Court Opinion

ID: 9386837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-13 19:07:22.942659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:08.827053
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Wagner, 2023-Ohio-1215.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
                                                            No. 109678
                v.                                 :

DAVID WAGNER,                                      :

                Defendant-Appellant.               :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 13, 2023

         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                            Case No. CR-19-636068-B

                                             Appearances:

                Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                Attorney, and Sarah E. Hutnik, Assistant Prosecuting
                Attorney, for appellee.

                John P. Parker, for appellant.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

                On March 16, 2022, this court granted defendant-appellant, David

Wagner’s (“Wagner”), timely application to reopen his appeal of his sentence

pursuant to App.R.26(B). State v. Wagner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109678, 2022-

Ohio-801. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the sentence.
Procedural and Factual History

             Wagner was indicted in January 2019, along with two codefendants,

Devaughnte Rice (“Rice”) and Richard Pinson, Jr. (“Pinson”) for an incident that

occurred on September 5, 2018, that led to the death of the defendants’ accomplice,

Deandre Wilson (“Wilson”). Wagner was charged with aggravated murder (Count

1); attempted murder (Count 2); two counts of felonious assault (Counts 3 and 4);

murder (Count 5); aggravated robbery (Count 6); robbery (Count 7); kidnapping

(Count 8); grand theft (Count 9); and having weapons while under a disability

(Count 11). Counts 1 through 9 each carried repeat violent offender (“RVO”)

specifications, and one- and three-year firearm specifications. Count 11 carried a

three-year firearm specification.

             A detailed factual background of this case can be found in State v. Rice,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109712, 2021-Ohio-1882, which we also referenced in the

original opinion in State v. Wagner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109678, 2021-Ohio-

3107 (“Wagner I”).     Accordingly, we will include a brief summary here with

additional facts relevant to the current appeal.

             On September 5, 2018, Ronnal White (“White”) shot and killed Wilson

in self-defense when Wagner, Wilson, Rice, and Pinson robbed him. Portions of the

altercation were captured by at least one nearby video camera. Wagner was the

primary actor, grabbing White and forcing him to the ground. The video showed

White being held down by Wilson as Wagner and an unidentified male removed

items from White’s person. During the altercation, White’s gun fell out of his pants
pocket. Wagner immediately picked up the gun and started striking White with it.

White, however, possessed another gun and used it by killing Wilson in self-defense.

Rice at ¶ 5, 7-9.

             Wagner was ultimately arrested and was held in jail during the

pendency of the case. During a pretrial in April 2019, the trial court addressed

reports that Wagner had attempted suicide four times and was on suicide watch. At

that time, Wagner’s counsel requested a competency and sanity evaluation. At a

later hearing, the trial court’s journal reflects that the parties stipulated to the

competency evaluation, finding Wagner competent.

              On March 2, 2020, Wagner appeared in court with counsel and entered

a negotiated plea deal. Wagner pleaded guilty to Count 1, as amended to involuntary

manslaughter, with a three-year firearm specification; Count 2, attempted murder;

Count 6, aggravated robbery; Count 8, kidnapping; Count 9, grand theft; and Count

11 having a weapon while under a disability. Wagner also pleaded guilty to RVO

specifications on Counts 1, 2, 6, and 8. The state dismissed the remaining charges

and specifications.    After accepting Wagner’s guilty plea, there was a brief

conversation on the record about the sentencing hearing. Wagner’s counsel wanted

the hearing scheduled at least 60 days out because Wagner was on federal parole for

a gun-related charge. Counsel hoped to negotiate a sentence in the federal court that

would be concurrent to the sentence in this case. Accordingly, the trial court

scheduled Wagner’s sentencing for May 2020.
             However, a week later on March 9, 2020, the trial court issued a journal

entry advancing Wagner’s sentencing to March 16, 2020. On the date of the hearing,

the trial court noted that Wagner’s behavior had “deteriorated significantly” while

in jail and that it was necessary to sentence him immediately. Wagner raised no

objection to the trial court’s decision.

