Court Opinion

ID: 9925296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 14:06:32.322409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:42.160376
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Reynolds v. Hamilton Cty. Dev. Disabilities Servs., 2024-Ohio-83.]
                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
              FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                   HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 JAMES REYNOLDS,                                    :          APPEAL NO. C-230046
                                                               TRIAL NO. A-1905513
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                        :

   vs.                                              :                O P I N I O N.

 HAMILTON COUNTY                                    :
 DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
 SERVICES,                                          :

 ALICE PAVEY, Individually and in her               :
 official capacity as Superintendent,
                                                    :
 SHAWN GARVER, Individually and in
 his official capacity as Human                     :
 Resources Director,
                                                    :
 JENNIE R. FLOWERS, Individually
 and in her official capacity as MUI                :
 Director,
                                                    :
 HANS VAN RHEENAN, Individually
 and in his official capacity as Service            :
 and Supports Administrator,
                                                    :
 KELLEY TEKESTE, Individually and in
 her official capacity as Behavior                  :
 Specialist,
                                                    :
 ERIC A. METZGER, Individually and
 in his official capacity as Integration            :
 and Advocacy,
                                                    :
 CHRIS MURPHY, Individually and in
 his official capacity as MUI                       :
 Investigator,
                                                    :
     and
                                                    :
 DAWN FREUDENBERG, Individually
 and in her official capacity as                    :
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

 Innovation and Quality,

         Defendants-Appellants.           :

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: January 12, 2024

Gatlin Voelker, PLLC, and Anthony Bucher, for Plainitff-Appellee,

Schroeder, Maundrill, Barbiere & Powers, Scott A. Sollman and Kurt Irey, for
Defendants-Appellants.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

WINKLER, Judge.

       {¶1}   Plaintiff-appellee James Reynolds filed a complaint alleging wrongful

discharge, defamation, and violations of R.C. 4112.02 against defendants-appellants,

Hamilton County Developmental Disabilities Services (“HCDDS”), Alice Pavey, Shawn

Garver, Jennie R. Flowers, Hans Von Rheenan, Kelley Tekeste, Eric Metzger, Chris

Murphy, and Dawn Freudenberg in both their individual and official capacities.

Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment in which they asserted a defense of

immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 and 5123.61(K).

       {¶2}   The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment. It found that

genuine issues of material fact existed regarding “whether Reynolds was a common

law employee of HCDDS and/or whether HCDDS was a co-employer of Reynolds. All

of Plaintiff’s claims with the exception of the defamation claim, depend on the

determination of the foregoing.” As to the defamation claim, it stated that “this claim

would survive this Motion regardless, as there are issues of material fact that must be

determined at trial.” The court also stated that “[t]here is no just reason for delay”

under Civ.R. 54(B). This appeal followed.

                               I.     Factual Background

       {¶3}   This case involves agencies providing supported living and residential

services to individuals with developmental disabilities. These services are known as

Individual Options Waiver Services. The Individual Options Waiver (“IO waiver”) is a

Medicaid waiver for clients who have developmental disabilities and who are eligible

to use that waiver to receive care and support in their homes and communities. The

use of these waiver services to fund supported living services results in a complex

relationship between the recipients, the providers, county boards of developmental

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

disabilities, the Ohio Department of Developmental Disabilities (“DODD”), and Ohio

Department of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS”).

       {¶4}   The DODD is the statewide governmental agency responsible for

overseeing all of the services and IO waivers provided to clients. It writes the rules and

handles the licensing of providers, which consist of numerous residential homes and

day programs throughout the state. Waiver services vary depending on the client’s

needs, but could include services such as personal care, home modifications,

transportation, social work, equipment, and home-delivered meals. Each IO waiver

determines the number of services that will be provided to a client.

       {¶5}   DODD and HCDDS personnel, including county behavioral support

specialists (“BSS”) and county support service administrators (“SSA”) use IO waivers

to implement an individual service plan (“ISP”) specific to each client. Individual

clients can select certified providers of their choice. Providers are certified by DODD

and the Ohio Department of Medicaid and are listed on the DODD website. The

providers employ direct support personnel (“DSP”), who ensure that clients follow

their ISP by tracking “outcomes,” which are documented and billed by the provider.

Medicaid and DODD submit weekly payments to the provider.

