Court Opinion

ID: 9489796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:24:25.196383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:43.274878
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I would affirm the district court on the basis of its thorough and well-reasoned opinion. I agree with each of the district court’s conclusions, namely (1) Seiler exhausted his state court remedies with respect to the claim in his habeas corpus petition, (2) the faulty jury instruction on first-degree felony murder rose to the level of a constitutional violation, (3) the error is subject to harmless-error analysis, and (4) the error was not harmless. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Instruction No. 17
The law provides that a person commits Murder in the Second Degree when he kills another with either express or implied malice aforethought.
However, it is Murder in the First Degree, if, in addition, he:
Willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation kills another person.
There are several circumstances, however, where murder becomes Murder in the First Degree.
*541One circumstance is the so-called “Felony — Murder Doctrine.” That is where one kills another person with malice aforethought while participating in a forcible felony. Other instructions further explain this type of First Degree Murder.
* • * * * * *
Instruction No. 28
In considering First Degree Murder under the Felony — Murder Doctrine, you are instructed that the law provides that when [sic] a person commits a burglary when the burglary is performed by force or against the will of the other.
You are further instructed that burglary is a forcible felony.
(J.A. at 66 and 77.)
The jury was given a general verdict form and returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. Neither the trial court nor this court can determine whether the jury found Seiler guilty of premeditated first-degree murder or first-degree felony murder.
The state concedes that instruction 28 was improper. There is also no doubt that Seiler fairly presented his federal claim to the state court and that he gave the state a full opportunity to address the constitutional violation that the jury was improperly instructed as to the essential elements to be found beyond a reasonable doubt for his conviction. Seiler cited Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) as authority for his claim. Moreover, in State v. Seiler, 342 N.W.2d 264 (Iowa 1983), the dissenting justice wrote:
The trial court’s instructions authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder based on finding defendant committed murder in the perpetration of a burglary. The court did not define burglary or tell the jury only first-degree burglary would enhance the offense to first-degree murder, despite a timely defense objection pointing out the error.

This court’s holding is the equivalent of a directed verdict for the State on an issue the State was obliged to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 268-69 (McCormick, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Thus, there can be no doubt that instruction 28 was in error and that the error was presented to the state court.
Moreover, the error was a constitutional one. The Due Process Clause protects an accused against a criminal conviction unless the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary for the crime with which the accused is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2080, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2457, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1892, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). In addition, the most important element of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is the right to have a jury, not a judge, reach the requisite findings of guilt. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277, 113 S.Ct. at 2080. Thus, “although a judge may direct a verdict for the defendant if the evidence is legally insufficient to establish guilt, he may not direct a verdict for the state, no matter how overwhelming the evidence.” Id. In this case, the trial court neither defined first-degree burglary nor told the jury that only first-degree burglary could enhance the offense to first-degree murder. The court also instructed the jury that burglary is a forcible felony, thereby impermissibly substituting its own judgment for- that of the jury. I agree with the district court that this amounted to a directed verdict for the state on an element of first-degree burglary, which was a predicate for a first-degree felony murder conviction. The instruction violated Seder’s due process rights-and his right to a fair jury trial.
I agree with both the district court and the majority that the effect of the faulty instruction on the jury’s verdict is subject to harmless error analysis. The appropriate inquiry for this court is set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): whether the state has proved that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority finds that the error was harmless in light of “the totality of the jury instructions and the over*542whelming evidence that the victim was intentionally struck during the burglary.” Maj. Op., supra at 540. To the extent that the majority relies on the evidence of Seiler’s guilt and its own strong belief that a properly-instructed jury would have convicted Seiler, it commits grave error. The Supreme Court has spoken directly on this issue. The question facing this court in a harmless error analysis,
is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered — no matter how inescapable the findings to support the verdict might be— would violate the jury-trial guarantee.
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279, 113 S.Ct. at 2081-82 (emphasis added). Had the jury explicitly based its verdict on premeditated murder, there certainly would be sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. However, as the record stands, neither the state court nor the majority nor I know whether the jury believed that Seiler was guilty of premeditated murder or felony murder. It would have been a simple matter to have prepared a verdict form that would have permitted the jury to make a separate finding on each instruction. Failing that, -I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this jury did not base its verdict on the erroneous felony-murder instructions.
The majority accepts the argument that the error was harmless in light of the totality of the jury instructions. I disagree. The only possible basis for this argument is that the missing elements of first-degree burglary are supplied when instructions 17 and 28 are read together. The fact remains, however, that instruction 28 permitted the jury to find Seiler guilty of murder in the first degree when he committed a burglary that was performed by force or against the will of another. We cannot read the jurors’ minds to supply the missing elements of that instruction.
Thus, I would not hesitate to affirm the district court and would remand the matter to the district court with directions to remand it to the state court for a new trial with a properly-instructed jury.