Court Opinion

ID: 9810383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:48:51.791232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:53.728993
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
concurring. I concur in the opinion of the Court, and I am glad that the practice has been so fully and so clearly stated. There is, however, one point of practice in this Court that has never met my approval, and is its refusal to consider an ordinary petition for certiorari unless the Judge below has already signified in writing his willingness to amend the record in accordance with the wishes of the petitioner. Such a course does not seem to be in accordance either with the dignity of this Court or the rights of the petitioner, nor is it required by the courtesy due to. the Judge below. If any error has occurred through no fault of the petitioner, he is entitled to have it corrected as a matter of right. The question is not whether the Judge is willing to correct the error, but whether the error has in fact occurred. We may rely upon the willingness of the upright gentlemen who hold our *106Superior Courts to correct in all places and at all times any error they may have committed when called to their attention; and there is no reason why the matter should not be brought to their attention by this Court in due forms of law, as well as by counsel in private interviews. When a party under oath asserts that there are errors in the record, and points them out with such particularity that they can be easily ascertained one way or the other, I see no reason why a certiorari should not be granted, and the Judge who tried the case asked in a respectful manner whether or not the petitioner’s allegations are true. The Judge’s statement would import just as much verity then as it does now; and would be just as final. It would not be the slightest reflection upon him in any way, and would relieve him from the private and ex-parte impor-tunities of counsel now unavoidable under the practice of this Court.
Another matter I deem proper to mention. As long as our judges retain their independence of thought and action, and I trust they always will, there will be radical differences of opinion in the decision of cases. Similar differences may exist as to the adoption of rules of practice, but in such cases custom does not permit any written dissent. It follows that the adoption of a rule does not imply its unanimous approval by the members of this Court, but simply that it met the views of a majority. In conclusion, I can only say, with the utmost respect for the Court, that there are many of its rules that-received neither my vote nor my approval. After their adoption they become the rules of the Court, binding upon me as well as upon others; and as such have received recognition and support.