Court Opinion

ID: 9916418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 22:08:33.75376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:17.035787
License: Public Domain

01/09/2024
                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                            AT NASHVILLE
                                December 6, 2023 Session

    EDWARD RONNY ARNOLD v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY

                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County
                     No. 22-C2097       Lynne T. Ingram, Judge
                      ___________________________________

                            No. M2023-00536-COA-R3-CV
                        ___________________________________

While a prior lawsuit was still pending on appeal, the Plaintiff filed a nearly identical
lawsuit. The trial court dismissed this second suit based on res judicata. Although the
second suit was not barred by res judicata because the first suit was not final for res judicata
purposes, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal on the basis of the prior suit pending
doctrine.

    Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JEFFREY USMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR.,
P.J., M.S., and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., joined.

Edward Ronny Arnold, Nashville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Cyrus L. Booker, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellee, Allstate Insurance Company.

                                          OPINION

                                               I.

        This court in opinions authored by Judges Stafford (Arnold I)1 and Frierson (Arnold
II)2 offered thorough explorations of the procedural history of the litigation underlying this
appeal. We borrow liberally from both opinions to delineate the procedural history that is

1
 Arnold v. Malchow (Arnold I), No. M2021-00695-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 774925 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar.
15, 2022).
2
 Arnold v. Malchow (Arnold II), No. M2022-00907-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 5097179 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.
9, 2023) perm. app. filed (Sept. 6, 2023).
relevant to understanding the complex tapestry within which this appeal arises.

      Addressing Mr. Arnold’s first appeal, this court in Arnold I observed the following:

             This appeal involves two interrelated cases filed in the trial court.
      First, on December 27, 2019, Plaintiff/Appellant Edward Ronny Arnold
      (“Appellant”), proceeding pro se, filed a complaint for damages against
      Defendants Deborah Malchow, Progressive Direct Auto (“Progressive”), and
      Mountain Laurel Assurance Company (“Mountain Laurel”) . . . . The
      complaint alleged that Ms. Malchow had injured Appellant through the
      negligent operation of a motor vehicle and that either Progressive or
      Mountain Laurel was Ms. Malchow’s insurer. On January 2, 2020,
      Progressive and Mountain Laurel filed a joint motion to dismiss on the
      ground that Tennessee law does not permit direct actions against insurance
      companies. On January 27, 2020, the trial court entered an order dismissing
      Progressive and Mountain Laurel as parties. This ruling was designated as
      final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.

              On October 5, 2020, Appellant initiated a second lawsuit involving
      the car accident at issue . . . . In the second case, Appellant named his own
      underinsured/uninsured motorist carrier, Defendant/Appellee Allstate
      Insurance Company (“Allstate”) as the sole defendant. Therein, Appellant
      set out as his “first cause of action” “negligent operation of a motor vehicle
      by uninsured motorist.” Appellant then set forth four “cause[es] of action
      against insurance company,” including breach of contract, breach of the
      implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and two claims of tortious breach
      of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. . . .

             On October 22, 2020, the trial court consolidated the two cases “as
      the two matters concern the same common questions of fact and law and
      therefore should be consolidated.” . . .

                [O]n January 15, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to begin discovery .
      . . . In response, on the same day, Allstate filed a motion for a protective order
      precluding Appellant from taking the depositions of several of its employees.
      On January 9, 2021, the trial court entered an order stating that

             this Court finds that [the action against Appellant’s insurer] is
             being pursued by [Appellant] as a uninsured/underinsured
             motorist claim, and because the named Defendant in [the
             original suit] is a claim against the alleged negligent named
             Defendant, Deborah Malchow, who has been determined to
             have insurance, this Court finds that all proceedings by
                                            -2-
       [Appellant as to his insurer] should be stayed pending further
       development of proof relating to whether Defendant Malchow
       may be an underinsured motorist . . .

        On April 30, 2021, Ms. Malchow filed a motion to dismiss . . . . The
trial court granted in part and denied in part Ms. Malchow’s motion to
dismiss by order of June 16, 2021. Therein, the trial court found that
Appellant stated a claim against Ms. Malchow for negligent operation of a
motor vehicle. But the trial court ruled that all other claims against Ms.
Malchow should be dismissed, including the claims of breach of an insurance
contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. . . . On June
23, 2021, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court.

