Court Opinion

ID: 9693118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:23:12.788683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:02:55.957750
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 186. (concurring). I have not voted to deny or to grant these motions, nor has Chief Justice Abrahamson or Justice Bradley. I agree with them that a denial is clearly inappropriate now. These motions deserve full briefing and oral arguments.1 Applying law to facts, after briefing and argument, is the job that Wisconsin Supreme Court justices were elected to do, and this court should do it.
¶ 187. The circumstances surrounding this matter have changed in significant ways. After reviewing the allegations and the relevant case law, I was initially ready, in the early stages of the matter, to deny the motion directed to the court to require Justice Gableman's recusal. My initial position was based on my understanding at that time that the reasoning of the majority of the court would address the petitioner's arguments concerning Caperton, and that the reasoning would be set forth in a denial order. I expected that the court would take the position that we had jurisdiction or power to consider the matter fully. My initial position was also based on the allegations in the initial motion having to do with campaign statements. I expected I would be voting with the majority of the justices in denying the motion. As it turns out, my expectation could not be realized.
¶ 188. I write separately to express my consternation, first, that three justices refuse to address adequately the very serious issues raised by these motions. Because they take the position that the court has *461no power to do what Allen asks, their writings dodge the analysis that could be undertaken to distinguish Allen's due process claim from that of the litigant in Caperton2 — analysis that is essential to the disposition of this matter.3 The writings by Justices Roggensack and Prosser, thus, essentially treat the due process claim as nonjusticiable. That was the approach of Justice Scalia's dissent4 regarding the due process claim presented in Caperton. On matters of United States constitutional law, this court is bound by the holding of the majority of the United States Supreme Court. Further, whatever Caperton may or may not mean, it at least is clear that a justice's subjective determination that he or she can be impartial is no longer enough:
The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias, and the fact that the inquiry is often a private one, simply underscore the need for objective rules. Otherwise there may be no adequate protection against a judge who simply misreads or misapprehends the real mo*462tives at work in deciding the case. The judge's own inquiry into actual bias, then, is not one that the law can easily superintend or review ....
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009). Thus, "[i]n lieu of exclusive reliance on that personal inquiry," an analysis of a claimed Due Process Clause violation considers "objective standards that do not require proof of actual bias." Id. It is highly significant that in reaching the decision that recusal was required in the Caperton case, the United States Supreme Court stated directly, "We do not question [Justice Benjamin's] subjective findings of impartiality and propriety Nor do we determine whether there was actual bias." Id. It is therefore abundantly clear that a determination that a subjective finding was made by a justice — a determination that Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler make in Part II.B. — simply cannot be dispositive.
¶ 189. Second, without briefing and without discussion of the supplemental filings, which have not been taken up by the court, this motion has been disposed of without a thorough airing of most of the issues.5 The supporting material in the supplemental *463filing of September 21, 2009, is particularly troubling. It details public statements made by Justice Gableman's attorney before a three-judge panel of the court of appeals, and at a press conference thereafter.6 These statements, made on Justice Gableman's behalf to explain his campaign strategy against an opponent, startled and appalled many in the legal community. The statements have changed this case drastically for several reasons. While Justice Gableman has recently publicly pledged to treat all persons fairly, including defendants in criminal cases, he has not repudiated any of the public statements made by his attorney, even those made at the press conference. The statements made at the press conference included one attacking the opponent as a public defender for being "willing to represent" a person accused of a sex crime against a *464child and characterizing that representation as "willingness to subvert our system of.. . bringing criminals into account." Those statements dramatically misrepresent the role of attorneys in the criminal justice system and, as the most recent filing by Allen, dated December 11, 2009, indicates, the statements have drawn a response from the Wisconsin State Bar Board of Governors. The Board unanimously adopted, by a vote of 43-0, a public policy position originally proposed by the Criminal Law Section of the State Bar, composed of both prosecutors and defense counsel, as well as judges, that reiterates the necessity of "vigorous representation for all criminal defendants," in order to maintain the integrity of the justice system.7
¶ 190. Justice Gableman informed the members of the court, on February 4, 2010, that he was withdrawing from participation in the court's consideration of the recusal issue; his decision to do so recognizes the bedrock principle of law that predates the American justice system by more than a century — that "no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause" — a principle recently repeated by Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a majority of the United States Supreme Court in the Caperton case.8 I commend him for his withdrawal decision.
*465¶ 191. The record now before the court contains serious allegations, some of which go well beyond campaign speech. Given the allegations that have been presented to the court, especially the evidence detailed in the supplemental motion, I believe this court has no choice but to exercise its power to address these motions on the merits.
¶ 192. Though, as noted above, I initially expected to vote to deny Allen's motion, I cannot join any opinion that is based on the premise that the court simply has no power to entertain the motion. Further, I cannot join any disposition of Allen's motions that fails to recognize and deal with the fact that Caperton requires, at a minimum, a new look at our interpretation of the recusal statute. I join Chief Justice Abrahamson and Justice Bradley, and I write separately for the reasons given and because of my concern for the institution of the Wisconsin court system — an institution that exists, not for its own sake, but for the purpose of protecting the constitutional rights and liberties of Wisconsin citizens.
