Court Opinion

ID: 9390020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 18:03:04.064078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:31.097070
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/26/23 P. v. Best CA2/4
         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

     IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                     B318531

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. SA096678)
           v.

 KIRAN CLISBY BEST,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, William L. Sadler, Judge. Affirmed.
      Glenn L. Savard, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                         INTRODUCTION
       Appellant Kiran Best was charged with attempted murder
and assault, and pled no contest to felony assault by means likely
to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)1.) In
May 2018, the court sentenced appellant to five years’ probation.
In January 2021, section 1203.1 was changed to limit probation
to no longer than two years in most cases. One exception to the
two-year limit is for cases of domestic violence—crimes such as
assault when the perpetrator is related to the victim. (§§ 1203.1,
subd. (l)(1), 1203.097, subd. (a)(1); Fam. Code, § 6211.) The
victim of the assault was appellant’s brother.
       In September 2021, appellant was charged with making
criminal threats, a probation violation. Appellant’s counsel and
the court discussed the change to section 1203.1, and appellant’s
counsel stated that the two-year limit did not apply to appellant
because the victim of the previous assault was appellant’s
brother. The court, counsel, and appellant himself acknowledged
that the assault victim was appellant’s brother. The court found
that appellant had violated his probation and sentenced him to
three years in prison.
       On appeal, appellant now argues the two-year probation
limit did apply to him, because there was insufficient evidence
that the assault victim was his brother. We affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.     Underlying conviction
       In March 2018, appellant was charged with attempted
premeditated murder using a knife, causing great bodily harm
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a));

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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and assault with a deadly weapon, a knife, causing great bodily
harm (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a)). The victim of the
crime was appellant’s brother, A. Best.2
      In May 2018, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pled
no contest to felony assault by means likely to produce great
bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4).) The court sentenced him to 364
days in jail and five years’ probation.
      Effective January 1, 2021, Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019–
2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1203.1 to limit the maximum
probation term that may be imposed for most felony offenses to
two years. (See § 1203.1, subd. (a).) However, the two-year
probation limit does not apply to “an offense that includes specific
probation lengths within its provisions.” (§ 1203.1, subd. (l)(1).)
One such exception is a crime involving domestic violence where
“the victim is a person defined in Section 6211 of the Family
Code,” which carries a minimum probation period of 36 months.
(§ 1203.097, subd. (a)(1).) Family Code section 6211 defines as
“domestic violence” abuse perpetrated against a “person related
by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree.”3 (Fam.
Code § 6211, subd. (f).) Case law holds that assault under section
245 against a family member falls under the domestic violence
exception to section 1203.1 (See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 637, 644 (Rodriguez).)
B.    Probation violation
      In 2021, appellant was charged with making criminal
threats against his mother, K.N. (§ 422, subd. (a).) At a combined

2     We refer to the victims using initials to protect their
privacy. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
3     Appellant admits that brothers are related by
consanguinity within the second degree.

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preliminary hearing on the criminal threats charge and hearing
on the probation violation, K.N. testified about the incident. The
facts are not relevant to this appeal, so we describe them only
briefly. On September 11, 2021, appellant got upset and shouted
at K.N. statements such as “I should stomp you out. . . . I should
fucking beat you,” and “You don’t deserve to be alive.” K.N.
testified that appellant also “ran over to me and stood over me
and started swinging and, you know, did not hit me but . . . came
close to . . . hitting me.” Appellant also said, “I should knock the
shit out of you. I should knock your teeth out,” which made K.N.
feel scared and vulnerable because she had recently had dental
surgery.
       At the same hearing, defense counsel and the court
acknowledged that appellant’s brother was the victim of the
underlying assault. For example, defense counsel stated that the
brothers had actually assaulted each other, thus appellant’s
assault conviction arose from “a relationship between him and
his brother, which is kind of mutual.” The court also noted that
“the case that’s placed Mr. Best on probation did start off as
attempted murder of his brother.” The court found appellant had
violated his probation. The court set a date for sentencing on the
probation violation.
       The trial court held a Marsden hearing on February 8,
2022.4 The amendment to section 1203.1 was discussed, and
defense counsel admitted that after researching the issue, she
determined that the two-year limitation did not apply in this case

4      See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. This transcript
is confidential (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.47(b)); we do not
describe portions of the transcript that include attorney-client
communication.

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because the victim of the assault was appellant’s brother. The
court denied the Marsden motion.
       At the sentencing hearing on February 18, 2022, the
prosecution said it would be willing to dismiss the criminal
threats charge and have the court order appellant to participate
in regional center services on the probation violation. The court
asked, “What were the injuries that caused the probation
violation? . . . [I]t’s a fairly serious case.” Defense counsel stated,
“The complaining witness on that case, the alleged victim, is Mr.
Best’s brother who is currently serving time for an assault on Mr.
Best in which he tried to set Mr. Best on fire.” Appellant said,
“What? . . . . My brother never tried to set me on fire.” Appellant
added, “[H]e robbed me that day. He robbed me that day. That
is a crime.”
       Appellant declined to accept services in lieu of a prison
sentence. The court sentenced appellant to the midterm of three
years. The court granted the People’s motion to dismiss the
criminal threats case “based on the sentencing and the
continuing validity of the sentence” in the assault case.
       Appellant timely appealed.
                               DISCUSSION
       On appeal, appellant contends “there is no record of any
factual evidence [that] there was a domestic violence nexus or the
victim was Mr. Best’s brother.” He argues that this lack of
evidence precludes a finding that he was on probation at the time
of the criminal threats offense in September 2021, because

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pursuant to section 1203.1, subdivision (a), his probation was
only two years—May 2018 to May 2020.5
       “We review a probation revocation decision pursuant to the
substantial evidence standard of review [citation], and great
deference is accorded the trial court’s decision, bearing in mind
that ‘[p]robation is not a matter of right but an act of clemency,
the granting and revocation of which are entirely within the
sound discretion of the trial court.’” (People v. Urke (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 766, 773.) “[T]he burden of demonstrating an abuse
of the trial court’s discretion rests squarely on the defendant.”
(Ibid.)
       To the extent appellant is making an evidentiary
argument, it borders on frivolous. The parties and court below
unequivocally agreed that appellant was on probation at the time
he made criminal threats to K.N. The court and defense counsel
discussed the changes to probation in section 1203.1, including
the domestic violence exception, and defense counsel stated that
the two-year limitation did not apply because the victim of the
assault was appellant’s brother. The record also includes
multiple other references that the assault victim was appellant’s
brother. No objection was raised to any of these references, and
no party suggested there was an insufficient evidentiary basis for
this mutual understanding. Appellant may not, for the first time
on appeal, attempt to undermine these factual assumptions or
complain that additional evidence should have been presented.
(See, e.g., People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356 [“complaints

5      Appellant asserts section 1203.1 was retroactive and
therefore applies to him. The Attorney General does not dispute
this contention, so for purposes of this opinion we assume section
1203.1 may operate retroactively.

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about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing
discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal”]; People v. Navarette (1976) 54
Cal.App.3d 1064, 1071-1072 [a party may not agree to facts
below, then claim on appeal that such facts were not supported
by evidence].)
       Moreover, if a lack of evidence or an inadequate factual
finding could be deemed error in this situation, it was invited.
Defense counsel specifically told the court that based upon her
research of the issue, the probation reduction in section 1203.1
did not apply due to the domestic violence exception. “‘The
doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent an accused from
gaining a reversal on appeal because of an error made by the trial
court at his behest. If defense counsel intentionally caused the
trial court to err, the appellant cannot be heard to complain on
appeal. . . . [I]t also must be clear that counsel acted for tactical
reasons and not out of ignorance or mistake.’” (People v. Coffman
and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49.) These factors are met here.
       Finally, appellant does not suggest the error was reversible
under any standard. Here, the record makes clear that had
evidence about the underlying assault been presented, it would
have shown that the victim was appellant’s brother. Any failure
to admit such evidence, or a failure to require a more formal
stipulation than the understanding expressed by all parties and
the court below, was harmless. (Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
       To the extent appellant is making a legal argument, it is
similarly unpersuasive. He asserts the domestic violence
exception does not apply because he was convicted of assault
under section 245, subdivision (a)(4), rather than domestic

