Court Opinion

ID: 9720080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:14:52.033597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:12.873348
License: Public Domain

Knutson, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the majority opinion. In the first place, the opinion is based on decisions of this and other courts that do not support the conclusions arrived at. The cases cited fall largely into two categories, namely, those in which the policy itself required some affirmative act on the part of the insurer before the period limited for bringing an action would commence to run or those in which the insurer had done something to lull the insured into deferring the commencement of action, such as negotiating for a settlement or carrying on efforts at an adjustment. This case does not fall into either class.
The facts are not seriously in dispute. The majority arrive at the conclusion that there was no denial of liability and therefore that the period limiting the time within which to commence an action was tolled or that the insurer waived the right to assert as a defense the provisions of the policy limiting the time within which to commence an action or is estopped in some manner to assert it. How either a waiver or estoppel can be established in this case is beyond my comprehension. *338The evidence is clear as to what happened. The insurer obtained information concerning the death of the insured within 2 days after its occurrence. Upon hearing a report that death was due to a cerebral hemorrhage, which would exclude liability, the claim manager of the insurer’s accident and health department called Father O’Donnell, one of the beneficiaries under the policy, and requested an autopsy. He was referred to the attorney who was handling the estate of the insured and was told by him that an autopsy would not be granted. The claim manager then informed the attorney that the claim would not be recognized without an autopsy. Father O’Donnell’s testimony with respect to the granting of an autopsy is quite revealing. He testified:
“A. He [the claim manager] asked for permission to perform an autopsy, and I explained that the wake was in progress, and that I did not think it was correct to follow such procedure during that time. In addition to the fact that my brother was opposed to an autopsy. I heard him speak on previous occasions that when the question came up he always said no, he would not want that, so I said no. I refused consent on those grounds, and I told this man to call the attorney who was handling the estate of my brother.” (Italics supplied.)
Can anyone deny, in view of that testimony from one of the beneficiaries in the policy, that there was a refusal to consent to an autopsy? Coupled with such refusal is a clear statement by the claim manager that they would not accept the claim without an autopsy. It is hard to imagine how there could be a more complete denial of liability.
Furthermore, the complaint in this action alleges, among other things:
“Within forty-eight (48) hours of the death of said James J. O’Donnell, defendant received notice of the accidental injuries and resulting death of said James J. O’Donnell and defendant thereupon was obligated to pay to plaintiffs the said sum of Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars, but the defendant then and there denied liability therefor, and no part thereof has been paid.” (Italics supplied.)
In an affidavit signed by Joseph M. Donahue, attorney for the estate of the insured, we find the following:
*339“Affiant states that said E. A. Benedum [defendant’s claim manager] still insisted upon an autopsy being performed and when again advised by affiant that such would be impossible that said E. A. Bene-dum stated that he would seek a Court Order exhuming the body of said James J. O’Donnell after the funeral and that in his opinion death was not caused by accidental means but due to a cerebral hemorrhage, and that said company would not pay any benefits under the policy, before referred to, if such autopsy was not performed.” (Italics supplied.)
An action for death by wrongful act was commenced to recover for the death of the insured, and Mr. Donahue testified, among other things:
“Q. It is true one of the main reasons why the suit on this policy was not commenced sooner was you wanted to settle the wrongful-death action first?
“A. Well, to the extent that this policy was an accidental death policy with the company claiming he died from a cerebral hemorrhage, and we didn’t want anything to interfere with the action for the wrongful death.
“Q. And to answer my question that would be one of the reasons that you delayed bringing the suit in this action?
“A. That was one, and the other one was that was the last item to clean up as far as the estate was concerned — I mean the death.” With respect to the present action, Mr. Donahue testified:
“* * * it further appears that when this complaint was served on the Continental Casualty Company on the 31st of March of 1959 it seemed perfectly obvious to me and to anyone that they had denied liability because they had not paid the money that was due under the policy.”
Nowhere is there any indication of an intention on the part of the insurer to pay. A waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right.1 There is not one iota of evidence that would justify a conclusion *340that the insurer had waived its defense that the action was brought too late, nor is there any evidence to show that the beneficiaries under the policy were lulled into any kind of security by the insurer or had any reason to believe that the policy would be paid.
The insurance policy was delivered to the attorney for the estate of the decedent a few months after his death. It remained there, with nothing having been done, until the time for bringing the action had expired.
The provisions of this policy respecting the limitation of the time within which an action may be brought are made part of the contract by virtue of Minn. St. 1953, § 62.03, which reads:
“Every policy so issued shall contain certain standard provisions, which shall be in the words and in the order hereinafter set forth and be preceded in every policy by the caption ‘Standard Provision.’ * * * The standard provisions shall be: * * *.”
