Court Opinion

ID: 9889848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 17:10:43.308288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:01.247238
License: Public Domain

J-S28042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MICHAEL C. LINT                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 988 WDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 2, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
                    at No(s): CP-65-CR-0003141-2019

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                     FILED: October 11, 2023

       Michael C. Lint appeals from the August 2, 2022 aggregate judgment of

sentence of 7½ to 15 years’ imprisonment imposed after a jury found him

guilty of nine counts of persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell

or transfer firearms.1        After careful review, we affirm the judgment of

sentence.

       The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of

this case as follows:

              [Appellant] was charged by criminal information on
              October 11, 2019, with 19 felonies, including nine (9)
              counts of persons not to possess a firearm, four (4)
              counts of changing or altering a firearm, four (4)
              counts of theft by unlawful taking, and two (2) counts
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
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          of receiving stolen property. These charges were filed
          after Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) troopers
          executed two (2) search warrants on March 30, 2019
          and found nine (9) guns as well as ammunition at the
          residence and place of business of [Appellant], a
          previously-convicted felon.

          On February 4, 2020, [Appellant] filed a “Motion to
          Suppress Evidence and Motion to Dismiss Charges
          Premised upon an Illegal Search and Seizure.” He
          alleged that because there was insufficient probable
          cause for the issuance of the search warrant for his
          home, the guns and ammunition seized, and the
          inculpatory statements procured, were fruits of the
          poisonous tree and should be suppressed.           An
          evidentiary hearing was held on May 13, 2020, after
          which the court ordered briefs. On July 27, 2020, the
          court issued an Opinion and Order denying the
          [Appellant’s] motions.

          On July 16, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a Motion
          in Limine requesting, inter alia, permission to offer
          evidence of [Appellant’s] 2013 conviction of persons
          not to possess a firearm, and/or his 2016 conviction
          of aggravated assault.         The Commonwealth’s
          purported reasons were to (1) aid in the grading of his
          sentence, in the event of a conviction, and (2) prove
          an element of the crime of persons not to possess in
          the instant case. A decision on the Commonwealth’s
          Motions in Limine was deferred until immediately
          prior to jury selection at the trial in this case. On
          September 10, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a
          Notice of Enhanced Penalties, advising that it was
          seeking     enhanced     sentencing     based     upon
          [Appellant’s] prior conviction for persons not to
          possess a firearm.

          On March 18, 2022, at a pre-trial conference, the
          Commonwealth made an oral motion to amend the
          criminal information.     This was based on a
          typographical error regarding dates on the original
          information. The court granted this motion with
          [Appellant’s] consent. The Commonwealth also orally
          moved to bifurcate, seeking to try the nine (9)

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          persons not to possess counts separately from the
          remaining changing/altering, theft by unlawful taking,
          and receiving stolen property counts. [Appellant]
          consented.    The court granted said motion and
          ordered [Appellant] to be tried at counts 1 through 9
          at the first trial and counts 10 through 19 at a
          subsequent trial. Immediately prior to jury selection
          on March 21, 2022, the court decided the
          Commonwealth's Motion In Limine and ordered that:

              (1) [T]he Commonwealth will be permitted to
              introduce evidence of any of [Appellant’s] pre-
              January 1, 2019 convictions to any crimes
              enumerated in 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] §6105(b) solely
              for the purpose of establishing a violation of 18
              Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6105(a); and

              (2) Once evidence of those crimes has been
              admitted into evidence, the Court will read to
              the jury an instruction directing them to
              consider [Appellant’s] prior convictions only as
              evidence to establish the prior conviction
              element of the crime of persons not to possess
              firearms, not as evidence of [Appellant’s] bad
              character or propensity to commit crime...

          The trial commenced on March 22, 2022. Over the
          course of the three (3)-day trial, the Commonwealth
          called seven (7) witnesses, including [Appellant’s] ex-
          girlfriend Lauren Carp and the three (3) Pennsylvania
          State Police troopers who participated in the execution
          of the search warrant at [Appellant’s] residence on
          March 30, 2019.

          Carp testified that [Appellant] and she had dated for
          one (1) year prior to [Appellant’s] arrest. They lived
          together in [Appellant’s] mobile home at 133 Tennis
          Court in Mount Pleasant from March 2018 to March
          2019. [Appellant’s] children from a prior relationship
          lived with them. After the county’ s children and
          youth agency became involved with [Appellant’s]
          children, and she learned that [Appellant] was
          prohibited from possessing a firearm, Carp removed

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          her guns from their residence and took them to her
          parents’ house.

