Court Opinion

ID: 9840997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 20:08:50.639013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:38:37.399483
License: Public Domain

ORIGINAL                                     09/20/2023

                                          DA 23-0054
                                                                                      Case Number: DA 23-0054

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                          2023 MT 177

THE MARY ELLEN DUKE TRUST dated March 13, 1997,
MILLARD COX, MINA COX, and TROUT CREEK RANCH,

              Plaintiffs and Appellees,
                                                                      FILED
         v.
                                                                       SEP 2 0 2023
LEE LOU, LLC, a Montana Limited Liability Company,                   BOWerl Greenwood
                                                                   Clerk of Supreme Court
                                                                      State of Montana
              Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District,
                       In and For the County of Stillwater, Cause No. DV 21-70
                       Honorable Matthew J. Wald, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                For Appellant:

                       W. Scott Green, Patten, Peterman, Bekkedahl & Green, PLLC,
                       Billings, Montana

                For Appellees:

                       Brandon Hoskins, Moulton Bellingham PC, Billings, Montana

                                                  Submitted on Briefs: August 2, 2023

                                                            Decided: September 20, 2023

Filed:

                                             Cler1
                                             6t cH
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1        Lee Lou, LLC (Lee Lou) appeals the denial of its partial motion for summary

judgment and the granting of Plaintiff s motion for summary judgment entered in the

Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Stillwater County. We affirm.

¶2        We restate the issue on appeal as follows:

          Whether the District Court erred in determining Tract 3 was the servient estate and
          Tracts 1 and 2 were the dominant estates regarding a 30' easement.

                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3        In 1989, the Trout Creek Ranch Partnership (TCRP) sought to buy a parcel of land

in Stillwater County from A. Joe Jenni, Jr., Callie W. Jenni, and Robert W. Jenni (the

Jennis). The land was to be collectively owned by TCRP with three individual tracts being

carved out from the Jennis' land for separate ownership by each of the three TCRP owners:

Millard Cox and Mina J. Cox (Coxes), A. St. George B. Duke and Mary Ellen Duke

(Dukes) and R.A. Roehder (Roehder).                Before purchasing the property, TCRP

commissioned Certificate of Survey 260286 (COS 260286) that created the three individual

tracts.    The COS 260286 also depicted three different easements, including the 30'

easement that is the subject of this litigation. The COS 260286 was filed with the Clerk

and Recorder in Stillwater County on January 22, 1990.

¶4        On April 17, 1990, the Jennis conveyed the Trout Creek Ranch Property to TCRP

and conveyed Tract 1 to the Coxes, Tract 2 to the Dukes, and Tract 3 to Roehder. At the

conclusion of these transactions, in addition to the property owned by TCRP itself, each of

these TCRP owners possessed their own individual tracts. The warranty deed conveying
                                               2
the Trout Creek Ranch Property provides the property is given "TOGETHER with thirty

foot (30') wide easements for ingress and egress as shown on [COS 260286]." The

warranty deeds from the Jennis to the Coxes and Dukes also contain the same "together

with" language which included a 30' wide easement. However, the deed to Roehder from

the Jennis for Tract 3 did not contain any mention of a 30' easement, and simply conveyed

the property "subject to existing rights-of-way, easements, reservations and exceptions of

record," which was standard language also contained in the other two deeds.

¶5     Subsequently, the three TCRP owners executed a series of quitclaim deeds to each

other in May and June of 1990, disclaiming, any interest the parties had in each other's

assigned tracts. Similar to the original warranty deeds, the quitclaim deeds for Tracts 1

and 2 contained the phrase "together with a thirty foot (30') wide easement for ingress and

egress[,]" while the deeds for Tract 3 only contained the standard language of "subject to

existing rights-of-way, easements, reservations and exceptions of record."

¶6     A few years after the transactions, Roehder sold his interest in the TCRP but

continued to own Tract 3 until his death. Tract 3 was then acquired by Zinvest, LLC

(Zinvest) by tax deed after Roehder's estate defaulted on the taxes for the property. Zinvest

then conveyed the property to Lee Lou. Tracts 1 and 2 continue to be held by the original

parties or their successors. Lee Lou alleged that a historical access road follows the path

of the 30' easement and provides access to the only residential structure on Tract 3.

¶7     On September 27, 2021, Trout Creek Ranch, the Coxes, and the Dukes (collectively

"Partnership) filed a complaint to quiet title with two counts: (I) a declaratory judgment

                                             3
that Lee Lou owns no interest in the 30' easement and only the Partnership has an interest

in the easement and (II) a permanent injunction preventing Lee Lou from using any roads

across the Partnership's lands, including the easements depicted on COS 260286. On

October 12, 2021, Lee Lou filed an answer and counterclaim, opposing the Partnership's

claims and pleading three counts of its own: (I) a quiet title action for Tract 3 against the

Partnership and third-party defendants (II) declaratory relief to determine the parties' rights

related to the easements and rights-of-way depicted in COS.260286, and (III) temporary

and permanent injunctive relief preventing the Partnership from interfering with Lee Lou's

use of the easements and rights-of-way to access Tract 3. The Partnership then filed their

answer, opposing such relief.

