Court Opinion

ID: 9782028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:50:42.373771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:44.528840
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Judge,
dissenting.
198 I respectfully dissent from both the conclusion that section 20A-7-201(2)(a)@®M) creates an unconstitutional abridgement of the Utah Constitution and from the analysis that equates the initiative right with the right to vote, thereby establishing the "initiative right" as one of the relatively few fundamental rights.
199 First, Petitioners have presented this court with a facial challenge to the use of any non-population based geographic distribution requirement in the initiative process. To succeed, Petitioners must demonstrate that no circumstances exist under which such requirement can be found constitutional. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987); State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 4 n. 2, 993 P.2d 854. Instead of performing a facial analysis of the question presented, the majority seemingly addresses the statute as applied.
1 100 Second, I believe the majority's decision to equate the people's initiative ability with the fundamental right to vote to be a new development, untested and unsupportable. I believe the majority's analysis of the nature of the initiative process is inadequate and the majority merely concludes that the people's ability to seek changes to the law through the initiative process is the same as voting rights because the initiative process, at its conclusion, involves the right to vote.1
1 101 While I agree that the right to initiative is granted within the State Constitution, I do not agree that this right is unfettered. The plain language of Article VI, § 1 establishes in the people the ability to legislate through the initiative process as reasonably defined and controlled by the legislature. While it is the responsibility of this court to ensure that the legislature does not unreasonably restrict this ability, I would conclude that the geographic distribution requirement is not unreasonable; therefore it does not infringe upon the people's ability to legislate.
1 102 Rather than the approach adopted by the majority, I would address Petitioners' arguments with the following analysis:
I. FEDERAL ANALYSIS
{103 Petitioners first argue that Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-201(2)(a)@) (Supp.2001), requiring Petitioners to demonstrate broad-based geographic support2 before an initiative can be placed on the ballot, violates *1101federal principles of equal protection and freedom of speech.
1 104 The ability to pursue a change in the law through the initiative process is solely a state-created right. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 1893, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988); Save Palisade Fruitlands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.2002); Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir.1997); Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1500 (11th Cir.1996); Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir.1993); Bowers v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 692 (Iowa 2002). Absent a state provision creating this right, an initiative right does not exist and no violation of the U.S. Constitution is possible. See Todd, 279 F.3d at 1211; Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843, 854 (9th Cir.1997) (O'Seannlain, J., concurring); Austin, 994 F.2d at 295; Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 375 Mass. 85, 375 N.E2d 1175, 1182 (1978). However, once a state creates an initiative process, the system must comport with the protections afforded under the U.S. Constitution. See Austin, 994 F.2d at 295; Hoyle v. Priest, 59 F.Supp.2d 827, 836 (W.D.Ark.1999). Included in these protections are the right to equal protection under the law and the right to freedom of speech. See id.
A. Free Speech
{105 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that Congress "shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Meyer, 486 U.S. at 420, 108 S.Ct. at 1891 (1988); see also U.S. Const. amend. IL " [Thhe freedom of speech and of the press, which are secured by the First Amendment against abridgment by the United States, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State." " Meyer, 486 U.S. at 420, 108 S.Ct. at 1891 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940)).
1106 "The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment." Id. at 421, 108 S.Ct. at 1892 (quoting Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 101-02, 60 S.Ct. 786). The First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). Petitioners seek to utilize the initiative process to achieve political change in Utah by exercising their right to engage freely in discussions concerning the need for that change as guaranteed by the First Amendment. See id.
1107 In Meyer, the Supreme Court reviewed a Colorado statute that prohibited the use of paid personnel to assist in the circulation of an initiative petition. See id. at 416, 108 S.Ct. 1886. The Court struck down this prohibition as violative of both the First and the Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 428, 108 S.Ct. 1886. The Court noted that:
{the circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change. Although a petition cireulator may not have to persuade potential signatories that a particular proposal should prevail to capture their signatures, he or she will at least have to persuade them that the matter is one deserving of the public serutiny and debate that would attend its consideration by the whole electorate. This will in almost every case involve an explanation of the nature of the proposal and why its advocates support it. Thus, the circulation of a petition involves the type of interactive communication concerning political change that is appropriately described as "core political speech."
Id. at 421-22, 108 S.Ct. at 1891-92. Recognizing that persuading citizens to sign an initiative necessarily involves political speech, and that there is value in allowing the citi*1102zenry to freely seek political change through the initiative process, the Court viewed Colorado's limitation on the qualification of petition cireulators as an unreasonable restraint on free speech. See id. at 428, 108 S.Ct. 1886. Thus, any state statute that unreasonably prohibits core political speech-citizens openly debating political issues during an initiative process-must be closely seruti-nized.
1108 In the case before the court today, Petitioners claim that their federally-protected right to free speech has been violated. Petitioners present a twofold argument: First, they claim that their free speech rights have been infringed because they were unsuccessful in getting their initiative on the ballot. They next argue that section 20A-T-201(2)(a)(ii) infringes upon core political speech. I address each in turn.
109 Petitioners first argue that their free speech right has been infringed because they were unsuccessful in placing their initiative on the ballot due to their failure to satisfy a geographic distribution requirement. Free speech, however, guarantees neither success in placing an item on the ballot nor eventual ratification by voters. Rather, free speech is found in the interplay of ideas during the attempt to capture the voters' curiosity and support. In Skrzypesak v. Kauger, 92 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir.1996), an Oklahoma woman sought to place an initiative on the general ballot but was refused on the grounds that the initiative was unconstitutional. See id. at 1052. The woman brought suit claiming the requirement that initiatives be subject to a screening before placement on the ballot constituted a prior restraint on her free speech. See id. The Tenth Circuit dismissed her claim concluding that the woman did not have a constitutional right to have her initiative placed on the ballot. See id. at 1053. The court stated:
Skrzypezak mistakenly conflates her legally-protected interest in free speech with her personal desire to have [an initiative] on the ballot. In removing [the initiative] from the ballot, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not prevented Skrzypezak from speaking on any subject. She is free to argue against legalized abortion, to contend that pre-submission content review of initiative petitions is unconstitutional, or to speak publicly on any other issue. Her right to free speech in no way depends on the presence of [the initiative] on the ballot. Moreover, she cites no law, and we find none, establishing a right to have a particular proposition on the ballot.
Id. at 1053; see also Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 913, 927-28 (4th Cir.1981) (noting that free speech does not equate to an entitlement to suceess in one's attempt to get a political viewpoint on the ballot).
T 110 Petitioners mistakenly rely upon language in Meyer, where the Court noted that a statute may burden political speech by making it "less likely that appeliees will garner the number of signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion." Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. at 1892. Petitioners take this quote out of context and thereby subvert its meaning. Fully viewed, the Court in Meyer stated:
The refusal to permit appellees to pay petition cireulators restricts political expression in two ways: First, it limits the number of voices who will convey appel-lees' message and the hours they can speak and, therefore, limits the size of the audience they can reach. Second, it makes it less likely that appellees will garner the number of signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion.
Id. at 422-23, 108 S.Ct. at 1892.
T 111 The Court explained that restricting the use of paid cireulators violated free speech because the "prohibition against the use of paid circulators has the inevitable effect of reducing the total quantum of speech on a public issue." Id. at 423, 108 S.Ct. at 1892. A more correct reading of Meyer is not that free speech was infringed in that case simply because the law made it less likely that citizens would garner enough signatures, but the violation occurred because the manner by which the signatures were to be garnered (which necessarily included core political speech) was unreason*1103ably restricted. Thus, a regulation that makes it more difficult to gather signatures in support of an initiative, in and of itself, does not necessarily infringe free speech. See Todd, 279 F.3d at 1211 (noting "the right to free speech ... [is] not implicated by the state's creation of an initiative procedure, but only by the state's attempts to regulate speech associated with an initiative procedure. (emphasis added)); Biddulph, 89 F.3d at 1498 n. 7 (recognizing that the Supreme Court in Meyer set forth "a distinction between a state's power to regulate the initiative process in general and the power to regulate the exchange of ideas.").
