Court Opinion

ID: 9734984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:55:11.309218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:53.246893
License: Public Domain

WHELAN, J.
I dissent.
When the defendant, before the trial of the case now on appeal, was punished for the possession, in Orange County on April 22, 1966, of marijuana with intent to sell, he was punished for possession of any and all marijuana he possessed concurrently in time on that date and in that county. The district attorney, when in June 1966 he filed an information in superior court case # C-16846 charging defendant with possession with intent to sell on April 22, 1966, knew he had on May 27, 1966 filed an information in superior court case # C-16810, in which this appeal was taken, charging defendant with possession of marijuana on April 22,1966.
That the district attorney sought to divide the crime of possession for sale from its included offense of possession by charging them in separate informations tried at different times should not preclude an examination of the evidence to determine whether defendant has not been twice punished for a single offense. Although the claim of double jeopardy must be raised by plea in the trial court (Pen. Code, § 1017; People v. Garcia, 166 Cal.App.2d 141 [333 P.2d 69]; People v. Mims, 136 Cal.App.2d 828 [289 P.2d 539]), and I agree that failure to raise the question in the trial court waives the objection that both charges should have been joined in a single accusatory pleading, the objection that a defendant has been twice punished for the same offense may be first raised after the pronouncement of judgment. {In re Johnson, 65 Cal.2d 393 [54 Cal.Rptr. 873, 420 P.2d 393].)
The multiple punishment and multiple prosecution aspects of the prohibition of section 654, Penal Code, are separate and distinct; one may be applicable where the other is not. {Kellett v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.2d 822 [48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409 P.2d 206].)
*343While disregard by the district attorney of the rights of the defendant to be subjected only to a single prosecution and to a joinder of both charges in a single accusatory pleading may not for the first time be raised on appeal, the requirements of joinder may be considered so far as they throw light on the question of double punishment. Accordingly the question of double punishment should be viewed as though both charges had in fact been joined in a single accusatory pleading and tried at the same time. That such procedure should have been followed is clear.
That is so even though the complaints filed in the municipal court may have been filed in different judicial districts. Both informations alleged the place of possession only as in Orange County, and the time as April 22, 1966. There were, therefore, two prosecutions, one of which was for an offense which so far as the face of the accusatory pleadings discloses was included in the other.
The fact that in the present case defendant was charged jointly is of no consequence in this regard even if all defendants had been tried jointly. The record before us shows that the jury that tried the present case was not informed that defendant was charged jointly with others; and the jury was not called upon to find and did not find that the marijuana that defendant was charged with possessing was possessed by any other person. It is only for his own possession of the marijuana that he could be convicted.
If the two charges had been united in a single accusatory pleading and tried together, resulting in a verdict of guilty on both counts, only one sentence would have been pronounced ; while an acquittal on the charge of simple possession would have been tantamount to an acquittal as to both charges. It was perhaps the possibility of the latter contingency that motivated the separation of the charges.
On the other hand, if in the assumed circumstances a verdict of not guilty on the simple possession charge would have been inconsistent with a verdict of guilty on the charge of possession with intent to sell, a verdict of guilty of the included offense of possession on the charge of possession with intent to sell and of guilty on the charge of simple possession could be the basis of only one punishment.
The issue would be presented in bolder outline if defendant had been charged in a single accusatory pleading with two counts of simple possession.
The question whether a defendant might be guilty of more than one offense if he had possession concurrent in time of *344contraband of the same kind in two or more different counties is not involved; nor is the question whether a defendant might be guilty of distinct acts of possession on different dates, where he is so charged, if on one of the dates he possessed marijuana, and on a later date had acquired other marijuana while he continued to possess the marijuana first acquired; and not involved is the question whether two counts charging possession on or about the same date might not be separately supported by proof of the possession on one date of marijuana and on another date of different marijuana.
It is not upon any theory that the possession by defendant of marijuana in Newport Beach and in Garden Grove were parts of an indivisible course of conduct that I believe the mandate of section 654, Penal Code, has been disregarded.
It was stated by the district attorney in the trial of superior court case # C-16846, the judgment in which was appealed from in 4 Crim. No. 2661, that defendant was there being charged with possession of the marijuana found in the garage of defendant’s Garden Grove home.
In the case in which the present appeal was taken, the evidence in chief for the People made no mention of the marijuana found in the Garden Grove garage, but was confined to the marijuana found in the pipe, found on the table, and found in defendant’s car, all of which was in Newport Beach.
