Court Opinion

ID: 9959468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 18:08:33.837448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:18.718076
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Ellison, 2024-Ohio-1377.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                      :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
                                                                        No. 23AP-5
v.                                                  :               (C.P.C. No. 19CR-2544)

Kailan Ellison,                                     :           (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellant.               :

                                              D E C I S I O N

                                       Rendered on April 11, 2024

                 On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and
                 Darren M. Burgess, for appellee. Argued: Darren M.
                 Burgess.

                 On brief: Carpenter Lipps, LLP, and Kort Gatterdam, for
                 appellant. Argued: Kort Gatterdam.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

BOGGS, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Kailan Ellison, appeals the judgment of the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas, convicting him of one count of aggravated murder with a
firearm specification, and sentencing him to a term of life imprisonment with parole
eligibility after 30 years, consecutive to a three-year sentence on the firearm specification.
For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        {¶ 2} On May 23, 2019, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted Ellison on one
count of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated murder, two counts of murder, and
one count of tampering with evidence. The aggravated robbery, aggravated murder, and
murder counts each contained a three-year firearm specification. All the charges stemmed
from the November 19, 2017 shooting death of Martrise Maddox-Suddith. Ellison initially
pled not guilty to all the charges.
No. 23AP-5                                                                                  2

       {¶ 3} After Ellison’s initial trial counsel withdrew due to a conflict of interest, the
trial court appointed attorney Regina A. Griffith to represent him.
       {¶ 4} Griffith brokered an agreement with the prosecution by which Ellison would
aid the prosecution in its case against Ellison’s codefendant, William Knox, and would
testify truthfully against Knox. In exchange, the state agreed to resolve Ellison’s case with
Ellison pleading guilty to one count of murder with a firearm specification and counsel
jointly recommending a prison sentence of 18 years to life. As part of the plea agreement,
the state would request the trial court to nolle the remaining counts and specifications in
the indictment. Ellison, Griffith, and the assistant prosecuting attorneys assigned to the
case signed a plea agreement to that effect, which was dated August 19, 2021. (Aug. 19,
2021 Def.’s Agreement at 0A522-T23.)
       {¶ 5} On August 19, 2021, prior to a change-of-plea hearing held that day, Ellison
signed a “Defendant’s Agreement,” in which he agreed to testify truthfully concerning
Maddox-Suddith’s murder in any proceeding in which he was called as a witness. He
agreed that his proffer, taken the same day, would be admissible in the state’s case against
him if he did not abide by the terms and conditions of the agreement. The agreement
stated, in part:
               If it is determined by the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office
               that at any time the Defendant fails to cooperate fully, refuses
               to testify, * * * or otherwise violates any terms of this
               agreement, then the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office may
               reinstate the original charges against the Defendant as well as
               any additional charges which may be appropriate. The parties
               will be returned to their respective positions prior to the
               execution of this agreement with the expressed exception [that
               Ellison’s proffer will be admissible in a criminal trial in the
               state’s case-in-chief against Ellison].

(Def.’s Agreement at 0A522-T24, 6-7.) The prosecutor requested during the change-of-
plea hearing that the Defendant’s Agreement be incorporated into the plea agreement by
reference. The trial court accepted Ellison’s guilty plea to one count of murder with a
firearm specification, nolled the remaining counts and specifications in the indictment, and
continued the matter for sentencing until after Knox’s trial. (Aug. 19, 2021 Tr. at 22-23.)
During his plea colloquy with the court, Ellison indicated that he was satisfied with
Griffith’s representation. Id. at 12.
No. 23AP-5                                                                                   3

       {¶ 6} With Griffith’s permission, prosecutors visited Ellison in jail on October 29,
2021, as part of their preparation for Knox’s trial. Griffith was not present for that meeting,
during which prosecutors played for Ellison his previously recorded proffer, reviewed
photographs, and talked “about usual witness prep stuff.” (Nov. 4, 2021 Tr. at 4.) Ellison
did not indicate to the prosecutors that he was having second thoughts about testifying
against Knox.
       {¶ 7} The state proceeded to trial against Knox as scheduled on November 1, 2021,
before the same judge who was presiding over Ellison’s case. On November 4, 2021—the
day Ellison was scheduled to testify against Knox—prosecutors received a message that
Ellison was refusing to be brought to court. Id. at 5. The events that then transpired are
detailed in the transcript of a hearing held in Ellison’s case that afternoon. Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney David Zeyen explained:
                Today it was [Ellison’s] turn to come in and testify about
                everything that happened. And we were -- my co-counsel
                received a message stating that the deputies had relayed to the
                bailiff that [Ellison] wasn’t willing to come over; that he was not
                going to testify.

                So when we got here we -- we attempted to contact Regina
                Griffith all morning. We were not able to get ahold of her. No
                one was. But being still a witness, we went down -- [Assistant
                Prosecuting Attorney Steven] Schott and I went down and just
                asked what was going on. He informed us that he was no longer
                going to testify.

                We informed him about the possible consequences of not
                testifying. He said that’s fine. He understood.

                Thereafter, we kept trying to get ahold of Ms. Griffith with no
                luck. But at this point we felt the defendant -- the witness, Mr.
                Ellison, was going from being a witness to possibly being a
                defendant involving some of his substantial rights. So the court
                very graciously -- and we appreciate Mr. Krapenc, who
                happened to be in the court today, another private attorney,
                was willing to go down and speak with him and -- as his
                attorney to find out what was going on, to give him advice, et
                cetera.

                It’s my understanding, having talked to Mr. Krapenc
                afterwards, that Mr. Ellison was still of the mind he was not
                going to testify and that he understood the consequences of
                that being that his plea would be undone and that the
                statement he made to the State in front of Regina Griffith, that
No. 23AP-5                                                                                 4

              recorded statement that he listened to on Friday where he
              confesses to his role in an aggravated murder, would be used
              against him at a trial.

