Court Opinion

ID: 9580403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:04:39.270878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:15.604975
License: Public Domain

WESLEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
This appeal has changed dramatically (post-oral argument) as a consequence of an executed settlement agreement now awaiting approval in the Southern District of New York. Because this intervening event has materially changed the nature of an appeal that is presently on the verge of resolution, the majority’s affirmance strikes me as imprudent. Were it up to me, I would have voted to stay the appeal, while retaining our jurisdiction to revisit it, should the promise of final settlement not bear fruit. Even if I thought the majority’s discussion of the merits prudent, however, I would not think it correct. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellants informed the Court, by letter dated May 1, 2008, of the possibility of an imminent settlement between the parties and, in light of that possibility, stated that “the parties jointly request that the Court refrain from issuing any decision on this appeal at this time.”1 Letter of Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellees of May 1, 2008. The letter went on to say that “[i]f the settlement is approved, the appeal will be withdrawn.” Id. As subsequently revealed in the public press, the settlement agreement was ultimately executed, and now awaits the confirmation of the district court.2
The public announcement of a prospective settlement prompted this Court to solicit the views of the parties on the impact of that agreement upon the instant appeal.3 By letter dated May 12, 2008 (and assertedly joined in by Defendant Appellants), counsel for Plaintiff-Appellees stated that “[t]he parties do not believe that the appeal, at this juncture, has been mooted by reason of the execution of the settlement agreement.” Letter of Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellees of May 12, 2008. It continued: “If the settlement is approved *95with finality, the appeal will be moot, but if the settlement is not approved, it will not become effective and the appeal would not be moot.” Id. Finally, the letter stated that
[t]he parties do not believe that a disposition of the appeal at this time would advance the interests of either party. Because the settlement is not conditioned on the result of the appeal, the disposition of the appeal will not permit either party to withdraw from or request modification of the settlement.

Id.

In short, the relevance of this Court’s resolution of the appeal is entirely dependent upon the outcome of the settlement approval process in the Southern District.
II.
In its opinion below, the district court contemplated the possibility of settlement in conducting its § 304(c) analysis, concluding that “having the claims against New Parmalat before this Court along with the others alleged in the [third amended complaint] will aid the process of possibly settling this dispute.” In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 493 F.Supp.2d 723, 739 (S.D.N.Y.2007). Defendant-Appellants argued that the district court’s weighing of the possibility of settlement in its § 304(c) analysis constituted “legal error and an abuse of discretion.” Appellants’ Br. 41.
There was merit, in my view, to New Parmalat’s position. After all, the possibility of settlement appears nowhere among the six enumerated factors that courts were directed to consider under § 304(c). Venturing beyond the specific considerations codified under § 304(c) may well have constituted an abuse of discretion.
Presumably, the district court thought that its consideration of the possibility of settlement was relevant to § 304(c)’s instruction that, “[i]n determining whether to grant relief ... the court shall be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious administration of such estate, consistent with” the § 304(c) factors. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c). But it is at best unclear whether the pressure upon New Par-malat to settle a suit arguably not properly before the district court in the first place would have helped or hindered the estate.
In any event, this is now “water under the bridge,” for New Parmalat has executed the settlement agreement with Plaintiff-Appellees, and seeks the district court’s approval of that agreement. As a result, New Parmalat’s objections to the district court’s jurisdiction over this parallel proceeding, and to the district court’s consideration of the possibility of settlement, take on a quite different hue. Even if it was improper for the district court to consider the possibility of settlement in its § 304(c) analysis prior to the settlement agreement, New Parmalat is now hard pressed to maintain its former objections. After all, the decision to settle is one that New Parmalat willingly undertook.
At the same time, the parties’ ambivalence concerning the prospect of our now issuing an opinion counsels caution, in my view, regarding the scope of our intervention. Thus, were I in the majority, I would have held the appeal to revisit it in the event that the settlement does not materialize. I think it unwise for this Court to address the merits of the dispute when the parties appear to be eminently (and imminently) capable of resolving it themselves.
III.
Even in the absence of a pending resolution of this case, I could not concur in the majority’s discussion of the merits. First, the majority accepts as true Plaintiff-Appellants’ argument that “New Parmalat as*96sumed all of the legal liabilities of its predecessor companies,” Maj. at 89, a view that — despite being controverted by New Parmalat — is a question best left to the Parma Court. Cf. In re Artimm, S.r.l., 278 B.R. 832, 887 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.2002). Second, the majority overlooks- — as did the district court below — a crucial distinction between Dr. Bondi’s posture in the Recovery Actions that he initiated in American courts, and the direct securities actions filed against Bondi and New Parmalat, which he did not. Bondi’s purely defensive involvement in the latter proceedings is unlike his offensive initiation of recovery suits on behalf of Old Parmalat.4 Third, the majority presumes that the Italian courts will be poorly equipped to handle American securities fraud claims, but — like the district court before it — does not weigh this fact against a number of other factors relevant to Italian law under § 304(c)(2), (3), and (4), all of which counsel in favor of issuing an injunction.5
Fourth, although the majority is correct to note that any award in Plaintiff-Appellants’ favor would ultimately need to be approved by the Parma Court, New Par-malat points out that just defending against Plaintiffs’ claims here, aside from any potential costs of enforcement in Par-ma, would impose its own set of costs, justifying deference on comity grounds.6 *97Without knowing the inner thoughts of New Parmalat and its counsel, we may speculate as to the role this concern may have played in its decision to settle with Plaintiffs.7 But whether it would have been proper for such pressures to impinge upon New Parmalat’s decisionmaking (by virtue of the district court’s denial of New Parmalat’s requested § 304(c) relief) is quite another matter.
This Court, as well as Congress— through its adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) — has taken note of the pressures upon corporate defendants to settle securities fraud “strike suits” when those settlements are driven, not by the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, but by defendants’ fears of potentially astronomical attorneys’ fees arising from lengthy discovery. See, e.g., Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir.2005) (Jacobs, J.) (noting “the congressional intent of the PSLRA ‘to deter strike suits wherein opportunistic private plaintiffs file securities fraud claims of dubious merit in order to exact large settlement recoveries.’ ” (quoting Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir.2000))); Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 98 (2d Cir.2004) (“The PSLRA was intended to curtail ‘strike suits’' — i.e., meritless class actions alleging fraud in the sale of securities. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-803 (1998).”). See also Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir.2001) (same).
Finally, while the views of the Italian Ministry of Economic Development (as made available to us in an amicus submission) are unquestionably relevant to the consideration of comity under § 304(c)(5), cf. Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir.2006) (reversing, in a non- § 304 suit, the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ suit on comity grounds, noting that, “[throughout the long pendency of this lawsuit, the Government of Egypt has never raised the slightest objection to adjudication of the instant controversy by United States courts”), those views are never acknowledged by the majority. Despite its absence from the majority’s opinion (as well as from the record below8), the amicus brief achieves added importance in light of the Ministry’s role in both administering the Marzano Law and in approving Bondi’s reorganization plan.
IV.
This Court’s docket is awash with pressing matters vying for our attention. The majority has chosen to allocate already stressed judicial resources to an issue that is not similarly exigent, and despite the parties’ express request that we hold our fire. It is arguable, I suppose, that the executed settlement agreement now awaiting approval confirms the wisdom of the district court’s decision. But such an inference would overlook the fact — well *98known by those who practice in this field— that settlements are often struck, not because of the persuasiveness of plaintiffs’ claims, but because the alternative (or even the possibility of the alternative) is too costly to contemplate.
Whether these same concerns animated New Parmalat’s settlement decision is not something we can know for certain, but what is clear is that the ends of settlement, alone, cannot justify the means employed by the district court below. The statute at issue does not speak to the district court’s inherent power to hear this case. It lays out a rule of judicial discretion that must be measured by restraint. In my view, the district court erred as a matter of law in adding a factor to its comity equation while overlooking important additional factors required by the statute. In issuing its majority opinion, this Court compounds the error done — by adding to its jurisprudence when neither necessity nor efficiency is served by it. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellees “request[ed] that th[e] letter be filed under seal and not be made available to the public,” but no motion to file under seal was granted by the Court and the issue, at this stage, is apparently moot.

