Court Opinion

ID: 9533786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:34:37.561443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:10.499350
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I agree that the definition of “patently offensive” in section 18-7-101(4), 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.) is unconstitutionally overbroad because the term is defined in terms of community standards of decency. However, I do not agree that the defective term may be effectively severed from the statute without rendering the balance of the Act unconstitutional.
We have held that where first amendment freedoms are at stake, precision in drafting and clarity of purpose are priority considerations. People v. Tabron, 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976); see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975). The term “obscene,” as defined by section 18-7-101(2), 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.), is central to the legislative scheme of Colorado’s obscenity statute, and its validity is dependent upon the constitutional standard of “patently offensive.” See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). Inasmuch as the “patently offensive” standard as prescribed by the General Assembly is unconstitutionally overbroad, I would conclude that the statutory definition of “obscene” must also fall as being unconstitutionally infirm.
While I recognize that the General Assembly may be prohibited from adopting specific criteria defining a community standard of patent offensiveness, see Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 (1977); cf. Op. at 359-360, n. 14, I do not read our federal guidelines as precluding the state from establishing substantive rules to define the permissible parameters of the community standard. Compare Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. at 302, 97 S.Ct. at 1764 with Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 2754, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). In my view, it is short sighted to attempt to surgically excise the “patently offensive” provision from the statute in an effort to uphold the balance of the Act, particularly in light of the centrality of the provision to the legislative scheme. Absent the statutory guidance of section 18-7-101(4), the substantive delineation of what may be deemed “patently offensive” is left to divergent judicial articulations or the unbridled discretion of a jury in any particular case.
Recognizing the difficulties in engineering an obscenity statute that comports with constitutional requirements, I would never*378theless conclude that the better result in this case is to declare that the infirmities contained in section 18-7-101(4) renders the statute unconstitutional in its entirety.