Court Opinion

ID: 9578782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:48:20.259251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:26.155425
License: Public Domain

Mowbray, C. J.,
dissenting:
The majority, by invoking the principle of “substantial evidence”, places its imprimatur upon what I can characterize only as a gross miscarriage of justice. In its quest for a quantum of evidence to support the jury’s finding that appellant had committed child abuse resulting in serious permanent disfigurement, the majority loses sight of “one of the most basic concepts of due process of the law,” that a person may not be punished without evidence to support each and every element of the crime with which he is charged. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1965); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 204 and 206 (1960).
In affirming the instant jury verdict, the majority declares that the record contains substantial evidence supporting a finding of permanent disfigurement and that, based upon this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that the permanent *750disfigurement was serious. That substantial evidence, according to the majority, consisted of a doctor’s testimony that “the disfigurement was permanent.’’ Ante at 748. The record, however, belies the existence of any such statement or of any other evidence of permanent disfigurement. And, after all, it is the record with which we are concerned on appeal. See, e.g., A Minor v. State, 85 Nev. 323, 454 P.2d 895 (1969); State v. Ah Mook, 12 Nev. 369 (1877). To the record I now turn.
At trial, the State called Dr. Grillot, one of the victim’s examining doctors, and apparently the doctor referred to by the majority as a medical expert. Dr. Grillot testified that he had examined the child’s burns on one occasion a few days after the burning incident and, at that time, he had not formed any opinion as to whether the child had incurred any permanent disfigurement. Moreover, Dr. Grillot added that even if he were to examine the child’s burns at trial, he would not be able to give an opinion as to the permanent nature of any injury. Though the doctor did note that black children scar more readily than other children, because of possible pigment loss, he emphasized that he had not noticed any damage to the victim’s pigment. No evidence was offered at trial to indicate or to imply that the child had, in fact, suffered a pigment loss or had incurred permanent scarring, discoloration, or disfigurement of any kind. Nor is there any indication, contrary to respondent’s contention, that the jury was presented with a view of the child’s stomach.1 The majority, however, reads Dr. Grillot’s exculpatory testimony as a statement that the child was permanently disfigured. With this conclusion, I cannot agree.
While I would agree with the majority that it is the jury’s function to determine whether any permanent disfigurement is serious, Gibson v. State, 95 Nev. 99, 590 P.2d 158 (1979), I note, as well, that the jury must be presented with some evidence upon which it can base its determination, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, supra; Thompson v. City of Louisville, supra. While I recognize that it is not the function of this court, on appeal, to reassess the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to the evidence, Wheeler v. State, 91 Nev. 119, 531 P.2d 1358 (1975), I add, with additional emphasis, that it is not this court’s function to create such evidence, ex nihilo, when no such evidence appears in the record, A Minor v. State, supra; State v. Ah Mook, supra. Since the record before us does not contain one shred of evidence to support a finding of serious, permanent disfigurement, due process demands that the instant jury verdict be reversed.
*751In addition, I cannot agree with the majority’s holding that a trial court need not give, on its own motion, a cautionary instruction regarding a defendant’s oral admissions to a third party. Appellant calls our attention to People v. Beagle, 492 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972), which explicitly holds that such an instruction must be given sua sponte by the trial court. 492 P.2d at 9-10. The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which have considered this issue is in accord. See People v. Bemis, 202 P.2d 82 (Cal. 1949) (and cases cited therein); Stork v. State, 559 P.2d 99 (Alaska 1977); State v. McGilbry, 392 P.2d 297 (Ariz. 1964); cf. State v. Bouse, 264 P.2d 800 (Or. 1953) (holding that it was error for the trial judge not to instruct, sua sponte, on the reasons behind the cautionary instruction).
The rationale underlying these decisions is simply that verbal admissions should be received by a jury with caution and subjected to careful scrutiny since no other class of evidence is more subject to error or abuse:
Witnesses having the best motives are generally unable to state the exact language of an admission, and are liable, by the omission or the changing of words, to convey a false impression of the language used. No other class of testimony affords such temptations or opportunities for unscrupulous witnesses to torture the facts or commit open perjury, as it is often impossible to contradict their testimony at all, or at least by any other witness than the party himself.
People v. Bemis, 202 P.2d at 84. I can see no reason why this rationale does not apply to the damaging admissions, virtually immune from challenge, offered against appellant in the present case.
The State’s case against appellant was not a strong one. The corpus delicti was established by the arguably inconsistent prior statements made by two of appellant’s children. This insubstantial corpus was buttressed by appellant’s third party admissions. Had the jury been properly instructed to view those admissions with caution, a more favorable verdict to appellant might very likely have been returned. See, e.g., Stork v. State, 559 P.2d at 103; People v. Lopez, 120 Cal.Rptr. 562 (Ct.App. 1975).
Since I believe that the jury was not properly instructed in the present case and that the judgment of the district court, unsupported by any evidence, deprived appellant of due process, I would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

 The record reflects that both the jurors and the prosecutor informed the trial judge that they were unable to see the boy’s stomach.