Court Opinion

ID: 9963870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 14:06:51.442544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:02.492613
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1668-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAQUAN L. LEE, a/k/a JAQUAN
JULIUS LEE, JACQUAN LEE,
JAQUEAN J. LEE, JAKWAN J.
LEE, JAKWAN LARRY LEE, and
JAKWAM L. LEE,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________

                   Submitted April 10, 2024 – Decided April 26, 2024

                   Before Judges Firko, Susswein and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Union County, Indictment No. 07-12-1019.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Robert C. Pierce, Designated Counsel, on the
                   briefs).
            William C. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney
            for respondent (Michele C. Buckley, Assistant
            Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant Jaquan L. Lee appeals from a November 18, 2021 oral decision

and subsequent November 23 memorializing order denying his second petition

for post-conviction relief (PCR) and motion for a new trial. Based on our careful

review of the record, we affirm, as defendant's assertions have either already

been fully litigated or are procedurally time-barred.

      The salient facts and procedural history were previously detailed in our

decision on defendant's direct appeal, State v. Lee (Lee I), Nos. A-2842-10, A-

3813-10 (App. Div. Aug. 12, 2013). We briefly summarize only the facts

material to our determination of defendant's second PCR appeal.

      Defendant was involved in three robberies. The first robbery occurred

after midnight on July 30, 2007. Two teenagers were walking in Elizabeth when

a white sedan stopped in the middle of the street. The car drove off and a few

minutes later, the teenagers were approached by three men armed with a

shotgun. The men robbed the boys of their cell phones, iPod, and cash.

      A few minutes later, the men robbed three friends who were out

celebrating a twentieth birthday. The men threatened the friends with shotguns

and took a purse, car keys, a wallet, and a passport. Shortly after that, the men

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approached a group of teenagers outside. The men had shotguns and took

phones, wallets, cash, and IDs from several of the teenagers.

      Witnesses to the robberies described one of the robbers as a short, stocky

man with dreadlocks. Witnesses said this robber was wearing a blue bandana

around his mouth and nose and a hoodie. Witnesses also said this robber was

holding the shotgun. The other two men were described as taller and slimmer,

with one wearing a Detroit Lions hat.

      Police were called after each robbery and had descriptions of the robbers,

their vehicle, and their license plate. Two Elizabeth police officers on patrol,

Guillermo Valladares and Jose Torres, observed the vehicle as well as four

individuals near the vehicle. The officers arrested defendant and Tony Canty,

while the other two individuals fled the scene. When defendant was arrested,

he was wearing a Detroit Lions hat. Canty was wearing a blue bandanna.

      The two officers searched the vehicle and seized two sawed-off shotguns.

They also seized several bags of vegetation, a Detroit Lions jacket, a wallet, and

a pocketbook and social security card belonging to Sade Ingram — the woman

driving the vehicle at the time of the robberies — who was in a relationship with

defendant.

      On December 6, 2007, a grand jury charged defendant with eight counts

of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (counts one through eight); two counts

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of third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon without a proper license,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(1) (counts nine and ten); two counts of third-degree

unlawful possession of a weapon, a loaded shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(2)

(counts eleven and twelve); third-degree possession of a prohibited weapon, a

sawed-off shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(b) (counts thirteen and fourteen); two

counts of second-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-4(a)(1) (counts fifteen and sixteen); and third-degree receipt of stolen

property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7 (count seventeen).       In a separate indictment,

defendant was also charged with a second-degree weapons charge under

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7.

      Count seventeen was dismissed prior to trial. On June 17, 2010, the jury

found defendant guilty on all remaining counts.        Defendant appealed his

conviction. We affirmed the conviction but remanded for resentencing. Lee I,

slip op. at 38. On September 20, 2013 defendant was resentenced to fifteen

years with an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period pursuant to the No

Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, on counts one and two; ten

years with an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period pursuant to NERA

on counts three, four, and five to run consecutively with count one; ten years

with an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period pursuant to NERA on

counts six, seven, and eight to run consecutively with count one and three. On

                                   4                                     A-1668-21
counts nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, and fourteen, the sentence of four years

remained unchanged and was to run concurrently with count one. Counts fifteen

and sixteen merged into counts one through eight. We heard defendant's appeal

on our sentencing calendar pursuant to Rule 2:9-11 and affirmed. State v. Lee

(Lee II), No. A-2141-13 (App. Div. Apr. 7, 2014).

