Court Opinion

ID: 9523918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:48:19.817047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:34.945478
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: I do. not agree with the construction placed on section 5 of the Contribution Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 70, par. 305) by my colleagues. That section provides: “A cause of action for contribution among joint tortfeasors may be asserted by a separate action before or after payment, by counterclaim or by third-party complaint in a pending action.” This section plainly establishes three ways in which a cause of action for contribution may be asserted. I see nothing in section 5 that requires that the cause of action for contribution must be asserted by way of a counterclaim (cross-claim), or by way of a third-party complaint if an action is pending or if there had been an action brought against one tortfeasor by the injured party. In fact, section 5, in enumerating the three methods of asserting the cause of action for contribution, states that such an action may be asserted in one of the three ways stated. That is, the cause of action may be asserted by a separate action. It may be asserted by a cross-complaint in a pending action, or it may be asserted by a third-party complaint in a pending action. In reading the entire act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 70, pars. 301 through 305), I find no expression of legislative intent that the cause of action created for contribution must be asserted by way of a cross-complaint or a third-party complaint if the injured party sues one of the tortfeasors. In Meckley v. Hertz Corp. (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1976), 88 Misc. 2d 605, 388 N.Y.S.2d 555, the court refers to the New York statute which provides: “A cause of action for contribution may be asserted in a separate action or by cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party claim in a pending action.” (88 Misc. 2d 605, 608, 388 N.Y.S.2d 555, 557.) This language is very similar to the language of section 5 of our act. The New. York court, while noting the desirability of asserting claims for contribution in the original action by way of a cross-claim or a third-party action, nonetheless recognized that the statute authorized a cause of action for contribution to be asserted in a separate action. Section 2 — 608(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 — 608(a)) provides: “Any claim by one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs, or against one or more codefendants, *** may be pleaded as a crossclaim in any action, and when so pleaded shall be called a counterclaim.” The historical and practice notes to this section in the Smith-Hurd Annotated (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2— 608(a), Historical and Practice Notes, at 183 (Smith-Hurd 1983)) state: “However, in contrast to Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for compulsory counterclaims that must be asserted or waived, this section is permissive; it does not require that a defendant immediately assert his rights by counterclaim if it would be inconvenient or strategically inadvisable.” In Miller v. Bank of Pecatonica (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 424, 427, the court, in discussing section 2 — 608(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, stated: “We are of the opinion, however, that while this section is designed to simplify the litigation between parties by providing that all issues can be tried in one forum at the same time, it does not require a defendant to immediately assert his rights by way of counterclaim ***. The word ‘may’ in the quoted words of the statute indicate[s] an election is available to the defendant and the cases have so interpreted this section.” Section 5 of the Contribution Act, as does section 2— 608(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, uses the word “may.” Both sections concern the pleading of cross-claims. Both provide that such cross-claims may be asserted by way of a counterclaim in a pending action. Both sections, not just section 2 — 608(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, should be construed as being permissive. The majority speaks strongly of public policy reasons for construing section 5 as the majority opinion does. The problems that may result from the construction I am urging would have been proper for the legislature to consider. It may well be that requiring contribution to be sought in a pending action is more desirable and will lead to fewer problems. That, however, is not the issue before us. In a comment in 44 Missouri Law Review 691 (1979), the author discusses the difficulties that may arise from asserting a contribution claim in a separate action, but notes that “only a few jurisdictions deny this opportunity.” Comment, Contribution in Missouri — Procedure and Defenses Under the New Rule, 44 Mo. L. Rev. 691, 708 (1979). The legislature could easily have provided that all claims for contribution must be asserted in the original action. Other States have done so: “If relief can be obtained as provided in this subsection no independent action shall be maintained to enforce the claim for contribution.” Ark. Stat. Ann. sec. 34 — 1007(3) (1962). “If relief can be obtained as provided in this subsection no independent action shall be maintained to enforce the claim for contribution.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, sec. 6306(b) (1975). “If relief can be obtained as provided in this paragraph no independent action shall be maintained to enforce the ' claim for contribution.” Hawaii Rev. Stat. sec. 663— 17(b) (1976). From these statutes, it is apparent that a standard form of prohibition has been used to prohibit the asserting of a claim for contribution in a separate action. The legislature in our statutes provided for no such prohibition. Instead, the legislature provided that a cause of action may be asserted in all of the three ways set out in the statute, including “by a separate action.”