Court Opinion

ID: 9866450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 11:47:57.54417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:37.333696
License: Public Domain

On .Plaintiff-Respondent's Motion To Strike.
In this opinion, also, the parties will be designated as plaintiff and defendant, as they were in the lower court.
The plaintiff has moved to strike from the record on appeal the “minutes of the court,” and “opinion and decision,” and “defendant’s bill of exceptions.” Said motion, as stated in the notice of motion that same would be, is made and based upon the grounds “that said documents are irrelevant and immaterial upon the appellant’s appeal; that they and each of them are not properly part of the record on appeal in this action; that no motion for a new trial was at any time made, presented, or decided in the District Court; that the alleged bill of exceptions was filed on March 4, 1948, long after the time for filing of the same had expired; that no order extending the time for the filing of the bill of exceptions was ever made by the District Court nor was time therefor extended by any stipulation.”
We shall first dispose of the motion in its relation to the bill of exceptions.
*305Plaintiff, relying upon Neill v. Mikulich, 57 Nev. 307, 64 P.2d 612, and Snyder v. Garrett, 61 Nev. 85, 115 P.2d 769, has contended, in effect, that upon the authority of those cases the filing and making of a motion for a new trial is indispensable to any review of the evidence on an appeal; that no motion for a new trial was made; that, therefore, the documents to which the motion to strike is addressed (including defendant’s bill of exceptions) “are what might be termed ‘fugitive documents.’ ” The first question presented by the assignment of error in Snyder v. Garrett, supra, as stated by Mr. Justice Ducker in his opinion, on page 87 of 61 Nevada Reports, page 769 of 115 P.2d, was “whether the findings are supported by the evidence.” This question is identical with the question arising in the instant case upon defendant’s assignment of error, which, as stated in his bill of exceptions, is: “the defendant here specifies that the findings were not supported by the evidence in that * * and, as stated in his opening brief on page 2, is: “that the findings of fact were not supported by the evidence in that the evidence clearly shows that the checks were given for a gambling transaction.”
The gist of defendant’s contention by such assignment apparently is that, as he contends, the evidence disclosed that the checks evidencing the obligation sued upon were given for a gambling consideration, or in connection with or in a gambling transaction, and that, therefore, same was insufficient to justify the findings of fact finding the existence of indebtedness, or in effect* a bona fide obligation in the amount of the checks.
In other words, in the instant case, as in Snyder v. Garrett, supra, the question presented and to be determined upon the assignment of error is whether the evidence was sufficient or insufficient to support the findings.
In Snyder v. Garrett, Mr. Justice Ducker, in the opinion above referred to, on page 91 of 61 Nevada Reports, page 771 of 115 P.2d, after reviewing and citing the *306earlier Nevada cases and the contemporaneous California cases, quoted approvingly from Whitmore v. Shiverick, 3 Nev. 288, the following:
“Our Practice Act was copied almost verbatim from the California Practice Act as it stood at the time ours was enacted. Under the California code of practice, the Supreme Court of that State had almost uniformly refused to review the facts of a case unless there had been a regular statement and motion for new trial.”
Further on in the opinion in Snyder v. Garrett, supra, on said page 91 of 61 Nev., page 771 of 115 P.2d, Mr. Justice Ducker stated:
“The reason of the long established rule for requiring that a motion for a new trial be made, and passed upon, before a consideration of the evidence can be had, is, as stated in Giannotti v. DeBock, 47 Nev. 332, 221 P. 520, that the trial court may first have an opportunity to rectify an error, if one was made, without subjecting the parties to the expense and annoyance of an appeal.”
And still further on, on pages 91 and 92 of 61 Nev. and on page 771 of 115 P.2d, the learned Justice, in finally disposing of the appeal in that case, stated:
“We agree with the statement in the brief of amici curiae ‘that it may readily be argued that the legislature has definitely accepted by re-enacting sections 12 and 34, the interpretation previously placed thereon by this court and clearly intended that there should be no appeal with review of the evidence unless a motion for a new trial has been made in the trial court.’
“We think such argument is most logical and must prevail, as we consider the opinion in Neill v. Mikulich, supra, of controlling influence.”
The defendant, however, has cited the recent case of Monitor Pipe & Steel Co. et al. v. Flanigan Warehouse Co. et al. 63 Nev. 449, 172 P.2d 846, and we infer that he has done so to indicate, perhaps, that upon his assignment of error to the effect that the findings of fact were not supported by the evidence, he could properly contend *307that the findings of fact were tuholly unsupported by the evidence, and that, therefore, his situation could well be considered parallel to that in Monitor Pipe & Steel Co. v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., supra, and that the doctrine of that case, based upon the exceptional factual situation therein, could be applied in the instant case.
