Court Opinion

ID: 9729804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:49:16.74263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:01.284738
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting).
I. INTRODUCTION
I cannot join the lead opinion because it fails to recognize important distinctions between state and federal law. It further fails to distinguish the factual situation presented in INS v Chadha, 462 US 919; 103 S Ct 2764; 77 L Ed 2d 317 (1983), from that presented *154today. I agree with the concurrence that a statutorily authorized legislative veto is not unconstitutional per se, and also agree that 1977 PA 108 does not violate the Enactment and Presentment Clauses of the Michigan Constitution. I do not, however, agree that §§45 and 46 are unconstitutional, and do not agree that §§45 and 46 conflict with the express will of the voters. I would hold that §§45 and 46 of the Administrative Procedures Act (apa), MCL 24.245, 24.246; MSA 3.560(145), 3.560(146), 1977 PA 108, are constitutional and that the Department of Corrections (doc) rules are invalid because they do not conform with the requirements of the apa. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. Because I would uphold §§45 and 46, I would not reach the issue of severability.
H. ISSUE
The central issue comes down to this: when an executive agency proposes rules pursuant to a limited delegation of authority, may a joint legislative committee disapprove the rules as part of a statutorily mandated rule-creation process? The defendants assert that the doc rules are valid because §§45 and 46 of the apa are unconstitutional. The plaintiffs counter that §§45 and 46 are constitutional, and if found unconstitutional, are not severable from chapter 3 of the apa. If §§ 45 and 46 are found constitutional and severable, the plaintiffs contend that the delegation of authority must fail as overbroad.
The argument does not hinge on whether the exertion of power by an agency is unconstitutional even though it conforms with the apa. Instead, the question is: (1) whether the delegation can still be considered constitutional if §§ 45 and 46 are invalidated, and (2) *155if the delegation is valid, whether an executive agency can pass rules without complying with the requirements of the APA.
IE. MICHIGAN LAW
A. RELEVANT HISTORY
The questionable DOC rules put into force without Joint Committee on Administrative Rules (JCAR) review came to fall on the courthouse steps after being tossed between the legislative and executive branches. In order to examine the validity of APA §§45 and 46, it is imperative to understand the history that necessarily attaches to an agency rule. The genesis of the DOC rules can be traced to the enactment of the apa. The APA became law as a product of the normal legislative process: enactment by introduction and passage of a bill that was eventually presented to and signed by the Governor. MCL 24.201 et seq.-, MSA 3.560(101) et seq. The enabling statute that conferred rulemaking power upon the DOC in the first place was also enacted pursuant to constitutional procedures. MCL 791.206; MSA 28.2276. From that point, the ball bounced to the executive branch, and the DOC had the power to promulgate rules within the bounds of authority delegated by the Legislature. Limitations were placed on the DOC by the enabling statute as well as by the apa. Here, the doc crafted rules and submitted them to JCAR as required by the APA. By determining that the doc stepped outside its delegated power, the Legislature volleyed the ball back to the executive branch. In response, the DOC then decided to play by its own rules. The DOC failed to comply *156with the apa when it proceeded to file proposed rules in the face of JCAR disapproval.
From a legal perspective, the enactment of the APA and the enactment of the enabling statute providing for doc rule creation clearly constituted “legislation” for the purposes of the Enactment and Presentment Clauses. They were introduced by bill, presented to the Governor, and were enacted. When the enabling statute delegated power to the DOC, constitutional rules governing delegation became applicable. The DOC failed to comply with the apa by submitting rules for filing without a certificate of JCAR approval. A question of rule validity then arose. Now the debate turns on whether the rules should be upheld on the grounds that the apa is unconstitutional, or whether the rules should be invalidated because of a procedural failure. I believe that §§45 and 46 are constitutional because JCAR review is not equivalent to “legislation.” Further, the doc rules should be invalidated in conformity with Michigan cases recognizing that procedural safeguards must be followed during the rulemaking process. See, e.g., Detroit Base Coalition for the Human Rights of the Handicapped v Dep’t of Social Services, 431 Mich 172; 428 NW2d 335 (1988); Clonlara, Inc v State Bd of Ed, 442 Mich 230; 501 NW2d 88 (1993); People v Turmon, 417 Mich 638; 340 NW2d 620 (1983).
The lead opinion correctly recognizes that this Court may only declare a statute unconstitutional in the face of a clear violation. Ante at 112, citing Gauthier v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co, 360 Mich 510, 515; 104 NW2d 182 (1960). Similarly, statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the *157challenger bears the burden of proving invalidity.1 Johnson v Harnischfeger Corp, 414 Mich 102, 112; 323 NW2d 912 (1982); League General Ins Co v Catastrophic Claims Ass’n, 165 Mich App 278, 293; 418 NW2d 708 (1987), rev’d on other grounds 435 Mich 338; 458 NW2d 632 (1990). I would hold that the DOC failed to meet its burden.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The lead opinion points to the following state constitutional provisions as key to the determination of the present case: (1) the Enactment and Presentment Clauses of Const 1963, art 4, §§ 1, 22, 26, and 33, (2) the Separation of Powers Clause found at Const 1963, art 3, § 2, and (3) the rule suspension provision of Const 1963, art 4, § 7. I agree that these constitutional provisions are relevant to our determination, but disagree that a collective reading of these constitutional provisions leads to the conclusion that §§45 and 46 of the apa are unconstitutional.
In determining whether the Legislature has the authority to enact a particular statute, we begin with the proposition that it has the power to do so unless an express constitutional prohibition is in place. See, e.g., In re Brewster Street Housing Site, 291 Mich 313, 333; 289 NW 493 (1939); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 PA 240, 400 Mich 311, 317-318; 254 NW2d 544 (1977); Attorney General ex rel *158O’Hara v Montgomery, 275 Mich 504, 538; 267 NW 550 (1936). The Constitution of 1963 changed the law in many respects, but the drafters chose to leave the nature of legislative authority intact. Michigan’s Legislature still operates pursuant to a broad grant of legislative authority; specific limitations are imposed by the constitution. Conversely, the federal constitution confers limited power on Congress. As this Court stated in In re Brewster, supra at 333:
