Court Opinion

ID: 9882395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:09:12.526278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:25.967049
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Brand, 2023-Ohio-3321.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                             HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                             :          APPEAL NO. C-220602
                                                       TRIAL NO. B-1402577A
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
                                                           O P I N I O N.
   vs.                                      :

 BARON BRAND,                               :

       Defendant-Appellant.                 :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 20, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Keith Sauter,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Baron Brand, pro se.
                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

CROUSE, Presiding Judge.

       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Baron Brand appeals the Hamilton County

Common Pleas Court’s judgment denying his Crim.R. 33(B) motion for leave to file a

delayed motion for a new trial. Because Brand was not unavoidably prevented from

discovering the grounds of his new-trial motion within the prescribed time, we affirm.

                                               I.

       {¶2}   Following a jury trial in 2015, Brand was convicted of two counts of

aggravated murder, felonious assault with firearm and repeat-violent-offender

specifications, aggravated robbery, and two counts of having a weapon while under a

disability. Brand unsuccessfully challenged his convictions in his direct appeal and in

a 2021 postconviction motion. See State v. Brand, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150590,

2016-Ohio-7456, appeal not accepted, 149 Ohio St.3d 1464, 2017-Ohio-5699, 77

N.E.3d 988; State v. Brand, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210323, 2022-Ohio-1185, appeal

not accepted, 167 Ohio St.3d 1408, 2022-Ohio-2047, 188 N.E.3d 1102.

       {¶3}   In October 2022, Brand moved for leave to file a new-trial motion based

on grounds of newly discovered evidence and juror misconduct. See Crim.R. 33(A)(2)

and (6). In support of his motion, Brand attached the affidavit of Keith Jacksson, a

juror in Brand’s 2015 criminal trial. Jacksson states in his affidavit that in his opinion

“the evidence was not strong enough to find [Brand] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”

and “the decision of guilt was based upon peer pressure of jurors, with the vote of the

majority.” Brand also attached his own affidavit in support of his motion for leave,

attesting that on September 19, 2022, “He came into contact with a[n] affidavit from

one said, Keith Jacksson.” Specifically, he stated, “I was incarcerated and was notified

that there was a sworn affidavit by a Keith Jacksson.” The common pleas court denied

the motion for leave as “not well-taken.”

                                               II.

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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶4}    Brand now appeals, arguing in a single assignment of error that the

common pleas court denied him due process and abused its discretion by denying his

motion for leave under Crim.R. 33(B). We are unpersuaded.

       {¶5}    We review a court’s denial of a motion for leave to file a delayed motion

for a new trial under an abuse-of-discretion standard. State v. Hatton, 169 Ohio St.3d

446, 2022-Ohio-3991, 205 N.E.3d 513, ¶ 29. An abuse of discretion is more than an error

of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Id., citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d

1140 (1983).

       {¶6}    Under Crim.R. 33(B), a motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct

must be filed within 14 days of the verdict and a motion for a new trial based on newly

discovered evidence must be filed within 120 days of the verdict. The jury returned a

verdict in Brand’s trial on September 22, 2015. As Brand did not attempt to file a motion

for a new trial until 2021, he is well beyond either of the time limits set forth in Crim.R.

33(B). However, a party may seek leave to file a motion for a new trial based on juror

misconduct if “it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the defendant was

unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for a new trial” within the 14-day time

period. Crim.R. 33(B). To obtain leave to file a motion for a new trial based on newly

discovered evidence, the defendant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence

that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence relied upon to support

the new-trial motion within the 120-day time period. A party is unavoidably prevented

from filing a motion for a new trial if “the party had no knowledge of the existence of the

ground supporting the motion for new trial and could not have learned of the existence

of that ground within the time prescribed for filing the motion for new trial in the exercise

of reasonable diligence.” State v. McKnight, 2021-Ohio-2673, 176 N.E.3d 802 (4th

Dist.), ¶ 11, citing State v. Walden, 19 Ohio App.3d 141, 145-146, 483 N.E.2d 859 (10th

Dist.1984).

