Court Opinion

ID: 9749007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:21:11.200398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:26.789120
License: Public Domain

CHASANOW, Judge,
dissenting.
A majority of this Court decides today that the notice provisions of Virginia’s long-arm statute are unconstitutional. I respectfully dissent. If statutorily authorized service of process in a long-arm jurisdiction case is actually received by the defendant, whether effectuated by first-class mail or certified mail with restricted delivery and return receipt requested, the court ought to have in personam jurisdiction. The focus of this Court should be on whether the Miserandinos actually received the statutorily authorized mail service. If they did, they received all of the process they were due.
If the Miserandinos were served with process in the Virginia proceeding, then the judgment against them should be given full faith and credit. The Miserandinos maintain that they did not receive service, but their uncorroborated denial of service is not necessarily adequate to overcome the presumption that service was properly made. Therefore, this case should be remanded in order to afford the Miserandinos an opportunity to establish that they were not served.
*69I.
This case does not arise from a failure to follow the applicable statute governing service of process. It is undisputed that Resort strictly complied with the notice requirements of Virginia’s long-arm statute. Specifically, Resort served the Secretary of the Commonwealth with process, accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the Miserandinos’ address as “418 Ridge Rd., Westminster, Md. 21157,” and stating that the Miserandinos were non-residents of the Commonwealth. The Secretary in turn certified that copies of these papers “were forwarded by first-class mail” to the Miserandinos.
The trial judge concluded that the Miserandinos received due process of law, and denied the Miserandinos’ Motion to Strike Entry of the Judgment. Although it is not clear from the record, this ruling may have included a determination that the Miserandinos received the notice mailed to each of them by the Virginia Secretary of the Commonwealth. Certainly, the Miserandinos’ mere affidavit of nonreceipt of service did not conclusively rebut the strong presumption of service. Until there is a hearing to rebut the presumption of service, we must assume that the Miserandinos received the mailed notice. If the Miserandinos received mailed notice of the Virginia suit pursuant to the Virginia statute, this Court should not give them standing to challenge the constitutionality of the notice provision in the Virginia statute.
Recently in Academy of IRM v. LVI Environmental Services, Inc., 344 Md. 434, 446, 687 A.2d 669, 675 (1997), this Court held that “the return of service ..., with its accompanying return receipt, prima facie evidences service of process .... ” “In a particular case, [however,] it may become a question of fact whether the person who signed the return receipt was an agent for accepting the delivery of certified mail on behalf of the corporate officer to whom delivery was restricted.” 344 Md. at 447, 687 A.2d at 675. Because no evidence was produced in Academy of IRM to contradict the prima facie validity of service, we upheld the service of process. 344 Md. at 449-50, 687 A.2d at 676-77.
*70How much of a burden of proof will be placed on a defendant to prove nonreceipt of service will depend on the reliability of the method of service chosen. Where there is a sheriffs return of service, very strong evidence is necessary to impeach the return. In Weinreich, Adm’x v. Walker, 236 Md. 290, 203 A.2d 854 (1964), we said:
“It is true that there may be successful impeachment of service seemingly valid on the record but, in all the Maryland cases in which there has been, the circumstances have ranged from virtual demonstration of the lack of service (as in German v. Slade, 42 Md. 510, in which a defendant swore he had not been served and the deputy sheriff swore he had served the other defendants but not that one and had entered the notation of service by mistake) to clear and convincing evidence that there had not been service, in the form of corroboration of the defendant’s claim that there had not been, by independent disinterested witnesses, plus lack of refutation, when challenged, by the sheriff or others. See, for example, Master v. Master, 223 Md. 618[, 166 A.2d 251](the defendant wife swore she was working in Washington when she was said to have been summoned and was corroborated by her employer’s payroll records and check); Little v. Miller [220 Md. 309, 153 A.2d 271 (1959)], supra (the defendant, a seaman, swore he was on a voyage when he was said to have been served and official Coast Guard records supported him); Harvey v. Slacum [181 Md. 206, 29 A.2d 276 (1942)], supra (husband and wife swore they had never been summoned and the deputy sheriff did not know whether he had served the father or his son, could not recognize the husband in the courtroom and could not remember the wife or say that he had summoned her); Plummer v. Rosenthal, 178 Md. 149[, 12 A.2d 530](sworn denial by Earl Rosenthal of any service; sheriff identified the brother of the defendant, Irvin, as the man he had summoned); Piedmont-Mt. Airy Guano Co. v. Merritt, 154 Md. 226[, 140 A. 62](father said to have been served at home of his son; sworn denial of service plus corroboration that the father never at any time was at son’s home at the hour *71mentioned by the sheriff; summons for both father and son were found by son’s wife on his bureau and sheriff was highly uncertain in attempted identification); Pattison v. Hughes, 80 Md. 559[, 31 A. 320](four witnesses swore sheriff was completely drunk when he called and said only T want you to come Ellicott City’; sheriff did not deny it).”
