Court Opinion

ID: 9686989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:13:18.234828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:23.579126
License: Public Domain

Blair Moody, Jr., J.
(concurring in part). I concur with the analysis and conclusion that the appellant improperly contacted and sought employment from members of a union to join in a class action and asked a union official to solicit clients for him. However, I deem the discipline imposed under the circumstances to be excessive. All evidence relating to direct solicitation of families is excluded from our consideration. I would suspend for one year.
Levin, J.
The grievance board found that Leonard C. Jaques solicited persons to join his clients, the parents of a victim of the Port Huron tunnel explosion, in a class action seeking a Coast Guard investigation of the explosion and asked a union business agent to recommend him to other persons who had claims arising out of the explosion.
The Court affirms the board’s determination of professional misconduct on the grounds that Jaques acknowledged in his testimony at the griev*545anee hearing that he had solicited the union to join his clients in a class action and there was substantial evidence supporting the charge that he asked the union official to recommend him to persons who had claims.
A disciplinary rule permits a lawyer to communicate with others for the purpose of obtaining their joinder in "litigation in the nature of a class action” where "success in asserting rights or defenses of his client * * * is dependent upon the joinder of others”. Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons, DR 2-104(A). The Court states that because no action had as yet been filed in behalf of Jaques’ clients the communications seeking joinder were improper. This limitation is not found in the rule and conflicts with its policy.
There was indeed substantial evidence that supports the finding that Jaques asked a union official to recommend him to persons who had claims. The hearing panel, in findings adopted by the grievance board, said that "crucial” to this determination was the testimony of a young former associate of Jaques.1 There was some other evidence, but there would not have been substantial evidence without her testimony.
A theory of the defense was that she had facilitated the solicitation of victims’ families in a manner which gave the impression that Jaques had done so, and that she testified against him in the expectation that the grievance administrator would refrain from bringing charges against her.
The associate acknowledged that she asked Eu*546gene LaBelle, attorney for the grievance administrator, shortly before she testified, whether she would be charged and said he responded that he did not believe it was likely. Jaques’ lawyer was not permitted to question LaBelle regarding his conversations with this witness.
In finding against Jaques, the panel declared "that there has been no demonstration of any motive on the part” of the associate to testify falsely. Its refusal to allow LaBelle to be questioned may have prevented Jaques from establishing such a motive by showing that, as a result of conversations between this witness and LaBelle there was a basis for a reasonable expectation on her part that if her testimony supported the allegations against Jaques she would not face charges.
We would reverse and remand for further proceedings because Jaques had a right to seek to impeach this witness by attempting to show that her discussions with LaBelle provided a basis for a reasonable expectation of forebearance or leniency.
I
Two days after the December 11th tunnel explosion, the Woods retained Jaques to recover damages for the death of their son; they entered into a contingent fee agreement. There is no claim that Jaques obtained these clients or, indeed, any other client, in violation of the canons or disciplinary rules. The claim is that he solicited, apparently unsuccessfully, for additional clients who had claims arising out of the tunnel explosion.
The hearing panel found that on "December 14 * * * Jaques decided that the United States Coast Guard should be required to investigate the tunnel *547explosion as he was of the opinion they were more competent than the state agencies”. In another case he had obtained Federal court order compelling the Coast Guard to make an investigation of an accident that occurred on Lake Erie.
Jaques telephoned the business agent for the local union of which 19 of those who died in the explosion were members, to arrange a meeting to discuss a class action to compel the Coast Guard to conduct an investigation of the explosion. Jaques was accompanied to the meeting by his associate. The business agent invited six union members and a priest to the meeting. None of those present was a victim or related to a victim. The priest was interested in the families of two who died in the explosion.
Jaques made a presentation urging the union and others to join his client in an action to compel a Coast Guard investigation.
The business agent testified that the discussion at the meeting concerned Jaques’ efforts to obtain joinder in an effort to obtain a Coast Guard investigation. He said that because he was concerned with finding lawyers to represent "[his] people” he believes he asked Jaques for business cards. He recalled receiving agreement forms. By the time of the hearing he had discarded all the forms. He could not describe the contents of the form, but when shown Jaques’ form contingent fee agreement he said it "looked like” the forms he received at the meeting. He denied that Jaques suggested that he "ought to get him some clients” or recommend him to victims’ families.
Jaques testified that the forms he gave McLaughlin were "agreement to represent contracts”, applicable only to the proposed class action, and *548that they specifically provided that no fee would be charged.2
The associate confirmed that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the proposed class action and that during the presentation Jaques told the audience there would be no charge for participation. She testified further, however, that Jaques piled a "fist full” of contingent fee agreement forms and a stack of business cards on a table in the meeting room.
