Court Opinion

ID: 9897247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:12.619428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:41.333217
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         Oct 27 2023, 9:27 am

                                                                              CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ralph E. Dowling                                           Amy O. Carson
Muncie, Indiana                                            Jacob W. Zigenfus
                                                           Massillamany Jeter & Carson, LLP
                                                           Fishers, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

August Wohlt,                                              October 27, 2023
Appellant-Respondent,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-DR-2685
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
                                                           Court
Christi Wohlt,                                             The Honorable Marianne Vorhees,
Appellee-Petitioner.                                       Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           18C01-1507-DR-78

                                  Opinion by Judge Riley.
                              Judges Crone and Mathias concur.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023                             Page 1 of 21
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant-Respondent, August Wohlt (Husband), appeals following the trial

      court’s entry of judgment in favor of Appellee-Petitioner, Christi Wohlt (Wife),

      on claims relating to the property settlement agreement resulting from their

      divorce proceedings.

[2]   We affirm in part, reverse in part, and enter summary judgment for Husband.

      ISSUES
[3]   Husband presents this court with six issues, which we consolidate, restate, and

      address as the following two issues:

              (1) Whether Husband was entitled to summary judgment as a
                  matter of law on the issue of whether certain cryptocurrencies
                  were subject to division; and

              (2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered
                  Husband to pay expert witness and attorney’s fees.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   On June 16, 2007, Husband and Wife married. Three children were born of the

      marriage. During the marriage, the couple owned and operated Echo Systems,

      Inc. (Echo), which was engaged in the business of mining and trading

      cryptocurrency. Wife was the Chief Financial Officer of Echo, and the

      company was owned in her name. During the marriage, Echo owned 6.21

      units of Bitcoin and 1,000 units of Ethereum Classic (ETC).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023        Page 2 of 21
[5]   On July 22, 2015, Wife filed a petition for dissolution. The parties exchanged

      information, but Wife did not conduct formal discovery during the dissolution

      proceedings. On June 1, 2016, the parties engaged in mediation, resulting in

      the Property Settlement Agreement (PSA). The PSA provided that the parties

      agreed to close Echo within thirty days and that “Husband shall retain all assets

      of the business, except for the following items: Wife’s Mac computer and

      printer, iPhone, iPad and laptop.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 59). The PSA

      did not specifically address the cryptocurrencies owned by Echo. At the time of

      the mediation, the Bitcoin and ETC units had a combined value of

      approximately $18,000. On June 6, 2016, the trial court issued a decree of

      dissolution approving the PSA and finding that “it was entered into fairly,

      without fraud, duress or undue influence and was fair and equitable.”

      (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 73).

[6]   After the entry of the decree of dissolution, in July 2016, ETC was “forked”

      into two cryptocurrencies, ETC and Ethereum (ETH). (Exh. Vol. VII, p. 58).

      As part of the fork, owners of ETC were entitled to an equal number of units of

      the new currency, ETH. Therefore, in July 2016, Husband came into

      possession of 1,000 units of ETH. Shortly after the entry of the decree in 2016,

      Husband sold some of his Bitcoin holdings. In November 2017, Husband

      searched the Echo computer hardware and software he had acquired as part of

      the divorce proceedings and discovered records pertaining to the ownership of

      the cryptocurrencies, which led him to confirm that he was still in possession of

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023    Page 3 of 21
      the ETC units. In December 2017, Husband alerted his counsel as to the

      existence of the cryptocurrencies.

[7]   On October 30, 2018, Husband’s counsel sent a letter to Wife’s counsel

      providing notice that Husband had become aware of the existence of the

      Bitcoin and ETC cryptocurrencies. On May 14, 2020, Wife filed her Verified

      Motion to Address Asset Omitted from the Marital Estate and Child Support

      Matters. Wife alleged that Husband had “failed to disclose” the Bitcoin and the

      ETC. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 80). Wife sought the division of those

      cryptocurrencies and an adjustment of Husband’s child support obligation from

      2017 forward. On August 18, 2020, Wife filed a request for relief pursuant to

      Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) in which she reiterated the allegations of her previous

      verified motion but in which she also acknowledged that Husband disputed

      whether the Bitcoin and ETC were subject to division.

