Court Opinion

ID: 9740127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:28:37.89319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.374509
License: Public Domain

*345Lynch, J.
(dissenting, with whom Nolan, J., joins). I would permit inspection by the defense attorney under controlled circumstances (such as contained in the judge’s first order), followed by an in camera hearing to determine the admissibility of any records the defense attorney wished to use at trial. I agree with the court that this result is not mandated by Commonwealth v. Liebman, 388 Mass. 483 (1983). However, Liebman does provide us with a beacon that illuminates the course to be followed here.
At the outset, my analysis differs significantly from that of the court. This case is not about the extent of the privilege of confidentiality created by G. L. c. 112, § 135. The court correctly points out that § 135 “neither creates an absolute privilege, nor establishes guidelines for the release of confidential records to a court or to a defendant requesting information from the records.” Ante at 343. The court concedes that a defendant is entitled to know whether a State agency’s confidential records contain exculpatory evidence. What this case is about, therefore, is the method of ascertaining whether circumstances exist that rfequire disclosure. Someone must examine the records to make that determination. At this point, I return to Commonwealth v. Liebman, supra at 489: “[W]hen a judge undertakes to decide if [evidence] benefits the defendant’s case he is ‘assuming vicariously and uncomfortably the role of counsel.’ Commonwealth v. Stewart, 365 Mass. 99, 105 (1974). We think it inappropriate for a judge to assume that role.” If one concedes, as does the court, that there is nothing in the statute that prevents the judge from examining the records to determine if they should be made available to the defendant, then it follows inexorably that there is nothing in the statute that prevents the judge’s designee (defendant’s counsel) from making the inspection. An examination of the records in this manner creates a reasonable opportunity for the defendant to ask the judge, in camera, that some information in the records be made available at trial. It is a necessary reading of the statute that permits a judge to examine the records. Nowhere is a judge explicitly or impliedly prevented from delegating that task to the person most able to perform *346it, the defendant’s attorney, while retaining his own traditional neutral role. It would be appropriate under such circumstances for the judge to bar the further disclosure to anyone, including the defendant, of the information in the records absent an order of the court. I do not base my view on the requirements of the Federal or State Constitution, but rather on what is fair and in recognition of the traditional roles of judge and attorney.