Court Opinion

ID: 9757880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:02:57.782807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:45.188826
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
No amount of verbal histrionics, legal irrelevances, or judicial smokescreens can conceal the simple issue,the resolution of which disposes of the present appeal. Section 977 of the 1937 Pennsylvania Election Code, 25 P.S. §2937, provides that all nomination petitions and papers shall be deemed valid unless objected to within seven days after the last day for filing. Arlen Specter filed his petition on March 7, 1967. As of March 14, 1967, nary an objection had been heard. Now, more than six months later, appellant stands be-, fore this Court, in equity, and seeks to enjoin Arlen Specter from running for mayor of Philadelphia unless he first resigns his office of district attorney. Thus, the issue is. framed: is §977 of the Pennsylvania *478Election Code the sole and exclusive remedy for challenging a person’s right to run for political office in Pennsylvania? On July 6, 1967, this Court in Jaspan v. Osser, S. Ct. Pa., East. Dist., Jan. Term, 1967, No. 393, held that it is.1 There is no reason to stray from that holding now. Accordingly, on the authority of Jaspan, I believe the present appeal should be quashed.
Any attempt to distinguish Jaspan can only serve further to pinpoint its identity with the present situation. Procedurally, the two cases are identical. In J aspan, the appellant therein sought to oust John B. Kelly, Jr. as a candidate for City Council on the theory that under the residency requirements of the Philadelphia Home Buie Charter he was ineligible to run. This complaint in equity was dismissed on the ground that §977 of the Election Code is the sole remedy.2 Jas*479pan’s appeal was then quashed by this Court. So also does the present appellant challenge a candidate’s right to run because of an alleged conflict with the Philadelphia Home Eule Charter. So also was the present appellant’s complaint dismissed below. And, so also should this Court now quash the present appeal.
Nevertheless, if, by some fantastic stretch of logic and law, the merits of this equity action are properly reached, the result is equally clear.
It is not open to question that only city officers are controlled by the Charter. So, once again, the issue is obvious: is Arlen Specter a city or a state officer? And, the answer is supplied not by one, but by two cases decided by this Court within the last year. The office of district attorney is a state office; Arlen Specter is a state officer. In Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Freed, 424 Pa. 508, 228 A. 2d 382 (1967), it was held that the district attorney did not have the subpoena power mandated by the Philadelphia Home Eule Charter since he was not subject to that Charter. Finally, as late as July 3, 1967, in Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Martin, 426 Pa. 102, 232 A. 2d 729 (1967), the district attorney was successful in a mandamus action to compel payment of his salary, again, because he was not a city officer and was not governed by the Philadelphia Home Eule Charter. Attempts have been made to undercut the holding in Martin by noting that only three Justices on the six member Court actually held Specter to be a state officer, a fourth concurring on the theory that Specter was entitled to be paid because he was at least a de facto district attorney. Two Justices dissented. To say that the mathematics of Martin prove that this Court did not really hold Spec*480ter to be a state officer is merely self deluding. Even had the concurring opinion been a dissent, thus leaving the Court divided 3-3, we would nevertheless have affirmed on the decision of the court below wherein Judge Waters held Specter to be a state officer.
I fully realize that the seven day “statute of limitations” provided by §977 is a short one. Nevertheless, appellant Chalfin cannot be heard to say that it worked an injustice on him. More than a mere taxpayer, the’ appellant is himself a candidate for City Controller of Philadelphia; he is a lawyer knowledgeable in political affairs. When Arlen Specter filed his petition on March 7, 1967, Chalfin no doubt was fully aware of all the legal entanglements that would be spawned by this act. Yet, not only did he fail to move within the seven days allowed under the law, he waited over four and one-half months before coming into equity. In a court where clean hands are the uniform of the day, appellant certainly deserves his share of demerits.
For these reasons, I concur in the affirmance of the court below.
Mr. Justice Jones and Mr. Justice O’Brien join in this concurring opinion.

 Jaspan’s complaint was dismissed by President Judge Gold on the precise ground that §977 was the exclusive remedy. An appeal from this decision was quashed upon petition and answer, without argument and without opinion. The fact that this appeal was quashed “without prejudice” indicates only that additional remedies under the election code, if any, could still have been pursued. Those words “without prejudice” were never intended to permit an action in equity, as the appellant contends. Indeed, the very appeal that was quashed was an action in equity.

 Much has been made of the fact that §976 of the Pennsylvania Election Code, 25 P.S. §2936, speaks only of technical defects in nomination papers and petitions which are patent on their face. Erom this it has been argued that the remedy section of the code, §977, can only be invoked when such defects appear, and .therefore, an underlying defect, such as the ineligibility of a candidate, is not covered by the code. Not only does J aspan itself prove that such is not the ease (Kelly’s alleged defect was his residence; it was certainly not patent), but the language of 977 shows, without doubt, that it was not intended to cover only the defects enumerated in §976. Section 977 recites that “if the court shall find that said nomination petition or paper is defective under the provisions of section 976 .. . or was not filed by persons entitled to file the same, it shall be set aside.” (Emphasis supplied.) The last phrase is a clear legislative “catch-all” designed precisely for attacks such as could have been made in Jaspan and should be *479made here. Appellant’s contention that the italicized language refers to the individuals who sign the petitions, rather than to the candidates themselves, is simply without merit.