       Following the filing of the notice of appeal, proceedings occurred
simultaneously in the trial court and the appellate court. In the trial court, on
July 22, 2021, Allstate filed a renewed motion for a protective order, asking
that Appellant be precluded from taking the depositions of Allstate
employees that had no knowledge of the facts involved in the case.
According to Allstate, the only remaining issues in the case were “whether
Defendant Malchow engaged in the negligent operation of a motor vehicle,
and if so, whether said negligence resulted in property damage and/or
personal injuries to [Appellant].” The trial court entered an order on August
11, 2021, granting Allstate’s motion. First, the trial court detailed the
procedural history of the consolidated cases, including the fact that the trial
court had “stayed further proceedings . . . pending further development of
proof relating to whether Defendant Malchow was an underinsured motorist
relating to the subject accident.” As for the June 16, 2021 order on the
motion to dismiss, the trial court found as follows:

       By an Order on Motion to Dismiss . . ., this Court dismissed
       the [Appellant's] claims of breach of insurance contract,
       contractual breach of implied covenant of good faith dealing
       and tortious breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
       dealing. This Order was not a final order relating to [the
       insurer], since this Court had stayed proceedings regarding the
       underinsurance motorist claim pending the outcome of [the
       action against Defendant Malchow] and a determination
       regarding whether Defendant Malchow was an underinsured
       motorist.

The trial court further found that because the deposition of the only Allstate
employee with knowledge had already been taken, Appellant was seeking to
depose individuals with no relevant information on the issues to be tried.
                                     -3-
       Thus, the trial court granted Allstate’s motion for a protective order. . . .

       Meanwhile, in the appellate court, on July 9, 2021, Ms. Malchow filed a
       motion to dismiss this appeal due to lack of a final judgment. Appellant
       responded in opposition on July 15, 2021. On July 19, 2021, this Court
       reserved ruling on Ms. Malchow’s motion to allow her to supplement her
       motion with supporting documentation. On July 26, 2021, Allstate filed its
       own motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On July 30,
       2021, Ms. Malchow filed a supplement to her motion to dismiss. On the same
       day, Appellant responded in opposition to Allstate’s motion. . . .

Arnold v. Malchow, No. M2021-00695-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 774925, at *1-2 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Mar. 15, 2022).

        With regard to Mr. Arnold’s attempt in Arnold I to reverse the dismissal of Ms.
Malchow’s insurers Progressive and Mount Laurel, the Arnold I Court concluded that the
trial court properly designated the order as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure and that Mr. Arnold had failed to timely file a notice of appeal of
their dismissal. Id. at *4. Accordingly, this court was without subject matter jurisdiction
as to these claims and the dismissals of Progressive and Mountain Laurel remained in effect
with prejudice. Id. As for the claims against Ms. Malchow and Allstate, the Arnold I Court
determined that there was not as of yet a final order and accordingly that this court was
without subject matter. Id. at *3.

       After the remand from Arnold I, Ms. Malchow moved for summary judgment on
November 16, 2021, which the trial court granted by an order entered June 30, 2022.
Arnold v. Malchow, No. M2022-00907-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 5097179, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Aug. 9, 2023) perm. app. filed (Sept. 6, 2023). The trial court concluded that Mr.
Arnold had presented no facts that would allow a rational jury to find that Ms. Malchow
negligently caused the accident or medical testimony related to causation of his injuries.
Id. Mr. Arnold appealed the grant of summary judgment to Ms. Malchow. Id. In the wake
of the grant of summary judgment to Ms. Malchow, Allstate moved to dismiss based upon
the underlying lack of liability of potentially uninsured motorist Ms. Malchow. Id.
Discussing the trial court’s response, this court in Arnold II observed the following:

       On September 16, 2022, the trial court entered an order granting Allstate’s
       motion to dismiss, stating in pertinent part:

                      At the hearing on Allstate’s Motion to Dismiss, Mr.
              Arnold stated Allstate was seeking to dismiss “any and all
              claims against Allstate Insurance Company, including
              collision.” Mr. Arnold went on to say this case “was never an
              underinsured motorist claim” and was a contract dispute for
                                          -4-
              collision coverage against Allstate. Mr. Arnold claims Allstate
              made him three offers for his vehicle, including a final offer
              for approximately $14,400. He refused these offers based on
              belief that the offers were not reasonable, rendering his policy
              “null and void.” He maintains this is a contract dispute with
              the issue of the vehicle’s value to be determined by the jury.

