Court Opinion

ID: 9528505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:41:41.324161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:19.666639
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). Bloomfield Township ordinance no. 397 regulates docking and launching of motorboats on the basis of the number of feet of lake frontage "owned” or "commonly owned.”1 The purpose, intent, and effect of the ordinance is to limit or bar altogether the use of lake frontage owned or commonly owned by "back-lot” owners, and has "the effect of zoning.”2 Such a regulation of docking and launching is 'an exercise of the zoning component of the police power, and is not a valid exercise of police power delegated by the Legislature to a local unit of government under a law, such as the township ordinance act,3 generally delegating police power.
A
Under well-established authority, see part n,
—a zoning regulation may not be enacted by a local unit of government under a general delegation of the police power, such as the township ordinance act;
—a zoning regulation may be enacted by a local unit of government only when the Legislature has delegated specifically to the local unit of government the power to enact the zoning regulation, *335which is ordinarily done by enactment of a zoning enabling act such as the Township Rural Zoning Act.4
A zoning regulation or ordinance, we all agree, must be enacted in accordance with the provisions of a zoning enabling act, and is invalid unless enacted in strict compliance with the procedures prescribed by law for the enactment of a zoning regulation or ordinance.5
Bloomfield Township, acknowledges that ordinance no. 397 was not enacted in accordance with the provisions of the trza.
Since this ordinance is a zoning regulation, not enacted in accordance with the procedural requirements of the trza, and a zoning regulation may not be preserved as an enactment in the exercise of the general police power, this ordinance is not valid.
B
I agree with the majority that "townships have the authority to regulate boat docking and launching for the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of persons and property within their communities under the township ordinance act.”6 A township could, accordingly, appropriately enact, under the township ordinance act, a regulation barring the docking of motorboats in an unsafe or hazardous manner, or the launching of motorboats during usual sleeping hours.7
The asserted "health, safety, welfare, property” justification for the enactment of the instant ordi*336nance is, however, essentially fictitious. The ordinance does not, in practical effect, regulate docking or launching of motorboats by a person owning land abutting Square Lake, who may dock, launch and operate a motorboat, insofar as this regulation by the township is concerned, of any size, at any hour, and without regard to any hazard or annoyance involved.
The ordinance, in practical effect, regulates only the docking and launching of a motorboat by a "back-lot” owner, a person whose home has not been constructed on land fronting on Square Lake, but who has an undivided interest, together with others, in an out-lot, set aside for recreational purposes, fronting on Square Lake.
This ordinance exemplifies
[t]he majestic egalitarianism of the law, which forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread. [Anatole France, Le Lys Rouge (1894), ch 7.]
C
If relatively small Square Lake cannot accommodate all the motorboats that all persons having a riparian or littoral right of access to Square Lake might launch, the township might, by ordinance adopted under the township ordinance act, allocate the motorboat use of the lake in a manner that recognizes the rights of all persons, back-lot owners as well as front-lot owners, having such a vested property right to the motorboat use of Square Lake.
It appears that the plaintiff condominium association seeks no more than to continue to dock and launch no more than seven motorboats. If the real *337reason8 for the enactment of this ordinance was that Square Lake is overcrowded, the hours of use could be allocated in a manner that recognizes the preexisting rights of all users who, apart from such a governmental regulation, would, as a matter of common law,9 be required to exercise their rights in a manner that recognizes that others with a like riparian or littoral right have an equal right to such use.
The majority does not predicate the validity of the ordinance on the dangers and noise associated with motorboats. Under the majority’s analysis, the township could as easily bar back-lot owners from exercising their riparian and littoral rights of access to Square Lake for the launching of canoes, rowboats, sailboats, kayaks, rubber rafts, inner tubes, swimming or fishing.10
D
The failure to enact ordinance no. 397, a zoning ordinance, in accordance with the procedural requirements of the trza is not “harmless error”— *338often the first and "last resort” of a court persuaded that a particular exercise of state power or trial court result should be sustained although procedures prescribed by law have not been observed.
The Legislature has, when delegating the zoning power,11 consistently required that a use extant at the time of enactment of a zoning regulation be permitted to be continued as a nonconforming use.12
The members of the plaintiff condominium association had, before enactment of this ordinance, been docking and launching up to seven motorboats on or from the 160-foot out-lot parcel fronting on the lake. The ordinance is invalid as applied to the plaintiff condominium association at least to the extent it does not permit the condominium association to continue the nonconforming use.
