Court Opinion

ID: 9753798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:29:55.629154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:42.498703
License: Public Domain

Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
dissenting.
Over a decade ago, defendant Marie Hess was indicted for a heinous crime: the cold-blooded, first-degree murder of her police officer husband while he slept, a charge that exposed her to up to life in prison, with a minimum of thirty years during which she would not be eligible for parole, N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3(b)(l). Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement that meaningfully reduced her penal exposure: she agreed to plead to and in fact pled to the lesser crime of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, *161in violation of N.J.S.A 2C:ll-4(a), with a recommendation of thirty years’ imprisonment subject to the provisions of the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.C. 2C:43-7.2, pursuant to which she would become eligible for parole after serving twenty-five and one-half years.
That plea agreement was crafted with great care between defendant and the State; each side sought advantages and made willing, knowing and informed concessions to achieve those advantages. As comprehensively memorialized in an April 5, 2001 letter from the State to defendant’s counsel,
the State sought [defendant’s cooperation to assist her late husband’s family (as the “victim-survivors” of the homicide of James B. Hess) in their family and individual grieving processes. Specifically, [the State] requested that [defendant] convey the truth as to the circumstances which led to her taking the life of her husband, and provide a truthful factual recitation of the manner in which she carried out the homicide.
As [the State] indicated to [defendant] and you, this was a prerequisite to any consideration being given to a negotiated plea by [the State], as it was [the State’s] view as a result of [its] investigation that this, quite simply, was a murder case. With the applicability of [NERA] to this erime[,] as well as the normal sentencing options for murder (either life imprisonment with a 30[-jyear parole disqualifier or a 30[-]year sentence without the possibility of parole), it was [the State’s] position that an agreement would encompass a plea to Murder with a 30[-]year term of imprisonment without parole. [The State], of course, was aware that you, as the advocate for [defendant], always hoped that [the State’s] position would be altered to the benefit of [defendant].
[I]n light of [defendant’s] cooperation[, the State] will extend the following plea offer: the State would amend the single count of the above-captioned indictment charging Murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3[,] to charge Aggravated Manslaughter, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2G:11-Jt[ (]a[) ]. As to sentencing, [defendant] must acknowledge the applicability of NERA ... to this crime. Further, [defendant] must acknowledge that she is pleading guilty with the understanding that she will receive a sentence of 30 years in the New Jersey State Prison, and, further acknowledge, that as part of that sentence she will receive a period of parole ineligibility of 25 % years. Further, [defendant] must agree that neither you, on her behalf, nor she will affirmatively seek a lesser term, of imprisonment from the Court. Additionally, [defendant] will affirmatively agree not to appeal her judgment of conviction.
It is [the State’s] intention, through this plea agreement, to provide a benefit to [defendant] for her cooperation in allowing a plea to Aggravated Manslaughter for a crime, which she has clearly indicated, was a purposeful murder. [The State] is *162reducing by 4)1 years the mandatory minimum for murder, i.e.[,] thirty years without parole, as the benefit she derives for her cooperation.
[Defendant] is, in turn, conceding the applicability of NERA to the maximum term of imprisonment for the crime of Aggravated Manslaughter. Further, she is conceding that the aggravating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1[ (]a[) ] so preponderate over the mitigating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1[ (]b[) ] as to make the maximum term of 30 years appropriate. [The State] would also indicate that [it] is aware that we cannot bind the Court to sentence in this fashion pursuant to the principles enunciated in State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433 [558 A.2d 1312] (1989), and it is not our intention to do so. However, we believe it permissible to bind [defendant] to this agreement.
Finally, pursuant to B. 3:9-3(c), it is our position that you and [the State] disclose this term of agreement to the Court and seek the Court’s concurrence in [the] same.
[ (first emphasis supplied; remaining emphasis in original).]
Defendant reaffirmed the terms of that plea agreement by a written, initialed and signed plea form that referenced, attached and incorporated the April 5, 2001 letter. Moreover, at the plea hearing, during which defendant was present and testified under oath, defense counsel stated clearly that “[njeither [he] nor [the prosecutor] will argue to the [c]ourt that any sentence, other than that which is set forth in the agreement, is appropriate. That, of course, leaves the [c]ourt to impose what is the appropriate sentence.” In sum, as set forth in the detailed plea agreement, the State did its part: it amended and downgraded the charge from first-degree murder to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, and requested the imposition of a thirty-year sentence, subject to NERA. Defendant also did her part: on April 16, 2001, she pled guilty to the lesser offense of first-degree aggravated manslaughter. Satisfying itself that defendant was entering into that plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, the court directly addressed defendant as follows:
[Defendant], you obviously have heard everything that I have heard here in open court this afternoon. And it’s my understanding that you are going to make certain admissions with respect to the homicide of your late husband.
And that point I want to make to you is you have been charged with ... purposely and knowingly committing a murder which would carry with it, if you are convicted, a minimum of actually serving 30 years in State Prison, possibly longer, but certainly that at the very least.
*163You’ve been offered the opportunity to plead to aggravated manslaughter which is, based on the agreement that I’ve heard in your presence, a little bit less than that ... 25 $ years actually minimum time in jail.
It’s not to say that if I were to sentence you in accordance with your agreement, 85 percent of 30 years, that you wouldn’t serve more than the bare bones minimum, but certainly you couldn’t service more than the maximum.
I tell you those things because you need to have decided, even before you got here, but still here, whether or not, under all the circumstances, that makes sense to you because your alternative is this.
You can go to trial. The State has the obligation to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that you are guilty of the charge that the State has brought against you. And, of course, they can do that only by bringing witnesses to court to testify against you.
And then [defense counsel] would have every opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses, in an attempt to breakdown what they’re telling the jury, in his attempt to be of help to you because it may well be that you would be found not guilty.
