Court Opinion

ID: 9753865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:33:21.367499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:44.364902
License: Public Domain

*1172McEWEN, President Judge,
dissenting:
¶ 1 While the opinion of the majority reflects a careful analysis of the intricate legal issues presented by the corporate impudence25 of appellees, I am obliged to dissent for I would affirm the order of denial of class certification.
¶ 2 The learned Judge Stephen E. Levin concluded “that common questions of law or fact did not predominate the case and that a class action would not be a fair and efficient method of adjudicating the claims [at issue in this action].” DiLucido v. Terminix International Inc., 450 Pa.Super. 393, 676 A.2d 1237, 1239 (1996), appeal denied, 546 Pa. 655, 684 A.2d 557 (1996). It is because I perceive neither an abuse of discretion by Judge Levin nor any error of law that I would affirm the order entered June 15,1998.
A trial court’s decision concerning class certification is a mixed finding of law and fact. Cribb v. United Health Clubs, 336 Pa.Super. 479, 480, 485 A.2d 1182, 1183 (1984). A trial court is vested with broad discretion in defining the class based on the commonality of the issues and the propriety of maintaining the action on behalf of the class. Hayes v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co., 370 Pa.Super. 602, 604, 537 A.2d 330, 331 (1987). On appeal, we will not disturb the trial court’s order denying class certification unless the court failed to consider the requirements of the rules of civil procedure or abused its discretion in applying them.
Weismer v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 419 Pa.Super. 403, 615 A.2d 428, 430 (1992). Accord: Hanson v. Federal Signal Corp., 451 Pa.Super. 260, 679 A.2d 785, 788 (1996); DiLucido v. Terminix International Inc., supra, 676 A.2d at 1240; D'Amelio v. Blue Cross of Lehigh Valley, 347 Pa.Super. 441, 500 A.2d 1137, 1141 (1985), appeal denied, 514 Pa. 630, 522 A.2d 559 (1986).
¶ 3 Rule 1702 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
RULE 1702. PREREQUISITES TO A CLASS ACTION
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members in a class action only if
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class;
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately assert and protect the interests of the class under the criteria set forth in Rule 1709; and
(5) a class action provides a fair and efficient method for adjudication of the controversy under the criteria set forth in Rule 1708.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1702.
¶4 Rule 1708 affords guidance to the trial court, as it exercises the broad discretion granted to it, in determining whether a class action would, in fact, be a fair and efficient method of resolution of the controversy. The Rule provides, in relevant part:
RULE 1708. CRITERIA FOR CERTIFICATION. DETERMINATION OF CLASS ACTION AS FAIR AND EFFICIENT METHOD OF ADJUDICATION
In determining whether a class action is a fair and efficient method of adjudicating the controversy, the court shall con*1173sider among other matters the criteria set forth in subdivisions (a),(b) and (c).
(а) Where monetary recovery alone is sought, the court shall consider
(1) whether common questions of law or fact predominate over any question affecting only individual members;
(2) the size of the class and the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of the action as a class action;
(3) whether the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(i) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would confront the party opposing the class with incompatible standards of conduct;
(ii) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be disposi-tive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
(4) the extent and nature of any litigation already commenced by or against members of the class involving any of the same issues;
(5) whether the particular forum is appropriate for the litigation of the claims of the entire class;
(б) whether in view of the complexities of the issues or the expenses of litigation the separate claims of individual class members are insufficient in amount to support separate actions;
(7)whether it is likely that the amount which may be recovered by individual class members will be so small in relation to the expense and effort of administering the action as not to justify a class action.
Pa.R.Civ.P. 1708(a) (emphasis supplied).
¶ 5 The trial court’s findings of fact, • which enjoy substantial evidentiary support in the record and thus may not be disturbed by this Court, include:
1. Defendants are Pennsylvania Corporations engaged in the manufacture, sale and advertising of Sunoco Ultra gaso-lines to consumers.
2. Defendants manufacture only two “base grades” of gasoline: “Economy” with a minimum of 86 octane; and “Ultra” with a minimum of either 93.5 or 94 octane.
3. These “base grades” are distributed to Sunoco franchises and blended at each pump to create intermediate grades of gasoline, typically rated at 87, 89 and 92 minimum octane.
4. “Octane” is an index number that measures a fuel’s resistance to engine knock. An automobile’s octane requirement is the recommended fuel octane that car requires to avoid engine knock.[ 26]
5. During the class period, defendants supplied gasoline to approximately 4, 455 Sunoco retail stations in twenty-three states, including approximately 647 stations in Pennsylvania.
6. Each year during the class period Sunoco retail stations sold between 750 million and 960 million total gallons of Ultra 93.5 and 94 gasoline, an amount approximately equal to 15% of total Su-noco gasoline sales.
7. During the class period, Ultra 93.5 and 94 gasolines were typically priced at least fifteen cents higher per gallon than non-premium grades of gasoline.
*11748. During the class period, defendants promoted their Ultra gasolines with both radio and television advertising campaigns in the media markets where their franchises were located.
9. Some of the defendants’ advertisements for Sunoco Ultra during the class period suggested that Ultra-grade gaso-lines would provide cars with superior engine performance as a result of their high octane content.
10. Plaintiff Weinberg is a citizen of Pennsylvania who purchased Sunoco Ultra gasoline in Pennsylvania for personal or family use from 1990 to 1992.
