Court Opinion

ID: 9582054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:22:00.801536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:25.215711
License: Public Domain

BROOKS, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellant contends that the “reasonable grounds to believe”1 standard of proof embodied in Rule 14(b) is not fundamentally fair and is violative of due process and that a standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” *313should be applied to this aspect of the transfer proceedings. The state responds, and the majority opinion concludes, that the standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” is an unrealistic burden of proof to be applied in a transfer hearing. I agree with this conclusion. The majority, however, makes the further conclusion that the stated standard in Rule 14(b) of “reasonable grounds to believe” is a lesser standard than “preponderance of the evidence” and that this lesser standard does not satisfy due process requirements. From this conclusion I respectfully dissent.
In concluding that the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard of Rule 14(b) does not meet minimum standards of due process, the majority analyzed each of the three factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.2 The. second factor is the critical determination in this matter. The majority concludes that a risk of error is present in the provided standard due to a “potential conflict between the probation officer and the child”, a “great deal of discretion [which is] placed in the trial court” due to the imprecise quality of evidence and the fact that “the ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ standard requires only a threshold factual accuracy which does not adequately impress upon the fact finder the importance of the decision involved and the proper allocation of risk of error.”
In determining the propriety of a particular standard of proof in a given case, however, it is not enough simply to say that we are trying to minimize the risk of error. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1411, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting opinion). Indeed, the second Eldridge factor provides that due process requires consideration of “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903. It is clear that the Eldridge test requires consideration of both the risk of erroneous deprivation of private interests and the likelihood that a substitute procedure or higher evidentiary standard would reduce that risk. See Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S.Ct. at 1398.
I agree with the majority’s analysis of the first Eldridge factor in which it finds that the juvenile has a critical interest in the transfer decision. I also find that under the third Eldridge factor, the state does not have a countervailing interest in imposing a “lesser standard of proof” on the transfer proceedings. The second Eldridge factor, however, is most significant. I find that the probable value of substituting “preponderance of the evidence” for “reasonable grounds to believe” is negligible and that the provided procedures regarding transfer of a juvenile for criminal prosecution meet the minimum requirements of due process.
I initially suggest that the majority is engaging in nothing more than a semantical exercise when it finds that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof requires something more than probabilities and that this standard meets minimum requirements of due process while a standard based on “reasonable grounds to believe” does not. The majority relies on Cole v. Town of Miami, 52 Ariz. 488, 83 P.2d 997 (1938) for its definition of “preponderance of the evidence.” The actual definition provided in that ease is “such proof as satisfies the conscience and carries conviction to an intelligent mind.” Id. at 497, 83 P.2d at 1001. Contrary to the majority opinion, there is no requirement under the “preponderance of the evidence” standard that a fact finder “be satisfied and convinced of the truth of the matter.” The more common and judicially accepted definition of *314this test is whether the fact sought to be proved is more probably true than not true. See, e.g., Todd v. Weikle, 36 Md.App. 663, 376 A.2d 104, 108 (1977); Appeal of Tucker, 538 P.2d 626, 629 (Okl.App.1975). Indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court in Cole concluded that “the ultimate test is, does the evidence convince the trier of fact that one theory of the case is more probable than the other.” Cole v. Town of Miami, 52 Ariz. at 497, 83 P.2d at 1001. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the “preponderance of the evidence” standard is based on “mere probabilities” in the same manner as the “probable cause” standard and the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard.3
Notwithstanding the semantical discussion, assuming arguendo, that “reasonable grounds to believe” requires something less than a “preponderance of the evidence”, the question still remains whether the existing procedures are fundamentally fair and in compliance with minimum due process requirements. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335, 343, 96 S.Ct. at 903, 907.
It is established that the procedures of a transfer hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). Due process of law, however, is a flexible principle. The requirements which it imposes upon governmental actions vary with the situations to' which it applies. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, “not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).
Given this flexibility, it is obvious that a proper due process inquiry cannot be made by focusing upon one narrow provision of the challenged statutory scheme. Such a focus threatens to overlook factors which may introduce constitutionally adequate protections into a particular government action. Courts must examine all procedural protections offered by the state, and must assess the cumulative effect of such safeguards. The courts must consider “the fairness and reliability of the existing ... procedures” before holding that the Constitution requires more. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. at 907. Only through such a broad inquiry may courts determine whether a challenged governmental action satisfies the due process requirement of “fundamental fairness”. See Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S.Ct. at 1405. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting opinion).
In determining which essentials of due process and fair treatment are required in delinquency adjudications, the emphasis is on accurate fact finding. Matter of Pima County Juvenile Action No. 63212-2, 129 Ariz. 371, 631 P.2d 526 (1981). Although the standard of proof is not “beyond a reasonable doubt”, as conceded by the majority, a similar emphasis on accurate fact finding is present in the procedures involved in a transfer hearing. Additional procedural safeguards are provided in Rule 14(c), which requires that upon transfer, the juvenile court shall state the reasons for the transfer. This additional procedural requirement insures that the transfer procedure has constitutionally adequate protections.
Although it is established that the procedures of a transfer hearing must satisfy due process requirements, the United States Supreme Court has made the following comment regarding the quantum of evidence that must support a decision to transfer a juvenile:
[T]he Court has never attempted to prescribe criteria for, or the nature and quantum of evidence that must support, a decision to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult court.
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1790, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a transfer order based on a “preponderance of the evidence” meets minimum requirements of due process but that a transfer *315order based on “reasonable grounds to believe” is constitutionally infirm.
Article 6, § 15 of the Arizona Constitution provides that juvenile court judges may, in their discretion, suspend criminal prosecution of children under the age of eighteen and that the powers of such judges to control such children shall be as provided by law. I find that the procedures regarding transfer for criminal prosecution provided in Rules 12, 13 and 14 of the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court meet minimum requirements of due process. I would affirm the order which transferred the juvenile for criminal prosecution.

. Rule 14(b) provides that the court may transfer the action for criminal prosecution if the court finds “probable cause and reasonable grounds to believe” that the three factors in Rule 14(b) are present. It is not clear whether the standard to be applied in this determination is “reasonable grounds to believe” or whether the standard includes both “probable cause” and “reasonable grounds to believe.” It can be argued that the phrase “probable cause” in Rule 14(b) applies to the probable cause detérmination made under Rule 14(a) and that the Rule 14(b) determination is to be made based on “reasonable grounds to believe.” This issue, however, is immaterial to this matter because, as the majority points out, the terms “reasonable grounds” and “probable cause” are substantial equivalents of the same meaning. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 n. 3, 79 S.Ct. 329, 331 n. 3, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). For the purpose of this opinion, “reasonable grounds to believe” will be referred to as the standard embodiéd in Rule 14(b).

. “[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

. Compare the definition of preponderance of the evidence (whether one theory of the case is more probable than the other) with the requirements for a showing of “probable cause” under Rule 14(a). In Matter of Juvenile Court No. 6358-4, 14 Ariz.App. 466, 471, 484 P.2d 235, 240 (1971), Division Two of this court said that “[i]n order to arrive at a conclusion of probable cause there must be more evidence for, rather than against, guilt....”