The associate also testified that Jaques had given $100 to a union steward to cover expenses on a trip to Indiana to talk to widows of victims,3 but the findings of the grievance board concerning solicitation through this person are set aside for the reasons set forth in my colleague’s opinion.
Two of the union members who were present at the meeting and the priest said they did not recall seeing either stacks of business cards or of forms.
The Court infers from the business agent’s affirmative response to the isolated question whether the form contained the word "death”4 that the business agent thereby identified the forms he received as contingent fee forms. The thrust of the business agent’s testimony, however, was that Jaques never asked him to solicit clients, and that Jaques’ only concern was the class action.
It is apparent that the only substantial evidence supportive of the finding that Jaques "requested *549the [business] agent for the local union * * * to recommend him to persons who had claims arising out of the explosion” was the testimony of his former associate. (Emphasis supplied.)
There was no evidence that the business agent passed out any of the forms or that he himself solicited or caused anyone to solicit any of the victims’ families. The only proper conclusion on this record is that none of the victims’ families were solicited as a result of any effort by the business agent.5
After the associate completed her testimony, LaBelle and Jaques’ lawyer entered into a number of stipulations, one of which was that the associate’s testimony recounting conversations with La-Belle was incomplete. The panel refused to accept this stipulation and ordered that she reappear. On her further appearance, in response to a question concerning the omitted portion of the conversation, she said:
"In any event, indirectly related to this case was that I asked Mr. LaBelle if he though — and this was after I told him my version of the story — if he thought that anything I did would likely give rise to a complaint against me by the bar, and his answer was that, well, one never knows for sure about those things, but, having heard the facts, he did not believe that it was likely, that there would be any — .”
Jaques subpoenaed LaBelle who refused to be sworn.6 The hearing panel granted a motion to quash the subpoena.
*551II
The panel found that in arranging the meeting and urging the union to join in a class action to compel a Coast Guard investigation Jaques had, on his own testimony, personally solicited employment in violation of the disciplinary rules.
A disciplinary rule provides that a lawyer may not seek employment from non-lawyers who have not sought his advice.7 Jaques contends that he was not seeking employment but, rather, joinder in litigation in the nature of a class action as permitted by another disciplinary rule:
"If success in asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation in the nature of a class action is dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may accept, but, shall not seek, employment from those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their joinder.” Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons, DR 2-104(A)(5).
The administrator contends that "shall not *552seek” modifies both "employment” and "joinder” and that the rule therefore prohibits seeking either employment or joinder.
The Court notes that while the Woods had hired Jaques, no action "had yet been filed” when the meeting took place. It concludes that an attorney may not "seek out and solicit persons with whom he or she has no pre-existing relationship in order to suggest litigation begin” and that the "disciplinary rules * * * are not tolerant of the sort of conduct in which Mr. Jaques was here engaged”.
The phrase in the disciplinary rule, "from those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their joinder”, manifestly means that it is proper to communicate with others to obtain their joinder. The principal limitation is that a lawyer may not seek employment from persons with whom he communicates; the rule permits him to accept employment from such persons if offered.
Implicit in the rule is that a lawyer seeking joinder must have a client, but neither the language nor policy of the rule requires that an action have been commenced before solicitation of joinder in that action or in an ancillary action; "presuit communications” are permitted. Halverson v Convenient Food Mart, Inc, 458 F2d 927, 930-931 (CA 7, 1972). The only limitations in that regard are that the litigation be "in the nature of a class action” and that the client’s success in asserting rights or defenses in such litigation is "dependent upon the joinder of others”.
Delay in seeking joinder might be a disservice to the lawyer’s client, playing into the hands of an adversary who might argue that the delay in seeking joinder should be counted against the client should the lawyer seek to add parties in an action already commenced or to commence an *553ancillary class action. It might be of utmost importance to assemble all the forces at the outset to persuade the judge of the substantiality of the claim or the significance of the class.
All who testified, including the associate, agreed that Jaques made it clear to the audience that those joining in the class action would not be charged; the hearing panel so found. The proposed class action did not seek a money recovery but simply an investigation.
There is no finding that the meeting was a pretext and that the real purpose was to solicit the families of victims to employ Jaques to represent them on a contingent fee basis. On the contrary, the panel found that Jaques’ "purpose” in calling the business agent was to solicit the union and others to join in the class action.
Jaques subsequently filed an action in the United States District Court in the name of the Woods to compel a Coast Guard investigation. (Neither the union nor any of the other victims joined in this action. The action was not successful.)
The rule differentiates between solicitation for the purpose of obtaining joinder and solicitation of employment. It is not unethical for a lawyer to solicit other claimants to join with his client in a class action "if his motive is not to secure fees for himself’. Halverson v Convenient Food Mart, Inc, supra, p 931.8
