Court Opinion

ID: 9484065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:39:37.754686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:59.950750
License: Public Domain

BLACK, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
Although I concur in the majority’s judgment vacating the sentences imposed on Appellants Carl and Helene Alpert, I write separately for two reasons. First, I believe that on remand the district court should be permitted to determine whether the Al-perts’ sentences should be enhanced for obstruction of justice. Second, I do not agree that the two-level upward departure the district court imposed on Carl Alpert based on the duration and extent of his fraudulent activity is precluded simply by the “more than minimal planning” adjustment. Rather, I believe the upward departure should be vacated because the Sentencing Commission discussed in some detail when an upward departure in a fraud case may be appropriate and this is not such a case.
*460I. BACKGROUND
Because the majority’s summary omits some detail which would support a finding that the Alperts intended to obstruct justice, I begin by reviewing the facts.
The United States initiated an investigation in 1988 into credit card and credit-related fraud being committed by Carl and Helene Alpert. In February 1990, the government located, served subpoenas on, and questioned the Alperts. Plea negotiations were scheduled for March and April 1990. Both the government and the Alperts understood that an indictment was being withheld while the attorneys sought to negotiate a sentence 1 and then proceed by information.
After the first meeting in March, but before the last scheduled meeting in April, the Alperts disappeared from Georgia. They withdrew their child from school without notifying school officials. They did not leave a forwarding address with the post office, their landlord, their creditors, Helene’s mother, or the government. There is no evidence that anyone knew where the Alperts had moved.2 In any event, the government was unable to locate them. Shortly thereafter arrest warrants were issued for each of the Alperts.
Unable to proceed by information because the Alperts had vanished and plea negotiations had consequently ended, the government presented its case to a grand jury. In September 1990, Carl and Helene Alpert were indicted. Carl was charged in forty-one counts, Helene in five.
Fortuitously, eight days after the indictment issued, Carl Alpert was arrested in California, where the Alperts had moved, for fraudulently leasing an automobile. When apprehended, Carl provided a false name to police. The police discovered dozens of false documents when they searched the Alperts’ home, indicating that the Al-perts had continued to engage in credit card and credit-related fraud after moving to California.
The police eventually determined that warrants for the Alperts’ arrest were outstanding in Georgia. Helene Alpert was permitted to return to Atlanta on her own. Carl Alpert was transported across the country in custody.
In July 1991, Carl pled guilty to forty counts and Helene pled guilty to two counts. The district court found that the Alperts defrauded eight financial institutions of almost half a million dollars between 1984 and 1990.
*461II. DISCUSSION
The first issue in this case is whether the district court erred in enhancing the Appellants’ sentences two levels for obstruction of justice. The United States Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines or U.S.S.G.) provide that a defendant’s sentence may be enhanced two levels “[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense_” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (1990). In this circuit, a district court must find that a defendant “ ‘consciously act[ed] with the purpose of obstructing justice.’ ” United States v. Burton, 933 F.2d 916, 918 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir.1990)). Instinctive flight from law enforcement officers, for example, generally will not constitute obstruction of justice because intent is absent. See Burton, 933 F.2d at 918.
Here, the district court enhanced the sentences of both Carl and Helene Alpert based on the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
With respect to the Defendants’ objection to the obstruction of justice determination, I will overrule the objection. It seems to me that the defendants leaving town in the middle of plea negotiations without notifying the government and their use of phony names in California once they got there constitutes an obstruction of justice since I infer that it slowed down the criminal process.
Because the district court focused only on the effect of the Alpert’s move and did not address their intent, I agree with the majority that the enhancement for obstruction of justice should be vacated. Unlike the majority, however, I would remand the case with directions to the district court to determine whether the Alperts consciously acted with the purpose of obstructing justice.
I believe there is enough evidence for the district court to find that the Alperts intended to obstruct or impede the administration of justice. The district court might reasonably infer from the circumstances surrounding the Alperts’ move to California and from their conduct after they arrived that the Alperts intended to continue their criminal activity and to avoid prosecution and punishment altogether. The innocent explanation for the Alperts’ behavior that the majority embraces is not the only reasonable one. Determination of the Al-perts’ intent is a factual question for the district court, not a legal question for this Court.
A second issue in this case — whether the district court erred in departing upward two levels when it sentenced Carl Alpert based on its conclusion that the Sentencing Guidelines do not adequately account for the duration and extent of the fraud — also merits comment.
Departure from the range established by the applicable guideline is appropriate if the district court finds “that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). Conversely, “it is an incorrect application of the Guidelines for a district court to depart from the applicable sentencing range based on a factor that the Commission has already fully considered in establishing the guideline range....” Williams v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1119, 117 L.Ed.2d 341, 353 (1992).
Here, the district court departed upward two levels when sentencing Carl Alpert after concluding that the Sentencing Guidelines do not adequately account for the “very large number of affirmative acts ... that covered so many years, four to five years, and involved so many victims.” The district court concluded that the table in U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, which is based on the dollar amount of the fraud, did not adequately capture the “social harm” caused. Other circuits considering upward departures in major fraud cases have split. Compare United States v. Benskin, 926 F.2d 562 (6th Cir.1991) (5-year scheme in which over 600 victims lost more than $3.8 million warranted upward departure) and *462United States v. Burns, 893 F.2d 1343 (D.C.Cir.1990) (6-year scheme involving 53 separate acts of fraud warranted upward departure which was not precluded by “more than minimal planning” adjustment), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991) with United States v. Boula, 932 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.1991) (upward departure in case involving 8-year scheme in which over 3000 victims were defrauded of more than $7 million not warranted based on amount of fraud loss and number of victims; upward departure permitted based on superseded commentary to Sentencing Guidelines).
The majority holds that the Sentencing Guidelines already account for the fraudulent activity evident in this case, pointing to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A), which requires a two-level enhancement where the fraud involved “more than minimal planning.” As the majority notes, more than minimal planning is “deemed present in any case involving repeated acts over a period of time.”3 Ante at 459. I am not convinced that the “more than minimal planning” adjustment bars an upward departure in this case.4
The Sentencing Commission discussed in some detail when an upward departure in a fraud case may be appropriate. Upward departures in cases involving more than minimal planning are not prohibited. According to the Sentencing Commission, an upward departure might be appropriate if:
(a) the primary objective of the fraud was non-monetary;
(b) false statements were made for the purpose of facilitating some other crime;
(c) the offense caused physical or psychological harm;
(d) the offense endangered national security or military readiness;
(e) the offense caused a loss of confidence in an important institution; or
(f) completion of the offense was prevented, or the offense was interrupted before it caused serious harm.
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment 9. Each of these is a characteristic that generally will not be captured by the monetary loss caused by the offense. The three factors relied upon by the district court — number of acts, number of victims, and duration of the fraud — are characteristics that typically are reflected in the monetary loss caused by the fraud.5 I would instead hold that the upward departure must be vacated because the Sentencing Guideline’s dollar loss table adequately captures the harm caused by the fraud in this case.
III. CONCLUSION
I would vacate the sentences and remand the case with directions to the district court to determine whether the Appellants’ purpose in moving from Georgia to California was to obstruct justice and to resentence Appellants accordingly.

