Court Opinion

ID: 9427085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:19:42.105917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:04.829645
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Powell,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
The Court today holds that collective-bargaining agreements in the maritime industry are subject to the filing and prior approval requirements of § 15 of the Shipping Act, 1916 (Act), 46 U. S. C. § 814. Neither statutory language nor legislative history offers specific support for this result. For well over a half a century, the agency responsible for enforcing the Act did not consider § 15 previews of maritime labor contracts to be within its mission,1 even though collective *65bargaining is hardly a recent development in the major ports of the Nation.2 No intervening legislation explains the Court’s willingness to recognize this belated assertion of jurisdiction.3
This' decision would be debatable but unexceptional were it not for the presence of a competing statute. The task confronting the Court is one of reconciling the broad language of § 15 with the distinct policy of federal labor law embodied in the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U. S. C. § 141 et seq. It seems to me that today’s ruling undercuts federal labor policy, imposing undue burdens on collective bargaining, without advancing significantly any Shipping Act objective. I therefore dissent.
*66I
The sweeping generality of § 15 arguably would enable the statute to be applied to almost any agreement involving a party subject to the Act. But this merely accents the importance of construing its general language in light of the Act’s purposes and the policies of other pertinent statutes. Section 15 has not been interpreted as reaching all agreements related to maritime transportation. See FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 731-734 (1973). Although Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U. S. 261 (1968), referred to today, ante, at 55-56, emphasized the breadth of the statutory language, the Court was careful to limit its holding to avoid any suggestion that collective-bargaining agreements must comply with the requirements of § 15.
In subjecting collective-bargaining agreements to prior clearance by the Commission under § 15, the Court goes well beyond the limits established in Volkswagenwerk. There, an earlier agreement between respondent Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) and respondent International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (Union) provided for the introduction of laborsaving devices and the elimination of certain work practices. The agreement required the creation of a “Mechanization and Modernization Fund” (Mech Fund) of |29 million to be used to mitigate the impact of technological unemployment upon employees. It reserved to the PMA alone the right to determine how to raise the fund from its members. The question before the Court was whether § 15 applied to a subsequent agreement among members of the PMA setting forth various formulas for collecting the Mech Fund. The Court held that the employers’ “side agreement” would have a substantial impact on stevedoring and terminal charges, and required the prior approval of the Commission. Following the suggestion of the United States,4 the Court *67restricted its holding to the “side agreement,” explicitly disclaiming any intention to reach the underlying collective-bargaining agreement.
“It is to be emphasized that the only agreement involved in this case is the- one among members of the Association allocating the impact of the Mech Fund levy. We are not concerned here with the agreement creating the Association or with the collective bargaining agreement between the Association and the ILWU. No claim has been made in this case that either of those agreements was subject to the filing requirements of § 15. Those agreements, reflecting the national labor policy of free collective bargaining by representatives of the parties’ own unfettered choice, fall in an area of concern to the National Labor Relations Board, and nothing we have said in this opinion is to be understood as questioning their continuing validity. But in negotiating with the ILWU, the Association insisted that its members were to have the exclusive right to determine how the Mech Fund was to be assessed, and a clause to that effect was included in the collective bargaining agreement. That assessment arrangement, affecting only relationships among Association members and their customers, is all that is before us in this case.” 390 U. S., at 278 (emphasis supplied).
*68The italicized language makes clear that the Volkswagenwerk Court perceived a distinction, material to Commission authority under § 15, between a collective-bargaining agreement, and implementing agreements among carriers, stevedoring contractors, and marine terminal operators.
In this case, I would follow what seems to have been the lead of the Court in Volkswagenwerk. A proper accommodation of the conflicting signals of the Shipping Act and federal labor policy requires that bona fide collective-bargaining agreements, arrived through arm’s-length negotiations,5 do not fall within § 15. As in other collective-bargaining contexts, labor and management in the maritime industry would be free to reach agreement without prior Government approval or control over the substantive terms of the bargain, while the agreement itself or its implementation would be subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws and the specific prohibitions of § § 166 and 177 of the Act.
*69II
The prospects for peaceful resolution of labor disputes in an industry marked by a history of industrial strife, see C. Larrowe, Shape Up and Hiring Hall 1-48, 83-138 (1955); Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U. S., at 296-299 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part), are not enhanced by the Court’s imposition of a system of administrative prior restraints. Collective bargaining works best when the parties are free to arrive at negotiated solutions to problems without first having to secure the approval of Government regulators. The legal consequences of a bargain may be assessed after the fact, but the parties should be free to negotiate an agreement within the framework of procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations Board (Board). Often negotiations are conducted under substantial constraints of time, and agreement is reached at the eleventh hour. If there is no agreement by the expiration date of the previous contract, or if an accord may not be executed because of a requirement of prior governmental approval, labor’s “no contract, no work” tradition suggests the likelihood of a disruptive work stoppage. Moreover, the bargaining process itself may suffer where the parties know that any agreement is simply a tentative accord, subject to pre-implementation review by an administrative agency. As the Board noted in New York Shipping Assn. v. FMC, 495 F. 2d 1215 (CA2), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 964 (1974):
“It is extremely difficult for the parties to make a meaningful judgment as to the kind of bargain they are negotiating if one or more of the key provisions on which agreement turns is subject to invalidation by the Corn-*70mission. This kind of administrative supervision will impede the process of collective bargaining and could inhibit negotiators’ attempts to arrive at novel solutions to troublesome labor problems. The superimposition of the approval of the FMC over [matters that are] crucial to the agreement is likely to disrupt the process of collective bargaining and deter the speedy resolution of industrial disputes in the maritime industry.” Brief for National Labor Relations Board as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 73-1919 and 73-1991 (CA2), p. 14.
Section 15 jurisdiction also entails recognition of a revisory power in the Commission over the substantive terms of collective-bargaining agreements. The Commission is empowered, after notice and hearing, to “disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement” that it finds to be “unjustly discriminatory or unfair,” detrimental to commerce, contrary to the public interest, or otherwise violative of the Act. If — as the Court holds — this power is applicable to collective-bargaining agreements, it would exceed even the broad remedial authority of the Board itself, which falls short of any substantial interference with the “freedom of contract” of the parties. In Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U. S. 99 (1970), the Court held that the Board could not order an employer to grant the union a contract checkoff clause as a remedy for an acknowledged violation of the statutory duty to bargain in good faith.
