Court Opinion

ID: 9790192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:48:43.351002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:27.286135
License: Public Domain

GRIFFIN, J.
I dissent. I agree with the majority opinion, if we accept the testimony of plaintiffs in its most favorable light, that there is sufficient evidence shown to establish negligence on the part of defendants in leaving, unattended and unlighted, a box car without warnings parked diagonally across and in the middle of a paved and fairly well traveled street in the nighttime under the circumstances described. The conclusion that defendants were negligent is supported by the decision in the case of Peri v. Los Angeles Junction Ry. Co., 22 Cal.2d 111 [137 P.2d 441], The question of defendants’ negligence, under the evidence here presented, however, is one of fact to be determined by the jury, and not one of law.
I also agree with the' main opinion that there is substantial evidence to indicate that the deceased driver was guilty of negligence in many respects, and if the jury determined that such negligence was a proximate cause of his death, plaintiffs would be barred from a recovery. This, however, is not the question here presented. The question is whether the evidence conclusively shows that the driver was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, which negligence contributed proximately to his death. I will concede that the question is a close one. On a motion for nonsuit this court is bound to assume that all evidence received in favor of the plaintiff, relevant to the issues, is true. All presumptions, *708inferences and doubtful questions must be construed most favorably to the plaintiff. (Hinds v. Wheadon, 19 Cal.2d 458, 460 [121 P.2d 724].) In Gray v. Southern Pacific Co., 23 Cal.2d 632, 640, 641 [145 P.2d 561], it was stated:
“In determining the disputed questions of fact presented at the trial of the case it was the province of the jury to disbelieve any testimony which appeared to them to lack verity. They were the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. They could reject positive testimony and accept circumstantial evidence as proof of the facts, as it is elementary that direct evidence may be disbelieved and contrary circumstantial evidence relied upon to support a verdict or finding.” (Citing cases.) (See, also, Whitechat v. Guyette, 19 Cal.2d 428, 434 [122 P.2d 47].)
There can be no question but that plaintiffs were, at the outset, entitled to the benefit of the presumption “that a person takes ordinary care of his own concerns” and “that the law has been obeyed.” Such presumptions are evidence until rebutted. (Smellie v. Southern Pacific Co., 212 Cal. 540 [299 P. 529].) As long as this presumption remained in the case a nonsuit should not have been granted. (Smellie v. Southern Pacific Co., supra.) The question is, then, can it be fairly said in this case that the presumption “faded out,” “disappeared and vanished from the case”'as a matter of law because of evidence adduced by plaintiff which, it is claimed, contradicted or controverted such presumption. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident. There was no testimony respecting the acts and conduct of the decedent leading up to the collision. The eases cited plainly declare that under such circumstances a presumption existed that the decedent was not guilty of contributory negligence. Although it might be inferred, from plaintiffs’ evidence, that other motorists, under varying conditions, saw the parked refrigerator car in time to avoid it, this court cannot declare as a matter of law, in the absence of evidence as to what the decedent saw or did, that the decedent should have seen the parked refrigerator car in time to have avoided it. Respondents lay considerable stress upon the fact that a strong light (250 candlepower arc light) was suspended over the street 89% feet north of the refrigerator ear, and that visibility “was such that the r'efrigerator car could be seen by persons driving south on M Street for a distance of 491 feet.” It *709may be well reasoned that the glare from such a strong light as contended by respondent, may have blinded the deceased to the extent that he was unable to see the refrigerator ear until it was too late to avoid striking it. Such an inference would not be unreasonable. (Nichols v. Southern Pacific Co., 58 Cal.App.2d 91 [136 P.2d 332]; Scoville v. Keglor, 27 Cal. App.2d 17, 33 [80 P.2d 162].)
One witness (Goodwin), who was driving north on M Street, testified that before he got to Eleventh Street he saw a freight ear on the railroad track; that he “was within six or eight feet of it before he saw it” (which was approximately under the same lighting conditions); that he swerved his car to the right and went around it; that he saw no lights of any kind on the roadway or any individual holding or signaling any light; that he had his lights burning on his car; that he was traveling about 20 miles per hour. On cross-examination he testified that somewhere in the last block approaching the refrigerator ear he took out a cigarette and lit a match. He was then asked the following questions and gave the following answers: “Q. And the flare of that match in your car and against your windshield blinded you for a while ? A. It didn’t blind. There is a flare after you strike a match to the cigarette. Q. And for a short time after you can’t see out very clearly ? A. Not too clearly. Q. And when that flare went out you saw that freight car ahead of you? A. Yes. Q. And you were about 40 feet away from it? A. I was about 6 or 8 feet away.”
It is true that other witnesses gave testimony which indicated that they could see the parked refrigerator car from a greater distance as outlined in the main opinion. It would have been competent for a jury to decide the issue of visibility on circumstantial evidence and determine from the testimony and circumstances of the case within what distance the dark refrigerator car, blended with its dark surroundings, should have been visible to the decedent as he approached it. On the motion for nonsuit appellants were entitled to the full weight and benefit of Goodwin’s testimony and to have such other testimony as might be opposed to it disregarded.
The results of the impact did indicate that the deceased driver was traveling at an excessive speed. In Peri v. Los Angeles Junction Ry. Co., supra, at page 127, it was said:
“Ordinarily it is not negligence as a matter of law for a *710motorist to drive at such a speed that he cannot stop within the range of his vision; it is a factual question.” (Citing cases.)
In this case I am not" particularly impressed from the evidence before us, that plaintiff should ultimately recover a judgment. In case of such a recovery the trial court, on a motion for new trial based on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, may weigh and consider the evidence adduced under different rules from those applicable to a motion for nonsuit. (Frost v. Los Angeles Railway Co., 165 Cal. 365 [132 P. 442]; 20 Cal.Jur. 117, § 75.)
In view of the cases above mentioned, keeping in mind that the testimony of witnesses called under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not, when weighing it against a presumption, to be considered (the main opinion rightfully omits from consideration such testimony); that the jury has a right to reject positive testimony and accept circumstantial evidence as proof of the facts; and assuming that all evidence received in favor of the plaintiffs and relevant to the issues is true, I am inclined to believe that it cannot be said here, as a matter of law, that the presumption of due care vanished and disappeared from the case. I am convinced that a question of fact arose for the determination of the jury as to whether the driver was guilty of contributory negligence and that the question was not one of law. (Peri v. Los Angeles Junction Ry. Co., supra; Nichols v. Southern Pacific Co., supra; Hinkle v. Southern Pacific Co., 12 Cal.2d 691 [87 P.2d 349]; Harper v. North Western Pac. R. Co., 34 Cal.App.2d 451 [93 P.2d 821] ; Brewer v. Southern Pacific Co., 29 Cal. App.2d 251 [84 P.2d 230].)
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 3, 1944. Griffin, J., voted for a hearing. Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 1, 1944. Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a hearing.