Court Opinion

ID: 9379587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 20:03:17.183191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.753917
License: Public Domain

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                                                                Electronically Filed
                                                                Supreme Court
                                                                SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                                15-MAR-2023
                                                                08:52 AM
                                                                Dkt. 23 OPA

             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

                                  ---o0o---

                            STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
                     Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                      vs.

                              LOGOVII TALO,
                     Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

                              SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX

           CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
               (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CR. NO. 1PC161000667)

                               MARCH 15, 2023

   McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ., WITH RECKTENWALD, C.J.,
  CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART, WITH WHOM CIRCUIT
    JUDGE MALINAO, IN PLACE OF NAKAYAMA, J., RECUSED, JOINS

                  OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.

                              I. Introduction

       This opinion addresses whether the Circuit Court of the

First Circuit (“circuit court”) abused its discretion by

imposing a probation condition allowing warrantless searches by

a probation officer for contraband (“special condition Q”).

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          Logovii Talo (“Talo”)’s probation was revoked after a

warrantless search by probation officers recovered a firearm and

ammunition from his home.

          After acceptance of certiorari, this court ordered

supplemental briefing pursuant to Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate

Procedure (“HRAP”) Rule 28(b)(4)(D) (2022),1 asking whether the

imposition of special condition Q was consistent with Hawaiʻi

Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 706-624(2) (2016) and this court’s

holding in State v. Kahawai, 103 Hawaiʻi 462, 83 P.3d 725 (2004).

Kahawai held that a sentencing court may not impose

discretionary conditions of probation pursuant to HRS § 706–

624(2) unless there is a factual basis in the record indicating

that such conditions are reasonably related to the factors set

forth in HRS § 706–606 (2014) and that they only involve

deprivations of liberty or property reasonably necessary for the

purposes indicated in HRS § 706-606(2).              Kahawai, 103 Hawaiʻi at

462-63, 83 P.3d at 725-26.

1         HRAP Rule 28(b)(4)(D) provides in relevant part:

                [T]he appellate court, at its option, may notice a plain
                error not presented. If an appellate court, when acting on
                a case on appeal, contemplates basing the disposition of
                the case wholly or in part upon an issue of plain error not
                raised by the parties through briefing, it shall not
                affirm, reverse, or vacate the case without allowing the
                parties the opportunity to brief the potential plain-error
                issue prior to disposition.

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       We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion

by imposing special condition Q because Talo was convicted of a

felony and a crime of violence, which prohibited him from owning

or possessing firearms and ammunition, and because he had notice

that “contraband” would include such items.            We therefore affirm

the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ (“ICA”) June 30, 2022

judgment on appeal.

                               II. Background

A.     Factual background

       On the morning of September 11, 2015, Talo went to Rent-A-

Center in Wahiawā.      When an employee told Talo the store was

closed, Talo forced his way in and repeatedly punched and struck

the employee, then threatened to kill him if he called the

police.    The employee suffered a concussion, lacerated lip and

buccal cavity, and a cervical strain.

B.     Circuit court proceedings

       On June 29, 2017, Talo pled no contest to assault in the

second degree in violation of HRS § 707-711(1)(a) and/or (b)

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(2016).2       Relevant here, the circuit court3 sentenced Talo to

four years of probation with special terms and conditions.

          A probation officer reviewed the terms and conditions of

probation with Talo on July 20, 2017.             Talo signed the probation

conditions form, acknowledging he understood the conditions.

Talo’s pre-sentence report (“PSI”) indicated that he did not

have any registered firearms, but the probation conditions form

contained a standard warning that Talo was “prohibited from

owning or possessing any firearm or ammunition pursuant to HRS §

134-7.”       Special condition B also prohibited Talo from owning or

possessing any firearms or ammunition.                Additionally, special

condition Q provided that Talo was to:4

                Q.    Submit at reasonable times to a search of your
                person, residence, vehicle, or other sites and property
                under your control by any probation officer, with or
                without a warrant, based on reasonable suspicion that
                illicit substances(s) or other contraband, may be in the
                places(s)of a search. Any

2         HRS § 707-711(1)(a) and (b) (2016) provided:

          (1) A person commits the offense of assault in the second degree if:
          (a) The person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes
                substantial bodily injury to another;
          (b) The person recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another[.]

