Court Opinion

ID: 9840178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 15:11:50.666459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:10:39.297901
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                September 15, 2023
                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                               EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                                   SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                            SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                   OF WEST VIRGINIA

State of West Virginia,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent

vs.) No. 22-0267 (Harrison County 21-F-124)

Edward Y.,
Defendant Below, Petitioner

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

       Petitioner Edward Y. appeals the Circuit Court of Harrison County’s March 7, 2022, order
sentencing him following his convictions for incest, second-degree sexual assault, and sexual
abuse by a parent, guardian, custodian or person in a position of trust. 1 On appeal, he argues that
he should have been acquitted after the circuit court improperly excused a juror during his trial.
Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision
affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

       Petitioner was indicted on twenty-four counts: eight counts each of incest, second-degree
sexual assault and sexual abuse by a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in a position of trust.
The charges in the indictment stemmed from various sexual offenses against his niece, who was
between the ages of twelve and sixteen at all times relevant to the indictment, who resided in his
home, and over whom he had been granted a guardianship.
        Petitioner proceeded to a jury trial on the counts alleged in the indictment. After the judge
instructed the jurors, the court recessed for the day. On the following day, before deliberations
occurred, one of the jurors advised the court that she had concerns about whether or not she could
be fair and impartial based upon the instructions. After the judge conducted an inquiry with the
juror and consulted with counsel, the judge excused the juror for cause and called the first alternate
juror. Prior to the juror’s dismissal, petitioner’s counsel responded “I don’t have a position” about
the dismissal. After the juror was dismissed, however, petitioner’s counsel stated, “Yes, actually,
since I probably should do this to preserve it for appeal, I object to the dismissal of that juror.” The

       1
          Petitioner appears by counsel Jeremy B. Cooper. Respondent appears by counsel Attorney
General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General William E. Longwell. We note that
initials are used where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See W. Va.
R. App. P. 40(e).

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case proceeded to verdict with an alternate juror and petitioner was ultimately convicted on all
counts.

        Petitioner appeals following entry of the court’s March 7, 2022, sentencing order, arguing
that the circuit court erred by dismissing the juror for inability to serve, over petitioner’s objection,
prior to the verdict. Respondent claims that petitioner failed to present a timely or sufficient
objection to the discharge of the juror. Upon our review, petitioner’s claim that he objected to the
dismissal of the juror is belied by the record on appeal, as the record demonstrates that petitioner
made no objection to the dismissal until after the juror had already been excused. Accordingly, his
objection was not timely. Moreover, petitioner’s untimely objection did not set forth the
substantive basis for the objection, and, therefore, was deficient. “To preserve an issue for appellate
review, a party must articulate it with such sufficient distinctiveness to alert a circuit court to the
nature of the claimed defect.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton, 196 W. Va. 208, 470
S.E.2d 162 (1996). Although petitioner presented an untimely and deficient objection and we could
find that he waived his opportunity to present this argument on appeal, we nevertheless find that
his argument fails on the merits as well.

        “Matters of qualifications of jurors are left to the discretion of the trial court and will not
be disturbed, absent an abuse of the discretion.” State v. Crouch, 178 W. Va. 221, 224, 358 S.E.2d
782, 785 (1987). Additionally,
                “[w]hen considering whether to excuse a prospective juror for cause, a trial
        court is required to consider the totality of the circumstances and grounds relating
        to a potential request to excuse a prospective juror, to make a full inquiry to examine
        those circumstances and to resolve any doubts in favor of excusing the juror.”
Syl. Pt. 3, O’Dell v. Miller, 211 W. Va. 285, 565 S.E.2d 407 (2002). In fact, Rule 24 of the West

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Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure 2 and West Virginia Code § 62-3-3 3 provide authority for the
court to utilize alternate jurors.
         Petitioner’s argument that the juror should not have been dismissed is without merit. When
the juror raised concerns about her ability to continue to serve on the panel, the court made a full
inquiry and the juror responded that she was uncertain as to whether she could be fair and impartial.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the juror. Certainly, had the juror expressed this concern during
voir dire, the juror would not have been selected for the jury panel. O’Dell, 211 W. Va. at 290,
565 S.E.2d at 412 (“Jurors who on voir dire of the panel indicate possible prejudice should be
excused, or should be questioned individually either by the court or by counsel to precisely
determine whether they entertain bias or prejudice for or against either party, requiring their
excuse.” (quoting Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Pratt, 161 W. Va. 530, 244 S.E.2d 227 (1978))). Given the
juror’s statement that she was unsure that she could be fair and impartial, we decline to find that
the court abused its discretion in excusing the juror. This is especially true where, as was the case
in petitioner’s trial, the jurors had not yet deliberated and an alternate juror was readily available
to ensure that a full jury panel could proceed with deliberations. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled
to no relief.
       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

       2
           Rule 24(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

       Alternate Jurors. The court may direct that more jurors in addition to the regular
       jury be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the order
       in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires
       to consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform
       their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same
       qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take
       the same oath, and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities and privileges
       as the regular jurors. An alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall
       be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict. Each side is entitled to
       one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed by law if one or
       two alternate jurors are to be impaneled, two peremptory challenges if three or four
       alternate jurors are to be impaneled, and three peremptory challenges if five or six
       alternate jurors are to be impaneled. The additional peremptory challenges may be
       used against an alternate juror only, and the other peremptory challenges allowed
       by these rules may not be used against an alternate juror.
       3
           West Virginia Code § 62-3-3, in relevant part, provides:

       Whenever, in the opinion of the court the trial is likely to be a protracted one, the
       court may direct that not more than four jurors, in addition to the regular jury, be
       called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in which
       they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider
       its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties.

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                                        Affirmed.

ISSUED: September 15, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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