Court Opinion

ID: 9779293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:44:06.967927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:24.991065
License: Public Domain

CADENA, Justice
(concurring).
I agree that the judgment below must be reversed and judgment be here rendered that plaintiff take nothing. However, my agreement rests solely on the fact that there is no evidence of negligence. However, even with respect to the finding of no negligence, I believe that the majority opinion, when read as a whole, paints with a brush which is much wider than is required to justify that conclusion.
My brother, Klingeman’s, opinion states that: “. . . it is now a settled doctrine that anticipation of consequences is a necessary element in determining not only whether a particular act or omission is ac-tionably negligent, but also whether the injury complained of is proximately caused by such act or omission.” This statement, read in the light of the entire opinion, may be interpreted as saying that the tests for determining negligence, or the existence, and breach, of duty, and for determining causation are the same. I am not prepared to accept that proposition.
My conclusion of no negligence is based on the fact that, in the ordinary course of human experience, there is no reason to anticipate that if the door latch of the door of an automobile is not pushed down, the door is likely to fly open, or that there exists an unreasonable risk that the door would fly open. That is, there is little or no risk that the failure to depress the door latch would create a dangerous condition. It is not necessary, in determination of the negligence question, to go beyond this and consider, from the viewpoint of foreseeability, the entire chain of events which led to plaintiff’s injury. At least, a consideration of the events intervening between the failure to depress the door latch and the injury to plaintiff need not be considered in this case.
*388In view of what has been said above, I would not reach the proximate cause issue. My unwillingness to join in the majority opinion is also due to the fact that it appears to take the position that the natural- and-probable-consequence test of proximate causation requires that the defendant should be able to foresee the precise way in which the injury was inflicted. “The injury results from a force the likelihood of the occurrence of which was what caused the defendant to be negligent even though the force causes the harm in an unforeseeable manner . . . .” Keeton, Negligence, Duty, and Causation in Texas, 16 Tex.L.Rev. 1, 12 (1937). I cannot agree that the only foreseeable danger resulting from a door of an automobile suddenly flying open is the risk of harm to the occupants of the car. Such an occurrence is also likely to create a danger to other users of the highway. At the very least, it cannot be said as a matter of law that it does not create such a risk.