Court Opinion

ID: 9773323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:42:05.458244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:20.015049
License: Public Domain

AKIN, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority only because the trial court failed to sign a formal order setting aside its order overruling the original motion for new trial. I agree, therefore, with that part of the opinion which states that the oral order setting aside the order overruling the motion for new trial was ineffective. The supreme court, in Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex.1976), held that an order disposing of a motion for new trial must be reduced to writing within the forty-five-day period to be effective and that an oral rendition within this period had no effect. To hold otherwise, the court said, would violate Rules 5 and 306a by permitting entry of nunc pro tunc orders long after the appellate times had lapsed.
I cannot agree, however, with the majority’s unduly narrow reading of Rule 5. Rule 5, designated “Enlargement,” provides:
When by these rules ... an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may, at any time in its discretion (a) order the period enlarged . . . ; or (b) upon motion permit the act to be done after the expiration of the specified period . . . ; but it may not enlarge the period for taking any action under the rules relating to new trials or motions for rehearing except as stated in the rules relating thereto .
The majority focuses on the clause which states that a court “may not enlarge the period for taking any action under the rules relating to new trials . . . , except as stated in the rules . . . .” To view this in proper perspective, however, we must read all of the rule together. The first portion of the rule permits a court to enlarge any time period prescribed by the rules. The clause quoted supra is a limitation to this general grant of power, and even that limitation is modified by “except as stated in the rules . . . .” I conclude that this phrase restricts the trial court to time limits relating to motions for new trial expressly specified in other rules. Accordingly, the trial court has plenary jurisdiction to set aside an order overruling a motion for new trial if such order does not otherwise affect the time limits prescribed by other rules such as Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b. Under the majority holding, once a trial court enters an order which restricts the appellate timetable, regardless of the reason, it cannot restore the status quo by setting aside this order. Reading Rule 5 as I do would in no way enlarge the time beyond that which is proper under the rules. It merely allows an appellant full use of the prescribed time periods and gives the trial court jurisdiction to permit it. Indeed, the very purpose of Rule 5 was to permit the trial court to enlarge the time periods for appeal rather than to restrict them. Here, it is evident that the trial court entered its order overruling the motion for new trial acting on a misconception. My reading of this rule and its intent would *300permit a trial court to correct its error in a case such as this without granting a new trial or penalizing an appellant.
This construction is consistent with prior authority dealing with the interaction of motions for new trial and appellate times. An amended motion for new trial which is filed more than twenty days after the original motion for new trial is a nullity for appellate purposes. Valley Transit Co. v. Lopez, 263 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1953, writ ref’d); Miller v. Esunas, 401 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Thus, an amended motion which is filed more than twenty days after the original is ineffective to preserve points on appeal. Orr Chevrolet, Inc. v. Courtney, 488 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1972, no writ). Since Rule 329b(2) requires that an amended motion be filed within twenty days and before the original is acted upon, it would logically follow that an amended motion filed within twenty days, but after the original had been overruled, would likewise be ineffective to preserve points on appeal. This is consistent with the position taken in the majority opinion, which holds that an amended motion filed within twenty days of the original, but after the original had been overruled, was ineffective for the purpose of determining appellate times. However, it has been held that an amended motion for new trial which is filed within twenty days of the original is effective to preserve points on appeal even though the original motion for new trial had been previously overruled if the order overruling the motion for new trial was set aside within the twenty-day period. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. King, 510 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Under the language in Rule 329b(2), this holding necessarily means that an amended motion for new trial is filed “before the original motion is acted upon” if the court sets aside its order overruling the original motion before the twenty-day period expires. Nothing in the rule suggests that different considerations should be applied in determining what is timely for the purpose of preserving points on appeal as opposed to determining the time for appeal. If the amended motion was timely filed, then the forty-five-day period set out in Rule 329b(3) for passing on the motion begins to run from the date the amended motion was filed.
