Court Opinion

ID: 9890459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 05:08:04.796024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:12.900810
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    October 12, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 361162
                                                                    Macomb Circuit Court
DAVID PAUL YOUSIF,                                                  LC No. 2021-002359-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and O’BRIEN and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial conviction for one count of fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC-IV) accomplished with force or coercion, MCL 750.520e(1)(b).
The trial court sentenced defendant to 270 days in jail and five years’ probation. On appeal,
defendant contends that his trial counsels1 rendered ineffective assistance in numerous ways that
cumulatively, if not individually, denied him a fair trial. We affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        Defendant’s conviction resulted from his interaction with the complainant at a sports bar
in July 2020. The complainant’s sister and nephew work at the bar, and the complainant is familiar
with “the manager and the owners.” On the evening in question, the complainant and a friend,
Jamie Hall, went to the bar together, sat at a high-top table, and ordered food and drinks. The
complainant testified that when she was on the phone at the bar, defendant, who was seated nearby,
grabbed her chin and turned her face toward him. Defendant told the complainant, “[Y]ou’re too
pretty to be upset,” and the complainant brushed him away.

        Once the complainant finished talking on the phone and Hall returned to the table,
defendant came over to strike up a conversation. The complainant and Hall testified that defendant
was arrogant, vulgar, and at one point removed the complainant’s baseball cap and took it back to
his table. A waitress retrieved the hat from defendant. They also testified that defendant stood by

1
  Defendant was jointly represented by two separate attorneys as relevant to his ineffective
assistance claims.
                                               -1-
the complainant and Hall’s table as they prepared to leave the bar. He ignored the complainant’s
protests and pulled his hand around her back to grab her face. He then pulled her into a forced hug
and squeezed her breast. The complainant and Hall reported the incident to police.

         Defendant’s jury trial took place over three days. Defense counsels did not call any
witnesses for the defense. The court agreed to instruct jurors on the lesser offense of simple assault
and battery in addition to CSC-IV. During closing arguments, defense counsels argued that even
if the prosecution’s witnesses, particularly the complainant and Hall, were believed, the testimony
did not establish that any of defendant’s alleged contact with the complainant was for a sexual
purpose. Ultimately, defense counsels argued that there was enough reasonable doubt to find
defendant not guilty of any offense. However, counsels acknowledged that “[i]t’s a closer call on”
whether there was enough evidence for an assault-and-battery conviction. In closing, defense
counsels requested a verdict of not guilty.

         After less than 20 minutes deliberating, the jury convicted defendant of CSC-IV. Later,
defendant, through new counsel, moved for a new trial and/or a Ginther2 hearing, arguing that his
trial counsels rendered ineffective assistance because “the Trial record is barren of any reference
to a videotape existing which could essentially exonerate defendant . . . .” Defendant also asserted
that a manager at the bar, Gwienyai “Brian” Mangenje, verified in a postconviction telephone call
that a video of the incident existed and showed no sexual assault. The trial court denied
defendant’s request for a new trial. The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant as described
earlier.

       The day after defendant’s sentencing, he filed the instant appeal. Concurrently, defendant
moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial and/or a Ginther
hearing. In support, defendant argued that he was:

                 entitled to a new trial based upon the failure to produce exculpatory
         evidence which was known both before trial as well as confirmed to exist during
         trial and then thereafter post-conviction via a telephone conversation by and
         between Defendant and the bar manager. That at the very least, Defendant is
         entitled to a Ginther Hearing [sic] as to why neither the video nor the individual
         who viewed the video was proffered at the time of trial.

        The trial court ultimately agreed to hold a Ginther hearing “to provide [further]
information” on the extent of defendant’s interaction with the complainant, and to allow
defendant’s trial counsels to testify regarding their performance. The trial court then held a Ginther
hearing, during which defendant raised additional ineffective-assistance claims for the first time.
Specifically, defendant argued that defense counsels were additionally ineffective for failing to
call Joe Youkhanna, defendant’s friend who was also at the bar, to testify, and for not allowing
defendant to testify. At the hearing, defendant’s cocounsels before and during trial, Stephen
Rabaut and Peter Torrice, both testified. Two police officers, Youkhanna, defendant, and
Mangenje also testified.

