Court Opinion

ID: 9901015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 22:11:39.557116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:24.436526
License: Public Domain

2023 UT App 120

               THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

                     SRB INVESTMENT CO.,
                          Appellee,
                              v.
                  DALE ORSON SPENCER, ET AL., 1
                         Appellants.

                            Opinion
                        No. 20220195-CA
                      Filed October 5, 2023

            Sixth District Court, Kanab Department
                 The Honorable Wallace A. Lee
                         No. 120600113

        Clifford V. Dunn, Adam C. Dunn, and Michael C.
                 Dunn, Attorneys for Appellants
            V. Lowry Snow, Devin Snow, and Devon J.
                Herrmann, Attorneys for Appellee

    JUDGE RYAN D. TENNEY authored this Opinion, in which
     JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

TENNEY, Judge:

¶1      SRB Investment Co. (SRB) owns a 240-acre parcel of
property in rural Kane County. To access its property, SRB must
cross through property owned by the Spencers. In 2012, the
Spencers began refusing to let SRB cross through their property.
SRB accordingly sued. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the
district court ruled that SRB had a “flexibly located roadway
easement” that allowed it to cross through the Spencers’ property,

1. Additional Appellants include Mary C. Pedersen, George A.
Pedersen, Mary Ellen Spencer, Mark D. Spencer, Charlene
Spencer, Spencer Ranch, Inc., KOB Properties, LLC, and Good
Day Ranch, LLC.
                    SRB Investment v. Spencer

but that SRB’s use was limited to “farming and ranching
purposes, and uses at random times for random reasons.”

¶2      SRB appealed, arguing that the limitations the court had
imposed on its use were improper. See SRB Inv. Co. v. Spencer (SRB
I), 2020 UT 23, 463 P.3d 654. The Utah Supreme Court agreed with
SRB and vacated those limitations, and it then remanded with
instructions for the district court to make a new determination
about the scope of the easement. Id. ¶ 1. On remand, the district
court ruled that SRB had a “flexible” easement to cross the
Spencers’ property. The court also ruled that the Spencers may
only make “reasonable, minor changes” to the location of the road
in question. The Spencers now appeal that determination, arguing
that the court should not have limited their ability to change the
road’s location. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

                        BACKGROUND

                     History of the Easement

¶3     The Spencer family owns a large amount of property in a
mostly undeveloped part of Kane County. 2 The Spencers’
property is located on something of a bluff, and the area is
sometimes referred to as “the Spencer Bench.” SRB owns a 240-
acre parcel of property on the Spencer Bench. Because of the
topography, the only way to access SRB’s property in a vehicle is
to drive about three miles on Highway 89 beyond the SRB
property and then traverse back to the property using a dirt road
that crosses through property owned by the Spencers.

2. To be a bit more precise: this land is owned by a number of
people or entities that are either directly related to the Spencer
family or associated with them. For ease of reference, we’ll refer
to them collectively as the Spencers or the Spencer family.

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                     SRB Investment v. Spencer

¶4      Norman Carroll was the previous owner of the SRB
property, and his father and grandfather had owned it before him.
Carroll later recalled that in 1940, when he was about 10 years old,
he “was going up” to the property “all the time.” 3 He also recalled
that from the 1940s on, his family accessed their property by using
a dirt road that crossed through the Spencers’ property.

¶5     Carroll and his family used their property for sheep
grazing and wheat planting, so they transported “all the farm
equipment,” the “harvesting equipment,” and “the camps” on the
road that ran across the Spencer property. Carroll and his family
used the road “for years and years and years,” and when they did,
they “never had to ask permission.” Although the Spencers
placed a gate with a lock across the road at certain times, they
would tell the Carrolls where any key was or simply give a copy
of the key to them.

¶6     The Carrolls weren’t the only ones using the road. Other
owners on the Spencer Bench also used the road. And this pattern
of neighborliness ran both ways—the Carrolls allowed the
Spencers’ cattle to feed on their property when they weren’t using
it, and the Spencers were allowed to travel across the Carroll
property to access certain portions of their own property.

