Court Opinion

ID: 9679402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:51:58.70029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:13.298607
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(concurring). I concur in the opinion of Judge Brennan and write separately *220only to comment upon two issues that were not raised in the majority opinion.
Plaintiff argues that error occurred when the trial judge ruled that the death certificate of plaintiff’s decedent was inadmissible during trial for purposes of establishing the cause of death. This ruling was consistent with Michigan law as established prior to the adoption of the new Public Health Code. In Smith v Children’s Hospital of Michigan, 33 Mich App 186, 188; 189 NW2d 753 (1971), this Court held:
"On appeal plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly refused to admit into evidence the statement of cause of death contained in the death certificate. MCL 326.16(6); MSA 14.236(6), specifically limits the purposes for which a death certificate may be used as prima facie evidence to questions of identity, occurrence, time and place of death. The cause of death represents a conclusion on the part of the coroner and nothing contained in the certificate is the basis for the opinion. There was no error in the refusal to admit this evidence.”
The statute referred to by this Court in the Smith opinion has been repealed by Michigan’s new Public Health Code. See MCL 333.2881-333.2886; MSA 14.15(2881)-14.15(2886). Unlike the former statute the new Public Health Code contains no language limiting the use of a death certificate to the questions of identity, occurrence, time and place of death. MCL 333.2886; MSA 14.15(2886) provides that a certified copy of a death certificate is to be considered as prima facie evidence of the facts as stated in the original. The cause of death is a "fact” contained in a death certificate. Therefore, the trial judge erroneously excluded the death certificate from evidence in this case. Nonetheless, no error requiring reversal *221has occurred because the cause of death as stated on the death certificate would not, in and of itself, supply the missing element in plaintiffs cause of action. That is, the failure to show that the alleged negligence of Dr. Silverstone caused, hastened, or enhanced the death of plaintiffs decedent. Because the trial judge properly granted defendants’ motions for directed verdicts, thereby obviating a need to submit this case to the jury, a failure to admit the death certificate is harmless error only.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to admit the rules and regulations of the American Osteopathic Association to establish the standard of care applicable to defendant Garden City Hospital. Plaintiffs proposed exhibits, 5 pages of a 96-page book entitled "The Accreditation Requirements of the AOA”, purported to establish that in order for a hospital to become accredited by the AOA the hospital is required to have a Tumor Board review all malignancy cases and stage all malignancies. The trial judge held this exhibit to be inadmissible to show the standard of care for the hospital because that standard can only be established by experts.
Violation of regulations promulgated pursuant to statutory authority is evidence of negligence and evidence of those regulations is admissible in medical malpractice actions. Duckett v North Detroit General Hospital, 84 Mich App 426; 269 NW2d 626 (1978), Kakligian v Henry Ford Hospital, 48 Mich App 325; 210 NW2d 463 (1973). In Ferguson v Gonyaw, 64 Mich App 685; 236 NW2d 543 (1975), this Court held that in an action alleging a hospital’s negligent hiring of a physician the guidelines of the AOA for checking a physician’s credentials properly were used to establish the requisite standard of care. Therefore, the trial *222judge erred in excluding the five-page exhibit offered by plaintiff in this case. However, the trial judge’s erroneous evidentiary ruling does not require reversal.
The AOA guidelines as recited in the record do not articulate the standard of care with regard to the staging of a malignancy. Rather, they recite the fact that a malignancy must be staged and that the staging must be made a part of the patient’s record. The guidelines do nothing to enlighten a trier of fact as to what the applicable standard of care is. Thus, the trial judge did not commit error requiring reversal in excluding them from evidence in this case.