Court Opinion

ID: 9912794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-23 00:02:20.918953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:44.992663
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Hsu CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,                                            B319181

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                      Los Angeles County
                                                       Super. Ct. No. SA097779
        v.

MICHAEL ROE CHIEN HSU,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Upinder S. Kalra and Lauren Weis
Birnstein, Judges. Affirmed.

      Werksman Jackson & Quinn and Kelly C. Quinn
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      _________________________
      The police arrested Michael Roe Chien Hsu after he poured
a liquid containing MDMA into a woman’s wine glass while she
was in the restroom. The government suspected Hsu intended to
assault the woman sexually, and it obtained warrants to search
his phone on the basis that it might contain evidence of other
sexual assaults. After initially struggling to bypass the phone’s
security, the government eventually unlocked the phone and
discovered photographs and videos apparently showing Hsu
sexually assaulting an unconscious woman. Based on those
discoveries, the People charged Hsu with multiple counts
of sexual assault.
      Before the preliminary hearing, Hsu moved to suppress
the evidence seized from his phone. The magistrate denied
the motion and held Hsu to answer. After a court denied his
motion to set aside the information, Hsu agreed to a plea deal,
under which he pleaded guilty to a single count of sexual
penetration by foreign object. The court placed him on formal
probation for eight years.
      On appeal, Hsu challenges the denial of his motion
to suppress. He argues the magistrate should have granted
the motion because the government failed to comply with
the particularity and notice requirements of California’s
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) (Pen. Code,
§ 1546 et seq.).1 Alternatively, he argues the government
did not have lawful possession of his phone and unreasonably
delayed obtaining the search warrant, there was not probable
cause to search his phone, and the warrant contains material

1     Unless noted, undesignated statutory references are to
the Penal Code.

                                2
misrepresentations and omissions. We reject Hsu’s arguments
and affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.     The arrest
       On May 26, 2016, Hsu was at a restaurant drinking wine
with L.U. Hsu and L.U. were coworkers and had been in a casual
sexual relationship for about a year. Recently, L.U. had met a
new partner, and she was starting to “ ‘pull away’ ” from Hsu.
       At some point, L.U. left the table to go to the restroom.
Three people sitting nearby noticed Hsu holding a small glass
object containing a white substance. Hsu looked from side
to side, poured the substance into L.U.’s wine glass, and then
slid the glass toward her end of the table. The witnesses
informed the restaurant’s security, who called the police.
One of the witnesses also ran to the restroom and told L.U.
what she had observed. Although L.U. was shocked, she
returned to the table and pretended not to know what Hsu
had done. Hsu tried to make a toast with L.U., but she refused
to drink the wine.
       Santa Monica Police Department officers arrived at the
restaurant and arrested Hsu. They searched Hsu and seized
his iPhone. The officers found three small glass vials in Hsu’s
pocket, two of which were filled with liquid. Hsu told police the
vials contained liquid vitamins that he used to help him sleep.
However, lab tests revealed the vials and L.U.’s wine glass
contained MDMA. L.U. denied having given Hsu permission
to put MDMA in her drink.
       L.U. told police she sometimes felt nauseous after spending
an evening with Hsu. She recounted attending two concerts with
Hsu in the past. Both nights she consumed drinks that Hsu had

                                3
given her, after which she felt “ ‘amazing’ ” and “ ‘on top of the
world.’ ” One of those nights she jokingly told Hsu she thought
he had “ ‘drugg[ed] [her]’ ” because she felt so good, which Hsu
denied. After the concerts, L.U. felt “super tired” and wanted
to sleep as soon as she returned to Hsu’s home. According to
L.U., Hsu had shown her pictures of them kissing in public
at one of the concerts, which surprised her because it was not
her normal behavior.
2.     The government searches Hsu’s digital devices
       Shortly after arresting Hsu, the government obtained
a warrant to search his home and vehicle (Warrant One).
During that search, the police seized a computer and several
other digital devices.
       About a month later, on June 30, 2016, the government
sought a warrant to search Hsu’s digital devices, including a
phone seized during his arrest (Warrant Two). In support of
the warrant, the government submitted a five-page affidavit
of probable cause from Detective Nicole Sierra.2
       In the affidavit, Sierra summarized the May 26 incident
at the restaurant and said she believed Hsu was attempting to
drug L.U. in order to assault her sexually. Sierra also said she
believed Hsu may have drugged and sexually assaulted other
victims. According to Sierra, Hsu’s digital devices might contain
evidence of his crimes because those “involved in these types
of crimes will at times photograph or record their crimes for

2     At some point during the case, Sierra married and changed
her last name to Murphy. For the sake of clarity, we refer to her
only by her original surname, Sierra.

                                 4
the purpose of keeping a momento or ‘reliving’ the sexual assault
at a later date.”
        A magistrate found probable cause to search Hsu’s devices
and issued Warrant Two. The police attempted to search Hsu’s
phone, but they could not unlock it. However, the police were
able to search Hsu’s other digital devices, on which they
apparently discovered evidence that he had sexually assaulted
L.U. Based on that evidence and the incident at the restaurant,
the People charged Hsu with several crimes, including poisoning
(§ 347, subd. (a)) and sexual penetration by foreign object (§289,
subd. (d)).
3.      Hsu moves to suppress evidence from his devices
        Hsu moved for an order returning his property—including
his phone—on the basis that it was neither evidence nor
contraband. The court ordered the government to return “all
previously imaged electronic devices” seized from Hsu. The police
did not return Hsu’s phone because they had not been able to
unlock it to create an image.
        A few months later, in September 2016, Hsu moved to
quash Warrant One and Warrant Two, suppress all evidence
seized under the warrants, and return his property. The
court granted the motion in part, finding the warrants lacked
sufficient probable cause. The court explained that, although
the magistrate properly found people who sexually assault
victims may retain evidence in photographs and recordings,
the affidavit contained insufficient facts to support an inference
that Hsu intended to assault L.U. or anyone else. The court
noted the affidavit stated MDMA is a Schedule I narcotic, but
it failed to describe its effects, how it is used, and who uses it.
Therefore, it failed to address the central issue: whether those

                                5
who commit sexual assaults or drug-facilitated sexual assaults
use MDMA and, if so, how.
       The court deferred ruling on Hsu’s motion to return his
property, and it explicitly stated it was not ordering the return
of the property at that time. The court noted it had discussed
this issue with the parties at the bench, and it asked Hsu if he
had anything to add to the record. Hsu did not object or urge
the court to issue a ruling. Instead, he asked the court if it would
allow a special master to “go through the electronic devices” if
the parties reached an agreement on the issue. The court said
it would not interfere with the parties’ agreement.
       After the court suppressed the evidence from Hsu’s
digital devices, the People dismissed all the charges except a
single count of poisoning.
4.     The government successfully searches Hsu’s phone
       In February 2017, the government obtained a new warrant
to search Hsu’s phone. Once again, however, the police were
unable to unlock the phone to search it.
       After learning of a new method that could unlock Hsu’s
model of iPhone, the government sought a new warrant to search
his phone in October 2017. The parties refer to this warrant
as “Warrant Five,” so we do the same. The government also
requested an order delaying notification of the warrant, citing
the possibility that Hsu could flee or remotely wipe his phone.
       The government supported Warrant Five with a 13-page
affidavit drafted by Detective Sierra. Compared to the affidavit
supporting Warrant Two, Sierra included in this affidavit
significantly more information related to MDMA, the
characteristics of sexual predators, and the basis for believing
Hsu’s phone might contain evidence of sexual assaults.