          Approximately one (1) month after removing her
          guns, [Appellant] demanded that she bring them
          back. She agreed to do so and hid them under their
          bed. The following day, Carp discovered that her guns
          were gone. She asked [Appellant] where they were,
          and he told her “not to worry about it.” Carp asked
          him to remove the serial numbers, so that she would
          not get in trouble if they were found in his possession.

          In late March or early April 2019, [Appellant] asked
          Carp to come to his place of business at the Verizon
          Service Center on Donohoe Road in Greensburg, so
          that he could prove that he had removed the serial
          numbers on her guns. When she arrived, [Appellant]
          showed her the guns and the obliterated serial
          numbers. She asked [Appellant] to return her guns,
          but he refused. Carp told him that she was going to
          go to the police. On March 28, 2019, Carp reported
          the theft of her four (4) guns to Trooper Cristen
          Cindric.

          Trooper John Beynon testified that based upon Carp’s
          report to Trooper Cindric, he obtained two (2) search
          warrants from Magisterial District Judge Anthony
          Bompiani - one ( 1) for [Appellant’s] residence and
          one (1) for his place of business. Both warrants were
          executed at the same time on March 30, 2019.
          Beynon, Joseph Lauricia, Patrick Nied, and others
          appeared at [Appellant’s] residence.

          Troopers Beynon, Lauricia and Nied testified
          consistently about the events that unfolded at
          [Appellant’s] residence on March 30, 2019. According
          to Lauricia, as the troopers approached the residence,
          they observed a handwritten note and a copy of
          [Appellant’s] photo ID taped to the front door. The
          writer of the note requested that [Appellant] be
          contacted on his cellular telephone before anyone was
          to enter the residence. Instead of knocking and
          announcing, they called the number provided.
          [Appellant] did not answer, so the troopers used the

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              loudspeaker on their patrol car to attempt to compel
              [Appellant] to leave his home. Eventually, he came
              outside. With guns drawn, the troopers commanded
              [Appellant] to raise his hands, and he did. [Appellant]
              was detained in his front yard, while officers swept the
              residence. Trooper Nied handcuffed [Appellant] and
              placed him in custody. Troopers Beynon and Lauricia
              read Miranda[2] warnings to him, and then, after he
              signed a written waiver of counsel form, interviewed
              him at a picnic table situated in the front yard.
              [Appellant] advised the officers that there were guns
              in his safe in the living room. He gave them the
              access code. He also admitted to obliterating the
              serial numbers on the guns belonging to Carp, which
              were found at his place of employment.

Trial court opinion, 12/28/22 at 1-6 (citations, extraneous capitalization, and

footnotes omitted).

       As noted, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on March 22, 2022.

Following a three-day trial, Appellant was found guilty of nine counts of

persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms.

On August 2, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term

of 7½ to 15 years’ imprisonment. Appellant did not file any post-sentence

motions. This timely appeal followed on August 30, 2022.3 Appellant and the

trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

____________________________________________

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3 The record reflects that the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s oral
motion to amend the criminal information to add the charge of altering or
obliterating marks of identification, 18 Pa.C.S.A § 6117(a), a felony of the
second degree. Appellant pled guilty to this charge on September 8, 2022
and was immediately sentenced to 3½ to 7 years’ imprisonment, to run
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

              I.     Did the [trial] court err in failing to suppress the
                     contents of [Appellant’s] residence because the
                     search warrant was not based upon probable
                     cause to search the residence?

              II.    Did the [trial] court err in failing to suppress the
                     interview/admissions of [Appellant] in that his
                     statements were the direct result of the illegal
                     search noted above?

              III.   Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion in
                     allowing the prosecution to choose the most
                     prejudicial prior predicate offense to prove that
                     [Appellant] was prohibited from possessing a
                     firearm, even if the prosecution was not
                     required to accept a general stipulation that
                     Appellant was prohibited from possessing a
                     firearm?

Appellant’s brief at 4-5 (extraneous capitalization omitted).4

                                               I.

