Court Opinion

ID: 9605801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:42:06.95029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:36.257275
License: Public Domain

LAKE, Justice.
Approximately two-thirds of the defendant’s brief is directed to his Assignment of Error No. 1, which reads:
“The Court erred in allowing the Solicitor to ask members of the jury panel questions regarding their moral or religious scruples about the death penalty in that such question eliminated all prospective jurors approved [opposed?] to capital punishment and denied defendant the right to be tried by a cross-section of his peers.”
It is not clear from the defendant’s brief whether his attack upon the trial, under this assignment of error, is directed to the trial court’s permitting the Solicitor to ask questions of prospective jurors concerning their views as to the death penalty, or to the trial court’s sustaining of challenges for cause by *427reason of the responses made to such questions. In either view of it, this assignment of error is completely lacking in merit.
The defendant does not challenge the procedures whereby the jury panel was selected and summoned, nor does the record contain any suggestion of a basis for such challenge. The statutory procedures for its selection having been followed, the jury panel, in its entirety, was a representative cross-section of the people of Wake County. Of the 38 prospective jurors examined in the selection of the 12 who rendered the verdict and two alternates, only four indicated their opposition to the imposition of a death sentence in a proper case therefor.
The defendant, in his brief, makes the startling observation that a jury’s verdict finding a defendant guilty need not be unanimous, so the denial of the State’s challenge to a juror, who under no circumstances would vote for a verdict of guilty of an offense for which the prescribed punishment' is death, would not necessarily prevent the State from obtaining such a verdict. In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S.Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed. 2d 184, and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed. 2d 152, a sharply divided Supreme Court of the United States, a majority of which was unable to agree upon an opinion, sustained sentences imposed by state courts pursuant to verdicts of guilty reached by juries not unanimous. Neither of these was a capital case. Whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prevents a state from imposing a death sentence upon a defendant convicted of a capital crime by a jury not unanimous, we need not now determine. It has never been doubted that the Constitution of this State requires a unanimous verdict for a valid conviction for any crime. Article I, § 24, of the Constitution of North Carolina provides:
“Right of jury trial in criminal cases. No person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury in open court. The General Assembly may, however, provide for other means of trial for misdemeanors, with the right of appeal for trial de novo.”
From time immemorial it has been standard practice in this State for prosecuting attorneys in capital cases to interrogate prospective jurors concerning their opposition, if any, to the imposition of the death penalty.
 The State, like the defendant, is entitled to a jury, all members of which are free from a preconceived determination *428to vote contrary to its contention concerning the defendant’s guilt of the offense for which he is being tried. See, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed. 2d 776. To that end, the State, like the defendant, is allowed certain peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, nine being allowed the State for each defendant in a capital case and 14 being allowed each such defendant. G.S. 9-21 (b). In order to permit intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges, as well as to determine the existence of basis for a challenge for cause, wide latitude must be allowed counsel in the interrogation of prospective jurors. In State v. Britt, 285 N.C. 256, 267, 204 S.E. 2d 817, Justice Branch, speaking for a unanimous Court, said:
“It is well established by our decisions and the decisions of the federal courts that in a capital case both the State and the defendant may, on the voir dire examination of prospective jurors, make inquiry concerning a prospective juror’s moral or religious scruples, his beliefs and attitudes toward capital punishment, to the end that both the defendant and the State may be insured a fair trial before an unbiased jury. [Citations omitted.] A prospective juror’s response to such inquiry by counsel may disclose basis for a challenge for cause or the exercise of a peremptory challenge. The extent of the inquiries, of course, remains under the control and supervision of the trial judge.”
In State v. Jarrette, 284 N.C. 625, 638, 202 S.E. 2d 721, this Court said:
“We have held many times that there is no error in permitting questions to be propounded to prospective jurors concerning their views about the death penalty. State v. Rogers, 275 N.C. 411, 168 S.E. 2d 345; State v. Yoes, and State v. Hale [271 N.C. 616, 157 S.E. 2d 386] ; State v. Spence, 271 N.C. 23, 155 S.E. 2d 802.”
A total of 38 prospective jurors was examined. The State challenged a total of eight of these, three for cause and five peremptorily, including four who stated no objection to the death penalty. The defendant challenged 14 peremptorily and two for cause. Each of the three prospective jurors challenged for cause by the State said, in response to questions by the Solicitor and by the Court, that even though the evidence satisfied her beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt of the offense of rape, she could not vote for such a verdict know*429ing that the death penalty was required thereupon. Under these circumstances, it was not error to sustain the Solicitor’s challenge for cause. Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra; State v. Ward, 286 N.C. 304, 210 S.E. 2d 407; State v. Sparks, 285 N.C. 631, 207 S.E. 2d 712; State v. Honeycutt, 285 N.C. 174, 203 S.E. 2d 844; State v. Crowder, 285 N.C. 42, 203 S.E. 2d 38; State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 202 S.E. 2d 750; State v. Jarrette, supra; State v. Anderson, 281 N.C. 261, 188 S.E. 2d 336; State v. Westbrook, 279 N.C. 18, 181 S.E. 2d 572; State v. Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E. 2d 241. Furthermore, had these three challenges for cause not been sustained, the Solicitor could have challenged all of these jurors peremptorily without reaching his limit of nine such challenges.