[8]   On October 2, 2020, the trial court held the first hearing in the instant litigation.

      Husband testified that during the parties’ mediation and prior to the entry of the

      decree of dissolution, he had forgotten about the Bitcoin and ETC owned by

      Echo. Husband also testified regarding the forking of the ETH cryptocurrency

      from the ETC cryptocurrency. Wife testified that she was not aware of the

      Bitcoin and the ETC at the time of the parties’ mediation because “[b]oth of us

      had forgotten about it.” (Exh. Vol. VII, p. 40). The hearing was not

      completed, and the trial court took all matters under advisement so that the

      parties could submit briefing. Thereafter, the parties engaged in further

      discovery.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023       Page 4 of 21
[9]    On January 21, 2021, Husband filed his motion for partial summary judgment

       and designation of evidence on the issues of Wife’s request to divide the

       cryptocurrencies, a request which now included the ETH units acquired by

       Husband as a result of the forking which occurred after the execution of the

       PSA, and her request to modify child support from 2017 forward. Regarding

       the cryptocurrencies, Husband argued, in relevant part, that he was

       unambiguously awarded those assets by the PSA and that, due to the PSA’s

       disclosure provisions, Wife could not request that the cryptocurrencies, which

       both parties agreed had been forgotten, should be divided. As to the support

       modification, Husband argued that Wife was precluded by long-standing

       Indiana precedent from seeking a support modification for any time period

       prior to the filing of her petition for modification and that no exceptions to this

       general rule applied.

[10]   On February 19, 2021, Wife filed her response in opposition to summary

       judgment, along with her designation of evidence. Wife argued that there were

       genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the trial court had the

       authority to divide the cryptocurrencies. Wife further argued that, because

       Husband had waited more than a year to disclose those assets to Wife upon

       their rediscovery by Husband and because Husband had made inconsistent

       statements about whether he still had the Echo-owned Bitcoin units in his

       possession, there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether he had

       acted fraudulently.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023      Page 5 of 21
[11]   On March 18, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Husband’s motion for

       partial summary judgment. 1 On March 26, 2021, the trial court denied

       Husband’s motion, ruling that the fact issues precluding summary judgment

       were “what did the parties know, and when did they know it?” (Appellant’s

       App. Vol. II, p. 29). Regarding the issue of child support, the trial court found

       that it was “not seeing this as a retroactive support modification issue. After a

       hearing, I may find this is a failure to disclose and a failure to share irregular

       income for the child’s benefit, and [Wife] has a legal right in either law or

       equity to make a claim to her percentage share of the irregular income.”

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 29).

[12]   Fact-finding hearings were scheduled on March 3 and 4, 2022, on Wife’s

       petition. In advance of the March hearings, on February 23, 2022, Husband

       filed a motion to compel discovery pertaining to Wife’s expert witness, Erik

       Min (Min), who would testify regarding cryptocurrency issues. In conjunction

       with his motion to compel, Husband filed a motion to continue the matter and

       to set a Daubert hearing on the scientific reliability of Wife’s expert evidence.

       On February 28, 2022, the trial court denied Husband’s motions. The March

       hearings took place as scheduled, at which Min testified regarding the forking of

       the ETH from the ETC cryptocurrency and his verification of the information

       1
           This hearing was not transcribed for appeal.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023        Page 6 of 21
       regarding the Bitcoin acquisition and sale. Min’s report was also admitted into

       evidence.

[13]   On April 1, 2022, the trial court entered its Order equally dividing the value of

       the cryptocurrencies, resulting in an award to Wife of $1,842 for the Bitcoin,

       $14,000 for the ETC, and $208,441.63 for the ETH, for a total of $224,283.63.

       On April 8, 2022, the trial court entered its Order denying Wife’s request to

       increase Husband’s support obligation retroactive to the filing of her petition on

       May 15, 2020, finding that it could not locate any authority for doing so. The

       trial court also adopted the parties’ pre-hearing support modification agreement.

