Court Opinion

ID: 9402166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 15:07:32.344327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:57.927871
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                                                     RENDERED: JUNE 15, 2023
                                                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                2022-SC-0098-MR

TREYVON M. DOWNS                                                        APPELLANT

                ON APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
V.             HONORABLE SAMUEL TODD SPALDING, JUDGE
                    NOS. 20-CR-00051 & 20-CR-00052

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                 APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                   AFFIRMING

      Treyvon Malik Downs shot and killed Tevaughn Porter after meeting him

to discuss the sale of Xanax bars. The main issue at the jury trial was whether

Downs’s killing of Porter was justified by the doctrine of self-defense. Downs

was convicted of murder and tampering with physical evidence and sentenced

to a total of twenty-five years of incarceration.1 Downs raises trial errors

relating to whether the Marion Circuit Court erred in failing to grant directed

verdicts on the murder and tampering charges, erred in admitting improper

character evidence in violation of Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 404(b), and

      1 Downs separately pled guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of a
firearm and received a sentence of five years’ concurrent with his other sentences.
Although this conviction is nominally being appealed, Downs has not raised any issue
on appeal related to this conviction and sentence.
cumulatively erred. We affirm as the motions for directed verdict were properly

denied and any errors as to the admission of evidence were harmless.

               I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Just after midnight on March 3, 2020, Porter texted Downs asking

Downs if he wanted to buy any Xanax bars. At 3:26 a.m. they texted back and

forth and at 3:30 a.m., Downs called Porter. Shortly thereafter, they met on

Oak Street in Lebanon, Kentucky. While they were there, an altercation ensued

and sometime after 3:44 a.m. Downs shot a .38 caliber revolver five times. He

hit Porter once in the chest.

      Gunshots woke several neighbors. Porter ran down Oak Street and

banged on at least two doors and yelled “Help me.”

      Shannon Porter, who lived on Oak Street, heard someone beating on her

door and calling her name. After she asked who it was, the person answered

“It’s Tevaughn Porter. I’ve been shot.” Shannon knew Porter as she was related

to him through her husband.

      Shannon let Porter inside her home. Porter repeatedly told her that he

had been shot by Trey Downs and was dying. Shannon called 911 and during

the call, Porter was recorded in the background stating that Trey Downs shot

him. Porter later died at the hospital as a result of a single gunshot wound to

his chest which entered his left chest by the armpit and exited his right chest

around his armpit.

      Based on Porter’s identification of Downs as the shooter and text

messages on Porter’s phone, officers attempted to locate Downs. They

                                        2
ultimately were able to obtain his phone number, called him and arranged to

take him to the police station for an interview.

      Detective B.J. Burton with the Kentucky State Police interviewed Downs.

During the lengthy interview, Downs repeatedly denied any involvement in the

shooting, denied meeting Porter that evening and denied speaking to him that

night. He also denied having any involvement with drugs or Xanax pills, and

that he played with guns or used a gun that night.

      Eventually, after being confronted with proof that he was involved,

Downs admitted to shooting Porter but told detectives that he acted in self-

defense because Porter was trying to kill him. Downs explained that Porter had

a gun and demanded money from Downs, Downs refused, they started

wrestling, Porter dropped the gun, Downs picked it up and Downs shot Porter

as he tried to run. Downs clarified that Porter had tried to sell Downs some

pills and when he refused Porter asked for money. Downs stated he tried to

give Porter $3, Porter saw the money in Downs’s hand and tried to grab it.

      Downs made damaging admissions during the interview that were

contrary to his claim that he acted in self-defense. Downs stated that after they

had wrestled for the gun and Porter dropped it, “I get a hold of the gun, he’s

trying to run, and that’s when I shoot him.” When the detective asked “And,

he’s running away from you after you get a hold of the gun?” Downs answered,

“Yeah.” Downs also explained, “He seen when I picked it up. He was running,

and I’m like . . . I’m gone.”

                                        3
      Downs stated that after shooting Porter, he had someone drive him to

Hamilton Heights where he got rid of the gun. He identified on a map where he

left the gun and agreed to take them to the location. Once there, Downs told

the police where to find the gun. The revolver was wrapped in a shirt and

placed under a dirty diaper inside a grocery bag.