       {¶6}   Individuals who serve the county as BSSes, SSAs, or DSPs are

“mandatory reporters,” who have a statutory responsibility to report allegations of

abuse, neglect, or other major unusual incidents (“MUIs”). See R.C. 5123.61(C). Once

these issues are reported, HCDDS and its investigative agents must review the report,

investigate the incident, and submit a report to DODD of their findings. If the incident

involves an MUI, those findings include whether the MUI has been substantiated. But

HCDDS does not have authority to take action concerning the person involved in the

substantiated claim. Ohio law requires DODD to have a registry office for purposes of

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

maintaining, reviewing, investigating, and depending on the circumstances, acting on

these reports, including placing someone on the abuser registry.

       {¶7}   A Ray of Hope was a certified waiver provider under contract with

DODD. It was incorporated in 2013, and during the relevant times, Laura Switzer was

its sole owner. It provided a residential program, as well as a separate day program

called Perfect Circles. As a provider, it was required to employ at least one DSP. The

residential and the day program each used the same people as employees.

       {¶8}   At A Ray of Hope, Reynolds worked as a DSP, and later, he also served

as its Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”). After he began working at A Ray of Hope, he

did not work for any other provider. He billed A Ray of Hope for his services and his

paychecks came from A Ray of Hope. He stated that he did not work directly for

HCDDS, he did not receive any payments for waiver services from HCDDS, and he was

not required to sign any of HCDDS’s policies. He also testified that A Ray of Hope had

its own internal policies apart from DODD’s rules and regulations, with which he had

to comply.

       {¶9}   Reynolds negotiated with A Ray of Hope with respect to his position,

potential ownership, and potential bonuses. When he started as a DSP with A Ray of

Hope, he brought a “big client” with him, and he later became CFO. In that position,

he “looked at the finances,” “helped people get their paychecks,” “helped make the

schedule,” and “put the staff in place where they were going to be working.” He hired

other DSPs and had authority to hire and fire employees at A Ray of Hope. Finally, he

testified that only he and Switzer had financial control of A Ray of Hope, and they were

responsible for paying staff.

       {¶10} Because Perfect Circles was a day program, he was able to use Perfect

Circles at night as his own entity to generate additional revenue through nonwaiver

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

activities, such as martial arts and a recording studio. He said he created the name

Perfect Circles, and he owned “Perfect Circles Boxing and Recording.” On his 2016

and 2017 tax returns, he filed as a self-employed person and independent contractor.

       {¶11} Reynolds contended that around July 2016, HCDDS employees started

comparing Reynolds, a black male, to Barry Isaacs, another black male service

provider, who was accused and ultimately convicted of fraud related to his work as a

DSP.   Reynolds learned of those comparisons and complained that they were

unjustified and racially motivated. Metzger, HCDDS Director of Integration and

Advocacy, sent an email to various HCDDS employees asking if anyone had concerns

about Reynolds or A Ray of Hope. In response, Mark Unterbrink, an Investigative

Agent in the Major Unusual Incident Unit, referred to Reynolds as “the next Barry

Issacs.” Reynolds noted that he had “dreads and piercings,” as did Isaacs.

       {¶12} Reynolds further testified that he had a conversation with Van Rheenan,

an SSA, and Tekeste, a BSS, in which they told him that Metzger had “problems with

Issacs.” Metzger had said that Isaacs was “ghetto” and a “thug.” Tekeste had to go

with Isaacs to county board meetings so that they didn’t think Isaacs was a “thug” or

“too ghetto to run a company.”

       {¶13} Subsequently, Metzger sent an email to various HCDDS employees

acknowledging that Reynolds was upset about being compared to Isaacs and agreeing

that the “thug” association with Reynolds was “unfair.” Metzger acknowledged that

he had once thought of Reynolds in that way. He then sent an email to Reynolds and

Switzer agreeing that the comparisons to Isaacs were “untrue” and “unfair.”

       {¶14} On January 3, 2017, Metzger sent a “clean the slate” email to Reynolds

and Switzer, which was copied to several HCDDS employees, in which he

acknowledged that the relationship between Reynolds and HCDDS was tenuous. He

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

also confirmed that Reynolds was not an associate of Isaacs, and he should not be

compared to Isaacs.

       {¶15} Reynolds complained about discrimination at a meeting on January 18,

2017, which was led by Metzger. According to Reynolds, Metzger had shown up

unannounced the following day at Perfect Circles. Then Metzger reported compliance

issues to DDOD.

       {¶16} On April 25, 2017, Van Rheenan and Tekeste visited a Perfect Circles

daycare program, where they spoke with clients. One client informed them that he

had called the police on April 20, 2017, because of a peer-to-peer incident in which he

was verbally threatened by another client. They sent an email to Reynolds advising

him about what they learned during the visit. Reynolds responded by stating that he

had been in New York and did not know that the police had been called.

