Court Opinion

ID: 9385389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 16:07:21.864059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:01.213886
License: Public Domain

J-S04014-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JAMICE NASH                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2145 EDA 2021

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 13, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                 Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0011415-2013

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                FILED APRIL 06, 2023

        Jamice Nash (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order denying his first

petition for relief filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 The trial

court convicted Appellant of attempted murder, aggravated assault, and

related crimes after he slashed his seven-year-old daughter’s neck with a

knife. We affirm.

        The PCRA court explained:

              On June 12, 2013, [Appellant] slit his [seven-year-old]
        daughter’s throat. Prior to slitting her throat, [Appellant] had
        been heard repeatedly threatening to kill the minor victim and her
        mother. When police were called to the scene[, Appellant] was
        holding the minor victim with his left hand and a knife in his right
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. The PCRA court permitted Appellant’s counsel
to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988)
and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
J-S04014-23

         hand. [Appellant] was screaming “this is not my daughter.” After
         finally yielding to police commands to drop the knife and let go of
         the minor victim, she ran to the police with a gash in her neck and
         informed the police that [Appellant] had cut her neck with a knife.
         The bleeding was so bad, instead of waiting for an ambulance, the
         police immediately drove her to Einstein Hospital.           Hospital
         records showed the victim received a ten-centimeter (close to four
         inches) laceration to her left interior neck. Although there was no
         extensive vascular damage, the minor victim was transferred to
         St. Christopher’s Hospital where she [under]went surgical repair
         to close the sternal mastoid muscle. She ended up spending two
         days at St. Christopher’s Hospital until she was discharged to the
         Department of Human Services. The minor victim testified that
         [A]ppellant was taking her to school when he took out the knife
         and sliced her neck. She subsequently testified that the incident
         was an accident. [Appellant] also testified to the same. The minor
         victim’s grandmother and mother, who were present during the
         incident[,] believe [Appellant] was high at the time of the incident.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/11/22, at 1-2. At trial, Appellant countered that he

accidentally cut the victim when, while holding a knife, he tried to fix her

uniform collar and she suddenly moved. N.T. Trial, 7/6/17, at 31-32.

         Appellant’s trial was delayed as a result of his repeated changes of

counsel. On July 6, 2017, following a bench trial, the trial court convicted

Appellant attempted murder, aggravated assault, unlawful restraint (serious

bodily     injury),   endangering     the      welfare   of   children   (EWOC)   by    a

parent/guardian, and possession of an instrument of crime (PIC).2                      On

September 12, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 10 – 20 years in

prison, followed by 10 years’ probation for attempted murder; and concurrent

sentences of 10 – 20 years for aggravated assault; 10 years’ reporting

____________________________________________

2   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 2702, 2902, 4304, 907.

                                            -2-
J-S04014-23

probation for EWOC; and five years’ reporting probation for PIC. On direct

appeal,     this   Court      affirmed     Appellant’s   judgment   of   sentence.

Commonwealth v. Nash, 240 A.3d 119 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished

memorandum).          Appellant did not seek allowance of appeal with the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

       Appellant timely filed the instant PCRA petition on December 29, 2020.

The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a no-merit letter and a motion

to withdraw from representation.               Following appropriate notice under

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition on September

13, 2021. Appellant timely appealed. Appellant and the PCRA court have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant argues the PCRA court improperly rejected his claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, and further asserts multiple claims of trial

court error.3 We limit our discussion to the ineffectiveness claims raised in

____________________________________________

3 Appellant’s pro se brief does not comport with our Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Appellant presents his issues in narrative form, together in one
section. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111 (providing the requirements for an appellate
brief); 2119(a) (providing “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts
as there are questions to be argued[.]”). Several issues are waived because
they contain no analysis or citation to supporting legal authority.
See Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1262 (Pa. Super.
2014) (en banc) (failure to conform to the Rules of Appellate Procedure results
in waiver of the underlying issue); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b) (require,
ng a properly developed argument for each question presented including a
discussion of and citation to authorities).

                                           -3-
J-S04014-23

Appellant’s brief and preserved in Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement.4

       Appellant presents the following issues:

       (1) Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
       failing to present the testimony of [Appellant’s] or the victim’s
       treating physicians.

       (2) Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
       failing to request a continuance.

       (3) Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
       failing to move for a mistrial.

       (4) Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
       failing to present an insanity defense.

       (5) Whether the Commonwealth committed a Brady5 violation,
       which was compounded by the denial of a trial continuance.

See Appellant’s Brief at 2, 4, 6-7, 9-10, 11.

