Court Opinion

ID: 9700236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:16:52.112209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:04.027068
License: Public Domain

WRIGHT, Circuit Judge (dissenting):
It is improper, in my judgment, to dismiss this suit at this time. Instead, I think we ought to examine the order now and decide whether the Commission’s action was supported by substantial evidence. I am in complete agreement with the proposition that any plaintiff who wants to challenge any rate now being charged must first pursue his administrative remedies under Sections 13 and 15 of the Act. However, the plaintiffs here are not seeking to challenge the appropriateness of any rate or combination of rates. Instead, they wish to challenge the propriety of a Commission order which allowed the rates generally to be raised by the carriers. That order was predicated on a factual determination by the Commission that the nation’s railroads need more freight revenue. That order, like any action of the Commission, must be based on substantial evidence. Cf. United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70, 77, 54 S.Ct. 28, 78 L.Ed. 181 (1933). Such an order is, of course, judicially reviewable, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1336, 2325 (1964), and I feel it is ripe for review now.
There can be no doubt that there are plaintiffs who are aggrieved now by this order. The effect of the order was to remove the upper limits on rates which the Commission had prescribed for certain commodities. Without this order, the railroads could not have increased any of the Commission-made rates. Shippers, therefore, are paying higher rates now as a direct result of this Commission determination. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507,18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967).
Considering challenges to the general order now would avoid needless relitigation of the same issue before the Commission in countless rate-making proceedings involving individual commodities. Furthermore, I think that it would be difficult if not impossible for any shipper to challenge this determination of a nationwide railroad need for revenue in the context of an individual rate-making proceeding. This is the sort of threshold issue which ought to be determined once and for all at the outset, preferably, as plaintiffs here seek to do, in a class action.
I admit that there is little direct language in the existing cases supporting judicial review of the order now. Review now does seem eminently sensible to me, however, in spite of the fact that Atlantic City1 seems to preclude it. Furthermore, both the Algoma2 and the Florida Citrus3 cases can be read as sanctioning this limited, threshold review. After holding that the plaintiffs *340could not challenge individual carrier-set rates until they were passed upon by the Commission, both courts did consider the propriety of the general order entered by the Commission. Both concluded that the general order was supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, neither of these eases, in my judgment, supports the disposition made here or in Atlantic City.4
I respectfully dissent.

. Atlantic City Electric Co. v. United States, S.D.X.Y., 306 F.Supp. 338 (1969).

. Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, E.D.Va., 11 F.Supp. 487, 494-495 (1935).

. Florida Citrus Comm’n v. United States, N.D.Fla., 144 F.Supp. 517, 524-527 (1956), affirmed, 352 U.S. 1021, 77 S.Ct. 589, 1 L.Ed.2d 595 (1957).

. It is not inconsistent to hold that individual rates must be first challenged before the Commission, but at the same time to permit judicial review of the propriety of the general order. Two different determinations are made by the Commission. In the first proceeding, which leads to the general order permitting the carriers to raise rates, the Commission determines that the railroads need more revenue. That order will stand if the court finds that it is based on substantial evidence. Florida Citrus Comm’n v. United States, supra Note 3, 144 F.Supp. at 524-527; Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, supra Note 2, 11 F.Supp. at 494 — 495. In the second proceeding, the Commission has to determine the reasonableness of individual rates. That determination, too, is subject to judicial scrutiny. 28 U.S.C. § 1336 (1964) ; see Swift & Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 373, 72 S.Ct. 716, 96 L.Ed. 1008 (1952).