                                 6
        The affidavit states MDMA “can . . . be used and [is]
known as one of the ‘date rape drugs.’ ” It is “an illegal narcotic
that is commonly used by perpetrators of sexual assault because
it [a]ffects the mind of the user in a fashion that can render them
incoherent.” MDMA belongs to the hallucinogen category of
drugs, a category with “indicators” that include “memory loss,
nausea, body tremors, dazed appearance, difficulty with speech,
disorientation, flashbacks, hallucinations, paranoia, perspiration,
piloerection, poor perception of time and distance, and
synesthesia.” MDMA is commonly used “to enhance one’s senses
so one can have increased positive and arousing responses to
touch, smell and vision.” L.U. reported feeling euphoric, wanting
to be touched, experiencing nausea, and suffering memory loss
while with Hsu, which were consistent with having been under
the influence of MDMA.
        Under the heading, “Characteristics of Sexual Predators,”
the affidavit states “perpetrators of sexual assault commonly
will drug their victims to make it easier to sexually assault
them while they are incoherent so as to reduce the likelihood of
being caught.” In addition, “[p]erpetrators of sexual assault who
assault their victims while they are incoherent typically do so
through supplying drugs secretly to a drink or through other
means of intoxication. These drugs render the victim incoherent
and allow[ ] the suspect to forcibly assault their victims with
little to no resistance.” Further, sexual predators “commonly
collect trophies such as clothing, videos and photographs of
their sexual assault experiences, commonly found on their
cellular phone devices and other electronic devices.”
        The affidavit concludes Hsu “could potentially be a sexual
predator with a proclivity to assaulting women who have been

                                 7
drugged.” Further, “like other likeminded individuals, [Hsu]
is likely to have evidence of his assaults on his cellular phone.”
       A magistrate found the affidavit established probable cause
to search Hsu’s phone, and it issued Warrant Five on October 19,
2017. The magistrate also ordered delayed notification of the
warrant.
       The police successfully unlocked Hsu’s phone and
discovered photographs and videos of L.U. that appeared to
have been taken without her knowledge. The photographs and
videos showed L.U. dressing and undressing, L.U. passed out
while Hsu used his hand to reveal her anus and vagina, and
Hsu digitally penetrating L.U.’s vagina and anus.
5.     Hsu’s motions related to Warrant Five
       Based on the evidence obtained from Hsu’s phone, the
People filed a new case against him alleging several counts of
sexual penetration with a foreign object (§ 289, subds. (d), (e)).
       Before the preliminary hearing on the new case, Hsu
moved to quash Warrant Five and suppress evidence obtained
from his phone. He argued the warrant was not supported
by probable cause, the scope of items to be searched exceeded
the probable cause statement, and the warrant failed to comply
with CalECPA’s particularity and notice requirements. Hsu also
moved to traverse the warrant, arguing it contained misleading
statements and omissions concerning MDMA and the prior
warrants.
       The same magistrate who quashed Warrant Two heard
Hsu’s motions concerning Warrant Five. The magistrate
considered the motions at the preliminary hearing, which
it conducted over the course of several days.

                                8
         Although Hsu did not raise the issue, the magistrate asked
the parties to submit briefs addressing whether Warrant Five
relies on suppressed evidence. The magistrate expressed concern
that the affidavit potentially refers to photographs the People
had obtained from Hsu’s computer, which the magistrate had
suppressed.
         After receiving the supplemental briefs, the magistrate
denied Hsu’s motions and held him to answer the charges. The
magistrate noted the affidavit supporting Warrant Five was
“much more detailed” than the affidavit supporting Warrant Two.
It concluded the “details [of] the citizen[ ] informants’
observations of Mr. Hsu’s pouring MDMA into the victim’s drink
. . . . coupled with the victim’s recitation of her past experiences
with Mr. Hsu and the expert’s and the affiant’s description of
the manner in which sexual assaults may be accomplished
through the secret drugging of victims with substances like
MDMA sufficiently establish that Mr. Hsu[ ] falls within the
class of offenders who surreptitiously drug victims in order [to]
incapacitate the victims to sexually assault them.”
6.       Hsu’s section 995 motion
         In September 2019, Hsu moved to set aside the information
under section 995. He argued the government unlawfully
obtained evidence from his phone, without which the People
lacked sufficient evidence to hold him to answer the charges.
         Hsu’s section 995 motion repeated many of the arguments
he raised in connection with his motions at the preliminary
hearing, including that the affidavit relies on suppressed
evidence. Hsu alternatively argued the government was not
in lawful possession of his phone when it conducted the search.
According to Hsu, section 1538.5 required the government to

                                 9
return his phone within 10 days of the order granting his motion
to quash Warrant Two. Hsu also argued the government’s
prolonged retention of his phone with “no ‘persuasive
justification’ ” violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
       At a hearing on the motion, the court allowed the People
to present testimony from Detective Sierra and Detective
Monique Carrillo concerning whether Warrant Five relies on
suppressed evidence. After hearing the testimony, Hsu seemed
to concede the issue, noting it had “become clear” the relevant
photographs did not come from his computer.
       The court denied Hsu’s motion in substantial part.
It found the government lawfully possessed the phone, the
delay in obtaining Warrant Five was reasonable, the warrant
complies with CalECPA’s requirements, the affidavit establishes
probable cause for the search, and the affidavit does not rely on
suppressed evidence.
7.     Plea and sentencing
       After the court denied the section 995 motion, Hsu and
the People reached a deal under which Hsu pleaded guilty to a
single count of sexual penetration while the victim was prevented
from resisting by an intoxicating or controlled substance (§ 289,
subd. (e)). The court suspended imposition of sentence and
placed Hsu on probation for eight years. The court dismissed
the remaining counts on the People’s motion in the interests
of justice. Hsu timely appealed.
                            DISCUSSION
1.     Standard of review
       The parties disagree about the standard of review on
appeal, which stems from their disagreement about the nature
of the motion Hsu filed to challenge the magistrate’s denial of

                               10
his motion to suppress. Hsu insists he challenged the decision
by filing a motion to set aside the information under section 995
(995 motion). The Attorney General contends that, although
labeled a 995 motion, Hsu’s motion in substance was a renewed
motion to suppress under section 1538.5, subdivision (i). The
proper standard of review on appeal depends on our resolution
of this dispute.
       When a magistrate denies a motion to suppress at
the preliminary hearing, the defendant has several avenues
to challenge the decision. If the defendant is held to answer,
one option is to file a 995 motion in the “superior court to set
aside the information for lack of probable cause on the ground
that the evidence is the product of an illegal search.” (People v.
Gephart (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 989, 995–996 (Gephart).) “In a
proceeding under section 995, the superior court’s role is similar
to that of an appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain a judgment. [Citations.] The superior court
merely reviews the evidence; it does not substitute its judgment
on the weight of the evidence nor does it resolve factual conflicts.”
(People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529
(McDonald).)
       The defendant also may challenge the magistrate’s decision
by filing a renewed motion to suppress at a special hearing
in the superior court. (Gephart, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d at p. 996;
§ 1538.5, subd. (i).) Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties,
“evidence presented at the special hearing shall be limited to
the transcript of the preliminary hearing and to evidence that
could not reasonably have been presented at the preliminary
hearing, except that the people may recall witnesses who testified
at the preliminary hearing.” (§ 1538.5, subd. (i).) The superior