Only you know what happened and you know what the strength of the State’s proofs are. And one would assume that you and [your defense counsel] have had ample opportunity to discuss those things. Because once the State has concluded its case, you then have an opportunity to present your part of the case. You could bring witnesses to court that you believe would be helpful to you.
You, of course, could get on the stand and tell whatever story you think would be helpful to you. You could have a trial and refuse to take the stand. And when I say refuse, what I mean is you could choose not to get on the stand because you don’t have any obligation whatsoever to get on the stand and tell any story at all.
[The prosecutor] could not tell the jury that, [“]well, ladies and gentlemen, you should convict this lady because she’s not telling any story different than what I told you through my witnesses.[”] He does not have the right to go th[ere] because you have the constitutional right to remain silent at your own trial. You have no obligation at all to get on the stand. And your decision to have a trial and not get on the stand and testify cannot be used, in any way, against you.
Once defendant acknowledged she understood those instructions, the trial court reviewed defendant’s plea form with her. She acknowledged under oath that she had reviewed every question on the plea form with her counsel; that she understood all of the questions; that she had answered them truthfully; that she had initialed and signed the form in several places; that she had acknowledged the application of NERA to her plea sentence; that, although the court retained “judicial discretion to sentence [her] to less than” what the plea agreement provided, the court did not “want to give [defendant] any false hopes or any hopes at all that [it] would sentence [defendant] to less than” the agreed-on sen*164tence; that she had not been threatened or coerced to enter into the plea agreement; that she had entered into the plea agreement voluntarily; that no additional promises had been made; that she was entering into the plea agreement because it represented “an opportunity, realistically, to serve less time than [defendant] might otherwise be likely to serve[;]” that she was not “under the influence of any medicine, prescribed or not, drugs, alcohol, or anything at all that might make it difficult for [her] to make a wise choice[;]” that she had “had a full opportunity to speak with [her defense counsel] about what is in [her] best interest[;]” that she had “had enough opportunity” to speak with her counsel; that she had had sufficient opportunity to question her counsel and to receive answers to those questions; that she was satisfied with her counsel’s advice as her lawyer; that she fully understood the plea proceedings; that she had the right to have her guilt adjudicated in a trial; and that she was waiving that right.
After defendant provided a factual basis for having intentionally shot and killed her husband while he slept, the court declared itself satisfied that “there is a sufficient factual basis for aggravated manslaughter” as the facts as admitted by defendant “show[ed] an extreme indifference to human life[.]” The court spoke to defendant directly, noting that, although the court understood “what [defendant’s] plea agreement is[,]” the court had made “very clear that [defendant] should expect nothing less than that.” Emphasizing the point, the court stated “once again, don’t count on anything different.]” Accepting defendant’s plea to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, the court ordered a pre-sen-tence report and scheduled a sentencing hearing.
During the June 22, 2001 sentencing hearing, the State presented a video prepared by the victim’s family, and one of the decedent’s fellow police officers read aloud a victim-impact statement from the victim’s police department that already had been sent to the sentencing judge.1 Tellingly, defendant interposed no *165objection to either the video or to the reading of the victim-impact statement aloud in open court. In mitigation, defendant argued as follows:
As your Honor knows from the plea agreement and the letter that accompanies it, my hands are somewhat tied. [Defendant] knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered into a plea agreement and it was as [the prosecutor] put it: after many, many hours and days of negotiation. That plea agreement does notr,] however[,] bind this Court. It cannot. We cannot and will not ever be able to bind the Court in terms of a plea agreement; State v. Warren is clear on that. The Court must make an independent evaluation of the defendant, each and every defendant, the aggravating and mitigating factors and consider what sentence is appropriate regardless of what [defendant] or I or [the prosecutor] think might be appropriate or might be appropriate to recommend to this court.
I cannot, pursuant to this plea agreement, ask the court to sentence [defendant] to less than [what] was agreed to. I can ask the Court to make an independent evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating factors recognizing the lack of any prior criminality, recognizing all of the appropriate factors, and to consider whether or not this Court believes in this particular instance that a 30[-Jyear sentence for a 34-year old woman is appropriate under the circumstances.
I’m bound by my agreement. There’s not more I can do but leave it to the Court, your Honor’s discretion and hope that the Court will find the appropriate sentence given these circumstances.
Given the opportunity to address the sentencing court directly, defendant did not ask for a lesser sentence; instead, she apologized for her actions and asked for forgiveness. She raised nothing else: neither that she claimed to have been a battered woman or otherwise suffering from diminished capacity, nor that the terms of her plea agreement restricting her from seeking a lesser sentence were somehow unlawful or improper.
After carefully identifying and weighing the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, the sentencing court addressed the particular terms of defendant’s plea agreement. It noted that defense counsel “has quite correctly pointed out that[,] while there is a plea bargain in this case, he has agreed not to argue for [a *166lesser] sentence, but I am in my discretion authorized to give a lesser sentence; clearly, that is the law.” It reasoned, therefore, that although the court was “authorized to sentence less than the plea agreement, this is the kind of case where [defendant] certainly could have been sentenced to more had she gone to trial on the charge as originally brought and been found guilty.” Declaring itself “satisfied therefore that the plea agreement as it was made is fair, just, and in the interest of justicef,]” the court sentenced defendant pursuant to that agreement. As agreed in the plea bargain, defendant did not appeal her conviction and sentence, although it had been made clear to defendant that she could appeal her conviction and/or sentence, albeit at the risk of losing the benefits of her plea bargain.
