Court Opinion

ID: 9560320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:47:27.675924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:50.109363
License: Public Domain

*835KENNARD, J.
I dissent.
California’s Open Meeting Law1 requires legislative bodies to give notice of the time and place of their meetings and to make such meetings open and accessible to the public. The stated purpose of this law is to assure that Californians can be fully informed about the legislative decisionmaking process of elected and appointed officials. Under the majority opinion, however, a legislative body is entirely free to conduct the public’s business in private session, shielding its decisionmaking process from scrutiny by the press or public, simply by dividing itself into various “standing committees” whose membership does not comprise a quorum of the full legislative body.2 The majority reaches this result by interpreting the Brown Act to exempt such committees from compliance with any of the Act’s requirements. The majority’s interpretation contorts the statutory language and contravenes the goal of this state’s Open Meeting Law.
I
This case arose out of the June 18, 1991, meeting of the “Operations Committee” of the Board of Directors of the Orange County Employees Retirement System. The Board administers $1.5 billion, consisting of moneys derived from the county’s general fund as well as those contributed by employees. The “Operations Committee” is one of five standing committees that report to the full Board. The membership of the Operations Committee (and of each of the other standing committees) consists of four of the nine Board members—one person less than a quorum of the Board.
The purpose of the June 18, 1991, meeting was to reevaluate the Board’s travel policy—a policy that had engendered substantial controversy after it was reported that some Board members had used public funds to tour Europe, assertedly in connection with Board investments. A reporter for the Orange County Register, a daily newspaper, tried to attend the meeting but was refused entry.
The next day, the newspaper’s parent company, Freedom Newspapers, Inc., petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate, seeking access to future meetings of the Operations Committee. The superior court denied the *836petition. The Court of Appeal reversed, however, concluding that the Operations Committee was a “legislative body of a local agency” whose meetings were consequently required by the Brown Act to be “open and public.” (Gov. Code, § 54953.)3
This court granted the Board’s petition for review and now reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
As I shall explain, the Court of Appeal reached the correct result.
II
In the preamble to the Brown Act, the Legislature expressed the intent underlying the Act: “[T]he Legislature finds and declares that the public commissions, boards and councils and the other public agencies in this State exist to aid in the conduct of the people’s business. It is the intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly, [¶] The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.” (§ 54950.)
Consistent with this stated legislative intent, the Act requires that all meetings of legislative bodies of local agencies “be open and public” and that all persons “be permitted to attend” such meetings. (§ 54953.) The Act does, however, permit legislative bodies to discuss in “closed session” certain sensitive topics, such as pending litigation and personnel matters.4
The Act also requires “legislative bodies” to conduct “regular” meetings (§ 54954) and abide by certain rules pertaining to adjournment or continuance of such meetings (§§ 54955, 54955.1). Additional requirements are posting the agenda of each regular meeting, acting only on items listed on the posted agenda (§ 54954.2), and giving written notice one week before *837each regular meeting to anyone requesting such notice (§ 54954.1). The Act does allow for special meetings, but only if they are preceded by a 24-hour written notice. (§ 54956.)
The Act defines “legislative bodies” broadly. The term includes “the governing board, commission, directors or body of a local agency, or any board or commission thereof’ as well as “any board, commission, committee, or other body on which officers of a local agency serve in their official capacity as members and which is supported in whole or in part by funds provided by such agency . . . .” (§ 54952.) The term also applies to “any board, commission, committee, or similar multimember body which exercises any authority of a legislative body of a local agency” (§ 54952.2), as well as to “planning commissions, library boards, recreation commissions, and other permanent boards or commissions of a local agency” (§ 54952.5).
The “Operations Committee” of the Board of Directors of the Orange County Employees Retirement System, as a “committee ... on which officers of a local agency serve in their official capacity as members and which is supported in whole or in part by funds provided by such agency,” qualifies as a “legislative body” within the meaning of section 54952, thus making it subject to the Brown Act’s “open meeting” requirements. The issue in this case is whether the Operations Committee is exempted by another, more specific, provision of the Act, section 54952.3, from holding meetings open to the public.
Section 54952.3 provides for less stringent notice requirements for meetings of “any advisory commission, advisory committee or advisory body of a local agency, created by charter, ordinance, resolution, or by any similar formal action of a legislative body or member of a legislative body of a local agency.” Under this section, an advisory commission, committee or body is a “legislative body” for purposes of the open meeting requirements of the Act. Such a legislative body can, however,' elect between giving 24-hour written notice of its meetings or providing by rule or bylaw for its meetings to be held at a regular time; “[n]o other notice of regular meetings is required.” (§ 54952.3.)
Section 54952.3 further provides that a “ ‘[legislative body’ as defined in this section does not include a committee composed solely of members of the governing body of a local agency which are less than a quorum of such governing body.” (Italics added.) It is on this italicized phrase that the majority rests its conclusion that advisory committees made up only of members of the full governing body but “less than a quorum” of that body *838are exempt from any of the requirements of the Brown Act. Thus, under the majority’s interpretation, the Operations Committee was free to conduct its business in private.
I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of section 54952.3’s “less-than-a-quorum” provision. In my view, this provision by its express terms excludes those advisory committees composed solely of members of the full governing body of the local agency only from the “relaxed” notice requirements of section 54952.3, thereby making such advisory bodies subject to the more rigid requirements that govern legislative bodies generally.
My interpretation of the “less-than-a-quorum” provision is compelled by the plain language of section 54952.3, which must be the starting point for this statutory interpretation. (Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 826 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216].) After specifying that advisory commissions or committees are “legislative bodies” for purposes of the Brown Act, section 54952.3 next describes the less stringent procedural requirements for the meetings of such advisory bodies. It then states that “ ‘[legislative body’ as defined in this section does not include a committee composed solely of members of the governing body of the local agency which are less than of quorum of such governing body.” By the limiting language, “as defined in this section,” the provision carves out an exception from section 54952.3’s definition of “legislative body” (and thus from the section’s less stringent notice requirements) for an advisory committee composed solely of members of the governing body of the local agency who comprise less than a quorum of the local agency’s full membership.
Therefore, in this case the Operations Committee of the Board of Directors of the Orange County Employees Retirement System, as an advisory committee composed solely of members of the full governing body of the local agency (the Board), is not a “legislative body” for purposes of the relaxed notice requirements of section 54952.3. Rather, as I explained earlier, the Operations Committee meets section 54952’s definition of “legislative body” as being a “committee ... on which officers of a local agency serve in their official capacity as members and which is supported in whole or in part by funds provided by such agency . . . .’’As such, the Operations Committee is subject to the full force of the Brown Act. Most important, the committee must conduct its business in public.
To require an advisory committee that, as here, is comprised of individuals who are members of the governing body to which the committee reports to conduct public meetings would further the Legislature’s stated intent that *839“the people’s business” be conducted openly, and that both the “actions” and the “deliberations” of government be open to the press and public. Even though the Operations Committee cannot itself bind the full Board by “actions” such as adopting a proposal or enacting a rule (which would require a majority vote of the full Board), it can and does “deliberate.” “Deliberation” is defined as “the process ... of thoughtful and lengthy consideration” or as “formal discussion and debate on all sides of an issue.” (American Heritage Diet, of the English Language (1980) p. 349.) Indeed, to best assure that government decisions follow thoughtful and lengthy consideration or debate of all sides of an issue, the Brown Act invites the public to witness that whole process.
A standing committee’s reconsideration of a significant policy that affects the public’s trust and confidence in its government officials—such as the Board’s travel policy here—necessarily involves deliberation. Yet, under the majority’s interpretation of section 54952.3, this deliberation can take place in private session outside the scrutiny of the public. And when, as in this case, the makeup of the standing committee recommending a policy change is just one member short of a quorum of the full governing body, and only one additional vote is needed to make the recommended change, there may be little further debate or deliberation on the issue by the full Board. In that event, the public is deprived of its right to witness the deliberative processes of government. Indeed, under the majority’s reading of section 54952.3, any local agency wishing to keep its deliberative processes from the public can effectively do so by referring controversial issues to standing committees comprised of one member less than a quorum.
The majority’s interpretation of section 54952.3 rests first on its conclusion that construing section 54952.3 to exempt from the less stringent procedural requirements specified by that section all less-than-a-quorum advisory committees composed solely of members of the governing body would “result in absurdity” by making even temporary, ad hoc advisory committees subject to the Brown Act’s “generally applicable procedural requirements,” including that set out in section 54954 of holding “regular” meetings. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 827.) But to require a temporary, ad hoc advisory committee to conduct its meetings at a regular time seems far less absurd than to permit, as the majority does here, a local agency to use standing committees to shield discussion and deliberation on controversial issues from public scrutiny.5
The majority relies also on opinions by the Attorney General (which the majority admits do not bind this court) and on a series of failed legislative *840efforts to amend the Brown Act. But we need not turn to unpassed or vetoed legislation to discern the Legislature’s intent. The Legislature has made its intent plain in the preamble to the Brown Act, which expressly states that to ensure that Californians can remain informed and “retain control” over their own government, legislative deliberations must be conducted openly. “Vital” to the functioning of any democratic society is “an informed citizenry.” (John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp. (1989) 493 U.S. 146, 152 [107 L.Ed.2d 462, 110 S.Ct. 471].) Consistent with our Legislature’s intent, I would affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment directing that the Board allow members of the press and the public to attend “its regular committee meetings,” including those of its Operations Committee.