3
          The Honorable Karen T. Nakasone presided.

4     Talo’s special condition Q was based on HRS § 706-624(2)(q), which
provides:

                (q) Submit to a search by any probation officer, with or
                without a warrant, of the defendant's person, residence,
                vehicle, or other sites or property under the defendant's
                control, based upon the probation officer's reasonable
                suspicion that illicit substances or contraband may be
                found on the person or in the place to be searched[.]

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             illicit substances(s) or contraband found or observed in
             such a search may be seized[.]

       Two years later, in June and July of 2019, Talo’s wife,

Jenifer Talo (“Jenifer”), filed two domestic abuse temporary

restraining order petitions against Talo (“TRO petitions”).

Jenifer alleged in both petitions that Talo may own, possess, or

have access to a weapon.

       Both petitions were ultimately dissolved.           On September 30,

2019, however, a sergeant from the Honolulu Police Department

(“HPD”) contacted probation supervisor Eleanor Kekauoha

(“Kekauoha”) to inform her that Jenifer and the Talos’ son had

reported that Talo had a firearm.           Kekauoha opened a probation

violation investigation for prohibited possession of a firearm.

       On October 1, 2019, Kekauoha spoke to Jenifer regarding the

location of the firearm and ammunition.            Kekauoha then reviewed

Jenifer’s TRO petitions.         Kekauoha again spoke to Jenifer on

October 14, 2019, to set up a meeting, which finally occurred on

November 19, 2019.       During this meeting, Kekauoha and assistant

probation supervisor Brooke Mamizuka obtained more details from

Jenifer and her son regarding the firearm and ammunition in the

home.

       Based on this information, probation officers conducted a

warrantless search of Talo’s home and car on December 6, 2019.

Probation officers found a firearm wrapped in a lavalava under

the mattress of Talo’s bed, in his bedroom.             They also located

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ammunition in an adjacent laundry basket in the same room.

Because probation officers do not handle or store weapons, HPD

officers were present and were called upon to handle the firearm

and ammunition.      A motion to revoke Talo’s probation was filed

the same day.

       At the January 16, 2020 initial hearing on the motion to

revoke, Talo orally moved to exclude or suppress all evidence

gathered as a result of the warrantless search.            He asserted the

search had been a subterfuge to have probation officers conduct

a warrantless search for later criminal prosecution, which is

prohibited by State v. Propios, 76 Hawaiʻi 474, 480, 879 P.2d

1057, 1063 (1994).      Various witnesses then testified over

several days in a consolidated hearing on the motions.

       On March 12, 2020, the circuit court denied Talo’s motion

to suppress, concluding the probation officers had specific and

articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion to conduct a

warrantless search of Talo’s home and car.           The court concluded

the search was properly conducted for probation purposes, for

public safety, and the rehabilitative goals of probation. HPD

stopped its criminal investigation when the prosecutor’s office

indicated it would not be pursuing criminal charges.             The

circuit court therefore determined the search was not a

subterfuge or a ruse for criminal prosecution and was not for an

HPD investigation.

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          On June 18, 2020, the circuit court granted the motion for

revocation of probation and resentenced Talo to five years of

imprisonment with credit for time served.

C.        ICA proceedings

          On July 16, 2020, Talo filed a notice of appeal to the ICA.

Talo asserted: (1) the circuit court erred in denying Talo’s

motion to suppress because the probation search was merely a

subterfuge for later criminal prosecution in violation of

Propios, 76 Hawaiʻi at 480, 879 P.2d at 1063; and (2) the circuit

court abused its discretion in sentencing Talo to an open term

of imprisonment of five years.

          The ICA concluded there was no indication that police and

probation officers colluded to gather evidence for a new

criminal prosecution against Talo; rather the purpose of the

warrantless search was to investigate a possible probation

violation.        The ICA further held the circuit court properly

considered the factors in HRS §§ 706-621 (2014)5 and 706-606,

5     HRS § 706-621 Factors to be considered in imposing a term of probation.
The court, in determining whether to impose a term of probation, shall
consider:

               (1) The factors set forth in section 706-606 to the extent
               that they are applicable;
               (2) The following factors, to be accorded weight in favor
               of withholding a sentence of imprisonment:
                   (a) The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor
                   threatened serious harm;
                   (b) The defendant acted under a strong provocation;
                   (c) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or
                   justify the defendant's criminal conduct, though
                   failing to establish a defense;

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including the nature and circumstances of the offense, Talo’s

history and characteristics, and public safety concerns.              The

ICA therefore held the circuit court did not abuse its

discretion in re-sentencing Talo to a five-year term of

imprisonment.