       {¶17} Flowers was the Director of the MUI Department for HCDDS. On April

17, 2017, she received a report of verbal abuse involving Reynolds, accompanied by an

audio recording capturing the alleged verbal abuse. Flowers testified that while she

was investigating that report, she discovered other allegations involving Reynolds,

including misappropriation of funds, abuse, and neglect. On May 1, 2017, she initiated

two MUIs in which Reynolds was the primary person of interest. One stated that

Reynolds had verbally abused two clients on April 25, 2017. The second stated that

Reynolds had failed to report the April 20, 2017 peer-to-peer incident that was

reported to Van Rheenan and Tekeste.

       {¶18} As a result of the initial allegation of verbal abuse involving Reynolds

and two clients from A Ray of Hope, Flowers recommended to Switzer that she remove

Reynolds from having contact with those two clients. She testified that it was up to

the owner’s discretion whether to follow that recommendation. She also stated that

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

neither she, nor HCDDS, had authority to remove any clients from their programs.

Further, Reynolds testified that no BSS or SSA from HCDDS had ever ordered a DSP

from A Ray of Hope not to work with a specific client or had any input as to the hiring

and firing of A Ray of Hope’s employees.

       {¶19} Reynolds first found out about the investigation into the verbal-abuse

allegation on May 5, 2017. On that day, Switzer instructed him to have no contact with

A Ray of Hope’s clients until further notice. Nevertheless, under Switzer’s direction,

he continued to be regularly paid by A Ray of Hope.

       {¶20} On June 21, 2017, A Ray of Hope was suspended by the Ohio

Department of Medicaid due to credible allegations of fraud. Reynolds said that

Medicaid later closed its investigation because it had “no prosecutorial merit.” He

added that A Ray of Hope was shut down by the Attorney General for “safety

concerns.” Reynolds thought that he was also suspended, but he later realized that he

was not under any suspension. Since June 21, 2021, he has been employed with

another provider as a community access specialist and a community living support

specialist, providing services like the ones he had been performing for A Ray of Hope.

                         I.      Political-Subdivision Immunity

       {¶21} In their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court

erred by failing to grant their motion for summary judgment on all claims. They argue

that HCDDS and the individual appellants are entitled to immunity under R.C.

2744.03(A)(3) and 5123.61(K) on all claims. They also argue that HCDDS and the

individual appellants acting in their official capacity are immune from an award of

punitive damages or attorney fees. We find merit in appellants’ argument.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                  A. Standard of Review

       {¶22} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for

summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671

N.E.2d 241 (1996); Maas v. Maas, 2020-Ohio-5160, 161 N.E.3d 863, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.).

Summary judgment is appropriate if (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists for

trial, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable

minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the

nonmoving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his

or her favor. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267

(1977); Maas at ¶ 13.

                        B. Employee v. Independent Contractor

       {¶23} R.C. Chapter 2744, the Political Subdivision Liability Act, establishes a

comprehensive statutory scheme for the tort liability of political subdivisions and their

employees. Piazza v. Cuyahoga Cty., 157 Ohio St.3d 497, 2019-Ohio-2499, 138

N.E.3d 1108, ¶ 11. R.C. 2744.09 “identifies certain scenarios in which R.C. Chapter

2744.09 does not apply.” Id. at ¶ 11. R.C. 2744.09(B) provides, “This chapter does not

apply to, and shall not be construed to apply to * * * [c]ivil actions by an employee * *

* against his political subdivision relative to any matter that arises out of the

employment relationship between the employee and the political subdivision * * *.”

This section removes immunity only as to the political subdivision and does not affect

the statutory immunity of a fellow employee. Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill

Joint Fire Dist., 128 Ohio St.3d 492, 2011-Ohio-1603, 946 N.E.2d 748, syllabus.

       {¶24} We begin our analysis by addressing the issue of whether Reynolds was

an employee or an independent contractor. Reynolds acknowledges that he was not a

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

direct employee of HCDDS. He claims that he was an employee under an agency or

joint-enterprise theory. His argument ignores the definition of employee set forth in

R.C. 2744.01(B). It states that “Employee” means “an officer, agent, employee, or

servant, whether or not compensated or full-time or part-time, who is authorized to

act and is acting within the scope of the officer’s, agent’s, employee’s, or servant’s

employment for a political subdivision.” It further states, that “Employee” does not

include an independent contractor * * *.”