. The May 1 letter informed us only of the prospect of imminent settlement — i.e., “that the parties [were] on the verge of reaching a settlement in this matter (subject to court approval)" — but the agreement was, shortly thereafter, executed and made public. See “Parmalat Settles U.S. Shareholder Suit,” N.Y. Times, May 3, 2008, available at http:// www.nytimes.com (visited July 21, 2008) (search for article title); see also Press Release, Parmalat, Settlement with "class” (May 2, 2008).

.The order of this Court “directed [the parties] to submit a letter to the Court ... advising us as to whether, in view of the reported settlement of the underlying litigation: (1) the issue on appeal has been mooted; and, (2) a disposition of the appeal would advance the present interests of either party.” In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., No. 07-2949, (2d Cir. May 5, 2008).

. New Parmalat argues that Bondi's offensive litigation in his recovery suits and New Par-malat's defensive litigation here are different in yet another respect — in the way they are treated by Italian law. Under Italian law, says New Parmalat, "any court (Italian or foreign) outside the Italian Bankruptcy Court that liquidates or enforces claims against the estate will be deemed by the Italian Bankruptcy Court to be acting without jurisdiction, making its actions void.” Appellants' Reply Br. 12. In contrast, they argue, Italian law provides an exception for "set-off” actions— perhaps including the compulsory counterclaims pressed by Grant Thornton against Bondi in response to Bondi's Recovery Action — where the claims against the estate are brought by a third-party plaintiff creditor in response to the debtor's offensive suit. The exception would arguably not apply to the instant suit, however, where Plaintiffs' claims are original, rather than counterclaims to Bondi's Recovery Action.

. Section 304(c)(2) requires consideration of the "protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding.” 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2). Plaintiffs do not contest that "Italian bankruptcy law comports with U.S. notions of fundamental fairness as it provides for notice, claims processing, and distribution similar to that provided for under U.S. law.” Adinolfi v. Empire Marble & Granite, Inc. (In re Rosacometta, S.r.l), 336 B.R. 557, 565 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2005). Furthermore, “the mere fact that [a creditor] would have to pursue his claim against [a debtor] in a foreign proceeding is not sufficient prejudice to deny relief.” Schimmelpenninck v. Byrne (In re Schimmelpenninck), 183 F.3d 347, 364 (5th Cir.1999). Section 304(c)(2) supports injunctive relief.
Section 304(c)(3) requires consideration of the "prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3). Plaintiffs do not contest that "Italian insolvency law proscribes both preferential and fraudulent transfers.” In re Rosacometta, S.r.l, 336 B.R. at 565. Section 304(c)(3) supports injunctive relief.
Section 304(c)(4) instructs the court contemplating § 304 relief to consider whether the foreign bankruptcy proceeding will undertake "distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4). Plaintiffs do not contest that "the distribution of assets under Italian law is substantially in accordance with the order prescribed under United States law.” In re Artimm, S.r.l, 278 B.R. at 843. Section 304(c)(4) supports injunctive relief.

.Indeed, one initial public report indicated that, pursuant to the pending settlement agreement, Parmalat agreed to issue 10.5 million shares, then valued at $36.8 million, to satisfy the class members' claims. Parmalat Settles Shareholder Lawsuit, N.Y. L.J. May 5, 2008. The full cost incurred by the estate did not include such transactional costs as, for *97example, notifying the members of the class of the settlement, an expense then estimated to be as much as $1.55 million. Id.

. We need not speculate, however, on the reasons that Parmalat has itself offered for its decision to accept the settlement: “Parmalat believes that this settlement is in the best interests of its shareholders to avoid the distraction and expense of further litigation, and diminishes uncertainty in the value of its stock.” Press Release, Parmalat, Settlement with “class” (May 2, 2008). That uncertainty was, in part, the result of Plaintiffs’ allegations of "the loss of billions of dollars by investors,” (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 4) forming a class whose "exact number ... [was] unknown to Plaintiffs at th[e] time” of the filing of the complaint, but which Plaintiffs estimated to number in the “thousands” (id. ¶ 1139).

. The district court cannot be faulted in this regard, for the amicus submission was not before that court.