Court Opinion

ID: 9461060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:04:58.942066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:52.495284
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM:
Respondent-appellant, John R. Manson, Commissioner of Correction of the State of Connecticut, appeals from a judgment entered May 10, 1974 in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, M. Joseph Blu-menfeld, District Judge, granting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by petitioner-appellee, John Wesley Ralls, a state prisoner presently incarcerated at the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers where he is serving a sentence of life imprisonment imposed after his conviction by a jury of second degree murder. We reverse the judgment of the District Court and dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Ralls was indicted on June 15, 1970, charged with the murder on March 1, 1970 of his mother-in-law, Mrs. Barbara Howell, in Hamden. After a two week jury trial before Honorable Louis George in the Superior Court for New Haven County, Ralls was convicted on November 17, 1970 of second degree murder. He was sentenced on December 11, 1970 to life imprisonment. Throughout proceedings in the Superior Court, including the trial, Ralls was represented by the Public Defender for New Haven County.
On December 30, 1970, the same Public Defender, who in the meanwhile had been appointed to represent Ralls on appeal, filed in the Superior Court a timely notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut from Ralls’ murder conviction. On October 28, 1971, at Ralls’ request, the Public Defender who had represented him up to that point and who had begun processing his appeal was permitted to withdraw as Ralls’ appellate counsel. In his place, a Special Public Defender was appointed by the Superior Court to represent Ralls on appeal and he has done so continuously to date. This Special Public Defender is a lawyer whom Ralls specifically requested be appointed to represent him on appeal.
During the period of approximately three and one-half years from the filing of the notice of appeal to the present date, various steps have been taken pursuant to the Connecticut Practice Book to perfect Ralls’ direct appeal to the state Supreme Court. We have been informed that the printed record on appeal was filed with the Supreme Court on October 31, 1973; that the Supreme Court has fixed a briefing schedule that calls for all briefs to be filed by September 18, 1974; and that the Supreme Court has scheduled the argument of the appeal at its October 1974 term, which means that the appeal will be argued during October.1
Backing up for a moment, Ralls filed his original petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court on October 17, 1973, and an amended petition was *493filed on December 21, 1973. By agreement of counsel in the habeas corpus proceedings,2 the District Court decided the case on the state court record, supplemented by various affidavits, exhibits and stipulations. No evidentiary hearing was held. On May 7, 1974, the District Court filed a memorandum of decision holding, first, that despite the pendency of Ralls’ direct appeal to the state Supreme Court, it cannot be said that he has failed to exhaust state remedies as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970); second, that of Ralls’ five substantive claims of alleged denial of federal constitutional rights at his state trial,3 two should be sustained (i. e. “(1) that the jury was improperly informed of his prior arrests”, and “(2) that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury applied improper pressure on the jury to agree to a verdict”); and, third, that Ralls should be discharged from custody unless afforded a new trial within sixty days. On May 20, the District Court entered an order staying execution of its judgment pending an expedited appeal to our Court. On June 4, we granted appellant’s motion for an expedited appeal and we heard the appeal on June 14. At our request, counsel for each side furnished to us, prior to argument, short statements of their respective versions of the essential evidence at the Superior Court trial.
We do not reach the merits of Ralls’ substantive claims; nor do we express any opinion as to whether they present issues of federal constitutional dimensions.
We reverse the judgment of the District Court and dismiss the petition solely on the ground that Ralls has failed to exhaust state remedies as required by § 2254(b). Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971); United States ex rel. Gibbs v. Zelker, 496 F.2d 991 (2 Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Nelson v. Zelker, 465 F.2d 1121 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1045 (1972).
While we deplore the delay in obtaining review of Ralls’ murder conviction by direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut,4 we hold, on the totality of the facts and circumstances presented by the record before us, that this case does not present a clear denial of constitutional rights sufficient to justify federal intervention. Specifically, we hold that there is neither “an absence of available State corrective process [nor] the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.” § 2254(b) (last clause). The delay here in processing the direct appeal is not the equivalent of a complete absence of effective state appellate process5 and therefore does not *494excuse the failure to exhaust state remedies.
We reverse the judgment of the District Court and dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

. See State of Connecticut v. John W. Ralls, XXXV Conn.Law Journal, No. 51, pages 3-4 (June 18, 1974); and see note 5, infra.

. Ralls has been represented in the federal habeas corpus proceedings by counsel other than his state appellate counsel; but his federal and state counsel have conferred together during the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, as we were informed at the oral argument of the instant appeal.

. Ralls’ counsel informed us at the oral argument of the instant appeal that these five substantive claims are essentially the same claims that Ralls intends to raise on his direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.

. IVe likewise deplore delays on direct appeals in criminal cases in other districts within this Circuit. E. g., United States ex rel. Mosher v. LaVallee, 491 F.2d 1346, 1347 n. 1 (2 Cir. 1974) (3½ years); United States ex rel. Gibbs v. Zelker, 496 F.2d 991 (2 Cir. 1974) (5 years).

. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in fixing the briefing and argument schedule in the instant case, State of Connecticut v. John W. Ralls, supra note 1, pointed out the remedies provided by Practice Book §§ 696 and 762 for expediting appeals :
“The rules contained in the Practice Book ‘set forth the time period for each step in the appeal. Those periods govern unless there is good cause for modifying them. And the cause which is asserted to be a good one should be explicitly set forth in any motion for an extension filed under Practice Book § 655. The granting of such a motion in the trial court, however, in no wise affects the power of this court under § 696 to compel the expedí-*494tious processing of appeals. . . . Under § 696, this court will, as occasion requires, make its own determination whether, from the time an appeal is filed, it is being prosecuted with proper diligence .... The work of this court is not expedited if counsel are permitted to dally for the purpose of bargaining with the opposition, for personal convenience or because other cases in hand are deemed by them to deserve preferential treatment.’ . . . Chanosky v. City Building Supply Co., 152 Conn. 449, 451-52, 208 A.2d 337.
When any party to an appeal fails to prosecute or defend that appeal with proper diligence the other party, or this court on its own motion, may dismiss the appeal or set aside the judgment with costs. Practice Book § 696. Also, in the interest of expediting decision or for other good cause, this court may suspend the requirements or provisions of any of the rules on the application of a party or on its own motion and may order proceedings in accordance with its direction. Practice Book § 762.
Although these remedies have been available to the state and to each of the defendants, it was not until this late date in the court year and on the eve of the court’s adjournment for the summer recess that the state has sought the benefit of the provisions of § 762 of the Practice Book. We also note that neither defendant has ever sought the benefit of the provisions of either §§ 696 or 762 of the Practice Book, choosing instead to ignore the availability of relief under these sections and to proceed by way of writs of habeas corpus in the federal district court which lias, nonetheless, assumed jurisdiction.” (footnotes omitted).