1112 On its face, section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(i) does not limit or restrict Petitioners' opportunity to engage in political speech, disseminate their ideas, or solicit support.3 Rather, Petitioners are required to. meet both a popular support threshold and a geographic distribution support threshold before their ideas are submitted to the citizens for a vote. Accordingly, section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) requires Petitioners to disseminate their political message to a large number of people across a broad geographic area in seeking to place an initiative on the ballot. In contrast to the situation in Meyer, where the regulation prevented citizens from utilizing the "most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political discourse, direct one-on-one communication," Meyer, 486 U.S. at 424, 108 S.Ct. at 1893, section 20A-7-201(a)(ii) encourages Petitioners to spread their political message via one-on-one communication with people across a wide geographic area. In this regard, the statute actually encourages free speech rather than unconstitutionally restricting it.
1 118 In Dobrovolny, appellants challenged a state constitutional provision that required an initiative petition to have secured the signatures of ten percent (10%) of the registered voters in Nebraska by the date the initiative was submitted. See 126 F.3d at 1112. The appellants claimed the constitutional provision violated their free speech and due process rights under the United States Constitution because they had insufficient prior notice of the number of signatures required. See id. In finding that the state constitutional provision did not violate any federally protected rights, the Eighth Circuit stated:
[Tihe constitutional provision at issue here does not in any way impact the communication of appellants' political message or otherwise restrict the circulation of their initiative petitions or their ability to communicate with voters about their proposals. Nor does the provision regulate the content of appellants' political speech. While the Nebraska provision may have made it difficult for appellants to plan their initiative campaign and efficiently allocate their resources, the difficulty of the process alone is insufficient to implicate the First Amendment, as long as the communication of ideas associated with the cireulation of petitions is not affected.
Id. at 1112-18 (emphasis added).
1 114 Accordingly, Petitioners' free speech rights to conduct political discussion during the solicitation of signatures and, later, during the attempt to persuade voters, is not infringed by section 20A-T-201(2)(a)(ii). See Hoyle, 59 F.Supp.2d at 836 (finding that a law requiring petition signers to be fully registered voters did not involve a restriction on core political speech).
1115 Section 20A-7-201(@)(a)(ii) establishes the conditions that must be met for an initiative to be placed on the ballot. Creating such requirements is within the province of the state. See Burdick v. Takush, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (noting that "[clommon sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring elections"). Establishing such requirements prevents frivolous initiatives from being placed on the ballot and ensures that state funds and efforts are utilized only on those initiatives that have *1104broad-based support. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 & n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983) (noting that a state has an interest in ensuring elections are run fairly and honestly and that proposals are not submitted for enactment into law unless they have sufficient support); see also Austin, 994 F.2d at 297. As the court in Dobrovolny stated, "the difficulty of the process alone is insufficient to implicate the First Amendment, as long as the communication of ideas associated with the cireulation of petitions is not affected." Dobrovolny, 126 F.3d at 1113.
1116 I conclude that section 20A7-201(2)(a)(ii) does not preclude Petitioners from disseminating any political message nor does it prohibit the exchange of ideas. Rather, the statute establishes a numeric and geographic floor that must be reached before an idea is presented for a vote. Since no core political speech is infringed by the statute, Petitioners' argument that the statute unconstitutionally burdens their First Amendment free speech right is without merit.
B. Equal Protection
1117 Petitioners next argue that section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, state laws must "treat similarly situated people alike unless a reasonable basis exists for treating them different-1y." State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 70, 20 P.3d 342 (quotations and citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court has stated that it will uphold a law against an equal protection challenge that neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class so long as the legislative classification bears a rational relation to some independent and legitimate legislative end. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996).
{118 A statute creates impermissible or suspect classifications when it impacts "discrete and insular minorities," United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783 n. 4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938), differently than the larger class of people affected by the statute. See generally Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 669-75 (Utah 1984). Petitioners argue that section 20A-T-201(2)(a)(ii) creates just such an impact on a discrete and insular minority group-urban dwellers. Petitioners, however, present inadequate support for this claim, nor have I been able to discover any authority for the proposition that urban dwellers represent a discrete and insular minority group worthy of suspect classification and constitutional protection. Cf. Bowers, 638 N.W.2d at 689 (noting that "Iowans who reside in counties with a relatively small population are not similarly situated to those who live in [larger counties]" and this was exactly why the legislature enacted a 10% signature requirement in all counties to get a bond on the ballot (citations and quotation omitted))4 Petitioners do argue that the United States Supreme Court has previously struck down laws based on a rural/urban distinction, and that therefore the United States Supreme Court has inferentially countenanced the inclusion of urban or rural dwellers within the rubric of *1105"suspect class." See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336, 92 S.Ct. 995, 999, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 4-5, 91 S.Ct. 1889, 1891, 29 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 818-19, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 1496, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). I, however, find these cases distinguishable.
1119 In Dunn, for instance, the Supreme Court expressly stated that "durational residence laws must be measured by a strict equal protection test," and, after applying the strict test, struck down a Tennessee statute that both required residence for one year and eliminated the possibility of registering to vote 80 days prior to an election. 405 U.S. 330, 342, 360, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1003, 1012, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). Rather than determining that place of residence could be used to establish a suspect class, the Court decided the issue based on the right to vote. Id. at 341-42, 92 S.Ct. at 1002-03. Similarly, the Court in Gordon upheld a Virginia statute that provided that any attempt to incur public debt must be approved by 60% of the voters. 403 U.S. at 7-8, 91 S.Ct. at 1893. Admittedly, in the body of the opinion, the Court used the phrase " 'discrete and insular minority," " id. at 5, 91 S.Ct. at 1891, as well as "identifiable class," id. at 7, 91 S.Ct. at 1892, but the Court did not adopt a position that would support holding urban dwellers out as a protected class. Finally, in Moore, rather than identifying any discrete and insular minority, the Court struck down an Ill-nois law that they determined intruded upon the principle of "one man, one vote," a fundamental right raised in voting rights cases, because of the "rigid and arbitrary formula" used by the state. Id. at 818-19, 89 S.Ct. at 1496.5
§120 Neither the majority nor the Petitioners have convinced me that the ability to attempt to change the law via the initiative process is entitled to the same protection as the right to vote. Nor can I find support for the proposition that the classifications created in section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) implicate an impermissible or suspect classification under the Fourteenth.6
{121 In the next part of their equal protection argument, Petitioners claim that seetion 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) violates their voting rights.7 In support for this claim, Petition*1106ers rely upon Idaho Coalition United for Bears v. Cenarrusa, Civ. No. 00-0668-S-BLW (D.Idaho Nov. 30, 2001).
€ 122 In that case, the district court judge ruled unconstitutional a requirement in the Idaho Code that a petition contain signatures from six percent (6%) of qualified voters in' 22 of 44 counties. See id. at 14. The court stated that "this Court must determine if the restriction is a 'severe' restriction on the right to vote ... [ilf the restriction is 'severe, it may be upheld only if narrowly drawn to advance a compelling state interest." Id. at 7 (relying upon Burdick, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992)). The court rejected the argument that "there is no fundamental interest in placing measures, as opposed to candidates, on the ballot," id. at 9, and found that placing a measure on the ballot was entitled to the same protection as "disseminating ideas." Id. at 9-10 (quoting Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers, 440 U.S. 173, 187, 99 S.Ct. 983, 991-92, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979) ("[A]n election campaign is a means of disseminating ideas as well as attaining political office.").
{123 In essence, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho equated the ability to legislate through the initiative process with both the free speech right and the right to vote. The District Court's conclusion that the Idaho statute violated free speech is unpersuasive, for states may regulate the means by which measures get on the ballot as long as core political speech is not infringed. See Dobrovolny, 126 F.3d at 1113 (holding signature requirement to place initiative on ballot did not impinge upon speech); Hoyle, 59 F.Supp.2d at 836 (holding that a law requiring petition signers to be fully registered voters did not involve a restriction on core political speech).
