Court Opinion

ID: 9759062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:02:27.419442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:13:13.874136
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-20671     Document: 00516875435         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/28/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                            FILED
                                                                  August 28, 2023
                                  No. 21-20671                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                            Clerk

   J.W.; Lori Washington, as next friend J.W.,

                                                           Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                       versus

   Elvin Paley; Katy Independent School District,

                                           Defendants—Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 4:18-CV-1848
                  ______________________________

   Before Graves, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:
          A school resource officer tased a special-needs student who physically
   struggled with school staff while attempting to leave school following a
   violent episode. The student’s mother sued the officer and the school
   district, bringing constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and disability
   discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
   Rehabilitation Act. We conclude, based on recent Supreme Court precedent,
   that the district court incorrectly subjected the disability discrimination
   claims to administrative exhaustion. On the merits, however, the district
   court correctly granted summary judgment to the officer and school district.
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   Plaintiffs have not shown that the officer intentionally discriminated based
   on the student’s disability. The district court also correctly denied Plaintiffs’
   claim alleging that the tasing amounted to excessive corporal punishment in
   violation of the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth
   Amendment. We AFFIRM.
                                                   I
                                                   A
           The underlying facts are disturbing. In November 2016, Jevon
   Washington1 was a 17-year-old special-needs student at Mayde Creek High
   School in the Katy Independent School District (KISD) in Katy, Texas. He
   was diagnosed with “an intellectual disability” and “an emotional
   disturbance” that impact “his daily functioning, his ability to communicate,
   control his emotions, and access regular educational services without
   accommodations.” At the time, Jevon was around 6’2” and weighed 250
   pounds.
           On the day of the incident, Jevon and a fellow special-needs student
   finished their class assignment and proceeded to play a card game. After
   some verbal taunting from the student, Jevon became angry, and according
   to a faculty member, punched the student in the chest before storming out of
   the classroom.
           Jevon tried to enter what he called his “chill out” room—a designated
   classroom that the school permitted him to use, under his academic
   accommodations, when he needed to regulate his emotions. Finding the
   room occupied by another student, Jevon became even more frustrated. A
           _____________________
           1
            Because this case involves events that occurred when Jevon was a minor, the case
   caption and initial district court filings referred to him by his initials to protect his identity.
   Now that his name has been disclosed, we refer to him by his full name.

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   staff member witnessed Jevon throw a desk across the room before kicking
   the door and heading toward the school exit. He was stopped in the
   breezeway by a security guard, a school resource officer, an athletic coach,
   and the assistant principal.
          Soon after, the individual Defendant, school resource officer Elvin
   Paley, heard a request for assistance over the school radio and arrived on the
   scene. Officer Paley had never interacted with Jevon before but said in his
   declaration that he “knew [Jevon] was probably a special needs student . . .
   but [he] did not know anything about [Jevon’s] specific disability or
   limitations.” Officer Paley did not witness the earlier incident in which Jevon
   punched his classmate but said that he had previously “witnessed [Jevon]
   leave class, curse at teachers, and punch the concrete hallway walls.”
          Officer Paley’s body camera captured most of the subsequent events
   in the breezeway. Officer Paley watched from a short distance away as Jevon
   paced in front of the exit door, explaining to staff that he wanted to walk home
   so he could calm down. The video shows Security Guard John Oglesby
   standing in front of the door, attempting to orally de-escalate the situation by
   asking what happened and suggesting that Jevon go to his designated
   classroom to calm down. Jevon only became more agitated, responding to
   Guard Oglesby with profanities. When Jevon pushed against the exit door, a
   struggle ensued at the door with Guard Oglesby attempting to hold the door
   shut to keep Jevon inside.
          Officer Paley moved toward Jevon and Guard Oglesby, with the body
   camera footage going dark as he pushed up against Jevon’s body. Both Officer
   Paley and Guard Oglesby told Jevon to calm down several times. Officer
   Paley threatened to tase Jevon, and a voice is heard saying, “You are not
   going to get through this door, just relax.” Jevon then began screaming that
   he wanted to go home.

