative to the termination of the parent's custodial

rights.' " See Ex parte Ogle, 516 So. 2d 243, 243 (Ala. 1987) (quoting

Hickman v. Alabama Dep't of Pensions & Sec., 489 So. 2d 601, 602 (Ala.

Civ. App. 1986)). In Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 1990), the

Alabama Supreme Court reformulated the language of the test to provide

that a juvenile court "must inquire as to whether 'all viable alternatives

to termination have been considered,' " 564 So. 2d at 952, but we find no

indication that the supreme court meant that a juvenile court satisfies

the Due Process Clause when it only "considers" a viable alternative. As

                                    4
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

the law currently stands, if a court may achieve the compelling

governmental objective at stake through a means other than the drastic

action of permanently revoking the custodial rights of the parent, a

juvenile court cannot terminate parental rights. See J.B. v. DeKalb Cnty.

Dep't of Hum. Res., 12 So. 3d 100, 115 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (plurality

opinion) (authored by Moore, J., with Pittman, J., concurring, Thompson,

P.J., concurring in the result, and Bryan and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).

     In the judgments in these cases, the juvenile court denied the

petitions to terminate the parental rights of the mother and ordered that

the custody of the children be returned to her. At the same time, the

juvenile court granted the petitions to terminate the parental rights of

the father, who was divorced from the mother and who had only visitation

rights with the children. In his appeals to this court, the father requests

that this court pronounce a bright-line rule to clarify that, based on the

viable-alternative prong of Ex parte Beasley, a juvenile court cannot

terminate the parental rights of a noncustodial parent when the custodial

parent can safely resume custody of the children. We decline to address

that point, however, because it is not necessary to the disposition of these

appeals, which concern solely the issue whether the juvenile court erred

                                     5
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

in terminating the parental rights of this particular noncustodial parent.

The resolution of that issue depends on whether placement of the

children with the mother achieves the state's compelling interest at stake

in the underlying proceedings.

     The evidence in the record indicates that the father had been found

indicated for physically abusing S.W., the mother's oldest child and the

father's stepchild, in 2005. See Ala. Admin. Code (Dep't of Hum. Res.), r.

660-5-34-.07(1). The father was found indicated for neglect and abuse of

S.W., J.E.G., and E.D.G. in May 2012 as a result of domestic violence

between him and the mother. In 2017, after another incident of domestic

violence between the mother and the father, this time occurring in the

presence of Y.L.W. and S.R.G., all five children were removed from the

family home.     On April 17, 2017, the mother obtained from the

Lauderdale Circuit Court a protection-from-abuse ("PFA") order

restraining the father from contacting her or the children. That PFA

order was amended in March 2018 to allow the father contact with the

children, but not the mother. Eventually, the father pleaded guilty to

assaulting the mother, and, in accordance with his plea agreement, the

Lauderdale Circuit Court entered a permanent PFA order precluding any

                                    6
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

contact between the father and the mother and restraining the father

from harming the children or interfering with their custody.

     DHR initially offered the father parenting classes, domestic-

violence classes, anger-management classes, and counseling and referred

the father for a psychological evaluation, a substance-abuse assessment,

and drug screens. After the PFA order was amended in March 2018,

DHR also allowed the father to exercise supervised visitation with the

children. A DHR social worker testified that the father did not follow

through with the services offered to him by DHR and that, although he

had expressed to her in 2020 that he needed inpatient substance-abuse

treatment, to her knowledge, he had not enrolled in such treatment. The

DHR social worker indicated that the father's conduct during his

visitations with the children had led to multiple changes in visitation

supervisors. According to the DHR witnesses, the father had visited the

children only sporadically, sometimes missing visits due to a myriad of

health problems; the testimony indicated that the father had last visited

J.E.G. and S.W. on January 14, 2020, and had last visited E.D.G., Y.L.W.,

and S.R.G. in August 2020. The visitation supervisor for the January

2020 visits testified that, for the most part, the father had interacted

                                   7
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

appropriately with J.E.G. and S.W., but, she said, J.E.G. and S.W. had

constantly complained during the visits.

