Court Opinion

ID: 9723883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:37:21.176381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:53.050050
License: Public Domain

HEFFERNAN, CHIEF JUSTICE
(dissenting). Had the majority opinion contained only the analysis in section III, I would have agreed with it entirely. In section III, the majority correctly looks to the exceptions contained in sec. 51.30(4)(b), Stats., as guides to interpret the "lawful order of the court" exception to closed court records contained in sec. 51.30(3), Stats. As the majority states, a circuit court may release ch. 51 court records when the requested access fits within one of the statutory exceptions in sec. 51.30(4)(b) or when the requested access is comparable to one of the statutory exceptions set forth in sec. 51.30(4)(b). The majority further states that a court may therefore grant access to court records under sec. 51.30(3) for a particular purpose that is similar to those enumerated, to those individuals who need access to achieve that particular purpose, and to the records needed to achieve that purpose.
Had the majority applied the approach contained in section III to the Racine Journal Time's request for access to Billy Jo W.'s civil commitment court records, the request would have been denied. The Journal Times has requested access on public safety grounds, but as the majority has carefully explained, public safety is not an issue in this case. The Journal Times also attempts to base its request on the desire to review *654the adequacy of ch. 51 proceedings — a purpose dissimilar to those enumerated. Clearly that justification for the request fails the test of being comparable to an existing statutory exception.
Although I agree with the analysis contained in section III of the majority opinion, that analysis is dicta because the majority does not apply it in disposing of the Journal Times' request for access to Billy Jo W.'s court records. When the majority actually applies the sec. 51.30 "lawful order of the court" exception to the facts of the present case, the majority does not consider whether the requested access to court records fits within or is comparable to one of the existing exceptions in sec. 51.30(4)(b). Rather, the majority, ignoring its own logic, adopts an entirely different approach to analysis of sec. 51.30(3) and applies that new analysis to the facts. The majority has thus concluded that the sec. 51.30(3) "lawful order of the court" exception encompasses two entirely different approaches to requests for access to records depending on whether there is a "significant interrelationship" between the court records of the chapter 51 proceedings and a criminal proceeding involving a violent felony pending prior to the civil commitment. The majority reasons that the two approaches are justified because, when an individual has been discharged from criminal commitment and then civilly committed, the policy in favor of open records in criminal cases applies to the civil commitment and outweighs the legislature's declared policy in favor of confidentiality contained in sec. 51.30.
I support the legislature's general presumption in favor of open records, set forth in sec. 19.31, Stats.,1 and the legislature's presumption in favor of open court *655proceedings.2 However, the legislature specifically negated the normal presumption of chapter 19 when it enacted chapter 51. . Both sec. 51.30(3), governing access to court records, and sec. 51.30(4), governing access to treatment records, begin with the general rule that the records are to remain confidential. Section 51.30(3) states, "The files and records of the court proceedings under this chapter shall be closed." Section 51.30(4)(a) states that except as otherwise provided, "all treatment records shall remain confidential and are privileged to the subject individual." Essentially, each of these general rules creates a presumption that the records will remain inaccessible unless one of the exceptions applies.3 The legislature balanced the need for confidentiality against the need for public review when it established the general rule that ch. 51 records are closed. It is inappropriate for this court to upset that determination of the legislature.
To justify taking two different approaches to analysis of the sec. 51.30(3) "lawful order of the court" exception to closed ch. 51 court records, the majority *656sua sponte finds it necessary to create a new category of ch. 51 proceedings. The majority cloaks certain civil commitments in a criminal mantle, expressly stating that a ch. 51 proceeding involving an individual whose civil commitment follows release from criminal commitment is merely "a criminal case in civil clothing." By judicially creating this category, the majority can then engraft the general policy in favor of open court records in criminal proceedings onto ch. 51 civil proceedings.
I find it logically a non sequitur that ch. 51 proceedings involving defendants discharged from criminal commitment are merely criminal cases in civil guise. The majority notes that the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution prohibit indefinite confinement of criminal defendants due to their inability to become competent to stand trial. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Unless there is a substantial probability that a criminal defendant will become competent in a foreseeable period, a state that has criminally committed a defendant must either institute civil commitment proceedings or release the defendant. Id. The majority characterizes this situation as a criminal case making a "detour" through civil commitment proceedings. However, "detour" suggests that the ch. 51 proceedings are just a different route to the same end. This is not necessarily true. If the subject individual does not regain competency, that person will never be subject to criminal proceedings. Moreover, if that subject individual is no longer dangerous, ch. 51 requires that the individual be released from civil commitment.
