Court Opinion

ID: 9405246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-27 21:00:32.345335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:20.462219
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4622

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        TERICKUS J. ASBURY,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:20-cr-00280-FDW-DSC-2)

        Submitted: March 10, 2023                                         Decided: June 26, 2023

        Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, AGEE, Circuit Judge, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: D. Baker McIntyre, III, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy
        Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Terickus J. Asbury appeals his conviction and the 151-month sentence imposed

        following his guilty plea to distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

        § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). On appeal, Asbury’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

        California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal

        but questioning whether the district court properly applied the career offender enhancement

        under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2018). Asbury has filed a pro se

        supplemental brief likewise challenging his career offender designation. For the reasons

        that follow, we affirm.

               Generally, we review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-

        discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). However, when

        “determining whether a district court properly applied the advisory [Sentencing]

        Guidelines, including application of any sentencing enhancements, we review the district

        court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v.

        Morehouse, 34 F.4th 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

               The district court sentenced Asbury as a career offender based on two prior

        convictions for North Carolina common law robbery. In challenging the enhancement,

        Asbury’s counsel broadly questions whether this offense counts as a crime of violence

        under USSG § 4B1.2(a). Asbury, meanwhile, more pointedly contends that North Carolina

        common law robbery is not a valid career offender predicate because it can be committed

        recklessly. See Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1834 (2021) (“Offenses with a

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        mens rea of recklessness do not qualify as violent felonies under [the Armed Career

        Criminal Act].”). 1

               We have previously held that “North Carolina common law robbery categorically

        qualifies as ‘robbery,’ as that term is used within [USSG] § 4B1.2(a)(2).” United States v.

        Gattis, 877 F.3d 150, 156 (4th Cir. 2017). But Asbury insists that Borden, which issued

        after Gattis, compels a different conclusion. We disagree. Under North Carolina law,

        “common law robbery requires a taking with the felonious intent on the part of the taker to

        deprive the owner of his property permanently and to convert it to the use of the taker.”

        State v. Herring, 370 S.E.2d 363, 368 (N.C. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Based on Herring, we conclude that North Carolina common law robbery requires more

        than mere recklessness and, therefore, that Borden did not disturb our holding in Gattis.

        Thus, the district court was correct in determining that North Carolina common law

        robbery qualifies as a career offender predicate.

               Next, noting that one of the robbery convictions resulted from an Alford plea, 2

        Asbury’s counsel questions whether this conviction is countable as a career offender

        predicate given that Asbury never admitted the elements of the offense. In support, counsel

               1
                “[T]his Court applies precedents interpreting ‘violent felony’ under the [Armed
        Career Criminal Act] and ‘crime of violence’ under the Guidelines interchangeably.”
        United States v. Covington, 880 F.3d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 2018) (some internal quotation
        marks omitted).
               2
                 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); see United States v. Mastrapa, 509
        F.3d 652, 659 (4th Cir. 2007) (“An Alford plea refers to a plea in which the defendant
        consents to a prison sentence even though he is unwilling or unable to admit his
        participation in the acts constituting the crime.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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        relies on United States v. Alston, 611 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2010), abrogated in part by United

        States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333, 340-42 (4th Cir. 2013), in which this court held that an

        Alford-based conviction could not serve as an armed career criminal predicate where: the

        statute of the prior conviction was divisible; some of the crimes proscribed by the statute

        were not valid predicates; and, by virtue of the Alford plea, the court could not exclude the

        possibility that the defendant had been convicted of a non-predicate offense. Id. at 221-28.

        But here, unlike in Alston, the absence of factual admissions is irrelevant since, again, the

        offense at issue categorically qualifies as a career offender predicate. See Gattis, 877 F.3d

        at 156. We therefore reject this argument.

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

        found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

        This court requires that counsel inform Asbury, in writing, of the right to petition the

        Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Asbury requests that a petition

        be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

        move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

        that a copy thereof was served on Asbury.

               We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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