Court Opinion

ID: 9635527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:53:16.151161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:29.311475
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority agrees with the suppression court that the search of appellant’s house was in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. They further find the statement taken from appellant was a fruit of that illegality and should have been suppressed. I do not agree with either conclusion, and hence this dissent.
A review of the facts of this case indicates there was probable cause to search appellant’s home. The majority points out the police had concluded that the body was thrown over the fence from appellant’s yard into the back yard of the adjoining premises. This position is supported by the fact that the police noticed a nail protruding from the rough fence, consistent with the abrasions and puncture marks on the body. Their conclusion was further bolstered by the fact that there was dust on the window sills of the house adjacent to appellant’s property, suggesting the body had not been dropped from those windows. Detective Melfi, who searched the house, testified he went to the front of appellant’s house and from the public sidewalk was able to see the front room which was in a state of disarray. Under these facts I am satisfied that the information possessed by the police was sufficient to support the conclusion that the deceased had been killed in the house of appellant and thereafter thrown over the fence into the yard of the adjoining residence. Since evidence required to establish probable cause for search need not amount to that required to convict, Commonwealth v. Dussell, 439 Pa. 392, 266 A.2d 659 (1970), it is clear from the evidence that the police had probable cause to search the house.
*526Having decided that there was probable cause, the presence of exigent circumstances must be found to justify a warrantless search. United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3rd Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 447 Pa. 91, 288 A.2d 727 (1972). Cases describing exigent circumstances have included the situation in which, based on surrounding circumstances and information at hand, it is reasonable to conclude the evidence will be destroyed or removed before they can secure a search warrant. United States v. Canada, .527 F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1973). Here, the nature of the crime was such that the police could reasonably expect to find readily destructible or removable evidence. Upon viewing the bloody nude body of the victim, the police would naturally be looking for clothes and blood spattered objects, the type of evidence to which “exigent circumstances” is in part directed.
The majority, in negating the existence of exigent circumstances, relies on the fact that the body was disposed of hours before the police arrived. I do not find this fact to be critical. This period of time is not so long as to necessitate the conclusion that there was an abandonment of intent to destroy the evidence. At the time of the search, it was reasonable to assume destruction or removal of the evidence was still imminent. Under the circumstances, the police acted properly in entering the house and seizing the evidence in plain view. Finding the search and seizure free from illegality, the subsequent confrontation of appellant with the evidence did not render his confession invalid.
Even if probable cause and exigent circumstances were not found to exist, I agree with the trial court in finding the confession was not a fruit of the poisonous tree. The appellant’s confession was elicited after being confronted with his co-defendant, William Holden. The connection between the search of appellant’s house and the confrontation with William Holden is so slight as to be “purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417 (1963).