Court Opinion

ID: 9517424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:16:37.208197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:51.463380
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.,
(dissenting). When William J. Murphy voluntarily left the employ of Roman Cleanser Company he disqualified himself for benefits under the Michigan Employment Security Act.1 *However, on March 13, 1968 the Employment Security Commission determined that his employment by a Kentucky employer requalified him under § 29(3)2 of the act and that his refusal of an offer of employment in Michigan because he wished to remain in Kentucky did not disqualify him under § 29(1) (e).3
No appeal from that determination was taken and it became final upon expiration of the 15-day appeal period.4
Subsequently, Roman Cleanser sought a redetermination; the commission, on June 13, 1968, and the employment security appeal board thereafter, ruled against it. Roman Cleanser then appealed to the circuit court, which ruled in its favor. The majority, in affirming the circuit court reversal of the appeal board, hold that the commission erred as a matter of law in deciding “that Murphy’s work with an out-of-state employer requalified him for benefits chargeable to the account of his former Michigan employer”. I dissent because I do not think we can *167properly reach the meritorious question; the determination of March 13, from which no appeal was taken and which thereupon became final, is, by reason of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel,* ***5 not subject to collateral attack.6
The March 13 determination of the commission was that Murphy’s employment by a Kentucky employer requalified him and that his refusal of an offer of employment in Michigan because he wished to remain in Kentucky did not disqualify him. Manifestly, the questions of the effect upon Murphy’s right to receive benefits under the Michigan act of his move to Kentucky, and of his employment there, and of his refusal of employment in Michigan were all involved in and decided by the not appealed and, therefore, final determination of March 13.
Roman Cleanser points out that under § 32a7 “the commission may, for good cause, * # * reconsider any prior determination or redetermination after the 15-day period has expired and issue a redetermination affirming, modifying or reversing the prior determination or redetermination”. (Emphasis supplied.) It contends that the redetermination of *168June 13 (appealed to the circuit court and now before us on appeal from that court) is within the ambit of this language and, thus, the determination of March 13 is not protected by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
I-think it is clear, however, that the June 13 redetermination8 was not a “reconsideration” of issues already decided, but rather was made in response to the commission’s statutory obligation under § 32 (d) of the act9 to determine whether there had been a change of facts or of law affecting Murphy’s right to continue to receive benefit checks.
Under § 32(d), the issuance of each benefit check is a determination entitling the employer to a re-determination of the former employee’s current eligibility and qualification. A redetermination may, thus, be obtained at any time upon a claim that there has been a change of facts or of law. But, absent a change of facts or of law, questions already decided may not be reopened unless “for good cause” the commission “reconsiders” under § 32a.10
If every § 32(d) redetermination reopens the issues resolved upon the original determination of *169eligibility, then the limitation in § 32a, providing that a reconsideration after the expiration of the 15-day appeal period may. be made only for good cause shown, would, at least insofar as employer-sought redeterminations are concerned, be of little practical significance. If that were the rule, whenever a benefit check issues, the former employer, by simply requesting a redetermination pursuant to subsection (d), could rehash all the issues resolved by the original determination without showing good cause for reconsideration.
How then are we to distinguish a redetermination of an original determination — a reconsideration— from a redetermination of a check determination when the redetermination is made after the issuance of a benefit check? It would, of course, simplify our task if the commission would state in so many words in the redetermination whether it is a “reconsideration” of the original determination for good cause shown or whether it is made mandatorily under subsection (d) and relates only to a later check determination.
A benefit check was issued to William J. Murphy on May 1, 1968. The commission’s redetermination of June 13 states on its face that it redetermines a determination of May 1 (i.e., the issuance of the May 1 check, which by law is treated as a determination) —the original March 13 determination is not adverted to. Merely because the June 13 redetermination reiterates that the continuing refusal by Murphy of employment outside Kentucky did not disqualify him from receiving benefits does not mean that issues decided March 13 were “reconsidered”. There had been no change of fact or of law, and in that context the restatement of the original March 13 determination as to the effect of refusing employ*170ment outside Kentucky does not indicate that the question was reconsidered by the commission. On the contrary, the June 13 redetermination decided simply that nothing had changed and, therefore, Murphy was entitled to continue to receive benefits.
There is no evidence whatsoever that the commission found good cause for reopening the original March 13 determination.11 Absent affirmative evidence that the June 13 redetermination, mandatorily required to be made under subsection (d) as to the check determination of May 1, also represents a reconsideration by the commission for good cause of the original determination of March 13, we have no basis for concluding that when the commission issued the redetermination it issued anything other than a mandatorily-required redetermination of the May 1 check determination or that it did more than to determine that there had been no change of law or fact requiring a discontinuance of the benefits which it had on March 13 decided Murphy was entitled to receive. Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding that the commission found good cause for reconsidering or that it did in fact reconsider *171the issues decided March 13; those issues could not be reconsidered on their merits by the appeal board or the circuit court.

