Court Opinion

ID: 9649104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:42:19.004666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:07.761800
License: Public Domain

Justice NIGRO
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately, however, to comment on what I see as the troubling fact that in sentencing Appellant, the jury found as aggravating circumstances both 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(10) and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(ll) for both of his first-degree murder convictions.
Section 9711(d)(10) of the death penalty statute provides for an aggravating circumstance where:
the defendant has been convicted of another Federal or State offense, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue, for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable or the defendant was undergoing a sentence of life imprisonment for any reason at the time of the commission of the offense.
*28442 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(10). At the same time, Section 9711(d)(ll) provides for an aggravating circumstance where:
the defendant has been convicted of another murder committed in any jurisdiction and committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(ll).
Here, the jury found both Section 9711(d)(10) and Section 9711(d)(ll) as aggravators for both of Appellant’s first-degree murder convictions, meaning that each first-degree murder conviction formed the basis for a finding of the two substantially similar aggravators. In my view, such double-dipping is impermissible. See Commonwealth v. Zook, 532 Pa. 79, 615 A.2d 1, 21 (1992) (although language in Section 9711(d)(10) and Section 9711(d)(ll) is different, both aggravators encompass first-degree murder and therefore, the Commonwealth was allowed to present its evidence “under either aggravating factor”) (emphasis added). However, whether the jury found three, as opposed to only two, aggravators in the instant case is of no moment, as they found no mitigating circumstances. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(l)(iv) (“the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance ... ”). Given this fact, and the fact that Appellant has not challenged the jury’s double-dipping here, I am able to join in the result reached by the majority.
Justice NEWMAN joins this concurring opinion, and also joins the majority opinion.