Unwilling to take that risk, more than four years later, on September 7, 2005, defendant instead filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ten separate grounds, running the gamut from newly-discovered “evidence,” to the ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel.2 In an amended verified petition for post-conviction relief filed on February 20, 2007 by counsel on defendant’s behalf, she addressed solely the sentence imposed, underscoring that she did “not contest the conviction itself and does not ask the court to set aside the conviction for aggravated manslaughter^]” defendant asked that her sentence “be set aside and the case set down for a new sentencing hearing.” In support, she alleged four separate grounds:
1. that “she was denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing in that counsel failed to argue applicable and supportable mitigating factors the court could have considered in sentencing [defendant], even if counsel did not specifically request a lesser sentence[;]”
2. that “she was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing when counsel failed to object to the statement of Burlington Twp. *167Detective Michael Simmons or to object to the showing of the videotape regarding [the victim] James Hess[;]”
3. that “the terms of the plea bargain deprived her of counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings in violation of her state and federal constitutional rights[;]” and,
4. that “the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.”
In partial response, the State tendered the certification of defendant’s trial counsel, the attorney who had represented defendant in her plea negotiations, the entry of her plea and her sentencing. He certified that he had “represented defendant during extensive plea negotiations with the State, and we were eventually able to reach a negotiated plea agreement that was accepted by both my client and the State.” He described the plea agreement as follows:
Under this negotiated plea agreement, Count One of Indictment 2000-03-0203-1 was amended to aggravated manslaughter, a firsbdegree offense with a maximum exposure of 30 years in prison. The State agreed to recommend a sentence of 30 years, 85% of that to be served before parole eligibility pursuant to NERA. In return, defendant and I agreed not to seek a lesser term of imprisonment at sentencing, and to stipulate that the aggravating factors, under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1[ (]a[) ], so preponderated over the mitigating factors, under N.J.SA 2C:44-1[ (b) ], as to make the sentence of 30 years appropriate. Additionally, defendant agreed to waive her right to appeal.
He further certified that he had “had extensive discussions with defendant as to the meaning of all terms of the negotiated plea agreement.” He stated that he had “advised [his] client that the State’s offer was fair since her potential exposure at trial was much greater based on the facts and overwhelming evidence of her guilt.” He also certified that “[defendant certainly understood that she was receiving the benefit of the plea agreement by having the indictment amended from first-degree murder to first-degree manslaughter and thus significantly reducing her potential exposure at sentencing.”
Responding to defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant’s trial counsel emphatically certified that “[a]t no time did I misstate or inaccurately convey either defendant’s potential exposure at trial or the meaning of the terms of the negotiated plea agreement.” He also certified that he had “discussed with the defendant the State’s burden of proof, discovery *168materials and obligations!,] and her potential exposure at trial as a first-degree offender if convicted!;]” that he “also discussed the potential aggravating and mitigating factors with the defendant, based on the discovery materials and the defendant’s input and information as to the events and facts underlying her offense!;]” and that he had “discussed with defendant all plausible defenses, including defenses relating to domestic violence.” Importantly, defendant did not rebut any of the assertions to which her trial counsel had certified.
On December 14, 2007, defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief was denied. The court rejected all of defendant’s contentions, finding that “[t]here is nothing presented by the defendant that would allow this [c]ourt to conclude that her [S]ixth Amendment rights, or any other rights, were violated by her willingness to enter into this agreement.” It determined that defendant’s concerns in respect of the admissibility of either the video or Det. Simmons’s open-court reading of the victim-impact statement that already had been submitted to the court could and should have been presented on direct appeal, thereby placing both questions outside the reach of a petition for post-conviction relief. See R. 3:22-3 (providing that petition for post-conviction relief “is not, however, a substitute for appeal from conviction”); R. 3:22-4(a) (“Any ground for relief not raised in the proceedings resulting in the conviction ... or in any appeal taken in any such proceedings is barred from assertion in a proceeding [for post-conviction relief.]”).
Defendant appealed and, in an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief. Procedurally, it concluded that “[t]here is no question that defendant could have raised on direct appeal the arguments she submitted in her PCR petition!,]” and that “[defendant cannot assert that she was precluded from doing so by the plea agreement.” It noted that “[d]efendant was clearly informed by the sentencing judge in accordance with Rule 3:9 — 3(d) that even though she agreed not to appeal, she still had that right, but *169if she chose to do so, the State would have the right to withdraw the plea offer and reinstate the original charge.”
Substantively, the Appellate Division also rejected defendant’s attack on her plea agreement. Explaining that what defendant was doing was “asking the court to undercut the plea agreement[,]” it stated that it was “not persuaded that defendant established either prong of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Noting that defendant’s “challenge is to trial counsel’s failure to enumerate potentially mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing and failure to object to the presentation of allegedly improper victim impact evidenee[,]” the panel concluded that “[ejven if we were to assume such conduct was deficient, which we do not find it was, defendant fails to demonstrate, by a reasonable probability, the prejudice prong of’ the two-prong test for determining whether counsel’s assistance was ineffective. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 698 (1984) (adopting two-prong test for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, that: (1) counsel’s performance was insufficient and made errors that were so serious that counsel was not functioning effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution (ineffectiveness prong), and (2) defect in performance prejudiced defendant’s rights to fair trial such that there exists a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different” (prejudice prong)); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58, 519 A.2d 336 (1987) (adopting Strickland test in New Jersey).
After granting defendant’s petition for certification,3 State v. Hess, 203 N.J. 95, 999 A.2d 464 (2010), the majority now concludes *170that the Law Division’s and Appellate Division’s separate determinations sustaining her plea agreement and sentence are somehow constitutionally deficient. According to the majority, the effect of the plea agreement was that “defendant was denied her constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing!,]” and that “[d]efense counsel deprived the court of mitigating evidence that was necessary for a meaningful sentencing hearing.” Ante at 129, 23 A.3d at 376. In the majority’s view, “[t]hat alone so undermined the adversarial process that counsel no longer was serving in the role of an advocate as envisioned in our criminal justice system.” Ante at 129, 23 A.3d at 376. It reasons that “the constraints embedded in the terms of the plea agreement — drafted by the State and accepted by defense counsel — denied the court of arguments that may have shed light on relevant sentencing factors and how they should be weighed.” Ante at 129-30,23 A.3d at 376. It therefore concludes that “[t]he terms of that plea agreement were incompatible with ... State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433, 558 A.2d 1312 (1989), and ... State v. Briggs, 349 N.J.Super. 496, 793 A.2d 882 (App.Div.2002),” and that the plea deal terms “impinged not only on the role of counsel at sentencing, but also on the role of our courts as independent arbiters of justice.” Ante at 130, 23 A.3d at 376. It additionally concludes that “defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge the unduly prejudicial video tribute to the victim scored to popular and religious music.” Ante at 130, 23 A.3d at 376-77.
