Court Opinion

ID: 9714577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:40:40.855448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:27.197879
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Because I do not believe that the Department of Transportation (DOT) met its burden of proving that Anthony Millili was given proper chemical test warnings at the scene of the traffic stop or at the police station, I would reverse. Inexplicably, the majority does not address this issue.
It is well-settled that to sustain a license suspension under section 1547(b) of the Vehicle Code,1 DOT must establish that the motorist: (1) was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol; (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test of breath, blood or urine; (3) refused to submit to the requested chemical test; and (4) was specifically warned that refusal would result in a license suspension. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Boucher, 547 Pa. 440, 691 A.2d 450 (1997); Yoon v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 718 A.2d 386 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998).
There is no question here that DOT proved the first element; Millili was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. With respect to the second and third elements, the majority states that the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court) received conflicting testimony concerning whether Millili was asked to submit to a chemical test and whether Millili refused to take a test. (Majority op. at 113.) The majority goes on to say that the trial court reconciled that conflicting testimony and determined that Millili had been asked to submit to a chemical test but refused. (Majority op. at 113.) However, the majority does not address the fourth element, whether Millili was specifically warned that his refusal would result in a license suspension. This is a critical omission in the majority opinion. If DOT failed to prove that Millili was given a proper chemical test warning, then DOT failed to meet its burden, and the license suspension could not be sustained.
In stating the trial court’s conclusions in this case, the majority does not even mention the trial court’s determination as to whether Millili was specifically warned that refusing to submit to a chemical test would result in the suspension of his driver’s license.2 The trial court found as follows:
Both at the scene of the traffic stop and afterwards at the station house, the officer asked Mr. Millili to submit to a chemical test. In fact, the officer read directly from [DOT’s] form entitled *116“Chemical Testing Warning and Report of Refusal to Submit to Chemical Testing as Authorized by Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code....” The form states in relevant part:
It is my duty as a police officer, to inform you that if you refuse to submit to the chemical test your operating privilege will be suspended for a period of one year.
(Trial court op. at 2.) In other words, the trial court found that the officer read the warning to Millili from a DOT form at the scene of the traffic stop and at the police station. However, the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the finding that Millili received proper warnings at either location.
First, the officer did not testify that he read from a DOT form at the scene of the traffic stop. Rather, the officer testified that the DOT forms are kept at the police station, that he does not carry the DOT forms with him and that he only read a DOT form to Millili at the police station. (R.R. at 31a.) Clearly then, the record provides no basis for concluding that the officer gave Millili a proper chemical test warning at the scene of the traffic stop.3
Second, the officer presented conflicting testimony as to whether he gave Millili a proper chemical test warning at the police station. The officer testified before the trial court that he took Millili to the police station and “read him the refusal form.” (R.R. at 24a.) However, the officer admitted on cross-examination that he testified differently at Millili’s preliminary hearing. (R.R. at 38a.) At Millili’s preliminary hearing, the officer testified that he simply processed Millili at the police station and took him home, that he never discussed chemical testing with Millili and that he never showed Millili the DOT form. (R.R. at 38a.) Thus, the officer testified both that he did and he did not give Millili chemical test warnings at the police station.
Questions of credibility and conflicts in the evidence are for the trial court to resolve. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873 (1989). Conflicts in the evidence most often arise when two different witnesses contradict one another. Here, the same witness contradicted himself, presenting two entirely different stories about what .happened at the police station after Millili’s arrest. The trial court chose to believe one of the two accounts b.ut did not explain that choice. As the fact finder, the trial court is required to actually resolve conflicts in the evidence; the law does not permit the trial court to simply “flip a coin” and avoid resolving those conflicts.
That is why, in reviewing trial court decisions, this court must examine whether the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. O’Connell. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Purcell v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 689 A.2d 1002 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). In other words, substantial evidence provides the fact finder with a reason, or reasons, for making a particular determination. Cf. Hahnemann University Hospital v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Wallace), 718 A.2d 391 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (holding that a workers’ compensation judge must adequately explain the reasons for rejecting conflicting evidence).
Certainly, no one would choose to believe one of two conflicting stories without *117a reason.4 Here, the trial court offered no reason for choosing to believe that the officer gave Millili a chemical test warning at the police station when the officer admitted testifying under oath that he did not do so. Thus, the trial court’s finding does not reflect that it is supported by substantial evidence.
Because DOT failed to meet its burden of proving by substantial evidence that the officer gave Millili a chemical test warning at the scene of the traffic stop or at the police station, I would reverse.
Judge KELLEY joins in this dissent.

. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b).

. In stating the facts of this case, the majority says nothing about chemical test warnings at the scene of the traffic stop. (Majority op. at 112.) The majority does state as a fact that Sergeant John Cane read DOT Form DL-26 to Millili at the police station. (Majority op. at 113.) However, in summarizing the trial court’s conclusions in this case, the majority merely states: "The court concluded that DOT had demonstrated that Millili was asked to submit to chemical testing and refused to do so.” (Majority op. at 113.) There is no mention of the trial court’s conclusion with respect to the chemical test warnings.

. Although the record does not support a finding that the officer gave Millili a proper chemical test warning at the scene of the traffic stop, a defective warning can be cured by a post-warning opportunity to assent to chemical testing. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Zeltins, 150 Pa. Cmwlth. 44, 614 A.2d 349 (1992). Thus, we must also examine whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the officer gave Millili a proper chemical test warning at the police station.

. To make such a choice would be completely arbitrary, and the administration of justice cannot be arbitrary.