Court Opinion

ID: 9591833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:08:01.964842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:12.386377
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The question presented is whether a person, who is subject to imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence, but, pursuant to the *464exercise of the court’s discretion for downward departure from the mandatory minimum, is actually sentenced to serve a term less than the mandatory minimum, is eligible to receive disciplinary or sentence credits. We would hold that he is.
We agree with the majority that “an individual who receives a downward departure of a minimum term of imprisonment in accordance with subsection 7401(4) or subsection 7403(3) is an ‘individual subject to a mandatory term of imprisonment’ under subsection 7401(3) . . . ,”1 We write separately because we do not agree that a person who receives a downward departure from a minimum term “is therefore ineligible to receive disciplinary credits or any other type of sentence-credit reduction of that minimum term.”2
i
Freddy Scott Dean was convicted of possession of more than 225 grams but less than 650 grams of cocaine, and was subject to imprisonment for not less than twenty years or more than thirty years.3 Dean was not, however, sentenced to serve the mandatory twenty-year minimum sentence. Rather, he was sentenced to serve twelve to thirty years pursuant to the provision authorizing the court to depart from the minimum term of imprisonment if it finds that there are substantial and compelling reasons to do so.4
*465The statute further provides — the provision here at issue — that a person subject to a mandatory term of imprisonment shall not be eligible for probation or suspension of that sentence or parole, nor shall he receive disciplinary or any other type of sentence credit reduction during that mandatory term.5
II
Because Dean was sentenced to a nonmandatory term of twelve to twenty years rather than to a mandatory twenty- to thirty-year term, and because the statute only prohibits disciplinary or sentence-credit reduction with respect to a mandatory term, his sentence may be reduced by disciplinary or other applicable sentence-credit provisions.
The statute provides:
An individual subject to a mandatory term of imprisonment under subsection (2)(a) or section 7403(2)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) shall not be eligible for probation, suspension of that sentence, or parole during that mandatory term, except and only to the extent that those provisions permit probation for life, and shall not receive a reduction in that mandatory term of imprisonment by disciplinary credits or any other type of sentence credit reduction. [MCL 333.7401(3); MSA 14.15(7401)(3) (emphasis added).]
The majority focuses on “subject to a mandatory term of imprisonment,” but does not discuss “during that mandatory term,” or “reduction in that mandatory term.” (Emphasis added.)
Although “subject to a mandatory term” refers to a mandatory term that might possibly be imposed, *466whether actually imposed, “during that mandatory term” refers to a mandatory term actually imposed. (Emphasis added.) Otherwise, a person sentenced, as here, to serve a term of years less than a mandatory term of years provided by statute would not, in the majority’s construction of the statute, be eligible for “parole during that mandatory term.” That would be a result manifestly inconsistent with the statutory authorization of a downward departure from a mandatory minimum term. The statute clearly contemplates that a person who has served a reduced term — here twelve years — is eligible for parole although the mandatory minimum term is longer— here twenty years — and parole would be a “parole during that mandatory term.”6 (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, because the sentence actually imposed was not the mandatory minimum term, such a person, sentenced to serve a reduced term as the result of a downward departure, is eligible to receive a reduction in the term of imprisonment as a result of disciplinary or other sentence credits.
Stated in the language of the statute, a person sentenced to serve twelve to twenty years, who receives *467disciplinary or other sentence credits, has not received “a reduction in that mandatory term of imprisonment by disciplinary credits or any other type of sentence credit reduction.” (Emphasis added.) The mandatory term is “reduced,” not by disciplinary or other sentence credits, but as a result of the downward departure.
The mandatory term is no longer applicable to a person who, although “subject” to the mandatory minimum, is sentenced to a term less than the mandatory minimum. Because a person serving a downward departure sentence is not serving a mandatory term, allowing disciplinary or other sentence credits does not constitute “a reduction in that mandatory term of imprisonment by disciplinary credits or any other type of sentence credit reduction.” (Emphasis added.)
It is therefore beside the point that Dean was “subject to a mandatory term of imprisonment,” as the majority states and restates throughout its opinion, ignoring “during” and “reduction in that mandatory term.”
in
Policy arguments that the Legislature intended harsh punishment, and “could not” have intended to further reward persons who obtain a downward departure from the mandatory minimum sentence, ignore that the Legislature authorized a judge to depart downward on finding substantial and compelling reasons therefor,7 and that there is at least as much reason for the Legislature to have so further *468rewarded persons, like Dean, who receive a lesser, downward departure sentence, simply because a judge has identified Dean as a person who should have the opportunity to return to society earlier than had a mandatory minimum sentence been imposed.
The Legislature could have decided, although, to be sure, we do not know whether it so decided, that persons so identified by a judge are as deserving of disciplinary or other sentence-credit reduction as offenders generally, including armed robbers, rapists, and second-degree murderers. Absent evidence of what the Legislature’s intent in this regard might have been, this Court cannot properly indulge assumptions regarding the Legislature’s intent that are opposed by other plausible assumptions.
We know that the legislative purpose in barring “parole during that mandatory term” and “reduction in that mandatory term” by disciplinary or sentence credits was to assure that the mandatory minimum term the offender faced, and thus was “subject” to receiving, would be fully served without reduction by parole or disciplinary or sentence credits. That is the apparent and undoubted, literally stated purpose. There is no justification for embellishing beyond that apparent and undoubted purpose by reading into the literal language,8 which speaks only of a reduction of *469sentence “during that mandatory term,” a broader purpose barring reduction by disciplinary or sentence credits of a sentence other than a mandatory minimum sentence. The statute speaks only of a “reduction in” a mandatory minimum sentence, and does not bar a reduction, by disciplinary or sentence credit, of a downward departure, nonmandatory sentence.
IV
In conclusion, the statute proscribes only a reduction in a mandatory term of imprisonment by disciplinary or other sentence credits. It does not prohibit disciplinary or sentence-credit reduction of a lesser nonmandatory term of imprisonment.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J.
Weaver, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 Ante, pp 450451.

