Court Opinion

ID: 9907501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 16:10:53.664934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:22.925124
License: Public Domain

380                   December 6, 2023              No. 636

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                    STATE OF OREGON,
                     Plaintiff-Respondent,
                               v.
                MARTY ANWAR JEFFERY,
                    Defendant-Appellant.
               Washington County Circuit Court
                    20CR31252; A176879

   Janelle F. Wipper, Judge.
   Argued and submitted April 26, 2023.
   Sara F. Werboff, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
   PAGÁN, J.
   Affirmed.
   Mooney, J., dissenting.
Cite as 329 Or App 380 (2023)                            381

        PAGÁN, J.
         Defendant was convicted of first-degree robbery,
ORS 164.415, and sentenced to 90 months in prison, ORS
137.700(2)(a)(R). On appeal, defendant’s primary argument
is that the length of his sentence is constitutionally dis-
proportionate when compared to the gravity of his offense.
Applying State v. Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or 46, 217 P3d 659
(2009), we conclude that defendant’s sentence, while severe,
does not constitute one of those rare circumstances that
requires reversal under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon
Constitution. At the sentencing hearing, defendant pre-
sented conflicting evidence regarding whether he suffered
from schizophrenia, but we do not read the Supreme Court’s
decision in State v. Ryan, 361 Or 602, 396 P3d 867 (2017)
as requiring the trial court to make findings regarding
that evidence. Instead, as we recently explained in State v.
Gonzalez, 326 Or App 587, 601, 534 P3d 289 (2023), “our
cases both before and after Ryan have restricted the con-
sideration of a defendant’s personal characteristics to those
affecting intellectual capacity.” Although there was some
evidence in the record that defendant may have suffered
from schizophrenia, there was also evidence suggesting he
did not, and we do not think that the trial court’s failure to
expressly discuss that evidence constitutes error. The more
significant mitigating factors in this case concerned defen-
dant’s specific conduct. Focusing on the circumstances of
defendant’s offense and comparing it to the range of conduct
described in the statute for first-degree robbery, we conclude
that defendant’s offense was sufficiently grave such that the
penalty imposed was not unconstitutional.
        In his other two assignments of error, defendant
challenges the trial court’s failure to merge the verdicts on
various counts. As we explain below, one of those arguments
is moot, and we reject the other argument. We therefore
affirm.
   I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL
                  HISTORY
       On July 7, 2020, Weldon Shields and Kristian
Henriquez worked as asset protection specialists or loss
382                                           State v. Jeffery

prevention officers (LPOs) at a Fred Meyer store in Beaverton.
They were wearing plain clothes. Shields worked on the
floor, while Henriquez observed the store using cameras.
         Shields noticed that defendant had many items in
his shopping cart, and Shields saw defendant picked up a
pair of “Skullcandy headphones” and put them in his cart
without looking at the price. Shields told Henriquez to look
on the cameras “for the individual that seems to be home-
less.” Shields observed defendant put some items into his
backpack and pockets. The items were primarily food, but
also the headphones and a lighter. Defendant “ditched the
cart,” put the backpack on, and exited the store without pay-
ing for the merchandise.
        Shields followed defendant outside and notified
Henriquez to join them. It was windy outside. When Shields
was about seven or eight feet away from defendant, and
while Henriquez was approaching from a different part of
the store, Shields identified himself as part of Fred Meyer
Asset Protection, and said, “ ‘Hey. I need to talk to you about
the unpaid-for merchandise that you have on you.’ ”
         Defendant turned around and looked at Shields.
Shields saw defendant pull something out of his right
pocket, reach over with his left hand, and then Shields saw
“a reflection.” Shields believed it was a blade or a knife.
Shields heard defendant say something like, “ ‘I’m not giving
you your stuff back,’ ” or “ ‘Don’t come near me.’ ” Henriquez
thought defendant said, “ ‘Don’t come near me.’ ”
          Shields was concerned, and he told Henriquez to
“ ‘[b]ack up because he has a knife.’ ” Defendant did not ges-
ture with the knife or come towards Shields. Instead, defen-
dant simply displayed the knife and continued walking away
from the store. At first, Henriquez did not see the knife, but
he saw it in defendant’s right hand when Shields pointed it
out. Shields called 9-1-1.
         Officer Kartchner, who worked as a patrol offi-
cer for the Beaverton Police Department, responded to
the call and arrived about three minutes later. Kartchner
located defendant near a restaurant across the street from
the store. When Kartchner made contact with defendant,
Cite as 329 Or App 380 (2023)                                            383