D.     Certiorari proceedings

       Talo filed an application for writ of certiorari raising

the same legal issues he raised before the ICA.            Although we

agree with the ICA that the issues Talo raised lack merit, we

accepted certiorari to address whether the circuit court erred

in imposing the warrantless search probation condition in the

first instance.

                (d) The victim of the defendant's criminal conduct
                induced or facilitated its commission;
                (e) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency
                or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for
                a substantial period of time before the commission of
                the present crime;
                (f) The defendant's criminal conduct was the result of
                circumstances unlikely to recur;
                (g) The character and attitudes of the defendant
                indicate that the defendant is unlikely to commit
                another crime;
                (h) The defendant is particularly likely to respond
                affirmatively to a program of restitution or a
                probationary program or both;
                (i) The imprisonment of the defendant would entail
                excessive hardship to the defendant or the defendant's
                dependents; and
                (j) The expedited sentencing program set forth in
                section 706-606.3, if the defendant has qualified for
                that sentencing program.

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       We therefore ordered supplemental briefing on the question

of whether the imposition of special condition Q was consistent

with HRS § 706-624(2) and this court’s holding in Kahawai.

                           III. Standard of Review

             A sentencing judge generally has broad discretion in
             imposing a sentence. The applicable standard of review for
             sentencing or resentencing matters is whether the court
             committed plain and manifest abuse of discretion in its
             decision. Factors which indicate a plain and manifest
             abuse of discretion are arbitrary or capricious action by
             the judge and a rigid refusal to consider the defendant's
             contentions. And, generally, to constitute an abuse it
             must appear that the court clearly exceeded the bounds of
             reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or
             practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.

State v. Mundon, 121 Hawaiʻi 339, 349, 219 P.3d 1126, 1136 (2009)

(quoting State v. Kahapea, 111 Hawaiʻi 267, 278, 141 P.3d 440,

451 (2006)).

                                IV. Discussion

A.     Applicable law

       Before addressing the parties’ supplemental briefs, we

summarize Kahawai and other law relevant to issues on

certiorari.

       In State v. Fields, 67 Haw. 268, 686 P.2d 1379 (1984), we

balanced a probation condition allowing warrantless searches by

probation officers against a defendant’s constitutional rights.

Defendant Shirley Fields (“Fields”) was convicted of three drug

charges and sentenced to probation.           67 Haw. at 279, 686 P.2d at

1388.     A condition of probation made her “subject at all

times . . . to a warrantless search of her person, property and

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place of residence for illicit drugs and substances by any law

enforcement officer including her probation officer.”                 67 Haw.

at 271, 686 P.2d at 1383-84.           Before any search pursuant to that

condition occurred, Fields challenged it on appeal.                67 Haw. at

273, 686 P.2d at 1384.

          We noted that defendants sentenced to probation, like those

on parole or in prison, are subject to limitations from which

ordinary persons are free.           67 Haw. at 277, 686 P.2d at 1387.

We pointed out, however, that a defendant on probation still has

the right to enjoy a significant degree of privacy.                67 Haw. at

279, 686 P.2d at 1388.          We recognized that our state

constitution explicitly protects people against unreasonable

searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy.6               67 Haw. at 282,

686 P.2d at 1390.         We explained that while a warrantless search

condition might serve the probationary goal of protecting the

public, it was doubtful that a near-total surrender of privacy

would be reasonably related to Fields’ rehabilitation.                 67 Haw.

at 278, 686 P.2d at 1387-88.

6     We cited to Article I, section 7 of the Constitution of the State of
Hawai‘i, 67 Haw. at 282 n.10, 686 P.2d at 1391 n. 10, which provides:

               The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
               houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches,
               seizures and invasions of privacy shall not be violated;
               and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
               supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
               describing the place to be searched and the persons or
               things to be seized or the communications sought to be
               intercepted.

