Court Opinion

ID: 9584713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:51:59.2072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:47.195438
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
concurring in judgment only in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the result reached in Divisions 1, 2 (a), 3, 4, and 5 of the majority, but I do not agree with all that is said in those divisions. Because I believe that they contain much that is not necessary to the analysis, I cannot concur fully and must concur in the judgment only as to those divisions.
I must respectfully dissent, however, to Division 2 (b) of the opinion. The majority opinion declares, with respect to Sheriff Hodge, that “the requirements of supervision, including of adequate training and enforcement of all policies, practices, and protocol, are ministerial in nature.” But neither Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744 (452 SE2d 476) (1994), nor Seay v. Cleveland, 270 Ga. 64 (508 SE2d 159) (1998), supports that broad and far-reaching proposition.2
*418As the majority correctly observes,
“[a] ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty. A discretionary act, however, calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.” [Cit.]
Joyce v. Van Arsdale, 196 Ga. App. 95, 96 (395 SE2d 275) (1990). Supervision of a law enforcement agency is generally a discretionary rather than ministerial function. Lowe v. Jones County, 231 Ga. App. 372, 373 (3) (499 SE2d 348) (1998) (“‘The operation of a police department, including the degree of training and supervision to be provided its officers, is a discretionary governmental function of the municipality as opposed to a ministerial, proprietary, or administratively routine function.’ ”). The majority has not demonstrated the basis for its conclusion that Sheriff Hodge’s acts were ministerial in nature.
The majority also has failed to set forth any basis for holding that the actions of the licensed practical nurses employed at the jail were ministerial rather than discretionary. Cantrell v. Thurman, 231 Ga. App. 510, 514 (4) (499 SE2d 416) (1998), written by the author of the majority, also declares that the general obligation to provide medical care to prisoners is a ministerial act by the sheriff, but the authorities cited therein do not support that assertion. The writer of the majority also proposed this view of ministerial functions in a dissent to Coffey v. Brooks County, 231 Ga. App. 886, 895 (500 SE2d 341) (1998), rev’d on other grounds, Rowe v. Coffey, 270 Ga. 715 (515 SE2d 375) (1999).
The law as currently established by this court is quite different. In Schmidt v. Adams, 211 Ga. App. 156, 157 (438 SE2d 659) (1993) (full concurrence on issue of discretionary function), we held that the actions of a physician’s assistant employed by a jail in failing properly to diagnose a condition and failing to order a timely transfer to a hospital were “based on his examination of the facts, his experience, and the exercise of his best judgment,” and therefore were discretionary. The declaration of the existence of a “protocol” does not create a ministerial duty. The medical field has long published diagnostic and procedural manuals that establish criteria and make recommenda*419tions for the diagnosis and treatment of disease. The mere publication of such standards, however, does not remove from the practice of medicine or nursing the requirement that, as professionals, nurses examine the facts and exercise judgment, as in Schmidt.
Decided July 15, 1999
Reconsiderations denied July 29, 1999
Burkey & Burkey, Frederick D. Burkey, for appellants.
Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, W. G. Scrantom, Jr., James C. Clark, Jr., Eugene H. Polleys, Jr., for appellees (case no. A99A0680).
Hatcher, Stubbs, Land, Hollis & Rothschild, Robert C. Martin, *420Jr., Clarence M. Mullin, Carter R. Page, for appellee (case no. A99A1258).
*419In the recent decision of Edwards v. Dept. of Children &c. Svcs., 236 Ga. App. 696 (512 SE2d 339) (1999), the parents of a deceased inmate alleged that workers and nurses at a youth development center had an absolute, nondiscretionary duty to summon medical aid for their daughter and failed to do so within a reasonable time. We concluded, however, that the “type of care and support and what and how much medical treatment to provide are decisions that must be left to the discretion of the employees who work with the inmates. [Cits.]” Id. at 700. Moreover, Edwards itself relies upon Cantrell, supra, to hold that while the county had a duty to provide medical care and treatment, “what medical care to provide is discretionary and therefore is subject to immunity. [Cit.]” Edwards, supra at 699.
We note that the Supreme Court of Georgia has granted certiorari in Edwards specifically to consider whether this court “improperly expanded the definition of ‘discretionary function’ found in OCGA § 50-21-22,” part of the Georgia Tort Claims Act, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 267 Ga. 6 (471 SE2d 849) (1996), involving the distinction between design decisions and policy decisions in opening a highway intersection to traffic. But even if the scope of the discretionary function may be altered by the Supreme Court in the near future, it is nevertheless incumbent upon the majority at this time to articulate the reasons for its determination that the decisions made here were ministerial and not discretionary. Moreover, it appears that this result will require that we overrule Lowe and Schmidt and the decisions upon which they rely, because Cantrell is wholly inconsistent with the existing law in Georgia governing ministerial and discretionary acts.
For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent from Division 2 (b) of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Johnson and Presiding Judge Blackburn join in this opinion.

 In Seay, the Supreme Court of Georgia merely reiterated that a sheriff may be sued in his individual capacity only to the extent he is not protected by official or qualified immu*418nity. Id. at 65-66, n. 1. Gilbert in fact concluded that the actions of the police officer in that case were discretionary rather than ministerial and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the officer under the doctrine of official immunity. Gilbert, supra at 752-753 (6).