Court Opinion

ID: 9957451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 16:00:45.599633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:20.715171
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                No. 22-50240

              Plaintiff-Appellee,           D.C. No.
                                         2:14-cr-00702-
 v.                                         ODW-2

VIVIAN TAT,
                                           OPINION
              Defendant-Appellant.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Central District of California
      Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

         Argued and Submitted October 5, 2023
                 Pasadena, California

                   Filed April 4, 2024

  Before: Daniel P. Collins, Salvador Mendoza, Jr., and
           Roopali H. Desai, Circuit Judges.

               Opinion by Judge Mendoza
2                           USA V. TAT

                          SUMMARY*

                         Criminal Law

   In a case stemming from Vivian Tat’s involvement in a
money-laundering scheme, the panel vacated the sentence
imposed at resentencing and remanded for resentencing.
    The panel held that a criminal defendant’s failure to
challenge specific aspects of her initial sentence on a prior
appeal does not waive her right to challenge comparable
aspects of a newly imposed sentence following de novo
resentencing.
    The panel held that the district court erred in applying an
organizer/leader enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 for
two reasons: (1) contrary to the district court’s suggestion,
Tat’s status as a mere member of the criminal enterprise—
even if she was an essential member—does not bear on
whether she was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor
of the criminal activity; and (2) the criminal conduct—a
scheme to launder roughly $25,000 via a single transaction
involving four participants and one victim—was not
“otherwise extensive.”
    The panel held that the district court did not err in
applying an enhancement for abuse of trust under U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.3, where Tat’s position as a manager at the bank gave
her the discretion to carry out transactions like the one at
issue here without oversight, and where her position of trust
facilitated her role in the underlying offense.

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                         USA V. TAT                         3

    The panel held that the district court did not improperly
consider “cost” in dismissing Tat’s community-service
proposal. The panel wrote that unlike the cost of
imprisonment, which may not be considered, the cost of
Tat’s proposed alternative to incarceration, and the lack of
measurable goals and violations for probation to work with,
are valid concerns that a district court may consider.
    Because the panel remanded for resentencing, the panel
did not need to reach Tat’s argument that the district court
failed to resolve two factual disputes in violation of Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32.

                        COUNSEL

Alyssa D. Bell (argued) and Michael V. Schafler, Cohen
Williams LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-
Appellant.
Bram M. Alden (argued), Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Appeals Section; Consuel S. Woodhead and
Karen I. Meyer, Assistant United States Attorneys; Joseph
T. McNall, United States Attorney; Office of the United
States Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Los
Angeles, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
4                         USA V. TAT

                         OPINION

MENDOZA, Circuit Judge:

    Defendant-Appellant Vivian Tat has twice been
sentenced by the district court and twice appealed to this
court, stemming from her involvement in a money-
laundering scheme and resulting conviction. In 2018, Ms.
Tat was convicted on several counts and, in early 2019, she
was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment. On appeal in
United States v. Tat, 15 F.4th 1248 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Tat I”),
we vacated her conviction as to one count, vacated her
sentence, and remanded for de novo resentencing. At her
second sentencing hearing, the district court resentenced Ms.
Tat to 18 months imprisonment. Now, in her second appeal,
Ms. Tat asks this court to vacate her sentence and remand so
that she may be sentenced for a third time. She argues that
the district court abused its discretion in applying the abuse-
of-trust and organizer/leader sentencing enhancements,
improperly considered “cost” in dismissing her community-
service proposal at sentencing, and violated Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32 by failing to make findings of fact
about certain portions of her presentence report. The
government disagrees. It argues that Ms. Tat waived her
challenge to the sentencing enhancements by failing to raise
them on appeal from her initial sentence in Tat I, and that the
district court did not otherwise err when it resentenced her.
    Ms. Tat’s appeal raises procedural and substantive
concerns. First, we address whether Ms. Tat waived her
challenge to the district court’s application of the sentencing
enhancements. Following the Second and Third Circuits’
lead, we conclude that a criminal defendant’s failure to
challenge specific aspects of her initial sentence on a prior
                                  USA V. TAT                    5

