Court Opinion

ID: 9751616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:39:30.692752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:52.767879
License: Public Domain

Opinion
WOODS (Fred), J.
Convicted by jury of possessing rock cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) appellant admitted a Penal Code section 12022.1 allegation (on bail in another case at the time of committing the instant offense), and was placed on three years probation on various conditions including that he not associate with his co-arrestee girlfriend.
Appellant contends: (1) the trial court committed Miranda error and (2) the “do not associate” with your co-arrestee girlfriend probation condition is invalid.
We find no error and affirm the judgment.
*1373Discussion
A. Appellant contends the trial court committed Miranda error.
Prior to the presentation of evidence, appellant moved to suppress his statements. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. (Evid. Code, § 402.) Five witnesses, including appellant, testified. It was undisputed that when appellant made his statements he was in custody and had not been advised of his Miranda rights. The sole issue was whether his statements were volunteered or the result of questioning or its functional equivalent. (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291 [64 L.Ed.2d 297, 100 S.Ct. 1682].)
The trial court determined the statements were volunteered and that there was no functional equivalent of questioning. Appellant contends this determination is in error.
“The scope of our review of constitutional claims of this nature is well established. We must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported [citations]. However, we must independently determine from the undisputed facts, and those properly found by the trial court, whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.” (People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 263 [256 Cal.Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610].) “ ‘ “[T]he trial court’s ruling on a Miranda [ ] issue may not be set aside by us unless it is '’palpably erroneous.'"'" (People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 575 [247 Cal.Rptr. 729, 754 P.2d 1306].)
With this perspective (People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 263; People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303-304 [228 Cal.Rptr. 228, 721 P.2d 110]) we summarize the evidentiary hearing evidence.
On January 31, 1990, about 11 a.m., when Los Angeles County Sheriffs deputies arrived at a Panorama City residence to execute a search warrant, appellant and his girlfriend (Juanita Johnson) were just leaving. Deputies blocked their path and detained them while other deputies went to the subject residence. After approximately 10 minutes, when the residence had been secured but not yet searched, appellant and his girlfriend were escorted into the residence and placed on the couch. The girlfriend stated she lived there. Appellant stated he did not live there but sometimes stayed overnight. A deputy told appellant and his girlfriend he knew they were selling drugs and if he found rock cocaine and could determine whose it was “some people will be going to jail.”
*1374After approximately 30 minutes of searching, a deputy found cocaine, money, and a gun in an upstairs bedroom. Narcotic “pay and owe” sheets were also found. During the 30-minute search no one asked appellant any questions.
Having found the cocaine and the other evidence, the deputy came downstairs and told both appellant and his girlfriend they were under arrest for possession of rock cocaine for sale. “Immediately” appellant and his girlfriend stated “they don’t sell rock cocaine, it was for their personal use.”
Appellant argues that the deputy’s advisement (you are under arrest for possession of rock cocaine for sale was the functional equivalent of questioning, rendering his response (I don’t sell rock cocaine, it was for my personal use) inadmissible under Miranda. Appellant is mistaken.
Rhode Island v. Innis states “ ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” (Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 291, 301 [64 L.Ed.2d 297, 308], Italics added.)
The deputy’s advisement (you are under arrest for possession of rock cocaine for sale) was “words or actions normally attendant to arrest” (Pen. Code, § 8411 and hence expressly outside the definition of “interrogation.”
Far more is required to constitute “the functional equivalent of questioning” than merely advising a person he is under arrest for a specific offense. (Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 291 [While being driven to jail for the shotgun murder of a cab driver, defendant listened to transporting officers state “God forbid one of [the handicapped children] might find [the missing shotgun] with shells and they might hurt themselves.” Defendant interrupted, indicating he wanted to show them where the shotgun was. Held: volunteered.]; People v. Siripongs, supra, 45 Cal.3d 548, 574 [Sitting next to defendant an officer “began an inventory” of defendant’s wallet, including five stolen credit cards. When he came to a First Interstate Bank card defendant “spontaneously denied he had stolen the card, and claimed it *1375had come in the mail.” Held: volunteered.]; People v. O’Sullivan (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 237, 241-244 [265 Cal.Rptr. 784] [Defendant, watching booking officer inventory her possessions, hears officer state “I believe I have something here,” indicating two small bags of cocaine. Defendant responds, “Oh, oh.” Held: volunteered.]; People v. Dominick (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1174 [227 Cal.Rptr. 884] [Officer tells defendant his coperpetrator has been arrested and falsely tells him a victim has identified his photograph as one of the persons who raped her and murdered her friend. Five minutes later defendant wants to talk to the officer and an hour later he confesses. Held: defendant initiated the confession conversation.]; People v. Hayes (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 898, 906-909 [215 Cal.Rptr. 595] [Officer tells 16-year-old he is going to have him certified as an adult. Juvenile says “You can’t do that to me” and “he hadn’t killed anybody and for me to come and go with him and he would show me where the gun was.” Held: volunteered.]; see also 5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) § 2685, pp. 3229-3231, 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986), § 626 pp. 608-609.)
B. Appellant contends the “do not associate” with your co-arrestee girlfriend probation condition is invalid.
“The Legislature has placed in trial judges a broad discretion in the sentencing process, including the determination as to whether probation is appropriate and, if so, the conditions thereof. (Pen. Code, § 1203 et seq.) A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the [defendant] was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .’ [Citation.] Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not in itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.” (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481,486 [124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545], Italics added.) In a footnote Lent makes clear “and,” not “or,” is the accurate connecting term. (Id. at p. 486, fn. 1.)
The challenged probation condition satisfies the Lent test. Appellant having been convicted of cocaine possession and having made admissions that he was a cocaine user, it was within the discretion of the trial court to prohibit him from associating with other admitted cocaine users and suspected cocaine sellers such as his girlfriend, Juanita Johnson. (See People v. Robinson (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 816 [245 Cal.Rptr. 50]; In re Peeler (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 483 [72 Cal.Rptr. 254].)
*1376Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
Lillie, P. J., concurred

The section provides:
“The person mating the arrest must inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest, and the authority to make it, except when the person making the arrest has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested is actually engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit an offense, or the person to be arrested is pursued immediately after its commission, or after an escape.
“The person mating the arrest must, on request of the person he is arresting, inform the latter of the offense for which he is being arrested.”