Court Opinion

ID: 9393113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 14:11:11.052206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:51.078185
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
PUBLISHED

            Present: Judges Beales, Fulton and Lorish
            Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia

            NANCY C. VELDHUIS, AS TRUSTEE OF THE
             NANCY C. VELDHUIS REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST
                                                                                 OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 0776-22-4                                   JUDGE JUNIUS P. FULTON, III
                                                                                 MAY 9, 2023
            TAREK C. ABBOUSHI AND
             KYE S. ABBOUSHI

                           FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
                                          Kathleen M. Uston, Judge

                           John C. Altmiller (Leonard C. Tengco; Linh H. Ly; Pesner Altmiller
                           Melnick DeMers & Steele PLC, on briefs), for appellant.

                           F. Andrew Carroll, III (Land Carroll & Blair, P.C., on brief), for
                           appellees.

                   This case arises out of a residential property line dispute between two neighbors. On

            June 10, 2020, Tarek C. Abboushi and Kye S. Abboushi (the “Abboushis”) filed a complaint

            against Nancy C. Veldhuis, as Trustee of the Nancy C. Veldhuis Revocable Living Trust

            (“Nancy”), seeking to establish a boundary line to obtain title by adverse possession to part of

            certain real property owned by Nancy. In response, Nancy filed an answer and counterclaim

            against the Abboushis for trespass. The trial court conducted a bench trial and, after taking the

            case under advisement, issued a letter opinion dated October 20, 2021 (“letter opinion”), wherein

            the trial court found that the Abboushis had established their claim of adverse possession.1 On

            November 19, 2021, the trial court entered an order memorializing its ruling, appointing a

                   1
                    The trial court subsequently issued an amended letter opinion to clarify certain language
            employed by the court in its letter opinion. For our purposes, it is enough to note that the
            substance of the letter opinion did not change at all.
surveyor to create a new survey establishing a new boundary line in the area over which the trial

court granted the Abboushis title by adverse possession, and dismissing Nancy’s counterclaim.

Upon completion of the survey, the trial court entered a final order on April 26, 2022. This

appeal followed.

                                        BACKGROUND2

       In 1996, the Abboushis purchased the property located at 4401 Kirchner Court,

Alexandria, Virginia (the “Abboushi property”), which they currently own. At the time the

Abboushis purchased their property, Joseph E. Carroll, Jr. (“Joe”) owned and resided at the

neighboring property located at 4400 Kirchner Court (the “Veldhuis property”). When the

Abboushis purchased their property, they did not obtain a land survey that would have shown the

boundary line between the Abboushi property and the Veldhuis property. However, Tarek

Abboushi (“Tarek”) asked Joe where the boundary line was between the two properties. Joe

stated that the boundary line was “a straight line” running along the western edge of Joe’s

driveway to the east side of a large pine tree at the back of the Abboushi Property. At trial, with

the aid of a photograph, Tarek marked the terminus of the line Joe defined with a red dot.

According to Tarek, Joe identified the boundary line as running along the side of Joe’s driveway

back to a pink azalea bush that Kye Abboushi (“Kye”) planted in 1996. Tarek testified that from

that point forward, the Abboushis began maintaining an area east of the line delineated by Joe

(the “disputed area”).

       When the Abboushis purchased their property, the disputed area had no gardens,

plantings, or trellises. During the summer of 1996, Tarek installed stakes, wire, and trellises to

       2
        On appeal, “this Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to [the
Abboushis, the prevailing party below],” granting them the benefit of any reasonable inferences.
Young Kee Kim v. Douval Corp., 259 Va. 752, 756 (2000) (citing Deskins v. T.H. Nichols Line
Contractor, Inc., 234 Va. 185, 186 (1987)). Here, the Abboushis are the prevailing party.
                                              -2-
ward off deer. Further, he retained a construction company to replace the trellises periodically

over the years. The Abboushis also installed a privacy lattice. Tarek testified that he mowed the

grass in the disputed area typically once a week, thatched and seeded the area once a year, and

raked the disputed area twice a year. The gardens in the disputed area were mulched by Tarek

each spring and fall.

       Kye testified that in the fall of 1996 she planted flowers and azaleas in the disputed area.

