Court Opinion

ID: 9458802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:01:50.188993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:53.878586
License: Public Domain

VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of the majority opinion reversing the district court judgment. The Pennsylvania cases, as well as those of this court, and the record, in my view, support the decision of the district court stated as follows (page 247a):
“There is thus presented a record in which there is simply no evidence of a defect at the time the cast iron part was furnished to Pennsylvania Electric Company, nor is there any evidence that it was dangerous to the ul*388tímate user at the time it was furnished or sold.”1
Comment G of Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts provides:
“The rule stated in this section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.” (Emphasis added).2
In Woods v. Pleasant Hills Motor Co., 219 Pa.Super. 381, 281 A.2d 649, 651 (1971), the Pennsylvania Superior Court adopted this Restatement position, using this language:
“The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced which supports the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained. Comment G to § 402A, Restatement 2d, Torts.” .
In Greco v. Bucciconi Engineering Co., 407 F.2d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1969), this court stated:
“Bucciconi vigorously contends that appellee failed to sustain his burden of showing the existence of a defect at the time of sale. The test we must apply is whether reasonable and well balanced minds would be satisfied from the evidence adduced that the defective condition existed when the machine was delivered.” (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.)
In Kaczmarek v. Mesta Machine Company, 463 F.2d 675 (3d Cir., Opinion filed June 30, 1972), this court said:
“Assuming that the appellant’s reconstruction of the accident is correct, liability does not automatically follow unless the appellant satisfied his burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller." (Emphasis added.)
There was no proof of when the attachment was actually sold by defendant. Mr. Jones testified that he would think that the particular attachment was purchased very close to the pole’s, installation date of 1958 (which would have been approximately eight years before the accident), but acknowledged that it may have been a reused part that was 15-20 years old at the time it was installed on the pole (see 146-47a). Jones could not even establish that the attachment had been purchased from the defendant and acknowledged that his conclusion was “just guesswork” (see pp. 150-51a).
The plaintiff attempted to introduce testimony at the trial to the effect that there was a rusted portion of the attachment that was obvious to those examining the attachment after the accident. If this evidence had been properly developed at the trial, it might have supported a finding of a defective condition in the attachment at the time that it was put on the pole eight years earlier. But in order to do this, I think that plaintiff was required to present an expert to testify that an analysis of the part indicat*389ed a defect in the casting process which might have resulted in a crack, or at the least to present expert testimony as to how long the rust indicated that the crack had been in the attachment. As it is, the most that can be said is that after the accident occurred, at least eight years after the attachment had been purchased from the defendant, there was a rusty crack in the section of the attachment that broke. An examination of the pictures (P — 1, P-7 and P-10) provided in the supplemental record does not disclose to me where the rust was. I do not believe that the products liability law of Pennsylvania permits a finding on this record that the attachment was sold in a defective condition.
I note that it appears that plaintiff’s decision to introduce the testimony regarding the rust in the cracked attachment was an after-thought. No mention of this defect at all was made at pretrial. Indeed, when defendant’s counsel objected to this testimony regarding rust at the trial, plaintiff’s counsel candidly stated:
“I can readily admit that it was not in the pre-trial record.” (153a).
It seems to me that in these circumstances, sound principles of judicial administration would preclude plaintiff from “surprising” defendant with this new theory of the attachment’s “defective condition.” It would seem that unless the trial is to become a matter of unfair surprise, the district court must hold plaintiff’s counsel to the theories and grounds of liability developed in the pre-trial proceedings. See Valdesa Compania Naviera v. Frota Nacional de Petroleros, 348 F.2d 33, 37-38 (3d Cir. 1965), and cases there cited.
Finally, I do not believe that the evidence justifies a finding that the T-fitting broke before the pole broke (74a, 83a, 84a, 88a, 94a, 101a, 111a). Mr. Smith, the chairman of the Pennsylvania Electric Company safety investigation committee, referred to in the majority opinion, who actually wrote the report, acknowledged that the committee started off by assuming that the broken attachment “must have caused” the accident and spent the rest of the analysis “trying to show how that caused the pole to collapse” (157-158a). Indeed, Smith acknowledged that the committee never even considered the possibility that the pole may have broken first (158a). Further testimony by the other members of the committee revealed that the committee had only one meeting four days after the accident (168a), that they had not seen the results of the testing of the attachment (166a, 169a), and that they may not have even seen the photographs taken after the accident (169a). Finally, when asked by the court whether, as often happens, the committee had trouble reaching agreement, Smith candidly answered:
“Not really. We pretty well agreed what we were going to put in the report before I ever started it.” (160a).
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. The ruling made at trial was as follows (243a) :
“As the Trial Judge I have to conclude that the plaintiff has not made out his case by a fair preponderance of the evidence. That is, that there was a defect at the time it was sold to Pennsylvania Electric Company.”

. L. R. Erumer, 2 Products Liability, § 16A [4] at 3-221-22:
“The task of the claimant’s counsel is to show that the damaging event resulted in the course of a normal use of the product, and not from an unforeseeable misuse, and further, to show that the defeat causing the damaging event existed when the defendant relinquished control or possession of the product." (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.)