Permitting the amended motion to govern the appellate timetable would not contravene Rule 5. Merely because a trial court enters an order which starts the time for appeal running does not preclude it from setting aside that order and entering a new order; the time for appeal runs from the latter order. In City of West Lake Hills v. State ex rel. City of Austin, 466 S.W.2d 722, 726-27 (Tex.1971), the supreme court held that a corrected judgment, which taxed costs not mentioned in the original judgment, effectively vacated the prior judgment, and the time for appeal ran from the second judgment. The supreme court has, however, held that a second rendition of the same judgment at a later date cannot affect the time for appeal; the time for appeal continues to run from the date of the first judgment if the sole effect of the second judgment is to increase the time for appeal. Only in that situation would it contravene Rule 5. Anderson v. Casebolt, 493 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex.1973). The distinction, then, is whether the trial court’s order, which would restart the time for appeal, has an effect other than enlarging the time period. An amended motion for new trial does not only change the time for appeal; it is also necessary to preserve points of error not set forth in the original motion. Twin City Fire Insurance Co. at 375. The majority concludes that the purpose of the trial court’s order here was to extend the time for appeal. However, the language in the order relied on merely states that the court’s intention was to allow appellant “to timely file an Amended Motion for New Trial.” The amended motion presented included an additional ground and would preserve that point on appeal if timely filed. Additionally, under the holdings in City of West Lake Hills and Casebolt, the controlling criteria is not the *301subjective intent of the trial court; rather, the reviewing court must look to the effect of the order. Only if its sole effect is extension of time is it forbidden by Rule 5.
The cases relied on by the majority are distinguishable and are not controlling here. In Chantre v. National Maritime Union Pension & Welfare Plan, 425 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1968, no writ), the trial court attempted to reenter the same judgment, thereby extending the time for appeal. This is the same basis as that relied upon by the supreme court in Case-bolt, which is not controlling because the amended motion raised an additional point and would not result solely in an enlargement of time. Recognition of the amended motions in A. F. Jones & Son v. Republic Supply Co., 151 Tex. 90, 246 S.W.2d 853, 855 (1952) and Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 346 S.W.2d 823, 826-27 (1961), would have required recognition of acts done after the time set out in other rules had expired. In the case before us, the order setting aside the overruling of the original motion and the filing of the amended motion all occurred within the twenty-day period prescribed for filing amended motions for new trial. A. F. Jones & Son concerned a tardily filed motion for new trial; since the motion itself was a nullity for purposes of appeal, the trial court could not, merely by overruling it, make it valid so as to affect the time for taking the appeal. This is consistent with the holdings in Valley Transit Co. and Miller. Similarly, the amended motion in Fulton was not overruled until the forty-ninth day, clearly beyond the time prescribed by the rules. However, the court stated that orders determining motions for new trial “cannot be un determined after the 45-day period without destroying” Rule 329b(3). Fulton at 826. Clearly, the court contemplated that such orders could be “undetermined” within the forty-five-day period. It would be incongruous to allow an order which has been “undetermined” to control an appeal. Thus, the time for appeal must run from the time the amended motion is overruled. Of course, the trial court cannot violate the mandate of Casebolt by later overruling a motion which is identical to the original motion.
Unquestionably, a trial court retains jurisdiction of a case for thirty days after overruling a motion for new trial. Thus, within thirty days after a motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law, the court may set aside its original judgment and grant a new trial. Thomas v. Gibbs, 504 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1973, mandamus overruled); Mercer v. Band, 454 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no writ). The same rule should apply when a motion is overruled by a signed order. See Leon & H. Blum v. Wettermark, 58 Tex. 125, 127 (1882). In view of these decisions, it seems incongruous that the trial court lacks the power to set aside an erroneously entered order overruling a motion for new trial, as the majority holds. Rather, it logically follows that the plenary jurisdiction of the trial court permits it to set aside an order overruling a motion for new trial if the effect of the trial court’s action is not solely to extend the appellate timetable and does not have the effect of extending its jurisdiction beyond the time limits prescribed in other rules.
In my view, the rules should be construed broadly so as not to deny an appellant his appeal or to restrict unduly his points of error on appeal unless the rules specifically require a contrary result. Our interpretation of the rules should not lay a trap for the unwary nor create an undue restriction on the scope of appeal.