Court Opinion

ID: 9718596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:27:38.686389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:00.543064
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, specially concurring: The court holds today that police officers may not detain a vehicle after the initial purpose for a traffic stop is concluded, and that any evidence seized during such a detention is inadmissible, consent to search notwithstanding. While I agree with this holding, I write separately because the majority fails to base its decision independently on the Illinois Constitution, despite defendant’s request that we do so. It is apparent from the majority’s analysis that the United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether the United States Constitution allows police officers to detain a motor vehicle after the initial purpose for a traffic stop is concluded. Nevertheless the majority opinion, citing both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution, holds that such a detention is “illegal.” 186 Ill. 2d at 518, 519, 521. The United States Supreme Court has warned that, when deciding an issue on which federal law is unsettled, state courts should clearly delineate whether their decision is based on federal or state grounds. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1214, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983). This directive stems from the Supreme Court’s concern that its “authority as final arbiter of the United States Constitution could be eroded by a lack of clarity in state-court decisions.” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 9, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34, 43, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1190 (1995). Such clarity is particularly important where the state court opinion refers to both the United States Constitution and the state’s constitution. See Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1031, 116 S. Ct. 2485 (1996) (noting that state court failed to clarify whether its reference to state constitution was intended as exclusive ground of decision where it also cited cases interpreting federal constitution); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 571 n.3, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 570 n.3, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1978 n.3 (1988) (same). In the instant case, the court’s opinion discusses both state and federal precedent, ultimately concluding that the challenged detention was unlawful. The United States Supreme Court, however, has never specifically addressed this question. The court’s opinion thus grants greater protections to criminal defendants under the Illinois Constitution than are currently recognized under the United States Constitution. In a recent concurrence, Justice Ginsburg offered the following counsel for state courts rendering decisions in such situations: “It is incumbent on a state court, *** when it determines that its State’s laws call for protection more complete than the Federal Constitution demands, to be clear about its ultimate reliance on state law. Similarly, a state court announcing a new legal rule arguably derived from both federal and state law can definitively render state law an adequate and independent ground for' its decision by a simple declaration to that effect.” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 44, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 357, 117 S. Ct. 417, 423 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). In failing to declare explicitly that the Illinois Constitution constitutes an independent ground for its decision, the court’s opinion places the rights of Illinois citizens in the hands of the federal judiciary. If an independent state law basis is not clearly apparent from a state court’s opinion, the United States Supreme Court will treat the decision as if based solely on federal law. Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1214, 103 S. Ct. at 3476. The Supreme Court is therefore free to reverse this court’s judgment if it disagrees with our view of the protections which should be afforded to criminal defendants, in this as well as in other cases. See, e.g., People v. Wardlow, 183 Ill. 2d 306, 310-11 (1998) (citing both federal and state constitutions in holding that flight alone is insufficient to justify an investigatory stop), cert. granted, No. 98—1036 (U.S. May 3, 1999). The responsible approach in this and other similar cases is to preclude federal review of the issue in question by clearly basing our holding on the Illinois Constitution. If this court truly believes that the right announced today is an essential component of the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, we should take the simple steps necessary to prevent its possible curtailment by the United States Supreme Court. By failing to be specific, this court has neglected an important “opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1041, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1214, 103 S. Ct. at 3476. For these reasons, I concur only in the court’s judgment.