Court Opinion

ID: 9352636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-09 00:17:29.727664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:58:19.160080
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed January 5, 2023.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                              NO. 14-21-00070-CV

         IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF KEVIN LEE THEDFORD

                   On Appeal from the 182nd District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. 0895230-0101Z

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This is an appeal from a civil commitment order, where a jury found that
appellant Kevin Lee Thedford is a sexually violent predator as defined in the Texas
Health and Safety Code and thereby subject to civil commitment.

      Thedford complains that (1) the evidence presented to the jury at trial was
legally insufficient to support its finding that he suffers from a behavioral
abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence,
and (2) the trial court erred by excluding his cross-examination of the State’s
expert as to her opinion whether Thedford would choose to reoffend in the future.
      We affirm.

                   I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      When Thedford was eighteen-years old he was charged with aggravated
sexual assault of a child under fourteen years of age, a charge based on allegations
that he was discovered performing oral sex on a nine-year-old boy. Three years
later, while on probation for that offense, Thedford was alleged to have raped a
nine-year-old girl in a McDonald’s bathroom. His probation was revoked, and he
agreed to serve a twenty year prison sentence for his conviction of the two
offenses.

      Eighteen years later, two years before his release date, appellee, the State of
Texas, commenced this action declaring Thedford a sexually violent predator and
requesting that Thedford be civilly committed for treatment and supervision under
Chapter 841 of the Health and Safety Code. The Civil Commitment of Sexually
Violent Predators Act (the “SVP Act”) provides a civil commitment procedure for
the long-term supervision and treatment of sexually violent predators. Tex. Health
& Safety Code Ann. § 841.001. Under the SVP Act, a person is a sexually violent
predator if the person “(1) is a repeat sexually violent offender; and (2) suffers
from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a
predatory act of sexual violence.” Id. § 841.003(a).

      Thedford was evaluated by two experts to determine whether Thedford
suffered from a behavioral abnormality makes him likely to engage in a predatory
act of sexual violence. The experts who evaluated Thedford testified at his trial
affirmatively as to the issue and explained the reasons for their conclusions. At the
close of trial, the trial court entered a directed verdict that Thedford was a repeat
sexually violent offender and instructed the jury that they were only required to
answer whether Thedford suffered from a behavioral abnormality that made the
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person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.1

       The jury answered “Yes”. On November 13, 2020, the trial court entered a
judgment committing Thedford to treatment at a secure correctional facility until
the behavioral abnormality altered to the extent that Thedford is no longer likely to
engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Thedford appeals.

                      II. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       In his first issue, Thedford complains the evidence is legally insufficient to
support a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt finding that he has “a behavioral abnormality
that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.”

       Standard of Review.           When reviewing legal-sufficiency in civil cases
where the prosecution’s burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, the
reviewing court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Commitment of
Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 674 (Tex. 2020). The court must “assume that the
factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder

1
  The single question posed to the jury was posed as follows: “Do you find beyond a reasonable
doubt that KEVIN LEE THEDFORD is a sexually violent predator?” To inform their decision,
the jury was provided instructions tracking the relevant statutory definitions under the Act,
including definitions for a “Sexually Violent Predator” and “Behavioral Abnormality”.

       You are instructed that a person is a “Sexually Violent Predator” for the purposes of
       Chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code if the person:
               1. is a repeat sexually violent offender; and
               2. suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in
               a predatory act of sexual violence.
                                                 ⁂ ⁂ ⁂
       “Behavioral Abnormality” means a congenital or acquired condition that, by affecting a
       person’s emotional or volitional capacity predisposes the person to commit a sexually
       violent offense, to the extent that the person becomes a menace to the health and safety of
       another person.

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could do so” and “disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have
disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d
256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). The court may not disregard undisputed facts that do not
support the finding. Id. at 674.

      Trial Evidence. Three witness testified at trial: Thedford, and two experts,
Michael Arambula, M.D. and Anoinette McGarrahan, Ph.D..

