Court Opinion

ID: 9950819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 20:10:15.14666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:50.696043
License: Public Domain

Joseph v 291 Broadway Realty Assoc., LLC
               2024 NY Slip Op 30770(U)
                     March 11, 2024
           Supreme Court, New York County
        Docket Number: Index No. 158519/2020
                  Judge: Lynn R. Kotler
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
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                       publication.
                                                                                                      INDEX NO. 158519/2020
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 185                                                                          RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/11/2024

                               SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
                                         NEW YORK COUNTY
            PRESENT: HON.LYNN R. KOTLER. J.S.C.                                               PART.8-

            Orin Joseph                                                                       INDEX NO. 158519/2020

                                                                                              MOT. DATE
                      -v-
                                                                                              MOT. SEQ. NO. 3 and 5
            291 BROADWAY REALTY ASSOCIATES, LLC et al

            The following papers_were read on this motion to/for ...,,_s,_·_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
            Notice ofMotion/Petition/O.S.C. -Affidavits - Exhibits                                ECFS Doc. No(s). _ __
            Notice of Cross-Motion/Answering Affidavits - Exhibits                                ECFS Doc. No(s). _ __
            Replying Affidavits                                                                   ECFS Doc. No(s)._ __

                This is an action for injuries sustained at a construction site in violation of the Labor Law. There are
            two summary judgment motions pending, which are hereby consolidated for the court's consideration
            and disposition in this single decision/order.

                  In motion sequence 3, plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on liability on his Labor Law §§
            240[1], 241[6] and 200 claims. Defendants 291 Broadway Realty Associates, LLC ("291 Broadway")
            and G.C. Plumbing & Heating Inc ("GC Plumbing") oppose the motion. In motion sequence 5, defend-
            ants/third-party plaintiffs 291 Broadway and GC Plumbing move for summary judgment against the
            third-party defendant Orin & Sons Mechanical LLC ("Orin") on their claim for contractual indemnifica-
            tion. Orin opposes that motion and cross-moves for summary judgment dismissing the third-party com-
            plaint. Issue has been joined and the motions were timely brought Therefore, summary judgment relief
            is available. The court's decision follows.

                 Plaintiff was injured on August 11, 2020, when he was working on the third floor of the building lo-
            cated at 291 Broadway as a plumber. Plaintiff operated his own company, Orin, as a sole proprietor.
            291 Broadway owned the building and GC Plumbing was the general contractor for the retrofit of a fire
            sprinkler system in the building (the "project"). GC Plumbing was hired to perform the installation. GC
            Plumbing in turn hired Orin to install sprinklers.

                  Many of the material facts are in dispute. At the time of the accident, plaintiff testified that he was
            working on the third floor of the subject building installing pipes inside a 12-foot ceiling. According to
            plaintiff, the only way to access the ceiling was to use a ladder. Before the accident, plaintiff stated that
            he was using an unsecured 12-foot A-frame stepladder on flooring that was covered by plastic sheet-
            ing. The plastic sheeting was placed by a person hired by 291 Broadway to protect the floors. Plaintiff
            testified that the plastic sheeting was slippery and an insecure footing for the ladder. Plaintiff further
            stated that he had complained to both GC Plumbing and the building superintendp~t about the plastic

            Dated:        -,   H~ 1,                                                               l'U-
                                                                                  HON. LYNN R. KOTLER, J.S.C.

            1. Check one:                         0 CASE DISPOSED ~ NON-FINAL DISPOSITION
            2. Check as appropriate: Motion is    □ GRANTED O DENIED ~ GRANTED IN PART O OTHER
            3. Check if appropriate:              □ SETTLE ORDER O SUBMIT ORDER               O DO NOT POST
                                                  □ FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT O REFERENCE

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  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 185                                                                        RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/11/2024

            sheeting on the floor, three or four times, and as recent as about two or three weeks before the acci-
            dent. Specifically, plaintiff explained:

                        A.      Yes. I was going up and when I reached about midway, that put me
                                around three to four steps and the ladder, it starts walking. That's what we
                                call it. It's still on the A, but it keeps moving. We call -- our phrase is the
                                ladder is walking while you're going up. I turned going up with caution and
                                when I reached the ninth floor, that's when it start tilting.

                        Q.      You mean-

                        A       The ninth step.

                        Q.      That's when the ladder tilted?

                        A.      Yes.

                        Q.      You indicated it was moving before that. Do you mean it was sliding on
                                the floor?

                        A.      Yes, it was sliding, yes.

                        Q.      Sothis-

                        A.      Not sliding. We call it walking. Like it's not sliding, but it's like jumping.

                        Q.      Do you believe, if I understand you correctly, do you believe that the ex-
                                clusive cause of this accident is because there was plastic on that floor
                                and that's what caused the ladder to slide or move?

