Court Opinion

ID: 9571871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:35:56.317371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:07.199300
License: Public Domain

*464. Pope, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I must dissent because there is insufficient evidence in this case from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly left the scene of an accident in violation of OCGA § 40-6-270 (a). I agree with the majority’s conclusions that knowledge is an element of the offense proscribed by OCGA § 40-6-270 (a) and that the only evidence in this case of criminal intent is circumstantial in nature. However, I do not agree with the majority’s further conclusion that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to support the verdict the evidence in this case excludes every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant’s guilt.
In this case, the defendant, a 61-year-old engineer, who is a resident of San Francisco temporarily working in the Augusta area, was returning from a trip to the grocery store in his rental vehicle. The victim and his son were walking along an unlit, well-traveled road after dark. Because the grass on the shoulder of the road was high, the victim and his son both testified that they were walking single file with one foot on the asphalt and one foot on the ground. Both the victim and his son also testified that the defendant’s car was traveling at a normal speed for that portion of the road and the car made no erratic movement when it approached them but eased closer to the side of the road where they were walking. Defendant’s car did not strike the son of the victim, who was walking ahead of the victim. The victim’s son testified that he was wearing an “electric blue” shirt with yellow plastic letters which he opined was easy to see. However, he further testified that no one had ever told him his shirt was easy to see at night. The victim was wearing a solid blue shirt and tan pants, without any reflective material on his clothing.
The victim’s son testified that the defendant applied his brakes at the top of the hill. However, he testified that the defendant’s car was approximately the length of two football fields away from the area where he struck the victim at the time he applied brakes. The only other witness who had an opportunity to observe defendant and his car at the time he struck the victim was a passenger in the car traveling behind the defendant’s car who testified he did not recall whether defendant applied his brakes after striking the victim and also testified defendant “looked like he didn’t know if he hit him or not.” That witness further testified that the defendant’s car may have sped up after it hit the victim but he was not sure and offered it could have appeared that way because the driver of the car he was riding in was slowing down. The defendant’s testimony was not impeached. He testified that on the night in question he was returning from the grocery store and had both the air conditioner and music on in his car with all windows closed. He stated he had no idea he struck anyone or *465anything with his car until he was contacted by the police officer investigating the reported hit-and-run of the victim. He then inspected his rental car and noticed the side view mirror was bent slightly. The investigating officer corroborated the defendant’s testimony that the damage to his car was slight and not readily noticeable. The defendant also presented a character witness who testified the defendant had a good reputation for honesty and integrity.
Decided September 9, 1993
Reconsideration denied October 6, 1993
Kenneth R. Chance, for appellant.
Robert W. Hunter III, Solicitor, Carl P. Dowling, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.
“ ‘Whether or not in a given case circumstances are sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the accused, is primarily a question for determination by the [finder of fact.] . . . However, this court as a court of law, where there appears a hypothesis from the evidence, or from the lack of evidence and the defendant’s statement, pointing to the innocence of the accused, and which tested by all human experience is a reasonable one, may declare it so as a matter of law.’ ” Harris v. State, 236 Ga. 242 (223 SE2d 643) (1976) (quoting Smith v. State, 56 Ga. App. 384, 387 (192 SE 647) (1937)). In my opinion under the facts of this case, the hypothesis that the defendant did not know he had struck the victim with the side view mirror of his rental car until he was contacted by the police is a reasonable one which is tested by human experience and was not excluded by the evidence. Because the evidence in this case was not sufficient to authorize a finding that the defendant knowingly left the scene of an accident beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Beasley and Judge Cooper join in this dissent.