Court Opinion

ID: 9897427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:25.477233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.489254
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Apr 13 2023, 8:46 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Gregory L. Fumarolo                                         Theodore E. Rokita
Fort Wayne, Indiana                                         Attorney General of Indiana

                                                            Caroline G. Templeton
                                                            Deputy Attorney General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ray Sorgdrager,                                             April 13, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            22A-CR-1175
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Allen Superior
                                                            Court
State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable David M. Zent,
Appellee-Plaintiff                                          Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            02D06-1905-F1-9

                      Opinion by Chief Judge Altice
                           Judge Tavitas concurs.
     Judge Brown concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023                               Page 1 of 19
      Case Summary
[1]   Following a jury trial, Ray Sorgdrager was convicted of two counts of child

      molesting, one as a Level 1 felony and the other as a Level 4 felony, and

      sentenced to an aggregate term of forty-one years in the Indiana Department of

      Correction (the DOC). On appeal, Sorgdrager presents the following restated

      issues for review:

              1. Did the State present sufficient evidence to support the Level
                 1 felony conviction?

              2. Do Sorgdrager’s dual convictions for child molesting violate
                 Indiana’s prohibition against double jeopardy?

              3. Is Sorgdrager’s sentence inappropriate in light of the nature of
                 his offenses and his character?

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts & Procedural History
[3]   G.L.’s parents, Mother and Father, divorced in 2014 when she was five years

      old. Mother married Sorgdrager later that year and had two daughters with

      him, M. and E., born over the next couple years. Sorgdrager had been a friend

      of the family and involved in G.L.’s life since shortly after she was born.

[4]   Mother initially had primary physical custody of G.L. after the divorce. Shortly

      after Father married Nicole, a teacher, in July 2015, Mother and Father agreed

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023          Page 2 of 19
      that G.L. should live with Father, as G.L. was starting first grade and had

      struggled a bit academically in kindergarten. Though the parents lived in

      different towns, Mother exercised regular parenting time, which included G.L.

      spending alternating weekends at Mother and Sorgdrager’s home.

[5]   On Friday, November 16, 2018, G.L., who had just turned ten years old, began

      her weekend visit at Mother’s home. She and Mother went to a movie that

      night, while Sorgdrager stayed home with M. and E. G.L. and Mother did not

      arrive home until about midnight, so G.L. decided to sleep in the main-floor

      guest bedroom to not awaken three-year-old M., with whom she typically slept

      across the hall. Sorgdrager remained awake playing games on the computer,

      while Mother went to sleep in their basement bedroom.

[6]   After everyone else was asleep, Sorgdrager entered the dark guest bedroom

      wearing a t-shirt and boxers and kissed G.L. twice on the lips. G.L. “kind of

      just froze” and pretended to still be asleep. Transcript Vol. 2 at 184. Sorgdrager

      then moved her shirt, lifted up her sports bra, and started licking her chest. He

      then left the room briefly.

[7]   Upon his return, Sorgdrager used his finger to trace the front seams of the shorts

      G.L. was wearing. He then put his hand under her shorts, over her underwear,

      before removing his hand to lick his finger. After licking his finger, Sorgdrager

      put his hand back under her shorts and, this time, inside her underwear and

      then “start[ed] rubbing [her] private area with his finger.” Id. at 186. He licked

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023        Page 3 of 19
       his hand again and then placed his finger “inside” of her “private,” which was

       “painful” for G.L. Id. at 187-88. He did this more than once. G.L. was scared

       but she tried to stay still.

[8]    Sorgdrager proceeded to cover G.L.’s face with a knitted blanket and then put

       her hand on his penis. He “made [her] squeeze it” by placing his hand over

       hers. Id. at 186. His penis “felt like hairy and weird” to G.L. Id. at 187.

[9]    After Sorgdrager left, he returned briefly and told G.L. that he loved her.

       Mother had come upstairs around this time because she heard footsteps, and

       she observed Sorgdrager at G.L.’s door. She believed he was telling her

       goodnight. Mother and Sorgdrager then went to bed.