       Appellant first argues that the suppression court erred in denying his

motion to suppress the firearms and ammunition found in his residence

because the search warrant not supported by the requisite level of probable

cause. Id. at 12. For the following reasons, we disagree.

____________________________________________

concurrent to the sentenced imposed on August 2, 2022. Appellant’s
remaining charges were dismissed, and he did not present any claims on
appeal related to his guilty plea.

4 Appellant has indicated that he has abandoned his claim concerning the
offensive gravity score utilized by the sentencing court (Issue IV).

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      Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a denial of a

suppression motion is well settled.

            [Our] standard of review in addressing a challenge to
            the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
            determining whether the suppression court’s factual
            findings are supported by the record and whether the
            legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.
            Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
            suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
            of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence
            for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read
            in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
            suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
            the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
            findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
            conclusions are erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation

omitted; brackets in original), appeal denied, 135 A.3d 584 (Pa. 2016).

      “Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee an individual’s

freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.”          Commonwealth v.

Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 550 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 158 (Pa. 2009); see also U.S.

Const. amend. IV.

            Under the federal and state constitutional prohibitions
            of unreasonable searches and seizures, both the
            United States Supreme Court and this Court have
            consistently held that, subject to certain exceptions, a
            search is constitutionally invalid unless it is conducted
            pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral and
            detached magistrate and supported by probable
            cause. Probable cause exists where, based upon a
            totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit

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            of probable cause, including the reliability and veracity
            of hearsay statements included therein, there is a fair
            probability that ... evidence of a crime will be found in
            a particular place. In reviewing an issuing authority’s
            decision to issue a warrant, a suppression court must
            affirm unless the issuing authority had no substantial
            basis for its decision. On appeal, this Court affirms
            the decision of the suppression court unless it
            commits an error of law or makes a factual finding
            without record support.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1063–1064 (Pa. 2013) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1048 (2014).

      In Commonwealth v. Harlan, 208 A.3d 497, 499 (Pa.Super 2019),

this Court “emphasize[d] that ‘the totality of the circumstances’ set forth in

the affidavit must be considered when examining whether probable cause

supports the issuance of the search warrant.” Id. at 505. The Harlan Court

noted:

            [T]he question of whether probable cause exists for
            the issuance of a search warrant must be answered
            according to the totality of the circumstances test
            articulated in Commonwealth v. Gray, [503 A.2d
            921 (Pa. 1985)], and its Pennsylvania progeny, which
            incorporates the reasoning of the United States
            Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, [462 U.S. 213
            (1983)]…. The task of the magistrate acting as the
            issuing authority is to make a practical, common
            sense assessment of whether, given all the
            circumstances set forth in the affidavit, a fair
            probability exists that contraband or evidence of a
            crime will be found in a particular place. A search
            warrant is defective if the issuing authority has not
            been supplied with the necessary information. The
            chronology established by the affidavit of probable
            cause must be evaluated according to a common
            sense determination.

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            Further, probable cause is based on a finding of the
            probability, not a prima facie showing, of criminal
            activity, and deference is to be accorded a
            magistrate’s finding of probable cause. We must limit
            our inquiry to the information within the four corners
            of the affidavit submitted in support of probable cause
            when determining whether the warrant was issued
            upon probable cause.

Harlan, 208 A.3d at 505 (internal citation formatting amended; some

citations omitted).

      In his February 4, 2020 suppression motion and subsequent Rule

1925(b) statement, Appellant detailed his claim of error relating to the

insufficiency of the application for the search warrant.         See Motion to

Suppress, 2/4/20 at ¶¶ 2-6; see also Rule 1925(b) Statement, 9/20/22, at

¶ 5(a). The trial court addressed Appellant’s claim of error in its July 27, 2020

opinion, rejecting Appellant's assertions regarding the unreliability of the

source of the information – his ex-girlfriend Lauren Carp – on account of the

fact she had last seen the firearms at his place of work on March 24, 2020.

Trial court opinion, 7/27/20, at 6; see also Appellant’s brief at 13. The trial

court found that although “it may have been more likely, when [Magisterial

District Judge (“MDJ”)] Bompiani reviewed the search warrant, the firearms

would be [at Appellant’s workplace] as opposed to [his] home … this did not

eliminate the ‘fair probability’ that the guns would be found at the home.”

Trial court opinion, 7/27/20, at 6.