     A therapist who was referred by DHR to provide services to the

children in 2017 testified that, in February 2020, she had recommended

that J.E.G. no longer visit the father because it had been reported to her

that the father had continued to fail drug screens and because S.W. and

J.E.G. had reported that the father had convinced J.E.G. to steal things

and deliver them to the father. The father's visitations with the children

had ceased following that recommendation. However, the mother and

the father were subsequently found indicated for "neglect, other risk of

serious harm," when the mother, who had regained custody of E.D.G.,

Y.L.W., and S.R.G., had taken those children to a party at which the

father was present. The mother and the father were later divorced by a

judgment entered by the Lauderdale Circuit Court on March 9, 2021. In

December 2021, the father contacted DHR about restarting his

visitations with the children; according to a DHR witness, a social worker

had directed him to contact his counsel and the father had not contacted

DHR again.

                                    8
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

     At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court indicated that it

would be terminating the father's parental rights because it considered

him to be "an ongoing risk to the children." Presumably, the juvenile

court determined that the father had not overcome his substance-abuse

problems, his penchant for domestic violence and physical abuse, and his

criminal behavior and, thus, that he continued to present a threat of real

harm to the children. See Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. T.S.,

218 So. 3d 1252, 1262 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (holding that, in reviewing a

judgment in a termination-of-parental-rights case, this court presumes

that the juvenile court implicitly made those findings of fact necessary to

sustain its judgment). Although the father maintains that the record

does not contain sufficient evidence to sustain such findings, the evidence

cited above could have led the juvenile-court judge to be clearly convinced

otherwise, and our standard of review does not permit this court to

reweigh the evidence to reach a different conclusion. See Ex parte Bodie,

[Ms. 1210248, Oct. 14, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2022). Thus, the record

substantiates that the state had a compelling interest in protecting the

children from the harmful conduct of the father.

                                    9
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

      Having determined that the father presented a risk of harm to the

children, the juvenile court was, at that point, required to utilize the least

drastic legal remedy available to protect the children from that harm. In

its judgments, however, the juvenile court did not expressly address

whether the children could be protected from the risk of harm presented

by the father by any means other than termination of his parental rights.

The judgments do not contain any language indicating that the juvenile

court considered and rejected other alternatives. In the orders denying

the father's postjudgment motion, the juvenile court also did not address

that point. Instead, the juvenile court simply determined that it would

be in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights of

the father. However, the constitutional framework acknowledged by our

supreme court requires a juvenile court to terminate a parent's parental

rights for the best interests of the children only after it has exhausted all

other viable alternatives.

      In his postjudgment motion, the father asserted that the children's

being returned to the mother's custody was a viable alternative to the

termination of his parental rights. The juvenile court could have properly

rejected that alternative only if it was clearly convinced from the evidence

                                     10
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

that placement of the children with the mother would not adequately

protect the children from the risk of harm posed by the father. Thus, we

examine the evidence in the record to determine whether the juvenile

court received evidence sufficient to support that determination. See

K.R.S. v. DeKalb Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 236 So. 3d 910 (Ala. Civ. App.

2017).

     The evidence showed that, through counseling and therapy, the

mother had learned to recognize signs of abuse. The mother testified that

she would not allow the father to abuse her again or to compromise her

relationship with the children. As stated above, the mother obtained a

PFA order that prevented the father from having any contact with the

mother and the children, which she had violated on only one occasion

before the juvenile court determined that she had sufficiently

rehabilitated herself to resume custody of the children. That PFA order

was subsequently amended to permanently enjoin the father from having

any contact with the mother and from engaging in any harmful conduct

toward the mother or the children and to require law-enforcement

officials to intervene to assure compliance with the terms of the PFA

order. The mother divorced the father in 2021, and the divorce judgment

                                   11
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

does not give the father any specified visitation rights with the children.