The majority distinguishes Bane v Pontiac Twp, 343 Mich 481; 72 NW2d 134 (1955), on the basis that there "the Court expanded the principle of nonconforming use, retroactivity in zoning”13 to provide relief to the plaintiffs, but does not provide Bane relief to the condominium association al*339though the nonconforming use issue has been briefed and argued.14
E
Until Fox & Associates, Inc v Hayes Twp, 162 Mich App 647; 413 NW2d 465 (1987), was decided, Bloomfield Township contended — see part m — that ordinance no. 397 was a zoning ordinance. This Court granted leave to appeal in this case primarily to consider whether Fox & Associates was correctly decided, but is unable to reach that issue because ordinance no. 397 was not adopted in accordance with the procedural requirements of the trza. The Hayes Township zoning ordinance at issue in Fox & Associates, much like ordinance no. 397, prohibited more than one "mooring, slip or dock space for each” 100 feet of lake frontage.
In Hess v West Bloomfield Twp, Michigan Supreme Court, Docket No. 91240, the trial court granted partial summary disposition in favor of the plaintiff back-lot owners on the authority of Fox & Associates, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. The provision of the West Bloomfield Township zoning ordinance there in issue requires planning commission approval for "boat launching, docking or mooring.”
An application by West Bloomfield Township for leave to appeal is pending in this Court in Hess. West Bloomfield Township there asks this Court to *340consider whether Fox & Associates was correctly decided. The instant appeal should not be decided until this Court decides whether to grant leave to appeal in Hess. If leave to appeal is granted, the correct disposition here would be to order reargument with Hess.
If this Court, either in Hess or in some other case, concludes that the regulation of boat docking or launching in the manner provided for in the West Bloomfield Township (Hess) zoning ordinance or the Hayes Township (Fox & Associates) zoning ordinance is within the delegation of zoning power under the trza, then the decision today, that the docking or launching of motorboats may, because such regulation is not zoning,15 be regulated in the manner provided in Bloomfield Township ordinance no. 397, should at the same time be reconsidered, and either
—relief should be granted to the members of the plaintiff condominium association, or
—this Court should reconsider the rule of law, well established in this and other jurisdictions— see part n — that a zoning regulation may not be enacted by a local unit of government under a general delegation of the police power, such as the township ordinance act.
i
Ordinance no. 397 provides that "no launching and/or docking [of a motorboat] shall be permitted with respect to a separate frontage of less than 100 feet,” and that if the continuous length of a separate frontage is greater than 150 feet, one additional boat may be launched and docked for each 100 feet of continuous frontage in excess of *341the initial 150 feet, and that the 100 feet minimum shall not apply to "lots or parcels constituting a building site of record” before the effective date of the ordinance.16 This ordinance thus locates the property surrounding Square Lake in a number of different zones:
*342NUMBER OF
CONTINUOUS FRONTAGE MOTORBOATS
ON SQUARE LAKE PERMITTED
Property with less than 100 feet not "constituting a building site of record” prior to the effective date of ordinance no. 397, is one zone None
Property with less than 100 feet that does constitute "a building site of record” prior to the effective date of the ordinance, is another zone One
Property with 100 to 249 feet is another zone One
Property with 250-349 feet is another zone Two
Property with 350-449 feet is another zone Three
Property with 450-549 feet is another zone Four
Property with 550-649 feet is another zone Five
Property with 650-749 feet is another zone Six
Property with 750-849 feet is another zone Seven
Property with 850-949 feet is another zone Eight
Property with 950-1049 feet is another zone Nine
Under the foregoing zoning classifications, all the members of the plaintiff condominium association may singly or in combination dock and launch but one motorboat from the 160-foot parcel in which each member of the plaintiff condominium *343association has a vested property right of access to the lake.17
n
The police power resides in the state. Cities, townships, and other local units of government may only exercise the police power to the extent it has been delegated to them by the state:
The governmental authority known as "police power” is concededly an inherent attribute of State sovereignty. It only belongs to subordinate governmental divisions when and as conferred by the State either through its Constitution or constitutionally authorized legislation. [Clements v McCabe, 210 Mich 207, 215; 177 NW 722 (1920).]
Before the enactment of zoning enabling acts delegating zoning power to local units of government, the Legislature had delegated to local units of government other components of the police power under general enabling acts such as the township ordinance act. The question arose whether local units of government could zone in the exercise of such a general grant of police power. This Court,18 and other courts, ruled they could not. Indeed, Bloomfield Township acknowledged in its brief that "[t]here are areas of regulation, such as zoning, which have been held to be excluded from this general conferral of authority [of police power] . . . .”
Maryland’s highest court said:_
*344We, and our predecessors, have held that the zoning powers of municipal corporations are derived from the State Enabling Acts and not from any general grant of the State’s police power to municipal corporations. [Lunter v Laudeman, 251 Md 203, 209; 246 A2d 540 (1968).][19]
