Court Opinion

ID: 9770303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:58:06.519912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:16.445109
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In his motion for rehearing James complains that this court cannot properly sustain the trial court’s award of the ranch to Linda as an exercise of the trial court’s discretion in making an unequal division of the community estate because the trial court did not exercise its discretion to divide all the community property, including the ranch, in view of its mischaracterization of the ranch as her separate property. He insists that this court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. We have found no decision passing on the question of whether a divorce decree making an unequal division that would be within the trial court’s discretion under section 3.63 must be reversed because the trial court mischaracterized community property as separate. This question does not involve an invasion of separate property, such as that condemned in Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.1977). The problem is one of appellate procedure, that is, of determining whether an appellant who properly complains of mischaracterization of community property as separate must show that the trial court would probably have made a different division if the property had been properly characterized, or whether it is enough to show that there was a substantial error in the characterization which may have affected the division.
We conclude that the appellant has the burden to show the trial court probably would have made a different division if the property had been properly characterized. A contrary holding would, in effect, apply a presumption of harm from the trial court’s mischaracterization. No such presumption is proper under rule 434 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
[N]o judgment shall be reversed on appeal and a new trial ordered in any cause on the ground that the trial court has committed an error of law in the course of the trial, unless the appellate court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of appellant as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case.
Under this rule it is settled that there is no presumption of prejudice from erroneous rulings of the trial court. Walker v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n, 155 Tex. 617, 291 S.W.2d 298, 301 (1956). An appellate court is not authorized to reverse merely because the record discloses some error that is reasonably calculated to cause a miscarriage of justice; the appealing party has the burden to go further and show that it probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Dennis v. Hulse, 362 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex.1962). The appellate *626court has the responsibility to determine from the record as a whole whether the appellant has been harmed from the error of the trial court. Dennis v. Hulse, supra; State v. Parrish, 159 Tex. 306, 320 S.W.2d 330, 332-33 (1958); Texas Power & Light Co. v. Hering, 148 Tex. 350, 224 S.W.2d 191, 192 (1949). These principles have been applied to errors concerning division of property in divorce cases. Cravens v. Cravens, 533 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1975, no writ); Gaulding v. Gaulding, 503 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.Civ.App.— East-land 1973, no writ); Patterson v. Patterson, 419 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1967, writ dism’d).
In the light of these authorities we are unable to say that an improper judgment resulted from the trial court’s conclusions that James took title to an undivided one-fourth of the ranch as constructive trustee for Linda, that the 1973 deed was not a sale but a testamentary transfer in anticipation of the mother’s death, and that the ranch was, therefore, Linda’s separate property. Erroneous legal conclusions are not grounds for reversal when the court’s fact findings are supported by the evidence and are sufficient to support the judgment. Wirth, Ltd. v. Panhandle Pipe & Steel, Inc., 580 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1979, no writ); Mercedes Dusting Service, Inc. v. Evans, 353 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1962, no writ). Here, the trial court’s findings concerning the circumstances of the 1973 deed, the manner in which payments were made on the note, and the earning capacity of the parties are supported by the evidence and are clearly sufficient to support a judgment awarding the ranch to Linda as if it were her separate property and dividing the remaining community property as it did. Consequently, we hold that James has failed to discharge his burden to show from the record as a whole that the court’s erroneous legal conclusions were reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment.
By so holding we are not substituting our discretion for that of the trial court, as condemned in McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863 (Tex.1976). In that case the supreme court considered another provision of rule 434 which authorizes the appellate court to “render such judgment or decree as the court below should have rendered.” The court held that this authority did not extend to rendition of a judgment on appeal making a different division from that made by the trial court because the division was a matter for the discretion of the trial court rather than the appellate court.
In this case, by contrast, we have not reversed the judgment of the trial court and rendered a different judgment. Instead, we have affirmed the judgment on the ground that although the trial court may have been technically in error in characterizing the ranch as Linda’s separate property, the peculiar circumstances of this case, as found by the trial court, would have justified an award of the ranch to Linda as if it were her separate property and, therefore, to that extent, in making an unequal division of what was, in fact, community property. In view of the trial court’s fact findings, we have no reason to suppose that the trial court would have made a different division if the ranch had been characterized as community. Thus, in affirming the judgment, we are upholding the trial court’s exercise of discretion on the basis of the whole record. This lawsuit has been bitterly contested. The interests of neither party would be served by the delay and expense of a remand for further proceedings, and possibly another appeal, when the probability of a different result has not been shown.
In his motion for rehearing James also points out that there is no evidence in the record justifying the trial court’s award of $1,500 to Linda as an attorney’s fee in the event of a writ of error to the supreme court. In this respect' James is correct. Linda is directed, therefore, to file a remit-titur of that amount of the fee, whether or not it would ever become payable under the terms of the judgment.
The motion for rehearing is granted to the limited extent indicated and otherwise *627overruled. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed on condition of remittitur of the $1,500 attorney’s fee allowed for proceedings in the supreme court. If such a remittitur is filed before the time for issuance of the mandate in this cause, the judgment will be affirmed. If no re-mittitur is filed, the cause will be remanded for further consideration of the property division, and the judgment in other respects will be undisturbed.