Court Opinion

ID: 9746179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:06:14.743772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:10.275197
License: Public Domain

PREMO, Acting P. J.
respectfully dissent. My concern is that even if the argument put forth by Exxon, as adopted by the majority, ultimately is persuasive and carries the day, it is premature for us to draw conclusions as a matter of law at this point in the case.
My colleagues state the dispositive conclusion that the relevant market in this case is the overall retail gasoline market and not the Exxon gasoline stocks which are purportedly the subject of vertical restraints. The majority does so because of what they perceive to be unassailable case law in support of petitioner’s argument. As a result the relevant market decision is herein made as a matter of law. We therefore disagree with the trial court who felt a triable question of fact was entailed.
Again, I stress my concern is the timing of these conclusions. The majority may well have stated the correct ultimate outcome. Certainly there *1690is a trend in the decided cases that would so indicate. But to do so in a case which at best is complex and somewhat arcane, which requires the distinguishing of Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enterprises, Inc. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 687 [248 Cal.Rptr. 189] and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. (1992) 504 U.S. 451 [119 L.Ed.2d 265, 112 S.Ct. 2072], and which entails weighing and disregarding the proffered testimony of respondent’s primary expert witness is, in my opinion, a bit of a quantum leap.
Even had these arguments been subjected to an evidentiary hearing or trial itself where the parties’ entrenched positions could be illuminated or worse, exposed as unpersuasive, in the light of cross-examination this court would at least have a complete record upon which to base the comprehensive conclusions of the majority opinion.
Without such a record, I believe this case does not merit our intervention at this stage. We should deny the petition.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 13, 1997, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. The petition of real parties in interest for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 14, 1997. Mosk, J., Chin, J., and Brown, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.