Court Opinion

ID: 9728443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:08:04.569624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:47.619735
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In a prosecution for prostitution in violation of a city ordinance, evidence of prior arrests and convictions for the same offense is admissible to show inter alia intent, knowledge or absence of mistake. Rule 404(b) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence provides:
*53Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
In United States v. Drury, 582 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1978), the court held that evidence that the defendant employed prostitutes on prior occasions was admissible in order to show he possessed the requisite intent for a violation of the Mann Act. The court held that under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, identical to Rule 404(b) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, evidence of other wrongdoing is admissible if the trial court makes the following finding:
(1) a material issue is raised on a subject for which such evidence is admissible; (2) the proffered evidence is relevant to that issue; (3) the wrongdoing is similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; (4) the evidence is clear and convincing; and (5) the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial possibilities. Id. at 1184.
When assessing the relative prejudice and probative value of prior wrongdoing on review, the trial court should be given great deference. The trial court may not be reversed unless it abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. Id. at 1185. Accord, United States v. Matlock, 558 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir.) (evidence that defendant possessed 61 credit cards in 3 different names admissible on the issue of intent to defraud in prosecution for making false statements on credit card application), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872, 98 S.Ct. 218, 54 L.Ed.2d 152 (1977); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.d 1321 (7th Cir.) (evidence of defendant’s corporate officer’s prior bribes of foreign officials properly admitted on the issue of defendant’s intent to bribe city officials), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S.Ct. 65, 62 L.Ed.2d 43 (1979).
It is also clear that use of such evidence for purposes of impeachment is improper under Rule 609 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence as well as City of St. Paul v. DiBucci, 304 Minn. 97, 229 N.W.2d 507 (1975).
The majority concludes that because the evidence of defendant’s prior arrests and convictions for prostitution was introduced during cross-examination, and had the incidental effect of substantiating one witness’ testimony, the evidence was used to impeach defendant’s testimony. I have serious doubts as to the soundness of a method of differentiating impeachment evidence from substantive evidence based on the point at which the evidence is elicited at trial. Under the majority’s view, evidence introduced during cross-examination is impeachment evidence while the same evidence, if introduced in the city’s case-in-chief, would have been substantive evidence.
It was the city’s burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to solicit for purposes of prostitution. The purpose of introducing defendant’s prior arrests and convictions for prostitution was to show that she approached Sergeant Billings with the intention of soliciting him for prostitution when she spoke with him outside Hill’s Cafe on June 11, 1978. I am not persuaded that the introduction of this evidence in cross-examination attacked defendant’s credibility any more than it would have been attacked if introduced in the city’s case-in-chief.
The task of assessing the probative value and prejudicial effect of evidence is committed to the trial court’s discretion and its decision should not be reversed unless it can be characterized as an abuse of discretion. State v. Titworth, 255 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn.1977).
While the majority seems to narrowly hold that a defendant charged with prostitution may not be cross-examined as to prior arrests or convictions for similar ordinance violations, there is considerable language in the majority opinion which would have a chilling effect on a trial court when determining whether to admit Rule 404(b) evidence in the city’s case-in-chief. I would *54reverse the decision of the trial court and affirm defendant’s conviction.