Court Opinion

ID: 9367625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 15:10:58.731755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:01.090196
License: Public Domain

In The
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-22-00094-CR

        JAMIE DELAINE COLLARD, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

         On Appeal from the County Court at Law
                Navarro County, Texas
              Trial Court No. C40453-CR

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
      Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

           A Navarro County1 grand jury returned an indictment charging Jamie Delaine Collard

with possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an amount less than one gram, a

state jail felony.2 After a trial in the County Court at Law of Navarro County, a jury found

Collard guilty as charged in the indictment. At the punishment hearing, Collard pled true to two

prior felony convictions alleged to enhance her punishment.3 After an evidentiary hearing, the

trial court found the enhancement allegations true, sentenced Collard to seven years’

imprisonment, and ordered her to reimburse the Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS) for

testing.

           On appeal, Collard contends (1) that the trial court erred in ordering reimbursement to the

TDPS and (2) that, in the absence of a valid transfer order, the trial court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction to render the judgment of conviction. Because Collard failed to preserve her issue

regarding the validity of the assignment of the case to the trial court, we will affirm the trial

court’s judgment of conviction. Nevertheless, because the trial court lacked authority to order

reimbursement to the TDPS, we will modify the judgment by deleting the reimbursement fees.

1
 Originally appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We are unaware of any
conflict between precedent of the Tenth Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant issue. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 41.3.
2
    See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(b) (Supp.).
3
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.425(b).
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I.     Reimbursement Fees Not Authorized

       The trial court’s judgment of conviction contains an entry under “Reimbursement Fees”

of $180.00. It also provides, “Furthermore, the following special findings or orders apply:

$180.00 to TX DPS Crime Lab[oratory].” In her first issue, Collard challenges the award of

reimbursement fees to the TDPS and requests that we modify the judgment by deleting that

award. The State concedes the issue.

       When a defendant is placed on community supervision, the trial court is authorized to

require the defendant to “reimburse a law enforcement agency for the analysis, storage, or

disposal of raw materials, controlled substances, chemical precursors, drug paraphernalia, or

other materials seized in connection with the offense” as a condition of her community

supervision. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.301(b)(17) (Supp.). However, there is no

statute that authorizes the trial court to order reimbursement to any law enforcement agency for

those costs when the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment. See Shircliff v. State, 654 S.W.3d

788, 793 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, no pet.). For that reason, “a trial court has no authority to

assess DPS lab fees when a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment.” Id. (quoting Ortega v.

State, No. 11-19-00081-CR, 2021 WL 2836799, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 8, 2021, no

pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op. on remand, not designated for publication)). Because Collard was

sentenced to imprisonment, we find that the trial court had no authority to order her to reimburse

the TDPS. We, therefore, sustain this issue, and we will modify the trial court’s judgment by

deleting the $180.00 entry under “Reimbursement Fees” and deleting “$180.00 to TX DPS

Crime Lab[oratory]” found in the trial court’s special findings and orders.

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II.    Validity of Case Assignment Not Preserved

       Collard also complains that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this case

and that, therefore, the judgment of conviction is void. Collard concedes that the County Court

at Law of Navarro County may acquire felony jurisdiction. However, she argues that, in this

case, because the indictment was first presented to the 13th Judicial District Court, the district

court was required to enter a transfer order that was accepted by the county court at law of

Navarro County before the county court at law could assume jurisdiction. She reasons that,

because there is no transfer order that shows that the judge of the county court at law consented

to the transfer of the case, the trial court acted without subject-matter jurisdiction.

       Section 25.1772 of the Texas Government Code states,

       In addition to the jurisdiction provided by Section 25.0003 and other law, . . . a
       county court at law in Navarro County has concurrent jurisdiction with the district
       court in:

       (1)     felony cases to:

       ....

