Court Opinion

ID: 9882678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:18:25.146369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:43.348131
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Kocher v. Ascent Resources-Utica, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-3592.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                             SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 JEFFERSON COUNTY

                                     SUSAN KOCHER et al.,

                                        Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                                                     v.

                       ASCENT RESOURCES-UTICA, LLC et al.,

                                      Defendants-Appellees.

                        OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014

                                   Civil Appeals from the
                       Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County, Ohio
                                    Case No. 20 CV 82

                                        BEFORE:
                Carol Ann Robb, Cheryl L. Waite, David A. D’Apolito, Judges.

                                          JUDGMENT:
                          Reversed in part, Affirmed in part, Remanded.

Atty. Sean Richard Scullin, Scullin & Cunning, LLC, 940 Windham Ct., Ste. 4, Boardman,
Ohio 44512, for Appellants Susan Kocher et al., Atty. Joshua E. O’Farrell, Atty. Jude B.
Streb, Atty. Justin S. Greenfelder, Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs LLC, 4277 Munson
Street, NW, Canton, Ohio 44718 for Appellant Bedway Land and Minerals Co. and
Atty. Kevin L. Colosimo, Atty. Christopher W. Rogers, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Union Trust
Building, 501 Grant Street, Suite 800, Pittsburgh, PA 15219 for Appellee Ascent
Resources-Utica, LLC and
Atty. Jeffrey J. Bruzzese, Bruzzese, Hanlin & Bruzzese, LLC, 100 N. 4th Street, 10 Floor,
                                                                                                      –2–

P.O. Box 1506, Steubenville, Ohio 43952 for Appellees James T. Banal Jr. et al. and
Atty. J. Zachary Zatezalo, Bordas & Bordas, PLLC, 526 Seventh Street, Moundsville,
West Virginia 26041 for Appellees James and Rebecca Mills.

                                    Dated: September 28, 2023

Robb, J.

        {¶1}    These consolidated appeals concern the ownership of oil and gas rights
underlying 1021 acres of real property in Jefferson County. Appellants filed suit seeking
quiet title to the oil and gas rights and named the surface owners of the real property as
defendants.
        {¶2}    The trial court ultimately granted Appellees, the surface owners, summary
judgment as a matter of law and found Appellants’ interests in the underlying oil and gas
rights, if any, were extinguished via the Marketable Title Act (MTA). It quieted title in
Appellees’ favor and determined Appellees own 100% of the oil and gas mineral interest
underlying the property. The trial court did not address the parties’ claims and arguments
arising from the Dormant Mineral Act (DMA). (July 26, 2022 Order.)
        {¶3}    For the following reasons, the trial court’s decision is reversed in part,
affirmed in part, and the case remanded for further proceedings.
                                           Statement of the Case
        {¶4}    Appellants, Susan Kocher et al., consist of 81 individuals and one company,
Bedway Land and Minerals Co. (Bedway), who are alleged heirs, successors, assigns,
and holders of the mineral interests underlying six parcels of real property. Appellants
filed suit in February of 2020. They filed their first amended complaint in November of
2020 and their second amended complaint on February 1, 2021.
        {¶5}    Appellants’ second amended complaint named as defendants, Ascent
Resources-Utica, LLC (Ascent), James M. and Rebecca L. Mills (the Mills defendants),
Heather C. Mazey, Trustee of the Fashing Family Irrevocable Trust, James T. and Maria
S. Banal, L.D. Jenkins, Mary L. Gorman, and Norman T. Fashing and Joyce K. Fashing,

1 The exact acreage of the real property is referred to in title transactions and throughout the trial court

proceedings as 102.167 in some pleadings and judgments and in others as 102.46. The discrepancy is
evidently a result of modernized survey technology. Regardless, it is not an issue on appeal.

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                         –3–

