Court Opinion

ID: 9840283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 19:05:39.409293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:12:02.661473
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/15/23 P. v. Caldwell CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B320850

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
          v.                                                      BA001856)

 CORNELIUS CALDWELL,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Affirmed.
      James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Defendant Cornelius Caldwell (defendant) pled no contest
to second degree murder in 1990. Many years later, defendant
petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6
(former Penal Code section 1170.95).1 Following an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court found defendant was the murder victim’s
actual killer and denied the petition. We are asked to decide
whether the trial court’s consideration of factual summaries in
prior appellate opinions and a stipulation made “for purposes of a
preliminary hearing only” require reversal.

                          I. BACKGROUND
      In 1989, the Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
defendant with “willfully, unlawfully, and with malice
aforethought murder[ing] Jane Doe, aka Charlisa Carlyn Clark, a
human being.” Defendant pled no contest to second degree
murder in May 1990.
      Less than a month later, at sentencing, defendant sought to
withdraw his plea because he “was under heavy medication last
time” and “wasn’t aware of what [he] was doing.” The trial court
denied the motion to set aside the plea and sentenced defendant
to 15 years to life in state prison. Plaintiff challenged the trial
court’s denial of his motion to set aside the plea on direct appeal,
and another panel of this court affirmed the judgment in 1991.
(People v. Caldwell (Sept. 11, 1991, B053741 [nonpub. opn.]
(Caldwell I).)

1
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

                                 2
       Defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing in
2019. The trial court summarily denied the petition without
     2

appointing counsel because it found defendant was the actual
killer and accordingly ineligible for relief. We reversed and
remanded for the trial court to appoint counsel and to conduct
further proceedings in accordance with section 1172.6. (People v.
Caldwell (Feb. 11, 2021, B299017 [nonpub. opn.] (Caldwell II).)
       On remand, the trial court appointed counsel for defendant
and held an evidentiary hearing. Neither the prosecution nor
defendant presented new evidence. The trial court indicated it
was “going to consider” documents filed by defendant and the
prosecution, which included the opinions in Caldwell I and
Caldwell II, a preliminary hearing transcript, plea and
sentencing transcripts, and a probation officer’s report. The trial
court found defendant was the victim’s actual killer and thus
ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6.
       Because the issues raised on appeal implicate the trial
court’s consideration of the prior appellate opinions and a portion
of the preliminary hearing transcript, we shall summarize the
facts as set forth in each of these documents and the basis of the
trial court’s “actual killer” finding.

       A.   The Preliminary Hearing Transcript
       Tyrone West (West) testified he was driving one night in
1989 when he saw defendant standing on a corner “looking kind
of strange.” West had known defendant for about two weeks.

2
       Defendant filed a duplicative petition in 2022, which the
trial court addressed in its ultimate ruling on the original
petition. The appellate record includes only the 2022 petition.

                                 3
        West rolled down his window to ask defendant what was
wrong and, when defendant did not reply, West parked and
repeated his question. Defendant did not answer and walked
into a house. West followed defendant, and defendant told him to
shut the door. Both men sat down, and West again asked
defendant what was wrong. Defendant told West “there was a
body back there.” West told defendant he did not believe him,
and defendant led him to a bedroom. A body was on the floor
“inside of a bag, trash bag wrapped around the leg, and [a] sheet
was tied over the trash bag and the feet were out.” West started
to bend down to check for a pulse, but “felt that [he] shouldn’t.”
He “didn’t see any breathing, didn’t see any motion, body
movements or anything.”
        West asked defendant whether the body belonged to his
girlfriend. Defendant replied, “It’s just a motherfucking
strawberry.” When West asked whether there had been an
argument, defendant told him “things got out of hand” and he
“broke out with a full nelson.” West testified that defendant
“demonstrated the way he had [the victim] by the neck,” and
West demonstrated for the court.
        West told defendant he had committed a serious crime and
asked him if he would like to pray. The two men “got down on
[their] knees” and defendant said, “Lord, please forgive me. Let
her rest in peace, and please give me a place to hide her body.”
        Defendant spoke to West about his plans for disposing of
the body, first proposing to “find some bushes to put her in” and
subsequently saying “that a better idea was a trash can around
the corner.” West decided he “had to leave” at this point, and as
he walked out the door defendant said, “I have to get
this . . . mother fucking shit out of here before it starts stinking

                                 4
up the place.” West reported the encounter to law enforcement
the next day.
       Vernice Jefferson (Jefferson) testified she was taking out
her trash on the same block the following morning when she
discovered a body near a dumpster. The body was in a box
covered in plastic and a sheet. Jefferson called the police around
7:00 a.m.
       Defendant stipulated “for purposes of a preliminary
hearing only” that “Mr. Christopher Rogers be deemed to have
been called as a witness, qualified as a surgeon who specializes in
forensic autopsy surgery and that Mr. Rogers be deemed to have
testified that he examined the body . . . and found the cause of
death of that body to be strangulation.”

