Court Opinion

ID: 9670710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:24:30.055567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:06.059620
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, G. BARRY,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that CARA does not create a civil cause of action for failure to report suspected child abuse and that Mayo had no special relationship with Nykkole giving rise to a duty to protect her from the harm that she suffered. Unlike the majority, however, I would not reach the question of whether the district court erred by excluding evidence of a common law duty to report because the Beckers did not make a sufficient offer of proof that earlier reporting would have prevented Nykkole’s injuries.
Where a court excludes evidence at trial, error may not be predicated upon the exclusion unless “the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked.” Minn. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). “Where no offer of proof is made so that the reviewing court may pass on the relevancy of the proposed evidence, the exclusion of such evidence is not prejudicial error.” State v. Bd. of Educ., 277 N.W.2d 524, 528 n. 3 (Minn.1979). “Even if [exclusion of testimony] were an abuse of discretion, we would be unable to determine if it was prejudicial inasmuch as no offer of proof was made as to what testimony [the witness] would give.” Wozniak v. Luta, 258 Minn. 234, 241, 103 N.W.2d 870, 875 (1960). The primary reason for requiring an offer of proof is so that the court on appeal can understand from the record the scope and effect of the proposed evidence in considering whether its exclusion was proper. John William Strong, McCormick on Evidence, 195-96 (4th ed.1992).
The Beckers argue in their brief that they “were clear from the beginning that evidence of reporting was crucial to prove their common law negligence claim.” I agree that the Beckers made clear the centrality of reporting to their case, but what they did not make clear — and were required to — is how earlier reporting would have prevented Nykkole’s injuries. I agree with the majority that the requirements for an offer of proof are not high, but the Beckers did not meet even their minimal burden here.
After the district court struck the three counts from their complaint, the Beckers submitted by affidavit the anticipated testimony of two physicians. Dr. Carolyn Levitt was expected to testify that failure to report suspected child abuse was a breach of Mayo’s standard of care, and that “the required report of the suspected abuse to proper authorities would have led to immediate removal of Nykkole from her birth *220parents’ custody.” Dr. Allen Walker was also expected to testify that the expected standard of care was breached and that “reporting the suspected abuse would likely have led authorities to investigate the abuse and protect the child pending the investigation and subsequent findings of abuse.” The affidavit did not assert, and nothing in the record established, that Drs. Levitt or Walker had any knowledge of Olmsted County’s resources or practices for investigating allegations of child abuse or protecting alleged victims. Indeed, there is no indication anywhere in the record that Drs. Levitt and Walker had worked with Olmsted County on similar matters. These two conclusory statements by witnesses who professed no personal knowledge of how Olmsted County authorities might have protected Nykkole constituted the entirety of proof of causation offered to the district court before trial.
After trial, the Beckers attached an affidavit to their motion for a new trial in which an attorney stated that she had “on several occasions contacted employees of the Olmsted County Child Protection Unit about their involvement with Nykkole Becker’s case” and that she had “discussed the policies and procedures in place at Child Protection in 1997, and how Child Protection likely would have responded to Nykkole’s particular situation in light of those policies and procedures.” Based on these conversations, the attorney stated that the Beckers, if allowed, would have subpoenaed these unidentified employees and that in the attorney’s opinion their testimony would have demonstrated that a report of suspected child abuse would more than likely have prevented Nykkole’s injuries. An attorney’s opinion, citing con-clusory, unidentified secondhand sources, is a woefully inadequate offer of proof.
While there are no doubt many varieties of an offer of proof that could have been successfully executed, one way to proceed under these circumstances would have been to present the district court with the anticipated testimony of an Olmsted County Child Protection worker as to what steps are taken when a report of suspected child abuse is made and how long the investigation typically takes. That offer of proof could have been made in numerous ways, including direct examination of the witness outside the presence of the jury or, more probably here, simply by counsel outlining what the identified witness would testify to if called. Without this information, however presented, this court can only speculate about what any witness familiar with Olmsted County Child Protection Unit would have testified to and whether this testimony would have allowed a reasonable jury to find that earlier reporting would have prevented Nykkole’s injuries.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the fact that Nykkole was taken from her biological parents after she arrived at the emergency room on September 15, with catastrophic, permanent injuries does not inform us of what would have happened if a report of suspected child abuse had been filed on August 27, when Nykkole presented with a broken arm, or on September 11, when she was vomiting and lethargic. Some idea of the anticipated time frame for a response by the appropriate government agency to a report of suspected child abuse is particularly important here because if the jury found Mayo negligent for not making a report on August 27, authorities would have had almost a month to protect Nykkole, but if the jury found Mayo negligent on September 11 and not on August 27, authorities would have had only 4 days.
I acknowledge that a party is not required to actually examine witnesses for an offer of proof, Santiago v. State, 644 *221N.W.2d 425, 442 (Minn.2002), that a formal offer of proof is unnecessary where the substance of the proposed testimony is apparent from cross examination, Uhlman v. Farm Stock & Home Co., 126 Minn. 239, 244, 148 N.W. 102, 103 (Minn.1914), and that the Beckers were not required to affirmatively establish causation in their offer of proof. I also agree with the majority that the district court had already made its intentions clear with respect to this issue.
Nevertheless, in order to preserve their right to move for a new trial based on exclusion of reporting-related evidence, the Beckers were required to somehow place on the record the suggestion that a witness familiar with the handling of reports of suspected child abuse in Olmsted County was prepared to testify about the manner in which an earlier report may have prevented Nykkole’s injuries. The record contains only the conclusory opinions of three identified individuals, unsupported by any foundation showing that the witnesses actually had experience with, or knowledge of, the relevant Olmsted County proceedings applicable when a report of suspected child abuse is received. I would affirm the district court’s denial of the Beckers’ motion for a new trial.