“It is implicit in the entire structure of the Act that the Board acts to oversee and referee the process of collective bargaining, leaving the results of the contest to the bargaining strength of the parties. . . . The Board’s remedial powers under § 10 of the Act are broad, but they are limited to carrying out the policies of the Act itself. One of these fundamental policies is freedom of contract. While the parties’ freedom of contract is not absolute under the Act, allowing the Board to compel agreement *71when the parties themselves are unable to agree would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is based — private bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract.” Id., at 107-108.
The parties cannot agree to terms that violate the law, but the remedy that is generally applied is post-execution invalidation and assessment of damages, rather than “official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract.” 8 Hence, the Court’s recognition of such a power reposing in the Commission is fundamentally at odds with national labor policy.
The Court insists that concern over "the possible impact of the Commission’s decision on the collective-bargaining process [is] exaggerated and [does] not justify the major surgery performed on § 15 by the decision below.” Ante, at 57. It is suggested that few labor agreements will have to be filed, because § 15 does not apply to contracts between a union and a single employer, and the Commission has forsworn jurisdiction over agreements falling within the uncertain contours of a “labor exemption” to be developed in the course of agency adjudications. Ante, at 57-58.
It is by no means clear to me that the Court’s optimism is justified. Labor unions and management groups, following the course of caution, are likely to respond to today’s decision by filing all labor agreements with the Commission. Respondents can take little comfort in the assertion that “routine,” Brief for Petitioners 28, or “ordinary collective-bargaining *72agreements” will not “be subject to the requirements of § 15,” ante, at 57.9 New agreements negotiated between a union and a multiemployer bargaining association for the purpose of governing working relations at a major port are likely to be so “routine” that the parties safely may assume that they enjoy an exemption from § 15. A degree of uncertainty and delay, then, would seem an inevitable byproduct of § 15 jurisdiction over maritime labor relations.
Similarly, the possibility that the Commission may find that a particular agreement qualifies for a “labor exemption” does not offer a realistic palliative for the probable impact of the Court's decision on free collective bargaining. The Court suggests that the Commission may apply its special understanding of the requirements of anticompetitive policy,10 but there is no well-developed corpus of maritime labor-antitrust decisions to guide the formulation of labor agreements in the industry. The Commission has identified four nonexclusive, nondeterminative criteria to inform its “labor exemption” *73rulings.11 The brief history of the Commission’s entry into the maritime labor field, however, see n. 1, supra, offers little basis for hope that its assertion of § 15 jurisdiction will not impair the collective-bargaining process. In the final analysis, the substantial penalties provided by the Act12 for “guessing wrong” make it unlikely that the disruption and uncertainty inherent in this prior-restraint scheme will be allayed significantly by the rulings of a federal agency inexpert in labor and labor-antitrust matters.13
Ill
I cannot agree that either the statutory language or the *74legislative history14 of § 15 requires that it be made applicable to collective-bargaining agreements. Neither contains any reference to labor agreements. Although § 15 reaches a broad spectrum of arrangements, its terms apply only to agreements among “common carriers by water” or “other persons subject to this chapter.” 15 Unions are not persons subject to the Act. One would have thought that if Congress had wished to include collective-bargaining agreements within the scope of § 15, it would have done so specifically or, at least, *75it would have provided for jurisdiction over the indispensable party to such an agreement — the labor union.16
The terms of § 15 must be construed in light of the considerations that led to federal regulation of the maritime industry17 and encouraged Congress to empower the Commission to immunize restrictive agreements among shippers and others subject to the Act from all antitrust scrutiny.18 The Court’s ruling abstracts this power of approval from the particular context that prompted Congress to accord certain agreements an immunity premised on Shipping Act policies which did not necessarily reflect antitrust principles.19 In *76Volkswagenwerk, the Court recognized § 15 jurisdiction over an agreement among members of respondent Association, to which a grant of immunity, after Commission study and approval, would have been understandable. That agreement presented only Shipping Act considerations. As the Government pointed out in that case, the assessment formula was “not a part of [the labor] contract, involve[d] no question of labor relations, and [was] not subject to the jurisdiction of the Labor Board.” See n. 4, supra. I find it difficult to believe, however, that Congress in 1916 intended to empower the Commission to approve, and thereby immunize from the reach of the antitrust laws, the varied terms of collective-bargaining agreements.
The Commission in this case found that the agreement fell within the third category of § 15 — which concerns agreements “controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competition.” Pacific Maritime Assn.- — Cooperative Working Arrangements, 18 F. M. C. 196 (1975). Undoubtedly, some maritime labor agreements will pose antitrust problems. But we must recognize, as we did in FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., that a broad “reading of the Commission’s jurisdiction would increase the number of cases subject to potential antitrust immunity,” and “conflict with our frequently expressed view that exemptions from antitrust laws are strictly construed, see, e. g., United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U. S. 305, 316 (1956) . . . .” 411 U. S., at 733, and n. 8.
Plenary review by the Commission of all maritime labor agreements that now will have to be filed in their entirety may be avoided only by retroactive, piecemeal grants of a “labor exemption.” 20 The better course would be to recognize that *77bona fide collective-bargaining agreements, as a class, do not come within § 15.
IV
An exemption from the filing and prior-clearance regime of § 15 would not shield collective-bargaining agreements from all scrutiny under the Shipping Act. It would remain open to the Commission to determine that a particular agreement was not the product of arm’s-length negotiations, but rather was an effort to circumvent § 15 by clothing a restrictive arrangement otherwise subject to the filing requirement with the trappings of a labor accord. Moreover, even a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement, or at least action taken in its implementation, may be reviewed under §§16 and 17. Petitioners have not demonstrated that vindication of Shipping Act policies requires the application of § 15, in the first instance, to genuine collective-bargaining agreements. Indeed, the Commission’s recognition of a “labor exemption” and its unreviewed assertion of power to accord “interim approval” to labor agreements, see n. 13, supra, suggest that the proposed remedy for an occasional-evasion of the Shipping Act through the device of the collective-bargaining agreement may be likened to using “a sledge hammer to fix a watch.” Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U. S., at 296 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).21
I respectfully dissent.

 Prior to 1968, the Federal Maritime Commission (Commission) and its predecessors resisted the idea that § 15 reached agreements affecting employer-employee relationships. Three years after this Court’s ruling in Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U. S. 261 (1968), however, the Commission held that § 15 applied to work-gang allocation and employee-recall provisions developed among members of a multiemployer association. The recall provision had been embodied in a collective-bargaining agreement. United Stevedoring Corp. v. Boston Shipping Assn., 15 F. M. C. 33 (1971). On appeal, the United States, as statutory respondent, incorporating the positions of the Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board, objected to the Commission’s decision. The opposition of the United States prompted the Commission to move for a remand for further consideration. The Court of Appeals granted the motion, expressing “astonishment” at the Commission’s failure to recognise the difference “between attaching a separate, Section 15, agreement, in which the union had little interest, to a collective bargaining agreement, and making a multiemployer agreement with a union, eyeball to eyeball, but which, by the very fact that it is multi-employer, has some effect on employer competition.” Boston Shipping Assn. v. United States, 8 SRR 20,828, 20,830 (CA1 1972). On remand, the Commission found that both provisions were entitled to a “labor exemption” derived, by analogy, from this Court’s labor-*65antitrust decisions. United Stevedoring Corp. v. Boston Shipping Assn., 16 F. M. C. 7, 14 — 15 (1972).
Aside from the present controversy, the Commission’s only other foray into the labor arena involved an assessment formula for funding a fringe-benefit program that was incorporated in a collective-bargaining agreement. New York Shipping Assn. — NYSA-ILA Man-Hour/Tonnage Method of Assessment, 16 F. M. C. 381 (1973). On appeal, the United States supported the Commission, while the Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board urged reversal. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision. New York Shipping Assn. v. FMC, 495 F. 2d 1215 (CA2), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 964 (1974).

