Court Opinion

ID: 9385946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-10 20:07:08.60249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:00.716865
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Weger, 2023-Ohio-1194.]

                                       COURT OF APPEALS
                                     LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO,                              :       JUDGES:
                                            :       Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
        Plaintiff - Appellee                :       Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
                                            :       Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
-vs-                                        :
                                            :
JAMIE WEGER,                                :       Case No. 2022 CA 00063
                                            :
        Defendant - Appellant               :       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                            Appeal from the Licking County
                                                    Municipal Court, Case No.
                                                    21CRB00221

JUDGMENT:                                           Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                   April 11, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                              For Defendant-Appellant

J. MICHAEL KING                                     TODD W. BARSTOW
Assistant Law Director                              261 West Johnstown Road
City of Newark                                      Suite 204
40 West Main Street, Fourth Floor                   Columbus, Ohio 43230
Newark, Ohio 43055
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00063                                               2

Baldwin, J.

       {¶1}   The appellant appeals her sentence because it was re-imposed by an acting

judge rather than the original sentencing judge after the case was affirmed on appeal.

Appellee is the State of Ohio.

                    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE

       {¶2}   The appellant was charged on February 22, 2021 with child endangerment

in violation of R.C. 2919.22, a misdemeanor of the first degree. The matter proceeded to

a bench trial on July 20, 2021, at which time the appellant was found guilty. The trial court

sentenced the appellant to 180 days in jail, with 120 days suspended and credit for time

served; one-year probation after her release from jail; completion of a parenting skills

class; and, payment of a $150.00 fine and court costs. The appellant appealed the

decision, and was granted a stay of execution of her sentence pending appeal. On June

27, 2022, this court affirmed the trial court’s decision in State v. Weger, 5th Dist. Licking

No. 2021 CA 00062, 2022-Ohio-2204.

       {¶3}   On July 5, 2022 the trial court issued a scheduling order setting the matter

for an “imposition of sentence” hearing on July 15, 2022. The appellant appeared for the

hearing without counsel, and the trial court appointed counsel for her at her request. The

hearing was continued until August 24, 2022.

       {¶4}   The August 24, 2022 hearing proceeded as scheduled. The original judge

was unable to preside, and an acting judge had been appointed. The acting judge called

the matter for hearing. Counsel for the appellant objected to the acting judge imposing

sentence because she was not the judge who imposed the original sentence. The

appellant incorrectly avers in her Statement of the Case and Facts that “[c]ounsel
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00063                                              3

objected to having the matter heard by the acting judge and asked that the case be

continued so that the assigned, elected judge could preside over the hearing.” A review

of the August 24, 2022 hearing transcript reveals that when asked if he was objecting or

making a motion to continue, counsel replied “Objecting.” The acting judge then stated

that “with no motion to continue before me I will be proceeding and your objection is noted

on the record and recorded.”

       {¶5}   The acting judge thereafter re-imposed the original sentence that had been

imposed by the judge who initially heard the case, which was 180 days with 120 days

suspended, for a total of sixty days, and credit for time served. The appellant had served

twenty-four days; thus, she was remanded to the county jail to serve the remaining thirty-

six days on her sixty-day jail sentence. In addition, the acting judge reminded the

appellant that the original judge had ordered that she be placed on probation for a period

of one year following the completion of her jail term, that she complete a parenting skills

program, and that she pay a $150.00 fine and court costs. Finally, the acting judge

advised the appellant that the original judge would be returning to the bench the next day,

and she could file a motion for reconsideration of re-imposition of the sentence for the

original judge’s consideration at that time.

       {¶6}   The appellant filed a timely appeal, and sets forth the following sole

assignment of error:

       {¶7}   “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT PERMITTING

APPELLANT TO BE SENTENCED BY THE ASSIGNED MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE.”
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00063                                                     4

       {¶8}   The appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when the

acting judge re-imposed the sentence that had originally imposed by the trial court after

the case had been affirmed on appeal. We disagree.

                                 STANDARD OF REVIEW

       {¶9}   Abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it

implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore

v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.2d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), at 219, citing Steiner v. Custer

(1940), 137 Ohio St. 448 [31 N.E.2d 855] [19 O.O. 148]; Conner v. Conner (1959), 170

Ohio St. 85 [162 N.E.2d 852] [9 O.O.2d 480]; Chester Township v. Geauga Co. Budget

Comm. (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 372 [358 N.E.2d 610] [2 O.O.3d 484].

