Court Opinion

ID: 9834560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 00:01:42.690916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:59.446275
License: Public Domain

*36On Motion nor Reargument and Remand.
After the foregoing opinion was handed down the plaintiff asked and obtained leave to file a motion for reargument and for a remand. The motion has been argued and briefs have been presented by both parties. Two grounds are assigned in support of the motion for reargument.
First. It is asserted that, in disposing of the motion for a directed verdict, we have overlooked certain evidence to the effect that on November 15, at the time of taking the third inventory, the plaintiff paid to Barup the latter’s salary, amounting to $247.50. It is argued that this circumstance raises an inference that the plaintiff had not then discovered the wrongdoing on the part of his employee. The evidence did not pass unnoticed, but, in view of the uncontradicted testimony that the plaintiff had made the discovery by the end of October, the probative effect of whatever inference might be drawn therefrom was, and is, considered to be of insufficient character to justify the jury, acting reasonably, to predicate a verdict thereon in favor of the party having the burden of proof, in accordance with the rule announced in Wellman, Admr. v. Wales, 98 Vt. 437, 448, 129 Atl. 317.
Second. It is claimed that there was evidence tending to show that the defendant had waived the requirement of notice, or was estopped from asserting it, which was not given attention in the consideration of the motion for a verdict. But, when the case was heard, no mention of this evidence as bearing upon the motion was made either in the brief of the plaintiff, or ill the argument in his behalf. The point is now presented for the first time in this connection. “A rehearing is not granted for the purpose of affording opportunity to present new questions * * *. And where there was occasion and opportunity for raising the point at the hearing, the rule applies equally to one not the excepting party. * * * When, as in this case, a voluminous transcript is made the record, failure to point out in the brief or argument the evidence relied upon places an unnecessary burden on the Court of searching for evidence to support the judgment. Indeed, our rule so often announced, does not require the Court to search the transcript to see if anything can be found to support the judgment.” Ryan v. Orient Ins. Co., 96 Vt. 291, *37305, 306, 119 Atl. 423, 429. See, also, Spaulding v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 94 Vt. 42, 54, 109 Atl. 22; Hawkins v. Wilson, 94 Vt. 417, 419, 420, 111 Atl. 634.
Although it is admitted that the question of waiver or . estoppel was not called to our attention as a reason why the ruling on the motion for a verdict should be upheld, we are asked to strike off the entry of final judgment and to remand the cause since the issue was raised on the trial below. It is well established that we have the discretionary power to remand a cause to prevent a failure of justice when the circumstances warrant such action, even when the record discloses error of such a nature as to justify the entry of final judgment here. Shea v. Pilette, 108 Vt. 446, 455, 189 Atl. 154, 109 A. L. R. 933.
The evidence which the plaintiff presents as tending to show waiver or estoppel includes a series of letters written by the defendant, or its agent, to the plaintiff. On November 17, 1937, the assistant manager wrote: 1 ‘ If this principal has been guilty of any offenses coming within the terms of our contract, please fill out the attached Proof of Loss in triplicate, returning three copies to this office. Please set out each item, showing its dates, and amount, and attach whatever substantiating evidence you have to the Proof of Loss.” On November 30, the attorney for the defendant wrote to the attorneys for the plaintiff, suggesting that inasmuch as the claim had previously been reported to the defendant’s local representative, E. Y. Denault, who had submitted the form for the Proof of Loss, further correspondence should be handled direct with him. On December 27, Denault wrote to the plaintiff, ‘ ‘ Under full reservation of all our rights and defenses, we are returning to you the three Proof of Loss forms which you submitted in connection with this case. These Proof of Loss forms have not been filled out sufficiently to comply with the terms of the bond. It will be necessary for you to list the items of default, showing the dates and amounts. For your convenience we are enclosing three blank Proof of Loss forms. We are retaining the copies of the inventories which you submitted with your Proof of Loss, but these inventories are not sufficient to make out a claim within the terms of our contract. We call your attention to Clause 6 of your bond and ask you to comply therewith without further delay.” Clause 6 provided that “should the employee become guilty of any *38criminal offense covered by this bond, the Employer shall immediately, on being requested by the company so to do, lay proper information before an officer or other body having authority to issue warrant for the arrest of the Employee, and verify the same as required by law, and furnish the company every aid and assistance (not pecuniary) that can be rendered by the Employer, his agents or servants, in the apprehension and prosecution of the Employee. ’ ’ The plaintiff complied with this clause, by placing the matter before the states attorney who issued the necessary complaint and warrant and proceeded with the prosecution which ended with a plea of guilty by the respondent Barup. On. January 19, 1938, Denault wrote to the plaintiff stating that “we have carefully gone over the information which you have submitted to us in connection with the above captioned bond and have also made a complete investigation concerning the circumstances surrounding this matter. Under the terms of the contract in force, it is necessary that we receive prompt notice of claim, and because this man’s accounts were out of balance quite some time, and that fact was not called to our attention, we feel that there has ■ been substantial delay * * *. We are therefore unable to honor your claim for the above and other reasons.”
These letters evidence no intention on the part of the defendant to surrender any defense to which it might be entitled. See Houran v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co., 109 Vt. 258, 267, 195 Atl. 253. In calling upon the plaintiff to present proof of loss and to inform the proper authority that a misappropriation had taken place the defendant acted within the express terms of the bond and its course of conduct was not such as to give the plaintiff the right to rely on it as giving him a just and reasonable ground to infer that the defense here interposed would not be asserted. Crosby v. Vermont Acc. Ins. Co., 84 Vt. 510, 513, 514, 80 Atl. 817.
We find the claims of waiver and estoppel unsupported by the evidence called to our attention, and consider it unnecessary under the circumstances to remand the cause.

Motion for reargument and remand denied. Let full entry go down.