Court Opinion

ID: 9712505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:55:14.615894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:12.634359
License: Public Domain

CONOVER, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It is readily apparent from this record Fiscus was denied substantive due process of law at her hearing before the school board.
A. Due Process
Our state and federal constitutions require as a minimum standard in any hearing whether before a court or an administrative body that a party whose interests are to be effected thereby be afforded fundamental due process of law. The constitutional guarantee of "due process" is one of broad and comprehensive implications, not readily definable with precision, but including the elements of reasonable notice, opportunity for a fair hearing, and the right to have a court of competent jurisdiction determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence having probative value. Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. (1940), 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399, 409. When rights are so effected that an individual is likely to suffer a grievous loss, due process mandates that minimum procedural safeguards be insured. Dunn v. Jenkins (1978), 268 Ind. 478, 377 N.E.2d 868, 876. In the absence of statute or prior interpretation, due process dictates essential fairness rather than detailed enumeration of procedures to be employed. Jenkins v. Harvey (1977), 174 Ind.App. 67, 367 N.E.2d 1, 2. It is always the duty of trial courts and courts on appeal to see that fundamental rights of due process are not improperly denied. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Dickerhoff (1964), 136 Ind.App. 258, 199 N.E.2d 719, 721. For due process requirements to be satisfied, there must be a fair opportunity to be heard before the matter is finally determined. Town of Walkerton v. New York, C. & St. L.R. Co. (1939), 215 Ind. 206, 18 N.E.2d 799, 803, cert den'd, 308 U.S. 556, 60 S.Ct. 75, 84 L.Ed. 467.
Here, Fiscus's prosecution was carried on by the obviously biased superintendent of schools. While that fact alone did not constitute a denial of due process, a combination of functions in the administrative body is not per se a violation of due process, Guide v. City of Marion (1972), 151 Ind.App. 435, 280 N.E.2d 81, 85, the constitution requires the hearing to be a fair one before a tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards of impartiality. Guido, 280 N.E.2d at 84-85. Whether or not the superintendent brought Fiscus's prosecution to satisfy a personal passion against Fiscus the record does not reveal. What it does reveal is a mockery of justice.
It is obvious from this record all the students who testified at the hearing carried a grudge against this teacher, most because she chastised them for writing obscenities on her van in the dust. Next, although there were some 20 students in the classroom at the time of the incident in question, some of whom were closer to Fiscus at the time than those who testified, only the seven with grudges appeared to testify. Finally, these 10 to 11 year old children were interrogated by the authority figure of a school superintendent who used blatantly leading questions on the prime issue being considered by the school board. These young witnesses' answers consisted of nothing but "uh-hums" and gutteral grunts of affirmance as to whether Fiscus uttered the obscene remark of which she was accused. Those techniques and responses rendered the entire proceeding a mockery of justice and a clear denial of due process. In sum, it was the prosecution testifying, not its young and immature witnesses.
A leading question is one that suggests to the witness the answer desired. Goodman v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 513, 515. The rule against leading questions is intended to prevent the substitution of the prosecutor's language for the thought of the witness as to the material facts in dispute. Webster v. State (1934), 206 Ind. 431, 190 N.E. 52, 54. While leading ques*1144tions on direct examination may be proper where the witness is a young child or a weak-minded adult, such questions must be carefully phrased to elicit coherent testimony and so as not to control the substance of such witness's testimony. Ingram v. State (1984), Ind.App., 463 N.E.2d 483, 485. It is readily apparent no attempt at careful phrasing was made by the prosecuting superintendent. The testimony thus elicited was tainted because it was substantially the testimony of the prosecutor, not the witnesses on a material issue. Because it is tainted, such testimony does not have probative value.
The factfinding process should be free of suspicion or the appearance of impropriety. City of Mishawaka v. Stewart (1974), 261 Ind. 670, 310 N.E.2d 65, 69. Clearly, the factfinding here is not. For these reasons it is clear Fiscus was denied fundamental due process of law. That being so, the proceedings before the school board at issue here are a nullity, in my opinion.
I would reverse, order Fiscus reinstated and made whole as of the date of her discharge.