Court Opinion

ID: 9474526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:00:27.407487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:09.352189
License: Public Domain

SNEEDEN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court and compel disclosure of the confidential informant’s name. Although he was more than a mere “tipster,” the informant in this case did not participate in the unlawful conversion of property, nor did he help to set up the criminal occurrence. Furthermore, since Price did not legitimately allege entrapment or duress, disclosure of the informant’s identity would not have significantly assisted him in his defense. Thus, I believe the majority erred in concluding that Price’s interest in learning the informant’s identity outweighed the public’s interest in guarding this confidential information.
The cornerstone of the majority’s opinion is Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), in which the Supreme Court held that, based on the facts of that case, disclosure of an informer’s identity was required by fundamental notions of fairness. In reaching its conclusion, the majority also relies heavily on McLawhorn v. State of North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.1973), a decision by this court requiring disclosure of an informant’s identity “where the informant is an actual participant (in the crime), particularly where he helps set up the criminal occurrence____” Id. at 5. Roviaro and McLawhorn are, however, distinguishable from the case at hand.
In Roviaro, the Supreme Court noted that the purpose behind the privilege of nondisclosure is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective law enforcement. 353 U.S. at 59, 77 S.Ct. at 627. The Court noted that this privilege is limited. Id. at 60, 77 S.Ct. at 627. However, the Court refused to articulate a fixed rule defining when disclosure is justifiable. Id. at 62, 77 S.Ct. at 629. Instead, the Court stated that a balancing test must be performed — the public interest in protecting the flow of information balanced against an individual’s right to prepare his defense. Id. Factors to be weighed included consideration of the crime charged, possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony and “other relevant factors.” Id.
The facts of Roviaro compelled the tipping of the scales in favor of disclosure. The defendant in that case was accused of knowingly and fraudulently receiving, concealing, buying and facilitating the transportation and concealment of heroin with the knowledge that the drug was unlawfully imported into the United States. 353 U.S. at 54, 77 S.Ct. at 624. The testimony of the confidential informant in Roviaro would be directly related to these charges because the informant had helped to set up the criminal occurrence and played a prominent part in it. 353 U.S. at 64, 77 S.Ct. at 629. The informant’s testimony might have cast doubt upon the identity of the defendant or the package of drugs he was accused of transporting. Furthermore, the informant was the only witness who might have testified to the defendant’s possible lack of knowledge of the contents of the *1142drug package he transported to the informer’s car. Id. Finally, the informant was the only person, other than the defendant himself, who could controvert, explain or amplify the report of a police officer who eavesdropped on a conversation between the defendant and the informant in which the accused directed the informant to the site of the drug pickup. Id. The officer, hidden in the trunk of the informant’s car, reported that he had observed the defendant exit from the car, walk to a tree, pick up a package, return to the car, deposit the package and had heard the defendant advise the informant that he would call him in a couple of days. 353 U.S. at 57, 77 S.Ct. at 626. The informant’s testimony in Roviaro was thus material and highly relevant.
The facts of the McLawhorn case also indicate that the testimony of the confidential informant was critically important to the defendant. The informant in McLawhom was working with a police detective in an undercover drug investigation. 484 F.2d at 3. The informant told the detective that the defendant McLawhorn was involved in drug trafficking and offered to arrange a cocaine sale. Id. The informant later spotted McLawhorn driving a car and signaled him to stop. Following a brief conversation, the informant introduced the detective to McLawhorn as a potential customer. Id. The informant negotiated a sale of one gram of cocaine. Then, according to the detective’s testimony, McLawhorn sold the drug to both he and the informant. Id. McLawhorn was later charged with illegal transportation, possession and sale of a narcotic drug. Id.
The informant’s role in McLawhorn thus made his testimony highly relevant. The informant set up the drug deal, negotiated a price and actually participated in the sale of the cocaine. The informant’s role in the present case was far more limited. The confidential informant’s involvement here consisted of alerting federal authorities to the fact that a truck driver in a bar announced he would sell his shipment, introducing the driver to federal agents and traveling to the location at which the truck and its contents were to be sold. The informant did not participate in negotiations for the actual sale. Instead, defendant Price identified himself to F.B.I. Agent Zacur as the driver of a truck loaded with meat. The defendant inquired whether Zacur wanted to buy the truck, trailer and contents for $10,000. Responding, Zacur indicated that if an inspection verified Price’s description of the truck’s cargo, a purchase price of $10,000 would be agreeable. The agent told Price, however, the sale must occur at a nearby hotel.
The confidential informant traveled to the hotel and introduced Price to another federal agent whom he described as Zacur’s associate. The informant did not ride to the hotel with Price or Zacur. The informant’s involvement, for all practical purposes, ended at this point. Although he was on the hotel premises, the confidential informant was not present when Price opened the truck trailer’s door to display the cargo to Zacur. Nor was the informant present when the agents arrested Price. In fact, the informant did not even witness the crime. He was positioned in front of the hotel restaurant while Price, Zacur and the truck were located behind the restaurant. Thus, since the confidential informant did not play a material role in the consummation of the crime of conversion and was not present when the crime was committed, this case is clearly distinguishable from Roviaro and McLawhorn.