      On June 1, 2020, Downs was indicted for murder, tampering with

physical evidence, and felon in possession of a handgun. Prior to trial, the

Commonwealth filed notice of its intent to introduce evidence pursuant to

Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 404(b). Ultimately, the trial court permitted

the Commonwealth to introduce photographs of Downs with guns, a silent

video showing Downs handling firearms, and texts from within ten days of the

killing which contained discussions relating to controlled substances, on the

basis that this evidence was relevant to show motive and rebut Down’s

assertions that he did not use guns, had “nothing to do with” pills or drugs,

and that he “wouldn’t rob [Porter].”

      Downs’s account of what occurred on the night Porter was killed, as

presented in his opening statement, included a denial he was buying drugs

that night or had a gun with him. Downs stated Porter was selling drugs,

Downs did not want drugs but offered to give Porter $3 to help him out. Downs

stated Porter wanted more money, Porter used Porter’s gun to try to rob Downs

and Downs acted in self-defense.

                                        4
      Twenty-three witnesses testified for the Commonwealth about what

Porter and Downs had been up to that night, hearing the gunshots, the

resulting 911 calls, Shannon’s observations, and the subsequent investigation.

Admitted during trial was a video Downs posted on social media showing him

holding a similar black revolver to the murder weapon, text messages between

Downs and his sister Amber Downs about drugs, photos from Downs’s phone

showing him with weapons and drugs, and text messages between Porter and

Downs showing them discussing Downs’s possible purchase of an AR-type rifle.

      Downs called four witnesses. He argued that Porter tried to rob him,

Downs took the gun away from Porter, and he shot Porter in self-defense.

      Downs’s most important witness was Zach Robertson, who supported

Downs’s claim of self-defense. Robertson testified that at around 3 or 3:30 a.m.

on March 3, 2020, he was in a car parked at an apartment complex off Oak

Street waiting for his Tinder date to call him when he heard a commotion. He

looked in that direction and in the low light saw two black men at the end of

the road, one taller and one shorter (earlier in the trial it was established that

Porter was much taller than Downs). Robertson testified he saw the taller man

reach back to his waistband and grab a gun, and then saw a fistfight between

them. As they went to the ground, the shorter man picked up the gun and

stared firing almost instantly.

      Robertson testified when he heard shooting he ducked. Then after a

short pause of maybe thirty seconds, when he looked back up the two men

were gone. Robertson testified he then drove away.

                                         5
      Robertson explained he did not know Downs. He did not come forward

earlier because he did not want to get involved. He only came forward after

speaking to an acquaintance of Downs who knew Downs was being charged

with murder; at that point he felt obligated to speak up because someone was

getting charged with murder for acting in self-defense.

                                   II. ANALYSIS

A. The trial court did not err by denying Downs’s motions for a directed
   verdict on the murder and tampering with evidence charges.

      Downs argues he sufficiently preserved this issue in moving for a

directed verdict at the end of the Commonwealth’s case and at the end of all

proof. In moving for a directed verdict, Downs only argued that for counts one

and two of the indictment “the Commonwealth has failed to meet its burden

regarding proof of the elements necessary in the indictments.”

      For motions for a directed verdict to be properly preserved, it is not

enough that the defense makes such a general motion. The Kentucky Rules of

Civil Procedure (CR) 50.01 requires that “[a] motion for a directed verdict shall

state the specific grounds therefor.” As noted in Pate v. Commonwealth, 134

S.W.3d 593, 597-98 (Ky. 2004), and the cases cited in support thereof in

footnote 13, “Kentucky appellate courts have steadfastly held that failure to do

so will foreclose appellate review of the trial court's denial of the directed

verdict motion.” Therefore, “[m]erely moving summarily for a directed verdict or

making a general assertion of insufficient evidence is not enough” to preserve

any error. Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665, 669 (Ky. 2009).

                                          6
      Accordingly, Downs’s motions for directed verdict were insufficient to

preserve this issue and we may only review for palpable error. However, even

had these motions been properly preserved, Downs could not satisfy his

burden.

      In Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991), our Court

specified how motions for directed verdict are to be evaluated by the trial court

and then reviewed on appeal:

      On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair
      and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
      Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable
      juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
      guilty, a directed verdict should not be given. For the purpose of
      ruling on the motion, the trial court must assume that the
      evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
      questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to such
      testimony.

      On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the
      evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to
      find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict
      of acquittal.

      1. Downs was not Entitled to a Directed Verdict on the Murder
         Charge.

      Downs argues that the text messages between him and Porter could not

support the theory that he planned to rob Porter and, instead, supported the

opposite conclusion, that Porter planned to rob him. He also argues that

Robertson’s testimony established that Downs shot Porter in self-defense.