I cannot agree.
*171I.
This appeal is based on defendant’s petition for post-eonviction relief. See generally R. 3:22-1 to -12 (setting forth rules for petitions for post-convietion relief). “Our post-conviction relief proceeding is the ‘analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus.’ ” State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 357, 972 A.2d 1091 (2009) (quoting State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420, 859 A.2d 364 (2004)). Petitions for post-conviction relief are not a haven for sundry wayward claims; “[bjecause post-conviction relief is not a substitute for direct appeal and because of the public policy to promote finality in judicial proceedings, our rules provide various procedural bars.” Ibid, (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] petitioner may be barred from relief if the petitioner could have raised the issue on direct appeal but failed to do so, Rule 3:22-4; the issue was previously decided on direct appeal, Rule 3:22-5; or the petition was filed more than five years after the judgment or sentence that was imposed, Rule 3:22-12.” Ibid. And, “[ajlthough our rules provide for certain exceptions to these general rules, we have emphasized that it is important to adhere to our procedural bars.” Ibid. (citation omitted). Finally, “[t]he burden is on the petitioner to establish the right to relief by a preponderance of the credible evidence.” Ibid, (citing State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 593, 803 A.2d 102(2002)).
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised on a petition for post-conviction relief are gauged under the Strickland/Fritz two-prong test, whereby
[ulnless both parts of the test are established, defendant’s claim must fail. The first part of the test is satisfied by a showing that counsel’s acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance considered in light of all the circumstances of the case. No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. As a result, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. That presumption may be rebutted if defendant demonstrates that counsel’s actions did not equate to sound trial strategy.
The court must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct. For that *172reason, an otherwise valid conviction will not be overturned merely because the defendant is dissatisfied with his or her counsel’s exercise of judgment during the trial.
The second part of the test is whether there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. That is, the challenged error must be so serious as to undermine the courts confidence in defendant’s conviction.
[Echols, supra, 199 N.J. at 358-59, 972 A.2d 1091 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).]
II.
A.
Stated in summary fashion, the majority proclaims as newly minted constitutional gospel that defense counsel’s obligation to present mitigating factors at sentencing cannot be waived, even as a condition of a bargained-for plea agreement. Based on that novel theory, the majority voids the fundamental underpinnings of the bargain struck by defendant and the State. The majority’s unapologetic dismantling of a decade-old carefully negotiated and constructed plea agreement presents the State with what is in fact no choice at all: either prosecute anew a now twelve-year-old murder case, or be forced to accept the negotiated aggravated manslaughter plea, forfeit all the benefits of that negotiated plea, and conduct a new sentencing hearing where defendant will be allowed to present proofs her plea agreement otherwise forbade.
The majority tethers its analysis to two cases: Warren, supra, and Briggs, supra. That mooring is illusory, as neither case is controlling here. Warren, supra, addressed circumstances quite different from those presented here; it grappled with a “negotiated sentence,” that is, one where the State is permitted to “withdraw from the guilty plea if the sentence imposed is more lenient than that recommended by the prosecutor and contemplated by the plea agreement[.]” 115 N.J. at 437, 558 A.2d 1312. Warren specifically describes that practice as follows:
A negotiated sentence is one that the parties, the State and the defendant, understand must be imposed by the sentencing court in order to fulfill the plea bargain and, if it is not, the party whose sentencing expectations have been *173disappointed, either the State or the defendant, would have the right to withdraw from the plea arrangement and insist on a trial. Such a negotiated sentence would constitute a material term of the plea bargain.

[Ibid.]

It couched the issue before it as follows: “Is it permissible for a sentencing court to accept a plea bargain that includes as a material term a negotiated sentence that enables the State to withdraw from the guilty plea and requires the defendant to go to trial if a sentence consistent with the negotiated sentence is not imposed?” Id. at 441, 558 A.2d 1312. It concluded that “there should be no implied authority to accept a guilty plea subject to the prosecutor’s right to withdraw if the sentence imposed does not conform to the negotiated sentence.” Id. at 442, 558 A.2d 1312. It so reasoned largely because “[t]he determination of a criminal sentence is always and solely committed to the discretion of the trial court to be exercised within the standards prescribed by the Code of Criminal Justice[,]” and “[t]hat discretion should not by implication be encumbered by augmenting the prosecutor’s influence on the sentencing determination.” Id. at 447-48, 558 A.2d 1312 (citation omitted).
It is beyond peradventure that defendant’s plea agreement did not implicate a “negotiated sentence”; nothing in defendant’s plea agreement authorized the State to withdraw from the plea bargain if a sentence less than what was agreed was imposed. On the contrary, the plea agreement specifically provided that both the State and defendant were “aware that we cannot bind the Court to sentence in this fashion pursuant to the principles enunciated in [Warren, supra ], and it is not our intention to do so. However, we believe it permissible to bind [defendant] to this agreement.” This appeal, then, presents facts and circumstances entirely different from those considered in Warren, making it inapplicable here; indeed, this plea agreement was made specifically subject to and entirely consonant with Warren.
