Court Opinion

ID: 9913287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 17:00:46.880386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:48.028053
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 23-1295
                        ___________________________

                            United States of America

                                      Plaintiff - Appellee

                                        v.

                               Ian Todd Good Left

                                   Defendant - Appellant
                                 ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                    for the District of North Dakota - Western
                                   ____________

                          Submitted: October 16, 2023
                           Filed: December 27, 2023
                                 [Unpublished]
                                 ____________

Before GRUENDER, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

PER CURIAM.

       Ian Todd Good Left pleaded guilty to assault of an intimate partner by
strangulation and suffocation, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(8), 1153, and domestic
assault by a habitual offender, see id. § 117(a). Good Left’s Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated a total offense level of 21 and a criminal
history category of IV, producing an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 57 to
71 months’ imprisonment. The PSR noted that an upward departure from this range
may be warranted due to Good Left’s twenty-six prior tribal-court convictions,
“many of which involved similar violent behavior.” At sentencing, the district court 1
adopted the PSR and departed upward to a criminal history category of VI. Good
Left’s adjusted criminal history category of VI, combined with a total offense level
of 21, produced an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 77 to 96 months’
imprisonment. The district court sentenced Good Left to 90 months’ imprisonment.
Good Left appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court committed significant
procedural error at sentencing and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.

       We first review a sentence for significant procedural error, analyzing the
district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of the guidelines de
novo. United States v. Rooney, 63 F.4th 1160, 1170 (8th Cir. 2023). A district court
commits significant procedural error when it “fail[s] to calculate (or improperly
calculate[s]) the Guidelines range, treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory, fail[s] to
consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, select[s] a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Good Left asserts that the district court committed
significant procedural error by relying on his tribal-court convictions as a basis for
the upward departure and by failing to adequately explain the upward departure.

       We disagree. It was proper for the district court to rely upon Good Left’s
tribal-court convictions as a basis for the upward departure. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3;
United States v. Cook, 615 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The Guidelines list
several situations which may form the basis for an upward departure. Among these
are when prior sentences for tribal offenses were not used in computing the criminal
history category.” (citation omitted)). The district court also adequately explained
its reasons for departing upward. At sentencing, the district court assigned six
additional criminal history points to Good Left due to his tribal-court convictions.

      1
        The Honorable Daniel M. Traynor, United States District Judge for the
District of North Dakota.
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The district court determined that these convictions placed Good Left in a
“[c]riminal [h]istory [c]ategory of VI rather than V.” It noted that Good Left
“suffer[ed] from fetal alcohol syndrome” but that an upward departure was
nevertheless appropriate as Good Left “ha[d] not, apparently, addressed his long
history of abuse to others.” According to the district court, Good Left’s “history of
aggression and violent behaviors [was] reoccurring” and he was a “habitual abuser
of individuals.”

       Although Good Left argues that the district court committed significant
procedural error based on United States v. Sullivan, 853 F.3d 475 (8th Cir. 2017),
and United States v. Azure, 536 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008), those cases are
distinguishable. In Sullivan, we concluded that the district court erred in departing
upward from criminal history category II to category VI based on conduct that had
not resulted in convictions and on state-court sentences that the district court thought
to have been too lenient. 853 F.3d at 479-80. In Azure, we concluded that the district
court abused its discretion in departing upward from criminal history category I to
category VI based on questionably relevant evidence and uncharged conduct. 536
F.3d at 931-32. Here, the district court departed upward by only two criminal history
categories and sufficiently explained that its decision was based on Good Left’s
lengthy history of violent behaviors. See United States v. Shillingstad, 632 F.3d
1031, 1038 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding no significant procedural error at sentencing
where the district court “departed upward by only two criminal history categories
and sufficiently explained that its decision was based on [the defendant’s] extensive
criminal record”). Thus, we discern no significant procedural error.

       In the absence of procedural error, we next consider the substantive
reasonableness of a sentence under the highly deferential abuse of discretion
standard. Rooney, 63 F.4th at 1170. The district court did not abuse its discretion
in sentencing Good Left to 90 months’ imprisonment. Although Good Left
disagrees with the weight that the district court afforded the different sentencing
factors, such disagreement is insufficient to establish that the district court abused
its discretion and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. See United States
                                          -3-
v. Richart, 662 F.3d 1037, 1054 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Simply because the district court
weighed the relevant factors more heavily than [the defendant] would prefer does
not mean the district court abused its discretion.”).

      Affirmed.
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