Court Opinion

ID: 9399971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 21:00:49.144764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:41.229829
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4130      Doc: 43         Filed: 06/05/2023     Pg: 1 of 4

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4130

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        TREVON DARNELL HOPKINS,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:19-cr-00239-RJC-DCK-1)

        Submitted: March 30, 2023                                             Decided: June 5, 2023

        Before HARRIS and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: D. Baker McIntyre III, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King
        United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
        UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               A jury convicted Trevon Darnell Hopkins of possession of a firearm by a convicted

        felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). Following his conviction, the

        district court sentenced Hopkins to 120 months’ imprisonment. Hopkins raises two

        arguments on appeal. First, he contends that his waiver of counsel at his sentencing hearing

        was invalid because it was not knowing and intelligent. Second, Hopkins argues that the

        court incorrectly calculated his Sentencing Guidelines range. We affirm.

               We review de novo the legal question of whether Hopkins’ waiver of his right to

        counsel was knowing and intelligent. See United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.4th 219, 227 (4th

        Cir. 2021). But because Hopkins was represented by counsel at the time of his waiver, and

        counsel did not challenge the adequacy of the district court’s Faretta * colloquy, we review

        the adequacy of the district court’s consideration of Hopkins’ mental competency for plain

        error. See id. at 227-28. “To establish plain error, [Hopkins] must show that the district

        court erred, that the error was plain, and that it affected his substantial rights.” United

        States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2013). “With regard to the third element of

        that standard, [Hopkins] must show that the alleged error actually affected the outcome of

        the district court proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               “The Sixth Amendment guarantees to a criminal defendant the right to the assistance

        of counsel before he can be convicted and punished by a term of imprisonment.” Ziegler,

        1 F.4th at 226 (internal quotation marks omitted). “But it is equally clear that the Sixth

        Amendment also protects a defendant’s affirmative right to self-representation.” Id.

               *
                   Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

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        (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he right to self-representation is inescapably in

        tension with the right to counsel,” but “the right to counsel is preeminent and hence, the

        default position.” United States v. Ductan, 800 F.3d 642, 649 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a court presumes that a defendant should proceed

        with counsel absent an “unmistakable expression” to the contrary by the defendant. Id. at

        650 (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel must

        be (1) clear and unequivocal, (2) knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and (3) timely.”

        Ziegler, 1 F.4th at 226 (internal quotation marks omitted). Also, to validly waive his or

        her right to counsel, a defendant must be mentally competent. Id. If a defendant is mentally

        competent to stand trial, a court may constitutionally permit the defendant to represent

        himself or herself. Id. at 227.

               Hopkins does not dispute that his request for self-representation was clear,

        unequivocal, and timely. Rather, Hopkins argues that his waiver was not knowing and

        intelligent. We disagree. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that, when Hopkins

        waived his right to counsel, Hopkins knew the charges against him, the possible

        punishment, the manner in which an attorney could be of assistance, and the dangers and

        disadvantages of self-representation. See United States v. Roof, 10 F.4th 314, 359 (4th Cir.

        2021), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 303 (2022). Therefore, the district court did not err in

        concluding that Hopkins’ waiver was knowing and intelligent.

               Hopkins also suggests that the district court did not adequately consider his

        competence, but again, we disagree. The court had already held a competency hearing and

        found that Hopkins was competent to stand trial—a finding that Hopkins does not

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        challenge on appeal. And Hopkins has identified nothing to suggest his status changed by

        the time of his sentencing hearing.

               Next, Hopkins argues that the district court erred by finding that his prior conviction

        under N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-258.4(a) was a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing

        Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(3) (2021). We conclude that, even if the court erred, the

        error was harmless and does not require resentencing. A Guidelines error is considered

        harmless when “(1) the district court would have reached the same result even if it had

        decided the [G]uidelines issue the other way, and (2) the sentence would be reasonable

        even if the [G]uidelines issue had been decided in the defendant’s favor.” United States v.

        Barronette, 46 F.4th 177, 210-11 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert.

        denied, 143 S. Ct. 414 (2022). Even without the two-level increase to Hopkins’ offense

        level under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3), Hopkins’ Guidelines range would have still been 120

        months’ imprisonment—the statutory maximum. So the court’s error had no effect on the

        Guidelines sentence, and the court made clear it would have imposed the same 120-month

        sentence regardless of whether Hopkins’ prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence.

        Moreover, the 120-month sentence is reasonable based on the factors identified by the court

        at sentencing.

               Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We deny Hopkins’ motions seeking the

        withdrawal of appellate counsel and the appointment of new counsel. We dispense with

        oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

        materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

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