Court Opinion

ID: 9919514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 17:02:15.225482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:07.533876
License: Public Domain

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

                                                                  SUMMARY
                                                            January 18, 2024

                                 2024COA6

No. 21CA0116, People v. Fregosi — Criminal Law — Sentencing
— Restitution — Procedural Deadlines — “Good Cause” to
Extend Trial Court’s Deadline — Actual Costs of Specific Future
Treatment

     A division of the court of appeals clarifies the relationship

between sections 18-1.3-603 (1)(b) and (1)(c) following People v.

Weeks, 2021 CO 75 and holds that a district court that defers a

restitution determination for ninety-one days under subsection

(1)(b) may further extend that deadline under subsection (1)(c) when

a victim incurs ongoing therapy expenses. The division also

concludes that sufficient evidence supports the district court’s

decision not to review in camera or to disclose the Crime Victim

Compensation Board records.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                          2024COA6

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0116
Weld County District Court No. 19CR2209
Honorable Marcelo A. Kopcow, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Alexander Ryan Fregosi,

Defendant-Appellant.

                              ORDER AFFIRMED

                                  Division V
                          Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
                          Yun and Kuhn, JJ., concur

           Prior Opinion Announced November 30, 2023, WITHDRAWN

     OPINION PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED AS “NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO
         C.A.R. 35(e)” ON November 30, 2023, IS NOW DESIGNATED FOR
                                PUBLICATION

                          Announced January 18, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mackenzie R. Shields, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1    Defendant, Alexander Ryan Fregosi, appeals the district

 court’s restitution order. We affirm.

                            I.   Background

¶2    Fregosi pleaded guilty to menacing as an act of domestic

 violence, a class 5 felony, in exchange for the dismissal of two other

 counts. As part of his plea agreement, he acknowledged that “[t]he

 People reserve[d] restitution” and that he “stipulate[d] to [a] factual

 basis.”

¶3    The court accepted the plea agreement and confirmed that

 Fregosi understood its terms. The court found Fregosi’s plea was

 knowing, intelligent, and entered without undue influence or

 coercion. The court then set the matter for a sentencing hearing.

¶4    The court sentenced Fregosi to three years in the custody of

 the Department of Corrections. During the hearing, the prosecutor

 asked for ninety-one days to seek restitution. The court asked

 defense counsel if he had any objection, and counsel responded,

 “No, Judge.” The court granted the prosecutor’s request.

¶5    Fifty-one days later, the prosecutor requested $873.10 in

 restitution for the victim’s medical and therapy costs accrued to

 date. Additionally, the prosecutor said he believed further

                                    1
 restitution would be forthcoming and asked the court to reserve

 future restitution under section 18-1.3-603(1)(c), C.R.S. 2023, to

 account for the victim’s future treatment costs.

¶6    The court gave Fregosi twenty-one days to object to the

 motion. Fregosi did not object or otherwise respond to the motion.

 Therefore, on May 28, 2020 (seventy-three days after sentencing),

 the court ordered Fregosi to pay $873.10 in restitution to the Crime

 Victim Compensation Board (CVCB). The order further stated,

 “Pursuant to C.R.S. § 18-1.3-603, in addition to the specific amount

 of restitution listed in this order, the defendant shall be required to

 pay the actual costs of specific future treatment of any victim of the

 crime, if applicable.”

¶7    Subsequently, the prosecution filed thirteen amended

 restitution requests seeking compensation for the victim’s ongoing

 therapy costs. Fregosi objected to the amended requests. Among

 other things, he objected to the court entering any orders beyond

 the ninety-one-day deadline without making express and timely

 good cause findings.

¶8    The court granted all the amended requests. In each of its

 orders, the court indicated that, under section 18-1.3-603, it

                                    2
  reserved final determination of restitution to account for the costs of

  the victim’s ongoing treatment. And at each hearing, the court

  reiterated its intent to reserve the final restitution determination

  under section 18-1.3-603.

