Court Opinion

ID: 9713420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:15:05.586221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:18.694623
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent in part. First, I disagree with the majority’s conclusions that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence that defendant Peters was using his cellular phone immediately prior to the accident and that this error requires a new trial between defendants. The majority determined that the circumstantial evidence that Peters was using his cellular phone was relevant because it went to the issue of what he was doing at the time of the accident. Further, the majority concluded that the evidence, consisting of Peters’s phone bill and testimony from a witness that Peters appeared to have only one hand on the steering wheel, was not so remote as to require its exclusion. In my opinion, the majority has improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court and has failed to explain how the trial court clearly abused its discretion in refusing to admit the cellular phone evidence. Weidner made an offer of proof that introduced Peters’s cellular phone billing records. The records showed that a one-minute call was made on Peters’s phone between 1:14 and 1:15 p.m. on the date of the accident. The sheriffs deputy who responded to the accident testified that the sheriffs department was notified of the accident at 1:20 p.m. There was no testimony from any witness regarding what precise time the accident occurred. Peters testified that he was not using his phone at the time of the accident. The trial court articulated the following reasons for excluding Peters’s cellular phone records: “The attorney for Mr. Peters makes a very valid point, and that is: We do not know the time of the accident. I grant that 1:14 is a time before the police department received the call, which is 1:20. Whether it was — whether it was at a time that he was on the road before the collision or it was a time after the collision, I don’t know, and I think it would basically raise a question on which the jury would have to speculate, especially since there is no establishment of the time of the accident by the testimony in this case. And I think it would be prejudicial. As a matter of fact, my view is it would be reversible error for me to do it with there being no issue before the Court, because I cannot say on the basis of the testimony that is in this record that 1:14, the time of the alleged phone call, that, in fact, this was prior to the accident.” The admission of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. A reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s decision unless it clearly abused its discretion. Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 312-13 (1993). A reviewing court will find that a trial court abused its discretion only where the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000). Although the admissibility of relevant evidence is favored, “[e]yen relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by such factors as prejudice, confusion, or potential to mislead the jury.” Gill, 157 Ill. 2d at 314. I would defer to the trial court’s discretion in excluding the cellular phone evidence. While the evidence may have met the standard for relevancy, the trial court determined that it would have led the jury into an improper area of speculation and thus resulted in unfair prejudice to Peters. In light of the lack of evidence as to when the accident occurred, I fail to see how the trial court’s ruling could be deemed arbitrary, fanciful, or completely unreasonable. The majority acknowledges that the timing of the cellular phone call did not establish that it was made prior to or at the time of the accident but nonetheless imposes its interpretation of the evidence over that of the trial court, which had the opportunity to hear all of the evidence on the issue. That the majority may not have reached the same conclusion as the trial court when confronted with the same evidence is not a sufficient reason for holding that the trial court abused its discretion. Likewise, the evidence that Peters appeared to have only one hand on the steering wheel at the time of the accident does not make the cellular phone evidence any less speculative or prejudicial. The witness who claimed to have had a clear view of Peters did not testify that he saw Peters using his phone, and there are a multitude of reasons why someone might be driving with only one hand. The majority’s conclusion that the evidence is admissible will allow the jury upon retrial to speculate as to whether Peters was using his cellular phone and, perhaps, attribute fault to Peters based on improper speculation. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence of Peters’s use of a cell phone. I also disagree with the majority’s decision to set aside the damages award to plaintiffs for their emotional distress. I am particularly disturbed by the majority’s determination that plaintiffs were not entitled to request damages for emotional distress on the verdict form because they did not present an expert’s testimony supporting their claim of emotional distress. None of the parties raised this argument before the trial court or this court. Furthermore, the majority has not cited a single case that has held that an expert’s testimony is required for plaintiffs who have been directly injured in an accident to obtain damages for emotional distress. Consequently, the majority has, sua sponte and without any supporting authority, created a new requirement for plaintiffs who seek damages for emotional distress as a result of a defendant’s negligence. Existing case law does not support the majority’s holding. Generally speaking, an expert witness’s testimony is required only where the matter is clearly outside the jury’s common knowledge and experience. Suich v. H&B Printing Machinery, Inc., 185 Ill. App. 3d 863 (1989). For example, an expert’s testimony is usually required in a medical malpractice action to establish that a defendant physician breached the standard of care and that the breach proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. This is not a case that required the jury to evaluate the standard of care applicable to a medical professional and its causal relation to a plaintiffs injuries. Moreover, the majority has failed to explain why the determination of whether plaintiffs suffered compensable emotional distress was clearly outside the jury’s knowledge and experience. The cases upon which the