      Thedford. Thedford was asked about his record of sexual misconduct. He
admitted that when he was 17, he and his girlfriend from his special education
class who he had known for over four years were arrested for public lewdness for
having sex in the high school bathroom. Thedford believes his girlfriend was
imprisoned for over four years. Thedford testified that he spent “15 minutes” in
jail and officers talked to him and his mom, warning Thedford not to have sex in a
public area.

      Thedford also discussed the two events that prompted his 20-year prison
sentence. Regarding the first offense, Thedford admitted that he engaged in oral
sex with his nine-year-old neighbor. Thedford testified that “[the boy] came to me
to be his babysitter.” He testified that he knew the boy’s parents were home and
ultimately admitted that the boy’s stepmother had walked in when it was occurring.
Thedford recalled discussing with doctors that he had known the child to be
promiscuous with other children his age and that he had not told anyone about that,
and that the child had probably asked him to perform sex. Thedford testified that
he had been friends with the child:

      Q. Okay. Do you feel like you were being a good friend to [the boy]
      by sexually offending against him?
      A. Well, not just about that. I helped him in other ways, too. Not just
      that.
      Thedford testified that after committing the first offense he did not think he
                                         4
would commit another offense. Before detailing the second offense, he testified
that after three years of doing well on probation, he “was sliding back,”: “I just
snapped”.

      In the second offense, Thedford was charged with “knowingly causing the
penetration of the female sexual organ of. . .Complainant, [a nine year-old-girl]
(person younger than fourteen. . .) by placing his penis and finger in the female sex
organ of the Complainant” while working at McDonald’s. Though he had pled
guilty to the offense, at his commitment trial Thedford essentially denied fault in
the rape of his manager’s nine-year-old daughter inside a bathroom stall at
McDonald’s . He testified that the nine-year-old girl grabbed his hand and wanted
him to put it on her vagina. He testified that it was his fault “for not trying to, you
know, kind of push her a little bit. Not, like, hard or nothing. Like, say stop. Like --
but tell her, This is not right. This is wrong. But I didn't do that.”

      Thedford insisted that that his “old self” had died, and was “dead and gone.
Done[,]” and that he had changed when he was in prison. During his time in
prison, Thedford has not committed another offense against a child. Thedford
admitted that he had been given a disciplinary infraction when he performed
masturbation on another inmate in the prison dining hall. Thedford was reluctant to
identify the act as sex.

      Arambula. The jury heard the testimony of Dr. Arambula, a board-certified
forensic psychiatrist hired by the state to perform the behavioral abnormality
evaluation of Thedford. Arambula testified that he has performed roughly 175
behavioral abnormality evaluations for the State, and explained that his conclusion
was not predetermined upon being hired by the state. He explained that among
those evaluations, in roughly 25 to 30 of the cases, he determined the individual

                                            5
did not suffer from a behavioral abnormality.2 Thedford, however, was not among
that smaller group.         Ultimately, Arambula concluded that Thedford has a
behavioral abnormality that makes Thedford likely to engage in a predatory act of
sexual violence in the future, and further testified about how he arrived at that
conclusion.

       Arambula was asked about the statutory definition of “behavioral
abnormality.” He explained that the definition prompts him to consider how the
subject’s “brain is functioning, making decisions, and looking at risks and benefits
associated with their behavior.” He explained that the statutory language “menace
to the health and safety of another” narrowed his understanding that the group
falling under the definition was a very small subset of sex offenders who are
particularly dangerous.”