A municipality may not avoid the substantive and procedural limitations of a zoning enabling act by claiming that an ordinance that enacts regulations that are within its power to enact under a zoning enabling act is valid as an enactment pursuant to the general police power. Krajenke Buick Sales v Hamtramck City Engineer, 322 Mich 250, 255; 33 NW2d 781 (1948).20
Other authorities agree:
It is true that zoning power is justified only as an exercise of the general police power but this will not permit a municipality to evade the protections thrown about the citizen’s use of his property by the legislative limitations imposed on the zoning power by the device of labeling a zoning act a mere exercise of police power. [Ellison v Fort Lauderdale, 183 So 2d 193, 195 (Fla, 1966). Emphasis added.][21]
*345Where a municipality has general police powers as well as specific zoning authority, it must adopt and enforce zoning regulations under the specific grant rather than the general one. [1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning (3d ed), § 2.20, p 70.]
In Bane v Pontiac Twp, supra, the plaintiffs were poor people who had lived in trailer homes for many years. This Court held that a township ordinance which mandated running water, inside toilets, and prohibited the use of trailer homes outside of trailer parks, could not be applied to the plaintiffs’ preexisting nonconforming use.
The Court said that "this particular provision in regard to trailers has the effect of a zoning, rather than a building, regulation ordinance.” Id., p 492 (emphasis added). Since the plaintiffs’ occupancy of trailers outside designated trailer parks constituted a preexisting nonconforming use, the law, which had "the effect of a zoning,” could not be enforced against them.22
This Court has also ruled that unless the procedural requirements set forth in a zoning enabling act for the enactment of a zoning ordinance are "strictly adhered” to, the enactment is not valid:
Indeed, this Court has consistently held that the procedures outlined in the zoning-enabling act must be strictly adhered to. Krajenke Buick Sales v Hamtramck City Engineer, 322 Mich 250 (1948); *346Stevens v Madison Heights, 358 Mich 90 [99 NW2d 564] (1959). As we stated in Stevens:
"The statute spells out a certain procedure that must be followed to enact a zoning ordinance; this procedure admittedly was not followed by the city in this case; and therefore the ordinance in question is invalid.” 358 Mich 90, 93.
Therefore, the amendment to the ordinance, having been enacted by a procedure different from and contrary to the procedure required by the zoning-enabling act, is invalid. [Korash v Livonia, 388 Mich 737, 746; 202 NW2d 803 (1972).]
Ill
Bloomfield Township contended that this ordinance was a zoning ordinance until the Court of Appeals held that the trza did not provide townships with the power to regulate boat docking. See Fox & Associates, Inc v Hayes Twp, supra23 In Bloomfield Township’s answer to the motion for preliminary injunction, Bloomfield Township stated that it "admit[s] that this action involves the validity of two ordinances enacted by Bloomfield Township to regulate land-use related lake access.” (Emphasis added.)
In its "brief in opposition to preliminary injunctive relief,” Bloomfield Township defended the *347validity of ordinance no. 397’s limitations on boat docking solely on the basis that the trza authorized the adoption of the ordinance, and that the provisions of the ordinance constituted a reasonable exercise of the zoning power.24 The township ordinance act, delegating elements of the police power but not the zoning power,25 was not mentioned in the brief.
Seven days after that brief was filed, Fox & Associates was decided by the Court of Appeals. Since then, Bloomfield Township has been striving to show that ordinance no. 397 is not a zoning ordinance. Nevertheless, in its brief on appeal to this Court, Bloomfield Township states:
[I]t is a matter of elementary logic that regulation of waterways and water front development, including boat launching and boat dockage, is clearly contemplated in the overall scheme of township planning and zoning.
It will be demonstrated in the Argument portion of this Brief that it would be legally sound to construe Act 246 [the township ordinance act] and zea [Township Rural Zoning Act] as delegating to townships the authority to regulate boat launching and boat dockage. Moreover, construing Act 246 and zea in such a manner is compelled by the policy consideration that planning, zoning and *348regulation is effective only when undertaken on a township-wide basis. [Emphasis added.]
IV
Provisions substantially affecting or interfering with the use and enjoyment of land are zoning provisions:
If an ordinance substantially affects land use, it must be enacted under the procedures which govern zoning and rezoning. [City of Sanibel v Buntrock, 409 So 2d 1073, 1075 (Fla App, 1982).]
We emphasize that ordinarily municipalities must follow statutory or charter zoning procedures strictly whenever they propose a substantial interference with land use, for such procedures are constitutionally mandated to insure that private property owners receive due process of law. [City of Escondido v Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc, 8 Cal 3d 785, 790; 106 Cal Rptr 172; 505 P2d 1012 (1973).]
Where the particular restriction constitutes, or would constitute, a substantial interference with land use, the municipality ordinarily must treat it as a zoning regulation and must follow statutory or charter zoning procedures, even though other authority for the particular type of ordinance has been granted. [1 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning, § 1.02(3), p 1-29.]
Zoning is governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings according to districts or zones. [8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 25.01, p 6.]
