Court Opinion

ID: 9754903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:17:54.662689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:00.548271
License: Public Domain

KEM THOMPSON FROST, Justice,
dissenting.
Appellees Bank One, N.A. (“Lienholder”) and Banc One Acceptance Corporation (“Assignee”) filed suit against appellant Pablo Tello to recover sums they claim were owing under the lease agreement; however, they attached only part of the lease agreement to their pleadings, and when they moved for summary judgment in the trial court, they made the same mistake. Consequently, our appellate record contains only part of the contract upon which the trial court’s summary judgment is based. As explained in more detail below, this omission is significant because to *121recover damages for breach of a contract as a matter of law, the movant must establish the amount of damages flowing from the breach. In this case, the part of the lease agreement omitted from our record contains terms regarding early termination of the lease, any security interest in the vehicle, and default charges — parts that would show how much Tello would owe if he terminated the lease before the end of its term and how much the Lienholder and the Assignee (hereinafter collectively “Bank One Entities”) would be entitled to recover for breach of the lease agreement. Moreover, because the Assignee does not have the vehicle and has no way of knowing the amount of mileage on the vehicle, it is not possible to calculate any applicable mileage penalty, a data point necessary to determine the amount ostensibly due under the lease. Based on the portions of the lease that are in the summary-judgment evidence, Tello owes only a fraction of the amount the trial court awarded in actual damages.
In his appellate brief, Tello asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to the amount of contract damages for which he is liable. Construing Tello’s brief liberally, as this court must, Tello argues that the traditional summary-judgment motion and attached evidence did not prove the lack of a genuine issue of fact and that the Bank One Entities are entitled to judgment as a matter of law for the damages awarded on their contract claim. This assertion is correct and should be sustained, but rather than reaching the merits of Tello’s winning argument, the court erroneously concludes that Tello should lose based on a failure to preserve error.
According to the majority, Tello did not expressly present his sixth issue to the trial court, thereby waiving this issue. This analysis is based on the majority’s conclusion that Tello’s argument is not an attack on the sufficiency of the summary-judgment motion, a point that need not be raised in the trial court to be asserted on appeal. This conclusion is incorrect because, under a liberal construction, Tello’s argument under his sixth issue challenges the sufficiency of the Bank One Entities’ motion and proof of their entitlement to summary judgment on their contract claim. Therefore, contrary to the majority’s assertion, this argument did not have to be raised in the trial court. See M.D. Anderson Hosp. and Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex.2000) (stating that, as to traditional motions for summary judgment, nonmovant has no duty to respond unless the movant conclusively establishes its claim or defense). There is no valid basis to find waiver for failure to preserve error in the trial court.
The court also holds that Tello waived this point through inadequate briefing. This analysis, though a somewhat subjective call, is contrary to the standards the Texas Supreme Court has articulated for disposing of parties’ appellate rights without reaching the merits of their appellate points. Under both the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and Texas Supreme Court precedent, this court must construe the briefing rules reasonably, yet liberally. See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h), 38.9; Republic Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Tex.2004). Substantial compliance with the briefing rules may be sufficient, and this court is not required to insist on unerring compliance with them. Bufkin v. State, 179 S.W.3d 166, 174 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005), aff'd, 207 S.W.3d 779 (Tex.Crim.App., 2006). Texas courts have embraced this liberal briefing standard largely because the proper objective of a reviewing court is to reach a just, fair, and equitable adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of substantive law. *122While well-organized and sharply focused writing is always appreciated, that is not the standard by which we determine the legal adequacy of appellate briefs. The Texas Supreme Court has set a far more forgiving standard, one that requires appellate courts to construe arguments liberally so that parties’ poor presentation of their appellate points does not result in a forfeiture of the opportunity for a merits review.
Ideally, an appellant’s brief should contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h). We must interpret this requirement reasonably and liberally. See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h), 38.9; Mex-Tex, Inc., 150 S.W.3d at 427; see also Tribble & Stephens Co. v. RGM Constructors, L.P., 154 S.W.3d 639, 675 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (plurality op.) (construing appellate brief liberally as asserting that contract was ambiguous even though brief did not state that contract was ambiguous). Applying these standards in construing Tello’s appellate brief, this court should discern, at a minimum, an argument challenging the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the movants, the Bank One Entities, on their contract claim.
Under the applicable standard of review, we must take as true all evidence favorable to Tello and make all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Dolcefino v. Randolph, 19 S.W.3d 906, 916 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). Thus, in evaluating the propriety of summary judgment, we must consider the following facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom:
Tello, who speaks Spanish but does not read or speak English, went to Randall Reed Ford in May 1999, to buy a truck. He signed a contract, written in English, which he believed to be an agreement to purchase the vehicle, based on conversations he had with the Spanish-speaking salesman. However, the contract he signed was a lease agreement and he unknowingly had agreed to lease — not buy— the truck. The lease identified an assign-ee, Bank One Texas Leasing Corporation, to whom monthly payments were to be made. Tello made monthly payments on the truck for the next three years. Then one day he called to find out the outstanding balance and was told that he had not bought the truck but had leased it instead. While still current in his payments, in July 2002, Tello returned the truck to Randall Reed Ford, and continued to make payments on it through September 2002.
In his sixth issue, Tello asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because, under the applicable standard of review, Tello’s affidavit raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the amount of contract damages for which he is hable to the Bank One Entities. Tello points to his testimony that, after he learned the agreement he signed was a lease and not a sales contract, he returned the vehicle to Randall Reed Ford. Tello then asserts that (1) “[t]he motion for summary judgment and its supporting evidence must show there is no genuine issue of a material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”; and (2) “[h]ad the trial court taken into account appellant’s claim that he returned the vehicle, the damages would be significantly decreased.” (citations omitted). Read liberally, Tello’s brief contains the argument that, based on his return of the truck three years after signing the contract and three months before he stopped making payments, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the Bank One Entities’ contract claim because their motion. and supporting evidence did not *123show that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law for the amount of damages awarded — more than $29,000, before attorney’s fees. Tello points to his summary-judgment proof that he returned the vehicle to Randall Reed Ford in July 2002, and asserts that, if this evidence is true (and we must presume that it is), then the damages would be significantly decreased.
The majority reaches the wrong conclusion — that the Bank One Entities are entitled to summary judgment on their claim for contract damages — partly because it is asking (and then answering) the wrong question. The inquiry is not whether Tello defeated the Bank One Entities’ traditional summary-judgment motion but whether the Bank One Entities, as movants, established their entitlement to the amount of damages awarded as a matter of law. The majority erroneously frames the issue as one of Tello failing to establish an offset when it is actually a failure by the Bank One Entities to carry their summary-judgment burden — or even to present a prima facie case to recover the amount of damages awarded under the lease. Instead of faulting the movants (the Bank One Entities) for failing to show from their own summary-judgment proof how they arrived at the amount awarded, the majority criticizes the non-movant (Tello) for failing to “cite any authority or evidence to inform us why he was allegedly entitled to offset the Bank’s damages or otherwise defeat summary judgment.”1 The problem with the summary judgment is not what Tello failed to do in attacking it, but what the Bank One Entities failed to do in the first instance to prove their damages as a matter of law.
Recovery under a lease agreement is not automatic nor is there a universal measure of damages for breach. “The ultimate goal in measuring damages for a breach-of-contract claim is to provide just compensation for any loss or damage actually sustained as a result of the breach.” Mays v. Pierce, 203 S.W.3d 564, 577 (Tex.App.Houston[14th Dist.] 2006, pet. filed); Walden v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 97 S.W.3d 303, 328 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). Typically, the measure of damages in a breach-of-contract case is the benefit-of-the-bargain measure, the purpose of which is to restore the injured party to the economic position it would have been in had the contract been performed. Mays, 203 S.W.3d at 577; SAVA gumarska in kemijska industria d.d. v. Advanced Polymer Scis., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 304, 317 n. 6 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). Because the movants failed to show what the contract provides as the measure of their recovery (or to show from the terms of the contract that the damage calculations would not be impacted by the missing portions of the contract), the Bank One Entities failed to establish a prima facie case for the damages awarded, let alone establish their entitlement to damages as a matter of law.
This is not a suit on a sworn account in which the plaintiffs sworn and unrefuted assertion of the amount allegedly owed itself will constitute prima facie evidence of damages; rather, this is a breach-of-contract case in which the movants are required to prove them entitlement to damages by establishing the amount of those damages under the terms of the contract. See e.g. Park v. Swartz, 110 Tex. 564, 222 S.W. 156 (1920) (holding that plaintiff “pri-ma facie was entitled to as damages the amount which under the contract he would, presumably, have earned ... ^(emphasis added); Consol. Petroleum Partners, I, LLC v. Tindle, 168 S.W.3d 894, 900 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, no pet.) (determin*124ing damages based on “the amount of money to which [plaintiff] was entitled as reimbursement pursuant to the agreement”) (emphasis added); Garza v. Allied Fin. Co., 566 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ)(holding that summary-judgment evidence consisting of “the manager’s affidavit and copy of the note and security agreement present evidence establishing a prima facie case in a suit on a promissory note ... ”) (emphasis added); Hogar v. Texas Distrib., Inc., 560 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1977, writ refd n.r.e.)(holding summary-judgment proof sufficient in promissory note case after looking to the “face of the note” and determining the amount that was due thereon). The Bank One Entities not only failed to prove the terms of the lease agreement that would entitle them to the sums awarded, they omitted portions of it that are germane to their dispute with Tello and the proper calculation of damages flowing from his alleged failure to perform. As the movants, the Bank One Entities had to present evidence to support the damages they sought under the contract. They failed to satisfy this burden. It is simply not possible to tell from the Bank One Entities’ summary-judgment proof how much (if any) is owing under the lease. According to the Bank One Entities’ affidavit, the first payment Tello failed to make under the lease was the payment due in October 2002, three months after Tello returned the vehicle to Randall Reed Ford. While Randall Reed Ford is an entity distinct from the Bank One Entities, the lease agreement contains defined terms which include Randall Reed Ford and any party to whom the lease is assigned in its definition of “we,” “us,” and “our” as used in the lease. Furthermore, the lease states at least three times that there are additional terms and conditions on the reverse side of the pages of the lease, none of which are in our record. The lease portion that is in the record unambiguously states that the back of the lease document contains “additional information on early termination, ... late and default charges, ... and any security interest, if applicable.”2 Because our record does riot contain a copy of the reverse sides of these pages, this court is not aware — and presumably the trial court was not aware — of all of the terms of the lease, any one of which could undermine the damage calculation proffered by the Bank One Entities. The absence of the contract or other proof of its terms creates an ambiguity that cannot be resolved by turning to the summary-judgment proof before this court.
Because the part of the lease contained in the record does not address early termination, default, credits, or what happens if Tello returns the vehicle before expiration of the lease term, it provides no basis for determining the amounts owing, if any, under the lease. The Bank One Entities’ summary-judgment affidavit states the following:
• Tello missed at least six payments starting in October 2002.
• After all offsets, payments, and credits were allowed and applied, the outstanding balance on the lease including principal and interest was $25,693.46 as of January 14, 2003.
• Prejudgment interest has been accruing at the rate of six percent per annum, which equates to $4.22 per day.
However, there is no summary-judgment evidence addressing how credits are applied under the lease agreement or addressing the effect, if any, of Tello’s return of the vehicle in July 2002, on Tello’s liabil*125ity for various sums allegedly owing under the lease. The Bank One Entities asserted that they did not have the vehicle and that Tello had concealed it and refused to surrender possession of it to them. Nothing in their summary-judgment evidence shows that the Bank One Entities had knowledge of the truck’s whereabouts or its odometer reading. Therefore, the Bank One Entities have no way of knowing the amount of mileage on the truck to calculate any applicable mileage penalty. Based on the summary-judgment evidence and the parts of the lease the Bank One Entities did attach to their motion, Tello would owe only $9,870 (21 monthly payments of $470) plus a $850 return fee. Nonetheless, the trial court awarded the Assignee in excess of $29,000 in actual damages, even though this amount is not supported by the part of the contract contained in the summary-judgment evidence and even though the missing parts of the lease (like certain parts of it that are in the record) may use the term “we” or “us” for the person to whom the truck may be returned, which terms would include Randall Reed Ford.
Though an affidavit containing a statement of balance due can in some instances suffice to satisfy a movant’s summary-judgment burden, when, as in this case, the summary-judgment affidavit itself creates a fact question that cannot be resolved by turning to the summary-judgment proof, a material fact issue as to the measure of damages arises and precludes summary judgment. General Specialties, Inc. v. Charter Nat’l Bank-Houston, 687 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ) (ambiguous lump sum figure in suit for collection on note, that is unexplained by other summary-judgment proof raises fact issue precluding summary judgment); FFP Mktg. Co., Inc. v. Long Lane Master Trust IV, 169 S.W.3d 402, 411-12 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). Because the Bank One Entities did not prove up all of the terms of the lease on which they sought and obtained summary judgment, this court has no way of knowing the appropriate amount of damages for breach of the agreement or whether Tello’s return of the vehicle affected the calculation of damages under the Bank One Entities’ contract claim. These ambiguities cannot be resolved by turning to their summary-judgment proof. Thus, on a merits review, the summary-judgment evidence does not support the amount of damages the Bank One Entities sought and the trial court awarded. Therefore, even if Tello had not responded at all, it would not have been proper to grant summary judgment on the Bank One Entities’ breach-of-contract claim.
Moreover, even if the Bank One Entities had not failed in the first instance, they still would not be entitled to summary judgment because Tello raised a fact issue as to the proper amount of damages based on his affidavit demonstrating he returned the leased vehicle and received no credit for it. Summary judgment is not proper because Tello raised a fact issue that had the Bank One Entities calculated the sums they claim are owing in accordance with the lease agreement, the amount of damages awarded would have been less. In Tello’s words, “[h]ad the trial court taken into account appellant’s claim that he returned the vehicle, the damages would be significantly decreased,”3 (citations omitted).
For these reasons, the Bank One Entities did not prove their entitlement to summary judgment on their contract claim as a matter of law. See McCulley Fine Arts Gallery, Inc. v. “X” Partners, 860 S.W.2d *126473, 478 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, no writ) (reversing summary judgment based on failure to prove contract claim as a matter of law). This court should sustain Tello’s sixth issue, reverse the summary judgment as to the Bank One Entities’ contract claim against Tello, sever, and remand for further proceedings. Because it does not, I respectfully dissent.

. See majority opinion, at 118.

. Emphasis added.

. Emphasis added.