Court Opinion

ID: 9918464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-13 01:00:44.89809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:39.357981
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40301         Document: 00517032268             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                               FILED
                                                                           January 12, 2024
                                       No. 22-40301
                                                                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Frances Salinas De Leon,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 7:19-CR-1502-2
                      ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Haynes and Duncan, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          In 2021, Frances Salinas De Leon entered a plea agreement for her
   role in defrauding the City of Le Joya, Texas. At sentencing, the district court
   orally pronounced De Leon’s term of imprisonment, adopted the standard
   supervised-release conditions listed in a court-wide standing order, and
   stated the total amounts owed in restitution and forfeiture. Six days later, the

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 22-40301

   district court entered a written judgment that appeared to be inconsistent
   with the oral pronouncements. De Leon timely appealed. For the reasons
   set forth below, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
                                         I
          Frances Salinas De Leon and her codefendants, who included her
   father, who was the mayor of the City of La Joya, Texas, defrauded that city
   and other entities. For example, loans were made by one of those entities,
   the Le Joya Economic Development Corporation (EDC), for community
   projects. Invoices for the costs of construction for certain of those projects
   were inflated, and when checks written by EDC to pay the invoices were
   cashed, kickbacks to De Leon were paid from the loan funds. In 2021,
   pursuant to a plea agreement, De Leon pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
   commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349.
          As stated in the plea agreement, De Leon agreed to make several
   restitution payments—to be determined by the district court—to the four
   entities harmed by her conduct. First, De Leon agreed to restitution to the
   La Joya EDC in an unspecified amount based on the offense of conviction.
   Second, De Leon agreed to make a restitution payment to the City of La Joya
   in an amount not to exceed $22,000. Third, De Leon agreed to restitution in
   an amount not to exceed $23,386 to the U.S. Department of Housing and
   Urban Development (HUD), which had funded loans made by EDC. Finally,
   De Leon agreed to restitution to the La Joya Housing Authority Non-Profit
   (HAN) in an amount not to exceed $26,641. She also agreed to forfeit to the
   United States an amount not to exceed $105,000, in accordance with the
   district court’s findings.

          At sentencing, the district court adopted the factual findings included
   in the presentence report (PSR), which included an appendix setting forth
   the proposed mandatory and standard conditions for supervised release. The

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   district court identified the total loss from De Leon’s fraudulent activity to
   be $280,531.26 and ordered restitution in that amount. The court found that
   the loss to La Joya EDC was $200,000, the loss to the City of La Joya was
   $22,000, and the loss to the “Le Joya Housing Authority” was $58,531.26.
   The court found that De Leon’s conduct merited a sentence above the
   guidelines range and sentenced De Leon to 39 months in prison. The district
   court also ordered three years of supervised release and stated that De Leon
   had to comply with the “binding mandatory conditions required by law” and
   with the “standard conditions adopted by this Court.”1                  As a special
   condition, the district court pronounced that it was requiring De Leon to
   “participate in a mental health program until she completes that program
   with the approval of a Probation Officer and the program director.”
          In addition to pronouncing De Leon’s prison sentence and adopting
   the standard supervised-release conditions, the district court pronounced
   forfeiture in the amount of $61,500. Six days later, the district court entered
   a written judgment that appeared to be inconsistent with the oral
   pronouncements. The written judgment included joint-and-several liability
   for the restitution obligation and detailed an unspecified amount regarding
   forfeiture. It also included the standard conditions listed in a court-wide
   standing order.2 De Leon timely appealed.3

          _____________________
          1
            These standard conditions are listed in a court-wide and public standing order.
   See U.S. Southern District of Texas General Order No. 2017-01 (Jan. 6, 2017),
   https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/file/3945/download?token=GAvFAGlJ.
          2
              Id.
          3
              See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A).

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                                                  II
           Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to be present at
   sentencing.4 For this reason, the district court must orally pronounce the
   defendant’s sentence in the defendant’s presence.5 When there is a conflict
   between the oral sentence and written judgment, the oral pronouncement
   controls, and the judgment must be amended to conform with the oral
   sentence.6 However, when there is only an ambiguity between the oral and
   written sentences, this court must review the record and determine the
   appropriate sentence by discerning the intent of the sentencing court.7
           On appeal, De Leon challenges three aspects of her written
   judgment—all of which relate to alleged conflicts between the oral
   pronouncement and written judgment. First, she argues that the district
   court failed to properly pronounce the standard conditions of supervised
   release included in the judgment. Second, she maintains that the inclusion
   of joint-and-several restitution liability in the written judgment directly
   conflicts with the orally pronounced sentence. Third, she contends that
   there is a conflict between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment
   as to her forfeiture obligation.
                                                  A
           De Leon asserts that the standard conditions of her supervised release
   were not orally pronounced at sentencing and must be removed from the

           _____________________
           4
            United States v. Vega, 332 F.3d 849, 852 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citing
   United States v. Martinez, 250 F.3d 941, 941 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)); see also Fed. R.
   Crim. P. 43(a)(3) (“[T]he defendant must be present at . . . sentencing.”).
           5
               United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
           6
               Id.; United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2020).
           7
               United States v. Vasquez-Puente, 922 F.3d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 2019).

