Court Opinion

ID: 9469673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:46:24.460131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:30.165856
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
While the magistrate’s recommendation, accepted by the district court, resolved a question of fact with respect to appointment of counsel, a question remains as to whether petitioner Louis Ford was represented by counsel who was present at his plea and sentence. If counsel was not present at either of these critical stages in the prosecution, then petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated.1 Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847, 91 S.Ct. 1089, 28 L.Ed.2d 519 (1971); Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1964). Because credibility is crucial to the determination of whether counsel was present, I would remand for additional testimony on that question.
Three witnesses, who were in court when petitioner originally pled guilty and was sentenced, were available to testify. The magistrate heard only two, refusing petitioner’s request to produce the third. Under these circumstances, it is an abuse of discretion to not entertain the live testimony of the third witness.
The majority concludes that “the most important credibility determination related to the petitioner Ford.” Ante at [873-874] I think it evident that it was not Ford’s reputation for truth telling or even his demean- or that was crucial. The issue was whether the story that he told as to the presence of counsel was true or not. Of course, even *875those whose credibility is poor and demean- or untrustworthy still may be telling the truth about an incident. No other evidence was so strong as to foreclose Ford’s claim. And that is why the testimony of Hamilton is important.
Hamilton was not proffered as a witness until after the conclusion of the magistrate’s evidentiary hearing. The district court’s denial of Ford’s request to reopen the hearing for the testimony of Hamilton rests upon its perceived inability to exercise subpoena power over Hamilton since he resided more than one hundred miles away from the courthouse. No other reason for the refusal appears in the record. However, it appears from the record that compulsory process was neither requested nor necessary. Ford offered to produce Hamilton. When both attorneys traveled to Hamilton’s domicile, he gave his deposition voluntarily. The perceived absence of subpoena power is an insufficient reason to deny Ford the opportunity to present his testimony.2
Upon examination of the cold record of Hamilton’s deposition, the magistrate rejected his story. The only stated reason is a 1971 conviction for interstate transportation of forged securities.
The majority focuses upon Hamilton’s conjecture that the court records may have been altered,3 and his statement that he and Ford were “partners in crime.”4 However, Hamilton’s recollection from personal knowledge of the events following his arrest in 1953 seems both sharp and clear. While Hamilton’s testimony corroborates the relevant facts testified to by Ford, Hamilton remembered certain details not mentioned by Ford.5 Hamilton discussed the crime, the involvement of the two female codefendants, the pretrial detention, plea bargaining proceedings and the appearance of Ford and he before the court. Hamilton forthrightly admitted prior convictions and noted that he had no outstanding court-imposed obligations as to any of them.
On review of the written transcript of his deposition, the magistrate found that the 1971 conviction “touched on his credibility.” Hamilton’s testimony was rejected without the factfinder allowing his live testimony, and without any sign of further evaluation by the factfinder beyond the recitation of the aged felony conviction. Yet the convie*876tion was followed by years of law-abiding, even exemplary conduct.6 Plainly, the conviction does not render Hamilton’s testimony inherently unbelievable.
The majority concludes that the cold record presented “sufficient information . . . to permit [an adverse] credibility determination as to Hamilton.” Ante at [873-874]. My review indicates that if any credibility inference is to be drawn from the deposition transcript it is to the contrary of that drawn by the majority’s selective and unrepresentative sampling. Moreover, the majority appears to endorse the view that a lower court may find facts adverse to a habeas corpus petitioner’s claim by rejecting, on credibility grounds, the sworn testimony of a witness without viewing the witness as he testifies. This view is out of step with Supreme Court guidance on the question.
The Supreme Court has often admonished the judiciary as to its responsibility to resolve factual disputes presented by habeas corpus petitions alleging unconstitutional confinement:
There is no higher duty of a court, under our constitutional system, than the careful processing and adjudication of petitions for writs of habeas corpus, for it is in such proceedings that a person in custody charges that error, neglect, or evil purpose has resulted in his unlawful confinement and that he is deprived of his freedom contrary to law. This Court has insistently said that the power of the federal courts to conduct inquiry in habeas corpus is equal to the responsibility which the writ involves: “The language of Congress, the history of the writ, the decisions of this Court, all make clear that the power of inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary.” Townsend v. Sain, [372 U.S. 293 [83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770] (1963) ] at 312, 83 S.Ct. at 756.
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 292, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1968).
Recently, in United States v. Raddatz, the Supreme Court noted the difficulties encountered by a district court when it reviews the written record developed before a magistrate who has heard the testimony of the witnesses:
To be sure, courts must always be sensitive to the problems of making credibility determinations on the cold record. More than 100 years ago, Lord Coleridge stated the view of the Privy Council that a retrial should not be conducted by reading the notes of the witnesses’ prior testimony:
The most careful note must often fail to convey the evidence fully in some of its most important elements .... It cannot give the look or manner of the witness: his hesitation, his doubts, his variations of language, his confidence or precipitancy, his calmness or consideration; . . . the dead body of the evidence, without its spirit; which is supplied, when given openly and orally, by the ear and eye of those who receive it.” Queen v. Bertrand, 4 Moo. P.C. N.S. 460, 481, 16 Eng.Rep. 391, 399 (1867).
447 U.S. 667, 679, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2414, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980).
When credibility is important, evaluation of the witness on the stand by a factfinder is very often necessary before a decision may be made. When the, evidence does not so clearly preponderate against the petitioner that additional evidence by the proffered witness could not turn the tide, the petitioner has not received the “careful consideration and plenary processing of [his claim] including full opportunity for presentation of the relevant facts,” to which he is entitled. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 82-83, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1633-34, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977), quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. at 298, 89 S.Ct. at 1090.
In the case at bar, other evidence did not so clearly preponderate against Ford as to render Hamilton’s credibility unimportant *877to the magistrate’s determination. Consequently, the magistrate’s refusal to hear Hamilton’s testimony on the stand in these circumstances abuses his discretion and affords the petitioner less than the full hearing to which he was entitled. Finding that a remand is required, I must dissent.