A family counselor testified that the mother had adequately addressed

her past issues with abuse and that the mother had allayed the concerns

of the children regarding whether they would ever again witness

domestic violence between the mother and the father.

     In J.C.D. v. Lauderdale County Department of Human Resources,

180 So. 3d 900, 901 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015), this court considered an appeal

from a judgment terminating the parental rights of J.C.D. to his children.

The judgment also directed DHR to return the children to the custody of

their mother, S.B. This court stated, in pertinent part:

           "This court has consistently held that termination of the
     parental rights of a noncustodial parent is not appropriate in
     cases in which the children can safely reside with the
     custodial parent and the continuation of the noncustodial
     parent's relationship does not present any harm to the
     children. See S.M.W. v. J.M.C., 679 So. 2d 256 (Ala. Civ. App.
     1996); Talley v. Oliver, 628 So. 2d 690 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993);
     In re Beasley, 564 So. 2d 959 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); and Miller
     v. Knight, 562 So. 2d 274 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990). See also
     A.J.H.T. v. K.O.H., 983 So. 2d 394, 406-07 (Ala. Civ. App.
     2007) (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)."

180 So. 3d at 901.

     This court in J.C.D. proceeded to conclude that the juvenile court's

determination that the children in that case could be returned to the care

                                    12
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

of S.B. amounted to an implicit finding that S.B. could adequately provide

for the safety, permanency, and other needs of the children. 180 So. 3d

at 901-02. Although there was testimony reflecting a history of abuse

between S.B. and J.C.D., this court observed that DHR had presented no

evidence indicating that J.C.D. had compromised the children's safety in

the four years preceding the conclusion of the trial or that the

continuance of J.C.D.'s status as a noncustodial parent with supervised

visitation would expose the children to the threat of physical or emotional

harm from J.C.D. Id. at 902. This court further noted that the record

contained no evidence indicating how the children would benefit from the

termination of J.C.D.'s parental rights. Id. Accordingly, in J.C.D. we

concluded that the juvenile court should have determined that the

children's being returned to the custody of S.B. constituted a viable

alternative to the termination of J.C.D.'s parental rights, and we

reversed the judgment terminating his parental rights. Id.

     In the present cases, unlike in J.C.D., the juvenile court at least

implicitly determined that the mother could not adequately protect the

children from harm when it denied the father's postjudgment motion;

however, the foregoing evidence shows not only that the mother had

                                    13
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

rehabilitated herself to the point that she could regain custody of the

children, but also that she had sufficiently adjusted her circumstances to

prevent further abuse by the father. At the time of trial, the mother had

successfully completed therapy and counseling, had divorced the father,

had obtained a permanent PFA order for the benefit of herself and the

children, and had displayed proper protective capacity over the children.

The record indicates that the father has had no visitation with the

children since 2020 and that he has no specified court-ordered visitation

rights. Thus, the evidence shows, without dispute, that the children are

protected from having any adverse contact with the father. Contrary to

the assertion made by the dissent, the court in this opinion is not

"speculating" as to the present circumstances showing that the mother

has and can adequately protect the children from any risk of harm

presented by the father. ___ So. 3d at ___ (Thompson, P.J., dissenting).

     Also, like in J.C.D., there is no evidence in the record indicating

how termination of the father's parental rights would otherwise benefit

the children. In most cases, the termination of parental rights serves to

free up children for adoption so that the children can achieve permanency

and stability.   See Ex parte Bodie, ___ So. 3d at ___ (Parker, C.J.,

                                   14
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

concurring in part and concurring in the result).      However, when a

juvenile court awards permanent custody of children to their natural

parent, their interest in permanency and stability has been satisfied and

a termination of the parental rights of the noncustodial parent will not

advance that interest in any respect. Because the mother is properly

fulfilling the parental role of providing the children with permanency and

stability, the termination of the father's parental rights is not necessary

for that purpose.

     In reaching our decision, we distinguish this case from S.N.W. v.

