Court Opinion

ID: 9757156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:21:06.785504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:35.358083
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
BELL, Chief Judge,
in which CATHELL, Judge, joins.
I do not agree with the conclusion drawn by the majority that the incentive payments at issue in this case were wages promised, and due, as part of the compensation for service of Timothy J. McCabe, the respondent. Consequently, I also do not agree either that the Maryland Wage Payment Collection Law, Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.) § 3-501 et seq. of the Labor and Employment Article, is applicable or that any payments are due the respondent.
The case sub judice cannot be distinguished from our decision in The Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 783 A.2d 667 (2001). We noted in Whiting-Turner, that § 3-505 of the Act1 is applicable only when wages have been promised as part of the compensation for employment and all conditions agreed to in advance for earning those wages have been satisfied. Id. at 305, 783 A.2d at 672. The fundamental disagreement between the parties, in the case sub judice, is whether the incentive payments were properly construed as a commission, rather than a bonus/gratuity, and whether those payments were promised to Mr. McCabe for his service. The trial court found for Medex, the petitioner, determining that the payments were not commissions. Despite this factual determination by the trial court, *46the Court of Special Appeals, and now this Court, reversed. Apparently, believing that designating the payments as “commissions” would justify reversal on the grounds that commissions are sufficiently tied to an employee’s efforts on behalf of the employer, the majority ignores that the statute requires a promise of wages in exchange for service. No such promise was made by Medex. Consequently, I would hold that the respondent was not entitled to the payments under the statute. For that reason, I dissent.
I.
The initial determination of whether the incentive payments were a commission or a gratuity was a question of fact. Both the petitioner and the respondent argued in the trial court their respective positions as to how the disputed payments should be classified. In that court, it was undisputed that the respondent was paid a yearly salary of $49,000.00. Finding for the respondent, the majority states that payments made under the Incentive Plans were “commissions,” expressly disagreeing with the petitioner that the payments were “more akin to a bonus for continued employment.” See Medex v. McCabe, at 36. The majority goes on to state further that the evidence produced at trial “seemed to belie” the contention that the payments were akin to a bonus. Id. The opinion and order of the trial was to the contrary, however. It found that the respondent was not a “commissioned sales representative, nor paid a draw against commissions.”
Unless the determinations of the trial court are clearly erroneous, an appellate court will “not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence ... and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Maryland Rule 8 131(c).2 In addition, appel*47late courts are required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Urban Site v. Levering, 340 Md. 223, 230, 665 A.2d 1062, 1065 (1995). Absent a contract provision to the contrary, and the record is devoid of any such evidence, any monies additional to his salary, paid to the respondent were simply gratuities. It is simply incorrect that payments made under the Incentive Plan were commissions that the petitioner paid employees who were employed on the date of payout.
II.
Whether, or not, the payments are categorized as commissions or bonuses, the critical determination to be made is whether the petitioner promised the payments to the respondent in exchange for the respondent’s service as an employee. We interpreted the Maryland Wage Payment Collection Act in Whiting-Turner.
In Whiting-Turner, this Court held that § 3-505 is applicable only when wages have been promised as part of the compensation for the employment arrangement and all conditions agreed to in advance for earning those wages have been satisfied. We explained:
“[t]he conditions of employment are determined in advance of the employment. What, if anything beyond the basic salary, the employee will receive is a matter for discussion, consideration and agreement. If a bonus is to be made part of the wage package, it can be negotiated and included in what has been promised. Similarly, whether commissions are to be paid or what fringe benefits attach are a matter for agreement in advance of the employment or to become a part of the undertaking during the employment. Once a bonus, commission or fringe benefit has been promised as part of the compensation for service, the employee would be entitled to its enforcement as wages. Consequently, this *48interpretation of § 3-501 (c), rather than rendering the language of the statute devoid of meaning, gives it a very definite one and creates a bright line test that is easily applied.”