The facts in this case are much more analogous to those found in our recent decision of United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977 (4th Cir.1984). In Brinkman we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the disclosure of the identity and location of a government informant. Id. at 981. Brink-man was convicted of violating the Extortionate Credit Transaction Act,1 and the Interstate Travel Act.2 His problems with the law stemmed from an unhappy busi*1143ness venture with Manual Kane. Id. The F.B.I. learned that Brinkman wished to hire a hit man to beat up Kane. Id. at 979. Agents arranged for a confidential informant to meet Brinkman. The informant introduced Brinkman to an undercover agent who was described as a hitman. Id. Brinkman told the agent where to find Kane and how to beat him to ensure payment of an alleged $5,000 debt. The agent later notified Brinkman that he had collected the debt. Brinkman was arrested after attempting to pay the “hitman” for his services. Id.
In assessing the role of the confidential informant in Brinkman, this court concluded that the informant’s participation in the case did not warrant disclosure of his identity:
We face, however, a situation in which Nails, the informant, falls somewhere in between the role of a mere tipster and that of a participant in the offense. That Nails was more than a “mere tipster” is clear from the fact that he had two important discussions with Brinkman, established that Brinkman wanted a hit man, and introduced Brinkman to Hartman. On the other hand, it is equally inappropriate to label Nails a “participant” in the offense; the crux of the government’s case came from the later, recorded discussions between Hartman and Brinkman, to which Nails was not a party.
739 F.2d at 981. In the case at hand, the confidential informant was also more than a tipster yet less than a participant in the offense. The informant alerted the F.B.I. to the defendant’s public announcement that he wished to sell his rig and its cargo. Furthermore, the informant introduced Price to government agents posing as buyers. However, the key negotiations for the sale of the truck and its contents were solely between the defendant and agent Zacur. Moreover, the informant could hardly be labeled a participant in the illegal conversion since he was not present and did not witness the actual criminal occurrence. Following Brinkman then, this court should decline to require release of the informant’s name.
Price does not cite Brinkman in his brief. The majority acknowledges the existence of the decision in footnote six but does not attempt to distinguish the case. I believe Brinkman is on point and controlling. Critics may assert that the present case is distinguishable because entrapment and duress are alleged here but were not issues in the Brinkman case. However, this is a distinction without a difference. Price has merely baldly asserted that he was entrapped. More than mere allegations must be forthcoming to force the release of a confidential informant’s name. See United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107 (4th Cir.1985) (en banc) (court requires more than mere speculation on usefulness of disclosure of informant’s identity). Otherwise, the privilege of confidentiality would be lost automatically upon the inclusion of certain statements in a complaint.
Furthermore, although he articulated more facts to support his defense of duress, Price failed to convince the trial court that he was forced into the illegal sale. The defendant’s testimony on the issue was inherently suspicious. He admitted that he never saw a weapon displayed by men who allegedly threatened him. Price never mentioned threats to his trucking dispatcher and gave inconsistent testimony over whether the threats came before or after his last call to the dispatcher.3 Furthermore, although he stated that he was threatened there earlier, Price returned to Rip’s bar after traveling to another bar to play pool and shoot darts. This behavior is inconsistent with the assertion that Price felt his life was threatened at Rip’s.
The district court had the opportunity to judge the credibility of all the witnesses including the defendant. Judge Ramsey chose not to believe Price’s allegations of duress and entrapment. The informant’s testimony on these issues was therefore not required. This court, working from a *1144cold record, should not attempt to second guess the trier of fact. Clearly, the record demonstrates that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to require disclosure of the informant’s identity following bald allegations or allegations supported by conflicting testimony and behavior that belies the defendant’s assertions.4
In conclusion, I restate my belief that Roviaro and McLawkorn are distinguishable and do not compel disclosure of the informant’s identity when he does not set up or participate in the crime. Instead, Brinkman dictates that when an informant’s involvement does not rise to the level of participating in a crime, his name need not be revealed. I believe the majority thus erred in reversing the trial court’s decision to keep this information confidential. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. 18 U.S.C. § 894(a)(1).

. 18 U.S.C. § 1952.

. Joint Appendix at 143-44.

. It is within a trial court’s discretion to determine whether the testimony of an informer is likely to be relevant to the trial of an accused. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 61 n. 9, 77 S.Ct. at 628 n. 9; Brinkman, 739 F.2d at 980-81; United States v. Soles, 482 F.2d 105, 109 (2nd Cir.1973). Furthermore, disclosure is not required unless the trial court determines that an informer’s testimony is highly relevant. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107.