. In light of the lower court’s disposition of this matter, the majority opinion should not be read to rule that delay provided an adequate ground to deny the petition.
Neither the magistrate nor the district judge relied upon Rule 9(a) of the rules governing section 2254 proceedings. When the magistrate originally recommended disposition under that rule, District Judge Siler rejected that recommendation and required an evidentiary hearing. After a hearing was held before the magistrate, the recommendation was considered and entered by District Judge Bertelsman. While Judge Bertelsman discussed Rule 9(a), his order adopted the magistrate’s report in toto. Even were Judge Bertelsman inclined to rely upon the rule, the familiar doctrine of law of the case would have counseled against such reliance. See United States v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198, 70 S.Ct. 537, 544, 94 L.Ed. 750 (1950); Greyhound Computer Corp., Inc. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 559 F.2d 488, 507-08 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040, 98 S.Ct. 782, 54 L.Ed.2d 790 (1978); White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1967).
The majority properly holds that unexcused delay may affect petitioner’s credibility and increase his burden. See Davis v. Adult Parole Authority, 610 F.2d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 1979). It resolves the case on credibility grounds, not upon Rule 9(a).

. Ford argues that the 100-mile limit of Fed.R. Civ.P. 45 is inapplicable in habeas corpus cases. In light of the irrelevance of compulsory process in the present case, this claim need not be addressed.

. Hamilton’s deposition question and answer was:
Q. Can you explain that record entry appointing Halloran in those court records?
A. I don’t know — I could possibly. The court, in order to cover up its own inadequacies, might have put his name there. But I never met him.
Deposition at 29, Supplemental Appendix at 135.
The purely speculative nature of his comment was confirmed a short time later when the commonwealth attorney asked a similar question:
Q. Do you know whether the records in the Kentucky Court, Campbell Circuit Court, state that Mr. Halloran was to represent— appointed to represent Gwendolyn and Evie?
A. I don’t know that, sir. I really don’t. I don’t know anything of what happens in the courts. 1 just know that I was glad to get off with my life, because I know I had done wrong.
Deposition at 32, Supplemental Appendix at 138.

. Hamilton’s remark referred to the fact that Ford and he were not friends. He said:
A. In 1953 we went to Kentucky together. We went to prison together. And that was the extent of our association. I mean, but as friendship we can’t say we were friends. We were partners in crime okay, but not friends, okay. I know what friends are. I have some now.
Deposition at 18, Supplemental Appendix at 124.
He had earlier testified that he had not seen Ford in 25 years. Deposition at 16, Supplemental Appendix at 122. He and Ford did not socialize while in prison. Deposition at 20, Supplemental Appendix at 126.

. For example, both Hamilton and Ford identified an attorney who came to their jail cell to discuss representation for a fee. Hamilton recalled that he was recommended by a jailer. Deposition at 21, Supplemental Appendix at 127.

. Beyond a full-time job, Hamilton regularly was involved in church participation and other eleemosynary activities, including volunteer work in an attempt to deter incarcerated individuals from a life of crime. Deposition at 37-40, Supplemental Appendix at 143-46.