Court Opinion

ID: 9479984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:34:36.583763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:24.701009
License: Public Domain

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The panel here affirms the district court’s finding that Ian Gordon waived his Miranda rights when he asked interrogating police officers what they wanted to know, twice refused to answer their questions on the delivery of drugs, and then shook his head when asked whether he used drugs. Because I cannot find any evidence in the record to support the district court’s conclusion of waiver, I respectfully dissent.1
After Gordon was placed under arrest at the airport, Agents Callahan and Becerra advised him of his Miranda rights. Becer-ra asked Gordon whether he would talk with the agents and Gordon replied, “What do you want to know?”
Becerra asked, “Where are you taking this stuff?” Gordon responded by shaking his head in a negative manner, he would not answer the question. Gordon was then taken to the police station.
At the station, Agent Callahan began processing Gordon, taking the usual personal information such as birth date and place of residence. During the processing, Becerra resumed his prior questioning and again asked Gordon where he was taking the drugs. Becerra told Gordon that the U.S. Attorney would be informed of his cooperation and that the U.S. Attorney might help him. Gordon replied, “No one can help me now. Only the Lord.” He again refused to answer Becerra’s question.
Becerra, referring to the drugs, then asked Gordon, “Do you use this stuff?” In response, Gordon just shook his head in a negative manner. Gordon’s head gesture and a quantity of cocaine (9 ounces) consistent with either distribution or personal consumption were the only evidence supporting the distribution charge on which Gordon was convicted.
My brothers conclude that the district court’s determination of the voluntariness of the gesture is fully supported by the evidence. See United States v. Smith, 608 F.2d 1011, 1013 (4th Cir.1979) (determination of waiver reviewed by appellate court under “clearly erroneous” standard). They reach that conclusion because Gordon never indicated that he wanted to conclude all questioning and even his negative response to the first question could have been reasonably interpreted as simply refusing to answer the specific question.
If our inquiry were whether Gordon unambiguously asserted his right to remain silent, I would join Judge Wilkins' opinion. But I fear he asks the wrong question. The inquiry is not whether Gordon clearly invoked his rights to remain silent and to have counsel present during custodial interrogation but, rather, whether he ever waived them. It cannot be said here that a determination of knowing and voluntary *940waiver is supported by substantial, indeed if any, evidence.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its progeny have made indisputably clear that the prosecution can make no use of an accused’s statements elicited during custodial interrogation unless it demonstrates that an accused had waived his Miranda rights prior to interrogation.2 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612; North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) (courts must presume that defendant did not waive Miranda rights); Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470-71, 100 S.Ct. 652, 653, 62 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980) (per curiam) (heavy burden on government to show knowing and intelligent waiver); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (government bears heavy burden and must prove waiver by “preponderance of evidence”). Waiver is defined as an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Thus, the record must contain sufficient evidence to support the inference that the defendant was in fact willing to make a statement. And, the defendant’s willingness to make a statement cannot be presumed solely because a statement was in fact made. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628.
The record here simply contains insufficient evidence to conclude that Gordon knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Gordon never indicated that he was willing to make a statement and he never did make a verbal statement to the police that was responsive to any of their questions. Indeed, some of Gordon's actions were marked with steadfast resistance. Aside from his resistance to answer the officers’ questions, Gordon only did two things: (1) when asked if he was willing to talk, he replied, “What do you want to know?” and (2) while being processed, he shook his head in response to Becerra’s question on personal drug consumption. Gordon’s conduct cannot constitute waiver.
Gordon could not have waived his Miranda rights by saying “What do you want to know?” Its content does not allow an inference that Gordon was willing to make a statement. If it suffices to constitute waiver, then almost any statement other than “No!” will constitute waiver. As long as an accused verbally responds to an officer who asks if he will talk, waiver can be found notwithstanding an absence of evidence indicating that the accused was willing to make a statement. Such a rule eviscerates the waiver requirement.
But here the situation is even worse. After Gordon said, “What do you want to know?” the officers asked Gordon where he was taking the drugs. He shook his head and did not answer the question. His gesture was not an answer to the question: there is no destination equivalent to “no,” at least none employed by Gordon. Gordon’s gesture was a refusal to answer either the specific question or all questions.
Even in cases in which an accused has waived his Miranda rights, when he then ambiguously asserts his right to remain silent, the police are allowed to ask only limited questions to clarify the ambiguity. See Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 329, 102 L.Ed.2d 346 (1988); United States v. Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1756, 100 L.Ed.2d 218 *941(1988); cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 96 n. 3, 105 S.Ct. 490, 493 n. 3, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam) (noting, but not resolving, conflict between courts over whether an ambiguous request permits limited clarifying questions or instead demands cessation of interrogation). Here we have an ambiguous refusal to answer a question3 coupled with a lack of any evidence indicating that Gordon was willing to make a statement. The police should have clarified Gordon’s refusal to answer the question in order to determine whether he was willing to talk. Cf. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529-30, 107 S.Ct. 828, 832-33, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987) (when an accused’s request for counsel, “understood as ordinary people would understand [it],” is ambiguous, the request should be construed broadly by the court). Because there was absolutely no evidence that Gordon was willing to make a statement, Gordon’s course of conduct preceding the question on drug consumption did not constitute waiver.4
The only fact capable of demonstrating waiver is Gordon’s possibly inculpatory gesture itself. But a valid waiver cannot be presumed simply because a statement was in fact elicited. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. Yet, even more troubling is the fact that Gordon’s inculpa-tory response was a nonverbal gesture made in reaction to an accusatory question. Such a response is far more ambiguous than a verbal response, and, alone, is incapable of communicating a knowing and voluntary waiver.
As Judge Wilkins notes, such gestures are susceptible to various reasonable interpretations. A head shake could have been intended as an answer to a question or instead it could have been intended as a refusal to answer the specific question or all questions.5 In the case of a nonverbal statement, two separate inferences must be drawn for one to conclude waiver: (1) the gesture was an answer, not a refusal to answer; and (2) the defendant answered the question because he wanted to do so voluntarily, declining to exercise his rights. It seems, to me, that drawing these inferences in the present case does a great injustice to the protections of Miranda, greatly increasing the risk of police precipitation of reactive gestures as grounds for conviction, and greatly decreasing the likelihood that defendants were actually willing to make these gestures.
Significantly, the Miranda rights only forewarn an accused to keep his “mouth shut,” not his “head still.” Miranda essentially set forth a disclosure scheme, based on the premise that voluntariness can be ensured only by informing an accused of the consequences of foregoing his right to have counsel present during interrogation. See Barrett, 479 U.S. at 530, 107 S.Ct. at 832. But, pursuant to Miranda, an accused is only informed that “anything said can and will be used against [him].” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625 (emphasis added).6 A reasonable inference an accused might draw from such a warning is that his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel will be pro*942tected as long as he does not “say” anything. Gordon should not be considered to have waived his Miranda rights when he was not informed that a responsive yet ambiguous gesture could be used against him, particularly when no other evidence existed to show that he was willing to make such a statement.7 See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574, 107 S.Ct. 851, 857, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987) (“The Miranda warnings ensure that a waiver of these rights is knowing and intelligent by requiring that the suspect be fully advised of ... the critical advice that whatever he chooses to say may be used as evidence against him.”).
Because Gordon did not waive his Miranda rights, and because the admission of his head gesture into evidence significantly prejudiced his case, I would reverse Gordon’s conviction.8

