Court Opinion

ID: 9670264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:17:45.104968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:03.443298
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring specially).
Beginning with my special writing in Northwestern Eng’r v. Thunderbolt Enterprises, 301 N.W.2d 421, 424 (S.D.1981) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), through my most recent dissent in Hageman v. Vander Vorste, 403 N.W.2d 420, 424 (S.D.1987), I have consistently taken a position on the determination of prejudgment interest. Two of my writings have been majority decisions involving this legal subject, namely, Hanson v. Funk Seeds Int'l 373 N.W.2d 30 (S.D.1985), and Meyer v. Dixon, 369 N.W.2d 658 (S.D. 1985).
Throughout my various writings, as the storm on the sea of prejudgment interest has raged, I have tried to grasp the rudder of Beka v. Lithium Corp. of America, 77 S.D. 370, 375, 92 N.W.2d 156, 159-60 (1958), hoping I could come safely to shore.
Circuit Judge Merton Tice’s scholarly treatise is to be admired, now tendered as the majority opinion, which I join. However, therein contained are references to certain cases in this Court — some reviewed — some criticized — some obliquely critiqued — and thus it is necessary to, at least, mention my previous navigation on the prejudgment waters. This special concurrence, I vouchsafe unto myself, that my previous writings and positions on prejudgment interest be cumulatively understood; and, further, because Judge Tice’s criticism of inconsistency might very well strike an undeserving target. Needless to say, prejudgment interest has occupied an inordinate amount of my time in writing majority opinions, researching, authoring minority opinions, and attempting to distinguish the differences in cases. It is not an easy task.
Let it be understood, I have no deep conceptual difference with Judge Tice’s basic mooring of the affirmance of the Honorable Circuit Court Judge E.W. Hertz. In fact, the precise question, as Judge Tice instructs us, has never precisely been before us. His majority opinion, which I take and understand to be, is simply that a defendant cannot pay over damages to a plaintiff until a jury sets the proportionate *26fault in a jury trial involving contributory negligence because he, the defendant, cannot, with any degree of certainty, know the amount of damages which he would owe.*
Beka, cited in the majority opinion, is the beacon light to avoid going upon the shoals. Judge Tice’s writing is anchored on State v. Ed Cox & Son, 81 S.D. 165, 132 N.W.2d 282 (1965), and Beka, 77 S.D. 370, 92 N.W.2d 156. This author, on behalf of the majority in Hanson, 373 N.W.2d at 36, likewise bottomed his writing on Ed Cox & Son and Beka. In Hanson, 373 N.W.2d at 36, we wrote:
To be awarded prejudgment interest under this statute, the exact amount of damages must be known or readily ascertainable. State v. Ed Cox & Son, 81 S.D. 165, 180, 132 N.W.2d 282, 290-91 (1965); Beka v. Lithium Corp. of America, 77 S.D. 370, 375, 92 N.W.2d 156, 160 (1958). Prejudgment interest is not to be awarded if the damages are uncertain until determined by the trier of fact. Arcon Constr. Co. v. S.D. Cement Plant, 349 N.W.2d 407, 416 (S.D.1984). “Thus, the test for awarding interest is not whether liability was clear, but whether (assuming liability) the damages were reasonably ascertainable by reference to prevailing markets.” Cole v. Melvin, 441 F.Supp. 193, 210 (D.S.D. 1977).
Lawyers advocate. Judges interpret and decide. Juries find facts. We, in the judiciary, owe a duty to honor the jury’s findings, absent some great substantive legal error, jury tampering, or highly improper conduct of the jury or outside forces (extraneous forces) brought to bear upon the jury which alters the quest for truth. The jury, in this case, found Authority partially responsible for its losses. Suffice it to say, defendant could not, with any degree of certainty, tender an amount of damage to plaintiff. There was no way possible for the defendant to reasonably know what percent of fault a jury would find.