               (D)    conduct jury trials on assignment of a district judge presiding in
               Navarro County and acceptance of the assignment by the judge of the
               county court at law;

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 25.1772(a)(1)(D) (Supp.). As a result, the County Court at Law of

Navarro County and the 13th Judicial District Court have concurrent jurisdiction for felony cases

assigned to the county court at law by the district court. Further, the Government Code requires

district and statutory county courts in each county to adopt local rules of administration that

provide for, inter alia, the “assignment, docketing, transfer, and hearing of all cases, subject to

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jurisdictional limitations of the district courts and statutory county courts.” TEX. GOV’T CODE

ANN. § 74.093(b)(1) (Supp.). We take judicial notice that, on February 16, 2012, the judges of

the 13th Judicial District Court, the County Court at Law of Navarro County, and the County

Court of Navarro County jointly entered an amended Administrative Order—Case

Management/Assignment Plan. 13TH DISTRICT COURT,                         COUNTY COURT AT     LAW & COUNTY

COURT        OF    NAVARRO COUNTY, TEXAS, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER—CASE MANAGEMENT/

ASSIGNMENT PLAN AMONG                 THE   SAID NAVARRO COUNTY COURTS (AMENDED FEBRUARY 16,

2012),             https://www.co.navarro.tx.us/upload/page/4291/docs/DistrictJudge/DJ_-_ADMIN_

ORDER_13TH_DIST.pdf. That order states:

            Felony cases filed with the District Clerk[4] . . . shall be randomly assigned, except
            as prohibited by Government Code 25.1772 and 25.003:

                    a.       Cases beginning with a “D” shall be assigned to the District Court.

                    b.       Cases beginning with a “C” shall be automatically assigned by the
                             District Court to the County Court at Law.

            The County Court at Law may conduct arraignments; conduct pretrial hearings;
            accept guilty pleas; conduct jury and bench trials; and may assess punishment
            and/or pronounce sentence.

Id. at 2.5

            As a result, the district court and the county court at law in Navarro County have adopted

a procedure, pursuant to the Government Code, by which certain felony cases are automatically

4
 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 25.1772(f) (“The district clerk serves as clerk of a county court at law in matters of
concurrent jurisdiction with the district court . . . .”).
5
    In the trial court, the cause number of this case was “C40453-CR.”
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assigned by the district court to the county court at Law. Nevertheless, Collard argues that such

assignment must be made by a separate order filed in each case.

       The issue, then, is whether the procedure adopted by the courts in Navarro County

comports with Section 25.1772’s provision that the County Court at Law of Navarro County has

jurisdiction of felony cases “on assignment of a district judge presiding in Navarro County and

acceptance of the assignment by the judge of the county court at law.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.

§ 25.1772(a)(1)(D). However, this is not a jurisdictional issue, but rather a question of statutory

procedure. See In re Griffith, No. 10-18-00131-CR, 2018 WL 2344651, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Waco May 23, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op, not designated for publication); Colomb v.

State, No. 10-08-00039-CR, 2009 WL 1163413, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 29, 2009, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication).

       “Errors involving statutory procedure are merely voidable and require an objection to

preserve error.” Colomb, 2009 WL 1163413, at *2 (citing Ex parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221, 224

(Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). Since Collard asserts an error involving statutory procedure, she was

required to assert the error in the trial court. See id.; see also Daniels v. State, 352 S.W.2d 267,

268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961) (finding that lack of transfer order between two district courts

cannot be complained of on appeal absent filing of timely plea to the jurisdiction in trial court);

Bradford v. State, No. 06-15-00192-CR, 2016 WL 6471353, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

Nov. 2, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that lack of objection

to exchange of benches between district court and county court at law failed to preserve

complaint regarding lack of assignment authorizing the exchange). Because Collard did not raise

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an objection regarding the lack of an assignment order in the trial court, she has failed to

preserve this issue on appeal. See Daniels, 352 S.W.2d at 268; Colomb, 2009 WL 1163413, at

*2. We overrule this issue.

III.   Conclusion

       For the reasons stated, we modify the trial court’s judgment by deleting the $180.00 entry

under “Reimbursement Fees,” and by deleting “$180.00 to TX DPS Crime Lab[oratory]” under

the trial court’s special findings and orders. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                              Scott E. Stevens
                                              Chief Justice

Date Submitted:        January 19, 2023
Date Decided:          February 1, 2023

Do Not Publish

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