Court Opinion

ID: 9939701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 15:11:32.39653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:49.715871
License: Public Domain

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                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1883-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOAQUIN A. LINARES-
HERNANDEZ, a/k/a
JOAQUIN LINARES, and
JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted November 29, 2023 – Decided February 12, 2024

                   Before Judges Firko and Susswein.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No.
                   16-06-0972.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, on
                   the brief).

                   Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Erin M. Campbell, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Joaquin A. Linares-Hernandez pled guilty in 2016 to

aggravated sexual assault. Defendant was sentenced in 2017 in accordance with

his plea agreement to a ten-year prison term subject to the No Early Release Act

(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. He appeals from a January 20, 2022 order entered

by Judge Pedro J. Jimenez, Jr., denying his petition for post-conviction relief

(PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. After carefully reviewing the record in

light of the governing legal principles, we affirm.

                                        I.

      We briefly summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history leading

to this appeal. In December 2015, defendant attended a party during which he

encountered an eight-year-old girl. Defendant sexually assaulted her by pulling

down her pants and underwear and touching her vagina.

      In June 2016, defendant was charged by indictment with first-degree

aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1); second-degree sexual assault,

N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); third-degree endangering welfare of child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-

4(a)(1); second-degree hindering own apprehension, N.J.S.A 2C:29-3(b)(3); and

third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a).

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      At a status conference conducted in July 2016, defendant proposed a

counteroffer to the plea agreement that had been offered by the prosecutor.

Defendant proposed to plead guilty to a second-degree aggravated sexual assault

with a recommendation for a nine-year prison term and the ability to argue for

a five-year term. The State's offer had capped the sentence at ten years rather

than nine.      Although the State was prepared to accept defendant's

counterproposal, defendant was not ready to plead guilty and the offer expired.

      At a status conference in September 2016, the prosecutor's plea offer

reverted to a ten-year maximum prison term but retained the possibility for

defendant to argue for a lesser sentence within the second-degree range. During

a subsequent status conference in October 2016, defense counsel told Judge

Jimenez he would present evidence at the sentencing hearing that would mitigate

the crime. Judge Jimenez responded:

             Okay, but I would be surprised, very surprised—and
             you're good enough to do that [defense counsel]—to get
             me down to a five. . . but I would probably feel—
             depending on what the facts are like—I'm not sure that
             I'm going to get there. At a best case scenario, because
             I've never seen . . . anything otherwise, but I'm looking
             for you to impress me as you always do, [defense
             counsel], maybe an eight, maybe an eight, and that's a
             stretch. But I'm thinking that the value of this case is
             anywhere between eight years and [ten] years based on

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            the offer that you got. Certainly, if we go to trial, you're
            looking at [twenty-five] to life.

       Later during that hearing, Judge Jimenez clarified:

            Ten years is the offer. That's what the State is
            recommending. Maybe, based on what [defense
            counsel] presents at the time of sentencing, maybe I
            could go down to nine, pressing me very hard, maybe
            an eight. Okay? But if you're thinking that the State is
            going to resolve this case by way of a five or that five
            years is an offer you're going to get for sentence, wipe
            that out of your mind. This is not that kind of case.
            Okay? The best you'd be able to do is anywhere
            between eight to [ten] years. And even then, I would
            be kind of hard pressed to get to that number because I
            don't know that there's [anything] in this record for me
            to be able to do that. But I'm telling you from me, based
            on my experience with these cases, representation of
            counsel so far, what I've read in the file, what I expect
            to read in the file, based on what the State offers, what
            the victim supplies, and most importantly what
            [defense counsel] is going to give me, I have to assess
            this case . . . as being no less than eight, no more than
            [ten]. Okay? Now, that's why I'm telling you when I
            bring this case back on . . . Monday . . . I need to know
            whether you're going to take this plea offer or not. It's
            going to be not to a first-degree but to a second-degree
            aggravated sexual assault . . . .

The prosecutor originally told Judge Jimenez the offer was only open for that

day, but the judge convinced the prosecutor to hold the offer open until the next

conference on the following Monday.

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      At the plea conference, which was convened on November 7, 2016, Judge

Jimenez stated:

            You're pleading guilty to [c]ount 1 of this indictment.
            It charges you with aggravated sexual assault in the
            second degree. In exchange—the maximum for which
            you could receive is ten years. In exchange, the State
            is dismissing the balance of this indictment,
            recommending that you serve ten years, [eighty-five]
            percent of which you would have to serve without
            parole as per [NERA]. And your attorney's going to
            argue for less time than that. The minimum you could
            receive is five years. I guess it will be up for me to
            decide based on my review of the aggravating and
            mitigating factors.