              This was, obviously, a blow to our case against Mr. Knox,
              requiring a negotiated settlement in that case, so -- which we
              just did about an hour ago. We had to discharge the jury and
              plead that case to a robbery without a gun, a 5-year sentence.

              So here we are, Judge. Myself, Mr. Schott is present, Mr.
              Krapenc is here. Ms. Griffith did finally start contacting people
              around noon. She said she’s having car trouble, and she’s still
              not here.

Id. at 5-7. The state thereafter moved the trial court to set aside Ellison’s plea.

       {¶ 8} Krapenc then explained:

              [A]t the Court’s request, I appeared because Ms. Griffith
              couldn’t be here. The prosecutors gave me a summary of the
              facts of the case, a -- they indicated to me that he had entered
              into a proffer which had been * * * [a]udiotaped * * *. And that
              he had also entered into a defendant’s agreement whereby if he
              failed to cooperate that [the] audiotaped statement would be
              used against him in his case in chief, and he would be -- the deal
              of 18-to-life, based on his plea, would be withdrawn, and he
              would proceed to trial.

              I met with Mr. Ellison on the third floor here shortly after that.
              I explained to him that although I had not seen or heard the
              proffer, that I understood the content of it; certainly it was
              damaging; and that it would, in fact, be used against him
              should he decide to not testify and not cooperate in accordance
              with his defendant’s agreement.

              I explained procedurally what would happen if he decided he
              did not want to testify. And he absolutely understood
              everything that we talked about. He asked me several
              questions that indicated to me he was very aware of the possible
              consequences here.

Id. at 7-8. Krapenc stated, “I made sure that he understood that -- that the case against him
would include evidence, of course, that somebody had been murdered, the death was
caused by gunshots, this was something that was easily proven, and his statement was also
going to be introduced.” Id. at 9. He continued, “after I cautioned him and advised him,
he indicated to me this was the path he wished to take. He wished to not testify. And he
understands that the State now wishes to take [the plea] deal off the table.” Id. at 10.
No. 23AP-5                                                                                                    5

        {¶ 9} The trial court directly addressed Ellison about his refusal to testify, to ensure
that he had been advised that his refusal could constitute a breach of his agreement with
the state, could result in the setting aside of his guilty plea, and that the state would be able
to use his proffer against him. Ellison stated he understood. He indicated he had been
advised that, if convicted of all the charges against him, he would face a minimum sentence
of 26 years to life and a maximum sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Id. at
10-12. The court found that Ellison “has been adequately warned as to the consequences
that his refusal to testify would bring and that then [he] knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently decided not to testify and thus breached his defense agreement.” (Nov. 4, 2021
Tr. at 12.) The court then granted the state’s motion to set aside Ellison’s guilty plea.
        {¶ 10} Griffith withdrew from representing Ellison later that month, after Ellison
expressed his wish to contest the validity of his proffer, and the trial court appointed
attorney Thomas Hayes as Ellison’s new attorney.1
        {¶ 11} On October 24, 2022, Ellison again entered a guilty plea, this time to
aggravated murder with a three-year firearm specification and without a joint
recommendation as to sentence. (Tr. at 3; Oct. 24, 2022 Entry of Guilty Plea.) The state
agreed to nolle the remaining charges and specifications. The state requested that the trial
court impose the maximum sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Following a
presentence investigation, the trial court sentenced Ellison to life imprisonment with parole
eligibility after 30 years, consecutive to a three-year sentence on the firearm specification.
        {¶ 12} Ellison appeals his conviction and raises three assignments of error:

                 [1.] APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF THE EFFECTIVE
                 ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF
                 APPELLANT’S RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AND
                 FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
                 CONSTITUTION, AND SECTION[S] 10 AND 16, ARTICLE I
                 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

                 [2.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FORCING APPELLANT
                 TO ACCEPT NEW COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF
                 APPELLANT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

1 The court acknowledged that, in appointing Krapenc to represent Ellison          on August 19, 2021, it had
“inadvertently knocked [Griffith] off as counsel.” (Nov. 22, 2021 Tr. at 3.) The court therefore issued an order
withdrawing Krapenc and reinstating Griffith as Ellison’s counsel. (Nov. 23, 2021 Entry.) It then issued an
order withdrawing Griffith and appointing Hayes. (Nov. 24, 2021 Entry.)
No. 23AP-5                                                                                    6

              [3.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REINSTATING
              CHARGES AGAINST APPELLANT AFTER ENTERING A
              NOLLE PROSEQUI.

II. ANALYSIS

       A. Assignments of Error Nos. One and Two: Ineffective Assistance of
       Counsel

       {¶ 13} Ellison maintains under both his first and second assignments of error that
the trial court denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.
       1. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel
       {¶ 14} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent
part, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall * * * have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense.” Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution similarly provides that, “[i]n any
trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
with counsel.” Although Ellison cites the Ohio Constitution in his first assignment of error,
he does not argue that it provides broader protections than does the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. We therefore focus our analysis on the Sixth Amendment
and the body of case law applying it.
       {¶ 15} The Sixth Amendment right to counsel “embodies a realistic recognition of
the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to
protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein
the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). According to the United States Supreme Court, “ ‘[o]f all the rights
that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most
pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.’ ” United States v.
Cronic 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984), quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956). The right to counsel is therefore necessary “to
protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684
(1984).
       {¶ 16} The Sixth Amendment envisions counsel “playing a role that is critical to the
ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.” Id. at 685. The language of the
amendment itself refers not to the mere provision of counsel but to counsel’s “[a]ssistance”
for an accused’s defense. It requires that an accused have counsel who acts as an advocate,
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743 (1967), and “who plays the role necessary to ensure
No. 23AP-5                                                                                    7

that the trial is fair,” Strickland at 685. Thus, “ ‘the right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 686, quoting McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) fn. 14.
       {¶ 17} Once the right to counsel attaches—by the initiation of a criminal
prosecution—the defendant is entitled to the presence of counsel and adequate
representation during any “critical stage” of the proceedings. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty.,
Texas, 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008). The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated:

              The cases have defined critical stages as proceedings between
              an individual and agents of the State (whether ‘formal or
              informal, in court or out,’ see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
              218, 226, * * *) that amount to ‘trial-like confrontations,’ at
              which counsel would help the accused ‘in coping with legal
              problems or * * * meeting his adversary,’ United States v. Ash,
              413 U.S. 300, 312-313 * * * (1973)[.]

