Court Opinion

ID: 9393219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 17:07:40.587829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:51.639824
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Pack, 2023-Ohio-1522.]

                                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                            TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                           CLERMONT COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

        Appellee,                                 :     CASE NO. CA2022-10-059

                                                  :            OPINION
     - vs -                                                     5/8/2023
                                                  :

 RICKY L. PACK,                                   :

        Appellant.                                :

           CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT
                            Case No. 2022 CRB 2545 A

Mark J. Tekulve, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas A. Horton, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

W. Stephen Haynes, Clermont County Public Defender, and Robert F. Benintendi, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

        M. POWELL, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Ricky Pack, appeals his conviction in the Clermont County

Municipal Court for obstructing official business.

        {¶ 2} On August 18, 2022, Clermont County Deputy Sheriff Detective Christopher

Shouse was investigating recent motorcycle thefts. As Shouse drove past 3188 Goodwin
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Schoolhouse Road, he observed appellant sitting in the driveway with his girlfriend, Amanda

Shuemake. Appellant was known to Shouse based upon previous contact between the two

and was a suspect in the motorcycle thefts Shouse was investigating. Shouse also knew

that there were active warrants for appellant's arrest. Shouse continued past the residence

to allow time to call for back-up.

       {¶ 3} Shouse returned to the residence about a half-hour later with three deputies.

Shouse parked 15-20 feet away from appellant, exited his vehicle, came to the front of the

vehicle, drew his sidearm, and said, "Ricky, sheriff's office. * * * You're under arrest."

Shouse's badge was displayed visibly on his belt. Appellant replied, "Ricky who?" and fled

on foot.

       {¶ 4} Appellant ran around a minivan parked in the driveway, threw a garbage can

down behind him and ran down the driveway toward the road. Three deputies stood in front

of him. Deputy Hanson drew his taser and commanded appellant to stop. Pack did not

obey the command and jumped a guardrail on the side of the road. When appellant hit the

ground, he slipped. Appellant remained on the ground and the deputies took him into

custody.

       {¶ 5} Appellant was charged in municipal court with a single count of obstruction of

official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31, a second-degree misdemeanor, and resisting

arrest. Appellant pled not guilty and the matter proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, the state

presented the testimony of Shouse and Hanson. Appellant testified in his own defense.

Appellant asserted that he fled after Shouse had exited his vehicle and drew his sidearm

because he did not realize Shouse was a police officer. Explaining, appellant testified that

Shouse was in plain clothes and he did not otherwise recognize him, his view of Shouse's

badge was obstructed by Shouse's vehicle's door, and he did not hear Shouse announce

that he was from the Sheriff's office. Appellant denied that he threw the trash can down to

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impede Shouse in chasing him, but rather claimed that he had inadvertently knocked it over

as he fled. Appellant also denied that he jumped the guardrail on the side of the road to

elude capture by the deputies and instead claimed that he simply could not stop in time to

avoid running into the guardrail.

       {¶ 6} The municipal court found appellant guilty as charged of obstructing official

business and acquitted him of resisting arrest. The municipal court sentenced appellant to

90 days in jail with credit for 29 days served.

       {¶ 7} Appellant appeals his conviction, raising two assignments of error.

       {¶ 8} Assignment of Error No. 1:

       {¶ 9} THE EVIDENCE, VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE STATE,

WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL

BUSINESS.

       {¶ 10} Appellant argues in his first assignment of error that the evidence presented

at trial was insufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that Appellant's behavior

created a "substantial stoppage" which "hampered" or "impeded" law enforcement's effort

to arrest him, and thus there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for obstructing

official business.

       {¶ 11} Whether the evidence presented at trial is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict

is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). When reviewing

the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction, an appellate court examines

the evidence to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average

mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Billingsley, 12th Dist.

Butler Nos. CA2019-05-075 and CA2019-05-076, 2020-Ohio-2673, ¶ 14. Therefore, "[t]he

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

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proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph

two of the syllabus.

       {¶ 12} Appellant was convicted of obstructing official business in violation of R.C.

2921.31(A), which provides "No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to

prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within

the public official's official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official

in the performance of the public official's lawful duties." As this court has stated previously,

"the proper focus in a prosecution for obstructing official business is on the defendant's

conduct, verbal or physical, and its effect on the public official's ability to perform his or her

lawful duties." State v. Ertel, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-12-109, 2016-Ohio-2682, ¶ 8,

citing State v. Bailey, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2007-04-013, 2008-Ohio-3075, ¶ 28. In

turn, to be convicted for obstructing official business, there must be evidence presented

indicating the defendant actually interfered with the performance of an official duty, thereby

making the performance of that duty more difficult. State v. Standifer, 12th Dist. Warren

No. CA2011-07-071, 2012-Ohio-3132, ¶ 28, citing State v. Whitt, 12th Dist. Butler No.

CA89-06-091, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 2479, 1990 WL 82592, *2 (June 18, 1990). The state,

however, is not required to prove the defendant's conduct successfully prevented a public

official from doing his or her job. Id.