       Lee Lou filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Count II on May 13, 2022,

and the Partnership opposed that motion and responded with their own motion for summary

judgment on their two counts. The parties did not assert there were any issues of material

fact although they disagreed on some collateral issues, and the District Court considered

these motions without a hearing. The District Court first found that COS 260286 could not

on its own have created any easement rights since it contains no granting language and was

completed while all the property was still under singular ownership. The Court further

explained COS 260286 did not describe the easement adequately enough for it to be

established by the easement-by-reference doctrine since it is not clear from the survey itself

what the easement's intended uses were, or which estates are dominant and servient. The

Court then found there was an easement created by the deeds, but that they established

                                              4
Tracts 1 and 2 as the dominant estates and Tract 3 as the servient estate as alleged by the

Partnership. Lastly, the Court found the relevant extrinsic evidence supported the Court's

conclusions, although it was not necessary to use extrinsic evidence to reach its

conclusions. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Partnership, concluding

that Tract 3 is burdened by the 30' easement and cannot benefit from it.

¶9     Lee Lou timely appealed the decision.

                              STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10    We review district court grants or denials of summary judgment de novo, applying

the same criteria as the district courts. Hudson v. Irwin, 2018 MT 8, ¶ 12, 390 Mont. 138,

408 P.3d 1283. Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

M. R. Civ. P. 56. We review conclusions of law for correctness and the district court's

findings of fact to determine if they are clearly erroneous. Hudson, ¶ 12.

                                     DISCUSSION

111    Whether the District Court er•red in determining Tract 3 was the servient estate and
       Tracts I and 2 were the dominant estates regarding a 30' easement.

112   An easement is a right to use the land of another for a specific purpose. Blazer v.

Wall, 2008 MT 145,1 24, 343 Mont. 173, 183 P.3d 84. An easement can be created by an

express grant or reservation in a written instrument of conveyance, by operation of law, or

by prescription. Blazer, ¶ 26. An easement appurtenant benefits a particular piece of land,

and the benefited piece of land is called the dominant estate, while the burdened piece of

land is called the servient estate. Burleson v. Kinsey-Cartwright, 2000 MT 278, ¶ 16, 302
                                              5
Mont. 141, 13 P.3d 384. This Court has recognized the easement-by-reference doctrine,

where "an express easement may be created by referring in an instrument of conveyance

to a recorded plat or certificate of survey on which the easement is adequately described."

Yorlum Props. v. Lincoln County, 2013 MT 298, ¶ 16, 372 Mont. 159, 311 P.3d 748. For

an easement to be considered adequately described, the dominant and servient estates must

be "ascertainable with reasonable certainty" from the transaction documents and the

transaction documents must givethe owner of the servient estate "knowledge of its use or

its necessity." Yorlum, ¶ 18 (citations oinitted). The instrument of conveyance and the

referenced plat or certificate of survey together must show "clear and unambiguous grantor

intent" to convey an easement and must describe "with reasonable certainty the intended

dominant and servient estates, use, and location of the easement." O'Keefe v. Mustang

Ranches HOA, 2019 MT 179, ¶ 18, 396 Mont. 454, 446 P.3d 509.

      A. COS 260286 does not describe the easement with the required specificity to
      fulfill the requirements of the easement-by-reference doctrine.

¶12    COS 260286 does not adequately describe the easement so that th'e dominant and

servient estates, the easeinent's use, and its scope can be ascertained with reasonable

certainty. The easement at issue is labeled "30' Access Esm't" on COS 260286 and it is

depicted by a thin line that appears to run from Stillwater Road across Trout Creek Ranch

property, touches Tract 1, traverses Tract 2, and connects to the western border of Tract 3.

However, for an undetermined distance, the easement appears to track the eastern boundary

of Tract 1 and the western boundary of Tract 3, and it is unclear how far, if at all, the

easement continues along those boundaries. The ambiguity is reinforced by the partles
                                         6
debating about the location of the easement on appeal, with Lee Lou maintaining that the

easement ends at the boundary of Tract 3 and the Partnership alleging that the easement

continues along the boundary of Tract 3 until it connects to BLM land to the north.'

