Court Opinion

ID: 9353351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 17:09:37.097117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:22.445785
License: Public Domain

J-S42024-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    THOMAS JOHN SCHRAM                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 249 WDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 14, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-17-CR-0000529-2021

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: JANUARY 11, 2023

        Appellant, Thomas John Schram, appeals from the February 14, 2022

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield

County after the trial court, in a non-jury trial, convicted Appellant of, inter

alia, driving under the influence (“DUI”) of a drug or combination of drugs.1

We affirm.

        The trial court summarized the factual history as follows:

        The case at bar involved an incident in Clearfield County[,
        Pennsylvania,] on October 22, 2019. Just before [5:00 p.m.],
        Pennsylvania State Police [("PSP")] received a [911 emergency]
        call from a motorist about an erratic driver in a gray [vehicle].
        Trooper Kacey Osborne was dispatched to [a convenience store]
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2). Appellant was also found guilty of driving on
roadways laned for traffic and careless driving. 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3309(1) and
3714(a), respectively.
J-S42024-22

       in Penfield, [Pennsylvania,] where the driver was reported to have
       stopped his vehicle. Upon her arrival, Trooper Osborne found the
       vehicle pulled into a parking spot, with the driver asleep in the
       driver's seat. Trooper Osborne was able to wake the driver after
       roughly thirty seconds of knocking on [the vehicle’s] window. The
       driver was identified as [Appellant].        After speaking with
       [Appellant], Trooper Osborne suspected [Appellant] was under
       the influence [of drugs or alcohol and asked him to perform] field
       sobriety tests, to which [Appellant] agreed. Following the field
       sobriety tests, Trooper Osborne arrested [Appellant] for driving
       under the influence, and she transported [Appellant] to the
       hospital for a voluntary blood draw. The results of the blood tests
       showed clonazepam, carisoprodol, and buprenorphine in
       [Appellant’s] blood.[2]

Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/22, at 1-2 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

       On February 5, 2020, Appellant was charged with the aforementioned

criminal offenses.3 On November 3, 2021, at the conclusion of a non-jury

trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned criminal

offenses. On February 14, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 72

____________________________________________

2 “Clonazepam is an intermediate to long-acting benzodiazepine hypnotic used
in the treatment of insomnia and in the prevention and treatment of various
seizure disorders.” Commonwealth’s Exhibit 5 at 3. “Carisoprodol is a
centrally-acting skeletal muscle relaxant and sedative.” Id. “Buprenorphine
is a Schedule III controlled synthetic opioid that has both analgesic and opioid
antagonist activities. . . . While buprenorphine can counteract some of the
effects of powerful opiates[,] it also has opiate-like effects of its own[,
including] analgesia, drowsiness, and sedation.” Id. at 2.

3The criminal complaint also charged Appellant with DUI – of a Schedule II or
Schedule III controlled substance, as defined by The Controlled Substance,
Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. § 780-101 to § 780-144, as well as
DUI – of a metabolite of a Schedule II or Schedule III controlled substance.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(ii) and (iii). Prior to the start of Appellant’s
non-jury trial, the Commonwealth withdrew these two criminal charges.

                                           -2-
J-S42024-22

hours to 6 months’ incarceration for his DUI conviction. No further sentence

was imposed for the two remaining criminal convictions.          Appellant was

ordered to pay fines and costs on all three criminal convictions. This appeal

followed.4

       Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

       Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to
       establish the crime of driving under the influence of a drug or
       combination of drugs, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2),
       where the evidence failed to demonstrate a causal link between
       the prescription drugs detected in Appellant’s blood and his
       purported inability to safely operate his vehicle?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

       Our standard and scope of review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence are well-settled.

       The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
       is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
       most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
       to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
       a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
       the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
       addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
       the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
       innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
       resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
       inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
       drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
       may sustain its burden of proof or proving every element of the
       crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
____________________________________________

4  Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The
Commonwealth filed a letter with this Court on October 24, 2022, stating that
it concurred with the trial court’s April 11, 2022 opinion and adopted the same
in lieu of filing an appellee’s brief.