The Constitution of the State of Michigan is not a grant of power to the legislature, but is a limitation upon its powers, while the Constitution of the United States is a delegation of power to the Federal government. [Citations omitted.]
In other words, under state law, that which is not prohibited is presumed to be permitted. Under federal law, that which is not permitted is prohibited.
These principles lead me to disagree with the position of the lead opinion that art 4, § 37 indicates an intent to restrict the Legislature’s authority to pass laws governing the delegation of rulemaking power. The lead opinion correctly concludes that art 4, § 37 serves as a “stopgap” measure. It does not follow, however, that § 37 forecloses the possibility that the apa is constitutional. Rather, Michigan’s presumption of statutory constitutionality weighs in favor of the plaintiffs. Under principles of statutory construction, if the apa and art 4, § 37 can be reconciled, they must be.2
*159Moreover, I disagree with the concurrence that the defeat of Proposal A in the 1984 election has any relevance to the present case. Voters reject proposals for a variety of reasons. The only effect of proposal defeat is that the law remains unchanged. Under the law of this state, a defeated proposal does not become law; enacted legislation does. When the APA was enacted, it became the law of this state in spite of the fact that a prior related proposal was rejected by the voters.3
The concurring opinion correctly acknowledges that the state of the law remains intact when a proposal is rejected by the voters. Nonetheless, the concurrence raises proposal rejection as a sword, making it relevant under the guise of ascertaining insight into voter intent. I cannot agree that the ballot-box rejection of a proposal almost twenty years after the passage of our state’s constitution provides any relevant insight into the “intent of the enduring political body that previously adopted the 1963 Constitution.” Ante at 149.4
*160The concurring opinion uses the following logic: “We the people” represent a constant in the political process. “We the people” adopted the 1963 Constitution. “We the people” rejected Proposal A in 1984. Therefore, the rejection of a proposed amendment in 1984 reveals that “we the people” intended to constitutionally reject the language of the 1984 proposal. The concurrence implies that the apa has been implicitly rejected by the same “we the people” responsible for the 1963 Constitution because the language of the APA parallels the language of Proposal A. In application, the concurrence would lead to the conclusion that the rejection of a proposal trumps legislation enacted by representatives elected by “we the people.” The concurrence defies logic. The delegates to the 1961 constitutional convention voted on a constitutional provision distinct from the amendment proposed in 1984, and the concerns that caused “we the people” to reject a proposal in 1984 were not necessarily the same concerns that drove “we the people” to adopt art 4, § 37 as part of the 1963 Constitution.5,
*161Although the electorate is not subject to the same political considerations as the Legislature, neither does the electorate exist in a vacuum. The law gives little weight to legislative comments made after the passage of a statute or constitutional provision when those comments represent an intent different than that expressed by those who adopted the statute or constitutional provision. See, e.g., Durant v State Bd of Ed, 424 Mich 364, 382, n 12; 381 NW2d 662 (1985); Schmidt v Dep’t of Ed, 441 Mich 236, 282; 490 NW2d 584 (1992) (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting). To the extent that the rejection of a proposal can even be considered indicative of legislative intent, the rejection of Proposal A in 1984 carries little weight because construing the rejection of Proposal A as a constitutional *162rejection of JCAR would be clearly contrary to the language of the APA and contrary to the language of the Michigan Constitution. I prefer to refer to laws that have been passed rather than those that have not.
Moreover, the judiciary has developed established rules for discerning the intent behind the laws of this state. The concurrence’s novel approach fits nowhere within those rules. We are bound to interpret constitutional provisions with a presumption of constitutionality, Johnson, supra, and in such a way that the words are interpreted “ ‘in the sense most obvious to the common understanding . . . .’ ” Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390, 405; 185 NW2d 9 (1971). A “plain” reading of art 4, § 37 does not support the position of either the lead opinion or the concurrence. Instead, a plain reading of art 4, § 37 provides only that
[t]he legislature may by concurrent resolution empower a joint committee of the legislature, acting between sessions, to suspend any rule or regulation promulgated by an administrative agency subsequent to the adjournment of the last preceding regular legislative session. Such suspension shall continue no longer than the end of the next regular legislative session.
The language of art 4, § 37 does not even mention review of agency rules during the regular legislative session. The concurrence essentially injects words into art 4, § 37.
If we are to consider intent, I would turn to the records of the constitutional convention rather than making an abstract, negative inference from the rejection of a ballot proposal. I disagree with the concurrence’s representation of the constitutional record, and with the concurrence’s assessment of the fram*163ers’ intentions and actions. The record reveals that a majority of delegates were concerned with ensuring legislative power, rather than limiting it. The convention comment to art 4, § 37 states that the provision was designed to “provide[] a legislative check on the rule-making authority of administrative agencies when the legislature is not in regular session.” The official constitutional record also reveals that the purpose of art 4, § 37 was to cure a perceived defect in the law that allowed agencies to evade meaningful legislative review of agency rules. 