       {¶25} The term “independent contractor” is not defined in R.C. Chapter 2744,

so we look to common law regarding both employment and agency relationships for

the test to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor. Trucco Constr.

Co. v. Fremont, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-12-007, 2013-Ohio-415, ¶ 18. Generally, a

party is classified as an independent contractor, rather than an employee or agent,

based upon the ability of the political subdivision to control the work to be performed.

Lakota v. Ashtabula, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2015-A-0010, 2015-Ohio-3413, ¶ 37;

Trucco Constr. Co. at ¶ 22; Wade-Hairston v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation

& Dev. Disabilities, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 98-AP-456, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6223,

10-11 (Dec. 17, 1998). “When a party agrees to produce some end product or result

without the political subdivision having any right to control the method of

accomplishing the specific work/services to be performed, the party is deemed to be

an independent contractor.” Trucco Constr. Co. at ¶ 22.

       {¶26} The determination of whether a party is an employee or an independent

contractor is fact specific. If the evidence is not in conflict, or if the facts are admitted,

the question of whether a person is an employee or independent contractor is an issue

of law. But if the facts are disputed, it is an issue of fact for a trier of fact to decide.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Trucco Constr. Co. at ¶ 23, and Wade-Hairston at 11, both citing Bostic v. Connor, 37

Ohio St.3d 144, 524 N.E.2d 881 (1988).

       {¶27} The facts in this case as to Reynold’s employment status are not in

dispute. Reynolds worked as a DSP at A Ray of Hope, and later, he also served as its

CFO. He billed A Ray of Hope for his services. He testified that his paychecks came

from A Ray of Hope. He stated that he did not work directly for HCDDS, he did not

receive any payments for waiver services from HCDDS, and he was not required to

sign any of HCDDS’s policies. He also testified that A Ray of Hope had its own internal

policies apart from DODD’s rules and regulations, with which he had to comply.

       {¶28} DODD and HCDDS have some control over the service providers in that

they promulgate rules and regulations consistent with the statutes governing IO

waivers. But that doesn’t mean that any individual who works for a certified service

provider qualifies as an employee. If we accept Reynolds’s argument that he was an

employee, then arguably any person or entity subject to rules or regulations could be

an employee of that entity.

       {¶29} A Ray of Hope was a separate entity and HCDDS could not control all

its activities. Flowers testified that she could only recommend that Switzer suspend

him from having contact with A Ray of Hope’s clients. She testified that it was up to

the owner’s discretion whether to follow that recommendation. She also stated that

neither she, nor HCDDS, had authority to remove any clients from their programs.

Further, Reynolds testified that no BSS or SSA from HCDDS, had ever ordered a DSP

from A Ray of Hope not to work with a specific client, nor did they have any input as

to the hiring and firing of A Ray of Hope’s employees. Additionally, Reynolds testified

that despite the pending investigation against him and the fact that he could not

provide any waiver services, Switzer, in her discretion, decided to keep paying him.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶30} Reynolds relies on various administrative regulations in arguing that he

was acting as an employee of HCDDS. We do not agree that those regulations change

the conclusion that Reynolds was not an employee of HCDDS.

       {¶31} This case is similar to Wade-Hairston, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 98AP-

456, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6223, in which the plaintiffs were originally full-time

employees of the Franklin County Board of Mental Retardation and Developmental

Disabilities (“Board”). They worked at a sheltered workshop for intellectually disabled

individuals. They were asked if they wanted to provide IO waiver services in their

homes. They were told that they would be providing those services through the state

Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities. After training and

entering into separate provider agreements, they provided waiver services in their

home or the homes of their consumers.

       {¶32} Plaintiffs filed suit for wages and overtime pay under the federal Fair

Labor Standards Act and R.C. 4111.03. Because the trial court found that the plaintiffs

were independent contractors and not employees of the Board while they were

providing waiver services, it granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment.

       {¶33} In determining whether the plaintiffs were employees or independent

contractors, the appellate court stated, “If the employer reserves the right to control

the manner or means of doing the work, the relation created is that of master and

servant, while if the manner or means of doing the work or job is left to one who is

responsible to the employer only for the result, an independent contractor relationship

is thereby created.” Id. at 10-11, quoting Bostic, 37 Ohio St.3d at 146, 524 N.E.2d 881.