Therefore, Downs argues that the Commonwealth failed to refute that he was

privileged to act in self-defense. Downs additionally argues in his reply that

                                        7
there was no evidence Porter was running away and the trajectory of the bullet

through Porter indicates that at most he was turned to his side.

      Downs ignores that in his own statement to the detectives, he stated that

he shot Porter as Porter was running away. Also, as the Commonwealth points

out, Downs running away after shooting Porter and then concealing the gun is

also some evidence of a guilty conscience.

      While there was evidence which supported Downs acting in self-defense

there was also evidence which supported Downs murdering Porter. The jury

was entitled to evaluate Robertson’s credibility and ability to accurately

interpret what he saw in low light. Ultimately, it was up to the jury to resolve

what occurred and it would have been inappropriate for the trial court to

resolve this issue through granting a directed verdict.

      2. Downs was not Entitled to a Directed Verdict on the Tampering
         with Evidence Charge.

      Downs argues that because he took the officers to find the gun, he could

not properly be found guilty of “removing” the firearm as the jury was

instructed as grounds for tampering. Downs argues it is reasonable to infer he

was leaving the scene of the crime to get himself away rather than for the

purpose of removing the firearm and there was no proof that he acted with

intent to prevent the evidence from being available at trial when he took the

gun with him. While he acknowledges that perhaps he “concealed” the gun, he

states the jury was not instructed on him committing tampering through

concealment.

                                        8
      The Commonwealth argues that there was sufficient evidence that Downs

concealed the gun. The Commonwealth also argues that the fact that Downs

took detectives to the location does not absolve him of the tampering charge

anymore than remedial action would undo a theft.

      In considering whether it was palpable error for the trial court not to

grant Downs’s motion for a directed verdict, we are concerned not with the

specific jury instructions, but with what is required generally for a conviction

for tampering.

      (1) A person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence when,
      believing that an official proceeding is pending or may be
      instituted, he:

             (a) Destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes or alters
             physical evidence which he believes is about to be
             produced or used in the official proceeding with intent
             to impair its verity or availability in the official
             proceeding[.]

Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 524.100.

      The circumstances of Downs fleeing with the firearm, hiding it, and then

denying any involvement with the shooting when questioned by the police

provide a basis for inferring that Downs removed or concealed the firearm with

intent to impair its availability in the official proceeding, however short-lived

that intent may have been. Therefore, we are confident there was sufficient

evidence to support a conviction for tampering through either concealing or

removing the firearm.2 It was properly left up to the jury to resolve this issue.

      2 These acts are not synonymous. “Construed in a manner so as not to render
the word ‘conceal’ redundant, ‘remove’ must refer to the act of changing the location or
                                           9
      In his reply brief, Downs makes two additional arguments about why he

should have been granted a directed verdict on the tampering charge. Downs

argues that at most he “attempted” to tamper and that it is a defense pursuant

to KRS 506.020 that he abandoned the effort to tamper. Whether Downs may

have only attempted or abandoned his efforts to tamper could perhaps have

gained traction if he had asked the trial court for instructions along those lines.

      Downs also argues that if a suspect cannot “undo” tampering, there will

be no incentive for suspects to cooperate with police. Such an argument is

more appropriately addressed to the General Assembly as a reason why our

tampering statute ought to be amended. It does not provide a justification for

us to conclude that the trial court erred by failing to grant a directed verdict.

B. Any Error in Admitting KRE 404(b) Evidence was Harmless.—Preserved

      Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a notice of its intent to introduce

KRE 404(b) evidence in the form of photographs and videos of Downs

possessing guns, videos of Downs rapping about murder and robbery, and text

messages between Downs and others related to drug trafficking. The

Commonwealth argued that this evidence should appropriately be introduced

during its case in chief to demonstrate “motive, intent, preparation, plan,

absence of mistake” and was also appropriate to admit to rebut Downs’s

statements to police during his interview that he did not handle guns, “had

position of a piece of an object in a way that moves it from the scene of a crime.”
Commonwealth v. James, 586 S.W.3d 717, 725 (Ky. 2019).

                                           10
nothing to do with” pills or drugs, and that he “wouldn’t rob [Porter].” Downs

objected to such evidence being admitted.

      The trial court agreed to allow some photographs of Downs with guns, a

silent video showing him handling a gun, and texts from ten days before Porter

was killed which related to drugs and tied into why he may have been meeting

Porter as relevant to show motive and rebut Downs’s previous denials of

involvement with guns, drugs, and denial of robbing Porter. The trial court

excluded the music videos. After this evidence was admitted at trial, the trial

court admonished the jury not to consider this evidence as character evidence.

