Court Opinion

ID: 9529758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:53:57.80576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:54.703424
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
There is no question but that the trial court was initially cloaked with jurisdiction. As Judge McClintick worded it: “The broad question presented ... is whether the amendment relates back to and governs this case.” He ruled that it did, “and as a consequence the Court has lost jurisdiction, this case must be dismissed, and the issue must be settled by the election procedure.”
It is clear from Judge McClintick’s memorandum decision that the 1979 amendment was special legislation aimed at the then pending declaratory judgment action, and as such possibly within the prohibition of article 1, section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, possibly within the prohibition of article. 3, section 19, governing limitation of civil actions (once commenced), but for certain within the provisions of article 11, section 12 of the Idaho Constitution1 and I.C. § 73-101.2
Garden City relies on Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho 264, 220 P. 1088 (1923).3 That case was the backbone of the Court’s unanimous opinion in the rather recent case of Unity Light & Power Co. v. City of Burley, 92 Idaho 499, 445 P.2d 720 (1968), wherein the Court said:
“This action was instituted on August 28, 1961, when Unity filed its complaint; Burley filed its answer and counterclaim on February 16, 1962, and therein it sought by its third cause of action to exercise the right of eminent domain by condemnation of Unity’s property. Even though this case came on for trial in December 1963, subsequent to the declared effective date of S.L.1963, ch. 269 (June 1, 1963), Burley’s right to exercise the power of eminent domain properly should have been adjudicated in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the filing of its answer and cross-claim. The reason for this conclusion is that *517unless a contrary intention clearly appears therein, a statute will not be given retrospective effect. Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho 264, 265, 200 [220] P. 1088, 35 A.L.R. 200 (1923). I.C. § 73-101. The legislature, in setting the effective date of the new statute, demonstrated an intent that it not be given a retrospective intent. 50 Am.Jur. Statutes § 478, p. 494. I.C. § 61-333B is more than a mere remedial or procedural statute; it purportedly involves a change of substantive rights in the exercise of the right of eminent domain.”
92 Idaho at 503-04, 445 P.2d at 724-25. (Emphasis added.)
Neither Cook nor Unity Light were mentioned in the trial court’s decision. It is difficult to distinguish this case from Unity Light. Clearly, Garden City, prior to the 1979 amendment, had a substantive right to have the dispute settled by a district court, rather than by a county-conducted4 popular vote. There is an important difference, as is readily observed by matching the adverse contentions in the case of Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d’Alene, Sup.Ct. No. 14238, now pending in this Court. Similarly, there is a vast difference in the entitlement to court and a jury resolution of a controversy, as against resolution by arbitration. For a good example in that area, see Loomis v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106, 656 P.2d 1359 (1982).

. Article 11, section 12 of the Idaho Constitution reads as follows:
“The legislature shall pass no law for the benefít of a railroad, or other corporation, or any individual, or association of individuals retroactive in its operation, or which imposes on the people of any county or municipal subdivision of the state, a new liability in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” (Emphasis added.)
“Other corporation” certainly includes the City of Boise, a municipal corporation.

. I.C. § 73-101 provides:
“No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”
Nothing in chapter 87, 1979 Idaho Sess.Laws, declared the enactment retroactive. Where the legislature was enacting a new remedy because of the Garden City-Boise litigation in district court, it would be absurd to suggest that the legislature intended chapter 87 to apply to that litigation, but forgot to say so. It is more realistic to believe that the legislature knew or was properly advised that it could not pass legislation nullifying a pending lawsuit which was predicated on existing statutory law.

.In the criminal context, State v. Augustine, 197 Kan. 207, 416 P.2d 281 (Kan. 1966), appears to sustain Garden City. Therein the Kansas Supreme Court unanimously held in the converse situation:
“2. A legislative enactment which enlarges the jurisdictional age limits of the juvenile court to include sixteen- and seventeen-year-old male persons constitutes a change in the substantive law, and will not be construed as having retroactive application to cases pending on the effective date of the act in the absence of language disclosing a contrary legislative intent.”
416 P.2d at 282 (Syllabus by the Court).

. I.C. § 67-6526(c) as amended provides in pertinent part:
“If any city objects to the recommendation of the board of county commissioners, the county shall within sixty (60) days from the date of the recommendation conduct a special election and establish polling places for the purpose of submitting to the qualified electors residing in the overlying impact area, the question of which area of city impact the electors wish to reside.”
However, not all nearly adjacent cities in Idaho are in the same county. I.C. § 67-6526(a)(3) even provides that “[a]reas of city impact, together with plan and ordinance requirements, may cross county boundaries by agreement of the city and county concerned if the city is within three (3) miles of the adjoining county.” But, I.C. § 67-6526 makes no provision for resolution of disputes regarding overlapping impact areas lying in more than one county. This presents yet another problem.