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶7}    In State v. Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190485, 2020-Ohio-6718, we

held that Smith had not been unavoidably prevented from discovering that a state’s

witness had recanted her trial testimony within the prescribed time period for filing a

new-trial motion based on newly discovered evidence, and therefore, affirmed the trial

court’s denial of Smith’s motion for leave.          In determining that Smith had not

demonstrated unavoidable prevention, we relied on the fact that the recanting witness’s

affidavit attached to Smith’s motion for leave did not speak to the circumstances of

making her affidavit and further, that Smith’s affidavit, also attached to the motion for

leave, did not attest to the circumstances of securing the witness’s affidavit. Id. at ¶ 18-

19. Therefore, there was no proof that Smith had used reasonable diligence to attempt

to discover this “new evidence” within the prescribed time frame.

       {¶8}    Similar to the defendant in Smith, Brand has submitted no proof that he

was unavoidably prevented from discovering, within the prescribed time period, that a

juror’s verdict may have been coerced. First, the juror’s affidavit did not explain the

circumstances of making his affidavit. For example, why did Jacksson decide to come

forward now, eight years after he had rendered his guilty verdict? Did Jacksson contact

Brand or did Brand or someone else contact Jacksson about his verdict? When did the

contact occur? Second, there is no information in Brand’s affidavit as to how he secured

Jacksson’s affidavit. For example, who, if anyone, directed Jacksson to set forth his

experience as a juror in an affidavit and when did that occur? Finally, Brand has offered

no evidence as to whether he used reasonable diligence within the relevant time period

to determine any juror misconduct. There is no evidence that he tried to contact or

question the jurors after the verdict was rendered.

       {¶9}    Brand argues that he could not have known about Jacksson being

pressured by other jurors until recently because jurors are not required to disclose how

they reach their verdict. While jurors are not required to discuss their deliberative

process, a defendant through defense counsel is permitted to speak with jurors following

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

a verdict and those discussions may lead to information about juror misconduct. Here,

there is no evidence that Brand sought to question the jurors after the verdict or used

reasonable diligence to discover any issues with the verdict. See State v. Schiebel, 55

Ohio St.3d 71, 75, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying leave to file a new-trial motion on the grounds of juror

misconduct when there was no evidence that the defendant used reasonable diligence

to discover issues with the verdict).

       {¶10} In Scheibel, two codefendants, Schiebel and Warner, filed motions for

leave to file a motion for a new trial outside the 14-day period alleging juror misconduct.

Warner’s attorneys interviewed several jurors immediately after the verdict was

rendered, but did not ask about “juror misconduct, outside influence, tampering, or other

improper conduct” during the interview. Id. Because his attorney made no attempt to

ask questions about any misconduct during the interview, the court determined, “It

cannot be said with any degree of probability, let alone conclusively, that Warner was

unavoidably prevented from discovering any alleged misconduct before the fourteen-day

period lapsed.” Id. Schiebel’s attorney made no attempt to interview the jury during the

14-day period and the court held, “It cannot be said that Schiebel was unavoidably

prevented from discovering an incident of juror misconduct when he made no attempt

toward such discovery.” Id. Here, there is no evidence that Brand attempted to contact

jurors after his verdict. Accordingly, like the defendants in Schiebel, Brand has not

demonstrated that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering any juror misconduct

when he made no attempts toward such discovery within the appropriate time frames.

       {¶11} Finally, Brand argues that the common pleas court should have held a

hearing on his motion for leave, but Brand did not request a hearing. Even if he had, a

trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for leave without a hearing

if there is no compelling proof that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from

discovering the grounds upon which his motion for a new trial depends. See Smith, 1st

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Dist. Hamilton No. C-190485, 2020-Ohio-6718, at ¶ 17, citing State v. Carusone, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No C-130003, 2013-Ohio-5034, ¶ 4 and 33.

                                              III.

       {¶12} Because Brand has not demonstrated that he was unavoidably prevented

from discovering the grounds upon which his new-trial motion depends, we overrule his

single assignment of error, and affirm the common pleas court’s judgment.

                                                                    Judgment affirmed.

WINKLER and KINSLEY, JJ., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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