Court Opinion

ID: 9914042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 15:00:45.717714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:55.507552
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11201   Document: 48-1    Date Filed: 12/29/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-11201
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       CHRISTOPHER EUGEAN BROWN,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant.
       versus
       WARDEN,

                                                          Defendant,

       SERGEANT ASHLEY KERN,

                                                 Defendant-Appellee.

                         ____________________
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                22-11201

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 7:20-cv-00204-HL-TQL
                           ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Christopher Brown, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed
       a complaint alleging that, while he was incarcerated at Valdosta
       State Prison, prison officer Sergeant Ashley Kern used excessive
       force against him by deploying pepper spray into his cell after he
       refused to be handcuffed, and then displayed deliberate indiffer-
       ence to his medical needs by failing to ensure he received proper
       treatment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
       of Kern, concluding that her use of pepper spray was reasonable
       given Brown’s repeated refusal to “cuff up” when ordered by Kern,
       and that Kern was not deliberately indifferent since she took him
       to the showers as soon as he became compliant. After careful re-
       view, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.
                                       I.
              In the light most favorable to Brown, the relevant facts are
       as follows. Brown, who is serving a life sentence without parole
       for murder, was transferred to Valdosta in February 2019. He
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       22-11201                 Opinion of the Court                            3

       refused his first housing assignment, requesting protective cus-
       tody 1, and he was instead assigned to a “lockdown” unit. Brown
       explained that Valdosta was “the most violent prison” he had been
       in, and he feared being housed with a gang member, having been
       previously labeled as a “snitch.” In his five months at Valdosta pre-
       ceding the events in this case, Brown had two or three cellmates.
       None were affiliated with any gang, but one cellmate threatened
       Brown with a knife after Brown rejected his sexual advances.
       Brown informed a prison officer of this incident, and he was moved
       to another cell.
              On July 26, 2019, Sergeant Kern and another prison officer
       came to Brown’s cell and ordered him to “cuff up”—i.e., be hand-
       cuffed at the cell door—because he was getting a new cellmate.
       Brown refused, telling Kern that he had been trying to obtain pro-
       tective custody and was “living in fear for [his] life,” and that he did
       not feel safe with an unknown cellmate. Kern responded that hous-
       ing assignments had “nothing to do with her,” and she told Brown
       he would be pepper sprayed if he refused to be handcuffed. When
       Brown replied that he was “refusing,” citing fears over his personal
       safety, Kern directed the other prison officer to start recording on
       her body-worn camera, and then gave another direct order to
       Brown to cuff up. Brown held firm and “still refused,” trying to
       explain his need for protective custody. As a result, Kern deployed
       pepper spray through the flap on the cell door and closed the flap

       1 It appears Brown received protective custody sometime after the events of

       this case.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11201

       before again asking Brown to cuff up. Within two minutes, Brown
       “gave up” and submitted to handcuffing “because [he] couldn’t
       take the spray no more.”
              Once Brown was in handcuffs, Kern and the other officer
       opened the cell door and escorted Brown to the showers, where he
       was permitted to wash while still in handcuffs. While showering,
       when Kern was away, Brown complained to the other officer that
       he was having vision problems. Thereafter, he was taken back to
       his cell, and his prospective cellmate was housed elsewhere.
       Brown continued to experience blurred vision after the pepper
       spray incident, but Kern did not have any role in his treatment
       apart from escorting him to medical appointments.
              The district court granted summary judgment to Kern based
       on a report and recommendation prepared by a magistrate judge.
       In the court’s view, no reasonable jury could conclude, based on
       Brown’s version of events, that “Kern applied force maliciously and
       sadistically, rather than in a good-faith effort to restore order.” The
       court also reasoned that Kern did not know about and was not de-
       liberately indifferent to his vision problems. Brown appeals.
                                         II.
              We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
       the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
       Brown, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. Pour-
       moghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010). Be-
       cause Brown is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe his filings.
       Trawinski v. United Techs., 313 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002).
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       22-11201                Opinion of the Court                          5

       Nevertheless, “issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are
       deemed abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th
       Cir. 2008).
                                         III.
              The Eighth Amendment forbids prison officers using exces-
       sive force against prisoners. Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1303–
       04 (11th Cir. 2010). The “core judicial inquiry” for an excessive-
       force claim is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to
       maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
       cause harm.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quotation
       marks omitted).
               To determine whether force was applied maliciously and sa-
       distically to cause harm, we consider the need for force, the
       amount of force used, the extent of any injury inflicted, the threat
       reasonably perceived by the responsible official, and any efforts
       made to temper the severity of the use of force. Danley v. Allen, 540
       F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds as recog-
       nized by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010); see Whit-
       ley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986). Based on these factors,
       “inferences may be drawn as to whether the use of force could
       plausibly have been thought necessary, or instead evinced such
       wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is
       tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.” Skrtich v.
       Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 2002), overruled on other
       grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). “Unless it ap-
       pears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11201

       plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the in-
       fliction of pain . . . , the case should not go to the jury.” Whitley,
       475 U.S. at 322.
              We have recognized that “correctional officers in a prison
       setting can use pepper-spray or a takedown to subdue an inmate as
       long as a valid penological reason supports the use of such force.”
       Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020). “Pepper
       spray is an accepted non-lethal means of controlling unruly in-
       mates,” and prison officers “need not wait until disturbances reach
       dangerous proportions before responding.” Danley, 540 F.3d at
       1307. Nor are officers required to “convince every inmate that
       their orders are reasonable and well thought out.” Id. In short, we
       must give “a wide range of deference to prison officials acting to
       preserve discipline and security.” Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199,
       1205 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).
               Here, the district court properly granted summary judg-
       ment on Brown’s excessive-force claim. Undisputed evidence re-
       flects that Sergeant Kern’s use of pepper spray inside Brown’s cell
       was supported by a “valid penological reason.” Sconiers, 946 F.3d
       at 126. According to Brown’s testimony, Kern shot a single burst
       of pepper spray and closed the door flap only after Brown refused
       multiple direct orders to be handcuffed, backed by warnings that
       he would be sprayed if he did not comply, so that another inmate
       could be added to his cell. Although Brown feared having a cell-
       mate, he acknowledged that Kern’s orders were valid and con-
       sistent with ordinary prison procedures, and that Kern herself had
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       22-11201               Opinion of the Court                        7

       no authority over housing assignments. Kern was not required to
       convince Brown that her orders were reasonable before acting to
       subdue him for being noncompliant and disruptive, see Danley, 540
       F.3d at 1307, and we must give prison officials “wide ranging def-
       erence” when acting to preserve discipline and security, see Sears,
       922 F.3d at 1205. Plus, immediately after Brown became compliant
       and submitted to being handcuffed, he was removed from the cell
       and taken to the showers to decontaminate.
              Based on this record, no reasonable jury could conclude that
       Kern applied force maliciously and sadistically, rather than in a
       good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. See Wilkins, 559
       U.S. at 37. And because Brown has not briefed his claim of delib-
       erate indifference to his serious medical needs, he has abandoned
       any appeal of that ruling. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874.
             For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of sum-
       mary judgment on Brown’s complaint.
             AFFIRMED.