Court Opinion

ID: 9678044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:09:31.11331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:01.570500
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
TEAGUE, Judge.
On original submission, this Court, with Judge McCormick dissenting and Judge Campbell concurring in the result, affirmed the judgments of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, which had reversed the convictions of Thomas Ray Breazeale and Wallace Neil Higgs, Jr., appellants, because each record of appeal did not reflect a formal written waiver of the right to a jury trial. This holding was made notwithstanding that the felony judgment in each cause affirmatively recites that a written waiver of the right to trial by jury was in fact executed.
This Court expressly held: “We hold that the presumption of regularity does not apply to waiver of jury trial in the light of the express dictates of Art. 1.13 (footnote omitted). In order to show a valid waiver the State must comply with Art. 1.13 and include in the record a waiver of jury trial signed by the defendant. All cases to the contrary are overruled insofar as they apply to trials conducted since the effective date of the adoption of Art. 1.13.”
We granted the State’s motion for rehearing in order to make the determination whether the above holdings are correct statements of the law. We find that they are not. We will, therefore, grant the State’s motion for rehearing. We will also remand Higgs’ cause to the court of appeals for it to consider Higgs’ grounds of error which have not yet been reviewed. Because the court of appeals has reviewed all of Breazeale’s other grounds of error, and rejected them, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court in that cause.
The formal judgment in Breazeale’s case reflects in part that Breazeale, “in person and in writing, in open court, having waived his right of trial by jury ...” The formal judgment in Higgs’ case is in all things identical. No issue was made in the trial courts over whether there had been a written waiver of the right to a jury trial. The State concedes that other than the recitations in the formal judgments, the records of appeals are silent on whether the appellants formally waived their right to a jury trial.
On direct appeal in Higgs’ cause, the State argued the following: “The State recognizes that, where there is an affirmative showing of no waiver, such a recitation in the judgment is insufficient. Ex parte Felton, 590 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Boyd v. State, 633 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.App.— Eastland 1982). However, unlike Felton, there is no affirmative showing that no waiver of jury trial was executed. Neither was there a bill of exception or objection to the record as required in 40.09(1), (7), Y.A. C.C.P. In absence of such an affirmative showing, the recitals create a presumption of regularity. Ex parte Reed, 610 S.W.2d 495 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); McCoy v. State, 529 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); *450Creeks v. State, 537 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Cr. App.1976). Further, the appellant neither claims he requested a jury trial nor that he was harmed in any way as a result of no jury.”
On direct appeal in Breazeale’s cause, the State made the following arguments: “Under the presumption of regularity of judgments, it must be presumed, in the absence of a contrary showing, that the recitation in the judgment and sentence, which were signed by the judge, is correct, and that the appellant, in writing, in open court, waived the right to a trial by jury. Creeks v. State, 537 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Robert v. State, 613 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Housewright v. State, 573 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). The presumption of regularity created by recitals in the judgment can be overcome only when the record otherwise affirmatively reflects that error occurred. Creeks v. State, supra; Ex parte Reed, 610 S.W.2d 495 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).”
We find the State’s arguments and authorities persuasive, and will grant its motion for rehearing.
We pause momentarily to point out that in Samudio v. State, 648 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), where the defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor offense, the formal judgment in that cause only contained the following recitation: “No jury having been demanded ...” This Court agreed with the decision of the court of appeals in that cause, see Samudio v. State, 635 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.App.1982), that this recitation was insufficient to establish that the defendant had waived his right to trial by jury. Samudio, however, emphatically distinguished between the absence in the record of a demand for a jury trial and an affirmative waiver thereof, and held that such could be challenged on direct appeal. Because of the difference in the wording of the judgments in the causes before us, and the judgment in Samudio, supra, Samudio is inapplicable to this cause.
The recitation in the judgments of these causes complies with the provisions of Art. 42.01, V.A.C.C.P., which defines the legal term “judgment,” and what should be placed in the formal judgment.
By both case law, see, for example, Hardin v. State, 471 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) (It is presumed on appeal that all the rulings of the trial court are correct); Johnson v. State, 478 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (It is presumed on appeal that if trial was to the court, the trial judge ignored improperly admitted evidence); Jackson v. State, 494 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (In an appeal involving the application of the law of another state, the Court of Criminal Appeals will presume that the foreign law is the same as Texas law), and statutory law, see Art. 44.24, V.A.C.C.P., there are many evidentiary legal presumptions utilized by this Court.
In addition to the above evidentiary presumptions, this Court will indulge every presumption in favor of the regularity of the documents in the trial court. McCloud v. State, 527 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975); Nichols v. State, 511 S.W.2d 945, 947-948 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). This means that the recitations in the records of the trial court, such as a formal judgment, are binding in the absence of direct proof of their falsity. In this instance, neither appellant has ever attacked or challenged the truthfulness of the recitation that is found in each of their formal judgments. They rely in support of their contention, that they did not formally waive a trial by jury, on the absence of any such document in their respective appellate record. This, of course, is insufficient to overcome the presumption that the recital in a formal judgment, that the defendant formally waived his right to trial by jury is true, and that such presumption attains until and unless the contrary is made to appear. Ex parte Brewer, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 369, 242 S.W.2d 430 (Tex.Cr .App.1951).
While it is true that a silent record cannot support a presumption that the defendant formally waived his right to trial by jury, it is equally certain that the formal judgment of the trial court carries with it a *451presumption of regularity and truthfulness, and such is never to be lightly set aside. Ex parte Morgan, 412 S.W.2d 657 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).
In this instance, neither appellant made any objection to the judgment that was entered and filed in his respective cause. Nor did either make an issue in his respective trial court over whether a formal written waiver of jury had been properly signed and filed. Nor did either request, through a designation of the record, the inclusion of the formal written waiver of the jury in the record of appeal, that each is presumed to have executed. Nor are we confronted with records of appeals which are both silent as to a formal written waiver of jury trial and the presumption that the formal judgment speaks the truth.
The burden of reciting in the formal judgment that a jury was waived by the accused is one established by statute, see Art. 42.01, supra, and if such recitation is present the burden is then on the accused to establish otherwise, if he claims that the contrary is true. In this instance, neither of the appellants overcame the presumption that his. respective formal judgment spoke the truth and was in all things regular.
The State’s motion for rehearing is sustained. Appellant Higgs’ cause is ordered remanded to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals for that court to review the grounds of error that have not yet been reviewed. The judgment of the court of appeals in Breazeale’s cause is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.