Court Opinion

ID: 9364211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 19:00:20.030298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.615918
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60861         Document: 00516613994             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/18/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                                                                 FILED
                                                                          January 18, 2023
                                         No. 21-60861                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                 Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Antony Daniel Abreu; Darrell Young,

                                                                Defendants—Appellants.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Mississippi
                                    No. 1:20-CR-48

   Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Following a seven-day jury trial, defendants Anthony Daniel Abreu
   and Darrell Young were found guilty of conspiring to possess with intent to
   distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and of attempting to possess with
   intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine.1 Defendants bring various
   challenges to their trial and sentencing, several of which are raised for the

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
          1
              See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846.
Case: 21-60861      Document: 00516613994            Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                     No. 21-60861

   first time on appeal. We hold that the district court neither abused its
   discretion nor committed plain error in trying and sentencing Defendants
   and AFFIRM.
                                                I.
          A longtime paid informant working with the Department of
   Homeland Security was introduced to Abreu through mutual friends. During
   a series of recorded calls, the informant arranged a cocaine sale with Abreu
   and his partner, Darrell Young. After meeting with the informant and
   examining a sample of cocaine from an undercover agent, Abreu asked to buy
   15 kilograms of cocaine. Young managed the transportation, arranging to
   have cash placed in a car’s secret compartment in Philadelphia and then
   having the car shipped to Gulfport. Abreu and Young traveled to Gulfport
   and met the informant at a Taco Bell, where they showed him a duffle bag
   full of cash, and the two were immediately arrested.
          Defendants were charged with conspiring to possess with intent to
   distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
   §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846, and with attempting to possess with intent to distribute
   500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Following a
   seven-day trial, a jury found Defendants guilty on both counts. Young now
   appeals two issues: the district court’s (1) denial of a for-cause challenge to a
   potential juror and (2) use of an aggravating role enhancement. Abreu appeals
   three issues relating to the district court’s handling of his: (1) entrapment
   defense, (2) sentencing, and (3) request to introduce extrinsic evidence
   during cross-examination of the informant. We address each issue in turn.
                                          II.
          We first address Young’s appeal of the district court’s denial of his
   for-cause challenge of Juror Number 28. “The Sixth Amendment guarantees
   an impartial jury, and the presence of a biased juror may require a new trial

                                          2
Case: 21-60861             Document: 00516613994              Page: 3      Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                               No. 21-60861

   as a remedy.”2 A juror is biased if his “views would prevent or substantially
   impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
   instructions and his oath.”3 A juror may be actually biased or, in “extreme
   situations,” bias may be implied as a matter of law.4 “The determination of
   implied bias is an objective legal judgment made as a matter of law and is not
   controlled by sincere and credible assurances by the juror that he can be
   fair.”5 As such, we review the issue of implied bias de novo.6
             This Court makes implied bias findings with “carefully watched lim-
   its,” as they are only appropriate in a narrow set of circumstances. 7 As Justice
   O’Connor described in her Smith v. Phillips concurrence, such circumstances
   may include when a juror is employed by the prosecuting agency, is a close
   relative of a trial participant or someone involved in the criminal transaction,
   or witnessed or is somehow involved in the crime. 8 Most cases finding im-
   plied bias “have done so because the juror had a close relationship with one

             2
               Hatten v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 595, 600 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing U.S. CONST.
   amend. VI). The remedy for a valid implied bias claim, as the one alleged here, is a new
   trial. Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2003).
             3
                 Hatten, 570 F.3d at 600 (quoting Soria v. Johnson, 207 F.3d 232, 242 (5th Cir.
   2000)).
             4
           Solis, 342 F.3d at 395 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982)
   (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
             5
            Brooks v. Dretke, 418 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Smith, 455 U.S. at 222
   n.* (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In those extraordinary situations involving implied bias,
   state-court proceedings resulting in a finding of ‘no bias’ are by definition inadequate to
   uncover the bias that the law conclusively presumes.”).
             6
            See Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 986 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Whether a juror was
   impliedly biased is a legal question we review de novo.”); Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316,
   318–19 (7th Cir. 1992) (considering the issue of implied bias a “question of law”).
             7
                 Solis, 342 F.3d at 396, 399 n.42.
             8
                 Id. at 395 (citing Smith, 455 U.S. at 222 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).

