Court Opinion

ID: 9532855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:25:33.108927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:51.316942
License: Public Domain

RUDMAN, J.,
with whom WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, J., join, dissenting.
[¶ 17] I respectfully dissent. Persson has — by submitting an incomplete filing— failed to make his appeal within thirty days of the Department’s decision as required by 5 M.R.S.A. § 11002(3) (1989). “Statutory limitations on appeal periods are jurisdictional.” Davric Maine Corp. v. Bangor Historic Track, Inc., 2000 ME 102, ¶ 11, 751 A.2d 1024, 1030 (citation omitted). Consequently, the Superior Court had no choice other than to dismiss Perssoris appeal. The court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to review the Department’s determination after the appeal period had run. Id.
[¶ 18] The facts of this case are not in dispute. The Department mailed its decision to Persson on February 10, 2000, clearly noting in boldfaced, capitalized letters that Persson had thirty days after his receipt of the decision in which to file an appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C. Persson placed his appeal in the prison mail on March 1, 2000, and the court received his filings on March 6, 2000.
[¶ 19] To be effective, however, all appeals must meet the requirements prescribed by the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure and by any applicable administrative orders. Filings that do not meet the prescribed requirements are deemed incomplete and cannot be docketed. See M. Admin. Order SJC-114 at ¶ 6 (effective October 15, 1997).4 Pers-son failed to file a complaint summary sheet and the appropriate court fees.5 See id.; M.R. Civ. P. 54A. As a result, Perssoris filing was incomplete and could not be docketed. The required complaint summary sheet and motion to proceed in forma pauperis were not received until March 30, 2000, more than 30 days after Persson received the decision. Thus, even if we adopted the Houston rule (which we have not), it would not make a difference under the present facts. The March 1, 2000, filing was defective and did not serve to preserve Perssoris appeal.
[¶ 20] The fact that the clerk allowed nine days to pass before sending Persson notice that his filing was incomplete is also irrelevant. The Administrative Order provides only that an incomplete filing “shall be returned by the clerk.” M. Admin. Order SJC-114 at ¶ 6. Beyond this, the Order does not impose any affirmative duties upon the clerk with regard to an appellant. Persson chose to file by mail, and he presumably did so knowing that postal filings are more exacting on time, particularly if complications arise.
[¶ 21] The Court today departs from its prudential rule not to raise issues in civil cases sua sponte. Before us, Persson contends only that we adopt the so-called “mail box” rule. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988). The Court wisely declined Pers-soris invitation, but then fashioned a ratio*368nale of its own. The Court’s reliance on the lack-of-notice theory for vacating the trial court’s judgment is without precedent. Persson never raised this issue in the Superior Court. The issue is, therefore, unpreserved and is not appropriate for our review. See Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 6, 761 A.2d 291, 295, n. 3 (stating that the Law Court will not address the issue concerning the applicability of the Maine Constitution to the constitutional validity of the Grandparents Visitation Act where neither party made the argument); Sanders v. Sanders, 1998 ME 100, ¶ 11, 711 A.2d 124, 127 (holding, when there is no indication in the record that an issue was either raised, discussed, or ruled upon below, the point is not preserved); Berg v. Bragdon, 1997 ME 129, ¶ 9, 695 A.2d 1212, 1214 (holding that an issue is waived if it is not raised or preserved by the parties). “We have applied this rule consistently whether the alleged right is constitutional or based on the common law,” Berg, 1997 ME 129, ¶ 9, 695 A.2d at 1214, and should resist the temptation from doing so now.
[¶ 22] Moreover, the fact that the filing requirements were not published in the Maine Rules of Court is of little consequence. That publication is not an official source for publishing newly adopted, or amended, court rules; hence, a failure to publish a newly adopted, or amended, rule in that text provides no defense against its application, even where a party asserts a lack of knowledge of the rule’s existence which Persson does not. In Maine, the only official source for announcing newly approved, or amended, rules is the Maine Reporter, and the applicable administrative order was duly published in that source. See 1997-1998 Maine Reporter, 699-709 A.2d at pp. CXLVI — CXLVIII.
[¶ 23] The principle that self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as represented litigants has been, and should remain, a part of our jurisprudence. Richards v. Bruce, 1997 ME 61, ¶ 8, 691 A.2d 1223, 1225. Consequently, Persson, like any other litigant, represented or not, should be imputed with knowledge of the duly published filing requirements. Applying those filing requirements here requires us to conclude that Persson’s March 1 filing was incomplete, and the appeal period had run by the time he corrected the problem. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

. The provisions of Maine Administrative Order SJC-114 (effective Oct. 15, 1997) are now incorporated in M.R. Civ. P. 5, which became effective on May 1, 2000. In particular, the "summary sheet” requirement can be found at M.R.Civ. P 5(h). Prior to May 2000, the applicable Administrative Order provisions were printed in a section of the Maine Rules of Court, a publication of West Group, that is dedicated solely to Maine Administrative Orders. See e.g., 1999 Maine Rules of Court at 327.

. As an alternative to the fee requirement, Persson could have, but did not, submit a motion to proceed in forma pauperis in his March 1 filing. See M.R. Civ. P. 91.