Court Opinion

ID: 9396452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 17:04:28.335708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:17.122624
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/22/23 Ponciano v. Citrus Community College District CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 RONALD L. PONCIANO,                                                 B316978

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct.
           v.                                                        No. 19PSCV00139)

 CITRUS COMMUNITY COLLEGE
 DISTRICT et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Peter A. Hernandez, Judge. Affirmed.
     Mahoney & Soll and Paul M. Mahoney for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
     Walsh & Associates, Dennis J. Walsh and Arash Arjang for
Defendants and Respondents.
                     ——————————
      In this age discrimination action, plaintiff Ronald L.
Ponciano appeals from a judgment following orders granting
demurrers and judgment on the pleadings in favor of employer
Citrus Community College District (District), and District
employees Geraldine Perri and Robert Sammis. Ponciano
contends: (1) he was not required to exhaust administrative
remedies under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) to pursue common law
remedies for employment discrimination; (2) equitable principles
excused his failure to obtain a right-to-sue letter from the
Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH);1 (3) if a
right-to-sue letter were required, leave to amend should be
granted; and (4) demurrers should not have been sustained to his
causes of action for intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
      We conclude that Ponciano has not identified any common
law cause of action to remedy discrimination or harassment that
he alleged in the complaint. His failure to exhaust
administrative remedies was not excused by his government
claim notice or any other circumstance. The facts alleged do not
state a claim for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and Ponciano has not met his burden on appeal to
explain how he could amend the complaint to state a cause of
action. Therefore, we affirm.

      1 Effective
                June 30, 2022, after the events in this case, the
agency’s name changed to the Civil Rights Department. (Gov.
Code, § 12901.)

                                2
                             FACTS2

       Ponciano was 59 years old when he filed the operative
complaint in this case. He was hired by the District in 2005 and
has worked as the head coach of the football team for 12 years.
Perri and Sammis are also employed by the District.
       The District denied several of Ponciano’s requests on behalf
of the football program. Ponciano requested the use of air
conditioning for the men’s football locker room on several
occasions. He notified his superiors on several occasions that the
field turf was in poor condition and likely to cause non-contact
injuries to his players. He requested practices be held at night,
something commonly done at other schools, so that the team did
not have to practice in extreme heat. The field turf was replaced,
but his requests for air conditioning, night practice, and
scheduling changes were repeatedly denied, jeopardizing the
safety of his players.
       The football program was not provided equal treatment and
benefits compared to other sports programs at the District as
follows: (1) the participation numbers and the amount of money
provided to each athlete were misrepresented in an official
report; (2) food comparisons and per diem were lower than other
sports programs; (3) football did not receive new uniforms for

      2 In accordance with the standard of review on appeal from
an order sustaining a demurrer or granting judgment on the
pleadings, we deem all properly pleaded, material facts to be
true, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or
conclusions of law. (Stearn v. County of San Bernardino (2009)
170 Cal.App.4th 434, 439–440 (Stearn); Adams v. Bank of
America, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 666, 670 (Adams).)

                                 3
12 seasons, while other sports received new uniforms annually;
(4) assistant coaches in other sports were allowed to teach extra
classes for extra pay; (5) the pay increase for the head football
coach was not equal to the pay increases for head coaches of other
sports, even though Ponciano had more experience and education
than any other coach in the District; (6) other teams got “[s]pirit
[p]acks” with gear, such as back packs, uniforms, and socks,
which the football program did not get; (7) other sports received
money from the rental of their field, court, or pool, but not the
football program; (8) there were signs around campus for other
student athlete sports, but not football; and (9) some sports
received four times the amount of funding per student athlete
compared to football.
       Ponciano learned that he was underpaid by the District for
years. Moreover, other coaches in the department, some of whom
were younger and less qualified, received higher compensation
than Ponciano. The actions that reduced Ponciano’s pay
included: not counting units that would enhance his pay, not
counting years of experience which would enhance his pay,
changing Ponciano’s job title to diminish his earnings, failing to
promote him because of the change in job title, and allowing
threats, intimidation, retribution, retaliation, and nepotism, all of
which caused Ponciano physical and emotional distress.
Ponciano was constantly questioned about how long he planned
to coach, with the implication that he should quit due to his age.
The defendants were afraid to fire him because he had worked for
the District for so long.
       The defendants spread rumors that Ponciano was going to
be fired for bringing the safety issues and compensation issues to
light. They also published false statements alleging that

