Court Opinion

ID: 9392873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-08 16:00:45.984695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:49.215689
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12509   Document: 20-1    Date Filed: 05/08/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-12509
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        NELIDA RAMIREZ MENDEZ,
        DEILY DOMINGO RAMIREZ,
        DELEIDI DOMINGO RAMIREZ,
        MILBER DOMINGO RAMIREZ,
        UBILMER DOMINGO RAMIREZ,
                                                           Petitioners,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                          Respondent.

                         ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                     22-12509

                       Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                            Board of Immigration Appeals
                              Agency No. A208-193-212
                              ____________________

        Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Nelida Ramirez Mendez and her daughter, Deleidi Do-
        mingo Ramirez, seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
        (BIA) final order affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) order deny-
        ing their respective applications for asylum, withholding of re-
        moval, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against
        Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
        Punishment (CAT). 1 After careful review, we dismiss in part, deny
        in part, and grant in part the petition for review. We also vacate
        certain parts of the BIA order and remand for further proceedings.
                                              I.
               First, Ramirez Mendez argues that the BIA erred in ﬁnding
        that she did not suﬀer past persecution or have a well-founded fear
        of future persecution on account of her race as an indigenous Ma-
        yan.

        1 Ramirez   Mendez and Domingo Ramirez filed their own respective applica-
        tions for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. Ramirez Mendez’s
        application includes her children as derivative beneficiaries: Deleidi, Deily,
        Milber, and Ubilmer Domingo Ramirez.
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        22-12509               Opinion of the Court                         3

               We review only the decision of the BIA, unless the BIA ex-
        pressly adopted the decision of the IJ. Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
        577 F.3d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009). In deciding whether to uphold
        the BIA’s decision, we are limited to the grounds upon which the
        BIA relied. See Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th
        Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
               We review legal conclusions de novo and review factual ﬁnd-
        ings for substantial evidence. Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913
        F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2019). Under the substantial evidence
        standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        agency’s decision, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that
        decision, and aﬃrm the BIA’s decision “if it is supported by reason-
        able, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered
        as a whole.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). To reverse the agency’s
        fact ﬁndings, we must ﬁnd that the record not only supports rever-
        sal but compels it. Id. The mere fact that the record may support
        a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the
        agency’s ﬁndings. Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir.
        2004) (en banc).
                To meet the burden of establishing eligibility for asylum, a
        non-citizen must, with speciﬁc and credible evidence, establish
        (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground,
        or (2) a “well-founded fear” that the non-citizen will be persecuted
        on account of a protected ground. Diallo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 596 F.3d
        1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a), (b).
        The protected grounds include, among other things, race and
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12509

        membership in a “particular social group.” Immigration and Na-
        tionality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); 8 C.F.R.
        § 1208.13(a), (b). Past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption
        of a well-founded fear of future persecution. De Santamaria v. U.S.
        Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2008). Without a showing
        of past persecution, an asylum applicant may show a well-founded
        fear of future persecution by showing that the fear is subjectively
        genuine and objectively reasonable. Id. The applicant must show
        a reasonable possibility of suﬀering persecution, either by being
        singled out for persecution or being identiﬁed with a regularly per-
        secuted group. Li Shan Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 672 F.3d 961, 965
        (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
                 An applicant must also establish a nexus between the feared
        persecution and a protected ground, demonstrating that the pro-
        tected ground “was or will be at least one central reason for perse-
        cuting” her. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). We
        have held that “[e]vidence that treatment is consistent with general
        criminal activity does not help [a petitioner] with the nexus require-
        ment.” Sanchez-Castro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 998 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th
        Cir. 2021). In Silva v. U.S. Attorney General, we held that although it
        could be inferred that Silva was shot at because of her political ac-
        tivity, substantial evidence did not compel such a conclusion because
        Silva had not explained or distinguished herself “from the majority
        of Colombians who are also subject to the general conditions of
        violence and criminal activity in Colombia.” 448 F.3d 1229, 1238
        (11th Cir. 2006). We found that although country reports reﬂected
        that there was widespread and indiscriminate violence in Colombia
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        22-12509                Opinion of the Court                          5

