Court Opinion

ID: 9597885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:03:40.947901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:18.090580
License: Public Domain

SUE WALKER, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority misapplies the traditional summary judgment burdens of proof and standards of review, I respectfully dissent.
The standards for reviewing a motion for summary judgment are well established. The movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine material fact issue and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Calvillo v. Gonzalez, 922 S.W.2d 928, 929 (Tex.1996); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979). When a defendant moves for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of proving each essential element of that defense. Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 121 (Tex.1996). If the movant’s motion and summary judgment proof facially establish the movant’s right to judgment as a matter of law, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a fact issue precluding summary judgment or to show that the movant’s legal position is unsound. City of Houston, 589 S.W.2d at 678; St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Mefford, 994 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex.App.Dallas 1999, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).
In her first issue, White contends that Tackett failed to meet the first summary judgment prong; that is, he failed to prove every element — specifically the good faith element — of his affirmative defense of official immunity to establish his right to *161judgment as a matter of law. The summary judgment evidence produced by Tackett consists only of his own affidavit and a copy of a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement is not relevant to Tackett’s affirmative defense. “White objected to various portions of Tackett’s affidavit, and the trial court entered a five-page order sustaining all of “White’s objections. A total of approximately five pages of Tackett’s nine-page affidavit were ordered stricken. The remaining portions of Tackett’s affidavit fail, as a matter of law, to establish the good faith element of Tackett’s alleged official immunity defense. See City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1994) (recognizing good faith is element of official immunity defense that governmental employee must prove).1 Consequently, the burden never shifted to White to come forward with any controverting summary judgment evidence. See, e.g., Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex.1989); City of Houston, 589 S.W.2d at 678. Because Tackett’s summary judgment evidence — the un-stricken portions of his affidavit — failed to conclusively establish the essential good faith element of his affirmative official immunity defense, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Tackett on his affirmative defense.
The majority does not dispute that Tackett’s summary judgment evidence alone (the unstricken portions of his affidavit) is insufficient to conclusively establish the good faith element of his affirmative defense. The majority instead holds that controverting summary judgment evidence attached to White’s response — specifically excerpts from Tackett’s deposition — satisfied Tackett’s initial burden of conclusively establishing every element of his affirmative defense. The majority attempts to justify its reliance on “White’s controverting summary judgment evidence by indicating that Tackett’s reply cites “White’s evidence, specifically Tackett’s deposition testimony. Tackett’s reply, however, contains a citation to only one page — page 45 — of his deposition and that evidence was not on file twenty-one days before the hearing. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(d). The majority’s analysis nonetheless utilizes all of Tackett’s deposition excerpts attached as controverting summary judgment evidence to White’s response, not just page 45 referenced by Tackett in his reply.2
The Texas Supreme Court has explained that while the majority’s approach may be appropriate in federal summary judgment practice, it is not in Texas traditional summary judgment practice:
Under [Fed.R.Civ.PJ 56c, summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Casso, 776 S.W.2d at 556 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). The supreme court has explained that traditional Texas summary judgment practice, unlike federal summary judgment practice, involves a distinct, two-step process: 3
*162Texas law, of course, is different. While the language of our rule is similar [to the federal rule], our interpretation of that language is not. We use summary-judgments merely “to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses,” and we never shift the burden of proof to the non-movant unless and until the movant has “established] his entitled to a summary judgment on the issues expressly presented to the trial court by conclusively proving all essential elements of his cause of action or defense as a matter of law. ”
Casso, 776 S.W.2d at 556 (citing City of Houston, 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 n. 5) (emphasis added).
Nor can I agree with the majority that Rule 166a(c) or the holding Wilson v. Bur-ford authorize the trial court to grant summary judgment to a defendant moving for a traditional summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense when the defendant movant’s summary judgment evidence fails to conclusively establish every element of the defense. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Wilson v. Burford, 904 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex.1995). The Texas Supreme Court in Casso rejected this interpretation of Rule 166a(c)’s language, making it clear that the burden of proof never shifts to the nonmovant unless the movant conclusively establishes all essential elements of his cause of action or affirmative defense— which Tackett undisputedly did not do, even considering page 45 of his deposition. Casso, 776 S.W.2d at 556. And in Wilson, the supreme court explained that when a movant attaches a deposition transcript to a brief filed in support of the movant’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court may consider the deposition transcript as part of the movant’s summary judgment evidence. Wilson, 904 S.W.2d at 628-29. The Wilson court did not alter the fundamental principle that a movant must conclusively establish all essential elements of his cause of action or defense as a matter of law before the burden shifts and the trial court looks to the nonmov-ant’s summary judgment evidence. See, e.g., Ryland Group, Inc., 924 S.W.2d at 121; Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co., 134 S.W.3d 359, 378 n. 18 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (recognizing “defendant-movant must present summary judgment evidence that establishes each element of the affirmative defense as a matter of law”) (emphasis added).
