Court Opinion

ID: 9830736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:25:35.478725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:26.124058
License: Public Domain

On Motions for Rehearing.
Appellees have filed a motion for rehearing in which they complain of all of the conclusions expressed in our original opinion upon which our judgment of reversal is based. No new argument is made, and no facts or authorities presented, which were not before us when we decided the case, and we feel constrained to adhere to all of our original eon-, elusions complained of in the motion except the holding, in substance, that, the sulphur company having made representations to appellant which induced it to believe that the only ground upon which it claimed the right to suspend operations of the mines was the lack of any obligation on its part to operate them, and appellant having brought this suit in reliance upon such representations, the sulphur company would be estopped to offer any other defense to a claim by appellant for costs and expenses incurred in bringing the suit. This holding was not well considered, and should be withdrawn. As it is expressed in our original opinion, the holding indicates confusion of thought on the issue of estoppel presented by the l-ecord. The question of appellant’s right to recover the costs and expenses incurred by it, caused by its reliance *459upon tie representations of tie sulpiur company, is not presented iy any pleading, and, if tie principle on wiici tie iolding is based is abstractly sound, it has no application in this case.
Appellant has also filed a motion for rehearing, in which it very earnestly insists that we erred in not iolding that the evidence raised tie issue of estoppel against appellees to set up any defense or excuse for failure of tie sulphur company to operate tie mines other then the justification or excuse given by it to appellant prior to tie institution of tie suit.
As stated in our original opinion, the evidence amply justifies a finding that tie only reason given appellant by tie sulpiur company prior to tie institution of this suit for its suspension of operations was that before stated, and that, when appellant brought this suit and incurred tie expenses incident thereto, it believed that the only defense ap-pellees would present to appellant’s claim was that tie sulphur company was not obligated by its contract to use any diligence in the development and operation of the mines.
Tie doctrine upon which appellant’s contention is based is thus broadly stated in 21 Corpus Juris, p. 1222:
"Where a party gives a reason for his decision and conduct touching anything involved in a controversy, he is estopped after litigation has been begun from changing his ground and putting his conduct on another and different consideration.”
Many cases are cited in support of this text. The leading case is Railway Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U. S. 258, 24 L. Ed. 696. This suit, which was tried in Missouri, was one against the railway company for damages for negligence, carelessness, and delay in the shipment of cattle. The cattle were shipped from St. Louis to Philadelphia, under a through contract, which contained no limitation upon the obligation of the initial carrier, the defendant in the suit, to safely transport and deliver the cattle at the point of destination named in the contract, une of the delays in tie shipment, which contributed to the damages claimed, occurred at Parkers-burg, W. Ya. The shipment reached .this place and was tendered to the connecting carrier, the Baltimore & Ohio Railway Company, on Saturday, but was not forwarded to its destination until the following Monday. The agent of the plaintiff, who accompanied the shipment, insisted that tie cattle should be sent on their way to destination on Sunday morning, ‘but the railway refused this request on tie ground that it did not have cars in which to transport the cattle, and, in the language of tie Supreme Court:
“It was expressly proved [on the trial] that the Baltimore Company ‘was not able to send the cattle out of Parkersburg on Sunday, because they had not the necessary cars therefor at the time, and that they were sent at the first opportunity, which was on Monday morning.’ ”
The opinion further states that—
“The evidence set forth in the bill of exceptions is wholly silent as to any other reason for not making the shipment on Sunday.”
Upon this statement of the record it is-clear that the Sunday law of West Virginia was not presented in the court below as a defense to plaintiff’s claim for damages occasioned by the delay at Parkersburg." The point was made, however, in the Supreme Court, that the defendant should not be held liable for damages caused by the refusal to ship the cattle on Sunday, and, in support of this contention, a West Virginia statute is cited. In answer to this contention, the Supreme Court says:
“The question made by the company upon the Sunday law of West Virginia does not, in our view, arise in this case. We have already shown that the defendant proved upon the trial that it was impossible to forward the cattle on Sunday, for want of cars. And it is fairly to be presumed that no other reason was given for the refusal at that time. It does not appear that anything was then said as to the illegality of such a shipment on the Sabbath. This point was an afterthought, suggested by the pressure and exigencies of the case. Where a party gives a reason for his conduct and decision touching anything involved in a controversy, he cannot, after litigation has begun, change his ground, and put his conduct upon another and a different consideration. He is not' permitted thus to mend his hold. He is estopped from doing it by a settled principle of law.”
It seems to us that the record in the case cited only called for the application of the general and long-recognized rule that no defense which, if available, should have been presented in the trial court, can be presented for the first time in the appellate court, and the broad rule of estoppel stated in that case was inapplicable.
One of the essential elements of an equitable estoppel is lacking in that case, as it is in the case before us. Appellant lost no right and suffered no detriment by the failure of appellees to inform it of all of their defenses to this suit, and it would be inequitable and unjust to refuse to permit appellees to present any valid defense they may have to appellant’s claim. The so-called rule of estoppel invoked by appellant, it seems to us, is but an arbitrary rule of decision, which has not obtained in the courts of this state, and which we cannot think should be applied in this cáse.
Appellant further complains of our holding upon the question of the admissibility in evidence of the report for publication issued by the Department of the Interior of the United States government. We think the report purports to give data taken from the rec*460ords of the department, and, appellant having agreed, as shown by the bill of exceptions, that the paper offered “should be treated as a copy of the original, duly certified by the Department of the Interior,” it should be considered as a certified copy of a record of the department, made by a proper officer of the depártment.
The statement is made in our opinion that — ■
“No contention is made in this case that ap-pellees could not at their discretion suspend operations for a reasonable time.”
If this statement he considered disconnected from the context of the opinion, it is inaccurate and might be misleading, but, when read with its proper context, it is, we think, clear that we did not intend to hold that there could be any - suspension of operations inconsistent with the exercise by the sulphur company of reasonable diligence and good faith in the development and operation of the mines.
Our conclusion as to the measure of the obligation of the sulphur company under its contract with appellant is, we think, fully stated in our opinion, and need not be restated.
Both motions for rehearing are ordered refused.