Court Opinion

ID: 9701621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:27:37.117157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:34.750794
License: Public Domain

BEVILACQUA, Chief Justice,
with whom KELLEHER, Justice, joins,
dissenting.
The sole issue before us is whether prejudgment interest must be added to the amount recoverable against the state under G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-31-1, as enacted by P.L.1970, ch. 181, § 2, and, if so, whether the total judgment may exceed the maximum amount of damages recoverable under the act.
Our opinion turns on the following language of § 9-31-1 and of the prejudgment interest statute.
Section 9-31-1 provides that
“[t]he state of Rhode Island and any political subdivision thereof, including all cities and towns, shall, subject to the period of limitations set forth in § 9-1-25, hereby be liable in all actions of tort in the same manner as a private individual or corporation, provided however, that any recovery in any such action shall not exceed the monetary limitations thereof set forth in the chapter.”
Section 9-31-2, as amended by P.L.1974, ch. 39, § 1, provides that
“[i]n any tort action against the state of Rhode Island, any damages recovered therein shall not exceed the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000); provided, however, that in all instances in which the state was engaged in a proprietory function in the commission of such tort, or in any situation whereby the state has agreed to indemnify the federal government or any agency thereof for any tort liability, the limitation on damages set forth in this action shall not apply.”
At the time the judgment was entered, the prejudgment interest statute, G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-21-10, as amended by P.L.1977, ch. 10, § 1 provided that
“[i]n any civil action in which a verdict is rendered or a decision be made for pecuniary damages, there shall be added by the clerk of the court to the amount of damages, interest at the rate of eight per cent (8%) per annum thereon from the date the cause of action accrued which shall be included in the judgment entered therein. This section shall not apply until entry of judgment or to any contractural [sic] obligation where interest is already provided or as to any condemnation action.” 3
In enacting § 9-31-1, the Legislature intended to reduce the broad notion of sovereign immunity.4 Calhoun v. City of Providence, 120 R.I. 619, 390 A.2d 350 (1978). As the majority points out, it is well established that because a waiver-of-immunity statute is in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed. See Brown University v. Granger, 19 R.I. 704, 36 A. 720 (1897). In construing a waiver-of-immunity *1297statute, it is presumed that the Legislature did not intend to deprive the state of any part of its sovereign power unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed or arises by necessary implication from the statutory language. Id. Stated another way, a private act passed for the benefit of an individual having a claim against the state is strictly construed against him. Markham v. State, 99 R.I. 650, 210 A.2d 146 (1965).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is well established that, under the canons of statutory construction, we are required to give effect to all parts of the statute, if reasonably possible, in keeping with its declared purpose. See Carey v. Clark, 82 R.I. 412, 111 A.2d 238 (1955). Thus, we must give the words used their ordinary and customary meaning unless a contrary intention appears on the face of the statute. Andreozzi v. D’Antuono, 113 R.I. 155, 319 A.2d 16 (1974). If the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the Legislature’s intended meaning and the statute must be interpreted literally. Rhode Island Chamber of Commerce v. Hackett, R.I., 411 A.2d 300 (1980); Little v. Conflict of Interest Commission, R.I., 397 A.2d 884 (1979); Brier Mfg. Co. v. Norberg, 119 R.I. 317, 377 A.2d 345 (1977).
We also note that interest statutes are in derogation of the common law and, therefore, must be strictly construed. Gott v. Norberg, R.I., 417 A.2d 1352 (1980); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Director of Public Works, 104 R.I. 436, 244 A.2d 853 (1968). Moreover, we have held that the purpose of the prejudgment interest statute is to accelerate the settlement of claims.5 Pray v. Narragansett Improvement Co., R.I., 434 A.2d 923 (1981); Isserlis v. State Director of Public Works, 111 R.I. 164, 300 A.2d 273 (1973).
With the foregoing principles in mind, we will examine the language of the respective statutes. Section 9-31-1 unambiguously holds the state “liable in all actions of tort in the same manner as a private individual or corporation * * The plain meaning of these words is that the state has rendered itself liable to the same extent as other tort litigants and, like them, is liable upon any judgment that the court might properly determine. Therefore, we find that because a private person is liable under § 9-21-10 for prejudgment interest on the amount of damages awarded in a wrongful death action, the state is equally liable.6
We must now ascertain whether prejudgment interest may be awarded in a tort action against the state where the resulting judgment would exceed the monetary limitation of § 9-31-2. The section provides that “[i]n any tort action against the state * * * any damages recovered therein shall not exceed the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) * * *.”7 Resolution of the instant question hinges on the meaning of the term “damages.” As the majority points out, prejudgment interest is not an element of “damages.” Rather, “damages” refers only to the amount of the jury award whereas prejudgment interest is peremptorily added to the verdict by the clerk of the court. See Pray v. Narragansett Improvement Co., supra. Therefore, we conclude that the $50,000 monetary limitation in the act on the amount of “damages” limits only *1298the amount of the verdict rendered, not the total amount of the judgment (including prejudgment interest). This conclusion accords with the legislative purpose of the act of exposing the state to the same liability as that of other tort litigants, who, of course, are liable for prejudgment interest in addition to damages.
Accordingly, we find that the trial justice did not err in denying the state’s motion to amend the judgment.
The judgment, therefore, should be affirmed.

. Under the present interest statute, enacted by P.L.1981, ch. 54, § 1, the interest rate is 12 per cent per annum.

. Although G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-31-1, as enacted by P.L.1970, ch. 181, § 2, reduces the sovereign immunity of the state, the Legislature did not intend to impose liability on the state for any and all acts or omissions of its employees or officers who might cause injury to persons. Calhoun v. City of Providence, 120 R.I. 619, 390 A.2d 350 (1978). Certain governmental functions cannot be the subject of tort claims because important societal interests are at stake. Id. Thus, activities such as judicial decision making and the enforcement of the criminal law by the Attorney General must be engaged in by these officials freely, independently, and untrammeled by the possibilities of personal liability. Id.

. The interest statute does not apply to all civil cases. Even though the Legislature amended the interest statute in 1976 to apply to “any civil action,” we have construed the statute to apply only to those actions sounding in tort or contract. See Gott v. Norberg, R.I., 417 A.2d 1352 (1980).

. We find this a proper conclusion, moreover, because the intent behind the interest statute, of promoting the early settlement of claims, applies equally to actions against the state as against a private person. See Pray v. Narragansett Improvement Co., R.I., 434 A.2d 923 (1981).

.This monetary limitation does not apply in circumstances in which the state was acting in a proprietory function or had agreed to indemnify the federal government for tort liability. General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-31-2, as amended by P.L.1974, ch. 39, § 1.