appeal does not waive her right to challenge comparable
aspects of a newly imposed sentence following de novo
resentencing. Second, we turn to the merits of Ms. Tat’s
challenges to her sentence. We agree with Ms. Tat that the
district court erred in applying the organizer/leader
enhancement. But we disagree with Ms. Tat regarding the
district court’s imposition of an abuse-of-trust enhancement
and the court’s analysis regarding the “cost” of her
community-service proposal. Because we vacate the
sentence on other grounds, we do not reach whether the
district court failed to comply with Rule 32, and we remand
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
                                      I.
    In 2009, while working as a branch manager for a bank,
Ms. Tat participated in a scheme to launder roughly $25,000.
See generally Tat I, 15 F.4th at 1249–50.1 After five years
of investigation, the government indicted Ms. Tat. Four
years later, she was convicted of one count of conspiring to
launder money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and two
counts of making false entries in bank records, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1005.
    At Ms. Tat’s first sentencing in 2019, the sentencing at
issue in Tat I, the parties disputed whether the district court
should apply a four-level organizer/leader enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 and a two-level enhancement for
abuse of a position of trust under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. The
district court overruled Ms. Tat’s objections to the
sentencing enhancements, resulting in a guidelines range of

1
    The facts of this scheme are laid out in detail in Tat I.
6                         USA V. TAT

33 to 41 months, and it sentenced Ms. Tat to 24 months
imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release.
    Ms. Tat appealed, arguing that there was insufficient
evidence to support her conviction on the two false-entry
counts. She did not challenge the district court’s ruling
regarding the organizer/leader and abuse-of-trust sentencing
enhancements in her initial appeal. In Tat I, we reversed one
count of false entry, vacated the original sentence, and
remanded to the district court for de novo resentencing. 15
F.4th at 1253–54.
     Ms. Tat’s second sentencing proceeded in two parts. The
first took place on September 14, 2022, and opened with the
district court stating, “as a practical matter, [the overturned
count] is not going to result in any change but we’re going
to go through the motions nonetheless.” The district court
then heard argument regarding the organizer/leader and
abuse-of-trust enhancements.           With regard to the
organizer/leader enhancement, the presentence report
(“PSR”) stated:

       In analyzing Tat’s role in this offense, the
       Probation Officer initially recommended that
       Tat did not occupy a mitigating role or
       aggravating role in this offense. The Court,
       however, has concluded that Tat occupied an
       aggravating role in this offense and a 4-level
       increase has been applied.

And with respect to the abuse-of-trust enhancement, the PSR
stated:

       Here, Tat served as the bank manager at the
       time of the offense. As such, her position as
                          USA V. TAT                         7

       the bank manager significantly facilitated the
       commission of the offense. She was clearly
       aware of the [Bank Secrecy Act] reporting
       requirements and manipulated bank policies
       to secure the initial three cashier’s checks.
       Further, throughout this offense, Tat used her
       role as bank manager to circumvent [the
       bank’s] policies and practices to detect and
       track large cash transactions. Accordingly,
       Tat abused a position of trust; and, a 2-level
       increase has been applied.

The district court ultimately applied both enhancements over
Ms. Tat’s objection.
     Ms. Tat also asked the court to resolve two factual
disputes: the first related to her deteriorating mental health,
as evidenced by Dr. Christine Wong’s report; the second to
her alleged pattern of criminal behavior. With regard to the
former, the district court suggested “that the cause of any
anxiety and depression [Ms. Tat] feels is quite clearly this
case and the fact that the one thing that’s unresolved is the
punishment issue and it is reasonable that she’s feeling some
mental distress about that. No question. And I didn’t need
a psychotherapist to tell me that.” And with regard to the
latter, the district court heard argument as to whether Ms.
Tat’s conduct was part of a pattern of criminal activity.
    The district court then moved on to potential sentencing
options for Ms. Tat and asked the parties to address whether
“alternatives to incarceration [] might be beneficial to the
community.” The district court asked defense counsel
whether Ms. Tat had thought of ways she could use her
knowledge and skillset to help others, while discouraging
others from following in her footsteps. After defense
8                        USA V. TAT

