Court Opinion

ID: 9844148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:58:16.63917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:28.769139
License: Public Domain

BARHAM, Justice
(dissenting).
Pretermitting for the moment the question of whether the United States Supreme Court decision in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, is applicable here, I am of the opinion that under our law the relator was denied his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Art. 1, Sec. 10, La.Const. of 1921. Under In Re Gault, supra, and Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed. 2d 84, undoubtedly the Supreme Court established this type of juvenile proceeding to be quasi-criminal. Our Constitution, however, would require adequate notice even if this proceeding were to be accorded only the protections afforded in civil hearings. See Art. 1, Sec. 6, La.Const. of 1921, guarantee of due process, and Art. 7, Sec. 44, forbidding waiver of service of citation.
On January 23, 1969, a probation officer explained to the relator and his mother that the specific violation constituting the delinquency was “theft and possession of a 1966 Ford white four door automobile”, under R.S. 14:67. He also read and explained Probation Department Form 20, “Guarantees Afforded to Juveniles and Waiver of Guarantees”, which relator, his mother, and the probation officer signed. On this form is the notation, evidently added by the officer: “Denied theft of automobile, but admits he was riding in auto. Mother present.” On the next day, January 24, a petition, which serves the same function in the juvenile court as an indictment or information in criminal proceedings, was filed charging that the relator and two other named juveniles were delinquent children because of having violated “Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:69, relative to receiving stolen things, in that they intentionally procured, received, or concealed a 1966 Ford automobile * * * This petition was never served upon or read or presented to the relator before the date of hearing.
The relator and his mother appeared in juvenile court for a hearing set for February 14 on the petition charging him with being a delinquent child, but the matter *979was continued because of the absence of one of the other juveniles. The majority-states that “At the date this matter was set for hearing, the judge advised relator of the nature of the charge contained in the petition”, and the juvenile judge says in his reasons for denial of a rehearing that on February 14 the relator “was advised again of the nature of the charge contained in” the petition. According to the minutes of court for February 14, neither the majority’s statement nor the judge’s is correct. So far as these minutes show, all that the judge told the relator and the other juvenile present about the charge was: “You two boys are charged in this petition, along with Wilbert Robinson who is not present, * * * with having been in possession of a stolen automobile, a 1966 Ford, on January 8th, 1969.”
Under these circumstances, when the relator appeared for hearing on March 20, he had been advised only that he was charged as a delinquent child because of having been in possession1 of a stolen automobile. He could not have been prepared to defend against the charge in the petition — a charge of delinquency because of having received, procured, or concealed the stolen car.
Unquestionably the relator knew the facts and circumstances which led to his arrest and a charge in juvenile court; but a given set of facts may afford a basis for more than one criminal charge. Under the facts here, for example, a charge of delinquency might be based upon the crime of theft or upon the crime of receiving, procuring, and concealing stolen things. One set of facts may, for instance, lead to a charge either of aggravated battery or of attempted murder. To know the facts of a matter is not to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against which one must be prepared to defend. To meet the constitutional requirements the gist of the offense must be charged in direct and unmistakable terms and with clearness and all necessary certainty so that the offender may be apprised of the charge of which he stands accused. See State v. James, 241 La. 233, 128 So.2d 21.
In Re Gault, supra, set forth certain requirements for juvenile proceedings such as this one. The requirement for notice laid down by that decision, which is in conformity with our constitutional provision discussed above, is simply that adequate notice of the accusation must be given sufficiently in advance of a juvenile hearing so that the juvenile may prepare to meet the charge. I am not here concerned with what type of notice was required, for I have determined that in the present case *981no notice of the accusation which this juvenile was required to face and defend against was given before the actual date of hearing. Neither the requirement of In Re Gault nor that of our own Constitution has been met.
I respectfully dissent.
BARHAM, J., is of the opinion a rehearing should be granted.

. “Possession” of stolen property is not a crime in Louisiana. See R.S. 14:69 and rfeporter’s comment® thereunder. For definition of the crime denounced by this article, see State v. Crum, 255 La. 60, 229 So.2d 700, this day decided.