Court Opinion

ID: 9789398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:35:54.929078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:22.263068
License: Public Domain

Herd, J.,
dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s reversal of Peter H. Ransom’s conviction for aggravated kidnapping and would find there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
The evidence showed that Ransom, like an enraged animal, chased the terror stricken victim for approximately one mile. At that point, an old pickup truck approaching from the opposite direction met the victim. She was afraid to seek the driver’s assistance since his appearance was similar to Ransom’s. After *607meeting the victim the vehicle proceeded down the road, then stopped for-Ransom, who climbed on the running board and had the driver back his vehicle up the road to the victim. Ransom then jumped off the pickup, forcefully grabbed the victim from behind by the neck and hair, and walked with her for a way until the pickup was out of sight. Ransom then dragged the victim back and forth across the road, choked her, burned her hair, and finally brutally raped her twice.
The majority opinion states the only possible time sequence in which a kidnapping could have occurred is in the period of time when Ransom took hold of the victim’s hair and neck and walked her down the road. However, the majority then states: “No evidence of time or distance involved was presented at trial relative to the ‘walking.’” With this statement the majority reverses the often-repeated rule that K.S.A. 21-3420 requires no particular distance or removal, nor any particular time or place of confinement. Rather, it is the fact and not the distance of the taking that supplies the necessary element of kidnapping. As we stated in State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720 (1976):
“Our kidnapping statute, K.S.A. 21-3420, requires no particular distance of removal, nor any particular time or place of confinement. Under that statute it is the fact, not the distance, of a taking (or the fact, not the time or place, of confinement) that supplies a necessary element of kidnapping.” Syl. ¶ 7.
“Under K.S.A. 21-3420 a taking or confining is a kidnapping if its purpose is to ‘facilitate’ the commission of any crime, even if the crime facilitated be a less serious crime such as robbery or rape.” Syl. ¶ 8.
“The word ‘facilitate’ in K.S.A. 21-3420 means something more than just to make more convenient. A taking or confining, in order to be said to ‘facilitate’ a crime, must have some significant bearing on making the commission of the crime ‘easier.’ ” Syl. ¶ 9.
“If a taking or confining is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement:
“(c) Must' have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection.” Syl. ¶ 10.
See also State v. Bourne, 233 Kan. 166, 168, 660 P.2d 565 (1983) (movement of children from one bedroom to an adjoining bedroom for purposes of rape and indecent liberties constituted aggravated kidnapping); State v. Chears, 231 Kan. 161, 164, 643 P.2d 154 (1982) (movement of sodomy victim from living room to bedroom was sufficient evidence of kidnapping); State v. Fer*608guson, Washington & Tucker, 228 Kan. 522, 528, 618 P.2d 1186 (1980) (movement of rape victims from back room of shop to adjoining parking lot was sufficient evidence of kidnapping).
The jury was instructed that to establish the crime of kidnapping the State must prove Ransom took or confined the victim with the intent to hold the victim to facilitate the commission of the crime of rape. The majority finds it “difficult to see” how the walk facilitated the commission of the crime and notes that the victim was screaming and being choked before the truck left. As we pointed out in State v. Royal, 234 Kan. 218, 224, 670 P.2d 1337 (1983), the fact that a kidnapping victim keeps fighting and screaming does not lessen the offense.
In taking the victim by the neck and forcing her to walk away from the truck until the truck was out of sight, Ransom was clearly attempting to insure that the driver of the pickup truck did not witness the rape or interfere with his intended acts. He lessened the risk of detection by his taking and confining the victim. Thus, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude Ransom moved the victim to facilitate the crime of rape.
The majority has chosen to disregard the standard of review to be applied when sufficiency of the evidence is challenged. We recently set forth that standard in State v. Jackson, 238 Kan. 793, 799, 714 P.2d 1368 (1986):
“When the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is raised, the standard of review on appeal is whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, convinces the appellate court that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court looks only to the evidence in favor of the verdict to determine if the essential elements of the charge are sustained.”
There is no minimum distance of asportation required to prove kidnapping; therefore, the evidence that Ransom grabbed the victim by the hair and neck and walked her down the road was sufficient to establish a “taking or confining.” Moreover, the evidence that Ransom continued to “walk” the victim until the truck was out of sight was sufficient to show Ransom took or confined the victim with “the intent to facilitate the crime of rape.” The evidence was sufficient to establish the essential elements of the crime of aggravated kidnapping. I find no evidence of mitigating circumstances which justify our treating *609Ransom more leniently than we have treated other like criminals. I would affirm the jury’s verdict.
Miller, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.