Court Opinion

ID: 9945227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 16:12:03.444836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:24.892883
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re Killoran, 2024-Ohio-711.]

                               IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

 IN RE: MELISSA KILLORAN                             Case No. 2023-00689VI

 MELISSA KILLORAN                                    Magistrate Holly True Shaver

               Applicant                             DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE

        {¶1}     On January 25, 2024, a hearing was held on Melissa Killoran’s (“applicant”)
appeal of the Attorney General’s (“AG”) October 23, 2023 final decision.
        {¶2}     Applicant was a victim of criminally injurious conduct on April 20, 2023,
when her husband (“offender”) committed domestic violence against her.                In her
application, applicant sought attorney’s fees she incurred to obtain a domestic violence
civil protection order (“CPO”) from the domestic relations division of the Licking County
Court of Common Pleas.
        {¶3}     In the final decision, the AG found that the CPO that applicant obtained did
not comply with the requirements of R.C. 2743.51(F)(4), because a provision of the CPO
allowed the parties to “have such contact as needed to address issues related to the end
of their marriage.” Final Decision, p. 1.1 The AG argued that this provision did not
physically separate the victim from the offender which disqualified applicant from
recovering attorney’s fees.
        {¶4}     Applicant was represented at the hearing by Attorney Mark Poole (“Poole”).
Assistant Attorney General Melissa Montgomery represented the state of Ohio. No
testimony was presented, but counsel for applicant submitted Applicant’s Exhibit 1, a copy
of the CPO, which is also contained in the case file.
        {¶5}     Poole stated that he represented applicant in the CPO hearing. Poole
stated that the CPO required offender to vacate the marital home; that offender was not

1 Former R.C. 2743.51(F)(4) is the same as current R.C. 2743.51(F)(5)(b).
Case No. 2023-00689VI                                -2-                                         DECISION

permitted to enter the marital home; that offender was required to stay 500 feet away from
applicant; and that the CPO was granted for a period of five years.
        {¶6}     Poole noted that the provision in the CPO that the AG takes issue with was
added by the domestic relations court without applicant asking for it. Poole argued that
the provision at issue does not violate R.C. 2743.51(F)(5)(b) because the CPO does
physically separate applicant from offender.                     Poole argued that a reasonable
interpretation of the provision is that the judge in the domestic relations court added that
language so that applicant and offender could pursue divorce proceedings without
violating the CPO. Poole stated that nothing in the language in this provision gives
permission for offender to approach applicant, go to her house, or to contact her. Poole
asks the court to reverse the final decision of the AG and remand the case to the AG to
calculate economic loss.
        {¶7}     In contrast, the AG argued that the CPO does not meet the requirements in
R.C. 2743.51(F)(5)(b). The AG stated that the language in section 26 of the CPO allows
for contact between applicant and offender, and that it does not adequately protect
applicant. The AG cited two cases to support its position: In re Warren, Ct. of Claims No.
V2008-30014tc (Sept. 5, 2008), and In re Pacey, Ct. of Claims No. V2011-60760 (June
11, 2012), adopted jud (July 6, 2012). The AG argued that even if the language in
provision 26 of the CPO allows for only electronic contact, it still violates R.C.
2743.51(F)(5)(b).
        {¶8}     In response to the AG’s arguments, Poole pointed out that the language in
the CPO prohibits offender from being present within 500 feet of applicant and from
initiating contact with applicant. (Sections 5 and 6).2 Poole stated that section 26 of the

2
 5. RESPONDENT SHALL STAY AWAY FROM ALL protected persons named in this Order, and not be
present within 500 feet * * * of any protected persons wherever those protected persons may be found, or
any place Respondent knows or should know the protected persons are likely to be, even with a protected
person’s permission. If Respondent accidentally comes in contact with protected persons in any public
or private place, Respondent must depart immediately. This Order includes encounters on public and
private roads, highways, and thoroughfares.

6. RESPONDENT SHALL NOT INITIATE OR HAVE ANY CONTACT with [applicant] or their residences,
businesses, places of employment, schools, day care centers, or child care providers. Contact includes,
but is not limited to, landline, cordless, cellular or digital telephone; text; instant messaging; fax; e-mail;
voicemail; delivery service; social media; blogging; writings; electronic communications; posting a
Case No. 2023-00689VI                         -3-                                   DECISION

CPO takes into account the reality that applicant and offender may need to speak to each
other in court or over the telephone because of the divorce proceedings. Poole stated
that section 26 does not negate everything else in the CPO, and that the AG’s argument
is too broad.
       {¶9}     R.C. 2743.61(B) states, in pertinent part:
       If upon hearing and consideration of the record and evidence, the court
       decides that the decision of the attorney general appealed from is
       reasonable and lawful, it shall affirm the same. If the court decides that the
       decision of the attorney general is not supported by a preponderance of the
       evidence or is unreasonable or unlawful, the court shall reverse and vacate
       the decision or modify it and enter judgment thereon.
       {¶10} R.C. 2743.52(B) states: The court of claims has appellate jurisdiction to
order awards of reparations for economic loss arising from criminally injurious conduct, if
satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the requirements for an award of
reparations have been met.
       {¶11} R.C. 2743.51(F)(5)(b) states, in pertinent part:
       For a victim described in division (L)(1) of this section, “allowable expense”
       includes * * * Attorney’s fees not exceeding one thousand dollars, at a rate
       not exceeding one hundred dollars per hour, incurred to successfully obtain
       a restraining order, custody order, or other order to physically separate a
       victim from an offender. (Emphasis added.)
       {¶12} In examining the language in the CPO, the magistrate notes the following.
Page 2 of the CPO states: “The Court also finds: Based upon the content of the hearing,
the Court anticipates that a divorce involving the parties will be forthcoming. The Court
will leave issues of child custody and visitation for that proceeding.”
       {¶13} The language in section 26 of the CPO states:
       IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:

message; or communications by any other means directly or through another person. Respondent may
not violate this Order even with the permission of a protected person.
Case No. 2023-00689VI                       -4-                                 DECISION

