Court Opinion

ID: 9565286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:18:29.06864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:31.578745
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
specially dissenting.
In addition to joining in the dissent of Justice Brown to this order, and inasmuch as the original opinion in this case is being supplemented by this order, I want to briefly note that I believe the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act should not be considered in connection with matters involving worker’s compensation.
The Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act, § 27-12-101 et seq., W.S.1977, is a law governing an employer-employee relationship. It is involved in this case, and its provisions are affected by the provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, § 1-39-101 et seq., W.S.1977, Cum.Supp. 1984. I believe this to be directly counter to the legislative intention as expressly set forth in the last section of the Wyoming *1147Governmental Claims Act, i.e. § 1-89-119, W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1984, which reads:
“The provisions of this act shall not affect any provision of law, regulation or agreement governing employer-employee relationships.”
Of course, the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act concerns employees of governmental agencies and § 1-39-119 is not intended to apply to the actions of such employees covered by the Act unless there is some other law, regulation or agreement pertaining to the employment relationship. The language of § 1-39-119 cannot be taken to be useless or without meaning or purpose. Every word, clause and sentence of a statute must be given meaning and a statute must be construed so that no part is inoperative or superfluous. Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, Wyo., 651 P.2d 778, 787 (1982); Haddenham v. City of Laramie, Wyo., ,648 P.2d 551, 555 (1982). But, in construing statutes, we must presume that the legislature intended to enact legislation that is reasonable and just. McGuire v. McGuire, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278, 1286, n. 10 (1980); Ramsay Motor Co. v. Wilson, 47 Wyo. 54, 30 P.2d 482, 485, 91 A.L.R. 908 (1934).
It is reasonable and just to assume that the legislature did not want the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act to become entwined with the Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Act, and the legislature said so in § 1-39-119.
In Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Bell, Wyo., 662 P.2d 410 (1983), we held that Bell’s complaint against the University for wrongful discharge should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction inasmuch as the complaint failed to allege the filing of a claim as required by statute. We there commented that § 1-39-119
«* * * ¿063 not serve to except claims which have their genesis in tort even though they arise out of an employment relationship. Instead this section indicates that the provisions of the statute are supplementary to others which may be provided by law, regulation or other agreement relating to employer-employee relationships. If the tort action is brought, and it does arise out of the employment relationship, we conclude that the claims procedure of this statute must be followed.” Id., 662 P.2d at 414-415.
I do not believe this language exempts torts from the provisions of § 1-39-119. Such interpretation would do extreme violence to the ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute. Bell’s discharge from employment by the University did not involve the worker’s compensation law or any other employer-employee law. As indicated in the quoted language from Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Bell, supra, § 1-39-119 makes the provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act supplementary to the provisions of other laws concerning employer-employee relationships. The provisions of the other laws control and the provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act are supplementary to them.
I would grant the petition for rehearing for the purpose of receiving briefs and arguments on the new issues and matters raised in this order and in the dissents thereto.