counsel, and Ms. Tat herself, suggested a few community-
service projects, the court shifted gears to focus on whether
she had already engaged in community service, or
demonstrated signs of growth and remorse to distinguish
herself from the person who had committed the crime a
decade prior. Defense counsel highlighted Ms. Tat’s years
of compliance with pretrial release and specific facts in Dr.
Wong’s report. The district court asked Ms. Tat herself:

       Now, there is no correct answer as to what
       you might be able to do. I’m just wondering
       whether or not you’ve given it any thought
       about what you might be able to do to correct
       this wrong; and if you haven’t, that’s fine,
       absolutely fine. I’m certainly not going to
       hold it against you but if you have, if you
       really have, then I’d really love to hear that
       because it’s one thing for the attorneys to
       stand up here and make argument, it’s
       something else entirely for the principals
       involved to talk about concrete things that
       they would like to do.

The district court then gave defense counsel 30 days to
confer with Ms. Tat before reconvening to discuss
alternatives to incarceration.
    A month later, on October 14, 2022, the court
reconvened for part two of Ms. Tat’s resentencing. In lieu
of confinement, Ms. Tat proposed that she complete a
minimum of 20 hours per week of community service;
disseminate a public service announcement (“PSA”) to her
community about the pitfalls of money laundering; and
partner with banks to conduct presentations to her former
                          USA V. TAT                         9

peers about this issue. The district court applauded Ms. Tat’s
creative efforts, but expressed concern with how “costly” her
proposal was, and how difficult it would be for probation to
monitor her compliance, stating: “trying to manage this
unwieldy thing that’s also going to be expensive which also
-- it probably is going to mean that it’s not going to happen.”
Defense counsel conceded that Ms. Tat could not, at that
moment, afford the PSA, but registered their “hop[e] that
[they] could fundraise for that part of the program.” The
district court commended defense counsel for their proposal
but ultimately rejected it. The court then found Ms. Tat’s
guideline range remained 33 to 41 months—which
accounted for the four-level organizer/leader enhancement
and the two-level abuse-of-trust enhancement—and
sentenced Ms. Tat to 18 months of imprisonment.
   Ms. Tat timely appealed.
                            II.
    We have jurisdiction to review this sentence under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review the
district court’s interpretation of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines de novo, its application of the Guidelines to the
facts of the case for abuse of discretion, and its factual
findings for clear error. United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852
F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
                           III.
    We start with whether Ms. Tat can challenge the district
court’s application of the organizer/leader and abuse-of-trust
sentencing enhancements, or whether she waived her
challenge to the district court’s application of those
enhancements by not raising it in Tat I. The government
urges us to find waiver, citing our decision in United States
10                        USA V. TAT

v. Nagra for the proposition that, “[w]hen a party could have
raised an issue in a prior appeal but did not, a court later
hearing the same case need not consider the matter.” 147
F.3d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 1998). Ms. Tat argues that “[t]he
Nagra rule has never been applied in this Circuit to bar a
defendant from challenging any aspect of her sentence
following an unlimited remand for resentencing,” and in any
event, that we should refrain from extending Nagra to that
context. We agree with Ms. Tat.
    “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Mercado-
Moreno, 869 F.3d 942, 959 n.9 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)) (alteration
omitted). When we remand for de novo resentencing, it is a
“settled principle” that vacating an appellant’s original
sentence “legally ‘wipe[s] the slate clean,’” United States v.
Merrell, 37 F.4th 571, 576 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Pepper
v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 507 (2011)), and that on
remand in such a case, “the defendant is placed in the same
position as if he [or she] had never been sentenced,” id.
(quoting United States v. Maldonado, 996 F.2d 598, 599 (2d
Cir. 1993) (per curiam)); see also United States v. Handa,
122 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended on reh’g
(Aug. 4, 1997) (holding that remand to the district court
begins “the sentencing process afresh”).              Generally,
therefore, the district court is “free to consider any matters
relevant to sentencing, even those that may not have been
raised at the first sentencing hearing, as if it were sentencing
de novo.” United States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 880, 885–86
(9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
    Our remand in Tat I left the district court free to rewrite
the script with respect to Ms. Tat’s sentencing. Ms. Tat had
been convicted on three counts and sentenced accordingly.
                          USA V. TAT                         11

