Court Opinion

ID: 9718052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:16:01.484681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:57.080619
License: Public Domain

Olly NEAL, Judge, dissenting. I cannot agree that the trial court’s cautionary instruction that Chief Spearman’s testimony could not be considered for the truth of the matter asserted made harmless the prejudice that occurred to appellant and would reverse and remand this case for a new trial. Trial courts have discretion to decide the propriety of evidence offered in rebuttal. Isbell v. State, 326 Ark. 17, 931 S.W.2d 74 (1996); Schalski v. State, 322 Ark. 63, 907 S.W.2d 693 (1995). Genuine rebuttal, however, is evidence offered in reply to new matters. Schalski, supra. Rebuttal evidence must be responsive to evidence which was presented by the defense. Pyle v. State, 314 Ark. 165, 862 S.W.2d 823 (1993). In this case, the only witness called by the defense, Karen Whitted, testified that she drove the car in which appellant was found to the driveway where Deputy Cox discovered appellant sleeping. The State’s claim that Chief Spearman’s testimony that someone advised him that there was a blue four-door passenger car driving erratically on Highway 252 rebuts Ms. Whitted’s testimony is completely unavailing. As the majority notes, the officer failed to relate the part of the tip that referenced a male driver, which would have been responsive to Ms. Whitted’s testimony. Moreover, there is no question that Chief Spearman’s testimony was prejudicial. Absent Chief Spearman’s “rebuttal” testimony the jury was left simply to believe or disbelieve Ms. Whitted’s testimony that she had driven appellant to the location where Deputy Cox discovered him. Chief Spearman’s testimony that someone told him that a blue car was driving erratically on Highway 252 unquestionably implied that someone was driving a car similar to the one in which appellant was found in an erratic manner and that person was probably under the influence. The majority concedes that Chief Spearman’s testimony was inadmissible. The majority, however, determines that no reversible error occurred because the court gave a cautionary instruction admonishing the jury not to consider the testimony for the truth of the matter asserted. I disagree. The prosecutor’s sole reason for calling Chief Spearman was to get testimony before the jury that someone was driving a blue four-door passenger car along Highway 252 in an erratic manner and presumably that person was under the influence of alcohol. The prosecutor almost admitted as much when he said, “What I am afraid of, Judge, is that if we exclude all of that, you are basically going to have or all of a sudden the officers going to the scene and finding this vehicle and the jury isn’t going to get to hear the whole story about why they actually responded to that area and approached that particular vehicle, and that would be because they saw a blue passenger car driving in that manner. That is my concern.” In fact, during the hearing on appellant’s motion in limine to prevent the introduction of the testimony, the trial court surmised that the only purpose for the testimony was for the truth of matter asserted. In such a situation where the prosecutor admits his need for such testimony and the trial court immediately recognizes its prejudicial effect and its purpose, I do not think a cautionary instruction alleviates that prejudice. Hart, J., joins.