. Carl Alpert's attorney said:
These were days when we thought we could sit down and draft what the guideline application would be, and we actually sat down and I said he will get two points for this and no points for this, and somehow we actually deceived ourselves into believing we would just submit that to a judge and that’s how it would come out, and since then we learned you can’t do that....

. The majority states that "[ajfter leaving the Atlanta area, the Alperts were in continual contact with Carl's lawyer.” My review of the record leads me to a different conclusion.
At the sentencing hearing on October 16, 1991, the Assistant United States Attorney said:
The government did look for these people during that time period but didn’t communicate with their lawyers because it became clear from my discussions with [their attorneys] that they didn't know necessarily where they were, or [Carl Alpert's attorney] I think at one point in time told me he might know where they were, but they weren’t about to tell me
Carl Alpert's attorney responded:
I object to that being [the Assistant United States Attorney’s] speculation that I didn’t know [where the Alperts were], and I’m not going to affirm or deny that, and I don’t want you to infer based on my refusal to do so that I didn’t know where they were.... If I did know where he was, that’s my business and my client’s business, and it’s not the government's business, and I suggest it is not a basis for the court to make its decision.
At the sentencing hearing on October 23, 1991, Carl Alpert’s attorney acknowledged only that Carl "had communicated with me” after he left Georgia.
These statements are too equivocal to permit an appellate court reading a cold record to determine whether the Alperts were or were not in "continual contact” with Carl's attorney. At the least, it is impossible to determine whether Carl's attorney knew where to reach the Alperts since even his later statement indicates only that Carl Alpert was able to contact him.

. Because the district court also relied on the number of victims involved, the majority also presumably bases its holding on U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2)(B), which requires a two-level enhancement when more than one victim was defrauded.

. The D.C. Circuit, for example, has held that the "more than minimal planning" adjustment does not preclude a district court from departing upward based on the duration of the execution of a scheme to defraud. Burns, 893 F.2d at 1346.

. When it "elected to factor the sentencing level according to the total loss, not the number of victims," United States v. Boula, 932 F.2d at 656, the Sentencing Commission also suggested how complex fraud could be fit into the fraud loss table. A sentencing court may estimate the amount of loss "based on the approximate number of victims and an estimate of the average loss to each victim, or on more general factors, such as the nature and duration of the fraud and the revenues generated by similar operations.” U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment 8 (emphasis added).