Court Opinion

ID: 9771296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:38:44.257798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:28.221822
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
In Brown v. St. Louis Public Service Company, 421 S.W.2d 255, 259 (1967), this Court held that “where there is deviation from an applicable MAI instruction which does not need modification under the facts in the particular case, prejudicial error will be presumed unless it is made perfectly clear by the proponent of the instruction that no prejudice could have resulted from such deviation.”
The rationale for the Brown holding was articulated by Judge Ben W. Swofford in McGowan v. Hoffman, 609 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Mo.App.1980):
The Supreme Court of this state with laudable intent and worthy and efficient aspiration adopted MAI and ruled so as to enforce upon the bench and bar a very strict code of restriction by and compliance with its mandatory use, all of which has effected a vast savings in judicial time and taxpayers' money. But the gate of restriction and compliance must in the interest of fundamental justice be left somewhat ajar. Thus, from the consistent and binding decisional law, since the adoption of MAI and Rule 70.02, the principle has evolved that courts faced with violations or impermissible modifications of MAI must gauge the prejudicial effect thereof. Such defect in submission of a case must be shown to be non-prejudicial before it can be given. It appears to this Court that it must be shown, and the judicial mind and conscience satisfied by means of some positive force of fact or logic, that no “prejudicial effect” has resulted from the erroneous instruction. The burden to make this showing rests upon the party offering the instruction.
In Hudson v. Carr, 668 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. banc 1984), an instruction on damages, taken from MAI without change, was given in behalf of plaintiff. Defendant asserted on appeal that under the evidence the MAI instruction should have been modified. The Court held, in such circumstance, that “when the instruction is only abstractly erroneous there is a need for balancing and balancing in this instance indicates that a new trial is not necessary.” Hudson v. Carr, 668 S.W.2d at 72.
In Fowler v. Park Corp., 673 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Mo. banc 1984), the wrong MAI instruction on standard of care was given in behalf of plaintiff and the Court, without mentioning Brown, placed the burden of demonstrating prejudice on the party opposing the instruction and held “that we should reverse only for defects of substance with substantial potential for prejudicial effect.”
It must be said that Fowler was an unwarranted and unwise extension of Hudson. See Points v. Dzur, 713 S.W.2d 634 (Mo.App.1986); Abshire v. Nordson Corp., 688 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo.App.1985) (Stewart, J., dissenting); McCarter and Behr, MAI Error After Fowler v. Park Corp.: Prejudicial or Not?, 41 J. of Mo. Bar 308 (July-August 1985). But Fowler remains intact.
I dissent.