Court Opinion

ID: 9583526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:39:31.765982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:03.657992
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
dissenting.
For the reasons set forth in my majority opinions in Johnson v. State, 269 Ga. 632 (501 SE2d 815) (1998) and Morman v. State, 269 Ga. 632 (501 SE2d 815) (1998), I am committed to the view that the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding Michael Johnson and his co-defendants guilty of felony murder based on the underlying felony of cruelty to children. Therefore, I respectfully dissent to the reversal of his conviction.
There is evidence in the record that Michael Johnson had been a party to or complied with the prior abuse of the baby. One neighbor specifically testified that she observed Chris Morman grab the three-four-month-old baby by the wrist and swing him above his head until the baby threw up. This same witness testified that Michael Johnson *844was present when this abuse occurred. In addition there was evidence that Michael Johnson lived in the home with Jennifer Johnson and apparently spent much of his time there as he was unemployed. Under such circumstances his knowledge of prior abuse would have been the same as Jennifer’s knowledge. Michael Johnson’s own testimony shows that he was aware of past physical abuse of the infant by Christopher Morman and after the infant died lied to the police by denying any past abuse of the baby and depicting Christopher Mor-man as a caring adult. This evidence that Michael Johnson knew of the past abuse and participated in the cover-up was sufficient to convict him of the crime of cruelty to children as a party to the crime.
Decided September 28, 1998.
Robert M. Thomas, for appellant.
J Brown Moseley, District Attorney, Robert R. Auman, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth L. Jaeger, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am likewise committed to the conclusion that Michael Johnson, a member of the household, knew as well as any of the co-defendants how Chris Morman treated the baby, and was lying about it when he talked to investigators. “A participant to a crime may be convicted for the crime although he . . .is not the person who directly commits the crime. OCGA §§ 16-2-20, 16-2-21.” Id. Because the law provides that criminal intent may be inferred from conduct before, during, and after the commission of a crime, I would affirm Michael Johnson’s conviction.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson and Justice Hines join in this dissent.