Court Opinion

ID: 9400434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 14:08:46.726327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:44.331449
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lance Tyler,                                          :
                                Petitioner            :
                                                      :
                        v.                            :   No. 302 M.D. 2021
                                                      :   Submitted: June 17, 2022
Department of Corrections,                            :
                        Respondent                    :

BEFORE:         HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
                HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER                            FILED: June 8, 2023

      Before this Court is the preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer (PO
or demurrer) filed by the Department of Corrections (Department) in response to the
pro se Petition for Review (Petition) filed by Lance Tyler (Petitioner), an inmate at
the State Correctional Institution (SCI) at Benner Township (SCI-Benner). In the
Petition, Petitioner asks this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Department
to comply with the misconduct hearing procedures set forth in Department’s Inmate
Misconduct Policy DC-ADM 801 (DC-ADM 801 or Policy) and regulation at 37 Pa.
Code § 93.10(b)(1)-(6).1 The Department asserts the Petition should be dismissed

      1
          This regulation states, in relevant part:

      § 93.10 Inmate Discipline
      ....
(Footnote continued on next page…)
because Petitioner has failed to state a claim for mandamus relief. Specifically, the
Department argues Petitioner has not established a clear right to relief because DC-
ADM 801 and the regulation do not create any enforceable rights and Petitioner
received all of the process constitutionally due. Based upon precedent, we must
sustain the demurrer and dismiss the Petition.

I.     THE PETITION
       On September 3, 2021, Petitioner filed the Petition in this Court’s original
jurisdiction asserting the following facts. Petitioner was issued a misconduct on
May 24, 2021, for threatening an SCI employee with bodily harm due to Petitioner
allegedly threatening to punch Corrections Officer in the face, and Petitioner was

       (b) Written procedures which conform to established principles of law for inmate
       discipline including the following will be maintained by the Department and
       disseminated to the inmate population:

       (1) Written notice of charges.

       (2) Hearing before an impartial hearing examiner or an informal resolution process
           for charges specified by the Department in the Department of Corrections
           Inmate Handbook, or any Department document that is disseminated to
           inmates. The informal resolution process is described in DC-ADM 801 . . . .
           The process gives inmates the option to meet with staff to resolve a misconduct
           rather than proceed with a hearing.

       (3) Opportunity for the inmate to tell his story and to present relevant evidence.

       (4) Assistance from an inmate or staff member at the hearing if the inmate is unable
           to collect and present evidence effectively.

       (5) Written statement of the decision and reasoning of the hearing body, based upon
           the preponderance of the evidence.

       (6) Opportunities to appeal the misconduct decision in accordance with procedures
           in the Department of Corrections Inmate Handbook.

37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b)(1)-(6).

                                                2
placed in pre-hearing confinement. (Petition ¶¶ 4-5, Exhibit (Ex.) C.) Petitioner
received notice of the misconduct/rule violation on May 27, 2021, after which he
requested that videos of the alleged incident be viewed and Corrections Officer who
issued the misconduct be called as a witness. (Id. ¶¶ 6-9.) A hearing examiner
conducted a misconduct hearing on June 3, 2021, at which the hearing examiner
indicated he viewed one of the videos, and Petitioner objected based on his desire to
have Corrections Officer be called as a witness and another video be provided. (Id.
¶ 10.) The hearing examiner subsequently took Corrections Officer’s testimony
under oath on June 9, 2021, and resumed the misconduct hearing on June 10, 2021.
(Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) At the resumed hearing, the hearing examiner stated he believed
Corrections Officer’s written report over Petitioner’s denial, found Petitioner guilty
of the misconduct, and imposed a sanction. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Petitioner, who did not
have access to the DC-ADM 801 while in pre-hearing confinement, obtained the
DC-ADM 801 during the appeal period, and asserted that multiple sections of the
Policy were not followed prior to and during his misconduct hearing.2 (Id. ¶¶ 15,
19, 21.)