                                                     3
Case: 21-60861           Document: 00516613994              Page: 4       Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                             No. 21-60861

   of the important actors in the case or was otherwise emotionally involved in
   the case, usually because the juror was the victim of a similar crime.” 9 For
   example, this Court has found implied bias where a juror withheld that his
   brother was a deputy in a sheriff’s department that investigated the case.10
   On the other hand, this Court has declined to find implied bias when a juror
   was friends with the victim of the alleged crime, 11 when a victim’s grandson
   was married to a juror’s daughter,12 and when a juror for a burglary case had
   prior, independent knowledge of the defendant burglarizing homes. 13
          During voir dire, Juror Number 28 shared that he previously worked
   with the Government’s case agent at the sheriff’s department. He explained
   that the case agent was one of the people who trained him, that they worked
   for the same department for ten years, and had patrolled together. Further
   questioning during voir dire revealed that the juror had not worked at the
   sheriff’s department since 2008, his only continued contact with the case
   agent was occasionally running into him while boating, and the juror’s last
   contact with the case agent was six months prior. The judge inquired as to
   whether the juror could “put that relationship out of [his] mind . . . and not
   let it affect [his] decision in his case,” to which the juror answered “yes.”
   The judge followed up: “You won’t tend to favor the government or the

          9
               Id. at 398–99.
          10
               United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 699–700 (5th Cir. 1988).
          11
             United States v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066, 1087 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated on other
   grounds, United States v. Brown, 161 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 1998).
          12
               Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.2d 612, 619–21 (5th Cir. 1997).
          13
               Solis, 342 F.3d at 398–400.

                                                  4
Case: 21-60861            Document: 00516613994            Page: 5      Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                            No. 21-60861

   defendant because of that [relationship], would you?” The juror responded,
   “No, sir.”14
           We hold that Juror 28’s relationship with the case agent is not one of
   the “extreme situations” justifying a finding of implied bias. Juror 28 did not
   meet any of the circumstances in Justice O’Connor’s Smith concurrence as
   potentially rising to the level of implied bias as a matter of law. He is not an
   employee of the prosecuting agency, he is not a closely related to any of the
   trial participants, and he did not witness nor was he otherwise involved in the
   crime. Additionally, there are no facts in the record indicating that Juror 28
   would inherently have a substantial emotional involvement in the case
   adversely affecting his impartiality. Accordingly, we affirm the district
   court’s denial of the for-cause juror challenge.
                                                III.
           Young next challenges the district court’s use of an aggravating role
   enhancement. “Whether a defendant exercised an aggravating role as an
   organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor for purposes of an adjustment
   under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) is a finding of fact reviewed for clear error.” 15 A
   factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is “plausible based on the record
   as a whole.”16 “Our precedent does not limit the enhancement to defendants
   who controlled other participants in the scheme.” 17 Rather, we look at

           14
              We include these facts regarding the juror’s assurances of impartiality for the
   sake of thoroughness. As noted, such assurances, even if found credible, have little bearing
   on the implied-bias question, which is an objective—not subjective—inquiry.
           15
                United States v. Ochoa-Gomez, 777 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2015).
           16
                Id. at 282.
           17
             United States v. Aderinoye, 33 F.4th 751, 756 (5th Cir. 2022); see Ochoa-Gomez,
   777 F.3d at 283 (“[A] § 3B1.1 adjustment may be based on either control over people or
   management of assets.”).

                                                  5
Case: 21-60861          Document: 00516613994               Page: 6   Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                             No. 21-60861

   “whether the record plausibly supports the district court’s finding that
   [a d]efendant exercised an aggravating role in his offense either by exercising
   control over another participant or exercising management responsibility
   over property, assets, or activities.”18 To determine whether a defendant is
   an organizer, “courts may consider, among other factors, whether the
   defendant exercised decision making authority, the nature of the defendant’s
   participation in the offense, whether the defendant recruited accomplices,
   [and] the defendant’s share of the fruits of the crime.”19
          In United States v. Aderinoye, we upheld an enhancement when a
   defendant “exercised extensive authority and control over the scheme’s
   network of fraudulent bank accounts” and “was paid like a leader for his
   efforts—[keeping] 40% of the proceeds for himself.”20 Similarly, in United
   States v. Delgado, this Court sitting en banc held a district court’s
   enhancement was not clearly erroneous when the defendant “control[led] a
   large quantity of drugs and the truck used to transport them,” and “made
   arrangements for their transportation and delivery,” even though the
   defendant did not exercise control over another participant.21
          In arguing that his involvement does not meet the level required by
   § 3B1.1, Young points to the Probation Officer’s (“PO”) comments in the
   Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”), which state that the aggravating role
   enhancement is “not appropriate.” Yet, the PO recognized that Young was
   an “organizer” to some degree. The comment to § 3B1.1 states that in
   “relatively small criminal enterprises,” like the one at hand, “the distinction

