Court Opinion

ID: 9596114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:46:11.160981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:32.632995
License: Public Domain

Forrest, J.
(concurring) — I concur in the reasoning and result of the majority opinion. I write only to suggest an additional reason that the judge need not apply the State v. Allen3 test to the child as of the date of the hearsay statement. The first Allen factor is "(1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand". Allen, *388at 692. On the face of it this is inapplicable to a child witness at the time of the hearsay statement. Indeed, an understanding of the obligation to tell the truth on the witness stand is not strictly relevant to the obligation to tell the truth off the witness stand at the time of the hearsay statement. How is the trial judge to realistically make such a retrospective finding as to the child's understanding of a completely hypothetical situation? Such a finding by the trial judge that months or even years earlier the child witness had "an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand" would be speculative at best. The fourth Allen factor is "the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence". Allen, at 692. In context this means on the witness stand. Yet it is not uncommon for otherwise qualified child witnesses to be unable to take the witness stand in front of the jury at trial. Such inability might reasonably suggest that the child would have been similarly unable to do so at the time of the hearsay statement. The literal application of the Allen rule to such an inference would result in excluding the child's hearsay statement. Such result would be totally inconsistent with the express provision of RCW 9A.44.120 which authorizes admission of the hearsay even if the child is unavailable. The first and fourth Allen factors are inappropriate in assessing reliability under RCW 9A.44.120.
As shown by the majority, the concerns of the Allen rule are satisfied by application of the State v. Ryan4 factors. The purpose of the child hearsay statute in making vital testimony available, while at the same time safeguarding a defendant's rights, is fully implemented by application of the reliability test. Accordingly, a finding of testimonial competency of a child witness should not be required to establish reliability.
State v. Ryan, supra, does not compel a different result. In my judgment, when the court in State v. Ryan, supra, said that the child must be shown to be "competent" at the *389time the hearsay statement was made, it did not mean tes-timonially competent in the technical sense of the Allen rule, but in the more general sense of the ability to receive, retain and relate accurate impressions of an occurrence. This interpretation is supported, although not required, by State v. John Doe,5 and furnishes an appropriate guide in the absence of a Supreme Court holding expressly requiring a finding of testimonial competence pursuant to Allen.
Review denied at 116 Wn.2d 1022 (1991).

 70 Wn.2d 690, 424 P.2d 1021 (1967).

 103 Wn.2d 165, 173, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).

 105 Wn.2d 889, 719 P.2d 554 (1986).