M.D.F.H., 127 So. 3d 1225 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013), cited in the dissent. ___

So. 3d at ___ (Thompson, P.J., dissenting). In S.N.W., this court affirmed

a judgment terminating the parental rights of S.N.W. so that D.W. could

be adopted by his stepfather, V.W.H.       In reaching our decision, we

examined the evidence showing that D.W., who was a teenager at the

time, had not had a relationship with S.N.W. since her infancy and did

not know S.N.W. because he had been incarcerated for stabbing D.W.'s

mother during a visitation exchange and that V.W.H. had fulfilled the

paternal role throughout D.W.'s life. In rejecting S.N.W.'s argument that

the juvenile court in that case should have maintained the status quo as

                                    15
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

a viable alternative to termination of his parental rights, this court

stated, in part, that

     "preserving the status quo will prevent the child from
     accessing the benefits available to her if she is allowed to be
     adopted by the stepfather and, consequently, would not be in
     her best interest. Thus, the juvenile court correctly concluded
     that maintaining the status quo is not a viable alternative to
     termination of the father's parental rights."

127 So. 3d at 1230. In this case, no one has come forward to adopt the

children, and the juvenile court was not asked to balance the benefits to

the children of adoption, which can be achieved only by termination of

parental rights, see Ala. Code 1975, § 26-10A-29(b), against the

alternative of maintaining the status quo. In S.N.W., unlike in this case,

D.W. would have been deprived of a beneficial and permanent father-

child relationship with V.W.H. if we had reversed the judgment.

Maintaining the "status quo" in this case, in which the mother will

resume sole legal and physical custody of the children, does not in any

away impair the stability and permanency interests of the children.

     This case is also easily distinguishable from A.E.T. v. Limestone

County Department of Human Resources, 49 So. 3d 1212 (Ala. Civ. App.

2010), another case cited by the dissent. ___ So. 3d at ___ (Thompson,

P.J., dissenting). In A.E.T., this court determined that, when the parents

                                   16
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

of a child cannot be rehabilitated and family reunification is not

foreseeable in the reasonably near future, the mere existence of a relative

who could potentially serve as a placement resource does not preclude a

juvenile court from terminating parental rights. 49 So. 3d at 1219. In

this case, the father is not seeking reversal of the judgments on the basis

that a third-party relative could possibly assume custody of the children.

The father is arguing that, because the mother has, in fact, been awarded

sole legal and physical custody of the children, under the circumstances

set out above, the termination of his parental rights is not the least

drastic remedy available to the juvenile court. None of the analysis in

A.E.T. applies in this context.

     We do not condone the father's behavior that led to the separation

of the family or his failure to adequately redress his issues, but the

termination of parental rights is reserved for those rare cases in which

no less drastic measure can achieve the state's compelling objective of

safeguarding children from harm or the children's interest in achieving

permanency and stability. In these cases, the record shows that the

state's goal of protecting the children from harm has been achieved by

returning the children to the custody of the mother and restricting the

                                    17
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

father's association with the mother and the children through other legal

remedies. The children have been provided permanency and stability

through the efforts of both the mother and the state in sponsoring her

rehabilitation.   Under Ex parte Ogle and Ex parte Beasley, the

availability of a less drastic viable alternative precludes the termination

of the father's parental rights.

                                   Conclusion

     For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court erred

in terminating the father's parental rights to the children. See J.C.D.,

supra. We therefore do not address the father's other argument for

reversal of the judgments. We reverse the juvenile court's judgments

terminating the father's parental rights to the children, and we remand

the cases for the entry of judgments consistent with this opinion.

     2210452       --   REVERSED         AND      REMANDED           WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

     2210453       --   REVERSED         AND      REMANDED           WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

     2210454       --   REVERSED         AND      REMANDED           WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

                                    18
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

     2210455     --    REVERSED         AND        REMANDED      WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

     Hanson and Fridy, JJ., concur.

     Moore, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

     Thompson, P.J., dissents, with opinion, which Edwards, J., joins.