¶ 193. For the foregoing reasons, I concur.
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK,
¶ 194. J. Aaron Antonio Allen (Allen) moves the court for an order disqualifying Justice Michael Gableman from further participation in these proceedings after the entire court, including Justice Gableman, acted to accept Allen's petition for review. Allen bases his motion on the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 1 and 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.
¶ 195. Allen's motion assumes that a majority of this court has the power to disqualify a fellow justice from participation in a pending matter. This assump*466tion presents a question for the entire court because each justice is equally affected by whether we conclude that a majority of the court has the power to disqualify a fellow justice.
¶ 196. Our decision on this issue does not depend on the factual context in which it arises, i.e., the issue would be the same if the motion to disqualify were directed at any justice. This is so because the vote of each justice on the scope of the court's power in regard to preventing a judicial peer from fully performing his or her elected office affects every justice on the court, in this case and in future cases as well. Therefore, if one justice were disqualified from participating in the decision on whether four justices may disqualify a fellow justice from fully performing his or her elected office, all justices would be disqualified from participating because all are equally affected by our decision on this issue.
¶ 197. For the reasons set forth in Section H.A., we conclude that a majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court does not have the power to disqualify a fellow justice from fully performing his or her elected office as a justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Justices David T. Prosser, Patience Drake Roggensack and Annette Kingsland Ziegler join the conclusions above and Section II.A. of this opinion. Justice Michael J. Gable-man chose to withdraw from participation in Section II.A., even though United States Supreme Court Justices do not recuse themselves from similar motions. United States Supreme Court Justices at whom disqualification motions are directed participate in the decisions on such motions.1
*467¶ 198. In addition, Allen moves the court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) (2007-08),2 for an order disqualifying Justice Gableman from participating in the consideration of this matter, alleging that he is disqualified by law from participation.
¶ 199. We conclude in Section II.B. that Allen's motion is legally insufficient to state a claim cognizable under the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions and that Justice Gableman fully performed his responsibilities under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g). Accordingly, we vote to deny Allen's motion to disqualify Justice Gableman. Justices David T. Prosser, Patience Drake Roggensack and Annette Kingsland Ziegler join in this decision. Justice Michael J. Gableman has never participated in the decision set out in Section II.B.
¶ 200. Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley and Justice Crooks decide that they have the power to disqualify another duly elected justice from participation in a pending matter if they think he or she should be removed. See Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley and Justice Crooks's writing [hereinafter Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing], passim. However, they do not decide Allen's motion, preferring to have briefing and oral argument before they do so. Id.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 201. Allen has filed one motion to Justice Gable-man individually and two motions to the court as a whole, seeking to disqualify Justice Gableman from further participation in this proceeding. Allen's first motion was filed on April 17, 2009. Allen claims that *468Justice Gableman's continued participation violates his rights under the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 1 and 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution and that Justice Gableman is disqualified by law, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g), from further participation.
¶ 202. Allen bases his disqualification motions, to the court as a whole and to Justice Gableman individually, on campaign speech by Justice Gableman, campaign speech by his campaign committee and its spokesman and campaign speech by independent third parties during the course of Justice Gableman's 2008 campaign. Allen also objects to comments Justice Gableman's defense counsel made. Allen alleges that the campaign speech and defense counsel's speech evidence bias and the appearance of bias by Justice Gableman against all defendants in criminal proceedings.
¶ 203. On September 10, 2009, Justice Gableman addressed Allen's motion that was directed to him individually. He issued a written order denying Allen's motion for his disqualification based on Allen's assertion that Justice Gableman was disqualified by law, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g), from participating in this proceeding, and that Justice Gableman's continued participation denied him due process of law.3 Justice Gableman's September 10, 2009, order was followed by a Supplemental Motion for Recusal in which Allen requested the entire court to "determine whether [Justice Gableman] actually made the determination required by Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g)."
*469II. DISCUSSION
A. Whether Four Justices Have the Power to Disqualify a Fellow Justice
¶ 204. One part of this proceeding involves a motion that four justices disqualify a fellow justice from further participation. That motion is based on sweeping allegations that campaign speech, including multiple radio and television commercials by the justice's campaign committee and independent third parties, as well as statements by defense counsel,4 are all attributable to a justice and that this "speech" evidences bias and the appearance of bias against all defendants in criminal proceedings. Allen alleges he would be denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 1 and 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution if that justice participates in this proceeding.