The next year she planted more azaleas and liriope. Each fall since 1997 she cut the liriope back,

“constantly” weeded the disputed area, and regularly trimmed the trees and shrubs she had

planted there. She also routinely fertilized the area until the Abboushis got a pet. Kye testified

that over the years, she removed dead bushes, replanted bushes as necessary, and, after she

retired, mowed the grass up to the line delineated by Joe once a week. Kye also placed a large

concrete birdbath, a large ornamental urn, and several large flowerpots in the disputed area.

Another neighbor, Linda App has resided at 4402 Kirchner Court since 1995. Ms. App testified

that she has personally observed Kye mowing and maintaining the disputed area since they

moved in and that her efforts in doing so are “like a full-time job for her.” Ms. App testified that

she has never observed anyone else mow or maintain the disputed area. Finally, the Abboushis

also constructed a short stone wall in the disputed area, immediately adjacent to the driveway

located on the Veldhuis property.

       Tarek testified that there were no obstructions that would prevent Joe from observing the

work that Kye and Tarek performed in the disputed area. According to both Kye and Tarek,

neither Joe nor his wife ever objected to their planting, mowing, and maintenance of the disputed

area. In fact, sometime before Joe passed away, he sought permission from Tarek and Kye to

install a two-inch plastic underground pipe along the edge of his driveway in order to direct

water away from Joe’s garage. Tarek and Kye granted him permission. Tarek thought it was

                                                -3-
installed sometime in the mid-2000’s. Joe’s daughter, and eventual successor in interest in the

property, Nancy, testified the pipe was installed in 2009. The pipe was buried under the ground

along the edge of the driveway, somewhere under the stone wall. Nancy’s husband Evert “John”

Veldhuis testified that the pipe runs under the Abboushis’ stone wall. He stated that he repaired

the “bend” of the pipe where it turns from his drive towards the stone wall and thus is aware of

the pipe’s location. Tarek testified that the pipe runs along Nancy’s side of the stone wall and

that its installation benefited both owners, since pooling water allowed mosquitoes to breed and

fester in the area.

        Joe passed away in February 2009. After his death, Nancy inherited the Veldhuis

property and she and John moved in in August 2009. In 2011, the large pine tree used by Joe to

delineate the property boundary line in 1996 died; Nancy testified that the pine tree “appeared to

be on [the Abboushis’] side” of the adjoining property line. Kye testified that Nancy asked her

when the Abboushis planned to have the tree removed, since Nancy feared it could fall onto her

house. Tarek testified he and John also discussed the pine tree. At the time, John was having

some tree work done and inquired whether Tarek wished to use his tree service to remove the

pine tree. Tarek declined, and in or around June 2011 he hired Bartlett Tree Experts to remove

the pine tree. It was undisputed that the Abboushis paid Bartlett for this service without

contribution from the Veldhuises. Kye testified that she placed a large urn over the stump of the

pine tree, which Nancy confirmed she observed and never objected to.

        Kye also testified that in 2019 she installed a stone wall, a small metal fence, and a raised

bed along the driveway line separating the properties. Both Tarek and Kye testified that these

items were installed because the area was sloped and when Kye mowed the grass there, she often

worried that the mower could slip or tip into the Veldhuises’ vehicles parked near the edge. Kye

said that Nancy often complained of grass clippings blowing onto her driveway and the

                                                -4-
installation of the wall and raised bed alleviated this issue as well. Kye testified that Nancy

never objected to her installation of the wall, fence, or shrubbery. Nancy first objected to the

Abboushis’ use of the disputed area by letter dated February 10, 2020.3

       At trial, Nancy argued that the pipe installed by Joe was fatal to the Abboushis’ adverse

possession claim, as the pipe negated the Abboushis’ exclusive possession of the disputed area.

The trial court made three important findings in its letter opinion regarding the pipe: (1) the

testimony was unclear as to whether the pipe was actually installed inside the disputed area;

(2) the testimony was unclear as to exactly when the pipe was installed; and (3) regardless of

when or where the pipe was installed, it was installed only with the permission of the Abboushis.

Based on the evidence adduced at trial, the trial court found that the Abboushis had proven all

the elements of their claim of adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence, including

their exclusive possession of the disputed area.

