Court Opinion

ID: 9477204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:17:18.935991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:45.468289
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I am not persuaded that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986), does not control the outcome of this case. In both, the plaintiff improperly named the defendant in the complaint, attempted service and then sought to amend the complaint after the statute of limitations had run but within the 120 days provided for service by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(j). Here, the majority reasons that plaintiff’s failure to set forth the defendant’s correct corporate name in the complaint is not fatal because the corporate entity always remained the same “party.” Therefore, according to the majority, neither Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) nor Schiavone apply. To my mind, the majori*169ty fails to appreciate the clear lesson of Schiavone, i.e., that even a simple error in designating the party defendant in a pleading requires satisfaction of Rule 15(c) if an amended pleading correcting the misnomer is to relate back to the date the original pleading was filed. Moreover, I do not believe this record shows conduct by defendant sufficient to invoke equitable tolling. I would therefore affirm the district court’s order dismissing the action.
Because the amendment to the complaint would only substitute the name Koppenhafer for Malsbary, the majority holds that there has been no change in “party” and the strictures of Rule 15(c) do not govern the facts of this case.1 By holding inappo-site, the majority avoids the need to consider Schiavone. I cannot agree with the majority’s assumption that plaintiff’s proposed amendment of her complaint to substitute the new corporate name of her former employer need not satisfy Rule 15(c). The note accompanying the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c) explicitly states that an amendment to a pleading changing the party against whom a claim is asserted includes “an amendment to correct a misnomer or misdescription of a defendant.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) advisory committee note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 82 (1966). Here, the plaintiff’s misstatement of the name of the defendant is a misnomer or misdescription requiring the amendment to comport with the commands of Rule 15(c).
The advisory committee’s approach was adopted by the Supreme Court in Schia-vone. The plaintiffs in Schiavone improperly named Fortune magazine as the defendant.2 However, the second paragraph of the controverted complaint made reference to Time. Schiavone, 106 S.Ct. at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Service was attempted within the governing limitations period. After the statute of limitations had expired, the plaintiffs sought to amend the captions of the complaints to substitute Time, Incorporated for Fortune. I believe the plaintiffs’ mistake in Schiavone is indistinguishable from the mistake made in this case. Both amendments involved mis-description of a defendant; both should satisfy Rule 15(c).
The plaintiffs in Schiavone first argued that naming Fortune in the complaint imputed notice to Time, a later named and sufficiently related party. The argument was premised upon an “identity-of-interest” exception to the usual notice requirement. That exception had been adopted by several Courts of Appeals. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention, the Supreme Court stresses the original complaint’s failure to provide Time with notice of the action sufficient to meet that requirement of relation back under Rule 15(c) because its registered agent refused the complaint:
Timely filing of a complaint, and notice within the limitations period to the party named in the complaint, permits imputation of notice to a subsequently named and sufficiently related party. In this case, however, neither Fortune nor Time received notice of the filing until after the period of limitations had run. Thus, there was no proper notice to Fortune that could be imputed to Time.
Id. at 2384.
In considering whether the amended complaints could relate back to the filing of the original complaints, which occurred within the applicable one year statute of limitations, the Supreme Court sets forth four factors which must be satisfied:
(1) the basic claim must have arisen out of the conduct set forth in the original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must have received such notice that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense; (3) that party must or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought against it; and (4) the second and third requirements must have
ADEA violation. This may be so. It does not appear on the record. *170been fulfilled within the prescribed limitations period.
Id. According to the Court in Schiavone, “[t]he linchpin [of Rule 15(c) ] is notice, and notice within the limitations period.” Id. at 2385.3
In the instant case, neither Malsbary nor Koppenhafer was afforded notice of the suit within the three year statute of limitations. The parties do not dispute the fact that Koppenhafer is the successor of Mals-bary and is responsible for the defense of the suit, although the record does not speak to this issue. Appellant seeks to correct the misstatement in the original complaint which she mailed to the Nebraska attorney within the three year statute of limitations. The amended complaint, according to the appellant, should then relate back to the original timely service.
