Court Opinion

ID: 9691522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:37:04.218168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:22.057336
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I do so because, while I agree with the court in all other respects, I believe the court’s conclusion that the state’s peremptory strike of juror 32 did not constitute a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky,1 and its progeny is error.
Prior to striking juror 32, the prosecutor asked the juror a short series of questions, each of which was rooted in issues of race.2 The prosecutor asked no questions of juror *34432 unrelated to race. After asking those questions, the prosecutor excused juror 32 without explanation. In response to defendant’s objection that the prosecutor’s rejection of juror 32 violated the principles set out in Batson, the prosecutor argued that Batson did not apply. In agreeing with the prosecutor, the trial court stated, “I think it is not a Batson challenge. The woman was caueasion.”3
Ignoring juror 32’s relationship with the African-American man she lives with and her interracial daughter and the fact that in reality, juror 32 was excluded, not because of her beliefs about race and the justice system, but because of the prosecutor’s concerns about race, the court summarily concludes that because juror 32, as a Caucasian woman, is not & member of any racial minority, a prima facie case of racial discrimination has not been made out.
“Race may be America’s single most confounding problem, but the confounding problem of race is that few people seem to know what race is.”4 In part, what makes race a confounding problem and what causes many people to not know what race is, is the view that the problems of race are the problems of the racial minority. They are not. The problems of race belong to all of us, no matter where our ancestors come from, no matter what the color of our skin. Thus, concluding that race is not an issue in this case because juror 32 is not a member of a racial minority, misses the point. Race is an issue.
*345Issues of race are difficult and'raise difficult questions. Resolution of these issues and questions will not come easily and taking the easy road will not bring about resolution. To achieve resolution, we must first have the ability to recognize issues of race when they come before us. To do so, we must look beyond the limited box of our own experience. In this case, that means being able to see and understand the racial impact of permitting prosecutors to exclude from service prospective jurors who do nothing more than express concerns about the racial makeup of the jury panel and our justice system’s treatment of people of color. Once we recognize that issues of race are before us, we must then determine whether race has played an impermissible role. In doing so, we must be critical in our analysis. Finally, if we conclude that race has played an impermissible role, we must be courageous in acting to eradicate the resulting bias. As a court, our commitment to eradicate racial bias from our judicial system must ground itself in concrete common sense actions whenever and under whatever guise that bias manifests itself.
If we are to root out racial bias from the judicial system, as we have an obligation to do under both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, and, as we have said we would in the Final Report of the Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System,5 we must do more than ask the simple surface question of whether juror 32 was excluded because of her race; we must look deeper and go on to ask whether race played an impermissible role in her exclusion. In City of Minneapolis v. State by Wilson,6 we held that under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, racial discrimination against a person is forbidden “whether it is based on a person’s race or the person’s association with people of color.”7 Thus, although juror 32 is Caucasian, her association with people of color may form the basis for the conclusion that her exclusion was impermissibly race based and is, at a minimum, sufficient to make out a prima facie case under Batson. Beyond juror 32’s association with people of color, it is clear that issues of race played a role in her exclusion. The record shows that, during voir dire, juror 32 expressed concerns about the lack of minorities on the jury panel as well as the general treatment of people of color by the judicial system and that the only questions asked juror 32 by the prosecutor concerned race. In State v. McRae,8 a Hennepin County prosecutor peremptorily removed a prospective African-American juror who expressed concern about the treatment of people of color by the judicial system. Based on defendant’s objection, the trial court evidently found that a prima facie ease under Batson had been established.9 In rebutting the prima facie case, the prosecutor claimed that because the juror thought the system was unfair, she could not be impartial.10 The trial court concluded that “there was an articulable basis for the prosecutor’s challenge”11 and permitted the juror to be struck. Presumably, what the trial court meant by the term “articulable basis” was that the prosecutor’s response was race-neutral and nonpretextual. On appeal, we disallowed the strike, stating:
[Ojn the record we have, the juror in question appears to have simply answered the prosecutor’s questions — which the prosecutor had not asked of other potential jurors at that point — in the same way that a large percentage of fair-minded, reasonable black people and fair-minded reasonable people of any other race would have answered the questions. To allow the striking of this juror on the basis of those answers in effect would allow a prosecutor to strike any fair-minded, reasonable black *346person from the jury panel who expressed any doubt the [sic] “the system” is perfect.
Moreover, one of the reasons the prosecutor gave for striking the African American juror was that he believed she might refuse to find defendant guilty simply because defendant was also a black person. As the prosecutor put it, “‘[S]he thought that basically the system is unfair to minorities, and the defendant’s being black is — and her being black she would over compensate by basically letting this guy off.’” “Batson expressly forbids this type of reasoning to enter into the jury selection process. ”12
Given our ruling in McRae, it is clear that, had juror 32 been a person of color, a prima facie case under Batson would have been made out and the state would not have been able to exclude juror 32 “solely because of her beliefs that people of color are treated unfairly by the system.” More would have been required; the state would have been required to articulate race-neutral grounds for its peremptory strike. Juror 32 should not be treated differently simply because she is Caucasian. Applying McRae to the facts in the record before us, the prosecutor’s strike of juror 32 is invalid.13
I find some degree of irony in this court’s holding that the peremptory strike of juror 32 was permissible based on her belief that our judicial system treats African-Americans and other people of color unfairly. After all, she did nothing more than give voice to concerns this court raised in its Task Force Report. That report contains over 70 findings detailing racial bias in the judicial system. Findings from the report with respect to juries state:

