Court Opinion

ID: 9731609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:52:06.106137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:20.095463
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. The record is absolutely void of any evidence which could establish an abandonment of the non-conforming use. A vested property interest does exist.’ Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court with an instruction to dissolve the preliminary injunction.
The Majority Opinion predicates its abandonment conclusion upon two assumptions. Both are incorrect: 1) that a mere vacancy of premises creates an inference that the previous non-conforming use of the premises has been abandoned and that the property owner must present evidence that only tenants for the non-conforming use were sought during the vacancy to preserve the non-conforming use;1 and 2) that the “finding” of the trial court — the non-conforming use was abandoned in November, 1974 — is somehow supported by evidence in the record.2 A mere vacancy does not create an inference of abandonment, and there is no evidence to support the “finding” of the trial court.
An inference of abandonment is negated by a vacancy of the premises and thereby preserves the non-conforming use without evidence of a contrary intent coupled with some overt act by the property holder. Smith v. Howard (1966), Ky., 407 S.W.2d 139. In Smith, the Court, quoting from Rathkopf’s Law of Zoning and Planning, volume 2, chapter 61, section 5, stated:
“ ‘A temporary cessation, even for a lengthy period, caused by circumstances over which the property owner had no control, is generally held not to constitute proof of a discontinuance in the sense of abandonment within the meaning of zoning ordinance provisions since the circumstances themselves negate an inference of the necessary intention to abandon the use.
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“ ‘Similarly, where there is a period of non-use because of the financial inability of the owner to continue in business or to find a tenant desirous of using the premises for a purpose permissible as a nonconforming use the requisite intent to abandon is lacking, and the right to resume the non-conforming use when opportunity presents itself is not lost.’ ” (My emphasis.).
407 S.W.2d at 141-142. Smith had leased his premises to a tenant for reconstruction and repair of tractors for twenty years. Later, he leased the premise to a plumbing supply business. When the plumbing tenant terminated its use of the premises, the East Side Screw Company leased and occupied the premises. The Court held that the light industrial use, a non-conforming use, had not been abandoned.
In Borough of Saddle River v. Bobinski (1969), 108 N.J.Super. 6, 259 A.2d 727, the owner purchased the property “solely be*1388cause of the barn and the anticipated use thereof for stabling his show horses and trotters and pacers.”- The Court held that a showing of vacancy or non-use did not establish an intent to abandon the non-eon-forming use. It stated “[D]espite the lack of use of the barnstable for 27 years, the Manzes had no affirmative subjective intent to abandon the use of the structure for stabling horses.”
In addition to requiring an “affirmative subjective intent” to change the non-conforming use for an abandonment, the Borough Court, quoting the Maryland Court of Appeals in Chayt v. Board of Zoning Appeals (1939), 177 Md. 426, 9 A.2d 747, adopted the following doctrine regarding nonconforming uses:
“Where a property is built for or adapted to a particular use, the question of existing use is determined by ascertaining as near as possible the intention of the owner, in connection with the fact of a discontinuance or apparent abandonment of use; it is not to be determined on the date of the adoption of the ordinance. Appeal of Haller Baking Co., 295 Pa. 257, 262, 145. A.77, 79. [9 A.2d, at 750]”
259 A.2d at 731. The Borough Court concluded:
“Application of this doctrine to the facts herein, where there had been a suspension of an actual use rather than a mere intention of future use, leads this court to conclude that there was an existing use within the comprehension of the ordinance when it became effective.”
259 A.2d at 732.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record indicating that Kathryn Serkes entertained an affirmative subjective intent to abandon the non-conforming use of an adult bookstore at 1524 South Miami Street during its vacancy. Her efforts were directed toward finding a tenant for the premises. She found a tenant on December 11, 1976, Dandy Corporation, and she executed a lease well before the effective date of the ordinance, January 1, 1977. From the record, it appears that the trial court treated the vacancy of the premises on November, 1974 as an abandonment of the non-conforming use. This is reversible error. As Chief Justice White observed in County of Saunders v. Moore (1967), 182 Neb. 377, 155 N.W.2d 317 at 319: “(A) vested interest in a nonconforming use under zoning regulations is a property right, and any statute or law purporting to take away that right is invalid.” (citations omitted)
Realizing that a vested property interest could have been created between November, 1974 when the trial court found abandonment occurred and January 1, 1977, the effective date of the zoning ordinance, the Majority Opinion attempts to negate the existence of a vested property interest by applying the test in Lutz v. New Albany City Plan Commission (1951), 230 Ind. 74, 101 N.E.2d 187. The Lutz test embraces two factors: 1) adaptability of the premises for the non-conforming purpose; and 2) employment of the premises for the purpose of exercising the non-conforming use. This attempted application of the Lutz test by the Majority Opinion fails from a mis-appli-cation of the facts to the test.
