Court Opinion

ID: 9573370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:53:34.345205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:55.360627
License: Public Domain

ZLAKET, Vice Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot subscribe to the majority opinion because it supports the unnecessary exclusion of important witnesses and exhibits in the absence of a showing that the defendant, whose liberty is at stake, had anything to do with their late disclosure. Where a defendant is innocent of the discovery violation and the trial court has other remedies available to it, I submit that the exclusion of evidence should generally be considered inappropriate.
Let us assume for argument’s sake that some tortured view of zealous advocacy prompted defense counsel to seek an advantage by knowingly and intentionally failing to timely disclose the witnesses. If his client had no knowledge of these shenanigans and took no part in them, who should be penalized? As matters stand, the lawyer here faces no serious consequences. The defen*272dant, on the other hand, is in prison, possibly because he was deprived of evidence important to his case. Something is wrong with this picture.
It may be an unavoidable fact of life that people will sometimes suffer the unpleasant effects of their attorneys’ sins. Nevertheless, I believe we should make every effort to prevent this from occurring. State v. Smith, 128 Ariz. 243, 252, 599 P.2d 199, 208 (1979) (“Prohibiting the calling of a witness should be invoked only in those cases where other less stringent sanctions are not applicable to effect the ends of justice.”). I find little consolation in the knowledge that the aggrieved client can subsequently file a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rule 32, Ariz. R.Crim.Proc. Such requests are seldom granted. Moreover, they frequently take considerable time to resolve, during which the defendant is usually incarcerated.
There is a broad range of available sanctions for discovery violations. See Rule 15.7, Ariz.R.Crim.Proc. One size clearly does not fit all, nor should it. Sanctions ought to be tailored to the facts of each case and, in my view, only the culprit should bear the brunt of them. Thus, I cannot understand why the lawyer’s bad faith, or lack of it, should influence anything other than the severity of sanctions to be assessed against him. A similar, but separate, analysis might be necessary with respect to the defendant if there is any indication that he had a hand in the late disclosure.
Assuming the lawyer was the culpable actor and the client was innocent, penalties ought to be imposed on the former. The latter should still be entitled to a full and fair trial with all available evidence at his disposal. On the other hand, if it appears that defendant knew and approved of the discovery ploy, it may be appropriate to exclude evidence in addition to sanctioning the lawyer. In the case of a completely innocent mistake, of course, the court has discretion to impose limited sanctions, or none at all.
Here, after conducting a hearing, the trial court apparently satisfied itself that the lawyer was responsible, even though it found his conduct not to have been motivated by bad faith. I agree with the majority that regardless of the lawyer’s good or bad faith, it appears that his actions were at least knowing and intentional. Thus, I believe the proper remedy would have been to impose sanctions on the attorney, and perhaps to request a State Bar investigation for ethical violations. At the same time, assuming there was no evidence of wrongdoing by the client, the trial court should have declared a mistrial when prejudice from the late disclosure became apparent. A continuance could then have been ordered to permit the state time for additional investigation and preparation. See Smith, swpra (preclusion of vital defense witnesses too severe even though state unaware of their testimony and defendant gave no explanation for the failure to disclose). As the majority notes, a mistrial would have been justified on the basis of “manifest necessity.” McLaughlin v. Fahringer, 150 Ariz. 274, 277, 723 P.2d 92, 95 (1986). Because the defense was responsible, there could be no reasonable argument that jeopardy had attached. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505, 98 S.Ct. 824, 830, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978).
Therefore, I concur in the result reached by the court of appeals.