Court Opinion

ID: 9930592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 13:02:20.68502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:16:38.160089
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                      LOANFLIGHT LENDING, LLC,

                                Appellant,

                                     v.

                            BANKRATE, LLC,

                                 Appellee.

                              No. 2D22-3394

                            February 7, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Darren D.
Farfante, Judge.

Nicholas Lafalce and John A. Anthony of Anthony & Partners, LLC,
Tampa, for Appellant.

Thomas A. Valdez and Winifred H. Quinlan of Quintairos, Prieto, Wood &
Boyer, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.

LaROSE, Judge.
     LoanFlight Lending, LLC, appeals the order dismissing its lawsuit
against Bankrate, LLC. The trial court determined that the forum
selection clause contained in the parties' business contract required
LoanFlight to sue in New York. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P.
9.030(b)(1)(A).1 We reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing so that it may resolve disputed issues of fact.

     1 LoanFlight's notice of appeal invoked our jurisdiction pursuant to

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110. However, this is a procedural
                               Background
     LoanFlight is a Tampa-based residential mortgage lender.
Bankrate is a consumer financial services company incorporated in
Delaware; its principal place of business is in South Carolina.
LoanFlight engaged Bankrate to help market its financial products and
services. As LoanFlight artfully described it, the service Bankrate offered
was akin to "match.com for home lenders." LoanFlight paid for access to
Bankrate's website platform to obtain leads from consumers whose
mortgage needs matched LoanFlight's loan rates.
     Apparently, as mortgage interest rates rose, the number of fruitful
leads available to LoanFlight evaporated. LoanFlight complained that
Bankrate overbilled for its services and furnished fabricated leads.
LoanFlight sued Bankrate in Hillsborough County for fraud, unjust
enrichment, and declaratory relief.2

rule. Compare Fla. R. App. P. 9.030 ("Jurisdiction of Courts"), with 9.110
("Appeal Proceedings to Review Final Orders of Lower Tribunals and
Orders Granting New Trial in Jury and Nonjury Cases").
       Moreover, the notice included the following footnote:
       It is unclear whether or not the Dismissal Order is a final
       order. See Touchton v. Woodside Credit, LLC, 316 So. 3d 392[,
       394] ([Fla. 2d DCA ]2021) (citing Bd. [o]f Cnty. Comm'rs of
       Madison C[n]ty. v. Grice, 438 So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. 1983))
       ("[w]here an order merely grants a motion to dismiss, it is not
       a final order."). This Notice of Appeal is being filed in
       abundance of caution in the event it is determined that the
       Dismissal Order is a final order.
(Fifth alteration in original.)
       The order provides that LoanFlight's "Complaint is dismissed
without prejudice to its right to bring these claims under the Agreement's
Governing Law provision in the appropriate forum." Ordinarily, "when an
order dismisses a complaint 'without prejudice,' that language signifies
that the order is not a final order." Al–Hakim v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 161
So. 3d 568, 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). However, "[i]f a dismissal is
'without prejudice' but it is clear from the context of the record that the
                                       2
      Bankrate moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that
"LoanFlight . . . sued Bankrate in the wrong place." In support of its
motion, Bankrate submitted two documents to the trial court.
      One was an unsigned and undated Master Advertising Services
Agreement (MASA).3 Purportedly, the MASA reflected the business
arrangement between LoanFlight and Bankrate. Section 12, Paragraph
G of the MASA provided as follows:
            Governing Law; Jurisdiction. This Agreement and all
      transactions contemplated by this Agreement will be governed
      by, and construed and enforced in accordance with, the laws
      of the State of New York. Any civil action or legal proceeding
      arising out of or relating to this Agreement will be brought
      exclusively in the courts of record of the State of New York in
      New York City or the United States District Court, Southern

plaintiff's right to pursue the case requires the filing of a new case, the
order is final." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 206 So. 3d 734, 736
(Fla. 3d DCA 2016). The order before us fits the bill of finality. Thus,
our jurisdiction lies under rule 9.030(b)(1)(A), authorizing district courts
of appeal to "review . . . final orders of trial courts, not directly reviewable
by the supreme court." (Footnotes omitted.)
      2 LoanFlight did not attach to its complaint a contract or other