1, 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 759, 2419-2425, 2968-2971. The focus was on actions taken between sessions. Only a minority of convention delegates expressed concern about the wisdom and constitutional validity of art 4, § 37. Id. The prevailing view was that art 4, § 37 was needed to close a loophole previously exploited by executive agencies. Id. at 2970-2971. The constitutional record reveals that art 4, § 37 was designed to guarantee that the Legislature would have the power to review agency rules promulgated between sessions. The record does not support the concurrence’s “limited grant” analysis. Rather, the record reveals that the framers intended to guarantee legislative oversight. The concurrence’s assumption that the framers intended to allow the Legislature to act under limited circumstances, comports neither with the constitutional record nor with the established premise that the framers of the Michigan Constitution intended that the Legislature would be able to act unless expressly prohibited from so doing. See, e.g., In re Brewster, supra at 333; Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 PA 240, supra at 317-318; Attorney General ex rel O’Hara v *164Montgomery, supra at 538. The apa provisions at issue involve circumstances different than those described in art 4, § 37, and I see no basis for concluding that the framers intended to accomplish anything other than what is clearly stated in art 4, § 37.
C. LEGISLATION DEFINED
In Michigan, the constitution requires that all legislation must be by bill, art 4, § 22, and that all bills must be presented to the Governor in order to become law, art 4, § 33. Logically, if an action of the Legislature is something other than “legislation,” then the action need not be by bill and need not be presented to the Governor.6 Thus, the disposition of this case must hinge on the definition of “legislation” under Michigan law.7
1. WESTERVELT v NATURAL RESOURCES COMMISSION
Michigan law supports a finding of apa constitutionality. This Court, in Westervelt v Natural Resources Comm, 402 Mich 412, 440; 263 NW2d 564 (1978), offered the following definition of legislation: “the concept of ‘legislation,’ in its essential sense, is the power to speak on any subject without any specified limitations.” Under this definition, I would conclude that the JCAR review process does not constitute “leg*165islation” because the jcar’s power is clearly limited by the terms of the apa.
Westervelt’s definition of legislation is noticeably absent from the lead opinion. Although Westervelt was a plurality opinion, I find its reasoning useful, and would take guidance from the wisdom of our predecessors. I cannot agree with the lead opinion’s casual dismissal of Westervelt nor its conclusion that the jcar is empowered to act without limitation. Rather, Westervelt’s discussion of “legislation” sprang from a long line of cases that support a conclusion contrary to that reached by the lead opinion.
The lead opinion makes various references to actions that are “legislative” in nature, but fails to distinguish a “legislative action” from “legislation.” Instead, the lead opinion concludes, without citing any authority, that “[w]hen the Legislature engages in ‘legislative action’ it must do so by enacting legislation.” Ante at 119. To the contrary, Michigan law recognizes that actions that are “legislative” in nature do not necessarily constitute “legislation.” Westervelt, supra at 440-441.
In Michigan, the delegation doctrine provides that the Legislature may delegate power that is legislative in nature but may not delegate the ability to create “legislation.” Id. Westervelt was thus an example of the delegation doctrine in action. There, this Court determined that the executive branch did not usurp legislative power in violation of the separation of powers doctrine when it promulgated rules in compliance with the apa precisely because there is a distinction between a “legislative act” and “legislation.” Id. If there were no distinction, the Legislature could not validly delegate its authority. See, e.g., Osius v St *166Clair Shores, 344 Mich 693; 75 NW2d 25 (1956). Moreover, Michigan cases that have commented on “legislative acts” support the apa as a valid procedural mechanism serving to ensure that delegations of authority to the executive branch are not unconstitutionally broad. Clonlara, supra; Turmon, supra; Michigan Farm Bureau v Bureau of Workmen’s Compensation, 408 Mich 141; 289 NW2d 699 (1980).
2. LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND THE DELEGATION DOCTRINE
This Court is not hard pressed to find an example of a case in which a separation of powers challenge was launched in response to a rule promulgated by the executive branch. The question today focuses on whether JCAR review of agency rules violates the separation of powers doctrine because the Legislature is “legislating.” In the past, the debate generally examined whether the exercise of rulemaking authority by the executive branch constituted the usurpation of a legislative function. Osius, supra at 698. The focus was on whether the executive branch violated the separation of powers doctrine by “legislating.” Cases that addressed yesterday’s question are useful today.
This Court’s decision in Osius is a good starting place for examining the state of modem law. Although Osius was decided before the ratification of Michigan’s Constitution of 1963, the principles enunciated in Osius have been consistently referred to in post-1963 constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Dep’t of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 309; 240 NW2d 206 (1976); Turmon, supra. Osius ex*167amined the validity of legislative delegation in a zoning context. It has subsequently been relied upon as the landmark case establishing the “standards test” as the law of delegation in Michigan. Westervelt, supra at 434. The Osius standards test provides that the Legislature may delegate certain legislative functions to another body as long as it prescribes guidance standards that “are as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits.” Osius, supra at 698.
In Westervelt, this Court examined the continuing validity of Osius. The Westervelt Court adhered to the Osius standard, and explained how the delegation doctrine related both to the separation of powers doctrine and to due process. Westervelt, supra at 437-438. At the end of the day, Westervelt held that, while lawmaking power cannot be delegated, the Legislature can delegate power to an administrative agency as long as certain guidelines are observed. Id. at 441. Westervelt used Osius as a starting point, concluding that when Osius standards were met, legislative authorization and limitation had occurred. Id. According to the Court, the act of delegation provided rules within which the delegate was required to operate and confined the scope of the delegate’s power. Id. Further, rulemaking did not constitute “legislation” because the delegate executive agency was required to act within limits. Id.