¶9     At a December 2021 restitution hearing, the CVCB coordinator

  reported that the victim had reached the limit of therapy sessions

  covered by the CVCB. The court then entered a final restitution

  order in the amount of $4,473.10.1

                             II.   Restitution

¶ 10   Fregosi contends that the district court lacked the authority to

  grant the prosecutor’s requested amount of restitution seventy-

  three days after sentencing because (1) the prosecutor failed to file

  the information necessary to support restitution before the

  judgment of conviction entered, as required by section 18-1.3-

  603(2); and (2) the court failed to enter a specific order at

  1 Before the final restitution hearing, the prosecutor filed a motion

  to clarify the total restitution amount due to a calculation error.
  The motion sought to correct the final restitution amount to a total
  of $4,923.10. After the hearing, the prosecutor filed a second
  motion asking to correct another error. This correction brought the
  total to $4,473.10, which is the final restitution amount the court
  entered.

                                     3
  sentencing under section 18-1.3-603(1). We address and reject

  both contentions.

              A.   Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11   Questions of statutory interpretation and whether a district

  court has authority to order a defendant to pay restitution are legal

  questions that we review de novo. People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75,

  ¶ 24; People v. Roddy, 2021 CO 74, ¶ 23.

¶ 12   The restitution statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

            (1) Every order of conviction of a felony . . .
            shall include consideration of restitution.
            Each such order shall include one or more of
            the following:

            (a) An order of a specific amount of restitution
            be paid by the defendant;

            (b) An order that the defendant is obligated to
            pay restitution, but that the specific amount of
            restitution shall be determined within the
            ninety-one days immediately following the
            order of conviction, unless good cause is
            shown for extending the time period by which
            the restitution amount shall be determined;

            (c) An order, in addition to or in place of a
            specific amount of restitution, that the
            defendant pay restitution covering the actual
            costs of specific future treatment of any victim
            of the crime; or

            (d) Contain a specific finding that no victim of
            the crime suffered a pecuniary loss and

                                    4
            therefore no order for the payment of
            restitution is being entered.

            (2)(a) The court shall base its order for
            restitution upon information presented to the
            court by the prosecuting attorney, who shall
            compile such information through victim
            impact statements or other means to
            determine the amount of restitution and the
            identities of the victims. Further, the
            prosecuting attorney shall present this
            information to the court prior to the order of
            conviction or within ninety-one days, if it is not
            available prior to the order of conviction. The
            court may extend this date if it finds that there
            are extenuating circumstances affecting the
            prosecuting attorney’s ability to determine
            restitution.

            ....

            (3) Any order for restitution may be:

            (a) Increased if additional victims or additional
            losses not known to the judge or the
            prosecutor at the time the order of restitution
            was entered are later discovered and the final
            amount of restitution due has not been set by
            the court . . . .

  § 18-1.3-603.

¶ 13   Every judgment of conviction must include one or more of the

  four types of restitution orders outlined in section 18-1.3-603(1).

  Weeks, ¶ 3. Section 18-1.3-603(1) does not permit the district

  court “to address the issue of restitution in a judgment of conviction

                                    5
  by entering an order deferring that issue in its entirety.” Id. at ¶ 30.

  Nor does it allow the prosecution “to ask that the issue of

  restitution (not just the amount of restitution) ‘remain open’ for any

  period of time after the judgment of conviction enters.” Id.

¶ 14   Further, under section 18-1.3-603(2), the prosecutor must

  move for restitution before or during the sentencing hearing and

  present the information supporting a proposed amount of

  restitution before the judgment of conviction is entered, if it is then

  available. Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. If that information is not available, the

  prosecution may submit it no later than ninety-one days after the

  judgment of conviction enters. Id. And the district court may

  extend this ninety-one-day deadline if — before the deadline

  expires — it expressly finds extenuating circumstances affecting the

  prosecution’s ability to determine restitution. Id. at ¶ 40.

¶ 15   Any failure to comply with these provisions bars the district

  court from awarding restitution. Id. at ¶ 45.

                     B.    Initial Restitution Request

¶ 16   Fregosi maintains that the district court lacked the authority

  to grant the ninety-one-day extension because the prosecution had

  access to, but failed to present, information supporting its initial

                                     6
  restitution request at the time of sentencing. We disagree and

  conclude that he waived the issue. We further conclude that even if

  he did not waive the issue, the record shows that the restitution

  information was not available at the time of sentencing.

