Court Opinion

ID: 9584085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:44:28.949773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:31.971486
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
In order to justify its reversal of the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress in this distressing prosecution involving the alleged abuse and murder of a young child, the majority makes wholly unwarranted assumptions regarding the trial court’s ruling and the evidence and, additionally, fashions an unsupported holding that an exigency created by the law enforcement officers themselves can authorize a subsequent warrantless search and seizure.
The Supreme Court of the United States has mandated that state courts exclude evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (81 SC 1684, 6 LE2d 1081) (1961). The Fourth Amendment has no exception for troubling cases and “we should not let hard cases make bad law.” Scarborough v. Long, 186 Ga. 412, 417 (2) (197 SE 796) (1938). Impartial judges cannot abandon the applicable rule of law because of a case’s “immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment” and seems to “exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.” Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 400 (24 SC 436, 48 LE 679) (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
[W]e are a nation of laws, and it is the duty of this Court to ensure that the State itself follows the laws of criminal procedure in the enforcement of our criminal statutes for the protection of all citizens. The law cannot be bent because of *662the culpability of the defendant, for that case would then become the precedent by which the truly innocent would be incarcerated. This is the price we pay to ensure the integrity and fairness of our criminal justice system and to ensure that the government conducts itself within the constitutional and statutory constraints provided by law.
Bowers v. State, 221 Ga. App. 886, 889 (473 SE2d 201) (1996).
In Division 1, the majority opines that the legality of the uniformed officers’ presence was “[n]ecessarily implicit” in, and “crucial” to the rationale of, the trial court’s holding that no exigent circumstances existed to authorize Detective Griffie’s entry. However, any such inference is entirely illogical. Indeed, it is far more likely that the trial court did not determine, but rather pretermitted, the issue of whether the presence of the uniformed officers was lawful. The majority’s supposedly necessary inference is no more valid than the obviously invalid inference that, in the multitude of decisions where this Court makes an assumption for the purposes of appellate consideration only, the truth of that assumption is a necessary part of the decision’s rationale.
Regardless of whether the trial court actually concluded that the uniformed officers were lawfully on the premises, its grant of the motion to suppress must be upheld if the State failed to present any evidence to support this conclusion. The State has the burden to prove that a warrantless search and seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine. OCGA § 17-5-30 (b); Phillips v. State, 167 Ga. App. 260, 261 (1) (a) (305 SE2d 918) (1983). As the reviewing court, we must construe the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress most strongly in favor of upholding the trial court’s judgment. Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1) (440 SE2d 646)| (1994). See also State v. David, 269 Ga. 533, 535 (1) (501 SE2d 494) (1998) (Benham, C. J.). “ ‘[I]n the absence of evidence of record demanding a finding contrary to the judge’s determination, this court will not reverse the ruling sustaining a motion to suppress. (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Williams, 193 Ga. App. 462 (388 SE2d 55) (1989) (Benham, J.). See also State v. Combs, 191 Ga. App. 625, 627 (2) (382 SE2d 691) (1989) (Benham, J.). Furthermore, the! issue is not simply whether Detective Griffie’s conduct could have! been shown to be reasonable under all of the circumstances, but! whether the State did show that his entry into Appellees’ residence! falls within the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. People v. Sutton, 134 Cal. Rptr. 921, 925 (Cal. App. 1976). At the! hearing, Detective Griffie testified that the uniformed officers were! present prior to his arrival at the apartment. Because officers were! already on the scene, there were no independent exigent circum-! *663stances justifying Detective Griffie’s presence. Detective Griffie testified that, when he arrived, the officers made statements to him regarding the children and the transporting of the last adult from the residence to the police station. On this basis, Detective Griffie went upstairs. However, none of the uniformed officers ever testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. As Appellees correctly point out, the transcript simply does not show that those officers entered and remained in the home in response to a 911 call or because of any other emergency. Thus, there is absolutely no evidence to justify the other officers’ initial entry into Appellees’ residence.
“In the instant case, the State has not demonstrated that a true emergency situation existed.” Nelson v. State, 609 P2d 717, 719 (Nev. 1980). The uniformed officers’ hearsay statements to Detective Griffie cannot support a finding that they were lawfully on the premises to care for the children or for any other purpose. The majority recounts these statements, and apparently assumes their admissibility, while ignoring the well-settled law of this state that inadmissible hearsay is not probative, even at a suppression hearing. State v. David, supra at 535 (1) (Benham, C. J.). If the State did not show, by probative evidence, that the original entry of the home was lawful, then there is no proof that Detective Griffie was authorized to make a subsequent plain view seizure. See Jones v. State, 131 Ga. App. 699, 700 (1) (206 SE2d 601) (1974). Application of the “collective knowledge” rule “has been limited in this State to factual situations where the collective knowledge of law enforcement officers has been relayed to and used by officers actually making or implementing a detention or seizure. [Cits.]” State v. Fischer, 230 Ga. App. 613, 615 (497 SE2d 79) (1998), overruled on other grounds, Workman v. State, 235 Ga. App. 800, 804 (510 SE2d 109) (1998) (a whole-court case rejecting only the incorrect Fourth Amendment analysis in Fischer, but not its “otherwise correct evidentiary analysis”). There is no evidence in this case of any collective knowledge or information being relayed to the uniformed officers prior to their entry, which is the intrusion at issue. State v. Fischer, supra at 615. Furthermore, Detective Griffie’s conduct in leaving the downstairs in order to check on the children was not relevant to the initial determination of whether the other officers’ presence was authorized, because their entry had occurred prior to Detective Griffie’s involvement in the matter. Thus, the statements of the uniformed officers to Detective Griffie were not admissible probative evidence of the reason for their presence under the narrow “explanation of conduct” exception to the hearsay rule. State v. Fischer, supra at 614-615.