1 124 The Idaho court's decision, equating the ability to place a matter on the ballot with the right to vote, is equally unpersuasive. In Moore, 394 U.S. at 818, 89 S.Ct. at 1495, the petitioners challenged on equal protection grounds the constitutionality of a statute that required nominating petitions for independent candidates to include signatures of 200 qualified voters from each of at least 50 of the state's 102 counties. The Court reasoned that "[the use of nominating petitions by independents to obtain a place on the ballot [was] an integral part of [the] elective system." Id. at 818, 89 S.Ct. at 1495. The Court further stated that "[alll procedures used by a State as an integral part of the election process must pass muster against the charges of discrimination or of abridgment of the right to vote." Id. at 818, 89 S.Ct. at 1495-96. The Court then concluded that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment as an abridgement of the right to vote. See id. at 819, 89 S.Ct. 1493.
125 Subsequently, in Burdick, the U.S. Supreme Court altered its position that merely because a law affects the election process it was "integral" to the process. In Burdick the Court stated:
Election laws will invariably impose some burden on individual voters. Each provision of a code, whether it governs the registration and qualification of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably af-feets-at least to some degree-the individual's right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends. Consequently, to subject every voting regulation to strict serutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, as petitioner suggests, would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.... Accordingly, the mere fact that a State's system creates barriers ... tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose, ... does not itself compel close scrutiny.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
126 The Court, therefore, abandoned the approach that all laws which impact the elec*1107tion process unconstitutionally impinge the right to vote. Thus, the Idaho court's reliance upon Illinois State Bd. of Elections, which adopts this absolutist approach, conflicts with the reasoning in Burdick.8
127 In the instant case, Petitioners rely upon Moore to support their claim that any law that affects the initiative process is a per se infringement upon the right to vote. However, in light of Burdick, this reasoning is flawed.
1 128 Other courts have agreed, concluding that limiting access to the ballot via the initiative process does not equate to restricting one's voting rights. For example, in Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group, 375 N.E.2d at 1181-82, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, performing almost exclusively a federal law analysis, addressed the constitutionality of a county-distribution rule that restricted the maximum number of petition signatures that could be utilized from any one county to qualify an initiative for the ballot. Opponents of the legislation claimed that it violated their federally protected voting rights. Id. at 1181. The court disagreed, and found that "[the county-distribution rule in no way affects the right of qualified voters to cast their votes for or against an initiative proposal properly on the ballot ... [nor does it] dilute any citizen's vote." Id. at 1181-82. The Tenth Circuit, also addressing an initiative issue, said
it could be argued that the appellant's fundamental right[ ] to vote [is] implicated within the broader right to bring an initiative, and that the power of initiative is therefore a fundamental right. However, nothing in the language of the [United States] Constitution commands direct democracy and we are aware of no authority supporting this argument. In fact, every decision of which we are aware has held that initiatives are state-created rights and are therefore not guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
Todd, 279 F.3d at 1210-11.
1129 Moreover, a close reading of Meyer supports the conclusion that the United States Supreme Court has accepted the proposition that the ability to change the law via the initiative process is not a right granted either under the United States Constitution or implicated within the right to vote. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 424, 108 S.Ct. 1886. Rather, the Court concluded that the initiative process is focused on the "discussion of public policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation." Id. at 428, 108 S.Ct. 1886; see also Austin, 994 F.2d at 296 (being unpersuaded that the signing of a petition to initiate legislation was entitled to the same protection as exercising the right to vote); Hoyle, 59 F.Supp.2d at 834, 838 (noting that signing a petition does not fall within the purview of the Voting Rights Act, and that there is no right under the federal constitution to have an initiative placed on the *1108ballot); Kelly v. Macon-Bibb County Bd. of Elections, 608 F.Supp. 1036, 1038 (M.D.Ga.1985) (stating “This is not a ‘right to vote’ case; referendums, unlike general elections for a representative form of government, are not constitutionally compelled.”).
¶ 130 I am persuaded by the reasoning of the cases cited above and agree that the ability to change the law via the initiative process is not equivalent to the right to vote. Were I to be persuaded by Petitioners’ claim that section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) implicates their right to vote, however, my conclusion today would not change. In their original petition for extraordinary writ, Petitioners asked that the court adopt the standard of review set forth in Moore. See 394 U.S. at 814, 89 S.Ct. at 1493. However, in its supplemental brief. Petitioners concede that the approach articulated in Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428, 112 S.Ct. at 2059, may be the more applicable guide.9
¶ 131 In Burdick, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[cjommon sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring elections.” 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. at 2063. The Court conceded that while the right to vote is of fundamental significance under the United States Constitution, it is erroneous to assume that all laws that impose a burden upon the right to vote are subject to strict scrutiny. See id. at 432-33, 112 S.Ct. at 2062-63. This conclusion constitutes a distinct departure from the Court’s holding in Moore, for it acknowledges that not all election laws are considered “an integral part of the election process” subject to strict scrutiny.10 394 U.S. at 818, 89 S.Ct. at 1496; see also Biddubph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1500 (1996) (finding that a “state’s broad discretion in administering its initiative process is subject to strict scrutiny only in certain narrow circumstances.”). The court in Burdick then adopted a “flexible standard” for reviewing election cases that requires courts to weigh the character and magnitude of the burden imposed against the State’s justification for the burden. 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. at 2063 (relying upon Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. at 1569-70).
¶ 132 Even were I to assume that section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) implicates Petitioners’ voting right, which I do not, the burden imposed by section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) is not severe enough to warrant a heightened level of scrutiny. Section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) passes constitutional muster because it imposes only reasonable burdens on Petitioners.
¶ 133 Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the geographic distribution requirement and assert that all geographic distributions are unconstitutional on their face. “A facial challenge to a legislative [statute] is ... the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. at 2100. The fact that section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since the U.S. Supreme Court has “not recognized an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.” Id.
¶ 134 Petitioners have failed to shoulder their heavy burden to demonstrate that section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) is facially unconstitutional. See id. I am unpersuaded that no *1109set of circumstances exist where a geographic distribution would be valid under the United States Constitution. Rather, I am persuaded by the fact that at least thirteen other states have created citizen initiative schemes that include a geographic distribution requirement.11 Likewise, I also find persuasive the fact that other courts have reviewed geographic distribution requirements and have found them to be constitutional. See Bowers, 638 N.W.2d at 695; Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group, 375 N.E.2d at 1182. Having failed to discredit all possible geographic distribution schemes, Petitioners' equal protection argument fails.
11835 Consequently, on its face, a geographic distribution requirement implicates neither federally recognized fundamental rights of free speech nor the right to vote. Nor does the requirement create distinctions based upon any previously recognized suspect classification. Therefore, if the statute is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest, I must conclude that it is not violative of the United States Constitution. See Austin, 994 F.2d at 297.
136 Here, the Respondents and the ami-cus curiae assert that requiring that initiatives have broad geographic support ensures that state-wide ballot initiatives are not controlled solely by highly populated areas with narrowly focused local interests. To address this concern, the legislature has required supporters to canvass the breadth of the State seeking support in multiple counties. See Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-201(2)(a)(@). It is within the range of legitimate government goals to ensure that initiatives placed on a ballot have been reviewed and agreed to by citizens from a broad range of geographic regions. See generally Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972) (addressing filing fee requirements). A geographic distribution component is reasonably related to achieving this goal. Thus, Petitioners' claim that all geographic distribution requirements violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is without merit.
1137 I now consider Petitioners) claims pursuant to the Utah Constitution.
