Court Opinion

ID: 9790504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:54:07.277251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.963143
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(concurring)—The majority correctly concludes that the conduct of James Selden warrants disbarment. I *257agree. Because our past pronouncements have caused a great deal of confusion, however, I have set forth my views as to what standards should be used for attorney discipline.
Standards for Attorney Discipline
The Supreme Court of Washington has exclusive responsibility to determine whether a lawyer's misconduct warrants disbarment. Rules for Lawyer Discipline 2.1; In re McGlothlen, 99 Wn.2d 515, 663 P.2d 1330 (1983); In re Espedal, 82 Wn.2d 834, 514 P.2d 518 (1973). Nevertheless, in In re Noble, 100 Wn.2d 88, 95, 667 P.2d 608 (1983), a majority of this court stated that "we will adopt the sanction recommended by the Disciplinary Board unless we are able to articulate specific reasons for adopting a different sanction." This standard is explicitly approved in the majority opinion at page 253. I believe this statement abdicates our constitutional responsibility. In my opinion we should not give such deference to the Board.
Historically, this court has stated that the primary purpose of attorney discipline cases is to protect the public and preserve confidence in the legal profession and judicial system. In re Noble, supra; In re Salvesen, 94 Wn.2d 73, 614 P.2d 1264 (1980); In re Smith, 83 Wn.2d 659, 521 P.2d 212 (1974); In re Steinberg, 44 Wn.2d 707, 269 P.2d 970 (1954). Over the years this court developed a test considering: (1) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense, (2) avoidance of repetition by the offender, (3) the sanction's likely deterrent effect upon others, (4) maintenance of respect for the honor and dignity of the legal profession and (5) assurance that those who seek legal services will be insulated from unprofessional conduct. In re Kumbera, 91 Wn.2d 401, 588 P.2d 1167 (1979); In re Smith, supra. These considerations accurately enable us to decide the proper sanction which would fulfill the goal of protecting the public and preserving confidence in the legal system. The considerations take into account the aggravating and mitigating factors of the particular case, carefully tailoring the disciplinary sanction to the violations of the attorney in ques*258tion.
Recently, however, in In re Noble and its progeny, we have strayed from the beaten path. Noble sets forth five different factors to be considered when we set the appropriate disciplinary sanction: (1) the purpose of attorney discipline, (2) proportionality to the misconduct, (3) the hardship on the attorney, (4) the Board's recommendation, and (5) the unanimity of the Board in deciding the recommendation. Noble, at 95-96. The new factors have, in my opinion, reduced the effectiveness of attorney discipline. While the purpose of attorney discipline remains the same, to protect the public and to maintain confidence in the legal profession, this court now considers this as only one of five factors in determining the appropriate sanction. As a result, this court now gives more weight to the Board's recommendation and the hardship to the offending attorney, than to the principal purpose of protecting the public and assuring the integrity of the legal system.
The Rumbera Approach
I believe this court should return to the five considerations described in Rumbera because they better fulfill the purpose of attorney discipline. When analyzing these factors in relation to the acts committed by the respondent, I believe the only result this court could reach would be disbarment.
1. The Seriousness and Circumstances of the Offense. Respondent committed approximately 30 counts of theft against his employers. The respondent argues that he should not be disciplined because our decision in In re Rice, 99 Wn.2d 275, 277, 661 P.2d 591 (1983) controls. I agree with the majority that Rice is not applicable. Unlike Rice respondent purposefully stole money from his partners at a time when two of the partners were seriously ill. He justified his actions stating he had a right to a bonus, when no evidence of a promise of a bonus existed, and soon after he had received a $12,000 per year raise.
Although this case does not involve theft of a client's *259trust funds, I believe the distinction between theft of client's funds and theft of an employer's funds is minimal. Clients often entrust lawyers with large amounts of money, and these clients deserve and expect trustworthy lawyers. A lawyer who steals, regardless of whether it is from his clients or the firm, places this trust in jeopardy and cannot be allowed to continue practicing law. We have emphasized this point time and time again, In re Stock, 104 Wn.2d 273, 704 P.2d 611 (1985); In re Moynihan, 97 Wn.2d 237, 643 P.2d 439 (1982) and have suspended an attorney for 2 years for shoplifting merchandise worth $300 in 1 hour. In re Saulnier, 97 Wn.2d 676, 648 P.2d 433 (1982). Theft by an attorney simply cannot be countenanced, and ordinarily warrants disbarment in all but the most extraordinary circumstances.
2. Avoidance of Repetition by the Offender. The hearing officer found that it was unlikely that the respondent would ever commit these acts again. While I accept this determination, I cannot help but discount its weight. Any person who can to this day continue to justify 30 counts of theft by an unfounded claim to a bonus must have the potential to convince himself sometime in the future that he is entitled to steal someone else's funds for another spurious reason.
3. The Sanction's Likely Deterrent Effect Upon Others. This case is one of first impression before this court. While we have followed a general rule that stealing from clients warrants disbarment, we have not addressed the question of the appropriate sanction for stealing from an attorney's employer. To give a more lenient sanction to this type of theft would only serve to encourage theft from an employer rather than a client. It would give the impression that certain types of theft are acceptable. All thefts are reprehensible and, absent extraordinary mitigating factors, warrant disbarment.
4. Maintenance of Respect for the Honor and Dignity of the Legal Profession. The legal profession requires trustworthy and honest professionals. Respondent stole repeatedly for 8 months, including the theft of one check after he *260was caught. He attempted to cover up the extent of the thefts by removing some ledger cards. He stole when two of the partners were seriously ill and particularly vulnerable. To allow such an individual to practice law in this state sends a clear message to the public that the bar tolerates certain types of thievery. We should not tolerate such conduct. It is beneath the dignity of the profession to allow respondent to remain a member of the bar.
5. Assurance That Those Who Seek Legal Services Will Be Insulated From Unprofessional Conduct. The final question each Justice of this court must consider is:
" Can I, in view of what has been clearly shown as to this man's conduct, conscientiously participate in continuing to hold him out to the public as worthy of that confidence which a client is compelled to repose in his attorney?"
In re Cary, 90 Wn.2d 762, 767, 585 P.2d 1161 (1978); In re Beakley, 6 Wn.2d 410, 107 P.2d 1097 (1940). I cannot.
I concur with the majority's decision to disbar.
Goodloe, J., concurs with Dore, J.