Court Opinion

ID: 9965898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 18:08:38.164152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:51.607219
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Hignight v. Knepp, 2024-Ohio-1708.]

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                              SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio, ex rel. Stephanea                      Court of Appeals No. L-23-1305
Hignight

       Relator

v.

Linda M. Knepp                                        DECISION AND JUDGMENT

       Respondent                                     Decided: May 3, 2024

                                               *****

       Stephen Szuch, for relator.

       Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
       John A. Borell and Kevin A. Pituch, Assistant Prosecuting
       Attorneys, for respondent.

       Beverly J. Cox, for amicus curiae.

                                               *****
       MAYLE, J.

       {¶ 1} This case is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by

respondent, Judge Linda Knepp, of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile

Division (“juvenile court”), asking us to dismiss the complaint for a writ of prohibition

filed by relator, Stephanea Hignight. Hignight filed this prohibition action to prevent
Judge Knepp from proceeding with a custody action filed by amicus curiae, Jill Hoffman,

because, she claims, Judge Knepp lacks jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). For the following reasons, we grant

Judge Knepp’s motion.

                                I. Background and Facts

       {¶ 2} Hignight and Hoffman were in a romantic relationship that ended sometime

in mid-2020; Hoffman says it ended in “the summer of 2020,” which Hignight pinpoints

as July. While they were together, they fostered two children, Z.H.-H. and M.H.-H, and

decided to adopt them. According to Hoffman, she and Hignight could not adopt the

children because they were unmarried, and would have to wait six months after marrying

to adopt the children, so “[o]n the advice of counsel, . . .” they decided to have Hignight

adopt the children, with Hoffman petitioning for stepparent adoptions after she and

Hignight married. However, they ended their relationship before Z.H.-H.’s adoption was

finalized on August 3, 2020, and M.H.-H.’s was finalized on April 12, 2021. Hignight is

the only parent listed in the children’s adoption decrees, but the decrees show that the

children’s surname includes both Hignight’s last name and Hoffman’s last name, despite

the women ending their relationship before either adoption was final.

       {¶ 3} After Hignight and Hoffman broke up, Hoffman claims that they continued

to coparent the children. She said that Hignight allowed her to have “frequent,

meaningful” parenting time with the children until September 2021, when she filed the

custody action underlying this original action. After that, Hignight “severely limited”

2.
Hoffman’s contact with the children. According to Hignight, however, Hoffman had

“sporadic and infrequent contact” with the children after July 2020, and was “on military

duty” from October 2021 to July 2022.

       {¶ 4} On September 17, 2021, Hignight sent Hoffman a text message telling her

that she and her now-wife, Rachael Varga, “are combining [their] families under one roof

and are looking at homes together in the Ypsi[lanti, Michigan] area.” However,

according to Hignight, she and the children actually moved to Michigan in June 2021.

Hoffman contends that Hignight and the children moved to Michigan in October 2021.

       {¶ 5} On September 22, 2021, five days after receiving that message, Hoffman

filed the underlying custody case, juvenile court case No. 21286267. She asked for

custody of the children, or, alternatively, for parenting time. At some point, the juvenile

court granted Hoffman temporary visitation. The juvenile court case is still pending.

       {¶ 6} Two years later, in August 2023, Hignight and Varga married. Three weeks

after marrying, they filed petitions for a stepparent adoption of each child in the 22nd

Judicial Circuit, Family Division, in Washtenaw County, Michigan. Hoffman moved to

intervene in the Michigan adoption cases, and it appears that these cases remain pending.

       {¶ 7} After filing the Michigan adoption petitions, Hignight filed a motion to stay

the juvenile court proceedings and terminate the temporary visitation orders. Judge

Knepp denied this motion. Hignight has also filed a motion in the juvenile court to

dismiss the custody case based on lack of jurisdiction, which Judge Knepp denied, and an

3.
affidavit of disqualification of Judge Knepp in the Ohio Supreme Court, which Chief

Justice Kennedy denied.