Id. at fn. 16. A “critical stage” is one that holds “significant consequences for the accused,”
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696 (2002), such as one in which “[a]vailable defenses may be
* * * irretrievably lost,” Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961). These include
arraignments, post indictment interrogations, post indictment lineups, the plea-bargaining
process, and the entry of a guilty plea. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2011); Missouri
v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2011).
       2. The Strickland standard
       {¶ 18} The Supreme Court has adopted the two-component standard set out in
Strickland as the general test for analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. State
v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142 (1989). In Strickland, the Supreme Court considered
the standards by which to judge a claim of “actual ineffective assistance of counsel,” 466
U.S. at 684, i.e., a claim that counsel deprived the defendant of the right to effective
assistance of counsel, “simply by failing to render ‘adequate legal assistance,’ ” id. at 686,
quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 (1980).
       {¶ 19} Under the Strickland test, the defendant must first establish that counsel’s
performance was deficient, because it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Id. at 688. An appellate court must judge the reasonableness of the attorney’s conduct on
the facts of the case, viewed as of the time of the conduct, while “indulg[ing] a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Id. at 689. The second component of the Strickland test requires a showing of
No. 23AP-5                                                                                     8

prejudice caused by counsel’s ineffective performance, because even professionally
unreasonable conduct by counsel does not warrant setting aside a criminal judgment if
counsel’s conduct had no effect on the judgment. Id. at 691. To establish prejudice, the
defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have
been different but for counsel’s deficiency. Id. at 698.
       3. Cronic and cases in which a showing of prejudice is not required
       {¶ 20} The Strickland test does not govern all claims that a defendant has been
denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In Strickland, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that, “[i]n certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed.” Id. at
692. See also State v. Johnson, 24 Ohio St.3d 87, 89 (1986) fn. 4 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, and noting the existence of exceptions to Strickland’s “ ‘cause-and-prejudice’ test”).
The Strickland court distinguished the claim before it from other types of Sixth
Amendment claims, in which the existence of prejudice is legally presumed. Strickland at
692, citing Cronic. Cronic, which the Supreme Court decided the same day as Strickland,
more fully addresses the categories of cases in which prejudice is presumed because the
circumstances are so likely to result in prejudice “that the cost of litigating their effect in a
particular case is unjustified.” Cronic at 658.
       {¶ 21} The Supreme Court in Cronic recognized three circumstances in which
prejudice will be presumed. The “[m]ost obvious” circumstance is a complete denial of
counsel at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. Id. at 659. “The presumption that
counsel’s assistance is essential requires [the] conclu[sion] that a trial is unfair if the
accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.” Id. The Supreme Court has
“uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was
either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the
proceeding.” Id. at fn. 25. For example, in Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976),
an order that prevented the defendant from consulting with his attorney during an
overnight recess during trial infringed upon the defendant’s right to the effective assistance
of counsel, even without a showing of prejudice. Next, no specific showing of prejudice is
required when “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful
adversarial testing,” thus rendering the adversary process presumptively unreliable. Cronic
at 659. Finally, the court recognized that circumstances may exist in which, “although
counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a
No. 23AP-5                                                                                               9

fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of
prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” Id. at 659-60.
        {¶ 22} After oral argument in this case, the court requested that the parties submit
supplemental briefs addressing the application of Cronic and its progeny, including but not
limited to Hunt v. Mitchell, 261 F.3d 575 (6th Cir.2001), and State v. Walton, 8th Dist. No.
90140, 2008-Ohio-3550, with respect to Ellison’s claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
        4. The parties’ arguments
        {¶ 23} Citing Strickland in his appellate brief, Ellison argues that Griffith performed
deficiently, to Ellison’s prejudice. He argues that Griffith provided ineffective assistance
during the plea bargaining process by failing to meet with him around the time of his proffer
and his change-of-plea hearing and, again, around the time of his scheduled testimony in
Knox’s trial, when he began to waiver on whether to testify. Ellison states that Griffith “was
totally absent at the most critical stage of the case,” when he was expected to testify against
Knox. (Appellant’s Brief at 15.) Ellison also argues that Griffith was ineffective when she
acquiesced to prosecutors meeting with Ellison outside of her presence while his case
remained pending for sentencing.              He claims that he was prejudiced by Griffith’s
ineffectiveness because he received a prison sentence of 33 years to life instead of the jointly
recommended sentence under the original plea agreement of 18 years to life.
        {¶ 24} Ellison maintains that the trial court’s eleventh-hour appointment of
Krapenc to advise him in Griffith’s absence, rather than continuing the proceedings to allow
Griffith’s participation, did not satisfy Ellison’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.2 While
defense counsel should not be “an organ of the state,” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
820 (1975), Ellison maintains that Krapenc, with whom he had no history or relationship,
“clearly met with Ellison at the State’s behest, to try to convince Ellison to testify and
preserve [the state’s] case against Knox.” (Appellant’s Brief at 23.) Ellison correctly notes
that Krapenc’s knowledge of the case was limited to what he had learned that day from
prosecutors and that Krapenc had no opportunity to review any discovery, including
Ellison’s proffer, prior to meeting with Ellison. At sentencing, Ellison’s attorney suggested
it was unrealistic to expect that Ellison would trust Krapenc, whom he had just met, “to

