Court Opinion

ID: 9665147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:41:48.077224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:06.020279
License: Public Domain

MIRABAL, Justice,
dissenting.
Relator seeks mandamus relief to compel respondent to withdraw his ruling that he has continuing jurisdiction over the underlying litigation. I would grant leave to file, because I am of the opinion that relator is entitled to the relief requested.
Respondent Judge Wood signed a final judgment on August 8, 1995. After that, relator timely filed a motion for new trial. On October 20, 1995, respondent timely (a) orally granted relator’s motion for new trial, on the record; (b) made and initialed a docket sheet entry “MNT granted”; and (c) signed a docket control order, setting the case for trial on December 18, 1995. On December 7, 1995, at a pre-trial conference, the real party in interest asserted the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over the ease, because respondent had not granted the motion for new trial in a written order, as required by Tex.R. Civ. P. 329b(c). The real party in interest reasoned that, in the absence of a signed order granting the motion for new trial, the motion was overruled by operation of law on Monday, October 23, 1995,1 and the trial court lost plenary power 30 days later, on Wednesday, November 22, 1995. The statement of facts shows that respondent was persuaded by that reasoning, and therefore refused to sign any further orders or take any further action in the case.
Neither the trial court’s act of orally granting relator’s timely motion for new trial on the record, nor its docket sheet entry, nor the two together, are sufficient to constitute a “written order” under rule 329b(c). Faulkner v. Culver, 851 S.W.2d 187 (Tex.1993) (per curiam). In the present case, however, the *809trial court additionally and simultaneously signed an order that set a new trial date for the ease. In my opinion, in context, the signed order setting the case for trial was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of rule 329b(c).2 See Thorpe v. Volkert, 882 S.W.2d 592, 595-96 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); Palermo v. McCorkle, 838 S.W.2d 887, 889-90 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding); Charles L. Hardtke, Inc. v. Katz, 813 S.W.2d 548, 550-51 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).3
Accordingly, the trial court continues to have jurisdiction of this case, and relator is entitled to the relief requested.

. Rule 329b(c) reads:
In the event an original ... motion for new trial ... is not determined by written order signed within seventy-five days after the judgment was signed, it shall be considered overruled by operation of law on expiration of that period.

. When all three relevant events that occurred in this case are taken together, they sufficiently indicate that the trial court granted a new trial. While this conclusion is not necessarily mandated by Thorpe, Palermo and Hardtke, it is certainly consistent with the reasoning and holdings of these three opinions.

. Because the 75th day after August 8, 1995, was Sunday, October 22, 1995, the 75-day period was extended one day under Tex.R. Civ. P. 4.