Court Opinion

ID: 9897330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:14.712574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.096229
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                               Jul 27 2023, 8:28 am

                                                                                   CLERK
                                                                               Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                  Court of Appeals
                                                                                    and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Paul E. Harold                                              Theodore E. Rokita
Stephen M. Judge                                            Indiana Attorney General
SouthBank Legal                                             Jesse R. Drum
South Bend, Indiana                                         Deputy Attorney General
Karen Lynch Conway                                          Indianapolis, Indiana
Conway Law, LLC
South Bend, Indiana

                                             IN THE
     COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Freeman Hochstetler, Willard                                July 27, 2023
Yoder, and Joe Hochstetler,                                 Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Defendants,                                      22A-CR-2154
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
State of Indiana,                                           Court
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                         The Honorable David Bonfiglio,
                                                            Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause Nos.
                                                            20D06-2105-CM-981, 20D06-2105-
                                                            CM-982, and 20D06-2105-CM-983

                                  Opinion by Judge Riley
                          Judges Bradford and Weissmann concur.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023                            Page 1 of 21
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellants Freeman Hochstetler (Freeman), Willard Yoder (Yoder), and Joe

      Hochstetler (Joe), (collectively, Defendants), appeal their convictions for

      intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(1).

[2]   We affirm.

      ISSUES
[3]   Defendants present this court with three issues, which we restate and reorder as:
              (1) Whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

              Defendants committed intimidation;

              (2) Whether Defendants’ convictions are barred by the church

              autonomy doctrine; and

              (3) Whether Defendants waived their arguments that their

              convictions are subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise

              Clause and the Indiana Religious Freedom Restoration Act

              (IRFRA).

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   The Old Order Amish Church (OOAC) is a religious organization that has

      members living in several counties in Indiana. The OOAC in Indiana is

      divided into Districts. In 2016, J.W. and E.W. were members of OOAC

      District 50 living with at least five of their seven children in LaGrange County.

      The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) first became involved with

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023            Page 2 of 21
      the family in December 2016 after it received a report that the father, J.W., was

      using inappropriate physical discipline in the home.

[5]   DCS opened an informal adjustment with the family. E.W. and J.W. worked

      with Amish support groups as well as DCS during the informal adjustment

      period. A safety plan prohibiting J.W. from disciplining the children was

      imposed, but J.W. violated the plan by directing E.W. to discipline the children

      in the manner he preferred. The DCS informal adjustment ended in the spring

      of 2017 with the filing of a CHINS petition after J.W. was arrested 1 for battery

      against one of his children who was four or five years old at the time. In May

      2017, E.W. and J.W. separated. DCS instituted a new safety plan for the

      family. On May 31, 2017, a civil protective order (the protective order) 2 was

      issued against J.W. in favor of E.W. and five of their minor children who were

      still living at home.

[6]   E.W. believed that to comply with DCS’s safety plan, she needed to keep J.W.

      away from their children and keep the protective order active. DCS employees

      told E.W. that if she had the protective order rescinded and there were further

      1
       Records from the CHINS proceedings have been included in the Appellants’ Appendix, but, because they
      were not admitted at trial, we do not consider them. The precise nature of the criminal charge against J.W. is
      not clear from the record; however, it is clear that J.W. was convicted of a criminal offense as a result of the
      charge.
      2
        There are references in the record to a no-contact order entered as part of J.W.’s criminal case, and, at
      times, the protective order was referred to at trial as a no-contact order. In our analysis, we refer only to the
      civil protective order.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023                                     Page 3 of 21
      instances of abuse in the home, she was at risk of having her children removed

      from her care. J.W. made no progress during the CHINS proceedings, but the

      CHINS case was closed at the end of 2017 because DCS felt that E.W. would

      adequately protect the children’s safety. In January 2018, E.W. moved with the

      children to OOAC’s District 70-1, which is in Elkhart County. Initially,

      although she was not formally made a new member, E.W. was welcomed in

      District 70-1, and she took communion in the church there.

