Court Opinion

ID: 9531531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:12:41.677559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:30.254417
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, J.,
concurring.
I concur with the reasoning and result reached by the majority. I write separately to comment on the case law that supports that result.
As the majority correctly observes, State v. Smith, 312 Or 561, 822 P2d 1193 (1992), cited two cases, State v. Broom, 121 Or 202, 253 P 1042, 253 P 1044 (1927), and City of Portland v. Parchen, 113 Or 209, 231 P 980 (1925), in support of its holding that
“ [although defendant’s absconding from probation does not deny this court the power to review his case, we, in our discretion, decline to call upon the resources of this court for a review of his case.” 312 Or at 564.
State v. Smith, supra, does not decide the question presented here, i.e., whether this court has discretion to dismiss an appeal, notwithstanding the defendant’s statutory right to appeal to this court under ORS 138.010, where the state asserts that the defendant has absconded from probation, and the defendant does not oppose that assertion. Broom and Parchen are relevant because they were decided when criminal defendants had aright to appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court in certain cases.
In State v. Broom, citing cases from other jurisdictions, the court said:
“The authorities abundantly sustain the proposition that, in the absence of a statute regulating the procedure, it is within the discretion of the court to hear or not hear the appeal of a prisoner who escapes pending his appeal. ” 121 Or at 206.
The court did not state what would constitute a “statute regulating the procedure.” The court did not identify the source of its discretionary authority to dismiss criminal *444appeals, or attempt to analyze the relationship between that authority and the defendant’s statutory right to appeal. However, the court chose not to exercise the discretionary authority that it described and overruled the motion to dismiss the appeal. The ultimate ruling suggests that much of the court’s discussion of a discretionary authority to dismiss criminal appeals was unnecessary to the decision.
City of Portland v. Parchen, supra, involved an appeal of a conviction in circuit court for violation of a city ordinance. The city moved to dismiss the appeal on jurisdictional grounds and because the defendant was a fugitive from justice who had filed no bond on appeal. The court allowed the motion on this rationale:
“It is a substantial and just rule that courts will not hear an appeal while the appellant is fleeing from justice, and this, of itself, would be sufficient reason for dismissing this appeal. But, aside from this, we have held, in the case of Portland v. White, 106 Or 169 (211 Pac. 798), that no appeal lies from the Circuit Court to this court upon a judgment of conviction in the Circuit Court for a violation of a city ordinance of the City of Portland.
“The appeal will therefore be dismissed.” 113 Or at 210.
I assume from that statement that the basis for the court’s holding was lack of jurisdiction because, given that fact, the court had no reason to decide whether to dismiss the appeal because of the defendant’s status as a fugitive. The court did not discuss the source of what it called a “substantial and just rule” authorizing it to dismiss a fugitive’s criminal appeal, or the relationship between that authority and the defendant’s statutory right to appeal.
Broom and Parchen provide thin support for the majority’s result. Those decisions suggest that an appellate court has discretion to dismiss a fugitive’s appeal, but the court’s statements appear to be dicta, and give no insight into the possible countervailing effect of the defendant’s unconditional statutory right to appeal.
However, this court is reluctant to disregard what appear to be statements of law by the Oregon Supreme Court, even if they are unnecessary to a particular decision and are not based on statutory authority. I am not willing to disregard *445what the court in Broom called its “intensive study of this subject,” which led it to conclude that the court is empowered to dismiss the appeal of a convicted criminal who has fled from the court’s jurisdiction. 121 Or at 210. Because the undisputed record establishes that defendant is in an analogous position, I concur with the majority’s disposition of the state’s motion.