Court Opinion

ID: 9474007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:45:26.455842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:51.239297
License: Public Domain

FAGG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
As the Supreme Court has recently noted, the grand jury is entrusted with “extraordinary powers of investigation and great responsibility for directing its own efforts]!] * * * [In exercising those powers,] ‘the grand jury may compel the production of evidence * * * as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials.’ ” United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423, 103 S.Ct. 3133, 3137, 77 L.Ed.2d 743 (1983) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 617, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)). It is with this view of the grand jury in mind that I approach the present controversy.
The sealed documents here at issue constitute ordinary work product and do not contain the mental impressions, conclusions, or opinions of the attorneys involved. Thus, although protected by the work product privilege in the grand jury context, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 845 (8th Cir.1973); see also In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 810 n. 65 (D.C.Cir.1982) {Sealed Case I), this privilege is not necessarily absolute and may be overcome in appropriate circumstances. One such circumstance that if established will defeat the work product privilege is commonly referred to as the crime or fraud exception. See, e.g., In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49, 61-63 (7th Cir.1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir.1979); see also Sealed Case I, 676 F.2d at 811 n. 67.
Two elements must be established in order for this exception to be applicable in a given situation. First, the government must make a prima facie showing of criminal activity, fraudulent behavior, or some “other type of misconduct fundamentally inconsistent with the basic premises of the adversary system.” Sealed Case I, 676 F.2d at 812, 814. Second, there must be a reasonably close relationship between the prima facie violation and the documents in question. Id. at 814-15. See also In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 and n. 4 *208(D.C.Cir.1985) (Sealed, Case II); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 338 (8th Cir.1977). In regard to this second element, “a finding that the work product reasonably relates to the subject matter of the possible violation should suffice.” Sealed Case I, 676 F.2d at 815. Whether a sufficient showing has been made with respect to these two elements is committed to the sound discretion of the district court who will be overturned only if that discretion has been abused. See Sealed Case II, 754 F.2d at 399-400; In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 553 (8th Cir.1980).
Unlike the court, I believe sufficient evidence was presented by the government from which a “prudent person [would] have a reasonable basis to suspect” that the attorneys knew certain evidence existed, were aware it should be disclosed, yet knowingly failed to do so. See Sealed Case II, 754 F.2d at 399 n. 3. Thus, a prima facie showing of misconduct has been established. I further conclude that a reasonably close relationship exists between this misconduct and the documents here at issue. Central to the grand jury’s inquiry is whether the attorneys involved had seen and were aware of certain evidence prior to trial. The documents in question speak directly to this issue.
The district court, in reaching the opposite conclusion, abused its discretion by embarking upon a detailed and highly refined analysis, effectively placing itself in the role of the trier of fact and vigorously insisting that the government convince .it that there was wrongdoing on the part of the attorneys. Rather than affording the government all reasonable inferences in support of its position, the district court essentially weighed evidence, made credibility determinations, and at bottom placed itself in the shoes of the grand jury. In so doing, the trial court failed to realize that the two-step inquiry here involved is not intended to resemble a minitrial, particularly since the government, which must make the prima facie showing, “will not be privy to the information at issue.” Sealed Case I, 676 F.2d at 814.
Applying the proper level of scrutiny, I conclude a sufficient showing has been made by the government. Thus, to the extent the attorneys contend that the documents are protected from grand jury scrutiny by the work product privilege, I would reverse the district court and enforce the government’s grand jury subpoena.