Court Opinion

ID: 9767611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:22:45.803185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.060443
License: Public Domain

STEPHAN, Presiding Judge.
This is a civil action for personal injuries brought by plaintiff, Michael Martin, under the uninsured motorist provision of his own automobile insurance policy. Martin, a mechanic employed by the City of University City, was injured on October 28, 1982, while working on a vehicle. Not realizing that Martin was there, a fellow employee of University City, Sylvester Alexander, began backing a four ton dump truck owned by the city out of its parking place and, in so doing, drove over both of Martin’s legs. The liability insurance policy which University City maintained on the dump truck specifically excluded coverage for any “bodily injury to any fellow employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his or her employment.” Alexander had no liability insurance of any kind. Accordingly, plaintiff Martin sought recovery from his own insuror, defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Company, under the uninsured motorist provision of his policy. The trial court granted summary judgment for State Farm. Martin appeals; we reverse and remand.
The uninsured motor vehicle provision in Martin’s policy provided:
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.
An uninsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle:
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4. owned by any government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies.
State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment based on this exclusion. The motion was granted on May 12, 1987, and this appeal followed.
A motion for summary judgment shall be sustained if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 74.04(c). On appeal, we review the entire record in a light most favorable to the party against whom judgment is entered. Fisher v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 664 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Mo.App.1984).
In his first point, Martin alleges that the State Farm uninsured motorist provision should apply to him despite the fact that it contains a clause which bars his *640claim. In order to be considered “uninsured” under the State Farm “uninsured motorist provision”, certain contractual requirements must be met. The contract specifically states that “[a]n uninsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle ... owned by any government or any of its political subdivisions or agencies.” This language is clear and unambiguous. We, therefore, give the language its plain meaning even though it is contained within a restrictive clause. Harrison v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 607 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Mo. banc 1980).
This contract precludes a claim which arises out of an accident in which the negligently operated vehicle is government owned. The City of University City did own the dump truck that injured Martin. He has, therefore, failed to meet the contractual requirement defining “uninsured motor vehicle.” Point I is denied.
Martin’s second point asserts that the exclusion under the uninsured motorist provision of his policy, exempting government-owned vehicles, should be void as against public policy. This point raises an issue of first impression for Missouri courts, but has been addressed elsewhere.
Missouri’s Uninsured Motorist Act, § 379.203.1, RSMo 1979, provides as follows:
No liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits for bodily injury or death set forth in section 303.030, RSMo, for the protection of persons insured thereunder
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State Farm claims that the uninsured motorist statute does not apply here because § 303.350 specifically exempts government-owned vehicles from the requirements of the Safety Responsibility Law (Chapter 303). We do not agree.
Vaught v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 413 F.2d 539 (8th Cir.1969) involved Arkansas statutes similar to those here. In both cases, the Uninsured Motorist Act and the Safety Responsibility Act were codified in separate chapters. The insurance company in Vaught argued that since the Safety Responsibility Act contained an exclusion for government vehicles, so should the Uninsured Motorist Act. The court there held that “if the legislature had so intended it could have been as explicit with respect to the one as it was with the other.” Vaught, 413 F.2d at 541.
We agree. If the policy is designed to restrict insured parties from the benefits provided by law, then the purpose of the law has been evaded and is void as against public policy. Craig v. Iowa Kemper Mutual Insurance Co., 565 S.W.2d 716, 725 (Mo.App.1978). We do not wish to “whittle away” at the uninsured motorist statute by furthering exclusions and exceptions which were not placed there by the legislature. Johns v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 337 So.2d 830, 831 (Fla.App.1976).
We hold that summary judgment was not proper as a matter of law. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial on the merits.
PUDLOWSKI, J., concurs.
SATZ, J., concurs in separate opinion.