¶7     Of particular note for this appeal, the Spencers would
sometimes “cut variant roads randomly across their property,”
and when they did, the Carrolls would “use[] the newly cut
roads.” This process of the Spencers sometimes moving the road
and the Carrolls then using the new one continued “as late as the
1990s or 2000s.” But Carroll also said that “[f]or a long time, there

3. Norman Carroll was deposed while this case was pending, but
he passed away before trial. His deposition was admitted at trial,
and any references in this opinion to his statements are drawn
from that deposition.

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                    SRB Investment v. Spencer

was only one” road and that when the Spencers did move it, its
location was only “changed a little bit.”

¶8      Sometime around 1980, a member of the Spencer family
told Carroll that if Carroll ever wanted to sell his property, the
Spencers would like to purchase it. This member of the Spencer
family believed that he had “a verbal agreement” at that point in
which the Spencers would be able to purchase the property if
Carroll ever sold it. In 2005, however, Carroll sold the property to
SRB. 4 Some of the Spencers believed that Carroll “had broken” the
verbal agreement.

¶9     SRB “had no plans to develop” its property but instead
“planned on splitting” it and building two family cabins on it.
After SRB purchased the property from Carroll, however, the
Spencers objected to SRB’s continued use of the road that crossed
through their property. The Spencers then built a house in the
middle of the then-existing road, after which they “built a new
variant” of the road nearby and began demanding payment from
SRB for the right to use it. The SRB owners thought the Spencers
were asking for an unreasonable amount of money, particularly
given that Carroll had never been charged for his use of the road,
so the SRB owners told the Spencers that they would not pay. In
response, the Spencers put a locked gate across the road and
didn’t give SRB a key, thus effectively blocking SRB’s access to its
property.

     The District Court’s Initial Ruling Regarding an Easement

¶10 In 2012, SRB sued, asking for a judicial declaration that it
had an “ingress and egress” easement across the Spencer

4. Stephan R. Brown formed SRB in the early 1990s to purchase
real property for investment purposes, and SRB owns other real
property near the Spencer Bench as well. Brown is SRB’s general
partner and his wife is “the only limited partner.” The name
“SRB” comes from Brown’s initials.

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                    SRB Investment v. Spencer

property. After much litigation that’s not relevant to this appeal,
the district court held a bench trial in May 2018, after which it
issued a written ruling.

¶11 The court noted that under Utah law, SRB was required to
show that there had been “open, notorious, adverse, and
continuous use [across the Spencer property] for at least 20 years.”
In its ruling, the court found that the relevant 20-year period for
establishing a prescriptive easement “started in the 1940s and
ended sometime in the 1960s” and that “a prescriptive easement”
across the Spencer property had accordingly been established.
The court ruled that this was a “flexibly located [r]oadway[]
easement”—i.e., that the Spencers could “vary” the easement’s
location as they “reasonably wish to designate variant paths” and
that SRB “should follow it, as has been done historically.”

¶12 The court also ruled that the “scope of this easement”
would be “limited by its historic use, which is farming and
ranching, with trips to and from” SRB’s property “at random
times.” Because of this conclusion, the court ruled that “house
buildings” on the SRB property (such as cabins) would be
“outside the scope of the prescriptive easement’s historic usage”
and that SRB could only use the easement to access “a camp or
other building[s] or vehicle[s]” that are “ancillary to farming and
ranching uses.” The court then ordered the Spencers “to
immediately provide access to [SRB] for their use” of this
“prescriptive easement,” and it also ordered them to “take no
action that would prohibit [SRB] from use of the prescriptive
easement.” 5

5. Pursuant to rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Spencers filed a motion to alter or amend this initial ruling. The
merits of that motion are not at issue in this appeal. We do note,
however, that the Spencers did not challenge the district court’s
                                                      (continued…)

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                      SRB Investment v. Spencer

                                SRB I

¶13 SRB appealed, explaining that it was challenging “those
parts of” the district court’s rulings “that relate to the scope” of its
prescriptive easement. In its appellate briefing, however, SRB did
not challenge the court’s ruling about the Spencers’ ability to
adjust the location of the easement. Instead, its briefing focused
on other issues relating to the limitations on its use of the
easement.

