Court Opinion

ID: 9733547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:10:18.652728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:42.265308
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
(dissenting). The Milwaukee Journal's petition for writ of mandamus is misdirected. The Board of Regents, the UW-Madison chancellor and the UW-Madison athletic director have no discretion to release the names of applicants for the positions of ath*944letic director or head football coach at the UW-Madison because the Department of Employment Relations has closed these records pursuant to sec. 230.13(2), Stats. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Section 230.13, Stats., provides:
Closed records. [T]he secretary and the administrator may keep records of the following personnel matters closed to the public:
(1) Examination scores and ranks and other evaluations of applicants.
(2) Names of applicants other than those certified for employment.
(3) Dismissals, demotions and other disciplinary actions.
(6) Pay survey data obtained from identifiable nonpublic employers.
(7) Names of nonpublic employers contributing pay survey data.
Pursuant to this section, the department issued bulletins closing applicants' personnel records which contain materials used for evaluating an applicant for employment, including the Applicant Registration Form and reference materials. Department of Employment Relations Bulletin P-157 (Dec. 28, 1982); Bulletin MRS-19 (Apr. 26, 1985). The university officials contend that the department thereby closed to the public the names of applicants for the positions of athletic director and football coach.
The majority concludes that sec. 230.13(2), Stats., applies only to employees in the state classified service and did not authorize the department to close to the public the names of applicants for the positions of athletic director and football coach. I disagree.
The majority creates an ambiguity in sec. 230.13(2), Stats., where none exists and cures the ambiguity by *945adding words to an unambiguous statute. I am unable to find anything in the language of sec. 230.13(2) which justifies the majority's action. On its face, sec. 230.13(2) is not limited to the classified service. It is located in subch. II, entitled "Civil Service." "Civil service" "means all offices and positions of trust or employment in the service of the state," except the militia. Section 230.03(6), Stats, (emphasis added). The civil service includes the classified service and the unclassified service. Section 230.08(1), Stats. It is undisputed that the positions of athletic director and football coach are in the unclassified service. When the legislature wished to limit a statute within subch. II to the classified service, it said so. See, e.g., secs. 230.09 (classification), 230.15 (appointments, promotions, changes in classified service) and 230.25, Stats, (certification, appointments and registers). When it wished to limit a statute to the unclassified service, it also said so. See, e.g., sec. 230.148, Stats, (unclassified service reappointments). Since sec. 230.13(2) is not limited by its language or context, it should be applied to all positions subject to subch. II.
The majority finds that sec. 230.13(2), Stats., must be narrowly construed because it creates an exception to the Public Records Law. Section 230.13 was created as sec. 16.095, Stats., by sec. 22, ch. 270, Laws of 1971. When that history is placed in the context of the developed case law, it is clear that sec. 230.13 simply codified and clarified a well-recognized common-law exception.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979) is a good place to begin a study of the previous public records law because the case was decided under sec. 19.21(2), Stats. (1973), which was in effect when sec. 16.095, Stats., was enacted. That statute was interpreted by the supreme court as a statement of the common law, leaving in place the limitations on the *946inspection of public records that existed at common law. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 426, 279 N.W.2d at 183. The court pointed out that under the common law, the right to inspect public records was not absolute. Id. at 429, 279 N.W.2d at 185.
The Breier court, and the Youmans court in an earlier decision, State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W.2d 470, 139 N.W.2d 241 (1965), concluded that the legislative policy expressed in the Open Meeting Law carried over to the inspection of public records and documents. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 430, 279 N.W.2d at 185.
When sec. 16.095, Stats. (1971), was created, the Open Meeting Law permitted closed sessions of governmental bodies for the purpose of considering the employment of any public employee. Section 66.77(3)(b), Stats. (1971). Under Breier and Youmans, the legislative policy expressed in this exception to the requirement of open meetings carried over to the inspection of public records and documents. Therefore if any legislative intent can be inferred from the state of the law when sec. 16.095 was created, the legislature appears to have intended to further limit the right to inspect public employees' personnel records. Parenthetically, I note that when the legislature created the modern Public Records Law, it continued to use the Open Meeting Law exemptions as indicative of public policy. Section 19.35(1)(a), Stats.
Given the public policy that personnel matters may be closed to the public, I cannot accept that when the legislature created sec. 16.095(2), Stats. (1971) [now sec. 230.13(2), Stats.], it intended to permit appointing authorities to close the records of applicants for positions in the classified service, but required them to disclose the applicants for positions in the unclassified service.
*947The majority opinion does not address whether any part of sec. 230.13, Stats., other than sub. (2) applies to unclassified employees. Admittedly, none of the other subsections are directly involved in this appeal. However, the subject matter of the other provisions provides a clue to the legislative intent as to sub. (2). For example, sub. (3) lists dismissals, demotions and other disciplinary actions. Historically, such records have always been subject to closure. I cannot accept that the legislature intended to change the law in this respect, without a clear expression of that intent. The alternative is to ascribe to the legislature an intent that one subsection of sec. 230.13 applies only to the classified service while others apply also to the unclassified service. That result is wholly illogical.
I conclude that secs. 230.01(1) and (2), Stats., reveal a public policy supporting the closing of personnel records. Exposing personnel records to public scrutiny would inhibit attracting and retaining competent personnel in the public service. In this case, we need not consider whether the Board of Regents, the chancellor, or the athletic director properly denied disclosure based on this public policy because they had no discretion to exercise. The decision to close the names of the applicants for the positions of UW-Madison athletic director and football coach was made by the department under sec. 230.13(2), Stats.
Department of Employment Relations Bulletin MRS-19 makes clear that the department intended its instructions to state agencies and appointing authorities to apply to all employees in the state service. The introductory paragraph states "This bulletin is issued to interpret the Open Records Law and clarify which documents in the Employe Personnel Record ("P" file) of state civil service employes are open to the public, and *948which may be closed to the public." (Emphasis added.) The civil service includes the unclassified service as well as the classified service.
The majority concludes that "a fair reading of the bulletin" indicates that the list of records therein includes only records of classified employees. Majority op. at 941 n.3.1 disagree. The majority's reading requires us to assume that the department which is charged with administering the state public service does not know the meaning of "civil service." I do not agree that ascribing that defect of knowledge to the department is a "fair reading" of the bulletin.
The majority's construction of sec. 230.13(2), Stats., requires that we judicially amend the statute to read: "Names of applicants for positions in the classified service other than those certified for employment." (Italicized words added.) We are not to add words to an unambiguous statute unless an interpretation of a statute leads to a ludicrous or plainly unintended result. State ex rel. Girouard v. Jackson County Circuit Ct., 149 Wis. 2d 578, 584, 439 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Ct. App. 1989) (Sundby, J., dissenting), rev'd, 155 Wis. 2d 148, 454 N.W.2d 792 (1990).
The majority concludes that in any event, the university "failed to exercise its discretion in the matter . . .." Majority op. at 943 n.5. The university officials had no discretion to exercise. Acting under sec. 230.13(2), Stats., the department closed the personnel records containing the names of applicants for positions in the public service, including the positions of athletic director and football coach. The Journal's quarrel is with the secretary and the administrator of the department, or, more likely, with the legislature.