Whiting-Turner, 366 Md. at 305, 783 A.2d at 672-73. I fear that the bright line that we identified has been blurred by the decision in this case.
The majority states “[w]here the payments are dependent upon conditions other than the employee’s efforts, they lie outside of the definition” of the statute. Medex, supra, at 36. This statement of our holding in Whiting-Turner is stated too broadly. Many, if not most, payments made by an employer to an employee in addition to periodic salary, will be dependent upon the employee’s efforts. This alone does not, and logically cannot, bring that additional payment within the scope of § 3—501(c).3 Whether express or implied, employers typically tie the payment of a bonus, a commission or a fringe benefit to a cognizable means of assessing the individual contributions of their employees to the organization. The bright-line test announced in Whiting-Turner was a “promise” of remuneration in exchange for service.
Here, the payments under the Incentive Plan made to the respondent are attenuated by a clear qualification: the respondent’s continued employment. The petitioner’s duty to pay is clearly conditional. We noted in Whiting-Turner that the “conditions of employment are determined in advance of the employment.” Id. at 305, 783 A.2d at 672. The fact that the petitioner could choose to adopt, or not adopt, an incentive plan in any fiscal year belies the contention that the respondent was promised, at the inception of the employment term, *49the incentive payments as part of his compensation. Moreover, if the incentive payments became a part of the promised compensation package subsequent to employment, the payments were further conditioned upon the respondent’s continued employment. In fact, in all references to the Incentive Plan the respondent’s continued service to the petitioner is a condition precedent to any payments under the plan. Thus, those payments cannot definitively be categorized as promised compensation for service.
Despite the trial court’s determination, as we have seen, under the majority’s analysis the incentive payments are classified as commissions. Pursuant to § 3-505, the commissions must have been promised as compensation as part of the employment arrangement. The facts are that the respondent was paid a salary of $49,000.00 for his service, the Account Manager Incentive Plan did not begin until a year after the respondent began his employment, and the petitioner was free to adopt or not adopt an Incentive Plan from time to time. Taken as a whole, these facts cast doubt upon the majority’s conclusion and its interpretation of the agreement reached by the parties. It is clear, however, as we noted in Whiting-Turner, had the respondent been employed with the petitioner when distributions under the Incentive Plan were made to the petitioner’s employees, the respondent clearly would have been entitled to the payment. Id. at 306-07, 783 A.2d at 673 (noting that the payment of a bonus w'ould be required if the conditions placed on the compensation package had been satisfied).
Whether the incentive payments are construed as commissions or a bonus, § 3-505(c) requires “remuneration promised for service” to constitute wages. Where “such remuneration is not a part of the compensation package promised, it is merely a gift, a gratuity, revocable at any time before delivery.” Id. at 306, 783 A.2d at 673 quoting Snyder v. Stouffer, 270 Md. 647, 650, 313 A.2d 497, 499 (1974); Dulany v. Taylor, 105 Md.App. 619, 660 A.2d 1046 (1995); Rudo v. Karp, 80 Md.App. 424, 429, 564 A.2d 100, 102 (1989). It is undisputed that a salary was earned, and paid to the respondent, up to the *50point of his resignation. It is also undisputed that payments under the Incentive Plan did not require that any work in addition to that for which compensation was already being provided by salary. We have held that, where a sales bonus plan did not call for any work to be done by the employee in addition to the work required under the original terms of his employment, the monies promised to the employee under that bonus plan were only a gratuity, which was not enforceable. Johnson v. Schenley Distillers Corp., 181 Md. 31, 36, 28 A.2d 606, 608 (1942).
I respectfully dissent. Judge CATHELL joins in the views herein expressed.

. Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol.) § 3-505 of tile Labor and Employment Article requires employers, upon the termination of an employee's employment, 1o pay that employee, or his or her authorized representative, "all wages due for work that the employee performed before the date of termination of employment, on or before the day on which the employee would have been paid the wages if the employment had not been terminated.”

. Maryland Rule 8-131 provides:
"(c) Action Tried Without a Jury. When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgement of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due *47regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.”

. Section 3-501(c) defines "wages” as follows:
"(c) Wage. — (1) 'Wage' means all compensation that is due to an employee for employment.
"(2) 'Wage' includes:
"(i) a bonus;
"(ii) a commission;
"(iii) a fringe benefit; or
"(iv) any other remuneration promised for service.”