Court Opinion

ID: 9789527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:37:50.787823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:22.950343
License: Public Domain

HANNAH, Judge.
Respectfully, I dissent.
None of the state’s pleadings and none of the pre-trial proceedings gave fair notice to appellants that they would still have partial access to the highway after the improvements were constructed or that the cost of obtaining that access would be pertinent. On the contrary, the state’s complaint and amended complaint indicated that there would be no access from the property to the truck bypass.
The appellants had the right to rely upon the pleadings and could not reasonably have been expected to be prepared at trial for the issue of the very substantial cost of constructing an access ramp. They were under no obligation to conduct pre-trial discovery on a matter which was not in dispute. A motion for continuance when the issue suddenly arose, with the jury already impanelled and the trial in progress, would hardly have been an adequate remedy. The appellants were the victims of “[ajccident or surprise which could not have been prevented by ordinary prudence”, for which a new trial should have been granted in accordance with Rule 59(a)(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Cf. Ries v. McComb, 25 Ariz.App. 554, 545 P.2d 65 (1976).
I am of the further opinion that the testimony of Simon Mastick at the 1966 condemnation trial involving another portion of the Mastick property was too remote, and, in view of the change in circumstances in the intervening years, was not relevant and was erroneously admitted by the trial court.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
NOTE: Judge JAMES D. HATHAWAY having requested that he be relieved from consideration of this matter, Judge J. RICHARD HANNAH was called to sit in his stead and participate in the determination of this decision.