Court Opinion

ID: 9955435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 17:01:12.08551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:42.291671
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH WILLIAM HART,                       No. 20-99011

               Petitioner-Appellant,      D.C. No. 2:05-cv-
                                            03633-DSF
 v.

RONALD BROOMFIELD, Acting                    OPINION
Warden, California State Prison at San
Quentin,

               Respondent-Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Central District of California
         Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

          Argued and Submitted January 22, 2024
                   Pasadena, California

                   Filed March 28, 2024

Before: Michelle T. Friedland, Lucy H. Koh, and Holly A.
                Thomas, Circuit Judges.

              Opinion by Judge H.A. Thomas
2                      HART V. BROOMFIELD

                          SUMMARY *

               Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty

    The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Joseph
William Hart’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition in a
case in which Hart was sentenced to death after a jury
convicted him of the murder of Diana H. (known as Diane)
and of the rape, sodomy, and forced oral copulation of Amy
R.
    Because the Supreme Court of California (CSC) did not
offer reasoning when denying Hart’s state habeas petition on
the merits, Hart is required under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act to show there was no reasonable
basis for the state court to deny relief.
    Hart claimed that the prosecution suppressed, in
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), material
impeachment evidence that could have been used to
challenge the qualifications of Dr. Dewitt Hunter, a
pathologist whom Riverside County contracted to perform
an autopsy on Diane. The panel held that the district court
appropriately rejected this claim because the CSC could
have reasonably concluded that this evidence was not
material.
     Hart claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge Dr. Hunter’s qualifications and
testimony. Affirming the district court’s rejection of this
claim, the panel wrote that Hart provided no reason to

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                     HART V. BROOMFIELD                      3

conclude that a challenge to Dr. Hunter’s qualifications
would have resulted in the exclusion of his expert testimony
or significant impeachment of his credibility; that a
detective’s report, even if it contradicted Dr. Hunter’s
testimony, did not harm Dr. Hunter’s testimony; that trial
counsel’s decision not to investigate and impeach Dr. Hunter
with Dr. Hunter’s errors in previous trials did not prejudice
Hart; and that Hart pointed to no evidence that trial counsel’s
presentation of his own expert would have contradicted Dr.
Hunter’s findings.
    The panel addressed uncertified claims in a concurrently
filed memorandum disposition.

                         COUNSEL

Susel Carillo-Orellana (argued) and Lauren Collins, Deputy
Federal Public Defenders; Cuauhtemoc Ortega, Federal
Public Defender; Federal Public Defender’s Office, Los
Angeles, California; for Petitioner-Appellant.
Stephanie H. Chow (argued) and Lise S. Jacobson, Deputy
Attorneys General; James W. Bilderback II, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General; Rob Bonta, Attorney General of
California; Office of the Attorney General, San Diego,
California; for Respondent-Appellee.
4                     HART V. BROOMFIELD

                          OPINION

H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

    In 1988, Joseph William Hart was tried and convicted of
the murder of Diana H. (known as Diane), and of the rape,
sodomy, and forced oral copulation of Amy R. Both Amy
and Diane were 15-year-old high school students and friends
whom Hart had lured to a rural area of Riverside County,
California, before committing the crimes. At the sentencing
phase of Hart’s trial, the prosecution introduced uncontested
evidence that Hart had committed several other sexual and
physical assaults, as well as contested evidence that Hart
murdered his 11-year-old niece, Shelah M., days before he
was arrested. Hart was sentenced to death.
     Hart now appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. First, Hart appeals the
district court’s rejection of his claim that the State
suppressed evidence that could have impeached one of the
prosecution’s expert witnesses, Dr. Dewitt Hunter, in
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Second,
Hart appeals the district court’s rejection of his claim that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge Dr.
Hunter’s qualifications and testimony. The district court
granted Hart a certificate of appealability with respect to
both of these claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291 and 2253. We affirm the district court’s denial of
Hart’s petition. 1

1
  In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, we address six
uncertified claims raised by Hart in this appeal.
                     HART V. BROOMFIELD                     5

                              I.
    On May 8, 1986, five days after the death of his niece,
Shelah, Joseph William Hart was arrested on suspicion of
the murder of Diane and the rape, sodomy, and forced oral
copulation of Amy. Hart was charged with the crimes on
August 27, 1986, and his trial began on January 11, 1988.
                             A.
                              1.
     Amy testified on behalf of the State, recounting the
circumstances of the sexual assault and murder. Amy and
Diane, then both 15 years old, were friends and classmates
at La Sierra High School in Riverside, California. On March
24, 1986, Hart encountered the teens at a 7-Eleven
convenience store, offering to pay one of them $1,000 to act
as a lookout while he harvested marijuana from someone
else’s field. Although Hart wanted only one person to
accompany him, at Diane’s insistence, both she and Amy
accompanied Hart. They got into Hart’s car, and Hart drove
off.
    After driving for around 30 to 40 miles, Hart made a brief
stop at a hardware store. Although he told Diane and Amy
that he intended to purchase a hatchet, Hart ended up
deciding not to buy one, claiming that the hatchet was too
expensive and that he could use a screwdriver to cut the
marijuana. Diane gave Hart her knife to use instead, but after
Amy objected, Hart gave the knife back to Diane.
    With Diane and Amy still in the car, Hart continued
driving, eventually arriving at a dirt road. Hart told Amy to
serve as a lookout while he and Diane went to gather
marijuana. Hart and Diane went up a hill for a few minutes,
came back, and then walked up another path out of Amy’s
6                     HART V. BROOMFIELD

sight. Amy waited for around 15 to 20 minutes. She
occasionally called out to Diane but heard no response.
    Hart eventually returned without Diane. He told Amy
that Diane was putting her feet in a spring, and that he needed
help bringing back some bags. Amy followed Hart back up
the path. While they were walking, Hart picked up a rock,
claiming to have seen a snake. Amy asked Hart to give her
the rock. Hart gave it to her but said that he would have to
pick up another one, so Amy gave him the rock back.
    It was around that time that Amy saw her friend Diane.
Diane was lying face down on the ground, without any
clothing on the bottom half of her body. Amy began to run
away but Hart chased her and hit her on the back of the head
with the rock, causing her to fall. He then started punching
her, and they fell into a nearby gully. Amy asked Hart to let
her talk to Diane, but Hart stated that Diane was
unconscious. Amy asked Hart if he planned to kill her. Hart
said he did not but warned Amy not to give him a reason to
do it. As Amy continued to ask to speak to Diane, Hart told
her to shut up, saying, “You’re kind of funny, kid, I’m about
to rape you and all you can do is think about your friend.”
    Hart then pulled up Amy’s skirt and ripped off her
panties from behind. Hart also ripped Amy’s blouse open
and ripped one of her bra straps. Hart told Amy not to look
at him as he slapped his penis back and forth, stating, “It’s
hard for me to get it up after I just got it on with your friend.”
Hart then attempted to sodomize Amy. When that attempt
failed, he instead placed his penis into her mouth. Hart
eventually became erect and sodomized Amy. At one point
he stated, “I’ve done this in people’s houses and I’ve never
killed anyone yet.” Hart then grabbed Amy and took her
further up the path. He picked up a jar of Vaseline and put
                     HART V. BROOMFIELD                     7

his penis into Amy’s mouth again. Hart then applied the
Vaseline to his penis and raped Amy.
     After Hart raped her, Amy asked again if he was going
to kill her. Hart said that he would knock her unconscious by
hitting her on the back of the neck with a rock. Amy instead
suggested that Hart tie her up and put her in a hole. Hart
agreed and tied Amy up with her shirt and bra. Hart then
walked over to Diane’s body to look for Diane’s knife,
explaining that his fingerprints were on it. Hart lifted, then
dropped Diane’s arm. He returned to Amy, stating that he
could not find the knife. Hart told Amy, “[L]ook, your friend
was an asshole, she called me a few names, and I think she’s
dead.”
    Amy told Hart that he had no reason to kill her, and that
she would never tell anyone about what happened because
she would be too ashamed. Hart responded that he had to
make her unconscious so he could get away. Amy then made
up a story about how she used to be beaten by her father.
Hart’s demeanor toward her became more vulnerable and
apologetic. He “changed into . . . another person.”
   Eventually, Hart dropped Amy off near the 7-Eleven, but
warned her not to talk to the police or tell anyone where
Diane was. Amy assured Hart that she would not tell anyone
what had happened. Hart responded, “But that doesn’t matter
because by the time they pick me up, you know, I can get out
before the, you know, sentencing. . . . Anyway, I’ve got two
good friends that would do anything for me.” Amy
understood this as a threat.
    After Hart left, Amy called her sister and told her what
had occurred. The Riverside County Sheriff’s Department
then contacted Amy, and Amy helped Detectives Michael
Lackie and Richard Moker locate Diane’s body.
8                     HART V. BROOMFIELD