[7]   It is the practice of the members of the OOAC not to involve secular authority

      or law enforcement in their lives. Although it is unclear from the record

      whether the members of District 50 were upset about J.W.’s abuse of his family

      or that E.W. had procured a protective order against J.W. or both, some

      members of District 50 supported E.W., while others did not. It is also a

      practice of the OOAC that when there is strife or discord in a District, a panel

      of three bishops from outside the District is formed to work with the

      community to resolve whatever issue it is facing. Joe Hochstetler, Freeman

      Hochstetler, and Daniel Hershberger (Hershberger), who are all bishops in the

      OOAC, were empaneled in 2017 to work with District 50, a process which

      began with the bishops discussing the matter with every family in the District.

[8]   In August 2018, the two Hochstetlers and Hershberger met with E.W. to

      pressure her to reconcile with J.W. After this meeting, Hershberger left the

      panel, and Yoder took his place. In February 2020, the two Hochstetlers and

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023        Page 4 of 21
      Yoder—Defendants—and their wives met with E.W. at her home in Elkhart

      County. E.W. told them she would not remove herself from the protective

      order because doing so would violate DCS’s safety plan and would increase the

      risk of her children being removed.

[9]   Defendants returned to E.W.’s home on June 29, 2020, unannounced and

      without their wives. Defendants advised E.W. that District 50 had voted the

      previous day to place her in the Bann. 3 Being placed in the Bann in the OOAC

      is a serious consequence to church members and meant that, although E.W.

      could attend church, she could not take communion or participate in church

      meetings, she could not serve herself at communal church meals, and her

      money would not be accepted at Amish stores. When E.W. asked if she had

      been banned for her refusal to remove herself from the protective order,

      Freeman nodded his head, while Joe told E.W. that she had “put [her]self into

      the ban [sic].” (Transcript Vol. II, p. 176). Defendants explained to E.W. that,

      to have the Bann lifted, E.W. would have to remove her name from the

      protective order. E.W. would also have to go to District 50, make a public

      confession of fault, and start working with an entirely different support group.

      3
       “Being in the Bann” is how the Amish describe being excommunicated from the church. Erik Wesner,
      Shunning, AMISH AMERICA Blog, https://amishamerica.com/shunning/#bann (last visited July 6, 2023,
      4:35 PM). “Shunning” refers to the practice of social exclusion and discipline that follows excommunication
      of a church member for thwarting church regulations or for committing other transgressions. Id.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023                              Page 5 of 21
       Although E.W. was open to attempting reconciliation with J.W., she was

       unwilling to remove herself from the protective order.

[10]   About four months later—with E.W. having taken no action to remove herself

       from the protective order—the local Bishop of the District 70-1 church read a

       letter from Defendants to the congregation. The letter announced to the

       congregation that E.W. had been placed in the Bann in District 50, in part, for

       her continued participation in the protective order. The letter specified that the

       eventual lifting of the Bann was conditioned, in part, on E.W.’s removal from

       the protective order.

[11]   On May 28, 2021, the State filed Informations, charging Defendants with Class

       A misdemeanor intimidation for communicating a threat to E.W. to expose her

       to “hatred, contempt, disgrace, or ridicule, with the intent that [E.W.] engage in

       conduct against her will, to wit: petition to remove herself from a protective

       order[.]” (Amended App. Vol. II, p. 224). Defendants filed an unsuccessful

       motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that their actions were protected by the

       First Amendment and the church autonomy doctrine.

[12]   During the ensuing bench trial, Defendants argued that their threatened

       speech—the Bann—invoked a matter of public or general concern within the

       OOAC community. Therefore, Defendants read Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d

       946 (Ind. 2014), as requiring the State to prove actual malice. The State

       vigorously defended against applying actual malice, arguing:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023        Page 6 of 21
               E.W.’s decision to get a protective order is not and will not be a
               matter of public concern. It’s a private choice, a private exercise
               to protect her family, to shield her children, based on what DCS
               communicated to her. Even more generally, Your Honor, a
               decision to seek a protective order is a fundamentally private act.

