Court Opinion

ID: 6663872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 21:04:42.809311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:00:16.538804
License: Public Domain

Stephen, J.,
delivered the opinion of this court.
We think the court were clearly right, in refusing to grant the defendant’s first prayer, made in this case. It was an action founded upon a collateral promise to pay the debt of another person, to whom goods were delivered by the plaintiffs. The prayer to the court was to instruct the jury, that the promise of the defendant to see the plaintiffs paid, if the principal debtor did not pay, not being in writing, was void by the statute of frauds, and the plaintiff, therefore, could not recover. It is the province of the jury to decide all questions of fact, of which evidence legally sufficient for that purpose is laid before them; and it is equally the right and duty of the court to decide all questions of law, arising upon the facts, when found and ascertained by the jury. The granting of the prayer made by the defendant of this case, would have violated this well established principle in law, defining the jurisdiction of the court and the' jury in the administration of civil justice. The court were called upon to assume the existence of facts *263which it was the exclusive province of the jury to find. The prayer assumes the truth of the facts of which evidence had been given, without submitting the verity thereof to the finding of the jury. To have granted such a prayer, would have been an unwarrantable encroachment upon the province of the jury, and it was therefore properly refused by the court.
We think there was error in the refusal of the court below to grant the defendant’s second prayer. The undertaking of the defendant, according to the proof in the cause, clearly subjected him to a separate and secondary, and not an original or joint responsibility. The contract was to pay, if the person to whom the goods were delivered did not. The goods were charged to him in the day-book of the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs refused to deliver them until they saw the defendant. When they saw the defendant, they asked him if he would pay for the goods, if the party to whom they were to be delivered, did not pay. And it is proved, that his undertaking was ex-presslya conditional one to pay, if the person to whom the goods were delivered, did not pay. That this was a collateral and not an original undertaking, is clearly established by the case of Elder vs. Warfield, to be found in 7 Harr. & John. Rep. 391, where this court say, “where there is no previously existing debt or other liability, but the promise of one, is the inducement to, and ground of, the credit given to another, by which a debt or liability is created in him to whom the credit is given, such a promise is a collateral undertaking. The general rule being, that wherever the party undertaken for, is originally liable upon the same contract, the promise to answer for that liability is a collateral promise, and must be in writing, as if B gives credit to C, for goods sold and delivered to him, or the promise of A to see him paid, or to pay him for them if C should not, in that case it is the immediate debt of C, for which an action will lie against him, and the promise of A is a collateral undertaking to pay that debt, he being only as a security. This case is not distinguishable in principle from the one here put, as an example or illustration of the nature and character of a collateral liability; and we think that the *264court below erred in refusing to grant the defendant’s second prayer; that there was no evidence of a joint responsibility of Sterling and Conolly, for the payment of the goods sold and delivered to Sterling, Conolly was manifestly a security only, and not originally and jointly liable with Sterling, for-the price of the goods sold and delivered. judgment reversed.
Motion by appellee for a procedendo overruled.