Court Opinion

ID: 9846133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:35:27.925015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:33.821810
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. I dissent from the majority opinion which affirms the grant of motion for summary judgment in this case. The judgment should be reversed. Here a physician was sued for malpractice, and contends that he pierced the allegations of plaintiffs petition solely upon his own depositions.
The burden was on defendant to "pierce the allegations of plaintiff’s petition” before being entitled to summary judgment. Paragraph 6 of plaintiff’s petition alleged: "That said reduction healed *35completely unsatisfactorily and. out of alignment due to the defendant’s negligence in his failing to follow accepted standards in practice in the treatment of said reduction as aforesaid.” Thereafter, in paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the petition, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant physician was negligent in such treatment of plaintiff. Unless there was satisfactory and uncontradicted evidence to refute plaintiff’s allegations of defendant physician’s negligence, and to show that the physician did "follow accepted standards in practice in the treatment of said reduction” he would not be entitled to a summary judgment. Contrary to the posture of the case when before a jury for final trial, on summary judgment the plaintiff had the right to rely upon his allegations, even though setting forth conclusions, as absolutely true; and the burden was on the defendant to introduce evidence to the contrary, which was not done in this case. In motions for summary judgment, all doubts as to the existence of an issue are to be resolved against the movant; and the opposing party is to be given the benefit of favorable inferences. See Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 4 (126 SE2d 442). Absolutely no evidence of any kind, including the defendant physician’s depositions, refuted plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant physician was negligent and thát he failed to follow accepted standards in practice in treating plaintiff. The defendant physician’s depositions did not even refer to "negligence” or "accepted standards in practice.” It was his burden to do so and to show that he had followed accepted standards in practice, and that he was not negligent, and to pierce the allegations of paragraph 6 of plaintiff’s petition. Plaintiff had no burden whatever except to "allege” his contentions in such respect. The defendant physician did testify as to the way and manner in which he treated plaintiff but offered no criterion by which it could be determined whether his services were performed "in an ordinarily skilful manner,” which is the test in malpractice cases. See Truluck v. Funderburk, 119 G. App. 734 (168 SE2d 657). It has been held time and again in recent months by the Supreme Court of Georgia, and by this court, that opinion evidence may be used to make a jury issue; but it cannot serve the purpose of dissipating a jury issue; and that summary judgments cannot be rendered on opinion testimony alone. See Truluck v. Funderburk, *36supra; Williams v. Melton, 120 Ga. App. 466 (171 SE2d 318); Ginn v. Morgan, 225 Ga. 192 (2) (167 SE2d 393); and Harrison v. Tuggle, 225 Ga. 211 (2) (167 SE2d 395).
The weight to be given opinion evidence, if any, has always been exclusively placed within the province of a jury. In the case of Ocean Accident &c. Corp. v. Lane, 64 Ga. App. 149 (1) (12 SE2d 413), it is held: "The opinion of an expert witness is not conclusive upon the jury. Such testimony is intended to aid them in coming to a correct conclusion upon the subject; but the jury is not bound by such opinion, and can disregard it. The jury may deal with such testimony as they see fit, giving credence to it or not,” citing Manley v. State, 166 Ga. 563, 566 (19) (144 SE 170); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 44 Ga. App. 452 (161 SE 853). Only a jury may credit such testimony or completely disregard it, for that power is not lodged with a trial judge.
The majority opinion correctly holds: "... in a malpractice trial the plaintiff must come forward with some evidence from which negligence may be inferred or he fails to make a prima facie case and must be nonsuited. Shea v. Phillips, 213 Ga. 269 (3) (98 SE2d 552).” But that means the plaintiff has that burden when he is before a jury, not when he is respondent in a motion for summary judgment. The majority opinion also correctly holds: "In an action brought by a patient against his physician or surgeon for malpractice, the presumption is that the medical or surgical services were performed in an ordinarily skilful manner, and the burden is on the one receiving the services to show a want of due care, skill and diligence,” and many cases are cited in support thereof. But, there is no such presumption in favor of the physician in the trial of his motion for summary judgment. That presumption cannot be applied until he is before a jury or other fact-facting body. The rule laid down in Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, supra, controls in motions for summary judgment.
