Court Opinion

ID: 9499611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:52:49.638382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:36.937253
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part.
I agree with my colleagues that Mr. Singh has not demonstrated reversible error in his conviction, and I further agree with the court that Mr. Busara has demonstrated error sufficient to require resen-tencing in the misapplication of the obstruction of justice enhancement. I write separately, however, because I believe that Mr. Busara has demonstrated an additional error at sentencing that requires this court’s attention. Specifically, Mr. Busara has invoked a line of this circuit’s precedent that directs a sentencing court to consider whether the first degree murder guideline is appropriate when, as here, the court concludes that a defendant is responsible for an unintentional felony murder. In my view, the majority opinion gives insufficient attention to this aspect of his challenge, and, therefore, insufficient direction to the district court on resentenc-ing.
As the majority opinion notes, before trial, Mr. Busara pleaded guilty to a charge of kidnaping Mukaram Iqbal, the surviving victim, and a charge of conspiracy to kidnap both Iqbal and Waheed Akh-tar. In exchange, the Government dropped the charge of kidnaping resulting in the death of Akhtar. In sentencing Mr. Busara, the district court began with the kidnaping guideline and arrived at the first degree murder guideline, resulting in a base offense level of 43, a result the majority opinion sanctions without much discussion. See op. at 495-96. I part company with the majority on this issue because I believe the district court, in calculating the appropriate offense level, failed to consider whether a departure from the first degree murder guideline was proper because the killing was unintentional.
A. The Sentencing Calculations and Related Findings
In order to understand the district court’s misstep in this regard, it is necessary to track with some precision the determinations made by the court to arrive at the ultimate sentence. At the sentencing hearing, before turning to the sentence calculation, the district court made the following statement in its findings:
It appears to me that what occurred here was not an intentional killing of Mr. Akhtar, at least as it started out. They intended to kidnap him. When it didn’t work, when they couldn’t coerce him into signing the promissory note or providing the money, the decision was made then to take him. And they needed to incapacitate him to do so. They struck him. Mr. Busara, I find, inflicted the blow.
He did so too hard. He inflicted such a harsh blow that — he inflicted a fatal blow where presumably his intent was to knock Mr. Akhtar out, and it is for that reason that they then tied up Mr. Akhtar, placed him on a tarp, intending to take a live, but unconscious person out of the area and presumably make good on the plan to get him to cooperate *498ultimately and pay the money or sign the documents or whatever.
No other explanation makes sense. Why they would have tied him up if they thought he was dead right away makes no sense.
Sent. Tr. at 80-81 (emphasis added).
Turning to the actual guidelines calculation on the count related to the kidnaping of Iqbal, the district court began with the kidnaping guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1. The court then determined that the kidnaping of Iqbal was committed “during the commission of, or in connection with, another offense or escape therefrom,” U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(7), that offense being the kid-naping of Akhtar. Following the directive of §' 2A4.1(b)(7), the court determined that the appropriate base offense level should be borrowed from this related offense— the kidnaping of Akhtar. To calculate the appropriate offense level for the killing of Akhtar, the district court looked afresh at the kidnaping guideline, § 2A4.1. It concluded that, if Akhtar was killed “under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § llll [1] had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States,” it would be appropriate to apply the kidnaping guideline’s cross-reference, U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(c), which directs the court to apply the offense level of the first degree murder guideline, § 2A1.1.
The court invited the parties to address the applicability of the cross-reference. Counsel for Mr. Busara clarified, “if I heard it correctly, I think what the Court said is that the version of the offense that Your Honor finds as being the reasonable one is that they didn’t intend to kill him; they intended to subdue him and that the hit was too hard.” Sent. Tr. at 90-91. On the basis of the finding that the killing was unintentional, counsel for Mr. Busara urged that, in applying the cross-reference, the court should not look to the first degree murder guideline, but to the second degree murder guideline. The court responded:
You heard me correctly.... And I don’t find evidence here — credible evidence that the intent in striking Mr. 'Akhtar was to kill him. That certainly was the effect. I don’t think it makes any difference.
I understand [defense counsel’s] argument is that this is not first degree murder, and it would be probably anyhow because it was committed in the course of a kidnapping.
First degree murder, of course, is defined in 18 U.S.C. [§ ] 1111. First and second degree murder actually is defined there. And if this crime was first or second degree murder, it would be— it would' constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. [§ ] 1111, and therefore, the applicable Guideline would be 2A1.1. 2A1.1 is a 43.
And this constitutes murder under [§ ] 1111, whether it was first or second degree murder. And it is certainly first degree murder because it is committed in the course of a kidnapping.
[Section] 1111 reads, “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice [a]forethought.” I note that malice [a]forethought does not require specific premeditation. That would be required for first degree murder, but it is not required for second degree murder.
Malice [a]forethought includes evil intent; not necessarily to murder, but malicious intent. Clearly that was here. *499So this would, even with the kidnapping, would constitute a second-degree murder, so it would be murder under 18 U.S.C. [§ ] 1111.
But every murder perpetrated — and then it goes on to state, “In perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate the crime of kidnapping is a first degree murder.” And I’m satisfied that this murder occurred in the course of an effort to perpetrate the crime or the conspiracy in this case — or the crime of kidnapping. It’s relevant conduct, and therefore, 43 is the offense.
Sent. Tr. at 91-93. Having made the determination that the cross-reference was applicable, the court thus arrived at the first degree murder guideline’s offense level of 43; after adding a multiple-count enhancement2 and an obstruction of justice enhancement and subtracting levels for acceptance of responsibility, the resulting total offense level was 44.
B. Application Note 1
Mr. Busara urges this court to consider whether the district court erred in applying the cross-reference in § 2A4.1(c)(l) without first acknowledging that the application notes permit a “departure” below that guideline for unintentional killings. At the time of the offense, Application Note 1 to § 2A1.1, the first degree murder guideline, provided:
The Commission has concluded that in the absence of capital punishment life imprisonment is the appropriate punishment for premeditated killing. However, this guideline also applies when death results from the commission of certain felonies. Life imprisonment is not necessarily appropriate in all such situations. For example, if in robbing a bank, the defendant merely passed a note to the teller, as a result of which she had a heart attack and died, a sentence of life imprisonment clearly would not be appropriate.
If the defendant did not cause the death intentionally or knowingly, a downward departure may he warranted. The extent of the departure should he based upon the defendant’s state of mind (e.g., recklessness or negligence), the degree of risk inherent in the conduct, and the nature of the underlying offense conduct. However, the Commission does not envision that departure below that specified in § 2A1.2 (Second Degree Murder) is likely to be appropriate. Also, because death obviously is an aggravating factor, it necessarily would be inappropriate to impose a sentence at a level below that which the guideline for the underlying offense requires in the absence of death.
U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, Application Note 1 (2003) (emphasis added).3 In the Application Note, the Sentencing Commission recognizes that, by virtue of the cross-reference contained in § 2A4.1 and certain other similar guidelines provisions (which sweep certain second degree murders into the first degree guideline), and by virtue of the classification of felony murder as murder in the first degree, many non-intentional, non-premeditated killings result in a life sentence under strict application of the guideline; a district court is empowered, indeed, directed to consider *500whether the mental state of the defendant justifies using a less severe starting point in the sentencing calculus. Mr. Busara contends that, because the district court failed to consider Application Note 1, it erroneously determined that it was bound to arrive at the full offense level under the first degree murder guideline because the death of Akhtar occurred in the course of a felony.4
As an initial matter, when the Note is applicable, it directs the sentencing court to consider a “downward departure.” Recent precedent from this court, of course, notes that post-Booker, the concept of departures is “obsolete.” See, e.g., United States v. Filipiak, 466 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir.2006). The “departure” involved in this case, however, relates to the proper application of the guidelines in determining the offense level, not a departure from a properly calculated sentencing range. Therefore, the present issue. is analyzed more properly as part of our de novo inquiry into whether the guidelines were properly applied. See United States v. Scott, 405 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir.2005) (“The Sentencing Reform Act requires re-sentencing when the challenged sentence was ‘imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.’ 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1). This provision survived Booker. See [543 U.S. 220, 258-60,] 125 S.Ct. [738,] 764 (2005). An incorrect application of the guidelines requires re-sentencing under the post-Booker sentencing regime.”). Further, “[i]t is well established that ‘[a]n application note is binding authority unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of that Guideline.’ ” United States v. Stitman, 472 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Dyer, 464 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir.2006)).
The particular Application Note at issue in this case has been the subject of several prior sentencing challenges in this court. In a series of cases beginning with United States v. Prevatte, 16 F.3d 767, 784-85 (7th Cir.1994), this court emphasized the duty of the district court, in imposing a sentence for first degree murder, to consider whether the use of the full base offense level for first degree murder was appropriate'in instances of non-intentional killings consistent with Application Note 1.
In Prevatte, the defendants had used pipe bombs to create diversions for burglaries; the explosion of one of those bombs killed an elderly woman outside her home. The district court had applied the first degree murder guideline and sentenced the defendants to life imprisonment. We overturned the life sentence because the district court had not applied “the directives of the Sentencing Commission in Application Note 1 to § 2A1.1.” Id. at 784.5
In United States v. Martin, 63 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir.1995), abrogated in part on other grounds by Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000), after determining on other grounds that resentencing was required, *501we again noted the relevance of Application Note 1. We noted that “there [was] no indication that the [district] court considered the defendant’s mental state or any other grounds for departure” authorized by the note, and noted that on remand the court “may depart ... should it find appropriate reasons therefor.” Id. at 1435.
More recently, in United States v. Thomas, 280 F.3d 1149 (7th Cir.2002), we evaluated a challenge to a sentence imposed under the first degree murder guideline without sufficient findings of premeditation, or, in the alternative, without specific findings supporting felony murder as first degree murder. After concluding that the court erred in not making such findings, we continued,
[additionally, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court recognized that it had the option under Application Note 1 to § 2A1.1 to depart downward from life imprisonment. See Prevatte, 16 F.3d at 784-85 (holding that when felony murder provides the basis for the sentence enhancement, a district court’s failure to make findings as to the defendant’s mental state to determine if a departure down from life imprisonment required a remand). Therefore, the district court’s selection of first degree murder under a felony murder theory cannot stand.
Thomas, 280 F.3d at 1158.
The thrust of these cases is that, because the Notes are binding authority, and because they authorize the court to exercise discretion not only in imposing a sentence but in calculating the guidelines range, a sentencing court is under an obligation to consider whether circumstances warrant a downward departure from the first degree murder offense level. In- Pre-vatte, the error of the district court had been its failure to “undertake further analysis of the mental state of each defendant.” 16 F.3d at 784. In the case before us, the court did make an inquiry, and indeed, repeatedly made a finding on the record that the killing was not intentional or premeditated. It nonetheless failed to acknowledge that "it' had discretion not to apply that offense level and indeed used language that strongly suggested it was bound to that guideline under the circumstances. Sent. Tr. at 91 (“And I don’t find evidence here — credible evidence that the intent in striking Mr. Akhtar was to kill him.... I don’t think it makes any difference.”); Sent. Tr. at 92 (“And if this crime was first or second degree murder, it would be — it would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. [§ ] 1111, and therefore, the applicable Guideline would be 2A1.1.”).
This approach is inconsistent with our precedent, as outlined above. Although Application Note 1 does not require the district court to adjust downward Mr. Bu-sara’s offense level as a necessary consequence of the finding that the killing was unintentional, it invests the court with discretion to do so, and our precedent imposes an obligation on that court to affirmatively consider its option in this regard. A sentencing court, therefore, should acknowledge its authority under the Note; particularly when, as here, a finding as to lack of intent to kill has been made, the sentencing court should make a further determination on the record as to whether such an adjustment would be appropriate.6