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             As Officer Paley moved away from Jevon, the video becomes clear
   again, showing Guard Oglesby and a female school resource officer struggling
   to hold Jevon in the doorframe as he tried to slip through. Officer Paley told
   the staff members to “let him go,” and as Jevon walked outside, Officer Paley
   fired his taser. Jevon screamed and fell to his knees. With Jevon on his knees,
   Officer Paley continued to tase Jevon, using a “drive stunning” method.2
   Officer Paley used the taser for approximately 15 seconds total, continuing to
   tase Jevon in the back even after he was lying facedown on the ground and
   not struggling.
             As a result of the tasing, Jevon urinated, defecated, and vomited on
   himself. Officer Paley commanded Jevon to put his hands behind his back
   while the female officer handcuffed him. School officials called the school
   nurse and subsequently the paramedics to treat Jevon. They then contacted
   Jevon’s mother, Lori Washington.
             Quite understandably, the family struggled in the aftermath, with Ms.
   Washington keeping Jevon home from school for several months because she
   feared for his safety at school and because the tasing caused him intense
   anxiety and PTSD.
                                                  B
             After an unfruitful meeting between Ms. Washington and the school
   district, Ms. Washington filed a petition against the school district with the
   Texas Education Agency under the procedures provided in the Individuals
   with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). In addition to the IDEA claims, the
   petition included constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 along with

             _____________________
             2
                 To “drive stun” means to hold the taser against the body without deploying the
   prongs.

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   claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and §
   504 of the Rehabilitation Act (§ 504).
           KISD responded by arguing, in part, that the hearing officer did not
   have jurisdiction over the non-IDEA claims. The hearing officer agreed and
   dismissed all non-IDEA claims for lack of jurisdiction. Likewise, the hearing
   officer dismissed the IDEA claims on timeliness grounds.
           Ms. Washington, on behalf of Jevon (collectively “Plaintiffs”), sued
   KISD and Officer Paley (collectively “Defendants”) in federal district
   court, again asserting claims under the ADA and § 504 against KISD, as
   well as § 1983 claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against
   Officer Paley.3 Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages along
   with attorney fees.
           Defendants jointly moved for summary judgment. The district court
   denied summary judgment on the § 1983 Fourth Amendment excessive force
   claim against Officer Paley but granted summary judgment to Defendants on
   all other claims. The district court held that: (1) Plaintiffs’ ADA and § 504
   claims were precluded for failure to exhaust administrative procedures; (2)
   alternatively, Plaintiffs’ ADA and § 504 claims failed on the merits; (3)
   Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim was
   precluded under our precedent in Fee v. Herndon;4 and (4) Officer Paley was
   not entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 Fourth Amendment
   excessive force claim because of genuine and material factual disputes. The

           _____________________
           3
             Plaintiffs originally asserted § 1983 claims against KISD but later abandoned
   them. They also asserted a claim under the Texas Constitution against Officer Paley, but
   the district court granted summary judgment on that claim, and it is not at issue in this
   appeal.
           4
               900 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990).

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   district court rejected Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration as to their ADA
   and § 504 claims.
          Defendants challenged the district court’s denial of qualified
   immunity on the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim in an
   interlocutory appeal to this court, and we reversed in an unpublished
   opinion.5 Plaintiffs’ requests for a panel rehearing and rehearing en banc were
   denied.6
          Plaintiffs timely appealed the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment to Defendants on the disability discrimination claims and the
   § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim. Specifically,
   Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court erred by: (1) subjecting their
   disability discrimination claims under the ADA and § 504 to the IDEA
   exhaustion requirement; (2) concluding that their disability discrimination
   claims were not viable on the merits; and (3) barring Plaintiffs’ substantive
   due process claim based on a misreading of our precedent in Fee.
                                                  II
          “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all
   evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all
   reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.”7 Summary judgment is
   appropriate only when the moving party establishes that “there is no genuine
   dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
   matter of law.”8

          _____________________
          5
              J.W. v. Paley, 860 F. App’x 926 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
          6
              Order, J.W. v. Paley, No. 19-20429 (5th Cir. Nov. 18, 2021).
          7
              Pierce v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 512 F.3d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 2007) (italics omitted).
          8
              Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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                                                  III
          In its summary judgment ruling and subsequent denial of Plaintiffs’
   motion for reconsideration, the district court held that Plaintiffs were
   required to exhaust administrative procedures under the IDEA before
   bringing their ADA and § 504 claims in district court. Plaintiffs contend that
   their ADA and § 504 claims are not subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion
   provision.9 With the helpful guidance of recent Supreme Court precedent,
   we agree with Plaintiffs.
          The IDEA aims to ensure that children with disabilities receive
   special education services.10 It does so by offering federal funds to states in
   exchange for a commitment to furnish a “free appropriate public education”
   to children with certain disabilities.11 It also provides procedural safeguards
   that parents can use when they disagree with the school regarding their
   child’s education.12 Specifically, a parent may file a complaint with a state or
   local agency,13 and after an initial mandatory meeting,14 may proceed to a
   “due process hearing” before an impartial hearing officer,15 followed by an
   appeal to the state education agency (if the initial complaint was filed

          _____________________
          9
             Plaintiffs also argue: (1) that Defendants should be judicially estopped from
   relying on the IDEA exhaustion requirement because they previously made contradictory
   arguments in the IDEA due process hearing; and (2) that exhaustion would be futile. Due
   to the Supreme Court’s clear guidance on IDEA exhaustion, we decline to address these
   arguments.
          10
               Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 158 (2017).
          11
               Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1).
          12
               Fry, 580 U.S. at 159.
          13
               See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).
          14
               Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i).
          15
               Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A).