2 We reject Ellison’s subordinate argument that the court essentially encouraged Krapenc to violate Prof.

Cond.R. 4.2, which protects a person represented by counsel against overreaching by other attorneys who are
participating in the same matter.
No. 23AP-5                                                                                  10

know what’s going on,” or to expect “everything to fall back in line” after Krapenc’s short
meeting with Ellison. (Dec. 6, 2022 Tr. at 42.)
       {¶ 25} In his supplemental brief, Ellison argues that Cronic applies and that his
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel was per se violated on three
occasions: (1) when prosecutors interviewed him without the presence of defense counsel
on October 29, 2021, (2) when prosecutors met with him without the presence of defense
counsel on November 4, 2021, and (3) when Ellison, nominally represented by a newly
appointed attorney unfamiliar with his case, was subjected to a hearing at which the trial
court withdrew his original plea agreement. (Appellant’s Supp. Brief at 6.) In the first two
instances, he claims that he was completely denied the assistance of counsel, and in the
third instance, he claims that no competent attorney could have provided effective
assistance.
       {¶ 26} In response to Ellison’s ineffective assistance arguments, the state asserts
that Ellison, with Griffith’s assistance, entered into his August 2021 plea agreement, that
he was fully informed of and fully understood the nature and terms of that agreement and
that, after being fully advised by Krapenc, Ellison chose not to comply with those terms by
refusing to testify against Knox. (Appellee’s Brief at 12.) The state disputes Ellison’s claim
that he was left without counsel at a critical stage of his criminal case, noting that, without
objection by Ellison, Krapenc “was able to speak with Ellison in confidence” prior to the
trial court’s vacation of his plea agreement. (Appellee’s Brief at 15.) The state further
disputes Ellison’s argument that, due to his lack of familiarity with either the case or with
Ellison, Krapenc was unable to provide competent counsel, stating that Krapenc was able
to advise Ellison of the consequences of his decision to breach his plea agreement even
without detailed knowledge of Ellison’s case. Finally, the state argues that Ellison cannot
establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s allegedly deficient performance, i.e., that there
is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but
for counsel’s deficient performance.
       {¶ 27} In its supplemental brief, the state maintains that Cronic and its progeny do
not apply and do not support a presumption of prejudice in this case. (State’s Supp. Brief
at 1.) It argues that the circumstances here cannot be reasonably equated with the egregious
circumstances in cases which have applied Cronic. In particular, it argues that neither
Griffith’s absence on November 4, 2021—purportedly caused by transportation problems—
No. 23AP-5                                                                                                    11

nor Krapenc’s last minute appointment of counsel to Ellison regarding his decision not to
testify against Knox, was sufficiently egregious to invoke Cronic’s application.
        5. No ineffective assistance leading up to Ellison’s initial plea
        {¶ 28} Ellison’s claims that Griffith provided ineffective representation by not
meeting with him around the time of his proffer and change-of-plea hearing fail because
they rely on facts not in the appellate record.3 When a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel depends on proof outside the trial court record, the claim is not appropriate for
consideration on direct appeal. State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 299 (2001).
        {¶ 29} Although the record contains no information about meetings or
communications between Ellison and Griffith prior to the August 19, 2021, proffer and
change-of-plea hearing, it is clear from the record that both Ellison and Griffith signed the
proffer letter, the Defendant’s Agreement, and the entry of guilty plea form and that Griffith
represented Ellison at the change-of-plea hearing. The record also indicates that Griffith
was present when Ellison made his recorded proffer. During his change-of-plea hearing,
Ellison assured the judge that he had reviewed the indictment, the discovery, and the plea
agreement with Griffith and that she had been able to answer all his questions, concerns,
or comments. Ellison indicated that he was satisfied with Griffith’s representation. We
accordingly reject Ellison’s argument that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
through August 19, 2021.
        6. Ellison was completely deprived of counsel at critical stages leading
           up the vacation of his initial plea

        {¶ 30} Ellison argues that Cronic applies to his claims and that he is entitled to a
presumption of prejudice because he was completely denied the assistance of counsel, to
which he was constitutionally entitled, at critical stages of the proceedings—when
prosecutors met with Ellison outside Griffith’s presence (and with Griffith’s permission) on
October 29, 2021, when prosecutors again spoke with Ellison, outside the presence of
defense counsel, on November 4, 2021, after he expressed his refusal to testify against
Knox. The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that complete denial of

3 In his sentencing memoranda, Ellison stated that Griffith visited him only once in jail, several weeks prior to

his August 19, 2021 proffer and plea. Although Ellison filed what purports to be a log of his visitors at the
Franklin County jail, the filed document contains only the odd numbered pages of that document and
therefore excludes any evidence of visits that might have occurred between April 22, 2021 and December 14,
2021. The visitors log provides no evidence of the existence or nonexistence of other communication, whether
by telephone or otherwise, between Ellison and Griffith.
No. 23AP-5                                                                                    12

