Court Opinion

ID: 9752416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:06:19.468232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:29.566556
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
The lower court committed two errors when it deprived appellant of custody of her two children. First, the lower court permitted appellee to introduce evidence of his general good reputation as part of his case-in-chief. It is settled that such evidence is inadmissible. This case, where appel-lee is a life-time resident and local celebrity, and appellant a relative outsider, is a vivid illustration of the importance of the rule of inadmissibility. Second, the lower court’s order does not represent an adjudication of what is in the chil*495dren’s best interest but is instead a penalty imposed upon appellant for what the court regarded as her immoral conduct in having had sexual intercourse with two men. It is settled that a child custody proceeding is not the proper forum in which to penalize a parent for his or her behavior. The only purpose of a custody proceeding is to determine what will be in the best interest of the children. The proper question is always, “What is the effect of this parental behavior on the children?” not, “Is this behavior good or bad?”
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Appellee has lived in Cornwall since he was two years old, except for the years he attended Penn State and played football professionally for the Dallas Cowboys and the Philadelphia Eagles. N.T. 7-8. Cornwall is described in the record as having a population of 2,200 and as being the kind of community where everyone knows everyone else’s business. N.T. 319, 323. Appellant was raised in Lebanon, N.T. 571, only came to Cornwall after her marriage, and has no claim to fame remotely approaching that of a professional football player.
Appellee’s first witness, after himself, was the Mayor of Lebanon. The mayor testified only as to appellee’s good reputation in the community. He did not testify as to appellee’s reputation as a parent, did not say that he knew the children, and did not say that he had ever seen appellee with the children. Nor did he testify as to appellant’s poor reputation as a parent. All he did was testify to appellee’s general good reputation at a point in the proceedings when appellee’s character had not in any way been attacked.
In Greenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company, 427 Pa. 494, 235 A.2d 582 (1967), our Supreme Court stated the general rule for the admissibility of reputation evidence in a civil case:
In civil actions evidence of good character or reputation “is inadmissible unless directly in issue or involved in the nature of the proceedings, and even then evidence of good character is not admissible unless and until it is attacked *496by evidence to the contrary ....[....] To be in issue in a technical sense, character must be of particular importance and therefore a material fact in the case.” Henry, Penna. Evidence (4th ed. 1953) § 152 (Footnote omitted.) Id., 427 Pa. at 498, 235 A.2d at 584.
This is so settled a principle that although Greenberg is cited as standing for it in numerous secondary sources,1 no Pennsylvania appellate court has had so to cite it until today.
Neither the lower court nor the majority cites any authority in support of the admission of appellee’s general good reputation; I have been unable to find any case in any state that supports it. The majority says that the lower court “recognized the proper weight to be given the reputation evidence,” at 576; but when one examines the lower court’s opinion, one sees, not only that this is not so, but that the lower court entirely missed the point. The lower court says that “a parental reputation which can bring instant and constant grief to children, thus adversely affecting their relationship with the custodial parent, must be included in the supply of factors reviewed . . . . ” Slip op. at 13. The lower court also says that “[o]ne question to be asked is whether the children should be thrust into or returned to a situation where they cannot avoid the impact of an adverse reputation.” Slip op. at 14. The point is not the admissibility of evidence of bad reputation-“which can bring instant and constant grief to the children”-but of good reputation. I agree that it may be proper for one parent to prove that the other parent has a bad reputation. Herr v. Lazor, 238 Iowa 518, 28 N.W.2d 11 (1947). Appellee, however, did not call the Mayor of Lebanon to prove that appellant had a bad reputation but to prove that he himself had a good reputation.
As explained more than thirty years ago by Mr. Justice JACKSON, the limitations that have been developed over the years on the use of reputation evidence are based on the *497concern, born of experience, that it often distorts the fact-finding process by precluding dispassionate judgment. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948). It is fundamental that evidence must be excluded where its probative value is outweighed by the unfair prejudice that may result from its admission. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Hickman, 453 Pa. 427, 309 A.2d 564 (1973). Unfairness is manifest here. Not only the Mayor of Lebanon, but nine other witnesses, including the President of the Cornwall Borough Council, testified to appellee’s general good reputation, as part of appellee’s case-in-chief, and when appellee’s character had not in any way been attacked. We should not sanction but condemn such a procedure. Children are not to be awarded the famous over the humble.
