Court Opinion

ID: 9576010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:19:39.817491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:56.086891
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
(concurring). I am convinced that the inconsistencies and anomalies we find in our deci*252sions as to public officer and public body tort immunity stem from our failure to recognize that governmental tort immunity has been abrogated while public officer immunity has not. In Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962), the court abrogated governmental tort immunity. In Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 300, 240 N.W.2d 610, 621 (1976), however, the court applied the general rule that a public officer is immune from tort liability to a person injured by his or her acts performed within the scope of his or her employment. However, the fact that the public officer may be immune does not mean that his or her public employer is immune from liability for the officer's act. In Holytz, the court said that, ”[b]y reason of the rule of respondeat superior a public body shall be liable for damages for the torts of its officers, agents, and employees occurring in the course of the business of such public body." 17 Wis. 2d at 40, 115 N.W.2d at 625.1
The doctrine upon which governmental tort immunity was based was the ancient and fallacious maxim that "the king can do no wrong." Id. at 33, 115 N.W.2d at 621 (quoting Britten v. Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 382, 386, 51 N.W.2d 30, 32 (1952)). Hence, its interment by the court. To make clear the scope of its intended abrogation, the Holytz court said that, "henceforward, . . . the rule is liability — the exception is immunity." Id. at 39, 115 N.W.2d at 625. The court was concerned that subsequent decisions would emasculate its abrogation. However, what the Holytz court feared has come to pass. The rule as we now apply it is immunity, not liability, whether the action is brought against a public *253officer or against the local government. We struggle, seemingly on a daily basis, to make sense out of something which makes no sense: the discretionary/ministerial dichotomy. Tort liability suits against public officers and employees and governmental bodies proliferate. Our burdensome and rapidly expanding caseload is hugely contributed to by governmental and public officer tort liability actions. When we see such conditions, the Code of Judicial Ethics urges us to speak out in the interest of the administration of justice. Supreme Court Rule 60.01(14).2
The Holytz court cited the Comment, Municipal Responsibility for the Torts of Policemen, 42 YALE L.J. 241 (1932). The commentator noted that, "[a]n overwhelming opinion throughout the world in favor of the assumption of community liability for the torts of public officers may be regarded as representing a growing moral conviction to which the courts should not remain impervious." Id. at 244-45, quoted in Holytz, 17 Wis. 2d at 35, 115 N.W.2d at 622-23.
While the Wisconsin courts have not been totally impervious to the responsibility of the community to redress those injured by the acts of its public officers and employees, we have on occasion absolved municipalities and public officers from liability for acts callous to the safety and well-being of those to whom the government and its officers owe a duty of care. In Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995), the county and its jail nurse were held to be immune from tort liability for failing to hospitalize a *254jail inmate suffering from appendicitis where the jail nurse advised the jailer that "he's got 24 hours"3 before the inmate's condition would require hospitalization and during that twenty-four hours the problem would become that of the jurisdiction for whom the county was holding Swatek. See id. at 54, 531 N.W.2d at 48.
The court did not come to grips with the issue in the case because it concluded that the jail nurse's negligence was "not germane" to the court's decision. Id. at 54 n.2, 531 N.W.2d at 47. The court failed to distinguish the discretion § 302.38(1), STATS., gave the jailer as to how medical treatment was to be provided inmates from the county's respondeat superior liability for the jail nurse's professional malpractice. But see Gordon v. Milwaukee County, 125 Wis. 2d 62, 69, 370 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Ct. App. 1985) (county liable only if county-employed psychiatrist failed to exercise "that degree of care and skill which would be exercised by the average psychiatrist acting in the same or similar circumstances.").
The Swatek court should have found that the county was liable for the jail nurse's negligence, if established, regardless of the nurse's immunity. We contributed to the confusion by complicating the analysis. We should not have been concerned whether the nurse's examination was discretionary or ministerial. The resolution of that dichotomy is irrelevant to the public employer's liability; what is relevant is the officer's or employee's negligence.
Section 893.80(4), Stats., does not alter the analysis or result. Public officer immunity is unaffected by the statute and governmental tort immunity is limited to acts of governance, as Holytz intended.
*255In the interests of simplicity and fairness, we should abrogate public officer or employee immunity. The reason for immunity no longer exists because any judgment rendered against a public officer or employee arising out of an act performed within the scope of the officer's or employee's employment will be entered against the public employer and not against the officer or employee. See § 895.46(l)(a), STATS. As to liability of the public body, the legislature has "capped" that. Section 893.80(3), STATS. Also, the existence of liability insurance means that the public officer and governmental tort immunity doctrines protect the insurance company's fisc and not the public treasury. The reason for the public officer and governmental tort immunity rules having disappeared, so should the rules.
If any justification for legislative action is necessary, it can be found in the dissenting opinion of Judge (later Justice) Cardozo, in People v. Westchester County Nat'l Bank, 132 N.E. 241, 249 (N.Y. 1921):
The legislature might readjust the incidence of the burden, might establish a more equitable distribution between the individual and the public, through the voluntary acceptance of liability for a loss which was without a remedy when suffered.... The readjustment of these burdens along the lines of equality and equity is a legitimate function of the state as long as justice to its citizens remains its chief concern.
Quoted in Comment, 42 Yale L.J. at 247.
Wisconsin has a progressive tradition. It was among the first states to adopt a workers' compensation act, Laws of 1911, ch. 50, and an unemployment compensation act, Laws of 1931, ch. 20. The attempt of the Holytz court to further that tradition in the area of governmental tort liability foundered when the holding *256of the Holytz court was, as the court feared, obfuscated by subsequent judicial decisions. In Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 511-12, 259 N.W.2d 537, 541-42 (1977), the court mistakenly declared that the words "legislative," "judicial," "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial" were synonymous with "discretion." The legislature considered that it was codifying the Holytz decision when it enacted what is now § 893.80(4), Stats. However, it is clear that the Holytz court intended to except from abrogation of governmental tort immunity only the common-law immunities for acts of governance. However, the discretionary/ministerial dichotomy developed and since Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 300-01, 240 N.W.2d at 621-22, the Wisconsin courts have attempted to make sense out of what does not make sense. The savings in the costs of investigation and litigation if public officer immunity is abrogated will more than repay the occasional judgment a public body or its insurer may have to pay as damages for the negligent acts of its officers, employees and agents. Further, with an adequate remedy available under state law, there will be less incentive to squeeze a plaintiffs case into the framework of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, where there is no cap on liability and the government may be subjected to ruinous costs of litigation if the plaintiff prevails. I urge the legislature to consider this problem.

 However, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to civil rights' liability. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

 Supreme Court Rule 60.01(14) provides: "A judge should contribute to the public interest by advising, suggesting and supporting rules and legislation which, from his or her judicial observation and experience, will improve the administration of justice."

 Swatek testified that he thought the nurse meant he had twenty-four hours to live.