Court Opinion

ID: 9577862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:38:51.046408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:22.827570
License: Public Domain

Justice HUDSON
dissenting.
Because I conclude that the trial judge here acted under the misapprehension that, when polling revealed the jury was not unanimous, he had no discretion to direct the jury to resume deliberations or instead to impose a life sentence on defendant, I respectfully dissent. I concur in the majority opinion except as to this sentencing issue. In my opinion, this failure to exercise discretion has profoundly prejudiced defendant, as it undermines confidence in the fairness of the ultimate sentence here — the death penalty. I would hold that the trial court’s conclusion was an error of law and would vacate the sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
This Court has consistently recognized — indeed, emphasized— the inherent authority and discretion of the trial judge to supervise and control the proceedings before him “to ensure fair and impartial justice for both parties.” State v. Fleming, 350 N.C. 109, 126, 512 S.E.2d 720, 732 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 941, 145 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1999). Since our earliest cases, we have entrusted trial judges with great discretion in assessing the possibility of undue influence on a jury:
[A trial judge] is clothed with this power because of his learning and integrity, and of the superior knowledge which his presence at and participation in the trial gives him over any other forum. However great and responsible this power, the law intends that the Judge will exercise it to further the ends of justice, and though doubtless, it is occasionally abused, it would be difficult to fix upon a safer tribunal for the exercise of this discretionary power, which must be lodged somewhere.
Moore v. Edmiston, 70 N.C. 382, 390, 70 N.C. 470, 481 (1874). Although Moore specifically involved the trial court’s discretion in dealing with undue influence on a jury, we have stressed the importance and scope of that discretion in all aspects of managing a trial by jury. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 317 N.C. 315, 318, 345 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1986) (“The trial judge has inherent authority to supervise and control trial proceedings. The manner of the presentation of the evidence is largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge and his con*298trol of a case will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” (citations omitted)); State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 236, 333 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1985) (“In this connection it is well settled that it is the duty of the trial judge to supervise and control the course of a trial so as to insure justice to all parties.”).
Here, the majority’s construction of N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1238 and -2000(b) restricts that principle, unnecessarily in my view. Moreover, the majority opinion’s repeated statement that the trial court “lacked authority to impose a life sentence” inadvisably constrains the discretion of a trial judge overseeing a capital sentencing proceeding while also incorrectly framing the question before us. The issue is whether, given the language of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(b), the trial court had the discretion to choose among these options: (1) order the jury to resume deliberations; (2) impose a life sentence; or (3) declare a mistrial. The canons of statutory construction and prior case law demonstrate that it did.
According to the majority, the trial court’s authority here was defined by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1238, which reads:
Upon the motion of any party made after a verdict has been returned and before the jury has dispersed, the jury must be polled. The judge may also upon his own motion require the polling of the jury. The poll may be conducted by the judge or by the clerk by asking each juror individually whether the verdict announced is his verdict. If upon the poll there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury must be directed to retire for further deliberations.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1238 (2007) (emphasis added). The majority maintains that § 15A-1238 controlled the situation faced by this trial judge because § 15A-2000(b) is “silent as to what a court can or cannot do where the polling reveals a nonunanimous jury as to sentencing recommendation in a capital case.” The relevant portion of § 15A-2000(b) provides:
The sentence recommendation must be agreed upon by a unanimous vote of the 12 jurors. Upon delivery of the sentence recommendation by the foreman of the jury, the jury shall be individually. polled to establish whether each juror concurs and agrees to the sentence recommendation returned.
If the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, unanimously agree to its sentence recommendation, the judge shall impose a *299sentence of life imprisonment; provided, however, that the judge shall in no instance impose the death penalty when the jury cannot agree unanimously to its sentence recommendation.
Id. § 15A-2000(b) (2007) (emphases added). Thus, § 15A-2000(b) tracks the basic outline of § 15A-1238 as to the return of a verdict by a jury and the subsequent polling of the jury, but § 15A-2000(b) eliminates the legislative command that “the jury must be directed to retire for further deliberations” if not unanimous.