Bloomfield Township ordinance no. 397 is a zoning ordinance; it both substantially affects the use and enjoyment of back land, and substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of back *349land. The ordinance does not limit the times that motorboats may be operated.26 Nor does it mandate safety procedures or provide for licensing of motorboats without regard or unrelated to the ownership and use of land, and back land in particular.
Owner-members of the plaintiff condominium association each possess an undivided interest in a lake-access easement.27
The ordinance is designed to deny motorboat lake access to landowners having property rights in lake frontage where the land on which their home is located is in a back-lot zone and not within a frontage zone. Such a limitation on a back-lot owner’s right to exercise a property interest that runs with the back lot substantially affects and interferes with the use and enjoyment of the land, and is a zoning limitation.
Ordinance no. 397 was enacted as a step in Bloomfield Township’s ongoing effort to control multiunit development around lakes in the township, which began in the early 1960’s when developers successfully challenged certain single family zoning classifications. Attempting to avert the perceived detrimental effects of "funnel development,”28 Bloomfield Township in 1974 began the *350first in a series of attempts to limit the lake-access rights of back-lot owners.29
v
The majority asserts that "[ljaunching and docking boats on inland lakes are 'activities/ and the number of boats that can be launched or docked is very much akin to a parking regulation on a residential street.”30
A street parking regulation does not, however, preclude the "launching” of a vehicle, parked in a garage or elsewhere, into the stream of traffic. Ordinance no. 397 seeks to do just that, to preclude not only the docking of a motorboat, but also the launching, of a motorboat into the lake.
The right to dock, in contrast with street parking on a residential street, includes the right to create parking, "[t]o wharf out to navigability.”31 The construction of a dock enlarges the parking available for mooring boats. Ordinance no. 397 thus does not allocate the available parking, as does a street parking regulation, but rather seeks to reduce the available parking.
Characterizing launching and docking as an "activity” does not advance the analysis. Regulating the use of lands and buildings is clearly zoning, although one who uses lands and buildings is clearly, when using lands or buildings, engaged in an activity.
The majority states that "[a] zoning ordinance is defined as an ordinance which regulates the use of land and buildings according to districts, areas, or *351locations.”32 To the extent that the majority’s analysis depends on distinguishing between a regulation of the use of "land and buildings” and a regulation respecting launching and docking boats on "inland lakes,”33 the analysis tends to support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in Fox & Associates:
Even with the liberal construction of the provisions of the constitution in mind, we do not believe that the trza grants authority to townships to regulate or limit boat dockage construction or riparian access rights. After consideration of all the applicable rules of statutory construction, we can only conclude that the Legislature, in enacting the trza, granted authority to townships to zone land use but not water use or to regulate riparian rights. Accordingly, the provisions in the Hayes Township zoning ordinance which limit boat dock-age and "funnel development,” § 5.13(A) and (B), are invalid.[34] [Fox & Associates, p 656.]
VI
The actions of Bloomfield Township in distin*352guishing in ordinance no. 397 between property owners on the basis of location of the land and the dimensions of their interests substantially affects and interferes with the use and enjoyment of back land and constitute zoning.35 Because ordinance no. 397 was not enacted pursuant to the procedures prescribed by the trza, the ordinance is not valid.
Cavanagh, C.J. I agree with Justice Levin that the ordinance in question is an exercise of the township’s zoning power. This Court has expressly held that riparian owners enjoy exclusive rights including the right to erect docks and the right to anchor boats.1 In addition, riparian rights are property rights.2 The nature of the right does not prevent the township from regulating the right, but it requires the township to do so under the Township Rural Zoning Act, MCL 125.271; MSA 5.2963(1). As a property right, the right to dock *353boats might more appropriately be accomplished under the provisions of the trza. The parties admit that the ordinance in question was enacted without regard to the public hearing provisions of the trza and, therefore, the ordinance must fail.3
I also concur with Justice Levin’s assertion that the township could, under the township ordinance act, properly enact a regulation barring the unsafe docking of boats, or regulating the hours of boating, or limiting the speed of boats upon the lake. But the ordinance at issue does more than regulate activities. Article IV, § 4.1 of the contested ordinance declares that "not more than one boat shall be launched and/or docked adjacent to each separate frontage.” The ordinance restricts the riparian rights of the property owners on the basis of the length of lake frontage, it is, therefore, distinguishable from ordinances regulating activities as in Miller v Fabius Twp Bd, 366 Mich 250; 114 NW2d 205 (1962), and Checker Cab Co v Romulus Twp, 371 Mich 232; 123 NW2d 772 (1963).
I would affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals decision which held that the township does not have authority under the township ordinance act to regulate these property rights.
Mallett, J., took no part in the decision of this case._

