Court Opinion

ID: 9754415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:59:59.631225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:53.262457
License: Public Domain

CERCONE, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the lead opinion on the grounds that the majority’s decision to terminate appellant’s parental rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. See, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).
The majority correctly states that prior to his divorce from appellee appellant failed to adequately support his children as much of his income was squandered on gambling. However, the evidence adduced at appellant’s termination hearing does not conclusively support the majority’s statements that appellant failed to regularly exercise his visitation rights with his minor children subsequent to his divorce or that appellant has failed to write or send cards or presents to his children during his term of incarceration. Appellee testified that from the time the parties separated until appellant’s incarceration, approximately fifteen months, appellant exercised his visitation privileges twelve to fifteen times. Appellant stated that during visitation periods he took the children to visit his mother and sister, played games with them, and went fishing with his son. However, since being incarcerated appellant’s contact with the children has diminished. Appellant, at the termination hearing, gave as the reason for less contact with his children that since he was jailed, appellee has thwarted his efforts to communicate with the children by refusing his phone calls and not acknowledging the cards he sent to the children on various occasions. This testimony was corroborated by appellant’s mother and sister who stated that when they asked to take the children to visit their father appellee told them that the children had other plans. Appellee also stated that she did not feel, that it was her responsibility to take the children to see their father. Appellant’s witnesses *62further stated that they sent cards to the children at appellant’s request and that he inquired about the children within a six month period prior to this proceeding. Appellee acknowledges that she would not accept appellant’s phone calls as they were made collect, a prison requirement, and that it was appellant’s mother, not appellant, who sent the children cards and money, on appellant’s behalf at Christmas, 1984 and a birthday card to one of his sons in February, 1985. Appellee’s testimony was substantiated by that of her husband.
The majority places too great an emphasis on the length of appellant’s sentence, which we note could expire in two years, concluding that it precludes any meaningful and significant contact with the children. It is settled law in this Commonwealth that appellant’s parental rights cannot be terminated solely on the fact that appellant is incarcerated. In Re Adoption of M.T.T., 467 Pa. 88, 259 A.2d 564 (1976). This is especially true when, despite incarceration, the prisoner strives to maintain an affirmative relationship with his children. See, In Re Adoption of Sabrina, 325 Pa.Superior Ct. 17, 472 A.2d 624 (1984). The record discloses that while in prison appellant has no resources to care for or support his children.1 This circumstance alone cannot justify a finding of abandonment of parental duties. Adoption of M.T.T., supra. Appellant and his witnesses set forth evidence of appellant’s repeated attempt to remain in contact with his children; appellant tried to call, send cards and seek permission from appellee to have his mother bring the children to visit him, all within six months of the instant proceeding herein. Appellee by her own admission, has discouraged these attempts and maintains that it is not her responsibility to take the children to see their father.
Our law recognizes there may be situations where the parent who has custody of the minor may create such barriers as to impede communications between the absent parent and the child. Where the absence of communica*63tion results from the deliberate conduct of the opposing parent, it may not be used as a basis for termination of parental rights, even when the lack of contact may have extended significantly beyond the statutory period ... A parent’s efforts in maintaining a relationship with the child must always be evaluated in light of the obstacles confronting that parent.
In Re Adoption of Jr., 492 Pa. 313, 317, 424 A.2d 878, 880 (1981).
The burden of proof is upon the party seeking termination to establish by “clear and convincing” evidence the existence of the grounds for termination. In Re: T.R., 502 Pa. 165, 465 A.2d 642 (1983). We have carefully examined the record in the case before us, and while we find that appellant is not an exemplary father, considering the totality of the circumstances, the record does not support a determination that appellee has proven by clear and convincing evidence that appellant has exhibited such failure to perform parental duties as would justify the involuntary termination of his parental rights. The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents. Santosky v. Kramer, supra.
The majority opines that the legislature, in recent years, severely restricted the ability of parents to rely on their natural ties to the children to defeat any attempt to bring order, stability, affection and care due them when parents are guilty of gross neglect or de facto abandonment. But, I believe that to deprive a parent of parental rights, even one who falls below the standard of conduct depicted from a law abiding citizen and who as a result finds incarceration as part of the penalty, in face of evidence which demonstrates a degree of concern, affection and love that ineffably exists between a natural parent and his or her child is contrary to the intent of the law having to do with the legally pronounced termination of parenthood. The law does not presume drastic results in every case based on an *64isolated period of lack of support, financial or emotional, six months in duration.
Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the trial court terminating appellant’s parental rights.

. Appellant earns approximately $25.00 per month at his prison job and from this income he must supply his own sundries and his share of the T.V. cable.