The majority recognizes that the general rule that ch. 51 records are to be closed is grounded in the legislature's strong interest in keeping private the details of an individual's mental and emotional condition, both to *657prevent stigmatization and to facilitate reintegration into the community. However, concerns about stigmatization and reintegration should apply equally to individuals whose civil commitment follows a prior criminal commitment and to individuals who have only been civilly committed. The problems both groups of individuals face upon reentering the community are substantially the same. It is clear that the legislature has so concluded.
It is evident that chapter 51 makes no distinction between individuals involuntarily committed after release from criminal commitment and other involuntarily committed individuals. Thus, it is curious why the majority finds it significant that the legislature applied the confidentiality provision of sec. 51.30 to both court records and treatment records in civil commitments but only to treatment records in criminal commitments. The majority finds this omission significant in light of the "meticulous specificity" of the rest of the statute. However, given this "meticulous specificity", the majority does not find it significant that ch. 51 omits any mention of different treatment of court records based on whether the subject individual was previously criminally detained.
I am unclear about the real concerns underlying the majority opinion. The majority states that access is justified in this case because public confidence in the judicial process depends on public access to that process. That is, access to the records helps the public evaluate whether public officials have discharged their duties appropriately. As the majority realizes, however, ch. 51 court hearings are generally open. The majority also acknowledges that the record does not indicate that any proceedings were closed in this case. Furthermore, the concern about fostering public confi*658dence in the judicial process ought to apply equally to any ch. 51 case and not just those that follow criminal incompetency proceedings. As is universally recognized, open proceedings and records in criminal cases appropriately protect a defendant. Likewise, open court records in ch. 51 proceedings might protect the committed individual for they would enable the public to assess whether courts conducting involuntary civil commitment proceedings are doing so appropriately. But the legislature has not reached that conclusion.
In creating the general rule that court records are closed under ch. 51, the legislature has decided that the civilly committed individual's privacy concerns outweigh concerns about fostering public confidence in this limited class of judicial proceedings. Rather than providing for open records, the legislature has implemented a number of safeguards to help ensure the integrity of the process. The majority acknowledges that the hearings are open unless specifically closed by court order and that the corporation counsel, who represents the interests of the public, is required to be at all commitment and recommitment hearings. Moreover, an appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from an order filed after an involuntary commitment or recommitment hearing. That appeal can be filed by a number of individuals, including any one of the three persons who sign the petition for examination and the counsel who represents the public. Section 51.20(15), Stats. Thus, in the context of ch. 51, the court of appeals performs the role of scrutinizing the performance of the circuit court.
I cannot help but think that the majority created an exception to allow limited public access in cases involving civilly committed individuals with pending criminal charges because this is the type of ch. 51 case *659which arouses legitimate media curiosity. Were I ab initio to balance the policy concerns at issue in determining whether ch. 51 court records should be open or closed in some instances at the discretion of the court "bylawful order", I might come to a different conclusion than did the legislature. However, in the present case, the subjective attractiveness of competing policies is not for this court to decide. The legislature has balanced these policies and provided ample guidance on acceptable exceptions to the general rule that ch. 51 court records are closed. It is inappropriate to upset the public policy determination of the legislature. I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals and deny the request for access to Billy Jo W.'s civil commitment court records.
I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. BABLITCH joins this dissenting opinion.

 Section 19.31, Stats., 1991-1992 states in relevant part:
*655[Sections] 19.32 to 19.37 [the open records statute], shall be construed in every instance with a presumption of complete public access, consistent with the conduct of governmental business.
Decisions I have authored for this court in which the court determined that records were to be open include: Hathaway v. Joint School District No. 1, City of Green Bay, 116 Wis. 2d 388, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984); Newspapers, Inc., v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979); State ex rel. Journal Company v. County Court of Racine County, 43 Wis. 2d 297, 168 N.W.2d 836 (1969).

 See State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court for La Crosse County, 115 Wis. 2d 220, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983).

 It should also be noted that sec. 19.36(1), Stats., specifically makes the presumption of open records inapplicable to statutes which specifically exempt records from disclosure.