Court Opinion

ID: 9963965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 16:06:04.79346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.130992
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     Apr 26 2024, 9:59 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

                                             IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                   Matthew Lucious Setlak,
                                         Appellant-Defendant

                                                     v.

                                          State of Indiana,
                                           Appellee-Plaintiff

                                             April 26, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-CR-2516
                              Appeal from the Lake Superior Court
                            The Honorable Samuel L. Cappas, Judge
                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                         45G04-1909-F1-47

                                Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                          Judges Mathias and Weissmann concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2516 | April 26, 2024                 Page 1 of 13
      Tavitas, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Following a jury trial, Matthew Setlak was convicted of three counts of child

      molesting, Level 1 felonies; one count of child molesting, a Level 4 felony; and

      one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors, a Level 6 felony. On

      appeal, Setlak claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting,

      under the Protected Person Statute, certain out-of-court statements the victim

      made to her mother. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

      discretion in admitting these statements. We also conclude that any error in the

      admission of these statements was cumulative of other evidence and, therefore,

      harmless. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Issue
[2]   Setlak presents one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial

      court abused its discretion in admitting, under the Protected Person Statute,

      statements the victim made to her mother.

      Facts
[3]   The victim, L.B., was born in April 2015. Thirty-five-year-old Setlak was a

      friend of L.B.’s parents and was L.B.’s godfather. L.B. referred to Setlak as

      “Uncle Matt.” Tr. Vol. II p. 7. In 2017, Setlak regularly babysat L.B. and her

      brother. The children often spent the night with Setlak, who would feed and

      bathe the children.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2516 | April 26, 2024        Page 2 of 13
[4]   In the fall of 2017, L.B.’s mother (“Mother”) was changing two-year-old L.B.’s

      diaper when she noticed that L.B.’s anal and vaginal areas were red and that

      there was a discharge coming from the child’s vagina. Mother took L.B. to the

      emergency room, where it was determined that L.B.’s hymen was ruptured.

      Child Protective Services was also called, but there was no firm evidence of

      sexual abuse. Mother did not suspect Setlak at the time and instead stopped

      taking L.B. to a different babysitter. Mother later noticed that, when she

      returned home while Setlak was babysitting, all the lights in the house were off,

      and the curtains and blinds were closed. On one particular occasion, Mother

      found Setlak and L.B. under blankets watching a movie.

[5]   During this time, Setlak’s behavior changed. When his friends asked him about

      his change in behavior, he told them that he had “bad thoughts” and was a

      “bad person” who had done “a bad thing.” Tr. Vol. IV pp. 22, 62. Setlak also

      indicated that he had suicidal thoughts. Yet Setlak also seemed excited to tell

      his friends about a culture he had read about that had no age-of-consent laws.

      In late 2018, Setlak’s girlfriend found a pair of young girl’s underwear in

      Setlak’s bed. When questioned about this, Setlak explained that “sometimes

      L.B. would get scared and come in [Setlak’s] room and get in the bed with him.

      And then [Setlak said L.B.] was a bedwetter, so sometimes she would take her

      panties off.” Id. at 52. Setlak’s girlfriend, however, noticed that the underwear

      was clean.

[6]   In 2019, Mother noticed that L.B. engaged in sexualized behavior. L.B. would

      get on her hands and knees and raise her buttocks. Mother also observed L.B.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2516 | April 26, 2024       Page 3 of 13
      rubbing her buttocks against other’s legs. Mother told L.B. to stop this

      behavior, but it continued. L.B. also touched her genitals when in the bathtub

      and even put toys in her vagina. On September 13, 2019, Mother reprimanded

      L.B. for this continued behavior. In response, L.B. stated, “I’ve got to tell you

      why I’m doing the butt stuff. It’s because of Uncle Matt[,] but I’m not

      supposed to tell you.” Tr. Vol. III p. 202. Mother then used her phone to take

      a video of L.B. as the child disclosed that Setlak had been molesting her. L.B.

      stated that “every day” she was at Setlak’s house, Setlak put his penis in her

      vagina and “butt” and showed her pornographic videos. State’s Ex. 1. L.B.

      also stated that Setlak instructed L.B. to never tell anyone about what he was

      doing to her. L.B.’s mother reported these disclosures to the police.

