Court Opinion

ID: 9851541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:14:40.446451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:21.569419
License: Public Domain

Spratley, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I find myself unable to agree with that portion of the majority opinion which directs the trial court to modify its decree of December 30, 1957, without the presentation of contemporary evidence *126showing that appellant has permanently attained a status of conduct justifying an enlargement of the visitation period of her child. I would affirm the decree in toto, leaving to appellant the opportunity to present in the future her claim to an extension of the period. Code Section 20-108'. In doing so we would be following precedent and heeding the facts found by the chancellor.
The final decree of the trial court is presumed to be correct, and the burden is on the appellant to show that it is wrong. Furthermore, the decree is binding upon us unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. The evidence is in conflict, but that accepted by the chancellor amply supports his conclusions. Collins v. Collins, 183 Va. 408, 32 S. E. 2d 657; Phillips v. Kiraly, 200 Va. 345, 105 S. E. 2d 855; Nix v. Nix, 186 Va. 14, 41 S. E. 2d 345.
There was no appeal from the decree awarding the custody of the child to appellee. The only question presented at the final hearing was whether any permanent change in the conduct of the appellant since June 15, 1956, justified modification of the decree entered on that day. The chancellor had an exceptional opportunity to pass upon the evidence and the weight to be attached thereto. The question whether the mother or father should have the custody of the child has been before the chancellor since 1955. The record in the case consists of more than 750 printed pages of testimony, most of which was heard ore tenus in two periods amounting to seven and a half days.
The chancellor, in the exercise of the discretion allowed him, gave full consideration to the paramount and controlling situation, that is, the welfare of the child. He was in a position to exercise a wiser discretion than the members of this Court. In the exercise of that discretion he found himself unwilling to take the risk of injury to the child. I agree with him that, in consideration of the nature, extent, and duration of the misconduct of appellant, it was a matter of speculation whether or not her reformation was permanent. The risk of injury to the child seems to me far more important than the natural wishes of the mother. It is perfectly clear from the opinion of the chancellor that he will give full, fair, and proper consideration to any future petition of the appellant for the enlargement of the visitation period. A year and a half has elapsed since the last decree, and the mother has full opportunity under the statute to show her present status as a proper person to have partial custody of her child. A proceeding of that nature permits a safe method to avoid speculation and error, and prejudices the rights of no one.
*127The cases cited in the majority opinion set out the controlling principles, but a casual examination will disclose in each of them a set of facts wholly different from those here, especially in respect to the status of one or the other of the parents involved.