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violence under section 1203.097, and section 245 “carries no
mandatory probation term.” He argues this case also lacks other
indicia of domestic violence; for example, he was “not ordered to
pay a domestic violence fine, was not ordered to perform
community service, and was not ordered to pay for and complete
a domestic violence class.”
       This argument has been soundly rejected. “[S]ection
1203.097 does not apply only to defendants charged with
specified offenses; it encompasses defendants convicted of any
crime of ‘abuse’ so long as the victim is a person identified in
Family Code section 6211.” (People v. Cates (2009) 170
Cal.App.4th 545, 550.)
       In People v. Rodriguez, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 637, for
example, the Court of Appeal held that a violation of section 245,
subdivision (a)(4) that meets the definition of domestic violence
falls under the domestic violence exception to section 1203.1.
There, “Rodriguez was convicted of assault under section 245,
subdivision (a)(4) against his then-girlfriend. This constitutes ‘a
crime in which the victim is a person defined in Section 6211 of
the Family Code’ under section 1203.097, subdivision (a). The
trial court accordingly sentenced Rodriguez to three years of
probation. (Id., subd. (a)(1).)” (Rodriguez, 79 Cal.App.5th at p.
644.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, stating, “In this case, section
1203.097, subdivision (a)(1) sets forth a minimum probation
length of 36 months. A domestic violence offense under section
1203.097 therefore constitutes an exception under section 1203.1
as it is ‘an offense that includes specific probation lengths within
its provisions.’” (Rodriguez, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 644, quoting §
1203.1, subd. (l)(1).)

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       The court in People v. Forester (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 447,
457-458, a stalking case, reached a similar conclusion: “[A]
defendant who is placed on probation for committing a crime
against a victim of domestic violence, as defined by section
1203.097, has committed ‘an offense that includes specific
probation lengths within its provisions.’ (§ 1203.1, subd. (l)(1).)
In such circumstances, and in the absence of a contrary
legislative indication, the two-year felony probation limitation
codified in section 1203.1, subdivision (a) does not apply.” The
Forester court also cited a leading treatise on the issue, which
used a section 245, subdivision (a)(4) conviction as an example:
“‘For example, probation for a violation of section 245, subdivision
(a)(4) [assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily
injury], does not normally have a minimum term of probation—
which means felony probation is limited to two years. But if the
victim is a person included in Family Code section 6211, section
1203.1, subdivision [(l)(1)], provides an exception to the new
limits established by [Assembly Bill No.] 1950.’” (Id. at p. 457,
quoting Couzens et al., Sentencing California Crimes (The Rutter
Group 2021) § 8:15.30, pp. 8-20 to 8-21, fn. omitted.) This
example is directly on point, and we agree with its analysis.
       Appellant cites Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 99,
and similar Sixth Amendment cases for the contention that any
fact that results in an increase to a defendant’s mandatory
minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury. The comparison
is not apt. “There is no right to a jury trial in a probation
revocation proceeding” (Jones v. Superior Court (2004) 115
Cal.App.4th 48, 60), and a defendant is not entitled to have a jury
determine facts about a prior conviction. (People v. Black (2007)
41 Cal.4th 799, 819.) Moreover, the probation violation did not

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increase appellant’s mandatory minimum sentence for the crime,
to which he pled no contest. Appellant was not entitled to factual
findings here, especially in light of the court, counsel’s, and
appellant’s clearly expressed understanding about the facts of the
underlying crime.
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.
  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                           COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, ACTING, P.J.

DAUM, J.

      
       Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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