Court Opinion

ID: 9550403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:34:59.266424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:30.506270
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result. As noted in the majority opinion in State v. Crowder, 155 Ariz. 477, 747 P.2d 1176 (1987), we modified the strict rule enunciated in Lukens and Phillips.
In Crowder, Justice Moeller concurred in part and dissented in part stating:
I was not a member of the court when either Phillips or Lukens was decided. I am mindful that precedents of the court should not lightly be overruled and certainly not for reasons so inconsequential as a change of personnel on the court. We now have enough experience in Phillips to know that it is creating great mischief in Arizona’s criminal justice system. The instant case is but one example of that mischief. In an effort to be scrupulously fair, the court in Phillips announced a wide-ranging rule which has now proved to be both unworkable and unnecessary. I perceive no infirmity whatsoever'under either the constitution or Rule 17 in imposing restitution upon a defendant who has been advised that the law requires it, who has agreed to it, and who has the right to have a hearing relative to the amount and manner of its payment. For this reason, I respectfully suggest that we should revise Phillips now and withdraw the broad rule there announced, rather than attempt to limit its effect in a piecemeal fashion.
State v. Crowder, 155 Ariz. 477, 747 P.2d 1176, 1182 (1987).
I now agree with Justice Moeller’s dissent in Crowder.
In the present case, the record establishes that defendant was fully aware of the essential and relevant terms of the plea *116agreement and its material consequences . to him, including the fact that he would have to make restitution in some amount and might be fined over $150,000. The only thing defendant did not know was the amount of restitution he would have to pay for loss of property since this had not been computed. Given the possible fate that awaited defendant, and the advantageous plea offered, it seems unlikely that the precise amount of restitution would have been a relevant consideration in defendant’s voluntary decision to accept the plea agreement.
Assuming that the defendant may not have been told the precise amount of restitution, it would appear that the amount of restitution, $78.00, could not have been a relevant factor in defendant’s decision-making process. Where it is a relevant factor and an issue, the facts will be examined with a critical eye. Crowder at 482, 747 P.2d 1181. Plea bargains however, should be honored by both parties, and withdrawal will be allowed only when it may fairly be said that the agreement was involuntary because defendant lacked information of true importance in reaching a decision. In the instant case, the precise amount of restitution was hot a material factor in defendant’s voluntary decision to enter into a plea agreement. I would agree with the State that such portions of Lukens, Phillips and Crowder, supra, contrary to this dissent should be overruled.