Although the majority claims not to shift the traditional summary judgment burdens of proof, it does. The majority upholds an affirmative defense summary judgment even though the movant’s summary judgment evidence (even, in fact, including page 45 of Tackett’s deposition referenced in his reply) is not sufficient to conclusively establish every essential element of the affirmative defense. The majority instead looks to controverting summary judgment evidence produced by the nonmovant White to determine whether the movant Tackett met his initial burden of proof of conclusively establishing every element of his affirmative defense.
Because I cannot agree with the majority’s departure from established summary judgment law, I dissent. I would sustain White’s first issue,4 reverse the trial *163court’s summary judgment for Tackett, and remand the case to the trial court.
Exhibit A
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK TACKETT
STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF COOKE
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared MARK TACKETT, who I personally know or who presented positive identification of his identity to me, and who being by me first duly sworn did state under oath the following:
“My name is Mark Tackett, I am over the age of eighteen, have never been convicted of a crime, am fully competent to make this affidavit, and have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein which are true and correct.
I have been commissioned peace officer for nearly six years and I am employed as a trooper for the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS). I am a certified peace officer, licensed by the State of Texas, and sworn to uphold and enforce the laws of the State of Texas. I have been trained in traffic enforcement, the operation of radar equipment, the making of traffic stops and the safe operation of a DPS patrol car. I began Basic Training School for the Uniformed Service at the Law Enforcement Academy in September 1997. I successfully completed my basic training in March 1998 and became a commissioned DPS Trooper at that time. I am familiar with state traffic law and Department policies relating to traffic enforcement, traffic stops and the pursuit of criminal violators. My duties include patrolling Texas public roads and highways. My duties include exercising discretion in deciding when to make a traffic stop, where to make a traffic stop, and how to make the traffic stop. My duties also include exercising discretion in deciding when to undertake a pursuit, where to undertake a pursuit, and how to carry out the pursuit.
On December 31, 2001, I was assigned routine patrol, working a shift from 5 p.m. to 2 a.m. At approximately 5:41 p.m., while in the course and scope of my employment as a DPS trooper, I was in my patrol car, patrolling Farm to Market Road 902, traveling east, when I observed a light colored car driving west on Farm to Market 902, between Lake Kiowa and Gainesville. This is approximately five miles from the city limits of Gainesville. Both vehicles were climbing toward the crest of a hill when we crossed paths. I turned on my radar and clocked the vehicle’s speed to be over the posted speed limit of 55 miles-per-hour. Based upon this information, I exercised my discretion to make a traffic stop of the suspect. As the vehicle passed by me, I saw two men inside. I did not identify the make or model of vehicle, but I recognized the vehicle as a luxury sports car that appeared to be new, a vehicle I later identified to be a Jaguar. I was unable to note the vehicle license plate number. I turned on my overhead lights, checked for approaching and oncoming traffic on FM 902 and, after determining that it was safe to do so, I made a u-turn in the direction of the westbound suspect vehicle. FM 902 is a two-lane road. I estimate that it took me approximately 5-10 seconds to complete this maneuver and begin traveling westbound.
*164Because I was on the down-side of a hill when I began to travel west, the suspect vehicle was no longer in view. It took several seconds for me to regain visual contact with the vehicle after I drove back up the same hill where I had encountered the suspect. It was at this point that I came to believe that the suspect vehicle had not slowed down in response to my lights and appeared to be increasing in speed. Based upon this observation, I exercised my discretion to increase my speed so that I could get closer behind the vehicle, attract the driver’s attention, and make the traffic stop.