                                 11
court is bound by the magistrate’s findings “as to evidence
or property not affected by evidence presented at the special
hearing.” (Ibid.) As to all other issues, the superior court
“sits as a finder of fact with the power to judge credibility,
resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw inferences.”
(People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718 (Laiwa).)
        The standard of review on appeal depends on whether
Hsu filed a 995 motion or a renewed motion to suppress under
section 1538.5, subdivision (i). “On appeal from a section 995
review of the denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress, we
review the determination of the magistrate at the preliminary
hearing. [Citations.] We must draw all presumptions in favor
of the magistrate’s factual determinations, and we must uphold
the magistrate’s express or implied findings if they are supported
by substantial evidence.” (McDonald, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th
at p. 529.) Although we defer to the magistrate on factual issues,
we independently determine whether the search was reasonable.
(Price v. Superior Court (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 13, 34.)
        In contrast, on appeal following the denial of a renewed
motion to suppress, we review the superior court’s decision at
the special hearing. (People v. Superior Court (Cooper) (2003)
114 Cal.App.4th 713, 717.) In that case, “all presumptions are
drawn in favor of the factual determinations of the superior
court and the appellate court must uphold the superior court’s
express or implied findings if they are supported by substantial
evidence.” (Laiwa, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 718.)
        Here, the record shows Hsu intended to file, and did in fact
file, a motion to set aside the information under section 995. In
addition to the fact that Hsu’s motion explicitly states it is a 995
motion, Hsu did not seek to present new evidence in the superior

                                 12
court, which is the defining characteristic of a renewed motion
to suppress. Although the superior court permitted the People
to present new evidence at the hearing, that does not transform
the nature of Hsu’s motion. Because we conclude Hsu’s appeal
challenges the magistrate’s denial of his motion to suppress,
we will review the magistrate’s decision directly. (McDonald,
supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.)
2.     Warrant Five satisfies CalECPA’s particularity
       requirements
       Effective January 1, 2016, CalECPA specifies the
conditions under which the government may access electronic
information from a service provider or the owner of an electronic
device, such as an iPhone. (See § 1546 et. seq.; Sen. Bill No. 178
(2015–2016 Reg. Sess.) § 1.) Among many other provisions, it
mandates that any warrant for electronic information “describe
with particularity the information to be seized by specifying, as
appropriate and reasonable, the time periods covered, the target
individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered,
and the types of information sought.” (§ 1546.1, subd. (d)(1).)
       Warrant Five authorized the government to seize the
following information from Hsu’s phone for the “time frame
of June 2015 through May 26, 2016”: (1) “All communications
content and records, . . . email, text (SMS/MMS or app chats),
notes, calendar or voicemail;” (2) “All location data;” (3) “All
photographic/video/audio data;” (4) “All internet history;” (5)
“All financial information;” (6) “All Social Media applications;”
and (7) “All indicia of ownership and control for both the data
and the device.”

                                13
       Hsu argues this description of items to be seized
fails to satisfy any of CalECPA’s particularity requirements.
We consider his arguments in turn.
       a.     Time periods covered
       Hsu first argues Warrant Five fails to specify with
particularity the “time periods covered.” (§ 1546.1, subd. (d)(1).)
He suggests the warrant provides “really no limitation at all”
with respect to time. Alternatively, he argues the warrant lacks
particularity because it is not limited to the time period “around
the purported crime,” and instead permits seizure of information
dating back to the start of his relationship with L.U. in June
2015.
       Hsu’s suggestion that Warrant Five does not provide a
time limitation “at all” is meritless; the warrant expressly limits
the time period covered to “June 2015 through May 26, 2016.”
As to Hsu’s other contention—that the time period is too long—
his argument goes to the breadth of the limitation, rather than
its particularity. (See People v. Meza (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
520, 535–536 [breadth and particularity are distinct concepts].)
Breadth concerns the scope of the warrant, while particularity
concerns whether the warrant clearly states what is sought.
(Ibid.; see Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) [“particularity” is
the “quality, state, or condition of being both reasonably detailed
and exact”].) Warrant Five’s time period limitation is reasonably
detailed and exact, such that the limitation would have been
obvious to any officer executing the warrant. (See Meza, at
p. 535 [a warrant is stated with particularity if an officer using
reasonable effort can ascertain what is intended to be searched].)
Accordingly, we reject Hsu’s contention that Warrant Five fails
to specify with particularity the time periods covered.

                                14
      b.     Target individuals and accounts
      Hsu argues Warrant Five fails to specify with particularity
the “target individuals [and] accounts” because it does not
expressly identify either. The magistrate rejected this argument,
reasoning that because the warrant concerns only Hsu’s phone,
there is an “obvious and reasonable understanding that [Hsu] is
the individual targeted and that the accounts are his accounts.”
We agree with the magistrate’s reasoning and reject Hsu’s
argument for the same reason.
      Hsu contends this reasoning is flawed because there is
no exception to the particularity requirement when the owner
of an electronic device is also the account holder. True, section
1546.1 does not explicitly contain such an exception. However,
the statute states the warrant must specify the information with
particularity only “as appropriate and reasonable.” (§ 1546.1,
subd. (d)(1).) Hsu points to nothing in the record that would
have led a reasonable person to suspect his personal cellphone
contained anyone else’s information or accounts. Nor does
he contend his phone actually contained either. Under these
circumstances, it was reasonable for the government not to
specify the targeted individuals and accounts, as both were
already obvious and implied by the very nature of the search.
      c.     Applications or services covered
      Hsu argues Warrant Five fails to specify with particularity
the “applications or services” covered. He insists CalECPA
requires the government to list each individual mobile
application (app) it intends to search, such as “WhatsApp,
Snapchat, Instagram, Facebook Messenger, etc.” According
to Hsu, it was not enough for the government to identify the

                               15
categories of apps subject to seizure, such as “[a]ll Social Media
applications.”
       The magistrate rejected this argument on the basis that
it would have been impossible for the government to list each
specific app it intended to search. We agree with the magistrate.
According to Apple, there are “nearly two million” iPhone apps
available in its app store. (Apple, App Store <https://www.
apple.com/app-store/> [as of Dec. 20, 2023], archived at <https://
perma.cc/T9Z7-QW5F>.) The government had no way to know
which of those apps Hsu had installed on his phone without first
looking through it. However, the government could not look
through the phone without a search warrant. Therefore, in order
to list the specific apps subject to seizure in Warrant Five, the
government first would have had to obtain a separate search
warrant limited to examining the names of the apps installed
on Hsu’s phone. This would have resulted in an enormous
waste of resources, and there is nothing in the text or history
of CalECPA to suggest it is what the Legislature intended.
       Hsu insists the Legislature “made a plain and specific
requirement” to list every application and service covered
by the warrant, and to allow an exception for impossibility
“ ‘ignore[s] [the statutory] language.’ ” (Italics omitted.)
However, it is Hsu who ignores the statutory language. Section
1546.1 explicitly states the government is required to specify
applications and services only “as appropriate and reasonable.”
(§ 1546.1, subd. (d)(1).) It is not reasonable to require the
government to undertake a seemingly impossible task. Hsu
does not acknowledge the “appropriate and reasonable” language,
let alone explain how it is consistent with his interpretation.

                               16
       For the first time in his reply brief, Hsu contends the
government could have satisfied the particularity requirement
by listing a handful of specific apps—he lists four—followed
by a catchall provision permitting the search of “any app not
accounted for on that list.” We see no meaningful distinction
between Hsu’s suggestion and the approach the government
took in Warrant Five, which was to identify “All Social Media
applications.”
       d.     Types of information sought
       Hsu argues Warrant Five fails to specify with particularity
the “types of information” sought. As we understand his
argument, he contends it was not enough for the government to
identify “photograph” and “video” files as the target of the search.
Instead, according to Hsu, the government was required to
list the specific file formats associated with those types of
information, such as “.jpg, .png, and .mov.” Hsu argues this
level of specificity was necessary to limit the locations and
types of documents the government could search. Without such
specificity, he asserts, the government could search “every single
piece of data on all locations of the phone.”
       As with Hsu’s contention that the government was required
to identify the specific applications it sought to search, it would
seem to be an impossible task to list every possible file format
associated with each type of information sought. Hsu points
to nothing in CalECPA’s text or legislative history to indicate
the Legislature intended to require such an onerous level of
specificity. Nor has Hsu shown that requiring a list of specific
file formats would have constrained the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant in a meaningful way. As best we can tell,
Hsu seems to believe specific file formats are limited to specific

                                17
locations on a device. However, Hsu did not present expert
testimony on the issue, and we are not aware of any such general
limitations.
       We also reject Hsu’s alternative suggestion that Warrant
Five violated section 1546.1, subdivision (d)(1) by prefacing each
category of information with the word “all.” Hsu’s argument is
essentially a challenge to the breadth of the warrant. However,
section 1546.1, subdivision (d)(1) is concerned only with
particularity. Hsu limited his argument to that specific statutory
provision, and we decline to make additional arguments for him.3
3.     The government did not violate CalECPA’s notice
       requirements
       Hsu contends the government failed to comply with
CalECPA’s notice requirements.
       a.    Background
       CalECPA generally requires the government to provide
a targeted individual notice of the warrant “contemporaneously
with the execution of a warrant.” (§ 1546.2, subd. (a)(1).)
However, the government may request an order delaying
notification for a reasonable period, not to exceed 90 days.
(Id., subd. (b)(1).) “The court shall issue the order if the court

3      In his reply brief, Hsu argues any purported limitations
were nullified by a boilerplate statement found in the
government’s request for an extension of the time to conduct
the search. The statement notes a “suspect may try to conceal
criminal evidence; he might store it in random order with
deceptive file names. This may require searching authorities
to examine all the stored data to determine which particular files
[are] evidence or instrumentalities of crime.” We do not interpret
this general statement to nullify the more specific limitations
found elsewhere in the warrant.

                                18
determines that there is reason to believe that notification may
have an adverse result.” (Ibid.) CalECPA defines “adverse
result” as (1) danger to the life or physical safety of an individual;
(2) flight from prosecution; (3) destruction of or tampering with
evidence; (4) intimidation of potential witnesses; and (5) serious
jeopardy to an investigation or undue delay of a trial. (§ 1546,
subd. (a).)
        In the affidavit attached to Warrant Five, the government
requested an order delaying notice for 90 days. The government
asserted the delay was necessary because “providing prior notice
. . . may result in flight from prosecution; lead to destruction of
or tampering with evidence; or otherwise seriously jeopardize
an investigation or unduly delay a trial. Hsu is currently out
of custody. Hsu has potential access to electronic communication
devices, such as computers and cell phones, which could allow
him to remotely locate his device listed above, disable it with
a lock (also known as a ‘kill switch’), and wipe any potential
evidence stored on his cellular device. Hsu could potentially have
other means or relations with an individual(s) who is technically
well versed in electronic communication devices, such as iPhones
like Hsu’s listed above, who can assist him in wiping his iPhone.”
        The court granted the request and issued the warrant
on October 19, 2017. The government provided notice to Hsu
68 days later, on December 26, 2017.
        b.    Hsu misrepresents the magistrate’s decision
        Hsu argues the magistrate refused to consider whether
the government provided good cause for delayed notification.
According to Hsu, the magistrate instead erroneously believed
its role was limited to determining whether the government had
requested delayed notification.

                                 19
        Hsu’s contention is premised on a gross misrepresentation
of the record. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the
magistrate noted it appeared the government had followed
the statute by requesting and obtaining an order for delayed
notification. The magistrate then asked Hsu if it had “miss[ed]
something” from his argument. Hsu clarified his argument was
that the “reasons for which [the government] requested [delayed
notification] failed,” noting if the government “had [the phone]
for over two years, how are they still concerned with destruction
of it, and can’t give us proper notice?” The magistrate responded:
“[I]t’s reasonable because you can still potentially delete the
evidence, and that is what their concern was. It didn’t seem
unreasonable.”
        It is readily apparent from this exchange that the
magistrate considered, and rejected, the substance of Hsu’s
argument. Hsu’s contention that the magistrate refused to do
so is wholly without merit.
        In another gross misrepresentation of the record, Hsu
asserts the magistrate erroneously held the government was not
required to comply with CalECPA’s notice requirement because
Hsu was aware it had seized his phone. While discussing the
notice issue, the magistrate did briefly note Hsu was on notice
that the government was in possession of his phone. However,
the magistrate prefaced that statement by noting it was “a
practical matter” and “less of a legal basis.” The magistrate
then discussed, in significantly more detail, the government’s
compliance with the statutory notice requirements. Given
this context, no one could seriously claim the magistrate held
Hsu’s knowledge of the seizure was alone sufficient to satisfy
CalECPA’s notice requirement.

                                20
      c.     The government provided a sufficient basis for
             delayed notification
       Hsu contends the government’s assertion he might flee if
given contemporaneous notice of Warrant Five was “ridiculous on
its face.” He points to the fact that the government had executed
prior warrants to search his property, yet he consistently
appeared in court.
       True, Hsu did not flee in response to prior warrants.
However, when the government applied for Warrant Five, Hsu
had received notice of only a single warrant to search his phone,
which the government obtained in June 2016. According to
Warrant Five, as of June 2016, law enforcement did not have
the ability to bypass the security features of Hsu’s model of
iPhone. However, upon reading Warrant Five, Hsu would have
learned that law enforcement had since discovered a way to
bypass the security on his phone. That knowledge may have
given him a new incentive to flee, especially if his phone
contained particularly incriminating evidence.
       Even if the risk of flight were insignificant, the government
provided an additional reason for delayed notice: the risk that
Hsu, or someone working on his behalf, could remotely lock or
wipe his device.
       Citing Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373 (Riley), Hsu
contends the United States Supreme Court has already rejected
the government’s line of reasoning. In Riley, the high court
held the Fourth Amendment generally requires police officers
to obtain a warrant to search an arrestee’s cell phone. (Id. at
pp. 378, 381–386.) In doing so, the court rejected the State of
California’s argument that warrantless searches are necessary
because of the risk a third party will remotely wipe the data

                                21
on the device. (Id. at pp. 388–389.) The court explained it had
been given little reason to believe the problem was prevalent, it
was not apparent a warrantless search would make a difference
given the search is usually conducted hours after the arrest, and
the government has other “specific means to address the threat,”
such as disconnecting the device from a network and placing it
in a special bag designed to isolate it from radio waves. (Id. at
pp. 389–391.)
       Riley is readily distinguishable. That case involved the
risk that a third party would remotely wipe a device shortly after
the owner was taken into custody. Here, in contrast, Hsu was
out of custody, knew the government wanted to search his phone,
and had several months to formulate a plan to wipe the device
if the government turned it on. Under these circumstances, the
risk of data destruction was significantly greater than in Riley.
       Hsu’s reliance on Riley is misplaced for another reason.
The issue in Riley was whether the state’s conduct violated the
arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights. To answer that question,
the court balanced “ ‘the degree to which [a warrantless search
of a phone] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy’ ” against
“ ‘the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.’ ” (Riley, supra, 573 U.S. at pp. 385–
386.) Here, the government’s delayed notice does not implicate
the Fourth Amendment, meaning we do not balance the
competing interests. Instead, we merely ask whether “there
is reason to believe that notification may” lead to the destruction
of evidence. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude the
government met this low standard.