as Co-Trustees of the Norman T. Fashing and Joyce K. Fashing Family Trust (collectively
the Fashing defendants). Appellants claim Ascent, L.D. Jenkins, and Mary L. Gorman
may claim to have an interest in this lawsuit. Appellants contend the other named
defendants are surface owners of the six parcels at issue and they wrongfully leased the
attendant mineral rights underlying their respective real properties. (February 1, 2021
Second Amended Complaint.)
       {¶6}   Appellees moved to dismiss certain claims, contending each was a remedy
and not a cause of action. The trial court agreed and dismissed four counts of Appellants’
complaint. Appellants do not challenge this decision on appeal. The remaining counts
after the motion to dismiss include the following.
       {¶7}   The first count in Appellants’ second amended complaint sought declaratory
judgment and a determination that Appellants are the owners of the mineral interests
underlying the property. Appellants’ second count seeks to quiet title the ownership of
the property’s mineral interests in their favor as owners or holders. Appellants’ third count
asserts an unjust enrichment claim. (February 1, 2021 Second Amended Complaint.)
       {¶8}   In their prayer for relief, Appellants sought declaratory judgment finding
defendants failed to comply with the Dormant Mineral Act; an order quieting title in their
favor to the mineral rights; and an order for an accounting of and imposition of a
constructive trust for all funds received from the minerals, including royalties, and any
other relief deemed necessary. (February 1, 2021 Second Amended Complaint.)
       {¶9}   The Mills defendants, surface owners of one of the parcels, counterclaimed
to quiet title in their favor regarding the respective mineral rights. In January of 2013, the
Mills filed an affidavit of abandonment, contending as surface owners that the prior
reservations of mineral rights regarding their real property had been abandoned.
(February 1, 2021 Second Amended Complaint, Exhibit E.)
       {¶10} The Fashing defendants likewise counterclaimed and sought declaratory
judgment and to quiet title in their favor.    (July 2, 2020 Second Amended Answer &
Counterclaim.) In December of 2013, the Fashings filed two affidavits of abandonment
and averred the mineral exceptions and reservations regarding their surface estates had
been abandoned. (Second Amended Complaint, Exhibit F & G.)

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                       –4–

       {¶11} After the exchange of discovery, the parties filed competing motions for
summary judgment. The Fashing defendants moved for summary judgment in their favor,
contending in part the 1957 Rembish deed is their root of title and that it does not contain
an oil or gas reservation or exception. They also alleged the Rembish deed did not repeat
a prior reservation or exception. They alleged their predecessor in interest, Bedway,
acquired title to the 102 acres from ten co-owners of the property or co-tenants. The
Fashing defendants alleged that Appellants’ claims to the mineral rights were
extinguished via the MTA in light of their unbroken chain of title in the land for more than
40 years, and because Appellants’ claims stem from transactions before the 40-year
period, these interests were extinguished as a matter of law. As for any alleged savings
events, the Fashing defendants claimed the title transactions were general, not specific,
and thus do not constitute savings events.         Alternatively, they argued Appellants’
interests, if any, were abandoned under the DMA. (June 4, 2021 Summary Judgment
Motion.)
       {¶12} The Mills defendants’ response to summary judgment also claimed the
February 4, 1957 Rembish deed was their root of title and showed they were the record
title owners to the mineral rights. They alleged the Rembish deed met the substantive
aspect of the root of title definition. The Mills defendants argued, because the real
property was jointly owned by nine owners, Wilmetta Belon’s conveyance to Bedway of
a 1/10 interest had the effect of conveying an “undivided share and had the right of
possession of the whole of the surface and mineral rights.” And since the real property
was not physically divided, she, as one co-tenant, had the right to lease oil and gas
mineral production for the entirety of the tract. (July 16, 2021 Response to Summary
Judgment.)
       {¶13} Appellants urged the trial court to find that neither the MTA nor the DMA
applied and their mineral interests were still viable. Regarding the Appellees’ MTA
arguments, Appellants contended the Rembish deed was not a proper root of title for
several reasons. And regarding the DMA, Appellants claimed the surface owners failed
to conduct a diligent search before resorting to notice by publication and that, regardless,
there were timely notices to preserve recorded. (June 4, 2021 Summary Judgment
Motion.)

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                    –5–

      {¶14} The trial court held a hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment
and issued its decision on July 26, 2022. The trial court dismissed Appellants’ unjust
enrichment claim at the hearing. (August 9, 2021 Tr. p. 43.) Appellants do not challenge
the dismissal of this claim on appeal.
      {¶15} The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, the surface
owners, and found pursuant to the MTA, Appellees had unbroken chains of title from the
recording of the Rembish deed to the present and Appellants’ interests were extinguished
by operation of law. (July 26, 2022 Order.)
      {¶16} Appellants, Susan Kocher et al., the individuals and alleged heirs,
successors, and assigns of the properties’ mineral interests, appealed the July 26, 2022
summary judgment decision, and Appellant Bedway separately appealed.                 We
consolidated the appeals in response to their joint request.       Appellants raise five
assignments of error.
                                         Standard of Review
      {¶17} The interpretation of deeds is generally a question of law for a court to
decide. Courts are to employ rules of contract construction to interpret deeds and focus
on a plain reading of the words in the four corners of the document. McGiffin v. Skurich,
2021-Ohio-2741, 176 N.E.3d 833, ¶ 20 (7th Dist.), citing Long Beach Assn., Inc. v. Jones,
82 Ohio St.3d 574, 576, 697 N.E.2d 208 (1998), and LRC Realty, Inc. v. B.E.B. Properties,
160 Ohio St.3d 218, 2020-Ohio-3196, 155 N.E.3d 852, ¶ 17.
      {¶18} We review questions of law and summary judgment decisions de novo and
apply the same test as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment was
proper. Cole v. Am. Industries & Resources Corp., 128 Ohio App.3d 546, 552, 715 N.E.2d
1179 (7th Dist.1998).
      {¶19} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment should be granted when
reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the
nonmoving party. The moving party has the burden of showing no issue exists as to any
material fact. State v. Licsak, 41 Ohio App.2d 165, 324 N.E.2d 589 (1974); Mitseff v.
Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 526 N.E.2d 798, syllabus (1988).
      {¶20} Once the moving party meets his burden, the opposing party may not rely
on the allegations in his pleadings, but must set forth facts showing there is a genuine

