Court Opinion

ID: 9690277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:02:19.732079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:07.204164
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 76. (concurring). The majority concludes that in a situation where the basis *335for the revocation of a sexually violent person's supervised release is violation of one or more conditions or rules, "a court should explore alternatives or fully explain why some step short of revocation would not be adequate." Majority op., ¶ 44. However, I believe that the language used by the majority does not go far enough. Therefore, I conclude that, in a situation where the basis for the revocation of a sexually violent person's supervised release is a rules violation, rather than a determination based on public safety, a court must consider alternatives to revocation on the record. Such consideration is required as a matter of good policy, as outlined in State ex rel. Plotkin v. Department of Health & Social Services, 63 Wis. 2d 535, 217 N.W.2d 641 (1974), and Van Ermen v. Department of Health & Social Services, 84 Wis. 2d 57, 267 N.W.2d 17 (1978), and because an appropriate application of Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2) (b) calls for it.
¶ 77. In Plotkin, we found that alternatives to revocation should be considered prior to the revocation of probation, and adopted Section 5.1 of the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Probation as guidelines for Wisconsin courts to follow in such situations. Plotkin, 63 Wis. 2d at 544-45. See also majority op., ¶ 29. In Van Ermen, this court reached a similar conclusion, but with regard to the revocation of parole. Van Ermen, 84 Wis. 2d at 66. These two decisions are applicable to this case, because, as the majority notes, allegedly sexually violent persons have the same constitutional rights as criminal defendants at trial, and the procedural due process protections of "probation and parole revocation proceedings also apply in supervised release revocation proceedings under Chapter 980." Majority op., ¶ 22. See also State v. VanBronkhorst, 2001 WI App 190, ¶ 9, 247 Wis. 2d 247, 633 N.W.2d 236. *336Using Section 5.1, Plotkin outlines several alternatives that " 'should be considered in every case as possible alternatives to revocation.'" Plotkin, 63 Wis. 2d at 545 (citation omitted). Van Ermen stated that discretion should be exercised "by at least considering whether alternatives are available and feasible." Van Ermen, 84 Wis. 2d at 67. Thus, requiring consideration of alternatives to revocation of a sexually violent person's supervised release in situations where the basis for the revocation is the violation of the conditions or rules of release is necessary in order to comply with prior decisions of this court and the court of appeals.
¶ 78. The language of Chapter 980 states that "[t]he department shall arrange for control, care and treatment of the person in the least restrictive manner consistent with the requirements of the person ...." Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2) (b). The language of § 980.06(2) (b) ties the statute to this court's decisions in Plotkin and Van Ermen. To comply with § 980.06(2)(b), the least restrictive manner for control, care and treatment of a sexually violent individual must be utilized. In order to determine the least restrictive manner, it follows that alternatives to revocation must be considered and such consideration must be on the record for purposes of review.
¶ 79. While I concur for the reasons noted, I join the majority in affirming the court of appeals' decision, since here the circuit court based its revocation order, on the need to protect the safety of others. See majority op., ¶ 14.
¶ 80. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.
¶ 81. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this concurrence.