                     However, this Court finds that Mr. Arnold never filed
              suit against Allstate for the collision coverage. Though Mr.
              Arnold may understandably wish to resolve the dispute over
              the value of his vehicle with Allstate, the only cognizable
              claims against Allstate in his Complaint were for
              uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

                     The claims ple[]d against Allstate . . . are against it as
              uninsured/un[der]insured motorist carrier. Because this Court
              granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Malchow,
              there is no “uninsured motorist,” thus Defendant submits the
              claims against Allstate as uninsured motorist carrier must be
              dismissed.

Id. at *4. Having considered the parties’ arguments, the trial court dismissed Mr. Arnold’s
claims against Allstate. Id.

       Mr. Arnold appealed. He raised eighteen issues on appeal including challenges to
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Ms. Malchow and challenges to the
dismissals of various claims against Allstate. Id. at *5-6.

       With regard to Mr. Arnold’s negligence claim against Ms. Malchow, the Arnold II
Court determined that genuine disputes of material fact existed and that the trial court had
erred by granting summary judgment to Ms. Malchow. Id. at *12-13. With regard to Mr.
Arnold’s claims against Allstate, the Arnold II Court noted that “[i]n his original complaint
filed against Allstate, Mr. Arnold stated manifold causes of action including negligent
operation of a motor vehicle by an uninsured/underinsured motorist (‘UM claim’), breach
of insurance contract, contractual breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” Id. at
*13. This court further observed that the trial court had dismissed the claims against
Allstate at two different times, with all of the claims other than the uninsured motorist
claim being dismissed in a non-final order in 2021 and the uninsured motorist claim being
dismissed in 2022 in connection with the grant of summary judgment to Ms. Malchow. Id.
This court considered the substance of Mr. Arnold’s claim of bad faith in connection with
Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-105, finding on the merits that the trial court properly
dismissed this claim. Id. at *14. Other than his uninsured motorist claim, this court
                                            -5-
concluded that Mr. Arnold’s manner of handling his appellate briefing had resulted in
waiver of his other claims against Allstate. Id. at *15. As to the uninsured motorist claim
against Allstate, the Arnold II Court determined that because the dismissal was based upon
the grant of summary judgment to Ms. Malchow, such grant had been in error and that the
trial court’s dismissal of his uninsured motorist claim against Allstate also must be vacated.
Id. at *16. This court also addressed a myriad of other issues related to protective orders
and various rulings made by the trial court, affirming the trial court’s decisions on these
matters. Id. at *16-22. On September 5, 2023, Mr. Arnold filed a Rule 11 application
seeking permission to appeal this court’s decision in Arnold II to the Tennessee Supreme
Court.

       On October 17, 2022, while Arnold II was pending before this court, Mr. Arnold
filed another action against Allstate. Though Mr. Arnold’s second complaint against
Allstate initiated a new lawsuit, it included substantially the same allegations as the first
complaint. Specifically, Mr. Arnold raised three causes of action against his insurer that
bear a remarkable resemblance to the claims in his first lawsuit against Allstate: a “Breach
of Contract Insurance Contract” claim, a “Contractual Breach by Insurance Company of
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith Dealing” claim, and a “Tortious Breach by Insurance
Companies of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith Dealing” claim.3 Mr. Arnold
acknowledges in his second complaint that his “claim[s] against the Defendant Allstate
Insurance Company [are] related . . . to Edward Arnold v. Deborah Malchow, Progressive
Direct Auto, Mountain Laurel Assurance Company . . . filed December 27, 2019.” In
response to this second suit, Allstate sought dismissal or summary judgment based upon
res judicata or claims preclusion.