IL STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
1 138 Petitioners' remaining avenue for relief lies in their claim that Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7T-201(@)(a)(ii) is facially unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution.12 Petitioners argue that under the Utah Constitution, the people's sovereign right to enact legislation through the initiative process can never be subject to a geographic distribution requirement. Petitioners predicate their argument on two claims: (1) The statutory geographic distribution requirement violates the guarantees of free speech set forth in Article I, §§ 1 and 15; and (2) the geographic distribution requirement violates Article I, § 24 (the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision}.
1139 To support a facial challenge, Petitioners must establish that the challenged statute is invalid under any set of cireum-stances. See State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64 at ¶ 4 n. 2, 993 P.2d 854. "Even if a court finds certain legislation unreasonable or unwise, that alone does not mean it has authority to invalidate it." State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 362 (Utah 1995).
It is well settled in this state, as elsewhere, that the courts will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it clearly and manifestly violates some provision of the Constitution of the state.... Every presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of an act, and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of its *1110validity .... If by any fair interpretation of the statute the legislation can be upheld, it is the duty of this court to sustain it, even though judges may view the act as inopportune or unwise; and it is not within the province of the judiciary to question the wisdom or the motives of the Legislature in the enactment of a statute.
Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 237 n. 2 (Utah 1979) (quoting State v. Packer Corp., 77 Utah 500, 508-09, 297 P. 1013 (1931) (citations omitted)).
T140 I also note that previously "(alll constitutional rights, including the highly protected right of free speech, [have been] subject to reasonable regulation." Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 743 (Utah 1996).13
1141 Petitioners, while offering no independent support or analysis for their free speech claim under the Utah Constitution, argue that the protections afforded under Article I, §§ 1 and 15 are broader than the protections afforded by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Therefore, Petitioners continue the geographic distribution requirement violates their free speech rights under the Utah Constitution, or that the ability to legislate through the initiative process is a fundamental State constitutional right worthy of heightened protection.
A. Freedom of Speech
T 142 In pertinent part, Article I, § 15 of the Utah Constitution states that "No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press." 14 Free speech protection has been interpreted to guarantee that the government has no authority to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1988)15 The constitutional guarantee of free speech prevents any public authority from assuming a guardianship role of the public mind through regulating the press and speech. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 791, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 2674-75, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). At its core, the free speech protection establishes that the government, even with the purest of motives, cannot substitute its judgment as to the most appropriate method of communication available to both speakers and listeners. See id. It also forbids the government from directing the free and robust debate anticipated by the free speech provision. See id.
{ 143 I see no reason to believe that Article I, § 15 provides any less protection than the First Amendment presumption that "speakers, not the government, know best both what they want to say and how to say it." Id.
11144 Petitioners argue that by requiring supporters to demonstrate geographic support for an initiative before it can be placed on the ballot, the State has imposed a severe restriction on the free speech rights of Utah voters, as well as chilled the initiative spon-sorg' right to political expression. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-201(2)(a)@1) states:
A person seeking to have an initiative submitted to a vote of the people for approval or rejection shall obtain:
+93
*1111(@) from each of at least 20 counties, legal signatures equal to 10% of the total of all votes cast in that county for all candidates for governor at the last regular general election at which a governor was elected.
The question then is whether this provision implicates either Petitioners' or the voters' right to free speech.
1 145 At its core, the statute requires initiative supporters to present to the lieutenant governor a sufficient number of signatures, from the required number of counties, before the initiative can be placed on the ballot. See id. With this threshold in mind, initiative supporters are free to approach any citizen within any, and ideally all, of the 29 Utah counties and freely discuss the initiative or any other subject without restriction from section 20¢A-7-201(2)(a)(#i). Moreover, Utah voters are equally free to voice their opinions concerning a proposed initiative, or concerning any other subject, with no restriction from section 20A-7-201(2)(a)@i). Petitioners would have us determine that any geographic distinction that is not population equivalent would unconstitutionally burden the free speech necessary to the initiative right.
1 146 Free and robust public debate, however, can neither be equated with successfully communicating one's ideas, nor with successfully placing an initiative on the ballot, or with the proposal being adopted as law. Free and robust public debate is merely a means to achieve success or failure in the initiative process, not simply the result of successfully placing an initiative on the ballot. Although successfully placing an initiative on the ballot potentially sets the stage for public debate, there is no free speech right to place an initiative on the ballot. The free speech right simply protects Petitioners right to engage in discourse that is essential to their attempt to place the measure on the ballot, as well as any further discussion that may occur in the process of their attempt to have the measure adopted.
11147 Not only am I unable to agree with Petitioners that any geographic distribution requirement implicates either Petitioners', or the general populace's, right to free speech, I am also unable to conclude that the geographic distribution requirement acts as a chilling force on the free and robust public debate protected by Article I, § 15.
B. Uniform Operation of Laws
1148 Next, Petitioners' claim that all geographic distribution requirements are viola-tive of Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution, the State equal protection provision, which requires that "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." This court has previously determined that "Iwlhether a statute meets equal protection standards depends in the first instance upon the objectives of the statute and whether the classifications established [by the statute] provide a reasonable basis for promoting those objectives." Malan, 693 P.2d at 670. "For a law to be constitutional under Article I, § 24, it is not enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform." Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1998). This court has interpreted this to mean that "persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different cireumstances should not be treated as if their cireum-stances were the same." Malan, 693 P.2d at 669. Thus, to determine the validity of Petitioners' claim, it is necessary to decided whether a geographic distribution requirement operates uniformly and within constitutional parameters on all similarly situated persons. To satisfy this requirement, any geographic distribution requirement adopted by the State, at a minimum: (1) "must apply equally to all persons within a class" and (2) any statutory classifications created, and any resulting different treatment given the classes, "must be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute." Id. at 670.
T 149 "When persons are similarly situated, it is unconstitutional to single out one person or group of persons from among the larger class on the basis of a tenuous justification that has little or no merit." Id. at 671 (footnote omitted). Thus, when presented with a uniform operation of the laws challenge that does not involve an important or critical State constitutional right, the court *1112examines the statute to determine whether: (1) the classification created by the statute is reasonable, (2) the legislative objectives are legitimate, and (8) there is a reasonable relationship between the two. See Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995). Previously, the court has determined that "a statutory classification is constitutional unless it has no rational relationship to a legislatively stated purpose or, if not stated, to any reasonably conceivable legislative purpose." Lee, 867 P.2d at 580. Moreover, so long as the classification creates no invidious discrimination,16 and is construed as having a rational relationship to the legitimate State purpose, the court is required to "presume that the classification was intended to further the legislative purpose." Id.
150 However, should a court conclude that a statute's classifications involve a critical state constitutional right or a suspect classification, then the court must employ a heightened standard of review. See id. at 581; Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, ¶ 23, 48 P.3d 941. Under those circumstances, a court may find that a statute does not violate the Constitution "only if it (1) is reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose, and (8) is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal." Lee, 867 P.2d at 583; accord Ryan, 903 P.2d at 428 (Stewart, J., concurring). But, the fact that the practical effect of a statute "subjects some persons to disparate treatment which is more oppressive than others must bear" does not create a claim of constitutional dimension. State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 398 (Utah 1989).
