Court Opinion

ID: 9925577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 09:09:57.276054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:03.292011
License: Public Domain

Concurrence in part and Dissent in part to Order issued January 18, 2024

                                     In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00156-CV
                           ———————————
                        DEMETRA MOORE, Appellant
                                        V.
                    DARRELL GENE CARDER, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 164th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 2020-23143

     CONCURRENCE IN PART AND DISSENT IN PART TO ORDER

      Because I again disagree with how the majority interprets Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4.5, I must respectfully dissent. See Moore v. Carder, No. 01-

22-00156-CV, 2023 WL 5923323, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 7,

2023, order) (Adams, C.J., dissenting). I would dismiss the motion for extension of
time for lack of jurisdiction and dismiss the motion to recall the mandate as moot. I

agree with dismissing the motion for en banc reconsideration, but disagree with the

path traveled to get here.

      Rule 4.5—“No Notice of Judgment or Order of Appellate Court; Effect on

Time to File Certain Documents”—provides that a party may obtain additional time

to file a motion for rehearing or en banc reconsideration if either the party or the

party’s attorney first received notice or acquired actual knowledge of the appellate

judgment after the prescribed time period. TEX. R. APP. P. 4.5 (a)–(b).

      As a result, and as this Court has previously recognized, a motion invoking

Rule 4.5 must show that the party or the party’s attorney first (1) received notice of

the underlying judgment from the court of appeals, or (2) acquired actual knowledge

of the judgment, after the time expired for filing a motion for rehearing or en banc

reconsideration. See id.; Peavy v. Tex. Home Mgmt., Inc., 16 S.W.3d 104, 105 n.1

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

      Additionally, the motion must be filed within 15 days of “the earliest date” of

these events—but in no event more than 90 days after the date of the judgment. TEX.

R. APP. P. 4.5(b).

      Here, this Court’s judgment issued on April 27, 2023. Moore’s deadline to

file a motion for rehearing and/or en banc reconsideration was therefore May 12,

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2023. See TEX. R. APP. P. 49.1, 49.5. Moore did not file anything. And the Court’s

mandate issued on July 7, 2023.

      Ten days later, on July 17, 2023, Moore filed a motion seeking to invoke Rule

4.5. The motion included the affidavit of Moore’s attorney. Moore asserted in the

motion that “July 7, 2023 [is] the date on which [she] and her counsel received actual

knowledge of the entry of this Court’s judgment.”                And, as the majority

acknowledges, Moore’s attorney admitted in his affidavit that he was provided with

an email notice from this Court about the judgment on April 27, 2023—the day the

judgment issued.1

      Because Moore’s attorney admitted that he received the email notice from the

Court before the time expired for filing a motion for rehearing and/or en banc

reconsideration, Rule 4.5 could not be triggered at all.2 The Court’s plenary power

then expired on June 26, 2023, without Moore filing anything. See TEX. R. APP. P.

19.1(a).

1
      Moore’s attorney further stated he did not receive the notice contained in the email
      until much later (July 7, 2023)—because he “inadvertently overlooked” the email.
      An assertion of inadvertence, however, has no impact the operation of Rule 4.5. See
      Peavy v. Tex. Home Mgmt., Inc., 16 S.W.3d 104, 105 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
      Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (“Under Rule 4.5, a party and its counsel must demonstrate that
      they did not receive notice of the appellate judgment until after the deadline for
      filing the document. It is insufficient for a party and its counsel to state that they
      were merely unaware of the notice’s contents.”).
2
      Moore’s motion was silent about whether she received the notice of the judgment
      before she acquired actual knowledge of it. But, as detailed, that makes no
      difference here.

                                            3
      Therefore, this Court lacked authority after June 26, 2023 to make any rulings

in this case as a matter of law—except to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We now

do that for the en banc motion, and I concur in that disposition. But because our

plenary power expired months ago, I must dissent from the denial of the motions for

extension of time and to recall the mandate. They likewise should be dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction.

      In that regard, the majority departs from the plain language of Rule 4.5. As

referenced above, this Court has previously recognized that a motion under Rule 4.5

must show when the party and the party’s attorney first received notice of the

judgment from the appellate court or acquired actual knowledge of the judgment.

See Peavy, 16 S.W.3d at 105.