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                      –6–

issue and produce evidence on issues that the party has the burden of proving at
trial. Civ.R. 56(E); Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas, 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570 N.E.2d
1095 (1991), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). In
determining a motion for summary judgment, the trial court will construe the evidence
most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party and grant summary judgment where that
party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element
upon which the party bears the burden of production. Celotex, at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
                                          Chain of Title
       {¶21} The parties filed copies of the following documents.
       {¶22} The deed recorded January 14, 1921 reflects the grantors, Mary Kithcart,
Clyde Kithcart, Francis Kithcart, James Kithcart, Georgia Black, and John Black conveyed
to Wm. H. Iler and Irving S. Iler a portion of the real property described in part as “Part
S.W. Quarter Section #15, Twp. 8, Range 3” and “containing 41-4/10 acres, more or less.”
(Report of Rod Swearingen, Exhibit 4.) This left the approximate 102 acres now in
dispute. (Report of Daryl J. Kirtley). A transfer was recorded on June 16, 1924. It shows
the same transaction recorded in the deed, which was recorded in January of 1921 and
conveying “Part S.W. Quarter Sec. #15, Twp. 8, Range 3” and “containing 41-4/10 acres,
more or less.” (Report of Daryl J. Kirtley, Exhibit 10.)
       {¶23} The affidavit for transfer recorded June 12, 1933, shows real estate
inherited by James T. Kithcart’s heirs. His heirs include Georgia Black, Clyde Kithcart,
and James T. Kithcart, and the transaction shows each obtained a 1/3 share of the real
estate described in part as “containing 102 46/100 acres, more or less.” (Exhibit C to
Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Response.)
       {¶24} The deed recorded June 16, 1933, conveys the property from Georgia and
John Black, James and Mary Kithcart, Clyde and Frances Kithcart to ten grantees, i.e.,
Ethel Murphy, Esta Stinard, Wilmetta Bellan, John Hartzell, Gladys Hennebert, Raymond
Hartzell, Lawrence Hartzell, Rowland Hartzell, Mattie Hartzell and Virginia Hartzell, as
heirs of James V. Hartzell, deceased. It conveyed real property in Smith Township,
Jefferson County consisting of “102 46/100 acres, more or less” but excepting the coal
rights previously sold. This 1933 deed does not contain a mineral rights exception. (June
4, 2021 Mills Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit E.) Thus, each of the ten grantees

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                       –7–

obtained a 1/10 joint ownership interest in the surface and in the mineral rights underlying
the property.
       {¶25} The warranty deed recorded October 11, 1955 shows Minnie Iler, a
widower, granting to Bedway Coal Company four different parcels in Smithfield Township,
Jefferson County. One of the four listed parcels is described in part as “containing 41.4
acres more or less.” The conveyance excepted 1.91 acres conveyed by William and
Irving Iler to the Jefferson Coal Company in 1924. (Report of Daryl J. Kirtley, Exhibit 16.)
This transaction shows Bedway acquiring the previously severed 41.4 acres.
       {¶26} Four deeds or title transactions were recorded on February 9, 1957.
       {¶27} The warranty deed dated July 30, 1956 and recorded February 9, 1957
shows Virginia Brake, a widow, granting her interest in the surface and mineral rights to
Raymond V. Hartzell, which gave him a 2/10 ownership interest. (Exhibit G to Exhibit 1
to Plaintiff’s Response to Summary Judgment Motions.)
       {¶28} Bedway acquired its surface interest in the 102 acres via three separate
deeds recorded on February 9, 1957. Two of these three February 1957 deeds contained
a clause reserving the grantors’ respective mineral rights.
       {¶29} One warranty deed recorded February 9, 1957 conveyed “102 46/100
acres, more or less” from grantors, Ethel M. Murphy, unmarried, Esta and Loman Stinard,
John and Martha Hartzell, and Gladys and Frank Hennebert, to the Bedway Coal Co. It
states in part it is: “Also excepting and reserving all minerals except Vein Number Eight
* * * of coal.” (Complaint, Exhibit A.)
       {¶30} By another warranty deed recorded February 9, 1957, Raymond and Louise
Hartzell, Lawrence and Lillian Hartzell, Rowland and Bessie Hartzell, and Mattie Hartzell,
unmarried, conveyed real estate consisting of “102 46/100 acres, more or less” to the
Bedway Coal Co. It states in part it is: “Also excepting and reserving all minerals except
Vein Number Eight * * *.” (Complaint, Exhibit B.)
       {¶31} By an administrator’s or executor’s deed, also recorded February 9, 1957,
Mary Rembish, as executrix for the estate of Wilmetta Belon, aka Bellan, conveyed to the
Bedway Coal Company real estate consisting of “an undivided one-tenth (1/10th) interest
in the following described real estate: * * * containing 102 46/100 acres, more or less.”
This deed does not contain a reservation of mineral rights. (Complaint, Exhibit C.)

