Court Opinion

ID: 9819337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:23:06.204445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:30.088614
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, specially concurring: I write this special concurrence only to make it clear as to what we are not deciding. The instant case comes to us on the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. We are not deciding the question of whether the City was guilty of an “affirmatively negligent act.” A question of fact exists concerning the need for notice. The Harding court had the benefit of all the evidence presented at trial. Harding also relied on Dziewatkowski in stating “when an affirmative act of a municipality’s agents or employees causes a dangerous condition, no actual or constructive notice of said condition is required.” Harding, 228 Ill. App. 3d at 571, 591 N.E.2d at 959. Additionally, Harding found that evidence suggested the dangerous condition was created by defendants’ employees and that these facts provided actual or constructive notice to the City. It is, at the most, premature to say the City caused the dangerous condition. The facts in Dziewatkowski relied on by the Harding court are considerably different than what is known here. In Dziewatkowski, plaintiff fell on a mud-coated sidewalk adjacent to a site where city workers had dug a parkway. Nothing in the record suggests the City had done anything with respect to altering the condition of the meter and cover other than a periodic reading of the meter, the last reading — prior to the incident— being June 2, 1995. No facts suggest any construction project. The facts as they develop on remand may show the immunity statute should apply.