Court Opinion

ID: 9853944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:57:55.462671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:17.396200
License: Public Domain

WATT, J.,
with whom KAUGER, J. joins, concurring in part, dissenting in part:
¶ 1 I concur in the pronouncement by the majority today with regard to Parts I, II, IV, V, and VI of the opinion. I dissent to Part III of the majority’s opinion for the reasons set forth below.
¶ 2 The majority at paragraph 12 declares:
A default declaration, imposed as a § 3237(B)(2) sanction, cannot extend beyond saddling the defendant with liability for the harm occasioned and for imposition of punitive damages. The trial court must leave to a meaningful inquiry the quantum of actual and punitive damages without stripping the party in default of basic forensic devices to test the truth of the plaintiffs evidence.
I disagree.
¶3 As stated by the majority, § 3237 of the Discovery Code allows the trial court to sanction a disobedient party ... by a default judgment. The record in this case supports the action taken by the trial court because of the defendant’s absolute refusal and failure to comply with any kind of discovery at all.
¶4 Defendant’s counsel appropriately attempted to protect his client’s interest in seeking leave to participate further in the proceeding and to examine and cross-examine plaintiffs’ witnesses. The record in this case reflects that the trial court denied that request because it intended to utilize its “full array of powers granted under 12 O.S. § 3237(B).”
¶ 5 If these sanction statutes as enacted by the Legislature are to have any effect, they must be enforced when properly utilized.
*1098¶ 6 Because the record in this case supports the sanctions entered by the trial court, I would affirm its decision in toto.