Court Opinion

ID: 9662989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:25:21.327075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:21.930073
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The opinion of the Court states that the trial court "instructed the jury on a unified standard of liability by using an amalgam of the common elements of proof under the implied warranty and negligence theories.” 1 The opinion also states that the "trial court properly recognized that the standards of liability under the theories of implied warranty and negligence were indistinguishable, and that instructions on both would only confuse the jury.”2 Accordingly, the trial judge’s instructions — the "amalgam” of the "indistinguishable” implied warranty and negligence theories — properly informed the jury of. the "necessary elements for determining whether defendant defectively designed the fork-lift” when he *696stated that "a manufacturer of a product made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous for uses for which it is manufactured” is subject to liability for "physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design,” and when he instructed— whether conjunctively or alternatively is unclear— that the manufacturer has a duty "to use reasonable care in designing his product and guard it against a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of injury, and this may even include misuse which might reasonably be anticipated.”3
The opinion of the Court further states that the essence of the judge’s instruction was that the jury should "consider whether the manufacturer took reasonable care in light of any reasonably foreseeable use of the product which might cause harm or injury.”4 In conclusion, the opinion of the Court states that in a product liability action "against a manufacturer, based upon defective design, the jury need only be instructed on a single unified theory of negligent design.”5
I
We agree that there is a risk of confusing the jurors in asking them to focus, in their evaluation of one count of the complaint, on whether the manufacturer’s conduct measures up to the law’s standard of care, and asking them, in their evaluation of another count of the complaint, to put aside from their consideration whether the manufacturer was at fault and to focus solely on *697whether the product is reasonably fit.6 That there may be such confusion does not decide what is the correct form of the inquiry.
The construction of the products liability statute7 that we believe to be correct would not require the jury to determine whether the manufacturer was at fault or to make a finding regarding the manufacturer’s conduct.8 The jury in the instant case should have been instructed to determine whether the product as designed was reasonably fit for the purposes and uses intended or reasonably foreseeable by the designer-manufacturer, the standard which, until today, governed the determination of whether there has been a breach of the implied warranty.
We had thought that the policy question whether the jury should be asked to assess the manufacturer’s conduct or the fitness of the product had been decided by the evolvement of products liability law from the negligence-fault concept to the concept of strict liability in effect adopted by this Court in Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, 375 Mich 85; 133 NW2d 129 (1965), and set forth in 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 402A, pp 347-348.9
*698II
The opinion of the Court discusses the various theories of design defect liability and acknowledges that courts "have insisted that the risk-utility tests they are applying are not negligence tests because their focus is on the product rather than the manufacturer’s conduct” (emphasis in original), but states that "the distinction on closer examination appears to be nothing more than semantic.”10
The opinion of the Court cites four general approaches for determining the meaning of defect. These approaches focus on the product, and not on the manufacturer’s conduct. The consumer expectation test emphasizes expectations "about the product,” and not about manufacturer conduct. The three risk-utility formulations also concentrate on the product. While the risk-utility tests may involve "assessment of the decisions made by manufacturers with respect to the design of their products,”11 (emphasis added) it does not appear that the assessment determinative of the manufacturer’s liability for a product affected by a design defect is the identical assessment made when judg*699ing the reasonableness of the manufacturer-designer’s decision.
The authorities cited by the Court illustrate this point. In only one of the five cited cases would the court look to the manufacturer’s conduct to determine liability, and in that case the court’s statement was dictum.12
Dean Keeton advocated weighing the risk and utility of the product at the time of trial.13 Keeton would use hindsight to allocate to the manufacturer all risks including those which were unknowable at the time of marketing.14 While a manufacturer could not be found negligent for *700failing to protect against an unknowable risk, Keeton would nevertheless hold the manufacturer subject to liability for designing a defective product.
Professor Wade’s position "has been characterized as a risk utility test with imputed knowledge of all risks 'knowable’ at the time of manufacture or sale.”15 Although this approach considers manufacturer conduct, Wade’s proffered jury instruction focuses on the product: "A [product] is not duly safe if it is so likely to be harmful to persons [or property] that a reasonable [sic] prudent manufacturer [supplier], who had actual knowledge of its harmful character would not place it on the market.”16 (Emphasis added.)
Ill
Nor is it true that there is a basis for distinguishing between design defect and other products liability cases. Evidence of negligence is not more readily uncovered in design defect cases than in manufacturing defect cases. Professors Twerski and Weinstein observed that "[t]here is perhaps no issue more difficult for a plaintiff to litigate than what the state of knowledge should have been for a manufacturer with expertise in his field.”17
In a manufacturing defect case, there may be documents, technical data, and expert witness testimony demonstrating that the manufacturer took all reasonable and, indeed, extraordinary precau*701tions to avoid manufacturing defects. Such a manufacturer deserves no less protection than a manufacturer who used reasonable care in designing a product which nevertheless was not reasonably fit. If we are to return to an incentive-deterrence model, there is arguably as much to be gained, from a societal point of view, in extending that concept to manufacturing defects.18
To be sure, a verdict that there is a design defect may be seen as an indictment of an entire product line. It does not follow that a jury verdict holding against the manufacturer will result in the public being deprived of the product; litigation will have stretched out over years before such a verdict is rendered and then there are appeals and, as in this case, retrial and further appeals— this action was commenced August 24, 1972, twelve years ago. The likelihood is that, taking into consideration what is learned in the litigation, the manufacturer will, measuring risk-utility, make such improvements in the product as it finds desirable. It has not been shown that there is need *702for a lower standard for design defect cases than in manufacturing defect cases in order to protect either the "manufacturer’s assets” or the public from being deprived of a product.19
IV
Assuming, as the opinion of the Court states, that implicit in a jury verdict that a product was— applying the implied warranty standard — "defectively designed,” is a determination that the manufacturer acted unreasonably in the design; the question of the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct and the reasonableness of the product, even in a design defect case, are not indistinguishable or identical.
The spectrum of what is reasonable is broad. If it were otherwise, all reasonable men and women would agree, and there would be nothing for jury assessment. Different juries looking at the same facts may reach different conclusions regarding what is reasonable and both verdicts may be unimpeachable. It is for this reason that the answer may depend on how the question is phrased.20
The opinion of the Court does not cite a single case where a jury was instructed as it would have juries instructed henceforth in this state. Cases *703cited by the Court21 appear to recognize that the proper inquiry is whether the product is reasonably fit for its intended or foreseeable purposes.
While, as a matter of logic, a jury might not bring in a verdict both that the manufacturer had not breached its duty of reasonable care and that the design of the product was not reasonably safe for its reasonably foreseeable uses, it is not, as the opinion of the Court declares, "inconceivable” that a jury would do so. Experience has shown that juries do just that. They do find a manufacturer not at fault, but the product, nevertheless, defective. The form of the question often preordains and directs the answer.22 The need or desirability of obviating juror confusion does not, we repeat, decide what is the correct form of the inquiry.
We would affirm the Court of Appeals.
Kavanagh, J., concurred with Levin,