There was no testimony that the marijuana found in Newport Beach had originally been a part of that found in Garden Grove that had been brought by defendant from the one place to the other, the defendant protesting rather that he was ignorant of the presence of marijuana in either place, so that it cannot be said that the possession of the marijuana found in Newport Beach and the possession of that found in the garage in Garden Grove were parts of an indivisible course of conduct.
There were multiple punishments because the defendant cannot twice be guilty of possession of marijuana in the same county on the same day merely because some of the marijuana possessed is in one place, some in another, when the possession of both is coincident in time. Punishment of two separate convictions of possession within the jurisdiction of the same trial court, based solely upon the fact that the contraband was divided into two lots found in different places, might result in a greater punishment for one offender than for another who, though he might possess a greater quantity, kept it all in one spot.
*345That there was a possession coincident in time is obvious. The evidence of possession in both trials was confined to the date of April 22. Either defendant possessed the marijuana in the Garden Grove garage at the same time he possessed the marijuana in Newport Beach or he had not possessed the marijuana in the garage at all. He had no opportunity to place the marijuana in the garage after his arrest in Newport Beach. It is true that an agent of his, acting under his direction, might have done so, but to assume such a state of facts is to go beyond the evidence.
The fact that the marijuana was found in the garage some six and one-half hours after defendant’s arrest is, therefore, immaterial. That more than one lot of the same contraband possessed simultaneously within the jurisdiction of the same trial court constitutes but one possession has been recognized in decisions of several courts dealing with the illegal possession of intoxicating liquor. (Richardson v. City of Tuscaloosa (Ala. Ct. of Appeals) 22 Ala.App. 604 [118 So. 496]; Puckett v. Commonwealth (Ky. Ct. of Appeals) 210 Ky. 768 [276 S.W. 811]; Beaman v. State (Okla. Ct. of Appeals) 69 Okla. Crim. 455 [104 P.2d 260].)
In Puckett v. Commonwealth, supra, 276 S.W. 811, where one pint of whiskey was found in defendant’s place of business, and a large quantity was found later the same day in his residence, the court stated . . the possession of the whisky in the residence and in the pool room at the same time and in the same jurisdiction constituted but one illegal possession of the whisky ...”
The defendant in Beaman v. State, supra, 104 P.2d 260, was charged and convicted jointly with another of possession of liquor found in a house after he alone had earlier been charged with and convicted of possession on the same day of other liquor that he was engaged in carrying in the outdoors.1
The California decisions of People v. Puppilo, 100 Cal.App. 559 [280 P. 545], and People v. Willard, 92 Cal. 482 [28 P. 585], are of some interest.
In People v. Puppilo, supra, 100 Cal.App. 559, conviction of possession of a concealable firearm by an alien was reversed *346where two counts each charged the offense of such possession on the same day without further identification or description of the firearm than as “a pistol.” Although there were two pistols in defendant’s house, he was found guilty on one count, not guilty on the other. The information was held to charge only a single offense. It is, indeed, stated that in the possession of two such firearms concurrently there could be only one violation. (Cf. People v. Wasley, 245 Cal.App.2d 383 [53 Cal.Rptr. 877], where the convictions were upheld of possession by an ex-felon of a pistol, and also of possession of a sawed-off shotgun.)
In People v. Willard, supra, 92 Cal. 482, it is suggested that if at the same time one knowingly receives stolen property taken from two different houses on different dates, there is but a single crime of receiving stolen property; otherwise, if the two lots were received on different days. (See also People v. Brumley, 242 Cal.App.2d 124, 130 [51 Cal.Rptr. 131].)
Although possession with intent to sell is defined as a different crime from simple possession, there is no difference in the quality of the possession as such. The intent to sell is not the gravamen of the crime of which the possession is only a necessary element, as in the crime of selling or transporting ; and the possession is not merely an incident to the crime, but is the very basis of it. It is no different in quality, qua possession, than possession without the intent. Intent divorced from any present or future sensibly perceptible action or conduct may not be punished criminally.
Simple possession of marijuana may be interrupted and terminated by loss, theft, seizure, destruction, sale or other disposition by the possessor. It is not terminated by the formation of an intent to sell it without an actual sale and delivery.
The setting aside by -a defendant for his own use of a portion of a whole of which he intended to sell the remainder, with the contemporary possession of both, would not create two acts of possession.
Possession with intent to sell, therefore, in its relationship to possession should be distinguished from the crimes of selling and transporting.2
*347The presence of marijuana in Newport Beach was evidence that as to it the crime of unlawful possession was being committed by someone, and the presence of marijuana in Garden Grove was evidence that as to it the crime of unlawful possession was being committed by someone and, because of the quantity, inferentially for sale; there was so far, a basis for considering that there were two separate possessions. Because the contraband in both places was possessed at one time by defendant, it must be said that there was, on the date charged in the informations, but a single possession so far as defendant is concerned, although defendant may have intended a different disposition as to some of the marijuana than with regard to other of it.
