Court Opinion

ID: 9471646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:37:49.213005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:30.936620
License: Public Domain

K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s jury instructions were constitutionally inadequate. Thomas’s contention that the trial judge erred by placing upon her the burden of proving self-defense belies both Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent. Nor do I agree that the jury was confused by the instructions. I therefore dissent.
The trial judge instructed the jury that it could return a verdict of murder, manslaughter, or not guilty. He distinguished the crimes of murder and manslaughter and described their respective elements in accord with South Carolina law. The judge repeatedly informed the jury that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the murder charge. He also instructed the jury that Thomas had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she acted in self-defense.
The gravamen of Thomas’s complaint is that South Carolina law, which allocates to *253the defendant the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, violates the principles of due process. In my mind, this argument is clearly meritless.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a state may require a defendant to prove an affirmative defense. In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), the Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s due process challenge to a New York statute requiring him to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of acting under the influence of extreme emotional distress. In upholding the statute, the Court observed that at common law the burden of proving all “affirmative defenses — indeed, ‘all ... circumstances of justification, excuse or alleviation’ — rested on the defendant.” Id. at 203, 97 S.Ct. at 2323 (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 201). The Court concluded that “once the facts constituting a crime are established beyond a reasonable doubt ... the State may refuse to sustain the affirmative defense ... unless demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 207, 97 S.Ct. at 2325.
This Court has applied Patterson in several cases involving laws which place the burden of proving self-defense upon the defendant. In Frazier v. Weatherholtz, 572 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.1978), we determined that because the State of Virginia considered self-defense an affirmative defense, it was not unconstitutional to require the defendant to bear the burden of proof. Although the Frazier Court addressed a Virginia statute, its holding is equally applicable in South Carolina, because the decision is based on the Federal — not the Virginia— Constitution. The Court cited Patterson for the proposition that due process was satisfied “when the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt ‘every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant was] charged.’ ” Id. at 996 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 206, 97 S.Ct. at 2324).
A few months later, in the unpublished opinion of Maxey v. Martin, 577 F.2d 735 (4th Cir.1978), this Court relied on Patterson and Frazier to uphold a South Carolina jury instruction which placed upon the State the full burden of proof for murder and placed upon the defendant the burden of establishing self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Frazier and Patterson were relied on again in Baker v. Muncy, 619 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.1980), where this Court held that it was not unconstitutional for Virginia to “cast upon the accused the burden of proving self-defense.”1 Id. at 331. As in Frazier and Maxey, the Baker Court stressed that the State was not relieved of its obligation to prove all of the essential elements of murder.
Most recently, in Cooper v. State of North Carolina, 702 F.2d 481 (4th Cir.1983), a Fourth Circuit panel, which included one of the majority members in the instant case, upheld a jury instruction which placed upon the defendant the burden of proving insanity. On appeal, the defendant argued that by failing to instruct the jury to consider evidence about his mental illness with regard to each specific element of the alleged crime, the court effectively forced him to prove the absence of those elements. This Court held that because an instruction on the State’s overall burden of proof was given along with the general instruction on mental illness the jury charge was not constitutionally infirm.
These cases clearly establish that South Carolina’s rule requiring a defendant to prove self-defense does not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. In the instant case, the trial judge properly instruct*254ed the jury. The instructions distinguished the elements of the crime on which the State had the burden of proof from the elements of the affirmative defense on which Thomas had the burden of proof. In addition, the jury was repeatedly reminded that the State carried the burden of proof on each element of the crime. The due process clause does not require more.
Nor do I agree with the majority’s conclusion that because the jury found Thomas guilty of murder, but added a request for leniency, it was confused by the jury instruction. In my mind, the recommendation for leniency could just as likely have been based upon the jury’s belief that the victim deserved his fate, and that, consequently, some mercy should be accorded the defendant.
By returning a verdict of murder, the jury indicated that the State had sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In so doing, the jury necessarily rejected Thomas’s claim of self-defense. Second-guessing the jury’s decision-making process is a dangerous game, as judicial action based on such guesswork intrudes upon the domain of the jury.
Accordingly, I would uphold the conviction.

. The Court’s full statement reads: “[w]e agree that self defense is an affirmative defense under Virginia law and the State may, under principles set forth in Patterson v. New York, cast upon the accused the burden of proving self defense.” 619 F.2d at 331 (citation omitted). I can find nothing in this language to support the majority’s conclusion that the Baker court was referring to the burden of production rather than the burden of persuasion. Pursuant to Patterson, a New York court “may refuse to sustain the affirmative defense of insanity unless demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence." 432 U.S. at 207, 97 S.Ct. at 2325 (emphasis added). Thus, the statement that “under the principles set forth in Patterson" a state may “cast upon the accused the burden of proving self defense” can only be read to mean that the state may place upon the defendant the burden of persuasion.