¶ 205. Allen makes no allegation that Justice Gableman is biased against him personally, that he has had any past involvement in or knowledge of Allen's case, or that he has any stated position toward the issues that Allen has presented in this case. In short, Allen's motion effectively seeks disqualification of a justice in all criminal cases on grounds of alleged bias against all criminal defendants.
¶ 206. Whether four justices have the power to disqualify a fellow justice from fully performing his or her elected office is a question that the entire court *470ought to address in advance of deciding Allen's motions directed at Justice Gableman. A decision on this issue is necessarily for the entire court because we have never decided this question and each justice on the court is equally affected by whether we conclude that a majority of the court has the power to disqualify a fellow justice. Our decision on this issue does not depend on the factual context in which it arises, i.e., the issue would be the same if the motion to disqualify were directed at any justice. This is so because the vote of each justice on the scope of the court's power in regard to preventing a judicial peer from fully performing his or her elected office affects every justice on the court, in this case and in all future cases as well. Therefore, if one justice were required to disqualify himself or herself from consideration of so important a question, every justice would be required to disqualify himself or herself.
¶ 207. We conclude that a majority of the justices on this court do not have the power to disqualify a fellow justice from participation in a proceeding before this court.5 Our decision is supported by the past practices of this court and by the past, and current, practices of the United States Supreme Court.
¶ 208. While our past practices do not establish precedent, we note that in all past decisions of this court, when the justice against whom a disqualification motion was made was capable of deciding the motion, our review has been limited to whether that individual justice made the determination that the motion required. In such cases, "[t]he reviewing court [] objec*471tively decide[s] if the judge went through the required exercise of making a subjective determination.... This is all that is required." Donohoo v. Action Wis., Inc., 2008 WI 110, ¶¶ 24-25, 314 Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480 (concluding that Justice Butler, himself, decided that he could be impartial);6 see also Jackson v. Benson, 2002 WI 14, ¶ 2, 249 Wis. 2d 681, 639 N.W.2d 545 (concluding that the motion to vacate an opinion in which Justice Wilcox participated was frivolous due to the inordinate delay); City of Edgerton v. Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 190 Wis. 2d 510, 521-22, 527 N.W.2d 305 (1995) (concluding that Justice Geske's disclosure in open court that she would be impartial despite the nature of her husband's employer showed she, herself, made the required subjective determination); State v. Am. TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc., 151 Wis. 2d 175, 183, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989) (concluding that once Justice Bablitch, himself, decided that he could be impartial, he was not disqualified by law from participating in the proceeding).
¶ 209. The rationale in those cases is consistent, but Donohoo, Jackson, City of Edgerton and American TV do not address the broader issue that affects each justice equally, with which we are concerned in Section II. A. That is, does a majority of the justices on this court have the power to prevent a sitting justice from fully participating in the work of his or her elected office.
*472¶ 210. In Donohoo, Jackson, City of Edgerton and American TV, the motions seeking disqualification of a justice came after the court had issued its decision in a pending case. However, as with Allen's motion, In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crosetto, 160 Wis. 2d 581, 466 N.W.2d 879 (1991), disqualification was sought before the court issued its decision. In Crosetto, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed whether all justices ought to be disqualified from participation. Crosetto's motion for disqualification alleged that each justice had a personal interest in the disciplinary proceeding because of Crosetto's personal criticisms of the justices in an ancillary proceeding. Id. at 584. Crosetto based his motion for disqualification on the appearance of a lack of impartiality. Id. He cited Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2), and he also cited the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions as legal bases for his motion. Id. at 583.
¶ 211. Six justices on this court did not convene to decide whether a seventh justice could participate in the decision in Crosetto. Instead, each justice of the court decided Crosetto's due process motion for himself or herself.7 As the court explained:
The members of this court, individually, have determined that none has a significant personal interest in the outcome of this disciplinary proceeding such as would require our disqualification. Each is satisfied that his or her impartiality in this proceeding is unimpaired and, further, that our acting in this matter does not create the appearance of a lack of impartiality.
Id. at 584 (emphasis added).
*473¶ 212. Chief Justice Abrahamson, who was a member of the court that decided Crosetto's motion, did not disqualify herself or request that the other justices decide Crosetto's due process challenge for her. Instead, she individually decided for herself that she was not disqualified from further participation by the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions or by Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2).8 Id. She also wrote a separate opinion that dissented from the discipline imposed and addressed whether a justice should apply a subjective or an objective standard to Crosetto's motion for disqualification. Id. at 602-03 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). The issue of whether someone other than then-Justice Abrahamson should decide whether she should be disqualified was never mentioned in her separate opinion.
¶ 213. However, now that the disqualification motion is not directed at her, Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing argues that four justices of this court have the power to disqualify another justice from participation. Abraham-son, C.J.'s writing, ¶ 34. This position is in direct conflict with the action that she took on her own behalf in Crosetto. She cites Case v. Hoffman, 100 Wis. 314, 74 N.W. 220 (1898), in support of her contention. Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶¶ 39-41. However, Case does not support the position she takes.
