Court Opinion

ID: 9755919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:00:09.672467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:13.108746
License: Public Domain

HARRELL, Judge,
in which RAKER and CATHELL, Judges, Join.
I join in the Majority opinion’s analysis and holding regarding the triable basis of MTA’s duty owed to Todd as set forth in its Part III(B) (Maj. op. at 164-66, 816 A.2d at 938-39) and the Majority’s breach of duty analysis and holding in Part III(C) of the opinion (Maj. op. at 166, 816 A.2d at 940), except as explained infra to the contrary. Accordingly, I join in the judgment of the Court. I am unable, however, to accept the Majority’s application of our prior cases on this record to reach the result it does based on Part 111(A)(1) and (2) of the Court’s opinion. I explain.
Part III (A)(1) of the Majority opinion (op. at 159-62, 816 A.2d at 936-37) presents the foreseeability element of its Tall1 analysis, concluding that the creation of a duty owed to Todd to protect him from the attack or to mitigate its duration arose in the present case from the moment the youths boarded the *170bus and became “disruptive and unruly” and “irritated” and “cursed” the passengers in the front of the bus. The Majority reaches this conclusion after presenting the facts of prior cases where various scenarios were found to create (or not create) triable issues as to foreseeability. I am not persuaded that the record in the present case, even when viewed in a light most favorable to Todd as the non-moving party, rises to the level of the factual scenarios in those prior cases where foreseeability was recognized as a triable issue. More telling, however, the facts of the present case are even less compelling than in the prior cases where the issue was found not to be triable.
In Tall, where the issue of foreseeability was deemed not triable, evidence was adduced that a quarrel broke out between two passengers on a steamboat who exchanged unpleasant words while the boat’s captain looked on. Tall, 90 Md. at 251, 44 A. at 1008. As the quarrel became physical, the captain, by then perceiving a need to intervene, attempted to do so, but could not before a shot fired inaccurately by one combatant injured an innocent bystander. Id. at 256, 44 A. at 1009.
By contrast in the present case, Todd claimed not to have said a word to his attackers before the attack. There was no evidence of the physical manifestation of a threat or aggression toward any passenger prior to the attack on Todd. At best, the record of this case depicts, in conclusory and generalized fashion based on Todd’s deposition testimony, that the youths “starting irritating passengers,” were “cursing them, disrespecting them, you know, [using] foul language.” Todd did not indicate whether these verbal diatribes contained fighting words, physical threats, or other words predictive of possible physical acting-out. No inference may be drawn as to what was said. Moreover, Rolle, the bus driver (the “captain of the ship” if you will), could not have seen the confrontation between the youths and Todd when they reached Todd’s location at the rear of the crowded bus as, by the admission of both Todd and Rolle in their depositions, neither could see *171across the length of the bus2 due to the passenger-congested aisles and seating on the overloaded bus. Accordingly, the facts revealed at the time summary judgment in the present case, seem even thinner on the issue of foreseeability than those found wanting in Tall.
In United Railways & Electric Co. v. State, 93 Md. 619, 49 A. 923 (1901), where the facts were found to create a triable issue as to foreseeability, the defendant’s agents were aware of the assailant’s lack of sobriety and that he had been acting violently on the train, having earlier ejected him forcibly from the train for those reasons. Id. at 627, 49 A. at 925. Yet, those same agents took no similar action when the future assailant rather promptly reboarded the train. Id. The physicality of the assailant’s earlier conduct, coupled with the contemporaneous appreciation of it by the defendant’s agents, convinced the Court that the subsequent injury to the plaintiff, a passenger toward whom the assailant manifested no prior animus, was triable as to foreseeability because the facts “rendered it very probable and likely that [the assailant] would attack someone else.” Id. The recipe for predicative possible violence in United Railways satisfied the Court because of the physicality of the assailant’s earlier conduct, i.e., drunk and acting violently. In the present case, we have not a clue as to whether the youths, other than being verbally rude and crude, said anything suggestive of possible violence. Although the Majority appears to attach additional significance to the size of the group (Maj. op. at 162, 816 A.2d at 937), I do not view that as sufficient, in combination with unknown profane words, to generate a triable issue as to the foreseeability of possible violence.
Similarly, in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Barger, 80 Md. 23, 30 A. 560 (1894) (triable issue presented where railroad employees were alleged to have known of drinking passengers throwing glass bottles from train window) and Pugh v. Washington Railway & Electric Co., 138 Md. 226, 113 *172A. 732 (1921) (no triable issue where evidence showed assailant twice grabbed victim’s knee twice, injuring her the second time, while train conductor stood nearby but unaware of conduct), the facts at least involved elements of offensive physical conduct. The present record lacks any such basis. Although the Majority opinion accurately describes the behavior in the early cases as being “reckless[], violent [], or disorderly” (Maj. op. at 162, 816 A.2d at 937), it fails to persuade me that the evidence in the present case solely of the use of irritating or swearing language, standing alone, by all or some of 15 to 20 youths rises to a triable issue of foreseeability, e.g., that Rolle should have known from this' conduct during the initial five minutes after the youths boarded the bus that some of the youths later would attack physically Todd or any other passenger.
Part III (A)(2) of the Majority opinion (op. at 162-64, 816 A.2d at 937-38) addresses the question of the reasonableness of the time for Rolle to act and assumes that his duty arose at the time the youths entered the bus. I do not agree, given the explanation supra of my views on Part III(A)(1) of the Majority opinion as to foreseeability, that there was a triable issue as to this factor for much the same reasons. It was not until Rolle was informed by a passenger in the front of the bus that the youths had commenced to batter Todd (see. Part III(B) of the Majority opinion) that any possible duty arose. It is from that point until when the bus was brought to a stop, some 4-5 minutes after the physical assault began, that a fact-finder should evaluate whether Rolle had time to act and whether what he did (or did not do) was reasonable under all of the relevant circumstances.
Judges RAKER and CATHELL have authorized me to state that they join this concurrence.

. Tall v. Baltimore Steam-Packet Co., 90 Md. 248, 44 A. 1007 (1899).

. Todd was seated in the rear of the bus, in front of the rear exit.