 Id., p 451.

 MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(ii); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(ii).

 MCL 333.7403(3)(aXii); MSA 14.15(7403)(3)(a)(ii). MCL 333.7401(4); MSA 14.15(7401)(4) similarly provides for a discretionary departure from the minimum term for persons convicted of delivery or possession with intent to deliver quantities of controlled substances.

 MCL 333.7401(3); MSA 14.15(7401)(3). See the beginning of part H for text.

 The construction of the statute that we believe to be correct would not mean that persons “subject to a mandatory term” would “be eligible for probation, suspension of that [mandatory] sentence.” The words “during that mandatory term” in the phrase “parole during that mandatory term” modify “parole” and not “probation, suspension of that sentence.” The majority errs in reasoning that
[t]o construe the statute as plaintiff suggests would lead to the conclusion that the trial court has the authority to suspend sentences, a construction in clear contravention of the legislative purpose and the explicit directive that an “individual subject to a mandatory term of imprisonment . . . shall not be eligible for probation, suspension of that sentence, or parole during that mandatory term. . . [Ante, p 462.]

 Neither Dean nor we argue that “the Legislature intended to afford either trial judges or corrections officials unfettered discretion.” Ante, p 462.
*468Nor do we take issue with the observation “in People v Fields, 448 Mich 58; 528 NW2d 176 (1995), [that] the term ‘substantial and compelling’ authorizes deviation from the minimum term only on a demonstration of sufficient objective and verifiable factors on the record.” Ante, p 462.
These comments in the majority opinion have nothing to do with the issue of statutory construction here presented, which does not concern whether the circuit judge erred in departing from the mandatory minimum twenty-year sentence.

 The majority does not assert that the “plain meaning” supports its construction of the statute:
*469Where, as here, the language is not plain, but is subject to varying interpretations, we look to the purpose of the act to ascertain legislative intent. [Ante, p 454]