Court Opinion

ID: 9966355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 20:00:43.402654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:52.749851
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                  ____________

                                       No. 23-2351
                                      ____________

                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                             v.

                             ESTEBAN LATORRE-CACHO,
                                             Appellant
                                   ____________

                    On Appeal from the United States District Court
                         For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
                         (District Court No. 1-21-cr-00160-001)
                    District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
                                     ____________

           Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on May 2, 2024
                                    ____________

               Before: KRAUSE, CHUNG, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

                                   (Filed: May 6, 2024)
                                      ____________

                                        OPINION*
                                      ____________

CHUNG, Circuit Judge.

       Esteban Latorre-Cacho challenges the District Court’s denial of his suppression

*
       This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does
not constitute binding precedent.
motion, arguing that his traffic stop was extended without reasonable suspicion and that

his consent to search his vehicle was involuntary. Since both arguments fail, we will

affirm.

I.        BACKGROUND1

          In 2021, Trooper Brian Konopka, positioned in an unmarked police vehicle,

observed Latorre-Cacho violate two Pennsylvania traffic laws.2 Konopka conducted a

traffic stop of Latorre-Cacho’s minivan, which was recorded by the police vehicle’s

dashboard camera. Approximately four minutes into the stop, Konopka ran Latorre-

Cacho’s driver’s license as well as checks of two additional police systems and a criminal

history check (the “criminal database checks”).3 Contemporaneously with these checks,

the two also engaged in conversation about Latorre-Cacho’s travel and other general

topics. Around seven minutes into the stop, Konopka began asking Latorre-Cacho about

boxes Konopka observed in Latorre-Cacho’s vehicle. Approximately nine minutes into

the stop, Konopka asked for Latorre-Cacho’s consent to search the vehicle, and Latorre-

Cacho gave both oral and signed written consent.

          Upon searching the car, Konopka discovered large amounts of cocaine and

1
       Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision.
2
       Latorre-Cacho does not contest that Konopka had probable cause to believe that
the violations occurred.
3
       As noted by the District Court, the record is insufficient to determine when each of
the criminal database checks began or to determine the duration of each check. Although
Latorre-Cacho’s argument on appeal addresses each individual check, we will treat them
as one cumulative criminal history check as Latorre-Cacho essentially did before the
District Court.

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arrested Latorre-Cacho. Latorre-Cacho moved to suppress the evidence, alleging that

Konopka extended the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion and that he did not obtain

valid consent to a search of the vehicle. After a suppression hearing, the District Court

denied the motion. Latorre-Cacho ultimately pleaded guilty but preserved his right to

appeal the denial of his suppression motion.

II.    DISCUSSION4

       A.     Extension of the Traffic Stop

       A lawful traffic stop must be conducted reasonably. Whren v. United States, 517

U.S. 806, 810 (1996). That means, among other things, that it lasts “no longer than is

necessary to effectuate” the mission of the stop and ends “when tasks tied to the traffic

infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Rodriguez v. United States,

575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (citation and quotation omitted). When a traffic stop extends

beyond this point, it is unlawful if unsupported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 355; see

also United States v. Stewart, 92 F.4th 461, 467 (3d Cir. 2024).

       In determining whether a traffic stop was unlawfully extended, our analysis is two-

fold. First, we must identify the “Rodriguez moment” — the point in time “when the stop

was measurably extended” beyond its mission. Stewart, 92 F.4th at 467. Even “a de

minimis extension” from the “basic mission of investigating a traffic violation” is unlawful

4
       The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
       We review legal arguments challenging a suppression ruling de novo and factual
findings for clear error. United States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404, 409 (3d Cir. 2018).
“Mixed questions of law and fact are subject to independent appellate review.” Id.

                                               3
if unsupported by reasonable suspicion. United States v. Hurtt, 31 F.4th 152, 160 (3d Cir.

2022). In determining whether an action was within mission, we review whether it was

“objectively reasonable and proper under Rodriguez.” United States v. Hunter, 88 F.4th

221, 224 (3d Cir. 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-6404, 2024 WL 675161 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2024).

