Court Opinion

ID: 9961904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-20 21:00:49.249423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:12.044955
License: Public Domain

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                                              PUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 23-1902

        CHRISTINE GIBBONS,

                    Plaintiff – Appellee,

        v.

        BETTY ANN GIBBS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Lynchburg Electoral
        Board, and in her personal capacity; STEVEN TROXEL, in his official capacity as Vice
        Chair of the Lynchburg Electoral Board, and in his personal capacity,

                    Defendants – Appellants,

        and

        THE ELECTORAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG,

                    Defendant.

                                               No. 23-2254

        CHRISTINE GIBBONS,

                    Plaintiff – Appellee,

        v.

        BETTY ANN GIBBS, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Lynchburg Electoral
        Board, and in her personal capacity; STEVEN TROXEL, in his official capacity as Vice
        Chair of the Lynchburg Electoral Board, and in his personal capacity,

                    Defendants – Appellants,
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        and

        THE ELECTORAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG,

                     Defendant.

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
        Lynchburg. Robert S. Ballou, District Court Judge. (6:23-cv-00035-RSB; 6:23-cv-00035-
        RSB-CKM)

        Argued: March 22, 2024                                           Decided: April 19, 2024

        Before QUATTLEBAUM and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and M. Hannah LAUCK,
        United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

        Orders affirmed by published opinion. Judge Heytens wrote the opinion, which Judge
        Quattlebaum and Judge Lauck joined.

        ARGUED: David Patrick Corrigan, HARMAN CLAYTOR CORRIGAN & WELLMAN,
        Glen Allen, Virginia, for Appellants. Stephen B. Pershing, KALIJARVI, CHUZI,
        NEWMAN & FITCH, P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Maurice S.
        Fisher, Jr., Blaire H. O’Brien, HARMAN CLAYTOR CORRIGAN & WELLMAN,
        Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants.

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        TOBY HEYTENS, Circuit Judge:

                 When a panel of this Court decides a legal issue in a published opinion, that ruling

        is binding on all future panels and district courts within this circuit unless it is abrogated

        by the Supreme Court or by an en banc decision of this Court. That rule does not disappear

        just because a future litigant identifies a fact, theory, or line of argument the previous panel

        could have but did not consider. Applying those principles here, we affirm the district

        court’s denial of the appellants’ motions to dismiss.

                                                        I.

                 This case involves the appointment of a general registrar of elections in Lynchburg,

        Virginia. Under Virginia law, elections are overseen locally by three-member electoral

        boards consisting of one Democrat, one Republican, and one member of the party of the

        sitting governor. Va. Code § 24.2-106(A). Each board appoints a general registrar. § 24.2-

        110. Boards may remove registrars who “fail to . . . maintain certification” or “fail[ ] to

        discharge the duties of [their] office.” § 24.2-109(A)(i). Registrars may not, however, be

        removed because of their political affiliation—nor may a board “fail[ ] to reappoint” an

        incumbent registrar on such a basis. McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319, 1322 (4th Cir.

        1987).

                 Plaintiff Christine Gibbons was appointed as registrar in 2018. The board that

        appointed Gibbons included two Democrats and one Republican, but the vote was

        unanimous.

                 Gibbons’ most recent term expired in 2023. At that point, the board had two

        Republican members and one Democratic member. Before Gibbons’ term expired, the

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        board told her it would be accepting applications for her position and that she would have

        to reapply if she wanted to be considered. Gibbons reapplied, but the two Republican

        members voted to appoint a different candidate who was a registered Republican.

               Gibbons responded by suing the board and its two Republican members, alleging

        the decision not to reappoint her was based on her political affiliation and violated the First

        Amendment. As relief, Gibbons sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, money

        damages, and attorneys’ fees.

               The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in two motions that—read

        together—asserted that sovereign immunity barred all of Gibbons’ claims. The district

        court agreed in part and disagreed in part. The court dismissed Gibbons’ claims against the

        board itself as barred by sovereign immunity, and Gibbons has not appealed that ruling.