{151 Petitioners argue that the State's geographic distribution requirement should be subject to heightened scrutiny, as established in Lee, because it not only involves a fundamental right, but it also creates " 'classifications considered impermissible or suspect in the abstract. " Peterson, 2002 UT 42 at ¶ 23, 48 P.3d 941 (quoting Ryan, 903 P.2d at 426). Petitioners assert that the geographic distribution requirement establishes a discrete and insular minority group-urban dwellers. Petitioners, however, present no state constitutional support for this claim nor have I been able to discover any authority, in any jurisdiction, to support the proposition that urban dwellers have been recognized as a discrete and insular minority group. Cf. Bowers, 638 N.W.2d at 689.
1152 Section 20A-7-2010@2)(a)@), in its present form, does not distinguish between rural and urban dwellers. It requires only that initiative supporters obtain signatures from a variety of counties, clearly balanced to account for population differences. The statute does not mandate that initiative supporters obtain signatures from certain counties nor does it require supporters to obtain signatures from only urban or rural residents.
{153 I am unwilling, at this time, to declare residents of either urban or rural counties as constituting an impermissible or suspect classification.
1154 Petitioners next argue that the geographic distribution requirement embodied *1113within section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) impacts the fundamental right of Utah citizens to seek changes to the law through the initiative process. Petitioners base this claim on Article VI, § 1(2) of the Utah Constitution.
The catalog of fundamental interests is relatively small to date, and includes such things as the right to vote, to procreatel[,] and to travel interstate.... A right or interest does not invoke strict [or heightened] serutiny just because it is important to the aggrieved party. Only those rights that form an implicit part of the life of a free citizen in a free society can be called fundamental.
Utah Pub. Employees' Ass'n v. State, 610 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1980). When "interpreting the state constitution, [courts] look primarily to the language of the constitution itself .... Therefore, [the] starting point in interpreting a constitutional provision is the textual language itself. ... [A court] need not inquire beyond the plain meaning of the [constitutional provision] unless [it] find[s] it ambiguous." Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 57, ¶ 29, 450 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (citations and quotations omitted); see also Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850 (Utah 1994) (stating that " 'The rule which should be applied is that laws, and especially foundational laws such as our Constitution, should be interpreted and applied according to the plain import of their language as it would be understood by persons of ordinary intelligence and experience' ") (citations omitted)). Thus, to properly perform this analysis, it is important to first determine whether the ability to pursue changes to Utah law, under the plain language of Article VI, § 1(2), and any prior interpretations of the provision, is an "implicit part of the life of a free citizen in a free society." Utah Pub. Employees' Ass'n, 610 P.2d at 1273.
155 "The power to initiate legislation was reserved to the people of the State and to the people of any legal subdivision of the State by an amendment to the Constitution of Utah in 1900." Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 277 P.2d 805, 806 (1954). Article VI, section? 1(2) sets forth that:
The Legislative power of the State shall be vested:
[[Image here]]
In the people of the State of Utah, as hereinafter stated:
The legal voters or such fractional part thereof, of the State of Utah as may be provided by law, under such conditions and in such manner and within such time as may be provided by law, may initiate any desired legislation and cause the same to be submitted to a vote of the people for approval or rejection ....
Utah Const. art. VI, § 1.17
1156 This court has recently commented on this provision stating
The Constitution has vested in the legislature the power to prescribe the conditions, the mammer, and the time that any desired legislation may be submitted to a vote of the people for approval or rejection. It is axiomatic that laws enacted by the legislature are presumed to be constitutional and that the legislature is accorded wide latitude in complying with constitutional directives such as the one contained in article VI, section 1.
Owens v. Hunt, 882 P.2d 660, 661 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added).18 This court has *1114also recognized limitations beyond the plain language of the Constitution. A voter's ability to initiate laws is restricted to proper legislative areas and away from areas specifically vested in an existing legislative body. See Dewey, 277 P.2d at 807; see also Anderson v. Cook, 102 Utah 265, 130 P.2d 278, 285 (1942) (concluding that even the constitutionally granted right to vote is subject to reasonable regulation).19
T 157 I conclude that the plain language of Article VI, § 1(2) is clear and unambiguous. While the ability to attempt to change Utah law through the initiative process is reserved to the legal voters of the State, this ability is expressly self-limiting. Article VI, § 1(2) establishes in the legislature the authority to reasonably limit the mnunibers, conditions, manner, and time within which the citizens may exercise this ability. Because of this limiting language within the Constitution, and while I acknowledge that the ability to pursue change through the initiative process is important, I conclude that the ability is not unfettered within the Constitution and, therefore, not subject to a heightened level of serutiny.
1 158 Accordingly, I would apply the lower standard of review to section 20A-/-201(2)(a)i) to determine whether: (1) any classification created by the statute is reasonable, (2) the legislative objectives are legitimate, and (8) there is a reasonable relationship between the two. See Ryan, 903 P.2d at 426. "[We should] keep in mind, however, that it is not {the court's] function to defend the merits, desirability, or rationality of legislative action. Rather, [the court's] function is to examine the reasonableness of the classification in light of legislative objectives." Id.
€ 159 The first question, then, is to "determine precisely what classification is at issue," and whether that identified classification is reasonable. Id. Petitioners challenge the State's authority to enact any legislation that would require initiative supporters to demonstrate non-population based geographically distributed voter support before an initiative can be qualified for placement on the ballot.20 This statutory requirement does not on its face create classifications. The court must therefore examine both the intent underlying the statute and the statute's impact. Petitioners assert that due to the concentration of Utah's population in four of the counties that make up the Wasatch front, the geographic distribution requirement vests *1115Utah's less populated counties with veto power over any proposed initiative.21
1160 Assuming arguendo that Petitioners' contention is correct and that that a geographic distribution requirement results in voters in higher populated counties being treated differently than voters in less populated counties, I do not see this as fatal. In fact, I believe that the variance in population densities supports a reasonable legislative conclusion that voters residing in less populated counties are not similarly situated to the voters from more heavily populated counties. See Bowers, 638 N.W.2d at 690. Thus, because "persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different cirenmstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same," Malan, 693 P.2d at 669, I conclude that the geographic distribution requirement is not nee-essarily an unreasonable or severe burden.
1161 Moreover, I am not convinced that the distribution requirement creates the impact Petitioners allege. The geographic distribution requirement is based upon a mathematical formula. This formula is used to determine first the number of voters who cast a ballot in the last gubernatorial election in every Utah county, and then to determine the number of signatures that would satisfy the 10% requirement within each county. Sidestepping this needed information, Petitioners utilize absolute population numbers to make their argument. Petitioners fail to present any information concerning the number of voters who cast ballots in the last gubernatorial election, the distribution of these voters in Utah, or the balance that may or may not be demonstrated through these figures. Petitioners have presented us with inadequate support for their argument that requiring a certain number of voters, representing a relatively wide geographic distribution, to sign an initiative petition before the initiative can be placed on the ballot is unreasonable.22
T 162 Therefore, I find nothing inherently irrational, see Peterson, 2002 UT 42 at ¶ 24, 48 P.3d 941, about the statutory geographic distribution scheme as a means to achieve widespread discussion and support when applied to the initiative process. See Halgren v. Welling, 91 Utah 16, 63 P.2d 550, 559 (1936) (analyzing Utah's statutory scheme surrounding the initiative process, including the then existing geographic distribution provision, without comment); Zautra v. Miller, 348 F.Supp. 347, 850 (D.Utah 1972)(conclud-ing that Utah's scheme, requiring a candidate demonstrate support over a geographic distribution to qualify for placement on the ballot, was reasonable); Bowers, 638 N.W.2d at 689-90 (determining that the inherent differences between smaller and larger counties supported a conclusion that the groups were not similarly situated); Massachusetts Pub. Interest Research Group, 375 N.E.2d at 1183 (concluding that requiring initiative supporters to show support over a geographic distribution was reasonable).
*1116[163 The second question to be answered is whether the legislature's purpose in requiring initiative supporters to demonstrate statewide support for their initiatives is legitimate. This court should " 'sustain legislative action if [it] can reasonably conceive of facts which would justify the classifications made by the legislation. " Peterson, 2002 UT 42 at ¶ 25, 48 P.3d 941 (quoting Ryan, 903 P.2d at 427 (citations omitted)). Thus, the court is not limited to the " 'purposes that can be plainly shown to have been held by some or all legislators." " Ryan, 903 P.2d at 427 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 641 (Utah 1989)). Here, however, much like in Peterson, the court has no need to impute a legitimate purpose, for at least one of several possible legislative purposes can be gleaned from examining the debate that surrounded the statute's 2000 amendment. At that time, Representative Garn stated
