Court Opinion

ID: 9581286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:13:20.330591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:49.867135
License: Public Domain

Justice Exum
dissenting.
The majority correctly concludes that a defendant’s acknowledgment of past, unprosecuted criminal wrongdoing at a sentencing hearing under the Fair Sentencing Act is not the equivalent of the statutory aggravating factor defined by section 15A-1340 (a)(l)(o) of the Act, i.e., “defendant has a prior conviction or convictions for criminal offenses punishable by more than 60 days’ confinement.” Judge Becton, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, demonstrates persuasively why such an acknowledgment should not be treated the same as if defendant had been convicted for his wrongdoing.
Yet the record reveals, I think beyond argument, that the sentencing judge treated this defendant’s acknowledgment precisely as if the statutory prior conviction aggravating circumstance were present. Indeed, he was careful to note that the acts *282of wrongdoing were “criminal offenses all of which carry sentences in excess of 60 days.” He then proceeded to list each offense in language suitable for an indictment, specifying the class into which the offense falls under the Fair Sentencing Act. The Court of Appeals accurately assessed the sentencing judge’s action. It affirmed on the ground defendant’s acknowledgment was the equivalent of prior convictions under section 15A-1340(a)(l)(o), saying:
If the fact of a defendant’s prior convictions punishable by 60 days’ confinement is reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing, we believe the fact of a defendant’s admitted commission of prior criminal offenses also punishable by 60 days’ confinement is reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing.
This, I think, is the error committed at sentencing which entitles defendant to a new sentencing hearing. As the majority seems to recognize, defendant’s acknowledgment of past wrongful acts bears on sentencing, not as if these acts were prior convictions but only as evidence of defendant’s character. That defendant committed the acts tends to rebut the evidence he offered of his good character. On the other hand defendant’s voluntary acknowledgment of his past wrongdoing could indicate that defendant was at least truthful, willing to admit his past wrongs, and perhaps ready to mend his ways and lead a better life. This acknowledgment could thus be some evidence of present good character.
The point is that however this aspect of the case is considered, it goes to the question of defendant’s character. This is how defendant’s acknowledgment should have been, but was not, regarded by the trial judge. The crucial question for purposes of sentencing in this case is whether defendant is a Dr. Jekyll or a Mr. Hyde. Is he a person of good character or bad character? Do his past wrongful acts demonstrate his bad character or does his acknowledgment of them demonstrate present good character? Is he entitled to have his sentence mitigated because he is a person of good character or aggravated because he is a person of bad character? The trial judge never answered these questions. In mitigation he found defendant to be a person of good character or reputation in his community and one with no prior criminal con*283victions. Yet he determined to aggravate the sentence as if defendant had been criminally convicted in the past.
The majority recognizes that a sentence may be set aside if it is imposed under “circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice or . . . which [offend] the public sense of fair play.” I believe the sentence before us was imposed under such circumstances. My vote is to reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing to be conducted consistently with the principles the majority recognizes but does not apply in this case.
Justices MITCHELL and Frye join in this dissenting opinion.