A like fate awaits the majority’s reliance on Briggs, supra, where, pursuant to the plea agreement, “ ‘defense counsel agrees not to request a sentence of less than twenty years.’ ” 349 N.J.Su*174per. at 498, 793 A.2d 882. Although the Briggs panel held that “the restriction in the plea form deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel during a critical stage of the criminal proeeeding[,]” ibid., it nevertheless conceded that, unlike the circumstances presented in this appeal, “[i]t is unclear how or why the restriction in the plea form that prohibited defendant from requesting a sentence of less than twenty years was included.” Id. at 499, 793 A.2d 882.4
The bargained-for plea agreement reached in this case between defendant and the State reflected a sophisticated, deliberate and carefully nuanced balance between defendant’s desire to minimize her penal exposure and the State’s wish to provide closure to the victim’s grieving family and friends. No doubt, the indictment for first-degree murder was well-founded. Defendant readily admitted in her plea colloquy that she intentionally selected a firearm that she knew would not misfire and for which she could use a speed-loader; that she wrapped the weapon in cloth to avoid leaving her fingerprints; that she approached her husband while he was asleep and shot him in the head, killing him; that she then left for work and did not return until several hours later; and that she did not call for help until after she had returned from work and was certain her husband was dead. In those circumstances— all of which the State was ready, willing and able to prove through competent evidence — defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder, and the mandatory minimum thirty-years’ imprisonment and *175maximum life imprisonment that conviction requires, appeared a near certainty. It was therefore logical and reasonable for defendant to seek to minimize her exposure by any legitimate means available.
On the other hand, the State was willing to downgrade its prosecution of defendant if she cooperated in “assisting] her late husband’s family (as the ‘victim-survivors’ of the homicide of James B. Hess) in their family and individual grieving processes.” In exchange for defendant “convey[ing] the truth as to the circumstances which led to her taking the life of her husband, and providing] a truthful factual recitation of the manner in which she carried out the homicide[,]” the State allowed that defendant plead to the lesser charge of first-degree aggravated manslaughter subject to three conditions: that the State would recommend the imposition of a thirty-year term of imprisonment subject to NERA; that neither defendant nor her counsel would “affirmatively seek a lesser term of imprisonment from the Court[;]” and that she “affirmatively agree not to appeal her judgment of conviction.”
Thus, unlike Briggs, there is a clear and unequivocal record here as to “how or why the restriction in the plea form that prohibited defendant from requesting a sentence of less than [thirty] years was included.” Id. at 499, 793 A.2d 882. Also, Briggs focused on that defense counsel’s failure to “advance any argument that, because of the preponderance of mitigating factors, a sentence substantially lower than [what was imposed] was merited[.]” Id. at 502, 793 A.2d 882. Again, that consideration is absent here as defendant, in her plea agreement, “conced[ed] that the aggravating factors ... so preponderate over the mitigating factors ... as to make the maximum term of 30 years appropriate.” 5
*176B.
Central to the majority’s analysis is the hitherto unheard-of notion that a plea bargain never may restrict a defendant’s ability to seek a sentence lower than the one recommended; the basis for that seemingly intractable rule apparently rests in the proposition that “[t]he determination of a criminal sentence is always and solely committed to the discretion of the trial court to be exercised within the standards prescribed by the Code of Criminal Justice[,]” and that such “discretion should not by implication be encumbered by augmenting the prosecutor’s influence on the sentencing determination.” Warren, supra, 115 N.J. at 447-48, 558 A.2d 1312 (citation omitted). Warren also states that “[sjueh limitations on prosecutorial influence over sentencing have long been understood and accepted in defining the prosecutorial role in criminal sentencing, and we entertain no doubt that this understanding is reflected in the current Code.” Id. at 448, 558 A.2d 1312.
However noble they may appear, those pronouncements are needlessly and, in the context of the facts presented here, unconscionably overbroad. For example, Section 12 of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12, specifically provides that, in respect of certain controlled dangerous substances prosecutions, the State and the defendant may enter into a “negotiated plea [that] provide[s] for a specified term of imprisonment.]” In those instances, “the court at sentencing shall not impose a lesser term of imprisonment ... than that expressly provided for under the terms of the plea ... agreement.” Ibid. In other words, when Section 12 applies, the parties — the State and *177the defendant — are authorized to bind the court as to the specific sentence to be imposed. Yet, that statute raises no constitutional infirmity in respect of a restriction on counsel to present meaningful arguments at sentencing. State v. Stewart, 136 N.J. 174, 179, 642 A.2d 942 (1994) (holding that “section 12 expressly prohibits a court from imposing a lesser term of imprisonment than that provided in the plea agreement”); State v. Bridges, 131 N.J. 402, 405-06, 621 A.2d 1 (1993) (same). If, at least in the context of illegal drug prosecutions, the State and a defendant can agree that the court is forbidden to impose a sentence less than the sentence agreed on in a plea bargain, then what principled rule of law prohibits those same parties from agreeing that the defendant, already having received the benefit of a reduced charge and its concomitant lesser penal exposure, will not seek a lesser sentence than the one set forth in the plea agreement? The answer is: none.6
*178C.