[10]   The rest of the weekend G.L. did not tell Mother what had happened. G.L.

       later explained, “I just didn’t trust her.” Id. at 190. G.L. wanted, instead, to

       report the incident to Nicole, which she did as soon as she returned home on

       Sunday. Nicole and Father then contacted the authorities.

[11]   That same night, G.L. submitted to a sexual assault exam, during which she

       provided details of the sexual abuse to the sexual assault nurse examiner (the

       SANE) performing the exam. Among other things, G.L. reported to the

       SANE: “[Sorgdrager] licked his finger and put it in my vagina and moved it

       back and forth, it hurt.” Exhibits at 29.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023        Page 4 of 19
[12]   Forensic testing later revealed the presence of male DNA on certain swabs from

       the evidence collection kit completed during the sexual assault exam. While

       male DNA was present on, among others, swabs taken from G.L.’s breasts,

       vagina, and external genitalia, the amount of DNA collected was insufficient

       for further analysis. However, a swab of G.L.’s bra, which was collected later,

       contained sufficient DNA for testing, and the test results provided “strong

       support for the position that Ray Sorgdrager is a contributor to the DNA

       profile.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 185.

[13]   A family case manager with the Indiana Department of Child Services spoke

       with Mother on November 27, 2018, and informed her of G.L.’s allegations.

       Mother expressed shock. She stood by Sorgdrager’s side throughout the

       subsequent investigation. Mother and her younger daughters had some visits

       with G.L. thereafter, but G.L. never spent the night at their home and had no

       contact with Sorgdrager again.

[14]   On May 6, 2019, the State charged Sorgdrager with two counts of child

       molesting. Count I, the Level 1 felony, alleged that Sorgdrager “did place his

       fingers in the female sex organ of G.L.” Appendix at 20. Count II, the Level 4

       felony, alleged generally that he “did perform or submit to fondling or touching

       with G.L. … with the intent of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of G.L.

       or Sorgdrager.” Id. at 22.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023      Page 5 of 19
[15]   Within about a month of the charges being filed, Father and Nicole were

       informed that Mother wanted to give up her parental rights and have Nicole

       adopt G.L. This was heartbreaking for G.L., especially losing the relationship

       with her sisters. According to Father, when he delivered the news to G.L., she

       had a panic attack – “crying, hyperventilating, curled up in a fetal position.”

       Transcript Vol. 3 at 9.

[16]   Sorgdrager’s jury trial did not commence until February 28, 2022, when G.L.

       was thirteen years old. The jury ultimately found him guilty as charged.

       Thereafter, on April 22, 2022, the trial court sentenced Sorgdrager to thirty-five

       years for Count I, as a credit restricted felon, and to a consecutive term of six

       years for Count II.

[17]   Sorgdrager now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as

       needed.

       Discussion & Decision
                                                    1. Sufficiency

[18]   Sorgdrager initially challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

       conviction for Level 1 felony child molesting. Specifically, he contends that the

       State failed to establish “the essential element of penetration.” Appellant’s Brief

       at 15. He describes G.L.’s testimony as vague in this regard because she used

       the term “private” and failed to define what that term meant or indicate that her

       sex organ was penetrated by his finger.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023         Page 6 of 19
[19]   When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction, we neither

       reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Fix v. State, 186

       N.E.3d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2022). “When there are conflicts in the evidence, the

       jury must resolve them.” Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176 (Ind. 2022).

       Thus, on appeal, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable

       inferences supporting the conviction and will affirm “unless no reasonable fact-

       finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

       Fix, 186 N.E.3d at 1138 (quoting Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind.

       2016)). Stated differently, our task is to “decide whether the facts favorable to

       the verdict represent substantial evidence probative of the elements of the

       offenses.” Young, 198 N.E.3d at 1176 (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144,

       147 (Ind. 2007)).

