Court Opinion

ID: 9901304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 17:02:09.955536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:30.590172
License: Public Domain

IN THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
                              COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

                                                      22 November 2022
 In re Y.B.,
        Petitioner                                     PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY
                                                       RELIEF, FILED 21 OCTOBER 2022
 United States,
       Real Party in Interest
                                                       MISC. DOCKET NO. 001-23
 James D. FINK,
 Fireman (E-3), U.S. Coast Guard                       BEFORE MCCLELLAND, BRUBAKER &
      Real Party in Interest                           HERMAN

                                                       ORDER

BRUBAKER, Judge (joined by Chief Judge McCLELLAND and Judge HERMAN):

        In the pending general court-martial of United States v. Fink, the military judge ruled that
Seaman (SN) G.C. may testify that he had a sexual encounter with Petitioner a few months prior
to the accused’s alleged assault of Petitioner. The prior alleged encounter has no connection to
the charged sexual assault other than to contradict statements made by Petitioner. Petitioner asks
this Court to issue a writ of mandamus requiring the military judge to exclude this evidence
under Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 412, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019
ed.). We conclude Petitioner is entitled to relief and grant the writ.

                                           Background

       Prior to trial, trial defense counsel moved for a ruling on the admissibility of evidence
under M.R.E. 412 that:

       (1) there were similarities between the encounter with the accused and a prior sexual
           encounter between Petitioner and SN G.C., after which she claimed to SN G.C. that
           she did not remember the encounter due to intoxication by cold medicine;
       (2) the prior incident with SN G.C. led to rumors within the unit and Petitioner was
           concerned about the possibility of additional rumors because of her encounter with
           the accused; and
       (3) Petitioner misrepresented to investigators that she had not had sex for two years prior
           to the incident with the accused.

       The Government and special victims’ counsel for Petitioner opposed the motion. After
conducting a closed hearing, during which SN G.C. and Petitioner testified, the military judge
made the following salient findings of fact:
       (1) During an interview with investigators, Petitioner alleged that on the night of 5 March
           2021, she went to sleep alone and awoke to find the accused standing naked next to
           her, stroking his penis.
       (2) Petitioner told investigators: “I have not been intimate or seeing, like been, dating for
           the past two years. So, after that incident, I do feel like I’ve been touched” in the
           vaginal area, adding that her vagina felt “like stretched.” Pet. Ex. H at 2–3.
       (3) After the interview, Petitioner agreed to conduct a controlled call with the accused.
           During this call, Petitioner asked “what happened last night?” and a lengthy back and
           forth ensued. After the accused stated he thought he asked her about engaging in
           sexual activity and she assented, Petitioner responded, “I don’t recall that. And,
           you’re my shipmate, and I don’t do that with my shipmates.” Pet. Ex. H at 3.
       (4) SN G.C. testified that he had vaginal intercourse with Petitioner within the few
           months prior to March 2021. This encounter occurred in her barracks room sometime
           in late 2020 or early 2021. They were “hanging out” one night when he asked if she
           wanted to be “friends with benefits” or words to that effect. At first, she did not want
           to, but later changed her mind and the two had sex. The next day, SN G.C. asked
           about the encounter via text message. Petitioner denied it happened, indicating that
           she was on cough medicine. There was no further romantic relationship between the
           two.
       (5) Petitioner testified that she reported to her unit in January 2020 and lived in the
           barracks during her pipeline training. She moved out of the barracks in September
           2020. She denied having sex with SN G.C. or exchanging text messages with him
           about the alleged encounter.

         In his ruling, the military judge rejected two of the three parts of the Defense’s motion,
concluding that evidence of rumors and of purported similarities between the encounter with SN
G.C. and with the accused were inadmissible. He concluded, however, that SN G.C.’s testimony
was relevant “for its tendency to contradict [Petitioner’s] statements to law enforcement in her
initial report,” and that what she told investigators “is not a collateral issue but is instead a
material detail of her initial unrestricted report of sexual assault.” Pet. Ex. H at 8. Accordingly,
he ruled the Defense may, in cross-examination, ask Petitioner about her alleged sexual
encounter with SN G.C.