        and that Silva testiﬁed that Colombians routinely suﬀer similar in-
        cidents of terroristic threats and violence, we could not say the
        shooting was “indisputably related” to her political activity when
        looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the IJ’s deci-
        sion. Id.
                A non-citizen is eligible for withholding of removal if she
        shows that, upon return to her country, she more likely than not
        will be persecuted there because of a protected ground, such as her
        race or membership in a particular social group. INA § 241(b)(3), 8
        U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). If an applicant cannot meet the well-founded
        fear standard of asylum, she generally will not be eligible for with-
        holding of removal. Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1352.
               Before we dive into whether the BIA’s decision is supported
        by substantial evidence, we have a few housekeeping matters to ad-
        dress. First, despite both Ramirez Mendez and Domingo Ramirez
        appealing the BIA’s decision, their brief argues only a well-founded
        fear of persecution on account of race as a protected ground for
        Ramirez Mendez. Thus, Domingo Ramirez has abandoned her
        claim for well-founded fear of future persecution on account of
        race. See Ruga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 757 F.3d 1193, 1196 (11th Cir. 2014).
                Second, Ramirez Mendez argues that the BIA erred as to her
        claim of past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecu-
        tion. But as the government correctly notes, Ramirez Mendez did
        not argue to the BIA that the IJ erred on the claim of past persecu-
        tion, meaning Ramirez Mendez failed to exhaust that claim. Jeune
        v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 792, 800 (11th Cir. 2016). Thus, we lack
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                22-12509

        jurisdiction to consider Ramirez Mendez’s claim of past persecu-
        tion because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. See
        INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S.
        Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
               Turning to the merits of Ramirez Mendez’s petition, we find
        that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination denying
        asylum and withholding of removal to Ramirez Mendez based on
        her claim that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution
        due to her race as an indigenous Mayan. Ramirez Mendez did not
        provide evidence of past persecution, and without such evidence,
        she is not entitled to a presumption of future persecution. See De
        Santamaria, 525 F.3d at 1007. As a result, Ramirez Mendez must
        show that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution.
                Ramirez Mendez submitted reports about the conditions in
        Guatemala, specifically for indigenous people. Those reports de-
        tailed inequality and exclusion based on racism and structural dis-
        criminatory actions. One report noted that indigenous people ex-
        perienced societal harm because of the “ongoing lack of protection
        for the human rights of indigenous people and communities in ac-
        cordance with international standards.” Ramirez Mendez testified
        generally about that harm but only provided one specific instance
        in which her neighbor threatened to take her land but ultimately
        did not take the land.
               Even if the record may support a conclusion contrary to the
        BIA, that is not enough to compel us to reverse the BIA’s findings.
        See Perez-Zenteno, 913 F.3d at 1306. Ramirez Mendez cannot rely
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        22-12509                Opinion of the Court                          7

        on general violence as a claim for future persecution. See Silva, 448
        F.3d at 1238. Despite the reports about the treatment of indigenous
        people, other reports provided to the BIA show that Guatemalan
        law does provide for equal rights for indigenous people. Thus, sub-
        stantial evidence supports the BIA denying Ramirez Mendez’s ap-
        plication for asylum. Because Ramirez Mendez does not meet the
        more lenient standards for asylum relief, she cannot meet the high
        standard to be eligible for withholding of removal. See Kazemzadeh,
        577 F.3d at 1352.
               The BIA’s decision to deny Ramirez Mendez’s application
        for asylum and withholding of removal based on her race as an in-
        digenous Mayan is supported by substantial evidence. Accord-
        ingly, we deny the petition for review as to this issue.
                                          II.
               Second, Ramirez Mendez and Domingo Ramirez argue the
        BIA erred in ﬁnding that they did not suﬀer past persecution or
        have a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of their
        particular social groups (PSG).
               The BIA must provide “reasoned consideration” to a peti-
        tioner’s claims. Jathursan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 17 F.4th 1365, 1372 (11th
        Cir. 2021). In Indrawati v. U.S. Attorney General, we analyzed the pe-
        titioner’s claims that we considered were “arguments clothed in
        reasoned consideration garb.” 779 F.3d 1284, 1302 (11th Cir. 2015)
        (quotation marks omitted). We stated that we have sometimes
        “granted petitions for review, vacated agency decisions, and re-
        manded for further proceedings when the agency’s decision was so
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12509

