Court Opinion

ID: 9756856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:04:35.049847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:31.635240
License: Public Domain

BENDER, J.,
concurring.
¶ 1 Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I write separately for two reasons. First, I respectfully disagree with the statement on page twelve of the majority’s opinion, which reads: “Therefore, Officer Correa’s testimony that Appellant was not under arrest when he first stopped him and handcuffed him demonstrated that Officer Correa acted lawfully, despite trial counsel’s contentions to the contrary.” Merely because a police officer says that an individual was not under arrest does not mean that such individual was not actually under arrest and, certainly, does not mean the officer acted lawfully. An arrest is defined as
[a]ny act that indicates an intention to take the person into custody and sub*54jects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest.... The test is an objective one, ie., viewed in the light of the reasonable impression conveyed to the person subjected to the seizure rather than the strictly subjective view of the officers or the persons being seized.
Commonwealth v. Butler, 729 A.2d 1184, 1137 (Pa.Super.1999) (citations omitted) (concluding that defendant had a reasonable belief that he was under control and custody of police and was, therefore, under custodial detention when police ordered defendant to come out of house, frisked and handcuffed him, and placed him in police car). See also Commonwealth v. Martinez, 437 Pa.Super. 93, 649 A.2d 143, 147 (1994) (indicating defendant under arrest where police handcuffed him and searched his residence; although police indicated they handcuffed him for their own safety, they did not tell the defendant this, and in the absence of this information, defendant could reasonably believe he was under custodial detention); Commonwealth v. Frank, 407 Pa.Super. 500, 595 A.2d 1258, 1261 (1991) (concluding arrest occurred when defendant was apprehended and handcuffed by police because defendant reasonably believed that he was not free to leave and because he was physically restrained by use of handcuffs).
¶ 2 In the instant case, chasing down Appellant, handcuffing him, and transporting him to the police station conveyed to Appellant the reasonable belief that he was under arrest. The proper focus of an inquiry into whether an arrest has occurred is not, as the majority contends, the arresting officer’s subjective opinion. The facts and circumstances surrounding the seizure of a person must be “viewed in the light of the reasonable impression conveyed to the person subjected to the seizure.” Butler, 729 A.2d at 1137. Here, Appellant’s impression that he was being placed in the custody and control of police after being chased down and handcuffed is a reasonable impression that he was indeed under arrest.
¶ 3 In any event, I agree with the majority that the trial court did not improperly curtail Officer Correa’s testimony regarding the lawfulness of Appellant’s arrest. However, I would only further note in this regard that the legality of his arrest was not a relevant issue at trial. “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Pa.R.E. 401. Appellant fails to explain the relevancy of the testimony defense counsel sought to elicit from Officer Correa regarding the lawfulness of Appellant’s arrest. Appellant merely complains that “Officer Correa was attempting to convince the jury that he had acted lawfully when in fact he had not” and that the trial court precluded defense counsel from establishing that Appellant had been illegally arrested and brought to the police station against his will. Appellant’s brief at 29-30. However, Appellant fails to explain how this fact, if established, was relevant at trial.
¶ 4 Moreover, as the majority recognizes, the legality of Appellant’s arrest is presented appropriately prior to trial. See Majority Opinion at 52 (citing Pa. R.Crim.P. 578 and Commonwealth v. Dobson, 486 Pa. 299, 405 A.2d 910, 916 n. 1 (1979)). For example, the issue of the legality of an arrest commonly arises where a defendant seeks to suppress incul-patory evidence obtained following a purportedly illegal arrest. See, e.g., Martinez, 649 A.2d at. 144 (appeal from judgment of sentence presenting challenge to denial of motion to suppress). See also Pa. *55R.Crim.P. 578 (indicating request for suppression of evidence is appropriate for omnibus pre-trial motion). Herein, Appellant does not present any such challenge; thus, the relevancy of Officer Correa’s testimony at trial regarding the legality of Appellant’s arrest is, at best, unclear. I agree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the Commonwealth’s objection to this line of questioning.
¶5 Second, Appellant also complained that the trial court improperly curtailed defense counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Correa when defense counsel asked Officer Correa about whether he heard Victor Vega indicate that he was unable to identify Appellant as one of the robbers. Appellant’s brief at 30. Appellant reproduces the following testimony in his brief:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Had you seen my client back at the location where you took Sandra Alvarado [the bartender]?
[OFFICER CORREA]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You saw him at the location where Victor Vega was with the other officers; is that right?
[OFFICER CORREA]: That’s correct.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you were present, were you not, when Victor Vega told the police that my client was not involved in the robbery? You were present for that, weren’t you?
[OFFICER CORREA]: I didn’t hear that part, no.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Oh, you didn’t hear that part?
[OFFICER CORREA]: No.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Why? Is there some reason why you didn’t hear that?
[OFFICER CORREA]: I was—
[PROSECUTOR]: Objection.
[TRIAL COURT]: Objection sustained. You don’t have to answer that.
N.T. Trial, 6/5/01, at 22-23. Appellant argues that, through this line of questioning, he sought to demonstrate that Officer Cor-rea “was deliberately withholding this exculpatory fact Mr. Vega’s failure to identify Appellant as one of the perpetrators] from the jury.” Appellant’s brief at 31.
¶ 6 I agree with the majority that this testimony was cumulative in that other witnesses testified that the bar owner, Victor Vega, could not identify Appellant as one of the robbers. See Majority Opinion at 52 (citing Commonwealth v. Mobley, 424 Pa.Super. 385, 622 A.2d 972, 976 (1993)). See also N.T. Trial, 6/5/01, at 70-71 (another officer’s testimony that no one, including Mr. Vega, could identify Appellant as one of the robbers and, therefore, Appellant was initially released). However, I do not agree with the majority’s statement on page thirteen of its opinion which reads: “Additionally, Detective Aitken ordered uniformed officers to find Appellant and bring him in for further questioning.... Therefore, why Officer Correa did not hear Mr. Vega fail to identify Appellant was irrelevant in light of Detective Aitken’s directive.” Majority Opinion at 53. In my opinion, this statement is problematic insofar as it infers that Officer Correa could act lawfully by arresting Appellant merely on Detective Aitken’s directive. However, the officer who issues an order or bulletin directing other officers to apprehend a suspect must have articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an offense. Commonwealth v. Queen, 536 Pa. 315, 639 A.2d 443, 445 (1994) (requiring officer who submitted police bulletin to testify at trial in order to assess probable cause for arrest made through another officer who acted on the bulletin). In summary, although I *56disagree with the majority’s statement as indicated above, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the testimony of Officer Correa on this issue was cumulative and, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the prosecutor’s objection.
¶ 7 In all other respects, I agree with the analysis presented by the majority opinion.