Court Opinion

ID: 9908219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:01:47.626412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:00.445066
License: Public Domain

Rel: December 8, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2023-0017
                                _________________________

              T Investments, LLC, and FHM Company, LLLP

                                                  v.

        City of Montgomery Planning Commission and City of
                           Montgomery

                   Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
                              (CV-21-901370)

COOK, Justice.
SC-2023-0017

     T Investments, LLC, and FHM Company, LLLP,1 challenge the

Montgomery Circuit Court's judgment denying their petition for a writ of

mandamus directing the City of Montgomery Planning Commission ("the

Commission") to conditionally approve their preliminary plat for a

proposed development within the geographical limits of the City of

Montgomery ("the City"). Because we conclude that the Commission

failed to record a legally sufficient reason for denying conditional

approval of the preliminary plat, we reverse the judgment and remand

the case with instructions for the circuit court to grant the petition for

the writ of mandamus.

                      Facts and Procedural History

     FHM owns approximately 85 acres of undeveloped land in the City's

County Downs neighborhood ("the subject property"). County Downs was

originally developed in 1974. From the beginning, the neighborhood has

continuously been zoned as "R-75-S," a designation that restricts

     1Although the pleadings and other filings identify this entity as
FHM Company, LLP, materials in the record, including the affidavit of
James B. Marshall, Jr., a partner in this entity, reflect that the entity's
actual name is FHM Company, LLLP, which is also how this entity is
listed in the Alabama Secretary of State's online business-records
database.

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development to single-family residential dwellings on lots with at least

75 feet of road frontage. Since 1974, different portions of County Downs

have been systematically developed at different times. Notably, although

County Downs is zoned "R-75-S," the developed lots adjacent to the

subject property generally have between 85 and 100 feet of road frontage.

     As County Downs has expanded, proposed plats contemplating the

development of unimproved land within the neighborhood have been

submitted to the Commission for approval. In January 2002, FHM

submitted a preliminary plat for the subject property ("the 2002

preliminary plat") to the Commission. The 2002 preliminary plat

proposed the development of 327 single-family, residential homes on lots

that were approximately 100 feet wide. Although the Commission

conditionally approved the 2002 preliminary plat, that plat was never

submitted to the Commission for final approval, and the subject property

remained undeveloped.

     In 2021, FHM entered into an agreement with T Investments to

develop the subject property. As part of the agreement, FHM authorized

T Investments to act as its agent in, among other things, seeking the

Commission's approval of a proposed development on the subject

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property. The City's subdivision regulations require developers to comply

with a two-stage process for plat approval. First, a subdivider, which is

defined in § IX.C of the City's subdivision regulations as "[a]ny person or

corporation or duly authorized agent who undertakes the subdivision of

[the] lands" at issue, must seek the Commission's conditional approval of

a preliminary plat. See § II.A-C of the City's Subdivision Regulations. To

do so, the subdivider must submit the "preliminary plat together with

other supplementary material as deemed necessary by the …

Commission and specified in Section III" of the subdivision regulations.

Id., § II.B.1.

      Conditional approval of a preliminary plat by the Commission does

"not constitute approval of the final plat," but, rather, is

      "deemed an expression of approval of the layout submitted on
      the preliminary plat as a guide to the preparation of the final
      plat, which will be submitted for the approval of the …
      Commission, and for recording upon the fulfillment of the
      requirements of [the subdivision] regulations and the
      conditions of the conditional approval, if any."

Id., § II.B.5. If the Commission grants conditional approval, and after

the subdivider satisfies the requirements set forth in the subdivision

regulations and any conditions imposed by the Commission, the

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subdivider then submits a final plat for approval and recording. See id.,

§ II.D.

        T Investments hired Flowers & White Engineering to create a

preliminary plat for the subject property that conformed with the

requirements for "R-75-S" zoning districts. The preliminary plat

proposed subdividing the subject property into 244 lots for single-family,

residential use, with typical lot sizes that were 75 feet wide and 135 feet

deep.

        In October 2021, the preliminary plat was submitted to the

Commission for conditional approval. City staff noted that the

preliminary plat complied with the City's zoning ordinance and

subdivision regulations. Moreover, the City's engineering, traffic, fire,

water, and sewer departments, along with the Montgomery County

Health Department, expressed no objections to the preliminary plat.

        Consideration of the preliminary plat was initially set for a hearing

at the Commission's October 28, 2021, meeting. At that meeting,

however, the Commission urged representatives of T Investments to

meet with certain residents of County Downs ("the residents") to discuss

their concerns regarding the preliminary plat. As a result, T Investments

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voluntarily delayed its request for conditional approval of the

preliminary plat until the Commission's next meeting on November 18,

2021, and it arranged for its representatives to meet with the residents

on November 9, 2021.

     Representatives from both T Investments and Flowers & White met

with the residents on November 9, 2021. The primary concern expressed

by the residents at the meeting was the proposed width of the lots in the

preliminary plat. Some of the residents were concerned that the proposed

smaller lot sizes in the preliminary plat would cripple the value of

existing homes in County Downs. Although the residents acknowledged

that the "R-75-S" zoning designation required that each lot have only 75

feet of road frontage, they nevertheless asked that the preliminary plat

be amended to propose lots with at least 100 feet of road frontage. T

Investments, however, would not agree to the residents' request, and no

resolution of this disagreement was reached at the meeting.

