Court Opinion

ID: 9546624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:33:05.124328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:41.781868
License: Public Domain

GIVENS, Justice
(dissenting).
Appellant’s second amended complaint alleged the City and the Butane Company negligently placed the storage tank with its valves protruding into the coal chute entering into the basement.
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of appellant against both defendants-respondents. Judgment notwithstanding the verdict was entered against appellant and in favor of the City, sustained on this appeal by the majority on the ground the evidence does not sufficiently show, escaping gas— which undoubtedly caused the terrific explosion, killing several people and maiming others and completely destroying the building — came from this storage tank into the coal chute down into the basement and/or into other parts of the building, rather than from leaks in the pipe lines from the storage tank to the stoves in the kitchen or at the stoves within the building.
The trial court denied appellant’s motion for a new trial as against the City because of the inadequacy of the verdict, which of course, was superseded by the judgment non obstante. The trial court granted the Company’s motion for a new trial.
If the majority is correct in holding the evidence herein is insufficient to show the City is .liable because of the claimed negligent place of installation of the storage tank — in other words, fails to show the escaping gas came from the tank and/or *15its immediate connections rather than from the pipe line inside the building, then so far as the negligence alleged in the second amended complaint, namely, negligent installation of the tank, there could be no liability on the part of the Butane Company, unless the evidence on a new trial differed sufficiently from herein to overcome the deficiency which the majority opinion holds exists.
Of course, if the evidence as a matter of law shows the gas escaped from within the building and not from the tank or its valves, the majority opinion is correct. The converse is equally true and the sole question is whether there was sufficient credible evidence to sustain the verdict as to the City’s liability.
The basis for the majority’s factual conclusion is: first, the evidence does not conclusively show the valves were leaking prior to the explosion, though there was evidence they were leaking after the explosion. Second, the majority’s concept that the explosion started or occurred in the kitchen and above the basement because of the greater damage above the basement, and that a Chinaman, sole occupant of the basement at the time of the explosion, was not more severely burned and/or injured. This deduction is untenable. Doxstater v. Northwest Cities Gas Co., 65 Idaho 814, 154 P.2d 498. Furthermore, this premise merely substitutes the majority’s resolution of the evidence for that of the jury.
It seems reasonable to say the record conclusively shows there was a terrific explosion which killed' and injured several people and destroyed the building; second, it is evident this explosion was caused by gas which escaped somewhere in or sufficiently close to the building to affect it directly and nqt any other adjacent building, the city block being solidly built up. The gas may have leaked at the tank, somewhere along the pipe line to the stoves, at the stoves, or any combination of these. There is no evidence as to the condition of the pipe line and/or the stoves after the accident and probably because of the force of the explosion, none would have been possible or controlling as to whether there might not have been a leak at all three places.
The result of- the majority’s holding is that no negligence could be sufficiently attributed to anyone to justify recovery, because if it is sought on a new trial to secure recovery against the Butane Company, the same reasoning which now supports the majority would support the conclusion it was not sufficiently shown the Butane Company, in the supervision of the installations within the building which it apparently carried on, was negligent in that it was not shown conclusively the leak was within the building, at the stoves, or a leak at the tank or the negligent filling thereof. There was some evidence gas had spilled on the floor, but whether in sufficiently large quantity to produce *16the terrific explosion which resulted, is problematical and it could be argued with equal effect that it would be insufficient to show the explosion was caused by the negligence of the owners of the restaurant, if it was sought to impose liability on them in this regard. Furthermore, the explosion did not immediately succeed this leak, as the evidence indicates would have been the
case if this leak were the responsible defect.
The result of the reasoning of the majority herein will be that no one is legally responsible herein for the destruction of property and killing and maiming of human beings. Thus, no plaintiff, present or prospective, may recover from any defendant, present or prospective, for ambushed catastrophe.
