Court Opinion

ID: 9724622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:05:00.655154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:03.189848
License: Public Domain

RENTTO, J.,
(dissenting in part). As indicated in the majority opinion commercial banks and savings and loan associations *77are unlike in their nature and purposes. While both are financial institutions their relation to and functions in a community are vastly different. That the legislature recognized this is manifest in the requirements which it prescribed each would have to satisfy to secure operating authority. Before a bank is authorized to do business it must appear that its organization is justified by "public convenience and necessity". In the case of savings and loan associations authority to do business is to be withheld if the city or town in which it proposes to operate "does not warrant a new or additional association". These standards are not synonymous.
The record compels me to the conclusion that the Superintendent, in denying the authority here requested, applied the bank standard of "public convenience and necessity". See Wall v. Fenner, 76 S.D. 252, 76 N.W.2d 722. In so doing he proceeded on an erroneous theory of law. For that reason the circuit court reversed the action of the Superintendent. I concur in this action. However, I am unable to affirm the remainder of the judgment which directs the Superintendent to grant the requested authority.
The decision whether such certificate should issue has been legislatively assigned to the Superintendent. When a court is called on to review his action its scrutiny does not extend beyond the question whether the Superintendent has acted within his constitutional and statutory powers and whether his determination is supported by substantial evidence and is reasonable and not arbitrary. The court may not 'be concerned with the weight of the evidence and cannot substitute its judgment and discretion for that of the Superintendent. In re Sioux Falls Traction System, 56 S.D. 207, 228 N.W. 179; Vander Werf v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 58 S.D. 586, 237 N.W. 909; Application of Dakota Transportation, Inc., 67 S.D. 221, 291 N.W. 589; Wall v. Fenner, supra; McKinnon v. State Banking Commission, 78 S.D. 407, 103 N.W.2d 179; 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 613 and § 675.
The interpretation of a statute involves a question of law and is a judicial function. Bandy v. Mickelson, 73 S.D. 485, 44 N.W.2d 341, 22 A.L.R.2d 1129. Consequently, it is for us to say *78what the legislature intended when it declared that the authority shall be withheld if the location in question "does not warrant a new or additional association." The circuit court did not attempt a definition of this phrase.
The remand approved by the majority directs the order which the Superintendent is to enter. This I feel is improper. In 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 763, the rule is stated thus:
"Just as the courts do not have the power to substitute their discretion and judgment for that of the administrative agency in passing upon the correctness of the matter under review, it is also held that they have no such power after they have determined that the agency has erred, and cannot or will not enter or direct the order which shall be entered* * *"
Since the Superintendent viewed the facts in the light of an improper standard in arriving at his determination he has not performed his statutory duty. It seems to me that by this remand the circuit court is substituting its discretion and judgment for that of the administrative agency.
We have recognized that when the facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences respecting the ultimate fact can be drawn that a court on review may enter or direct the order to be entered. Lang v. Jordon Stone Co., 61 S.D. 330, 249 N.W. 314. The factual issues then are matters of law. Whether that situation exists here cannot be determined absent a definition of the legislatively prescribed standard. Without such factual foundation the court is without power to direct the order to be entered and this lack of power is for our consideration whether the parties urge it or not.
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the circuit court to remand the case to the Superintendent for a new determination, on the record already before him, giving effect to the standard as defined by us.
ROBERTS, J., concurs in dissent.