Court Opinion

ID: 9495333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:00:17.55489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:57.436757
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur in Part C of Section I of the majority opinion regarding Konop’s claims under the Stored Communications Act, and Section II of the majority opinion regarding Konop’s claims under the Railway Labor Act. I dissent, however, from Part B of Section I, which holds that the term “intercept” in the Wiretap Act, as applied to electronic communications, refers solely to contemporaneous acquisition. I conclude instead that “stored electronic *887communications” are subject to the statute’s intercept prohibition as well.
Because I recognize that any reading of the relevant statutory provisions raises some difficulties and introduces some inconsistencies, the question becomes: which reading is more coherent and more consistent with Congressional intent? The majority reasons, and I agree, that stored electronic communications are covered under the definition of “electronic communications” in the Wiretap Act. However, having made that determination, the majority proceeds to introduce unnecessary confusion and incoherence into the statute by holding that “intercept” encompasses only contemporaneous acquisition of electronic communications, and thus that it is not possible to “intercept” a stored electronic communication. We have already rejected just such a contemporaneity requirement with respect to the acquisition of stored wire communications, and there is no justification for reviving it with respect to stored electronic communications. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 n. 11, 1058 (9th Cir.1998).
The contemporaneity requirement for interception first appeared in United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.1976), in which the Fifth Circuit held that the definition of “intercept” in the statute “require[s] participation by the one charged with an ‘interception’ in the contemporaneous acquisition of the communication through the use of [a] device.” 526 F.2d at 658 (emphasis added). In Turk, however, the Fifth Circuit was interpreting a version of the Wiretap Act that predates the one at issue in Smith and in this case. That version did not cover interception of stored wire communications or of electronic communications at all. The statute was subsequently amended to include electronic communications, stored electronic communications, and stored wire communications in 1986.1 Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Pub.L. No. 99-508. 100 Stat. 1848. Thereafter, in Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 n. 11, 1058 (9th Cir.1998), this court held, in a case involving the acquisition of stored voicemail messages, that Turk’s contemporaneity requirement had been “statutorily overruled;” at least with respect to wire communications, by the changes in the statute which brought stored wire communications within its purview. The Smith court reasoned that “intercept” must necessarily include non-contemporaneous acquisition of stored wire communications because Congress had deliberately inserted stored wire communications into the intercept provision despite the fact that contemporaneous acquisition of stored wire communications is, by definition, impossible. 155 F.3d at 1058. To read “intercept” to include only contemporaneous acquisition would, of course, have rendered the intercept prohibition with respect to stored wire communications meaningless. .Id.
Here, the majority’s definition of “intercept” renders that prohibition meaningless with respect to stored electronic communications. The majority opinion would result in eliminating stored electronic communications from the purview of the intercept prohibition altogether, because a stored communication cannot be acquired contemporaneously with its transmission — it has already been transmitted. *888The majority’s reading of the statute simply doesn’t work: while explicitly holding that stored electronic communications are within the term “electronic communications” and that the intercept prohibition of the Wiretap Act applies to electronic communications, it also explicitly holds that interception of electronic communications is limited to contemporaneous acquisition, thereby simultaneously including and excluding stored electronic communications from the intercept prohibition.
