Court Opinion

ID: 9908631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 15:05:41.28839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:21.952839
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0320-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JARON STROTHER, a/k/a
JARON STROTHERS,
TYQUAN STROTHER,
JARON DECHAUN STROTHER,
and JASON STROTHER,

          Defendant-Appellant.

                   Argued November 14, 2023 – Decided December 11, 2023

                   Before Judges Rose, Smith and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 11-10-2489.

                   Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, Designated Counsel, argued the
                   cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
                   Defender, attorney; Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, on the
                   briefs).

                   Bethany L. Deal, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
                   cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
            General, attorney; Lauren Bonfiglio, Deputy Attorney
            General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant Jaron Strother appeals from a July 26, 2022 order denying his

petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) following an evidentiary hearing. Prior

to the hearing, defendant contended his plea counsel was ineffective because he

was not informed his plea might subject him to civil commitment under the New

Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38.

Defendant sought vacation of his guilty plea and sentence – for the sole purpose

of effectuating his immediate release from the Special Treatment Unit (STU).

For the first time during the hearing, defendant claimed he was innocent of the

sexual offense at issue. Following the hearing, the PCR judge entered the order

and issued a cogent written decision rejecting defendant's contentions. Because

the PCR judge's findings are "are supported by sufficient credible evidence in

the record," State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013), we affirm.

                                       I.

      We summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history from the record

before the PCR judge. In March 2013, defendant pled guilty to second-degree

sexual assault by physical force or coercion, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c), and second-

degree certain persons not to have firearms, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7, charged in

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Atlantic County Indictment No. 11-10-2489; and fourth-degree hindering

apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3, charged in a second indictment.

      Pertinent to this appeal, prior to entering his guilty plea to sexual assault,

defendant initialed and signed the plea form and supplemental plea forms for

sexual offenses.    One of these forms, "New Jersey Judiciary Additional

Questions for Certain Sexual Offenses," reflected defendant answered, "Yes" in

response to question 7, which was entitled, "Civil Commitment," and asked:

            Do you understand that if you are convicted of a
            sexually violent offense, such as aggravated sexual
            assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual
            contact, kidnapping . . . criminal sexual contact, felony
            murder if the underlying crime is sexual assault, an
            attempt to commit any of these offenses, or any offense
            for which the court makes a specific finding on the
            record that, based on the circumstances of the case, the
            offense should be considered a sexually violent offense,
            you may upon completion of your term of incarceration
            be civilly committed to another facility for up to life if
            the court finds, after a hearing, that you are in need of
            involuntary civil commitment?

      During his plea colloquy, defendant acknowledged under oath that he

"t[ook] the time to go over the whole form, item by item, with the help of [plea

counsel]," and "answer[ed] all the questions on the form honestly." Defendant

also answered, "Yes," to the court's inquiry: "While you were going through

those papers, to the extent that you had any lingering questions or need [ed]

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                                         3
explanations of the plea agreement or any other considerations, was [plea

counsel] able to answer your questions to your satisfaction?"

      Defendant testified he understood in exchange for his guilty pleas the

State recommended a five-year prison sentence subject to the No Early Release

Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, on the sexual assault charge, to be imposed

concurrently to a five-year prison sentence, with a mandatory five-year parole

disqualifier subject to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), on the certain

persons charge, 365 days' imprisonment on the hindering charge, and dismissal

of all remaining charges. The plea agreement also subjected defendant to the

reporting requirements under Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, parole

supervision for life, a psychological and physical evaluation at the Avenel

Diagnostic and Treatment Center (ADTC), and no contact with the victim.

      Defendant further acknowledged the "no show – no recommendation"

term of the plea agreement, permitting the State to argue for the maximum

sentence if defendant failed to appear at sentencing. See State v. Subin, 222

N.J. Super. 227, 240 (App. Div. 1988) (permitting the State to recommend a

harsher sentence if the defendant fails to appear for sentencing). Defendant

confirmed he was entering a guilty plea because he was guilty of the offenses

charged and he was satisfied with plea counsel's advice.

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      In his factual basis for his guilty plea to the sexual assault offense,

defendant testified that on July 3, 2011, he had vaginal-penile intercourse "with

S.S. by holding her down against her will." The court accepted defendant's

guilty plea finding defendant "read, signed, and understood the plea form and

the thirteen pa[ges] of supplements."

      Defendant failed to appear for his mandatory evaluation at the ADTC and

sentencing hearing. While on the lam, defendant committed new crimes. Just

prior to his eventual sentencing in June 2014, defendant pled guilty to third-

degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(b), charged in a third indictment,

and fourth-degree possession of a stun gun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(h), charged in a

fourth indictment. Because his ADTC report indicated his conduct did not

constitute a pattern of repetitive and compulsive sexual behavior, defendant was

not eligible for sex offender treatment in prison.       See N.J.S.A. 2C:47-3.

Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of eight years, subject to

NERA, and the collateral consequences for sexual offenses set forth in the plea

agreement. The judgment of conviction (JOC) was entered in July 2014.

      On direct appeal, defendant only challenged his sentence, which this court

heard on an excessive sentencing calendar pursuant to Rule 2:9-11. We rejected

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                                        5
defendant's contentions and affirmed. State v. Strother, No. A-5638-13 (App.

Div. Jan. 13, 2015).

      Thereafter, in January 2020, defendant was charged in a fifth indictment

with various sexual offenses allegedly committed upon two children under the

age of thirteen.1 Two months later, just prior to defendant's release date, the

Attorney General's Office moved for civil commitment under the SVPA, and a

temporary commitment order was issued. After his prison term was completed,

on March 27, 2020, defendant was transferred to the STU, where he remains

temporarily committed pending the outcome of his PCR application.

      In July 2021, seven years after the JOC was entered, defendant filed an

untimely pro se petition for PCR, see R. 3:22-12(a)(1), addressing only his

convictions under the first indictment. Defendant asserted neither the trial court

nor plea counsel informed him about the potential for civil commitment under

the SVPA. After PCR counsel was assigned, defendant amended his petition,

clarifying he sought immediate release from the STU.

      Following oral argument on December 9, 2021, the PCR judge, who was

not the plea and sentencing judge, granted defendant's application for an

1
   According to the record provided on appeal, the offenses charged in this
indictment remain open.
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evidentiary hearing.     Assuming arguendo defendant was unaware of the

potential for civil commitment following the completion of his prison term and

the ensuing pandemic inhibited access to the STU's law library, the judge found

defendant "made a prima facie case" for a hearing and relaxed the time bar.

      Defendant was the only witness called at the hearing. He claimed plea

counsel "never discussed" the possibility of civil commitment.        Defendant

testified "had [he] been informed of the possibility of this indefinite period of

civil commitment," he would not have entered a guilty plea. Defendant stated:

"I was going to trial the whole time. I entered the guilty plea based on the

reinstatement of my bail, and the combining of the charges that . . . [were] run

concurrent."

      Defendant acknowledged plea counsel showed him the plea forms but

claimed they "didn't have time" to review them. He further claimed plea counsel

circled all the answers to the questions on the plea forms and "basically told

[him] that everything that applied to [him] was circled. If it didn't apply to

[him], it wasn't circled."

      Defendant acknowledged that during the plea hearing he admitted he

sexually assaulted S.S. but stated he only did so because plea counsel advised

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"that's what needed to be said to fit the qualifications to take the plea deal."

Defendant testified: "I still maintain my innocence that the sex was consensual."

      On cross-examination, defendant confirmed any answers that were circled

on the supplemental plea form "applied to [him]," and the answer to question 7

under "Civil Commitment" was circled.         Defendant further confirmed his

signature appeared at the bottom of the page. When shown the transcript of the

plea hearing, defendant acknowledged he: answered, "Yes" to several questions

posed by the plea judge referenced above, including that he recognized the forms

his plea counsel had reviewed with him; reviewed the questions with the

assistance of plea counsel; and gave honest answers to the questions posed in

the forms.

      Following the evidentiary hearing, the PCR judge reserved decision.

Thereafter, the judge issued a cogent written opinion and memorializing order,

denying relief. The judge squarely addressed the issues raised in view of the

governing law. Noting defendant failed to present the testimony of plea counsel,

"any other witness," or "any other evidence to corroborate his claims," the judge

"f[ound] his testimony completely self-serving and lacking in credibility."

Contrasting defendant's colloquy during his plea hearing with his testimony at

the PCR hearing, the judge rejected defendant's belated claim of innocence. The

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judge reasoned: "As the denial of culpability is more self-serving at this time,

and the plea to the [second-]degree sexual assault is a more onerous admission

against [defendant]'s interest, it is clear that his testimony at the evidentiary

hearing was disingenuous."

      The judge elaborated:

                   In the context of the self-serving testimony
            outlined above, the court cannot accept and does not
            accept on the basis of [defendant]'s incredible
            testimony alone, that [defendant]'s attorney at the time
            of the plea failed to review the plea[] forms with him in
            detail and that he was unaware of all of the
            consequences of the plea to these crimes, including the
            potential for civil commitment. While the testimony
            that the plea form was filled out, that the answers to the
            questions were circled when his attorney reviewed it
            with him, may at first blush seem alarming, in reality,
            this court is aware that attorneys will frequently fill out
            the form for their clients as a result of them being
            handcuffed while at court, but nonetheless would
            review the form with their client extensively before
            their undergoing the plea on the record. [Defendant]
            testified he met with his attorney and had an
            opportunity to review the consequences of his plea with
            counsel. He detailed the contents of this conference
            from his self-serving perspective, indicating that while
            there "actually wasn't time" to review the plea forms,
            and that they were shown to him "briefly," he had time
            to discuss the consequences of the plea as he recalls,
            and to quote the exact advice he alleges was given by
            his attorney, which notably did not include any
            reference to the consequences detailed in Paragraph 7
            of S-1, but included essentially all of the other
            consequences of [d]efendant's plea. Yet the question

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                                        9
              was answered and acknowledged by [defendant] on the
              record. The very page where this consequence is
              detailed is signed by [defendant], with his signature
              being acknowledged by him, on the record, under oath
              in open court.        This court cannot find, by a
              preponderance of the evidence presented by
              [d]efendant, that there has been a substantial denial of
              his constitutional rights, including his right to effective
              assistance of counsel. [Defendant] seeks to expand the
              reach of Bellamy [2] by insisting that the court taking the
              plea should have specifically asked [defendant]
              question 7 verbatim, rather than asking if he had
              reviewed each and every question and answered the
              questions honestly. Bellamy directed the Criminal
              Practice Committee and the Administrative Director to
              revise the plea form to "include an appropriate
              reference to the Act for use in all cases where defendant
              pleads guilty to a predicate offense under the Act."
              This has been the status of the law regarding this type
              of plea since 2003 and no reviewing court has seen fit
              to change or find fault with the procedure whereby a
              plea of this type is taken. With regard to the claim of
              ineffective assistance of counsel . . . , [defendant] has
              not shown that counsel was deficient, and while that is
              a necessary component of that claim, [defendant] has
              also not shown a reasonable likelihood of succeeding
              or that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
              different, other than his self-serving testimony that he
              believed he was innocent of the charge and would have
              gone to trial if he knew of the potential for indefinite
              civil commitment, which testimony is wholly lacking in
              credibility.

This appeal followed.

2
    State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127 (2003).
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                                         10
                                      II.

      Defendant now raises the following points for our consideration:

                                   POINT I

            THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT [DEFENDANT]
            [PCR] BECAUSE PLEA COUNSEL FAILED TO
            ADVISE HIM OF THE POTENTIAL FOR CIVIL
            COMMITMENT, WHICH CONSTITUTED THE
            INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND A
            FUNDAMENTAL INJUSTICE.

                  A. New Jersey law requires defense attorneys
                  and criminal courts to ensure that defendants
                  pleading guilty to certain offenses know that they
                  may one day be subject to civil commitment.

                  B. The PCR court's factual findings are not
                  supported by the record and ignored misleading
                  statements by plea counsel and the court
                  contained in the plea record.

                                  POINT II
            [DEFENDANT] ASKS THIS COURT TO GRANT
            HIM [PCR], ALLOW HIM TO WITHDRAW HIS
            GUILTY PLEA, AND ORDER HIS IMMEDIATE
            RELEASE FROM CIVIL COMMITMENT.

      Having considered defendant's contentions in light of our deferential

standard of review following an evidentiary hearing on PCR, we conclude the

judge's findings "are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record."

See Nash, 212 N.J. at 540. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by

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                                     11
Judge Nancy Ridgway in her well-reasoned written opinion that accompanied

the order under review. We add only the following comments.

        As a preliminary matter, we reject the State's argument, raised in its

responding brief, that defendant's petition was procedurally barred and

untimely. Noting defendant's direct appeal failed to challenge his sexual assault

plea or conviction, the State argues defendant's petition is procedurally barred

pursuant to Rule 3:22-4. The State also contends defendant's petition was

untimely filed under Rule 3:22-12(a)(1), because it was filed more than five

years after his JOC was entered and more than one year after he was transferred

to the STU. The State did not move for leave to appeal from the PCR judge's

December 9, 2021 decision granting an evidentiary hearing and thereby

excusing the procedural and timeliness bars. 3

        In her July 26, 2022 decision denying PCR, the judge amplified her

reasons for considering defendant's petition and granting a hearing:

                    The court accepted the cause of the delay as
              argued by [defendant] and permitted the time bar to be
              expanded. If the extent and cause of the delay was due
              [to defendant]'s expectations and understanding of his
              plea and the consequences of same, and were the cause
              of the delay, as exacerbated by the C[OVID]-19
              [p]andemic, it would be appropriate to allow this matter
              to be determined by the court. If found to be factual,

3
    It is unclear from the record whether the judge entered a memorializing order.
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                                        12
            [defendant]'s claim would be of great importance for
            future courts when obtaining a knowing and voluntary
            plea under the Act and requires further inquiry as to
            whether there has been an injustice sufficient to relax
            the limitation. In order to assess [defendant]'s claim the
            court also determined an evidentiary hearing should be
            permitted.

Based on the confluence of factors presented in this matter, we neither discern

any error in the judge's decision to address the merits of defendant's claims nor

to do so following an evidentiary hearing.

      We turn to the contentions raised in defendant's first point. For the first

time on appeal, defendant argues the Supreme Court's decision in State v.

Nuñez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 138 (2009), when viewed in conjunction with its

decision in Bellamy, mandates the trial court explicitly inquire whether a

defendant understands the entry of a guilty plea to certain sexual offenses could

result in civil commitment. Defendant contends his matter is similar to the

defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Nuñez-Valdez. Defendant

argues in that case, the "Court accepted the defendant's factual claims that plea

counsel misinformed him about the deportation consequences of his ple a" even

though the defendant had completed the plea form with plea counsel, who

"circled 'yes' next to the question, 'Do you understand that if you are not a United

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                                        13
States citizen or national, you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty?'"

See id. at 141. Defendant's argument is misplaced.

      "A defendant asserting plea counsel's assistance was ineffective may meet

the first prong of the Strickland [4] standard if the defendant can show counsel's

representation fell short of the prevailing standards expected of criminal defense

attorneys." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 624 (App. Div. 2023) (citing

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2010)). Accordingly, a defense

attorney must not "provide misleading, material information that results in an

uninformed plea." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 353 (2012) (quoting Nuñez-

Valdez, 200 N.J. at 139-40). "Plea counsel's performance will not be deemed

deficient if counsel has provided the defendant 'correct information concerning

all of the relevant material consequences that flow from such a plea.'" Vanness,

474 N.J. Super. at 624 (quoting State v. Agathis, 424 N.J. Super. 16, 22 (App.

Div. 2012)); see also Nuñez-Valdez, 200 N.J. at 138-39.

4
  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring a defendant
seeking PCR on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds to demonstrate: (1)
the particular manner in which counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) that
the deficiency prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial); see also State v. Fritz,
105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey).

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                                        14
      Unlike the defendant in Nuñez-Valdez, defendant in the present matter

does not assert his plea counsel provided affirmatively inaccurate, false, or

misleading information about the consequences of his plea. Nor did defendant

demonstrate that plea counsel failed to inform him about the potential civil

commitment consequences.

      Rather, the judge discredited defendant's "self-serving" testimony, which

was belied by the record evidence. That evidence included defendant's signature

on the supplemental plea form, reflecting defendant answered, "Yes," to the

"Civil Commitment" question and defendant's colloquy with the trial court

confirming he had reviewed all the plea forms – "item by item" – with his

attorney. Further, although the judge granted defendant's application for an

evidentiary hearing, defendant failed to call plea counsel as a witness or present

any other evidence in support of his claim.

      In summary, we discern no basis to disturb the PCR judge's decision. Any

remaining contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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