Court Opinion

ID: 9658399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:58:35.075942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:54.727545
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(dissenting). The opening sentence of the people’s concise statement of proceedings and facts upon application for leave to appeal to this Court states:
“On Saturday evening, April 17, 1965, the defendant was arrested by the Jackson County Sheriff’s Department in connection with a breaking and entering of a car wash located in Jackson County.”
The first sentence of the statement of facts contained in the brief for the people upon appeal to this Court states:
“On Saturday evening, April 17, 1965, the defendant was arrested by the Jackson County Sheriff’s Department in connection with a breaking and entering of a business establishment located in Jackson County.”
Judge John C. Dalton’s opinion, dated May 24, 1966, in which he denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, states:
“Basically, the grounds are that the plea of guilty heretofore entered by him on April 23, 1965, to a charge of breaking and entering was based upon an illegal and involuntary confession because he was arrested without a warrant or complaint, was interrogated by police officers relentlessly and incessantly until late that night and thereafter intermittently until coerced into admitting certain incriminating statements were true; and, further, because the alleged confession and/or admissions were obtained *379during a period of illegal and incommunicado detention for a period exceeding two days before a warrant was obtained and an appearance had before a magistrate; and, further, because defendant was told by police officers time after time that if he admitted participation in the alleged crime or crimes he would be released on bond and he could call his mother in exchange for confessing to crimes which he knew nothing about, and that he was further threatened as set forth in paragraph 6 of his petition to withdraw plea of guilty. Defendant further claims that he is not in fact or in law guilty of the offense charged against him and his confession is a gross miscarriage of justice.”
Judge Dalton’s opinion then makes reference to the defendant’s arraignment, the defendant’s plea, the presentence investigation, the defendant’s criminal record, and proceeds as follows:
“By his own statement to the investigation probation officer, besides the instant offense, petitioner participated in three other breaking and enterings, one attempted breaking and entering, and was an accessory in two others.
“For this petitioner to now in fact claim that he deliberately lied to this court upon his arraignment on April 23, 1965, does not command credibility.
“A Walker hearing would serve no useful purpose.
“His plea of guilty was freely, voluntarily, and understandingly made by him on April 23, 1965.”
Nowhere in Judge Dalton’s opinion on the motion for new trial, nowhere in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and nowhere in Chief Justice Thomas E. Brennan’s opinion, is there contained anything in a statement of facts as to what occurred from the evening of April 17, 1965 to the following Monday, April 19,1965, when a warrant for the arrest of John Robert Taylor was issued. The warrant, it may be *380noted, was for a breaking and entering that occurred on March 8, 1965.
Defendant’s counter-statement of facts contained in defendant’s brief filed with this Court, with the assistance of counsel, contains the following with regard to the two-day period before the warrant was issued:
“On April 17, 1965, John Taylor was arrested, at his mother’s restaurant, without a warrant having been issued. He was not allowed to leave a note advising his mother of the occurrence, and was taken to the Jackson County jail, and there they interrogated him relentlessly and incessantly by relays of city and county police officers relative to the breaking and entering of a car wash. He was not charged with this crime until April 19th.
“At 10:30 or 11 p.m. on April 17, 1965, another prisoner, Lynn Negus, was placed in the room with defendant, who attempted to induce defendant to admit participation in the crime by stating that his (Taylor’s) refusal to do so was preventing Negus and others then being detained from being released on bond. Negus was also urged by police officers to beat Taylor.
“Taylor, still being held incommunicado, was again questioned on the morning of April 18, 1965, and told by three police officers, ‘If you cooperate with us and the other boys, you can call your mother and we’ll help you get out on bond.’ Upon his refusal, he was told in a loud voice, ‘We’ll put you upstairs with them and they’ll stomp you to death.’ Also, defendant’s father was used to coerce his confession.
“During the entire period, Taylor was without counsel and was refused use of the telephone to call his mother.
“On April 19, 1965, a period in excess of two days after his arrest, Taylor was arraigned before a magistrate.”
*381The meager record we have before us as to what occurred from Saturday evening, April 17, 1965 until Monday, April 19, 1965, raises several questions :
Are the facts alleged by Taylor true?
If he was not held incommunicado, if he was not denied an attorney, and if he was not threatened with violence to secure his confession, what did occur ?
Ordinarily, I would favor remand for a Walker-type hearing to be conducted by an outside judge. However, this appeal has been pending much too long. Some conclusive resolution of it should be achieved by this Court if at all possible.
In People v. Dunn (1968), 380 Mich 693, this Court held (p 700):
“We here hold that the meaning of the ‘consequence’ of a plea of guilty, within the wording of the rule, is that an accused, by so pleading, waives his right to trial by jury, or trial without a jury by the court, and that additionally the accused subjects himself to whatever penalty is prescribed by law, including possible confinement in a penal institution. Under the rule, the accused must be advised minimally of the foregoing.”
Taylor was not told that he had a right to a “trial without a jury by the court”, and he was not informed that he was subjecting himself to whatever penalty is provided by law, “including possible confinement in a penal institution”. I agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court did not comply with the requirements of GrCR 1963, 785.3(2), 9 Mich App 333,336.
Since I shall vote to remand to the trial court for a new trial, I do not deem it necessary to pass upon the defendant’s claims that his constitutional rights were violated. These claims, it may be noted, have *382not been passed upon by the Court of Appeals or by this Court even though defendant sought review of the same.
In this case the Court of Appeals addressed itself to the problem of plea taking when a defendant wishes to enter a plea of guilty. Chief Justice Brennan, in his opinion, has addressed himself to the role of appellate courts in reviewing guilty pleas. Until this Court elects to re-formulate detailed requirements for the taking of pleas, such as were set forth in repealed GrCR 1963, 785.3(2), the procedure must largely be left up to the individual trial judge.
In an application for leave to appeal that was recently before this Court, the record reveals that while the trial judge was interrogating a defendant who wished to plead guilty and, as the judge was informing the defendant of his rights, the judge interjected: “I’ve got to go through this rigmarole, do your understand?” The brief by counsel for defendant in this case refers to “mechanical questions by the judge”.
During the calendar year 1968, 14,466 criminal cases were processed through the circuit courts of this State. Of this number, 12,671 (87.6%) were disposed of without trial, presumably the most by guilty pleas. It is a well-known fact that in our busier circuits defendants are carted to our courts in busloads for the taking of guilty pleas. It is not at all uncommon for a busy judge on a busy day to take the pleas of a large number of defendants. It is easy to understand how a judge can come to regard the process as “rigmarole” and can, even without meaning to do so, conduct the examination mechanically.
I believe that much of the difficulty both trial courts and appellate courts are encountering with guilty pleas could be obviated if, once the trial judge *383has completed his interrogation of a defendant, before he accepts the plea of guilty, the judge would present to the defendant a written questionnaire framed by the judges in the circuit along the lines of the 21 questions set forth in the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case. The defendant should be instructed to complete the form by giving written answers to the interrogatories with the advice of counsel and to sign and return the same to the trial judge by some later designated time. Upon the return of the form to the trial judge and such examination by him and such further questioning as he deems necessary, if the judge decides a plea of guilty should be accepted, he should so state and the completed and signed questionnaire should be made a part of the record in the case.
If the above procedure were to be followed, there would be no need to attempt to formulate broad rules for review by our appellate courts.
I vote to affirm the Court of Appeals and to reverse the trial court and to remand to the trial court for a new trial.