Court Opinion

ID: 9639547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:22:42.524621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:19.687864
License: Public Domain

John Mauzy Pittman, Judge, dissenting. There are two ways to establish a violation of the owner’s duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for the benefit of invitees. The plaintiff must prove either that the presence of a substance upon the floor was the result of the defendant’s negligence, or that the substance had been on the floor for such a length of time that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of its presence and failed to use ordinary care to remove it. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Dep’t, 347 Ark. 826, 69 S.W.3d 20 (2002). Although the majority recites this rule, it fails to recognize that it establishes two distinct kinds of slip-and-fall cases. The first type of case, and the more common of the two, is the type in which an invitee slips on a substance that is not under the exclusive control of the owner of the premises. In such a case there is a very real possibility that the substance was dropped or spilled by a customer, and the owner of the premises will not be deemed liable unless it can be shown that the substance or object remained on the floor for so long that the premises owner knew or should have known of its presence. All of the cases cited by the majority fall into this category. Water is not an instrumentality under the exclusive control of a business owner, particularly on rainy days, and can easily be tracked in by invitees. Consequently, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kelton, 305 Ark. 173, 806 S.W.2d 373 (1991); Bank of Malvern v. Dunklin, 307 Ark. 127, 817 S.W.2d 873 (1991); Fayetteville Diagnostic Clinic v. Turner, 344 Ark. 490, 42 S.W.3d 420 (2001); and Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Willmon, 289 Ark. 14, 709 S.W.2d 623 (1986), all turn — and properly so — on the length of time the water was on the floor in determining whether the owner of the premises was hable. The same approach was correctly taken in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Regions Bank Trust Dep’t, 347 Ark. 826, 69 S.W.3d 20 (2002), where the broken snow-globe had been on display and it was equally accessible to customers and employees. The majority’s reliance on these cases shows beyond dispute that it fails to understand that the case at bar is of the second sort, where the presence of the substance on the floor is itself the direct result of the defendant’s negligence. The appellant provided substantial evidence that strapping bands were an instrumentality under Wal-Mart’s direct control. It was the responsibility of Wal-Mart’s employees to remove these bands before placing merchandise on display. It follows that it was also Wal-Mart’s responsibility to safely dispose of these bands so they would not present a hazard to invitees. As the majority notes, apparently without appreciating its import, Wal-Mart’s store manager herself admitted that she could not remember a product being displayed with the strapping bands not having been first removed. Appellant testified that she had shopped at Wal-Mart for years and had never seen a customer remove a strapping band from an item on display. There was evidence that magazines were displayed in the area where appellant fell, and that these magazines were brought into the store by vendors. The testimony that the vendors removed the strapping bands from the magazines does not relieve Wal-Mart from liability because, in stocking the magazine racks, they were acting as Wal-Mart’s agents. Under these circumstances, the length of time that the strapping band was on the floor, or whether it “migrated” from some other location to the spot where appellant fell, are immaterial. Appellant provided evidence to show that its very presence on the floor was more probably than not the direct result of Wal-Mart’s negligence, and that is all the law requires in this type of case. Fayetteville Diagnostic Clinic v. Turner, supra. The trial court was wrong to grant Wal-Mart’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper only if there is no substantial evidence to support the jury verdict and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fayetteville Diagnostic Clinic v. Turner, 344 Ark. 490, 42 S.W.3d 420 (2001). Although there was no direct evidence in the present case to show that the strapping band appellant slipped on was on the floor because of Wal-Mart’s negligence, there was an abundance of circumstantial evidence from which this fact could properly be inferred, including evidence that Wal-Mart employees are responsible for removing these bands from shipments while stocking merchandise, and that such bands are not generally accessible to customers. Any material fact in issue may be established by circumstantial evidence; the fact that evidence is circumstantial does not render it insubstantial, because the law makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and circumstances from which a fact can be inferred. Muskogee Bridge Co. v. Stansell, 311 Ark. 113, 842 S.W.2d 15 (1992). Here, Wal-Mart’s negligence could properly be inferred on the basis of the extensive evidence offered at trial to show that strapping bands are almost invariably in the control of and removed by Wal-Mart’s employees. In contrast, there is no evidence whatsoever to establish Wal-Mart’s alternative hypotheses for the presence of the strapping band on the floor, e.g., that any strapping bands were brought into the store by customers on the day in question, or that any strapping bands happened to blow in the front door from parts unknown. The jury rejected these far-fetched possibilities and made a finding based on substantial evidence, and I believe that it was error to disturb that verdict. I respectfully dissent. Hart, J., joins in this dissent.