Court Opinion

ID: 9748913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:17:30.964928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:40.647708
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
concurring.
I write separately because the majority opinion conflicts with this court’s opinion in Ex parte Brosky.6 In Brosky, this court held that Brosky could be prosecuted for conspiracy to commit murder after being convicted of murder as a party.7 We specifically stated that while criminal conspiracy requires proof of an agreement to commit an offense, murder as a party does not require proof of an agreement.8
In the case now before us, the indictment properly charged Appellant with capital murder under section 19.03(a)(2) of the penal code.9 Because the law does not require that Appellant be indicted as a party, the indictment merely alleges that Appellant intentionally caused Rich’s death in the course of committing kidnaping. The application paragraph of the jury charge required the jury to find a conspiracy, that is, an agreement. Yet, Appellant is not accused of entering into a conspiracy. In Brosky, we held that the additional element of an agreement establishes an offense separate and apart from guilt as a *92party.10
The line of cases relied on by the majority directly conflicts with our Brosky opinion. The majority interprets these cases as allowing conviction as a party without the mens rea required by the statute. The jury must find that the primary actor, the shooter, intended to cause the victim’s death. But in order to convict the non-shooter as a party, the jury is not required to find that the party, the non-shooter, intended to cause the death or that the shooter intended to cause the death, even though both section 19.03(a)(2) and the indictment require proof of specific intent to cause the death. This interpretation allows conviction on less evidence than required by either the statute or the indictment. The jury charge should contain all of the fundamental elements of the offense and should not allow conviction on less proof than required by the statute.
The Court of Criminal Appeals should revisit this issue. But we should either follow Brosky or disavow that opinion.

. Ex parte Brosky, 863 S.W.2d 783 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, no pet.).

. See id. at 788.

. See id. at 784, 788.

. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1994).

. See Ex parte Brosky, 863 S.W.2d at 788.