Court Opinion

ID: 9961517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 05:07:26.094803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:51.710598
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re PETERSON, Minors.                                              April 18, 2024

                                                                     Nos. 366907; 366976
                                                                     Branch Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 22-006436-NA

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and FEENEY and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

         In these consolidated appeals,1 respondent-father and respondent-mother appeal as of right
the trial court order terminating their parental rights to the minor children, EP, DP, JP, and MP,
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist),
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)
(reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent). We affirm.

                                I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

        The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) received a complaint in March
2022 after the oldest child, EP, was seen at a hospital for excessive vomiting, and medical staff
determined that he was malnourished and also suspected gross neglect. When DHHS went to
respondents’ rental home, they found that there was no heat in the house and that respondents had
not had hot water for several weeks. The house was also littered with piles of trash, beer cans,
liquor bottles, cigarette butts, urine, and feces. Respondent-father and respondent-mother kept
animal kennels in the kitchen that were full of urine and feces, and the refrigerator contained moldy
and spilled food. The shower in the house also contained garbage, a mop, dirty diapers, and feces.

        DHHS tried to work with respondent-father and respondent-mother to encourage them to
clean the house. In May 2022, a DHHS employee went to the home and saw no improvement in
the conditions and also saw that EP, DP, and JP were covered in rashes that respondents did not

1
 In re Peterson Minors, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 25, 2023 (Docket
Nos. 366907 and 366976).

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treat. In June 2022, DHHS filed a petition describing these and other deplorable conditions and
further alleged that the children did not see doctors, did not receive regular vaccinations, and did
not have any dental care. The petition further alleged that the oldest child, who was five years old,
could not speak and communicated with grunting noises, he was not potty trained, and he was not
enrolled in any educational programs.

        DHHS did not request removal of the children from the custody of respondents until
respondent-mother refused a DHHS employee access to part of the home and then lunged at the
worker when the employee tried to take photos of the house and one of the children, JP.
Respondent-mother was ultimately arrested when she physically fought with police officers at the
scene. The children were placed with their paternal grandmother, but they were later moved to the
care of a maternal aunt after the grandmother scratched EP’s arms as a punishment and, in doing
so, drew blood and left numerous abrasions on the EP’s arms. At about the same time, EP
sustained a serious burn on a propane heater that the grandmother had agreed to remove from the
house or put a barrier around but did not. During the investigation, DHHS discovered that the
grandmother’s parental rights were terminated to, or she otherwise lost custody of, eight other
children because of abuse and neglect.

        Respondent-mother gave birth to the youngest child, MP, and that child was removed from
respondent-mother’s care because of the allegations in the petition involving the other children.
She also failed to interact with the baby while in the hospital and expected others to feed and clean
the baby. At that time, respondent-mother admitted that the house was not clean enough yet for
the children to return to the home. Evidence also showed that respondent-mother’s parental rights
were terminated to three other children in 2017 because of neglect and failure to provide those
children safe and suitable housing. When respondents could not get necessary repairs on their
rental home, and when they were about to be evicted, they decided to move in with the same
paternal grandmother and her husband who abused EP.2 Even though the DHHS made clear that
the children would not be returned to the parents if they lived with the paternal grandmother,
respondent-father and respondent-mother nonetheless planned to keep the children in the upstairs
bedrooms of the grandmother’s house, although they would need to share a bathroom, kitchen, and
living room with the grandmother as well as three other family members who also lived in the
home.

       In April 2023, petitioner filed a petition to terminate both respondent-father and
respondent-mother’s parental rights. After a two-day termination hearing, the trial court entered
an order terminating their parental rights in June 2023.

       Both respondents now appeal.

2
 The paternal grandfather hit EP with a belt and respondents knew about it but respondent-mother
believed he was “playfully” hitting EP with the belt because EP did not cry, so she did not tell
DHHS about the incident.

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                      II. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

        Respondent-father and respondent-mother both argue that clear and convincing evidence
did not support the trial court’s finding of statutory grounds for termination. We disagree.

         We review “for clear error the trial court’s finding that there are statutory grounds for
termination of a respondent’s parental rights.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 343; 990 NW2d
685 (2022). Clear error occurs “if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed . . . .” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).
“When applying the clear-error standard in parental termination cases, ‘regard is to be given to the
special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before
it.’ ” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020), quoting In re Miller, 433 Mich
331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).

