Court Opinion

ID: 9666906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:29:58.835406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:33.471608
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellee, Rolando Gonzalez, pled guilty to three felony charges of delivery of marihuana. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.120. Punishment was assessed by the trial court at probation for five years for one of the offenses, and imprisonment for three years for the other two. Appel-lee later filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court granted after a hearing. The State appealed the granting of the motion, but the Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the trial court. State v. Gonzalez, 820 S.W.2d 9 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991). We granted the State’s petitions 1 for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for new trial. Unlike the court of appeals and the majority of this Court, I believe the trial court did abuse its discretion in granting the motion for new trial. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Appellee’s motion for new trial stated in relevant part:
Defendant requests that he be allowed to present witnesses that were not available to testify previously. It is in the interest of justice for Defendant to present witnesses that were not presented at the time of sentencing to testify on behalf of Defendant.
At the hearing on appellee’s motion, appel-lee called a single witness, his uncle. His uncle testified that he was chairman of the Dallas Commission for Drug and Substance Abuse; that he had been unavailable to testify at the earlier proceeding; and that he wished to testify at a new trial. Appel-lee’s uncle said nothing about the content of his proposed testimony at a new trial, although defense counsel did explain to the trial court that the proposed testimony “could have a substantial impact on the court’s considerations regarding punishment.” The State did not cross-examine appellee’s uncle or otherwise controvert his assertion that he had been unavailable to testify at the earlier proceeding. The State only asked the trial court to deny the motion. As noted previously, the trial court granted the motion.
The State now argues, inter alia, that appellee did not establish a right to a new trial under any of the grounds listed in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30(b); that the “interest of justice” is not a ground listed in Rule 30(b) and is not, therefore, a lawful ground on which a trial judge may base the granting of a new trial; and that even if the “interest of justice” were a lawful ground, appellee failed, as a matter of law, to present sufficient evidence to establish the right to a new trial under that ground.
I have no quarrel with the majority’s holding that the grounds for a new trial listed in Rule 30(b) are not exclusive. See State v. Evans, 843 S.W.2d 576, 578-579 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). Nor do I dispute the notion that, under appropriate circumstances, a new trial may be granted in the interest of justice. I find unacceptable, however, the majority’s failure to explain how a defendant may carry his burden of establishing that granting him a new trial is actually in the interest of justice. I also find unacceptable the majority’s implicit conclusion that, in this case, appellee carried his burden.
Once a defendant has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to give him a second trial. It is elementary, therefore, that motions for new trial should be viewed with great caution, and that they should not to *700be granted lightly. It is equally elementary that a defendant carries the heavy burden of showing with evidence that he is entitled to a new trial on some cognizable ground. King v. State, 502 S.W.2d 795, 800 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Additionally, one would have thought it obvious that a trial court may not grant a motion for new trial under the “interest of justice” standard unless the defendant shows that there might otherwise be a genuine miscarriage of justice. See 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 551 (1982) (discussing federal case law utilizing the “interests of justice” standard under Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 33); 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1428 (1989) (discussing case law from various jurisdictions utilizing the “interests of justice” standard).
Here, appellee presented no evidence whatsoever in the trial court establishing that a new trial was necessary to prevent a genuine miscarriage of justice. For all anyone knows, his uncle’s testimony at a new trial may be only marginally relevant, or even completely irrelevant, to the trial court’s assessment of punishment.
Finally, I note that the majority has failed to explain away our prior ease law holding that a motion for new trial based on an absent witness is properly denied where, as here, there is no evidence presented as to what the witness’ testimony would have been. Webb v. State, 460 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Kingham v. State, 374 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Tex.Cr.App.1964). In my view, these precedents are dispositive of the instant case.
Because appellee presented no evidence in the trial court as to the nature of his uncle’s proposed testimony, I believe the trial court abused its discretion in granting his motion for new trial. I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and direct the trial court to vacate its order granting a new trial.
McCORMICK, P.J., and WHITE, J., join.

. Both the Collin County District Attorney and the State Prosecuting Attorney filed petitions for discretionary review.