 Bloomfield Township ordinance no. 397, art III, § 3.1(e).

 Bane v Pontiac Twp, 343 Mich'481, 492; 72 NW2d 134 (1955).

 MCL 41.181; MSA 5.45(1).

 MCL 125.271; MSA 5.2963(1).

 Ante, p 316, n 11.
See Korash v Livonia, 388 Mich 737, 746; 202 NW2d 803 (1972), quoted in text following n 22.

 Ante, p 313.

 See Miller v Fabius Twp Bd, 366 Mich 250; 114 NW2d 205 (1962).

 Because the plaintiff condominium association prevailed both at the trial court and Court of Appeals levels, it has not had occasion to develop the record evidence tending to show that the real reason for the adoption of the ordinance is not overcrowding of the lake, but rather to restrict further development of the back land.

 [A]ll the riparian proprietors have an equal or common right to use the water, but each must exercise his rights in a reasonable manner and to a reasonable extent, so as not to interfere unnecessarily with the corresponding rights of others. [23 Michigan Law & Practice, Waters and Watercourses, § 2, p 262.]

 See n 22 concerning Bloomfield Township ordinance no. 340 requiring "nonriparian owners” to obtain prior approval from the Township Zoning Board of Appeals before making any use of inland lakes.
See also n 23 concerning the Hayes Township ordinance which limited access — in Hayes Township — to Lake Charlevoix to one living unit for each 100 feet of lake frontage.

 MCL 125.286; MSA 5.2963(16), township zoning; MCL 125.216; MSA 5.2961(16), county zoning; MCL 125.583a; MSA 5.2933(1), village zoning.

 In an action based upon a prior nonconforming use the reasonableness of the zoning amendment is not in issue. A prior nonconforming use is a vested right to continue the lawful use of real estate in the manner it was used prior to the adoption of a zoning ordinance. Though the ordinance be reasonable, it cannot operate to oust the property owner of his vested right. [Dusdal v City of Warren, 387 Mich 354, 359-360; 196 NW2d 778 (1972).]

 Ante, p 323, n 19.

