Court Opinion

ID: 9673584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:14:51.610974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:22.921019
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I agree with the appellant that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing Officer T. J. Farley to give hearsay testimony relating to two witnesses who were unable to make in-court identification of the appellant. The officer was allowed to testify that the two witnesses had made extrajudicial identification of the appellant from photographs viewed at the police station. I am of the opinion that all of our case law and our rules of evidence prevent such testimony from being received. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 801, states: * * * (c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. (d) Statements Which are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: (1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (iii) one of identification of a person made after perceiving him; or *** Obviously, when the officer testified that two of the witnesses identified the photographs at some point before the trial, this was clearly hearsay as defined in 801 (c). Of course, 801 (d) attempts to set out the exceptions to the hearsay and his testimony clearly does not fit into the exception. If the witnesses had testified that they observed photographs at the police station, then it would have been harmless to allow the officer to verify that they had indeed looked at photographs and made positive identification at that time. This same question was considered in the case of Conley v. State, 272 Ark. 33 (1981), wherein we stated: If any confusion existed as to our prior decisions in the matter of extrajudicial identifications, it has been put to rest by Acts of Arkansas 1979, No. 1097. In amending the Arkansas Uniform Rules of Evidence the purpose of Act 1097 was stated by the General Assembly to be to amend Rule 801 (d) (1) to include ‘prior identification of a person’ in the definition of statements which are not hearsay. ... We further stated: Therefore, we hold that a witness may testify on direct examination, that he has previously identified the defendant and may relate when and where such identification took place. Thus, both our case law and our rules permit a witness to testify as to prior identification of an accused but nowhere is there any authority for allowing a witness to testify that another witness made an extrajudicial identification of an accused. In the case of Cromwell v. State, 269 Ark. 104 (1980), we held that a third person, such as a police officer, could not testify that another witness identified the accused on an earlier occasion. In Cromwell the extrajudicial identification which we permitted was that of the prosecuting witness. His testimony was that he identified the appellant in a line-up on an earlier occasion and that he also saw the appellant at a hearing or pretrial conference. Therefore, neither Conley, supra, nor Cornwell hold that a third party witness may testify as to extrajudicial identification made by another witness. The rule, given its plain ordinary interpretation, also excludes this testimony. Therefore, I would reverse the case and remand it for another trial.