Court Opinion

ID: 9956499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 14:18:16.969236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:34.137028
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

  QUANZA HEATH                                        )    S Ct Crim No 2020 0009
         Appellant/Defendant                          )    Re Super Ct SX 15 CR 384 (STX)
                                                      )
  V                                                   )
                                                      )
  PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS                        )
       Appellee/Plaintiff                             )
                                                      )
                                                      )

                   On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands
                                    Division of St Croix
                        Superior Court Judge Hon Robert A Molloy

                                  Considered March 9, 2021
                                    Filed March 27 2024

                                     Cite as 2024 VI 17

BEFORE        RHYS S HODGE ChiefJustice' MARIA M CABRET, Associate Justice and
              IVE ARLINGTON SWAN Associate Justice

APPEARANCES

Martial A Webster, Sr , Esq
Law Ofﬁce of Martial A Webster, Sr
St Croix U S VI
       Attorneyfor Appellant

[an S A Clement, Esq
Assistant Attorney General
St Thomas U S VI
       Attorneyfbr Appellee

                               OPINION OF THE COURT

SWAN, Associate Justice

111   Appellant Quanza Heath (“Heath ’) appeals from the Superior Court’s January 24, 2020,
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judgment and commitment, which convicted him of ﬁve counts of unauthorized possession of a

ﬁrearm, in violation of 14 V I C § 2253(a), ﬁve counts of possession of ammunition, in violation

of 14 V I C § 2256(a), and one count of failure to report ﬁrearms obtained outside or brought into

the Virgin Islands, in violation of 23 V I C § 470(a) For the reasons elucidated below, we afﬁmi

the Superior Court 5 January 24, 2020 judgment and commitment

               I       FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

112     In 2015, Heath was under house arrest, having been granted pretrial release in February of

2014 and ordered to reside at No 176 Estate Hannah 3 Rest, Frederiksted, St Croix while he

awaited trial on criminal charges resulting from his unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm in violation

of 14 V I C §2253(a), possession or sale of ammunition in violation of 14 V I C §2256(a), failure

to report ﬁrearms obtained or brought into the Virgin Islands in violation of 23 V I C § 470(a),

carrying or using a deadly weapon in violation of l4 V l C § 2251(a)(1) and delaying and

obstructing an ofﬁcer in discharge of his lawﬁJI duty in violation of 14 V I C § 1508     His pre

trial release was subject to many conditions, including 24 hour GPS electronic monitoring under

the supervision of a third party custodian, David Hodge, who is Heath’s grandfather

113     During that year, the Virgin Islands Police (‘ VlPD”) and the Virgin Islands Superior Court

Marshal Division (‘ Marshal Division”) commenced a joint operation called Operation Curfew

Operation Curfew was created to assist the Marshal in conducting inspections on individuals under

house arrest and curfew and on pre trial release by the court pending commencement of trial

Inspections were coordinated due to manpower limitations and an increase in violations of pretrial

release during the Christmas and Carnival seasons

114     On December 19, 2015, sometime between 9 00 and 10 00 p m , members of Operation

Curfew arrived at Heath’s residence      VIPD Ofﬁcer Melissa Fraser Jacobs (“Fraser Jacobs”)
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testiﬁed that VlPD Lieutenant Robert Matthews (“Matthews ), her supervisor, and Marshal Chris

Richardson (“Richardson ) arrived at Heath’s residence and knocked on the front door

Richardson testiﬁed that he saw lights on in the house when they arrived and that he identiﬁed

himself as a marshal when he knocked on the door Fraser Jacobs and Richardson testiﬁed that

after Matthews and Richardson knocked on the front door of the residence there was considerable

delay before a response came from inside—which according to Richardson           was confounding

because his GPS equipment was accurate, and it conﬁrmed that Heath was inside his residence

This tardy response also prompted the ofﬁcers engaging in the operation to position themselves

strategically near the front of the house for their safety

115     The evidence presented at the suppression hearing was that, at the time that Matthews and

Richardson were knocking at the front door of the residence, Fraser Jacobs testiﬁed that she heard

noise coming from behind the house and that she could see a light in the house She testiﬁed that

Matthews instructed her to go to the rear of the residence to contact anyone in the house Fraser

J acob testiﬁed that she proceeded to the back of the residence and saw over 100 marijuana plants

in plain view Additionally, she testiﬁed that she also noticed movement inside the house before

she returned to the front of the house and that she relayed this infomation to the other members

of Operation Curfew who were then on the scene

116     After some delay, Winston Berkley (“Berkley”), who is the defendant’s uncle and who had

been residing at 176 Estate Hannah’s Rest with the defendant since 2009, opened the front door

and spoke to Matthews and Detective Kai Joseph (“Joseph”), who had just recently arrived along

with Detective Darryl Walcot (‘ Walcott”)      Richardson, Walcott, and Joseph, each testiﬁed that

Berkley told Matthews that he was an owner of the residence, and Richardson and Joseph further

testiﬁed that Berkley also told Matthews that Berkley was Heath’s third party custodian Joseph
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Opinion of the Court
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further testiﬁed that Berkley gave law enforcement ofﬁcials oral consent to search the residence,

and Richardson, Walcott, and Joseph each testiﬁed that Berkley signed a consent to search form

authorizing law enforcement ofﬁcers to enter and search the residence      Detective Walcott then

entered the residence through the ﬁont door and commenced searching inside Richardson also

entered the residence, spoke to Heath, and examined his GPS monitoring unit         Heath’s sister,

Keisha Heath, and her children, who were visiting for the Christmas holiday, were also present in

the residence Detective Walcott asked Heath which room was his, and Heath pointed to one of

the rooms and said, ‘ go ahead and search it ” (J A 216 ) In that room, Detective Walcott found

only women’s clothing and concluded that the room contained no personal items indicating that

Heath was occupying that room

117      Walcott testiﬁed that during the search he smelled a strong odor of marijuana and noticed

from where he was standing in the common hallway that a bag with marijuana was on a table in

another bedroom        When Walcott inquired about the occupancy of the room with the bag of

marijuana on the table Heath informed him that he did not know whose room it is but that he had

just smoked a ‘ joint ” (J A 220 ) Walcott searched the room containing the marijuana and found

a handgun, a magnum revolver and a semi automatic M 12 gun, under the mattress, with more than

15 live rounds inside the attached extended magazine The revolver contained one live round in

the chamber of the cylinder, aligned with the barrel and ﬁve more in the remaining slots of the

cylinder The other handgun contained seven live rounds in the magazine         Walcott also found

live rounds inside a plastic bag and a box of ammunition on top of the closet in that same bedroom

$8       Walcott also searched a third bedroom adjacent to this room which no one claimed to

occupy    Many items were assembled on the bed in this room and Walcott’s search revealed a

semi automatic assault riﬂe, a bullet proof vest and a riﬂe scope resting underneath the mattress
Heath v People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 5 of 32

along with a shotgun with eight live rounds and another bullet proof vest in the closet

19      Law enforcement ofﬁcials seized the items and arrested Heath and Berkley and transported

them to the police precinct, where law enforcement ofﬁcers advised them of their Miranda rights

Heath declined to waive his right to remain silent and refused to sign his advice of rights form

While Joseph was transporting Heath to the Bureau of Corrections (“BOC”), Heath spontaneously

asked Joseph whether his sister who was visiting at his residence would be involved        Joseph

responded to Heath informing him that his sister would be interviewed as part of the ongoing

investigation    In response, Heath volunteered that he did not want his sister to be involved and

that the contraband belonged to him and Berkley      Heath agreed to provide a written statement

during his trip to the BOC

1110    The People ﬁled an information on January 1 1, 2016, charging Berkley with maintaining

or operating a controlled substance production facility, and simultaneously charging Heath with

unauthorized possession of a ﬁrearm, unauthorized possession of ammunition, failure to report

