Court Opinion

ID: 9657192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:17:14.3029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:42.057839
License: Public Domain

*881HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
RITUALISTIC, CATECHISTIC RECITATIONS? NOT REQUIRED.
FREE AND VOLUNTARY PLEA THROUGH EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS? YES, REQUIRED.
Appellant’s 1981 guilty pleas are used as a basis to enhance his punishment for a third DWI conviction in 1986. These were Tripp County convictions in the Sixth Judicial Circuit. Appellant, in the immediate proceedings below, filed a motion to vacate these two prior Tripp County DWI convictions and to totally dismiss the Part II Information filed by the State’s Attorney’s Office of Pennington County. However, the Seventh Judicial Circuit Court Judge denied the motion to vacate and thereafter held a factual trial on whether appellant was one in the same person as convicted in the Tripp County DWI convictions. The Seventh Judicial Circuit Judge held, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was one in the same person. Appellant protected his record in filing a motion to strike and vacate these two prior criminal convictions based upon constitutional infirmities. Enhancement of his punishment is made possible by SDCL 32-23-4, which provides:
If conviction for a violation of § 32-23-1 is for a third offense, or subsequent offense thereafter, the person is guilty of a Class 6 felony, and the court, in pronouncing sentence, shall unconditionally revoke the defendant’s driving privileges for such period of time as may be determined by the court, but in no event less than one year from the date of his final discharge. If the person is convicted of driving without a license during that period, he shall be sentenced to the county jail for not less than ten days, which sentence may not be suspended.
We are not concerned with the validity of the 1986 conviction. We are concerned with the enhancement of punishment aspect of this appeal, as appellant advocates that the two DWI guilty pleas are constitutionally infirm. Appellant has a right to attack these two convictions, for he is being additionally punished for these two convictions. When Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), is read in conjunction with Nachtigall v. Erickson, 85 S.D. 122, 178 N.W.2d 198 (1970), it is clear that a successful collateral attack upon prior DWI guilty plea(s) can be avoided if the defendant, in making those pleas,
(1) waived his right against self-incrimination;
(2) waived his right to confrontation;
(3) waived his right to a jury trial; and
(4) was given an understanding of the nature and consequences of the plea.
We have held that compliance with these four mandates is required, and evidence of compliance must be reflected in the court’s records; “[a] silent record is not sufficient.” 1 Nachtigall, 85 S.D. at 128, 178 N.W.2d at 201; In re Garritsen, 376 N.W.2d 575, 577 (S.D.1985). See, e.g., In re Smiley, 66 Cal.2d 606, 427 P.2d 179, 58 Cal.Rptr. 579 (1967); City of Monroe v. Coleman, 304 So.2d 332 (La.1974).
Here, in my opinion, the record is deficient. Appellant was never advised of the maximum sentence he could receive upon a plea of guilty. Both the state law, SDCL 23A-7-4, and the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c) require that this admonishment be given. Obviously, it has a purpose: to let a criminal defendant know how *882long he might serve behind bars if a guilty plea is entered. Absent accurate information regarding likely punishment resulting from a guilty plea, I fail to perceive how a defendant can make a “free and intelligent” waiver of his constitutional rights. Cf. Garritsen, 376 N.W.2d at 577; Nachtigall, 85 S.D. at 128, 178 N.W.2d at 201.2 Therefore, under Boykin, Nachtigall, and Garritsen, Part II of the Information should be reversed.
Sentencing of appellant on the February 22, 1981 conviction was held on April 15, 1981. Thereupon, a discussion was held between the appellant and the trial court concerning appellant’s decision to seek treatment for alcoholism at a state facility. Critical, however, again is a colloquy at the bench, wherein the court inquired of the appellant: “I expect that you are acquainted with what the penalty is for second offense DWI?” And thereupon, appellant replied, “Yes.” Appellant was then sentenced to twenty days at hard labor in the Tripp County Jail. In all due respect to the distinguished and experienced trial judge, I simply cannot condone this type of sentencing procedure. True, the pleas were not coerced nor forced nor secured by threats or promises; however, the nub or gravamen of the wrongful criminal procedure here is that (1) appellant could not have voluntarily or intelligently entered a plea when the maximum and minimum penalties had not been explained to him for second offense DWI; and (2) that he had not been individually canvassed on his rights with an express waiver of his rights. This author would not require ritualistic, catechistic recitations or incantation of legal rights. Substantively, however, constitutional and statutory rights must be explained and waived on the record or the plea process breaks down. See n. 2 and accompanying text, supra.
Finally, prejudice is here shown by time served in jail on the second offense, DWI, followed by prosecution for enhancement in this proceeding for which defendant was sentenced to the South Dakota State Penitentiary for two years. Where there is a constitutionally infirm conviction(s), these convictions cannot be used to enhance the sentence of a defendant under habitual offender statutes. See State v. King, 383 N.W.2d 854 (S.D.1986), and In re Rogers, 28 Cal.3d 429, 434, 619 P.2d 415, 417, 169 Cal.Rptr. 222, 224 (1980). The answer is that our state law requires it. If this author’s position on prejudicial error is unsustainable, for the reason that we cannot peek into the window of the appellant’s mind to determine his thoughts as to whether he would/would not enter a plea of guilty if he knew of the maximum penalty, I would steadfastly anchor myself to the settled law of this state as expressed in Nachtigall, namely: That this state not only adopted the principles of Boykin, but added an absolute requirement that the defendant have “an understanding of the nature and consequences of [his guilty] plea.” Nachtigall, 85 S.D. at 128, 178 *883N.W.2d at 201. The consequences of a guilty plea cannot be known unless the defendant is first informed by a trial judge of the possible range of penalties leviable upon entrance of his guilty plea.
APPENDIX
TRANSCRIPT OF ARRAIGNMENT AND SENTENCING — FEBRUARY 25, 1981
THE COURT: Mr. State’s Attorney? You may proceed with the arraignment of Leonard Raymond King.
MR. CONKLIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
Let the record show that I have handed Mr. King a copy of an Information for DWI which bears date of October 9, 1980 and a second part of the Information alleging a former conviction also bearing date of October 9, 1980. Both of these Informa-tions deal with an offense which allegedly occurred September 28, 1980.
(Mr. Conklin reads the Informations aloud in open Court.)
THE COURT: And we are on Clerk of Court’s file number 80-252.
Mr. King, were you present when I advised you of your legal rights?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Were you with a group of others that were all lined up here?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: First let me ask you if you would look at the Copy of the Information that the State has just given to you and tell me if your name is spelled correctly?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. King, do you have any questions that you would like to ask me about any of those constitutional and statutory rights that we talked about?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Now, one of those rights that I talked about had to do with your right to have a lawyer. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Now, I note that you do not have a lawyer here with you now. Is it your desire to proceed in this case without a lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Let’s talk about the Information that the State has filed and I want to call to your attention the fact that it is in two parts.
The second part alleges that you had a prior conviction in Tripp County, South Dakota for DWI on August 15 of 1979. THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Now, the allegation, or, the charge by the State that you had that prior conviction is important because it serves to inform the Court if it is true, that this would be a second offense for you, okay? I want you to keep that in mind.