      On October 27, 2014, defendant filed a PCR petition, which the first PCR

court denied on January 5, 2018. We affirmed the first PCR court's order

denying defendant's petition on July 21, 2020. State v. Lee (Lee III), No. A-

3209-17 (App. Div. Jul. 21, 2020). The Supreme Court denied certification.

State v. Lee, 244 N.J. 434 (2020).

      On September 21, 2020, defendant filed a second PCR petition and a

motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. In his second PCR

petition, defendant argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel because

his counsel failed to consult with a DNA expert. Defendant also argues that he

was prejudiced at trial because he was unaware of an internal affairs (IA)

investigation regarding an off-duty incident involving Sergeant Michael

Sandford of the Union County Police Department, who testified at the trial as a

firearms expert. Defendant's second PCR petition and motion for new trial was

denied in an oral decision November 18, 2021 following a non-evidentiary

hearing. A memorializing order was entered on November 23, 2021.

                                     5                                       A-1668-21
      The second PCR court found that, on appeal from denial of his first PCR

petition, we addressed defendant's allegation his trial counsel was deficient for

failing to spend sufficient time reviewing the DNA evidence with him during

trial. The second PCR court also held that we previously found no error in the

first PCR court's decision there was no evidence to support defendant's argument

his trial counsel failed to discuss a last-minute plea negotiation with him.

Further, the second PCR court found that defendant's argument his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to seek a jury instruction regarding Ingram's

admission was clearly raised on direct appeal.

      Finally, the second PCR court found that Sandford's IA investigation did

not constitute newly discovered evidence as to warrant a new trial. The IA

investigation was twenty-two years old and the incident surrounding the

investigation occurred when Sandford was off duty. The second PCR court also

found that Sandford's testimony was limited and not material.

      This appeal followed. Defendant raises the following arguments for our

consideration:

            POINT I

            SAN[D]FORD'S [IA] INVESTIGATION WAS
            GERMANE TO A CASE RESTING LARGELY ON
            WITNESS CREDIBILITY; WHETHER TREATED
            AS A MOTION FOR [A] NEW TRIAL OR AS AN
            ADDITIONAL GROUND FOR PCR, [DEFENDANT]

                                    6                                     A-1668-21
            RAISED A VALID ISSUE AND WAS ENTITLED TO
            RELIEF.

               A. [DEFENDANT] ESTABLISHED GROUNDS
                  FOR [A] NEW TRIAL.

               B. [DEFENDANT] ESTABLISHED GROUNDS
                  FOR [PCR].

               C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT
                  ORDERING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

            POINT II

            THERE WAS NO DECISION CONCERNING
            [DEFENDANT'S] ALLEGATION THAT TRIAL
            COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO
            OBTAIN A DNA EXPERT.

            POINT III

            THE FIRST PCR APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED
            TO REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION ABOUT
            SADE INGRAM'S ADMISSION.

            POINT IV

            THE FIRST PCR APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED
            TO PURSUE THE SPEEDY TRIAL ISSUE.

                                          I.

      Defendant argues he is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered

evidence. Sargeant Sandford, the officer who testified to the shotgun and rounds

from the vehicle used during the robberies, was subject to a 1988 IA

investigation regarding a firearm which found that during an off-duty altercation

                                    7                                     A-1668-21
Sandford's weapon fell to the ground. Sandford reported that he immediately

picked up the weapon. The IA investigation concluded that Sandford was not

truthful in his reports, and another individual actually found the weapon and

returned it to him.