Weinreich, 236 Md. at 297, 203 A.2d at 857.
Compliance with the statutory requirements for service in the instant case gives rise to a presumption that service was properly made. Academy of IRM, 344 Md. at 446-47, 687 A.2d at 675. Hence, the burden is on the Miserandinos to show by clear and satisfactory evidence that they did not receive the mailed summons. The presumption of service afforded by first-class mail service ought to be the easiest presumption of service to rebut, but a mere affidavit of nonreceipt without corroborating facts does not necessarily rebut the presumption of receipt of mailed service. The trial judge did not find that the Miserandinos failed to receive the mailed service; in fact, the trial judge’s finding that the Miserandinos were not denied due process may have encompassed a finding that they did receive the mailed service.
At a hearing to determine whether the Miserandinos received the mailed notice, the factors that the trial judge could weigh against the Miserandinos’ denial of service are the presumption of proper mailing based on the affidavit of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia; the fact that the address was the correct home address and that other mailed service in the Maryland case was received at that address; and any possible defenses the Miserandinos have to the Virginia action. The Miserandinos’ possible defenses to the Virginia action are relevant to receipt of service based on the assumption that a person with a strong defense would be unlikely to ignore notice of a suit, but a person with no defense might be likely to ignore or forget about notice of a suit. Instead of refusing to give full faith and credit to the Virginia judgment, this Court should remand the case to give the Miserandinos an opportunity to rebut the presumption of service and to establish a denial of due process by proving an *72actual lack of notice and to proffer some defense to the . Virginia action.
II.
The majority clearly defines what it sees as the issue in this case: “whether initial and original service of process by first-class mail is constitutionally sufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident individual in a long arm jurisdiction case.” 345 Md. 43, 52, 691 A.2d 208, 212 (1997). It then recognizes the significant body of law and experience that is contrary to its holding when it says, “there is strong precedent and rather extensive experience that supports the use of first-class mail 345 Md. at 63, 691 A.2d at 217-218. The Court goes on to acknowledge that service by first-class mail is probably adequate to acquire jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases. But, according to the majority, first-class mail is not adequate to acquire jurisdiction over nonresidents in long-arm cases because it “ ‘is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other means at hand.’ ” 345 Md. at 67, 691 A.2d at 220 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319, 70 S.Ct. 652, 660, 94 L.Ed. 865, 876 (1950)). The majority seems to indicate that the only acceptable form of mail service is “certified mail with restricted delivery and return receipt stating to whom delivered and the date and address of delivery.” 345 Md. at 67, 691 A.2d at 214 (citing Maryland Rule 2-121(a)). Hereinafter, I will refer to that kind of mail as “certified” mail, but the majority’s requirement raises interesting questions, such as, would certified mail without restricted delivery, but which is signed for by the defendant, also be inadequate to acquire in personam jurisdiction in the same manner that ordinary mail actually delivered is insufficient to acquire in personam jurisdiction?
The majority suggests that if “certified” mail were substituted for first-class mail in Virginia’s long-arm statute, the statute would be constitutional. This type of mail does not increase the likelihood that the mail will arrive at the address to which it was sent. If the address is correct, then ultimate receipt by the defendant is about as likely with first-class mail *73as with certified mail. The use of “certified” mail merely provides corroborative evidence that the material is actually sent, and further provides a record of dispatch and delivery. See State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 209, 328 A.2d 737, 746 (1974)(stating that “[t]he only logical purpose to be served by directing that the notice be delivered by certified mail is to provide corroboration for bald assertions of having given such notice and a means of tracing and establishing the date of receipt should a dispute concerning the delivery of notice arise”); Holmes v. Randolph, 610 N.E.2d 839, 845 (Ind.1993)(stating “use of certified mail will provide a better record of receipt but not necessarily increase the probability the addressee will actually receive the notice. Certified mail is not insured, and ‘is dispatched and handled in transit as ordinary mail.’ U.S. Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual subch. 912.11 (Issue 43: June 1992)”).