        Although respondent-father only cites two statutory sections, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and
(g), in arguing that the trial court lacked clear and convincing evidence to find grounds for
termination, the trial court ruled that petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence to
terminate respondent-father’s parental rights to the children under three statutory sections:
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Termination of parental rights needs only to be supported by
a single statutory ground. In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). As such,
we may presume that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the unchallenged statutory
ground, MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), was established by clear and convincing evidence. See In re JS &
SM, 231 Mich App 92, 98-99; 585 NW2d 326 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds In re
Trejo, 462 Mich 341; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Therefore, respondent-father’s failure to challenge
subsection (3)(j) constitutes a waiver of his challenge to the trial court’s finding that statutory
grounds existed to support termination. Nevertheless, as will be discussed, for many of the same
reasons supporting the trial court’s finding that statutory grounds existed to support termination of
respondent-mother’s parental rights, the trial court also did not clearly err by finding that statutory
grounds existed to support termination of respondent-father’s parental rights.

        Respondent-father and respondent-mother argue that the record did not contain clear and
convincing evidence that, after 182 days, the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to
exist and that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a
reasonable time considering the ages of the children. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). We disagree.

        At the beginning of the case, respondent-father and respondent-mother lacked suitable
housing, and the same remained true at the time of the termination hearing. After the children
were removed from their care, respondent-father was able to restore heat and water to the home
but the dirty conditions went unremedied, and their landlord refused to enter the home to make
other repairs due to the condition of the home. Both respondent-father and respondent-mother
knew that, after the paternal grandmother physically harmed EP and he was hit with a belt and
burned on a dangerous heating element that should not have been in the house, DHHS would not
consider the grandmother’s home safe or appropriate for the children. The parents chose to move
into the grandmother’s house despite DHHS’ admonition that the children could not be returned
to the paternal grandparents’ home due to physical abuse, prior terminations, and unsafe conditions
where the children were allowed to play. They needed to install drywall and flooring in the upstairs
bedrooms, but, when the foster-care worker asked to see the space that they made for the children

                                                 -3-
the day before the termination petition would be filed, respondent-father and respondent-mother
did not allow her to see the rooms. Respondent-father admitted that the rooms were not ready or
safe for the children.

        During the proceedings, respondent-father agreed to obtain some form of long-term
employment because a lack of food led to the children’s malnourishment as well as their food-
binging and hoarding behaviors. Respondent-father claimed to have applied for numerous jobs
through an employment agency, but when the foster-care worker checked, she found that he
applied for two jobs in December 2022, and two jobs in January 2023, but he did not have the
qualifications for any of them. Respondent-father worked at four different jobs during the
pendency of the case, but the longest he held a job by the first termination hearing was three weeks.

        Respondent-mother claimed that she worked in the past but that she needed to receive
disability income because she had low iron and mental-health problems. Contrary to respondent-
mother’s claim, however, her therapist did not diagnose her with anything that would prevent her
from working. Instead, he recommended that she get a psychiatric evaluation for her disability
claim, but respondent-mother refused to do so. Respondent-mother also testified at the termination
hearing that she did not remember ever receiving a doctor’s diagnosis of a physical problem that
prevented her from working. Possibly for that reason, respondent-mother was denied disability
income several times in the past, and she received another denial on the first day of the termination
hearing. Therefore, by the termination hearing, neither respondent had a source of income or other
resources to support themselves, much less a family of six people.

        With respect to the conditions that led to the adjudication continuing to exist, respondents
continued to neglect or ignore the children’s emotional, physical and educational needs.
Testimony revealed that even when EP received his “first start” for positive behavior at school and
asked respondent-mother if she was proud of him, she merely walked away. Respondent-mother
did not support DP and JP participating with Early On services even though their trauma
assessments, hoarding behaviors, and outward aggressiveness indicated that they would benefit
from these services as they were too young for therapy. Respondent-father tended to follow
respondent-mother’s lead on these issues. They did not inform DHHS of paternal grandmother’s
prior terminations when DHHS first planned to place the children with her, and then did not reveal
the abuse that they learned was occurring in paternal grandmother’s house when it happened (i.e.,
when the grandmother scratched EP as punishment for him scratching MP and when the
grandfather hit EP with a belt). During visits, respondents would hold MP but did not call her by
name or interact with her to develop a strong bond with the baby; in the hospital, respondent-
mother had others feed and clean up the baby. Whether putting off EP’s original follow-up medical
appointment after his emergency room visit in March 2022 or finally reapplying for disability
benefits in April 2023, respondent-mother’s ability to take care of important issues in a timely
manner remained unresolved. And both respondents delayed significantly in participating with
counseling.3 Clearly, the conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist and there was