                                            ANALYSIS

       On appeal, Nancy challenges only the element of exclusive possession. She raises four

assignments of error; the trial court erred by: (1) finding that the evidence was not sufficient with

regard to either the location of the pipe or when it was installed by Nancy’s father; (2) finding

that no survey or other evidence was presented to establish the precise location of the pipe;

(3) finding that the evidence was contradictory as to when Nancy’s father installed the pipe; and

(4) shifting the burden to Nancy to prove that a pipe located in the disputed area was installed

prior to the running of the statutory period, rather than placing the burden on the Abboushis to

prove all elements of adverse possession, including the element of exclusive possession, by clear

and convincing evidence.

       3
         The trial court’s letter opinion also seems to indicate that Nancy may have asserted her
claim to the disputed area before this date, on February 2, 2020. However, whether Nancy first
asserted her claim to the disputed area on February 2 or 10 makes no difference to the analysis.
                                                 -5-
       As an initial matter, the Abboushis note that a trial transcript was not made part of the

record. Therefore, they argue that the appeal has been procedurally defaulted. Nancy

acknowledges that a trial transcript was never made part of the appellate record in this case, but

argues in response that it is not necessary to resolve the issues raised on appeal. “When the

appellant fails to ensure that the record contains transcripts or a written statement of facts

necessary to permit resolution of appellate issues, any assignments of error affected by such

omission will not be considered.” Rule 5A:8(b)(4)(ii). “If . . . the transcript [or statement of

facts] is indispensable to the determination of the case, then the requirements for making the

transcript [or statement of facts] a part of the record on appeal must be strictly adhered to.” Bay

v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 520, 528 (2012) (alterations in original) (quoting Turner v.

Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 96, 99 (1986)). Here, we hold that the transcript is not indispensable

to resolving this case, as we are able to dispose of the case by considering other portions of the

record, namely the letter opinion issued by the trial court.

       Turning to the assignments of error, on appeal, “this Court must consider the evidence in

the light most favorable to [the Abboushis, the prevailing party below],” granting them the

benefit of any reasonable inferences. Young Kee Kim v. Douval Corp., 259 Va. 752, 756 (2000)

(citing Deskins v. T.H. Nichols Line Contractor, Inc., 234 Va. 185, 186 (1987)). “In determining

the proper application of the law of adverse possession to the facts of this case, we review the

trial court’s decision de novo.” Quatannens v. Tyrell, 268 Va. 360, 365 (2004) (citing Turner v.

Caplan, 268 Va. 122, 125 (2004)); see also Barter Found. v. Widener, 267 Va. 80, 90 (2003)

(regarding mixed questions of law and fact, a trial court’s application of law is subject to de novo

review).

       Nancy’s assignments of error all center on the trial court’s treatment of the pipe installed

by Joe. Here, the fact that the Abboushis granted Joe permission to install the pipe in the

                                                 -6-
disputed area is dispositive. Even assuming that the pipe was actually installed both (1) within

the bounds of the disputed area and (2) prior to the Abboushis establishing their claim of right by

adverse possession,4 the Abboushis would still prevail on their claim, as their exclusive

possession of the disputed area was unaffected by the installation of the pipe.

       The common law regards the fee simple owner of the land as the owner of everything

above and below the surface from the sky to the center of the earth. Clinchfield Coal Corp. v.

Compton, 148 Va. 437, 451 (1927). It is undisputed that Joe, and subsequently Nancy, owned

the real property, the disputed area, in fee simple. To establish title to real property by adverse

possession, a claimant must prove actual, hostile, exclusive, visible, and continuous possession,

under a claim of right, for the statutory period of fifteen years. Hollander v. World Mission

Church, 255 Va. 440, 442 (1998). The burden is upon the claimant to prove all of the foregoing

elements by clear and convincing evidence. Grappo v. Blanks, 241 Va. 58, 62 (1991) (citing

Matthews v. W.T. Freeman Co., 191 Va. 385, 395 (1950)).