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                      –8–

       {¶32} In the year 2000, Bedway sold its surface rights to the property via three
title transactions.
       {¶33} On April 7, 2000, Bedway conveyed 34.72 surface acres to David A. Bailey,
a portion of a 102.46 acre tract. This limited warranty deed states in part: “EXCEPTING
AND RESERVING all coal, oil, gas, mineral rights and mining rights previously conveyed.
Applicable to both tracts.”   (Exhibit L to Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment
Response.)
       {¶34} Bailey subsequently conveyed his real property to James T. Banal, Jr. by
limited warranty deed recorded August 29, 2003. This property is described as consisting
of two tracts “[b]eing a portion of a 102.46 acre tract conveyed to Bedway Coal Company
* * *.” This deed states the conveyance was: “EXCEPTING AND RESERVING all coal,
oil, gas, mineral rights and mining rights previously conveyed. Applicable to both tracts.”
(Exhibit M to Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Response.)
       {¶35} On April 25, 2000, Bedway conveyed 37.489 acres to James and Rebecca
Mills via a joint and survivorship deed. It describes the property as being portions of two
tracts conveyed to Bedway Coal Company. This deed also stated it was: “EXCEPTING
AND RESERVING all coal, oil, gas, mineral rights and mining rights previously conveyed.”
(Exhibit N to Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Response.)
       {¶36} Bedway Coal Company conveyed 67.5 acres to Norman T. and Joyce K.
Fashing via a joint and survivorship deed recorded on July 17, 2000.           Both tracts
conveyed are described as being a portion of a “102.46 acre tract conveyed to Bedway
Coal Company.” This deed states it is: “EXCEPTING AND RESERVING all coal, oil, gas
rights and mining rights previously conveyed.” It also states: “EXCLUDING all coal, oil,
gas and mineral rights previously conveyed.” (Exhibit Q to Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs’ Summary
Judgment Response.)
                                   The Marketable Title Act
       {¶37} We address Appellants’ first, second, fourth, and fifth assigned errors
collectively, which assert:
       “[1.] The trial court erred in granting Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment
       under the MTA. Judgment Entry ¶ 42.”

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                           –9–

       “[2.] The trial court erred by denying Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
       under the MTA. Judgment Entry ¶ 42.”
       “[4.] The trial court erred by denying Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment to
       quiet title to the 102 mineral acres. Judgment Entry at 43.”
       “[5.] The trial court erred by denying Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as
       to damages. Judgment Entry at 43.”
                                 Arguments Regarding Root of Title
       {¶38} Appellants’ first assigned error raises several reasons the trial court
allegedly erred by finding the Rembish deed was a proper root of title for 100% of the
mineral rights underlying the 102 acres.
       {¶39} Appellants’ second assigned error asserts, for these same reasons, the trial
court should have granted summary judgment in their favor under the MTA.                    And
Appellants’ fourth and fifth assignments of error contend the trial court should have
quieted title in their favor and awarded them damages as a result.
       {¶40} The MTA provides a “marketable record title” to an individual who has an
unbroken chain of title of record to any interest in land for at least 40 years to that interest.
R.C. 5301.48. With limited exceptions delineated in R.C. 5301.49, a marketable record
title “operates to extinguish” all interests and claims that existed prior to the effective date
of the root of title, and those preexisting interests are “null and void.” R.C. 5301.47(A);
R.C. 5301.50.
       {¶41} R.C. 5301.49 identifies exceptions from extinguishment, which the Ohio
Supreme Court refers to as “saving events.” Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C.,
149 Ohio St.3d 512, 2016-Ohio-5796, 76 N.E.3d 1089, ¶ 18. The MTA extinguishes
property interests by operation of law after 40 years from the effective date of the root of
title unless a saving event has occurred. Id. And an interest extinguished by operation
of the MTA cannot be revived. R.C. 5301.49(D).
       {¶42} A marketable record title remains subject to an interest predating the
effective date of the root of title when: (1) the preexisting interest is specifically identified
in the muniments which form the record chain of title; (2) the holder of the preexisting
interest has recorded a notice claiming the interest, in accordance with R.C. 5301.51; or
(3) the preexisting interest arises out of a title transaction that was recorded after the

