Court Opinion

ID: 9808596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:43:31.631527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:17.144848
License: Public Domain

GURICH, J.,
with whom KAUGER, J.,
joins concurring in part, dissenting in part:
T1 I write separately to point out several critical facts omitted from the majority opinion. While I concur that under the particular cireumstances, the attorney in this case should be disqualified; I do not believe lawyers should be per se prohibited from interviewing a child witness in custody disputes. Of paramount importance in any legal decision affecting the welfare of a child is consideration of his or her best interests. The majority opinion renders this basic principle subservient to the mother's custodial rights and the majority's perceived transgression of ethical boundaries governing attorney conduct.
12 First, the abuse suffered by the minor child in this case was shocking. So much so, the trial court issued an emergency order placing custody of the child with father 1-a direct result of the efforts undertaken by counsel and father. There were allegations the step-father drank excessively, hit the minor child, and imposed inappropriate discipline such as forced calisthenics. Additionally, it was suggested mother inflicted undue physical punishment on her son. However, the real issue presented in the trial court was the sexual abuse endured by this child. Although mother and step-father were not the perpetrators, mother had knowledge of the child's illicit encounters. She discovered the molestation and notified father. However, she apparently did not fully disclose the severity of the situation and urged him not to confront the child. On January 11, 2014, the child voluntarily disclosed the ongoing sexual activity to his father.
3 Three times before the 2014 emergency action, DHS was notified about the safety and well-being of the minor child. In 2008 (Referral #11684* *), DHS investigated alleged abuse following a report by the child's pediatrician.2 Mother refused to allow the child to be interviewed. Nevertheless, DHS concluded the concerns were unsubstantiated and took no action. A second investigation was initiated in April 2013 (Referral #11568* *). Again, DHS concluded no action was warranted. A third inquiry was commenced in May 2018 (Referral # 15315* *), after the child expressed suicidal idea tions. DHS found no intervention was necessary, but noted mother and father's will*1209ingness to obtain psychotherapy for their eight-year old son. After beginning counseling sessions, mother unilaterally terminated the therapy after only a couple of months.
T4 After receiving. no assistance from DHS and weighing the urgency of the situation, father sought to protect his son by contacting his attorney. While the attorney's interview in this case may have exceeded what was necessary, there is no ethical proscription which forbids attorney interviews of children.3 Moreover, at the time the child was not represented by counsel and a guardian ad litem had not been appointed. Inherent in a lawyer's responsibilities is the obligation to thoroughly evaluate the facts of each case. This includes seeking information through witness interviews. It should be noted that Mr. Thomas served as a Tulsa County Sheriff's Deputy for ten years prior to entering law school. During his service, Mr. Thomas interviewed numerous victims of criminal acts, including child and domestic abuse.4
T5 The route taken by attorney and father in this case was pursuit of an emergency custody order via 43 0.8.2011 § 107.4. Utilization of emergency custody relief demands thorough assessment of the allegations presented by a client; more so than the ordinary due diligence mandated by 12 0.8.Supp.2018 § 2011. Such a tactical approach was almost certainly more prompt and effective in protecting the child in this case than notifying DHS and waiting for their investigation.5 In fact, it is likely DHS would have insisted father pursue an emergency custody order lest he face a custodial placement with the state for failing to protect his son. See generally OAC 840:75-3-300.
T6 The majority opinion also infers father had no authority over decisions affecting his son and that his actions were somehow viola-tive of mother's status as legal custodian. While 10 0.8.2011 $ 7800 and its predecessor vests a mother with custody prior to a court order adjudicating paternity, it does not eliminate the intrinsic constitutional rights vested in a natural parent-in this case there was no dispute over father's biological relationship with the child. In truth, father had an absolute right to take the action he did in furtherance of protecting his son. See 48 0.8.2011 § 111.4(A) ("A parent who, in good faith and with a reasonable belief supported by fact, determines that the child of that parent is the victim of child abuse or neglect, or suffers from effects of domestic violence, may take necessary actions to protect the child, including refusing to permit visitation.")(emphasis added).
T7 Accordingly, while I agree that the attorney for the father exceeded his role as an advocate gathering and evaluating the facts, I dissent to what I perceive as blanket restrictions placed by the majority on attorneys seeking to serve their clients and protect children from abuse.

. Throughout the majority opinion, father is referred to as "Client," despite mother admitting his parentage and father exercising visitation with the child throughout the pendency of this case. Further, DHS reports identify Michael Jensen as a Parent/Person Responsible for Child (PRFC). Michael Jensen is the father of the minor child in this case, regardless of the trial court's failure to enter a paternity order for nearly nine years. Adjudication of paternity is necessary for purposes of custody determinations, not for recognition of a man as the father to his children. See 10 0.$.2001 § 6 and 10 0.8.2011 § 7800.

. The majority opinion makes no mention of this 2008 DHS inquiry.

. According the majority, father's attorney prepared and submitted the child's affidavit in a tactical move designed to "prevent mother from calling child as a witness." Such a characterization of the testimony misconstrues the actual intent of father's attorney. He testified that the affidavit was done in lieu of bringing him to court on the emergency, ""to protect [child] so he doesn't have to sit in this [witness] chair." Tr. at 84, lines 3-4. Nothing about submission of the affidavit prevented either parent from calling the child as a witness at the subsequent show cause hearing or from urging the trial court to interview the child in camera.

. Mr. Thomas' interview with the child likely crossed the line between an attorney ascertaining relevant facts in furtherance of pursuing an emergency custody order for father and the role of a law enforcement officer investigating an alleged criminal act. It was this particular variable in the facts presented which I believe supports the trial court's disqualification ruling.

. The majority emphasizes Mr. Thomas' violation of the law by not promptly reporting the alleged abuse to DHS pursuant to 10A O0.S.Supp.2013 § 1-2-101. However, Mr. Thomas did report the abuse after being directed to do so by the trial court. The revelation of sexual abuse occurred during a weekend when child was safely in father's care. Both the emergency application and notice to DHS was given the first business day following the weekend-Monday January 13, 2014. Faced with allegations of serious abuse and time constraints due to trial court docket availability, attorneys should. have discretion to pursue emergency custody orders without first notifying DHS, as long as notice is given. As a practical matter, emergency custody matters are often presented to the court first, with trial judges directing notice to DHS when necessary.