Court Opinion

ID: 9911593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 16:00:32.825797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:32.300905
License: Public Domain

22-302
Clark v. Hanley

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    August Term 2022

              (Argued: June 7, 2023               Decided: December 20, 2023)

                                         No. 22-302

                         ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

                                  VERONICA-MAY CLARK,

                                     Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                             -v.-

   THOMAS HANLEY, KEVIN MANLEY, PETER MURPHY, KIMBERLY WEIR, ROBERTO
                  QUIROS, AND JANE AND JOHN DOES 1-9,

                                   Defendants-Appellees. *

                         ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Before:           LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, CHIN and KAHN, Circuit Judges.

      Plaintiff-Appellant Veronica-May Clark, an incarcerated transgender
woman, was serially sexually assaulted by Defendant-Appellee Thomas Hanley,
a corrections officer at the prison facility in which she was housed. More than
seven years after this abuse, Clark brought a civil rights action against Hanley and

        The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption to conform to
        *

the above.
                                              1
other corrections officers, seeking equitable tolling of the applicable statute of
limitations due to the paralyzing effects of the abuse. After convening an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of equitable tolling, the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J.) denied Clark’s claim for equitable
tolling and dismissed her case as untimely. Clark appeals from the district
court’s judgment of dismissal, asserting that the court embarked on an
impermissible factfinding expedition at the pleading stage of the case by eliciting
her testimony at the evidentiary hearing and violated her Seventh Amendment
rights by making factual determinations properly reserved for the jury. Because
the district court employed proper procedures to resolve Clark’s equitable tolling
claim and did not make any factual findings that infringe the Seventh
Amendment, we AFFIRM.

      Judge Chin dissents in a separate opinion.

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:              ALEXANDRA BURSAK (Andrew D. Silverman,
                                      Jennifer M. Keighley, on the brief), Orrick,
                                      Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York, NY.

                                      (Sasha Buchert and Richard Saenz, Lambda
                                      Legal, Washington D.C. and New York, NY,
                                      for Lambda Legal Defense and Education
                                      Fund, Inc., The Amicus Project at UConn
                                      Law, Just Detention International, and
                                      Center for Constitutional Rights, as amici
                                      curiae)

                                      (Richard Luedeman, Assistant Clinical
                                      Professor of Law, UConn School of Law,
                                      Hartford, CT, for Amicus Project at UConn
                                      Law, as amicus curiae)

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:             STUART M. KATZ (Wilson T. Carroll, on the
                                      brief), Cohen and Wolf, P.C., Bridgeport, CT,
                                      on behalf of Defendant-Appellee Thomas
                                      Hanley.
                                         2
                                         ZENOBIA G. GRAHAM-DAYS, Assistant
                                         Attorney General, for William Tong,
                                         Attorney General, Connecticut Office of the
                                         Attorney General, Hartford, CT, on behalf of
                                         Defendants-Appellees Kevin Manley, Peter
                                         Murphy, Kimberly Weir, Roberto Quiros,
                                         Jane and John Does 1-9.

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge:

      During the summer of 2011, Plaintiff-Appellant Veronica-May Clark

(“Clark”), an incarcerated transgender woman serving a 75-year term of

imprisonment for murder, assault, and burglary, was repeatedly sexually

assaulted by Defendant-Appellee Thomas Hanley (“Hanley”), a corrections officer

at the Connecticut prison facility where Clark was then housed. 1 Clark initiated

the present action in the fall of 2018—more than seven years after Hanley’s

abuse—asserting federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of

her Eighth Amendment rights, along with tort claims under Connecticut law.

Conceding that she filed this action more than four years beyond the applicable

statute of limitations, Clark asserts that the trauma she suffered in 2011 and her

      1   At the time this action was filed, the plaintiff’s name was Nicholas Clark. The
district court granted Clark’s motion to amend the case caption to reflect her name change
in December 2021.
                                            3
fear of retaliation from corrections staff, aggravated by her then-undisclosed

gender dysphoria, constitute extraordinary circumstances that prevented her from

taking timely steps to file this action against Hanley and other allegedly

acquiescent corrections officers (together, the “Defendants”).               Clark seeks

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

       Based primarily on its assessment of Clark’s testimony at an evidentiary

hearing, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J.)

denied Clark’s equitable tolling claim and dismissed her suit as untimely. 2 The

court concluded that portions of Clark’s testimony, which focused on the

circumstances that allegedly hampered her from timely filing, were not credible,

and that Clark’s asserted bases for equitable tolling were, in large part, a post hoc

rationalization to buttress her equitable tolling claim. 3

       2The district court initially dismissed Clark’s pro se complaint sua sponte under the
three-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims. Clark, still proceeding pro
se, appealed, moving “to extend the statute of limitations.” App’x 104. A motions
panel of this Court, construing Clark’s motion as a request for an extension of time to
move for reconsideration in the district court, remanded, suggesting that the district court
consider appointing counsel in reassessing the timeliness question. Pro bono counsel
was then appointed and has represented Clark since, both at the evidentiary hearing and
on appeal.
       3Clark does not challenge on this appeal the dismissal of her state law claims and
has thus abandoned them. See Town of Southold v. Wheeler, 48 F.4th 67, 71 n.2 (2d Cir.

                                             4
       On appeal, Clark contends that the district court engaged in impermissible

factfinding at the pleading stage and resolved contested issues of fact bearing on

the merits of her legal claims in violation of the Seventh Amendment.                  Clark

further argues that the record adduced at the evidentiary hearing entitles her to

equitable tolling as a matter of law. These arguments lack merit.

       As set forth below, we have repeatedly approved—sometimes even

required—evidentiary hearings to resolve equitable tolling claims.                Relatedly,

equitable tolling is an issue that is generally appropriate for a court, rather than a

jury, to resolve, so long as the court’s factual findings do not deprive plaintiffs of

their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on any legal claims.

       Here, the district court did not err by holding an evidentiary hearing and

gauging the credibility of Clark’s testimony in concluding that she was not entitled

to equitable tolling. And because the court’s factual findings relate squarely to

her equitable tolling claim, without intruding upon the merits of her legal claims,

the court did not flout Clark’s Seventh Amendment rights. Nor was it an abuse

2022). In any event, Connecticut law provides that the three-year limitations period
applicable to her state-law claims is a statute of repose that is not susceptible to equitable
tolling. See Gerena v. Korb, 617 F.3d 197, 206 (2d Cir. 2010).
                                              5
of discretion for the district court to hold on the record before it that Clark failed

to carry her burden to show circumstances that warrant equitable tolling.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment of dismissal.

                                    BACKGROUND

I.     Factual Background 4

       A.     Hanley’s Sexual Assault of Clark

       In November 2007, Clark was incarcerated at the MacDougall-Walker

Correctional Institution (“MacDougall-Walker”) in Suffield, Connecticut, where

she was serving a 75-year term of imprisonment based on her conviction earlier

that year, pursuant to a guilty plea, on charges of murder, assault, and burglary.

Based on her prior experience as an electrician, the facility assigned Clark to assist

with various electrical projects in the facility’s general maintenance department,

placing her under the supervision of Hanley, MacDougall-Walker’s General

Maintenance Officer.

       4  The facts concerning the events that form the basis of Clark’s legal claims are
drawn from the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint and are accepted as true
at this stage of the proceedings. See Kane v. Mount Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist., 80 F.4th 101,
104 n.1 (2d Cir. 2023). Additional facts concerning the circumstances surrounding
Clark’s commencement of this action are sourced from materials extraneous to the
pleadings, which, as explained infra Discussion Section I.A, we consider only as pertinent
to the issue of equitable tolling.
                                             6
      As set forth in the Second Amended Complaint, Hanley was running a

smuggling ring at MacDougall-Walker at the time, supplying inmates with

contraband, such as illegal narcotics and alcohol, in exchange for payment.

Tipped off to Hanley’s illicit scheme, the Connecticut Department of Correction

(“DOC”) initiated a formal investigation into Hanley in 2010 that uncovered not

only his smuggling activities, but also his pattern of propositioning inmates with

sexual behavior. Clark alleges that several high-ranking officials at MacDougall-

Walker—including Defendants-Appellees Warden Peter Murphy, Director of

Security Kimberly Weir, and Intelligence and Security Unit Captains Kevin

Manley (“Manley”), and Roberto Quiros (collectively, the “MacDougall-Walker

Defendants”)—knew of Hanley’s abusive tendencies yet did nothing to address

them. Clark further contends that MacDougall-Walker maintained policies that

facilitated her abuse by allowing Hanley and other staff to isolate inmates from

the general prison population free from oversight and outside the purview of any

video surveillance or inmate tracking systems.

      On at least five occasions spanning the spring and summer of 2011, Hanley

sexually assaulted Clark, leveraging his authority to coerce her into performing

sexual acts.    Hanley’s initial physical encounter with Clark occurred in April

                                        7
2011 and escalated over the ensuing days and weeks to include oral sex on one

occasion and mutual masturbation on four occasions. Typically, Hanley would

isolate Clark from other inmates under the pretext of needing assistance on a

maintenance project. According to Clark, none of the incidents involved the use

of physical force or threats of force: “Hanley did not threaten me to perform any

sexual acts but said he would take [care] of me by feeding me well. I kind of felt

obligated into engaging in the sexual acts with Hanley.”          App’x 139.     The

assaults occurred outside the view of security cameras.

      Apprised of his conduct, the DOC placed Hanley on leave in August 2011,

and he resigned shortly thereafter. Hanley was arrested in connection with his

assaults on Clark in December 2011 and eventually pleaded guilty to three counts

of sexual assault in the fourth degree.

      B.     The Aftermath of the Assaults

      The Second Amended Complaint sets forth Clark’s claims regarding the

aftermath of the assaults in fourteen paragraphs. Clark alleges that the string of

sexual assaults “deeply and profoundly scarred” her, making it “difficult for her

to carry out ordinary functions, let alone process her assaults and attempt to secure

justice while incarcerated.” App’x 123. She was initially reluctant to participate

                                          8
in the DOC’s investigation of Hanley but in August 2011 provided Connecticut

state police with a statement detailing Hanley’s sexual assaults. 5 Clark requested

transfer to another facility.

      The DOC first transferred Clark from MacDougall-Walker to Corrigan

Correctional Center (“Corrigan”) around September 2011. Clark alleges that she

suffered physical and mental abuse at the hands of a cellmate at Corrigan, causing

her to initiate a hunger strike to bring about transfer to another facility. The DOC

transferred Clark in early 2012, but back to MacDougall-Walker, further stoking

her trauma. Clark alleges that on her return to MacDougall-Walker, corrections

officers taunted her for being the victim of Hanley’s sex crimes and told her she

was “gross,” “nasty,” and “disgusting.” Clark again went on hunger strike and

told one of her physicians that she would kill herself if she were not transferred

out of MacDougall-Walker. She was then transferred to the Garner Correctional

Facility (“Garner”), an inpatient psychiatric facility, where she “was placed on

suicide watch and carefully evaluated.” App’x 124. About two weeks later, still

      5  Appended to the Second Amended Complaint is an affidavit of Connecticut
State Police Trooper Paul DaCruz (“DaCruz”), in support of an application for an arrest
warrant of Hanley, which describes Hanley’s assaults of Clark in detail.
                                          9
in early 2012, she was discharged from the inpatient facility and transferred to the

Cheshire Correctional Institution (“Cheshire”), where she remained for the next

four and a half years, until mid-2016.

      The Second Amended Complaint alleges, without specification as to the

dates or frequency of such events, that Clark encountered corrections officers at

Cheshire who were at MacDougall-Walker around the time of the assaults in 2011,

and that inmates at Cheshire openly mocked and diminished the abuse she

suffered at the hands of Hanley as “gay stuff.” App’x 124. Clark also alleges

that Cheshire officials repeatedly denied her treatment for gender dysphoria,

resulting in a crisis in July 2016 when she attempted to castrate herself with a pair

of nail clippers. 6 Clark alleges that she received outpatient treatment at a medical

facility in the aftermath of this incident and was then sent briefly to the infirmary

at MacDougall-Walker, where she was hospitalized and declared to be an ongoing

self-harm risk.    Later in 2016, she was transferred back to Garner, where she

      6  Clark has a pending Eighth Amendment action against the DOC related to its
alleged failure to provide her transitional medical care. See Clark v. Quiros, No. 19 Civ.
575 (VLB) (D. Conn.).
                                           10
remained at the time she filed suit in 2018.      In 2020, Clarke returned first to

MacDougall-Walker and then to Cheshire, where she is currently housed.

II.   Procedural Background

      A.     Filing the Instant Suit and Clark’s First Appeal

      Clark commenced this lawsuit by filing a pro se complaint in October 2018,

over seven years after Hanley’s abuse. In January 2019, before the Defendants

appeared in the case, the district court sua sponte dismissed Clark’s suit as untimely

under the three-year statute of limitations applicable to her § 1983 claims. See

Clark v. Hanley, No. 18 Civ. 1765 (JAM), 2019 WL 319398 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2019).

Clark, still proceeding pro se, appealed the district court’s dismissal and filed a

motion to extend the statute of limitations. See Clark v. Hanley, No. 19-502, Dkt.

No. 14 (2d Cir. 2019). She argued in her motion that the statute of limitations

should be tolled because she “lived in absolute terror of filing this lawsuit” after

what happened with Hanley. App’x 22.

      A motions panel of this Court concluded that Clark should have the

opportunity to present her equitable tolling arguments, on the general principle

that “a district court should not sua sponte dismiss a complaint as untimely

without first granting a litigant notice and an opportunity to be heard.” App’x

                                         11
104 (citing Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007)). We thus remanded

the case to allow Clark to move before the district court for reconsideration of the

dismissal of her complaint, at the same time suggesting that the district court

consider the appointment of pro bono counsel.