2
    See People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
                                                 -2-
        Following the witnesses’ testimony, the trial court concluded that defendant’s trial counsels
were not ineffective, and that a new trial was unwarranted. Additionally, the court determined that
even presentation of the video of the incident and Mangenje’s description thereof would not have
affected the case’s outcome. The trial court, therefore, entered an order denying defendant’s
request for a new trial.

                                   II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        “Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of
fact and constitutional law.” People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App 210, 227; 966 NW2d 437
(2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, while
constitutional determinations are reviewed de novo.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“A finding is clearly erroneous if this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial
court made a mistake.” Id. at 227-228 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, for multiple
claims of ineffective assistance, “[t]his Court reviews a claim of cumulative error to determine
whether the combination of alleged errors denied the defendant a fair trial.” People v Allen, 331
Mich App 587, 611; 953 NW2d 460 (2020), vacated in part on other grounds 507 Mich 856 (2021).

        However, defendant raises for the first time on appeal that defense counsels were
ineffective by effectively conceding his guilt. Accordingly, this argument of ineffective assistance
is unpreserved. “This Court reviews an unpreserved ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for
errors apparent on the record.” People v Hieu Van Hoang, 328 Mich App 45, 63; 935 NW2d 396
(2019).

                                           III. ANALYSIS

        Criminal defendants are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel under both the
Michigan and United States Constitutions. Const 1963, art 1, § 20; US Const, Am VI, Strickland
v Washington, 466 US 668, 686; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). “In order to establish the
right to a new trial premised on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the
result of the proceedings would have been different.” Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App at 228. “A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
(quotation marks and citations omitted). This two-part test is derived from the standard set forth
by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland. See People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600-601;
623 NW2d 884 (2001).

        “Generally, attorneys are given broad latitude to determine trial strategy, and there is a
strong presumption that counsel’s performance was born from sound strategy.” People v Yeager,
___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 164055); slip op at 6; see also People v
Isrow, 339 Mich App 522, 531; 984 NW2d 528 (2021) (“Trial counsel’s performance is presumed
to be effective, and [a] defendant has the heavy burden of proving otherwise.”). “However,
counsel’s strategic decisions must be objectively reasonable.” Yeager, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at
6.

                                   A. CONCESSION OF GUILT

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        Defendant argues that defense counsels were ineffective for effectively conceding
defendant’s guilt. According to defendant, his case, given defense counsels’ concession, is similar
to McCoy v Louisiana, 584 US ___; 138 S Ct 1500; 200 L Ed 2d 821 (2018) (holding that a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right was violated because defense counsel conceded the
defendant’s guilt despite the defendant’s repeated protests that he was innocent). Defendant argues
that, given the definition of “sexual contact” under MCL 750.520a(q), defense counsels’ strategy
and associated argument in effect conceded, even if inadvertently, defendant’s guilt of CSC-IV.
This holds true, according to defendant, because the definition includes categories of touching not
strictly done for a sexual purpose, including the type of contact to which defense counsels
conceded. This misunderstanding of the law, defendant continues, was a serious error requiring
automatic reversal because, under McCoy, the violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to pursue his defense through counsel’s concession of guilt is structural error.

         A person is guilty of CSC-IV if he or she “engages in sexual contact with another person
and . . . [f]orce or coercion is used to accomplish the sexual contact.” MCL 750.520e(1)(b). Under
MCL 750.520a(q):

              “Sexual contact” includes the intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s
       intimate parts or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate
       area of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts, if that intentional touching can
       reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification,
       done for a sexual purpose, or in a sexual manner for:

               (i) Revenge.

               (ii) To inflict humiliation.

               (iii) Out of anger.

        A complete concession of guilt amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. People v
Krysztopaniec, 170 Mich App 588, 596; 429 NW2d 828 (1988).3 However, a lawyer does not
render ineffective assistance by conceding certain points at trial, including conceding guilt of a
lesser offense. See People v Emerson (After Remand), 203 Mich App 345, 348-349; 512 NW2d 3
(1994).

       As an initial matter, defendant’s reliance on McCoy, 584 US ___; 138 S Ct 1500, is
misplaced. Defense counsel’s conduct in McCoy constituted the following:

               At the beginning of his opening statement at the guilt phase of the trial,
       [defense counsel] told the jury there was “no way reasonably possible” that they
       could hear the prosecution’s evidence and reach “any other conclusion than [that
       the defendant] was the cause of these individuals’ death.” [The defendant]
       protested; out of earshot of the jury, [the defendant] told the court that [defense

3
 Although this Court is not required to follow cases decided before November 1, 1990, see MCR
7.215(J)(1), a published case decided by this Court “has precedential effect under the rule of stare
decisis,” MCR 7.215(C)(2).
                                                -4-
       counsel] was “selling [him] out” by maintaining that [the defendant] “murdered
       [his] family.” The trial court reiterated that [defense counsel] was “representing”
       [the defendant] and told [the defendant] that the court would not permit “any other
       outbursts.” Continuing his opening statement, [defense counsel] told the jury the
       evidence is “unambiguous,” “my client committed three murders.” [The defendant]
       testified in his own defense, maintaining his innocence and pressing an alibi
       difficult to fathom. In his closing argument, [defense counsel] reiterated that [the
       defendant] was the killer. On that issue, [defense counsel] told the jury that he
       “took [the] burden off of [the prosecutor].” [Id. at 1506-1507 (citations omitted;
       sixth, eighth, seventeenth, and eighteenth alterations in original).]

        In holding that these facts amounted to a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to control his defense,4 the McCoy Court stated, “When a client expressly asserts that the
objective of his defence [sic] is to maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts, his lawyer must
abide by that objective and may not override it by conceding guilt.” Id. at 1505, 1509 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). The Court also distinguished the facts of McCoy from an earlier case
where the defendant “was generally unresponsive during discussions of trial strategy,” “never
verbally approved or protested counsel’s proposed approach,” and “complained about the
admission of his guilt only after trial.” Id. at 1509 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In
contrast, the defendant in McCoy “opposed [defense counsel]’s assertion of his guilt at every
opportunity, before and during trial, both in conference with his lawyer and in open court.” Id.

        Here, unlike in McCoy, defense counsels never conceded guilt in any way. Defense
counsels explicitly argued that there was enough reasonable doubt to find defendant not guilty of
CSC-IV, or any offense for that matter, and requested such a verdict. Indeed, defense counsels
noted for the jury that the complainant and Hall were both drinking, possibly impacting their
reactions in the moment and memories of events, and counsels generally raised alleged
inconsistencies in the prosecution’s evidence and the complainant’s and Hall’s stories. Defense
counsels only conceded that if the prosecution’s witnesses were believed, the testimony did not
establish that any of defendant’s alleged contact with the complainant was for a sexual purpose
and he, at most, committed assault and battery. Indeed, defense counsels never actually conceded
that a breast-grab, or any specific touching, occurred. Instead, counsels merely emphasized that
Hall described the touching as forceful, not sexual. And, it is not ineffective assistance to
concede to specific points or to the guilt of a lesser offense. Further, unlike the defendant in
McCoy, defendant here only objected to defense counsels’ strategy after he was found guilty at
trial. For these reasons, we believe defense counsels did not render ineffective assistance by
effectively conceding guilt.

        In any event, defendant was not prejudiced from counsels’ error. Critically, defendant fails
to substantively address the prejudice prong under this claim of error. Instead, he merely argues
that automatic reversal is required because counsels’ error, under McCoy, is structural. But the
facts here, as discussed, are dissimilar to defense counsel’s complete concession of guilt over the
defendant’s repeated objections that occurred in McCoy. Further, structural error is generally
insufficient by itself to establish prejudice for ineffective assistance. See People v Vaughn, 491

4
 Notably, the McCoy Court did not apply its ineffective-assistance-of-counsel jurisprudence to the
case “[b]ecause a client’s autonomy, not counsel’s competence, [wa]s in issue.” Id. at 1510-1511.
                                                -5-
Mich 642, 671; 821 NW2d 288 (2012) (“[O]nly a narrow class of situations [exist] in which
prejudice is presumed for ineffective assistance purposes: ‘when counsel was either totally absent,
or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding’ or ‘when counsel
is burdened by an actual conflict of interest.’ Otherwise, ‘actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a
deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant
affirmatively prove prejudice.’ ”) (citations omitted). None of these limited situations apply here.

        Additionally, the jury’s verdict was seemingly unaffected by defense counsels’ potential
misunderstanding of the law. To reiterate, defense counsels never really conceded anything, and
merely emphasized that Hall described the touching as forceful, not sexual. But in convicting
defendant of CSC-IV and not assault and battery, jurors implicitly determined that defendant did
touch the complainant, and that the touching was for a sexual purpose. Specifically, the court’s
jury instructions, which defendant neither contested below nor contests on appeal, described the
elements necessary to convict defendant under CSC-IV as:

       First, the Defendant intentionally touched [the complainant’s] breast or the clothing
       covering that area. Second, that the touching was done for sexual purposes or could
       reasonably be construed as having been done for sexual purposes. Third, the
       Defendant used force or coercion to commit the sexual act.

         Accordingly, the jury was never instructed on, and thus could not be confused by, the
additional categories of sexual conduct not requiring a sexual purpose under MCL 750.520a(q)(i),
(ii), and (iii). Jurors determined beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant satisfied the elements
of CSC-IV as stated by the court, including that his conduct was, or could reasonably be construed
as, for a sexual purpose. For the foregoing reasons, defendant was not prejudiced on this subissue,
and it, therefore, does not require reversal.

                             B. FAILURE TO CALL WITNESSES

     Defendant argues that defense counsels were ineffective for failing to call Youkhanna and
Mangenje as witnesses.

        As an initial matter, much of defendant’s focus on this, and the next, subissue involves
counsels’ alleged errors depriving him of various substantial defenses. However, our Supreme
Court has stated that a defendant is “not required to show, in order to obtain relief for ineffective
assistance of counsel, that trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses deprived him [or her] of a
substantial defense.” People v Jurewicz, 506 Mich 914, 915 (2020). “Rather, a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel premised on the failure to call witnesses is analyzed under the same standard
as all other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, i.e., a defendant must show that (1)
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s
deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been
different.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We analyze defendant’s claims accordingly.

        Here, Torrice and Rabaut both testified that they discussed the decision not to call
Youkhanna with defendant. And we agree with the trial court that Youkhanna’s testimony was
not particularly helpful to defendant’s case. Youkhanna was a longtime friend of defendant and
thus a potentially biased witness. And while Youkhanna testified at the Ginther hearing that he
saw the entire incident and observed no inappropriate touching by defendant, Youkhanna also
acknowledged that he was seated some distance away from the others and was unable to hear
                                               -6-
everything between defendant and the complainant. His testimony was also inconsistent at times
regarding the extent of what he saw and heard at the bar. Given these facts, it was not objectively
unreasonable to forego calling such a witness.

        The same is true regarding Mangenje. Because the video apparently viewed by Mangenje
was unavailable by the time Torrice and Rabaut started on defendant’s case, they could not be
ineffective for failing to secure it. And the trial court correctly recognized that Mangenje’s
testimony describing the video was vague and unhelpful to defendant’s case, particularly given
that Mangenje only saw a portion of the video. Concerning defendant’s focus on Mangenje
testifying only that surveillance video once existed, Torrice and Rabaut both maintained that they
were never informed that Mangenje saw any video, despite them having a private investigator
speak with Mangenje. While Mangenje testified that he told the investigator about having seen
surveillance footage of the incident, the trial court implicitly rejected this assertion in addressing
the video and Mangenje’s testimony. Given the disputed testimony on this matter, the court’s
implicit finding was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, without the benefit of hindsight, it was
not objectively unreasonable for defense counsels not to call Mangenje, a witness counsels
appropriately investigated but deemed unhelpful to the case.