[14]   On September 1, 2022, the trial court held a hearing to address Wife’s motion

       for expert witness and attorney’s fees. Husband incurred $50,011.60 in

       attorney’s fees, and Wife incurred $51,636 in attorney’s fees. Min requested

       $42,000 for his services. At the hearing, Wife requested that Husband pay a

       portion of her fees, but Husband did not make any similar request. On October

       14, 2022, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $15,042 in attorney’s

       fees, which it calculated by applying the parties’ income allocations for

       purposes of child support (Husband 64%/Wife 36%) to the total attorney’s fees

       incurred by both parties. The trial court also ordered Husband to pay half of

       Min’s fees, $21,000. In awarding the expert witness fees, the trial court found

       that Wife was not required to take Husband’s word about the cryptocurrencies,

       that Wife was justified in hiring an expert, and that the trial court had found

       Min’s report and testimony to be “very helpful.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p.

       48).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023        Page 7 of 21
[15]   Husband now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

       DISCUSSION AND DECISION
       I. Summary Judgment

[16]   Husband contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for

       partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the Bitcoin, ETC, and ETH

       cryptocurrencies were subject to division. Summary judgment is appropriate if

       the designated evidence “shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material

       fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ind.

       Trial Rule 56(C). We review the denial of summary judgment de novo and

       apply the same standard as the trial court. Kerr v. City of South Bend, 48 N.E.3d

       348, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The party moving for summary judgment bears

       the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine

       issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

       Sargent v. State, 27 N.E.3d 729, 731 (Ind. 2015). “Summary judgment is

       improper if the movant fails to carry its burden, but if it succeeds, then the

       nonmoving party must come forward with evidence establishing the existence

       of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 731-32. “All disputed facts and

       doubts as to the existence of material facts must be resolved in favor of the non-

       moving party.” Kerr, 48 N.E.3d at 352. If the facts are undisputed, we

       determine the law applicable to those facts, and whether the trial court correctly

       applied it. King v. Ebrens, 804 N.E.2d 821, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). A

       property settlement agreement which has been incorporated into a dissolution

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023       Page 8 of 21
       decree becomes a binding contract which is interpreted according to the general

       rules of contract construction. Bailey v. Mann, 895 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind.

       2008). The interpretation of a property settlement agreement is a matter of law

       which we review de novo. Id.

       A. PSA Interpretation

[17]   Husband asserts that he was entitled to summary judgment because the PSA

       unambiguously awarded him the cryptocurrencies. Wife counters that the PSA

       could not have awarded Husband those assets because the cryptocurrencies had

       been forgotten by the parties and, thus, it could not have been the parties’

       intention to divide those assets when executing the PSA.

[18]   The Dissolution Statute provides that “orders concerning property disposition

       entered under this chapter . . . may not be revoked or modified, except in case

       of fraud.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-9.1(a); see also Ryan v. Ryan, 972 N.E.2d 359,

       362 (Ind. 2012) (noting that the statutory proscription on the modification or

       revocation of property settlement agreements is unambiguous). However, a

       trial court may interpret and enforce a property settlement agreement, and

       when doing so, the general rules of contract construction apply. Id. at 364;

       Fackler v. Powell, 839 N.E.2d 165, 169 (Ind. 2005).

[19]   Unless the terms of a property settlement agreement are ambiguous, we will

       give those terms their plain and ordinary meanings, we will consider those

       terms conclusive, and we will not resort to extrinsic evidence or construe the

       agreement. Bailey, 895 N.E.2d at 1217; Harris v. Copas, 165 N.E.3d 611, 619

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023     Page 9 of 21
       (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). It is a well-settled principle of contract construction that

       terms are not ambiguous simply because a controversy exists between the

       parties as to their meaning. Harris, 165 N.E.3d at 619.

[20]   Here, the PSA provided that “Husband shall retain all assets of the business, except

       for the following items: Wife’s Mac computer and printer, iPhone, iPad and

       laptop.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 59) (emphasis added). Wife did not

       identify any ambiguity in the wording of this provision in her initial petition

       seeking to divide the disputed assets, her Trial Rule 60 motion, in her response

       to Husband’s summary judgment pleadings, or on appeal. The term “all” is

       generally used to refer to the totality of what is being designated and is not a

       term that is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. See

       Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-

       webster.com/dictionary/all (last visited October 12, 2022) (defining “all” as

       “the whole amount, quantity, or extent of” and “every member or individual

       component of”). We find that this provision of the PSA unambiguously means

       that every asset owned by Echo would be awarded to Husband, apart from the

       five specifically listed items awarded to Wife.

