Court Opinion

ID: 9748080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:51:16.386005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:31.343737
License: Public Domain

CROSBY, J.,
Dissenting. — This appeal should be dismissed, not decided. It has long been the rule that discovery sanctions are not directly appealable. In my view the principle applicable here is this: “ ‘Where a statute has been construed by judicial decision, and that construction is not altered by subsequent legislation, it must be presumed that the Legislature is aware of the *691judicial construction and approves of it.’ [Citations.]” (Wilkoff v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 353 [211 Cal.Rptr. 742, 696 P.2d 134].) Because the amended statute fails to explicitly add discovery sanctions to the list of separately appealable orders, we must assume that remedy is not available. The Legislature surely would have said otherwise had it intended the expansion of Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (k) first conjured in Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429 [273 Cal.Rptr. 262],1 given full bloom in Kohan v. Cohan (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 967 [280 Cal.Rptr. 474], and now endorsed by my colleagues.2
My conclusion is buttressed by everyone’s agreement that the statutory change was obviously motivated by a desire to restrict access to the appellate system (see, e.g., Kohan v. Cohan, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at pp. 970-971), rather than increase it exponentially, as today’s decision threatens to do.3 The Legislature prescribed good medicine, but it was not meant for this patient.4 Hopefully, it will so advise this term so that appellate courts might turn their attention to weightier matters. In the meantime, I would follow Rao v. *692Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1568 [285 Cal.Rptr. 691] and Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle of Los Angeles (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 380, 389 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 43] and dismiss the appeal. (See also Imuta v. Nakano (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1570, 1584, fn. 17 [285 Cal.Rptr. 681].)

There, the Court of Appeal hedged though: “We construe the order imposing the second sanction award of $800 as a judgment in order to preserve its appealability. Alternatively, we could of course treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. [Citation.] Either way, we reach the merits.” (223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1442, fn. 10.)

Nor am I impressed by the suggestion that the Legislature’s use of the word “judgment” was intended to encompass what has unanimously been viewed in the past as an nonappealable order. The Legislature surely knows the difference between orders and judgments. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a); Code Civ. Proc., § 473; Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602 [275 Cal.Rptr. 887].)

My colleagues remain unconcerned in the face of a possible avalanche of petty discovery sanctions appeals: “[W]e do not believe our interpretation of subdivision (k) will add appreciably to our workload.” (Maj. opn., ante p. 690.) But consider this: Beginning 14 months ago with Mattco Forge and counting today’s opinion, there have been 5 published cases involving appeals from pretrial discovery orders, squandering the time of 15 appellate justices and their staffs. This energy was invested in cases involving an aggregate sum that probably did not exceed $7,000 (the Kohan opinion does not reveal the amount of the sanctions at issue there). How many more have already been resolved in a less public manner by dismissal or resolution on the merits? Based on the usual ratio of published to unpublished opinions, 30 would be a reasonable estimate. How many more will follow when more attorneys become aware of the option? Plenty.

More churning of files occurs in the discovery process than any other aspect of litigation. (Mannino v. Superior Court (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 776, 778 [191 Cal.Rptr. 163].) If any part of the system needs reform, this is it. And the last reform that would make any sense would be to require the Court of Appeal to afford pretrial review of routine sanctions orders whenever the amount exceeded $750. It defies logic to suppose the Legislature intended to turn the intermediate appellate court into an adjunct of the law and motion departments of the superior courts and bury it in petty cases with generally less at stake than the average small claims appeal. The majority creates new billing opportunities for attorneys, but litigants and the system will suffer.