     Hart was arrested on May 8, 1986, a few days after a
detective spotted a car matching the description offered by
Amy parked outside of Hart’s mobile home. Evidence
recovered from the crime scene linked Hart to the crimes,
including a matching fingerprint obtained from a beer bottle
left at the scene, and tire tracks that matched the tread pattern
on Hart’s car. Amy identified Hart in a lineup, dropping to
the ground in fear when she saw him.
   When Detective Lackie searched the area where Hart had
sexually assaulted Amy and killed Diane, Lackie found no
marijuana growing.
                               2.
    The prosecution also called law enforcement witnesses
to testify regarding their investigation of the crime scene.
Criminalist James Hall testified that he collected loose hairs
from Diane’s body, including a pubic hair from Diane’s
thigh that was microscopically similar to Hart’s, but not
Diane’s, hair. Hall did not find any seminal fluid on Diane’s
panties but found Diane’s blood on her blouse. The
prosecution then called Dr. Claire McArthur, who treated
Amy after the sexual assault. Dr. McArthur testified that
Amy had bruising on her upper back, abrasions and dirt on
her knees, and injury to her perineum. Dr. McArthur also
noted sand-type particles in Amy’s vagina, strongly
indicating penetration. On cross-examination, Dr. McArthur
acknowledged that her report did not indicate evidence of
sodomy, and that Amy had told her she was not sodomized
when asked.
                               3.
    The prosecution next called Dr. Dewitt Hunter, a
pathologist whom Riverside County contracted to perform
                     HART V. BROOMFIELD                      9

an autopsy on Diane. Dr. Hunter testified that he found
“major trauma” to Diane’s “head and to the back,” “minor
trauma in various sites” over Diane’s body, and “physical
evidence consistent with possible sexual violation.” Diane’s
body showed seven “impact-type lacerations,” five of which
were to the back of her head. These lacerations resulted in
skull fractures, which Dr. Hunter explained would have
required a “large amount of force” to create, and were likely
created by a “rock or brick-like instrument.” Dr. Hunter
testified that three of the injuries could have independently
resulted in death. He testified that Diane was likely
unconscious from five minutes to an hour before dying, and
that during this time she had inhaled vegetable material.
    The prosecution asked Dr. Hunter if Diane had been
sexually assaulted. Dr. Hunter testified that he saw “no
physical evidence to indicate forceful entry.” Nevertheless,
he saw evidence of reddening around Diane’s vagina, which
he testified could have been caused by “forceful massage.”
Dr. Hunter noticed a “Vaseline-like substance” around
Diane’s vaginal introitus and inner thighs. He also observed
abrasions and contusions on Diane’s inner thighs, indicating
that her legs may have been forcefully spread apart. Dr.
Hunter testified that he believed Diane had been sexually
assaulted, deeming his assessment “90 percent accurate.”
                              4.
    In his closing statement, the prosecutor explained that
Hart could be found guilty of murder in the first degree if the
jury believed that he committed the murder during a rape or
attempted rape, or he committed the murder deliberately and
with premeditation. But the prosecutor acknowledged that if
the jury found that Hart lacked premeditation, and if he
committed the murder during a sodomy or attempted
10                   HART V. BROOMFIELD

