Court Opinion

ID: 9693703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:57:36.83002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:17.089875
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent because several factors prompt me to conclude that plain error was committed here.
In my dissent in State v. Ross, 152 Vt. 462, 474, 568 A.2d 335, 342 (1989), I stated in describing the plain error doctrine:
The first requirement recognizes that a trial judge cannot reasonably be expected sua sponte to correct an error unless the error is an obvious one. The second requirement emphasizes only that an error will not be deemed plain unless it is very serious or very prejudicial....
The Court fails to address why DeJoinville, Catsam, Hicks, Recor, and Ross — all decided before trial of this defendant in October 1989 — did not cause the analysis of expert-comment-on-victim-credibility, by then sufficiently evolved, to be recognized as plain error. The Court’s reliance on these cases as precedents for absence of plain error is tantamount to indelibly labeling this type of error never plain. Evolution of our case law in this area should make errors plain that once were not, and the Court’s approach reverses that evolution.
I think that plain-error analysis is so fact-based that prior cases about plain error are relatively weak indicators. There*190fore the decision about plain error must turn largely on the facts of each case. Here, the Court does not address the evidence other than the forbidden testimony, and gives no indication how prejudicial to defendant the inadmissible evidence was in light of other evidence and how it might have affected the outcome. I also believe that by “using an expert to bolster the credibility of the complaining witness, the State [may] intrude [ ] on the core function of the jury.” Ross, 152 Vt. at 475, 568 A.2d at 343. Here, the Court’s reliance upon prior cases is inadequate to assess the prejudicial effect of the testimony of Linda Cope, Officer Whipple, and Diane Dexter upon this jury. Further, this inadequacy is magnified because the Court underestimates the effect of testimony recognized as “dangerous because ... [it is] too easily taken for expert comment on the credibility of the complainant’s allegations.” To determine the harmful effect of the inadmissible testimony, the relevant facts must be analyzed.
The child testified by videotape, telling the jury that at her grandmother’s house she was once molested in a bedroom by defendant ejaculating onto her pants and another time on a couch when defendant rubbed her backside under her clothes and attempted to touch her “private place.” The child said she felt sad and angry about these incidents and feared defendant would do something bad again.
The defendant took the stand, denied any wrongdoing and refuted details of the State’s case by saying he was at the grandmother’s home as a cleaning person and babysitter for the child. Part of his role, he explained, was to require the child to clean up after herself, go to bed early, and fold her bedclothes, something not required of her in her own home. Describing the child as “cold and vindictive,” defendant claimed that his discipline caused the child to become so upset that she lied about her relationship with him. Defendant denied that anything occurred in the bedroom and said that the “couch” incident was merely an innocent massage, which the child requested.
Corroborating testimony, introduced to substantiate either the child’s or defendant’s version of their relationship, included observations of the child’s mother that defendant would buy “practically anything [her] daughter wanted.” The child’s case*191worker, Diane Dexter, stated that after the abuse the child feared defendant. The child’s grandmother testified by deposition that the child and defendant liked each other and were friends, downplaying any physical incidents between them, and saying that the child often lied and that her parents were angry with defendant because he would not bring them alcohol.
The Court’s opinion describes other evidence, finding it to have impermissibly bolstered the child’s credibility. The credibility-bolstering testimony of Linda Cope, who the trial court acknowledged as an expert on child sexual abuse, was given immediately after the jury viewed the taped testimony of the child. In addition to the testimony which the Court outlined, the expert volunteered testimony that the child, “like many children, would never have told something like that,” and “usually kids don’t tell.”
The impermissible expert testimony of Linda Cope might, in itself, rise to the level of plain error, especially in a case where no corroborating witness observed the abuse. See Ross, 152 Vt. at 465, 568 A.2d at 337 (brother of victim an eyewitness to the sexual abuse). Where additional impermissible testimony is considered, however, little doubt remains that defendant’s chances of prevailing were greatly disadvantaged.
Officer Whipple, who investigated the allegations, directly commented on credibility by saying to the jury that he believed her and thought defendant was lying. Officer Whipple stated to the jury that “I have had ... in excess of 400 hours in specialized training in the investigation of child abuse.” He went on to say, “I would estimate that I investigate on the average of thirty to forty [child abuse cases] a year, and that would be over the past five years.” Whipple then testified that he told defendant, after questioning him at the Barre Police Department, “I did not believe ... what he was saying and that I believed what the child had told me.” The court admonished the jury not to consider the officer’s opinion about the credibility of the child. Yet, in the State’s rebuttal the officer testified, “I find her to be truthful.”
The child’s SRS caseworker, Diane Dexter, was also recalled to testify. Dexter testified that she had specialized training and experience in the field of child sexual abuse investigation and *192case management. When asked whether she had an opinion about the child’s honesty, Dexter commented, “I believe that she’s a very honest child.” When the witness was asked about the child’s state of mind, the court cautioned: “I think it’s a conclusion that a person with this woman’s experience with children can draw, but let’s understand that this is not an expert opinion. This is the opinion of an experienced person. There’s a difference.” The trial court was wrong — an opinion of an experienced person is an expert opinion. See V.R.E. 702. Here, the witness has expertise because of both experience and specialized training. The opinion of a person with this expertise must have a major impact on the jury. In short, Dexter’s testimony on the complainant’s credibility was another significant factor impermissibly bolstering the child’s credibility.
Finally, defendant represented himself. We have recognized in the past that this is a significant factor in plain error analysis, State v. Ayers, 148 Vt. 421, 426, 535 A.2d 330, 334 (1987) (high unlikelihood pro se defendant would interrupt argument of prosecutor to object requires that trial judge take extra care and a failure to do so contributes to a finding of plain error). The court’s response to defendant’s status as a pro se litigant was insufficient in that it failed to keep inadmissible, highly prejudicial evidence from the jury.
The cumulative effect of the multiple errors, in my opinion, adds up to plain error requiring retrial. See State v. McCarthy, 156 Vt. 148, 155-57, 589 A.2d 869, 873-75 (1991) (multiplicity of errors contributing to the same improper impression of defendant relevant to plain error analysis).
I would reverse and remand. Justice Dooley joins in this dissent.