Court Opinion

ID: 9387263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-17 15:00:19.093402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:12.623741
License: Public Domain

22-0278
Philip Edwardo v. The Roman Catholic Bishop, et al

               United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Second Circuit

                              August Term 2022
                            Argued: March 17, 2023
                            Decided: April 17, 2023

                                   No. 22-0278

                                PHILIP EDWARDO,
                               Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                         v.
  THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF PROVIDENCE, ST. ANTHONY’S
CHURCH CORPORATION NORTH PROVIDENCE, AND LOUIS E. GELINEAU,
                              Defendants-Appellees.

            On Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the Southern District of New York

Before: PARK and LEE, Circuit Judges, and STEIN, District Judge. *

     Plaintiff Philip Edwardo alleges that he was sexually abused
and exploited from approximately 1978 to 1984, when he was

       * Judge Sidney H. Stein of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, sitting by designation.
between 12 and 17 years old, by Father Philip Magaldi, a now-
deceased Rhode Island priest. Edwardo sued the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Providence (“RCB”), St. Anthony’s Church Corporation
North Providence (“St. Anthony’s”), and retired Bishop Louis E.
Gelineau (together, “Defendants”) for various torts based on
Defendants’ alleged role in enabling the abuse. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Failla, J.)
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that New York’s
long-arm statute did not permit the court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over Defendants.
       We conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the case
for lack of personal jurisdiction. First, Magaldi did not commit the
alleged sexual abuse in New York as an agent of Defendants.
Second, the alleged conduct is unrelated to Defendants’ business
activities in New York. We thus AFFIRM.

            STEVEN J. PHILLIPS, Phillips & Paolicelli, LLP, New York,
            NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

            HOWARD A. MERTEN, Partridge Snow & Hahn, LLP,
            Providence, RI (Eugene G. Bernardo II, Partridge Snow
            & Hahn, LLP, Providence, RI; William E. Vita, Shook,
            Hardy & Bacon, LLP, New York, NY on the brief), for
            Defendants-Appellees.

PER CURIAM:

      Plaintiff Philip Edwardo alleges that he was sexually abused
and exploited from approximately 1978 to 1984, when he was
between 12 and 17 years old, by Father Philip Magaldi, a now-
deceased Rhode Island priest. Edwardo sued the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Providence (“RCB”), St. Anthony’s Church Corporation

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North Providence (“St. Anthony’s”), and retired Bishop Louis E.
Gelineau (together, “Defendants”) for various torts based on
Defendants’ alleged role in enabling the abuse. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Failla, J.)
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that New York’s
long-arm statute did not permit the court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over Defendants.
       We conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the case
for lack of personal jurisdiction. First, Magaldi did not commit the
alleged sexual abuse in New York as an agent of Defendants.
Second, the alleged conduct is unrelated to Defendants’ business
activities in New York. We thus affirm.

                           I.   BACKGROUND

A.     Factual Background

       St. Anthony’s is a parish of the Roman Catholic Church in
Providence, Rhode Island. 1 At all relevant times, St. Anthony’s was
operated, managed, and maintained by Gelineau—the Bishop of
Providence at the time—and RCB.              Father Philip Magaldi was a
priest at St. Anthony’s.

       Edwardo alleges that he was sexually abused by Magaldi for
approximately six years—from 1977 or 1978 to 1984—when Edwardo
was between 12 and 17 years old and was an altar boy, employee, and

       1 The following facts are taken from Edwardo’s Second Amended
Complaint. See App’x at 8-44. In reviewing the district court’s decision
on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, we “constru[e] all
pleadings . . . in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolv[e] all
doubts in the plaintiff’s favor.” In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714
F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2013).

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parishioner at St. Anthony’s. Among other things, Magaldi would
force Edwardo to drink alcohol and then threaten to report the
drinking to Edwardo’s family if Edwardo attempted to stop the
abuse.

      Most of the alleged abuse occurred in Rhode Island, but some
took place during trips out of state. One such trip was in 1983, when
Magaldi traveled to New York City to meet with Claus von Bülow, a
Danish-born socialite who had been convicted of attempting to
murder his wife. Von Bülow was seeking a new trial based on the
affidavit of a witness whom Magaldi had previously counseled in his
capacity as a priest.   Magaldi agreed to meet with von Bülow to
discuss this information as well as a potential donation to the Church
by von Bülow that von Bülow said would be between $500,000 and
$1,000,000.   Edwardo’s job responsibilities at the time included
driving Magaldi to the train station and accompanying Magaldi to
New York City.