                                 4
Ponciano conducted his practices in a negligent fashion and
caused his players to suffer from heat stroke. A trainer employed
by the District told several people at a high school football game
being played at the District, “Ron Ponciano is getting fired.” As a
result, many people and players contacted Ponciano to ask if he
was getting fired. These statements interfered with recruiting.
       Ponciano contacted the Title IX coordinator at the District
about the rumor that he would be fired, as well as harassment
and discrimination that he was experiencing by the coordinator’s
superior, Sammis, but the coordinator did not contact him to
provide assistance. Ponciano’s complaints to Perri and Sammis
about Title IX and Education Code violations were ignored.
       An athletic secretary began to not clear athletes playing
football who were coached by Ponciano, although she had told
Ponciano that the players were cleared. The reimbursement
rules for classes discriminated against athletes, so Ponciano lost
several students from his program. A broken copy machine that
Ponciano needed to coach was not fixed for the entire season. A
mid-season practice field was taken away from Ponciano’s
program without warning before a conference championship
game. Ponciano was forced to stripe the entire softball field for
his team to practice. Women’s soccer received $8 per meal per
athlete and men’s soccer received $10 to $15 per meal per athlete,
but football received $2.30 per meal per athlete. In addition, the
website Transparent California reported a higher salary for him
than his W-2 showed for the same year.

                                 5
               PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Complaint Filed

       On February 7, 2019, Ponciano filed a complaint against
the District, Perri, and Sammis for age discrimination, hostile
work environment, and negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. He filed an amended complaint, and the
defendants filed a demurrer. On August 7, 2019, the trial court
overruled the demurrer as to age discrimination, but sustained it
as to the remaining causes of action with leave to amend.
       On September 11, 2019, Ponciano filed a second amended
complaint alleging the same four causes of action. Defendants
filed a demurrer to the causes of action other than age
discrimination. On March 11, 2020, the trial court sustained the
demurrer with leave to amend.

Operative Third Amended Complaint

      On April 6, 2020, Ponciano filed the operative third
amended complaint for age discrimination, hostile work
environment, and negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In addition to the facts above, the cause of
action for age discrimination alleged that Ponciano’s pay had
been decreased due to age discrimination and a hostile work
environment. Less qualified employees had been paid more
money and treated more fairly.
      The cause of action for hostile work environment
additionally alleged that due to Ponciano’s age and in order to
make Ponciano’s environment intolerable and force him to resign,

                                6
the defendants denied Ponciano’s requests on behalf of the
football team and provided unequal treatment to the football
program compared to other sports programs in violation of
Title IX. The discriminatory actions that caused Ponciano to be
underpaid were motivated by a desire to force him to resign
because of his age.
       The rumor spread by the District, through Sammis and
Perri, that Ponciano would be fired, the statement that he
conducted his practices negligently, and the trainer’s comment
that he would be fired were motivated by age discrimination and
the desire to create a hostile work environment to force Ponciano
to quit. They retaliated against him due to his complaints and
his age. All of the statements and actions were ratified by Perri
and Sammis. The defendants were liable under Government
Code sections 815.2, subdivision (a), and 820, subdivision (a). By
ignoring Ponciano’s complaints about Title IX and Education
Code violations, the defendants engaged in a course of conduct to
force Ponciano to resign.
       Discriminatory reimbursement rules for classes, failing to
fix the copy machine, removing a practice field, and paying less
per meal than other sports received were acts of discrimination
against Ponciano and his players due to Ponciano’s age which
were intended to force Ponciano to resign, constituted retaliation,
and created a hostile work environment. As a result of all the
above actions, Ponciano suffered several physical and emotional
distress, as well as economic damage. The actions were
motivated by age discrimination because the defendants wanted
Ponciano to resign.
       With respect to the causes of action for intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, he alleged the

                                 7
defendants intentionally or negligently harassed and
discriminated against him in handling his workplace complaints,
in disseminating false information that was defamatory about his
job performance, and in retaliation for the complaints that he
stated. The defendants engaged in extreme conduct to force
Ponciano to resign, because of his age, which should not be
tolerated in civilized society. They owed him a duty of care to
refrain from such activity, which they breached and caused him
to suffer severe emotional distress.