The determination of who has the right to control must be made by examining the

individual facts of each case including: (1) who controls the details and the quality of

the work; (2) who controls the hours that are worked; and (3) who selects the

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

materials, tools, and the personnel used in performing the work. Id. at 11, citing Bostic

at 146.

          {¶34} The court stated that the plaintiffs never received any payments for

waiver services from the Board. They each entered into a provider contract with the

Board, which stated that they were individually responsible for all expenses incurred,

that they had to carry liability insurance, and that they were responsible for fulfilling

the requirements and goals for each consumer. The court also noted that during the

time in question, the plaintiffs filed tax forms that would be applicable only to self-

employed individuals. It concluded that “there was little or no control exercised over

the manner and means by which [plaintiffs] provided waiver services,” and that

plaintiffs were independent contractors. Wade-Hairston, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

98AP-456, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6223, at 12.

          {¶35} Finally, the court noted that plaintiffs had argued that “because the

Board oversaw the program, i.e., developed the goals and requirements for each

consumer and supervised the waiver program, that an employee/employer

relationship was established.” Id. The court disagreed. It stated, “[t]he provider

contract is primary evidence of the parties’ contractual relationship. [Plaintiffs] were

permitted to use their discretion in meeting the goals and objectives set forth for each

consumer. The goals and objectives set forth by the Board were merely the guidelines

to be used by [plaintiffs] in successfully completing the requirements of the waiver

program.” Id. at 12-13.

          {¶36} Similarly, in Williams v. Richland Cty. Children Servs., 861 F.Supp.2d

874 (N.D.Ohio 2011), the plaintiff was owner of a company that provided housing and

transportation for the elderly and special-needs individuals. She filed a complaint

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

against the defendants, a children services agency and various employees of the

agency. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss.

       {¶37} The court granted the motion to dismiss as to the agency because

plaintiff was not an employee of the agency. The court stated,

       Courts distinguish employee and independent contractor status by

       determining whether the employer has the right to control the manner

       in which the work is performed. The following elements are considered

       in determining the independent contractor/employee question: the

       hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the

       product is accomplished; the skill required by the hired party; the

       duration of the relationship between the parties; the hiring party’s right

       to assign additional projects; the hired party’s discretion over when and

       how to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and

       paying assistants; whether the work is part of the hiring party’s regular

       business; the hired party’s employee benefits; and tax treatment of the

       hired party’s compensation. No one factor is dispositive.

Williams at 884, citing Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir.1996).

       {¶38} The court determined that the plaintiff was an independent contractor.

It reasoned that that the agency did not retain any control over how she carried out

transportation assignments or the route she took; the agency did not provide plaintiff

with a car or any other vehicle to conduct her transportation duties; her business

provided numerous services other than transportation; she did business with several

different agencies; and she was not paid by the agency but from various other sources,

including Medicaid and Medicare.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶39} The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that she was an employee

because the agency had significant control over her duties since it dictated whom she

transported, the amount charged, the nature of the trips assigned, and whether the

work was part of the agency’s regular business. It stated that “case law is clear that a

workers lack of discretion is not an indication of employee status, particularly when

the lack of discretion is the result of governmental regulation.”       Williams, 861

F.Supp.2d at 884.

       {¶40} Reynolds’s testimony showed that he negotiated with A Ray of Hope,

not HCDDS, with respect to his position, potential ownership, and potential bonuses.

HCDDS did not own or control the building used by A Ray of Hope. He stated that A

Ray of Hope rented the building from a third party. No BSSes or SSAs had their offices

in that building. Reynolds was able to use the building and the name Perfect Circles

to generate additional revenue through nonwaiver services activities. HCDDS did not

provide him with a vehicle to conduct his duties. He used his own vehicle or a vehicle

rented by A Ray of Hope.

       {¶41} Reynolds had no contract with HCDDS, and he testified that he never

had to sign off on any HCDDS policies, but instead only had to comply with rules and

regulations that were issued by the state. A Ray of Hope had its own internal policies.

As CFO, he made the schedule, issued payroll, had financial control, and had the

authority to hire, fire, and discipline its employees. He further stated that HCDDS had

no control over who or how he scheduled employees to carry out A Ray of Hope’s

duties. He testified that he paid himself as an independent contractor, and his tax

returns reflected that status.

       {¶42} We hold as a matter of law that Reynolds was an independent

contractor, not an employee of HCDDS. Therefore, the exception from immunity for

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

employees of political subdivisions does not apply. The trial court erred in denying

appellants’ motion for summary judgment on the basis that issues of fact existed as to

whether Reynolds was an employee of HCDDS.

