Court Opinion

ID: 9611806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:00:40.411801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:16.661645
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
By their motion for rehearing, appellants Danny Lee Lambert and Teresa Lambert, individually and as next friends of Rusty Lambert and Rebecca Lambert (Lambert), contend this Court erred by affirming the summary judgment that they take nothing against appellee Affiliated Foods, Inc. Remaining convinced that our affirmance of the summary judgment was proper, we overrule Lambert’s motion for rehearing with the following additional comments.1
In support of his contention that the waiver or election executed by Lambert of rights to sue Affiliated for common law negligence are unenforceable on grounds of public policy, Lambert points out that after briefs were filed herein and before submission of the case, the Texas Supreme Court denied a petition for discretionary review in Reyes v. Storage & Processors, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied). In addition to the reasons set out in our original opinion, we do not deem Reyes controlling or applicable for two reasons.
First, the Reyes court concluded that if the employer’s plan benefits which required a waiver were not similar to the benefits provided under the Act, then the waiver was void as being contrary to public policy. Following its comparative analysis of the benefits provided by the Act to those provided by the plan, the Reyes court held that the waiver signed by the employee was void on public policy grounds. The employer’s plan under consideration in Reyes did not provide benefits for non-occupational injuries, and benefits were limited to injuries arising from the employer-employee relationship. In contrast, Affiliated’s plan provides no-fault coverage for occupational as well as nonoccupational injuries to employees who voluntarily elect to participate in the plan.2 Generally, Affiliated’s plan provides short-term disability benefits, long-term disability coverage, accidental death and dismemberment benefits, and life insurance. Thus, for example, if Lambert’s injuries had been sustained in an automobile accident while driving to work, he would have been entitled to benefits under Affiliated’s plan, but would not have been eligible for benefits under the Act. Jones v. United States Fire Insurance Company, 420 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Unlike the plan in Reyes, Affiliated’s plan provides benefits for injuries received in addition to those covered by the Act. Thus, the two plans are not capable of comparison as was done in Reyes3 Therefore, Reyes does not apply to a plan which provides broader coverage than required by the Act.
Second, as Affiliated suggests in its response to the motion for rehearing, the effect of the notation “denied” means *8that Reyes is not binding on this Court. See Tex.R.App.P. 56.1(b)(1). Even the Reyes court agrees that denial of a petition does not necessarily indicate the Supreme Court’s approval or even its consideration of the merits of the ease. See Alamo Community College Dist. v. Obayashi, 980 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). Even if Affiliated’s plan was comparable to the employer’s plan in Reyes, nevertheless this Court is not bound to follow the decision of our sister court. Mitchell v. John Wiesner, Inc., 923 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1996, no writ).
Accordingly, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled. We also direct that our original opinion in this cause dated November 16, 1999, and this opinion be designated for publication.

. In our original opinion dated November 16, 1999, we adopted our decision in Lawrence v. CDB Services, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 903 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1999). Because the opinion dated October 11, 1999 was withdrawn, we adopt and incorporate the opinion on rehearing in Lawrence v. CDB Services, Inc., 16 S.W.3d 35 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 2000).

. Under the Affiliated plan intoxication or "horseplay” are not defenses to coverage.

.Comparative analysis of the benefits provided under the Act and those provided by the plan would be subjective depending upon whether the subject accident was work related. Moreover, because of the broader coverage under Affiliated’s plan as opposed to limited coverage under the Act, any attempt to make an intelligent comparison would be futile, (i.e., comparing "apples to oranges”).