counsel during a critical stage of a criminal proceeding mandates a presumption of
prejudice. Hunt, 261 F.3d at 581, citing Cronic, 266 U.S. 648, and Powell, 287 U.S. 45.
       {¶ 31} We agree with Ellison that the meetings between prosecutors and Ellison,
outside the presence of defense counsel, on October 29 and November 4, 2021, occurred
during critical stages of Ellison’s criminal proceedings, at which Ellison was
constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel. The “essence of a ‘critical stage’ is not
its formal resemblance to a trial, but the adversary nature of the proceeding, combined with
the possibility that a defendant will be prejudiced in some significant way in the absence of
counsel.” United States v. Leonti, 326 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that the
“cooperation period” between the defendant’s entry of a guilty plea, which included an
agreement to cooperate with the government, and sentencing was a “critical stage”).
       {¶ 32} When prosecutors visited Ellison in jail on October 29, 2021 to prepare for
his anticipated testimony against Knox and again on November 4, 2021 to convince him to
fulfill his obligations under the Defendant’s Agreement, the criminal proceedings against
Ellison remained pending, as he had not been sentenced. Further, the Franklin County
Prosecutor’s Office retained sole discretion to determine whether Ellison had complied
with his Defendant’s Agreement. Under the Defendant’s Agreement, which Ellison had
signed after discussing it with Griffith, if the prosecutor’s office determined that Ellison
failed to fully cooperate or that he gave false, misleading, or incomplete information, the
prosecutor’s office retained the right to vacate Ellison’s plea and reinstate his original
charges. The state would then be permitted to introduce as evidence in its case-in-chief
Ellison’s recorded proffer, in which he confessed his involvement in Maddox-Suddith’s
murder. Although Ellison had agreed to cooperate in the state’s prosecution of Knox to
reduce his own criminal sanctions, the prosecutors remained Ellison’s adversary.
Nevertheless, while prosecutors held over his head a potential prison sentence of life
without the possibility of parole should it determine that he violated his Defendant’s
Agreement and he then be convicted of aggravated murder, Ellison was left to face the
prosecutors’ questions alone.
       {¶ 33} In Leonti, the Ninth Circuit addressed a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel during a defendant’s attempts to cooperate with the government following the
entry of a plea, in which he agreed to cooperate in exchange for a governmental motion
requesting a downward departure from the federal sentencing guidelines. Id. at 1115-16.
The Ninth Circuit held that the cooperation period was a “critical stage” at which a
No. 23AP-5                                                                                  13

defendant is entitled to counsel, because of the “profound effect” a motion for a downward
departure could have on a defendant’s sentence. Id. at 1117. The court stated:
              [A]n attorney’s assistance is critical to the cooperation process
              in a number of respects, including, but not limited to,
              facilitating communication between the defendant and the
              government, attending proffer sessions, ascertaining the
              government’s expectations and whether the defendant is
              satisfying them, communicating the client’s limitations to the
              government, and establishing a record of attempts to
              cooperate.

Id. at 1119. The same may be said with respect to the cooperation process in state court.
       {¶ 34} In United States v. Ming He, 2d Cir. No. 95-1331, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
28744 (Sept. 3, 1996), the Second Circuit addressed a similar claim, that the defendant was
denied the constitutionally guaranteed assistance of counsel during a debriefing by the
prosecution, after the defendant entered a guilty plea in conjunction with a cooperation
agreement. With respect to such debriefings, the court stated, “While it is true that the
government’s questions are aimed at facilitating its own trial preparation rather than
‘trapping’ a cooperating witness, the potential obviously exists for the statements to be used
later against the defendant,” such that counsel has a role to play beyond merely ensuring
that her client tells the truth. Id. at *18. The lawyer’s assistance may include explaining the
government’s questions, calming the defendant, keeping the defendant focused on the fact
that the government does not share the defendant’s interests, assisting the defendant to
clarify his answers, and helping to resolve disagreements between the government and the
defendant. Id. at *19. Until the defendant’s side of a cooperation agreement has been
performed, the court reasoned, the government remains the cooperating witness’s
adversary. Id. The Second Circuit stated:

              The government was in a position to impose grave penalties on
              Ming He if his assistance turned out to be incomplete or
              dishonest. For example, it had the power to set aside the
              cooperation agreement and withdraw its acceptance of his plea,
              re-indict him on additional charges, and use his statements at
              the debriefing against him -- both directly and indirectly -- in a
              new criminal proceeding. * * * We think these constitutional
              ramifications of the debriefing session serious, and their
              seriousness strongly supports the appellant’s insistence that he
              have the aid of counsel when the government interviews him.
No. 23AP-5                                                                                    14

Id. at *19-20. Although the Second District opted to decide Ming He on grounds other than
the Sixth Amendment, its analysis—particularly, its discussion of the ongoing adversary
nature of the proceedings and the prejudicial outcomes possible for a cooperating witness—
applies equally to the Sixth Amendment context here. See id. at *3-4, 15.
       {¶ 35} As the Ninth Circuit did in Leonti, we find the circumstances here—
concerning interactions between the state and Ellison during the cooperation period—
distinguishable from cases concerning a non-adversarial, presentence interview, generally
conducted by a probation officer, which several courts (including the Ninth Circuit) have
concluded is not a critical stage. See Leonti, 326 F.3d at 1119, citing United States v.
Benlian, 63 F.3d 884, 827 (9th Cir.1995). Those cases, the Leonti court stated, have focused
primarily on the non-adversarial nature of a presentence interview. Id. For example, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that a federal probation officer conducting a presentence interview
has “no adversarial role” in the proceedings and serves only as a “neutral information
gatherer” for the court, not as “an agent of the prosecution.” United States v. Gordon, 4
F.3d 1567, 1571-72 (10th Cir.1993). In contrast, the prosecutors here retained exclusive
authority to determine whether Ellison complied with the terms of his Defendant’s
Agreement, and if they determined that he had not complied, the prosecutors could vacate
the plea, reinstate the original charges against Ellison, and introduce Ellison’s damning
proffer against him as part of the state’s case-in-chief. The “government is not transformed
into a neutral and impartial ‘arm of the court’ simply because it is seeking information from
the defendant,” as it simultaneously seeks the imposition of a sentence for the defendant’s
criminal conduct. Leonti at 1120. Encounters between the government and the defendant
during the cooperation period remain “essentially adversarial.” Id.
       {¶ 36} For these reasons, we conclude that the October 29, 2021 and November 4,
2021 adversarial meetings between prosecutors and Ellison, outside the presence of
defense counsel, constituted a critical stage of Ellison’s criminal case and that the complete
absence of defense counsel during those meetings constituted per se violations of Ellison’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, under Cronic.
       7. Ellison was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to the
          effective assistance of counsel at the hearing on November 4, 2021

