Court Opinion

ID: 9375240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-25 21:00:47.814419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:57.075206
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-2130

        DEBORAH BYGUM, Administratrix of the Estate of Eric Michell Young,
        deceased,

                             Plaintiff – Appellee,

                      v.

        THE CITY OF MONTGOMERY; ROGER L. KING, individually as a member of
        the Montgomery Police Department,

                             Defendants – Appellants,

                      and

        THE MONTGOMERY POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY OF SMITHERS; JOHN
        MICHAEL HESS, SR., individually as a member of the Smithers Police Department,

                             Defendants.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
        Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., Senior District Judge. (2:19-cv-00456)

        Argued: October 25, 2022                                     Decided: February 24, 2023

        Before RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and Sherri A. LYDON, United
        States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Lydon wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Richardson and Judge Rushing joined.
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        ARGUED: Michael William Taylor, BAILEY & WYANT, PLLC, Charleston, West
        Virginia, for Appellants. Stephen Paul New, NEW, TAYLOR & ASSOCIATES, Beckley,
        West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Charles R. Bailey, BAILEY & WYANT,
        PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants. Russell A. Williams, NEW, TAYLOR
        & ASSOCIATES, Beckley, West Virginia; Truman C. Griffith, WARNER LAW
        OFFICES, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        LYDON, District Judge:

               Shot four times by Officer Roger King, Eric Young died in the early morning hours

        of February 11, 2019, on a deserted West Virginia street. The shooting came on the heels

        of a tense foot pursuit spanning less than five minutes. King followed Young for several

        blocks, trying unsuccessfully to apprehend him for committing several non-violent

        misdemeanors such as shouting obscenities, attempting to break into a patrol car, trying to

        evade arrest, and obstruction. Officer King did not know if Young had a weapon. But he

        could not rule out the possibility Young was armed.

               When Officer King opened fire, Young was empty-handed, stationary, and 50 feet

        away. With the first shot, Young started falling. Firing four more times while advancing

        on Young, Officer King fired the final shot when he had advanced to 25 feet from Young.

               Whether true or not, we must view these facts in the plaintiff’s favor as provided by

        the district court. A jury could of course credit Officer King’s different story at trial. But

        that’s for another day. The district court correctly noted it lacks that option (as do we) on

        Officer King’s motion for summary judgment. And contrary to Appellants’ arguments, the

        record here does not “blatantly contradict” the nonmoving party’s version of events such

        that we cannot accept the facts as the district court viewed them. Because a jury could

        reasonably find Officer King violated Young’s clearly established Fourth Amendment

        right to be free from excessive force, the district court properly denied King qualified

        immunity at this stage of the litigation. We affirm the district court’s decision.

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         I.    Background

               Working the overnight shift alone on February 11, 2019, around 4:30 a.m., Officer

        King heard someone yelling obscenities and threatening to kill everyone. King checked

        the live video feed of the alleyway behind the Montgomery Police Department station and

        saw a man, later identified as Eric Young, trying to open his locked police cruiser door.

        Seeming to head to another cruiser, Young disappeared from the video frame. King

        notified police dispatch of Young’s actions and left the station to investigate.

               After searching, Officer King heard and then saw Young in a neighbor’s car shed.

        King instructed Young to walk over to him. Instead, Young walked away and Officer King

        followed. Attempting to confront Young, King (6’ 2” and between 180 to 185 pounds)

        told Young (5’ 7” and 166 pounds) to get on the ground. Young told Officer King to get

        out of his face and walked away. Officer King again followed.

               Throughout the pursuit, Young remained non-compliant—refusing to get on the

        ground as directed—and behaved erratically. J.A. 642–44. Young yelled “something

        about Satan and the Lord,” J.A. 642. When Officer King asked Young who he was, Young,

        in a voice King described as “demonic,” said he was Satan. J.A. 642. Young also

        repeatedly flailed his arms and shirt, which Officer King said made him suspect aggression

        and the possibility that Young was reaching for a weapon in his waistband. 1 J.A. 642. He

        never saw a weapon on Young, though. J.A. 642.