                               1.   Waiver

¶ 17   Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right or

  privilege. People v. Roberson, 2023 COA 70, ¶ 24. Although a

  waiver can be implied, the conduct must be unequivocal and clearly

  manifest an intent to relinquish the claim. Phillips v. People, 2019

  CO 72, ¶ 21. The mere failure to raise an issue does not suffice. Id.

  We indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Id. In

  “[a]nswering a question not addressed by the Colorado Supreme

  Court in [Weeks],” a division of this court recently held that a

  district court’s ninety-one-day deadline for entry of restitution

  under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) is not jurisdictional and is therefore

  waivable. People v. Babcock, 2023 COA 49, ¶¶ 1, 5-11.

¶ 18   We find People v. Johnson, 2023 COA 43M, instructive

  concerning waiver. There, the division determined that, under

  Weeks, a plea agreement provision giving the prosecutor additional

  time to submit restitution information serves “as both a motion for

                                     7
  restitution and the parties’ acknowledgment that restitution

  information was not available before the conviction.” Johnson,

  ¶ 24. When the prosecution subsequently files its restitution

  motion within ninety-one days, the prosecution has “met its

  obligation under subsection (2)” of section 18-1.3-603. Id.

¶ 19   Here, as in Johnson, Fregosi agreed to pay restitution, and

  “[t]he People reserve[]d restitution” in the plea agreement. Id. at ¶

  6; see also id. at ¶¶ 35-39 (Welling, J., specially concurring)

  (concluding that the defendant, by the terms of his plea agreement,

  waived any challenge to the prosecution’s deadline in section 18-

  1.3-603(2) to provide restitution information to the court before

  judgment of conviction enters). Thus, simply by the terms of the

  plea agreement, Fregosi waived this issue.

¶ 20   But even if we look beyond the terms of the plea agreement,

  the record shows that Fregosi clearly and unequivocally waived this

  argument when defense counsel stated at sentencing that he had

  no objection to the prosecution’s request for a ninety-one-day

  extension. Phillips, ¶ 21.

¶ 21   Accordingly, Fregosi’s challenge to the timeliness of the

  prosecution’s requested restitution amount fails.

                                     8
       2.   Restitution Information Was Not Available at Sentencing

¶ 22    Even assuming Fregosi had not waived this issue, we conclude

  that the record shows the restitution information was not available

  to the prosecution at the time of sentencing.

¶ 23    Fregosi argues that the dates of the service provider’s bills

  were the dates that the prosecution should have had the

  information to request restitution. But that is not how CVCB

  claims are processed. Indeed, as the CVCB coordinator testified,

  the CVCB negotiates medical and mental health bills with each

  service provider. Thus, the amount the CVCB ultimately pays is

  different from the service provider’s original bill.

¶ 24    Here, the record shows that disbursements for the victim’s

  mental health therapy were not approved until April 2020 — one

  month after sentencing. The record further shows that the victim’s

  medical bills were still being processed by the CVCB in early May

  2020 — two months after sentencing.

¶ 25    Accordingly, because the prosecution did not have the

  information, it had ninety-one days to present that information.

  See § 18-1.3-603(2)(a).

                                      9
                  C.    Subsequent Restitution Orders

¶ 26   We next consider and reject Fregosi’s contention that the

  district court erred by granting the amended restitution requests

  because it did not make the express good cause findings necessary

  to extend the ninety-one-day deadline. We disagree for three

  reasons.

¶ 27   First, no provision in the restitution statute precludes a court

  that deferred its restitution determination under subsection (1)(b)

  from later finding good cause (under subsection (1)(b)) and

  extenuating circumstances (under subsection (2)(a)) to further

  extend the statutory deadline under subsection (1)(c) within the

  initial ninety-one-day period. Fregosi’s assertion that the court’s

  subsection (1)(c) order could only be given effect if it were entered at

  sentencing contradicts subsection (1)(c)’s purpose of accounting for

  unknown costs to be ascertained during the initial period.