defendant was wearing earphones,1 but defendant did not
have a problem hearing the officer or responding to the offi-
cer’s commands.
         The officer located the pocketknife. Defendant
described it as a can opener. Defendant admitted display-
ing it while in the parking lot of the store, but he said that
he took it out as protection because he did not know who
the LPOs were, and he had been assaulted three times.
When asked by the officer whether he had opened the blade
of the pocketknife, defendant stated, “I probably did, yeah.”
Defendant added that the persons were far behind him, and
he “had no intention of getting closer to them with it.” The
merchandise that defendant took from the store had a value
of $41.78.
        Defendant was charged with first-degree robbery,
ORS 164.415 (Count 1), second-degree robbery, ORS 164.405
(Count 2), unlawful use of a weapon (UUW), ORS 166.220
(Count 3), and third-degree theft, ORS 164.043 (Count 4).
         After the charges were filed, defendant was eval-
uated by three different psychologists. James Andretta,
Ph.D., diagnosed defendant as suffering from schizophrenia
based on defendant’s “disconnection and distancing from
social relationships, his mumbling to himself in a way that
was in keeping with the experience of internal stimuli, his
assertion of fixed false beliefs, and his mildly disorganized
speech.” Dr. Andretta acknowledged that defendant had a
history of using methamphetamine, but he did not think
that defendant’s drug use explained his symptoms because
they manifested earlier in defendant’s life. Based on his
diagnosis, Dr. Andretta did not believe that defendant could
aid and assist in his defense.
         At the state hospital, a second psychologist evalu-
ated defendant for the purpose of determining whether he
could proceed to trial. Kordell Kennemer, Psy. D., observed
that the defendant “did not appear distracted during the
evaluation and did not appear to be responding to internal
stimuli.” In his view, defendant’s symptoms were “less severe
than what was observed by Dr. Andretta. It is possible that
   1
       They were not the same headphones that defendant took from the store.
384                                             State v. Jeffery

his symptoms may be remitting over time and that they
were substance-induced.” Dr. Kennemer diagnosed defen-
dant with “[s]chizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic
disorder” and substance use disorders. Dr. Kennemer con-
cluded that defendant could proceed to trial.
          A third psychologist, Alexander Millkey, Psy. D.,
evaluated defendant to determine whether he suffered from
a qualifying mental disorder that impacted his ability to
form the intent to commit the charged crimes. Dr. Millkey
noted that, by the time of his evaluation, defendant’s “symp-
toms appear to have entirely abated without treatment with
psychotropic medications.” Dr. Millkey opined that defen-
dant experienced “an unusually protracted methamphet-
amine-induced psychotic state,” and “it is more parsimonious
to attribute the symptoms he experienced to amphetamine
use rather than to [s]chizophrenia or another chronic mental
illness.” According to Dr. Millkey, defendant did not have a
qualifying mental disorder. Before trial, defendant raised a
“disordered mental state defense,” but he withdrew it at the
beginning of trial.
         Defendant waived his right to a jury trial. The
trial judge heard testimony from the LPOs, Kartchner, and
defendant. The judge also watched body camera footage of
Kartchner’s contact with defendant. A photograph of the
pocketknife was received into evidence. At trial, Kartchner
testified that the blade of the pocketknife was about two to
three inches long. Defendant testified that he was listening
to music on his earphones when he left the store, and he did
not hear Shields announcing himself as an LPO.
         The trial judge found defendant guilty of the
charges. Before his sentencing hearing, defendant filed a
sentencing memorandum arguing, among other things, that
a 90-month sentence for defendant’s offense would be consti-
tutionally disproportionate. Defendant’s memorandum dis-
cussed the three psychological evaluations. At the hearing,
the trial court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence.
The trial judge stated:
     “[T]he only way for me to come off of the 90 months is to
   make certain findings.
Cite as 329 Or App 380 (2023)                                    385

