Court Opinion

ID: 9747242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:05:22.255343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:51.593165
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the Court’s judgment that respondent should be disbarred. I write separately to explain why the Court’s prior order, requiring supplemental proceedings to determine whether respondent’s manic depression or bipolar disorder should mitigate the quantum of discipline, was inappropriate in this case.
Respondent Tonzola pled guilty to theft by unlawful taking, contrary to N.J.S.A 2C:20-3, and forging a judge’s signature, contrary to N.J.S.A 2C:21-la(2). A person is guilty of theft of movable property by unlawful taking or disposition “if he [or she] unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another with purpose to deprive him [or her] thereof.” N.J.S.A 2C:20-3. Respondent also purposely forged the signature of a Superior Court judge to a letter that falsely informed other counsel of the status of civil litigation related to the purchase of real estate by respondent’s client.
When respondent entered his unconditional guilty pleas to theft and forgery, he admitted that his conduct was purposeful and that he was waiving any and all defenses to those offenses, including any mental defect such as diminished capacity. See R. 3:9-2. The guilty plea to purposely stealing $27,000 from a client satisfied the mental culpability requirement for a knowing misappropriation of client funds explicated in In re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451, 409 A.2d 1153 (1979). See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2c(2). Respondent’s criminal convictions, based on his guilty pleas, are “conclusive evidence of [his] guilt in disciplinary proceedings.” In re Goldberg, 142 N.J. 557, 565, 666 A.2d 529 (1995).
Our Court Rules provide that once a respondent has been convicted of a criminal offense, whether by plea or verdict, and disciplinary proceedings are based on the criminal conduct, the *310sole issue to be decided in the attorney disciplinary proceeding “shall be the extent of final discipline to be imposed.” R. 1:20— 13(c)(2). To mitigate the quantum of discipline, a respondent may present “evidence which does not dispute the crime but which shows mitigating circumstances [relevant to] the issue of whether the nature of the ‘conviction merits discipline and, if so, the extent thereof.’ ” In re Mischlich, 60 N.J. 590, 593, 292 A.2d 23 (1972) (citation omitted). That principle has been codified in our Court Rules: “The Board and Court may consider any relevant evidence in mitigation that is not inconsistent with the essential elements of the criminal matter for which the attorney was convicted or has admitted guilt as determined by the statute defining the criminal matter.” R. 1:20 — 13(c)(2) (emphasis added).
Notwithstanding that respondent’s guilty plea and criminal conviction for knowing misappropriation of client funds triggered the Wilson automatic disbarment rule, he has attempted to prove in the mitigation proceeding that his manic depression/bipolar disorder prevented him from being able to formulate the requisite mental culpability for a knowing misappropriation of client funds. Respondent also contends that although he pled guilty to forgery, he suffered from a mental defect that prevented him from being able to purposely commit forgery. I reject both of those contentions as a matter of law. I am of the view that the supplemental hearing afforded respondent should not have been conducted and the outcome of those proceedings should have no impact on the quantum of discipline to be imposed. Although such a hearing was unwarranted, I am further persuaded that respondent’s proofs failed to establish any entitlement to mitigation.
The supplemental proceedings were intended to afford respondent an opportunity to collaterally attack his criminal convictions. A quote from the report of Dr. Gross, who was retained as respondent’s expert, illustrates this point:
... Mr. Tonzola’s Manic Depression so impaired his will that his otherwise purposeful actions are excusable. And though Mr. Tonzola may have been aware that the funds misappropriated were client funds and that the utilization of those funds in the manner he did was unauthorized, his cognitive and cerebral processes concerning the nature, quality and, most significantly, consequences of those acts were totally impaired.
*311Respondent’s reliance upon In re Greenberg, 155 N.J. 138, 714 A.2d 243 (1998), and In re Jacob, 95 N.J. 132, 469 A.2d 498 (1984), to support his mitigation claim, is misplaced. The relevant statement in Jacob, that competent medical proofs can demonstrate that a respondent has “suffered a loss of competency, comprehension or will of a magnitude that could excuse egregious misconduct that was clearly knowing, volitional and purposeful,” Id. at 137, 469 A.2d 498, which was repeated in Greenberg, supra, 155 N.J. at 150, 714 A.2d 243, arose in the context of a respondent who had not been convicted of knowing misappropriation of client or law firm funds. Even in those cases, the Court did not find the respondents had met the Jacob burden. Additionally, the disciplinary proceedings in those cases were not based on Rule 1:20-13(c)(2), as in the present case. More on point are In re Goldberg, 109 N.J. 163, 536 A.2d 224 (1988), and In re Gipson, 103 N.J. 75, 510 A.2d 660 (1986), cases involving convictions for theft of client funds where the criminal convictions formed the basis for the disciplinary proceedings. There, too, the Jacob mitigation defense was rejected. Indeed, no decision of this Court ever afforded Jacob-type relief in a Wilson misappropriation case. The misappropriations involved in In re Cornish, 98 N.J. 500, 501, 511, 488 A.2d 551 (1985), predated the decision in Wilson and there was no criminal conviction for theft.