          18
               Ochoa-Gomez, 777 F.3d at 283 (emphasis added).
          19
               Aderinoye, 33 F.4th at 756.
          20
               Id.
          21
               672 F.3d 320, 345 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

                                                  6
Case: 21-60861           Document: 00516613994              Page: 7       Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                            No. 21-60861

   between organization and leadership . . . is of less significance,” 22 which is
   reflected in § 3B1.1(c)’s inclusion of “organizer,” in addition to “leader,
   manager, or supervisor.”23 Young’s role as an organizer included arranging
   for transportation, counting cash, and providing items to process the cocaine.
   On these facts, the district court’s finding that Young was an “organizer” is
   “plausible in light of the record as a whole.” 24 We affirm Young’s sentence.
                                                 IV.
           We next address Abreu’s challenges. First, Abreu contends that the
   district court (A) erred in granting the Government’s in limine motion
   preventing the defense from referring to entrapment until the presentation of
   trial evidence and (B) improperly modified the pattern entrapment
   instruction.
                                                  A.
           District courts have “broad discretion to determine . . . what questions
   will be asked” to potential jurors.25 Such decisions are reviewed for abuse of
   discretion.26 “[U]nless abuse of discretion and prejudice are shown, this
   Court will not disturb ‘the scope and content of voir dire . . . on appeal.’” 27
   An abuse of discretion is present when “there is insufficient questioning to

           22
           U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1 cmt. background (U.S.
   SENT’G COMM’N 2004) (hereinafter U.S.S.G.).
           23
                Id. § 3B1.1(c).
           24
                United States v. Rodriguez, 630 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 2011).
           25
              United States v. Cervantes, 706 F.3d 603, 613 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United
   States v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222, 231 (5th Cir. 1997)).
           26
                Id.
           27
               Id. (quoting United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F.3d 426, 433 (5th Cir. 1995))
   (alteration original).

                                                   7
Case: 21-60861           Document: 00516613994               Page: 8      Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                             No. 21-60861

   produce some basis for defense counsel to exercise a reasonably
   knowledgeable right of challenge.”28 “[I]t is not an abuse of discretion to
   refuse to allow inquiries of jurors as to whether they can accept certain
   propositions of law;”29 such is the case here. Although not allowed to use the
   word “entrapment,” defense counsel was still able to offer evidence and talk
   about specific evidence. Because Abreu fails to allege that the scope of
   permissible voir dire questioning was insufficient and that using the specific
   term “entrapment” would have yielded different results, Abreu cannot
   establish that the district court abused its discretion.
                                                  B.
           A district court’s “instructions will be affirmed on appeal if the charge
   in its entirety presents the jury with a reasonably accurate picture of the
   law.”30 A district court’s “decision to give or exclude a jury instruction is
   reviewed for abuse of discretion.”31 Any erroneous jury instruction is subject
   to harmless-error review.32
           At issue here is whether the district court erred by adding to the Fifth
   Circuit pattern entrapment jury instruction “additional guidance to the jury
   from [Fifth Circuit] cases as to the elements of an entrapment defense.” The
   disputed additional language clarified that evidence of later conduct can be
   used to show that the defendant was predisposed to being approached, noting

           28
                Id. (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 993 F.2d 1170, 1176 (5th Cir. 1993)).
           29
                Id. (quoting United States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990, 992 (5th Cir. 1977)).
           30
            United States v. Stanford, 805 F.3d 557, 569 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted).
           31
             United States v. Arthur, 51 F.4th 560, 567 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States
   v. Ragsdale, 426 F.3d 765, 779 (5th Cir. 2005)).
           32
                Id.

