Court Opinion

ID: 9930945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 21:04:23.321001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:29.098243
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/24 P. v. Fragoso CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,                                                B328692

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No. VA017817)
         v.

RUDY ANTHONY FRAGOSO,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Andrew C. Kim, Judge. Reversed.

     Law Office of Janice M. Belluci and Janice M. Belluci for
Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Gabriel Bradley, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Defendant and appellant Rudy Anthony Fragoso challenges
the denial of his petition for termination of sex offender
registration. He asserts the trial court’s conclusion—that
continuing his registration would significantly enhance
community safety—lacks substantial evidence. We agree and
reverse.

                           BACKGROUND
        Fragoso began sexually abusing his stepdaughter when she
was seven years old. The abuse continued until she was almost
18, despite her numerous pleas for him to stop. Though Fragoso
told his stepdaughter to keep the abuse a secret and to take that
secret to her grave, she eventually reported the abuse.
        In 1993, Fragoso was arrested and pleaded no contest to
violating Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), by engaging in
lewd acts upon a child under age 14.1 He was sentenced to state
prison for three years and required to register as a sex offender
for life.
        In 2022, Fragoso petitioned to terminate his sex offender
registration. The superior court denied his petition and ruled that
appellant may not file another petition for two years.
        Fragoso filed a timely notice of appeal.

                           DISCUSSION
I.    Applicable law and standard of review
      Prior to 2021, California required those convicted of certain
sex crimes to register as sex offenders for life, as long as they live

1       All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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or work in California. Section 290 now provides a tiered system
requiring different lengths of registration depending on the
offense. Those who, like defendant, are convicted of violating
section 288, subdivision (a), are considered second tier offenders,
meaning they must register for a minimum of 20 years. (§ 290,
subd. (d)(2)(A).)
       Once a sex offender has been on the registry for the
minimum amount of time mandated by their tier, that person
may petition to be removed from the registry and for relief from
the duty to continue to register. (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(1).) The People
determine whether to request a hearing. If a hearing is not
requested, the petition is granted unless the sex offender has
pending charges and is not in custody or on parole, probation, or
supervised release. (Ibid.)
       If a hearing is requested, the People have the burden of
producing evidence establishing that community safety would be
significantly enhanced by requiring continued registration.
(People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 432 (Thai).)
       “In determining whether to order continued registration,
the court shall consider: the nature and facts of the registerable
offense; the age and number of victims; whether any victim was a
stranger at the time of the offense (known to the offender for less
than 24 hours); criminal and relevant noncriminal behavior
before and after conviction for the registerable offense; the time
period during which the person has not reoffended; successful
completion, if any, of a Sex Offender Management Board-certified
sex offender treatment program; and the person's current risk of
sexual or violent reoffense, including the person’s risk levels on
SARATSO static, dynamic, and violence risk assessment
instruments, if available.” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3).) Permissible

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evidence includes “declarations, affidavits, police reports, or any
other evidence submitted by the parties which is reliable,
material, and relevant.” (Ibid.) If the court denies the petition, it
must also select a one- to five-year time period after which the
sex offender may file another petition and must state the reason
on the record for the time period it selects. (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(4).)
       “An appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling on a
petition for termination from the sex offender registry for abuse
of discretion.” (Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 433.) “‘The abuse
of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it
calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling
under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for
substantial evidence . . . .’” (Ibid.)
II.    Insufficient evidence that community safety would
       be significantly enhanced by continued registration
       Defendant argues the evidence, which shows he engaged in
egregious conduct 30 years ago, does not show he has a current
risk of reoffense. The prosecution made a similar showing in
Thai, arguing the facts of the underlying crime were
“‘particularly egregious,’” with that defendant taking advantage
of a 12-year-old victim and showing no remorse after the crime.
(Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 430.) The defense responded
that the events occurred 23 years earlier and there was no
evidence he was currently a danger. (Id. at p. 431.) The trial
court denied the petition, reasoning the crime was egregious and
the defendant had taken advantage of a position of trust. (Id. at
pp. 430-431.) The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the trial
court had abused its discretion in that the prosecution had failed
to produce evidence establishing that “terminating the
registration requirement considerably raised the threat to society

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because [the 64-year-old defendant] was currently likely to
reoffend.” (Id. at p. 433.) Assuming the underlying crime was
egregious, “those facts alone do not demonstrate [the defendant]
was a risk to the community over 24 years later.” (Id. at p. 434.)
      Here the prosecutor submitted evidence showing defendant
began inappropriately touching his stepdaughter when she was
seven years old. When she was nine, he began having sexual
intercourse with her multiple times a month until she was 15 and
then every other weekend until she was 17 and reported the
abuse to her mother.
      When confronted, defendant admitted the molestation. He
was arrested and pleaded no contest to the charge of committing
a lewd act upon a child. Additionally, he admitted having
engaged in this act while in a position of special trust and that he
committed an act of substantial sexual conduct with his victim.2
      Defendant’s victim endured years of abuse, which ended 30
years ago when defendant was arrested and sentenced. No
evidence was presented that in the following three decades
defendant failed to register or committed any sex offenses. Nor
was there any risk assessment test or other evidence tending to
show a significant risk that defendant was likely to reoffend.3 As

2     “Substantial sexual conduct” is defined by section 1203.066,
subdivision (b), to mean “penetration of the vagina or rectum of
either the victim or the offender by the penis of the other or by
any foreign object, oral copulation, or masturbation of either the
victim or the offender.”
3       We note defendant submitted to the trial court an abstract
showing the risk of sexual recidivism is highest during the first
few years after release, and decreases substantially the longer
individuals remained sex offense-free in the community. (Hanson,
et al., High Risk Sex Offenders May Not Be High Risk Forever in

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a result, the burden of showing defendant to be a current risk to
the community was not met.
       The People argue defendant could have been charged with
violating section 288.5 because he committed the continuous
sexual abuse of his victim while she was under the age of 14, a
violation that mandates lifetime registration. However, the
determination under section 290.5 depends on the actual crime
for which defendant was convicted, and not the possible crimes
available. (People v. Franco (Jan. 25, 2024, B324852) ___
Cal.App.5th ___ [2024 Cal.App. Lexis 41].)
       Defendant, a second tier offender (§ 290, subd. (d)(2)(A)),
has been registered for 27 years. Defendant is therefore entitled
to be removed from the sex offender registry because he has not
reoffended and has been registering for well in excess of the
minimum 20 years. (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(1).)

                        DISPOSITION
      The order denying defendant’s petition is reversed.

                                     __________________________
                                     CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

____________________________         __________________________
LUI, P. J.                           HOFFSTADT, J.

29 Journal of Interpersonal Violence (Mar. 24, 2014) 2792, 2807-
2808.)

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