Plea bargaining has become an important and now indispensable commonplace of our criminal justice system. It “is a legitimate, accepted practice in the administration of criminal justice[and t]he system rests on the advantages both sides receive from it; and it depends on the good faith of both parties in carrying out the agreement struck — provided it is reasoned, fair, and approved by the trial court.” State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 161, 966 A.2d 461 (2009); see also State v. Taylor, 80 N.J. 353, 360-61, 403 A.2d 889 (1979) (“Plea bargaining has become firmly institutionalized in this State as a legitimate, respectable and pragmatic tool in the efficient and fair administration of criminal justice. Courts across the country have adopted plea bargaining as an appropriate accommodation of the conflicting interests of society and persons accused of crime and as a needed response to an ever-burgeoning case load.” (citations omitted)). Of course, “[a] key component of plea bargaining is the ‘mutuality of advantage’ it affords to both defendant and the State.” State v. Means, 191 N.J. 610, 618, 926 A.2d 328 (2007) (quoting Taylor, supra, 80 N.J. at 361, 403 A.2d 889 (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Simply stated, plea bargaining enables a defendant to reduce his penal exposure and avoid the stress of trial while assuring the State that the wrongdoer will be punished and that scarce and vital judicial and prosecutorial resources will be conserved through a speedy resolution of the controversy.” Ibid, (quoting Taylor, supra, 80 N.J. at 361, 403 A.2d 889 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This appeal presents a quintessential primer of all that is sensible and reasonable in plea bargaining: the State prosecuted, convicted and incarcerated a murderer, and the defendant — facing overwhelming proofs of guilt and with the advice of clearly competent and dedicated counsel — bargained for and received the benefit of a reduced charge and its similarly reduced sentence exposure. That is precisely how the system ought to work; it should not be derailed by the notion that judges simply know better than *179defendants themselves what they can or cannot agree to in a plea bargain. Simply put, the majority’s construct is ironic to the point of illogic; although a defendant is entitled to waive each and every constitutional, statutory or common law right he or she may have,7 the majority now commands that a defendant cannot waive one and only one specific right: the right of allocution at sentencing. In other words, although a defendant may properly waive the right to counsel in its entirety, that same defendant cannot waive the right to have that counsel speak on the defendant’s behalf at sentencing. That is sheer nonsense.
The better rule — and one which is completely consonant with our waiver jurisprudence on the whole — is to require that the court make inquiry as to whether the waiver of any right is voluntarily and intelligently made. If the court is so satisfied, then the waiver should be enforced, no matter which right is being waived.
Here, defendant was represented by counsel in what admittedly was a difficult case: the proofs stacked against defendant were *180daunting. By bargaining his Ghent’s cooperation in “convey[ing] the truth as to the circumstances which led to her taking the life of her husband, and providing] a truthful factual recitation of the manner in which she carried out the homicide[,]” defense counsel salvaged all that anyone could and made the best of what was a particularly bad set of circumstances: he successfully bargained for a downgrade of a certain first-degree murder conviction, which carried a mandatory minimum of thirty years’ imprisonment, to a first-degree aggravated manslaughter conviction, which carried a maximum of thirty years’ imprisonment, subject to a mandatory minimum of twenty-five and one-half years without parole. And, even if defendant was sentenced to the maximum for a first-degree aggravated manslaughter conviction — as, in fact, she was— that sentence still made her parole-eligible four and one-half years before she would have been eligible for parole on a first-degree murder conviction. In the circumstances presented, few lawyers would have been able to strike as generous a deal on behalf of their clients. Yet, under the majority’s construct, that lawyer is now tagged as ineffective; that categorization is woefully undeserved.
Because there is no logical or reasonable basis to prohibit categorically the State and a defendant from bargaining away the right of allocution at sentencing in exchange for a separate plea agreement advantage, I cannot join in the majority’s unreasonable condemnation of that practice. Therefore, in respect of that conclusion, I must respectfully dissent.8
*181III.
The majority also finds fault with the video depicting vignettes of the victim’s life and internment; applying inapposite decisional authority relevant solely in capital cases — where a jury and not the judge determines whether a death sentence is to be imposed— the majority nevertheless concludes that the video should have been redacted to delete those portions that “have the great capacity to unduly arouse or inflame emotions.” Ante at 159, 23 A.3d at 394. Although the majority so concludes, and save for endorsing the procedure that a “victim-impact video [be provided] in advance to both the trial court and defense counsel!,]” omte at 158, 23 A.3d at 393, it eschews providing any meaningful or substantive guidance to the sentencing courts on the length, content or presentation of any victim-impact video. Ante at 159, 23 A.3d at 394.
Let there be no doubt: even applying the majority’s standard— that a victim-impact statement must be redacted to delete that which may “have the great capacity to unduly arouse or inflame emotions” — the victim-impact video offered and received here passes muster. That is because a victim-impact statement of whatever medium must satisfy general and tried-and-true standards for the admissibility of evidence, standards the victim-impact video here readily meets.
*182The proper point of departure is obvious: “[t]he admissibility of victim impact statements ... is of both constitutional and statutory dimension.” State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 482, 921 A.2d 954 (2007) (citing N.J. Const, art. I, ¶ 22 (“Victim’s Rights Amendment”); N.J.S.A 2C:ll-3(c)(6) (victim impact statement statute); N.J.S.A 52:4B-34 to -49 (“Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights”)), cert, denied, 552 U.S. 1146, 128 S.Ct. 1074, 169 L.Ed.2d 817 (2008). “Acknowledging, however, a potential for abuse, we have taken great care in defining the proper scope of admissible victim impact statements.” Ibid, (citations omitted). See also State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 497-99, 776 A.2d 144 (2001) (explaining application of Victim’s Rights Amendment and victim impact statement statute); State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 47—48, 54-55, 678 A.2d 164 (1996) (explaining requirements for admissibility of victim impact statements, and setting procedural limitations for their use). Although this appeal is couched in terms of what is or may be admissible in a sentencing hearing, sentencing courts — like all other courts — remain under the obligation to admit only relevant evidence, N.J.R.E. 402, that is, “evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.” N.J.R.E. 401; see generally N.J.R.E. 101(a)(2) (providing that New Jersey’s “rules of evidence shall apply in all proceedings, civil or criminal, conducted by or under the supervision of a court”).