                                22
       d.     The notice explained the reason for the delay
       For the first time in his reply brief, Hsu argues the
government failed to include in the notice a statement of
the reasons for the delay, as required under section 1546.2,
subdivision (a)(1).
       At the outset, Hsu forfeited this argument by failing
to raise it in his opening brief. (See People v. Rangel (2016)
62 Cal.4th 1192, 1218 [a defendant forfeited claims raised
for the first time in a reply brief].) Regardless, the argument
lacks merit.
       Hsu relies on language in section 1546.2, subdivision (a)(1)
stating the government must provide the target “a copy of the
warrant or a written statement setting forth facts giving rise
to the emergency.” Hsu seems to believe the phrase “facts
giving rise to the emergency” refers to the government’s reasons
justifying delayed notification. He is wrong. Even a cursory
review of the statute makes clear the “emergency” language
refers to situations where the government, without a warrant,
“obtains electronic information in an emergency pursuant to
Section 1546.1.” (Ibid.)
       Nevertheless, Hsu is correct that the government
was required to provide notice of the reasons for the delay.
Under section 1546.2, subdivision (b)(3), the government must
provide the target of a warrant “a statement of the grounds
for the court’s determination to grant a delay in notifying the
individual.” Here, the government included in an attachment
to the warrant a paragraph stating the reasons the court granted
its request to delay notice. Hsu seems to concede the government
served the warrant and the attachment on him. Accordingly,
he has not shown the government erred in this respect.

                                23
4.     There was probable cause to search Hsu’s phone
       The government must support an application for a search
warrant with an affidavit that establishes probable cause to issue
the warrant. (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 161.)
To determine whether the government has met its burden, “ ‘[t]he
task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit before him [or her], including the
“veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ ” (Ibid.)
       On review, the “magistrate’s determination of probable
cause is entitled to deferential review.” (People v. Kraft (2000)
23 Cal.4th 978, 1041.) “The question facing a reviewing court
asked to determine whether probable cause supported the
issuance of the warrant is whether the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding a fair probability existed
that a search would uncover wrongdoing.” (Id. at p. 1040.)
       a.     The affidavit does not rely on unsupported
              conclusions
       Hsu contends the government failed to establish probable
cause to search his phone because the affidavit relies on
conclusory statements, rather than statements of fact. Hsu
identifies three specific statements that he argues lack the
requisite factual support yet are crucial to demonstrating
probable cause. We consider each statement in turn.
              i.    MDMA is a date rape drug
       First, Hsu contends the affidavit lacks factual support for
the statement that MDMA “can . . . be used and [is] known as
one of the ‘date rape drugs.’ ” Although Hsu does not distinguish

                                 24
between them, the statement includes two distinct assertions:
(1) MDMA can be used as a “date rape drug;” and (2) MDMA
is known as a “date rape drug.” Contrary to Hsu’s contentions,
the affidavit contains ample factual support for both assertions.
       The affidavit does not expressly define “date rape drug.”
Nevertheless, its meaning can be inferred from the affidavit’s
detailed description of sexual predators who “assault their
victims while they are incoherent.” According to the affidavit,
this type of perpetrator commits sexual assault typically by
“supplying drugs secretly to a drink or through other means
of intoxication. These drugs render the victim incoherent and
allow[ ] the suspect to forcibly assault their victims with little to
no resistance.” From this, it is reasonable to infer the affidavit
uses the term “date rape drug” to mean a drug that could be used
to facilitate a sexual assault by rendering a victim incoherent.
       Based on the affidavit’s description of MDMA and its
effects, it is reasonable to infer a perpetrator could use the drug
to render a victim incoherent and facilitate a sexual assault.
The affidavit states MDMA “falls into the drug category of
[h]allucinogens,” which is a group of drugs with “indicators” that
include memory loss, nausea, disorientation, and poor perception
of time and distance. As to MDMA, specifically, the affidavit
asserts the drug causes the “enhancement of the senses,”
including “increased . . . responses to touch, smell and vision,”
and it affects “the mind of the user in a fashion that can render
them incoherent.” The affidavit also states L.U. experienced
symptoms consistent with MDMA use, including euphoria,
nausea, a desire to be touched, and memory loss. Based on this
profile of MDMA—and particularly the fact it may cause memory
loss, the desire to be touched, disorientation, and impaired

                                 25
perception—it is reasonable to conclude the drug could be used
to facilitate a sexual assault by rendering a victim incoherent,
i.e., could be used as a “date rape drug.”
        As to the second assertion in the challenged statement—
that MDMA is “known” as one of the “date rape drugs”—it is
reasonable to infer the claim is based on the affiant’s training
and experience. According to the affidavit, the affiant worked
as a police officer for seven years, during which time she
investigated drug-related crimes and sexual assaults, received
training on narcotics, and attended a seminar and conference
focused on sexual assault issues. The affiant’s extensive history
with narcotics and sexual assault provided a sufficient basis
for her to make the assertion that MDMA is “known” as one
of the “date rape drugs.”
              ii.    Risk of death or health risks
        Hsu argues the affidavit lacks any factual support
for the assertion there is a “risk of death or health risks with
[MDMA] use.” We disagree. As discussed above, the affidavit
describes several serious effects of MDMA and the category of
drugs to which it belongs. It is not unreasonable to conclude
some of those effects—such as disorientation, altered perception,
and memory loss—might cause health risks or potentially death.
        Even if the factual support for the statement were
insufficient, Hsu has not shown Warrant Five lacked probable
cause without it. As the magistrate explained in quashing
Warrant Two, the key to establishing probable cause was
establishing a link between MDMA and sexual assault. Whether
there are health risks associated with MDMA use is not relevant
to that issue, something Hsu seems to acknowledge on appeal.
The affidavit’s general statement concerning the health risks

                               26
of MDMA use, therefore, was irrelevant to the magistrate’s
probable cause determination. Accordingly, there is no risk
the inclusion of the challenged statement was the basis for
the magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant.
              iii.  Perpetrators’ preference not to be without
                    photographic evidence
       Hsu challenges the affidavit’s assertion that “[p]erpetrators
of sexual assault prefer not to be without their photographic
evidence [of the assaults] for any prolonged time period.”
According to Hsu, the affidavit improperly attributes this
conclusion to the observations of “officers involved in the
investigation of sexual assault throughout the world.” Hsu
insists this is equivalent to claiming “ ‘everybody says so’ ”
as justification for a significant assertion.
       Assuming for the sake of argument Hsu is correct, he
has not shown the warrant lacked probable cause without the
challenged statement. In the same paragraph of the affidavit,
the affiant states that, based on her “training and experience,”
those who have an interest in sexual activity of inebriated
persons will “maintain images depicting their victims secreted,
but readily at hand.” This conveys essentially the same
information as the challenged statement. However, Hsu does
not argue the affiant’s statement is conclusory, lacks factual
support, or is otherwise improper. Accordingly, even without
the challenged statement, the magistrate would have been
presented with essentially the same information. Suppression
is not required under these circumstances.
       b.     The affidavit links Hsu to the offender profile
       Hsu argues the affidavit lacks probable cause because it
fails to link him to the profile of a typical sexual assault offender.

                                 27
According to Hsu, the affidavit describes a profile of “a person
who drugs a victim to unconsciousness because of a sexual
interest in incoherent victims.” He asserts it is not reasonable
to infer he is a member of that class because the affidavit
“provides no facts that the complaining witness was ever
rendered unconscious or incoherent on MDMA, or sexually
assaulted while in an unconscious state.”
       Hsu’s argument is based on a faulty premise: that the
affidavit describes a typical offender as someone who “drugs
a victim to unconsciousness.” As best we can tell, Hsu arrives
at this conclusion by conflating the words “incoherent” and
“unconscious.” For example, where the affidavit states the
“drugs render the victim incoherent and allow[ ] the suspect to
forcibly assault their victims with little to no resistance” (italics
added), Hsu interprets it to mean the “drugs render the victim
[unconscious] and allow[ ] the suspect to forcibly assault their
victims with little to no resistance.” As the trial court explained
in rejecting a similar argument, “incoherent” and “unconscious”
are not synonyms. Nor do we think any reasonable person would
interpret the affidavit in the way Hsu suggests.
       In his reply brief, Hsu briefly acknowledges that incoherent
and unconscious might have different meanings, depending on
context. Citing dictionary.com, he states it is “[c]ertainly” true
that “ ‘incoherent’ ” can modify the word “ ‘speech,’ ” in which case
it would convey that the person’s “speech was incomprehensible.”
Hsu then asks this court to consider whether, in drafting
the affidavit, the affiant believed “that typical offenders were
exploiting women by taking pictures of victims who were
unconscious or by taking pictures of persons who were speaking
in a modified manner?”

                                 28
       In making this argument, Hsu overlooks—or, perhaps,
purposefully omits—dictionary.com’s actual definitions for
“incoherent.” The online dictionary provides eight definitions
for the word, none of which resembles “unconscious.” One of
the top definitions is “characterized by . . . thought or language
[lacking logical or meaningful connection].” (Dictionary.com
<https://www.dictionary.com/browse/incoherent> [as of Dec. 20,
2023], archived at <https://perma.cc/G8HX-HABR>.) It is
reasonable to infer the affidavit uses the word in this manner
when it repeatedly describes the typical offender as a person
who sexually assaults incoherent victims.
       Hsu asserts the affiant’s true intention is revealed by two
sentences in the affidavit that contain the word “unconscious.”
First, the affidavit states Hsu’s phone may contain photographs
of L.U. and other victims “while they were unconscious or after
they had been drugged by Hsu, unbeknownst to them.” A few
paragraphs later, it states “[i]ndividuals who sexually assault
females, especially those that are rendered incoherent/
unconscious due to the intake of illegal narcotics . . . may receive
sexual gratification . . . viewing unconscious women engaged
in sexual activity . . . .”
       We do not agree with Hsu that these sentences make clear
the affiant mistakenly used the word “incoherent,” rather than
“unconscious,” throughout the affidavit. If anything, it seems
more reasonable to presume the affiant mistakenly used the
word “unconscious” when she meant to say “incoherent.”
       Hsu is also wrong to claim the affidavit lacks probable
cause because it provides no facts showing L.U. was incoherent
or sexually assaulted while under the influence of MDMA. Hsu
overlooks that the affidavit states facts indicating L.U. suffered

                                 29
memory loss after ingesting MDMA. If so, she may not recall
having been incoherent or sexually assaulted. Accordingly,
the affidavit’s lack of direct evidence that L.U. was incoherent
or sexually assaulted is not determinative.
5.      Hsu forfeited the unlawful possession issue; it also
        lacks merit
        Hsu argues the evidence seized from his phone must
be suppressed because the government did not have lawful
possession of the phone when it conducted the search. He
asserts that, after the court granted his motion to suppress
evidence seized under Warrant Two, the government was
required to return his phone within 10 days. Hsu relies on
section 1538.5, subdivision (e), which states, if a motion to
suppress “is granted at a preliminary hearing, the property
shall be returned upon order of the court after 10 days unless
the property is otherwise subject to lawful detention or unless,
within that time, further proceedings authorized by this section
. . . are utilized.”
        The Attorney General asserts Hsu forfeited this argument
by failing to raise it below. We agree. In his motion to suppress,
Hsu made a few passing remarks about the government’s refusal
to return his phone. However, he did not specifically argue the
government’s possession violated section 1538.5 or that it was
otherwise unlawful. Hsu did explicitly make that argument
in his section 995 motion. However, on appeal, we review
the magistrate’s order denying Hsu’s motion to suppress,
not the superior court’s order denying his section 995 motion.
(McDonald, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.) Therefore,
to preserve the issue, Hsu was required to raise the specific
argument in his motion to suppress. His failure to do so forfeits

                                30
the issue on appeal. (See People v. Lilienthal (1978) 22 Cal.3d
891, 896 [“it would be wholly inappropriate to reverse a superior
court’s judgment for error it did not commit and that was never
called to its attention”]); People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428,
435 (Partida) [“[a] party cannot argue the court erred in failing
to conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct”].)
       Hsu contends he preserved the issue by raising it orally at
the hearing on his motion to suppress. Tellingly, Hsu does not
support that assertion with a citation to the reporter’s transcript
from the hearing. Instead, he cites the transcript of the hearing
on his section 995 motion. In our independent review of the
relevant transcripts, we found no references to section 1538.5
or specific arguments that the government’s retention of the
phone was unlawful.
       Even if we were to overlook the forfeiture, we would reject
Hsu’s argument on the merits. Section 1538.5 does not require
the government to return property sua sponte. Instead, the
government must return the property only “upon order of
the court.” (§ 1538.5, subd. (e).) As Hsu seems to concede, after
the court granted his motion to suppress, it deferred ordering
the government to return his phone. As best we can tell, the
court never revisited the issue and Hsu never pressed it to do so.
Absent an “order of the court,” the government’s retention
of the phone did not violate section 1538.5, subdivision (e).
6.     Hsu forfeited the unreasonable delay issue; it also
       lacks merit
       Hsu argues the government unreasonably delayed
obtaining Warrant Five, which violated his Fourth Amendment
rights.

                                 31
       Once again, we agree with the Attorney General that Hsu
forfeited this issue by failing to raise it in his motion to suppress.
(Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 435.) In any event, the
argument lacks merit.
       To determine whether the government’s retention of
property without a warrant was unreasonable, we “balance
‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’ ”
(United States v. Sullivan (9th Cir. 2015) 797 F.3d 623, 633.)
“Seizures, which affect a person’s possessory interest in an item,
are less intrusive than searches, which implicate a person’s
privacy interests.” (People v. Tousant (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 804,
816 (Tousant).)
       Before considering the merits of Hsu’s argument, we
address another instance in which he entirely mischaracterizes
the record. Hsu contends that, instead of balancing the relevant
interests, the magistrate erroneously held CalECPA “specifically
allows the government to circumvent the Fourth Amendment and
retain and search electronic devices repeatedly and indefinitely.”
The magistrate did nothing of the sort. While discussing the
fact that the “phone has been retained for several years,” the
magistrate explained that, if the government “properly retain[s]
a phone,” CalECPA allows it to “go back and continue to get
a warrant until they do it right.” In other words, CalECPA
allows the government to seek successive warrants so long as it
“properly retain[s]” the property to be searched. The magistrate
did not hold, in any way, that CalECPA allowed the government
to circumvent the Fourth Amendment and retain Hsu’s phone
indefinitely.

                                 32
       Turning to the merits of Hsu’s argument, we conclude
the government’s retention of his phone was not unreasonable.
Although Hsu initially requested an order returning his phone,
the court deferred ruling on the issue. Hsu did not object, press
the court to issue a ruling, or seek a writ directing the court
to do so. Instead, he simply requested the court allow a special
master to search the device. By failing to object or press the
court for a ruling, Hsu effectively conceded the government
could continue to possess his phone. At the very least, it strongly
indicates his interest in regaining possession of the phone was
minimal. (See Tousant, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 816–817
[noting a defendant’s possessory interests are not adversely
affected where he does not seek return of the seized property].)
       In contrast, the government had a significant interest
in retaining the phone. The government had probable cause
to believe Hsu’s phone contained evidence of sexual assaults.
Given Hsu’s suspected modus operandi, the government also
had reason to believe his victims were not aware of the crimes.
However, the government was unable to bypass the phone’s
security in order to search it. If the government had returned
the phone to Hsu, he easily could have destroyed any evidence of
his criminal activity contained in it. Under these circumstances,
the government had a significant interest in retaining the phone.
Weighed against Hsu’s minimal interest, the government’s
retention was reasonable and not a violation of Hsu’s
constitutional rights.
7.     Hsu has not shown Warrant Five relies on suppressed
       evidence
       Hsu argues the affidavit relies on suppressed evidence
when it states L.U. “had memory loss and no recollection of Hsu

                                33
and her kissing in public at one of their concert outings. Hsu
had shown [L.U.] photographs and/or videos of them engaging
in such intimate behavior, which surprised [L.U.].”
      a.     Background
      Although Hsu did not raise it in his motions, at the
preliminary hearing, the magistrate asked the parties to address
whether Warrant Five relied on previously suppressed evidence
by referring to photographs of L.U. and Hsu kissing. The
magistrate expressed concern that the government may have
obtained the photographs from Hsu’s computer while executing
Warrant Two.
      The People filed a supplemental brief responding to
the magistrate’s concerns. According to the People, L.U. told
a detective she saw the photographs before Hsu’s arrest and
before the police searched his computer. Hsu did not respond
to the People’s brief.
      L.U. testified at the preliminary hearing a few days later.
According to L.U., the photographs in which she and Hsu were
kissing were a “little out of the norm” for her. In response
to Hsu’s questions on cross-examination, L.U. said a detective
showed her the photographs on a computer and claimed they
were recovered from Hsu’s phone. On redirect, the prosecutor
asked L.U. if she had ever seen the photographs before meeting
with the detective. L.U. responded: “I think I may have seen
some of the photos . . . . I don’t recall specific instances, but
[Hsu and I] have looked at photos . . . .”
      After L.U. testified, Hsu filed a supplemental brief
arguing Warrant Five relies on previously suppressed evidence.
According to Hsu, L.U.s testimony established the photographs

                               34
of her kissing Hsu “must have come” from a device the police
seized and searched under Warrant One and Warrant Two.
       The magistrate addressed the issue at a subsequent
hearing. It noted that Hsu was “able to elicit from the victim
that her current recollection is the only time she saw [the
photographs] was from the detective, but she too was—that
was qualified. Some time has passed.” The magistrate stated
the issue did not affect its decision to deny Hsu’s motions
one way or the other.
       b.    Analysis
       Hsu contends L.U.’s preliminary hearing testimony
establishes that Warrant Five relies on suppressed evidence.
He argues “the only photographs [the detective] could have shown
[L.U.] were those recovered pursuant to Warrants One and Two,
which had been quashed and all evidence suppressed.” The
only other explanation, Hsu contends, is that L.U. lied at
the preliminary hearing.
       Contrary to Hsu’s contention, those are not the only
possible explanations for L.U.’s preliminary hearing testimony.
For example, L.U. may have simply misremembered how she
came to see the photographs. Indeed, in connection with Hsu’s
section 995 motion, the prosecutor presented evidence that
L.U. saw the photographs sometime before Hsu’s arrest. The
prosecutor’s evidence was so overwhelming, in fact, that Hsu
later remarked it had “become clear” L.U. was not talking about
photographs taken from his computer. Considering this apparent
concession, we question why Hsu continues to contest the issue
on appeal.
       Even if we ignored the evidence presented at the section
995 hearing and Hsu’s apparent concession, we would still reject

                              35
his argument. Assuming L.U.’s preliminary hearing testimony
were accurate—in which case the detective showed her the
photographs—it does not follow that the photographs must have
come from Hsu’s computer. Indeed, it is possible the detective
obtained the photographs through some other lawful channel.
Given this possibility—for which Hsu does not account—we reject
his insistence that the “photographs could have only come from
the suppressed evidence.”
8.     The affidavit does not contain material
       misstatements and omissions
       “[A] defendant may challenge the veracity of statements
contained in an affidavit of probable cause made in support of
the issuance of a search warrant. When presented with such a
challenge, the lower courts must conduct an evidentiary hearing
if a defendant makes a substantial showing that: (1) the affidavit
contains statements that are deliberately false or were made in
reckless disregard of the truth and (2) the affidavit’s remaining
contents, after the false statements are excised, are insufficient
to justify a finding of probable cause. At the evidentiary hearing,
if the statements are proved by a preponderance of the evidence
to be false or reckless, they must be considered excised. If the
remaining contents of the affidavit are insufficient to establish
probable cause, the warrant must be voided and any evidence
seized pursuant to that warrant must be suppressed.” (People
v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1297 (Bradford).)
       “A defendant who challenges a search warrant based
upon an affidavit containing omissions bears the burden of
showing that the omissions were material to the determination
of probable cause. [Citation.] ‘Pursuant to section 28(d),
materiality is evaluated by the test of Illinois v. Gates (1983)

                                36
462 U.S. 213, which looks to the totality of the circumstances
in determining whether a warrant affidavit establishes good
cause for a search. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Bradford, supra,
15 Cal.4th at p. 1297.)
       Hsu argues Warrant Five contains four categories of
material misstatements and omissions. We consider each
category in turn.
       a.    MDMA’s effects
       Hsu challenges the affidavit’s assertion that “MDMA
is a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act
and there is a risk of death or health risks with use.” According
to Hsu, the statement is false because the federal government
does not classify drugs based on their health risks. Instead, the
government classifies a drug as “Schedule I” if it has no currently
accepted medical uses and poses a high potential for abuse.
       Contrary to Hsu’s insistence, the affidavit does not state
MDMA is a Schedule I drug because there is a risk of death or
health risks with use. Nor do we think a reasonable magistrate
would interpret the statement in the way Hsu suggests.
Accordingly, we reject his argument.
       Hsu next argues the affidavit misleadingly suggests MDMA
has the same indicators as other hallucinogens. He contends
the affidavit should have listed only those effects the People’s
drug expert, Jason Olson, identified at the first preliminary
hearing.4 Olson testified that MDMA may affect the user’s

4     Hsu insists the affidavit should have mirrored Olson’s
testimony because it purports to be a summary of it. Not so.
The affidavit states the affiant spoke with Olson regarding
MDMA and he “provided [the affiant] with an in depth
explanation of his opinions and suspicions regarding the overall

                                37
speech, coordination, memory, and body temperature, and it
may cause dehydration and goose bumps.
       Hsu points to no direct evidence that MDMA does not share
the same indicators as other hallucinogens. Instead, he simply
assumes Olson testified to an exhaustive list of MDMA’s effects.
The record, however, belies that assumption. At the second
preliminary hearing, the People presented testimony from a
different drug expert, Trinka Porrata, who identified several
effects of MDMA that Olson had not. Those effects include
panic attacks, exhaustion, elevated heart rate, “twisted” senses,
impaired ability to resist, and “terrible spasms.” Because these
effects generally resemble the indicators of hallucinogens listed
in the affidavit, we reject Hsu’s argument that the affidavit is
misleading in this respect.
       Hsu alternatively contends the affidavit improperly omits
Olson’s preliminary hearing testimony that MDMA “mirrors
a stimulant.” Hsu asserts that, because stimulants usually
increase wakefulness and movement, a stimulant “would not
be a drug that would render its user incoherent.”
       Hsu’s argument seems to be premised on his belief that
“incoherent” is synonymous with “unconscious.” For the reasons
we discussed in detail above, we disagree. Absent that faulty
presumption, there is no merit to Hsu’s argument.
       b.    MDMA is a date rape drug
       Hsu argues there is nothing in the literature, law, or
expert testimony to support the affidavit’s statement that MDMA

circumstances of this case.” From this, it is clear the affidavit
reflects information Olson conveyed to the affiant directly; it
does not simply summarize his preliminary hearing testimony.

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is a “date rape drug.” In support, he cites a U.S. Department
of Health & Human Services (HHS) webpage, which states
the three most common “date rape drugs” are Rohypnol
(flunitrazepam), gamma hydroxybutyric acid (GHB), and
ketamine. (Office on Women’s Health, U.S. Dept. Health
& Human Services, Date Rape Drugs (May 22, 2018) <http://web.
archive.org/web/20180728010337/https://www.womenshealth.gov/
a-z-topics/date-rape-drugs> [as of Dec. 21, 2023], archived at
<https://perma.cc/H5HU-WD6G> (HHS webpage).) Hsu
also asserts federal law defines “date rape drug” to mean
flunitrazepam, GHB, and ketamine. (See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(g)(2)(A).)
       Despite accusing the government of omitting relevant
information in order to paint a misleading picture, Hsu engages
in similar tactics himself. For example, Hsu does not mention
the HHS webpage defines “date rape drugs” as “drugs that are
sometimes used during sexual assault.” Nor does he mention
the webpage explicitly states MDMA “has been used to commit
sexual assault. It can be slipped into someone’s drink without
the person’s knowledge.” (HHS webpage.) In other words,
Hsu’s own source seems to support the affidavit’s assertion
that MDMA is a “date rape drug.”5

5     In a footnote, Hsu acknowledges the HHS webpage states
MDMA use can inhibit the ability to give reasoned consent and
place an individual at greater risk of sexual assault. However,
he suggests that fact is irrelevant because the webpage does not
specifically state MDMA is a “ ‘date rape’ drug which renders
the victim unconscious.” True, the webpage does not claim
MDMA can render a victim unconscious. However, neither does
the affidavit.

                               39
       Also misleading is Hsu’s suggestion that federal law
provides an exhaustive list of “date rape drugs.” It does not.
The statute states that, in addition to flunitrazepam, GHB, and
ketamine, the term “ ‘date rape drug’ ” includes “any substance
which the Attorney General designates . . . to be used in
committing rape or sexual assault.” (21 U.S.C. § 841(g)(2)(A).)
Although it does not appear the Attorney General has designated
MDMA to be a “date rape drug,” based on the information in
the record concerning its effects, it would not be unreasonable
to designate it a “substance . . . to be used in committing rape
or sexual assault.”
       Hsu also wholly ignores Porrata’s testimony on the issue.6
At the second preliminary hearing, Porrata defined “date rape
drugs” as drugs used “for the purpose of committing . . . drug-
facilitated sexual assault.” She testified it is a “myth” that there
are only three such drugs. Instead, according to Porrata, more
than 50 drugs have “been identified and used in this manner,”
including MDMA.
       Considering the ample evidentiary support for the
affidavit’s characterization of MDMA as a “date rape drug”—
including from one of Hsu’s own sources—we reject Hsu’s
argument that the affidavit misstated or omitted material
information on the issue.

6     We reject Hsu’s suggestion that, because the affiant
drafted the affidavit before the second preliminary hearing,
Porrata’s testimony is irrelevant. As Hsu acknowledges, the
question before us is whether the affidavit makes material
misrepresentations or omissions concerning MDMA’s status
as a “date rape drug.” Porrata’s testimony is directly relevant
to that issue.

                                 40
       c.     The quantity of MDMA in L.U.’s wine glass
       Hsu argues the affidavit improperly omits the fact that
L.U.’s wine glass contained roughly 16.95 milligrams of MDMA.
He argues this information is crucial because 16.95 milligrams
are not enough to render someone “unconscious or incoherent.”
In support, Hsu relies entirely on Olson’s testimony that
recreational MDMA users often recommend 120 milligrams
as a safe first-time dose of the drug.
       In making this argument, Hsu simply ignores the fact that
police discovered two additional vials of MDMA in his pocket.
From this, it is reasonable to infer Hsu intended to administer
more MDMA to L.U. If so, the fact that L.U.’s glass contained
a relatively small amount of MDMA is largely irrelevant.
       Even if we were to assume Hsu did not intend to
administer more MDMA to L.U., his argument still fails. In
relying on Olson’s testimony, Hsu assumes the dose required to
facilitate a sexual assault is the same as the dose required for
recreational use. That assumption is not well founded. Porrata
testified that a typical dose of MDMA is in the range of 50 to 150
milligrams, “but we see lower doses needed in sexual assault.”
In fact, Porrata explained that a high dose of MDMA could be
counter-productive for facilitating a sexual assault because
it may cause increased energy and activity. Considering this
testimony, the fact that L.U.’s glass contained less than a
recreational dose of MDMA would seem to support—rather
than refute—the government’s suspicion that Hsu’s goal was
sexual assault. Accordingly, we reject Hsu’s contention that
the government’s omission was material or intended to mislead
the magistrate.

                                41
       d.     Disclosure of the previously quashed warrants
       Hsu argues the government made material
misrepresentations and omissions concerning the fact that
a court previously quashed Warrant One and Warrant Two.
The trial court rejected this argument, explaining that, “while
it is disturbing that the affiant failed to disclose to the magistrate
that this Court granted a motion to quash a previous warrant,
even when factoring in this omitted information, probable cause
still existed for authorizing the search.”
       Hsu does not directly address the court’s reasoning.
Instead, he simply accuses the government of strategically
omitting the information to hide the fact that it made only
superficial additions to Warrant Five that failed to correct
the deficiencies with Warrant Two. According to Hsu, the
government “shopp[ed] for a judge (while failing to notify
those judges of what else was occurring) that would allow the
government to do what they had been unsuccessfully trying to do
for over two years—use the purported poisoning in a restaurant
in Santa Monica to search Mr. Hsu’s electronic devices.”
       To the extent Hsu is suggesting the government spent
two years “shopping for a judge” who would sign a search
warrant, his argument finds no support in the record. The delay
in completing the search was the result of the government’s
inability to bypass the phone’s security; it had nothing to do
with the government’s difficulty obtaining a warrant. The
government seized Hsu’s phone in May 2016 and completed
its search sometime around December 2017. During those
19 months, three different magistrates issued warrants
to search the phone.

                                 42
       Equally meritless is Hsu’s suggestion that the government
made only superficial additions to Warrant Five. The affidavit
supporting Warrant Five is eight pages longer than the affidavit
supporting Warrant Two. Those additional pages directly
address the deficiencies with Warrant Two by providing
significant new details concerning the effects of MDMA, the
characteristics of sexual assault perpetrators, and the reasons
to suspect Hsu used MDMA to facilitate a sexual assault. Indeed,
the same judge who quashed Warrant Two found Warrant Five
is “much more detailed” and “contains significant facts” that
address Warrant Two’s deficiencies. While we share the court’s
concern that the government did not disclose the quashed
warrants, we also agree it does not necessitate granting
Hsu’s motion to suppress.
                          DISPOSITION
       We affirm the order.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                   EGERTON, J.

We concur:

                 EDMON, P.J.                          LAVIN, J.

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