But we reversed one of those convictions, Tat I, 15 F.4th at
1249, and we did not direct the district court to conduct a
limited resentencing on remand, see United States v. Klump,
57 F.3d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that “the general
rule that resentencing is de novo applies” absent limiting
language). Cf. United States v. Pimentel, 34 F.3d 799, 800
(9th Cir. 1994) (“In light of this clear evidence that the scope
of our remand was limited to the single sentencing issue
raised in Pimentel’s prior appeal, the district court was
without authority to reexamine any other sentencing issues
on remand.”). We therefore sent the case back to the district
court to resentence Ms. Tat on a clean slate. Accordingly,
Ms. Tat’s failure to challenge certain aspects of her initial
sentence on appeal in Tat I cannot amount to an “intentional
relinquishment or abandonment” of her right to challenge
similar aspects of her second sentence in the present appeal.
See Mercado-Moreno, 869 F.3d at 959 n.9. And because
Ms. Tat was to be resentenced de novo, she was free to raise
any timely objections at that resentencing, without regard to
whether she might have forfeited such objections at the prior
sentencing that was completely set aside.
    The government’s reliance on Nagra stretches its waiver
rule too far. In the appeal preceding our decision in Nagra,
we vacated the defendants’ sentences “because the trial court
had imposed departures without articulating sufficient
supporting factual findings,” and remanded for resentencing.
147 F.3d at 878. On remand, however, the defendants
sought more than resentencing: they moved to withdraw
their guilty pleas. Id. After the district court rejected their
arguments, the defendants appealed a second time and we
affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendants’
motions to withdraw their pleas because they were “based
upon events known to [the defendants] when they filed their
12                       USA V. TAT

first appeals.” Id. at 882. Properly read, therefore, Nagra
does not bar defendants from challenging aspects of a new
sentence following de novo resentencing. Instead, Nagra
merely stands for the unremarkable proposition that erasing
a defendant’s sentence has no bearing on the validity of that
defendant’s plea agreement. After all, remand could not
open the door for the defendants to bring new challenges to
their plea agreements that they could have raised all along.
Here, conversely, Ms. Tat challenges aspects of a newly
imposed sentence following a remand for de novo
resentencing; she does not seek to vacate her convictions.
To broadly extend Nagra’s reasoning to this case, as the
government invites us to do, would thus contravene Merrell,
Handa, and Matthews, and we see no basis to create such an
unnecessary conflict.
     Our approach today also aligns with that of our sister
circuits. In United States v. Quintieri, the Second Circuit
distinguished between de novo and limited resentencing for
the purposes of forfeiture and waiver. 306 F.3d 1217, 1225
(2d Cir. 2002). And it held that where, as here, “a case is
remanded for de novo resentencing, the defendant may raise
in the district court and, if properly preserved there, on
appeal to the court of appeals, issues that he or she had
previously waived by failing to raise them.” Id. Likewise,
the Third Circuit followed Quintieri’s lead in United States
v. Miller, holding that vacatur of a sentence provides an
“exception to the waiver doctrine,” which allows defendants
to raise issues not previously argued following a remand for
de novo resentencing. 594 F.3d 172, 179 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citing Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1225). As in Quintieri, the
Miller court reasoned that “when the resentencing is de novo
rather than limited, issues concerning the first sentence that
                             USA V. TAT                            13

