Court Opinion

ID: 9939371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 21:00:44.174832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:00.180615
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4705

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        BREYCI VILLAREAL,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:16-cr-00002-WO-1)

        Submitted: October 31, 2023                                       Decided: February 8, 2024

        Before WILKINSON, QUATTLEBAUM, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Michael W. Patrick, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL W. PATRICK, Chapel
        Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. Margaret McCall Reece, Assistant United States
        Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
        Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Breyci Villareal appeals the district court’s judgment and commitment order

        revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 24 months’ imprisonment with no

        additional supervised release. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,

        386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but

        questioning whether the court exceeded the maximum allowable term of imprisonment.

        The Government did not file a response. Although informed of his right to file a pro se

        supplemental brief, Villareal has not done so. We affirm.

               The district court may revoke supervised release if it “finds by a preponderance of

        the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C.

        § 3583(e)(3). This Court reviews a district court’s revocation decision for abuse of

        discretion and its factual findings underlying the revocation for clear error. United States v.

        Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015). We conclude that there was no error in the

        court’s decision to revoke Villareal’s supervised release.

               “A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of

        supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will

        affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not ‘plainly

        unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006)).

        “[W]e first consider whether the sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively

        unreasonable. Only if we find the sentence unreasonable must we decide whether it is

        plainly so.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We generally employ the

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        same procedural and substantive considerations that guides our review of original

        sentences. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.

               “A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately

        explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding

        Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United

        States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (footnotes omitted); see 18 U.S.C.

        § 3583(e) (listing relevant factors). “[A] revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if

        the court sufficiently states a proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant should

        receive the sentence imposed.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

               We conclude that that the 24-month sentence, the statutory maximum, is both

        procedurally and substantively reasonable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), United States v.

        Harris, 878 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2017). When imposing Villareal’s revocation sentence,

        the district court correctly calculated the policy statement range of imprisonment,

        considered the relevant statutory factors, imposed a sentence within the statutory

        maximum, gave sufficiently detailed reasons for its decision, and addressed Villareal’s

        argument for a lower sentence.

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in its entirety and found

        no meritorious grounds for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s revocation

        judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Villareal, in writing, of the right to

        petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Villareal requests

        that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then

        counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s

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        motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Villareal. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                     AFFIRMED

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