Court Opinion

ID: 9877568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 16:08:51.109427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:42.312199
License: Public Domain

J-S20007-23

  NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  GEORGE VINCENT KUBIS                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2945 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-09-CR-0008943-2007

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                           FILED SEPTEMBER 27, 2023

       Appellant pro se appeals from the October 4, 20221 order which

dismissed as untimely his third petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction

Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. Because Appellant fails to plead

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant’s notice of appeal purports to appeal from a September 21, 2022

order, which the PCRA court subsequently vacated on September 29, 2022.
This Court issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed
as moot. Appellant responded that the reference to the September 21, 2022
order was in error, and that he intended to appeal from the October 4, 2022
order dismissing his petition. We conclude that Appellant’s designation of the
wrong date on his notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the
appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 902 (providing “[f]ailure of an appellant to take any
step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal[.]”). Appellant timely filed the instant appeal and,
therefore, we decline to quash it and, instead, have corrected the caption to
reflect the correct order date.
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and prove an exception to the PCRA time-bar, we affirm the PCRA court’s

dismissal.

       On March 10, 2008, a jury convicted Appellant of four counts of Robbery

and related offenses for robbing the owner of a hair salon at knifepoint after

the Commonwealth presented, inter alia, the victim’s unequivocal testimony

identifying Appellant as his assailant.          On May 12, 2008, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration.

On July 21, 2009, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Commonwealth v. Kubis, 978 A.2d 391 (Pa. Super. 2009) (unpublished

memorandum). Appellant did not file seek further review of his judgment of

sentence.

       Instead, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition and a counseled

Amended PCRA Petition asserting, inter alia, that the Commonwealth failed to

provide Appellant with a computer-generated composite sketch generated by

police investigators using the FACES software (“FACES Image”).2 This Court

affirmed the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s petition, concluding that

Appellant learned about the FACES Image during the suppression hearing and

“failed to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain the image from the
____________________________________________

2 Appellant had filed pre-trial motions seeking suppression of, among other

things, the victim’s identification of Appellant from a line-up. During the
suppression hearing a police detective testified that investigators had created
a FACES Image during investigation, but the image was abandoned and never
used because the police discovered that the computer program was limited
and was not able to accurately depict the description of the assailant provided
by the victim and other eyewitnesses. This FACES Image was not presented
at trial.

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Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Kubis, No. 3347 EDA 2013, 2014 WL

10889657 at *4 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 12, 2014) (non-precedential decision).

We further concluded, “the [FACES Image] was not a picture of the

perpetrator as described by the victim, was never seen by the victim, and was

never adopted by the victim as resembling the perpetrator. Therefore, the

image itself was not material to [Appellant]’s guilt or even an identification of

[Appellant].” Id. at *5.

      On March 30, 2015, Appellant filed a second pro se PCRA petition, once

again raising an issue concerning the FACES Image, asserting that he

contacted the proprietor of the technology company that developed the FACES

computer program and learned information that conflicted with prior

testimony about the program’s operability.         The PCRA court dismissed

Appellant’s petition as untimely without a hearing, and this Court affirmed that

decision, concluding that Appellant failed to overcome the PCRA time-bar.

Commonwealth v. Kubis, No. 482 EDA 2017, WL 6014942 at *4 (Pa. filed

Dec. 4, 2017) (non-precedential decision).

      On August 15, 2022, Appellant pro se filed the instant PCRA petition, his

third, focused again on the FACES Image. Appellant acknowledged that his

petition was untimely but invoked the governmental interference and newly

discovered facts exceptions to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar.       See 42

Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii).   Although difficult to decipher, in his petition

Appellant essentially averred that in April 2020 he discovered a 2020 Harvard

Law Review article that discusses the features of the 4.0 version of the FACES

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program and how it has helped various law enforcement agencies over the

past 10 years, as well as won awards.      PCRA Petition, 8/15/22, at 11-12.

Appellant further averred, based on the law review article and the current

FACES website, that the Commonwealth fabricated evidence and presented

false testimony in previous proceedings regarding the FACES program. Id. at

11-13.

      On November 1, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice

to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing.      After considering

Appellant’s response, the PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely.