To read a contemporaneity requirement into the definition of “intercept” renders the prohibition against the electronic communication interception largely superfluous, and violates the precept against interpreting one provision of a statute to negate another. See e.g., Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 106 S.Ct. 1600, 89 L.Ed.2d 855 (1986) (applying the whole act rule to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981). Intercept of electronic communications is defined as any “acquisition of the contents of any ... electronic ... communication through the use of any ... device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). The nature of electronic communication is that it spends infini-tesmal amounts of time “en route,” unlike a phone call. Therefore, in order to “intercept” an electronic communication, one ordinarily obtains one of the copies made en route or at the destination. These copies constitute “stored electronic communications,” as acknowledged by the majority. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A)(“ ‘electronic storage’ means ... any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire nr electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof’). If intercept is defined as solely contemporaneous acquisition, then in contravention of Congressional intent, at most all acquisitions of the contents of electronic communications would escape the intercept prohibition entirely. Jarrod J. White, Commentary, EMail@Work.Com: Employer Monitoring of Employee E-Mail, 48 Ala. L.Rev. 1079, 1083 (1997) (“Following the Fifth Circuit’s rationale, [and excluding stored electronic communications from the intercept prohibition] there is only a narrow window during which an E-mail interception may occur — the seconds or milliseconds before which a newly composed message is saved to any temporary location following a send command. Therefore, ... [assuming that stored communications are excluded from the intercept prohibition], interception of E-mail within the prohibition of the ECPA is virtually impossible.”).
The majority asserts that it is reasonable that the term “intercept” would describe different conduct with respect to wire communications than with respect to electronic communications because different actions are required to intercept different kinds of communications. This reasoning fails because, although wire communications and electronic communications are quite different, stored wire communications are technologically equivalent to stored electronic communications. Thus it would make little sense to treat them differently. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (defining “wire communication” as including “any electronic storage offwire] communication”). While Congress may not always act sensibly, there is no reason for the majority to presume that it failed to do so in this instance.
The Non-Contemporaneous Acquisition Reading Permits a Coherent Reading of the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act Together, Consistent with Congressional Intent
Congress’s clear intent, when amending the statute in 1986, was to regulate access to and acquisition of stored electronic communications. See S.Rep. No. 99-541 at 3-4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. *8893555, 3557-8 (discussing Congressional intent to cover email and computerized recordkeeping systems). The majority’s interpretation of the Wiretap Act depends in part on a tortured reading of the Stored Communications Act under which “access to” a communication is equated with “acquisition of’ a communication, contrary to clear statutory language. Sections 2701 and 2703 of the Stored Communications Act regulate “access” to facilities where communications are stored and “access” to the communications themselves. The majority, relying on Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir.1994) somehow reads these provisions as being analogous to the “intercept” provisions of the Wiretap Act. 236 F.3d at 1044. However, “access” is more properly understood as being qualitatively different from “intercept,” not temporally different, and as constituting a lesser included offense of “intercept.” The “access” prohibitions in § 2701, in contrast to those regarding “interception” • in § 2511, do not mention at all “acquisition” of the “contents” of any communication, but only “access,” authorized and unauthorized, to them. “Access” is not defined in the statute, and therefore courts must apply the ordinary or technical meaning that the word has in the context of electronic communications. “Access” is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “[t]he habit or power of getting near or into contact with; entrance, admittance, admission (to the presence or use of) [noun]” and “[t]o gain access to (data, etc., held in a computer or computer-based system, or the system itself) [transitive vérb].” As discussed above, “intercept” is defined in the statute as the actual acquisition of the contents of a communication. Given the plain language of the statute; the difference between the prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (“intercept”) and 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (“access”) becomes more than semantic; it indicates that Congress intended that only 18 U.S.C. § 2511 prohibit the actual acquisition of the contents of a communication.
On the other hand, section 2703 (the structure of which the panel claims supports a “contemporaneous acquisition” reading of the text) sets out the parameters under which governmental authorities can gain “access” to the “contents” of stored electronic communications. That section provides that governmental authorities may obtain a search warrant to compel electronic communication service providers to disclose the contents of stored electronic communications. By its plain terms, it does not provide a judicial means by which government authorities can independently intercept or acquire the contents of electronic communications. That is covered under 18 U.S.C. § 2516. Having excluded stored electronic communications from the Wiretap Act, the majority is forced to torture the statutory language of the Stored Communications Act in order to craft a reading of the statutes which accomplishes Congress’s intent of establishing procedures by which governmental authorities may directly acquire the contents of stored electronic communications. A reading of the Wiretap Act which includes stored electronic communications under the intercept prohibition provides a plain answer — one that does not require linguistic gymnastics.