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Since her divorce from appellee in 1974, appellant has had sexual intercourse with two men. Both men were subpoenaed by appellee, and their uncontradicted testimony may be summarized as follows. One of the men first met appellant in 1973 but their relationship did not become intimate until early 1975. N.T. 341-342. During the following two and a half years he spent fifty or more nights with appellant in her house but they never had intercourse when the children were in the house and awake. N.T. 365-368. The second man met appellant in March 1977, four months before the hearing in the lower court. N.T. 370. They had had intercourse less than six times and never while the children were in the house. N.T. 372-373. They spent “[sjeveral, more than six,” nights together but the only two times he spent the night when the children were in the house he slept on the couch. N.T. 377, 381-382.2
The lower court made plain its disapproval of this conduct. Thus the court said: “We find it to be witless judgment and in poor taste on [appellant’s] part.” Slip op. at 8. The court also referred to the circumstances as “insidious,” slip op. at *4989, and appellant’s “transgression” as “grievous,” id. However understandable, these expressions of disapproval did not address the issue before the court.
Everyone develops a code of personal conduct. It does not follow that one is entitled to impose that code on others, or penalize those who do not conform to it. Especially in a child custody case is it important that the hearing judge distinguish between his personal code of conduct, and his determination of what is in the children’s best interest. One may believe, with the utmost conviction, that certain conduct is wrong, and yet it may be that that belief should have little or no part in determining who should have custody of the children. A judge may believe that “lips that touch liquor shall never touch mine,” but he is not for that reason to deny custody to a mother who drinks. A judge may be a devout churchgoer, but he is not for that reason to deny custody to a mother who does not go to church. Or, as here, a judge may believe that it is immoral for an unmarried woman to have sexual intercourse, but he is not for that reason to deny her custody of her children. See Commonwealth ex rel. Myers v. Myers, 468 Pa. 134, 360 A.2d 587 (1976) (collecting and discussing cases); Gunter v. Gunter, 240 Pa.Super. 382, 361 A.2d 307 (1976). Of course, “a parent’s nonmarital relationships must be given close scrutiny in determining custody matters.” Commonwealth ex rel. Myers v. Myers, supra, 468 Pa. at 138, 360 A.2d at 589. The purpose of the scrutiny, however, is only to determine the impact of the relationship on the children:
[I]t is the effect of the nonmarital relationship on the child and not the fact of the relationship itself which is crucial to a custody decision. If the evidence shows that a parent’s conduct has had harmful effects on the child the court may be justified in denying custody to that parent. On the other hand, if the evidence shows that the parent’s conduct has not adversely affected the child and that the parent has taken good care of the child, then the best interests of the child may dictate that the parent retain custody. In each case, all relevant circumstances must be examined to determine what action would be in the best *499interests of the child. Commonwealth ex rel. Myers v. Myers, supra, 468 Pa. at 141, 360 A.2d at 590.
The controlling words in this statement of the law are, “if the evidence shows . . . . ” The court must never assume, or infer, that simply because a nonmarital relationship exists, the impact of the relationship on the children has been harmful. The evidence must show that it has been harmful, and this is so whether the nonmarital relationship, as in Myers and Gunter, approaches a de facto marriage or, as in this case, is more transient. Rupp v. Rupp, 268 Pa.Super. 467, 408 A.2d 883 (1979). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Drum v. Drum, 263 Pa.Super. 248, 397 A.2d 1192 (1979) (SPAETH, J., dissenting opinion).
In the present case, the lower court specifically refused to follow the law as thus stated in the cases. Instead of examining the evidence to determine whether it showed that appellant’s nonmarital relationships had had any harmful impact on the children, and then stating that determination in the form of specific findings of fact, the lower court said:
But the non-marital affairs here had to adversely affect the children if only subconsciously, because of the number of times one of the two men with whom [appellant] was keeping company, spent the night and was seen first thing in the morning by the children. During the same period a second man stayed overnight with [appellant] at different times than the first man, also with the knowledge of the children. Slip op. at 7 (emphasis added).3
Later in its opinion the lower court attempts to justify its resort to inference, and its failure to make specific findings of fact showing harmful effect, by saying:
Must we wait to see some further manifestation of destructive effect sometime in the children’s teen years to determine the degree of adversity? We think not. Slip op. at 8.