               1
                 In his statement provided to investigating officers less than three hours after the
        incident, King initially stated he “didn’t see a weapon so [he] didn’t really think anything
        of” Young’s actions. J.A. 42. But Officer King later said he “couldn’t tell if there was
        (Continued)
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               According to Officer King, Young stopped more than once to turn and “lunge” at

        him before turning around and walking away again. J.A. 642. During one of those

        instances, after Young turned and began walking toward Officer King, King fired his taser.

        Young appeared to rip the wires out before walking away again. With the taser failing to

        drop Young, King worried a substance was blocking Young’s pain receptors.             King

        notified police dispatch the taser was ineffective and continued to follow Young.

               At some point after attempting to tase Young, Officer King drew his firearm in one

        hand while still carrying the taser in the other. J.A. 643. Though out of cartridges, King

        tried, to no avail, to convince Young to comply and get on the ground by threatening to

        tase him again. J.A. 643–44. Soon after, the encounter ended with Officer King firing five

        shots at Young, four of which hit and killed him. J.A. 399, 644.

               After the shooting, Officer King stated he called for immediate medical assistance

        and unsuccessfully tried to save Young by applying pressure to his chest wound. At some

        point following the shooting, King discovered an unopened pocketknife clipped to Young’s

        pocket. J.A. 643 n.4. Soon after, backup and paramedics arrived. Young was pronounced

        dead. J.A. 398. He died from multiple gunshot wounds perforating the heart and lungs.

        J.A. 399.

        something in [Young’s] waistline.” J.A. 42. In his statement and during his deposition
        just over a year later, King further stated he could not rule out whether Young’s picking up
        his shirt revealed he had a weapon. See J.A. 52 (“And then when he started flapping his
        shirt up and down, I thought he’s gonna reach for a gun or he’s gonna’ have something so
        that’s why I pulled my gun out in fear that he had something.”); J.A. 60 (testifying “[i]f
        he’s flailing his shirt, I don’t know if he’s not reaching for a weapon.”).
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               Officer King and Deborah Bygum, Young’s mother, disagree on the circumstances

        of the shooting, especially the positions, locations, and movements of King and Young.

        According to Officer King, Young was about 20 feet away when he turned to face King

        and charged him. J.A. 644. King stated he then shot Young when Young closed the

        distance between them to about 8 to 10 feet. J.A. 644. Officer King reported Young “said,

        just shoot me.” J.A. 499, 644. King also stated he feared for his life and was concerned

        that if he backpedaled he could fall and lose his firearm because of a curb behind him. J.A.

        644. After the first two shots, “[Young] just kept coming and then he turned and he turned

        around again and that’s when [King] thought he was gonna’ reach or something,” and King

        shot him again. J.A. 645.

               In his initial, transcribed statement to law enforcement King said that, after the last

        shot, Young fell on his back with his head toward King and his legs facing “the Kanawaha

        side.” J.A. 645. During his deposition, however, King testified that, post-shooting,

        “[Young] stood completely straight up, turned completely around away from [King], and

        walked a good distance” before he “collapsed against the fence line.” J.A. 645.

               Following the incident, Ms. Bygum brought several federal and state-law claims in

        the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. She sued Officer King,

        the cities of Montgomery and Smithers, and Officer John Hess. Ms. Bygum retained a

        forensic expert, Dr. Jeremy J. Bauer, Ph.D., to suggest how the shooting unfolded. Based

        on Dr. Bauer’s reconstruction of the shooting, Young’s version of events would differ from

        King’s if Young were here to tell it.

