Court Opinion

ID: 9729577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:43:15.6037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:59.785618
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, Judge,
dissenting.
Since it may readily be agreed that appellant, Gladden, was properly convicted of second degree murder, the only issue presently considered is whether he was properly convicted of possession of instrument of crime (generally) 18 Pa.C.S.A 907(a). (PIC (generally))
§ 907. Possessing instruments of crime
(a) Criminal instruments generally. — A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally.
This crime, which is part of the chapter of our crimes code defining inchoate crimes, was initially believed by a celebrated minority of this court not to extend to weapons such as the firearms involved in this case. Commonwealth v. McNear, 238 Pa.Super. 177, 353 A.2d 39 (1975). Aff'd, 478 Pa. 19, 385 A.2d 975 (1978). Although there is a logical and principled *453argument that the scheme and interrelationship of Crime Code provisions dealing with firearms and other weapons was formulated to exclude firearms from 907(a) coverage, it is easy to understand why the majority in McNear and cases since that time have uniformly held that a firearm is indeed within any reasonable definition of “any instrument of crime” under 18 Pa.C.S.A. 907(a). That issue having been settled, it is also easy to understand why PIC (generally) has become a boilerplate charge in any case where a completed crime involves usage of a firearm. Quite naturally, in a case involving a homicide, aggravated assault or robbery, the PIC (generally) charge does not become the focus of attention as a trial, sentencing or appeal issue.1 However, occasionally it does, and in such cases it is well to remember that 907(a) is first and foremost a crime of possession. We have held that in order to show possession, the Commonwealth is required to show power of control over the weapon. Commonwealth v. Carter, 304 Pa.Super. 142, 450 A.2d 142 (1982) (citing cases). We have also recognized that “possession” may be shown by evidence of constructive possession. Commonwealth v. Hamm, 301 Pa.Super. 266, 447 A.2d 960 (1982); Commonwealth v. Carter, supra; See also, Commonwealth v. Stanley, 265 Pa.Super. 194, 401 A.2d 1166 (1974) affirmed, 498 Pa. 328, 446 A.2d 583 (1982) (constructive possession proved by evidence of previous actual possession); Commonwealth v. Nelson, relied upon by the majority is just such a case. There the constructive possession was based upon the defendant’s warning to the robbery victim while his co-actor brandished a gun that he (the victim) should be quiet or “my boy” would take care of him. Our court equated this to an ability to control use of the weapon.2
*454In our case, Gladden was never in possession of a weapon during the course of the criminal episode nor is there any evidence that he exercised any dominion or constructive possession of a weapon in the hands of any cohort. Thus, extension of criminal liability for the possession offense is, by the majority, based on alternative concepts of concert, collusion and, in turn, complicity.3
It may seem anomalous that concerted conduct, while sufficient to make one culpable of a murder actually perpetrated by a co-actor, is at the same time insufficient to form the basis for conviction of a lesser weapons offense on a conspiracy theory. Nevertheless, the elements of the separate crimes lead me to conclude that, in a case such as this, conspiracy or complicity in a murder does not necessarily implicate conspiracy to possess an instrument of crime. I would hold that, absent evidence of actual or constructive possession, criminal liability for possession of a weapon by one, other than the possessor, may only be based upon evidence that the defendant supplied, procured, or in some way, facilitated the actual possession of the weapon by another. In sum, I believe that theories of conspiracy, accomplice liability or shared intent are irrelevant to a PIC charge unless they relate to the gravamen of the charge — possession of a weapon. There is no such showing in this case.
Consequently, I would reverse and vacate the judgment of sentence for possession of instrument of crime (generally) and I would otherwise affirm.
JOHNSON, J., joins.

. Two cases relied upon by the majority demonstrate this subordination of issues. In neither Commonwealth v. Wilson, 493 Pa. 332, 426 A.2d 575 (1981) nor Commonwealth v. Smith, 490 Pa. 329, 416 A.2d 494 (1980) is there any discussion of the possessory aspect of the weapons charge where more serious charges were at issue.

. Other cases relied upon by the majority (Breslin, Dionisio, and Segers) deal with actual or constructive possession of burglary tools. Burglary tools and similar "instruments of crime" are the original *454intended subject matter of 907(a). See comments, Model Penal Code Comment Sections 5.06 and 5.07 Tentative Draft No. 13.

. The majority's detailed discussion of accomplice liability fails to disclose how Gladden’s conduct implicates him in the act of possessing a weapon held by another. Similarly, the invitation to a cohort to join a “stick-up” can hardly subject one to a charge of possession of a weapon when all the evidence is that the person, in fact, chose not to possess a weapon.