Court Opinion

ID: 9716624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:46:08.122598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.282959
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: Defendant David Samuelson pied guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse on March 1, 1990. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 15 and 7 years in the penitentiary. Defendant was subsequently scheduled to begin supervised release on March 5, 1998. One day before his release, however, the State instituted proceedings to further incarcerate him under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998)), which first became law in 1998. The Act authorizes the State to commit defendants found to be “[sjexually violent person[s]” for an indefinite period of time after the completion of their criminal sentences. 725 ILCS 207/5(1) (West 1998). Defendant argues that the Act violates the Illinois Constitution’s provision that a person shall not “be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10) because the Act imposes a second punishment upon a criminal defendant who has already served his sentence. Defendant also argues that applying the Act to defendants such as himself, who committed their crimes before its effective date, violates the Illinois Constitution’s provision against ex post facto, or retroactive, criminal laws. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 16. The majority rejects both of these arguments by characterizing the confinement authorized by the Act as civil rather than criminal in nature. The majority’s characterization is incorrect. There are a multitude of compelling reasons to conclude that confinement under the Act is criminal punishment rather than a mere civil remedy. The most obvious is that the Act is found in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. See 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998). More importantly, the Act explicitly affords defendants against whom it is enforced “[a]ll constitutional rights available to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” 725 ILCS 207/35 (West 1998). The Act also mandates the use of criminal rules of evidence. 725 ILCS 207/35 (West 1998). Although the General Assembly is to be commended for providing these criminal procedural safeguards within the Act, their inclusion serves to underscore the criminal character of the Act. Moreover, defendants adjudicated sexually violent under the Act are confined in Department of Corrections facilities. 725 ILCS 207/15 (West 1998). Yet another indication of the criminal character of the Act is that, in the vast majority of cases, it applies only to defendants who have been convicted of, and are already serving a sentence for, a criminal sexual offense.2 725 ILCS 207/5(1) (West 1998). In other words, a criminal charge or conviction is a necessary precondition for confinement under the Act. If the Act were truly civil, it would apply to all persons who have a mental disorder of a sexual nature rather than only to those who have been prosecuted for a sexual crime. Similarly, the fact that the Act allows the State to request continued confinement of a defendant whom the State has already chosen to prosecute criminally shows that the State is really merely seeking to impose a supplemental sentence of confinement. In cases such as this, the State had the option of seeking civil commitment in lieu of criminal proceedings at the time of the original charge. See 405 ILCS 5/1 — 100 et seq. (West 1996); 725 ILCS 205/1 — 0.01 (West 1996) (Sexually Dangerous Persons Act et seq.). That the State in every proceeding under the Act has chosen not to exercise this fully available civil option contradicts the State’s assertion that the Act’s purposes are civil and demonstrates that the Act is a pretext for incarcerating sexual offenders for longer periods of time than the sentence which the Criminal Code provides. Certainly, the legislature has wide discretion in fixing penalties for specific crimes. Should the legislature wish to increase the penalties for sexual crimes, it has that option. What it may not do, however, is attach a second sentence subsequent to the one for which the defendant was initially sentenced. Further indication that the Act’s procedures are merely a proxy for imposing additional criminal punishment comes from the astonishing ease with which a convicted sex offender can be brought within the Act’s provisions. Incarceration under the Act is premised upon a finding that a convicted sex offender suffers from a “mental disorder.” 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 1998). The Act defines “mental disorder” as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence.” 725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 1998). The facts of the instant case aptly demonstrate, however, that a finding of a mental disorder flows almost inexorably from a conviction for a violent sex offense. When asked at the probable cause hearing to identify the “mental disorder” from which defendant was suffering, the State’s expert diagnosed defendant as having “pedophilia.” When asked what factors enabled her to arrive at this diagnosis, the State’s expert explained, “The first criteria is that over — longer than a six month period [defendant] engaged in sexual behavior with children in spite of any consequences. The second criteria is that despite consequences, personal and criminal consequences, he kept — in spite of that he continued his behaviors.” Thus, the State’s expert in this case was able to diagnose defendant as having a “mental disorder” within the meaning of the Act solely by virtue of defendant’s having committed the acts which led to his criminal conviction and punishment. In light of this fact, the State’s contentian that the Act’s procedures are not criminal is entirely incredible. Finally, the indefinite nature of the confinement period under the Act is a telling manifestation of the Act’s criminal purposes. By allowing the State to secure a defendant’s continued incarceration even after prosecuting and extracting from him the full service of a criminal sentence, the Act effectively amends every sentencing statute applicable to sexual crimes to give the State the option of seeking life imprisonment whenever it is displeased with the sentence imposed by the court in the defendant’s original prosecution. The Illinois Constitution cannot countenance such a perverse transmutation of the criminal law. If the State desires to adopt a policy mandating a life sentence for certain serious sexual crimes, it must do so openly within the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code. Because the Act is criminal rather than civil, it violates the Illinois Constitution’s double jeopardy provision by imposing further punishment upon defendants who have already served their sentences. Furthermore, when the Act is applied to individuals such as defendant, who committed their crimes before it was passed, it also violates the Illinois Constitution’s ex post facto clause. The majority rejects these arguments because the United States Supreme Court has rejected them as a matter of federal constitutional law. Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court has no authority to curtail the protections afforded by our own state constitution. See People, v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 74 (1996). The Act is unconstitutional as a matter of Illinois law. Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.  The Act may also be applied to offenders who have been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity. 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 1998).