Demurrer to Operative Complaint and Subsequent
Proceedings

      The defendants filed a demurrer to the causes of action for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress in the
operative third amended complaint. The defendants argued that
the complaint failed to state facts to support either cause of
action. In addition, as public employees, Perri and Sammis were
immune from liability under Government Code section 820.2, and
the District was immune from liability under Government Code
section 815.2. Ponciano opposed the demurrer. On
September 17, 2020, the trial court sustained the demurrer
without leave to amend as to the causes of action for intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court also
granted a motion by the defendants to strike punitive damages
allegation.
      The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings as to the remaining causes of action for age
discrimination and hostile work environment on the ground that

                                 8
Ponciano failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a
complaint with the DFEH and obtaining a right-to-sue letter.
       Ponciano opposed the motion for judgment on the pleadings
on the grounds that he had filed an appropriate tort claim with
the human resources office of the District, and his causes of
action for age discrimination and hostile work environment were
common law claims that were not preempted by the FEHA. He
attached a notice of claim that he sent the District on
November 9, 2018. The claim notified the District of his
allegations that he had been discriminated against in terms of his
pay, causing him physical and emotional distress. He was
subjected to a hostile work environment and false rumors about
him, causing damages. The notice did not allege discrimination
or harassment based on Ponciano’s age. The notice also did not
allege any conduct by Perri or Sammis against Ponciano. The
defendant filed a reply.
       In a supplemental opposition, Ponciano argued that the
FEHA was not the exclusive remedy for employment
discrimination. In addition, he argued that equitable principles
should bar the application of the administrative exhaustion rule.
Lastly, he requested leave to amend, but did not state how he
could amend the complaint. The defendants filed a supplemental
reply.
       The trial court took the matter under submission on
July 19, 2021. On July 21, 2021, the court granted the motion for
judgment on the pleadings. On August 16, 2021, the court
entered judgment against Ponciano in favor of the defendants.
Ponciano filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                9
                           DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

       “On appeal from an order of dismissal after an order
sustaining a demurrer, the standard of review is de novo: we
exercise our independent judgment about whether the complaint
states a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citation.] First, we
give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a
whole and its parts in their context. Next, we treat the demurrer
as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. Then we
determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.” (Stearn, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at
p. 439.)
       “We do not, however, assume the truth of contentions,
deductions, or conclusions of law. [Citation.] If a complaint is
insufficient on any ground specified in a demurrer, the order
sustaining the demurrer must be upheld even though the
particular ground upon which the court sustained it may be
untenable.” (Stearn, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 440.)
       “A judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant is
appropriate when the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to
state a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(3)(B)(ii).)
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a
demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of
review. [Citation.] All properly pleaded, material facts are
deemed true, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of
fact or law.” (Adams, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 670.)

                                  10
Common Law Claims

       Ponciano contends that he may pursue common law causes
of action to remedy age discrimination and a hostile work
environment without exhausting administrative remedies under
the FEHA. This is correct, but he has failed to identify a common
law cause of action stated by the allegations of the complaint.
       The FEHA declares discrimination on specified grounds,
including age, is against public policy and an unlawful
employment practice. (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997)
16 Cal.4th 880, 890–891 (Stevenson).) An aggrieved person may
file a complaint with the DFEH. (Id. at p. 891.) If the DFEH
decides not to prosecute the case or fails to issue an accusation
within a certain number of days, the DFEH must give the
complainant a right-to-sue letter. (Ibid.) Only after receiving a
right-to-sue letter may the aggrieved person file a civil action for
remedies under the FEHA. (Ibid.)
       The remedies available under the FEHA supplement other
state law remedies for discrimination, including an employee’s
common law claims for injuries from employment discrimination.
(Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 891–892.) Plaintiffs do not
need to exhaust the FEHA administrative process to seek relief
for injuries arising from employment discrimination under other
causes of action that are otherwise available. (See, e.g., Rojo v.
Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 88 (Rojo) [employee was not required
to exhaust FEHA administrative process before bringing action
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy]; Stevenson, at
p. 903 [exhaustion of administrative remedies not required to
bring claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
against age discrimination].)