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          We also pointed out that probation conditions must

contribute to the rehabilitation of the defendant, 67 Haw. at

278, 686 P.2d at 1387, and we discussed the role of probation

officers.        A probation officer has been described as a social

therapist in an authoritative setting.              67 Haw. at 280, 686 P.2d

at 1388.       The officer must monitor a probationer’s life and help

them safely reintegrate into the community.               Id.   Thus, we

reasoned that a probation officer has a unique interest in

invading a supervised defendant’s privacy and that given the

officer’s necessary involvement in a supervised person’s life,

there is a diminished expectation of privacy.               67 Haw. at 280,

686 P.2d at 1389.

          Because of Fields’s known involvement in drug trafficking,

we concluded a condition allowing warrantless searches by her

probation officer could serve a legitimate correctional purpose

and contribute to her rehabilitation.7             67 Haw. at 280, 686 P.2d

at 1388.       We held, however, that such a condition would be

unreasonable unless it required “specific and articulable facts

giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that illicit drugs are

concealed on the person, in the property, or at the place of

7     We distinguished between a probation officer, whose responsibility is
to monitor a probationer, and a police officer, who seeks to investigate and
prosecute criminal activity. 67 Haw. at 280, 686 P.2d at 1388. We concluded
that warrantless searches at the whim of police officers were unlikely to be
rehabilitative and unduly restrictive of a probationer’s liberty. Id.

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residence” of the defendant.8           67 Haw. at 281, 686 P.2d at 1389.

Because the probation condition was not so limited, we vacated

the sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with our

opinion.        67 Haw. at 282, 686 P.2d 1390.

          Then, in State v. Lee, 10 Haw. App. 192, 862 P.2d 295

(1993), the ICA held that a defendant's probation may not be

revoked for failure to comply with a special condition of

probation when he was never provided with written notice of that

condition, as required by HRS § 706-624(3) (Supp. 1992).                 10

Haw. App. at 192, 862 P.2d at 295-96.             HRS § 706-624(3) then

(and still) provides as follows:

                (3) Written statement of conditions. The court shall
                order the defendant at the time of sentencing to sign a
                written acknowledgment of receipt of conditions of
                probation. The defendant shall be given a written copy of
                any requirements imposed pursuant to this section, stated
                with sufficient specificity to enable the defendant to
                comply with the conditions accordingly.

The ICA discussed the Commentary to HRS § 706–624, which

indicates that the written notice requirement “is an addition to

the law suggested by the Model Penal Code and accepted in other

states.       The intent is to provide the defendant with notice of

what is expected of him in a form which will not escape his

memory.”        Lee, 10 Haw. App. at 198, 862 P.2d at 298.

          The next year, we held that despite the existence of

specific and articulable facts providing reasonable suspicion of

8         The existence of such required facts is not at issue in Talo’s case.

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a probation violation, a warrantless search by probation

officers can be invalid if its true purpose is future criminal

prosecution.        Propios, 76 Hawaiʻi at 487, 879 P.2d at 1070.              We

held the search in question unreasonable “because the avowed

purpose was in reality a subterfuge designed to facilitate a

criminal investigation,” as police took over a search nominally

conducted by probation officers to gather evidence for use in a

criminal prosecution, which actually occurred.               76 Hawaiʻi at

480-81, 879 P.2d at 1063-64.

          Finally, Kahawai involved a defendant convicted of

violating a protective order.              103 Hawaiʻi at 463, 83 P.3d at

726.       The State requested an alcohol and substance abuse

assessment and treatment, as necessary, as conditions of

probation.        Id.   The State argued that if a PSI had been

completed, various parties would have attested to the necessity

for such assessment and treatment.              Id.   Despite Kahawai’s

assertions that nothing in the record warranted such conditions,

the court imposed special conditions relating to alcohol and

substance abuse.         Id.

          On certiorari, we held a sentencing court has discretion to

impose the conditions set forth in HRS § 706-624(2),9 but that

9         HRS § 706-624(2) now provides:

                (2) Discretionary conditions. The court may provide, as
                further conditions of a sentence of probation, to the
                extent that the conditions are reasonably related to the