        But the court denied the individual board members’ motions to dismiss in two orders,

        concluding that the board members could be sued for equitable relief in their official

        capacities and for damages in their personal capacities.

               The board members appealed both orders, and we consolidated the appeals. We

        have jurisdiction over the board members’ appeals under the collateral order doctrine.

        See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147

        (1993). “[T]he existence of sovereign immunity is a question of law that we review de

        novo.” Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 192 (4th Cir. 2002).

                                                       II.

               We reject the board members’ argument that sovereign immunity bars Gibbons’

        claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against them in their official capacities. True,

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        “[s]uits against state officials in their official capacity” are “treated as suits against the

        State” and are thus barred by sovereign immunity to the extent that they seek monetary

        relief. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). But there is also a well-settled corollary—

        associated with Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)—that allows suits “for declaratory

        or injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities.” Reed v. Goertz,

        598 U.S. 230, 234 (2023).

               The board members contend the Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply here

        because neither of them standing alone had the ability to prevent Gibbons from being

        reappointed as registrar and neither has the unilateral power to reinstate her to that position.

        Instead, the board members say that “[r]einstatement would require that action be taken by

        the Board as a whole.” 23-1902 Appellants Br. 8. The board members cite various decisions

        they claim hold that sovereign immunity applies in such circumstances and urge us to

        follow suit. See 23-1902 Appellants Reply Br. 2 (citing Barnett v. University of N.M. Bd.

        of Regents, 562 Fed. Appx. 692, 693 (10th Cir. 2014); Stewart v. Nottoway Cnty., No. 3:22-

        cv-00635, 2023 WL 4849936, at *8 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2023); Caldwell v. Nottoway Cnty.,

        No. 3:22-cv-00636, 2023 WL 4850156, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2023)).

               We decline the board members’ invitation. The reason is not that we conclude the

        argument is wrong—though we do not conclude it is right, either. Instead, it is because we

        lack the authority to accept the board members’ argument regardless of its merit.

               More than 35 years ago, a published opinion of this Court affirmed a district court’s

        grant of the same relief Gibbons seeks under circumstances materially identical to those

        presented here. There, as here, former Virginia registrars sued individual board members,

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        alleging they had not been reappointed “solely because” of their political affiliation.

        McConnell, 829 F.2d at 1322. There, as here, the former registrars sought injunctive relief

        against the board members in their official capacities. See id. The district court ordered the

        defendants to reinstate the registrars, and this Court affirmed. See id. at 1329. Citing

        Ex parte Young, the Court rejected the notion that “the state’s eleventh amendment

        immunity” prevented the district court from “requiring the” individual board members to

        “rehire” the former registrars. Id. at 1329–30.

               The board members insist McConnell does not control here because the Court’s

        opinion did not discuss “the specific question of whether the Ex parte Young exception

        applies when the authority to act rests entirely with a board as a whole rather than with

        individual members.” 23-1902 Appellants Br. 16. That is both true and irrelevant. Few—

        if any—judicial opinions reflect on and reject every conceivable counterargument, and “the

        rule that one panel cannot overrule” another would be weak tea indeed if all a later panel

        had to do was identify a fact, theory, or argument a previous panel did not address.

        McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 356 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). To be sure, not

        “everything said in a panel opinion binds future panels,” and the line between holding and

        dicta is notoriously elusive. Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2021). But if

        stare decisis means anything, it means a future court lacks the authority to say a previous

        court was wrong about how it resolved the actual legal issue before it. And that is exactly

        what the board members are asking us to do here because—as they acknowledged at oral

        argument—there is no way we could adopt their proposed rule without saying McConnell

        wrongly affirmed the grant of injunctive relief in that case. See Oral Arg. 2:30–3:22.

