Court Opinion

ID: 9697410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:15:57.827308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:23.533782
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
dissenting. The central issue is whether an involuntary discontinuance for the requisite statutory period of time, standing alone, is sufficient to constitute a forfeiture of a nonconforming, permitted use. In my opinion, it is not, and therefore I dissent.
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the applicable provision of Vermont’s enabling legislation, 24 V.S.A. § 4408(b)(3), makes a meaningful distinction between the terms “discontinuance” and “abandonment.” I also agree that this distinction effects the evidentiary burdens required in terminating a preexisting, nonconforming use. The Court, however, fails to recognize and give effect to a further legal distinction: namely, the difference between a voluntary discontinuance and one that results from circumstances beyond the control of the property owner. See, e.g., McLay v. Maryland Assemblies, Inc., 306 A.2d 524, 529 (Md. 1973) (explaining the difference between a voluntary cessation of use and a cessation which is involuntary).
*44In general, a common law claim of abandonment requires a showing of both (1) an intention to abandon, and (2) actual abandonment in the form of an overt act, or failure to act, which carries the. implication that the owner does not retain any interest in the right to continue the nonconforming use. See 1 K. Young, Anderson’s American Law of Zoning § 6.65, at 678 (4th ed. 1996). Ordinarily, the burden of proving the fact of abandonment is on the party asserting it. See Smith v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 459 A.2d 1350, 1352 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
As an alternative, discontinuance of use for a specified amount of time has been made a statutory equivalent of abandonment. Courts differ on what evidentiary showing is required under discontinuance ordinances. Many jurisdictions continue to require a showing of both intention to abandon and actual abandonment under their discontinuance ordinances. See, e.g., Union Quarries, Inc. v. Board of County Comm’rs of Johnson County, 478 P.2d 181, 186 (Kan. 1970); 1 Young, supra, § 6.68, at 693 (“Many courts have merged the terms ‘abandon’ and ‘discontinue’ and require proof of intent to abandon although the ordinance speaks in terms of a use discontinued for a specified period of time.”).
We, today, adopt the polar opposite evidentiary view and hold that nonuse for the applicable period of discontinuance satisfies both intention to abandon as well as actual abandonment, and thereby obviates any additional inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the discontinuance. In other words, under this view, mere nonuse for the statutory period creates a conclusive presumption of abandonment.
I believe the proper and more equitable view is reflected in those jurisdictions that hold that discontinuance for the statutory period of time creates a rebuttable, as opposed to a conclusive, presumption of intent to abandon. See Metzger v. Bensalem Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 645 A.2d 369, 370 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994). Under this rationale, it is incumbent upon the party asserting abandonment to also prove actual abandonment. See id. And, it is the evidentiary requirement of actual abandonment that necessitates a distinction between cessations of use that are voluntary and those that are involuntary. As explained by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania:
[W]here, as here, a one-year time limitation on the right to resume the nonconforming use is imposed by the zoning ordinance, the intention to surrender the right is presumed *45from the expiration of the designated period. Although because of this presumption it becomes unnecessary to prove the intent to abandon after cessation of one year, it is still necessary to show the concurrent overt acts or failure to act which indicate abandonment.
Márchese v. Norristown Borough Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 277 A.2d 176, 183 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1971) (emphasis in original omitted) (footnote omitted).
Thus, there must be proof of discontinuance for a specified period of time in conjunction with some overt act or failure to act, indicating that the nonconforming use has been abandoned. See, e.g., Metzger, 645 A.2d at 370 (actual abandonment cannot be inferred from nonuse alone); City of Glendale v. Aldabbagh, 939 P.2d 418, 421 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that town can enact an ordinance dispensing with the intent to abandon requirement but may not terminate a use simply because the statutory period of discontinuance passes; rather, some conduct within the control and attributable to the property owner must be a cause of the condition justifying the termination); City of Minot v. Fisher, 212 N.W2d 837, 841 (N.D. 1973) (holding that a discontinuance statute presumed abandonment after the designated time period except in situations where the cessation of use was beyond the control of the property owner).
The implication of abandonment is negated when the discontinuance is the result of circumstances beyond the control of the property owner. See 4 E. Ziegler, Rathkopfs’ The Law of Zoning and Flanning § 51B.02, at 51B-23 — 51B-24 (4th ed. 1996).
A temporary cessation, even for a lengthy period, caused by circumstances over which a property owner had no control, has been held not to constitute proof of an intent to abandon in the sense of an abandonment within the meaning of zoning ordinance provisions where the circumstances themselves negate an inference of the necessary intention to abandon a use.

Id.

