Court Opinion

ID: 9946578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 21:03:26.894733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:29.972151
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                  STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D23-3716
                  LT Case No. 2021-305059-CFDB
                  _____________________________

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES,

    Petitioner,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA and
WILLIAM ELVEY,

    Respondents.
               _____________________________

Petition for Certiorari Review of Order
from the Circuit Court for Volusia County.
Raul A. Zambrano, Judge.

Jennifer L. Ware, Assistant General Counsel, of Department of
Children and Families, DeLand, for Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T.
Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Respondent, State of Florida.

No Appearance for Respondent, William Elvey.

                        February 29, 2024

SOUD, J.
     The Department of Children and Families petitions this Court
for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the trial court’s order
involuntarily committing William Elvey upon finding he remained
incompetent to proceed due to mental illness. We have jurisdiction.
See Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(3). The
petition is denied.

                                 I.

     Elvey was charged in October 2021 with Aggravated Assault
on a Law Enforcement Officer with a Deadly Weapon, a second-
degree felony, and Fleeing or Attempting to Elude, a third-degree
felony as charged. After defense counsel raised Elvey’s possible
mental incompetence, the trial court appointed Dr. Roger Davis to
evaluate Elvey. As recommended in Dr. Davis’s December 12, 2021
report, the trial court found Elvey incompetent to procced due to
mental illness in May 2022 and placed him on conditional release.
Amongst other conditions, Elvey was required to take all
medications as prescribed. Ultimately, he violated this condition
and was taken into custody.

     Thereafter, the trial court ordered Dr. Davis to again evaluate
Elvey. As Dr. Davis reports, 1 he “went to the Volusia Branch Jail’s
mental health unit to interview Mr. Elvey, but . . . was informed
that [Elvey] had refused to come out of his cell to meet with me.”
In an attempt to overcome Elvey’s refusal, correctional officers
allowed Dr. Davis to speak with Elvey outside of Elvey’s cell.
Nonetheless, Elvey persisted in his refusal to cooperate, telling Dr.
Davis “[i]t’s redundant” and then “cluck[ing] like a chicken.”
Relatedly, mental health providers advised Dr. Davis that on
several occasions Elvey would respond to their attempts to speak
with him by “barking and howling” and, at other times, making
sexually inappropriate comments.

    Finally, Dr. Davis reviewed forensic case management status
reports from June 2022 (the month after Elvey was first adjudged
incompetent) through September 2023 (the same month he was
taken into custody for violating conditional release). While there is

    1 Dr. Davis reported to the court in a writing dated November

13, 2023.

                                 2
no mention in these records of Elvey “behaving in a bizarre
manner,” the records revealed a “recent Baker Act admission due
to ‘showing aggressiveness to hospital staff.’” However, the records
also indicate that he was compliant with medication designed to
improve memory functioning and “able to have meaningful
conversation.”

    Dr. Davis ultimately concluded, “It appears that Mr. Elvey’s
bizarre behavior at the jail is volitional rather [than] a symptom of
the neurocognitive disorder.” Dr. Davis expressed uncertainty if
Elvey was trying to appear incompetent in an effort to avoid
prosecution.

    Thereafter, and based upon stipulation of both the State and
defense, on November 21, 2023, the trial court entered its order
(again) adjudging Elvey incompetent to proceed and involuntarily
committing him to the Department for treatment. From this order,
the Department seeks certiorari relief.

     The Department argues that Dr. Davis’s November 13, 2023
communication to the trial court was insufficient in that it was
unable to conclude if Elvey was at that time incompetent to
proceed and met the criteria for involuntary commitment. As a
result, the Department argues committing Elvey to its care for
treatment was error. We disagree.

                                 II.

                                 A.

     Certiorari has been determined by this Court to be “the proper
vehicle for seeking this court’s review of orders committing an
individual involuntarily.” Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Kirshner, 49
Fla. L. Weekly D353 (Fla. 5th DCA Feb. 2, 2024). To warrant relief,
the Department must establish the trial court’s order involuntarily
committing Elvey constitutes “(1) a departure from the essential
requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the
remainder of the case, (3) that cannot be corrected on
postjudgment appeal.” Id. (quoting Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d
1129, 1132 (Fla. 2011)). The last two requirements are often
combined into the concept of “irreparable harm.” See id.; see also
Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc. v. Machalek, 48 Fla. L. Weekly

                                 3
D1971 (Fla. 5th DCA Oct. 6, 2023). “We must first consider the
final two elements because irreparable harm is jurisdictional and
must be found before we may decide whether there has been a
departure from the essential requirements of the law.” Machalek,
48 Fla. L. Weekly D1971.