Since there was notice to neither Mals-bary nor Koppenhafer within the limitations period, there is nothing to which the amended complaint could relate back. The attempted service upon the Nebraska attorney, on the eve of the running of the statute of limitations, failed to afford Malsbary/Koppenhafer notice of the suit. Rule 4(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for service upon a foreign corporation by delivering the summons and complaint “to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” Service upon an attorney is not effective unless the attorney had either express or implied authority to receive service on his client’s behalf. Schultz v. Schultz, 436 F.2d 635, 639-40 (7th Cir.1971); United States v. Marple Community Record, Inc., 335 F.Supp. 95, 101 (E.D.Pa.1971). A general grant of authority alone is not sufficient to make an attorney the agent of his client for receipt of service. Schultz, supra; Marple, supra. See also 2 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 4.12, at 4-142 (1987). Appellant has pointed to nothing in the record which would demonstrate an agency relationship between the Nebraska attorney and the defendant authorizing him to receive service. Indeed, the only evidence on this point shows that the Nebraska attorney upon whom plaintiff attempted service was no longer Malsbary’s attorney when the attempt at service was made. See Amended Joint Appendix at 7a.l. Service of a complaint upon an attorney is improper unless his authority appears. This improper service did not provide notice of the impending suit.
Since Malsbary defended appellant’s EEOC charge of discrimination, appellant argues that Malsbary/Koppenhafer was aware within the limitations period that an action might be filed and that knowledge was enough to meet the notice requirement of Schiavone and Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). Administrative proceedings on an EEOC charge before commencement of an ADEA action does not afford a party defendant the notice required by the rule. The only notice relevant to Rule 15(c) is notice of “the institution of the action.” Fed.R.Civ. P. 15(c). See also Gonzales v. Secretary of the Air Force, 824 F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir.1987); Stewart v. United States Postal Serv., 649 F.Supp. 1531, 1535 (S.D.N.Y.1986). Malsbary’s defense of the administrative claim did not give the defendant notice of the subsequent lawsuit in federal court.
Lastly, the appellant contends that the defendant’s name change unfairly prevented her from properly serving the complaint during the limitations period because she had no notice of it. She asks that we equitably toll the statute of limitations and deem her suit timely. Malsbary’s failure to *171notify the appellant of its name change to Koppenhafer, according to the appellant, precluded her from effectuating proper service. Because there is no causal connection between the name change and the improper service upon the Nebraska attorney, I believe this argument must fail.
In School District of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir.1981) (quoting Smith v. American President Lines Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir.1978), we stated that equitable tolling of a statute of limitations takes place when “the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the cause of action.” Additionally, relief may be warranted where the plaintiff has “in some extraordinary way” been prevented from asserting his rights. Id. See also Kocian v. Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co., 707 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852, 104 S.Ct. 164, 78 L.Ed.2d 150 (1983). We have cautioned that “restrictions on equitable tolling ... must be scrupulously observed.” Williams v. Army and Air Force Exch. Serv., 830 F.3d 27, 30 (3d Cir.1987) (quoting School District, supra, 657 F.2d at 19).
Appellant argues that appellee’s failure to inform her of its name change from Malsbary to Koppenhafer warrants the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Again I cannot agree. The attempt at service upon the Nebraska attorney was ineffective for reasons not related to the corporate name change. This is not a situation where appellant was unable, within the statute of limitations, to make proper service after first attempting service upon a registered agent or other person authorized to accept service by either Malsbary or Koppenhafer. In such a case, a causal relationship between the name change and the inability to properly locate and serve the defendant might be demonstrated. Here, with only five days remaining, appellant mailed the complaint to an attorney no longer representing either Malsbary or Koppenhafer without verifying his status or authority. Equitable tolling is not warranted.
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the district court granting appellee’s motion to dismiss.

. The assumption that the name change does not involve a change of identity assumes that Koppenhafer, after selling Malsbary's name as well as its assets, succeeded to any liability Malsbary might be subject to for the claimed

. Fortune is simply a trademark and the name of an internal division of Time.

. Rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not offer appellant any relief. The rule allows the plaintiff 120 days after the filing of the complaint to serve the summons and complaint upon the defendant. However, the rule does not serve as an extension of time beyond the running of the statute of limitations. The rule provides only a reasonable time limit for service of a timely filed complaint. As Justice Blackmun states: "[w]e are not inclined ... to temper the plain meaning of the language [of Rule 15(c) ] by engrafting upon it an extension of the limitations period equal to the asserted reasonable time, inferred from Rule 4, for the service of a timely filed complaint." Schiavone, 106 S.Ct. at 2385. See also Williams v. Army and Air Force Exch. Serv., 830 F.2d 27, 29 (3d Cir.1987).