       As stated earlier, on appeal, Nancy only challenges the trial court’s finding that the

Abboushis’ possession of the disputed area was exclusive. “One’s possession is exclusive when

it is not in common with others.” Id. (citing Providence F. Club v. Miller Co., 117 Va. 129,

132-33 (1915)). Nancy argues that because Joe, her successor in interest and the rightful owner

of the disputed area, installed the pipe within the bounds of the disputed area, the Abboushis’

possession of the disputed area was not exclusive. However, this argument misunderstands the

ethos of an adverse possession claim. As the Supreme Court has stated on multiple occasions,

the possession must be “under a claim of right and adverse to the right of the true owner.” Id.

       4
          “No person shall make an entry on, or bring an action to recover, any land unless within
fifteen years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or bring such action shall
have first accrued to such person or to some other person through whom he claims.” Code
§ 8.01-236.
                                                 -7-
(citing Va. M.R. Co. v. Barbour, 97 Va. 118, 123 (1899)). “Actual occupation, use, and

improvement of the property by the claimant, as if he were in fact the owner, is conduct that can

prove a claim of right.” Id. (citing Marion Inv. Co. v. Va. Lincoln Furn. Corp., 171 Va. 170, 182

(1938)). A claim of right is “a possessor’s intention to appropriate and use the land as his own to

the exclusion of all others.” Id. (citing Marion Inv. Co., 171 Va. at 182).

       The permission sought by Joe and granted by the Abboushis to install the pipe proves the

Abboushis’ claim of right, as the act of granting another permission to use your property is a

clear indication that the grantor views himself, and no other, as the rightful owner and possessor

of the property. Furthermore, the act of seeking permission to install the pipe, as well as Joe’s

initial delineation of the boundary line, supports the trial court’s conclusion that Joe also viewed

the Abboushis as the rightful owners of the disputed area. The permission Joe sought in this case

was more than a polite attempt to maintain the goodwill of a neighbor for work that Joe already

intended to perform. Instead, the trial court found that the pipe was installed only with the

permission of the Abboushis. Joe’s permissive use of the disputed area does not defeat the

Abboushis’ claim of exclusive possession, as it is well within the right of the possessor of land to

grant or deny access to the land as he or she sees fit. The operable question here is whether Joe

used the land as the rightful owner; as his use as a licensee or invitee would not affect the

Abboushis’ exclusive possession. It goes without saying that the rightful owner does not need to

seek permission to use his own land. Joe’s act of seeking permission to use part of the disputed

area not only fails to cast doubt on Abboushis’ claim of ownership, it strengthens it.

       The case of Leake v. Richardson, 199 Va. 967 (1958), is informative here. In Leake, the

claimant, Leake, attempted to assert a claim of adverse possession over a pond, or, in the

alternative, a claim of exclusive riparian water rights (via prescriptive easement) to the pond.

199 Va. at 968. The evidence there showed that Leake and her predecessors in interest, after

                                                -8-
moving to a home beside the pond, began using the pond to boat and fish, and further, that they

used the pond as if they were the exclusive owners, requiring others who desired to boat or fish

to request a permit. Id. at 973-74. Moreover, Leake and her predecessors in interest employed

caretakers to watch over the property and the pond. Id. at 972. These caretakers were instructed

to keep trespassers out. Id. In fact, another property owner who owned land “at the ‘lower side

of the [pond]’” even testified that he also had a permit from Leake to fish. Id.

       Notwithstanding the efforts of Leake and her predecessors to exclusively use and possess

the pond, the defendants testified that: (1) they also owned property that bordered the pond to the

north; (2) during the relevant period, they used the pond “when they desired to do so”; (3) they

gave out permits of their own to their friends to fish the pond; and (4) none of the defendants had

knowledge that Leake claimed ownership of the entire pond until just before Leake filed her

adverse possession action. Id. at 974-77. The defendants thereafter disputed Leake’s claim of

ownership or exclusive riparian rights over the pond. Id. at 974-76. Based on that evidence, the

trial court found that Leake had not proved her claims of adverse possession or easement by

prescription. Id. at 968.

