Court Opinion

ID: 9956281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 17:11:09.964732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.155115
License: Public Domain

J-A28030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CE'JII KANO CAMPBELL                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 360 EDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 5, 2023
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-23-CR-0005154-2021

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                                FILED APRIL 1, 2024

       Appellant, Ce’jii Kano Campbell, appeals from the January 5, 2023

judgment of sentence imposing an aggregate 30 to 60 months of incarceration

for firearms not to be carried without a license and possession of a firearm

prohibited. After review, we affirm.

       The trial court summarized the pertinent facts:

       [O]n October 5, 2021, at approximately 6:00 p.m., [Officer
       Geoffrey Walls] was on patrol near the intersection of West Third
       and Thurlow Streets in the City of Chester. At the time of this
       incident, Officer Walls had been a patrol officer in the City of
       Chester for more than three years.        The area around the
       intersection of West Third and Thurlow Streets is a high-crime
       area known for violent crime and open-air drug sales. Officer
       Walls, himself, previously witnessed a shootout at this same
       intersection.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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      While on patrol on October 5, 2021, Officer Walls observed
      Appellant Ce’Jii Campbell standing [] by the intersection wearing
      a ski mask. Officer Walls described the ski mask as a “full mask”
      that covered his entire face except his eyes. At the time, the
      outdoor temperature was 66 degrees Fahrenheit. The weather did
      not require thermal protection from a ski mask. Obviously, the
      ski mask was worn for some other purpose.              During his
      employment as a Chester Police Officer, Officer Walls had
      previously encountered individuals wearing ski masks and those
      individuals were commonly involved in robberies, shootings, and
      homicides.

      Appellant was seen approaching an occupied vehicle while
      grasping his waistband in a manner Officer Walls recognized from
      his training and experience as indicative of a person carrying an
      illegal firearm. When Appellant noticed Officer Walls, he stepped
      out of the street and positioned himself in such a way that a car
      was between him and Officer Walls, blocking Walls’ view. Officer
      Walls got out of his patrol vehicle which prompted Appellant to
      begin walking away from the intersection. As Appellant walked
      away, he was manipulating an object in his jacket pocket and was
      continually looking back at Officer Walls while positioning part of
      his body away from the officer. Officer Walls demonstrated the
      maneuver and described it as “blading.” Based on Officer Walls’
      training and experience, he recognized the “blading” maneuver as
      consistent with a person in possession of an illegal firearm or other
      contraband and trying to obscure it from view.

      Based on Appellant wearing a ski mask in a high crime area during
      warm weather coupled with Appellant’s familiar “blading”
      maneuver, Officer Walls conducted an investigatory detention and
      pat down.     Upon performing the pat down, Officer Walls
      discovered a Glock .40 caliber handgun in Appellant’s waistband.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/23, at 3-5.

      Appellant filed a motion to suppress and argued that he was unlawfully

subjected to a stop and frisk. A suppression hearing was held, and the trial

court denied the motion. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which

was denied after oral argument. The parties proceeded to a stipulated bench

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trial wherein the trial court found Appellant guilty and sentenced him to an

aggregate term of 30 to 60 months of incarceration. This appeal followed.

      Appellant raises two issues for our review:

      1. Whether the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to
         suppress physical evidence and statements where appellant
         was seized in the absence of specific and articulable facts to
         support a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot
         and frisked in the absence of reasonable suspicion that he was
         armed and dangerous, in violation of the United States and
         Pennsylvania Constitutions?

      2. Whether the trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion to
         suppress physical evidence and statements where the search
         of appellant exceeded the scope of a permissible Terry frisk, in
         violation of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      It is well-settled that:

      [O]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s
      denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether
      the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the
      legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are
      bound by the suppression court’s factual findings so long as they
      are supported by the record; our standard of review on questions
      of law is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the
      ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
      of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense
      as remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression
      rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes
      evidence elicited at trial.

Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017) (internal

citations omitted).

      The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,

Section   8   of   the    Pennsylvania   Constitution   protect   citizens   against

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unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement. U.S. Const. amend.

IV; Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8. “To secure the right of citizens to be free from

unreasonable search and seizure, courts in Pennsylvania require law

enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify

their interactions with citizens to the extent those interactions compromise

individual liberty.”   Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 542 (Pa.