Thereafter standard provisions are prescribed in the statute that are identical in substance with the provisions of the policy quoted in the majority opinion.
Plaintiffs contend, and the trial court held, that an obligation rested on the insurer to furnish forms for submitting proof of loss and that, until it did so, the time limited for commencing an action was tolled. Neither the contract, nor the statute from which the contract provisions are taken, can be so construed. It is to be observed that under Standard Provision 4 of the contract (§ 62.03[4][C]) the first requirement in case of accidental death is that immediate notice must be given the insurer. It might be held that such notice need not be given where the insurer has actual notice of such death. But Standard Provision 6 (§ 62.03[6]) provides:
“The Company upon receipt of such notice, will furnish to the claimant such forms as are usually furnished by it for filing proofs of loss.
Thus as a prerequisite to the insurer’s obligation to furnish forms is the requirement that notice of the death be given to the insurer. Aside from that,- however, Standard Provision 6 provides an alternative in that, if the insurer fails to furnish such forms within 15 days after *341receipt of such notice, the claimant is deemed to have complied with the requirements of the policy with respect to furnishing proofs of loss “upon submitting within the time fixed in the policy for filing proofs of loss, written proof covering the occurrence, character and extent of the loss for which claim is made.” It is thus apparent that some obligation rests upon the beneficiaries of a policy to take some action either by procuring forms from the insurer for submitting proofs of loss or by following the alternative provided by the statute.
We have held that denial of liability waives the necessity of furnishing proof of loss. Allen v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 167 Minn. 146, 208 N. W. 816. But denial of liability does not operate to waive a provision of the contract or statute limiting the time in which to commence an action on the policy,2 in the absence of some act on the part of the insurer that would establish an estoppel.3
Some of the same questions involved here were considered in Paleias v. Equitable Life Assur. Society, 181 Misc. 1003, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 698, affirmed, 267 App. Div. 862, 47 N. Y. S. (2d) 116, appeal denied, 267 App. Div. 901, 48 N. Y. S. (2d) 325. The provision of the policy involved in that case limiting the time within which to bring an action is identical with that involved here. In holding that the claim involved there was barred, the New York court said (181 Misc. 1007, 42 N. Y. S. [2d] 701):
“Plaintiff urges that defendant waived the filing of any further proofs of loss by its letter disclaiming liability * * *. I am inclined to agree with this contention, and defendant does not seriously dispute it. However, while defendant’s denial of liability under the policy * * * operated to relieve plaintiff of the necessity for filing proofs of loss, it did not have the effect of waiving the explicit provision of the policy concerning the period of limitation within which to bring an action. Plaintiff argues that waiver of proofs of loss made the two-year statute inapplicable, since it could not be set running without filing proofs of loss. * * * In the case at bar, however, the limitation was not set *342running by the furnishing of proofs, but began from a fixed date, that is from the expiration of time within which proofs of loss must be furnished under the terms of the policy. This court holds, therefore, that the * * * cause of action is barred by the two-year limitation provided in the policy.”
The language of Standard Provision 14 (§ 62.03[14]) clearly provides that the 2-year limitation period commenced to run “from the expiration of the time within which proof of loss is required by the policy.” This fixed a definite time for commencement of the running of the period of limitation. Nowhere is there any indication that the period of limitation shall be tolled if proofs of loss are not furnished or the alternative provided by Standard Provision 6 is not complied with. Proofs of loss are intended for the benefit of the insurer. So are provisions limiting the time for commencing an action. It may waive the right to receive proofs of loss expressly or by its conduct without thereby also waiving the right to insist on the separate provision requiring the action to be brought within a 2-year period of limitation.
Plaintiffs and the majority rely on Kelly v. Ancient Order of Hibernians, 113 Minn. 355, 129 N. W. 846; Dechter v. National Council, 130 Minn. 329, 153 N. W. 742; and Stewart v. National Council, 125 Minn. 512, 147 N. W. 651. These cases are not in point. In all of them it was necessary for the insurer or someone else to perform some act that would establish the time when the period of limitation would commence to run. Here, that time is definitely fixed by the contract and the statute as the expiration of the 90-day period within which proofs of loss are required to be furnished.4
Plaintiffs seek to invoke the rule that the language of the policy, having been selected by the insurer, should be resolved in favor of the insured where there is ambiguity. The rule has no application here for two reasons. In the first place, there is no ambiguity. The language of both contract and statute is clear. In the second place, the language *343is not that of the insurer but that of the legislature. The contract provisions are taken verbatim from the legislative act.
Minn. St. 1953, § 62.03, paragraph 14, was repealed by the 1957 legislature. L. 1957, c. 489. The standard provision enacted in its stead, c. 489, § 4, subd. 2(11), is now codified as Minn. St. 62.0025, subd. 2(11), and extends the time for bringing the action from 2 years after the time written proof of loss is required to be furnished to 3 years. While the trial court did not base its decision on the fact that the time for bringing the action had been extended before the action was commenced, and the majority do not discuss it, plaintiffs nevertheless assert the claim that the 3-year limitation applied as an additional reason why we should affirm. The provision was enacted after the death of the insured but before the 2-year limitation period had expired, so that if the 3-year period were applicable the action would have been brought within that period of time.
In Donaldson v. Chase Securities Corp. 216 Minn. 269, 13 N. W. (2d) 1, affirmed, 325 U. S. 304, 65 S. Ct. 1137, 89 L. ed. 1628, Mr. Chief Justice Henry M. Gallagher pointed out that there are really three types of statutes of limitation. The first is one where the passage of time creates a vested right, such as that relating to adverse possession; the second is one where a time limitation is imposed on the action arising out of a right where no vested interest in immunity from suit is given; and the third is one where a cause of action is established by the statute and the limitation is a part of the cause of action. The instant case is clearly of the second type where the right exists independent of the right of limitation. It is basically a right based on contract, but a remedy to enforce the right is denied by statute after the expiration of the limiting period. In cases such as we have here it may be admitted that the time for bringing an action on the contract may be extended by the legislature before the right has expired. However, a legislative act changing such statute of limitation is not to be construed to have retroactive effect unless it is clearly so intended by the legislature.5 Section 645.21 provides:
*344“No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature.”
This statutory provision was construed in Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 65, 45 N. W. (2d) 822, 824, where we said:
“* * * This section is but expressive of the principle that the courts will presume that a statutory enactment applies to the future and not to the past. * * * Furthermore, § 645.21 applies to all laws without making any distinction between laws relating to procedure and those pertaining to substantive rights.”
The Chapman case was followed in Ekstrom v. Harmon, 256 Minn. 166, 168, 98 N. W. (2d) 241, 242, in which we said:
“* * * This case [Chapman v. Davis, supra] has since been followed at least twice. We reaffirm the soundness and desirability of that rule now. We overrule any decisions to the contrary, * * *.”
Thus, it follows that if a statute of limitations is to be given retroactive effect the legislative intention to have it so applied must clearly appear from its enactment. There is no language in the 1957 act that would indicate any legislative intent to have it applied retrospectively. To the contrary, the legislative intent appears to be the opposite. Section 62.0015, subd. 1, reads in part:
“On and after effective date of Laws 1957, Chapter 489 [April 12, 1957], no policy of accident and sickness insurance shall be issued or delivered to any person in this state * * * until * *
From this language it is clear that the act was to apply only to policies issued after April 12, 1957. Section 62.0025, subd. 2, provides in part:
“Except as provided in subdivision 4 each such policy delivered or issued for delivery to any person in this state shall contain the provisions specified * * *.”
Here, again, it appears- that reference is had to policies issued after April 12, 1957, and that the standard provisions enumerated in § 62.0025 shall apply to only such policies.
*345Further evidence of the legislature’s intent appears in § 62.0055, which reads:
“A policy-rider or endorsement, which could have been lawfully used or delivered or issued for delivery to any person in this state immediately before the effective date of Laws 1957, Chapter 489, may be used or delivered or issued for delivery to any such person until January 1, 1959, without being subject to the provisions of sections 62.002, 62.0025 or 62.003.”
Here the legislature permitted the use of certain riders or endorsements for a period of almost 2 years after the effective date of c. 489.
Under these circumstances, it must be apparent that the legislature did not intend to extend the period within which an action could be brought retroactively as to policies issued before the effective date of the act. It follows that the 2-year period of limitation governs the rights of the parties to this action.
The trial court obviously based its decision, at least in part, on its dislike for provisions in insurance policies limiting the time in which to bring an action and the action of the insurer in resting on that defense. While I might agree that it is deplorable that an insurance company, having accepted premiums over a number of years for an assumed risk, will evade payment of a legal claim based on such a risk on a legal technicality, we, as courts, have no right to set aside a defense that exists if the insurer wishes to assert it. We must take the contract and .the statute as we find them and enforce the legal rights of the parties according to the language of the contract, if its meaning is clear. It is difficult to understand why action was not brought within the time limited by this contract. To me it is clear that the evidence sustains only one conclusion and that is that the provisions of the contract required commencement of the action within 2 years after the expiration of the 90-day period within which proof-of-loss blanks were required to be furnished. That being so, I fail to see how we have any right to change the provisions of the contract, no matter how much we might dislike the denial of liability.
Nelson, Justice (dissenting).
I concur in the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Knutson.
*346Mr. Justice Rogosheske, not having been a member of the court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice Otis, having presided at the pretrial conference, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

 Engstrom v. Farmers & Bankers Life Ins. Co. 230 Minn. 308, 41 N. W. (2d) 422.

 Annotation, 171 A. L. R. 578.

For examples of action on the part of the insurer that would establish an estoppel, see 46 C. J. S., Insurance, § 1264c.

For cases where it was held that a claim was barred, see Kulberg v. Supreme Council F. A. U. 135 Minn. 150, 160 N. W. 685, and McKitrick v. Travelers Equitable Ins. Co. 174 Minn. 354, 219 N. W. 286.

See, Annotation, 112 A. L. R. 1296.