Court Opinion

ID: 9713752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:21:41.238126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:20.316877
License: Public Domain

POMEROY, Justice
(dissenting).
This case is not as simple factually nor as plain legally as the majority opinion would seem to indicate. I do not, however, undertake an analysis on the merits of what is meant by the word “policemen”, for my reading of the Public Employee Relations Act (“Act 195”) 1 2indi-cates that the initial determination of who is a “public employee” under that statute is to be made by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (“Board”).2 Because Act 195 and the 1968 statute (“Act 111”) 3 *are mutually exclusive, 43 P.S. § 1101.301(2), a determination by the Board that the appellees are public employees would necessarily preclude a finding that they are covered by Act 111; conversely, a determination that appellees are “policemen” within the meaning of Act 111 would compel a finding that they are not public employees under Act 195. Whatever the decision of the Board in this regard, Act 195 guarantees prompt judicial review of any such determination should the parties so choose. See 43 P.S. §§ 1101.1502,1101.1505.
*565Not only does the legislative scheme point to the Board as the body which in the first instance should determine who are and who are not public employees, but such a procedure in this case is also strongly suggested by fundamental principles of administrative law. See Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrantsen Co., Inc., 356 U.S. 481, 498, 78 S.Ct. 851, 2 L.Ed.2d 926, 937-38 (1958). See generally, Davis, Administrative Law, “Primary Jurisdiction,” § 19.01 et seq. Application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction would not only bring to bear the expertise of those best qualified to speak in this specialized area of labor relations, but also would tend to assure uniformity throughout the state in the approach to problems under Acts 195 and 111. An incidental benefit in terms of judicial economy would accrue to the judicial system, many of the courts of our Commonwealth being already overburdened with their present load of cases wherein the courts’ jurisdiction is plain and inescapable.
For the reasons indicated, I believe this Court should not now undertake to decide this case on its merits. I would, accordingly, reverse the orders of the courts below, and sustain the preliminary objections of the County of Allegheny to the complaint in mandamus. Hence I dissent from the decision of the Court.

. Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, Art. I, § 101 et seq., 43 P.S. § 1101.101 et seq.

. In reaching this conclusion I am obliged to disagree with the decision of the Commonwealth Court in Venneri v. County of Allegheny, 5 Pa.Cmwlth. 105, 289 A.2d 523 (1972), holding that deputy sheriffs should seek determination of their status under either Act 195 or Act 111 through the courts rather than through the Board.

. Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, No. Ill, § 1 et seq., 43 P.S. § 217.1 et seq.