Court Opinion

ID: 9378428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 15:05:49.039035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.057632
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13243

                COMMONWEALTH   vs.   JEROME JARRETT.

       Suffolk.      September 9, 2022. - March 10, 2023.

 Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                           & Georges, JJ.

Practice, Criminal, Revocation of probation, Identification of
     defendant in courtroom. Identification. Evidence,
     Identification. Due Process of Law, Identification.
     Controlled Substances.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on June 10, 2016.

     A proceeding for revocation of probation was heard by
Robert L. Ullmann, J.

     The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

     Joseph Visone for the defendant.
     Monica J. DeLateur, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
     Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, &
Radha Natarajan, for Committee for Public Counsel Services &
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.
                                                                    2

    GEORGES, J.   The probationer, Jerome Jarrett, appeals from

a Superior Court judge's order revoking his probation and

imposing the remainder of his suspended sentence.   The

probationer challenges the determination that he violated the

terms of his probation.   In particular, he argues that the judge

could not have found him in violation without relying upon an

unreliable, in-court identification by a witness who had made no

prior, out-of-court identification.   The probationer asks us to

extend the rule excluding such identifications in criminal

trials without a showing of good reason, see Commonwealth v.

Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 241 (2014), to probation violation

hearings, because such identifications are just as inherently

suggestive and unreliable at those proceedings as they are in a

criminal trial.   The probationer also challenges the sufficiency

of the evidence that he violated the terms of his probation by

committing a new criminal offense.

    We decline to extend Crayton, 470 Mass. at 241, to

probation violation hearings.   In addition, we conclude that

sufficient evidence was presented at the hearing for the judge

to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
                                                                     3

probationer had violated a term of his probation by committing a

new offense.1

     1.   Background.   In September of 2018, the probationer

pleaded guilty to two counts of attempting to derive support

from a prostitute, in violation of G. L. c. 274, § 6.     He was

sentenced to a term of two and one-half years in a house of

correction, with two years to serve and the balance suspended

for eighteen months, with conditions of probation.    Among those

conditions were that the probationer stay away from children

under the age of sixteen who were not family members and obey

all local, State, and Federal laws.   Because the probationer had

been held in pretrial detention for 763 days while awaiting

trial, the two years were deemed served.

     In June of 2019, the probation department issued a notice

of surrender based, in part, on allegations that the probationer

had violated a term of his probation by committing a new offense

related to the distribution of cocaine.    A Superior Court judge

held a probation violation hearing on November 22, 2019.    The

evidence at the hearing consisted primarily of the testimony of

Boston police Officer Shana Rivera.   The judge also considered

several exhibits introduced by the Commonwealth:     the notice of

     1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee
for Public Counsel Services and the New England Innocence
Project.
                                                                   4

violation, the order of probation, and a summary of the

probationer's financial information.     Based on the evidence

presented, the judge could have found the following.

     At around 1:30 P.M. on the afternoon of June 17, 2019,

Rivera and her partner, Officer Chris Adams, were patrolling in

an area of downtown Boston that included Tremont, Winter, and

Summer Streets.    Rivera had been employed as a police officer

for three years and had received specialized training on

identifying controlled substances and identifying drug

transactions.

     While on routine patrol, Rivera saw Gregory Gomes, whom she

knew to be a drug user, and an unknown white male, later

identified as Sean McCarthy, following a tall, thin Black male

with a red shirt and a "man bun,"2 walking into a nearby mall.

Rivera then saw McCarthy hand Gomes a sum of money.     Rivera

testified that, once Gomes noticed her and Adams, he started

walking quickly and met the probationer immediately inside the

mall doors.     All three men left the mall within approximately

one minute from when they entered, from which Rivera inferred

that they had not been in the mall to shop.     The probationer

headed toward Tremont Street, while McCarthy and Gomes walked

     2 A man bun is "a hairstyle for men, comprising long hair
looped into a bun and fixed in position with a hair tie."
Macquarie Dictionary (7th ed. 2017).
                                                                     5

toward Washington Street.    Rivera and Adams followed McCarthy

and Gomes to Bromfield Street, where they observed Gomes hand

McCarthy an object later learned to be a piece of "crack"

cocaine.

