Court Opinion

ID: 9601513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:46:07.602613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:30.696681
License: Public Domain

LA PRADE, Justice
(dissenting).
I do not agree with the determination made by the majority members of this court for the reason that the statutory interpretation made is not reasonably permitted under the statutes. The majority conclude by saying:
“Unquestionably, our liquor legislation envisages participation by the general public in the administration of the liquor laws. We believe the more reasonable interpretation of the Act is that the scope of this participation is not limited to protesting to the local governing body or the superintendent, but extends to initiating appeals to the superior court from the orders of the superintendent. Granting the right of appeal to the applicant while denying it to the citizens would run counter to the spirit of strict regulation permeating the whole of the Act. The persons upon whose doorsteps the liquor business will operate, and whose businesses, homes, and families will be affected thereby, are given the same rights as those who seek to engage in the liquor traffic.”
As pointed out in our case of Lane v. Ferguson, 62 Ariz. 184, 156 P.2d 236, 238, in a unanimous opinion that I authored for this court, it is said:
“ * * * that the legislature, in creating the Department of Liquor Licenses and Control, intended to create and establish state-wide control over the traffic in intoxicating liquors. The need of its regulation and control is undisputed. In a search for a system of effective, impartial, and uniform regulation and control of this traffic, our legislature first enacted Chapter 76, Sess.Laws 1933, then Chapter 46, Sess. Laws 1935, then later Chapter 64, Sess. Laws 1939, being Chapter 72, A.C.A. 1939. This system is a departure from that which had long existed here prior to the advent of national prohibition. Then the regulation and control of every phase of the liquor traffic was vested exclusively in local governing bodies. Running through the entire act is the central idea that the traffic in intoxicating liquors is a problem that is state-wide; and correspondingly that only state supervision and control can adequately cope with it. The superintendent is charged with the administration and enforcement of the act” (Emphasis supplied.)
Then followed this conclusion:
“The only remnant of local participation in the administration of -the liquor traffic is contained in section 72-105, A.C.A.1939. This section specifi-' cally provides that notice of the appli*172cation for a liquor license must be noticed on the premises, ‘with a statement requiring any person opposed to the issuance of the license to file his written objections with the clerk.’ ”
At the time the Lane case was decided any person could file objections with the local boards. By the 1952 amendment the right to object has been circumscribed and only those persons who reside, own or lease property within a half-mile radius of the proposed premises to be licensed can voice objections. By this amendment the statute for the first time has recognized proponents for the issuance of a license or transfer thereof, and if they live within a half-mile radius they may file written arguments in favor of the application.
I am still of the opinion that all of the statutes relating to the licensing and traffic in liquors demonstrate that its regulation and control is a matter of state-wide concern, and that its entire supervision and control is lodged in the Department of Liquor Licenses and Control under the supervision of the superintendent thereof. The number of licenses to be issued is fixed by statute, Section 72-107, A.C.A.1939. As to whether a license should issue in the first instance is solely within the discretion of the superintendent, subject to review, as provided in Section 72C109(b) (id.) as amended. In determining whether a license should issue the superintendent is mandated to look into the capability, qualifications and reliability of the applicant, and shall determine whether the public convenience requires and will be substantially served by the issuance of such license. Section 72-108 (id.) as amended. In determining these matters he shall receive the advice of the city council where it is proposed that the license will be located in an incorporated city or town; if outside of an incorporated city or town the advice will come from the board of supervisors. The advice in either instance will be in the nature of (1) an approval, (2) a disapproval, or (3) a submission without recommendation. Section 72-105 (id.) as amended.
It is only when the governing body recommends that a license do not issue that it is compelled to insert a statement of the reasons therefor. In the instant case, according to the allegations for the writ of prohibition, the governing body recommended the transfer of the license. The governing body was not required to furnish a statement of its reasons for recommending the transfer. Nevertheless the statute provides that
“ * * * All petitions submitted to the governing body within the twenty (20) day period for the filing of protest shall be transmitted to the superintendent with the certified copy of the order.” Sec. 72-105 (b) as amended, (id.) (Emphasis supplied.)
According to the petition for the writ, it appears that the superintendent had before him the fact that there was a petition containing approximately 117 names opposing *173the transfer, some of whom did not live within a half-mile radius of the building into which it was proposed to transfer the license and business, and hence were not entitled to object, together with another petition containing approximately 294 signatures of residents, all of whom lived within the half-mile radius, petitioning that the transfer be allowed on the ground that public convenience required it.