 In Hilt v Weber, 252 Mich 198, 225; 233 NW 159 (1930), this Court said that docking boats, "[t]o wharf out to navigability,” are riparian rights. "Riparian rights are property, for the taking or destruction of which by the State compensation must be made . . . .”
There is no doubt that a riparian owner can grant an easement over his land to permit a nonriparian owner to have access to the water. [Thompson v Enz, 379 Mich 667, 696; 154 NW2d 473 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting).]

 "Bloomfield Township ordinance no. 397 is not a zoning ordinance.” Ante, p 323 (emphasis in original).

 Bloomfield Township ordinance no. 397 provides:
The Township of Bloomfield Ordains: ■
Article III. Definitions.
Section 3.1. For the purpose of construction and application of this Ordinance, the following definitions shall apply:
(e) "Separate Frontage” means that portion of a lot or parcel of land existing on documentation recorded within the Oakland County Register of Deeds, which abuts or intersects with the normal high water mark of a lake, whether such lot or parcel is owmed by one or more persons, or commonly owned by several persons, or combinations of persons.
Article IV. Regulations.
Section 4.1. Subject to the provisions below, not more than one boat shall be launched and/or docked adjacent to each separate frontage.
Section 4.2. If the continuous length of a separate frontage is greater than 150 feet, one additional boat may be launched and/or docked for each 100 feet of continuous frontage in excess of the initial 150 feet. For the purpose of computing the length of frontage, the measurement shall be along the water’s edge at the normal high water mark of the lake as determined by the Department of Natural Resources, or if the Department has not made such a finding, the normal high water mark location shall be determined in the [discretion] of the Township. Moreover, the measurement shall be made only along a natural shoreline, and shall not include any man-made[] channel, lagoon, canal or the like.
Section 4.3. Following the effective date of this Ordinance, no launching and/or docking shall be permitted with respect to a separate frontage of less than 100 feet, provided, this provision shall not apply to lots or parcels constituting a building site of record prior to the effective date of this Ordinance.

 The members of another condominium association, which share the right to use the 160-foot out-lot, apparently have the right to launch nine motorboats, because their condominium units front on roughly 1,000 feet of Square Lake. They are not parties to this litigation.

 Id, p 215.

 The court ruled that an ordinance adopted by the mayor and aldermen that prohibited the petitioner from attaching a pier with four permanent slips to his riparian lot was invalid because the Legislature had not provided the mayor and aldermen the power to consider zoning questions.

 Krajenke commenced an action to require issuance of a building permit. It averred that its application for the permit was in proper form and complied with all requirements. The municipality contended that the building would violate an ordinance requiring new construction to conform to the established building line in the district. It further contended that the ordinance was not a zoning ordinance, but a building code. This Court invalidated the ordinance because it was not enacted in compliance with the zoning enabling act.

 The court invalidated an ordinance barring horses on land zoned r-o because it was not adopted according to the procedures set forth in a zoning enabling act.

 The plaintiffs there were subject, as are the members of the condominium association here, to the law of nuisance. Id., p 494.
Ordinance no. 397 accommodates some preexisting nonconforming uses by permitting certain owners with less than one hundred feet of lake frontage to launch and dock a boat if the lot constituted "a building site of record prior to the effective date of this Ordinance.” Section 4.3.
Bloomfield Township ordinance no. 340, which is not before the Court, makes no such accommodation. Ordinance no. 340 requires nonriparian owners to obtain prior approval from the Township Zoning Board of Appeals before making any use of inland lakes.

 The ordinance at issue in Fox & Associates prohibited more than one "mooring, slip or dock space for each one hundred (100) feet of lake frontage,” and limited access to Lake Charlevoix to one living unit for each 100 feet of lake frontage, § 5.13(A) and (B) of the Hayes Township Zoning Ordinance. Hayes township did not contend in Fox & Associates that these restrictions did not constitute zoning.
Neither does the township so contend in West Bloomfield Twp v Hess, Michigan Supreme Court, Docket No. 91240, where the township refused to allow the plaintiff to construct a seasonal boat dock for the use of subdivision homeowners on a common riparian lot. West Bloomfield Township attempted to distinguish Fox & Associates by arguing that it was regulating land use, which is authorized by the trza, and not regulating water use as was Hayes Township in Fox & Associates.

