Court Opinion

ID: 9665143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:41:47.048498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:05.866218
License: Public Domain

Williams, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although I concur in the results reached by the majority in each of these cases, I must respectfully dissent from the analysis. Four years after this Court issued its opinion in Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), the majority sees fit to overrule the decision of five members óf a six-member court and adopt the position of the dissent in that case. I cannot accept the premise that such action assists the bench and bar in construing the phrase, "serious impairment of body function” or is conducive to the progress of orderly jurisprudence in this state.
Even in view of the short shrift given to the doctrine of stare decisis, I might be inclined to sign the majority opinion if I were persuaded that it corrected an earlier misinterpretation of the will of the Legislature. I cannot reach that conclusion.
The principal conclusions of the majority, with which I disagree, are as follows:
1) The question whether the plaintiff suffered a *93serious impairment of body function must be submitted to the trier of fact whenever the evidence would cause reasonable minds to differ as to the answer. This is true even where there is no material factual dispute as to the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries.
4) The impairment need not be ... of an important body function.
5) The "general ability to live a normal life” test will no longer be used to determine whether the plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function. [Ante, pp 38-39.]
1
As to the first conclusion, there appears to be no compelling reason to depart from the normal rule that the judge construes the law and the jury decides on the facts. The proposition that "[t]he question whether the plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function must be submitted to the trier of fact whenever the evidence would cause reasonable minds to differ as to the answer” even where there is no material dispute of fact sidesteps the very reason for which this Court granted leave to appeal in these cases. These cases were taken in an effort to give the bench and bar further definition of the legislative phrase, "serious impairment of body function.” The majority itself recognizes the need for further definition, and states:
By choosing two rather amorphous thresholds, the Legislature apparently preferred that the parameters of § 3135(1) be developed through the judicial process. [Ante, p 48.]
Rather than using Cassidy as a starting point *94for the further development of a working definition of serious impairment of body function, the majority eliminates the aids to construction adopted by the Court in that case, without substituting any similar aids. Henceforth, decisions as to what constitutes a serious impairment of body function will be rendered by juries and no body of law will have been or will be created in the future to aid the bench and bar.
Even if we were to accept the majority’s conclusion that the meaning of the phrase shall now be left to the jury, the jury will still have to be instructed in its duty to interpret the phrase. The majority does nothing to guide the trial courts in this respect.
The meaning of the § 3135 language is a matter of statutory construction. It is a well-settled principle of law that statutory construction is a matter for the courts and not for the jury.
2
Second, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to limit recovery of noneconomic damages to the catastrophically injured. The majority’s recitation of the legislative history demonstrates that the lawmakers rejected language which would perhaps have raised the threshold so high that only the catastrophically injured could successfully overcome it. The quoted comments of Representatives Clark and Crampton (ante, pp 44, 45), however, indicate that those legislators, at least, believed that the threshold, as it was finally drafted, was still a substantial obstacle to suit. In my opinion, Cassidy was consistent with this history in limiting recovery to those suffering serious impairment of important body functions, and in its holding that Leo *95Cassidy, who suffered complete breaks of both bones in his lower leg, wore casts for seven months and was almost completely recovered after one and one-half years, did indeed suffer a "serious impairment of body function” within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, I can see no reason to discard the Cassidy rule that "serious impairment of body function” contemplates the impairment of an important body function. In the statutory language, "serious impairment of body function” appears with the other threshold requirements of "permanent serious disfigurement” and "death,” leaving the strong implication, under the rule of ejusdem generis, that while the impairment need not be permanent or fatal, it was not to be transient or trivial either.
While perhaps not definitive by itself, the legislators’ use of the words, "serious impairment of body function” rather than "serious impairment of a body function” helps persuade me of the correctness of the Cassidy Court’s conclusion that the legislators did not mean serious impairment of any body function.1
3
As to the "general ability to live a normal life” test, while I do not regard it as exclusively definitive, I do regard it as useful. The question is whether there has been a serious impairment of body function. Medically there are scientific tests to measure this. But there are practical tests that may also be useful. A person’s ability to walk, talk, lift, and perform normal daily activities is an important consideration in determining the seri*96ousness of an injury. While these matters in many cases depend upon the credibility of the plaintiff, judges and juries resolve questions of credibility every day.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
In conclusion, while I agree with the results in each of these cases, I would hold, consistently with Cassidy, that where there is no factual dispute regarding the extent of a plaintiff’s injuries the court is to decide as a matter of statutory construction whether plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function. Where there is a factual dispute which straddles the line demarcating those injuries which constitute serious impairment of body function, and those which do not, the factual dispute is to be submitted to the jury which should be instructed that, if it finds the facts to be as the plaintiff claims, it must also find a serious impairment of body function.
Therefore, in DiFranco, Burk, and Paupore, in which juries found no serious impairment, I agree with the results, but hold that the trial courts should have found no serious impairment as a matter of law.
In Kucera and Routley the factual disputes, in my view, "straddled the line” and therefore presented jury questions. In Kucera, the jury resolved the dispute in plaintiff’s favor. The trial court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict to defendant. While the trial judge was correct in assuming the duty to determine whether the plaintiffs claimed injuries constituted a serious impairment, I agree that the court’s conclusion was in error and the jury’s verdict should be reinstated.
*97In Routley, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant. In my view, plaintiffs complaint that the accident caused a continuing disability in which lifting a gallon of milk or climbing a flight of stairs resulted in severe pain, if believed by a jury, described a serious impairment of body function. I therefore agree that summary judgment was inappropriate. When the matter is tried, it is my view that the jury should be instructed that, if it finds the facts to be as plaintiff, contends, it must find a serious impairment of body function.
Riley, J., concurred with Williams, C.J.
Levin, J. I concur with Chief Justice Williams for the reasons stated in part l of his opinion.

 Therefore, I find it difficult to agree with the majority’s statement (ante, p 65) that "the relevant inquiries are whether the injury impaired a body function and, if so, whether that impairment was serious.” (Emphasis added.)