And the court goes on to ask:
How can the children, though allegedly showing no outward visible sign of the immoral effect thereof [i. e., of *500appellant’s non-marital relationships], help but be influenced in the wrong direction[?] Slip op. at 8 (emphasis added).
Thus the court makes plain that in its opinion, and despite such cases as Myers and Gunter, it is entitled to infer, simply from the evidence that appellant had nonmarital relationships, that the relationships “had to” have a harmful impact on the children.
-3-
The majority opinion suggests that despite the lower court’s refusal to follow Myers and Gunter, its award of custody should be affirmed. Thus the majority says:
While we may agree with appellant that the lower court might have placed too much emphasis on this factor [i. e., appellant’s nonmarital relationships] we cannot say that it committed reversible error when it awarded custody of the children to the father since the court clearly considered many other relevant factors in making its decision. At 577.
I submit that this statement will not withstand examination. The majority fails to identify the “many other relevant factors” it says the lower court “clearly considered.” When the lower court’s opinion is read in light of the record, it becomes plain that in fact the lower court did not consider many other factors, but to the contrary, that its disapproval of appellant’s “grievous transgression” swept aside all other considerations.
The lower court makes much of the fact that when it interviewed Meredith she gave as a reason for wanting to stay with appellant that she liked seeing Spoony and Steve (appellant’s men friends). In the lower court’s words: “In preference to her father she wants to be around her mother’s boyfriends, and at no fault of her father!” Slip op. at 7. This is a most unfair reading of what the child said. . As the dialogue reprinted by the majority indicates, Meredith, who we must remember was only seven years old, had difficulty articulating her reasons for wanting to stay with appellant. *501She had no difficulty in saying that it was appellant she wanted to live with and that she liked things the way they were; it was only after the lower court pressed her at some length that she mentioned seeing Spoony and Steve, and then as only one aspect of what she liked about the status quo; the other aspect was “going to the shore,” which the record shows she did with her father as well as with her mother.
The lower court goes on to say that Meredith “has not been given a chance to fully develop her relationship with her father as circumstances sans other men would and should otherwise permit.” Slip op. at 7. I find this very troubling. Since when is a mother, divorced and living with her children, obliged to forgo any relationship with other men, on the theory that otherwise her children’s relationship with their father may not “fully develop”?
One would suppose that if a child expresses a preference of living with a parent, that expression will usually count in the parent’s favor. It may not count for much or even anything at all, because the child may be very young, Shoup v. Shoup, 257 Pa.Super. 263, 390 A.2d 814 (1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Doberstein v. Doberstein, 201 Pa.Super. 102, 192 A.2d 154 (1963), but one would hardly expect it to count against the parent. Yet here, the lower court turns Meredith’s statement that she prefers to live with appellant against appellant.
There are other things the lower court turns against appellant, although one would expect them to count in appellant’s favor.
After her divorce appellant became employed. The parties’ separation agreement, whereby appellant and the children lived in the former family home and appellee paid certain of the children’s expenses but did not provide appellant with any cash support, clearly assumed that appellant would be employed. Because appellee and his parents lived close by, and because appellant did not want to limit her children’s contact with their father and paternal grandparents, the children spent a considerable amount of time *502before and after school and at other times with their father and grandparents. The result was that the children spent far more time with appellee and members of his family than was called for by the visitation schedule in the separation agreement, and little or no time with non-family baby sitters. All of the testimony was to the effect that the children were thriving under these arrangements, as the lower court noted in its opinion. Slip op. at 5. And yet, the lower court criticizes appellant, saying that “with a bit more effort she could have given more of herself to her children. Even by her own admission she could have stopped working, spent more time with the children and forced the monetary issue with their father.” Slip op. at 4. It seems odd to me to criticize a mother for not “forc[ing] the monetary issue,” while not criticizing the father for his failure to provide support. Such criticism hardly reflects a dispassionate or even-handed treatment of the parties. Furthermore, while a parent’s work schedule is certainly relevant in deciding what is in the children’s best interest, a mother is not to be penalized because she must work for living. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Lovell v. Shaw, 202 Pa.Super. 339, 195 A.2d 878 (1963). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437, 292 A.2d 380 (1972).
