Court Opinion

ID: 9613128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:14:26.238531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:25.621938
License: Public Domain

Toal, Justice,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent, and while I could just rely on my dissent in Sumpter v. State, — S.C. —, 439 S.E. (2d) 842 (1994), I feel it necessary to comment on today’s majority opinion.
The majority appears to place an additional, if not insurmountable, burden on the defendant. In Sumpter, a potential black juror was struck for a prior DUI “involvement” that the solicitor’s office had previously prosecuted. This same solicitor also seated a white juror with a DUI “conviction,” which was handled by a different solicitor’s office. The majority in Sumpter held that the defendant failed to prove that the same solicitor’s office handled the prosecution, consequently, there was no proof of a Batson1 violation.
The holding in Sumpter forces a defendant to offer proof of which solicitor’s office handled the prosecution, and now the majority goes even further by requiring a defendant to show which solicitor within the same office handled the prosecution. It does not require a deep analysis to realize that today’s rule is fraught with enough practical problems to render a defendant powerless to counter invidious discrimination. Here, the defendant showed that a white juror prosecuted by the same office was seated as a juror, while a very similarly situated black juror was struck. To accept the reasoning that it was not this particular solicitor begs the question.
On the present facts, five peremptory strikes were exer*81cised by the solicitor. Three removed black males, one removed a black female, and one removed a white male. Defense counsel informed the trial court that at least two of the seated white jurors had a similar background.2 The fact which the majority ignores is that defense counsel obtained this information from a list containing juror background information which was provided by the very same solicitor’s office. The only inference I can draw from these facts is that the solicitor’s reasoning was pretextual, and therefore, a Batson violation.
This continued departure from our previous precedent concerning the use of pretextual reasons to shield racial discrimination is alarming. See State v. Sumpter, supra; State v. Johnson, 302 S.C. 243, 395 S.E. (2d) 167 (1990); State v. Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 379 S.E. (2d) 891 (1989). Accordingly, I would adhere to my dissent in Sumpter v. State, supra, and reverse the trial court.
Finney, Acting Judge, concurs.
ORDER
We granted appellant’s petition for rehearing. After hearing oral arguments, we adhere to the original majority opinion. State v. Dyar, Op. No. 24136 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed August 15, 1994) (Davis Adv. Sh. No. 19 at 16).
(s) A. Lee Chandler C.J.
(s) Jean H. Toal A.J.
(s) James E. Moore A.J.
(s) John H. Walker Jr. A.J.
I adhere to my original dissent.
(s) Ernest A. Finney. Jr. A.J.

 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed. (2d) 69 (1986).

 One seated white juror had charges for possession with intent to distribute marijuana dismissed, and a second white juror had been charged and fined for two counts of fraudulent checks. Regarding one of the struck black jurors, the solicitor stated that, “we struck him because he had recently been prosecuted by my office. ... He was arrested by Richland County Sheriff’s Department and prosecuted. The charges were ultimately dismissed.” [ROA at p. 2]