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   written judgment. She maintains that fifteen conditions included in the
   written judgment did not satisfy the pronouncement requirement.
   Generally, any supervised release condition not required by 18 U.S.C.
   § 3583(d) is considered discretionary and must be orally pronounced at
   sentencing.8 The district court is not required to recite these conditions
   “word-for-word.”9 But, as we explained in United States v. Diggles,10 the
   district court must pronounce the discretionary conditions in some form to
   allow for objection.11
          Before assessing the merits of De Leon’s claim, we must determine
   the appropriate standard of review.                   When a defendant objects to her
   supervised release conditions for the first time on appeal, as in the present
   case, the standard of review depends on whether she had a chance to object
   in the district court.12 The chance to object exists when the court notifies a
   defendant at sentencing that conditions are being imposed.13 If the defendant
   had the chance to object, this court reviews for plain error only; if the
   defendant did not, this court reviews for abuse of discretion.14
          Here, De Leon received notice of the supervised release conditions
   and had the opportunity to object. An appendix to the PSR stated that
   “[w]hile on a term of supervised release or probation, the defendant shall
   comply with the following applicable mandatory conditions and all standard

          _____________________
          8
               See, e.g., Diggles, 957 F.3d at 557-59.
          9
               Grogan, 977 F.3d at 352-53.
          10
               957 F.3d 551, 557-59 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
          11
               Id. at 559-60.
          12
               United States v. Martinez, 47 F.4th 364, 366 (5th Cir. 2022).
          13
               Id. at 367.
          14
               See id. at 366; Grogan, 977 F.3d at 352.

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   conditions of supervision that have been adopted by the Court as well as any
   additional special conditions.” That appendix listed ten “mandatory”
   conditions, thirteen “standard” conditions, and one “special” condition of
   supervised release.          The special condition pertained to mental health
   treatment and included a justification for imposition of that condition based
   on De Leon’s specific history. The “mandatory” and “standard” conditions
   of supervised release contained in the appendix tracked those contained in a
   district-wide standing order.
          The PSR was disclosed four times to De Leon before the sentencing
   hearing. At the hearing, the district court pronounced that “[De Leon is] to
   comply with the standard conditions adopted by this Court or by binding
   mandatory conditions required by law.” As we explained in Diggles, “[a]
   standing order provides advance notice of possible conditions . . . . And the
   in-court adoption of those conditions is when [a] defendant can object.” 15
   We have further explained that the district court may adopt the standard
   conditions set forth in a standing order via a “shorthand reference” at
   sentencing.16 In this case, the existence of a court-wide standing order in the
   Southern District of Texas,17 combined with the district court’s
   pronouncement at sentencing, gave De Leon notice of the standard
   conditions and afforded her the opportunity to object when the conditions

          _____________________
          15
               Diggles, 957 F.3d at 561.
          16
               See, e.g., United States v. Vargas, 23 F.4th 526, 528 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam).
          17
            U.S. Southern District of Texas General Order No. 2017-01 (Jan. 6, 2017),
   https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/file/3945/download?token=GAvFAGlJ.

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   were adopted.18 Accordingly, we review her challenge for plain error only.19
   A standard that “is difficult to overcome.”20
           De Leon must show that a clear or obvious error with the oral
   pronouncement affected her substantial rights.21 In doing so, she contends
   the district court failed to pronounce the standard conditions adequately.
   She maintains that the district court did not ensure that she had an
   opportunity to read and review the conditions with counsel. In response, the
   Government argues that the district court satisfied the pronouncement
   requirement by adopting the court-wide standing order in De Leon’s
   presence.
           The Government is correct. The district court is not required to recite
   the standard supervised release conditions verbatim.22 A district court
   satisfies the pronouncement requirement by, inter alia, referring to a list of
   recommended conditions and ensuring that the defendant had the chance to
   review the list.23 Here, the district court did just that. In imposing the
   supervised release conditions, the district court stated that De Leon had to
   comply with “the standard conditions adopted by this Court.” Given the

           _____________________
           18
                See Vargas, 23 F.4th at 528; Diggles, 957 F.3d at 561; Grogan, 977 F.3d at 352.
           19
             See United States v. Martinez, 15 F.4th 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Because the
   court told [defendant] it was imposing ‘standard conditions,’ he had notice and an
   opportunity to object . . . .”); United States v. Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th 292, 297 (5th Cir.
   2023) (“Because [defendant] did not object when the district court pronounced that it was
   imposing the standard and mandatory conditions, [defendant] forfeited his objection.”).
           20
                Diggles, 957 F.3d at 559 (internal quotation marks omitted).
           21
             See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); United States v. Escajeda,
   8 F.4th 423, 426 (5th Cir. 2021).
           22
                Grogan, 977 F.3d at 352-53.
           23
              See Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560-64 & n.5; United States v. Martinez, 47 F.4th 364, 367
   (5th Cir. 2022).

