Court Opinion

ID: 9760047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:39:28.169416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:07.961362
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I join the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McDermott. I also wish to add that, unlike silence in the face of Miranda warnings, an express written waiver is sufficient to meet *120the Commonwealth’s burden of proving a waiver of Miranda rights. Contrary to the majority position, North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) supports this view. In that case, the United States Supreme Court neither held nor said that a signature on a waiver form could never by itself satisfy the Miranda requirement that the defendant make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent. In fact, in Butler the United States Supreme Court said
[a]n express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.
Id. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757. This statement, to my mind, leaves the decision as to whether a written waiver is valid within the sound discretion of the trial court. Since the suppression court had sufficient basis for finding a valid waiver, I believe the trial court en banc and the Superior Court erred in reversing the suppression court. I would, therefore, reverse.
LARSEN and McDERMOTT, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.