Court Opinion

ID: 9775606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:04:48.070652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:29.357236
License: Public Domain

*268KEITH, Justice
(concurring).
I express my complete concurrence in the well-reasoned opinion of Justice Stephenson. The result reached is sound and compatible with the authorities considered. However, I am perturbed by the unanswered questions which still exist in this area of procedural law notwithstanding our holding.
I have experienced difficulty in drawing a definite distinction between two seemingly conflicting rules which emerge from the myriad of decisions on the subject. There are many decisions which support the rule announced in Pollard v. Steffens, 161 Tex. 594, 343 S.W.2d 234, 239 (1961), where the Court said: “[A] consent judgment has the same degree of finality and binding force as does one rendered by the court at the conclusion of an adversary proceeding.” Indeed, quoting from a text quoted earlier in Wagner v. Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 295 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1956), the Court held that such a consent judgment has neither less nor greater force or effect than one rendered after protracted litigation, “ ‘except to the extent that the consent excuses error and operates to end all controversy between the parties.’ ” See also, Schwartz v. Jefferson, 18 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 261, 264 (March 19, 1975).
These cases fit readily into the general concept of finality of judgments. Judge Smedley in Harrison v. Manvel Oil Co., 142 Tex. 669, 180 S.W.2d 909, 914 (1944), expressed the rule in these words:
“Final judgment is intended to be the end of controversy and trial. * * *
Otherwise, a final adjudication would become the starting point for new litigation, for reexamination and for second decision of the question decided in the former suit.”
See also, Carter v. Nichols, 349 S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
But, in consent judgment cases, and particularly those relating to child support orders resting upon contracts incorporated into the decree, we find confusing language which seemingly limits or restricts the generality of the foregoing line of cases. This language apparently first entered our jurisprudence in Peterman v. Peterman, 55 S.W.2d 1108, 1110 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1933, no writ), in quoting from 34 C.J., Judgments § 337 at 133 (1924) [the substance of which now appears in 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 178 at 316 (1947)]: “It [the consent judgment] has the same force and effect as any other judgment, and in the absence of fraud or mistake is valid and binding, as such, as between the parties thereto and their privies, * * (emphasis supplied)1
The first phrase in the quotation from Corpus Juris is now firmly embedded in the jurisprudence of Texas. See, e. g., Pollard v. Steffens, supra (343 S.W.2d at 239); Wagner v. Warnasch, supra (295 S.W.2d at 893).
However, when we come to consider the italicized words, we encounter confusion because of another rule epitomized by this quotation from Hutchings v. Bates, 406 S. *269W.2d 419, 420 (Tex. 1966), which also has solid support in the Texas cases:
“In a case like the present, however, where the duty to make support payments arises from an agreement of the parties [which has been incorporated in the divorce decree], their rights and obligations in that respect are governed largely by the rules relating to contracts.”
Thus, our courts'are required: (a) to determine the rights of the parties under the rules “relating to contracts”; and (b) to hold that consent judgments are just like other judgments “in the absence of fraud or mistake.” The application of these two rules suggests the questions which I now state: (1) When, where, and in what kind of a proceeding may a party assert fraud, mistake, or other contractual defense? and (2) When does the court use the “contract interpretation” rule ?
Since the so-called consent judgments are final judgments in the true sense of the word, such a judgment is not subject to a collateral attack but may be attacked only in a direct proceeding. Professor Gus Hodges has stated the thesis in this manner: “A direct attack on a judgment is an attempt to change it in a proceeding brought for that specific purpose, such as an appeal or bill of review. A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid the effect of a judgment in a proceeding brought for some other purpose.” G. Hodges, “Collateral Attacks on Judgments,” 41 Tex.L.Rev. 163 (1962).
Each of the defenses which defendant sought to interpose in the case at bar was in the nature of a collateral attack upon a final judgment. Such defenses could be urged, if at all, only in a direct attack upon such judgment, i. e., by direct appeal [and the time had long since expired within which to appeal] or by a bill of review. We need not determine the effectiveness of such defenses because of the almost impossible burdens attendant upon the availability of the bill of review procedure.2
Thus, the “fraud or mistake” limitation upon the finality of such consent judgments [see cases cited in footnote 1] is confined to situations wherein a direct attack is made upon such judgments. Subject to all other limitations upon the bill of review procedure [see cases cited in footnote 2], the defenses sought to be interposed in this case may be urged only in such an action. Hodges, supra (41 Tex.L. Rev. at 180 et seq.). Until set aside in a direct proceeding, such final judgment is conclusive as to all issues therein determined under the doctrine of res judicataKolb v. Kolb, 479 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex.Civ. App.—Dallas 1972, no writ).
Two instances wherein Courts of Civil Appeals have met and considered the defenses which amounted, in law, to collateral attacks upon final judgments are: Lampkin v. Lampkin, 480 S.W.2d 35 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1972, no writ), and Lee v. Lee, 509 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.Civ. App.—Beaumont 1974, writ ref’d n. r. e.), wherein I spoke for this court. The defenses interposed in each of the cited cases were no more than collateral attacks upon final judgments and should not have been considered by the court. However, in each instance, the court reached the correct result.
Having placed the two rules in proper perspective, I find no conflict in the application of each to the proper type action. The “fraud and mistake” and contractual defense line of cases refer to direct attacks; the “contract interpretation” doc*270trine applies in subsequent proceedings between the parties and their privies, not to alter the judgment but to determine and enforce the order entered.
With these remarks, I now reaffirm my concurrence in this case.

. The substance of the “fraud or mistake” quotation from Corpus Juris has found its way into many decisions of our courts, either directly or by paraphrasing. I cite only a few instances. Beam v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 164 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1942, writ ref’d w. o. m.) [quoting from Peterman, but not from Corpus Juris]; Plumly v. Plumly, 210 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex.Civ. App.—San Antonio 1948, writ dism.) [cited with approval in Ex parte Jones, 163 Tex. 513, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962), upon another point]; Brady v. Hyman, 230 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1950, no writ); Routon v. Phillips, 246 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex.Civ.App.—Port Worth 1952, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Akin v. Akin, 417 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1967, no writ).
Several cases have used the words “fraud, accident, or mistake.” See Morris v. Morris, 406 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1966, no writ); Plumly, supra, and Brady, supra.

. See, e. g., Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996 (1950); Hanks v. Rosser, 378 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.1964); Gracey v. West, 422 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.1968); Texas Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Gordon Knox Oil & Exp. Co., 442 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.1969). This series presents the usual attempt to set aside a default judgment. But, the general rules are also applicable to other situations. See Petro-Chemical Transport, Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex.1974).