             Instead, Wagner’s counsel informed the court that he had discussed the

earlier sentencing hearing with Wagner and the potential effect on his federal case.

Per counsel, Wagner understood and wished to proceed with sentencing anyway.

The trial court spoke to Wagner directly and confirmed that he still wished to

maintain his guilty plea and proceed with sentencing.

             The trial court then reviewed Wagner’s plea on the record. Because the

court had presided over the trial in codefendant Rice’s case in the weeks prior, had

seen the video evidence, and had obtained Wagner’s criminal history, the trial court

elected not to request a presentence investigation. Neither party objected. The

hearing then began with statements from the parties.

              The state addressed the court first and noted that Wagner was the

principal offender in this matter. Per the state, Wagner jumped on White’s back and

wrestled him to the ground. Although Wilson held White down, Wagner was the

one who picked up the gun that fell from White’s pocket, kicked White in the head,

punched White, and shot at White with a gun Wagner brought to the scene.

              The state also referred to White’s testimony. White elected not to

appear for Wagner’s sentencing.        At Rice’s trial, White testified that Wagner
threatened to shoot him while Wilson held him down. White heard Wilson tell

Wagner to wait, to not shoot him until Wilson could get a grip on him. In that

instant, White had to act in self-defense because he knew Wagner was going to shoot

him otherwise. Even so, White noted that having to shoot Wilson continued to

haunt him.

              Next, Wagner’s counsel addressed the court and stressed that Wagner

was not at Rice’s trial because he chose to accept responsibility for his actions.

Referring to the video, counsel noted that there was no dispute that Wagner had

kicked White in the head and that it was deplorable conduct that his client wished

had not happened. Counsel told the court that Wagner denied having a gun himself,

but that “an exchange of gunfire” occurred with Wagner using one of White’s guns.

              At that point, the trial court interjected, noting that the evidence

established that a third gun was used. The court found Wagner’s counsel’s version

“hard to believe.”

              Wagner’s counsel continued, reiterating that regardless of what

occurred, Wagner did take responsibility for his actions. He went on to address

Wagner’s criminal history noting that his offenses were clustered between 2010 and

2014. He noted that the most serious offenses happened in one case and involved

aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery.

              Continuing, counsel noted that Wagner underwent a psychological

evaluation through the court in 2010 and was found to have a borderline functional

IQ between 60 and 70. Counsel also noted that Wagner was diagnosed with an
adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct, as well as a

myriad of dual diagnoses, including PTSD, and drug and alcohol addiction.

              In summation, counsel alleged that Wagner and the others did not

intend to commit a robbery. He argued that the events occurred due to the

surrounding circumstances. Finally, he alleged that if the case had gone to trial,

Wagner would have testified that White boasted about “what he was going to do to

these young men” which precipitated the incident. The trial court interjected again,

stating that although White might have been saying something there is no

confirmation in the video. The court also noted that although the crimes were not

extensively preplanned, there was evidence based on the participants’ actions that

they acted in concert to commit the robbery.

             Wagner then addressed the court. He began by expressing remorse

over getting his best friend, Wilson, killed and told the court that it haunted him

every day. Wagner then proceeded to tell the court that he never intended to rob

White but alleged that White approached them with a gun and was talking crazy to

Wilson, so Wagner grabbed him. Wagner then expressed remorse again for Wilson’s

death.

              The court proceeded to sentence Wagner as follows:

              On Count 1, involuntary manslaughter, three years consecutive to

three years on the firearm specification for a total of six years; Count 2, attempted

murder, nine years; Count 6, aggravated robbery, nine years; Count 8, kidnapping,

nine years; Count 9, grand theft, 12 months, and Count 11, having a weapon while
under a disability, 24 months. The court ordered Counts 1 and 6 to be served

consecutively to one another and that the remaining counts, Counts 2, 8, 9, and 11,

run concurrent to each other and concurrent to the sentences in Counts 1 and 6 for

a total sentence of 15 years.

