Court Opinion

ID: 9470457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:06:57.869895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:54.947843
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
Ronald Briece’s death led to this inter-pleader in which his widow and parents make conflicting claims for life insurance proceeds. Shortly before his death, Ronald had removed Bonnie, his wife, as beneficiary on the policy and substituted his parents, William and Gladys Briece. Bonnie had earlier filed for divorce. Four days before Ronald’s death, Bonnie obtained a temporary restraining order directing that Ronald reinstate her as beneficiary. Ronald never knew of the order and did not comply with it. The district court1 awarded the insurance proceeds to the parents on cross-motions for summary judgment. Bonnie appeals claiming that the temporary ■restraining order was for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and that the equitable doctrine that considers as done that which ought to be done requires that she be reinstated as beneficiary. We affirm the judgment of the district court in favor of the parents, William and Gladys Briece.2
Ronald Briece was insured under a group term life insurance policy issued to his employer by Connecticut General Life Insurance Company. Bonnie and Ronald had been married for about six and one-half years when Bonnie filed a petition for dissolution of their marriage in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois on January 23, 1981. On April 20, 1981, Ronald removed Bonnie as beneficiary under the insurance policy and designated his parents as the new beneficiaries.
At a hearing in the divorce action on April 28, 1981, Bonnie learned of this change and also learned that Ronald was dying of lung cancer. Bonnie obtained from the circuit court an order directing Ronald to reinstate her as beneficiary. The court further ordered Ronald to maintain Bonnie as beneficiary until further order of the court, or until ten days from the date of the order.
Ronald died four days later without complying with the order. He was never personally aware of the order, although his attorney was present at the time it was entered.
Ronald’s parents filed this action against Connecticut General to recover death benefits under the insurance policy. Upon motion of Connecticut General, the district court added Bonnie as party defendant and ordered interpleader.
The district court, in granting summary judgment in favor of Ronald’s parents, held that under Illinois law the divorce action, and with it the interlocutory order of April 28, abated upon Ronald’s death. The court further found that Ronald lawfully exer*1047cised his right to change the beneficiary designation under his life insurance policy and that there were no equities in Bonnie’s favor to invalidate the change.
We affirm primarily for the reasons expressed by the district court.
In Illinois, an action for divorce abates upon the death of one of the parties prior to entry of a final decree of divorce. Bushnell v. Cooper, 289 Ill. 260, 124 N.E. 521 (1919); Howard v. Howard, 49 Ill.App.3d 441, 7 Ill.Dec. 303, 364 N.E.2d 464 (1977). The Illinois Supreme Court has reasoned that “death settle[s] the question of separation beyond all controversy,” and deprives the court of jurisdiction over the matter. Bushnell v. Cooper, 289 Ill. at 264,124 N.E. at 522.
During the dissolution proceeding in In re Estate of Chandler, 90 Ill.App.3d 674, 46 Ill.Dec. 46, 413 N.E.2d 486 (1980), the husband withdrew funds from a savings account held jointly with his wife and deposited the funds in a new account held jointly with his brother. The husband also changed the beneficiary under a trust account by crossing out the name of his wife and substituting the name of his brother one day prior to being served with an injunction preventing the transfer or dissipation of marital assets. The husband died before final judgment was entered in the divorce proceeding. The trial court awarded the wife half of the funds in each account as “marital property.” The appellate court held that it was error to award the funds as marital property because the divorce action abated upon the husband’s death, but the court upheld the award of half the joint savings account on another ground.3
As in Chandler, the divorce action between Ronald and Bonnie abated upon Ronald’s death. That Chandler involved an injunction preventing transfer of property, and this case involves a temporary restraining order ordering reinstatement of Bonnie as beneficiary is not significant. Following Chandler, we conclude that the temporary restraining order abated along with the divorce action upon Ronald’s death. Cf. Dietz v. Van Speybroeck, 225 Ill.App. 133 (1922) (a docket entry awarding the wife certain real estate in a divorce proceeding had no effect since the wife died before entry of a formal decree awarding her property).
Bonnie argues that the purpose of the temporary restraining order was to preserve the status quo. Under the circumstances of this case, however, with the death of Ronald only four days later, to so recognize the temporary restraining order would be to give it the effect of a final distribution of marital property. By its own terms it was to be in effect only until further order of the court or until ten days from' the date of its entry. Had Ronald lived, disposition of all the marital property would have been determined in the divorce action. The court would have considered the marital residence and, conceivably, the respective rights to the property of Bonnie, who was Ronald’s third wife and had been disabled in an automobile accident, and of the four children surviving Ronald by other marriages, who were grandchildren of appellees. The temporary restraining order should not be recognized as doing what the death of Ronald prevented the Illinois Circuit Court from doing in a final decree.
Bonnie argues that the equitable maxim “equity considers as done that which ought to be done” applies. We cannot conclude that the district court erred when it held that the maxim was inapplicable. When Ronald changed the beneficiary designation on his life insurance policy, he did so pursuant to the terms of the policy, and he was not violating any order of the court when he did so. Ronald never personally knew about the temporary restraining order which abated upon his death four days after it was entered.
*1048Bonnie relies upon cases which are distinguishable because they involved not only knowledge of a restraining order but defiance' of it. See Candler v. Donaldson 272 F.2d 374 (6th Cir.1959); Webb v. Webb, 375 Mich. 624, 134 N.W.2d 673 (1965). Other cases involved final divorce decrees and abatement was not an issue. See Travelers Insurance Co. v. Daniels, 667 F.2d 572 (7th Cir.1981); Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Watson, 71 Ill.App.3d 900, 28 Ill.Dec. 339, 390 N.E.2d 506 (1979). Bonnie does not contend that she obtained a vested interest in the insurance policy by virtue of a prior oral contract or property settlement agreement. See Thomson v. Thomson, 156 F.2d 581 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 793, 67 S.Ct. 370, 91 L.Ed. 679 (1946) (oral contract gave wife vested interest in husband’s insurance policy, abatement not in issue because parties made contract four years prior to filing of divorce action and because court granted divorce decree); Glover v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 664 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir.1981) (property settlement agreement gave wife vested interest in husband’s insurance policy, abatement not in issue because court granted divorce decree). Cf. In re Estate of Chandler, 90 Ill.App.3d 674, 46 Ill.Dec. 46, 413 N.E.2d 486 (1980) (husband could not withdraw all funds from savings account held jointly with his wife because evidence showed that both spouses contributed to the account and intended to share the property equally during the marriage).
Bonnie claims the proceeds because of her status as prior beneficiary, but this does not confer upon her a vested property interest or right. When the insured reserves the right to change a beneficiary, as Ronald did, the beneficiary has a mere expectancy during the insured’s lifetime. O’Toole v. Central Laborers’ Pension & Welfare Funds, 12 Ill.App.3d 995, 299 N.E.2d 392 (1973).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

. The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

. On appeal, this panel reversed the judgment of the district court. Briece v. Briece, No. 82-1104 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 1982). On February 22, 1983, we granted the parents’ petition for rehearing and vacated the earlier panel decision. After reconsideration, we now affirm the district court judgment.

. The presumption that either party to a joint savings account can withdraw the funds with-' out liability to the other party was rebutted by evidence that both spouses contributed to the account and intended to share the property equally during the marriage. 413 N.E.2d at 490.