The reasoning in the majority opinion is completely contrary to Valles v. Union Pac. R. Co., 72 Idaho 231, at page 238, 238 P.2d 1154, 1159, where it was held the concurring negligence of two or more persons may be held as the proximate cause of the injury and-
“ * * * The rule derived from the following cases is that negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause are questions for the jury unless the proof is so clear that different minds cannot reasonably draw, different conclusions or where all reasonable minds would construe the facts 'and. circumstances of the case in only . one, way.”
Herein the majority has, it is true, plausibly analyzed the evidence and con-eluded this analysis does not justify the jury considering the leak came from the valves of the tank. The pivotal question is whether the evidence sustains the verdiet, not whether it would sustain some other theory. The nine members of the jury who signed the verdict thought it
did and while it is true the Court may determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the verdict of the jury, the nine jurors reached a different conclusion and there is no contention they were not properly instructed and that they were not fair and reasonable, and as aptly stated in Hobbs v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 62 Idaho 58, at page 72, 108 P.2d 841, 848, the best way to get a just determination of a disputed question is to submit it to a jury and get the benefit of the combined opinion of twelve persons:
“ ‘The method of deciding disputed facts, or of drawing just conclusions from those not in dispute, by submitting the question to a jury, composed of individuals of various walks of life, ages and experiences, is the best known means of establishing the facts which, in the administration of justice, must form the basis of a judgment.’ ”
The majority overlooks the absolute distinction between absence of evidence and analysis of the evidence and factual conclusions to be drawn therefrom. The majority says that where the verdict rests *17upon circumstances, the circumstances must he clear and explicit and nothing left to conjecture. The majority opinion states the tank had been filled 100 times and nothing untoward had occurred. By the same token, the stoves and inside piping had been used every day the restaurant was open — more than a hundred days— and nothing had happened. This time the tank was filled by another than the regular and skilled operator and a devastating explosion occurred. The valve at the tank was leaking immediately after the explosion. The force of the explosion was similar to that detailed in Doxstater v. Northwest Cities Gas Co., supra, wherein there was less damage in the basement, where concededly the escaping gas was, than in the upper part of the house. How can it justifiably be said conclusively, as a matter of law, that this situation fails to factually justify the jury in pointing the finger of guilt unswervingly and unerringly at the tank and its lethal location?
The employee of the Butane Company who filled the tank, not the regular employee, did testify gas was not spilled at the tank. The valve on the tank was leaking when it was found later by a disinterested witness and the jury had the right to take into consideration this tank attendant was an employee of one of the co-defendants and credibility of the witness is for the jury.
The majority opinion further states: “The evidence on this point [that is, knowledge on the part of the owner or his duty to investigate or determine the presence of the gas tank] is fairly susceptible of only one construction, and that is that he knew of and consented to the installation and use of gas by his tenants”:
The word “installation” runs all through respondents’ brief and to some extent is in the evidence. It is perfectly apparent, however, from the context that such reference to “installation” is inaccurate and completely misleading to refer only to “installation”. Appellant knew the restaurant operators were going to use gas and gas equipment was to be and was installed, but there is absolutely no evidence he knew where the tank was to be or was placed. At the most it was for the jury, not this Court to make the evaluation.
Kenneth C. Baird, the manager of the Butane Company, who made the arrangements with the Chinese operating the restaurant for their use of gas and secured the permit from the City and appellant, testified:
“Q. Do you know whether Mr. Splinter ever knew where you put the tank? Did you ever tell him? A.
I never told him.”
Previous to that time he had, without definite and explicit statement as to the owner’s knowledge of the position of this tank, thus testified:
*18“Q. Now, before you ever started to install this tank you went to Mr. Splinter and got his permission, didn’t you? A. That’s correct.
“Q. You and Mr. Fong went to Mr. Splinter and got permission from him to install this butane tank. A. Kim Fong.
“Q. Both of you? A. Uh huh.”
