Court Opinion

ID: 9901973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 19:02:22.289158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:42.364971
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/22/23 P. v. Camarillo CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B325716

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. SA034055-02)
           v.

 MARCOS CAMARILLO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT:
     Marcos Camarillo appeals the order of the superior court
denying his postjudgment petition for resentencing under Penal
Code1 section 1172.6.2 We appointed counsel to represent
Camarillo on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel

         1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

         2 Camarillo petitioned the court pursuant to section
1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, that section was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.)
filed an opening brief raising no issues and requesting that we
exercise our discretion to independently review the record for
arguable issues pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14
Cal.5th 216, 228–232 (Delgadillo) and People v. Wende (1979) 25
Cal.3d 436 (Wende).
       Camarillo filed a supplemental brief in which he argues the
superior court erred in finding him ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law and denying his petition for
resentencing. Camarillo also filed a letter brief claiming that
appointed appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
any issues or otherwise challenge the superior court’s denial of
his section 1172.6 petition.
       We affirm the superior court’s denial of Camarillo’s petition
for resentencing under section 1172.6, and reject his claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
       On October 18, 1998, Camarillo and codefendant Alex
Acuna were driving a stolen vehicle. Shots were fired from
Camarillo’s vehicle at Jaime Cruz, who was in another car. Cruz
sustained several gunshot wounds and underwent surgery.
       Following a jury trial, Camarillo and Acuna were convicted
of willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder (Pen.
Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), shooting at an occupied motor
vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246), and the unlawful driving or taking of a
vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), with true findings as to

      3 The brief summary of facts is drawn from this court’s
unpublished decision in Camarillo’s direct appeal from his
conviction. (People v. Alex Istok Acuna et al. (Feb. 27, 2002,
B142948) [nonpub. opn.] (Acuna).)

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the attempted murder and shooting at an occupied vehicle that a
principal was armed with assault weapons and that a principal
used and discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (Pen.
Code, §§ 12022, subds. (a)(1), (a)(2), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d),
(e)(1)). As to all three counts, the jury also found that the
offenses were committed in association with a criminal street
gang. (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) Camarillo admitted he
was on bail at the time of the offenses. (Pen. Code, § 12022.1.)
The trial court sentenced Camarillo to life in prison with
consecutive terms of 25 years to life and six years. This court
affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion filed
February 27, 2002. (Acuna, supra, B142948.)
       On June 1, 2022, Camarillo filed a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95.4 The prosecution filed an
opposition to which Camarillo filed a reply. The matter came on
for prima facie review on September 26, 2022. The superior court
denied the petition on the ground that Camarillo had failed to
make a prima facie case of eligibility for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law.
                            DISCUSSION
       Because the instant appeal is not from his conviction,
Camarillo is not entitled to our independent review of the record
pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 or its federal
constitutional counterpart, Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S.

      4 Acuna filed a petition for resentencing under former
section 1170.95 on January 19, 2022. At the prima facie review
hearing on September 26, 2022, the superior court considered the
two petitions together. Acuna and Camarillo filed timely notices
of appeal, but pursuant to Acuna’s request, Acuna’s appeal was
dismissed.

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738. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 227 [“Courts below have
uniformly agreed that Wende procedures are not constitutionally
required on an appeal from a denial of a postconviction petition
under section 1172.6”]; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 119
[independent judicial review mandated by Anders applies only to
first appeal as of right]; see also Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987)
481 U.S. 551, 559.)
       However, although “[t]he filing of a supplemental brief or
letter does not compel an independent review of the entire record
to identify unraised issues,” we are required to address the
contentions Camarillo raises in his supplemental brief.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232 [“the Court of Appeal is
required to evaluate the specific arguments presented in [the
supplemental] brief and to issue a written opinion”].)
I. The Superior Court Correctly Determined that
    Camarillo Is Ineligible for Section 1172.6 Relief as a
    Matter of Law
       Camarillo argues the superior court erred in denying his
petition for resentencing because the jury did not find that he
personally discharged a firearm and there was no “concrete
evidence” directly linking him to the act of personally discharging
a firearm to establish malice. He thus contends that the jury
could have convicted him of attempted murder on a theory of
natural and probable consequences based solely on his
participation in the offense, and he is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing in accordance with section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
       We disagree. Camarillo was convicted of willful,
premeditated and deliberate attempted murder, which required
the jury to find he personally harbored the intent to kill. As the
superior court found, there was no instruction on the natural and