     Consideration of the preliminary plat was reset for a hearing at the

Commission's November 18, 2021, meeting. All nine commissioners,

along with several members of the City's land-use staff, were present at

the meeting. During the meeting, the Commission and City officials

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discussed, among other things, the connectivity of the street system in

County Downs, the neighborhood's sewage infrastructure, whether a

traffic study was required at the conditional-approval stage, and whether

the preliminary plat submitted by T Investments could supersede the

2002 preliminary plat previously conditionally approved by the

Commission. Kenneth White, the Flowers & White engineer who had

prepared the preliminary plat, asserted that he had met with the City's

traffic engineer before submitting the preliminary plat to the

Commission and that the traffic engineer had not indicated that a traffic

study was required. According to White, the City's zoning ordinance --

rather than the 2002 preliminary plat -- controlled the width of the

proposed lots in the preliminary plat. White further explained that, as

development of the subject property pursuant to preliminary plat

proceeded, there would be greater street connectivity within County

Downs, which would help improve the quality of emergency and other

municipal services to the neighborhood.

     Several of the residents also appeared at the meeting to object to

the proposed development of the subject property. The Commission heard

from some of the residents, who voiced concerns about increased traffic,

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exacerbation of existing drainage issues, and the fact that the 2002

preliminary plat called for lots with 100 feet of road frontage, rather than

the 75-feet-per-lot of road frontage proposed by the preliminary plat. One

of the residents, attorney Richard Dean, submitted a letter to the

Commission on the day of the meeting, specifically asking it to deny

conditional approval of the preliminary plat for eight enumerated

reasons. 2

      At the meeting, Dean explained that, in his view, the City's

subdivision regulations required subdividers "to have a traffic study

ahead of time before [the Commission] approve[d] a plat that has a

subdivision of 50 houses or more." Dean argued that some neighborhood

residents had relied on the 2002 preliminary plat when purchasing

homes in County Downs. Dean also provided the Commission with his

overview of the legal and regulatory framework governing the

Commission's review of the preliminary plat:

      2The Commission took Dean's letter under advisement during the

meeting. Dean's letter noted that the Commission's bylaws and the
relevant statute required that it state in its records a valid reason for
denying conditional approval of a preliminary plat. See § 11-52-32(a),
Ala. Code 1975, and Smith v. City of Mobile, 374 So. 2d 305, 308 (Ala.
1979).

                                     8
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          "MR. DEAN: I'll hurry. I just want to explain, very
    briefly, the law …. You are supposed to vote on this. You can
    vote it up or down. The statute says, the ground of disapproval
    shall be stated on the record if you vote it down.

          "You have to state a reason for it to be valid. Secondly,
    the case law says, valid reason. There's no definition of valid
    reason. But what the cases all come down on is health, morals,
    public safety, welfare of the community, stuff like that.

         "I have given you a memo with eight good, valid reasons,
    including the fact the plat's already out there that says
    something different. But if you do vote it down -- here's where
    most … planning commissions get messed up.

           "You either vote and it's a tie and you do nothing, well,
    it's automatically approved in 30 days. If you vote it down, but
    you don't give your reasons on the record tonight, it's going to
    be approved in 30 days. But it -- you're just like a jury. You
    decide. You vote.

          "If five of you vote this plat down, and you state your
    reasons tonight, that's the final decision. I don't want you to
    assume it's going to be an appeal. I looked. I didn't see but
    about three cases that have ever been appealed. And when it
    does get appealed, it's not somebody suing the [C]ity. They
    just asking a circuit judge to review what you did. They can
    ask the appellate courts to review what you did. You can vote
    it down and give a reason -- and by the way, the law says you
    can give as many reasons as you want.

          "Only one of them has got to be valid. So I've typed up
    eight of them for you ….

         "….

        "I'm asking … you make an affirmative motion to vote it
    down, second it, and then vote. And please state your reasons

                                   9
SC-2023-0017

     on the record if you do so. And you will not be overturned.
     That's my opinion. I've researched it.

           "….

           "If you vote to approve it, it's approved. No reason has
     to be given. If you vote it down, you have to state your reason
     on the record here at the meeting tonight. One person's of the
     opinion it's got to be in writing. I'm of the opinion you can
     orally state it because we're being filmed. There's a nice little
     video of this. But you have to give a reason why you're denying
     it.

           "I had one attorney tell me you -- to be safe, you need to
     make a motion to deny it or disapprove or vote down the plat,
     whatever you call it, a second, a discussion, if you want. Then,
     you vote. And if you vote to deny it, somebody has to say, okay,
     the reason is this.

          "And I suggest you give a lot of reasons because if there's
     an appeal, if just one of those reasons is valid, it's going to be
     upheld. That's what I'm asking to do. If you want to vote it
     down, I'd like you to give every one of them eight reasons I
     gave you. And that's your discretion. I'm not trying to tell you
     what to do. But that would help down the road."

     A commissioner moved to deny conditional approval of the

preliminary plat, and that motion was seconded. Ann Clemons, the

Chairperson of the Commission, then asked that those commissioners in

favor of denying conditional approval of the preliminary plat raise their

right hand. All nine commissioners raised their right hand, and

Chairperson Clemons announced that the motion to deny conditional

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approval of the preliminary plat carried by a 9-0 vote. After the vote,

Chairperson Clemons polled some of the Commission's members as to the

reasons they had voted to deny conditional approval of the preliminary

plat. Commissioner Buddy Hardwich asserted that conditional approval

of the preliminary plat should be denied for safety reasons.