There are two issues related to this house bill 304. The first is that this bill will assure [that] citizen's initiatives that go to the ballot are truly statewide issues and that is really one of the fundamental issues. If we're going to have initiatives on the ballot let's make sure that they are statewide issues.... If this law passes, you're still going to need 67,188 signatures. The difference is that we're increasing the distribution ... so by doing that we make sure the initiatives that go on the ballot are truly statewide initiatives.
See 52nd General Session of the Utah Legislature (February 17, 1998); Transcription of Floor Debate, House Bill 304.
€ 164 It is also possible to discern a number of other legitimate purposes that may underlie this statement in support of the adoption of a geographic distribution requirement. Chief among these is a desire to facilitate a broader level of participation in discussing issues of statewide importance and to provide initiative supporters with a broader platform from which they can convey their message. Additionally, the requirement for support to be demonstrated over a geographic distribution could be motivated by a desire to avoid the appearance of matters of purely local interest on the statewide ballot that might occur if initiative supporters were permitted to garner 100% of the required signatures from one locality. Finally, the legislature may have intended to avoid the possibility of ballot clutter, where an issue is lost among competing initiatives and therefore not a focus of discussion. All have been recognized as legitimate goals in other locales.
{165 In addition to acknowledging the broad range of possible legislative purposes, and noting that this is an issue of first impression, it is possible to look outside of the state for assistance in establishing the legitimacy of these identified, possible legislative purposes. To this end, I believe the analysis of Bullock, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, is persuasive. In Bullock, the United States Supreme Court stated
the State understandably and properly seeks to prevent the clogging of its election machinery, avoid voter confusion, and assure that the winner is the choice of a majority, or at least a strong plurality, of those voting, without the expense and burden of runoff elections. Although we have no way of gauging the number of candidates who might enter primaries in Texas if access to the ballot were unimpeded by the large filing fees in question here, we are bound to respect the legitimate objectives of the State in avoiding overcrowded ballots. Moreover, a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.
405 U.S. at 145, 92 S.Ct. at 857 (footnote omitted). I conclude that the legislature may legitimately establish geographic distribution requirements for application to the initiative process to encourage wider debate, reduce ballot overcrowding, or ensure that initiatives are not focused solely on issues of local interest.23
*1117€ 166 Finally, the analysis turns to a determination of whether the legislature has chosen a reasonable means to achieve its objective. See Peterson, 2002 UT 42 at ¶ 27, 48 P.3d 941. I would conclude that instituting a geographic distribution requirement within the initiative process is not an unreasonable choice to achieve one or more of the aforementioned possible legislative purposes.24 While it may be possible to imagine alternative options that would have a different impact on the process, it is not this court's place " 'to defend the merits, desirability, or rationality of legislative action.' " Id. (quoting Ryan, 903 P.2d at 426). It is sufficient that the geographic distribution requirement is a reasonable and fairly debatable method to further conceivable legislative purposes.
[167 Finally, were I to accept Petitioners' challenge as implicating a fundamental right under the state constitution, my conclusion would not change. As the parties acknowledge, the standard articulated in Moore has evolved over time into a more realistic approach. In Burdick, the United States Supreme Court determined that "to subject every voting regulation to strict serutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest . would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently." Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. at 2063. Thus, the Court explained, when a challenge to a State election law is considered, a court is directed to
weigh "the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights ... that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate" against "the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule," taking into consideration "the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights."
Id. at 434, 112 S.Ct. at 2063 (citations omitted). The Court then further refined the standard, adopting a sliding scale to apply to state election laws and instructing courts to examine whether a statute has been " 'narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance' " only if the regulation is determined to create a " 'severe' restriction{ ]." Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289, 112 S.Ct. 698, 705, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992)). However, if the regulation creates "only 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions' ... 'the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify' the restrictions." Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564).
T 168 Here, contrary to Petitioners) assertion, there is inadequate support for the conclusion that any geographic distribution requirement must always create a severe restriction on the people's ability to legislate through the initiative process. In the last general election, initiative supporters qualified two separate initiatives for inclusion on the ballot, each of which ultimately was approved by the voters. I am unable, therefore, to discern the severe impact that the geographic distribution requirement may have upon the people's ability to seek change through the initiative process. Accordingly, whether under Burdick or Utab's State Constitutional equal protection analysis, I conclude that " 'the State's important regulatory interests,!" id. (quoting *1118Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564), are sufficient to justify the requirement.
III. SEVERABILITY
T{169 Finally, I disagree with the conclusion that the geographic distribution requirement is severable from the body of the statute. Whether a portion of a statute is severable depends upon a determination of the legislature's intent in including the portion declared unconstitutional. See Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 779 (Utah 1994). Central to this analysis is a need to "determin[el whether the remaining sections, standing alone, will further the legislative purpose." Id. As we stated in an earlier case, "[the test fundamentally is whether the legislature would have passed the statute without the objectionable part, and whether or not the parts are so dependent upon each other that the court should conclude that the intention was that the statute be effective only in its entirety." Union Trust Co. v. Simmons, 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190, 193 (1949). In Stewart we determined that the best measure of this lay in determining whether the offending subsection "has no necessary legal or practical ef-feet upon the operation" of the statute. Stewart, 885 P.2d at 780.
1170 My examination of section 20A-7-201(2) suggests that the geographic distribution requirement has both a legal and a practical effect on the law. Thus, subsection (2)(a)(ii) is not severable from the whole unless there is no circumstance under which such a requirement would survive a constitutional challenge. The majority, having stated that "(ilt is not inconceivable that a less restrictive, burdensome, or nondiscriminatory mechanism for ensuring broad geographic statewide support could be crafted," supra 149, have thereby established that a geographic distribution requirement may survive a constitutional challenge in at least one circumstance. Thus, it would be improper for this Court to find that the legislature could not have determined that a geographic distribution is integral to the legislative intent underlying the statute. Because subsection (2)(a)(i) has a practical effect upon the operation of the initiative statute, which affects the balance struck between the various state interests, I do not believe that it is properly severable.
CONCLUSION
1171 A voter's ability to legislate through the initiative process is uniquely a state-created right that does not, in and of itself, implicate a fundamental right under the Constitution of the United States. It is a creature of state law that, if adopted, must comport with the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. I conclude that the State geographic distribution plan satisfies this requirement.
{172 The people's right to legislate through the initiative process, though important, is self-limiting under the plain language of the state constitution. As Article VI, seetion 1(2) sets forth:
The Legislative power of the State shall be vested:
[[Image here]]
In the people of the State of Utah, as hereinafter stated: The legal voters or such fractional part thereof, of the State of Utah as may be provided by law, under such conditions and in such manner and within such time as may be provided by law, may initiate any desired legislation and cause the same to be submitted to a vote of the people for approval or rejection ....
Utah Const. art. VI, § 1. Thus, the ability to pursue change through the initiative process is not unfettered and not properly the subject of heightened serutiny.
T173 Accordingly, following the analysis previously set forth in Owens, I would weigh limitations on the initiative ability for reasonableness, and, having done so, I would then hold that geographic distribution requirements are a reasonable exercise of legislative prerogative. As long as the legislature does not effectively foreclose the people's ability to seek change through the initiative process, the legislature may create reasonable regulations for the exercise of the ability. Thus, because the adoption of a geographic distribution requirement does not violate Article I, §§ 1, 15, or 24 of the Utah State Constitu*1119tion, I would affirm the action of the Lieutenant Governor and deny Petitioners' request for writ.
1 174 Judge DAVIS concurs in Judge THORNE's dissenting opinion.
1175 Having disqualified himself, Associate Chief Justice DURRANT does not participate herein, and Justice WILKINS does not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judges JAMES Z. DAVIS and WILLIAM A. THORNE sat.

