Court Opinion

ID: 9761485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:43:54.82028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:23.951463
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority is of the opinion that a conflict exists between § 556.041 and § 571.-015, both enacted in S.B. 60 by the 79th General Assembly, 1st Session, Laws of 1977, pp. 665, 700, effective January 1,1979.
In Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592, 598, 599 (Mo.banc 1980), the majority spoke of § 571.015 (the Armed Criminal Action Statute) as follows:
“The language of the armed criminal action statute shows that the General Assembly clearly intended that a defendant convicted of armed criminal action shall be punished for both armed criminal action and for the underlying felony. Section 559.225, RSMo Supp.1976 (now § 571.015, RSMo 1978) expressly provides that ‘any person who commits any felony under the laws of this state by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon is also guilty of the crime of armed criminal action.’ (Emphasis added.) The armed criminal action statute provides in three separate subsections for punishment of not less *46than three years’ imprisonment for the first offense, not less than five years’ imprisonment for the second offense, and not less than ten years’ imprisonment for the third. The legislative intent to impose punishment both for the underlying felony and for the ‘compound’ offense of which it is a part is clearly and unambiguously expressed in the following sentence, which appears in each of the three subsections: ‘The punishment imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to any punishment provided by law for the crime committed by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous [instrument] or deadly weapon.’ There is nothing ambiguous or uncertain about the meaning of this provision. The statute provides that the state may punish for any felony and also punish for that felony a second time in virtue of its having been committed through the use of a dangerous or deadly weapon. This is the plain meaning of the words used, and it is the unmistakable intent of our General Assembly. * *
There is respectable authority by which the majority could uphold § 571.015:
“ ‘It is the established rule of construction that the law does not favor a repeal by implication, but that where there are two or more provisions relating to the same subject matter they must, if possible, be construed so as to maintain the integrity of both.’ * * * Where there are in one act * * * specific provisions relating to a particular subject, they will govern in respect to that subject as against general provisions contained in the same act. * * * [And the rule is] that when a general intention is expressed, and also a particular intention, which is incompatible with the general one, the particular intention shall be considered an exception to the general one.” 1 J. G. Sutherland and J. Lewis, Statutes and Statutory Construction, §§ 274, 275, at 527, 528, 581, 532 (2d ed. 1904).
See also State ex rel. Fort Zumwalt School Dist. v. Dickherber, 576 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Mo.banc 1979); City of Raytown v. Danforth, 560 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Mo.banc 1977); Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Mo.banc (1968); Flarsheim v. Twenty Five Thirty Two Broadway Corp., 432 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Mo.1968); Edwards v. St.Louis County, 429 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo.banc 1968); Brooks v. Cooksey, 427 S.W.2d 498, 503 (Mo.1968); Veal v. City of St. Louis, 365 Mo. 836, 843-44, 289 S.W.2d 7, 12 (1956); Layson v. Jackson County, 365 Mo. 905, 909, 290 S.W.2d 109, 111 (1956); State ex rel. Baker v. Goodman, 364 Mo. 1202, 1212, 274 S.W.2d 293, 297 (banc 1954); Fleming v. Moore Bros. Realty Co., 363 Mo. 305, 315, 251 S.W.2d 8, 15 (1952); Eagleton v. Murphy, 348 Mo. 949, 953, 156 S.W.2d 683, 685 (1941); State v. Richman, 347 Mo. 595, 601, 148 S.W.2d 796, 799 (1941); State ex inf. McKittrick v. Carolene Products Co., 346 Mo. 1049, 1059-60, 144 S.W.2d 153, 156 (banc 1940); State v. Harris, 337 Mo. 1052, 1058, 87 S.W.2d 1026, 1029 (1935); State ex rel. Buchanan County v. Fulks, 296 Mo. 614, 625-26, 247 S.W. 129, 132 (banc 1922); State ex inf. Barrett v. Imhoff, 291 Mo. 603, 617, 238 S.W. 122, 125 (banc 1922); State ex rel. Jones v. Chariton Drainage Dist. No. 1, 252 Mo. 345, 363, 158 S.W. 633, 638 (banc 1913); State ex inf. Major v. Amick, 247 Mo. 271, 292, 152 S.W. 591, 597 (banc 1912); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 257 (1974)..
In my view, it would not be unreasonable for a rational person to believe that the General Assembly intended, and hoped, that the Armed Criminal Action Statute would deter the commission of felonies by use of a gun and would diminish, at least to some extent, the killings of human beings which have become commonplace in our lives.
And yet the majority in this case, by use of dicta and for no compelling reason, strains to effectually repeal § 571.015, the Armed Criminal Action Statute.
I concurred in the principal opinion in State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44 (Mo.banc 1981), not because I agree with it, but because I have tired of arraying my judgment against that of the majority of this Court.
I dissent in this case because an unfavorable response by the United States Supreme Court to the principal opinion in Haggard, *47supra, in my view, is a certainty. In light of such contingency, the volunteered references in the principal opinion to § 556.041, RSMo 1978, are extremely unfortunate.
I respectfully dissent.