Court Opinion

ID: 9707834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:22:49.625807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:38.735293
License: Public Domain

SACKETT, Judge
(concurring in part; dissenting in part).
I concur in part and dissent in part. I would affirm the trial court.
Carrie and Irvin were divorced and the dissolution decree made the parties joint custodians of their children and awarded Carrie physical care. Carrie filed for modification of the decree to restrict Irvin’s visitations and requested the following relief:
[That the trial court] modify the Decree to prohibit the Respondent [Irvin] from allowing any of the Petitioner’s [Carrie’s] family to visit with the children or place them in their care for any period of time and further requesting that the Respondent [Irvin] be prohibited from allowing any contact whatsoever between the Petitioner’s [Carrie’s] family and the minor children.
The issue is whether Carrie has shown facts which, if believed, would show a change of circumstances and grounds to justify modification of the dissolution decree.
To justify a modification, Carrie must show changed circumstances. In re Marriage Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983). The circumstances to show a change of visitation are not as great as those to modify custody. See In re Marriage of Jerome, 378 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Iowa App.1985).
The trial court found the record showed Carrie’s position was that:
Her relationship with her own family has deteriorated so that her family refuses contact with her;
That her family has sought to circumvent her by obtaining visitation from Irvin;
That Carrie is in a position of not knowing where her children are during their visitations with Irvin and that places Irvin in the center of a conflict between Carrie and her family; and
Irvin has assisted Carrie’s family in the matter even though he knows Carrie disapproves.
Carrie claims she should control not only her time with the children but, also, the time Irvin spends with the children.
There are two questions:
*6The first is, can a custodial parent restrict the visitation of a noncustodial joint custodian?
And, did Carrie show that there was a factual issue concerning the interest of the children?
The evolution of our statutory law on joint custody has evidenced the legislature’s strong voice that children deserve the attention and support of both parents even when a marriage is dissolved.
Apparently, the majority has determined Carrie does not have veto power over Irvin’s visitation; a position with which I agree. I depart, though, from the majority’s conclusion Lihs v. Lihs, 504 N.W.2d 890 (Iowa 1993), and Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571 (Iowa 1984), may be applicable, in whole or in part, to the issue before us. In Lihs, the natural father was deceased. In Olds, the grandparents were seeking visitation. Neither case is instructive.
Irvin is a natural parent and a joint custodian. His status in regard to visitation is clearly defined by Iowa Code section 598.1(3) which provides:
“Joint custody” or “joint legal custody” means an award of custody of a minor child to both parents under which both parents have rights and responsibilities toward the child and under which neither parent has rights superior to those of the other parent. The court may award physical care to one parent only. (Emphasis supplied).
The second issue is whether there is evidence from which a fact finder could find there is a change of circumstances and the interest of the children require modification.
The only evidence of changed circumstances is Carrie at the time of the dissolution decree had a relationship with her parents and her brothers and today she does not. I do not find this to be evidence such as would support a finding for a modification. Particularly where, as here, there is no evidence the relief Carrie seeks is in the children’s best interests.
There is no evidence visitation between Carrie’s children and Carrie’s parents and brothers poses any threat to the children. In fact, the following portions of Carrie’s affidavit illustrate that point:
While my mother has done nothing to this point to harm my relationship with my children that I know of, I think there is the very real potential for her to do so. She has a history of causing poor family relations. My mother has been involved in long-standing disputes with my father’s family, specifically his two brothers for separate reasons, and is not welcome in their home. My father’s family wants nothing to do with her.
I think it is completely possible that at some point in the future my mother may attempt to alienate the children from me or otherwise undermine my authority with my children. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court made the observation Carrie is attempting to keep her children from her mother to force her mother to reestablish communications. The court went on to reason, “In this way, Carrie is using the children as a lever to force her mother to mend their broken relationship.”
The observation is clearly evident from Carrie’s affidavit where she states, in part, “I fail to see why he [Irvin] should be drawn into it. I fail to see why he [Irvin] does not understand that if it were not for his allowing visitation with my family they would have to go through me and he would not be in this situation at all.”
There is nothing in this record from which a fact finder could determine Irvin’s recognition of a need for the children to be in contact with their mother’s extended family with whom they have had substantial bonding is harmful to the children. Absent such a showing, there is no basis to put restrictions on Irvin’s visitation. The trial court should be affirmed.
While I feel summary judgment in a modification case is unusual, the trial court should be affirmed in this case. Additionally, I would order Carrie pay $1000 toward Irvin’s attorney fees.