¶14 In May 2020, the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision.
There, the supreme court held that the district court had “erred by
limiting the use of the access easement to only those people who
would use it with the subjective purpose to farm or ranch on the
SRB property,” and the supreme court further held that the
district court had erred “in limiting SRB’s use of SRB’s own
property.” SRB I, 2020 UT 23, ¶¶ 40, 43, 463 P.3d 654.

¶15 In the supreme court’s view, the improper limitations were
part of the district court’s ruling about the easement’s scope. Id.
¶ 7. Because the supreme court concluded that “the district court
erred in describing the scope of the prescriptive easement,” it
accordingly “remand[ed] for a new determination.” Id. ¶ 48. The
supreme court provided detailed guidance about the nature of the
scope determination. It explained that

       when asked to determine the scope of a prescriptive
       easement, or whether a particular use is permitted
       under that easement, courts should consider any
       and all factors that are helpful in determining the
       extent of the historical burden on the servient estate.
       Factors that courts should consider in almost every
       case are the physical dimensions of the prescriptive

conclusion that a prescriptive easement existed, nor have they
since appealed or otherwise argued that the easement itself
should not be recognized.

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                     SRB Investment v. Spencer

        use, the frequency and intensity of the use, and the
        effect of the use on the aesthetic and economic value
        of the property. Additionally, courts may consider
        the subjective purpose for using the easement, as
        well as the nature of the use of the dominant estate,
        but only to the extent those factors are helpful in
        determining the nature of the burden on the servient
        estate. Finally, in determining the scope of a
        prescriptive right, courts should take a flexible
        approach that permits changes of use so long as
        those changes do not materially burden the servient
        estate or materially interfere with the prescriptive
        right.

Id. ¶ 38. 6

¶16 The supreme court thus directed the district court on
remand to “be careful to consider only those factors that provide
information regarding the burden that has been imposed
historically by the easement on the Spencer property.” Id. ¶ 48.
The supreme court also directed the district court to “employ a
flexible approach that aims to find some accommodation of the
parties’ conflicting interests, to the maximum advantage and to
the minimum disadvantage of both parties, so that the
prescriptive right retains its utility for SRB without materially
adding to the burden imposed on the Spencers.” Id. (quotation
simplified).

6. A “servient estate” is “[a]n estate burdened by an easement,”
whereas a “dominant estate” is “[a]n estate that benefits from an
easement.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Estate (11th ed. 2019).
Consistent with this common understanding, the supreme court
noted that the Spencers’ property is the servient estate in this case
and that SRB’s property is the dominant estate. SRB I, 2020 UT 23,
¶ 9, 463 P.3d 654.

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                    SRB Investment v. Spencer

                     Post-Remand Proceedings

¶17 After the case returned to the district court, the parties
disagreed about whether the court should hold a new evidentiary
hearing before issuing a ruling about the scope of the easement.
The Spencers thought that the court should hold such a hearing,
while SRB believed that the supreme court’s “directive may be
carried out based on the facts that are already in the record.”

¶18 After requesting and receiving supplemental briefing, the
district court issued new findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding the scope of the prescriptive easement. Following what
it understood to be the “mandate from the Supreme Court on
remand,” the court made findings about the nature and extent of
the easement’s historical use, the burden historically imposed on
the Spencers’ estate, the physical dimensions of the historical use
of the easement, and the frequency and intensity of its use. From
all this, the court ruled that the “easement may be used as often
as necessary,” that “[a]ny kind of motorized vehicle may be
driven on the easement for ingress and egress to [SRB’s]
property,” that “[s]upplies, agricultural materials, crops, and
building materials may be transported over the easement at any
time,” and that “[p]ermission to use the easement is not required.”

