Court Opinion

ID: 9394217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 18:03:27.423613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:58.010970
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/12/23 P. v. Gomez CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H050029
                                                                    (Santa Cruz County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. No. 21CR03701)

             v.

 ANDRES TREJO GOMEZ,

             Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Andres Trejo Gomez pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a
felon and related charges and admitted a prior serious felony conviction. At sentencing,
the trial court denied Gomez’s request to dismiss his strike prior pursuant to Penal Code
section 13851 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).
The trial court sentenced Gomez to a total term of two years and eight months in prison.
         On appeal, Gomez contends that the trial court erred when considering his Romero
motion by failing to apply certain amendments to section 1385 enacted by Senate Bill
No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) (Senate Bill 81).
         We disagree and affirm the judgment.

         1
             Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                   I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A. Facts2
       On September 1, 2021,3 Watsonville police officers initiated a traffic stop on a
moving vehicle after observing it had no visible front license plate and had tinted front
passenger windows. Gomez was seated in the front passenger seat. The driver and
Gomez eventually exited the vehicle at the request of the officers and a police sergeant
who had arrived on scene. Officers observed a firearm partially visible beneath the front
passenger seat. The gun was loaded. Another firearm, registered to the driver, was
located in the backseat inside of a backpack. Officers searched Gomez and found nine
unspent bullets in his pocket, which matched the brand and caliber of both the gun
beneath the front passenger seat and the gun registered to the driver.
       B. Procedural History
       On October 13, following a preliminary hearing, the Santa Cruz County District
Attorney filed an information charging Gomez with possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1), carrying a loaded firearm in public (§ 25850, subd. (a);
count 2), carrying a concealed handgun in a vehicle (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1); count 3), and
possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing a firearm (§ 30305,
subd. (a)(1); count 4). In addition, the information alleged that Gomez had suffered a
prior serious and/or violent felony conviction for attempted robbery (§§ 664, 211) in
2015 in Monterey County. (§§ 667.5, subds. (b)–(i) (strike allegation or strike prior).)
       In January 2022, after the trial court denied Gomez’s motion to suppress evidence
pursuant to section 1538.5, the trial court gave a tentative indicated sentence of 32
months in state prison (based on the low term of 16 months on count 1, doubled by the

       2
        The factual summary is taken from the September 30, 2021 preliminary hearing.
The parties stipulated to the preliminary hearing transcript as the factual basis for the
plea.
      3
        Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2021.
                                                 2
strike prior), with the opportunity to file a Romero motion at sentencing. Gomez pleaded
no contest to all four counts and admitted the prior strike allegation pursuant to section
667, subdivisions (b)–(i). The court accepted Gomez’s plea and admission of the strike
prior.
         Prior to sentencing, defense counsel filed a Romero motion asking the trial court to
dismiss Gomez’s strike prior in furtherance of justice based on multiple considerations,
including the nature and age of the strike prior, Gomez’s good performance on parole,
and his willingness to undergo counseling for possible PTSD. In support of his motion,
Gomez cited the additional language of section 1385, subdivision (c) (hereafter, section
1385(c)), requiring that certain factors be “ ‘afforded great weight’ ” in favor of
dismissal. Gomez noted that he had reported to the interviewing probation officer “that
he may suffer from PTSD as a result of being a crime victim in the past,” and furthermore
asserted that the strike offense was more than five years old, had occurred when he was a
teenager, and was “a different type of offense” than the current offense, which involved
possession of a firearm that was “not exhibited” and “certainly wasn’t discharged.” The
district attorney opposed the Romero motion, arguing it would not be in the interests of
justice to strike Gomez’s strike allegation based on his conviction history and
performance on supervision since his release from incarceration in late 2018.
         At the sentencing hearing in May 2022, the trial court indicated it would deny the
Romero motion and explained its reasons on the record, noting there was not a clear
connection between the mental health issue raised by Gomez and the current offense and
concluding that the other relevant factors did not justify dismissal of the strike. Over the
objection of the district attorney, who requested a four-year prison sentence, the trial
court sentenced Gomez in accordance with the court’s indicated sentence to an aggregate
term of two years, eight months in prison. The sentence comprised the low term of 16
months for count 1, doubled pursuant to section 667, subdivisions (b)–(i), 16 months for
counts 2 and 3, stayed pursuant to section 654, and a concurrent term of 16 months for
                                                  3
count 4, doubled due to the strike prior. The court awarded custody credits and imposed
fines and fees.
       Gomez timely appealed.
                                     II. DISCUSSION
       Gomez contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike his prior
strike conviction by failing to apply the amendments set forth in section 1385(c). He
argues that section 1385(c), enacted by Senate Bill 81, applies to strike priors and
requires the trial court to “ ‘afford great weight’ ” to evidence of certain enumerated
mitigating circumstances, unless the result would endanger public safety. Gomez
maintains the court in this case abused its discretion by failing to consider three of the
four factors present using the presumptions specified by section 1385(c).
       Section 1385, subdivision (a), authorizes trial courts to dismiss an action “in
furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (a).) In Romero, the California Supreme Court
held that a trial court’s discretion under section 1385, subdivision (a) includes the power
to dismiss a prior conviction alleged under the Three Strikes law. (Romero, supra,
13 Cal.4th at pp. 529–530.) Section 1385, subdivision (a) allows a court to “strike or
vacate an allegation or finding under the Three Strikes law that a defendant has
previously been convicted of a serious and/or violent felony.” (People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 158 (Williams).)
       Section 1385, subdivision (b), pertains to enhancements. It states, “If the court has
the authority pursuant to subdivision (a) to strike or dismiss an enhancement, the court
may instead strike the additional punishment for that enhancement in the furtherance of
justice in compliance with subdivision (a).” (§ 1385, subd. (b)(1).)
       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 81 amended section 1385 to add subdivision
(c), also pertaining to enhancements. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) The newly added
subdivision lists specific mitigating factors a court must consider when deciding whether
to strike an enhancement from a defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice.
                                                  4
(§ 1385(c); People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674; People v. Burke (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 237, 242–243 (Burke).) Additional amendments to section 1385(c),
effective June 30, 2022, make minor changes not at issue here. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 15.)
         We review de novo, as a matter of statutory interpretation, whether the
amendments to section 1385 enacted by Senate Bill 81 apply to prior strike convictions.
(Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 242.)
         As amended, section 1385(c) states: “(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court
shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. [¶] (2) In exercising
its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the [enumerated] mitigating
circumstances . . . are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.” The mitigating circumstances in
section 1385, subd. (c)(2) are listed in subparagraphs (A) to (I).4