       In his first four issues, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective.

Counsel is presumed to be effective; a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of

proving otherwise. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 270 A.3d 1221, 1226 (Pa.

____________________________________________

4 Appellant also argues claims of trial court error and sufficiency of the
evidence which are not cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543
(setting forth the eligibility requirements for PCRA relief). To the extent
Appellant claims trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence before trial, the claim lacks merit.
Appellant was convicted of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 984 (Pa. 2013)
(“[O]nce a defendant has gone to trial and has been found guilty of the crime
or crimes charged, any defect in the preliminary hearing is rendered
immaterial.”).

5   See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

                                           -4-
J-S04014-23

Super. 2022).   To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner

must demonstrate (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) there was

no reasonable basis for counsel’s action or inaction; and (3) but for counsel’s

error, there is a “reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d

435, 444 (Pa. 2015)). Failure to satisfy any of the three prongs is fatal to the

claim. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). “[C]ounsel

cannot be held ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim[.]” Thomas,

270 A.3d at 1226 (citation omitted).

      Appellant first argues trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

not calling as a witness the victim’s treating physician or his own physician.

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (capitalization modified). Appellant asserts:

      It should be even know[n] to a layman how important this doctor
      or [Appellant’s] personal doctor would have been at trial. More
      importantly, it should be more of an issue to this Superior Court
      that counsel wasn’t even given an opportunity to contact or review
      this doctor as a potential witness.

Id. (capitalization modified).

      To prove arguable merit based on trial counsel’s failure to call a

witness, a PCRA petitioner must

      show that the witness existed and was available; counsel was
      aware of, or had a duty to know of the witness; the witness was
      willing and able to appear; and the proposed testimony was
      necessary in order to avoid prejudice[.]

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 278 A.3d 336, 343 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citations omitted).

                                       -5-
J-S04014-23

      Our review discloses Appellant failed to demonstrate the physicians

were available and willing to testify at trial, and the omission of this testimony

caused him prejudice. See id. Further, we agree with the PCRA’s court’s

assessment that Appellant’s claim lacks arguable merit and is waived:

      In order to be convicted of attempted murder, it must be shown
      that you took a direct step in furtherance of the crime. In the
      present case[,] we have a four-inch cut on the neck, which caused
      surgical repairs and a two[-]day hospital stay. Not to mention
      that had the knife severed the victim’s jugular vein, which has no
      protection from bone or cartilage, we could have had a much
      more tragic result. There was also testimony … that [Appellant]
      was threatening to kill the victim and her mother. It should also
      be noted that defense counsel asked [A]ppellant twice,
      during his testimony, whether there were any other
      witnesses [Appellant] would like to call.                In both
      instances[,] [Appellant] answered no. Based on the area of
      the knife wound, the immediate action of the police rushing the
      victim to the hospital, the testimony of the victim’s mother and
      grandmother and [A]ppellant’s own testimony, [t]his [c]ourt
      believes the outcome of the proceedings would not have changed
      based upon the testimony of the treating doctor[.]

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/11/22, at 4. Appellant’s first issue merits no relief.

See id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) (providing PCRA petitioner must

plead and prove “the allegation of error has not been previously … waived.”);

Thomas, 270 A.3d at 1226; Spotz, 84 A.3d at 311.

      In his second issue, Appellant argues trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by not requesting a continuance on the day of trial. Appellant’s

Brief at 2. Appellant asserts he met counsel for the first time that day. Id.

at 3. Appellant acknowledges he

      went through a parade of ineffective counsels appointed by the
      court until he finally retained counsel himself. At this time the

                                      -6-
J-S04014-23

      court set aside our constitution in order to get this trial over with
      as “[the trial court] made it clear.” No person would agree that
      [Appellant] received a fair trial of counsel that he meets [sic] the
      same day trial commences.

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (capitalization modified).      According to Appellant,

“defense counsel had no time to review pertinent evidence in this case. It is

uncertain if counsel even knew [Appellant] had recently been declared

incompetent.” Id. at 9 (capitalization modified). Appellant concedes “trial

counsel requested a continuance because she knew that she needed to

investigate the case and plan in order to be effective[.]” Appellant’s Brief at

10 (capitalization modified, emphasis added). Additionally, we agree with the

PCRA court’s assessment:

      Defense counsel (Mary Moran, Esquire,) was privately retained by
      [Appellant] and entered her appearance on June 5, 2017, knowing
      that the trial was to commence on June 5, 2017. This case had
      been on the docket for close to four years due to defense
      continuances and a parade of attorneys at [A]ppellant’s request.
      [Appellant] himself retained new representation that day.
      [Appellant] was of course present at the commencement of trial
      and never raised an objection during the colloquy of [the trial
      judge].

