Court Opinion

ID: 2964836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:52.861583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:13.332242
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
       No. 96-1997
                          RUBEN O. GIERBOLINI-ROSA, ET AL.,
                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,
                                         v.
                            BANCO POPULAR DE PUERTO RICO,
                                Defendant, Appellee.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
                   [Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                          Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, 
                            and Lagueux, District Judge.
                                ____________________
            Benny Frankie Cerezo for appellants.
            Jay 
                A. 
                   Garcia-Gregory, with whom   Ricardo 
                                                       L. 
                                                          Ortiz and  Fiddler,
       Gonzalez & Rodriguez were on brief for appellee. 
                                ____________________
                                   August 18, 1997
                                ____________________
                           
       Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.

                      CAMPBELL, 
                               Senior Circuit Judge
                                                   . This civil action is
            a related, non-core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. S 1334(b).
            Plaintiffs-appellants Ruben O. Gierbolini-Rosa, Carmen Nidia
            Gierbolini-Marrero, and their four children, Ruben Oscar
            Gierbolini-Gierbolini, Carlos Ruben Gierbolini-Gierbolini,
            Ricardo Jose Gierbolini-Gierbolini, and Nirin Mirnel
            Gierbolini-Gierbolini, (collectively referred to as the
            "Gierbolinis" or the "appellants") brought suit against Banco
            Popular de Puerto Rico ("BPPR") under Puerto Rico's General
            Tort Statute, Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, see
            31 L.P.R.A. S 5141 (1991),  for damages allegedly caused by
            defamatory statements made to the Puerto Rico Treasury
            Department and the United States Bankruptcy Court. A year
            later, BPPR filed its "Motion Requesting Entry of Summary
            Judgment Dismissing the Complaint." The United States District
            Court for the District of Puerto Rico issued an Opinion and
            Order, published as 
                               Gierbolini Rosa
                                               v. Banco Popular de Puerto
                                
            1.   Section 1334(b) provides as follows:
                 "(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers
            exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the
            district courts, the district courts shall have original but
            not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising
            under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title
            11."
            28 U.S.C. S 1334(b) (West 1993). 
            2.   Section 5141 states, in relevant part, as follows:
                 "A person who by an act or omission causes damage to
            another through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair
             the damage so done."
            31 L.P.R.A. S 5141 (1991). 
                                         -2-
                                          2

            Rico, 930 F. Supp. 712 (D.P.R. 1996), and separate judgment on
            June 28, 1996, dismissing the complaint. The court later
            entered an amended judgment in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P.
            54(b), stating that there was no just reason for further delay
            and that it was in the interest of justice that the judgment
            entered on June 28, 1996, be treated as a final judgment for
            purposes of appeal.
                      "We review the district court's grant of summary
            judgment de novo, and will uphold that determination if the
            record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
            party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
            fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
            matter of law."  Daniels-Recio v. Hospital del Maestro, Inc.,
            109 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (internal
            quotation marks omitted). Having carefully considered the
            arguments, the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of
            the district court for substantially the same reasons set out
            in its Opinion and Order, adding the following.
                      1. Appellants argue that the district court erred in
            applying the common law privilege codified in Section 4 of the
            Libel and Slander Act of 1902, 
                                          see 32 L.P.R.A. S 3144 (1968),
                                
            3.   Section 4 of the Libel and Slander Act of 1902 provides as
            follows:
                 "A publication or communication shall not be held or
            deemed malicious when made in any legislative or judicial
            proceeding or in any other proceeding authorized by law. A
            publication or communication shall not be presumed to be
            malicious when made:
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                                          3

            to their defamation action brought under the provisions of
            Puerto Rico's General Tort Statute, Article 1802 of the Puerto
            Rico Civil Code, see note 2, supra.
                      For this contention, appellants rely mainly upon
            Romany v. 
                     El Mundo, Inc.
                                   , 89 P.R.R. 592 (1963), and 
                                                              Ojeda Ojeda
            v. 
              El Vocero, Inc.
                             , 94 J.T.S. 131 (1994). However, these cases
            do not hold that an action for defamation brought under Article
            1802 may not be subject to essentially the same privilege
            codified in the Libel and Slander Act of 1902. Rather, they
            merely indicate that a libel and slander action brought
            pursuant to the Libel and Slander Act of 1902 and a defamation
            action brought under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code
            are separate and independent causes of action with distinct
            elements.
                      Citing the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's opinion in
            Rodriguez v. 
                        El Vocero, Inc.
                                       , 94 J.T.S. 13 (1994), the district
            court construed Puerto Rico law as maintaining that, "though
            [the action] arises under Section [sic] 1802 of the Civil Code,
            defendant may claim the traditional defense of privilege as it
            might under the Libel and Slander Act of 1902", that being a
                                
