Court Opinion

ID: 9926371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 17:05:29.168667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:44.030349
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                      No. 23-1940
                                Filed January 24, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF C.A.,
Minor Child,

F.M., Mother,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

         Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Carrie K. Bryner,

District Associate Judge.

         A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her third daughter.

AFFIRMED.

         Robert W. Davison, Cedar Rapids, for appellant mother.

         Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

         Robin O’Brien-Licht, Cedar Rapids, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor

child.

         Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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TABOR, Presiding Judge.

      A mother, Fawn, contests the termination of her parental rights to her

daughter, C.A., born in March 2023. We recently affirmed the termination of her

parental rights to two older daughters: A.M.-A., born in December 2020, and B.A.,

born in February 2022. See In re A.M.-A., No. 23-1381, 2023 WL 7391827, at *1

(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2023). In this appeal, Fawn challenges the grounds for

termination of her rights to C.A. and contends that the juvenile court should have

preserved their relationship because of her bond with C.A. After our independent

evaluation of the facts, we reach the same conclusion as the juvenile court.1

Fawn’s struggles with substance use, mental health, and instability prevent

reunification with C.A. So we affirm.

   I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

      The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services had been working with

this family for more than one year before C.A. was born. In February 2022, the

department responded to reports that B.A., then a newborn, and her older sister

A.M.-A. were malnourished. The juvenile court removed those girls from parental

care in March 2022 and adjudicated them as children in need of assistance (CINA).

The case plan directed the parents, Fawn and Carl, to be evaluated for any

substance-use and mental-health issues and follow through with recommended

treatment. The department also expected them to complete parenting classes,

1 We review termination proceedings de novo.    In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313
(Iowa 2022). We respect the juvenile court’s factual findings, but they do not
dictate our result. Id. The State must prove the grounds for termination by clear
and convincing evidence. Id. Our primary concern is the best interests of the child.
In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Iowa 2014).
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attend visits with their children, and find suitable housing. As we wrote in our

previous decision quoting from the juvenile court, “the parents’ ‘engagement in

services seemed to ebb and flow.’” Id. They were slow in securing the evaluations.

Their visits were inconsistent at first. They lacked stable housing. And they

skipped many drug-testing appointments. And most concerning, both parents

tested positive for methamphetamine six times between January and May 2023.

The court terminated the parents’ rights to A.M.-A. and B.A. in August 2023.

       Meanwhile the department removed C.A. from parental custody one day

after her birth.2 She was placed with her sisters in the home of an aunt and uncle,

where all three have remained in family foster care. Because the parents made

little progress toward the case plan goals after losing custody of their two older

daughters, the State petitioned to terminate their rights to C.A. in September 2023.

       Both parents attended the November 2023 termination hearing, but neither

testified. The State presented testimony from a family support worker and the

department case manager. At the end of the hearing, C.A.’s guardian ad litem

recommended termination of parental rights so that the child could be adopted by

her aunt and uncle. The juvenile court granted the State’s termination petition.

Only Fawn appeals.

   II. Analysis

       We analyze this termination case in three steps. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d

703, 706–07 (Iowa 2010). First, we decide whether the State proved any ground

for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2023). Second, we apply the

2 The court adjudicated C.A. as a CINA in August 2023.
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best-interests framework in section 232.116(2).       Id.   Third, if that framework

supports the State’s petition, we check whether any factors in section 232.116(3)

should nevertheless preclude termination. Id.

       A.     Grounds for Termination

       The State petitioned to terminate Fawn’s parental rights under section

232.116(1), paragraphs (g), (h), and (l). The juvenile court decided the State

satisfied the elements of paragraphs (g) and (h) but not (l). When the court

terminates rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm on any ground

supported by the record. In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012).

       Here, we focus on paragraph (g), which requires proof of these elements:

(1) C.A. has been adjudicated as a CINA under section 232.96; (2) the court

terminated parental rights under section 232.117 with respect to other children in

the same family; (3) there is clear and convincing evidence that Fawn “continues

to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which would correct the

situation”; and (4) “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that an additional

period of rehabilitation would not correct the situation.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(g).

Elements one and two are undisputed. At issue are elements three and four.