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           factors set forth in section 706-606 and to the extent that
           the conditions involve only deprivations of liberty or
           property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes
           indicated in section 706-606(2), that the defendant:
           (a) Serve a term of imprisonment to be determined by the
           court at sentencing in class A felony cases under section
           707-702, not exceeding two years in class A felony cases
           under part IV of chapter 712, not exceeding eighteen months
           in class B felony cases, not exceeding one year in class C
           felony cases, not exceeding six months in misdemeanor
           cases, and not exceeding five days in petty misdemeanor
           cases; provided that notwithstanding any other provision of
           law, any order of imprisonment under this subsection that
           provides for prison work release shall require the
           defendant to pay thirty per cent of the defendant's gross
           pay earned during the prison work release period to satisfy
           any restitution order. The payment shall be handled by the
           adult probation division and shall be paid to the victim on
           a monthly basis;
           (b) Perform a specified number of hours of services to the
           community as described in section 706-605(1)(d);
           (c) Support the defendant's dependents and meet other
           family responsibilities;
           (d) Pay a fine imposed pursuant to section 706-605(1)(b);
           (e) Work conscientiously at suitable employment or pursue
           conscientiously a course of study or vocational training
           that will equip the defendant for suitable employment;
           (f) Refrain from engaging in a specified occupation,
           business, or profession bearing a reasonably direct
           relationship to the conduct constituting the crime or
           engage in the specified occupation, business, or profession
           only to a stated degree or under stated circumstances;
           (g) Refrain from frequenting specified kinds of places or
           from associating unnecessarily with specified persons,
           including the victim of the crime, any witnesses,
           regardless of whether they actually testified in the
           prosecution, law enforcement officers, co-defendants, or
           other individuals with whom contact may adversely affect
           the rehabilitation or reformation of the person convicted;
           (h) Refrain from use of alcohol or any use of narcotic
           drugs or controlled substances without a prescription;
           (i) Refrain from possessing a firearm, ammunition,
           destructive device, or other dangerous weapon;
           (j) Undergo available medical or mental health assessment
           and treatment, including assessment and treatment for
           substance abuse dependency, and remain in a specified
           facility if required for that purpose;
           (k) Reside in a specified place or area or refrain from
           residing in a specified place or area;
           (l) Submit to periodic urinalysis or other similar testing
           procedure;
           (m) Refrain from entering specified geographical areas
           without the court's permission;
           (n) Refrain from leaving the person's dwelling place
           except to go to and from the person's place of employment,

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the discretion is not without limits.          103 Hawaiʻi at 465, 83

P.3d at 728.     We held:

             A sentencing court may not impose discretionary conditions
             of probation pursuant to HRS § 706-624(2)(1993) unless
             there is a factual basis in the record indicating that such
             conditions are reasonably related to the factors set forth
             in HRS § 706-606 and insofar as such conditions involve
             only deprivations of liberty or property that they are
             reasonably necessary for the purposes indicated in HRS §
             706-606(2).10

             the office of the person's physician or dentist, the
             probation office, or any other location as may be approved
             by the person's probation officer pursuant to court
             order. As used in this paragraph, "dwelling place"
             includes the person's yard or, in the case of condominiums,
             the common elements;
             (o) Comply with a specified curfew;
             (p) Submit to monitoring by an electronic monitoring
             device;
             (q) Submit to a search by any probation officer, with
             or without a warrant, of the defendant's person, residence,
             vehicle, or other sites or property under the defendant's
             control, based upon the probation officer's reasonable suspicion
             that illicit substances or contraband may be found on the person
             or in the place to be searched;
             (r) Sign a waiver of extradition and pay extradition
             costs as determined and ordered by the court;
             (s) Comply with a service plan developed using
             current assessment tools; and
             (t) Satisfy other reasonable conditions as the court
             may impose.

10     HRS § 706-606(2) provides:

             The court, in determining the particular sentence to be
             imposed, shall consider:
                   . . . .
             (2) The need for the sentence imposed:
                   (a) To reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
                         promote respect for law, and to provide just
                         punishment for the offense;
                   (b) To afford adequate deterrence to criminal
                         conduct;
                   (c) To protect the public from further crimes of the
                         defendant; and
                   (d) To provide the defendant with needed educational
                         or vocational training, medical care, or other
                         correctional treatment in the most effective
                         manner[.]

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103 Hawaiʻi at 462-63, 83 P.3d at 725-26 (cleaned up).

       We noted that a sentencing court is not limited to any

particular source of information when imposing probationary

conditions, as long as some factual basis for imposing such

conditions exists in the record.            103 Hawaiʻi at 465-66, 83 P.3d

at 728-29.     We agreed with Kahawai, however, that the sentencing

court had no basis for imposing conditions related to substance

abuse when there was no factual basis in the record for such

conditions.     103 Hawaiʻi at 466, 83 P.3d at 729.          Accordingly, we

remanded the case for resentencing.            103 Hawaiʻi at 468, 83 P.3d

at 731.

