Court Opinion

ID: 9573514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:56:17.625631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:31.274562
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
dissenting.
I must take issue with the majority’s conclusion that a party’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice, without court order or approval, constitutes a judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata.
Georgia’s theory of res judicata, codified in OCGA § 9-12-40, relies on “[a] judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) A voluntary dismissal with prejudice, involving no judicial action, does not constitute a “judgment of the court,” and therefore does not have res judicata effect. If res judicata effect is desired, a party may seek judicial sanction of the dismissal by having the court issue a dismissal order. See Rowland v. Vickers, 233 Ga. 67 (209 SE2d 592) (1974). Since no judgment of the court was entered when Vineyard voluntarily dismissed with prejudice his cross-claim, res judicata does not bar Vineyard’s current action against Fowler and Georgia Hi-Lift.
*465Decided July 9, 1991 —
Reconsideration denied July 24, 1991.
Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Frederick A. Johnson, Stevan A. Miller, for appellants.
Barry E. Billington, for appellee.