      The majority here now recasts Rule 4.5 to focus only on the party. According

to the majority, the “dispositive issue under Rule 4.5 is whether and when [the] party

received notice or acquired actual knowledge of [the] rendition of our judgment and

that counsel’s receipt of notice or acquisition of knowledge is relevant to [the]

party’s awareness, inasmuch as counsel is party’s agent,” citing Moore, 2023 WL

5923323, at *3 (emphasis added).

      Under this rationale, any earlier notice or actual knowledge by the party’s

attorney will have no impact, or very little impact, on whether Rule 4.5 is invoked.

This interpretation will cause much of the language in Rule 4.5 to have no meaning,

                                          4
which courts are cautioned not to do. See Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia, 363 S.W.3d

573, 579 (Tex. 2012) (“When construing rules of procedure, we apply the same rules

of construction that govern the interpretation of statutes. We first look to the plain

language of the rule and construe it according to its plain or literal meaning.”); see

also Long v. Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship., 426 S.W. 3d 73, 81 (Tex. 2014)

(“[Courts] must interpret statutes and rules of procedure to give them effect.”).

      As support for its interpretation of Rule 4.5, the majority cites to Nance v.

Evandale Independent School District, No. 09-05-00221-CV, 2005 WL 2271599, at

*1–2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 15, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.), and includes the

following parenthetical: “(noting that, among other reasons, party was not entitled

to relief under trial-court rule, given that she only established when her lawyer first

became aware of appellate judgment but made no showing as to her own notice or

actual knowledge of judgment).”

      In Nance, the appellant sought to invoke the trial court equivalent of appellate

Rule 4.5, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a.3 Like appellate Rule 4.5(b), Rule

306a(5) states “the party adversely affected is required to prove . . . the date on

which the party or [her] attorney first either received a notice of the judgment or

acquired actual knowledge of the [judgment] and that this date was more than twenty

3
      Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a has substantially similar language to Texas Rule
      of Appellate Procedure 4.5.
                                           5
days after the judgment was signed.” Id. at *1 (emphasis added) (quoting TEX. R.

CIV. P. 306a(5)).

      The appellant in Nance contended that Rule 306a could be triggered if either

the party or the party’s attorney did not receive the notice or acquire actual

knowledge of a judgment within the specified time period. Id. The Nance court

rejected that interpretation and explained that, “[u]nder the plain language of the

rule, a party seeking a new judgment date must establish the first occurring of four

possible events: (1) the party receives notice, (2) the party acquires knowledge,

(3) counsel receives notice, and (4) counsel acquires knowledge.” Id. (emphasis

added). The same is true for Rule 4.5.

      But the appellant in Nance only provided evidence showing that her attorney

obtained notice and actual knowledge of the judgment past the specified time period.

Stated differently, the appellant in Nance presented only favorable evidence

(regarding her attorney) that would trigger the rule—she provided no evidence

(regarding herself) that might show earlier dates and preclude operation of the rule.

That failure led to dismissal of the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Id. at *2

      Our Court faced a similar situation in Peavy v. Texas Home Management, Inc.,

where the appellee sought to invoke Rule 4.5. The appellee asserted that its counsel

did not receive timely notice of our judgment, but made no showing of when it (the

                                           6
party) obtained notice and actual knowledge of the judgment. Peavy, 16 S.W.3d at

105.

       Stated differently, the appellee in Peavy, like the appellant in Nance, provided

only favorable evidence (regarding its attorney) that would trigger Rule 4.5—the

appellee provided no evidence (regarding itself) that might show earlier dates and

preclude operation of the rule.4     Thus, neither Nance nor Peavy supports the

proposition that “the dispositive issue under Rule 4.5 is whether and when [the] party

received notice or acquired actual knowledge of rendition of our judgment.”

       Here, Moore also only provided evidence about when her attorney received

notice from the Court about the judgment; but, in contrast to Nance and Peavy, that

evidence was unfavorable to Moore and precluded the operation of Rule 4.5 as a

matter of law. Nothing could change that result here.

       Accordingly, for these reasons, I concur with the majority’s dismissal of

Moore’s motion for en banc reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction, but disagree

with the majority’s interpretation and application of Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 4.5. I therefore must further dissent from the majority’s denial of Moore’s

4
       Instead of dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, the Peavy court remanded for a
       determination of when the appellee itself received notice and acquired actual
       knowledge of our judgment―and whether that date prevented Rule 4.5 from being
       triggered. Id.

                                           7
motion to extend time and motion to recall the mandate, as these motions should also

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

                                             /s/ Terry Adams
                                             Terry Adams
                                             Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Kelly and Goodman.

Chief Justice Adams, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

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