Court Opinion

ID: 9597700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:02:13.8756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:39.181351
License: Public Domain

*477Utter, J.
(concurring) — Although I concur with the majority's result and analysis, I write separately to explain more fully why the "attempt" requirement, first discussed in People v. Werblow, 241 N.Y. 55, 148 N.E. 786 (1925), should not apply in this state. Furthermore, I am concerned that the majority's opinion might be read too broadly to cover all cases in which assault and kidnapping in Washington result in murder in another jurisdiction.
Regarding the first problem, the difficulty lies in determining when a crime is committed "in part" within the state. Cardozo's Werblow opinion limited the definition by requiring an act that would amount to an attempt to commit the crime charged. Werblow, at 61. The discussion of "attempt," however, leaves room for adjustment:
Acts in furtherance of a criminal project do not reach the stage of an attempt unless they carry the project forward within dangerous proximity to the criminal end to be attained. Where the line is to be drawn will differ with different crimes. Wherever it is drawn, it marks the division between promise and partial or complete fulfillment.
(Citations omitted.) Werblow, at 61-62. In Werblow, the defendants were charged with grand larceny in obtaining money by false pretenses. They sent cablegrams and messages within the state of New York to inform the participants about their roles in the planned crime. However, both the false pretenses and the receipt of money (23,350 pounds sterling) occurred in England. Apparently the only other act that occurred in New York was the purchase of a draft for 100 pounds from a New York bank. The defendant later deposited the draft in the bank's London branch to establish his credit. The court found this act to be mere preparation and the cablegrams to be mere incitement — neither was sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
Two other states have also interpreted their statutes, in part similar to ours, to require an attempt, which they discussed as an "act beyond mere preparation." See People v. Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d 709, 256 P.2d 317 (1953); People v. *478Utter, 24 Cal. App. 3d 535, 101 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1972); People v. Holt, 91 Ill. 2d 480, 440 N.E.2d 102 (1982) (dealing with felony murder).32 However, the Utter court noted that there is no constitutional objection to a broader interpretation and that the Buffum decision establishing the requirement in California had been strongly criticized. Utter, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 224. The Holt court also noted that the federal constitution may permit greater geographical jurisdiction over crimes. Holt, 440 N.E.2d at 103.
The Holt court also emphasized a statutory limitation of "in whole or in part," which reads as follows:
(b) An offense is committed partly within this State, if either the conduct which is an element of the offense, or the result which is such an element, occurs within the State. In homicide, the 'result' is either the physical contact which causes death, or the death itself; and if the body, of a homicide victim is found within the State, the death is presumed to have occurred within the State."
Holt, at 484 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 1-5 (1979)). Based on this limitation, the court concluded that "[n]ot every element of an offense supports jurisdiction", Holt, at 487: the conduct itself, not just any conduct, must be an element. The court emphasized the history of 1-5, noting its origins in the model penal code which codified the attempt analysis of Werblow and Buffum. Holt, 440 N.E.2d at 106.
A Colorado court, construing an almost identical statute, did not consider itself bound. See People v. Cullen, 695 P.2d 750 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984). Instead, it focused on the purpose of the statute — to modify the common law and expand the scope of state territorial jurisdiction. Cullen, at *479751. See also State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 645 P.2d 784 (1982) (construing a similar statute and finding jurisdiction where buying canvas bags to hold the bodies and renting the boat in Arizona showed evidence of premeditation).
The California Supreme Court found the following statutory language limiting:
"Whenever a person, with intent to commit a crime, does any act within this state in execution or part execution of such intent, which culminates in the commission of a crime, either within or without this state such person is punishable for such crime in this state in the same manner as if the same had been committed entirely within this state."
Buffum, at 715 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 778a). The court emphasized the words in execution or part execution of and culminates, finding the latter analogous to the attempt requirement of a "'direct' ineffectual act towards consummation of the crime." Buffum, at 716. In lieu of analyzing the in whole or in part language of another statutory section, the court merely stated that Werblow and previous California case law make it "apparent" that an attempt is required. Buffum, 256 P.2d at 320; see also People v. MacDonald, 24 Cal. App. 2d 702, 76 P.2d 121, 125 (1938) (relying on Werblow and requiring an "act" that is an "essential ingredient of the crime").
In construing a similar statute, however, the Nevada Supreme Court looked at the defendant's conduct as a whole, finding kidnapping to be "partial execution" of an overall plot to assault and murder the victim. Smith v. State, 101 Nev. 167, 697 P.2d 113, 114 (1985). Moreover, Nevada had previously adopted the "attempt" analysis in Vincze v. Sheriff, Cy. of Clark, 86 Nev. 474, 470 P.2d 427 (1970). In Smith v. State, supra, the court modified the attempt rule to make it inapplicable "when a defendant commits criminal acts in Nevada which are a substantial and integral part of an overall continuing crime plan, and which are clearly in 'partial execution' of the plan ..." 101 Nev. at 169.
*480Washington statutes, though, contain no counterpart for the definition of "partly" in the Illinois statute or the limitation in the California statute. The language "in whole or in part" dates from the criminal code enacted in 1909. Laws of 1909, ch. 249, § 2, p. 890. Nonetheless, our statute enlarges Washington's criminal jurisdiction without completely departing from the territorial basis required by common law. See 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 16.2(c), at 349 (1984). At common law, a state could criminalize an act if the conduct or results occurred within the state. 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, at 347. A concomitant notion, that a crime had only one situs, limited the territoriality principle. 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, at 347. As Professor LaFave notes, the situs principle has been expanded, but conduct within the state is still required. The cases are not to the contrary. The dispute centers upon how much activity is required and upon whether the conduct itself must be an element of the crime.
Although the conduct in this case is not in itself an element, the alleged conduct provides evidence of premeditation. Where premeditation is an element, as it was not in Werblow, conduct evidencing premeditation is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. See also State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 645 P.2d 784 (1982). I find this interpretation consonant with the trend toward expanded jurisdiction in criminal cases but still within the basic concept of territoriality. There is no reason to cling to the strict territorial interpretation of an earlier era.
The remaining concern, then, is whether the assault and kidnapping alone provide sufficient indication of premeditation. The concern is with a case where a defendant assaults and kidnaps a victim in one state but does not form the intent to kill or premeditate concerning the killing until within another jurisdiction. That concern would be particularly great where the murder occurred not minutes or hours after crossing the state line but perhaps days or weeks later. The term "integrally related" may not provide *481enough definition in such a case, but we need not consider that question today.
In addition to the kidnapping and assault in the present case, the State alleges evidence of defendants' discussions about killing the victim in revenge for her testifying against them in an earlier trial. They went to her home "to fix her"; they took her to a remote area "to dispose of her"; and they brought a gun with them to her home. These allegations, if proved, provide additional evidence of premeditation in Washington. See State v. Ollens, 107 Wn.2d 848, 853, 733 P.2d 984 (1987) (motive and procurement of a weapon are factors to consider in determining premeditation). These indicia give direction and purpose to the acts of assault and kidnapping. Therefore, I concur.
Reconsideration denied June 14, 1989.

The Missouri Court of Appeals has ruled that premeditation is not enough to confer jurisdiction where a defendant is charged with capital murder. State v. Harvey, 730 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). The court's arguments are unpersuasive, however, because Missouri does not have a statute abrogating the common law jurisdictional rules. Strict territorial analysis is subject to considerable scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the State Criminal Law, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 763 (1960).