¶19 Relevant to this appeal, the ruling also included the
following three paragraphs:

   •   Finding of Fact 18: “Use of the easement was limited to
       the travelled surface of the roadway.”

   •   Conclusion of Law 9: The Spencers “may make
       reasonable, minor changes to the location of the
       easement in the future, but may not diminish the
       current width of the traveled way or ease of use.”

   •   Conclusion of Law 13: “The scope of the easement shall
       hereafter be construed in a flexible manner which

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                    SRB Investment v. Spencer

       ‘permits changes of use so long as those changes do not
       materially burden the servient estate or materially
       interfere with the prescriptive right.’” (Quoting SRB I,
       2020 UT 23, ¶ 49.)

¶20 After this ruling was issued, the Spencers filed a rule 59
motion to alter or amend it. The Spencers had three main requests.
First, they asked the court to alter Finding of Fact 18, requesting
that the court now state that the historical road was “limited in
width to a maximum of fourteen feet.” Second, the Spencers asked
the court to remove the word “minor” from Conclusion of Law 9.
And third, the Spencers asked the court to include language in
Conclusion of Law 13 stating that they are allowed to “change the
location of the easement.”

¶21 With respect to their second and third requests, the
Spencers argued that the court’s initial post-remand ruling had
actually “exceed[ed]” the mandate from the supreme court in SRB
I. In the Spencers’ view, this was so because the district court’s
initial ruling had given them “the ability to move the easement,”
but “that ability to move the easement was not challenged” by
SRB in the appeal. The Spencers thus argued that their “ability to
relocate the easement should not now be limited by a new, more
restrictive, order.” SRB opposed this motion, after which the court
heard additional arguments from the parties.

¶22 In January 2022, the district court issued a revised decision
that granted some, but not all, of the changes requested by the
Spencers. The court amended the post-remand decision as
follows:

   •   Finding of Fact 18: “Use of the easement was limited to
       the travelled surface of the historical roadway, which
       was a maximum of fourteen feet.”

   •   Conclusion of Law 9: The Spencers “may make
       reasonable, minor changes to the location of the

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                    SRB Investment v. Spencer

       easement in the future, but may not diminish the width
       of the travelled way to less than fourteen feet. [The
       Spencers] also may not diminish the ease of use.”

The court did not change Conclusion of Law 13.

            ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶23 The Spencers now challenge the district court’s ruling on
two grounds. First, they argue that the district court violated the
law of the case doctrine when, after the remand from the Utah
Supreme Court, the district court altered a portion of the
judgment that “had not been appealed and remain[ed]
undisturbed on appeal.” Appellate courts review the “application
of the law of the case doctrine . . . under an abuse of discretion
standard.” McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2013 UT 20, ¶ 19, 299 P.3d 1139
(quotation simplified).

¶24 The Spencers next argue that the district court erred by
imposing certain limitations on their ability to move the location
of the road. In reviewing a district court’s determinations relating
to “whether a prescriptive easement exists,” we review the court’s
“conclusions regarding the legal standard for correctness,” and
we “review the court’s factual findings, including how the court
applied those findings to the correct legal standard, for an abuse
of discretion.” SRB I, 2020 UT 23, ¶ 6, 463 P.3d 654.

                            ANALYSIS

¶25 The district court ruled that SRB has a prescriptive
easement across the Spencers’ property and that the Spencers can
make “reasonable, minor” changes to its location. The Spencers
now challenge that limitation.

 20220195-CA                    10              2023 UT App 120
                    SRB Investment v. Spencer

¶26 We first note two things that are not at issue in this appeal.
First, the Spencers have not challenged the district court’s
threshold determination that SRB has a prescriptive easement to
cross their property. And second, SRB has not challenged the
court’s determination that the Spencers have at least some ability
to move the location of the road through which SRB exercises its
rights.

¶27 The two issues raised by the Spencers in their appeal are
instead narrower. Namely, the Spencers first argue that the
district court violated the law of the case doctrine on remand
when it imposed certain limitations on their ability to move the
location of the road. And they next argue that, law of the case
implications aside, the court abused its discretion when it limited
them to “minor” adjustments to the road’s location. We disagree
with the Spencers on both fronts.

                        I. Law of the Case

¶28 The Spencers argue that under the law of the case doctrine,
the district court could not impose any limitations on the location
of the road beyond those that were already set forth in the initial
decision that the court had issued before SRB’s appeal to the
supreme court. In response, SRB argues that the law of the case
doctrine was inapplicable, and, in any event, that the doctrine
didn’t prevent the district court from imposing the limitations
that it did. We agree with the Spencers that the law of the case
doctrine was applicable to the court’s post-remand ruling, but we
disagree with the Spencers’ contention that the doctrine was
violated here. 7

7. SRB also argues that the law of the case issue is unpreserved
because the Spencers didn’t mention the law of the case doctrine
below or cite authority about it. “In order to preserve an issue for
appeal,” however, “the issue must be presented to the district
                                                     (continued…)

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                     SRB Investment v. Spencer

¶29 Under the law of the case doctrine, “a decision made on an
issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of
the same litigation.” IHC Health Services v. D&K Mgmt., Inc., 2008
UT 73, ¶ 26, 196 P.3d 588 (quotation simplified). And where a
“final ruling or order of the trial court[] goes unchallenged by
appeal, such becomes the law of the case, and is not thereafter
subject to later challenge.” Tracy v. University of Utah Hosp., 619
P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1980); see also State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228,
1229 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a trial court’s ruling
remained law of the case “[s]ince the defendant ha[d] failed to
appeal” that ruling). In this sense, “a district court’s power to
reconsider decided issues is limited when the case has been
appealed and remanded.” Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2015 UT
App 192, ¶ 30, 357 P.3d 586 (quotation simplified); see also

court in such a way that the district court has an opportunity to
rule on that issue.” State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, ¶ 23, 282 P.3d 985
(quotation simplified). While appellate courts “view issues
narrowly,” “new arguments, when brought under a properly
preserved issue or theory, do not require an exception to
preservation.” State v. Johnson, 2017 UT 76, ¶ 14 n.2, 416 P.3d 443
(emphases in original); see also Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, ¶ 45,
323 P.3d 998 (“Issues must be preserved, not arguments for or
against a particular ruling on an issue raised below.” (emphasis
in original)).
        In their rule 59 motion after the remand, the Spencers
argued that the post-remand ruling was erroneous because the
district court addressed matters that hadn’t been challenged in
SRB I. The Spencers further argued that their “ability to change
the roadway location” therefore “should not be restricted beyond
the limits imposed by the original Court Order.” Although the
Spencers didn’t use the phrase “law of the case,” this was
essentially the same argument that they are making now, both in
terms of its core legal rationale and its ultimate request. This was
sufficient to bring the issue to the district court’s attention,
thereby preserving it for appeal.

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                     SRB Investment v. Spencer

Woodward v. LaFranca, 2016 UT App 141, ¶ 8, 381 P.3d 1125 (noting
that a “remand with specific instructions to the trial court
necessarily precludes the trial court from considering issues
outside the scope of remand”).

¶30 The Spencers’ argument turns on “a subset of the law of the
case doctrine” that is referred to as the “mandate rule.” State v.
Oliver, 2018 UT App 101, ¶ 29 n.8, 427 P.3d 495. This rule
recognizes that a decision of an appellate court “binds both the
district court and the parties to honor the mandate of the appellate
court” if there is a remand. Id. (quotation simplified). In this sense,
“the decisions of an appellate court become the law of the case
and cannot be reconsidered on remand.” Id. (quotation
simplified).

¶31 Here, there was an initial ruling from the district court, an
appeal to the supreme court by SRB, and then a remand by the
supreme court for further proceedings. Given this trajectory, we
agree with the Spencers that the law of the case doctrine
(including the mandate rule) was applicable to the district court
in the post-remand proceedings.