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   existence of the Southern District’s standing order, it reasonably could be
   understood that the standard conditions being imposed were the ones listed
   in the order.24 After all, at the time of De Leon’s sentence, the Southern
   District’s standing order had been in existence for over five years.25
           De Leon argues that the district court did not satisfy the
   pronouncement requirement because it failed to confirm that she read and
   reviewed the conditions included in the PSR appendix. But this misstates the
   pronouncement rule established in United States v. Diggles.26 The district
   court is not obligated to ask the defendant specifically whether she read and
   reviewed the discretionary conditions included in the adopted document.27
   Instead, the court “must ensure . . . that the defendant had an opportunity to
   review [the conditions] with counsel.”28                 Because of the longstanding
   existence of the court-wide standing order and the listed conditions included
   in the PSR appendix, De Leon had that opportunity.
           Indeed, our recent decision in United States v. Baez-Adriano29 clarified
   the implication of an in-court adoption of a court-wide standing order.

           _____________________
           24
              See Martinez, 15 F.4th at 1181 (“Given the longstanding existence of the Western
   District's standing order, defense counsel certainly knew that the standard conditions being
   imposed were the ones listed in the standing order . . . .”); United States v. Vargas, 23 F.4th
   526, 528-29 (5th Cir. 2022); Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th at 297.
           25
            U.S. Southern District of Texas General Order No. 2017-01 (Jan. 6, 2017),
   https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/file/3945/download?token=GAvFAGlJ.
           26
                Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560.
           27
             See Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th at 301; United States v. Chavez, No. 20-50550, 2022
   WL 767033, at *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 14, 2022) (unpublished) (affirming even where the district
   court never referred to the standing order or confirmed that defendant had reviewed it with
   counsel).
           28
                Diggles, 957 F.3d at 561 n.5 (emphasis added).
           29
                Baez-Adriano, 74 F.4th at 298-302.

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   There, we noted: “if the conditions imposed in the written judgment match
   those in the standing order, a district court need only orally reference the
   standard conditions to satisfy the pronouncement requirement.”30 Put
   differently, when the district court adopts a court-wide standing order in the
   defendant’s presence, it satisfies the oral-pronouncement requirement. De
   Leon has not demonstrated the district court plainly erred by including those
   same standard conditions in the written judgment.
                                                B
           De Leon next argues that the written judgment conflicts with the oral
   sentence as to the restitution award. In short, she argues that the written
   judgment details her restitution obligation as being joint and several, but the
   district court did not pronounce at sentencing that joint-and-several liability
   would be imposed. De Leon raises this issue for the first time on appeal, for
   the simple reason that she had no opportunity at sentencing to object to the
   joint-and-several liability later included in the written judgment.
   Accordingly, we review the court’s imposition for an abuse of discretion. 31
           At sentencing, the district court pronounced that De Leon’s
   restitution amount was $280,531.26. The district court did not state the
   restitution obligation was joint and several.              Nevertheless, the written
   judgment specifies that De Leon’s restitution obligation is joint and several
   with her codefendants, Jose Adolfo Salinas and Ramiro Alaniz.

           _____________________
           30
                Id. at 301.
           31
              See United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v.
   Adams, 363 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Once we have determined that an award of
   restitution is permitted by the appropriate law, we review the propriety of a particular
   award for an abuse of discretion.”) (citation omitted).

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           The threshold question is whether the discrepancy between the oral
   pronouncement and the written judgment presents a conflict or “merely an
   ambiguity.”32 In general, a conflict exists if the written judgment “broadens
   the restrictions or requirements of supervised release”33 or “impos[es] a
   more burdensome requirement” than that of the oral pronouncement.34
   Here, the Government contends that De Leon’s written judgment containing
   joint-and-several liability is not “more burdensome” than the oral
   pronouncement. It argues that joint-and-several liability as to De Leon’s
   $280,531.26 restitution amount is in fact beneficial to the defendant. This is
   because her codefendants could, in theory, pay portions of the amount and
   lessen De Leon’s total liability. Accordingly, the Government maintains
   there is no conflict between the written judgment and oral pronouncement.
           We agree that the inclusion of joint-and-several-liability neither
   broadens the burden of the condition of supervised release nor imposes a
   more burdensome requirement. De Leon could only benefit from the shared
   liability included in the written judgment.35
           Our court has previously recognized that a conflict exists in the
   converse scenario.36 When the district court orally pronounced joint-and-

