Court Opinion

ID: 9672138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:49:33.284784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:14.485917
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
Because the majority opinion refuses to grant Robert Watkins, henceforth applicant, an out-of-time appeal, and because I find that under the record of this cause applicant is entitled to be granted an out-of-time appeal, I respectfully dissent.
The record before us makes the following clear: Applicant, who was then an indigent charged with committing the offense of capital murder, and his court appointed trial counsel entered into a plea bargain agreement with the prosecution. The terms of the agreement were that, in exchange for the State moving to reduce the offense of capital murder to the offense of murder, applicant would enter a plea of guilty to the murder charge and not appeal the trial court’s judgment and sentence. Although the State was not going to make a recommendation as to punishment, it was apparently understood by all that applicant’s punishment would be assessed by the trial judge at life imprisonment. The trial judge approved in all things the plea bargain agreement, except that part of the agreement that pertained to applicant waiving his right to appeal. The trial judge expressly granted applicant permission to appeal his conviction and sentence. In fact, the trial judge appointed trial counsel to represent applicant on his appeal. Counsel, however, never gave notice of appeal, nor did he represent applicant on any appeal. In fact, there never was an appeal. An appeal never occurred, apparently because counsel later told applicant that he, applicant, could not appeal his case because he, applicant, had waived his right to appeal as part of the plea bargain agreement, and further told applicant that not only would an appeal be futile, it could perhaps be disastrous to applicant if he was granted a new trial. Being convinced by counsel’s statements that he should not appeal his conviction and sentence, applicant took no action to appeal his cause. All of the above occurred in 1981.
In 1988, obviously having been made aware of this Court’s extremely liberal policy in granting inmates out-of-time appeals, *821which I believe has occurred as a result of this Court’s decisions of Ex parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), and Ward v. State, 740 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), probably not because applicant read those cases but because he had read or heard about some of this Court’s per curiam opinions, like Ex parte Rice, 757 S.W.2d 384 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), which are usually circulated throughout the inmate population verbally rather than in printed form, applicant reached the conclusion that he, too, was entitled to be granted by this Court an out-of-time appeal. He filed the instant post-conviction application for the writ of habeas corpus in 1988 seeking an out-of-time appeal.
As far as I can tell from the record before us, the majority opinion declines to order that applicant should be granted an out-of-time appeal for several reasons, namely, (1) because it concludes that applicant got “a good deal” and (2) because it concludes that his then attorney correctly convinced him that if applicant had appealed his conviction for murder and life sentence at that time this Court might have set aside the murder conviction, which holding might have exposed him to receiving a death sentence on retrial. The majority opinion then opines, at least implicitly, that if it had been representing applicant, it could understand why applicant did not appeal his conviction and sentence: “In choosing the certainty of a prison sentence over the uncertainty of retrial on capital charges, we cannot fault applicant.”
But for Ward and Axel, supra, I might understand why the majority opinion declines to grant applicant an out-of-time appeal. However, if those cases have any stare decisis validity, they control, and applicant is entitled to be granted an out-of-time appeal by this Court under those cases.
In Ward, this Court held that “an appointed attorney’s legal responsibilities do not magically and automatically terminate at the conclusion of the trial,” (796), and further held that until counsel was permitted to formally withdraw from the case by the trial court, he must remain counsel for his indigent client. In Ex parte Axel, this Court expanded upon what it had held in Ward, and held that it was the primary duty of trial counsel, and not the duty of the trial judge, to inform his client “of his right to appeal and of other appellate matters to the extent deemed appropriate in the premises.” (374). In both Ward and Ex parte Axel, for reasons stated, I unsuccessfully advocated that it should be the trial judge, and not trial counsel, who should be the individual who has the burden of advising the defendant of his appellate rights. I still subscribe to that view.
I find that the facts of this cause lie somewhere between the principles a majority of this Court adopted in Ward and Ex parte Axel and the principle, albeit implicit, that the Fifth Circuit adopted in Martin v. Texas, 737 F.2d 460 (5th Cir.1984).
The facts in Martin are closely analogous to those found in this cause. There, given the law that existed at the time, trial counsel became convinced that his client’s appealing his conviction for capital murder and life sentence could be a dangerous course for the defendant Martin to take, because he might receive a new trial and on retrial receive the death sentence. Counsel told the defendant Martin that because of this he was not going to give notice of appeal or represent him on any appeal, and he didn’t do either one. The Fifth Circuit granted Martin an out-of-time appeal, after finding that counsel failed to advise Martin that because he was indigent he was entitled not only to the services of a court appointed counsel but to a free record as well. The Fifth Circuit made short shrift of what counsel believed might result from a successful appeal. That became totally secondary to resolving the issue.
In this instance, the trial judge appointed trial counsel to represent applicant on his appeal, but counsel never gave notice of appeal and never represented applicant in any appeal, obviously for the very same reasons that the defendant Martin’s counsel gave Martin.
The majority opinion states that after trial counsel was appointed to represent *822applicant on his appeal, but without any further formal courtroom proceedings taking place, counsel conferred with applicant, and after being convinced by counsel that an appeal would not only be futile but could be disastrous to applicant, applicant told counsel that he did not wish to appeal. There is nothing in this record, however, that might reflect or indicate that the trial judge at that time was ever made aware of what applicant told counsel, or what counsel told applicant. That occurred 7 years later.
If it is the intent of the majority of this Court to expressly overrule whatever it stated and held in Ward and Ex parte Axel, it should state this fact in big, bold letters, rather than let the reader conclude that this is occurring implicitly.
Believing that applicant is entitled to be granted an out-of-time appeal, pursuant to Ward and Ex parte Axel, as well as Martin v. Texas, my vote is to grant him an out-of-time appeal. To the majority’s contrary vote, I respectfully dissent.