Court Opinion

ID: 9453584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:18:15.662947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:43.351273
License: Public Domain

*272SWYGERT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). ^
In the Supreme Court of Indiana, one of the bases for rejecting petitioner’s application to file a belated appeal was that he had not shown sufficient excuse for failing to take a timely appeal. The Indiana court summarily denied the application by a per curiam opinion. That application contained substantially the same allegations with respect to the reason for the delay as those contained in the instant habeas petition.
The important allegation made by petitioner is that he was unaware until 1965 (although he had been sentenced in 1960) that he had a right to have an appeal prosecuted at public expense.1 He further alleged that his court-appointed trial counsel did not inform him of his right to prosecute an appeal at public expense. Since he asserted that he was unaware of this right for several years after his conviction, it must be assumed that neither the trial judge nor the prosecuting attorney advised him of this right either although they were aware of his indigency.
In this setting, I agree with Judge Fairchild that on the question whether there were sufficient grounds for allowing a belated appeal, and on the more precise constitutional question whether the State of Indiana was responsible for the lateness of the appeal, the district court should conduct an evidentiary hearing. The constitutional question is subsumed in the determination of the sufficiency of the grounds advanced by the petitioner for a belated appeal under Burns’ Ind.Stat., 1956 Repl., § 9-3305. Thus both questions were before the Indiana Supreme Court. A combination of the principles enunciated in Douglas v. People of State of California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), and Griffin v. People of State of Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), applied to the facts alleged in this case, if those facts as alleged were found to be true, would require a determination that petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated.
My disagreement with the majority arises from its holding that, in order to obtain a belated appeal in the Indiana Supreme Court, a defendant must, in addition to demonstrating sufficient excuse for the delay, “show that his appeal has arguable merit.” If there are sufficient reasons to excuse a defendant in a criminal case from failing to take a timely appeal, the grant of a belated appeal ought not depend on whether there is a preliminary showing that the appeal has merit. Otherwise, a defendant who through no fault of his own has failed to take an appeal in time will be treated differently and to his disadvantage from a defendant who has taken a timely appeal.
In Douglas v. People of State of California, supra, the Supreme Court said: “When an indigent is forced to run * * [the] gauntlet of a preliminary showing of merit, the right to appeal does not comport with fair procedure.” 372 U.S. at 357, 83 S.Ct. at 816. Even though the circumstances in Douglas and the instant case are different, they are sufficiently analogous to require the application of the view expressed in Douglas to this case. Once sufficient excuse for delay is advanced, the equal protection clause of the Constitution should prevent a state from imposing a more rigorous standard on defendants seeking a belated appeal than on those seeking a timely appeal.
I would reverse.

. As an indigent, petitioner might have secured a transcript without cost and been represented by the Public Defender on appeal. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892 (1963). Because of his ignorance of his rights, petitioner alleges that he resorted to self-help. In August 1964 he was able to purchase a transcript of the evidence submitted at his trial with his own funds, and in March 1965 he was able to employ private counsel for the first time.