¶13    It is unclear from COS 260286 alone which are the intended dominant and servient

estates. This Court has required that the identities of the dominant and the servient estates

must be "ascertainable with reasonable certainty from the referenced plat or certificate of

survey" to fulfill the easement-by-reference doctrine. Blazer, ¶ 54. In Blazer, this Court

found those requirements were not met because, while there was a 30-foot easement

depicted on the certificate of survey, it was not clear whether the easement was to benefit

Tract 4 or to burden Tract 4. Blazer, ¶¶ 56-57. This contrasts with other cases where it

was apparent with reasonable certainty which were the dominant and servient estates based

on the certificate of survey or plat. For example, in Bache, this Court concluded it was

clear from the depiction of the easement that it burdened Tract 2 for the benefit of Tract 1

so that access was provided to the state route. Blazer, ¶ 52 (citing Bache v. Owens, 267

Mont. 279, 285-86, 883 P.2d 817, 821-22 (1994)). Similarly, in Halverson, it was clear

that the depicted 30-foot road burdened Turner's tract for the benefit of Dahlia's tract that

was otherwise landlocked and had no access to the public street without the easement.

Blazer, ¶ 52 (citing Halverson v. Turner, 268 Mont. 168, 170-71, 885 P.2d 1285, 1287-88

I Although the parties debate on appeal whether the easement reaches as far as BLM land, neither
party maintains that there was a dispute of material fact, making summary judgment inappropriate.
Furthermore, how far north the easement reaches is immaterial to what is being appealed, namely
which land is the dominant estate with the right to use the easement.
                                                  7
(1994)). Further, in Wilkinson, this Court again found the dominant and servient estates

were clear from the plat and Government Lot 7 clearly needed the easement across

Government Lot 3 to access Bear Gulch Road. Wilkinson, LLC v. Scott & Cindy Erler,

LLP, 2021 MT 177, ¶ 13, 404 Mont. 541, 491 P.3d 704.

¶14   When -considering this precedent, the present case is more like Blazer where the

dominant and servient estates and the easement's use were not clearly ascertainable from

the plat or survey. As in Blazer, it is unclear from COS 260286 which parcels are meant

to benefit from the 30' easement and which are meant to be burdened by it.

                             7546761'

 JJ

                                                          CORTE DATA

                                                    POAD Cs

                                          ROUT CREEK RANCH
                                                              LEGEND
                                               DATA
                                        n•aLL.oa
                                                                er-q-nliTEPTIOC
                                        As ir °ed.                 — MOW CAP I
                                        I-di late                    SET OM%
                                                                       tiltsLIM
                                                                  „. PEOAD—ACC
                                                                     eftpLASTIC

Lower part of the 30' easement as it touches Tract 1

                                                        8
                   004.on                    73113'
                      Top ot kin
                      114 illopurponl
                          lH
                                        na                1 2
                                                      •

t30. k774 is
  Els71.

 5
ts<.et

Upper part of 30' easernent and Tracts 2 and 3

We conclude it is not clear which estates are dominant or servient and, therefore, the

incorporation of COS 260286 by the deed to Tract 3 did not establish an easement for the

benefit of Tract 3.

         B. The deeds establish Tract I and 2 as dominant estates and Tract 3 as a servient
         estate.

¶15      Since COS 260286 alone did not contain an adequate description of the easement,

it can be considered alongside the deeds to see if the easement can be ascertained clearly

from the combination of the deeds and COS 260286. 0 'Keefe,¶ 18. To create an express

easement, an instrument of conveyance and any references to a plat, certificate of survey,

or map of record "must be sufficient together to express clear and unambiguous grantor

intent to grant or reserve an easement . . . [describing] the intended dominant and servient

estates, use, and location of the easement." O'Keefe, ¶ 18 (emphasis in original). Upon

                                               9
examination, we conclude the language of both the quitclaim and warranty deeds for Tract

3 in combination with COS 260286 is not enough to establish an easement for the benefit

of Tract 3.

¶17     The original warranty deed for Tract 3 describes the property as:

        Tract 3 of Certificate of Survey No. 260286, according to the official plat
        thereof on file and of record in the office of the Clerk and Recorder of said
        county, under Document No. 260286, containing 21.304 acres more or less,

        Subject to existing rights-of-way, easements, reservations, and exceptions of
        record [.]

Unlike the deeds to Tracts 1 and 2, there is no language of "together with a thirty foot (30')

wide easement for ingress and egress" as part of Tract 3's legal description. There is no

reference to any easement; rather, standard language is used describing the property is

"subject to" existing easements. The quitclaim deeds for Tract 3 have the same "subject

to" language as the warranty deed.

¶18     This Court's precedent clearly establishes that "subject to" language does not

generally create an easement. See Blazer, ¶ 28; Bache, 267 Mont. at 286; Wild River

Adventures v. Board of Trustees of Sch. Dist. No. 8, 248 Mont. 397, 401, 812 P.2d 344,

346-47 (1991). We have previously explained:

        The words "subject to" used in their ordinary sense, mean subordinate
         to, subservient to or limited by. There is nothing in the use of the words
      . "subject to", in their ordinary use, which would even hint at the creation
        of affirmative rights or connote a reservation or retention of property
        rights. "Subject to" wording is commonly used in a deed to refer to
        existing easements, liens, and real covenants that the grantor wishes to
        exclude from warranties of title.