        “And, given my experience and the particulars of this
     case, unfortunately for you, it doesn’t qualify. These are the
     same types of cases that the Court imposes similar sen-
     tences to.
        “And so, legally, based on the statute and the cases that
     both the attorneys have talked about, that is not something
     that allows me to find that your case is constitutionally dis-
     proportionate to other cases. Obviously, you are an individ-
     ual, but, in terms of what I can do for you, given that it’s a
     Measure 11 Robbery in the First Degree, I don’t think that
     that applies in your case.”
        The trial court entered a judgment, which was later
amended. Defendant was sentenced to 90 months in prison
on Count 1 (first-degree robbery), a concurrent 70-months
in prison on Count 2 (second-degree robbery), a concurrent
6-month jail term on Count 3 (UUW), and the trial court
merged the verdicts on Count 4 (third-degree theft) and
Count 1 (first-degree robbery). Defendant appeals.
                          II. ANALYSIS
A.    Defendant’s 90-month sentence for first-degree robbery is
      not constitutionally disproportionate.
         We focus on defendant’s third assignment of error in
which he argues that the mandatory minimum sentence of
90 months for first-degree robbery is constitutionally dispro-
portionate as applied to him. “We review for legal error the
trial court’s conclusion that defendant’s sentence was consti-
tutional under Article I, section 16.” Ryan, 361 Or at 614-15.
         Article I, section 16, provides, in part, that “all
penalties shall be proportioned to the offense.” In consider-
ing that proportionality requirement, we ask whether the
length of the sentence would “shock the moral sense of rea-
sonable people.” Ryan, 361 Or at 612. That standard will be
satisfied rarely because it is the province of the legislature
(or the people, when acting in their legislative capacity) to
determine the appropriate penalty for a crime, and it is “not
the role of this court to second-guess the legislature’s deter-
mination of the penalty or range of penalties for a crime.”
Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or at 58. Nevertheless, we do play a
role in ensuring that sentences conform to the requirements
386                                               State v. Jeffery

of our state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Davidson, 360 Or
370, 372, 380 P3d 963 (2016) (concluding that life imprison-
ment without the possibility of parole was unconstitutionally
disproportionate as applied to the defendant, who had two
prior felony convictions for public indecency, and who was con-
victed of two counts of public indecency for exposing himself
in a park).
         When considering an as-applied constitutional
challenge to a sentence, the Supreme Court has identified
three nonexclusive factors for courts to consider: “(1) a com-
parison of the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the
crime; (2) a comparison of the penalties imposed for other,
related crimes; and (3) the criminal history of the defen-
dant.” Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or at 58.
         Under the first Rodriguez/Buck factor, the amount
of time is the “primary determinant” of the severity of the
penalty. Id. at 60. When comparing the offense and the
sentence, the offense is not limited to the description of the
prohibited conduct in the statute. Id. at 61. It includes “the
specific defendant’s particular conduct toward the victim
that constituted the crime.” Id. at 62. In determining the
gravity of the offense, we consider the circumstances of the
defendant’s specific conduct and place it on the range of pro-
hibited conduct. Id. at 62, 69-70.
   “An as-applied proportionality analysis that considers the
   facts of an individual defendant’s specific criminal conduct
   is particularly significant when the criminal statute at issue
   covers a broad range of activity, criminalizing a variety of
   forms and intensity of conduct. In such a case, a harsh pen-
   alty might not, on its face, be disproportionate, because of
   the fact that the statute dealt, inter alia, with some extreme
   form of that conduct. However, when a defendant is con-
   victed for engaging in only more minor conduct encompassed
   within the statute, the defendant may plausibly argue that
   the mandatory sentence, as applied to the particular facts of
   his or her case, is unconstitutionally disproportionate.”
Id. at 61. When          assessing     whether     a   penalty      is
disproportionate,
   “a court may consider, among other things, the specific cir-
   cumstances and facts of the defendant’s conduct that come
Cite as 329 Or App 380 (2023)                                 387

