Court Opinion

ID: 9517654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:26:13.333978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:39.139771
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority pronounces that the words “state-supported institution” are not ambiguous, and accordingly, it is not necessary to attempt to construe, interpret, or understand those words. I disagree. We interpret administrative regulations the same way we interpret statutes. Even if a statute is not particularly ambiguous, we should still examine it carefully and try to understand it, considering the entire statute in the factual context to which it applies and the various meanings that words may have. We should not seize upon one word or phrase in isolation and use that word as an excuse not to give the matter further consideration. Peck v. Froehlich, 367 Ill. App. 3d 225, 233 (2006). What does “state-supported” mean? Does it mean “state” as opposed to “private”? Does it mean “state” as opposed to “local”? Does it refer to an institution that receives most of its support from the state? A substantial amount of its support? Any amount of support? A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood “by reasonably well-informed persons” in two or more different senses. In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d 510, 517, 782 N.E.2d 217, 222 (2002); In re Timothy T, 343 Ill. App. 3d 1260, 1263, 799 N.E.2d 994, 997 (2003). The words “state-supported institution” are ambiguous here. Statutory construction’s fundamental rule requires courts to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Thus, courts must consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature’s apparent objective in enacting it. People v. King, 366 Ill. App. 3d 552, 555, 852 N.E.2d 559, 561 (2006). The words used are only a way to get to the legislature’s intent. “A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.” Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 62 L. Ed. 372, 376, 38 S. Ct. 158, 159 (1918) (opinion by Justice Holmes). Our goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, even if the language is not clear. It is not our goal to punish the legislature because its language is “exceedingly subtle” or could have been better written. See 368 Ill. App. 3d at 167. Under the majority’s approach, if an absurd result is possible, we should go for it, to encourage the legislature to change the statute. When the language of the statute is open to two possible interpretations, the interpretation that is reasonable and that will not produce “absurd, unjust, unreasonable[,] or inconvenient results” should prevail. Collins v.. Board of Trustees of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 110, 610 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1993); Albee v. City of Bloomington, 365 Ill. App. 3d 526, 528, 849 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (2006). The majority’s interpretation will produce an absurd result. The regulation was intended to distinguish between institutions that qualified and those that did not. Under the majority’s interpretation, all institutions will qualify, even private religious institutions who receive some minimal form of state support. The majority’s citation to Lieberman is inappropriate. Lieberman did not involve a statute that was open to two possible interpretations, but a situation where the court chose to honor the legislative intent despite the language of the statute. “We conclude that the legislature’s omission of the now-repealed offense of rape from this definition was purely inadvertent and constituted a situation ‘where a legislative intention, otherwise clear, was in part mistakenly or inaccurately stated.’ ” Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 320, 776 N.E.2d at 229-30, quoting Gill v. Miller, 94 Ill. 2d 52, 58, 445 N.E.2d 330, 333-34 (1983). The majority argues that we should not consider the fact that the regulation was revised in the late 1980s to change the wording from “state-assisted” to “state-supported.” The majority complains that the board is inviting us to consider an external aid of construction— legislative history — when the meaning is clear on its face. 368 Ill. App. 3d at 166-67. This is not a situation where we are asked to consider something like the comments of a legislator on the floor, which may not have represented the thinking of other legislators who voted for the bill. This is the language of the regulation itself. An amendment indicates that the amendment was enacted to clarify the legislature’s original intent. Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at 111, 610 N.E.2d at 1253. It is clear from the face of the amendment here that a minimal amount, mere “assistance,” does not constitute “support.” The majority says that we should not use external aids of construction but then refers to the dictionary. Why should we look to the dictionary, the meaning used by the public at large, but ignore the meaning actually used by “reasonably well-informed persons” in the profession? Even the dictionary refutes the majority’s assertion that one could not interpret the regulation any other way than it has chosen to read it. There are other meanings to the word “support” than “assist” or “help.” “Support” can also mean “to pay the costs of: MAINTAIN” and “to provide a basis for the existence or subsistence of.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1184 (10th ed. 1998). Mere assistance does not amount to maintenance of or providing a basis for the existence of an activity. More important, there is a distinction between state-supported and local-supported institutions. The board’s interpretation of the regulation is a reasonable one. Black Hawk College, a community college, is primarily funded through local tax funds. State institutions have no such source of funds and are primarily funded from State appropriations. The regulation has consistently been interpreted not to apply to community colleges; our decision is the first to do otherwise. Black Hawk College is not a “state-supported institution” as that term is used in the regulation. We should affirm the decision of the board and the decision of the circuit court.