Court Opinion

ID: 9759003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:59:45.866375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:58.080292
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority opinion in every respect but one. I would dismiss the tort-of-outrage claim rather than address that issue. My reasoning is based on Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, 991 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1993), which dealt with the church’s suspension of a minister. In that case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals said: The Constitution forbids secular courts from deciding whether religious doctrine or ecclesiastical law supports a particular decision made by church authorities. The First Amendment does not shield employment decisions made by religious organizations from civil court review, however, where the employment decisions do not implicate religious beliefs, procedures, or law. See Scharon, 929 F.2d at 363 n. 3 (and cases cited therein). 991 F.2d at 471. In the case before us, the decision to disenroll Preston did implicate religious beliefs and procedures, as the majority correctly holds. The Huffstuttler’s claim of outrage is directly related to Preston’s disenrollment. Indeed, Preston testified at length at trial that the conduct that caused him the greatest distress was Calvary Christian School’s disenrollment decision, which, of course, was directly tied to religious doctrine. To hold that the First Amendment protects the disenrollment decision but then to allow a claim of outrage based on that same decision is logically inconsistent and violates the Free Exercise Clause. For these reasons, I would dismiss the outrage claim for lack of jurisdiction.