After appellee instituted the custody proceeding, appellant on the advice of counsel limited the children’s time with their father and his family to the amounts specified in the separation agreement. Although acknowledging that she had acted on advice of counsel, the loweí» court nonetheless found that appellant’s action “smack[ed] of footballism” and belied her testimony that she believed her prior generosity with visitation had been in the children’s best interest. Slip op. at 10. Again, I find such criticism odd, and unfair. It was appellee who initiated the custody litigation. He was therefore at least as responsible for disturbing the children’s lives as appellant. Why should appellant be charged with “footballism” for following her attorney’s advice, and not appellee?
*503Every indication from the record is that appellant believed that the coincidence of her need to work, her desire not to limit the children’s contact with their father, and the availability and willingness to help of the paternal grandparents, was fortunate for all concerned. Now, however, instead of being given credit for adjusting to a difficult situation in a generous way, she finds herself accused of being insensitive to her children’s welfare, and is told, in effect, that the transfer of custody from her to appellee is of no great consequence because the children have already spent so much time with appellee and his parents.
Finally, the lower court discusses a number of “instances of seeming callousness on [appellant’s] part [which] when taken in isolation of each other . . . signified nothing ponderous [b]ut when viewed altogether .. . yield an unfavorable reflection.” Slip op. at 4. It is far from clear to me that even taken together and as described by the court these events have enough weight to be considered in a child custody action. But far more disturbing, and more indicative of the court’s unrelenting attitude toward appellant, is the court’s failure to acknowledge appellant’s accounts of these events. It is true that as the finder of fact it was the hearing judge’s duty to make determinations of credibility; he was not required to believe appellant or any other witness. However, when the hearing judge does not find a witness credible, he still must discuss the testimony and explain why he does not believe it. Kimmey v. Kimmey, 269 Pa.Super. 346, 409 A.2d 1178 (1979).
The court wrote that “[appellant] refused Meredith permission to cross the street fronting their property to show her father and grandparents . .. the doll she received for her birthday-a pathetic picture of a child running to the curb, showing the doll briefly from afar, then abruptly turning away and entering her house.” Slip op. at 4. This dramatic presentation totally ignores appellant’s testimony that she did not know the father and grandparents were outside, and that in asking to cross the street, Meredith gave no indication of why she wanted to cross; appellant was *504inside the house and simply wanted her young daughter to stay in the yard unless there was some good reason for her to leave. N.T. 597. In any case, one is bound to ask' why it would not have been perfectly easy for the father and grandparents themselves to have crossed the street-but there is no mention of this by the lower court. The court’s other examples of “callousness” are similar; and in each case the court fails to acknowledge appellant’s version of the event.
In summary, one leaves the lower court’s opinion persuaded that the court’s conviction that appellant was an immoral person was so strong that it disabled the court from viewing the evidence in a dispassionate manner, and as required by law, in particular, by such decisions as Commonwealth ex rel. Myers v. Myers, supra, and Gunter v. Gunter, supra.
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The question remains of what remedy we should grant appellant.
Our Supreme Court has just emphasized the importance it places on continuity in children’s lives by reversing an order by which we had provided for a change of custody from grandparent to parent over the objection of the child. El-lerbe v. Hooks, 490 Pa. 363, 416 A.2d 512 (1980), rev’g, 257 Pa.Super. 219, 390 A.2d 791 (1978). It has now been three years since the hearing in this case. The lower court made its order transferring custody effective immediately, denying appellant’s application for a stay pending its consideration of her exceptions. It then took the lower court eleven months to consider and deny the exceptions and write its opinion, and, most unfortunately, it has taken another two years for the case to make its way through this court.
In child custody cases it is the present best interest of the children that counts. Thus any change in circumstances during the appellate process requires consideration. Commonwealth ex rel. Hulschuh v. Holland-Moritz, supra. Therefore, although I believe that appellant was improperly deprived of custody of her children three years ago, the *505proper alternative at this point is not reversal but remand. On remand, however, I should order that the matter be heard before a different judge, who would hear the case de novo, receiving such testimony as necessary to bring the record up to date. This should include testimony as to the present preferences of the children who, at their present ages, may be expected to be more able to speak for themselves than they were three years ago.
The case should be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

. E. g., 14 P.L.E., Evidence § 56 (1979 Cum.Supp.); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 423 (1980 Cum.Supp.); 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 64 (3d ed. 1940) (1979 Supp.)

. The lower court’s statement of the facts implies that both men had intercourse with appellant in her house when the children were there. See slip op. at 7.

. This statement of the facts is misleading. See footnote 2, supra.