Court Opinion

ID: 9854551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:09:07.088587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:08.981162
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur with the affirmance of the judgment in favor of Singletary, and agree with the majority that Roehm’s lack of actual knowledge of any hazard was established by the record, I cannot agree that the evidence did not establish a lack of constructive knowledge as well. It is not enough to look only at the affidavit of one of the defendants and say that the affidavit does not establish a lack of constructive knowledge. We must look also at the deposition of Shiver. It is established there that the floor appeared to be clear and dry. Shiver walked past the same spot on the way to the rest room without any problem, but fell on his way back. If the hazard came to be on the floor after he had passed, but before he returned, a time established by Shiver as two or three minutes, it can hardly be said that it was there long enough for Roehm to be charged with knowledge of its existence.
I cannot agree with the majority that the evidence warrants an inference that a store employee could have seen the hazard or placed it there. Shiver testified that he entered the back of the store and turned to his left to go to the rest room, and that he saw an employee off to his right working at a table “prepping” some kind of vegetable. The employee was not, from what Shiver said, in a position to put anything in Shiver’s path. In addition, there was no vegetable matter found by Shiver or by any agent of appellee in the area where Shiver fell. Shiver stated that there appeared to be water on the skid mark he made when he fell, but there is nothing in the record to indicate that any employee of the store was using water in the area. The majority’s assertion that Shiver’s testimony is “consistent with and suggestive of the hypothesis that there was a store employee standing in the immediate vicinity washing vegetables shortly prior to his fall, who may have been responsible for the presence of moisture on the floor” is totally without evidentiary support. Shiver said there was an *750employee “on” his right as he went to the rest room; since there is no evidence to establish the dimensions of the space through which Shiver was walking, that testimony does not establish that the employee was in Shiver’s immediate vicinity. Shiver’s testimony concerning the employee’s activity was that the employee was “prepping” or “working on” some kind of vegetable. There is no evidence in the record that “prepping” vegetables means washing them, and this court is not empowered to assume that it does. Shiver had just come from the rest room, and it is as valid to infer that he somehow got his foot wet there as it is to infer that a store employee was responsible. Concluding that a store employee could see anything on the floor or placed anything there is a mere supposition rather than an inference.
To reverse the judgment in favor of Roehm and to overrule Newman v. Ruby Tuesday, Inc., 184 Ga. App. 827 (363 SE2d 26) (1987), and Bright v. Food Giant, 177 Ga. App. 641 (340 SE2d 272) (1986), is to abandon the basic principle that an owner’s superior knowledge of the hazard is essential to his liability. The majority’s position is that whenever employees are anywhere near a fall, whether the cause of the fall can be ascertained beforehand or not, the owner may be liable. That is not the law of this State, and I cannot join in making it so. “[The majority] seeks to invoke a conclusion that because [appellee’s employee was] present near the scene of the slip and fall [appellee] constructively was aware of the dangerous situation caused by the slippery substance. The fallacy of the supposition of constructive knowledge is that the condition must in fact exist and for a sufficient period of time in the immediate vicinity of the proprietor’s agents so that constructive knowledge may be imposed. [Cit.]” Kenny v. M & M Supermarket, 183 Ga. App. 225, 226 (358 SE2d 641) (1987).
Bright does not purport to change the burden of proof in slip and fall cases; it merely held that where all the evidence points to a lack of knowledge, and the plaintiff cannot counter that lack of knowledge, the defendant is entitled to judgment. While Bright might be clearer in holding that the defendant had already pierced the allegations of the complaint and shifted the burden to the plaintiff, Newman is not subject to that criticism. It is clear from the opinion in that case that the defendant submitted sufficient evidence to the trial court to show a lack of both actual and constructive knowledge of the defect. That is the situation in this case. I must, therefore, dissent to the reversal of the judgment in favor of Roehm.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Birdsong and Judge Sognier join in this opinion.