                                   19
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

MOORE, Judge, concurring specially.

     I concur in the main opinion.       I write specially to address the

additional argument made by J.G. ("the father") as to why the judgments

terminating his parental rights to the children should be reversed.

     As set out in the main opinion, the Lauderdale Juvenile Court ("the

juvenile court") determined in the final judgments that the children were

not dependent. Based on that finding, the father argues that, under Ex

parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 1990), as a matter of law, the juvenile

court could not terminate his parental rights. In a letter to this court

explaining that it would not be filing a brief in opposition to the father's

appeals, the Lauderdale County Department of Human Resources

("DHR") noted the juvenile court's finding that the children were not

dependent and basically asserted that the judgments were due to be

reversed on that basis. However, a finding that a child is not dependent

does not preclude a juvenile court from terminating parental rights.

     Ex parte Beasley involved one parent seeking to terminate the

parental rights of the other parent, and the supreme court had granted

certiorari review to address whether the 1984 Child Protection Act, Ala.

Code 1975, former § 26-18-1 et seq., required a court to make a "finding

                                    20
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

of dependency" before parental rights can be terminated." 564 So. 2d at

950. Nevertheless, the supreme court opined that, before a court can

terminate parental rights based on the petition of the state, the court

first must "make a 'finding of dependency' " and second, "after it has

determined that the child is 'dependent,' ... must inquire as to whether

'all viable alternatives to termination have been considered.' " 564 So. 2d

at 952 (citations omitted). In a special writing in which I concurre4d in

the result in J.C. v. State Department of Human Resources, 986 So. 2d

1172, 1201-06 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007), I explained that the statement in Ex

parte Beasley regarding a finding of dependency when the state petitions

to terminate parental rights amounted to dictum, "[a] judicial comment

made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to

the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may

be considered persuasive)," Black's Law Dictionary 569 (11th ed. 2019)

(defining "obiter dictum"), and that the statement should not be followed

in future cases. Since this court issued its opinion in J.C., these are the

first cases in which a party before this court has argued that a finding of

dependency is, in fact, required in order to terminate parental rights, as

espoused in Ex parte Beasley.

                                    21
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

     Before 1984, the only operative statute authorizing the termination

of parental rights provided, in part, that "[i]f a child is found to be

dependent, the [juvenile] court may" "award permanent custody to the

Department of Human Resources ... with termination of parental rights

...." Ala. Code 1975, former § 12-15-71(a)(6). Naturally, based on the

plain language of that statute, this court construed that statute as

requiring a finding of dependency before a juvenile court could terminate

parental rights.   However, effective January 1, 2009, the legislature

adopted the current Alabama Juvenile Justice Act ("the AJJA"), Ala.

Code 1975, § 12-15-101 et seq., so that, now, a juvenile court has

jurisdiction to terminate parental rights pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, §

12-15-114(c)(2).   Section 12-15-319(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in

pertinent:

     "If the juvenile court finds from clear and convincing evidence,
     competent, material, and relevant in nature, that the parents
     of a child are unable or unwilling to discharge their
     responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct or
     condition of the parents renders them unable to properly care
     for the child and that the conduct or condition is unlikely to
     change in the foreseeable future, it may terminate the
     parental rights of the parents."

By its plain language, § 12-15-319 does not require a juvenile court to

find a child dependent as a prerequisite to exercising its jurisdiction to

                                   22
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

terminate parental rights. Furthermore, no language in § 12-15-319 or

any other part of the AJJA expresses that, if the juvenile court

determines that a child is not dependent, the juvenile court may not

terminate parental rights. Cf. Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-310(b) (requiring

dismissal of a dependency action if the juvenile court determines that the

evidence fails to show that the child is dependent).