       2
           Specifically, Petitioner avers the following sections of the DC-ADM 801 were violated:

             •
             1.B.1 (stating that a DC-141, Part 1 Misconduct Report (DC-141, Part 1) is to be
             used to give notice of the misconduct and is evidence to be used against an inmate
             during a misconduct hearing);
          • 1.D.1 (providing that, unless an inmate is in “POC” (a term not defined in the
             record, but appears to be a form of custody), the DC-141, Part 1 “shall be personally
             served” on the inmate the day it was written, and, if not, a Shift Commander is to
             determine why and provide a justification);
          • 1.D.4 (stating that additional forms relating to an inmate’s request for
             representation and witnesses, the inmate’s version of the events, and witness
             statement to be delivered with DC-141, Part 1 and the procedures related to
             completing and submitting those forms);
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                 3
      Petitioner followed through with each step of the appeals process. (Id. ¶¶ 14,
16-18, 20, 22; Ex. D.) SCI-Benner’s Program Review Committee (PRC) reviewed
Petitioner’s appeal and upheld the hearing examiner’s decision, finding the hearing
examiner had adequately documented his findings of facts and those findings
support the determination.          (Petition Ex. D.)        SCI-Benner’s Superintendent
considered Petitioner’s appeal from the PRC decision and, upon his review, upheld
the PRC’s and hearing examiner’s determination. (Id.) Finally, the Department’s
Office of Chief Hearing Examiner likewise upheld the hearing examiner’s decision
and subsequent appeal decisions based on its review of the entire record. (Id.) Thus,
Petitioner exhausted the appeals process.
      Petitioner argues he has a clear right to relief to a formal misconduct hearing
that complies with the policies set forth in the DC-ADM 801 and the regulation at

          •   3.A.1 (providing that the “Hearing Examiner shall conduct the misconduct
              hearing”);
          •   3.A.12 (stating the hearing examiner is to ensure that “complete records of all
              proceedings are maintained for a period of two years in the Hearing Examiner’s
              Office[]”);
          •   3.B.4 (providing that an inmate should be permitted to meet with an assistant before
              a hearing);
          •   3.D.1 (stating the hearing examiner can approve the calling of a staff member or
              witness who has knowledge of the incident, is present on the facility’s grounds, and
              whose testimony is needed to establish an inmate’s guilt or innocence);
          •   3.D.2(a)-(b) (providing for up to three witnesses to be requested and the procedures
              for making such request);
          •   3.D.3 (stating the hearing examiner may question a witness and an inmate “shall be
              permitted a reasonable opportunity to pose relevant questions to any adverse
              witness,” which can be controlled by the hearing examiner);
          •   3.D.4 (indicating that the hearing examiner shall make credibility determinations);
              and
          •   3.D.5 (providing that “[a]ll testimony shall be under oath”).

(Petition ¶ 21; PO Ex. A; Petitioner’s Response to PO Exs. A-C; and https://www.cor.pa.gov/
About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/801%20Inmate%20Discipline.pdf (last visited June
7, 2023).)

                                               4
37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b)(1)-(6), which set forth the process due to inmates in
misconduct or disciplinary hearings. (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) According to Petitioner, DC-
ADM 801 imposes a duty on the Department to comply with the formal procedures
set forth in that Policy and the regulation, and it has not done so in this matter. (Id.
¶¶ 25-26.)    In particular, Petitioner claims the Department did not serve the
misconduct report on the same day it was written and failed to provide him a
reasonable opportunity to question Corrections Officer, an adverse witness. (Id.
¶ 27.) Finally, Petitioner asserts mandamus is appropriate because he lacks any other
remedy that would compel the Department to conform to its own regulation. (Id.
¶¶ 28-29.) As relief, Petitioner asks the Court to direct the Department “to conduct
his misconduct hearing in accord with [a]dministrative regulations . . . or other
appropriate relief this Court deems necessary.” (Id. ¶ 31.)

