Court Opinion

ID: 9956194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 14:07:27.440635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:41.008264
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1064-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

CHRISTIAN CORTES,

     Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________

                   Submitted March 6, 2024 – Decided April 1, 2024

                   Before Judges Firko and Susswein.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 18-07-
                   1061.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Mark Zavotsky, Designated Counsel, on the
                   brief).

                   Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Randolph E. Mershon III,
                   Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
       Defendant Christian Cortes appeals from a September 22, 2022 Law

Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) alleging

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel without an evidentiary

hearing. After carefully reviewing the record in light of the arguments of the

parties and governing legal principles, we affirm, substantially for the reasons

set forth in Judge Thomas J. Buck's comprehensive written opinion.

                                       I.

       Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, second-degree unlawful

possession of a handgun without a permit, and second-degree possession of a

firearm for an unlawful purpose. Following a Miranda1 hearing, the trial court

granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion to suppress a statement he

made to the police. After a jury was sworn to hear the case and before opening

statements, defendant entered into a plea agreement. The first-degree murder

charge was amended to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, and the other

charges were dismissed.      Defendant preserved the right to challenge the

admissibility of his recorded statement made to the police and phone calls he

made from the county jail to his girlfriend. The trial court accepted defendant's

guilty plea. Defendant was sentenced to sixteen years' imprisonment subject to

1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                                                           A-1064-22
                                       2
the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 43-7.2, the sentence recommended in the

plea agreement.

      We affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. State

v. Cortes, No. A-0505-19 (App. Div. Apr. 19, 2021). The Supreme Court denied

his petition for certification. 248 N.J. 386 (2021).

      We need only briefly summarize the facts adduced at the Miranda hearing

and plea allocution, which are fully recounted in our opinion affirming

defendant's conviction on direct appeal. Cortes, slip op. at 2-9. Defendant

purchased marijuana from a man named Manuel Garcia. The marijuana was

thereafter stolen from defendant, who believed Garcia was behind the robbery.

Based on his belief, defendant purposely and knowingly fired a gun at Garcia's

car, which had tinted windows, unaware Garcia's mother was sitting in the car

at the time. The bullet struck Garcia's mother in the neck, and she died from her

wound.

      Police officers went to defendant's residence and brought him to

headquarters for questioning. Defendant asserted the police officers questioned

him while in the police car. At headquarters, Sergeant Thierry Lemmerling and

Detective Erika DiMarcello interrogated defendant. Defendant was read his

Miranda rights prior to the video-recorded interview.

                                                                           A-1064-22
                                        3
      At his plea allocution hearing, defendant admitted that he caused victim's

death, fired into the driver's side window, and the windows were blackened. He

also admitted his act of shooting into the car was reckless because he did not

know where the bullets would hit and manifested an extreme indifference to the

value of human life because he could have struck anyone on the street. In

addition, defendant admitted he consciously disregarded a known risk.

      Prior to sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. In

support of his motion, he argued ineffective assistance of first trial counsel 2 and

claimed he was innocent. Defendant's newly assigned second counsel argued at

the motion to withdraw hearing that:         (1) defendant lacked the requisite

"manifest indifference to human life" necessary to sustain a conviction for first -

degree manslaughter; and (2) his first trial counsel was ineffective for not

meeting with defendant enough, not discussing trial strategy, failing to explain

the difference between reckless manslaughter and aggravated manslaughter, and

2
   Second trial counsel raised an ineffective assistance of counsel argument
against first trial counsel in support of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. Second counsel argued that first trial counsel was ineffective for not
meeting with defendant enough, talking trial strategy with him enough, and that
first trial counsel did not explain the difference between reckless manslaughter
and aggravated manslaughter. First trial counsel testified at the motion.
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied. The motion court
found defendant received effective assistance of counsel.
                                                                              A-1064-22
                                         4
pressuring him to accept the plea agreement because first counsel was

unprepared for trial.

      Defendant and his first counsel testified at the motion to withdraw

hearing. Following the hearing, defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea

was denied, and he was sentenced as stated.

      On May 13, 2022, 3 defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR alleging

ineffective assistance of first trial and appellate counsel. Defendant claimed:

(1) his first trial counsel failed to communicate, failed to investigate the case,

and failed to provide him with full discovery "before encouraging [him] to take

a plea deal," depriving him of his due process and constitutional rights to a fair

trial; (2) his second trial counsel failed to present all of his cognizable claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel in support of defendant's motion to withdraw

his guilty plea; and (3) cumulative errors of his first and second trial counsel

deprived him of effective legal representation.

      Defendant certified that on July 15, 2017, he gave a recorded interview to

police and before the interview commenced, he answered questions posed by

Sergeant Thierry Lemmerling. Defendant also certified that he advised both his

3
  In his PCR petition, defendant states he filed for such relief on October 18,
2021. However, defendant's supporting certification is dated May 13, 2022.
                                                                               A-1064-22
                                         5
trial and appellate counsel that he wanted to appeal his sentence on the basis it

was excessive. The judge appointed counsel to represent defendant.

        Upon considering the parties' briefs and oral argument, Judge Buck denied

defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing for the reasons set forth in

his comprehensive written opinion. The judge found, contrary to defendant's

assertion that first trial counsel raised the "two-step procedure" 4 argument at the

Miranda hearing, thus, second trial counsel did not fail to argue this issue at

defendant's motion to withdraw hearing to avoid preclusion under Rule 3:22-4.5

4
   A "two-step procedure" is a "question-first, warn-later" interrogation, which
is a technique to undermine the efficacy of Miranda and our state law privilege
because it amounts to a failure to advise defendant of his Miranda rights. State
v. O'Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 180, 184-85 (2007).
5
    Rule 3:22-4(a)(1) - (3) provides:

              (a) First Petition for [PCR]. Any ground for relief not
              raised in the proceedings resulting in the conviction, or
              in a [PCR] proceeding brought and decided prior to the
              adoption of this rule, or in any appeal taken in any such
              proceedings is barred from assertion in a proceeding
              under this rule unless the court on motion or at the
              hearing finds:

              (1) that the ground for relief not previously asserted
              could not reasonably have been raised in any prior
              proceeding; or

                                                                              A-1064-22
                                         6
      The judge explained that during the Miranda hearing on July 9, 2018, first

counsel asked defendant: "So inside the car, the vehicle while you were being

transported to the police station prior to the statement that was in the videotape

. . . you were being asked questions by Sergeant Lemmerling?" Defendant

responded, "Yeah. We were talking about the robbery."           Defendant's first

counsel also cross-examined the interrogating officer—Sergeant Lemmerling—

during the Miranda hearing and queried the officer if a conversation took place

between defendant and the officer prior to defendant giving his statement.

            (2) that enforcement of the bar to preclude claims,
            including one for ineffective assistance of counsel,
            would result in fundamental injustice; or

            (3) that denial of relief would be contrary to a new rule
            of constitutional law under either the Constitution of
            the United States or the State of New Jersey.

            A ground could not reasonably have been raised in a
            prior proceeding only if defendant shows that the
            factual predicate for that ground could not have been
            discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable
            diligence.

            A denial of relief would be contrary to a new rule of
            constitutional law only if the defendant shows that the
            claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made
            retroactive to defendant's petition by the United States
            Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
            that was unavailable during the pendency of any prior
            proceedings.
                                                                            A-1064-22
                                        7
      The judge highlighted that we addressed defendant's "two-step procedure"

argument in our opinion, and therefore, the record does not support defendant's

claim that first trial counsel failed to raise this issue. Cortes, slip op. at 2. The

judge emphasized Sergeant Lemmerling asked defendant in his recorded

interview: "'You are hiding your car from me. You had said you were hiding —

because you said [Garcia] knows what your car is like, that's why you parked it

in the other spot rather, where you usually park. Why are you hiding your car

from me?'" And that the "mention of a comment" by defendant at a prior time

and "a bare assertion" of another question by the officer does not, standing alone,

indicate a two-step interrogation technique was used that would require

suppression of the statements. The judge also noted that in any event, the motion

to suppress would not have been successful; hence, trial counsel was correct not

to bring it.

      Regarding defendant's pro se arguments, the judge found they lacked

merit, and his first and second trial counsel did not fail to communicate,

investigate the case, or provide discovery. The judge determined "the evidence

is overwhelming that defendant's claim is a falsehood," and cited to the motion

to withdraw transcript where the motion judge asked defendant's first attorney

if defendant was provided with discovery prior to entering his guilty plea. First

                                                                              A-1064-22
                                         8
counsel responded defendant "was provided with the full discovery ," and he

ultimately discussed "[nineteen] videos" with him in connection with the

investigation. The judge underscored we previously addressed the allegation

that defendant's first trial counsel did not communicate with him in our opinion,

Cortes, slip op. at 22, and "these claims are nothing more than bald assertions."

      The judge rejected defendant's claim that his plea was not voluntary and

noted the procedure when the plea was accepted was "paramount" because

defendant acknowledged he initialed each page of the plea form, that he had read

and discussed the plea form with trial counsel, acknowledged trial counsel

answered his questions, and he was satisfied with counsel's advice. At the plea

hearing, the judge explained to defendant that the maximum sentence for

aggravated manslaughter was "thirty years in prison" with a minimum sentence

of "ten years," and that defendant should only accept the plea deal if the

recommended sentence of sixteen years was "acceptable" to him.

      Because Judge Buck found first counsel's performance was "not deficient

in this regard," he concluded that second trial counsel was therefore not

ineffective for failing to allege ineffectiveness of first trial counsel during

defendant's plea withdrawal hearing because it was already raised by first trial

counsel. A memorializing order was entered. This appeal followed.

                                                                           A-1064-22
                                       9
Defendant presents the following arguments for our consideration:

     POINT I

     DEFENDANT      RECEIVED    INEFFECTIVE
     ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL AT HIS PLEA
     WITHDRAWAL HEARING FOR COUNSEL'S
     FAILURE TO ARGUE HE WAS PREJUDICED BY
     AN        IMPERMISSIBLE       TWO-STEP
     INTERROGATION.

     (A) APPLICABLE LAW.

     (B) TRIAL COUNSEL AT DEFENDANT'S MOTION
     TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA WAS INEFFECTIVE
     FOR FAILING TO ARGUE COUNSEL, WHO
     REPRESENTED HIM AT HIS MIRANDA HEARING,
     FAILED TO ARGUE HE WAS SUBJECTED TO AN
     IMPERMISSIBLE TWO-STEP INTERROGATION.

     POINT II

     APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
     NOT ARGUING THAT DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE
     WAS    EXCESSIVE,   AND   ALSO,    THAT
     DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO APPLICATION
     OF MITIGATING FACTOR [FOURTEEN], THAT HE
     WAS UNDER THE AGE OF [TWENTY-SIX] AT
     THE TIME THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED.

     POINT III

     A REMAND TO THE TRIAL COURT IS REQUIRED
     BECAUSE      DEFENDANT'S    ARGUMENTS
     REGARDING INEFFECTIVE OF ASSISTANCE OF
     APPELLATE COUNSEL WERE NOT CONSIDERED
     AS THE COURT LEFT THEM UNADDRESSED IN
     ITS OPINION.

                                                                    A-1064-22
                               10
                                        II.

      We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing

this appeal. PCR serves the same function as a federal writ of habeas corpus.

State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). When petitioning for PCR, a

defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he

is entitled to the requested relief. Ibid. To sustain this burden, the petitioner

must allege and articulate specific facts, "which, if believed, would provide the

court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell,

126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

      To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must

demonstrate: (1) "counsel's performance was deficient"; and (2) "the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984); see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the

Strickland two-pronged analysis in New Jersey). "That is, the defendant must

establish, first, that 'counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness' and, second, that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.'" State v. Alvarez, 473 N.J. Super. 448, 455 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).

                                                                              A-1064-22
                                        11
       When assessing Strickland's first prong, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's

performance must be highly deferential." 466 U.S. at 669. "Merely because a

trial strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective." State v. Bey,

161 N.J. 233, 251 (1999). Thus, a trial court "must indulge a strong presumption

that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance," and "the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action [by counsel] 'might be considered sound

trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350

U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).

       Under Strickland's second prong, the defendant must show "the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. That is, "counsel's errors were

so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable." Ibid. It is insufficient for the defendant to show the errors "had some

conceivable effect on the outcome." Id. at 693. Ultimately, "[a]n error by

counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the

judgment of a criminal proceeding if [it] had no effect on the judgment." Id. at

691.

       The same Strickland/Fritz standard applies to the assessment of

ineffective assistance of counsel claims asserted against appellate counsel. See

                                                                            A-1064-22
                                       12
State v. Gaither, 396 N.J. Super. 508, 513 (App. Div. 2007). Appellate counsel

does not have an obligation to "advance every argument, regardless of merit,

urged by the appellant," Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985), but "should

bring to the court's attention controlling law that will vindicate [the appellant] 's

cause." State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 612 (2014). Failure to do so constitutes

ineffective assistance if there is a "reasonable probability" that the outcome of

the appeal would have been different. Id. at 617. Thus, to prove ineffectiveness,

a defendant must prove an underlying claim to relief is meritorious. State v.

Morrison, 215 N.J. Super. 540, 547-51 (1987).

      Further, "[a]ny factual assertion that provides the predicate for a claim of

relief must be made by an affidavit or certification pursuant to Rule 1:4-4 and

based upon personal knowledge of the declarant before the court may grant an

evidentiary hearing." R. 3:22-10(c); see State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.

154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).

      Short of obtaining immediate relief, a defendant may show that an

evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the factual record in connection with

an ineffective assistance claim. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63. The mere raising

of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing.

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. Rather, "[i]f the court perceives that holding

                                                                              A-1064-22
                                        13
an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the defendant

is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State

v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (citations omitted).

      The PCR court should grant an evidentiary hearing only when: "(1) the

defendant establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR; (2) the court

determines that there are disputed issues of material fact that cannot be resolved

by review of the existing record; and (3) the court determines that an evidentiary

hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J.

Super. 609, 623 (App. Div. 2023) (citing State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354

(2013)).

      "Where, as here, the PCR court has not conducted an evidentiary hearing,

we review its legal and factual determinations de novo." State v. Aburoumi, 464

N.J. Super. 326, 338 (App. Div. 2020); see als

      o State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540-41 (2013). However, "we review under

the abuse of discretion standard the PCR court's determination to proceed

without an evidentiary hearing." State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401

(App. Div. 2013) (citing Marshall, 148 N.J. at 157-58).

                                                                             A-1064-22
                                       14
                                        III.

      We next apply these foundational principles to the matter before us.

Defendant argues he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he established

a prima facie case that his first trial counsel failed to raise the two -step issue,

and his second trial counsel was ineffective by failing to argue defendant was

prejudiced by an impermissible two-step interrogation. Defendant's arguments

are belied by the record.

      Prior to the Miranda hearing, defendant's first trial counsel submitted a

brief in which he argued, "[d]efendant was promised that he would be allowed

to return home if he told them [the officers] 'what they wanted to hear' prior to

being advised of his Miranda rights and without the benefit of [c]ounsel.

Accordingly, the [d]efendant's statements must be suppressed."

      Moreover, during the Miranda hearing, first trial counsel cross-examined

Sergeant Lemmerling, who was accused of the impermissible two-step

interrogation as follows:

            FIRST TRIAL COUNSEL: And prior to him going into
            that interrogation room, you had a conversation with
            my client prior to this statement that we saw, the
            videotaped statement?

            SERGEANT LEMMERLING: No.

                                                                              A-1064-22
                                        15
FIRST TRIAL COUNSEL: You had no conversations
with him whatsoever?

SERGEANT LEMMERLING: Other than probably
telling him we're going to take a statement from him,
no.

FIRST TRIAL COUNSEL: Okay. So if you had
conversations you're saying that that's what you would
have said to him?

SERGEANT LEMMERLING: Correct.

FIRST TRIAL COUNSEL: Okay. So there is a
possibility that you had a conversation with him prior
to the taped statement, but if it was that's what—
that's—

SERGEANT LEMMERLING: It would have been
limited to, go sit in the room, we’re going to take a
statement from you later.

FIRST TRIAL COUNSEL:              Were—Did you or
anybody in your vicinity prior to going into that
interview room tell [defendant] that if he were to make
a statement that they would let him go that day?

SERGEANT LEMMERLING: No.

FIRST TRIAL COUNSEL: So you didn't witness it;
correct?

SERGEANT LEMMERLING: No.

FIRST TRIAL COUNSEL: And you didn't make that
representation to my client?

SERGEANT LEMMERLING: Absolutely not.

                                                          A-1064-22
                         16
Defendant's first trial counsel also questioned defendant directly during the

Miranda hearing:

           FIRST TRIAL COUNSEL: So inside the car, the
           vehicle while you were being transported to the police
           station prior to the statement that was in the videotape,
           there were—you were being asked questions by
           Sergeant Lemmerling?

           DEFENDANT:        Yeah. We were talking about the
           robbery.

           FIRST TRIAL COUNSEL:           While you were in the
           backseat of the vehicle?

           DEFENDANT: Yes.

           FIRST TRIAL COUNSEL: Were you handcuffed at
           the time?

           DEFENDANT: Yes I was handcuffed. I was andcuffed
           the whole time.

           FIRST TRIAL COUNSEL: Okay. And then you arrive
           at the headquarters, at the police station.

           DEFENDANT: Yeah.

At the end of the Miranda hearing, the motion judge determined:

           As far as credibility goes, I have some problems with
           . . . defendant's answers with regard to his version of
           the events. You know often the truth is somewhere in
           the middle. But I find a lot of what he said to be very
           biased and skewed, and unrealistic.            He was
           downplaying his understanding of rights. I don't
           believe that. In other words there were too many

                                                                       A-1064-22
                                     17
            denials in his testimony. That in my mind brought into
            question [h]is overall credibility. On a homicide
            investigation, whether an investigating officer actually
            made false promises to somebody, I don't see it
            happening. I don't see it happening quite frankly. He's
            going with them, and he did go with them in custody,
            in handcuffs. And I just don't see it happening, tell us
            what we want to hear and we'll let you go home. And
            even if some police officer uttered such a ridiculous
            statement or remark to this defendant, there is no way
            an individual as intelligent as [defendant] would put
            any stock into it. Clearly, by how he interacted with
            these police, he was not going to go for such a thing.

      Judge Buck noted "[t]he opinion of the Appellate Division supports that

this point was made," because we stated "[d]efendant asserted that the officers

began questioning him in the police car on the way to headquarters." Thus, not

only did first trial counsel litigate the two-step issue, it was also addressed on

direct appeal.

      We agree with Judge Buck that defendant has not established a prima facie

case for ineffective assistance of first trial counsel relative to the two -step

procedure. Moreover, because first trial counsel clearly raised this issue, it was

unnecessary for second trial counsel to argue defendant's statement was

inadmissible as the result of a purported two-step procedure. Defendant's claim

that his second trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue his statement

was inadmissible and would have warranted a withdrawal of his guilty plea,

                                                                            A-1064-22
                                       18
gone to trial, and won his case, is flawed. The two-step procedure argument was

unequivocally raised when the Miranda issue was heard and adjudicated.

      Defendant's assertion is simply untrue. And, his supposition that he would

have gone to trial or negotiated a better plea deal is a bald assertion based upon

pure speculation. Our de novo review of the record convinces us that defendant

failed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz analysis. We agree with

Judge Buck that defendant failed to show any deficient prejudice under the

second prong. See Marshall, 148 N.J. at 89, 157 (citations omitted).

                                       IV.

      Next, defendant contends his appellate counsel was ineffective for not

arguing his sentence was excessive. In his merits brief, defendant argues: (1)

mitigating factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7) ("[t]he defendant has no history

of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a

substantial period of time before the commission of the present offense"), should

not have been given little weight; (2) mitigating factor eight, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(b)(8) ("[t]he defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to

recur") should have been given weight; and (3) mitigating factor two, N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(b)(2) ("[t]he defendant did not contemplate that the defendant's conduct

would cause or threaten serious harm") should have applied.

                                                                            A-1064-22
                                       19
      In State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984), our Supreme Court identified

the relevant criteria for our review of a sentence:

            [A]n appellate court can (a) review sentences to
            determine if the legislative policies . . . were violated;
            (b) review the aggravating and mitigating factors found
            . . . to determine whether those factors were based upon
            competent credible evidence in the record, and (c)
            determine whether, even though the court sentenced in
            accordance with the guidelines, nevertheless the
            application of the guidelines to the facts of th[e] case
            make the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock
            the judicial conscience.

      Here, the sentencing judge conducted a thorough analysis of the

aggravating and mitigating factors and determined the aggravating factors

substantially outweigh the mitigating factors. Consequently, appellate counsel's

failure to argue defendant's sentence was excessive was not ineffective.

      For example, regarding mitigating factor seven, the sentencing judge

stated:

            [T]his mitigating factor says that the defendant has no
            history of prior delinquence or criminal activity, or has
            led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time
            before the commission of the present offense. It doesn't
            say "has no prior convictions." It says "has no history
            of prior criminal activity." Well, we know that
            [defendant] has a lengthy history of criminal activity, if
            only the regular purchase of marijuana to . . . support
            his own habit.

                                                                           A-1064-22
                                       20
            So no prior record? I think that can be considered a
            mitigation. But when you factor in what the actual
            mitigating factor says, it doesn't say anything about
            having convictions. And this is documented and
            uncontroverted that he was involved in criminal
            activity. Now, maybe not the most egregious criminal
            activity. I know [the prosecutor] takes the . . . position
            that he was a drug dealer, but I really don't—it's kind of
            speculative. But . . . it's undisputed that he was a drug
            user. And by the way, being a drug user, a regular,
            daily user of marijuana, what that does is—it's people
            like that who keep drug dealers in business. And when
            drug dealers are in business, violent crime is likely to
            occur.

            So I would find that mitigating factor applies (sic) to—
            at least to the extent that he's got no prior record.
            However, I . . . ascribe minimal weight to . . . mitigating
            factor seven because it is clearly documented that
            [defendant] does have a documented substantial history
            of being involved in criminal activity[] . . . albeit
            perhaps not the most serious criminal activity, but
            nonetheless, it is criminal activity. And it was, for a
            substantial period of time before the commission of the
            present offense. That's documented in . . . the [Pre-
            Sentence Investigation Report]. He's been using
            marijuana on a daily basis—I think since age [sixteen].
            All the way up through the incident offense; on a daily
            basis. So I will ascribe some weight, but it's minimal
            weight to mitigating factor seven.

Defendant argues "[t]his was in error because the sentencing judge used

conjecture to impute a 'lengthy history of criminal activity' as to . . . defendant

in assessing the weight the factor's application." However, mitigating factor

seven applies when "[t]he defendant has no history of prior delinquency or

                                                                             A-1064-22
                                       21
criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time

before the commission of the present offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7)

(emphasis added). The record is clear the sentencing judge considered and

attributed weight to mitigating factor seven. We discern no error.

      As to mitigating factor eight, the sentencing judge found this factor

inapplicable because "eight flies in the face of number three" and determined

defendant was likely to re-offend. The sentencing judge attributed "extreme"

weight to factor three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) ("[t]he risk that the defendant will

commit another offense") and concluded:

             So I do think there is a substantial risk that this
             defendant would re-offend. [A]nd when I say re-
             offend, I mean re-offend with a violent crime; a crime
             of violence. He's prone to violence and what sets his
             fuse off doesn't take much. And he's demonstrated that
             he is willing and able to go to extremes in the interest
             of revenge or retaliation, including using a nine-
             millimeter handgun against someone who he perceives,
             he perceives, wronged him. And that tells me that the
             risk of . . . re-offense, in . . . the crime of violence, is
             very high. [A]nd the prosecutor points it out in his brief
             and he's right. It's the weight of these factors, not the
             number of facts. And aggravating factor number three
             is an extremely weighty aggravating factor.

      As for aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), ("[t]he need for

deterring the defendant and others from violating the law") the sentencing judge

explained:

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            So specific deterrence is a very weighty factor. But
            general deterrence in this case is huge, and it's
            extremely weighty. In other words, the word needs to
            get around that [defendant] got the maximum under the
            plea agreement for using a firearm and . . . killing this
            woman. [A]nd therefore, other people, perhaps his
            associates, people who know him, other people who—
            who may be inclined to commit such atrocious acts,
            may think twice when they see that you know what?
            You arm yourself with a handgun and go after
            somebody and kill people, you're going to get the full
            weight of the law. And that's general deterrence. And
            . . . that's an extremely weighty aggravating factor.
            Again, I think that the . . . full impact of this sentence,
            . . . the [sixteen] years, is necessary for the protection
            of the public as long as possible. And also to get the
            word out that this type of violent crime is going to be
            met with the harshest penalties. And that's aggravating
            factor number nine, general deterrence.

We are convinced the sentencing judge conducted a thorough analysis of the

aggravating and mitigating factors, which is supported by the substantial

credible evidence in the record.

      Appellate counsel does not have an obligation to "advance every

argument, regardless of merit, urged by the appellant," Evitts, 469 U.S. at 394,

but "should bring to the court's attention controlling law that will vindicate [the

appellant]'s cause." O'Neil, 219 N.J. at 612.

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     Defendant was made aware prior to sentencing that he could receive a

sixteen-year sentence. At the plea allocution hearing, the following colloquy

ensued:

           THE COURT: . . . and I told you aggravated
           manslaughter—so let's say you took the case to trial and
           the jury came back not guilty of murder but guilty of
           aggravated manslaughter, right?            You'd fall for
           sentencing anywhere in the range for aggravated
           manslaughter of [ten] to [thirty] years. Obviously your
           lawyer would be arguing for the [ten]. He may even
           argue that you be sentenced in the second-degree range,
           [five] to [ten], which he could make that. State would
           be arguing for the high end, the highest end being
           [thirty]. In this plea agreement they're saying they will
           ask for no more than [sixteen]. All right. That doesn't
           mean your lawyer—so now, instead of the range being
           [ten] to [thirty], it's [ten] to [sixteen]. So that doesn't
           mean your lawyer can't argue for the [ten], or even
           argue that you be sentenced in the second-degree range.
           It just means that it's capped, you could get no more
           than [sixteen]. So, between now and sentencing, you
           could hope that you get less sentencing, but here's what
           I will tell you. You should assume the worse, because
           if you go into this thinking you're gonna get less than
           [sixteen], then you do get the—because you sign on for
           [sixteen]—

           DEFENDANT: Yes.

           THE COURT:—and you do get the [sixteen], you're
           gonna be—disappointed.

           DEFENDANT: I understand.

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            THE COURT: If you do better than [sixteen], okay,
            you get better than [sixteen]. But I would tell you don't
            even take the deal unless the [sixteen] is acceptable
            because that's certainly within the realm of
            possibilities. We on the same page?

            DEFENDANT: Yes.

            THE COURT: All right. So, this language . . . I mean
            it's written in here, but it's really implied. This would
            imply even if it wasn't written here. Where it says
            [d]efense will argue for a minimum time at sentencing,
            no other promises—well, whether or not that was
            written here, he would still be doing that, arguing for
            the minimum time at the time of sentencing. Okay?
            But I just want to make sure that you understand that
            you are exposed to the full [sixteen]. You understand
            that?

            DEFENDANT: Yeah, I understand that.

            THE COURT: And you should expect the worse. In
            other words, I would tell you don't take this deal unless
            the [sixteen] is acceptable. You're agreeable?

            DEFENDANT: Yes.

An excessive sentence argument would have been meritless based upon our

review of the record, and therefore, defendant was not prejudiced by appellate

counsel's failure to raise that argument.

      Finally, defendant argues the matter should be remanded for resentencing

and application of youth mitigating factor twenty-six. Defendant asserts this

factor should be applied retroactively. However, our Supreme Court rejected

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such an argument in State v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 97 (2022).            Therefore,

defendant's argument lacks merit.

      Based upon our review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied

that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of ineffectiveness of trial

or appellate counsel within the Strickland/Fritz test warranting an evidentiary

hearing. We are further satisfied that all of defendant's arguments raised on PCR

are either procedurally barred or without substantive merit.        Defendant's

arguments raised on appeal were more than adequately addressed by the PCR

judge and do not warrant additional discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm

substantially for the reasons articulated by Judge Buck in his thoughtful and

thoroughly-written opinion.

      Affirmed.

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