Court Opinion

ID: 9406140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 00:00:21.327192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:27.313041
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50045        Document: 00516805147             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/29/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                     June 29, 2023
                                      No. 22-50045                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Jordan Ray Smith,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                              USDC No. 7:21-CR-218-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge: *
         Midland Police Officer Jeremy Renforth searched Jordan Ray Smith
   and found a firearm. Charged as a felon-in-possession, Smith moved to
   suppress. The district court denied the motion, finding that the conversation
   leading to the search and the search were consensual, or alternatively
   supported by reasonable suspicion. We AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                        No. 22-50045

                                              I.
                                             A.
          On July 13, 2021, MPD Officer Renforth was “dispatched” to follow
   up on a “suspicious person-call . . . at the Candlewood Suites motel.” The
   anonymous       call   had come to the Midland Police Department
   Communications Center, relaying “a description of the subject[s]”—“a
   black male with a blue shirt . . . as well as another black male with no
   description”—and a location “at [the motel’s] rear parking lot area.”
   According to Renforth, the caller “was approached by these people and they
   had offered to sell him drugs or a gun.” Renforth was in the area and quickly
   arrived on scene.
          According to Renforth, upon arriving at the motel area, he noticed a
   Black male with a blue shirt—later identified as Jordan Ray Smith—“look[]
   over, s[ee] my patrol unit, which it’s a marked patrol unit, then start[]
   walking away.” Given that response, Renforth “believe[d] that this [was]
   going to be the person [he] probably need[ed] to talk to.” After circling the
   area “to make sure that there[] [was] not anybody else . . . that matche[d]
   those descriptions there,” Renforth got out of his car and approached Smith
   without activating his emergency lights or sirens. 1 Finding Smith was on the
   phone with his wife, Renforth requested that he hang up the phone so that
   they could speak, saying “you could talk to her later.” Smith put the phone
   down, but did not disconnect the call.
          When Renforth told Smith that the police received a call regarding
   someone in the area selling drugs and a firearm, Smith stated unequivocally
   that he was not doing so. Complying with Renforth’s request, Smith gave
          _____________________
          1
             Renforth’s body camera footage, which began here, confirms this. The remainder
   of the factual recitation is gleaned from this footage.

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                                    No. 22-50045

   Renforth his personal information, including his name, address, and phone
   number. Renforth then asked whether Smith had any weapons on his person.
   Smith said “no, sir.” Renforth also asked if Smith was carrying drugs or
   anything illegal. Again, Smith said “no, sir.” Renforth sought Smith’s
   consent to search his “person to make sure.” Smith granted Renforth
   permission, saying “Yes sir,” but quickly added, “The only thing I do have,
   because I just picked it up is [my wife’s] pistol, I got her pistol, I just went
   and got it.”
          Renforth asked if it was on his person. Smith said yes. Renforth said:
   “Without pointing at it, where is it?” Smith raised his hands, jutted his left
   hip out, and said it was in his pocket. Smith raised his hands further and
   offered Renforth the opportunity to retrieve the pistol himself. Instead,
   Renforth placed Smith in handcuffs, explaining that it was necessary to
   retrieving the pistol safely. Once Smith was secured, Renforth confirmed
   which pocket the firearm was in and then retrieved it from his jeans pocket.
   Renforth escorted Smith to his cruiser and asked for consent to complete his
   search, which Smith permitted. Indeed, Renforth then said, “I appreciate
   you being honest and working with me.” The subsequent portion of the
   search found a pocketknife, a “meth pipe,” a torch lighter, and a flip phone
   (not the phone on which Smith was speaking). Following the search,
   Renforth placed Smith in the back of his vehicle to secure him.
          With Smith in the cruiser, Renforth obtained Smith’s driver’s license
   information from a database search on his mobile laptop and radioed in to
   request further investigation of Smith’s background. Renforth also requested
   a check on Smith’s pistol, submitting the make, model, and serial number.
   While waiting on this information, Renforth called the anonymous tipster,
   asking to describe again what the gun seller was wearing. The tipster stated
   that the purported seller was wearing a “blue and black shirt I think.”
   Renforth asked the tipster to confirm if the seller was Black—the tipster so

