Court Opinion

ID: 9946959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 20:02:55.591295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:44.054443
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/1/24 In re Sebastian H. CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In re SEBASTIAN H. et al.,                                   B325717
 Persons Coming Under the                                     (Los Angeles County
 Juvenile Court Law.                                          Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP03677)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 IRENE M. et al.,

            Defendants and
            Appellants.

     APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Charles Q. Clay III, Judge. Appeals dismissed.
      Lauren K. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Irene M.
      Suzanne M. Nicholson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Daniel H.
      Dawyn Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant
County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                 _______________________________
                                                                  1
       In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.),
Irene M. (Mother) and Daniel H. (Father) appeal from the
juvenile court’s disposition order, challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting one of several jurisdictional findings
against them. While their appeals were pending, the juvenile
court terminated dependency jurisdiction and granted sole
physical custody of their two children to Mother, with shared
legal custody for both parents. The Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) moved to
dismiss the appeals as moot. For the reasons explained below,
we agree the appeals are moot, and we decline to exercise our
discretion to consider the appeals on the merits.
                          BACKGROUND
I.     Jurisdiction and Disposition
       In March 2022, DCFS received a referral alleging domestic
violence between Mother and Father. DCFS found the
allegations against Mother and Father to be substantiated on the
bases of emotional abuse and general neglect of their two
children, Sebastian (then six years old) and Santiago (then three

      1
        Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 2
years old). DCFS filed a “non-detain” dependency petition,
meaning the children remained in Mother and Father’s physical
custody.
       On November 29, 2022, the juvenile court assumed
dependency jurisdiction over Sebastian and Santiago. The court
sustained the following allegations under section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b):
       “[Mother] and [Father] have a history of engaging in violent
altercations in the children’s presence. On or about 03-20-22, the
mother repeatedly struck the father’s chest. Further, the mother
prevented the father from entering the home by holding the door
resulting in the father forcibly pushing the door open and
forc[ibly] entering the home. The father struck the back of the
mother’s head with the father’s hand. On or about 03-20-22, the
father was arrested for Spousal Battery. On prior occasions, the
father engaged in violent altercations against the mother
resulting in law enforcement intervention. Remedial services
have failed to remedy the family problem in that the mother and
father continue to engage in altercations. Such violent conduct
on the part of the father and the mother endanger the children’s
physical health and safety and place the children at risk of
serious physical harm, damage, and danger.” (Count a-1.) The
nearly identical count b-1 finding included the following
additional language: “The mother failed to protect the children in
that the mother allowed the father to reside in the children’s
home and to have unlimited access to the children.” It also stated
the children were at risk because of Mother’s failure to protect
them from the violent conduct.
       The juvenile court also sustained the following amended
allegations against Father and Mother:

                                3
       “[Father] has a history of substance abuse and is a current
abuser of alcohol which renders the children’s father incapable of
providing regular care for the children. On 3-20-22 and on other
occasions, the father was under the influence of alcohol while the
children were in the father’s care and supervision. On 06-09-22,
the father had a positive toxicology screen for alcohol. The
children are of such young age requiring constant care and
supervision and the father’s substance abuse interferes with
providing regular care and supervision of the children. [Mother]
failed to protect the children when the mother knew of the
father’s substance abuse and allowed the father to reside in the
children’s home and have unlimited access to the children.
Remedial services have failed to remedy the family problem in
that the father continues to abuse alcohol. The father’s
substance abuse and the mother’s failure to protect the children
endangers the children’s physical health and safety and creates a
detrimental home environment, placing the children at risk of
serious physical harm, damage and failure to protect.” (Count
b-2.)
       At the disposition hearing held the same day, the juvenile
court declared Sebastian and Santiago dependents of the court,
and allowed them to remain in Mother and Father’s custody. The
court ordered Mother and Father to complete case plans. The
court also set a section 364 review hearing for May 30, 2023.
II.    The Appeals
       Mother and Father each timely appealed from the juvenile
court’s November 29, 2022 disposition order. In their opening
appellate briefs, they both challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the jurisdictional finding under section 300,
subdivision (a), regarding their history of domestic violence

                                4
(count a-1), but they did not challenge the nearly identical finding
under subdivision (b) (count b-1), or the finding regarding
Father’s substance abuse and Mother’s failure to protect the
children from same (count b-2). Mother also contended in her
opening brief that DCFS and the juvenile court failed to comply
with the duties of inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25
U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; (ICWA)) and California law implementing
ICWA. In his opening brief, Father challenged certain
components of his case plan.
III. DCFS’s Motion to Dismiss the Appeals
       DCFS filed a motion to dismiss the appeals, arguing (1)
Mother and Father challenge only one of three jurisdictional
findings, so their challenge is not justiciable; (2) the juvenile
court ordered a new case plan for Father while the appeals were
pending, and Father did not appeal from that order, so his
challenge to the superseded case plan is moot; and (3) the
juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction over Sebastian
and Santiago while the appeals were pending, so Mother’s ICWA
challenge is moot.
       In support of the motion to dismiss the appeals, DCFS filed
a request that we take judicial notice of (1) Father’s subsequent
case plan dated May 22, 2023, and the juvenile court minute
order from the same date; (2) the juvenile court’s November 27,
2023 minute order terminating dependency jurisdiction,
awarding sole physical custody of the children to Mother and
joint legal custody to both parents, granting Father monitored
visitation, and staying the termination of jurisdiction pending
receipt of the final custody order; (3) the juvenile court’s
December 4, 2023 minute order stating that the final custody
order was signed, the stay was lifted, and jurisdiction was

                                 5
terminated on that date; and (4) the December 4, 2023 final
custody order (which is consistent with the juvenile court’s
November 27, 2023 minute order referenced above). We grant
DCFS’s unopposed request for judicial notice.
      Neither Mother nor Father has challenged the termination
of dependency jurisdiction or the final custody order.
      Father filed an opposition to DCFS’s motion to dismiss the
appeals. Therein, he “concede[d] his challenge to the original
case plan was rendered moot by a subsequent case plan from
which he did not appeal.” He requested that we exercise our
discretion to review his challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision
(a) because (1) the jurisdictional finding has “the potential to
impact” future dependency or family law proceedings; (2) the
finding is “likely to be reported to” the Child Abuse Central Index
(CACI) under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen.
Code, § 11164 et seq.; (CANRA)); and (3) “given the speed with
which dependency matters proceed, the exercise of discretion may
be desirable to avoid ‘insulating erroneous or arbitrary rulings
from review.’ ” Father did not suggest how the challenged finding
could impact future dependency or family law proceedings
(especially in light of the two other unchallenged findings).
      Mother did not file an opposition to the motion to dismiss,
but she addressed the mootness issue in her reply brief. She did
not dispute DCFS’s contention that the termination of
dependency jurisdiction rendered her ICWA challenge moot. She
argued that her challenge to the jurisdictional finding under
section 300, subdivision (a) is not moot or, in the alternative, this
court should exercise its discretion to reach the merits of her
challenge because such a finding could result in her being listed

                                 6
in CACI. She also noted that she is a social worker and asserted
that the sustained count under section 300, subdivision (a) could
have consequences such as “loss of employment and all future
employment as a social worker.” She did not explain how the
subdivision (a) finding might affect her employment (in a way the
subdivision (b) findings would not) other than the potential
listing in CACI. Finally, she maintained that the “adverse
finding may have far-reaching implications regarding future
dependency proceedings and [her] parental rights,” but she did
not specify why or how this might be so.
                            DISCUSSION
        A case is moot when it is “ ‘ “impossible for [a] court, if it
should decide the case in favor of [the appellant], to grant him [or
her] any effect[ive] relief.” ’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’
. . . the [appellant] must complain of an ongoing harm [that is] . . .
redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the
[appellant] seeks.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).)
To establish the appeal is not moot, the appellant must
“demonstrate[] a specific legal or practical consequence that
would be avoided upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings.”
(Id. at p. 273.) Absent such a specific legal or practical
consequence, we may still exercise our discretion to hear the
merits of a moot appeal in a dependency case. (Id. at pp. 282-283,
286 [setting forth a non-exhaustive list of factors for assessing
“whether a court should exercise discretionary review of a moot
appeal,” and noting that “no single factor is necessarily
dispositive”].)
        Neither Mother nor Father challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
under section 300, subdivision (b), regarding their history of

                                   7
domestic violence (count b-1) or Father’s substance abuse and
Mother’s failure to protect the children from same (count b-2).
They only challenge the domestic violence finding under section
300, subdivision (a), which is based on the same factual events
set forth in unchallenged count b-1. Thus, they do not challenge
the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the children.
       Mother and Father ask us to hear the merits of their
challenge to count a-1 based on a hypothetical inclusion in CACI.
They posit that because count a-1 required a finding that “there
is a substantial risk that the child will suffer[] serious physical
harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s
parent” (§ 300, subd. (a)), this means their names will be listed in
CACI. (Italics added.) Based on the record before us and
applicable law, any claim that DCFS might report Mother or
Father to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for inclusion in CACI
is based on unfounded speculation.
       CANRA requires DCFS to “forward to [DOJ] a report in
writing of every case it investigates of known or suspected child
abuse or severe neglect that is determined [by the agency] to be
substantiated.” (Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (a), italics added.)
CANRA further requires that “[a]t the time an agency . . .
forwards a report in writing to [DOJ],” the agency must “also
notify in writing the known or suspected child abuser that he or
she has been reported” to DOJ for inclusion in CACI. (Pen. Code,
§ 11169, subd. (c).) If DCFS makes such a report to DOJ, a
juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding based on the same conduct
set forth in the report precludes the parent from challenging his
or her inclusion in CACI at a hearing contemplated under Penal
Code section 11169. (Pen. Code, § 11169, subds. (d)-(e).)

                                 8
       In March 2022, DCFS found to be substantiated allegations
of emotional abuse and general neglect of the children based on
the history of domestic violence between Mother and Father.
There was no allegation that either child was ever physically
injured during an incident of domestic violence between Mother
and Father, and DCFS did not detain the children from Mother
or Father based on these substantiated allegations. Nearly two
years have passed, and neither Mother nor Father asserts DCFS
has notified them that they have been reported to DOJ for
inclusion in CACI. Nor has Mother or Father advanced any
reason indicating that these substantiated allegations are
reportable or eligible for inclusion in CACI, given they do not
involve physical abuse or severe neglect of the children.
       In D.P., our Supreme Court concluded a speculative claim
about possible inclusion in CACI does not constitute a specific
legal or practical consequence sufficient to avoid mootness. The
court explained: “In sum, Father has not shown that he was
included in the CACI or that he will be reported in the future
based on the allegations at issue here. And even if the
Department attempted to report him, Father has not shown that
the allegations against him are reportable. In light of these
layers of uncertainty, we will find Father’s CACI claim too
speculative to demonstrate a specific legal consequence that a
favorable judgment could redress.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp.
281-282.) Here, Mother and Father’s speculative claim about
possible inclusion in CACI is similarly insufficient to avoid
mootness or cause us to exercise our discretion to review the
merits of these moot appeals.
       Mother and Father have advanced no other specific legal or
practical consequence arising from the challenged jurisdictional

                                9
finding. Nor have they advanced any other argument that
persuades us to deny DCFS’s motion to dismiss and exercise our
discretion to consider the merits of these moot appeals. Mother’s
claim of potential employment consequences appears to hinge on
a report to CACI, a report we have no reason to believe will be
made, as already discussed. Mother suggests no other reason
that count a-1 could affect her employment. Neither Mother nor
Father explains how count a-1 might impact future dependency
or family law proceedings or their parental rights in a manner
that unchallenged counts b-1 and b-2 would not.
       None of the other factors enumerated in D.P. weighs in
favor of our consideration of the merits of these moot appeals.
For example, count a-1 is not “based on particularly pernicious or
stigmatizing conduct,” especially given unchallenged count b-1 is
based on the same factual events. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
pp. 285-286.)
       Father’s concern that dismissing the appeals might
insulate an erroneous or arbitrary ruling from review is a concern
that could be asserted in every moot appeal. It is because of this
concern that we review the various factors in deciding whether
we should exercise our discretion to hear the merits of a moot
appeal. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 285.) In conducting
this review, we are “guided by the overarching goals of the
dependency system,” including child safety and family
reunification. (Id. at p. 286.) Here, after reviewing the relevant
factors in light of the goals of the dependency system, we decline
to exercise our discretion to consider the merits of these moot
appeals, and we dismiss them.

                               10
                       DISPOSITION
     The appeals are dismissed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                     CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             BENDIX, J.

                             11