Westervelt’s rule was then strengthened in Michigan Farm Bureau, supra. There, the Court probed the definition of a rule under the APA and concluded that an administrative rule could only be valid if it was (1) within the scope of granted power, (2) issued pursuant to the proper procedures, and (3) was reasonable. Michigan Farm Bureau, supra at 149. By *168implication, a rule failing to satisfy these requirements would be invalid.
In Twrmon, supra, this Court examined the definition of “sufficient guidelines” in the context of constraining and directing delegation. Turmon held that, when an agency appropriately exerts legislatively delegated power, the delegation fits within Michigan’s constitutional framework because the Legislature retains policymaking control. Id. at 647. The Court specifically noted that “inclusion of the apa provision as mandatory procedure to be followed in the board’s rulemaking further insures against possible abuse of delegated power . . . .” Id. at 648.
Finally, Clonlara, discussed the effect of the apa more directly. There, the Court specifically stated that if an agency attempts to adopt a rule without following the procedure outlined by the apa, then the rule will not have the force and effect of law. Id. at 239. Legislatively delegated power can only be validly exercised pursuant to proper procedure. Id.
From these cases, it becomes clear that rulemaking pursuant to appropriate statutory procedure, though legislative in character, is not “legislation.” Yet, executive agencies have rulemaking power only to the extent that they act within the bounds of power conferred upon them by the Legislature. Thus, the following three rules apply. (1) if the delegation of authority is sufficiently specific, then the delegation of power will be valid, but the executive agency must nonetheless act within prescribed boundaries; (2) if the delegation is not sufficiently specific for the subject matter, then the delegation will be constitutionally invalid; and (3) if the delegation is valid, but the executive *169branch steps outside its bounds, then the executive use of power will be invalid.
Clearly, the DOC director’s authority to promulgate rules was at least partially derived from the enabling statute, found at MCL 791.206; MSA 28.2276. That statute expressly provides, “[t]he director may promulgate rules pursuant to the administrative procedures act . . . .” MCL 791.206(1); MSA 28.2276(1). Therefore, the delegation of authority under the enabling act is necessarily linked to the delegation of authority under the apa.8
Michigan cases have repeatedly recognized that JCAR review is relevant to the delegation process. See, e.g., Clonlara, Turmon, and Michigan Farm Bureau, swpra. By declaring §§45 and 46 unconstitutional and then severing those sections from the apa, the lead opinion fails to recognize fully the relationship between the apa and the enabling statute. It simply is not logical to conclude that an agency is not “legislating” when it creates “legislative” rules outside procedural boundaries and beyond its scope of authority, but that the Legislature is “legislating” by reviewing those same rules within procedural boundaries.
Even though this Court has concluded that an agency does not violate the separation of powers doctrine when it promulgates rules in compliance with *170the apa, this Court’s decisions also state that a rule will be invalid if apa procedures are not followed. Today, the Court steps blindly forward when it upholds the DOC rules and declares §§ 45 and 46 unconstitutional without even considering key Michigan cases.
I would hold that the exertion of the jcar’s veto power does not constitute “legislation.” Michigan case law provides that an agency meeting the Osius standard need not comply with enactment and presentment procedures during the rulemaking process because the agency is not “legislating.” See, e.g., Seaman, supra at 309. The process does not magically evolve into “legislation” simply because the rules pass from the desk of an executive officer to a legislator.9 The Legislature performs some functions that do not constitute “legislation,” and I believe that JCAR review is one such function. The JCAR does not have the power to speak without limitation. Instead, JCAR review is merely one part of an intricate procedural system. Further, as stated above, JCAR review does not fall within Westervelt’s definition of “legislation.”
IV. THE LEAD OPINION
Even though today’s case fits naturally within the framework of state case law, the lead opinion relies primarily on Chadha when concluding that JCAR review constitutes a “legislative act.” Also, in the *171spirit of Chadha, the lead opinion would hold that jcar review usurps gubernatorial authority in violation of the Presentment, Enactment, and Separation of Powers Clauses of our constitution. In adopting the logic of Chadha, the lead opinion concludes that “the provisions of the APA at issue in this case are similar to the legislative veto struck down in Chadha." Ante at 115. The lead opinion summarizes the four factors utilized in Chadha for determining whether congressional action constitutes the type of legislative power governed by Article I of the United States Constitution. Ante at 113-114. However, if we are to take guidance from Chadha, I would categorize the factors in a slightly different fashion: (1) whether the status of persons outside the legislative branch have been altered, (2) whether the action in question is “legislative in its character and effect,” (3) whether the statute involves policy determinations that may only be made by enactment and presentment, and (4) whether the governing constitution prescribes rules for legislative action by one house. Chadha, supra at 952-955. As will be discussed below, jcar review maintains the status quo, is not legislative in character and effect, does not require policy determinations requiring enactment or presentment, and does not involve legislative action by one house. Additionally, although Chadha bears some resemblance to the present case, I disagree with the conclusion of the lead opinion that Michigan’s JCAR review process carries the same constitutional significance as the legislative veto at issue in Chadha.10
*172A. “LEGISLATIVE CHARACTER AND EFFECT” OF JCAR REVIEW AND MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO
In Chadha, the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1254(c)(2), was at issue. The act provided that either house of Congress could pass a resolution invalidating the United States Attorney General’s decision to allow a deportable alien to remain in the United States. Chadha, supra at 923. Section 244(a)(1) conferred upon the Attorney General the discretion to suspend deportation. Section 244(c)(2) allowed a single house of Congress to override the suspension and order that the alien be deported.