      Edwardo alleges that Defendants paid for Edwardo and
Magaldi to stay in a two-bedroom suite at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel.
After they arrived, Magaldi met with von Bülow in von Bülow’s
apartment and had dinner with von Bülow and several others.
Magaldi then returned to the hotel and had a telephone call with
Gelineau about the meeting with von Bülow and von Bülow’s
potential donation.     At approximately dawn, Magaldi sexually
assaulted Edwardo, who had been sleeping in his hotel room.
Magaldi assaulted Edwardo in the hotel again later that day.

B.    Procedural History

      Edwardo first sued Defendants and several others in Rhode
Island state court on September 30, 2019. The operative complaint

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in that case (“R.I. Complaint”) contained allegations about Magaldi’s
sexual abuse of Edwardo in both Rhode Island and New York. The
R.I. Complaint included claims under Rhode Island law for breach of
fiduciary duty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, as well as a claim under
the New York Child Victim’s Act.

         The defendants in the Rhode Island action moved to dismiss.
On September 29, 2020—the night before oral argument on the
motion to dismiss the R.I. Complaint—Edwardo brought the current
lawsuit in New York state court. On October 16, 2020, the Rhode
Island court dismissed the R.I. Complaint, finding the claims time-
barred under Rhode Island law.          Edwardo timely appealed to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, and that appeal remains pending.

         On February 19, 2021, Defendants removed this case to federal
court.    The following month, Edwardo filed the operative Second
Amended Complaint, bringing claims for negligence, negligent
training and supervision, negligent retention, breach of fiduciary
duty, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.   Edwardo principally alleges that
Defendants knew or should have known that Magaldi was a danger
to children and that Defendants failed to intervene, warn, or
meaningfully protect Edwardo. Although Edwardo does not allege
facts demonstrating that Defendants had knowledge of Magaldi’s
sexual abuse, Edwardo does allege that Gelineau was aware of the
sexual abuse of minors by other Diocese of Providence priests at the
time.

         Edwardo alleges that he brought this action “pursuant to the
New York Child Victims Act.”        See App’x at 15.    The New York
Child Victims Act created an approximately two-year window when

                                    5
plaintiffs could bring claims related to certain sexual offenses that
would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations, if the sexual
offense at issue occurred when the plaintiff was under eighteen years
old. See C.P.L.R. § 214-g.

      The district court held that it lacked a statutory basis for
exercising personal jurisdiction over Defendants based on New
York’s long-arm statute.        See C.P.L.R. § 302.    The court thus
dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(2).

      Edwardo timely appealed.

                     II.    LEGAL STANDARDS

      “We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant motions
under Rule 12(b)(2).” Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883
F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2018). “In order to survive a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must make a prima facie
showing that jurisdiction exists.” Eades v. Kennedy, PC L. Offs., 799
F.3d 161, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese
Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 167 (2d Cir. 2013)). To determine
whether jurisdiction exists over a non-domiciliary, we first consider
whether the state’s long-arm statute provides a statutory basis for
jurisdiction and, if so, whether exercising personal jurisdiction would
comport with due process. See id. at 168.

      Here, the statutory basis for jurisdiction is New York’s long-
arm statute, C.P.L.R. § 302(a).       Two sections of the statute are
relevant to this case.     First, a court may exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who, personally or “through an
agent,” “commits a tortious act [other than defamation] within the

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state,” if the cause of action arises from that activity.       C.P.L.R.
§ 302(a)(2). Second, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a non-domiciliary who, personally or “through an agent,” “transacts
any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods
or services in the state” if the claim asserted arises from that business
activity. Id. § 302(a)(1).

                         III.   DISCUSSION

      Edwardo concedes that the district court could not exercise
general personal jurisdiction over Defendants, who are all domiciled
in Rhode Island.    He argues instead that the district court should
have exercised specific personal jurisdiction under New York’s long-
arm statute based on the 1983 trip to New York City with Magaldi.
First, Edwardo argues that Defendants committed a tortious act in
New York through an agent, so jurisdiction is proper under C.P.L.R.
§ 302(a)(2).   Second, Edwardo argues that Defendants transacted
business in New York and his claim is related to that business, so
jurisdiction is proper under C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).

A.    C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2)

      Edwardo first argues that the district court has personal
jurisdiction over Defendants under section 302(a)(2) because Magaldi
committed a tortious act in New York and Magaldi was acting as an
agent of Defendants. We disagree.

      “In determining whether an agency exists under § 302, courts
have focused on the realities of the relationship in question rather
than the formalities of agency law.” Cutco Indus., Inc. v. Naughton,
806 F.2d 361, 366 (2d Cir. 1986). To be considered an agent under
section 302, the alleged agent must have acted “for the benefit of and

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with the knowledge and consent” of the non-resident principal and
the non-resident principal must have “exercised some control over”
the alleged agent. Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 467
(1988); see Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 168 (2d
Cir. 2010) (finding that alleged agent’s actions in New York may be
“imputed” to defendant where “deposition testimony unmistakably
demonstrates that there existed a Kreutter-type relationship”).
Edwardo did not allege facts suggesting that Magaldi’s sexual abuse
occurred in Magaldi’s capacity as an agent under section 302(a)(2).

      First, Edwardo did not allege facts suggesting that Magaldi
acted “for the benefit of” Defendants when he sexually assaulted
Edwardo. “Under New York law, although an employee’s tortious
acts are imputable to the employer if done while the servant was
doing his master’s work, no matter how irregularly, or with what
disregard of instructions, an employer is not liable for torts
committed by the employee for personal motives unrelated to the
furtherance of the employer’s business.”        Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622
F.3d 123, 144 (2d Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Accordingly, “New York
courts consistently have held that sexual misconduct and related
tortious behavior arise from personal motives and do not further an
employer’s business, even when committed within the employment
context.” Id. at 145-46 (quoting Ross v. Mitsui Fudosan, Inc., 2 F. Supp.
2d 522, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (collecting cases)). “[F]or example, New
York courts have rejected respondeat superior claims that a church was
liable for its priest’s sexual assault of a child.” Id. at 144 (citing Paul
J.H. v. Lum, 736 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562 (4th Dep’t 2002)); see also Judith M.
v. Sisters of Charity Hosp., 93 N.Y.2d 932, 933 (1999) (“Assuming
plaintiff’s allegations of sexual abuse are true, it is clear that the
employee here departed from his duties for solely personal motives
unrelated to the furtherance of the [defendant’s] business.”).

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      Second, Edwardo did not allege facts suggesting that Magaldi
acted “with the knowledge and consent of” Defendants in committing
sexual assault.    To establish agency under section 302, the non-
resident principal must request not just the alleged agent’s general
presence in New York but also the activities giving rise to suit. See
E. N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Republic Realty Mortg. Corp., 402 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641
(2d Dep’t 1978) (holding that a tortfeasor is an agent of a
nondomiciliary under § 302(a) only where the nondomiciliary
“requested the performance of those activities in New York” (emphasis
added)). Edwardo alleges only that Defendants had knowledge of
and consented to the trip to New York.          He does not allege that
Defendants had knowledge of Magaldi’s tortious conduct in New
York. This renders his pleadings insufficient.

      We thus agree with the district court that it could not exercise
personal jurisdiction over        Defendants based        on    Edwardo’s
allegations that Magaldi sexually abused him in New York without
Defendants’ knowledge or consent.          See also Doe v. Roman Cath.
Diocese of Erie, Pa., No. 20-CIV-257, 2021 WL 5232742, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.
Nov. 10, 2021) (reaching the same conclusion); Powers-Barnhard v.
Butler, No. 19-CIV-1208, 2020 WL 4925333, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,
2020) (same). 2

      2  As Edwardo points out, one district court has taken the contrary
position, finding that an agent may be acting for the “benefit of and with
the knowledge and consent of” his principal in committing sexual assault
where the agent was “employed, managed, and supervised” by the
principal and the principal “authorized and funded” the agent’s travel to
New York. See Love v. West, No. 19-CIV-10799, 2021 WL 431210, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2021). We agree with the district court’s observation that
the Love decision failed to consider “how an employee’s sexual assault in

