Court Opinion

ID: 9753412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:13:16.347189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:36.138092
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
¶ 30. concurring. I concur in the result and much of the reasoning of the majority opinion in this case. I write separately only to express my view of the distinction between the agency actions in this case, where the discretionary function exception applies, and those in Sabia v. State, 164 Vt. 293, 307-08, 669 A.2d 1187, 1196-97 (1995), where we'did not apply the exception. The majority characterizes the difference between Sabia and this case as the difference between the agency’s alleged failure to respond at all to the plaintiffs’ claims of abuse in Sabia and its alleged failure to provide an adequate response to plaintiff’s claims here. Ante, ¶¶ 20, 28. I believe this distinction is somewhat of an oversimplification. There may be circumstances under *299which the agency responds to a claim of abuse, but its response fails to comply with the mandatory duties established by 33 V.S.A. § 4915, including the duty to promptly investigate claims of abuse, 33 V.S.A. § 4915(a), and the duty to conduct such investigations according to the requirements of § 4915(b). The agency cannot claim immunity under the discretionary function exception by simply taking some action, no matter how token, in response to a report of abuse; its response must be sufficient to satisfy the mandatory requirements of the statute. The response of SRS was sufficient to meet that standard in this case, so I join in the conclusion reached by the majority. I am authorized to state that Justice Skoglund joins in this concurrence.