That said, a sentencing court also must determine whether evidence, otherwise relevant, nonetheless is to “be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” N.J.R.E. 403. In gauging whether a trial court has struck a proper evidentiary balance, “[a] trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.” State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 157, 19 A.3d 985 (2011) (citing Brenman v. Demello, 191 N.J. 18, 31, 921 A.2d 1110 (2007)); Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 374, 997 A.2d 954 (2010) (“[Ojrdinarily, an evidentiary *183determination made during trial is entitled to deference and is to be reversed only on a finding of an abuse of discretion!;.]”).
Those core evidentiary standards provide the guidance needed to determine the admissibility of victim-impact statements. As is the case in respect of any other item of evidence offered for admission, “[t]he trial court must balance ... competing concerns in the exercise of its discretion as the gatekeeper for the admission or exclusion of evidence.” State v. Rosales, 202 N.J. 549, 562, 998 A.2d 459 (2010); State v. Smith, 158 N.J. 376, 391, 730 A.2d 311 (1999) (reiterating that “trial courts in a proper case must serve as gatekeepers”). Because the imposition of sentence is solely within the province of the trial court, that court rules both on the admissibility of victim-impact evidence and the weight that evidence will have, a task consistently defined as “‘among the most solemn and serious responsibilities of a trial court. No word formula will ever eliminate this requirement that justice be done.’ ” State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 296, 997 A.2d 194 (2010) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 365, 471 A.2d 370 (1984)). For those reasons, the determination of whether a victim-impact statement of whatever nature or medium is admissible rests in the sound discretion of the sentencing court, not in some amorphous, inchoate standards.
It is worth emphasizing that the sentencing decision belongs to the sentencing court, as those decisions also are subject to limited appellate review. State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180, 966 A.2d 473 (2009) (“Although appellate courts are expected to exercise a vigorous and close review for abuses of discretion by the trial courts, when reviewing a trial court’s sentencing decision, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)). In sentencing, as in any other context, the proponent of evidence should insure that the evidence propounded is relevant, material and, hopefully and most importantly, persuasive; aesthetics or personal biases have no room in that calculus. Those comfortably familiar standards — relevance, materiality and per*184suasiveness — govern the admissibility and weight of victim-impact statements, regardless of what medium is used. And, as with any other evidence proffer, persuasiveness is not measured by its proponent, but by the fact-finder. The fact that the proponent of a victim-impact video ultimately seeks to persuade a sentencing judge engaged in one of “the most solemn and serious responsibilities of a trial court” serves as an initial objective censor of the video’s contents, a result achieved without the need to superimpose personal views of propriety. The need to persuade an impartial magistrate is the goal; together with our Evidence Rules, it provides all of the guidance necessary, a threshold proponents ignore at their own peril.
The majority does not recognize these basic precepts, electing instead to usurp the gatekeeper function properly resident in the sentencing court. Because a fair application of the standard the majority adopts — one where redaction of a victim-impact statement of whatever medium is required only when necessary to delete that which may “have the great capacity to unduly arouse or inflame emotions” — should result in the conclusion that the victim-impact video shown here was properly admitted, and because the majority fails to explain how its overarching standard is to be applied if not as set forth here, I must dissent.
IV.
Finally, the majority in the end determines that allowing Det. Simmons to read aloud in open court a victim-impact statement already submitted to and reviewed by the sentencing court is not error or, even if it is, the error was harmless. Ante at 159-60, 23 A.3d at 394. The majority nevertheless commands that “[o]n remand, the sentencing court should consider anew the propriety of Detective Simmons’s making a statement in open court if he is offered the opportunity to do so.” Ante at 160, 23 A.3d at 394.
As with the admission of the victim-impact video, the decision of whether a victim-impact statement may be read aloud — or, in evidentiary parlance, is “published” — in open court also is one *185rightly entrusted to the sound discretion of the sentencing court. On a very elementary level, the thought that there may be something wrong with publishing in open court a piece of evidence already brought to the attention of and considered by the court is, to say the least, nonsensical. Yet, according to the majority, it is perfectly acceptable for someone tangentially related to a sentencing proceeding to send a written statement to the sentencing judge; it is perfectly proper for the sentencing judge to read that statement; it also is entirely acceptable for the sentencing judge to consider the contents of that statement in making a sentencing decision; but it is somehow out-of-bounds for the statement itself to be read aloud in open court. Reason cannot credit a rule so divorced from common sense.
Because, again, I would entrust the decision to accept and then publish a form of victim-impact statement to the sentencing court’s broad discretion, I additionally dissent.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s judgment that voids “the plea agreement’s restrictions on defense counsel’s right to argue for a lesser sentence!,]” ante at 160, 23 A.3d at 394. Further, to the extent the majority’s opinion can be read to limit unnecessarily a sentencing court’s necessarily broad discretion in admitting a victim-impact video or the publishing of a victim-impact statement, I also dissent.
For reversal and remandment — Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN and HOENS — 4.
For affirmance — Chief Justice RABNER and Justice RIVERA-SOTO — 2.

 The majority unfairly and inaccurately portrays both the video and the victim-impact statement: it pejoratively describes the videotape as a "video of *165the victim's life set to popular and religious music[,]” and it mischaracterizes the victim-impact statement as “an invective-filled victim-impact statement given by a police officer who served with defendant's husband.” Ante at 129, 23 A.3d at 376. The former description is unnecessary; the latter description is plainly and unfairly incorrect, and does not comport with the statement's content.

 As specifically provided in her plea bargain, defendant did not file a direct appeal from her conviction and sentence. She nevertheless has claimed she had contacted the Office of the Public Defender to prosecute her appeal, but that, without any explanation, "the appeal was never filed.” Defendant has tendered no support for that allegation.

