Court Opinion

ID: 9599829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:21:44.235579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:47.096127
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I concur entirely with the majority, I believe that several important legal factors should also be addressed.
1. The legal significance under OCGA § 51-3-1 of the Georgia Access To & Use of Public Facilities By Persons With Disabilities Act, OCGA § 30-3-1 et seq., which mandates compliance with the American National Standards Institute standards1 or possibly the Rehabilitation Act of 19732 is that the owner/occupier has actual or constructive knowledge of any static condition, the absence of any safety *554device mandated, or prohibited condition under such Acts. Thus, as to any owner/occupier of premises that are subject to the mandate of one or more of such Acts, the first prong has been satisfied of premises liability “that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the [condition]” and that such knowledge is “superior” to the invitee’s knowledge, because such Acts put the owner/occupier on notice of the dangers and possible risk of injury to those individuals within the ambit of the Acts as to the requirements for the'premises. See Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (493 SE2d 403) (1997); Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 623 (272 SE2d 327) (1980). The mandated knowledge gives the owner/occupier superior knowledge over the invitee as to conditions or defects set forth under the Act that should be prevented.
Decided June 11, 1998
Reconsiderations denied July 24, 1998
Goodman, McGuffey, Aust & Lindsey, William S. Goodman, Kimberly C. Raley, Tracy M. Culver, Goodman & Associates, James E. Goodman, Norman L. Smith, for appellants.
Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, Alexander H. Booth, Robert L. Shannon, Jr., for appellees.
2. The foregoing is not negligence per se, even though it does satisfy some of the elements for premises liability under Alterman. Before such Acts can give rise to negligence per se, the plaintiff must show that the deceased was disabled within the meaning of the Act or Acts, that the intent of the Act was to protect such disabled as the deceased from safety risks of slip-and-fall, and that the injury was caused in whole or in part by deviation from such safety measures under the Act. Keith v. Beard, 219 Ga. App. 190 (464 SE2d 633) (1995); Bradley v. Custom Sprinkler Systems, 218 Ga. App. 431 (461 SE2d 592) (1995); Central Anesthesia Assocs. P. C. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150 (325 SE2d 819) (1985); Potts v. Fidelity Fruit &c. Co., 165 Ga. App. 546 (301 SE2d 903) (1983). Thus, if the plaintiff by proof can bring the deceased within the statutory definition of “disabled” and show that the Act was intended to safeguard the disabled from the risk of injury that the deceased received, then the plaintiff may be able to prove negligence per se. Thompson v. Crownover, 259 Ga. 126, 129 (4) (381 SE2d 283) (1989); Biggs v. Long, 212 Ga. App. 195, 199 (3) (441 SE2d 677) (1994).

 OCGA § 30-3-9 requires compliance with “ANSI” standards A117.1-1986 or A117.11980.

 29 USCS § 701 et seq.; 42 USCS § 12201 (a); 59 FR 17446. The Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 USCS § 12101 et seq. cannot be applied in this case, because of res judicata. The Federal District Court in this case, originally in the federal court, adjudicated that since the plaintiff was deceased and since only injunctive relief was sought, then there no longer existed a federal action under the ADA. Federal jurisdiction was lost with the loss of the federal issue, which under federal practice was an adjudication on the merits. Therefore, the ADA and any derivative actions were res judicata in this suit. However, if the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is applicable to a person with a disability who comes within the ambit of that Act, then the Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings & Facilities, 36 CFR § 1191.1 were applicable.