   within the statutory definition of the offense, as well as
   other case-specific factors, such as characteristics of the
   defendant and the victim, the harm to the victim, and the
   relationship between the defendant and the victim.”
Id. at 62.
        Under the second Rodriguez/Buck factor, we com-
pare the imposed penalty to penalties for related offenses.
Id. at 63. And under the third Rodriguez/Buck factor, we
consider the defendant’s criminal history, which is relevant
“because a defendant who previously has been convicted of
and served sentences for other crimes has demonstrated, by
committing additional crimes, that the previously imposed
sentences were insufficient to prevent the defendant from
returning to his or her criminal behavior.” Id. at 77.
          Applying those factors here, we begin by comparing
the severity of the penalty to the gravity of the offense. As a
result of the passage of Ballot Measure 11 in 1994, the penalty
for first-degree robbery is a mandatory term of 90 months
in prison. ORS 137.700(2)(a)(R). “[A] 90-month sentence
unquestionably results in a substantial deprivation of lib-
erty; it is a long time to be separated from society, family
and friends, and a long time to be separated from employ-
ment and educational opportunities available to people who
are not incarcerated. It is a severe sentence.” Gonzalez, 326
Or App at 603.
         Turning to the gravity of the offense, the statute for
first-degree robbery, ORS 164.415, describes a broad range
of conduct. It provides, in part:
      “(1) A person commits the crime of robbery in the first
   degree if the person violates ORS 164.395 and the person:
      “(a) Is armed with a deadly weapon;
      “(b)   Uses or attempts to use a dangerous weapon; or
       “(c) Causes or attempts to cause serious physical injury
   to any person.”
ORS 164.397, the statute for third-degree robbery, provides,
in part:
388                                              State v. Jeffery

      “(1) A person commits the crime of robbery in the third
   degree if in the course of committing or attempting to com-
   mit theft * * * the person uses or threatens the immediate
   use of physical force upon another person with the intent of:
       “(a) Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking
   of the property or to retention thereof immediately after
   the taking; or
      “(b) Compelling the owner of such property or another
   person to deliver the property or to engage in other conduct
   which might aid in the commission of the theft * * *.”
As the Supreme Court has explained it,
      “Third-degree robbery is the least serious and describes
   the basic crime of robbery: taking or attempting to take
   property from another, while preventing or overcoming the
   victim’s resistance to giving up the property by using or
   threatening to use physical force. The crimes of second-
   and first-degree robbery then use third-degree robbery
   as a foundation and build on its elements by identifying
   additional elements that, if present, make the crime a more
   serious one. The highest level of robbery, first-degree rob-
   bery, is a robbery in which the robber is armed or actually
   causes or attempts to cause the victim serious injury.”
State v. White, 346 Or 275, 285-86, 211 P3d 248 (2009) (cita-
tions and footnotes omitted).
         Clearly, ORS 164.415 describes a wide range of cir-
cumstances that can elevate a theft to first-degree robbery,
including when there are threats of the use of force, and
when the conduct does or does not result in serious physi-
cal injury to others. See, e.g., Martinez v. Cain, 366 Or 136,
138, 458 P3d 670 (2020) (defendant shot the victim while
attempting to steal the victim’s wallet and car); State v.
Osborne, 242 Or App 85, 87, 255 P3d 513 (2011) (defendant,
while holding a folding knife with a short blade, told a store
clerk to give him the money in the cash register, he apolo-
gized to her as she did so, and he then fled the store); State
v. Melillo, 160 Or App 332, 336, 982 P2d 12, rev den, 329 Or
438 (1999) (defendant was the “wheel man” for his armed
co-defendant and the crime involved the use of a gun).
       Here, although defendant’s conduct was relatively
minor when considered in the context of the range of activity
Cite as 329 Or App 380 (2023)                            389

