Court Opinion

ID: 9571736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:34:48.690342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:53.607989
License: Public Domain

Shanahan, J.,
dissenting.
Not since “Lazarus, come forth” has there been such a summons for the dead to associate with the living, for this court raises from Nebraska’s dead statutes a procedure, killed by repeal in 1972, which is today used to defeat Clarence Fisher’s *934action for pension benefits. The deceased procedure concerning an appeal from a justice of the peace court which departed statutory life nearly 20 years ago is, nonetheless, resurrected by judicial invocation of the “Lazarus Rule” expressed by the majority: “In general, ‘where one statute refers to another and incorporates it, which incorporated statute is subsequently repealed, the statute repealed, having been incorporated as part of the one referring to it, remains in force so far as the adopting statute is concerned.’ ”
In Fisher’s case, there are two statutes which existed before and during 1972 and, according to the majority, dispose of Fisher’s appeal. First, there is Neb. Rev. Stat. § 16-727 (Reissue 1987), which authorizes a claimant’s appeal from a city council’s disallowance of a claim, an appeal that is commenced and perfected by the claimant’s serving a notice of appeal on the city clerk and executing the appropriate surety bond for the appeal. Correspondingly, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 16-728 (Reissue 1987) allows a taxpayer to appeal from allowance of a claim against a city. The second crucial statute, according to the majority, is Neb. Rev. Stat. § 16-729 (Reissue 1987), which states:
The [city] clerk, upon such appeal being taken, and being paid the proper fees therefor, including fees for filing the same in the district court, shall make out a transcript of the proceedings of the council, mayor, and other officers as relate to the presentation and allowance or disallowance of such claim, and shall file the same with the clerk of the district court within thirty days after the decision allowing or disallowing the claim and paying the proper commencement fees. Such appeal shall be entered on the docket of the court, tried, and determined as appeals from justice courts, and costs shall be awarded thereon in like manner. No appeal bond shall be required of the city by any court in the case of an appeal by the city, and judgment shall be stayed pending such appeal.
The majority applies the Lazarus Rule in view of 1972 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1032, legislation enacted almost.20 years ago for abolition of the justice of the peace courts in Nebraska. In 1972, L.B. 1032 was a massive overhaul of the judicial system of the *935State of Nebraska. Motivation for L.B. 1032 was a desire to completely eliminate the state’s justice of the peace courts in response to' a presidential report which had thoroughly discredited the justice of the peace courts as a part of the judicial system throughout the United States. After amendment of the Nebraska Constitution to eliminate the justice of the peace courts, the Legislature reorganized the judicial system in view of the abolished justice of the peace courts in Nebraska. Resulting legislation comprised 287 separate sections, which were printed on 121 single-spaced pages. During floor debate on L.B. 1032, some of the Legislature acknowledged that the bill was so voluminous and extensive that errors and omissions were inevitable.
In Leach v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 213 Neb. 103, 327 N.W.2d 615 (1982), this court, recognizing the basic unfairness of the Lazarus Rule, held that the rule applies only when a designated statute was, by reference to that specific and, therefore, identified statute, incorporated into another statute. Therefore, in Leach, the court held that statutory incorporation of other legislation which is part of a general scheme of statutory law on a subject fails to restrict the incorporating statute to the material incorporated by reference, or, as the Leach court stated: “We believe that when a statute adopts the general law on a particular subject rather than a specific statute, it adopts not only the existing law but later legislation on the subject.” 213 Neb. at 107, 327 N.W.2d at 618.
Section 16-729 (Reissue 1987), invoked by the majority as a basis for its decision, provided that appeals such as Fisher’s “shall be entered on the docket of the [district] court, tried, and determined as appeals from justice courts, and costs shall be awarded thereon in like manner.” Because § 16-729 made no specific reference to any particular statutory provision in the previous act pertaining to appeals from justice of the peace courts, § 16-729 incorporated only the general and composite law pertaining to the former justice of the peace courts and, therefore, adopted all later legislation abolishing justice of the peace courts and, consequently, eliminating the procedure for an appeal from those courts.