      Defendant thereupon accepted the State's offer and entered a guilty plea

to the amended charge of second-degree aggravated sexual assault. Defendant

provided a factual basis for the plea, admitting he improperly touched an eight -

year-old girl for sexual gratification at a party on December 13, 2015.

      The sentencing hearing was held on March 31, 2017. Defense counsel

argued defendant accepted responsibility for the crime and provided letters from

friends and family. Defense counsel also proposed mitigating factors for the

judge to consider. Defendant spoke on his own behalf and expressed remorse.

Six character witnesses spoke in support of defendant.

      After considering the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, Judge

Jimenez sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement to a ten-

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year NERA term. Defendant did not file a direct appeal. In November 2018, he

filed the present petition for PCR.

      In February 2021, Judge Jimenez convened a non-evidentiary PCR

hearing. Defendant argued the judge misrepresented what the sentence was

going to be, violating his constitutional rights. Judge Jimenez asked defense

counsel, "[a]t any time did I tell the defendant that I was going to give him an

[eight]-year sentence?" Defense counsel acknowledged, "Your [H]onor did not

say that directly." The judge stated, "[t]he record doesn't reflect, at all, that I

ever said I was going to give him an [eight]-year sentence, and only an [eight]-

year sentence. Right?" Defense counsel replied, "[i]n no specific words."

      On January 20, 2022, Judge Jimenez issued a written opinion denying

PCR. He found that any confusion regarding the plea agreement had been

cleared up before defendant accepted the State's final plea offer. The judge also

rejected defendant's argument that he detrimentally relied on the judge's

comments. Judge Jimenez noted the language used was "certainly not language

indicative of a guarantee or a promise as petitioner alleges."

      With respect to defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel contention,

Judge Jimenez concluded "the counsel [d]efendant received from his attorneys

in no way reaches the level required to claim ineffective assistance of counsel."

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                                        6
The judge further noted the plea agreement defendant accepted was "incredibly

favorable" considering the sentence he would have received if convicted of the

first-degree aggravated sexual assault of a minor charge. Judge Jimenez also

found defendant failed to show he suffered any prejudice as a result of his

attorney's performance.

      Defendant raises the following contentions for our consideration:

            POINT I
            MR. LINARES-HERNANDEZ IS ENTITLED TO
            RELIEF OR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS
            CLAIM THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO AN
            ENFORCEMENT OF HIS PLEA BARGAIN.

                  A. By pleading guilty, Mr. Linares-Hernandez
                  detrimentally relied on the sentencing court's
                  statements, and defense counsel's belief, that the
                  court could be convinced, through mitigating
                  evidence, to impose an eight-year term of
                  imprisonment.

                  B. The [S]tate and defense agreed to a nine-year
                  maximum sentence, where the range was
                  between five and nine years, in exchange for Mr.
                  Linares-Hernandez's guilty plea, and that plea
                  agreement must be enforced.

            POINT II

            IN  THE  ALTERNATIVE,     MR.   LINARES-
            HERNANDEZ IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY
            HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT COUNSEL
            RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY

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                                       7
              FAILING TO ADVOCATE ADEQUATELY ABOUT
              HIS SENTENCE.

                                        II.

      We first address defendant's contentions regarding the plea agreement and

his reasonable expectations as to the sentence that would be imposed. "The

validity of a plea agreement is guided by considerations of fundamental fairness

and public policy." State v. Subin, 222 N.J. Super. 227, 237 (App. Div. 1988).

"The overall consideration when evaluating a particular plea agreement is

fairness." Ibid. "A defendant who pleads guilty in reliance on a promise or

agreement of the State has the right to expect that the bargain will be fulfilled."

Id. at 238.

      Defendant argues, "[b]y pleading guilty, [he] detrimentally relied on the

sentencing court's statements, and defense counsel's belief, that the court could

be convinced, through mitigating evidence, to impose an eight-year term of

imprisonment." In support of that contention, defendant relies on our opinion

in State v. Hooper, 459 N.J. Super. 157 (App. Div. 2019). Defendant's reliance

on that opinion is misplaced.