First, the factual posture in Lutz is different. In Lutz, an undeveloped parcel of real estate had never been used for a gasoline service station. The lease provided for the construction of a two-bay service station by the lessor and periodic payments by the lessee after its completion. Construction of the service station had not commenced on the effective date of the ordinance prohibiting its use. Only preliminary plans for its construction had been finalized. The non-conforming use had not existed before or on the effective date of the ordinance. Furthermore, Judge Jasper, writing for the Lutz Court, noted that “until construction was commenced, there could be no vested right.” (citations omitted) 101 N.E.2d at 190. Although there is no employment of the premises for the purpose of exercising the non-conforming use of the premises, a vested interest may be acquired if there has been substantial construction to prepare the premises for the exercising of the non-conforming use. County of Saunders v. Moore, supra.
*1389Secondly, the factual posture of this case does not lend itself to the substantial, new construction concept use in Lutz to create an existing use. The building at 1524 South Miami was completely constructed. It had been adapted to the non-conforming use of an adult bookstore since 1972. The lease negotiated between Dandy Corporation and Kathryn Serkes in November, 1976 provided that Dandy could use the existing sign on the building. The lease executed on December 11, 1976 provided that the premises would be used as an adult bookstore.3 Only two hundred twenty-five dollars worth of lumber was purchased to have the existing partitions rearranged in the storeroom.4 This very minor construction or rearrangement of partitions was accomplished by only one carpenter, Martin Harris. The only additional expenditure needed to fully employ the non-conforming use was the purchase of nine thousand dollars worth of magazines and racks which were ordered by Dandy on December 11, 1976.5 Under the lease, there was nothing left for Kathryn Serkes to perform so that Dandy could use the premises as intended. The minor re-arrangement of the partitions was done and the building completely cleaned out by Martin Harris, the carpenter, in several weeks.
With these factual differences in mind, it is difficult to reconcile this conclusion by the Majority Opinion:
“It offered evidence that Serkes had attempted to lease the premises and had actually secured Dandy as a tenant to operate an adult bookstore prior to rezoning. However, merely signing a lease and beginning clean-up work by the effective date of the ordinance would not make known to the neighborhood that the premises were being used as an adult bookstore within the meaning of the rule laid down in Lutz v. New Albany City Plan Comm., supra. There was no substantial construction or direct adaptability of the land for the intended purpose nor was there any employment of the land within the intended purpose. At best, reasonable minds could have differed on the issue of abandonment. The finding was not contrary to law.”
Serkes did not attempt to lease. She did lease the premises to Dandy Corporation on December 11,1976 after negotiating the use of the existing sign and clean-up in November, 1976.6 Although the neighborhood’s knowledge is not a factor in the Lutz test, it was well established by the evidence in the record that the neighborhood had reason to know that the premises had been used as an adult bookstore since 1972. It is true that there was no substantial construction. None was needed. One carpenter with two hundred twenty-five dollars worth of lumber completed the re-arrangement of the partitions and clean-up of the premises within several weeks. There was nothing substantial undertaken by Dandy in making the premises adaptable for the non-conforming use. The premises were already adapted for the use and had been so adapted since 1972. No reasonable mind could differ on the issue of abandonment, since there is no evidence to establish an abandonment of the non-conforming use, even under the most tenuous legal definition of the word.
The trial court committed reversible error when it found that a mere vacancy of the premises in November, 1974 amounted to an abandonment of - the non-conforming use. Kathryn Serkes has a vested property interest in leasing her property for the non-conforming use.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and instruct it to dissolve the preliminary injunction.

. Majority Opinion: “Although Serkes testified that she attempted to rent the premises and placed a rent sign in the building, there was absolutely no evidence that her rental efforts during the two year vacancy were aimed at finding a tenant to operate an adult bookstore.’ As the trial judge was free to weigh the evidence, he could reasonably have concluded that this omission in Dandy’s case indicated that Serkes did not intend to retain a nonconforming use for the premises. This inference coupled with the two year lapse of time supports the finding of abandonment.”

. Transcript, page 60; the trial court made the following findings:
“9. A prior non-conforming use of the building terminated in November, 1974, and was not continuous to the effective date of the Ordinance.”
“10. The prior non-conforming use did not exist at the effective date of the Ordinance.”

. Transcript, page 28; the lease provided: “The Lessee shall have the right to use the sign presently on the premises. . . . ”

. Transcript, page 99; Mr. Harris, the carpenter testified:
“A. The total material cost with everything was roughly around two hundred and twenty-five dollars.”
When Mr. Harris inquired about a permit, he was told that he did not need one. Transcript, page 101.

. Transcript, page 115 and page 116.

. Transcript, pages 108 and 109.