                 First. In the proper discharge of an official duty.
                 Second. In a fair and true report of a judicial,
            legislative, official or other proceeding, or of anything said
            in the course thereof.
                 Third. To a Commonwealth official upon probable cause
            with the intention of serving the public interest or of
            securing the redress of a private wrong."
            32 L.P.R.A. S 3144 (1968).
                                         -4-
                                          4

            "traditional defense[] that ha[s] always been available."
            Gierbolini  
                       Rosa, 930 F. Supp. at 717. We agree with the
            court's interpretation, which is supported in two other
            decisions of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, namely, 
                                                                 Porto v.
            Bentley 
                    Puerto 
                           Rico, 
                                 Inc., 92 J.T.S. 175 (1992), and  Jimenez
            Alvarez v. Silen Maldonado, 92 J.T.S. 95 (1992).
                      In Porto, a former employee, Ivan Porto, and his
            wife, personally and on behalf of the conjugal partnership and
            their minor children, sued the company, claiming damages for
            "allegedly false, slanderous and libelous accusations" made
            against him at the time of his discharge.  Porto, P.R. Offic.
            Trans. (majority opinion) at 2-3. He alleged that, in a letter
            of discharge, he was falsely accused of having unlawfully
            appropriated the official company vehicle.     Id. (majority
            opinion) at 3. Porto's action rested upon Article 1802 of the
            Puerto Rico Civil Code, as both parties to the suit were
            "private persons."  Id. (majority opinion) at 6; see also id.
            (concurring opinion) at 1. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
            explained: "[i]n our jurisdiction the liability rule based on
            negligence [governs] all libel tort suits brought by private
            persons." Id. (majority opinion) at 8 (citations omitted); 
                                                                      see
            also id. (concurring opinion) at 2. Nevertheless, the   Porto
            Court made reference to the common law privileges codified in
            Sections 4 and 5 of the Libel and Slander Act of 1902, and
            applied "the qualified privilege for promoting the free flow of
                                         -5-
                                          5

            communication between employer and employee" to defeat the
            cause of action for defamation. Id. (majority opinion) at 16-
            21; see also 32 L.P.R.A. S 3145 (1968).
                      Even more in point is the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's
            decision in  Jimenez  
                                 Alvarez, where one of the defendants,
            Baldomero Roig Velez, appealed from a partial judgment that
            dismissed his counterclaim for damages allegedly caused by
            certain defamatory, false and libelous allegations negligently
            made in the plaintiff's verified complaint.  Jimenez Alvarez,
            P.R. Offic. Trans. at 1. Writing for the Supreme Court of
            Puerto Rico, Justice Naveira de Rodon framed the issue
            presented for review as one of defamation, identifying the
            three sources of a defamation claim in Puerto Rico: (1) the
            Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
                                                            (2) the Libel
            and Slander Act of 1902, and (3) Article 1802 of the Puerto
            Rico Civil Code. Id. at 3-4. Nonetheless, Justice Naveira de
                                
            4.   Section 5 of the Libel and Slander Act of 1902 states as
            follows:
                      "Malice shall be presumed to exist in any injurious
            communication or writing made without justifiable motive and
            addressed to any person other than to a relative within the
            third degree, or to a person whom the author has under his
            guardianship or 
                           when said communication passes between persons
            having business in partnership, or other similar association
                                                                       ."
            32 L.P.R.A. S 3145 (1968) (emphasis added).
            5.   Article II, Section 8 of the Constitution of the
            Commonwealth of Puerto Rico provides as follows:
                 "Every person has the right to the protection of law
            against abusive attacks on his honor, reputation and private or
            family life."
            P.R. Const. art. II, S 8.
                                         -6-
                                          6

            Rodon noted that the common-law privilege generally applicable
            to judicial proceedings "covers anything that may be said with
            regard to the controversy, whether it be in the pleadings, in
            affidavits, or in open court."   Id. at 4 (citation omitted)
            (emphasis added). In Puerto Rico, Justice Naveira de Rodon
            continued, Section 4 of the Libel and Slander Act of 1902
            recognizes a similar kind of privilege, and, for purposes of
            that privilege, a complaint shall be deemed to be "'[a]
            publication or communication . . . made in [a] . . . judicial
            proceeding.'"  Id. at 5; see also 32 L.P.R.A. S 3144 (1968).
            The court concluded that the common law privilege codified in
            Section 4 of the Libel and Slander Act of 1902, regarding
            communications in a legislative, judicial or any other
            proceeding authorized by law, barred the tort action for
            defamation raised in Roig Velez's counterclaim.  Id. at 5, 7.
                      We, therefore, agree with the district court that the
            privilege applies in the instant case to immunize BPPR's
            conduct in filing the informative return before the Puerto Rico
            Treasury Department and the proof of claim before the United
            States Bankruptcy Court. The informative return, which BPPR,
            as payor, had a legal obligation to file with the Puerto Rico
            Treasury Department, qualifies as "[a] publication or
            communication . . . made . . . in [a] . . . proceeding
            authorized by law." 32 L.P.R.A. S 3144 (1968);      see  also
            Gierbolini 
                       Rosa, 930 F. Supp. at 715-16. The proof of claim
                                         -7-
                                          7

