Court Opinion

ID: 9669527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:58:13.598696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:57.618213
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, C.J.
(dissenting). The majority severely restricts collateral attacks on prior convictions. I dissent for two reasons. First, the majority once again rejects established precedent, thereby rendering useless the concept of stare decisis. Second, it allows a sentence for ouil, third offense, to stand where there is only one valid prior conviction of record.
Certainty and predictability are among the key *305determinants of fairness in the law. See Parker v Port Huron Hosp, 361 Mich 1; 105 NW2d 1 (1960). To ensure this predictability, the courts have traditionally been guided by the doctrine of stare decisis. People v Jamieson, 436 Mich 61; 461 NW2d 884 (1990). In 1983, this Court carefully and fully considered the question of allowing collateral attack on a conviction used to enhance the severity of a subsequent offense. People v Crawford, 417 Mich 607; 339 NW2d 630 (1983). At that time the Court expressly held:
A conviction defective under [People v Jaworski, 387 Mich 21; 194 NW2d 868 (1972)] can be challenged by a timely motion by the defendant to quash the supplemental information or to strike from the supplemental information the defective conviction. [Crawford at 613.]
Under Jaworski, the defendant must be advised of the right to trial by jury, the right to confront one’s accuser, and the privilege against self-incrimination. As Justice Levin explained in Crawford, these rights "are of such importance that the failure to advise of such rights requires that a guilty plea be set aside.” 417 Mich 614, n 14 (citing Jaworski and Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96; 235 NW2d 132 [1975]).
Rather than construing the precedent established in Crawford,1 the Court today adopts the *306concurring opinion in that case which advocated allowing collateral attack only where the plea was taken in the absence of counsel. This Court, in Jaworski and Guilty Plea Cases, recognized the importance of the right to counsel,- but also assigned preeminent importance to the rights of confrontation and trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination. Recognizing that the right to counsel may be paramount does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that we must overlook the breach of all other rights or ignore a trial court’s failure to follow applicable court rules. I agree that this is not a question of constitutional dimension; rather, it is a question of policy.2 But this Court resolved the policy question when it adopted the court rules requiring that these rights be explained to the defendant on the record.3 In addition, I am not convinced that the mere fact that an attorney made an appearance, or was appointed, will necessarily insure that the defendant will receive adequate advice. For example, the defendant in this case was represented by counsel, and yet the record reflects no indication that he was informed of even the basic right to trial, which was expressly required by the court *307rule in effect at that time.4 I fail to see any justification for elevating the rather mundane concepts of finality and administrative consequence over that of fair procedure. While finality is of course desirable, it is not imbued with any particular reverence, and, where a defendant had no incentive to appeal because he had been placed on probation, the record of his conviction should not be considered sacrosanct.5 I would affirm the judg*308ment of the Court of Appeals on this issue.
The majority also completely evades a unique issue in this case. The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty of ouil, third offense, even though one of the convictions used to enhance was later set aside by the court that originally took the plea. At the time the plea was accepted, there were two valid prior convictions of record, but on August 8, several weeks before sentencing on November 27, the district court set one of these convictions aside. The defendant was convicted and sentenced under MCL 257.625(6); MSA 9.2325(6), which is implicated only when a defendant is convicted of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants within ten years of two or more prior convictions. The term "conviction” has been defined as:
"[A] final judgment on a verdict or finding of guilty, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere, and do[es] not include a final judgment which has been expunged by pardon, reversed, set aside, or otherwise rendered nugatory.” [Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed), p 301, citing 18 USC 4251.]
After the 1982 conviction was set aside by the district court, an interesting question arose regarding whether the factual underpinning for a conviction and sentence for ouil, third offense, still existed.6 The statute specifically requires two prior *309"convictions” as the linchpin of this offense.
The Court of Appeals did not reach this issue because it was remanding for entry of a conviction for the reduced charge of ouil, second offense. Because this issue has not been addressed, I believe remand is appropriate.

 The majority’s attempt to distinguish Crawford is unpersuasive. See ante, pp 295-296. The defendant in Crawford had not made a timely motion, and, accordingly, his conviction was affirmed. But the rule of stare decisis refers to principles and points of law, not to factual situations that exist in the cases where the principles are applied. In re Sprenger Estate, 337 Mich 514, 523; 60 NW2d 436 (1953).
The fact remains that, in Crawford, this Court expressly held that collateral attacks are acceptable if the motion is timely. Even though that defendant was not protected by the rule established, this Court did establish the rule, and there is no basis for discarding that rule now.