*554Jaques had a client when he communicated with the business agent and sought the union’s joinder in the class action. He may not properly be disciplined for expeditiously seeking joinder of others in the action to compel a Coast Guard investigation.
Ill
In finding that Jaques gave the business agent contingent fee forms and requested that he solicit clients for him, the panel relied primarily on the testimony of Jaques’ former associate. Her credibility was, therefore, as the panel itself observed, of "crucial” importance.
Jaques sought to impeach her. He said that she had lied to him on several occasions, and that they were not on good terms when she left his employ. Witnesses contradicted various aspects of her testimon.9
*555It was Jaques’ position that it was she who was guilty of misconduct. A witness testified that she gave him Jaques’ contingent fee forms and business cards. Jaques said this was without his knowledge. The priest said that the associate called him within two days after the meeting to question him regarding the two families in which he had an interest. Jaques testified that the associate would receive a percentage of the legal business she brought to his firm.
Jaques sought to prove that the associate was fearful that she would be charged with misconduct and agreed to testify against him in an effort to avoid being charged herself. The panel erred in denying Jaques’ lawyer the opportunity to question LaBelle regarding any discussion or understanding with the associate.10 See People v Davis, 52 Mich 569; 18 NW 362 (1884); People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 354; 224 NW2d 867 (1975).
Evidence of a witness’s interest or motive for testifying has a direct bearing on credibility.11 The issue is never collateral.12
*556The panel relied fundamentally on the associate’s testimony in finding that Jaques had requested the business agent to solicit clients for him. The panel chose to believe her in preference to the conflicting testimony of Jaques, the business agent and other witnesses because "there has been no demonstration of any motive on [her] part * * * [w]hile, on the other hand, Jaques’ motive to fail to be completely truthful and honest with the panel can be explained only by either his failure to have the integrity to tell the truth and/or his desire not to be punished for the offense which appears to this panel to be clear”.
The associate acknowledged that she was apprehensive she might be charged. If the panel had believed Jaques it is possible she would have been charged.
"[Agreements regarding the testimony of a witness materially affect the bias or interest of a witness and should be placed before the trier of fact.”13 Even if there has been no actual promise of leniency, it is proper "to show a belief or even only a hope” of securing favorable treatment, in return for testimony. Farkas v United States, 2 F2d 644, 647 (CA 6, 1924).14
Jaques was not bound by the associate’s statement denying that LaBelle had made any commitment. She "was certainly not as reliable or objective a source of testimony” regarding her motives for testifying as LaBelle who was likely to know under what, if any, pressures she may have been; LaBelle’s testimony "may well have differed in *557substantial degree from the testimony given by” the associate.15
The associate was in a most difficult position. She was concerned that she might face grievance board action. The administrator’s case depended on her testimony.
The associate’s initial testimony regarding her discussions with LaBelle was incomplete as La-Belle and she subsequently acknowledged. LaBelle, who was not personally involved, could be expected to be more objective than the associate and fully straightforward in his testimony. His testimony would have cleared the air and resolved any doubt regarding expectations of leniency engendered by explicit or tacit understandings with the grievance administrator or LaBelle.
The confidence of the profession and of the public in the administration of grievance proceedings is not served by the refusal of the administrator’s counsel to be sworn and testify fully regarding any circumstances which might affect the legitimacy of the evidence on which the administrator relies in asserting that a lawyer has not conducted himself in accordance with the standards of the profession.
IV
The discipline imposed by the grievance board, three years suspension, manifestly was based on the findings of solicitation of victims’ families set aside by this Court.
The reduced discipline, two years suspension, *558cannot, in light of the discipline imposed by other hearing panels and the grievance board, be justified on the findings that are affirmed.
—In two cases lawyers were reprimanded for soliciting worker’s compensation claims through runners.16
—In one case the lawyers offered a police officer compensation to refer arrested persons to them; paralleling the facts here, no referrals were made and there was no further communication between the lawyers and the officer. The lawyers were reprimanded.17
—A two-month suspension was imposed where the lawyer pled nolo contendere to two of five counts charging solicitation of clients in traffic court; the other counts were dismissed.18
—The grievance board increased the 120-day suspension imposed by the hearing panel to a one-year suspension "for solicitation of three personal injury claims where the evidence disclosed money was paid layman [sic] for referring clients to him”.19
The novel construction of the disciplinary rule aside, neither the union nor any other person joined Jaques’ client in the class action. There is no evidence that the business agent or anyone acting at his suggestion solicited anyone to employ Jaques; Jaques obtained no client and no fees from the asserted request for clients. It is not claimed that he promised the business agent any compensation; the business agent was not a police officer or other public official.
*559The discipline is excessive and appears to be imposed on the evidence supportive of the findings of actual solicitation by or for Jaques of families of victims that have been set aside.
We would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Kavanagh, C. J., concurred with Levin, J.