 Ante, p 679.

 Ante, p 694.

 Ante, p 694.

 Ante, pp 694-695.

 Ante, p 695.

 See Cova v Harley Davidson Motor Co, 26 Mich App 602; 182 NW2d 800 (1970), advocating the adoption of a single unified theory of products liability.

 MCL 600.2945-600.2949; MSA 27A.2945-27A.2949.

 Amicus curiae Michigan Defense Trial Counsel contends only that "[mjanufacturers have a duty to produce a product which is not unreasonably dangerous in light of the foreseeable risks of injury,” "a product which is not unreasonably dangerous in light of the foreseeable risk of injury.” (Emphasis added.)

 See, Comment: Products liability in Michigan: Implied warranty, strict tort, or both?, 15 Wayne L R 1558, 1580 (1969) ("In Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the strict tort doctrine under the guise of the implied warranty theory”). See also Williams v Detroit Edison Co, 63 Mich App 559, 567; 234 NW2d 702 (1975) ("Regardless of whether the tortious conduct is labeled a breach of warranty or whether the claim is founded on strict liability in tort, it seems that plaintiff must basically prove [the same ele*698ments]”); Owens v Allis-Chalmers Corp, 83 Mich App 74, 78; 268 NW2d 291 (1978) ("This Court has recognized that the requisite elements for a cause of action based upon strict liability in tort are congruent to those for breach of warranty”); Tulkku v Mackworth Rees (On Remand), 101 Mich App 709, 722, fn 4; 301 NW2d 46 (1980) ("[T]he Michigan doctrine of implied warranty of fitness is worded differently, but is virtually indistinguishable in concept and practical effect [from the concept of strict liability in tort]”); Johnson v Chrysler Corp, 74 Mich App 532, 535; 254 NW2d 569 (1977) ("If anything, the proofs that would be presented under a strict liability theory in a product case would overlap with the proofs that would be presented under an implied warranty theory”); similarly, see Dooms v Stewart Bolling & Co, 68 Mich App 5, 15; 241 NW2d 738 (1976); Auto-Owners Ins Co v Chrysler Corp, 129 Mich App 38, 43, fn 1; 341 NW2d 223 (1983).