        On April 10, 2023, prior to this court’s August 9, 2023 decision in Arnold II, the
trial court granted Allstate’s motion. The trial court ruled as follows:

               The Court finds that the facts and circumstances surrounding [Mr.
        Arnold’s second case filed against [Allstate] arise[] out of the same incident
        relating to which [Mr. Arnold’s first case filed against Allstate] was filed by
        the same Plaintiff against the same Defendant, and that all claims asserts in
        [the second case] could have been asserted in [the first case], and therefore
        in accordance with Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tenn. 2012), the
        doctrine of res judicata or claims preclusion precludes a second lawsuit
        asserting a claim involving the same parties and arising out of the same
        incident . . .

3
  Mr. Arnold does include an argument in his second complaint which he styled a “First Cause of Action
Against Insurance Company,” concerning Allstate’s alleged noncompliance “with an order from the Second
Circuit Court . . . issued January 17, 2020.” It appears that Mr. Arnold mistakenly interpreted one of the
trial court’s orders to have definitively allowed him to recover against Allstate on his uninsured motorist
claim.
                                                   -6-
Therefore, the trial court dismissed Mr. Arnold’s second complaint.

        Mr. Arnold appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his second suit against Allstate.
Mr. Arnold raises twelve issues in his brief on appeal. Most of the issues raised bear no
direct relationship and have no impact on the basis of dismissal by the trial court, which
was the trial court’s conclusion that res judicata or claim preclusion barred his second suit
against Allstate. In response, Allstate maintains that the trial court properly concluded that
the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion bars Mr. Arnold’s second suit.

       During oral argument, this court expressly questioned both parties regarding the
applicability of the prior suit pending doctrine. Following oral argument, neither party
sought permission to file any supplemental briefing to further address this matter.
Nevertheless, to provide the parties an opportunity to consider and address in writing the
applicability of the prior suit pending doctrine, this court entered an order inviting briefing.
The order explained that it appeared that Mr. Arnold’s second suit against Allstate might
not be subject to dismissal under res judicata but instead under the closely related prior suit
pending doctrine. The order invited the parties to address the applicability of the prior suit
pending doctrine to the circumstances of the present case. In the parties’ briefing, Allstate
argued that prior suit pending doctrine is applicable while Mr. Arnold insisted that it is not.
Mr. Arnold asserts that his claim is different as it relates to property damages rather than
personal injuries stemming from the auto accident. On December 19, the Tennessee
Supreme Court denied Mr. Arnold application for permission to appeal in Arnold II. He
sought a recall of the mandate issued by the Tennessee Supreme Court but that request was
denied on January 3, 2024.

       Having considered the parties initial and supplemental written briefing and oral
argument, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed Mr. Arnold’s second suit but
mislabeled as res judicata or claim preclusion what instead falls under the prior suit pending
doctrine.

                                               II.

        We note that Mr. Arnold is proceeding pro se in this appeal. Pro se litigants “are
entitled to fair and equal treatment by the courts.” Vandergriff v. ParkRidge E. Hosp., 482
S.W.3d 545, 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). Courts should be mindful that pro se litigants
often lack any legal training and many are unfamiliar with the justice system. State v.
Sprunger, 458 S.W.3d 482, 491 (Tenn. 2015). Accordingly, courts should afford some
degree of leeway in considering the briefing from a pro se litigant, Young v. Barrow, 130
S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), and should consider the substance of the pro se
litigant’s filing. Poursaied v. Tennessee Bd. of Nursing, 643 S.W.3d 157, 165 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2021). Pro se litigants, however, may not “shift the burden of litigating their case to
the courts.” Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
Additionally, “[i]t is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a
                                              -7-
litigant’s case or arguments for him or her.” Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 301
S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010). It is imperative that courts remain “mindful of the boundary
between fairness to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s adversary.”
Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

       As to the standard of review when considering a trial court’s dismissal of a suit
based upon res judicata, “[a] trial court’s decision that a claim is barred by the doctrine of
res judicata or claim preclusion involves a question of law which will be reviewed de novo
on appeal without a presumption of correctness.” Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491
(Tenn. 2012). Similarly, “[t]he applicability of the doctrine of prior suit pending is a
question of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness.” Heatley
v. Gaither, No. M2018-01792-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 2714378, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App.
June 28, 2019).

                                                  III.

