Court Opinion

ID: 9704027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:19:13.535186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:54.818316
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McGLOON, dissenting: I do not dispute the facts as set out by my colleagues in the majority opinion. However, I must differ with my colleagues on their interpretation of section 67 of the Civil Practice Act. That section is unambiguous and provides that “[t]he court shall give instructions to the jury only in writing.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 67.) The statutory requirement that jury instructions must be in writing has remained unchanged since 1907. (Ill. Laws 1907, at 458, secs. 72-76; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, ch. 110, par. 191; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, ch. 110, par. 195; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, ch. 110, par. 191; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, ch. 110, par. 191; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, ch. 110, par. 67; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 67.) Thus, the legislature has clearly and consistently provided that the court shall instruct the jury in writing. Although the statute does not specify when the written instructions are to be given, the requirement that the instructions “shall be taken by the jury to the jury room” demonstrates the intent on the part of the legislature that the jury have access to the instructions during its deliberations. Ellis v. People (1896), 159 Ill. 337, 42 N.E. 873, and People v. Grandstaff (1926), 324 Ill. 70, 154 N.E. 448, construe similar versions of the statute. In Ellis, the court stated that in criminal cases, where the accused is not presumed to waive any of his legal rights, the statute requiring written instructions must be strictly complied with. Strict compliance necessarily dictates that the jurors receive written instructions prior to reaching their verdict. In the case at bar, the jury indicated that they had reached its verdict by signalling the bailiff. The following colloquy between the defense counsel and the court further demonstrates that the jury had reached its verdict without the benefit of written instructions: “MR. STONE: I think it is clear that the jury had already reached their verdict before the instructions were sent back. THE COURT: I have no quarrel with the representation, Mr. Stone.” Furthermore, my interpretation of People v. Grandstaff (1926), 324 Ill. 70, 154 N.E. 448, differs from that of my colleagues. I could find no reference to whether or not written instructions were prepared, given to the jury, or filed. In Grandstaff, a burglary conviction was reversed due to the State’s failure to bring the defendant to trial within four months, however, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that giving oral instructions to the jury, in violation of the Practice Act, was a procedural error which would cause a judgment to be reversed. Few Illinois cases address the issue of whether a violation of statutory provisions that jury instructions be in writing constitutes reversible error. In light of the absence of Illinois case law, it is necessary to look to our sister States for their interpretation of similar statutes. I find the majority opinion of Hart v. State (1926), 21 Ala. App. 621, 111 So. 47, and Kunz v. Nelson (1938), 94 Utah 185, 76 P.2d 577, to be persuasive on this issue. In Hart, the court of appeals reversed a defendant’s conviction because the requested instructions were read to the jury but were not taken by the jury upon their retirement, as required by a statute similar to the Illinois statute. The court concluded that “[w]hen there is a plain mandate of the statute, a failure to observe such cannot be said as a matter of law to be error without injury. The Legislature has fixed it as being a necessary part of a trial before a jury, and the courts must abide by it.” Hart v. State (1926), 21 Ala. App. 621, 622, 111 So. 47, 47. The instant case is unlike Hart in that after it was discovered that the jury had reached its verdict without receiving written instructions, defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial thereby preserving this issue for appeal. Had counsel failed to promptly object and move for a mistrial, his failure would be construed to be a waiver by agreement of counsel. (See Johnson v. Shell Oil Co. (1970), 131 Ill. App. 2d 1032, 264 N.E.2d 278 (abstract of opinion).) However, the above distinction strengthens the defendant’s case. The supreme court of the State of Utah has held that the failure to reduce all substantial instructions to writing for the use of the jury in the jury room is itself reversible error. (Kunz v. Nelson (1938), 94 Utah 185, 201, 76 P.2d 577, 584.) In Kunz, the court emphasized that it could not inquire as to whether the failure to furnish the jury with written instructions was in fact actually prejudicial, stating, “[I]t will be irrebuttably presumed to be prejudicial. The requirement to instruct in writing does not mean for the purpose of the record only, but for the purpose of use by the jury in the jury room ***.” (94 Utah 184, 201, 76 P.2d 577, 584.) I find the reasoning in Kunz to be applicable to the case at bar. The majority holds that any conceivable error arising from this matter was harmless. I cannot agree. The sixteen instructions (including the verdict forms) covered sophisticated and abstract legal concepts such as: burden of proof, consideration of evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the elements of the offense charged, presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, the weight to be given the testimony heard, inconsistent statements, what the State must prove, and the limitation of evidence regarding prior convictions for impeachment purposes only. While the case is not complex in that there was no scientific evidence presented or expert testimony heard, the jurors were denied the opportunity to review the principles of law and to apply those principles to the facts of the case and arrive at the proper verdict. As stated in People v. Plum (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 922, 925, 358 N.E.2d 1235, 1237, citing People v. Anthony (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 464, 467, 334 N.E.2d 208: “The function of instructions is to convey to the jurors the correct principles of law applicable to the facts so that the jury can arrive at a correct conclusion according to the law and evidence. [Citation.] Where the evidence is conflicting, it is even more important, for a proper consideration of the facts, that the jury be properly instructed.” Here, the jury was not properly instructed in accordance with the plain mandate of the statute. The essential function of the instructions was vitiated by the trial court’s failure to comply with the statute thereby prejudicing defendant. Moreover, the error cannot be cured by delivering instructions after submission of the case to the jury for deliberation. Vanmeter v. True (1894), 16 Ky. L. Rep. 320 (abstract of opinion). I therefore conclude that defense counsel’s objection to submitting instructions to the jury after it had reached a verdict was well-founded. The trial court should have granted defendant’s motion for a new trial.