Court Opinion

ID: 9775437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:58:36.054707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:26.288964
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
I concur in the majority holding that Sue Cook is entitled to enforcement of the judgment rendered in Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.1984) awarding her 35% of Paul Cameron’s gross military retirement benefits. However, I dissent from the majority’s refusal to enforce the contingent increase award.
The majority concludes this lawsuit does not gmount to “further litigation” because Cameron acted in good faith in refusing to honor the divorce decree. I disagree. The decree states that 35% of gross military retirement benefits “is determined to be just and right only in the event that [Cook] receives the allotted share without further litigation other than a direct appeal....” Litigation is defined as a contest in the courts to enforce a right or seek a remedy. Black’s Law Dictionary 841 (5th ed. 1979). The purpose of litigation is to preserve and enforce rights and secure compliance with the laws of the state. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Hickman, 183 U.S. 53, 60, 22 S.Ct. 18, 21, 46 L.Ed. 78 (1901). Because Cameron failed to honor the divorce decree, Cook was forced to file this lawsuit. By definition, she was forced to pursue further litigation whether Cameron acted in good faith or not. Consequently, she is entitled to 45% of Cameron’s gross military retirement pay.
Cameron failed to properly challenge the contingent provision in his direct appeal of the divorce. Because he could have secured review of the provision in the divorce appeal, res judicata bars him from litigating that issue in this lawsuit. Garcia v. RC Colar-7-Up Bottling Co., 667 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex.1984).
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold Cook is entitled to enforcement of the entire divorce decree including the contingent provision.