               In his first appeal, Wagner challenged the imposition of consecutive

sentences, arguing that the record did not support consecutive sentences and that

his sentence was contrary to law. We disagreed, finding that the record did support

the imposition of consecutive sentences and that the sentence was not contrary to

law.

              In this reopened appeal, Wagner raises the following assignments of

error for our review:

                            Assignment of Error No. 1

       Trial counsel was ineffective under the Sixth and Fourteenth
       Amendments of the Federal Constitution when the competency report
       dated June 3, 2019, was not made part of the record.

                           Assignment of Error No. 2

       Trial counsel was ineffective under the Sixth and Fourteenth
       Amendments when he failed to object to the advanced sentencing
       hearing and or failed to request a continuance. Strickland v.
       Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

                           Assignment of Error No. 3

       It was plain error under Ohio Crim.R. 52 to conduct a sentencing
       hearing with only aggravating evidence, advanced for inadequate
       reasons and without a presentence report promised at the time of the
       guilty pleas and without no defense sentencing memorandum.
                           Assignment of Error No.4

      It was plain error under Crim.R. 52 for the trial court to consider a
      video of the crime and testimony from the victim from a codefendant’s
      trial that was not made part of the sentencing record in this case and
      which the trial judge used in aggravation of penalty.

                           Assignment of Error No. 5

      Trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing for failing to object and or
      preserve for the record the trial court’s reliance on evidence from a
      codefendant’s trial not made part of the record at Wagner’s sentencing
      hearing. Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, U.S. Constitution.

                           Assignment of Error No. 6

      Mr. Wagner’s 15-year sentence as opposed to codefendant Pinson who
      went to trial and received only an eight year sentence is contrary to
      State v. Lyons, 2002-Ohio-3424 (8th Dist.) and R.C. 2929.11(B).

                           Assignment of Error No. 7

      A combination of errors at sentencing violated due process under the
      Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Brown, 115 Ohio St.3d 55 (2007).

Law and Analysis

              For ease of analysis, we will address some of the assigned errors in

combination and out of order.

Wagner’s Third and Fourth Assigned Errors

              We will begin with Wagner’s third and fourth assigned errors that

both challenge the evidence, or lack thereof, used to determine his sentence. In the

third assigned error, Wagner alleges it was plain error for the trial court to advance

the sentencing hearing and then only consider aggravating evidence. Because we

view the decision to advance the hearing as a distinct issue, we will consider it

separately. In the fourth assigned error, Wagner argues that it was plain error for
the trial court to consider video evidence and testimony from the victim that was

never made a part of the record in Wagner’s case.

Standard of Review

               “Failure to object waives all but plain error on appeal.” State v.

Friscone, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107801, 2019-Ohio-1781, ¶ 23; citing State v. St.

Martin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96834, 2012-Ohio-1633, ¶ 7. Wagner failed to raise

any concerns about the evidence considered during his sentencing hearing before

the trial court. Therefore, in order to prevail, Wagner must establish that the errors

he claims occurred at the sentencing hearing were plain errors mandating relief.

              Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), “[p]lain errors or defects affecting

substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of

the court.” In order to find plain error, we must make three findings. “First, there

must be an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule.” State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d

21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002); citing State v. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 749 N.E.2d

274 (2001), citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.

Ed.2d 508 (1993). Second, the error must be plain, i.e., it must be an “obvious defect

in the trial proceedings.” Id., citing State v. Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 750 N.E.2d

90 (2001), citing State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 684 N.E.2d 4 (1997). Finally,

“the error must have affected ‘substantial rights.”’ Id. An error affects a substantial

right if it “‘affected the outcome of the [proceeding].’” State v. Thomas, 152 Ohio

St.3d 15, 2017-Ohio-8011, 92 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 33, quoting Barnes at 27.
Evidence in Support of the Trial Court’s Sentence

              In his appellate brief regarding the third assignment of error, Wagner

suggests, citing Wagner I, that the trial court only considered aggravating evidence.