        Res judicata, which is also sometimes referred to as claim preclusion,4 “bars a
second suit between the same parties . . . on the same claim with respect to all issues which
were, or could have been, litigated in the former suit.” Jackson, 387 S.W.3d at 491 (citing
Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 376 (Tenn. 2009)). Res judicata promotes finality
in litigation, prevents contradictory judgments, conserves judicial resources, and protects
litigants from the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits. Id. “Res judicata is an affirmative
defense . . . and as such ordinarily must be included in the defendant’s answer . . .. In
certain circumstances, however, the defense may be raised in a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee
Rules of Civil Procedure.” Regions Bank v. Prager, 625 S.W.3d 842, 848 (Tenn. 2021)
(citations omitted).

       To assert a valid defense based on res judicata, “[t]he party asserting a defense
predicated on res judicata or claim preclusion must demonstrate (1) that the underlying
judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) that the same parties or
their privies were involved in both suits, (3) that the same claim or cause of action was
asserted in both suits, and (4) that the underlying judgment was final and on the merits.”
Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 620 S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tenn. 2021)
(quotation omitted)

       The prior suit pending doctrine bears a close familial relationship to res judicata.
This court has even previously observed that “[i]n order to determine whether res judicata
4
 State v. Thompson, 285 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tenn. 2009) (noting that “the doctrine of res judicata” is “also
known as claim preclusion”).

                                                  -8-
is applicable in this case, we must also consider the doctrine of prior suit pending.” Collins
v. Sams E. Inc., No. W2017-00711-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1299857, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Mar. 13, 2018). “The prior suit pending doctrine is derived from the ancient common-law
rule prescribing that a person ‘shall not be . . . twice vexed for one and the same cause.’”
West v. Vought Aircraft Indus., Inc., 256 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Sparry’s
Case, (1591) 77 Eng. Rep. 148, 148 (Exch.)). Reflecting on the roots and rationale of the
rule, the Tennessee Supreme Court referenced an 1800s commentator who addressing the
prior suit pending doctrine observed the following:

        The law abhors multiplicity of actions; and therefore whenever it appears on
        record, that the plaintiff had sued out two writs against the same defendant
        for the same thing, the second writ shall abate; for if it were allowed that a
        man should be twice arrested, or twice attached by his goods for the same
        thing, by the same reason he might suffer in infinitum; . . . if there was a writ
        in being at the time of suing out the second, it is plain the second was
        vexatious, and ill ab initio.

Id. at 622-23 (quoting 1 Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law 22 (7th ed.
London, Strahan 1832)). The four elements to a defense of prior suit pending are as
follows: “1) the lawsuits must involve identical subject matter; 2) the lawsuits must be
between the same parties;5 3) the former lawsuit must be pending in a court having subject
matter jurisdiction over the dispute; and 4) the former lawsuit must be pending in a court
having personal jurisdiction over the parties.” Id. at 623.

        The closeness of the relationship between res judicata and prior suit pending has
been further intertwined through application. For example, in connection with the subject
matter, this court has observed that the identical subject matter actually extends to “all
issues which are made or might be made concerning the same subject matter” and that
“[t]he test of the question of subject matter is whether the judgment in the first suit could
be pleaded to the second suit in bar as former adjudication.” Tallent v. Sherrell, 184
S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944). Accordingly, “to determine whether the same
subject matter is involved in both suits, a court must consider whether a judgment in the
first suit would bar litigation of an issue in the second suit under res judicata principles.”
Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Corley, No. W2002-02633-COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL
23099685, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).

      This court has previously explained that “a judgment is not final and res judicata
where an appeal is pending.” McBurney v. Aldrich, 816 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tenn. Ct. App.

