Court Opinion

ID: 9940260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 19:04:10.762661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:41.505651
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/13/24 Ashlock v. Beremesh CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

BRADLEY ASHLOCK,                                                 B319392

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct.
         v.                                                      No. 19STCV26472)

ARSEN BEREMESH et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from the judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, John P. Doyle and Bruce G. Iwasaki, Judges.
Affirmed.
      The Wallace Firm and Bradley S. Wallace; Joseph S.
Socher for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Yoka Smith, Aaron S. Case and Christine C. De Metruis for
Defendants and Respondents.
                    __________________________
       Bradley Ashlock appeals from the judgments entered in
favor of Arsen Beremesh and Turo Inc. after the trial court
granted the summary judgment motions filed by Beremesh and
Turo. Ashlock alleged causes of action for negligence and
negligent entrustment arising from an accident on November 18,
2018 in which a vehicle driven by Vitaly Berezhnoy struck
Ashlock as Ashlock was riding his motorcycle. The vehicle driven
by Berezhnoy was owned by Beremesh, who listed the vehicle for
rent through the Turo personal vehicle sharing program. Denis
Kostritsa rented the vehicle though the Turo platform, and in
turn loaned the car to Berezhnoy.
       The trial court granted the motions on multiple grounds,
including that Turo and Beremesh did not authorize Berezhnoy
to operate the vehicle, and further, there was no evidence Turo or
Beremesh knew or should have known Berezhnoy was not fit to
drive. In addition, the fact Kostritsa had a suspended license
was not the cause of the accident.
       On appeal, Ashlock contends the trial court erred in
granting Beremesh’s motion because the grounds relied on in
granting the motion were not raised in Beremesh’s moving
papers. Further, as to negligent entrustment, Ashlock argues if
Beremesh had not allowed Kostritsa to rent the vehicle with a
suspended license, Kostritsa would not have been able to loan the
car to Berezhnoy, and Ashlock would not have been injured.
Ashlock also contends Turo was the statutory owner of the
vehicle; Turo was not protected by statutory immunity for car
rental companies; Turo was negligent in failing to screen
Kostritsa at the time of the rental to ensure he had a valid
driver’s license; and breach of this duty was a cause of the
accident. Because Beremesh and Turo raised meritorious

                                2
arguments in their summary judgment motions as to both causes
of action, we affirm.

         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    The Complaint
      Ashlock filed this action for negligence and negligent
entrustment in 2019 against Beremesh, Turo, Berezhnoy, and
Kostritsa. The complaint alleged that on November 21, 2018
Ashlock was riding on his motorcycle when he was struck by a
vehicle driven by Berezhnoy (vehicle), injuring Ashlock. The
complaint alleged all the defendants owned the vehicle, and they
were negligent in causing the collision. Further, as to the
negligent entrustment cause of action, defendants knew or should
have known Berezhnoy “was incompetent and/or unfit to safely
operate” the vehicle, yet they permitted him to drive the vehicle.
In addition, Berezhnoy’s “incompetence or unfitness to drive was
a substantial factor in causing harm” to Ashlock. As a result of
defendants’ conduct, Ashlock suffered physical injuries, property
damage, and other losses.

B.     Beremesh’s Motion for Summary Judgment
       On January 20, 2021 Beremesh moved for summary
judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of three
defenses to liability. Beremesh argued he was not directly liable
for any injuries suffered by Ashlock because he was not the driver
who caused the accident. Further, Beremesh was not vicariously
liable under Vehicle Code section 17150, which provides the
owner of a vehicle is liable for the negligence of a person the

                                3
owner permits to drive,1 because he gave the vehicle to Kostritsa,
not Berezhnoy, and Beremesh did not give Berezhnoy permission
to drive the vehicle. In addition, because Kostritsa obtained the
vehicle through Turo, which was a “personal vehicle sharing
program,” under Insurance Code section 11580.24,
subdivision (d),2 Turo was “considered the owner of the vehicle for
all purposes” during the period Kostritsa was operating the
vehicle.3 (Ibid.)