       Dr. Arambula testified about the methodology that he used in arriving at his
conclusion.     Arambula explained that he first performs a clinical evaluation
(“general psychiatric evaluation”) of the subject, performs a historical evaluation
(reviewing records indicating subjects developmental history, social history, school
records) and takes a medical history (surgical, medical, mental health, including
drugs and alcohol). Dr. Arambula testified that when he evaluates someone for a
behavioral abnormality he reviews any available records of that individual,
including the results of psychological tests that previous evaluators had
administered, including social, school history, any depositions in the case, and

2
  Arambula testified about his extensive training and experience in the field of forensic
psychiatry. Arambula testified that he spent close to 15 years teaching in the field of forensic
psychiatry. Additionally, he testified to extensive public service as the chair of the state’s
medical ethics committee, that that two Texas governors have appointed him to serve on the
Texas Medical Board and that he has served for over two years as president of the board.
Arambula was educated on the subject of sexual behaviors during his fellowship training in
Chicago and since then has taught on the subject and trained residents. Arambula does not
currently treat sex offenders but has previously worked as a licensed offender treatment provider.

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prison administrative records. In this case, Dr. Arambula reviewed, in addition to
other information, investigative reports and legal records associated with
Thedford’s prior offenses, Thedford’s deposition testimony, and his administrative
records from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), including a
behavior abnormality assessment report administered by a psychologist for the
TDCJ. Dr. Arambula explained that this is the same methodology and these are the
same kind of records used by other experts in his field when formulating an
opinion in civil commitment cases.

      Arambula’s forensic analysis included the review of data from his
evaluation, other evaluations in the file, and from other records associated with
Thedford. He explained:

      Beyond that, then I focus on the forensic matters which in these cases
      are the sexual offenses. And I try to obtain as much information as the
      individual remembers about what happened, what led up to it, why did
      they do this, what occurred during the offense, and then what did they
      do afterwards. In other words, I look at the continuum here. If it -- in
      these cases, since they are repeat offenses, then I try to understand
      how long in between, why did it not continue, why did it pick back
      up. And, again, I go through the same details that the individual will
      share with me so I have an understanding of why they did what -- why
      they did -- why they did what they did.
      And then I'll look at investigative records related to their offenses,
      some of the legal records, what they've done in prison. So, I look at
      what kind of courses and classes they've taken to improve their job
      skills, personal skills. And then I look at treatment records to see if
      indeed they've taken sex offender treatment and to better understand
      how much they understand about their illness so that way they can
      manage it in the future. And then ultimately I put all that together and
      then arrive at an opinion regarding behavioral abnormality
      Arambula diagnosed Thedford with paraphilic disorder (a type of sexual
deviance). Based on his two-hour evaluation of Thedford, guided by his education,
training, experience, and the methodology that he employed in this case, he
                                         7
concluded that Thedford suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him
likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence.

      Arambula testified that the severity of appellant’s sexual deviance was the
most significant risk factor in his evaluation. He explained that this assessment
was significantly attributed to age and appearance of Thedford’s past targets–as
having “no secondary sex characteristics.”3 Arambula also discussed his concern
that appellant blamed the victims: “it's an example of not accepting responsibility,
not being aware of their behavior when the investigation revealed the exact
opposite.” Arambula suggested that because he is a doctor, bound by a different
code of ethics than lawyers and judges, he does not disregard allegations in the
criminal records that might not be accounted for in the criminal charge and
judgment. For example, in the file relating to Thedford’s first offense, where the
conviction was based on one incident, he explained that statements had suggested
the occurrence happened over ten times beginning five years previously, and that
Thedford had suggested the conduct was acceptable because the boy had been
“messing around with other kids”.

      Arambula discussed his concern regarding the risk associated with the
escalation of physical violence between the first and second offense. He described
the second offense as desperate and aggressive, and testified that the records
indicated Thedford had followed the nine-year-old girl into a bathroom stall in the
girl's restroom, covered her mouth, knocked her to the ground and then raped her.

      Arambula testified that the second incident presented facts that Thedford’s
volitional capacity was affected because he had already been in trouble for public
lewdness as a child, pled guilty to a sexual offense, and knew he was under

      3
         Arambula described this phrase to mean children at an age with a “body shape and
image like a stick figure”, “that haven’t started developing yet.”

                                           8
supervision. In short, “he knew it was wrong.”