                        C. Appellate Review of Immunity Claims

       {¶43} Next, we address the issue of whether HCDDS is entitled to immunity

and whether any other exceptions to that immunity apply. Generally, we would

remand unresolved issues to the trial court to determine them in the first instance.

But R.C. 2744.02(C) provides that “[a]n order that denies a political subdivision or an

employee of a political subdivision the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as

provided in this chapter or any other provision of law is a final order.” The Ohio

Supreme Court has held that when a trial court denies a motion in which a political

subdivision or its employee seeks immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744, “that order

denies the benefit of an alleged immunity and, therefore is a final, appealable order

pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C).” Hubble v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839,

873 N.E.2d 878, syllabus.

       {¶44} The court in Hubble also noted policy reasons for its “broad

interpretation of R.C. 2744.02(B).” Slonsky v. J.W. Didado Elec., Inc., 9th Dist.

Summit No. 24228, 2008-Ohio-6791, ¶ 7. “As the General Assembly envisioned, the

determination of immunity could be made prior to investing the time, effort and

expense of the courts, attorneys, parties and witnesses * * *.” Id. at ¶ 7, quoting Hubble

at ¶ 26.

       {¶45} After a de novo review of the law and facts, if genuine issues of fact

remain, a court of appeals may remand the cause to the trial court for further

development of the facts necessary to resolve the immunity issue. But if only issues of

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

law remain, we may decide the appeal based on those issues of law. See Slonsky at ¶

8.

                              D. A Three-Tiered Analysis

       {¶46} Determining whether a political subdivision is immune from tort

liability under R.C. Chapter 2744 involves a three-tiered analysis.          Pelletier v.

Campbell, 153 Ohio St.3d 611, 2018-Ohio-2121, 109 N.E.3d 1210, ¶ 15; Inwood Village,

Ltd. v. Cincinnati, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110117, 2011-Ohio-6632, ¶ 11. The first

tier provides a general grant of immunity. A political subdivision is immune from

liability incurred performing either a governmental or a proprietary function. R.C.

2744.02(A); Pelletier at ¶ 15; Inwood Village at ¶ 11.

       {¶47} The second tier requires a court to determine whether any of the five

exceptions set forth in R.C. 2744.02(B) apply. Pelletier at ¶ 15; Inwood Village at ¶ 11.

Under the third tier, if any of those exceptions apply, a court must determine whether

any of the defenses contained in R.C. 2744.03 apply to reinstate immunity. Pelletier

at ¶ 15; Inwood Village. at ¶ 11.

       {¶48} It is undisputed that HCDDS is a political subdivision. Similarly,

Reynolds does not argue that it was not performing a governmental function. R.C.

2744.01(C)(2)(o) specifically provides that the “operation of mental health facilities,

developmental disabilities facilities, alcohol treatment and control centers, and

children’s homes or agencies” are governmental functions. Therefore, HCDDS is

entitled to the general grant of immunity under the first tier of the analysis.

       {¶49} Under the second tier, we must determine whether any of the exceptions

to the general grant of immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) apply. In light of the presumption

of broad immunity for political subdivisions, the statute does not place the burden on

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the political subdivision to demonstrate that no exceptions apply. “[R]ather, once the

first tier has been met, the plaintiff must demonstrate one of the statutorily defined

exceptions apply in order to proceed.” Fried v. Friends of Breakthrough Schools., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108766, 2020-Ohio-4215, ¶ 22.

          {¶50} Appellants raised the issue of immunity in their motion for summary

judgment. Reynolds did not address that issue in his memorandum in response, but

instead argued the merits of the claims in his complaint. In his brief to this court, he

has not specified which exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) apply, and we find

none.

          {¶51} Instead, Reynolds relies on R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), which states that a

political subdivision is immune from liability if the “injury, death, or loss to person or

property resulted from the exercise of judgment or discretion in determining whether

to acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials, personnel, facilities, and

other resources unless the discretion was exercised with malicious purpose, bad faith,

or in a wanton or reckless manner.” But the application of R.C. 2744.03 is the third

tier of the analysis. If none of the exceptions in R.C. 2744.02(B) apply, the political

subdivision is immune from liability and the analysis ends. Partin v. Norwood, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-140461, 2015-Ohio-1616, ¶ 18. Therefore, we need not reach

issue of whether R.C. 2744.03 applies.

          {¶52} Thus, HCDDS and employees acting in their official capacity are entitled

to immunity as a matter of law on Reynolds’s claims for wrongful discharge,

harassment, alteration of conditions of employment, and retaliation. Therefore, the

trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion for summary judgment as to those

claims.