B.     Supplemental briefs

       As noted, we ordered supplemental briefing on the question

of whether the imposition of special condition Q was consistent

with HRS § 706-624(2) and this court’s holding in Kahawai.

       1.   State’s arguments

       The State argues the imposition of special condition Q was

consistent with HRS § 706-624(2) and Kahawai because, as a

convicted felon, Talo could not possess firearms or ammunition,

and doing so would violate his probation and also constitute a

felony.     The State posits:

            [S]pecial condition   Q is directly related to factors such
            as “afford adequate   deterrence to criminal conduct,” and
            “protect the public   from further crimes of the defendant.”
            Special condition Q   is directly relevant and related to the

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            overall goal of probation to provide rehabilitation to the
            probationer and protect the public from any criminal
            activity.

       The State thus contends special condition Q was consistent

with Kahawai.     It points out Kahawai involved improperly imposed

drug and substance abuse conditions despite the lack of any drug

history in the record.       103 Hawai‘i at 466, 83 P.3d at 729.            In

contrast, the State argues, Talo’s conviction for a violent

felony resulted in substantial injuries.           The State also asserts

special condition Q directly relates to the factors in HRS §

706-606, and the overall rehabilitation of Talo.             In summary,

the State contends special condition Q served a valid

rehabilitative purpose and was reasonably related to Talo’s

probation condition prohibiting him from possessing firearms and

ammunition based on his felony conviction.11

11    The State also asserts that although Talo’s crime did not involve use
of a firearm, special condition Q was reasonably related to his proclivity
towards violent aggressive conduct and also to future criminality. The State
cites a California case, People v. Balestra, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 77 (Cal. 1999),
in support. Balestra held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing a warrantless search condition in an elder-abuse case that did not
involve narcotics, theft, or firearms. Balestra, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d at 80, 82.
The court ruled that “warrantless search conditions serve a valid
rehabilitative purpose, and because such a search condition is necessarily
justified by its rehabilitative purpose, it is of no moment whether the
underlying offense is reasonably related to theft, narcotics, or firearms.”
90 Cal.Rptr.2d at 82.
      This holding, however, violates Kahawai’s requirement of factual basis
in the record for imposition discretionary conditions. 103 Hawaii at 466, 83
P.3d at 729. Therefore, it is not persuasive.

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       2.   Talo’s arguments

       Talo argues the circuit court illegally imposed special

condition Q because there was no factual basis in the record or

in the nature of the charge that supported the condition.

       Talo argues that, in Fields, this court validated a

warrantless search probationary condition because of the

defendant’s known proclivity for involvement in the trafficking

of illicit drugs.      67 Haw. at 280, 686 P.2d at 1389.         Talo also

argues that, in Propios, this court implicitly upheld a

warrantless search condition based on the probationer’s drug

offense conviction and her history of drug use.            76 Hawaiʻi at

481, 879 P.2d at 1064.

       Talo argues that, in contrast, there is nothing in the

record that supports the imposition of any warrantless search

condition.     Talo points out there was no weapon involved and

that his blood alcohol content after the incident was .000%.

Talo also asserts this was his only conviction and that he has

never been arrested or charged with offenses involving drugs,

alcohol, or other contraband.         Talo also points to the statement

in his PSI that he has never experimented with illegal

substances and has not consumed alcohol in three to four years.

       In summary, Talo argues special condition Q should not have

been imposed because there was nothing in the nature and

circumstances of the underlying offense or Talo’s history and

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characteristics that suggested the condition was necessary.                 He

argues his felony conviction, without more, is insufficient to

support the imposition of special condition Q.            Furthermore,

Talo claims that the nature of the charge itself, assault in the

second degree, does not indicate the use of illicit substances

or contraband that would support special condition Q.

C.     Analysis

       For the reasons discussed below, we hold the circuit court

did not abuse its discretion by imposing special condition Q.