¶ 28   Second, neither Weeks nor Meza v. People, 2018 CO 23,

  demands a contrary conclusion. Indeed, in its discussion of

  compensation for ongoing treatment under section 18-1.3-603(3)(a),

  the Weeks court observed that when a court enters a subsection

  (1)(b) order requiring a partial amount of restitution but defers the

                                     10
  final amount of restitution and later invokes subsection (3)(a) to

  increase the amount of restitution, the court — though still bound

  to determine the final amount of restitution within ninety-one days

  of the judgment of conviction — may, alternatively, make its

  determination “within whatever expanded time period the court has

  established upon a finding of good cause.” Weeks, ¶ 36; see also

  Meza, ¶ 14 (“While perhaps less express, paragraph (b), permitting

  an order that the defendant is obligated to pay restitution but that

  the specific amount of that restitution is to be determined later,

  contains nothing actually precluding the court from making

  findings at sentencing with regard to particular victims or losses of

  which the prosecution is aware, while reserving until a later date,

  within ninety-one days, findings with regard to other victims or

  losses of which the prosecution is not yet aware.”).

¶ 29   Finally, the record shows that the court complied with the

  requirements of section 18-1.3-603(1). During sentencing, the

  prosecution requested, and the district court granted, a ninety-one-

  day period to determine restitution under section 18-1.3-603(1)(b).

  Before the expiration of the ninety-one-day deadline, the court

  entered an order under section 18-1.3-603(1)(c), reserving the issue

                                    11
  of future restitution costs to account for the victim’s ongoing

  therapy treatment. The record further shows that the court

  reiterated its section 18-1.3-603(1)(c) order each time it granted the

  prosecution’s amended restitution requests. Moreover, at each

  hearing, the court expressly indicated its intent to find good cause

  to reserve the final determination of restitution based on the

  victim’s ongoing treatment. For example, at the third restitution

  hearing, defense counsel asked the court to clarify its restitution

  order. The court responded,

            [T]he victim has received future counseling
            expenses and if there’s a need for her to get
            additional counseling expenses for mental
            health or otherwise than that’s good cause for
            the court to consider restitution in the future
            based on this — assault that she suffered
            where there was physical and now mental
            health treatment necessary.

  Thus, the court expressly stated that its orders finding that the

  victim had incurred future therapy expenses constituted good cause

  for extending the final determination of restitution beyond the

  statutory deadline.

¶ 30   Based on this record, we conclude that the court’s express

  finding that the victim incurred ongoing treatment costs and

                                    12
  requiring Fregosi to pay those costs, constituted a valid restitution

  order under section 18-1.3-603(1)(c). See Weeks, ¶ 7 n.4 (noting

  that, under the restitution statute, “talismanic incantations” are not

  necessary, and “substance controls over form”).

¶ 31   Because the court made a good cause finding in an order

  entered before the ninety-one-day deadline expired and that order

  was reiterated in each restitution order thereafter, we conclude that

  the court had the authority to extend the ninety-one-day deadline

  based on future losses accounted for in the subsequent restitution

  orders.

                    III.   Disclosure of CVCB Records

¶ 32   Fregosi raises two challenges regarding disclosure of the CVCB

  records. He first contends that the prosecution failed to establish

  that the amounts paid by the CVCB were the direct result of his

  criminal conduct. Second, he contends that the district court erred

  by declining to conduct an in camera review of the CVCB records.

  We reject both contentions.

                                    13
                          A.   Additional Facts

¶ 33   The prosecutor’s amended restitution requests included CVCB

  summaries of the victim’s ongoing therapy costs. The summaries

  excluded the identity of the victim’s treatment provider.

¶ 34   In his objections to the amended restitution requests, Fregosi

  argued that the prosecution had not proved that his conduct was

  the proximate cause of the victim’s loss. Specifically, he asserted

  that he needed the CVCB summaries to include the identity of the

  victim’s treatment providers and requested an in camera review of

  the CVCB records.

¶ 35   The court denied Fregosi’s requests in a written order. The

  court explained that Fregosi’s purported evidentiary hypothesis for

  needing the CVCB records was speculative and did not warrant an

  in camera review. The court further found that releasing the

  records would pose a threat to the victim’s welfare.

¶ 36   Fregosi reasserted these arguments at subsequent restitution

  proceedings. In response, the prosecutor elicited testimony from

  the CVCB coordinator who explained the CVCB’s policy of excluding

  the identity of the victim’s treatment provider in cases involving

  domestic violence. The CVCB coordinator also testified concerning

                                    14
  the application process for mental health reimbursement and the

  limitations on such requests and confirmed that these standards

  were followed in this case.

¶ 37   The court repeatedly found no error in the nondisclosure of

  the CVCB records based on its continued finding that disclosure

  would pose a risk to the victim’s welfare.