The defendant’s Assignments of Error No. 9 and No. 11 are directed to the denial of the defendant’s motions for a judgment of nonsuit and for a directed verdict. These assignments of error are patently without merit. The evidence for the State was abundantly sufficient to permit the jury to find that the offense of rape was perpetrated upon the prosecuting witness and that the defendant was the perpetrator of it. It is elementary that, upon a motion for judgment of nonsuit, or for a directed verdict, the evidence for the State is taken to be true and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference which may be drawn therefrom, contradictions and discrepanices in the State’s evidence are disregarded and the evidence of the defendant in conflict with that of the State is not taken into consideration. Strong N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law, § 104, and the numerous cases there cited. It is also elementary that upon the consideration of such a motion, evidence for the State, even though improperly admitted, is taken into account. State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 156 S.E. 2d 679; State v. Walker, 266 N.C. 269, 145 S.E. 2d 833; State v. Virgil, 263 N.C. 73, 138 S.E. 2d 777. The motion for judgment of nonsuit and the motion for a directed verdict of not guilty have the same legal effect. State v. Britt, supra; State v. Glover, 270 N.C. 319, 154 S.E. 2d 305.
The defendant’s Assignment of Error No. 14 is to the imposition of the sentence of death upon the verdict of guilty of rape. The defendant’s contentions with respect to the validity of the death sentence for rape have been carefully considered and found without merit by this Court in a number of recent decisions. See: State v. Noell, supra; State v. Jarrette, supra; State *430v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E. 2d 19. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat here the reasons for that determination.
At the time this offense was committed and at jthe time the defendant was tried, convicted and sentenced to death, G.S. 14-21, as construed by this Court in State v. Waddell, supra, made a sentence to death mandatory upon every person convicted of the rape of any female of the age of 12 years or more by force and against her will. Chapter 1201 of the Session Laws of 1973, § 2, ratified 8 April 1974, rewrote G.S. 14-21. As rewritten, the statute now makes provision for first degree rape, for which the punishment “shall be death,” and for second degree rape, for which the punishment shall be “imprisonment in the State’s prison for life, or for a term of years, in the discretion of the court.”
The same Act also rewrote G.S. 14-17, dealing with murder, G.S. 14-52, dealing with burglary, G.S. 14-58, dealing with arson, G.S. 148-58, dealing with the parole of prisoners, and G.S. 14-2, dealing with the punishment of persons convicted of felonies for which no specific punishment is prescribed by statute. Section 8 of the Act provides:
“This act shall become effective upon ratification and applicable to all offenses hereafter committed.” (Emphasis added.)
The Act was ratified, and thus became effective, 8 April 1974 and is, in its entirety, “applicable” to all offenses thereafter committed.
The defendant contends that this statute is retroactive so as to make unlawful the imposition upon this defendant of a sentence to death, since the prosecuting witness, at the time of the offense, was more than 12 years of age, her submission was not procured by the use of a deadly weapon and serious bodily injury (other than the rape, itself) was not inflicted upon her and, therefore, the offense falls within the definition of second degree rape contained in Section 2(b) of the above mentioned Act of 1974.
This contention requires us to construe Section 8 of the 1974 Act. It is our authority and duty, in capital cases as in other cases, to apply a valid statute so as to give to it the meaning and effect intended by the Legislature at the time of its enactment. Throughout the years, rules of statutory construction *431have been evolved and declared whereby courts are to determine such legislative intent. They apply to capital cases just as to other cases. Because of the gravity of a capital case, both in its consequences to the defendant and in the consequences to the State of the offense with which the defendant is charged, this Court always considers the record and the legal contentions in such case with special care, but in a capital case, just as in any other case, we are not at liberty to disregard established principles of law in arriving at the intent of the Legislature in enacting a statute, nor, having determined that intent, may we properly refuse to give it effect.
We find no merit in this contention of the defendant. In clear, explicit terms the Legislature provided, “This act shall become * * * applicable to all offenses hereafter committed.” Had these words been omitted, the Act would, nevertheless, apply to all offenses committed after its effective date, 8 April 1974. Consequently, these words were not used for the purpose of giving the Act that effect. It is a well established principle of statutory construction that a statute must be construed, if possible, so as to give effect to every part of it, it being presumed that the Legislature did not intend any of its provisions to be surplusage. State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 19, 187 S.E. 2d 706; Clark v. Carolina Homes, 189 N.C. 703, 710, 128 S.E. 20; State v. Barksdale, 181 N.C. 621, 625, 107 S.E. 505.
In State v. Broadway, 157 N.C. 598, 72 S.E. 987, a statute, providing for the punishment of the crime of incest, was amended so as to increase the penalty. The amending act provided that the amendment should be in force “from its ratification.” This Court, speaking through Chief Justice Clark, said:
“The change in the punishment took effect only by terms of the statute, ‘from its ratification,’ and hence did not apply to an offense which was committed prior to its enactment. Repeals by implication are not favored by the law. In this case there is neither express repeal of any part of the statute, nor any repeal by implication. The statute stands intact as it was, the Legislature simply adding ten years to the quantum of the punishment which the judge might impose. This additional ten years was to take effect in the future, and indeed under the constitutional provision forbidding ex post facto laws such additional punishment could not have been applied to such crime unless committed after the act.”
*432In 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 422, it is said:
“Where a repealing statute contains a saving- clause as to crimes committed prior to the repeal, or as to pending prosecutions, the offender may be tried and punished under the old law. * * *
“Similarly, where amendatory legislation carries a saving clause as to prior offenses * * * the law as it stood at the time of the offenses is applied to the prosecution and sentencing of the violator.”
We construe the provision in the 1974 Act, “This act shall become * * * applicable to all offenses hereafter committed” as a saving clause, showing the intent of the Legislature to leave the preexisting statute in effect as to the elements of and punishment for the crime of rape committed prior to 8 April 1974. Otherwise, that provision of the Act would be a mere meaningless redundancy.
In 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 250, it is said:
“In the interpretation of a statute, the legislature will be presumed to have inserted every part thereof for a purpose. Thus, it should not be presumed that any provision of a statute is redundant. The statute should not be construed in such manner as to render it partly ineffective or inefficient if another construction will make it effective. Indeed, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect should, if possible, without destroying the sense or effect of the law, be accorded every part of the act, including every section, paragraph, sentence or clause, phrase, and word.”
In 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 419, it is said:
“A statute will not be construed to operate retrospectively so as to take away a penalty or condone a crime unless such intention is clearly expressed.”
In State v. Perkins, 141 N.C. 797, 808, 53 S.E. 735, this Court said:
“It can make no difference how the intention of the Legislature, that an act should have prospective operation, is expressed; whether it is done by unequivocal terms in the act, or by a proviso, or is to be gathered from its general *433scope and tenor, so that it appears with sufficient clearness that such is the intention.”
In that case and again in State v. Harvey, supra, this Court quoted with approval, the following statement from the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Virginia in Pegram’s Case, 28 Va. 569:
“A punishment affixed to an offense prior to the first of May, 1828 [the effective date of an amending statute], is not incompatible with a different punishment, either lighter or more severe, affixed to the same offense subsequent to that date. They may well stand together. The punishment prescribed by Laws 1827-’28 being different from that prescribed by Laws 1822-’23, is certainly an implied repeal of it, as to new offenses, from the time it goes into effect; but, by the very terms of the law, the new punishment is only applied to the offenses happening after 1 May 1828, leaving the old punishment to be applied to the offenses happening before that day.”
In State v. Harvey, supra, at page 20, we said:
“The same criminal offenses exist under the Controlled Substance Act as existed under the former Articles 5 and 5A of Chapter 90 of the General Statutes. The provisions for punishment under the new act are different from those contained in the former act. Thus, if the saving clauses contained in G.S. 90-113.7 do not save the punishment provisions of the former act, they are useless and redundant.”
We do not perceive how effect can be given to the express declaration that the Act of 1974 “shall become * * * applicable to all offenses hereafter committed,” unless it be construed to mean that the Act has no application to offenses committed prior to its effective date, 8 April 1974. We so construe it.
The defendant’s remaining Assignments of Error, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 relate to the admission of testimony by various witnesses for the State and to the Solicitor’s cross-examination of the defendant’s witnesses, Mrs. Williams and Mrs. Barefoot. All of these bits of testimony were trivia. We have carefully considered them all and the surrounding testimony, as shown by the record. We find no error in the rulings of the trial judge, certainly none which could conceivably be deemed to entitle the defendant to a new trial. Had all of these *434ten bits of testimony been kept from the jury, it is inconceivable that, in view of the overwhelming mass of evidence as to the perpetration of the offense and the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it, the jury would not have reached the same verdict. No useful purpose would be served by a detailed discussion of any of these assignments. They are overruled.
No error.