Court Opinion

ID: 9747062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:54:50.516803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:19.623803
License: Public Domain

YEGAN, J.
I respectfully dissent.
Our Supreme Court has held that Code of Civil Procedure section 998 reflects California’s policy of encouraging settlements. (Poster v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 266, 270 [276 Cal.Rptr. 321, 801 P.2d 1072].) “In order to encourage parties to accept reasonable settlement offers made pursuant to the section, subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 998 afford the offeror a remedy against a party who has failed to accept a statutory settlement offer that proves to be reasonable.” (Ibid.) Today, the majority thwart that policy.
DeCharon made a $15,000 statutory offer which included costs on March 19, 1992, seven months before the action was tried. The Adams rejected the offer and obtained a verdict for $9,900. Judgment was entered November 18, 1992.
A month later, counsel for Adams moved for attorney fees. The motion failed to apportion fees or set forth what fees were incurred before the statutory offer was made. Instead, counsel declared that Adams’ fees were “$44,600 to date.” The trial court denied the motion.
The Adams have not provided a reporter’s transcript of the hearing. Because this is a judgment roll appeal, every presumption is drawn in favor of the judgment. (Wheelright v. County of Marin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 448, 454 [85 Cal.Rptr. 809, 467 P.2d 537].) The majority, however, reverse on the theory that the Adams might be able to show that their preoffer attorney fees, when added to the $9,900 award, exceed $15,000. The holding undermines the pragmatic value of statutory offers to compromise.
The trial court, in determining whether a plaintiff has obtained a judgment more favorable than the defendant’s statutory offer, adds the plaintiff’s preoffer costs to the damage award. (Stallman v. Bell (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 740, 748 [286 Cal.Rptr. 755].) “Postoffer costs are, however, excluded. *715[Citations.]” (Ibid.) Attorney fees, under Civil Code section 1717 or Code of Civil Procedure section 1021, are treated as a cost item. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10); Russell v. Trans Pacific Group (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1724-1725 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 274].) The motion for attorney fees must spell out in detail the date, nature, and value of the services rendered. (E.g., Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559-560 [227 Cal.Rptr. 354] [attorney’s testimony that he billed $40,000 “for services rendered” insufficient].)
Here the trial court was told that the total fees were “$46,000 to date.” The Adams did not itemize their attorney fees or seek leave to file an amended declaration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.) No competent evidence was presented that the fees and costs incurred before the statutory offer, when added to the $9,900 award, exceeded $15,000. The trial court properly concluded that DeCharon was the prevailing party as defined by Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (c).
The Adams are not entitled to a second bite of the apple. Assuming, on remand, they show that the judgment and preoffer costs exceed $15,000, the trial court retains the discretion to deny costs because the judgment could have been rendered in a court of lesser jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033, subd. (a).) More problematic is Code of Civil Procedure section 998, subdivision (c). The Legislature, effective January 1, 1995, amended the statute to provide in pertinent part that “. . . . a plaintiff in a cause of action not based on tort shall not be deemed to have obtained a more favorable judgment unless the judgment obtained by the plaintiff, exclusive of attorney’s fees and costs, exceeds the offer made by the defendant pursuant to this section.” (Stats. 1994, ch. 332, § 1.)
I would affirm the judgment. No showing has been made that the trial court abused its discretion or failed to follow the law. “[E]ven a defendant against whom a money judgment is entered can recover costs under section 998, subdivision (c). [Citation.]” (Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 797, 803 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 838 P.2d 218].)
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 15, 1995. Yegan, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.