Court Opinion

ID: 9544011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:51:19.406269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:47.595524
License: Public Domain

SILAK, Justice,
specially concurring:
My special concurrence is addressed to the Court’s decision of the double jeopardy issue.
The Court’s opinion states, quoting the appellant’s reply brief, that the facts presented here amount to the same classic case of the “overbearing” judge as presented in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). I cannot agree with the Court’s conclusion in this regard. The Jom opinion reveals that the district court judge set off on his own course of questioning whether the government’s witnesses had been adequately apprised of their constitutional rights, and refused to permit them to testify. During the course of questioning the prosecutor in this regard, the judge abruptly cut off the prosecutor and immediately discharged the jury. The Supreme Court stated that
*831“It is apparent from the record that no consideration was given to the possibility of a trial continuance; indeed, the trial judge acted so abruptly in discharging the jury that, had the prosecutor been disposed to suggest a continuance, or the defendant to object to the discharge of the jury, there would have been no opportunity to do so.”
400 U.S. at 487, 91 S.Ct. at 558. This conduct by the judge was correctly characterized as “overbearing” in United States v. Buljubasic, 808 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir.1987).
The record here, however, does not support the Court’s characterization of the magistrate judge as overbearing. The magistrate engaged in a colloquy, outside the presence of the jury, with the prosecutor and defense counsel over defense counsel’s objection as to the “speculative” nature of the testimony regarding the relative reliability of certain field sobriety tests. After listening to the basis for defense counsel’s objection, the judge queried the prosecutor regarding the legal basis for the proffered testimony, and discussed appellate precedents. The magistrate then stated his intention to grant a mistrial, and after further colloquy from the prosecutor as to the trial testimony, as well as questions from the prosecutor about the court’s proposed course of action and the legal basis for it, the magistrate stated he was granting the mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor registered the state’s exception to the mistrial. This record stands in contrast to Jorn, supra, where neither counsel had the opportunity to comment on or object to the judge’s discharge of the jury.
Moreover, the Court does not need to reach the “overbearing” judge issue in order to reach the conclusion that the defendant did not consent to the mistrial. State v. Werneth, 101 Idaho 241, 611 P.2d 1026 (1980), held that a defendant’s consent to the declaration of mistrial need not be express, but “may be implied from all the circumstances.” 101 Idaho at 242-48, 611 P.2d at 1027-28. See United States v. Buljubasic, 808 F.2d at 1265 (defendant may still be determined to have given consent even where suggestion for mistrial originates with the trial judge); United States v. DiPietro, 936 F.2d 6, 9-10 (1st Cir.1991) (consent to a mistrial may be inferred from silence where a defendant had the opportunity to object and failed to do so.) The Court need not make the determination that the magistrate judge here fell within the definition of the classic overbearing judge. As to the judge’s conduct, it is enough to note that the judge sua sponte declared a mistrial. The proper focus then is whether from all the circumstances the defendant’s consent to mistrial could be implied.
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that there has been no showing by the state of express or clear implication of consent. The state here bears the burden on the issue of consent, and given that burden I agree that no consent has been shown.