      Defendant argues that Sandford has a history of "(1) losing a firearm, (2)

lying about the loss, and (3) conspiring with other law enforcement agents to

conceal the truth." Defendant argues that because the firearm at issue in his case

was analyzed by Sandford, the newly discovered evidence of Sandford's prior

history could have been used to challenge the chain of custody and the material

elements of this offense.

      The State argues the second PCR court properly denied defendant's

motion because the judge considered all the evidence and applied the factors set

forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300,

(1982)1.

1
  In State v. Carter, our Court remanded the matter back to the Law Division "to
take further testimony and make findings of fact" to determine whether the
Brady rule was violated. 85 N.J. at 315-16. Our Court retained jurisdiction. Id.
at 316. On remand, the Law Division "held extensive hearings and submitted
detailed findings . . . [and] found that there was no Brady violation, and that a
new trial was not warranted." State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 95 (1982). Our Court
then affirmed. Id. at 131.

                                    8                                      A-1668-21
      "A motion for a new trial based on the ground for newly[]discovered

evidence may be made at any time, but if an appeal is pending, the court may

grant the motion only on remand of the case." R. 3:20-2. Our Supreme Court

            has stated repeatedly that to qualify as newly
            discovered evidence entitling a party to a new trial,
            the new evidence must be (1) material to the issue and
            not merely cumulative or impeaching or contradictory;
            (2) discovered since the trial and not discoverable by
            reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that
            would probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial
            were granted.

            [Carter, 85 N.J. at 314 (citing State v. Artis, 36 N.J.
            538, 541 (1962)).]

      "The Brady disclosure rule applies to information of which the

prosecution is actually or constructively aware." State v. Nelson, 330 N.J.

Super. 206, 213 (App. Div. 2000). "[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to

learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's

behalf . . . ." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). On the other hand,

"showing that the prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence unknown

to the defense does not amount to a Brady violation, without more." Id. at 437-

38. "[W]hether the prosecutor succeeds or fails in meeting this obligation . . .

the   prosecution's    responsibility   for    failing   to   disclose    known,

favorable evidence rising to a material level of importance is inescapable." Ibid.

                                    9                                      A-1668-21
       The analysis for a new trial under Brady and Carter differs slightly, in

that the threshold for materiality under the latter is "more stringent." State v.

Henries, 306 N.J. Super 512, 534 (App Div. 1997). "[D]efendant must establish

that the evidence must not only have not been discovered until after trial, but

could not have been with due diligence." Ibid. "The critical issue . . . is whether

the additional evidence probably would have affected the outcome, regardless

of whether it is characterized as impeachment evidence." Id. at 535.

      Under the first prong of Carter, "[m]aterial evidence is any evidence that

would 'have some bearing on the claims being advanced.'" State v. Ways, 180

N.J. 171, 188 (2004) (quoting Henries, 306 N.J. Super. at 531). "Determining

whether evidence is 'merely cumulative['] . . . and, therefore, insufficient to

justify the grant of a new trial requires an evaluation of the probable impact such

evidence would have on a jury verdict." Id. at 188-89.

      Under the second prong, "new evidence must have been discovered after

completion of trial and must not have been discoverable earlier through the

exercise of reasonable diligence."        Id. at 192.   Prong two "encourage[s]

defendants and attorneys to act with reasonable dispatch in searching for

evidence before the start of the trial." Ibid.

      Finally, under prong three:

                   The characterization of evidence as "merely
                   cumulative, or impeaching, or contradictory" is a

                                     10                                     A-1668-21
                  judgment that such evidence is not of great
                  significance and would probably not alter the
                  outcome of a verdict. However, evidence that
                  would have the probable effect of raising a
                  reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt
                  would not be considered merely cumulative,
                  impeaching, or contradictory.

                  [Id. at 189.]