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

          {¶53} As to Reynolds’s defamation claim, the trial court stated that that claim

was not dependent on the determination of whether Reynolds was an employee of

HCDDS. It further stated that the defamation claim would survive the motion for

summary judgment “as there are issues of material fact that must be determined at

trial.”

          {¶54} In Ohio, the tort of defamation may be either negligent or intentional.

Mayer v. Bodnar, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 22 CAE 05 oo41, 2022-Ohio-4705, ¶ 51;

Price v. Austintown Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 178 Ohio App.3d 256, 2008-Ohio-

4514, 897 N.E.2d 700, ¶ 25 (7th Dist.). But Reynolds has only alleged intentional

conduct, and political subdivisions are immune from intentional torts. Yankovitz v.

Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112040, 2023-

Ohio-2584, ¶ 39; Fried, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108766, 2020-Ohio-4215, at ¶ 24;

Price at ¶ 22.

          {¶55} HCDDS and the appellants acting in their official capacity also argue

that they are immune from an award of punitive damages or attorney fees. We agree.

R.C. 2744.05(A) states that “punitive or exemplary damages shall not be awarded”

against a political subdivision. Further, attorney fees may not be awarded against a

political subdivision unless specifically authorized by statute. Speller v. Toledo Pub.

Sch00l Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2015-Ohio-2672, 38 N.E.3d 509, ¶ 52 (6th Dist.).

          {¶56} Those appellants also argue that they are entitled to immunity under

R.C. 5123.61(K), which involves their duty to report abuse, neglect, and other major

unusual incidents to a law enforcement agency or to a county board of developmental

disabilities. Since we have already determined that the appellants are immune under

R.C. Chapter 2744, this issue is moot and we decline to address it.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶57} In sum, we hold as a matter of law that HCDDS and the other appellants

acting in their official capacity have immunity with regard to all of Reynolds’s claims,

and the trial court erred in failing to grant their motion for summary judgment on all

of Reynolds’s claims. Consequently, we sustain appellants’ first assignment of error.

                      II. Political-Subdivision-Employee Immunity

       {¶58} In their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial

court erred in failing to address the immunity of the appellants in their individual

capacities (“employees-appellants”) and in failing to grant summary judgment in their

favor. They argue that they are entitled to immunity under both R.C. Chapter 2744

and 5123.61(K) on all claims. This assignment of error is well taken.

       {¶59} R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) provides that employees of a political subdivision

enjoy a presumption of immunity in connection with their performance of

governmental or proprietary functions unless any of three exceptions apply. Anderson

v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d 266, ¶ 21; Morelia

Group-De, LLC v. Weidman, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220153, 2023-Ohio-386, ¶ 24.

Those exceptions are (1) the employees acts or omissions were manifestly outside the

scope of the employee’s employment or official responsibilities; (2) the employee’s acts

or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless

manner; (3) civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the

Revised Code. R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a)-(c); Morelia Group-De at ¶ 25. The exceptions

to immunity must be narrowly construed. Stoll v. Gardner, 182 Ohio App.3d 214,

2009-Ohio-1865, 912 N.E.2d 165, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.).

       {¶60} For purposes of R.C. 2744.03, “malice” has been defined as the “willful

and intentional desire to harm another, usually seriously, through conduct which is

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

unlawful or unjustified.” Morelia Group-De at ¶ 29. When an employee’s conduct is

motivated by actual malice, it is outside the scope of his or her employment. Id. at ¶

27. Bad faith means more than bad judgment or negligence. It implies “a dishonest

purpose, moral 0bliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through

some ulterior motive or ill will partaking in the nature of fraud.” Alagha v. Cameron,

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-081208, 2009-Ohio-4886, ¶ 20, quoting Wooten v. Vogele,

147 Ohio App.3d 216, 2001-Ohio-7096, 769 N.E.2d 889, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.).

       {¶61} Willful and wanton misconduct is something more than negligence.

Whitley v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 2009-Ohio-6933, 970 N.E.2d 1009, ¶ 12

(1st Dist.). Wanton misconduct is the failure to exercise any care whatsoever toward

those to whom a duty is owed if the failure to exercise care occurs when a great

probability of harm exists. Id. at ¶ 12. Willful misconduct involves an “intent, purpose

or design not to perform the duty of care that is owed.” Id. at ¶ 12, quoting Alagha at

¶ 21. Recklessness is a perverse disregard of a known risk. The actor must be

conscious that his or her conduct will probably result in injury. O’Toole v. Denihan,

118 Ohio St.3d 374, 2008-Ohio-2574, 889 N.E.2d 505, paragraph three of the syllabus;

Alagha at ¶ 21.

