Court Opinion

ID: 9694951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:01:28.791547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:43.504811
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      AUG 25 2023
                                                                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALANNA U.N. TAYLOR,                               No.   22-35724

                   Plaintiff-Appellant,           D.C. No. 3:21-cv-05884-MLP

     v.
                                                  MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,

                   Defendant-Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Washington
                    Michelle L. Peterson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                              Submitted August 23, 2023**
                                  Portland, Oregon

Before: BENNETT, VANDYKE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

          Alanna Taylor appeals the district court’s decision affirming the denial of

Taylor’s application for disability benefits. We review the district court’s judgment

de novo and “set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by substantial

*
 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
  The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
evidence or is based on legal error.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d

1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009).

      To establish a disability for purposes of the Social Security Act, a claimant

must establish an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which … has lasted or

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “In order to determine whether a claimant meets this

definition, the ALJ employs a five-step sequential evaluation.” Molina v. Astrue,

674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1502(a).

      In this case, the ALJ found that Taylor was not disabled at step five because

Taylor could perform work available in the national economy. The ALJ gave limited

weight to the medical opinion of David Morgan, Ph.D., gave limited weight to

Taylor’s own testimony, and did not expressly consider the lay witness testimony of

Taylor’s partner. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because the ALJ

applied the correct legal standards and its decision is supported by substantial

evidence, we affirm.

      1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Morgan’s

medical opinion. First, the ALJ explained why it found that Dr. Morgan’s medical

opinion was unsupported and inconsistent. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792

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(9th Cir. 2022) (“[A]n ALJ cannot reject a[] . . . doctor’s opinion as unsupported or

inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.”);

20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)–(c). The ALJ explained that it found part of Dr. Morgan’s

medical opinion was unsupported because the limitations therein were based on

unexplained checkboxes, a sufficient reason for rejecting a medical opinion. Molina,

674 F.3d at 1111–12. The ALJ also explained that Dr. Morgan’s opinion was

inconsistent with Dr. Morgan’s own mental examination, another reason to reject

Dr. Morgan’s opinion.

      Second, the ALJ discounted the opinion because the assessed debilitation

would last less than twelve months, not satisfying the statutory duration period. 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (impairment only counts as “disability” if it “has lasted or can

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months”). This too is

a reason for discounting Dr. Morgan’s medical opinion.

      Because the ALJ explained why it found that Dr. Morgan’s medical opinion

was unsupported and inconsistent and because that explanation is supported by

substantial evidence, the ALJ “reasonably rejected” Dr. Morgan’s opinion. See

Woods, 32 F.4th at 787, 792–93; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a)–(c).

      2. The ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial

evidence for discounting Taylor’s subjective testimony. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53

F.4th 489, 497 (9th Cir. 2022). First, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding

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that Taylor’s subjective testimony with regard to the degree of Taylor’s anxiety and

depression symptoms conflicted with the objective medical evidence in the record.

See id. at 498; Carmickle v. Soc. Sec. Comm’r, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008).

Second, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to discount Taylor’s

testimony regarding Taylor’s impairments related to sleep and fatigue. There was

no mention in the treatment record of “sleep attacks,” Taylor’s visit to a sleep center

found Taylor had “only mild obstructive sleep apnea,” and Taylor’s claimed

“persistent intense fatigue” conflicted with Taylor’s statements to a nurse, over a

period of several months, that Taylor was sleeping well at night and had no sleeping

pattern disruption. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 496–99; Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d

1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). Third, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding

that Taylor’s symptoms improved with medication. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)

(ALJ may consider evidence concerning claimant’s medications); Orteza v. Shalala,

50 F.3d 748, 750 (9th Cir. 1995) (ALJ may consider effectiveness of medications).

Finally, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Taylor’s testimony as

to the severity of the symptoms conflicted with Taylor’s admitted levels of activity.

See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039; Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir.

2021).

      3. While the ALJ did not address the lay testimony of Taylor’s partner, any

error in the failure to address this testimony is harmless because that testimony

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echoed Taylor’s complaints of debilitating symptoms and the ALJ gave legitimate

reasons for discounting Taylor’s subjective testimony. See Molina, 674 F.3d at

1122.

        4. Because the ALJ did not err in discounting the above evidence, the ALJ

also did not err in declining to incorporate the limitations suggested by that evidence

into its assessment of Taylor’s residual functional capacity (RFC) or in using that

RFC to pose a hypothetical to the vocational expert. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261

F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).

        AFFIRMED.

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