Court Opinion

ID: 6780048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-21 00:55:02.381949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:02:51.244517
License: Public Domain

Moyer, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur with the judgment of the majority and with the reasoning in the majority opinion, except on the remittitur issue (Issue IV). I write separately because we are not required to reach the issue of whether a remittitur is generally appealable by the plaintiff. Therefore this is an inappropriate case for defining a new standard of law for Ohio.
I would hold that where, as in the case before us, a trial court deems a jury award not to be excessive, the trial court lacks authority to offer a remittitur, and that it is an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial or offer a remittitur to reduce damages.
Because the trial court here expressly determined that the jury did not award excessive punitive damages under Ohio law in returning a verdict of $25,000,000, the trial court had no authority to remit the jury award to $15,000,000. It therefore becomes necessary to reevaluate the appropriateness of the punitive damages award.
The majority correctly states that, in lieu of ordering a new trial, a court has the inherent authority to remit an excessive award not tainted by passion or prejudice, if the plaintiff agrees to the remittitur. . See, e.g., Larrissey v. Norwalk Truck Lines, Inc. (1951), 155 Ohio St. 207, 44 O.O. 238, 98 N.E.2d 419, paragraph five of the syllabus; Pendleton Street RR. Co. v. Rahmann (1872), 22 Ohio St. 446.
However, “[i]t is the function of the jury to assess the damages, and generally, it is not for a trial or appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact.” Villella v. Waikem Motors, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 36, 40, 543 N.E.2d 464, 469. The trial court has only limited authority to offer remittitur. The concept of remittitur was developed to provide the trial court with an alternate remedy, in the interest of judicial economy, by which it could correct an award that was legally excessive, thereby avoiding another trial.
In Chester Park Co. v. Schulte (1929), 120 Ohio St. 273, 166 N.E. 186, paragraph three of the syllabus, this court set forth the specific criteria that control the determination of a trial court to grant remittitur. One of these criteria is that the original jury award is found to be excessive. The majority cites this criterion, admits that the trial court did not meet it, and yet, accepts the trial court’s order of remittitur.
*447I have found no support for allowing a trial court to offer remittitur absent a finding that a jury’s verdict of damages was excessive. To allow a court to offer remittitur simply because the trial court, as in this case, believes that a lesser award might help the defendant accept the verdict without challenge, would be to infringe improperly upon the plaintiffs right to a jury determination and could be viewed as encouraging defendants to threaten appeals and delay payment of verdicts.
The trial court, in this case, originally filed a judgment entry ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the entire $25,000,000 in punitive damages that had been awarded by the jury. Following this judgment entry, the defendant moved for remittitur to an amount less than $1,200,000 on the grounds that the verdict was excessive and in violation of due process, or in the alternative, for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was tainted with passion and prejudice. The court granted the motion for remittitur and denied the motion for a new trial. In doing so, the trial court cited Chester Park, including the criterion that the trial court find the damages award to be excessive. The trial court then specifically found that the damages awarded by the jury were not excessive under Ohio law and unconditionally denied the motion for a new trial. It nonetheless asked the plaintiff to agree to a remittitur.
It is true that we must defer to the trial court’s discretion, absent an abuse of discretion, when it determines a verdict to be legally excessive. See Thompson v. Titus (1959), 169 Ohio St. 203, 8 O.O.2d 166, 158 N.E.2d 357; Larrissey at 219-220, 44 O.O. at 243-244, 98 N.E.2d at 426. However, we cannot defer to a judgment that the trial court had no authority pursuant to statutory or common law to make.
I would remand this case to the court of appeals to determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that the punitive damages award "was not excessive.
Lundberg Stratton, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.