Court Opinion

ID: 9402589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 06:06:00.159793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:00.998293
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     June 15, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 360980
                                                                     Chippewa Circuit Court
DAVID PAUL TADGERSON,                                                LC No. 20-005129-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and BORRELLO and BOONSTRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant, David Paul Tadgerson, appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of two
counts of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.81d(1), and one count of
operating a motor vehicle without insurance, MCL 500.3102(2). The trial court sentenced
defendant as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to serve 2 to 4 years’ imprisonment
for assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer and 365 days’ imprisonment for operating
a motor vehicle without insurance. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

         On July 19, 2020, City of Sault Ste. Marie Patrol Officer Jacob Driedric was performing a
nightly patrol when he observed a 2003 GMC Sonoma drive the wrong way down a marked alley.
Officer Driedric activated his patrol lights, stopped the vehicle, and asked the driver—defendant—
for his license, registration, and proof of insurance. Defendant handed Officer Driedric his license
and the title to his vehicle, which had been issued on June 25, 2020. Officer Driedric asked
defendant about the dealer license plate that was affixed to the vehicle, and defendant responded
that the plate was from the dealer from which he had purchased the vehicle. Officer Driedric again
asked defendant to produce his insurance, and defendant stated that he did not have any insurance
at that time “because of COVID.” Officer Driedric obtained verification from the Secretary of
State that the vehicle was not insured.

        In accordance with departmental procedure, Officer Driedric asked defendant if he had a
preference on a wrecker company to tow his vehicle. Defendant refused to provide one, and,
instead, told Officer Driedric that no towing would occur. Officer Driedric asked for the car keys

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because he was concerned that defendant was going to drive away. In response, defendant threw
his keys on the dashboard. Officer Driedric called for backup, and Officer Scott Hazewinkel and
Sergeant John Weist responded to the scene. Officer Driedric and Officer Hazewinkel repeatedly
asked defendant to get out of his vehicle, but defendant refused and reiterated that his vehicle
would not be towed.

        After numerous commands for defendant to exit his vehicle and defendant steadfastly
refusing, Driedric and Hazewinkel physically removed defendant from his vehicle. The officers
then asked defendant to turn around and face his vehicle, but defendant refused, so the officers had
to physically apply force to get defendant to turn toward his vehicle. When Driedric and
Hazewinkel attempted to arrest defendant, defendant tensed up, which made it difficult for the
officers to place handcuffs on him. Accordingly, the officers had to again use physical force to
make defendant comply with their commands.

        Defendant testified at trial that although the officers had commanded him to leave his
vehicle, he did not think he had to comply. Defendant testified that he told Driedric that he “didn’t
personally have insurance”; defendant further testified that the vehicle had insurance “[t]hrough
the dealer plate that was on there.” Defendant believed that the officers did not have the right to
tow his vehicle. Defendant denied pulling back when he was removed from his vehicle by the
officers, and he explained that he got out of the vehicle because he was afraid he was going to be
“tased.” Defendant testified that he tensed up when the officers were putting the handcuffs on
because the officers were twisting his arm.1

       Defendant was convicted and sentenced as indicated above. This appeal of right then
ensued.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

        In his appeal, defendant first argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to
establish that he knowingly resisted the officers’ lawful commands and that he operated his vehicle
without insurance.

        We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction.
People v Speed, 331 Mich App 328, 331; 952 NW2d 550 (2020). “ ‘In examining the sufficiency
of the evidence, this Court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor to
determine whether any trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id., quoting People v Reese, 491 Mich 127, 139; 815 NW2d 85
(2012) (quotation marks omitted). This Court “is required to draw all reasonable inferences and
make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400;
614 NW2d 78 (2000).

1
 Much of the interaction between Driedric and defendant was captured on Driedric’s body camera
and played for the jury.

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       Defendant argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate that
he operated a vehicle without insurance. Defendant’s arguments on this issue are as follows:

         Here the charged conduct was that Mr. Tadgerson refused to comply with
         commands by Officers Driedric and Hazewinkel when they ordered him out of his
         motor vehicle. The order was the result of a belief that the vehicle did not have
         proper insurance. The evidence was that Mr. Tadgerson had dealer plates on the
         vehicle and that with those plates the car was properly on the road. Officers never
         made an attempt to even verify what Mr. Tadgerson told them. Instead, they ordered
         him out of the car. Before ordering Mr. Tadgerson out of the car, the officers had
         an obligation to properly investigate the status of Mr. Tadgerson’s claim that the
         car was legally on the road. This holds especially true where both officers
         acknowledged that there could be a two-week lag in insurance showing up on the
         Secretary of State website. Just as in Moreno, supra, where this Court held that a
         person is entitled to resist an unlawful arrest, Mr. Tadgerson was likewise entitled
         to not get out of his vehicle at the time the officers requested he do so. In the case
         at bar there was insufficient evidence that Mr. Tadgerson was driving without
         insurance and therefore insufficient evidence that he knowingly resisted a lawful
         command of either Officer Driedric or Officer Hazewinkel.