       B.     The Proceedings on Remand

       On remand, now with the assistance of pro bono counsel, Clark filed an

amended complaint to detail Hanley’s pattern of sexual assault, the institutional

failures that allegedly enabled the abuse, and the abuse-related trauma she

suffered.    The Second Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading,

asserts two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Clark’s Eighth

Amendment rights—one against Hanley for sexually assaulting her and the other

against the MacDougall-Walker Defendants for being deliberately indifferent to

abusive conditions of confinement—and three claims under Connecticut state law

for intentional infliction of emotional distress, recklessness, and intentional sexual

assault. 7   As relevant to her equitable tolling argument, the Second Amended

       7 Soon after filing the First Amended Complaint, Clark sought leave to amend her
pleadings to replace defendant Angel Quiros, who had been erroneously identified as
working at MacDougall-Walker, with Roberto Quiros, a Captain in MacDougall-Walker’s
Intelligence Security Unit. See Clark v. Hanley, No. 18 Civ. 1765 (JAM) (D. Conn.)

                                          12
Complaint alleges that Clark was “not in a position to seek justice any earlier than

when she did” due to the impact of the sexual assaults, her fragile mental state,

and mistreatment by prison officials and inmates during the years after the assault.

App’x 123–25.

       Hanley and the MacDougall-Walker Defendants each filed motions to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Clark’s

claims were time-barred. The Defendants argued that, even as supplemented by

her amended pleadings, Clark failed to show extraordinary circumstances and

appropriate diligence so as to warrant equitable tolling.                The Defendants

emphasized that the Second Amended Complaint does not allege any attempt by

Clark to file this action between 2011 and 2018, despite her demonstrated capacity

to commence legal proceedings during this period, as evidenced by a habeas

petition she prepared in November 2011. 8 Clark argued in opposition that her

(“District Court Docket”), Dkt. No. 45. The First and Second Amended Complaints are
otherwise identical. See District Court Docket No. 45-11.
       8 Clark alleged in her habeas petition that her attorney in the criminal case “failed
to engage meaningfully in plea bargaining and to adequately inform the petitioner of the
terms of the plea offer in a timely manner.” App’x 278. As a result, she claimed she
was “unjustly coerced into entering a guilty plea without [her] counsel having
meaningfully explained the terms of any sentence that would be imposed” after pleading
guilty. Id. Clark withdrew the petition on February 10, 2023. See Nicholas Clark NKA
Veronica-May Elizabeth Clark #355139 v. Warden, TSR-CV12-4004677 (Conn. Super. Ct.).
                                            13
circumstances warranted equitable tolling and that resolution of this fact-laden

issue was premature at the pleading stage.

      The court heard oral argument on the Defendants’ motions to dismiss and

proposed holding a hearing to assess Clark’s claim for equitable tolling. Clark’s

counsel noted that he had an “issue” with the proposal because equitable tolling

is “a factually intense question,” A557-58, and he had not yet received sought-after

discovery relating to Clark’s prison medical records, the assault circumstances,

and retaliation by other prison officials. A560. Clark’s counsel did not object to

the idea of a limited evidentiary hearing but stated “I would just be a little bit

concerned, Your Honor, if there were an evidentiary hearing . . . that cabined the

inquiry on the exceptional circumstances to just sort of a very narrow aspect of it

without giving us the benefit of fully exploring those issues.”         App’x 566.

Counsel requested that “[i]f the Court is inclined to consider an evidentiary

hearing,” the Defendants should be ordered to provide the requested discovery.

App’x 570-71.

      Ultimately, the court decided “to conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide

if Clark can sustain her burden to establish grounds for equitable tolling.” SPA1.

The district court provided that Clark’s full medical file should be provided to the

                                        14
plaintiff, along with the “already requested discovery,” and that “the hearing

should be limited to the testimony of Clark and to . . . any exhibits or documents

that are not presently in the record and that any party wishes the Court to consider

that bear on the issue of equitable tolling.”     App’x 578, SPA2.     In accordance

with this instruction, the parties submitted a list of exhibits, which included,

among other things, a selection of Clark’s medical records and filings made in

Clark’s habeas case.

      C.     The Evidentiary Hearing

      The district court held the evidentiary hearing on September 20, 2021, which

consisted of direct and cross examinations of Clark, questioning by the court, and

oral argument from counsel.         Clark admitted that she failed to take even

preliminary steps to commence suit until 2016, notwithstanding that she both

provided a detailed account of the crimes to Connecticut police in November 2011

and, during the same month, pursued habeas relief based on the claim that her

attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in her criminal case. In broad

strokes, Clark described two, interrelated reasons for her inability to file this civil

case within the limitations period: (1) her fear that bringing suit against Hanley

and other high-level DOC officials would invite retaliation from corrections staff,

                                          15
as evidenced by their ridiculing her as a victim of sexual assault; and (2) the severe

psychological trauma she suffered related to the abuse, which aggravated her

gender dysphoria and heightened her fear of coming out as transgender in prison.

She argued that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled until at least

October 2015—three years before she filed her complaint.

      On her fear of retaliation, Clark repeatedly testified that she feared DOC

personnel would retaliate against her for filing this lawsuit. 9 See, e.g., App’x 360

(“I was afraid of the COs and the staff and retaliation for filing the lawsuit”).

Clark could not point to any specific threat of retaliation by DOC personnel, but

she sourced her fear to the repeated name-calling and ridicule she testified to

having experienced in the aftermath of the assaults. See, e.g., App’x 375 (“[I]n the

unit they would call me disgusting. And fag[g]ot. And they would laugh at me

because of what happened.”). She feared this derision would escalate if she filed

suit. See, e.g., App’x 478 (“I thought . . . the abuse would become worse to the

point of physical violence, and also that they would come into my cell and just tear

      9   Clark claimed she was reluctant even to provide her statement to the
Connecticut police, and that investigators pressured her to do so. In contrast, in his
affidavit in support of an application for an arrest warrant for Hanley, DaCruz affirmed
that Clark had requested to speak to a state trooper in order to file her complaint. Clark
denied this ever took place.
                                           16
it up every chance they got and just make my life a nightmare[.]”). Extensive

medical records introduced at the hearing, however, do not reflect that Clark ever

informed any prison mental health worker of these concerns, nor did she testify to

reporting the alleged insults to anyone else.

      As to her mental health struggles, Clark explained that she suffered from

depression and suicidal ideation at various points during the relevant period,

which conditions were heightened when she re-encountered corrections officers

from MacDougall-Walker, whom she associated with the abuse. See, e.g., App’x

387 (describing her encounters with such officers as “awful,” “terrible,” and

causing “really high anxiety”). Clark testified that she was too traumatized to

file suit while incarcerated at Cheshire from early 2012 until the middle of 2016.

Clark’s extensive medical records, however, reflect that by December 2012 she was

reporting to medical personnel at Cheshire that she was “doing fine,” experiencing

no major distress, and was both writing poetry and looking forward to

participating in the facility’s writing group. 10 App’x 604. Clark testified that the

      10 In another notation dated April 2013, Clark is reported to have denied any
psychiatric distress and to be “future oriented.” App’x 604. Clark was again seen in
December 2013 when prison officials became concerned at her sudden unwillingness to
work in the facility’s sign shop. She did report being depressed at that time but was

                                         17
only reason her mental health records suggest she was improving during this

period was because she had decided to stop being forthright with the DOC mental

health staff.   She produced no medical records at all for 2014 and 2015 but

explained that she avoided seeking mental health treatment during this period

because she did not trust the mental health personnel.

      Clark testified that there came a point in April 2016 when she first admitted

to and sought medical treatment for her gender dysphoria, while still at Cheshire.

She experienced “at least some mental health improvement” at that time but was

denied treatment, which was “horrible,” “really stressful,” and resulted in her

attempt at self-castration. 11   App’x 391–96.       Clark testified that she was only

able to take steps to bring suit later that year, when she was transferred to Garner,

noted to be cooperative and future oriented, if “very indignant about being found guilty
of murder and having been sentenced to 75 years.” App’x 606. Clark explained that
she was no longer willing to work in the sign shop because “[i]t’s immoral to make us
work for less than minimum wage and to sell our goods for money.” App’x 606. When
asked about this statement by the district court, Clark testified that she had been reading
Ayn Rand at the time.
      11   Clark testified that she feared coming out as transgender earlier because she
thought it would leave her vulnerable to abuse. See, e.g., App’x 453 (“One of the huge
things about not filing the lawsuit was my gender issues. Like, I felt that it would come
out that I was trans, you know. And that was like really, really scary for me.”); App’x
481 (“I just thought . . . I would be raped all the time [if I came out as transgender in
prison]. And beat up. Or killed. You know, just terrible things would happen to me
. . . .”).
                                            18
began receiving treatment for her gender dysphoria, and “felt safer.” App’x 401.

Yet, she also admitted requesting her most recent transfer back to Cheshire, where

she had allegedly suffered mistreatment, explaining, among other reasons, that

“there’s way more stuff at Cheshire like programs and so on and so forth.” App’x

402.

       As to her state habeas petition, Clark initially claimed that her fear of

retaliation and mental health issues did not inhibit her from working on it in

November 2011, only a few months after the assaults, because it had “nothing to

do with the DOC at all.” App’x 403–04. She added on direct examination that

after she filed the petition, counsel was assigned and she devoted no significant

amount of time to the matter. On questioning from the district court, however,

Clark claimed for the first time that her cellmate at Corrigan, where she was

incarcerated in November 2011, had in fact pressured her into preparing and filing

the petition: “[H]e prided himself on being a legal scholar, in his words. . . . I was

terrified of this guy. . . . [H]e kind of like made me file this. I didn’t want to file

it.” App’x 469–70. Despite claiming that her cellmate had forced her to bring

the habeas petition, however, Clark also testified that she is “happy” it was filed.

App’x 472.

                                          19
      D.       The Dismissal Order

      Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed Clark’s

Second Amended Complaint, deeming her claims barred by the applicable three-

year statute of limitations because she failed to demonstrate extraordinary

circumstances caused her tardy filing so as to warrant equitable tolling. See Clark

v. Hanley, No. 18 Civ. 1765 (JAM), 2022 WL 124298 (D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2022). The

district court concluded that neither of Clark’s stated reasons for failing timely to

bring suit—her alleged fear of retaliation or the trauma from Hanley’s abuse, as

aggravated by Clark’s gender dysphoria—caused her years-long delay in bringing

this action.    Accordingly, the court concluded that Clark was not entitled to

equitable tolling and that her suit was time-barred. See id. at *4–9.

      The district court first rejected Clark’s argument that concerns about

retaliation prevented her from filing this action within the limitations period. See

id. at *4–5. Clark was unable to recount any actual threat of retaliation from any

prison official, but attributed her fears to the anguish she felt when officers

allegedly insulted her or belittled the abuse she suffered. Id. Clark, however,

never filed any reports about such insults or mentioned them during her extensive

interactions with prison mental health officials. Id. at *5. The court found that

                                         20
Clark’s testimony “that she actually feared retaliation if she filed this lawsuit was

not credible.” Id. at *6.

       Turning to her second rationale, the district court recognized that Clark

suffered from serious depression and gender dysphoria during the period at issue,

at times to the point of self-harm.        The court nevertheless concluded that the

evidence did not establish a causal link between Clark’s mental state and the delay

in filing this lawsuit nor show that she exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing

her rights. See id. The court saw reason to doubt Clark’s claim that the abuse

“was of such a nature that [she] could not bring herself to talk about the incidents

or file a court action,” because soon after the abuse she provided a detailed account

of the events to a Connecticut state trooper. 12        Id.   The court also considered

Clark’s pro se habeas petition to “strongly weigh[ ] against” her contention that she

“was so psychologically immobilized that she lacked the ability . . . to file a federal

civil rights complaint to seek relief for Hanley’s sexual abuse.” 13 Id. at *7. The

        The district court rejected as not credible Clark’s testimony denying that she
       12

ever made a request to speak to a trooper in order to file a complaint.
       13 The district court noted that Clark “tried to blame her filing of the habeas corpus
petition on an unnamed cellmate,” but rejected this aspect of her testimony as “neither
plausible nor credible.” Clark, 2022 WL 124298, at *7.
                                             21
court found it significant that while Clark’s medical records reflect many concerns

about various issues in her life—that she missed her children, was frustrated with

the legal system, her ex-wife, and the charges against her—conspicuously absent

is any mention of trauma preventing her from filing suit. Id. at *7–8. “To the

contrary,” the court noted, these records “show Clark’s willingness to advocate for

herself in prison by going on a hunger strike, writing a complaint to the warden,

and protesting prison labor conditions . . . .” Id. at *8.

      As to Clark’s claim that she was only able to file suit after her transfer to

Garner in July 2016 and her treatment there for gender dysphoria, the court noted

that “[a]lthough Clark’s burden is to prove that the limitations period should be

tolled through October 2015, she has not introduced any medical records at all for

2014 or 2015.” Id. The court rejected Clark’s reliance on medical records from

dates long after the limitations period had expired, observing that even these later

records undercut her case. “There is one medical note from October 2017,” the

court observed, “stating that Clark is ‘focused on habeas appeal at present,

objective is to have a trial granted [in] hope of a [lower] sentence (currently doing

75 yrs. on a plea bargain).’”    Id.   The court observed that this note, far from

helping Clark carry her burden, “shows that she was able to focus at that time on

                                          22
seeking relief . . . a full year before she got around to filing her federal civil rights

action in this case in October 2018.” Id.

      “All in all,” the court concluded, Clark “failed to carry her burden to show

grounds for equitable tolling.”       Id. at *9.   The court acknowledged Clark’s

“significant mental health issues,” but determined that “the evidence does not

show that these issues prevented her from timely filing a complaint.” Id. Her

testimony on the critical points relevant to her equitable tolling claim “was not

generally credible or persuasive.” Id. Clark timely appealed.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

      In the ordinary case, “[w]e review a district court’s grant of a motion to

dismiss the complaint on the pleadings de novo and construe the complaint

liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 940 F.3d

804, 809 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).