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   locally).16 Only after exhausting that process can a parent seek judicial review
   by filing a civil action in state or federal court.17
           Importantly for our purposes, the IDEA contains an exhaustion
   requirement for certain claims brought under laws that may overlap with the
   IDEA, including the ADA and Rehabilitation Act:
           Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit
           the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the
           Constitution, the [ADA], title V of the Rehabilitation Act
           [including § 504], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of
           children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil
           action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under
           [the IDEA], the [IDEA’s administrative procedures] shall be
           exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the
           action been brought under [the IDEA].18
           At the time this appeal was filed, our precedent applied this
   exhaustion requirement even to suits seeking remedies not provided by the
   IDEA, such as compensatory damages.19 But prior to oral argument, the
   Supreme Court granted certiorari in Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools,20 and we
   granted Plaintiffs’ motion to place this appeal in abeyance, acknowledging
   the potential impact of Perez on the application of IDEA exhaustion.21

           _____________________
           16
                See id. § 1415(g).
           17
                See id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
           18
                Fry, 580 U.S. at 161 (alteration in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)).
           19
              McMillen v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 939 F.3d 640, 648 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (“[B]ecause the IDEA can remedy the failure to provide a blind student with a reader by
   giving her one, a suit seeking damages for such a failure must first exhaust the IDEA’s
   administrative procedures.”).
           20
                143 S. Ct. 81 (Mem) (granting certiorari).
           21
             Order, J.W. v. Paley, No. 21-20671 (5th Cir. Oct. 3, 2022). In their motion to
   reconsider abatement, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have forfeited any argument that

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           The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Perez provides unmistakable
   new guidance.22 Interpreting the word “relief” in the IDEA’s exhaustion
   provision as synonymous with “remedies,” the Court held that because the
   IDEA’s exhaustion requirement applies only to suits that “seek[] relief . . .
   also available under” the IDEA,23 it does not apply “when a plaintiff seeks
   a remedy IDEA cannot provide.”24 As the plaintiff in Perez sought
   compensatory damages, a remedy both sides agreed was unavailable under
   the IDEA, his claim was not subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion
   requirement.25
           Similarly here, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages.26
   The IDEA provides neither. Thus, Plaintiffs can proceed without
   exhaustion.

           _____________________
   suits for remedies not available under the IDEA are exempt from the IDEA exhaustion
   requirement because Plaintiffs only raised the issue in a “passing footnote.” Indeed, in
   their opening brief, Plaintiffs acknowledge in a footnote that the argument is foreclosed by
   our decision in McMillen, but “reserve the right to challenge that holding en banc or in a
   petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.” We hold that this was sufficient to preserve
   the argument in the event of intervening Supreme Court precedent. See United States v.
   Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that an argument was preserved for
   review in light of intervening Supreme Court precedent when appellant conceded the
   argument was foreclosed by circuit precedent but raised it in his brief only to “preserve it
   for further review”), cert. granted, vacated on other grounds, Pineiro v. United States, 543 U.S.
   1101 (2005).
           22
                Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 598 U.S. 142 (2023).
           23
                Id. at 863.
           24
                Id. at 865.
           25
                Id. at 863–64.
           26
             Plaintiffs also seek attorney fees. Attorney fees are an available remedy under the
   IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), and Perez indicates that requests for remedies
   provided by the IDEA may be subject to exhaustion even if included in an action that also
   requests damages. Perez, 598 U.S. at 150 (“[A] plaintiff who files an ADA action seeking
   both damages and the sort of equitable relief IDEA provides may find his request for

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           Plaintiffs also contend that the district court erred in holding that their
   ADA and § 504 claims against KISD fail on the merits. We disagree. The
   district court properly granted summary judgment to KISD on the merits of
   the ADA and § 504 claims because Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence of
   intentional discrimination.
                                                  A
           Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a
   disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in
   or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
   entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”27 Section 504 of
   the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides, in relevant part:
           No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
           States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by
           reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
           participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
           discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
           financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted
           by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
           Service.28
           “The language in the ADA generally tracks the language set forth in
   [§ 504].”29 And the ADA expressly provides that “[t]he remedies,
   procedures, and rights” available under the Rehabilitation Act are also

           _____________________
   equitable relief barred or deferred if he has yet to exhaust [IDEA procedures].”).
   However, it would be nonsensical to apply the exhaustion requirement solely to the
   attorney fees request because Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees is inextricably intertwined
   with the ADA and § 504 claims for compensatory and punitive damages they bring.
           27
                42 U.S.C. § 12132.
           28
                29 U.S.C. § 794.
           29
                Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002).