       {¶ 8} A trial on Hoffman’s custody complaint was scheduled for the end of

January 2024, but on December 26, 2023, Hignight filed her prohibition complaint. In it,

she argued that she and the children moved to Michigan in June 2021, so Ohio was not

the children’s home state on September 22, 2021, when Hoffman filed the custody

complaint.1 She also argued that Hoffman was not a “person acting as a parent” due to

her limited contact with the children after July 2020. Thus, the jurisdictional provisions

of the UCCJEA in R.C. 3127.15(A) did not apply, and Judge Knepp did not have subject-

matter jurisdiction over the case.

       {¶ 9} On December 29, 2023, we granted an alternative writ against Judge Knepp

because it appeared from Hignight’s complaint that Judge Knepp lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction over the custody case under the UCCJEA. In that order, we rejected

Hignight’s argument that the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State ex rel. Davis v.

Kennedy, 2023-Ohio-1593, which determined that an Ohio probate court’s jurisdiction

over adoption proceedings is superior to an Ohio juvenile court’s jurisdiction over

parenting-time proceedings, did not apply to a jurisdictional dispute between an Ohio

juvenile court and an out-of-state court. We also dismissed the juvenile court as a

respondent because the court itself cannot sue or be sued.

1
 We discuss the litigants’ factual claims and evidentiary materials in greater detail in our
analysis.

4.
       {¶ 10} Soon after, Hoffman, a nonparty, requested leave to file an amicus curiae

brief, which we granted. In her amicus brief, Hoffman presented evidence supporting her

belief that Judge Knepp has jurisdiction because Hignight and the children lived in Ohio

on September 22, 2021, and showing that Hignight “clearly viewed Ms. Hoffman as a

person acting as a parent of the minor children.” She contends that the facts of the case

make Ohio the children’s home state under the UCCJEA, which gives Judge Knepp

subject-matter jurisdiction over the custody case.

       {¶ 11} On February 5, 2024, Judge Knepp filed her motion for summary

judgment, claiming that Hignight is not entitled to a writ of prohibition. The crux of her

arguments is that Hignight admitted to the fact that Ohio was the children’s home state at

the time Hoffman filed the custody complaint, so she cannot change her mind and claim

that Ohio was not their home state.

       {¶ 12} On February 26, 2024, Hignight filed an opposition to Judge Knepp’s

motion. In it, she argues that parties cannot waive the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction,

so the fact that she challenged Judge Knepp’s subject-matter jurisdiction two years after

the case was filed is of no consequence. She also claims that her former attorney’s

admission in October 2021 that Ohio was the children’s home state, and her statement in

2022 that she moved to Michigan in October 2021, were mistakes that cannot support a

finding of judicial estoppel. She also contends that “facts that could divest jurisdiction

from . . .” Judge Knepp remain to be determined, so summary judgment is not

appropriate.

5.
       {¶ 13} The matter is now decisional.

                                  II. Law and Analysis

       {¶ 14} In her motion, Judge Knepp argues that we should dismiss Hignight’s

complaint because she has failed to show that Judge Knepp patently and unambiguously

lacks jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. While Judge Knepp acknowledges that the parties

cannot consent to a court having subject-matter jurisdiction over a case if that jurisdiction

is otherwise lacking, she contends that Hignight is estopped from claiming that Ohio is

not the children’s home state—which is necessary to confer jurisdiction under the

UCCJEA—because she admitted, through counsel, that Ohio was the children’s home

state at the time Hoffman filed the custody case. Judge Knepp also argues that the

doctrine of judicial estoppel applies because Hignight took a contrary position under oath

at a prior proceeding, which Knepp accepted and applied in reaching her determination

that she has jurisdiction.