                                                   8
Case: 21-60861         Document: 00516613994              Page: 9       Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                          No. 21-60861

   that “[e]vidence to show predisposition may include active, enthusiastic
   participation or demonstrated expertise in the criminal endeavor” and that
   “[a] defendant’s ready and willing participation in government-solicited
   criminal activity, standing alone, is sufficient to prove predisposition.” The
   language to which Abreu objects directly quotes this Court’s precedent on
   the issue of entrapment.33 We hold that the district court did not abuse its
   discretion by including it.
                                               V.
           We next address Abreu’s two challenges to his sentence: (A) whether
   the government erroneously manipulated the drug quantity calculation by
   using a criminal informant to suggest the drug amount involved in the
   conspiracy; and (B) whether the district court erred by imposing a $10,000
   dollar fine.
                                               A.
           Abreu challenges the district court’s drug quantity determination on
   the basis of sentencing-factor manipulation,34 a claim that this Court has not
   explicitly recognized as a cognizable defense.35 His appeal rests on different

           33
              See United States v. Nelson, 732 F.3d 504, 514 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[I]f the evidence
   suggests that the defendant was an unwary criminal who readily availed himself of the
   opportunity to perpetrate the crime, then predisposition is present.”); United States v.
   Theagene, 565 F.3d 911, 919 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Evidence of predisposition can include, for
   example, active, enthusiastic participation or demonstrated expertise in the criminal
   endeavor.”); United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 739 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[A] defendant’s
   ready and willing participation in government-solicited criminal activity, standing alone, is
   sufficient to prove predisposition.”).
           34
             Abreu argues that law enforcement inflated the amount of cocaine Defendants
   negotiated to buy from the government agent (17 kilograms), amounting to sentencing-
   factor manipulation.
           35
             See United States v. Montgomery, 746 F. App’x 381, 388 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (unpublished per curiam) (“Our court has not determined whether the concept of

                                                9
Case: 21-60861          Document: 00516613994               Page: 10           Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                             No. 21-60861

   grounds than his objection at sentencing,36 Abreu did not preserve the claim,
   and we review it for plain error.37 Abreu cannot show a clear and obvious
   error.38
                                                  B.
           Abreu, for the first time on appeal, challenges the district court’s
   imposition of a $10,000 fine, contesting the determination that he is able to
   pay that amount. Abreu argues that the district court erred by “fail[ing] to
   make specific findings that [he] could afford to pay the fine.” While a district
   court must make findings regarding a defendant’s ability to pay a fine if it
   disregards the PSR’s recommendation on fines,39 a district court need not do

   sentencing entrapment or factor manipulation is a cognizable claim but has addressed a
   similar contention in the context of a due-process claim.”); United States v. Sain, 858 F.
   App’x 730, 731–32 (5th Cir. 2021) (unpublished per curiam) (“[T]his court has not
   explicitly recognized sentencing entrapment or sentencing factor manipulation as a
   cognizable defense . . . .”), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 376 (2021).
           36
              At sentencing, Abreu objected to the drug quantity on the basis that he shouldn’t
   be “held responsible for nonexisting drugs,” and thus should only be responsible for two
   kilos of cocaine the undercover agent brought to show Abreu, not the negotiated amount of
   17 kilograms. But as the Sentencing Guidelines explain, “in a reverse sting, the agreed-
   upon quantity of the controlled substance . . . more accurately reflect[s] the scale of the
   offense because the amount actually delivered is controlled by the government, not by the
   defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.5.
           37
                United States v. Escobar, 872 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 2017).
           38
             See Sain, 858 F. App’x at 732 (“Because this court has not explicitly recognized
   sentencing entrapment or sentencing factor manipulation as a cognizable defense, [the
   defendant] cannot show a clear or obvious error. This issue lacks merit.” (citations
   omitted)).
           39
              United States v. Landerman, 167 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir.1999) (citing United States
   v. Fair, 979 F.2d 1037, 1041 (5th Cir. 1992)).