Furthermore, the majority appears to equate first-class mail with the specific method of notice prescribed by Virginia’s long-arm statute. In fact, the method of notice under the statute surpasses ordinary first-class mail in that, like “certified” mail, it too provides a record of dispatch. The statute requires the Secretary of the Commonwealth, rather than the plaintiff, to mail the notice and to certify the date and fact of mailing. Hence, a party disinterested in the litigation issues a record of dispatch. This feature enhances the reliability of the notice.
The majority’s insistence on registered or certified mail also fails to take into account the fact that these types of mail are not available in certain instances. The postal regulations declare certain matters ineligible for registration. Mail which is “[a]ddressed to post offices to which it cannot be transported safely,” for example, may not be registered. United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual, Issue 48, S911.1.4, at S-19 (1995)(hereinafter “DMM”). In addition, mail that requires a signature is, as a practical matter, often unavailable in certain rural areas. Rural letter carriers must dismount from their vehicles in order to deliver registered, certified, or return-receipt mail only if the address is “on the line of travel, *74or within one-half mile of the route and has a passable road leading to it.” Rural Carrier Duties and Responsibilities § 313.3, at 63 (1991). If an individual lives farther than one-half mile from the rural route, a letter carrier need not deviate from his or her route. Therefore, return-receipt mail sent to such a remote address is undeliverable, unless the addressee takes affirmative steps to retrieve the mail at a post office. The Uniform Probate Code specifically references such difficulties with rural route delivery and in some circumstances permits service by ordinary mail. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 15-4-303 (1996)(comment to official text)(stating that “[t]he provision for ordinary mail as a substitute for registered or certified mail is provided because ... registered mail may not be available to reach certain addresses ... and also certified mail may not be available as a process for service because of the method of delivery used [rural delivery and star route delivery]”); Mont.Code Ann. § 72-4-203 (1995)(same); N.D. Cent. Code § 30.1-25-03 (1995)(same); Utah Code Ann. § 75-4-303 (1996)(same).
In adopting a long-arm statute that provides for service by first-class mail the Virginia legislature concluded that this method is reasonably calculated to inform nonresidents of the pendency of a judicial proceeding against them. This Court should accept the general validity of that determination, and only deny full faith and credit if the mailed process has not been received. Notice by first-class mail certainly has been upheld in a number of cases, and ample authority exists to support Virginia’s decision to employ it in the context of notice to nonresidents who, because of real estate transactions or other contacts with the Commonwealth, are amenable to service.1
III.
My primary difficulty with the majority’s approach is that it seems to assume that first-class mailed service (hereinafter *75“mailed service”) is constitutionally permissible to establish in personam jurisdiction in some types of law suits, but not others. Under the majority’s approach, if mailed service is not constitutionally permissible in a particular type of lawsuit, then statutorily permissible mailed service does not establish in personam jurisdiction even if received. The majority’s test for determining when mailed service is permissible is at best vague and uncertain, yet the majority does acknowledge that mailed service is adequate in some causes of action, such as bankruptcy. A better approach would be to hold that mailed service is constitutionally permissible in any form of action, and the decision as to when it may be authorized should be left to the legislative or rule making authorities.2 Some legislatures may choose to adopt a statute that comports with merely the minimum requirements of due process, while others may choose to enhance the constitutional minimum. As one legal commentator has observed:
“Some service-by-mail statutes require only the satisfaction of minimum constitutional standards. Such statutes permit the use of ordinary mail....
ik sk ❖ ❖
In contrast ..., most service-by-mail statutes contain at least some requirements that are not constitutionally mandated. For example, many statutes demand that the plaintiff use registered or certified mail.... ” (Footnotes omitted).
Service of Process by Mail, 74 Mich. L.Rev. 381, 385-86 (1975).
There are numerous Maryland rules and statutes that authorize service by first-class mail. These rules and statutes *76may be of questionable validity as a result of the Court’s decision in the instant case. A few examples should suffice.