Commissioner Crews Reaves stated that he had voted to deny conditional

approval of the preliminary plat for reasons relating to safety, drainage,

and the applicability of the 2002 preliminary plat. Commissioner James

Reid stated that he had voted to deny conditional approval of the

preliminary plat because it did not conform with the 2002 preliminary

plat. Commissioner Frank Cook cited the lack of a traffic study and the

preliminary plat's deviations from the 2002 preliminary plat. The

remaining five commissioners did not vocalize their reasons for

disapproving of the preliminary plat.

     On the following day, November 19, 2021, Thomas M. Tyson, Jr.,

the land-use-control administrator for the City and the Commission's

executive secretary, sent Flowers & White a letter stating that the

conditional approval of the preliminary plat had been denied for "safety

reasons, drainage, and … [failure to] conform to the preliminary plat that

                                   11
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was approved in 2002." The minutes of the Commission's November 18,

2021, meeting were also considered and approved at its next meeting on

December 9, 2021. Those minutes contain the following entry:

          "Presented by Flowers & White Engineering
     representing T Investments, LLC requesting preliminary
     approval of County Downs Addition Preliminary Plat located
     on the east end of Paddock Lane in an R-75-[S] (Single-Family
     Residential) Zoning Districts.

           "ACTION: After thorough study and consideration and
     based on the facts as presented, a motion was made by Mr.
     Reaves, seconded by Mr. Dunn, and carried to deny this
     request for safety reasons, drainage, and this plat does not
     conform to the preliminary plat that was approved in 2002, by
     the following vote:

     "AYES            :     UNANIMOUS                   9
     "NAYS            :     NONE                        0
     "RECUSED         :     NONE                        0
     "ABSTAINED       :     NONE                        0
     "ABSENT          :     NONE                        0"

(Emphasis added.)

     On December 30, 2021, T Investments and FHM petitioned the

circuit court for a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to

conditionally approve the preliminary plat submitted on November 18,

2021. The Homeowners Association of County Downs ("the HOA")

petitioned to intervene. The circuit court denied the HOA's petition, and

the HOA appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals upheld the circuit court's

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order denying the HOA's petition to intervene. County Downs

Homeowners Ass'n v. T Invs., LLC, [Ms. CL-2022-0572, Sept. 30, 2022]

___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2022) (table). The HOA, however, was

allowed to file an amicus curiae brief in the circuit court.

      On October 26, 2022, the circuit court heard oral arguments. At oral

arguments, the Commission and the City conceded that T Investments

had not been required to provide a traffic study, stating that, "[w]ith a

planned unit development, you do have to have what they call a traffic

study. However, with a preliminary plat, you do not have to have a traffic

study." The Commission and the City additionally clarified that the lack

of a traffic study is "just one thing. It's not safety. It's not drainage." The

Commission and the City argued that the denial "wasn't based solely on

what the residents [were] saying. It wasn't based solely on the traffic

study. It wasn't based solely on the fact that the residents [were]

concerned about the 75-feet homes and the 100-feet homes. They were,

but it was also safety issues that [were] addressed." In addition, the

Commission and the City raised no arguments pertaining to T

Investments and FHM's failure to provide a traffic study in their answer

to the mandamus petition. Attached to the Commission and the City's

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answer, moreover, was the affidavit of Tyson, who stated that "T

Investments presented a preliminary plat, whereas, a preliminary plat is

a map of the property which can be used in any zoned district. For a

preliminary plat, a traffic impact study is not required."

     On December 2, 2022, the circuit court entered a judgment

upholding the Commission's decision to deny conditional approval of the

preliminary plat and denying T Investment and FHM's petition for a writ

of mandamus. Specifically, the circuit court found that, although the

stated reasons of "drainage" and "failure to conform to the [2002

preliminary plat]" were legally insufficient grounds for denying

conditional approval of the preliminary plat, the Commission's decision

to deny approval based on "safety reasons" was valid. According to the

circuit court, it was upholding the Commission's decision to deny

approval based on "safety reasons" because (1) § III.A.3(j) of the City's

subdivision regulations "suggests a traffic analysis approved by the …

Commission may be necessary for approval of the preliminary plat (based

on the subdivision consisting of more than 50 dwelling units and/or where

deemed appropriate by the planning commission)," (2) there was no

traffic study provided at the time the preliminary plat was presented,

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and (3) the transcript of the November 18, 2021, meeting reflects that

Commissioner Cook stated that one of his reasons for denying the

conditional approval of the preliminary plat was the lack of a traffic

study. As the circuit court explained:

           "The final reason cited by the … Commission for denying
     the preliminary plat was based upon 'safety.' The record
     reflects that at least one [c]ommissioner cited lack of a traffic
     study and potential danger to neighborhood residents caused
     by increased traffic in the area. While there was no objection
     to the preliminary plat from the traffic engineering
     department of the City of Montgomery, Sec. III(A)(3)(j) of [the
     City's subdivision regulations] governing requirements for
     preliminary approval of plats states:

           " 'Data required as a basis for the preliminary plat
           in A(1) above shall include the following
           information:

                 " '[(j)] For all planned unit developments,
           subdivisions consisting of more than 50 dwelling
           units, and for any subdivision when deemed
           appropriate by the planning commission, a
           comprehensive traffic analysis, which must be
           approved by the planning commission, indicating
           the probable effect of the proposed subdivision on
           traffic patterns and capacities of adjacent streets
           in the immediate area.'