[7]   Lake County Sheriff’s Department Detective Laurie Reilly conducted a forensic

      interview of L.B. During the interview, Detective Reilly first determined that

      L.B. could distinguish between the truth and a lie. Detective Reilly also stated

      that L.B. “gave me numerous examples of the difference between a truth and a

      lie.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 146. Using a body diagram, L.B. marked the areas of her

      body where Setlak touched her—her nipples, genitals, and buttocks. L.B.

      indicated that Setlak put his penis on these areas. Using a male body diagram,

      L.B. indicated where the penis is located and stated that Setlak put his penis in

      her vagina and buttocks. L.B. also told Detective Reilly that Setlak put his

      penis in her mouth and that “juice” came out of Setlak’s penis. State’s Ex. 2.

[8]   When she was back at Mother’s home, L.B. mentioned Setlak’s abuse several

      times. During one such incident, L.B. reported she accidentally gagged herself

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2516 | April 26, 2024         Page 4 of 13
       while brushing her teeth. This prompted L.B. to state that she gagged and

       vomited when Setlak put his penis in her mouth.

[9]    On September 19, 2023, Schererville Police Department Detective David Nagle

       interviewed Setlak. During the interview, Setlak admitted that he had physical

       contact with L.B., including bathing the child and changing her diaper. Setlak

       believed L.B. had been molested by someone based on the incident in which

       Mother took L.B. to the emergency room. Setlak, however, denied that he had

       molested L.B. Setlak did agree that L.B. knew the difference between the truth

       and a lie. Setlak also consented to the police searching his phone. The search

       revealed a large amount of pornography. They also found a cartoon image of

       an older man holding a small child on the phone; the photo had a caption

       stating, “Go for it. Even if it means sacrificing everything.” State’s Ex. 9.

[10]   On September 23, 2019, the State charged Setlak with three counts of child

       molesting, Level 1 felonies, and one count of dissemination of matter harmful

       to minors, a Level 6 felony. The State subsequently amended the charging

       information to add a count of child molesting, a Level 4 felony. On March 14,

       2023, the State moved to admit, under the Protected Person Statute, L.B.’s out-

       of-court statements to Detective Reilly and L.B.’s recorded and unrecorded

       statements to Mother. The trial court held hearings pursuant to the Protected

       Person Statute on March 17, May 30, June 15, and June 23, 2023. Mother

       testified at the hearings regarding L.B.’s fear of Setlak and stated that testifying

       at trial would be “devastating” for L.B. Tr. Vol. II p. 70. The trial court found

       L.B. to be unavailable as a witness for purposes of the Protected Person Statute.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2516 | April 26, 2024         Page 5 of 13
       The trial court also found that L.B.’s out-of-court statements had sufficient

       indicia of reliability. Setlak’s counsel subsequently deposed L.B.

[11]   A jury trial was held on July 31 through August 2, 2023. At trial, Setlak

       objected to Mother’s testimony about L.B.’s out-of-court statements to Mother.

       Setlak also objected to the admission of the video Mother made in which L.B.

       stated that Setlak molested her. Setlak, however, did not object to the

       admission of the video of the forensic interview of L.B. conducted by Detective

       Reilly. See Tr. Vol. IV p. 149 (defense counsel stated, “[n]o objection,” to the

       admission of the video recording of the forensic interview). At the end of the

       trial, the jury found Setlak guilty as charged. On September 21, 2023, the trial

       court sentenced Setlak to an aggregate term of 120 years of incarceration.

       Setlak now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
[12]   Setlak argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting, under the

       Protected Person Statute, L.B.’s recorded and unrecorded out-of-court

       statements to her Mother.

       A. Standard of Review

[13]   We review challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial

       court’s discretion. Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 990 (Ind. 2021), cert. denied.

       We will reverse only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of

       the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.

       Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259-60 (Ind. 2013). Our Supreme Court has

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2516 | April 26, 2024        Page 6 of 13
       cautioned that the Protected Person Statute “impinges upon the ordinary

       evidentiary regime,” which requires trial courts to exercise “a special level of

       judicial responsibility.” Carpenter v. State, 786 N.E.2d 696, 703 (Ind. 2003).

[14]   “The effect of an error on a party’s substantial rights turns on the probable

       impact of the impermissible evidence upon the jury in light of all the other

       evidence at trial.” Gonzales v. State, 929 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 2010). “The

       improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is

       supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the

       reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned

       evidence contributed to the conviction.” Pelissier v. State, 122 N.E.3d 983, 988

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “The erroneous admission of evidence may

       also be harmless if that evidence is cumulative of other evidence admitted.” Id.