This law, which is codified in Government Code section 54950 et seq., is also known as the Ralph M. Brown Act, and will hereafter be referred to alternatively as the “Brown Act” or the “Act.”

Of course, in the case of a “committee” whose members make up a quorum or more-than-a-quorum of the membership of the full governing body, the committee would not be a “committee” at all; it would be the governing body.

Further undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code.

The Act permits closed session meetings when an agency discusses a license application by someone with a criminal record (§ 54956.7), or meets with its negotiator regarding the price and terms acceptable to the agency in a real property transaction (§ 54956.8), or discusses pending litigation with legal counsel (§ 54956.9), or participates in a joint agency meeting about insurance pooling, tort liability losses, or workers’ compensation liability (§ 54956.95), or discusses employee wages and benefits with its labor negotiator (§ 54957.6), or participates in meetings regarding multijurisdicttonal drug law enforcement (§ 54957.8).

FortunateIy, the majority’s opinion, though misguided, will be short-lived. New legislation (Stats. 1993, ch. 1138), which changes the Brown Act’s definition of “legislative body” *840effective April 1, 1994, draws a distinction between “ad hoc” and “standing” advisory committees, and specifies that the latter, to the extent they “have a continuing subject matter jurisdiction,” are covered by the Brown Act’s “open meeting” requirements. (§ 54942, subd. (b), as amended by Sen. Bill No. 1140 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.), Stats. 1993, ch. 1138, § 3, eff. Apr. 1, 1994.)