      This appeal, however, comes to us in an unusual posture in that the district

court held an evidentiary hearing focused on equitable tolling, an issue over which

trial courts possess a degree of factfinding authority. See Doe v. United States, 76

F.4th 64, 70 (2d Cir. 2023) (“In general, district courts should ‘resolve the factual

                                           23
questions’ relevant to the equitable tolling of a statute of limitations, such as those

‘surrounding a plaintiff's mental state.’” (quoting Montin v. Est. of Johnson, 636 F.3d

409, 414–15 (8th Cir. 2011))); see also Upadhyay v. Sethi, 848 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446

(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Questions pertaining to matters of equity, including the

applicability of equitable tolling to statutes of limitations, are well within the ambit

of the Court’s authority to resolve.”). On review of the record, the district court

duly apprised the parties that it would resolve the issue of equitable tolling based

on matters outside the pleadings. Indeed, the evidentiary hearing possessed the

hallmarks of a bench trial limited to the issue of equitable tolling.        Given the

nature of these proceedings and the thoroughness of the record before the district

court, we review the district court’s equitable tolling decision for abuse of

discretion, as we ordinarily would from the denial of such a claim that has moved

beyond the pleading stage.        See Doe, 76 F.4th at 70 (“When a district court

determines that equitable tolling is inappropriate, we review the legal premises

for that conclusion de novo, the factual bases for clear error, and the ultimate

decision for abuse of discretion.” (quoting DeSuze v. Ammon, 990 F.3d 264, 268 (2d

Cir. 2021))); accord Phillips v. Generations Fam. Health Ctr., 723 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir.

2013).

                                           24
      Likewise, we review the district court’s decision regarding the scope of

discovery for abuse of discretion. See Pippins v. KPMG, LLP, 759 F.3d 235, 251 (2d

Cir. 2014) (“A trial court enjoys wide discretion in its handling of pre-trial

discovery, and we will reverse a district court’s discovery ruling only upon a clear

showing of an abuse of discretion.” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)); accord Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2016). “A district court

abuses its discretion only ‘when the discovery is so limited as to affect a party’s

substantial rights.’” In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 103 (2d Cir.

2008) (quoting Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 795 (2d Cir.1985)).

                                   DISCUSSION

      The parties agree that Connecticut’s general three-year statute of limitations

for personal injury actions applies to Clark’s § 1983 claims asserting violations of

her Eighth Amendment rights. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577; see also Walker v.

Jastremski, 430 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577 to a

§ 1983 claim). As Clark alleges no contact with Hanley following the date Hanley

resigned from his post at MacDougall-Walker, the district court indicated, and we

agree, that Clark’s claims accrued at the latest by August 2011. See Barnes v. City

of New York, 68 F.4th 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2023) (explaining that “federal law governs

                                         25
the accrual of [§ 1983] claims [which] typically accrue when the plaintiff knows or

has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of [her] action” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)). Based on this accrual date, the statute of

limitations on Clark’s claims expired in August 2014. She did not commence this

action, however, until October 26, 2018, more than four years beyond the

limitations period.

      In “rare and exceptional circumstances,” Walker, 430 F.3d at 564 (citation

omitted), the statute of limitations governing a § 1983 claim may be subject to

equitable tolling, “where necessary to prevent unfairness to a plaintiff who is not

at fault for her lateness in filing.” 14 Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 F.3d 318, 322 (2d Cir.

2011) (citation omitted). “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the

burden of establishing two elements: (1) that [s]he has been pursuing [her] rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way.”

      14  The MacDougall-Walker Defendants assert that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577 is a
statute of repose (not limitations) to which equitable tolling does not apply. As already
noted, this feature of Connecticut law forecloses any equitable tolling argument that
might apply to Clark’s state claims. It is less clear, however, whether this vitiates the
possibility of equitable tolling as to her federal claims. See Walker, 430 F.3d at 564
(assuming equitable tolling could apply to § 52-577 when applied to a § 1983 claim). We
need not resolve this question because even assuming arguendo that her federal claims
are eligible for equitable tolling, we agree with the district court that Clark has not
demonstrated her entitlement to tolling of the limitations period.
                                           26
Smalls v. Collins, 10 F.4th 117, 145 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).     “The law

prohibits a judge from exercising her discretion where these two elements are

missing[,]” but “[i]f they are found to be present . . . then a judge brings

discretionary considerations to bear in deciding whether to permit equitable

tolling.” Doe, 76 F.4th at 71.

      Clark seeks reversal or, in the alternative, vacatur of the district court’s

denial of her equitable tolling claim.         At the outset, Clark contends it was

inappropriate for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the

Defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), in which posture a

district court may not rely on matters outside the pleadings or engage in

factfinding. And, while a district court may convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into

one for summary judgment under Rule 12(d), Clark emphasizes that the district

court did not purport to do so here. 15 Clark additionally argues that the district

court resolved contested factual issues bearing on the substance of her legal claims,

which the Seventh Amendment reserves for the jury. Beyond these procedural

      15  In any event, Clark claims that summary judgment is inappropriate on this
truncated record, which was limited to her testimony at the evidentiary hearing and the
set of documents then available.
                                          27
errors, Clark insists that the record compels equitable tolling as a matter of law

and the district court’s ruling to the contrary was infused with legal and factual

error.

         None of these arguments has merit. The district court did not overstep by

holding an evidentiary hearing and resolving Clark’s equitable tolling claim based

on the evidence adduced therein. Neither did the court transgress the Seventh

Amendment by resolving factual issues that relate squarely to her equitable tolling

claim. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Clark

was not entitled to equitable tolling based on the record before it. We address

each of these arguments in turn.

I.       Claims of Procedural Error

         The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe distinct judicial roles at the

pleading, summary judgment, and trial stages of a case. Clark acknowledges that

district courts sit in equity on the issue of equitable tolling, which affords them a

degree of factfinding authority over the issue.       See Doe, 76 F.4th at 70.    The

district court erred here, she argues, by holding an evidentiary hearing on the basis

of limited discovery and by resolving disputed issues of fact upon a motion to

dismiss. While the Defendants invoked Rule 12(b)(6) in moving to dismiss the

                                           28
Second Amended Complaint, however, the record shows that the litigation had

progressed beyond the pleading stage on Clark’s equitable tolling claim.               The

parties were on notice that the district court intended to resolve this claim based

on evidence adduced at the hearing and that the evidentiary hearing, as

conducted, was the functional equivalent of a bench trial on the equitable tolling

issue. 16   In these circumstances, as set forth herein, the district court did not

deviate from the applicable procedural rules by holding this evidentiary hearing

and using it to resolve contested issues of fact going to Clark’s equitable tolling

claim. 17

       16 The dissent, but not Clark, contends that the 20 calendar days between the
August 2021 order announcing the hearing and the deadline to submit additional
materials was too short a time frame to provide Clark a meaningful opportunity to
establish the relevant facts. Dissent at 9. That Clark herself has not raised this issue
speaks for itself. At any rate, Clark received pro bono counsel in October, 2019 and
amended her complaint with equitable tolling in mind in November, 2020. We disagree
that she was shorted of the time needed to prepare on this issue.
       17 The MacDougall-Walker Defendants argue that Clark failed to preserve any
objection to the evidentiary hearing because she sought the opportunity to offer evidence
prior to the district court’s ruling on the motions to dismiss and she did not object when
the court scheduled the hearing. We agree that Clark did not clearly state an objection
to proceeding as the district court proposed, but we decline, in this case, to find that she
forfeited her challenge, as Clark did apprise the district court of concerns regarding the
evidentiary hearing during the pre-motion conference.
                                            29
       A.     The Procedural Framework for Equitable Tolling

       On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the district court’s task is

to assess the pleadings to determine whether they contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Int’l

Code Council, Inc. v. UpCodes Inc., 43 F.4th 46, 53 (2d Cir. 2022). In performing this

exercise, district courts “may review only a narrow universe of materials,” which

includes “facts stated on the face of the complaint, documents appended to the

complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, . . . matters of which

judicial notice may be taken,” as well as “document[s] not expressly incorporated

by reference in the complaint [that are] nevertheless ‘integral’ to the complaint.” 18

Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks,

alterations, and citations omitted).

       18 Both Hanley and the MacDougall Walker Defendants argue that the district
court did not flout the Rule 12(b)(6) standard because the extra-pleading materials it
considered were “integral” to her complaint. This is clearly incorrect. We have
explained that a matter may be deemed “integral” to the complaint “when the complaint
relies heavily upon its terms and effect.” Palin, 940 F.3d at 811 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). But “[h]earing testimony elicited by the trial judge after litigation
has already begun is not the type of material that ordinarily has the potential to be a
matter ‘integral’ to a plaintiff's complaint.” Id. The same logic applies to Clark’s
medical records, which, Clark represents, she did not have access to when drafting the
complaint.
                                            30
      Generally speaking, “the lapse of a limitations period is an affirmative

defense that a defendant must plead and prove.” Whiteside v. Hover-Davis, Inc., 995

F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 2021) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks, citation,

and alteration omitted). The pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure “do not compel a litigant to anticipate potential affirmative defenses,

such as the statute of limitations, and to affirmatively plead facts in avoidance of

such defenses.” Abbas, 480 F.3d at 640; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief”). “Nevertheless, a defendant may raise an affirmative defense in a pre-

answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the defense appears on the face of the complaint.”

Whiteside, 995 F.3d at 319 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).         A

court may dismiss a claim as untimely at the pleading stage “only if” from the face

of the complaint “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”    Harris v. City of

New York, 186 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

      Related to the pleading rules for affirmative defenses, equitable tolling often

raises fact-specific issues premature for resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

                                         31
before a plaintiff can develop the factual record. See, e.g., Brown v. Parkchester S.

Condominiums, 287 F.3d 58, 60–61 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating dismissal and ordering

evidentiary hearing because “[b]ased on the limited record presented to the

district court, it appears there may be substance to [the plaintiff’s equitable tolling]

claim.”); Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2000) (vacating dismissal and

remanding “to develop further the facts” on equitable tolling claim); see also Lama

v. Malik, 58 F. Supp. 3d 226, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases suggesting that

equitable tolling issues are generally not amenable to resolution on a motion to

dismiss). 19   We acknowledged as much in vacating the district court’s first

dismissal of Clark’s complaint, affirming the well-established rule that it is

generally improper to dismiss a complaint as untimely without first granting a

       19 This principle is generally applicable across circuits. See, e.g., Bernstein v.
Maximus Fed. Servs., Inc., 63 F.4th 967, 969 (5th Cir. 2023) (“When equitable tolling is raised
as a defense to a motion to dismiss, this court assume[s] the pleaded facts as true, and . . .
will remand if the plaintiff has pleaded facts that justify equitable tolling.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 301-02 (3d
Cir. 2010) (“[O]ur Court (and our sister circuit courts) have reasoned that, because the
question whether a particular party is eligible for equitable tolling generally requires
consideration of evidence beyond the pleadings, such tolling is not generally amenable
to resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”); Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992,
1003–04 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Generally, the applicability of equitable tolling depends on
matters outside the pleadings, so it is rarely appropriate to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss (where review is limited to the complaint) if equitable tolling is at issue.”).
                                              32
litigant notice and an opportunity to be heard. App’x 104 (citing Abbas, 480 F.3d

at 640).

       If “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the

court” on a motion to dismiss, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) provides that

“the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(d). In advance of such a conversion, “[a]ll parties must be given a

reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.”

Id.   We have stressed a functional approach to conversion, emphasizing that

“[t]he district court’s conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary

judgment is governed by principles of substance rather than form.” In re G. & A.

Books, Inc., 770 F.2d 288, 295 (2d Cir. 1985). As such, “[t]he essential inquiry is

whether the appellant should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the

motion might be converted into one for summary judgment or was taken by

surprise and deprived of a reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the

pleadings.”   Id.; see also Hernandez v. Coffey, 582 F.3d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 2009)

(“Ordinarily, formal notice is not required where a party should reasonably have

recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted into one for

summary judgment [and] was [neither] taken by surprise [nor] deprived of a

                                        33
reasonable opportunity to meet facts outside the pleadings.” (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted)).

      On summary judgment, courts are tasked with determining whether “the

movant [has] show[n] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

. . . is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”     Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   “The

function of the district court in considering the motion for summary judgment is

not to resolve disputed questions of fact but only to determine whether, as to any

material issue, a genuine factual dispute exists.” Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th

150, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This

limited judicial role stems from the precept that, at least as pertaining to a party’s

legal claims, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the

drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a

judge.” S. Katzman Produce Inc. v. Yadid, 999 F.3d 867, 877 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

      This logic is not altered because district courts may serve as the ultimate

factfinder on the issue of equitable tolling. In other words, when a district court

“approache[s] the issue of equitable tolling in the prototypical summary judgment

                                         34
posture”—that is, purporting to “draw[ ] legal conclusions based on purportedly

undisputed facts regarding the prerequisite elements to the exercise of equitable

tolling”—it is not acting in a factfinding capacity.              Doe, 76 F.4th at 71.