       (Tr. Vol. III, p. 19). Finding that actual malice did not apply, the trial court

       convicted Defendants of intimidation.

[13]   Defendants now appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

       DISCUSSION AND DECISION
       I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       A. Standard of Review

[14]   When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the

       evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Runnells v. State, 186 N.E.3d

       1181, 1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). We look to the evidence and any resulting

       reasonable inferences that support the verdict. Id. The conviction will be

       affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a

       reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

       doubt. Id.

       B. State’s Contentions

[15]   We pause to address the State’s appellate contentions. At trial, Defendants

       argued that their speech concerned issues of public or general concern,

       triggering the requirement that the State prove actual malice. At trial, the State

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023          Page 7 of 21
       vigorously defended this position, but on appeal, without explanation, the State

       reverses course. Now, the State joins Defendants in urging that their

       convictions must be reversed because the evidence of actual malice is lacking.

[16]   We acknowledge that this court has accepted concessions by the State that the

       evidence does not support a conviction. See, e.g., Brent v. State, 957 N.E.2d 648,

       652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing based on the State’s admission that it had

       not presented evidence to support an element of the offense of visiting a

       common nuisance, given that the court was not faced with any other legal

       issued related to that conviction). However, here, the State attempts to concede

       its case based on a question of law which is a matter for the courts, not the

       State, to decide. In addition, we have long held that, even where the State

       concedes error, it is “nevertheless the duty of this court to examine the record

       and decide the law as applied to the facts.” Nash v. State, 433 N.E.2d 807, 810

       (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); see also State v. Torres, 159 N.E.3d 1018, 1021 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2020) (noting that even when the appellee fails to file a brief, this court is

       still obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record). The State

       does not present us with any authority indicating that we must accept its

       concession. Therefore, despite the State’s change of stance, we will examine

       the law and the facts before us to determine whether the evidence supports

       Defendants’ convictions.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023          Page 8 of 21
       C. Sufficient Evidence of Intimidation

[17]   The State charged Defendants under Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(a)(1),

       which provides that “[a] person who communicates a threat with the intent . . .

       that another person engage in conduct against the other person’s will” commits

       Class A misdemeanor intimidation. The statute defines “threat” to mean “an

       expression, by words or action, of an intention to . . . expose the person

       threatened to hatred, contempt, disgrace, or ridicule.” I.C. § 35-45-2-1(c)(6).

       And “[t]hreats are, by definition, expressions of an intention to do a future

       thing[.]” Roar v. State, 52 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. Ct. App.), adopted in relevant

       part, Roar v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1001, 1002 (Ind. 2016). Indiana’s intimidation

       statute criminalizes the present expression of an intent to expose another person

       in the future to hatred, contempt, disgrace, or ridicule, with the intent that the

       other person engages in conduct against her will. A defendant need not carry

       out the threat to defame the victim to be guilty of intimidation. See, e.g., Gates v.

       State, 192 N.E.3d 222, 226-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (finding evidence of

       intimidation sufficient when evidence showed the defendant merely intended

       the victim to believe he would carry out the threat but did not perform the

       threatened conduct).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023          Page 9 of 21
[18]   Citing Brewington, the parties contend that when threatened speech implicates a

       matter of public or general concern, the State must prove actual malice. 4

       Brewington, a dissatisfied divorce litigant, carried out a persistent and

       prolonged crusade —including faxes (sometimes multiple per day), repetitive

       pro se motions, and internet posts—accusing the parties’ psychologist evaluator

       and the judge of “unethical” and “criminal” conduct. Brewington, 7 N.E.3d at

       955-56. Faced with whether proof of actual malice was required for

       Brewington’s intimidation conviction, our Supreme Court found that subpart

       (c)(6) of the intimidation statute incorporates the classic common-law definition

       of defamation into Indiana’s criminal code. Id. at 959. The Court therefore

       concluded that “[t]he same constitutional free-speech protections that apply in

       civil defamation cases . . . must also apply to prosecutions under (c)(6)[.]” Id. at

       959.