11. While plaintiff Weinberg saw and heard advertisements for Sunoco Ultra gasolines during the class period, he does-not now recall the content of any specific advertisement.
12. Plaintiff Weinberg did not rely on any specific assertion made in those advertisements when deciding to purchase Ultra gasoline during the class period.
13. Plaintiff Weinberg’s decision to purchase Ultra gasoline wás based mainly on his general perception and belief that it was the best gasoline available.
14. Plaintiff Guarino is a citizen of New Jersey who purchased Sunoco Ultra gasoline in Pennsylvania for personal or family use from 1990 to 1992.
15. Plaintiff Guarino saw and heard advertisements for Sunoco Ultra gasoline during the class period.
16. Plaintiff Guarino purchased Ultra gasoline during the class period, relying on assertions in defendants’ advertisements that it would enable her car to achieve superior engine power, acceleration and performance.
17. Plaintiff Gordon is a citizen of Pennsylvania who purchased Sunoco Ultra gasoline in Pennsylvania for personal or family use from 1990 to 1992.
18. Plaintiff Gordon saw and heard advertisements for Sunoco Ultra gasoline during the class period. 1
19. Plaintiff Gordon purchased Ultra gasoline during the class period, relying on assertions in defendants’ advertisements that it would enable his cars to achieve superior engine power, acceleration and performance.
20. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint asserts five claims: 1) that defendants made false and deceptive representations to plaintiffs, violating Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“CPL”), 73 P.S. §§ 201-1, et seq.; 2) that defendants fraudulently induced plaintiffs to purchase Ultra-grade gasoline in violation of Common Law Fraud principles; 3) that defendants negligently misrepresented the characteristics of Ultra gasoline; 4) that defendants’ improper actions constituted a breach of an express warranty created by their claims about Ultra gasoline; and 5) that defendants have been unjustly enriched by the practices set forth above.
21. Plaintiffs’ suit has been filed as a class action on behalf of the following proposed class:
All persons in the United States who purchased Sunoco Ultra 93.5 and 94 gasoline for personal, family or household purposes from February 22, 1990 through May 6, 1992. Excluded from the class are defendants Sun Company, Inc. and Sun Company, Inc. (R & M) and defendants’ officers and directors.
¶ 6 My review of the record suggests that certification of the class proposed by appellants 27 would have constituted an abuse of discretion by the learned trial court judge. In this case, just as in Hanson, the sole fact common to all of the proposed class members is the purchase of Sunoco Ultra gasoline. “The remaining questions of fact and law are unique to each person’s circumstances, to wit, [whether the pur*1175chase was for personal or family use as opposed to business use, whether the class member read or heard the offending advertisements and as a result of those specific misrepresentations by appellee28, purchased Sunoco Ultra, whether the class member owned a car which could not benefit from increased octane29, the amount of each class member’s damages, the state consumer fraud statute of the class member’s home state, the requirements and remedies of that statute, etc.]”. Hanson v. Federal Signal Corp., supra, 679 A.2d at 789.
.. .While the existence of individual questions of fact is not necessarily fatal, it is essential that there be a predominance of common issues, shared by all the class members, which can be justly resolved in a single proceeding. Hayes, 370 Pa.Super. at 606, 537 A.2d at 332. In determining liability, this court has stated that “the common question of fact” means precisely that - the facts surrounding each plaintiffs claim must be substantially the same so that proof as to one claimant would be proof as to all. Allegheny County Housing Authority v. Berry, 338 Pa.Super. 338, 341, 487 A.2d 995, 997 (1985).
There is a significant difference, however, between individual factual questions regarding damages and individual questions of fact concerning liability. Cook v. Highland Water & Sewer Authority, 108 Pa.Cmwlth. 222, 231, 530 A.2d 499, 504 (1987). Once a common source of liability has been clearly identified, varying amounts of damages among the plaintiffs will not preclude class certification. Id. “However, where there exist various intervening and possibly superseding causes of damage, liability cannot be determined on a class-wide basis.”
Weismer v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., supra, 615 A.2d at 431 (emphasis in original).
¶ 7 Recently, this Court in Basile v. H & R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc., 729 A.2d 574 (Pa.Super.1999), agreed with
Judge Herron’s conclusion that the UTPCPL requires a showing of detrimental reliance in private actions based on all provisions of the statute. See: 73 P.S. § 201-9.2. See also: DiLucido, supra, at 1241. Additionally, we recognize that an action under the UTPCPL may not be amenable to class certification due to discrepancies in the respective levels of reliance displayed by individual class members.
Basile, supra, 729 A.2d at 584.
¶ 8 The requirement of detrimental reliance for a private cause of action under the UTPCPL would appear to generally preclude certification of a class action30, since such a requirement almost insures that individual factual issues will predominate over common questions of law or fact. See, e.g.: Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997)(the commonality of asbestos exposure shared by the proposed class members was insufficient to satisfy the predominance requirement of *1176F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3) where numerous individual issues existed, differences which were compounded by differences in the applicable state laws); Carpenter v. BMW of North America, Inc., 1999 WL 415390 (1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9272)(E.D.Pa.l999)(denial of class certification of claims against BMW of North America, Inc. based upon consumer fraud statutes, common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract due to inability of class to meet predominance requirement where the consumer protection laws of each state varied, and individual issues of knowledge and reliance overwhelmed the commonality element).
¶ 9 Thus it is that I would affirm the order which denied certification of the proposed class.

