Court Opinion

ID: 9747303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:09:30.166835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:22.663776
License: Public Domain

SCOTLAND, P. J., Concurring.
With one exception, my colleagues got it right. We differ only on whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of his crime was “developmentally disabled” within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.9, subdivisions (a) and (d).
*1157My colleagues begin by assuming the evidence establishes that the victim was “developmentally disabled” within the meaning of the statute. It does.
The evidence showed that the victim suffered from schizophrenia and was unable to live independently. Thus, she stayed in a board and care home to obtain needed help with the tasks of day-to-day living. When the victim had lived alone, her apartment was filthy. Indeed, a mental health specialist described the apartment as “gross.” For example, cockroaches were on the floor, unwashed dishes appeared to have “been there for a number of weeks,” and hardly any food was in the apartment. The victim suffered from anxiety even when taking medication for her mental illness. The medication would stop her from hearing voices, allow her to remember things that she would otherwise forget, and help her to have a normal life. However, if the victim did not take her medicine, she would walk the streets talking to herself and could not find her way home. The victim would not wear dentures because she believed that her teeth would grow back since she was taking vitamins.
Based on this evidence, a jury reasonably could find that the victim’s mental illness was likely to continue indefinitely and caused her to have substantial functional limitations in three areas of life activity: self-care; capacity for independent living; and self-direction. (Pen. Code, § 667.9, subd. (d)(1), (2), (3)(A), (E) & (F).)
In my view, the evidence is also sufficient to support the jury’s finding that defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of his crime was developmentally disabled. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1251 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015] [in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence].)
For starters, by his own admission, defendant knew the victim was mentally ill; he called her the “crazy lady.” Defendant also admitted he had seen, spoken to, and “interacted” with the victim on other occasions prior to stealing her purse. Because defendant described the victim as the crazy lady, the jury reasonably could deduce that his prior interaction with the victim occurred at times when she was not taking her medication. When the victim failed to take her medication, she would walk the streets talking to herself and was unable to find her way home. Even when she took medication, her mental illness was apparent. During summation, the prosecutor observed that the victim’s mental problem was “something that’s just notable” and that, having listened to her testify, jurors must have recognized the victim “wasn’t all there completely.” Even defense counsel acknowledged the victim was “somebody who appears different.” Thus, the jury could reasonably deduce that, when he grabbed the victim’s purse, defendant knew the victim’s mental *1158illness impaired her ability to function. Indeed, defendant admitted that, before he grabbed the victim’s purse, he asked her if she was “okay” because “she sort of was looking around.” He also admitted that the victim “look[ed] like [she was] an easy target” at first. These admissions—coupled with evidence that the victim was an older, toothless person who would not wear dentures because she believed her teeth would grow back since she was taking vitamins, who suffered from anxiety even when taking her medication, and who was confused and talking to herself when not taking her medication—paint the picture that, from his interactions with her on other occasions and from his observations of her on the day that he grabbed her purse, defendant was aware or reasonably should have been aware that the victim’s mental illness substantially limited her ability to function in life activities such as self-care, the capacity for independent living, and self-direction.
The majority’s contrary conclusion fails to allow for reasonable inferences that a layperson is capable of deducing. To instead apply the majority’s test will effectively mean that, unless the evidence establishes that a defendant is a mental health expert, a jury never could find a defendant knew or had reason to know that a victim was developmentally disabled.