          "Because the foregoing City [subdivision regulation]
     suggests a traffic analysis approved by the … Commission
     may be necessary for approval of the preliminary plat (based
     on the subdivision consisting of more than 50 dwelling units
     and/or where deemed appropriate by the planning
     commission), this Court cannot find that the decision to deny

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     the plat due to safety concerns was arbitrary and capricious.
     While this Court may have reached a different decision than
     the … Commission, the standard of review requires that the
     Court uphold the Commission's decision unless it is arbitrary
     and capricious. While a close call, based upon the foregoing,
     the above-styled Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED."

(Some emphasis added; some emphasis in original.) T Investments and

FHM subsequently appealed the circuit court's judgment denying their

petition for a writ of mandamus to this Court.

                          Standard of Review

     " There is no dispute that the proper standard of review in
     cases based on an administrative agency's decision is whether
     that decision was arbitrary or capricious or was not made in
     compliance with applicable law.

                 " ' Our standard of review regarding
           administrative actions is very limited in scope. We
           review the circuit court's judgment without any
           presumption of correctness since that court was in
           no better position than this court to review the
           agency decision …. The special competence of the
           agency lends great weight to its decision. That
           decision must be affirmed unless arbitrary,
           capricious, or not made in compliance with
           applicable law …. Neither the circuit court nor this
           court may substitute its judgment for that of the
           administrative agency.' "

Ex parte City of Fairhope, 739 So. 2d 35, 38 (Ala. 1999) (quoting State

Dep't of Revenue v. Acker, 636 So. 2d 470, 473 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)).

                               Discussion

                                   16
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     At issue in this appeal is whether T Investments and FHM are

entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the Commission to grant

conditional approval of the preliminary plat. T Investments and FHM

argue that the Commission failed to adequately state in writing its

reasons for denying conditional approval of the preliminary plat within

30 days of the plat's submission and that such failure should have

resulted in the automatic approval of the preliminary plat pursuant to

§ 11-52-32(a), Ala. Code 1975. We begin our analysis by reviewing the

law governing a planning commission's decision to disapprove a

subdivision plat.

                                     I.

     A planning commission's authority to regulate the subdivision of

land is derived from legislative act. Smith v. City of Mobile, 374 So. 2d

305, 307 (Ala. 1979). " 'In exercising its function approving or

disapproving any particular subdivision plat, [a planning commission]

acts in an administrative capacity, and is bound by any limitations on its

authority contained in the legislation authorizing it to act, as well as any

restrictions contained in its own regulations.' " Id. (quoting Boulder Corp.

v. Vann, 345 So. 2d 272, 274 (Ala. 1977)).

                                    17
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     Alabama's subdivision-control statutes, § 11-52-30 et seq., Ala.

Code 1975, impose certain limitations on a planning commission's review

of subdivision applications. As relevant here, § 11-52-32(a) provides that

a planning commission "shall approve or disapprove a plat within 30 days

after the submission thereof to it; otherwise, the plat shall be deemed to

have been approved, and a certificate to that effect shall be issued by the

municipal planning commission on demand." Section 11-52-32(a) further

mandates that "[t]he ground of disapproval of any plat shall be stated

upon the records of the municipal planning commission."

     Appellate decisions interpreting § 11-52-32(a) make clear that the

reasons assigned for the denial of a subdivision application must be both

(1) valid and (2) "sufficiently clear … to inform a developer 'wherein the

plan failed to meet the requirements of the regulations.' " Ex parte Pine

Brook Lakes, Inc., 617 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Ala. 1992) (quoting E.C. Yokely,

The Law of Subdivisions § 54 (2d ed. 1981); see Smith, 374 So. 2d at 308

(" 'Where a subdivision plan is disapproved, valid reasons must be given

for such action.' " (quoting Yokely, supra, § 54 (1963 and Supp. 1979)));

Mobile City Plan. Comm'n v. Southern Region Devs., Inc., 628 So. 2d 739,

740 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (affirming a trial court's decision to grant

                                    18
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mandamus relief to developer when planning commission cited existence

of vague "concerns" and "questions" as reasons for denying developer's

subdivision application).

     As this Court explained in Sigler v. City of Mobile, 387 So. 2d 813

(Ala. 1980),

     "[i]n passing judgment on a landowner's proposed subdivision,
     [a planning commission] must assign its reasons for denial
     within thirty (30) days. If it does not do so, approval is
     automatic under the statute. An invalid reason is equivalent
     to no reason …."

Id. at 814 (emphasis added). Importantly, in addition to being both valid

and unambiguous, the reasons for a planning commission's disapproval

of a proposed subdivision plat must also be sufficiently recorded to

comply with § 11-52-32(a). See Sadie v. Tyson, 539 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Ala.

Civ. App. 1988) (concluding that § 11-52-32(a) "requires that the grounds

for the disapproval of any plat shall be stated upon the records of the

planning commission within thirty days of the submission of the plat ….")

                                   II.

     As noted above, the Commission cited three reasons for its denial

of conditional approval of the preliminary plat: (1) "safety reasons," (2)

"drainage," and (3) "this plat does not conform to the preliminary plat

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that was approved in 2002." The circuit court found that all but one of

those reasons were invalid. In particular, the circuit court concluded that,

although some of the residents had expressed concern that the proposed

development of the subject property would exacerbate existing drainage

issues, "no data or other evidence was presented to bolster those

concerns." The circuit court additionally concluded that "[t]he fact that a

prior preliminary plat was approved calling for 100 ft. lots nearly two

decades ago d[id] not serve as a valid legal basis for rejecting a

preliminary plat that otherwise conform[ed] to the zoning requirements

for the area."3

     The circuit court, however, upheld the Commission's decision to

deny conditional approval of the preliminary plat for "safety reasons."

