Court Opinion

ID: 9765483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:03:45.20911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:10.389242
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I.
As the principal opinion points out, there was no error in the failure to submit a voluntary manslaughter instruction, because the jury had the opportunity to mitigate when it was instructed that it could find the defendant guilty of second degree murder, and did not avail itself of that opportunity. I agree thoroughly with the holding of State v. Merritt, 734 S.W.2d 926 (Mo.App.1987). The omission of a man*776slaughter instruction, whether required or not, was not prejudicial.
The discussion as to whether a manslaughter instruction is required, then, is not necessary, and, in my opinion, unwise. I am particularly concerned about such expressions as “the evidence on this point is inconclusive” and “though this evidence standing alone might suggest a marginal basis for a finding of sudden passion arising from adequate cause, it becomes quite untenable when considered in the light of all the circumstances.” In determining whether the defendant is entitled to an instruction, the court should consider only the evidence favorable to the defendant, and should give the defendant the benefit of inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Even marginal theories should be submitted.
The principal opinion speaks as though the defendant had some burden to introduce evidence, and suggests that the trial judge may weigh evidence in deciding whether to submit the defendant’s request. This is heresy, and can bring only trouble. The prosecutor was ill-advised to resist the manslaughter instruction, and the trial judge should have given it. Because the point is immaterial I omit discussion of the evidence in detail, but it persuades me that there was a tenuous basis for a manslaughter finding. That this evidence was unconvincing to me, and probably would not persuade the jury, makes no difference. It is not for us to say whether or not the evidence is convincing.
II.
I cannot understand the intimation in footnote 4 of the principal opinion, and in Judge Billings’ opinion, that there was a violation of the rules in the defendant’s briefing. Leave of court for a brief in excess of 100 pages was first obtained, as specified in Rule 30.06(i).
The rules also permit counsel to argue “plain error.” This does not mean that the extensive briefing of points of error which have not been preserved, in the same manner as preserved points is helpful or effective. Cases in which there have been reversals for plain error are rare indeed. If counsel thinks that a point may meet the plain error standard, it should be possible to say so in a very few words. The random briefing of unpreserved points may not be sound advocacy.
I also find it necessary to comment on Judge Billings’ gratuitous attack on lawyers who raise points of ineffective assistance of counsel in postconviction proceedings.1 A convicted defendant is entitled to challenge his conviction by charging that trial counsel was ineffective to such an extent that sixth amendment rights were violated. We have held that Rule 29.15 is the exclusive means for making this claim. State v. Wheat, 775 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. banc 1989). The defendant is told that the claim must be made within thirty days after the record on appeal is filed. A transcript is provided and counsel furnished for indigent defendants. The defendant is advised that the claim is forever barred if not timely raised. Day v. State, 770 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. banc 1989).
Counsel appointed for Rule 29.15 litigants owe duties only to their client. An attorney violates no rule of ethics in pursuing a claim that the client is entitled to make. This may include the unpleasant duty of challenging the performance of trial counsel. Motion counsel may have to proceed with complaints they do not necessarily agree with, if there is an arguable basis for them.
Those who have represented capital defendants, whether at the trial or appeal stage, realize that such defense is extremely difficult. Penalties for a misstep may be severe. Counsel operate under the specter of such cases as Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986), Dugger v. Adams,- — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989), in *777which defendants were executed because counsel did not choose to include possibly meritorious points in their initial appellate proceedings. Judges may appropriately comment on the effectiveness of the performance of defense counsel and, for that matter, of the prosecution, but lawyers should not be criticized for doing their duty as they see it.
With these observations, I concur in the principal opinion.

. The attack is gratuitous because there is no issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in the present case. The defendant failed to file a timely motion under Rule 29.15.