sodomy, but not a rape, then Hart would be guilty only of
second-degree murder. The prosecutor argued that the jury
could infer malice aforethought from the fact that Hart
repeatedly struck Diane in the head with a rock, and
premeditation from the fact that Hart appeared to have
planned out the assault at least from the time he encountered
Amy and Diane at the 7-Eleven. He also urged the jury to
find that the murder was committed with a “special
circumstance” of attempted or completed rape or sodomy.
The prosecutor emphasized that Hart admitted to Amy that
he had sexually assaulted Diane just before assaulting Amy.
    In his closing argument, defense counsel conceded that
Hart killed Diane during a sodomy or attempted sodomy, and
that the killing was intentional. But counsel argued that the
murder was not premeditated, and that Hart did not rape or
attempt to rape Diane. Defense counsel emphasized that Dr.
Hunter considered Diane’s injuries to be “overkill.” Defense
counsel also noted that Hart stopped at multiple points along
the drive and that he had given Diane back a knife that she
had given him. The defense emphasized that the sexual
assault swabs of Diane’s body returned a negative result, that
no semen was found on Diane’s body or clothing, and that
Dr. Hunter was not absolutely certain in his assessment that
Diane had been sexually assaulted.
    In his rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that Hart began his
attempt to commit a rape as soon as he started talking to
Diane and Amy at the 7-Eleven. The prosecutor argued that
Hart specifically intended to commit rape, and not just
sodomy. He expressed skepticism that the difference in
criminal penalties between murder during the course of rape
and murder during the course of sodomy would have
influenced Hart’s behavior. He noted that Hart ripped off
Diane’s bra, that he raped Amy, that petrolatum (found in
                     HART V. BROOMFIELD                    11

Vaseline) and pubic hair were found on Diane’s body, and
that abrasions and contusions on Diane’s thighs indicated
that Hart tried to force Diane’s legs apart. Emphasizing
Hart’s statement that Diane was an “asshole, she called me
some names and I killed her,” the prosecutor urged the jury
to infer that Hart killed Diane while she was resisting sexual
assault. And the prosecutor argued that the murder was
deliberate because Hart must have realized, between his
multiple blows to Diane’s back and head, that he was killing
her.
    After one morning of deliberations, the jury returned a
verdict of guilty. The jury found Hart guilty of murdering
Diane in the first degree, with the rape and sodomy special
circumstances, meaning the murder was committed while
Hart was engaged in the commission or attempted
commission of both rape and sodomy. The jury also found
Hart guilty of rape, sodomy, and forced oral copulation of
Amy. The jury’s special circumstances findings made Hart
eligible for the death penalty.
                             B.
    At the penalty phase of Hart’s trial, the prosecution
introduced evidence regarding five crimes Hart had
committed against different women: two assaults in 1973, a
rape in 1975, forcible oral copulation in 1975, and an
attempted burglary in 1975. When Hart was arrested after
the fifth incident, he admitted that he was attempting to
commit sexual assault and that he had committed each of the
previous offenses. As a result of these crimes, Hart was
institutionalized at Patton State Hospital from 1975 until
1978.
   The prosecution also introduced evidence that Hart had
murdered his 11-year-old niece, Shelah, a few weeks after
12                   HART V. BROOMFIELD

he murdered Diane and sexually assaulted Amy, and a few
days before he was arrested for those crimes. That evidence
included testimony from Randall Gresham, Hart’s former
cellmate, who said that Hart had admitted that he had killed
Shelah.
    Hart’s defense counsel introduced evidence and
argument that Hart did not murder Shelah, including
arguments attacking Gresham’s credibility. Defense counsel
also introduced mitigating evidence, including testimony
about Hart’s childhood and positive qualities.
    After the parties gave their closing statements, the jury
began its sentencing deliberations. During those
deliberations, a juror requested a copy of Gresham’s
testimony, and the court provided a read-back of the
testimony. On March 31, 1988, after two days and one
morning of deliberations, the jury sentenced Hart to death.
                             C.
                              1.
    Hart’s conviction and sentence reached the Supreme
Court of California (CSC) on automatic appeal. People v.
Hart, 976 P.2d 683, 695 (Cal. 1999). The CSC rejected each
of Hart’s claims. Id. Hart also filed multiple petitions for
habeas corpus before the California courts: one in 1998, one
in 2005, and one in 2007. Each petition was denied on the
merits in a largely unreasoned order, and many of Hart’s
claims were also denied as successive or untimely.
                              2.
    Hart filed a federal habeas petition on May 16, 2005.
Hart received a stay of the case to complete state habeas
review. After exhausting his claims in California courts, Hart
                     HART V. BROOMFIELD                    13