¶32 But even so, we disagree with the Spencers’ contention that
the district court violated the law of the case doctrine here. It’s
true, as the Spencers point out, that although SRB’s appeal of the
district court’s 2018 ruling was certainly broad enough to include
any issues related to the “scope of” the easement, SRB didn’t
include any argument in their appellate briefs challenging the
court’s specific ruling about the Spencers’ ability to move the
location of the road. And it’s also true that when a “final ruling or
order of the trial court[] goes unchallenged by appeal, such
becomes the law of the case, and is not thereafter subject to later
challenge.” Tracy, 619 P.2d at 342.

¶33 But as explained above, SRB did appeal the district court’s
limitations on its ability to use the road, and the supreme court
regarded those limitations as being part of the easement’s scope.

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                     SRB Investment v. Spencer

Because it was reversing one part of the ruling about the
easement’s scope, the supreme court remanded for the district
court to again “determine[e] the scope of the prescriptive
easement.” SRB I, 2020 UT 23, ¶ 1, 463 P.3d 654. Providing
guidance to the district court about what a scope determination
should look like, the supreme court explained that the scope of an
easement is defined by “the nature and extent of the easement’s
historical use.” Id. ¶ 14. And the supreme court then laid out a
host of factors relevant to this determination, stating that “courts
should consider any and all” of them when “determining the
extent of the historical burden on the servient estate.” Id. ¶ 38.
These factors include “the nature of the burden on the servient
estate” and “the physical dimensions of the prescriptive use.” Id.

¶34 Again, under the law of the case doctrine, a “remand with
specific instructions to the trial court necessarily precludes the
trial court from considering issues outside the scope of remand.”
Woodward, 2016 UT App 141, ¶ 8. But because the supreme court
here had expressly remanded to the district court for a new scope
determination, and because that determination would turn, in
part, on an assessment of the “nature and extent” of the road’s
“historical use” and the “nature of the burden” imposed by that
easement on the Spencers, this new determination would
naturally include decisions about where the road was located,
whether the Spencers could move the road, and, if they could
move it, whether there were any limitations on that right.

¶35 If there was any doubt about the district court’s ability to
consider these issues on remand, the supreme court removed that
doubt in Part III(D) of its opinion. In Part III generally, the court
laid out the various factors that go into a decision about an
easement’s scope. See SRB I, 2020 UT 23, ¶¶ 19–38. In Part III(D),
the court more particularly held (as indicated in that subsection’s
subheading) that “the nature of a use can be altered reasonably.”
Id. ¶¶ 31-32 (quotation simplified). In that subsection, the
supreme court explained that “in considering changes to the use

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                     SRB Investment v. Spencer

of an easement or the servient estate, [Utah courts] apply a flexible
rule that seeks to accommodate reasonable changes in use.” Id.
¶ 33. Echoing this same point at the close of the opinion, the
supreme court directed the district court on remand to “employ a
flexible approach that aims to find some accommodation of the
parties’ conflicting interests . . . so that the prescriptive right
retains its utility for SRB without materially adding to the burden
imposed on the Spencers.” Id. ¶ 48 (quotation simplified).

¶36 The Spencers did not file a petition for rehearing asking the
supreme court to strike those paragraphs. Because of this, those
paragraphs were part of the mandate given to the district court.
Because the district court was being directed by the supreme court
to employ a “flexible” approach that would consider “reasonable
changes in use” to the roadway in an effort to accommodate the
“parties’ conflicting interests,” this determination would
naturally include consideration of the Spencers’ ability to move
the road.

¶37 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court acted
within the scope of the supreme court’s mandate when it
considered the location of the road and whether any change could
be made to it. Under the circumstances of this case, the law of the
case doctrine was not violated.