[21]   We are aware that in Dewbrew v. Dewbrew, 849 N.E.2d 636, 646 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2006), this court concluded that a property settlement agreement which

       purported to settle the rights of the parties to real and personal property then

       owned by them was ambiguous because it was silent as to “the most significant

       marital assets,” namely, the marital residence and two businesses, which were

       acquired during the marriage. However, it cannot be said that the Bitcoin and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023      Page 10 of 21
       ETC, the cryptocurrencies which existed at the time of the signing of the PSA

       which were indisputably forgotten by both parties, were among their “most

       significant” marital assets for purposes of the PSA that otherwise disposed of

       the parties’ marital residence, business, vehicles, investments, bank accounts,

       and personal property. Id. The fact that these assets, particularly the ETH

       currency, may have increased in value after the parties entered into the PSA

       does not inject ambiguity into the PSA itself. Dewbrew does not extend to the

       instant case for the additional reasons that the assets at issue in Dewbrew were

       specifically discussed by the parties prior to the entry of the settlement

       agreement, the wife in that case did not have her attorney review the finalized

       settlement agreement prior to signing it, and we remanded for recalculation of

       the division of the marital estate for other reasons apart from the omissions of

       the marital estate and the two businesses from the parties’ settlement

       agreement. Id. None of those factors are at issue here.

[22]   We also observe that as part of her attempts to have the cryptocurrencies

       divided, Wife filed a Trial Rule 60 motion seeking relief from judgment. Parties

       seeking such relief are allowed to raise claims of mutual mistake occurring at

       the time of the settlement agreement. See Ryan, 972 N.E.2d at 370-71

       (observing that a Trial Rule 60 motions seeking relief from a property

       settlement agreement should be viewed as a contract claim and that “[i]f there is

       a mutual mistake, contract law provides the rules for resolving it”). However, a

       party may not assert mutual mistake as a basis for relief under Rule 60(B)(1)

       more than one year after the entry of the judgment, and the “reasonable time”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023         Page 11 of 21
       period for seeking relief under the catch-all provision of Rule 60(B)(8)

       specifically excludes claims of mistake. Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(1), (8); Dusenberry

       v. Dusenberry, 625 N.E.2d 458, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). The decree of

       dissolution in this case was entered on June 6, 2016, and Wife filed her initial

       petition seeking to divide the disputed assets on May 14, 2020, which was more

       than one year after the entry of judgment. Therefore, a claim of mutual mistake

       was unavailable to Wife as a basis for disputing summary judgment. On

       appeal, Wife does not cite any legal authority pertaining to mutual mistake in

       her argument as to why summary judgment was inappropriate on this issue. In

       light of this lack of citation to authority, even if such a claim were available to

       her, she has waived it for our consideration. See Ind. Appellate Rule

       46(A)(8)(a) (providing that appellate arguments must contain the party’s

       contentions supported by cogent reasoning); Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135,

       137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting that the “[f]ailure to present a cogent argument

       results in waiver of the issue on appeal”).

[23]   Neither can we credit Wife’s assertion that we should not consider Husband’s

       appellate arguments on this issue because he took a contrary position in the trial

       court. “The premise of judicial estoppel is that, absent a good explanation, a

       party should not be permitted to gain an advantage by litigating on one theory

       and thereafter pursuing an incompatible theory in subsequent litigation.”

       ArcBest Corp. v. Wendel, 192 N.E.3d 915, 928 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). However,

       the doctrine only applies where the litigant has made intentional

       misrepresentations, so the litigant’s bad-faith intent is dispositive of its

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023           Page 12 of 21
application. Id. In support of her claim that Husband is estopped from arguing

that the PSA awarded him the cryptocurrencies, Wife cites Husband’s

testimony at the October 2, 2020, hearing in this matter prior to the summary

judgment proceedings which included the following:

        Husband’s Counsel: Let’s get down to the nitty gritty of what the
        Judge has to do in this case of cryptocurrency. The Judge has to
        decide whether to give [Wife] anything, and if so, how much of it
        to give her. What do you think is a fair resolution of the
        cryptocurrency issue for the [c]ourt to provide for you today?