filed an amended federal habeas petition. Hart then filed his
operative second amended federal habeas petition on March
10, 2008. On August 5, 2020, the district court rejected
Hart’s second amended petition, finding two claims unripe
for review and denying the remainder.
    Relevant here, the district court rejected Hart’s guilt-
phase Brady claims. Hart argued that the prosecution should
have turned over evidence of errors that Dr. Hunter had
made in autopsies at previous trials. The district court,
however, found that this evidence was not available to the
prosecution until it was compiled into memos and articles
after Hart’s trial. The district court further held that this
evidence was not material, concluding that the errors Dr.
Hunter made in previous cases were not relevant to his
autopsy of Diane and would not have called into question the
accuracy of his findings. The district court additionally
rejected Hart’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to Dr. Hunter’s testimony, concluding that this
objection would have been futile given the court’s other
findings about the testimony.
    The district court granted a certificate of appealability
with respect to Hart’s claims regarding Dr. Hunter’s
testimony. Hart then appealed the district court’s judgment
with respect to those claims as well as several additional
claims that the district court did not certify for appeal.
                             II.
    “We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas
corpus petition and review for clear error any factual
findings made by the district court.” Jurado v. Davis, 12
F.4th 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2021). “The decision by the
district court to decline to order an evidentiary hearing is
14                   HART V. BROOMFIELD

reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d
964, 968 (9th Cir. 2006).
                             III.
    Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 (AEDPA), we may grant habeas relief under 28
U.S.C § 2254 only if state court proceedings “resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is “contrary to clearly
established federal law ‘if the state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court
on a question of law or if the state court decides a case
differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts.’” Ochoa v. Davis, 50
F.4th 865, 876 (9th Cir. 2022) (alterations in original)
(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). “A state court’s decision is an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law
‘if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
[petitioner’s] case.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting
Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).
    “When, as here, the [CSC] did not offer reasoning when
denying [the petitioner’s] state habeas petition on the merits,
‘the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing
there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny
relief.’” Bolin v. Davis, 13 F.4th 797, 805 (9th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011)). “In
that circumstance, we ‘must determine what arguments or
theories . . . could have supported[] the state court’s
                         HART V. BROOMFIELD                           15

decision; and then [we] must ask whether it is possible
fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or
theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision
of [the Supreme] Court.’” Id. at 805–06 (omission and
alterations in original) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102). 2
                                  IV.
   Hart argues that the prosecution unconstitutionally
suppressed material evidence that could have been used to
challenge Dr. Hunter’s qualifications. Because the CSC
could have reasonably concluded that this evidence was not
material, the district court appropriately rejected Hart’s
Brady claim.
                                  A.
     Hart points to several memos drafted by Riverside
County deputy district attorneys in which they complained
about errors that Dr. Hunter had made in previous trials. Two
of the memos are undated, and one was dated after Hart’s
trial. One memo described a trial in which Dr. Hunter gave
inconsistent testimony regarding the victim’s time of death

2
  Hart argues that we must assume the truth of the factual allegations in
his petition because the CSC denied his claims on the pleadings. But we
have explained that even when the CSC rejects a petition for failure to
state a prima facie claim, a federal court must evaluate the “full merits
of [the petitioner’s] claims to assess whether the [CSC] could reasonably
have denied habeas relief.” Montiel v. Chappell, 43 F.4th 942, 957 n.13
(9th Cir. 2022) (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189–203
(2011)). Additionally, even when considering only whether a petitioner
has stated a prima facie case, California courts conduct their own review
of the trial record and do not credit wholly conclusory allegations or
those based on hearsay. See Bolin, 13 F.4th at 806 n.2; Waidla v. Davis,
68 F.4th 575, 589 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing People v. Madaris, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 869, 873 (Ct. App. 1981), overruled on other grounds by People v.
Barrick, 654 P.2d 1243, 1250 (Cal. 1982)).
16                   HART V. BROOMFIELD

and whether the victim’s skull had been fractured. During
another trial described in that memo, Dr. Hunter gave a
“100%” wrong answer regarding the victim’s time of death,
later backtracking with inconsistent and confusing
testimony. A second memo characterized Dr. Hunter as
careless, describing the trial in People v. Seaton (discussed
further below), in which Dr. Hunter confused lacerations and
incisions, and inaccurately stated that blood flowing from a
dead person will not clot. A third memo described a case in
which Dr. Hunter “reversed in his mind the locations of the
damage to the victim’s skull,” resulting in an incorrect
conclusion about the cause of death. After being shown
autopsy photographs, Dr. Hunter only reluctantly—and even
then, inconsistently—corrected himself.
    Hart also points to a letter drafted by a representative
from Damon Reference Laboratories on December 15,
1988—after Hart’s trial—urging Riverside County not to
award a contract to Dr. Hunter. The letter described a case in
which Dr. Hunter incorrectly determined a cause of death
was not homicide, when a second autopsy found that it was.
The pathologist who conducted that autopsy described Dr.
Hunter’s work as a “very sloppy job.” The letter also
discussed a homicide trial in which Dr. Hunter wrongly
insisted that there were photos taken with probes and was
highly reluctant to correct his testimony.
    Hart further points to January 1989 news articles printed
in the Riverside Press Enterprise regarding Dr. Hunter’s
work for the County. These articles describe an investigation
into a potential capital case in which the district attorney
requested that Dr. Hunter not perform the autopsy because
he was not board certified in forensic pathology. One article
described an instance in which Dr. Hunter did not note in an
autopsy that the woman’s uterus had been removed, causing
                      HART V. BROOMFIELD                     17

insurance officials to question whether Dr. Hunter examined
the right body.
    Finally, Hart points to a declaration submitted by defense
counsel in the case of People v. Seaton, 28 P.3d 175 (Cal.
2001). In support of a motion for a new trial, Seaton’s
counsel submitted a declaration describing Dr. Hunter’s
testimony in Seaton’s trial. Dr. Hunter had testified that the
victim was attacked in two locations, and that one could tell
from the blood clotting and blood pattern that the victim
survived the first attack but not the second. None of those
conclusions was found in Dr. Hunter’s autopsy report.
Seaton’s counsel thereafter consulted with another
pathologist, who reviewed Dr. Hunter’s testimony and
autopsy, finding that the victim had certainly died at the first
location, and that it was not possible to distinguish blood
from a live or dead person through blood clotting. Seaton’s
counsel also deposed the Riverside County Coroner, who
stated that Dr. Hunter had admitted some of his mistakes in
a conversation with him around December 1988 or January
1989.
                              B.
    Under Brady v. Maryland, the government may not
suppress evidence favorable to the accused “where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”
United States v. Alahmedalabdaloklah, 76 F.4th 1183, 1229
(9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87), opinion
amended and superseded, -- F.4th --, 2024 WL 844755 (9th
Cir. Feb. 28, 2024). This principle also prohibits suppression
of evidence that could impeach a government witness’s
credibility. Id. (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
154–55 (1972)). “To establish a Brady/Giglio claim, a
18                    HART V. BROOMFIELD

defendant must show that: (1) the evidence at issue would
have been favorable to the accused, either because it was
exculpatory or impeaching; (2) it was suppressed by the
prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) it was
material.” Id.
    “Evidence is material within the meaning of Brady ‘if
there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.’” Id. (quoting Ochoa, 16 F.4th at 1327).
“The question is not whether the defendant would more
likely than not have received a different verdict with the
evidence, but whether in its absence [the defendant] received
a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy
of confidence.” Ochoa, 16 F.4th at 1327 (alteration in
original) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434
(1995)). If we determine that evidence is not material under
Brady, we need not address the other elements of a Brady
claim. See Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. 313, 323–24
(2017).
    Hart argues that evidence impeaching Dr. Hunter is
material because Dr. Hunter’s testimony helped establish
that Hart both raped Diane and intentionally killed her. But
the CSC could reasonably have concluded that the
impeachment evidence was not material because, even
without Dr. Hunter’s testimony, there was little likelihood
the jury would not have found Hart guilty of first-degree
murder with a rape or sodomy special circumstance. Hart
argues that Dr. Hunter’s testimony regarding the
circumstances of Diane’s death was “critical.” But Hart also
concedes that Diane’s cause of death—multiple blows to the
back of her head—“was not subject to serious dispute.” In
closing statements, the prosecution urged the jury to infer
that Hart must have realized he was killing Diane while
                     HART V. BROOMFIELD                    19

