Court Opinion

ID: 9966341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 19:00:40.32741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:50.552038
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAY 6 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NICOLE GILILLAND, an individual,                No.    23-35028

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 6:19-cv-00283-MK

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
SOUTHWESTERN OREGON
COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, by
and through its Board of Education, an
Oregon community college district and
board; SOUTHWESTERN OREGON
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, an Oregon
community college,

                Defendants-Appellants.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Oregon
                 Mustafa T. Kasubhai, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted April 4, 2024
                               Portland, Oregon

Before: OWENS and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and RAYES,** District Judge.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The Honorable Douglas L. Rayes, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
      Defendant Southwestern Oregon Community College (“SWOCC”) appeals a

partial judgment in favor of Plaintiff Nicole Gililland after a jury trial. The jury

found in favor of Gililland on her breach of contract claim and awarded economic

and noneconomic damages. We review the district court’s denial of a renewed

motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. Dunlap v. Liberty Nat. Prods.,

Inc., 878 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm in part and reverse in part.

      1. To start, we hold that the terms of SWOCC’s policy were enforceable in

contract. The student-college relationship is contractual in nature. See Tate v. N.

Pac. Coll., 140 P. 743, 745 (Or. 1914). We predict that the Oregon Supreme Court

would agree with the consensus of federal district courts that have held, in

interpreting Oregon law, that “[t]he catalogs, bulletins, circulars, and regulations of

the institution made available to the matriculant bec[o]me a part of the contract”

between the student and the college, Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 104 F. Supp. 2d

1271, 1276 (D. Or. 2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted), and that the

relevant question is whether the college “manifested assent” to be bound by them,

Vejo v. Portland Pub. Schs., 204 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1175-77 (D. Or. 2016) (citation

omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 737 F. App’x 309 (9th Cir. 2018). See In re

Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 1990). Here, there was sufficient evidence

for the jury to find that SWOCC manifested assent to be bound by the provisions

of the policy.

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      2. Next, we hold that the jury verdict on the Title IX claim does not

undermine the verdict on the contract claim. We note first that “there is no duty to

reconcile inconsistent general verdicts,” Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1132

(9th Cir. 2018), and here the jury returned general verdicts that offered only the

ultimate legal conclusion on each claim. Regardless, the verdicts were not

irreconcilable because Title IX contains several highly specific requirements that

were not applicable to the contract claim. There was sufficient evidence in the

record for the jury to conclude that if SWOCC had complied with its obligations,

Gililland would have been able to continue in the nursing program, even if the jury

thought that evidence did not support a Title IX violation.

      3. We also hold that Gililland’s economic losses were a foreseeable result of

the breach. Whether damages are foreseeable is a question of fact for the jury.

Dynagraphics, Inc. v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 785 P.2d 760, 763 (Or. Ct. App.

1990). The jury was properly instructed that Gililland was entitled to recover

consequential damages that were reasonably within the contemplation of the

parties when the contract was formed and were proximately caused by the breach.

See Cont’l Plants Corp. v. Measured Mktg. Serv., Inc., 547 P.2d 1368, 1371 (Or.

1976) (“All that is necessary . . . is that [the loss] is one that ordinarily follows the

breach of such a contract in the usual course of events, or that reasonable [persons]

in the position of the parties would have foreseen as a probable result of breach.”

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(quoting 5 Corbin on Contracts 79 § 1010 (1964))). Having to unenroll and begin

a new career path was a foreseeable result of SWOCC’s failure to follow the

policy, and Gililland presented unrebutted evidence of the amount of her damages

encompassing losses related to her unenrollment.

      4. We hold, however, that the $1 million noneconomic damages award was

not recoverable because Oregon follows the general rule that “emotional distress

damages are not recoverable” for breach of contract.1 Moody v. Or. Cmty. Credit

Union, 542 P.3d 24, 42 (Or. 2023); see also Moser v. DKN Ind., 82 P.3d 1052,

1054 (Or. Ct. App. 2004). Oregon allows a plaintiff to recover emotional distress

damages where a breach of contract causes physical pain, but that exception has

been applied only where the breach is intrinsically tied to physical pain, not where

a breach causes mental suffering that in turn causes physical pain. See Coffey v.

Nw. Hosp. Ass’n, 189 P. 407, 408-09 (Or. 1920) (denying rehearing); McKenzie v.

Pac. Health & Life Ins. Co., 847 P.2d 879, 880, 882 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). And the

prohibition on emotional distress damages applies despite foreseeability. See

      1
         Gililland argues that some of the award could have been for other
categories of noneconomic damages: reputational damage and interference with
activities. Although courts have allowed reputation damages for identifiable,
economic losses, there is no indication that Oregon courts would have allowed the
sort of speculative, immeasurable damages awarded here, as Gililland’s own cited
cases show. See, e.g., Buck v. Mueller, 351 P.2d 61, 66 (Or. 1960)
(“Denominating defendant’s conduct as a breach of contract does not give the
plaintiff a license to demand damages not subject to measurement.”).

                                         4
Keltner v. Washington County, 800 P.2d 752, 755-58, (Or. 1990) (declining to

adopt the rule that emotional distress damages may be recovered in contract even

where “emotional security is the very object of the promise[]” (citation and

quotation marks omitted)). We thus vacate the $1 million award of noneconomic

damages.

      Each party shall bear its own costs.

      REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.

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