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                                     No. 22-50045

   confirmed—and, then, what the seller’s skin tone was—dark, medium, or
   light. The tipster stated “Medium.” The tipster said he was unsure of the
   seller’s height and other clothing because the seller was sitting down. In the
   conversation, Renforth noted, “I actually have the guy, I’m just trying to see
   if you can describe him to me, make sure I got the right guy.” The tipster
   then estimated the seller’s age to be 35 and described him as skinny with
   scruffy short hair. Finally, Renforth urged the tipster to disclose his identity,
   but the tipster refused, fearing police involvement and retaliation.
                                          B.
          In July 2021, Smith was indicted on a single count of possession of a
   firearm by a convicted felon. Two months later, the district court heard
   Smith’s motion to suppress the firearm. Renforth was the only witness
   questioned, and both the Parties and the court questioned him about
   everything from the dispatch to his arrival on the scene and his training.
          Four days after the hearing, the district court issued a 16-page opinion
   denying the motion. The district court found that both the initial encounter
   and the pat down search were consensual. The court also held that even
   absent Smith’s consent, “the Government succeeded in carrying its burden
   of proof by showing, based on the totality of the circumstances, which
   included a credible tip and [Smith]’s evasive behavior during an encounter in
   a high crime area, that Officer Renforth had reasonable suspicion to execute
   a Terry stop and pat down on [Smith] after [Smith] initially consented to the
   search.”
          Following the suppression hearing, the district court found Smith
   guilty in a bench trial facilitated by the Parties’ stipulation of facts, which
   “la[id] out some recommendations concerning the denial of the Defendant’s
   motion to suppress as well as what the [P]arties’ recommendation [would]
   be concerning acceptance of responsibility at sentencing.” Smith was

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                                               No. 22-50045

   ultimately sentenced to 37 months’ imprisonment, the top of the Guidelines
   range.
             Smith timely appealed.
                                                    II.
             “When examining a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress,
   [this Court] review[s] questions of law de novo and factual findings for clear
   error.” 2 The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party that
   prevailed in the district court. 3 “The district court’s ruling on a motion to
   suppress will be upheld if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to
   support doing so.” 4
                                                    III.
                                                    A.
             The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be
   secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
   searches and seizures.” 5 “Warrantless searches and seizures are per se
   unreasonable unless one of the recognized exceptions applies.” 6 “The
   Government bears the burden of showing that a warrantless search or seizure
   fits within one of the exceptions.” 7

             _____________________
             2
            United States v. Wise, 877 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v.
   Hearn, 563 F.3d 95, 101 (5th Cir. 2009)).
             3
                 United States v. Toussaint, 838 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir. 2016).
             4
             United States v. Thomas, 997 F.3d 603, 609 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v.
   Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)), cert. denied 142 S. Ct. 828 (2022).
             5
                 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
             6
                 Thomas, 997 F.3d at 609 (citing Cotropia v. Chapman, 978 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir.
   2020)).
             7
                 Id. (citing United States v. Monsivais, 848 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2017)).

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           As we have explained:
           There are three recognized types of encounters between law
           enforcement officers and citizens, including: 1) a consensual
           encounter during which an individual voluntarily agrees to
           communicate with the police; 2) a limited investigatory stop
           based upon less than probable cause; and 3) an arrest which
           constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 8

           As for voluntary or consensual encounters, “[t]he Fourth
   Amendment permits police officers to approach [individuals] at random to
   ask questions and to request their consent to searches, provided a reasonable
   person would understand that he or she is free to refuse.” 9
           This [C]ourt considers six factors when evaluating the
           voluntariness of consent:

                   (1) the defendant’s custodial status;

                   (2) the presence of coercive police procedures;

                   (3) the extent and level of the defendant’s cooperation
                   with the police;

                   (4) the defendant’s awareness of his right to refuse
                   consent;

                   (5) the defendant’s education and intelligence[;] [and]

           _____________________
           8
              United States v. Williams, 365 F.3d 399, 403–04 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing United
   States v. Cooper, 43 F.3d 140, 145–46 (5th Cir. 1995)).
           9
             United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197 (2002) (citing generally Florida v.
   Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)).