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   accessible under the ADA.30 Thus, we “equate[] liability standards under
   § 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] and the ADA.”31
           To establish a prima facie case under either statute, a plaintiff must
   show:
           (1) that he is a qualified individual . . . ; (2) that he is being
           excluded from participation in, or being denied benefits of,
           services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is
           responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by the
           public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or
           discrimination is by reason of his disability.32
   “The only material difference between [§ 504 and Title II of the ADA] lies
   in their respective causation requirements.” 33 Section 504 requires that the
   plaintiff’s disability be the “sole reason” for the exclusion or denial of
   benefits, but the ADA’s standard is less stringent.34
           The ADA and § 504 provide for vicarious liability. This means that a
   plaintiff need not identify an official policy to sustain a claim against a public
   entity as it may be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees under
   either statute.35
           Plaintiffs can only recover damages under the ADA or § 504 upon a
   showing of intentional discrimination.36 While we have not “delineate[d] the

           _____________________
           30
                42 U.S.C. § 12133.
           31
                D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2010).
           32
              T.O. v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 2 F.4th 407, 417 (5th Cir. 2021) (alteration in
   original) (quoting Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671–72 (5th Cir.
   2004)).
           33
                Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2005).
           34
                Id. (quoting Soledad v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 304 F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2002)).
           35
                See Delano-Pyle, 302 F.3d at 574–75.
           36
                Id. at 574.

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   precise contours” of this intentionality requirement, our “cases to have
   touched on the issue require something more than deliberate indifference.” 37
   “Of course, this standard is met under circumstances revealing a
   discriminatory motive.”38
           Because disparate treatment and failure-to-accommodate claims
   under the ADA and § 504 are distinct,39 the intentionality standard looks
   different for each of them. Our case law provides more guidance for failure-
   to-accommodate claims than disparate treatment claims. For a failure-to-
   accommodate claim specifically, “intentional discrimination requires at least
   actual knowledge that an accommodation is necessary.” 40 The requisite
   notice comes from the plaintiff’s request for an accommodation or from facts
   establishing that “‘the disability, resulting limitation, and necessary
   reasonable accommodation’ were ‘open, obvious, and apparent’ to the
   entity’s relevant agents.”41 Notice beyond merely notice of the disability is
   required because “[t]he ADA [and § 504] do[] not require clairvoyance.”42
   “[K]nowledge of a disability is different from knowledge of the resulting
   limitation” and “certainly is different from knowledge of the necessary
   accommodation.”43 When a disability is mental, rather than physical, the

           _____________________
           37
             Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations
   omitted) (quoting Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 575 (5th
   Cir. 2018)).
           38
             Wilson v. City of Southlake, No. 21-10771, 2022 WL 17604575, at *6 (5th Cir. Dec.
   13, 2022) (per curiam).
           39
            Windhauser v. Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 360 F.
   App’x 562, 565 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
           40
                Smith v. Harris Cnty., 956 F.3d 311, 319 (5th Cir. 2020).
           41
                Windham v. Harris Cnty., 875 F.3d 229, 237 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
           42
                Id. at 236 (quoting Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995)).
           43
                Id. at 238.

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   disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable accommodations
   often are not “open, obvious, and apparent.”44
                                                   B
           It is this “intentional discrimination” requirement that dooms
   Plaintiffs’ claims under either a disparate treatment or failure-to-
   accommodate theory. While Officer Paley may have used poor judgment
   when he tased Jevon, Plaintiffs have failed to create a genuine dispute on the
   issue of whether Officer Paley intentionally discriminated against Jevon by
   reason of his disability.
           On appeal, Plaintiffs frame their ADA and § 504 claims as disparate
   treatment claims. They point to Officer Paley’s declaration, in which he
   stated that he wanted to keep Jevon inside the school because Jevon’s
   disability made leaving the premises unsafe. According to Plaintiffs’ logic,
   because Jevon’s disability motivated Officer Paley to keep him inside the
   school and because he tased Jevon to keep him inside, a jury could reasonably
   conclude Officer Paley discriminated against Jevon by reason of his disability.
           But more is required to meet the intentional discrimination standard.
   Officer Paley’s desire to keep Jevon inside the school does not rise to the level
   of “something more than deliberate indifference” to Jevon’s disability. 45 In
   fact, record evidence shows that Officer Paley’s desire to keep Jevon inside
   the school arose from consideration of the vulnerabilities surrounding Jevon’s
   disability, not from indifference, much less ill-will or discriminatory animus.
   As the district court put it, “The treatment of a disabled student may be