*474¶ 214. Case arose in a very interesting context because Justice Newman, for whom disqualification was sought, was dead when the court took up the motion. Case, 100 Wis. at 354. Justice Newman had previously participated in the decision, but he had never ruled on the disqualification motion. Id. Therefore, the remaining justices had to decide it, as Justice Newman obviously could not. Accordingly, Case is not support for this court to determine, that a majority of the justices have the power to disqualify a justice from participating in a proceeding before the court.
¶ 215. It is imperative to note that Case was published long before then-Justice Abrahamson's decision in Crosetto. Therefore, if Chief Justice Abrahamson truly understood Case's holding to require the court to act in the manner that she now urges, she would have acted differently in Crosetto. The reader should note that despite more than 50 pages of narration and a voluminous appendix, Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing fails to mention any reason for Chief Justice Abrahamson's change of position, now that it is not she, but rather, a different justice, who is the subject of a disqualification motion.
¶ 216. Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing also cites State v. Carprue, 2004 WI 111, 274 Wis. 2d 656, 683 N.W.2d 31, as support for the power of four justices to disqualify another justice. Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶ 86 n.54. Carprue does not support their position. Carprue involved a claim that a circuit court judge should have disqualified herself. Carprue confirmed that a judge's decision about disqualification is "up to the judge's own determination. This provision 'leaves the responsibility of withdrawal to the integrity of the individual judge.'" Carprue, 274 Wis. 2d 656, ¶ 61 (quoting State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 665, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996)).
¶ 217. Furthermore, it is a vastly different matter for this court to review whether a circuit court judge *475should have participated in a proceeding at the circuit court than it is to conclude that the majority of this court has the power to disqualify a fellow justice from participation in a pending matter. When a circuit court judge is disqualified from participating in a proceeding, another circuit court judge takes his or her place. However, when a supreme court justice is disqualified, no other person can take his or her place.9
¶ 218. The critical nature of a justice's decision on a motion for disqualification was explained by United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the context of the question of disqualification of a Supreme Court Justice. She said, "Because there's no substitute for a Supreme Court Justice, it is important that we not lightly [disqualify] ourselves." Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Day, Berry & Howard Visiting Scholar: An Open Discussion with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 1033, 1039 (2004).
¶ 219. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's history of requiring the justice who is the focus of a disqualification motion to decide the motion is consistent with the precedent of the United States Supreme Court.10 When a motion is made to disqualify a justice of the United *476States Supreme Court, either the justice for whom disqualification is sought addresses the motion individually, e.g., Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004)11 (Justice Scalia sitting individually in response to the Sierra Club's motion to disqualify him), or, less frequently, the entire Supreme Court, including the justice for whom recusal is sought, issues a one sentence denial of the motion for disqualification, e.g., Ernest v. United States Attorney for the Southern District of Alabama, 474 U.S. 1016 (1985).12
¶ 220. The United States Supreme Court has never held that a majority of that Court has the power to disqualify a judicial peer, i.e., a duly appointed and confirmed United States Supreme Court Justice, from participating in any case to come before the Court because of an allegation that the justice at whom the *477motion was directed was not impartial.13 As Justice Robert Jackson explained, "[t]here is no authority known to me under which a majority of this Court has power under any circumstances to exclude one of its duly commissioned Justices from sitting or voting in any case." Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of Am., 325 U.S. 897, 897 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
¶ 221. Similarly, in the more than 150 years that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has served the people of Wisconsin, it consistently has followed the practice of the United States Supreme Court in regard to disqualification of a judicial peer.
¶ 222. Allen cites Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. _, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), as support for his assertion that a majority of this court should disqualify a judicial peer. Caperton has no relevance here. First, the United States Supreme Court was not considering the disqualification of a judicial peer in Caperton; rather, it was considering the disqualification of a state court justice. Second, the state court justice did decide all motions for his disqualification; other *478state court justices did not decide them, even though they voiced their opposition to his decisions.
¶ 223. Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing also asserts that a federal constitutional claim must be addressed and that a state constitutional claim must have a remedy. The writing then assumes that a majority of the court must decide those claims. Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶ 46, ¶ 47 n.22. We agree that constitutional questions properly presented should be addressed and that providing a remedy for meritorious claims is important. However, addressing claims and providing a remedy do not require that a majority of the court have the power to disqualify a fellow justice from court proceedings. Constitutional claims, both federal and state, are addressed by the individual justice against whom the allegations were made, just as they were in Crosetto, when then-Justice Abrahamson decided for herself whether the allegations that the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions required her disqualification. Crosetto, 160 Wis. 2d at 584. As the opinion she joined stated, "Each is satisfied that his or her impartiality in this proceeding is unimpaired and, further, that our acting in this matter does not create the appearance of a lack of impartiality." Id. (emphasis added).14