Thus, in Chadha, Congress conferred upon the Attorney General the authority to make a decision regarding the deportation of a particular alien. By exercising its “legislative veto,” it nullified the Attorney General’s decision. The result was that the “delegation of authority” conferred no authority at all because one house of Congress could unilaterally take away the effect of the Attorney General’s deci*173sion. Thereafter, the Attorney General remained powerless to respond. Importantly, the “legislative veto” came into play after the Attorney General exercised the delegated authority. That is not the case here. In this case, jcar review is part of the rule-approval process. Rulemaking authority is not conferred and then taken away; rather, the apa establishes a rulemaking process. The executive agencies have only been delegated the power to act within that process. Also, unlike Chadha, the executive agency has the opportunity to revise proposed rules. The plain language of §§45 and 46 provide procedures for the executive agency to follow in the face of JCAR disapproval. When the agency follows the provisions of the apa, it has an opportunity to overcome the jcar’s decision. Here, the DOC simply decided to ignore the plain language of the apa because it felt that it was not bound by the statute.
Further, Chadha held that the Immigration and Nationality Act was constitutionally flawed because Congress’ ability to order deportation was “legislative in its character and effect” and “had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations” of persons outside the legislative branch. Id. at 952. Today’s lead opinion similarly opines that allowing JCAR review of administrative rules would affect the rights of individuals outside the legislative branch. Specifically, the lead opinion argues that the jcar review process interferes with the doc director’s ability to administer his department. Yet, the director only has power to enact rules “pursuant to the administrative procedures act . . . .” MCL 791.206(1); MSA 28.2276(1). Jcar review does not limit the director’s *174power or alter his rights and duties, rather, the director’s power is subject to jcar review.
Michigan’s apa is quite different than the Immigration and Nationality Act. Under Michigan law, rules do not become effective until they undergo jcar review. MCL 24.245, 24.246; MSA 3.560(145), 3.560(146). The “puipose and effect” of jcar review is not to “legislate.” Rather, jcar disapproval maintains the status quo ante. Persons who would otherwise be affected by the rules retain the same status because the rules have never been in effect at the time when the jcar disapproves. The rights of the executive branch similarly remain unchanged because the executive agency never had the authority to promulgate rules outside the scope of jcar review. Instead, jcar review is part of the required process. If the agency ignores the procedural requirements imposed by the terms of delegation, then the executive has exceeded the power delegated to it. As such, the analysis simply returns to whether the DOC rules must be invalidated. Michigan law clearly provides that agency rules must be invalidated if procedural standards are not satisfied. Here, the doc failed to satisfy the constitutionally valid procedural standards of the apa when it proceeded without jcar approval. Therefore, the rules cannot stand.
B. ENACTMENT AND PRESENTMENT
When examining enactment and presentment, it is important to recognize the reasons that the Enactment and Presentment Clauses of the United States Constitution were key to Chadha. Chadha depended on the separation of powers doctrine—by using the legislative veto to alter individual rights other than by *175legislation, the legislative branch was stepping outside its prescribed powers. Id. at 957-958. However, the federal constitution, unlike our state constitution, contains no express Separation of Powers Clause. The separation of powers argument was reached by making reference to federal precedent, and by noting the “checks and balances” that the federal constitution does explicitly impose. Id. Presumably, because Michigan’s Constitution does expressly provide for a separation of powers between branches, the result in Chadha could be reached without reference to bicameralism or presentment even though Chadha explains how enactment, presentment, and bicameralism are directly linked to the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 946. If we are to analogize the present case to Chadha, then we must carefully consider Chadha’s presentment and enactment arguments.
The lead opinion concludes that jcar review involves policy determinations akin to those at issue in Chadha. Ante at 116-117. Yet, I find that the lead opinion misses the mark. The question is not simply whether the Legislature is engaged in making policy determinations, but whether the Legislature is engaged in making the type of policy determinations that need to be made in the form of legislation. The analysis of the lead opinion is tied to its misconception that any “legislative” action taken by a subset of the Legislature is “legislation.” I disagree for the reasons stated in part m of this opinion.11 In my view, the *176action taken by the doc was more akin to legislation than is the jcar review process. Because this Court has already decided that agency rulemaking does not constitute impermissible “legislation” as long as necessary guidelines are followed, I would further conclude that review of agency rules as part of the promulgation process is similarly not “legislation.” Therefore, jcar review does not violate the Enactment and Presentment Clauses of our constitution.
C. BICAMERALISM12
Chadha is also clearly distinguishable because it repeatedly made reference to “the one-house veto,” and placed importance on the bicameralism requirement of the United States Constitution. Jcar review is clearly not the same thing as a one-house veto.13 *177Instead, the jcar is a joint committee, composed of both senators and representatives. MCL 24.235; MSA 3.560(135). When the jcar disapproves of a rule, both houses are given notice and an opportunity to pass a joint resolution. MCL 24.245; MSA 3.560(145).14
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the Chadha view to which one subscribes, it is clear that the constitutional analysis in Chadha was directly tied to the text of the United States Constitution and the federal Immigration and *178Nationality Act. Similarly, our analysis should begin with Michigan’s law. As stated previously, Michigan law requires a different outcome than occurred in Chadha. Furthermore, the jcar review process is distinguishable from the “legislative veto” at issue in Chadha.. Pursuant to state law, I would hold that §§45 and 46 are constitutional. When the doc failed to follow the procedural requirements of §§ 45 and 46, it exceeded the scope of its rulemaking authority. I would hold that the rules promulgated by the doc are invalid, and would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