                        A.      Hundred percent.

                 Defendants dispute plaintiff's version of events and point to sworn affidavits of three individuals
            submitted in opposition to the motion, to wit, Asjad Mahmood, Aaron Franklyn, and loannis Likidis.
            Mahmood states that he was hired to provide protective covering for the furniture and floors in the build-
            ing while during the time period that plaintiff worked in the building. Mahmmod claims that he personally
            observed plaintiff "stand on the top (highest) step of a 6-foot A-frame ladder", that he observed plaintiff
            "moving the plastic" which was "not attached to the floor", "very light and very easy to move". Mahmood
            further claims:

                        l was not in the building on the day of the accident involving Orin Joseph. I saw
                        him very soon after the accident with a bandage or brace on his wrist. He told me
                        he hurt himself when his ladder tipped over. He said nothing about plastic.

                 Franklyn is the building manager, employed at the building during all relevant times. According to
            Franklyn, "no complaints" were ever made about "slippery plastic on the floors". Finally, Likidis is the
            owner of GC Plumbing. Likidis explains that due to the early-Covid Pandemic, GC Plumbing employees
            worked at separate times from Orin and plaintiff specifically. Likidis further states that plaintiff reported
            the accident to him shortly after it occurred. Specifically, Llkidis claims the following:

                        Orin Joseph called me in the evening one day in August of 2020 and told he had
                        an accident and that he hurt his wrist earlier that same day while working in the
                        building at 291 Broadway. In that phone call he stated he was leaning off the side
                        of the top of a ladder while his son was holding the ladder. He stated that his son

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  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 185                                                                      RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/11/2024

                        failed to hold the ladder properly. He stated nothing else about the cause of the
                        accident on that day and for much more than a month after that.

                 Likidis otherwise claims consistent with Franklyn that plaintiff never complained about "slippery
            plastic on the floors" nor that he "had any issues or problems regarding ladders or scaffolds or equip-
            ment (or lack of equipment) for the job ... " and that plaintiff "always supplied his own equipment for the
            dozens of different jobs he worked on over the years for [GC Plumbing]. There was no different ar-
            rangement or understanding for the building ... "

           Parties' arguments

                In motion sequence 3, Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because this is a
           "simple 'falling worker"' case and "the failure of the ladder to remain upright shows, prima facie, that the
           plaintiff was not provided with proper protection and establishes the defendant's liability under Labor
           Law§ 240[1]." Plaintiff further argues that the failure to provide proper footing for the ladder or secure
           the 12-foot ladder violates Industrial Code§ 23-1.21 [b][4][ii], [e][3] and Industrial Code§ 23-1.21 [e][3],
           respectively. Finally, plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to judgment on liability on his Section 200 claim
           because the defendants created a dangerous condition and failed to correct it despite having notice of
           same.

                In opposition to the motion, defendants argue that there are at least triable issues of fact suffi_cient
           to defeat the motion based on the aforementioned affidavits as well as photographs of the accident lo-
           cation which have been provided to the court. Alternatively, defendants argue that the motion should be
           denied because plaintiff has failed to provide the last known address of "two critical employees Barr
           Keson and Phil Ferrante" who "worked int eh subject building during the two (2) week period immedi-
           ately preceding the subject incident."

               On reply, plaintiff maintains that he has met his burden on this motion, that the evidence submitted
           by defendants merely confirms plaintiff's version of events and that plaintiff never made an admission
           against interest.

                In motion sequence 5, 291 Broadway and GC argue that they are entitled to contractual indemnity
           from Orin pursuant to GC's contract with the latter, a portion of which has been provided to the court.
           The document is signed by plaintiff as Owner on behalf of Orin. Said document, hereinafter referred to
           as the "Indemnity Agreement", provides in pertinent part as follows:

                                                             Exhibit "A"

                                        INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

                        The provisions of this exhibit are incorporated and made a part of the at-
                        tached agreement dated _ (referred to in this exhibit as "Agreement"),
                        between Orin □ as Subcontractor □ and GC □ as Contractor □·

                        1. Indemnification and Hold Harmless

                            (a) To the fullest extent permitted by law, Subcontractor ... agrees ... to in-
                            demnify, defend and hold harmless Contractor, and their respective affiliates,
                            principals, partners, members, stockholders, officers, directors, agents, em-
                            ployees, servants, successors and assigns (hereinafter collectively referred to
                            as "lndemnitees") from and against any and all liabilities, claims, demands,
                            losses, obligations, fines, liens, penalties, actions, judgments, damages,
                            costs, charges, and expenses ... in connection with, or as a consequence of
                            the performance or nonperformance of the Subcontractors Work (whether
                            same be labeled as full indemnification, partial indemnification or contractual

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  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 185                                                                      RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/11/2024

                            contribution) arising from, in connection with and/or relating to the work de-
                            scribed in the Agreement.