       Fawn contends that she responded to services aimed at correcting the

situation that led to losing custody of her older daughters.3 She asserts that there

are “minimal safety concerns” regarding her care of C.A. She insists that her

3 The State contests error preservation, maintaining that Fawn did not challenge

this issue at the termination hearing and has not argued it with enough detail in her
petition on appeal. We assume without deciding that the issue is properly before
us and proceed to the merits.
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current housing would be a safe environment for C.A.          She also notes her

participation in “drug testing and treatment.”

       Granted, the family support worker testified that she had no concerns about

Fawn’s supervised interactions with C.A. But other worries remained. After Fawn

and Carl secured an apartment in June 2023, the worker was uncomfortable

having visits there because they had a roommate who had not been approved by

the department.     The parents—who both worked at fast food restaurants—

struggled with their finances and had their power cut off three times for not paying

their utility bill. One month before the termination hearing, Carl commented that

he would have to start living in his car. The department offered the parents

budgeting tips during the first CINA case, but they did not seek help in that area

as the second case progressed.

       Beyond her housing instability, Fawn refused to engage in any mental-

health services. She told the department that she didn’t need professional help

and could “just use her mom as her counselor.”

       And most concerning, Fawn did not fully address her substance-use issues.

Even after the termination hearing for A.M.-A. and B.A. in May 2023, Fawn tested

positive for methamphetamine in June. And she continued to test positive for

marijuana in September and October. Plus, Fawn missed eight scheduled drug

tests during this CINA case. We presume that such missed tests would have been

positive for illegal substances. See In re R.A., No. 21-0746, 2021 WL 4891011, at

*1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2021). True, Fawn finished an outpatient program in

September 2023. But the counselor described her participation as doing “the

minimum required” for substantial completion.
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          On this record, we find that the State offered clear and convincing evidence

to satisfy the elements of paragraph (g).         Fawn continued with a lackluster

response to the offered services. And the evidence did not show that more time

for rehabilitation would correct the situation.

          B.    Best Interests of the Child

          In her petition on appeal, Fawn argues that termination is not in C.A.’s best

interests. But her appellate counsel conflates the framework for deciding what is

in a child’s best interests in section 232.116(2) with the exceptions to termination

in section 232.116(3)(c). While this briefing mistake is common, it muddles the

burdens of proof. It is the State’s burden to prove termination is in a child’s best

interests. See In re R.P., No. 23-0419, 2023 WL 3612412, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

May 24, 2023). But our supreme court has held that the burden shifts to the parent

resisting termination to prove that one of the exceptions in subsection (3) applies.

In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Iowa 2021).

          In assessing best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child’s

safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of

the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the

child.”    In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2)). We also consider C.A.’s integration into her foster home with her

sisters. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b). The case manager testified that C.A.

had a close bond with her sisters and found comfort in the care of her aunt and

uncle. Given the continued drug use and instability in Fawn’s life, we find the State

proved that termination is in C.A.’s best interests.
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      C.     Closeness of Parent-Child Bond

      As the last step, we turn to Fawn’s argument that termination would harm

C.A. because of “the closeness of the parent-child relationship.”          See id.

§ 232.116(3)(c). Fawn maintains that the juvenile court order is “very sparse” in

addressing their bond. But that’s as far as her argument goes. Her bare-bones

briefing does not reveal “why” she disagrees with the court order.4

      But assuming the issue is properly before us, we find little evidence to show

C.A.’s relationship with Fawn is so close that termination would harm the child.

C.A. has never lived with her mother. Her main attachment is to her aunt and

sisters. Any bond Fawn may share with C.A. is not enough to preclude termination

because the mother has not made enough progress with her substance-use and

mental-health issues to ensure that the child would be raised in a safe

environment. See In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 475 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011).

      AFFIRMED.

4 We recognize termination appeals are expedited. See In re J.A.D.-F., 776
N.W.2d 879, 883 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). But the petitioner must “state what findings
of fact or conclusions of law the district court made with which you disagree and
why, generally referencing a particular part of the record, witnesses’ testimony, or
exhibits that support your position on appeal.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.1401–Form 5
(emphasis added).