Court Opinion

ID: 9668369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:10:38.515827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:44.511399
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(concurring). The legislative formula which is challenged in this case is the formula which provides the basis for distribution of public funds for the financing of public elementary and secondary education. Under the state’s general aid formula, the largest portion of state aid is distributed under the label of equalization aid.
I agree with the result reached by the majority; however, in coming to this conclusion, I find the appellants have not met their burden of proving the school finance system unconstitutional. The majority devotes attention to the protection of local control. I do not find local control arguments relevant to whether the formula contravenes either the uniformity provision or the guarantee of equal protection.
The majority’s description of the school finance formula on pages 476-481 of the majority demonstrates its complexity. Although the issue is not its complexity, *511it would have been helpful for one of the parties to set forth the formula in a clear fashion, if possible.
The issue in this case is whether the formula has been proven unconstitutional, either on its face or in application. The appellants argue that the school financing system violates art. I, sec. I1 of the Wisconsin Constitution which guarantees equal protection of the laws and art. X, sec. 32 which requires that the legislature provide school districts that are as nearly uniform as practicable. Therefore, the state constitution guarantees an equal opportunity of an education that is as nearly uniform as practicable as that in another area of the state. The legislature is only required to present an equal opportunity for an education to the students. If the students are not able to take advantage of the opportunities, there is no way a change in the formula can force those opportunities upon them.
I believe the standard of proof in this type of action should be clearly set forth by this court. The United *512States Supreme Court in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1973) stated:
[W]e stand on familiar ground when we continue to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet, we are urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the present system or to throw out the property tax altogether in favor of some other form of taxation. ...
Education, perhaps even more than welfare assistance, presents a myriad of “intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems.” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. [471] at 487 [1970)]. The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system suggests that “there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them,” and that, within the limits of rationality, “the legislature’s efforts to tackle the problems” should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v. Jackney, 406 U.S. [535] at 546-47 [(1972)].
This court stated in Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 566, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976), as to deference to legislative policy involving fiscal-educational decisions:
If “character of instruction” was all that was required to be “as nearly uniform as practicable” under the mandate of the constitution, then it was left up to this court to ultimately determine what subjects were to be included in “character of instruction” and to the legislature to determine what uniformity was “practicable.”
Without a showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislature has unconstitutionally denied a uniform *513opportunity for education or has treated students unequally, I agree with the majority that, “we [the court] will otherwise defer to the legislature’s determination of the degree to which fiscal policy can be applied to achieve uniformity." Majority at 503. The school funding system is declared in a statute. A statute is presumed constitutional and a party challenging its constitutionality must prove it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Soo Line R. Co. v. Transportation Dept., 101 Wis. 2d 64, 76, 303 N.W.2d 626 (1981).
I believe, as does the majority, that education is a fundamental right in Wisconsin and “that where a statutory classification adversely affects or interferes with a fundamental constitutional right, the classification is subject to strict scrutiny and the normal presumption of constitutionality will not apply.” Base, 74 Wis. 2d at 580 (quoting Town of Vanden Broek v. Reitz, 53 Wis. 2d 87, 93, 191 N.W.2d 913 (1971)). However, in this case the appellants do not challenge any statutory classification. They merely challenge the statutory method by which public schools are funded— the statutory method of implementing the constitutional mandate. Similarly, the challenge as to the degree of uniformity resulting from the statutory scheme only questions legislation. Base, 74 Wis. 2d at 568. Thus, the appellants carry the burden of proving that the statutory scheme is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 64, 398 N.W.2d 756 (1987).
Whether a degree of uniformity is practicable is a policy decision and in the province of the legislature. This court stated in Buse, 74 Wis. 2d at 568:
*514Whether absolute uniformity of an equal opportunity for education in all school districts of the state is socially desirable, is not for this court to decide. We can only conclude that the plain meaning of sec. 3, art. X does not mandate it.
With that previous statement by the court, it is difficult to show that the lack of uniformity rises to the level of unconstitutionality. If a party could prove that the Milwaukee Public School System deteriorated to a point so as to not be comparable to other districts, the legislature would be required to take action under art. X, sec. 3. As long as the level of education funded is reasonably acceptable, the funding system is not unconstitutional. I do not believe the appellants met their burden.
The circuit court decision recapitulated the evidence offered by the appellants which indicated that certain areas of the state would benefit from additional and specialized programs. The appellants have shown by test results that additional funds are needed because currently the funds do not cover the expenses incurred by disciplinary problems and early educational needs, i.e., headstart programs, early kindergarten. Additional funds may not be the exclusive answer but they may help in providing wanting children with supplies so they do not start the school day without the tools to learn and providing funds for expenses incurred because of disciplinary problems so that teachers can devote their time and energies to their expertise of teaching students. These are concerns of both a state and local nature.
No one refutes that additional public support would be beneficial. Yet the constitution simply does not mandate such expenditures. The state constitution requires that an education system which is as nearly *515uniform as practicable be presented to each student. It does not require the legislature to allocate funds to provide a school system which produces students who are educated to a level as nearly uniform as practicable, although the latter may be desirable.3 This case has been a public cry to the legislature, disguised as a constitutional attack, that additional funds are necessary to improve education in some districts.4
The challenge that the formula fails to treat similarly situated students equally to the extent that the quality of education a student receives depends upon his or her place of residence also has not been demonstrated as causing a constitutional equal protection violation of art. 1, sec. 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution.
Although I rely on different grounds, I concur with the majority’s result.

 Article I, sec. 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides as follows:
Equality; inherent rights. Section 1. All people are bom equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

 Article X, sec. 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides as follows:
District schools; tuition; sectarian instruction; released time. Section 3. The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years; and no sectarian instruction shall be allowed therein; but the legislature by law may, for the purpose of religious instruction outside the district schools, authorize the release of students during regular school hours.

 It is interesting to note at this point that the school district with the least expenditure per pupil, the Denmark School District, was not claiming a need for additional funds in this suit. This indicates that the amount given to a district does not totally control a district’s need. The amount must be compared to the need of a district when attempting to produce a uniform product.

 Recently the legislature proposed a constitutional amendment. If adopted, Art. VIII, sec. 1(a), will read: “Except as authorized by law for capital expenditures, the proceeds of the tax on property shall not be used to operate the common schools.” 1987 Enrolled Joint Resolution 75.