1     Vehicle Code section 17150 provides, “Every owner of a
motor vehicle is liable and responsible for death or injury to
person or property resulting from a negligent or wrongful act or
omission in the operation of the motor vehicle, in the business of
the owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the
same with the permission, express or implied, of the owner.”
Ashlock does not contend on appeal that either Beremesh or Turo
was vicariously liable under Vehicle Code section 17150. Further
undesignated statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
2      Insurance Code section 11580.24, subdivision (d), provides
in relevant part, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law or
any provision in a private passenger motor vehicle owner’s
automobile insurance policy, in the event of a loss or injury that
occurs during any time period when the vehicle is under the
operation and control of a person, other than the vehicle owner,
pursuant to a personal vehicle sharing program, . . . the personal
vehicle sharing program shall assume all liability of the owner
and shall be considered the owner of the vehicle for all purposes.”
3      Beremesh also argued that even if he could be vicariously
liable under section 17150 for the acts of Berezhnoy,
section 17150 was preempted by the Graves Amendment
(49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)), which provides immunity to an owner of a
vehicle that “is engaged in the trade or business of renting or
leasing motor vehicles” from vicarious liability for the alleged

                                 4
       Beremesh stated in his supporting declaration that he was
the registered owner of the vehicle and on November 19, 2018 he
listed the vehicle for rent on the Turo car sharing platform. The
same day he learned Kostritsa made a reservation for the vehicle.
Kostritsa was the only authorized driver on the reservation.
Kostritsa came to pick up the vehicle that day, and “[a]fter
checking his driver’s license and confirming his identity,
[Beremesh] handed him the keys” to the vehicle. Beremesh
added that he “had no reason to believe that Mr. Kostritsa would
allow someone else to drive[] [his] vehicle.”
       In opposition, Ashlock did not dispute that Kostritsa rented
Beremesh’s vehicle through Turo from November 19 to 22, 2018;
Kostritsa turned the vehicle over to Berezhnoy; Berezhnoy was
not authorized to drive the vehicle; and Berezhnoy drove the
vehicle at the time of the collision. Ashlock argued the trial court
should deny Beremesh’s motion because Ashlock alleged only
theories of direct liability, and Beremesh raised “defenses to
claims of vicarious liability, not direct claims of negligence or
negligent entrustment.” Further, Kostritsa had a suspended
driver’s license from May 30 to November 21, 2018 (including the
first two days of the rental period) due to a conviction for driving
under the influence.4 Ashlock argued Beremesh was negligent in

negligence of the driver. We do not reach the Graves amendment
because we conclude Beremesh was not vicariously liable under
section 17150.
4     Ashlock submitted a declaration from Chad Ragan, a
private investigator, who conducted a search of Kostritsa’s
driver’s license record. The attached report shows Kostritsa’s
driver’s license was suspended on May 30, 2018 and was

                                 5
renting the vehicle to an unlicensed driver, and further, “[h]ad
Kostritsa not been allowed to rent the car, he could not have
given possession of it to [Berezhnoy], and [Ashlock] would not
have been injured.”
      In his reply, Beremesh argued he did not give Berezhnoy
permission to drive his vehicle or know that Berezhnoy would
drive it. And because Beremesh did not know Berezhnoy, he had
no knowledge whether Berezhnoy was unfit to drive. In addition,
the fact Kostritsa had a suspended driver’s license was irrelevant
because he was not driving at the time of the accident, and
therefore the rental to Kostritsa was not a substantial factor in
causing Ashlock’s injuries.

C.    Turo’s Motion for Summary Judgment
      On March 1, 2021 Turo moved for summary judgment, or in
the alternative, summary adjudication of three liability issues.
Turo conceded it was deemed the owner of vehicle at the time of
the accident pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580.24,
subdivision (d), because a person other than Beremesh operated
the vehicle pursuant to Turo’s personal vehicle sharing program.
But Turo argued it was not vicariously liable for Ashlock’s
injuries and losses because Berezhnoy was not an authorized
driver. Further, Turo argued it “facilitates short-term car
bookings” and “assists people seeking a car for short-term use,”
similar to a car rental company, and therefore, it was not liable
for Ashlock’s injuries because it complied with Vehicle Code
sections 14604 (requiring the owner to make reasonable efforts to

reinstated six months later on November 21, with a restriction
allowing him to drive only for work.

                                6
confirm the driver possesses a valid driver’s license but not
requiring the owner to contact the Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV)) and 14608 (requiring the owner to inspect the renter’s
driver’s license).5
      In opposition, Ashlock argued Kostritsa’s driver’s license
was suspended when he rented the vehicle in November 2018,
and Turo did not conduct a valid check of his driver’s license.
Ashlock asserted that under Insurance Code section 11580.24,
subdivision (d), Turo assumed the responsibilities of an owner,
including the duty not to entrust the vehicle to an unfit person.

