Court Opinion

ID: 9533640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:33:27.249272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:06.400763
License: Public Domain

*595Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
Among the specific findings of fact made by the trial court pursuant to Ind. R.P.C. 1, § 6, paragraph 6 is central to the resolution of this appeal. That paragraph follows in full:
“6. The Court further finds that James H. Woodsmall could not, and did not, identify the petitioner herein in a face to face confrontation with petitioner immediately after the alleged incident; and that James H. Woodsmall appeared at a preliminary hearing in Marion County, Indiana, in Municipal Courtroom 6 on February 22, 1969, and that James H. Woodsmall could not identify petitioner at said hearing; and that James H. Woodsmall appeared again in Marion County Municipal Courtroom 6 on February 27, 1969, and did on said occasion identify petitioner as one of the persons who allegedly robbed and kidnapped him.” (Emphasis added.)
The suggestive face-to-face confrontation between appellee and Woodsmall, referred to in the finding, occurred on February 21, 1969, in the immediate aftermath of the abduction of Woodsmall. Woodsmall did not identify appellee at that time. The crucial part of this finding is the fact presented that on February 22, the very next morning after the fruitless confrontation at the scene, Woodsmall appeared in Municipal Courtroom 6 and still could not identify appellee. If a jury believed that Woodsmall could not make a positive identification of appellee on the 22nd, it would certainly not believe his statement that he first became certain of his identification of appellee on the 21st, within an hour or so after the on-the-scene meeting. If a jury did not believe that statement of Woodsmall, it is very likely that it would conclude that the positive identification of appellee by Woodsmall, first communicated by Woodsmall to the police or anyone immediately prior to the hearing in Municipal Courtroom 6 on the 27th of February, was the product of the suggestiveness of the photographic line-up at which appellee’s criminal record was on display and the on-the-scene confrontation. As a result of that the jury would have given little weight to Woodsmall’s *596identification of appellee and therefore a reasonable doubt has been shown to have arisen from the failure of the prosecution to disclose the employment of the suggestive photographic identification procedure utilized on the 27th of February.
The foregoing conclusion rests upon paragraph 6 of the trial court’s findings. It remains to be determined whether that paragraph is supported by sufficient evidence. The trial judge heard the testimony of the officer in charge of the case that appellee and Woodsmall appeared in court on the 22nd of February. The officer then unequivocally testified that Woodsmall identified appellee that morning. Under further questioning the officer admitted that he did not remember whether Mr. Woodsmall identified appellee on the 22nd or not. He further testified that if Woodsmall had made a positive identification prior to the 27th, there would have been no reason to employ the photographic identification procedure in preparation for the hearing on the 27th. Contrary to this testimony, the witness later suggested a reason to employ a photographic line-up under such circumstances.
The trial judge heard this testimony, and while it was not unequivocal, the judge was warranted in basing his finding in paragraph 6 upon it. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Prentice, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 372 N.E.2d 453.