 MCLA § 421.29(1) (a) (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.531[1] [a]).

 MCLA § 421.29(3) (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.531[3]).

 MCLA § 421.29(1) (e) (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.531[1] [e]).

 MCLA § 421.32a (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.534[1]).

 The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to administrative determinations adjudicatory in nature particularly where, as here, a method of appeal is provided and it is clear that it was the legislative intention to make the determination final in the absence of an appeal. See OAG, 1967-1968; No 4628, p 217 (March 25, 1968), which discusses the application of these doctrines to the appeal provisions of the employment security act, the act under which this appeal arises.

 The majority cite cases holding that on appeal a court may consider questions not properly preserved below, but those statements were made in cases on direct appeal where no issue of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or finality was presented.
In this connection it is noteworthy that the appeal board affirmed the decision of the referee who found that no timely protest had been made from the March 13 determination and “consequently, the issue as to the claimant’s separation and failure to accept further work at the time of such separation was not before the referee at this time”.

 MOLA § 421.32a (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.534[1]).

 The use of the same term, “redetermination”, to describe both (1) a reconsideration of an issue already decided and (2) a determination of whether, because of a change of fact or law, a decision previously made should no longer be operative, is confusing and unfortunate.

 “The issuance of each benefit check shall be considered a determination by the commission that the claimant receiving the check was, during the compensable period, covered thereby, eligible and qualified for benefits, and any employer upon receipt of a copy of the check as provided in subsection 21(a) may protest by requesting a redetermination as to such eligiblity or qualification as to such period and a determination as to later weeks and benefits still unpaid as are affected by such protest.” MCLA § 421.32(d) (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.534[d]).

 Compare Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen (1948), 333 US 591 (68 S Ct 715, 92 L Ed 898), discussing the extent to which the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar reconsideration of a question adjudicated as to an earlier period; see, also, 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments, § 421, p 591.

 Commission regulation 270 [4] provides that good cause includes situations when (1) an interested party has newly discovered material facts which through no fault of his own were not available to him at the time of the determination, (2) the commission has additional or corrected information or (3) an administrative clerical error has been discovered. (1967 ACS, p 4356.)
Merren v. Employment Security Commission (1966), 3 Mich App 383, affirmed by an equally-divided Court in 380 Mich 240, referred to in the majority opinion, was decided by our Court in 1966 and by the Michigan Supreme Court on March 4, 1968, i.e., before the determination of March 13 was issued. Reconsideration by the commission on the basis of Merren was not sought in this case. Except for Merren, which was decided by our Court long before Murphy left the employ of Roman Cleanser and which was decided by the Supreme Court before the March 13 determination was issued, nothing new has come to light either of fact or of law which would justify reopening the March 13, 1968, determination either for (1) good cause under the statute, or (2) as an exception to general res judicata and collateral estoppel principles.