Court Opinion

ID: 9609104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:22:35.549347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:48.938314
License: Public Domain

KENNETH W. SHRUM, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although a voluntary satisfaction of a judgment ordinarily renders an appeal from that judgment moot, Two Pershing Square, L.P. v. Boley, 981 S.W.2d 635, 638[4] (Mo.App.1998), an involuntary payment or satisfaction of a judgment does not have that effect. Kinser v. Elkadi, 654 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Mo.banc 1983). Generally, a payment is considered involuntary when, as here, it is made to forestall collection and no su-persedeas bond is posted. Boley, 981 S.W.2d at 638[5]. “The inference is strong that a judgment paid after execution or garnishment has issued was paid as a result of legal coercion.” Kinser, 654 S.W.2d at 903. Moreover, a payment to stop the accrual of interest on a judgment is considered involuntary. Id.; Boley, 981 S.W.2d at 638-39.
Here, as in Kinser, Appellant has consistently insisted on her right to appeal. 654 S.W.2d at 904. As happened in Kinser, payment and satisfaction of the judgment came in response to an execution and garnishment. Id. at 902. By satisfying the judgment, Appellant not only minimized her obligation to pay the statutory interest on the judgment and eliminated the threat of forced payment, she also received the land. Given these facts, it is reasonable to infer that Appellant paid the judgment, at least in part, to avoid paying additional interest and to receive something more than mere satisfaction of the judgment in exchange for payment of the judgment sum. In my view, the strong inference of legal coercion spoken of in Kinser attends here and compels a finding that satisfaction of this judgment was involuntary. I would deny the motion to dismiss this appeal and address it on its merits.