Accordingly, in the equitable tolling context, courts routinely grant summary

judgment to defendants where deficiencies in the record establish that the

prerequisites of equitable tolling have not been met and deny summary judgment

where a reasonable factfinder could conclude otherwise. 20

       When, however, a district court exercises its role as factfinder on an

equitable issue such as equitable tolling, we have stated that “a district court

generally should conduct an evidentiary hearing before making factual findings if

a plaintiff’s ‘sworn averments of fact, though disputed, meet the legal standards

       20 Compare, e.g., Perez v. Harbor Freight Tools, 698 F. App’x 627, 629 (2d Cir. 2017)
(summary order) (affirming denial of equitable tolling where plaintiff’s argument was
“belied by the record” and “no reasonable factfinder could have concluded” that the
plaintiff was incapacitated to the extent claimed); Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 185 (2d
Cir. 2000) (affirming summary judgment for a defendant where a plaintiff offered only a
“conclusory and vague claim, without a particularized description” of the circumstances
purporting to justify equitable tolling), with Doe, 76 F.4th at 71-72 (vacating grant of
summary judgment where a factfinder “could reasonably conclude that an extraordinary
circumstance stood in [the] way of commencing this case sooner”); Crosby v. United States,
No. 20 Civ. 330 (SDA), 2021 WL 4805465, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2021) (denying summary
judgment on equitable tolling where there existed “factual issues [that] should not be
decided in the summary judgment context”).
                                            35
for equitable tolling.’” Id. at 70 (quoting Torres v. Barnhart, 417 F.3d 276, 279 (2d

Cir. 2005)).    As such, evidentiary hearings exploring the merits of equitable

tolling claims are routine in the district courts. 21 Indeed, at times, this Court has

explicitly directed an evidentiary hearing when equitable tolling involves

weighing competing inferences or resolving contested factual issues. See Brown,

287 F.3d at 60–61 (finding an “evidentiary hearing [to be] appropriate to

determine” whether “equitable tolling would be in order”); Canales v. Sullivan, 936

F.2d 755, 756 (2d Cir. 1991) (remanding “for an evidentiary hearing to determine

if [the plaintiff’s] condition warrants equitable tolling.”). Going a step further,

we have held that a district court abused its discretion in not holding an

evidentiary hearing to resolve a plausible equitable tolling claim. See Torres, 417

F.3d at 276 (finding the district court’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing to

be an abuse).

       21 See, e.g., Moore v. City of Norwalk, No. 17 Civ. 695 (JAM), 2020 WL 6275033, at *1
(D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2020); Montgomery v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 403 F. Supp. 3d 331, 339
(S.D.N.Y. 2018); Moreno v. 194 E. Second St. LLC, No. 10 Civ. 7458 (JMF), 2013 WL 55954,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2013); Vincent v. Wal-Mart Store 3420, No. 10 Civ. 5536 (JFB), 2012
WL 3800833, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012); Wen Liu v. Mt. Sinai Sch. of Med., No. 09 Civ.
9663 (RJS), 2012 WL 4561003, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012); Upadhyay, 848 F. Supp. 2d at
446–47.
                                            36
       When a district court holds an evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling, the

hearing functions within the rubric of the federal rules as a bifurcated bench trial

on the issue of equitable tolling. 22     Because district judges sit in equity when

adjudicating equitable tolling, they are empowered at this hearing (qua bench

trial) to make credibility findings, weigh evidence, and resolve factual disputes

that bear on equitable tolling, so long as they stay within the bounds of the Seventh

Amendment.       Sometimes, district courts convene an evidentiary hearing after

deciding on summary judgment that the issue cannot be resolved based on the

record compiled in discovery. 23 Other times, district courts hold a hearing earlier

       22 It is well-established that district courts have discretion to structure the
sequence of issues to be adjudicated in a given case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (“For
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a
separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-
party claims.”). This equally pertains to the sequencing of legal and equitable issues.
See 8 Moore’s Fed. Prac. § 39.14 (“[W]here disposition of the equitable claim would make
consideration of the legal claim unnecessary, common sense dictates that the equitable
claim be determined first.”); 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc.
Civ. § 2338 (4th ed.) (“If legal and equitable issues are completely independent, so that
the resolution of one will not control the resolution of the other, the trial court has
discretion to decide the order of trial as a matter of administrative convenience.”).
       23  See, e.g., Crosby, 2021 WL 4805465, at *2 (denying defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and directing evidentiary hearing to resolve factual questions
applicable to equitable tolling); Lama v. Malik, No. 13 Civ. 2846 (LDW), 2015 WL 13758051,
at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2015) (same); Moreno, 2013 WL 55954, at *3 (same); Wen Liu, 2012
WL 4561003, at *7 (same); Upadhyay, 848 F. Supp. 2d at 446-47 (same).
                                            37
in the case, with an eye toward facilitating the efficient adjudication of the possibly

controlling issue of equitable tolling. 24 District courts have discretion on how to

sequence the hearing, so long as they afford the parties a full and fair opportunity

to be heard on the issue. See In re Agent Orange, 517 F.3d at 103 (“A party must

be afforded a meaningful opportunity to establish the facts necessary to support

his claim.”).

      B.        Application

      Clark argues that in dismissing her claims, the district court “contravened

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s precedent at every step . . . .”

Appellant’s Br. 3. At base, she contends that the district court erred in holding

an evidentiary hearing for factfinding purposes at the pleading stage. But we

fundamentally disagree with Clark’s characterization of the proceedings below.

As the record shows, the parties had moved beyond the pleading stage to a bench

      24 See, e.g., Moore, 2020 WL 6275033, at *2 (resolving equitable tolling based on
testimony elicited at evidentiary hearing after defendant moved to dismiss); Montgomery,
403 F. Supp. 3d at 339, 343 (same); Alamo v. Berryhill, No. 18 Civ. 210 (JCH), 2018 WL
3596751, at *3 (D. Conn. July 26, 2018) (determining at the pleading stage that evidentiary
hearing was required to adjudicate equitable tolling); F.B. by Galbato v. Berryhill, No. 15
Civ. 148 (BKS) (CFH), 2018 WL 5777768, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2018) (same); Vincent,
2012 WL 3800833, at *5 (same); Rodriguez v. Barnhart, No. 01 Civ. 3411 (DAB) (MHD), 2002
WL 31875406, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 2002) (same).
                                            38
trial on Clark’s equitable tolling claim, notwithstanding the Defendants’

invocation of Rule 12(b)(6). The circumstances of this case thus call for treating

the evidentiary hearing for what it functionally was—a bifurcated bench trial on

the issue of equitable tolling.

      To begin, the judgment on appeal is the district court’s second dismissal of

Clark’s case on timeliness grounds, coming after we vacated the district court’s

first dismissal for failing to afford Clark notice and an opportunity to argue her

equitable tolling claim. The stage, therefore, was set on remand for the parties to

reach the substance of Clark’s contention that she had, in fact, exercised diligence

in pursuing her untimely claim, but that extraordinary circumstances prevented

her from timely filing.

      On remand, once the Defendants renewed their motions to dismiss, the

district court held a pre-motion conference, at which it made clear to the parties

that it did not believe it could properly adjudicate Clark’s equitable tolling claim

based solely on the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint. See App’x

540 (suggesting “it would not be appropriate for [the district court] to try to resolve

[equitable tolling] on just the basis of the allegations of the complaint”); App’x 578

(“I’m really not comfortable with trying to decide this equitable tolling issue solely

                                          39
on the papers that I have in front of me.”). The district court thus proposed, and

ultimately settled on, an evidentiary hearing, a procedural device we have time

and again endorsed (sometimes even required) in the equitable tolling context.

See Doe, 76 F.4th at 70; Torres, 417 F.3d at 279.     The court made clear that the

hearing would be “limited in terms of overall scope” with a focus on “trying to

understand the state of mind of Ms. Clark . . . and what it is that she felt that . . .

resulted in her waiting years beyond the statute of limitations” to file this action.

App’x 578. But the district court permitted the parties in advance of the hearing

to provide “any exhibits or documents that are not presently in the record and that

any party wishes the Court to consider that bear on the issue of equitable tolling,”

which they did. SPA2; see also App’x 256–57 (exhibit list).

      It is thus beyond dispute that Clark was aware going into the evidentiary

hearing that the district court intended to resolve her equitable tolling claim based

on the record that would be compiled at the hearing.             The hearing, itself,

resembled a bench trial.       It included direct, cross, re-direct, and re-cross

examinations of Clark, as well as oral argument from counsel on whether she had

met her burden on equitable tolling.       See App’x 356–406 (direct examination),

406–20 (cross examination), 420–474 (court’s questioning), 474–81 (redirect

                                          40
examination), 481–84 (recross examination), 484–526 (oral argument). And the

hearing transcript reveals that Clark had a full opportunity to testify to the

circumstances she claims prevented her from timely filing this action.

      Clark faults the district court for failing to convert (either explicitly or

implicitly) the Defendants’ motions to dismiss into ones for summary judgment.

But converting the Defendants’ motions would have served no practical purpose

in the context of this case. Cf. In re G. & A. Books, 770 F.2d at 295 (noting that the

conversion rules are “governed by principles of substance rather than form”). As

already discussed, district courts scrupulously avoid resolving any factual

disputes on summary judgment because “[c]redibility determinations, the

weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts

are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . .” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. When it

comes to equitable tolling, however, district judges are empowered to make

precisely the types of determinations that are disallowed on summary judgment.

Given the district court’s authority to find facts on equitable issues, the district

court’s decision to convene an evidentiary hearing on the issue of equitable tolling

obviated the purpose of the summary judgment exercise, i.e., determining whether

there are any triable issues of fact.

                                         41
      Clark disputes that she had a full opportunity to discover and present

evidence relevant to her equitable tolling claim, arguing that the district court

unduly curtailed the record by limiting what could be presented at the hearing.

We are unpersuaded. District courts are vested with “wide latitude to determine

the scope of discovery and we ordinarily defer to the discretion of district courts

regarding discovery matters.”        In re Agent Orange, 517 F.3d at 103 (internal

quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted); see also EM Ltd. v. Republic of

Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Of course, as in all matters relating to

discovery, the district court has broad discretion to limit discovery in a prudential

and proportionate way.”), aff’d sub nom. Republic of Argentina v. NML Cap., Ltd., 573

U.S. 134 (2014). A district court abuses its discretion only “when the discovery is

so limited as to affect a party’s substantial rights.” In re Agent Orange, 517 F.3d at

103 (citation omitted).

      Here, in deciding Clark’s equitable tolling claim, the district court permitted

limited discovery to proceed during the pendency of the Defendants’ motions to

dismiss. 25 At the hearing, in addition to Clark’s testimony, the district court had

      25 The district court twice denied Defendants’ request for a stay of discovery while
their motions to dismiss remained pending.
                                           42
before it Hanley’s arrest warrant application, records of Clark’s transfer history

among DOC prison facilities, Clark’s medical records from the period she seeks to

have tolled, filings from her state habeas case, and an amicus brief filed by the

New Haven Pride Center. The district court additionally permitted the parties to

“file . . . any documents that they intend to use as exhibits during the hearing or

that they wish the Court to consider with respect to the issue of equitable tolling

. . . .” SPA3.

      In setting the bounds of the available record, the district court sought to

focus on matters going to the heart of Clark’s theory for equitable tolling. Clark

claimed that tolling was appropriate due to the combination of her mental

condition and fear of retaliation at the hands of correctional officers. Fitting the

contours of this claim, the district court designed the evidentiary hearing “to

understand the state of mind of Ms. Clark . . . .” App’x 578. The district court’s

initial inclination was that it could make a determination as to the merits of her

equitable tolling claim on the basis of Clark’s testimony, her medical file, and the

record of her state habeas case, yet the court left open the possibility that

“something would surface in [Clark’s] testimony that has further bearing and

suggests that additional evidence would be needed . . . .”   App’x 578–79.

                                        43
      Clark nevertheless protests that the district court ruled on her equitable

tolling claim based on an incomplete record devoid of, for instance, “expert

testimony . . . which could have illuminated the impact of sexual assault and

gender dysphoria on Ms. Clark’s ability to seek relief.” 26 Appellant’s Br. 41; see

also Reply Br. 12–13 (suggesting additional discovery along the lines of “expert

testimony about sexual assault or gender dysphoria, . . . corroboration from prison

staff, cross-examin[ations of] medical personnel about information not contained

in the medical records, or investigat[ion of] instances of retaliation”). But Clark

did not raise the possibility of introducing such testimony before the district court.

       In addition, the court had more than an adequate basis to reject the

additional discovery Clark did request.           Clark’s counsel sought additional

discovery relating to (1) the severity of Hanley’s assaults and (2) institutional

retaliation.   App’x 560.    But as the district court observed, the record already

      26    To the extent Clark contends that the district court lacked any information
regarding the unique difficulties confronting transgender survivors of sexual violence,
this is belied by the New Haven Pride Center’s amicus brief submitted in opposition to
the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 82-1. The brief cites multiple
studies to contextualize rates of violence perpetrated against transgender individuals
alongside reasons why such instances might go unreported, see id. at 5–13, and the district
court expressly noted it had “taken into account the arguments advanced in [this] amicus
brief . . . about how transgender prisoners in general may be particularly reluctant to
report abuse and vulnerable as well to retaliation,” SPA19 n.67.
                                            44
contained Hanley’s arrest warrant, which included “a very detailed verbatim

recitation of multiple assaults by Mr. Hanley.”              App’x 561.       And as to

institutional retaliation, Clark had not alleged that anyone at DOC ever threatened

to retaliate against her, as opposed to ridicule her with “insulting comments.”

App’x 563.     Concerned that Clark was “on a fishing expedition” “for merits

discovery,” App’x 563–64, the district court thus declined to expand the record

beyond Clark’s expected testimony and the discovery that had already been

authorized. This was not an abuse of discretion. 27 In sum, Clark was unable to

show that the information she sought was not duplicative of what was already in

the record or based on speculation beyond the allegations in her complaint. We

      27  The dissent suggests that the district court “prevented Clark from developing
and presenting” five categories of evidence that might have more fully informed its
decision. Dissent at 10-11. But Clark never sought evidence as to four of these five
categories (i.e., affidavits or deposition testimony from the medical providers who treated
her, from her fellow prisoners, from an independent psychologist, or from an expert on
the difficulties faced by transgender inmates). And as to the final category—evidence
concerning the assaults themselves—the district court, as we already noted, had the
benefit of the detailed affidavit about Hanley’s abuse that Clark included with her
complaint. Clark also had the opportunity to submit “any [additional] documents” that
she “wish[ed] the Court to consider.” SPA3. Accordingly, Clark was hardly unable
“to present the district court with a full[] picture of her circumstances.” Dissent at 11.

