Court Opinion

ID: 9608293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:09:04.625296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:44.955694
License: Public Domain

GRANT, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part,
I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the judgments on liability and damages. I dissent from the reversal on apportionment of fault. The majority states no legal principle which was violated by the verdict. Further, the majority offers no standard by which trial judges in future cases are to be guided or to instruct juries.
I believe the majority is substituting its view of the evidence for that of the jury and of the trial court. This is not the proper role of an appellate court. The statute and prior ease law provide no formula for comparison of fault, nor does the majority opinion. Some of the factors the fact finder may consider in determining percentages of responsibility are: 1) contribution to causation; 2) culpability of conduct — the degree of departure from the applicable legal standard; 3) relative timing of the conduct; and 4) the responsibility to avoid harm. The third factor subsumes the former doctrine of “last clear chance” into the comparative negligence scheme. The fact finder may consider relative timing in allocating responsibility for harm. The fourth factor for the fact finder to consider is responsibility to avoid harm.
The jury gets to weigh the responsibility of foresight and avoidance as factors in allocating relative degrees of fault. See, Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 183 Ariz. 399, 402, 904 P.2d 861, 864 (1995). We have recognized that the general good of the present version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCATA”) is to make each tortfeasor responsible for only its share of fault. Id. at 405, 904 P.2d at 867. Jimenez supports the idea that the prohibition against damage limitations is not violated by making concurrent “last clear chance” a comparative, rather than an absolute defense. The change essentially regulates responsibility for cause rather than limiting the damages recoverable. Therefore it was proper for the fact finder to weigh the operator’s responsibility for foresight and avoidance.
The majority ignores factors three and four. The murderer’s culpability is enormous, the operator’s is slight. He committed deliberate homicide; she misjudged the severity of the call. And when it comes to contribution to causation, at first blush, the imbalance again weighs heavily toward the murderer. When you add relative timing into the picture, however, the balance starts to shift. The operator has notice of a potentially imminent harm and a chance to avoid it. This is a proper factor for the fact finder to weigh. It is also proper for the fact finder to weigh the operator’s responsibility for foresight and avoidance. It enters into the weighing of relative degrees of fault.
As for who gets to do the weighing, this is uniquely a jury issue. An appellate court has no special sensors which equip it to do a better job of allocating fault. The court should be very reluctant to compare the actions of an intentional tortfeasor with the responsibility of a negligent tortfeasor (having not only the duties of foresight, avoidance and notice, but also, an arguable chance to avoid the harm), and to then declare that the jury got the balance among those intangible factors wrong.
The majority gives enormous weight to comparative culpability. The jury gave *198greater weight to comparative responsibility for avoidance. The majority holds that the jury’s apportionment of fault is not supported by the evidence, stating: “[T]he evidence does not justify a verdict that the 911 operator was three times as much at fault for the wrongful deaths of Plaintiffs’ decedents as Gardner, who intentionally shot and killed Plaintiffs’ decedents.” ante p. 187, 933 P.2d p. 1255. This is an erroneous analysis because the 911 operator is neither a party nor a defendant in this case. The defendant is the City of Phoenix, a municipal corporation, which is solely responsible for maintaining the 911 system.
The majority’s view does not explain why a seasoned trial judge, who also heard the evidence, denied the City’s Motions for New Trial, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for Remittitur.
The majority is analyzing this appeal with an improper standard of review. Although the majority gives lip service to the requirement of law that an appellate court must view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment, McFarlin v. Hall, 127 Ariz. 220, 224, 619 P.2d 729, 733 (1980), it then proceeds to reweigh the evidence. As the majority states: “We have heard the tape of Burt’s 911 call; all voices on it sound relatively calm and controlled.” That is not a decision or finding of fact for an appellate court to make. As the majority admits, one of the jury’s duties is to “determine and apportion” the “relative degrees of fault of the respective parties and any non-parties at fault.” A.R.S. section 12-2506(0 (Supp.1993). Again, the majority keeps referring to the fault of the 911 operator as though she were a defendant in this case.
The majority states that the apportionment of fault “is unjustified by the evidence and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the City’s motion for new trial on apportionment of fault.” This is not a legal analysis of an appellate issue; but rather the majority substituting its judgment for that of the jury and the trial court. The majority states it is our duty to set aside a verdict when the record contains no evidence to justify it. Spain v. Griffith, 42 Ariz. 304, 307, 25 P.2d 551, 552 (1933). No appellate court reviewing the evidence presented in this case could determine that no evidence supported the apportionment of fault.
We are all well aware that our society is rife with violent crime and domestic violence. We are well aware that the criminally insane exist and are an ever-present danger to everyone. Our only buffer for our well-being and safety is our law enforcement agencies and officers. Through their often heroic and always under-appreciated efforts, many more lives are saved than we can ever even know, let alone count. However, the comfort we take in our law enforcement agencies’ ability to protect us is only as well-grounded as our ability to quickly access competent law enforcement when an emergency arises, or when we are confronted with danger. Without the 911 system, our ability to quickly access law enforcement would be rendered impotent and the public would be left unprotected in this type of circumstance. Crime and criminal insanity will never disappear; therefore, the efficiency and accuracy of the 911 system is crucial. For these reasons, I cannot say that on this record, the trial court abused its discretion by finding that both the verdict and the apportionment of fault were supported by the evidence. Furthermore, the majority opinion cites nothing in this record that supports a contrary conclusion.
