Court Opinion

ID: 9374463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 23:02:02.992025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:50.574967
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/23 P. v. Patton CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B320352

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. TA144611
           v.

 RAMON PATTON,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Affirmed.

      Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Kathy S. Pomerantz,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   _________________________
       In September 2018, defendant and appellant Ramon Patton
entered into a plea agreement with the People. Patton pleaded
no contest to attempted murder and admitted he had personally
used and discharged a firearm in the commission of the crime.
In January 2022 Patton filed a petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court denied Patton’s
petition, stating, “Patton was the only perpetrator and the
only shooter,” and therefore ineligible for relief. We affirm
because the record of conviction establishes Patton is ineligible
for resentencing as a matter of law.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.     The shooting of David Jackson2
       At about 7:40 p.m. on May 27, 2017, Los Angeles Police
Department Detective Anthony Balderama was called to the
Casa Motel on South San Pedro Street in Los Angeles about
a shooting. The motel manager had surveillance footage of
the shooting and Balderama watched it. At the preliminary
hearing, Balderama testified to what he’d seen in the footage:
A man later identified as David Jackson drove a car into the

1     References to statutes are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered section
1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2      We take our facts from the testimony given at Patton’s
preliminary hearing on January 9, 2018. We previously granted
the Attorney General’s request for judicial notice of the transcript
of that hearing. We consider only the witness testimony “that is
admissible under current law,” disregarding any testimony that
was admitted at the preliminary hearing under Proposition 115,
codified as subdivision (b) of Section 872. (See § 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3).)

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parking lot of the motel. He got out of the car and walked up
to the front counter.
       A man later identified as Patton walked up to the driveway
of the motel. He pulled a handgun from his front sweatshirt
pocket and fired three rounds at Jackson. Jackson fell to
the ground but then got up and went back to his car. Patton
“fle[d] in a northeasterly direction.”
       Detective Christian Mrakich was assigned to the case
on June 22, 2017. He watched the surveillance video. Mrakich
knew Patton; Mrakich had met him and spoken with him in
the past. Mrakich got a photograph of Patton from his Facebook
page and then had a search warrant served “for the official
records” of Patton’s Facebook account.
       In the Facebook photo, Patton was wearing what the
detective described as “stone washed or bleached type blue jeans.”
The jeans Patton was wearing in the photo—with “distinct
patterns” and “stains” with “shape[s]”—appeared to be the same
jeans the shooter was wearing in the surveillance footage. The
court at the preliminary hearing, after examining the Facebook
photo as well as still photos from the surveillance footage, stated,
“[T]hey’re very similar.”
       Officer Otoniel Ceballos also testified at the preliminary
hearing. Ceballos was assigned to a gang enforcement detail.
Ceballos had had “numerous contacts” with Patton and had
seen him 20 times. Ceballos had spoken with Patton and had
“been able to watch the way he walks.” Ceballos had watched
the surveillance footage of the May 27 shooting and he recognized
Patton as the shooter. Ceballos listed “his mannerisms, the
way he walks, his stature, the way he runs away.” Ceballos
continued, “I’ve seen him run away from us. I’ve seen him walk.
I’ve seen his stature up close and personal. In my opinion,
that’s him.”

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2.     The charges and plea agreement
       The People charged Patton with the attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder of Jackson. The People
alleged Patton committed the crime for the benefit of a criminal
street gang and personally inflicted great bodily injury on
Jackson. The People further alleged that a principal personally
used a firearm, personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm, and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
that caused great bodily injury under section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b), (c), (d), and (e)(1). The People also charged
Patton with carrying a loaded firearm while being an active
participant in a street gang and with possession of a firearm
by a felon.
       On the date set for trial, Patton entered into a plea
agreement with the prosecution. After an offer by the People
(32 years) and a counteroffer by the defense (25 years), the
prosecution offered Patton—who was facing two indeterminate
life terms—a determinate term of 29 years. Patton accepted.
The prosecution agreed to strike the allegation that the
attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
In response to the prosecutor’s questions, Patton confirmed
he understood his rights and the consequences of his plea, and
he was pleading freely and voluntarily. Patton then pleaded
no contest to attempted murder. The prosecutor asked, “As to
the allegation under Penal Code section 12022.53(c) that you
personally used and discharged a firearm in the course of the
crime do you admit or deny that allegation?” Patton replied,
“Admit.”
       In accordance with the parties’ agreement, the court
sentenced Patton to 29 years in the state prison, calculated
as the high term of nine years for the attempted murder plus

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20 years for the firearm enhancement. The court dismissed
the remaining counts and allegations on the People’s motion.
3.     Patton’s petition for resentencing
       On January 18, 2022, Patton, representing himself, filed
a form petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. Patton
checked boxes on the form stating (1) the information filed
in his case “allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation
in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine,” (2) he was “convicted of murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or
[he] accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which [he] could
have been convicted of murder or attempted murder,” and
(3) “[he] could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189,
effective January 1, 2019.” Patton also checked a fourth box
that stated, “Having presented a facially sufficient petition,
I request that this Court appoint counsel to represent me.”
       The court appointed the Alternate Public Defender to
represent Patton. On April 11, 2022, the prosecution filed a
response to Patton’s petition. The prosecution asserted Patton
was not entitled to relief because “as the direct perpetrator
[he] could not have been convicted of attempted murder based
upon the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” Patton
did not file a reply to the People’s response.
       On May 13, 2022, counsel appeared by Webex for a
hearing on Patton’s petition. Patton also was present by Webex.
The court stated it had read the transcripts of the preliminary
hearing and of the change of plea. The court then asked counsel,
“Does either side wish to be heard further or augment the record

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in any way?” Patton’s counsel replied, “No, I don’t need to submit
anything more.” The prosecutor also said he had nothing further
to present and the court responded, “Well, thank you again to
both sides.”
       The court stated, “I read through the entirety of the
preliminary hearing transcript. The defendant was identified by
way of social media, some distinctive jeans that he was wearing
as the shooter, and there was only one shooter. [¶] Furthermore,
I read the plea transcript in which the defendant admitted to
personally discharging a firearm.”
       The court said, “So in this particular case, reading the
People’s response and the preliminary hearing, the court finds
that, number one, there’s more than substantial evidence that
Ramon Patton was the only perpetrator and the only shooter
as charged with attempted murder.” After summarizing the
terms of the plea agreement, the court concluded, “Therefore,
the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and based
on the information that I have in front of me that Mr. Patton
was acting alone, he was the shooter, and that substantial
evidence supports the charge of attempted murder and his
plea of no contest to that charge. [¶] For those reasons, the court
finds that he has failed to make a prima facie claim for relief,
and the court respectfully denies the motion.” The court asked
both counsel if there was “anything else,” and both replied, “No.”
                           DISCUSSION
1.     Section 1172.6
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437) took effect
on January 1, 2019. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) The
bill amended existing law on accomplice liability for murder
“ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person
who is not the actual killer . . . .’ ” (People v. Gutierrez-Salazar
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 411, 417, quoting Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,

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subd. (f); § 189, subd. (e)(1).) To accomplish this goal, Senate
Bill 1437 limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder
rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as it relates to murder, to ensure a person’s sentence
is commensurate with his individual criminal culpability.
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843 (Gentile);
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 971 (Lewis).)
       Senate Bill 1437 also authorized, through new section
1172.6, an individual convicted of felony murder or murder based
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition
the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be resentenced
on any remaining counts if he could not have been convicted of
murder because of Senate Bill 1437’s changes to the definition
of the crime. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959-960;
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.)
       If the petition contains all the required information,
including a declaration by the petitioner that he was convicted
of murder and is eligible for relief (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A)),
section 1172.6, subdivision (c) requires the court to direct
the prosecutor to file a response to the petition and permit
the petitioner to file a reply,3 and to determine if the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief.
(See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959-960.)
       In determining whether the petitioner has carried the
burden of making the requisite prima facie showing he falls
within the provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief,
the superior court properly examines the record of conviction,
“allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit

3      Section 1172.6, subd. (b)(3) also requires the court to
appoint counsel to represent the petitioner, if requested. Here,
the trial court did appoint counsel for Patton.

