Court Opinion

ID: 9573743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:58:22.497199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:14.269808
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the trial court should not have admitted Sloan’s statement under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule and that such admission also violated Yancey’s right of confrontation in this particular case. I submit, however, that the error was clearly harmless because it is cumulative of other admissible evidence.
This Court has often held that the erroneous admission of testimony under the necessity exception is harmless where there is other evidence proving the substance of the hearsay testimony. Gardner v. State, 273 Ga. 809, 813 (7) (546 SE2d 490) (2001); Bellamy v. State, 272 Ga. 157, 161 (7) (527 SE2d 867) (2000); Holmes v. State, 271 Ga. 138, 141 (2) (516 SE2d 61) (1999); Suits v. State, 270 Ga. 362, 365 (2) (507 SE2d 751) (1998); Fetty v. State, 268 Ga. 365, 368 (4) (489 SE2d 813) (1997); Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 827, 831 (4) (470 SE2d 674) (1996). Furthermore, the admission of confessions or other inerimi*559nating statements in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights is also harmless when it is cumulative of the testimony of other witnesses. Borders v. State, 270 Ga. 804, 809 (3) (514 SE2d 14) (1999); Burnham v. State, 265 Ga. 129, 134 (6) (453 SE2d 449) (1995); Tankersley v. State, 261 Ga. 318, 321 (2) (b) (404 SE2d 564) (1991). Likewise, other similar, but admissible, testimony can render a violation of the Confrontation Clause harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Vaughns v. State, 274 Ga. 13, 15 (3) (549 SE2d 86) (2001); Jones v. State, 265 Ga. 84, 86 (4) (453 SE2d 716) (1995); Byrd v. State, 262 Ga. 426, 428 (2) (420 SE2d 748) (1992).
Decided September 16, 2002
Reconsideration denied October 11, 2002.
Harold S. Gulliver, for appellant.
To support its conclusion that admission of the evidence requires reversal of the conviction, the majority applies an inverted harmless error analysis by its initial indication that Sloan’s statement linking Yancey to the van used in the drive-by shooting was harmful because it corroborated Lofton’s eyewitness identification. This observation actually demonstrates a lack of prejudice to Yancey. Indeed, Sloan’s statement regarding his loan of the van was, at most, cumulative of Lofton’s far stronger testimony. Lofton gave a detailed description of Yancey, picked him out of an extensive photographic lineup, and identified him at a preliminary hearing and at trial as the person who was driving the van at the time of the shooting. The majority also inaccurately states that Sloan “was the witness who tied the defendant to the white sedan. . . .” To the contrary, this portion of Sloan’s statement was only cumulative of the stronger trial testimony of the Oldsmobile’s previous owner that Yancey was driving the white sedan when they fought. That admissible testimony, rather than Sloan’s statement, constituted the evidence of motive. Similarly, Sloan’s statement regarding Yancey’s admissions concerning the van and the shooting was cumulative of both the eyewitness testimony and the evidence that, when the abandoned van was discovered, the windows were broken and shell casings found on the floor were from the same rifle as the one used in the murder. Because Sloan’s statement was merely cumulative of other overwhelming probative evidence, there was not a reasonable possibility that it contributed to the verdict. Therefore, any error in admitting the statement was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Vaughns v. State, supra; Jones v. State, supra; Byrd v. State, supra. Accordingly, I dissent to the judgment reversing the conviction.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.
*560Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Jill M. Zubler, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.