        Husband: What makes sense to me is that I get it between filing
        and mediation . . . If at all. I don’t fully understand the wording
        in our decree and there may be something in there that affects
        that, but I defer to the Judge’s decision on that.

(Tr. Vol. VII, p. 51). Later on cross-examination, Husband was asked if he felt

that “an adjustment is warranted,” to which he responded “Yeah. I believe, at

this time, the reasonable approach would be to settle on a value between the

mediation and the divorce, the filing.” (Tr. Vol. VII, p. 62). However, as early

as her August 18, 2020, request for relief pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B),

Wife acknowledged that Husband disputed whether the trial court had the

authority under the PSA to divide the cryptocurrencies. After a review of the

parties’ pleadings and the context of Husband’s responses cited above, it is clear

to us that Husband did not assent to divide the challenged assets with Wife or

that he took a position contrary to that which he now argues on appeal. Even if

Husband had taken divergent positions, Wife does not even attempt to

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023      Page 13 of 21
       demonstrate any bad-faith intent on Husband’s part. Therefore, the doctrine

       does not apply. See ArcBest Corp., 192 N.E.3d at 928.

[24]   On appeal, Wife also asserts that the trial court properly denied summary

       judgment to Husband because the parties disagreed about whether the trial

       court had the authority to divide the cryptocurrencies and whether the PSA was

       ambiguous so as to require interpretation. These arguments are not persuasive,

       as both are predicated on the meaning of the PSA which is a question of law for

       the trial court. See Bailey, 895 N.E.2d at 1217.

[25]   Because the PSA’s terms are unambiguous, we must apply the plain terms of

       the agreement, and we cannot credit Wife’s argument concerning what the

       parties might or might not have intended when entering into the PSA because

       that would entail looking beyond the four corners of the unambiguous contract.

       See Niccum, 734 N.E.2d at 639. There was no factual dispute that the Bitcoin

       and the ETC, from which the ETH forked, were assets owned by Echo.

       Therefore, we conclude that there was no genuine issue of material fact

       precluding summary judgment to Husband on this issue.

       B. Constructive Fraud

[26]   Wife alleged in her verified petition to divide the cryptocurrencies that Husband

       had failed to disclose those assets, and she clarified in her response to

       Husband’s motion for summary judgment that she claimed Husband had

       committed constructive fraud by failing to disclose those assets prior to the

       parties entering into the PSA. In order to demonstrate constructive fraud, a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023        Page 14 of 21
       party must establish the following elements: (1) a duty owed by the party

       charged to the complaining party as a result of their relationship; (2) a violation

       of that duty through deceptive material misrepresentations of past or existing

       facts or through remaining silent where there was a duty to speak; (3) reliance

       by the complaining party; (4) injury to the complaining party; and (5) an

       advantage gained by the charged party to the detriment of the complaining

       party. Ehle v. Ehle, 737 N.E.2d 429, 434 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). In Selke v. Selke,

       600 N.E.2d 100, 101-02 (Ind. 1992), our supreme court held that, while a duty

       to disclose information regarding assets between dissolution litigants “may arise

       from unique factual circumstances including the express terms of a property

       settlement agreement, or from a request for discovery under the Indiana Trial

       Rules,” there is no spontaneous duty of disclosure.

[27]   The PSA contained the following relevant provisions:

               Section 5.12. Fully Advised. Each of the parties hereto has been
               fully, separately, and independently apprised and advised of their
               respective legal rights, remedies, privileges and obligations,
               arising out of the marriage relation or otherwise, by counsel of
               their own choice and selection, and each has, in addition thereto,
               made such independent inquiry and investigation with respect to all of
               the same as they deemed necessary to be fully informed. Each party
               acknowledges that he or she has consulted with and sought the
               advice of legal counsel and other professional persons, such as,
               but not limited to, accountants and other counselors, as he or she
               desires, and with or without the advice of such professionals,
               each party has made his or her own determination as to the
               valuation of all assets and liabilities. [].

