Court Opinion

ID: 9637127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:58:22.575633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:53.810013
License: Public Domain

McCORD, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I do not concur in the majority opinion.
When this case was here before, 5 Cir., 100 F.2d 162, we said of rules 93 and 99, “Defendant’s rules 93 and 99 are in conflict as applied to this case. * * * ” I still adhere to that opinion. A cursory reading of these rules will show that they are in conflict and that without explanation they lack understanding. I am of opinion, however, that it is of no moment to pass upon or discuss these rules since the verdict should turn solely upon the testimony of the engineer, fireman, and conductor of Train 46-S, Ballard being the engineer of this *774train. Only rules D-1S3 and 494 have any hearing on this case and they should be considered, along with the evidence to arrive at a verdict.
The wreck occurred at the town of Hagerman, New Mexico, about 10:30 in the night time. W. Ballard, the plaintiff was severely injured. On the trial of the case he testified: “When I approached Hagerman about a mile or. a mile and a half from the station, the track there makes about a two per cent curve; the curve begins about the double crossings and it extends beyond the station. It was a clear night, chilly and hazy down in the flat. I was sitting on my side of the engine with my hands on the control valve. The curve there is what is known as a ‘fireman’s curve’. I was on the outside of the curve. I had a conversation with the fireman at or about the double crossings. After I put the air on the train and reduced the speed I looked over at the fireman and said, ‘How does it look around there ?’ He had his window shut; he opened his window and looked out, came hack in with his head and said, ‘It is clear’. He was riding upon his seat box there in the cab on the left hand side of the engine. I shoved my brake valve off, released the air, and let her drift on down on her own power. I had information the track was clear. My view was obscured from the curve; I couldn’t see around there. The engineer is blinded and the fireman has a clear view. I relied on the information of the fireman. As I released my brakes and approached the station at Hagerman my speed held its own, just drifted along there, was not working any steam. When I first saw anything that indicated the switcher was there in front of the station was after we had come around on that portion of the straight track about 900 or 1,000 feet from the rear of that train. I saw the marker which is a red light on the right hand side; that is the caboose light burning bright red on the rear of the train. I did not see the left marker; it was not possible from my place in the engine to see. I was about 900 or 1.000 feet from the caboose when I first saw the marker. The caboose was about 1.000 feet from the station and towards me as I approached the station. My cab and boiler protruded ahead of me about 40 feet; it was the boiler of the engine that prevented me from seeing out to the left and upon the curve; it blinded my vision. When I saw the marker, I 'big holed’ the train, put all the air I had under them, shut off the drifting throttle, put on my sand, ran down in the gangway to look out to see whether he was moving or stopped dead still. I looked back and saw that the fireman had not shut off his fire; I shut it off; reached up and caught my whistle so it would not kill anbody. I had a car of gasoline fqur cars behind and I didn’t want to burn anybody up. I stood behind the seat box and figured I would only get a jar, and I rode it right down in the collision. I didn’t see the fireman. No sir, he wasn’t there. The fireman from his side had a plain view; all he had to do was look across; nothing in his view to blind him; he had a straight view right out there; his view got better as we approached Hagerman. One riding on his side could have seen the caboose markers of that switcher that night and known what they were. The fireman and the brakeman did not tell me that night that they saw any caboose markers. I did not see the head brakeman that night after we left Artesia; he had gone forward to help the conductor with his report. We had about thirty cars on the train, averaged fifty feet.”