¶ 224. Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley and Justice Crooks contend that four justices of this court have the power to remove another justice under our superintending powers. Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶ 48. There is a process by which a justice may be removed from the court, but only with due process *479accorded to the justice. All judges and justices accept the constitutional provisions for their removal and the remedies available under the judicial code upon election to the judicial branch of government.15 However, those bases for removal are a far cry from what Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing is proposing. She asserts that four justices can disqualify a fellow justice based on the allegation that a defendant's due process rights were violated by campaign speech. She accords no substantive standards and no procedural due process. Such a suggestion is shocking.16
¶ 225. Finally, Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley and Justice Crooks assume that if they have the power to force another justice off a pending case, both an impartial court and the appearance of an impartial court will result. Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, passim. Their unspoken assumption is based on the *480faulty premise that giving four members of the court the power to disqualify a fellow justice will increase the appearance of impartiality of the court.
¶ 226. This is a deeply divided court, at a very philosophical level concerning how a state supreme court should function. The public perception of this court is also deeply divided. Therefore, four justices forcing another justice off the court is just as apt to be perceived as a biased act resulting in a biased tribunal, as is the justice remaining on the case and participating in it after he or she has considered the disqualification motion. What Chief Justice Abrahamson, Justice Bradley and Justice Crooks propose is the opening of Pandora's Box to ever-increasing attempts to manipulate the outcomes in pending matters by changing the composition of the court that will decide the issues presented.
¶ 227. Actual fairness and the appearance of an unbiased tribunal are very important to us, but impartiality will not be furthered by granting four justices the power to prevent another justice from fulfilling his judicial office.
¶ 228. In summary, as is the practice of the United States Supreme Court and has been the practice of this court for more than 150 years, we, who join in this opinion, conclude that a majority of the justices on the Wisconsin Supreme Court do not have the power to disqualify a fellow justice from participation in a proceeding before this court.
¶ 229. Justices David T. Prosser, Patience Drake Roggensack and Annette Kingsland Ziegler join in this opinion.17
*481B. Whether Justice Gableman Made the Required Determination18
¶ 230. Motions such as Allen's have institutional impacts on the court as a whole. Such motions with their allegations of bias and the appearance of bias receive significant attention in the mass media and tend to undermine the public's trust and confidence in the impartiality of this court's decisions and in the integrity of all justices, not only the justice at whom the motion is directed. Accordingly, motions to disqualify a justice are never routine matters for the court.
¶ 231. At its heart, Allen's motion is based on the allegation that a judicial candidate's announced concerns for issues bearing on law enforcement is sufficient to violate Allen's constitutional right to due process of law. His motion extensively quotes campaign speech and Justice Gableman's attorney's defense of that speech. However, Allen's allegations do not even begin to approach a due process violation.
¶ 232. Not every pleading that labels itself as a due process challenge actually states such a challenge.19 Therefore, as a foundational matter, we independently review whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted. John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, ¶ 12, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827. In so doing, we accept the facts set forth in the pleadings as true for purposes of determining the *482sufficiency of the pleading. Id. However, we do not accept the pleadings' legal conclusions. Id.
¶ 233. The United States Supreme Court has explained that due process is violated only when a practice "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986). The right to an impartial judge is so rooted in our traditions as to be fundamental, and therefore, it is guaranteed by due process. State v. Hollingsworth, 160 Wis. 2d 883, 893, 467 N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1991).
¶ 234. However, the preclusion of bias that is guaranteed by due process to every party is bias against the specific party who is then before the court or bias due to the judge's having a financial interest in the outcome of the particular case then pending. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997).
¶ 235. This bias of a constitutional nature is not a generalized displeasure with a particular group, when that group is not also a constitutionally protected class. Aetna, 475 U.S. at 820-21 (concluding that allegations of a judge's general hostility toward insurance companies does not support the conclusion that such a judge's participation violated due process). The bias Allen alleges is bias against every person who is a defendant in every criminal proceeding; it is not bias against Allen.
¶ 236. Bias also is not a judge's past interpretation of issues that may appear again in a party's pending case. State v. O'Neill, 2003 WI App 73, ¶ 16, 261 Wis. 2d 534, 663 N.W.2d 292 (concluding that a judge's use of a procedure that was earlier challenged is not evidence of bias against the defendant).
¶ 237. Allen has alleged no particularized bias by Justice Gableman against him personally, nor has he alleged that Justice Gableman had any financial inter*483est in the outcome of his case. Allen has not alleged that Justice Gableman has had any past contacts of any type with him or his case. Allen has not alleged that Justice Gableman even knows who he is. No potential constitutional due process violation has been alleged here based on Justice Gableman's participation in Allen's case.
¶ 238. Allen's claim is not comparable to the claim made in Caperton. Caperton was based on claims of particularized bias against a party in a pending case because of actions taken by the other party. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263-64. Those actions were alleged to have directly benefitted a justice who at that time was about to decide Caperton's case. Id. at 2265. Here, there has been no allegation of bias against Allen because of any connection between Justice Gableman and Allen. Accordingly, Allen has failed to state a claim cognizable under the due process clauses of either the federal or state constitution.