         4
         Section 1385, subd. (c)(2) lists the following mitigating circumstances:
“(A) Application of the enhancement would result in a discriminatory racial impact as
described in paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of [s]ection 745. [¶] (B) Multiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a
single enhancement shall be dismissed. [¶] (C) The application of an enhancement could
result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be
dismissed. [¶] (D) The current offense is connected to mental illness. [¶] (E) The
current offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma. [¶] (F) The
current offense is not a violent felony as defined in subdivision (c) of [s]ection 667.5. [¶]
(G) The defendant was a juvenile when they committed the current offense or any prior
offenses, including criminal convictions and juvenile adjudications, that trigger the
enhancement or enhancements applied in the current case. [¶] (H) The enhancement is

                                                  5
       Gomez asserts that the enumerated circumstances at issue in this case, and noted in
his Romero motion, are whether the current offense is connected to a mental illness
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D)), or to prior victimization or childhood trauma (id., subd.
(c)(2)(E)), whether the current offense is a violent felony (id., subd. (c)(2)(F)), and
whether the enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old (id.,
subd. (c)(2)(H)).
       Gomez argues that because the California Supreme Court in Romero held that
section 1385 authorizes courts to strike prior felony convictions alleged under the Three
Strikes law, any amendments to section 1385—unless otherwise indicated—likewise
apply to strike priors. Since Senate Bill 81 amended section 1385, Gomez contends that
section 1385(c) should be construed as applying to strike allegations, notwithstanding the
amended statute’s use of the word “ ‘enhancement.’ ”
       Gomez acknowledges case law holding that the Three Strikes regime is not an
“enhancement” but an alternative sentencing scheme. (See People v. Sipe (1995) 36
Cal.App.4th 468, 487; People v. Williams (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 733 (Williams II).)
However, he argues that because “enhancement” as used specifically in section 1385 has
not been judicially construed and is not defined in the relevant statutory amendments, it
may be understood according to its ordinary meaning. (See Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
p. 527 [noting the technical definition of “enhancement” but declining “to answer all of
these arguments”]; De Vries v. Regents of University of California (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th
574, 590–591 [“ ‘When a term goes undefined in a statute, we give the term its ordinary
meaning.’ ”].)
       Referencing Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), Gomez suggests that
“ ‘enhancement’ ” refers simply to an allegation that increases the punishment for an

