Court Opinion

ID: 9614187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:23:20.3337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:45.801153
License: Public Domain

Lockett, J.,
concurring: I concur in the majority’s decision affirming the defendant’s conviction but disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant was in custody and being interrogated in a manner that required the giving of the Miranda warning set out in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). In its analysis, the majority fails to recognize that there are two types of interrogation that may be conducted by a law enforcement officer, a “custodial interrogation” and an “investigatory interrogation.”
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court in its landmark decision discussing “custodial interrogation” proclaimed:
“[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 384 U.S. at 444.
Miranda, however, does not stand for an absolute proposition that law enforcement officers may never ask a detained citizen a question without first informing that person of the constitutional *405right to remain silent. As the Miranda court observed, “[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement.” 384 U.S. at 477-78.
Miranda was decided in 1966. Shortly thereafter, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), the United States Supreme Court modified the bright line rule set by Miranda. The Terry court recognized that because of the government’s general interest in preventing and investigating crime, under certain circumstances law enforcement officers have a right to physically stop and search individuals for personal safety purposes during an investigatory interrogation.
Based on Terry, the Kansas Legislature enacted K.S.A. 22-2402 in 1970. The statute, now K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 22-2402, provides that without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime and may demand the name and address of such suspect and an explanation of such suspect’s actions. The statute further notes that after a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for questioning and reasonably suspects that the officer’s personal safety requires it, the officer may frisk the person for firearms or other dangerous weapons. If the law enforcement officer finds a firearm or weapon, or other thing of which possession may be a crime or evidence of a crime, the officer may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time the officer shall either return the item if lawfully possessed or arrest the person. K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 22-2402(2).
In the absence of legislation of this kind, it could have been argued that a Kansas police officer had no power to search a suspect for weapons until an arrest has actually been made. The statute clarifies the power of the investigating officer to restrain an individual and make a preliminaiy search for weapons prior to an actual arrest. The justification and limitations applicable to such *406statutory powers are expressed by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 24-25.
The admissibility of the defendant’s statements depends upon whether they were the result of a “custodial interrogation” or an “investigatory interrogation.” A custodial interrogation, which requires that Miranda warnings be given, involves significant restraints on a subject’s freedom of movement imposed by a law enforcement officer. See State v. Brunner, 211 Kan. 596, Syl. ¶ 2, 507 P.2d 233 (1973); State v. Greenberg, 4 Kan. App. 2d 403, 405, 607 P.2d 530, rev. denied 228 Kan. 807 (1980).
In State v. Taylor, 231 Kan. 171, 642 P.2d 989 (1982), this court faced a similar factual situation. Officers were aware that Taylor had shot and killed a store clerk. When Taylor was stopped for questioning, the officer asked him for his name. Taylor answered, giving a fictitious name. The officer knew the individual was Taylor and proceeded to frisk him. Taylor was then taken to the police station and again asked his name. He replied, “Harry Taylor, why should I lie anymore.” Taylor was then advised of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda, which he voluntarily waived. 231 Kan. at 172.
On appeal Taylor argued that the statements he made before waiving his rights were inadmissible. The court observed that the admissibility of Taylor’s statements depends upon whether they were the result of a “custodial interrogation” or an “investigatory interrogation.” The Taylor court recognized that general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process does not constitute custodial interrogation requiring a Miranda warning. An investigatory interrogation, requiring no warning, is defined as the questioning of persons by law enforcement officers in a routine manner during an investigation which has not reached an accusatory stage and where such persons are not in legal custody or deprived of their freedom of action in any significant way. 231 Kan. at 173.
The Taylor court noted that the term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express questioning of a suspect, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those *407normally attendant to arrest and custody) which the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. The Taylor court held that a request for a person to identify himself is not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda and found that the trial court did not err in admitting Taylor s answer. 231 Kan. at 174.
State v. Roadenbaugh, 234 Kan. 474, 673 P.2d 1166 (1983), was concerned with the governmental interest in investigating crime and the immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could be unexpectedly and fatally used against him. In reaching this conclusion the court noted that it was unreasonable to require police officers to take unnecessary risks in the perfonnance of an investigatory interrogation. The Roadenbaugh court noted that the officer had a clear right, for personal safety purposes, to physically search the defendant for weapons. In so doing it is permissible to “spread-eagle” a suspect for the pat down or frisk and then feel the suspect’s person for weapons. 234 Kan. at 477.
From people in the crowd at the scene of the shooting here, Officer Granger discovered that a person named Ewing shot Guinn and that Ewing was “next door.” Granger did not know anyone named Ewing. Granger went to the house next door and as he approached, two males, one of which was Ewing, walked out of the house. Officer Granger drew his gun and told both of the males to halt and put their hands where he could see them. He then asked: “Who shot the lady?” Ewing answered the officer’s question by stating: “I shot the bitch.”
*408The officer was conducting an investigatory interrogation. After stopping Ewing and insuring that it was safe, to investigate, the officers had the right to demand Ewing’s name and address and ask who had shot the victim. The officer attempted to elicit a statement from the defendant but did not attempt to elicit a statement incriminating Ewing as to his intent. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit all incriminating statements. Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by even the most damning admissions. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187, 52 L. Ed. 2d 238, 97 S. Ct. 1814 (1977). The United States Supreme Court reached a similar determination in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). The trial court was correct in admitting Ewing’s response to the officer’s question.
McFarland, C.J., joins in the foregoing concurring opinion.