3
 Notably, the trial court ordered the parties to submit to psychological evaluations but they never
occurred and, in its bench opinion, the trial court stated it had no idea why they were not completed.
The court did, however, reference respondent-mother’s previous 2014 psychological evaluation

                                                 -4-
no reasonable likelihood, given that this was respondent-mother’s second time being involved with
services and facing the termination of parental rights, that they would be rectified within a
reasonable time given the young ages of these children. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).

       Moreover, a parent’s failure to provide adequate housing and financial support for a minor
child constitutes clear and convincing evidence that termination is appropriate. In re Frey, 297
Mich App 242, 244; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Clear and convincing evidence showed that
respondent-father and respondent-mother lacked safe and suitable housing and respondent-father
was financially able to provide care for these children but they lacked the resources to feed, clothe,
and properly care for the children. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Again, because petitioner is required to
prove only one statutory ground for termination, we need not consider whether the trial court
properly terminated respondents’ rights under other statutory sections. See In re Olive/Metts, 297
Mich App 35, 41; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).

                           III. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN

        Respondent-father and respondent-mother further argue that the trial court erred when it
terminated their parental rights because petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of evidence
that termination was in the best interests of the children. We again disagree.

        This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights
was in the best interests of the children. In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 129; 777 NW2d 728
(2009). “Once a statutory basis for termination has been shown by clear and convincing evidence,
the court must determine whether termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re LaFrance, 306
Mich App 713, 732-733; 858 NW2d 143 (2014), citing MCL 712A.19b(5). “Best interests are
determined on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence.” In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App
at 733. In its best-interest determination, the trial court should consider a variety of factors that
may include “the child’s bond to the parent[;] the parent’s parenting ability[;] the child’s need for
permanency, stability, and finality[;] and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.”
In re Mota, 334 Mich App at 321 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court may also
consider “the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history
with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted). A trial court may also consider how long the child has
lived in foster care or with relatives and the likelihood that “the child could be returned to [the]
parent’s home within the foreseeable future, if at all.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-249.
Further, under MCL 712A.19b(5), “If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of
parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall

from the prior child protective case that resulted in the termination of her rights to three other
children. Caution should be used when relying on a psychological evaluation that is not current.
While her own testimony—without confirmation—could lead to the conclusion that respondent-
mother suffered a brain injury as a child and had a learning disability, no one argued that the
respondents were entitled to additional services consistent with In re Hicks-Brown, 500 Mich 79,
85-88; 893 NW2d 637 (2017).

                                                  -5-
order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child
with the parent not be made.”

        We note that respondent-father has failed to properly present this issue on appeal because
he does not explain what factors or evidence the trial court should have considered or weighed in
his favor at the termination hearing, and instead asserts that, because he felt that he had a bond
with the children and he now has a steady job, the trial court’s ruling should be reversed. “An
appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give issues cursory treatment with little or no
citation of supporting authority.” In re Warshefski, 331 Mich App 83, 87; 951 NW2d 90 (2020)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

        Nevertheless, we hold that ample evidence established that termination of respondent-
father’s parental rights was in the best interests of EP, DP, JP, and MP. For several months after
the petition was filed, respondent-father failed to clean up the filth in the home. Although he
blamed the landlord for failing to fix some problems, the record reflects that no workers would
enter the house to make repairs because of the deplorable conditions inside. As discussed, once
respondent-father moved into the paternal grandmother’s house, he chose to live with someone
who deliberately harmed one of his children, and, therefore, he failed to understand or concern
himself with the risk of harm to the children if they were returned to his care.