      We review the trial court’s decision to admit this evidence for abuse of

discretion. Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 19 (Ky. 2005).

      KRE 404(b), which concerns character evidence regarding “other crimes,

wrongs, or acts[,]” provides as follows:

      Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
      the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
      therewith. It may, however, be admissible:

         (1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,
             opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
             or absence of mistake or accident; or

         (2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to
             the case that separation of the two (2) could not be
             accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering
             party.

Of note, “the list provided in KRE 404(b)(1) is illustrative rather than

exhaustive.” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 655 S.W.3d 154, 165 (Ky. 2022).

      We apply the Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 889-94 (Ky. 1994),

test as summarized in Leach v. Commonwealth, 571 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Ky.
                                           11
2019): “In order to determine if other bad acts evidence is admissible, the trial

court should use a three-prong test: (1) Is the evidence relevant? (2) Does it

have probative value? (3) Is its probative value substantially outweighed by its

prejudicial effect?”

      It is usually fairly easy to determine whether evidence is relevant and

probative. Typically, the more challenging part of this evaluation is weighing

“the prejudicial nature of the ‘other bad acts’ evidence versus its probative

value.” Leach, 571 S.W.3d at 554. Such evidence “is, of course, prejudicial to

[the defendant] as all evidence of culpability is in a criminal proceeding” but is

still properly admissible so long as it is not “unduly prejudicial because it is not

unnecessary or unreasonable.” Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851, 873

(Ky. 2015) (footnote omitted).

      To justify its exclusion, “[t]he prejudice must go beyond that which is

merely detrimental to a party’s case and be of such character that it ‘produces

an emotional response that inflames the passions of the triers of fact or is used

for an improper purpose.’” Kelly, 655 S.W.3d at 165 (quoting Robert G.

Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.25[3][d], at 135 (4th ed.

2003)).

      1. Some Text Messages between Downs and his Sister about
         Drugs were Properly Admissible and the Remainder were
         Harmless.

      The trial court admitted text messages between Downs and his sister

Amber which concerned Xanax, marijuana and Percocet that took place on

February 27, 2020, through March 1, 2020.

                                        12
      Downs argues that evidence that “[he] was involved in drug transactions

with his sister was irrelevant to whether he killed Mr. Porter in self-defense[,]”

“did not go to motive, nor was this inextricable intertwined to the case[,]” and

would “make the jury hate him for something unrelated to the case” and

caused the jury to wonder if he was on drugs the night of the shooting.

      The Commonwealth counters that it was appropriate that it be allowed to

introduce this evidence to counteract Downs’s previous statements to establish

his involvement with the drug trade and provide evidence of a motive for killing

Porter (to get drugs or money). The Commonwealth notes that texts admitted in

trial which Porter does not challenge, established that on the day of the murder

Porter texted Downs that Porter had Xanax to sell and call logs showed that

later a call was placed from Downs’s phone to Porter’s phone, they then met on

Oak Street and Downs shot Porter.

      The messages concerning Amber asking Downs about getting “Xans” and

selling them to her was relevant, probative and more probative than prejudicial

because it set the scene and provided the story or context of the crime as other

messages made it clear that Downs was meeting Porter about obtaining Xanax.

See St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 455 S.W.3d 869, 885 (Ky. 2015). Downs having

a buyer for Xanax he obtained was part of the chain of events and was thus

intertwined with the events that led to Porter’s death and admissible pursuant

to KRE 404(b)(2).

      In contrast, the messages relating to Amber stating she wanted “this

weed out of my house NOW” because it was smelly, Downs promising to get it

                                        13
and stating the quantity, and Downs explaining that the “white residue” left on

Amber’s blender was “Prolly from that perc I crushed down” was of more

marginal relevance.

      While, “[u]nder Kentucky law, prior inconsistent statements may be

introduced as an impeachment device and as substantive evidence[,]” McAtee v.

Commonwealth, 413 S.W.3d 608, 618 (Ky. 2013), if they would otherwise be

improper character evidence they must still satisfy the three part test regarding

relevance, probativeness and whether that probativeness is substantially

outweighed by the prejudicial effect of such evidence. These statements were

relevant and probative regarding Downs’s prior statements denying any

involvement with drugs, but also somewhat prejudicial as showing his more

extensive involvement with drugs. The prior statement regarding the Xanax

had already established the falsity of Downs having nothing to do with drugs,

and this was just piling on. However, considering the trial as a whole, this

evidence was harmless.