     Section 12-15-319 allows a juvenile court to terminate parental

rights when the juvenile court determines that the petitioner has proven:

(1) a ground for termination, (2) that no viable alternative to termination

of parental rights exists, and (3) that termination of parental rights is in

the best interest of the child. See Ex parte Bodie, [Ms. 1210248, Oct. 14,

2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022) (Parker, C.J., concurring in part and

concurring in the result). In proving that a ground for termination exists,

the petitioner may incidentally also prove that the child or children at

issue are dependent, but § 12-15-319 does not require that the juvenile

court make a separate finding of dependency as a matter of substantive

or procedural law. Ex parte Beasley, 564 So. 2d at 958 (Maddox, J.,

concurring in the result).

                                    23
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

     In Ex parte Beasley, Justice Maddox pointed out that the statement

in the majority opinion requiring a finding of dependency in state-

initiated termination-of-parental-rights cases was dictum because the

case did not involve a petition filed by the state and expressed hope that

"the rule of law will be corrected before it becomes entrenched." 564 So.

2d at 958. I agree with Justice Maddox. The issue in Ex parte Beasley

was whether a parent needed to prove the dependency of a child in order

to obtain a judgment terminating the other parent's rights to the child.

Because the case involved two competing parents, the supreme court had

no need to address the separate question of whether the state was

required to prove dependency in a termination-of-parental-rights case.

None of the statements of the law concerning state-initiated petitions to

terminate parental rights were relevant, much less essential, to the

holding in Ex parte Beasley that a dependency finding is not necessary

in a parent-initiated termination-of-parental-rights case.    As Justice

Maddox indicated in his special writing, the requirement of a finding of

dependency originated in opinions of this court, see, e.g., Clemons v.

Alabama Dep't of Pensions & Sec., 474 So. 2d 1153 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985),

that were "clearly wrong and should be overruled." 564 So. 2d at 955.

                                   24
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

Those opinions, like Ex parte Beasley, construed the 1984 Child

Protection Act, which made no reference to dependency. This court,

however, never explained why a finding of dependency was required

under a statute that did not even mention that term. Rather, this court

simply regurgitated the law from cases construing the older statute that

did require a child to be found dependent before a juvenile court could

terminate parental rights. See Ala. Code 1975, former § 12-15-71(a)(6).

Although in Ex parte Beasley the supreme court discussed why a finding

of dependency might be necessary in a state-initiated termination-of-

parental-rights case, see 564 So. 2d at 954, that dictum does not express

any authoritative opinion that constitutional concerns for due process or

standing require a finding of dependency. The AJJA already addresses

those concerns by conferring upon the state the right to file petitions to

terminate parental rights, see Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-317, and by

requiring clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for

termination. See § 12-15-319; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745

(1982).

     Since Ex parte Beasley was decided, our supreme court itself has

clarified that, "[f]or a finding of dependency, the court must consider

                                   25
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

whether there are grounds for terminating the parental rights."       Ex

parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 4 (Ala. 2007). I take that statement to mean

that, when a juvenile court makes a finding of grounds for termination,

it satisfies the first prong of the two-part test set forth in Ex parte

Beasley, without having to make any further or separate finding of

dependency. When read in this manner and in light of the actual text of

§ 12-15-319, Ex parte T.V. more aptly expresses the first requirement for

terminating parental rights, and our caselaw should reflect that by

clearly rejecting the notion that a separate finding of dependency must

be made before a juvenile court can terminate parental rights.

                                   26
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge, dissenting.

     I dissent. Although the main opinion purports to decline to create a

"bright-line rule" that awarding custody to one parent necessarily

constitutes a viable alternative to the termination of the other parent's

parental rights, the result of the main opinion, in essence, creates that

rule. The main opinion concludes that, "[p]resumably, the juvenile court

determined that the father had not overcome his substance-abuse

problems, his penchant for domestic violence and physical abuse, and his

criminal behavior and, thus, that he continued to present a threat of real

harm to the children." ___So. 3d at ___. At the conclusion of the evidence,

the juvenile court found the father to be "an ongoing risk" to the children.

