Court Opinion

ID: 9409472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 14:11:59.525068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.724587
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Raphael, White and Senior Judge Petty

              DANIEL EDWARD KRENICKY
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0790-22-2                                         PER CURIAM
                                                                                  JULY 18, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY
                                              W. Allan Sharrett, Judge

                              (Jonathan P. Bourlier; Law Office of Jonathan P. Bourlier, on brief),
                              for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Mason D. Williams, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Daniel Edward Krenicky of object sexual

              penetration of a child under thirteen, sodomy, aggravated sexual battery of a child under thirteen,

              and indecent liberties with a minor by a parent. The trial court sentenced Krenicky to life

              imprisonment for both the sexual penetration and sodomy convictions, and to twenty-five years’

              imprisonment for the remaining two convictions. Krenicky challenges the sufficiency of the

              evidence to sustain his convictions.1 After examining the briefs and record, the panel

              unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                     1
                        In his brief, Krenicky suggests that he did not preserve his sufficiency challenge but
              asks this Court to apply Rule 5A:18’s ends of justice exception to consider it. We find “that the
              challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was properly preserved by the appellant’s closing
              argument in h[is] bench trial.” Thorne v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 248, 250 n.1 (2016).
              “Consequently, Rule 5A:18 does not bar consideration of the merits of h[is] claim.” Id.
merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                                         BACKGROUND

       On appeal, we review the evidence “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth,

the prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires us to “discard the

evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the

credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).

       After a car accident involving Krenicky and his daughter M.K. in November 2018, M.K.’s

grandfather, James Touchard, obtained custody of her. In March 2019, Touchard was at home

watching a football game while nine-year-old M.K. played with Doris Upton’s four-year-old

grandson. When Touchard went to the bathroom, he found M.K. “on top of” the boy; both

children’s pants were down. Touchard contacted Child Protective Services, who then alerted police.

       In April 2019, Briana Valentino conducted a forensic interview of M.K. concerning the

incident. M.K. disclosed that Krenicky had had “sex” with her ten or twelve times. She described

how he had licked her “private,” rubbed his chin on it, “humped” her,” and pressed his “private”

against her. Using anatomical drawings, M.K. identified a female’s private as the genital area, and a

male’s private as the penis.

       A grand jury indicted Krenicky for object sexual penetration of a child under thirteen,

sodomy, aggravated sexual battery of a child under thirteen, and indecent liberties with a minor by a

parent. At trial, M.K. testified that on the night of November 16, 2018—the night before the car

accident—Krenicky “mess[ed] with” her. M.K. went to Krenicky’s bedroom after having a “bad

dream” and found him naked. Krenicky removed M.K.’s pajamas, pants, and underwear and placed

                                                -2-
his mouth on her “private part.” M.K. testified that Krenicky initially put his hand on, then “inside”

her “private part.” He then spread M.K.’s legs and “started licking” and placing his tongue “inside”

her “private part.” When M.K. rolled onto her stomach, Krenicky “got on top” of her and began

“humping” her. M.K. testified that she felt Krenicky’s “private part” repeatedly “pushing into [her]

belly,” but it did not enter her “private part.” Eventually, M.K. “felt something” warm, “gooey and

disgusting” come out of Krenicky’s “private part,” which then “shrank.”

       M.K. testified that Krenicky had “messed with” her ten or twelve times before the incident

and had once asked her to “suck [his] private part.” M.K. reported the abuse to her mother, but her

mother said, “It’s okay.”

       Valentino, an expert in forensic interviewing, testified that she did not notice anything

during M.K.’s forensic interview2 indicating that M.K.’s disclosures were “coached.” Valentino

opined that M.K.’s allegations were credible because M.K. made admissions during the interview

that could get M.K. “in trouble.”

       Impeached by his prior convictions for misdemeanor crimes of moral turpitude, Krenicky

denied sexually touching or penetrating M.K. He claimed not to recall M.K. entering his bedroom

on the night before the car accident.

       During closing argument, Krenicky asserted that the trial court should acquit him of all

charges because his testimony was more credible than M.K.’s, which was uncorroborated by

physical evidence and contained “substantive inconsistencies.” The trial court found that M.K.’s

testimony was credible because she had no motive to fabricate her claims and provided significant

details about the incident that she “couldn’t have” known “unless she had been there.” Accordingly,

the trial court convicted Krenicky of object sexual penetration of a child under thirteen, sodomy,

       2
           At trial, the Commonwealth introduced a video of M.K.’s forensic interview.
                                               -3-
aggravated sexual battery of a child under thirteen, and indecent liberties with a minor by a parent.

Krenicky appeals.

                                             ANALYSIS

       In his sole assignment of error, Krenicky contends that the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his convictions because M.K.’s allegedly uncorroborated testimony was incredible and the

trial court should have credited his testimony, which he claims was “clear, concise, and unrebutted.”

We disagree.

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does

not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,

228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193

(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted

to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by

the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

       Such deference stems, in part, from the trial court’s “opportunity to observe the testimony

and demeanor of all witnesses.” Lopez v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 70, 81 (2021).

Accordingly, settled principles dictate that “[d]etermining the credibility of witnesses . . . is

within the exclusive province of the [fact finder], which has the unique opportunity to observe

                                                 -4-
the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify.” Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525

(2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304

(1993)). “[T]he conclusions of the fact finder on issues of witness credibility may be disturbed

on appeal only when we find that the witness’ testimony was ‘inherently incredible, or so

contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief.’” Ragsdale v. Commonwealth,

38 Va. App. 421, 429 (2002) (quoting Ashby v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 548 (2000)).

“Evidence is not ‘incredible’ unless it is ‘so manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to

believe it’ or ‘shown to be false by objects or things as to the existence and meaning of which

reasonable men should not differ.’” Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 487 (2018) (quoting

Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415 (2006)).

       Krenicky’s contention that M.K.’s testimony was incredible because “no physical evidence”

corroborated her testimony is unpersuasive. It is well-settled that “a conviction for rape and other

sexual offenses may be sustained solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of the victim.” Wilson

v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 73, 87 (2005). To be sure, “because sexual offenses are typically

clandestine in nature, seldom involving witnesses to the offense except the perpetrator and the

victim, a requirement of corroboration would result in most sex offenses going unpunished.” Id. at

88 (quoting Garland v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 189, 192 (1989)).

       The record here supports the trial court’s finding that Krenicky sexually abused M.K. as

alleged. At trial, M.K. testified unequivocally that Krenicky had digitally and orally penetrated her

vagina and the abuse occurred between ten and twelve times. That testimony alone was sufficient to

sustain his convictions. Cf. Alvarez Saucedo v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 31, 48-49 (2019)

(holding ten-year-old victim’s testimony that the defendant “touched her vagina with his tongue”

was sufficient to prove oral sodomy).

                                                 -5-
        Consistent with that testimony, M.K. also told the forensic interviewer that Krenicky had

“sex” with her multiple times. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 457, 464 (2011) (holding a

fact finder may consider a witness’s prior consistent statements in assessing credibility). In

addition, the trial court could discount Krenicky’s self-serving denial that he sexually abused M.K.

as “little more than lying to ‘conceal his guilt,’ and could treat such prevarications as ‘affirmative

evidence of guilt.’” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 19, 25 (2008) (first quoting Haskins

v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 10 (2004); and then quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296

(1992)).

        In sum, M.K.’s testimony that Krenicky digitally and orally penetrated her vagina on

multiple occasions was competent, not inherently incredible, and sufficient to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he was guilty of object sexual penetration of a child under thirteen, sodomy,

aggravated sexual battery of a child under thirteen, and indecent liberties with a minor by a parent.

Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was not plainly wrong and we do not disturb it.

                                            CONCLUSION

        For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                               Affirmed.

                                                  -6-