       B. The Protected Person Statute

[15]   Indiana Code Section 35-37-4-6, known as the “Protected Person Statute,” lists

       certain conditions under which evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible

       will be allowed in cases involving certain crimes against “protected persons.”

       Shoda v. State, 132 N.E.3d 454, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “Among

       the crimes to which the protected person statute applies are sex crimes under

       Indiana Code chapter 35-42-4, which includes child molesting.” Id. A

       “protected person” is defined as including “a child who is less than fourteen

       (14) years of age at the time of the offense but less than eighteen (18) years of

       age at the time of trial.” I.C. § 35-37-4-6(c)(1).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2516 | April 26, 2024         Page 7 of 13
[16]   Subsection (e) of the Protected Person Statute provides:

               A statement or videotape that:

                    (1) is made by a person who at the time of trial is a protected
                    person, as defined in subsection (c);

                    (2) concerns an act that is a material element of an offense
                    listed in subsection (a) or (b) [which includes child molesting]
                    that was allegedly committed against the person; and

                    (3) is not otherwise admissible in evidence;

               is admissible in evidence in a criminal action for an offense listed
               in subsection (a) or (b) if the requirements of subsection (f) are
               met.

       I.C. § 35-37-4-6(e).

[17]   Subsection (f) of the Protected Person Statute then provides that:

               A statement or videotape described in subsection (e) is admissible
               in evidence in a criminal action listed in subsection (a) or (b) if,
               after notice to the defendant of a hearing and of the defendant’s
               right to be present, all of the following conditions are met:

                    (1) The court finds, in a hearing:

                        (A) conducted outside the presence of the jury; and

                        (B) attended by the protected person in person or by using
                        closed circuit television testimony as described in section
                        8(f) and 8(g) of this chapter;

                    that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement
                    or videotape provide sufficient indications of reliability.

                    (2) The protected person:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2516 | April 26, 2024             Page 8 of 13
                        (A) testifies at the trial; or

                        (B) is found by the court to be unavailable as a witness for
                        one (1) of the following reasons:

                              (i) From the testimony of a provider, and other
                              evidence, if any, the court finds that the protected
                              person’s testifying in the physical presence of the
                              defendant will cause the protected person to suffer
                              serious emotional distress such that the protected
                              person cannot reasonably communicate. . . .

       I.C. § 35-37-4-6(f) (emphasis added).

[18]   Factors to be considered in the reliability determination under Subsection (f)(1)

       “include the time and circumstances of the statement, whether there was a

       significant opportunity for coaching, the nature of the questioning, whether

       there was a motive to fabricate, [the] use of age-appropriate terminology,

       spontaneity, and repetition.” J.A. v. State, 904 N.E.2d 250, 256 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2009); accord Pierce v. State, 677 N.E.2d 39, 44 (Ind. 1997).

[19]   Setlak argues that L.B.’s recorded and unrecorded statements to Mother

       provided insufficient indicia of reliability and were, therefore, inadmissible

       under the Protected Person Statute. We disagree. Mother testified that L.B.

       understood the difference between the truth and a lie. Detective Reilly also

       testified that L.B. clearly knew the difference between the truth and a lie.

       Detective Reilly further testified that L.B. gave several examples of the

       difference between truth and falsehood, which was more than the detective

       expected for a child of L.B.’s age. In fact, Setlak himself admitted during his

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2516 | April 26, 2024              Page 9 of 13
       interview with Detective Nagle that L.B. knew the difference between the truth

       and a lie.

[20]   In addition, L.B. used age-appropriate language when speaking with Mother

       about Setlak’s actions. L.B. did not appear to be coached in any way. Nor is

       there any suggestion of improper questioning. L.B. also spontaneously

       disclosed the abuse after Mother reprimanded L.B. for her unusual, sexualized

       behavior, and nothing in the record would suggest any motive to fabricate the

       allegations against Setlak. To the contrary, Setlak was a trusted family friend.

       L.B., using age-appropriate language, consistently stated that Setlak placed his

       penis in her vagina and “butt.”

[21]   Setlak claims that L.B.’s recorded and unrecorded statements to Mother were

       unreliable because it is unclear exactly how much time had elapsed between

       L.B.’s statement and the acts of molestation she described. Although the exact

       time the acts occurred is unclear, the State alleged that Setlak molested L.B

       sometime between October 2, 2016, and July 31, 2019. The State established

       that L.B.’s statements to Mother were made on September 13, 2019.