encompassed by ORS 164.415(1), there are some circum-
stances that make his offense more serious. On the one
hand, defendant’s conduct did not result in physical harm,
defendant did not target an individual for robbery, he did not
move toward the LPOs after displaying the pocketknife, or
otherwise brandish it, the pocketknife consisted of a small
blade, and the items stolen for the store, which consisted
primarily of food, were valued at a little over $40. But, on
the other hand, when confronted by the LPOs, defendant
took the pocketknife out of his pocket and opened the blade,
he told the LPOs that he would not return the items or not
to come near him, and Shields testified that he was con-
cerned for their safety. That second set of circumstances cre-
ated the potential for violence, and they move defendant’s
conduct closer to the midrange of activity encompassed by
the first-degree robbery statute. See White, 346 Or at 287
(“What the statutes and the legislative history indicate is
an incremental classification, not of levels of actual vio-
lence during the commission of a robbery, but of levels of the
potential for violence, including its potential extent.”).
         The circumstances, of course, also include the defen-
dant’s personal characteristics, and, in Ryan, the Supreme
Court held that an offender’s personal characteristics may,
in some cases, be relevant to the assessment of the gravity
of an offense. 361 Or at 616. Defendant suggests that, at
the time of the offense, he suffered from schizophrenia, and
that his mental condition should be considered as part of the
Rodriguez/Buck analysis. Indeed, defendant argues that the
trial court was required to consider his mental condition,
and it “may have reduced his culpability for the offense.”
         At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge made no
express findings regarding defendant’s mental condition,
but there is nothing in Ryan that indicates that the trial
judge was required to do so. In Ryan, the Supreme Court
determined that when there is evidence of an intellectual
disability, then the trial court must address that evidence
in comparing the gravity of an offense with the severity of
a Measure 11 sentence. 361 Or at 624-25. Evidence of an
intellectual disability is significant because it may mean
that an offender is operating with the intellectual capacity
390                                              State v. Jeffery

of a child, and there are laws establishing that children
should be treated more leniently than adults. Id. at 623-26.
But here, there was no argument or evidence that defendant
suffers from an intellectual disability. “The court’s recog-
nition that an offender’s intellectual disability is relevant
to the proportionality analysis does not equate to a general
rule that an offender’s other individual characteristics are
relevant to the analysis.” Gonzalez, 326 Or App at 592.
         As we further explained in Gonzalez,
       “[T]he law accounts for how mental health conditions
   may affect culpability by allowing the introduction of evi-
   dence of mental health conditions for the purpose of demon-
   strating diminished capacity, insanity, or that the mental
   health condition ‘is relevant to the issue of whether the
   actor did or did not have the intent which is an element
   of the crime,’ ORS 161.300. See generally ORS 161.295 -
   161.309. Because such conditions—and their relationship
   to criminal culpability—are taken into account in the
   determination of guilt in the first instance, it is difficult
   to see how such conditions might then also be relevant, in
   the context of proportionality analysis under Ryan, to show
   that a defendant should be viewed as less culpable than
   other defendants found to have acted with the same culpa-
   ble mental state, absent the same sort of legislatively rec-
   ognized societal standard on which the Ryan court relied.”
Id. at 602. Based on our analysis in Gonzalez, we disagree
with defendant’s claim that the trial judge, in sentencing
defendant, was required to make findings based on the con-
flicting evidence in the record regarding defendant’s mental
health.
         Clearly, the court considered that evidence because
defendant relied on it at the sentencing hearing. However,
in this case, the more significant mitigating circumstances
concerned the nature of defendant’s conduct, including the
fact that defendant caused no harm, defendant did not tar-
get a specific individual, he did not brandish the pocketknife
or advance toward the LPOs, and the items taken from the
store were valued at only about $40. Here, those circum-
stances, not his mental condition, are the weighty factors
when considering the gravity of defendant’s offense.
Cite as 329 Or App 380 (2023)                                  391