     This Court has recently determined that the Department
“establishes the requisite irreparable harm or injury under these
second and third prongs when it has been ordered to accept a
defendant for involuntary commitment who does not meet the
criteria.” Kirshner, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D353. Thus, we find the
Department would demonstrate irreparable harm if the trial court
departed from the essential requirements of the law. Thus, we may
properly exercise jurisdiction. However, we conclude the trial court
did not depart from the essential requirements of the law in this
case.

                                 B.

     Part II of Chapter 916, Florida Statutes, governs forensic
services for those who are mentally ill. As applied to the case sub
judice, first the trial court was required to determine if Elvey was
incompetent to proceed. As defined by section 916.12, he would be
incompetent to proceed if he “does not have sufficient present
ability to consult with . . . his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding or if [he] has no rational, as well as factual,
understanding of the proceedings against . . . him.” See § 916.12(1),
Fla. Stat. (2023). Generally, an expert witness is required “to
determine [Elvey’s] mental condition . . . , including competency to
proceed, insanity, involuntary placement, and treatment.” See §
916.115(1), Fla. Stat. Finally, when, as here, Elvey has been
adjudged incompetent due to a mental illness, section 916.13(1)
sets forth the criteria that must be met before he may be
committed to the Department for competency restoration
treatment. See Kirshner, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D353.

                                  1.

    The trial court properly determined Elvey remained
incompetent to proceed. Elvey was first adjudged incompetent due
to mental illness in May 2022 and placed on conditional release.
“An individual who has been adjudicated incompetent is presumed

                                  4
to remain incompetent until adjudicated competent to proceed by
a court.” See Henry v. State, 178 So. 3d 928, 929 (Fla. 5th DCA
2015) (citing Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 676 (Fla. 2014));
see also Abreu-Gutierrez v. James, 1 So. 3d 262, 264–65 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2009).

     Upon Elvey’s violating conditional release, the trial court
correctly (and unlike in Kirshner 2) ordered him again evaluated by
Dr. Davis. Yet, Elvey steadfastly refused to cooperate with this
evaluation. “A defendant may not thwart the competency
determination process ‘by refusing to be examined’ by court-
appointed experts.” Abreu-Gutierrez, 1 So. 3d at 267 (quoting
Muhammad v. State, 494 So. 2d 969, 973 (Fla. 1986)). “If the court
has followed the procedures of the rules and the defendant’s own
intransigence deprives the court of expert testimony, the court
must still proceed to determine competency in the absence of such
evidence.” Muhammad, 494 So. 2d at 973 (noting the trial court
had opportunity to observe the defendant in open court, review
letters and pleadings written by the defendant, and review the
proffer of expert evidence).

     In this case, the trial court followed the rules of procedure and
the requirements of Florida law in ordering Elvey evaluated again
after he violated conditional release. Thus, the trial court was not
only permitted to proceed in determining his competence, but was

    2 We are aware that this Court recently held in Kirshner that

that the trial court erred in adjudging the defendant incompetent
to proceed based on a sixteen-month-old evaluation. However, the
trial judge in Kirshner “found it unnecessary to order any further
competency evaluations” after the defendant violated his
conditional release. Our court concluded that such “a stale
evaluation . . . does not constitute competent substantial evidence
of a defendant’s present level of competency.” Kirshner, 49 Fla. L.
Weekly D353. That is not the situation presented in the case before
us. Here, the trial court did not simply rely upon the first report
from Dr. Davis, which at time of commitment was approximately
23 months old. Rather, the trial court ordered an additional
evaluation, which was refused by Elvey.

                                  5
required to do so. And while the trial court did not have a full
(customary) report from Dr. Davis, the trial court was not without
evidence to determine Elvey’s competence and placement.

     First, Elvey was previously adjudged incompetent in May
2022, and it is presumed he remains so absent further order of the
trial court. See Henry, 178 So. 3d at 929. Additionally, Dr. Davis’s
November 13, 2023 report of his partial evaluation paints a picture
of Elvey “clucking like a chicken” in the presence of Dr. Davis,
“barking and howling” at mental health providers at the jail, and,
at other times, making sexually inappropriate comments. The
report further describes a then-recent Baker Act admission for
Elvey. In light of this evidence, and even in the absence of a
comprehensive report resulting from Elvey’s refusal to cooperate
with Dr. Davis, the trial court had before it competent, substantial
evidence to adjudge Elvey incompetent to proceed.