The circuit court asserted that, because a provision of the City's

subdivision regulations "suggests a traffic analysis approved by the …

Commission may be necessary for approval of the preliminary plat, … [it

could] not find that the decision to deny the plat due to safety concerns

     3In its judgment denying the mandamus petition, the circuit court

also noted that the Commission and the City had raised the issue of
standing, but it found that T Investments and FHM did have standing to
seek mandamus relief.

                                    20
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was arbitrary and capricious." In reaching that conclusion, the circuit

court acknowledged that the Commission had not mentioned the lack of

a comprehensive traffic analysis as a ground for denial in the minutes for

the November 18, 2021, meeting, but it stated that the submissions to

the circuit court did reflect that at least one commissioner had cited the

"lack of a traffic study and potential danger to neighborhood residents

caused by increased traffic in the area" as a reason for his vote to deny

conditional approval of the preliminary plat.

                                   III.

     T Investments and FHM argue that the circuit court erroneously

concluded that the "safety reasons" articulated in the meeting minutes

were legally sufficient grounds for denying conditional approval of the

preliminary plat. In response, the Commission and the City contest T

Investments', and by extension FHM's, standing to petition the circuit

court for a writ of mandamus. Alternatively, the Commission and the

City contend that, assuming that T Investments did have standing to

seek mandamus relief, the circuit court correctly concluded that the

Commission's denial of conditional approval of the preliminary plat for

"safety reasons" was legally sufficient. We first address the Commission

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and the City's challenge to T Investments' standing to seek mandamus

relief.

                                   A.

      The Commission and the City argue that, because FHM, and not T

Investments, is the owner of the subject property, "T Investments was

not the proper party to present the preliminary plat to the …

Commission, and therefore, had no standing and no legal right to petition

the trial court for [a] writ of mandamus." The Commission and the City's

brief at 17. The Commission and the City's argument is premised on § I.B

of the City's subdivision regulations, which provides:

            "B. Limits of jurisdiction. From and after the effective
      date hereof, these regulations shall govern all subdivision of
      land within the corporate limits of the City of Montgomery
      and its police jurisdiction. Any owner of land within the area
      governed by these regulations wishing to subdivide land shall
      submit to the Planning Commission a plat of the subdivision
      which shall conform at least to the minimum requirements
      and procedures set forth in these regulations."

The Commission and the City insist that, because the above provision

states that the "owner of land … shall submit to the … Commission a plat

of the subdivision," only FHM could have properly presented a

preliminary plat to the Commission.        Thus, according to them, T

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Investments had no "standing"4 to seek mandamus relief from the circuit

court.

     Notably, the Commission and the City's argument overlooks other

relevant language in the City's subdivision regulations -- namely, the

provisions of the regulations that pertain to the procedures for approval

of a preliminary plat. As relevant here, those provisions provide (1) that

"the subdivider may … proceed to prepare the preliminary plat for

     4Although     couched in terms of standing and jurisdiction, the
Commission and the City's argument actually concerns whether T
Investments and FHM have shown a clear legal right to a writ of
mandamus. Importantly, the Commission and the City do not dispute
that T Investments, as the intended developer of the subject property,
has a legally cognizable interest that has been injuriously affected by the
Commission's decision to deny conditional approval of the preliminary
plat. See Ingle v. Adkins, 256 So. 3d 62, 71 (Ala. 2017) (plurality opinion)
("[T]o have standing to bring an action, the plaintiff must have an
interest in the outcome of the action and show that he or she has suffered
or imminently will suffer an injury."). Rather, they argue that, because T
Investments was not the proper party to present the preliminary plat to
the Commission, T Investments and FHM could not demonstrate that the
Commission owed T Investments a clear duty to comply with § 11-52-
32(a). See Campbell v. City of Hueytown, 289 Ala. 388, 390, 268 So. 2d
3, 4 (1972) ("An indispensable requirement for mandamus is the presence
of a right in the applicant to the thing applied for."). Thus, the
Commission and the City confuse T Investments and FHM's entitlement
to a writ of mandamus with the circuit court's jurisdiction to consider the
mandamus petition. In any event, and as discussed below, the
Commission and the City's assertion that T Investments could not
properly present the preliminary plat to the Commission is without
merit.

                                    23
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submission," § II.A.2 of the City's subdivision regulations, and (2) that

"the subdivider shall cause to be prepared a preliminary plat together

with other supplementary material as deemed necessary by the Planning

Commission and specified in section III." Id., § II.B.1.

     As previously noted, the City's subdivision regulations define a

subdivider as "[a]ny person or corporation or duly authorized agent who

undertakes the subdivision of lands defined herein." Id., § IX.C (emphasis

added). Thus, the City's subdivision regulations allow an agent of the

landowner to prepare and present a preliminary plat. Here, T

Investments and FHM presented the circuit court with affidavit

testimony indicating that T Investments was acting as FHM's agent

when it filed the application for conditional approval of the preliminary

plat. 5 The City and the Commission do not acknowledge, much less

dispute the accuracy of the facts alleged in, those affidavits.

