Court Opinion

ID: 9580707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:07:52.868219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:27.709820
License: Public Domain

STRINGER, Justice
(dissenting).
DISSENT
I respectfully dissent. It is undisputed that when respondent’s bank closed his office business account in December of 1999 because of chronic overdrafts, he ran his business accounts through his trust account, at times commingling business account funds with trust account funds. But one feature remained unchanged — he was still chronically overdrawn, but now as to trust account assets. When the Director’s office was notified, efforts to get information about these overdrafts were all but ignored — respondent admitted he didn’t even open the Director’s frequent mailings. Perhaps nothing more pointedly underscores respondent’s reckless and irresponsible conduct, however, than when his certification of trust account compliance accompanied his attorney registration fee that was paid by a check drawn on his trust account.
After hearing nothing from respondent for almost a year, despite the Director’s frequent efforts to investigate his trust account overdrafts, respondent appeared at oral argument to explain how depression and other matters had led him down a path of irresponsible neglect of his practice and his professional responsibilities. His description was a heart-rending account of all that can go wrong when an attorney fails to conduct his practice within the rules prescribed for all practitioners, but the only facts that we may consider are those admitted on November 28, 2000 and our only task is to determine the appropriate sanction.
Respondent’s serious and admitted disciplinary rule violations overwhelmingly demonstrate his lack of fitness to practice law and he should be suspended from the practice of law. The Director received eleven overdraft notices in the months the Director attempted to investigate, warn and assist respondent regarding his misconduct. Although respondent initially appeared willing to cooperate, his subsequent utter lack of response and the continued overdrafts revealed an intent to continue misusing the trust account despite the Director’s, insistence that he stop doing so. Respondent’s failure to respond has left this court with no evidence of mitigating circumstances or indication that he is willing or able to change his behavior to conform with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Thus, respondent’s trust account violations are compounded by his failure to cooperate with the Director or heed warnings to stop using the trust account for operating funds.
The majority’s ruling is clearly out of step with numerous decisions of this court suspending attorneys for trust account violations. “Misappropriation of client funds reflects adversely on an attorney’s fitness to practice law and warrants serious sanctions, unless substantial mitigating circumstances exist.” In re Isaacs, 451 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Minn.1990). Further, respon*150dent has demonstrated a complete unwillingness to cooperate, which we have clearly stated carries its own sanctions. See In re Engel, 538 N.W.2d 906, 906-07 (Minn.1995) (imposing indefinite suspension); see also In re Cartwright, 282 N.W.2d 548, 551-52 (Minn.1979) (imposing six-month suspension).
In In re Beal, we ordered a three-month suspension and a year of probation for trust account violations where an attorney fully cooperated with the Director and hired an accountant to implement proper bookkeeping procedures. 374 N.W.2d 715, 716-19 (Minn.1985) (sanctioning attorney who had commingled personal and client funds, filed improper attorney liens, charged illegal fees, failed to keep the required books and records and falsely certified that he was in compliance with trust account requirements). The sanction in Beal was light because the attorney was relatively inexperienced and the misconduct resulted from the attorney’s failure to understand and implement basic record keeping and business procedures rather than fraudulent intent. Id. at 719.
We were similarly lenient where an attorney presented evidence that he had changed his bookkeeping system to ensure that the misconduct would not recur, the misconduct was partially caused by disruption in his professional life stemming from the misconduct of others who were no longer part of his practice, and alcoholism was a mitigating factor. In re Isaacs, 406 N.W.2d 526 (Minn.1987) (ordering public reprimand and stayed five-year suspension where attorney failed to hold client funds in trust, negligently misappropriated client funds, faded to maintain proper books and records, falsely certified compliance with trust account procedures and failed to promptly disburse settlement proceeds).
The circumstances in this case demonstrate a much greater risk to the public than those in Beal and Isaacs because respondent has failed to cooperate with the Director or provide evidence that his misconduct will not recur. As the Director explained to the court, a supervising attorney has only a limited ability to monitor the daily activities of an attorney on probation, and “probation does not work where the lawyer does not cooperate.” The many examples of refusal to cooperate in this case indicate that probation is particularly unlikely to be effective in curbing respondent’s misconduct.
Further, unlike the attorney in Isaacs, respondent has failed to provide any evidence of mitigating circumstances. Respondent’s last-minute assertions that he suffers from depression and is undergoing treatment cannot be a part of our consideration as they were without any eviden-tiary support whatsoever. To show that psychological disability is a mitigating factor, the attorney must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the psychological problem is severe, that the problem was the cause of the misconduct, that the attorney is undergoing treatment and is making progress to recover from the psychological problem, that the recovery has arrested the misconduct, and that the misconduct is not likely to recur. In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn.1983). Such a showing requires evidence going to each factor. See In re Hanvik, 609 N.W.2d 235, 240-41 (Minn.2000) (holding respondent did not establish depression was a mitigating factor where the diagnosis was moderate rather than severe and imposing indefinite suspension with leave to apply for reinstatement after two years for misappropriation of client funds and misrepresentations to the Director). No evidence going to any of these factors was presented here — indeed respondent was even unclear as to whether he suffered from a psychological disability.
*151Public reprimand and two years of probation was ordered where, as here, an attorney committed trust account violations and neglected client matters during a period of claimed emotional distress. In re Fling, 316 N.W.2d 556, 557-58 (Minn.1982). The trust account violations in Fling were less troubling than the ones here, however, as the attorney in Fling deposited all client funds in a trust account, did not commingle client funds with personal or firm funds, and did not convert client funds for his own use. Id. In contrast, respondent failed to put client funds in trust, misappropriated client funds to pay a third party and commingled client funds with operating funds. Further, there was evidentiary support in Fling for the attorney’s assertions that his misconduct was related to the distraction created by the aftermath of a crime committed against one of his children. Id. The temporary nature of the emotional distress in conjunction with the family problems in Fling provided assurance that the misconduct was temporary. Respondent has provided no such evidence. Therefore, indefinite suspension is the only sanction appropriate to protect the public from conduct respondent admitted at oral argument was beyond his control.
Demonstrated compliance with the trust account requirements in the conduct of the attorney’s practice and proven acceptance of his responsibility to cooperate fully with the Director in identifying and correcting misconduct is the only basis upon which this court might order probation without suspension when faced with serious trust account violations such as those before us here. Respondent appeared at oral argument and stated that he feels remorseful, has improved his business practices,1 and will not misuse his trust account again. There has been no fact finding on his argument before the court, however. Respondent had every opportunity to cooperate with the Director and present evidence on his own behalf but he did not do so. Suspension would appropriately put the burden on respondent to demonstrate his fitness to practice law and the diminished risk to the public. Further, as respondent has not cooperated and has demonstrated no interest in correcting his misconduct other than his appearance at oral argument, it is all the more important that he be put to the test of demonstrating he is trustworthy and that he no longer poses a risk to the public through the process of reapplication following suspension.
The majority’s striking departure from long established precedent in discipline imposed for trust account violations is based on what it terms unique about the circumstances here. But the only unique feature of this matter is the level of disdain with which a practicing lawyer may treat his professional responsibility in managing his trust account, his duty to cooperate with the Director and his duty to attend to his clients’ affairs. Under the facts of this case, suspension is necessary to fulfill the duty of this court to protect the public, the legal profession, and the administration of justice.

. Respondent advised the court that now he has no business or trust account and all transactions are in cash.