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                        – 10 –

effective date of the root of title. West v. Bode, 7th Dist. No. 18 MO 0017, 2019-Ohio-
4092, 145 N.E.3d 1190, ¶ 23, aff'd, 162 Ohio St.3d 293, 2020-Ohio-5473, 165 N.E.3d
298.    These exceptions or savings events shield the excepted interests from
extinguishment. O'Kelley v. Rothenbuhler, 2021-Ohio-1167, 171 N.E.3d 775, ¶ 24-26
(7th Dist.), appeal not allowed, 165 Ohio St.3d 1456, 2021-Ohio-4033, 176 N.E.3d 758.
       {¶43} Here, the trial court decided marketability from the date of Appellants’
original complaint, February 25, 2020. It then found the first recorded deed in the chain
of title more than forty years prior to that date was the 1957 Administrator’s Deed of Mary
Rembish, recorded at deed volume 342, Page 567, and recorded on February 9, 1957.
The court noted there were two older deeds, i.e., the December 27, 1956 Hartzell deed
and the December 28, 1956 Murphy deed. (July 26, 2022 Order.)
       {¶44} The trial court noted the parties agreed the Rembish deed met the temporal
requirement to be the root of title. Regarding the substantive aspect of root of title, the
court found it was satisfied as well, explaining:
       22. The Rembish deed conveyed the interest of Wilmetta Belon to Bedway
       Coal. Ms. Belon was a joint tenant in common to the original 102.46 acre
       surface and mineral interests. Ms. Belon acquired that interest jointly with
       9 other individuals on June 6, 1933. As a joint tenant in common, Ms. Belon
       owned an undivided share and had the right of possession of the whole of
       the surface and mineral rights of the original 102.46 acre tract.
       23. The other individuals, who were co-tenants with Ms. Belon, had
       previously conveyed their interests in the surface of the 102.46 acre tract to
       Bedway Coal in the previously executed and recorded Hartzell and Murphy
       deeds. The Hartzell and Murphy deeds purported to except and reserve
       the oil and gas mineral interests owned by the respective grantors in those
       deeds from conveyances to Bedway Coal.
       24. The Rembish deed conveyed the Belon interest in the surface of the
       102.46 acre tract. It is important to note that the Rembish deed, while an
       Administrator’s or Executor’s Deed, was not a judicial or partition deed and
       the deed did not physically separate, divide, or describe any new 1/10th
       size share of the property. The original 102.46 acres remained intact.

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                           – 11 –

      25. The Rembish deed made absolutely no mention of any oil and gas
      mineral interests and made no attempt to reserve any such interest.
      26. As a joint tenant in the tract, Ms. Belon had a right to full occupation and
      possession of the whole mineral interest.
      27. Importantly, on the record at the August 9, 2021 hearing, Plaintiff
      Bedway Coal’s counsel conceded, and even argued in support of the
      principle that an undivided ownership share of a mineral interest, such as
      Ms. Belon’s provides that owner with a right of ownership as to the mineral
      interest as a whole.
      ***
      29. The Belon interest was conveyed to Bedway Coal and subsequently
      conveyed onto the Defendants.
      30. The Plaintiffs have asserted that the language in various deeds from
      Bedway Coal to the Defendants and/or their predecessors in interest
      included clear and unambiguous new reservations of mineral rights by
      Bedway.
      ***
      33. Bedway’s argument that the Belon interest was ‘previously conveyed’
      to it and that interest is therefore excepted and/or reserved from the Bedway
      Coal transactions to the Defendants and/or their predecessors in title fails.
      ***
      35. The “EXCEPTING AND RESERVING all coal, oil, gas, mineral rights
      previously conveyed” language asserted by Bedway as a claim to
      ownership of the Belon interest does not clearly except or reserve any oil
      and gas minerals actually owned by Bedway Coal from the subject
      transactions. Whatever interest Bedway had to the Belon interest was
      conveyed to the Defendants and/or their predecessors in interest.
      36. * * * the Rembish deed substantively accounts for the oil and gas
      mineral interests which are at issue in this case; that is, the oil and gas rights
      underlying the subject real estate as Wilmetta Belon owned an interest in

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                           – 12 –