       Arambula explained that in evaluating the history of appellant’s conduct in
prison, the consensual incident occurring with another inmate in the chow hall was
noteworthy as unusually “risky” conduct due to its public nature. He explained
that “yes, sex goes on in prison; but in public, you’ll get caught, [and] punished.”

       McGarrahan. Dr. Antoinette McGarrahan, a psychologist specializing in
forensic psychology and neuropsychology, was also hired to provide her
professional opinion4 as to whether Thedford has a behavioral abnormality and is
likely to engage in future predatory acts of sexual violence. Like Arambula,
McGarrahan concluded that Thedford has a behavioral abnormality that makes him
likely to engage in a future predatory act of sexual violence.

       McGarrahan testified that the methodology she used in evaluating Thedford
involved reviewing records, which typically includes prior convictions, offense
reports, witness and victim statements, medical records, institutional records,
educational records, and judgments and sentences from the courts where the
individual faced charges. McGarrahan testified that she normally interviews the
individual if he agrees to a face-to-face evaluation, and also conducts a mental
status examination. Her methodology incorporates the use of actuarial instruments,
which she described as “tools that are utilized in these sorts of cases, to look at
which risk factors the individual has or doesn't have to determine their risk of
recidivism.”

       McGarrahan described risk factors from her assessment of Thedford,
including sexual deviance in the form of sexual interest in children, lacking an

4
 McGarrahan has postgraduate degrees in forensic psychology and neuropsychology and teaches
a forensic psychology course to doctorate students since 2005. She works on various types of
cases and has been performing behavioral abnormality evaluations since 2000.

                                             9
emotionally intimate relationship with an adult in the past, poorly managed anger,
and what she called “internal grievance thinking” or “the victim stance” (based on
his denial of responsibility for prior acts), “poor coping skills”, and Thedford’s
inability to avoid trouble while under supervision or while in an institutional
setting.

                                     Analysis

       On appeal, Thedford raises points that even if accepted would not tip the
scales in Thedford’s favor. In one point, Thedford acknowledges that he should
have enrolled in a sex offender treatment class as part of his probation, but also
contends that he was not required to do so by his probation officer and that there
was no evidence that he was offered a sex offender treatment program during his
current incarceration.   Thedford contends “it obviously mattered” to the jury
because the jury asked during deliberations if such treatment had been offered. We
are reluctant to decipher, like Thedford, any meaning from either the jury’s
question or the fact the jury asked the question, as one could equally surmise that
the jury’s verdict reflects that the jury considered and eliminated doubts with
respect to the availability of sex offender treatment in prison. We also note that
Arambula testified that Thedford is an untreated sex offender while McGarrahan
testified that Thedford had received some treatment, and some counseling in a
group home, but continued to offend even while in treatment. Whether he received
any treatment or not, the record shows that Thedford never completed a sex
offender treatment program.

       Thedford told the jury that he does not need treatment — that he changed;
that he believes it is safe for him to be around children when he is released from
prison. Given his history, various contradictions cited in the criminal records by
the experts, the testimony of the experts and Thedford, the jury was free to

                                        10
disregard his testimony that Thedford had changed and believe McGarrahan’s
testimony that Thedford does not have the tools he needs to manage and control his
sexual deviance.

      Thedford argues that “it is highly likely that Thedford would not be able to
effectively participate in a traditional sex offender treatment program due to his
intellectual disability and not a behavioral abnormality.” Ultimately, Thedford
accepts the proposition that he “lacks emotional or volitional control” but insists
that the experts, the jury and the courts should associate evidence of Thedford’s
past misconduct with Thedford’s intellectual limitations rather than his behavioral
abnormality.    Thedford presumes the two (intellectual disability and behavioral
abnormality) are mutually exclusive conditions but offered no evidence or
meaningful argument to support his proposition. However, even if there is some
evidence that Thedford suffers from some intellectual impairment, ample
evidence—testimony offered from each of the three witnesses—illustrated
Thedford’s pedophilia and his impaired volition. In re Commitment of Hebert, 578
S.W.3d 154, 158 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, no pet.)(finding behavioral abnormality
and noting intellectual deficit).