Second, we determine “whether the facts available to the officer up to that moment

established reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Stewart, 92 F.4th at 467. In

evaluating whether reasonable suspicion exists, “we consider ‘the totality of the

circumstances—the whole picture.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264,

271 (3d Cir. 2020)). Reasonable suspicion requires more than a “hunch,” id. (citation

omitted), but considerably less than a showing of criminality by a preponderance of the

evidence, United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The

standard is objective and we consider “‘whether a reasonable, trained officer standing in

the officer’s shoes could articulate specific reasons justifying’ the extension of the stop.”

Stewart, 92 F.4th at 468 (quoting United States v. McCants, 952 F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir.

2020)).

       The District Court determined that the Rodriguez moment occurred when Konopka

questioned Latorre-Cacho about the boxes in his vehicle. Latorre-Cacho argues that the

Rodriguez moment occurred earlier, approximately four minutes into the traffic stop when

Konopka ran the criminal database checks.5 We recently held that a criminal record check

5
        Latorre-Cacho also argues that the Rodriguez moment occurred at the onset of the
stop when Konopka asked Latorre-Cacho about his travels. It was Latorre-Cacho who
initiated the topic of travel, however, and it was reasonable for Konopka to respond in

                                             4
that “was supported by objectively reasonable safety concerns … [fell] squarely within the

confines of the stop’s mission.” Hunter, 88 F.4th at 226. Though not every criminal record

check “improves officer safety,” id. at 231 (McKee, J., concurring), “[v]iewing the

circumstances as they existed at the scene of the stop,” id. at 255, particularly the indictors

that drugs were being transported, see infra (discussion of reasonable suspicion and

supporting facts), we conclude that the criminal database checks were supported by

objectively reasonable safety concerns. Id. at 225.6 Accordingly, we see no error in the

District Court’s decision that the Rodriguez moment occurred later in time.

       Nonetheless, even assuming that the Rodriguez moment occurred at this point,

kind. Rodriguez does not require that officers abstain from questions that naturally
follow in the course of a stop; rather, it prohibits officers from extending traffic stops
with off-mission conduct. These questions were limited in scope and duration, providing
no basis to conclude that they exceeded the run-of-the-mill travel questions that we have
repeatedly held fall within the scope of a traffic stop. Garner, 961 F.3d at 271; United
States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir. 2003).
6
        Konopka testified that he did not frisk Latorre-Cacho because he had subjectively
concluded that Latorre-Cacho was not armed and dangerous. That subjective assessment
does not control our analysis here. We evaluate the reasonableness of an officer’s actions
based upon an objective standard. Hunter, 88 F.4th at 224. Moreover, while a reasonable
belief that an individual may be armed is the principal factor in evaluating the
reasonableness of a frisk for weapons, see Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009),
a criminal history check addresses a safety concern that may encompass, and be broader
than, that addressed by a frisk. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997)
(dangers posed by traffic stop include assaults); see also Jordan Blair Woods, Policing,
Danger Narratives, and Routine Traffic Stops, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 635, 640–41 (2019) (in
study of Florida traffic stops from 2005 to 2014, the “most common weapons used to
assault officers” during routine traffic stops were “hands, fists, or feet” and “the motor
vehicle itself.”). Similarly, the information obtained from a criminal history check (e.g.,
whether an individual’s history includes assault, fleeing the scene, or other conduct that
may implicate physical safety) is different than that obtained by a frisk (i.e., whether the
individual has weapons).

                                              5
giving due weight to the “totality of the circumstances” known to and observed by

Konopka, a reasonable, trained officer in his shoes could articulate specific reasons

justifying the extension of the traffic stop. Stewart, 92 F.4th at 468. These factors in

particular support such a determination:

