Court Opinion

ID: 9891436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 16:08:50.452535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:21.258048
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This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40507

MARIA ISABEL RIOS,

       Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

JUAN MANUEL RIOS,

       Respondent-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Amber Chavez Baker, District Court Judge

Enlace Comunitario
Vanessa I. Peake
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Cordell Law, LLP
Linda L. Ellison
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

HANISEE, Judge.

{1}     Petitioner Maria Rios appeals an order from the district court dismissing her
petition for dissolution of marriage for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner
claims that her purported marriage to Respondent Juan Rios was valid under New
Mexico law despite the existence of her prior, lawful marriage in California at the time of
her nuptials with Respondent. Because New Mexico does not recognize marriages that
occur when at least one party is otherwise still married, we affirm.
BACKGROUND

{2}    Petitioner and Respondent met in October 2011 and began a romantic
relationship shortly thereafter. At the time, both parties were still married to their
respective spouses from previous marriages, but both eventually began divorce
proceedings to end those relationships. Apparently under the belief that the prior
marriages were dissolved and they were both free to marry, Petitioner and Respondent
held a wedding ceremony on July 7, 2012, in New Mexico, where they then resided.
Several days later, however, Petitioner received notice by mail from a California court
indicating that the final divorce decree from her first marriage was to be issued on July
17, 2012.

{3}     Nine years later, Petitioner filed to dissolve her marriage with Respondent and
sought distribution of marital property. After discovery, Respondent moved to dismiss
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that the marriage was never
valid because Petitioner was still married at the time of their ceremony on July 7, 2012.
After a hearing on the motion, the district court found in favor of Respondent, finding
that the marriage was finalized on July 7, 2012, and that, on that date, Petitioner was
still married to her prior husband. The court concluded that Petitioner, therefore, lacked
contractual capacity to marry on July 7, 2012, and the resulting relationship with
Respondent was not a marriage but a domestic partnership. Petitioner was granted
leave to amend her petition to reflect the court’s finding, but filed this appeal instead.

DISCUSSION

{4}    Petitioner makes two primary arguments on appeal. First, she argues that she
and Respondent held a second marriage ceremony on July 27, 2012, after her divorce
was finalized, and any defect in her marriage with Respondent was thereby cured.
Second, Petitioner argues that neither New Mexico statutory nor case law declares
bigamous marriages void, and that, even if the marriage between her and Respondent
began on July 7, 2012, it is still valid. We address each argument in turn.

{5}     In reviewing a judgment entered after a hearing, we review the district court’s
application of the law to the facts de novo while reviewing the district court’s findings of
fact for substantial evidence. Skeen v. Boyles, 2009-NMCA-080, ¶ 17, 146 N.M. 627,
213 P.3d 531. Regarding factual findings, we consider whether substantial evidence
supports the result reached, not whether there is substantial evidence to support the
opposite result. See id. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind would find adequate to support a conclusion.” Hough v. Brooks, 2017-
NMCA-050, ¶ 18, 399 P.3d 387 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In
reviewing factual findings, “we do not reweigh the evidence but instead decide whether
each challenged finding was supported by substantial evidence, indulging every
reasonable inference in favor of the district court’s disposition.” Autrey v. Autrey, 2022-
NMCA-042, ¶ 9, 516 P.3d 207.
{6}     Petitioner claims that any invalidity in her marriage to Respondent was cured by
a second wedding, purportedly occurring on July 27, 2012, after her divorce was
finalized. While Respondent disputes the occurrence of the second ceremony, both
parties admit that the ceremony on July 7, 2012, did occur. More pertinent to our
analysis, the district court made no express finding about the occurrence of a July 27,
2012, ceremony, and Petitioner does not challenge the court’s implicit rejection of
Petitioner’s claim that she and Respondent participated in a second wedding ceremony
twenty days following the first. Petitioner merely asserts, based solely upon her own
testimony that did not lead the district court to conclude that a second, valid ceremony
took place, that her version of facts relating to a subsequent ceremony is correct and
legally trumps the district court’s determinations.

