Court Opinion

ID: 9695528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:21:46.114162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:13.873909
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Justice,
dissenting. I dissent from the remand of this case for further proceedings in the Superior Court. Final judgment has entered in this case on more than one occasion and indeed a writ *717of mandamus was issued from the Superi- or Court ordering the state to pay the judgment forthwith. The interest calculation that is the subject of this recent flurry of post-judgment activity was part of the mandamus judgment issued in 1998 in the Superior Court. This interest calculation was never raised in any proceeding in the Superior Court at the time of entry or later in this Court on appeal, nor even later before Justice Needham during the last round of post-judgment proceedings and finally, the issue was not raised before this Court during the recent appeal of Justice Needham’s comprehensive decision. Enough is enough.
The travel of this case reflects that condemnation damages were awarded and a judgment entered in the Superior Court on May 6, 1997. This Court affirmed that judgment on April 17, 1998, wherein we declined to review the merits of the state’s post-judgment arguments relative to the contractual obligations of the parties and of non-parties, noting that “the merits of this issue * * * were never properly before the Superior Court.”
The state then sought a stay of the execution on the judgment from the Presiding Justice of the Superior Court who not only denied the requested relief, but also noted that to rule otherwise “would be to ignore established principles of res judi-cata, or even collateral estoppel.”
On July 22, 1998, the aforementioned writ of mandamus was issued compelling payment of the final judgment to Capital Properties. That trial justice concluded that CPI had a clear legal right to this payment and the state has but a ministerial legal duty to pay the judgment. The interest rate was set forth in the writ and was never objected to by the state.
On December 8, 1998, a three-judge panel of this Court heard the state’s appeal from the judgment of mandamus and ordered that before the judgment was paid, the state’s post-judgment defenses be addressed in the Superior Court. However, we directed that all matters be heard and decided and ruled as follows:
“Accordingly, we defer further consideration of this appeal pending resolution of these remaining issues, and we remand this case to Justice Needham with our direction to consolidate, hear, and decide all claims and defenses, including, but not limited to, title to parcel 9, alleged unpaid taxes owed by CPI to the city, and any agreements between the city and the state and any further unresolved claims between the parties.”
In what can be described as a Herculean effort, Justice Needham issued a comprehensive decision and went so far as to pass upon the appropriateness of the judgment of mandamus. During the course of that proceeding, not a word was raised about the previously calculated interest on the judgment. This Court, in near record time, heard and decided the appeals of all parties to these post-judgment “motions” and issued an opinion in which we affirmed Justice Needham in all respects except one, which was suggested by CPI at oral argument. However, neither side was satisfied with our decision, and sought another remand for yet another round of post-judgment hearings. The state is now questioning, for the first time in this prolonged case, the appropriateness of the interest calculation. CPI, on the other hand, is concerned about the viability of its breach of contract claims that were reserved by Justice Needham and are properly the subject of a remand. The state’s concerns are another matter.
Simply put, I agree with the Presiding Justice’s 1998 pronouncement that these issues are barred by principles of res judi-cata. This Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine of res judicata as it relates to the preclusive effect of a final judgment between the parties. E.W. Audet & Sons, Inc. v. Firemen’s Fund Insurance Co., 635 A.2d 1181 (R.I.1994); ElGabri v. Lekas, 681 A.2d 271 (R.I.1996); Garganta v. Mobile Village, Inc., 730 A.2d 1 (R.I.1999). *718In any other case, the parties would be precluded from re-litigating all issues that were actually litigated or that could have been litigated in any of the plethora of hearings and appeals in this case. “When res judicata is invoked, it renders the original judgment conclusive with respect to any issues that were raised or that could have been raised." E.W. Audet & Sons, Inc., 635 A.2d at 1186. (Emphasis added.) The inviolability of that doctrine has been tested by my colleagues in this case not once, but now twice. Consequently, I dissent.
Entered as an Order of this Court this 20th day of December 1999.