The majority would graft that language onto § 15A-2000(b) with its holding that the trial court “lacked authority to impose a life sentence.” Had the General Assembly intended to limit the trial court’s discretion when a jury is nonunanimous in its capital sentencing recommendation, the language of § 15A-1238 clearly shows that it knows how to do so. See, e.g., N.C. Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Mitchell, 323 N.C. 528, 538, 374 S.E.2d 844, 849 (1988) (in construing statute, noting “[tjhere is no doubt that the legislature knows how to draft such language when it chooses to do so”). Nevertheless, “ ‘[t]he short answer is that [the legislature] did not write the statute that way.’ ” Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17, 24 (1983) (quoting United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 773, 60 L. Ed. 2d 624, 630 (1979)).
Likewise, we have long held that, “[w]here one of two statutes might apply to the same situation, the statute which deals more directly and specifically with the situation controls over the statute of more general applicability.” Trs. of Rowan Tech. Coll. v. J. Hyatt Hammond Assocs., 313 N.C. 230, 238, 328 S.E.2d 274, 279 (1985) (citations omitted); see also Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 301 N.C. 561, 579, 273 S.E.2d 247, 257 (1981) (“Where two statutory provisions appear, a special or particular provision will control over a general one.” (citation omitted)); State v. Baldwin, 205 N.C. 174, 176, 170 S.E. 645, 646 (1933) (“A settled rule of construction requires that all statutes relating to the same subject shall be compared and harmonized if this end can be attained by any fair and reasonable interpretation, and that if two statutes are apparently incompatible, one general in its terms and the other special and expressive of a restricted application, the latter may be considered in the nature of an exception and sustained upon this theory.” (citations omitted)); State v. Johnson, 170 N.C. 771, 776, 170 N.C. 685, 690-91, 86 S.E. 788, 791 (1915) (stating that a special statute controls over general statute that relates to the same subject matter and is inconsistent).
*300Here, section 15A-1238 falls under Article 73, “Criminal Jury Trial in Superior Court,” while § 15A-2000(b) is within Article 100, “Capital Punishment,” which the legislature specifically drafted to govern the conduct of capital proceedings. There is no indication that the General Assembly intended to make § 15A-1238, the more general act, controlling over § 15A-2000(b). See Nat’l Food Stores v. N.C. Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C. 624, 629, 151 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1966) (“[T]o the extent of any necessary repugnancy between them, the special statute, or the one dealing with the common- subject matter in a minute way, will prevail over the general statute, according to the authorities on the question, unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the general act controlling ....” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, the rule of lenity requires us to “construe[] strictly” and resolve “[a]ll conflicts and inconsistencies” in penal statutes “in favor of the defendant.” State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 1, 10, 72 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1952).
Although the unique factual situation presented by this case has never before been considered by this Court, we have discussed the discretion of the trial court in the context of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000. In State v. Sanders, this Court affirmed the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial based on a finding of “manifest necessity” after learning of juror misconduct during deliberations, including the jury’s acting contrary to the instructions given by the trial court. 347 N.C. 587, 599, 496 S.E.2d 568, 576 (1998). The trial court sent the jury to deliberate, or resume deliberations, on three separate occasions before ultimately declaring a mistrial upon the State’s motion. Id. at 597-98, 496 S.E.2d at 575. Our “thorough review of the record” led us to conclude that “the trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering a mistrial.” Id. at 599, 496 S.E.2d at 576.
This is not to suggest that Sanders should be read as having compelled the trial judge here to declare a mistrial. Rather, Sanders is instructive in that it discussed approvingly the trial court’s “exploring alternative remedies which could have allowed the sentencing proceeding to continue” before its ultimate declaration of a mistrial. Id. at 600-01, 496 S.E.2d at 576-77. Sending the jury back to resume deliberations was one such option employed by the trial court in Sanders. Justice Frye, in his dissent in Sanders, stated even more succinctly his view of the “alternative remedies” available to the trial court under § 15A-2000(b), when faced with a nonunanimous jury: “The appropriate action was for the judge to either impose a sentence of life imprisonment or encourage the jurors to continue deliberating *301to see if they could unanimously agree to a sentencing recommendation.” Id. at 601, 496 S.E.2d at 577 (Frye, J., dissenting).