That is not testimony that Mr. Splinter gave permission to put this tank where it was placed and the jury was justified in so considering. Mr. Splinter testified thus:
"Q. Now, that butane tank was installed in such a way that the end of the tank, the end with the valves on it, the intake valves, came right out into this opening that you had to put coal into your basement, didn’t it? A. That’s the way it was found to he. (Emphasis ours.)
“Q. Anyone walking by there, looking at that opening, or walking down the alley, could plainly see the end of that tank with valves attached to it, couldn’t they? A. No. they couldn’t not if they kept it closed, because it had a lid on top.
“Q. You kept a lid on top. A. There was a lid on top. Whether they kept it closed, I don’t know.
“Q. But you don’t know if that lid was ever kept on top of it. A. I never saw it open whenever I came through the alley.
“Q. You came through that alley frequently? A. Not too frequently, no. Not very frequently.
“Q. You never made any inspection of your own business, your own building, to see where that butane was being stored or how it was stored, or whether it was in the building? A. I had no reason to inspect it.
“Q. I asked you if you did. A. No, I didn’t.”
The jury had a right to believe Mr. Splinter, that he didn’t have actual knowledge. It is true that Baird further testified:
“Q. Put it this way. What was the conversation you had with Mr. Splinter, you and the Fongs had with Mr. Splinter? A. Well, I don’t remember the exact wording of it. We went up to get permission from Mr. Splinter to convert his equipment over and install this new gas range that Kim had already purchased.
“Q. Did you ask him permission— was that before or after you had permission from the City of Nampa? A. This was before.
“Q. Did you tell him where you were going to put the tank or did you have any conversation with him about the storage of butane gas? A. I *19don’t remember the conversation, but it’s very probable that he would ask. (Emphasis ours.)
“Q. But you don’t remember? A. No.”
This was a bare conclusion which the jury had the right to completely disregard and, furthermore, Baird testified:
?‘Q. At the time you talked to Mr. Splinter isn’t it a fact that you were going to place the tank behind the McLane Building? A. There hadn’t been any decision at the time. We were just asking permission to do it.
“Q. Where were you going to place the tank at that time ? A. There hadn’t been any decision made at the time.”
If there had been no decision, it does not show even by implication that Baird at that time told Mr. Splinter the tank was to be put where it was, in the coal chute. The testimony immediately following completely bears out the thought that Baird’s testimony was not of such a nature as to render the verdict of the jury unsupported by the evidence on the point appellant did not know where the tank was placed:
“Q. When, did you make up your mind that you wanted to put it behind the McLane Building? A. After we got permission from Mr. Splinter to make the installation.
“Q. Did you ask Mr. Splinter for permission to place the tank behind his building? A. No, not explicitly.
“Q. Did John Griffith ask him, to your knowledge? A. No, not to my knowledge.
“Q. Do you know whether Mr. Splinter ever knew where you put the tank? Did you ever tell him? A. I never told him.”
As to what appellant should have known, the court properly instructed' the jury as follows:
“You are instructed that a plaintiff should not be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence if it appears that he had no knowledge or means of knowledge of the danger, and conversely, he should be held guilty of contributory negligence if it is shown that he knew or reasonably should have known of the peril and might have avoided it by the exercise of ordinary care.
“You are further instructed that a plaintiff’s knowledge of the physical characteristics of the offending instrumentality or condition does not in itself constitute contributory negligence. It is the appreciation of, or the opportunity to appreciate, the peril in an instrumentality or condition rather than the knowledge of its physical characteristics that may bar a plaintiff of recovery for negligence.”
*20Undoubtedly the owner’s knowledge or what he should have known under this instruction was a question for the jury. Respondents argue, however, that he knew as much as the City did. Baird testified positively that the tank was placed where it was in the alley back of the building with the valves protruding into the coal chute at the express direction of the City Engineer after the City, by resolution introduced in evidence, (Moved by Robinson and seconded by Kinney that the aforesaid request — Company’s request to furnish gas to the restaurant and use its streets— be granted, provided the tank be buried under the direction of the City Engineer.) had authorized the installation under the direction of the City Engineer:
“Q. Then what happened? After you were permitted to install the tank, what did you do? A. Well, the next day we met with the city engineer, and was informed where to install the tank.