 The order granting defendant’s petition for certification limited the issues to those raised by defendant save for those relating to the attorney-client privilege and the discovery of decedent's personnel file. As a result, and as identified in defendant’s petition for certification, there are five remaining but overlapping issues. Retaining defendant’s original numbering, they are: "1. Whether the defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the restrictive plea *170agreement deprived her of [the] right to counsel at sentencing?!']” 2. Whether the court erred in not granting defendant an evidentiary hearing on her Petition for Post-Conviction Relief?!]” 3. Whether the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel at her sentencing hearing?!]” 4. Whether the admission of the victim[-]impact statement of Detective Simmons and the videotape of the deceased was grossly prejudicial to the [defendant and necessitates a new sentencing hearing?! and] 7. Whether cumulative errors by counsel amounted to the ineffective assistance of counsel and denial of fundamental fairness?

 Further, Briggs was decided almost a year after defendant’s conviction and sentence became final and unappealable, and any discussion of its holding having full retroactive effect — or, for that matter, any retroactive effect — is glaringly absent from that opinion or, for that matter, from the majority’s analysis.
Moreover, Briggs was decided by the Appellate Division-our intermediate appeals court — whose decisions are not binding on this Court. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Popovich, 18 N.J. 218, 224, 113 A.2d 666 (1955) (explaining that Appellate Division decisions are "not binding upon this court. [They are] not stare decisis in this court”); see also J.D. Constr. Corp. v. Isaacs, 51 N.J. 263, 272, 239 A.2d 657 (1968) ("We reserve our views on all expressions of the Appellate Division except to the limited extent we have indicated approval.”).

 Briggs seemingly also was influenced greatly by the appellate panel’s attraction to the notion that the defendant may have been “a candidate for a downgraded sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:44 -If (]f[) ](2), which permits the court *176to sentence the defendant to a term appropriate to a crime one degree lower, if it is ‘clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and where the interest of justice demands.’ ” Ibid. Yet, as even the appellate panel in Briggs reluctantly conceded, "because of the legislative judgment to enhance the penalty for aggravated manslaughter, trial courts 'should be cautious’ in downgrading sentences for such offenses.” Ibid, (citation omitted).

 Further, in the federal system, the procedure by which the prosecution and the defense properly can enter into a valid and binding plea agreement that specifies that a specific sentence is to be imposed and binds the court if the plea is accepted is so much part of the fabric of their processes that it has been codified. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)(C) (providing that prosecution and defendant may enter into plea agreement that defines that "a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case” and that "such a recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement”). If a plea agreement contains a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) limitation, the court's alternatives are limited to just two: either (1) accepting the plea and sentencing the defendant as provided in the plea bargain, or (2) allowing the defendant to withdraw his or her guilty plea. See United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 363 (7th Cir.2005) (explaining that if the court "does not accept the sentencing agreement in its entirety, the defendant must be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea [as] the court does not have the power to retain the plea and discard the agreed-upon sentence”), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1097, 126 S.Ct. 1021, 163 L.Ed.2d 866 (2006).
It is also quite usual in the federal system for the parties to stipulate to various sentencing factors under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1A1.1, et seq. (2010) — many of which are comparable to the aggravating and mitigating factors under New Jersey law. See N.J.S.A.20.44-1(a) (aggravating factors) and (b) (mitigating factors). That routine practice is a sign of sensible, sound lawyering, not ineffective assistance of counsel.

 By way of illustration, and certainly not as an exhaustive listing, a defendant may waive the constitutional right to remain silent, see, e.g., State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 461-62, 874 A.2d 546 (2005) (explaining that even though " ‘the privilege against self-incrimination derives from the common law and is codified in our statutes and rules[,]’ ” (quoting State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533, 549, 847 A.2d 530 (2004)), “[t]he key question here is whether defendant's waiver of the privilege [against self-incrimination] and resulting statements were made voluntarily, as due process requires”); or the constitutional right to trial by jury, see State v. Dunne, 124 N.J. 303, 316, 590 A.2d 1144 (1991) (explaining that, although "a defendant does not have a constitutional right to waive a jury trial and insist on a bench trial[,]” certain standards apply to defendant's request to waive trial by jury). Indeed, the majority bases its analysis on the constitutional right to competent counsel; yet, a defendant may properly waive the right to counsel in its entirety. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2532, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 572 (1975) (holding that Sixth Amendment, which applies to the states via Fourteenth Amendment, gives criminal defendants right to proceed without counsel when they voluntarily and intelligently elect to do so); State v. DuBois, 189 N.J. 454, 467, 916 A.2d 450 (2007) (explaining procedure for waiver of counsel under State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 511-12, 608 A.2d 317 (1992)); State v. Figueroa, 186 N.J. 589, 593, 897 A.2d 1050 (2006) (same).

 Because the plea agreement restrictions are proper and enforceable, one need not reach the question of whether counsel was ineffective in failing to present proofs of Battered Women’s Syndrome in mitigation of defendant’s sentence. See generally State v. B.H., 183 N.J. 171, 182-83, 870 A.2d 273 (2005) (defining "battered wom[e]n[’s] syndrome” as "a collection of common behavioral and psychological characteristics exhibited in women who repeatedly are physically and emotionally abused over a prolonged length of time by the dominant male figure in their lives” and explaining that ”[t]he syndrome has become widely accepted as admissible evidence in self-defense cases because it has been determined to be useful in explaining conduct exhibited by battered *181women toward their abusers” (citations omitted)). Even if counsel’s failure to advance a Battered Women’s Syndrome rationale in mitigation of sentence in fact was "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance considered in light of all the circumstances of the case[,]” Echols, supra, 199 N.J. at 358, 972 A.2d 1091 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), thereby satisfying the ineffectiveness prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, it plainly cannot be shown that such failure inured to defendant’s prejudice, that is, that "there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different!,]” Echols, supra, 199 N.J. at 358, 972 A.2d 1091 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), thereby satisfying the prejudice prong of the Strickland/Fritz test. Therefore, no matter how one views the failure of counsel to advance a Battered Women’s Syndrome claim in mitigation of sentence, this petition for post-conviction relief should be denied.