       On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia noted that both Leake and the

defendants had a possessory interest in the pond. See id. at 977 (“[A]n adjoining landowner on

an island or fresh water pond takes to the center thereof.”). The Court stated that:

               [W]here [land] consists of a fresh water pond or stream surrounded
               by lands of different persons, whose title as riparian owners
               include the land under the water to the center of such pond or
               stream, the acts of ownership must indicate a change of condition,
               showing a notorious claim of title, accompanied by the essential
               elements of adverse possession.
                       To work a disseisin or ouster of the owner of land, it is not
               sufficient to set up a mere claim or color of title. The acts relied on
               must show actual, hostile, exclusive and continuous possession for
               the period of the statutory bar; acts of such notoriety that the true
               owner has actual knowledge, or may be presumed to know, of the
               adverse claim.
                                                -9-
Id. at 976 (internal citations omitted). The Court, in affirming the trial court’s decision, stated

that:

               [T]he acts of the complainant, Leake and [her] predecessors in title
               were not inconsistent with the rights of the defendants, who used
               the pond for boating and fishing when they were able and desired
               to do so, and granted permits to others to do the same. There was
               no change in the condition of the pond which affected the rights of
               the defendants. . . . [T]he right asserted by Leake was not
               necessarily anything more than the assertion of a right held in
               common.

Id. at 978 (emphases added). Further, there was no evidence that the “defendant landowners

knew of, and acquiesced in, the claim of the complainants.” Id. at 980 (emphasis added).

Because of this, the Court held that the evidence was not sufficient to show that “Leake acquired

either the waters and lands comprising [the pond] by adverse possession, or the exclusive right of

fishing in said pond by right of prescription.” Id.

        In contrast to the defendants in Leake, Joe sought permission before installing the pipe.

The Abboushis’ use clearly evinced their claim of right over the disputed area, and Joe’s

permissive use supported that claim. Here, there can be no question that Joe, the actual owner,

“knew of, and acquiesced in,” the claim of right that the Abboushis asserted over the disputed

area. See id. The Abboushis’ right was more than just a “right held in common” with Joe, it was

exclusive. See id. at 976-80 (collecting cases on adverse possession and describing the

difference between a claim of right that is exclusive versus a claim of right in common with

another). This conclusion is further supported by Helms v. Manspile, 277 Va. 1 (2009). The

Court there found that the Helmses “asserted a claim of right to the property as demonstrated by

their use and conduct.” Id. at 9. The Helmses’ possession of a tract of land was adverse to the

rightful owners, the Manspiles, where the Manspiles “sought and obtained permission from the

Helms[es]” to rebuild a fence on the boundary line between the properties. Id. at 8 (emphasis

added). Though the court did not specifically address how the request and grant of permission
                                                - 10 -
impacted the element of exclusivity, we think it is clear that the Supreme Court intended that

such behavior does not defeat an adverse possessor’s exclusivity of the real property, but in fact

serves to further the claim that the possession was in fact exclusive.

       Lastly, the Veldhuises argue that the trial court erred by improperly shifting the burden of

proof away from the Abboushis, the party attempting to assert a claim of adverse possession of

the disputed land. The Veldhuises point out that the element of exclusivity must be proved as

part of the Abboushis’ prima facie case, Grappo, 241 Va. at 62, and that the trial court

improperly shifted this burden of proof by finding that “[n]o survey or other evidence was

presented to establish the precise location of the pipe” and that “[i]n the absence of such

evidence, and given the contradictory evidence presented at trial, the Court cannot determine

where the pipe is located—on [Nancy’s] undisputed property or in the Disputed Area.”

       We find it doubtful that the trial court engaged in any sort of burden shifting, given the

extensive evidence that the Abboushis presented, and the trial court accepted, regarding their

exclusive use of the disputed area. Nevertheless, assuming without deciding that the trial court

erred, any such error was harmless, as this assignment of error is also based on the premise that

the pipe installed by Joe undercut the exclusivity of the Abboushis’ possession of the land. As

we stated above, the location and date of installation of the pipe itself is immaterial to the

question of whether the Abboushis presented a prima facie case for the element of exclusivity,

given the permission that had been earlier sought by Joe.

                                          CONCLUSION

       Because Joe first sought and received the Abboushis’ permission, Joe’s permissive use of

the disputed area did not defeat the Abboushis’ exclusive use of the disputed area. The trial

                                                - 11 -
court therefore did not err in finding that all elements of the Abboushis’ adverse possession

claim had been met.

                                                                                         Affirmed.

                                              - 12 -