                 Meanwhile, in a cross-motion, Orin disagrees and maintains that even if valid, Orin did not have an
            obligation to indemnify 291 Broadway and the document proffered by the third-party plaintiffs "appears
            incomplete and such incompleteness renders the produced page smoot and inapplicable to any work
            Orin[] performed at 291 Broadway." Orin otherwise argues that triable issues of fact as to its negli-
            gence produces summary judgment in favor of the third-party plaintiffs. Further, Orin cross-moves to
            dismiss the third-party complaint, arguing inter alia that absent a claim for contractual indemnity, Orin
            has no liability for contribution or common law indemnity because plaintiff did not sustain a "grave inju-
            ry" within the meaning of Workers Compensation Law § 11. On reply, the third-party plaintiffs concede
            that plaintiff's alleged injuries fall below the threshold of a grave injury and thus summary judgment
            should be granted dismissing their common law indemnification and contribution claims against Orin.
            However, the third-party plaintiffs otherwise maintain that they are entitled to contractual indemnification
            from Orin as Orin does not dispute the validity of the Indemnity Agreement and Orin's counsel's affirma-
            tion is not based upon personal knowledge and therefore insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact.

            DISCUSSION

                  On a motion for summary judgment, the proponent bears the initial burden of setting forth eviden-
            tiary facts to prove a prima facie case that would entitle it to judgment in its favor, without the need for a
            trial (CPLR 3212; Winegrad v. NYU Medical Center, 64 NY2d 851 [1985]; Zuckerman v. City of New
            York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). If the proponent fails to make out its prima facie case for summary
            judgment, however, then its motion must be denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing pa-
            pers (Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Ayotte v. Gervasio, 81 NY2d 1062 [1993]).

                  Granting a motion for summary judgment is the functional equivalent of a trial, therefore it is a dras-
            tic remedy that should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue
            (Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223 [1977]). The court's function on these motions is limited to
            "issue finding," not "issue determination" (Sillman v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, 3 NY2d 395 [1957]).

                 Triable issues of fact preclude plaintiff's motion. Although plaintiff claims he could not move the
            plastic, defendants' witnesses disagreed with that testimony. They also disagreed with plaintiff that
            plaintiff had made prior complaints to them about the condition of the floors. Plaintiff's claims about how
            the accident happened are also in dispute, and defendant's witness Likidis testified that plaintiff admit-
            ted the ladder tipped over because he was leaning over it and his son wasn't properly holding the lad-
            der, not because the ladder had been placed on plastic floor covering and "walk[ed]". If a jury credits
            the defendants' witnesses' version of events, they will find that the defendants were not negligent, de-
            feating the Labor Law§ 200 and common law negligence claim, and that plaintiff's accident was not
            proximately caused by a violation of either Labor Law §§ 240[1] or 241 [6]. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion
            sequence 3 is denied.

                 Turning to motion sequence 5, at the outset, all but the third-party plaintiffs' contractual indemnity
            claim are severed and dismissed based on the third-party plaintiffs' concession. As for the contractual
            indemnity claim, the motion is denied. "A party is entitled to full contractual indemnification provided that
            the 'intention to indemnify can be clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agree-
            ment and the surrounding facts and circumstances"' (Drzewinski v Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co., 70
            NY2d 774, 777 [1987], quoting Margolin v New York Life Ins. Co., 32 NY2d 149, 153 [1973]; see also
            Tonking v Port Auth. of N. Y. & N.J., 3 NY3d 486, 490 [2004]). However, "General Obligations Law§ 5-
            322.1 prohibits and renders unenforceable any promise to hold harmless and indemnify a promisee
            which is a construction contractor or a landowner against its own negligence" (Ki/feather v Astoria 31st
            St. Assoc., 156 AD2d 428 [2d Dept 1989]).

                On the threshold question of whether defendants have proffered a valid and binding contract, the
            court agrees with plaintiff that their failure to proffer the Agreement referred to within the Indemnity

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            Agreement is fatal to the third-party plaintiffs' motion. The Indemnity Agreement expressly provides that
            Orin will defend and indemnify for all claims "in connection with, or as a consequence of the perfor-
            mance or nonperformance of the Subcontractors Work ... arising from, in connection with and/or relat~
            ing to the work described in the Agreement." Without the Agreement, the court cannot determine
            whether the injury-producing work falls with the definition of work set forth in the Indemnity Agreement.
            Therefore, the third-party plaintiffs' motion on their claim for contractual indemnification against Orin is
            denied. Relatedly, the court denies the cross-motion as to this claim, for while the third-party plaintiffs
            have failed to provide a copy of the underlying Agreement, this failure is not necessarily fatal to the
            claim, which they may otherwise prove at trial.

            CONCLUSION

                In accordance herewith, it is hereby:

                ORDERED that motion sequence 3 is denied in its entirety; and it is further

                 ORDERED that motion sequence 5 is granted only to the extent that all but the third-party plaintiffs'
            claims against Orin for contractual indemnification are severed and dismissed; and it is otherwise

                ORDERED that the motion and cross-motion on motion sequence 5 are otherwise denied.

                Any requested relief not expressly addressed herein has nonetheless been considered and is
            hereby expressly rejected and this constitutes the decision and order of the court.

            Dated:
                        New vi
                              ~~r~ ,,~~                                So Ordered:
                                                                                   1
                                   N
                                                                                  lf1
                                                                       Hon. Lynn R. Kotler, J.S.C.

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