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               Dr. Bauer used 3D visualization software to recreate the shooting. He simulated the

        event following his consideration of the physical evidence (e.g., King’s ejected bullet

        casings, Young’s bullet wounds, the locations of two bullets that struck the house behind

        Young, Young’s location and position of rest), Officer King’s statement and deposition

        testimony, and the autopsy report.       Based on the 3D digital simulation, Dr. Bauer

        concluded: Officer King fired the first shot, which hit Young in the left side of his chest,

        when Young was 50 feet away facing him; Young was falling and rotating to his right with

        respect to Officer King when he was struck by the next three bullets; Officer King fired the

        last shot at 25 feet away from Young; and Young was not charging Officer King when

        shots were fired. J.A. 646–50. Dr. Bauer otherwise “couldn’t eliminate whether or not

        [Young] was moving forward or walking backward” during the shooting. J.A. 464. He

        also determined Officer King moved toward Young “in an approximate 42-foot leftward

        arc” during the shooting. J.A. 649–50.

               Officer King and the City of Montgomery moved for summary judgment on, among

        other grounds, qualified immunity on Ms. Bygum’s claim Officer King violated her son’s

        Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. In considering Officer King’s

        summary judgment motion, the district court construed the facts in Ms. Bygum’s favor and

        assumed true the following narrative:

               Officer King, who was noticeably larger than Young, opened fire while
               Young was 50 feet away, stationary, not wielding a weapon, and not known
               to be carrying a weapon. He then fired four more bullets while advancing 42
               feet in a leftward arc towards Young, firing the last bullet 25 feet away from
               Young. Young began to fall to the ground after the first shot. Officer King
               had probable cause to believe Young had committed several non-violent

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               misdemeanors that night … and that Young was attempting to evade arrest
               by flight. There is no evidence that anyone else was in the area at the time.

               J.A. 654.

               Against these facts, the district court decided a jury could find the shooting violated

        Young’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. J.A.

        651–59. Officer King and the City of Montgomery now appeal the denial of their summary

        judgment motion, asking we find King is entitled to qualified immunity and reverse. J.A.

        671; Br. of Appellants at 47.        They argue Officer King did not violate Young’s

        constitutional rights, Br. of Appellants at 15–33, and, if he did, such rights were not clearly

        established, Br. of Appellants at 34–47.

         II.   Jurisdiction

               “A denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity presents a narrow

        exception to the general rule that we cannot review a denial of summary judgment in an

        interlocutory appeal.” Halcomb v. Ravenell, 992 F.3d 316, 319 (4th Cir. 2021). Based on

        this limited exception, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over the district court’s

        denial of qualified immunity here “to the extent it turns on an ‘issue of law.’” Behrens v.

        Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 311 (1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530

        (1985)). But we may not review the district court’s facts. See Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225,

        234 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e lack jurisdiction to re-weigh the evidence in the record to

        determine whether material factual disputes preclude summary disposition.”).

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        III.     Discussion

               A. Legal Standards

                 An objective reasonableness standard governs our analysis of Bygum’s Fourth

        Amendment excessive force claim. Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 642–43 (4th Cir. 1996)

        (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–97 (1989) and Tennessee v. Garner, 471

        U.S. 1 (1985)). “When deadly force is used, we have a more specific test for objective

        reasonableness.” Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022). “In those cases, we

        consider whether the hypothetical reasonable officer in that situation would have had

        ‘probable cause to believe that the suspect pose[d] a threat of serious physical harm, either

        to the officer or to others.’” Id. (quoting Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 477 (4th Cir.

        2005)). Our review “must focus on the moment that deadly force was used” rather than

        “the whole episode.” Id. “[T]he justification for deadly force can fall away in seconds.”

        Id.

                 Taking care to “avoid hindsight bias,” we must “try to place ourselves in the heat of

        the moment,” Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233, mindful “that officers on the beat are not often

        afforded the luxury of armchair reflection,” Elliott, 99 F.3d at 642. We must “allow[] for

        the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in

        circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force

        that is necessary in a particular situation.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)

        (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97).

                 We consider the affirmative defense of qualified immunity against this substantive

        legal backdrop. “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold

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        public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield

        officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties

        reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “When a qualified-immunity

        defense is raised, we apply a two-step test.” Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233. “We must determine,

        first, whether the facts viewed in [Ms. Bygum’s] favor make out a violation of [her son’s]

        constitutional rights, and second, whether that violated right was clearly established at the

        time.” Id. The burden of proof in this circuit is the plaintiff’s on the first question and the

        defendants’ on the second. Id. (citing Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377–78 & n.4 (4th

        Cir. 2007)).

               When we review a district court’s denial of summary judgment in the qualified

        immunity context, “our review is de novo.” See id. at 234. “We view the evidence in the

        light most favorable to the plaintiff; we draw all reasonable inferences in h[er] favor; and

        we do not weigh the evidence or make credibility calls, even if we do not believe [s]he will

        win at trial.” Id. Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine dispute of

        material fact and Officer King is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. See id.

           B. Federal Qualified Immunity Analysis

                  1. Constitutional Violation

               Viewing the facts most favorably to Ms. Bygum in the moments immediately

        preceding the use of lethal force, Officer King lacked probable cause to believe Young

        posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to King or others. Other than Officer

        King and Young, the streets were empty. If Young threatened anyone, it would have been

        Officer King. But when Officer King opened fire, Young was standing 50 feet away,

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        stationary, empty-handed, and not known to be carrying a weapon. J.A. 654–55. After the

        first shot, Young started falling. Officer King advanced on Young in a 42-foot leftward

        arc as he kept shooting, firing the last shot when he reached 25 feet away from Young.

        Officer King had probable cause to suspect Young recently committed non-violent

        misdemeanors and attempted to evade arrest by flight. But at the time of the shooting,

        King lacked “probable cause to believe that [Young] pose[d] a threat of serious physical

        harm, either to the officer or others.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11; see also Wilson v. Prince

        George’s Cnty., 893 F.3d 213, 220 (4th Cir. 2018) (“A jury could determine that [plaintiff],

        standing 20 feet away and armed only with a pocket knife that he was using solely against

        himself, did not pose an immediate threat to [the officer] or others, thereby rendering [the

        officer’s] use of lethal force unreasonable”).

               In no way do we discount that Officer King may have reasonably believed Young

        was potentially dangerous. To be sure, the justification for deadly force can arise in

        seconds, just as it also “can fall away in seconds.” Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233. And King had

        just observed Young commit several misdemeanors and behave erratically, yelling

        obscenities and talking about God and Satan. Besides this irregular behavior, Young kept

        flailing his arms and shirt during the confrontation, which made Officer King worried that

        Young was aggressive and possibly reaching for a weapon. Though Officer King did not

        see a weapon on Young, he couldn’t rule it out. More than once, Young lunged at Officer

        King. And Young continually refused to comply with Officer King’s lawful commands.

               While there may have been times during this pursuit Officer King felt fearful, the

        moments immediately preceding the use of deadly force paint an objectively different

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        picture. Young was 50 feet away, not moving, and not known to be armed. That’s when

        Officer King fired his first shot. As Young was falling from the impact of the bullet,

        Officer King advanced on Young, cutting the distance in half, while firing four more shots

        killing Young in the deserted street. In those vital moments, Officer King could not

        reasonably believe Young posed a threat of serious physical harm to King or others.

               Appellants disagree. First of all, they argue, we can consider and reject the district

        court’s factual findings as so “blatantly contradicted by the record’ … that ‘no reasonable

        jury could believe [them],” Harris v. Pittman, 927 F.3d 266, 276 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting

        Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007)). Br. of Appellants at 18–24; Reply Br. of

        Appellants at 1–3. Appellants rely on Scott v. Harris to make that argument, though, and

        the facts before this court are very different.

               Though Scott does address a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, Scott

        involved “a videotape of the incident … that ‘utterly discredited’ the plaintiff’s account,

        rendering it a ‘visible fiction.’” Harris, 927 F.3d at 275 (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–

        81). The Scott Court instructed, “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of

        which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a

        court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for

        summary judgment.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

               We have emphasized that “Scott is the exception, not the rule[,]” Harris, 927 F.3d

        at 276, and “does not ‘abrogate the proper summary judgment analysis, which in qualified

        immunity cases ‘usually means adopting ... the plaintiff's version of the facts.’” Id.

        (quoting Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F.3d 272, 276 (4th Cir. 2011)). Scott

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        applies “only when there is evidence—like the videotape in Scott itself—of undisputed

        authenticity that shows some material element of the plaintiff’s account to be ‘blatantly

        and demonstrably false.’” Id. (quoting Blaylock v. City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405, 414 (3rd

        Cir. 2007)). This case lacks Scott’s “added wrinkle[,]” 550 U.S. at 378, of “evidence …

        of undisputed authenticity[,]” Harris, 927 F.3d at 276, “clearly contradict[ing] the version

        of the story told by [Ms. Bygum] and adopted by [the district court,]” Scott, 550 U.S. at

        378. See also Stanton, 25 F.4th at 234 (“Courts should be careful at summary judgment to

        avoid simply accepting an officer’s self-serving statements and must consider all

        contradictory evidence.”).

               But hold on, argues Officer King: Even if we accept the district court’s facts, his

        use of lethal force was still constitutional because he reasonably believed Young posed a

        serious threat of physical harm. Because Young was allegedly “reaching” or “grabbing at”

        his waistband, and in fact had a knife on him, Officer King argues his shooting was

        justified. We do not agree.

               Let’s start with the record. When Officer King opened fire, Young was empty-

        handed and stationary. J.A. 654–55. There is nothing in the record that suggests Young

        furtively moved “immediately prior to and at the very moment” Officer King fired his

        weapon. 2 Betton v. Belue, 942 F.3d 184, 191 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Greenidge v. Ruffin,

               2
                 Officer King’s statements regarding Young “flailing” his shirt do not expressly
        relate to the moments immediately preceding Officer King opening fire on Young. See
        J.A. 42, 52, 60, 217, 628.

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        927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991)). And the knife is irrelevant because Officer King was

        unaware of it until afterwards.

               Now to the case law. The cases cited by Officer King are factually distinct and do

        not help him. For example, an officer shot a detainee who “was running in a crouched

        position” and “close behind” another deputy who was yelling “[t]he man has got a gun!”

        in McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1005 (4th Cir. 1994). In Anderson v. Russell, an

        officer shot a suspect after (1) the officer was told by a citizen the suspect “appeared to

        have a gun[;]” (2) the officer perceived the suspect to have a gun “on his left side near his

        waist band[;]” and (3) the suspect “lowered [his hands], without explanation to the officers,

        in an attempt to reach into his back left pocket[,]” seemingly “reaching for the reported

        weapon.” 247 F.3d 125, 128 (4th Cir. 2001). When Officer King opened fire on Young,

        he had no such affirmative, reasonable belief that Young—who was standing still and

        empty-handed in the vacant street—had a weapon and was on the verge of using it against

        King or others.

               Appellants’ reliance on Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill is similarly misplaced. 161

        F.3d 782 (4th Cir. 1998). The procedural flip of this case, Sigman involved the district

        court’s grant of summary judgment for the officer on a Section 1983 excessive force claim.

        But in Sigman “officers had uncontroverted evidence of a suspect’s dangerousness and

        knew that the suspect was armed and was behaving violently within a residence.” Clem v.