          Given those circumstances, we recognize that the
penalty required by the statute is harsh. It may be desirable
for trial judges to have more discretion in cases like this one.
As explained in the concurring opinion in Ryan,
       “Appropriate legislation would give the courts discretion
   to impose a sentence more tailored to a particular defen-
   dant and crime, rather than imposing the current manda-
   tory minimum sentence; and perhaps also could provide
   additional guidance as to the kinds of personal character-
   istics that may affect a defendant’s legal culpability and, if
   reduced culpability is found, the relationship between that
   reduced culpability and the kind of sentence that would be
   proportionate to the defendant’s offense.
        “But that is not the sentencing law that the people and
   the legislature have put in place for Measure 11 offenses
   * * *. Oregon’s statutory sentencing provisions for Measure
   11 offenses permit only the most limited consideration of
   personal characteristics, degree of culpability, mitigating
   facts, or the impact of the Measure 11 sentence on a partic-
   ular defendant.”
361 Or at 628 (Balmer, C.J., concurring). We agree with that
assessment.
         Nevertheless, in the instant case, defendant used a
dangerous weapon during the robbery. By unfolding and dis-
playing the blade of his pocketknife when confronted by the
LPOs, defendant created a circumstance that was “fraught
with the potential for causing fear in the victim and promot-
ing violence.” Melillo, 160 Or App at 336. Although there are
other circumstances that lessen the seriousness of defen-
dant’s offense, it was sufficiently grave such that we cannot
conclude that the legislatively prescribed sentence for the
offense contravenes Article I, section 16.
         In arguing otherwise, defendant relies on second-
degree robbery cases in which the defendants received
70-month sentences. See, e.g., State v. Bentley, 301 Or App
347, 350-51, 456 P3d 651 (2019) (trial court acquitted defen-
dant of first-degree robbery because trial court could not
infer that defendant knew his accomplice had a gun); see
also State v. George, 146 Or App 449, 451, 934 P2d 474 (1997)
(in a robbery that involved accomplices, defendant did not
392                                            State v. Jeffery

use a dangerous weapon). Those cases are not helpful in
assessing the proportionality of a sentence for a conviction
of first-degree robbery, because, under the first Rodriguez/
Buck factor, we must focus on the range of conduct prohib-
ited by the statute for first-degree robbery and where defen-
dant’s particular conduct and circumstances fall on that
range. See Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or at 60-62.
         Regarding the second Rodriguez/Buck factor, “[i]f
the penalties for more ‘serious crimes’ than the crime at issue
result in less severe sentences, that is an indication that the
challenged penalty may be disproportionate.” Rodriguez/
Buck, 347 Or at 63. In the instant case, defendant makes
no argument comparing the imposed penalty to penalties
for related offenses—he expressly disavows reliance on the
second Rodriguez/Buck factor—and we thus do not address
it.
          With regard to the third factor, defendant claims
that his criminal history weighs in favor of departing from
the mandatory minimum sentence. We disagree. The record
indicates that defendant has prior misdemeanor convictions
from Massachusetts for indecent exposure and for walking
on a railroad track, and he also has some arrests that did
not result in criminal prosecutions. Although his crimi-
nal history is minimal, it certainly does not weigh in his
favor in determining whether his sentence is disproportion-
ate. Instead, it is a factor that weighs against him, albeit
slightly, because it has some tendency to show that his prior
convictions “were insufficient to prevent the defendant from
returning to his or her criminal behavior.” Rodriguez/Buck,
347 Or at 77.
          In arguing otherwise, the dissent is shocked by
the length of the sentence in this case. 329 Or App at 396
(Mooney, J., dissenting). For the reasons explained, we agree
that the sentence is severe. But to the extent that the dis-
sent focuses on the value of the property stolen, it is stray-
ing from the concern underlying robbery statutes. Oregon’s
robbery statutes do not depend on the value of the goods
stolen to determine the severity of the crime, but rather the
gravity of the threat of violence. See White, 346 Or at 290
(“It is the concept of fear or threat of violence that separates
Cite as 329 Or App 380 (2023)                           393