Super. 2019). There are three general levels of contact between the police

and citizens: (1) mere encounter; (2) investigative detention; and (3)

custodial arrest. Id. Here, both parties and the trial court agree that the

interaction was an investigative detention.

      An investigative detention “constitutes a seizure of a person, and to be

constitutionally valid police must have a reasonable suspicion that criminal

activity is afoot.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 A.3d 1195, 1199-1200

(Pa. 2019). For a stop and frisk to be constitutionally sound, the following

two conditions must be met:

      First, the investigatory stop must be lawful. That requirement is
      met in an on-the-street encounter … where the police officer
      reasonably suspects that the person apprehended is committing
      or has committed a criminal offense. Second, to proceed from a
      stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that the
      person is armed and dangerous.

Interest of T.W., 261 A.3d 409, 417 (Pa. 2021) (citing Arizona v. Johnson,

555 U.S. 323, 326-27 (2009)). While officer safety is a legitimate interest, it

only enters a Fourth Amendment analysis if the investigative detention was

supported by reasonable suspicion. Adams, 205 A.3 at 1204. “A contrary

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conclusion would eviscerate the Fourth Amendment since a concern for officer

safety is present in nearly all interactions police have with members of the

public.” Id. “Simply put, in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity justifying an investigative detention, officer safety is not a permissible

basis for police to seize an individual during a mere encounter.” Id.

      A   reasonable    suspicion   analysis   considers   the   totality   of   the

circumstances.    Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa.

2004). “[A]n investigative detention is constitutionally permissible if an officer

identifies “specific and articulable facts” that led the officer to believe that

criminal activity was afoot, considered in light of the officer’s training and

experience.” Adams, 205 A.3d at 1205. The test is not limited to facts that

clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rogers, 849 A.2d at 1189. “Rather, [e]ven

a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further

investigation by the police officer.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

      Recently, our appellate courts have cautioned that the characterization

of a neighborhood, i.e., high crime and/or high drug, should not be the

primary basis for reasonable suspicion. See Commonwealth v. Barr, 266

A.3d 25, 44 (Pa. 2021) (the fact that a traffic stop occurred in a high crime

area, without more, is not relevant to whether troopers had probable cause to

search the vehicle); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 951 (Pa. 2019)

(“Even taking into account the early morning hour and [the] characterization

of the neighborhood, there remains no particularized basis upon which to

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suspect that [defendant’s] mere possession of a concealed firearm was

unlawful”); Commonwealth v. Brown, 2020 WL 6335982 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(unpublished memorandum) (“while the police’s characterization of a

neighborhood may enhance suspicion if tied to some specific conduct by the

frisked individual, it does not carry much weight in and of itself”).

      Here, Walls testified that the reason he stopped Appellant was “due to

him possibly possessing contraband or a firearm.” N.T. Suppression, 5/18/22,

at 62. Walls stated the pat-down occurred because he believed Appellant “was

armed and possibly a danger to myself or others.” Id. at 27. This belief was

“due to how he was turning his body and avoiding me being able to see the

front of the waistband area.” Id. at 30. Walls explained that “it draws concern

when the person’s looking over their shoulder at me and I can’t view their

hands.” Id. at 52.

      The trial court found Walls had reasonable suspicion to conduct an

investigatory detention of Appellant. Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/23, at 6. First,

Appellant was wearing a ski mask in a high-crime area despite warm

temperatures, which is “indicative of a subject seeking to hide his identity.”

Id. Further, the trial court credited Walls’ testimony, based on his experience,

that wearing a ski mask was “indicative of Appellant engaging in criminal

activity.” Id. Second, the way Appellant grabbed his waistband while walking

to the parked vehicle in the street “was consistent with the officer’s past

experiences with armed subjects.”      Id.   Lastly, the way Appellant moved,

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described by Walls as “blading”, “was indicative of an individual attempting to

obscure contraband from the view of police according to Officer Walls’ training

and experience.” Id.

      Appellant argues Walls had no reasonable suspicion to believe that

criminal activity was afoot and did not articulate anything more than a

suspicion or hunch. He argues this case is analogous to Commonwealth v.

Anderson, 276 A.3d 282 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), where we held that

the facts did not support reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative

detention:

      (1) [defendant] was observed by the officers in a high crime area
      at 9:30 p.m.; (2) he was crawling on his hands and knees by a
      parked, albeit askew truck that was turned off; (3) when Officer
      McGowan first spoke with him and asked if he was okay,
      [defendant] said that he was looking for something; (4)
      [defendant] was first observed sweating profusely on a May night,
      when the temperature that day was 86 degrees; (5) Officer
      McGowan saw that the driver’s side window of the truck was down,
      which [] caused him to be curious that the driver was intoxicated
      or impaired, but Officer McGowan never intended to ask
      [defendant] if he was the driver or to find the driver; (6) the
      officers observed [defendant] go into the restaurant, pace around,
      and order a drink but not food; (7) [defendant] came out of the
      restaurant, looked at the officers, and then turned right and
      walked off; (8) the officer did not perceive any indication that
      [defendant] was in an intoxicated state; and (9) as the trial court
      points out, there was no testimony that [defendant] made any
      furtive movements or that Officer McGowan felt his safety was at
      issue.

Anderson, 276 A.3d at 297. In holding that the officer did not possess the

requisite reasonable suspicion, we explained:

      Officer McGowan repeatedly testified that he was “curious” of the
      circumstances, that things seemed a little bit “unusual,” and that

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      something was off. However, as noted above, an officer “must be
      able to articulate something more than an inchoate and
      unparticularized suspicion or hunch.”      [United States v.
      Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)]
      (citations and quotation marks omitted). Officer McGowan’s
      testimony amounted to nothing more than a “hunch” that
      something was amiss as his “reasonable suspicion” belief
      stemmed from the fact that they were in a high crime area, the
      truck was not parked properly even though he never connected
      [defendant] with the vehicle, the fact that the windows were
      down, and [defendant’s] state of profuse sweating.

Id. at 297-298.

      We distinguished Anderson from Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d

765 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), one of the cases relied upon by the

Commonwealth.     In Carter, we found there was reasonable suspicion to

believe criminal activity was afoot where:

      [defendant] was in a high-crime area, at night, with a weighted
      and angled bulge in his coat pocket. Furthermore, [defendant]
      was alerted to the officers’ presence and intentionally turned his
      body away from them, at least three times, to conceal the bulge.
      The officers also observed [defendant] walking away from the
      known drug corner whenever the officer’s passed by it.

Carter, 105 A.3d at 775. We explained the distinction:

      Officer McGowan did not testify that he observed a bulge in
      [defendant’s] clothing or that his clothing appeared to be weighted
      down. He also never testified that when [defendant] stood up after
      crawling on the ground, he observed [defendant] attempting to
      conceal an item in his pants. Rather, Officer McGowan stated that
      after questioning [defendant], he made the decision to search –
      first the pat down [defendant’s] pockets which revealed nothing,
      and then the sweep over [defendant’s] groin area where he felt a
      bulge. The officer never testified that [defendant] was carrying
      anything in his hands that was suspicious, that he saw [defendant]
      engaging in criminal activity, or that he was concerned for his own
      safety.

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Anderson, 276 A.3d at 298.

      We find this case more analogous to Carter than to Anderson.

Appellant was in a high-crime area in the evening. N.T. Suppression, 5/18/22,

at 19. The temperature was around 66 degrees, unusually warm for October.

Id. at 22. Walls was on routine patrol and while driving west on Third Street

approached a vehicle stopped at the intersection of Third and Thurlow Streets.

Id. at 23, 59. Appellant approached the vehicle on the driver’s side while

holding his waistband area with his hand. Id. at 23. Based on his training

and experience, Walls testified that people who hold their waistbands while

fleeing are typically carrying an illegal firearm or trying to conceal an item.

Id. at 23-24.

      Appellant was wearing an overcoat, camouflage pants and a ski mask

that covered his entire face.   Id. at 20.   Walls testified that based on his

experience, people wear ski masks when they commit crimes, such as

robberies, shootings or homicides.    Id. at 22.   When Appellant saw Walls’

vehicle, he walked to the sidewalk, put his left hand in his pocket and moved

his hand around. Id. at 24-25. Appellant then walked behind a vehicle, only

allowing Walls to see his upper chest and head. Id. at 25-26. Upon seeing

Walls exit his vehicle, Appellant turned and walked away, concealing the front

of his body, while looking back over his shoulder at Walls. Id. at 27. Walls

said this behavior is commonly known as “blading” and he frequently sees this

behavior when someone is carrying contraband or an illegal firearm. Id. at

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30. Walls “moved quickly” to catch up to Appellant, touched Appellant from

behind, asked him to remove his hands and conducted a pat down search.

Id. at 30, 61-62.

      Based on the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the trial court

that Walls identified specific and articulable facts which provided reasonable

suspicion to conduct an investigative detention. Adams, supra. Appellant

was wearing a full ski-mask on a day where the temperatures did not require

it, in a high-crime area. His movements were indicative of someone carrying

an illegal firearm and upon noticing Walls, walked away and attempted to

conceal the front of his body.   Moreover, based on Walls’ experience and

Appellant’s movements, we agree with the trial court that Walls reasonably

believed Appellant was armed and dangerous, justifying a frisk. Interest of

T.W., supra. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion

to suppress. Yandamuri, supra.

      In the second issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress because the search exceeded the scope of a

Terry frisk.   The Commonwealth contends this issue is waived because

Appellant failed to raise it in his motion to suppress. We agree.

      A suppression motion “shall state specifically and with particularity the

evidence sought to be suppressed, the grounds for the suppression, and the

facts and events in support thereof.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(D). “Thus, when a

defendant’s motion to suppress does not assert specifically the grounds for

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suppression, he or she cannot later complain that the Commonwealth failed

to   address    a    particular    theory      never    expressed   in   that   motion.”

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1242 (Pa. Super. 2015).

Additionally, an appellant’s brief must state where the issue was preserved in

the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c).

       Nowhere in his motion to suppress did Appellant claim that the search

exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk. Specifically, he argued:

       Because there was no justifiable specific and articulable reasons
       for Officer Walls to conclude that petitioner was both armed and
       dangerous, the stop, frisk and seizure violated petitioner’s rights
       under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments the United States
       Constitution, as well as his rights under Article I Section 8 of the
       Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Motion to Suppress, 3/15/22, ¶ 7. Moreover, Appellant’s brief does not state

where and how the issue was preserved.1 He argues that the Commonwealth

failed to present evidence to prove that the scope of the search was lawful.

Appellant’s Brief at 23-25. However, that is an incorrect statement of the law.

Appellant’s motion failed to state with particularity that he was challenging

the scope of the frisk, and he cannot now claim the Commonwealth failed to

address a theory that was never raised.                Therefore, the issue is waived.

Freeman, supra.

____________________________________________

1 Appellant also filed a reply brief but did not address the Commonwealth’s

contention that the issue was waived.

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      Even if the issue was not waived, Appellant would not be entitled to

relief. Appellant alternatively argues that if the investigatory detention was

lawful, Walls exceed the scope of a Terry frisk because there was no evidence

that what Walls felt in Appellant’s waistband was a weapon. Appellant’s Brief

at 23. Our Supreme Court held:

      If a police officer conducting a lawful Terry frisk detects an object
      within a suspect’s clothing, assuming no other exception to the
      general warrant requirement applies, the officer may remove the
      object under one of two justifications. Pursuant to Terry, and
      consistent with … Taylor, a police officer may remove an object
      from within a suspect’s clothing under the reasonable suspicion
      that the object is a weapon. If, however, during the frisk the
      police officer is able to determine that the object is not a weapon,
      pursuant to Dickerson, the officer may only remove the object if,
      by touch, it is immediately apparent that the object is illegal
      contraband.

Interest of T.W., 261 A.3d at 422. We apply a reasonable suspicion standard

to determine whether an officer exceeded the scope of a lawful Terry frisk.

Id. at 423. In Interest of T.W., our Supreme Court found the following facts

“would allow a reasonably prudent person to suspect that the object in

[a]ppellant’s left pants pocket was a weapon: (1) appellant was a passenger

in a high-speed chase; (2) in a high crime area; (3) once the vehicle stopped,

appellant shielded his body from officers; and (4) appellant reached into his

pocket after being told not to. Id. at 424.

      Similarly, as discussed supra, Walls identified specific and articulable

facts to believe that Appellant was carrying a firearm. Appellant’s movements

were indicative of someone illegally carrying a firearm, and Walls’ frisk was

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limited to the area that he suspected the firearm to be. Thus, we find Walls

did not exceed the scope of the Terry frisk because he had reasonable

suspicion to believe the object was a firearm. Interest of T.W., supra.

     Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not err in denying

Appellant’s motion to suppress and affirm the judgment of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 4/1/2024

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