. When the defendant was arraigned on February 25, 1981, the circuit court judge in Tripp County called forward twelve individuals present whose date for arraignment had been set on misdemeanor charges and advised them of their rights en masse. This appellant’s rights were not singularly explained to him, nor did he singularly waive his rights. Attached hereto, and by this reference made a part thereof, is the Transcript, at 6-7, of the sentencing of Mr. King, appellant. Note that it is the circuit court who is asking Mr. King if he, Mr. King, has any questions about his constitutional and statutory rights. This is the function of the court to explain them. And this author does not express that the constitutional and statutory rights were not explained with the crucial exception of a failure to advise this criminal defendant of the consequences of his plea. Another layer of error is atop the preceding error which I have noted, namely, that this criminal defendant did not, on the record, waive his individual rights. See first sentence, sixth full paragraph of the majority decision.

. This point was most succinctly made in Commonwealth v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 103-07, 237 A.2d 196, 197-98 (1968). There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania perceptively wrote:
A majority of criminal convictions are obtained after a plea of guilty. If these convictions are to be insulated from attack, the trial court is best advised to conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which should include, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of sentences.
Id. (citations omitted; footnotes omitted). This passage was later quoted with approval in Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. at 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d at 280, and subsequently expressly adopted by the California Supreme Court in In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 133, 460 P.2d 449, 457, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 585 (1969). One year later, in Nachtigall, we too quoted from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s Rundle opinion and we stated:
[I]t is now settled as a principle of the constitutional law that a plea of guilty cannot stand unless the record in some manner indicates a free and intelligent waiver of the three constitutional rights mentioned in Boykin — self-incrimination, confrontation and jury trial— and an understanding of the nature and consequences of the plea.
Nachtigall, 85 S.D. at 128, 178 N.W.2d at 201 (quoting Rundle, 237 A.2d at 197).