                                11
       The “common law of this state provides any number of
remedial theories to compensate for injuries ‘relating to
discrimination’ (§ 12993, subd. (a)).” (Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at
p. 74.) Employment discrimination cases “ ‘involve several causes
of action arising from the same set of facts. A responsible
attorney handling an employment discrimination case must plead
a variety of statutory, tort and contract causes of action in order
to fully protect the interests of his or her client. [Fn. omitted.]’
[Citation.] Although the common law theories do not per se
‘relate to discrimination,’ they are nonetheless a standard part of
a plaintiff’s arsenal in a discrimination case.” (Ibid., italics
omitted.) Conduct which entitles an employee to damages for
employment discrimination under the FEHA may also cause
injury outside the bounds of statutory protection. (Id. at p. 81.)
For example, an employer’s discriminatory actions might
constitute assault and battery, wrongful discharge, or outrageous
conduct under a theory of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. (Ibid.; Medix Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 109, 118.)
       In this case, however, Ponciano has not identified any
common law remedy that applies to the causes of action in the
complaint labeled “age discrimination in the workplace” and
“hostile work environment.” (Capitalization omitted.) Stevenson,
supra, 16 Cal.4th 880, which is the sole case that he cites on
appeal, concerned a cause of action for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy. Ponciano clearly states he is not
pursuing a claim for wrongful discharge, as he was still working
for the District when he filed the operative complaint. Ponciano
has not identified any other statutory or common law claims
stated by the allegations of the complaint.

                                12
Equitable Relief

       Ponciano contends that the trial court should have excused
him from compliance with the administrative exhaustion doctrine
based on equitable principles, because obtaining a right-to-sue
letter was a mere formality and his notice to the District was the
functional equivalent of filing a complaint with the DFEH. We
disagree.
       The failure to exhaust administrative remedies by
obtaining a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional defect. (Martin
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718,
1724.) Exhaustion of administrative remedies before the DFEH
is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a FEHA claim. (Ibid.)
       Ponciano’s contention that his government tort claim
satisfied FEHA requirements and exhausted administrative
remedies is incorrect. “The purpose of FEHA’s administrative
exhaustion requirement is to ensure DFEH is provided the
opportunity to resolve disputes and eliminate unlawful
employment practices through conciliation. (Rojo[, supra,]
52 Cal.3d [at p.] 83 [‘the exhaustion requirement serves the
important policy interests embodied in the act of resolving
disputes and eliminating unlawful employment practices by
conciliation [citation], as well as the salutory goals of easing the
burden on the court system, maximizing the use of
administrative agency expertise and capability to order and
monitor corrective measures, and providing a more economical
and less formal means of resolving the dispute [citation]’].)”
(Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 156.) For
example, the names and addresses of the defendants who
allegedly discriminated against the plaintiff must have been

                                13
named in the caption or the body of the DFEH charge in order to
bring a civil lawsuit against them under the FEHA. (Cole v.
Antelope Valley Union High School Dist. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th
1505, 1513–1515.)
       The government claim notice that Ponciano provided to the
District did not satisfy the requirement to exhaust administrative
remedies by filing a complaint with the DFEH. The notice did
not mention age discrimination, did not allege any conduct by
Perri or Sammis, and was not provided to the DFEH to allow the
administrative agency to investigate the allegations. The trial
court properly concluded the government claim notice was not a
substitute for a complaint filed with the DFEH, and Ponciano
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by obtaining a
right-to-sue letter.
       Ponciano also asserts that the trial court should not have
applied the administrative exhaustion doctrine because the
defendants did not raise the issue earlier and have not produced
witnesses for deposition. The defendants conducted discovery to
discern whether a DFEH complaint had been filed and there is no
evidence of undue delay, but in any event, the administrative
exhaustion doctrine is jurisdictional. With respect to depositions,
other statutes provide measures to enforce the discovery
obligations.