                                            45
thus conclude that Clark was afforded a meaningful opportunity to establish the

facts necessary to support her claim.

II.   The Seventh Amendment

      Clark next argues that the district court violated her Seventh Amendment

right to a jury trial by resolving contested factual issues bearing on the merits of

her legal claims. Recognizing the overarching principle that “claims in equity,

including tolling, generally fall outside the Seventh Amendment’s scope,”

Appellant’s Br. 42, Clark contends that the district court “neglected the significant

overlap between [her] equitable tolling argument and her Section 1983 claims,” id.

at 45, which both arise from the same set of operative facts—Hanley’s sex crimes.

Clark asserts that it is impossible to disentangle the district court’s factual findings

on equitable tolling from those relating to her legal claims. But as set forth below,

the district court’s decision did not violate the Seventh Amendment.

      “The Seventh Amendment protects the right to a jury trial only for matters

at law, ‘in contradistinction’ to those in equity.” In re CBI Holding Co., Inc., 529

F.3d 432, 465 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,

41 (1989)); see also U.S. Const. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the

value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be

                                          46
preserved . . . .”). Even then, “the right to a jury trial exists . . . only with respect

to disputed issues of fact.” Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 819 (2d Cir.

1977), aff’d, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). “When legal and equitable claims are joined in

the same action, ‘the right to jury trial on the legal claim, including all issues

common to both claims, remains intact.’” Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S.

545, 550 (1990) (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196, n. 11 (1974)).       “To

safeguard this right,” we have said that “the general rule is that the jury must

decide the legal claims prior to the court’s determination of the equitable claims,

in order to prevent the court’s determination of a common factual issue from

precluding, by collateral estoppel effect, a contrary determination by the jury.”

Wade v. Orange Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 844 F.2d 951, 954 (2d Cir. 1988) (internal citations

omitted) (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959); Dairy

Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479 (1962)); see also Wright & Miller, § 2338 (“If

. . . issues of fact are common to both the legal and equitable claims and a jury has

been demanded on the common issues that are material to the legal claim, a jury

must be permitted to determine these issues prior to deciding the equitable aspects

of the case”). This is a prudential rule, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.

322, 334 (1979), and one the district court acknowledged in explaining that it could

                                           47
only “determine the issue of equitable tolling provided that it [did] not make

factual determinations reserved by the Seventh Amendment for a jury to resolve

as to a plaintiff’s legal claims.” SPA2.

       This general rule was not dishonored here. “The Court’s concern in these

cases has been the res judicata or collateral estoppel effect of a prior determination

of an equitable claim upon questions common to a legal claim.” 28 Heyman v. Kline,

456 F.2d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1972). Consistent with the preclusion standard, when

considering whether resolution of an equitable claim might infringe on the jury

trial right, we have “consider[ed] whether the elements of [the] claim[s] . . . are so

similar that a finding in favor of [a party] on one claim necessitates a finding for

[that party] on the other claim” as well. 29 Song v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 957 F.2d

       28 In order for a prior ruling to have collateral estoppel effect on a given issue, “(1)
the issues in both proceedings must be identical; (2) the issue in the prior proceeding
must have been actually litigated and actually decided; (3) there must have been a full
and fair opportunity for litigation in the prior proceeding; and (4) the issue previously
litigated must have been necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.”
S.E.C. v. Monarch Funding Corp., 192 F.3d 295, 304 (2d Cir. 1999); accord Seneca Nation v.
Hochul, 58 F.4th 664, 668 (2d Cir. 2023).
       29 The foundational Supreme Court cases enshrining the importance of preserving
a litigant’s jury trial right when legal and equitable claims are presented together
involved drawing factual conclusions that would necessarily have decided both types of
claims. See Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 479–80 (holding that jury trial was required where
legal claims seeking monetary relief and equitable claims seeking injunctive relief both

                                              48
1041, 1048 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that a district court sitting in equity on a Title

VII claim must conform its findings to those a jury rendered in the same case

sitting at law on an employment discrimination claim under New York State

Human Rights Law). But that is simply not the case in the circumstances here.

       At the start, the factual issues relevant to Clark’s equitable tolling claim and

her § 1983 claims are analytically and temporally distinct.               Her deliberate

indifference claim, for instance, is fundamentally backward-looking, pertaining to

the conditions of Clark’s confinement and Defendants’ awareness and behavior

up to the time she was sexually assaulted. See Morgan v. Dzurenda, 956 F.3d 84,

89 (2d Cir. 2020) (outlining the elements of an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim, which requires an inmate to prove “(1) that [the plaintiff] is

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, and (2)

“that the prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind, which in prison-

hinged on “the question of whether there [had] been a breach of contract”); Beacon
Theatres, 359 U.S. at 503–04 (holding that jury trial was required where legal and equitable
claims both turned on the reasonableness of certain exclusive rights afforded to a theater
to show first-run movies, which involved gauging the level of competition between two
theaters). And even then, there are circumstances in which courts may proceed to
resolve an equitable claim first, “’even though the results might be dispositive of the
issues involved in the legal claim.’” Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 335 (quoting Katchen v.
Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966)).
                                            49
conditions cases is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). So, too, Clark’s constitutional claim against

Hanley for sexual abuse requires assessing his assaultive conduct at the time it

occurred. See Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 256–58 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining

that sexual abuse by a corrections officer is cognizable where (1) “the defendant

acted with a subjectively sufficiently culpable state of mind” and (2) the conduct

was objectively harmful enough or sufficiently serious to reach constitutional

dimensions” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).          The equitable

tolling inquiry, by contrast, is trained solely on the circumstances that Clark faced

after the date her claims accrued. See Smalls, 10 F.4th at 145 (“Generally, a litigant

seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that

[s]he has been pursuing [her] rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in [her] way.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

      Should liability be established, the damages inquiry as to Clark’s claims

would require that the jury determine how much money would compensate Clark

for the harm that the Defendants’ misconduct caused her to suffer. But this is

distinct from the district court’s equitable tolling inquiry, which required assessing

whether the harm Clark suffered caused her to miss the filing deadline despite

                                         50
reasonable diligence in pursuing the claim. To be sure, both inquiries touch upon

the consequences of Hanley’s sexual assault, but neither depends on the other; a

jury could assign any degree of monetary value to the harm notwithstanding

whether the district court found that harm to have been an extraordinary obstacle

that prevented Clark from timely filing suit. 30 Clark argues, to the contrary, that

several features of the decision below foreclose aspects of her legal claim. But

this is simply incorrect.

      First, Clark takes issue with the district court’s “sweeping credibility

determinations,” which she asserts usurped the jury’s role to gauge her credibility

on the critical issue of the impact of Hanley’s abuse. Appellant’s Br. 45. But the

district court’s credibility findings were limited to specific aspects of Clark’s

testimony that related squarely to whether she encountered circumstances that

caused her to delay in filing her complaint. These findings cannot be said to have

      30  The dissent contends that the severity of Hanley’s abuse is an issue common to
Clark’s equitable tolling and Section 1983 claims. Dissent at 17. We disagree. True,
“Clark bears the burden of demonstrating that Hanley’s abuse was of constitutional
magnitude” in asserting her Section 1983 claims. Id. But the equitable tolling inquiry
is different. It focuses on a distinct question: whether the abuse and its effects—severe
or not—caused Clark to delay in filing suit.
                                           51
resolved any issues “identical” or even “common” to those presented on her legal

claims. See Seneca Nation v. Hochul, 58 F.4th 664, 668 (2d Cir. 2023).

      For instance, the district found that Clark’s “testimony that she actually

feared retaliation if she filed this lawsuit was not credible.”       Clark, 2022 WL

124298, at *6. But whether Clark, in fact, suspected she would face retaliation for

filing this lawsuit has no bearing on any element of her constitutional claims.

Similarly, the court disbelieved Clark’s denial, contrary to the affirmation of

DeCruz, that she affirmatively “requested to speak to a state trooper to file a

complaint” against Hanley.       Clark, 2022 WL 124298, at *6 n.42.        But, again,

whether Clark solicited DaCruz to relate the circumstances of her abuse does not

bear on the elements of her legal claims and is not a factual issue of relevance—let

alone identity—to the merits of these claims.            Finally, the district court

determined that “Clark falsely testified that she lied [to Cheshire mental health

staff about being psychologically stable] because she realized how damaging the

notes of her statements to the mental health staff at Cheshire were to her claim for

equitable tolling in this case.” Id. at *7 n.55. But this finding, too, is specifically

                                          52
tied to her equitable tolling claim and does not purport to establish that she did

not, in fact, suffer from abuse-related harm during her incarceration. 31

       Clark next contends that the district court determined that “‘the trauma

stemming from Hanley’s sexual abuse’ was not meaningfully ‘severe,’”

foreclosing her from seeking emotional damages from a jury. Appellant’s Br. 46

(quoting Clark, 2022 WL 124298, at *6, *7). But Clark overreads the district court’s

findings on the effect of Hanley’s abuse. Far from concluding that Clark suffered

no harm or trauma stemming from Hanley’s abuse, the district court directly

acknowledged Clark’s suffering in the aftermath of the abuse, which was

aggravated by her gender dysphoria. See Clark, 2022 WL 124298, at *6 (“I do not

doubt the evidence that Hanley abused Clark and that Clark was also deeply

depressed—at times to the point of self-harm—as well as conflicted about her

gender”).     Moreover, the district court’s factual findings as to the effects of

Hanley’s abuse were all expressly tied to whether they caused Clark to delay filing

       31 The fact that Clark’s medical records, if she had succeeded in establishing a basis
for equitable tolling, might have been presented to the jury on the issue of damages does
not change this analysis. “[C]onsideration of some aspects of the same relevant evidence”
does not create a Seventh Amendment issue. Afga Corp. v. Creo Products Inc., 451 F.3d
1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209,
1213 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
                                             53
this lawsuit. See, e.g., Id. at *7 (“If Hanley’s abuse of Clark was so traumatic that

it prevented Clark from filing a court action for seven years, one would reasonably

expect some sign of this trauma to surface in the extensive notes of conversations

between Clark and prison mental health counselors” (emphasis added)); id. at *9

(“Although I credit Clark’s claim that she suffers from gender dysphoria, the

evidence does not show that her dysphoria or any other underlying mental

condition prevented her from filing this lawsuit within the three years of Hanley’s assaults

. . . .” (emphasis added)). This is not an issue common to the damages inquiry a

jury would undertake.

       Finally, Clark asserts that the district court ignored how her allegations of

retaliation relate to the merits of her deliberate indifference claim. She contends

that the district court preempted her ability to argue that “the MacDougall-Walker

Defendants’ involvement in the Hanley investigation evidenced their knowledge

of the substantial risk that Hanley posed to inmates . . . .” Appellant’s Br. 47–48.

Again, the district court did no such thing.         Clark testified at the evidentiary

hearing that Manley, who investigated Hanley’s assaults on Clark, did “the right

thing” in helping to hold Hanley to account after his assaultive conduct. App’x

426–27.    The district court referenced this portion of Clark’s testimony to

                                            54
highlight that Clark had no explanation, given this testimony, as to why she feared

retaliation from Manley in the aftermath of the investigation.          Clark, 2022 WL

124298, at *5. Contrary to Clark’s contention, however, the district court made

no factual finding as to Manley’s—or any other Defendant’s—awareness of

Hanley’s conduct before Clark’s claims accrued, as a result of the earlier

investigation. And in any event, whether Manley attempted to dissuade Clark

from filing suit is an issue entirely distinct from her legal claims.

      Clark cites cases to support the proposition that her equitable tolling claim

should be submitted to the jury. But because these cases involve a much closer

identity of relevant facts bearing on the equitable and legal questions, they

undercut rather than support her position. In Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, for

example, the plaintiff brought legal claims against an accounting firm alleging that

the firm fraudulently concealed its preparation of false and misleading financial

documents for a company of which the plaintiff was a shareholder. 609 F.2d 583,

585 (2d Cir. 1979). The plaintiff sought equitable tolling “by reason of this alleged

fraudulent concealment . . . .” Id. at 593. We determined that the jury should

decide “whether there was fraudulent concealment sufficient to invoke the federal

equitable tolling doctrine” because both Robinson’s legal and equitable claims

                                          55
required determining precisely the same issue: whether the accounting firm had

fraudulently concealed its misconduct.         Id.   But unlike in Robertson, Clark’s

equitable tolling and § 1983 claims are analytically and temporally distinct.

      Clark also cites Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., an employment discrimination

case in which the Sixth Circuit concluded that the issue of equitable tolling should

be heard by a jury alongside the plaintiff’s legal claims. 600 F.2d 24, 28 (6th Cir.

1979). But as in Robinson, the claims were not distinct: the Ott plaintiff alleged

that he was wrongfully discharged because of his age by an employer who

fraudulently induced him into a consulting arrangement to secure a waiver of the

plaintiff’s right to sue for age discrimination. Id. at 26–27. The plaintiff sought

equitable tolling on the grounds that he was fraudulently induced to forego suit

by entering into this agreement.       Id. at 30–31.       The Sixth Circuit found

“submission of the entire case to the jury [to be] particularly appropriate” because

the merits of the age discrimination claim necessitated an inquiry into the

employer’s “motives for terminating [the plaintiff],” while his equitable tolling

claim similarly brought into question the “good faith of [the employer] in offering

the consultation agreement[.]”    Id. at 31.     More than just a degree of factual

overlap, both inquiries were “pieces of the larger mosaic of [the employer’s]

                                        56
  treatment of [the plaintiff].” Id. This stands in contrast to Clark’s case, where

  her equitable tolling claim hinges on her own mental state and perception of the

  risk of retaliation, while her constitutional claims turn entirely on the Defendants’

  conduct and knowledge at a time prior to the period she seeks to have tolled.