document memorializing the parties' respective duties and
responsibilities in their business relationship.
      3 Bankrate is named as a party to the MASA.      LoanFlight is not
named in the MASA. Indeed, the MASA lacks any indication that any
other party agreed to its terms.
      According to Bankrate, the MASA is an enforceable "click-through"
agreement. See Vitacost.com, Inc. v. McCants, 210 So. 3d 761, 764–66
(Fla. 4th DCA 2017). See generally IT Strategies Grp., Inc. v. Allday
Consulting Grp., L.L.C., 975 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1280 (S.D. Fla. 2013) ("On
the internet, the primary means of forming a contract are the so called
'clickwrap' (or 'click-through') agreements, in which website users
typically click an 'I agree' box after being presented with a list of terms
and conditions of use, and the 'browsewrap' agreements, w[h]ere website
terms and conditions of use are posted on the website typically as a
hyperlink at the bottom of the screen." (quoting Hines v. Overstock.com,
668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D. N.Y. 2009))).
                                       3
      District of, New York, Borough of Manhattan. Each Party
      consents to the jurisdiction of such court in any such civil
      action or legal proceeding and waives any objection to the
      laying of venue of any such civil action or legal proceeding in
      such court. Service of any court paper may be effected on
      such Party by mail, as provided in this Agreement, or in such
      other manner as may be provided under applicable laws,
      rules of procedure, or local rules.
      Bankrate's second document was titled "Amendment 1 To Master
Advertising Services Agreement" (Amendment 1). Paul Blaylock,
LoanFlight's CEO, signed Amendment 1 virtually. The "Recitals" in
Amendment 1 stated that "Customer [LoanFlight] and Bankrate entered
into a [MASA], dated August 6, 2018." Amendment 1 had a January 19,
2022, effective date.
      Based on these documents, Bankrate contended that New York was
the proper forum for the lawsuit. Bankrate asked the trial court to
dismiss LoanFlight's lawsuit "without prejudice to LoanFlight's right to
bring it in . . . New York."
      Thereafter, a legal tit-for-tat ensued, with each party submitting
written arguments and various exhibits. LoanFlight observed that the
forum selection clause was contained in the undated, unsigned MASA,
not in Amendment 1. It contended that "[i]t is axiomatic that for a party
to be bound by a forum clause contained within an agreement, the party
must have actually signed the agreement thereby agreeing to be bound
by the provisions therein." Bankrate countered that LoanFlight had
signed the MASA. Bankrate presented a diminutive screenshot of
LoanFlight's alleged click-through acceptance of the MASA. However, the
screenshot simply states that a "Legal Agreement" was accepted, not that
LoanFlight had agreed to the MASA.
      The trial court conducted a nonevidentiary hearing on Bankrate's
motion to dismiss. The trial court simply heard counsel's arguments.
                                     4
     Bankrate complained of LoanFlight's "artful pleading" and posited a
tautology:
     [T]he common denominator with every count is the fact that
     the leads that they obtained as a result of the agreement they
     entered into with Bankrate is the problem. That's the basis,
     that's the core, of their complaint, and all of those leads are
     only available to them because they entered into a contract
     with Bankrate.
In other words, an executed MASA had to exist because it was necessary
for LoanFlight to secure leads from Bankrate.
     Not so, LoanFlight insisted. It responded that there was no signed
MASA in evidence, only an alleged screenshot of LoanFlight's purported
click-through acceptance of the MASA. LoanFlight suggested it was an
unusual and suspicious anachronism. Cf. William Shakespeare, Julius
Caesar act 2, sc. 1, lines 193-195 (Brutus: "Peace, count the clock." /
Cassius: "The clock has stricken three."). LoanFlight admitted that it did
business with Bankrate pursuant to an informal, unwritten handshake
agreement, and that "there was no [written] contract of any kind" until
Mr. Blaylock "DocuSign[ed]" Amendment 1. Further, LoanFlight's
counsel reported that "Mr. Blaylock vehemently states that he's never
seen or signed th[e MASA]." Instead, counsel relayed that Mr. Blaylock
"was induced to sign [Amendment 1] well after the damage[s] had
occurred in order for [Bankrate] to cover their tracks. That's something
for an evidentiary hearing. . . . What happened here was all the damages
were incurred and then [Mr. Blaylock] signed the amendment."
     Bankrate's counsel opined that an evidentiary hearing was
unnecessary. She argued that "by virtue of the click-through agreement,

                                    5
which we have provided and attached to the Motion to Dismiss, evidence
of that click-through agreement, the initial contract was signed."4
      The trial court noted that although the MASA was not attached to
LoanFlight's complaint, it was attached to Bankrate's motion to dismiss.
The trial court observed that the complaint "detailed the relationship
between the parties" and that "[t]he court is well within its purview to
consider the Agreement . . . [in light of] the allegations of the complaint."
      In its order, the trial court observed that Amendment 1's "Recitals"
reflect Mr. Blaylock's acknowledgment that the parties had "entered into
[the MASA] dated August 6, 2018." The trial court pointed out that
"[t]his acknowledgement is contrary to an unverified representation made
in argument at the hearing . . . that the [MASA] was never signed by
LoanFlight." Consequently, the trial court did "not believe there [wa]s
any authority that compels it to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a
Motion to Dismiss where the forum selection clause is specific and
detailed and has no discretionary or permissive language." Because it
was mandatory, "the forum selection clause . . . governs."