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/11/22, at 5-6 (emphasis added). Appellant’s second

issue merits no relief. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3); Thomas, 270 A.3d at

1221, 1226.

      In his third issue, Appellant argues counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by not moving for a mistrial. Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant

states:

                                      -7-
J-S04014-23

      [O]n cross-examination[,] trial counsel asked Officer [Allen]
      Carroll[,] “Prior to this occasion had you any interaction with
      [Appellant] before?” Officer Carroll responded that he had.
      Defense counsel followed up, “You had interaction with
      [Appellant]?” Carroll responded[,] “Yes, but 110 East. It’s a
      playground park over there. A couple of times I received calls for
      a male ….” He was interrupted by defense counsel. The court
      responded by stating[,] “You asked him.”

Id. (capitalization and punctuation modified, citation omitted). After a brief

recess, and with the agreement of counsel, the question was withdrawn and

the answer stricken.     Id.    Appellant argues this evidence nevertheless

prejudiced the trial court, which sat as fact finder. See id. We disagree.

      “A judge, as factfinder, is presumed to disregard inadmissible evidence

and consider only competent evidence.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 421 A.2d

179, 183 n.6 (Pa. 1980) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v.

McFadden, 156 A.3d 299, 309 (Pa. Super. 2017) (reiterating that a

trial court acting as fact finder “is presumed to know the law, ignore

prejudicial   statements, and    disregard inadmissible   evidence”   (citation

omitted)). Appellant fails to demonstrate that the trial court was unable to

disregard the withdrawn question and stricken answer. Appellant’s third issue

does not merit relief.

      In his fourth issue, Appellant argues counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by not presenting an insanity defense.     Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant claims his counsel had no opportunity to raise this defense. Id.

Appellant recognizes the trial court

                                       -8-
J-S04014-23

     was aware of [Appellant’s] prior diagnosis of PTSD and the strong
     medications he was prescribed. Evidence certainly could have
     supported a temporary insanity claim, that is[,] a diminished
     capa[c]ity induced by medication and mental illness. Each doctor
     who examined [Appellant] stated he was not competent. The
     court[-]appointed psychiatrist concluded that [Appellant] was not
     competent….

Id. (capitalization modified). Appellant asserts that as an infant, an uncle

threw him against a tree, causing a traumatic brain injury, and that he is

taking the medications Zyprexa and Zoloft. Id. Appellant asserts he did not

understand the legal proceedings and did not cooperate with his counsel. Id.

     Section 315 of the Crimes Code provides that the “mental soundness of

an actor engaged in conduct charged to constitute an offense shall only be a

defense” when the defendant was legally insane. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315(a). To

prevail on an insanity defense, the defendant

     must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time
     he committed the offense, due to a defect of reason or disease of
     mind, he either did not know the nature and quality of the act or
     did not know that the act was wrong. 18 Pa.C.S. § 315;
     Commonwealth v. Heidnik, 526 Pa. 458, 587 A.2d 687, 690-91
     (Pa. 1991).

     A defense of insanity acknowledges commission of the act by the
     defendant,    while    maintaining   the   absence    of    legal
     culpability. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 865 A.2d
     761, 788 (Pa. 2004); Commonwealth v. Cross, 535 Pa. 38, 634
     A.2d 173, 175 (Pa. 1993). Where a defendant has testified at trial
     and has denied committing a crime, this Court has declined to
     deem counsel ineffective for failing to present a defense that
     would have been in conflict with his client’s own
     testimony. Hughes, 865 A.2d at 788; Commonwealth v.
     Paolello, 542 Pa. 47, 665 A.2d 439, 455 (Pa. 1995).

                                    -9-
J-S04014-23

Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 901 (Pa. 2011). To be declared

incompetent to stand trial, an appellant must establish he was either unable

to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to participate in

his own defense. Id. at 899-900.

     Here, Appellant participated at trial and testified in his defense.

Appellant testified that the morning of June 12, 2013, he drove the victim to

his mother’s home before school. N.T., 7/6/17, at 29. After the victim dressed

for school, she went to the kitchen. Id. at 30. Appellant explained that when

he entered the kitchen, he retrieved from the table a sheetrock knife he

wanted to use for “a basement job that morning[.]” Id. at 31. Appellant

stated:

     [T]he rain had fallen the day before and messed up somebody’s
     basement, and I already had cut some of the Sheetrock out. So
     I said, all right, I will bring the knife over there to finish up the
     job.

