Court Opinion

ID: 9582751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:30:55.022698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:17.777007
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the conclusion that the admission into evidence, over objection, of the cohort’s inculpatory statement detailing the commission of the crimes at issue was error. As urged by Hardy at trial and in his appellate brief, it violated his Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” I reach this conclusion because of the high standard which must be applied in determining whether this was reversible error. In applying the standard required by the United States Supreme Court, it is clear that the convictions on all of the counts must be reversed and a new trial afforded. It must proceed either without cohort Burgess’ statement implicating Hardy as an active participant in the crimes, or with Burgess’ testimony, which will be subject to cross-examination. The analysis is as follows.
“On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence is construed in the light most favorable to the verdict of guilt, and the presumption of innocence no longer applies. An appellate court does not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses but only determines whether the adjudication of guilt is supported by sufficient competent evidence. [Cit.]” Belins v. State, 210 Ga. App. 259 (1) (435 SE2d 675) (1993). A jury is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from facts it finds. OCGA § 24-4-9; Farmer v. State, 208 Ga. App. 198, 199 (1) (430 SE2d 397) (1993). On appeal, we must accept that “the fact finders have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ridley v. State, 236 Ga. 147, 149 (223 SE2d 131) (1976).
In applying these principles in this case, we must exclude the inadmissible evidence of the co-defendant’s statement and test the evidence by an additional standard as well. Since a federal constitutional violation occurred, the applicable test is that required by the United States Supreme Court, not the Georgia Supreme Court. As recognized by the latter court in measuring the effect of a federal constitutional error, the standard found in Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (87 SC 824, 17 LE2d 705) (1967), must be applied. Vaughn v. State, 248 Ga. 127, 131 (2) (281 SE2d 594) (1981). The effect of non-constitutional errors was measured in Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59 (230 SE2d 869) (1976), the case in which the Georgia Supreme Court *601established the “highly probable” test. That same test was applied to a nonconstitutional error in such cases as Barrett v. State, 263 Ga. 533, 535 (2) (436 SE2d 480) (1993); Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534, 537 (2) (314 SE2d 910) (1984), and by this Court in Cobb v. State, 209 Ga. App. 708, 709 (434 SE2d 513) (1993).
“The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination [was] fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 684 (106 SC 1431, 89 LE2d 674) (1986). In that case, the court held that Confrontation Clause errors are subject to the harmless error analysis of Chapman, supra.
The proper analysis is explained in Chapman, supra at 24: “There is little, if any, difference,” the Supreme Court wrote, “between our statement in Fahy v. Connecticut[, 375 U. S. 85 (84 SC 229, 11 LE2d 171) (1963)] about ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction’ and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. We, therefore, do no more than adhere to the meaning of our Fahy case when we hold, as we now do, that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” As reiterated in that case, we may not “treat as harmless those constitutional errors that ‘affect substantial rights’ of a party.” Id. at 23.
In Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (89 SC 1726, 23 LE2d 284) (1969), which preceded Van Arsdall, the confessions of two co-defendants who did not testify were introduced. Even though there were limiting instructions that the jury was to consider each confession only against the confessor in the multi-defendant trial, the admission of the evidence constituted a Confrontation Clause violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (88 SC 1620, 20 LE2d 476) (1968). But the court concluded that under the particular circumstances of that case, including the nature of the confessions and of the other evidence, the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the two statement-making co-defendants constituted harmless error. This evidence was regarded as cumulative and the balance of the evidence as overwhelming, so that the violation “was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Harrington, supra at 254.
As instructed in Harrington, “[o]ur judgment must be based on our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to have been the probable impact of the . . . [confession] on the minds of an average jury.” Id. I cannot conclude that the admission of Burgess’ statement was “ ‘harmless’ in terms of [its] effect on the factfinding pro*602cess at trial.” Van Arsdall, supra at 681.
The factors which we must consider “include the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted[ Van Arsdall involved impermissible limit on cross-examination of a witness], and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Van Arsdall, supra at 684.
This was a circumstantial evidence case. None of the victims could positively identify Hardy as one of the robbers, although Bartholomaus said “I think” and “I believe” defendant was the gunman, based on his recollection at the trial twenty and one-half months after the incident, during which incident he saw one of the robbers pointing a gun at him through the window of his car. He said he focused on the gun, but that the gunman’s “face was only about twelve to eighteen inches behind the gun.”
Burgess’ statement was of critical importance to the State’s case, as is demonstrated by the vigorous effort expended by the State in achieving its admission. Burgess was called to testify but refused to do so, and the State wished to depend on the written statement taken while he was in custody instead. The statement, if Burgess was believed, left no doubt that Hardy was one of the three robbers. The quality of the statement was high, as it went into detail about the trio’s activities that night, and its credibility was confirmed by the testimony of the victims with respect to their respective experiences and by the circumstances of their apprehension at the pawn shop. The evidence did not contradict the statement on any material points; rather, the statement tied it together and contributed missing points. It spoke directly to the issue of identity, which was the primary disputed issue in the case.
Burgess’ statement was not cumulative; no one else testified who knew of the robbers’ spree and knew who they were. Its importance in eliminating any doubt is evidenced by the jury’s deliberations of only one hour before reaching a verdict, although the trial was held on two days.
Of significant importance in the analysis is “the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Van Arsdall, supra at 684. Particularly because of the distinctive clothing, the gun, the car, the proximity in time and location of the car theft and series of robberies and attempted robbery, the mode of operation, and the apprehension of the three perpetrators in the process of committing another crime involving the property of others, there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), when the impermissible evi*603dence is removed. But it was not so “overwhelming” as in Harrington that the Sixth Amendment violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Decided November 19, 1996.
Jimmie E. Baggett, Jr., for appellant.
Harry N. Gordon, District Attorney, Richard J. Weaver, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The same result was reached in Barksdale v. State, 265 Ga. 9, 13 (2) (c) (453 SE2d 2) (1995). Compare Byrd v. State, 262 Ga. 426, 427 (2) (420 SE2d 748) (1992); Wyatt v. State, 222 Ga. App. 604 (475 SE2d 651) (1996).