The inquiry contemplated by Jacob ordinarily is not warranted after a criminal conviction for theft of client or law firm funds that form the basis of disciplinary proceedings because of the Wilson automatic disbarment rule. The purpose of a mitigation inquiry is to “determine if circumstances exist that would justify [the Court] in concluding that the attorney had suffered such a loss of comprehension that ‘he was unable to comprehend the nature of his act or lacked the capacity to form the requisite intent.’ ” In re Steinhoff, 114 N.J. 268, 272, 553 A.2d 1349 (1989) (citation omitted). A judgment of conviction forecloses further consideration of mental culpability for the offense for which a respondent stands convicted.
In a Wilson-type case, the purpose of the diminished capacity evidence in a Jacob proceeding is to show the loss of competency, *312comprehension, or will. That is simply another way of attacking the essential mental culpability element of purposeful theft of client funds contrary to Rule l:20-13(c)(2). Jacob and its progeny use a “M’Naghten-type” diminished capacity standard.1 I prefer a bright-line rule holding that Jacob, has no application when the disciplinary proceedings are based on a judgment of conviction for theft of client or law firm funds. The rule that I endorse adheres to the dictates of Rule 1:20 — 13(c)(2), disallowing mitigation evidence that is inconsistent with one or more of the essential elements of the offenses for which a respondent has been convicted. The requisite mental states for theft and forgery were conceded by respondent when he acknowledged that he purposely committed the offenses. Neither of his guilty pleas nor the judgment of convictions has been vacated. Consequently, I would invoke both judicial estoppel and quasi-estoppel to enforce Rule 1:20 — 13(c)(2), thereby preventing respondent from blowing both “hot and cold” by taking a position in the disciplinary proceedings that is inconsistent with his criminal convictions. In other words, I would simply enforce the Court’s own Rule 1:20 — 13(c)(2). I empathize with respondent and his family’s plight. But as the Disciplinary Review Board observed:
[T]his matter arose by way of a motion for final discipline following respondent’s guilty plea to forgery of a judge’s signature and a theft of client funds by unlawfully taking. By virtue of the guilty plea, respondent admitted that his conduct was knowing and purposeful. To permit him now to argue that he lacked the requisite cognitive ability to commit those crimes would not only violate R. l:20-13(c), but would also cause the public to question the integrity of the attorney disciplinary system and its goal of protecting the public. Rightfully, the public *313would be unable to reconcile one court’s acceptance of respondent’s guilty plea and the factual basis for it, with a subsequent finding in a disciplinary context by a separate court system that he lacked the requisite cognitive abilities to be held responsible for his actions and would, therefore, not be disbarred.
The record clearly and convincingly establishes that respondent knowingly misappropriated client funds, which triggers the Wilson automatic disbarment rule. He also poisoned the well of justice with the forgery. In re Verdiramo, 96 N.J, 183, 186, 475 A.2d 45 (1984). Hence, I join the Court’s judgment to disbar respondent.
For disbarment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG and VERNIERO — 7.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part — Justice COLEMAN — 1.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that JUDE J. TONZOLA of PARSIPPANY, who was admitted to the bar cif this State in 1986, be disbarred and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys of this State, effective immediately; and it is further
ORDERED that JUDE J. TONZOLA be and hereby is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it is further
ORDERED that JUDE J. TONZOLA comply with Rule 1:20-20 dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further
ORDERED that JUDE J. TONZOLA reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs.

 The English common-law M'Naghten Rule evolved as our insanity rule. State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 164, 142 A.2d 65 (1958). That rule was essentially codified in the New Jersey Code.of Criminal Justice (Code), that currently defines insanity as "laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.” N.J.S.A. 2C:4-1. The Code also recognizes that, although a person may not have been insane at the time he or she committed a criminal act, that individual may have a diminished-capacity defense. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2. It is a defense that will either excuse conduct otherwise criminal, by negating the essential mental culpability element of an offense defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2, or reduce the degree of the offense charged. State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 603, 532 A.2d 199 (1987).