5      Section 14604 states, “(a) No owner of a motor vehicle may
knowingly allow another person to drive the vehicle upon a
highway unless the owner determines that the person possesses a
valid driver’s license that authorizes the person to operate the
vehicle. For the purposes of this section, an owner is required
only to make a reasonable effort or inquiry to determine whether
the prospective driver possesses a valid driver’s license before
allowing him or her to operate the owner’s vehicle. An owner is
not required to inquire of the [DMV] whether the prospective
driver possesses a valid driver’s license. [¶] (b) A rental company
is deemed to be in compliance with subdivision (a) if the company
rents the vehicle in accordance with Sections 14608 and 14609.”
Section 14608, subdivision (a), provides a person renting a vehicle
may only rent to a licensed driver, and further, the person must
inspect the driver’s license of the renter and “compare[] either the
signature thereon with that of the person to whom the vehicle is
to be rented or the photograph thereon with the person to whom
the vehicle is to be rented.” Section 14609, subdivision (a),
requires the person renting the car to “keep a record of the
registration number of the motor vehicle rented, the name and
address of the person to whom the vehicle is rented, his or her
driver’s license number, the jurisdiction that issued the driver’s
license, and the expiration date of the driver’s license.”

                                 7
And Vehicle Code section 14604 imposed an affirmative duty on
the owner to make a reasonable effort to determine whether
Kostritsa had a valid driver’s license. Ashlock asserted other
arguments, including that Turo was liable for negligence under
the negligent undertaking theory because Turo undertook
responsibilities for screening drivers; Turo failed to exercise
reasonable care in screening Kostritsa; and Turo’s breach
increased the risk of harm to Ashlock and was the proximate
cause of his injuries.

D.     The Trial Court’s Summary Judgment Rulings and Entry
       of the Judgments
       1.     Ruling on Turo’s motion
       On December 8, 2021, following a hearing, the trial court6
granted Turo’s summary judgment motion. The court held, “The
negligence claim lacks merit because it is undisputed that Turo
never expressly or impliedly authorized Berezhnoy to operate the
subject vehicle. To the contrary, it is undisputed that Turo dealt
exclusively with Kostritsa. Thus, Turo cannot be vicariously
liable for the first cause of action for negligence.”
       The trial court also found Ashlock could not prove negligent
entrustment because “Turo was involved in renting the vehicle
only to Kostritsa, not Berezhnoy”; assuming Turo gave the
vehicle to Berezhnoy, there were no facts showing Turo knew or
should have known Berezhnoy was incompetent or unfit to drive;
and “Kostritsa’s incompetence/disqualification (a suspended

6    Judge John P. Doyle ruled on Turo’s and Beremesh’s
summary judgment motions and signed the judgment in favor of
Turo. Judge Bruce G. Iwasaki signed the judgment in favor of
Beremesh.

                                 8
license) was not the cause of [Ashlock’s] injuries.” In addition,
the court found Turo did not breach any duty to Ashlock when
renting to Kostritsa because “Turo is akin to a car rental
company” and satisfied the requirements under sections 14604
and 14608.
       The trial court added, “Even if Turo were not a car rental
company, there is no evidence here that Turo knew or should
have known Kostritsa had a suspended license. Contrary to
[Ashlock’s] arguments, Turo’s statements do not indicate that it
affirmatively undertook to provide screening services which
would determine whether a license was suspended. The Court
also sees no reason in law or fact to hold car sharing companies to
a stricter standard than car rental companies.”
       On January 19, 2022 the trial court entered judgment in
favor of Turo.

       2.    Ruling on Beremesh’s motion
       At the January 19, 2022 hearing, Ashlock’s attorney
objected to the trial court’s tentative ruling to grant Beremesh’s
motion, arguing Beremesh “did not include on noticed motion the
grounds on which the court is now granting summary judgment.”
The court responded that notice was provided but Ashlock could
file a supplemental brief. Ashlock’s attorney declined to submit a
supplemental brief, questioning why he was “asked to file a
supplemental brief on an issue that wasn’t set forth in [the]
notice.”
       Following the hearing, the trial court granted Beremesh’s
motion. The court explained with respect to vicarious liability
under section 17150, “The negligence claim lacks merit because it
is undisputed that Beremesh never expressly or impliedly