     The officers then followed McCarthy and Gomes into Wesleyan

Place, a location known as a place for drug users to consume

drugs.     When McCarthy entered a no-trespassing area, Rivera

stopped him and found that McCarthy had a piece of crack cocaine

and a crack pipe on his person.    McCarthy told her that he had

obtained it from Gomes, who had received it from a tall Black

male with a red shirt and dreadlocks.     Gomes fled as soon as he

saw the officers stop to talk to McCarthy.3

     Rivera returned to the mall, where she saw the probationer.

Upon seeing Rivera and Adams, the probationer rushed into a

nearby gym.    The officers followed the probationer inside and

stopped him.    They found a digital scale and $292 of currency on

his person.    Rivera testified that the man she had arrested was

the same man she had seen with Gomes and McCarthy shortly

before, i.e., the tall, thin, Black male wearing a red shirt and

with "dreads" formed into a "man bun," whom she identified at

the hearing as the probationer.

     3 Gomes and McCarthy subsequently were issued summonses for
possession of a class B substance.
                                                                       6

    The judge concluded that there was an "extremely strong"

circumstantial case to support a finding, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that the probationer had violated the terms of his

probation by committing a new offense.   Subsequently, on January

3, 2020, the judge found the probationer in violation of

probation, revoked his probation, and ordered him to serve the

remaining six-month balance of his committed sentence.     The

probationer filed a timely notice of appeal in the Superior

Court and then filed an appeal in the Appeals Court.     We

transferred the case to this court on our own motion.

    2.   Discussion.   a.   Standard of review.   A judge's

decision to revoke probation involves a two-part inquiry:        the

judge must determine first whether the probationer willfully has

violated a condition of probation and, second, if such a

violation is found by a preponderance of the evidence, whether

the violation warrants revocation of probation.    See

Commonwealth v. Eldred, 480 Mass. 90, 101 (2018), and cases

cited.   In considering an appeal from a decision that a

violation of probation occurred, a reviewing court must

determine "whether the record discloses sufficient reliable

evidence to warrant the findings by the judge[, by a

preponderance of the evidence,] that [the probationer] had

violated the specified conditions of his [or her] probation."

See Commonwealth v. Morse, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 582, 594 (2000).
                                                                     7

The court reviews a determination to revoke probation for an

abuse of discretion.   See Eldred, supra.

    b.   Applicability of Crayton.    The probationer argues that

Crayton's rule precluding in-court identifications in criminal

trials absent good reason, where there was no prior out-of-court

identification, see Crayton, 470 Mass. at 241, should be

extended to other proceedings where liberty is at stake.     We do

not agree.

    In Crayton, 470 Mass. at 241, we held that "[w]here an

eyewitness has not participated before trial in an

identification procedure, we shall treat the in-court

identification as an in-court showup, and shall admit it in

evidence only where there is 'good reason' for its admission."

"Good reason" may exist where "the eyewitness was familiar with

the defendant before the commission of the crime, such as where

a victim testifies to a crime of domestic violence," or "where

the witness is an arresting officer who was also an eyewitness

to the commission of the crime."     Id. at 242.   In both

circumstances, the identification is only "confirmatory" in

nature, as the jury will understand the in-court showup as

indicating that "the defendant sitting in the court room is the

person whose conduct is at issue rather than as identification

evidence."   Id.   "[I]n both of these circumstances, where the

witness is not identifying the defendant based solely on his or
                                                                     8

her memory of witnessing the defendant at the time of the crime,

there is little risk of misidentification arising from the in-

court showup despite its suggestiveness."     Id. at 243.

    Pragmatic concerns specific to criminal trials, and

"[c]ommon law principles of fairness," guided our reasoning in

adopting this approach (citation omitted).     See id. at 240, 241

n.16.   More specifically, we recognized three key distinctions

between in- and out-of-court identifications in the context of a

criminal trial.   First, with an in-court identification, the

jurors serve collectively as the fact finder and see the

identification procedure as it unfolds.     Therefore, a juror is

"better able to evaluate the reliability of the identification

because he or she can observe the witness's demeanor and hear

the witness's statements during the identification procedure."

Id. at 239.   The juror also can note "indications of witness

certainty or hesitation during [that] process, including facial

expression, voice inflection, and body language" (citation

omitted).   Id.   Second, an in-court identification benefits from

immediate challenge through cross-examination.     Id. at 240.

Third, because defense counsel has advance notice of the

Commonwealth's intended in-court identification, counsel has the

opportunity to propose less suggestive identification

procedures.   Id. at 241.
                                                                         9

       We recognized, however, that neither immediate cross-

examination nor the jury's ability to observe the identification

in person guarantees an accurate identification.       Id. at 240-

241.    Accordingly, we limited the use of in-court identification

of a defendant, where a witness had never made a nonsuggestive

out-of-court identification, to situations in which there was

"good reason" to use such a procedure.       Id. at 241-242.   We also

left open to defendants the ability to challenge the use of an

in-court identification even where there was good reason for its

use.   Id. at 243.     Notably, however, we did not adopt the

approach followed by courts in other jurisdictions that places

the burden on the defendant to propose less suggestive in-court

identification procedures.      Id.

       As stated, Crayton, 470 Mass. at 241-243, addressed the

introduction of in-court, showup identifications at criminal

trials.   Probation violation hearings, however, are not one of

the stages of a criminal prosecution.       See Commonwealth v.

Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990).      Thus, a probationer is not

entitled to all of the due process protections applicable at a

criminal trial.      Id.   In addition, at a probation violation

hearing, a judge acts as the fact finder and is able to assess

an in-court identification, in conjunction with the other

evidence presented, to determine whether the evidence contains

substantial indicia of reliability.      The judge can make the same
                                                                  10

observations of a witness's hesitancy or uncertainty that we

concluded in Crayton, supra at 238-244, that a jury could make

at a criminal trial, but without the same likelihood of being

influenced by an identification that might appear unnecessarily

suggestive to a jury, based on the witness's apparent

confidence, see id.

    Moreover, at a probation violation hearing, concerns about

injustice due to a potentially unreliable in-court

identification are significantly reduced and conditional;

"[w]hen an individual is on probation, the Commonwealth has

already gone through the expense and effort of convicting him

[or her]."   Durling, 407 Mass. at 115-116.   A probationer is

released on probation, rather than having been incarcerated, as

a "matter of grace."   Id. at 115.   Nonetheless, while

probationers have fewer and "more flexible" due process rights

at a probation violation hearing than do defendants at a

criminal trial, those constitutional rights probationers do

possess are protected with "equal vigilance."    See Commonwealth

v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 319 (2013).

    In Durling, 407 Mass. at 113, this court examined at some

length the minimum requirements of due process applicable at

probation violation hearings, in reliance on the Federal

requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Court in

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973).    The court
                                                                  11

explained that, to comport with due process, a probationer must

be provided with at least "(a) written notice of the claimed

violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the

[probationer or] parolee of the evidence against him [or her];

(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses

and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-

examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer

specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation);

(e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional

parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or

lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to

the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation or]

parole."   Durling, supra, quoting Gagnon, supra.   See

Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 474 Mass. 474, 479 (2016).

    At the same time, given the differing concerns at a

probation violation hearing, where the probationer already has

been found guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable

doubt and is not at risk of conviction of any new offense, and a

criminal trial, where the Commonwealth must prove a defendant's

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, probation violation hearings do

not afford probationers the full panoply of constitutional

protections afforded a defendant at a criminal trial.     See

Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 34 (2010), citing

Durling, 407 Mass. at 114-120.   In particular, probation
                                                                    12

violation hearings are not subject to the rule against the

introduction of hearsay.   See Abbott A., supra.

     The question we must address here is whether due process

requires us to extend the protections against in-court showup

identifications of defendants at criminal trials to probation

violation hearings.   Given the flexible due process standard

applicable to probation violation hearings, and given that the

judge acts as the fact finder, in-court identifications may be

introduced without arbitrarily depriving the probationer of his

or her (attenuated) liberty interest.     Accordingly, we conclude

that the "good reason" standard set forth in Crayton, 470 Mass.

at 238-244, regarding in-court showup identifications does not

apply to probation violation hearings.4

     c.   Reliability of the in-court identification.    Although

we conclude that the requirements of Crayton, 470 Mass. at 241-

243, are inapplicable here, that does not end our inquiry.      The

     4 The Commonwealth asks us, in effect, to broaden the type
of testimony Crayton's "good reason" standard permits. More
specifically, the Commonwealth contends that if Crayton, 470
Mass. at 238-244, is applicable to probation violation hearings,
Rivera's in-court identification of the probationer as "being
the person she saw near the [mall] being followed by Gomes and
McCarthy," and the "person she arrested who had a digital scale
and money on his person," would have been permissible, because
she did not actually see an exchange of drugs for money. In the
Commonwealth's view, Rivera was not a percipient witness within
the meaning of Crayton, supra, because she did not personally
observe the probationer commit the offense for which he was
arrested. Because we conclude that Crayton is not applicable to
probation violation hearings, we need not reach this issue.
                                                                   13

"touchstone" of an "accurate and reliable determination," which

underpins the due process question of fundamental fairness,

remains.   See Durling, 407 Mass. at 117-118.   The probationer

argues that, absent a nonsuggestive identification by McCarthy

at the time of the probationer's arrest, Rivera's in-court

identification was "inherently unreliable."     We do not agree.

    As stated, at a probation violation hearing, somewhat

different concerns animate the inquiry concerning fundamental

fairness from those at trial.   At such a hearing, the concern is

whether an in-court identification is substantially reliable,

and not whether there was "good reason" for the introduction of

evidence that could appear to a jury to be worthy of an inflated

level of confidence, due to the inherently suggestive nature of

a showup identification.   Where evidence bears "substantial

indicia of reliability," admission of the evidence furthers the

shared interests of the Commonwealth and the probationer in

reaching "a reliable, accurate evaluation of whether the

probationer indeed violated the conditions of his [or her]

probation."   Durling, 407 Mass. at 116, 118.   In making such a

determination, the judge is guided by the principles that

pervade all questions of due process and must carefully define

the various interests involved and then balance those according

to the weight society places on them.   Id. at 115.
                                                                    14

    Although, as the probationer argues, the Commonwealth's

case would have been strengthened by a nonsuggestive

identification of him by McCarthy at the time of the arrest, its

absence is not fatal to a determination of reliability.       See

Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 446 Mass. 61, 67-68 (2006).    Police

officers may be the only witnesses at probation violation

hearings, even where they report on statements by others, and

the proceeding may still comport with due process.     See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Bukin, 467 Mass. 516, 520 (2014).     "[I]f

reliable hearsay is presented, the good cause requirement is

satisfied."    Id. at 522, quoting Commonwealth v. Negron, 441

Mass. 685, 691 (2004).    Indeed, in Durling itself, the

probationer was found in violation of a term of his probation by

having committed a new crime, based on testimony by his

probation officer reading from two police reports and the

introduction of those reports; the probation officer had not

been a witness to any part of the events described in the

reports.   See Durling, 407 Mass. at 110.

    Here, Rivera provided a detailed account of the incidents

she observed on the day of the probationer's arrest, including

her observations of a man whose description matched that of the

probationer.   Rivera testified that she was on routine patrol in

an area she believed, based on her experience, to be one where

drug transactions and drug use were frequent.   She saw an
                                                                       15

unknown man hand money to someone whom she knew to be a drug

user; the two followed a man who matched the description of the

probationer into a mall and left within a minute.        Rivera then

saw the man she knew to be a drug user hand something to the

unknown man.     She followed the suspected buyer, stopped him, and

found crack cocaine on his person.     He told her that he had

asked the known drug user for drugs and had received them from

someone matching the description of the man the two had followed

into the mall.     When that man saw officers approaching, he

rushed into a building.     They followed him, arrested him, and

seized a digital scale and $292 in cash from his person.         Rivera

testified that the man, whom she described as a tall, thin,

Black man with a red shirt and a man bun, was the same one she

had seen entering the mall followed by the others.        In these

circumstances, the in-court identification was sufficiently

reliable to be considered among the other evidence presented.

    d.   Sufficiency of the evidence.        Relatedly, the

probationer also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that

he violated the terms of his probation by committing a new

crime, i.e., that he distributed cocaine.       At a probation

violation hearing, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving

a violation of a condition of probation by a preponderance of

the evidence.     Bukin, 467 Mass. at 520.    We review a decision to
                                                                  16

revoke probation for an abuse of discretion.    See L.L. v.

Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

    Here, the judge properly focused on the reliability of the

in-court identification when deciding what weight it was due.

Contrary to the probationer's argument, the judge did not rely

solely on the hearsay evidence concerning McCarthy's reported

statements; Rivera testified to numerous direct observations she

made at the time of the offense that supported a determination,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer had

participated in the distribution of cocaine, a controlled

substance.

    In conjunction with the other evidence introduced, Rivera's

in-court identification of the probationer provided sufficient,

substantially reliable evidence for the judge to conclude, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the probationer "more likely

than not violated the conditions of his probation."    See

Commonwealth. v. Kelsey, 464 Mass. 315, 324 (2013).

    3.   Conclusion.   The order finding the probationer in

violation of his probation and revoking his probation is

affirmed.

                                    So ordered.