Court Opinion

ID: 9521283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:02:06.817457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:27.672488
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that section 11 — 401 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11 — 401 (West 1992)) requires, as an element of the offense, that a hit-and-run driver who fails to report an accident have had knowledge of the involvement of another person in the accident. In People v. Nunn, 77 Ill. 2d 243 (1979), this court declined to impose on the plain language of the statute the requirement that a driver have known that injury or death resulted from the collision. The court explained: "We consider that to show a violation of section 11— 401 the prosecution is required to prove that the accused had knowledge that the vehicle he was driving was involved in an accident or collision. We do not, however, hold that it is necessary for the prosecution to show also that the accused knew that injury or death resulted from the collision. To require this additional proof would impose a burden that would be unrealistically difficult to sustain and would tend to defeat the public interest which is served by requiring persons involved in vehicle collisions to stop and provide identification and other personal information and to be available to render assistance if required.” Nunn, 77 Ill. 2d at 252. I agree with what this court said in Nunn, and I would continue to adhere to the holding in that case. The majority attempts to distinguish Nunn, however, on the ground that the court was not required to consider in that case whether a defendant must also have had knowledge that another person was involved in the accident. Because the collision in Nunn involved two moving vehicles, the involvement of another driver was implicit in the circumstances of the accident. The majority goes on to conclude that section 11 — 401 requires the State to prove that a hit-and-run driver have had knowledge that another person was involved in the accident. The plain language of the statute does not support the majority’s construction. The duty to stop imposed by section 11 — 401 of the Vehicle Code is not dependent on the driver’s knowledge of the involvement of another person in the accident. Related measures found in sections 11 — 402 and 11 — 404 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11 — 402, 11 — 404 (West 1992)) similarly require drivers to stop and provide appropriate assistance or information, as the case may be. Although the nature of the harm caused in the accident determines what the driver must do after he or she stops, the duty to stop remains a constant in these provisions. A driver who does not stop to determine whether someone has been injured and who does not make a report of the accident does so at his peril. Today’s decision simply reduces drivers’ duties to stop and give necessary assistance and information. The statute does not require such a result, and I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion. I also disagree with the majority’s determination that the defendant’s conviction for obstruction of justice must be reversed because the State failed to establish venue of the offense in Madison County. Consistent with the views I expressed in my concurrence in People v. Adams, 161 Ill. 2d 333, 346 (1994) (Miller, J., concurring), I believe that the recent amendment to the venue statute, which codified the principles set forth in the Adams concurrence by relieving the prosecution of any duty to establish "that the alleged offense occurred in any particular county in this State” (720 ILCS 5/1 — 6(a) (West 1996)), affects a matter of procedure only and therefore may be applied retroactively. See Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2, 122 Ill. 2d 303, 310 (1988). JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this dissent.