. I also believe that the majority position may have been more persuasive had the majority equated the initiative right with the right to associate as a political party. The reasons underlying a person's decision to join or create a new political party may, in some cases, be identical to their reasons for utilizing the initiative process, and therefore, may be subject to similar protections. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers, 440 U.S. 173, 187, 99 S.Ct. 983, 991-92, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979) (stating "[the freedom of association as a political party, a right we have recognized as fundamental, has diminished practical value if the party can be kept off the ballot" (citation omitted)). The majority, however, does not attempt an analysis of this approach.

. Pursuant to the plain language of section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(@i), Petitioners were required to obtain signatures from a specified number of counties. Throughout this dissent I refer to this requirement either as the "geographic distribution requirement" or as section 20A-7-201(2)(a)@i).

. Freedom of speech has been defined as implicating several areas. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n. of Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 789, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 2673, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (acknowledging solicitation of charitable contribution is protected speech); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 97-98, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2291, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) (picketing is form of free speech). None of these are claimed to be applicable to Petitioners' case.

. In Bowers v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Iowa 2002), the petitioners argued that a statute which required sponsors of a bond to acquire signatures from 10% of the voters in each county in the last gubernatorial or presidential election within a ten-day period violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Iowa Constitution. The petitioners argued that voters in the more populous counties were treated differently from voters in less populous areas, because the ten-day time limit for obtaining signatures did not provide adequate time to collect signatures in the more populated counties. See id. at 689. In rejecting the challenge, the Iowa Supreme Court noted:
"Towans who reside in counties with relatively small populations are not similarly situated to those who live in [more populous counties] for the purposes of this statute." We agree with the district court that to account for this variance in population is exactly why the legislature enacted the ten percent requirement, a requirement that applies to all counties. As the United States Supreme Court recognized, "{slometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different as though they were exactly alike."
638 N.W.2d at 689-90 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).

. In this voting rights case, the formula required that persons seeking inclusion on the ballot as nontraditional candidates must submit a fixed number of registered voter signatures from a large number of counties. See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 815, 89 S.Ct 1493, 1494, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). The Court held that this formula, involving a fixed number without consideration for the population size of the various counties, was rigid and arbitrary, therefore violative of the Constitution. See id. at 818-19, 89 S.Ct. at 1496.

. Additionally, the statute requires only that initiative supporters obtain signatures in 20 of the 29 Utah counties amounting to 10% of the total of all votes cast in that county for gubernatorial candidates in the last regular general election in which a governor was elected. Nowhere in the statute are initiative supporters directed to include certain counties nor are they mandated to ensure the participation of either rural or urban dwellers. Moreover, while it may be true that population figures are larger along the Wasatch front, it is not true that the people who make up this population can be fairly described as either urban or rural and, therefore, a "discrete and insular minority." Nor can it be safely asserted that the interests of the people who make up this purported group coincide or are even closely related. Without such evidence, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to characterize most geographic areas of Utah as containing a "discrete and insular minority."

. I am unconvinced by the reasoning underlying the decision of the majority to declare the people's right to legislate via the initiative process equal to the voting right and therefore fundamental. As it stands, the majority approach discusses the vital nature of fundamental constitutional rights and concludes, with little substantive discussion, that the ability to change the law through the initiative process is equal to the voting right and therefore fundamental. Admittedly, the majority proffers a number of cases to support this proposition, see infra 1166-74. However, a close reading of these cases shows that they do not, in fact, support the majority's conclusion that the ability to change the law via the initiative is fundamental. See infra, dissent, note 20.
Outside of Idaho Coalition United for Bears v. Cenarrusa, Civ. No. 00-0668-S-BLW (D.Idaho Nov. 30, 2001), there is a dearth of authority to support the conclusion that a federal right to initiative exists or that the initiative process itself implicates a citizen's voting right under the federal Constitution. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 1893, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988); Save Palisade Fruitlands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.2002); Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir.1997); Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1500 (11th Cir.1996); Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts *1106v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir.1993); Bowers v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 638 N.W.2d 682, 692 (Iowa 2002). Prior to this decision, the ability to legislate through the initiative process has been subject to reasonable regulation, and has not triggered a declaration that the ability is either equal to the voting right or independently a {fundamental right worthy of protection under a heightened scrutiny analysis.

. The majority has chosen to follow Moore and not the more cautious and more recent approach used in Burdick. The majority ignores the fact that Moore's treatment of a voting rights claim represents an evolutionary dead end. "Even though election laws will invariably impose some burden on individual voters, not all restrictions on access to the ballot merit strict scrutiny." Rockefeller v. Powers, 74 F.3d 1367, 1378 (2d Cir.1996) (citations and quotations omitted). "To subject every voting regulation to strict seru-tiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest . would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently." Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). The approach, as outlined in Burdick, requires a balancing of competing interest rather than an immediate application of strict scrutiny. Therefore, the majority errs in failing to apply the standard set forth in Burdick.
Under Burdick, I would conclude the geographic distribution requirement is not severe, if for no other reason than the simple fact that Petitioners missed their goal by a mere 147 signatures. Moreover, since the recent amendment to section 20A-7-201(2)(a)ii) two groups have successfully placed initiatives on the ballot. Petitioners have made no representation that any other group has failed to collect the sufficient number of signatures with the required geographic distribution.
It is also noteworthy that since deciding Moore, with the exception of Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers, 440 U.S. 173, 187, 99 S.Ct. 983, 991-92, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979), the United States Supreme Court has not cited Moore as controlling authority in any election or voting case, thereby reaffirming my belief that *1108Burdick is the proper statement of the law to be applied.

. Petitioners acknowledge that "to avoid performing a strict scrutiny analysis [each] time a plaintiff complains that a state election law violates the First or Fourteenth Amendments, [the federal courts] have softened the test to require that a plaintiff show that her First or Fourteenth Amendment rights are subject to 'severe' or 'discriminatory' restrictions before strict scrutiny is triggered.” Petitioners' Supplemental Brief at 18 n. 20.

. For the same reason, it is misplaced for both Petitioners and the majority to rely upon such pre-Burdick cases as Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963), where the Court struck down a "county-unit system” in which rural counties were given a disproportionate share of voting power in a primary as violating tire Equal Protection Clause, and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), which found that weighing the votes of citizens differently because of place of residence is not justified as support for its position that the geographic requirement of section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) violates equal protection.

. See Ark. Const. amend. 7; Fla. Const. art. XI, § 3; Mass. Const. Amend. art. 48, Gen. Prov., pt. 2; Miss. Const. Ann. art. 15, § 273; Mo. Const. art. 3, § 50; Mont. Const. art. III, § 4; Neb. Const. art. 3, § 2, Nev. Const. art. 19, § 2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 1a; Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 52; see also Alaska Stat. § 15.45.140 (2000); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 15.21 (West 2001); Idaho Code § 34-1805 (Michie 2001).

. While the majority delves into a discussion of the statutes' signature removal provision, this provision is not challenged. In fact, in their supplemental brief, Petitioners specifically request that this court not address this issue and concede that it is, in all likelihood, constitutional. See Petitioners' Supplemental Brief, at 22.

. The majority relies upon Cope v. Toronto, 8 Utah 2d 255, 332 P.2d 977 (1958), as support for its claim that the people's ability to directly legislate through the initiative process is a fundamental right that the court must "defend against encroachment" and "maintain inviolate." See supra 127. The majority misapplies case law as well as the plain language of the Utah Constitution which states that the legislature may reasonably regulate the initiative process. See Utah Const. Art. VI, § 1. Furthermore, my reading of Cope does not support the majority's claim. While Cope does encourage liberal construction of the initiative process, the case itself only addresses the inequities of keeping initiatives off the ballot for "technical deficiencies."