        lacking in reasoned consideration and explanation that meaningful
        review was impossible.” Id. “When assessing whether a decision
        displays reasoned consideration, we look only to ensure that the IJ
        and the BIA considered the issues raised and announced their deci-
        sions in terms suﬃcient to enable review.” Id. “[T]he IJ and the
        BIA need not address speciﬁcally each claim the petitioner made or
        each piece of evidence the petitioner presented.” Id. (quotation
        marks omitted). We will remand for lack of reasoned considera-
        tion not because we disagree with the agency’s legal conclusions
        and factual ﬁndings but because “given the facts and claims in the
        speciﬁc case before the IJ and BIA, the agency decision [wa]s so fun-
        damentally incomplete that a review of legal and factual determi-
        nations would be quixotic.” Id. (quotation marks and emphasis
        omitted).
                In I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, the Supreme Court stated that “a
        court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of
        a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands.” 537 U.S.
        12, 16 (2002) (per curiam). “The agency can bring its expertise to
        bear upon the matter; it can evaluate the evidence; it can make an
        initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed
        discussion and analysis, help a court later determine whether its
        decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides.” Id. at 17.
              Here, before the BIA, Ramirez Mendez and Domingo
        Ramirez argued that their PSG was based on the interplay between
        race and disability—specifically, their race as indigenous Mayans,
        Domingo Ramirez’s disability, and Ramirez Mendez being the
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        22-12509                 Opinion of the Court                            9

        parent of a disabled child. 2 Based on the cumulative effect of those
        two characteristics and their interplay, Ramirez Mendez and Do-
        mingo Ramirez argued that this increased discrimination against
        them and decreased their access to medical care. Despite them
        making this clear argument, the BIA separately addressed the two
        characteristics: (1) race as indigenous Mayans and (2) Ramirez
        Mendez as the parent of a disabled child and Domingo Ramirez as
        a disabled child. But the BIA failed to address those two character-
        istics in combination. The BIA should have addressed how these
        two characteristics interact to exaggerate the threat of persecution
        to possibly establish a claim of well-founded fear of future persecu-
        tion. Thus, the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to
        Ramirez Mendez’s and Domingo Ramirez’s PSG claims.
                Because this was an important argument of Ramirez Men-
        dez and Domingo Ramirez, the BIA’s decision not to address the
        PSG is “so fundamentally incomplete that a review of legal and fac-
        tual determinations would be quixotic.” Indrawati, 779 F.3d at
        1302. Because the BIA did not address this issue, we must remand
        to the agency, which sits in a better place to decide the matter in
        the first instance. See Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. at 17.
              Because the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to
        Ramirez Mendez’s and Domingo Ramirez’s PSG claim based on
        the interplay between their race as indigenous Mayans and

        2 They also made the argument before the IJ, who did not address the inter-
        play between those two characteristics.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                      22-12509

        disability, we grant the petition for review as to this issue and re-
        mand to the agency to address each petitioner’s claim in the first
        instance.
                                             III.
              Last, Ramirez Mendez and Domingo Ramirez argue that the
        BIA erred in denying their request for CAT relief.
                We review the BIA’s factual determinations for the denial of
        CAT relief3 under the substantial evidence standard, where we will
        reverse the BIA only where the record compels it. Edwards v. U.S.
        Att’y Gen., 56 F.4th 951, 966 (11th Cir. 2022). But sometimes we are
        “prevented from performing that review in the ﬁrst place.” Ali v.
        U.S. Att’y Gen., 931 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2019). “[O]ur review
        of the Board’s decisions operates on a simple premise: The Board
        has reached a decision only after having evaluated the entire evi-
        dentiary record.” Id. But “[w]hen the Board has not convinced us
        that it has done so, as is the case when we remand for a lack of
        reasoned consideration, we hold that the decision is incapable of
        review and thus do not proceed to analyze the Board’s legal or fac-
        tual conclusions.” Id.