In that case the appellant maintained, as stated in this court’s opinion, by Mr. Chief Justice Taber, on page 451 of 63 Nevada Reports, and on page 847 of 172 P.2d: “that on appeal from the judgment alone this court may examine the evidence to determine the legal question whether there is a total failure of proof to support the judgment. * * * Appellant says he has taken this appeal ‘essentially on the basis that he is questioning the sufficiency of the judgment in the light of the pleadings in the case and in the light of the issues made by those pleadings.’ It is his contention that the findings of fact and conclusions of law do not conform to the pleadings and do not settle the issues made by them; nor, he says, do they settle the most important question of law involved in the case, as pointed out in his opening brief.”
At that point in the opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Taber stated further:
“Bills of exceptions are sometimes properly stricken on motion as, for example, in Lewis et al. v. Williams, 61 Nev. 253, 123 P.2d 730, 125 P.2d 305. But whether the bill in the instant case is superfluous and of no value, as movent contends, and whether anything in it' is useful on this appeal, are questions which we think should be determined on the appeal proper.”
It appears that defendant has not shown or attempted to show or contend that in the instant case, as in Monitor Pipe & Steel Co. v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., supra, “there is a total failure of proof to support the judgment,” or, “that the findings of fact and conclusions of law do not conform to the pleadings,” or, that they do *308not “settle the most important question of law involved in the case.” Indeed, defendant failed to appear for the argument in this court upon the motion to strike, and has assigned no reason why he was unable to be present. He has contended himself with mailing to the clerk of this court.his motion for an extension of time in which to file bill of exceptions, and his affidavit .in support thereof, which, as before stated, is based upon the refusal of opposing counsel to stipulate for such extension, and on Judge McKnight’s declination to grant same upon the ground that he had no power to do so.
As hereinbefore stated, defendant has cited Monitor Pipe & Steel Co. v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., supra, but it clearly appears that he has failed to show the existence of any of the extraordinary elements of fact or law, similar to those in that case, which would bring him within the rule or doctrine therein enunciated. In the present state of the record we would be justified in holding, pursuant to this court’s opinion and decisions in Neill v. Mikulich, supra, and Snyder v. Garrett, supra, respectively, that in order for us to review the evidence incorporated in the bill of exceptions, a motion for a new trial and an order of the lower court denying same were indispensable, and, such motion not having been made, such bill of exceptions, which contains nothing but evidential matters, should be stricken for that reason. But it is not necessary to so hold in the instant case, or to pass, now, finally upon that question, for the reason that, under the clear mandate of our statute, section 36 of the Nevada New Trials and Appeals Act of 1937, same being sec. 9385.86, N.C.L.Supp.1931-1941, we are required to hold, in view of the long-settled law of this state, as repeatedly held by this court, that defendant has waived his right to his bill of exceptions, or to have same considered by this court, because not served or filed within the time specified by sec. 31 of said New Trials and Appeals Act of 1937, same being N.C.L.Supp.1931-1941, sec. 9385.81.
*309In the accompanying opinion in relation to defendant’s motion to extend time for filing bill of exceptions, we have dealt at considerable length with the question of the mandatory and jurisdictional character of the element of the statutory time of serving and filing, in relation to bills of exceptions, and have cited authorities.
In McGill v. Lewis, 61 Nev. 28, 111 P.2d 537, 539, Mr. Justice Orr, in dealing with a motion to strike, on pages 31 and 32 of 61 Nev. and on page 539 of 111 P.2d, stated the law and cited former decisions of this court, as follows:
“The transcript of proceedings intended as a bill of exceptions was served upon respondent on November 26, 1940, more than twenty days after the entry of judgment and more than twenty days after the notice of decision on motion for new trial. Appellants failed to comply with the requirements of section 31 of the New Trials and Appeals Act, Statutes of Nevada 1937, c. 32, p. 63. Section 36 of said Act provides: Tf a party shall omit or fail to serve and file his bill of exceptions within the time limited he shall be deemed to have waived his right thereto.’. In a number of decisions this Court has held this requirement to be mandatory, and that unless a bill of exceptions is served and filed within twenty days, providing the time has not been extended by stipulation or order of the Court, the bill of exceptions will be stricken upon proper motion. Markwell v. Gray, 50 Nev. 427, 265 P. 705; Joudas v. Squire, 50 Nev. 42, 249 P. 1068; Water Co. v. Tonopah Belmont Development Co., 49 Nev. 172, 241 P. 1079; McGuire v. Ehrlich, 49 Nev. 319, 245 P. 703; Bowers v. Charleston Hill Nat. Mines, Inc., 50 Nev. 99, 251 P. 721, 256 P. 1058.”