           _____________________
           44
                Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996).
           45
             Plaintiffs argue that “the district court held Plaintiffs to an unduly high standard
   for proving discriminatory intent, faulting Plaintiffs for failing to show that Defendants’
   treatment of Jevon was ‘motivated by ill will, prejudice, or spite.’” But this is something of
   a red herring as Defendants’ actions do not even rise to the level of “deliberate
   indifference.”

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   different from that of a nondisabled student, but different is not necessarily
   discriminatory.” If different were always discriminatory, then even disability
   accommodations would be discriminatory.
           Against this logic, Plaintiffs argue that we must consider the method
   that Officer Paley used to keep Jevon from exiting the building: tasing him
   repeatedly. Again, the tasing was arguably excessive. However, based on the
   summary judgment evidence, it was not indifference or hostility toward
   Jevon’s disability that motivated Officer Paley when he tased Jevon, but a
   desire to keep Jevon safe inside the school because of the vulnerabilities
   caused by his disability. To show why this subtle distinction matters, consider
   a hypothetical non-disabled student behaving similarly to Jevon who was
   similarly considered, for whatever reason, unsafe to leave the school.
   Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence that Officer Paley would not have
   tased such a non-disabled student.46

           _____________________
           46
              Plaintiffs claim that, based on the evidence they produced, a finder of fact could
   conclude that a non-disabled student would have been treated differently than Jevon.
   Putting aside the fact that this argument does not speak to the intentional discrimination
   requirement, Plaintiffs’ argument is a stretch. Plaintiffs’ summary judgment evidence
   includes the school district disciplinary handbook, which provides that “[s]tudents who
   leave campus at any time without parental permission and administrative approval shall be
   considered truant and will be subject to disciplinary action.” Plaintiffs contend that because
   nothing in the handbook allows a school official to restrain a student to prevent truancy, “a
   finder of fact could conclude that the truancy policies that would ordinarily apply to a
   nondisabled student attempting to leave campus were not applied to Jevon and that he was
   instead subjected to a particularly violent form of restraint because he was disabled.” But
   the lack of a specific policy allowing school officials to restrain students attempting to leave
   school does not lead to a reasonable inference that a non-disabled student attempting to
   leave campus would have been treated differently than Jevon. The policy disallows students
   from leaving campus and simply does not specify methods by which officials can stop
   students from leaving. This makes sense as different situations may call for different actions
   from school officials. Thus, there is no evidence that a non-disabled person would not have
   been tased in similar circumstances. And in fact, the record shows that Officer Paley was
   involved in another incident in which he tased a non-disabled student in February 2017.
   Although the student was not attempting to leave the school, the incident was similar in

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           Plaintiffs further argue that Officer Paley’s statements in the
   aftermath of the tasing show discriminatory intent. Immediately after the
   tasing, Officer Paley said to Jevon as he lay on the ground: “I did not want to
   tase you, but you do not run shit around here, you understand?” Officer Paley
   subsequently explained, “I got tired of wrestling with him so I popped him.”
   While these statements may have been inappropriate, they do not show
   indifference or discriminatory animus toward Jevon’s disability. Indeed,
   Officer Paley’s chosen language made no reference to Jevon’s disability and
   was not traditionally associated with a protected disability. Plaintiffs have
   thus failed to create a material dispute on the issue of intentional
   discrimination in regard to their disparate treatment claim.
           And to the extent Plaintiffs put forth a failure-to-accommodate claim,
   it similarly fails. While Officer Paley said in his declaration that he had prior
   knowledge of Jevon’s disability, there is no evidence that he had notice of its
   resulting limitations or necessary accommodations. Plaintiffs do not contend that
   Officer Paley had been privy to the meetings regarding limitations of and/or
   accommodations for Jevon’s disability. Nor were the limitations or
   accommodations “open, obvious, and apparent” to Officer Paley. In fact, he
   had already witnessed the failure of staff’s attempts to orally de-escalate the
   situation. There is no evidence that Officer Paley was aware or should have
   been aware of a further accommodation that would have calmed Jevon down.
   Plaintiffs have thus failed to create a material dispute on the issue of
   intentional discrimination for their failure-to-accommodate claim.
           We reiterate that Officer Paley’s use of his taser in this situation was
   poor judgment, especially after Jevon had ceased struggling. However, § 504
   of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA are not the proper vehicles

           _____________________
   that Officer Paley deployed his taser to restrain and gain control over a student behaving
   disruptively.