Wagner misunderstands the conclusion in Wagner I. This court noted that the trial

court did not find any mitigating circumstances, not that the trial court failed to

consider mitigating circumstances. Wagner I at ¶ 20. The trial court directly

addressed the mitigating factors under R.C. 2929.12(C) on the record as follows:

      Court: Whether the conduct is less serious. The victim induced or
      facilitated the offense. It’s hard because in this case there are two
      victims. There’s the victim of the robbery, Mr. White, and the
      kidnapping and the felonious assault and the theft. But there’s also Mr.
      Wilson who’s the victim of the murder.

      Court: So it’s — it’s two pronged. Did Mr. White induce or facilitate
      this offense? No. But did Mr. Wilson? Absolutely.

      Court: Whether the offender acted under strong provocation. I don’t
      find that finding.

      Court: Whether the offender did not cause or expect to cause physical
      harm to persons or property. That, again, is two-pronged. I don’t think
      anybody engaged in this thinking that Mr. Wilson was going to die. But
      was it foreseeable that somebody who’s being robbed and felt that they
      are going to get shot might defend themselves? That is foreseeable.

      Court: And then if you look at it on the second prong, whether the
      offender did cause — did not cause or expect to cause physical harm. I
      can’t make that finding. [Wagner] was kicking Mr. White on this
      particular — kicking Mr. White in the head. Took him to the ground.
      Pinned him on the ground. Wouldn’t let him up for, I think it was at
      least two minutes in that video.

      Court: Whether there’s substantial grounds to mitigate the offender’s
      conduct. I cannot make that finding.

(Tr. 122)
              Wagner also argues that the record fails to reflect that the trial court

considered his mental health conditions. We disagree. The record reflects that

Wagner’s counsel summarized the findings in Wagner’s competency report that

were favorable to him and could mitigate his sentence. The trial court found that

there were no “substantial grounds” to mitigate Wagner’s conduct. We interpret the

court’s finding as Wagner’s mental health diagnoses were not substantial enough to

mitigate his conduct.

               Furthermore, when imposing a felony sentence, a trial court must

consider the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the

sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.12. State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-

Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 20. However, “neither R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12

requires [the] court to make any specific factual findings on the record.” Id., quoting

State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649 ¶ 20, citing

State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 31, and State

v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000). Consequently, the trial

court was not required to expressly reference Wagner’s competency report during

the sentencing hearing in order to meet the requirements of R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12. The trial court’s journal entry noting that it “considered all required factors

of the law,” was sufficient.

               Accordingly, the record does not support Wagner’s conclusion that

the trial court only considered aggravating circumstances prior to imposing his

sentence; therefore there was no error. Because Wagner has failed to establish that
the trial court erred, he has failed to meet the burden necessary to establish plain

error in his third assignment of error.

              Accordingly, this part of the third assignment of error is overruled.

              In the fourth assignment of error, Wagner argues that the trial court

committed plain error when it considered evidence outside the record when

sentencing Wagner, specifically, the videotape of the incident and the testimony of

the robbery victim, White.

              It is indisputable that the trial court repeatedly referenced this

evidence during Wagner’s sentencing hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, the

trial court explicitly referenced its familiarity with the case based on having listened

to Rice’s trial just prior to the sentencing hearing. (Tr. 103.) That familiarity, in

addition to other factors, led the court to note that it did not need a presentence-

investigation report. The trial court also disagreed with Wagner’s attorney during

his recitation of facts with respect to whether Wagner had a gun, whether the victim

instigated the incident, and whether the robbery was planned. Furthermore, the

trial court indicated that its impression of what happened was negatively affected by

the testimony at the codefendant’s trial. (Tr. 118.)