       {¶ 37} We now turn to Ellison’s argument that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel by Griffith’s absence at the hearing in which the trial court vacated his initial plea
agreement. When Ellison communicated his decision not to testify against Knox, thus
No. 23AP-5                                                                                                   15

exposing himself to the withdrawal of his plea agreement, the reinstatement of the original
charges against him, and a sentence far greater than the 18 years to life sentence that had
been jointly recommended under his plea agreement4, Griffith was nowhere to be found.
We have already determined that Ellison was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
when, with neither the presence nor the permission of defense counsel, prosecutors visited
Ellison in jail to “inform[] him about the possible consequences of not testifying.” (Nov. 4,
2021 Tr. at 5-6.) The prosecutors themselves recognized during that meeting that Ellison
was entitled to the assistance of counsel, because he “was going from being a witness to
possibly being a defendant involving some of his substantial rights.” Id. at 6.
        {¶ 38} Rather than wait for Griffith, whom prosecutors claim they had “attempted
to contact * * * all morning,” the trial court instead sent attorney Krapenc, who happened
to be in the courtroom but who had no prior knowledge of the case, to speak with Ellison.5
Id. at 5. A prosecutor stated during the hearing that afternoon that Griffith had begun
“contacting people around noon,” claiming she had been having car trouble. Id. at 7. But
instead of waiting for Griffith, the trial court proceeded, with Krapenc representing Ellison
at the hearing in which the court vacated Ellison’s plea agreement and reinstated the
original charges against him. This branch of Ellison’s ineffective assistance claim is akin to
the third type of cases described in Cronic as not requiring a showing of prejudice—cases
in which even competent counsel could likely not render effective assistance.
        {¶ 39} Krapenc explained his limited knowledge of Ellison’s circumstances, which
was based solely on “a summary of the facts” relayed to him by the prosecutors. (Nov. 4,
2021 Tr. at 7.) The prosecutors had informed Krapenc that Ellison had given a recorded
proffer and had executed a Defendant’s Agreement, in which he agreed that his plea and
the jointly recommended sentence would be withdrawn if he failed to cooperate and that
the state would then be entitled to use his proffered statement against him. However,
Krapenc had neither seen nor heard Ellison’s proffer. After speaking with Ellison in the
jail, Krapenc reported to the prosecutors that Ellison would not testify and that he
understood, as a consequence, his plea would be vacated, and his proffer used against him.
After hearing from Krapenc, but before going on the record in Ellison’s case or even

4 If Ellison were convicted on all the charges originally brought against him, he faced a minimum sentence of

26 years to life.
5 At Ellison’s subsequent plea hearing, the prosecutor stated that Ellison seemed to understand the

implications of his refusal to testify and that “[w]e even gave him a day, I think, to think about” his decision
(Oct. 24, 2022 Tr. at 23), but that is clearly not the case.
No. 23AP-5                                                                                    16

formally moving the trial court to vacate Ellison’s guilty plea, prosecutors executed a plea
agreement with Knox. The trial judge, who was presiding over both Knox’s case and
Ellison’s case, discharged the jury in Knox’s case, accepted Knox’s guilty plea, and
proceeded immediately to sentence Knox, all before taking any action vis-à-vis Ellison’s
refusal to testify.
       {¶ 40} Ellison argues that no competent attorney in Krapenc’s position could have
rendered effective assistance of counsel. (Ellison’s Supp. Brief at 6.) More specifically, he
argues that Krapenc had no knowledge of Ellison’s case, had no history, and had built no
trust with Ellison, had not seen or heard Ellison’s proffer, and did not independently review
Ellison’s case. Id. at 9-10. Krapenc’s knowledge of the case was based solely on a summary
provided to him by the prosecutors, Ellison’s adversaries, who had a vested interest in
Ellison testifying against Knox.
       {¶ 41} In State v. Walton, 8th Dist. No. 90140, 2008-Ohio-3550, the Eighth District
Court of Appeals found the trial court’s appointment of replacement counsel for the
defendant one hour before hearings on the defendant’s repeat violent offender
specification, sexual predator classification, and sentencing was “ ‘sufficiently egregious as
to warrant a presumption of ineffectiveness.’ ” Id. at ¶ 43, quoting Hunt, 261 F.3d at 585.
The trial court had previously rescheduled the defendant’s repeat violent offender, sexual
predator, and sentencing hearings due to defense counsel being ill, but when defense
counsel remained ill on the rescheduled date, it refused to grant another continuance.
Instead, the trial court appointed new counsel, who had not been present during the
defendant’s trial and who had never previously spoken with the defendant regarding his
case, to represent the defendant. At the hearings, which commenced an hour later, the trial
court found the defendant guilty of the repeat violent offender specification, classified the
defendant as a sexual predator, and imposed an aggregate prison sentence of 23 years.
       {¶ 42} On appeal in Walton, the defendant argued that he had been denied his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, and the Eighth District agreed. It noted, “The duty to provide
counsel ‘is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as
to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.’ ” Id. at ¶ 40,
quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. The court also quoted the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Hunt:
“ ‘The likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one [appointed to represent a
defendant on the day of trial], could provide effective assistance is so small that a
presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the
No. 23AP-5                                                                                 17