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                         (6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating
                         evidence will be found. 10

             Consensual encounters “may be initiated by the police without any
   objective level of suspicion,” 11 and during such encounters, officers “may
   ask questions of the person, ask for identification, and request permission to
   search” an individual or one’s personal effects. 12
             “A district court’s determination that an exchange with a police
   officer constitutes a consensual encounter, rather than a seizure implicating
   Fourth Amendment protections, is a factual finding reversible only for clear
   error.” 13 This Court “examines the following non-exclusive factors for
   determining whether a consensual encounter occurred: ‘(1) the threatening
   presence of several police officers; (2) the display of a weapon by an officer;
   (3) physical touching of the person of the citizen; and (4) the use of language
   or tone of voice indicating that compliance with an officer’s request was
   compelled.’” 14

             _____________________
             10
                  Cooper, 43 F.3d at 144 (citing United States v. Ruigomez, 702 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir.
   1983)).
             11
                  Id. at 145.
             12
                  Williams, 365 F.3d at 404 (citing Drayton, 536 U.S. at 200–01).
             13
              United States v. Gurrola, 301 F. App’x 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished)
   (per curiam) (citing United States v. Butler, 988 F.2d 537, 541 (5th Cir. 1993); and then
   citing United States v. Mask, 330 F.3d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also United States v.
   Muniz, 340 F. App’x 192, 196 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (per curiam) (“A district
   court’s determination that an exchange with a police officer constitutes a consensual
   encounter, rather than a seizure implicating Fourth Amendment protections, is a factual
   finding reversible only for clear error.” (citing Mask, 330 F.3d at 334)).
             14
             United States v. Guevara, 448 F. App’x 453, 456 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished)
   (per curiam) (quoting Mask, 330 F.3d at 337).

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           Relatedly, we “review fact-findings as to the voluntariness of consent
   to search for clear error.” 15 And “whether a consent to a search was in fact
   ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a
   question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” 16
                                                  B.
           Here, the record supports the district court’s factual determinations
   that Renforth’s initial discussion with Smith and subsequent search were
   consensual. We review each separately.
                                                  i.
           First, there is no evidence that Renforth was a “threatening
   presence.” At no point did Renforth “block[]” Smith’s “path.” 17 To the
   contrary, Renforth “permitted [Smith] to keep his cell phone” throughout
   the interaction, even allowing Smith to continue a call to his wife (Smith
   stated she was on the line). 18 The brevity of the discussion also evidences a
   voluntary encounter—that he was not “subject to a lengthy interrogation.” 19
   Moreover, this Court has repeatedly referenced the number of officers
   engaging in an interaction as relevant in consent analysis, reflecting the
   obvious fact that more officers can create an air of coercion. 20

           _____________________
           15
                United States v. Glenn, 931 F.3d 424, 428 (5th Cir. 2019).
           16
                Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
           17
             Tyson v. Sabine, 42 F.4th 508, 516 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Berry,
   670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)).
           18
                United States v. Wilson, 306 F. App’x 871, 873 (5th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (per
   curiam).
           19
                United States v. Brown, 567 F. App’x 272, 280 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished).
           20
            See Guevara, 448 F. App’x at 456 (“Furthermore, only two officers talked with
   him; most of the remaining officers were inventorying the store.”); United States v.
   Colunga-Perez, 124 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 1997) (unpublished) (per curiam) (“Although

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           Second, the bodycam footage suggests that at no point did Renforth
   reach for or “brandish a weapon or make any intimidating movements,” 21
   nor does Smith suggest such actions occurred. Similarly, during the initial
   encounter, Renforth never placed his hands on Smith.
           Third, Renforth never told Smith that he was the individual suspected
   of criminal activity. This Court “ha[s] recognized that statements by an
   officer indicating that an individual is suspected of illegal activity are
   persuasive evidence that an objectively reasonable person would not feel free
   to leave.” 22 By contrast, disclosing a generalized suspicion about a crime to
   an individual “is insufficient to effect a seizure.” 23
           Renforth’s statements fall into the latter category, beginning the
   conversation with Smith with an explanation that “we just got some calls
   from some people about, I guess, some Black male trying to sell people drugs
   and guns.” Smith responded: “Nah, not I,” and the two pivoted the
   conversation to Smith’s presence in the area. 24

           _____________________
   approximately ten officers were on the property, only two were near the defendant when
   he consented to the search.”).
           21
                Wise, 877 F.3d at 221 (5th Cir. 2017).
           22
                Sabine, 42 F.4th at 516 (collecting cases).
           23
                Id.
           24
              See Berry, 670 F.2d at 597 (“Statements which intimate that an investigation has
   focused on a specific individual easily could induce a reasonable person to believe that
   failure to cooperate would lead only to formal detention.”); United States v. Gonzales, 79
   F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that officers’ statement “that the car [the defendant]
   was driving was suspected of being used to transport drugs . . . may have pushed the
   encounter, which was initially consensual, to being a Terry stop”); United States v. Zukas,
   843 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that “when the police officers . . . informed [the
   defendant] . . . that he was suspected of smuggling drugs” a seizure occurred (emphasis
   added)); United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[W]hen [the officer]