      and fully possessed the entirety of those oil and gas mineral interests as a
      cotenant with her family members.
      37. Each of the Defendants hold an unbroken chain of title as it relates to
      the Belon interest from the recording of the Rembish deed to the present.
(July 26, 2022 Order.)
      {¶45} The court quieted title in favor of Appellees/Defendants as to the mineral
interests underlying their properties pursuant to the MTA. The court did not address the
merits of the parties’ DMA arguments. (July 26, 2022 Order.)
      {¶46} Appellants claim the trial court erred as a matter of law by finding the
February 9, 1957 Rembish deed is a proper root of title for 100% of the mineral rights
underlying the property. For the following reasons, we agree.
      “Root of title” means that conveyance or other title transaction in the chain
      of title of a person, purporting to create the interest claimed by such person,
      upon which he relies as a basis for the marketability of his title, and which
      was the most recent to be recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time
      when marketability is being determined. The effective date of the “root of
      title” is the date on which it is recorded.
R.C. 5301.47(E).
      {¶47} This court has explained that a root of title consists of two distinct
components, a substantive requirement and a temporal one:
      The temporal element for a “root of title” is a title transaction that is at least
      40 years preceding the date when marketability is being determined. Once
      that title transaction is found, it must be determined whether that title
      transaction meets the second element. This substantive element requires
      the title transaction to purport “to create the interest claimed by such person,
      upon which he relies as a basis for the marketability of his title.” R.C.
      5301.47(E). A “root of title” cannot be the initial severance deed of the
      interest the person is seeking to have extinguished. This is because record
      marketable title extinguishes interests and claims existing prior to the
      effective date of the root of title, not when the interest and claims were
      created in the “root of title.” R.C. 5301.47(A).

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                      – 13 –

Senterra Ltd. v. Winland, 7th Dist. No. 18 BE 0051, 2019-Ohio-4387, 148 N.E.3d 34, at ¶
53 (7th Dist.).
       {¶48} The date of marketability here is February 25, 2020, the date of Appellants’
initial complaint. Appellees alleged, and the trial court agreed, the root of title was the
February 9, 1957 Administrator’s Deed conveying the property from Mary Rembish to
Bedway Coal Company. There is more than 63 years between the alleged root of title
and the date of marketability, so there is no dispute the temporal element is satisfied.
       {¶49} A proper root of title must “account for the interest the person is claiming to
have record marketable title to.” Senterra, Ltd. v. Winland, 169 Ohio St.3d 595, 2022-
Ohio-2521, 207 N.E.3d 632. A plain reading of the Rembish deed shows it only conveyed
1/10 of an interest in the described property.       Thus, the logical conclusion, when
addressing the substantive aspect of root of title, is that the Rembish deed only “accounts
for” 1/10 an interest—not the 100% as claimed by Appellees. Id. This conclusion is
consistent with our obligation to interpret deeds with a focus on the plain language
employed in the document. See McGiffin v. Skurich, 2021-Ohio-2741, 176 N.E.3d 833,
¶ 20 (7th Dist.).
       {¶50} Furthermore, “[a] person can only convey what he or she owns.” Sharp v.
Miller, 7th Dist. No. 17 JE 0022, 2018-Ohio-4740, 114 N.E.3d 1285, ¶ 28. A plain reading
of the Rembish deed shows Wilmetta Belon, conveyed to the Bedway Coal Company real
estate consisting of “an undivided one-tenth (1/10th) interest in: * * * 102 46/100 acres,
more or less.” (Complaint, Exhibit C.) Consequently, the Bedway Coal Company could
only convey this same 1/10 interest to Appellees. See Senterra Ltd. v. Winland, 7th Dist.
No. 18 BE 0051, 2019-Ohio-4387, 148 N.E.3d 34, ¶ 68 (explaining a deed containing a
1/4 mineral reservation only purports to convey the remaining 3/4 interest in the oil and
gas). A reading to the contrary defies logic and reason.
       {¶51} The trial court appears to have erroneously applied other aspects of the law
to reach the contrary conclusion. It cites the proposition that one co-tenant enjoys the
right to use the whole of the land to support its decision that a co-tenant has the power to
convey the whole property. Neither the parties nor the trial court identify legal authority
for the proposition and conclusion that the right to occupy the whole parcel, i.e., the unity
of possession, authorizes one co-tenant to sell or convey the property in its entirety. The

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                      – 14 –

opposite is true. See Black Stone Minerals Co., L.P. v. Brokaw, 2017 ND 110, 893
N.W.2d 498, ¶ 9-10 (finding husband who owned property in fee simple absolute jointly
with his wife was only capable of conveying his equal one-half interest).
       {¶52} “A tenancy in common merely means two or more people hold an interest
undivided without entitlement to an exclusive part but with entitlement to occupy the whole
in common with the others, and upon death, a co-tenant's interest passes to her heirs and
not to the surviving co-tenants. See generally Webster v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co., 53
Ohio St. 558, 565, 42 N.E. 546 (1895).”        Richmond Mills, Inc. v. Ferraro, 7th Dist.
Jefferson No. 18 JE 0015, 2019-Ohio-5249, ¶ 42; see generally Tomechko v. Garrett, 7th
Dist. No. 20 NO 0473, 2021-Ohio-1377, 172 N.E.3d 1087, ¶ 51, appeal not allowed, 164
Ohio St.3d 1441, 2021-Ohio-3233, 173 N.E.3d 1230 (noting a co-tenants’ possession of
land is consistent with a co-tenants’ right to enter land at any time).
       {¶53} “The central characteristic of a tenancy in common is simply that each
tenant is deemed to own by himself, with most of the attributes of independent ownership,
a physically undivided part of the entire parcel.” TENANCY, Black's Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019), quoting Thomas F. Bergin & Paul G. Haskell, Preface to Estates in Land and
Future Interests 54 (2d ed. 1984). “Because cotenants have distinct titles, ‘one cotenant
cannot convey away the interest of another cotenant.’” Sullinger v. Reed, 3rd Dist. Hardin
No. 6-20-14, 2021-Ohio-2872, ¶ 27, quoting Lewellyn v. Village of South Zanesville, 43
Ohio App. 385, 390, 183 N.E. 306 (5th Dist. 1932). Thus, the trial court erred by holding
a co-tenant’s right to enter and enjoy the entirety of the land is synonymous with the right
to convey it. Id.
       {¶54} Accordingly, we conclude the Rembish deed does not satisfy the
substantive element of the root of title definition because it purports to create less of an
interest than “the interest claimed by” Appellees. This conclusion is based on the plain
language of R.C. 5301.48, the plain language of the root of title definition, and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Senterra, Ltd., supra, at ¶ 15. On its face, the Rembish deed
does not “purport to convey” the interest claimed to be owned by Appellees here.
       {¶55} Furthermore, the trial court emphasizes Appellants’ counsel conceded at
the summary judgment hearing that one co-tenant has the authority to convey the
property as a whole. First, this is not what this attorney was stating. Instead, Appellants’

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                          – 15 –

attorney was explaining how a notice of preservation filed by one mineral interest holder
acts to preserve all holders’ interests. Counsel stated in part:
       when you have heirs who own * * * an undivided interest in those mineral
       rights * * * [i]t’s not as if Farmer Smith gets this little piece of a mineral
       interest. * * * They own it in unified fashion. * * * [And] one holder who files
       a preservation has effectively preserved those interests for all of the other
       owners of the mineral interests, because they all own it together.
(August 9, 2021 Tr. p. 36-37.) More importantly, parties cannot concede or stipulate as
to matters of law, only issues of fact. Crow v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 159 Ohio App.3d
417, 2004-Ohio-7117, 824 N.E.2d 127, citing Diversified Capping Equip., Inc. v. Clinton
Pattern Works Inc., Wood App. No. WD-01-035, 2002 WL 537998 (Apr. 12, 2002).
Consequently, to the extent the trial court relied on counsel’s alleged concession about
an issue of law, it erred.
       {¶56} Moreover, the explicit reservations Appellees allege to have been
extinguished under the MTA were created and recorded on the same date as the Rembish
deed, the alleged root of title. As stated, there were three deeds or title transactions
recorded on February 9, 1957, i.e., the Murphy deed, the Hartzell deed, and the Rembish
deed in Volume 342 of the Jefferson County Recorder’s Office conveying property to
Bedway. The Rembish deed was the latest in time to be filed on this date, but it was
nevertheless filed on the same date.
       {¶57} “Marketable record title” is statutorily defined as “a title of record, as
indicated in section 5301.48 of the Revised Code, which operates to extinguish such
interests and claims, existing prior to the effective date of the root of title, as are stated in
section 5301.50 of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 5301.47.
       {¶58} A plain reading of the definition of marketable record title shows it
extinguishes interests “existing prior to the effective date of the root of title.” It does not
state the MTA extinguishes an interest existing prior to the root of title, as Appellees
impliedly argue, but “prior to the effective date of the root.” Thus, this court concludes the
MTA does not extinguish reservations or exceptions of mineral interests created on the
same date as the alleged root of title, like those in the Murphy and Hartzell deeds here.

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                       – 16 –