 New York longshoremen were sufficiently organized by 1874 to conduct a five-week strike for higher wages. By 1914, New York locals formed the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and, by 1916, the union secured a portwide agreement. On the west coast, District Council 38 of the ILA, in 1915, entered into an agreement providing for wage increases with all employers in the Puget Sound-British Columbia area. C. Larrowe, Shape-Up and Hiring Hall 7-9, 87-89 (1955).

 The Court notes that the Shipping Act, including § 15, was extensively revised in 1961, Pub. L. 87-346, 75 Stat. 763, see ante, at 54, but offers no evidence that this re-examination of “the entire gamut of antitrust problems in the ocean freight industry,” H. R. Rep. No. 1419, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1962), touched upon the possibility of § 15’s application to collective-bargaining agreements.

 “For purposes of deciding this case, we may assume that agreements which relate solely to collective bargaining or labor relations are excepted from the scope of Section 15 of the Shipping Act. Cf. Kennedy v. Long *67Island R. Co., 211 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. N. Y.), affirmed, 319 F. 2d 366 (C. A. 2), certiorari denied, 376 U. S. 830. The basic agreement to provide a mechanisation fund in a certain amount for the benefit of the longshoremen would appear to be of this character. And after the Association agreed to create the fund it had an ancillary obligation to collect it somehow. But at issue here is only the side agreement among the Association’s members prescribing a special assessment on the cargo handled by them. Such an agreement among employers apportioning the cost of the labor contract is not a part of that contract, involves no question of labor relations, and is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Labor Board.” Brief for United States in Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, O. T. 1967, No. 69, pp. 31-32 (emphasis supplied); see Memorandum for United States in Volkswagenwerk, pp. 7-8.