              Nevertheless, Wagner failed to object and therefore has waived all but

plain error. Therefore he must establish that the trial court’s reliance on this

evidence was a plain and obvious error that affected a substantial right, i.e., it

affected the outcome of the proceedings. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d at 27, 759 N.E.2d

1240.
               This court has found that “[t]he trial court must only consider what is

properly on the record at sentencing and cannot rely on information outside of the

record.” State v. McManus, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101922, 2015-Ohio-2393, ¶ 31;

see also Ohio v. Fowler, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-21-031, 2022-Ohio-3499, ¶ 15. To

the extent that the evidence in question was not properly before the trial court it

would be an error for the court to consider it. However, because we are examining

this evidence under the plain error standard, Wagner must establish that he was

prejudiced by the error. Based on our review of the record, we cannot find that this

error prejudiced Wagner such that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. The

record reflects that there was an independent basis for the trial court’s findings in

support of the sentence.

              Ignoring the evidence that came from the codefendant’s trial, the

record reflects that Wagner pleaded guilty to repeat violent offender specifications.

A repeat violent offender is someone who (a) is being sentenced for “aggravated

murder, murder, any felony of the first or second degree that is an offense of

violence, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses” if the attempt is still a felony

of the first or second degree and (b) who has previously pleaded guilty or been

convicted of any of the aforementioned offenses. R.C. 2929.01(CC). Wagner had

prior convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. Additionally, at

the time of the offense, Wagner was on federal parole for gun-related charges. These

facts alone are sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that consecutive

sentences were necessary to both protect the public and punish the offender.
              In making the finding that Wagner’s conduct caused harm that was so

great or unusual that a single term did not adequately reflect the seriousness of the

conduct, the court noted that there were a number of codefendants that colluded in

this offense and that the offense of aggravated robbery was the worst form of the

offense because it led to the death of Wilson at the hands of the victim who had to

defend himself. Finally, Wagner was the primary aggressor in the incident.

              Consequently, the trial court’s findings in support of consecutive

sentences were supported by evidence in the record, independent from the

videotape and White’s testimony.

              Nevertheless, Wagner also alleges that he was prejudiced because he

could not adequately respond to the videotape and White’s testimony. We disagree.

Arguably, seeing the incident via video had an impact, however, given the factors

previously addressed, Wagner was not prejudiced by the trial court’s ability to see

the crime. The trial court had an independent basis for issuing its sentence through

the record and information provided by the prosecutor. Consequently, Wagner was

not prejudiced by the trial court having seen it.

              With respect to the trial court’s consideration of White’s testimony,

this court has previously addressed a similar situation in State v. Williams, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 101885, 2015-Ohio-2041. The Williams Court found that it was not

prejudicial for the trial judge to have viewed the victim in another proceeding

involving a codefendant. Id. at ¶ 12. R.C. 2929.19(B) requires the trial court to
consider a variety of factors, including “any victim impact statement.” Id., quoting

R.C. 2929.19(B).

              We are mindful that in a case like this where there are multiple

codefendants, the likelihood of the trial court hearing evidence outside of the record

in one or more of the cases is heightened. Nevertheless, this evidence was not

extraneous to the court’s required considerations, nor can we find that the evidence

affected the outcome of the proceedings.

              Accordingly, Wagner has failed to establish plain error.

              The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

Advancement of Sentencing Hearing

              Finally, we separate Wagner’s argument that the decision to advance

the sentencing hearing was plain error. At the core of Wagner’s argument in these

assignments of error is the suggestion that the trial court’s errors were precipitated

by the decision to advance the sentencing hearing without just cause. A trial court’s

decision with respect to how it manages its docket is solely within its discretion.

State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105256, 2018-Ohio-841, ¶ 38, citing 6750

BMS, L.L.C. v Drentlau, 2016-Ohio-1385, 62 N.E.3d 928, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.),

citing State ex rel. V Cos. v. Marshall Cty., Aud., 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 692 N.E.2d 198

(1998). Accordingly, we will not overturn that decision, “unless there has been an

abuse of discretion.”   Id.   “A court abuses its discretion when its attitude is

‘unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.’” In re Ry.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

111311, 2023-Ohio-12, ¶ 18, citing In re N.N., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110443, 2021-
Ohio-3931, ¶ 23, quoting Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d

1140 (1983).