      4 Although a MASA was attached to Bankrate's motion to dismiss,

LoanFlight's purported "assent" to the agreement first appears in our
record as a copied-and-pasted screenshot in the body of Bankrate's
"Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss":

                                      6
     After the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, LoanFlight
sought reconsideration.5 LoanFlight argued that disputed issues of fact
precluded the trial court from dismissing the lawsuit without conducting
an evidentiary hearing. LoanFlight attached an affidavit from Mr.
Blaylock affirming:
     Of my own personal knowledge, I am not aware that such
     document was presented, generated, agreed to, or otherwise
     came into existence as a result of the arrangement between
     LoanFlight and Bankrate. I do not have any information as to
     the origin of this document other than as stated by Bankrate
     in the context of this Action.
          It is my understanding that the relationship formed
     between LoanFlight and Bankrate was not evidenced by a
     contract at the time of the relationship's inception.
     The trial court never ruled on the motion. Fearing that the
dismissal order was nonfinal, LoanFlight filed a notice of appeal to
preserve its appellate remedies.6
                                    Analysis
     We review the trial court's dismissal order de novo. See All Ins.
Restoration Servs., Inc. v. Heritage Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 338 So. 3d 448,
449 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ("When considering an order granting a motion
to dismiss, the de novo standard of review applies." (quoting Belcher Ctr.
LLC v. Belcher Ctr., Inc., 883 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004))). As

     5 In a footnote, LoanFlight expressed doubt about whether the

dismissal order was a final appealable order. In an abundance of
caution, LoanFlight advised that its motion for reconsideration was "filed
on a conditional basis" in order "to avoid waiving its appellate rights if in
fact the Dismissal Order is determined to be a final order."
     6 We need not address Bankrate's assorted claims that LoanFlight's

arguments are not preserved for appeal. We have carefully considered
arguments from LoanFlight's various written and oral arguments in the
trial court. Suffice it to say, LoanFlight preserved for our review the
argument on which it now prevails.
                                       7
framed by the parties, the issue before us is one of contract formation.
See Gunderson v. Sch. Dist. of Hillsborough Cnty., 937 So. 2d 777, 779
(Fla. 1st DCA 2006) ("Where the order on appeal turns on the validity of a
contract, it is subject to a de novo standard of review."); see also Am.
Boxing & Athletic Ass'n v. Young, 911 So. 2d 862, 864 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
("[A]n appellate court reviews the interpretation of a contractual forum
selection provision as a matter of law.").
      "The right to initially select venue belongs to the plaintiff. It is the
defendant's burden to plead and prove that venue is improper." Loiaconi
v. Gulf Stream Seafood, Inc., 830 So. 2d 908, 909–10 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
(citation omitted). Further, "[i]t is well established that 'parties may
provide by their agreement where suit may be brought to enforce it.' "
Pocock v. Pocock, 360 So. 3d 1219, 1222 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (quoting
Interval Mktg. Assocs. v. Sea Club Assocs. IV, 468 So. 2d 262, 263 (Fla.
2d DCA 1985)).
      The rationale underlying forum selection clauses is sound. As our
supreme court observed, "forum selection clauses provide a degree of
certainty to business contracts by obviating jurisdictional struggles and
by allowing parties to tailor the dispute resolution mechanism to their
particular situation." Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. 1986)
(quoting Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., Inc., 320
N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1982)).
      Our task is to review whether the trial court properly dismissed
LoanFlight's lawsuit based on counsel's filings and arguments. Doing so
requires that we review the record in light of LoanFlight's contention that
it had never seen the MASA until seeing Bankrate's motion to dismiss.
      Despite the technological advances attendant to the Internet,
antediluvian pre-world wide web legal principles still adhere:

                                       8
      "While new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to
      many new situations, it has not fundamentally changed the
      principles of contract." Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356
      F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir.[ ]2004). One such principle is the
      requirement that "[m]utual manifestation of assent, whether
      by written or spoken word or by conduct, is the touchstone of
      contract." Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17,
      29 (2d Cir.[ ]2002).
Vitacost.com, Inc. v. McCants, 210 So. 3d 761, 762 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)
(alterations in original) (quoting Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d
1171, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2014)); see also State v. Fam. Bank of
Hallandale, 623 So. 2d 474, 479–80 (Fla. 1993) ("Mutual assent is an
absolute condition precedent to the formation of a contract. Absent
mutual assent, neither the contract nor any of its provisions come into
existence.").
      For a party to be bound by a forum selection clause contained in a
contract, the party must have assented to the contract. See You Fit, Inc.
v. Core Indus., Inc., No. 8:12-cv-840-T-26TBM, 2012 WL 12952734, at *3
(M.D. Fla. June 22, 2012); Bodywell Nutrition, LLC v. Fortress Sys., LLC,
No. 10-61646-CIV, 2011 WL 31074, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2011); Ward
v. Kerzner Int'l Hotels Ltd., No. 03-23087-CIV-JORDAN, 2005 WL
2456191, at *6-7 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2005); cf. Arena Football League v.
Bishop, 220 So. 3d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ("A contract requires
mutual assent, and a form contract that provides it is between two
parties . . . and that has only one party's signature cannot—without
more—demonstrate mutual assent." (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
      Having laid down some general, but fundamental, principles of
contract formation, we turn to the issue at hand. "A motion by the
defendant to dismiss or transfer on the ground of improper venue raises
issues of fact which must be resolved by an evidentiary hearing, unless
the complaint shows on its face that venue is improper." Kinetiks.Com,
                                     9
Inc. v. Sweeney, 789 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001);
Leatherwood v. Cardservice Int'l, Inc., 885 So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla. 4th DCA
2004). "[W]hile a trial court has broad discretion in dealing with matters
of venue, the party challenging venue must provide a sufficient factual
basis for the exercise of that discretion." Loiaconi, 830 So. 2d at 910.
     Our record contains an undated and unsigned MASA. It does not
show that LoanFlight assented to the agreement, much less that it was
even a party to it. To hear LoanFlight tell it, Bankrate contrived the
document out of whole cloth. Bankrate retorts that LoanFlight was the
signatory to the MASA. Particularly problematic, there is no record
evidence proving or disproving either side's position.7 Rather, counsel's
arguments about what happened conflict. We are not persuaded that a
screenshot submitted by Bankrate is conclusive as to whether LoanFlight
signed the MASA. For that matter, Amendment 1 contained virtual
signature blocks, while the MASA does not:

These many uncertainties urge caution. Based on our record, we are
reluctant to conclude that LoanFlight entered into the MASA.

     7 The trial court relied heavily upon Amendment 1's "Recitals."

However, LoanFlight disputed that it had ever signed the MASA, and
Bankrate's submission of the undated and unsigned MASA does not
demonstrate that LoanFlight was a party to the agreement, much less
that the MASA was the August 6, 2018, agreement to which Amendment
1 referred.
                                    10
      Bankrate argues that the trial court properly dismissed LoanFlight's
lawsuit without an evidentiary hearing. Bankrate tells us that a forum
selection clause is presumptively valid and that it met its initial burden
by simply filing the document.
      [W]here the relevant parties executed an agreement with a
      forum selection clause, such clause is presumed valid and the
      party seeking to avoid its application bears the burden "to
      establish that trial in the contractual forum will be so gravely
      difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical
      purposes be deprived of his day in court."
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. v. Ooi, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1697, D1699
(Fla. 3d DCA Aug. 23, 2023) (quoting Steiner Transocean Ltd. v.
Efremova, 109 So. 3d 871, 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)).
      We are unpersuaded. Bankrate's argument elides the antecedent,
and controlling, issue: whether the parties entered a contract with a
forum selection clause. Bankrate submitted an unsigned and undated
MASA. Bankrate's argument requires cobbling together piecemeal
documents to create an enforceable forum selection clause. Without the
benefit of an evidentiary hearing, and in the face of LoanFlight's
consistent and repeated claims that it did not enter the MASA, we are
hesitant to undertake that task. See New England Tank Indus. of N.H.,
Inc. v. United States, 865 F.2d 243, 245 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("It is, of course,
axiomatic that an appellate court must not 'find its own facts' . . . ."); see
also, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123
(1969) ("[A]ppellate courts must constantly have in mind that their
function is not to decide factual issues de novo."); Goland v. Cent. Intel.
Agency, 607 F.2d 339, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Factfinding and the
creation of a record are the functions of the [trial] court . . . ."). And the
trial court could not do so absent evidence. See, e.g., Interactive Retail
Mgmt., Inc. v. Microsoft Online, L.P., 988 So. 2d 717, 721 (Fla. 2d DCA

                                      11
2008) ("Because there were disputed issues of fact concerning the
existence of a valid and enforceable forum selection clause, the trial
court should have held an evidentiary hearing before granting the motion
to dismiss for improper venue."); Leatherwood, 885 So. 2d at 998
(holding that a factual dispute concerning the enforceability of a forum
selection clause required reversal of an order dismissing the complaint
and remand for an evidentiary hearing). Disputed factual issues
concerning the existence of an enforceable contract are properly fleshed
out at an evidentiary hearing before the trial court. Cf. Consolo v. A.M.K.
Corp., 344 So. 2d 1285, 1286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (explaining that the
unresolved issues of fact concerning "whether or not a contract existed
between the parties" precluded the entry of summary judgment).
                                Conclusion
     We reverse the trial court's dismissal order and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
     Reversed and remanded.

SLEET, C.J., and MORRIS, J., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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