. Article I, § 1 of the Utah Constitution includes the phrase "to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions." This court, however, has concluded previously that Article I, § 15 provides a broader description than Article I, § 1 of the people's right to communicate freely. See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1015 (Utah 1994). Therefore, I focus my analysis on Article I, § 15.

. "[To the extent we cite federal authority, we do so only because we consider it persuasive to our independent construction of article I, section[] ... 15 of the Utah Constitution." West, 872 P.2d at 1018.

. In paragraphs 49, 54, 78, and 80, the majority makes the bold statement that the geographic distribution requirement is invidiously discriminatory. Black's Law Dictionary defines "invidious discrimination" as "arbitrary, irrational and not reasonably related to a legitimate purpose." Black's Law Dictionary, 826 (6th ed.1990) (citation and quotation omitted) (emphasis added). While there may be a question as to whether the distribution requirement is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose, there is nothing to support the conclusion that the requirement is either irrational or arbitrary in this case. Such a conclusion would seem to ignore the 12 states that also have included a geographic distribution requirement within their initiative processes. See infra dissent note 19. Moreover, the small amount of évidence proffered during this case supports just the opposite conclusion, that the requirement was the product of significant discussion on the part of the Legislature to satisfy certain concerns that today have been deemed insufficient by the majority. Invidious discrimination is not the same thing as a fundamentally different point of view. Rather, it is an unreasoned distinction with an intolerable consequence.
Finally, today's adoption of the urban/rural distinction may have widespread and far-reaching effects well beyond today's decision. I fear that future, benign legislation that makes reference to distinctions between urban and rural residents and their differing needs and concerns will be subject to attack as invidiously discriminatory.

. The majority cites to constitutional provisions from other states to support its conclusion that the ability to attempt change through the initiative process is fundamental. Having reviewed the cited provisions, I would conclude that they are sufficiently different as to be inapplicable. Unlike Utah, the states cited by the majority have expressly limited the legislatures' ability to restrict the people's initiative right within the body of their constitutions. See, eg., Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(10) (2001) (establishing that the initiative right is self-executing under the Colorado constitution); Ore. Const. art. IV, § 1 (2001) (setting out, within the body of the constitution, the percentages of signatures required and only providing the legislature with the authority to "provide by law for the manner in which the Secretary of State shall determine whether a petition contains the required number of signatures"). Additionally, that the majority relies on constitutions other than our own to establish the fundamental nature of a Utah right is unpersuasive.

. This court has addressed the initiative and referendum process in several other cases. See Tobias v. South Jordan City Recorder, 972 P.2d 373 (Utah 1998); Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994); Bigler v. Vernon, 858 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1993); Wilson v. *1114Manning, 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982); Provo City v. Anderson, 12 Utah 2d 417, 367 P.2d 457 (Utah 1961); Revne v. Trade Comm'n, 113 Utah 155, 192 P.2d 563 (Utah 1948); Allan v. Rasmussen, 101 Utah 33, 117 P.2d 287 (Utah 1941); White v. Welling, 89 Utah 335, 57 P.2d 703 (Utah 1936).

. The majority concludes that the people's ability to initiate legislation is "coequal, coextensive and concurrent" with the power of the legislature. In making this statement, the majority relies on a concurring opinion, joined by no other member of the court, found in Utah Power & Light v. Provo City, 94 Utah 203, 74 P.2d 1191, 1205 (1937) (Larson, J., concurring). I am unpersuaded by the prose of the concurring opin-fon, and instead am convinced that the analysis adopted by the entire court in Owens is a more appropriate statement of the law. In Owens, we determined that the people's ability to change the law via the initiative process, as found in our Constitution, is an ability subject to reasonable limitations set by the legislature. Owens v. Hunt, 882 P.2d 660, 661 (Utah 1994).
Moreover, I do not think that Shriver supports the majority's conclusion that the ability to change the law via the initiative process is a fundamental right. Instead, I read Shriver to merely restate the language of Article VI, § 1. See Shriver v. Bench, 6 Utah 2d 329, 313 P.2d 475, 476 n. 2 (1957). Furthermore, in Shriver, we stated that "the fundamental power of government is in the people, and the policy of the law generally is to regard it as being reserved to them except as it may have been clearly declared otherwise." Id. at 332, 313 P.2d 475 (emphasis added). What was left unstated in Shriver, but is clear in both the language of our Constitution and Owens, is that while the ability to change the law via the initiative process is reserved to the people, the Legislature has the power to "prescribe [the number,] the conditions, the manner, and the time" surrounding the initiative process. Owens, 882 P.2d at 661.
For this reason, I am unpersuaded by the argument that the ability to change the law via the initiative process might be obliterated by excessive regulation. Any such regulation is limited by the plain language of the Utah Constitution, and our case law, to reasonable regulation of condition, manner, and time.

. As presently enacted, section 20A-7-201(2)(a)(ii) requires initiative supporters to obtain signatures from 20 of Utah's 29 counties. However, because Petitioners challenge the geographic distribution statute on its face, I do not address the legislature's present requirement.

. The majority asserts that the geographic distribution requirement endows the rural counties with an "effective veto" over initiatives that enjoy support from the majority of Utah voters. This may indeed be true, but an equally effective veto power is held by what the majority has declared to be those subject to invidious discrimination-the four urban counties. These counties, apparently comprising 3/4 of Utah's population, can effectively veto any rural initiative through the requirement that an initiative garner support from 10% of the voters prior to qualifying for the ballot. Moreover, the concern regarding majoritarian rule is somewhat misplaced. As the United States Supreme Court has said, "Certainly any departure from the majority rule gives disproportionate power to the minority. But there is nothing in the language of the Constitution, our history, or our cases that require that a majority always prevail on every issue." Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6, 91 S.Ct. 1889, 1892, 29 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971).

. Petitioners and the majority argue that the county distribution requirement creates a distinction between rural and urban voters. However, I am hard pressed to accept an argument that would require declaring St. George (approximate population 50,000) or Logan (approximate population 42,000) to be rural in nature, rather than urban, based purely on their existence within certain counties. By the same token, I would have a similar difficulty characterizing Magna or Spanish Fork, which both share a great number of rural characteristics, but are located within what Petitioners identify as urban counties. Finally, both Park City and Moab, each with very small year-round populations, defy characterization because both could reasonably be considered urban and rural in character.

. Despite the existence of geographic distribution requirements enacted for similar reasons in twelve other states, and despite the acceptance of such reasons by the United States Supreme Court, the majority has concluded that none of the purposes proffered by the appellees are legitimate. Then, after drawing this conclusion, the majority proceeds to determine that these "ille*1117gitimate purposes" are not actually and substantially furthered by the geographic distribution requirement. I am unpersuaded by the analysis of the majority, and in fact believe it ill-advised to determine whether the legislative purpose is actually and substantially furthered by the geographic distribution requirement absent a developed factual record.

. It is of no small moment that of the 23 states that have created a citizens initiative process, thirteen of them have instituted a geographic distribution requirement. More importantly, among these thirteen, ten states have concluded that the geographic distribution requirement is so important to the process that they have consti-tutionalized the requirement. See Arkansas Const. amend. 7; Fla. Const. art. XL, § 3; Mass. Const. Amend. art. 48, Gen. Prov., pt. 2; Miss. Const. Ann. art. 15, § 273; Mo. Const. art. 3, § 50; Mont. Const. art. III, § 4; Neb. Const. art. 3, § 2; Nev. Const. art. 19, § 2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 1a; Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 52; see also Alaska Stat. § 15.45.140 (2000); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 15.21 (West 2001); Idaho Code § 34-1805 (Michie 2001). It would seem illogical to declare the geographic distribution requirement unreasonable in the face of such strong evidence of the central importance of such a limitation to so many other jurisdictions.