[19]   This means that the “actual malice” standard applies to speech about public

       officials, such that the State may not seek to punish a defamatory statement

       relating to the conduct of a public official, such as the judge, unless it proves

       that the statement was made “with ‘knowledge that it was false or with reckless

       disregard of whether it was false or not.’” Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v.

       4
        To bring their claim under the auspices of actual malice, the parties insist that the Bann is a matter of
       “public or general concern” within the Amish community. We make no determination as to whether a
       church congregation of seventy-five people constitutes a community from which we can find an issue of
       public or general concern.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023                                 Page 10 of 21
       Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)). As to the psychologist, the Brewington

       court, “out of an abundance of caution” that actual malice might apply,

       assumed arguendo that the evaluator gave corrupt testimony for personal

       gratification. Id. at 962. The Court noted that “[w]e have extended the

       stringent New York Times standard to ‘defamation cases involving matters of

       public or general concern,’ even if the victim is a private figure.” Id. at 962

       (quoting Journal-Gazette, Co. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 449, 452 (Ind.

       1999)).

[20]   Clinging to the words “matters of public or general concern,” the parties argue

       that the State had to prove actual malice because the Bann is a matter of public

       or general concern within the Amish community. The parties’ reading of

       Brewington is overbroad. Brewington applied actual malice to words Brewington

       had already published in his internet posts, not to speech not yet uttered. We

       do not read Brewington as requiring application of the actual malice standard to

       hypothetical defamation.

[21]   Brewington’s years-long campaign against the judge and the psychologist

       provided the Court with a documented pattern of defamatory speech. The

       Court was not forced to rely on conjecture about the content of unuttered

       defamatory statements. Reading Brewington as the parties do – to require proof

       of actual malice for possible future public speech – would prove unworkable.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023         Page 11 of 21
[22]   Actual malice requires proof by clear and convincing evidence 5 that the

       defendant published a defamatory statement “with knowledge that it was false

       or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Bandido’s, 712 N.E.2d

       at 456 (quoting New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80, 84 S. Ct. 71); see also

       Taylor v. Antisdel, 185 N.E.3d 867, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

       Actual malice is based on the mindset of the defendant when the defamatory

       words are communicated, not his intention while contemplating the defamatory

       act. See Bandido’s, 712 N.E.2d at 456. In other words, inherent in actual malice

       is the necessity for speech to be disseminated rather than merely threatened.

       Defamation cases require a fact-sensitive inquiry involving the nature of the

       words spoken and the context of their publication. New York Times Co., 376

       U.S. at 285. Courts must

               examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances
               under which they were made to see * * * whether they are of a character
               which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due
               Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect. We must ‘make
               an independent examination of the whole record,’, so as to assure
               ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on
               the field of free expression.

       Id. (citations omitted).

       5
        Arguably, in a criminal intimidation trial, the prosecutor would be put to the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
       burden of proof.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023                              Page 12 of 21
[23]   In the Bandido’s case, upon which Brewington relied, the restaurant sued a

       newspaper for falsely reporting the establishment had rats. In analyzing actual

       malice, our Supreme Court reviewed the health department’s warning about

       disclosure, the newspaper’s provocative headlines, the performance of the

       newspaper’s reporters in verifying the story, and the speed with which the

       newspaper published the retraction of the story. Bandido’s, 712 N.E.2d at 456.

