Court Opinion

ID: 9848676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:25:02.293472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:36.819961
License: Public Domain

*19On Motion for Rehearing.
Almand, Justice.
Counsel for the plaintiffs in error in their motion for a rehearing contend that the Cobb County Zoning Ordinance of 1939 is a State law having the effect of a statute law, and, being valid at the time of its enactment, does not become invalid by virtue of a change of conditions.
The act of the General Assembly of 1937, which authorized the Commissioner of Roads and Revenues of Cobb County to promulgate zoning laws, specifically authorized him “to make, promulgate and declare zoning ordinances.” Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., pp. 790-91. An ordinance enacted by a county legislative body is a law, but it is not a State law. The words “any law of the State of Georgia” mean enactments of the General Assembly. Maner v. Dykes, 183 Ga. 118, 121 (187 S. E. 699). Bearing in mind that we are dealing with a law enacted under the police power, restricting the use of private property, and that no legislative body may provide restrictions on its use that are arbitrary or unreasonable, we have been pointed to no authority, nor have we found any, that prohibits a court from inquiring into the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a law enacted under the police power, and from declaring it unreasonable by reason of circumstances and conditions existing at the time its reasonableness was questioned, though it be reasonable at the time of its enactment. “A statute valid as to one set of facts may be invalid as to another. A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably.” Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U. S. 405, 415 (55 Sup. Ct. 486, 79 L. ed. 949). See also Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270 (5 Sup. Ct. 903, 29 L. ed. 185); Perez v. Fernandez, 220 U. S. 224 (31 Sup. Ct. 412, 55 L. ed. 443); Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765 (51 Sup. Ct. 252, 75 L. ed. 690); In re Opinion of the Justices, 278 Mass. 607 (181 N. E. 833).
We did not overlook Reeves v. Comfort, 172 Ga. 331 (157 S. E. 629), or Dooley v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 199 Ga. 353 (34 S. E. 2d 522). Those cases involved an effort on the part of the grantee or his successor in title, in a deed containing restrictive covenants as to the use of the granted premises, to have such covenants declared unreasonable and void by reason of *20changed conditions affecting the property. There, the owner of the property subject to the restrictions voluntarily assumed them, whereas in the instant case the restrictions on the defendants’ property were imposed by an ordinance enacted under the police power. We know of no constitutional inhibition that prevents a person from agreeing to restrict the use of his property to certain limited purposes, but where the restrictions as to the use of private property are imposed by law, such law must not violate the constitutional rights of the owner.

Motion for rehearing denied.

All the Justices concur, except Duckworth, C. J., and Candler and Hawkins, JJ., who dissent.