Court Opinion

ID: 9454242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:40:26.902755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:01.992795
License: Public Domain

DANAHER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
My colleagues correctly point out that the appellee Bank on July 18, 1967 had moved for summary judgment, supported by its statement of material facts as to which it contended there was no genuine issue. Then before the trial court were the original sworn complaint, supplemented by an exhibition of a certified copy of the judgment of the Florida court awarding the Bank $396,375 with interest. My colleagues say:
At this point, it was open to Gordon to oppose summary judgment by filing a statement alleging that his guaranty of the company’s debt was either subject to an oral condition precedent, or had been obtained by fraud. Had he then supported this claim by affidavit, summary judgment could not have been rendered against him.
So, my colleagues undertake to construct a course for opposition which, they correctly say, Gordon did not take. The “course” which he did pursue was knowingly adopted, indeed Gordon says that available to him was a single “substantive defense.” He tells us on brief:
Obviously, the Defendant’s only method of avoiding Summary Judgment in this matter would have been to reveal under Oath the names of the three persons who were to have signed the Guarantee and upon doing this he would have provided a link in the chain of evidence needed in the prosecution of the criminal case.
I suggest once again that the “course” chosen by Gordon was purposeful, and his brief before us explains:
Federal Rule 56 provides that a party must make some affirmative factual defense in opposition to an otherwise valid Motion for Summary Judgment, but it is submitted that when the only substantive defense available would necessitate the revelation of names of persons and that when the information itself, or information derived from the required Affidavit, would tend to incriminate the Defendant in a pending Federal criminal prosecution, the same rule that applies in Discovery should be applied to the required Affidavits. * * *
I have said enough to indicate the position1 taken by Gordon and the reasons for his doing so. On July 24, 1967, he filed his motion to stay the pending motion for summary judgment but instead of granting that motion, Judge Waddy simply allowed 2 an extension of time within which Gordon might file his opposition to the pending motion.
Then, what did Gordon do? Did he file affidavits setting up such defenses as my colleagues have supplied? Did he *664suggest on the record as the District Court’s Rule 9(h) requires a statement of genuine issues setting forth material facts? Quite the contrary; within the time allowed by Judge Waddy’s order, Gordon on August 18, 1967 filed his pleading entitled “Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment.” My colleagues characterize that pleading as “an extremely cursory opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” They correctly point out that he had “accompanied the opposition neither with the statement of facts in controversy suggested by Rule 9(h) of the District Court, nor with the affidavits suggested by Rule 56(e) and (f), Fed.R.Civ.P.”
My colleagues venture that Gordon “assumed” that he would have a further opportunity to support his opposition. The majority opinion so states notwithstanding Gordon’s insistence above noted, that he had only one method of avoiding summary judgment and that for reasons advanced by him there was only one substantive defense available.
I see no point in going further into the ramifications of my disagreement from the action taken by the majority. The requested stay had been denied, but the time within which to file an opposition had been enlarged. An opposition in fact was filed, “extremely cursory” as my colleagues say, but that was because the appellant decided to make it so. Clearly he thought then as he has argued here, were he to assert his claimed defense, he would have had to do so under oath. Besides—but erroneously— he argues that in so pleading, he would have tended to incriminate himself in the Florida proceeding. So the opposition was insufficient on its face, and that is all there is to it as Judge Sirica recognized.3 The appellant should be required to abide the result brought about by his own choice not to comply with the rule in the first place. I would affirm the District Court’s judgment.4

. Interestingly enough, my colleagues afford him no ruling respecting his unsupported and on this record, unsupportable claim.

. The docket entries and Judge Waddy’s order as it appears in the record before us reflect the action of the District Court in giving notice to respective counsel of Judge Waddy’s order of August 3, 1967.

. See Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Company, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 299, 300 and see n. 7, 394 F.2d 774, 776-777 and see n. 7, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 884, 89 S.Ct. 194, 21 L.Ed.2d 160 (1968).

. Judge Sirica on October 20, 1967 pointed out that Gordon had filed his opposition on August 18. Judge Sirica observed:
You never answered the motion, simply said incorporated motion for stay; never did set forth what your defense was, although Judge Waddy ordered you to answer, you see. That is what I told you at the beginning.