Court Opinion

ID: 9901730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 15:05:53.201331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:38.302763
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-544

                              JOSEPH SINKIEWICZ

                                       vs.

                                 PIERRE LOUIS.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       Following a bench trial that spanned ten days, a judge of

 the Superior Court entered judgment for the defendant on the

 plaintiff's various claims arising out of the defendant's

 keeping of domesticated animals on his property.1              The plaintiff

 timely appealed, claiming that the judge abused her discretion

 by excluding a series of photographs and rebuttal testimony.                 We

 affirm.

       Background.     We recite the facts that the judge could have

 found, reserving some for later discussion.

 1 The judge construed the claims as breach of quiet enjoyment and
 privacy, nuisance, trespass, negligence, and intentional
 infliction of emotional distress. The judge also found in favor
 of the plaintiff as to the defendant's counterclaims, alleging
 harassment in violation of G. L. c. 258E, and violation of quiet
 enjoyment and privacy. The defendant did not submit a brief or
 otherwise participate in this appeal.
     The plaintiff and his companion live in a home situated on

a three-acre lot, of which two acres remain wooded.     The

plaintiff welcomes indigenous wildlife, such as wild turkeys,

geese, birds of all sorts, opossums, deer, and other animals, on

his land without restriction.

     The defendant lives on property that abuts the plaintiff's

property.    In 2016, the defendant erected a large chicken coop

approximately twenty feet from the mutual property line.2      The

defendant kept ducks, guinea hens, turkeys, and approximately

thirty chickens in the coop, which was open at the top.       Some of

the animals occasionally "escaped" onto the plaintiff's

property.3

     The plaintiff's home sits approximately three hundred feet

from the chicken coop.    The coop is not visible from the

plaintiff's patio.

     The defendant regularly cleaned out the coop and treated it

to reduce odors.     A city employee with the board of health, who

inspected the chicken coop multiple times at the plaintiff's

2 From 2012 to 2016, the defendant had a smaller chicken coop
that sat twenty-five feet from the shared property line. During
this time, the plaintiff made no complaints to the defendant,
his family, or city officials.
3 In 2017 and 2019, the plaintiff and defendant respectively

installed fences to, among other things, limit the animals'
intrusions on the plaintiff's property. The defendant also
clipped the ducks' wings to prevent them from flying onto the
plaintiff's property.

                                  2
insistence, testified that the defendant disposed of the waste

from the coop by mixing it with soil and using it as a

fertilizer for his gardens.4     She also testified that the

defendant's property was of an adequate size to accommodate his

animals and that the elevation of the coop helped limit

predators' access to the animals inside it.

     Despite his complaints about the noises and the smells from

the chicken coop, the plaintiff and his companion still "spen[t]

time sitting outside on the patio in the rear of their residence

. . . for an hour 'or so'" each night in pleasant weather and

"walk[ed] their dog upon the acreage" "at least twice a day."

No other neighbors testified that their lives were affected by

noise or odor from the chicken coop.      For these and other

reasons, the trial judge did not credit the plaintiff's

testimony about the impact of the animals on his enjoyment of

his property.

     Discussion.     1.   Exclusion of photographs.   "We do not

disturb a judge's decision to admit evidence absent an abuse of

discretion or other legal error."      Zucco v. Kane, 439 Mass. 503,

507 (2003).     "Trial judges have broad discretion to make

discovery and evidentiary rulings conducive to the conduct of a

4 The defendant was never fined or cited for a violation and was
never ordered to make any corrections to the structure of the
chicken coop.

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fair and orderly trial" (quotations and citation omitted).

Nally v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 405 Mass. 191, 197 (1989).     We

discern no abuse of the judge's broad discretion in her

exclusion of the proffered photographs.    See N.E. Physical

Therapy Plus, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 466 Mass. 358, 363

(2013).

    The judge denied the plaintiff's request, made several days

into the long trial, to admit a series of five photographs

purporting to show a manure pile on the defendant's land because

they were not disclosed prior to trial.    The plaintiff concedes

that similar photographs were admitted as Exhibit 5.     Three

witnesses testified about a manure pile.    This decision was well

within the judge's discretion.   See Mass. R. Civ. P.

37 (b) (2) (B), as amended, 390 Mass. 1208 (1984) (where party

fails to comply with discovery requests, judge may impose

sanctions, including "refusing to allow the disobedient party to

support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting

him from introducing designated matters in evidence").

    To the extent that the plaintiff now argues that he "should

neither be required to reveal words or photographs before

cross," the judge was within her discretion in excluding the

photographs given the discovery rules' purpose.    See, e.g.,

Partlow v. Hertz Corp., 370 Mass. 787, 790 (1976) ("Compliance

with the rules of civil procedure is not accomplished if the

                                 4
parties make of answers to interrogatories some kind of a

game"); Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Assocs., 50 Mass. App. Ct. 480,

484 n.8 (2000) ("the rules of civil procedure are instruments

for the promotion of justice . . . not the exaltation of mere

technicalities").

    The plaintiff also maintains that these photographs should

have been admitted to impeach the defendant.   "[T]he decision to

admit impeachment evidence rests in the broad discretion of the

judge and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the exercise of

that discretion constituted an abuse of discretion or palpable

error of law."   Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 49,

52 (2009).   "The trial judge has both the discretion and the

responsibility to exclude irrelevant, cumulative, or repetitive

evidence" (emphasis added).    Boston v. United States Gypsum Co.,

37 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 260 (1994).    In this circumstance, where

the plaintiff concedes that these photographs were similar to

some that were admitted, we see no error.   Even if the exclusion

was error, it did not prejudice the plaintiff; he was able to

question the defendant on concededly similar photographs and to

present witness testimony about the manure pile.

    2.   Rebuttal testimony.   We find no merit in the

plaintiff's argument that the judge improperly denied his

                                 5
request for rebuttal testimony.5       "A trial judge possesses broad

discretion in deciding whether to permit the presentation of

rebuttal evidence."   Urban Inv. & Dev. Co. v. Turner Constr.

Co., 35 Mass. App. Ct. 100, 103 (1993), citing Drake v. Goodman,

386 Mass. 88, 92 (1982), and Mason v. General Motors Corp., 397

Mass. 183, 193 (1986).   The defendant's introduction of the city

employee's testimony was not a surprise and did not suddenly

advance a new or unforeseen theory.       See Drake, supra at 92-93;

Teller v. Schepens, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 346, 350-351 (1988).       The

plaintiff was permitted to present evidence of the city

employee's purported prodefendant bias; on cross, the

plaintiff's counsel solicited information from the city employee

that she had friendly interactions with the defendant and

contentious interactions with the plaintiff.       The plaintiff did

not have the right to present rebuttal evidence.6       See Drake, 386

Mass. at 93.

5 Specifically, the plaintiff's counsel intended the plaintiff to
testify as to his meetings with the city employee and documents
regarding the defendant's property. Likewise, the attorney was
to testify to the city employee's alleged refusal to bring the
file concerning the defendant's property -- a file the plaintiff
opted not to subpoena ahead of time -- to the trial and the
employee's "continuing interaction on a daily basis . . . [with]
the defendant, laughing and joking."
6 The same is true for the plaintiff's argument that the judge

should have also allowed the manure-pile photographs as rebuttal
evidence. The existence (or not) of the manure pile on the
defendant's property was a key issue of the case; his denial of
its existence on cross was not "new or unanticipated evidence

                                   6
    3.    Factual findings.   We review factual findings for clear

error.    See DeMayo v. Quinn, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 115, 116-117

(2015).   "We accord the credibility determinations of the judge

who 'heard the testimony of the parties . . . [and] observed

their demeanor,' the utmost deference."       Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67

Mass. App. Ct. 139, 140 n.3 (2006), quoting Pike v. Maguire, 47

Mass. App. Ct. 929, 929 (1999).       In a bench trial, credibility

determinations are "quintessentially the domain of the trial

judge [so that her] assessment is close to immune from reversal

on appeal except on the most compelling of showings."       Prenaveau

v. Prenaveau, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 496 (2012), quoting

Johnston v. Johnston, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 536 (1995).

    During the ten-day trial, the judge heard testimony from

many witnesses, including the parties, their companions, the

city employee, and two other neighbors.       In her detailed factual

findings, the judge explained her reasoning for not finding the

plaintiff, his companion, or his weekly maintenance worker

wholly credible.    While the judge credited the plaintiff's

testimony in part, in that "some odors could develop from the

animal feces," she credited the defendant's testimony, supported

by the city employee's testimony, that the defendant took

measures to mitigate any odor.    It is settled that a judge may

presented for the first time at trial."       Urban Inv. and Dev.
Co., 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 103-104.

                                  7
"accept or reject in whole or in part the testimony of the

witnesses."   Learned v. Hamburger, 245 Mass. 461, 468 (1923).

Cf. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 392 (2020)

(jury may believe part of witness's testimony and reject part,

or believe all, or reject all).       There was no error.

     Conclusion.   Seeing no basis to disturb the judge's

credibility determinations and no abuse of discretion or other

error of law, we affirm.7

                                       So ordered.

                                       By the Court (Meade,
                                         Hershfang & D'Angelo, JJ.8),

                                       Clerk
Entered:   November 22, 2023.

7 We address the merits of each claim, but do not necessarily
analyze each argument advanced in support of those claims. "To
the extent that we have not specifically addressed other points
made . . . in [the plaintiff's brief], they 'have not been
overlooked. We find nothing in them that requires discussion.'"
Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 163, 168 n.3 (2018), quoting
Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
8 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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