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probable consequences doctrine or any other theory which might
have allowed the jury to impute malice to Camarillo. Camarillo
was thus ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of
law, and the superior court properly denied his petition for
resentencing.
   A. Applicable legal principles
      The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) in 2018, effectively abolishing the natural and
probable consequences doctrine in cases of murder and limiting
the application of the felony-murder doctrine. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis).) With one narrow exception (§ 189, subd. (f)), Senate Bill
No. 1437 effectively eliminated murder convictions premised on
any theory of imputed malice—that is, any theory by which a
person can be convicted of murder for a killing committed by
someone else, such as felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine—unless the People also prove that the
nonkiller defendant personally acted with the intent to kill or
was a major participant who acted with reckless disregard to
human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).) Specifically,
the Legislature amended section 188 to require that, when the
felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of
murder “shall act with malice aforethought” and “[m]alice shall
not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).) Effective January 1,
2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended section 1172.6 to expand its
coverage to individuals convicted of “attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a); People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 747.)

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       Senate Bill No. 1437 also enacted former section 1170.95
(now § 1172.6), which established a procedure for vacating the
murder convictions of defendants who could no longer be
convicted of murder because of the amendments to sections 188
and 189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 957, 959, 971; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) Section
1172.6, subdivision (c) requires the court to appoint counsel when
requested upon the filing of a properly pleaded petition for
resentencing. (Lewis, at pp. 963, 966.) The court must then
conduct a prima facie analysis with briefing to determine the
petitioner’s eligibility for relief, and, if the requisite prima facie
showing is made, issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(c); Lewis, at p. 971; People v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458,
469–470.)
       We review de novo whether the trial court properly denied
an appellant’s section 1172.6 petition without issuing an order to
show cause. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545
(Coley); People v. Harrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 429, 437.)
    B. Camarillo fails to make a prima facie showing of
       eligibility for relief under section 1172.6,
       subdivision (c)
       No instructions on a natural and probable consequences
theory of liability were given to the jury in this case.
Nevertheless, Camarillo contends his “conviction was based
solely on participation under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine” because (1) the jury found only that a
principal in the attempted murder, not Camarillo personally,
discharged a firearm which caused great bodily injury under
section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1); and (2) the jury was
instructed with CALJIC No. 2.09, a defective instruction that

                                  6
permitted the jury to consider gang evidence to identify the
perpetrator(s), and thereby supported conviction for attempted
murder on a theory of imputed malice. These claims lack merit.
None of the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict
Camarillo of “attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)), or any other theory
of imputed malice. Camarillo is thus ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law. (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 542, 548.)
       1. Because Camarillo was not convicted of attempted
          murder under the natural and probable consequences
          doctrine, he is ineligible for relief
       As amended by Senate Bill No. 775, section 1172.6,
subdivision (a) provides: “A person convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter may file a petition with the court that sentenced
the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts.” (Italics added.)
       When construing a statute, our fundamental task is to
ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to give effect to the law’s
purpose. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 961; People v. Gonzalez
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.) We start by determining whether
the language of the statute is ambiguous (People v. Dieck (2009)
46 Cal.4th 934, 940), examining its words and giving them a
plain and commonsense meaning (Gonzalez, at p. 1141). “ ‘ “If
there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the