       After reviewing these relevant facts, the Court concluded the restaurant failed to

       show actual malice. We question whether the same analysis would have been

       applied in Bandido’s had the newspaper editor merely threatened the restaurant

       that it might publish an unfavorable story. In that scenario, determining

       whether the future content of the speech and the context of possible publication

       would be done with actual knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard for the

       truth would be an exercise in conjecture. It is unclear how a prosecutor would

       prove actual malice for speech threatened but not yet uttered. To the extent the

       parties seek to extend the actual malice standard from actual defamation to

       threats of future defamation, we refuse to inject this type of unworkable

       speculation into the criminal process.

[24]   Like the trial court, we confine our review to the facts preceding and

       surrounding Defendants’ threat and do not consider the later alleged

       defamation. For almost two years, Defendants pressured E.W. to remove

       herself from the protective order. In August 2018, two of the three defendants,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023        Page 13 of 21
       Joe and Freeman Hochstetler, met with E.W., along with a third bishop,

       Hershberger, to discuss the protective order and her possible reconciliation with

       J.W. After this meeting, Hershberger left the panel, and Yoder took his place.

       Thereafter, Defendants kept working with District 50. The members of District

       70-1 also had differing opinions about whether E.W. should be supported and

       whether she should be allowed to take communion. It was decided that E.W.

       should remove herself, but not her children, from the protective order so that

       E.W. and J.W. could meet in person to work with OOAC support towards

       reconciliation.

[25]   In February 2020, Defendants again visited E.W. at her home in Elkhart

       County. Defendants came with their wives, as E.W. had requested because she

       felt safer with the women present. Defendants informed E.W. that J.W. was

       making progress with his behavior, and they asked what progress E.W. had

       made in removing herself from the protective order. E.W. told Defendants that

       she was unwilling to remove herself from the protective order because doing so

       would violate DCS’s safety plan and would increase the risk of her children

       being removed. Defendants resolved that the next step would be to speak with

       DCS, an action which E.W. felt would resolve the matter. The consequences to

       E.W. if she refused to remove herself from the protective order were not raised

       at this meeting.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023      Page 14 of 21
[26]   On June 29, 2020, Defendants returned to E.W.’s home in Elkhart County, this

       time unannounced and without their wives. E.W. was at home with her

       younger children, and two of her older children arrived during the meeting. At

       trial, the State summarized the meeting as:

               These Defendants came rip-roaring into [E.W.’s] home
               unannounced in June 2020; bullying tactics personified. Three
               intimidating men confronting a woman and kids in her own
               home, her own safe space, doing so, while knowing they felt --
               that she felt safer if their wives came along.

       (Tr. Vol. III, p. 17).

[27]   The meeting occurred in the privacy of E.W.’s home and involved a private

       matter, a protective order. Defendants communicated to E.W. that she was to

       be placed “into the ban [sic].” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 176). When E.W. asked if she

       had been banned for her refusal to remove herself from the protective order,

       Freeman nodded his head, while Joe told E.W. that she had “put [her]self into

       the ban [sic].” Id. Defendants explained to E.W. that to have the Bann lifted,

       E.W. would have to remove her name from the protective order. Given the

       Defendants’ pattern of behavior concerning the protective order, the content of

       their threat, their choice to utter the threat within the confines of E.W.’s home

       without the presence of their wives, and Defendants’ power and position with

       the church, the State presented sufficient evidence that Defendants intimidated

       E.W. on June 29, 2020.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023        Page 15 of 21
[28]   The parties’ focus on Defendants’ execution of the threat is misplaced. Four

       months after Defendants threatened to defame E.W. by placing her under the

       Bann, they read the Bann in her new district. The four-month delay from the

       issuance of the threat to the reading of the Bann to E.W.’s new congregation

       reinforces the conclusion that Defendants committed the crime of intimidation

       on June 29, 2020. Defendants sought to induce action by E.W., and then they

       waited to see if their threats would bear fruit. Only after months passed without

       the threat of the Bann having the desired effect did the Defendants publish the

       Bann to the congregation. The implementation of the Bann is of no moment

       because the crime of intimidation was complete upon utterance of the threat,

       not upon its completion.