In fashioning, and utilizing the Lazarus Rule, this court has *936continually failed to explain why a generic statutory expression incorporated into another statute remains effectual in the incorporating and subsisting statute after repeal of the statute which was the source for the incorporation. Legal logic dictates that reference to a general subject in the incorporated statute also vanishes when the incorporated statute disappears by repeal. If general reference to appeals under the repealed justice of the peace act were deleted, as common sense requires, § 16-729 (Reissue 1987) would provide in relevant part: “Such appeal shall be entered on the docket of the [district] court, tried, and determined as appeals from justiee-eour-ts,- and costs shall be awarded[.] thereon-in-like manner.” (Deletion indicated by lined-out language.) Fortunately for the future, it is precisely that deletion which an awakened Nebraska Legislature achieved by L.B. 1, introduced and passed during the 1991 session, legislation effective as of September 6, 1991, for amendment of § 16-729 in pertinent part regarding an appeal from a city council’s action on a claim: “Such appeal shall be entered on the docket of the court, tried, and determined and costs awarded thereon in the manner provided in sections 25-1901 to 25-1937.” (Emphasis supplied.) § 16-729 (Supp. 1991).
Bearing in mind that Fisher’s appeal to the district court was perfected on March 2, 1988, and that the district court’s judgment awarding pension benefits to Fisher was entered on April 11, 1989, § 16-729 (Supp. 1991) had been effective for 3 months before this court heard the present appeal on December 6,1991. Therefore, when this court heard the appeal in Fisher’s case and, consequently, at the time of its decision in this appeal, § 16-729 no longer referred to the procedure applicable to an appeal from a decision in a justice of the peace court; rather, § 16-729, as amended in 1991, directs that appeals such as the Fisher case are governed by Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1901 to 25-1937 (Reissue 1989 & Supp. 1991), none of which authorize the Draconian action taken by this court to defeat Fisher’s claim and deprive him of pension benefits recognized in the district court’s judgment against the city. In Lindgren v. School Dist. of Bridgeport, 170 Neb. 279, 283, 102 N.W.2d 599, 604 (1960), which involved a question of timeliness for a bill of exceptions *937on appeal, this court stated: “ ‘A litigant has no vested right in the mode.of procedure, and an action commenced before an enactment changing the procedure in the court where the action is pending, after the enactment becomes effective, is properly triable under the changed method.’ ” (Quoting from Lovelace v. Boatsman, 113 Neb. 145, 202 N.W. 418 (1925).) See, also, Hancock v. State ex rel. Real Estate Comm., 213 Neb. 807, 331 N.W.2d 526 (1983) (standard of review, as a procedural matter, is governed by statutes in effect when the appeal is heard); Happy Hour, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 186 Neb. 533, 184 N.W.2d 630 (1971); Lovelace v. Boatsman, supra.
Section § 25-1937 (Supp. 1991), mentioned in the 1991 amendment to § 16-729, states:
When the Legislature enacts a law providing for an appeal without providing the procedure therefor, the procedure for appeal to the district court shall be the same as for appeals from the county court to the district court in civil actions. Trial in the district court shall be de novo upon the issues made up by the pleadings in district court. Appeals from the district court to the Court of Appeals shall be taken in the same manner provided by law for appeals from the district court in civil cases. This section shall not apply if the Administrative Procedure Act otherwise provides.
Use of § 25-1937, even before the 1991 amendment of § 16-729, accommodates the commonsense expectations of courts and lawyers who examined Nebraska’s legislation to ascertain a procedure for an appeal in situations such as Fisher’s, a procedure which allowed an orderly progression of appeals concerning a city council’s action on a claim against the city. It is apparently that rational process which Fisher’s lawyer actually pursued. In Fisher’s case, however, experience and ordinary expectations betrayed the practitioner.
As matters now stand, the Lazarus Rule, utilized by the majority, arguably amounts to a denial of due process required by the Constitutions of the United States and Nebraska because
due process requires the government to give notice to individuals of government actions which would deprive *938those individuals of a constitutionally protected life, liberty, or property interest. When individual interests are adversely affected by legislative action, there is no notice issue, because publication of a statute is normally considered to put all individuals on notice of a change in the law of a jurisdiction.
(Emphasis supplied.) J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, & J. Young, Constitutional Law § 13.8at489(3ded. 1986).
The situation in Fisher’s case is decidedly abnormal in view of reference to statutes which have been repealed for nearly 20 years and which exist only in dust-covered books in a dark, musty backroom of a law library, conducive to raising mushrooms, or which have been placed beneath an uneven table leg to stop wobbling.
However, since this court wishes to rely on the Lazarus Rule and act as a magisterial mortician, caring for a body of law long since demised, it is noteworthy that § 16-729 (Reissue 1987) is inapplicable to preclude Fisher’s action, since § 16-729 supplies directives to a city clerk and the district court which hears an appeal. Regarding appeals brought under § 16-727 (claimant’s appeal) or § 16-728 (taxpayer’s appeal), § 16-729 directs that a city clerk, within 30 days after a city council’s decision on a claim, must provide the district court with a transcript of the proceeding in question. Thereafter, the district court resolves the appeal. Also, § 16-729 exempts a city from an appeal bond. However, the all-important and pivotal point in Fisher’s case is that while § 16-729 governs conduct of a city clerk and the district court, § 16-729 imposes no obligation on an appellant,
Nevertheless, Fisher’s written claim, contained in the transcript filed with the district court, clearly expressed the nature of his claim for pension benefits and the relief sought. By supplying that information to the court, Fisher’s claim qualified as a petition. See In re Interest of L.D. et al., 224 Neb. 249, 258, 398 N.W.2d 91, 98 (1986): “A petition, as a pleading, is a plaintiff’s or claimant’s written statement of fact which invokes the jurisdiction of a court, sets out a cause of action, and seeks relief.” See, also, Paxton v. State, 59 Neb. 460, 81 N.W. 383 (1899). “ ‘Proper pleading requires a petition to state in logical and legal form the facts which constitute the *939plaintiff’s cause of action, define the issues to which the defendant must respond at trial, and inform the court of the real matter in dispute.’ ” League v. Vanice, 221 Neb. 34, 43, 374 N.W.2d 849, 855 (1985). Accord, Holden v. Urban, 224 Neb. 472, 398 N.W.2d 699 (1987); Rosnick v. Marks, 218 Neb. 499, 357 N.W.2d 186 (1984); Russell v. First York Sav. Co., 218 Neb. 112, 352 N.W.2d 871 (1984).
Moreover, even in an appeal from a justice of the peace court, absence of a petition on appeal, under the now defunct procedure for an appeal from a justice of the peace court, did not automatically authorize nonsuit or dismissal of an appellant’s action in the district court; rather, an appellant was permitted to show “good cause” for the absence of a petition filed on appeal. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-1307 (Reissue 1964) (repealed 1972). See, also, City of Seward v. Gruntorad, 158 Neb. 143, 62 N.W.2d 537 (1954) (pursuant to § 27-1307, a district court must determine whether good cause has been shown for the absence of a petition on appeal); In re Estate of Meyers, 152 Neb. 165, 40 N.W.2d 536 (1950). In any event, if the procedure for an appeal from a justice of the peace court were applicable, as espoused by the majority, Fisher is entitled to the opportunity for showing good cause regarding an absent petition, assuming that there is such an absence. Yet, the majority’s decision deprives Fisher of the opportunity to show good cause, a right granted under the very law used by the majority to deny Fisher’s pension benefits.
Because L.B. 1032 in 1972 repealed the statutory provisions for an appeal from the former justice of the peace courts and resulted in an absence of a procedure for an appeal from a city council’s disallowance of a claim, and, moreover, since the 1991 amendment of § 16-729 has removed reference to an extinct procedure relative to justice of the peace courts, the procedure set forth in § 25-1937 governed Fisher’s appeal. Under the circumstances, the City of Grand Island was not entitled to dismissal of Fisher’s action in the district court. For that reason, the district court’s judgment should have been affirmed.
Consequently, while. the Legislature has commendably removed the living dead from § 16-729, nevertheless, as far as the dead justice of the peace procedure is concerned, its ghost *940walks in this court’s decisions.
Grant, J., joins in this dissent.