Court Opinion

ID: 9717349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:02:07.291184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:52.736576
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Doyle:
I agree with the majority opinion insofar as it resolves the counterclaim pertaining to abuse of process. I respectfully dissent, however, from that portion of the opinion which would reverse the trial court on the issue of the exclusiveness of the arbitration remedy. In this *367matter I would affirm the trial court’s order to grant the police officers’ demurrer.
The police officers contend that they have stated a cause of action under Section 1190 of the Borough Code (Code),1 53 P.S. §46190, by pleading that the Borough improperly furloughed them despite ending its fiscal year with a budgetary surplus. Succinctly stated, in my view, their furlough was not an issue, nor did it give rise to a grievance, under the collective bargaining contract, after that agreement expired.2 Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local No. 258, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 430 U.S. 243 (1977), upon which the majority relies, is clearly distinguishable. There the subject matter of the dispute was the right of the employees to severance pay upon the employer’s cessation of business or upon a plant closing and was specifically covered by a provision in the collective bargaining agreement.3 The dispute in Nolde, therefore, did arise under the collective bargaining contract and was a condition of employment during its term. It was a benefit the employees earned by their labor under the terms of the contract itself. This is not the situation in the case now presented to us. The collective bargaining agreement in the present case nowhere addresses the issue of, nor deals with the proce*368dure for, determining a reduction of the police force for economic or other reasons.
Section 1190 of the Code pertinently provides:
If for reasons of economy or other reasons it shall be deemed necessary by any borough to reduce the number of paid employes of the police or fire force, then such borough shall apply the following procedure: (i) if there are any employes eligible for retirement under the terms of any retirement or pension law, if the party to be retired exceeds the maximum age as defined in the act of October 27, 1955 (P.L. 744, No. 222), known as the ‘Pennsylvania Human Relations Act,’ then such reduction in numbers shall be made by retirement of such employes, starting with the oldest employe and following in order of age respectively, (ii) if the number of paid employes in the police force or fire force eligible to retirement is insufficient to effect the necessary reduction in numbers, or if there are no persons eligible for retirement, or if no retirement or pension fund exists, then the reduction shall be effected by furloughing the person or persons, including probationers, last appointed to the respective force. Such removal shall be accomplished by furloughing in numerical order commencing with the person last appointed until such reduction shall have been accomplished.
It would seem to me, therefore, that if in fact any furlough rights were violated, the violation was not one occurring under the contract, but was purely statutory and, hence, Act 1114 arbitration is inapplicable.
Moreover, the provisions for grieving disputes between AFSCME and the Borough in the collective bar*369gaining agreement itself would seem to clearly indicate that such an event as a reduction-in-force (RIF) under Section 1190 of the Code was not within the parties’ contemplation.5
This Court has previously considered on appeal issues concerning a RIF under Section 1190 of the Code where the litigation was instituted by filing a complaint in assumpsit, Kraftician v. Borough of Carnegie, 35 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 470, 386 A.2d 1064 (1978) (when a RIF is deemed necessary under Section 1190 of Code it is proper to furlough the oldest police officer while hiring and retaining part-time non-civil service “special police”). We have likewise dealt with cases addressing the identical provisions in Section 313 of the Police Tenure Act,6 where litigation was commenced by filing a suit in equity and mandamus, Gruver v. Howell, 28 Pa. Common*370wealth Ct. 296, 368 A.2d 920 (1977) (a reduction in the police force of a second class township for reasons of economy, even though not experiencing a financial crisis, was proper), and where an action for declaratory judgment and an appeal were filed under the Local Agency Law, Minnick v. Borough of Hyndman, 116 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 361, 541 A.2d 1179 (1988) (furlough of chief of police, the only police officer in the borough, because of the lack of funds to purchase a police car).
While it is true that in the three cases cited, the procedural posture of the case itself was not an issue, we can fairly assume that the police officers in at least two of those matters were members of a collective bargaining unit employed under a collective bargaining agreement, since Act 111 was adopted in 1968, years before the cases were decided.
Last, although I cannot disagree with the majority’s view that the police officers’ complaint alleges a breach of the collective bargaining agreement, such an allegation is a conclusion of law. When the police officers in their complaint as plaintiffs, point to no specific provision of the agreement which has been breached, when we find none upon close examination, and the answer of the Borough asserts that the furloughs were for budgetary reasons only,7 (an allegation admitted for the purposes of a demurrer), the legal conclusion is inescapable that the furloughs at issue here were under the statutory provisions of Section 1190 of the Code and not under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the grievance and arbitration procedures contained in the agreement as well as the provisions of Act 111 are totally inapplicable.

 Act of February 1, 1966, P.L (1965) 1656, as amended.

 The parties to the agreement were the Borough of Philipsburg and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, District Council 83 (AFSCME).

 Article IX, section 5 of that agreement, provided in pertinent part:
Section 5. Each full-time employee who is permanently displaced from his employment with the Company by reason of... the closing of an entire plant, ... shall be compensated for such displacement providing he has been actively employed by the Company for a period of at least three (3) years.

 The Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, 43 P.S. §§217.1-217.10.

 Article XV of the collective bargaining agreement, denominated GRIEVANCES, deals in substance only with the following subjects:
A. Should a dispute arise between the Borough and a Police Officer, there shall be no suspension of work on account of such dispute, but a grievance shall be filed and settled in accordance with the grievance procedures hereinafter set forth except that flagrant insubordination, intoxication on duty, or any action which must be taken immediately [sic]. No orders shall be disobeyed prior to completion of the within grievance procedure.
E. . . . The scope of the matter cognizable through the above grievance procedure shall include all matters pertaining to the terms and conditions of employment found in this contract.
F. No officer shall be disciplined, demoted, suspended or discharged without just cause. (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore-, the procedure for resolving a grievance outlined in the agreement, which culminates in binding arbitration, seems also unlikely to resolve a dispute over whether the Borough had “economic or other reasons” to reduce the size of the police force.

 The Act of June 15, 1951, P.L. 586, as amended, 53 P.S. §813.

 Paragraph 84 in Answer of Borough.