                                9
authorized Berezhnoy to operate the subject vehicle. To the
contrary, it is undisputed that Beremesh dealt exclusively with
Kostritsa. Thus, Beremesh cannot be vicariously liable for the
first cause of action for negligence.”
       The trial court observed that Beremesh only addressed the
negligent entrustment cause of action in his reply brief and
acknowledged that “[t]ypically, new arguments are not to be
presented for the first time in reply.” However, the court found
“the facts are undisputed and do not support a negligent
entrustment theory.” Moreover, the court explained, negligent
entrustment “was briefed in connection with Turo’s motion for
summary judgment,” and the court’s “conclusions are
unchanged.” The court found Ashlock could not establish
negligent entrustment because Kostritsa was not driving the
vehicle at the time of the accident. The court added, “[T]hat
Kostritsa had a suspended license does not make it predictable
that he would hand the car off to Berezhnoy so as to avoid a
citation. In fact, it is undisputed that Kostritsa had his own car
and drove it to pick up the rental. To put it simply, Kostritsa’s
incompetence/disqualification (a suspended license) was not the
cause of [p]laintiff’s injuries.”
       On March 11, 2022 the trial court entered judgment in
favor of Beremesh.
       Ashlock timely appealed from both judgments.

                             DISCUSSION

A.    Standard of Review
      Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no
triable issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

                                10
judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c);
Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018)
4 Cal.5th 607, 618; Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los
Angeles (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 657, 668.) “‘“‘“We review the trial
court’s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in
the moving and opposing papers except that to which objections
were made and sustained.”’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and
resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that
party.”’” (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340,
347; accord, Doe, at p. 669; Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil
Corporation (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1068.)
       A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial
burden of presenting evidence that a cause of action lacks merit
because the plaintiff cannot establish an element of the cause of
action or there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 853; Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 1068.) If the defendant satisfies this initial
burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence
demonstrating there is a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, at p. 850; Sabetian, at
p. 1069.)
       “‘In performing an independent review of the granting of
summary judgment, we conduct the same procedure employed by
the trial court. We examine (1) the pleadings to determine the
elements of the claim, (2) the motion to determine if it establishes
facts justifying judgment in the moving party’s favor, and (3) the
opposition—assuming movant has met its initial burden—to
“decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the

                                11
existence of a triable, material fact issue.”’ [Citation.] ‘We need
not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the reasons in its
summary judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial court,
not its rationale.’ [Citation.] Thus, a reviewing court ‘will affirm
a summary judgment if it is correct on any ground that the
parties had an adequate opportunity to address in the trial court,
regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons.’” (Martin v. Board
of Trustees of California State University (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
149, 160-161; accord, Murchison v. County of Tehama (2021)
69 Cal.App.5th 867, 881-882.)

B.     Ashlock Cannot Establish a Cause of Action for Negligence
       Against Beremesh or Turo
       “To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff
must show that the ‘defendant had a duty to use due care, that he
breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or
legal cause of the resulting injury.’” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213; accord, Kesner v. Superior Court
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.)
       With respect to Beremesh, Ashlock cannot establish the
elements of a cause of action for negligence because Beremesh
was not considered the vehicle owner at the time of the accident.
Under Insurance Code section 11580.24, subdivision (d), if an
injury or loss occurs while a person other than the owner
operates or controls the vehicle pursuant to a personal vehicle
sharing program, “the personal vehicle sharing program shall
assume all liability of the owner and shall be considered the
owner of the vehicle for all purposes.” Because it is undisputed
that the accident involving Ashlock occurred while the vehicle
was driven by Berezhnoy, who obtained the vehicle pursuant to

                                12
Turo’s rental to Kostistra, Turo assumed liability for the loss or
injury. Ashlock therefore cannot establish that Beremesh owed a
duty of care to Ashlock or breached that duty.7
       With respect to the negligence claim against Turo, although
Turo was considered the owner of the vehicle, Ashlock cannot
establish proximate cause. “[P]roximate cause has two aspects.
‘“One is cause in fact. An act is a cause in fact if it is a necessary
antecedent of an event.”’ [Citation.] This is sometimes referred
to as ‘but for’ causation.” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v.
Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 352 (State Hospitals);
accord, People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130, 1138.)
For “causation in fact,” the conduct must be a “substantial factor”
bringing about harm that “is ‘recognizable as having an
appreciable effect in bringing it about.’” (Kumaraperu v. Feldsted
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 60, 68; accord, Vasquez v. Residential
Investments, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 269, 288.) “The second
aspect of proximate cause ‘focuses on public policy considerations.
Because the purported [factual] causes of an event may be traced
back to the dawn of humanity, the law has imposed additional
“limitations on liability other than simple causality.” [Citation.]