               ****

               Section 5.20. Disclosure. Husband and Wife acknowledge that
               each party is entitled to thorough discovery, analysis and
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023        Page 15 of 21
        investigation of the other party’s financial information and all
        data and facts relevant to the dissolution proceeding. Husband
        and Wife expressly waive that right for the purpose of this Agreement and
        hereby certify that they have full and adequate knowledge of all such
        relevant financial and other information, data and facts. Each party
        represents to the other that they have relied on the full and
        complete disclosure of the other person upon entering into this
        Agreement.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 70-72) (emphasis added). Taken together, these

provisions did not impose any duty upon Husband to proactively search the

Echo software and hardware and to disclose what he discovered there prior to

entering into the PSA. Although formal discovery requests could have been

propounded to Husband to discover the assets of Echo, in the PSA, Wife

waived her right to formal discovery. Instead of conducting discovery, Wife

agreed that she had made an independent inquiry and investigation of her legal

rights and privileges which she deemed necessary to be fully informed, and

Wife certified that she had complete knowledge of all relevant information prior

to entering into the PSA. We find this waiver of discovery and certification of

full knowledge to be significant to any claim of constructive fraud here. In

Voight v. Voight, 645 N.E.2d 623, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied, we

found no constructive fraud in a wife’s failure to disclose certain bank accounts

she had forgotten about prior to entering into a property settlement agreement

with her husband, where the husband “had access to information regarding

each of the disputed accounts and yet he also failed to recall that they existed.”

Here, Wife could have had access to information about Echo’s business assets,

yet she waived that right according to the terms of the PSA she voluntarily

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023          Page 16 of 21
       executed. In addition, while Husband and Wife warranted to each other that

       they relied on the “full and complete disclosure of the other person upon

       entering into” the PSA, warranting reliance on full disclosure is not warranting

       that such full and complete disclosure has actually been made to the other

       party. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 72).

[28]   In her response to Husband’s motion for summary judgment, Wife relied on

       Atkins v. Atkins, 534 N.E.2d 760, 762-63 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. denied, in

       which this court found that the husband had committed constructive fraud by

       failing to disclose to the wife the fact that a certain stock owned in his name had

       doubled in value prior to the signing of the settlement agreement and the entry

       of the decree. Atkins is factually distinguishable for the principal reason that the

       settlement agreement in that case contained the provision that “Husband and

       Wife warrant and represent that the financial information and statements of

       Husband and the Wife supplied to Husband's and Wife's counsel as of diverse

       dates, past and present, have been true, accurate and complete as to any

       interest, direct, indirect or beneficial, that either may have,” an express

       warranty of full disclosure not present in this case. Id. at 762. In her summary

       judgment response, Wife also contended that Husband’s failure to disclose the

       existence of the cryptocurrencies for more than a year after their discovery, his

       inconsistent statements after this litigation had commenced about whether he

       still had the Bitcoin units in his possession, and his sale of the ETH for

       substantial gains all created issues of material fact regarding his fraudulent

       intent. However, all of these events occurred after the parties had entered into

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023      Page 17 of 21
       the PSA and their divorce had been finalized and do not reflect circumstances

       bearing on his intent at the time of executing the PSA.

[29]   In light of the express language of the PSA, we conclude that Husband was

       unambiguously awarded the cryptocurrencies at issue and that Husband owed

       Wife no duty to find and disclose the cryptocurrencies so as to support a claim

       of constructive fraud. Therefore, we reverse the denial of summary judgment

       and enter summary judgment in favor of Husband. 2

       II. Expert Witness and Attorney’s Fees

[30]   The trial court ordered Husband to pay $21,000 in expert witness fees and

       $15,042 of Wife’s attorney’s fees. Husband separately challenges the expert

       witness and attorney’s fees associated with Min and the attorney’s fees

       associated with the denial of Husband’s motion for summary judgment on the

       issue of Wife’s claim to retroactive child support. We address each of these

       issues in turn.

       A. Fees Associated with Min

[31]   Husband argues that Wife did not provide him with adequate pre-hearing

       discovery pertaining to Min, Min’s opinions were not supported by the

       2
         In light of our entry of summary judgment in favor of Husband on this issue, we do not address his claims
       that the trial court erred when it awarded Wife half of the value of the cryptocurrencies after trial as argued in
       his Issues II and III or his argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions to compel
       discovery and to continue the final hearing pertaining to the expert witness, Min, as presented in Issue V.
       Those issues are now moot. In his Issue IV, Husband acknowledges that he does not contest the merits of the
       trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the issue of retroactive child support, as the trial court ultimately
       ruled in Husband’s favor on that issue.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023                                Page 18 of 21
       evidence, Min’s opinions were rendered in an inefficient manner that resulted