       II. Church Autonomy Doctrine

[29]   The First Amendment, which provides that “Congress shall make no law

       respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise

       thereof[,]” guarantees the right of churches to decide matters concerning faith

       and doctrine without government intrusion. Our Lady of Guadelupe Sch. v.

       Morrissey-Berru, – U.S. – , 140 S.Ct. 2029, 2060, 207 L.Ed.2d 870 (2020)

       (quotation omitted). The church autonomy doctrine gives effect to this

       principle and “deals with a church’s First Amendment right to autonomy in

       making decisions regarding its own internal affairs[,] including matters of faith,

       doctrine, and internal governance.” Indiana Area Found. of United Methodist

       Church, Inc. v. Snyder, 953 N.E.2d 1174, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Despite the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023           Page 16 of 21
       fact that their communications with E.W. concerned in part the topic of her

       removing herself from the civil protective order, a decidedly non-religious issue

       which did not implicate OOAC doctrine or decision making, Defendants claim

       that their actions were shielded by the church autonomy doctrine and that the

       State’s prosecution was an impermissible incursion into “internal church

       disciplinary and membership decisions, and the communication of those

       decisions to a member[.]” (Appellants’ Br. p. 24).

[30]   Defendants cite no cases wherein an Indiana appellate court has reversed a

       criminal conviction based on the church autonomy doctrine. Indeed, there is

       limited legal authority in Indiana on the application of the church autonomy

       doctrine to allegations of criminal activity, but our supreme court has provided

       some guidance. In Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d

       286 (Ind. 2003), Brazauskas was denied a position at the University of Notre

       Dame after the pastor at her former church employer and a bishop at the

       church’s Diocese had truthfully informed Notre Dame that she had sued them

       after being terminated. Id. at 289. Brazauskas sued the Diocese and others for

       tortious interference with a business relationship and under the blacklisting

       statute, which made blacklisting a Class C infraction and provided for pursuing

       penal damages through civil suit. Id. Our supreme court affirmed the trial

       court’s dismissal based in part on the Free Exercise Clause and the church

       autonomy doctrine. Id. at 293-94. The Brazauskas court noted, however, that

       the “doctrine does, of course, have limits.” Id. at 293. The court detailed some

       of those potential limits within the framework of the facts of the case by noting

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023       Page 17 of 21
       that the Free Exercise Clause would not prevent a successful prosecution for

       conspiracy to commit a felony, even if the agreement involved a church

       member or official and the agreement implicated ecclesiastical issues. Id. at 294

       n.6. The court provided the example that the Free Exercise Clause would not

       shield a defendant charged with conspiracy to commit murder through a

       terroristic attack who claimed that the agreement to commit the offense was the

       result of a discussion of church doctrine or policy. Id. In concluding that

       plaintiff’s claims were barred, the court observed that “Brazauskas would have

       us apply the blacklisting statute and tort law to penalize communication and

       coordination among church officials . . . on a matter of internal church policy

       and administration that did not culminate in any illegal act.” Id. at 294 (emphasis

       added). We glean from this discussion and the example provided that our

       supreme court has recognized that the church autonomy doctrine does not

       shield those who engage in illegal activity.

[31]   This limit on the church autonomy doctrine was recently re-iterated by the

       Indiana Supreme Court in Payne-Elliot v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of

       Indianapolis, Inc., 193 N.E.3d 1009, 1012 (Ind. 2022), another civil employment

       tort case in which Payne-Elliott filed suit against the Archdiocese after being

       terminated from his teaching job at a catholic high school for marrying his

       same-sex spouse. The Archdiocese invoked the defense of the church

       autonomy doctrine, and the trial court dismissed Payne-Elliot’s complaint. Id.

