Court Opinion

ID: 9490493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:45:05.049317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:07.886645
License: Public Domain

RYAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Under the sentencing guidelines, a court may enhance a defendant’s sentencing offense level by two points “[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Application note 3(b) of the provision indicates that obstruction of justice under the guidelines includes “committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury.” Id. at comment. (n.3(b)).
We have interpreted the term “instant offense” to mean the offense of conviction. United States v. Horry, 49 F.3d 1178, 1180-81 (6th Cir.1995). Additionally, we have held that the obstructive conduct need not be *408directly connected to the offense of conviction as long as it is related to and occurred during the investigation or prosecution of the offense, or the sentencing for its commission. United States v. Crousore, 1 F.3d 382, 384-85 (6th Cir.1993).
In Crousore, the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court imposed an obstruction of justice enhancement after finding the defendant had perjured himself by denying, at his detention hearing and later at his sentencing hearing, that he had told the investigating officer that he had traded a gun for marijuana, which was not the offense for which the defendant was convicted. On appeal, we held that the term “instant offense” denoted the offense of conviction, but that the defendant’s perjured testimony fell within the “instant offense” because it occurred “during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing” of what ultimately became the offense of conviction. Id. at 385. We held: “[T]he test is not whether the false statement was about the actual crime charged, but whether it was made during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the ‘instant offense.’” Id. Thus, our focus was on the relationship between the defendant’s obstructive conduct and the criminal conduct ultimately resulting in his conviction. In Crousore, the perjury committed at the defendant’s detention hearing was relevant to the risk that he would flee. And the perjury committed at his sentencing was, of course, intended to affect the sentence he would receive. The point is that both efforts to obstruct justice were relevant to the defendant’s offense of conviction.
In Horry, the defendant was convicted of wire fraud. On appeal she claimed that the lower court erred in enhancing her sentence for obstruction of justice because she had used a false name when writing to her husband, who was in prison, in order to assist him in avoiding detection by the police. As result, the defendant’s husband was able to become a federal fugitive. We held:
[T]he obstruction must occur solely with respect to the offense of conviction----
In the present case, defendant’s use of a false name to assist her husband is unrelated to her conviction for wire fraud. Nothing in the record shows that her husband was involved in any way in the fraud. Therefore, this cannot be a basis for enhancing her sentence for obstruction of justiee[.]
Horry, 49 F.3d at 1180-81 (emphasis added). The majority attempts to distinguish this case by pointing out that here, unlike Horry, both Walker and Watkins “were co-defendants, and were associated and involved together in the ‘offense of conviction.’ ” But that is only half the battle; critically, the majority fails to explain how Walker’s perjured testimony obstructed justice with respect to his own offense of conviction.
The majority also seeks support from United States v. Nesbitt, 90 F.3d 164 (6th Cir.1996). There, a codefendant had been convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and money laundering. The lower court applied the obstruction of justice enhancement after determining that the codefendant had perjured himself in the civil forfeiture proceeding that was related to count 3 of his indictment (and not to the offense of his plea-bargained conviction, count 2.) On appeal, we distinguished our earlier decision of Horry, embraced Crousore, and found that the eodefendant’s perjured testimony was related because it “impeded the government’s overall investigation against him.” Id. at 169 (emphasis added). Specifically, we held: “[The] conduct was related to the ‘instant offence’ in that it was intended to impede the same government investigation that eventually resulted in [the codefendant’s] plea bargain and conviction.” Id. Nesbitt does not stand for the proposition that perjured testimony at a codefendant’s trial, standing alone, warrants application of the obstruction enhancement. Instead, the testimony must, itself, be material and relevant to the defendant’s offense of conviction.
Not all the circuits that have addressed this issue are in agreement as to the proper resolution of the question. Compare United States v. Acuna, 9 F.3d 1442 (9th Cir.1993) and United States v. Bernaugh, 969 F.2d 858 (10th Cir.1992), with United States v. Strang, 80 F.3d 1214 (7th Cir.1996) and United States v. Valdez, 16 F.3d 1324 (2d Cir.1994). *409Close study of Acuna, relied on here by the majority, and the cases cited in support, reveal that where a court has engaged in any substantive discussion of the issue, it has found the defendant’s perjury related to his offense of conviction. Acuna, 9 F.3d at 1445-46.
Acuna relies upon the Tenth Circuit case of Bernaugh, and upon United States v. Morales, 977 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir.1992). The Bemaugh court held that the enhancement applies “where a defendant attempts to obstruct justice in a case closely related to his own, such as that of a codefendant.” Bernaugh, 969 F.2d at 861. Critically, the facts of that case indicated that the defendant testified at his oum plea hearing and lied about his eodefendant’s involvement in the underlying crime. Id. at 862. The court found that his testimony could have been “an attempt to affect his own sentencing, by impairing the court’s inquiry under Fed. R.Crim.P. 11(f), obfuscating his role in the transaction, and otherwise.” Id. Significantly, the court did not discuss, as the majority infers, a defendant committing perjury at a codefendant’s trial. Similarly, the Morales court, without discussion, held that “a defendant’s refusal to testify at a co-conspirator’s trial after an immunity order has been issued constitutes an obstruction of justice under section 3C1.1.” Morales, 977 F.2d at 1331. In support, Morales refers to the Eleventh Circuit opinion in United States v. Williams, 922 F.2d 737 (11th Cir.1991), in which the court, albeit in dicta, stated essentially the same thing. Id. at 739.
I conclude that the term “instant offense” does not encompass perjured testimony at a codefendant’s trial where that testimony does not relate to the defendant’s offense of conviction. I further conclude that mere joint participation in the underlying “offense of conviction” does not, without more, serve to relate the defendant’s perjured testimony and make it relevant to the defendant’s trial.
Consequently, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.