                                         ANALYSIS

       {¶10} Ohio Criminal Rule 25(B) permits another judge to act after a verdict or

finding of guilt, and states:

              If for any reason the judge before whom the defendant has been tried

       is unable to perform the duties of the court after a verdict or finding of guilt,

       another judge designated by the administrative judge, or, in the case of a

       single-judge division, by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio,

       may perform those duties. If such other judge is satisfied that he cannot

       perform those duties because he did not preside at the trial, he may in his

       discretion grant a new trial.

       {¶11} The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the application of Crim.R. 25(B) as

follows:
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00063                                                 5

             In addition, the Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically authorize a

      trial judge who has not presided over a trial to sentence a defendant.

      Crim.R. 25(B) provides:

             If for any reason the judge before whom the defendant has been tried

             is unable to perform the duties of the court after a verdict or finding

             of guilt, another judge designated by the administrative judge, or, in

             the case of a single-judge division, by the Chief Justice of the

             Supreme Court of Ohio, may perform such duties. If such other judge

             is satisfied that he cannot perform those duties because he did not

             preside at the trial, he may in his discretion grant a new trial.

      (Emphasis added.)

             Thus, it is “entirely proper” for a substitute judge to sentence a

      defendant after the retirement or death of the judge who presided over the

      defendant's trial. State v. Green, 122 Ohio App.3d 566, 571, 702 N.E.2d

      462 (12th Dist.1997). See also State v. Fitzpatrick, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos.

      C–930413, C–930439, B–927123, and B–928955, 1994 WL 164189 (May

      4, 1994) (Crim.R. 25(B) authorized substitution of judge on sentencing when

      substitute judge stated on record that trial judge “would not be available for

      several months” and substitute “had familiarized himself with the file”).

State v. Roberts, 150 Ohio St.3d 47, 2017-Ohio-2998, 78 N.E.3d 851, ¶38-39. See, also,

State v. Dowell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110629, 2022-Ohio-615, ¶14 (“…Crim.R. 25(B)

does not prohibit another judge from presiding over postconviction proceedings if the

original judge is unable to perform those duties for any reason.”)
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00063                                              6

       {¶12} In this case, the original judge, who had already sentenced the appellant

prior to her first appeal, was unavailable on the day the hearing was scheduled for re-

imposition of the appellant’s sentence. An acting judge had been appointed, and the

matter proceeded. The appellant objected, but did not request a continuance. The acting

judge did not “sentence” the appellant, but rather, simply engaged in the ministerial act of

re-imposing the sentence that had previously been imposed by the original judge.

       {¶13} A “ministerial act” is “‘. . . one which a person performs in a given state of

facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without

regard to, or the exercise of, his own judgment upon the propriety of the act being done.’”

State ex rel, Trauger v. Nash, 66 Ohio St.612, 64 N.E. 558 (1902), 618. This is precisely

what the acting judge did in this case. She performed the function of re-imposing the

appellant’s sentence pursuant to the mandate of legal authority that had been previously

exercised by the original judge, without regard to her own judgment on the propriety of

the sentence.

       {¶14} This reasoning is supported by State v. Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 2000-Ohio-

275, 723 N.E.2d 1019, in which the Court stated:

       . . . [D]efendant argues that his death penalty must be vacated because

       Judge Patrick McGrath signed the writ of execution when, in fact, retired

       Judge Thomas Mitchell presided over the case and sentenced defendant to

       death.

                However, signing the death warrant was a ministerial act, since

       Judge Mitchell had already imposed the death penalty and signed the

       sentencing entry. Crim.R. 25(B) permits another judge to be assigned a
Licking County, Case No. 2022 CA 00063                                                  7

       case if, “for any reason,” the original judge “is unable to perform the duties

       of the court after a verdict.” Although the file does not explain why another

       judge signed the writ, defendant still “has not contradicted the presumption

       of regularity accorded all judicial proceedings.” State v. Hawkins (1996), 74

       Ohio St.3d 530, 531, 660 N.E.2d 454, 455. Accord State v. Sweet (1995),

       72 Ohio St.3d 375, 650 N.E.2d 450; State ex rel. Tillimon v. Weiher (1992),

       65 Ohio St.3d 468, 469, 605 N.E.2d 35, 36.

Id. at 88.

       {¶15} Based upon the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion when the acting judge re-imposed the sentence that had originally imposed by

the trial court after the case had been affirmed on appeal.

       {¶16} The appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of

the Licking County Municipal Court is hereby affirmed.

By: Baldwin, J.

Hoffman, P.J. and

Delaney, J. concur.