Court Opinion

ID: 9597877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:03:34.185802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:17.606623
License: Public Domain

CARTER, Justice,
dissenting.
Wisconsin Hard Chrome admitted Jimmy Neal was never its employee and objected that the term “employee” lacked specificity.
A request to admit or deny that a particular person was an employee of one of the parties at the time of the accident has routinely been utilized. See Hughes Wood Prods., Inc. v. Wagner, 18 S.W.3d 202, 208 n. 4 (Tex.2000); United States Fire Ins. *895Co. v. Maness, 775 S.W.2d 748, 749-50 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ ref'd); Smith v. Univ. of Tex., 664 S.W.2d 180, 189 (Tex.App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ill. Employers Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 582 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont), writ ref'd n.r.e., 590 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.1979); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. Franks, 399 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1966, writ dism’d by agr.); Halbert v. Sylestine, 292 S.W.2d 135, 138 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1956, no writ). One court even chastised a party for attempting to evade such a question. Sanchez v. Caroland, 274 S.W.2d 114, 115-17 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1954, no writ) (the question as to whether the person operating Sanchez’ truck was in the course of Sanchez’ employment was a matter about which Sanchez should be fully informed, or at least should have been in a position to ascertain the facts by reasonable inquiry). The majority opinion acknowledges that such a question is ordinarily a request to admit a factual matter. However, without citation to any authority that such an admission is a legal conclusion, the majority concludes that this request calls for a legal conclusion. I disagree.
The majority opinion states that Neal seeks to use Chrome’s admission to lead to the legal conclusion that Neal was never Chrome’s employee for the purposes of workers’ compensation. The fact that Neal wants to use the admission for that purpose does not make the admission a legal conclusion. The admission is a factual one — Neal never worked for Chrome. A court is presented with facts on which it relies to arrive at legal conclusions. Here, Neal established the fact that he was not an employee of Chrome. It is the Court’s function to determine the legal effect of that fact.
The majority opinion states that Chrome objected to the request on the basis it lacked specificity. While that is true, it has no bearing on whether the question called for a legal conclusion. The relevance of that objection simply is that the term “employee” could be argued to have several definitions and none was specified. If the term “employee” as used in this context is vague or nonspecific, then a very good argument is available that the admission is not specific enough to lead to the conclusion that Neal was not an employee of Chrome for workers’ compensation purposes. In fact, Chrome makes such an argument — that its admission concerning Neal’s employment status only meant that Chrome did not issue Neal’s paychecks.
In this case, Neal alleged that he suffered exposure to toxic substances on the premises of Chrome and that Chrome was negligent and that negligence was a proximate cause of Neal’s injuries. Chrome answered, asserting that Neal’s claim was barred and that Neal’s exclusive remedy was through the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act. In these circumstances, I find that the request was specific. Chrome was defending Neal’s claim based on the Workers’ Compensation Act, which includes a specific definition of “employee.” That definition is not a technical term needing further clarification (each person in the service of another under a contract of hire), but is a term commonly used and understood. Such admissions have been recognized by Texas courts for many years.
I would find that the admission is binding and raises material facts which preclude the granting of summary judgment. I respectfully dissent.