trial.’ ” Walton at ¶ 42, quoting Hunt at 585. The Eighth District concluded that the trial
court’s appointment of replacement counsel one hour prior to defendant’s hearing
constituted “a per se violation” of the defendant’s constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel. Id. at ¶ 44.
       {¶ 43} In Hunt, the trial court arraigned Hunt, appointed counsel, and began voir
dire all on the same day—89 days after Hunt’s arrest, during which time he had remained
in jail. Facing the statutory speedy trial deadline, the court told Hunt “ ‘we’ll start trial
[today] or you can waive time if you want more time to consult with your lawyer to prepare
your case.’ ” Id. at 578. The trial court denied defense counsel’s request for “another ten
minutes” to speak with his client. Id. After Hunt refused to waive time, voir dire
commenced that afternoon, and trial began the following day, despite defense counsel’s
stated misgivings about proceeding without sufficient time to consult with Hunt or to
prepare a defense. Id. at 579. Hunt was convicted, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals
affirmed his convictions.
       {¶ 44} After the Supreme Court of Ohio refused a discretionary appeal, Hunt filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which the district court denied. The
Sixth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to consider whether Hunt was denied his
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel due to the trial court’s
appointment of counsel on the day of trial. Id. at 579. The Sixth Circuit concluded that, in
affirming Hunt’s convictions, the Eighth District misapplied Cronic and erred by
concluding that Hunt was not entitled to a presumption of ineffectiveness, including
prejudice. Id. at 582. It stated, “As a consequence of the trial court’s haste to begin trial,
counsel was required to procced to voir dire without ever discussing the case with his client
and without conducting any discovery or independent investigation of the facts.” Id. at 583.
In conclusion, the court stated, “ ‘[W]here counsel has no acquaintance with the facts of the
case and no opportunity to plan a defense, the result is that the defendant is effectively
denied his constitutional right to assistance of counsel.’ ” Id. at 585, quoting Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 59 (1975) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
       {¶ 45} In United States v. Morris, 470 F.3d 596 (6th Cir.2006), the Sixth Circuit
found that the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel under Cronic, when
it had “no trouble agreeing that * * * ‘counsel was placed in circumstances in which
competent counsel very likely could not render assistance.’ ” Id. at 602, quoting Mitchell v.
Mason, 325 F.3d 732, 742 (6th Cir.2003). In Morris, newly appointed defense counsel was
No. 23AP-5                                                                                                     18

provided only a short time to prepare for a preliminary examination hearing in which the
defendant was asked to accept or deny a plea offer by the state. The court noted that counsel
was able to meet with defendant only in the court’s “bull pen,” which prohibited counsel
from having a confidential, privileged conversation with the defendant before the hearing.
Id. at 601. The court went on:
                 The fact that Morris’s counsel gave him some advice does not
                 preclude a finding of constructive denial of counsel under [the
                 Cronic] standard. Rather, the circumstances, such as the lack
                 of time for adequate preparation and the lack of privacy for
                 attorney-client consultation, would have precluded any lawyer
                 from providing effective advice.

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at 602.
        {¶ 46} As in Morris, the fact that Krapenc, an attorney, met with Ellison about his
refusal to testify does not preclude a finding that Ellison was constructively denied the right
to counsel. At the same time, however, we in no way criticize Krapenc’s efforts; the trial
court placed him in an impossible situation. Ellison knew Griffith was his attorney; she had
negotiated his favorable plea agreement and Defendant’s Agreement with the state,
answered all his questions, concerns, and comments about the plea agreement, was present
as his counsel when he gave his proffered statement to the prosecution, and represented
him at the August 19, 2021 change-of-plea hearing. Yet when Ellison was scheduled to
testify against Knox pursuant to the Defendant’s Agreement and when, upon refusing to do
so, he was hauled before the trial court for revocation of his plea agreement, Griffith was
neither present nor available to consult with Ellison about his decision and its
consequences.
        {¶ 47} After deciding that he would not testify against Knox, Ellison was first visited
by the prosecutors who were not only counting on his testimony6 in the in-progress trial of
Knox, but also held over Ellison’s head the threat of revoking his plea agreement and
reinstating the original charges against him. While they ostensibly informed Ellison about
the possible consequences of his decision not to testify, they understood that Ellison—
whose substantial rights were at stake—was entitled to the assistance of counsel. See
Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950, 964 (5th Cir.2000) (in determining whether a particular

6 Assistant Prosecutor Zeyen stated it was Ellison’s expected testimony that convinced the state to proceed to

trial in Knox’s case. (Nov. 4, 2021 Tr. at 4-5.) The prosecutors were aware that Ellison’s testimony was
essential for the state to obtain a conviction against Knox. Zeyen explained that Ellison’s refusal to testify was
“a blow” to the case against Knox, id. at 7, “requiring a negotiated settlement in that case.” Id. at 8.
No. 23AP-5                                                                                    19

stage of the proceedings is critical, the court looks to whether “ ‘the substantial rights of a
defendant may be affected during that type of proceeding’ ”), quoting United States v.
Taylor, 933 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.1991). Next, Krapenc appeared to speak with Ellison, who
had no history with Krapenc and no basis for believing that Krapenc was advocating for or
acting in Ellison’s best interest, as opposed to as an agent of the court or the state. See Jones
v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 758 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“To satisfy the Constitution,
counsel must function as an advocate for the defendant, as opposed to a friend of the
court.”). Notably, it does not appear from the record that the trial judge called Ellison into
court to explain its appointment of Krapenc as replacement counsel before sending him to
speak with Ellison.
       {¶ 48} Krapenc had no prior knowledge of Ellison’s case, had not been provided any
discovery, and could not speak to the details of Ellison’s Defendant’s Agreement or proffer,
which he had not seen or heard. Krapenc’s knowledge was based solely on what he had
learned from the prosecutors, the representatives of Ellison’s adversary. Krapenc stated he
advised Ellison that if he did not testify his plea would be withdrawn, the state would
introduce his proffer against him at trial, and that if convicted of all charges he would be
sentenced to a minimum sentence of 26 years to life and up to a maximum sentence of life
without the possibility of parole. Beyond his unfamiliarity with the details of Ellison’s case
and the lack of established trust with Ellison, Krapenc was not privy to information Ellison
had shared with Griffith regarding the charges against him or regarding his agreement to
testify against Knox. He was, therefore, in no position to respond to or ease any anxiety or
fear that Ellison may have had about testifying. These circumstances are such that,
although Krapenc spoke with Ellison in the hours leading up to the vacation of his guilty
plea and stood beside Ellison in the hearing at which that occurred, the likelihood that any
replacement lawyer, even a fully competent one, could have provided Ellison with effective
assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate under Cronic.
       {¶ 49} For these reasons, we conclude that Ellison was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to the assistance of counsel on both October 31, 2021 and November 4, 2021, and we
sustain Ellison’s first assignment of error. Having concluded that the trial court’s
appointment of Krapenc to represent Ellison in Griffith’s absence did not assuage the denial
of Ellison’s constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, Ellison’s second assignment of
error, that the trial court erred in “forcing” him to accept Krapenc as “new counsel,” is moot.
No. 23AP-5                                                                                  20