     5Specifically, the T Investments and FHM submitted the affidavits

of James B. Marshall, Jr., a partner in FHM, and Foy Tatum, the owner
of T Investments, who both testified (1) that FHM had entered into an
agreement with T Investments to develop the subject property and (2)
that, as part of that agreement, FHM had authorized T Investments to
serve as its legal agent in presenting "the City … and the … Commission
[with] documents needed for approval of a preliminary plat, construction
permitting, final platting, and any other items needed to gain approval
to develop the [subject] property."

                                    24
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Furthermore, the Commission never indicated that T Investments was

not permitted to present the preliminary plat, and it did not cite that as

a basis for its disapproval of the plat. Because the City's subdivision

regulations permit the duly authorized agents of property owners to

present preliminary plats to the Commission, and because the affidavits

confirm the existence of an agency relationship between T Investments

and FHM, the Commission and the City's argument that T Investments

could not properly request the Commission's approval of the preliminary

plat is without merit.

                                   B.

     We now turn to the merits of the arguments raised in T Investments

and FHM's brief. T Investments and FHM contend that the Commission's

denial for "safety reasons" was impermissibly vague and speculative and

that the circuit court improperly "endeavored on a fact-finding mission to

resolve this vagueness by reasoning that … 'safety reasons' could be

broadly interpreted to mean there was a lack of the traffic study." T

Investments and FHM's brief at 29 (emphasis in original). According to

them, the meeting minutes control whether, pursuant to § 11-52-32(a),

the Commission sufficiently stated its grounds for denying conditional

                                   25
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approval of the preliminary plat. T Investments and FHM additionally

say that the Commission "did not and could not" base its disapproval on

the lack of a traffic study because the City, as evidenced by Tyson's

affidavit testimony, did not require a traffic study at the conditional-

approval stage. Id. at 32.

     The Commission and the City dispute T Investments and FHM's

contention that judicial review of the Commission's decision in this case

should be limited to the reasons recorded in the meeting minutes.

Instead, they urge this Court to consider, cumulatively, the minutes of

the meeting, the transcript of the meeting, and all other evidence in the

record in determining whether the Commission adequately stated its

grounds for denying conditional approval of the preliminary plat.

According to the Commission and the City, because that evidence reflects

that a traffic study was discussed during the meeting, and that one

commissioner cited the lack of a traffic study as a reason for his vote to

deny conditional approval of the preliminary plat, the circuit court

correctly concluded that the Commission's denial for "safety reasons" was

not impermissibly vague. They further contend that the discussions that

took place during the meeting provided the Commission with a

                                   26
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reasonable basis for its decision to deny conditional approval of the

preliminary plat for "safety reasons."

     As a threshold matter, we agree with T Investments and FHM's

contention that the meeting minutes, standing alone, fail to comply with

the requirements of § 11-52-32(a). This Court has held that "[n]otification

of disapproval must be accompanied by reasons sufficiently clear and

definite to inform a developer 'wherein the plan failed to meet the

requirements of the regulations.' " Ex parte Pine Brook Lakes, Inc., 617

So. 2d at 1016 (quoting Yokely, supra, § 54). In Ex parte Pine Brook

Lakes, Inc., we concluded that the "planned county roadway

construction" cited by Jefferson County as the basis for its disapproval of

a preliminary-plat application was insufficient under our statutes and

caselaw. Id. As we explained, "the purported explanation utterly fail[ed]

to apprise [the developer] of the nature of the deficiency, and,

consequently, of the nature of such amendments as would render the

plans acceptable." Id. Here, the "safety reasons" stated in the meeting

minutes gave no indication as to how T Investments and FHM could have

altered their application to address the Commission's concerns.

                                    27
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     As noted, however, the Commission and the City dispute T

Investments and FHM's contention that review of the Commission's

decision should be limited to the reasons recorded in the minutes of the

Commission's November 18, 2021, meeting. Although this Court has held

that a planning commission's reasons for denying a subdivision

application must be recorded, we have not interpreted § 11-52-32(a) as

requiring that those reasons be recorded in any specific type of document.

Thus, we reject T Investments and FHM's contention that planning

commissions can rely only on meeting minutes to satisfy § 11-52-32(a)'s

requirement that valid grounds for a planning commission's denial of

approval of a plat be adequately "stated upon the records of the municipal

planning commission."

     Nevertheless, even when we consider the Commission's meeting

minutes, the transcript of the meeting, and other evidence in the record

cumulatively, as the Commission and the City urge, that evidence does

not reveal that the Commission recorded a sufficiently specific basis for

its decision to deny conditional approval of the preliminary plat within

30 days -- or that the "safety reasons" cited in the meeting minutes

pertained to the lack of a traffic study.

                                     28
SC-2023-0017

     Crucially, although the transcript of the Commission's November

18, 2021, meeting reflects that several potential reasons for denying

conditional approval of the preliminary plat -- both valid and invalid --

were raised and debated throughout the course of that meeting, at the

time the commissioners voted to deny conditional approval of the

preliminary plat, only four of the nine commissioners in attendance

articulated their reasons for doing so. Of those four commissioners,

moreover, only one, Commissioner Cook, referenced the lack of a traffic

study, but he did not otherwise mention any safety concerns arising from

the lack of a traffic study.6 Furthermore, the two commissioners who

expressly referenced safety as a reason for their votes to deny conditional

     6Although    the circuit court's judgment states that "[t]he record
reflects that at least one [c]ommissioner cited lack of a traffic study and
potential danger to neighborhood residents caused by increased traffic in
the area," the transcript does not reflect that Commissioner Cook, or any
other commissioner, cited the danger posed by increased traffic as a
reason for disapproving the preliminary plat. According to the transcript,
when asked for his reasons for denying conditional approval of the
preliminary plat, Commissioner Cook responded as follows:

          "Mr. Cook: My reason is that the interconnectivity of the
     roads, the traffic -- I don't think there's a question about
     [whether] the traffic study has to be done. And I've got a
     question about the, uh, the change with the plat -- with the
     preliminary plat that was done in 2002."