      This pro se appeal followed.      Both Appellant and the PCRA court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

         Did the PCRA court err as a matter of law and abuse its
         discretion when denying/dismissing petitioner[’]s well plead
         subsequent PCRA which required an evidentiary hearing to
         set forth the newly discovered fact and permit a
         demonstration of the evidence which serves to present the
         court/record with evidence of wide[-]spread government
         interference with petitioner[’]s previous proceedings
         denying petitioner rights as guaranteed by the Pennsylvania
         and U.S. Constitutions, depriving petitioner a fair trial,
         appeal, and PCRA proceedings?

Appellant’s Br. at iv. (some capitalization omitted).

      We review the denial of a PCRA petition to determine whether the record

supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its order is otherwise free of

legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014). This

Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if they are

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supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa.

Super. 2007).    “We give no such deference, however, to the court’s legal

conclusions.”   Commonwealth v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super.

2017)

      In order to obtain relief under the PCRA, a petition must be filed within

one year from the date the judgment of sentence became final. 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(1). Appellant’s petition, filed more than a decade after his judgment

of sentence became final, is facially untimely.

      Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition, however,

if the petitioner pleads and proves one of the three exceptions to the time-bar

set forth in Section 9545(b)(1). Any petition invoking a timeliness exception

must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.

42 Pa.C.S § 9545(b)(2).

      Here, Appellant attempts to invoke the governmental interference and

newly discovered facts exception provided in Section 9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii).

The government interference exception requires proof that “the failure to raise

the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials[.]”

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i). See also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941

A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008).

      To satisfy the newly discovered facts exception, a petitioner must plead

and prove “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the

petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due

diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Our Supreme Court has held that this

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exception “does not require any merits analysis of the underlying claim.”

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1271 (Pa. 2007). Rather the

exception merely requires the petitioner to plead and prove two elements: “1)

the facts upon which the claim was predicated were unknown and 2) could

not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Id. at 1272

(internal quotation marks omitted), citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

      Due diligence requires a petitioner to make reasonable efforts to

uncover facts that may support a claim for collateral relief. Commonwealth

v. Brensinger, 218 A.3d 440, 449 (Pa. Super. 2019).          A petitioner must

explain why he could not have learned the new facts earlier by exercising due

diligence. Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001).

      Notably, a petitioner does not satisfy the Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) time-

bar exception where he merely alleges a newly discovered or newly willing

source for previously known facts. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d

714, 721–22 (Pa. 2008). Our Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he fact [an]

appellant discovered yet another conduit for the same claim [] does not

transform his latest source into evidence falling within the ambit of [the newly

discovered fact exception].” Abu-Jamal, 941 at 1269.

      The PCRA court found that Appellant’s recycled claims failed to meet the

requirements of either the governmental interference or the newly discovered

fact exceptions. The PCRA court opined:

         The facts are clear: Appellant raised this claim previously
         several times, the government did not impede Appellant’s
         acquisition of the sketch, Appellant never requested the

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             image despite his knowledge of it, the Commonwealth never
             used it at trial or in the course of the investigation, and the
             Superior Court agreed the computer-generated image was
             immaterial to Appellant’s conviction. These facts clearly
             support the notion that Appellant’s instant claim does not
             trigger the governmental interference exception.

             Second, Appellant’s claims were known to him previously.
             To circumvent the timeliness requirement by alleging “newly
             discovered facts,” Appellant must show “the facts upon
             which the claim is predicated were unknown to the
             defendant and could not have been ascertained by the
             exercise of due diligence[.]” As outlined above, Appellant’s
             composite sketch claims were known to him beforehand as
             demonstrated in his previous PCRA Petitions when he raised
             the same issues.

PCRA Op., 12/16/22, at 7. We agree.

       Appellant has raised variations of the same claim in all three of his PCRA

petitions and the exhibits attached to his most recent petition are merely

another conduit for the same claims.          Accordingly, the PCRA court did not

abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant’s claims fail to meet either

exception to the PCRA’s time-bar.

       In conclusion, the PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s petition.

Appellant has not pleaded and proved the applicability of the newly discovered

fact or the government interference exceptions and, therefore, we are without

jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. We, thus, affirm the denial

of relief.

       Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/27/2023

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