repeatedly striking her on the back of her head. Because Hart
does not dispute that Diane died from these blows, the
prosecution’s argument would still have been available even
if Dr. Hunter’s testimony had been discredited.
    Nor would the exclusion of Dr. Hunter’s testimony have
undermined the prosecution’s argument that Hart’s plan to
lure Amy and Diane to a remote area demonstrated
premeditation. Indeed, as Hart acknowledges on appeal,
some of Dr. Hunter’s testimony arguably undermined the
inference that Hart intended to kill Diane—including his
characterization of Diane’s injuries as “overkill,” which
could have suggested that Hart was motivated by a
spontaneous impulse.
    Hart also argues that Dr. Hunter’s testimony that Diane
had been sexually assaulted likely swayed the jury. But Dr.
Hunter’s testimony—in which he admitted some
uncertainty—was far from the only evidence on which the
jury might have relied in reaching its conclusions. The jury
could have found that Hart attempted or committed sexual
assault against Diane based on the facts that (1) foreign
pubic hair and a “Vaseline-like substance” were found on
Diane’s body, (2) Diane’s body was unclothed from the
waist down, lying on top of her torn bra, when Amy saw it
and when Diane’s body was discovered by police, (3) Hart
told Amy that he had “just got it on with [her] friend,” and
(4) Hart raped Amy and used Vaseline in doing so. When
significant evidence other than a single witness’s testimony
supports the jury’s verdict, a state court can reasonably find
that evidence impeaching that witness is not material. See
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 293 (1999); Rhoades v.
Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 504 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding no
prejudice when an impeachable witness’s testimony “was
20                        HART V. BROOMFIELD

not central to the prosecution’s case in the same way that a
key witness’s testimony” could be). 3
                                    C.
    Hart also argues that the state court erred in resolving his
Brady claim on an incomplete record. But “[a] state court’s
decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing does not render
its fact-finding process unreasonable so long as the state
court could have reasonably concluded that the evidence
already adduced was sufficient to resolve the factual
question.” Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th
Cir. 2012). Here, Hart provides no argument other than a
conclusory assertion that the state court record was
incomplete. And although Hart notes that he requested
permission from the state court to supplement the record in
his state habeas proceedings, these requests do not identify
what additional evidence would be material to his claims.
The state court record contained all the evidence discussed
above, including Dr. Hunter’s testimony and the
impeachment evidence that Hart believes he should have
received. For the reasons discussed above, the state court
could have reasonably determined from the record that this
evidence was not material.
                                    V.
                                    A.
   A defendant’s right to counsel has not been effectively
vindicated if he can show “(1) constitutionally deficient

3
 Hart also argues that the district court, “and presumably the state court,”
erred in relying on Seaton to determine that the prosecution was unaware
of this evidence regarding Dr. Hunter at the time of Hart’s trial. But as
we have explained, Hart has failed to demonstrate that this evidence was
material, even if the prosecution knowingly suppressed it.
                      HART V. BROOMFIELD                     21

