Court Opinion

ID: 9733882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:19:43.052617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:44.279462
License: Public Domain

PIERCE, P. J.
— I concur in both opinions and agree with all of the views expressed by each of my colleagues. Irresistible, however, is the desire to add my own bit of composition.
I agree that civil commitment under the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code (§ 5000 et seq.) falls short of *461the community’s needs. I believe that inadequacy in the “commitment” provisions (§§ 5000-5607) is less grossly apparent than elsewhere As I read them, these sections permit commitment and provide for safekeeping of dangerously mentally ill persons rather adequately, at the same time protecting the constitutional rights of the assertedly mentally ill. (No doubt legislative implementation of the provisions for the safekeeping and treatment of the criminally mentally ill is needed.)
It is in the provisions relating to the discharge of such persons that the existing law is woefully inadequate. Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6728 the superintendent of a state hospital may discharge any patient who, in his judgment, has recovered. Under section 6730 the superintendent may also discharge any unrecovered patient whose discharge “in the judgment of the superintendent, will not be detrimental to the public welfare.” (Italics added.) This, in my judgment, in the ease of a mentally ill person who has once demonstrated that he is dangerous to society by an act of violence, is too broad a power to be vested in any one administrative officer, however conscientious and skilled he may be.
The inadequacy of the present law, however, should not, as I view it, stay the hands of the district attorney, unable to prove insanity under the M’Naughton rule, and unable to establish guilt in a criminal trial (under rules and constitutional guaranties wisely designed for the protection of sane accused) from seeking commitment of persons known to be dangerously mentally ill. Imperfect as they may be, the existing civil commitment laws, enacted to protect society against dangerously mentally ill persons, should be used; in fact, as I see it, it is the duty of public peace officers to use them. Section 5047 provides such officers “may” petition the court for the commitment of such persons. I would interpret the “may” — when applied to any public officer having knowledge that an apparently dangerous mentally ill person is at large — as meaning “shall.”
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 25, 1965. Mosk, J., did not participate therein. Schauer, J.,* was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.