Court Opinion

ID: 9469115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:32:33.349841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:13.919776
License: Public Domain

DYER, Circuit Judge,
Sitting by Designation, specially concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I travel a different road to get there.
The majority holds that notice must be given to “any party likely to be harmed or substantially affected by the result of the hearing” — in other words notice must be given to an indispensable party. I agree. But it then treats the notice provisions of 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (j) to an indispensable party as a “procedural” requirement. I disagree.
An award entered without notice to an “involved” (indispensable) third party is void — absolutely void, not merely voidable. The notice provisions are jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Unless there is notice a public law board is without power to enter a final award. Kirby v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 188 F.2d 793, 798-799 (3rd Cir. 1951); Hunter v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 171 F.2d 594, 597-598 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. den. 337 U.S. 916, 69 S.Ct. 1157, 93 L.Ed. 1726; Allain v. Tummon, 212 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1954); Nord v. Griffin, 86 F.2d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. den. 300 U.S. 673, 57 S.Ct. 612, 81 L.Ed. 879; Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. New Orleans, Tex. & M.R. Co., 229 F.2d 59, 67 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. den. 350 U.S. 997, 76 S.Ct. 548, 100 L.Ed. 861; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Templeton, 181 F.2d 527, 534-535 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. den. 340 U.S. 823, 71 S.Ct. 57, 95 L.Ed. 605.
The majority dismisses these authorities by suggesting that they did not consider “whether contemporaneous objections to agency error were either advisable or necessary”. This erroneously assumes that lack of notice to an indispensable party is “error” rather than a “jurisdictional defect”. Moreover whether an objection is “advisable or necessary” is of no moment where there is lack of notice to an indispensable party; because that party may raise, at any time, the consequential voidness of a board order. Kirby, supra at 188 F.2d 799; Allain, supra at 212 F.2d 36.
The majority’s reliance on Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, 380 F.2d 605 (D.C.Cir.1967) is misplaced. The general rule concerning procedural objections is correctly stated and was applicable there where the union purposely refused to participate before the Special Board of Adjustment and then later complained that the evidence was not taken under oath and a transcript was not prepared by the Board. Obviously this was a procedural objection that was not timely made but had nothing to do with administrative agency jurisdiction.
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Central of Georgia, 415 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1969) which the majority cites as authority for its position, the railroad made no request for oral argument before the referee until after the referee had decided the case. We held that the carrier waived its rights because its procedural objections were not timely made. Again the question of administrative agency jurisdiction was not in question.
United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 73 S.Ct. 67, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952) relied on by the majority as authority *141for a waiver of notice to an indispensable party is inapposite. That case involved a failure to object to compliance with the technical procedure of the Administrative Procedure Act in the appointment of a hearing officer before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The case did not involve the Railway Labor Act, or an impediment to administrative agency jurisdiction.
I can find no authoritative support for the majority’s conclusion that the requirements of notice in 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (j) to an indispensable party are procedural rather than jurisdictional and can be waived. But this case does not end there. The facts are undisputed. The Railroad and Brae entered into a labor contract pursuant to which a job classification was established for clerical employees who regularly devote not less than four hours per day doing defined clerical work. In 1973 a job was awarded to a member of the Car-man Craft which required six hours of the defined clerical work per day.
It is crystal clear that there is a total absence of any competing union claims here which would make the Carman Craft an indispensable party. Nothing more is involved than an erroneous assignment of work by the Carrier. Under these circumstances the Act plainly did not intend that the courts should inject themselves into this kind of dispute. See Transportation—Communication Employees Union v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 385 U.S. 157, 87 S.Ct. 369, 17 L.Ed.2d 264 (1966).
The district court correctly determined that no third party notice was required to be given to the Carman Craft since it was not an “involved” union under the notice provisions of 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (j).