        Corbeau, 284 F.3d 543, 555 n.4 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d

        279, 292 (4th Cir. 2001)). The Sigman suspect (1) had threatened to kill the officer and

        others present, Sigman, 161 F.3d at 784–85, 787; (2) threw objects and swung a knife at

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        the officer, id.; and (3) just before the officer shot him, had advanced to within 10 to 15

        feet of the officer, knife in-hand, “in a threatening manner[,]” id. at 785. Young—a

        nonviolent, nonthreatening misdemeanor suspect standing still, empty-handed, and 50 feet

        away—hardly reminds us of the suspect in Sigman.

               We thus conclude the district court correctly held a reasonable jury could find

        Officer King’s actions here violated the Fourth Amendment.

                  2. Clearly Established Analysis

               Because Ms. Bygum has shown Officer King violated her son’s Fourth Amendment

        right to be free from excessive force, we turn to the second step of the qualified immunity

        framework, the clearly established analysis. “A right is clearly established only if its

        contours are sufficiently clear that ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he is

        doing violates that right.’” Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 16 (2014) (quoting Anderson

        v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). We agree with the district court that Young’s

        Fourth Amendment right not to be shot under the circumstances was clearly established.

               As a threshold matter under this query, “we must first define the right at issue with

        specificity[,]” Knibbs v. Momphard, 30 F.4th 200, 223 (4th Cir. 2022), “keeping in mind

        that the Supreme Court has cautioned against defining the right at too ‘high [a] level of

        generality,’” Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 539 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting

        Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). “[W]e have previously stated, clearly

        established ‘includes not only already specifically adjudicated rights, but those manifestly

        included within more general applications of the core constitutional principle invoked.’”

        Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492, 502–03 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d

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        307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992)). There is no prerequisite of “a case directly on point[,]” Kisela,

        138 S. Ct. at 1152 (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)), as “the test is not

        whether ‘the very action in question has previously been held unlawful,’” Clem, 284 F.3d

        at 555 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).

               Instead, the standard is “whether pre-existing law makes the unlawfulness of an act

        ‘apparent.’” See id. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640). With this test in mind, we do

        not “assume that government officials are incapable of drawing logical inferences,

        reasoning by analogy, or exercising common sense.” See Williams v. Strickland, 917 F.3d

        763, 770 (4th Cir. 2019). “In some cases, government officials can be expected to know

        that if X is illegal, then Y is also illegal, despite factual differences between the two.” Id.

        As such, “defendants ‘can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even

        in novel factual circumstances,’ so long as the law provided ‘fair warning’ that their

        conduct was unconstitutional.” Booker, 855 F.3d at 538 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

        730, 741 (2002)).

               Here, “the question before us … is whether it was clearly established [by February

        11, 2019] that shooting an individual was an unconstitutional use of excessive force,”

        Betton, 942 F.3d at 194, when (1) the suspect was 50 feet away from the officer; (2) the

        suspect was facing the officer; (3) the suspect was stationary, not charging at or running

        toward the officer; (4) the suspect was not wielding or known to be carrying a weapon; (5)

        the officer had probable cause to believe the suspect had committed non-violent

        misdemeanors; (6) the suspect had behaved erratically; (7) the suspect was non-compliant;

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        (8) the suspect was attempting to evade arrest by flight; and (9) no other members of the

        public were present.

               As of February 2019, two Fourth Circuit decisions provided “fair warning” that

        shooting a suspect under these circumstances “was unconstitutional.” Booker, 855 F.3d at

        546 (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741). These cases did not “specifically adjudicate”

        Young’s right not to be shot under the conditions here and differ factually. But they involve

        the court finding a suspect’s right to be free from deadly force clearly established when the

        suspect posed a greater threat to the officer than Young did to Officer King. Thus, Young’s

        right is “manifestly included within more general applications of the core constitutional

        principle invoked” in the findings of Fourth Amendment violations in these cases. Wall,

        741 F.3d at 502–03 (quoting Pritchett, 973 F.2d at 314).

               First, in Clem v. Corbeau, two officers responded to a call to assist a mentally ill

        man’s family with getting him to see a doctor. 284 F.3d at 545–46. Like Officer King, the

        officers in Clem did not see anything indicating the presence of a weapon, see id. at 547,

        551, though the officer who shot the man could not rule out that he was armed, see id. at

        552, 555 n.3. Like Young, the man “became agitated[,]” see id. at 547, and non-lethal

        force (pepper spray) seemed ineffective, id. Similarly, the man was “grabbing,” “flailing,”

        and “waiving his arms around.”        See id.     The man’s hands were also “open” and

        weaponless. See id. at 547–48. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the man

        shot, the court found the constitutional right clearly established, as “a reasonable police

        officer in [the officer’s] position would have perceived [the man] to be unarmed, blinded,

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        and stumbling, in no condition to pose any threat to the officer” when the officer fired three

        shots at close range down the hallway at the man. Id. at 548, 554.

               Viewing our facts here, Young posed even less of a threat to Officer King than the

        man posed to the officer in Clem. Young was 50 feet away instead of at close range,

        stationary rather than moving toward the officer, and in an empty street instead of a

        confined hallway. If the man in Clem’s constitutional right was clearly established, it is

        “manifestly included” that Young’s was as well.

               Second, in Wilson, officers responded to a 911 call that a woman’s ex-boyfriend had

        broken into her home and assaulted her. 893 F.3d at 216. When they arrived on the scene,

        officers located the man, who pulled out a knife that he refused to drop. Id. at 216–17. As

        the man approached the officer, he slit his own throat, and stabbed and poked himself in

        the chest, with the knife. Id. at 217. The suspect (who survived) said he was about 20 feet

        away from the officers when the officer shot him five times. Id.

               The court stressed that following its 2018 opinion, officers were on notice that

        shooting a person violates that person’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive

        force when (1) the person was a burglary and battery suspect (2) the person “was standing

        about 20 feet from the officer holding a knife, inflicting harm on himself and stumbling,

        but not threatening others or making sudden movements; and (3) [the person] was refusing

        to obey the officer’s repeated commands to drop the knife at the time he was shot.” Id. at

        224.

               On each of these three elements, the Wilson suspect posed a greater threat to the

        officer than Young did to Officer King. Officers suspected the man in Wilson of burglary

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        and attacking someone—not nonviolent misdemeanors. And the Wilson suspect was 20

        feet away when the officer shot him—30 feet closer to the officer than Young to Officer

        King. Further, the Wilson suspect visibly had a knife he refused to drop and was stabbing

        himself.   Because Wilson “manifestly included” Young’s clearly established Fourth

        Amendment right not to be shot under the circumstances here, it would have been apparent

        to a reasonable officer on the scene that Officer King’s use of deadly force against Young

        was unconstitutional. 3

        IV.    Conclusion

               For the reasons articulated above, we find a reasonable jury could credit Ms.

        Bygum’s version of events, if proven at trial, over Officer King’s story and determine

        Officer King’s actions violated Young’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be

        free from excessive force. Without suggesting who is right or whose side a jury may

        ultimately believe, we therefore conclude Officer King was not entitled to qualified

        immunity. Accordingly, the district court’s order denying Officer King summary judgment

        on qualified immunity grounds with respect to plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force

        claim is

                                                                                      AFFIRMED.

               3
                 The cases Appellants rely on do not help Officer King on the clearly established
        prong. See, e.g., Sigman, 161 F.3d at 784–85 (undisputedly dangerous suspect had
        threatened to kill the officer and others present and had advanced to 10 to 15 feet from the
        officer with a knife when shot); see also McLenagan, 27 F.3d at 1005–09 (officer shot
        detainee “running in a crouched position” and “close behind” another deputy yelling “[t]he
        man has got a gun!”); see also Anderson, 247 F.3d at 128–31 (suspect appeared to be
        “reaching” for a gun, disregarding officers’ commands, when shot).
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