       {¶ 13} In arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, appellant

relies primarily upon the First District's opinion in State v. Grice, 180 Ohio App.3d 700, 2009-

Ohio-372 (1st Dist.). The defendant in Grice was convicted of obstructing official business

for failing to identify himself to police officers investigating a "shots fired" report. In reversing

the conviction, the court of appeals held that

               [A] violation of this statute requires an affirmative act. "A person
               cannot be guilty of obstructing official business by doing nothing
               or failing to act." The mere refusal to produce identification upon

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              the request of a police officer cannot support a conviction for
              obstructing official business. In addition, the defendant's act
              must actually hamper or impede the public official in the
              performance of the official's duties.

              ***

              This court has held that there is no element in R.C. 2921.31(A)
              requiring the state to prove that the offender's conduct
              "prevented" a public official from doing his job. Rather, to
              "hamper" or "impede," the conduct at issue must create some
              "substantial stoppage" of the officer's progress. This stoppage
              is not defined by a particular period of time, but it must occur
              because of the defendant's act.

Grice at ¶ 9 & 12. Appellant contends that though his act of fleeing may be an "affirmative

act" that was done with an intent to "hamper or impede," it did not result in a "substantial

stoppage" of Shouse's efforts to arrest him. Appellant argues that this is apparent because

Shouse did not chase him in earnest, since appellant was fleeing right into the arms of the

three deputies positioned at the end of the driveway. Appellant thus asserts that his

behavior resulted in, at most, minor delay, annoyance, and some inconvenience to the

deputies.

       {¶ 14} In State v. Ertel, this Court rejected application of the "substantial stoppage"

standard recognized in Grice.

              [W]hile we find some courts have used the "substantial
              stoppage" language when reviewing a conviction for obstructing
              official business, see State v. Grice, 180 Ohio App.3d 700,
              2009-Ohio-372, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.); State v. Ellis, 2d Dist.
              Montgomery No. 24003, 2011-Ohio-2967, ¶ 59, our research
              has failed to uncover any such case emanating from this court.
              It is well-established that we are generally only bound by the
              decisions of the Ohio Supreme Court and by past precedent
              produced by our own district, not those decisions from our
              brethren within the other eleven appellate districts.

Ertel, ¶ 9.

       {¶ 15} As opposed to requiring a "substantial stoppage," we held that conviction of

obstructing official business requires proof that the defendant "hampered or impeded the

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public official's ability to perform his or her lawful duties." Id., at ¶ 10. There is no finite,

definitive, or particular period of time that must elapse for a public official's lawful duties to

have been hampered or impeded. Id. This Court has previously found that "[a] suspect

who flees even after committing a minor nonarrestable offense can be convicted of

obstructing official business." State v. Botos, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2004-06-145, 2005-

Ohio-3504, ¶ 16.

       {¶ 16} We find that appellant's actions in fleeing from Shouse and eluding the other

three deputies by jumping the guardrail, however brief and futile, constitute sufficient

evidence to support his conviction.

       {¶ 17} Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶ 18} Assignment of Error No. 2:

       {¶ 19} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A VERDICT OF GUILTY

BECAUSE SUCH VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE

EVIDENCE.

       {¶ 20} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that his conviction was

against the manifest weight of the evidence for the same reason he advances in his first

assignment of error. Appellant also asserts that his conviction was against the manifest

weight of the evidence based upon his testimony that he did not know Shouse was a police

officer and that he ran because he was afraid after Shouse displayed his sidearm. He

further argues that there are innocent explanations for why he threw a trash can down and

jumped the guardrail on the side of the road as he fled.

       {¶ 21} A manifest weight of the evidence challenge "concerns the inclination of the

greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of the issue rather

than the other." State v. Barnett, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-09-177, 2012-Ohio-2372, ¶

14. To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the

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reviewing court must look at the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable

inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in resolving the

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State

v. Graham, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2008-07-095, 2009-Ohio-2814, ¶ 66.

        {¶ 22} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, a reviewing court must look at the entire record to weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, as well as consider the credibility of the witnesses. Barnett at ¶ 14.

In reviewing the record, we must ask if the trier of fact "clearly lost its way and created such

a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed, and a new trial

ordered." State v. Cephas, 12th Dist. Buter No. CA2021-05-051, 2021-Ohio-4356, ¶ 9.

While our review requires us to consider the credibility of witnesses and weight given to the

evidence, "these issues are primarily matters for the trier of fact to decide." State v. Barnes,

12th Dist. Brown No. CA2010-06-009, 2011-Ohio-5226, ¶ 81. Accordingly, an appellate

court will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence "only in

extraordinary circumstances when the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor

of acquittal." State v. Roberson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-01-003, 2021-Ohio-3705,

¶ 29.

        {¶ 23} Clearly, the municipal court did not find Pack's claims credible, and instead

placed greater weight on the testimony of Shouse and Hanson. Shouse testified that he

identified himself as a police officer, announced that appellant was under arrest, and that

other sheriff's personnel were behind him in marked cars and in uniform. Hanson testified

that he drew his taser and commanded appellant to stop, but appellant continued to run,

jumped over the guardrail, and fell onto his stomach, after which two other deputies made

it over the guardrail and cuffed him.

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       {¶ 24} For the same reasons set forth in the discussion of the first assignment of

error and in consideration of the testimony at trial, we find that appellant's flight from Shouse

and the three deputies "hampered or impeded" his arrest and his conviction is not against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶ 25} Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶ 26} Judgment affirmed.

       HENDRICKSON, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.

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