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               The board members do not identify a “subsequent en banc opinion of this court or a

        superseding contrary decision of the Supreme Court” that abrogates McConnell. United

        States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 2005). They also do not assert that the legal

        framework for appointing and reappointing registrars in Virginia has changed in any

        material way since McConnell was decided. McConnell thus remains binding. And, under

        McConnell, individual members of Virginia electoral boards may be sued in their official

        capacities for equitable relief under Ex parte Young.

                                                      III.

               We also reject the board members’ assertion that Gibbons’ damages claims against

        them are barred by sovereign immunity. Neither the Eleventh Amendment nor the broader

        doctrine of state sovereign immunity it reflects forbids “suits to impose individual and

        personal liability on state officials” under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31

        (quotation marks removed). But the board members insist that Gibbons’ claims for

        damages against them are different because here the Commonwealth of Virginia is the

        “real, substantial party in interest.” 23-2254 Appellants Br. 11 (quotation marks removed).

        That argument fails to convince.

               The board members rely mainly on Martin v. Wood, 772 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2014).

        In Martin, this Court held that a suit alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act by

        state officials “in their individual capacities” was really a suit against the Commonwealth

        of Virginia and was thus barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 193 (emphasis removed).

        The Court reached that conclusion after announcing and applying a five-factor test to

        determine “the real, substantial party in interest.” Id. at 196.

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               So far, so good for the board members. But now comes the problem. Gibbons’ suit

        is not an action under the FLSA—it is a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. And in Adams v.

        Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2018), this Court specifically considered, and specifically

        rejected, the argument that “the Martin factors” “apply to [Section] 1983 claims.” Id. at

        226. The Court explained that the FLSA and Section 1983 are “very different statute[s],”

        and it concluded that applying the Martin factors to Section 1983 claims would stray from

        the Supreme Court’s decision in Hafer and “undermine the very purpose of

        [Section] 1983.” Id.

               The board members note that Adams “is factually distinguishable” from this case.

        23-2254 Appellants Br. 12. Once again, that is true but irrelevant. Faced with an argument

        that it should apply the Martin factors in the case before it, Adams declined to do so, and

        the only reason the Court gave had nothing to do with the facts of Roxanne Adams’

        individual case. Instead, the Adams Court announced and applied a general rule: “[T]he

        Martin factors,” it held, do not “apply to” actions under Section 1983—full stop. 884 F.3d

        at 226. So, once again, principles of stare decisis preclude us from adopting the board

        members’ argument that—contra Adams—the Martin factors really do apply in some

        Section 1983 cases. *

               Finally, the board members cursorily assert that, even under Adams, Gibbons’

        claims are still barred because her complaint fails “to truly distinguish between” her claims

               *
                 The board members assert we “should follow” a post-Adams district court decision
        that applied the Martin factors in analyzing a case under Section 1983. 23-2254 Appellants
        Br. 19 (citing Stewart, 2023 WL 4849936, at *8). For reasons that should be clear by now,
        we may not and do not do so.
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        against the board members in their personal and official capacities. 23-2254 Appellants Br.

        18. We disagree. Fairly read, the complaint makes clear that Gibbons’ request for damages

        from the board members applies only if the board members “are proven at trial to have

        engaged in the violations . . . in their personal capacities,” and that Gibbons seeks to hold

        them liable “as individuals.” 23-1902 JA 21. That is precisely what the Supreme Court’s

        precedent and our own permits. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 28; Adams, 884 F.3d at 25–26.

        Indeed, this Court has stated that “a plaintiff ’s request for compensatory . . . damages” in

        a Section 1983 suit may itself be evidence that a state officer is being sued in their personal

        capacity “since such relief is unavailable in official capacity suits.” Biggs v. Meadows,

        66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995).

                                               *      *       *

               Cases involving the intersection of sovereign immunity, Section 1983, and the

        Ex parte Young doctrine can pose difficult legal questions. But one benefit of stare decisis

        is we need only answer those questions once. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature

        of the Judicial Process 149 (1921) (noting that the “labor of judges would be increased

        almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and

        one could not lay one’s own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid

        by others who had gone before”). The district court’s orders are therefore

                                                                                         AFFIRMED.

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