¶ 239. Allen also has sought disqualification based on statutory grounds.20 He alleged that Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) requires Justice Gableman's disqualification. Section 757.19(2)(g) provides:
*484(2) Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself from any civil or criminal action or proceeding when one of the following situations occurs:
(g) When a judge determines that, for any reason, he or she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in an impartial manner.
¶ 240. Our most recent consideration of an alleged violation of Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) occurred in Donohoo. There, Donohoo alleged that Justice Butler contravened § 757.19(2)(g) when he accepted financial contributions from an attorney who had a case pending before the court. Donohoo, 314 Wis. 2d 510, ¶ 25. As we considered Donohoo's allegations, we reiterated the standards that are applied by this court to a justice's disqualification decision in regard to an alleged violation of § 757.19(2)(g). Id., ¶ 24. We said:
Appellate review of [the justice's] subjective determination is "limited to establishing whether the judge made a determination requiring disqualification,." American TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 186 (further citations omitted). The reviewing court must objectively decide if the judge went through the required exercise of making a subjective determination.
Id. (citing Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d at 663-64). In addition, when a motion is made to disqualify a justice from past or future proceedings, we do not address whether the justice correctly or incorrectly decided the issues presented. Am. TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 183. As we explained,
To the extent prior cases cited by the State suggest that a reviewing court, in determining whether a judge should have recused himself, is to independently and objectively determine whether there was an appearance *485of [jpartiality,... or whether the judge's impartiality can reasonably be questioned ... they are inapplicable to a determination whether a judge was disqualified by sec. 757.19(2)(g), Stats.
Id. at 183-84.
¶ 241. We now apply these standards to the decision made by Justice Gableman. The motion to disqualify Justice Gableman has been pending before the court since April 17, 2009.21 Prior to addressing Allen's motion, Justice Gableman had all of Allen's submissions before him. He also had the response of the State, which was filed April 28, 2009. When he denied Allen's motion requesting him to disqualify himself, he said:
Having considered the motion of defendant-appellant-petitioner, Aaron Antonio Allen, individually directed to Justice Michael J. Gableman for his recusal from participation in Case No. 2007AP795, and after careful consideration of the motion for recusal;
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to Justice Michael J. Gableman individually is hereby denied.
¶ 242. The order denying Allen's motion was released on September 10, 2009, after "careful consideration of the motion." Justice Gableman authored the order with all of the alleged grounds for disqualification that are now before the court. He had plenty of time to research and carefully consider the arguments made in support of and in opposition to the motion. He made a subjective determination that the grounds specified in Allen's motion did not warrant his disqualification. The order that was issued is objective proof of Justice Gableman's subjective decision. Justice Gableman's or*486der satisfied the test we set out in Donohoo. Accordingly, we conclude that Justice Gableman made the decisions he was required to make, just as Chief Justice Abrahamson did in Crosetto.
¶ 243. Although we are probably pointing out the obvious, the affirmative vote of four justices is required to grant a pending motion. There are not four justices who have voted to grant Allen's motions. Therefore, his motions, that were first presented to the court on April 17, 2009, are denied.
¶ 244. Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing laments that we did not order briefing on Allen's motions to disqualify Justice Gableman.22 The writing concludes with a proposed "ordering" of briefs on Allen's motions. The proposed "order" is unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, the "order" is without legal authority. This is so because our internal operating procedures require the affirmative vote of four justices before briefing on an issue that was not set forth in the petition for review may be ordered. IOP II.B.l. Allen did not list the disqualification of Justice Gableman either in his petition for review or in his supplemental petition for review, and there are not four justices who have voted to have additional briefing on the issues his motions raise. Second, the proposed "order" may cause unnecessary confusion, and perhaps expense, for the participating attorneys who are "ordered" to file briefs on motions that have not garnered the affirmative votes of four justices.
¶ 245. And finally, we cannot leave this decision without noting, with a degree of sadness, that in satisfying his perceived need to attack Justice Gableman's fairness, Allen did not bother to investigate *487the manner in which Justice Gableman has treated defendants who have appeared in criminal proceedings in courts over which Justice Gableman has presided. Had Allen made even a cursory investigation into the person who is Justice Michael Gableman, he would have found that in 2003, while the Circuit Court Judge of Burnett County, Justice Gableman founded the Burnett County Restorative Justice Program, an alternative model to the traditional criminal court's adversary proceeding.23 Justice Gableman remained the chairman of the Burnett County Restorative Justice Program for six years. During that time he proposed and oversaw the development of numerous special services to criminal defendants: the Inmate Community Service Program, a program under which inmates could reduce their jail time by working for charitable and municipal organizations,24 and the Victim-Offender Mediation Program, a program that permits willing victims the opportunity to take an active part in the rehabilitation of the offender.25 In 2006 as Judge in Burnett County, Justice Gableman founded the Burnett County Drug *488and Alcohol Court that presented an alternate way of approaching longstanding drug and alcohol addiction problems that many criminal defendants struggle to overcome.26
¶ 246. Accordingly, based on our discussion above, Justices Prosser, Roggensack and Ziegler vote to deny all of the motions that Allen has filed seeking the disqualification of Justice Gableman.

 Chief Justice Abrahamson's writing, ¶¶ 116, 125-127.

 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009) (reversing a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on the grounds that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated when a justice in the majority participated in the case when objective standards required recusal).

 Like Justice Ziegler, I would have this court interpret and examine the applicability of the Caperton decision, though I would have this court order briefing and oral argument before doing so, and Justice Ziegler would not. See Justice Ziegler's writing, ¶ 271.

 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2275 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court today continues its quixotic quest to right all wrongs and repair all imperfections through the Constitution. Alas, the quest cannot succeed — which is why some wrongs and imperfections have been called nonjusticiable.").

 A supplemental filing providing additional authorities was filed August 13, 2009. A supplemental motion filed September 21, 2009, directed to the court as a whole, seeks review of Justice Gableman's individual denial of the motion for recusal on statutory and ethical grounds, and alleges that he did not make the determination required by Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g), which mandates a justice's disqualification when in fact or in appearance, the justice cannot act in an impartial manner. A second supplement to the motion was filed December 11, 2009, and it summarizes the reasons for the new filing thus:
This supplement is necessary because (1) the Court has not ruled on the parties' joint position that full briefing is necessary to *463resolve the important issues presented in Mr. Allen's motion, (2) inclusion of other recent developments following the filing of Allen's original and supplemental motions are necessary to complete the record, especially should this matter have to go to federal court, and (3) recent statements by certain members of the Court reflect a serious misunderstanding of the possible relevance of the First Amendment to the issues of recusal raised in Allen's motion.

 The statements made before the panel as part of a hearing on an ethics complaint brought by the Wisconsin Judicial Commission included statements that deliberately conflated the roles of a justice and a public defender. They included statements that Justice Gableman's opponent was "willing to find a loophole, whatever result that manifests," even for a defendant who was "evil," and that the message of a campaign ad was, "[T]his guy is willing to find a loophole for such an evil person, do we really want him on the State Supreme Court if that's his mindset?" In the matter of Judicial Disciplinary Proceedings Against the Honorable Michael J. Gableman, Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Hon. Michael J. Gableman, No. 2008AP2458-J, slip op. at 18 (2009) (Deininger, J, concurring) (quoting Tr. of Oral Argument).

 The full text of the position can be found at the web site of the Wisconsin Bar Association (http://www.wisbar.org/AM/ Template.cfm?Section=News&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay. cfm&ContentID=88343).

 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009) (reversing a judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia on the grounds that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated when a justice in the majority participated in the case when objective standards required recusal).

 See infra ¶ 26, notes 11-12.

 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated.

 Justice Gableman further explained his reasons for denying Allen's motions in a supplemental order issued January 15, 2010.

 Justice Crooks finds fault with Justice Gableman's silence in regard to statements his attorney is alleged to have made. Justice Crooks's dissent, ¶ 189. However, as Justice Crooks surely knows, Justice Gableman is involved in pending litigation and it is not uncommon for a party to refrain from comment at such a time.

 The Wisconsin Constitution establishes a Wisconsin Supreme Court consisting of seven co-equal justices. Wis. Const, art. VII, § 4(1). The Constitution does not grant any particular justice or group of justices power over a judicial peer with respect to whether he or she may hear a particular case.

 Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing implies that in Donohoo v. Action Wis., Inc., 2008 WI 110, 314 Wis. 2d 510, 754 N.W.2d 480, the court reviewed the merits of whether a justice ought to have disqualified himself. Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶ 42. That is incorrect because the court did not decide whether Justice Butler correctly concluded that he could be impartial. The court decided only that "Justice Butler clearly determined that he could be impartial." Donohoo, 314 Wis. 2d 510, ¶ 25 (emphasis added).

 Chief Justice Abrahamson is the only justice now serving on the Wisconsin Supreme Court who was also a member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court when In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Crosetto, 160 Wis. 2d 581, 466 N.W.2d 879 (1991), was decided.

 Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing above attempts to divert attention from a comparison of then-Justice Abrahamson's acts in Crosetto with her current position by asserting that she "did not join" the per curiam opinion. Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶ 10 n.2. This is not a forthright statement to the reader. Chief Justice Abrahamson, then-Justice Abrahamson, was the only woman justice when Crosetto was decided. Therefore, the statement in the per curiam that "her impartiality in this proceeding is unimpaired" must refer to the decision of then-Justice Abrahamson.

 Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing extensively relies on judicial disqualification opinions regarding circuit court judges, without informing the reader that the judge who was the focus of the motion was a circuit court judge and without pointing out the difference between our disqualifying a circuit court judge as compared with disqualifying a judicial peer. See discussions of In re Hon. Charles E. Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975); State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996); State v. Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 325 N.W.2d 687 (1982). Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, passim.

 In a 2004 interview, United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg clearly explained that the decision about *476whether a Supreme Court Justice is disqualified from participation in a proceeding is always made by the individual justice. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Day, Berry & Howard Visiting Scholar: An Open Discussion with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 1033, 1039 (2004).