Furthermore, contrary to the arguments of Hawaiian Airlines and its amici, the drafting of a separate act specifically governing the contents of stored electronic communications (Stored Communications Act. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702-03) was necessary, even though, stored communications were included in the Wiretap Act. First, the damage caused by computer hackers (also known as “electronic trespassers”) was a major concern of Congress in enacting the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Stored Communications Act. The *890separate provisions prohibiting unauthorized access were found necessary, in addition to the pre-existing prohibitions on interception, because computer hackers often do a great deal of damage to stored communications facilities and stored communications without ever acquiring the contents of those communications. See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1058-59 (9th Cir.1998) (explaining that the Stored Communications Act permits penalties against hackers who put themselves in the position to acquire a communication, but the Wiretap Act penalizes those who go further and acquire the communication); In re Doubleclick, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F.Supp.2d 497 at 507(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that Title II of ECPA was aimed at computer hackers); Sherman & Co. v. Salton Maxim Housewares, Inc., 94 F.Supp.2d 817, 820 (E.D.Mich.2000) (explaining that the general purpose of the ECPA was to create a cause of action against computer hackers.); State Wide Photocopy, Corp. v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc., 909 F.Supp. 137, 145 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (“[T]he ECPA was primarily designed to provide a cause of action against computer hackers....”). Hackers often use their unauthorized access to disrupt or prevent authorized access of others to stored communications facilities. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (prohibiting obtaining, altering or preventing access to wire or electronic communications without authorization). Moreover, the activities of hackers, and the mere potential that they could acquire the contents of electronic or wire communications in storage, create an atmosphere of anxiety in which computer users do not feel confident about the confidentiality of their communications, and productivity is hampered. These were all major concerns of Congress in enacting the Stored Communications Act, concerns which necessitated the drafting of a separate act even though stored electronic communications were already included under the definition of electronic communications.
Second, it is in the nature of electronic communication to be stored (both temporarily and permanently, as Congress indicated in the definition of electronic storage, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)), and it is in the nature of the electronic communications industry that electronic communications service providers (defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15)) have possession and control over large amounts of stored electronic communications. Therefore, electronic communications service providers would be an obvious source for law enforcement authorities who seek to obtain the contents of electronic communications. Recognizing that compelling disclosure by these entities would be one means by which government authorities might seek to obtain the contents of communications, Congress added a section setting out the procedures for compelling such disclosure. Michael S. Leib, E Mail and the Wiretap Laws: Why Congress Should Add Electronic Communication to Title Ill’s Statutory Exclusionary Rule and Expressly Reject a “Good Faith” Exception, 34 Harv. J. on Legis. 393, 414 (1997). There is no analogous storage of wire communication by wire communication service providers (i.e., telephone companies, also included under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15)) such that guidelines would be needed on how governmental authorities could compel disclosure of stored wire communications from them.
Third, the Stored Communications Act is necessary to police the unauthorized access to electronic and wire communications facilities that is a necessary antecedent to illegal interception of those communications in storage. Were Congress to prohibit only actual acquisition of the contents of communications in storage, law enforcement would be powerless to do anything about persons who gained unauthorized *891access in preparation for interception (i.e., the acquisition of the contents of communications) until such persons had actually accomplished their unlawful mission. Further, because acquisition of the contents of an electronic communication in storage, or a wire communication in electronic storage does not disturb the “original” copy of such communication, actual acquisition of these communications is likely to be much more difficult to detect and prove than unauthorized access to a facility. Therefore it is helpful to law enforcement to have in its arsenal a separate provision governing access.