By the provisions of subparagraph (d) of this section, when the superintendent receives the order from the governing body he is required to “consider such order together with other facts in his possession relating to the qualifications of the applicant.” This section does not specifically require the superintendent to examine the petitions for or against. Since the statute requires that petitions for or against be transmitted with the order of the governing body it is fair to assume that it was intended that the superintendent should take cognizance of the petitions and examine them. Presumably he might get some information from such an examination in assisting him in exercising his discretion. So far it would appear from the statutes that petitioners for or against had not acquired any status in the proceedings except to give advice to the local boards, who will transmit that advice to the officer who is ultimately to decide the matter as the state •official in whom the legislature, in the overall administration and regulation to the traffic in liquor, has vested the ultimate discretion. It is when we come to subdivision (c) of Section 72-109 (id.) as amended that any claim can be made that objectors are parties to the proceedings for all purposes including the right to perfect appeal. This subdivision (c) in part provides :
“The decision of the superintendent shall be final in any matter relating to the issuance, transfer, renewal, suspension, or revocation of a license, unless the person aggrieved, within ten (10) days after the date of the decision, files an appeal with the superior court of the county in which the licensed premises are located. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.)
I am satisfied that the statute, in giving, the right of appeal to the “aggrieved person” refers exclusively to the applicant for the issuance, transfer or renewal of a license and also exclusively applies to a licensee who has had his license suspended or revoked by the superintendent. Subsection (b) of this section provides for the suspension or revocation of licenses after a hearing. A large segment of the public might be inconvenienced by the fact that a license had been suspended or revoked and wholly in disagreement with the announced reasons for suspension or revocation. But can it be said that they are “aggrieved persons” within the meaning of the appeal statute? Can it be said that those 294 persons who were recommending that the transfer of license be granted for their con*174venience can be classified as aggrieved persons within the appeal statute? The majority would have to answer this query in the affirmative if they were to be consistent. The ridiculousness of an affirmative answer is apparent. The majority opinion has overlooked this possible situation and is wholly concerned with the fact that there are objectors who are sorely aggrieved and hence entitled to appeal. If the residents in a community who want a liquor license in their neighborhood cannot be parties to an appeal, then how can objectors become parties to an appeal? In the supervision and control of the liquor traffic the state has provided for an over-all supervision and entrusted the superintendent with the authority and discretion to supervise it according to the dictates of the statutes. The statute here provides for a limited portion of the public to be heard and to give their advice and recommendations to the superintendent to assist him in reaching an honest conclusion as to whether the public convenience will be subserved by the issuance or transfer of a license. When the superintendent has exercised his discretion he has exercised the discretion of the state. When the statutes do not provide for the privilege of appeal to objectors or proponents the right does not exist. The legislature has provided' that the right of appeal vests in “the aggrieved person”. The aggrieved person, for the purpose of an appeal, can only be the applicant for a license or a licensee who has had his license suspended or revoked. The resort to rules of statutory construction and definitions to the effect that the singular includes the plural and the granting of an appeal to an aggrieved person must be interpreted to mean that “person” means "persons”, and that persons can only refer to objectors and hence objectors are aggrieved persons, is most tenuous.
That there are persons who are unhappy, dissatisfied, provoked or “aggrieved” by the decision of the superintendent does not make them the aggrieved person upon whom the right of appeal is conferred. The statutes contemplate that the superintendent should be advised of the wishes and judgment of both proponents and objectors but they do not contemplate that because they are unhappy or dissatisfied that their dissatisfaction takes on the stature of making them parties with the right to invoke the solemn processes of the Superior Court to review the decisions of the state superintendent. In the first instance the citizens whose interests are to be affected by the issuance or denial of a license, make known their desires in the matter by advising the local boards in whom some discretion is vested. The local boards in turn then transmit their advice by an order, thus necessarily exercising some of the state’s sovereignty. It appears to me that the written judgment (order) of the local board is of more dignity than the desires or wishes of the proponents or objectors. The appeal statute does not authorize an appeal by the local boards from the decisions of the su*175perintendent, regardless of how dissatisfied the boards might be because the superintendent, in his judgment in supervising the liquor laws, from a state-wide view, determines that the opinion of the local board is circumscribed, unreasonably prejudiced, or evidences provincialism Still a fair interpretation of the majority opinion confers upon the local governing boards the right of appeal under the elastic interpretation of who is an “aggrieved person”.
There being no right of appeal in the instant case, the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and for this reason a peremptory writ should issue.