were previously waived may be raised in the first instance if
warranted by the second sentence.” Id. at 179.2
    Consistent with our precedent and with that of the
Second and Third Circuits, we hold that Ms. Tat did not
waive her challenge to the district court’s application of the
sentencing enhancements following the de novo
resentencing.
                               IV.
    Turning to the merits of Ms. Tat’s challenges to her
sentence, we conclude that the district court erred in
applying the organizer/leader enhancement, but permissibly
applied the abuse-of-trust enhancement. Additionally, we
see no error in its decision to reject her community-service
proposal. And we decline to address whether the district
court violated Rule 32 in its factfinding. We take each in
turn.
                                 A.
    The district court may apply a four-level
organizer/leader enhancement when “the defendant was an
organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five
or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(a). To impose such an enhancement, “there must be
evidence that the defendant exercised some control over
others involved in the commission of the offense or was
responsible for organizing others for the purpose of carrying
out the crime.” United States v. Avila, 95 F.3d 887, 889 (9th
Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Harper, 33 F.3d 1143,

2
 We do not reach the related issue addressed by the Second Circuit in
Quintieri regarding the circumstances in which a defendant may raise
new challenges to a newly imposed sentence following a limited remand.
306 F.3d at 1225.
14                            USA V. TAT

1151 (9th Cir. 1994)). “Under this circuit’s clear articulation
of § 3B1.1[], ‘even a defendant with an important role in an
offense’ cannot receive an enhancement unless there is also
a ‘showing that the defendant had control over others.’”
United States v. Whitney, 673 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting United States v. Lopez-Sandoval, 146 F.3d 712, 717
(9th Cir. 1998)).
    The district court erred in applying this enhancement to
Ms. Tat for two reasons. First, contrary to the district court’s
suggestion, Ms. Tat’s status as a mere member of the
criminal enterprise—even if she was an essential member—
does not bear on whether she was as an organizer, leader,
manager, or supervisor of the criminal activity. It is
insufficient for purposes of the organizer/leader
enhancement to show that, “but for” a defendant’s
participation, the crime could not have occurred. See
Harper, 33 F.3d at 1151. “[E]ven a defendant with an
important role in an offense” cannot receive an enhancement
unless there is also a “showing that the defendant had control
over others.” Lopez-Sandoval, 146 F.3d at 717 (quoting
United States v. Ramos-Oseguera, 120 F.3d 1028, 1039 (9th
Cir. 1997)). And Ms. Tat did not exhibit the requisite control
over other participants3 involved in the criminal conduct.
See Whitney, 673 F.3d at 975; see also United States v.
Holden, 908 F.3d 395, 402 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding
that, “[f]or the organizer enhancement to be proper, there
must be evidence in the record to support the conclusion that
Defendant exercised control over [participants] or was able

3
   “A ‘participant’ is a person who is criminally responsible for the
commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted. A person
who is not criminally responsible for the commission of the offense . . .
is not a participant.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), cmt. n.1.
                          USA V. TAT                        15

to influence [participants]” because “unwitting facilitators of
an offense, even if they are ‘participants’ in the usual sense
of the word, do not count”).
    Second, even if Ms. Tat had exercised the requisite level
of control over participants in the criminal conduct, the
enhancement was still improperly applied here. Because the
criminal activity involved fewer than five participants,4 the
government also had to show that the criminal activity was
“extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). In United States v. Rose,
we explained that whether criminal activity is extensive
depends on (1) “the number of knowing participants and
unwitting outsiders”; (2) “the number of victims”; and
(3) “the amount of money fraudulently obtained or
laundered.” 20 F.3d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 1994).
    Applied here, those principles dictate that the criminal
activity at issue was not otherwise extensive. The activity at
issue—a scheme to launder roughly $25,000 via a single
transaction involving four participants and one victim—was
criminal, but pales in comparison, by size and scale, to the
type of schemes that we have found to be extensive. See,
e.g., Rose, 20 F.3d at 374 (noting an extensive scheme that
“involved approximately $3 million, sixty knowing or
unwitting employees . . . , an untold but no doubt
considerable number of bank employees and other outsiders,
and scores of duped investors”); United States v. Govan, 152
F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing an extensive
scheme that involved “interstate travel, a large number of
victims,” and “nearly $100,000 in robbery proceeds”).
Given the limited scope of the criminal conduct here—both
in the amount laundered and the number of parties