It is my experience that suspected traffic offenders do not always stop when I first engage my overhead emergency lights. They may be appearing to flee from me, but will generally stop when they see my patrol car emergency lights and hear my siren as I approach from behind. I expected the driver of the suspect vehicle to stop once I got closer to him. For these reasons, I turned on my siren as I attempted to catch up to the suspected vehicle. The fights and siren were also intended to alert other motorists on the road and warn them to pull over to the side of the road so that I could safely pursue the speeding vehicle.
[[Image here]]
The time of the day was late afternoon. Visibility was clear. Dusk was approaching, making my emergency lights more noticeable than they would be during the middle of a typical day. The weather was good. The pavement was dry. Traffic was fighter than usual. It was the start of the New Year’s holiday and it is my experience that some people leave work early to prepare for New Year’s Eve activities.
[[Image here]]
On this stretch of FM 902, I was unable to maintain constant visual contact with the suspect vehicle.
I radioed Sheriffs dispatch, providing a general description of the vehicle and its direction. However instead of slowing down to stop in response to my fights and siren, the vehicle continued heading west of FM 902 at what appeared to be a higher rate of speed.
[[Image here]]
It is my experience and training that alcohol consumption can impair driver’s judgment, increasing the risk of an accident and injury to himself and others.
[[Image here]]
I am familiar with the subject of the photograph that is attached to this affidavit and state that this photograph fairly and accurately represents the scene, and interior view from the passenger’s side of the vehicle driven by Guadalupe Max Li-mones, Jr., as it was found at the time on December 31, 2001.
I observed the driver make a series of dangerous maneuvers, including driving in the oncoming lane of traffic, passing in a no passing zone, and driving erratically and recklessly.
[[Image here]]
At -the time, I was patrolling the east side of Cooke County, an area known by law enforcement officers, including DPS, to have a higher rate of property crimes, such as theft. It is an area in which arrests for the possession and sale of illicit drugs is — and was at the time — also higher. In my experience, it would not be unusual to see a luxury sports car in the vicinity of Lake Kiowa. It would not be unusual to encounter a luxury sports car whose driver was exceeding the speed limit. It was, however unusual and suspicious to encounter a late model luxury sports car whose driver engaged in maneuvers that were plainly dangerous to himself, his passenger, and other motorists on FM 902, in an apparent attempt to evade an otherwise routine traffic stop.
[[Image here]]
Within approximately one-and-a-half minutes of my initial move to turn on my *165vehicle’s emergency lights, the suspect driver has escalated the seriousness of his criminal offenses from speeding, a class C misdemeanor to reckless driving, a class A misdemeanor to evading authorities, state jail felony.
[[Image here]]
This stretch of FM 902 is open country. I saw no pedestrians and traffic was light in both directions.
[[Image here]]
During the pursuit along FM 902, I maintained radio contact with Cooke County Sherriffs Dispatch, reporting my location, direction, and the general description of the vehicle.
[[Image here]]
FM 902, westbound, ends at FM 372. This is a t-intersection. A right turn onto FM 372 heads north toward Gainesville, approximately one mile from the intersection. A left turn onto FM 372 heads south, away from Gainesville and toward Lake Ray Roberts.
From the time I turned around to drive westbound on FM 902, my pursuit of the suspect vehicle occurred over a period of some two-and-a-half minutes. Over approximately the first two minutes, I came to believe that I was unable to catch up the vehicle. I estimated the vehicle’s speed to range between 100-and-150 miles-per-hour. I estimate my vehicle’s top speed to have been 115 miles-per-hour. I also realized that I was losing ground due to the reckless manner in which the suspect was driving. While he passed other vehicles without regard to the safety of others, I observed the no passing zones. I also slowed down for other westbound vehicles in front of me, waiting until they pulled over before proceeding to pass by them.
[[Image here]]
I had not determined the identity of the driver or passenger, the make or model of the vehicle, or the vehicle’s license plate number. Therefore, I had no information with which to trace the suspect or vehicle.
[[Image here]]
My initial radio call to the Sheriffs Department, requesting assistance, was acknowledged immediately and I understood that help was on the way. As the suspect approached the intersection of FM 902 and FM 372, I saw two patrol vehicles sitting in the intersection with emergency lights flashing, waiting for the suspect to arrive. I, then, witnessed the suspect drive past the patrol cars, making a right turn on FM 372 in the direction of Gainesville.
[[Image here]]
After the suspect passed the Cooke County patrol cars at the intersection of FM 902 and FM 372, Deputy Wood took over the pursuit in his vehicle. The other patrol ear, operated by Deputy Taylor, became the second behind the suspect. When I reached the intersection of FM 902 and FM 372, I was the third patrol vehicle behind the suspect.