majority relies do not address whether an expert’s testimony is required to prove emotional distress when a plaintiff has been physically injured by the defendant’s negligence. The case of Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296 (1991), involved a plaintiff who sued her psychologist for malpractice. The court determined that, as a direct victim of the defendant’s malpractice, the plaintiff had a viable action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 308. The court then went on to hold that the plaintiff was not required to allege physical injury or illness in order to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 309. In explaining why an allegation of physical injury is not required in such cases, the court stated: “Clearly, when a primary response is coupled with a secondary one (which would include physical symptoms), damages can be established with a sense of objectivity. However, lack of precision is not a justifiable reason to preclude recovery, as expert witnesses such as psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers are fully capable of providing a jury with an analysis of a plaintiff’s emotional injuries. The emotional distress of the primary response is no less real than the distress that is coupled with the physical manifestation of the secondary response and should not be distinguishable at law.” Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 311. The court further noted that allegations of physical injury were not required in cases involving the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 311, citing Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73 (1961). In Knierim, the court stated that “the men of science” could assist in determining whether a plaintiff suffered emotional distress even in the absence of physical symptoms and that “ ‘jurors from their own experience will be able to determine whether *** conduct results in severe emotional disturbance.’ ” Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 312, quoting Knierim, 22 Ill. 2d at 85. The Corgan court acknowledged that “this court has not lost its faith in the ability of jurors to fairly determine what is, and is not, emotional distress.” Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 312. It added that “the women and men of the mental health care field have made significant improvements in the diagnosis, description and treatment of emotional distress.” Corgan, 143 Ill. 2d at 312. Nowhere, however, does the court hold that an expert’s medical testimony is required, even in cases where the plaintiff did not suffer physical injury. Consequently, the majority’s reliance on Corgan is misplaced. The majority acknowledges the court’s statement in Corgan that jurors are able to fairly evaluate allegations of emotional distress but dismisses it by saying that the statement does not mean that all plaintiffs in personal injury actions may seek damages for emotional distress without medically verifiable proof. The majority has no problem, however, with taking the court’s statement that an expert’s testimony could be helpful in determining whether a plaintiff who did not suffer physical injury has suffered emotional distress and expanding that statement into a general rule that applies to plaintiffs who have sustained serious injuries as a direct result of a defendant’s negligence. In my view, the majority’s reasoning is illogical and the end result constitutes an improper expansion of Corgan. I find more persuasive the reasoning of the court in Clark v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 297 Ill. App. 3d 694 (1998). In that case, the court held that the medical testimony of an expert was not required to support the damages awarded to the plaintiff for emotional distress. The plaintiff in Clark alleged that she suffered emotional distress as a result of her former employer’s retaliatory discharge. In rejecting the defendant’s argument that the evidence regarding emotional distress was insufficient due to the lack of an expert’s medical testimony, the court concluded that the plaintiffs own testimony was sufficient to support the award. The court noted as follows: “The existence or nonexistence of medical testimony goes to the weight of the evidence but does not prevent this issue [of emotional distress] from being submitted to the jury. Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296, 312, 574 N.E.2d 602, 609 (1991). Expert *** testimony is not needed to prove things that are common knowledge. Any average, reasonable person can readily evaluate a claim of emotional distress alleged to result from a discharge and loss of earnings. After hearing Clark’s testimony that her utilities were turned off and that she was forced to seek community help to feed her family, a jury could reasonably conclude that she suffered emotional distress.” Clark, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 701. Similarly, in the case before us, the jury did not need an expert to help it decide whether plaintiffs who were seriously injured in a car accident suffered emotional distress as a result of the accident. Any reasonable person could make that determination. Defendants were free to point out the lack of corroborating medical evidence, and it was the jury’s job to weigh all of the evidence. There certainly was sufficient testimony from plaintiffs for the jury to find that they suffered emotional distress as a result of the accident and to award damages accordingly. Therefore, I would allow the damages award for emotional distress to stand and would not require plaintiffs to retry the issue of damages. Last, I disagree with the majority’s attempt to remedy the reversal of the emotional distress award by providing that upon retrial plaintiffs can seek damages for “loss of a normal life” instead of damages for emotional distress. Pursuant to the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, plaintiffs are entitled to damages for the loss of a normal life and emotional distress when the evidence so warrants and plaintiffs have a viable claim for emotional distress damages. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, Nos. 30.04.01, 30.05.01 (2000). The majority has cited no authority for its conclusion that damages for the loss of a normal life encompass emotional distress. Accordingly, in addition to disagreeing with the remand of plaintiffs’ case for a new trial on damages, I disagree with the majority’s holding limiting plaintiffs to damages for the loss of a normal life instead of the loss of a normal life and emotional distress.