7      With respect to the first cause of action for negligence,
Beremesh argued in his motion that “[Insurance Code] section
11580.24 exempts him from liability because the vehicle was
being used as part of a personal vehicle sharing program at the
time of the accident.” Although the trial court granted
Beremesh’s motion on a different ground—that Beremesh did not
authorize Berezhnoy to operate the vehicle—we review the trial
court’s ruling de novo and are not bound by the reasoning of the
trial court. (Martin v. Board of Trustees of California State
University, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 160-161.)

                                 13
“These additional limitations are related not only to the degree of
connection between the conduct and the injury, but also with
public policy.”’” (State Hospitals, at p. 353; accord, Carney, at
p. 1139 [“The limitation on liability under the second component
of proximate cause comes down to the question of
foreseeability.”].)
      “‘Ordinarily, proximate cause is a question of fact which
cannot be decided as a matter of law from the allegations of a
complaint. . . . Nevertheless, where the facts are such that the
only reasonable conclusion is an absence of causation, the
question is one of law, not of fact.’” (State Hospitals, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 353; accord, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals
Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 187.)8
      The Supreme Court’s decision in State Hospitals, supra,
61 Cal.4th 339 is on point. There, the court upheld the trial
court’s ruling sustaining the demurrer of the Department of
Public Health to the plaintiff’s complaint alleging the
Department’s failure to conduct a required second evaluation of a
prisoner to determine whether he was a sexually violent
predator, after which he was not referred for commitment, was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s rape and death, where the

8      Ashlock did not argue in the trial court or contend on
appeal that Turo failed to give notice of the grounds on which it
moved for summary judgment. Thus, any argument that Turo
did not move for summary judgment based on lack of causation is
forfeited. (Quiles v. Parent (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1013
[“‘Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the
claim on appeal.’”].) Further, Ashlock in his opposition to Turo’s
motion for summary judgment addressed causation, arguing that
Turo’s breach “was a substantial cause of plaintiff’s harm.”
(Capitalization and boldface omitted.)

                                  14
prisoner raped her four days after his release. (Id. at p. 346.)
The court concluded the plaintiff had not alleged proximate cause
as a matter of law, explaining, “The only mandatory duty
established by the complaint’s allegations is the duty to use two
evaluators; the details of the manner in which each evaluator
conducts the review are discretionary, so long as they include the
statutory criteria. Thus, no actionable breach of duty can be
found in the single evaluator’s failure to conclude that [the
prisoner] was an SVP. Nor can plaintiff hypothesize a positive
finding by that evaluator as a link in the chain of proximate
causation. Instead, she must posit a subsequent unbroken series
of discretionary findings contradicting the first evaluator’s
conclusion and leading to civil commitment . . . . Plaintiff’s
showing of ‘but for’ causation is weak, because with each step in
the review process the results become more speculative.” (Id. at
pp. 355-356.)
       Ashlock alleges a similar chain of events, with the
speculative result that Turo’s conduct was the proximate cause of
Ashlock’s injuries: Ashlock posits that had Turo not allowed
Kostritsa to rent the vehicle because of his suspended driver’s
license, Kostritsa could not have loaned the vehicle to Berezhnoy,
and Berezhnoy would not have driven in a negligent manner,
injuring Ashlock. But even assuming Turo had a duty to check
the DMV records to screen drivers for license suspensions before
allowing a rental on its platform and Turo breached that duty,9

9      Because we assume without deciding that Turo had a duty
to screen for whether a renter had a suspended driver’s license
and breached that duty, we do not reach whether Turo is
considered a car rental company for purposes of section 14604,

                               15
Turo’s failure to check whether Kostritsa’s driver’s license was
suspended did not cause the accident because Kostritsa was not
the driver involved in the accident. Rather, Ashlock’s theory of
proximate cause depends on the assumption that Kostritsa would
have loaned the vehicle to Berezhnoy, who in turn was an unfit
driver. However, even if it was reasonably foreseeable that
Kostritsa would loan the rented vehicle to a third party given his
suspended license, there is nothing in the record to show it was
reasonably foreseeable that the third party (Berezhnoy) would
negligently operate the vehicle. Further, there is nothing in the
record to support a finding that Berezhnoy was not fit to drive,
for example, that he too had a suspended driver’s license.
Ashlock’s argument that it was more likely that a renter with a
suspended license would provide the vehicle to a third party who
would then negligently drive is pure speculation. (See Saelzler v.
Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 776 [affirming
summary judgment for building owner where plaintiff argued