       in unnecessary costs, and that Min’s expertise was unnecessary because Min

       ultimately concluded that the information provided by Husband about the

       acquisition and sales of the cryptocurrencies was accurate. As a result,

       Husband contends that he should not have been ordered to pay half of Min’s

       fee or “related attorney fees.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 61). For each issue presented

       to us, an appellant is required to provide a concise statement of the applicable

       standard of review. App. R. 46(A)(8)(b). An appellant is also required to

       support his argument with cogent reasoning, including citation to legal

       authority. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). In contravention of the Indiana Appellate

       Rules, Husband has not provided us with a standard of review applicable to an

       award of expert witness fees, nor has he cited any statutes or caselaw in support

       of his challenge demonstrating that a trial court errs in awarding expert fees

       under these circumstances. Therefore, Husband has waived this claim, and we

       decline to address it. Martin, 130 N.E.3d at 137.

[32]   Husband’s one-phrase argument that he should not have been ordered to pay

       any attorney’s fees related to Min’s expert testimony fails for the same reason.

       Although Husband cites a standard of review for a trial court’s award of

       attorney’s fees, he has provided us with no pertinent legal authority to support

       his challenge to those attorney’s fees. Therefore, that claim is also waived. See

       Halum v. Halum, 492 N.E.2d 30, 31 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (declining to

       address wife’s claim regarding the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees, finding

       it waived for failure to present cogent argument), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023      Page 19 of 21
[33]   Husband further argues that, because of the purported deficiencies in Min’s

       testimony and report, Husband should have been awarded attorney’s fees for

       having to defend against this expert. Our review of the transcript of the

       September 1, 2022, hearing on expert witness and attorney’s fees revealed that

       Husband did not request an award of attorney’s fees on this basis. Because we

       cannot discern that Husband requested an award of attorney’s fees for having to

       defend against Min’s expert testimony, he has waived this claim as well. See

       Wireman v. LaPorte Hosp., Co., LLC, 205 N.E.3d 1041, 1046 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2023) (“It is well settled that an appellant cannot present an argument for the

       first time on appeal[.]”), trans. denied.

       B. Denial of Summary Judgment on Retroactive Child Support

[34]   The trial court denied Husband’s motion for summary judgment on Wife’s

       claim to retroactive child support but ultimately ruled in Husband’s favor on

       this issue. Husband claims that the trial court’s “erroneous denial of the motion

       for summary judgment on this issue subjected [Husband] to paying substantial

       amounts of attorney fees to litigate the issue that should have been resolved on

       March 26, 2021, not April 8, 2022” and that he should have been awarded

       attorney’s fees for “needless litigation.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 52). However, the

       record does not reveal that Husband requested attorney’s fees on this basis, and,

       therefore, we find that his has also waived this claim. Wireman, 205 N.E.3d at

       1046 n.2.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023    Page 20 of 21
[35]   Inasmuch as Husband asserts that the trial court’s order that he pay a portion of

       Wife’s attorney’s fees was unreasonable in light of the litigation on this issue,

       his argument is unpersuasive. The trial court entered findings and conclusions

       on attorney’s fees in which the trial court apportioned the parties’ combined

       attorney’s fees based upon their relative incomes. Pursuant to Indiana Code

       section 31-16-11-1 and within its broad discretion in awarding attorney’s fees, a

       trial court may take into consideration the financial resources of the parties.

       Redd v. Redd, 901 N.E.2d 545, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Husband does not

       address his argument to the trial court’s findings and conclusions regarding the

       award of attorney’s fees, and, therefore, he has failed to demonstrate that the

       trial court abused its discretion.

       CONCLUSION
[36]   Based on the foregoing, we hold that Husband was entitled to summary

       judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether the cryptocurrencies were

       subject to division. We further hold that Husband waived the majority of his

       claims regarding the trial court’s award of expert witness and attorney’s fees

       and that he has failed to demonstrate the merit of any preserved claims.

[37]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and summary judgment entered for Husband.

       Crone, J. and Mathias, J. concur

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-DR-2685 | October 27, 2023     Page 21 of 21