Court Opinion

ID: 9604158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:15:49.67852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:15.856035
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority concludes that, in interpreting sections 1-7-309(3), IB C.R.S. (1991 Supp.), and l-7-507(l)(e), IB C.R.S. (1991 Supp.), “a substantial compliance test affords the appropriate means of analysis.” Op. at 876. I disagree. Application of well settled rules of statutory construction reveals that both sections impose mandatory requirements regarding write-in ballots. §§ 1-7-309(3), l-7-507(l)(e), IB C.R.S. (1980 & 1991 Supp.). I dissent, and would reverse that portion of the district court’s ruling addressing the vote count.
I.
We are called on to determine whether the district court properly construed sec*879tions 1-7-309(3) and 1-7-507(1)(e). Those sections provide as follows:
1-7-309. Determination of defective ballots.
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(3) No cross mark (X) shall be required to the right of the name of any candidate written in by a voter. Each write-in vote shall include a reasonably correct spelling of the last name and the given name or the initial or the nickname and the last name of the candidate for whom the vote is intended.
1-7-507. Electronic vote-counting— procedure.
(1) ....
(e) No ballot without the official endorsement, except as provided in section 1-6-408, shall be allowed to be deposited in the ballot box, and no ballot shall be counted unless it is provided in accordance with the provisions of this code. Each write-in vote shall include a reasonably correct spelling of a given name or an initial or nickname and the last name of the person for whom the vote is intended. Ballots not counted shall be marked “defective” on the back thereof and shall be preserved by the county clerk and recorder pursuant to section 1-7-701.
§ 1-7-309(3), § 1-7-507(1)(e), 1B C.R.S. (1991 Supp.) (emphasis added).1 Relying on Erickson v. Blair, 670 P.2d 749 (Colo.1983), and on Moran v. Carlstrom, 775 P.2d 1176 (Colo.1989), the majority finds that application of a substantial compliance rule “appropriately protects the right to vote against unnecessary and unreasonable governmental restriction.”2 Op. at 875. I find that neither Erickson nor Moran provide the appropriate framework for the task of statutory construction that we are required to perform in the present case. However, if Erickson and Moran did govern the instant dispute, I do not believe that they support the application of a substantial compliance standard in this case.
A.
In Erickson v. Blair, 670 P.2d 749 (Colo.1983), we considered whether seven voter affidavits complied with the requirements of section 32-1-821(4), 13 C.R.S. (1973 & 1982 Supp.), in the context of a special district election. Id. at 750-51. That section then provided:
The return envelope for the absent voter’s ballot shall have printed thereon an affidavit containing a statement of the qualifications for an elector, and it shall contain a space for the person’s name, address, and signature, and the date of election. The voter shall sign the affidavit stating that he is an elector of the district and that he has not previously voted at said election.
§ 32-1-821(4), 13 C.R.S. (1973 & 1982 Supp.); see Erickson, 670 P.2d at 751. Thus, the statute at issue required that the affidavit attached to an absent voter ballot return envelope contain a certain statement, and a space for the absent voter’s name, address, signature, and the date of election. The statute also required voters to sign the affidavit.
We concluded in Erickson that two of the seven affidavits were improperly executed on the grounds that one absent voter failed to sign the affidavit and another absent voter provided an address outside of the district. Id. at 757. We found that five absent voter affidavits were deficient insofar as the absent voters either failed to *880place an “X” in the appropriate box corresponding to a choice in voter qualification categories, or failed to write their address on the appropriate line, or failed to write in the election date. Id. at 756-57. We concluded in Erickson that the deficiencies did not render the affidavits deficient; the statute at issue in Erickson, however, did not expressly require that absent voters so complete the affidavits. The statute only required that space be provided for such information and that the absent voter sign the affidavit. Id. at 751. We rejected the ballot accompanied By the unsigned affidavit, and the ballot accompanied by an affidavit listing an address outside of the district. Id. at 755.
In Moran v. Carlstrom, 775 P.2d 1176 (Colo.1989), this court considered whether four write-in ballots could be counted for one of two candidates in a general election. Id. at 1179. We evaluated the validity of the ballots against section 1-7-309, which provided that “a ballot may not be counted ‘[i]f a voter marks in ink or indelible pencil more names than there are persons to be elected to an office or if for any reason it is impossible to determine the choice of any voter for any office to be filled.’ ” Id. We concluded in Moran that a ballot cast by a qualified elector should be rejected only if the elector’s intent could not be ascertained with reasonable certainty; the statute at issue in Moran, however, did not impose a mandatory requirement. Id. at 1180. Rather, the statute at issue invited discretionary evaluation of whether an absent voter revealed intent with reasonable certainty. Id. at 1179. We ultimately rejected the four contested ballots on the ground that the voter’s intent could not be ascertained with reasonable certainty because each of the contested ballots selected more names than persons to be elected to a specific district office. Id. at 1179-83.
Unlike either Erickson or Moran, the statutory scheme in the present case does not contain a provision inviting the exercise of discretion. As such, neither case directly controls the present dispute. In both Erickson and Moran, this court applied statutory schemes that invited the exercise of discretion, and concluded that a substantial compliance standard was appropriate. We rejected ballots that failed to comply with the statutory scheme’s requirements and tolerated deficiencies that went, not to choice of candidate, but to matters of form, such as completing voter qualification forms. Thus, if I were to conclude that the cases did govern the instant dispute, I would find that they instruct that substantial compliance is not an appropriate standard to apply where, as in the present case, a voter’s choice of candidate is the basis of the alleged write-in ballot deficiency.3 I conclude, however, that we are constrained to apply the principles of statutory construction to resolve the present dispute.4
B.
“In construing a statute or statutes, ‘we seek to determine the intent of the legisla*881ture as expressed in the language it selected.’ ” Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. RE-1, 841 P.2d 237, 246 (Colo.1992) (quoting Triad Painting Co. v. Blair, 812 P.2d 638, 644 (Colo.1991)); A.B. Hirschfeld Press, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 806 P.2d 917, 920 (Colo.1991); Bloomer v. Board of County Comm’rs, 799 P.2d 942, 944 (Colo.1990); People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 975 (Colo.1987). ‘“[A] court should look first to the plain language of the statute,’ and words used ‘should be given effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning.’ ” Martin, 841 P.2d at 246 (quoting Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo.1991)); see East Lakewood Sanitation Dist. v. District Court, 842 P.2d 233, 235 (Colo.1992) (relying on Griffin v. S.W. Devanney and Co., 775 P.2d 555, 559 (Colo.1989)); Guenther, 740 P.2d at 975 (holding that this court looks first to the language of a statute, giving terms their commonly understood and accepted meaning). “ ‘Where the word “shall” is used in a statute, it is presumed to be mandatory.’ ”5 East Lakewood Sanitation Dist., 842 P.2d at 235 (quoting Sargent Sch. Dist. v. Western Servs., Inc., 751 P.2d 56, 60 (Colo.1988)); Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Saddoris, 825 P.2d 39, 43 (Colo.1992); Guenther, 740 P.2d at 975.
In the present case, the statutes at issue each state:
1-7-309(3) ... Each write-in vote shall include a reasonably correct spelling of the last name and the given name or the initial or the nickname and the last name of the candidate for whom the vote is intended.
1-7-507(1)(e) ... Each write-in vote shall include a reasonably correct spelling of a given name or an initial or nickname and the last name of the person for whom the vote is intended.
§§ 1-7-309(3), 1-7-507(1)(e), 1B C.R.S. (1980 & 1991 Supp.) (emphasis added). Taken together, these sections mandate that a write-in ballot contain a reasonably correct spelling of a last name, and either a given name, nickname, or initial of the person for whom the vote is intended. Accordingly, to be valid, the statutory scheme requires that a write-in ballot contain some version of “Lamm,” and some version of “Margaret” or “Peggy,” including either “M” or “P.” I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “write-in votes for ‘Lamm,’ ‘Ms. Lamm,’ ‘Miss Lamm,’ or ‘Mrs. Lamm’ should be counted for Peggy Lamm.” Op. at 877.
Relying on case law from other jurisdictions, the majority concludes that “[t]he district court properly considered evidence extrinsic to the ballots in ascertaining the voter’s intent.” Op. at 877. The statutory scheme at issue, however, neither addresses voter intent nor evidence extrinsic to the ballot. I thus find no need to “indulge in ... speculation [that] subverts the constitutionally recognized power of the General Assembly to pass legislation ‘to secure the purity of elections.’ ” Op. at 878 (quoting Colo. Const, art. VII, § 11).

