Court Opinion

ID: 9677344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:49:39.294043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:56.240987
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority finds justification for the officers’ entry into the motel room; I do not. The majority and I have no great dispute about the applicable law or the facts of this ease. The application of the law to the facts is our dispute.
We do not disagree that the motel room enjoyed Fourth Amendment protection. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 84 S.Ct. 889, 893, 11 L.Ed.2d 856, 861 (1964) held that: “No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant of a room in a boarding house, [citation omitted], a guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,” citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). See also United States v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d 729 (6th Cir.1977). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Moberg v. State, 810 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), recognized the holding of Stoner concerning the status of a hotel guest and reaffirmed the earlier holding of Tarwater v. State, 160 Tex.Crim. 59, 267 S.W.2d 410 (1954), that same was true under Tex. Const., art. I, § 9.
We do not disagree that absent exigent circumstances, police officers may not enter an individual’s home or lodging to effect a warrantless arrest or search. United States *417v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1161 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061, 105 S.Ct. 2126, 85 L.Ed.2d 490 (1985), citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980).
We do not disagree that the burden of justifying a warrantless entry into a private home or motel room is upon the Government, Killebrew, 560 F.2d at 733, citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 193, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948).
We do not disagree that the initial intrusion must be proper, in other words, that the police have a right to be where they are when the discovery is made. State v. Haley, 811 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), recognizing the rule of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583 (1971).
Some courts have called the majority’s justification the cursory safety check exception. To satisfy the cursory safety check exception the government must show that there was a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger. Morgan, 743 F.2d at 1162, citing United States v. Kolodziej, 706 F.2d 590 (5th Cir.1983), quoting United States v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917, 96 S.Ct. 1119, 47 L.Ed.2d 322 (1976). Smith, 515 F.2d at 1031, says courts will strictly scrutinize such alleged precautionary searches to insure there exists a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger.
Kolodziej was a case which found no justifiable cursory safety check. The court stated an officer must have reasonable grounds to believe that there are other persons present inside who might present a security risk, citing United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1071 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 1617, 71 L.Ed.2d 852 (1982), overruled on other grounds in United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.1992). It acknowledged what are reasonable grounds is no easy question. It held a cursory safety check is permissible when the circumstances provide, at the least, probable cause to believe that a serious threat to safety is presented, citing United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 418 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983, 97 S.Ct. 1679, 52. L.Ed.2d 377 (1977).
In Killebrew, 560 F.2d at 729, the police were notified by the motel clerk that a man had a gun in a room. The police went to the room and knocked on the door. The guest unlocked the door and stepped into the hallway. When asked for identification the guest walked back into the room and the officer followed “five or six” feet into the room where he saw the gun laying on the bed. The court said the critical time as of which the Fourth Amendment question must be determined is the moment of the warrants less entry by the officers into the motel room. Id. at 733. At that time the officer only knew the occupant had a gun. There was no evidence the occupant was known to be dangerous. The court held the entry violated the Fourth Amendment.
Mitchell v. State, 756 S.W.2d 71, 75 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1988, no pet.), discussed the cursory safety check, citing Kolodziej. The court held an invalid check under these facts. Officers went to a residence and used a loudspeaker to order the occupants from the house. Mitchell and two others came outside. Mitchell was arrested for unauthorized use of a vehicle. Mitchell asked one of the other occupants, Wilkins, to lock the front door of the house. An officer stated he was going to accompany Wilkins. The officer testified he had no knowledge of Wilkins, but had arrested Mitchell for possession of a weapon and had been told Mitchell kept firearms in the home. The officer testified he was concerned that if Wilkins went into the house unescorted, he might come out with a firearm. Wilkins went into the home and the officers stepped inside the front door. Once inside they detected the odor of marijuana and noticed drug paraphernalia on the floor. The court held there was no serious threat to the officers’ safety, citing Morgan, 743 F.2d at 1158, and reversed the conviction.