. I do agree with Judge Wilkins’ fourth amendment analysis and find none of Gordon's arguments on this basis persuasive. Particularly unappealing is Gordon’s contention that the existence of an Arlington County, Virginia, ordinance requiring identification upon request transformed the encounter with the police into a seizure. The ordinance is completely inapplicable to the present case because the Virginia Supreme Court has interpreted the ordinance to require a reasonable and articulable suspicion prior to the imposition of criminal liability for refusal to provide identification. Jones v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 14, 334 S.E.2d 536 (1985). Thus, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the ordinance could not have been applied to the encounter and the officers did not attempt to invoke its authority.

. It is only after an accused has waived his Miranda rights and custodial interrogation has been permissibly initiated that the accused must indicate his wish not to be interrogated to make further questioning impermissible. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. at 1612-13. Once the accused so indicates a desire to remain silent, all interrogation must cease. Id. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-28.
The panel's discussion of Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), is puzzling to say the least. Mosley is an exception to the rule that prohibits further interrogation once an accused indicates his intent to remain silent. Mosley provides the police with the ability to resume interrogation after a significant length of time if they “scrupulously honor” an accused's right to cut off questioning. Id. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326. It simply does not apply here.

. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that Gordon’s head gesture was unambiguous and was clearly intended only as a refusal to answer the specific question on delivery, the police did not even honor that request. After Gordon refused to answer the delivery question, the police, at the station, again asked him the same question. A request not to be questioned with regard to a particular subject-matter must be honored by the police. United States v. Vasquez, 476 F.2d 730, 732-33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 836, 94 S.Ct. 181, 38 L.Ed.2d 72 (1973). Further questioning after police refuse to honor a desire for limited silence is impermissible.

. Gordon said, “What do you want to know?”, shook his head and refused to answer a question, was taken to the station, and again refused to answer the question.

. That Gordon’s gesture was a refusal to answer is, perhaps, more likely when considering that he also shook his head in refusing to answer the officer's first question.

. Callahan told Gordon that "he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could and would be used against him in a court of law; that he had the right to an attorney; if he could not afford one, one would be provided for him by the court; and that he did not have to make any statements at this time unless he wished to do so." (Emphasis added.)

. I do not mean to suggest that nonverbal communication should be prohibited from the interrogation room, only that the police clarify whether an accused is in fact willing to make such a statement prior to eliciting it.

. Whereas I would reverse Gordon's conviction, I do not reach the Sentencing Guidelines issues addressed in the panel opinion. I must note, however, that I am troubled by Judge Wilkins’ rejection of an approach used by the First Circuit on an issue that is not presented in this case. Not only does Judge Wilkins unnecessarily create a direct conflict with another circuit court, but his statements, obiter dictum, restrict the discretion of the sentencing judges.
Prior to sentencing, Gordon admitted his possession of the cocaine but did not admit an intent to distribute; he feared that such an admission might be used against him if he was successful on appeal. The probation office's report recommended against giving Gordon a downward adjustment due to his failure to admit the crime for which he was convicted. Although the district court denied Gordon the acceptance of responsibility adjustment, the judge stated reasons different from those contained in the probation office’s report. Essentially, Judge Bryan reasoned that something more than post-conviction statements is required to manifest acceptance of responsibility.
Nevertheless, Judge Wilkins addresses, and rejects, Gordon's argument that a defendant should not be required to admit the entire crime for which he was convicted to receive the responsibility adjustment. In light of Judge Bryan’s rationale, the argument is a non-issue. Also unnecessary is Judge Wilkins' rejection of the approach used in United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455 (1st Cir.1989), in which the First Circuit held that a defendant need only accept responsibility for the counts to which he has pled guilty as part of a plea agreement. Id. at 463. Judge Wilkins takes the opposite view, stating that “for section 3E1.1 of the guidelines to apply, a defendant must first accept responsibility for all of his criminal conduct.” But, as Judge Wilkins acknowledges, Perez-Franco is irrelevant. The problem here is that Gordon did not accept responsibility for the count on which he was convicted. The correctness of Perez-Franco is not before the Court.