                            B.    Sufficiency

¶ 38   Framed as a sufficiency issue, Fregosi contends that the

  prosecution failed to establish that the amounts paid by the CVCB

  were the direct result of his criminal conduct because it relied

  exclusively on the CVCB payment summaries that did not include

  the identity of the victim’s treatment provider or otherwise establish

  that including that information would pose a threat to the safety or

  welfare of the victim. We are not persuaded.

              1.   Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 39   Generally, we review a trial court’s restitution award for an

  abuse of discretion. People v. Gregory, 2019 COA 184, ¶ 21. A trial

  court abuses its discretion when it misconstrues or misapplies the

  law, or when its decision fixing the amount of restitution is not

  supported by the record. Id.

                                    15
¶ 40   But in a sufficiency challenge, we review the record de novo to

  determine whether the evidence was sufficient in both quantity and

  quality to support a restitution award. People v. Barbre, 2018 COA

  123, ¶ 25; Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2005). We

  evaluate “whether the evidence, both direct and circumstantial,

  when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the

  prosecution, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that

  the defendant caused that amount of loss.” Barbre, ¶ 25.

¶ 41   Convicted offenders must “make full restitution to those

  harmed by their misconduct.” § 18-1.3-601(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023.

  Restitution “means any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim . . .

  proximately caused by an offender’s conduct . . . that can be

  reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.” § 18-1.3-

  602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2023.

¶ 42   “Proximate cause in the context of restitution is defined as a

  cause which in natural and probable sequence produced the

  claimed injury and without which the claimed injury would not

  have been sustained.” People v. Rivera, 250 P.3d 1272, 1274 (Colo.

  App. 2010).

                                   16
¶ 43    Crime victims and their relatives may seek compensation from

  the CVCB for losses caused by criminal conduct. §§ 24-4.1-102(1),

  -108, -109(1), C.R.S. 2023. When a CVCB pays a victim

  compensation claim, it is a “[v]ictim” for purposes of the restitution

  statute. § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(IV). Therefore, “[i]f a CVCB awards

  compensation to a victim or other qualifying person, the CVCB is

  eligible to seek and obtain restitution from a defendant in [a]

  criminal proceeding.” People v. Martinez-Chavez, 2020 COA 39, ¶

  13.

¶ 44    The prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the

  evidence that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the

  victim’s loss and the amount of that loss. People v. Henry, 2018

  COA 48M, ¶ 15. For CVCB claims, however, the restitution statute

  creates a rebuttable presumption that “the amount of assistance

  provided and requested by the [CVCB] is presumed to be a direct

  result of the defendant’s criminal conduct and must be considered

  by the court in determining the amount of restitution ordered.”

  § 18-1.3-603(10)(a); see Martinez-Chavez, ¶ 20. The rebuttable

  presumption shifts the burden to the defendant to present evidence

  to show that the amount paid was not the direct result of their

                                    17
  criminal conduct. Henry, ¶ 19. “[I]f that burden is not met, [the

  presumption] establishes the presumed facts as a matter of law.”

  Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting Krueger v. Ary, 205 P.3d 1150, 1154 (Colo.

  2009)). To trigger the rebuttable presumption, however, the

  prosecution must establish the amount of assistance provided.

  Martinez-Chavez, ¶ 20.

¶ 45   The restitution statute prescribes two ways of establishing this

  amount: (1) “[a] list of the amount of money paid to each provider”;

  or (2) “[i]f the identity or location of a provider would pose a threat

  to the safety or welfare of the victim, summary data reflecting what

  total payments were made for.” § 18-1.3-603(10)(b)(I)-(II).

                               2.    Analysis

¶ 46   We reject Fregosi’s sufficiency challenge for three reasons.

  First, the record supports the court’s determination that disclosing

  the identity of the victim’s treatment provider would pose a risk to

  the victim. The victim expressed concern that disclosing additional

  information about her treatment providers would revictimize her

  and “bring[] up a lot of extra trauma for her.” Additionally, the

  CVCB coordinator explained that, in the context of domestic

  violence cases, releasing this type of information can implicate

                                     18
  patient safety and welfare because doing so allows the offender to

  “basically look up that provider and know where [the victim] [is]

  going to be on that day and time.”