5
  In setting forth the elements for applicability of the prior suit pending doctrine, the Tennessee Supreme
Court included a footnote that expressly noted that “we have held previously that the doctrine of prior suit
pending may also be applicable when a party in a subsequent lawsuit is the privy of a party in the former
lawsuit.” West, 256 S.W.3d at 623 n.4 (citing Fultz v. Fultz, 175 S.W.2d 315, 316 (Tenn. 1943)).
                                                   -9-
1991) (citing 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 623, p. 48); accord Freeman v. Marco Transp. Co.,
27 S.W.3d 909, 913 (Tenn. 2000) (“Because the dismissal was appealed to this Court, the
final disposition of this issue will not occur until this Court enters its judgment.”); see also
In re Charles R., No. M2017-02387-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3583307, at *7 (Tenn. Ct.
App. July 25, 2018) (noting that “the trial court’s findings and conclusions in the
dependency and neglect order do not carry a preclusive effect because the judgment was
not final; rather it was pending on appeal”); In re Shyronne D.H., No. W2011-00328-COA-
R3-PT, 2011 WL 2651097, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 7, 2011) (“[I]t is an inescapable
conclusion that, in Tennessee, a judgment from a case in which an appeal is pending is not
final and cannot be res judicata until all appellate remedies have been exhausted.”). To
that end, this court has strived to confirm in prior opinions addressing res judicata whether
the underlying judgment was appealed and, if so, what effect that appeal had on the finality
of the underlying judgment. See, e.g., Lien v. Couch, 993 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1998) (“This judgment became final after the Liens voluntarily dismissed their appeal.”);
Lee v. Hall, 790 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (“[T]he trial court rendered a final
judgment on the merits from which no appeal was taken.”) (emphasis added).

       Here, the trial court’s order granting Allstate’s motion for summary judgment had
not become a final judgment for the purposes of res judicata when Mr. Arnold filed his
second suit. Though the trial court entered its order on April 3, 2023, Mr. Arnold timely
appealed the order to this court. Arnold II, 2023 WL 5097179, at *4-5 (describing Mr.
Arnold’s appeal). In that appeal, this court vacated the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment to Ms. Malchow and the dismissal of Mr. Arnold’s uninsured motorist claim
against Allstate while affirming the dismissal of Mr. Arnold’s other claims against Allstate.
Mr. Arnold filed an application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court,
which was still pending until being denied on December 19, 2023. In other words, on April
10, 2023 when the trial court issued its decision dismissing Mr. Arnold’s second suit
against Allstate there was not a final judgment for purposes of res judicata. Accordingly,
we cannot conclude that Allstate had successfully demonstrated all of the elements needed
to support a dismissal on the basis of res judicata in April 2023.

        However, Mr. Arnold’s res judicata arguments, which are conclusory and
unsupported, and the record on appeal provide no basis to indicate that any other element
of res judicata is absent in this case. To the contrary, the record supports the trial court’s
conclusion that all of the other elements of res judicata are satisfied. This renders the trial
court’s error in dismissing Mr. Arnold’s suit as one of labeling, not of result.6 As noted by
one commentator in a reflection on the prior suit pending doctrine in Tennessee, “[a]ll other
things being equal, prior suit pending bars any action during the pendency of an earlier

6
  Any error is also a matter of timing. While the trial court erred in dismissing Mr. Arnold’s second lawsuit
on the basis of res judicata on April 10, 2023, we note that the dismissal of some of his claims have since
become final for purposes of res judicata.

                                                   - 10 -
action if res judicata would operate to bar it had the earlier action already been reduced to
judgment”7 and become final. Simply stated, what made res judicata inapplicable in this
case, lack of finality, is what made the prior suit pending doctrine applicable.

       In addressing the prior suit pending doctrine in his supplemental briefing, Mr.
Arnold contends that the claims are different in his first and second suits against Allstate
because they relate to property damage rather than personal injuries stemming from the
accident. Even if we were to accept his argument, which does not appear to be fully
supported by the record, the trial court expressly concluded that Mr. Arnold failed to raise
any claims in the second suit against Allstate that could not have been brought in the first
action. Mr. Arnold has failed to demonstrate any error in this conclusion nor does the
record reflect any error by the trial court in reaching this determination. Accordingly,
though the trial court mislabeled the basis for dismissal, we find that its findings and ruling
supported dismissal under the prior suit pending doctrine.

                                                 IV.

       In considering the arguments advanced on appeal and for the reasons discussed
above, we affirm judgment of the trial court dismissing the case. The costs of the appeal
are taxed to the appellant, Edward Ronny Arnold, for which execution may issue if
necessary. The case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and
consistent with this opinion.

                                                        _________________________________
                                                        JEFFREY USMAN, JUDGE

7
  Paul J. Krog, One Bite at A Time Analyzing the Prior-Suit-Pending Doctrine in Tennessee, Tenn. B.J.,
June 2012, at 14, 16.
                                               - 11 -