Court Opinion

ID: 9626977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:29:51.050282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:37.049582
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I am in full agreement with respect to the Court’s opinion on the limitation that was placed on cross-examination. Regarding the Court’s interpretation of G.L.1956 § 12 — 19— 21, Rhode Island’s habitual-criminal statute, however, I respectfully dissent. The critical facts to this issue are not in dispute.
In the early morning hours of March 18, 1993, defendant Bradley C. Peterson (Peterson) stepped in front of a slow-moving truck being driven by Joseph Kaiser (Kaiser). After Peterson apparently feigned injury, as discussed in the majority’s recitation of the facts, a struggle ensued between Peterson and Kaiser, which culminated in Peterson’s theft of Kaiser’s vehicle. Peterson eventually was arrested, and on July 22, 1993, arraigned in Newport County Superior Court on one count of second-degree robbery. At the arraignment, a pretrial conference date of September 2, 1993, was scheduled, although the conference was continued until November 18, 1993. On November 10, 1993, eight days prior to the date of the actual pretrial conference, and a full one-hundred and eleven days after the arraignment, the Attorney General’s office filed notice that upon conviction Peterson “is subject to the imposition of an additional sentence as an [sic ] habitual offender.”
Before the trial justice, Peterson argued that the habitual offender notice was untimely. Specifically, he maintained that pursuant to § 12-19-21, the state must declare its intention to seek an enhanced sentence within forty-five days of the arraignment, but in no case later than the scheduled pretrial conference date of September 2, 1993. On the other hand the state argued, and the trial justice eventually found, that notwithstanding the pretrial conference continuances, as long as the state provided notice before the date the pretrial conference was actually held (November 18, 1993), the requirements of § 12-19-21 were satisfied.
*267On February 14, 1995, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the charge of second-degree robbery, and on March 1,1995, Peterson was declared a habitual criminal.3 On April 19, 1995, Peterson was sentenced to thirty-years imprisonment on the robbery conviction, twenty years to serve and ten years suspended with probation. In addition, because of Peterson’s status as a habitual criminal, the trial justice sentenced him to serve an additional fifteen years consecutive to the robbery charge. On December 5, 1995, the trial justice reduced the habitual criminal sentence to five years.
In pertinent part, Rhode Island’s habitual-offender statute, § 12-19-21 (b), .states:
“Whenever it appears a person shall be deemed an [sic] ‘habitual criminal,’ the attorney general, within forty-five (It 5) days of the arraignment, but in no case later than the date of the pretrial conference, may file with the court, a notice specifying that the defendant, upon conviction, is subject to the imposition of an additional sentence in accordance with this section.” (Emphasis added.)
It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court is obligated to interpret the statute literally and apply its plain and ordinary meaning. See State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251, 253 (R.I.1998); State v. LaRoche, 683 A.2d 989, 997 (R.I.1996). Furthermore, “penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the party upon whom a penalty is to be imposed.” State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 779 (R.I.1996) (quoting State v. Calise, 478 A.2d 198, 200 (R.I.1984)). With these well established principles in mind, I simply cannot agree with the majority that the Legislature intended to bestow upon the Attorney General’s office the option of presenting notice either within forty-five days of the arraignment or at some point before the pretrial conference is held, particularly given that the pretrial conference routinely is scheduled before the expiration of the forty-five day period and is actually held at a later time only because it has been continued, often through the informal agreement of counsel.
This “either/or” interpretation contravenes the clear and unambiguous words of the habitual criminal statute. If the Legislature sought to achieve this “either/or” result, it easily could have utilized such words. To the contrary, the Legislature proscribed that “the attorney general, within forty-five (45) days of the arraignment, but in no case later than the date of the pretrial conference, may file [notice] with the court.” Section 12-19-21(b). (Emphasis added.) The words “but in no case later than the date of the pretrial conference” are limited by the preceding words “within forty-five (45) days of the arraignment.” In other words, the Attorney General’s office may present notice within forty-five days of the arraignment, but not later than the pretrial conference, which may occur before the expiration of the forty-five day period. See, e.g., State v. Heald, 232 A.2d 79, 81 (Me.1967) (interpreting the phrase “ ‘[a]ll motions for new trials in criminal cases *** shall be filed during the term at which verdict is rendered, but in no case later than SO days after verdict [is] rendered ’ as meaning that the motion must be filed during the term and in the event the term continues for moré than 30 days, then within 30 days after the rendition of the verdict”).
Nevertheless, the majority reads the requirement that notice be presented “not later than the pretrial conference” as extending the time in which the state may provide notice and thus renders the forty-five day requirement nugatory. This interpretation, however, has the anomalous result that the granting of pretrial conference continuances, which previously were based upon informal procedure and brotherly courtesy, now have significant and substantive consequences for a defendant facing the most punitive weapon in the Attorney General’s arsenal. See State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1278 (R.I.1998) (augmenting habitual offender’s sentence by twenty-five years); State v. Sitko, 457 A.2d 260, 261-62 (R.I.1983) (“ ‘The purpose of the habitual offender act is to allow enhanced penalties for those defendants who meet objective guidelines indicating recidivism’ ”).
*268In this case, Peterson was arraigned on July 22, 1993. Consequently, the state was required to provide notice within forty-five days (September 6, 1993).4 The state’s failure to file notice until November 10, 1993, which was one-hundred and eleven days after the arraignment, was in contravention of the plain words of § 12-19-21 and violative of Peterson’s due process rights. See State v. Tregaskis, 540 A.2d 1022, 1025 (R.I.1988) (oral notice provided at arraignment).
For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the habitual criminal sentence.

. The Attorney General's notice indicated that Peterson previously had been convicted of robbery in 1985 and possession of a stolen motor vehicle in 1990.

. I note that since Peterson was arraigned on July 22, 1993, the state was required to provide notice within forty-five days, which would have been September 5, 1993. Since September 5, 1993, fell on a Sunday, however, the state had until the end of the following day to provide notice. See Super.R.Crim.P. 45(a).