Court Opinion

ID: 9761039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:29:58.783188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:19.814518
License: Public Domain

TIJERINA, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority has concluded that Boze-man was the driver as a matter of law. Special Issue 14 was phrased as follows:
Was James C. Bozeman the driver of the van at the time of the collision in question?
Answer “Yes” or “no”.
Answer: NO
This was a defensive issue; the railroad had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Bozeman was the driver. Allied Finance Co. v. Gammill, 440 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The jury had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to weigh their testimony. The witness Blount testified that on the date of the accident a few minutes after five he was stopped by the driver of a van who asked for directions to the boat ramp. He said he saw a total of three (3) persons in the van. The following testimony is relevant to this question:
A: If you were shown pictures of all three of the men who were in the van, assuming that there were three men in the van, do you think it would be possible for you to pick out the man who was the driver?
A: No Sir. It would be highly unlikely.
The witness Blount said the nearest description he could give of the driver was *322that he had a full head of hair, a medium build, and a full face. This description fit Bozeman or Athey. He said he did not remember saying that the driver had facial hair but that he could have said so. The following colloquy is pertinent:
Q: Okay. Let me ask you to try to remember back as close to the accident as you can on whether — when you are talking about facial hair, are you talking about a beard, are you talking about a moustache or which?
A: Both.
Q: Both?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was it a full moustache or what or was it just like a two day growth?
A: I couldn’t even say he had a mous-tache for sure.
Rodriguez, the police officer, was asked on cross-examination if there was any doubt on his mind, based on his observations at the scene, that Bozeman was the driver. He replied: “To be honest with you, I can’t put him on the steering wheel.” He further stated that he could not be absolutely positive because Bozeman was not sitting in the driver’s seat behind the wheel and the van after impact tumbled two or three times. With reference to the police report, Rodriguez stated that he located and identified a body close to the driver’s position and wrote “Bozeman” as the driver. Counsel then inquired, “You are not telling this jury you know who was driving the van?” He answered, “No, sir. ”
When the party having the burden of proof appeals from an adverse fact finding in the trial court, the point of error should be that the matter was established as a matter of law or that the jury finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Where there is some evidence which contradicts the assertion, the matter is not established conclusively. Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex.1983). In the instant case, the railroad, the party with the burden of proving Bozeman as driver, failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the driver. Their point of error on appeal was that the jury finding at issue was erroneous because the evidence establishes as a matter of law that Bozeman was the driver. The testimony of Blount and the police officer on cross-examination constituted some evidence that Bozeman was not the driver. A reasonable inference from this evidence would be that Athey was the driver. Athey had a full head of hair and otherwise fit the description of the driver as given by Blount; Athey was the only one of the three occupants who had a beard. The jury in the exercise of their prerogative apparently considered the engineer and the reconstruction specialist to be interested witnesses and disregarded their testimony. The railroad did not assert a great weight and preponderance point of error, so we are not concerned with the quantum of evidence required to make that determination.
The railroad relies on circumstantial evidence to establish their onerous burden of proving that Bozeman was the driver as a matter of law. Texas law requires that the circumstances relied upon must have probative force sufficient to constitute a basis of legal inference; it is not enough that they raise a mere surmise or suspicion of the existence of the fact or permit a purely speculative conclusion. Lumbermen’s Underwriting Alliance v. Bell, 594 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.). A fact finder has implied finding power and can make a reasonable inference from the direct or circumstantial evidence. Harrison v. Harrison, 597 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The review of this record clearly shows the existence of a genuine fact issue on this question and there is sufficient evidence to support the jury finding.
Special Issue 25, the percentage of negligence issue, was predicated on the jury finding more than one party negligent. The jury found that the railroad crossing was “extra-hazardous”, that the railroad was negligent for failure to have flashing signal lights at the crossing, and that such *323negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence. With reference to Special Issue No. 2, the failure to have flashing signal lights, the jury found that such conduct on the part of the railroad constituted gross-negligence. The jury also found that the driver of the van was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to properly apply his brakes, and failing to timely stop the van at the crossing. Such negligence was found to be a proximate cause of the collision. However, since the jury found that Bozeman was not the driver, he could not be guilty of negligence. Therefore, the only party subject to assessment of damages was the railroad. The supreme court in Cypress Creek Utility Service Co. v. Muller, 640 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex.1982), held: “The policy of the comparative negligence statute is to apportion all damages in relation to the percentage of fault found by the jury.” Accordingly, the judgment is correct in assessing all the damages against the railroad, the only party found negligent.
For the reasons indicated, I would affirm the judgment.