Court Opinion

ID: 9717615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:07:14.612307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:54.293045
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Summary judgment shall be rendered on a party’s motion “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1005(c).) The purpose of summary judgment proceedings is to determine whether there is any genuine triable issue of fact which must be passed upon. (Lawrence v. Rubio (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 472, 476, 406 N.E.2d 946, 951.) In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the trial court must construe the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits most strictly against the moving party and most liberally in favor of the opponent. (Cimino v. Dill (1980), 92 Ill. App. 3d 345, 348, 415 N.E.2d 1272, 1274.) The right of a party to summary judgment must be clear and free from doubt. (92 Ill. App. 3d at 348, 415 N.E.2d at 1274-75.) In the instant case, defendant’s right to summary judgment is not clear and free from doubt. I first address plaintiff’s claim that he was terminated from his employment in violation of policy statements contained in the 1983 personnel manual. There are provisions in sections 7.030 to 7.034 of the manual that require employees be evaluated periodically in writing, including a mandatory evaluation prior to separation. This final evaluation is required to be reviewed by the president and the employee and signed by the employee. Section 7.032 mandates that vice-presidents, a position held by plaintiff, be evaluated by the president annually with such evaluations being referred to the board of directors for approval and recommendation as to disposition. Essentially, plaintiff argues that these provisions constituted a clear promise for annual evaluations and, more importantly, evaluations prior to discharge which would lead a reasonable employee to conclude that defendant was making an offer that it would not discharge employees without an evaluation informing the employee of the alleged unsatisfactory conduct and the opportunity to correct such conduct. On review of the language relied on by plaintiff, I conclude that it meets Duldulao’s requirements of a clear promise. Under the general provisions in section 1.019(a) of the manual, it is stated that “shall is mandatory and may is permissive.” Section 7.030(d) goes on to state that “[a]ll employees shall be evaluated at least annually, and said evaluation shall be completed prior to the date of preparation for the annual budget.” Section 7.030(f) states that “[a]ll employee evaluations shall be reviewed by the affected employee and signed by said employee.” Finally, section 7.030(h) states that “[a]ll employees being separated from the Corporation shall be evaluated prior to the date of separation.” I would find that this language may lead a reasonable employee to conclude that he or she would not be separated from defendant’s employment without an evaluation informing that employee of his or her unsatisfactory conduct and the opportunity to correct the deficiency. These sections were therefore sufficient to constitute a promise by defendant to its employees that certain procedural due process rights would be afforded to an employee before he or she could be terminated. In determining that there was no genuine issue as to material fact and that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the trial court found that the manual contained a disclaimer negating the promises made. Defendant also relies on this so-called disclaimer clause to support its position that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in its favor. In contrast to the disclaimers noted by the majority, the alleged disclaimer clause in the instant case is found buried within section 7.010(h) of the manual entitled “Job Descriptions.” It states: “The Corporation assumes no contractual liability to any employee via the job description or this publication. The employee shall hold the Corporation harmless from liability due to the nature, scope, or assignment outlined by any job description.” In my view, the trial court erred in finding this to be a general disclaimer. The placement of the clause in the manual, as well as the wording of the clause itself, leads to the conclusion that this disclaimer is limited to job description only. This disclaimer is not strong enough to overcome a reasonable employee’s belief that an offer had been made. The second requirement under Duldulao is that the statement must be disseminated to the employee in such a manner that the employee is aware of its contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer. In the instant case, all employees were given a copy of the manual and the manual was expected to be followed. Plaintiff was given a copy of the manual shortly after he started working for defendant. Plaintiff’s understanding of the manual was that “it was to provide directions, procedures, and policies for employees to abide by.” The trial judge placed great emphasis on deposition testimony in which plaintiff stated that he did not consider the manual to be a contract. Defendant