               Here, the trial court expressed that it advanced the case because

immediately after taking Wagner’s plea, the trial court learned that Wagner’s

behavior in jail was deteriorating. Although the court did not go into detail, our

review of the record establishes that the trial court kept track of Wagner’s condition

because of reports that he had attempted suicide four times in jail. For example, in

an October 2019 hearing, the trial court discussed with Wagner his removal from

the psychological ward of the jail and placement in the general population and his

subsequent return to the psychological ward. In addition to those reports, Wagner’s

competency evaluation also detailed Wagner’s behaviors in jail.

               Consequently, while the specific details were not addressed at the

hearing, the trial court’s decision was based on information it had been receiving

that Wagner’s behavior necessitated immediate action. Consequently, there was

sufficient information in the record to rebut any concern that the trial court acted

unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably when it elected to advance Wagner’s

sentencing hearing.

               Wagner has also failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the

advanced sentencing hearing. The trial court docketed the date change a week in

advance. There was sufficient time to request a continuance or otherwise notify the

court that the defense would not be prepared for the hearing.
              Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it advanced

the sentencing hearing. Furthermore, based on the foregoing, Wagner has failed to

establish that a substantial right was violated preventing a finding of plain error.

              Accordingly, we overrule the third and fourth assignments of error.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

              In Wagner’s first, second, and fifth assignments of errors, he alleges

he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Wagner argues his counsel was

ineffective when he failed to (1) make the competency report a part of the record; (2)

object to or request a continuance of the advanced sentencing hearing; and (3)

object to the trial court’s reliance on evidence outside of the record.

              In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant

“must demonstrate ‘“(1) deficient performance by counsel, namely that counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2)

that counsel’s errors prejudiced the party, or a reasonable probability that but for

counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different.”’” State v. Moore, 2022-

Ohio-522, 185 N.E.3d 216, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Knight, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 109302, 2021-Ohio-3674, ¶ 46, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d

136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus.                  “A

‘reasonable probability’ is one ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’”

Id., citing State v. Mohammad Khoshknabi, 2018-Ohio-1752, 111 N.E.3d 813, ¶ 29

(8th Dist.), quoting Strickland at 694.
                   With respect to the first assignment of error, there is no evidence that

the competency evaluation was not a part of the trial court record. Wagner I merely

noted that the competency report was not part of the appellate record. Wagner I,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109678, 2021-Ohio-3107, at ¶ 4, fn. 1.1 The trial court’s

docket reflects that on June 4, 2019, counsel for Wagner and the state were present

in court and stipulated to the June 3, 2019 competency evaluation. Consequently,

the parties reviewed the report and agreed that Wagner was competent to stand trial.

                   Furthermore, as we have noted, there is no affirmative evidence in the

record that the trial court failed to consider the competency report. While Wagner’s

counsel did not admit the competency evaluation into evidence at sentencing, he

gave a brief summary of its contents on the record. Notably, the competency

evaluation also contained facts unfavorable to Wagner.                 There were several

notations indicating Wagner had threatened to harm corrections officers and

medical staff. Additionally, there were notations that Wagner was malingering

hallucinations in order to be placed in either the psychological or medical units. The

evaluator also suggested that Wagner manipulated his responses on the IQ test to

lower his score. It is objectively reasonable for trial counsel to determine that it

would be more effective to discuss the contents favorable to Wagner rather than

introduce into evidence a report that indicates he was alternately disruptive and/or

lying.

         1   The competency evaluation is now a part of the appellate record.
              When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must

remain mindful of the myriad ways for an attorney to provide effective assistance,

and, accordingly, give great deference to trial counsel’s performance. State v.

Vargas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97376, 2012-Ohio-2767, ¶ 14, citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “Trial tactics and strategies do not

constitute a denial of effective assistance of counsel.” Id., citing State v. Gooden, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88174, 2007-Ohio-2371, ¶ 38, citing State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio

St.2d 45, 402 N.E.2d 1189 (1980).