       {¶ 15} In her response, Hignight argues that Judge Knepp’s motion is based on

two misstatements, which should not stop her from challenging the juvenile court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction. She contends that her prior attorney made a mistake when

counsel stated at the injunction hearing that Ohio was the children’s home state, and

she—a layperson without knowledge of the legal significance of a child’s “home state”—

should not be held responsible for that mistake. She also claims that her statement at a

different juvenile court hearing that she moved to Michigan in “October of last year”

(i.e., October 2021) was a misstatement; she was referring to when she sold her house in

6.
Toledo, not when she moved to Michigan. Hignight further argues that judicial estoppel

does not apply because challenging the juvenile court’s jurisdiction does not impugn the

court’s integrity. Finally, she argues that genuine issues of material fact remain to be

litigated, i.e., “consideration of facts that could divest jurisdiction from . . .” Judge

Knepp, and that her single misstatement about moving to Michigan in October 2021 is far

outweighed by the evidence she has supplied showing that she moved to Michigan before

Hoffman filed the custody complaint.

                              A. Summary-judgment standard

       {¶ 16} A court can grant a motion for summary judgment only when the moving

party demonstrates:

                (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the

       moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that

       reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is

       adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is

       made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his

       favor.

Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66 (1978); Civ.R. 56(C).

       {¶ 17} The party seeking summary judgment must specifically delineate the basis

upon which the motion is brought and identify those portions of the record that

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio

St.3d 280, 293 (1996); Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112 (1988), syllabus. When a

7.
properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, an adverse party may not rest

on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must respond with specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Civ.R. 56(E); Riley v.

Montgomery, 11 Ohio St.3d 75, 79 (1984). A “material” fact is one that would affect the

outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. Russell v. Interim Personnel,

Inc., 135 Ohio App.3d 301, 304 (6th Dist.1999); Needham v. Provident Bank, 110 Ohio

App.3d 817, 827 (8th Dist.1996), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986).

                    B. Estoppel does not bar Hignight’s arguments.

       {¶ 18} As a preliminary matter, we reject Judge Knepp’s estoppel arguments.

First, she argues that Hignight’s former attorney “conceded” that Ohio was the children’s

home state. While parties to a case may concede facts that, if believed, grant a trial court

jurisdiction, they cannot create subject-matter jurisdiction by any such concession, and a

court cannot be bound by “any agreement, stipulation, or concession from the parties as

to what the law requires.” State ex rel. Steffen v. Myers, 2015-Ohio-2005, ¶ 16, citing

State ex rel. Finkbeiner v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2009-Ohio-3657, ¶ 18; Mullinix v.

Mullinix, 2023-Ohio-1053, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.) (“Parties to an action may not confer

jurisdiction on a court by mutual consent. . . . They may, however, stipulate to facts that

are sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.” (Emphasis sic.)). Whether a statute is

applicable to a case is a legal issue for the court to decide. See Steffen at ¶ 16.

8.
       {¶ 19} Determining if Ohio is a child’s home state requires a court to decide

whether the facts presented by the parties fit the definition of “home state” in R.C.

3127.01(B)(7). This is a legal issue that the court must decide—not a factual issue that

the parties can stipulate to. Here, Hignight’s former attorney conceded a legal conclusion

(i.e., that Ohio was the home state), which is not binding on Judge Knepp and cannot, by

itself, give Judge Knepp jurisdiction that does not otherwise exist. Steffen at ¶ 16;

Mullinix at ¶ 20. Although our conclusion might be different if Hignight’s former

attorney had conceded that the children lived in Ohio at the time of filing—which is a

fact underlying the legal conclusion that Ohio is the home state—that is not the record

before us. As it stands, the former attorney stated a legal conclusion, which cannot

resolve the jurisdictional dispute before us.

       {¶ 20} Further, applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel is not warranted here.

“Judicial estoppel precludes a party from taking a position inconsistent with a position

that it successfully and unequivocally asserted in a prior judicial proceeding.”

Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga Cty. Executive, 2014-Ohio-4650, ¶ 29. It is

intended to prevent a party “‘from abusing the judicial process through cynical

gamesmanship, achieving success on one position, then arguing the opposing to suit an

exigency of the moment.’” Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 2007-Ohio-6442, ¶ 25, quoting

Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 380 (6th Cir.1998). It is an equitable

doctrine that a court has discretion to invoke. Independence at ¶ 29.

9.
       {¶ 21} Assuming that the doctrine of judicial estoppel fits this case, we decline to

apply it. There is no evidence that Hignight’s former attorney told the juvenile court that

Ohio was the children’s home state with some nefarious intent, or that Judge Knepp

relied on the former attorney’s representation to determine that she had jurisdiction. In

fact, in her affidavit, Judge Knepp outlines the factors that she considered in determining

that she has home-state jurisdiction over the custody case, which do not include former

counsel’s representation. Based on the scant evidence regarding these statements and

Hignight’s alleged prior legal position, we do not believe that this is a case in which

judicial estoppel is appropriate.

         C. Hignight has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

       {¶ 22} In her motion, Judge Knepp seeks summary judgment because, she

contends, Hignight is not entitled to a writ of prohibition against her. “The purpose of a

writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction.” State

ex rel. Kerr v. Kelsey, 2019-Ohio-3215, ¶ 5 (6th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Jones v. Suster,

84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73 (1998). To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, a relator must

establish that “(1) [the respondent] is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power,

(2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ will cause

injury for which no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law exists.” State ex

rel. Henry v. McMonagle, 87 Ohio St.3d 543, 544 (2000). However, if the respondent

patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, the relator need not demonstrate that she

lacks an adequate remedy. Davis, 2023-Ohio-1593, at ¶ 10.

10.
       {¶ 23} A writ of prohibition will not issue if the relator has an adequate remedy in

the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Smith v. Hall, 2016-Ohio-1052, ¶ 8. “In the vast

majority of cases, ‘a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its

own jurisdiction, and a party contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by

appeal.’” Schlegel v. Sweeney, 2022-Ohio-3841, ¶ 6, quoting State ex rel. Plant v.

Cosgrove, 2008-Ohio-3838, ¶ 5. In other words, “[a]bsent a patent and unambiguous

lack of jurisdiction, a relator’s ability to appeal generally bars relief in prohibition.” State

ex rel. Harris v. Capizzi, 2022-Ohio-3661, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.), citing Johnson v. Sloan, 2018-

Ohio-2120, ¶ 24. A party can appeal a juvenile court’s determination that it has

jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and any resulting custody orders, so a party seeking a

writ of prohibition has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel.

M.L. v. O’Malley, 2015-Ohio-4855, ¶ 9.

       {¶ 24} Here, Hignight can appeal Judge Knepp’s jurisdictional determination

when the custody case concludes. See id. Neither of the parties argues otherwise. Thus,

unless Judge Knepp patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, Hignight has an

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and is not entitled to a writ of prohibition

as a matter of law.

      D. Judge Knepp does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction.

       {¶ 25} When a relator has an adequate remedy, there is a “narrow exception” that

entitles her to a writ of prohibition when the respondent patently and unambiguously

lacks jurisdiction over the matter. Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 2019-

11.
Ohio-2845, ¶ 6. Thus, if Judge Knepp demonstrates that there are no genuine, material

factual issues regarding whether she patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction under

the UCCJEA, she is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, and we must grant

her motion.

       {¶ 26} The jurisdictional issue underlying this case involves the UCCJEA,

adopted in R.C. Chapter 3127, which “address[es] interstate recognition and enforcement

of child custody orders . . . .” R.C. 3127.01(A). Whether an Ohio court has jurisdiction

over a custody case that involves, or potentially involves, custody determinations from

other states is outlined in R.C. 3127.15(A)(1) to (4).