       1.   Special condition Q is reasonably related to the
            factors in HRS § 706-606(2) and is consistent with
            Kahawai

       As recognized in Kahawai, a trial court has discretion to

impose special conditions of probation pursuant to HRS § 706–

624(2) that are reasonably related to the factors set forth in

section 706-606, but only to the extent that the conditions

involve deprivations of liberty reasonably necessary for the

purposes indicated in section 706-606(2).           Kahawai, 103 Hawaiʻi

at 465, 83 P.3d at 728.       And pursuant to Kahawai, a factual

basis for imposing special conditions of probation must inhere

in the record.12     103 Hawaiʻi at 466, 83 P.3d at 729.

12    Although no longer at issue due to the revocation of probation, based
on the applicable law discussed in Section IV.A, we agree with Talo that
special conditions M, N, O, and P, relating to alcohol and drug/paraphernalia
possession, use, consumption, testing, assessment, and treatment, if
necessary, were improperly imposed on him. The record does not reflect that
Talo had drug or alcohol issues. The imposition of these conditions violated
Kahawai.

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       At issue in this case is special condition Q.           HRS § 706-

624(2) provides in relevant part:

            (2) Discretionary conditions. The court may provide, as
            further conditions of a sentence of probation, to the
            extent that the conditions are reasonably related to the
            factors set forth in section 706-606 and to the extent that
            the conditions involve only deprivations of liberty or
            property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes
            indicated in section 706-606(2), that the defendant:
                  . . . .
            (q) Submit to a search by any probation officer, with or
            without a warrant, of the defendant’s person, residence,
            vehicle, or other sites or property under the defendant’s
            control, based upon the probation officer’s reasonable
            suspicion that illicit substances or contraband may be
            found on the person or in the place to be searched[.]

       HRS § 706-606, referred to in HRS § 706-624(2),

provides:

            The court, in determining the particular sentence to be
            imposed, shall consider:

            (1)   The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
                  history and characteristics of the defendant;
            (2)   The need for the sentence imposed:
                  (a) To reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
                       promote respect for law, and to provide just
                       punishment for the offense;
                  (b) To afford adequate deterrence to criminal
                       conduct;
                  (c) To protect the public from further crimes of the
                       defendant; and
                  (d) To provide the defendant with needed educational
                       or vocational training, medical care, or other
                       correctional treatment in the most effective
                       manner;
            (3)   The kinds of sentences available; and
            (4)   The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
                  among defendants with similar records who have been
                  found guilty of similar conduct.

       Thus, HRS § 706-624 first requires a determination of

whether a special (discretionary) condition of probation is

reasonably related to the factors set forth in HRS § 706-606.

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With respect to special condition Q, Talo was convicted of a

felony under Hawaiʻi law, assault in the second degree.              He was

also convicted of a “crime of violence” under Hawaiʻi law.13                As

such, Talo is prohibited from owning, possessing, or controlling

any firearm or ammunition pursuant to HRS § 134-7(b).

       Hence, special condition Q was reasonably related to

deterring Talo from committing an HRS § 134-7(b) firearm and/or

ammunition possession crime.        It was also reasonably related to

protecting the public from further crimes by Talo involving

firearms.     Thus, at a minimum, special condition Q is reasonably

related to factors (2)(b) and (c) of HRS § 706-606.

       HRS § 706-624(2) further requires that special conditions

involve deprivations of liberty only as reasonably necessary for

section 706-606(2) purposes.        Due to the heightened danger of

firearm use,14 special condition Q involves a deprivation of

13    HRS § 134-1 (2016) defines “crime of violence” as “any offense, as
defined in title 37, that involves injury or threat of injury to the person
of another, including sexual assault in the fourth degree under section 707-
733 and harassment by stalking under section 711-1106.5.”

14    In 2020, Hawaiʻi had the lowest age-adjusted firearm mortality rate in
the nation and only fifty total firearm deaths. Firearm Mortality by State,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, https://perma.cc/92XH-PMRD.
While Hawaiʻi ranks the lowest nationally in gun ownership and has some of the
strictest firearm laws, the number of firearms in Hawaiʻi is increasing. Gun
Violence and Violent Crimes Commission (“GVVCC”), Report of the GVVCC 6
(2022). From 2000 to 2020, the number of permit applications processed
increased by 302.5 percent. Id. Additionally, between 2010 and 2019, Hawaiʻi
saw a 38 percent increase in gun deaths. Jolanie Martinez, Criminologists
see uptick in gun violence involving Hawaii’s young people, Hawaiʻi News Now
(May 27, 2022), https://perma.cc/U6XP-RGX2.