       Any order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction as to custody of or
       visitation with the children named in this Order shall prevail over this Order
       to the extent the two are inconsistent. Parties may have such contact as is
       needed to address issues related to the end of their marriage and to comply
       with orders related to upcoming divorce/custody/visitation proceedings.
       {¶14} In In re Warren, Ct. of Claims No. V2008-30014tc (Sept. 5, 2008), a panel
of commissioners found that applicant was not a victim of criminally injurious conduct.
The panel further found that assuming, arguendo, that the applicant qualified as a victim,
the modification that the applicant made to the ex-parte civil protection order “to allow
contact between parties to discuss termination of marriage or reconciliation” did not
provide for the physical separation of the parties.
       {¶15} In the case at bar, the language in section 26 of the CPO pertains to contact
needed to address issues related to the end of the marriage and to comply with court
orders regarding divorce and custody proceedings. The facts in this case show that the
CPO did not encourage “reconciliation,” as the CPO did in Warren, which would imply
that there would not be a physical separation from the offender.         Furthermore, the
language in other parts of the CPO in this case clearly mandates physical separation from
applicant.
       {¶16} In In re Pacey, Ct. of Claims No. V2011-60760 (June 11, 2012), adopted
jud (July 6, 2012), the applicant had contemporaneously suffered a stroke when she was
attacked by the offender. Applicant was hospitalized immediately after the criminally
injurious conduct, and she was subsequently transferred to a nursing home. Applicant’s
counsel entered into a consent agreement with the offender. The consent agreement
and domestic violence CPO provided physical separation of the parties, except for a two-
hour period each week during which the offender was allowed to visit with applicant at the
nursing home. The court found that because of that exception, which expressly allowed
for contact two hours per week, the CPO did not comply with the physical separation
requirement in R.C. 2743.51(F)(4).
       {¶17} The magistrate finds that the facts in this case are distinguishable from
Pacey because there is no language comparable to a two-hour period each week that
allows for contact. Indeed, in Pacey, the two-hour visitation period allowed for, and even
Case No. 2023-00689VI                       -5-                                DECISION

encouraged, contact between the victim and the offender. In the present case, the
language in section 26 of the CPO, read in context with the rest of the CPO, was clearly
meant to allow the parties to proceed with a divorce and custody proceedings without
violating the CPO. Therefore, the magistrate finds that the AG’s cited precedent in
Warren and Pacey is not particularly persuasive authority as applied to the facts in this
case.
        {¶18} The magistrate further finds that the facts in this case are more similar to
the facts in In re Richards, Ct. of Claims No. 2013-00700-VItc (July 16, 2014), aff’d jud
(October 13, 2014), where a judge of the Court of Claims allowed a claim for attorney’s
fees. In Richards, the AG argued that an addendum to a CPO violated the statutory
requirement of physical separation. The addendum at issue allowed both the applicant
and the offender to have contact at any subsequent hearing or court matter involving the
parties; permitted both parties to go to the hospital in the event either minor child was
injured and required medical treatment; and allowed both parties to contact each other
via text message only for the exclusive purpose of informing and advising each other of
medical or health issues/concerns regarding the minor children. Richards, p. 2. A judge
of the Court of Claims stated:
        There is no question that the CPO provides for the physical separation of
        the applicant and the offender as contemplated in R.C. 2743.51(F)(4). The
        CPO requires the offender stay at least 500 feet away from the applicant
        and have no contact with the applicant. The CPO then allows minimal
        interaction solely for the purpose of participating in court proceedings and
        coordinating the medical care of their children.      The interactions are
        designed to allow the offender and applicant to participate in court
        proceedings regarding their divorce and to allow coordination for the
        purposes of medical care for their children.
Id., p. 3.
        {¶19} Upon review of the evidence in the case file and in consideration of the
arguments of counsel at the hearing, the magistrate finds that the CPO in this case
complies with the requirements in R.C. 2743.51(F)(5)(b). The language in the CPO
mandates a physical separation of the victim and offender. The magistrate further finds
Case No. 2023-00689VI                         -6-                                   DECISION

that the language in section 26 of the CPO that allows for minimal interaction solely for
the purpose of participating in divorce and custody proceedings does not prohibit
applicant from obtaining an award of attorney’s fees as an allowable expense pursuant
to R.C. 2743.51(F)(5)(b).
         {¶20} Accordingly, the magistrate concludes that the final decision of the AG is
not reasonable or lawful. The magistrate recommends that the final decision of the AG
be reversed and that the claim be remanded to the AG for economic loss calculations
consistent with this decision.
         {¶21} A party may file written objections to the magistrate’s decision within 14
days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has adopted the decision during
that 14-day period as permitted by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i).           If any party timely files
objections, any other party may also file objections not later than ten days after the first
objections are filed. A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of
any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as finding
of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and
specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusion within 14 days of the filing of
the decision, as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).

                                             HOLLY TRUE SHAVER
                                             Magistrate
Filed 2/6/24
Sent to S.C. Reporter 2/27/24