Court Opinion

ID: 9706377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:42:07.475117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:22.109872
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the majority. I find it curious that the court raises an issue of ripeness that was neither raised nor recognized by the parties, the trial court, or the Supreme Court of Illinois. The majority pointedly raised this ripeness issue in its previous decision in Drum I, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 751-53, 718 N.E.2d at 309-10, yet the supreme court did not address that issue, instead remanding this case for us to address the merits (Drum II, 194 Ill. 2d at 492-93, 743 N.E.2d at 48): whether the trial court’s decision, that the prior testimony of Thomas and Marcus did not meet the requirements of the statutory residual hearsay exception, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We should do so and find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The statute requires the trial court to make several findings before prior statements are inadmissible: “(a) A statement not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception[,] but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as defined in subsection (c) and if the court determines that: (1) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; and (2) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (3) the general purposes of this [s]ection and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. (b) A statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent’s intention to offer the statement, and the particulars of the statement, including the name and address of the declarant. (c) Unavailability as a witness is limited to the situation in which the declarant persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement despite an order of the court to do so.” 725 ILCS 5/115—10.2(a) through (c) (West 1998)). Equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, evidence of a material fact more probative than other evidence, interests of justice, and advance notice may be determined, or should be, prior to trial. I agree with the majority that the actual determination of unavailability cannot be made in most circumstances until trial. As with any hearsay statement under sections 115—10, 115—10.1, 115— 10.3, and 115—10.4 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115—10, 115—10.1, 115— 10.3 (West 1998); 725 ILCS 5/115—10.4 (West Supp. 1999)), or with evidence of prior sexual offenses under section 115—7.3 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115—7.3 (West 1998)), section 115—10.2 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115—10.2 (West 1998)) requires notification of the intent to use the evidence and, either explicitly or by inference, requires the trial court to rule on admissibility prior to the witness or defendant taking the stand. If the evidence is found inadmissible because the trial court has found that the evidence does not possess sufficient “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” (725 ILCS 5/115—10.2(a) (West 1998)), the inquiry stops there. If the evidence is ruled admissible, the issue of unavailability only arises if the individual does not testify. Clearly, the parties should not be faced with a lengthy hearing on all of the issues of admissibility in the middle of trial. This certainly would impair the State’s ability to prosecute the case and the defendant’s ability to defend the case. For example, as in the instant case, when aware in advance of a witness’ potential reluctance to testify, the State can grant immunity to encourage testimony or uncover other evidence to bolster the case if the evidence is inadmissible. I would, therefore, affirm the trial court.