                                                   10
Case: 21-60861         Document: 00516613994             Page: 11     Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                          No. 21-60861

   so where it neither rejects nor departs from the adopted PSR’s
   recommendation,40 as is the case here.
           Here, the district court adopted the PSR, reduced the fine below the
   Guidelines minimum, and instead imposed what it believed was an
   “appropriate” and “modest” fine. During Abreu’s sentencing, the court
   confirmed that the Guidelines called for a fine range of $50,000 to $10
   million for Count 1 and $50,000 to $5 million for Count 2. 41 Abreu’s PSR
   stated that while Abreu did not appear to be able to immediately pay a fine
   “within the guidelines range,” he “may be able to pay a modest fine in
   monthly increments during any term of incarceration or supervised release
   imposed by the Court.” The district court accepted this recommendation
   and reduced the fine amount by 80 percent.42 In imposing a $10,000 fine, the
   district court explained that “[t]he fine is a downward departure from the
   applicable guideline fine range and is based on the defendant’s ability to
   pay.” The sentencing judge determined that the $10,000 fine was
   “appropriate,” noting that “Abreu is able-bodied and capable of working”
   and that the fine was “sufficient but not greater than necessary to accomplish
   the goals of sentencing.” After the district court announced the fine, neither
   Abreu nor his counsel voiced any objection. In adopting and following the
   PSR recommendations, the district court did not err.
                                               VI.
           Lastly, Abreu maintains that the district court erred by refusing to
   allow him to call the informant’s wife as a witness for purposes of testifying

           40
             United States v. Nava-Palacios, 476 F. App’x 24, 26 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished
   per curiam).
           41
                See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)–(B); U.S.S.G. §§ 5E1.2(c)(3)–(c)(4).
           42
                The $50,000 minimum fine per count was reduced to $10,000.

                                                11
Case: 21-60861            Document: 00516613994               Page: 12       Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                              No. 21-60861

   about whether her husband reported a prior $50,000 informant payment on
   his tax returns.43 The scope of cross-examination is within the discretion of
   the trial judge but “only after there has been permitted as a matter of right
   sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.” 44 While the
   Confrontation Clause guarantees defendants an opportunity for effective
   cross-examination, it does not guarantee defendants cross-examination to
   whatever extent they wish.45 “Whether the exclusion of evidence is of a
   constitutional dimension depends on the [district] court’s reason for the
   exclusion and the effect of the exclusion.”46 “This determination typically
   includes an inquiry into the admissibility of the evidence under the Federal
   Rules of Evidence.”47
             Rule 608(b) forbids Abreu from questioning the informant’s wife
   about the $50,000 payment for the purpose of challenging the informant’s
   character for untruthfulness.48 Rule 608(b) limits such inquires to the cross-
   examination of the informant.49 Accordingly, the questioning would be
   permissible only if it contradicted the informant’s testimony on a material

             43
              The informant’s wife was not listed on the witness list, and the district court also
   ruled that the informant’s wife should have been listed as a witness.
             44
                United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States
   v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 908 (5th Cir. 1978)).
             45
                  Bigby v. Dretke, 402 F.3d 551, 573 (5th Cir. 2005).
             46
                  Skelton, 514 F.3d at 440 (quoting Kittelson v. Dretke, 426 F.3d 306, 319 (5th Cir.
   2005)).
             47
                  Id.
             48
              See FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove
   specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s
   character for truthfulness.”).
             49
            Id. (noting that courts may allow inquiries as to specific instances of conduct on
   cross-examination).

                                                    12
Case: 21-60861        Document: 00516613994                Page: 13        Date Filed: 01/18/2023

                                           No. 21-60861

   issue or contradicted the informant’s testimony on a collateral issue raised
   on direct examination.50 Here, Abreu cannot show that the excluded
   testimony contradicted the informant’s testimony that his wife filed his taxes
   and that he didn’t know whether he reported the $50,000. Nor was the
   $50,000 material, as it was a payment unrelated to this case. As such, the
   Federal Rules of Evidence bar Abreu from using extrinsic evidence (the
   wife’s testimony) to inquire about a collateral issue (the informant’s tax
   returns). Additionally, Abreu was able to cross-examine the informant, which
   was not only beneficial but necessary to his potential entrapment defense.
   The district court did not plainly err in refusing to allow Abreu to call the
   informant’s wife as a witness for purposes of testifying about her husband’s
   tax returns.
                                                VII.
           The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

           50
              See id.; Jones v. S. Pac. R.R., 962 F.2d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[I]f the opposing
   party places a matter at issue on direct examination, fairness mandates that the other party
   can offer contradictory evidence even if the matter is collateral.”).

                                                 13