 Because of the nature of the allegations of Jaques and his witnesses regarding his former associate’s activities, she is not identified by name in keeping with the policy of the State Bar Grievance Board Procedural and Administrative Rules that disciplinary files and records shall be kept confidential until a formal complaint is filed. See Grievance Rule 16.29.

 Jaques could not produce a copy of the agreement. He reconstructed a facsimile. The panel rejected Jaques’ testimony that this was an accurate facsimile and, on the basis of the associate’s testimony, found that the agreement was a contingent fee agreement.

 This testimony was contradicted by Mr. and Mrs. Woods. See fn 9, infra.

 Although the facsimile prepared by Jaques, assertedly from memory, did not contain the word "death”, it is not at all improbable that an "agreement to represent” in connection with a class action to compel an investigation into an explosion which caused 21 fatalities would contain the word "death”.

 All the evidence regarding solicitation of victims’ families is excluded from our consideration for the reasons set forth in my colleague’s opinion.

 The following colloquoy indicates the clarity of the argument by Jaques’ lawyer and the refusal of LaBelle to take the stand:
"Mr. Corace [Attorney for Respondent]: Call Gene LaBelle.
"Mr. LaBelle: I respectfully object, decline to be sworn as a witness *550unless I’m given some tender as to the relevancy of my testimony. I have no actual knowledge as to whether or not Mr. Jaques solicited these cases, or acted in concert with the other people as alleged in the complaint. I have no knowledge with regard to any relevant or material collateral matters.
"Mr. Corace: An attorney is like any other person. He is bound to appear when subpoenaed. This attorney has been subpoenaed. He is bound to take the stand, and he is bound to testify, save only for confidential matters learned from his client. That’s all.
"There are a host of cases that say that, and they apply to civil lawyers, and those cases are collected in Section 37.25—
"Mr. Columbo [Vice Chairman of Hearing Panel]: I think we all know the law, Mr. Corace. You realize there is a rule too that it is an unusual procedure to call a lawyer who is participating in a lawsuit.
"I suggest, Mr. Chairman, we have Mr. LaBelle take the stand and we will rule on the question.
"Chairman Maiullo: Take the stand, Mr. LaBelle.
"Mr. LaBelle: I respectfully refuse to do so, sir.
"You may cite me for contempt and the procedure is outlined in Rule 16.
"Mr. LaBelle: If he thinks I have some relevant evidence, I would like to know what it is.
"Mr. Corace: He knows one thing I’m going to ask him about. I’m going to ask him about his little visit to [the associate].
"Mr. LaBelle: I won’t testify.
"Mr. Corace: I submit that is why he won’t take the stand.
"Mr. LaBelle: That is not relevant in these proceedings, what I said to her. And besides that it is part of my work product.
"Mr. Corace: We had a stipulation which he refused to receive. When he takes the stand, I’m going to ask him a few questions about like when he walked over here after [the associate] had said, golly, there was nothing I left out, after the second shot the panel gave her, and then he says, stands in front of her and reminds her about something, then she testifies, oh, yes, there was. Come on, now. Where is the privilege? The work product privilege is in discovery, civil discovery, but there is no work product privilege at trial.
"Now, you have known, Mr. Chairman, that this was a storm cloud looming on the horizon and so has Mr. LaBelle and the whole crux of my defense lies with him, right now. He took it upon himself to become investigator and go over to [the associate’s] office and sit down with her and have a conversation, and then allowed me to examine her on what the conversation was, and then she was — then stipulated with regard to that conversation, and then came back — then she was called back, now, we have had a lot of it and that is one area that I’m certainly entitled to examine him on.
*551"Mr. Columbo: We brought [the associate] back to clarify that, and she told us, as I recall it, that she did talk to you about whether or not any charges would be brought against her.
"Mr. LaBelle: That is exactly true. Your recollection is perfect, Mr. Vice Chairman.
"Mr. Corace: * * * We have a right to show, through this witness, that after [the associate] was called here, and as the record shows, she was asked whether she had made any omission in her statement with regard to what was discussed between she and this witness, he walked over to her in this courtroom and reminded her of the testimony that she ultimately gave with regard to whether or not she was going to be charged with an unethical practice, and I submit to you that the precise and carefully worded statement that she used is, itself, grounds for examination of this witness. The words were, in substance, no, on the basis of the facts as you relate them to me * * * .”