            is, as the district court pointed out, in the nature of an
            ordinary civil pleading, and thus forms part of a "judicial
            proceeding." 32 L.P.R.A. S 3144 (1968);  see also  Gierbolini
            Rosa, 930 F. Supp. at 716. More specifically, the informative
            return and the proof of claim fall, as the district court
            found, within the scope of Section 4's first and third
            provisos, respectively.    See 32 L.P.R.A. S 3144 (1968);
            Gierbolini 
                       Rosa, 930 F. Supp. at 718. We need not decide
            whether the privilege is an absolute or a qualified privilege
            because, even if it is only qualified, there is no evidence of
            malice or bad faith on the part of BPPR that would defeat the
            claim of privilege in this case.  See Gierbolini Rosa, 930 F.
            Supp. at 718.
                      2. Appellants assert that the district court erred in
            finding that they had offered insufficient evidence to
            establish a causal nexus between the alleged defamatory conduct
            and the claimed mental and moral suffering. The appellants
            further insist that the district court erred in determining
            that they had presented insufficient evidence to substantiate
            the nature and the degree of their alleged damages. The three
            basic elements of a cause of action under Article 1802 of the
            Puerto Rico Civil Code are as follows: (1) a guilty or
            negligent act or omission, (2) a causal link between the act or
            omission and the damages, and (3) damages. 31 L.P.R.A. S 5141
            (1991); see  also  Gierbolini  
                                           Rosa, 930 F. Supp. at 717
                                         -8-
                                          8

            ("Plaintiff must show that defendant's wrongful or negligent
            actions actually and proximately caused plaintiff certain and
            quantifiable damages." (citations omitted)); Rodriguez, P.R.
            Offic. Trans. at 7; Ojeda 
                                      Ojeda, P.R. Offic. Trans. at 2, 5.
            Even assuming arguendo that BPPR's conduct was negligent and
            defamatory in the instant case, we nonetheless agree with the
            district court that there was insufficient proof of causation
            and damages for the complaint to withstand a summary judgment
            challenge.  See Gierbolini Rosa, 930 F. Supp. at 718-19.
                      The appellants contend that the district court's
            determination on this point is at odds with the position the
            same judge took in 
                              Pages v. 
                                       Feingold, 928 F. Supp. 148 (D.P.R.
            1996). The two cases are, however, distinguishable. In Pages,
            there was an unmistakable causal connection between Feingold's
            defamatory conduct and Pages' reputational damage. No such
            connection exists in the case at hand between BPPR's filing of
            the informative return and proof of claim and the Gierbolinis'
            alleged mental and moral suffering.  See Gierbolini Rosa, 930
            F. Supp. at 718-19. And, unlike  Pages, where not only mental
            and moral, but also financial and reputational damages were
            established, the evidence presented here in support of damages
            did not go beyond the most conclusory allegations. See 
                                                                   id. at
            719.
                      3. Finally, the appellants contend that the district
            court erred in failing to consider the affidavit of attorney
                                         -9-
                                          9

            William Pagan submitted in support of "Plaintiffs' Opposition
            to Defendant's Motion Requesting Entry of Summary Judgment
            Dismissing the Complaint and for Order Requiring Defendant to
            Pay Attorney's Fees and Costs." The appellants maintain that
            this affidavit contained facts indicating the publication or
            communication of an additional defamatory statement outside the
            confines of a privileged legislative, judicial or other
            proceeding authorized by law.
                      The Gierbolinis accompanied their opposition to
            BPPR's motion for summary judgment with a "Statement of
            Material Facts as to Which There Exists a Genuine Issue to be
            Tried." In the statement, the Gierbolinis asserted, for the
            first time, that BPPR's "false and public accusations were not
            exclusively made through the Proof of Claim and [a related
            motion]" filed with the United States Bankruptcy Court, and
            that BPPR, through employees at the Coamo branch, "slandered
            and destroyed Carmen Gierbolini's reputation." The Pagan
            affidavit was cited as supporting these assertions. In that
            affidavit, the affiant stated that a BPPR auditor informed him
            that Gierbolini-Marrero had been under investigation and would
            possibly be charged with fraud and defalcation.
                                
            6.   The Pagan affidavit provides, in pertinent part, as
            follows:
                 "2. That sometime during the month of July 1992 Gilberto
            Canales an Auditor for Banco Popular de Puerto Rico informed me
            that Carmen N. Gierbolini had been the subject of an
            investigation and would posibly [sic] be accused of fraud and
            defalcation."
                                        -10-
                                         10

                      We do not believe that the district court was
            required to consider the new incident mentioned in the Pagan
            affidavit for purposes of determining BPPR's motion for summary
            judgment. The conduct which the complaint alleges in paragraph
            12 to be "tortious, wrongful, negligent and culpable" under
            Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code is set out in
            paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the complaint. These describe
            BPPR's filing of the informative return before the Puerto Rico
            Treasury Department and the proof of claim and a related motion
            before the United States Bankruptcy Court. No mention is made
            of a claim of slander based on a statement by a BPPR auditor.
                      The Gierbolinis' "Answer to Interrogatories"
            reaffirmed that they based their charges of defamation on
            BPPR's filing of the informative return, the proof of claim and
            a related motion. In their answers to Interrogatory No. 17,
            addressed to Gierbolini-Marrero, and Interrogatory No. 11,
            addressed to Gierbolini-Rosa, both Gierbolini-Marrero and
            Gierbolini-Rosa identify BPPR's proof of claim and a related
            motion as the basis for their allegation in paragraph 12 of the
            complaint. The only other answers that identify any
                                
            7.   Interrogatories No. 17 and No. 11 provide, in pertinent
            part, as follows:
                 "State the basis for your allegation in paragraph 12 of
            the Complaint that BPPR 'falsely and publicly' accused you of
            'embezzlement and defalcation'."
                 Gierbolini-Marrero's answer to Interrogatory No. 17
            states:
                                        -11-
                                         11

            defamatory conduct on the part of BPPR are those responding to
            Interrogatory No. 15, served on Gierbolini-Marrero, and
            Interrogatory No. 9, served on Gierbolini-Rosa, regarding the
            alleged falsity of the informative return filed with the Puerto
            Rico Treasury Department.
                      Neither the complaint, nor the interrogatory answers,
            nor, for that matter, the "Preliminary Pretrial Order", mention
                                
                 "Proof of claim filed by BPPR on January 12, 1993 and
            Motion filed by BPPR on March 8, 1993 both in B-92-05458."
                 Gierbolini-Rosa's answer to Interrogatory No. 11 states:
                 "Proof of claim filed by the BPPR on January 12, 1993 and
            Motion field [sic] by BPPR on March 8, 1993, both in the
            bankruptcy proceeding."
            8.   Interrogatories No. 15 and No. 9 provide, in pertinent
            part, as follows:
                 "State the basis for your allegation in paragraph 9 of the
            Complaint that the report filed by BPPR with the Treasury
            Department was false and, specifically, was filed with the
            malicious intent to harass plaintiffs."
                 Gierbolini-Marrero's answer to Interrogatory No. 15
            states:
                 "BPPR filed form 480.6 (Informative Return) with the
            Treasury Department reporting having paid me the amount of
            $95,387.22 during 1992 as deferred compensation. BPPR knew
            that that was false. The obvious intention was to provoke a
            tax investigation of our return by the Treasury Department
            since I could not have reported that income in my 1992 tax
            return because I never received the payment."
                 Gierbolini-Rosa's answer to Interrogatory No. 9 states:
                 "BPPR filed form 480.6 Informative Return with the
            Treasury Department reporting having paid my wife the amount of
            $95,387.22 during 1992 as deferred compensation. BPPR knew
            that the report was false. The obvious intention was to
            provoke a tax investigation of our return by the Treasury
            Department since we could not have reported that income in our
            1992 return because my wife never received such payment."
                                        -12-
                                         12

            any other allegedly defamatory acts. There is no allegation or
            assertion of fact in any of these documents indicating that one
            of the acts for which recovery is sought consists of a BPPR
            auditor telling someone in the community of Coamo that
            Gierbolini-Marrero had been under investigation and would
            possibly be charged with fraud and defalcation. The appellants
            contend that that incident was only discovered afterwards, at
            which time it was promptly brought to the district court's
            attention through the Pagan affidavit. Appellants, however,
            did not move to amend their complaint to charge this alleged
            conduct as an additional defamatory act by BPPR. The district
            court and BPPR were not required to shoot at a moving target.
            They were entitled to proceed on the assumption that the
            defamation action rested on the claims in plaintiffs' complaint
            as confirmed in their sworn answers to interrogatories.
                      Affirmed.
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