4
  The government concedes that there were only “four criminally
culpable participants.”
16                         USA V. TAT

involved—the district court erred in finding it “otherwise
extensive.” We therefore vacate and remand for the district
court to resentence Ms. Tat without applying the
organizer/leader enhancement.
                               B.
     The district court did not err by imposing a two-level
sentencing enhancement for abuse of trust under section
3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines. That enhancement
“applies when ‘the defendant abused a position of public or
private trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated the
commission or concealment of the offense.’” United States
v. Laurienti, 731 F.3d 967, 973 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3) (alteration in original). Application of the
abuse-of-trust enhancement involves a two-part inquiry:
first, whether the defendant occupied a position of trust;
second, whether the defendant’s position facilitated the
offense. Id.
    As the district court noted, the record reflects that Ms.
Tat, who worked as a bank manager, occupied a position of
trust. The “decisive factor” in determining whether a
defendant occupied a position of trust is “the presence or
lack of professional or managerial discretion.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted); see also United States v. Willard, 230 F.3d
1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that “[l]imiting the
categories of positions of trust to those of professionals and
managers is perfectly consistent with the guideline[s]”). Ms.
Tat’s position as a manager at the bank gave her the
discretion to carry out transactions, like the one at issue here,
without oversight.
   Further, Ms. Tat’s position of trust facilitated her role in
the underlying offense. Several witnesses—from bank
employees to co-conspirators to Ms. Tat herself—testified
                          USA V. TAT                          17

about Ms. Tat’s managerial authority and the pivotal role it
played in the underlying offense. Her position allowed her
to conduct transactions alone, unsupervised, and behind
closed doors, which facilitated the illicit transaction. And
she used her role to circumvent policies that were designed
to detect and track large cash transactions. Given this record,
the district court’s decision to apply the abuse of a position
of trust enhancement cannot be said to be “illogical,
implausible, or without support in inferences that may be
drawn from facts in the record.” United States v. Hinkson,
585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
                               C.
    Ms. Tat also argues that the district court improperly
considered “cost” in dismissing her community-service
proposal. We disagree. Although it is reversible error to
consider the cost of imprisonment during sentencing, see
United States v. Tapia-Romero, 523 F.3d 1125, 1127–28
(9th Cir. 2008), here, the district court was concerned with
the cost of Ms. Tat’s alternative to incarceration, and only
to the extent that it related to Ms. Tat’s ability to fulfill her
proposed community-service initiative. The court was also
concerned with the lack of measurable goals and violations
for probation to work with. These concerns are valid, and
do not relate to the issue of “the cost to society of
imprisoning a defendant,” id. at 1126—the factor that we
held a district court may not consider in Tapia-Romero, id.
at 1128.
                               D.
    Finally, Ms. Tat argues that the district court failed to
resolve two factual disputes material to the section 3553(a)
factors, in violation of Rule 32. Although failure “to make
the required Rule 32 findings or determinations at the time
18                      USA V. TAT

of sentencing” is reversible error, United States v.
Fernandez-Angulo, 897 F.2d 1514, 1516 (9th Cir. 1990) (en
banc), because we vacate and remand for resentencing on
other grounds, we need not and do not reach Ms. Tat’s
argument that the district court failed to comply with Rule
32.
                           V.
    In accordance with the foregoing, we VACATE Ms.
Tat’s sentence and REMAND to the district court for
resentencing consistent with this opinion.