Court Opinion

ID: 9851625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:16:20.130906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:09.354715
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice TOAL.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, Appellant’s repeated failure to present the Collection Agreement amounted to extrinsic fraud, and I would therefore hold that the trial court properly dismissed Appellant’s action to enforce the California judgment.
Extrinsic fraud is fraud that induces a person not to present a case or deprives a person of the opportunity to be heard. Relief is granted for extrinsic fraud on the theory that because the fraud prevented a party from fully exhibiting and trying his case, there has never been a real contest before the court on the subject matter of the action. Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, 80, 579 S.E.2d 605, 610 (2003) (quoting Hilton Head Ctr. of South Carolina v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 294 S.C. 9, 11, 362 S.E.2d 176, 177 (1987)). On the other hand, intrinsic fraud is fraud which was presented and considered in the trial. Chewning, 354 S.C. at 81, 579 S.E.2d at 610. It is fraud which misleads a court in determining issues and induces the court to find for the party perpetrating the fraud. Id.
In the instant case, Appellant retained Attorney Thomas Botkin to negotiate an assignment agreement between him and Rehon & Roberts for collection of the California judg*596ment.12 Subsequently, Botkin filed suit in Indiana on behalf of Appellant to enforce the California judgment. In the complaint, Botkin alleged that the California judgment had been assigned to Appellant, and he attached Appellant’s supporting affidavit and a copy of the Assignment as proof of his right to enforce the judgment. The Collection Agreement was never referenced in the complaint or at any time during the Indiana litigation. Likewise, in the South Carolina complaint, Bot-kin 13 attached a copy of the Assignment in support of his motion to enforce the judgment and never disclosed the existence of the Collection Agreement. It was not until 2004 following the Master’s order to compel that the Collection Agreement was disclosed.
In my view, the evidence shows that Appellant’s attorney intentionally concealed the Collection Agreement. As a result of these actions, Respondent was prevented from fully litigating her claim that the assignment was invalid14 during the Indiana litigation. See Chewning, 354 S.C. at 84, 579 S.E.2d at 611 (recognizing that where an attorney embarks on a scheme to intentionally conceal documents, extrinsic fraud constituting a fraud upon the court occurs). For these reasons, I would hold that repeatedly failing to disclose the Collection Agreement constituted extrinsic fraud, and therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to give full faith and credit to the Indiana judgment.

. Botkin’s signature appears on the Collection Agreement.

. Botkin was admitted pro hac vice to represent Appellant in the South Carolina litigation.

. The Collection Agreement purports to disclaim any fiduciary duty between the parties and appears to be a partial assignment, both of which are prohibited under California law. Thus, the alleged assignment upon which Appellant relied for his authority to enforce the judgment was invalid.