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                                          No. 21-20671

   for remedying “all unreasonable, inappropriate, unprofessional, and/or
   unduly harsh conduct by public agents.”47
           We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
   KISD on the ADA and § 504 claims.
                                               IV
            Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the district court misapplied our
   precedent when it granted summary judgment to Officer Paley on the
   substantive due process claim.48
           In its opinion, the district court acknowledged that “[s]chool children
   have a liberty interest in their bodily integrity protected by the Due Process
   Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and . . . physical abuse by a school
   employee violates that right.” But in granting summary judgment to Officer
   Paley, it applied our holding in Fee v. Herndon, that “as long as the state
   provides an adequate remedy, a public school student cannot state a claim for
   denial of substantive due process through excessive corporal punishment.”49

           _____________________
           47
                Wilson, 2022 WL 17604575, at *11.
           48
               Defendants contend that this argument is precluded by our previous opinion in
   J.W. v. Paley, 860 F. App’x 926 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam), under law-of-the-case
   doctrine. Under that doctrine, “when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision
   should continue to govern the same issue in subsequent stages in the same case.” Lindquist
   v. City of Pasadena, 669 F.3d 225, 238 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). While our previous
   decision discussed Fee, it did not “decide” the substantive due process issue. See J.W., 860
   F. App’x at 928–29. It only decided the Fourth Amendment excessive force qualified
   immunity issue. Thus, law-of-the-case does not apply. See Pegues v. Morehouse Par. Sch. Bd.,
   706 F.2d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 1983).
           49
             Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Fee,
   900 F.2d at 808). In Fee, we denied the substantive due process claim of a special-needs
   student’s parents who alleged that their child was beaten so excessively for misbehaving
   that he was forced to remain in psychiatric rehabilitation for months. 900 F.2d at 805–10.
   We reasoned that when “the forum state affords adequate post-punishment civil or

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           Plaintiffs contend that Fee is inapplicable because the tasing incident
   cannot properly be defined as “corporal punishment.” The Supreme Court
   has defined “corporal punishment” as the use of “reasonable but not
   excessive force to discipline a child” that a teacher or administrator
   “reasonably believes to be necessary for the (the child’s) proper control,
   training, or education.”50 We’ve explained: “At bottom, fairly characterizing
   an act as corporal punishment depends on whether the school official
   intended to discipline the student for the purpose of maintaining order and
   respect or to cause harm to the student for no legitimate pedagogical
   purpose.”51
           We have dismissed substantive due process claims under Fee “when
   the offending conduct occurred in a disciplinary, pedagogical setting.”52 “In
   contrast, we have allowed substantive due process claims against public
   school officials to proceed when the act complained of was ‘arbitrary,

           _____________________
   criminal remedies” for corporal punishment, “such states have provided all the process
   constitutionally due.” Id. at 808.
           50
                Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977).
           51
                Flores v. School Bd. DeSoto Par., 116 F. App’x 504, 510–11 (5th Cir. 2004).
           52
               T.O. v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 2 F.4th 407, 414 (5th Cir. 2021) (“For
   example, we dismissed substantive due process claims (1) when a student was instructed to
   perform excessive physical exercise as a punishment for talking to a friend; (2) when a
   police officer slammed a student to the ground and dragged him along the floor after the
   student disrupted class; (3) when a teacher threatened a student, threw him against a wall,
   and choked him after the student questioned the teacher’s directive; (4) when an aide
   grabbed, shoved, and kicked a disabled student for sliding a compact disc across a table;
   and (5) when a principal hit a student with a wooden paddle for skipping class.” (citations
   omitted)).

