Court Opinion

ID: 9792778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:36:22.87714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:03.303201
License: Public Domain

*698Young, J.,
with whom Shearing, J., joins,
dissenting:
My colleagues conclude that the search of the Millers’ bedroom was not subject to constitutional protections because it was perfected by a private citizen. The majority relies upon United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1983), to support this proposition. I believe that this rationale is flawed. I respectfully submit that the principles established by Jacobsen are simply inapplicable to the instant case.
In Jacobsen, Federal Express employees inadvertently opened a customer’s parcel and found what they suspected was cocaine. The employees resealed the package and summoned federal authorities. An agent of the Drag Enforcement Administration later reopened the parcel, without a warrant, at the Federal Express office. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of this search, reasoning that the Constitution was not violated when a government agent reenacted a search conducted by private individuals. The decision established the general principle that the government has the right to conduct independent searches no greater in scope than that performed by the private actor. Id. at 120.
There is a key distinction between Jacobsen and the instant appeal that is ignored in the majority opinion. In Jacobsen, the search was reenacted by a government official at the parcel service’s offices. The official was properly invited onto the premises and was free to perform the same type of search conducted by Federal Express employees. In the case at bar, however, Officer Brown’s reenactment of the search was performed in the Millers’ home. Jennifer was not merely allowing the police to reenact a private search of an unopened paper bag, she was waiving any privacy interests that the Millers had in their bedroom. This far exceeded Jennifer’s initial discovery and search.1 *699Surely, any time a private citizen fortuitously discovers evidence of contraband at another’s home, they are not free to invite police in for a romp around the connubial bed. See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.8(b), at 188 (2nd ed. 1987). The Fourth Amendment simply affords more protection to an individual’s residence.
The error of the majority’s reliance on Jacobsen is aptly illustrated by the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Brewer, 690 P.2d 860 (Colo. 1984). In Brewer, a landlord conducted a private search of a tenant’s apartment after the tenant had apparently abandoned the residence. Within the apartment, the landlord found a shoe box containing marijuana. She summoned the police and admitted them into the apartment, where they seized the marijuana that the landlord had privately discovered. In holding that the search was unlawful, the Brewer court rejected the State’s reliance upon Jacobsen. The court agreed that the landlord’s initial search was a private endeavor not subject to constitutional restrictions. Id. at 862. However, the court properly recognized that allowing the police into the residence to search for, and retrieve, the marijuana involved a different constitutional question. While the integrity of the shoe box was compromised by the private search, the expectation of privacy in the apartment remained intact. The real issue on appeal was whether the landlord had the authority to consent to a search of the premises. The court ultimately held that the landlord did not have such authority and invalidated the search. Id. at 862-63; see also State v. Miggler, 419 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (distinguishing Jacobsen on grounds that police entered home of suspect to reenact search conducted by private individual).
Like Brewer, and without the controlling influence of Jacob-sen, the real issue of this appeal is whether twelve-year-old Jennifer had the authority to consent to a search of her employers’ bedroom. The majority summarily dismisses this issue, stating that Jennifer provided Officer Brown with a “valid, third-party consent to enter and search the Millers’ apartment.” Again, I respectfully submit that the majority’s conclusion is incorrect.
The government has the burden of establishing the effectiveness of a third party’s consent. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). It can accomplish this task in three ways. First, the government can come forward with evidence of both joint access and shared use or control over the area that was searched. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974). Such a showing would demonstrate that the third party had actual authority to consent. Second, it can show that the owner of the property to be searched expressly authorized the third party to give consent. Finally, the government may establish valid consent by *700means of the “apparent authority doctrine.” There, a search is valid if the officer reasonably believes that the third party has actual authority to consent. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188.
After examining these three different possibilities of consensual authority, the flaw in the majority’s analysis becomes clear. First, there is nothing in the record indicating that Jennifer had shared access to, or control over, the Millers’ bedroom. To the contrary, the Millers presented evidence at the suppression hearing that Jennifer was specifically instructed to stay out of their bedroom. Vicky Miller testified that she regularly shut the bedroom door before she left for work. In light of these simple facts, and understanding the general restrictions placed upon a twelve-year-old babysitter, I cannot conclude that Jennifer had the actual authority to waive the Millers’ constitutionally protected right to be free from warrantless searches of their bedroom. See State v. Rodrigues, 692 P.2d 1156, 1157 (Hawaii 1985) (babysitter did not have actual authority to consent to a search of resident’s bedroom where she never had access to the subject room); see also People v. Litwin, 355 N.Y.S.2d 646, 649 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (babysitter had no authority to consent to search of employer’s home). Second, there is nothing in the record indicating that the Millers authorized Jennifer to consent to the search. Finally, and most importantly, it was not reasonable for Officer Brown to believe that a twelve-year-old babysitter had the authority to waive the constitutional protections of her employer. See, e.g., People v. Jacobs, 729 P.2d 757, 763 (Cal. 1987) (eleven-year-old girl does not have the actual or apparent authority to consent to search of parent’s home). The record indicates that the officer entered the house and almost immediately followed young Jennifer into the connubial resting place. Officer Brown had knowledge that Jennifer was only the babysitter and was not a resident of the house. In addition, he surely noticed that Jennifer was a young girl. Yet in spite of this information, Officer Brown never once questioned Jennifer regarding her responsibility or authority over the household or bedroom. I submit that it was unreasonable for Officer Brown to summarily determine that Jennifer had the authority to invite him into the most private parts of the Millers’ home. The Constitution prohibits police officers from plowing through ambiguous situations and later claiming ignorance or “reasonableness” when an issue arises regarding the consensual authority of a third party. In fact, the Constitution mandates that officers ask questions to dispel any concerns they may have about whether the third party has authority to consent. See United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
In its ruling, the district court determined that there was not valid consent to the search of the Millers’ home. The conclusion *701rested upon factual determinations made by the court after considering the testimony of Officer Brown and the factual climate of his visit to the Millers’ residence. There is nothing in the record on appeal indicating that the findings of the district court were clearly erroneous. United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430, 433 (9th Cir. 1978) (findings of fact at a suppression hearing will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979).
Unlike the majority, I cannot conclude that the government carried its burden in proving that the third-party consent of young Jennifer was valid. The Constitution affords the Millers more protection in their home. Their fundamental right to be free from warrantless searches of their residence cannot be waived by a twelve-year-old temporary employee. I agree with the district court’s sound rationale and its recognition of this issue as fundamental to our culture of individual freedoms. I also share the lower court’s admiration for the immortal words of William Pitt concerning the sanctity of the tenement:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown.
It may be frail — its roof may shake — the wind may blow through it — the storm may enter — the rain may enter — but the King of England cannot enter!
All his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.2
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the district court’s ruling.

 This distinction was tacitly recognized in Jacobsen. Reacting to concerns expressed by his colleagues, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, expressed a limitation to the Court’s holding:
We reject Justice White’s suggestion that this case is indistinguishable from one in which the police simply learn from a private party that a container contains contraband, seize it from its owner, and conduct a warrantless search which, as Justice White properly observes, would be unconstitutional. Here, the Federal Express employees who were lawfully in possession of the package invited the agent to examine its contents; the governmental conduct was made possible only because private parties had compromised the integrity of this container.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120 n.17.
With these comments, the court identified a distinction where the container is compromised but other expectations of privacy remain intact. Such is present in the instant case, where Jennifer’s search compromised the integrity of the paper bag but the sanctity and expectation of privacy in the bedroom remained undisturbed.

 William Pitt, the elder, Earl of Chatham, Speech in the House of Lords (1763).