        Further, we conclude that the failure to call Youkhanna or Mangenje did not prejudice
defendant. As discussed, defense counsels did argue that defendant never sexually assaulted the
complainant. Counsels merely did so by challenging the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence
and the credibility of its witnesses’ stories rather than by calling unhelpful and potentially biased
witnesses to testify for the defense. Concerning the other lines of argument defendant asserts could
have been made had Mangenje testified that surveillance video was at one point available but never
secured, we disagree that any of these likely would have affected the case’s outcome. First, police
were already questioned at trial regarding the lack of surveillance footage and why no video of the
incident was ever acquired. Second, defense counsels explicitly highlighted the complainant’s
family connections at the bar in attempting to discredit various aspects of her testimony. Even had
defense counsels called Mangenje at trial and argued that the video was somehow improperly
withheld in connection with the complainant’s relatives working at the bar, this argument is
entirely too speculative to satisfy a finding of prejudice. See People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181,
190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009) (reasoning that ineffective-assistance arguments cannot be supported
by mere speculation). For the foregoing reasons, defense counsels’ decisions not to call
Youkhanna or Mangenje to testify were objectively reasonable and did not prejudice defendant.

                              C. FAILURE TO CALL DEFENDANT

         Next, defendant argues that his counsels were ineffective for failing to call him to testify,
and for not informing him of his right to do so. In making this argument, defendant admits that
the trial court advised him of his right to testify at the end of the first day of trial and gave him an
opportunity to discuss this with counsel. But defendant reiterates his Ginther hearing testimony
that he wanted to testify at trial, and his attorneys neither conferred with him on the matter before
resting nor allowed him to express his desire to testify. Defendant contends that, rather than being
a matter of trial strategy, this decision deprived defendant of the substantial defense “that he was
innocent of the crime he was accused of committing.” This is especially true given defense
counsels’ “conce[ssion] that an inappropriate touching occurred and . . . that it was not sexual.”

                                                  -7-
        Here, the trial court emphasized the testimony of defense counsels that they discussed this
issue thoroughly with defendant, but were concerned about his credibility. Accordingly, the court
seemed to find that defense counsels sufficiently informed defendant regarding his right to testify.
Given the disputed testimony on this matter, the court’s implicit finding was not clearly erroneous.
Moreover, while defendant’s lies to police were already established in the trial record, it was not
unreasonable to forego presenting defendant’s version of events when the prosecution would be
able to significantly expand on defendant having lied to police. Indeed, defendant’s credibility
issues could have been interpreted by the jury as reinforcing the truth of the prosecution’s case
even more than as occurred without defendant’s testimony.

        Further, for the same reasons as stated earlier, defendant was not prejudiced by not
testifying. While defendant never testified to his version of events, defense counsels still argued
against the prosecution’s case and asserted that defendant was innocent of CSC-IV. And
defendant, apart from conclusively asserting that this alleged error deprived him of the substantial
defense (setting aside the inapplicability of this standard) that he was innocent, fails to explain
how exactly he was prejudiced by not testifying.

        We acknowledge that an attorney, regardless of strategy implications, must abide by a
defendant’s desire to testify at trial. But defendant never made it apparent that he wanted to testify.
Critically, defendant was clearly instructed by the trial court on his right to testify, and was given
the opportunity to discuss this with counsel at the end of the second day of trial. At this point,
defense counsels told the court that some discussions with defendant on the issue had already
occurred, and defendant did not object to this characterization. When trial resumed the next day
and defense counsels rested, defendant similarly made no mention of any desire to testify. For the
foregoing reasons, we conclude that defense counsels’ decision not to call defendant to testify was
objectively reasonable and did not prejudice defendant.

        Lastly, defendant argues that defense counsels’ errors cumulatively, if not individually,
undermined the outcome of this case and denied him a fair trial. However, because there was no
ineffective assistance and otherwise no prejudicial error, there was no cumulative error by defense
counsels that would warrant a new trial.

       Affirmed.

                                                               /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                               /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                               /s/ Brock A. Swartzle

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