Court Opinion

ID: 9744095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:53:15.208536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.609666
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RYAN, specially concurring: The insurance policy involved in this case uses language that is somewhat different from that used in the policies involved in the cases relied on by the majority opinion. Those policies required that there be “physical contact” between the hit-and-run vehicle and the person injured or the vehicle in which he was riding. This seems to be the language used in the policies in most of the cases that have considered this question. (See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1299, 1306 (1969); Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 88-90 (1986 Supp.).) As noted in the majority opinion, the courts have generally found the requirement of physical contact satisfied when the hit-and-run driver strikes a third vehicle and it in turn strikes the plaintiff or the vehicle in which he is riding. I believe that the use of the language in the policy in the case before us requiring that the hit-and-run vehicle “must hit” an insured was tailored to avoid the construction placed by the courts on the usual “physical contact” language found in the uninsured-motorist provisions in most policies. If this were solely a matter of construing the language of the insurance contract, one could find that there was an intention by the use of this different language to avoid the construction courts have placed on the language “physical contact.” We are not here dealing, however, solely with the contract of insurance. That contract must be construed in accordance with the requirements of section 143(a) of the Insurance Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 73, par. 755(a)). That section requires that the motor vehicle liability insurance policy provide for coverage for injuries by uninsured motorists and hit-and-run motor vehicles. The physical-contact requirement of insurance policies has been held not to be inconsistent with the public policy expressed in the statute. “[B]oth seem to be entirely consistent and to be aimed at the avoidance of fraudulent claims.” (Ferega v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 109, 111.) The purpose of the physical-contact requirement of the insurance policy, and of the statute, is to avoid the claim that a ghost vehicle forced the claimant from the highway, or in some other manner caused the accident. I agree with the majority that the physical-contact requirement has been met in this case. However, I would further hold that any attempt to alter the language of the insurance policy so as to circumvent the holding of this case, and other cases which have construed such indirect contact as is involved here as satisfying the physical-contact requirement of the statute, to be violative of public policy. In other words, the indirect physical contact involved in this case satisfies the hit-and-run provisions of section 143(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 73, par. 755(a)), and the policy of insurance must provide coverage. Language in the policy cannot be altered in an attempt to circumvent the statutory requirement as thus construed. Unless this is made clear, the language of the policies will simply be altered in such a manner so as to require some future opinion to again, through construction, hold that it does not avoid the requirements of section 143(a).