Court Opinion

ID: 9711476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:32:47.480509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:05.350737
License: Public Domain

Archer, J.
(concurring in the dissent). I agree with the basic rationale and result in Justice Levin’s dissent. I write separately, however, to lend a slightly different perspective.
Unlike the dissent, I believe this Court’s opinion in Leahan v Stroh Brewery Co, 420 Mich 108; 359 NW2d 524 (1984), offered a sound and consistent method through which persons perceiving themselves to be aggrieved by signed release agreements could repudiate. I further believe the rule is applicable to the case at bar. However, in my view, the Leahan rule in its present state is neither complete nor fair.
In instances where there is a bona ñde, good-faith dispute regarding whether consideration recited in the "expressed language of the release *225agreement” actually amounted to that which is defined "consideration,” the rule in Leahan is unworkable. Accordingly, I agree that " 'Where, aside from the transaction, the person seeking restitution would be entitled to retain what the other gave as the result of the agreement, the transaction does not enrich him even though he retains such things, nor does it diminish the net assets of the other ....’” See ante, p 198, n 48, citing Restatement Restitution, ch 2, §65e; see also Carey v Levy, 329 Mich 458, 465; 45 NW2d 352 (1951). The practical purpose of the "tender first” rule is to ensure that the party challenging the validity of the release form receives no unjust enrichment in receiving monies exchanged. Id.
Clearly, a plaintiff who contests the sufficiency of the consideration supporting a release agreement should be allowed to withhold tender of such alleged consideration until there is a judicial determination that consideration was in fact paid. If it is found that the consideration was paid, then the plaintiff should be required to tender that amount. However, if the court determines that the amount paid to the plaintiff for the release was already owed to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff should be allowed to retain that amount and proceed with any legal action. See, generally, ante, pp 196-202, part hi.
The nature and depth of the rights sacrificed at the signing of a release or settlement agreement are of such stature that a mere, hollow "recitation of consideration” should not be considered as a sufficient basis for the exchange. Indeed, the sufficiency of consideration, in this context, should be foremost in the construction, execution, and review of the activities surrounding release and settlement agreements. Any endeavor to balance *226the equities involved in the relinquishment of clearly defined rights demands, above all, fairness.
In my view, the majority fails in its attempt to justify the harshness and inflexibility of the Leahan "tender back” rule with its assertion that parties contesting the fact and existence of consideration in this context should, prior to instituting an action on the propriety of their own dismissal, bring an action for rescission of the release agreement in equity. For then, the majority states, the issue whether valid consideration supported the agreement can be decided preceding the institution of a wrongful discharge suit.
In my view, however, even in the case that the validity of the release agreement is not challenged preceding the filing of legal claims, there is no justice in maintaining a rule that blindly demands "tender back,” even when tender, absolutely, should not be required. See Williston, Contracts (3d ed), § 1530, p 646; 76 CJS, Release, § 37, p 666. It is the iron-clad feature of the rule that sits at the center of this dispute. The "tender back” rule simply cannot in fairness be properly applied, in every case, unless there is, in addition to equitable rescission, some internal method by which the sufficiency of that which must be tendered back, i.e., the consideration itself, can be "checked” as well. Hence, Justice Levin’s proposed rule, which merely reflects the standardization of Restatement Restitution, ch 2, §65, comment e, provides the fairest solution of all.
In the present case, the plaintiff was unquestionably owed her earned wages, as well as four weeks of accrued vacation pay. Thus, she was not unjustly enriched in the receipt of these. However, because there is a factual dispute regarding whether additional vacation pay was owed, I believe, any amount over that which was concededly *227owed to the plaintiff should, indeed, be tendered to the defendant within a reasonable time following the resolution of this question of fact by the trial court. Accordingly, I would urge that the plaintiff be allowed to amend her complaint to request rescission of the release agreement. See Style v Greenslade, 364 Mich 679; 112 NW2d 92 (1961); McDonald v Zinn Drywall, 134 Mich App 270, 277; 350 NW2d 864 (1984); Carey, supra at 466.
Lastly, I disagree with the dissent on one point. I do not believe the plaintiff was coerced into signing the release. The plaintiff’s failure to question the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s offer of alleged consideration reflects negligence, not on the part of the defendant, but on the part of the plaintiff. The dissent presumes that the immediacy of the defendant’s request that plaintiff sign a release agreement necessarily intimated that the defendant prohibited the plaintiff from retaining an attorney. I disagree.
The implicit alleged threat, "sign now or forego your money,” still carried with it the notion that the plaintiff should have been, with or wdthout an attorney, concerned or at least hesitant about signing away her right to sue at any price, especially if she felt she had been wronged in her dismissal. Therefore, in my view, there was no actionable coercion in this case.