Court Opinion

ID: 9954768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 20:19:32.944968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:10:40.371741
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                           Washington State
                                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                                            Division Two

                                                                                            March 26, 2024

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                          DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                 No. 57664-3-II

                                Respondent,

         v.

 RYAN CHRISTOPHER FANCHER,                                      UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                                Appellant.

       VELJACIC, J. — Ryan C. Fancher appeals his convictions for assault in the second degree

and retail theft in the third degree with special circumstances, contending that the witness’s pretrial

identification of him was impermissibly suggestive and not otherwise reliable. Fancher further

alleges he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We affirm Fancher’s convictions.

                                               FACTS

       Julian Brim was a customer at a home improvement store when he observed a man run out

the front door, pushing a shopping cart full of unpaid merchandise. He followed the man into the

parking lot and grabbed his cart Brim asked to see a receipt. The man told Brim to “f*** off” and

then pulled out a knife. Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 107. Brim was close enough to be able to describe

the knife as “retractable, composite handle, inexpensive.” RP at 107. He was just a couple of feet

away. The man made a stabbing motion toward Brim. Brim was afraid of being stabbed, so he

retreated to the store to call the police. The encounter lasted approximately 30 seconds.

       Brim described the man to police as disheveled and unkempt, wearing a long-sleeved gray

shirt, gray baggy pants, and a Seattle Seahawks COVID face mask. Longview Police Officer Scott
57664-3-II

McDaniel1 responded to the scene and began looking for the suspect. He observed a man matching

the suspect’s description coming out of some trees near some railroad tracks. He was wearing a

Seahawks mask when McDaniel initially saw him but the suspect dropped the mask on the railroad

tracks.

          Back at the store, Brim got in the back of a police vehicle and drove to McDaniel’s location.

Brim identified Fancher as the man from the store. As they drove away, Brim noticed merchandise

scattered under a tree.

          The State charged Fancher with assault in the second degree and retail theft with special

circumstances2 in the third degree. Our record does not show a pretrial motion to exclude Brim’s

show-up identification of Fancher.

          During trial, the State presented a surveillance video showing a man leaving the store with

a shopping cart of unpaid merchandise wearing a mask. Brim testified that the video was a true

representation of what happened on the day in question and that the Seahawks mask was distinctive

because there was no mask mandate at the time. He clarified that the mask stood out because,

while many individuals still wore medical masks, the man at the store was wearing a cloth logo

mask.

          Brim further testified that when he was in the back of the police vehicle, Brim first

recognized Fancher as the man from the store when he was 50 feet away. When they got eight

feet away, Brim noticed the man was wearing the same clothes minus the Seahawks mask. Brim

told the officer that the man was the same individual he encountered back at the store. When asked

1
    McDaniel retired prior to trial.
2
  Under RCW 9A.56.360(1)(b), the special circumstance in this case was that Fancher “at the
time of the theft, [was] in possession of an item, article, implement, or device used, under
circumstances evincing an intent to use or employ, or designed to overcome security systems.”

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57664-3-II

if he was certain, Brim testified, “Very certain.” RP at 111. There was no objection to this

testimony.

       The identification occurred approximately 30 minutes after the incident. Brim testified

that as they drove away he noticed merchandise under a tree. The merchandise was approximately

30 feet from where he identified Fancher.

       Longview Police Officer Jordan Sanders also testified for the State. He testified that he

responded to the incident report at the store and picked up Brim to take him to view the suspect.

Sanders testified that his identification procedure was to first ask the witness if he or she was

willing to identify the suspect, explain that they “may or may not” see the suspect, and then stress

that they are only viewing someone who may be involved in the crime. RP at 131. Sanders

testified that as they pulled up, Fancher was standing near other police officers and in handcuffs.

Brim then identified Fancher as the person he encountered in the store parking lot. Sanders

testified that the identification occurred less than 30 minutes from the time of the incident. There

was no objection to this testimony.

       The jury found Fancher guilty as charged. He appeals.

                                            ANALYSIS

I.     OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION

       For the first time on appeal, Fancher argues that Brim’s show-up identification of him was

obtained through an impermissibly suggestive procedure that was not reliable under the totality of

the circumstances. We hold this issue has not been preserved for appeal.

       We may review an issue raised for the first time on appeal if it suggests a manifest error

affecting a constitutional right. RAP 2.5(a)(3). A party demonstrates manifest constitutional error

by showing that the issue affects their constitutional rights and that they suffered actual prejudice.

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57664-3-II

State v. J.W.M., 1 Wn.3d 58, 91, 524 P.3d 596 (2023). To demonstrate actual prejudice, the

defendant must make a plausible showing that the claimed error had practical and identifiable

consequences in the trial. Id.

        A.      Constitutional Right

        The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

requires the exclusion of identifications that were “obtained by an unnecessarily suggestive police

procedure” and that lack “reliability under the totality of circumstances.” State v. Derri, 199

Wn.2d 658, 673, 511 P.3d 1267 (2022). Because Fancher raises an issue that implicates a

constitutional right, we evaluate the merits to determine whether there was a manifest error

affecting the constitutional right.

        B.      Manifest Error

        Fancher must first establish that the identification procedure was “unnecessarily

suggestive” to establish a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. Id. at 673. Brim’s

identified Fancher during a show-up identification. A “[s]how-up identification is typical shortly

after a crime occurs when police show a suspect to a witness or victim.” State v. Birch, 151 Wn.

App. 504, 513, 213 P.3d 63 (2009). Show-up identifications are “not per se impermissibly

suggestive,” rather, the defendant must demonstrate “that the procedure was unnecessarily

suggestive.” State v. Guzman-Cuellar, 47 Wn. App. 326, 335, 734 P.2d 966 (1987). To meet due

process requirements, an out-of-court identification must not be “so impermissibly suggestive as

to give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” State v. Vickers, 148

Wn.2d 91, 118, 59 P.3d 58 (2002). If the defendant fails to make this showing, the inquiry ends.

Derri, 199 Wn.2d at 674.

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57664-3-II

       In Guzman-Cuellar, police located a shooting suspect and escorted him back to the tavern

where the shooting took place for a show-up identification. 47 Wn. App. at 333. This took place

“less than 1 hour” after the shooting. Id. Witnesses at the tavern identified Guzman-Cuellar as

the shooter. Id. at 329. At the time, he was handcuffed and standing approximately 15 feet from

a police car. Id. at 336. A jury later found Guzman-Cuellar guilty of murder in the first degree.

Id. at 330. On appeal, Division One of this court affirmed, holding that the show-up identification

was not impermissibly suggestive. Id. at 336.

       Here, McDaniel responded to the scene and began looking for the suspect. He observed a

man matching the suspect’s description coming out of some trees. Back at the store, Sanders

picked up Brim and drove him to McDaniel’s location. Sanders testified that he explained that

they “may or may not” see the suspect, and stressed that they were only viewing someone who

may be involved in the crime. RP at 131. Brim testified that from 50 feet away he knew it was

the man from the parking lot. Fancher was standing next to police officers and handcuffed (it is

unclear from our record if Brim noticed the handcuffs when he first identified him). The

identification occurred approximately 30 minutes after the incident. Here, like in Guzman-Cueller,

the show-up identification was held shortly after the crimes were committed and in the course of

a prompt search for the suspect. We conclude that based on our facts, the identification was not

impermissibly suggestive. Our inquiry ends here. Derri, 199 Wn.2d at 674.

       Fancher fails to establish a manifest constitutional error. Accordingly, this issue is not

preserved for review.

II.    INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       Fancher next argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel for defense

counsel’s failure to move to suppress the show-up identification. We disagree.

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        Ineffective assistance of counsel claims arise from the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution. State v. Vazquez, 198

Wn.2d 239, 247, 494 P.3d 424 (2021). To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the defendant

must show both that (1) defense counsel’s representation was deficient and (2) the deficient

representation prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 247-48.

        Representation is deficient if, after considering all the circumstances, it falls below an

objective standard of reasonableness. Id. Prejudice exists if there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have differed. Id. at 248. We apply a

strong presumption that defense counsel’s performance was reasonable. Id. at 247. Where the

defendant’s ineffective assistance claim is based on trial counsel’s failure to challenge the

admissibility of evidence, the defendant must show the absence of a legitimate strategic or tactical

reason for not objecting, the likelihood that the objection would have been sustained, and a

different outcome at trial had the evidence not been admitted. Id. at 248-49.

        We can conceive of a legitimate reason for counsel choosing not to object to the show-up

identification. Counsel could have concluded, as we do, that there appears little likelihood such

an objection would have been successful. Moreover, Fancher’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim fails because he cannot show that the outcome of the trial court would have been any

different.

        Here, Brim was only a couple of feet away from Fancher when the confrontation occurred

and was able to describe Fancher to police including details about his clothes and the Seahawks

mask he was wearing. McDaniel responded to the scene and observed Fancher coming out of

some trees near some railroad tracks. He was wearing a Seahawks mask when McDaniel initially

saw him but he dropped the mask on the railroad tracks. Brim testified that as they drove away he

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57664-3-II

noticed merchandise under a tree. The stolen merchandise was approximately 30 feet from where

he identified Fancher.

        Based on the above, Fancher fails to show there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have differed. Therefore, Fancher cannot show

he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Without this showing, Fancher fails to show he

received ineffective assistance of counsel.

                                          CONCLUSION

        Fancher failed to preserve for review his challenge to the show-up identification. And he

fails to show he was denied effective assistance of counsel for counsel’s decision not to object to

the identification. For these reasons, we affirm Fancher’s convictions for assault in the second

degree and retail theft in the third degree with special circumstances.

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                             Veljacic, J.

We concur:

        Maxa, P.J.

        Che, J.

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