Leave to Amend

      Ponciano contends that the trial court should have given
him leave to amend to allege a claim under the Education Code.
“When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect

                                14
can be cured by amendment. [Citation.] ‘ “[I]f it can be, the trial
court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has
been no abuse of discretion and we affirm.” ’
[Citation.] . . . [Citations.] Plaintiff has the burden to show there
is a reasonable possibility the complaint’s defects can be cured by
amendment.” (Adams, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 670–671.) On
appeal, Ponciano failed to meet his burden to explain how he
could amend the complaint to state a claim for recovery as an
employee of the District under the Education Code. Ponciano had
four opportunities to state a viable cause of action. No abuse of
discretion has been shown.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

       Ponciano contends the third amended complaint states a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We
disagree.
       “The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress are: ‘ “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by
the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s
outrageous conduct.” ’ ” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991)
54 Cal.3d 868, 903.) To be considered outrageous, the conduct
must be “ ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually
tolerated in a civilized community.’ ” (Ibid.) “Liability for
intentional infliction of emotional distress ‘ “does not extend to
mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions,

                                 15
or other trivialities.” ’ ” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035,
1051.)
       “Managing personnel is not outrageous conduct beyond the
bounds of human decency, but rather conduct essential to the
welfare and prosperity of society. A simple pleading of personnel
management activity is insufficient to support a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper
motivation is alleged. If personnel management decisions are
improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against the employer
for discrimination.” (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 55, 80; see Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 908, 946.)
       None of the actions alleged in the complaint constituted
extreme and outrageous conduct. The District’s decisions about
how to allocate resources to various sports programs, such as the
use of air conditioning, compensation for food, and decisions
about schedule changes, were standard program and personnel
management decisions that did not amount to extreme and
outrageous conduct. The District’s calculation of Ponciano’s
salary and decisions about salary increases were also routine
personnel management decisions that did not constitute
outrageous conduct. To the extent that the District provided
Ponciano with a negative performance evaluation, discussed
termination of his employment, or failed to address his
employment-related complaints, these were also personnel
management decisions that did not rise to the level of extreme
and outrageous conduct. The actions alleged in the complaint,
regardless of the motivation behind them were common
personnel management decisions that did not constitute
outrageous conduct beyond the limits of human decency and do

                                16
not state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress in the employment context. The trial court properly
sustained the demurrer to the cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

       Ponciano contends the third amended complaint states a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We
disagree.
       Negligent infliction of emotional distress is simply a
negligence claim, not an independent tort. (Delfino v. Agilent
Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 818.) “ ‘The
traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and
damages apply. [¶] Whether a defendant owes a duty of care is a
question of law. Its existence depends upon the foreseeability of
the risk and a weighing of policy considerations for and against
imposition of liability.’ ” (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992)
2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072.)
       An employer’s supervisory actions are inherently
intentional and not the basis for a negligence claim. (Semore v.
Pool (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1105.)
       Ponciano has not alleged a duty owed to him that was
breached, causing him to suffer serious emotional distress.
Ponciano contends the respondents were negligent in their
handling of his workplace complaints, dissemination of
information about his job performance, and retaliation for his
complaints. Even assuming the District had a duty to respond to
Ponciano’s workplace complaints, there is no allegation that
failing to respond to his complaints was a substantial factor in

                                 17
causing him to suffer serious emotional distress. The only
allegation concerning dissemination of information about
Ponciano’s job performance was a comment made by a trainer to
parents at a high school game, but there is no allegation that the
trainer had a duty to Ponciano to refrain from discussion of his
job performance or employment status. It is not clear which acts
Ponciano alleges were taken in retaliation for making complaints,
but all of the conduct discussed in connection with intentional
infliction of emotional distress were common personnel and
program management decisions. Supervisory acts by the District
were intentional conduct and are not the basis for a negligence
claim. In sum, Ponciano has not shown on appeal that the trial
court erred by sustaining the demurrer to the cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. (See Baldwin v. AAA
Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 545, 549 [appellant has burden to demonstrate
trial court erred].)

                                18
                         DISPOSITION

      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents Citrus Community
College District, Geraldine Perri, and Robert Sammis are
awarded their costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                       MOOR, J.
We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             BAKER, J.

                             19