The majority opinion correctly states: “Where the evidence presents no conflict, and there is nothing from which an inference of negligence can be drawn, the decision is for the court and not the jury. Wimpy v. Rogers, 58 Ga. App. 67 (197 SE 656); Shea v. Phillips, supra.” But this decision was written long before the advent of the comparatively recent statutes on motion for summary judg*37ment and has absolutely no application to such motions. The majority opinion holds that the depositions of the defendant physician were sufficient in and of themselves to show the physician used ordinary skill, even though he did not specifically so testify.
I have a different concept of such depositions. First of all: where a party himself relies solely upon his own testimony, a jury is not required to believe him; and, a fortiori, a judge in a summary judgment case would not be required to believe him. See Laramore v. Minish, 43 Ga. 282, 287; Penny v. Vincent, 49 Ga. 473, 475; Armstrong v. Ballew, 118 Ga. 168 (2) (44 SE 996); Bell v. Proctor, 212 Ga. 325, 327 (92 SE2d 514), citing Amis v. Cameron, 55 Ga. 449 (3); Hinchcliffe v. Pinson, 87 Ga. App. 526 (74 SE2d 497).
Next, much of his testimony was premised upon what other physicians had told him respecting their evaluation of the case, and, of course, that was hearsay and not admissible in evidence, more especially in motions for summary judgment. Illustrative of the unsatisfactory nature of his testimony, we quote: "A. Well, at that time we had — we had obtained a consultation with an orthopedic, in Greenville, we had sent him to check on the — we had sent him the x-rays to check and make an opinion, to get an opinion on it and it was his opinion that this would not — that it would be better to go ahead and do this open reduction in it and not do the closed reduction, that it probably wouldn’t hold and would not be satisfactory, therefore, that it would be better to do an open reduction to be more certain of the end result.” (T. 46).
The "we” implies a plurality of persons, and the opinion of the orthopedic surgeon in Greenville was, of course, inadmissible, but some duty devolved upon the defendant physician to produce these witnesses unaccounted for. See Code § 38-119. Obviously, the defendant physician relied upon the opinion of someone else as to the treatment he gave plaintiff, without ever producing such authoritative source to bolster his own testimony at the hearing, and thus leaving it entirely hearsay, and without probative value. In this connection the defendant physician further testified: "Q. What was the reason that this closed reduction would not hold? A. Simply that this particular type of a fracture, he did not feel that it *38would hold, it was straight into the bone at that particular location. . . He and I conferred and we felt that after considering the situation that this would probably not hold. ” (Emphasis supplied.) (T. 47).
The defendant physician was asked if he decided why the bone was not knitting or healing as it should and he replied: "A. Not that — not that I could see at that time, no. Q. Well, did you find out later that there was a reason for this? A. No, sir, not particularly. Q. Then you still don’t know, why, do you? A. No, sir,— not — no, sir, I can’t say that there is some actual reason for it.” (T. 55).
Again the defendant physician was asked as to the effect of the erosion around the screw and he replied: "A. The plate — as far as I remember now, as the result of that the plate would loose from the break, it will lose hold on the bone and the bone begins to— actually I don’t remember without the x-ray here, but I mean — it was the effect is that the bone was not healed and there was a nonunion, there is a nonhealing effect, the bone just isn’t healing.” (T. 58).
The defendant physician was asked if the patient requested that his wrist be straightened at a later time, and he testified: "A. I don’t remember — no—whether I don’t remember specifically asking that question, however, we did probably discuss it but I don’t remember asking that specific question of him, no, sir. Q. And — A.— However, it was felt — it was our opinion that it was best to go ahead and do this afterwards.” (Emphasis supplied.) (T. 67-68).
The defendant physician was interrogated as to the other physicians with whom he consulted, as follows: "Q. In your testimony you stated, several times you have mentioned 'we,’ would you state who the 'we’ is that you are referring to in your descriptions? A. Well, that would be our radiologist. Q. And who is that? A. Dr. Singer and myself and possibly with Dr. Knowlton. Q. And who is Dr. Knowlton? A. He is another surgeon in our group. Q. All right — A.—and together with the orthopedic consultant. Q. And who was that? A. That was Dr. Myer and Dr. Stilling. Q. And they are in Greenville? A. Yes, sir.” (T. 72).
The foregoing illustrates some of the unsatisfactory testimony delivered by the defendant physician, showing clearly that he was *39testifying as to hearsay, and depending on what other physicians told him, without producing them in the case so they could give original, and admissible, evidence.
For all the reasons stated above I dissent and would vote to reverse the judgment.