       {¶59}   Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred by concluding the Rembish
deed was a proper root of title. Absent a proper root of title, there is no title of record
upon which to rely for the marketability of title, and extinguishment under the MTA does
not occur. R.C. 5301.48.
                Arguments Regarding Bedway’s 1/10 Mineral Right Reservation
       {¶60} The final argument in Appellants’ first assigned error argues the trial court
erred by finding the Bailey, Mills, and Fashing deeds did not create a reservation in favor
of Bedway, corresponding with the 1/10 mineral interest conveyed to Bedway by the
Rembish deed. Thus, Appellants claim Appellees lack an “unbroken chain of title” to the
1/10 interest since the alleged root of title contains an explicit exception and creates a
reservation of the mineral rights in Bedway’s favor. We disagree with this aspect of their
assignment.
       {¶61} Appellants assert each of the deeds conveying the property from Bedway
to Appellees contained language creating a new reservation of oil and gas rights in
Bedway’s favor. The trial court disagreed, and held in paragraphs 29-30, 33, and 35 of
its opinion that the language did not create a new reservation but instead conveyed
“[w]hatever interest Bedway had to the Belon interest * * * to the Defendants and/or their
predecessors in interest.” (July 26, 2022 Order.)
       {¶62} As stated, the Rembish deed conveyed to the Bedway Coal Company real
estate consisting of “an undivided one-tenth (1/10th) interest in the following described
real estate: * * * containing 102 46/100 acres, more or less.” This deed does not contain
a reservation of mineral rights, and thus, it conveyed 1/10 of the surface rights and mineral
rights to Bedway. (Complaint, Exhibit C.)
       {¶63} Thereafter, and pursuant to three transfers in the year 2000, Bedway
conveyed the property to the subsequent owners of the real property, i.e., the Bailey
(Banal), Fashing, and Mills deeds. As detailed in the chain of title section of this opinion,
each of these three deeds contain language stating: “EXCEPTING AND RESERVING
all coal, gas, mineral rights and mining rights previously conveyed.” (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, the deed conveying the property from Bedway to the Fashings also states:
“EXCLUDING all coal, oil, gas and mineral rights previously conveyed.” (Emphasis
added.) (Exhibit Q to Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Response.)

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                         – 17 –

       {¶64} The inclusion of the words “previously conveyed” makes it abundantly clear
the grantor was not creating a new reservation in its favor, but was instead acknowledging
and repeating that previous rights had been excepted. This conclusion is consistent with
a plain reading of the language employed in the deed, and there is no ambiguity in this
regard. Thus, the trial court is affirmed in part on this basis only.
       {¶65} To summarize, we reverse the court’s decision finding Appellants’ interests
have been extinguished by the MTA. We conclude Appellants’ first and second assigned
errors have merit, in part. The trial court erred by finding the Rembish deed was a proper
root of title, but it correctly found the three title transactions recorded in the year 2000 did
not create a reservation of mineral rights in Bedway’s favor.
       {¶66} As for Appellants’ fourth and fifth assignments of error, which contend the
trial court should have quieted title in their favor and awarded them damages, we decline
to reach these issues since we reverse and remand for the trial court to address the merits
of the parties’ arguments under the DMA. Thus, any award of damages and an order
quieting title are premature. See State ex rel. Elyria Foundry Co. v. Indus. Comm., 82
Ohio St.3d 88, 89, 694 N.E.2d 459 (1998) (the ripeness requirement is designed to avoid
premature adjudication of legal issues and conserve judicial resources).
                                     The Dormant Mineral Act
       {¶67} Appellants’ third, fourth, and fifth assigned errors concern the Dormant
Mineral Act and assert:
       “[3.] The trial court erred by denying Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
       under the DMA. Judgment Entry, at 43.
       “[4.] The trial court erred by denying Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment to
       quiet title to the 102 mineral acres. Judgment Entry, at 43.
       “[5.] The trial court erred by denying Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as
       to damages. Judgment Entry, at 43.”
       {¶68} Appellants’ third and fourth assigned errors assert the trial court should
have granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants under the DMA, and their fifth
assignment of error seeks an award of damages flowing from these arguments.
       {¶69} As stated, the trial court did not address the parties’ arguments about the
DMA because the court found Appellants’ mineral rights were extinguished under the

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
                                                                                      – 18 –

MTA. Because the trial court erred in the application of the MTA, the DMA arguments
should be addressed.
       {¶70} This court has consistently held a trial court should have the first opportunity
to review the underlying claims, and as such, we decline to consider the merits of these
assignments of error for the first time on appeal. Fullum v. Columbiana Cnty. Coroner,
2014-Ohio-5512, 25 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 45-46 (7th Dist.), citing Tree of Life Church v.
Agnew, 7th Dist. No. 12 BE 42, 2014-Ohio-878, ¶ 27-28. In light of our reversal on
Appellants’ MTA arguments, we direct the trial court to address the parties’ DMA
arguments on remand.
                                           Conclusion
       {¶71} Based on the foregoing, we reverse the court’s decision finding Appellants’
interests have been extinguished by the MTA. We conclude Appellants’ first and second
assigned errors have merit, in part. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Bedway did not
create a reservation in its favor via the three deeds conveying the property recorded in
the year 2000.
       {¶72} In light of our reversal on Appellants’ MTA arguments, we decline to address
assignments of error three, four, and five. Instead, we direct the trial court to address the
parties’ DMA arguments, whether to quiet title, and damages on remand.
       {¶73} The trial court’s decision is reversed in part, affirmed in part, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Waite, J., concurs.

D’Apolito, P.J., concurs.

Case Nos. 22 JE 0012, 22 JE 0014
[Cite as Kocher v. Ascent Resources-Utica, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-3592.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are sustained and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County, Ohio, is reversed in part and affirmed in
part. We hereby remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings according to
law and consistent with this Court’s Opinion. Costs to be taxed against the Appellees.
        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.