 An interesting twist in this case is that the doc, an executive agency, refused to comply with a statute because it felt that the statute was unconstitutional. It is the action of the doc in violation of the statute that gave rise to the plaintiffs’ claims, while statutory constitutionality is raised as a defense. Thus, it is the defendant, as statutory challenger, who carries the burden of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality.

 Contrary to the assertion of the concurrence, I do not suggest that the constitution must yield to a statute. Rather, a statute must be deemed constitutional unless it is clearly unconstitutional. In my view, if a statute can be reconciled with the constitution, then it is not clearly unconstitutional. Unlike the concurrence, I am aware of a great deal of authority that requires us to interpret a statutory provision as constitutional if it can *159be construed in a manner consistent with the constitution. To say otherwise would destroy the presumption of constitutional validity. See, e.g., Kampf v Kampf, 237 Mich App 377; 603 NW2d 295 (1999); Brown v Siang, 107 Mich App 91, 97; 309 NW2d 575 (1981), citing Ferguson v Skrupa, 372 US 726; 83 S Ct 1028; 10 L Ed 2d 93 (1963). See also Dep’t of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich 299; 240 NW2d 206 (1976); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan v Governor, 422 Mich 1, 51; 367 NW2d 1 (1985); People v McQuillan, 392 Mich 511, 536; 221 NW2d 569 (1974); Lehnhausen v Lake Shore Auto Parts Co, 410 US 356; 93 S Ct 1001; 35 L Ed 2d 351 (1973). Art 4, § 37 and the apa are easily reconciled because they address legislative approval under two separate types of circumstances, and because nothing in art 4, § 37 prohibits the jcar review process.