                                    29
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approval of the preliminary plat made no effort to identify with any

particularity the bases for their stated safety concerns. Accordingly,

although the transcript of the meeting may reflect that T Investments

and FHM were made aware of various potential bases for the

Commission's decision to deny conditional approval of the preliminary

plat, the transcript does not indicate that T Investments and FHM were

provided with meaningful notice of the actual basis for the Commission's

collective decision to deny conditional approval of the preliminary plat.

     The evidence in the record, moreover, undermines the circuit

court's conclusion and strongly suggests that the Commission's

disapproval of the preliminary plat was not actually related to the lack

of a traffic study. As previously discussed, neither the meeting minutes

nor the denial letter mentioned a traffic-study requirement. The

Commission and the City's answer to the mandamus petition also made

no reference to T Investments and FHM's failure to provide a traffic

study.

     Most importantly, attached to the Commission and the City's

answer was the affidavit of Tyson, the City's land-use-control

administrator, who stated that "T Investments presented a preliminary

                                    30
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plat, whereas, a preliminary plat is a map of the property which can be

used in any zoned district. For a preliminary plat, a traffic impact study

is not required." (Emphasis added.)

     Likewise, at oral arguments before the circuit court, the

Commission and the City expressly conceded that T Investments and

FHM were not required to provide a traffic study for conditional approval

of a preliminary plat, stating: "With a planned unit development, you do

have to have what they call a traffic study. However, with a preliminary

plat, you do not have to have a traffic study." (Emphasis added.)

     Crucially, at no point in the proceedings before the circuit court did

the Commission and the City argue (1) that § III.A.3(j) of the City's

subdivision regulations required T Investments and FHM to submit a

traffic study or (2) that the lack of a traffic study was a valid or actual

basis for the Commission's disapproval of the preliminary plat. Thus, the

record of the proceedings before the circuit court indicate that the

Commission deliberately declined to adopt the lack of a traffic study as a

basis for its disapproval in the meeting minutes and denial letter and

that the Commission did not intend for the stated ground of "safety

                                    31
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reasons" to encompass T Investments and FHM's purported failure to

submit a comprehensive traffic analysis.

     The Commission and the City, for the first time in their briefing to

this Court, now contend that the Commission's denial based on "safety

reasons" was really because of the lack of a traffic study and therefore

was not overly broad and vague. However, beyond approvingly

reiterating the circuit court's findings and stating -- in conclusory fashion

-- that Tyson's affidavit testimony "cannot override" the City's

subdivision regulations,7 the Commission and the City do not explain

how the circuit court could have reasonably concluded that the

Commission's denial of conditional approval of the preliminary plat for

"safety reasons" was actually based on the T Investments and FHM's

purported failure to comply with § III.A.3(j) of the City's subdivision

regulations when, in proceedings before the circuit court, they never

alleged that the lack of a traffic study was a ground for the Commission's

decision and when their own employee swore that providing a traffic

     7We    note that the question whether the City's subdivision
regulations requires the submission of a traffic study is distinct from
whether the Commission (1) actually based its denial T Investments and
FHM's purported failure to provide a traffic study or (2) adequately
stated its reasons for the denial.

                                     32
SC-2023-0017

study was not a requirement for conditional approval. See Noojin v.

Mobile City Plan. Comm'n, 480 So. 2d 587, 590 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) ("The

commission would have this court judge the validity of the denial of

approval, not just in terms of the reason given in the official denial letter

…, but also in terms of the four purposes … set forth in the subsequent

letter …. This we cannot do.").

     The Commission and the City, moreover, distinguished the issue of

the traffic study from the safety concerns cited by the Commission,

explaining that the Commission's denial of conditional approval of the

preliminary plat "wasn't based solely on the traffic study … [or] the fact

that the residents w[ere] concerned about the 75-feet homes and the 100-

feet homes. They were, but it was also safety issues that w[ere]

addressed." (Emphasis added.)

     For these reasons, we conclude that the Commission failed to

satisfy § 11-52-32(a)'s requirement that valid and sufficiently specific

grounds for its denial of approval of a subdivision plat be "stated upon

the records" of the Commission within 30 days of the submission of the

plat. See Ex parte Pine Brook Lakes, Inc., supra. Because that failure

resulted in the automatic approval of the preliminary plat pursuant to

                                     33
SC-2023-0017

§ 11-52-32(a), T Investments and FHM are entitled to a writ of

mandamus directing the Commission to conditionally approve the

preliminary plat. See Sigler v. City of Mobile, supra.

                                  Conclusion

        Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court

and remand the case with instructions that the circuit court grant the

petition for the writ of mandamus.

        REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

        Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.

        Bryan, J., concurs in the result.

        Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Wise and Stewart, JJ.,

join.

                                      34
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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).