            When I am going down the steps – I had … capri pants on,
     and the pockets was short. I had the knife in my pockets. So the
     knife fell out [of] my pocket when I’m going down the stairs. So
     I put it back in my pocket. It fell out again.

            My car was right out at the front of the house. So I said, all
     right, being that my car was right out in front of the house, I will
     just hold the knife in my hand and bring it to the car.

            I was walking in front of [the victim]. While I am walking in
     front of her, I turn around to see [the victim] behind me. When I
     said, “[] come on,” I observed her uniform collar – like she had on
     a uniform collar like this one. It was tucked in like this. And, so,
     I said “Come on, …. Let me fix you.” She said, “No, Dad,” and
     moved away. When she moved away, that’s the only time I think
     that the incident could have occurred when she moved and said,
     “No. I want to do it.” So I turned back around. When [sic] I

                                    - 10 -
J-S04014-23

      heard my mom say … something like, “Nash.” When I turned
      around, I was like all in shock. Like, what’s going on? Then I
      seen a little spec on her. That’s when I got, like, in shock, like,
      what’s going on? That’s when I dropped the knife right there and
      was just staring at my daughter. I couldn’t come to understand,
      like, what is going on.

            At the same time, I seen all this rush, like the cops and
      everybody started coming in. The whole time, I am just, like,
      what’s going on? I was so quiet. I couldn’t say nothing, cause I
      was in a state of shock. I am, like, what’s going on. What is really
      going on with this thing.

Id. at 31-32.

      Our review discloses Appellant was competent at trial and participated

in his defense. Specifically, Appellant testified on his own behalf, supporting

his trial strategy that the incident was an accident. See id. As the PCRA court

explained:

      Appellant’s own testimony indicated that he was not experiencing
      an episode of mental illness. He even testified that he was calm
      and not upset. It was the strategy of [A]ppellant and counsel to
      claim that the incident was an accident. … [B]ased on the
      testimony of the victim, who stated she thought it was an
      accident[,] and [Appellant’s] own testimony, the strategy was to
      prove it was an accident ….

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/11/22, at 7. Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness, based

on counsel’s failure to present an insanity defense or challenge his

competency, merits no relief. See Smith, 17 A.3d at 901 (declining to find

counsel ineffective for failing to present a defense in conflict with his client’s

testimony).

      In his fifth and final issue, Appellant asserts a Brady violation by the

Commonwealth. Appellant argues:

                                     - 11 -
J-S04014-23

      In this case, the prosecution cannot escape the fact that the
      assigned investigator in this case, Detective Justin Montgomery,
      has numerous claims of misconduct lodge[d] against him.
      According to an article that was published nine months prior to []
      trial, Detective Justin Montgomery outlines misconduct …
      regarding his investigation of an alleged indecent assault
      complaint. … This detective also testified at [Appellant’s] trial,
      even stating himself that there were discrepancies with the filing
      of this incident. See also [N.]T. VOL 3, 6/16/17[, at] 32-34
      demonstrating that someone forged a signature a “log” in this
      case.

Appellant’s Brief at 6. Appellant claims his counsel had no time to look for

this information. Id. Appellant posits counsel’s advice on this issue “couldn’t

be construed as competent because counsel didn’t even have all the requisite

information of this case.” Id.

      In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that “suppression by

the prosecution of favorable evidence to an accused upon request violates due

process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment ….”

Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Brady’s mandate is not limited to pure exculpatory

evidence; impeachment evidence also falls within Brady’s parameters and

must be disclosed by prosecutors. U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677 (1985).

To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show:

      (1) the evidence was suppressed by the Commonwealth, either
      willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable to the
      defendant; and (3) the evidence was material, in that its omission
      resulted in prejudice to the defendant.

Commonwealth v. Haskins, 60 A.3d 538, 545 (Pa. Super. 2012). The

burden rests with the defendant to prove by reference to the record that

evidence was withheld or suppressed. Id. Further, the evidence must have

                                    - 12 -
J-S04014-23

been in the exclusive control of the prosecution. Id. No Brady violation

occurs where the defendant knew or with reasonable diligence could have

discovered the evidence, or where the evidence was available to the defense

from a non-governmental source. Id.

     Appellant concedes in his brief that this evidence regarding Detective

Montgomery was in “an article that was published nine months prior to [his]

trial[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 6. Because the evidence was available from a

non-governmental source, and discoverable with reasonable diligence,

Appellant’s Brady claim fails. See Haskins, supra.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/2023

                                  - 13 -