 "A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a nonlawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer.” Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons, DR 2-103(A).

 An ethics opinion states that while it is unethical for a lawyer to solicit members of a class for funds to be used to pay compensation, it is not unethical to solicit funds to defray expenses of preparation of a class action. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Opinion No. 1326 (May 27, 1975).
Another ethics opinion permits a lawyer to accept employment from class members solicited by a client. The client, seeking joinder and financial assistance in a class action, mailed potential class members a request for an immediate contribution and a limited *554power of attorney authorizing the client to retain the lawyer and assign him a contingent fee of 35% and a contingent interest of 12% to the client. The lawyer drafted the documents. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Opinion No. 1280 (August 8, 1973).

 The associate testified that she accompanied Jaques to the Woods’ home and that the union steward arrived a short time later. She said she was present at all times during the meeting and that Jaques gave the steward contingent fee forms, business cards and $100 to cover expenses of the Indiana trip.
Jaques said that he visited the Woods’ home in response to a telephone call from Woods about other lawyers trying to persuade him to change lawyers and that the union steward, a friend of Woods’ son, arrived soon thereafter. He said that the associate was not present at all times; part of the time she was in another room talking to Mrs. Woods. Jaques said that he gave the steward $22 which the steward told Woods his son owed him when he died and which Woods did not have at the time. He said that he paid the money to avoid embarrassment to Woods and that Woods paid him back.
Jaques denied giving the steward contingent fee forms. He said that the steward asked him if he could recommend him to people who were looking for lawyers in connection with the explosion and that he told the steward he would be glad to talk to such persons, but that the steward should not "push” for him. Jaques also said that the *555steward asked to see a contingent fee agreement and that Woods showed the steward his agreement.
Jaques’ story concerning the money and the agreement was corroborated in its essentials by Mr. and Mrs. Woods.

 The associate was not LaBelle’s client; there was no attorney-client privilege.
While a lawyer ordinarily should not act if he knows he will be called to testify, this does not disable or shield him from testifying. Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons, DR 5-101(B); DR 5-102. Whether a lawyer who unexpectedly is called should continue to represent his client depends on all the circumstances. See Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons, DR 5-101(B)(4); cf. Phillips v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co, 43 Del Ch 436; 235 A2d 835 (1967); Galarowicz v Ward, 119 Utah 611; 230 P2d 576 (1951).

 MCLA 600.2158; MSA 27A.2158; People v Jackson, 390 Mich 621, 625, fn 2; 212 NW2d 918 (1973); People v Sesson, 45 Mich App 288, 301; 206 NW2d 495 (1973), lv den 389 Mich 801 (1973). See, generally, 3A Wigmore, Evidence (Chadboum rev), §§ 948-949, pp 783-792; McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 40, pp 78-80.

 McCormick, supra; Wigmore, supra; Geary v People, 22 Mich 220, 222 (1871).

 People v Glover, 47 Mich App 454, 459; 209 NW2d 533 (1973). Similarly, see People v McCoy, 392 Mich 231; 220 NW2d 456 (1974).

 Although these cases and others cited in this opinion arise out of criminal prosecutions, the principle is the same in civil litigation. See Foster v Krause, 187 Mich 630; 153 NW 1066 (1915); Durant v Stahlin, 374 Mich 82, 90, fn 5; 130 NW2d 910 (1964); McCormick, supra, § 40, pp 78-80 and § 274, p 665, fn 94.

 See Hughes v United States, 427 F2d 66, 68 (CA 9, 1970), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that although an informant admitted charges were pending against him and his hope for leniency, the defendant should have been permitted to question a police officer regarding any pressure exerted upon the informant during conversations between the officer and the informant.

 State Bar Grievance Board, Synopses of Cases Disposed of by Formal Hearing from March 1, 1970 (looseleaf), Reprimands, p 6, File No. 27980; id, p 14, File No. 27981.

 Id, p 29, File Nos. 32798, 32800.

 Id, Suspensions, p 19, File No. 30413.

 Id, p 28, File No. 29651.