       On transfer from the court of appeals’ reversal, our supreme court held that

       Payne-Elliot’s claims were barred by the doctrine. Id. at 1013-15. The court re-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023         Page 18 of 21
       iterated its holding in Brazauskas that “the church-autonomy doctrine does not

       provide an automatic per se defense simply because a religious organization

       invokes it” and that “criminal conduct is not protected by the church-autonomy

       doctrine—even if carried out using communications about church doctrine or

       policy.” Id. at 1014.

[32]   As set forth above, sufficient evidence supported Defendants’ convictions for

       Class A misdemeanor intimidation, a criminal offense. See I.C. § 35-45-2-

       1(a)(1). Pursuant to the court’s discussions in Brazauskas and Payne-Elliot, we

       conclude that Defendants were not shielded from criminal liability for their

       actions by the First Amendment or the church autonomy doctrine.

[33]   In arguing otherwise, Defendants cite Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60

       S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), in which the Court overturned the convictions

       of Jehovah’s Witnesses who had been distributing literature and soliciting

       donations, concluding that the statute three of the defendants had been charged

       under was not content neutral and constituted a prior restraint on the free

       exercise of their religion. Id. at 301-04. The Cantwell Court expressly stated,

       however, that “[n]othing we have said is intended even remotely to imply that,

       under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit frauds upon

       the public. Certainly[,] penal laws are available to punish such conduct.” Id. at

       306. The Court also reversed one of the defendants’ conviction pursuant to a

       vague breach of the peace statute, concluding that simply sharing his religious

       beliefs on the street was not conduct within the meaning of the common-law

       offense with which he had been charged. Id. at 307-11. Thus, Cantwell was not

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023       Page 19 of 21
       decided on the grounds that the defendants’ convictions interfered with the

       autonomy of their church, it does not directly support Defendants’ argument,

       and it has not been cited by any Indiana court to overturn a criminal conviction

       on the basis urged by Defendants.

[34]   Defendants also draw our attention to the criminal offense which the Brazauskas

       court indicated would not be shielded by the doctrine, namely conspiracy to

       commit a murder through a terroristic act, and argue that “the court had in

       mind crimes involving more than the mere communicative activity itself” and that

       the church autonomy doctrine is only inapplicable when violent crimes are

       alleged. (Appellants’ Br. p. 27) (emphasis in the original). However, absent

       any further guidance on the subject by our supreme court, we decline to limit its

       clear directive that “criminal conduct is not protected by the church-autonomy

       doctrine—even if carried out using communications about church doctrine or

       policy.” Payne-Elliot, 193 N.E.3d at 1014. Accordingly, we conclude that

       Defendants’ convictions were not barred by the church autonomy doctrine.

       III. Strict Scrutiny Under the Free Exercise Clause and IRFRA

[35]   As a final challenge to their convictions, Defendants assert that their

       prosecution for “communicating the ban[] to [E.W.] substantially burdens their

       exercise of religion and is thus subject to strict scrutiny under the First

       Amendment and [IRFRA].” (Appellants’ Br. p. 41). Although Defendants

       contend that they “asserted the exercise of their religious beliefs as a defense to

       the State’s prosecution” in the trial court, we have searched the record in vain

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023             Page 20 of 21
       for these precise arguments. (Appellants’ Br. p. 43). It is well-established that

       an appellant may not raise issues for the first time on appeal and that failure to

       raise an issue in the trial court results in waiver of an issue for our

       consideration. See Leonard v. State, 80 N.E.3d 878, 884 n.4 (Ind. 2017) (finding

       Leonard’s constitutional claim raised for the first time on appeal to be waived

       and observing that declining to review a waived issue is a cardinal principle of

       sound judicial administration). Accordingly, we conclude that Defendants

       have waived these claims, and we do not address them.

       CONCLUSION
[36]   Based on the foregoing, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain

       Defendants’ convictions for intimidation. We further hold that Defendants’

       convictions were not barred by the church autonomy doctrine and that they

       have waived their remaining claims.

[37]   Affirmed.

       Bradford, J. and Weissman, J. concur

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2154 | July 27, 2023         Page 21 of 21