       B.    The Prior Appellate Opinions
       Because defendant challenged only the denial of his motion
to withdraw his plea on direct appeal, the opinion in Caldwell I
includes a fairly brief summary of the facts: “The record reflects
that on July 27, 1989, [defendant] admitted to an acquaintance,
Tyrone West, that he had just killed a woman. He brought West
to his bedroom and showed him a body that was partially
wrapped in a plastic trash bag. West did not see the woman’s
face and asked how the killing occurred. [Defendant] said,
‘[t]hings just got out of hand’ and demonstrated how he had
applied ‘a full nelson’ around the woman’s neck. At West’s
suggestion, they knelt and prayed. [Defendant] prayed, ‘Lord,
please forgive me. Let her rest in peace, and please give me a
place to hide her body.’ [Defendant] then began to talk about his
ideas for disposing of the body, and West left because he did not
want to become further involved. The next day, after a box

                                 5
containing the woman’s body was discovered near an apartment
building dumpster, West decided to report the incident to police.
An examination of the body revealed the woman had died of
strangulation.”
       After summarizing the facts of the crime, the Caldwell I
opinion notes the trial court’s incredulous response when
defendant moved to withdraw his plea: “Were you under heavy
medication when you confessed at an Alcoholics Anonymous
meeting, and when you confessed to the probation officer?”
Caldwell I explained in a footnote that “[t]his information about
[defendant’s] admitting to the killing was contained in the
probation report, which also revealed that [defendant] stated
‘essentially that the victim was a prostitute who got him angry
when she [was] leaving with his money because he did not have
enough for the sex act that he enlisted her for.’”
       In Caldwell II, a single-sentence summary of the facts was
all that was necessary: “According to testimony at defendant’s
preliminary hearing, defendant’s then-girlfriend was found
strangled to death by a dumpster and defendant told an
acquaintance (who saw the dead body before it was moved to the
dumpster area) that ‘things just got out of hand’ and he needed to
find a place to hide the body.”

      C.    The Section 1172.6 Court’s “Actual Killer” Finding
      The trial court prefaced its summary of the facts with the
explanation that it was “reading off of [the prosecution’s]
opposition.” The trial court stated “defendant showed this
person, Mr. West, the victim’s corpse, which was wrapped up in a
sheet and trash bag. And when Mr. West asked the defendant if
the dead woman was [defendant’s] girlfriend, [his] response was,

                                6
‘It’s just a motherfucking strawberry.’” [¶] Mr. West asked how
the killing occurred, and the defendant explained thoroughly how
he killed her, what he did, how he did it, et cetera. And he only
wanted to get some assistance to get the body out because he
didn’t want to contend with the smell of the rotting of the corpse.
[¶] For all intents and purposes, this is how this murder
occurred. In that description, the defendant also indicated how
he strangled her, how he wrapped her up, how he put her
wherever he put her, et cetera.”

                          II. DISCUSSION
      Defendant contends the trial court improperly relied on the
prior appellate opinions and the stipulation made at the
preliminary hearing in finding him ineligible for resentencing.3
Any error was harmless. The brief factual summaries included in
the prior appellate opinions accurately reflect the preliminary
hearing testimony in all material respects. Additional references
to the sentencing hearing and probation report in Caldwell I did
not factor into the trial court’s analysis. The preliminary hearing
stipulation concerning the cause of death is not, as defendant
contends, necessary to establish the corpus delicti of murder
because there is ample circumstantial evidence that the victim’s
death was caused by a criminal agency.

3
      Insofar as defendant additionally contends the trial court
impermissibly considered other materials proffered by the People
at the order to show cause hearing, the contention is
immaterial—there is no pertinent information in the other
materials that the trial court relied on that is not reflected in the
preliminary hearing transcript.

                                  7
       A.     Legal Framework and Standard of Review
       “Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill 1437 ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).) In addition to substantively amending sections 188
and 189 of the Penal Code, Senate Bill 1437 added [former]
section 1170.95, which provides a procedure for convicted
murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended
to retroactively seek relief. [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 959.)
       If the trial court determines a prima facie showing for relief
has been made, the trial court must issue an order to show cause.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The trial court must ordinarily hold a
hearing on the order to show cause at which the prosecution
bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty of murder under amended section 188 or 189
as amended by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       The Evidence Code governs at the hearing, “except that the
court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including
witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially
noticed. The court may also consider the procedural history of
the case recited in any prior appellate opinion. However, hearsay
evidence that was admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be excluded from the hearing
as hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible pursuant to another

                                 8
exception to the hearsay rule. The prosecutor and the petitioner
may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
      On appeal from the denial of a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, we review the trial court’s factual findings
for substantial evidence. (People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 298; People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
1015, 1022.)