{7}     On appeal, we “presume the correctness of the judgment of the district court who
had the advantage of evaluating the demeanor of the parties and of the witnesses.”
Clark v. Clark, 2014-NMCA-030, ¶ 26, 320 P.3d 991 (alteration, internal quotation
marks, and citation omitted). “Where evidence is conflicting and the court adopts
findings on a disputed issue, the fact that there may have been other evidence upon
which the court could have adopted a different finding does not constitute error.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioner has not adduced any evidence
in the record—beyond her own testimony—to demonstrate that the district court erred in
declining to make a finding regarding the existence or legal impact of a second
ceremony on July 27, 2012. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence to support
the court’s finding that the couple’s marriage began on July 7, 2012. Indeed, both
Petitioner and Respondent agree that a ceremony occurred on July 7, 2012. We,
therefore, discern no error in the district court’s finding that the marriage began, and
must be evaluated for validity on, that date. Further, in light of the record before us, we
conclude there to be no error on the part of the district court in declining to include in its
order findings related to a purported ceremony on July 27, 2012.

{8}    Petitioner also briefly argues that she and Respondent ratified their marriage
contract by fulfilling all statutory requirements and acting as husband and wife for the
nine years of their relationship. This is effectively an argument for common law
marriage, which—as Petitioner acknowledges—New Mexico does not recognize. See
Medina v. Medina, 2006-NMCA-042, ¶ 11, 139 N.M. 309, 131 P.3d 696 (“New Mexico
does not recognize common law marriage.”). We, thus, decline to further address this
argument.

{9}    Petitioner next argues that she had a valid marriage with Respondent under New
Mexico law. She claims that, even if the second ceremony on July 27, 2012, had not
occurred, her marriage to Respondent was still valid because bigamy is not expressly
unlawful in New Mexico. Determining whether the parties’ relationship met the
requirements of a valid marriage presents a question of law, which we review de novo.
Skeen, 2009-NMCA-080, ¶ 17.

{10} We begin by noting that, while bigamy is not an expressly prohibited form of
marriage by statute, see NMSA 1978, § 40-1-9 (2013) (prohibiting only incestuous
marriages and unions with minors), it is a criminal offense under NMSA 1978, Section
30-10-1 (1963). The general rule is that “a contract founded on an illegal consideration
is void.” Forrest Currell Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 1970-NMSC-018, ¶ 15, 81 N.M. 161,
464 P.2d 891. Relevant case law further supports the notion that two people may not
marry one another while one is still married. See Prince v. Freeman, 1941-NMSC-006, ¶
4, 45 N.M. 143, 112 P.2d 821 (“We need not cite authority to the proposition that the
ceremonial marriage between the parties was void, as at the time of such marriage, the
defendant was the wife of [another].”); see also Panzer v. Panzer, 1974-NMSC-092, ¶
13-15, 87 N.M. 29, 528 P.2d 888 (explaining that the validity of a marriage may be
attacked by showing, through clear and convincing evidence, the existence of a prior
marriage); Allen v. Allen, 1982-NMSC-118, ¶ 7, 98 N.M. 652, 651 P.2d 1296
(recognizing the rule laid out in Panzer); Medina, 2006-NMCA-042, ¶ 7 (stating that,
while New Mexico does not have a statute characterizing bigamous marriages as void
ab initio, bigamy is a criminal offense in this state). Under such authority, there is no
legal basis supporting Petitioner’s assertions that her marriage to Respondent remains
valid simply because there is not a statute explicitly prohibiting bigamy.

{11} Here, Petitioner concedes that a wedding ceremony with Respondent occurred
on July 7, 2012, and further admits that the divorce decree from her first marriage was
not issued until July 17, 2012. While Petitioner alleges that an additional ceremony
occurred on July 27, 2012, such assertion is unsupported by the record before us other
than—as discussed above—through Petitioner’s own testimony which was heard and
weighed by the district court. Petitioner also acknowledges, by admitting that common
law divorce is not recognized in New Mexico, she was still married to her first husband
until July 17, 2012. See Medina, 2006-NMCA-042, ¶ 11 (rejecting common law divorce
and requiring formal legal proceedings to dissolve a marriage). Thus, under all relevant
facts, we discern no error on the part of the district court in finding that Petitioner was
still married to her first husband at the time of her marriage to Respondent on July 7,
2012, and that the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent was never valid. We
conclude that the district court’s order is supported by substantial evidence and,
therefore, hold there to be no error in the judgment below.

CONCLUSION

{12}   For the above reasons, we affirm.

{13}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

WE CONCUR:

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge