Court Opinion

ID: 9706064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:30:46.269033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:18.878294
License: Public Domain

Peck, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. Under the circumstances of this case: the age of the victim and the nature of the offense charged, I concur in the majority’s resolution of the second issue affirming the trial court’s exclusion from the courtroom of defendant’s wife and a neighbor, during the testimony of the young victim at trial. Testimony by the complainant during the public trial of a sexual pífense case must be a traumatic experience at best; humiliating and embarrassing. It may well have lasting adverse consequences, particularly, as here, when the victim is a child.
I am disturbed, however, by the rationale employed by the majority in affirming the trial court’s disposition of the first issue. It is contrived; it is typical of the out-and-out word games *42and bald speculation to which appellate courts all too often resort when that is the only route to a desired result.
The majority points out correctly that “V.R.E. 804a permits evidence of out-of-court statements ... so long as the victim is ‘ten years of age or under at the time of trial.’” With candor it cannot escape, the opinion then concedes that in this case the victim was over (not “under”) ten years of age (as contemplated by the rule). To quote the opinion directly, “[t]his victim was ten years, seven months old at the time of the trial.” (Emphasis added.) The opinion might have extended its concession a few more decimal points to weeks, days, hours, minutes, and on and on, had there been anything to support it.
It is at this point, however, that the majority begins its game playing. In construing the rule, the opinion holds common usage of the key words establish that when a person gives, his age as that of his last birthday (regardless of how near in time he may be to his next birthday), reference in a rule or statute to a specific age really means that for the entire year between the age specified in the rule or statute, and the next birthday, the specific age does not change by a minute. Thus, as in this case, when the out-of-court statements of a victim are admissible unless the victim is ten years of age or over, V.R.E. 804a doesn’t mean what it says in plain English. On the contrary, according to the majority, we must read the rule as if it read eleven years of age, notwithstanding the word “ten” is used (which I have never conceived as anything but plain on its face, and in no conceivable way confusing or ambiguous).
The meaning of the entire key phrase in the rule, “ten years of age or under” is equally plain on its face and admits of no ambiguity. Without hesitation I can say that everyone (except the majority) who reads this phrase would agree that its meaning is plain and that it meang exactly what it says: in substance, that once a victim reaches his tenth birthday, he becomes too old to trigger the admissibility of any out-of-court statements he may have made. Otherwise, as noted above, the rule doesn’t mean “ten”; necessarily, it means “eleven,” regardless of its express language. Without more, this is indeed ridiculous.
*43But the ingenuity of the majority is not yet exhausted. Out of thin air, or like a prestidigitator pulling a rabbit from a hat, the opinion trots out the rule that when the words used in a rule or statute have not been specifically defined they must be given their commonly accepted meaning, citing Vincent v. Vermont State Retirement Board, 148 Vt. 531, 535-36, 536 A.2d 925, 928 (1987).
However, the majority does not understand the significance of Vincent as applied to this case. Properly applied here, it supports my position. In effect, Vincent holds only that if a given statute contains no definition which alters the ordinary or “plain” meaning of the statutory word or words, then the plain meaning is to be applied, and the courts are obligated to do so. In this case, the meaning of the key phrase, “ten years of age or under” (emphasis added) is obviously “plain on its face”; any uncertainty or ambiguity dwells exclusively and only in the minds of the majority. There is no “definition” of any of these words used that would take any one of them, or the entire phrase itself, out of the plain meaning rule; accordingly, there is no need for construction. The rule must, therefore, be enforced according to its terms. Its meaning can and must be ascertained from the rule itself. See, e.g., Weissenstein v. Burlington Board of School Commissioners, 149 Vt. 288, 292, 543 A.2d 691, 693 (1988). And similarly:
“[Wjhen the meaning of a statute is plain on its face it must be enforced according to its terms and there is no need for construction; the legislative intent is to be ascertained from the act itself, which is presumed to be in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the statutory language.”
Derosia v. Book Press, Inc., 148 Vt. 217, 222, 531 A.2d 905, 908 (1987) (quoting Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 93, 463 A.2d 232, 233 (1983) (per curiam)).
A word about “the commonly accepted meaning.” This reference by the majority is to the common practice of referring to one’s age as being that age achieved on the last birthday throughout the ensuing year until the next birthday. The attempted application of this familiar practice, not only by children but by adults as well, to alter the plain meaning of Rule *44804a is ludicrous. The practice is, as everyone knows, no more than a matter of convenience, not intended by anyone as a painstaking recitation of exact age. No one is going to the painful length of saying, for example, “I am twenty years, eight months, two weeks and three days old.” We all know that after we reach any given age, we immediately become older than that age with every passing second. The majority’s holding that “ten” means “eleven,” and its use as a mere phrase of convenience to support its position borders on the risible indeed.
Other preposterous consequences flow from the majority rationale. Thus, for example, under 23 V.S.A. § 606 a license to operate a motor vehicle “shall not be issued to any person under eighteen years of age.” Following the majority’s wonderful rationale, this means, of course, that an applicant is under eighteen until he is nineteen; so vague and ambiguous is § 606. Similarly, 7 V.S.A. § 222(3) prohibits the employment of persons “under the age of 18” in certain establishments, for the purpose of preparing, mixing, dispensing, or serving alcoholic beverages. Owners of such establishments should take warning: the majority’s opinion in today’s case means that now, job applicants are under eighteen until they are nineteen, so vague and ambiguous is § 222. Finally, many other concepts relating to age, too numerous to justify further discussion here, must now be reexamined because they may lack definitions of such expressions that had previously been accepted as plain on their face; phrases such as “under (or over) a specific age,” “ten years old”; provisions relating to drinking, driving, voting, military service, and no doubt many others.
It is probable that, on the record, the majority is so convinced of defendant’s guilt that it is prepared to deprive him of the benefit of a clear rule promulgated by the Court itself. If that is so, the first issue might have been resolved on a “harmless error” basis rather than twisting the rule out of its clear meaning simply to accomplish an affirmance.
If, on the other hand, the majority feels that ten years of age is too young, the remedy is to change the rule, following the *45proper procedure for doing so. The rule should not be changed by an exercise in semantics which makes the rule say what it clearly does not.
Concluding this dissent in a lighter vein, the majority appears to have made the first real break-through in the age-old search for a way to restore lost youth! It is unfortunate that the writers who penned the wistful pleas: “Backward, turn backward, 0 Time in your flight, make me a child again just for tonight.” and “Time, you old gypsy man, will you not stay, put up your caravan just for one day?” did not then have the majority available for consultation. The ghost of Ponce de Leon, who, in life, searched for the fountain of youth must be rejoicing. Finally, I am reminded of a limerick. Memory being fallible it may not be strictly accurate, but as I remember it, it read:
There was a young lady named Bright,
Whose speed was much faster than light,
She took off one day,
In a relative way,
And came back on the previous night.
The majority is even faster than Miss Bright; it returns us a full year back of our last birthday.