           _____________________
           32
                See United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2006).
           33
              Id. (noting that a conflict exists “[i]f the written judgment broadens the
   restrictions or requirements of supervised release from an oral pronouncement”).
           34
            Bigelow, 462 F.3d at 383 (explaining that there is a conflict when the burden
   imposed by the written sentence exceeds that of the orally pronounced sentence).
           35
              By way of example, she either would remain liable for the entire amount of
   restitution ordered if her codefendants paid nothing or her obligation would be reduced by
   payments made by her codefendants.
           36
             See United States v. Podio, 672 F. App’x 487, 488-89 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
   (unpublished); see also United States v. Dillard, 83 F. App’x 678, 679 (5th Cir. 2003) (per
   curiam) (unpublished) (remanding for district court to amend judgment holding defendant

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   several liability but failed to include the shared liability in the written
   judgment, we noted that “a correction [was] warranted.”37 That is because
   in that case, the written judgment made the defendant solely liable and
   therefore did impose a more burdensome requirement.
                                                   C
           De Leon next maintains that there is a conflict between the oral
   pronouncement and the written judgment as to her forfeiture obligation. She
   argues that the district court ordered her at sentencing to forfeit a specific
   amount of money—$61,500—whereas the written judgment detailed no
   specific forfeiture responsibility. This court reviews the alleged error, which
   appeared initially in the judgment, for abuse of discretion.38
           The operative question is whether the discrepancy between the
   written judgment and oral pronouncement represents a conflict or
   ambiguity.39 The Government argues that the discrepancy is a reconcilable
   ambiguity. We agree. The judgment does not impose a more burdensome
   requirement or otherwise expand De Leon’s forfeiture obligation.40 Instead,
   it imposes a forfeiture amount that is ambiguously defined. This ambiguity

           _____________________
   liable for entire amount of a fine to conform to oral sentence holding defendant liable for
   only one half plus one cent of fine jointly and severally liable with codefendant).
           37
                Podio, 672 F. App’x at 489.
           38
              See, e.g., Bigelow, 462 F.3d at 381; United States v. Flores, 664 F. App’x 395, 397
   (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. De La Torre, 445 F. App’x 806, 807 (5th Cir. 2011).
           39
              See, e.g., United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2006); United States
   v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 935-36 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
           40
              See Bigelow, 462 F.3d at 381 (explaining that there is a conflict when the burden
   imposed by the written sentence exceeds that of the orally pronounced sentence); Mireles,
   471 F.3d at 558 (noting that a conflict exists “[i]f the written judgment broadens the
   restrictions or requirements of supervised release from an oral pronouncement”).

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   can be resolved by reviewing the record and identifying the intent of the
   district court.41
           We start with the written judgment.                   The judgment effectively
   incorporated the forfeiture provision included in the plea agreement. That
   provision stated that De Leon had to forfeit the amount determined by the
   district court—limiting the amount to a maximum of $105,000. Next, we
   turn to the district court’s forfeiture calculation. At sentencing, the district
   court determined the forfeiture obligation and pronounced it to be $61,500,
   quantifying the to-be-determined-amount in the plea agreement provision.
   Accordingly, when analyzing the record wholistically, the district court’s
   intent becomes abundantly clear. The judgment, by citing to the forfeiture
   provision included in the plea agreement, ordered De Leon to forfeit the
   amount pronounced at sentencing—$61,500.                      In other words, the oral
   sentence provides the necessary context for resolving the ambiguity found in
   the written judgment. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
   discretion. De Leon’s forfeiture obligation is $61,500.
           The ambiguity presented here would typically be treated as a clerical
   error correctable under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.42
                                          *        *         *
           For the foregoing reasons, we REMAND for the district court to
   correct the written judgment to conform with its oral pronouncement that
   De Leon’s forfeiture obligation is $61,500. We AFFIRM all other aspects
           _____________________
           41
                See United States v. Vasquez-Puente, 922 F.3d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 2019).
           42
               See Fed. R. Crim. P. 36; United States v. Nagin, 810 F.3d 348, 353-54 (5th
   Cir. 2016) (recognizing that Rule 36 is a proper way to address the failure of the judgment
   to reflect the oral sentence); see also United States v. Quintero, 572 F.3d 351, 353 (7th Cir.
   2009) (“[T]he failure to include forfeiture in a judgment, that everyone intended to be
   included, constitutes a clerical error, correctable under Rule 36.”).

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   of the district court’s judgment.

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