       {¶ 27} As used in the UCCJEA, “initial custody determination” means “the first

child custody determination concerning a particular child.” R.C. 3127.01(B)(8). A

“child custody determination” is, generally speaking, a court order that “provides for

legal custody, physical custody, parenting time, or visitation with respect to a child.”

R.C. 3127.01(B)(3). A child’s “home state” is “the state in which a child lived with a

parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately

preceding the commencement of a child custody proceeding . . . .” R.C. 3127.01(B)(7).

Any “temporary absence” is counted as part of the six-month period. Id. Finally, a

“person acting as a parent” is someone other than a parent who (1) at the time the custody

action is filed, has physical custody of the child or, within one year before filing, had

physical custody of the child for six consecutive months (including any temporary

12.
absence) and (2) has been awarded or claims a right to legal custody of the child. R.C.

3127.01(B)(13).

       {¶ 28} Under R.C. 3127.15, an Ohio court has jurisdiction to make an initial

custody determination only if, as potentially applicable here, (1) Ohio is the child’s home

state on the day the custody action is filed; (2) Ohio was the child’s home state within six

months before filing and the child is no longer in Ohio, but a parent or person acting as a

parent still lives here; or (3) another state’s court does not have home-state jurisdiction,

as defined in R.C. 3127.15(A)(1), the child and at least one parent or person acting as a

parent have a “significant connection” with Ohio that is beyond mere physical presence,

and there is “substantial evidence” in Ohio regarding the child’s “care, protection,

training, and personal relationships.” R.C. 3127.15(A)(1)-(2). The rules outlined in R.C.

3127.15(A) are “the exclusive jurisdictional basis . . .” for an Ohio court to make a child

custody determination under the UCCJEA. R.C. 3127.15(B).

       {¶ 29} The dispute at the heart of this matter is whether the children lived in Ohio

on September 22, 2021, the day Hoffman filed her custody complaint. If they did, Judge

Knepp has subject-matter jurisdiction because Ohio is the children’s home state; if they

did not, Judge Knepp’s subject-matter jurisdiction is contingent upon Hoffman’s status as

a “person acting as a parent,” as defined in R.C. 3127.01(B)(13)—a factual matter that

Judge Knepp has not yet been able to decide. The record before us shows that Judge

Knepp arguably has jurisdiction over the custody case, which means that any

jurisdictional defects are not patent and unambiguous.

13.
       {¶ 30} Hignight and Hoffman have provided conflicting information about where,

exactly, the children lived between June and October 2021. Hignight says that she and

the children moved to Michigan in June 2021, where they lived in Varga’s house until

December 2021, when she and Varga moved to a house that they bought together. In

support of her position, she submits:

       • records from the children’s Michigan daycare showing that they attended the

          daycare on 12 days over a period of four weeks beginning June 14, 2021;

       • photos that purport to show Hignight’s stepson’s bedroom without bunkbeds in

          March 2021, Z.H.-H. in the stepson’s room with bunkbeds in mid-July 2021,

          when Hignight and Varga “had just gotten bunk beds to begin a trial month of

          living together . . .[,]” and her stepson in one of the bunkbeds in August 2021;

       • a letter regarding her older daughter’s enrollment in a Michigan school

          beginning August 30, 2021, and the daughter’s attendance records for the

          2021-2022 school year;

       • evidence that she listed her Toledo house for sale on September 13, 2021,

          accepted an offer to purchase the house on September 19, 2021, and deeded the

          house to the new owner on October 22, 2021;

       • two photos taken on behalf of her real estate agent for purposes of listing the

          Toledo house, which the agent received from the photographer on September

          13, 2021;

14.
      • a bank statement for August 18 to September 17, 2021, that lists her Toledo

          address and purports to show that she paid to change her address; and

      • an agreement that she signed with a Michigan real estate agent on September 8,

          2021;

      {¶ 31} On the other hand, Hoffman claims that Hignight and the children did not

move to Michigan until sometime after September 22, 2021. To support that position,

