Court Opinion

ID: 9950755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 19:01:47.055197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:44.092531
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10114   Document: 26-1    Date Filed: 03/14/2024   Page: 1 of 4

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-10114
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       KEVIN KARPEL,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       DANIEL BLONSKY,
                                                             Plaintiﬀ,
       versus
       GEBRUEDER KNAUF VERWALTUNGSGESELLSCHAFT, KG, et
       al.,

                                                          Defendants,
USCA11 Case: 23-10114     Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 03/14/2024    Page: 2 of 4

       2                      Opinion of the Court                23-10114

       KNAUF GIPS KG,
       KNAUF PLASTERBOARD ( TIANJIN ) CO., LTD.,

                                                    Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-24168-RNS
                           ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Kevin Karpel appeals the district court’s November 30, 2022
       order dismissing his action and imposing attorney’s fees as sanc-
       tions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f) but leaving the amount of fees to
       be determined. Karpel filed his notice of appeal on December 29,
       2022, before the district court entered its January 3, 2023 order de-
       termining the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded, and he did
       not file a new or amended notice of appeal after entry of the Janu-
       ary 3 order. We conclude that the November 30 order was not
       final or otherwise appealable and, thus, Karpel’s notice of appeal
       was premature.
              We generally only have jurisdiction to review final decisions
       of district courts that end the litigation on the merits and leave
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       23-10114               Opinion of the Court                          3

       nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. See CSX
       Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir.
       2000). Generally, a pending request for attorney’s fees by a prevail-
       ing party is a collateral matter that does not affect finality. See Bu-
       dinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 197, 199–202 (1988);
       Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int’l Union of Operating
       Eng’rs & Participating Emps., 571 U.S. 177, 180-81, 183–86, 189–90
       (2014). However, orders imposing attorney’s fees as sanctions are
       different. In Jaffe v. Sundowner Properties, Inc., we concluded that an
       appeal from an order dismissing an action and awarding attorney’s
       fees as a sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) was not final because
       the amount of attorney’s fees had not yet been determined. 808
       F.2d 1425, 1426–27 (11th Cir. 1987). We reasoned that the award
       of attorney’s fees was “not separable from the imposition of the
       dismissal sanction.” See id. at 1427.
              Jaffe’s reasoning applies with equal force here. Thus, there
       was no final order until the district court entered its January 3 order
       determining the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded, which
       Karpel did not appeal. See Jaffe, 808 F.2d at 1426–27. Moreover, the
       January 3 order did not cure the premature appeal because the No-
       vember 30 order was an interlocutory order that could not be ap-
       pealed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See Robinson v. Tanner, 798 F.2d
       1378, 1382–83 (11th Cir. 1986) (discussing this Court’s precedent to
       explain that, when appeals are taken from interlocutory orders not
       appealable under Rule 54(b), subsequent entry of final judgment
       cannot cure those premature appeals); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
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       4                     Opinion of the Court                23-10114

       (providing that a “court may direct entry of a final judgment as to
       one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties”).
              Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdic-
       tion. All pending motions are DENIED as moot.