      The second PCR court agreed with the State's position that the newly

acquired evidence of the IA investigation regarding Sandford's off-duty incident

was not material. The second PCR court found the IA investigation regarding

the off-duty incident was twenty-two years old and Sandford was testifying at

trial in his official capacity as a firearms expert.     The second PCR court

concluded Sandford's credibility was not an issue at trial because he was only

there to provide limited testimony and knew nothing about the facts of the case.

At trial, Sandford testified only as to his examination of the involved weapons

since he did not participate in the arrest of defendant and was only asked to

provide an opinion after viewing the firearms.

      We hold the newly discovered evidence was not material to defendant's

case and would not probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted.

Under Brady and Carter, defendant has not shown that the prosecution purposely

withheld material information related to Sandford's IA investigation. Therefore,

                                    11                                     A-1668-21
we reject defendant's claim that he is entitled to another trial on the grounds of

newly discovered evidence.

                                           II.

      Defendant argues ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial

counsel failed to obtain a DNA expert. He also asserts his first PCR counsel

failed to request a jury instruction about Ingram's admission and failed to pursue

a speedy trial.

      We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). The de novo standard also applies to

mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 420. Where an evidentiary hearing has

not been held, we "conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings and

legal conclusions of the PCR court." Id. at 421.

      PCR "is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus." State

v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459

(1992)). It is the vehicle through which a defendant may, after conviction and

sentencing, challenge a judgment of conviction by raising issues that could not

have been raised on direct appeal and, therefore, "ensures . . . a defendant was

not unjustly convicted." State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997).

                                    12                                     A-1668-21
      To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel,

defendant must satisfy the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), which our Supreme Court adopted in

State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). "First, the defendant must show . . . .

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'

guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment."         Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Defendant must then show counsel's "deficient

performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid. To show prejudice, defendant must

establish by "a reasonable probability" that the deficient performance

"materially contributed to defendant's conviction." Id. at 58.

      We need not address whether defendant's second PCR petition meets the

Strickland standard as we affirm the second PCR court's conclusion defendant's

petition is time-barred under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). Second or subsequent PCR

petitions must comply with the requirements of Rule 3:22-4(b) and Rule 3:22-

12(a)(2). To avoid dismissal of a second—or subsequent—PCR petition, the

petition must be timely filed under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). R. 3:22-4(b)(1). Rule

3:22-4(b) contains no exceptions to the time-bar for second or subsequent PCR

petitions. Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(C) specifically provides "no second or subsequent

petition shall be filed more than one year after . . . the date of the denial of the

first . . . application for [PCR]" based on ineffective assistance of counsel. An

                                     13                                      A-1668-21
appeal of defendant's first PCR petition does not toll the time limitation of Rule

3:22-12. State v. Dillard, 208 N.J. Super. 722, 727 (App. Div. 1986); see State

v. Dugan, 289 N.J. Super. 15, 19 (App. Div. 1996).

      Defendant was required to file his second PCR petition within one year of

January 5, 2018, the date his first PCR petition was denied. However, he did

not file his second PCR petition until September 21, 2020, and, therefore, the

trial court did not err in concluding it is time-barred under Rule 3:22-

12(a)(2)(C).

      Moreover, notwithstanding that defendant's second PCR petition is

procedurally time-barred, we previously rejected defendant's claim the

instructions given to the jury were erroneous on direct appeal, where we found

there was no plain error. In our opinion regarding his first PCR petition, we

addressed defendant's argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to consult a DNA expert. Since these claims were previously adjudicated, they

are barred under Rule 3:22-5.      Additionally, the first PCR court rejected

defendant's argument that his trial counsel's failure to pursue a speedy trial

amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Since defendant did not address

this issue on his first PCR appeal, we deemed it waived. Sklodowsky v. Lushis,

417 N.J. Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011).

                                    14                                     A-1668-21
      Because defendant has not satisfied the factors set forth in Brady or Carter

for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and defendant's second PCR

petition was not filed within the time limitation proscribed under Rule 3:22-

12(a)(2), we affirm the second PCR court's order.

      Affirmed.

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