This rationale is consistent with the historical distinction between “discontinuance” and “abandonment.” See Hartley v. City of Colorado Springs, 764 P.2d 1216, 1222 (Colo. 1988). As explained by the Supreme Court of Colorado, discontinuance, as distinguished from abandonment, was traditionally interpreted “not to require proof of *46intent to abandon so long as there was proof of actual abandonment in the form of an act or failure to act which carries an implication of abandonment.” Id. at 1222-23 (emphasis in original omitted); see also 8A E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 25.194, at 77 (3d ed. 1994) (“Historically, courts have been somewhat reluctant to read intent out of termination for nonuse. . . . [and] [w]here the nonuse is involuntary, even courts that purport to do away with the intent requirement hesitate before finding a discontinuance.”).
Moreover, while I agree with the Court that we have never squarely addressed and resolved the issue before us, I believe the rationale I advocate here is supported by our prior cases construing discontinuance provisions. In particular, I am mindful of our opinion in Town of Castleton v. Fucci, 139 Vt. 598, 601, 431 A.2d 486, 488 (1981), where we expressed the view that cessation of use must be assessed in light of the circumstances bearing upon the nonuse, before concluding that a vested property right has been forfeited. There we stated that the court must consider “such use as an average owner would make of the property, taking into account its nature and condition” and noted “that periods of non-use, between recurring periods of seasonal use,” would not amount to a discontinuance or abandonment. Id.
Furthermore, applying the discontinuance provision to cases of involuntary interruption would raise constitutional concerns as well. We have stated, “[w]here possible, a statute must be construed to avoid constitutional infirmities.” State v. Cantrell, 151 Vt. 130, 134, 558 A.2d 639, 642 (1989). Allowing a conclusive presumption of abandonment to be drawn from facts beyond the control of the owner is a potentially arbitrary and unreasonable application of the law. See 4 Ziegler, supra, § 51B.02[3], at 51B-16 (“Statutes creating permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”) (quoting Vlandes v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973)). As the Supreme Court of North Dakota in a similar case observed, abandonment is presumed “after the designated period of nonuse has passed”; however, a due process challenge is avoided “by not applying the presumption of abandonment in situations where the cessation of use was beyond the control of the property owner.” City of Minot, 212 N.W2d at 841.
The undisputed facts in the instant case support the conclusion that the requirement of actual abandonment has not been met. It is stipulated that the property at issue was vacant for approximately twenty-two months, and that the vacancy was caused by the insol*47vency of property owners’ predecessors in title, Eppe and Judith Bos. When the subject property was conveyed to the Bos’ in May of 1988, they had a vested right to continue the preexisting, nonconforming use. Shortly after the conveyance, however, they experienced financial difficulties and their mortgagee initiated foreclosure proceedings. The mortgagee, in turn, was required to give title to the property to HUD, free of encumbrances and tenants, in order to receive payment on its loan guaranty. HUD auctioned the property in May of 1994, and it was listed in the auctioneer pamphlet as a “quadruplex.”
Thus, there was no time period during which any of the predecessors in title voluntarily abandoned or discontinued the use of the property as a multi-family structure. On the contrary, the property was the subject of an involuntary cessation of use from its nonconforming, permitted purpose.
As a result, because the vacancy was involuntary, the discontinuance period should have been tolled. See, e.g., Flowerree v. City of Concord, 878 S.E.2d 188, 190 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (where rental property remained vacant, the use did not cease where the landlord actively sought new tenants and made repairs and renovations to attract new tenants); Southern Equipment Co. v. Winstead, 342 S.E.2d 524, 525 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (owner’s failure to operate concrete mixing facility due to slump in business did not amount to cessation); McLay, 306 A.2d at 528-29 (no discontinuance where property owner/manufacturer ceased production for the statutory period of time due to lack of business).
Accordingly, the conduct of the new owners, in this case the Badgers, is dispositive of whether or not the nonconforming use was discontinued. As explained by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, “[t]he right to continue [a] nonconforming use, once established and not abandoned, runs with the land and this right is not confined to any one individual or corporation. A vested right, unless abandoned, to continue the nonconforming use is in the land.” In re Indianhead, Inc., 198 A.2d 522, 525 (Pa. 1964) (holding that there was no legal discontinuance under a one-year maximum discontinuance period created by ordinance where landowner established that his actions of apparent abandonment were in fact motivated by pending mortgage foreclosure proceedings, and not by an intent to abandon).
Upon purchasing the subject property, the Badgers prepared the structure as a three-family dwelling for immediate occupancy. I do not believe that a prior mortgage foreclosure should foreclose their right to continue a lawful, nonconforming use. For all the reasons previ*48ously stated, a discontinuance ordinance that is construed to effect a summary termination of a vested property right, in my opinion, is not consistent with the phase-out policy contemplated by the relevant statutes and case law. Accordingly, I would reverse.