      Thedford himself testified, although he believed he had control of himself
after the first offense, he “just snapped.” In further support of the jury’s verdict,
both experts provided the jury with evidence of the likelihood of Thedford’s
behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of
violence that remains uncontradicted.

      After considering the evidence presented to the jury in the light most
favorable to the verdict, we hold that a rational trier of fact could find that
Thedford has a behavioral abnormality which impairs his volition and that makes
him likely to engage in a future predatory act of sexual violence. See Tex. Health

                                         11
& Safety Code Ann. § 841.003(a); Short, 521 S.W.3d at 919.

      We therefore overrule Thedford’s first issue.

                           III. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

      In his second issue, Thedford raises one or more evidentiary complaints
based on trial court’s rulings sustaining the State’s objections to Thedford’s trial
counsel’s cross-examination of the State’s expert, Dr. McGarrahan.

      Standard of Review. We review the evidentiary rulings of the trial court
under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Trial courts have discretion in evidentiary
rulings, and we will uphold such rulings if they are within the zone of reasonable
disagreement. In re Commitment of Grice, 558 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) citing Diamond Offshore Servs. Ltd. v.
Williams, 542 S.W.3d 539, 545 (Tex. 2018). A trial court abuses its discretion
when it acts arbitrarily, without regard to any guiding rules and principles. In re
Commitment of Dunsmore, 562 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Oct. 18, 2018, no pet.).

      Record of the Evidentiary Ruling. During the examination of McGarrahan,
Thedford’s attorney began a series of questions about the relative volition of sex
offenders generally and Thedford specifically, with respect to future predatory
offenses. Thedford’s attorney first asked McGarrahan, “If Kevin reoffends in the
future, will he choose to do so?” Without an intervening objection, McGarrahan
testified, “He might or he might not.” No objection followed, until after the next
question, when trial counsel inquired into the basis of the opinion and asked,
“What are the factors that he might or might not?” The State’s attorney objected to
the question on “relevance and speculation” grounds, and the trial court sustained
the objection based on speculation.

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      Thedford’s counsel then asked a generic version of the first question that had
been answered without objection, asking: “Do sex offenders generally choose their
behavior?” McGarrahan responded, “I don't think I can speculate on what is going
through the mind of a sex offender at a particular time. I don't have any way to
determine that.” The State did not object to either the question or answer.
Thedford’s counsel then followed by framing the same question specifically as to
Thedford:

      Q. Okay. So, you don't know whether he'll choose to reoffend or not.
      If he reoffends, you don't know whether he'll choose to reoffend or
      not. If he reoffends, will his re-offense be a product of free will?
This prompted the following objection and discussion:

      MS. WHITTMORE: Objection. Again, speculation. And also it's
      confusing.
      MR. BENNETT: She's here as an expert on this subject, your Honor.
      Surely she knows whether choice will be a matter -- it will be there or
      not.
      THE COURT: Say your question again because I think it's -- I think
      that's what drawing the objection. What is your question exactly?
      MR. BENNETT: If somebody like Kevin chooses -- excuse me. If
      somebody like Kevin reoffends, is he going to choose to do so. She's
      an expert on psychology and on neuropsychology. Surely she knows
      what a choice is and what a non-choice -- a behavior that's not chosen.
      THE COURT: But the problem I think she's having -- and I usually
      don't speak with this -- is that you're guessing. She's speculating as to
      what he's going to choose to do. But if you were to like --
      MR. BENNETT: Well, would in general be --
      THE COURT: There you go. Hypothetically.
      MR. BENNETT: Thank you.
      Q. (BY MR. BENNETT) Hypothetically, Doctor, if a sex offender
      reoffends, hypothetically, does he or she choose to do that?
      A. I think that's a philosophical question that I cannot -- I cannot be in

