Court Opinion

ID: 9653966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:00:28.7188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:04.110768
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). Sitting as District Court in the Solomon Case in 1923, I reached the conclusions that the question of the admissibility of Solomon’s conviction for keeping a house of ill fame, to *212discredit Ms testimony in Ms own behalf, was to be determined under the federal law; that it was admissible, although the offense was but a misdemeanor under Massachusetts law; and that the Massachusetts statutes excluding such conviction for a misdemeanor, if not within 5 years, had no bearing on the question in the federal court. Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 298, 300, 303, 12 S. Ct. 617, 36 L. Ed. 429; United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 365, 13 L. Ed. 1023; Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S. 467, 38 S. Ct. 148, 62 L. Ed. 406. I have never seen and do not now see any reason to change the views then formed. I think the great weight of authority is that conviction of a prior crime, whether called a misdemeanor or a felony, is, under federal criminal procedure, competent to affect the credibility of a witness. 2 Wigmore Ev. § 987 (4), 16 C. J. p. 55. Under Federal law, crimes are what, and only what, specific statutes make them. Prior to the Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1152, 18 USCA § 541, there was no federal definition of felony. By that statute all offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 1 year were made felomes. Nevertheless, under the Act of February 5,1917, 39 Stat. 880, 8 USCA § 144, illegal importation of aliens was by the express terms of the statute made a misdemeanor,- although punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 5 years. Solomon’s conviction of the offense of keeping a house of ill fame plainly involved more moral turpitude than many offenses falling under the Federal definition of felony. Moreover, it was, under the Massachusetts statute (Gen. Laws of Mass. c. 233, § 21), although made a misdemeanor, subject to a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding two years, and therefore fell within the Act of March 4, 1909, supra, as a felony under the Federal law. Compare In re Humphrey, 64 Cal. App. 572, 222 P. 366. Obviously the real reason for admitting evidence of conviction of crime is because it is, in general, a short and easy way of showing such a state of moral delinquency as to.discredit the veracity of the witness. Moral turpitude is the essence; the weight of a prior conviction, either of misdemeanor or of felony, depends mainly on the jury’s view of the moral turpitude of the crime of which the witness was convicted.
Without now reviewing the authorities which are mostly stated in Judge Kenyon’s learned opinion in Williams v. United States (C. C. A.) 3 F.(2d) 129, 41 A. L. R. 328, and in Merrill v. United States (C. C. A.) 6 F.(2d) 120, I cannot adopt the view that “the record of a conviction for a crime of the degree of a felony, at common law or statutory, may be introduced in evidence as affecting the credibility of a witness. Convictions of misdemeanors may not be so used.” But I repeat that Solomon’s conviction was of an offense both involving moral turpitude and made a felony under the statute of 1909, supra; and I think conviction of any crime of any degree is, in federal criminal trials, admissible to discredit a witness.
In tMs ease I think the ruling of the trial court may be regarded as not a reversible error. The evidence of prior conviction for selling liquor was put before the jury. But the court instructed the jury to disregard it. This would have but little practical effect. Moreover, prior conviction of selling liquor is not generally regarded as involving such moral turpitude as keeping a house of ill fame.
I concur, therefore, in affirming the judgment under the general authority of the amendment of 1919, of section 269 of the Judicial Code (28 USCA § 391).