Court Opinion

ID: 9756016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:02:58.649462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:13.895661
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting.
The testimony of the victim, the employee of the Fish and Boat Commission, and the co-conspirator are all in agreement that the victim, Thomas Black, fled from his motor vehicle, ran to another vehicle and was seated in the second vehicle before the defendant, John George, occupied the driver’s seat of Black’s car and sped away. George was not in Black’s presence at the time the car was taken. The statute, as enacted, requires the car to be taken “in the presence of’ the victim before the crime of robbery of a motor vehicle can be established. I must conclude that George is entitled to arrest of judgment on this specific crime, given the unique facts of this case. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b); Prevish v. Northwest Medical Center, 692 A.2d 192, 198 (Pa.Super.1997). When the language of a statute is clear and free from all ambiguity, any further deliberation as to its meaning is unwarranted. American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner, 610 Pa. 430, 450-54, 509 A.2d 838, 849-50 (1986); Meier v. Maleski, 670 A.2d 755, 759 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996). This Court is constrained to give effect to the obvious meaning of clear and unambiguous statutory language; when the words are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded. Commonwealth v. Patchett, 284 Pa.Super. 252, 425 A.2d 798, 800 (1981).
The words of the statute here under review could not be any clearer. The statute provides:
§ 3702. Robbery of motor vehicle
(a) Offense defined. — A person commits a felony of the first degree if he steals or takes a motor vehicle from another person in the presence of that person or any other person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle.
By its terms, the statute requires that the theft of the motor vehicle occur “in the presence of [the victim] or any other person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle.” The unrebutted testimony of the victim, Thomas Black, was to the effect that he had been outside of his car pumping gasoline into the car’s fuel tank. Jury Trial Transcript (JTT) December 9, 1996, at 45. When he had finished pumping the gasoline, he began to enter his vehicle, observed the defendant, John George also entering the Black vehicle, and then he exited his car, shut the door, and ran over to a vehicle owned and operated by the Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission. *922Id. Nicole Kirby testified that Black “[had] seen the fish commissioners, and started to get in the car and then ran.” Id. at 62. John Bowser, employee of the Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission, testified that Black “came at a dead run towards the passenger door of our car ... and he stood there in our passenger door like he didn’t know what to do, and then he opened the door, which was unlocked, and jumped in the passenger side.” JTT, December 10, 1996, at 9-10.
There was no evidence produced that George took the car in the presence of the victim Black. While distances are not set forth from the testimony, one may surmise that the distance was more than a few feet, based on Bowser’s testimony that the victim “came at a dead run towards the passenger door of our car.” Black ran from his own vehicle, unimpeded, and was seated in the passenger front seat of the Fish and Boat Commission vehicle when George took the vehicle and sped off. I am unable to conclude, as do my colleagues, that this constituted taking the vehicle in George’s presence.
I need not disagree with my colleagues that § 3702 was “intended to criminalize the conduct known as carjacking.” Slip opinion at 6. However, because the words chosen by the legislature are both clear and free from any ambiguity, I cannot join my distinguished colleagues in pursuing the legislative history. Nor do I find the definition of “robbery” helpful, inasmuch as the term appears in the heading of the statute but is not included in the words of the statute itself. See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 444 Pa.Super. 206, 663 A.2d 746, 748-49 (1995) (statute headings may be considered in construing a statute but the letter of a statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit).
My colleagues describe the statute here under review as being “inartfully drafted.” Maj. opinion at 919. They then turn to Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary for a definition of carjacking, and to Black’s Law Dictionary for a definition of theft. However, § 3702 stands on its own. It defines the offense as occurring when an actor “steals or takes a motor vehicle from another person in the presence of that person or any other person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle.” The majority concludes that “[t]he carjacking in this case effectively occurred when appellant entered the vehicle, displayed his weapon and forced the victim to drive to various locations.” Id. at 920. I must respectfully disagree. The majority would expand the clear meaning of the statute to provide, in addition, that the crime is completed once an actor “exercises unlawful control over the operation of the vehicle.” Id. at 920. I find nothing in the statute to support this conclusion.
George, the appellant, is not arguing, as my colleagues assert, that his conduct constituted a simple theft. Following a jury trial, George was convicted of robbery, criminal conspiracy, unlawful restraint, terroristic threats, simple assault, and robbery of a motor vehicle. The only conviction that George has contested through this appeal is the conviction for robbery of a motor vehicle. He contends that the elements as set forth in the statute necessary to support a conviction were not proven. I agree, on the basis that the car was only taken by George after Black had escaped, ran to the Fish and Boat Commission vehicle and jumped inside that latter vehicle. At the time that George got behind the wheel of Black’s car and drove off, Black was no longer in George’s presence. Since the theft must occur in the presence of the victim, I am constrained to conclude, on these undisputed facts, that George was guilty of a number of crimes, but not robbery of a motor vehicle. Accordingly, I am constrained to dissent.