       B.    Any Error Was Harmless
       We have doubts that there was any error in considering the
preliminary hearing stipulation: section 1172.6 expressly permits
a trial court to consider “stipulated evidence” previously admitted
at “any prior hearing.” Separately, the question of what a section
1172.6 court may consider when relying on a prior appellate
opinion (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)) has not been definitively resolved.
We shall assume for argument’s sake, however, that neither
source of information should have been considered. Reversal still
is not required because it is not reasonably probable defendant
would otherwise have obtained a more favorable outcome in the
absence of such consideration. (People v. Myles (2021) 69
Cal.App.5th 688, 706, citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836; see also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 973.)
       As we have already indicated, the brief factual sketches in
the prior appellate opinions faithfully reflect the testimony given
at the preliminary hearing. There can accordingly be no
prejudicial error in considering the facts of the offense developed
by that testimony and summarized in the opinions even if those
facts do not qualify as being part of the “procedural history of the
case.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Rather, the only colorable

                                 9
argument that the trial court’s consideration of the prior
appellate opinions was prejudicial is derivative of defendant’s
other argument: that the section 1172.6 court should not have
considered the stipulation concerning cause of death that was
part of the preliminary hearing evidence.
       Defendant believes that, absent this stipulation, there is
insufficient corpus delicti evidence, i.e., that the victim’s death
occurred as a result of a criminal agency. Defendant
acknowledges “the preliminary hearing
evidence . . . established . . . [he] admitted assaulting the victim
with a full nelson type hold” and she died, but he maintains that,
“[a]bsent the stipulation, the cause of death . . . is unknown.”
These contentions are unavailing.
       “In every criminal trial, the prosecution must prove the
corpus delicti, or the body of the crime itself—i.e., the fact of
injury, loss, or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its
cause. In California, it has traditionally been held, the
prosecution cannot satisfy this burden by relying exclusively upon
the extrajudicial statements, confessions, or admissions of the
defendant. [Citations.]” (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th
1161, 1168-1169; People v. Huynh (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 285,
300 [“‘In a prosecution for murder, as in any other criminal case,
the corpus delicti—i.e., death caused by a criminal agency—must
be established independently of the extrajudicial statements,
confessions or admissions of the defendant’”].) “This rule is
intended to ensure that one will not be falsely convicted, by his or
her untested words alone, of a crime that never happened.
[Citations.]” (Alvarez, supra, at 1169.)
       The independent evidence “may be circumstantial and need
not be beyond a reasonable doubt, but is sufficient if it permits an

                                10
inference of criminal conduct, even if a noncriminal explanation
is also plausible. [Citations.]” (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at
1171.) Our Supreme Court has emphasized that “‘[t]he amount of
independent proof of a crime required [to satisfy the corpus
delicti rule] is quite small” and the prosecution “need only make
‘some indication that the charged crime actually happened,’ so as
to ensure ‘that the accused is not admitting to a crime that never
occurred.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 317;
People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 382 [“Given the low
quantum of proof that is required, we are satisfied that the
prosecution provided the ‘“minimal”’ amount of independent
evidence necessary to satisfy the corpus delicti rule”].)
       Under the governing legal standard, there was ample
circumstantial evidence here that the victim’s death resulted
from a criminal act. Defendant showed West the body wrapped
in a trash bag in a bedroom, defendant did not report the death,
and the body was ultimately discovered near a dumpster. In
Huynh, supra, the Court of Appeal held that “the fact that [a
victim’s] body was found in an alley wrapped in a blanket
furnishes at least a prima facie showing of criminal agency,
inasmuch as the bodies of victims of accidental deaths typically
would not be disposed of in this manner. [Citation.]” (Huynh,
supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 301.) The inference is sound, and it
applies with equal force here. Although other inferences are
possible, the corpus delicti rule does not require that such
alternatives be ruled out. (Alvarez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 1171.)
       With the corpus delicti rule satisfied, defendant’s
statements to West are sufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion that he was the actual killer and thus ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6. Contrary to defendant’s argument,

                                11
the fact that West “never testified that [defendant] affirmatively
told him he killed the victim” does not undermine the substantial
evidence supporting the trial court’s finding. Indeed, such a
statement would have been redundant. Defendant led West to
the victim’s motionless body wrapped in a trash bag and
explained that he had held her by the neck when “things got out
of hand.” He subsequently prayed for forgiveness and a place to
hide the body. These statements and the attendant
circumstances are enough; defendant did not have to pronounce
his responsibility for the killing “with the discrimination of an
Oxford don” (Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 476
(conc. opn. of Souter, J.)).

                          DISPOSITION
      The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing is affirmed.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                      BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

      MOOR, J.

      KIM, J.

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