Court Opinion

ID: 9707295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:07:53.325614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:30.616793
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
Since Nasser was not present in court when the alleged contempt occurred-nor does my examination of the record reveal the court was even in session (the judge was awaiting Nasser's arrival)-Nasser could not have committed direct eriminal contempt. Thus, the judgment of guilt for direct contempt was not supported by the facts and evidence, was clearly erroneous, and should be reversed.
The dignity of a court depends upon the maintenance of decorum. The right of the court to protect its inherent right to function through its contempt power has a venerable history in Indiana, and our law with respect to that right is not complicated. When an individual disturbs accepted courtroom protocol, he or she faces punishment for contempt. While the majority has noted several definitions of contempt, I find the explanation of direct and indirect contempt given by our supreme court in Ex Parte Wright (1879), 65 Ind. 504 to be clearly instructive:
*1342A contempt of court is either direct or constructive [indirect].... A direct contempt is an open insult, in the face of the court, to the person of the judges while presiding, or a resistance to its powers in their presence. A constructive [indirect] contempt is an act done, not in the presence of the court, but at a distance, which resists their authority, as disobedience to process, or an order of the court, such as tends in its operation to obstruct, interrupt, prevent or embarrass the administration of justice.
Id. at 508.
When the disruptive activity constitutes direct contempt of court, no formal charges are filed and no evidentiary hearing is held. Ind.Code 34-4-7-7. Rather, citation and punishment for direct contempt is an entirely summary process; the offense may be punished immediately upon its occurrence, without further proof or explanation beyond what is known to the presiding judge by his senses. Skolnick v. State (1979), 180 Ind.App. 253, 388 N.E.2d 1156, 1170, cert. denied. Conversely, when the disruptive activity constitutes indirect contempt, the accused is entitled to a panoply of constitutional procedural due process, including notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Ind.Code 34-4-7-8 and Ind.Code 34-4-7-9.
Given the above definition of direct contempt, I fail to see how Nasser's failure to appear in court, or non-presence, constitutes an action taken in the presence of the court. Indeed, the majority of state and federal courts that have addressed this question have found similarly errant attorneys' actions to constitute indirect contempt. Generally, these courts reason that while an attorney's absence is within the personal knowledge of the court, the reason for the absence is not, and, therefore, the due process requirements of indirect contempt attach. See 13 A.L.RAth 122, § 10 (1982).
Moreover, while the New Jersey procedure, adopted by the majority in Curtis v. State, Ind.App., 625 N.E.2d 496, for determining whether an attorney is in direct or indirect contempt for failing to appear in court, is innovative, it is not the law in Indiana. In short, the New Jersey procedure provides that when an attorney fails to appear in court, he or she is given an opportunity to explain the absence at a later, apparently perchance, appearance before the court.1 If the explanation given is reasonable, citation for contempt will not follow. However, if the attorney refuses to give an explanation or the explanation given is inadequate or insulting to the court, the attorney may be summarily cited for direct contempt. On the other hand, if the explanation is of questionable adequacy, the matter will be treated as indirect, and will be accompanied by due process safeguards. Curtis at 498.
I fail to see why Indiana's contempt procedure is insufficient for determining the fate of an attorney who fails to appear in court.2 *1343However, it appears to me that even under the New Jersey "hybrid" approach, the procedure afforded Nasser is indicative of that of indirect contempt, and seems to support my position that his non-presence in court might have constituted indirect, rather than direct contempt of court. Specifically, Nasser was afforded an opportunity to explain his absence at a "preliminary" hearing the day of the occurrence. Judge Yelton apparently found his explanation to be inadequate, and thereafter issued an affidavit citing Nasser for indirect contempt. Later, Nasser was afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard at a formal hearing. Nothing about the procedure employed was summary in nature.
In summary, Nasser was charged with an offense which was impossible to prove because his actions did not take place in the court's presence. That, however, is the state's problem.3 Since the Special Judge entered no judgment with respect to the indirect criminal contempt charge, Nasser was not found guilty of any other offense. The case should be reversed and Nasser discharged.

. The Curtis court adopted the New Jersey "hybrid" approach from In re Yengo (1980), 84 N.J. 111, 417 A.2d 533, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124, 101 S.Ct. 941, 67 L.Ed.2d 110, where, in describing this initial step in the contempt procedure, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
Aside from the unlikely event of complete disappearance of an attorney, the absence will be followed ... by a subsequent appearance before the court. At that time the court invariably will ask for an explanation from the attorney. Generally the absence alone does not constitute contempt. An essential element of the offense is the inadequacy of the explanation.
Judge Shields elaborated no further on the procedural formality, or lack thereof, of this essentially "preliminary" (or possibly surprise) hearing for which no mention is made of a requirement for notice to be given the accused. Depending upon the individual circumstances of each case, it is entirely possible that days, weeks, or even months may go by before the attorney will have reason to appear again, or perhaps the attorney will never have reason to appear before the court again. Thus, I seriously question the practicality, as well as the apparent lack of formal procedural due process, of this initial procedure.

. - For an example of one procedure employed for finding an attorney in contempt of court, see In re the Matter of Stanley Jablonski (1992), Ind.App. 590 N.E.2d 598. While the issue presented in Jablonski is not relevant here, the factual scenario is similar and instructive. After Jablon-ski, a public defender, failed to appear three times on behalf of a criminal defendant, the judge requested the county prosecutor to proceed with indirect criminal contempt charges. After conducting an investigation, the prosecutor declined to file the charges because he found that Jablonski's absence was not based on intentional disobedience, but upon an apparent lack of com*1343munication on the part of the court staff, The procedure employed in Jablonski is logical and comports with that prescribed by Indiana law. Thus, I see no need for Indiana to embrace the "manufactured" hybrid procedure adopted in Curtis, particularly the perchance "preliminary" hearing.

. The record reveals that Nasser did not object to the filing of the direct criminal contempt charge. That does not mean, however, that he waived the state's duty to prove the direct contempt charge against him.