The standard of review for this issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining whether the verdict was supported by the evidence.
It is a well-settled rule of law that the granting of a new trial is largely within the discretion of the court, and that the appellate court will not disturb the ruling except for an abuse of discretion. The discretion in this sense is a legal discretion, based on reason and law. Where the showing for a new trial is insufficient both in form and substance there is no discretion to be exercised.
(citations omitted) Mayo v. Ephrom, 84 Ariz. 169, 172, 325 P.2d 814, 816 (1958).
*199In Mayo v. Ephrom, the trial court granted remittitur; plaintiffs did not remit and the trial court granted a new trial on the ground that the verdict was excessive as the result of the passion and prejudice of the jury. Id. Arizona has also long recognized that verdicts which are shockingly large or small may be the result of something other than passion and prejudice. Waqui v. Tanner Bros. Contracting Co., Inc., 121 Ariz. 323, 327, 589 P.2d 1355, 1359 (App.1979). This same reasoning must also apply to apportionment of fault.
The greatest possible discretion is given to the trial court with respect to the alteration of the verdict ... because, like the jury, it has had the opportunity to hear the evidence and observe the demeanor of witnesses.
Mammo v. State, 138 Ariz. 528, 533-34, 675 P.2d 1347, 1352-53 (App.1983). This court should give the greatest possible discretion to the trial court concerning its refusal to alter the verdict.
If any substantial evidence could lead reasonable persons to find ultimate facts sufficient to support the verdict, we will affirm the judgment. Styles v. Ceranski, M.D., Ltd., 185 Ariz. 448, 450-51, 916 P.2d 1164, 1167 (App.1996); see also A.R. Teeters & Assoc., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 172 Ariz. 324, 328, 836 P.2d 1034, 1038 (App.1992) (sufficiency of evidence presented at trial is reviewed only to determine if substantial evidence exists in the record to support the trial court’s judgment).
The Plaintiffs have presented substantial evidence to support the jury’s apportionment of fault. Their evidence shows the City: (1) failed to assign the appropriate priority to the victim’s 911 call, (2) did not forward the supplemental dispatch card which had critical information to the police radio dispatcher, and (3) induced the victim to remain in the apartment in reliance on the operator’s assurance of prompt police response at that location.
The 911 operators categorize incoming calls by priority of response needed for the situation. In general, the higher the priority, the more rapid the response time. Priority 1 is the highest priority. While the City provides guidelines for determining the priority of 911 calls, the operator also must use his or her judgment in making a determination as to the appropriate priority for each call. The operators receive extensive training from the City to enable them to do this.
Priority 1, or “hot calls,” are those which indicate a crime is in progress or a crime has just occurred. According to the City’s policy, incoming calls are Priority 1 if they are of a serious nature or someone is in immediate, personal danger. Domestic violence calls are Priority 1, according to the City’s policy, if there is an assault in progress or weapons are involved, such as when one spouse/person is hitting, beating, striking, or harming the victim in any physical manner.
Priority 2 calls involve crimes of an urgent, but not life-threatening, nature. In the domestic violence context, a Priority 2 designation is justified when no physical abuse is occurring, but there is an argument or verbal disagreement.
Finally, Priority 3 is an appropriate designation if the caller is reporting a crime after the fact. Service calls, such as the recovery of stolen property, are also Priority 3. The City’s policy is that domestic violence calls must never be entered as Priority 3.
Here, the 911 operator rated the victim’s call as Priority 3. The jury may have reasonably inferred that domestic violence precipitated the victim’s 911 call because she explained to the operator in great detail the nature and recency of the killer’s threats and the interrelationships between the killer, the other victim and herself. In addition, the victim told the operator a gun was present at the scene. From the tape of the call and the testimony of the witnesses, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the crime of threatening and intimidating had been ongoing and was currently in progress, thereby requiring a heightened priority. Therefore, substantial evidence existed to support a determination by the jury that the City, *200through its operator, was negligent in not assigning the call a higher priority. Moreover, the jury could have determined that the City failed to comply with its own domestic violence policy and that, but for the City’s negligence, the police could have prevented the deaths of the two victims.
The City’s policy also requires that 911 operators place a completed supplemental dispatch card on a conveyor belt which transfers it to the police radio dispatch. The supplemental dispatch card contains information relating to the call which the 911 operator cannot enter into the computer because of space limitations. Here, the operator had written on the card: “complainant said her new boyfriend threatened, that is 236, to shoot ex if he did any damage.” The reference to 236 is the police code for a threat. The operator admits she failed to place the card on the conveyor belt after completing the call with the victim. The operator also admits it was a “mistake” not to put the supplemental dispatch card on the conveyor belt. It is reasonable, therefore, for the jury to infer that the officer dispatched to the scene needed to know, for his own safety and the safety of others, that a threat was in progress and a weapon was present.
There is sufficient evidence of one other error in judgment by the operator which also affirms the jury’s apportionment of fault. The operator verified with precision the exact address of the victims. Then, the operator said: “We’ll send an officer out there ... if he happens to show up at the apartment before the officers first do, just call us back right away, okay?” A jury could have reasonably inferred that by telling the victim that the City would send a police officer to meet her at the apartment, the operator was telling the victim to stay put and wait for the officer. This was said in spite of the fact that the victim told the operator that the killer lived less than five minutes away. Therefore, a jury could have reasonably determined that the victim relied on the City’s promise to provide prompt police protection, after being told to wait at the apartment.
UCATA had the twofold purpose of effectively abolishing the common law doctrines of contributory negligence and joint and several liability, and replacing them with the statutorily defined concept of pure comparative fault. A.R.S. sections 12-2501-2506 (Supp. 1993). The practical effect of UCATA was to remove the harsh results of the contributory negligence defenses, which permitted a negligent defendant to escape liability if there was contemporaneous negligence by the plaintiff, no matter how negligible. UCATA also abolished joint and, several liability among tortfeasors and provided for the apportionment of damages according to the degree of relative fault. Here, the majority remands for a new trial, and a new outcome, on the question of apportionment of fault because the 75% apportionment of fault to the City appears to the majority to be contrary to the legislative intent of the comparative fault statute. Unfortunately, the majority fails to make the necessary interpretation of the statute to explain its view that a different outcome is mandated by the statute. The majority simply substitutes its view of the evidence for that of the jury and the trial court, without setting forth any legal stam dard for doing so.
A.R.S. section 12 — 2506(F)(2) defines fault as:
“an actionable breach of legal duty, act or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including negligence in all of its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a product, products liability and misuse, modification or abuse of a product.”
The majority states, “given the broad definition of fault in section 12 — 2506(F)(2), and the clear directive in section 12 — 2506(B) to compare all fault, we conclude that the Arizona comparative fault statutes should be interpreted as requiring comparison of all types of fault, including intentional wrongdoing.” ante p. 192, 933 P.2d p. 1260 (emphasis in original). Although I agree with this statement by the majority, from a jurisprudential perspective, I am concerned about *201the ability of the trier of fact to apportion fault between intentional and negligent tortfeasors because such misconduct is both different in “degree” and in “kind.” See B. Scott Andrews, Premises Liability — The Comparison of Fault Between Negligent and Intentional Actors, 55 La.L.Rev. 1149 (1995); Jordan M. Leibman, Comparative Contribution and Intentional Torts: A Remaining Roadblock to Damages Apportionment^ 30 Am.Bus.L.J. 677 (1993). Undoubtedly, this same concern has led the majority to substitute its judgment for that of the jury and the trial court. I agree with the majority that because the legislature has effectively abolished joint and several liability, thereby prohibiting one tortfeasor from seeking contribution from another, we are left with no alternative but to conclude that all “degrees and kinds” of tortious conduct fall under this statute.
The jury heard the evidence and apportioned 75% of the fault to the City because of its negligence in providing and operating the 911 service, and apportioned 25% of the fault to the subsequent intentional acts of the killer. The jury’s apportionment of fault is justified by the evidence presented in this case because the victims’ harm occurred within the scope of the protection extended to them by the City.
In Styles, the jury held Dr. Ceranski solely at fault for medical negligence to Styles and awarded Styles four million dollars in damages. Styles, 185 Ariz. at 449-50, 916 P.2d at 1166. The jury assigned no fault to the co-defendant, Dr. Szokol. Id. This court reversed because there was no evidentiary support for a verdict that Dr. Ceranski was at fault but Dr. Szokol was not. Id. The issues and verdict were impacted by the trial court’s error in allowing three of Styles’ damage witnesses to become standard of care witnesses as well. The ease was remanded for a new trial on both the liability and damages issues. Id. at 454, 916 P.2d at 1170. In Styles, we held the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial will be reversed only if it reflects a manifest abuse of discretion given the record and circumstances of the case. Id. at 450, 916 P.2d at 1166 (citing Blakely Oil, Inc. v. Wells Trackways, Ltd., 83 Ariz. 274, 278, 320 P.2d 464, 466 (1958)). The majority fails to demonstrate a manifest abuse of discretion in the record and circumstances of this case. The majority substitutes its view of the evidence for that of the jury and the trial judge, all of whom actually saw and heard the testimony and measured the credibility of each witness. Unlike in Styles, in this case the jury did not ignore the applicable comparative fault law; the jury apportioned fault between the defendants. The majority opinion is based on its disapproval of the jury’s apportionment of fault. The standard of review applied by the majority is improper and incorrect as to this issue. See Mammo v. State, 138 Ariz. 528, 532, 675 P.2d 1347, 1351 (App.1983).
I cannot say that a seasoned trial judge, who heard the evidence and denied the City’s Motions for New Trial, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, and for Remittitur, abused his discretion in determining that the facts supported this verdict, including the apportionment of fault. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment in all respects.