      2. The Photos and Videos of Downs Handling Weapons and
         Drugs were Excessive but Harmless.

      Downs argues that the twenty-seven photographs admitted into evidence,

which were taken from his phone, of him handling weapons and drugs were

irrelevant to the shooting on March 3, 2020, many were repetitive, and this was

highly prejudicial. He argues these photos “did nothing to help the jury

determine whether he was defending himself when he shot Mr. Porter. Instead,

they painted him as a liar who claimed he did not handle guns, nor messed

with drugs.”
                                       14
      Downs details the contents of each photo which included these general

categories: (1) photos of Downs (by himself or with other people) holding

handguns, long guns, AR-type rifles, and other weapons; (2) photos of guns or

advertisements for guns; (3) photos of other men holding guns; and (4) photos

of apparent marijuana and an apparent advertisement for Percocet.

      Downs made denials in his interview about having anything to do with

guns and drugs. He also argued in his opening statement that the gun was not

his and he was not there to buy drugs. However, the evidence admitted at trial

established that Porter offered in a text to sell Downs some Xanax and then

Downs met Porter.

      The evidence about the guns and drugs was relevant to help clarify

whether Downs’s account was accurate. His involvement in the drug trade

made it more likely that he was meeting Porter for the purpose of buying drugs.

His access to guns, made it more likely that the gun with which he shot Porter

may have been Downs’s gun.

      However, the volume of photos was needlessly excessive and prejudicial

where Downs admitted later to having shot Porter and text messages

established Porter offered to sell Downs Xanax and Downs he had a reason to

purchase Xanax. The fact that Downs handled many types of guns, showed an

interest in guns and had photos related to drugs was cumulative of other

evidence, which was more properly admitted because it had additional

relevance. This evidence should have either been greatly limited or excluded,

but any propensity towards criminal behavior this evidence provided was

                                       15
unlikely to sway the jury’s opinion as to whether Downs had acted in self-

defense or not against a known drug dealer. Ultimately the admission of such

evidence was harmless in light of the other proper evidence in the same vein.

      3. The Text Discussion between Downs and Porter about
         Purchasing a Rifle was Harmless.

      The trial court allowed into evidence a text exchange which took place on

January 28, 2020, concerning Downs possibly wishing to purchase an AR-type

weapon, with Porter acting as an intermediary. Downs argues this exchange

should not have been allowed as it was remote in time and had nothing to do

with the shooting.

      We agree that this evidence was of limited relevance or probativeness,

but it did provide a sense of the relationship between Downs and Porter and

ultimately this short exchange was harmless.

C. Cumulative Error does not Require Reversal.

      Downs argues that the individual errors he has identified, when

considered collectively warrant reversal for cumulative error.

      [T]he doctrine [of cumulative error] is necessary only to address
      “multiple errors, [which] although harmless individually, may be
      deemed reversible if their cumulative effect is to render the trial
      fundamentally unfair.” Still, the doctrine is a limited one. “We have
      found cumulative error only where the individual errors were
      themselves substantial, bordering, at least, on the prejudicial.” If
      the errors have not “individually raised any real question of
      prejudice,” then cumulative error is not implicated.

Elery v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 78, 100 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Brown

v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010), internal citations

and paragraph break omitted).

                                       16
      Downs had the right to a fair trial, not a perfect one. McDonald v.

Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Ky. 1977). We are confident that the

errors Downs identified regarding the admission of evidence relating to

guns and drugs, while improper, did not render his trial fundamentally

unfair. As Downs has said, the trial concerned whether he acted in self-

defense or not. His credibility as to whether his later account of self-

defense should be believed after he earlier denied any involvement with

Porter’s death or any involvement with a lifestyle involving guns and

drugs, was central to this determination. Porter was not presented as a

law abiding, wholly innocent party; there was evidence to suggest that

both men were involved in a criminal lifestyle and, so, they were on a

level playing field as presented as having similar propensities. Downs

even argued in his closing that both of them were drug dealers. Thus,

such evidence was ultimately harmless whether considered in isolation

or cumulatively.

                             III. CONCLUSION

      We affirm the Downs’s convictions and sentences by the Marion Circuit

Court.

      All sitting. All concur.

                                        17
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Robert C. Yang
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Joseph A. Beckett
Assistant Attorney General

                               18