It is argued in the case at bench that defendant took possession of the marijuana in Newport Beach at a time when he already had possession of that in Garden Grove. However, defendant is not charged with a crime of receiving marijuana into his possession, were there such an independent crime; nor does the evidence show when he came into possession of the marijuana at either Newport Beach or Garden Grove.3
It could hardly be claimed that if defendant had taken the marijuana on his person from Newport Beach to his home and was there arrested and the marijuana in the garage found immediately thereafter, two separate charges of possession could be sustained.
It may be said that there has been a fragmentation in space of a single possession, just as in In re Johnson, supra, 65 Cal.2d 393, a single sale was fragmented in time.
The California decisions holding that there may be separate crimes of possession and of other acts in the commission of which possession is a necessary element are not inconsistent with these views.
Such are the cases in which separate convictions were upheld for concurrent possession of different kinds of prohibited narcotics {People v. Lopez, 169 Cal.App.2d 344 [337 P.2d 570]; People v. Mandell, 92 Cal.App.2d 865 [208 P.2d 416]; People v. Mandell, 90 Cal.App.2d 93 [202 P.2d 348]); for possession incident to sales made on different days {People v. Rosales, 226 Cal.App.2d 588 [38 Cal.Rptr. 329]); or for possession and sale of different marijuana on the same day, the possession being of marijuana acquired subsequent to and not incidental to the sale (People v. Wallace, 199 Cal.App.2d 678 *348[18 Cal.Rptr. 917]) ; or for sale and for possession on the same day, the. possession being of narcotics retained after the sale (People v. Tenney, 162 Cal.App.2d 458 [328 P.2d 254]) ; or for transporting marijuana and possession on the same day of marijuana other than that transported (People v. Holliday, 120 Cal.App.2d 562 [261 P.2d 301] People v. Roland, 183 Cal.App.2d 780 [6 Cal.Rptr. 895]).
People v. Roland, supra, 183 Cal.App.2d 780, contains a statement that there might have been two separate crimes of possession, both unrelated to the crime of transportation, that must be considered as dictum, inasmuch as there was a single conviction of possession and a conviction of transportation.
Some comment must be made upon People v. Cole, 113 Cal. App.2d 253 [248 P.2d 141], where the defendant was charged in two separate counts with possession of marijuana and in a third count with transportation, all alleged to have occurred on or about the same date in the same county. The court noted that multiple pleading is permitted. One possession count was on the theory it was incident to the transportation; the two counts relating to such possession and transportation had to do with a single weedy flake about the size of a fingernail, a total of 12 seeds, and an apparently empty tobacco can from which a trace of material was scraped, all found in a ear in front of defendant’s house. The other count had to do with a large quantity of marijuana found on a shelf in an open compartment outside the house. Verdicts of guilty were returned on all counts. The verdicts on the two counts having to do with the particles and seeds found in the car were set aside on appeal because of erroneous instructions. The decision cannot be considered authority for the proposition that two separate convictions of concurrent possession could be upheld; although convictions of possession of certain marijuana and transportation of other marijuana might stand. What action would have been taken by the court if defendant had been convicted only on the two counts of possession need not be the subject of speculation.
Since defendant was placed on probation for five years in the case in which this appeal was taken, unless he has already been sentenced under the provisions of section 1203.2a, Penal Code, the trial court has probably lost jurisdiction over him if he was in fact imprisoned under the sentence imposed in superior court action # C-16846. It is possible that he may have been sentenced under section 1203.2a in the matter in which this appeal was taken, so that the question whether he *349committed only one crime continues to be material. He would have been subject to such sentencing although judgment in superior court action # C-16846 was pronounced before the granting of probation in the case at bench. (In re Klein, 197 Cal.App.2d 58 [17 Cal.Rptr. 71].)
If defendant’s probation has been revoked and judgment pronounced in the trial court for the conviction in the present case, such judgment should be reversed; if judgment has not been pronounced, the order granting probation should be reversed.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 14, 1968, and appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 17,1968.

In People v. Mehra, 73 Cal.App. 162, 174 [238 P. 802], it is said:
“By the eighth instruction the jury is advised that the offense of unlawful possession is transformed into a different crime if that unlawful possession is inside instead of outside of a building. The statute makes no such distinction. Unlawful possession, as unlawful possession, is simply unlawful possession whether the forbidden article is upon the person or within a building. ’ ’

In a posthumous decision prepared by the late Justice Ward of Division One of the First District, adopted as the opinion of the court, it is stated: "Possession may be a circumstance tending to prove transportation but it is not an essential element to that specific offense any more than to an ‘offer to transport’ or an ‘attempt to transport’ a narcotic.’’ (People v. Watkins, 96 Cal.App.2d 74, 76 [214 P.2d 414].)

See People v. Wasley, 245 Cal.App.2d 383 [53 Cal.Rptr. 877], for suggestion that “possession” is not an act, although acquisition would be.