Court Opinion

ID: 9644765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:04:31.817747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:08.376167
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I concur in the majority opinion but wish to add a few observations about the troublesome questions raised by Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964).
As the majority opinion indicates, it is this Court’s view that Escobedo is basically limited to the particular facts and circumstances of that case. That is, we do not believe that the rule of the case extends to the situation where the accused confesses in the absence of counsel and there has been no request for counsel. The present case is not the first in which our Court has so held. See Commonwealth ex rel. Storch v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 55, 204 A. 2d 263 (1964); Commonwealth v. Coyle, 415 Pa. 379, 403, 203 A. 2d 782, 794 (1964). With this result, People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N.E. 2d 33 (1964), and People v. Agar, 44 Misc. 2d 396, 253 N.Y.S. 2d 761 (S. Ct. N.Y. 1964), are in accord. Cf. People v. Stanley, 15 N.Y. 2d 30, 203 N.E. 2d 475, 255 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (1964). However, a contrary result has been reached in California. People v. Dorado, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 394 P. 2d 952 (1964), rehearing granted.
*339While I join in the majority opinion and conclusion, I am not entirely untroubled by the fact that, at least in part, our test turns on a request for counsel. There are some logical problems in making it do so. See People v. Dorado, supra, at 268, 394 P. 2d at 956. In fact, Justice White in dissent in Escobedo, joined by Justices Clark and Stewart, sees difficulty in limiting the Escobedo majority’s ruling to cases where counsel has been requested. 378 U.S. 478, 495, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 1767. Among other things, I am somewhat bothered by the fact that a “request test” may protect only those who know enough to request counsel. Those most likely to know that they should request counsel are persons often in criminal trouble before, perhaps the habitual criminal. Those who are having their first encounter with the law may be much less likely to have either the knowledge or presence of mind to request counsel.
Nevertheless, I do see a greater deprivation of rights when an accused requests counsel and the state refuses to permit him to exercise that right. I am willing, at least for the present, to believe that this situation violates constitutional imperatives, while the situation in the present case does not. In part, this willingness stems from Escobedo’s repeated references to the “circumstances” of that case.
No doubt, we shall have further guidance from the Supreme Court of the United States on this subject. In any event, if the law enforcement officers of this Commonwealth unfailingly advise one upon whom the spotlight of accusation has swung that he has a right to counsel, then the stress in this area will be substantially lessened.