Court Opinion

ID: 9912445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 15:05:15.382419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:23.132925
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 15, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                          NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals
                                  NO. 2022-CA-1464-MR

TROMONTE DEMON RICE                                              APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE JULIE MUTH GOODMAN, JUDGE
                          ACTION NO. 16-CR-00119

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                           APPELLEE

                                          OPINION
                                         AFFIRMING

                                         ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, JONES, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: The Appellant, Tromonte Demon Rice, appeals from the Fayette

Circuit Court’s order denying his CR1 60.02 motion. Having reviewed the record

and being otherwise sufficiently advised, we affirm.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
                                        I. BACKGROUND

                 In December 2015, while Rice was on parole, the Division of

Probation and Parole conducted a search of Rice’s residence. During the search,

officers located a loaded handgun under a bed. The gun was later identified

as stolen property belonging to Mr. Lee Giles. Rice was read his Miranda2

warnings by law enforcement after the gun was found, and he confirmed that he

knew he was not allowed to be in possession of a firearm.

                 Rice’s parole was revoked, and on February 1, 2016, a Fayette County

grand jury indicted Rice for being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun

and receiving stolen property (firearm). Acting with the assistance of counsel,

Rice pleaded guilty to the charges in exchange for the Commonwealth’s

recommendation that Rice serve a five-year term with the Department of

Corrections. Rice was sentenced on June 2, 2016, with the five-year sentence

ordered to run consecutively to the sentence he was already serving following

revocation of his parole.

                 Rice did not file a direct appeal or an RCr3 11.42 motion. However,

on June 8, 2020, Rice, acting without the assistance of counsel, filed a post-

conviction motion citing new evidence discovered “as of April 2020” in the form

2
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
3
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                                -2-
of an admission from his sister, Vashani Rice. According to the motion, Vashani,

who was a minor at the time the firearm was seized, subsequently admitted to Rice

that she had obtained the firearm and unbeknownst to Rice hid it under her bed.4

Vashani indicated that she did not come forward when the gun was originally

seized because she was still a minor and afraid of what would happen to her. The

trial court appointed counsel to represent Rice, and in July 2020, Rice

supplemented his motion with a handwritten affidavit from Vashani. The trial

court denied the motion on November 15, 2022, on the grounds the motion was

untimely brought. This appeal followed.5

                                 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

               The grant or denial of a motion for relief under CR 60.02 is within the

“sound discretion” of a trial court and subject to reversal only on a finding of abuse

of discretion. Priddy v. Commonwealth, 629 S.W.3d 14, 17 (Ky. App. 2021).

Abuse of discretion occurs where a trial court’s decision was arbitrary,

4
  Rice explained that Vashani was living with him at the time, and she and her boyfriend slept
on the bed in question while Rice slept on the couch.
5
  The record indicates the Department of Public Advocacy filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
for Rice on September 21, 2021, on the basis this was not a motion “that a reasonable person
with adequate means would be willing to bring at his or her own expense” under Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 31.110(2)(c). The trial court granted that motion on November 9, 2022.
However, for reasons that are unclear from our review of the record, the Department of Public
Advocacy continued to represent Rice after the trial court’s denial of the post-conviction motion,
including bringing and briefing this appeal on Rice’s behalf.

                                               -3-
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Id. (citation

omitted). “The burden of proof falls squarely on the movant to affirmatively allege

facts which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further allege special

circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.” Stoker v. Commonwealth, 289 S.W.3d

592, 596 (Ky. App. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                    III. ANALYSIS

             Rice argues the trial court erroneously denied his motion as untimely

filed. Specifically, Rice asserts the trial court denied the motion as time barred

under CR 60.02(b) which requires all motions asserting “newly discovered

evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move

for a new trial under Rule 59.02” to be filed “not more than one year after the

judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Instead, Rice contends the

trial court should have permitted a review on the merits under CR 60.02(f) which

provides that a motion predicated upon “any other reason of an extraordinary

nature justifying relief” shall be filed “within a reasonable time.”

             Rice did not indicate which subsection of CR 60.02 he was relying

upon. Regardless of the subsection applied, however, Rice’s claim fails. See

Stoker, 289 S.W.3d at 597 (“[W]e may affirm a trial court’s ruling despite the fact

that it reached the correct result for the wrong reason.”).

                                          -4-
             Our Supreme Court has recognized that claims based upon newly

discovered evidence may be maintained under CR 60.02(f) if such claims are time-

barred under CR 60.02(b). Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880 (Ky. 2014).

The real issue in this case is whether Vashani’s affidavit may properly be

construed as “newly discovered evidence.”

             “Newly discovered evidence is evidence that could not have been

obtained at the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”

Commonwealth v. Harris, 250 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Ky. 2008). We have previously

recognized that CR 60.02(f) relief is available when a witness previously unknown

to either the defendant or the Commonwealth comes forward. Commonwealth v.

Graham, 586 S.W.3d 754, 768 (Ky. App. 2019). However, when a previously

known witness “who has chosen not to testify subsequently comes forward to offer

testimony exculpating a defendant, the evidence is not newly discovered.” Carwile

v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Ky. App. 1985) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

             The facts in this case mirror those in Carwile. Vashani was known to

Rice at the time he pleaded guilty. While Vashani may not have been willing to

admit that the gun was hers at the time Rice was prosecuted, Rice certainly should

have been aware that the gun did not belong to him, and that it must have been

hidden by someone else, presumably his sister or her boyfriend who were sleeping

                                         -5-
in the bed where the gun was found. Even so, Rice chose to plead guilty to the

charges, admitting both that he was in possession of the gun and that it was stolen.

The fact that a witness, previously known to the defendant, has subsequently come

forward with additional information is not the type of situation that justifies relief

under CR 60.02(f). Harris, 250 S.W.3d at 642. Therefore, we hold that the trial

court properly denied Rice’s CR 60.02 motion.

             Rice’s final argument is that the trial court improperly treated his CR

60.02 as a motion for relief under RCr 11.42 without providing him with advance

notice that it intended to do so. He requests us to vacate the order and remand this

matter to the trial court to amend its order to remove any reference to RCr 11.42.

While the trial court discussed RCr 11.42 relief, a review of the trial court’s order

makes clear that its denial was confined to CR 60.02, and that any reference to RCr

11.42 was mere dicta, making remand unnecessary. Armstrong v. Estate of

Elmore, 647 S.W.3d 214, 219 (Ky. 2022) (“Dicta is commentary in a court’s

decision that is unnecessary to the ruling at hand.”).

                                  IV. CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Fayette Circuit Court is

affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                          -6-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Andrea Reed              Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky      Attorney General of Kentucky

                         Jenny L. Sanders
                         Assistant Attorney General
                         Frankfort, Kentucky

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