 See also Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000) (wherein Justice Rehnquist responded denying a motion for his disqualification); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301 (1980) (Justice Rehnquist denying a motion for his disqualification); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 901 (1972) (Justice Rehnquist denying a motion for his disqualification); Gravel v. United States, 409 U.S. 902 (1972) (Justice Rehnquist denying a motion for his disqualification); Guy v. United States, 409 U.S. 896 (1972) (Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist individually denying motions requesting disqualification of each justice).

 See also Kerpelman v. Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md., 450 U.S. 970 (1981) (summary denial of motion to disqualify Chief Justice Burger); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 409 U.S. 1029 (1972) (summary denial of motions to disqualify Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist).

 In 1975, after Justice William O. Douglas suffered a serious stroke that left him severely compromised, seven of the remaining justices decided not to assign Justice Douglas any more opinions to write. However, they did not disqualify Justice Douglas from all further participation in Court proceedings, even in his very compromised condition. He was not forced off any case. See David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 995 (2000). The action taken regarding Justice Douglas has nothing to do with whether four justices can disqualify a fully competent member of this court from a pending proceeding. Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing's description of the actions taken by the United States Supreme Court after Justice Douglas had suffered a stroke is not accurate. See Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶ 62, Appendix B, ¶¶ 161-62.

 Chief Justice Abrahamson, then-Justice Abrahamson, was the only woman justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court when Crosetto was decided. Therefore, she did decide, for herself, Crosetto's motion to disqualify her on the basis of the state and federal due process clauses.

 A justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court can be removed only through impeachment (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 1), defeat in an election (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 4(1) & § 9; Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 12), as part of a disciplinary proceeding by the supreme court for cause or disability (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 11), by address (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 13), or if the legislature were to impose a mandatory retirement age (Wis. Const. art. VII, § 24(2)).

 We note Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing's lengthy narration of her version of proposed decisions that she contends were presented in the private meetings of the justices. Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶¶ 14 — 19. In the past, we have not publicly discussed what we believed transpired in our private meetings while a case was being considered. We also have not discussed proposed decisions, considering preliminary opinions the confidential work product of the court. We are at a loss to determine why Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing has taken this tack as it adds nothing to the legal reasoning in her opinion. Perhaps it is an attempt to justify Chief Justice Abrahamson's extraordinary delay in permitting the public release of our decision on Allen's recusal motion.

 Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing is filled with name-calling directed at the members of the court who have joined in this opinion. Name-calling is not legal reasoning. Name-calling *481reflects poorly on the justices who resort to its use and reflects adversely on the dignity of this court as an institution. We have not responded in kind.

 Justice Gableman has never participated in the decision set out in Section II.B.

 Abrahamson, C. J.'s writing has ignored this basic premise of law.

 The federal court system has established an expanded rule that satisfies various due process and other non-constitutional concerns. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006). Wisconsin also employs a statutory scheme to guide judges and justices in fulfilling their obligation either to participate or to disqualify themselves.- See Wis. Stat. § 757.19. However, as we have recognized in the context of judicial disqualification, "not all questions of judicial qualification ... involve constitutional validity." State v. Kywanda F., 200 Wis. 2d 26, 35, 546 N.W.2d 440 (1996). "The adoption of [disqualification] statutes that permit disqualification for bias or prejudice is not a sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 36 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986)).

 On August 13, 2009, Allen filed a letter supplementing the authority he previously cited for his April 17, 2009 motion.

 Abrahamson, C.J.'s writing, ¶¶ 21-22, passim.

 Restorative Justice Receives $42,000 Bremer Grant, Inter-County Leader, Sept. 21, 2005 (available at http:// www.the-leader.net) (enter 9/21/05 as the issue date in the "search archives" box; then follow "Restorative Justice Receives .. ." hyperlink).

 Joan O. Fallon, Judge Asks Grantsburg to Consider Inmate Work Program, Inter-County Leader, July 20, 2005 (iavailable at http://www.the-leader.net) (enter 7/20/05 as the issue date in the "search archives" box; then follow "Judge Asks Grantsburg..." hyperlink).

 Nancy Jappe, Restorative Justice Has New Staff, Inter-County Leader, Feb. 15, 2007 (available at http://www.theleader.net) (enter 2/15/07 as the issue date in the "search archives" box; then follow "Restorative Justice Has ..." hyperlink).

 Nancy Jappe, County Celebrates First Drug and Alcohol Court Graduation, Inter-County Leader, July 11, 2007 {available at http://www.the-leader.net) (enter 7/11/07 as the issue date in the "search archives" box; then follow "County Celebrates .. ." hyperlink); Nancy Jappe, County Board Hears Reports on Drug Court and Lakes and Rivers Association, Inter-County Leader, Jan. 24,2007 {available at http://www.theleader.net) (enter 1/24/07 as the issue date in the "search archives" box; then follow "County Board Hears ..." hyperlink).