performance by counsel (2) that prejudiced the defense.”
Washington v. Shinn, 46 F.4th 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2022)
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
“To establish deficient performance, [the petitioner] must
show that ‘counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.’” Id. at 927 (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 688). “To establish prejudice, [he] must show
that there is ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694).
    This “standard, although by no means insurmountable, is
highly demanding.” Id. at 926 (quoting Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986)). “Trial counsel’s
strategies, including the treatment of witnesses, are entitled
to deference on review.” Lopez v. Allen, 47 F.4th 1040, 1050
(9th Cir. 2022). “And because we view the state court’s
resolution” of the question whether a petitioner’s counsel
performed deficiently “only through the lens of AEDPA, our
review” of that issue “is ‘doubly deferential.’” Id. (quoting
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)).
     Hart argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate and criticize Dr. Hunter’s lack of
certification in forensic pathology or rape trauma. But Dr.
Hunter had been board certified in pathologic anatomy and
clinical pathology since 1957, had conducted over 5,000
autopsies by the time of Hart’s trial, and had testified in over
50 trials regarding his findings. Indeed, the California Court
of Appeal had previously emphasized Dr. Hunter’s extensive
qualifications in another case. See People v. Roehler, 213
Cal. Rptr. 353, 361, 382 (Ct. App. 1985) (allowing the jury
to rely on Dr. Hunter’s testimony). Hart therefore provides
no reason to conclude that a challenge to Dr. Hunter’s
22                   HART V. BROOMFIELD

qualifications would have resulted in the exclusion of his
expert testimony or significant impeachment of his
credibility.
    Hart next argues that his counsel should have impeached
Dr. Hunter with Detective Lackie’s report about the crimes.
He asserts that Detective Lackie’s report contradicted Dr.
Hunter’s testimony because the report gave no indication
that Diane was sexually assaulted. But even assuming that
there was a contradiction, this contradiction harmed
Detective Lackie’s credibility, not Dr. Hunter’s. Detective
Lackie acknowledged in his testimony that Dr. Hunter had
made findings regarding sexual assault but explained that he
had simply failed to include Dr. Hunter’s findings in his own
report. And although Detective Lackie acknowledged that
his report had incorrectly indicated no trauma to Diane’s
vaginal or anal area, he testified that this was because he had
misunderstood Dr. Hunter’s findings. Detective Lackie’s
testimony therefore placed the blame for any inconsistencies
on himself. And because this information was already before
the jury, Hart’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to
raise it when cross-examining Dr. Hunter. See Lopez, 47
F.4th at 1051 (upholding a state court’s finding of no
prejudice when defense counsel failed to impeach a witness
with information of which the jury was already aware).
     Hart also argues that trial counsel should have
discovered the errors that Dr. Hunter had made in previous
trials and used those to impeach Dr. Hunter. But, as
explained above, the CSC could have reasonably concluded
that those errors were not material under Brady. And because
“Brady materiality and Strickland prejudice are the same,”
Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 906 (9th Cir. 2013), trial
counsel’s decision not to investigate and impeach Dr. Hunter
with his previous mistakes did not prejudice Hart.
                      HART V. BROOMFIELD                     23

    Some of Dr. Hunter’s testimony was in fact potentially
helpful to Hart. For example, in his guilt-phase closing
argument, Hart’s counsel referenced Dr. Hunter’s
uncertainty regarding whether Diane had been sexually
assaulted. Hart’s counsel also pointed to Dr. Hunter’s
testimony that the killing blows were “overkill” to argue that
Hart lacked premeditation or intent to kill Diane. Hart
reiterates these points on appeal. The state court could
reasonably have found that trial counsel was not ineffective
for failing to question the credibility of a “mixed witness,
offering testimony that was both favorable and unfavorable
to Petitioner.” Lopez, 47 F.4th at 1050. Such impeachment
may well have harmed Hart’s case.
     Finally, Hart argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to present his own expert to contradict Dr. Hunter’s
findings. Yet, Hart points to no evidence that another expert
would have done this. “[S]peculative assertions that more
consultation with an expert could somehow have aided
[counsel] in preparing his defense or in cross-examining [an
expert witness] are unpersuasive and insufficient to establish
prejudice.” Gallegos v. Ryan, 820 F.3d 1013, 1035 (9th Cir.
2016).
                              B.
    Hart also requests an evidentiary hearing for his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim but makes no
argument specific to this request. He has therefore forfeited
the request. See Cui v. Garland, 13 F.4th 991, 999 n.6 (9th
Cir. 2021) (finding a claim forfeited when the party made
“no substantive argument” regarding the claim).
24                 HART V. BROOMFIELD

                          VI.
   For the reasons discussed above, the district court’s
denial of Hart’s habeas petition is hereby AFFIRMED.