This language — admittedly, dicta — strongly suggests that this Court previously concluded that the trial court is vested with discretion to determine the most appropriate action when faced with a nonunanimous jury in a capital sentencing proceeding. Sending the jury back to resume deliberations is one acceptable option. However, according to the plain language of § 15A-2000(b), if the trial court determines that the jury has deliberated for a “reasonable time,” imposing a life sentence is another alternative. See State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 370, 259 S.E.2d 752, 762 (1979) (“[W]hat constitutes a ‘reasonable time’ for jury deliberation in the sentencing phase should be left to the trial judge’s discretion.”).
Nevertheless, as reflected in the transcript, and as argued by defendant in his brief, the trial judge’s error here was in believing that he was required to send the jury back to resume deliberations. The following excerpts from the transcript of sentencing, immediately after polling initially showed that the jury was not unanimous, clearly reflect that the trial judge believed he had no discretion at this point:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I move that you impose a life sentence.
THE COURT: Denied at this time. As I recall the statute it says it’s my duty to direct them to retire and begin deliberations. Is that not correct?
[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Yes, sir.
[Again, after polling was concluded:]
THE COURT: .... Ladies and gentlemen, finding that there is not, at this time, a unanimous recommendation as to sentence .... Under North Carolina law, it is thus my duty to direct you to retire and resume your deliberations.
(Emphases added.) The trial court then sent the jury out for a short recess, during which defense counsel renewed the motion for a mistrial and mentioned the jury’s “opportunity to witness all emotions on both sides,” arguing that it was “prejudicial” for jury to see “emotions” and “reactions” to the sentencing recommendation, including “crying” and “some happiness.” Defense counsel also referred to *302Alicia Patrick, the third juror polled, changing her mind at the end of the polling, and he stated that “when you have a situation like that, we just are not going to be able to achieve a verdict that we could have confidence in.” The defense again renewed its motion for a mistrial, and the trial court responded: “I’ve heard counsels’ arguments and considered the same and, in the court’s discretion, the motion is denied. The statute says that we shall — or the law says, we shall begin deliberations anew. And so we’re going to try.” (Emphasis added.)
As quoted by the majority, and under long-standing precedent:
When a trial court fails to exercise its discretion in the erroneous belief that it has no discretion as to the question presented, there is error. Where the error is prejudicial to a party, that party is entitled to have the question reconsidered and passed upon as a discretionary matter. In such cases, this Court may remand the case or take such other actions as the rights of the parties and applicable law may require.
State v. McAvoy, 331 N.C. 583, 591, 417 S.E.2d 489, 494-95 (1992) (citations omitted); see also State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 36-37, 331 S.E.2d 652, 657-58 (1985) (concluding that a trial court’s complete failure to exercise discretion amounted to reversible error).
Here, the error was neither the denial of defendant’s motion for a sentence of life imprisonment nor sending the jury back to resume deliberations. Instead, the error was the trial judge’s erroneous belief, apparent from the transcript, that he had no discretion in reaching his decision. The trial judge faced a highly unusual situation: the jury indicated its unanimity; then, on polling, some individual jurors disavowed their assent to that unanimous recommendation, including one juror who changed her vote after already having been polled, all following emotional reactions in the courtroom to the initial recommendation of life imprisonment for a defendant convicted of killing a police officer. In light of these circumstances, it is impossible to determine how the trial judge might have ruled on defendant’s motion for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment had he been aware such a ruling was discretionary. Thus, this failure to exercise discretion was fundamental to the fairness of defendant’s sentencing proceeding.
The authority of the trial judge to supervise and control proceedings in the courtroom is paramount in our criminal justice system. I do not necessarily find error in the trial court’s decision to direct the *303jury to resume deliberations; rather, I conclude only that the court erred in believing that decision was mandated. In my view, our precedents and long-standing rules of statutory construction clearly indicate that such a decision is discretionary. The trial court thus erred by failing to make the decision as an exercise of that discretion, resulting in the most extreme prejudice possible to defendant, a sentence of death. As such, I would vacate and remand for a new sentencing hearing for defendant.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting opinion.