Court Opinion

ID: 9733237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:59:25.06782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:39.712008
License: Public Domain

R. M. Maher, P.J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent. GCR 1963, 785.12 provides that both the prosecution and the defense must be given an opportunity to explain or controvert any factual representations that appear in the presentence report. When, as in the instant case, a party chooses to exercise this right, the trial court must *707respond in some manner. The mode of response is left to the exercise of the trial court’s discretion. That response may be as simple as an announcement that the disputed facts will not be considered when passing sentence or as complicated as an evidentiary hearing. This Court consistently has held that when the trial court fails to respond it has failed to recognize and exercise its discretion and resentencing is required. People v Major, 106 Mich App 226; 307 NW2d 451 (1981), People v Baker, 103 Mich App 704; 304 NW2d 262 (1981), People v Perez, 103 Mich App 636; 303 NW2d 49 (1981), People v Perez, 94 Mich App 759; 289 NW2d 857 (1980), People v Horace Williams, 77 Mich App 402, 405-406, 409-410; 258 NW2d 737 (1977) ,1 People v McIntosh, 62 Mich App 422, 440-448; 234 NW2d 157 (1975), rev’d on other grounds 400 Mich 1; 252 NW2d 779 (1977).
Because the trial court in the instant case failed to respond in any manner to defendant’s claim, it failed to recognize and exercise its discretion. On the basis of the present record, this Court cannot determine whether the trial court considered the information claimed to be inaccurate when passing sentence. Contrary to the majority’s position, it is not reasonable to conclude from a silent record that the trial court exercised its discretion and accepted defendant’s version of the outcome of his prison disciplinary problems.
I am not persuaded by the majority’s attempt to distinguish the prior decisions of this Court, appar*708ently on the basis that the claimed inaccuracies in those cases were more severe than in the instant case. This Court is ill-suited for such review. The majority does not suggest on what basis this Court should hold one claim of inaccuracy serious and another merely incidental. Furthermore, I have no doubt that what will appear to be a serious inaccuracy to one judge may appear trifling to the next. Add to this the fact that it doesn’t really matter in the end whether this Court feels the inaccuracy is serious or not since it is the trial court which determines the sentence, and the result can be seen to set an unwise precedent. No matter how serious the claimed inaccuracy might be said to be, once the claim has been made the trial court’s discretion is engaged.
The majority also assumes that the claimed inaccuracy had no bearing on the sentence ultimately imposed. I do not find this conclusion so easy to reach. In the face of a silent record, I am unable to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court did not consider the information claimed to be inaccurate, or, that if it did consider the information, that this did not affect the sentence. Although I do not suggest that the relative seriousness of the alleged inaccuracy should excuse the trial court’s failure to exercise its discretion, it is important to note that information concerning a defendant’s prison conduct is vitally important to the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion. People v Triplett, 407 Mich 510, 516; 287 NW2d 165 (1980). In this regard, the distinction between "threatening behavior” and "insolence” was important to the trial court’s evaluation of defendant’s prison behavior.
When the trial court does nothing in the face of a claimed inaccuracy in a prehearing report, it has *709failed to recognize and exercise its discretion, and the case should be remanded for resentencing and for a proper exercise of discretion. The problem with the majority’s approach is that it requires this Court to attempt the manifestly impossible— to infer from a silent record the proper exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion. We cannot place ourselves inside the head of the trial judge, and we should not attempt to do so.
I would remand for resentencing.

 The Supreme Court remanded Horace Williams to the trial court for a Robinson hearing, People v Robinson, 390 Mich 629; 213 NW2d 106 (1973), and, if necessary, for resentencing. This order was expressly based on the Court of Appeals dissent in Horace Williams, which had stated in part that resentencing was required because of the trial court’s failure to respond to all of the claimed inaccuracies in the presentence report. People v Horace Williams, 402 Mich 950j (1978) .