       8. Remedy
       {¶ 50} We must now consider the appropriate remedy for the violation of Ellison’s
constitutional right to counsel. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a trial court
must proceed on remand from the point at which the error necessitating the remand
occurred. State ex rel. Douglas v. Burlew, 106 Ohio St.3d 180, 2005-Ohio-4382, ¶ 11, citing
State ex rel. Stevenson v. Murray, 69 Ohio St.2d 112, 113 (1982); State v. Chinn, 85 Ohio
St.3d 548, 563 (1999); State v. Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 240 (1999). The error
necessitating a remand—the denial of Ellison’s constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel—occurred before the trial court revoked Ellison’s original plea
agreement and reinstated the charges that had been nolled pursuant to that agreement.
       {¶ 51} “Sixth Amendment remedies should be ‘tailored to the injury suffered from
the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.’ ”
Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170, quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981). The
remedy must “ ‘neutralize the taint of the violation.’ ” Id., quoting Morrison at 364. The
remedy should not, however, grant a windfall to the defendant. Id. at 170, citing United
States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986).
       {¶ 52} As a result of the ineffective assistance of counsel, the respondent in Lafler
rejected a plea offer, by which the state agreed to dismiss certain charges and to recommend
a sentence of 51 to 85 months for the remaining charges. Id. at 161. After trial, the
respondent was convicted on all counts and received a mandatory minimum prison
sentence of 185 to 360 months.         Id. The Supreme Court recognized that, in some
circumstances, the injury suffered by a defendant who declines a plea offer as a result of
ineffective assistance of counsel and who then receives a greater sentence at trial may be
remedied by resentencing alone. “This is typically the case when the charges that would
have been admitted as part of the plea bargain are the same as the charges the defendant
was convicted of after trial.” Id. at 171. But if the rejected offer was for a guilty plea to a
count or counts less serious than the ones for which a defendant was ultimately convicted,
or if a mandatory sentence restricts the court’s discretion with respect to the charges of
conviction, resentencing alone may not suffice. Id.
       {¶ 53} This case presents the latter scenario. While being denied the assistance of
counsel to which he was constitutionally entitled, Ellison lost the benefit of his plea
agreement to a lesser charge than that to which he was subsequently convicted. The trial
court revoked Ellison’s original guilty plea to murder with a firearm specification, for which
No. 23AP-5                                                                                 21

the parties jointly recommended the mandatory aggregate sentence of 18 years to life. Once
the court revoked Ellison’s original plea and reinstated the nolled charges, the state did not
negotiate with the defense and would accept a plea only to the most serious charge,
aggravated murder, with a firearm specification, for which a conviction required a
minimum mandatory sentence of life in prison with parole eligibility after serving 23 years.
See R.C. 2929.03(A)(1) and 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii). Ultimately, the trial court sentenced
Ellison to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 33 years.
        {¶ 54} The only way to neutralize the taint of the violation of Ellison’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is to require the trial court to proceed on remand from the
time of the violations, prior to the revocation of Ellison’s original plea agreement. We
acknowledge the state’s argument that such a result gives Ellison the full benefit of his plea
agreement despite his refusal to fulfill his obligations thereunder, and thus represents a
windfall to Ellison. But we also recognize that the timing of the prosecution’s and trial
court’s actions on November 4, 2021 rendered it impossible for Ellison to fulfill his
obligations under the plea agreement. Before formally moving the trial court to withdraw
Ellison’s original guilty plea and to reinstate the nolled charges against Ellison, the
prosecution resolved the charges against Knox via a plea agreement and proceeded
immediately to sentencing. Thus, by the time the state moved to vacate Ellison’s plea
agreement based on his refusal to testify against Knox and before the court confirmed with
Ellison that he would not testify, there were no pending proceedings against Knox for
Ellison to testify in. Under these circumstances, we conclude that vindication of the
violation of Ellison’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires the reinstatement of
Ellison’s original plea agreement and sentencing thereunder.
        B. Assignment of Error No. Three
        {¶ 55} In his third and final assignment of error, Ellison argues that the trial court
erred by reinstating the charges it had nolled as part of his initial plea agreement after he
refused to testify against Knox. Because we have concluded that Ellison is entitled to
reinstatement of his original plea agreement, we deny Ellison’s third assignment of error as
moot.
III. CONCLUSION
        {¶ 56} For these reasons, we sustain Ellison’s first assignment of error and overrule
as moot Ellison’s second and third assignments of error. Because Ellison was denied his
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the
No. 23AP-5                                                                              22

United States Constitution, we vacate his judgment of conviction and remand this matter
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision and the law.

                                                                        Judgment reversed;
                                                                          cause remanded.

                       MENTEL, P.J., and EDELSTEIN, J., concur.