        He noted, however, that extrinsic evidence for impeachment by contradiction on a
collateral matter is “only admissible if the collateral matter was raised during the witness’ direct
examination.” Id. at 9 (quoting United States v. Braimer, 81 M.J. 572, 581 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
2021)). Thus, “If [Petitioner] raises the issue of what she said to investigators during her direct
examination, the Defense would be entitled to call SN G.C. to contradict her testimony. The
impeachment by contradiction doctrine would prohibit the Defense from raising an issue on
cross-examination and then contradicting that testimony with extrinsic evidence during their own
case.” Id.

       During trial, Petitioner testified for the Government. She stated she woke up to find her
pants and underpants removed and the accused standing over her naked, stroking his penis.
During direct examination, she made no mention of her vagina feeling stretched or not engaging

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in sexual activity with shipmates or for any period of time prior to the alleged assault. During
cross-examination, trial defense counsel, consistent with the military judge’s ruling, confronted
Petitioner with her statement to investigators that she had not been intimate for two years
preceding the alleged assault and with whether she had been intimate with SN G.C. Petitioner
admitted she told investigators that, and attested to its veracity, denying having been intimate
with SN G.C. Trial defense counsel also confronted Petitioner with her statement to the accused
that she does not “do that with shipmates.” She responded, “Correct, I don’t have intimate
relations with shipmates.” Pet. Ex. L at 4:06.

        During its case, the Government sought introduction of the transcript of the controlled
call between Petitioner and the accused. Trial counsel offered a redacted version that struck the
statement, “I don’t do that with my shipmates.” Trial defense counsel objected under M.R.E.
106, arguing that the entirety of the transcript, including this statement, ought in fairness to be
considered at the same time. The military judge sustained the objection and admitted an
unredacted transcript.

        As the Government approached the end of its case-in-chief, the military judge held a
session outside the presence of the members. Trial defense counsel asserted that the nature of the
Government’s case opened the door to testimony by SN G.C. to impeach Petitioner by
contradiction. The military judge agreed. He noted that by testifying, Petitioner had put her
credibility in issue. He concluded that although the statement, “I don’t do that with shipmates,”
was admitted under M.R.E. 106, it was part of the Government’s case, and that he was going to
allow, as impeachment by contradiction, the Defense to call SN G.C. The military judge granted
an overnight recess, during which Petitioner sought, and we granted, a stay of proceedings to
allow our consideration of this petition.

                                                Law

        Article 6b, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), grants Courts of Criminal Appeals
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus when needed to enforce certain protections afforded to
alleged crime victims. Article 6b(e), UCMJ; In re C. P-B, 78 M.J. 824, 827 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App.
2019). This includes the protections of M.R.E. 412. Article 6b(e)(4)(c), UCMJ. A writ of
mandamus is “a drastic instrument which should be invoked only in truly extraordinary
situations.” United States v. Labella, 15 M.J. 228, 229 (C.M.A. 1983) (citations omitted). The
writ has traditionally been used “to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.” Roche v.
Evaporated Milk Association, 319 U.S. 21, 26, (1943) (citations omitted). Only exceptional
circumstances amounting to a “clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial power” justify
the invocation of the writ. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)
(cleaned up).

        To prevail, a petitioner seeking an extraordinary writ must show that: “(1) there is no
other adequate means to attain relief; (2) the right to issuance of the writ is clear and
indisputable; and (3) the issuance of the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Hasan v.
Gross, 71 M.J. 416, 418 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (citing Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D.C.,
542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004)).

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        M.R.E. 412 is a rule of exclusion that prohibits evidence of “other sexual behavior”
unless it meets certain exceptions. M.R.E. 412(a)(1); United States v. Gaddis, 70 M.J. 248, 251
(C.A.A.F. 2011). Its purpose is “to shield victims of sexual assaults from the often embarrassing
and degrading cross-examination and evidence presentations common to sexual offense
prosecutions.” Gaddis, 70 M.J. at 252 (cleaned up).

       The relevant exception in this case is “evidence the exclusion of which would violate the
accused’s constitutional rights.” M.R.E. 412(b)(3). An accused seeking admission of evidence
under this exception bears the burden of showing that the evidence is “relevant, material, and
favorable to his defense,” and thus necessary. United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 445, 448 (C.A.A.F.
2010). “The term ‘favorable’ as used in both Supreme Court and military precedent is
synonymous with ‘vital.’ ” Id. (cleaned up). The probative value of the evidence must be
balanced against and outweigh countervailing issues, such as the dangers of unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, or wasting time. Gaddis, 70 M.J.at 255.

        Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” M.R.E. 401(a). Evidence is material if it is “of
consequence to the determination of the accused’s guilt.” Smith, 68 M.J. at 448 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Assessing materiality involves looking at “the
importance of the issue for which the evidence was offered in relation to the other issues in this
case; the extent to which this issue is in dispute; and the nature of other evidence in the case
pertaining to this issue.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

        The use of extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness is highly circumscribed. See, e.g.,
M.R.E. 608, 609, 613. The rules on the use of extrinsic evidence to impeach depend on the
method of impeachment. Broadly, there are four methods of impeachment: character for
untruthfulness; prior inconsistent statements; bias, prejudice, or motive to misrepresent; or
impeachment by contradiction. United States v. Banker, 15 M.J. 207, 210 (C.M.A. 1983).
Extrinsic evidence to prove a character for untruthfulness is, with a limited exception, prohibited.
M.R.E. 608(b) (“Except for a criminal conviction under [M.R.E.] 609, extrinsic evidence is not
admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’ conduct in order to attack or support the
witness’ character for truthfulness.”). On the other hand, extrinsic evidence is permitted to show
bias, prejudice, or motive to misrepresent. M.R.E. 608(c).

        Here, the military judge concluded that the testimony of SN G.C. is constitutionally
required as impeachment of Petitioner by contradiction. Impeachment by contradiction, though
scantly mentioned in the Military Rules of Evidence,1 is a common law doctrine recognized by
military courts. Banker, 15 M.J. at 210; United States v. Montgomery, 56 M.J. 660, 668 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. 2001). “This line of attack involves showing the tribunal the contrary of a witness’
asserted fact, so as to raise an inference of a general defective trustworthiness.” Banker, 15 M.J.
at 210.

1
 M.R.E.s 304(e)(1) and 311(c)(1) address the specific context of using otherwise suppressed evidence to impeach
an accused’s in-court testimony by contradiction.

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        The general rule is that if a witness’s asserted fact is “collateral,” then extrinsic evidence
to contradict it is inadmissible. Id. A matter is “collateral” if “the fact could not be shown in
evidence for any purpose independent of the contradiction.” United States v. Langhorne, 77 M.J.
547, 555 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1306–07
(7th Cir. 1976)). See also, United States v. Cobia, 53 M.J. 305, 310 (C.A.A.F. 2000); United
States v. Kamra, No. 21-1615, 2022 WL 4998978, at *4 (3d Cir. Oct. 4, 2022); United States v.
Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993) (“A matter is considered collateral if “the matter itself
is not relevant in the litigation to establish a fact of consequence, i.e., not relevant for a purpose
other than mere contradiction of the in-court testimony of the witness.”); Head v. Halliburton
Oilwell Cementing Co., 370 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1966) (“The test for determining what is
a collateral matter was laid down over one hundred years ago . . . . Professor Wigmore phrases it
thusly: ‘Could the fact as to which error is predicated have been shown in evidence for any
purpose independently of the contradiction?’ ”) (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 1003 (3rd ed.)).

        Like military courts, Federal Circuit Courts generally bar a criminal defendant’s use of
extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness by contradiction on a collateral matter. For instance, in
Beauchamp, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed the defendant’s
contention that the value of his right to cross-examine a witness for the purpose of “exposing
falsehood” was “vastly diminished” if he could not also present extrinsic evidence demonstrating
that the witness had lied. Beauchamp, 986 F.2d at 3. The court rejected the contention, noting it
is “well established that a party may not present extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness by
contradiction on a collateral matter. Thus, it is often said that when a witness testifies to a
collateral matter, the examiner must take the answer, i.e., the examiner may not disprove it by
extrinsic evidence.” Id. (cleaned up). See also, United States v. Bitterman, 320 F.3d 723, 727
(7th Cir. 2003) (“While contradiction is a valid method of impeachment, it is well-settled that
one may not impeach by contradiction regarding collateral or irrelevant matters, and that a party
may not contradict for the sake of contradiction.”) (cleaned up).

