Court Opinion

ID: 9366734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 19:03:28.013181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:54.800596
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                          2023 IL App (3d) 210352-U

                                 Order filed January 27, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                     IN THE

                                     APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                               THIRD DISTRICT

                                                      2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                         )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                          )       of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
                                                         )       Peoria County, Illinois,
              Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                         )       Appeal No. 3-21-0352
              v.                                         )       Circuit No. 07-CF-111
                                                         )
      JACKIE LEE WILLIAMS,                               )       Honorable
                                                         )       Katherine S. Gorman,
              Defendant-Appellant.                       )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justice Davenport concurred in the judgment.
            Justice McDade dissented.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   ORDER

¶1          Held: The court did not err by summarily dismissing defendant’s postconviction
                  petition.

¶2          Defendant, Jackie Lee Williams, appeals the first-stage dismissal of his postconviction

     petition. He argues that the Peoria County circuit court erred by dismissing the petition because

     he stated the gist of a claim that his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the

     Illinois Constitution. We affirm.
¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4          A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2006))

     and attempted armed robbery (id. § 8-4, 18-2(a)(2)). It also found that the State failed to prove

     that defendant was armed with or personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused the

     death of another person. Defendant’s sentencing range was between 20 and 60 years’

     imprisonment. The presentence investigation report, which the court considered in making its

     ruling, indicated that defendant was 21 years old at the time of the offense. The court sentenced

     defendant to 50 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, arguing that there were several

     evidentiary errors, the evidence was insufficient, and his sentence was unconstitutional.

     Regarding his sentence, defendant argued that the court should have considered scientific

     developments regarding the development of the young adult brain prior to imposing his sentence.

     This court affirmed and determined that the record was not sufficiently developed to address

     defendant’s constitutional challenge to his sentence. People v. Williams, 2020 IL App (3d)

     170124-U, ¶¶ 87, 89.

¶5          Defendant filed, as a self-represented litigant, a postconviction petition. As relevant here,

     he argued that his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution

     as applied to him because the court did not consider the current factors in juvenile sentencing. He

     argued that scientific research has shown that the brain does not finish developing until the mid-

     twenties, young adults are similar to adolescents, and that an individual’s upbringing can

     contribute to his maturity and brain development. Defendant argued that he was found guilty

     under an accountability theory, his prior armed robbery was committed as a juvenile, he was

     raised by his grandmother as his parents were in and out of prison, he “was born with cocaine

     abuse” in prison, he attended learning and behavior disability classes at school, he had a ninth

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     grade education, he was incarcerated at the age of 17, and, at 21 years old—his age when he

     committed the instant offenses—he had the mental age of a 15- or 16-year-old. Defendant further

     argued that his 50-year sentence is a de facto life sentence. The court dismissed the petition as

     frivolous and patently without merit. Defendant appeals.

¶6                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶7          Defendant argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing his postconviction petition as

     frivolous and patently without merit. He argues that the supreme court has not foreclosed the

     possibility that a de facto life sentence may violate the proportionate penalties clause as applied

     to an offender over the age of 18. He further argues that the supreme court did not establish a

     maximum age at which the claims would be cognizable and the court in People v. Savage, 2020

     IL App (1st) 173135, ¶¶ 63, 67, 76, held that the defendant’s petition was not frivolous and

     patently without merit when the defendant, who was 21 years old at the time of the murder,

     raised an as-applied proportionate penalties challenge to a de facto life sentence. He argues that

     unless the supreme court holds otherwise, it cannot be said that his legal theory is indisputably

     meritless. Defendant also argues that there is a factual basis for his claim.

¶8          The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) provides a

     process for a criminal defendant to assert that his conviction resulted from a substantial denial of

     his rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or both. People v.

     Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009). Defendant need only state the “gist” of a constitutional claim at

     the first stage. Id. The petition may be summarily dismissed at the first stage of proceedings if it

     is frivolous or patently without merit, such that it “has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

     Id. at 16. “A petition which lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact is one which is based

     on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” Id.

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¶9          As stated in People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶ 33, defendant “can point

     to no case in which an Illinois court has recognized that a life sentence imposed on a young

     adult—21 or older as [defendant] was—is unconstitutional as applied to that offender under the

     proportionate penalties clause or the eighth amendment.” The Humphrey opinion went on to

     explain that

                    “While 21 is undoubtedly somewhat arbitrary, drawing a line there is in keeping

                    with other aspects of criminal law and society’s current general recognition that

                    21 is considered the beginning of adulthood. In Illinois, a person under the age of

                    21 when he or she commits first degree murder is now eligible for parole review

                    after serving 20 or more years of his or her sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West

                    Supp. 2019). The Illinois legislature has also prohibited the sale of nicotine and

                    tobacco products to persons under 21 (720 ILCS 675/1 (West Supp. 2019)),

                    prohibited the sale of alcohol products to persons under 21 (235 ILCS 5/6-16

                    (West 2016)); and made possession of a firearm by those under the age of 21 an

                    aggravating factor for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-

                    1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I) (West 2016)).” Id. ¶ 34.

     Nearly all opinions are in agreement with Humphrey that the young adult sentencing claims are

     limited to those under 21 years of age.