Hoffman submitted:

      • a text message from Hignight on September 17, 2021, telling her that Hignight

          and Varga “are combining [their] families under one roof and are looking at

          houses together in the Ypsi[lanti] area[;]”

      • the ex parte injunction the juvenile court magistrate issued on September 22,

          2021, to prevent Hignight from moving the children out of Lucas County;

      • a summary of Z.H.-H.’s time at daycare on August 10, 2021, which

          purportedly came from the children’s Ohio daycare;

      • an email that she sent to the billing department of the children’s Ohio daycare

          on August 4, 2021, asking to change payment arrangements;

      • text messages from Hignight on August 5, 2021, discussing the cost of the

          children’s Ohio daycare and how Hoffman could pay her share;

      • an email from the Ohio daycare showing that she paid over $2,000 to the

          daycare between August 13 and December 31, 2021;

15.
       • a text message from Hignight on September 1, 2021, asking her about daycare

          payment;

       • text messages from September 23, 2021—the day Hignight was personally

          served with the custody complaint—in which Hignight said that she was at her

          Toledo house, and Hoffman arranged to drop off clothes;

       • text messages from September 24, 2021, in which she says that the children

          were not at the Ohio daycare when she went to pick them up;

       • text messages from October 22, 2021, in which Hignight said that she and the

          children “are in town tonight . . .” and informed Hoffman that it was the

          children’s last day at the Ohio daycare; and

       • a portion of the transcript from a September 29, 2022 juvenile-court hearing in

          which Hignight said that she moved to Michigan in “October of last year”—

          i.e., October 2021.

       {¶ 32} Although Judge Knepp did not submit independent evidence regarding the

children’s residence at the time of filing, she explains in her affidavit that she believes

she has jurisdiction based on (1) the address Hoffman provided for Hignight in her initial

filings, (2) Hoffman’s representation in her UCCJEA affidavit that the children were

living with both her and Hignight, (3) Hignight being personally served in Lucas County,

and (4) Hignight’s failure to claim or imply that she had moved to Michigan at the

October 2021 injunction hearing. Judge Knepp also said that, due to procedural delays,

she has not yet been able to determine whether Hoffman is a person acting as a parent.

16.
       {¶ 33} When all of this information is considered together, it is clear that there are

facts in dispute regarding the children’s residence on September 22, 2021. If we were

deciding a motion for summary judgment on the merits of the underlying custody case,

this would mandate that we deny the motion. However, we are deciding a motion for

summary judgment on Hignight’s claim that she is entitled to a writ of prohibition, so we

must decide whether the conflicting evidence about the children’s residence raises a

genuine issue of material fact about whether Judge Knepp patently and unambiguously

lacks jurisdiction over the custody case. Davis, 2023-Ohio-1593, at ¶ 10.

       {¶ 34} When a court arguably has jurisdiction under a statute, any lack of

jurisdiction is not patent and unambiguous. State ex rel. Kelleys Island School Dist. Bd.

of Edn. v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 2024-Ohio-285, ¶ 36, citing M.L., 2015-Ohio-4855, at ¶

15, 17. That is, lack of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous if there is “‘no set of facts

under which a trial court or judge could have jurisdiction over a particular case[.]’”

(Brackets sic.) State ex rel. Morrow Cty. Job & Family Servs. v. Morrow Cty. Court of

Common Pleas, 2022-Ohio-2549, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.), quoting Leatherworks Partnership v.

Stuard, 2002-Ohio-6477, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.). But if a judge generally has subject-matter

jurisdiction over that particular type of case and the judge’s authority to hear the case

underlying a prohibition action depends on the specific facts before the judge, “‘the

jurisdictional defect is not obvious and the court/judge should be allowed to decide the

jurisdictional issue.’” Id. That is the case here.

17.
       {¶ 35} There is conflicting evidence about whether Ohio is the children’s home

state based on their residence at the time the custody case was filed. For example,

although Hignight claims she moved to Michigan in June 2021, (1) she did not tell

Hoffman that she intended to move to Michigan to live with Varga until September 17;

(2) the evidence Hignight submitted with her complaint indicates that she and Varga

began a “trial month of living together . . .” in the middle of July; (3) there is evidence the

children attended a Michigan daycare about half of the days from mid-June to mid-July,

but there is also evidence that they attended an Ohio daycare that Hoffman helped pay for

until late October; (4) the Michigan daycare’s “Child Information Sheet” for M.H.-H.,

which lists a Michigan address for M.H.-H. and Hignight and includes the notes “Lives

With[,]” “Emergency[,]” and “Pickup” with Hignight’s contact information, also includes

Varga’s name with the notes “Emergency” and “Pickup”—but not “Lives With”—and

without an address; (5) the bank statement that Hignight used to claim that she paid a fee

to have her address changed lists her Toledo address; (6) Hignight testified in 2022 that

she moved to Michigan in October 2021, although she now says that was a misstatement;

and (7) Hignight (who was represented by counsel) did not tell the court, explicitly or

implicitly, that she was already living in Michigan during the hearing at which Hoffman

was attempting to obtain an injunction preventing Hignight from moving to Michigan.

       {¶ 36} Under these facts, it is far from clear that Judge Knepp patently and

unambiguously lacks home-state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. That is, she might have

subject-matter jurisdiction, depending on how the facts of the matter develop and are

18.
interpreted. When that is the case, the narrow exception for a clear and obvious lack of

jurisdiction does not apply. Ruehlman, 2019-Ohio-2845, at ¶ 6; Morrow Cty. at ¶ 23;

Leatherworks at ¶ 19; Kelleys Island, 2024-Ohio-285, at ¶ 36. Moreover, R.C. Ch. 3127

generally gives juvenile courts jurisdiction to determine interstate custody disputes

(assuming the necessary factual prerequisites are met), so Judge Knepp is able to

determine her own jurisdiction. Schlegel, 2022-Ohio-3841, at ¶ 6. And if Hignight

ultimately disagrees with Judge Knepp’s resolution of the facts and determination of

jurisdiction, she can appeal the judge’s final decision. M.L., 2015-Ohio-4855, at ¶ 9.

       {¶ 37} Based on the evidence before us, we find that no genuine issues of material

fact remain on the issue of whether Judge Knepp patently and unambiguously lacks

jurisdiction, Judge Knepp is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable

minds can reach only one conclusion regarding the issue of whether Judge Knepp

patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. Accordingly, Judge Knepp is entitled to

summary judgment.

                                     III. Conclusion

       {¶ 38} In sum, Hignight has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by

appealing Judge Knepp’s jurisdiction determination when the custody case concludes.

Further, the exception to showing lack of an adequate remedy when a respondent patently

and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction is inapplicable. The parties’ conflicting evidence

regarding the children’s residence on the day the complaint was filed shows that Judge

Knepp arguably has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, so her lack of jurisdiction—if any—

19.
is not patent and unambiguous, and Judge Knepp should have the opportunity to

determine her own jurisdiction based on the facts of the case. Taken together, this shows

that no genuine issues of material fact remain and Judge Knepp is entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Judge Knepp’s motion for summary judgment is

granted, Hignight’s complaint for a writ of prohibition is dismissed, and our prior stay of

the proceedings in the underlying custody case, case No. 21286267, is lifted.

       {¶ 39} Hignight is ordered to pay the costs of this proceeding pursuant to App.R.

24.

       {¶ 40} It is so ordered.

       {¶ 41} The clerk is directed to serve upon the parties, within three days, a copy of

this decision in a manner prescribed by Civ.R. 5(B).

                                                                            Writ dismissed.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                           ____________________________
                                                         JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
                                               ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, P.J.                                   JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                         JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

20.