                                 7
Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the
statute governs.” ’ ” (Dieck, at p. 940.)
       According to the plain language of section 1172.6, a person
convicted of attempted murder is eligible for relief only if that
conviction was based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548 [“Section
[1172.6] applies by its terms only to attempted murders based on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine”].) Where, as in
this case, the instructions did not permit the jury to convict
appellant of “attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)), appellant is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
(Coley, at p. 548 [defendant convicted of attempted murder not
entitled to § 1172.6 relief because the jury was not instructed on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine]; see also People
v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599 [“if the jury did not
receive an instruction on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, the jury could not have convicted the defendant on that
basis, and the petition should be summarily denied”].)
       2. Camarillo was not convicted of attempted murder as an
          aider and abettor under any theory of imputed malice
       Even if section 1172.6 relief were available for an
attempted murder conviction based on some other theory of
imputed malice, Camarillo would still be ineligible because his
jury was not instructed on any theory of imputed malice. Rather,
the only theory on which Camarillo’s jury was instructed was
direct aiding and abetting of attempted murder, which does not
qualify for section 1172.6 relief.
       Specifically, the jury in this case was instructed that to
prove attempted murder, each of the following elements must be

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proved: “1. A direct but ineffectual act was done by one person
towards killing another human being; and [¶] 2. The person
committing the act harbored express malice aforethought,
namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.”
(CALJIC No. 8.66.)
       The trial court instructed that “[p]ersons who are involved
in committing or attempting to commit a crime are referred to as
principals in that crime. Each principal, regardless of the extent
or manner of participation is equally guilty. Principals include:
[¶] 1. Those who directly and actively commit or attempt to
commit the act constituting the crime, or [¶] 2. Those who aid
and abet the commission or attempted commission of the crime.”
(CALJIC No. 3.00.) The jury was further instructed that “[a]
person aids and abets the commission or attempted commission
of a crime when he [¶] 1. With knowledge of the unlawful purpose
of the perpetrator and [¶] 2. With the intent or purpose of
committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the
crime, and [¶] 3. By act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or
instigates the commission of the crime.” (CALJIC No. 3.01.)
       Two other instructions ensured that in order to find
Camarillo guilty of aiding and abetting the attempted murder
with the requisite malice, the jury had to consider Camarillo’s
guilt separately from Acuna’s. (CALJIC No. 17.00 [“You must
decide separately whether each of the defendants is guilty or not
guilty”].) The jury also had to find that Camarillo himself
harbored the requisite intent to kill. (CALJIC No. 3.31 [“Unless
this specific intent exists the crime or allegation to which it
relates is not committed or is not true”].)
       Under these instructions, in order to convict Camarillo of
attempted murder as an aider and abettor, the jury necessarily

                                9
found Camarillo knew Acuna’s criminal purpose to kill Cruz, and
with the intent of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the
attempted murder, Camarillo aided, promoted, encouraged, or
instigated the attempted murders by his own words or conduct.
When a jury has been instructed as Camarillo’s jury was, our
Supreme Court has declared that “ ‘the person guilty of
attempted murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill.’ ”
(People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054 (Nguyen), quoting
People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 624; People v. Gonzalez
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654, fn. 8.)
      The instructions thus required Camarillo’s jury to find that
he personally shared the actual shooter’s intent to kill. This
finding constitutes a finding of express malice, which renders
Camarillo ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.
(See People v. Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, 182–183.)
      Camarillo nevertheless argues that CALJIC No. 2.09
permitted the jury to impute malice to him, and the absence of
any finding that Camarillo personally discharged a firearm
establishes that the jury did in fact impute malice to him. We
disagree.
      CALJIC No. 2.09 instructed the jury that “[i]n this case,
gang evidence has been introduced for the following limited
purposes only: [¶] (1) As evidence of the identity of the
perpetrator or perpetrators of the crimes charged. [¶] (2) As
evidence of the intent of the perpetrator or perpetrators of the
crimes. [¶] (3) As evidence of the motive behind the commission
of these crimes. [¶] Do not consider this evidence for any
purpose except the limited purpose for which it was admitted.”
      Although he contends that the jury’s consideration of gang
evidence was “very prejudicial,” Camarillo does not explain how