 See People v Yost, 433 Mich 133, 139-140; 445 NW2d 95 (1989), where we stated:
As we [have] explained . . ., and as we have demonstrated through the development of the court rules, there is no federal constitutional requirement that Boykin [v Alabama, 395 US 238; 89 S Ct 1709; 23 L Ed 2d 274 (1969)]/Jaworski advice be given when misdemeanants plead guilty. It is a matter of policy for this Court.

 Even though the court rule as it existed at the time of this defendant’s plea did not require explanation of all the Jaworski rights, it did require that the defendant be advised of his trial rights. The policy decision had then been made to require this advisement, and this should have been enforced at that time.

 The rule required that a defendant pleading guilty in district court be advised "that if his plea is accepted, he will not have a trial of any kind, so he gives up the rights he would have at a trial . . . .” See former DCR 785.4(e)(1). This rule was amended to require the Boykin/Jaworski rights in 1988. See former MCR 6.201(E)(3)(b)(i)-(iii), now MCR 6.610(E)(3)(b)(i)-(iii).

 1 note further, as a general matter, that the majority, in its rhetorical obeisance to the icon of "finality,” fundamentally confuses two different types of collateral challenge. The cases cited by the majority in support of its argument regarding the importance of "finality,” see ante, p 294, ns 3-4, citing McCleskey v Zant, 499 US —; 111 S Ct 1454, 1468-1469; 113 L Ed 2d 517 (1991), Coleman v Thompson, 501 US —; 111 S Ct 2546, 2563-2565; 115 L Ed 2d 640 (1991), Murray v Carrier, 477 US 478, 487-492; 106 S Ct 2639; 91 L Ed 2d 397 (1986), Engle v Isaac, 456 US 107, 126-128; 102 S Ct 1558; 71 L Ed 2d 783 (1982), Wainwright v Sykes, 433 US 72, 88-89; 97 S Ct 2497; 53 L Ed 2d 594 (1977), Henderson v Kibbe, 431 US 145, 154, n 13; 97 S Ct 1730; 52 L Ed 2d 203 (1977), Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 491 and n 31; 96 S Ct 3037; 49 L Ed 2d 1067 (1976), and United States v Timmreck, 441 US 780; 99 S Ct 2085; 60 L Ed 2d 634 (1979), all involved direct attacks on prior convictions in their own right. The attacks were styled "collateral” because they proceeded by habeas corpus or other means apart from direct appeal. None of those cases involved "collateral” attacks in the sense posed by the instant case— that is, involving the use of a prior conviction to enhance criminal culpability in a present, ongoing criminal proceeding.
This is a crucial distinction. The state’s invocation of "finality” is greatly weakened when the state itself seeks to resurrect one or more prior convictions and put them to new use, to impose new and further adverse repercussions on the defendant. Indeed, this Court in Crawford distinguished the case of Timmreck, supra, by explicitly emphasizing this very distinction:
[T]he question here is not whether the conviction is subject to collateral attack as an alternative to direct appeal, the issue dealt with in Timmreck, but whether the defective conviction may be used in supplemental proceedings when the repercussions to the defendant of his failure to appeal may yet be felt. A defendant placed on probation might not appeal a defective *308conviction. We are persuaded that a plea-based conviction, violative of Boykin-Jaworski, cannot be used to supplement a charge in habitual offender proceedings. [Crawford, 417 Mich 614, n 14. Emphasis added.]

 In Lewis v United States, 445 US 55; 100 S Ct 915; 63 L Ed 2d 198 (1980), the defendant was charged with possession of a firearm while being a convicted felon. The prior felony conviction in Lewis was subject to collateral attack in the state court but had not been *309vacated. The Court declared that it is a "common-sense notion” that after a conviction is vacated it can no longer serve as a factual predicate for a subsequent offense:
One might argue, of course, that the language is so sweeping that it includes in its proscription [against possessing a firearm] even a person whose predicate conviction in the interim had been finally reversed on appeal and thus no longer was outstanding . . . though we have no need to pursue that extreme argument in this case, we reject. it. [Id. at 61, n 5. Emphasis added.]