Court Opinion

ID: 9353354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 17:09:38.079674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:24.154876
License: Public Domain

J-S35002-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ZARINAH MUHAMMAD                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 690 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 6, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-40-SA-0000053-2022

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                         FILED JANUARY 11, 2023

        Appellant, Zarinah Muhammad, appeals from the judgment of sentence

of a $300.00 fine, imposed after she was convicted, following a non-jury trial,

of disorderly conduct under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(3). Appellant challenges

the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. After careful review,

we reverse Appellant’s conviction and vacate her judgment of sentence.

        On August 12, 2021, Appellant was charged with disorderly conduct,

pursuant to Sections 5503(a)(2) and (a)(3), in connection with an incident

which the trial court summarized as follows:

        The incident which resulted in the disorderly conduct charges
        occurred at the Judge Bernard C. Brominski building[,] which
        contains the domestic relations and child custody divisions of the
        Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. [Appellant] attempted
        to enter the Brominski building without a mask at a time when
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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      masks were required. After obtaining a mask, [Appellant] was
      permitted to enter the building. As she was entering, [Appellant]
      told a security officer, “I’m not fucking talking to you.” She then
      entered and said “fuck you” to a deputy sheriff and the security
      officer. [Appellant] then said “fuck you” again as she walked in
      the direction of the elevator.        After entering the elevator,
      [Appellant] began screaming for help. As a result of her actions,
      [Appellant] was charged with one count of disorderly conduct for
      using obscene language and one count for making unreasonable
      noise. She was found guilty of [disorderly conduct for] using
      obscene language on April 6, 2022.

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 6/30/22, at 1.

      On May 6, 2022, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a

timely,   court-ordered   Pa.R.A.P.   1925(b)   concise   statement   of   errors

complained of on appeal. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on June

30, 2022. Herein, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

      1. Did the trial court err by convicting [Appellant] for [disorderly
         conduct] using “obscene language[,]” pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.
         [§] 5503(a)(3)[,] by failing to utilize the standard set forth by
         Miller v. California[, 413 U.S. 15 (1973),] and
         Commonwealth v. Pennix, 176 A.3d 340, 345 (Pa. Super.
         2017)[,] to analyze obscene language?

      2. Whether[] “saying” the “f—word” constitutes making
         unreasonable noise, as alleged within the non-traffic citation
         filed by the Commonwealth[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

      Appellant’s first issue relates to the sufficiency of the evidence for her

conviction under Section 5503(a)(3), which provides that “[a] person is guilty

of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance

or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he … uses obscene language or

makes an obscene gesture[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(3). In reviewing her

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claim, “[t]his Court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences to

be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as the verdict winner and determine if the evidence was sufficient to enable

the fact-finder to establish all the elements of the offense.” Commonwealth

v. Kelly, 758 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).

      Instantly, Appellant does not dispute using the language described,

supra, which led to her conviction but, rather, she argues that the language

used did not constitute “obscene language” under Pennsylvania law.

Appellant’s Brief at 9.   Thus, we consider the definition of “obscene” as it

relates to this matter. “This Court has held that, for purposes of a disorderly

conduct statute prohibiting the use of obscene language, language is obscene

if it meets the test set forth in Miller v. California, [supra] ….” Pennix, 176

A.3d at 345 (citing Kelly, 758 A.2d at 1286). The guidelines set forth by the

United States Supreme Court in Miller for determining what language

constitutes “obscenity” are as follows:

      (a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary
      community standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole,
      appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or
      describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
      defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work,
      taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
      scientific value.

Id. (quoting Kelly, 758 A.2d at 1286).