Detective Griffie’s entry was authorized only if the prior entry of the uniformed officers was lawful or if his own warrantless entry had some independent justification. The majority correctly observes, and *664the trial court apparently overlooked, the principle that “additional investigators or officials may . . . enter a citizen’s property after one official has already intruded legally. [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) United States v. Brand, 556 F2d 1312, 1317 (III) (5th Cir. 1977). However, the majority is compelled to admit that “the later officials must confine their intrusion to the scope of the original invasion unless a warrant or one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement justifies a more thorough or wide ranging search.” United States v. Brand, supra at 1317 (III), fn. 9. The State does not claim that the exception which allegedly justified Detective Griffie’s subsequent actions was any different from that which justified the uniformed officers’ original presence. Additionally, the State has not shown that Detective Griffie confined his intrusion to the scope of the original entry, because it has not produced any probative evidence showing the nature of that initial entry.
In Division 2, the majority makes the extraordinary assertion that, even if the uniformed officers were not legitimately on the premises, their own action of removing responsible adult supervision while they were illegally in the residence unintentionally created an exigent circumstance that would authorize Detective Griffie’s entry to assist the children. In so holding, the majority radically departs from settled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. “Many . . . courts have held that a warrantless entry will not be justified by a police-created exigency, at least where the police conduct was unnecessary in view of available alternatives.” State v. Kelly, 963 P2d 1211, 1213 (Idaho App. 1998). The police may not, by an unreasonable search or | seizure, “create the emergency situation which they advance as the 1 predicate for their warrantless entry.” Nelson v. State, supra at 719.1 Furthermore, if the temporary care of children were considered to be 1 an independent justification for Detective Griffie to join other officers I who were already at the scene for the identical reason, then the police could always remove the taint of any unlawful entry into a citizen’s home for a laudable purpose merely by bringing in more officers.
I am constrained to conclude that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing that the seizure accomplished by Detective Griffie was lawful. The record contains absolutely no evidence that the prior entry of the uniformed officers was lawful or that Detective Griffie’s own warrantless entry had some independent justification. Accordingly, this Court is without any authority whatsoever to reverse the trial court’s grant of the motion to suppress the evidence which Detective Griffie seized. See State v. Fischer, supra; Phillips v. State, supra.
I note, however, that the State’s failure to prove the lawfulness! of the seizure would result only in the suppression of that particular! *665evidence at trial. United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251, 255 (86 SC 1416, 16 LE2d 510) (1966). The suppression of unlawfully seized evidence “does not bar a criminal prosecution. [Cits.]” State v. Brown, 198 Ga. App. 239, 241 (401 SE2d 295) (1990). See also United States v. Blue, supra at 255. Such a drastic extension of the exclusionary rule, especially under the grievous circumstances which might be present in this case, would “increase to an intolerable degree interference with the public interest in having the guilty brought to book.” United States v. Blue, supra at 255. See also Van Nice v. State, 180 Ga. App. 112, 121 (7) (348 SE2d 515) (1986).
Decided March 2, 2001
Reconsideration denied April 6, 2001.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Anne E. Green, Peggy R. Katz, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant.
Larry D. Wolfe, Bruce S. Harvey, August F. Siemon III, Derek H. Jones, for appellees.
A summary of the reasons for my dissent in this important case is in order: In an attempt to meet the State’s burden of proving the lawfulness of a warrantless search and seizure in defendants’ residence under the plain view doctrine, the prosecutor presented evidence only of the body of a child who was the alleged victim of a homicide, the presence of uniformed officers in the residence which is unexplained by any probative evidence whatever, and the later arrival of an additional officer who testified to his subsequent discovery and seizure of the items sought to be suppressed. However, the prosecutor introduced absolutely no probative evidence of the reason for the uniformed officers’ initial entry or of any independent justification for the additional officer’s entry. Therefore, the grant of defendants’ motion to suppress was absolutely necessary, notwithstanding the possibility that the uniformed officers could have testified that exigent circumstances justified the initial entry and that there was a lawful necessity for their continuing presence. Because what might have been shown was not shown, I dissent to this Court’s reversal of the trial court’s grant of the motion to suppress.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher and Justice Sears join in this dissent.