Court Opinion

ID: 9769287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:43:30.321826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:59.818137
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
GREEN, Commissioner.
On motion for rehearing, appellant renews his contention that the judgment should be reversed because of the admission in evidence of appellant’s “remote” felony conviction of murder for purposes of impeachment.
The record reflects that the instant trial commenced October 11, 1971, and that the deceased was killed on December 31, 1970. Appellant, as a witness for himself at the guilt stage, testified to facts raising the issue of self-defense. On direct examina*855tion, he testified that he had not been convicted of a felony in this or any other state during the past ten years, and that he had not been in any trouble with the law during that time. On cross-examination, he stated that he had been convicted of “displaying a fire-arm in a rude and threatening manner” in California in 1968. He also stated that he had been convicted of driving while intoxicated in California on June 9, 1968. Both of these convictions, as the State admits, were for misdemeanors which do not involve moral turpitude. Stephens v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 417 S.W.2d 286; Hunter v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 160, 324 S.W.2d 17; Burton v. State, 149 Tex. Cr.R. 327, 194 S.W.2d 398; Porter v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 540, 215 S.W.2d 889; Williams v. State, 130 Tex.Cr.R. 86, 91 S. W.2d 709 ; 62 Tex.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 271, p. 243.
Thereafter, the State was permitted to prove, over appellant’s objection of remoteness, that on December 22, 1948, appellant was convicted of murder in Texas and that he served time in the State penitentiary until November 10, 1958, when he was released on parole. The record reflects that his parole was terminated in 1967.
In determining remoteness of a conviction the computation of time should begin after release from prison. King v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 356, 357.
As stated in the majority opinion on original submission,
“In most instances where a prior felony conviction has been used for impeachment, it has been held remote if the time of one’s discharge from such conviction is more than ten years. See 62 Tex.Jur. 2d, Witnesses, Section 340 page 381; Penix v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 488 S.W.2d 86; Livingston v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 421 S.W.2d 108; Haney v. State, 152 Tex.Cr. 63, 211 S.W.2d 215. However, the often referred to ten-year rule of thumb is not always followed. Each case must rest on its own circumstances. See Dillard v. State, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 134, 218 S.W.2d 476.”
In Dillard, supra, this Court held to be inadmissible for impeachment and prejudicial a prior conviction of a violation of the Dyer Act; i. e., transporting a stolen automobile over the State line. The defendant had been released from the penitentiary ten years prior to the subsequent trial. The opinion states that other elements must be considered in addition to the passage of ten years in determining whether this was error, and that the facts of each case must be looked to and considered in determining the question of remoteness. The judgment was reversed.
In Crisp v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 470 S. W.2d 58, tried in March, 1970, a 1956 felony conviction was held to have been properly admitted to impeach the defendant where it was also proved that he had been convicted in 1961 of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, and in 1962 of a felony. The Court reiterated the rule that the question of remoteness is to be determined in the light of the facts of each case, and evidence of lack of reformation or subsequent conviction of another felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude causes the prior conviction not to be subject to the objection of remoteness.
A conviction of a misdemeanor which does not involve moral turpitude has not been considered as evidence of a lack of reformation. See Livingston v. State, 421 S.W.2d 108; Blessett v. State, 168 Tex. Cr.R. 517, 329 S.W.2d 434.
We quote from Bustillos v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 464 S.W.2d 118, 119, as follows:
“Since the early case of Lights v. State, 21 Tex.App. 308, 17 S.W. 428 (1886-Court of Appeals), the rule was established that the credibility of a witness in a criminal case could be attacked by a *856showing'that he had been convicted of a crime. There are, however, some limitations upon the rule which developed. The conviction must be for a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, the conviction must be final and must have occurred at a time sufficiently recent to have some bearing on the present credibility of the witness and the evidence must be limited to the fact of the conviction itself and details thereof may not be shown.”
In Penix v. State, 488 S.W.2d 86, 88, we said:
“Even though this court has never ‘undertaken to fix arbitrarily and absolutely a space of time which would characterize such testimony as too remote’, there seems to have developed a rule of thumb or guideline that such should not be admitted if the time lapse exceeds ten years. See, e. g., 62 Tex.Jur.2d, Witnesses, Section 340, at page 381, where it is written that:
“ ‘Nevertheless, the tendency of many decisions is to hold that an interval of ten years, counting from the time of release from jail if the defendant served a term of imprisonment, renders the previous conviction unavailable for impeachment,
“See, e. g., Livingston v. State, Tex.Cr. App. 421 S.W.2d 108; Haney v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 63, 211 S.W.2d 215.
“On the other hand, the tendency has been that the trial court’s discretion to admit such conviction has generally been upheld if the period of time was less than ten years. . . . ”
In Penix, a felony conviction was held to be admissible for impeachment when 9 years 8½ months had elapsed from the date of defendant’s release from prison to the date of the trial.
We repeat what was said in the dissenting opinion in this case on original submission:
“Appellant’s gratuitous statement that he had not been in trouble with the law during the last ten years clearly authorized proof of ‘any trouble with the law’ which appellant had experienced during that period,1 but it did no more. Only a felony conviction or one for an offense involving moral turpitude will revitalize remote convictions. Livingston v. State, 421 S.W.2d 108.”
In Livingston v. State, supra, the defendant appealed from a conviction of assault with intent to murder. The trial court, over defendant’s objections, permitted the State to prove for impeachment purposes that in 1963 the defendant had been convicted of carrying a pistol, and previous thereto he had served time in the penitentiary from 1952 to 1955 on a murder conviction. The instant trial was in 1967.
In reversing the judgment and holding that the misdemeanor conviction did not involve moral turpitude, and that the murder conviction was too remote to be used for impeachment, this Court quoted with approval from Blessett v. State, supra, as follows:
“The testimony on the hearing in the absence of the jury apprised the trial court of the remoteness of the 1946 conviction and the objection that it was too remote when offered before the jury should have been sustained. 45 Tex.Jur. 235, sec. 318; 1 Branch 2 Ed., 213-214, sec. 192; Abercrombie v. State, 159 Tex.Cr. R. 417, 264 S.W.2d 727; Stevens v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 19, 280 S.W.2d 283.
“The testimony introduced by the appellant, without objection, that she had not within the last ten years been convicted of a felony did not authorize the state to *857then prove that she had been convicted of murder over twelve years before the commission of the instant offense, unless there was first a showing that such prior conviction was not too remote due to a conviction of a felony or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude occurring since said conviction. 1 Branch 2 Ed., p. 210, sec. 190, and p. 213, sec. 192.
“The testimony of appellant’s prior conviction was of a prejudicial nature and its admission in evidence calls for a reversal.”
In Blessett, the accused was interrogated in the absence of the jury about several misdemeanor convictions not involving moral turpitude, and the trial court stated that proof of such misdemeanors “takes this out of the general rule with regard to remote convictions.” As above stated, this Court held that an intervening conviction of a misdemeanor not involving moral turpitude would not perform that task.
We hold that under the fact situation in this case, the trial court erred to the prejudice of appellant in admitting in evidence at the guilt stage for impeachment the felony conviction of appellant where 12 years 11 months had elapsed between his release from prison and the trial.
In view of our disposition of the case, it is not necessary that we pass on the other contention raised in appellant’s motion. The motion is granted.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Opinion approved by the Court.

. See Ochoa v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 847, 850.