Court Opinion

ID: 9569672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:16:17.349249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:43.249579
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s imposition of temporary suspension. In my view petitioner’s conduct fully warrants disbarment and I would sustain such recommendation by the State Bar.
Petitioner, a prosecutor, deliberately altered written documentary evidence introduced at a criminal trial. To assist his case he changed the witness-cab driver’s “trip ticket” in two respects, both the time and place of the customer’s transport, thereby depriving defendant of a basis for impeaching a prosecution witness. Petitioner then destroyed the original ticket and submitted to his adversary the modified copy falsely representing it to be accurate.
He thereafter pursued a carefully calculated plan to hide his misconduct. Without either the knowledge or consent of defense counsel petitioner contacted defendant in jail in order to obtain the latter’s con*551sent to waive his right to appeal in return for a lighter sentence. Petitioner’s efforts to conceal his misdeeds continued for several months. When his conduct was finally disclosed to his superiors in an attempt to obtain support for his efforts at concealment, he was suspended by the district attorney’s office with commendable promptness and the case was properly referred to the Attorney General for criminal prosecution.
Petitioner’s conduct during trial was calculated, deceitful, knowingly performed for his own advantage, and was followed by a prolonged and complicated attempt to cover his tracks. The setting in which petitioner’s misbehavior occurred was the prosecution of a defendant charged with multiple murders, the most serious of criminal offenses. It is self evident that a lawyer’s presentation to the court and counsel of deliberately fabricated documentary evidence strikes directly at the very integrity of the judicial process. Such conduct is so violative of every sense of duty and honor as to justify amply the State Bar’s recommendation of disbarment.
As noted, petitioner was a prosecutor and we previously have described the range and depth of his public duties under Penal Code section 691 in In re Ferguson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 525, 531 [96 Cal.Rptr. 594, 487 P.2d 1234]. Within the context of the offenses herein presented, however, the same ethical constraints would have bound him if he had represented a defendant because before he was either prosecutor or defense counsel he was first of all a lawyer. As such he was committed to the highest standards of honesty, fidelity, and rectitude, which he admittedly and deliberately violated.
Nor do I find in the record adequate mitigation. The fact that he had no prior discipline is not enough. Given the nature of his offenses, once was too often. Nor is mental or emotional stress or a heavy workload a justification. Most lawyers live honorably under conditions of stress and contention. It is the very air they breathe. Petitioner’s general community reputation vouchsafed by character witnesses, may support his application for readmission, if exemplary behavior is sustained for an extended period of time. (In re Giddens (1981) 30 Cal.3d 110, 116 [177 Cal.Rptr. 673, 635 P.2d 166]; In re Petty (1981) 29 Cal.3d 356, 362 [173 Cal.Rptr. 461, 627 P.2d 191].) However it does not provide sufficient proof of mitigation in the present proceedings.
*552Because I conclude that petitioner’s behavior constitutes moral turpitude and dishonesty (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106) in my view disbarment is appropriate and I do not examine further the question whether he must also be automatically disbarred because of section 6131 of the same code.
I would accept the recommendations of the State Bar’s panel and review department and would disbar petitioner.
Bird, C. J., and Kaus, J., concurred.