Court Opinion

ID: 9750707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:26:09.267359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:27.068684
License: Public Domain

Handler, J.,
concurring. If a defendant’s state of mind is a material factor in determining whether a particular crime has been committed — and if a degree of intoxication so affects the defendant’s mental faculties as to eliminate effectively a condition of the mind otherwise essential for the commission of a crime ■ — ■ intoxication should be recognized as a defense in fact.
When dealing with the issue of intoxication, the focus at trial should be upon the mental state which is required for the commission of the particular crime charged. This should not ordinarily call for desiccated refinements between general intent and specific intent. I subscribe to the reasoning expressed in State v. Maik, 60 N. J. 203 (1972), and endorsed by this Court, which denigrated the attempted differentiation between so-called specific intent and general intent crimes. It is an unhelpful, misleading and often confusing distinction. See People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 456-457, 462 P. 2d 370, 377-378, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625-626 (1969); J. Hall. General Principles of Criminal Law 142 (2d ed. 1960); G. Williams, Criminal Law — The General Part (2d ed. 1961); Hall, "Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility”, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1064,(1944), authorities cited by the majority opinion. Ante at 475-476. Eor the most part, the inquiry *486at a criminal trial should be directed toward the general guilty condition of mind or mens rea necessary to append responsibility for criminal conduct. See State v. Savoie, 67 N. J. 439, 454-461 (1975).
Adherence to the distinction between specific and general intent crimes, and the availability of voluntary intoxication as a defense in terms of that distinction, has led to anomalous results. See Annot., “Modern Status of the Rules as to Voluntary Intoxication as Defense to Criminal Charge”, 8 A. L. R. 3d 1236 (1966); for example, compare State v. Frankland, 51 N. J. 221 (1968) (intoxication is a defense to a statutory criminal charge of burning with intent to burn) with State v. Kinlaw, 150 N. J. Super. 70, 73 (App. Div. 1977) .(intoxication is not a defense to a statutory charge of wilfully and maliciously burning). Inconsistent applications of the intoxication defense and disparate results can be avoided or reduced by rejecting the dichotomy between specific intent and general intent crimes.
The Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute has eschewed this distinction. It deals with mens rea primarily in terms of purpose and knowledge and calls for an analysis of the elements of the criminal offense in relation to these components. See Model Penal Code § 2.02, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Id., § 2.08, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The recently enacted New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N. J. S. A. 2C:1 — 1 et seq., similarly abandons the distinctions between specific and general intent in addressing the area of the mental components of crime. N. J. S. A. 2C :2-2. This approach, in my view, enables a trier of fact to assimilate proof of a defendant’s intoxication in a more realistic perspective and to reach a more rational determination of the effect of intoxication upon criminal responsibility, particularly in terms of consciousness and purpose. N. J'. S. A. 2C:2-2.
On this point, the majority disapproves of the decision of’ the Appellate Division in State v. Del Vecchio, 142 N. J. Super. 359 (App. Div.), certif. den. 71 N. J. 501 (1976). *487Ante at 47A-475. I also disavow that decision to the extent it maintains the distinction between specific intent and general intent crimes and determines the availability of voluntary intoxication as a defense based upon that distinction. I do not think it follows, however, that if the separation between so-called specific and general intent crimes is rejected, voluntary intoxication as a factual defense must also be rejected.
The majority of this Court repudiates the intoxication defense on grounds of general deterrence and a ubiquitous need to protect society from drunken criminals. This approach mirrors a commendable impulse, which I share. But, it fails to consider that enforcement of the criminal law must be fair and just, as well as strict and protective.
The criminal laws need not be impotent or ineffective when dealing with an intoxicated criminal. The question should always be whether under particular circumstances a defendant ought to be considered responsible for his conduct. This involves a factual determination of whether he has acted with volition. Intoxication, in this context, would constitute a defense if it reached such a level, operating upon the defendant’s mind, so as to deprive him of his will to act. Cf. State v. King, 37 N. J. 285, 297-298 (1962). I would accordingly require, in order to generate a reasonable doubt as to a defendant’s responsibility for his acts, that it be shown he was so intoxicated that he could not think, or that his mind did not function with consciousness or volition. Cf. State v. Ghaul, 132 N. J. Super. 438, 440 (App. Div. 1975); State v. Turley, 113 R. I. 104, 318 A. 2d 455 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (intoxication must be so extreme as to paralyze the will of defendant); State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 298 A. 2d 378 (Ct. App. 1973) (intoxication that suspends defendant’s reasoning abilities constitutes a defense); also State v. Bindhammer, 44 N. J. 372 (1965); State v. Trantino, 44 N. J. 358 (1965), cert. den. 382 U. S. 993, 86 S. Ct. 573, 15 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1966); State v. King, supra 37 N. J. at 296-297 (homicide prosecutions).
