Court Opinion

ID: 9928276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 15:03:07.895647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:20.660215
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed January 31, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-1173
                      Lower Tribunal No. F00-23049A
                           ________________

                           Johnny LaFlippe,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                         The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ellen Sue
Venzer, Judge.

      Law Offices of Michelle Walsh, P.A., and Michelle R. Walsh, for
appellant.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SCALES, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

     BOKOR, J.
      Johnny LaFlippe1 appeals from an order rendered after an evidentiary

hearing, denying a motion for new trial based on allegedly newly discovered

evidence.   We have jurisdiction.     See Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(1)(D).

Because the trial court’s conclusions are supported by competent substantial

evidence, we affirm.

      On January 31, 2001, LaFlippe was charged, through an indictment,

with one count of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree

murder, and another count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Following a jury trial, LaFlippe was found guilty of first-degree murder and

attempted murder. This court affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. See

Laflipe, 888 So. 2d at 106 (affirming conviction).

      On June 15, 2020, LaFlippe filed a motion for new trial based on newly

discovered evidence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.

In the motion, LaFlippe alleged that the newly discovered evidence of a

statement made by Monyca Pierre would have had a meaningful influence

at trial and would have weakened the case enough to give rise to a

1
  LaFlippe appears in the dockets of the trial and appellate court with
variations in the spelling of his name, including Johnnie LaFlipe, Johnny
LaFlippe, and various other similar permutations. We’re using the version
chosen by his counsel of record in this appeal (Johnny LaFlippe), but it’s the
same person as in prior appeals. See, e.g., Laflipe v. State, 888 So. 2d 104
(Fla. 3d DCA 2004); LaFlipe v. State, 11 So. 3d 958 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009);
LaFlippe v. State, 338 So. 3d 348 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).

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reasonable doubt as to LaFlippe’s guilt. In her statement, Pierre claimed that

she was an eyewitness and that LaFlippe was not one of the men at the

scene of the crime. After an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court

entered an order denying LaFlippe’s motion for new trial.

      Under Florida law, a defendant must meet two requirements before a

conviction may be set aside based on newly discovered evidence. The

parties do not contest the first prong, that the evidence “must have been

unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and

it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known [of it] by

the use of diligence.” Ferguson v. State, 306 So. 3d 985, 989 (Fla. 3d DCA

2020) (quoting Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998)). Instead,

the postconviction court focused on the second prong, concluding that the

newly discovered evidence would not “be of such nature that it would

probably produce an acquittal on retrial.” Id. (quoting Jones, 709 So. 2d at

521). “Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones

test if it ‘weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a

reasonable doubt as to his culpability.’” Taylor v. State, 260 So. 3d 151, 158

(Fla. 2018) (quoting Jones, 709 So. 2d at 526). In reaching this conclusion,

the “post-conviction trial court must ‘consider all newly discovered evidence

which would be admissible,’ and must ‘evaluate the weight of both the newly

                                       3
discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial.’”

Poff v. State, 41 So. 3d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (quoting Jones v.

State, 591 So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla. 1991)).

       “In determining the impact of the newly discovered evidence, the court

must conduct a cumulative analysis of all the evidence so that there is a ‘total

picture’ of the case and ‘all the circumstances of the case.’” Hildwin v. State,

141 So. 3d 1178, 1184 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Swafford v. State, 125 So. 3d

760, 776 (Fla. 2013)).

       Notably, “[t]he credibility of the newly discovered evidence can be

critical in determining whether it gives rise to a reasonable doubt as to the

defendant's culpability.” Schofield v. State, 311 So. 3d 918, 921–22 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2020) (concluding that the postconviction court’s findings as to

credibility were supported by competent substantial evidence); see also

Riechmann v. State, 966 So. 2d 298, 317 (Fla. 2007) (“[S]he conceded she

was high on crack cocaine at the time of the alleged incident and had been

convicted of many felonies, making her credibility a substantial issue. . . .

[T]he credibility of these two witnesses was a matter for the trial court's

evaluation . . . .”).

       As this case hinges on the second prong of Jones, the critical question

is whether Pierre’s testimony would “probably produce an acquittal on re-

                                       4
trial.” Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521. Here, in rendering its determination as to

whether the newly discovered evidence would give rise to a reasonable

doubt of LaFlippe’s culpability, the postconviction court primarily focused on

Pierre’s credibility. Notably, the court found Pierre’s testimony unreliable,

particularly as to the reasons in which she remained silent for nineteen years

and wished to reconnect with LaFlippe after years.             Specifically, it

determined: “Pierre's testimony was suspect – at best. Pierre is a recovering

drug addict who has brought forth her testimony after nineteen years of

silence. She testified that she had been addicted to cocaine for two years

prior to and at the time of the shooting.” Because the postconviction court’s

primary concern revolved around Pierre’s lack of credibility, the court did not

err in denying LaFlippe’s motion on this ground. See, e.g., Hitchcock v.

State, 991 So. 2d 337, 350 (Fla. 2008) (noting that witness credibility is

“critical to the newly discovered evidence analysis”).         Moreover, the

postconviction court based its credibility determination on several factors,

such as Pierre’s years of silence, addiction to cocaine, and addiction to

cocaine during the events in question.

      In addition to the competent substantial evidence supporting the lack

of witness credibility, the postconviction court went through the significant

eyewitness testimony and evidence at trial to conclude that the evidence

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against LaFlippe was “overwhelming.” Pierre’s nineteen-year-old testimony

that she did not see LaFlippe at the scene of the crime, even though she did

not directly witness the shooting, did not weaken the case against LaFlippe

“so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability” considering the

testimony at trial.   See Taylor, 260 So. 3d at 158.            Therefore, the

postconviction court’s findings are supported by competent substantial

evidence.

      Affirmed.

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