Court Opinion

ID: 9634849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:26:07.183143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:04.969813
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the Majority in this case. I would hold that where one is found guilty of Driving Under the Influence in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731, while currently enrolled in an ARD program for a separate drunk driving indicent and that ARD enrollment is then revoked, that individual should be considered a first offender for sentencing purposes under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(e).
Appellee was placed in an Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program (ARD) as a result of charges having been filed against him alleging a violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731, Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or a Controlled Substance. Appellee’s “status under the ARD program was subsequently revoked” when he violated the requirements of the program by entering a guilty plea to a separate drunk driving offense. (Trial Court Opinion at 2). The *76second incident which occurred in September of 1984, was treated by the trial court as a first conviction for sentencing purposes under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(e)(l)(i). The charges which gave rise to Appellant’s admission into the ARD program, which admission was later revoked, were yet to be acted upon at the time Appellee was sentenced for the September incident.
The Majority adopts the Commonwealth’s position and holds that Appellee should be sentenced for the September offense as a second offender under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(e)(l)(ii), which calls for a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 30 days for violators with a prior conviction. The Majority reaches its conclusion based, in part, on its view of the plain meaning of the relevant statute. The pertinent section of the Vehicle Code provides as follows:
Acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or any other form of preliminary disposition of any charge brought under this section shall be considered a first conviction for the purpose of computing whether a subsequent conviction of a violation of this section shall be considered a second, third, fourth or subsequent conviction.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(e)(2).
The Majority reads this language as requiring Appellee to be sentenced as a second offender based upon his prior acceptance into a program of ARD. Although words and phrases used in any legislation are to be construed according to their common meaning and accepted usage, Fireman’s Fund Insurance v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 317 Pa. Super. 497, 502, 464 A.2d 431, 434 (1983), the General Assembly is presumed not to have intended a result which is absurd or unreasonable. Id. I believe this is the result which flows from the Majority’s interpretation of the statute. In spite of the fact that Appellee has not had an accelerated rehabilitative disposition, was actually removed from the program by the Commonwealth and is awaiting action to be taken involving the first incident, the Majority *77would have him receive the enhanced sentence provided for those with previous convictions.
I believe § 3731(e)(2) requires disposition of the charge of drunk driving.
ARD, accelerated rehabilitative disposition, is a pretrial disposition of certain cases, in which the attorney for the Commonwealth agrees to suspend prosecution for an agreed upon period of time in exchange for the defendant’s successful participation in a rehabilitative program
Pa.R.Crim.P. 175-185, also provides that the defendant must agree to the terms of the ARD, and that after he has completed the program successfully, the charges against him will be dismissed, upon order of court. If he does not complete and ARD successfully, he may be prosecuted for the offense with which he was charged.
Commonwealth v. Lutz, 508 Pa. 297, 303, 495 A.2d 928, 931 (1985).
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731(e) provides in part:
(7) Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or other preliminary disposition of any charge of violating this section may be revoked and the court shall direct the attorney for the Commonwealth to proceed on the charges as prescibed in general rules if the defendant:
(i) is charged with or commits any crime enumerated in Title 18....
There has been no pretrial accelerated rehabilitative disposition of Appellee’s first case. Appellee was terminated from the ARD program after he pled guilty to violating the drunk driving statute in September. Appellee must now face trial on the charges stemming from the earlier incident. I believe that if Appellee is found guilty on the charges for which he had sought ARD, he could be sentenced as a second time offender. Appellee would then properly be receiving the harsh penalty which the Legislature intended for those who repeatedly violated the statute. If, howevér, Appellee, were to be found not guilty, he would not be in the unenviable position suggested by the Majority *78of being sentenced as a second time offender on the charges giving rise to this appeal although he had only been convicted of one violation of the statute.
In my view, if Appellee is convicted on those charges for which he sought ARD, he could be sentenced as a second time offender. If, however, he is not convicted, he will not have received undue punishment. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s decision to sentence Appellee as a first offender for the conviction which arose from the September incident.