subdivision (b), which provides immunity for rental car
companies that comply with sections 14608 and 14609.
Moreover, because we assume Turo had a duty, we need not
decide whether the negligent undertaking doctrine applies.
(See Luebke v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2020)
59 Cal.App.5th 694, 707 [negligent undertaking doctrine is an
“aspect of the law of duty”]; Lichtman v. Siemens Industry Inc.
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 914, 922, fn. omitted [“the Good Samaritan
rule or the negligent undertaking theory of liability . . . is applied
to determine the ‘duty element’ in a negligence action where the
defendant has ‘“specifically . . . undertaken to perform the task
that he is charged with having performed negligently, for without
the actual assumption of the undertaking there can be no
correlative duty to perform that undertaking carefully.”’”].)

                                 16
additional security measures would have prevented physical
attack on her at the building, explaining “‘“plaintiff must show it
more likely than not defendant’s conduct was cause in fact of the
result; ‘mere possibility of such causation is not enough’”]; Leyva
v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1097, 1105 [affirming
summary judgment in favor of landlord for injuries to tenants
from fire where fire officials could not determine whether fire was
caused by malfunction in heater or tenants placing combustible
material too close to heater, reasoning, “[I]t became incumbent
upon plaintiffs to ‘establish, by nonspeculative evidence, some
actual causal link between the plaintiff’s injury and the
defendant’s [act or omission.]’”].)

C.     Ashlock Cannot Establish Negligent Entrustment Against
       Beremesh or Turo
       “‘Negligent entrustment is a common law liability doctrine,
which arises in numerous factual contexts. [Citation.] In cases
involving negligent entrustment of a vehicle, liability “‘is imposed
on [a] vehicle owner or permitter because of his own independent
negligence and not the negligence of the driver.’” [Citations.]
“‘Liability for the negligence of the incompetent driver to whom
an automobile is entrusted does not arise out of the relationship
of the parties, but from the act of entrustment of the motor
vehicle, with permission to operate the same, to one whose
incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should
have been known by the owner.’”’” (McKenna v. Beesley (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565; accord, Ghezavat v. Harris (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 555, 559.) The jury instruction for negligent
entrustment of a motor vehicle (CACI No. 724), cited approvingly

                                17
in McKenna, at page 566, states the elements for negligent
entrustment:
      “1. That [name of driver] was negligent in operating the
vehicle;
      “2. That [name of defendant] [owned the vehicle operated
by [name of driver]/had possession of the vehicle operated by
[name of driver] with the owner’s permission];
      “3. That [name of defendant] knew, or should have known,
that [name of driver] was incompetent or unfit to drive the
vehicle;
      “4. That [name of defendant] permitted [name of driver] to
drive the vehicle; and
      “5. That [name of driver]’s incompetence or unfitness to
drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to [name of
plaintiff].” (Boldface omitted.)
      Ashlock cannot establish negligent entrustment against
either Beremesh or Turo. With respect to Beremesh, even if he
could be considered the owner of the vehicle for purposes of
handing the keys to Kostritsa, Beremesh rented the vehicle to
Kostritsa, not Bereshnoy, and it is undisputed that Beremesh did
not give Bereshnoy permission to drive the vehicle.10 Thus,

10      Ashlock contends Beremesh never challenged the negligent
entrustment cause of action, which was based on his direct
liability as the owner, not vicarious liability. However, Beremesh
moved for summary judgment, which necessarily meant he
moved on both causes of action. And Beremesh argued in his
motion that he loaned his vehicle to Kostritsa, not Bereshnoy,
and he did not give permission for Bereshnoy to drive. The fact
that Beremesh referred to his liability as “vicarious liability” does
not negate his argument that he did not give permission to
Bereshnoy to drive the vehicle.

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Ashlock cannot prove the fourth element for negligent
entrustment—that Beremesh permitted Bereshnoy to drive the
vehicle.
      The inability of Ashlock to prove the fourth element for
negligent entrustment is likewise fatal to his claim against Turo
because Turo did not give permission for Berezhnoy to drive the
vehicle. Nor can Ashlock prove the third element—that Turo
knew or should have known Berezhnoy was an incompetent or
unfit driver.

                            DISPOSITION

      The judgments are affirmed. Beremesh and Turo are to
recover their costs on appeal.

                                     FEUER, J.
We concur:

             SEGAL, Acting P. J

             EVENSON, J.*

*     Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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