Court Opinion

ID: 9964764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 19:01:18.369127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:41.566670
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       APR 30 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LANCE ELLIOT WILLIAMS,                          No. 23-15751

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00513-DJC-AC

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
D. LACROIX, Correctional Officer,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of California
                   Daniel J. Calabretta, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted April 22, 2024**

Before:      CALLAHAN, LEE, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

      Lance Elliot Williams, a former California state prisoner, appeals pro se

from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action after

denying Williams’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
interpretation and application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Washington v. L.A. County

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.

      The district court properly denied Williams’s motion to proceed IFP because

Williams does not challenge that he had filed at least three prior actions that were

dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim, and he failed to

plausibly allege that he was “under imminent danger of serious physical injury” at

the time he lodged the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Andrews v. Cervantes,

493 F.3d 1047, 1052-53, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the imminent danger

exception to § 1915(g)).

      We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

      AFFIRMED.

                                           2                                    23-15751