        In sum, the district court did not intrude on Clark’s jury trial right by

  determining whether she was entitled to relief from the statute of limitations

  before proceeding further with her case. Clark’s argument for equitable tolling

  is distinct from the merits of her legal claims and the decision below treated them

  as such. Accordingly, the district court did not violate the Seventh Amendment

  in determining that Clark failed to establish the “rare and exceptional

  circumstances” necessary to excuse an untimely filing. Walker, 430 F.3d at 564

  (citation omitted).

III.    Equitable Tolling Analysis

        Clark maintains, finally, that the record assembled at the evidentiary

  hearing compels the conclusion that she is entitled to equitable tolling as a matter

  of law.    From the premise that “medical conditions, whether physical or

  psychiatric, can manifest extraordinary circumstances depending on the facts

  presented,” Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2011), Clark urges that the

                                           57
record “leaves no doubt” that the combination of Hanley’s repeated sexual

assaults, her particular mental condition, and her fear of reprisal presented

extraordinarily severe obstacles to her filing this case as a matter of law. We do

not discount Clark’s traumatic experiences or that such circumstances could

warrant equitable tolling in the appropriate case.        Here, however, we cannot

conclude that that district court abused its discretion in deciding that Clark failed

to establish a basis for equitable tolling.

      As previously noted, we review equitable tolling determinations for abuse

of discretion, that is, with an eye toward whether the district court’s ruling is

“within the range of possible permissible decisions.” See Phillips, 723 F.3d at 149

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If an asserted error is legal in

nature, our review is de novo; meanwhile, we review factual determinations for

clear error. Id. Clark posits both types of errors. But the record establishes no

basis for upsetting the district court’s determination.

      Turning to the first of the district court’s supposed legal errors, Clark claims

that in analyzing her fear of retaliation, the district court focused its analysis only

on the Defendants’ efforts to threaten or retaliate against her, when the law is clear

that non-defendants can equally contribute to extraordinary circumstances for

                                              58
equitable tolling purposes. But the district court did not ignore Clark’s concerns

about non-defendant corrections officials, let alone proceed under a rule that fear

of retaliation from a non-defendant cannot support equitable tolling. Rather, the

district court, relying on Davis v. Jackson, No. 15 Civ. 5359 (KMK), 2016 WL

5720811, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016), simply explained that “in the prison

context, reasonable fear of retaliation may be sufficient to constitute extraordinary

circumstances warranting equitable tolling, particularly if the person threatening

retaliation is a defendant or another official who could be or was influenced by a defendant.”

Clark, 2022 WL 124298, at *4 (emphasis added). The court specifically considered

the “other correctional officials,” id., who Clark claimed made her feel vulnerable,

but ultimately found her allegations too vague to support a valid threat of

retaliation. See also id. at *5 (noting that “Clark never reported any of the alleged

insults made to her by any officers, much less any belief she purportedly had that

these officers were trying to intimidate her from filing a court action against any of

the named defendants in this action” (emphases added)).                This was not legal

error.

         The district court’s other asserted legal error is for failing to factor Clark’s

gender dysphoria into its analysis.          But Clark mischaracterizes the decision

                                             59
below. The court stated that it did not doubt that Clark was “conflicted about her

gender” and that she was “subject to depression and gender dysphoria,” and the

court expressly “credit[ed] Clark’s claim that she suffers from gender dysphoria.”

Id. at *6, *9.   Clark dismisses the court’s discussion of her mental condition as

making “no reference to the clinical conditions that accompany gender dysphoria

and giv[ing] no consideration to whether or how sexual assault might affect a

transgender individual suffering from the condition.” Appellant’s Br. 62. Far

from ignoring Clark’s medical condition, however, the court expressly took it into

account but concluded that “the evidence does not show that her dysphoria or any

other underlying mental condition prevented [Clark] from filing this lawsuit

within the three years of Hanley’s assaults from August 2011 to August 2014.”

Clark, 2022 WL 124298, at *9. As already noted, the court cast doubt on Clark’s

claim that she was unable to talk about Hanley’s abuse by pointing to the fact that

soon after the events in question, she provided a full statement to the Connecticut

police. Moreover, in late 2011 into 2012—within the period Clark seeks to have

tolled—Clark filed the habeas petition in state court, which the district court

believed “strongly weighs against a conclusion that Clark was so psychologically

immobilized that she lacked the ability at that time to file a federal civil rights

                                         60
complaint to seek relief for Hanley’s sexual abuse.” Id. at *7. Again, there was

no legal error.

      On the factual side, Clark argues that “the district court’s finding of no

extraordinary circumstances is clearly erroneous” because “[t]he entire evidence

assembled here compels the conclusion that Ms. Clark faced extraordinary

circumstances that warrant equitable tolling.”         Appellant’s Br. 68–69.       She

disputes, for instance, the district court’s conclusion that her fear of retaliation was

not credible. The district court discounted Clark’s testimony regarding her fear

of retaliation, however, because Clark did not attest to any overt threat of

retaliation by any relevant actor, did not report any of the alleged insults that

ostensibly generated her fear, and because her medical records make no mention

of any officer harassment.       The court’s skepticism on this point, then, was

grounded in the record and is not based on any clearly erroneous finding of fact.

See Sulzer Mixpac AG v. A&N Trading Co., 988 F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Factual

findings are clearly erroneous if they are without adequate support in the record,

are against the clear weight of the evidence, or are the product of an erroneous

view of the law.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).           Clark, in

effect, urges us to adopt a more favorable view of her testimony than that taken

                                          61
by the district court. But we are not free to reject a district court’s factual findings

absent clear error, which Clark has failed to show.

       Finally, Clark points to the district court’s preliminary observation that:

             As to the trauma stemming from Hanley’s sexual abuse,
             the assaults on Clark were plainly unlawful, wrong, and
             abusive.     But these assaults were not physically
             coercive or made under threat of harm or retaliation.
             They were unlike a violent sexual assault or rape that
             would likely result in the most severe type of
             psychological trauma.

Clark, 2022 WL 124298, at *6. To be sure, we do not endorse the proposition—for

which there is no record evidence—that certain types of assault are more or less

likely to cause severe psychological trauma across all victims in all settings. But

we need not endorse such a proposition to conclude, here, that the district court

did not clearly err in determining as to Clark that her trauma did not prevent her

from filing a timely suit. In other words, this remark does not obviate the district

court’s otherwise sound factfinding, nor constitute a basis for upsetting the court’s

work. 32

       32 The dissent characterizes this remark as a conclusion, Dissent at 4, and as a
factual finding, Dissent at 22. We do not read the district court’s comment to hold such
weight. It is a characterization of the assaults, phrased in the abstract, unsupported by
any citation, and immediately followed with more case-specific reasoning that forms the

                                           62
      After conducting an evidentiary hearing at which the district court heard

from Clark firsthand, and after considering her testimony in light of the assembled

record, the district court determined that Clark failed to show that her

psychological state prevented her from complying with the statute of limitations.

The onus was on Clark to show both extraordinary circumstances and that she

exercised “reasonable diligence throughout the period [she seeks] to toll.”

Walker, 430 F.3d at 564. Yet, Clark undertook no effort at filing this case for nearly

five years after her claims accrued—already two years beyond the limitations

period—and did not actually file it for another two years, even as she pursued her

habeas claim. Even accepting Clark’s testimony that coming out as transgender

in April 2016 was a watershed moment in her life that alleviated an immense

amount of pressure and anxiety, the district court did not clearly err in giving

weight to those portions of the record that undermined her claim to equitable

tolling. And absent legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding, it is not for

an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the appropriate factfinder

in areas within its purview. We decline to do so here.

basis of the district court’s determination as to whether the harmful effects of Hanley’s
abuse caused Clark to delay in filing suit.
                                           63
                                  CONCLUSION

         In sum, the district court employed proper procedures in adjudicating

Clark’s equitable tolling claim and did not intrude on Clark’s Seventh Amendment

right.    We perceive no infirmity in the district court’s factfinding nor in its

decision to dismiss Clark’s claims as untimely.    Accordingly, we AFFIRM the

judgment of the district court.

                                        64
CHIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

             In 2011, Thomas Hanley, a Connecticut corrections oﬃcer,

repeatedly sexually assaulted Veronica-May (then known as Nicholas) Clark, a

transgender woman incarcerated at the MacDougall-Walker Correctional

Institute ("MacDougall-Walker"). Hanley eventually resigned, was arrested in

connection with his assaults on Clark, and pleaded guilty to three counts of

sexual assault in the fourth degree.

             Clark ﬁled this civil rights action pro se in the district court -- but she

did not do so until well after the applicable limitations period expired. The

district court sua sponte dismissed the case as untimely. This Court remanded,

concluding that Clark should be aﬀorded an opportunity to present her claim

that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled.

             On remand, with the assistance of counsel, Clark ﬁled a second

amended complaint. She alleged that she remained silent because she was

"deeply and profoundly scarred," App'x 123, a consequence of the trauma she

suﬀered from the sexual assaults, her fear of continued harassment and further

retaliation (exacerbated by her continued housing for periods of time at
MacDougal-Walker), and the denial of medical and mental health treatment for

her depression and gender dysphoria.

             After defendants-appellees moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court held an

evidentiary hearing. It concluded that Clark was not credible in material

respects, granted the motions, and dismissed the Complaint. The majority now

aﬃrms.

             I agree that the district court did not err in holding an evidentiary

hearing on the question of equitable tolling. See ante, at 5. We have routinely

approved of this practice and have even reversed district courts for failing to

conduct evidentiary hearings where plaintiﬀs have put forward plausible claims

of equitable tolling. See, e.g., Brown v. Parkchester S. Condos., 287 F.3d 58, 60-61 (2d

Cir. 2002) (vacating and remanding, where "it appears there may be substance to

[a plaintiﬀ's] claim[,]" because "an evidentiary hearing is appropriate to

determine [whether] . . . equitable tolling would be in order"). I also agree that

when a district court convenes an evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling, the

court's role is that of a factﬁnder; the proceeding, as the majority puts it,

functions as a bench trial on facts related to tolling. See ante, at 37.

                                           2
             I disagree with the majority, however, in two principal respects.

First, although district courts have wide latitude in structuring discovery and

conducting evidentiary hearings, here the district court failed to aﬀord Clark a

"meaningful opportunity" to make the case that her circumstances warranted

tolling. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 103 (2d Cir. 2008)

(quoting Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 795 (2d Cir. 1985)). The

court convened an evidentiary hearing on only a few weeks' notice and before

discovery could be completed, took testimony from no one besides Clark, and

reviewed only a subset of Clark's medical records. Perhaps because the district

court did not hear directly from the healthcare providers who worked with

Clark, did not consider aﬃdavits or deposition testimony from the prisoners and

corrections oﬃcials who knew her, and did not have before it any expert

testimony, the district court minimized the harm Hanley inﬂicted on her and

found that aspects of Clark's testimony were "neither plausible nor credible."

Clark v. Hanley, No. 18 Civ. 1765, 2022 WL 124298, at *7 & n.55, *9 (D. Conn. Jan.

13, 2022). Perhaps it would have concluded otherwise if it had had a fuller

evidentiary record, including testimony from experts on the barriers transgender

prisoners face in reporting sexual assault.

                                           3
             Second, to the extent the judgment rests on factual ﬁndings about

the severity of Hanley's conduct and its eﬀect on Clark, those ﬁndings were not

the district court's to make. The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

guarantees Clark the right to have matters that go to the heart of her legal claims

be decided by a jury. The district court's ﬁndings deprived Clark of her right to

present those issues to a jury. It concluded, for example, that Hanley's behavior

was "not physically coercive or made under threat of harm or retaliation" and

was "unlike a violent sexual assault or rape that would likely result in the most

severe type of psychological trauma." Clark, 2022 WL 124298, at *6. These were

issues that Clark was entitled to submit to the jury.

             Because the district court failed to aﬀord Clark an adequate

opportunity to develop evidence in support of her equitable tolling claim and

intruded into the province of the jury, I would vacate and remand. Accordingly,

I dissent.

                                          I.

             I address ﬁrst the issue of discovery. It is troubling that the district

court denied Clark's request for equitable tolling based on a factual record that

was underdeveloped, both procedurally and substantively. The district court

                                          4
convened the evidentiary hearing on less than four weeks' notice and did not

give Clark an adequate opportunity to gather the information she needed -- and

that she told the district court she needed -- to make out her equitable tolling

claim.

             As the majority emphasizes, "[d]istrict courts have 'wide latitude to

determine the scope of discovery'" and "a discovery ruling will warrant relief on

appeal only if it constitutes an 'abuse of discretion.'" Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d

89, 99 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Agent Orange, 517 F.3d at 103). Our review in

this posture is highly deferential: "A district court abuses its discretion only

'when the discovery is so limited as to aﬀect a party's substantial rights.'" In re

Agent Orange, 517 F.3d at 103 (emphasis added) (quoting Long Island Lighting, 779

F.2d at 795). One of those substantial rights "is that '[a] party must be aﬀorded a

meaningful opportunity to establish the facts necessary to support [her] claim.'"

In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props., 934 F.3d 147, 157 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting In re

Agent Orange, 517 F.3d at 103).

             The record demonstrates that the district court gave short shrift to

Clark's eﬀorts to show that Hanley's abuse created a "sever[e] . . . obstacle

impeding compliance with a limitations period." Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132,

                                           5
137 (2d Cir. 2011). I would hold that the district court abused its discretion by

curtailing Clark's ability to obtain discovery on matters clearly relevant to

equitable tolling. This, in turn, limited Clark's ability to vindicate her Eighth

Amendment rights.