 Ante, p 688.

 Ante, pp 686-687.

 Caterpillar Tractor Co v Beck, 593 P2d 871, 876 (Alas, 1979) (jury instructed that "[a] design defect is one in which the product, however perfectly manufactured, incorporates or fails to incorporate a design feature with the result that injury is proximately caused thereby”; the supreme court reversed a verdict for the plaintiff and adopted the test set forth in Barker v Lull Engineering Co, Inc, 20 Cal 3d 413; 143 Cal Rptr 225; 573 P2d 443 [1978], which requires a judge to instruct the jury that a product is defective in design if it "fail[s] to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect” or if "the defendant fails to prove . . . that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweighed the risk of danger inherent in such design.” Beck, supra, p 884 [emphasis added]); Barker v Lull Engineering Co, Inc, supra (see discussion under Beck, supra); Suter v San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co, 81 NJ 150; 406 A2d 140 (1979) (jury instructed that plaintiff required to prove "that the product had not been reasonably fit for the ordinary use for which it was intended,” id., p 168 [emphasis added]; the supreme court sustained the instruction, saying that "[t]he principle of strict liability, shiftfs] the focus from conduct, as in negligence law generally, to the product,” id., p 169 [emphasis added]); Micallef v Miehle Co, 39 NY2d 376, 387; 348 NE2d 571; 384 NYS2d 115 (1976) (instructions on implied warranty action not stated in the opinion, but court states that "under a doctrine of strict products liability, the manufacturer of a defective product is liable to any person injured or damaged if the defect was a substantial factor in bringing about his injuries or damages,” id., p 387 [emphasis added]); Wilson v Piper Aircraft Corp, 282 Or 61; 577 P2d 1322 (1978) (instructions not reproduced; court held that, because there was insufficient evidence of a defect, the case should not have gone to jury; dictum, however, did emphasize the conduct of the manufacturer).

 Ante, p 686, citing Keeton, Manufacturer’s liability: The meaning of "defect” in the manufacture and design of products, 20 Syracuse L R 559, 569-571 (1969).

 Keeton, fn 13 supra, p 571.

 Ante, p 686 and fn 18.

 Wade, On the nature of strict tort liability for products, 44 Miss L J 825, 839-840 (1973).

 Twerski & Weinstein, A critique of the uniform product liability law — A rush to judgment, 28 Drake L R 221, 227 (1978-1979). See also Keeton, fn 13 supra, p 570; Keeton, Product liability — Inadequacy of information, 48 Tex L R 398, 407-409 (1970), and Keeton, Product liability and the meaning of defect, 5 St Mary’s L J (1973).

 Assuming that a negligence standard promotes safety more effectively than a strict liability standard, today’s decision might encourage manufacturers to pursue "fail-safe” designs at the expense of quality control. Professors Twerski and Weinstein said:
"By imposing a strict liability standard for production defects and a negligence standard for design defects, the UPLL aggravates an already difficult situation. In the development of product safety, there may be several ways to address a safety hazard. One way may be to increase quality control to assure the integrity of a crucial part. Another may be to design a back-up safety feature (a fail-safe component). By deciding that construction defect cases are not defensible (in that strict liability applies regardless of fault), and that design defect cases are defensible (on negligence or risk-utility grounds), the UPLL has made a conscious decision to favor the design alternative over quality control. This may be a short-sighted approach. It is possible that increased safety can be accomplished at a lower cost by raising quality control standards rather than by designing a fail-safe system that could engender other risks. The difficulty is that the litigation categories have been created by lawyers. Engineers who must think in functional terms may find the framework totally unsatisfactory.” Twerski, fn 17 supra, p 226.

 Addressing the fourth and final "intrinsic fairness” argument, if a careful manufacturer is rewarded with lower insurance premiums based on his products liability experience, then without regard to whether there is a fault or a product defect system, that manufacturer will not bear the burden of paying for losses caused by a manufacturer with a less satisfactory product liability experience. To the extent that the argument incorporates the result of a lower fault standard in terms of fewer successful products liability actions, the argument begs the question whether there should be a lower standard.

 See Smith v ER Squibb & Sons, Inc, 405 Mich 79, 98-100; 273 NW2d 476 (1979) (Levin, J., dissenting).

 See fn 12.

 Courts recognize that the lexicon appropriate for jury instruction may differ from the language of the evolvement of a rule of law. See People v Woods, 416 Mich 581, 626; 331 NW2d 707 (1982); Holland v United States, 348 US 121; 75 S Ct 127; 99 L Ed 150 (1954).