[22]   Setlak cites our Supreme Court’s opinion in Carpenter, 786 N.E.2d 696, in

       support of his argument that too much time elapsed between the molestation

       and L.B.’s statements for L.B.’s statements to be considered reliable. In

       Carpenter, the three-year-old victim made statements to her mother on May 19,

       2000, indicating that she had been sexually molested by her father. The victim

       then gave a consistent statement during a forensic interview later that day. She

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2516 | April 26, 2024      Page 10 of 13
       also made a similarly consistent statement to her grandfather several days later.

       These statements were admitted at trial over the defendant’s hearsay objections.

[23]   On appeal, our Supreme Court concluded that the admission of these

       statements was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 704. In so holding, the Court

       emphasized that there was a lack of evidence about when the alleged

       molestation occurred, writing:

               [T]here is no evidence at all as to when the alleged molestation
               occurred. That is, while the evidence supports a conclusion that
               the mother sought both medical attention and the intervention of
               law enforcement after her conversation with [the victim] on May
               19, there is absolutely nothing of record to tie the alleged
               molestation to May 19 or any other date. Indeed by alleging in
               its charging information that the offense occurred “on or before
               April 1, 2000 and May 19, 2000,” the State effectively concedes
               there was a period exceeding six weeks during which the alleged
               molestation could have taken place.

       Id. at 703. “Added to these difficulties,” the Court also noted that, “during the

       competency determination at the hearing, [the victim] was asked three times in

       different ways whether she understood the difference between the truth and a

       lie. [The victim] responded that she did not.” Id. at 704. The Court noted that

       “there is a degree of logical inconsistency in deeming reliable the statements of

       a person who cannot distinguish truth from falsehood.” Id.

[24]   We find Carpenter to be readily distinguishable from this case. Here, unlike the

       victim in Carpenter, L.B. repeatedly stated and demonstrated that she

       understood the difference between the truth and a lie. Although “[w]e

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2516 | April 26, 2024      Page 11 of 13
       acknowledge the concern . . . that the ‘passage of time tends to diminish

       spontaneity and increase the likelihood of suggestion,’ ‘[t]here are undoubtedly

       many other factors in individual cases [to be considered].’” Taylor v. State, 841

       N.E.2d 631, 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Pierce, 677 N.E.2d at 44-45).

[25]   Here, a consideration of all the factors leads us to the conclusion that the trial

       court did not abuse its discretion by admitting L.B.’s out-of-court statements to

       Mother. We find Taylor, 841 N.E.2d at 636, instructive. In Taylor, we

       distinguished Carpenter and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

       in admitting the child victim’s out-of-court statements under the Protected

       Person Statute. Id. We noted that, although at least several weeks had passed

       between the molestation and the child’s statements, the statements were

       spontaneous, there was no motive for fabrication, the child used age-

       appropriate language, and the child could distinguish between truth and

       falsehood. Id. The factors that distinguished Taylor from Carpenter are the same

       factors that distinguish Carpenter from this case.

[26]   Even if we were to conclude otherwise, Setlak would not prevail. As noted

       above, although Setlak objected to the admission of L.B.’s recorded and

       unrecorded statements to Mother, he did not object to the admission of the

       forensic interview with Detective Reilly. L.B. told Detective Reilly, among

       other things, that Setlak put his penis into her vagina and buttocks and made

       her watch pornographic videos. L.B.’s statements to Mother were thus merely

       cumulative of her statements to Detective Reilly. It is well settled that the

       erroneous admission of evidence which is cumulative of other evidence

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2516 | April 26, 2024        Page 12 of 13
       admitted without objection is not reversible error. Stewart v. State, 167 N.E.3d

       367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1240

       (Ind. 2012)). Accordingly, even if the trial court abused its discretion by

       admitting L.B.’s statements to Mother, such does not constitute reversible error.

       Conclusion
[27]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that L.B.’s out-of-court

       statements to Mother were sufficiently reliable for admission under the

       Protected Person Statute. Moreover, even if L.B.’s statements to Mother were

       inadmissible, any error was harmless. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s

       judgment.

[28]   Affirmed.

       Mathias, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Kristin A. Mulholland
       Appellate Public Defender
       Crown Point, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General of Indiana

       Catherine E. Brizzi
       Deputy Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2516 | April 26, 2024       Page 13 of 13