In the matter of the bill of exceptions now before us, in the accompanying opinion dealing with defendant’s said motion for extension of time we have pointed out that the judgment in the instant case was rendered and filed in the lower court on the 16th day of January, *3101948, and, there having been no motion for a new trial, the time within which to serve and file a bill of exceptions expired upon the expiration of February 5, 1948. The bill of exceptions was not filed until the 4th day of March, 1948, which was forty-seven days after judgment and twenty-seven days after the time to serve and file same had expired. The bill of exceptions cannot be considered by us, and, therefore, is redundant and merely surplusage, and must be stricken. Plaintiff did not raise the question of the failure to settle the bill of exceptions and to have it properly certified or authenticated, so that question is not properly before us for determination. The determination thereof would, of course, add nothing to the result.
The plaintiff has moved to strike, also, as hereinbefore stated, from the record on appeal, certain minutes of the district court pertaining to the proceedings prior to and upon the trial and subsequent thereto, in relation to the settlement of the findings; also to strike therefrom the district judge’s opinion and decision.
Section 8829, N.C.L. 1929, provides what shall constitute the judgment roll. The enumeration in that section does not include the minutes of the lower court, nor the opinion or decision. It has been repeatedly held by this court that no papers, documents or other things not thus enumerated in the statute constitute any part of the judgment roll, and that any such papers, documents or other things not thus enumerated cannot be considered upon appeal, unless properly embraced within a bill of exceptions. Werner v. Babcock, 34 Nev. 42, 116 P. 357; Johns-Manville, Inc. v. Lander County, 48 Nev. 253, 240 P. 925; Markell v. Gray, 50 Nev. 427, 265 P. 705; Peri v. Jeffers, 53 Nev. 49, 292 P. 1; Brearley v. Arobio, 54 Nev. 382, 12 P.2d 339.
In the situation with which we are confronted in the instant case, neither the minutes referred to nor the district court’s decision and opinion were attempted to *311be made either part of the judgment roll or of the bill of exceptions. The confines of the judgment roll are well delineated in the transcript on appeal, and properly-designated, and the same observation may be made as to the bill of exceptions.
The minutes referred to and the court’s opinion and decision are not placed within the confines of either the judgment roll or the bill of exceptions, but lie snugly between the two in the transcript on appeal, which is entitled “Record on Appeal.” The bill of exceptions, not having been filed in time, has never been other than a “vagrant” or “fugitive” document in the record. Even if, by extreme liberality in relieving of mistake or inadvertence, the minutes and the opinion and decision could be deemed part of the bill of exceptions, upon proper application after due notice and proceedings to that end, for such construction to operate the first essential would be the existence of a bill of exceptions filed in time and in other respects valid. Such a bill of exceptions is absent in this case.
In dealing with the question whether an opinion and decision by the lower court is properly a part of the record on appeal to the supreme, court, Mr. Justice Norcross, in Werner v. Babcock, supra, on page 44 of 34 Nev., on page 358 of 116 P., expressed the law clearly, in the following language:
“Such a written opinion does not form any part of the judgment roll, and was never intended to perform any function, other than an aid to the appellate court in the determination of the appeal, which must he based, either upon the statement upon appeal, bill of exceptions, or, where neither such statement or bill is filed, upon the judgment roll alone. Corbett v. Job, 5 Nev. 201; Reno Water Land & Light Co. v. Osburn, 25 Nev. 53, 56 P. 945.” (Italics added.)
Upon striking the bill of exceptions, as we must, this appeal will remain upon the judgment roll alone.
*312In Marlia et al. v. Lockwood, 54 Nev. 403, 20 P.2d 247, Mr. Chief Justice Sanders, in an opinion concurred in by Justices Ducker and Coleman, stated:
“This is an appeal from a judgment upon the judgment roll alone. Counsel for appellants states that the opinion of the trial court on the merits of the case incorporated in the judgment roll constitutes the basis of the appeal. This being so, under the decisions of this court the opinion is no part of the judgment roll, and, unless embodied in a bill of exceptions, it cannot be looked to to aid the court in the determination of the case upon its merits. Finding no error in the judgment roll proper, the judgment is affirmed.”
The minutes of the lower court and that court’s opinion and decision, not being embraced within, nor properly part of, the judgment roll, nor embraced within any valid bill of exceptions, must be stricken.
It is hereby ordered that the motion of plaintiff to strike said “minutes of the court,” the “opinion and decision” of the district court, and the “bill of exceptions” filed in the lower court March 4, 1948, including the portion thereof denominated “defendant’s engrossed bill of exceptions,” and the court reporter’s transcript of the proceedings, and each of them, be, and is hereby granted. This leaves, as before stated it would do, the appeal pending in this court upon the judgment roll alone.
The defendant has filed his opening brief upon the merits. The plaintiff is hereby given thirty days from the date of the filing of this opinion within which to serve and file his answering brief on the merits, and the defendant is given thirty days from the date of the filing of such answering brief within which to serve and file his closing or reply brief on the merits.
Badt, J., concurs.
Eather, C. J., because of illness, did not participate in the preparation or rendition of the foregoing opinions.