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   capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal of maintaining an
   atmosphere conducive to learning.’”53
           Plaintiffs argue that the tasing incident was not corporal punishment
   because “Paley was not trying to punish or discipline Jevon for an
   infraction.” Officer Paley, on the other hand, focuses on the word “control”
   in the Supreme Court’s definition of corporal punishment, arguing that he
   was attempting to assert control over Jevon by restraining him with the taser.
   Our precedent favors Officer Paley.
           We have applied Fee in cases where, although the offending conduct
   may not have been traditional “punishment,” it was intended to assert order
   or control over a student for a legitimate pedagogical purpose. For instance,
   in T.O. v. Fort Bend Independent School District, a student was removed from
   his classroom due to disruptive behavior.54 A teacher who was walking by
   positioned herself between the student and the door so he could not return
   to the classroom.55 When the student tried to push the teacher so he could
   get into the classroom, she threw him to the ground and placed him in a
   chokehold.56 We applied Fee, explaining, “The facts alleged simply do not
   suggest that T.O. was the subject of a ‘random, malicious, and unprovoked
   attack,’ which would justify deviation from Fee.”57

           _____________________
           53
               Id. at 414 (“For example, we held that a substantive due process claim could
   proceed when a teacher allegedly molested a student, and when a teacher tied a student to
   a chair for two days as part of an experimental technique.” (citations omitted)).
           54
                Id. at 412.
           55
                Id.
           56
                Id.
           57
                Id. at 415 (citation omitted).

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          Similarly, this case involves disruptive behavior from Jevon and a
   struggle to keep him from going through a door. And like the teacher in T.O.,
   Officer Paley was not necessarily “punishing” Jevon but trying to restrain
   him for the pedagogical purpose of maintaining order. Like the incident in
   T.O., the tasing incident was not a “random, malicious, and unprovoked
   attack.”
          Campbell v. McAlister, while not published precedent, is also
   particularly on point.58 The case concerned a five-year-old boy who was
   “misbehaving” in class.59 Feeling they could not “control” the boy, his
   teacher and the assistant principal summoned the help of a police officer,
   Officer McAlister, to remove the boy from the classroom and escort him to
   the principal’s office.60 The boy’s family alleged that the officer “slammed
   [the boy] to the floor” and “dragged [him] along the ground to the principal's
   office.”61 We applied Fee:
          In this case, there is no question that McAlister’s use of force
          to remove Dennis from his classroom w[as] rationally related
          to legitimate school interests in maintaining order. As the
          district court noted, and the Campbells apparently concede,
          Texas provides civil and criminal post-deprivation remedies
          for the excessive use of force by school officials. Thus, the
          district court correctly concluded that the Campbells’s
          substantive due process claim fails as a matter of law. 62

          _____________________
          58
               No. 90-20675, 1998 WL 770706 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 1998) (per curiam).
          59
               Id. at *1.
          60
               Id.
          61
               Id.
          62
               Id. at *5.

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                                            No. 21-20671

          Like Officer McAlister, Officer Paley is a law enforcement officer.
   And in both cases, the officers were not engaged in traditional “punishment”
   of a student, but used force for restraint purposes. In each case this restraint
   was used for a legitimate pedagogical purpose—either transporting a
   disruptive student to the principal’s office to limit disruption or keeping a
   disruptive student inside the school due to safety concerns. While the force
   used in each case may have been excessive, the purpose of such force was
   “rationally related to legitimate school interests in maintaining order.”63
          The cases that Plaintiffs cite are inapposite. One involved the sexual
   molestation of a student by her teacher,64 and the other involved a teacher
   tying a student to a chair for two days as part of an experimental teaching
   technique,65 acts plainly “unrelated to any legitimate state goal.”66 This case
   clearly falls on the T.O. and McAlister side of the spectrum.
          Again, under Fee, claims for excessive corporal punishment are
   precluded if the forum state provides adequate post-punishment civil or
   criminal remedies. Texas provides such remedies.67
          We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
   Officer Paley on the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim.
                                                  V
          Parents deserve to believe that their children, no matter their unique
   needs, are safe at school. We are sympathetic to what Ms. Washington and

          _____________________
          63
               Id.
          64
               Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
          65
               Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305–06 (5th Cir. 1987).
          66
               T.O., 2 F.4th at 414.
          67
               McAlister, 1998 WL 770706, at *5.

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   Jevon have endured. However, controlling precedent provides no remedy for
   the claims they bring.
          AFFIRMED.

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                                    No. 21-20671

   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:
          I agree with the majority that the district court erred in subjecting
   Jevon Washington’s disability discrimination claims to an exhaustion
   requirement. But I disagree with the majority that Washington’s disability
   discrimination claims are not viable on the merits. Further, because there are
   genuine disputes of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment, I
   would vacate and remand on the disability discrimination claims. Thus, I
   respectfully dissent in part.
          The district court denied summary judgment as to the excessive force
   claim, saying that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether
   the tasing was objectively unreasonable and whether qualified immunity
   applied. But the district granted summary judgment as to Washington’s
   other claims. In doing so, the district court found that Washington had failed
   to exhaust his disability discrimination claims. Washington moved for
   reconsideration on the basis that the district court erred by imposing an
   exhaustion requirement. The district court denied the motion, reasserting
   its exhaustion finding. The district court also found, in the alternative, that
   Washington’s disability discrimination claims failed on the merits.
   Specifically, the district court found that, “[t]he record evidence shows no
   factual dispute material to determining that the defendants did not
   intentionally discriminate against [Washington] because of his disabilities.”
          Both the district court and the majority set out the requisite elements
   for Washington to establish such a disability discrimination claim, and the
   requirement that he prove the discrimination was intentional, or something
   more than deliberate indifference, to recover damages. See T.O. v. Fort Bend
   Indep. Sch. Dist., 2 F.4th 407, 417 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Delano-Pyle v.
   Victoria Cty., Tex., 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002); and Cadena v. El Paso
   Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2020). Though acknowledging that

