Court Opinion

ID: 9703025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:37:15.399017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:42.922041
License: Public Domain

MONTEMURO, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I dissent from the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s award of a new trial on the issue of comparative negligence but join in the remainder of its opinion. Following a detailed review of the entire record of this case, it is my *138opinion that a finding of 70% negligence on the part of the City and Commonwealth was unreasonably excessive and grossly against the weight of the evidence. Consequently, I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a new trial solely on the issue of comparative negligence.
The record of this case sets forth incontrovertible facts and circumstances of such weight that I am convinced that an injustice has been done. It is clear from the record that, for no apparent reason, Smith, the truck driver, failed to see two large signs that directed traffic, exiting at Spring Garden Street, to bear right. There was undisputed evidence that a speed limit sign that read “Exit, 25 miles per hour” was located at the bottom of the ramp, which Smith also failed to observe. The record further indicates that two thirty inch “STOP” signs were placed at the end of the exit ramp—one on the right side and one on the left side—which Smith, again, testified that he did not see. All signs were boldly printed and in good condition. Despite these warnings, Smith proceeded up the ramp at a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour, and, while neglecting to apply his brakes, attempted to negotiate a left turn. In doing so, his right tire blew out and his tractor-trailer plunged over the bridge, killing the decedent.
The fact that Smith may have been lost or confused does not excuse his failure to comply with traffic regulations. He had a duty to operate his tractor-trailer in a manner which did not endanger any person or property, 75 Pa.C. S.A. § 3714; to operate his vehicle within the posted speed limit, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361; and to bring his vehicle to a complete stop where official “STOP” signs had been erected, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323.
The majority attempts to distinguish the facts of this case from those in Caldwell v. Piggly-Wiggly Madison Co., 32 Wis.2d 447, 145 N.W.2d 745 (1966) and Warshany v. Supermarkets General Corporation, 161 N.J.Super. 515, 391 A.2d 1271 (1978). The majority indicates that in Caldwell, the duties of each defendant involved were virtually identi*139cal as opposed to the instant case wherein the duties of Smith were different from those of the City and the Commonwealth. Similarly, the majority distinguishes Warsha-ny on the ground that in that case the court determined that the jury’s award of 50% negligence against a landowner was too low, whereas, in the case sub judice, the trial court determined that the jury’s award of 70% negligence on the part of the City and Commonwealth was too high. I do not perceive these factual differences as crucial to the determination of whether the jury’s verdict in this case was grossly against the weight of the evidence and, consequently, whether a new trial should be granted on the issue of comparative negligence. Each case depends on its unique facts and the facts of this case indicate that Smith was so flagrantly negligent in the handling of his vehicle that a finding of merely 30% liability on his part shocks my conscience.
I would affirm the order of the trial court granting a new trial on the issue of comparative negligence.