             On August 26, 2021, at a hearing on defendants' motions to dismiss,

the district court, apparently sua sponte, proposed holding an evidentiary

hearing. The district court ﬁrst asked Hanley's counsel whether it would be a

"problem if I decided to hold a hearing to hear from the plaintiﬀ and make a

determination whether the plaintiﬀ's stated grounds for equitable tolling have

merit." App'x 541. Both Hanley's counsel and counsel for the MacDougall-

Walker Defendants said they thought a hearing was unnecessary because the

district court could decide their motions to dismiss on the papers alone. See id. at

542-43. In contrast, Clark's counsel expressed concern with the district court's

proposal: "[H]ere's the issue I have with the hearing, Your Honor. I think courts

have been reluctant to decide equitable tolling without the beneﬁt of discovery.

And I think the reason why is because equitable tolling is such a factually intense

question." Id. at 557. Clark's counsel represented that, as of the date of the

hearing, the defendants had produced no discovery at all. See id. at 558 (Clark's

                                          6
counsel: "We haven't heard from the State or received any discovery."). In

response to the court's suggestion that a hearing at which Clark alone would

testify would be suﬃcient for the court to "make a determination whether

equitable tolling is established," id. at 560, Clark's counsel explained that

additional discovery was necessary, see id. at 560-61. Clark's counsel indicated

that she wished to seek "discovery relating to the assault circumstances which

would show, I think, how severe those assaults were and . . . how long lasting the

impacts on her mental condition would be" as well as discovery "related to the

institution['s] retaliation and the impact on plaintiﬀ." Id. at 560. Clark's counsel

argued that "it would be unfair for this case to be dismissed when we don't have

the discovery that the State was ordered to provide." Id. at 558.

             The district court insisted that between Clark's testimony, her

medical records, and other documents already available, Clark's counsel had

suﬃcient information to argue her equitable tolling claim. See id. at 561-62. "I

have to say, what more do you want?" Id. at 561. The district court criticized

Clark's counsel for "looking for merits discovery" and noted that counsel already

had Clark's 2011 statements to the state troopers who were investigating

Hanley's misconduct. Id. at 563. "Why do you need to know more about what

                                          7
happened," the court asked, "when your client knows very well what happened

and told them at the time?" Id. at 562.

             As it became increasingly clear the district court was going to

schedule an evidentiary hearing at which Clark alone would testify, her counsel

reluctantly asked the court to order the MacDougall-Walker Defendants to

produce all discovery previously requested, particularly Clark's medical records.

See id. at 570-71. In the end, the district court concluded that "it's really

appropriate to have an evidentiary hearing, one that's limited in terms of overall

scope. . . . [T]o me the key issue is trying to understand the state of mind of Ms.

Clark." Id. at 578. In an order dated August 27, 2021, the court ordered the

production of discovery by September 3; scheduled an evidentiary hearing for

September 20; limited the hearing to "the testimony of Clark and to the Court's

additional consideration of any exhibits or documents that are not presently in

the record"; and set September 16 as the deadline for ﬁling any such materials.

Clark v. Hanley, No. 18 Civ. 1765, 2021 WL 4192108 (D. Conn. Aug. 27, 2021). The

hearing occurred as scheduled, see App'x 348, and the district court received into

evidence only Clark's testimony and eighteen exhibits from her prison medical

                                           8
records, see id. at 352-53. 1 There is no indication the court invited the parties to

submit further evidence after the hearing concluded.

              For three interrelated reasons, I would hold that the district court

abused its discretion by denying Clark a "meaningful opportunity," In re Agent

Orange, 517 F.3d at 103, to obtain and present evidentiary support for her

equitable tolling claim.

              First, the district court scheduled the evidentiary hearing on short

notice. It did not aﬀord Clark time to meaningfully seek evidence in addition to

what she was already owed and the MacDougall-Walker Defendants were

already late in producing. Only twelve business days separated the district

court's order scheduling the evidentiary hearing and the deadline for Clark to

submit any documents not already part of the record. Only one further business

day separated that deadline and the day of the hearing itself. Such an

abbreviated timetable is perhaps not surprising in light of the district court's

repeated comments that Clark's counsel already had suﬃcient information to

argue her equitable tolling claim. See, e.g., App'x 561, 563. Nevertheless, the

1      In addition, the district court granted permission for the New Haven Pride
Center to ﬁle an amicus curiae brief in support of Clark. See Clark, 2022 WL 124298, at *9
n.67; App'x 354.
                                            9
limited time frame allotted for discovery did not provide Clark with a suﬃcient

opportunity to develop evidence in support of her claim. See In re Agent Orange,

517 F.3d at 103 ("A party must be aﬀorded a meaningful opportunity to establish

the facts necessary to support his claim."); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 166

(2d Cir. 1999) (vacating and remanding where, inter alia, "plaintiﬀs should have

been given an opportunity to present evidence" in support of their claim). 2

              Second, the district court erroneously concluded that additional

discovery was not needed. The beneﬁts of such discovery would almost

certainly have been more than "hypothetical." App'x 578. The district court's

approach to the evidentiary hearing prevented Clark from developing and

presenting such evidence as (1) aﬃdavits or deposition testimony from the

medical and mental health providers who worked with Clark and made the

notes contained in her records; (2) additional documentary evidence or

deposition testimony concerning the circumstances and eﬀects of Hanley's

assaults; (3) aﬃdavits or deposition testimony from fellow prisoners about the

2      The majority contends that Clark has not argued that she had "too short a time
frame" to have "a meaningful opportunity to establish the relevant facts." Ante, at 29
n.16. In fact, in her brief on appeal, Clark argues that the district court "failed to aﬀord
[her] appropriate opportunity to take discovery and gather evidence." Brief for
Plaintiﬀ-Appellant at 3.
                                             10
risk of retaliation Clark might have faced had she complained about Hanley's

assaults (or about other inmates' and corrections oﬃcers' responses to them) or

had she ﬁled suit earlier; (4) an independent psychological evaluation of Clark;

and (5) other expert testimony. 3

              Such evidence would have enabled Clark to present the district

court with a fuller picture of her circumstances. Moreover, the evidence the

district court did permit Clark to oﬀer was rife with shortcomings. The majority

of Clark's medical records consist of reports prepared in relation to speciﬁc

events, often emergencies. See, e.g., App'x 585. Some are "inﬁrmary admission

orders," which describe the circumstances leading a prisoner to present herself

for treatment. See, e.g., id. at 589, 595, 600, 610. Others are "transfer summar[ies],"

3       The majority contends that "Clark never sought evidence as to four of these ﬁve
categories." Ante, at 45 n.27. While it is true that at the hearing Clark's counsel did not
explicitly identify these discrete categories of discovery, counsel described broadly the
discovery that "would be helpful for equitable tolling." App'x 560. This included
"medical information" and "discovery relating to the assault circumstances which would
show . . . how severe those assaults were" and "how long lasting the impacts on her
mental condition would be." Id. Counsel also referred to "the other category of
discovery, painting in sort of broadbrush strokes, that we asked for with respect to
tolling related to the institutional[] retaliation and the impact on the plaintiﬀ." Id.
Counsel further identiﬁed "bases for justifying equitable tolling," including "[f]ear of
retaliation," "mental condition," "medical condition," and "[a]dministrative exhaustion,"
noting that there is "a full . . . spectrum" of factors relevant to equitable tolling. Id. at
565. Surely these descriptions would encompass the information in the ﬁve categories
above, which are only examples of the type of information that could shed light on
Clark's state of mind for purposes of equitable tolling.
                                             11
documenting at a high level of generality a prisoner's medical and mental health

conditions when she is being moved from one DOC facility to another. See, e.g.,

id. at 591, 602. Reﬂecting the severity of mental distress Clark experienced, two

of her medical records contain "suicide risk assessments," one dated January 8,

2012, id. at 597-98, and the other dated July 15, 2016, the day Clark attempted to

castrate herself, id. at 612-13. Of the medical records before the district court,

only four pages contain narrative notes by Clark's healthcare providers. See id. at

587, 604, 606, 608. But no volume of medical records alone could have

compensated for the absence of testimony from Clark's healthcare providers, her

fellow prisoners, or an independent psychologist and other experts.

             Third, the district court wrongly assumed that Clark -- a survivor of

sexual abuse with an extensive mental health history -- could adequately explain

the impact of what Hanley did to her, more than a decade after the fact. The

district court reached this conclusion notwithstanding amicus's admonition that

"transgender survivors of sexual assault face exceptional barriers to reporting

their assailants" and that such barriers include "justiﬁable distrust of authorities,

the risk of further victimization as a response to reporting, history of past

trauma, the pervasive discrimination they face in their daily lives, and the

                                          12
heightened discomfort they may feel as to intimate physical examinations." Clark

v. Hanley, No. 18 Civ. 1765, Dkt. 82-1 at 4 (D. Conn. July 12, 2021). Moreover,

amicus warned, "prison [is] an exceptionally challenging setting in which to

report abuse," especially for transgender prisoners. Id. at 8.

             The district court likely overestimated both Clark's capacity to

disclose Hanley's conduct to prison healthcare providers and her ability to

describe the eﬀects of Hanley's assaults, particularly in the adversarial and

charged atmosphere of an evidentiary hearing. As a consequence, the court

issued a decision replete with adverse ﬁndings about Clark's credibility without

giving Clark a "meaningful opportunity" to contextualize her testimony via the

opinions of experts in sexual abuse, gender dysmorphia and gender transition,

the psychological dynamics associated with prisoners' fears of retaliation on the

part of corrections oﬃcials, and other topics relevant to Clark's case. Expert

testimony, combined with further development of the factual record, could very

well have corroborated Clark's statements about her fear of retaliation and the

impact of Hanley's assaults. Such evidence could also have conﬁrmed why, as

Clark's medical records appear to corroborate, she took steps to bring this

                                         13
lawsuit only after she came out as transgender and began to receive consular

support and adequate medical care. 4

              Instead of giving Clark the opportunity she deserved to "establish

the facts necessary to support [her] claim," In re Agent Orange, 517 F.3d at 103, the

district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on less than a month's notice,

declined Clark's request for discovery beyond the limited discovery the court

allowed, and placed on Clark's shoulders the burden of recalling her mental state

over a period of some ﬁve years and explaining why she could not have come

forward sooner. I would hold that the combined eﬀect of these decisions

prejudiced Clark's substantial rights and that, therefore, the district court abused

its considerable discretion in limiting discovery on Clark's equitable tolling claim

and conducting an evidentiary hearing in the expedited and limited manner that

it did.

4       The majority notes that Clark did not raise in the district court the issue of calling
expert witnesses. See ante, at 44. But the district court aﬀorded Clark's counsel less
than four weeks to prepare for the evidentiary hearing, and the district court made clear
at the hearing on defendants' motion to dismiss that it would only permit Clark to
testify. See id. at 580 (court conﬁrming that its intention was that the hearing would be
"conﬁned to testimony from the plaintiﬀ"). Thus, any request for expert testimony
would have been futile.
                                             14
                                          II.

             In my view, the district court denied Clark the protections of the

Seventh Amendment because, in its opinion denying her request for equitable

tolling, the district court found facts that are common to Clark's equitable tolling

and Section 1983 claims.

             The Seventh Amendment limits the facts that a district court, sitting

in this posture, is empowered to ﬁnd. In pertinent part, the amendment provides

that "[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed

twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S. Const., amend.

VII. The guarantee of a jury trial "was held in such esteem by the colonists that

its deprivation at the hands of the English was one of the important grievances

leading to the break with England." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,

340 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Some scholars have argued that the

omission of the right to a jury trial from the original Constitution was the reason

"the entire issue of the absence of a bill of rights was precipitated at the

Philadelphia Convention." Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the

Seventh Amendment, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 639, 657 (1973).

                                          15
             For this reason, both the Supreme Court and our Court have

ensured that questions the Constitution reserves to juries are actually decided by

them. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has taught that where a case

presents both legal and equitable issues, the legal issues should generally be tried

ﬁrst, before a jury. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11

(1959); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962); Ross v. Bernhard, 396

U.S. 531, 540 (1970). These holdings guarantee that in mixed cases, "the jury's

ﬁndings on the issues of fact common to both the equitable and legal claims . . .

bind the judge in the equitable action," rather than the reverse. Margaret L.

Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amendment

Jurisprudence, 68 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 183, 208 (2000). For our part, we have

conﬁrmed that "[w]hen an action involves both legal and equitable claims that

have common issues of fact, and a jury trial has been properly demanded with

regard to the legal claims, the parties have a right under the Seventh Amendment

to have the legal claims tried to a jury." Wade v. Orange Cnty. Sheriﬀ's Oﬀ., 844

F.2d 951, 954 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Dairy Queen, Beacon Theatres, and Ross).

             The majority holds that the district court did not violate Clark's

Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial because "the factual issues relevant to

                                           16
Clark's equitable tolling claim and her § 1983 claims are analytically and

temporally distinct." Ante, at 49. I disagree because the district court made

factual ﬁndings about at least one issue -- the severity of Hanley's abuse -- that is

common to Clark's equitable tolling and Section 1983 claims.

             The Complaint asserts two Section 1983 claims for violations of her

Eighth Amendment right to be free of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S.

Const., amend. VIII. Clark brings the ﬁrst of her claims against Hanley alone,

alleging he assaulted her on at least four occasions and the assaults "served no

cognizable or conceivable penological purpose." App'x 125. She brings her

second claim against the MacDougall-Walker Defendants, alleging they were

deliberately indiﬀerent to the risk Hanley posed to her safety. Id. at 126-27. To

maintain each of her claims, Clark bears the burden of demonstrating that

Hanley's abuse was of constitutional magnitude.

             I begin with Clark's claim against Hanley. In Boddie v. Schnieder, 105

F.3d 857, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1997), we held that "sexual abuse of a prisoner by a

corrections oﬃcer may in some circumstances violate the prisoner's right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment." A prisoner may maintain a Section

1983 claim for sexual abuse suﬀered while incarcerated "when two requirements

                                         17
are met. First, the alleged 'punishment' must be, 'objectively, suﬃciently serious.'