II.   PO AND RESPONSE
      In its demurrer, the Department argues the Petition fails to establish the clear
right to relief needed to obtain a writ of mandamus. To the extent Petitioner is
seeking judicial review of the hearing examiner’s misconduct finding in either the
Court’s original or appellate jurisdiction, the Department asserts Petitioner has no
right to that relief because the results of disciplinary hearings are not subject to that
review, absent a substantial constitutional issue, which is not present here. (PO
¶¶ 23-28; Department’s Brief (Br.) at 8-9 (citing, e.g., Bronson v. Cen. Off. Rev.
Comm., 721 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1998); Edmunson v. Horn, 694 A.2d 1179 (Pa. 1997);
Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 913 A.2d 301 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); Iseley v. Beard, 841
A.2d 168 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)).) According to the Department, Petitioner already
received the formal disciplinary hearing he requests in the Petition and neither DC-
ADM 801 nor 37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b)(1)-(6) create rights or constitutional interests

                                           5
that trigger due process protections. (PO ¶¶ 29-31; Department’s Br. at 9-10 (citing
Bronson v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 610 M.D. 2017, filed June 26, 2018), slip op.
at 93).) Thus, the Department contends Petitioner’s claims are based upon a non-
existent right. (PO ¶ 31.) The Department also argues Petitioner’s own allegations
reflect he received the process found to be due in prison disciplinary hearings, which
is advance written notice, no less than 24 hours before the disciplinary hearing, a
written statement by the factfinder reflecting the evidence relied upon, and an
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense. (PO
¶¶ 32-33, 47; Department’s Br. at 10-12 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
(1974); Feliciano v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 250 A.3d 1269, 1275 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)).)
The Department observes Wolff specifically holds there is no constitutional right to
confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses or for appointed counsel in disciplinary
hearings, nor a right to call as many witnesses as an inmate chooses, and, therefore,
Petitioner cannot prevail on these claims. (PO ¶¶ 40-41, 46, 48; Department’s Br.
at 12-13.) Having not established a clear right to relief to a writ of mandamus, the
Department asserts the Petition must be dismissed.
       Petitioner responds he is not challenging the misconduct decision but the
Department’s failure to comply with its own procedure before the decision was
issued and, therefore, the Department’s assertions that this Court lacks jurisdiction
are misplaced. (Petitioner’s Response to PO (Response) ¶¶ 10-14; Petitioner’s Br.
at 17.) Petitioner argues the Department is empowered to enact regulations, the
regulation at 37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b) provides the written procedures for inmate
discipline, and DC-ADM 801 states violations “shall be [] disposed of . . . by formal

       3
         While not precedential, an unreported opinion of this Court may be cited as persuasive
authority pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126(b)(1), Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1),
and Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

                                              6
process,” all of which reflect the Department’s mandatory obligation to follow those
procedures. (Response ¶¶ 2-4, 7-8 (citing Section 1.A.1 of the DC-ADM 801;
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)) (emphasis and alterations in original);
Petitioner’s Br. at 11-12.) As there is a mandatory obligation to provide a formal
misconduct hearing, which Petitioner denies he received, Petitioner maintains
mandamus will lie against the Department because it did not comply with that
obligation. (Response ¶¶ 5-6; Petitioner’s Br. at 16 (citing Banks v. Dep’t of Corr.,
759 A.2d 432, 434 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000)).)
      Replying to the Department’s arguments that he received all the process he
was due, Petitioner asserts his arbitrary placement in pre-hearing confinement,
which is not used routinely, affected his ability to present relevant evidence in his
defense by his not receiving the notice of the misconduct and DC-ADM 801 until
after his release or obtaining assistance from a staff member. (Response ¶¶ 17, 20,
22.) Petitioner maintains the Department has not provided justification for the delay
in providing the notice of the misconduct. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 21.) He further contends he
should have been present during Corrections Officer’s testimony so he could have
an opportunity to pose questions. (Id. ¶¶ 30-32; Petitioner’s Br. at 13-16.) Petitioner
disputes that Wolff supports the conclusion that he does not have a right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses because there would be no undue risk to institutional
safety or correctional goals and Section 93.10(b)(3) and (4) of the regulation and
Section 3.A.12 of DC-ADM 801 allow for such questioning. (Response ¶¶ 23-24,
26, 29; Petitioner’s Br. at 13-14, 18.) Alternatively, Petitioner asserts the hearing
examiner’s decision affected his personal rights and, therefore, it is an adjudication
under the Administrative Agency Law (AAL), 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 501-588, which requires
cross-examination, a full and complete record, that all testimony be recorded, and a

                                          7
decision that contains reasons for the decision, which did not occur here. (Response
¶¶ 32-35.) For these reasons, Petitioner argues the demurrer should be overruled.
(Id. ¶ 37.)

III.   DISCUSSION
       “Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that will only lie to compel official
performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right
in the [petitioner], a corresponding duty in the [respondent], and want of any other
appropriate or adequate remedy.” Chanceford Aviation Props., L.L.P. v. Chanceford
Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 923 A.2d 1099, 1107-08 (Pa. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Mandamus is not used to establish legal rights, but to enforce rights that are “already
established beyond peradventure.” Lawrence v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 941 A.2d 70, 72
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Mandamus will not lie to “direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way, or to direct the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken.” Chanceford Aviation Props., 923 A.2d at 1108. Mandamus may be
used “to compel a tribunal or administrative agency to act when that tribunal or
agency has been sitting on its hands.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
       When ruling on preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, this Court
must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the petition for review as true,
along with any reasonable inferences deducible therefrom. Williams v. Wetzel, 178
A.3d 920, 923 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). The Court is not bound, however, “by legal
conclusions, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or
expressions of opinion encompassed in the petition for review.” Id. Preliminary
objections should be sustained only where it “appear[s] with certainty that the law
will not permit recovery and any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain
them.” Neely v. Dep’t of Corr., 838 A.2d 16, 19 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).

                                          8
       The Department asserts multiple reasons why Petitioner has failed to establish
a clear legal right to the relief he seeks, which is a formal disciplinary conduct
hearing held in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Department’s
regulation and DC-ADM 801. Petitioner’s mandamus claim would thereby be
precluded as a matter of law.           The Department first argues the Court lacks
jurisdiction, either in our appellate or original jurisdiction, to review the merits of
the hearing examiner’s decision upholding the misconduct against Petitioner. The
Department is correct that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review that determination.
This Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over inmate misconduct
determinations because they are matters of internal prison management and not
“adjudications subject to appellate review.” Hill v. Dep’t of Corr., 64 A.3d 1159,
1167 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).4 Petitioner, however, is not seeking judicial review of the
underlying misconduct determination and, therefore, does not invoke our appellate
jurisdiction. And, while this Court may exercise original jurisdiction “if an inmate
can identify a personal or property interest not limited by [Department] regulations
and affected by a final [Department] decision” that violates an inmate’s
constitutional rights, Feliciano, 250 A.3d at 1275 (quoting Hill, 64 A.3d at 1167)
(alterations in the original), Petitioner’s claim is that the Department is not
complying with the written procedures set forth in its regulations and DC-ADM 810.
Such claims do not ask this Court to exercise its original jurisdiction over the actual
misconduct determination itself. Id. at 1275 n.9. Accordingly, this is not a reason
to dismiss the Petition.

       4
         Because the hearing examiner’s decisions are not “adjudications,” Hill, 64 A.3d at 1167,
Petitioner’s arguments that the AAL’s requirements for adjudications must be satisfied, and were
not, necessarily fail.

                                               9
       The Department next argues Petitioner failed to establish a clear legal right
based on rights he contends are established by DC-ADM 801 and the Department’s
regulation. Notably, Petitioner does not allege that the Policy or regulation violate
any statutory or constitutional rights but asserts he has a clear right to the DC-ADM
801 and regulatory procedures provided. However, “[a]dministrative regulations are
not statutes or constitutional provisions.” Tindell v. Dep’t of Corr., 87 A.3d 1029,
1035 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Thus, “allegations that the Department failed to follow
its regulations or internal policies cannot support a claim based upon a vested right
or duty because these administrative rules and regulations, unlike statutory
provisions, usually do not create rights in prison inmates.” Shore v. Dep’t of Corr.,
168 A.3d 374, 386 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). See also Tindell, 87 A.3d at 1035. This is
because they do not create enforceable rights in a state prison inmate. Weaver v.
Dep’t of Corr., 829 A.2d 750 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). DC-ADM 801 specifically
disclaims that it creates any rights in any person, DC-ADM 801 Section VI,5 and
similar language in other sections of the Department’s policies has been found to be
“sufficient to dispel any reasonable expectation that an enforceable right is created
by the [Department’s] policy.” Weaver, 829 A.2d at 753. Therefore, no clear legal
right to relief, or cause of action, can be based on a violation of the Department’s
policies or administrative regulations. Feliciano, 250 A.3d at 1275 n.9; Tindell, 87
A.3d at 1035; Weaver, 829 A.2d at 753.
       Finally, the Department asserts Petitioner’s allegations that he did not receive
a proper misconduct hearing fail to state a claim because the Petition’s averments
reflect that the requirements of Wolff and Feliciano were met. Assuming that

       5
         This section provides relevantly: “This policy does not create rights in any person nor
should it be interpreted or applied in such a manner as to abridge the rights of any individual.”
DC-ADM 801 § VI.

                                               10
Petitioner has been deprived of a protected interest, which is when principles of due
process are implicated, “[t]he amount of process due depends on the context
presented.” Shore, 168 A.3d at 383 (quoting Silo v. Ridge, 728 A.2d 394, 399 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1999)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that, unlike criminal
trials and related appeals, during which “a defendant is accorded the full spectrum
of rights and protections guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions,” “the
procedures for pursuing . . . misconduct appeals are a matter of internal prison
administration and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal
prosecution is not necessary in a prison disciplinary proceeding.” Bronson, 721
A.2d at 358-59 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In Feliciano, we
explained the due process requirements for prison misconduct hearings set by the
United States Supreme Court:

      In the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, three components, at
      minimum, must be present to satisfy an inmate’s right to procedural due
      process:

             [A]dvance written notice of the claimed violation[;] a
             written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence
             relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action
             taken[;] . . . [and the ability] to call witnesses and present
             documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him
             to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety
             or correctional goals.

      Wolff . . . , 418 U.S. [at] 563, 566 . . . .

250 A.3d at 1275 (sixth through eighth alterations added). The advance written
notice must be at least 24 hours before the hearing. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. On the
last point, the ability to call witnesses and present evidence, the United States
Supreme Court held, in Wolff, that an inmate does not have “the unrestricted right to

                                             11
call witnesses” and the “Constitution should not be read to impose the procedure” of
requiring “confrontation and cross-examination of those furnishing evidence against
the inmate.”    Id. at 566-67.    Wolff further holds that inmates in disciplinary
proceedings do not have a constitutional right to have either retained or appointed
counsel, and assistance from others, such as “staff” or “a sufficiently competent
inmate designated by the staff,” is available where an inmate is illiterate or the issue
is so complex that it is unlikely the inmate can “collect and present the evidence
necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case.” Id. at 569-70. Accordingly,
both the United States Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have set
forth more limited due process requirements for prison disciplinary hearings than
those available in other types of hearings or proceedings. We are bound by those
determinations.
      Here, Petitioner’s averments reflect that he received written notice of the
misconduct violation against him on May 27, 2021, and his misconduct hearing
commenced on June 3, 2021. (Petition ¶¶ 6, 10.) As there were 7 days between
Petitioner receiving written notice and the commencement of the misconduct
hearing, which is more than the 24 hours required by Wolff, Petitioner has not stated
a claim based on the alleged untimely notice of the misconduct.
      Petitioner’s allegations also indicate he requested the testimony of Corrections
Officer, who issued the misconduct, and two videos which might show the incident
be viewed. (Id. ¶¶ 7-9.) The hearing examiner viewed one of the videos several
times, finding the second video was not needed to establish Petitioner’s innocence
or guilt, and took the testimony of Corrections Officer under oath, which was outside
of Petitioner’s presence. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11; Petition Exs. B-C.) The video the hearing
examiner watched did not have audio and showed Petitioner “approach [a] desk and

                                          12
look[] down at something,” Corrections Officer looking at Petitioner as Petitioner
approaches and says something, and Corrections Officer “turn[ing] and fac[ing
Petitioner] at which point [Petitioner] turns and walks away.” (Petition Ex. C.) The
hearing examiner further recounted Corrections Officer’s testimony, taken under
oath, that Corrections Officer “de[fi]nitely heard [Petitioner] state [Petitioner] was
going to punch me in the face as he approached the desk[,] . . . that [Corrections
Officer] did turn to face [Petitioner] in order to be prepared in case [Petitioner]
attempted anything[,] . . . [Corrections Officer] ordered [Petitioner] back to his cell[,
and] . . . [Corrections Officer] was having on-going issues with [Petitioner].” (Id.)
The hearing examiner resumed the hearing on June 10, 2021, and advised Petitioner
of Corrections Officer’s testimony and of the review of the video, to which Petitioner
responded he was not guilty of the misconduct charge. (Id.) The hearing examiner
then indicated he believed Corrections Officer’s written report over Petitioner’s
denials, found Petitioner guilty, and imposed a sanction. (Petition ¶¶ 12-13.) These
allegations, and the hearing examiner’s decision, reflect the hearing examiner
considered one of the videos and Corrections Officer’s testimony and report, as
requested by Petitioner, and denied the third piece of evidence as not being needed.
While Petitioner understandably wanted to be present to hear Corrections Officer’s
testimony and to cross-examine Corrections Officer, and to watch the video with
hearing examiner to explain, since there was no audio, this is not constitutionally
required by Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567, and we are constrained by that pronouncement.
Petitioner cites language in Wolff related to allowing witnesses to appear if there
would be no undue risk to institutional safety or correctional goals. That language
relates to calling witnesses, not cross-examining witnesses. Equally understandable
is Petitioner’s argument that he should have had assistance, but Wolff similarly holds

                                           13
that no such assistance by either counsel or staff is constitutionally required, as there
are no allegations that he is illiterate or that the issue was somewhat complex that
staff assistance was needed. Id. at 569-70. We recognize it is difficult to understand
how the ability to call a witness is given effect in this case, where the witness testifies
outside the presence of the inmate, who cannot hear the testimony, and thus cannot
respond to it or question it. We similarly recognize it is difficult to understand how
the ability to present evidence is given effect when only one of two videos is
reviewed, the video has no audio, and the inmate is not present during the viewing.
What occurred here is troubling. However, this Court has no authority to require
more. Accordingly, we are constrained to hold that Petitioner has not stated a claim
on this basis.
       Last, and for completeness, the hearing examiner issued a written decision
explaining why he found Petitioner guilty of the misconduct. (Petition Ex. C.)
Therein, as discussed above, the hearing examiner identified the evidence presented,
including the video, which had no audio, Corrections Officer’s testimony and report,
and Petitioner’s not guilty plea. The hearing examiner stated he credited Corrections
Officer’s written report regarding Petitioner’s threatening him over Petitioner’s
denial, and a preponderance of the evidence supported the misconduct charge,
Petitioner was guilty, and he would receive 30 days of disciplinary confinement and
lose his job as punishment. This decision, which was upheld at all three levels of
appellate review within SCI-Benner and the Department, reflects “a written
statement of the factfinders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the
disciplinary action taken,” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563, and, therefore, under our binding
precedent, meets the constitutional requirements of due process thereby precluding
a valid claim on this basis.

                                            14
IV.   CONCLUSION
      Because DC-ADM 801 and the regulations do not create enforceable rights
and Petitioner received the process our precedent has held due under Wolff, Bronson,
and Feliciano, we must hold that Petitioner has not established the clear legal right
to the relief requested needed to state a claim for a writ of mandamus. Accordingly,
it “appear[s] with certainty that the law will not permit recovery” on Petitioner’s
claims, Neely, 838 A.2d at 19 n.4, and, therefore, we are constrained to sustain the
Department’s demurrer and dismiss the Petition.

                                       __________________________________________
                                       RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

                                         15
       IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lance Tyler,                            :
                        Petitioner      :
                                        :
                  v.                    :   No. 302 M.D. 2021
                                        :
Department of Corrections,              :
                        Respondent      :

                                     ORDER

      NOW, June 8, 2023, the Preliminary Objection in the Nature of a Demurrer
filed by the Department of Corrections is SUSTAINED, and the Petition for Review
filed by Lance Tyler is DISMISSED.

                                      __________________________________________
                                      RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge