Court Opinion

ID: 9581555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:16:12.140022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:03.880044
License: Public Domain

Nichols, Justice,
dissenting. The above decision was prepared in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the court but I must dissent from the judgment affirming the grant of the summary judgment.
Code § 113-301, while amended in 1958 to lower the required number of witnesses from three to two, has remained basically the same since it was first adopted in 1851 (Ga. L. 1851-52, p. 104), and even then was a mere application to personalty of the law relating to realty.
The decisions of the court based upon such language are not without inconsistency. The decision in Thornton v. Hulme, 218 Ga. 480 (128 SE2d 744), relied upon by the majority, states that it is necessary for the witnesses to see the testator sign or for the testator to acknowledge such signature. This is a full bench decision but as will be shown it is in conflict with older full bench decisions.
In Webb v. Fleming, 30 Ga. 808 (1) (76 AD 675), cited in the *698Thornton case, the holding was that an acknowledgment of the signature by the testator was sufficient, but the question of whether an acknowledgment of the will without seeing the testator’s signature would be sufficient was not presented.
Wood v. Davis, 161 Ga. 690 (1) (131 SE 885), also cited in the Thornton case, need not be discussed in view of the fact that two Justices dissented.
In Slade v. Slade, 155 Ga. 851, 859 (118 SE 645), a full bench decision, it was held: “In the case of Beall v. Mann, 5 Ga. 456, 469, the court said, ‘In the case of Gryle v. Gryle, 1 Ves. Jr. 11, Lord Hardwick doubted whether it was a sufficient execution, and publication of a will, for the testator to say before the witnesses, “this is my will,” without some further act on his part. But those doubts have long since vanished, and modern adjudications have gone to the extent of deciding that a will is duly executed and published, though the witnesses neither saw the testator’s signature, nor were made acquainted with the instrument they attested, provided they were requested by the testator to subscribe the memorandum of attestation. British Museum v. White, 3 M. & P. 689, s. c. 6 Bingh. 310. Wright v. Wright, 5 M. & P. 316, s. c. 7 Bingh. 457. Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Cromp. and Mees. 140.’ ” And on page 860 of the same decision it was said: “In the more recent case of White v. Trustees of British Museum, 3 M. and P. 689, 6 Bing. 310, which was very similar as to its facts upon this point to the case at bar, it was held that a will was sufficiently attested when subscribed by three witnesses in the presence of the testator and at his request, though none of the witnesses saw the testator’s signature and only one of them knew what the instrument was.”
In Brown v. McBride, 129 Ga. 92, 93 (58 SE 702), another full bench decision of this court wherein the jury was held authorized to find for the propounders of the will where the evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of the witnesses’ signatures was set forth as follows: “Clegg was the testator. G. A. McDonald, J. M. Rhodes, and A. A. Kerney were the subscribing witnesses. There was no testimony by any witness that the testator actually signed the will in the presence of any of the witnesses, but there was testimony to the effect *699that all three witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each other. Upon this point, Kerney testified by interrogatories: ‘I was a witness to the will; signed the original will as a witness at the request of Judge D. H. Pope. George McDonald and John Rhodes were the other witnesses. I do not know whether the other two witnesses were present when Clegg signed the will, but my best judgment and recollection is that I was not present when Clegg signed the will. I and the other two witnesses signed the will in the presence of the testator, as witnesses and in the presence of each other.’ Neither McDonald nor Rhodes testified. It was proved on the trial that McDonald was dead. It was shown that the signature to the will was the genuine signature of the testator. There was also evidence to the effect that, some fifteen years before the trial, Rhodes had left the country and had not been heard of since.”
Under the full bench decisions beginning with Beall v. Mann, supra, decided in 1848, and never criticized in the one hundred and twenty years since, although at times overlooked, the judgment granting the caveator’s summary judgment and thus denying the propounders the opportunity to have a jury decide the issue should be reversed.