ﬁrearms obtained outside or brought into the Virgin Islands, and other related charges

1|ll    A jury trial in the Superior Court commenced on August 19, 2019 and terminated on

August 21, 2019 At the end of the trial, the jury rendered unanimous verdicts of guilty on all 1 1

counts in the amended information Heath timely perfected an appeal to this Court on January 30,

2020 and this appeal ensued SeeVI R APP P S(a)(l)

                                       [I     JURISDICTION

1112    Title 4, section 32(a) of the Virgin Islands Code vests the Supreme Court of the Virgin

Islands with jurisdiction over “all appeals arising from ﬁnal judgments, ﬁnal decrees, [and] ﬁnal

orders of the Superior Court ” The Superior Court 3 January 24, 2020 judgment and commitment

constitutes a ﬁnal judgment within the meaning of section 32(a), thereby conferring Jurisdiction
Heath v People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 6 of 32

on this Court Joseph v Daily News Publishing Co Inc 57 V I 566 578 (V I 2012)

                                 III     STANDARD OF REVIEW

1H3     In reviewing the Superior Court’s denial of Heath’s motion to suppress, we review its

factual ﬁndings for clear error and exercise plenary review over its legal determinations

Simmonds v People, 53 V I 549, 555 (V I 20l0)           We also exercise plenary review over the

Superior Court’s application of law with regard to the other issues that Heath raises in this appeal,

including the sufﬁciency of the evidence Allen v HOVENSA L L C 59 V I 430 436 (V l 2013)

(citing St Thomas St John 3d ofElectlons v Daniel 49 VI 322 329 (VI 2007)) Brathwazte

v People 60Vl 419 426 (VI 2014)

                                        IV      DISCUSSION

1114   Heath seeks reversal of his convictions, while propounding a multifaceted argument

claiming (1) that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) that the evidence

was insufﬁcient to support any of his convictions and (3) that the Superior Court erred when it

denied his motion to dismiss the case for violating his rights to a speedy trial (Appellant’s Br 18

34) We address these issues in turn

                                   1   SUPPRESSION MOTION

                     a.   The Knock and Talk Exception to the Warrant Requirement

1115   Heath posits that Virgin Islands law enforcement ofﬁcials repeatedly violated his Fourth

Amendment rights and, accordingly, that the Superior Court erred when it denied his motion to

suppress evidence seized at his residence Heath asserts that the presence and conduct of Virgin

Islands law enforcement ofﬁcers at his residence were unlawful and constituted a seizure because

the ofﬁcers lacked probable cause to support a search, thus rendering the warrantless search

unreasonable per se (Appellant’s Br I8 30 ) The People counter Heath’s assertions, arguing that
Heath v People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 7 of 32

the Superior Court properly applied the relevant law with no clear error and that the court’s

determination to deny Heath’s motion to suppress was correct ' (Appellee’s Br 20 32 )

1H 6     The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, applicable to the U S Virgin Islands pursuant

to Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act of 1954 as amended,2 generally protects people in their

homes and curtilage3 from unreasonable governmental intrusion Blyden v People, 53 V I 637,

648 (V I 20l0) A warrantless search or seizure of a person’s residence or home is therefore per

se unreasonable, absent the applicability of any exceptions to the rule Thomas v People, 63 V I

595 605 (V l 2015) (citing Brown v People 56 V I 207 217 (V 1 2012)) see also City ofLos

Angeles v Patel 576 U S 409 410 (2015) Arizona v Grant 556 U S 332 338 (2009)

Tll7     Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement, courts have generally recognized a

“knock and talk” exception Estate ofSmith v Marasco, 318 F 3d 497, 519 (3rd Cir 2003), see

' Heath argued to the Superior Court that “[o]ne who has been released on pre trial bail,” such as himself, does not
lose his Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure,’ and ‘neither does he waive his Fourth
Amendment rights by agreeing, as a condition of bail, to submit his person and property to search at any time upon
request by a law enforcement ofﬁcer ” (J A 88 89; 98) As a result, Heath concluded that “[a]ny search made pursuant
to th[at] condition must necessarily meet the Fourth Amendment 5 standard of reasonableness," citing to United
Staten Scott 450 F3d 863 (9th Cir 2006) as support (Id) He repeats this argument on appeal again citing to Scott
as support (Appellant Br 21) In response, the People distinguish Scott, observing that in that case, “law enforcement
needed probable cause to issue a drug test to [a] defendant released on bail, while in Heath 8 case, “the police needed
only a legitimate reason to knock on Heath s front door,” and “[315 the Superior Court found, Operation Curfew” and
its purpose to ascertain and ensure arrestees' compliance with their conditions of pre trial release, “was that legitimate
reason ‘ (Appellee 5 Br 23) As an alternative justiﬁcation for law enforcement s actions, the People represent that
“as a condition of Heath’s house arrest, the Marshal’s Ofﬁce and/or the VIPD were entitled to knock on Heath 5 front
door to ensure that he was complying with the conditions of his house arrest and [they] were not required to articulate
any suspicion that he was not in compliance ”(1(1) Assuming without deciding that the reasonableness requirement
of the Fourth Amendment applies notwithstanding an arrestee s express agreement, as a condition of his or her release
on bail to house arrest, to submit his person and property to warrantless search at any time upon request by a law
enforcement ofﬁcer, that requirement was satisﬁed by the law enforcement officers and marshals involved in the
instant case

  See 48 U S C § 1561 See also The complete Revised Organic Act of 1954 is found at 48 U S C §§ l54l I645
(1995), 1ch! mud m V 1 CODE ANN Historical Documents Organic Acts and U 5 Constitution at 73 177 (I995 &
Supp 2003) (preceding V 1 CODE ANN tit l)

3 See Stmmonds v Virgin Islands, 53 V I 549, 556 (V I 2010) (noting that curtilage is the area around the home to
which the activity of home life extends, and that people have a legitimate expectation of privacy within this area )
Heath v People
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Opinion ofthe Court
Page 8 of 32
also Rogers v Pendelton 249 F 3d 279 289 90 (4th Cir 2001)             Consistent with the Fourth

Amendment, the knock and talk exception authorizes law enforcement ofﬁcers to approach an

individual’s ﬁ‘ont door to inform the individual of their presence, ask questions or investigate

matters, and seek consent of the occupants to search the residence or property     Umted States v

Wells 648 F 3d 671 679 (8th Cir 201 1) see also Umted States v Weston 443 F 3d 661 667 (8th

Cir 2006) Courts have recognized two justiﬁcations for this rule The ﬁrst is that “homeowners

or occupants of a residence do not have an expectation of privacy in areas generally made

accessible to visitors, including but not limited to, entrance ways such as a driveway, a walkway

or a passageway       See Wells 648 F 3d at 679' Umted States v Reed 733 F 2d 492 501 (8th Cir

1984) ‘ These are simply not areas in which a person can reasonably maintain any expectation of

privacy    Wells 648 F 3d at 679 see also Umted States v Maestas 639 F 3d 1032 1036 37 (10th

Cir 201 1) The second justiﬁcation is that homeowners grant members of the visiting public such

as “mail carriers, sanitation workers [and] neighbors      to name a few ’ an “implied consent to

enter these areas for those purposes that accompany the normal interaction of a social, civilized

society    Wells 648 F 3d at 679 (citing Umted States v Stmms 606 F 3d 966 969 71 (7th Cir

2010))    Accordingly, ‘ absent a clear expression by the owner [of a residence] to the contrary,

police ofﬁcers are permitted to approach a dwelling and seek permission to question an occupant

in the course of their ofﬁcial business ’ Gompfv State, 120 P 3d 980, 986 (Wyo 2005) (listing

cases)    Importantly, for law enforcement ofﬁcers to avail themselves of the knock and talk

justiﬁcation, both their initial entry onto the property and their conduct within the property must

be reasonable, that is, the circumstances must not objectively indicate that law enforcement

ofﬁcers’ purpose was to initiate a warrantless search instead of engaging the inhabitants      See

Florida v Jardmes, 569, U S 1, 8 9, 21 (2013) (observing that ‘ [t[he scope of a license—express
Hazlitt People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 9 of 32

or implied     is limited not only to a particular area but also to a speciﬁc purpose,’ and that while

‘ the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him there to

conduct a search, ’ it is nevertheless permissible for “a police ofﬁcer not armed with a warrant [to]

approach a home and knock [on the door], precisely because that is no more than any private

citizen might do,’” and that in doing so, police may “seek[ ] to speak to an occupant for the purpose

of gathering evidence )(citing Kentucky v King 563 U S 452 469 (201 1))

$18     Here, the undisputed testimony is that on December 19, 20 I 5, Virgin Islands police ofﬁcers

and ofﬁcers from the Marshal Division conducted “Operation Curfew, ’ for the purpose of assisting

the Marshals in conducting checks of individuals placed on pretrial release by the Superior Court

in pending criminal matters, which included individuals under house arrest and curfew, such as

Heath    Operation Curfew was memorialized in an ofﬁcial memorandum consummated among

government agencies, via an informational brieﬁng which contained a deﬁned list of locations that

were under the supervision ofthe Marshal Division and articulated a proper government purpose—

speciﬁcally, decreasing crime during the Christmas and Carnival seasons

1H 9    It is likewise undisputed that on December 19, 2015, Heath was on pretrial release pursuant

to an order of the Superior Court, pending his trial on criminal charges related to the unlawﬁil

possession of a ﬁrearm In this order, David Hodge, who is Heath’s grandfather and a resident of

I76 Estate Hannah’s Rest, Frederiksted, St Croix, was required to agree to act as Heath 5 third

party custodian    The Superior Court’s order also imposed several other requirements        Among

these were that Heath must reside at the same 176 Estate Hannah 3 Rest address with a working

telephone number through which he could be contacted, that Heath was to immediately notify the

Superior Court if there was a change of his address or his telephone number; that Heath should be

placed under house arrest with 24 hour GPS electronic monitoring, and that Heath shall not violate
Heath v People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 10 of 32

the laws of the Virgin Islands or of the United States, and other conditions (See Superior Court

Pretrial Release Order dated February 7 2014 )

1|20    [t is undisputed that law enforcement ofﬁcers did not approach Heath’s residence on

December 19, 20l5, in the late evening, between nine and ten o’clock, with a warrant        Instead,

they approached Heath’s residence to conduct a compliance check on Heath, consistent with

Operation Curfew, which was executed to monitor house arrest compliance and to decrease crime

during the Carnival and Christmas seasons Operation Curfew involved a legitimate Virgin Islands

government and law enforcement objective        A review of the marshals and law enforcement

ofﬁcers’ conduct upon their arrival at Heath s residence reveals that they ﬁrst attempted to contact

Heath at the front door of his residence       Ofﬁcer Melissa Fraser Jacobs, Lieutenant Robert

Matthew, and Marshal Chris Richardson approached the front door ofthe residence Matthew and

Richardson knocked on the front door for an extended period, encompassing three to ﬁve minutes,

during which Richardson identiﬁed himself as being from the Marshal Division               Marshal

Richardson testiﬁed that he was puzzled by this delay because the GPS tracker, which was accurate

to within approximately 100 feet, disclosed that Heath was inside his residence        There is no

dispute, or any evidence presented in the trial record which indicates, that the Virgin Islands law

enforcement ofﬁcers acted in an intimidating or coercive manner or brandished their weapons

while at Heath’s residence    Because Virgin Islands law enforcement ofﬁcers were present at

Heath’s residence to perform a compliance check by ﬁrst knocking on the front door and their

subsequent conduct in going to the back of the property to see if contact with Heath could be made,

there was a reasonable limited intrusion for legitimate law enforcement objectives, and we

therefore reject Heath’s argument that law enforcement ofﬁcials were unlawfully on his property
Heath v People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 11 of 32

                               b   The Consent Exception t0 the Warrantiess Search

 1|21   Heath argues that he never gave consent to search his room or the house and that he was

the subject of an illegal search and seizure (Appellant 3 Br 23 26)          Heath also argues that

Berkley’s consent was defective, that the search was conducted before Berkley gave consent, that

law enforcement ofﬁcers persuaded Berkley to sign the written consent to search form and that

Berkley did not know what he was doing         (App 5 Br 25 ) Heath further argues that Berkley did

not have authority over the entire house, therefore, he could not give consent      (Appellant’s Br

25 ) The People oppose Heath’s assertion, arguing that Berkley s consent to search the house was

knowing and voluntary and that Berkley had apparent authority to consent to law enforcement 5

search of the residence (Appellee’s Br 33 37 )

                       I   Berkley freely and voluntartly gave VIPD Ofﬁcers verbal and written
                           consent to search the resuIence at I 76 Hannah ’s Res!

1122    A person s consent to search is a valid authorized exception to the warrant requirement

under the Fourth Amendment Thomas v People 63 V I 595 607 (V I 2015) (quoting Szmmonds

53 V I at 559 60)’ see also Schneckloth v Bustamonte 412 U S 218 219 (1973)              [fa person

gives free and voluntary consent to search, a warrantiess search is considered constitutionally valid

and whether consent was freely and voluntarily given is determined by looking at the totality of

the circumstances surrounding the consent ” Thomas, 63 V I at 607 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U S

at 227) see also United States v Lucas 640 F 3d 168 174 (6th Cir 201 l) (noting that the factors

considered in determining whether consent was given voluntarily include the age, intelligence and

education of the individual giving consent, whether the individual understood the right to refuse

to consent to search, and whether the individual understood his rights)

1'23    Berkley’s oral and written consent for VIPD ofﬁcers to search the residence at 176
Heath v People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 12 of 32

Hannah’s Rest was freely and voluntarily given The record reveals that Berkley, after some delay,

opened the front door and spoke to Matthews and Marshal Richardson            The record further

establishes that multiple participants in Operation Curfew who were present at the residence

testiﬁed that Berkley represented to Matthews, in response to Matthews’ inquires, that he was

Heath’s third party custodian and that he was one of the owners of the residence         Marshal

Richardson, as well as Detectives Walcott and Joseph, likewise testiﬁed that Berkley gave consent

to search the residence and further signed a consent to search fomi, which was attested by two

witnesses   Detective Joseph’s testimony at trial supported Marshal Richardson’s testimonial

evidence that Berkley consented to the search orally and in writing Both detectives testiﬁed that

Berkley understood that he was consenting to the search of the residence where he was located,

and there is no evidence in the record which suggests that Berkley did not understand that he was

consenting to the search of his residence Heath 3 argument that the VIPD search was conducted

before Berkley gave consent, that law enforcement ofﬁcers persuaded Berkley to sign the written

consent to search the residence, and that Berkley did not know what he was doing is not

substantiated by any evidence in the record The record demonstrates that in the brief exchange

Berkley had with law enforcement ofﬁcers before he gave them oral and written consent to search

the house, he was intelligent, cooperative, responsive, and understood that a VIPD law

enforcement ofﬁcial was seeking his consent to search the house where he was residing    Further,

contrary to Heath’s argument that Berkley’s consent resulted from coercion, law enforcement

ofﬁcers did not threaten Berkley or use any type of force during their encounter with him No

evidence exists that law enforcement ofﬁcers used the discovery of the marijuana in the backyard

to coerce Berkley to provide consent for them to search the residence     Berkley provided oral

consent to search the house and no evidence was presented that Berkley was confused or
Heath v People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 13 0f 32

misunderstood the ofﬁcers’ directives during the encounter         Rather, law enforcement ofﬁcers

testiﬁed that Berkley ﬁilly understood that they wanted to search the house in which he resided

Based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent, Berkley gave free and

voluntary consent to search the residence at 176 Hannah’s Rest More succinctly, the evidence in

the court’s record substantiates that upon the ofﬁcers’ arrival at Heath 8 residence, they knocked

on the front door and waited for several minutes for a response Berkley eventually responded to

the door, acknowledged the ofﬁcers, represented to them that he was Heath’s third party custodian

and that he was one of the owners of the residence at 176 Hannah 3 Rest, signed a consent to search

form, and additionally gave the ofﬁcers oral consent to search the residence             Berkley’s

representation indicated that, at a minimum, he had apparent authority over the residence to

consent to its search Accordingly, there was no violation of Heath’s Fourth Amendment rights

when the ofﬁcers received a valid consent to enter his residence

124     Heath also argues that Berkley did not have authority over the entire house; therefore, he

could not give consent to search the residence However, on the present record, this contention is

meritless

1125    As the Supreme Court of the United States has held, “permission to search {may be]

obtained from a third party who possesse[s] common authority over[,] or other sufﬁcient

relationship to[,] the premises or effects sought to be inspected ’ United States v Matlock, 4|5

U S 164, 171 (I974) However, this conclusion “does not suggest that law enforcement ofﬁcers

may always [blindly] accept a person’s invitation to enter premises” that are occupied 111mm: v

Rodriguez, 497 U S I77, 188 (1990) Instead, as the Court explains in Rodriguez,

        Even when the invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the
       person [giving the invitation to enter and search] lives there, the surrounding
       circumstances could conceivably be such that a reasonable person would
Heath v People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 14 of 32

        doubt its truth and not act upon it without further inquiry As with other
        factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of
        consent to enter [and search] must be judged against an objective standard
        would the facts available to the ofﬁcer at the moment warrant a man of
        reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had [apparent]
        authority over the premises? If not, then warrantless entry without further
        inquiry is unlawﬁJl unless authority actually exists But if so, the search is
        valid

497 U S at 188 89 (quoting Terry v Ohio 392 U S 1 21 22 (1968)) (internal quotation marks

and alterations omitted)     In other words, ‘ [t]he test for determining common authority or other

sufﬁcient relationship to the premises or effect to be searched focuses on apparent authority rather

than actual authority[, t]hus, if it reasonably appear[s to the police] that a third party ha[s] common

authority over the premises, then the [third party’s] consent to search would be valid ” State v

Castaneda 724 P 2d 1 8 (Ariz 1986) (citing Matlock 415 U S at 171 & n 7)

1126    Here, the record informs that Berkley afﬁrmatively represented that he was one of the

owners of the residence at 176 Estate Hannah 5 Rest and that he was Heath’s third party custodian

It likewise indicates that law enforcement’s reliance on these representations was objectively

reasonable       Since Heath was under house arrest, it is rational to expect that his third party

custodian would be at the residence with him and Berkley was the only other adult in the residence

at the time besides Heath’s sister, who was not then residing at 176 Estate Hannah 5 Rest but only

visiting for the Christmas holiday with her minor children In addition, the record further informs

that after Berkley freely and voluntarily gave VIPD Marshals consent to search the residence,

including its common areas, Heath further gave VIPD Marshals consent to search the room that

he admitted was his room aﬁer the VIPD Marshals were inside the residence and talking to him

             0    The Flam View doctrine appltes t0 the Marguana Plants Setzed on the Property
                  and the Illegal F(rearms and Contraband Found InSIde hts Res1dence

$27     Heath argues that law enforcement ofﬁcers conducted a search of the yard and discovered
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Opinion of the Court
Page 15 of 32
the marijuana plants before Berkley gave consent to search the residence (Appellant 3 Br 23 )

The People argue in opposition that law enforcement ofﬁcers were traversing the yard area of the

house to contact Heath and that they were not searching for evidence of a crime Therefore, the

discovery of the marijuana plants in the yard was inadvertent and incidental to their legitimate

attempt to contact Heath (Appellee 3 Br 32 )

1128    The plain view exception authorizes a law enforcement ofﬁcer to “make a warrantless

seizure of items that he or she viewed from a place or position in which he or she was lawfully

entitled to be, provided it is immediately apparent that the item observed is evidence of a crime,

contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure    Gumbs v People, 64 V I 491 508 09 (V I 2016)

(citing Thomas v People 63 V I 595 606 n 4 (V I 2015) Coolidge v New Hampshire 403 U S

443 465 (1971) and Horton v California 496 U S 128 136 (1990)) A seizure in plain view is

proper only if law enforcement ofﬁcers did not violate the Fourth Amendment protection by

arriving at the place where the evidence could be plainly and clearly be viewed See e g , Horton,

496 U S at 136 Kennedyv King 563 U S 452 462 63 (2011)

1|29    Here, law enforcement ofﬁcers were conducting a compliance check on Heath who was

under court ordered house arrest     The evidence presented informs that Virgin Islands law

enforcement agents proceeded to the rear of the residence after knocking repeatedly on the front

door and announcing themselves and waiting for approximately three to ﬁve minutes without

receiving an answer or response at the front door Ofﬁcer Fraser Jacobs testiﬁed that she saw a

light outside in the back of the residence and observed movements inside the residence Detective

Matthews then instructed Ofﬁcer Fraser Jacobs to walk to the back of the residence to investigate

whether someone could be present and contacted there Upon arriving in the rear of the residence,

the ofﬁcer saw in plain view multiple marijuana plants, numbering more than 100 plants being
Heath v People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 16 of 32

grown with the assistance of an elaborate lighting system    Because the ofﬁcers were legally on

the premises and the marijuana was in plain view of where the ofﬁcers had a right to be the

marijuana was validly seized in compliance with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment

Moreover, the conduct of law enforcement ofﬁcers was harmonious and consistent with the scope

of their original purpose, which was to effectuate Operation Curfew compliance by contacting

people on pretrial house arrest   Accordingly, Virgin Islands law enforcement ofﬁcers did not

interfere with Heath’s privacy interests when they, in good faith, went unimpeded t0 the back of

Heath’s residence in attempting to contact Heath who was residing at 176 Estate Hannah 8 Rest

See Umted States v Anderson 552 F 2d 1296            I300 (8th Cir    1977) (observing that law

enforcement ofﬁcers must sometimes move away from the front door when attempting to contact

the occupants of the residence)

            d    Plum View Doctrine Applzes to Maryuana, Ammumtwn and Firearms Found
                                       InmIe the Heath ’3 Resulence

1]30   Heath argues that the marijuana, ammunition, and guns found in his residence should be

suppressed because they are the fruit of an illegal search in violation of his Fourth Amendment

rights The People argue that the marijuana was lawfully seized based on the plain view doctrine

and based upon Heath’s and Berkley’s consent to search the residence (Appellee 8 Br 38 39 )

1|3l   ‘ It is well established that under certain circumstances, the police may seize evidence in

plain view without a warrant ” Coolzdge, 403 U S at 465 The U S Supreme Court has held that

for the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement to apply, the police

must not “violate the Fourth Amendment by aniving at the [place] in which the evidence could be

plainly viewed   Horton, 496 U S at 136
Heath v People
S Ct Crim No 2020 0009
Opinion of the Court
Page 17 of 32

1132    Here, aﬁer Berkley signed the consent form and gave law enforcement personnel consent

to enter the residence, they were lawfully admitted inside the residence Further, the evidence in

the court proceedings continued that while Detective Walcott was leaving the room Heath earlier

identiﬁed as his room, Walcott smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from directly across the

hallway, which displayed an open bag with marijuana on top of a table Detective Walcott then

entered the room and seized the marijuana and, after looking around brieﬂy, found several guns

and ammunition under a mattress in that room Because Berkley had given the ofﬁcers oral and

written consent to search the residence, the guns and ammunition and the marijuana located in

plain view were not seized in violation of Heath’s Fourth Amendment rights because it was

authorized by Berkley s consent See United States \ Stan 533 F 3d 985 996 (8th Cir 2008)

(interpreting a written consent as an unqualiﬁed consent to search an entire residence, where the

defendant was present during the full search of his residence but remained silent and made no

attempt to impede law enforcement officers or to communicate to them that he believed they

exceeded the scope of their consensual search )

                                d        Illegally Obtained Confesswn

1|33    Heath argues that his confession was illegally obtained (Appellant 8 Br 26 27) and that his

right to counsel was violated       (Appellant’s Br 27 30)   The People dispute Heath 5 contention,

arguing that he initiated the conversation that led to his spontaneous confession, and he further

waived his constitutional rights by memorializing a signed written statement of his confession

(Appellees Br 30 44)

1|34    Miranda requires that prior to a law enforcement ofﬁcial’s questioning of a defendant in

custody, he must be advised of his Fifth Amendment rights Miranda v Arizona, 384 U S 436,

479 (1966) An individual is in custody or subject to custodial interrogation when law enforcement
Heath v People
S Ct Crim No 2020 0009
Opinion of the Court
Page 18 of 32

ofﬁcials initiate questioning aﬁer the individual is taken into custody or deprived of his or her

freedom of movement to leave the immediate area 1d at 444           Concomitantly, interrogation is

present in ‘ conduct intentionally designed to evoke a confession        as well as any conduct an

ofﬁcer should reasonably have foreseen would elicit an inculpatory response ” United States v

Banner 469 Fed Appx 119 126 (3d Cir 2012) (citing Rhode Island v Imus 446 U S 291 301

(1980))    Accordingly, the suspect must be informed of his or her rights, including the tight to

remain silent and the right to have an attorney present during interrogation Miranda, 384 U S at

444     In considering this right, a waiver or “[a]ny statement given freely and voluntarily without

any compelling inﬂuence, is of course, admissible into evidence        [and] volunteered statements

of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment       Blyden v People 53 V I 637 662-64 (V 1

2010) (quoting Miranda, 384 U S at 478) [t is well established that ‘ a suspect who has received

and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right

to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police ’ Blyden, 53 VI at 662 64

(quoting Berghms v Thompkms, 560 U S 370 388 89 (2010))             [A] spontaneous utterance, not

prompted by a police interrogation, made by a suspect who is plainly in custody is admissible even

if the suspect has not waived his Miranda rights     53 V l at 662; see also Miranda, 384 U S at

478

1135     Here, Heath was arrested aﬁer the ammunition and contraband were found in his residence

Several of the ofﬁcers testiﬁed that they were not sure whether Heath was advised of his Miranda

rights after he was arrested   Nevertheless, the evidence discloses that Heath was advised of his

Miranda rights when he arrived at the police station However, Heath declined to sign the advice

of rights form; therefore, Virgin Islands law enforcement personnel did not interrogate or question

Heath     Subsequently, Detective Moses Francis (‘ Francis”) provided evidence in the form of
Heath v People
S Ct Crim No 2020 0009
Opinion of the Court
Page 19 0f 32

testimony that he was assisting Detective Joseph to book and transport Heath to the Bureau of

Corrections (‘ BOC”), during which Heath asked Joseph if his sister was involved in the

investigation   Francis testiﬁed that Joseph told Heath that his sister would be investigated in

reference to the ammunition and ﬁrearms found in the residence Heath then stated that he did not

want his sister to be involved because everything in the house belonged to him and his uncle

Francis testiﬁed that Detective Joseph asked Heath to reduce his confession statement to writing

and he complied “Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement [and a]ny statement

given freely and voluntarily without any compelling inﬂuences, is of course, admissible in

evidence ” Innis, 446 U S at 299 300 Accordingly, contrary to Heath’s argument, there was no

violation of his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in this case because Heath was timely advised of

his Miranda rights     Heath’s confession was obviously spontaneous and not the product of

custodial interrogation by law enforcement ofﬁcers "The special procedural safeguards outlined

in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a

suspect in custody is subject to interrogation ’ Castillo v People, 59 V I 240, 266 (V l 2013)

(quoting Inms, 446 U S at 300) The trial record discloses that Heath voluntarily, knowingly and

without any urging by the ofﬁcers offered the statement to the ofﬁcers, which is not a violation of

his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, because it was voluntarily made and not the result of

custodial interrogation Because there was no custodial interrogation of Heath when he confessed

to the ofﬁcers while he was being transported to the BOC, there was absolutely no violation of his

Fifth Amendment rights

1136   Furthermore, there was no violation of Heath’s Sixth Amendment rights            The Sixth

Amendment of the United States Constitution, applicable to the Virgin Islands, assures the

defendant of the assistance of counsel in all criminal proceedings See U S CONST amend VI
Heath \ People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 20 of 32
The questioning or interrogation of a defendant in custody must cease if the defendant in custody

requests a lawyer Miranda, 384 U S at 444 45          The trial evidence conﬁrms that Heath was

advised of his Miranda rights before he was transported to the BOC Importantly, because there

is no evidence in the record that Heath requested a lawyer, after he was advised of his Miranda

rights, and therefore he waived his Sixth Amendment rights when he confessed orally and in

writing that the property and personal items in the house belonged to him and his uncle

                 A There was Sufﬁcient Evidence to Convict Heath of All the Counts in the
                   Amended Information

‘37     Heath argues that was is insufﬁcient evidence to sustain his convictions for unauthorized

possession of a ﬁrearm in violation of 14 V l C § 2253(a), unauthorized possession of ammunition

in violation of 14 V I C § 2256(a), and for his failure to report ﬁrearms obtained outside or brought

into the Virgin Islands in violation of violation of 23 V I C § 470(a)      We conclude there was

sufﬁcient evidence for a reasonable jury to ﬁnd beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of each

of the crimes for which Heath was convicted

                               I     Unauthorized Possesswn ofa Firearm

1138    Heath was charged in the amended information in counts one through ﬁve with

unauthorized possession of a ﬁrearm after law enforcement ofﬁcials seized the following from his

residence (1) a Ruger 357 magnum revolver model Security Six, (2) a SWD 380 auto semi

automatic pistol model M12, (3) a Phoenix Arms 25 caliber semi automatic pistol, model HP25A,

(4) a Norinco Sporter 7 62 x 30 semi automatic riﬂe model MAK 90, and (5) a Mossberg 12 gauge

semi automatic     shotgun   model     500    On    appeal,   Heath   challenges    the   legal   and

factual sufﬁciency of the evidence presented in support of his convictions for unauthorized

possession of a ﬁrearm in Violation of 14 V l C § 2253(a)      Alternatively, the People argue that
Heath v People
S Ct Crim No 2020 0009
Opinion of the Court
Page 21 of 32
the Superior Court properly denied Heath 8 motion for judgment of acquittal or in the alternative

a new trial because    viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People-—a reasonable

jury could have found Heath guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charges in the amended

information (Appellee 3 Br 38 40 ) Based on the evidence presented, the jury properly convicted

Heath of the charges in the amended infomation

1|39     In reviewing Heath's challenge to the sufﬁciency of the evidence, “this Court applies a

 particularly deferential standard ofreview        and will afﬁrrn the verdict so long as the evidence,

when viewed in the light most favorable to the People—including the beneﬁt of all reasonable

inferences    would allow a rational jury to ﬁnd all elements of each offense proven beyond a

reasonable doubt ” Ponce v People, 72 V I 828, 834 (V I 2020) (quoting James 1 People, 60

VI 311 317(V1 2013)) see also Faluel People 62 VI 625 630 (VI 2015) Vzerav People

71 VI 67 679 (VI 2019) McIntosh v People 57 V1 669 678 (VI 2012)

1140     Title 14 section 2253(a) of the Virgin Islands Code, which criminalizes the unlawﬁJl

possession of a ﬁrearm, speciﬁcally states that “whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, has,

possesses, bears, transports or carries either, actually or constructively, openly or concealed any

ﬁrearm       loaded or unloaded, may be arrested     To prove unauthorized possession of a ﬁrearm,

the People were required to prove that Heath was not authorized to possess a ﬁrearm, and that

Heath knowingly possessed either actually or constructively, openly or concealed, a ﬁrearm          [n

the instructions to the jury, the Superior Court deﬁned “possession ’ and distinguished between

“actual and constructive possession ” Constructive possession, as used in the statute, means

‘ having the power and the intention at any given time to exercise dominion and control over the

ﬁrearm either directly or through another person ’ 14 V I C § 2253(d)(5) Based on the statute’s

deﬁnition, the Superior Court also instructed the jury that constructive possession means having
Heath v People
S Ct Crim No 2020 0009
Opinion of the Court
Page 22 of 32

the power and intention at any given time to exercise dominion or actual control over the ﬁrearm,

either directly or through another person    (.1 A 498 99) see also 4 V l C § 2253(d)(5)       The

Superior Court further instructed the Jury that a ﬁrearm is “any device by whatever name known,

capable of discharging ammunition by means of gas generated from an explosive composition,

including any air gas or spring gun or any ‘BB’ pistols or ‘BB’ guns that have been adapted or

modiﬁed to discharge projectiles as a ﬁrearm ” 23 V I C § 451(f)

1|41   Here, there was sufﬁcient evidence for a rational jury to ﬁnd beyond a reasonable doubt

that Heath was guilty of unauthorized possession of a ﬁrearm To prove the elements necessary

for conviction of unauthorized possession of a ﬁrearm, the People had the burden of proving that

Heath had or possessed the ﬁrearms; that the ﬁrearms Heath had were operable and that Heath was

not authorized to possess them   14 V I C § 2253(a)

                                   Heath possessedﬁrearms

1|42   Heath argues that he never possessed the ﬁrearms and accordingly that there was

insufﬁcient evidence to convict him of the unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm pursuant to the statute

Detective Walcott testiﬁed during the trial that after Berkley gave law enforcement ofﬁcers a

written consent to search the residence, he entered the residence and stood in the hallway next to

Heath, who was shirtless and only wearing a pair of pants and also standing next to a Superior

Court Marshal   Walcott testiﬁed that he asked Heath which room was his and Heath pointed to

the room on the right side of the hallway Walcott testiﬁed that when he searched the room Heath

identiﬁed as his room he found “pretty much a normal room with just woman’s [sic] clothing and

shoes [and] appears to be a female occupying the room but that there was no indication in that

speciﬁc room that a male individual was occupying it ” (J A 216 ) Walcott testiﬁed that after he

searched the room containing the women’s clothing, he returned to the hallway where Heath was
Heath v People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 23 of 32

standing shirtless with the Superior Court Marshal and looked directly across from the hallway

into another room and saw marijuana on top of the table in that room      Walcott ﬁthher testiﬁed

that Heath admitted and acknowledged that he owned the marijuana on the table and that he had

just smoked a joint Walcott then testiﬁed that he asked Heath who owned the room with the

marijuana 0n the table, and that Heath said he did not know Detective Walcott further testiﬁed

that he continued to search the bedroom in which he found the marijuana on top of the table and

found three ﬁrearms when he liﬁed the mattress on the bed Walcott s testimony revealed that he

continued to search the room and also found ammunition in the top of the closet in that room

Importantly, Walcott also testiﬁed that he found court documents bearing Quanza Heath 8 name

in that room

1143   Detective Walcott then testiﬁed that he proceeded to search the third bedroom, which was

immediately next to the room in which he found the guns, ammunition, marijuana and court

documents with Quanza Heath’s name on them          Walcott further testiﬁed that the third room

resembled a storage room at the residence because it was unoccupied and had many items strewn

across the bed and ﬂoor with very little room to walk Walcott testiﬁed that he also searched that

room and found two ﬁrearms, one under the mattress on the bed and the other in a closet

Additionally, Walcott’s testimony revealed that he also found a bullet proof vest, a ﬁrearm scope

and ammunition in the same room

1144   The foregoing evidence establishes that Heath possessed the ﬁrearms           Constructive

possession as used in the statute means “having the power and the intention at any given time to

exercise dominion and control over the ﬁrearm either directly or through another person ” 14

V [C § 2253(d)(5) In this case, the evidence, albeit circumstantial, reveals that some of the guns

and marijuana were found in the bedroom that was solely occupied by Heath, while others were
Heath v People
S Ct Crim No 2020 0009
Opinion of the Court
Page 24 of 32

found in another adjacent bedroom that was apparently used as a storage room and to which he

and the other occupants of 176 Estate Hannah’s Rest had free access The bedroom in which some

of the weapons, ammunition, and the bag of marijuana were found also contained ofﬁcial court

documents with the name “Quanza Heath ’ inscribed on them          Although Heath did not admit to

occupying this particular room, it is important to note that when he was arrested and was given

permission to put on at shirt before being transported to the police station, he retrieved his t shirt

from that bedroom     This evidence, considered along with the surrounding circumstances, was

sufﬁcient for a reasonable Jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this same room was

occupied by Heath and that, accordingly, he had the intention and the power at any given time to

directly exercise dominion and control over the ﬁrearms that were located therein See e g United

States v Bonham 477 F 2d 1 137 1138 (3d Cir 1973) (noting that [w]hen a person is the sole

occupant of a room and has the right to exclude all others from it, it may logically be inferred that

he has knowing dominion and control over objects so situated in his room that he is likely to be

aware of their presence ’)    In addition, since Heath had free access to the adjacent bedroom,

apparently used for storage, he had the same intention and power to directly exercise dominion

and control over the ﬁrearms that were located there

1145   Reynold D’Souza (‘ D’Souza"), employed for 10 years by the VlPD as a ﬁrearm and tool

mark examiner, also testiﬁed at Heath 8 trial     As a ﬁrearm and toolmark examiner, D’Souza’s

tested ﬁrearms for operability and compared bullets and cartridge cases to determine if they were

ﬁred from a particular ﬁrearm D’Souza offered undisputed testimony that he tested for operability

the Ruger 357 revolver, the M12 380 auto, the Phoenix Arms 25 auto and the Norinco 7 26

caliber riﬂe, as well as the Mossberg shotgun, and all the ﬁrearms were deemed operable and none

of the ﬁrearms was manufactured in the Virgin Islands (See J A 321       29 ) D’Souza also testiﬁed
Heath v People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 25 of 32

that he examined all the ammunition for each ﬁrearm, and his examination revealed that they were

all live” cartridges (J A 329 )

1146      During Heath’s trial Elsworth Jones (“Jones”), a ten year employee and supervisor in the

Firearms Division of the VIPD, testiﬁed that he had the responsibility to license, issue and register

ﬁrearms and ammunition to the public and that he was the caretaker and custodian of the ﬁrearm

records Jones testiﬁed that he consulted the records for issuance of a ﬁrearm license to Heath

Aﬁer conducting a search of the ﬁrearms record for both the St Thomas and the St Croix Districts,

Jones determined that Heath did not have a license to possess a ﬁrearm in the Virgin Islands on

December 19, 20l5, the date the ﬁrearms and ammunition were discovered in the 176 Estate

Hannah’s Rest residence Jones also produced two absence of entry forms that were admitted into

evidence

1147      Consequently, there was sufﬁcient evidence for a reasonable and unbiased jury to convict

Heath of the offense of unauthorized possession of a ﬁrearms in counts one through ﬁve and to

support his conviction of the same See Cascen v People, 60 V I 392, 409 (V I 2014)

                              i     Unauthorized Possessron or Sale ofA mmumtton

'|48      Heath also argues that there is insufﬁcient evidence to support his conviction of

unauthorized possession of ammunition in violation 0f [4 V I C § 2256(a), as charged in counts

six, seven, eight, nine and ten of the amended infomation 4 The People argue in opposition that

‘ Heath was charged with unauthorized possession of various forms of live ﬁrearm ammunition in the amended
information as follows

Count 6
          Winchester USA 38 SPL +P cartridge loaded with silver tip hollow point bullet and/or 2 Top Brass 357
          Mag cartridge loaded with lead ﬂat nose bullet and/or 2 CBC 357 Mag cartridge loaded with semi jacketed
          hollo point bullet in violation of 14 V I C § 2256(a)
Heath v People
S Ct Crim No 2020 0009
Opinion of the Court
Page 26 of 32

there was sufﬁcient evidence provided at trial to support Heath’s conviction of unauthorized

possession of ammunition

1149       Title 14 section 2256(a) of the Virgin Islands Code states that

                   (a) Any person who is not
                          (1) a licensed ﬁrearms or ammunition dealer; or
                          (2) ofﬁcer, agent or employee of the Virgin Islands or the
                   United States, on duty and acting within the scope of his duties; or
                           (3) holder of a valid ﬁrearms license for the same ﬁrearm
                   gauge or caliber ammunition of the ﬁrearm indicated on such
                   license; and
                           (4) who possesses, sells, purchases, manufactures,
                   advertises for sale, or uses any ﬁrearm ammunition is guilty
                   subject to imprisonment for up to seven years or a ﬁne not more
                   than $10,000[, or] to both ﬁne and imprison[ment]

150        T0 convict Heath of unauthorized possession of ammunition, the People were required to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Heath possessed or used ﬁrearm ammunition, and that at the

time of such possession or use, he was neither a licensed ﬁrearm or ammunition dealer, nor an

ofﬁcer, agent or employee of the Virgin Islands or the United States, then on duty and acting within

Count 7
           1 Winchester USA 380 Auto cartridge loaded with full metal jacketed round nose bullet and/or 3 Federal
            380 Auto cartridge loaded with Hydra Shock bullet and/or [0 PMC 38 cartridge loaded in full metal
          jacketed round nose bullet and/or 14 WEN 380 Auto cartridge loaded with fuIl metal jacket round nose
          bullet in violation of 14 V I C § 2256(a)

Count 8
          7 CCI 25 Auto cartridge loaded with full metal Jacketed round nose bullet and/or 36 25 Auto cartridge
          loaded with full metal jacketed round nose bullet and/or 31 REM 22 LR cartridges loaded with lead round
          nose bullet in violation of 14 V I C § 2256(a)

Count 9
          1 Winchester USA 7 62x39 cartridge loaded with full metal jacketed bullet and/or 4 VYMPEL (Russian)
          7 62x39 cartridges loaded in full metal jacketed bullet and/or 6 Tulammo (Russian) 7 62x39 cartridges
          loaded in full metal Jacketcd bullet in violation of [4 V I C § 2256(a)

Count 10
          2 Winchester USA 12 GA shot gun cartridges loaded with 00 buck pellets and/or 6 Winchester USA 12
          GA shot gun cartridges loaded with unknown pellets in violation of 14 V I C § 2256(a)
Heath v People
8 Ct Crim No 2020 0009
Opinion of the Court
Page 27 of 32
the scope of his duties; nor the holder of a valid ﬁrearms license for the same ﬁrearm gauge or

caliber ammunition of the ﬁrearm indicated on such license “Firearm ammunition means any

self contained cartridge or shotgun shell by whatever name known, which is designed to be used

or adaptable for use in a ﬁrearm    14 V I C § 2256(c)(2)

115]    Sufﬁcient evidence is present in the record to support Heath’s conviction of unauthorized

possession or sale of ammunition Here, we have already concluded that a reasonable jury could

ﬁnd beyond a reasonable doubt that Heath constructively possessed the ﬁrearms and ammunition

recovered from 176 Estate Hannah’s Rest residence In addition, Jones’ testimony and the related

records admitted into evidence during his testimony established that Heath did not have a license

to possess a ﬁrearm in the Virgin Islands on December 19, 2015, the date the ammunition was

discovered in the 176 Estate Hannah’s Rest residence Accordingly, the evidence established that

the exemption afforded under 14 V I C § 2256(a)(3) could not apply to Heath Heath also failed

to satisfy his burden to prove that, at the time the ammunition was recovered, he was either a

licensed ﬁrearms or ammunition dealer within the intendment of 14 V I C § 2256(a)(1) or an

ofﬁcer, agent or employee of the Virgin Islands or the United States, then on duty and acting within

the scope of his duties within the intendment of 14 V I C § 2256(a)(2) Indeed Heath offered no

argument or evidence regarding any conceivable exemption from the statute          See 14 V I C §

2256(0 (unambiguously providing that ‘ {t]he defendant shall have the burden of proving          an

exemption” provided by 14 V I C § 2256, and that “[a]n information based upon a violation of

this section need not negate any exemption       contained” in the statute); Roberts v People, 76

V1 555 573 (VI 2022) (observing that to the extent that 14 VIC § 2256(a)(l) (a)(2) and

(a)(3) provide exemptions from the punishments available under [14 V I C {5 2256], it is the

defendant who must establish a prima facie case of entitlement to th[os]e exemptions ’)
Heath v Peoplz
S Ct Crim No 2020 0009
Opinion of the Court
Page 28 of 3’

Accordingly, there was sufﬁcient evidence for a reasonable jury to ﬁnd Heath guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of possession or sale of ammunition without authorization in violation

of 14 V I C § 2256(a) in counts six, seven, eight, nine, and ten of the amended information        See

also Vzera 71 V I at 686 87 (observing that 14 V I C § 2256 was amended in 2010 to state the

conditions under which possession of ammunition is and is not authorized in the Virgin Islands)

                    11'   Fallure to Report Firearms Obtained Outside or Brought Into the Virgin
                                                         Islands

$52      Heath argues that there is insufﬁcient evidence to support his conviction of failure to report

ﬁrearms obtained outside or brought into the Virgin Islands in violation of Title 23 section 470(a)

of the Virgin Islands Code The People counter that the People met its burden beyond a reasonable

doubt, by providing evidence that the ﬁrearms were transported to the Virgin Islands (Appellee 8

Br 40)