robbery from mere theft.”). The dissent suggests that defen-
dant’s conduct amounted to mere theft, but defendant does
not challenge his conviction for first-degree robbery.
        Having reviewed the arguments regarding the
Rodriguez/Buck factors, we conclude that defendant’s
90-month sentence for first-degree robbery does not contra-
vene Article I, section 16. We therefore reject defendant’s
third assignment of error.
B.   Defendant’s Merger Arguments
        We summarily address defendant’s first two assign-
ments. Defendant’s first assignment of error is moot because
the trial court issued an amended judgment merging the
verdicts on Count 4 (third-degree theft) and Count 1 (first-
degree robbery). Regarding defendant’s second assignment,
as explained below, we are not persuaded that the trial
court should have merged the verdicts on Count 3 (UUW)
and Count 1 (first-degree robbery).
         We review the trial court’s merger rulings for legal
error. State v. Ortiz-Rico, 303 Or App 78, 84, 462 P3d 741,
rev den, 366 Or 827 (2020). The anti-merger statute provides,
in relevant part, that guilty verdicts may not merge when
“the same conduct or criminal episode violates two or more
statutory provisions and each provision requires proof of an
element that the others do not * * *.” ORS 161.067(1). “It is
not enough to show that one offense has an element that the
other does not; the other offense also must have an element
that the first does not.” Martinez, 366 Or at 145. “[W]hen
a statute contains alternative forms of a single crime * * *,
we will look to the indictment to determine which form is
charged, and we use the elements of the charged version in
the merger analysis.” State v. Pass, 264 Or App 583, 587, 333
P3d 1139 (2014).
       Here, in Count 1 of the indictment, which charged
defendant with first-degree robbery, the state alleged that
defendant “use[d] or attempt[ed] to use a dangerous weapon.”
In Count 3 of the indictment, which charged defendant with
UUW, the state alleged that defendant carried or possessed
a dangerous or deadly weapon.
394                                           State v. Jeffery

         Defendant’s merger argument is based on the
premise that the state cannot prove that a defendant used
or attempted to use a dangerous weapon without also prov-
ing that the defendant carried or possessed the weapon
with the intent to use it unlawfully. We disagree. In State
v. Reed, 101 Or App 277, 279, 790 P2d 551, rev den, 310 Or
195 (1990), focusing on the broad definition of a dangerous
weapon in ORS 161.015(1), we determined that the sidewalk
was a dangerous weapon for purposes of the assault statute.
Thus, “[i]t is possible to inflict serious physical injury with
a dangerous or deadly weapon without either possessing or
carrying it.” State v. Alvarez, 240 Or App 167, 173, 246 P3d
26 (2010), rev den, 350 Or 408 (2011).
         Similarly, here, it is possible that a defendant could
commit a theft using a dangerous weapon without carry-
ing or possessing it—for example, using force to strike a
victim against a sharp or hard stationary object. Thus, the
UUW count contains an element—carrying or possessing a
dangerous weapon—that is not one of the elements of first-
degree robbery. And the crime of first-degree robbery con-
tains elements that are not contained in the crime of UUW,
such as using or threatening the immediate use of physi-
cal force upon a person with the intent of preventing and
overcoming resistance to the defendant’s taking of property.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it did not merge
the verdict on Count 3 (UUW) with the verdict on Count 1
(first-degree robbery). We reject defendant’s second assign-
ment of error.
        Affirmed.
        MOONEY, J., dissenting.
         The statutory 90-month prison sentence imposed by
the trial court and upheld today by my colleagues is con-
stitutionally disproportionate to the gravity of the crimi-
nal offense that defendant committed. The majority cor-
rectly recites existing case law, but it misapplies that law
to the facts of this case. I would reverse and remand for
resentencing.
       Defendant shoplifted approximately $40 worth of
merchandise from a Fred Meyer store, including food, a pair
Cite as 329 Or App 380 (2023)                             395