     Defendant was convicted of violating MCL 500.3102(2), a provision of the no-fault act,
MCL 500.3101 et seq. MCL 500.3102(2) provides:

                 An owner or registrant[2] of a motor vehicle or motorcycle with respect to
         which security is required, who operates the motor vehicle or motorcycle or permits
         it to be operated upon a public highway in this state, without having in full force
         and effect security complying with this section or [MCL 500.3101 or MCL
         500.3103] is guilty of a misdemeanor. A person who operates a motor vehicle or
         motorcycle upon a public highway in this state with the knowledge that the owner
         or registrant does not have security in full force and effect is guilty of a
         misdemeanor. A person convicted of a misdemeanor under this section shall be
         fined not less than $200.00 nor more than $500.00, imprisoned for not more than 1
         year, or both.

MCL 500.3102(2) required that defendant have insurance on his truck in compliance with MCL
500.3101.3 MCL 500.3101 provides that “[e]xcept as provided in [MCL 500.3107d and MCL
500.3109a], the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall
maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance and property
protection insurance as required under this chapter, and residual liability insurance.” MCL

2
 Defendant does not argue that he was not an “owner or registrant” within the meaning of MCL
500.3101 and MCL 500.3102(2).
3
    MCL 500.3103 governs insurance requirements for motorcycles.

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500.3107d and 500.3109a, in turn, allow an individual to opt out of personal protection insurance
benefit coverage under certain circumstances if the individual has qualified health coverage.

        Accordingly, by the plain terms of MCL 500.3102(2), defendant was required to maintain
security for payment of insurance benefits as required under the no-fault act. By defendant’s own
admission during the traffic stop and in his testimony at trial, he did not procure such insurance.
Moreover, the officers confirmed through Secretary of State documentation that defendant’s
vehicle was uninsured. Therefore, the evidence presented was sufficient to support a finding that
defendant operated a motor vehicle without insurance, in violation of MCL 500.3102(2).4

        Defendant also argues that because he was driving with a dealer plate, the officers had a
duty to investigate whether the dealership had insured defendant’s motor vehicle. However, in the
absence of any case law or statutory basis for such a finding, we reject defendant’s assertion that
the officers were required to investigate whether the vehicle was insured through the dealer. Our
rejection of this argument is based, in part on MCL 500.3102(3), which provides:

               The failure of a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle or
       motorcycle has in full force and effect security complying with this section or
       [MCL 500.3101 or MCL 500.3103] on the date of the issuance of the citation,
       creates a rebuttable presumption in a prosecution under subsection (2) that the
       motor vehicle or motorcycle did not have in full force and effect security complying
       with this section or section 3101 or 3103 on the date of the issuance of the citation.

        Accordingly, defendant’s failure to provide proof of insurance to Officer Driedric, and his
admission that he had not insured the vehicle under MCL 500.3102(3), created a “rebuttable
presumption . . . that the motor vehicle . . . did not have in full force and effect security complying
with this section or section 3101 or 3103 on the date of the issuance of the citation.” Both at trial
and on appeal, defendant has failed to overcome this presumption. Defendant admitted to Officer
Driedric that the vehicle was not insured; he testified at trial that the vehicle was not insured; and
the officers verified electronically that the vehicle was not insured. Defendant provides no support
for his bald assertion that the officers were required to further investigate to ascertain whether the
dealer plate had accompanying insurance because, as previously mentioned, it was clear that the
dealer plate had been used far beyond a period of 72 hours. Hence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, the evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to find that
defendant operated a motor vehicle without insurance in violation of MCL 500.3102(2).

4
  We note that the prosecution suggests that MCL 257.244(9) allows the purchaser of a vehicle to
operate the vehicle, with a dealer plate affixed, without insurance for up to 72 hours after
purchasing the vehicle. We do not share the prosecution’s analysis of MCL 257.244(9). We note
that MCL 257.244 addresses registration requirements and does not address no-fault insurance.
Regardless, defendant’s title was issued approximately one month prior to the traffic stop, and
defendant himself testified that he had purchased the vehicle seven or eight days prior to the traffic
stop; accordingly, all of the evidence established that defendant had been in possession of the
vehicle for much longer than 72 hours at the time of the stop. Hence, MCL 257.244 does not
apply.

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       Defendant also argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence that he
knowingly resisted a lawful command from either Officer Driedric or Officer Hazewinkel.
Defendant’s argument is again tethered to his assertion that the officers’ commands were unlawful
because he had insurance on his vehicle.

       MCL 750.81d(1) provides:

               Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4), an individual who
       assaults, batters, wounds, resists, obstructs, opposes, or endangers a person who the
       individual knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties is guilty of
       a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more
       than $2,000.00, or both.

“The elements of resisting or obstructing a police officer under MCL 750.81d(1) are: (1) the
defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered a police
officer, and (2) the defendant knew or had reason to know that the person that the defendant
assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered was a police officer
performing his or her duties.” People v Quinn, 305 Mich App 484, 491; 853 NW2d 383 (2014)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). However, MCL 750.81d does not “abrogate the common-
law right to resist unlawful arrests or other unlawful invasions of private rights.” People v Moreno,
491 Mich 38, 58; 814 NW2d 624 (2012). Therefore, “ ‘the prosecution must establish that the
officers’ actions were lawful’ as an element of resisting or obstructing a police officer under MCL
750.81d.” Quinn, 305 Mich App at 491, quoting Moreno, 491 Mich at 52.

         On appeal, defendant argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to
establish that the officers’ actions were lawful. To demonstrate the lawfulness of an officer’s
actions, the prosecution must prove that the officer “gave the defendant a lawful command, was
making a lawful arrest, or was otherwise performing a lawful act.” M Crim JI 13.1(4); 5 see
Moreno, 491 Mich at 55-56. “For an arrest to be lawful, the police officer making the arrest must
have probable cause, either that a felony or misdemeanor was committed by the individual in the
officer’s presence, or that a felony or specified misdemeanor (i.e., a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment for more than 92 days) occurred outside the officer’s presence and that the
individual in question committed the offense.” People v Vandenberg, 307 Mich App 57, 69; 859
NW2d 229 (2014). Because the legality of an officer’s actions is an element of MCL 750.81d(1),
it is a question of fact for the jury. Quinn, 305 Mich App at 494.

        It is important to remember that at the time of the arrest, the officers must possess probable
cause that a crime has been committed. “Probable cause to arrest exists where the facts and
circumstances within an officer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
an offense has been or is being committed.” Vandenberg, 307 Mich App at 69 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). When Officer Driedric stopped defendant’s vehicle, he asked defendant to
produce his license, registration, and proof of insurance, and defendant responded that he did not

5
 We acknowledge that the standard criminal jury instructions are not binding authority. People v
Williams, 288 Mich App 67, 76 n 6; 792 NW2d 384 (2010), aff’d 491 Mich 164 (2012).

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have insurance. A check with the Secretary of State verified that the vehicle was not insured.
MCL 500.3102(2) provides that “[a] person who operates a motor vehicle or motorcycle upon a
public highway in this state with the knowledge that the owner or registrant does not have security
in full force and effect is guilty of a misdemeanor” punishable by imprisonment for up to one year.
Therefore, Officer Driedric had probable cause to arrest defendant because he directly witnessed
defendant commit a misdemeanor offense. Additionally, Officer Hazewinkel had probable cause
to arrest defendant for committing a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for at least 92 days
outside Officer Hazewinkel’s presence. See Vandenberg, 307 Mich App 69. Therefore, when
viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury’s finding that the officers’ actions were lawful.

        Defendant asserts, without citation to authority, that the prosecution was required to prove
that he resisted a command from the officers that defendant knew was lawful. We glean nothing
from MCL 750.81d(1) that requires officers to glean from defendant whether he knew their
commands or actions were lawful. Rather, MCL 750.81d(1) requires only that defendant knew or
had reason to know that the officers were “performing [their] duties” (emphasis added). Hence,
MCL 750.81d(1) does not require the prosecution to establish that defendant knew that the
officers’ conduct was lawful. See Moreno, 491 Mich at 51-52; People v Morris, 314 Mich App
399; 886 NW2d 910 (2016). See also Quinn, 305 Mich App at 494 (stating that the lawfulness of
an officer’s actions is an element of MCL 750.81d and, therefore, is “a question of fact for the
jury”). Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

        We note that the judgment of sentence inaccurately states that defendant’s sentences are
consecutive and that they are to run consecutively with his sentences in another case. However,
at sentencing, the trial court stated that the sentences were concurrent and were to run concurrently
with the sentence in the other file number 20-5236-FH. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the
trial court for the ministerial task of amending the judgment of sentence.

        Affirmed, but remanded for the ministerial task of amending the judgment of sentence. We
do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                              /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                              /s/ Mark T. Boonstra

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