The main opinion acknowledges that "the record substantiates that the

state had a compelling interest in protecting the children from the

harmful conduct of the father." ___ So. 3d at ___. It then concludes that

because the children could be left in the custody of the mother, that

arrangement constituted an alternative to the termination of the father's

parental rights. I believe that that conclusion usurps the juvenile court's

discretion. It also fails to balance the father's constitutional rights with

                                    27
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

the children's rights to safety and security and not to be under the threat

of the father's conduct, i.e., their best interests.

      The father, who was not present at the trial, has a history of

abusing his stepchild and has been found indicated for neglect and abuse

of the parties' children on multiple occasions. He also has an extensive

domestic-violence history involving the mother and a substance-abuse

history that has not been addressed during the lengthy involvement of

the Lauderdale County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") with

the family. Additionally, the father has made little effort to be reunited

with his children. He has attended only two individualized-service-plan

meetings in over four years, he has not financially supported his children,

and he has only sporadically visited the children while they have been in

foster care. A family counselor described the children as being "very

fragile and vulnerable." As opposed to the mother, who made great

strides in improving her situation, the father has failed to comply with

nearly all of DHR's requests and recommendations. As the main opinion

recognizes, the mother, who is now divorced from the father, obtained a

"lifetime" protection-from-abuse order that permanently enjoins the

                                      28
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

father from directing any harmful conduct toward the mother or the

children.

     Appellate courts must apply a presumption of correctness in favor

of a juvenile court's findings in a termination-of-parental-rights action.

J.C. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 986 So. 2d 1172, 1183 (Ala. Civ. App.

2007). This court does not reweigh the evidence. A.A. v. Jefferson Cnty.

Dep't of Hum. Res., 278 So. 3d 1247, 1251 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018). "[W]e

will reverse a juvenile court's judgment terminating parental rights only

if the record shows that the judgment is not supported by clear and

convincing evidence." J.C. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 986 So. 2d at 1183.

"[M]aintaining the status quo is a viable option to terminating parental

rights when the parent and the child enjoy a relationship with some

beneficial aspects that should be preserved such that it would be in the

child’s best interests to continue that relationship." S.N.W. v. M.D.F.H.,

127 So. 3d 1225, 1230 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). We have held, however, that

when the evidence demonstrates that a parent is incapable of being

rehabilitated or that the parent's conduct or condition is unlikely to

change in the foreseeable future, " 'obviously no alternative can be

considered viable to the end of returning the child to a normal custodial

                                    29
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

relationship with his or her parent.' " A.E.T. v. Limestone Cnty. Dep't

Human Res., 49 So. 3d 1212, 1218 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (quoting D.M.P.

v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 871 So. 2d 77, 92 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)

(plurality opinion)).

     The main opinion speculates that the mother can adequately

protect herself and the children from the father's harmful conduct. The

juvenile court determined that the father was an ongoing risk to the

children. The evidence supports that finding by the juvenile court, and I

disagree with the implication in the main opinion that the father will not

seek to challenge or modify the current orders prohibiting him from

visiting the children. I agree with Chief Justice Parker's statement in

his special writing in Ex Parte Bodie, [Ms. 1210248, Oct. 14, 2022] ___

So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2022) (Parker, C.J., concurring in part and

concurring in the result), that, "ordinarily, the viability of alternatives to

termination should be analyzed based on the circumstances that are

before the juvenile court at the time of the termination judgment, not

based on potential future circumstances." At the time of the termination

decision, the juvenile court viewed the father as an "ongoing risk" to the

children. The evidence before the juvenile court was sufficient to clearly

                                     30
2210452, 2210453, 2210454, and 2210455

convince that court that grounds for the termination of the father's

parental rights existed and that the father's conduct or condition was

unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The evidence also supported

the juvenile court's implicit finding that no viable alternatives were

present at the time of the termination. I cannot agree with the main

opinion that the children's best interests are served by reversing the

judgments terminating the parental rights of the father.

     Based on the foregoing, I would affirm.

     Edwards, J., concurs.

                                   31