based on a prior conviction that is over five years old. [¶] (I) Though a firearm was used
in the current offense, it was inoperable or unloaded.”
                                                  6
offense beyond that authorized for the offense alone.5 As such, he maintains that
“elevating” or “doubling” enhancements under the Three Strikes law are increases in
punishment subject to the changes made by Senate Bill 81. Gomez argues that as a
matter of statutory interpretation, a term should be given its ordinary meaning unless such
an interpretation would defeat the statute’s purpose or raise constitutional questions.
Gomez contends that in this case, applying the new subdivision (c) to the trial court’s
Romero determination is consistent with the statutory purpose because Senate Bill 81
addresses systemic disparities in sentencing, including those engendered by the Three
Strikes law. He contends that attempting to reduce such disparities by enabling the
dismissal of penalty provisions raises no constitutional concerns.
       We join other Courts of Appeal in rejecting this reading of section 1385(c).
       In Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th 237, the Third District Court of Appeal looked to
the statutory language as the primary indication of legislative intent. (Id. at p. 243; see
People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151.) It noted that “[s]ubdivision (c) of
section 1385 expressly applies to the dismissal of an ‘enhancement.’ (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(1).)” (Burke, at p. 243.) The court considered both the “well-established technical
meaning [of ‘enhancement’] in California law” (ibid.) as well as case authority
concluding that the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement but “an alternative
sentencing scheme for the current offense” (ibid.). The court reasoned that since words
in a statute “ ‘are presumed to be used in accordance with their established legal or
technical meaning’ ” (ibid.), and it is “well established that the Three Strikes law is not an

       5
          According to Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), “enhancement” means:
“1. The act of augmenting, as with a sentence in a criminal prosecution or damages in a
civil action; the quality, state, or condition of being enhanced. [¶] 2. Criminal procedure.
An upward adjustment to a defendant’s offense level under applicable sentencing
guidelines .” The
same source defines “sentence enhancement” as “[t]he increase of a criminal defendant’s
punishment based [] on a prior conviction.”
                                                  7
enhancement” (ibid.), section 1385(c) does not apply to the Three Strikes law. (Id. at
p. 244.)
       We agree. Case law uniformly recognizes use of the term “enhancement” in the
sentencing context to mean “ ‘ “an additional term of imprisonment added to the base
term.” ’ ” (Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 243, quoting People v. Jefferson (1999) 21
Cal.4th 86, 101; People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 695, fn. 9; see also Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.405(5).) Conversely, courts agree that “[t]he Three Strikes law is a penalty
provision, not an enhancement. It is not an enhancement because it does not add an
additional term of imprisonment to the base term. Instead, it provides for an alternate
sentence . . . when it is proven that the defendant has suffered . . . prior serious [or
violent] felony convictions.” (Williams II, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 744; Burke,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 243; see Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 527.) Given the
uniform construction of these terms by courts, we are not persuaded by Gomez’s
argument that “enhancement” within the specific context of section 1385 has not been
judicially construed. We “presume the Legislature was aware of, and acquiesced in, both
this established judicial definition of enhancement and the distinction between an
enhancement and an alternative sentencing scheme such as the Three Strikes law.”
(Burke, at p. 243; see also People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 845–846 [reiterating
that a statute’s use of a term that has been judicially construed is presumed to be
consistent with “ ‘ “the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon [the
term] by the courts” ’ ”].)
       Gomez acknowledges these points but argues that interpreting section 1385(c)
narrowly, to restrict its application to technical “enhancements,” is contrary to the
Legislature’s intent as well as the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity, which “generally
requires that ‘ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity, giving
the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt on questions of interpretation’ ” (In
re M.M. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 530, 545), applies when “ ‘ “two reasonable interpretations of
                                                   8
the statute stand in relative equipoise” ’ ” (ibid.). That is not the case here, where
Gomez’s proposed construction of the term (to encompass strike priors) would be
inconsistent with prior, uniform judicial construction of the word “enhancement.”
       Gomez also points to the legislative history of Senate Bill 81, including Senate and
Assembly Floor Analyses, which he contends support his interpretation of section
1385(c). As we perceive no ambiguity in the wording of section 1385(c), we need not
resort to legislative history to construe its meaning. (See People v. Arias (2008) 45
Cal.4th 169, 177; Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 243.)
       We decide that section 1385(c)’s use of the term “enhancement” does not extend
to strike priors under the Three Strikes law. As Gomez’s sole contention on appeal is that
the trial court erred in failing to apply section 1385(c), we affirm the judgment.
                                    III. DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                  9
                           ______________________________________
                                      Danner, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Wilson, J.

____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H050029
People v. Gomez