      In Hooper, the judge allegedly made remarks during off-the-record

negotiations between the defendant's attorneys and the prosecutor, commenting

the case did not appear to be one that justified consecutive sentences. Id. at 182-

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                                        8
83. The defendant's lawyer claimed to rely on those statements by the judge "to

counsel defendant to reject a recommended thirty-year sentence and instead

enter an open plea to the indictment. . . . " Id. at 184. The defendant claimed

his counsel predicted his sentence would be between ten and twenty years. Id.

at 171. By entering an "open plea," defendant exposed himself to an extended

term of life in prison. Id. at 176.

      On those facts, we reasoned, "although defendant cannot compel the court

to take any action based on its remarks about the sentence outside the confines

of Rule 3:9-3(c), the judge should, nevertheless, consider whether counsel's

reliance on those remarks, whether reasonable or not, caused them to seriously

misadvise their client." Id. at 183. We thus held fundamental fairness allows

the judge to consider whether a withdrawal of the guilty plea is permitted under

Rule 3:21-1. Id. at 183-84.

      The matter before us is starkly different from the facts in Hooper. Here,

Judge Jimenez' remarks—which we have reproduced verbatim—were made

during a status conference on the record and in defendant's presence. We are not

dealing with a situation where a judge's off-the-record comments were presented

to defendant via his attorney. The record makes clear, moreover, that Judge

Jimenez at no time promised or guaranteed he would reduce the negotiated

                                                                          A-1883-21
                                       9
prison term from ten to eight years. To the contrary, Judge Jimenez's remarks

before the guilty plea was entered made clear that while a reduced sentence was

possible, it was unlikely.

      We also reject defendant's contention he is entitled to specific

performance of the counteroffer that would have capped the prison term at nine

years. The record shows that while the prosecutor accepted the counteroffer,

defendant was not prepared to plead guilty at that hearing and wanted time to

speak with his family. The nine-year maximum plea offer thus expired before

defendant agreed to plead guilty.

      At the hearing during which defendant did plead guilty, Judge Jimenez

made clear the State's offer was that it would recommend a ten-year sentence,

while leaving open the possibility for defense counsel to convince the court to

impose a lesser sentence. As Judge Jimenez stressed in his PCR decision, "any

confusion surrounding the plea agreement was ultimately cleared up prior to

[d]efendant accepting the plea."

      On this record, we agree with Judge Jimenez that defendant knowingly

and voluntarily pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that capped his prison

term at ten years, not nine years. We add that notions of fundamental fairness

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                                     10
do not require defendant be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, nor entitle

him to specific performance of the nine-year plea agreement that had expired

before he pled guilty.    See Subin, 222 N.J. Super. at 237 ("The overall

consideration when evaluating a particular plea agreement is fairness."). As

Judge Jimenez aptly noted in his PCR decision, "the plea being offered to

[d]efendant, even its final form, was incredibly favorable given the maximum

sentence [d]efendant faced."

                                      III.

      We next turn to defendant's contention he was denied effective assistance

of counsel. In addressing an ineffective assistance claim, New Jersey courts

follow the two-part test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in

Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). See State v. Fritz, 105 N.J.

42, 58 (1987). "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was

deficient." State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687). "Second, the defendant must have been prejudiced by counsel's

deficient performance." Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

      To meet the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, a defendant must show

"that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466

                                                                           A-1883-21
                                      11
U.S. at 687. Reviewing courts indulge in "a strong presumption that counsel's

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. . . ."

Id. at 689.

      The second Strickland prong is especially demanding. It requires the

defendant show "that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687. Put differently,

counsel's errors must create a "reasonable probability" that the outcome of the

proceedings would have been different if counsel had not made the errors. Id.

at 694.

      This "is an exacting standard." Gideon, 244 N.J. at 551 (quoting State v.

Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)). "Prejudice is not to be presumed," but must

be affirmatively proven by the defendant. Ibid. (citing Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52, and

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.). Furthermore, to set aside a guilty plea based on

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show "'that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not

have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. DiFrisco,

137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration in original) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474

U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

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                                       12
        In the present matter, defendant argues "counsel failed to argue against

the court's improper findings of aggravating factors [two] 1 and [nine].2" More

specifically, defendant argues plea counsel should have argued the sentencing

court's finding of aggravating factor two was impermissible double counting and

that the court did not set forth an adequate basis for finding aggravating factor

nine.

        With respect to aggravating factor two, "sentencing courts must avoid

double-counting any element of an offense as an aggravating factor. . . ." State

v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 601 (2013). Accordingly, "[e]lements of a crime,

including those that establish its grade, may not be used as aggravating factors

for sentencing of that particular crime." Id. at 608.