Under the objective standard, 'conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and

unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional.'" Id. at 861

(ﬁrst quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994), then quoting Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). Sexual abuse of a prisoner by a corrections

oﬃcer can rise to the level of a constitutional violation if it is "severe,"

"repetitive," or "cumulatively egregious." Id. But "isolated episodes of

harassment and touching," even if "despicable" or actionable under state tort law,

"do not involve a harm of federal constitutional proportions." Id. at 861-62 (citing

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-34; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348-49).

             As with other Eighth Amendment claims, "contemporary standards

of decency" evolve over time and, thereby, "mark the progress of a maturing

society." Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 259 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Roper v.

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (noting that contemporary standards emerge

out of "objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the

enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question"). In the past

quarter-century, Congress, state legislatures, and courts have all acknowledged

that "deep moral indignation . . . has replaced what had been society's passive

                                           18
acceptance of the problem of sexual abuse in prison." Crawford, 796 F.3d at 259-

60 (cataloguing federal and state statutes). Connecticut recognized the severity

of the issue earlier than many other States, enacting in 1975 a statute

criminalizing "sexual contact" between a person "in custody of law or detained in

a hospital or other institution" and a perpetrator who "has supervisory or

disciplinary authority over such other person." 1975 Conn. Acts 983 (Reg. Sess.).

This is the crime to which Hanley pleaded guilty and for which he served a term

of imprisonment and was required to register as a sex oﬀender.

             In addition to making this objective showing, a plaintiﬀ must also

satisfy a subjective standard: She must demonstrate that "the prison oﬃcial

involved must have a 'suﬃciently culpable state of mind.'" Boddie, 105 F.3d at 861

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

             Like her claim against Hanley, Clark's claim against the

MacDougall-Walker Defendants includes both objective and subjective elements.

Where a prisoner's Section 1983 claim is for prison oﬃcials' deliberate

indiﬀerence to a corrections oﬃcer's sexual misconduct, the objective standard is

whether the prisoner "is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk

of serious harm," Morgan v. Dzurenda, 956 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting

                                         19
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The subjective test is the same as above, that is, the

defendant oﬃcials "must have a 'suﬃciently culpable state of mind.'" Farmer, 511

U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)).

             Both of Clark's claims, therefore, require her to show that Hanley's

abuse -- or, as to the MacDougall-Walker Defendants, the risk of abuse Hanley

presented -- was, objectively and subjectively, serious enough as to violate the

Eighth Amendment. Our cases make clear that these are questions of fact that do

not always have self-evident answers and depend on value judgments about the

moral standards of the community. For instance, in Crawford we observed that

"as the basic mores of society change[,] . . . conduct that might not have been seen

to rise to the severity of an Eighth Amendment violation 18 years ago may now

violate community standards of decency." 796 F.3d at 260. 5

             These are, quintessentially, questions for a jury -- even more so

because the plight of transgender prisoners is an issue as to which social mores

are changing quickly and dramatically. Courts both in this Circuit and elsewhere

have recently permitted transgender prisoners' Section 1983 claims to survive

5      Indeed, in Crawford we speciﬁcally held that "the oﬃcer's conduct in Boddie,"
which we had decided was not of constitutional magnitude, "would ﬂunk its own test
today." Id.
                                          20
motions to dismiss, sometimes even where prison oﬃcials' sexually harassing

conduct was purely verbal. In Johnson v. Cook, No. 19 Civ. 1464, 2021 WL

2741723, at *10 (D. Conn. July 1, 2021), the plaintiﬀ alleged that oﬃcers at a

facility where Clark was temporarily housed "made demeaning and derogatory

comments about [the plaintiﬀ's] gender transition and voiced transgender-phobic

slurs about her in front of the other inmates at her dining table." Because the

plaintiﬀ alleged she had "experienced an 'appreciable injury'" as a result of the

harassment, the court declined to dismiss her Eighth Amendment claim. Id.

(quoting Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 70 (2d Cir. 2015)); see also B.

Braxton/Obed-Edom v. City of New York, 368 F. Supp. 3d 729, 737-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)

(denying motion to dismiss transgender prisoner's failure-to-protect claim);

Stroud v. Pruitt, No. 17 Civ. 1659, 2019 WL 2077028, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2019)

(recommending dismissal of transgender prisoner's claims of verbal harassment

but not her claims of physical abuse). But see Fisher v. Worth, No. 18 Civ. 16793,

2022 WL 3500432 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2022); Outman v. Superintendent, Five Points

Corr. Facility, No. 16 Civ. 788, 2017 WL 318852 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017) (both

declining to equitably toll statutes of limitations for transgender inmates).

                                           21
             Whether Hanley's abuse was of constitutional magnitude overlaps

with whether Clark is entitled to equitable tolling. As no party contests, the

severity and sequelae of Hanley's abuse are central to Clark's claim for equitable

tolling. The ﬁrst element of that claim is that "a petitioner must demonstrate

'extraordinary circumstances beyond [her] control' that prevented [her] from

timely ﬁling [her] petition." Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d at 137 (quoting Baldayaque

v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2003)). Whether a circumstance is

"extraordinary" does not have to do with "the uniqueness of a party's

circumstances" but, rather, "the severity of the obstacle impeding compliance

with a limitations period." Id. The second element of a claim for equitable tolling

is that the petitioner "must demonstrate that '[s]he acted with reasonable

diligence throughout the period [s]he seeks to toll.'" Id. at 138 (quoting Belot v.

Burge, 490 F.3d 201, 205 (2d Cir. 2007)). The standard is whether the petitioner

"acted as diligently as reasonably could have been expected under the

circumstances," not whether she demonstrated "maximum feasible diligence." Id.

(alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted).

             Thus, when the district court concluded that Hanley's assaults "were

not physically coercive or made under threat of harm or retaliation" and that

                                          22
"[t]hey were unlike a violent sexual assault or rape that would likely result in the

most severe type of psychological trauma," Clark, 2022 WL 124298, at *6, the

district court found facts that were common to Clark's claim for equitable tolling

and Clark's underlying Section 1983 claims. The district court ventured

improperly into the province of the jury because its characterization of the abuse

Clark experienced could, under principles of collateral estoppel, have precluded

the jury from determining that Clark's injuries -- and the risk Hanley posed to

her -- were of constitutional magnitude or that they could have prevented her

from bringing suit for four years. That the district court did not ﬁnd Clark

suﬀered no harm is not relevant to this analysis. First, no party denies that

Hanley repeatedly assaulted Clark. Second, the overlap between the elements of

Clark's Eighth Amendment claims and her claim for equitable tolling has to do

with the magnitude of the harm she suﬀered, not the fact that she suﬀered any

harm at all. 6

6      The majority writes that a jury would determine "how much money would
compensate Clark" for the harm she suﬀered, an inquiry "distinct" from the equitable
tolling inquiry, which requires assessing "whether the harm caused her to miss the ﬁling
deadline." Ante, at 50-51. But part of the inquiry into whether the harm caused Clark to
miss the deadline turns on the severity of the harm, which would be an obvious factor in
the jury's determination of the amount of compensatory damages. Both inquiries
implicate the Eighth Amendment. By concluding that Clark's harm was not so severe as
to warrant equitable tolling, the district court intruded into the province of the jury.
                                          23
             The district court's error in making factual ﬁndings that the Seventh

Amendment reserves to the jury is, in my view, suﬃcient reason for this Court to

vacate and remand the judgment of the district court. The district court's

discussion of the severity of Clark's harm ignores the extent to which a sexual

assault survivor may suﬀer and supports that testimony from a qualiﬁed

individual would have been proper in making such a determination. It also

underpins the district court's assessment that the fact Clark ﬁled a state habeas

petition -- which had nothing to do with Hanley's assaults, the conditions of

Clark's conﬁnement, or her transgender status -- shows she could have also

brought this claim earlier, see id.

             It is noteworthy that the district court's opinion contains no

reference to the Seventh Amendment. The MacDougall-Walker Defendants

argue that the guarantee of a jury trial is inapplicable to Clark's case because the

"Seventh Amendment does not extend" to "threshold issues that courts must

address to determine whether litigation is being conducted in the right forum at

the right time." Appellees' Br. at 34 (alteration adopted) (internal quotation

marks omitted). For this proposition, the MacDougall-Walker Defendants cite --

but misapprehend -- our decision in Messa v. Goord, 652 F.3d 305, 309 (2d Cir.

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2011). In Messa, we held that statutes of limitations are not "threshold issues" like

the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. (noting that while "the two are

similar in some ways -- e.g., both are non-jurisdictional aﬃrmative defenses --

they serve very diﬀerent functions in our civil justice system").

             In sum, the district court made factual ﬁndings that, under the

Constitution, were not for it to make -- and, then, to Clark's disadvantage,

allowed those ﬁndings to pervade its legal reasoning.

                                         III.

             Clark's allegations as to her diﬃculties in bringing this case are not

unique. The amicus briefs ﬁled in the district court as well as this Court depict

the grim realities that are the daily fare of transgender prisoners. An empirical

study published in 2011 reported that nearly two in ﬁve transgender people who

are incarcerated report being sexually victimized; close to half of those prisoners

identify police or corrections oﬃcers as their perpetrators. Brief of Amici Curiae

Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Amicus Project at UConn Law,

Just Detention International, and Center for Constitutional Rights ("Amicus Br."),

at 5. And "[o]nce targeted for abuse, the majority of transgender survivors are

subjected to repeated sexual assaults," as Clark was. Id. at 6 n.9 (quoting Just

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Detention International, Targets for Abuse: Transgender Inmates and Prison Rape 2

(2013)). Like Clark, many transgender inmates do not disclose their gender

identity, "fearing [they] will be at greater risk of sexual assault" if they do. Stroud

v Pruitt, 2019 WL 2077028, at *2.

             As a general matter, it is well-established that victims of sexual

misconduct often delay reporting. See, e.g., United States v. Weisinger, 586 F.

App'x 733, 737-38 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (noting that expert testimony

"that delayed reporting was not inconsistent with abuse" was "supported by

empirical, peer-reviewed research, well accepted in the courts"); see also Fuentes v.

T. Griﬃn, 829 F.3d 233, 239 (2d Cir. 2016) (recounting expert testimony that "a

recognizable pattern of behavior that is exhibited by victims of sexual assault . . .

may include delayed reporting" (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted)). In this respect, prisons in particular present a "unique psychological

environment," Stone #1 v. Annucci, No. 20 Civ. 1326, 2021 WL 4463033, at *12

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2021), in which "the specter of retaliation [is] a real and ever-

present force in an inmate's life," Davis v. Jackson, No. 15 Civ. 5359, 2016 WL

5720811, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016). See also, e.g., James E. Robertson, "One of

the Dirty Secrets of American Corrections": Retaliation, Surplus Power, and

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Whistleblowing Inmates, 42 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 611, 614 (2009) (noting that

"[i]nmates' fear of retaliation deters them from ﬁling grievances," yet the failure

to ﬁle timely often limits a prisoner's capacity to seek redress).

             Because the prison environment is more threatening for those who

are transgender, when transgender prisoners report mistreatment, more than

half of them report facing "retaliation in the form of punitive transfer, isolation,

neglect, or further abuse." Amicus Br. at 16. Moreover, "transgender prisoners

experience secondary victimization when their reports of abuse are ignored or

disbelieved." Id. (quoting Julia C. Oparah, Feminism and the (Trans)gender

Entrapment of Gender Nonconforming Prisoners, 18 U.C.L.A. Women's L.J. 239, 263

(2012)).

             Clark's allegations and her testimony at the evidentiary hearing

track these ﬁndings closely: She was repeatedly abused by a corrections oﬃcial

who took advantage of prison policies to isolate and assault her. She was

mocked by oﬃcials -- including some who were friendly with her assailant --

who called her "gross," "nasty," "disgusting," and a "fag[g]ot" for being another

man's victim. App'x 123, 375. Her fellow prisoners ridiculed the assaults as "gay

stuﬀ" -- a phrase that very likely heightened Clark's already intense shame about

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her gender dysphoria. Between 2011 and early 2016, she reported Hanley's abuse

only once, and even then reluctantly: She told the district court "I didn't want to

go" to the interview at which she disclosed what Hanley did to her because "I

was afraid of what would happen with the staﬀ." Id. at 366. Although

authorities believed Clark's report and took appropriate action, in the ensuing

years Clark's fear prevented her from speaking up further. She lacked access to

medical and mental health care for her gender dysphoria, to the point that she

partially castrated herself and was repeatedly hospitalized out of concern she

would die by suicide.

             Whether Clark can prove her allegations, whether Hanley's abuse

was "suﬃciently serious," Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, and whether the danger to

which the MacDougall-Walker Defendants exposed Clark constituted a

"substantial risk of serious harm," id., are all questions for a jury. For the reasons

discussed above, I would hold that the Seventh Amendment guarantees Clark

the right to have these questions answered by a jury -- not by a judge presiding

over a highly circumscribed evidentiary hearing scheduled on short notice. And

I would hold that the district court further abused its discretion by evaluating

Clark's testimony based on a limited record, without permitting Clark's counsel

                                          28
to conduct discovery into other categories of evidence bearing on Clark's claim

for equitable tolling.

             "Statutes of limitations are generally subject to equitable tolling

where necessary to prevent unfairness to a plaintiﬀ who is not at fault for her

lateness in ﬁling." Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 F.3d 318, 322 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting

Veltri v. Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 322 (2d Cir. 2004)). Because

Clark was not provided with a full and fair opportunity to show that she was

"not at fault for her lateness in ﬁling," and because the district court decided

questions that should have been put to a jury, I would vacate the judgment and

remand for further proceedings. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

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