Court Opinion

ID: 9834578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 01:00:40.224302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:34.087256
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear:
Code, 56-4-46, provides that when a pleading alleges “that any person made * * * any writing, it shall not be necessary to prove such fact” unless the denial be under oath. After setting out the contract between Means and the Tennessee Company, the notice of motion alleges “and that at a later date, to-wit: bn the 4th day of June, 1930, the Jervian Corporation, a corporation, by John Eoghan Kelly, its duly authorized agent or officer, acting as your agent and on your behalf executed to the undersigned the following guaranty”. Then follows the letter signed by Kelly purporting to bind the Jervian. The defendant plead the general issue without verifying it. Counsel for Means stress the position that by virtue of the statute, it was not necessary to prove the allegation that the Jervian was the agent of defendant. Considering the notice in connectnion with the statute, the “writing” is the letter of June 4th, and the “person” alleged to have executed the letter (the guarantee) is Che Jervian Corporation. (It will be noted that the pleading does not allege that Southeastern executed the gtiarantee.) The “fact”, unnecessary to have proved under the statute, is that the Jervian did execute the letter. The execution by the Jervian and the capacity in which the Jervian acted are two entirely separate *870matters. Tlie former (the execution) is a question of fact, while the latter (the agency) is a question of law. Proof relates to fact and not to law. It is clear that the statute applies only to a pleading of fact and not to one of law.