Court Opinion

ID: 9963422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 15:41:48.2242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:49.097017
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
           in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                       2024 IL App (3d) 240058-U

                                  Order filed April 24, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 IN THE

                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                           THIRD DISTRICT

                                                   2024

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                      )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                       )      of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                                      )      Will County, Illinois,
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )
                                                      )      Appeal No. 3-24-0058
            v.                                        )      Circuit No. 22-CF-983
                                                      )
     JAMES L. FAINT,                                  )      Honorable
                                                      )      Vincent F. Cornelius,
            Defendant-Appellant.                      )      Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment.
            Presiding Justice McDade dissented.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                ORDER

¶1         Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s petition to deny
                 pretrial release.

¶2         Defendant, James L. Faint, appeals the trial court’s decision to deny him pretrial release.

     We affirm.

¶3                                        I. BACKGROUND
¶4          Defendant was indicted on July 14, 2022, with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon

     (Class 3) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), (e) (West 2022)) and two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a

     weapon (Class 4) (id. § 24-1.6). Defendant’s bail was set at $100,000, but he remained in custody.

     On January 9, 2024, defendant pro se filed a petition seeking pretrial release. In response, the State

     filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release, alleging defendant was charged with a

     nonprobationable felony, and his release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person,

     persons, or the community under section 110-6.1(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

     (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2022)).

¶5          The factual basis provided that on June 14, 2021, officers observed a vehicle whose

     registered owner had a revoked license. The registered owner was driving the vehicle, and

     defendant was in the front passenger seat. A traffic stop and subsequent search of the vehicle were

     conducted, during which a firearm was recovered from the glove compartment in front of

     defendant. Officers executed a search warrant on defendant’s cellphone, which showed a video of

     defendant possessing the firearm. Officers were able to identify the firearm in the video as being

     the one recovered from the vehicle due to the firearm having a very unique aftermarket gun sight

     which was in the same location as the one found in the vehicle. At the time of the offense, defendant

     was on bond in another case where he was also charged with unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.

     Defendant had a prior criminal history which included a 2019 conviction for theft.

¶6          A hearing was held on January 11, 2024, on this case and defendant’s other pending case.

     The State provided the factual basis and argued defendant was a felon, was on bond, and was not

     supposed to have guns. The State indicated that defendant posed a threat to the community by his

     possession of the firearms and stated,

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                       “I don’t think he would obey any lawful orders of the Court, because he has been

                       given a chance to be put on bond to obey certain conditions of bond. But even more

                       so, he was convicted and was given rules that he was supposed to follow, and he

                       doesn’t follow those, allegedly, for three separate occasions.”

     The State further said,

                       “I believe [defendant] has been given a couple chances to be able to show the Court

                       that he is able to follow conditions of bond, conditions of convictions, and he has

                       not shown the Court that he would be able to do that. And I think that goes greatly

                       to the fact that there could be no condition or combination of conditions that would

                       be able to prevent [defendant] from being a risk to the community.”

     Defendant argued he was not a threat and stated, “there was no harm done.” Defendant also argued

     that there was insufficient evidence that he committed the offenses. Defendant stated he would

     comply with any conditions of pretrial release and indicated he had a family to care for. While

     defendant said he had never failed to appear, the State indicated that he did have failures to appear

     in a previous case.

¶7          The court granted the petition, finding that the State met its burden by clear and convincing

     evidence. In doing so, the court stated defendant had three pending cases, all of which were

     “unlawful use of weapons by a felon” cases, and in all three defendant was on some sort of release,

     whether parole or bond. The court further noted that defendant was known to possess weapons.

     The court said,

                    “The Court further finds that, given three consecutive possessions of firearm in a

                    short window of time while in vehicles and while on parole and/or bond, *** there’s

                    nothing that this Court can think of *** that would mitigate your ability to do that.

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                        I don’t think an electronic home monitor *** restricts your ability to possess

                        firearms. I don’t think home detention would restrict your ability to possess

                        firearms.”

¶8                                                 II. ANALYSIS

¶9               On appeal, defendant argues the court abused its discretion in granting the State’s petition

       “where the State failed to clearly and convincingly prove that [defendant] poses a real and present

       safety threat that no conditions could mitigate.” We consider factual findings for the manifest

       weight of the evidence, but the ultimate decision to grant or deny the State’s petition to detain is

       considered for an abuse of discretion. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. Under

       either standard, we consider whether the court’s determination is arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.;

       see also People v. Horne, 2023 IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 19.

¶ 10             Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be denied

       in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a verified

       petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the burden of

       proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that

       defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant poses a real and present threat to any

       person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate this

       threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(a), (e). Sections 110-5(a) and 110-6.1(g) set forth factors for

       the court to consider when determining dangerousness and any conditions. Id. §§ 110-5(a), 110-

       6.1(g).

¶ 11             We cannot say the court abused its discretion in granting the State’s petition. Defendant

       continued to possess firearms, though he was a felon and on bond, thus showing he was dangerous.

       Moreover, the State presented evidence and argument regarding the factors in section 110-5(a),

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       including the nature and circumstance of the offense. Id. The State argued defendant had been on

       bond and was a felon, did not follow the conditions placed on him then, and would not comply

       with any further conditions of the court. The court further found that no conditions would prevent

       defendant from possessing firearms. Based on the evidence and argument presented, it was not

       against the manifest weight of the evidence for the court to determine that the defendant was thus

       unlikely to comply with any conditions of pretrial release. Therefore, the court did not abuse its

       discretion in granting the State’s petition.

¶ 12                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 13          We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County.

¶ 14          Affirmed.

¶ 15          PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting:

¶ 16          The majority has affirmed the circuit court’s decision to grant the State’s petition to deny

       Faint pretrial release. I would hold that the State failed to meet its burden of proof under section

       110-6.1(e)(3) and that Faint would necessarily have to be admitted to pretrial release despite the

       nature of his alleged crimes. Thus, I dissent.

¶ 17          In full, section 110-6.1(e) states:

                              “(e) Eligibility: All defendants shall be presumed eligible for pretrial

                      release, and the State shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing

                      evidence that:

                              (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has

                      committed an offense listed in subsection (a), and

                              (2) for offenses listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a), the

                      defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or

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                      the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, by conduct

                      which may include, but is not limited to, a forcible felony, the obstruction of

                      justice, intimidation, injury, or abuse as defined by paragraph (1) of Section 103

                      of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, and

                              (3) no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of

                      Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the

                      safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific

                      articulable facts of the case, for offenses listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of

                      subsection (a), or (ii) the defendant’s willful flight for offenses listed in paragraph

                      (8) of subsection (a), and

                              (4) for offenses under subsection (b) of Section 407 of the Illinois

                      Controlled Substances Act that are subject to paragraph (1) of subsection (a), no

                      condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-

                      10 of this Article can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any

                      person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the

                      case, and the defendant poses a serious risk to not appear in court as required.”

                      725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022).

       While not every subsection of section 110-6.1(e) may be applicable in any given case, the statute

       is abundantly clear that the burden of proving that a defendant should be detained, rather than

       released, lies with the State.

¶ 18          “Burden of proof” contains two concepts: a burden of production and a burden of

       persuasion. Black’s Law Dictionary 196 (6th ed. 1990). The burden of production is “[t]he

       obligation of a party to introduce evidence sufficient to avoid a ruling against him on the issue.”

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       Id. The burden of persuasion is “[t]he onus on the party with the burden of proof to convince the

       trier of fact of all elements of his case.” Id. In pretrial-release cases, then, when the State opposes

       release and seeks detention, it would seem elementary that for the State to meet its legislatively

       mandated burden under section 110-6.1(e)(3), it would at a minimum produce evidence and

       present argument related to the conditions listed in section 110-10(b) because that section is

       explicitly referenced by section 110-6.1(e)(3). 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2022); see People

       v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, ¶¶ 15-19. Of course, not every conceivable condition of

       pretrial release would need to be addressed by the State to meet its burden under section 110-

       6.1(e)(3). But the language of that section shows that the legislature contemplated what conditions

       would arguably be applicable and mandated that the State produce evidence and present argument

       on them.

¶ 19          If the State fails to meet its burden of proof—namely, its burdens of production and

       persuasion—under section 110-6.1(e), the presumption that the defendant is eligible for release

       stands and the defendant cannot be detained. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e). If, on the other hand, the

       State satisfies its burden, the presumption vanishes. However, detention in that situation is not

       automatic, as the ultimate decision of whether a defendant will be released or detained has now

       passed squarely into the discretionary power of the circuit court. See, e.g., People v. Trottier, 2023

       IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13 (holding that “[w]e review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s

       ultimate determination regarding pretrial release”).

¶ 20          In this case, the State’s petition to deny pretrial release was based on sections 110-6.1(a)(1)

       and (6). Accordingly, at the hearing on the petition, the State was required to prove by clear and

       convincing evidence, in relevant part, that (1) “the proof is evident or the presumption great that

       the defendant has committed an offense listed in subsection (a)” (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1));

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       (2) “the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

       community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case” (id. § 110-6.1(e)(2)); and (3) “no

       condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of this Article

       can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community,

       based on the specific articulable facts of the case” (id. § 110-6.1(e)(3)).

¶ 21          At the hearing in this case, the State presented evidence of the circumstances surrounding

       the incident leading to the charges that were filed against Faint. The State emphasized that Faint

       was out on bond at the time he committed the alleged offenses and that one condition of his bond

       was a prohibition on possessing firearms. Because Faint violated that condition, the State

       continued, he was not likely to abide by any conditions such that no conditions could mitigate the

       safety risk he posed.

¶ 22          As I stated above, I believe that to meet its burden of proof under section 110-6.1(e)(3),

       the State ought to address, at a minimum, the conditions explicitly listed in section 110-10(b).

       Supra ¶ 18. Here, while the State did address one of those conditions—a prohibition on possessing

       firearms (id. § 110-10(b)(2))—it was an unsubstantiated leap for the State to conclude that the

       failure of Faint to abide by one condition meant that he would not follow any conditions and that

       no conditions therefore could mitigate the safety threat he posed. The State cannot meet its burden

       of proof under section 110-6.1(e)(3) by addressing only one of the conditions listed in section 110-

       10(b), and it certainly cannot persuasively conclude, without more, that the failure to abide by one

       condition means Faint would not abide by any conditions. Accordingly, under these circumstances,

       I would hold that the State failed to meet its burden of proof under section 110-6.1(e)(3) and that

       the statutory presumption accordingly compels his release. Id. § 110-6.1(e).

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¶ 23             In this regard, I would note that there has been a tendency of late by my colleagues on this

       court to issue decisions in pretrial-release cases that claim the State can meet its burden of proof

       under section 110-6.1(e) by producing evidence related to the factors the circuit court is statutorily

       mandated to consider under section 110-5 when considering what conditions should attach to a

       defendant’s pretrial release. See, e.g., People v. Mikolaitis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230791, ¶¶ 9-11;

       People v. Salazar, 2024 IL App (3d) 240066-U, ¶¶ 14-15, 17; People v. Grant, 2024 IL App (3d)

       230623-U, ¶¶ 7-8. These decisions reflect a profound misinterpretation of the pretrial-release

       statutory scheme.

¶ 24             Section 110-5, which contains a nonexhaustive list of factors the circuit court is required

       to consider when imposing conditions of pretrial release (725 ILCS 5/110-5 (West 2022)), is not

       referenced at all in section 110-6.1(e) (id. § 110-6.1(e)). The reason for this should be obvious.

       Section 110-5, which is titled “Determining the amount of bail and conditions of release,” only

       applies after the court has received evidence and heard arguments on whether a defendant should

       be detained rather than released; i.e., once the discretion of the court has been invoked. See id.

       § 110-5. Language used throughout section 110-5 confirms what ought to be obvious about when

       it applies. Subsection (a) provides factors for the circuit court to consider when deciding what

       conditions should apply, if any, to pretrial release. Id. § 110-5(a). Subsection (b) states that the

       court “may use a regularly validated risk assessment tool to aid its determination of appropriate

       conditions of release.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 110-5(b). Subsection (c) requires the court to

       impose conditions that are mandatory under section 110-10(a). Id. § 110-5(c). Other examples

       exist in the statute as well, but more are unnecessary. It is abundantly clear that section 110-5 plays

       no part in the determination of whether the State has met its burden of proof under section 110-

       6.1(e).

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¶ 25          Section 110-5 has been misused with increasing frequency by my colleagues on this court

       to infer that the State can meet its burden of proof under section 110-6.1(e) by presenting evidence

       that would be related to factors the circuit court must consider under section 110-5 when making

       an entirely separate determination. See, e.g., Mikolaitis, 2024 IL App (3d) 230791, ¶¶ 9-11;

       Salazar, 2024 IL App (3d) 240066-U, ¶¶ 14-15, 17; Grant, 2024 IL App (3d) 230623-U, ¶¶ 7-8.

       This case is no different. The majority in this case presents a misleading, overly generalized

       summary of what section 110-6.1(e) requires and then immediately refers to section 110-5, as if

       that section has something to do with the section 110-6.1(e) determination. Supra ¶ 10. In the next

       paragraph, when it analyzes whether the circuit court erred in granting the State’s petition to detain,

       the majority then explicitly uses section 110-5 as support for its decision: “the State presented

       evidence and argument regarding the factors in section 110-5(a), including the nature and

       circumstance of the offense.” Supra ¶ 11. The majority’s use of section 110-5 in this manner is

       manifestly incorrect under the law and underscores the erroneous nature of the majority’s decision.

¶ 26          For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

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