        DHHS also intervened because, by age five, EP could not speak, he was not potty trained,
and he lacked developmentally appropriate skills, as did DP and JP. The children also exhibited
alarming and violent behaviors, such as running into traffic, food binging and hoarding,4 stealing
food from other children, throwing objects and chairs at people, and spitting on people. Despite
evidence that the children showed signs of food being unavailable or withheld from them and that
malnourishment resulted in rotten teeth, respondent-father did not seem concerned when he would
lose a job after only a short time working. He did not show any understanding that, without a
regular income or other resources, the children would again go hungry if returned to his care.

        Further, at parenting time, the foster-care worker noted that respondent-father had a hard
time engaging with the children or keeping them engaged once he had their attention. The foster-
care worker also noted that respondent-father had a short temper with the children and became
easily frustrated with them.5 Respondent-father participated in services in a perfunctory way, but

4
  The children’s maternal aunt, Ms. McFarland, who took placement of the children after they left
the grandparents’ home, testified that the young children would get up in the middle of the night
and eat anything they could find including a jar of garlic and a 2 lb meatloaf. They would also
break locks off cabinets to get to the food. EP and MP remained with McFarland but respondent-
mother’s harassment of her sister led to McFarland requesting that DP and JP be removed from
her home. The trial court did note that it considered this relative placement when determining the
children’s best interests, but it found that termination was still in their best interests.
5
  This would occur most when respondent-mother would sit and instruct respondent-father on what
to do during their parenting time rather than engage with the children herself. She would hold the

                                                 -6-
he only began services months after he agreed to engage in them, and he could not name one thing
that he learned during parenting classes. Evidence also showed that respondent-father asked to
leave parenting time early, and when a relative supervised parenting time, she saw respondent-
father hit the children. EP and DP also told the foster-care worker that respondent-father hit them.
Although respondent-father seemed to do better when a supportive visitation worker helped with
parenting time, EP still reported that respondent-father hit the girls or yanked them by the arms at
those parenting-time visits.

        Indeed, the trial court stopped parenting time because, although the children’s behaviors
improved after they were removed from respondent-father and respondent-mother’s custody, they
regressed on days when the children would visit with them and after the visits. On one occasion,
EP threw himself on the ground and refused to get on the school bus at the end of the day because
he did not want to go to parenting time. As the trial court found, it was only because of DHHS’
involvement that EP was receiving the intensive psychological services that he needed when the
parents failed to provide even the most basic medical and dental care to the children. We find no
error in the trial court’s ruling that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the
best interests of the children.

         We also hold that the trial court did not err by finding that a preponderance of evidence
showed that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the
children. Like respondent-father, respondent-mother never adequately cleaned the rental home for
any length of time, even though respondent-mother’s parental rights were terminated in 2017 to
three other children because her living conditions were not appropriate or safe. Nonetheless, at
the termination hearing, respondent-mother denied that the rental home was unclean, despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary, including her own prior admissions. Respondent-mother
testified that the house was in disarray because two toddlers, DP and JP, made a mess before she
could clean it up and it happened to fall on a day when the foster-care worker visited. Respondent-
mother insisted at the termination hearing that she cleaned the house and animal kennels every
morning and that the home was completely clean as soon as the children were removed. As the
foster-care worker observed, and the trial court summarized, toddlers simply could not create the
piles of trash, excrement, cigarette butts, and beer cans throughout the home.

        As with respondent-father, respondent-mother only started services months after she
agreed to begin parenting classes and mental-health counseling. Despite the fact that the children
were malnourished, never went to a doctor, harmed themselves and others, and lacked age-
appropriate skills, respondent-mother testified at the termination hearing that she was already
doing virtually everything they taught in parenting classes and that she, therefore, did not learn
much from them. She clearly did not benefit from services because she repeatedly blamed others
for circumstances in the home and denied that the children had any significant problems while in
her care.

       Further, throughout the case, foster-care and Court Appointed Special Advocate workers
were concerned about the lack of bond between respondent-mother and the children. Evidence

baby MP but would not interact with her, call her by name, or check to see if she needed a diaper
change.

                                                -7-
showed that respondent-mother often ignored the children when they sought her attention, she left
parenting times early, and she failed to interact with the children unless instructed to do so or
heavily supervised. The children’s behaviors improved after they were removed from respondent-
mother’s custody and received the medical, psychological, and educational services they needed,
but the children regressed on days when they had parenting time with respondent-mother and after
parenting time. On the basis of this evidence, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that
termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                            /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
                                                            /s/ Adrienne N. Young

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