An eminent legal authority makes this general observation about prejudgment interest: “Actually, the decisions have been moving toward a greater willingness to award such interest for a long time, but this very movement has left a certain amount of conflict in the cases, and this, together with the influence of local statutes, makes it impossible to state any single rule or set of rules with accuracy.” D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 3.5, at 165 (1973). If this Court has been caught up with confusion, it is not alone in the jurisdictions of this Union. It should not bear the brunt of deep censure. Courts throughout the land are struggling with prejudgment interest. Court declarations on this subject have been an academic pilgrimage. Each particular set of facts seems to create a new hazard. This great concern over prejudgment interest has mushroomed due to higher interest rates, foreclosures, bankruptcies, and general economic conditions — not to mention an increase of easy credit and dependency upon credit rather than currency of the Realm. Prejudgment interest is unascertainable in cases where comparative fault of the parties must be determined by a jury. See First Nat’l Bank v. Kehn Ranch, 394 N.W.2d 709, 717 (S.D.1986); Hanson, 373 N.W.2d at 36; Arcon Constr. Co. v. South Dakota Cement Plant, 349 N.W.2d 407, 416 (S.D.1984). Hageman v. Vander Vorste, 403 N.W.2d 420, 424 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., dissenting), and Amert v. Ziebarth Constr. Co., 400 N.W.2d 888, 892 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., dissenting), are cases wherein I tried to maintain my core thoughts on prejudgment interest. Hopefully, in both of those dissents, the expressions followed consistently with my majority writings in this Court; and I believe them to be conceptually in step with that which is accomplished by the majority decision herein. In my dissent in Amert, 400 N.W.2d at 892, which I spiritually followed in my dissent in Hageman, I camped down on the premise that the teaching of Beka *27instructed us that the defendant-Ziebarth should not be charged with prejudgment interest because it, as a debtor, could not know or reasonably ascertain the exact sum owing. In support, I cited Hanson, 373 N.W.2d at 36, Meyer, 369 N.W.2d at 659, and Subsurfco, Inc. v. B-Y Water Dist., 369 N.W.2d 129, 131 (S.D.1985). Amert, 400 N.W.2d at 893. In quoting Beka, 77 S.D. at 375, 92 N.W.2d at 160, I tethered to this settled law: “ ‘When the exact sum of the indebtedness is known or can be readily ascertained the reason for the denial of interest does not exist.’ ” Amert, 400 N.W.2d at 893. In Hageman, 403 N.W.2d at 424, as recent as April of this year, I hinged my dissent on language I have quoted in Amert, 400 N.W.2d at 892. In Hageman, I dissented from the majority opinion because I believed it was not “ ‘clear that the plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum certain, or that the damages sought are capable of being made certain by calcu-lation_’” 403 N.W.2d at 425 (quoting Amert, 400 N.W.2d at 892) (Henderson, J., dissenting). Thus, where a jury is setting the proportionate fault in a jury trial, a defendant cannot pay over damages to a plaintiff until the jury sets the proportionate fault, such as we have here, and the defendant cannot, with any degree of certainty, know the amount of damages which he would owe. Basic is the rationale of Beka, 77 S.D. at 375, 92 N.W.2d at 159-60, which I quoted in my Hageman dissent, 403 N.W.2d at 424: “ ‘The reason for denying interest on a claim is that where the person liable does not know what sum he owes, he cannot be in default for not paying.’ ” Paramount in out thinking must be certainty vis-á-vis uncertainty. If it is not certain, it must be made capable of certainty by calculation and it must also vest as of a particular day. Master that, in the final analysis, and your ship will come safely to port.

 Compare this basic platform of thought with my two most recent minority writings in Hageman v. Vander Vorste, 403 N.W.2d 420, 424 (S.D. 1987) (Henderson, J., dissenting), and Amert v. Ziebarth Constr. Co., 400 N.W.2d 888, 892 (S.D. 1987) (Henderson, J., dissenting), amplified below.