Court Opinion

ID: 9700063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:08:36.609742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:03.724093
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
BENDER, J.:
¶ 11 respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 “It is absolutely crucial to remember that when reviewing the grant of a mistrial sua sponte, “we resolve any doubt’ in favor of the liberty of the citizen, rather than *1259exercise [of] what could be an unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary judicial discretion.” Commonwealth v. Kelly, 797 A.2d 925, 942 (Pa.Super.2002) (citation omitted).
¶ 3 By affirming the judgment in this case, the Majority vitiates the defendant’s protection against double jeopardy and gives the prosecution another chance to convict where the victim’s own testimony undermines the Commonwealth’s claims. Such a course is, at best, an empty gesture unsupported by a sufficient justification for the trial court’s decision, sua sponte, to end the first trial in a mistrial. In point of fact, the prosecution’s failure to lay the appropriate foundation for testimony seeking to impeach the victim’s recollection with prior inconsistent statements, could have been excused by the trial court in the “interests of justice” pursuant to Pa.R.E. 613(b)9. Although I recognize the trial court’s good faith in striving to achieve the evidentiary benchmark set by the Rule, the discretion the Rule itself affords the court eliminates the need for strict application whenever the just resolution of the case renders untenable adherence to the fine points of procedure counseled by subsections (1), (2), and (3). Because the trial court failed to apply that more measured remedy as an alternative to a mistrial, I find no convincing demonstration of the “manifest necessity” on which a trial court’s exercise of discretion must be based. See Kelly, 797 A.2d at 936-37 (reaffirming that trial judge may declare mistrial sua sponte only on the basis of manifest necessity).
¶ 4 Moreover, the record at the previous trial demonstrates that the safeguards imposed by Rule 613 were observed even if technical compliance with the Rule was not achieved. Both the prosecution and the defense questioned the victim as to whether she remembered what she said to treating medical personnel, see Pa.R.E. 613(b)(1), (2), and the victim, in turn, stated that she did not remember what she said. Thereafter, the trial court ruled that the victim’s prior inconsistent statements were admissible and permitted several treating medical personnel to testify about the statements the victim made to them regarding penetration. Presumably, they testified precisely as they would at a new trial, albeit without the benefit of the court’s later invocation of Rule 613(b), which set in motion a well-intended but ill-advised impetus toward mistrial.
¶ 5 Significantly, the Commonwealth responded to the trial court that the fact of the victim’s age and the fact that she testified on both direct examination and cross-examination that she could not recall her statements each weighed in favor of a relaxation of the rule to further the inter*1260ests of justice. See N.T. Trial, 2/8/2006, at 257. I concur in that assessment.- Given that both the prosecution and the defense had the opportunity to examine the victim regarding her conversations with the treating medical personnel, and, given that several treating medical personnel had already testified on this subject, the “interests of justice” weighed in favor of the trial judge relaxing the Commonwealth’s strict compliance with the Rule’s requirements. This is especially true, since neither Appellant nor the Commonwealth sought a mistrial at that stage of the proceedings. In my view, these circumstances eliminate any possibility that manifest necessity might have existed to sustain the court’s grant of a mistrial.
• ¶ 6 Because I conclude that the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial is not supported by “manifest necessity,” I would also conclude that the court abused its discretion subsequently when it denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the current prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. See Kelly, 797 A.2d at 942. I recognize that such a ruling would eliminate the possibility that the most serious charges in the information will ever' be resolved in court. Likewise, I am well aware of the complexity of the issues presented in this case, and the learned trial judge’s attempts to resolve those issues properly and impartially. Nevertheless, I cannot countenance the Majority’s compromise of the defendant’s constitutional rights, first to have his trial completed expeditiously, and second to avoid being “twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V; Pa. Const, art. I, § 10. See also 18 Pa.C.S. § 109(1). These rights are paramount and may never be subordinated to rigid adherence to a Rule of Evidence, especially where the record reveals that the Rule’s requirement was satisfied in substance, and the Rule itself permits its relaxation in the interests of justice, see Pa.R.E. 613(b). Given these realities, I can find little common ground with the Majority; in point of fact, its disposition serves only to create a risk of — or potential for — conviction, which, even if the product of a perfect trial, will stand in plain violation of double jeopardy and, not coincidentally, the “interests of justice.” See id.
¶ 7 In my view, the trial court’s order should be reversed and the defendant discharged. As the Majority declines this course, I must respectfully dissent.
¶ 8 BOWES, J., joins this Dissenting Opinion and also joins the Dissenting Opinion filed by KLEIN, J. KLEIN, J., Concurs in the Result of this Dissenting Opinion and files a separate Dissenting Opinion.

. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 613 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Rule 613. Prior statements of witnesses
(a) Examining witness concerning prior inconsistent statement. A witness may be examined concerning a prior inconsistent statement made by the witness, whether written or not, and the statement need not be shown or its contents disclosed to the witness at that time, but on request the statement or contents shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Unless the interests of justice otherwise require, extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is admissible only if, during the examination of the witness,
(1) the statement, if written, is shown to, or if not written, its contents are disclosed to, the witness;
(2) the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the making of the statement; and
(3) the opposing party is given an opportunity to question the witness.
This section does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 803(25) (relating to admissions by a party-opponent).