 Petitioners do not challenge the bona fides of the agreement in question. Indeed, they concede that the Union has a legitimate interest in the integrity and work opportunities of the registered work force and in the fringe benefits covered by the agreement. Reply Brief for Petitioners 6.

 Section 16 of the Act, as set forth in 46 U. S. C. § 815, provides in relevant part:
"It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by water, or other person subject to this chapter, either alone or in conjunction with any other person, directly or indirectly—
“First. To make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, locality, or description of traffic in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, locality, or description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever . . . .”
See n. 16, infra.

 Section 17 of the Act, as set forth in 46 U. S. C. § 816, provides in relevant part:
“Every such carrier and every other person subject to' this chapter shall establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to or connected with the receiving, handling, storing, or *69delivering of property. Whenever the Commission finds that any such regulation or practice is unjust or unreasonable it- may determine, prescribe, and order enforced a just and reasonable regulation or practice.” This provision may not reach the collective-bargaining agreement, but it would appear to be applicable to the implementation of the agreement by persons subject to the Act.

 For example, although § 8 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (e) (1970 ed., Supp. V), prohibits entering into a “hot cargo” agreement, there is no requirement that the parties submit a proposed agreement to the Board for prior clearance. The Board’s remedial authority is limited to the obtaining of a preliminary injunction under § 10 (l), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (l), and the ultimate issuance of a cease-and-desist order, requiring enforcement by a court of appeals.

 The Court’s discussion on this point is somewhat unclear. The argument appears to be, as observed in the text, that “ordinary collective-bargaining agreements” would not “be subject to the requirements of § 15,” ante, at 57, apparently because their conformity with antitrust and Shipping Act policies may be presumed. If the Court is simply saying, however, that such agreements are likely to be “routinely approved even if filed,” ibid., this is no answer to respondents’ contention that compliance with § 15 prevents the prompt implementation of compromise agreements worked out in eleventh-hour bargaining sessions that often is necessary to the preservation of labor peace.

 “We should add that since the Shipping Act contains its own standards for exempting and for approving and disapproving agreements between carriers, and because the ultimate issue in cases such as this is the accommodation of the Shipping Act and the labor laws, rather than the labor laws and the antitrust laws, it will not necessarily be a misapplication of the statutes if the exemption for collective-bargaining contracts from Shipping Act requirements is not always exactly congruent with the so-called labor exemption from the antitrust laws as understood by the courts.” Ante, at 63.

 “These criteria are by no means meant to be exclusive nor are they determinative in each and every case. Just as in the accommodation of the labor laws and the antitrust laws the courts have resolved each case on an ad hoc basis, so too will we. Each of the following criteria deserves consideration, but it is obvious that each element is not in and of itself controlling. They are rather guidelines or ‘rules of thumb’ for each factual situation.” United Stevedoring Corp. v. Boston Shipping Assn., 16 F. M. C., at 12.
Although the Commission has promised to undertake a rulemaking proceeding to promulgate more precise standards for its “labor exemption,” id., at 15, no regulations have been forthcoming.

 Noncomplianee with § 15 exposes the offending party to a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 for each day of violation. If the agreement, or its implementation, is ultimately held to violate § 16 as well, the party also may be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000 for each offense.