. Section 11 of article VII of the Colorado Constitution confers upon the General Assembly the power to "pass laws to secure the purity of elections, and guard against abuses of the elective franchise.” Colo. Const, art. VII, § 11; see People ex rel. the Attorney General v. The New-Times Publishing Co., 35 Colo. 253, 293, 84 P. 912, 925 (1906) (“[T]he constitution of Colorado, in and by article VII thereof, distinctly and in terms confers upon the legislative branch of the government the making of all laws and regulations for the conduct of elections.”).

. The majority also premises its application of a substantial compliance standard on both federal cases and cases from other states. Op. at 874-878. While instructive of general trends, I find that none of these cases provides the framework for resolution of the present dispute because none of the cases cited evaluates those sections of the Colorado Revised Statutes at issue in the present case.

. The majority additionally relies on an 1889 case, Kellogg v. Hickman, 12 Colo. 256, 21 P. 325 (1889). Op. at 875. I find, however, that reliance on Kellogg is not warranted for the same reasons I would decline to rely on Moran or Erickson. The Kellogg court found that (1) forty-eight votes cast on printed pale yellow paper should have been counted where the statute at issue required votes to be cast on plain white paper; (2) thirty votes placed in a sealed ballot box should have been counted regardless of the fact that the judges who counted and tallied the votes failed to sign the tally-lists or poll-books until the day after the election; and (3) twenty-two votes should have been counted where voters provided sufficient evidence of their residence by testimony at trial.

. The majority opines that "we are guided by the principle that statutes must be construed in such manner as to avoid potential constitutional difficulties. The presumption of constitutionality accorded all statutes also assumes that the legislative body intends the statutes it adopts to be compatible with constitutional standards." Op. at 876. The majority structures its analysis by noting, on the one hand, that the right to vote is fundamental under our constitutional structure, but that, on the other hand, the constitution expressly confers authority to regulate elections upon the General Assembly. Op. at 874. By implication, the majority posits that §§ 1-7-309(3) and l-7-507(l)(e) are unconstitutional in the absence of application of a substantial compliance standard. The district court, however, did not "declare that the statutes are unconstitutional." I am not inclined to address constitutional arguments not briefed by either of the parties.

. The majority relies on an 1895 case, Young v. Simpson, 21 Colo. 460, 42 P. 666 (1895), as standing for the proposition that this court will not require strict compliance with statutes "unless the statute declares that a strict compliance [standard] is essential.” Op. at 876 (quoting Young, 21 Colo. at 462, 42 P. at 667). This rationale conflicts with our more current reasoning that the presence of the word “shall” in a statute indicates that a statute’s language is mandatory. This court has not previously instructed the General Assembly that it must declare that strict compliance “is essential” prior to our giving a statute a mandatory construction. I am not persuaded that an indication of this court given in 1895 justifies divergence from our otherwise consistent application of rules of statutory construction.