Court Opinion

ID: 9363014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 16:05:50.437556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:27.696884
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 124,275

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                     v.

                                            TERRY L. WEBB,
                                              Appellant.

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; SETH L. RUNDLE, judge. Opinion filed December 16,
2022. Affirmed.

        Rick Kittel, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

        Kristi D. Allen, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before HURST, P.J., HILL and ATCHESON, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: In a bench trial, the Sedgwick County District Court found
Defendant Terry L. Webb guilty of aggravated escape from custody when he left a
residential community corrections program with permission but did not return as directed.
Webb has appealed the conviction and resulting sentence on the grounds his conduct did
not violate K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5911, the statute defining the crime. On appeal, he
offers a pair of related arguments playing off the statutory language; they come up short
and cannot be reconciled with a Kansas Supreme Court decision construing the
predecessor statute. We, therefore, affirm the district court.

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                           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       The district court found in August 2019 that Webb violated the terms of his
probation on a felony conviction and imposed a 60-day jail sanction. The district court
stayed the sanction when Webb entered the Sedgwick County Adult Residential Facility
in mid-August. The facility is considered a community corrections program, so it is a
form of conditional release rather than incarceration. Convicted defendants, like Webb,
spend nights at the facility and typically are released during the day to go to jobs or to
look for employment. On August 30, Webb was released at 10 a.m. to job-hunt and was
directed to return no later than 3:05 p.m. He didn't.

       After Webb took off, he periodically contacted staff at the facility to say he
wanted to come back. But he never did. The district court issued a warrant for Webb's
arrest for aggravated escape from custody. Webb was arrested on the warrant in
December 2019. Webb waived his right to a jury trial. And the district court held a bench
trial in May 2021 at which the State called staff members from the Adult Residential
Facility who testified about their interactions with Webb. The State also introduced a
document Webb signed on August 23, 2019, acknowledging and agreeing to abide by the
facility's rules. The document prominently states that residents who fail to return as
directed at designated times may be prosecuted for aggravated escape from custody or
other crimes. Webb testified in his own defense and conceded he left the facility, did not
return, and was aware of the possible consequences as outlined in the agreement he
signed.

       The district court found Webb guilty of aggravated escape from custody in
violation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5911(b)(1)(A), criminalizing "[e]scaping while held in
custody . . . [u]pon a charge, conviction of[,]or arrest for a felony" as a severity level 8
nonperson felony. The district court later sentenced Webb to serve 18 months in prison,

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reflecting the low presumptive guidelines punishment based on his criminal history, to be
followed by 12 months of postrelease supervision. Webb has appealed.

                                           ANALYSIS

       On appeal, Webb attacks his conviction on dual grounds he characterizes as
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, although they actually depend more on how
language in K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5911 is construed. We view the trial evidence in the
best light for the State, as the prevailing party. State v. Jenkins, 308 Kan. 545, Syl. ¶ 1,
422 P.3d 72 (2018); State v. Butler, 307 Kan. 831, 844-45, 416 P.3d 116 (2018). In a
sufficiency challenge, we simply ask whether a rational fact-finder properly could have
determined the defendant to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on that
assessment of the evidence. 307 Kan. at 844-45. In reviewing the statutory language, we
strive to discern and give effect to the legislative intent and purpose in enacting a statute.
We typically give the words of a statute their ordinary meaning. State v. Keys, 315 Kan.
690, 698, 510 P.3d 706 (2022); State v. Gracey, 288 Kan. 252, 257, 200 P.3d 1275
(2009). When the words are statutorily defined, we must respect and apply those
definitions. Midwest Crane & Rigging, LLC v. Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 306 Kan.
845, 851, 397 P.3d 1205 (2017); State v. Baumgarner, 59 Kan. App. 2d 330, 335, 481
P.3d 170 (2021). Statutes should be construed to avoid unreasonable or absurd outcomes
if that's possible without doing grave linguistic violence to the words used. State v.
James, 301 Kan. 898, 903, 349 P.3d 457 (2015).

       Webb first argues that he was not in "custody" within the meaning of K.S.A. 2019
Supp. 21-5911(b)(1)(A). The argument, however, is not framed with precision. If Webb
is claiming his placement at the Adult Residential Facility does not constitute custody,
the statute plainly undercuts his position. In K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5911(d)(1), "custody"
is defined to include "detention in a . . . facility pursuant to a court order . . . imposed as a
specific condition of assignment to a community correctional services program."

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Conversely, "custody" does not include the general supervision of a person on probation.
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5911(d)(1). Webb was required to be at the facility at night and
when not otherwise granted leave to be out. That amounts to detention, and the facility
was a form of community correction, so it fits within the definition.

       More likely, Webb contends he was not in custody when he left the facility itself
with permission. During that time, Webb's movements were not impeded with shackles
or confined by bars on a cell. But he was not at liberty to roam where he pleased for as
long as pleased. So Webb remained in legal custody.

       Moreover, Webb's argument is undone by State v. Garrett, 235 Kan. 768, 774-75,
684 P.2d 413 (1984), construing K.S.A. 1983 Supp. 21-3809 and K.S.A. 21-3810
(Ensley), predecessor statutes to K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5911 that criminalized escape
from custody and aggravated escape from custody, respectively. The material provisions
in K.S.A. 21-3810 (Ensley) and K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5911 are legally and functionally
indistinguishable. In Garrett, the court held: "K.S.A. 21-3810, which provides for the
offense of aggravated escape from custody, is applicable to a convicted felon who,
without permission and in violation of the rules, departs from a community corrections
facility or fails to return following temporary leave lawfully granted." 235 Kan. at 418.
Webb, of course, was a convicted felon who failed to return from temporary leave from a
community corrections facility. In his briefing, Webb does not mention Garrett, let alone
try to distinguish it in some fashion. We view that silence to be about as effective as any
argument we perceive he might have offered to deflect the decidedly deleterious impact
of Garrett on his legal position.

       Apart from Garrett, Webb's argument fails because it conflicts with the plain
language of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5911(d)(2)(B)(iii) defining "escape" as including the
"failure to return to custody following temporary leave lawfully granted by . . . a
custodial official authorized to grant such leave." To accept his position, we would have

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to endorse a reading of the statute that rejects what seems to be the obvious import of the
definition and a clear legislative intent to criminalize precisely what Webb did here.

       Webb's second argument trades on a similarly untenable reading of the statutory
language. He contends there was no "failure to return to custody" under K.S.A. 2019
Supp. 21-5911(d)(2)(B) because he did return when he was arrested on the warrant some
four months after he walked away. Webb, of course, was forcibly returned and did not
come back voluntarily. So there was a failure on his part to return of his own volition,
and that sort of failure is part and parcel of what the statute criminalizes. Webb's
argument cannot be reconciled with the holding in Garrett. Nor does it represent a
reasonable reading of the applicable phrase.

       Webb's interpretation leads to an absurd outcome effectively precluding the
prosecution of anyone given permission to leave a community corrections facility
temporarily, i.e., with a set return, and then doesn't come back. If the individual were to
remain at large, he or she couldn't be successfully prosecuted, since we don't try
defendants in absentia on felony charges. If the individual were arrested and then held on
a criminal complaint, he or she would not have violated the statute, according to Webb,
because he or she would have been returned, albeit involuntarily. That sort of squirrely
result cannot be teased out of any plausible reading of the statute. The Legislature
intended to punish people who do what Webb did here, and the language reasonably
implements that intent.

       Webb has not shown the district court erred in convicting him of aggravated
escape from custody.

       Affirmed.

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