               Undeniably, there were clear strategic benefits to summarizing the

report rather than submitting it in its entirety at sentencing. Consequently, trial

counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to introduce the

competency evaluation into evidence during sentencing.

              Accordingly, Wagner’s first assignment of error is overruled.

              Likewise, Wagner has failed to establish ineffective assistance of

counsel where trial counsel failed to request a continuance or object to the advanced

sentencing hearing. We have already established that Wagner failed to demonstrate

that the trial court committed plain error in its decision to advance the hearing.

Furthermore, the trial court’s docket reflects that it notified the parties of the

hearing at least a week beforehand. Finally, it was apparent as well, that counsel

had discussed the sentencing hearing with Wagner and that Wagner agreed to go

forward with sentencing that day.
              Wagner suggests that the advanced hearing prevented his counsel

from adequately preparing for the hearing or ensuring that a presentence-

investigation report was created. He also alleges that a mitigation witness was

unavailable for the advanced court date.

              However, as we have already discussed, trial counsel was given

adequate notice. Further, Wagner’s counsel was able to advocate on his behalf and

raise several issues in his favor during the sentencing hearing. As to the unavailable

witness, neither trial counsel nor Wagner raised the issue before the court. In fact,

Wagner expressed a desire to proceed with sentencing. Finally, while a presentence

investigation can be helpful, it is not required prior to a sentencing hearing. R.C.

2929.19 requires the court to consider any information presented at the hearing, and

“if one was prepared, the presentence investigation report.” The trial court elected

not to have one prepared.

              Wagner has therefore failed to establish that trial counsel’s failure to

request a continuance or object to the advancement of the sentencing hearing was

prejudicial that but for which, the outcome of his sentencing would have been

different.

              Accordingly, we overrule Wagner’s second assignment of error.

              Finally, in the fifth assignment of error, Wagner argues that his trial

counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the trial court’s reliance on

videotaped evidence and the testimony of the victim that was not in the record in

Wagner’s case. As we have noted, Wagner has failed to establish that it was plain
error for the court to rely on the videotape or White’s testimony. Wagner was not

surprised by the evidence, and his counsel had an opportunity to view the video

multiple times prior to the hearing. Further, he was not prejudiced by the trial

court’s consideration of White’s testimony.

              Accordingly, Wagner has not demonstrated prejudice to establish that

his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The fifth assignment of error is

overruled.

Wagner’s Sentence Relative to Codefendant Pinson

              In his sixth assignment of error, Wagner argues that his sentence and

his codefendant Pinson’s sentence of eight years is contrary to this court’s holding

in State v. Lyons, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80220, 2002-Ohio-3424, and R.C.

2929.11(B). Wagner argues that the trial court erred because Pinson received an

eight-year sentence, and therefore the court failed to ensure that “the sentence

imposed was consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by

similar offenders.” (Appellant’s brief at p. 18).

              Preliminarily, the parties present different views of Pinson’s case.

Wagner alleges that Pinson was sentenced after a jury trial, while the state alleges

that Pinson pleaded guilty. To clear up this dispute, we reviewed the online court

docket for the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court in Pinson’s case. State ex rel.

Maron v. Corrigan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112130, 2022-Ohio-4406, ¶ 2, fn. 1 (“An

appellate court is permitted to take judicial notice of publicly accessible online

court dockets.” Citing State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 115 Ohio St.3d 195, 2007-
Ohio-4798, 874 N.E.3d 516, State v. Estridge, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2021-CA-25,

2022-Ohio-208).

              Accordingly, we take judicial notice that Pinson pleaded guilty to

involuntary manslaughter, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping; all felonies of the

first degree; and to grand theft a felony of the third degree. Unlike Wagner, Pinson

did not plead guilty to attempted murder, having weapons while under disability, or

to any firearm or repeat violent offender specifications. The trial court sentenced

Pinson to five years on the involuntary manslaughter charge; eight years on the

aggravated robbery charge; five years on the kidnapping charge; and 24 months on

the grand theft charge, to run concurrently for a total of eight years.

