Court Opinion

ID: 9530625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:01:40.968374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:11.534703
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the order of consolidation was erroneous and that the Greene Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the matter of custody. This conclusion is premised upon the view that the pendency of the CHINS matter in the Greene Circuit Court precluded that court from consolidating a custody issue involved in a dissolution matter, pending in the same court, and from resolving the issue of custody in the consolidated proceeding. This conclusion in turn rests upon the rationale that all matters of custody must be resolved within the exclusive confines of a CHINS disposition and must be resolved by the court having jurisdiction of the CHINS proceeding, which jurisdiction is exclusive.
The holding relies upon several cases cited by the majority. In P.B. v. T.D. (1987) Ind.App., 504 N.E.2d 1042, 1043, modified on rehearing, 507 N.E.2d 992, the Elkhart Circuit Court, exercising its juvenile jurisdiction, found the child to be a CHINS and made her a ward of the Department of Public Welfare but ordered the child to remain in her stepmother’s home. Because the Circuit Court was exercising its exclusive jurisdiction, we held that the Elkhart Superior Court could not validly modify a prior custody order entered by it in a dissolution proceeding. Id. at 1043. This court specifically noted, however, that the Superior Court could have exercised its jurisdiction had there been an order transferring the cause. Id.
In the case before us, the proceedings were pending in the same court, the Greene Circuit Court, although in one cause the court was exercising its juvenile authority and in the other its jurisdiction over custody issues in a dissolution matter.2 Be that as it may, the court entered an order of consolida*309tion, which I deem to be a valid equivalent of the order of transfer alluded to in P.B., supra, 504 N.E.2d at 1043.3
Had the trial court here proceeded in a slightly different manner, the result obtained would be clearly validated. Assuming as we must that the juvenile jurisdiction being exercised by the Greene Circuit Court was exclusive, it was as to matters relating to the custody and care of the child. There surely could be no impediment to a transfer of a custody modification matter pending in a dissolution context and a consolidation of that issue or issues with the issues pending in the CHINS court.
The court could have placed the child in the custody of Arthur, as a dispositional determination in the CHINS proceeding. The court could then have put on'its dissolution jurisdictional hat and, pursuant to a final CHINS decree, granted the custody modification and ordered support and visitation. The same result was achieved utilizing the custody order, followed by a dismissal of the CHINS proceeding, all as per motion made by the Greene County Office of Family and Children. Once custody had been placed with the father, the purposes of the CHINS proceeding had been entirely fulfilled.
I see no necessity to reverse and. remand, requiring the court to jump through the various hoops in reverse sequence in order to elevate the form of the concept of exclusive CHINS jurisdiction over the substance of the determination which was made.4
I would affirm the judgment.

. In Hemingway v. Sandoe (1997) Ind.App., 676 N.E.2d 368, 372, we observed that, although a court exercising juvenile jurisdiction and a court exercising dissolution jurisdiction may be the same court, in exercising the particular jurisdiction the courts must be viewed as separate courts.

. In In re Bramblett (1986) Ind.App., 495 N.E.2d 798, 799, relied upon in P.B., supra, 504 N.E.2d at 1043, we found that the Grant Superior Court, Juvenile Division, had exclusive CHINS jurisdiction, which precluded the Grant Circuit Court from appointing a guardian over the child in question. Unlike the instant case, in Bramblett there was no order transferring or consolidating the causes. Further, in Alexander v. Cole, (1998) Ind.App., 697 N.E.2d 80, this court noted that the CHINS court jurisdiction was continuing and exclusive unless that court discharged the parties "or transferred the cause." Id. at 82 (emphasis supplied).

. Even if I were to disregard the consolidation of the CHINS and the dissolution custodial matters and to view the determination as if it had been made in total disregard for a separate and independent CHINS proceeding, it would not alter my vote to affirm the judgment. The majority, I believe, mistakenly invalidates the judgment upon grounds that the Greene Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Here, clearly, the Greene Circuit Court has and had jurisdiction over the general class of cases into which this matter fell, i.e. custody modification following a custodial award made in a dissolution. This is subject matter jurisdiction. Pivarnik v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (1994) Ind., 636 N.E.2d 131, 137. The fact that the court may have lacked jurisdiction (absent transfer and/or consolidation) over the particular case, by reason of a pending CHINS petition, did not divest it of the jurisdiction of the subject matter itself.
Matters relating to jurisdiction of the particular case, as opposed to jurisdiction of the subject matter, may he waived. National Educ. Ass’n—South Bend v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp. (1995) Ind.App., 655 N.E.2d 516, 519. Here, the parties agreed to the consolidation and to a joint evidentiary hearing upon the consolidated matters. The June 2, 1998 order, which granted sole custody of the. child to Arthur, awarded child support and visitation, and became effective upon dismissal of the CHINS proceeding, was a result of those procedural occurrences. That Fox did not explicitly agree that the custody order was to be made within the context of the custody modification cause and that the CHINS proceeding would be dismissed does not affect my view that any challenge of the jurisdiction of the Greene County Circuit Court to determine the matter of custody, in the manner it did, had been waived.