 The power of the Commission to grant temporary approvals under § 15, e. g., New York Shipping Assn. v. FMC, 495 F. 2d, at 1218, has not been passed on by a federal court, see Marine Cooks & Stewards v. FMC, No. 75-2013 (CADC Feb. 4, 1977) (dismissing appeal). In any event, this dispensation is a matter of administrative grace. The problems of uncertainty and delays are not likely to disappear because there is a chance that the Commission may be persuaded to issue a temporary approval. And, as the Court of Appeals recognized, even if such a power and its frequent exercise are assumed, interim approval “does not remove the possibility of later unilateral modification by the Commission . . . .” 177 U. S. App. D. C. 248, 260, 543 F. 2d 395, 407 (1976).

 Petitioners concede that “[t]he legislative history of the Shipping Act is unilluminating concerning Congress’ specific intent where a labor union is a signatory to an agreement- otherwise subject to- the Act. . . .” Brief for Petitioners 24 n. 25.
Legislative developments after the passage of the Shipping Act highlight the improbability of § 15 jurisdiction over labor agreements. In 1938, Congress created a Maritime Labor Board (MLB) for the purpose of encouraging collective bargaining and assisting in the peaceful settlement of disputes through mediation. A provision of the 1938 measure, § 1005, 52 Stat. 967, required every maritime employer to file with the MLB a copy of every contract with any group of its employees covering wages, hours, and working conditions. A 1941 House Committee Report on a bill providing for a two-year extension of the 1938 machinery noted:
“This is the only Government agency with which copies of all labor agreements are required to- be filed and these have been studied by the Board with a view to promoting stable labor relations in the maritime industry.
“One of the most unique provisions . . . requires the filing with the Board of all maritime labor agreements. The 4,303 collective agreements filed with the Maritime Labor Board represent the most complete file of collective agreements in the maritime industry, as employers are not required to file agreements, covering their maritime employees, with any other Federal agency.” H. R. Rep. No. 354, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1941) (emphasis supplied).
The MLB ultimately was discontinued.

 The term "other person subject to this chapter” “means any person not included in the term ‘common carrier by water,’ carrying on the business of forwarding or furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse, or other terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier by water.” 46 U. S. C. § 801.

 By contrast, § 16 bars certain discriminatory acts engaged in by “any common carrier by water, or other person subject to this chapter, either alone or in conjunction with any other person The term “person” “includes corporations, partnerships, and associations, existing under or authorized by the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, District or possession thereof, or of any foreign country.” 46 U. S. C. § 801.

 The guiding force in the development of the Shipping Act was the House Committee that issued the “Alexander Report.” House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Report on Steamship Agreements and Affiliations, H. R. Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). See Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U. S. 481, 490 (1958). The Alexander Committee principally addressed the methods for control of competition employed by steamship lines and water carriers that had cartelized much of the industry. Alexander Report 409-412, 415, 421-422. To ensure Government surveillance of these practices, the Committee recommended that all carriers engaged in the foreign and domestic trade of the United States file with the Government all agreements entered into with any other carrier, shipper, railroad, or other transportation agencies. Id., at 419-420, 422-423.

 Concluding that outright prohibition of steamship agreements and conference arrangements would result only in rate wars and anticompetitive mergers, the Alexander Committee “chose to permit continuation of the conference system, but to curb its abuses by requiring government approval of conference agreements.” FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 738 (1973).

 At least until 1961, it was an open question whether the Commission could take antitrust policies into account when ruling on proposed agreements. Id., at 739. Apparently, the approval of an agreement, premised *76on a consideration of Shipping Act policies alone, was sufficient to confer an immunity from the antitrust laws.

 The Commission’s assertion of power to accord a “labor exemption” after filing to particular collective-bargaining agreements, or portions thereof, does not fit neatly within the authorization of § 35 of the Act, *7746 U. S. C. § 833a. That provision contemplates action "for the future,” after opportunity for a hearing, exempting “any class of agreements between persons subject to this chapter or any specified activity of such persons . . . .”

 Because of my conclusion that § 15, properly read, does not apply to bona fide collective-bargaining agreements, I do not reach the question of whether the Commission interpreted correctly Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657 (1965), to deny a “labor exemption” from the Shipping Act to the agreement in question.