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           Finally, Renforth’s “use of language [and] tone of voice” suggest that
   the search was consensual. Upon review of the bodycam footage, at no point
   did Renforth raise his voice or yell at Smith. He was instead calm and spoke
   to Smith respectfully throughout the encounter (both the initial encounter
   and the frisk), supporting a finding of no coercion or compulsion. 25
           So, then, Smith’s contention that the initial interaction was not
   consensual largely rests on two issues: (1) Renforth’s driving “so close” to
   Smith; and (2) Renforth’s telling Smith “[y]ou can talk to [your wife, with
   whom you are currently on the phone] in a minute.” Neither argument
   persuades.
           In Michigan v. Chesternut, a defendant started to run upon noticing a
   police cruiser, which prompted the driver, an officer, to follow the defendant
   and “dr[i]ve alongside him for a short distance.” 26 A unanimous Supreme
   Court offered relevant signals of intimidation—here absent—including
   activating flashers or sirens, brandishing firearms, commanding the
   defendant to halt, or driving the cruiser “in an aggressive manner to block
   [his] course or otherwise control the direction or speed of his movement,”
   and “[w]hile the very presence of a police car driving parallel to a running
   pedestrian could be somewhat intimidating, this kind of police presence does
   not, standing alone, constitute a seizure.” 27 If the defendant in Chesternut
   was not seized, neither was Smith.

           _____________________
   . . . informed [the defendant] that he . . . [was] suspected of carrying drugs, a reasonable
   person would not have believed that he was free to go.”).
           25
              See, e.g., United States v. Abdenbi, 361 F.3d 1282, 1292 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting
   that an interaction was consensual where, inter alia, the officer “did not raise his voice”).
           26
                486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988).
           27
                Id. at 575.

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          Upon initially approaching, the encounter proceeded as follows:
          Renforth:         Hey partner.
          Smith:            Yes sir.
          Renforth:         Do you mind hanging up the phone and talking
                            to me real quick?
          Smith:            Huh?
          Renforth:         Do you mind hanging up and talking to me real
                            quick?
          Smith:            It’s my wife.
          Renforth:         Ok, [sigh] well, you can talk to her in a minute.

   All the while, Smith remained on the phone, having only dropped the phone
   from his ear while keeping the phone in his hand and the call connected, with
   Renforth raising his generalized suspicion with Smith. And given Smith’s
   cooperative response to Renforth, it is fair to conclude that if Smith thought
   “compliance with [Renforth’s] request [to hang up] was compelled,” 28 he
   would have complied. Regardless, this alone cannot overcome the deference
   due to the district court’s decisive review.
                                               ii.
          This analysis carries into the search, as the initial encounter provides
   vital context to the search itself. Indeed, the only additional fact to add is the
   discussion undertaken just before the search. Renforth, after speaking with
   Smith for approximately one minute to obtain Smith’s identifying
   information, asked Smith if he had “any weapons on [him]” and whether
   Smith had any “drugs or anything illegal.” Smith immediately and
   unequivocally answered no to both questions. Thereafter, Renforth calmly

          _____________________
          28
               Guevara, 448 F. App’x at 456 (quoting Mask, 330 F.3d at 337).

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   asked, “May I search your person to make sure?” Smith answers “Yes Sir,”
   but then immediately reverses course and states that he does have a pistol on
   him. Without touching Smith, Renforth asks where it is on Smith’s body, and
   Smith lifts his arms and sticks his hip out. Renforth says “Can I have you --”
   when Smith cuts him off, says “Yes, sir, you can get it” and raises his arms
   further. In these questions, Renforth is expressly asking for permission to
   proceed with an action pursuant to a search, and in both instances, Smith
   answers affirmatively and without qualification.
           Again, Renforth did not present an overwhelming show of force with
   multiple officers in tow nor did he use inappropriately demanding language
   or an intimidating tone of voice, which could suggest compliance is required.
   He did not brandish his weapon, nor did he take any other escalatory action.
   Rather, he calmly requested permission to search Smith. In sum, there is
   more than enough record evidence to affirm the district court’s finding of
   fact that the search was conducted with Smith’s consent. 29
                                             *****
           AFFIRMED.

           _____________________
           29
              Upon finding that the district court did not clearly err with respect to its factual
   finding that Smith consented to the initial discussion as well as the searches, we need not
   review the district court’s alternative holding that Renforth also had reasonable suspicion
   to search Smith even in the absence of consent.

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