To begin with, it is ironic that the Maryland proceedings in the instant ease were initiated by service on the Miserandinos by statutorily authorized first-class mail service. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, codified in Maryland at § 11-801 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, provides in § 11-803:
“(a) Addresses of debtor and creditor to be furnished.— At the time a foreign judgment is filed, the judgment creditor or the judgment creditor’s attorney shall file with the clerk of the court an affidavit showing the name and last known post office address of the judgment debtor and the judgment creditor.
(b) Clerk to mail notice of filing to debtor.—(1) The clerk promptly shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to the judgment debtor at the address given and shall note the mailing in the docket.”
Notice of the Maryland action against the Miserandinos, therefore, was addressed and sent to the same address in the same manner as was used to obtain service in the Virginia action; yet, this Court today holds that this method of notice is violative of due process.
Several other statutes similarly provide for service of process by first-class mail. As the majority notes, “[t]he Maryland legislature has recently enacted a bill that permits the giving of first notices in an estate case by first-class mail.... ” 345 Md. at 61, 691 A.2d at 217. This provision is codified in the Maryland Code (1974, 1996 Supp.), Estates and Trusts Article, § 1-103. Unfortunately, doubt is cast on the constitutionality of that statute when the Court states that “[t]his Court has not had an opportunity to pass upon the constitutional sufficiency of notice by first-class mail in this context, and we intimate no opinion on that question.” 345 Md. at 62, 691 A.2d at 217.
Title 6 of the Maryland Rules governs all matters in the orphan’s courts and before the registers of wills relating to the *77settlement of decedents’ estates. Rule 6-125 of that title was recently adopted by this Court and is the general rule on service. Rule 6-125 provides:
“RULE 6-125. SERVICE
(a) Method of Service—Generally.—Except where these rules specifically require that service shall be made by certified mail, service may be made by personal delivery or by ordinary mail. Service by certified mail is complete upon delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon mailing. If a person is represented by an attorney of record, service shall be made on the attorney pursuant to Rule 1-321. Service need not be made on any person who has filed a waiver of notice pursuant to Rule 6-126.” (Emphasis added).
Did this Court recently adopt an unconstitutional rule? I doubt it.
Other actions commenced by first-class mail are now questionable because first-class mail may be insufficient to acquire in personam jurisdiction. These include judicial review actions in workers’ compensation cases initiated by first-class mail service. Rule 7-202(d)(2) provides:
“(2) Service by Petitioner in Workers’ Compensation Cases.—Upon filing a petition for judicial review of a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, the petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition by first-class mail on the Commission and each other party of record in the proceeding before the Commission.”
Even process initiating criminal proceedings may be served on a defendant by first-class mail under Rule 4-212. That rule provides:
“(a) General.—When a charging document is filed or when a stetted case is rescheduled pursuant to Rule 4-248, a summons or warrant shall be issued in accordance with this Rule. Title 5 of these rules does not apply to the issuance of a summons or warrant.
(b) Summons—Issuance.—Unless a warrant has been issued, or the defendant is in custody, or the charging *78document is a citation, a summons shall be issued to the defendant (1) in the District Court, by a judicial officer or the clerk, and (2) in the circuit court, by the clerk. The summons shall advise the defendant to appear in person at the time and place specified or, in the circuit court, to appear or have counsel enter an appearance in writing at or before that time. A copy of the charging document shall be attached to the summons. A court may order the reissuance of a summons.
(c) Summons—Service.—The summons and charging document shall be served on the defendant by mail or by personal service by a sheriff or other peace officer, as directed (1) by a judicial officer in the District Court, or (2) by the State’s Attorney in the circuit court.” (Emphasis added).
These statutes and rules are just some of the first-class mail provisions that may be cast in doubt by the majority’s opinion in the instant case. Do these statutes and rules have “special or unique circumstances that would justify relaxation of the ordinary and available methods of service ... ?” 345 Md. at 65, 691 A.2d at 219. We do not know, and the test for special and unique circumstances seems, at best, murky. Apparently bankruptcy proceedings probably pass the test, estate and probate proceedings might pass the test, but long-arm suits do not pass the test.
