Court Opinion

ID: 9630655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:16:37.440932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:41.251488
License: Public Domain

PRICE, J.,
filed a concurring opinion.
I agree with the majority that we should allow the applicant to file an out-of-time petition for discretionary review. I write separately to explain why I think that the doctrine of laches should not apply to this case. The facts of this case are distinguishable from Ex parte Garrió1 because the State did not argue that the applicant’s claims should barred by the doctrine.
*435In Carrio, we held that the doctrine of laches may apply in an appropriate case. In that case, the State argued that, because of the appellant’s fourteen-year delay in bringing his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant should be barred from having the merits of those claims decided.2 The State claimed that its ability to respond to the Carrio’s claims was prejudiced by his failure to bring them in a reasonable amount of time.3
We cited with approval Rule 9(a) of the federal habeas corpus rules.4 We explained that Rule 9(a) required that the State show (1) “a particularized showing of prejudice,” (2) “that the prejudice was caused by the petitioner having filed a late petition,” and (3) “that the petitioner has not acted with reasonable diligence as a matter of law.”5 Although we did not explicitly adopt these requirements, Carrio relies almost exclusively on Rule 9(a) and cases interpreting it.6
I would agree with the conclusion that the applicant waited too long to bring his claims in this case if the State had satisfied the three requirements of Rule 9(a). To the contrary, in the State’s original response to the application, the State requested the trial court to designate the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel as an unresolved issue. After the trial court received the affidavit from appellate counsel, the State made proposed findings of fact, which the trial court signed. Those findings state that the applicant’s appellate counsel notified the applicant that his conviction had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals but failed to notify the applicant that he had a right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review.
We should assume that the State was aware of Carrio and knew that it could raise the doctrine of laches if it was so inclined. In this case it is particularly true because the applicant’s conviction was obtained in Harris County, the same county from which Carrio’s conviction was obtained. But, the State never argued that the applicant’s claim was so stale that the State was unable to respond to the merits of the claim. The State was clearly not prejudiced in its ability to respond.
And, because the State never argued that the doctrine should apply to this case, the trial court made no findings on this issue. In Carrio, we said that because the parties had not had the benefit of our opinion, the record was insufficient to rule on the State’s claim that Carrio’s claims were barred by the doctrine.7 We remanded the case for findings on that issue. Here we have no findings regarding the possible application of the doctrine, and the parties did have the benefit of our opinion in Carrio. We could not, on this record, find that the applicant’s claim was barred by the doctrine of laches.
Also, I believe that the fact that the applicant could raise only one claim in his petition for discretionary review is of no moment. Generally we do not look behind the request for an out-of-time appeal or out-of-time petition for discretionary review to determine whether we should grant relief. The parties have not asked us to do so in this case. And, the fact that the applicant may not have his conviction successfully reversed on petition for dis*436cretionary review has no bearing on whether the doctrine of laches ought to apply in this case.
I do not think that the laches doctrine applies here, primarily because the State has not asked us to apply it and because the trial court made no findings on this issue. With these comments, I join the majority.

. 992 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

. Id., at 487.

. Ibid.

. 28 U.S.C. 2254.

. Carrio, 992 S.W.2d at 488 (citing Walters v. Scott, 21 F.3d 683, 686 (5th Cir.1994)).

. Id., at 487-88.

. Id., at 488.