                           “Humphrey is consistent on this issue with nearly every other case from

                    our appellate court. See People v. Kruger, 2021 IL App (4th) 190687, ¶ 32 (‘We

                    agree with the Humphrey court limiting Miller-based claims to those young adults

                    aged 18 to 20.’); People v. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶ 42 (‘[D]efendant

                    was 21 years old at the time of the offense, and therefore was an adult for

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                      purposes of a Miller claim.’); People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶ 35

                      (noting that the defendant could not ‘point to any line, societal, legal, or

                      penological, that is older than 21 years’); People v. Glinsey, 2021 IL App (1st)

                      191145, ¶ 46 (noting that ‘our state’s statutes and caselaw treat young adults

                      under 21 years of age differently than adults’); People v. Rivera, 2020 IL App

                      (1st) 171430, ¶ 27 (recognizing that Miller protections ‘have been arguably

                      extended in some cases and statutes to under-21-year-olds,’ but that any further

                      extension ‘should be made by our legislature or our highest court’); People v.

                      Williams, 2021 IL App (1st) 190535, ¶ 35 (rejecting a 22-year-old defendant’s

                      proportionate penalties claim because it could not be said that ‘the legislature’s

                      decision to define adulthood as being 21 years old or older shocks the moral sense

                      of the community’).” People v. Montanez, 2022 IL App (1st) 191930, ¶ 56.

       See also People v. Guerrero, 2022 IL App (1st) 210400, ¶ 29 (“This court, in cases decided after

       Savage, has drawn a line for ‘young adult offenders’ ending at 21 years of age.”); People v.

       Everett, 2022 IL App (1st) 201169, ¶ 40 (“While our legislature has acknowledged the greater

       capacity for rehabilitation in young adults, and recent statutory enactments reflect the significant

       weight given to this factor, a clear line is drawn at 21 years of age.”).

¶ 10          In line with this precedent, we conclude that because defendant was 21 years of age at the

       time of the offense, he was an adult, and his proportionate penalties claim has no basis in law. As

       other courts have indicated, there is no legal, societal, or penological support for extending the

       juvenile protections to young adults 21 years of age or older. See Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d)

       170632, ¶ 35 (“[S]ociety has drawn lines at ages 18 and 21 for various purposes. Defendant

       cannot point to any line, societal, legal, or penological, that is older than 21 years.”). Therefore,

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       the court did not err in summarily dismissing defendant’s postconviction petition at the first

       stage.

¶ 11            Defendant cites to Savage as support for his claim, but Savage did not conclude that an

       offender who was 21 years of age or older stated a valid proportionate penalties claim, rather it

       determined that the claim was not frivolous. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135, ¶ 76. We

       disagree with the determination that such a claim is not frivolous. As we are not bound to follow

       that decision, (see People v. McKee, 2017 IL App (3d) 140881, ¶ 33), we decline to do so and

       instead, we follow the abundance of authority cited above (supra ¶ 9) recognizing that juvenile

       sentencing protections do not apply to those who are 21 years or older at the time they commit an

       offense.

¶ 12                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 13            The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 14            Affirmed.

¶ 15            JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting:

¶ 16            The majority reaches its holding on the basis that a bright-line age limit of 21 years

       applies to young adult, Miller-based, as-applied proportionate penalties sentencing challenges.

       Because I believe there is no persuasive rationale underlying the bright-line age limit, I

       respectfully dissent.

¶ 17            Sentencing decisions are generally based, at least in part, on the individual characteristics

       and background of a defendant and the nature and circumstances of the crime. See, e.g., 730

       ILCS 5/5-4-1(a) (West 2016) (providing that during the sentencing hearing, the court shall

       consider the evidence at trial, the presentence report and evidence in mitigation and aggravation);

       id. § 5-3-2(a) (requiring a presentence report to include various information about defendant,

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       including his criminal/delinquency history, mental history, family situation and background,

       education, as well as information concerning the effect on the victim, available resources to help

       with defendant’s rehabilitation, and defendant’s status since his arrest). The focus on the

       individual characteristics of a defendant and his potential rehabilitative potential is heightened

       when a defendant makes an as-applied proportionate penalties (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11)

       challenge to his sentence because such challenges “are dependent on the specific facts and

       circumstances of the challenging party.” People v. House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶ 27. Therefore, an

       as-applied proportionate penalties challenge depends on a review of and inquiry into the personal

       mental, psychological, cultural, and educational history of defendant as it bears on his

       rehabilitative potential. In this regard, the inquiry is inherently sui generis or unique to each

       individual defendant and, thus, ill-suited for a bright-line age cut-off. As the sui generis nature of

       the analysis has long been implicit in the proportionate penalties clause of our constitution, it

       should inform the way we approach these cases and lead to a conclusion that a bright-line age

       limit is not appropriate.

¶ 18          Further, while no one could dispute that a strict age cut-off would make our jobs easier,

       there is no principled argument that such an arbitrary boundary is consistent with the ever-

       evolving scientific knowledge on young adult brain development. Recognized and reputable

       science has shown that the various relevant factors noted above impact each person in an

       individualized manner both up to and beyond the age of 21. Therefore, the determination of

       whether individual traits indicate a defendant’s sentence should be adjusted based upon

       rehabilitative potential demands a case-by-case analysis based on evidence and present scientific

       research rather than an arbitrary bright-line age limit. To advance that theory is certainly not

       frivolous.

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¶ 19           Additionally, if we accept the factual allegations of defendant’s petition as true, as we

       must (see People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶ 25), it is clear he has stated a cognizable and

       tenable factual basis for relief. Specifically, his petition alleged that due to his mental deficits

       and certain circumstances of his upbringing, which he detailed, he was functioning at the mental

       level of a 15- or 16-year-old at the time of the offense. Surely his allegations in this regard are

       sufficient to state an arguable claim under the low threshold applicable to first-stage petitions.

       Thus, I would find that because defendant’s claim has an arguable basis in law and fact, it cannot

       be frivolous. I would reverse and remand for second-stage proceedings and I respectfully dissent

       from the majority’s contrary decision.

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