Court Opinion

ID: 9706931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:55:37.626543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:25.625958
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GARCIA, concurring: I write separately to cast further doubt that defense counsel’s decision to forego closing argument may be properly characterized as a “virtually unchallengeable tactical decision,” as the State claims in its brief. As Justice Hall points out, there is very little Illinois case law addressing this precise issue in the context of a jury trial for a very good reason: it ought to be a rare case where the failure to give a closing argument before a jury may constitute sound trial strategy. Even if such a case exists, this is not that case. The jury heard from the defendant after the State gave its opening statement before the jury. In his opening statement, defense counsel raised questions as to the reliability of the anticipated testimony against the defendant. At the close of evidence, the trial judge, being unaware that defense counsel intended to waive closing argument, informed the jury that it would hear from the State first, then the defense, and again from the State. The State addressed the jury. The jury, then expecting to hear from the defense, instead, saw the attorneys for each side engage in a sidebar with the trial judge, after which the jury was instructed on the law. Defense counsel made no request of the trial judge to admonish the jury that just as the defendant had a right to not testify without giving rise to an adverse inference, in the same manner, he could waive his right to address the jury. See People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 92, 902 N.E.2d 571 (2008) (“The jury was also specifically instructed not to consider the defendant’s failure to testify in arriving at its verdict”). The jury was told nothing about the defendant’s decision not to give a closing argument. Of course, the State made good use of its opening closing argument. It highlighted the testimony of the only witnesses, Jefferson and Jackson, that claimed to have seen the defendant actively participate in the shootings. Certainly, if the jury believed the testimony of Jefferson or Jackson, that testimony was sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Tabb, 374 Ill. App. 3d 680, 692, 870 N.E.2d 914 (2007) (“If trustworthy, a single positive eyewitness identification may be sufficient proof of guilt”). The State argued for their credibility; defense counsel offered nothing in response. I agree that in the context of this case, in light of the conflicting nature of the evidence, where only two of numerous witnesses presented by the State identified the defendant as a shooter, defense counsel’s decision not to present a closing argument was “objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms [of our criminal courts].” People v. Bailey, 232 Ill. 2d 285, 289, 903 N.E.2d 409 (2009). Defense counsel was ineffective when she gave up “the last clear chance to persuade the trier of fact that there may be reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593, 600, 95 S. Ct. 2550, 2555 (1975). The closeness of the evidence compelled not only a closing argument by defense counsel, but provides the basis to find that defense counsel’s decision to forfeit a closing argument so prejudiced the defendant that a new trial must be granted. See People v. Brown, 358 Ill. App. 3d 580, 595, 831 N.E.2d 1113 (2005) (but for counsel’s shortcoming, reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding could have been different).