Court Opinion

ID: 9915083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 17:02:06.012814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:04.183532
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                   LANCE EUGENE ROHRER, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 22-0460
                               FILED 1-4-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                        No. CR2020-132401-001
              The Honorable Margaret B. LaBianca, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Kevin M. Morrow
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Robert W. Doyle
Counsel for Appellant
                           STATE v. ROHRER
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1           Lance Eugene Rohrer appeals his convictions for one count of
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, one count of conspiracy to
commit kidnapping, and one count of conspiracy to commit theft by
extortion. For the following reasons, we affirm.

               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            During the summer of 2020, Rohrer was working for a car
dealership owned by TM. Rohrer believed TM kept a large sum of money
in the company safe located in his office at the dealership. Rohrer discussed
with PT, his coworker, a plan to kidnap TM’s son and hold him for a
multimillion-dollar ransom. PT disclosed the conversation to TM who
contacted the FBI. The FBI involved the Mesa Police Department, and PT
agreed to serve as a confidential informant for the FBI.

¶3             PT recorded a series of conversations with Rohrer where they
discussed the details of the kidnapping. These conversations included
discussions about killing the child if the ransom was not received. During
one conversation, PT and Rohrer decided they needed a third person to
help with the kidnapping. The FBI and Mesa Police Department engaged
Mesa Police Detective Francis to work undercover as the third person.
Rohrer obtained easy-to-discard phones, also known as “burner phones,”
for the three conspirators to communicate without ease of tracing. Rohrer
continued to meet with Detective Francis to discuss the kidnapping plan
until Rohrer was arrested at the car dealership on August 26, 2020.

¶4            A year later, as Rohrer’s case was pending trial, PT displayed
a firearm at work in a roughhousing incident with a coworker (“PT’s work
incident”). No employee said they felt threatened and no charges were
brought against PT for the incident. Prior to trial, the State moved in limine
to prevent any testimony regarding the incident, arguing that jurors could
be highly prejudiced against PT based on his display of a weapon at work.
The superior court granted the motion reasoning “the probative value of

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                            STATE v. ROHRER
                            Decision of the Court

the incident [is] outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues and
misleading the jury.”

¶5            At trial, Mesa Police Detective Osborne, the department’s case
agent for the investigation, testified for the State. Detective Osborne was
the department’s case agent for the investigation. He reviewed recordings
of Rohrer and was responsible for making investigative decisions. At trial
Detective Osborne testified to how the recordings of Rohrer impacted his
investigative decisions. Defense counsel objected to much of Detective
Osborne’s testimony on the grounds that Detective Osborne was
improperly giving his opinion about Rohrer’s mental state and that such
testimony was speculative. The superior court overruled the objections.

¶6            Rohrer was convicted and timely appealed. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-
120.21(A), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).

                               DISCUSSION

¶7              “Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not second-guess
a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence.” State v.
Rodriguez, 186 Ariz. 240, 250 (1996).

I.     Preclusion of PT’s Work Incident

¶8               Rohrer argues that the superior court abused its discretion
when it precluded evidence regarding PT’s work incident. Evidence is
relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. Ariz. R. Evid. 401. “The
court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of . . . confusing the issues [or] misleading the jury
. . . .” Ariz. R. Evid. 403.

¶9           Rohrer notes the State relied on Arizona Rule of Evidence
(“Rule”) 404(b) in its motion to preclude PT’s work incident at trial. Rohrer
argues Rule 404(b) applies to evidence of other acts committed by a criminal
defendant and does not apply to witnesses. Regardless of whether Rule
404(b) applies to PT, the evidence is nonetheless subject to a Rule 403
balancing test. See State v. Leteve, 237 Ariz. 516, 522, ¶ 11 (2015). The
superior court found “the probative value of the incident [was] outweighed
by the danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury.”

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                           STATE v. ROHRER
                           Decision of the Court

¶10           Rohrer argues that evidence regarding PT’s work incident is
relevant and not unfairly prejudicial because it shows the bias of the FBI
towards PT. Introducing PT’s work incident could have created confusion
or mislead the jury. The incident happened a year after Rohrer was arrested
and charged, and the facts surrounding it were in dispute. Also, by the time
of the work incident, PT had already been paid for his participation in the
investigation and his primary role in the case was that of a foundational
witness for the introduction of recordings he made during the course of the
investigation.

¶11           At trial Rohrer impeached PT regarding his work for the FBI
in exchange for financial gain and a potential workplace promotion. The
jury also heard testimony that the FBI paid PT for his services, that PT was
known to carry a gun, and that after an incident where PT acted
unprofessionally at his job he chose to leave instead of being demoted to a
sales position. This testimony allowed the jury to decide whether the FBI
was biased in favor of PT and what effect any bias may have had on PT’s
credibility. The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it
precluded evidence about PT’s work incident.

¶12            Rohrer further argues the State opened the door to the need
for evidence about PT’s work incident when it questioned an FBI agent
about the admonitions the FBI gives to confidential informants. A party
opens the door for otherwise improper evidence to be introduced when
“comments made by one party make otherwise irrelevant evidence highly
relevant or require some response or rebuttal.” Pool v. Superior Court, 139
Ariz. 98, 103 (1984); see State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 477 (1986).

¶13           The FBI agent testified that PT was warned he could not
engage in illegal activities just because he was working with the FBI and
that he could not hold himself out as an employee of the federal
government. Rohrer argues that this testimony gave jurors the impression
that PT did not violate the FBI’s admonitions. But the line of questioning
did not delve into whether PT complied with the admonitions, simply that
he was in fact warned. The superior court did not abuse its discretion when
it precluded evidence about PT’s work incident on this basis.

II.   Detective Osborne Testimony

¶14           Rohrer argues that Detective Osborne was impermissibly
allowed to give his opinion as to Rohrer’s state of mind when he testified to
Rohrer’s recordings. Lay testimony may include inferences and opinions
that are “rationally based on the witness’s perception” and “helpful to

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                            STATE v. ROHRER
                            Decision of the Court

clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in
issue.” Ariz. R. Evid. 701; State v. Ayala, 178 Ariz. 385, 387 (App. 1994).

¶15            Rohrer states that the key question in this case was his intent
and that Detective Osborne’s testimony was improper opinion testimony
about Rohrer’s recorded statements. We disagree. Detective Osborne
testified to the effect of Rohrer’s statements on the investigation. This
testimony was helpful to the jury in understanding why the investigation
proceeded in a particular way. Therefore, the superior court did not abuse
its discretion when it allowed Detective Osborne to testify about the
recordings.

                               CONCLUSION

¶16           We affirm.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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