Court Opinion

ID: 9715160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:56:08.043781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:32.156326
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring.
The instant case involves the question of whether appellant’s statement that he had shot the deputy sheriff, made en route to jail, was properly admitted in evidence. I join in the judgment of the Court, but find it necessary to further examine the question of whether it may be properly considered a volunteered statement, and thus beyond the purview of the case of Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 463, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
Two slightly divergent descriptions of the events occurring between the time appellant was arrested in the housing subdivision and the time he arrived at the Morgan County jail are presented in the record. Officer Katter presented one, the one relied upon mainly and quoted in the majority opinion. Officer Strader presented another. After Katter and Strader took appellant into custody in the subdivision, Strader read a complete advisement of Miranda rights to appellant from a card, identified at trial as State’s Exhibit 67, and introduced into evidence at trial. Appellant was in the police car in the front seat alongside Strader, and Officer Katter was in the rear seat. During the travel from that point to the jail, Officer Strader was always in a better position to hear and observe appellant than was Officer Katter.
The car in which the three were traveling passed out of the housing subdivision, turned left and travelled a few hundred feet when it was stopped for a few mo*744ments by a police roadblock which had been set up to protect the scene of the shooting of the deputy sheriff. The car then proceeded on through the roadblock, past the car in which the deputy sheriff had been driving. It was during this very short period of time that appellant allegedly made the challenged incriminating admissions.
Regarding these statements, Officer Kat-ter testified as follows:
“Q. While you were in the area of that Deputy’s car, did Mr. Cobb say anything to you?
A. Mr. Cobb said, there’s that Deputy’s car. At this time Officer Strader said-let me retract that. Mr. Cobb said, there’s that sheriff’s car. At this time Officer Strader said, what about that sheriff, what happened and the reply to that was he pointed a gun at me and I shot him.”
This version of the conversation places appellant in the position of answering a specific question posed by Officer Strader and places in considerable doubt the issue of whether the incriminating response can justly be considered a volunteered statement. During cross-examination this officer stated that he had made no notes regarding this conversation and that he did not recall the exact conversation.
Officer Strader on the other hand testified that as the three approached the exit from the subdivision he asked which way he should turn to get to the Morgan County jail and Katter motioned from the back seat for him to turn left. As he did so, appellant then made the first incriminating statement:
“Q. What did he say?
A. Said the bank wasn’t in Morgan County, was in Johnson County.”
The car proceeded on and in short order through the roadblock and past the deputy sheriff’s car. Strader continued his testimony:
“Q. When was the next time anybody in the car made a statement?
A. Shortly after that, right after we had passed that area there.
Q. And ,who made a statement?
A. Mr. Cobb.
Q. What did he say?
A. He said I know why you’re taking me to Morgan County now, he said, it was because of that sheriff I shot.
Q. Did you ask him anything at that time?
A. No.
Q. Was anything else said at that time?
A. No.”
According to this version of events, appellant’s admission that he had shot the deputy sheriff, tantamount to a complete confession of the killing, was not made in response to any inquiry by Officer Strader, but to his sight of the victim’s auto. It is apparent that the testimony of Strader, if believed, would support the conclusion that appellant’s statement was volunteered, and was therefore admissible without proof of compliance with the requirements of Miranda governing the use by the State of the fruits of custodial interrogation.
PRENTICE, J., concurs.