Court Opinion

ID: 9695492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:20:56.065874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:12.777546
License: Public Domain

WEISBERGER,
Chief Justice, concurring.
I concur completely in the opinion written by Justice Goldberg, not only in respect to her conclusions, but also in respect to the rationale of that opinion.
I write separately only to indicate that our dissenting justices have expended more than twenty pages of enunciation of policy that could have been implemented by less than a paragraph of legislation had the General Assembly been inclined so to provide.
I do not disagree that sound policy would support legislation that would enable a police officer to obtain a warrant for the production of a blood sample in the event that he or she had probable cause to believe that a suspect committed a felony by taking the life or seriously injuring a human being while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. The sad fact is that G.L.1956 § 12-5-2 simply does not authorize the issuance of such a warrant.
The dissenters eloquently argue that common sense should dictate that the consent of one who has committed the crime of driving under the influence of drugs or a controlled substance resulting in death should not be required as a condition precedent to obtaining a blood sample by a physician or qualified medical technician for the purpose of testing the content of that blood. I would agree that common sense would support such an outcome. However, the incontrovertible truth is that our felony statutes, G.L.1956 §§ 31-27-1 and 31-27-2.2, do not contain such a statement. Further, the provisions of G.L.1956 § 5-37.3-4 specifically prohibit the release of such medical health care information in the absence of written consent of the patient or his or her authorize representative. A close reading of the exceptions provided under § 5-37.3-4(b) discloses no provisions for release of the results of a blood test obtained pursuant to a judicial warrant.
I sincerely wish that our statutory provisions in chapter 27 of title 31 and in chapter 37.3 of title 5 would authorize the obtaining of a blood sample or other chemical tests of breath and body fluids when probable cause exists to believe that a suspect has committed vehicular homicide. The plain fact is that our statutes make no such provision. All of the oratory in the dissent cannot amend these statutes to achieve the desired purpose. Only the General Assembly has this power.
I believe that the statements of policy and reason set forth in the dissent have considerable merit. However, these statements should be addressed to the Legislature and not to this Court. An examination of the relevant statutes indicates that there is a significant tension evidenced by our statutory structure between the objec*1171tive of protecting the confidentiality of persons accused of a crime (particularly matters relating to the disclosure of health care information or requiring such person to submit to chemical tests of breath and bodily fluids), and the desire to prosecute for serious criminal offenses. The result is, as we stated fourteen years ago in State v. Timms, 505 A.2d 1132, 1135-36 (R.I. 1986), that no person accused of driving so as to endanger resulting in death, wherein the alcoholic content of the person’s blood would be a relevant factor in determining his or her ability to drive safely could be subjected to a blood test without that person’s consent. I agree that the feeble civil remedy provided for refusing the chemical test is an insufficient disincentive for such refusal when one is accused of vehicular homicide. See § 31-27-2.1. I would urge the General Assembly to amend the law so that it might read as the dissenters would have it read.
However, I do not believe that the members of this Court have the power to torture the language of these various relevant statutes in order to bring about the desired result. I would, therefore, respectfully ask the members of the General Assembly to review these statutes in the light of State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251 (R.I.1998); State v. Timms, supra; and State v. St. Jean, 554 A.2d 206 (R.I.1989), as well as the various opinions in this case, and enact into law the suggestions contained in the dissenting opinion. I would certainly applaud such action, but do not have the power by decisional legerdemain to amend the existing statutes so as to achieve the dissenters’ objective.