Court Opinion

ID: 9453981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:31:23.600643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:54.867013
License: Public Domain

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part):
I am in full agreement with the view that under the undisputed facts the borrowed servant doctrine was improper-1 y submitted to the jury. With that issue correctly decided this is a classic case for retrial on the issue of damages only.
On interrogatories the jury found that the operator of the crane was negligent, that the decedent was not contributorily negligent, and that the accident caused aggravation of decedent’s pre-existing condition resulting in his death. Both parties moved for a directed verdict. The plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict on the borrowed servant issue which the jury by interrogatory found in favor of the defendant. We now rectify the error of submitting that issue to the jury. The only issue that has not been decided by the jury as a matter of fact> or by this court as a matter of law, is that of damages,
In several instances this Circuit has remanded cases for trial on the sole issue *133of damages. A recent — and close — case is Parker v. Wideman, 380 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1967), an automobile accident case, in which the jury found appellee liable to appellant for injuries as a proximate result of appellee’s negligence but assessed damages at zero. The court remanded for trial on the issue of damages only, saying:
On this appeal the only question presented relates solely to the issue of damages. The appellee has not contested the findings of negligence and proximate cause, and we do not think he could logically do so. Those matters were properly submitted to the jury and its determination of the factual controversy as to liability is adequately supported by the evidence. Hence, we conclude that the interests of justice are best served by vacating the judgment of the district court only as it relates to damages and remanding the cause solely for a trial as to damages. We therefore vacate that portion of the judgment awarding the appellant “no dollars” damages, and remand for a trial solely on the issue of damages. Id. at 437.
In Atkinson v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 143 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1944), an appeal from a jury verdict for plaintiff awarding compensatory damages only, this court remanded for trial on the sole issue of punitive damages, which the trial court had declined to submit to the jury. In Indamer Corp. v. Crandon, 217 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1954), the jury, having heard prejudicial remarks by defense counsel concerning insurance, returned a verdict for a small fraction of the damages proved. Remand was for retrial on damages alone. See also New Orleans & N. E. R. R. Co. v. Hewett Oil Co., 341 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1965); State ex rel. Sidenfaden v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 193 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1951).1
Partial new trial is discretionary and may be ordered only when the issues for new trial are so distinct and independent that they may be separately tried without injustice. The clearest case for exercise of our discretion is presented when the defendant has had a full and fair trial on the issues of liability and the jury by special interrogatory has established his culpability. To require this plaintiff to relitigate culpability when every factual issue except damages has been once found in his favor by the jury is a grave injustice to him out of keeping with the spirit of Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. See the discussion at 6A J. Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 59.06, at 3761 (2d ed. 1966). Likewise it is a disservice to the overburdened courts, racing to stay ahead of the tidal waves of litigation.2
Perhaps the most serious effect of a decision such as this one is the damper *134that it puts on intelligent use of Fed.R. Civ.P. 49. The Fifth Circuit has been the pacesetter in urging the . district courts to employ the flexibility of special findings of facts because of their demonstrable value in excising critical issues for appellate review and enabling correction of errors by a limited new trial. Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84, 93, n. 3 (5th Cir. 1966) and Fifth Circuit cases there cited; Brown, John R., Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, 44 F.R.D. 338 (1968); Wright, The Use of Special Verdicts in Federal Court, 38 F.R.D. 199 (1965). “[The special verdict technique] affords the reviewing court a sure foundation for approving the part of the trial uninfected by the error by leaving the retrial to specific separable issues.” Brown, supra, 44 F.R.D. at 348. As an appellate court we cannot call on the trial courts to employ this useful device to limit litigation if when employed we will not take advantage of it. Having received a case in which by the trial judge’s diligence only limited postoperative surgery is required, the majority direct him to perform the operation over again.
Our exercise of discretion may not properly turn on whether factual issues already decided by a jury are close ones or whether we as appellate judges agree with what the jury found. There is no injustice in a partial new trial in this case except in the mind of the defendant, who having once lost on proximate causation wants a crack at another jury with the hope he will come out better.

. Compare Hatfield v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company, 5 Cir., 396 F.2d 721 [June, 1968]. The jury, by special interrogatories, found defendant liable and in the face of evidence of serious injuries and substantial medical expenses and lost wages awarded damages of $1.00. The court reversed for a new trial on all issues but pointed out that it did so because jury impropriety was apparent in the form of a compromise, an attempt to force defendant to pay the costs, or refusal to follow the court’s instructions. Compare also Korbut v. Keystone Shipping Co., 380 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1967) in which maintenance and cure was correctly fixed by the jury but the trial court arbitrarily reduced the jury award, and the jury was unable to agree on Jones Act damages whereupon the trial court fixed the damages therefor. On appeal this court direefed entry of judgment for the correct amount for maintenance and cure and granted a partial new trial on all other issues, for the reasons that the trial had been short, issues of liability neither complex nor burdensome to litigate, and plaintiff’s credibility was attacked both with respect to liability and damages.
For remand for trial of single issues other than damages, see Gallo v. Crocker, 321 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1963), new trial on sole issue of whether injury was caused by concurrent negligence of two defendants after a jury charge that plaintiff could recover against either defendant but not both, and Clark v. Bauman, 339 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1964).

. E. g., Peters v. Rutledge, 5th Cir. 1968, 397 F.2d 731 [June 6, 1968] n. 22; Shafroth, Survey of the United States Courts of Appeals, 42 F.R.D. 243 (1968).