Court Opinion

ID: 9652616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:28:28.686847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:52.971005
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge LEAVITT.
Respectfully, I dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s holding that the facts found by the Board did not support the legal conclusion that Attorney Matson forwarded the two ordinances to the Planning Commission thirty days after their passage, as required.
It was the burden of the Township to prove that the two new ordinances were “forwarded” to the Planning Commission.1 Section 609(g) of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, provides that “[wjithin 30 days after enactment, a copy of the amendment to the zoning ordinance shall be forwarded to the county planning agency.” 53 P.S. § 10609(g). Matson testified that he assumed the ordinances had been forwarded based on his office file copies of the unsigned letter and the receipt, both dated December 5, 2005, that would have, customarily, been sent out with the ordinances on that same date.
Matson further testified that he checked to see if the ordinances had been received *863by the Planning Department sometime before December 20th. When the Planning Department informed him that it had no record of receiving the letter or ordinances, Matson hand delivered the ordinances to the Planning Department and had the letter and the receipt timestamped. This conduct belies Matson’s assumption that the ordinances had previously been mailed to the Planning Commission.
Matson testified that the letter and ordinances were mailed on December 5th to the best of his knowledge based on customary office policy; however, his entire testimony hinges on assumptions. When asked if proper postage was affixed to the envelope, Matson replied, “I assume my secretary put the required postage.” Reproduced Record at 86a (R.R. — ). Matson was unable to positively identify the contents of the December 5th mailing: “I assume the letter, the receipt, and copies of the ordinances [were forwarded.]” Id. This testimony did not prove mailing.
In Department of Transportation v. Brayman Construction Corp., 99 Pa. Cmwlth. 373, 513 A.2d 562, 566 (1986), this Court outlined the paradigm for using office procedure to prove that a mailing, or “forwarding,” occurred. In Brayman, the Commonwealth presented evidence that a copy of the letter was found in its file and that its customary procedure was to place a copy in the file after the letter was mailed. This Court held that relying on the existence of procedure, without proof the procedure had been followed in that instance, was insufficient to show the letter had, indeed, been mailed. Instead, the Court stated that “proof of office filing procedures without proof that the letter was written in the regular course of business and was placed in the usual place of mailing does not meet the burden to establish mailing.” Id.
Matson’s belief that the ordinances were forwarded on December 5th is founded on no more than an assumption. He testified: “My assumption is because I had a copy of this letter in my file with this date, and a copy of the receipt with the same date, that in fact, it was signed and sent out on that day, because that is normally what happens in my office.” R.R. 85a.2 The Zoning Hearing Board relied on Matson’s testimony to conclude that the two ordinances were mailed to the Planning Commission on December 5th. In doing so, the Board did what Brayman forbids. Proof of office procedures, without proof that the ordinances were placed into the “stream” of mail, proves nothing in this case.
Because there is no substantial evidence to support the decision of the Board, I would affirm the order of the trial court.

. The “mailbox rule” is not applicable because it "applies only when there is evidence that the item was mailed.” Department of Transportation v. Brayman Construction Corp., 99 Pa.Cmwlth. 373, 513 A.2d 562, 566 (1986). Brayman established that when the mailbox rule does not apply, as in this case, evidence of regular office procedure for mailing letters is admissible as evidence to establish that the letter was, indeed, mailed. However, in order for the fact-finder to consider the procedure as evidence, the letter must have “been written and signed in the usual course of business and placed in the regular place of mailing.” Id.

. Significantly, Matson conceded on cross-examination that the date of the letter is not always determinative of the mailing date:
Q. Haven’t you testified at prior proceedings before the board that the date that may appear on the letter in your file isn’t necessarily the date it goes out?
A. That’s possible. Yes. Q. And, in fact, that’s exactly what you said in Rural Route Neighbors Exhibit 208, isn’t it?
A. That’s my recollection, yes.
R.R. 188a-189a. Consequently, Matson’s "customary procedure” may not be as reliable as the majority apparently believes.