Court Opinion

ID: 9714834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:46:48.723089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:28.927951
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s holding that the 160-day speedy-trial provision of section 103 — 5(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 103 — 5(b)) commences running only upon a speedy-trial demand made by one who has actually been released on bail or recognizance. The language of that provision does not suggest such a result, and the majority’s construction will yield consequences I find clearly unintended by the legislature. There is an obvious distinction drawn in sections 103 — 5(a) and (b) between those held in custody and those who have been released on bail or recognizance. However, the statute does not require that a person must actually be on bail or recognizance at the time he makes his speedy-trial demand in order for the 160-day provision of section 103 — 5(b) to attach. Because the 120-day in-custody provision of section 103 — 5(a) operates automatically and independently of any demand made by a defendant, the only reason for a defendant to make such a demand is to start the 160-day period running, with a view toward his possible release prior to the expiration of the 120-day period. I see nothing in the language of the statute to suggest that such a demand ought not be effective from the time it is made, regardless of the fact that the defendant is still in custody. By making such a demand while in custody, the defendant can be sure of a speedy trial — he must be tried within 120 days if he remains in custody, or within 160 days from the date of demand if he is released from custody before the 120-day period expires. The majority opinion states that the legislature did not countenance the simultaneous running of two separate speedy-trial clocks for criminal defendants held in custody who have made demands for speedy trial. There is, however, nothing in the statute indicating that the legislature intended otherwise. If a person in custody demands a speedy trial, then the statute operates to ensure that if he is released on bail or recognizance prior to the expiration of the automatic 120-day period, at least he will be entitled to trial within 160 days of his demand. Under the majority's holding, the State could be allowed nearly 280 days to try a defendant. I do not believe that such results were intended by the legislature. As the majority notes, the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8) is not necessarily coextensive with the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the statute here in consideration. (People v. Richards (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 454, 459.) However, this court has interpreted the statute as implementing the constitutional right, and has recognized that the statute should be liberally construed to that effect. (People v. Reimolds (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 101, 106.) It is clear that this right stands in favor of the individual defendant as a check against arbitrary and oppressive delays. (People v. Morris (1954), 3 Ill. 2d 437, 441.) In the present case, defendant demanded a speedy trial three times while he was in custody. The State was aware that defendant desired a speedy trial. I fear that the majority’s construction of the statute undermines the protection afforded by the statute in a manner unintended by the legislature and grants prosecutors an instrument with which they may, on a whim, contravene a defendant’s legitimate demand for a speedy trial. If our speedy-trial statute is intended to implement a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, the period of time before trial should be approximately the same for all defendants. Under the majority opinion, if a defendant is arrested, makes bail and demands a speedy trial, his constitutional right, as implemented by the statute, is to a trial within 160 days. If his codefendant is arrested at the same time and also demands a speedy trial but is not released on bail until 110 days later, his constitutional right to a speedy trial, as implemented by the statute, would mean a trial, at the earliest, 270 days later. For the above reasons, I would reverse the appellate court and affirm the circuit court’s order dismissing the charges against defendant. JUSTICE STAMOS joins in this dissent.