Court Opinion

ID: 9757113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:19:15.833576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:35.066139
License: Public Domain

Speziale, J.
(concurring). A crucial issue, which is not treated in the majority opinion, is who has authority to appoint the fire chief under the Bristol city charter. Section 15 (a) states in pertinent part: “All other officers . . . , except as otherwise provided herein, shall be nominated by the mayor and appointed by the city council.” (Emphasis added.) Since two other provisions of the charter, §§ 40 and 42, relate to appointment of the fire chief, § 15, by its own terms, is inapplicable. Sections 40 and 42 both apply specifically to the fire department. Section 40 (g), which was made part of the charter *44in 1939, provides that “[t]he city conncil shall have power of appointment ... of the chief ... of the department upon recommendations from the board of fire commissioners.” Section 42, which became effective in 1957 and was modified in 1959, sets forth promotional procedures within the fire department. These procedures apply to the office of fire chief as well as to lower echelon appointments. (Sections 42 [a] and 42 [c] specifically refer to promotion to chief.) Under § 42, the board of fire commissioners (the board) has the power to make appointments1 from the appropriate civil service eligibility list. It appears then that according to the Bristol charter both the board, under § 42 (c), and the city council, under §40 (g), have the power to appoint the fire chief. The provisions are clearly in conflict,2 and, under such circumstances, the general rule is that a subsequent act will be found to have repealed the first by implication. See Pizzola v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 167 Conn. 202, 205, 355 A.2d 21; East Haven v. New Haven, 159 Conn. 453, 469, 271 A.2d 110. The elaborateness of the promotion/ appointment procedure set forth in § 42 gives further support to the plaintiff’s argument that § 42 *45was intended to supersede or repeal §40 (g). See East Haven v. New Haven, supra; McAdams v. Barbieri, 143 Conn. 405, 414, 123 A.2d 182. Although the charter containing both sections was submitted to and approved by the city voters in 1968, this does not indicate that § 42 was not intended to supersede §40 (g). “The rule is that where there has been included in a general compilation or code two conflicting sections or provisions carried forward from prior enacted statutes, that section or provision should prevail which can be considered the last expression of the lawmaking power.” Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 416, § 3, p. 430. Thus, under general principles of statutory construction, § 42 controls and the board had the sole authority to appoint the new chief.
Unfortunately, the board did not take upon itself the power to appoint, but instead submitted a recommendation to the city council, as prescribed by §40 (g). It is unclear whether this was done as a courtesy to the council or in a sincere belief that the commission lacked the power to appoint on its own. Whatever the reason, the board left it to the council to make the final appointment. The council refused to accept the recommendation, the commission refused to submit a new one, and the council finally appointed someone nominated by the mayor. Since § 15, which provides for appointment of city officers by the city council upon the nomination of the mayor, does not apply to appointment of the fire chief, the appointment of the defendant by the council was invalid under the charter.

 The words “promotion” and “appointment” are both used in various subseetions of § 42. Since the section does not distinguish the power to promote from the power to appoint, it is inferable that the terms have been used interchangeably. At the very least one can conclude that the commission is empowered to do both.

 The only conceivable way to reconcile these provisions is to read them to require the board of fire commissioners, whose discretion under § 42 (e) has already been restricted to a choice of one out of three candidates on an eligibility list, to be subject to the further discretion of the city council. If the city council can then, without giving reasons, reject the recommendation of the board, as it did here, and force the board to “recommend” a candidate whom the council prefers, then, in practical fact, the role of the board in the selection process is effectively eliminated. This reading is not only unreasonable, but it is sure to lead to further litigation.