Court Opinion

ID: 9583469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:39:02.297466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:02.151435
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. Defendant was charged with burglary. In his opening statement to the jury, the district attorney attacked the defendant’s character, by telling the jury that defendant had been "fired” from the place which was burglarized.
Defendant’s counsel promptly moved for mistrial, and during the absence of the jury, the trial judge suggested to the district attorney that he use a different word than "fired.” The district attorney, during the absence of the jury, stated he would use "termination of employment.”
But the trial judge did not at any time thereafter, in the presence of the jury, reprove the district attorney for such statement; nor did he instruct the jury to disregard it; nor did the district attorney ever withdraw the statement, nor did he apologize to the jury for the unauthorized remark.
"To fire” means "to evict forcibly; to discharge from a position; to discharge summarily.” It definitely fixes blame or fault upon the person "fired.”
Our law has constantly guarded the right of a defendant with respect to not having his character attacked unless he himself first places it in issue. See Code §§ 38-201, 38-202. Our courts also *859have strongly guarded this right, and time and again our appellate courts have reversed the trial courts for permitting a defendant’s character to be placed in issue by the State, even though in many of such cases the remarks were withdrawn and the jury instructed to disregard them. See Garrett v. State, 21 Ga. App. 801 (8) (95 SE 301); Josey v. State, 89 Ga. App. 215, 218 (79 SE2d 64); Smoot v. State, 146 Ga. 76 (1) (90 SE 715); Bland v. State, 210 Ga. 100 (7) (78 SE2d 51). A recent case written by Judge Deen, and concurred in by Presiding Judge Jordan and Judge Pannell, and citing the Bland case, is that of Smith v. State, 118 Ga. App. 464 (1) (164 SE2d 238). On page 465 we find the following language: "'Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and prevent the same; and, on objection made, he shall also rebuke the counsel, and by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper impression from their minds; or, in his discretion, he may order a mistrial if the plaintiff’s attorney is the offender.’ Code § 81-1009. 'In the trial of a criminal case, counsel for the State should refrain from making any argument that might be calculated to unfairly influence the jury in arriving at its verdict.’ Bland v. State, 210 Ga. 100, 107 (78 SE2d 51). 'It is error to allow, over objection of the defendant, prejudicial and irrelevant matter to go before the jury in a trial, which tends to place his character and conduct before the jury, where the nature of the case does not involve such character.’ Fitzgerald v. State, 184 Ga. 19 (190 SE 602) and see Harris v. State, 183 Ga. 106 (187 SE 669); Josey v. State, 89 Ga. App. 215 (79 SE2d 64). Nor will a mere apology and withdrawal of the remark by counsel, where there is no reprimand by the court, be sufficient to prevent a mistrial if it appears that the remarks were such as to prejudice a fair trial.” No apology, withdrawal or reprimand was here made.
In his brief, State’s counsel urges that evidence as to the defendant’s being "fired” was admissible in order to show motive. He admits that he could find no reported cases supporting this proposition, but he did cite two cases where the crime charged was arson. But, arson is entirely different from burglary. The commission of arson presumes the motive of injuring or damaging *860the property, and, inferentially, its owner. The commission of burglary presumes the motive of enrichment of the burglar. But, a complete answer to the district attorney’s contention here is that there was no evidence introduced to show defendant had in fact been "fired” and thus a double error was committed. The language used not only attacked defendant’s character, but it was without foundation in fact.
The majority opinion cites the case of Fairbanks Publishing Company v. Pitka, 376 P. 2d 190, 195 (Alaska) and quotes therefrom: "The mere statement that a person has been fired 'is not defamatory as a matter of law. . .’ ” But a careful reading of the opinion shows the court was simply saying that such statement is not "defamatory per se,” within the meaning of the libel and slander law. This language on page 195 of the cited case is followed by the following: "There was here at least a question for the jury as to whether the publication was in fact understood by those to whom it was addressed in a sense which made it defamatory.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case sub judice, if the jury could have understood the language ’’fired” to import fault, of course this constituted an attack on defendant’s character. Further, there is a vast difference between the very narrow confines of the requisites of a suit for slander (or libel) and an attack on character. A person’s character may be completely annihilated by his opponent, and yet the injured person may not be able to plead a good cause of action under the law as to slander. To prove libel it must be shown that the words written were both false and malicious. Code § 105-701. In the case sub judice, of course the defendant is not required to show the district attorney’s words were actuated by malice. To prove slander it must be shown the spoken words charge a crime, or a contagious disorder; or an act which would exclude the plaintiff from society, or words that would damage him in his business or profession. Code § 105-702. To illustrate, in the case of Jordan v. Fowler, 25 Ga. App. 709 (104 SE 511) in a suit for slander, the defendant said of plaintiff: "William Pinkney Jordan is a damn low down yellow son of a bitch ... a damn low down yellow rotten dog.” This was held not to be slanderous. But suppose the district attorney, in his opening statement to the jury, stated that he is going to prove these exact words were true of the *861defendant — could any one say defendant’s character had not been placed in issue and that a mistrial should not be granted? To the same effect are the holdings in Morris v. Evans, 22 Ga. App. 11 (95 SE 385) and Jones v. Poole, 62 Ga. App. 309 (8 SE2d 532).
Thus, it is respectfully contended that words which are not per se slanderous may still attack character, and that defendant’s character was improperly attacked and placed in issue by the district attorney’s opening statement to the jury in this case. I would, therefore, reverse the trial court because of the error set forth in enumeration of error 4.
I am authorized to state that Judge Whitman joins me in this dissent.