      • Latorre-Cacho was driving a rental vehicle, which in his training and experience
        was “a common method for transporting drugs.” Appendix (“Appx”) 240; see,
        e.g., Stewart, 92 F.4th at 470 (“[W]e have counted the use of a third-party vehicle
        as a factor contributing to reasonable suspicion”); Givan, 320 F.3d at 458.
      • Latorre-Cacho’s travel plans appeared to be a “rehearsed story.” Appx 240, 293.
      • Latorre-Cacho was taking a “highly unusual route of travel between Buffalo and
        New York City, particularly his overnight stay at a hotel in Lebanon,
        Pennsylvania, where he claimed he was visiting a ‘friend.’” Appx 240; see, e.g.,
        Stewart, 92 F.4th at 468–69 (defendant’s “evasive, inconsistent, and downright
        puzzling answers to [officer’s] questions about his travel” supports reasonable
        suspicion); Givan, 320 F.3d at 458–59.
      • Latorre-Cacho was traveling on a known “drug corridor.” Appx 240; see, e.g.,
        Stewart, 92 F.4th at 468, 470–71 (traveling along “a well-known drug smuggling
        corridor” supports reasonable suspicion); Garner, 961 F.3d at 272.
      • There were multiple large boxes of electronic equipment in the car that appeared
        to have been “opened and re-taped.” Appx 240.
      • Sunshades were used to partially obscure the backseat where the boxes were
        located. Id.; see, e.g., Stewart, 92 F.4th at 468, 469 (vehicle’s “dark tint” and
        use of “sun-screening shades” supports reasonable suspicion).
      • Three cell phones were in the car. Appx 240; see, e.g., United States v. Frierson,
        611 F. App’x 82, 85 (3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential) (presence of “three cell
        phones in the console” supports reasonable suspicion).7

Thus, even if the Rodriguez moment occurred at the earlier time asserted by Latorre-Cacho,

the extension was lawful and supported by reasonable suspicion.8

7
        We give less weight to the other “commonplace, otherwise innocuous factors” that
the District Court considered, and that the trooper noted, Stewart, 92 F.4th at 473
(Freeman, J. concurring), though they also lend some support to a reasonable suspicion
determination.
8
        Since we determine there was reasonable suspicion justifying the stop even at this
earlier moment, we also conclude that it existed at the later Rodriguez moment that the
District Court identified.

                                            6
       We will affirm the District Court’s denial of Latorre-Cacho’s motion on this ground.

       B.      Validity of the Consent9

       Latorre-Cacho also argues that he did not validly consent to the search of his vehicle

because there was a “clear language barrier inhibiting [his] understanding” of the consent

form. Opening Br. at 58. He argues that although the form was in Spanish, “no one

explained the substance of the form” to him, and “he held the form far too briefly to actually

read it.” Id. at 62.

       We see no clear error in the District Court’s determination that Latorre-Cacho gave

consent “freely and voluntarily.” United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 277 (3d Cir. 2009)

(citation omitted). The District Court correctly noted that Konopka “obtained Latorre-

Cacho’s consent to search three times,” and there was no evidence of “duress or coercion.”

Appx 242–43. The video recording of the stop also confirms that “Latorre-Cacho’s words

and actions … demonstrate that he understood what he was doing when he consented to

the searches” even though there was a “slight language barrier.” Appx 243. Finally, as the

District Court noted, this “slight language barrier … [was] outweighed by numerous other

indicia of voluntariness” such as Latorre-Cacho’s age, education, and intelligence, the lack

of any use or threat of force or physical punishment by Konopka, and Latorre-Cacho’s

consenting to the search several times. Appx 243; see also Price, 558 F.3d at 278.

       Further, Latorre-Cacho’s decision to briefly review the consent form does not render

9
      Whether consent was voluntary is a factual finding subject to clear error review.
United States v. Murray, 821 F.3d 386, 391 (3d Cir. 2016).

                                              7
his consent invalid, particularly in the absence of any interference by Konopka. See, e.g.,

United States v. Roberson, 573 F. Supp. 3d 209, 233 (D.D.C. 2021) (“A defendant’s mere

failure to read a consent form when he had ample opportunity to do so does not invalidate

the resulting consent.”). Konopka informed Latorre-Cacho that he could ask any questions

before signing the Spanish-language consent form and allowed him unconstrained time to

review it. Thus, the District Court did not clearly err in concluding that consent was freely

and voluntarily given, and we will also affirm on this ground.

III.   CONCLUSION

       For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Latorre-Cacho’s

suppression motion.

                                             8