        As a narrow exception to the general rule, military courts allow that “a witness who
makes a collateral assertion on direct examination may be contradicted by extrinsic evidence.”
Banker, 15 M.J. at 210 (emphasis added); United States v. Braimer, 81 M.J. 572, 581 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. 2021); Langhorne, 77 M.J. at 556. In United States v. Dominguez, the court applied
this exception to a recorded statement that, although made out-of-court rather than during direct
testimony, was introduced as substantive evidence under the residual hearsay exception. 81 M.J.
800, 816–17 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2021).

                                              Analysis

        As a starting point, we emphasize that this case is not about an accused’s Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights, unlike United States v. Gaddis. 70 M.J. at 256–57. Over
objection, the military judge permitted the accused to confront Petitioner with her purportedly
false statements and to inquire into her alleged sexual encounter with SN G.C. Nor, unlike
United States v. Ellerbrock, is it about the right to present evidence of bias or motive to fabricate.
70 M.J. 314, 319 (C.A.A.F. 2011).

                                                  5
        The question, instead, is whether now, having had the opportunity to confront her with
these matters, the accused is constitutionally entitled to present extrinsic evidence for the sole
purpose of contradicting statements he himself elicited or insisted upon admitting. We conclude
that under the proper legal framework for impeachment by contradiction, the answer is a clear no
and that the military judge’s ruling to the contrary is erroneous as a matter of law and violative of
protections afforded Petitioner by M.R.E. 412.

        First, the military judge clearly erred by concluding the evidence proffered by the
Defense is not collateral. The military judge noted the importance of Petitioner’s credibility and
that the evidence is material to her credibility, but that does not complete the analysis. Credibility
of a witness is always material. Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 319. But for a matter to be non-collateral
under the impeachment by contradiction doctrine, it must be material independent of its tendency
to contradict a statement. Langhorne, 77 M.J. at 555; see also, Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 320
(holding that because evidence tending to show motive to fabricate was itself “a substantial issue
in question,” it was constitutionally required).

        In effect, the military judge’s ruling renders whether Petitioner engaged in sexual activity
with anyone in the two years before the alleged assault and whether she ever engaged in sexual
activity with a shipmate as non-collateral matters that can now be litigated with extrinsic
evidence. This is clearly wrong. The only relevance of such evidence is its tendency to contradict
Petitioner’s statements. Independent of that, SN G.C.’s testimony is wholly disconnected from
the charged misconduct, flatly inadmissible, and contrary to the text and purpose of M.R.E. 412.
The evidence is, therefore, collateral.

        Because this sexual history is a collateral matter, the accused may only present extrinsic
evidence of it if Petitioner raised it during direct examination. Banker, 15 M.J. at 210. Petitioner,
however, did not testify during direct examination that she had not engaged in sexual activity in
a given amount of time, nor that she did not engage in sexual relations with shipmates; nor did
she create any other factual inference opening the door to rebuttal. The Defense, in effect, wishes
to open its own door, then exploit it to present otherwise irrelevant extrinsic evidence of
Petitioner’s sexual history. Nothing in the Constitution requires such a misuse of the doctrine of
impeachment by contradiction.

        It is true that one of Petitioner’s two statements—that she does not “do that” with her
shipmates—was contained in a prosecution exhibit. But for two reasons, we conclude that this
did not open the door to extrinsic evidence. First, it was the accused who insisted that this
statement be included in the exhibit. The Government, therefore, was not responsible for creating
any potential factual inference—it was the Defense who desired that statement to be included.
Second, unlike Dominguez, the exhibit is not a substitute for direct testimony by Petitioner. In
Dominguez, the out-of-court statement was admitted for the truth of the matters asserted by the
witness under the residual hearsay exception. Dominguez, 81 M.J. at 809. Here, in contrast, the
transcript was offered as an admission by the accused as a party-opponent under M.R.E.
801(d)(2). Petitioner’s statements remain hearsay and are not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted. In other words, her statements in her recorded phone conversation with the accused
may provide context and effect on the listener, but they do not open the door to a mini-trial about
whether, in fact, she has ever engaged in sexual activity with shipmates.

                                                  6
        We must also address the military judge’s suggestion that the Defense may be able to
simply recall Petitioner to the stand and elicit the same statement during its direct examination.
This, too, evinces a misapplication of the doctrine of impeachment by contradiction. It is true
that a party can impeach its own witness. M.R.E. 607. But nothing in the doctrine of
impeachment by contradiction allows the same party to invite a broad, collateral statement, then
to present extrinsic evidence to impeach the factual inference that it has created. See United
States v. Banks, 36 M.J. 150, 166 (C.M.A.1992) (“It is well settled that the function of rebuttal
evidence is to explain, repel, counteract or disprove the evidence introduced by the opposing
party. The scope of rebuttal is defined by evidence introduced by the other party.”) (cleaned
up).

         The Defense has been given the opportunity to cross-examine Petitioner about the alleged
falsity of her statements to investigators and to the accused. But having chosen to examine her
about collateral matters, the Defense now must “take the answer, i.e., the examiner may not
disprove it by extrinsic evidence.” Beauchamp, 986 F.2d at 3. Just as this rule did not violate the
constitutional rights of the defendants in Beauchamp and Bitterman, 320 F.3d at 727, nor does it
violate the accused’s.

         To place this within the balancing test articulated in Gaddis, 70 M.J.at 255, the probative
value of evidence of an alleged sexual liaison months before the charged misconduct does not
outweigh countervailing issues. The evidence has no independent legal or logical relevance to
the charged offenses. To the extent that having intercourse months prior would affect a woman’s
ability to feel like she had been vaginally penetrated while she was asleep—which is beyond
tenuous—the Defense removed this as an issue when it conceded in opening that the touching
had occurred. The only relevance is the testimony’s tendency to contradict Petitioner’s
statements—and as discussed, an accused does not have a constitutional right to present extrinsic
evidence to contradict collateral statements to which he himself opened the door.

         On the other side of the coin, the dangers of confusing the issues and unfair prejudice are
significant. Petitioner denies having consensual sex with SN G.C.; this is not an uncontroverted
matter. And there is a risk of confusing the issues. One of trial defense counsel’s bases for
seeking admission of the testimony was an attempt to draw similarities between Petitioner’s
encounter with SN G.C. and her encounter with the accused, demonstrating she had “made a
similar ‘bad memory’ statement to SN G.C. about her consensual sexual encounter with
him. . . .” Pet. Ex. E at 10. The military judge rejected this basis, but there is a danger that the
members would use the evidence for just this purpose: to draw similarities between the two
encounters and draw improper inferences from the testimony beyond its mere tendency to
contradict Petitioner’s statements.

        Accordingly, we conclude the military judge clearly abused his discretion in ruling that
evidence of Petitioner’s otherwise-irrelevant sexual history is constitutionally required as
impeachment by contradiction. We also conclude that Petitioner has shown the three prongs
necessary to be entitled to extraordinary relief. First, granting this writ under Article 6b, UCMJ is
the only adequate means for Petitioner to prevent a violation of her protections under M.R.E.
412. Second, Petitioner is, we conclude, clearly and indisputably entitled to relief. The harm that

                                                 7
would ensue from an erroneous application of the law is precisely the type that Article 6b and
M.R.E. 412 seek to avoid. Finally, under the circumstances, we conclude that issuance of the
writ is appropriate.

       Accordingly, it is, by the Court, this 22nd day of November, 2022,

       ORDERED:

       That the petition for a writ of mandamus is granted.

       That the military judge’s ruling that the testimony of SN G.C. is admissible is reversed.

      That the stay of proceedings ordered on 4 October 2022 is vacated. Proceedings may
recommence consistent with this opinion.

                                                              For the Court,
                                                              JARAMILLO.CHRIS Digitally signed by
                                                                              JARAMILLO.CHRISTOPHER.RO
                                                              TOPHER.ROBIN.16 BIN.1607630603
                                                                              Date: 2022.11.22 12:27:54
                                                              07630603        -05'00'
                                                              Christopher R. Jaramillo
                                                              Acting Clerk of the Court

Copy: Office of Military Justice
      Special Victims’ Counsel
      Appellate Government Counsel
      Appellate Defense Counsel

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