Court Opinion

ID: 9773449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:46:08.729633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:53.956450
License: Public Domain

WOODLEY, Judge,
(dissenting).
The complaint and information alleged the possession of policy paraphernalia on or about January 28, 1958, and further alleged that appellant, prior to the commission of said offense, had been previously convicted of possession of policy paraphernalia on July 15, 1957, in Cause No. 121426 in County Court at Law No. 3 of Harris County.
Trial was to the court without a jury on a plea of not guilty, and resulted in the pronouncement and entry of judgment reading in part as follows:
“The Court having heard the Information read and evidence submitted, finds the defendant guilty of unlawful possession of policy paraphernalia as charged as a second offender a misdemeanor, and assesses the punishment at confinement in jail for 30 days.
“It is, therefore, considered, ordered and adjudged by the Court that the Defendant Dollie Henderson is guilty of the offense of unlawful possession of policy paraphernalia charged as a second offender a misdemeanor, as charged, * *
It will be noted that the trial judge made no specific finding that appellant had been previously convicted of the prior offense set out in the information. He simply returned a general judgment of guilty as charged in the information.
The same rule applies to such a judgment as applies to a general verdict by the jury. This court may apply such a verdict or judgment to any good count which finds sufficient support in the evidence. Taubert v. State, 146 Texas Cr. Rep. 582, 176 S.W. 2d 955; Briggs v. State, 108 Texas Cr. Rep. 169, 300 S.W. 56; Southern v. State, 34 Texas Cr. Rep. 144, 29 S.W. 780; Brunk v. State, 109 Texas Cr. Rep. 474, 6 S.W. 2d 353.
*115Brunk v. State, supra, was a trial before the court. The information was in two counts, one charging the running of a tent show without a permit, and the other alleging that the tent show was run within 300 feet of certain business houses, both being-violations of a city ordinance. The judgment found Brunk guilty and assessed a fine of $110. This court held that the judgment could be applied to either count.
It is true that the allegation of a prior conviction for the purpose of enhancement of the punishment is not a separate “count” in an information or indictment, and it is equally true that the prior conviction does not change the primary oifense to some other oifense.
However, if a judgment finding the defendant guilty of several offenses charged in separate counts of the information may be applied to one of such offenses, thus rejecting the finding on other counts, no reason appears why the judgment above quoted should not be applied to the primary offense.