                                         13
      the mind of sex offenders or a particular sex offender to say how or
      why they do what they do.
Questioning continued until the State objected to Thedford’s counsel’s questions to
McGarrahan based on legal standards with reference to Texas statutes and the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kansas v. Crane. 534 U.S. 407, 411,
122 S. Ct. 867, 869, 151 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2002). The record does not contain any
specific question that Thedford’s counsel sought to ask (and was precluded from
asking McGarrahan), but the record shows that Thedford’s counsel explained the
to the court that the basis of his questions was to inform the jury that Texas’s
statute authorizing civil commitment based on behavioral abnormalities affecting
“emotional or volitional” capacity conflicts with Kansas v. Crane which required
at least some lack-of-control determination. The State argued to the court that the
issue before the jury was limited to proving that Thedford has a congenital or
acquired condition that affects his emotional or volitional capacity. The court
sustained the State’s objection.

      In summary, liberally construing his trial objections and his argument on
appeal, Thedford complains that the trial court erred in sustaining objections to
three categories of questions: (1) whether, if Thedford committed a predatory
offense in the future, such offense would be an act of volition; (2) the basis, or
factors supporting, McGarrahan’s answer to the first question, that such a future
predatory act by “[Thedford] might or he might not” be an act of volition; and (3)
unspecified further questioning aimed at illustrating that the Texas statute conflicts
with constitutional authority.

      Analysis. First, Thedford complains that the trial court erred in sustaining
objections to specific and generic questions as to whether, if Thedford (or any
sexually violent predator) committed a predatory act in the future, that act would
be a volitional act. Even accounting for her field of expertise, there was no basis in
                                         14
the record for McGarrahan to respond precisely to the questions asked; the
questions asked McGarrahan to speculate as to Thedford’s (or another’s) state of
mind at the time of a possible future offense. This would, as McGarrahan testified,
be mere speculation. See Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 786
(Tex. 2020), reh'g denied (Oct. 2, 2020)(“speculative [expert] opinion testimony is
not relevant evidence because it does not make the existence of a material fact
more or less probable”).

      Second, Thedford complains that he was prevented from asking the follow-
up question– “What are the factors that he might or might not [be exercising free
will upon committing any future predatory offense]? Again, we find no error. The
trial court would not have abused its discretion in refusing the testimony on the
basis that the question was confusing or speculative, and would have elicited a
response that would only confuse the jury.      See Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC,
610 S.W.3d at 786.

      Finally, Thedford failed to preserve a complaint that the trial court refused to
permit questions aimed at illustrating that the SVP Act conflicts with constitutional
authority. In the course of discussions at the bench, appellant never detailed for
the court or opposing counsel what particular questions he sought to ask
McGarrahan or what response he expected to obtain. This would be particularly
important, because this court has previously addressed the Crane case and has
found similar constitutional challenges to be unavailing. In re Commitment of
Wirtz, 451 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)(“the
Crane court focuses “the constitutional analysis on the seriousness of the
abnormality and the seriousness of the danger to society posed by the abnormality,
and not fundamentally on the nature of the abnormality as ‘volitional, emotional or
cognitive.’”). Without a more detailed explanation as to what testimony he sought

                                         15
to obtain (or at a minimum the questions he sought to ask), we cannot conclude
that the trial court was made aware directly or by context of the substance of the
anticipated testimony. Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(2)(“if the ruling excludes evidence, a
party informs the court of its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance
was apparent from the context.”); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Garden Ridge, L.P. v.
Clear Lake Ctr., L.P., 504 S.W.3d 428, 439 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2016, no pet.)(“primary purpose of making an offer of proof is to enable an
appellate court to determine whether the exclusion of the evidence was erroneous
and harmful”).

      Having addressed each of the sub-points Thedford raises under his second
issue, we overrule appellant’s second issue.

                                 IV. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled each of appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.

                                       /s/     Randy Wilson
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Poissant, and Wilson.

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