Court Opinion

ID: 9715048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:53:09.799641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:08.544494
License: Public Domain

LAVORATO, Justice
(dissenting).
I agree with the majority that the $150,-000 minimum restitution under Iowa Code section 910.4 is a “fine” within the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. My agreement, however, stops there. Contrary to the majority, I believe, for reasons that follow, that the fine is excessive and therefore unconstitutional under those constitutional provisions.
*554Two years ago, for the first time, the United States Supreme Court applied the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 2033, 141 L.Ed.2d 314, 325 (1998). I think Bajakajian provides a framework of analysis here. For that reason, I think it is important for me to discuss it in detail.
In Bajakajian, the defendant, with his family, attempted to leave the United States without reporting, as required by federal law (31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A)), that he was transporting more than $10,-000 in currency. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324, 118 S.Ct. at 2031, 141 L.Ed.2d at 323. The federal statute in question provides that a person convicted of willfully violating this reporting requirement “shall be fined not more than $250,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.” 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a). In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) directs the court in imposing sentence on a person convicted of violating the reporting requirement to order the defendant to forfeit “to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property.”
When arrested, Bajakajian had $357,144 in cash in his possession. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 325, 118 S.Ct. at 2032, 141 L.Ed.2d at 323. He pled guilty to the failure-to-report offense. Id. at 325, 118 S.Ct. at 2032, 141 L.Ed.2d at 324. Although section 982(a)(1) directed sentencing courts to impose full forfeiture, the federal district court concluded that forfeiture of the entire $357,144 would be grossly disproportionate to the offense in question and would therefore violate the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 326, 118 S.Ct. at 2032, 141 L.Ed.2d at 324. The court instead ordered forfeiture of $15,000, in addition to a sentence of three years of probation and a fine of $5000 (the maximum fine under the Sentencing Guidelines). Id. The government appealed, seeking full forfeiture, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court had little trouble concluding the forfeiture provision constituted punishment and was therefore a “fine” within the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 328, 334, 118 S.Ct. at 2033, 2036, 141 L.Ed.2d at 325, 329.
The Court next considered whether the fine was “excessive” — precisely the issue in the case before us. The Court’s analysis began with a recognition that “[t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” Id. at 334, 118 S.Ct. at 2036, 141 L.Ed.2d at 329.
The Court recognized that until now it had never articulated a standard for determining whether a punitive forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. See id. The Court adopted the standard of gross dis-proportionality articulated in its cruel-and-unusual punishment precedents under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 334-36, 118 S.Ct. at 2036-37, 141 L.Ed.2d at 330-31. The Court adopted a gross rather than a strict disproportionality standard for two reasons. First, “judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature.” Id. at 336, 118 S.Ct. at 2037, 141 L.Ed.2d at 330. Second, “any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise.” Id.
The Court directed district courts and the courts of appeal on how to apply the standard:
[They] must compare the amount of the forfeiture to the gravity of the defendant’s offense. If the amount of the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offense, it is unconstitutional.
Id. at 336-37, 118 S.Ct. at 2037-38, 141 L.Ed.2d at 331.
*555Using this standard, the Court concluded that the forfeiture of Bajakajian’s $357,-144 would violate the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. In support of its conclusion, the court gave the following reasons. First, Bajakajian’s crime was solely a reporting offense: He could legally transport the money out of the country if he reported it. Id.
Second, Bajakajian’s violation was unrelated to any other illegal activities. Id. at 338, 118 S.Ct. at 2038, 141 L.Ed.2d at 332. The money was the proceeds of legal activity, and Bajakajian was going to use the money to repay a lawful debt. Id. Bajaka-jian did not fit the profile of persons for whom the statute was intended: money launderers, drug traffickers, and tax evaders. Id.
Third, under the Sentencing Guidelines, the maximum sentence that could have been imposed on Bajakajian was six months, while the maximum fine was $5000. Id. The Court viewed these penalties as “confirming] a minimal level of culpability.” Id. at 338-39, 118 S.Ct. at 2038,141 L.Ed.2d at 332.
Last, the harm that Bajakajian caused was also minimal. Id. at 339, 118 S.Ct. at 2039, 141 L.Ed.2d at 332. The only victim was the Government, and the Government was affected in a relatively minor way — it was deprived of information that $357,144 had left the country. Id.
The Court’s analysis in Bajakajian makes clear that determining what is grossly disproportional and therefore excessive must be done on a case-by-ease basis by the sentencing court. This is in direct opposition to the majority’s conclusion here that a $150,000 fine is per se constitutionally acceptable in every case. The majority’s per se approach is also in direct conflict with the Supreme Court pronouncement that “no penalty is per se constitutional.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009, 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 649 (1983).
Contrary to proportionality principles, the majority’s per se approach (1) gives no consideration as to how the offense occurred and (2) prevents any consideration of the degree of culpability. Today, this court decides a case that illustrates why the majority’s per se approach is not only contrary to proportionality principles but is unfair. See State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504, 512 (Iowa 2000).
In Rohm, a mother was convicted of involuntary manslaughter because of her passive conduct in allowing alcohol to remain accessible to minors. Two members of this court believed the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction. See id. (Ternus, J., dissenting). Given the circumstances surrounding the offense and the closeness of the decision, one could make a compelling argument that the $150,000 fine assessed against the defendant is excessive. Yet, under -the majority’s per se approach, she will never have the opportunity to make that argument.
The majority’s per se approach also denies a defendant the opportunity to show that the $150,000 fine would deprive the defendant of a livelihood. This is especially important because the fine is nondis-chargeable in bankruptcy. Although in Bajakajian the defendant did not raise the deprivation-of-livelihood argument, the Court hinted that such a consideration is relevant. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 340 n.15, 118 S.Ct. at 2039 n.15, 141 L.Ed.2d at 333 n.15. The Court also hinted that a defendant’s wealth and income are relevant, as they are on the question of punitive damages in civil cases. Id.
Finally, the legislature itself has indicated that a . person convicted of involuntary manslaughter may not be so culpable as to merit a $150,000 fine. Apart from the $150,000 restitution award, the legislature has determined that the maximum fine that may be imposed for such a crime is $7500. See Iowa Code § 902.9(4). The *556disparity between the $150,000 and the $7500 is telling.
I would vacate the restitution order and remand the case for a meaningful hearing on the $150,000 restitution order, at which the State and the defendant should be allowed to present evidence and argument as to what the restitution should be. Using the Bajakajian standard and analysis, the district court should then determine what amount of restitution is constitutionally appropriate.
SNELL and TERNUS, JJ., join this dissent.