Court Opinion

ID: 9664124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:03:42.465159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:02.285533
License: Public Domain

WAHL, Justice
(concurring specially).
Although I concur in the affirmance of the conviction on both issues and agree that no prejudice was suffered by defendant, I do not believe that this case should stand to illustrate an exception to the general rule that evidence of Miranda silence is inadmissible.
The questions asked of the police officers were not atypical, nor did the answers create the kind of atypical situation present in the cases cited in the majority opinion. In United States v. Hood, 593 F.2d 293 (8 Cir. 1979), the defendant testified on direct examination that he had offered to talk to the F.B.I. when in fact he had refused to do so. Under such circumstances impeachment was held proper. 593 F.2d 297.
Evidence of Miranda silence was admissible in United States v. Fairchild, 505 F.2d 1378 (5 Cir. 1975), also cited by the majority, where the defendant freely and falsely created the impression that he had cooperated fully and actively with the police when in fact he had not.
The case before us is distinguishable. Since defendant did not take the stand, there was no need to rebut contradictory statements as there was in Hood, supra. The evidence of defendant’s cooperation, which is claimed to justify rebuttal in the instant case, was created through the testimony of several police officers and a fire department captain on cross-examination.
It was plain fact that defendant did not try to obstruct the movement of the officers, conceal any evidence, or attempt to escape. It is also fact that defendant gave his version of the incident to the officers. It was only when asked to give a written statement that defendant asked to speak first with a lawyer. This evidence of cooperation is not properly rebuttable with evidence that defendant exercised his constitutional right to remain silent.
The trial court acted correctly in instructing sua sponte the jury to disregard the testimony. We should affirm on the basis *94that no prejudice was suffered and not conclude, as did the majority, that there would have been no error in admitting the evidence under these circumstances.
ROGOSHESKE, Justice (concurring specially).
I join in the concurring opinion of Justice Wahl.
SHERAN, C. J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.