Court Opinion

ID: 9731121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:34:31.632003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:13.517950
License: Public Domain

ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.
I respectfully dissent. Notwithstanding that I agree with the philosophy expressed in Syllabus ¶1 of the majority opinion to the effect that the Workmen’s Compensation statutes should be liberally construed to promote the ends intended to be secured by their enactment, I cannot agree that that philosophy permits a claimant to recover benefits for a permanent partial disability while he is receiving benefits for a permanent total disability.
*863The majority opinion seems to be based upon the fact that the Legislature did not provide specifically for the exclusion of permanent partial disability benefits while the claimant was receiving permanent total disability benefits.
I believe that when one uses such clearly understood terms as total and partial, it becomes unnecessary to provide more specific exclusory language and that when one is permanently totally disabled and is receiving the maximum award under the statute, he should receive no additional award upon proof that he is permanently partially disabled.
It is one thing to permit a claimant to recover benefits for a temporary total disability while the claimant recovers from his or her injury and, thereafter, upon a partial recovery to permit the claimant to recover benefits for a permanent partial disability while not receiving temporary total disability benefits; and it is a completely different thing to permit a claimant to recover permanent partial disability benefits while receiving permanent total disability benefits.
The latter situation is what we have present in the instant ease.
The majority cites 2 Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation, Ch. X, § 57.10, p. 10-7 (1974) in its support.
I have studied that reference and can see no relevancy between that reference and the majority’s holding, permitting the payments of benefits for permanent partial disability and permanent total disability simultaneously.
I likewise find very little connection between Ambroson v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 210 N.W.2d 85 (N.D.1973), and the majority opinion and reasoning in this case.
The majority opinion cites Heiliger v. City of Sheldon, 236 Iowa 146, 18 N.W.2d 182 (1945), for the proposition that “Exclusions will not be read into Workmen’s Compensation statutes where they do not expressly appear.”
In Heiliger the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a volunteer fireman was an “official” of the city and was therefore excluded from Workmen’s Compensation coverage by the Workmen’s Compensation law and, accordingly, that the casualty company which had provided an accident policy for the City was liable for the volunteer fireman’s claims arising from his injury in conjunction with his duty as a fireman. In other words, the Supreme Court of Iowa actually found the fireman to be excluded by construing the term “official” to include a volunteer fireman.
My analysis of Heiliger is that from a practical standpoint, the Supreme Court of Iowa found an exclusion where none existed by construing the word “official” to include volunteer firemen. I. accordingly believe it to be of little support for the majority opinion.
The majority opinion will work an injustice rather than justice since it will permit a person who has only a permanent partial disability, but who otherwise is unable to be employed, to receive benefits both as a permanently totally disabled person and as a permanently partially disabled person; whereas a person who is not only receiving benefits as a permanently totally disabled person, but who has a permanent total disability of the entire body (100%), as opposed to a disability of only a part of the body, will be permitted to receive benefits as a permanently and totally disabled person only and not additional benefits for being only partially permanently disabled.
It is significant that Section 65-05-12, N.D.C.C., covers partial disability extending from one percent to ninety percent. It does not provide benefits for 100 percent disability. That feature alone would seem to indicate that when 100 percent disability is reached, the benefits are under Section 65— 05-09, N.D.C.C., which provides benefits for total disability.
The Bureau states that it has no argument with the principle that the Workmen’s Compensation statutes must be interpreted *864liberally in the appellant’s favor. It asserts, however, that in the instant case the appellant has two side-by-side remedies. It says that the situation involves the “ * * canon of statutory construction that, where two remedies are created side by side in a statute, the claimant should have the benefit of the more favorable * * * ”, 2 Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation, Ch. X, § 58.20, p. 10-224 (1974).
I agree that this is the more reasonable approach to a solution of the issue.