Court Opinion

ID: 9560571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:51:28.828272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:00.012528
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. Plaintiffs obtained a verdict and judgment against defendant in the Superior Court of Coweta County by default, despite the fact that the case was not on the trial calendar, and despite the further fact that a local rule of court required all parties desiring a trial of their actions to notify the clerk in writing 30 days prior to the opening of court, and to send a copy to the opposite party, and which rule was not complied with.
Defendant filed a complaint in equity to have the verdict and judgment set aside, to which summons was attached *855and copy of which was regularly served upon the plaintiffs. Thus, in this action the original defendant was plaintiff, and the original plaintiffs became defendants.
The majority opinion mistakenly concludes that this was a "motion to set aside” as contemplated by Code Ann. § 81A-160 (d) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 662; 1967, pp. 226, 239, 240) and further mistakenly concludes that relief could be granted only because of "some non-amendable defect which does appear upon the face of the record or pleadings.” Code Ann. § 81A-160 (d) is substantially the same as the former law as contained in Code §§ 110-703 and 110-705.
This was not a "motion to set aside”; this was a petition or complaint in equity, with process (summons) attached, wherein the original plaintiffs were sued and served as defendants. The law as to "motions to set aside” for "non-amendable defects which appear on the face of the record” is not applicable. The difference is clearly spelled out in Union Compress Co. v. Leffler & Son, 122 Ga. 640 (1, 2) (50 SE 483), which is approved and upheld in Allen v. Allen, 218 Ga. 364, 365 (127 SE2d 902). Also on this point see Dugan v. McGlann, 60 Ga. 353 (1) and Turner v. Jordan, 67 Ga. 604 (2) and Lyons v. State, 7 Ga. App. 50, 53 (66 SE 149). A "motion to set aside” is different from a suit or complaint which attacks the judgment, separate and apart from the original suit. See Code Ann. § 81A-160 (b), supra. A motion to set aside may be made only in the original action, and is limited to "defects which appear on the face of the record” (see Union Compress Co. v. Leffler & Son, 122 Ga. 640, 642, supra), but any judgment which has been "irregularly or improperly” obtained may be set aside by a separate suit. The suit may be in equity or at common law, with appropriate pleadings. See Dugan v. McGlann, 60 Ga. 353 (1), supra. The relief which may be granted is not limited to non-amendable defects or defects which appear on the face of the record.
The majority opinion urges that in the original suit, defendant waived its right to receive notice by failure to file defensive pleadings, citing Code Ann. § 81A-105 (a).
*856But the defect in the verdict and judgment is not the failure of defendant to receive notice of the time and place. The case never did reach the trial calendar.
No case can be tried unless it is on the trial calendar. Code Ann. § 81A-140 (c) provides for two methods of placing cases on the trial calendar as follows: 1. Without request of the parties but upon notice to the parties, or 2. Upon request of a party and notice to the other parties. It is certainly true that defendant in the original suit waived his right to notice; but the only way that plaintiffs could try the case and secure verdict and judgment was to first get the case on the calendar; and the only way they could get it on the calendar was to follow the mandate of the above statute, which spells out in clear and unmistakable language that under No. 1 or No. 2, there had to be "notice to the parties.” And although defendant may waive his right to notice by failure to timely file defensive pleadings, the statute in question was not enacted solely for the benefit of the defendant, but also conferred rights upon the trial judge and the clerk of court. Plaintiffs had to comply with the statute before his case was ripe for trial.
But going a step further, the local rule of court is admitted by the defendants, and they also admitted they had not complied with it, which required the giving of notice to the clerk of court 30 days prior to the opening of court before a trial could be had. It cannot be contended that the clerk of court had waived his right to compliance with this rule, which allowed him advance notice of which cases would be tried, so he might conduct the affairs of his office in an.orderly fashion. Such local rules must be followed. Code Ann. § 81A-183.
This case was tried when it was not on the trial calendar, and the trial court erroneously sustained the motion to dismiss, which was treated as a motion for summary judgment.