Court Opinion

ID: 9730082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:00:33.657451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:03.981760
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C. J.,
dissenting.
I regret that I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. While it may very well be that the injuries are not as serious as Mr. Bashus would have us believe and, therefore, the verdict of the jury is correct, nevertheless, I have difficulty agreeing with a proposition of law to the effect that when the driver of an automobile, who admittedly does not see a pedestrian, strikes the pedestrian while the pedestrian is in a marked crosswalk, the pedestrian is somehow guilty of negligence because he went from a place of safety to a place of danger. It would appear that this case may be misunderstood for the proposition that every pedestrian leaves the sidewalk at his own risk. I do not believe that to be the law in this jurisdiction. See Dunlap v. Coleman, 201 Neb. 148, 266 N.W.2d 527 (1978).
The majority relies upon testimony to the effect that Mr. *23Bashus, after he observed that the Turner vehicle was not going to stop, began to run, and jumped prior to being struck by the vehicle. I do not read the testimony to mean that Bashus ran in front of the vehicle; rather, I read that to mean that when he realized the Turner vehicle was not going to stop, he ran to what he hoped would be a place of safety, but was not able to get away from the Turner vehicle. I do not believe that such action on the part of a pedestrian constitutes an act which would have justified the trial court in giving instruction No. 11. For that reason I would have reversed and remanded.
White, J., joins in this dissent.