. 18 U.S.C. § 1111 provides that murder is killing with "malice aforethought”; it defines first degree murder to include felony murder and it also defines second degree murder.

. The court had arrived at an offense level of 43 for the conspiracy count "for the same reasons” as arriving at an offense level of 43 for the kidnaping count. Sent. Tr. at 97. The obstruction enhancement was applied to the conspiracy count, and the multiple-count enhancement was applied, without grouping, because the counts involved two victims.

. Subsequent amendments to the guidelines restructure this section and it now appears, with minor modifications, in Application Note 2.

. As has been made clear by the foregoing discussion, Mr. Busara urged the district court to adopt something lower than the first degree murder guideline because the court had made a finding that the killing was unintentional. At oral argument, Mr. Busara conceded that he did not make specific reference to Application Note 1 directly to the district court; however, the Government does not suggest that our review of the appropriate guidelines calculation is other than de novo, see Appellee's Br. at 29-30.

. We simultaneously rejected the sentence on the alternate ground that under the relevant statute, a jury recommendation was required before a life sentence could be imposed. United States v. Prevatte, 16 F.3d 767, 784 (7th Cir.1994).

. I acknowledge that the court had the authority to depart from a properly-calculated *502guidelines sentence and chose not to do so. I cannot say, however, that the same considerations necessarily would animate a decision regarding proper calculation of the guidelines range as opposed to a decision that no departure from a properly calculated, guidelines range is appropriate. The error in failing to consider Application Note 1, is, therefore, not harmless despite the considerable discretion now afforded to sentencing courts.