Wallace W. Foster, the fireman, testified that he had been fireman for about thirteen years and had passed up and down the track at Hagerman fourteen or fifteen times. “There wasn’t any doubt in my mind about them being marker lights, lights on the caboose; I thought they were too far to the left to be anywhere close to the tracks. The engineer did not ask me anything before the collision. If I had any doubt about the nature of those lights or had thought possibly they may have been on the main track, or might be marker lights, I would have called attention to the engineer. Well, it was only after we got on the curve before I saw anything that created any doubt in my mind; pretty close to it. I watched those lights and when we got a little bit further I saw they were caboose lights, then I hollered to the engineer to ‘big hole’ her; that is, put the brakes in emergency. I did this as soon as I recognized them. It didn’t like much of being around the curve before I recognized them, the lights. It was just a few seconds after I knew what the lights were before I told the engineer to ‘big hole’ her; then I rode down and about three or four cars from the wreck I jumped off. I don’t think we were going very fast then; the witness in the investigation said about ten miles an hour. I guess the yard limit there is about three quarters of a mile from the wreck. I did *775not become acquainted with the lay out there at Hagerman very well; I thought I knew it pretty well but I. didn’t. There is no curve up at the double crossings. Yes, I lost the line of the track up there. I was seated on the box; I was keeping a constant lookout ahead. Up at the crossings I saw lights which later turned out to be the markers of the caboose. I watched them all the way down. There was more curve than I had figured there was. I did not see the caboose lights to recognize them as caboose lights before I did. I could have seen them if I had known the track better; but those lights I saw I thought were getting too far away to the left but I made a big mistake. Ballard set the brakes up there at the double crossings; that was before he got to the yard limit board. It was about thirty car lengths when I told him to ‘big hole’ her. The cars are forty to fifty feet. Ballard was on the blind side of the curve and could not see around there. I could see. I lost the line of the track around there. Yes, I got confused. There was more curve there than I thought there was. I didn’t think Ballard could see around the curve. Somewhere between the yard limit board and the double crossings Ballard released the air on his brakes, somewhere there between the places, I do not remember where. I did not tell Ballard to release the brakes. I did not pay any particular attention to Ballard releasing the brakes that night, not very much. I just noticed that he applied them, and we slowed down just a little bit. I have always heard that a train could stop in its length in emergency. The only thing I ever said to Ballard was to ‘big hole’ her; he applied. As soon as it slowed down and I saw it was going to hit her before we did get stopped I jumped off about three car lengths before it hit. I went away from there. Ballard blew his whistle about the whistle post — two long and two short. He blew at the double crossings; just before we got off the curve I think he blew again, there it was a succession of blows. I did not turn off the fire and did not cut off the oil. I noticed after the wreck that the fire had been turned off and the oil cut off. I did not get hurt. The last time I saw Ballard that night he was seated on his box on the right hand side of the cab looking ahead.”
Defendant’s witness Sears, the conductor testified: He testified in the investigation, the former trial, and this trial. “Both times I testified that as my train approached the double crossings I thought it was running at restricted speed.
“Q. That is your testimony now? A. Yes sir, I thought he was at that time.”
Counsel for the defendant railroad was permitted to ask Ballard over one hundred times to define “restricted speed”:
“Q. What did the yard limit board mean to you? A. Meant to me reduce speed and run carefullyi
“Q. Did you do that? A. Yes sir.
“Q. Mr. Ballard, after you entered the yard limits there at Hagerman, up until the time of the collision, state whether or not you were operating your train at restricted speed. A. Yes sir, I was.”
On cross examination Ballard testified again as to “restricted speed”:
“Q. You say the yard limit board means reduced speed, to run carefully? A. Reduce your speed and run carefully.
“Q. Don’t you know it means to run at restricted speed? A. To me it means reduce your speed and run carefully.
“Q. Didn’t that yard limit board mean to run at restricted speed? A. It meant to run at reduced speed.
“Q. You don’t like the word ‘restricted’, Mr. Ballard? A. I reduced the speed and ran carefully.
“Q. I said don’t a yard limit board mean for you to run at restricted speed ? A. Yes sir.
“Q. It did, didn’t it? A. Yes sir.
“Q. When you said reduce speed and run careful you were giving a definition of restricted speed, weren’t you? A. Yes sir.”
After the witness had been questioned more than one hundred times as to “restricted speed”, counsel on re-cross examination commenced asking over and over again the same questions. The court interposed saying, “I think it has been gone over a dozen times by the witness defining it.” The court, nevertheless, permitted counsel to take the witness over the same line of questions again and again. Many of the questions were argumentative and erroneous.
