Court Opinion

ID: 9959756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 16:03:01.496474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:52.505760
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D23-2658
                 LT Case Nos. 2013-305906-CFDB
                              2013-306530-CFDB
                              2017-300901-CFDB
                              2017-302243-CFDB
                              2017-304704-CFDB
                  _____________________________

MARQUIS A. MCCORVEY,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County.
Raul A. Zambrano, Judge.

Marquis A. McCorvey, Raiford, pro se.

No Appearance for Appellee.

                         April 12, 2024

HARRIS, J.

    Marquis McCorvey appeals the postconviction court’s
summary denial of his seven-ground Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 motion. We find that ground five of McCorvey’s
motion was insufficiently pled, and, because McCorvey should be
given the opportunity to amend that ground, we reverse on that
limited basis. In all other respects, the summary denial of the
remaining grounds is affirmed.

     The defendant in a postconviction proceeding bears the
burden of establishing a prima-facie case based upon a legally
valid claim; conclusory allegations are insufficient. See Patton v.
State, 784 So. 2d 380, 386 (Fla. 2000). When a defendant files a
facially insufficient motion, he is entitled to one opportunity to
amend the motion. See Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 761 (Fla.
2007); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(2). The defendant must have been
given a meaningful opportunity to cure all the insufficiencies in his
motion. See Osorio v. State, 233 So. 3d 516, 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).

     To make a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel
following the entry of a plea, a defendant must first show that
counsel’s performance was deficient. See Grosvenor v. State, 874
So. 2d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 2004) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
58–59 (1985)). This is determined based on the totality of the
circumstances. Id. at 1181 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 690 (1984)). Second, the defendant must show that there
was “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the
defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.” Id. (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).

    The fifth ground of McCorvey’s motion alleged that his trial
counsel was ineffective for advising him to enter a plea when he
had a defense to the charges. Specifically, he contended that he
was innocent of two of the offenses with which he was charged and
suggested the State did not have a corpus delicti for these offenses.
Despite his innocence, McCorvey claimed that his counsel advised
him that it was in his best interest to accept the State’s plea offer,
which he ultimately did.

     The postconviction court summarily denied this claim on the
basis that it was challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, which
it found to be improper in a Rule 3.850 motion. We see this claim
differently. McCorvey was not challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence, but rather alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective
for advising him to enter the plea when he had a defense to the
charge. In that sense, the claim is governed by Grosvenor. While

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his claim may appear dubious, nothing in the attached record
conclusively refutes his arguments, so they must be taken as true.
If McCorvey did in fact have a valid defense to these charges, his
trial counsel advising him to enter no contest pleas to them may
well have constituted deficient performance. However, McCorvey
did not allege prejudice under Grosvenor, since he never alleged
that had he been properly advised, he never would have entered
the plea. Consequently, the claim was insufficiently pled, and he
should be given an opportunity to amend it under Spera.

     The postconviction court’s summary denial of ground five of
McCorvey’s motion is reversed and remanded with instructions to
afford McCorvey an opportunity to amend.

     AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED with
instructions.

EDWARDS, C.J., and MAKAR, J., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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