Court Opinion

ID: 9546407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:29:02.481465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:24.268011
License: Public Domain

Fontron, J.,
dissenting: In my opinion, the prosecutor’s final argument was so inflammatory and so filled with invective as to deny the accused a fair trial.
The court has quoted but a small part of the intemperate language which flowed from the lips of the prosecution. Other passages are equally offensive. Some of them must be quoted before the devas*897tating effect of the prosecution’s diatribe can be fully appreciated.
Preceding the language set out in the majority opinion, these purple passages appear in the record.
“. . . She was no match for his ego. He wanted what he wanted and everything else. Just forget it — I’ll get what I want, and he got it. . . . “. . . how many women have not some time in their life imagined themselves with their stockings stuck down their throat and a pair of jeans wrapped around their neck? . . .
“There were millions of people who walked to their death at Beuchenwald [sic] in World War II. How many of those do you think had given up hope? They just couldn’t imagine that anyone would pull such an enormity. He’s not a gentleman; he has no respect for anybody but himself; and he has less respect for himself than anybody. . . .”
After the defendant’s objection was overruled, counsel for the state, unabashed, continued in like vein and near the end of the bitter peroration came this passage:
“. . . We submit that he [the defendant] went straight home and forgot about it and licked his chops. He got what he wanted; the hell with her.”
To spread the entire summation upon the records of this court would take more space than can be justified. Hence, I would only add that the sections extracted reflect the tone of the entire summation.
For the court to say, in gentle reproof, that it cannot approve the language — that it is bad oratory — evidences small concern that the bounds of fair comment were grossly exceeded.
The majority opinion correctly points out that only one objection was interposed by the defense. That objection was to the language quoted by the court in its opinion. However, I believe the trial court should have evaluated the objection against the background of all the denunciatory language which had gone before. The impact of the quoted passage on the fairness of the trial, itself, should have been viewed within the framework of the harangue in its entirety. Considered in this context, I consider the trial court’s overruling of the defendant’s objection as constituting prejudicial error.
Moreover, the state’s tempestuous tirade approaches, in my judgment, the proportions of general prejudice. Final summations of counsel serve a useful purpose in the adversary system only as they provide opportunities for fair comment and rational persuasion. *898When summations become platforms for abusive invective they pervert the function they are designed to perform.
Many years ago, in times less sophisticated than ours, perhaps, but certainly no less sound or more disordered, this court voiced words of wisdom in State v. Gutekunst, 24 Kan. 252. They are relevant here:
“. . . Where counsel refers to pertinent facts not before the jury, or appeals to prejudices foreign to the case, it is the duty of the court to stop him then and there. The court need not and ought not to wait to hear objection from opposing counsel. The dignity of the court, the decorum of the trial, the interest of truth and justice forbid license of speech in arguments to jurors outside of the proper scope of professional discussion. . . .” (p. 254.)
The Gutekunst case has frequently been cited with approval, the last occasion being as recently as 1961 where, in State v. Wilson, 188 Kan. 67, 360 P. 2d 1092, the foregoing passage was quoted in full.
In Weaver v. Winchell, 116 Kan. 296, 226 Pac. 719, an action to recover damages for alienation of affections, indefensible language was used in argument by plaintiff s counsel. No objection was interposed at the trial. Nonetheless, prejudicial error was found to exist, the court using these words:
“The remarks of counsel for plaintiff in the instant case could, and undoubtedly did, enter largely into the result of the jury’s verdict and thereby prejudiced the rights of the defendant. Under the circumstances there should be a new trial.” (p. 299.)
Misconduct of counsel during oral argument was alleged on appeal in State v. Netherton, 128 Kan. 564, 279 Pac. 19. No objection had been lodged against the offensive language until after the jury had retired. In an opinion reversing the conviction on this ground, among others, the court said:
“. . . We think the failure of the court to admonish the jury to disregard these remarks was error, even if the jury had retired from the room before the request was made.” (p. 575.)
Prejudicial error was held to have resulted from abusive language in State v. Ryan, 141 Kan. 549, 42 P. 2d 591, where the court declared:
“Defendant’s repeated and timely objections to the sort of argument just quoted were well taken. Indeed, it was the trial court’s duty on its own motion to interfere and put a stop to it and to admonish the jury that such vituperation and abuse of defendant and all matters not in evidence stated or implied in the address of counsel should be disregarded. . . .” (p.553.)
*899The final words spoken by this court in the Ryan case appear to me as peculiarly appropriate under the present facts:
“It need hardly be added that such a diatribe as that quoted above cannot be printed in our official reports and bear the seal of our judicial approval. Neither in the interest of simple justice to defendant can his complaint thereat be ignored. The court holds that the closing argument for the prosecution was prejudicial, and the failure of the trial court to check it and to admonish the jury to disregard it renders it impossible for this court to affirm the judgment.” (p. 554.)
It is my opinion that the prosecution’s philippic merits strong disapproval and that this case should be returned for re-trial. Hence, I respectfully dissent.