Court Opinion

ID: 9854097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:00:49.316124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:55.376320
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in the well-reasoned opinion of the majority. I part company only on the issue of retroactivity.
It is truly heroic to overrule a long line of cases originating 75 years ago (Estate of Harris (1915) 169 Cal. 725 [147 P. 967]). Such action is understandable, however, when a contemporary view of the issue compels a more rational approach.
But this newly devised concept does not justify reflecting on the validity of action taken by countless persons in reliance on numerous decisions by this court and by Courts of Appeal over the past seven and a half decades.
Whatever may be the logic of the proposition that overruling is generally retroactive, Witkin points out, “the retrospective effect of an overruling decision can cause a great deal of harm to innocent persons. And it would seem that the court, which by its former erroneous decision induced the conduct or action now condemned, ought to do something to protect such persons. The solution which has attracted considerable support is for the reviewing court, in circumstances where retroactivity would cause great hardship, to make its decision expressly prospective; i.e., overrule the prior case for the future, but follow it in the case at hand. That this practice is constitutional was authoritatively declared in Great Northern Ry., Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. (1932) 287 U.S. 358 .. . .” (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 813, p. 795.)
In Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 973 [258 Cal.Rptr. 592, 772 P.2d 1059], a four-to-three majority of the court held Foley v. *466Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654 [254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373] to be retroactive substantially on two grounds. First, it was said that the law was unsettled because “Foley did not address an area in which this court had previously issued a definitive decision” (italics added), as distinguished from “a consistent line of Court of Appeal cases.” (Newman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 986.) The majority implied that a rule of law is not determined by Courts of Appeal, but only by an opinion of this court, a unique theory. Second, the Court of Appeals’ “doctrine stood for less than six years . . . .” (Ibid.) The implication is that there was not lengthy reliance on the earlier authority.
Neither of those factors applies to the instant case. The concept being overruled originated not with Courts of Appeal, but with this court. And it was not a mere six years ago or less, but seventy-five years ago.
There are at least four opinions of this court, not Courts of Appeal, that held there is a distinction between real and personal property in joint tenancy. (Estate of Harris, supra, 169 Cal. 725; Fish v. Security-First Nat. Bank (1948) 31 Cal.2d 378 [189 P.2d 10]; Estate of Harris (1937) 9 Cal.2d 649 [72 P.2d 873]; and In re Kessler (1932) 217 Cal. 32 [17 P.2d 117].) Note that all of those authorities are considerably more than six years old.
Courts of Appeal have dutifully followed this court in a long series of cases on which the bench, bar and public were entitled to rely. These include: Bliss v. Martin (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 500 [169 P.2d 61]; Estate of Drucker (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 509 [199 Cal.Rptr. 345]; Estate of Zeisel (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 516 [192 Cal.Rptr. 25]; Taylor v. Crocker-Citizens Nat. Bank (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 682 [65 Cal.Rptr. 771]; Cordasco v. Scalero (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 95 [21 Cal.Rptr. 339]; Doran v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 790 [182 P.2d 630]; Wallace v. Riley (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 654 [74 P.2d 807]; Lagar v. Erickson (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 365 [56 P.2d 1287]; Estate of McCoin (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 480 [50 P.2d 114].
The majority declare it seems likely that few persons relied on the prior rule. They cite no empirical data and I doubt there are any to confirm or refute their ipse dixit declaration. On the contrary, it seems more likely to me that innumerable persons would have been advised by their attorneys that the law in California had been settled by a long series of cases beginning with the highest court in the state. Certainly they would have been justified—indeed compelled—to act consistently with prevailing authority.
How many persons may be affected by the new rule this court pronounces today is wholly speculative. The only way they can be protected without *467protracted litigation, after relying on what the judiciary has been declaring for the better part of this century, is to make our current view of the law applicable to this case and thereafter prospective.