The final answer of the plaintiff was that when he ran his engine into the yard limits and thereafter until the time of the collision he was running at restricted speed. No witness comes forward to dispute the evidence of the plaintiff, and the testimony of the fireman and the conductor corrobo*776rates his statements. Moreover, no witness disputed the evidence of Ballard as to within what distance his train could have been stopped.
The facts are simply these, we have an engineer deserted by his fireman; left by his brakeman. An engineer left to feel his way around a blind curve unaided; left to “bear the burden alone”.
The jury considered the rules and the evidence and .returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The reason for its verdict is not hard to find. The fireman riding on the left hand side of the engine cab admits that he was negligent; he admits that he failed to keep a proper lookout; he admits thát he lost the line of the rails; and that his engineer could not see around the curve. It seems that the fireman completely forgot Rule 494 which provides that firemen “must assist in keeping a constant lookout upon the track, and must instantly give the engineer notice of any obstruction or signal they may perceive.” The fireman did not obey this rule that night.
Ballard was not to stop his train at Hagerman. The fireman told him the way was clear and he had a right to and did rely on the fireman to tell him the truth. Under the facts and circumstances the fireman was the eyes of the engineer, and the engineer was, by necessity, compelled to rely upon him to watch the track and inform him of any obstructions. The rules provided that the fireman should see for the engineer on the blind curve that night, and the fireman admits that he sat on his box and failed to keep a proper lookout. I think it clear that the negligence of the fireman was the sole cause of the wreck.
All the evidence, charges, and exceptions as to rules 99 and 93 have no bearing on this case. If error was made as to them it was error without injury. We sit to do substantial justice and by statute and the Rules of Civil Procedure harmless error is not ground for reversal.
I am firm in my belief that the rule as to “restricted speed” is ambiguous. I think decision must turn upon this part of rule D-153: “Restricted speed. Proceed to stop short of train, obstruction or anything that may require the speed of the train to be reduced.” To make this rule free of ambiguity it must be understandable and that without the necessity of explanation. Here is the acid test:
1. The writer of the majority opinion says that “the rule requiring an engineer to operate his train at restricted speed within yard limits, is, in the light of the definition in the rules not ‘very indefinite’, but most definite.”
2. The writer of our former opinion says of this rule. “Further, the rule requiring an engineer to operate his train at restricted speed within yard limits is very indefinite. If the jury believed the testimony of the engineer they might have considered that he was not negligent in this respect.” Opinion, 5 Cir., 100 F.2d page 164.
3. The conductor, Sears, who was on the train with Ballard, testified, “If you hit an automobile going at two miles per hour you would not be going at restricted speed. I do not take into consideration the element of time, time to stop.”
4. The plaintiff, Ballard, testified, “To me restricted speed means reduce your speed and run careful.”
5. To me this rule is not clear and self-explanatory. To know its meaning one should have expert testimony of railroad men to say what it means.
We have five expressions of opinion as to the meaning of “restricted speed”. We do not agree as to the meaning of the rule. The rule is not free from ambiguity and its meaning was a question for the jury upon proper evidence. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 218 Ala. 384, 118 So. 565, 569; 22 Corpus Juris p. 548, and note; Texas & N. O. R. v. Mortensen, 27 Tex.Civ.App. 106, 66 S.W. 99; Finnegan v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 261 Mo. 481, 169 S.W. 969.
In the majority opinion it is stated, “What was decided on the former appeal was this; on all the evidence in the record the case was clearly one for the jury and it was error to direct a verdict for defendant. With that decision we are in full accord.” The evidence on this appeal is substantially the same as the evidence on the former appeal, yet, after the above statement, the majority opinion proceeds to dismantle our former opinion which is and should be the law of this case.
The sole cause of the wreck was the negligence of the fireman. The court fully and fairly submitted the case to the jury and the rights of the defendant were in no way prejudiced. I think that substantial justice has been done and that the parties should not be put to the trouble and expense of another trial and, perhaps, another appeal.
The judgment should be affirmed. I respectfully dissent.