                                           -3-
J-S42024-22

      circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test,
      the entire record must be evaluated and all the evidence actually
      received must be considered. Finally, the trier[-]of[-]fact while
      passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
      evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the
      evidence.

Commonwealth v. Pappas, 845 A.2d 829, 835-836 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 862 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 2004); see also

Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1163 (Pa. 2012) (stating that, in

reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, “the relevant question is whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier[-]of[-]fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt” (emphasis in original)).

      [T]he [trier-of-fact's] individualized assessment of the credibility
      of the trial evidence is, as a general principle, not to be questioned
      by an appellate court as part of its review, even if the evidence is
      conflicting.     [C]ourts presume the [trier-of-fact] resolved
      evidentiary disputes reasonably so long as sufficient evidence
      supports the verdict.        [M]ere inconsistency and conflicts in
      witnesses[’] testimony, by itself, will not furnish a basis for an
      appellate court to reverse a conviction [] on the grounds of
      evidentiary insufficiency.

Brown, 52 A.3d at 1165 (citations omitted).           Rather, the trier-of-fact’s

resolution will only be disturbed “in those exceptional instances [] where the

evidence is so patently unreliable that the [trier-of-fact] was forced to engage

in surmise and conjecture in arriving at a verdict based upon that evidence.”

Id., citing Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167, 1170 (Pa. 1993).

To preserve a sufficiency claim, the appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement must

                                      -4-
J-S42024-22

specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008).

      Section 3802(d)(2) of the Vehicle Code states, in pertinent part, that,

      An individual may not drive, operate[,] or be in actual physical
      control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the following
      circumstances:

         ...

         (2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
         combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the
         individual's ability to safely drive, operate[,] or be in actual
         physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2).     In order to convict a defendant of a Section

3802(d)(2) DUI offense, the Commonwealth must prove that “while driving or

operating a vehicle, [the defendant] was under the influence of a drug to a

degree that impaired [his or her] ability to safely drive or operate a vehicle.”

Commonwealth v Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231, 1236 (Pa. 2011) (original brackets

omitted).

      Our Supreme Court in Griffith, supra, held that,

      [Section] 3802(d)(2) [does not require] expert testimony to
      establish that the defendant's inability to drive safely was caused
      by ingestion of a drug, even if it is a prescription drug, or drug
      combination. [Rather,] in some cases, depending on the specific
      facts and circumstances, expert testimony may be helpful, or
      perhaps even necessary, to prove causation under [Section]
      3802(d)(2), but we decline to hold that the need for expert
      testimony is inherent in the statutory provision and thus
      mandatory in all cases.

Id. at 1238.    “The need for expert testimony in a [Section] 3802(d)(2)

prosecution must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account

                                      -5-
J-S42024-22

not just the specific drug at issue, prescription or otherwise, but also the

nature and overall strength of the Commonwealth's evidence.” Id. at 1239.

“[E]xpert testimony is not necessary to establish impairment under [Section]

3802(d)(2) where there exists other independent evidence of impairment.”

Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 538 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal

denied, 173 A.3d 267 (Pa. 2017).

      Here, Appellant concedes “that he was operating a motor vehicle, that

he was observed driving in an erratic manner, [and] that he had the reported

quantities of prescription medications in his blood” on the day of the incident.

Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant contends, however, that the Commonwealth

failed to present sufficient evidence of the causal connection between the

prescription medications present in his blood and his erratic operation of a

motor vehicle without the offer of expert testimony. Id. Appellant argues

that an expert’s testimony was necessary to sufficiently demonstrate that the

erratic driving observed by the eyewitness who called 911 emergency services

and the balance issues observed by Trooper Osbourne during field sobriety

tests were caused by the prescription medication Appellant ingested earlier in

the day.    Id. at 13.   Appellant asserts that, although the Commonwealth

presented    the   testimony   of   an    expert   in   forensic   toxicology,   “the

Commonwealth still failed to present sufficient evidence to permit the

[trier-]of[-]fact to infer a causal connection between the detected drugs and

[Appellant’s erratic driving].” Id. at 17.

                                         -6-
J-S42024-22

      In finding sufficient evidence to establish the causation element of the

Section 3802(d)(2) offense, the trial court explained,

      [t]o establish its case, the Commonwealth presented evidence
      from three witnesses. The first witness was [an eyewitness who]
      called 911 [emergency services] because of [Appellant’s] erratic
      driving. During the trial, [the eyewitness] testified that he
      observed [Appellant’s] vehicle swerving and weaving, to the point
      that [Appellant’s] vehicle crossed the center line multiple times.
      [The eyewitness] also recalled that the vehicle would repeatedly
      speed up and slow down. At one point, [the eyewitness] observed
      [Appellant’s] vehicle bump into a wall while he [] attempted to
      stop behind a school bus.        While following [Appellant, the
      eyewitness] saw [Appellant] pull into the parking lot of [a
      convenience store. The eyewitness pulled his vehicle into the
      same parking lot and] remained in the parking lot until a [PSP]
      trooper arrived. At no time did [the eyewitness] see [Appellant]
      leave the parking lot.      [The trial] court note[d] that [the
      eyewitness’s] testimony was credible as to his recollection of the
      events that day. Additionally, the Commonwealth presented the
      recording of [the eyewitness’s 911] call, which supported his
      testimony.

      The second witness the Commonwealth presented was Trooper
      Osborne. When [Trooper Osborne] arrived to the [convenience
      store parking lot], she found [Appellant] asleep in the driver's seat
      of his vehicle. Trooper Osborne testified that it took roughly thirty
      seconds of knocking on the driver's [side] window to wake
      [Appellant]. While Trooper Osborne was talking with [Appellant],
      she noticed he looked disheveled, drowsy, and slightly confused.
      Further, [Appellant] admitted to Trooper Osborne that he had
      taken buprenorphine and carisoprodol earlier that day. Trooper
      Osborne then requested [Appellant] perform field sobriety tests,
      which [Appellant] agreed [to do].

      During the field sobriety tests, Trooper Osborne detected multiple
      signs of impairment. [Appellant’s] eyes appeared droopy and
      tired during the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Trooper Osborne
      noticed [Appellant] had difficulty maintaining balance during her
      instructions for the walk-and-turn test. Additionally, [Appellant]
      missed multiple heel[-]to[-]toe steps and used his arms for
      balance. During the one-leg-stand [test, Appellant] dropped his
      leg several times, swayed, and raised his arms for balance. Lastly,

                                      -7-
J-S42024-22

       [Appellant] displayed eyelid and body tremors during the modified
       Romberg test[.5 Appellant] also calculated 55 seconds to be [the
       equivalent of] 30 seconds. Following completion of the [field]
       sobriety tests, [Appellant] was arrested for driving under the
       influence, and he agreed to complete a blood draw.

       The last witness the Commonwealth presented was Donna
       Papsun, a forensic toxicologist[. ]Papsun was found to be an
       expert in the field of forensic toxicology upon the agreement of
       [Appellant. ]Papsun completed the report for the results of
       [Appellant’s] blood test. She testified that [Appellant’s] blood was
       positive for clonazepam, carisoprodol, buprenorphine, and their
       metabolites, which are Schedule III and Schedule IV controlled
       substances. In her expert opinion, [] any of the three substances
       found in [Appellant’s] blood could [impair] a person's ability to
       drive.    The three substances in [Appellant’s] system are
       depressants, and all three taken together "can have, this additive
       central nervous system depressant effect."

       While [] Papsun agreed that the levels within [Appellant’s] blood
       were within the therapeutic range, she also opined that it
       generally takes two weeks for a person to build up a tolerance to
       these types of substances. Until a person's body establishes a
       tolerance, they are likely to experience impairing effects from the
       drugs. [Appellant] presented copies of his prescription records.
       The records showed that he received [a] clonazepam
       [prescription] on October 8, 2019, [a] buprenorphine
       [prescription] on October 9, 2019, and [a] carisoprodol
       [prescription] on October 16, 2019. [Appellant] additionally
       testified that he had been incarcerated until October 8, 2019[,]
       and was not taking the medications during his incarceration.
       Based on [the] timeline presented, it is likely that [Appellant] was
       still building a tolerance to, at [a] minimum, the carisoprodol, but
       possibly all three substances.

____________________________________________

5 The Romberg test is a field sobriety test in which the suspect puts his or her
feet together so they are touching and puts his or her arms down along the
side of the body and, when told to do so, tilts his or her head backward, shuts
his or her eyes, and estimates the passage of 30 seconds in this position
before ending the test. N.T., 9/24/21, at 32.

                                           -8-
J-S42024-22

Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/22, at 4-6 (record citation and extraneous

capitalization omitted).

      A review of the record demonstrates that the eyewitness observed

Appellant’s vehicle swerving “quite a bit.” N.T., 9/24/21, at 8. After observing

Appellant’s vehicle swerve into the on-coming lane of traffic, the eyewitness

contacted 911 emergency services. Id. Appellant’s vehicle was “constantly

weaving,” and “[t]here [were] a few times where [the eyewitness] was sure

that [Appellant] was going to hit another vehicle.” Id. at 9. At one point,

while Appellant’s vehicle was coming to a stop behind a school bus, the

eyewitness observed Appellant’s vehicle strike a retaining wall. Id. at 13-15.

The eyewitness also testified that “[t]here [were] points where [Appellant]

was driving fast and he would slow down and [then] he’d speed up and slow

down.”    Id. at 16.       The eyewitness followed Appellant’s vehicle into a

convenience store parking lot where Appellant parked his vehicle, and the

eyewitness parked his own vehicle a short distance away. Id. at 11. The

eyewitness maintained his observation of Appellant’s vehicle until the police

arrived. Id.

      Trooper Osbourne testified that she was trained to determine if a

suspect was under the influence of drugs or alcohol and to administer various

field sobriety tests. Id. at 19. At the time of the incident, Trooper Osbourne

was also certified in advanced roadside impairment driving enforcement. Id.

at 20.   In response to the 911 call, Trooper Osbourne located Appellant’s

vehicle in a convenience store parking lot, as reported by the eyewitness who

                                       -9-
J-S42024-22

placed the emergency call. Id. at 21. Appellant’s vehicle engine was still

running, and Trooper Osbourne found Appellant “slumped over asleep in the

driver’s seat.”    Id.   Trooper Osbourne was able to wake Appellant after

knocking on the vehicle’s driver’s side window with her fist for 30 seconds.

Id. at 22, 24.     When Trooper Osbourne advised Appellant that she was

responding to reports of Appellant’s erratic driving, Appellant responded that

“he was tired.”      Id. at 26.    Appellant also admitted to taking several

prescription drugs earlier that day. Id. Trooper Osbourne described Appellant

as appearing dirty, disheveled, tired, drowsy, and “a little bit confused.” Id.

Trooper Osbourne, upon asking Appellant for identification, noted, however,

that Appellant did not fumble or demonstrate any difficulty in producing his

identification.   Id. at 39.   After Appellant agreed to perform several field

sobriety tests, he exited his vehicle and walked towards Trooper Osbourne’s

police cruiser. Id. at 27. As Appellant was walking towards the police cruiser,

Trooper Osbourne observed Appellant staggering. Id. at 40.

      In performing the field sobriety tests, Appellant was unable to maintain

his balance during the instruction phase of the walk-and-turn test, and while

performing the test, Appellant missed multiple heel-to-toe steps and had to

use his arms for balance.      Id. at 30-31.   During the one-leg stand test,

Appellant dropped his leg 3 times, swayed, and used his arms for balance.

Id. at 31. Finally, during the Romberg test, while Trooper Osbourne did not

observe Appellant swaying, she did note that Appellant misjudged the 30

second length of time for performing the test and, instead, performed the test

                                      - 10 -
J-S42024-22

for 55 seconds, which, in Trooper Osbourne’s opinion, indicated Appellant’s

“internal clock [was] going slow.” Id. at 32. In sum, as Trooper Osbourne

explained, the field sobriety tests are not pass-or-fail tests, but, rather, allow

a police officer to observe the suspect for “clues of impairment.” Id. at 31.

In Appellant’s case, Trooper Osbourne observed several “clues of impairment”

on each of the tests Appellant performed. Id. at 31-33.

      Without knowing additional information, the Commonwealth’s expert in

forensic toxicology testified that she was unable to provide an opinion to a

reasonable degree of scientific certainty as to whether the controlled

substances detected in Appellant’s blood on the day of the incident impaired

his ability to operate his motor vehicle. Id. at 55. The expert explained that

an impairment assessment, such as an assessment of Appellant’s ability to

operate his vehicle, requires knowledge of, inter alia, the person’s history with

the controlled substance, how long the person has been prescribed or using

the controlled substance, and whether there has been any change in the use

regimen or dosage.     Id. at 57.    The expert did opine, however, that, in

general, a controlled substance, such as the controlled substances found in

Appellant’s blood, could have an impairing effect on a person when the person

first starts using the controlled substance, and this impairment continues until

the person develops a tolerance for the adverse effects of the controlled

substance. Id. at 55, 59. A person develops a tolerance against the adverse

effects of the controlled substance, the expert explained, generally after two

weeks but that tolerance period can be prolonged if the person starts using

                                     - 11 -
J-S42024-22

additional controlled substances or if there is a change in the dosage of the

controlled substance. Id. at 60-61. When asked about the specific drugs

detected in Appellant’s blood, the expert stated that they were the “types of

drugs that have central nervous system depressant effects.” Id. at 55. In

her toxicology report, the expert detailed that, based upon DUI related case

studies involving each of these three drugs, all three of the drugs detected in

Appellant’s blood were found, in general, to have impaired a driver’s ability to

operate a motor vehicle. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 5 at 2-3.

      Appellant testified that he was released from prison on October 7, 2019,

and immediately began using buprenorphine. Id. at 66. Prior to his release

from prison, Appellant was not using the three drugs that were detected in his

blood on the day of the incident.       Id. at 70.    A report from Appellant’s

pharmacy confirms that Appellant          filled prescriptions for,    inter   alia,

buprenorphine on October 8, 2019, carisoprodol on October 16, 2019, and

October 21, 2019, and clonazepam on October 8, 2019, and October 21, 2019.

See Defendant’s Exhibit B. As such, the incident occurred within two weeks

of Appellant starting to use these three drugs.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

as verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier-of-fact to find

a causal connection between Appellant’s use of the aforementioned drugs and

his inability to safely operate his motor vehicle, even in the absence of expert

testimony as to the issue of causation. It is uncontradicted that on the day of

the incident, Appellant ingested, and had present in his blood, the three

                                      - 12 -
J-S42024-22

aforementioned drugs. Some time after Appellant ingested these drugs, an

eyewitness observed Appellant operating his motor vehicle in an erratic and

unsafe manner, and Appellant admitted to erratic operation of his motor

vehicle. Upon engaging Appellant, Trooper Osbourne observed ordinary signs

that Appellant was under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs,

including her finding Appellant “slumped over the steering wheel asleep” while

his vehicle engine was running, and her observations of Appellant staggering

while he walked and appearing drowsy with drooping eyes, as well as

confused. Moreover, based upon her training, Trooper Osbourne testified that

Appellant exhibited multiple “clues of impairment” during the field sobriety

tests, including his inability to main a one-leg stand, use of his arms for

balance, and several missed steps in the heel-to-toe test.         Appellant’s

drowsiness, drooping eyes, and inability to perform the field sobriety tests

properly, coupled with direct and undisputed observations of erratic driving,

are ordinary signs of impairment discernable by laypersons.6           Expert

testimony was, therefore, not required in the case sub judice to show a causal

connection between Appellant’s drug use and his impaired ability to safely

____________________________________________

6 Unlike Gause, supra, where the Commonwealth’s evidence of impairment
was body and eye tremors, the evidence in the case sub judice involves widely
understood indicia of impairment discernable by a layperson. See Gause,
164 A.3d at 539 (stating, “staggering, stumbling, glassy or bloodshot eyes,
and slurred speech” are “originally signs of [impairment] discernable by a
layperson”); see also Griffith, 32 A.3d at 1240 (finding that, a person’s
unsteadiness and inability to perform field sobriety tests are widely
understood indicia of impairment discernable by a layperson).

                                          - 13 -
J-S42024-22

operate his motor vehicle. Accordingly, Appellant’s issue as it relates to the

element of causation is without merit.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/11/2023

                                    - 14 -