                                10
CALJIC No. 2.09 could have prompted the jury to impute malice
to him in this case, nor does he cite language in section 1172.6 or
any decisional authority for the proposition that the presentation
of gang evidence creates an ambiguity as to whether intent may
be imputed to the defendant. CALJIC No. 2.09 itself merely
emphasized that gang evidence was introduced for a limited
purpose and explained what that limited purpose was. Nothing
in the instruction permitted the jury to impute malice to
Camarillo. Rather, read together as a whole, the instructions
required the jury to find that Camarillo personally acted with an
intent to kill in order to convict him of attempted murder as an
aider and abettor. (See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 433 (Bryant et al.) [“ ‘ “ ‘[T]he correctness
of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of
the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or
from a particular instruction’ ” ’ ”].)
       Our Supreme Court has declared “ ‘[i]t is fundamental that
jurors are presumed to be intelligent and capable of
understanding and applying the court’s instructions.’ [Citation.]
‘ “A defendant challenging an instruction as being subject to
erroneous interpretation by the jury must demonstrate a
reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in
the way asserted by the defendant.” ’ ” (Bryant et al., supra, 60
Cal.4th at p. 433.) We will not presume the jury misunderstood
or failed to follow the court’s instructions on the law. (People v.
Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 431 [courts presume that “jurors
understand and follow the instructions they are given”].)
       Further, the fact that Camarillo was not specifically found
to have personally discharged a firearm does not support a
conclusion that the jury imputed malice to Camarillo in reaching

                                11
its verdict on attempted murder. In finding Camarillo guilty of
attempted murder, the jury made multiple findings that a
principal in the offense personally and intentionally used, was
armed with, and discharged a firearm or firearms within the
meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a)(1) and (2), and section
12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), (d), and (e)(1). With respect to
these allegations, the jury was instructed that if it found a
defendant5 guilty of attempted murder, it must further determine
the truth of the firearm allegations. (CALJIC Nos. 17.19, 17.19.5,
17.15.) Because these instructions directed that the jury not even
consider the gun enhancement allegations unless and until it
found Camarillo guilty of attempted murder, there is no
reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted the gun
enhancement instructions to allow it to impute malice to
Camarillo. (See Bryant et al., supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 433.)
II. Camarillo Fails to Show Prejudice Based on the
    Purported Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
       Camarillo filed a letter brief in which he contends
appointed appellate counsel has rendered constitutionally
defective assistance for failing to raise any issues or otherwise
challenge the superior court’s denial of his section 1172.6
petition, and for effectively abandoning the appeal by failing to:
communicate with Camarillo, send him a copy of appellant’s
opening brief, or mail him the record in the appeal. He requests:
(1) an evidentiary hearing to examine the ineffective assistance of
counsel in these appellate proceedings; (2) appointment of new
appellate counsel; and (3) consideration of the issues that counsel

      5 CALJIC No. 1.11 instructed that “[t]he word ‘defendant’
applies to each defendant unless you are instructed otherwise.”

                                12
failed to raise in the appeal from the superior court’s denial of
Camarillo’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.
       In light of our conclusion that the superior court correctly
determined that Camarillo is ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law, Camarillo cannot establish prejudice
based on his claim of defective representation by appellate
counsel. In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, “a court need not determine whether counsel’s
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.
The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s
performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim
on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will
often be so, that course should be followed.” (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697; People v. Thompson (2016)
1 Cal.5th 1043, 1101; In re Crew (2011) 52 Cal.4th 126, 150 [“[i]f
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be determined on
the ground of lack of prejudice, a court need not decide whether
counsel’s performance was deficient”].)
       We therefore find no merit to Camarillo’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel based on the filing of a no-issue
brief on appeal.

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                          DISPOSITION
       The order of the superior court denying Camarillo’s petition
for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.        ASHMANN-GERST, J.             CHAVEZ, J.

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