. As the majority aptly recounts, the Federal Trade Commission in 1974 concluded that a Sun advertising campaign had been "unfair and deceptive”. As a result, Sun entered into a consent decree that required Sun to cease and desist from "misrepresenting, in any manner, performance characteristics of Suno-co gasoline....” Nonetheless, Sun in 1990 undertook a campaign which resembled that prior "deceptive” campaign. This latter Sim effort underlies the instant action.

. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary provides the following definitions:
octane 1: any of several isomeric liquid paraffin hydrocarbons C8H18 2: octane number
octane number: a number that is used to measure the anti-knock properties of a liquid motor fuel and that represents the percentage by volume of isooctane in a reference fuel consisting of a mixture of isooctane and normal heptane and matching in knocking properties the fuel being tested - called also octane rating; compare cetane number.

. I agree with the conclusion of the majority that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure permit certification of a national class action.

. Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, I remain convinced that “the UTPCPL requires a showing of detrimental reliance in private actions based on all provisions of the statute.” Basile v. H & R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc., 729 A.2d 574, 584 (Pa.Super.1999)(emphasis supplied). Accord: Fay v. Erie Insurance Group, 723 A.2d 712, 714 (Pa.Super.1999); DiLucido v. Terminix International Inc., supra, 676 A.2d at 1241.

. The parties agree that a small percentage of cars do require or will benefit from high octane gas.

.The reliance of the majority upon the decision of the Commonwealth Court in Commonwealth v. Hush-Tone, 4 Pa.Cmwlth. 1 (1971), is not here appropriate, in my view, since the instant case is a private action for money damages under Section 201-9.2(a) of the Act, and not an enforcement action brought under Section 201-4 by the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or a county district attorney.