Court Opinion

ID: 9402470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 19:12:05.229369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:00.039150
License: Public Domain

No. 21-0913 –WesBanco Bank, Inc. v. Chrystal Gayle Ellifritz                         FILED
                                                                                  June 15, 2023
                                                                                    released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                                EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                                SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                     OF WEST VIRGINIA
BUNN, Justice, dissenting:

               The central issue in this case is whether a valid, enforceable contract exists

to require WesBanco to pay the funds Ms. Ellifritz’s father deposited in a money market

certificate with WesBanco’s predecessor, Central National Bank, upon Ms. Ellifritz’s

presentation of the certificate for payment. The majority concludes that an enforceable

contract exists, and, therefore, the jury did not need to be instructed on whether the

redemption clause at issue here—that requires presentment of the certificate to receive

payment—is a substantive part of the parties’ contractual agreement or whether it is merely

boilerplate language that has no real meaning or effect because the parties have waived or

abandoned this portion of their contract. However, determination of whether the parties

intended to be bound by this language was not a question for the court—either the trial

court or this Court. “Generally, the existence of a contract is a question of fact for the jury.”

Syl. pt. 4, Cook v. Heck’s, Inc., 176 W. Va. 368, 342 S.E.2d 453 (1986). Because the

majority usurps the role of a properly instructed jury by resolving the factual disputes at

issue in this case, I respectfully dissent.

               At the time of trial, Ms. Ellifritz still had the subject money market certificate

in her possession. WesBanco’s corporate representative stated that the certificate

constitutes a contract between the depositor and the bank, and the majority finds this

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testimony to be conclusive evidence of the contract’s existence and enforceability. But the

bank representative also admitted that WesBanco has redeemed similar certificates without

requiring that the certificate be presented, signed, or returned at the time of payment, even

though the specific language of the document says, on its face, that it is “payable . . . on

the return of this certificate properly endorsed.” Therefore, two questions of fact were at

issue at trial: (1) is the certificate a valid, enforceable contract and (2) if the certificate is a

valid, enforceable contract, have the parties waived compliance with its terms.

               With respect to the first question of fact, even though the jury is vested with

the authority to determine whether the parties have entered into a contract, both the trial

court and the majority of this Court definitively determined that the certificate constitutes

a valid contract. I do not agree with this approach because the existence of a contract is a

factual issue that the jury should have been allowed to decide. See Syl. pt. 4, Cook, 176

W. Va. 368, 342 S.E.2d 453.

               The second factual dispute—whether one or both of the parties has waived

or abandoned the terms of their agreement by considering the presentment clause to be

mere boilerplate language—is guided by Syllabus point 4 of Peters v. Peters, 191 W. Va.

56, 443 S.E.2d 213 (1994),1 which provides:

               1
               Although the concurring opinion in this case suggests that the Court revisit
the continued validity of Peters v. Peters, 191 W. Va. 56, 443 S.E.2d 213 (1994), the
majority has not undertaken such a review. Therefore, until the Court either modifies or
overrules Peters, it remains good law. See State ex rel. W. Va. Dep’t of Transp., Div. of
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                      The rules of a bank voluntarily adopted by it become a
              valid agreement or contract between the bank and its depositors
              when an account is opened and the passbook is issued or a
              certificate of deposit purchased pursuant to the printed rules set
              forth in the passbook or the certificates. However, mere
              boilerplate recitals of the obligation to present passbooks or
              surrender endorsed certificates at the time of withdrawal
              constitute nothing more than general statements of bank policy
              and as such create no substantive rights in depositors. Thus,
              when the terms relating to the requirement of presentation of a
              passbook or certificate are positioned or articulated in such a
              way as to make it evident that a [b]ank does not intend the
              terms to be binding, no contract exists as to those terms.

(Emphasis added). Thus, regardless of the actual terms of a deposit certificate, Peters

recognizes that the holder of such funds may treat the redemption terms as mere boilerplate

language. As boilerplate, neither the depositor nor the funds holder is required to comply

with those terms, which means Ms. Ellifritz’s possession of the certificate is not

determinative of whether the certificate’s funds have been paid to one of the depositors or

are still being held by the bank. Here, the parties dispute whether compliance with the

presentment provision was required for payment of the certificate’s funds. Ms. Ellifritz

maintains that until the certificate is endorsed and presented for payment, as required by

the certificate’s terms, the funds have not yet been paid. Conversely, WesBanco contends

that it has waived the presentment requirement because that terminology is mere boilerplate

language—pursuant to Peters—that has no real force or effect. Syl. pt. 4, Peters, 191

W. Va. 56, 443 S.E.2d 213. Resolution of this second question of fact—whether

Highways v. Reed, 228 W. Va. 716, 719, 724 S.E.2d 320, 323 (2012) (“[T]he doctrine of
stare decisis requires this Court to follow its prior opinions.” (quotations and citation
omitted)).

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compliance with the terms on the face of the certificate is required or whether one or both

parties has waived their performance—is also entrusted to the jury: “The question of waiver

or abandonment by plaintiffs of their contract . . . was one of fact for the jury[.]” Roberts

& Stanley v. Am. Column & Lumber Co., 76 W. Va. 290, 296, 85 S.E. 535, 537 (1915). Cf.

Pilling v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 201 W. Va. 757, 759, 500 S.E.2d 870, 872 (1997)

(per curiam) (“Only if the court makes the determination that the contract cannot be given

a certain and definite legal meaning, and is therefore ambiguous, can a question of fact be

submitted to the jury as to the meaning of the contract. It is only when the document has

been found to be ambiguous that the determination of intent through extrinsic evidence

become[s] a question of fact.” (quotations and citation omitted)). Despite the jury’s critical

task of determining whether the seemingly straightforward presentment terms had been

waived or abandoned by one or both of the parties, the trial court refused to give the jury a

Peters instruction, because it said Peters was not “applicable” or “pertinent.” The majority

agrees with the trial court’s finding that recognition of a valid contract between the parties

effectively forecloses all other inquires, including whether contractual terms have been

waived. I disagree.

              In order to effectively perform its role of fact finder, a jury must be properly

instructed on the law that applies to the disputed facts it is asked to decide.

                      The purpose of instructing the jury is to focus its
              attention on the essential issues of the case and inform it of the
              permissible ways in which these issues may be resolved. If
              instructions are properly delivered, they succinctly and clearly
              will inform the jury of the vital role it plays and the decisions

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              it must make. . . . Without [adequate] instructions as to the law,
              the jury becomes mired in a factual morass, unable to draw the
              appropriate legal conclusions based on the facts.

State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 672, 461 S.E.2d 163, 178 (1995) (quotations and citation

omitted). Therefore,

                     [a] trial court’s instructions to the jury must be a correct
              statement of the law and supported by the evidence. Jury
              instructions are reviewed by determining whether the charge,
              reviewed as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury so they
              understood the issues involved and were not mislead by the
              law.

Syl. pt. 4, in part, id. In other words, “[i]nstructions should be based upon and correctly

state the evidence.” Franklin v. Pence, 128 W. Va. 353, 362, 36 S.E.2d 505, 510 (1945).

“An instruction which undertakes to cover the whole case and to state all the circumstances

and conditions necessary to be considered by the jury in arriving at a verdict, but which

omits an essential view of the case, is erroneous.” Delmar Oil Co. v. Bartlett, 62 W. Va.

700, 709, 59 S.E. 634, 638 (1907). The majority recognizes the importance of instructing

the jury on all the law applicable to the facts in a given case through its reliance on Syllabus

point 11 of State v. Derr in its opinion:

                     A trial court’s refusal to give a requested instruction is
              reversible error only if: (1) the instruction is a correct statement
              of the law; (2) it is not substantially covered in the charge
              actually given to the jury; and (3) it concerns an important
              point in the trial so that the failure to give it seriously impairs
              a defendant’s ability to effectively present a given defense.

Syl. pt. 11, Derr, 192 W. Va. 165, 451 S.E.2d 731 (1994) (emphasis added).

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              During the underlying trial, the court refused to give WesBanco’s two

proffered jury instructions that would have provided the correct legal context for the jury’s

deliberations by instructing them on Peters and a bank’s ability to treat certain deposit

terms as unenforceable boilerplate language.2 The majority endorses this ruling. I do not.

Without giving the jury an instruction regarding the law as established by Peters, the trial

court “omit[ted] an essential view of the case” from the jury’s consideration and left the

jury in a “factual morass.” Delmar Oil, 62 W. Va. at 709, 59 S.E. at 638; Guthrie, 194

W. Va. at 672, 461 S.E.2d at 178. Regardless of the court’s opinion of the evidence

presented at trial, “[i]f there be evidence tending in some appreciable degree to support the

              2
                WesBanco’s proposed Jury Instruction No. 2, which the circuit court
refused, provided:

                     Plaintiff [Ms. Ellifritz] contends that the Certificate of
              Deposit indicates that neither she nor her father could withdraw
              the funds from the account without first endorsing and
              surrendering the Certificate of Deposit to the bank. Under West
              Virginia law, these types of surrender provisions are nothing
              more than general statements of bank policy. As such, they
              create no substantive rights in depositors like the plaintiff and
              her father.

WesBanco’s proposed Jury Instruction No. 3, which the circuit court also rejected, stated:

                     Furthermore, the provision in the Certificate of Deposit
              that indicates that neither the plaintiff [Ms. Ellifritz] nor her
              father could withdraw the funds from the account without first
              endorsing and surrendering the Certificate of Deposit to the
              bank does not constitute or create a contractual duty on the part
              of the bank.

Both of these proposed instructions cited Peters as the source of their authority. See
generally Peters, 191 W. Va. 56, 443 S.E.2d 213.
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theory of proposed instructions, it is not error to give such instructions to the jury, though

the evidence be slight, or even insufficient to support a verdict based entirely on such

theory.” Syl. pt. 2, Snedeker v. Rulong, 69 W. Va. 223, 71 S.E. 180 (1911). Here,

WesBanco’s corporate representative’s testimony presented evidence from which the jury

could have found both the existence of a valid contract and that the bank had effectively

waived the contract’s terms requiring presentment of the certificate upon a request for its

redemption. Because only those instructions supporting the finding of a contract were given

while instructions regarding the alternative theory of waiver of the contract’s requirements

were steadfastly refused and blatantly omitted from the jury’s charge, the jury’s

instructions, as a whole, did not “sufficiently instruct[] the jury.” Syl. pt. 4, in part, Guthrie,

194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163. The majority’s opinion affirming the circuit court’s

refusal of the proffered Peters instructions fails to recognize or remedy this deficiency and

further compounds this error by removing the essential factual question of whether an

enforceable contract exists from the jury’s province. For these reasons, I respectfully

dissent.

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