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liberty only as reasonably necessary for the section 706-606(2)

purposes discussed above.

       Finally, Kahawai also requires a factual basis in the

record for imposing a discretionary condition of probation.15

103 Hawaiʻi at 466, 83 P.3d at 729.         Although Talo did not use a

firearm in the commission of the underlying assault, the record

supports the imposition of special condition Q because Talo was

convicted of a felony offense as well as a crime of violence,

which prohibited him from owning or possessing any firearms or

ammunition.

       2.   Under the circumstances, special condition Q’s
            prohibition on possession of “contraband” gave Talo
            appropriate notice that he was prohibited from owning
            or possessing firearms or ammunition

       As discussed earlier, HRS § 706-624(3) requires that a

written statement of probation conditions be provided to a

defendant:

            (3) Written statement of conditions. The court shall
            order the defendant at the time of sentencing to sign a
            written acknowledgment of receipt of conditions of
            probation. The defendant shall be given a written copy of
            any requirements imposed pursuant to this section, stated
            with sufficient specificity to enable the defendant to
            comply with the conditions accordingly.

15    The sentencing transcript is not part of the record, so it is possible
that testimony at the sentencing hearing created a record indicating that
special condition Q was necessary. Regardless, we conclude special condition
Q was properly imposed based on the record.

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The ICA explained in Lee that this written notice requirement is

intended to provide defendants with notice of what is expected.

Lee, 10 Haw. App. at 198, 862 P.2d at 298.

       Special condition Q allows for warrantless searches by a

probation officer based on reasonable suspicion that “illicit

substances(s) or other contraband, may be in the places(s) of a

search.” (emphasis added).        If, as required by Kahawai, a

sufficient factual basis appears in the record to impose

special conditions regarding drugs, a person on probation would

most likely have notice that a warrantless search condition for

“illicit substances” could allow for drug searches.16

       The meaning of “contraband,” however, is not clear.

“Contraband” could include firearms, child pornography, illegal

fireworks, military equipment, or even endangered animals kept

as pets, just to name a few examples.17          Hence, special condition

16    The term “illicit substances” is understood to refer to addictive and
illegal substances such as heroin and meth. Illicit Drug Addiction and
Abuse, Addiction Center, https://perma.cc/CR8E-ARMF.

17     Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) defines “contraband” as follows:

       1. “Illegal or prohibited trade; smuggling”;
       2. “Goods that are unlawful to import, export, produce, or possess.”
       contraband, adj.
       - absolute contraband. (1908) Goods used primarily for war, such as
       arms and ammunition, as well as clothing and equipment of a military
       character.
       - conditional contraband. (1915) Goods susceptible of being used for
       warlike and peaceful purposes, such as coal and food.
       - contraband per se. (1901) Property whose possession is unlawful
       regardless of how it is used.
       - derivative contraband. (1965) Property whose possession becomes
       unlawful when it is used in committing an illegal act.

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Q does not provide sufficient notice to a person on probation as

to what “contraband” the person is prohibited from possessing so

as to “enable the [person] to comply with the conditions

accordingly.”      HRS § 706-624(3).       In addition, for “contraband”

that has nothing to do with the record, special condition Q

would violate Kahawai.      18

       In Talo’s case, however, his written probation conditions

contained a clear warning that he was “prohibited from owning or

possessing any firearm or ammunition pursuant to HRS § 134-7.”

Special condition B also clearly prohibited him from owning or

possessing any firearms or ammunition.19          Therefore, special

condition Q sufficiently provided Talo with notice that

“contraband” included firearms or ammunition.

18    We disagree with the dissent that a probation condition prohibiting
possession of all “contraband” is consistent with the Hawaiʻi cases we have
discussed.

19     YOU SHALL:
             . . . .
       B.    Not own or possess any firearms or ammunition. If you have any
             firearms or ammunition, you must immediately turn them in to the
             appropriate county police department[.]

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                                V. Conclusion

       Because Talo’s points on certiorari lack merit and the

circuit court did not abuse its discretion in imposing special

condition Q, we affirm the ICA’s June 30, 2022 judgment on

appeal.

Benjamin E. Lowenthal                      /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
Jon N. Ikenaga (on the briefs)
for the petitioner                         /s/ Michael D. Wilson

Loren J. Thomas                            /s/ Todd W. Eddins
for respondent

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