     I respectfully dissent. This Court has long held that municipal

planning commissions operate in an administrative capacity when

"exercising [their] function approving or disapproving any particular

subdivision plat." Boulder Corp. v. Vann, 345 So. 2d 272, 275 (Ala. 1977).

Although the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act, § 41-22-1 et seq.,

Ala. Code 1975, does not apply to the City of Montgomery Planning

Commission ("the Commission"), the majority correctly notes that, due to

the administrative nature of municipal planning commissions as arms of

municipal government, we must still accord the Commission's decision

considerable deference and affirm it " 'unless [it was] arbitrary,

capricious, or not made in compliance with applicable law.' " Ex parte City

of Fairhope, 739 So. 2d 35, 38 (Ala. 1999) (quoting State Dep't of Revenue

v. Acker, 636 So. 2d 470, 473 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)). But the majority's

invocation of this standard of review appears to be nominal at best

because it proceeds to do exactly that which the standard of review

forbids: The majority " 'substitute[s] its judgment for that of the

[Commission].' " Id. Notably, in its de novo review of the trial court's

judgment upholding the Commission's decision, the majority accepts

                                    35
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certain conclusions without any explanation, yet it ultimately reverses

the trial court's judgment by parsing the judgment and reweighing the

evidence before the Commission, deeming the Commission's recorded

reasons legally insufficient to support the denial of conditional approval

of the preliminary plat.

     Relying on a series of appellate decisions construing § 11-52-32(a),

Ala. Code 1975, the majority contends that a municipal planning

commission's reasons for disapproving a preliminary plat must be not

only valid but also "sufficiently clear" to apprise a developer of its plan's

deficiencies. Ex parte Pine Brook Lakes, Inc., 617 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Ala.

1992); see Smith v. City of Mobile, 374 So. 2d 305, 308 (Ala. 1979).

Applying this standard requiring fair notice to the developer, the

majority concludes that the "safety reasons" espoused by the Commission

did not relate to the lack of a traffic study and that the Commission failed

to record a sufficiently specific basis for denying conditional approval of

the preliminary plat. In so concluding, the majority, in my view, applies

the "sufficiently clear" prong in too exacting a manner, requiring a level

of specificity well beyond what our precedents mandate. Indeed, the two

cases the majority cites that applied this standard involved reasons for

                                     36
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denial that were so vague that the developer in each case had no guidance

regarding "the nature of [the] amendments [that] would render the plans

acceptable." Ex parte Pine Brook Lakes, Inc., 617 So. 2d at 1016 (noting

that the planning commission's citation to a "planned county roadway

construction" would authorize indefinite suspension of real-estate

development, which was at odds with the commission's own regulatory

time constraints); see Mobile City Plan. Comm'n v. Southern Region

Devs., Inc., 628 So. 2d 739, 740 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (affirming a trial

court's granting mandamus relief to a developer when the planning

commission based its denial merely on "concerns" and "questions").

     Such is not the case here. The trial court found that the

Commission's decision to deny conditional approval of the preliminary

plat because of "safety reasons" was valid, noting that at least one

commissioner had cited as the bases for his vote the lack of a traffic study

and -- more importantly -- the "potential danger to neighborhood

residents caused by increased traffic in the area." And unlike the

majority, I believe that § 11-52-32(a) requires only that the "ground of

disapproval of any plat shall be stated upon the records of the municipal

planning commission." It is logical to conclude that, based on all the

                                    37
SC-2023-0017

evidence presented at the Commission's November 18, 2021, meeting

(which the trial court had before it), the addition of 244 houses in a

subdivision will result in increased traffic and an increase in other

attendant dangers, about which the current residents expressed their

concerns. Surely the developers knew of those concerns as a result of

discussions they had with the residents before the Commission's

November meeting and as a result of views expressed by residents at the

meeting. I do not believe the "sufficiently clear" prong required the

Commission to record each safety concern that can be readily inferred

from the residents' expressions of concern and the circumstances at the

level of specificity the majority demands in order to affirm the trial

court's judgment and uphold the Commission's decision.

     One final note. The majority rests its decision on a series of cases

interpreting § 11-52-32 as imposing rather specific and onerous time

constraints and recording requirements. See Boulder Corp., 345 So. 2d at

276 (requiring a planning commission that disapproves a plat to record

its ground for doing so within 30 days of the submission date); Sigler v.

City of Mobile, 387 So. 2d 813, 814 (Ala. 1980) (holding that a proposed

plan should have been automatically approved because "[a]n invalid

                                   38
SC-2023-0017

reason is equivalent to no reason"); Ex parte Pine Brook Lakes, Inc., 617

So. 2d at 1016 (requiring that the "[n]otification of disapproval ... be

accompanied by reasons sufficiently clear and definite to inform a

developer 'wherein the plan failed to meet the requirements of the

regulations' "). But in so doing, I am concerned that the majority is

impliedly reaffirming interpretations of § 11-52-32 that are inconsistent

with the statute's plain meaning and that divest the Commission of its

proper authority and the deference its decisions are due to be afforded,

thereby rendering the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review a

nullity. Seeing as no party has asked that we overrule any of the decisions

in those cases, however, I will withhold judgment on this matter until a

later date.

     Regardless of the questionable tenability of those aforementioned

decisions, I believe the Commission recorded a valid and sufficiently clear

reason for its denial; therefore, I would affirm the trial court's judgment.

     Wise and Stewart, JJ., concur.

                                    39