¶ 47    Second, the record shows that the prosecution did not rely

  solely on the CVCB summaries. The prosecution presented

  testimony from the CVCB coordinator who explained how the CVCB

  processes claims and how this case met the statutory requirements.

  Additionally, the court also took judicial notice of the pre-sentence

  investigation report, the Crim. P. 11 paperwork, and Fregosi’s arrest

  affidavit.

¶ 48    Finally, Fregosi offered no evidence to rebut the statutory

  presumption of causation, such as evidence of an alternate reason

  for the victim’s ongoing therapy.

¶ 49    Accordingly, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the

  court’s findings and affirm the order.

                 C.    In Camera Review and Disclosure

¶ 50    Fregosi last contends that the district court erred in declining

  to conduct an in camera review of the CVCB records. We disagree.

                                      19
               1.   Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 51   A trial court’s refusal to conduct an in camera review is

  reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Blackmon, 20 P.3d

  1215, 1220 (Colo. App. 2000).

¶ 52   The restitution statute’s definition of “[v]ictim” includes any

  CVCB that has compensated a victim. § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(IV). “[T]he

  amount of assistance provided and requested by the crime victim

  compensation board is presumed to be a direct result of the

  defendant’s criminal conduct.” § 18-1.3-603(10)(a). Moreover, the

  CVCB’s records relating to the claimed amount of restitution are

  confidential. § 24-4.1-107.5(2), C.R.S. 2023. Consequently, “a

  defendant generally cannot obtain access to them.” Henry, ¶ 28.

¶ 53   “But in restitution proceedings, section 24-4.1-107.5(3)

  creates a two-step process through which a defendant can obtain

  information in CVCB records.” People v. Hernandez, 2019 COA

  111, ¶ 17.

¶ 54   First, the defendant may ask the court to conduct an in

  camera review if the request “is not speculative and is based on an

  evidentiary hypothesis that warrants an in camera review” to rebut

                                    20
  the presumption established in section 18-1.3-603(10)(a). Id.

  (quoting § 24-4.1-107.5(3)).

¶ 55   Second, after conducting an in camera review, the court may

  release additional information contained in the records only if it

  finds that the information “[i]s necessary for the defendant to

  dispute the amount claimed for restitution” and “[w]ill not pose any

  threat to the safety or welfare of the victim, or any other person

  whose identity may appear in the board’s records, or violate any

  other privilege or confidentiality right.” § 24-4.1-107.5(3)(a)-(b).

                               2.   Analysis

¶ 56   Here, Fregosi presented no evidence or information that the

  victim received medical or mental health treatment unrelated to the

  conduct for which he was convicted. Fregosi’s only evidentiary

  hypothesis was that he needed the CVCB records

             to investigate and potentially litigate (a)
             whether the costs-as-alleged are primarily
             based upon outpatient mental-health services;
             (b) whether the costs were in-fact “proximately
             caused” by [Fregosi’s] conduct, or rather are
             related in whole (or in part) to something
             besides [Fregosi’s] conduct; or (c) whether the
             costs were something for which [the victim]
             was eligible to have insurance cover (in whole,
             or in part) etc.

                                     21
  Essentially, Fregosi alleged nothing more than that he needed or

  wanted additional information. If a litigant fails to show “a specific

  factual basis demonstrating a reasonable likelihood” that the

  discovery will yield material evidence, the request for in camera

  review is properly denied. People v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d 662, 671-72

  (Colo. 2010). Accordingly, we conclude that Fregosi’s insufficient

  and speculative evidentiary hypothesis does not meet the statutory

  requirements for an in camera review.2 See Rivera, 250 P.3d at

  1277 (concluding that defendant’s request for an in camera review

  of the victim’s medical records on the basis that the victim “must

  have had previous mental health problems” was speculative where

  there was no evidence presented that the victim received counseling

  before the crime).

                             IV.   Disposition

¶ 57   The restitution order is affirmed.

       JUDGE YUN and JUDGE KUHN concur.

  2 Even assuming Fregosi’s hypothesis were nonspeculative, based

  on our conclusion that the district court properly determined that
  disclosure of the CVCB records would pose a threat to the victim’s
  welfare, the court had sufficient grounds upon which to deny the
  request.

                                    22