Court Opinion

ID: 989443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:07:14.926375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:30.641428
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 93-6781

ERNEST EDWARD SIMPSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge.
(CR-81-397-S, CR-81-508-S, CA-93-1959)

Submitted: April 9, 1996

Decided: June 7, 1996

Before WIDENER and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER,
Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Gail Starling Marshall, Rapidan, Virginia, for Appellant. Lynne A.
Battaglia, United States Attorney, Kathleen O. Gavin, Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Ernest Edward Simpson pled guilty to (i) conspiring to transport in
interstate commerce falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited
securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988); (ii) transporting
such securities in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2314 (West Supp. 1996);
and (iii) aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). He
did not appeal. Twelve years later, Simpson filed a motion to vacate,
set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988), claiming
that his conviction for transporting securities was invalid because he
merely forged payees' endorsements on checks--which did not con-
stitute a "falsely made, forged, altered, counterfeited or spurious
security" within the meaning of § 2314--and because his counsel was
ineffective for failing to recognize that he was improperly convicted.
The district court summarily denied relief on Simpson's § 2255
motion, relying on United States v. Fontana, 948 F.2d 796 (1st Cir.
1991). Although the district court's reliance on Fontana is misplaced,
we affirm the summary dismissal on other grounds.

Simpson's primary contention on appeal is that the district court's
summary dismissal was improper because it did not plainly appear
from the record that he was not entitled to relief. The record before
the district court suggests that Simpson may only have forged payees'
endorsements. But the Government has filed on appeal the transcript
of Simpson's plea hearing conducted pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
Although the transcript was prepared two years after the district court
entered its judgment, we may take judicial notice of it. See
Rothenberg v. Security Management Co., 667 F.2d 958, 961 n.8 (11th
Cir. 1982); Pratt v. Kelly, 585 F.2d 692 (4th Cir. 1978). Our review
of the Rule 11 colloquy discloses that Simpson admitted that the
checks were forged in their entirety. We therefore find that Simpson's
conviction was proper. See United States v. Tyson, 690 F.2d 9, 14 (1st
Cir. 1982); United States v. Sciortino, 601 F.2d 680, 682-83 (2d Cir.
1979). Based on this finding, we also find no merit in Simpson's inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order summarily deny-
ing and dismissing Simpson's § 2255 motion. We dispense with oral

                    2
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pres-
ented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                    3