A case cited by the majority, Worthey v. State, 805 S.W.2d 435, 439 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), is factually distinguishable. After being told not to move, appellant made a sudden move which obstructed the officer’s view of her hand and purse. Based upon this, the court found “a specific articulable suspicion” *418to fear appellant could be armed and dangerous.
At the motion to suppress hearing Officer Callesto testified he could only see a corner of the bed from outside the motel room. It was only when they were about three or four feet in the doorway that they could observe the entire bed. As to Sharon Patterson: “She had crossed over and went into the bathroom while we were talking to Mr. Watson”, “He stepped back a couple of feet ... When he stepped back and Sharon went into the bathroom, I stepped in approximately three to four feet. I told her that she needed to step out of the bathroom, just for our safety, so we could talk to everybody in the room.” When questioned by the prosecutor whether Sharon Patterson or Tony Watson made any attempt to bar their entry, Officer Callesto testified they did not. Officer Ross testified he went into the room “to clear out the room.”
At the conclusion of the motion to suppress hearing the state’s argument was: “The officers had a right to proceed to the room. No effort was made to bar the entry by the defendant or Sharon Patterson. When they saw the crack pipe, they had authority to arrest....” The court, in ruling, stated: “And upon knocking on the door of the room, the defendant answered the knock and answered that he was not Mr. Burrows and made no attempt to keep the officers out of the room.... After entering the room, the officers noticed a pipe on the bed_” It is apparent both the trial prosecutor and the trial judge placed major emphasis on Watson’s failure to bar or somehow deny the officers’ entry into the room. However, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 643, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 802 (1968), held that simple acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority • is not consent. Thus, consent is not an issue in this entry.
The state, in its brief, does not even address the cursory safety check exception. It treats the officers’ entry in the room thusly: “Officers Collesto and Ross had authority to enter that room because they had reason to believe Jim Burrows who had rented the room would be there. Payton v. New York [citation omitted]. Once justifiably in the room Officers [sic] immediately saw drug paraphernalia.”
The record is completely amazingly silent as to any objective facts from which Officer Collesto concluded he needed to enter the room for his safety. Both Watson and Patterson were unknown to him. Unlike Kille-brew, he had no information concerning weapons in the room. At the time the officers entered the room, Ms. Patterson’s movements were not in themselves threatening nor in violation of any order or request by the officers, e.g. Worthey, 805 S.W.2d at 435. Under Officer Collesto’s and the majority’s logic, any time an officer saw an individual move inside a house or room, however innocent that movement might be, the officer would be authorized to enter.
An insightful case is Riddick v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), the companion case to Payton v. New York. In Riddick the officers went to his house to arrest him, without a warrant, for two robberies. They knocked on the door and it was opened by Riddick’s 3-year-old son. The officers saw Riddick sitting in bed. They entered the house, arrested Riddick and in a search for weapons, opened a chest of drawers two feet from the bed where they found drug paraphernalia. In discussing Riddick’s case, the court noted the police entered before Riddick had an opportunity either to object or to consent. 445 U.S. at 583, 100 S.Ct. at 1378, 63 L.Ed.2d at 649. The court noted “the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed’ ”, 445 U.S. at 585, 100 S.Ct. at 1379, 63 L.Ed.2d at 650, citing United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2135, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). The court stated, “... the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S.Ct. at 1382, 63 L.Ed.2d at 653. The court held the entry was prohibited.
The Fourth Amendment is not a hollow statement that must give way simply to claimed officer safety. I do not intend to minimize the danger officers face each and *419every time they encounter unknown individuals in unknown places. However, precedent requires this court to strictly scrutinize such alleged precautionary searches to insure there exists a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger. Moreover, as noted in Riddick, the entrance to a home or motel room is an important threshold. In this ease, the record does not reveal any exigent circumstances which rise to the level of serious and demonstrable potentially for danger.
Consequently, I would hold the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress and reverse and remand for a new trial.