also relies on this statement to argue that the manual did not create a binding contract. I believe this statement must be reviewed in context. During his discovery deposition, plaintiff was asked by defendant’s attorney: “Q. Was it your understanding, at the time you were working, that this manual was any type of contract? A. No, madam. Q. Did you follow the manual? A. To the best of my ability, yes. Q. Was the manual followed generally at the clinic? A. No, madam. Q. Who didn’t follow it? A. I — I can’t tell you everybody didn’t follow it. I don’t know. Q. Well, why did you say it wasn’t followed. A. Well, there’s things that weren’t done. Q. Like what? A. The evaluations. Q. You’re speaking of the evaluations of the employees at the clinic? A. Right. Q. Did you evaluate the employees who were under you? A. Yes, madam. Q. How did you do that? A. I evaluated personnel, you know, with employees. Q. Did you do it in writing? A. To the best of my knowledge I did, yes. Q. Did you ever do it orally? A. Yes, madam. Q. These would be the employees in your bookkeeping department or other employees that you supervised at the clinic? A. Right. Q. Was it any way part of your responsibility to see that the manual was enforced or followed? A. Yes, madam. Q. How was that part of your responsibility, in your opinion? A. As it was the responsibility of every person within management — within the organization. Q. To follow the guidelines in the manual? A. Yes, madam.” In his order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court expressly held “[t]he Plaintiff stated in depositions that the manual was not followed and he did not consider it a contract.” However, in light of the strict standards which govern the granting of a motion for summary judgment, I believe the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant based in large part on plaintiff’s statement that he did not consider the manual to be a contract. If the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it can be concluded that plaintiff was aware of the contents of the manual and reasonably believed the manual to contain an offer. The above-quoted language of plaintiff’s deposition shows that plaintiff followed the terms of the manual and that except for evaluations, all other provisions in the employee handbook were followed by defendant’s employees. Plaintiff’s being asked whether he considered the manual to be a contract could be objectionable at trial, as it calls for a legal conclusion. I believe that there was sufficient evidence presented by plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff reasonably believed that an offer had been made. Plaintiff’s statement is damaging, but we do not know what other evidence plaintiff might produce at trial to buttress his own position. Schuster v. East St. Louis Jockey Club, Inc. (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 483, 487, 345 N.E.2d 168, 170. Finally, defendant gave the manual to plaintiff with the intent that plaintiff become familiar with it. In fact, section 5.006 specifically states: “a. Employees shall familiarize themselves with the Manual of Rules, Regulations, Policies and Procedures. * * * f. An employee’s lack of knowledge in reference to any items covered in this section, shall not be considered useable in their defense of any violations of said items.” There is no question but that plaintiff continued to work with knowledge of defendant’s manual. Thus, the requirements set forth in Duldulao were met here. Contrary to defendant’s assertion that even if a contract is found to exist, plaintiff’s termination did not violate provisions of the manual, it is reasonable to infer from the language of the manual that the evaluations specified therein were not merely academic and meaningless exercises, but rather that they were intended to be performed in order to give an employee a chance to improve his or her performance and thereby avoid discharge. An employee reading the handbook could reasonably believe that he or she would not be terminated without such evaluation and opportunity to improve. Likewise, an employee could reasonably believe that he would not be terminated except for good reason. As pointed out earlier in this opinion, it is not clear why plaintiff was dismissed. There were several different theories given by members of the board and by plaintiff’s colleagues. Defendant rightly points out that plaintiff himself, as executive vice-president, did not consistently perform employee evaluations nor did plaintiff request any of his rights under the manual such as an employee evaluation or review of the actions taken by Jerry Cummings in dismissing him. These issues are better left for the trier of fact to determine the reasonableness of plaintiff’s position that a contract was, in fact, made. Accordingly, I conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact and that the trial court erred in finding that the personnel manual did not constitute a contract as a matter of law. Therefore, we should find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant, but that its denial of summary judgment for plaintiff was appropriate, and remand this cause for further proceedings.