                                              10
Wild River, 248 Mont. at 401, 812 P.2d at 346-47. Therefore, the "subject to" line in the

deeds to Tract 3 could not have created an easement for Tract 3's benefit in combination

with COS 260286.

1118   In contrast, the "together with" language that includes an easement on the deeds for

Tracts 1 and 2 did create an easement for the benefit of Tracts 1 and 2, making them

dominant estates. Tracts 1 and 2 have a similar legal description to Tract 3 except they

both contain the dispositive language "together with a thirty foot (30') wide easement for

ingress and egress as shown in said Certificate of Survey." These deeds establish the 30'

easement was for the benefit of Tracts 1 and 2. The deed for the Trout Creek Ranch

Property also contains this language demonstrating that the easement Was also intended to

benefit the Trout Creek Ranch Property.

¶19    Lee Lou argues the District Court failed to give appropriate credit and weight to the

following standard appurtenance language in Tract 3's warranty and quitclaim deeds

placed just after Tract 3's legal description: "TOGETHER with all and singular the

hereinbefore described premises together with all tenements, hereditaments, and

appurtenances thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining . . . ." This is standard

language that appears in all the deeds to all the tracts, and some version of such language

is in most deeds. Lee Lou refers to this Court's decision in Clark where similar language

was found to grant an easement. Clark v. Pennock, 2010 MT 192, ¶ 9, 357 Mont. 338, 239

P.3d 922. However, the language in Clark included an express reference to a particular

easement, providing after the standard language: "including a general non-exclusive

                                            11
sixty-foot (60') easement for ingress to and egress from the above-described lot or

tract . . . ." Clark, ¶ 9. This is different from the standard language contained in the Tract

3 deeds, especially when contrasted with the deeds to Tracts 1 and 2 that do specifically

mention the 30' easement in the legal description of the property. Although Clark allowed

for the creation of an easement with language outside of the legal description, it still

required specific language identifying the easement and its use, which is absent from the I

present facts. While standard appurtenance language can convey easements already in

existence when a property is transferred, it cannot create new ones without more specific

language."

       C. The District Court did not improperly use extrinsic evidence to reach its
       conclusion.

¶20    Lastly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in addressing extrinsic

evidence presented by the parties as this evidence was not used to reach its conclusion but,

rather, confirm it. A land conveyance is treated like a contract for the purposes of

considering extrinsic evidence. Proctor v. Werk, 220 Mont. 246, 248, 714 P.2d 171, 172

(1986) (citing § 70-1-513, MCA). If the language of the deed is clear and explicit, the

court should not consider extrinsic evidence. Proctor, 220 Mont. at 248, 714 P.2d at 172.

Extrinsic evidence may be used to resolve an ambiguity in an otherwise sufficient

conveyance. Blazer, ¶ 70-71. A conveyance instrument must provide notice of the burden

to the servient estate owner without reference to extrinsic evidence, otherwise purchasers

could not rely on records in the chain of title to determine which easements might burden

their property. Blazer, ¶ 74. In Woods, this court found the District Court was correct to
                                           12
not consider extrinsic evidence because the terms of the conveyance stating the easement

was to be used for ingress and egress were clear and specific. Woods v. Shannon, 2015

MT 76, ¶ 14, 378 Mont. 365, 344 P.3d 413. In Clark, this Court concluded the District

Court erred in considering extrinsic evidence since the easement language was specific,

but it affirmed the result since the same conclusion was reached regardless of whether

extrinsic evidence was considered. Clark, ¶¶ 27-28.

¶21    The District Court need not have considered extrinsic evidence since the terms of

the deed were clear in identifying the eakment and its use. Although the District Court

discussed the extrinsic evidence presented by the parties, it made clear "the documents

speak for themselves" and the extrinsic evidence was "ultimately unnecessary to the

Court's conclusions." While the District Court could have declined to discuss the affidavits

at all, its discussion still does not violate the bar against considering extrinsic evidence

when the granting language is specific. Additionally, even if the District Court had

improperly utilized extrinsic evidence, it still came to the same conclusion as warranted by

the deed language and, like Clark, arrived at the correct result.

                                      CONCLUSION

¶22    The District Court did not err in determining that Tract 3 does not benefit frorn the

30' easement depicted on COS 260286 and Tracts 1 and 2 do benefit from the easement.

¶23   Affirmed.

                                             13
We Concur:

     "r
    nor                 r
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             Justices

                                 14