1
    N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 (a)(2) provides:

              The gravity and seriousness of harm inflicted on the
              victim, including whether or not the defendant knew or
              reasonably should have known that the victim of the
              offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of
              resistance due to advanced age, ill-health, or extreme
              youth, or was for any other reason substantially
              incapable of exercising normal physical or mental
              power of resistance. . .
2
  "The need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law. . ."
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9).
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                                        13
      In this case, in support of finding that aggravating factor two applied,

Judge Jimenez stated:

            Based on my reading of the [Presentence Report], I do
            find aggravating factor [two] applies, the gravity and
            seriousness of the harm inflicted on the victim.
            Because whether it was a touching or a penetration, as
            alleged by the State, and I cited the phrase "touching,"
            recalling the defendant's plea.         Either[] it was
            perpetrated on an 8-year-old girl at the time of the
            offense. And while I accept [defendant's] remorse as
            represented by his statement in court here today, for the
            difficulties now that he's going to have to experience as
            a result of this prison sentence, and whatever other
            consequences he is subjected to as a result of this
            sentence, I cannot lose sight of the fact that . . . the
            conduct to which he's admitted to has not only
            destroyed his own family, as represented by those who
            present themselves here in support of him. But it's also
            destroyed the family of the victim for what they've had
            to experience, and what they now have to live with for
            the rest of their lives, as well. . . .

            My hope would be that this young girl, the victim in
            this case, would be able to outgrow this experience . . .
            so that she could live a normal life, free of this memory
            because this is most certainly not a memory that she
            should be carrying with her because she doesn't deserve
            it. Because no 8-year-old deserves it, but all I can do is
            just hope. I hope that the defendant remembers, and
            never loses sight of this incident.

      We are satisfied the judge did not commit impermissible double-counting

by acknowledging the impact defendant's crime will have on the life o f the

young victim and her family. That impact is not an element of aggravated sexual

                                                                         A-1883-21
                                       14
assault.   Accordingly, counsel did not render constitutionally deficient

assistance with respect to the sentencing court's consideration of the gravity and

seriousness of the harm inflicted on the victim.

      As for aggravating factor number nine, Judge Jimenez stated,

"[a]ggravating factor [nine] applies, the need for deterring him and others from

violating the law." It would seem self-evident that this type of criminal behavior

warrants deterrence. We see no error whatsoever in the judge applying this

aggravating factor, and no argument of counsel could render it inapplicable.

      Defendant further argues, "counsel should have advocated for the court to

consider the references who wrote and spoke for [defendant], which is what the

court had said it would focus on in favor of a lower sentence." However, the

sentencing judge stated, "I'm more concerned with what comes out of the

defendant's mouth. I'm more concerned with what is available from the victim.

And with regards to any character references that the defendant has, because

those are the three things that I base my decision on." The record thus shows

the judge did consider the character references. We add that viewed in context,

those references by no means mitigate the serious sex crime defendant

committed against an eight-year-old victim. In sum, we conclude defendant has

                                                                            A-1883-21
                                       15
failed to show counsel's performance at the sentencing hearing was deficient or

that he was prejudiced in any way by that performance.

      Lastly with respect to defendant's ineffective assistance contentions,

defendant argues,

            [t]he transcripts show that no one—the judge, the
            prosecutors, or defense counsel—knew what had
            already transpired and been agreed to, to [defendant's]
            detriment, and counsel's failure in knowing the history
            of his client's case, so that he could present a proper
            record and advocate for his client, resulted in a higher
            sentence for [defendant].

However, Judge Jimenez found in his PCR decision:

            While the turnover of attorneys on both sides was
            inefficient, it does not qualify as an error so severe that
            it prevented [d]efendant from receiving the
            representation guaranteed to him by the Sixth
            Amendment. The [c]ourt agrees with the State that any
            confusion surrounding the plea agreement was
            ultimately cleared up prior to [d]efendant accepting the
            plea.     Additionally, the plea being offered to
            [d]efendant, even its final form, was incredibly
            favorable given the maximum sentence [d]efendant
            faced. As such, [d]efendant's attorneys worked in
            concert with the State so much so that they were able to
            secure such a favorable plea for [d]efendant.

      We have no basis upon which to disturb this finding and agre e with the

PCR judge's ultimate conclusion that defendant has not carried his burden with

respect to either prong of the Strickland/Fritz test. Having failed to prove a

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                                       16
prima facie case under that test, defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary

hearing, much less to vacate his conviction or sentence. See State v. Preciose,

129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992); see R. 3:22-10(b).

      Affirmed.

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