                                 2.

     Likewise, the trial court had before it sufficient evidence to
involuntarily commit Elvey to the Department for competency
restoration treatment at the state hospital. “[U]nder section
916.13(1) there must be clear and convincing evidence that the
criteria under this statute are met before a felony defendant
adjudicated incompetent to proceed due to mental illness may be
involuntarily committed to [the Department] for treatment.”
Kirshner, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D353. As with competence, the
findings justifying commitment are properly the subject of expert
testimony. Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. State, 279 So. 3d 1271, 1272
(Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (quoting Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Lotton,
172 So. 3d 983, 987–88 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)); see also Dep’t of
Child. & Fams. v. Tetley, 365 So. 3d 479, 480–81 (Fla. 5th DCA
2023).

     Pertinent here, as to placement, section 916.13 requires the
court to conclude that because of mental illness, “[t]here is a
substantial likelihood that in the near future the defendant will
inflict serious bodily harm on . . . himself or another person, as
evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening
such harm.” See § 916.13(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The
trial court also must conclude that all other available less-
restrictive treatment alternatives are inappropriate. See §

                                 6
916.13(1)(b), Fla. Stat. Finally, the trial court must find that there
is a substantial probability that Elvey will regain competence “in
the reasonably foreseeable future.” See § 916.13(1)(c), Fla. Stat.

     In this case, there was clear and convincing evidence
warranting Elvey’s commitment. First, Dr. Davis’s report
indicated a “recent Baker Act admission due to ‘showing
aggressiveness to hospital staff.’” In light of this evidence presented
by Dr. Davis’s November 13, 2023 report to the court (limited by
Elvey’s refusal to allow a renewed evaluation), and considering the
nature of the underlying charges against him, such evidence is
sufficient under section 916.13 to establish that “[t]here is a
substantial likelihood that in the near future the [Elvey] will inflict
serious bodily harm on . . . himself or another person, as evidenced
by recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening such
harm[.]” See § 916.13(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat.

     Further, commitment to the Department is the least
restrictive means available that “would offer an opportunity for
improvement of the defendant’s condition . . . . ” See § 916.13(1)(b),
Fla. Stat. At the time of his commitment to the Department, Elvey
had already violated his conditional release plan. That lesser
restrictive means having failed, commitment is the least
restrictive means that remained available to the trial court. This
is made clear by the State and defense stipulating to Elvey’s
commitment to the Department.

     Finally, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that a
substantial probability exists that Elvey will regain competence in
the reasonably foreseeable future. Dr. Davis’s 2023 report
indicated a Baker Act admission—and by clear implication his
discharge and return to the jail’s mental health unit. It further
described Elvey’s compliance with medication designed to improve
memory functioning, and that notwithstanding his “bizarre
behavior at the jail . . . he was able to have a meaningful
conversation.” In light of information obtained by Dr. Davis—
though incomplete as a result of Elvey’s refusing to participate in
the evaluation—the trial court’s findings are sufficiently
supported by the evidence available to it.

                                  7
                                III.

     In sum, the trial court rightly proceeded to determine
competence and placement with the information before it in this
case. Elvey’s obstruction of Dr. Davis’s evaluation—and the trial
court’s ability to receive a complete evaluation more fully
considering Elvey’s competence and each of the factors set forth in
section 916.13—will not operate to defeat the trial court’s decision
to commit Elvey. Indeed, to hold otherwise would allow a
defendant to obstruct the legal process and, for those so inclined,
manipulate the proceedings to delay or avoid altogether
prosecution for criminal actions. This the law does not permit or
require.

     Any deficiencies in Dr. Davis’s November 13, 2023 report
claimed by the Department are the direct byproduct of Elvey’s
refusal to participate in the evaluation. Elvey simply will not be
permitted to thwart the judicial proceedings, the restoration of his
competency (if such be possible), and his receiving treatment in a
setting and manner contemplated by Florida law that protects
Elvey himself, law enforcement personnel in the jail, and the
public safety.

     Accordingly, as the trial court did not depart from the
essential requirements of law in adjudging Elvey incompetent to
proceed and involuntarily committing him to the Department’s
custody for restoration training, the Department’s petition for writ
of certiorari is DENIED.

    It is so ordered.

EDWARDS, C.J. and WALLIS, J., concur.
                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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