Court Opinion

ID: 9736813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:07:24.626836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:54.836813
License: Public Domain

VERNON R. PEDERSON, Surrogate Justice,
dissenting.
The record in this case supports a conclusion that Struekness’ relationship to Speedway, Inc., is an ambiguity. Some of the evidence does corroborate the conclusion that Struekness is an employee, other evidence negates that conclusion — not an uncommon scenario when complex commercial contracts are oral.
Judicial deference toward administrative agency determinations ordinarily warrant affirmance. However, I believe that those cases which tend to allow only a blind, knee-jerk deference ought to be reexamined and redefined to permit courts to reject administrative agency determinations such as those which make a mockery of due process offered by an administrative law hearing proceeding which has been handled by an experienced hearing officer who has made adequate findings and conclusions.
*531Although it might appear from this court’s holding in Schultz v. North Dakota Department of Human Services, 372 N.W.2d 888 (N.D.1985), that in this state judicial deference is absolute, we have not always followed that practice. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Knutson, 278 N.W.2d 383 (N.D.1979); Insurance Services Office v. Knutson, 283 N.W.2d 395 (N.D.1979); and Blocker Drilling Canada, Ltd. v. Conrad, 354 N.W.2d 912 (N.D.1984).
Some jurisdictions have specifically held that an agency may not reject its hearing officer’s finding unless there is no competent substantial evidence from which the finding could be inferred. Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, 475 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla.Ct.App.1985). See generally also The Procedural Due Process Approach to Administrative Discretion: The Courts’ Inverted Analysis, 95 Yale L.J. 1017 (1986), and Keeping ’Em Honest, 62 Law Inst.J. 836.