Court Opinion

ID: 8019354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 02:08:44.14212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:36:33.882982
License: Public Domain

WOODSON, C. J.
(dissenting) — That portion of the plaintiff’s railway lying in this State was constructed and owned by a Missouri corporation, and was so owned at the date of the adoption of the Constitution of this State in 1875; and that being so, the plaintiff and those through whom it claims took that part of the road located in this State with all the rights, powers, iduties, burdens and ■ limitations granted and imposed upon it by the Constitution and laws- of this State.
At the date of the consolidation of the roads mentioned in the majority opinion, under the name of the Wabash Railway Company, section 18 of article 12 of the Constitution of 1875 was in full force and effect. It reads as follows:
“Sec. 18. Consolidation with foreign companies.— If any railroad company organized under the laws of this State shall consolidate, by sale or otherwise, with any railroad company organized under the laws of any other State, or of the United States, the same shall not thereby become a foreign corporation; but the courts of this State shall retain jurisdiction in all matters which may arise, as if said consolidation had not taken place. In no case shall any consolidation take place, except upon public notice of at least sixty days to all stockholders, in such manner as may be provided by law. ’ ’
• According to the plain letter and spirit of this constitutional provision, the company which owned that part of the road lying within this State at the date of said consolidation remained and still remains a domestic corporation, and its property, rights and duties, in so far as intrastate transportation is concerned, 're-' main subject to and are governed by the laws of this State to the same extent as if the consolidation had never taken place.
*320The consolidations mentioned become new companies, so is this reorganized company. [State ex rel. v. Keokuk & W. Ry. Co., 99 Mo. 30; State ex rel. v. Chicago, Burlington & K. C. Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 523.]
But that is not true regarding interstate commerce, for under both the State and Federal Constitutions, as well as under the statutes of this State authorizing the consolidation of the railroads of this State with those of other States, those parts of the consolidated road situate in Missouri are authorized and required to carry interstate commerce; and consequently the Act of 1913 (Laws 1913, p. 179) does not and could not apply to that character of commerce. [State ex inf. v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, l. c. 376.]
In other words, in my opinion, in construing said Act of 1913 we must view that part of plaintiff’s road located in this State from two aspects, viz.: First. That as a matter of law the Missouri company still owns the physical property and possesses all the rights, powers .and privileges it possessed, and owes all the duties to the public imposed upon it prior to the date of its consolidation with the plaintiff, in so far as intrastate shipments are concérned. Second. That said company, property, rights, powers and privileges are subjected by said statutes and constitutional provisions to the paramount duty of carrying interstate commerce, but not totally destroyed, as I understand the majority •opinion in effect holds.
If I am correct in the foregoing observations,-then the Act of 1913 is only applicable to intrastate commerce and is valid in that regard.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the alternative writ of mandamus should be quashed.