 The brief states:
The Township Zoning Enabling Act, MCL 125.271, et seq. [MSA 5.2963(1) et seq.], expressly authorizes the enactment of a zoning ordinance to achieve: the needs of the state citizens for natural resources and recreation; facilitate adequate and efficient provisions for water and recreation; to conserve natural resources; and to promote the public health, safety and welfare. Defendant submits that such broad grants of authority clearly provide the Township with the right to regulate land-use related lake access, particularly for recreational purposes.

 See n 3.

 See Miller v Fabius Twp Bd, n 7 supra.

 McCardel v Smolen, 404 Mich 89; 273 NW2d 3 (1978), relying on Cass Co Park Trustees v Wendt, 361 Mich 247; 105 NW2d 138 (1960), and Backus v Detroit, 49 Mich 110; 13 NW 380 (1882).

 In Lunter v Laudeman, supra, see n 19 and accompanying text, a riparian lot owner applied to the "Port Wardens,” for permission to construct a pier with boat slips on his lot. Neighboring property owners objected, but the wardens, who had jurisdiction only to consider navigation problems in their decision, approved. The mayor and aldermen overruled them by ordinance, and barred construction of the pier.
Maryland’s highest court held that there was no evidence that the pier would hinder navigation, and that the action of the mayor and aldermen was taken in response to complaints by the neighbors that " 'we worry about the fact that it is a residential area, and we would like to keep it that way.’ ” These objections were, "in regard to the possible use of the pier for commercial purposes or by more boats *350than supposedly permitted in a Residential c zone” and, “the problem, if any, is a zoning problem over which . . . the Port Wardens [and mayor and aldermen] have no jurisdiction.” Id., p 213.

 See n 22.

 Ante, pp 324-325.

 Hilt v Weber, n 14 supra.

 Ante, p 323 (emphasis added). McQuillin states that whether an ordinance is zoning depends on the "nature and purpose of the ordinance, its relation to the general plan of zoning in the city, its provisions and the terms used.” 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 25.10, p 31.

 "The ordinance does not regulate the use of land or lake frontage” (ante, p 323) (emphasis in original); "[l]aunching and docking boats on inland lakes are 'activities’ ”; “a township regulation of docking and launching boats on its inland lake” (ante, pp 324, 325) (emphasis added).

 The trza expressly lists the specific subjects which a township may regulate. Section 1, as quoted above, states that townships may provide by zoning ordinance for the "regulation of land development,” "establishment of districts,” "regulate the use of land and structures,” "limit the inappropriate overcrowding of land,” etc. The only mention of “water” in § 1 is in the provision quoted above relevant to the "efficient provision for transportation systems, sewage disposal, water, energy, education, recreation, and other public service and facility requirements.” [Fox & Associates, p 654.]

 In contending that the provisions of ordinance no. 397 are not authorized by the thza, the condominium association is not asserting that the ordinance is not a zoning ordinance, but rather that the scope of the provisions of ordinance no. 397 exceeds the zoning power that was delegated by the terms of the trza.
This Court need not decide whether the trza authorizes a township to regulate motorboat docking and launching. Since Bloomfield Township concedes that it did not follow the procedures prescribed by the trza when ordinance no. 397 was adopted, the ordinance is invalid even if the scope of the ordinance does not exceed the scope of the zoning power delegated to townships.

 Persons who own an estate or have a possessory interest in riparian land enjoy certain exclusive rights. These include the right to erect and maintain docks along the owner’s shore, and the right to anchor boats permanently off the owner’s shore. [Thies v Howland, 424 Mich 282, 288; 380 NW2d 463 (1985) (citations omitted). See also Hilt v Weber, 252 Mich 198, 226; 233 NW 159 (1930).]

 While the exact nature of [riparian] rights has been variously described, it is generally agreed that they constitute property rights, possessing the usual attributes and incidents of property, and are entitled to protection as such. [78 Am Jur 2d, Waters, § 262, p 706.]

 For a declaration that ordinance no. 397 was not adopted under the authority of the Township Rural Zoning Act, see Affidavit of Township Clerk. In addition, the attorney for Bloomfield Township declared during oral argument that only a general police power ordinance was before this Court, not a zoning ordinance.