Court Opinion

ID: 9757004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:14:10.235489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:05.649702
License: Public Domain

EAGEN, Justice
(Dissenting).
The opinion of the majority proceeds upon the assumption that Bullard expressed through intermediaries, mainly Judge Dandridge and “Country” Robinson, a “clear desire not to be questioned until counsel was obtained for him — as he was constitutionally entitled to do” and that “Judge Dandridge conveyed this invocation of . rights to” police. This factual assumption is totally without support in the record.
The opinion of the hearing court following the suppression hearing states:
“There is little dispute about the facts. It clearly appears to the Hearing Judge that the defendant, 22 years of age, had decided to surrender to police but was apprehensive of his physical wellbeing if he did so unattended. He solicited the advice and aid of a friend, one Robinson, a gang control worker, who, in turn, solicited the intervention of the Honorable Paul A. Dandridge, Judge of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County. Judge Dandridge arranged for the defendant to surrender to Detective Branche of the Philadelphia County Detective Office at a meeting with Judge Dandridge in the Judge’s own chambers.
*351“At the meeting so arranged, Judge Dandridge himself read the defendant the standard warnings of his Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination required by Miranda and, in addition told Detective Branche that he understood the defendant’s family were making efforts to retain counsel for him, by reason of which he, Judge Dandridge, wished the police to conduct no interrogation of the defendant until he had spoken with counsel being retained, and so instructed the detective. Detective Branche responded that he would transmit the Judge’s instruction, but that he knew the detectives in the Homicide Unit would disregard it, and interrogate notwithstanding. Detective Branche expressed the view that Judge Dandridge instead should instruct the defendant to decline to make any statement and thus halt interrogation. This the Judge did, forthwith.
“Detective Branche took the defendant into custody, transported him from the Judge’s chambers at One East Penn Square, opposite City Hall, to the Police Administration Building at 8th and Race Streets, and there repeated the Judge’s instruction as to not interrogating the defendant to the receiving officer, Sergeant Green, who listened without comment. Sergeant Green said nothing about Judge Dandridge’s instruction to the interrogating officers to whom he turned the defendant over. Standard interrogation ensued, preceded by standard warnings given defendant, in response to which, prior to both oral and written statements, he waived his Constitutional privilege.
“From both Judge Dandridge and the defendant’s witness Robinson came testimony that the principal purpose of securing the Judge’s intervention in arrangements for surrender was to insure the defendant’s not being subjected to physical abuse.
“The defendant was clocked in at the Homicide Unit at 3:50 P.M. on April 21, 1970. His Constitutional *352privileges were read to and waived by him at 4:10 P.M. Until 5:00 P.M. he was left unattended while other persons involved in the investigation were spoken to. Interrogation began at 5:00 P.M., continued to 6:15 P.M., was interrupted until 6:50 P.M. for the defendant to use the toilet, rest, and have some food, and was resumed until 7:45 P.M. This interrogation resulted in the oral statement here challenged. From 9:45 to 11:30 P.M. there was a second interrogation, preceded by standard warnings and the defendant’s waiver of his Constitutional privileges, and during this period he gave the written signed statement of which suppression is now sought.” [Emphasis added.]
Moreover, the opinion of the trial court en banc following motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment completely agrees with the suppression hearing judge on the facts.
Nothing in the opinion of the supression hearing court, nor in the opinion of the trial court following motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial, nor in the opinion of the majority indicates that Bullard ever expressed any desire to exercise his constitutional rights. Indeed, the testimony quoted by the majority opinion and the opinions of the suppression court and the trial court indicate only that Judge Dandridge did not want police to question Bullard, not that Bullard did not want to be questioned. Further, Deputy Chief Branche clearly pointed out to Judge Dandridge that the police would not consider themselves bound to follow his instructions and that he should advise Bullard to exercise his rights.1 The Judge so advised Bullard. Yet, when asked for the first time if he wished to exercise his rights, Bullard *353clearly responded that he did not. Further, he then proceeded to answer police questions.
What these facts do indicate is that Bullard had the unusual advantage of being advised by a Judge of the Municipal Court, prior to arrest, that it would be advantageous to him to exercise his rights. Despite this advantage, Bullard clearly waived his rights. When the police first warned Bullard after he was taken to the Police Administration Building, Bullard’s responses clearly indicated a waiver. Moreover, the responses to warnings were followed shortly by responses to other questions. On the record, the first and only time Bullard expressed his desire to exercise or not to exercise his rights, Bullard chose the latter. What, in fact, exists “in the record” to show that Bullard expressed a clear desire to anyone not to be questioned is not pointed out by the majority.2 Indeed, it could not be pointed out because it quite simply is not present in the record.
It is true that the Commonwealth has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an accused’s waiver of his rights must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Here Bullard was not only properly advised of his rights by the police, he was advised by a Judge of the Municipal Court, and further advised by that Judge that it would be to his advantage to exercise those rights. The opinion of the suppression court states that Bullard enlisted the aid of Judge Dandridge to insure he would not be subject to physical abuse. Nothing *354indicates Bullard enlisted the aid of Judge Dandridge to act as an intermediary in exercising his constitutional rights. Moreover, Bullard was twenty-two years of age at the time and clearly indicated he understood his rights when advised of them.
Admittedly, Bullard did inform the police officer while in Judge Dandridge’s office that he was attempting to acquire counsel. But Bullard did not indicate that he did not want to be questioned until such counsel was obtained. This Court has ruled that a person who has already retained counsel may in the absence of counsel waive his right to have counsel present during questioning. Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 448 Pa. 206, 292 A.2d 302 (1972). It follows that where an accused is merely in the process of obtaining counsel, he too may knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his constitutional rights. Since an accused may waive his rights under these circumstances, it only remains to determine if Bullard did so here.
The majority states and rejects the two possible ways by which the Commonwealth attempted to show Bullard waived his rights, mainly, Bullard’s responses to the Miranda warnings given by the police which indicated a waiver and Bullard’s answering of questions following the warnings. In doing so, the majority treats the “one word answers ... to the pro forma questions in the Miranda warnings” and Bullard’s answering of subsequent questions as if they existed independently. In dealing with the answering of questions, the majority quotes from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), to the effect that silence in response to warnings followed by the answering of questions is a silent record from which the presuming of a waiver is impermissible. But this is not a silent record. Moreover, in the sentence immediately preceding the pas*355sage quoted by the majority, the United States Supreme Court stated:
“An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver.”
Miranda v. Arizona, supra at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628.
In response to police questions prior to interrogation, Bullard expressly stated that he understood he did not have to say anything, that anything he said could and would be used against him, that he did not want to remain silent, that he understood he had a right to talk to a lawyer before being questioned, that the lawyer would be provided free of charge if he could not afford one, that he did not want to talk to a lawyer, that he did not want to have a lawyer present while he was asked questions, and that he was willing to answer questions of his own free will, without fear or force, or without any threats or promises having been made to him. Shortly thereafter, Bullard provided the police with a statement. Thus, Bullard clearly waived his rights in a manner specifically approved by Miranda and the interrogation was permissible.
Since the facts do not support an exercise of constitutional rights by Bullard at any time, and since his actions and statements constitute a waiver of his constitutional rights, I cannot subscribe to the opinion of the majority.
I dissent.
JONES, C. J., and POMEROY, J., join in this dissent.

. How this response, both candid and correct, since the Judge had no authority to control the actions of police and since nothing indicates Bullard had expressed to anyone a desire to exercise his rights, can be considered an “alarming disregard” for Bullard’s rights defies comprehension.

. Clearly, a judge learned in the law, could convey a clearer indication to the police officer that Bullard expressed a desire to exercise his constitutional rights, if that were in fact the situation. This is particularly true in light of the Judge’s response when told by the police officer that Bullard would be questioned despite the Judge’s instructions. It is inconceivable that had Bullard at any time expressed a desire to exercise his constitutional rights, Judge Dandridge would not have clarified his instructions to indicate this to the police officer after the officer’s statement that the Judge’s instructions would not be followed.