I have read the deposition of Deputy Taylor and now understand that I became the fourth patrol car behind the suspect. According to Deputy Taylor’s testimony, he waited to allow another Sheriffs patrol car to back out of a driveway near the intersection of Howeth and Moss. The patrol car became the second patrol car behind Deputy Wood. The intersection of Howeth and Moss is approximately twelves blocks from the intersection of Broadway and Ritchey, where the collision occurred.
[[Image here]]
Shortly after I turned onto FM 372, I made another radio call to request additional assistance from the Gainesville Police Department.
[[Image here]]
*166This is an intersection controlled by a traffic light and is one of Gainesville’s busier intersections.
[[Image here]]
As the suspect proceeded toward Gainesville, I was too far back to maintain sight of his vehicle, I continued to follow the patrol vehicle of Deputy Taylor. Based upon Deputy Taylor’s route of travel and radio reports from Deputy Wood, the suspect took several side streets before reaching the intersection of California and Wine Streets. The suspect apparently proceeded west on California for a short distance before turning north on Ritchey Street. Due to my distance behind the suspect and pursuing patrol units, I did not witness the collision between the suspect vehicle and the vehicle driven by Patricia Ann White. The collision occurred at the intersection of Ritchey and Broadway approximately two minutes after the suspect entered the city limits.
Throughout the drive of FM 372 toward Gainesville, ... as well as within the city limits of Gainesville, I kept watch for pedestrians and other vehicles. Traffic was still fairly light. There was still sufficient daylight
I arrived at the scene of the accident approximately 30 seconds after the collision was reported. Ms. White was lying on the ground. She was not moving. I immediately requested that an ambulance be called. Paramedics arrived on a fire truck a short time later. I, then, turned my attention to locating the suspects who, according to eye witnesses, fled on foot, as did the passenger of the vehicle.
[[Image here]]
I did not know of these facts or allegations at the time of my attempted traffic stop of Guadalupe Max Limones on New Year’s Eve.
[[Image here]]
Further affiant sayeth not.”
/s/ Mark Tackett
MARK TACKETT
SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me, by said MARK TACKETT on this the 4 day of Sept. 2003, to certify which witness my hand and seal of office.
/s/ Vickie Camp NOTARY PUBLIC
/s/ Vickie Camp (Printed name of Notary)
My commission expires: 12-21-03
Exhibit B
was very — very few vehicles on the road. And I had already seen that — that he had no regard for other people’s safety by driving on the wrong side of the road, passing in a no-passing zone. And I believe that any reasonable person that saw my lights and knew that I was a peace officer would stop. And he didn’t.
Q. All right. So during that time, did you feel like there was a — a need to apprehend that gentlemen in the Jaguar?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. All right. And now, tell me — tell me everything that you knew or thought of at that time that — that weighed on your decision in chasing him with regard to why it was important for you to immediately apprehend him.
A. The area that we were in has a high rate of criminal activity. And I’m not speaking specifically of that highway. I’m speaking specifically of the area. We have a lot of stolen items out there. There are a lot of people — narcotic-related issues. There’s — there’s more — there’s an increased amount of criminal activity on that side of the county and that portion.
For that date and time seeing those two

. See also Exhibit A attached hereto, a copy of Tackett's affidavit with the portions ordered stricken omitted.

. Page 45 of Tackett's deposition, mistakenly referred to in his reply as page 42, is attached hereto as Exhibit B.

.First, the movant bears the burden of coming forward with summary judgment evidence proving each essential element of his cause of action or affirmative defense. See, e.g., Ryland Group, Inc., 924 S.W.2d at 121. If the movant’s motion and summary judgment proof facially establish the movant’s right to *162judgment as a matter of law, then the second step is triggered and the burden shifts to the nonmovant to come forward with summary judgment evidence raising a fact issue. City of Houston, 589 S.W.2d at 678.

. In her second issue, which I would not reach, White challenges the second summary judgment prong; she claims that if, somehow, Tackett conclusively established every element of his affirmative defense of official immunity, then she met her summary judgment burden of coming forward with controverting *163summary judgment evidence demonstrating the existence of material fact issues concerning Tackett’s official immunity defense. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1 (court of appeals must address only issues necessary to disposition of appeal).