       {¶62} These are “rigorous standards” to establish. Argabrite v. Neer, 149

Ohio St.3d 349, 2016-Ohio-8374, 75 N.E.3d 161, ¶ 8; Strayer v. Barnett, 2d Dist. Clark

No. 2016-CA-19, 2017-Ohio-5617, ¶ 39. Generally, the determination of whether an

employee of a political subdivision acted willfully and wantonly is a question of fact

for the jury. But where the record does not contain evidence of willful and wanton

misconduct, a trial court may grant summary judgment in favor of the employee.

Whitley at ¶ 13; Alagha at ¶ 22.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶63} Reynolds argues that the allegations against him surfaced shortly after

he complained that the comparisons between him and Isaacs were unjustified and

were racially motivated. He specifically cites Flowers’s conduct during the MUI

investigation. He contends that: (1) she initiated her investigation after his claim of

racial discrimination; (2) she continued her investigation of the alleged verbal abuse

after informal interviews with clients that denied any verbal abuse; (3) she continued

her investigation after learning that Reynolds was out of town at the time of the alleged

verbal abuse; (4) she initiated other MUI investigations based solely on unreliable

claims of a severely developmentally disabled client; (5) she informed the Ohio

Attorney General’s Office that A Ray of Hope clients were “at risk trafficking victims”;

(6) she implied that he was giving his clients drugs; (7) she falsely informed DODD

that Reynolds was providing services in Clermont County after he had been removed

from client contact; and (8) she allowed the investigation to linger for two years even

though those investigations are supposed to be completed in 30 days.

       {¶64} These arguments are largely based on mischaracterizations of the

evidence. Flowers testified that she was unaware of any discrimination complaint

before or during the MUI investigation. Further, undisputed evidence showed that the

investigation was only initiated after a tip accompanied by an audio recording was

received from a third-party informant. The record also shows that an employee of

DODD, not Flowers or HCDDS, stated to the Attorney General’s Office that A Ray of

Hope clients were “at risk trafficking victims.”      The document, which Reynolds

claimed implied that he was giving drugs to the client, did not mention drugs. It said

only that Reynolds made “vape juice.” Finally, the only document he refers to in

support of the allegation that Flowers falsely stated to DODD that he was providing

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

serves in Clermont County was his amended complaint. The evidence did not support

that allegation.

       {¶65} Finally, as to the length of the investigation, Flowers testified that the

state of Ohio dictates when an MUI investigation report becomes final. While an

investigator can recommend a report for closure, the state issues that final closure. A

standard investigation can take about 45 days, but the length of an investigation is

determined on a case-by-case basis. Because extensions are available, some cases can

take two years to close.

       {¶66} Reynolds also claims that Flowers prohibited him from having any

contact with clients, but the evidence showed that neither she nor HCDDS had the

authority to prohibit Reynolds from having contact with A Ray of Hope clients.

Although Flowers had recommended that Reynolds should not have contact with

certain clients, the decision was ultimately up to Switzer, the owner of A Ray of Hope.

       {¶67} Reynolds asserts that Flowers’s MUI investigation resulted in the

closure of A Ray of Hope, but the evidence showed that The Ohio Department of

Medicaid suspended A Ray of Hope due to “credible allegations of fraud.” Flowers

testified that A Ray of Hope and Perfect Circles were being investigated for billing

concerns prior to the initial verbal-abuse allegation that spurred Flowers’s

investigation.

       {¶68} While some of the statements made by various employees-appellants

were inappropriate, the evidence does not show that the employees-appellants’ actions

were manifestly outside the scope of their employment; that they engaged in willful or

wanton misconduct; or that they acted recklessly or with actual malice. Reynolds has

not met the “rigorous standard” to establish that the exceptions in R.C. 2744.03(6)

apply. Consequently, the employees-appellants are entitled to immunity under R.C.

                                             23
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Chapter 2744, and we do not address whether they have immunity under R.C.

5123.61(K). We overrule Reynolds’s second assignment of error, reverse the trial

court’s judgment, and remand the cause to the trial court to enter summary judgment

in favor of appellants.

                                              Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

CROUSE, P.J., and BOCK, J., concur.

Please note:
       The court has recorded its own entry this date.

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