Court Opinion

ID: 9617837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:02:03.361154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:20.244209
License: Public Domain

Smith, Justice,
dissenting.
This is another case in which the Department of Transportation (DOT) has with impunity trampled upon the property rights of an individual. If a private home instead of a “dance club” had been involved in this case, such high-handedness would not have been approved by the majority of this court.
“[T]he definition of property interest under the damage clause in inverse condemnation cases ... is broader than under direct condemnation where all or part of the fee is taken.” MARTA v. Trussell, 247 Ga. 148, 150 n. 5 (273 SE2d 859) (1981). The majority, thus, ignores a fundamental distinction when it relies on a direct condemnation case, Housing Auth. of Decatur v. Schroeder, 222 Ga. 417 (151 SE2d 226) (1966), to support the proposition that losses occurring before actual condemnation “are not compensable.” Here, no direct condemnation has occurred, but damage to the appellant’s property interest, a leasehold interest, has undoubtedly occurred as a result of the actions of the DOT and the local governments involved. The only question before this court, thus, should be whether that damage and the gov-, ernment’s conduct fit the mold of an inverse condemnation action.
“The ‘damage’ clause gives the injured citizen a constitutional cause of action against a public authority for injury to his property interests regardless of whether there is also a ‘taking.’ ” Trussell, supra at 150. “In [such an action], to warrant a recovery it must appear there has been some direct physical disturbance of a right, either public or private, which the plaintiff enjoys in connection with his property . . . .” Pause v. City of Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92, 99 (26 SE 489) (1895). This “disturbance” may result from noise, odors, or smoke. See Trussell, supra at 151. The damage may likewise result from interference with access to the property caused by physical barriers that may actually lie outside of the property. Dougherty County v. Hornsby, 213 Ga. 114 (97 SE2d 300) (1957). In this case, Josh Cabaret, Inc. has produced evidence that actions taken by the DOT damaged its leasehold interest in its place of business. More specifically, the question properly before us is whether the non-physical nature of the DOT’s interference with the property interest renders the alleged *751damages inactionable as a matter of law.
Decided March 5, 1987.
Fine & Block, Paul R. Jordan, for appellant.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Beverly B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
The June 1982 letter from the DOT to Josh Cabaret, Inc. specifically stated:
“This is to advise you that due to the projected construction of the above highway project, you will be required to remove your personal property from [your place of business]. You will not be required to move from and surrender possession of the property prior to September 30, 1982, which is three months from the date of this letter. When title to the above property is secured, you will be notified, in writing, of the exact date you will have to remove your personal property.”
This letter and other conduct intimating an impending condemnation are tantamount to physical coercion and interference with Josh Cabaret, Inc.’s property interest sufficient to support Josh Cabaret, Inc.’s contention that there was an inverse condemnation of Josh Cabaret, Inc.’s leasehold interest in its place of business. The trial court should thus have denied the DOT’s motion for summary judgment.