In sum, a reading of the Wiretap Act that includes stored electronic communications in the statute’s “intercept” prohibition is consistent with the nature of the technology at issue, leaves no unexplained statutory gaps, and renders none of the myriad provisions of either the Wiretap Act or the Stored Communications Act superfluous. Under such a reading, the Wiretap Act would prohibit the interception of electronic communications, both stored and en route, and subject violators to serious penalties. It would permit law enforcement to intercept such communications using a court order as indicated in § 2516. (Whether or not it would preserve the use of other less savory techniques is a matter this court is not called upon to decide.) A court order can be obtained by state prosecutors in connection with any one of a number of enumerated crimes, and by any assistant United States attorney for the investigation of any federal felony. Wire communications are treated similarly with only minor exceptions (for example, authorization to intercept wire communications is only available for a finite, though extensive, list of federal crimes); this reading, consistent with Congressional intent as revealed in the legislative history of the statute, rejects the idea that stored electronic communications are afforded a lesser degree of protection from interception than stored wire communications.2
Prior Precedent on the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act Does Not Preclude the Non-Contemporaneous Acquisition Reading
This is a case of first impression in this circuit, and there is no binding authority on the regulation of stored electronic communications. There are no Supreme Court cases interpreting the provisions of the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act as they relate to electronic communications, and the court of appeals decisions, in our circuit and others, either do not deal with stored electronic communications, or are superseded by changes in law and technology, or both. United States v. Turk predates the addition of the electronic provisions and language to the statute, and therefore is of little relevance. 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.1976). More important, its contemporaneity requirement was expressly repudiated in United States v. Smith. 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 n. 11, 1058 (9th Cir.1998) (“[T]o the extent that Turk stands for a definition of “intercept” that necessarily entails contemporaneity, it has ... been statutorily overruled.”). Steve Jackson Games is the only circuit court *892case that involves stored electronic communications. As discussed above, the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning is flawed, as it fails to consider the difference between “access” 18 U.S.C. § 2701 and “intercept” 18 U.S.C. § 2511 and erroneously conflates the terms, reading them both to refer to the acquisition of the contents of a communication. 36 F.3d at 463. Moreover, Steve Jackson Games is rendered somewhat obsolete by the growth of the Internet, a phenomenon that the judges deciding that case could not have meaningfully incorporated into their, reading of the statute. In particular, it would have been impossible to anticipate the expectations of privacy that people would develop regarding the Internet, expectations that are crucial to interpreting the statutory scheme consistent with Congressional intent to protect privacy interests. The other cases cited by the majority are district court cases, not binding on this court; they also have little persuasive value because they rely on the flawed reasoning of Steve Jackson Games and on the contemporaneity requirement that this court has rejected. See Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F.Supp. 375, 386 (D.Del.1997), aff'd, 172 F.3d 861 (3d Cir.1998) (affirmed by the Third Circuit in an unpublished disposition, which therefore has no precedential value); United States v. Reyes, 922 F.Supp. 818, 836 (S.D.N.Y.1996); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F.Supp. 1232, 1236-37 (D.Nev. 1996). Although this court in United States v. Smith correctly recognized the access/intercept distinction, our opinion contained unfortunate dicta regarding electronic communications. 155 F.3d 1051 at 1057. Because the case involved wire, not electronic, communications, those statements are not binding upon us.
Conclusion
In conclusion, because I believe that reading the Wiretap Act to prohibit interception of “stored electronic communications” provides a more coherent construction of the Act and is more consistent with the text of the statute as well as with the Congressional intent underlying both the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act, I respectfully dissent from Part B of Section I of the majority opinion.

. The statute was again recently amended, this time to repeal the inclusion of stored wire communications in the definition of wire communication. Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub.L. No. 107-56, § 209, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (enacted October 26, 2001). However we apply here the version that was in effect at the time of the acts in question, Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Pub.L. No. 99-508. 100 Stat. 1848.

. In its interpretation of the term "intercept,” the majority relies in part on legislative history from the USA Patriot Act. As the Supreme Court has cautioned, however, " ‘the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.' " Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)(quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313, 80 S.Ct. 326, 4 L.Ed.2d 334 (1960)). Such subsequent legislative history will "rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative history prior to its enactment.” Id. at 118 n. 13, 100 S.Ct. 2051 (emphasis added).