      The trial court noted that the affidavit of probable cause included specific

descriptions of make, model, caliber, and serial numbers of the firearms, along

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with testimony that Appellant had boasted to Carp that if police came to his

residence, the encounter would “end in a shootout.”        Id. at 3, 6-8. The

record also established that MDJ Bompiani was aware from the affidavit that

Appellant was a convicted felon who was not permitted to possess firearms

and that Carp had threatened to call police if he did not return the firearms to

her.   Id. at 2, 6.     The court then concluded that “a review of the facts

contained within the four corners of the affidavit incorporated into the search

warrant indicates that MDJ Bompiani has a substantial basis for concluding

that probable cause to search the home existed.” Id. at 6. Based on our

review, we find the trial court's factual findings are supported by the record

and its legal conclusions are free of error. Therefore, we shall not disturb the

trial court’s ruling.

                                       II.

       Appellant next argues, albeit with virtually no citation to the certified

record, that the suppression court erred in denying his motion to suppress

various inculpatory statements that he made to police following the execution

of the search warrant. Appellant’s brief at 14. Appellant maintains that “if

this Court finds that the warrant for [his] home was not based on probable

cause … [t]he interview of [Appellant] following the execution of the search

warrant[] are ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’ and should also be excluded.” Id.

Having already concluded that the search of his residence was conducted

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pursuant to legal and properly executed search warrant, we find Appellant’s

contention entirely devoid of merit.

      In reaching this conclusion, we note that Appellant’s inculpatory

statements during the subsequent police interview at his residence were made

independent of the search warrant and only after Appellant was properly

advised of and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntary waived his Miranda

rights.   See notes of testimony, 3/23/22 at 174-175, 180-182; see also

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 84.     As recognized by the trial court, at no point

during this course of this litigation did Appellant challenge the voluntariness

of his statements or argue that they were made in violation of his Miranda

rights. See trial court opinion, 12/28/22 at 9. Any claim to the contrary on

appeal would, therefore, be waived. See Commonwealth v. Schoff, 911

A.2d 147, 158 (Pa.Super. 2006) (finding that a party must make a timely and

specific objection at trial in order to preserve an issue for appellate review,

and the failure to do so results in waiver of that issue on appeal); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Accordingly, Appellant’s claim must fail.

                                       III.

      In his final claim, Appellant contends that he was unfairly prejudiced by

the trial court’s decision to allow the Commonwealth to introduce into evidence

his “most prejudicial prior predicate offense,” namely his prior aggravated

assault conviction, to prove that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm.

Appellant’s brief at 15. For the following reasons, we disagree.

                                       - 11 -
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            The admission of evidence is within the sound
            discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only
            upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its
            discretion. Accordingly, a ruling admitting evidence
            will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling
            reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,
            prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be
            clearly erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Shelton, 170 A.3d 549, 552 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted).

      As applicable here, the crime of persons not to possess, use,

manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms provides that a person may not

possess a firearm if “convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection (b) ...

or whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c)[.]”            18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 6105(a). The Commonwealth in this matter therefore bore the burden of

proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had been convicted of an

enumerated offense in subsection (b) or met the criteria in subsection (c).

      In Commonwealth v. Jemison, 98 A.3d 1254, 1262 (Pa. 2014), our

Supreme Court explicitly held that a defendant does not suffer “unfair

prejudice merely by the admission into evidence of his or her certified

conviction of a specific, identified, predicate offense, which has been offered

by the Commonwealth to prove the prior conviction element of § 6105.” Id.

at 1262. In reaching this conclusion, the Jemison Court emphasized that

“[a]ny possibility of unfair prejudice is greatly mitigated by the use of proper

cautionary instructions to the jury, directing them to consider the defendant’s

prior offense only as evidence to establish the prior conviction element of the

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[section] 6105 charge, not as evidence of the defendant’s bad character or

propensity to commit crime.” Id.

      Here,   the   charge   of    aggravated    assault   introduced   by   the

Commonwealth is clearly one of the enumerated offenses under § 6105(b).

The trial court appropriately instructed the jury regarding its proper

consideration of Appellant’s prior aggravated assault conviction, thereby

alleviating any undue prejudice.    See notes of testimony, 3/23/22 at 192.

Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the admission of his prior aggravated

assault conviction into evidence is meritless.

      For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s August 2, 2022

judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

 10/11/2023

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