              In comparison, Wagner received a sentence of three years on the

involuntary manslaughter charge, consecutive to a three-year firearm specification;

and nine years each on the aggravated robbery and kidnapping charges, and 12

months on the grand theft charge. Also, Wagner received a sentence of nine years

for attempted murder and 24 months for having weapons while under disability.

              R.C. 2929.11(B) requires a defendant’s sentence to be “consistent with

sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.” See State v.

Palmer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86035, 2006-Ohio-686, ¶ 10. This “consistency” in

sentencing “does not require that codefendants receive equal sentences.” State v.

Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103359, 2016-Ohio-5320, ¶ 37, citing State v. Pruitt,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98080, 2012-Ohio-5418, ¶ 26, citing State v. Nelson, 11th

Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-072, 2008-Ohio-5535. Our review consists of determining
“‘whether the sentence is so unusual as to be outside the mainstream of local judicial

practice. Although the offense may be similar, distinguishing factors may justify

dissimilar treatment.’” Id., citing State v. Dawson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86417,

2006-Ohio-1083, ¶ 31, quoting State v. Turner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81449,

2003-Ohio-4933.

              Admittedly, Wagner and Pinson were involved in the same incident,

but their circumstances are dissimilar. Wagner pleaded guilty to more serious

charges than Pinson. Additionally, the trial court identified Wagner as the primary

aggressor in the crime. There is no evidence in the record that Pinson was a

significant participant in the crime compared to Wagner.

              Furthermore, the trial court’s sentence is in line with the holding in

Lyons, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80220, 2002-Ohio-3424. The court’s holding in that

case was that a trial court “must ensure that any sentence it imposes is consistent

with that imposed for similar crimes by similar offenders.” Id. at ¶ 33. Wagner and

Pinson are not “similar” offenders in this case. Their conduct was not “alike in

substance or essentials.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/similar (accessed Feb. 14, 2023).

              Given the foregoing, the trial court did not err in sentencing Wagner

differently than Pinson. Although involved in the same crimes, the trial court clearly

recognized that Wagner was a principal offender and sentenced him commensurate

with his conduct.

             Accordingly, Wagner’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.
Cumulative errors amounting to a violation of Due Process

               Finally, in the seventh assignment of error, Wagner argues that the

combination of errors, or cumulative errors, noted in the other assigned errors

violated his right to due process under the law.

               This argument is often referred to as the cumulative-error doctrine. It

recognizes that although individual errors at trial may not rise to the level of

prejudicial error, “‘a conviction will be reversed where the cumulative effect of the

errors deprives a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial.’” State v.

Brown, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 22AP-38, 22AP-39, 22AP-40, 22AP-41, and 22AP-

42, 2022-Ohio-4073, ¶ 39; quoting State v. Ferrell, 2020-Ohio-6879, ¶ 42, 165

N.E.3d 743 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191, 509 N.E.2d

1256 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. Furthermore, one cannot establish

cumulative error by merely “combining * * * unsuccessful claims together.” If none

of the claims have merit, cumulative error cannot be established. Id.

               Wagner alleges the following errors, when combined, represent

cumulative error warranting reversal of his sentence: (1) failure to obtain a

presentence investigation; (2) trial court’s failure to “look at everything”; (3) the trial

courts failure to consider all of the mitigating evidence contained in the competency

report; (4) the advancing of the sentencing hearing without good cause and the

absence of a potential witness; (5) counsel’s shortcomings at the sentencing hearing;

(6) the trial court’s reliance on evidence in the codefendant’s trial; and (7) the

“disparate sentences” between the codefendants.
             All of Wagner’s assignments of error are without merit and have been

overruled. Therefore, cumulative error cannot be established.

              Accordingly, Wagner’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.

             Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

                       ____
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR