Court Opinion

ID: 9584265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:46:08.055264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:19.732572
License: Public Domain

Jansen, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant1 had sufficient minimum contacts with Michigan to support assertion of limited personal jurisdiction. I would hold that the exercise of limited personal jurisdiction in this case constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause, US Const, Am XIV. Consequently, I would reverse the order of the trial court.
Our Supreme Court has stated that the constitutional inquiry in this regard is whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Witbeck v Bill Cody’s Ranch Inn, 428 Mich 659, 666; 411 NW2d 439 (1987), citing Int'l *571Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316; 66 S Ct 154; 90 L Ed 95 (1945). In determining whether sufficient minimum contacts exist between a defendant and Michigan to support Michigan’s exercise of limited personal jurisdiction, the court is to apply a three-pronged test. First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Michigan, thus invoking the benefits and protections of this state’s laws. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities in the state. Third, the defendant’s activities must be so substantially connected with Michigan to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. Starbrite Distributing, Inc v Excelda Mfg Co, 454 Mich 302, 309; 562 NW2d 640 (1997), citing Jeffrey v Rapid American Corp, 448 Mich 178, 186; 529 NW2d 644 (1995). I would hold that the facts of this case do not support a finding of sufficient minimum contacts to assert personal jurisdiction over defendant.
First, I do not find that defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Michigan. Our Supreme Court has stated that the defendant’s own conduct with the forum must be examined in order to determine whether the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Id., p 187. The unilateral acts of unrelated third parties may not be used to justify the imposition of personal jurisdiction. Id. The requirement of purposeful availment ensures that a partnership will not be subjected to jurisdiction on the basis of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts. Id.
The facts of this case indicate that defendant’s contacts with Michigan are attenuated. In fact, defendant’s contacts with Michigan are almost nonexistent. *572Defendant is a partnership of Canadian chartered accountants based in Toronto, Ontario. Defendant audited the consolidated financial statement of Confederation Life Insurance Company (cue) in 1991, 1992, and 1993. Defendant has no physical presence in Michigan: it has no employees or property in Michigan, has never done business in Michigan, and has provided no auditing or accounting services in Michigan. Additionally, cue is a mutual insurance company organized in Canada, with its principal place of business in Canada, although it did business throughout the United States and the United Kingdom as well. Cue is a Canadian company regulated by Canadian insurance authorities. Michigan is merely cue’s state of entry into the United States, but this does not make even cue a Michigan resident.
More importantly, the question regarding the foreseeability of defendant’s audits being relied upon in Michigan is not sufficient to create the proper exercise of limited personal jurisdiction. Forseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286, 295; 100 S Ct 559; 62 L Ed 2d 490 (1980). Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state that must be such that the defendant should. reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Id., p 297. Indeed, defendant never directly sent any of its audit reports or opinions to anyone in Michigan. Thus, the audit reports did not create any special relationship or contact with Michigan. Our Supreme Court’s decision in Khalaf v Bankers & Shippers Ins Co, 404 Mich 134; 273 NW2d 811 (1978), *573is particularly instructive on this point. The Court in Khalaf, pp 145-146, stated:
Proof alone that a nonresident caused an effect in Michigan that was foreseeable does not establish a relationship to Michigan such as to make it fair and reasonable to subject the nonresident to jurisdiction. A nonresident insurance agent is not subject to long-arm jurisdiction in an action for negligent procurement of insurance solely on evidence that i) he knows the insured may engage in activities outside the state in which the insured’s activities are generally centered and the agreement to procure insurance was made and ii) he agreed to procure insurance which covered those activities.
Because defendant had no conduct or connection with Michigan, it could not reasonably anticipate being haled into court in this state.2 Therefore, I would find that defendant did not purposefully avail itself of the benefits of Michigan law and had insufficient contacts with Michigan to sustain Michigan’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendant.
With respect to the second and third prongs, neither of those has been met either. The cause of action did not arise from defendant’s activities within this state because defendant conducted no activities within Michigan. Further, defendant having no activi*574ties within Michigan, its activities are not so substantially connected with Michigan to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.
Finally, at this juncture, I would note that plaintiff could bring suit against defendant in a Canadian forum. In fact, plaintiff is litigating issues against defendant in a proceeding in Ontario. Therefore, the fact that personal jurisdiction does not arise in Michigan does not mean that Michigan policyholders of cue are without legal recourse.
I would reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition that was based on lack of personal jurisdiction.

 In this opinion, defendant will refer solely to Ernst & Young-Canada because it is the only defendant involved in this appeal.

 For other factually similar cases involving insufficient minimum contacts over foreign accountants, see, e.g., General Electric Capital Corp v Grossman, 991 F2d 1376, 1387-1388 (CA 8, 1993) (Canadian auditors did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Minnesota by sending a copy of a certification of net equity of the Canadian subsidiary of the Minnesota corporation to the parent’s directors in Minnesota or by sending the Canadian subsidiary’s financial statements to auditors in Minnesota); Young v Federal Deposit Ins Corp, 103 F3d 1180, 1190-1192 (CA 4, 1997) (Bahamian accounting firm did not have sufficient minimum contacts with South Carolina where it used information contained in a standard bank confirmation form submitted to a South Carolina bank to substantiate its audit of an insurance company’s financial statement).