of earbuds, and a lighter. He, thus, committed the crime of
theft in the third-degree, ORS 164.043, a class C misde-
meanor, punishable by up to thirty (30) days in jail and a
fine of up to $1,250.
          Two Fred Meyer employees, dressed in plain clothes
and working in “loss prevention,” observed defendant place
merchandise into his backpack and leave the store without
paying. The employees followed defendant, who appeared to
them to be homeless, out of the store and pursued him on
foot. It was not apparent from their clothing that the employ-
ees worked for Fred Meyer, and they were not wearing store
badges or other store insignia. It was a windy day, and defen-
dant was wearing earbuds, listening to music. When they
asked defendant to stop and return the items that he had not
paid for, the loss prevention employees were separated from
him by a distance of eight feet. After hearing the approach-
ing individuals yell at him, defendant pulled a pocketknife
out of his pocket and, although he opened it, defendant did
not raise or otherwise brandish the pocketknife. In fact,
only one of the employees even noticed it. Defendant did not
threaten the employees or anyone else with the pocketknife.
At most, he declined to return the merchandise that he had
taken and told the pursuing employees not to approach him.
         Defendant did not target any individual for rob-
bery, and he did not cause physical harm. He did not at any
point move toward the Fred Meyer employees. Instead, he
walked away from them. Defendant retrieved his pocket-
knife and opened the small blade when he was approached
by the employees, but he did not posture, speak, or move
in any way that suggested impending violence. He moved
away from them, signaling his plan to avoid contact, not to
cause it. Defendant was shoplifting. For that, he was con-
victed of robbery in the first-degree, ORS 164.415, a class A
felony, and the court imposed a sentence of ninety months in
prison. ORS 137.700(2)(a)(R).
         Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution
declares that “[c]ruel and unusual punishments shall not
be inflicted, but all penalties shall be proportioned to the
offense.” The policy choice of what penalty to assign to a par-
ticular crime is a legislative decision made by Oregonians
396                                             State v. Jeffery

or their elected representatives. Our role is to subject such
choices to constitutional scrutiny when they are applied to
a particular individual in a particular case. In testing the
proportionality of a sentence to a crime we ask whether the
sentence would “shock the moral sense of reasonable peo-
ple.” State v. Ryan, 361 Or 602, 612, 396 P3d 867 (2017).
         The 90-month prison sentence imposed on this
defendant fails the test of proportionality. Seven and one-
half years in prison for stealing bread and a pair of cheap
earbuds without even the threat of violence would, and cer-
tainly should, shock the moral sense of reasonable people.
This is especially so given that defendant’s criminal history
consists solely of two misdemeanor convictions: (1) walk-
ing on a railroad track and (2) indecent exposure. Neither
of those offenses involved violence or physical harm. Not
unlike shoplifting small amounts of food or carrying a
pocketknife, defendant’s past convictions were for conduct
much more likely to be associated with homelessness than
violence. Defendant was suddenly approached by strangers
dressed in street clothing, who were yelling at him. That
he responded by holding onto his pocketknife as he walked
away from them does not render the 90-month sentence
constitutional.
         I would hold that defendant’s 90-month prison sen-
tence violates Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution.
I respectfully dissent.