         II. The “Reasonable, Minor Changes” Limitation

¶38 In their rule 59 challenge to the post-remand ruling, the
Spencers claimed they had an “absolute right to relocate the
easement.” In its final ruling, however, the district court
determined that the Spencers could make “reasonable, minor
changes to the location of the easement in the future.” The
Spencers now argue that by imposing this limitation, the district
court “abused and exceeded its discretion . . . by imposing an

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                     SRB Investment v. Spencer

effectively permanent geographic scope             where    no   such
permanence previously existed.” 8

¶39 The ruling in question first limits the Spencers to
“reasonable” changes to the road’s location. The initial ruling
contained a similar limitation, and the Spencers did not appeal or
cross-appeal that limitation. Though they have at times seemed to
concede that this limitation was proper, they have at other times
argued that they have an “absolute right” to move the road—an
argument that would seem to challenge the reasonableness
limitation too. Regardless, at oral argument in this appeal, the
Spencers conceded that the reasonableness component of the
post-remand limitation was proper.

¶40 The Spencers’ challenge is thus confined to the additional
inclusion of the word “minor” in this limitation. But again, the
supreme court in SRB I directed the district court to make a new
determination of the easement’s scope. And it explained that this
determination should be based, in part, on “the nature and extent

8. In passing, the Spencers also suggest that the court “did not
apply the correct legal standard” that was set forth by the
supreme court in SRB I. But the court did. It introduced its post-
remand order by noting that the Utah Supreme Court had
instructed it “to take a flexible approach to determining the scope
of the easement that permits changes in use of both the dominant
and servient estates so long as those changes do not materially
increase the burden imposed on either party.” The court then
introduced its findings of fact under headings that were lifted
from SRB I. For example, the district court quoted the supreme
court’s statement that a “prescriptive easement’s scope should be
defined with particularity based on the nature, or extent, of . . .
historical use,” and it then proceeded to apply that statement to
the facts at issue in this case. Because of this, the real focus of the
Spencers’ challenge is to the court’s application of that standard
to this case which, again, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

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                     SRB Investment v. Spencer

of the easement’s historical use.” SRB I, 2020 UT 23, ¶ 14. In its
post-remand ruling, the district court found that “the course of
the road easement was occasionally adjusted.” With respect to the
nature of these adjustments, Carroll testified that for “a long time,
there was only one” road and that when the location of the road
changed, it was only “changed a little bit.” The Spencers haven’t
pointed to any testimony or evidence that contradicted this
testimony. Thus, while it’s undisputed that the road has been
historically moved, there’s nothing in the record showing that the
Spencers ever had a historical practice of moving the easement in
what could be described as a major way. The limitation at issue
therefore appears consistent with the parties’ historical use, not
inconsistent with it.

¶41 In any event, SRB I also directed the district court to “find
some accommodation” of the parties’ “conflicting interests” “so
that the prescriptive right retains its utility for SRB without
materially adding to the burden imposed on the Spencers.” Id.
¶ 48 (quotation simplified). Given that the Spencers are now
conceding that the court could impose a “reasonableness”
limitation on them, the Spencers have not persuaded us that the
addition of the word “minor” materially adds to the burden that
is being imposed on them. To the extent that there is any daylight
between what would be “reasonable” and what would be
“minor,” this would seem to be minimal. And regardless, SRB has
its own interests in play too, and the supreme court directed the
district court to take those into account. This limitation seems
consistent with that directive, particularly given the possibility
that a major adjustment to the location of the road could create
additional and unwarranted burdens on SRB’s ability to access its
property.

¶42 As noted, we review the district court’s application of its
“findings” to the “legal standard” regarding an easement’s scope
for an abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 6. The abuse of discretion standard
is a deferential one, and that deference is warranted here where

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                    SRB Investment v. Spencer

we’re reviewing a lower court’s attempt to accommodate and
balance the parties’ respective interests. In these circumstances,
we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s addition of the word
“minor” to this limitation as part of its effort to do so.

                         CONCLUSION

¶43 In SRB I, the supreme court remanded with directions for
the district court to determine the scope of SRB’s easement. In
making that determination, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it limited the Spencers to “reasonable” and
“minor” changes to the road’s location.

¶44   Affirmed.

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