Findings

⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ * *
2) Jury pools rarely are representative of the racial composition of a community.
3) People of color have a general distrust of the criminal justice system and exclusion from jury service fosters that distrust.
# ⅜ ⅝ * * ⅜
5) Juries are generally made up of white middle class people. Without the broad range of social experiences that a group of diverse individuals can provide, juries often are ill-equipped to evaluate the facts presented in cases that involve people of color.
6) Lack of understanding among whites creates an opening for unconscious prejudice and racial bias when evaluating the facts of a ease concerning people of color.
7) Grand and petit juries need people of color to truly reflect the whole community if the jury’s verdict is to reflect the community’s judgment.14
Even the trial court recognized that although juror 32 was eaucasion, her diverse experience, living with an African-American man and having an interracial child, would have brought a range of social experiences to the jury that are generally not represented.15
By this decision, the court permits the state to exclude from jury service any “fair-minded, reasonable * * * person from the jury panel who expressed any doubt * * * *347‘the system’ is perfect.”16 Based on the record before us, this court’s conclusion that juror 32 was properly excluded by the trial court is error. Whether the prospective juror is a person of color or not, on the issues raised by this case, race matters. Permitting prospective jurors to be excluded from service because their personal experience bears out what we said in .our Task Force Report, makes no sense, but does make a mockery of our efforts to bring about racial fairness. In saying this, I do not mean to call into question this court’s commitment to eradicate racial bias from Minnesota’s judicial system. We must, however, move beyond rhetoric.
In some respects, the problem appears to be more one of this court struggling to stay within what some consider to be the unworkable and ineffective analytical structure for challenging a prosecutor’s race-based use of peremptory challenges set forth by the Court in Batson17 as modified in Purkett v. Elem.18 We should not feel limited by Batson and its progeny. Batson establishes the floor for challenging race based peremptory strikes. It does not set the ceiling. We may set higher standards to ensure that racial bias does not infect the selection of jurors.19 Today’s decision, as well as the Court’s decision in Purkett, demonstrates to me that it is time for this court to consider seriously Justice Marshall’s admonition in his concurrence in Batson that the goal of ending “the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process * ⅜ ⅜ can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.”20 In that concurrence, Justice Marshall eloquently details the historical use of the peremptory challenge, beginning in the post-Civil War reconstruction era, to prevent African-Americans from serving, on juries and the inadequacies of the remedy provided. Others have also detailed the peremptory challenge’s use as a tool “to eliminate the new black faces appearing for jury duty” and its effectiveness as “an incredibly efficient final racial filter.”21
Sitting here some 12 years after Batson, it cannot be said that its promise to eradicate racial bias from the jury selection process has been accomplished. Sadly, it has not. While Batson has made racial bias in the jury selection process harder to detect, that is not, as I have said before,22 the same as making it go away. At a minimum, we should refer the issue of the continued use of the peremptory challenge to the Criminal Rules Committee for review, debate, and recommendation.

. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

. Q. Good afternoon, ma'am.
A. Hello.
Q. I want to go back to something you talked about with Mr. Lucas and kind of your impressions when you came in at that first kind of gathering that we had when we first called all the jurors together. You know, you indicated some concern about the system, given that you
looked around and there were only a few people of color in the room, and I think you said something like the 1950's Minnesota or something. Do you have any perception or information in terms of kind of how that happens or who controls that or where that comes from, that kind of makeup of a group?
A. Well, looking at the division — I found out that the zip code I gave you was incorrect. I didn't realize. I had just recently moved and I had the wrong zip code, so I was looking in the *344phone book and that's when I realized this is a county court, so it's not just the City of Minneapolis. It's all of these, and some of the prospective jurors are from the outlying suburbs, and so it is reflective of the counly, I am sure. It just isn’t reflective of the city.
Q. And did that information kind of change maybe how you felt when you saw that or not?
A. That day, yes.
Q. Do you have some concerns about the system in general treating people of color fairly?
A. Yes, I have concerns about it.
Q. Can you verbalize that at all, explain that to me what you are thinking?
A. It all kind of falls back on the media. If I watch the news, if there is a crime committed, and this is my opinion now. I will just be honest about it, if the person that they have as a suspect is black, their picture is flashed on the entire screen. If the person is Caucasian, rarely do you see a picture, and so my family and friends that live in the outlying parts of the state, I get this sense of fear from them, and I think that it ahs [sic] been promoted by the media.
Q. And how do you see that played out in the courtroom here in Hennepin County in terms of what happens in these cases?
A. I don't have any experience with it, I am sorry, but I — that was my feeling is that, you know, if that assembly room of jurors reflected what I have known in my acquaintances or just people when I was looking to rent a place.
Q. Were different?
A. It’s different. Because I am Caucasian, I hear things from Caucasian people that they wouldn’t talk about around black people.
Q. And given that you are being talked to in a case where you can expect to be a juror and the defendant is African-American, how do you [sic] beliefs about what we are facing as a society here, how do those beliefs affect how you would sit as a juror in a case like this where we do have a defendant of color?
A. I feel — well, the reason I wanted to be a juror so there would be somebody who doesn’t have that fear base.
Q. And would you treat this defendant in this case differently based on the fact that he is a person of color and not a white person?
A. No. I didn't know when I saw that assembly room that it was going to be a person of color. I didn't know anything about the case, so I—
Q. And is it kind of your belief or your expectation of your decision making that the defendant’s race should not enter into your decision about the facts of the case?
A. No. I don’t feel that I would be affected by race.
Q. And do you feel that it's likely or possible that you would hold the state to a higher burden of proof because of the fact that the defendant is a black man?
A. No.
MS. HANNON: May I have a moment, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. HANNON: Thank you, ma'am. Your Honor, the state would excuse Ms. Deponty.

. The trial court judge went on to say, "I was wondering if they were going to ask her any questions at all. I could see her as someone they may have stricken without even inquiring, but their questions did only go to essentially race issues, but I am not willing to expand it to a caucasion who may be living in a primarily minority family * *

. Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 Harv. C. R.-C. L.L.Rev. 1, 5-6 (1994).

. See Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System, Final Report, May 1993, 32-38 (hereinafter "Task Force Report”).

. 310 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. 1981).

. Id. at 487 (emphasis added).

. 494 N.W.2d 252, 253-58 (Minn. 1992).

. While the trial court did not make an explicit finding, such a finding is implied by the fact that the trial court went on to analyze the challenge under the second and third prongs of the Batson test. See id. at 256.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id. at 257 (emphasis added).

. In this case, the trial court concluded that a prima facie case had not been made out and therefore did not proceed further with the Batson analysis. As a result, the record contains no explanation, race-neutral or otherwise, for the prosecutor's strike of juror 32. Because the trial court in the first instance is generally in a better position to evaluate the facts and circumstances surrounding the exercise of peremptory strikes, remand for further proceedings will usually be the appropriate remedy. There may be times, however, when the record is such that the reviewing court can properly decide the validity of the strike. I believe this is one of those cases.

. Task Force Report, supra, at 36.

. In responding to the defense challenge, the trial court stated:
I couldn’t agree with you more, her answers made her seem like an ideal juror to try to get this to be as representative as possible of a jury from the pool we have to choose from * * *. It's unfortunate, because she does add or would add more, if not minority representation on the panel, at least someone who lives and works and understands the black community, and I got that impression from her.

. McRae, 494 N.W.2d at 257.

. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (Marshall, J., concurring); Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 Yale LJ. 93 (1996); see also State v. Gaitan, 536 N.W.2d 11, 18-20 (1995) (Page, J. dissenting).

. 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995).

. See generally State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn.1991) (noting that the Minnesota Supreme Court may apply a "more stringent standard of review” as a matter of state law under the state constitution's equivalent to the federal constitution's equal protection clause).

. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03, 106 S.Ct. 1712.

. Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. Chi. L.Rev. 809, 829 (1997).

. Hennepin County v. Perry, 561 N.W.2d 889, 900 (Minn.1997) (Page, J., concurring).