        3 To be eligible for CAT relief, an applicant must show that she more likely
        than not will be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal. 8
        C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2); Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 369 F.3d 1239, 1242
        (11th Cir. 2004). All relevant evidence must be considered, including her abil-
        ity to relocate and human rights violations within the country.
        8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).
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        22-12509               Opinion of the Court                        11

               Here, in this BIA order, it is hard to comprehend whether the
        BIA has addressed both Ramirez Mendez’s and Domingo Ramirez’s
        CAT claims. When the BIA says that it is aﬃrming the IJ’s denial
        of CAT relief as to “respondents,” we assume that it means both
        Ramirez Mendez and Domingo Ramirez. But as the BIA order pro-
        gresses, it appears to only discuss Ramirez Mendez’s CAT claim
        and not Domingo Ramirez’s CAT claim. This is a problem because
        Ramirez Mendez’s and Domingo Ramirez’s CAT claims are not the
        same. As noted, Domingo Ramirez is disabled, and she likely has a
        stronger claim as a disabled indigenous Mayan than Ramirez Men-
        dez, who is the indigenous Mayan mother of a disabled child. It
        appears that the BIA either conﬂated Domingo Ramirez’s CAT
        claim with Ramirez Mendez’s claim or simply ignored and failed to
        address Domingo Ramirez’s CAT claim. As a result, the BIA has
        failed to announce a decision “in terms suﬃcient to enable” this
        court to review and understand why Domingo Ramirez’s CAT
        claim was ultimately rejected. Tan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1369,
        1374 (11th Cir. 2006). Thus, the BIA failed to give reasoned consid-
        eration to Ramirez Mendez’s and Domingo Ramirez’s CAT claims
        as separate claims.
               We do not pass judgment on whether or not it was a good
        idea to address Domingo Ramirez’s and Ramirez Mendez’s peti-
        tions together for review. And the BIA may ultimately come to the
        same conclusion on remand, but remand requires the BIA to sepa-
        rately address each petitioner’s individual CAT claim. If the BIA
        reviews multiple petitions together (like for a family, as is the case
        here), the BIA needs to make sure that it delineates whose claim it
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12509

        is referencing to ensure meaningful appellate review. Accordingly,
        we grant the petition for review as to this issue and remand to the
        agency to address each petitioner’s claim in the ﬁrst instance.
                                         IV.
                To recap, we dismiss the petition in part for lack of jurisdic-
        tion on Ramirez Mendez’s claim of past persecution because she
        failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. We deny the petition
        in part as to Domingo Ramirez’s and Ramirez Mendez’s claims that
        they had a well-founded fear of future persecution due to their race
        as indigenous Mayans. But we grant the petition in part because
        the BIA did not adequately address Domingo Ramirez’s and
        Ramirez Mendez’s PSG as a whole, nor did the BIA address Do-
        mingo Ramirez’s and Ramirez Mendez’s request for CAT relief as
        separate claims. Thus, we vacate the BIA’s order on those claims
        and remand to the BIA. The BIA must consider Domingo
        Ramirez’s and Ramirez Mendez’s PSG: (1) on account of how
        Ramirez Mendez’s race as an indigenous Mayan interacted with
        Ramirez Mendez having an indigenous child with a disability; and
        (2) on account of how Domingo Ramirez’s race as an indigenous
        Mayan interacted with her disability status. The BIA must also ad-
        dress Domingo Ramirez’s and Ramirez Mendez’s CAT relief claims
        separately.
            PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART,
        AND GRANTED IN PART.