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                                         No. 21-20671

   Washington was treated differently than a non-disabled student would have
   been, the district court found that the “uncontroverted summary judgment
   evidence undermines any inference” that Paley’s actions were “motivated
   by ill will, prejudice, or spite” or “by reason of” Washington’s disabilities.
           The majority now affirms that Washington is unable to establish
   intentional discrimination, saying that, Paley “may have used poor
   judgment” in repeatedly tasing Washington, but there is no dispute on
   whether it was not intentional discrimination by reason of his disability.
   However, the record here does not support such a conclusion.
           Paley’s argument is contradictory, as is the majority’s resulting
   analysis. For example, Paley admits knowing that Washington was disabled
   but then claims he had no knowledge of Washington’s specific disability.1
   However, that claim is contradicted by Paley’s additional claim that he tased
   Washington repeatedly because his disability made leaving the premises
   unsafe. If Paley had no knowledge of Washington’s specific disability, then
   he would not know whether his disability made leaving the premises unsafe
   or whether repeatedly tasing him would be an appropriate accommodation.
           Similarly, the majority says, “based on summary judgment evidence,
   it was not indifference or hostility towards Jevon’s disability that motivated
   Officer Paley when he tased Jevon, but a desire to keep Jevon safe inside the
   school because of the vulnerabilities caused by his disability.” Again, if Paley
   had no knowledge of Washington’s specific disability, then he had no
   knowledge of any specific vulnerabilities or accommodations. 2 Further, the
           _____________________
           1
              Paley’s claim is further contradicted by his admission that he knew of multiple
   specific incidents.
           2
              This is further supported by the majority’s analysis of Washington’s failure-to-
   accommodate claim, wherein it concludes that “there is no evidence that [Paley] had notice
   of its resulting limitations or necessary accommodations.” (Emphasis original).

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                                     No. 21-20671

   majority fails to cite any authority for its attempt to equate repeatedly tasing
   a disabled student with a disability accommodation.
          The majority also fails to give sufficient weight to Paley’s explicit
   statements as to exactly why he repeatedly tased Washington, conceding only
   that they “may have been inappropriate.” These statements are much more
   than inappropriate. Instead, they directly contradict Paley’s claim that he
   repeatedly tased Washington to protect him. Paley told Washington, “I did
   not want to tase you, but you do not run shit around here.” Paley then said,
   “I got tired of wrestling with him so I popped him.” Significantly, Paley did
   not say anything about tasing Washington repeatedly to keep him safe or as
   an accommodation.        Paley’s actual statements support Washington’s
   argument that he was tackled and repeatedly tased because of his disability.
   The record clearly establishes that Washington was attempting to leave
   because of his disability. The issue is whether Paley tackled and tased him
   repeatedly because he believed that it was necessary to keep Washington safe,
   as he says now, or because of indifference, ill will, hostility or discriminatory
   intent. Paley’s statements that “you do not run shit around here” and “I got
   tired of wrestling with him so I popped him” fall squarely into the latter
   category.
          Moreover, nothing Paley said prior to tasing Washington provides
   support for Paley’s claim that he was only concerned about Washington’s
   safety. As recounted by the majority, Paley threatened to tase Washington,
   who screamed that he wanted to go home. Paley then moved away and told
   staff members to “let him go,” as if Washington was going to be allowed to
   leave. Once Washington walked outside, Paley then repeatedly tased him,
   even after he was lying face down on the ground.
          As the majority concedes, we must view the evidence in the light most
   favorable to Washington and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See

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                                   No. 21-20671

   Kariuki v. Tarango, 709 F. 3d 495, 501 (5th Cir. 2013). When we do that,
   there are clearly genuine disputes of material fact sufficient to overcome
   summary judgment on the disability discrimination claims. See Fed. R. Civ.
   P. 56(a). Because I would vacate and remand on these claims, I respectfully
   dissent in part.

                                           25