Court Opinion

ID: 9374430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 21:01:00.577333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:47.219378
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 22 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    20-10110

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 4:18-cr-00282-HSG-1

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MILTON MENDOZA, AKA Miguel
Ramirez Cirigo, AKA Milton Navarette
Mendoza, AKA Milton Mendoza Navarette,
AKA Edgar Rodriguez, AKA Edgar Angel
Rodriguez, AKA Enrique Alvardo
Rodriguez, AKA Milton Rodriguez,

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of California
                 Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted February 14, 2023**

Before:      FERNANDEZ, FRIEDLAND, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

      Milton Mendoza appeals from his guilty-plea conviction for illegal reentry

following removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      Mendoza argues that the removal order upon which his conviction was

predicated was fundamentally unfair under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3) because the

immigration court did not meaningfully inform him of his right to seek voluntary

departure and it lacked jurisdiction to enter the order. These arguments are

unavailing. First, the district court did not err in determining that Mendoza failed

to establish prejudice from any potential defect in the immigration court’s

voluntary departure advisement. See United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 804 F.3d

920, 927-29 (9th Cir. 2015). Second, the omissions in the notice to appear did not

deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction. See United States v. Bastide-

Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied, No. 22-

6281, 2023 WL 350056 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2023).1 In any event, Mendoza did not meet

the other two requirements of § 1326(d), which are mandatory in a collateral attack

on an underlying removal order. See United States v. Palomar-Santiago, 141 S.

Ct. 1615, 1622 (2021).

      1
        Because the notice to appear conferred jurisdiction on the immigration
court, we do not reach Mendoza’s argument that the subsequent notice of hearing
was insufficient to cure the alleged jurisdictional defects in the notice to appear.
Moreover, any alleged defect in the notice of hearing was harmless in light of
Mendoza’s appearance at his removal hearing.

                                          2                                    20-10110
Mendoza’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief is denied.

AFFIRMED.

                                  3                                  20-10110