“Q. Who was the city engineer?
A. John Griffith.
“Q. When did you meet with him?
A. I went down to his office.
“Q. His office in the city hall of Nampa? A. Yes.
“Q. Then what did you do ? A. Well, he and I went down to the Forbidden Palace.
“Q. What conversation did you have with him there, if any? A. Well, there was a discussion of whether — where to install the tank, and the decision made with him where I was to put it, and the installation was started.
“Q. Did you make any suggestion as to where to place this tank? A. Yes. I had a place in mind where I wanted to put it.
“Q. Did you show him that place? A. Yes.
“Q. What did he say about it? A. No, he didn’t want me to install it there.
“Q. What was his reason? Did he give you any? A. Well, it involved digging up part of the alley to bury the underground pipe.
“Q. Then did he fix a location for you to locate the tank or site for the tank? A. Yes, he told me to bury it underneath the ground, back of the building.”
* ❖ * * * *
“Q. * * * Now, as a matter of fact, you didn’t tell John Griffith why you considered that an unsafe installation, did you? A. Yes.
“Q. Did you tell him why it was unsafe? A. Two reasons.
“Q. I know what your reasons were, but did you express those reasons to him? A. I did.
“Q. But you never mentioned them, to anyone else. A. No.
*21“Q. Now, as I understand your reasons, it was on account of the propensity of butane gas when it vaporizes to seek a low level, is that right? A. That’s right.
* * * * * *
“Q. I believe you said Mr. Griffith wasn’t even there until you sent for him when you ran into some pipes, some underground pipes. A. He was there when it was decided where to put the tank.
“Q. But after deciding on the place, Mr. Griffith went his way, and didn’t come back until you hit these underground pipes. A. That’s correct.
“Q. Then he came back and told you what to do with them. A. Yes.”
The implication in the opinion seems to be that because only the City Engineer, so far as the City was concerned, knew exactly where this tank was placed, the City was absolved from liability. While what the Mayor testified to or what his attitude of mind was, did not necessarily determine the liability of the City, it is interesting to notice his attitude and what the jury might have thought reflected the attitude of the council with regard to the City Engineer in this respect:
“Q. Now then, as a member of the city council and mayor of the city, Mr. Honstead, weren’t you concerned with the safety of the persons and property that might be involved in connection with burying that tank in an alley of the City of Nampa? A. Well, I think those are left to the charge of the engineer and somebody responsible for it.
“Q. You were leaving that entirely to the city engineer? A. And the butane people. It isn’t uncommon to bury gas tanks, and permission was given to — for burying gasoline tanks in the parking on city property where it was necessary and as demanded by the owner.
“Q. You were leaving that up to the city engineer and the American Butane Company. A. As far as the butane company, yes, I think the butane company was — they were in the service and I understand they had been servicing buildings. I didn’t know of any danger or hazard.
“Q. You were leaving that up to them. A. That would be the natural procedure, wouldn’t it?”
The Mayor, so far as the record shows, left this matter entirely to the City Engineer and the City Engineer told the Butane Company to bury the tank at the place they did, after the manager of the Butane Company told the engineer that place was unsafe and hazardous. While there is no Question that different minds might draw different factual conclusions from the evidence in the record, the record does not. justify the conclusion the majority makes, that there is not sufficient evidence to show *22that both the City and the Company were negligent in placing the tank where they did and it was for the jury to determine .from all the facts and circumstances whether this negligent and improper location was one of the efficient causes, though coupled with other acts of negligence, which resulted in the destruction of the building.
Therefore, I dissent.
PORTER, C. J., concurs in this dissent.