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       In addition, jurisdiction under section 302(a)(2) would also be
improper to the extent Edwardo seeks recovery for Defendants’
allegedly tortious conduct, rather than Magaldi’s.                   Even if
Defendants’ own negligence or failure to intervene caused Edwardo’s
injury in New York, their conduct (or lack thereof) occurred entirely
in Rhode Island. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 29 (2d
Cir. 1997) (“The acts giving rise to [plaintiff’s] lawsuit . . . were
performed by persons physically present in Missouri and not in New
York. Even if [plaintiff] suffered injury in New York, that does not
establish a tortious act in the state of New York within the meaning
of § 302(a)(2).”); Platt Corp. v. Platt, 17 N.Y.2d 234, 237 (1966) (“The
failure of a man to do anything at all when he is physically in one
State is not an ‘act’ done or ‘committed’ in another State” that would
“fall literally within [§ 302(a)(2).]”); see also Reinhardt v. City of Buffalo,
No. 21-CV-206, 2022 WL 2442300, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. July 5, 2022) (“[A]
negligent act that takes place outside of New York—such as negligent
hiring—that causes an injury in the state does not confer jurisdiction
under § 302(a)(2).”). 3

these circumstances benefitted the principal” in a manner that would
establish personal jurisdiction. Special App’x at 26 n.13. And we have
no occasion to consider the potential application of CPLR § 302(a)(3) in that
case, see infra note 3.
       3 Edwardo does not argue that there is personal jurisdiction under
C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3), which permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant who “commits a tortious act without the state causing
injury to person or property within the state” in certain circumstances. See
Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 785 & n.2
(2d Cir. 1999).

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B.    C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1)

      Edwardo next argues that jurisdiction is proper under
§ 302(a)(1) because Magaldi’s New York meeting constituted a
business transaction, and his claims “arise from” the business activity.
Again, we disagree.

      Even assuming Defendants transacted business in New York,
the district court correctly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction
because Edwardo’s claims do not “arise from” Defendants’ business
activity. A claim “‘arises from’ a particular transaction when there
is some articulable nexus between the business transacted and the
cause of action sued upon, or when there is a substantial relationship
between the transaction and the claim asserted.” Sole Resort, S.A. de
C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2006)
(cleaned up). “Although ‘the inquiry under the statute is relatively
permissive,’ and ‘causation is not required,’ not every conceivable
connection to a New York transaction is substantial enough to confer
jurisdiction.”     Daou v. BLC Bank, S.A.L., 42 F.4th 120, 130 (2d Cir.
2022) (quoting Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 339
(2012)). “Where this necessary relatedness is lacking, the New York
Court of Appeals has characterized the claim as ‘too attenuated’ from
the transaction, or ‘merely coincidental’ with it.”    Id. (cleaned up)
(quoting Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 339–40); accord Johnson v. Ward, 4 N.Y.3d
516, 520 (2005).

      The only alleged business activity here was Magaldi’s meeting
and dinner with von Bülow. But Edwardo’s claims are unrelated to
Magaldi’s conduct during the meeting or dinner—the alleged
conduct took place at a separate location and at a separate time from
the alleged business transaction, and Edwardo pleads no facts
suggesting how Magaldi’s sexual abuse of him in New York has a

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sufficient “relatedness” to Magaldi’s discussions with von Bülow.
See Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 340 (“[T]he ‘arise-from’ prong limits the broader
‘transaction-of-business’ prong to confer jurisdiction only over those
claims in some way arguably connected to the transaction.”).

      Edwardo argues that the nexus requirement is satisfied because
Defendants’ alleged business activity, conducted through Magaldi,
was the “factual cause” of Magaldi’s sexual assault of “Edwardo in
New York.”       Appellant’s Br. at 20.      But a chain of causation
involving physical presence in New York does not, by itself, create a
nexus between an otherwise unrelated tort claim and a business
transaction. See Johnson, 4 N.Y.3d at 520 (“The relationship between
the negligence claim and defendant’s possession of a New York
license and registration at the time of the [out-of-state] accident is too
insubstantial to warrant a New York court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over defendant” under § 302(a)(1).). Rather, “the claim
asserted must arise from th[e] business activity,” Eades, 799 F.3d at
168, so that there is a “direct relation between the cause of action and
the in-state [business] conduct,” Beacon Enters., Inc. v. Menzies, 715
F.2d 757, 764 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Ramgoolie v. Ramgoolie, No. 16-CIV-
3345, 2016 WL 11281385, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2016) (“[T]he fact that
[the defendant] ‘transacted business’ in New York within the
meaning of CPLR § 302(a)(1) does not provide a basis for the Court to
exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s wholly unrelated claims” even
when the defendant’s employees worked in New York), report and
recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 564680 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2017).

                         IV.   CONCLUSION

      We have considered Edwardo’s remaining arguments and find
them to be without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
the district court.

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