Court Opinion

ID: 9738758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:02:05.771602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.273791
License: Public Domain

Carter, J.,
concurring.
I am in accord with the majority opinion in this case. The treatment of the controlling point by the dissent is, however, subject to challenge.
I quite agree that chapter 49, Laws 1907, now sections 30-101 to 30-108, R. R. S. 1943, was a new law that made sweeping changes in the law of descent in this state, It has made cases decided prior to its enactment in*636applicable as to the competency of witnesses under the dead man’s statute, section 25-1202, R. R. S. 1943. I submit that the following sentence in the dissent is not a correct statement of the law: “However, it left nonresidents, both husbands- and wives, in exactly the same situation they were in previous to 1907.”
Section 30-101, R. R. S. 1943, provides in part: “When any person shall die, leaving a husband or wife surviving, all the real estate of which the deceased was seized -of an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage, or in which the deceased was possessed of an interest either legal or equitable at the time of his or her death, which has not been lawfully conveyed by the husband and wife while residents of this state, or by the deceased while the husband or wife was a nonresident of this- state, which has not been sold under execution or judicial sale * * * shall descend * * * in the manner following: * * Reduced to a simple statement the statute says when any person shall die leaving a husband or wife surviving who has not conveyed his estate by the method prescribed, the estate shall descend in the manner therein provided. The statute does not differentiate between residents and nonresidents except as to the method of conveyance of the spouse’s interest. Where no conveyance has been made, as here, the spouse of the nonresident title owner has an identical marital interest in his estate in this state, as does- the spouse of a resident title owner. The words “When any person shall die” make it clear that residence or nonresidence of the spouse is not a material factor in determining the interest of a spouse under the statute. The interests of resident and nonresident spouses are identical and consequently the dead man’s statute should be identically applied.
It is- true, of course, that one of the means of deciding whether or not a person has an interest in real estate is to determine if he would be required to join in a conveyance of the property. It is not exclusive, however, *637nor is it always a controlling factor. The bare legal title is often in one person while the beneficial interest is in another as in the case of a trustee, executor, or agent with power to convey. In a suit for the benefit of one owning only the equitable title against the representative of a deceased person, the equitable owner would be barred under the dead man’s statute even though he would not be required to join in a conveyance of the property.
It is contended in the dissenting opinion that, where the interest of the spouse might be defeated by the conveyance of the owner alone, the spouse has only an interest if the owner is still seized of the property at his death, in other words, her interest is merely speculative. This is just as true as to a resident spouse. If this reasoning is sound, the interests of resident and nonresident spouses are all speculative under the plain language of the act in that the marital interest of each might be defeated by a sale under execution or judicial sale. The possibility of a conveyance by a nonresident husband is no more speculative than the possibility of a sale under execution or judicial sale.
I submit that under section 30-101, R. R. S. 1943, a nonresident spouse of a nonresident title owner of an estate in this state has a marital interest in the estate and the quoted statement to the contrary in the dissenting opinion has no foundation in fact. It would be strange indeed if a witness could be a competent or incompetent witness through the simple expedient of moving his residence across a state line. It is direct legal interest that determines the competency of a witness under the dead man’s statute, not where he has his residence.
Judges Yeager, Messmore, and Brower join in this concurrence.