A better rale would be that, where a permissible method of service of process reasonably designed to reach the defendant is used but does not reach the defendant through no fault or lack of diligence of the defendant and where a judgment is entered against the defendant based on that service of process, the defendant will be deemed to have been denied due process when the failure to receive service prevented the assertion of a viable defense to the cause of action. Of course a heavy burden will be placed upon the defendant to prove nonreceipt of service. The amount of proof necessary to establish nonreceipt of service will depend upon the method of *79service chosen by the plaintiff. This rule is entirely consistent with this Court’s prior holdings.3
A.
The majority and I agree that:
“At a minimum, the notice must be ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ ”
345 Md. at 53, 691 A.2d at 212 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657, 94 L.Ed. at 873). First-class mail meets that test, but it is up to the legislative or rule making body to authorize such service, and when authorized, it should be up to the litigants to decide whether to use first-class mail or an easier-to-prove form of service that would better insulate judgments from later collateral attack for nonreceipt of service.4
*80The law presumes that a letter properly mailed is in fact received. Mohr v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 216 Md. 197, 204, 140 A.2d 49, 51 (1958)(referring to “the universal rule to the effect that the receipt of a letter by the addressee is presumed, when it is shown that the letter, properly stamped and addressed, was posted in the mails”). Although current statistics are unavailable, a law review article published in 1987 reported that:
“[Rjecords of complaints of nondelivery of all first-class mail show an annual figure of approximately 44,000 claims of nonreceipt out of a total first class mail volume of over 72 billion pieces, for a rate of .00006 of 1 percent (or about 1 claim for every 2 million pieces of mail). Actual loss experience is presumably considerably less than even this tiny fraction of mail volume.” (Footnotes omitted)
Kent Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of Serving Process Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 Va. L. Rev. 1183, 1206 (1987)(citing United States Postal Serv., Annual Report of the Postmaster General 26 (1985)). The Supreme Court has referred to the mails as “ ‘an efficient and inexpensive means of communication,’ upon which prudent men will ordinarily rely in the conduct of important affairs,” see Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 1880, 72 L.Ed.2d 249, 258 (1982) (citation omitted), and has recognized mail service as a constitutionally sufficient means of providing notice in a number of cases. See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 1347, 99 L.Ed.2d 565, 578 (1988)(stating that “[w]e have repeatedly recognized that mail service is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is reasonably calculated to provide actual notice”). In Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. *81259, 72 L.Ed. 446 (1928), for example, the Supreme Court assessed the validity of a New Jersey statute that permitted notice to nonresident motorists to be accomplished by service upon the Secretary of State. The Court observed that this method of service “would not be fair or due process unless such officer or the plaintiff is required to mail the notice to the defendant, or to advise him, by some written communication, so as to make it reasonably probable that he will receive actual notice.” Wuchter, 276 U.S. at 19, 48 S.Ct. at 260, 72 L.Ed. at 449 (emphasis added). Because the New Jersey statute failed to provide for such communication by mail, the Court found the statute to be unconstitutional. The method of notification provided under the Virginia statute, in contrast, appears to conform with Wuchter’s precise requirements; service was made upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth, who then mailed the notice to the defendants.
The Supreme Court made similar reference to the mail system as an acceptable method of notification in Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 83 S.Ct. 279, 9 L.Ed.2d 255 (1962), a case which involved a municipality’s decision to divert a portion of a river. With regard to landowners whose property rights would be adversely affected by this action, the relevant statute required notice by publication. Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 209, 83 S.Ct. at 280-81, 9 L.Ed.2d at 257. The Supreme Court found that while newspaper publications and posted notices did not provide the “quality of notice” required by the Due Process Clause, the municipality’s constitutional obligation would have been discharged by “the mailing of a single letter.” Schroeder, 371 U.S. at 213-14, 83 S.Ct. at 283, 9 L.Ed.2d at 260. See also Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 2712, 77 L.Ed.2d 180, 188 (1983)(stating that “[njotice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition ....” in the context of notice to mortgagee of tax sale).
In Mullane, supra, the Supreme Court specifically referenced ordinary mail as an acceptable means of providing notice. At issue in Mullane was the validity of notice by publication to trust fund beneficiaries of a judicial settlement *82of fund accounts. 339 U.S. at 307-09, 70 S.Ct. at 654-55, 94 L.Ed. at 869-71. Some of the beneficiaries were not residents of the state. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309, 70 S.Ct. at 655, 94 L.Ed. at 871. The Court held that notice by publication was constitutionally inadequate, and stated that those beneficiaries whose whereabouts were ascertainable should have been informed of the accounting “at least by ordinary mail.”5 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318, 70 S.Ct. at 659, 94 L.Ed. at 875 (emphasis added).
In assessing the minimal requirements of due process, therefore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly referenced the ordinary mail system as a constitutionally sufficient mechanism by which to provide notice. Virginia’s decision to permit service by mail, therefore, seems in accord with the minimum requirements of due process as defined by the Supreme Court.
B.
Service by ordinary mail also has been upheld by numerous lower courts. Service by first-class mail in a bankruptcy proceeding, for example, withstood direct constitutional attack in Matter of Park Nursing Center, Inc., 766 F.2d 261 (6th Cir.1985). Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7004 provides in pertinent part:
“(b) Service by first class mail. Except as provided in subdivision (h), in addition to the methods of service authorized by [certain Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], service may be made within the United States by first class mail postage prepaid as follows:
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or incompetent, by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode or to the place where the individual regularly conducts a business or profession.”
*83Fed. R. Bankr. 7004(b)(1)(1994, 1996 Cum.Supp.)(emphasis added). A debtor, against whom a default judgment in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding had been entered, challenged the constitutionality of an earlier version6 of this rule on the grounds that: (1) due process requires personal service; (2) a method of service more likely to accomplish service should be attempted before resorting to first-class mail; (3) safeguards to ensure receipt of a first-class letter were lacking; and (4) the rule contained no requirement that the address on the envelope be correct. Park Nursing Center, 766 F.2d at 263-64. In rejecting these assertions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that “Mullane does not require the very best means of serving process, only a means that is reasonably calculated to reach the party.” Park Nursing Center, 766 F.2d at 264. In light of other rules of civil procedure that provide a mechanism by which to set aside a default judgment, the court concluded that the rule in question satisfies due process. Park Nursing Center, 766 F.2d at 263-64. Bankruptcy court decisions subsequent to Park Nursing Center have consistently supported the constitutionality of service by first-class mail. See, e.g., In Re M & L Business Mach. Co., Inc., 190 B.R. 111, 115-16 (D.Colo.1995)(observing that “strict compliance with Rule 7004 serves to protect due process rights.... ”); Leavell v. Karnes, 143 B.R. 212, 217 (S.D.Ill.1990)(stating that “[sjervice under Rule 7004(b) comports with the procedural due process requirements identified by the Supreme Court in Mullane. ...”).
The Minnesota Supreme Court, similarly, upheld the constitutionality of a statute permitting ordinary mail service upon a nonresident motorist in Schilling v. Odlebak, 177 Minn. 90, 224 N.W. 694 (1929). The statute at issue was strikingly similar to Virginia’s long-arm statute. Specifically, it allowed substituted service upon the Secretary of State “ ‘provided, that notice *84of such service and a copy of the process are within ten days thereafter sent by mail by the plaintiff to the defendant at his last known address and that the plaintiffs affidavit of compliance with the provisions of this act are attached to the summons.’ ” Schilling, 224 N.W. at 695 (quoting L.1927, p. 557, c. 409, 1 Mason Minn. St. § 2684-8)(emphasis added). Relying in part on Wuchter, supra, the court concluded that “it is reasonably certain that the defendant will receive actual notice, and that adequate opportunity is afforded him to defend.” Schilling, 224 N.W. at 696.
In a more recent decision, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a statute that permitted notice of the impoundment and potential disposal of abandoned vehicles by first-class mail. Holmes, supra. The plaintiff in Holmes contended that this method of notification was constitutionally flawed in that it “fail[ed] to provide notice in the best available manner to assure delivery to the known owner prior to depriving the owner irrevocably of a property interest.” 610 N.E.2d at 840. Although the trial court entered summary judgment in the plaintiffs favor, based in part on its conclusion that due process requires certified mail, return receipt requested, see id., the Indiana Supreme Court reversed that judgment. Holmes, 610 N.E.2d at 846. The court noted that “[t]he notice by first class mail given to owners of abandoned vehicles must be viewed in light of the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement in dicta that ‘the mails provide an “efficient and inexpensive means of communication,” ... upon which prudent men will ordinarily rely in the conduct of important affairs.’ ” Holmes, 610 N.E.2d at 844 (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. at 455, 102 S.Ct. at 1880, 72 L.Ed.2d at 258, in turn quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319, 70 S.Ct. at 660, 94 L.Ed. at 876). Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test, the court concluded that the method of notification prescribed by the statute satisfied due process, see Holmes, 610 N.E.2d at 845 (observing that “[t]he risk that failure of ... notice will lead to deprivation of an individual’s vehicle is modest”), and that “[f]irst class mail notice sent to the record address of the vehicle owner is reasonably calculated to apprise the owner of the pendency of *85abandoned vehicle proceedings.” Holmes, 610 N.E.2d at 846. See also Service of Process by Mail, 74 Mich. L.Rev. at 382, where the author concludes that “service by mail without a return-receipt requirement complies with the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments,” (citations omitted), and further “concludes that, in light of the procedures available to a defendant to challenge service [by ordinary mail] and to reopen default judgments entered against him, the requirement of a signed receipt is unduly harsh on plaintiffs.” Id.
Service by ordinary mail clearly satisfies due process in a variety of contexts. Virginia has apparently concluded that the use of first-class mail under its long-arm statute is “reasonably calculated” to reach defendants. Maryland courts should defer to that assessment and limit their inquiry to whether the Miserandinos were afforded due process in the application of this statutory method of service. Since first-class mail is “reasonably calculated” to reach a recipient, if the Miserandinos actually received the mailed service authorized by the Virginia statute, they have literally received all the process they were due. I respectfully dissent.
Judges RODOWSKY and RAKER have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion.

. In the instant action, the Miserandinos do not dispute that they had sufficient contacts with the Commonwealth to otherwise subject them to the jurisdiction of the Virginia courts.

. Even if first-class mail service is permitted, litigants should be cautious in using this method of service because if the defendant does not respond, any judgment might be vulnerable to a due process attack. It is easier to prove nonreceipt of first-class mailed notice than it is to prove nonreceipt of certified mail notice where there is a written return receipt.

. It is interesting to speculate that the majority might have held first-class mail service to be constitutional had the Virginia statute required the Secretary of the Commonwealth to give notice by registered mail return-receipt requested, restricted deliveiy, but the Secretary only gave notice to the Miserandinos by first-class mail, as in the instant case. This Court has indicated that the use of first-class mail is adequate, even though the statute requires registered mail, if the first-class mail is actually received. This Court has said:
“even when a statute requires that a notice be given by registered mail it has been held that notice actually received, though by regular mail, is valid. See 58 Am.Jur.2d, Notice § 27 (1971); Crummer v. Whitehead, 230 Cal.App.2d 264, 40 Cal.Rptr. 826 (1964); Volandri v. Taylor, 124 Cal.App. 356, 12 P.2d 462 (1932); Steele v. Trustees of Pittsburg Public Schools, 121 Cal.App. 419, 9 P.2d 217 (1932); Drake v. Comptroller of City of New York, 278 App. Div. 317, 104 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1st Dept.1951).”
State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 210, 328 A.2d 737, 746 (1974).

. First-class mail service would be less expensive and less burdensome to plaintiffs as well as defendants and ought to be available as an optional form of service in many causes of action. Plaintiffs in some instances, however, should prefer “certified” over first-class mail, not because the former increases the probability of service, but because it increases the evidence of service and makes any judgment less vulnerable to a later challenge. Whether first-class mail is more or less reliable than “certified” mail often depends upon the individual to be served, *80rather than the nature of the cause of action. If "certified” mail is sent to thé home address of a defendant or defendants who work during postal delivery hours or travel frequently, and who find it too difficult or inconvenient to go to the post office, such mail will often be returned as “unclaimed." A prospective plaintiff who wishes to serve a working defendant at a home address may wish to use ordinary mail and to consider later a back-up form of service if the defendant does not respond and there may be some doubt about receipt of service.

. For those beneficiaries whose whereabouts could not be ascertained with due diligence, notice by publication was held to be sufficient. Mullane v. Central Hanover B. & T. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318, 70 S.Ct. 652, 659, 94 L.Ed. 865, 875 (1950).

. Fed R. Bankr. 704(c)(1) similarly permitted service "by mailing a copy of the summons, complaint, and notice to [an individual's] dwelling house or usual place where he regularly conducts his business or profession.”