1|53    Title 23 section 470(a) of the Virgin Islands Code states that

                Any person upon entering the Virgin Islands and bringing any
                ﬁrearm or ammunition shall declare all ﬁrearms and ammunition
                to the Commissioner or the Commissioner's designee immediately
                upon arrival to any port of entry and shall furnish a complete
                description of all ﬁrearms and ammunition brought into the Virgin
                Islands The person shall also fumish the person's own name,
                address, date of birth and occupation

1154   To sustain a conviction under 23 V I C § 470(a), “there must be evidence that a person

failed to immediately report the purchasing or obtaining of a ﬁrearm or ammunition ’ Velazquez

v People 65 V l 312 320 (V I 2016) (quoting Sonson v People 59 V I 50 597 (V I 2012))

The Superior Court instructed the jury that in order to ﬁnd Heath guilty of failure to report ﬁrearms

purchased outside or brought into the Virgin Islands in violation of 23 V I C § 470(a), the People

were required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Heath is not a licensed dealer of ﬁrearms,
Heath v People
S Ct Crim No 2020 0009
Opinion of the Court
Page 29 of 32

that he purchased or obtained ﬁrearms and or ammunition from within or outside the U S Virgin

Islands, and that he failed to immediately report such receipt in writing or in person to the Police

Commissioner of the Virgin Islands, and that Heath s failure occurred on or about December 19,

2015, the day when the ﬁrearms and ammunition were recovered from the 176 Estate Hannah’s

Rest residence Accordingly, the jury was tasked to determine whether Heath had those recovered

ﬁrearms in his possession and failed to immediately report such possession to the Police

Commissioner See 23 V I C § 470(a)

1l55    We have already concluded that the evidence was sufﬁcient to prove that Heath possessed

the ﬁrearms and ammunition in question During the trial, the People established the models and

manufacturers of the ﬁrearms that were recovered from the 176 Estate Hannah’s Rest residence

and provided evidence that these ﬁrearms were not made in the Virgin Islands We therefore turn

our review to the complete record to determine whether Heath furnished the Police Commissioner

with his name, address, date of birth, and occupation with a complete description of all of the

ﬁrearms and ammunition in his possession on or before December 19, 2015            A thorough and

exhaustive review reveals the lack of any such evidence Viewing this evidence in the light most

favorable to the People, a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that     because

these ﬁrearms are not manufactured in the Virgin Islands       Heath either obtained the ﬁrearms

outside of, or brought them into, the Virgin Islands, and then simply did not report possession of

those ﬁrearms and ammunition to the Police Commissioner or a designee thereof Accordingly,

there was sufﬁcient evidence to ﬁnd Heath guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of failure to report

ﬁrearms obtained outside or brought into the Virgin Islands in violation of 23 V I C § 470(a), and

therefore, this argument by the defendant fails on appeal
Heath v People
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Opinion of the Court
Page 30 of 32

                   B   Heath’s Argument that his Case Should be Dismissed on Speedy Trial
                                              Grounds is Waived

1156    The extent of Heath’s argument on appeal that his case should have been dismissed on

speedy trial grounds consists of one sentence ‘ The case should have been dismissed on violation

of speedy trial grounds   (Appellant 3 Br 34 ) The People counter that Heath has failed to provide

any analysis of the speedy trial issue he raised, and therefore the issue has been waived, pursuant

to Rules 4(h) and 22(m) of this Court (Appellee 3 Br 41 42 )

1|57    We agree with the People     The rules of this Court require that an argument be “fairly

presented to the Superior Court [in order to] be presented for review on appeal ”5 Clearly, Heath

presented this issue to the Superior Court in his March 5, 20l9 motion to dismiss, in which he

devoted almost all of its six pages to his argument that the case against Heath must be dismissed

for failure to timely prosecute, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial That

motion featured citations to numerous cases, including Barker v ngo, 407 U S 514 (1972) and

other authorities that purportedly support his argument Appellant acknowledges in his brief that

the Superior Court denied his motion, after consideration of his argument (Appellant’s Br 10 )

Therefore, appellant’s argument that the case against him should have been dismissed on Sixth

Amendment grounds was fairly presented to the Superior Court within the intendment of Rule

4(h) of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure and thus adequately preserved for appeal

1158    However, the Virgin Islands Rules ofAppellate Procedure, and our precedent, require more

than just adequate preservation of an argument for it to be considered on appeal     Indeed, Rule

22(m) of these rules requires that a sufﬁciently preserved argument also be adequately presented

to this Court on appeal, in order for it to be considered   A preserved argument is adequately

5VIR APP P 4(h)
Heath v People
8 Ct Crim No 2020 0009
Opinion of the Court
Page 31 of 32

presented when it is set out in an appellate brief and “contain[s] the contentions ’ of the party ﬁling

the brief “with respect to each of the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to

the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on to support it      V l R APP P 22(a)(5)

(requirement for appellant s argument in the opening brief), V I R APP P 22(b) (brief of appellee

 shall conform to the requirements of paragraph[s] (a)(l) (6) of Rule 22)’ V I R APP P 22(i)

(specifying how citations to legal authorities are to be made in appellate bn'efs)

1159    It is in the presentation aspect, rather than the preservation aspect, that the appellant’s brief

is insufﬁcient    An argument consisting of a single sentence, lacking citation to any supporting

authority whatsoever, and providing no references to facts in the record on appeal that are relied

upon for support, clearly does not comply with the obligation imposed by Rule 22(a)(5) Nor does

it provide the information contemplated by Rule 22(i) Indeed this Court has repeatedly held that

such undeveloped arguments need not be considered on appeal See 6 g Presser v Public Servs

Comm n of the U S V I       56 VI 391 400 n 8 (VI 2012) (regarding a claim of a purported

procedural due process violation in an appellate brief that is limited to a single sentence and that

lacks any supporting citations, observing that [g]enerally, appellate courts do not consider issues

that are identiﬁed but not supported”); Construction Technzccans v Zurich American Insurance

Co , 61 V I 153, 162 (V I 2014) (mere mentions of the ‘ right to a fair trial, right Ofconﬁ'ontation,

and right to due process ’ appearing in the conclusion of a brief were deemed to be “legal ideas

[that] were never developed into complete, supported arguments presented to the Court,” and that

failure to develop and adequately present those issues ‘ forecloses any discussion” of them on

appeal) Importantly, Rule 22(m) provides the Court with the express authority to deem “[i]ssues

that    are only adverted to in a perfunctory manner or unsupported by argument and citation to

legal authority     waived for purposes of appeal       To be sure, that provision also provides that
Heathi People
S Ct Crim No 2020 0009
Opinion of the Court
Page 32 of 32

“the Court, at its option, may notice an error not [adequately] presented that affects substantial

rights ” Id     But on the record presented, we decline to exercise the option to notice Heath 3

adequately preserved, but woeﬁJlly undeveloped and insufﬁciently presented argument concerning

Heath 8 Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, and instead deem it waived pursuant to Rule

22(m)   See Perczval v People 62 VI 477 490 (V1 2015) ( Since [appellant s] substantive

argument on th[e] issue amounts to a single sentence, unsupported by any citation to legal authority

supporting th[e] argument, the issue is waived ”) (citing former VI S CT R 22 (m), the

predecessor of current V I R APP P 22(m)) This is clearly a textbook example of what the rules

of this Court, and its precedent, actively discourage

                                       III CONCLUSION

$60     For all the foregoing reasons, we afﬁn‘n the Superior Court’s January 24, 2020

memorandum opinion and order

DATED this 27th day of March, 2024

                                                 /      IVE ARLlNggEON SWAN
                                                        Associate Justice
ATTEST

VERONICA J HANDY ESQ
Clerk of the Court

By
          epu     Clerk

Dated MOW] HM