      Applying these guidelines in Kelly, we reversed the appellant’s

conviction for disorderly conduct under Section 5503(a)(3) for profanely

responding “fuck you, asshole” to a street department employee and

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accompanying the response with the extension of his middle finger. The Kelly

Court explained:

         Here, the record supports a conclusion that [the a]ppellant’s
         use of the “F—word” and use of the middle finger were angry
         words and an angry gesture having nothing to do with sex.
         The words and gesture were meant to express disrespect to
         and to offend[] the [b]orough employee. The record fails to
         support a conclusion that the words and gesture, as used in
         the circumstances of [the a]ppellant’s case, appeal to the
         prurient interest or a depiction, in a patently offensive way,
         of relevant sexual conduct. Thus, while the words and
         conduct used by [the a]ppellant were disrespectful,
         insulting, and offensive, they were in the circumstances of
         this case, not “obscene” within the meaning of Section
         5503(a)(3). Further, the record fails to support a conclusion
         that [the a]ppellant’s comment risked an immediate breech
         [sic] of the public peace. See [Commonwealth v.] Hock,
         728 A.2d [943,] 946-47 [(Pa. 1999)]. On review of the
         record, the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction
         of disorderly conduct under Section 5503(a)(3) ….

Kelly, 758 A.2d at 1288. See also Commonwealth v. McCoy, 69 A.3d 658,

666 (Pa. 2013) (concluding that shouting “fuck the police” during a funeral

procession for a sheriff’s deputy was not obscene language under Section

5503(a)(3), as there was no evidence that the language was intended to

appeal to anyone’s prurient interest, nor did it describe, in a patently offensive

way, sexual conduct).

      More recently, in Pennix, a case that is closely analogous to the present

matter, the appellant was detained at the metal detector while attempting to

gain entry into a family court building and became argumentative with the

sheriff’s deputies. Pennix, 176 A.3d at 341. Pennix was heard screaming,

“Fuck you I ain’t got time for this,” “Fuck you police[,]” and “I don’t got time

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for you fucking police.”   Id. at 341-42.    We ultimately found insufficient

evidence to uphold the appellant’s disorderly conduct conviction under Section

5503(a)(3) where her words “were angry words … having nothing to do with

sex.” Id. at 346 (quoting Kelly, 758 A.2d at 1288).

      Here, Appellant admits that her words “may have been disrespectful,

insulting, and offensive[,]” but insists that, like the words spoken by the

appellant in Pennix, her words “had nothing to do with sex[] and did not risk

an immediate breach of the peace.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant seeks

a reversal of her conviction on this basis. Id.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court concedes that the evidence is

insufficient to support Appellant’s conviction under Section 5503(a)(3) and

that her judgment of sentence should therefore be vacated. See TCO at 2-3

(citing Miller, supra; Pennix, supra; McCoy, supra; Kelly, supra). The

trial court explained: “There is no doubt that the language used by [Appellant]

during her contact with the deputy sheriff and security officer at the

Brombinski building on August 12, 2021[,] was disrespectful, insulting[,] and

offensive. However, it had nothing to do with sex and was not obscene.” Id.

at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Additionally, the Commonwealth

submitted a letter in lieu of an appellee’s brief, indicating that it is in

agreement with Appellant and the trial court that the evidence is insufficient

to support Appellant’s conviction.

      After careful consideration, we agree that the language used by

Appellant did not constitute “obscene language” as defined under Section

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5503(a)(3), and, therefore, Appellant’s conviction must be set aside.

Accordingly, we reverse Appellant’s conviction for disorderly conduct and

vacate her judgment of sentence.

       Finally, we note that Appellant’s remaining issue relates to her citation

for   disorderly   conduct     under    18     Pa.C.S.   §   5503(a)(2),   for   making

“unreasonable noise.” Appellant, however, was never convicted of this crime.1

Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review this claim. See Orfield v. Weindel,

52 A.3d 275, 277 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted) (“Our Courts cannot

decide moot or abstract questions….”).

       Conviction reversed.        Judgment of sentence vacated.            Jurisdiction

relinquished.

       Judge McLaughlin joins this memorandum.

       President Judge Emeritus Stevens files a concurring memorandum in

which President Judge Emeritus Bender and Judge McLaughlin join.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/11/2023

____________________________________________

1 Based on our review of the record, it appears that the trial court never
entered a disposition on this charge.

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