*488I disagree therefore with the suggestion by the Court that if voluntary intoxication is recognized as a defense, as it is under the recently enacted New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N. J. S. A. 2C :2-8, it will serve to excuse criminal conduct with respect to which purpose or knowledge is a component. Ante at 482 I do not share the pessimism of the Court that voluntary intoxication as a recognized defense will wreak havoc in criminal law enforcement under the New Jersey Criminal Justice Code. The fear of condoning criminals, who are also drunks, can be addressed, I respectfully suggest, by imposing a heavy burden of proof upon defendants to show a degree of intoxication capable of prostrating the senses. Drunkenness which does not have this effect does not diminish responsibility and should not serve to excuse criminality. I think it amiss therefore for this Court to forewarn the Legislature. Ante at 480-482, on the basis of its own dire prognostications as to the applications of the statutory intoxication defense contemplated under the New Jersey Criminal Justice Code.
In this case, the crime with which defendant was charged is denominated by the statute, N. J. S. A. 2A:90 — 2, as assault with intent to rob. It serves no useful end to describe the mental state necessary to sustain the charge as a “specific intent” in contradistinction to a “general intent” to do the particular acts revealed by the evidence. I am satisfied that under any formulation of the elements of the crime, defendant on these facts could not be exonerated for reasons of intoxication. The facts, which are fully set forth in the Court’s opinion, Ante at 470-471, reveal that defendant engaged in volitional, purposeful activity — he assaulted his victim with a knife and at the same time unmistakably expressed his purpose by demanding that his victim turn over $80 from the cash register. He had the requisite mens rea for affixing criminal responsibility. The evidence of defendant’s drinking during the day and before the assault is relevant, of course, to the question of whether he was intoxicated when he committed this crime. But, in light of his unequivocal *489assault on the bartender with a knife and his loud and clear demand for money from the cash register, the evidence of intoxication was palpably insufficient to negate the volitional character of the defendant’s behavior. Juxtaposed against such overwhelming and clear evidence of purposeful criminal conduct, only intoxication which prostrated the defendant’s faculties or deprived him of will would justify his acquittal.
Was defendant nevertheless entitled to have the jury consider the evidence of intoxication as a factor relevant to his commission of the charged crime? Evidence of intoxication, which may under some circumstances be inferred from prolonged, continuous, heavy drinking, should ordinarily entitle a defendant to a charge of intoxication as a factual defense bearing upon his mental state and whether he acted without purpose or volition. E. g., State v. Frankland, supra; State v. Sinclair, 49 N. J. 525 (1967); State v. Hudson, 38 N. J. 364 (1962); State v. King, supra. The charge on intoxication, however, should explain to the jury that unless defendant’s intoxication was sufficiently extreme so as to have deprived him of his will to act and ability to reason, and prevented him in fact from having a purpose to rob the bartender, he would not, on this ground, be entitled to an acquittal. The jury, moreover, should be admonished to consider and weigh the evidence of intoxication with great caution. See State v. Tune, 17 N. J. 100, 114-115 (1954), cert. den. 349 U. S. 907, 75 S. Ct. 584, 99 L. Ed. 1243 (1955).
In another context, I would be inclined to consider the ruling of the trial judge in rejecting the asserted defense of intoxication as harmless error since under the strong evidence of guilt, it would not have affected the jury’s ultimate verdict. See State v. Atkins, 78 N. J. 454 (1979), (Handler, J., concurring), decided this day. But, the Court’s ruling in this case occurred during the trial. It altered defendant’s fundamental trial strategy and induced him not to take the stand. The ruling, therefore, had an effect beyond the sole issue of intoxication and its impact upon *490the ultimate outcome of the trial is an imponderable. The fair course of action, therefore, is a new trial.
In voting with the majority, for the reasons given, I likewise express my agreement with its observations as to the proper instruction involving the phrase “prima facie” in relation to the possession by defendant of a dangerous knife.
Justice Cliffokd joins in this opinion.