Court Opinion

ID: 9642976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:14:13.744683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:55.689550
License: Public Domain

RONNIE L. WHITE, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the principal opinion. I write separately only to emphasize the last five words of the opinion, “except as provided by law,” that acknowledges the wisdom of our legislature in its astute drafting of section 211.171. The legislature was wise, because while providing an exception to the normal mandatory public exclusion in juvenile matters in instances where a juvenile faces severe felony charges, it correctly did not make the application of that exception mandatory in all instances, thereby abridging the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.
“While it is clear the public has a right of access to criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court has held that right is qualified and must be carefully balanced with the defendant’s absolute Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.”1 “[E]ven when a right of access attaches, it is not absolute.” 2 ‘While open criminal proceedings give assurances of fairness to both the public and the accused, there are some limited circumstances in which the right of the accused to a fair trial might be undermined by publicity.” “In such cases, the trial court must determine whether the situation is such that the rights of the accused override the qualified First Amendment right of access.”3
“To safeguard the due process rights of the accused, a trial judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity,” and he or she “may surely take protective measures even when they are not strictly and inescapably necessary.”4 Publicity concerning pretrial hearings, in particular, poses special risks of unfairness because that may “influence public opinion against a defendant and inform potential jurors of inculpatory information wholly inadmissible at the actual trial.”5 “Closure of pretrial proceedings is often one of the most effective methods that a trial judge can employ to attempt to insure that the fairness of a trial will not be jeopardized by the dissemination of such information throughout the community before the trial itself has even begun.”6
It should be noted that that section 211.011, entitled, “Purpose of law — how construed,” provides:
The purpose of this chapter is to facilitate the care, protection and discipline of children who come within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This chapter shall be liberally construed, therefore, to the end that each child coming within *903the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall receive such care, guidance and control as will conduce to the child’s welfare and the best interests of the state, and that when such child is removed from the control of his parents the court shall secure for him care as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given him by them. The child welfare policy of this state is what is in the best interests of the child.
Our legislature was wise to retain the trial court’s discretion to close any proceedings when required for the protection of the juvenile’s Sixth Amendment right to receiving a fair trial. The trial court has an affirmative duty to close proceedings when justice so demands and must do so in conformity with the child welfare policy of this state when the best interests of the child so require.

. State ex rel. Pulitzer, Inc. v. Autrey, 19 S.W.3d 710, 713 (Mo.App.2000).

. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 9, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986).

. Id.

. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378-379, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979).

. Id.

. Id.