 In any event, voter distaste is not the standard for determining statutory constitutionality.

 The concurrence dangerously associates its argument with the question whether the voters’ rejection of Proposal a in 1984 was “right” or *160“wrong.” I express no opinion about whether the jcar review process is prudent. Instead, my analysis focuses on the validity of the jcak review process that was enacted by the Legislature as the representatives of the people. I do not argue that proposal rejection has no relevance to the governance of this state, but rather believe that the effect of proposal rejection is only that the language of the proposal fails to become the law of the state at the time rejected and in the form presented by the proposal.

 Thinking of the equation in more common terms clearly illustrates the logical error: Monday, I asked Mary what her favorite color was, and she said blue. On Tuesday, 1 again asked what her favorite color was, and she said green. Mary is a constant, but her intentions are not. Mary’s response on Tuesday does not lead to the conclusion that, on Monday, she intended to say her favorite color was green.
The concurrence tries to refute this example, but the example provided by the concurrence is imperfect. It necessarily rests on the idea that Mary’s favorite color never changes. In the concurrence’s example, Mary’s decision on Monday would be the equivalent of the people’s decision dur*161ing the 1961 constitutional convention. By analogy, then, the concurrence asserts that, in 1963, “we the people” gave “some indication” that it intended to reject the jcar review process. I disagree for the reasons stated throughout this opinion.
As explained in the body of this opinion, I do not believe that the rejection of Proposal a creates any useful inference. However, if we are to refer to the rejection of Proposal a, I would note that a different construction is possible. One could say that, in 1963, “we the people” intended to impose a restriction on executive rulemaking power. In 1977, the apa was passed by the Legislature on behalf of “we the people.” In 1984, “we the people” chose not to change the state of the law. Thereafter, “we the people” never expressed a desire to change the law even though “we the people” became aware of the implications of the apa in 1984. The concurrence suggests that any interpretation other than its own is at odds with “historical reality.” I see no support for such a proposition. I see no reason to conclude that the Legislature may choose to reject proposed legislation for a variety of reasons, but that the voters are so one-dimensional that they could vote against a proposal for only a single reason. Even if one concedes that the only permissible inference to be made from ballot rejection is that the people did not want the proposal to become a part of the constitution, it does not necessarily follow that the people also did not want the proposal to be part of the statutory law of this state. Despite the concurrence’s efforts to demonstrate otherwise, I see no meaningful distinction between legislative acquiescence (of which my brother Markman disapproves) and the “popular acquiescence” doctrine created by the concurrence today. Neither logic nor authority support the concurrence.

 Legislators undertake many actions that do not rise to the level of “legislation.” Resolutions and committee work are common examples. The courts and Attorney General have both recognized a distinction between introducing bills and acting by resolution. See, e.g., Boyer-Campbell Co v Fry, 271 Mich 282; 260 NW 165 (1935); OAG, 1976, No. 4936 (February 3, 1976).

 Like the concurrence, I am unpersuaded by the lead opinion’s reference to the law of our sister states.

 Recently, the link was expressed more clearly by the Legislature. In 1996, the enabling statute was amended in part as follows:
If the Michigan supreme court rules that sections 45 and 46 of the administrative procedures act are unconstitutional, and a statute requiring legislative review of administrative rules is not enacted within 90 days after the Michigan supreme court ruling, the department shall not promulgate rules under this section. [MCL 791.206(5); MSA 28.2276(5) (citations omitted).]

 Although, I disagree with the concurrence that Michigan-specific circumstances render §§ 45 and 46 unconstitutional, I agree that the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches is endangered by concluding that the executive branch may regulate pursuant to a delegation without satisfying the Enactment and Presentment Clauses, but that the Legislature may not check the executive’s use of legislative power through the use of the legislative veto. Ante at 136-137.

 Further, although Chadha addressed some of the issues we are faced with today, it should be acknowledged that Chadha’s discussion looked *172beyond the validity of the “legislative veto.” Rather, the Chadha majority took great pains to discuss the federalist principles underlying the United States Constitution, with emphasis on the “Framers’ intent.” Id. at 944-959. The very first sentence of Chadha’s Presentment Clause analysis makes reference to the Constitutional Convention. Id. at 946. The analysis then notes that the federal constitution carefully circumscribes the powers of Congress. Id. at 946-949. With regard to bicameralism, Chadha opined, “[t]he bicameral requirement of Art. I, §§ 1, 7 was of scarcely less concern to the Framers than was the Presidential veto and indeed the two concepts are interdependent.” Id. at 948. According to Chadha, “Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.” Id. at 951. Thereafter, the opinion explained the process to be considered when analyzing a federal statute within the constitutional framework of art I. Id. at 951-959. The procedural standards applied in Chadha are not applicable here. Instead, Michigan is guided by the procedures outlined in the apa.

 The lead opinion asserts that the jcar review process must be invalidated because it allows legislative action to go unchecked. Instead, the lead opinion concludes, “the Legislature’s action exerts a ‘policy-making effect equivalent to amending or repealing existing legislation.’ ” Ante at *176117, n 8, quoting New Jersey General Assembly v Byrne, 90 NJ 376, 388; 448 A2d 438 (1982) (emphasis omitted).
I do not agree that jcar review is akin to the process of amending or repealing legislation. Rather, jcar review holds the status quo ante in place. If an analogy is to be made, jcar review would be more akin to a proposal introduced into a legislative committee than to an amendment to legislation. A proposal will only later become subject to the Enactment and Presentment Clauses if it passes and follows the appropriate procedural rules. Surely, the lead opinion would not hold that every failed proposal must be submitted to the Governor. In fact, the constitution states, and the lead opinion acknowledges, that the Enactment and Presentment Clauses require that all bills passed by the Legislature be presented to the Governor. Article 4 provides examples of actions taken by the Legislature that need not be done by bill. A perfect example is art 4, § 37, which allows the Legislature to act by concurrent resolution. Similarly, jcar review is a legislative action that does not constitute “legislation.”

 As a matter of terminology, it is important to recognize that Michigan’s “Legislature” is the entire bicameral legislative branch, consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

 The lead opinion misapprehends the enactment and presentment arguments put forth by petitioner and amici curiae. I understand the argument as being that the apa should be presumed constitutional because nothing in Michigan’s constitution limits the Legislature’s ability to enact *177legislation requiring rule review by a joint committee as part of the rule promulgation process.

 The statute provides as follows:
(9) If, within the time period provided by subsection (6), the committee disapproves the proposed rule or the committee chairperson certifies an impasse after votes for approval and disapproval have failed to receive concurrent majorities, the committee shall immediately report that fact to the legislature and return the rule to the agency. The agency shall not adopt or promulgate the rule unless 1 of the following occurs:
(a) The legislature adopts a concurrent resolution approving the rule within 60 days after the committee report has been received by, and read into the respective journal of, each house.
(b) The committee subsequently approves the rule.
(10) If the time permitted by this section expires and the committee has not taken action under either subsection (8) or (9), then the committee shall return the proposed rules to the agency. The chairperson and alternate chairperson shall cause concurrent resolutions approving the rule to be introduced in both houses of the legislature simultaneously Each house of the legislature shall place the concurrent resolution directly on its calendar. The agency shall not adopt or promulgate the rule unless 1 of the following occurs:
(a) The legislature adopts a concurrent resolution approving the rule within 60 days after introduction by record roll call vote. The adoption of the concurrent resolution requires a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house of the legislature.
(b) The agency resubmits the proposed rule to the committee and the committee approves the rule within the time permitted by this section. [Emphasis added.]