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from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) However, “the prima facie inquiry under
[section 1172.6,] subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous
prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘ “the court
takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner
would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were
proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.” ’[4]
. . . ‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents,
“contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,”
then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination
adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see People v. Daniel (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 666, 675.)
        Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
775), effective as of January 1, 2022, amended section 1172.6
in various respects. The bill clarified that “persons who were
convicted of attempted murder . . . under . . . the natural [and]
probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief
as those persons convicted of murder under the same theor[y].”
(Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a).) Senate Bill 775 also
clarified that the burden of proof at a section 1172.6 hearing
is beyond a reasonable doubt and a trial court’s finding
that there is substantial evidence to support a conviction
is insufficient to meet this burden. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
In addition, the bill clarified the standards for the admissibility
of evidence at the evidentiary hearing. Section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3) now provides, “The admission of evidence

4     The court then holds an evidentiary hearing at which
the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).)

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in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except
that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at
any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,
including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters
judicially noticed. . . . The prosecutor and the petitioner may
also offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       We independently review a trial court’s determination
of whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing.
(People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 (Harden).)
2.     The trial court was not required to issue an order
       to show cause or conduct an evidentiary hearing
       because—as the sole perpetrator of the attempted
       murder—Patton is ineligible for resentencing
       as a matter of law
       Patton contends that—because he checked a box on a form
that stated he “could not presently be convicted” of attempted
murder “because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189”
—the trial court was required to issue an order to show cause
and conduct an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3). Patton does not acknowledge Justice Groban’s
statement for a unanimous court in Lewis that, “The record of
conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry under section 117[2.6], allowing the court to distinguish
petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless. This is consistent with the statute’s overall purpose:
to ensure that murder culpability is commensurate with a
person’s actions, while also ensuring that clearly meritless
petitions can be efficiently addressed as part of a single-step
prima facie review process.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
       At the hearing on Patton’s petition, the court stated
it had read the preliminary hearing transcript as well as the

                                9
transcript of Patton’s change of plea in his negotiated agreement
with the prosecution. Police officers testified at the preliminary
hearing that they had watched the surveillance video and
they knew and recognized Patton as the sole perpetrator,
who approached Jackson as he stood at the motel clerk’s desk
and fired several rounds at him. Those officers were personally
involved in the investigation of the shooting of Jackson, and
they were subject to cross-examination at the preliminary
hearing. In the trial court, Patton never offered any theory
to support his implicit contention now that he was an accomplice
and not the person who actually shot Jackson. Nor, on appeal,
has Patton even suggested what facts he has to demonstrate
that someone else shot Jackson and he was merely an accomplice.
       As the sole and actual perpetrator of the attempted
murder of Jackson, Patton is ineligible for resentencing as a
matter of law. (People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 969-
971 [affirming denial of resentencing because record of conviction
“unequivocally establishes” defendant was the sole perpetrator
and actual killer]; Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 47-48,
56 [same]; People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 692-694
[affirming denial of resentencing because defendant admitted
at parole suitability hearing that she was actual killer; defendant
therefore was “ ‘directly liable,’ ” “ ‘not vicariously liable’ ”];
People v. Gallo (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 594, 599-600 [defendant
was actual killer]; People v. Edwards (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 666,
669, 671, 674 [affirming summary denial of resentencing petition
where record of conviction showed petitioner was actual killer];
see also People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233
[defendant “not entitled to any relief under section 1172.6”
because he “was the actual killer and the only participant in
the killing”]; cf. People v. Daniel, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 678
[failure to appoint counsel was harmless because defendant was

                                10
actual killer who was “directly, not vicariously, liable for
[victim’s] murder”].)
      Finally, we reject Patton’s contention that the trial court
“ ‘engage[d] in factfinding, weigh[ed] the evidence, or reject[ed]
the petition’s allegations[5] on the basis of adverse credibility
determinations.’ ” The sworn testimony of police officers,
based on surveillance video of the crime, that Patton committed
the shooting was and is uncontroverted. “[N]o factfinding,
weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations” were or are
necessary here. “[T]he record of conviction irrefutably establishes
as a matter of law that” Patton was convicted as the actual
perpetrator of the attempted murder. (Harden, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at pp. 47, 56.) In short, Patton was convicted,
by his plea, under a valid theory of attempted murder that
survives the changes to sections 188 and 189.

5      Nowhere in Patton’s petition did he assert he was not the
sole and actual perpetrator. Apparently he contends his checking
of a box that he “could not presently be convicted” of attempted
murder encompasses such an implicit assertion.

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                          DISPOSITION
       We affirm the trial court’s order denying Ramon Patton’s
petition for resentencing.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                     EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             RICHARDSON (ANNE K.), J.


      Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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