[20]   For Count I as charged, the State was required to prove, as relevant here, an act

       of “other sexual conduct,” which is defined by statute to include “the

       penetration of the sex organ … of a person by an object.” Ind. Code § 35-42-4-

       3(a); Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5(2). Our Supreme Court has made clear that

       “proof of the slightest penetration of the sex organ, including penetration of the

       external genitalia, is sufficient to demonstrate a person performed other sexual

       misconduct with a child.” Boggs v. State, 104 N.E.3d 1287, 1289 (Ind. 2018).

       “[A]ny penetration is enough,” and the victim need not provide “a detailed

       anatomical description of penetration.” Spurlock v. State, 675 N.E.2d 312, 315

       (Ind. 1996), on reh’g (1997).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023        Page 7 of 19
[21]   Here, G.L. testified in relevant part that, after licking his finger, Sorgdrager put

       his hand inside her underwear and “rubb[ed her] private area with his finger.”

       Transcript Vol. 2 at 186. He then licked his hand again before placing his finger

       “inside” her “private.” Id. at 187. She described this as being “painful.” Id. at

       188. In addition to G.L.’s testimony, her statements to the SANE, provided

       within two days of the sexual abuse, were admitted into evidence. G.L.’s

       account included that “[Sorgdrager] licked his finger and put it in my vagina

       and moved it back and forth, it hurt.” Exhibits at 29. The SANE’s report noted

       that G.L. used the word “Vagina” to refer to the “Female Sex Organ.” Id. at

       30. Buttressing G.L.’s testimony and her report to the SANE, DNA testing

       revealed the presence of male DNA on the swabs taken by the SANE of G.L.’s

       external genitalia and vagina.

[22]   The State presented ample evidence from which the jury could find that

       Sorgdrager at least slightly penetrated her sex organ with his finger. See Boggs,

       104 N.E.3 at 1289 (“proof of the slightest penetration of the sex organ,

       including penetration of the external genitalia, is sufficient”); cf. Wisneskey v.

       State, 736 N.E.2d 763, 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“T.L.’s testimony that it hurt

       when Wisneskey stuck his penis in his ‘butt,’ can reasonably lead to the

       inference that the pain was the result of the child being sodomized.”).

                                                2. Double Jeopardy

[23]   Next, Sorgdrager contends that his two convictions for molesting G.L.

       constitute double jeopardy in violation of Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023          Page 8 of 19
       Constitution. In Wadle v. State, our Supreme Court adopted a new analytical

       framework for addressing claims of substantive double jeopardy when a single

       criminal act, such as in this case, violates multiple statutes with common

       elements. 1 151 N.E.3d 227, 247 (Ind. 2020). Sorgdrager expresses uncertainty

       regarding whether this new analysis or the prior one from Richardson v. State,

       717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999) should apply here given the fact that his offenses

       were committed prior to the Wadle decision but he was tried and convicted after

       it. The State, on the other hand, argues that Wadle should be applied

       retroactively in this case because the convictions were not final at the time

       Wadle was decided.

[24]   We have come close to holding that Wadle applies retroactively to cases that

       were not yet final when it was decided but have yet to conclusively take that

       step. See Woodcock v. State, 163 N.E.3d 863, 871-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans.

       denied. The question has continued to pester us for nearly three years. See, e.g.,

       id. at 872 (finding it “unnecessary to definitively decide” the issue – especially

       where the State had not had the opportunity to brief the issue of retroactivity –

       because under either framework there was no double jeopardy violation); Diaz

       v. State, 158 N.E.3d 363, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Our conclusion that there is

       1
        The Supreme Court decided Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020), the same day as Wadle. Powell
       addressed the new analysis to be applied “when a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute
       and results in multiple injuries.” Id. at 263.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023                                 Page 9 of 19
       no double jeopardy in this case under either Wadle or the ‘old law’ allows us to

       avoid that potentially sticky issue, which has not been briefed here.”); Holt-

       Spencer v. State, No. 21A-CR-2795, 2022 WL 1698207, at *1, n. 1 (Ind. Ct. App.

       May 27, 2022) (“We agree with the State that Wadle likely applies retroactively

       to double jeopardy claims.”). Accordingly, we now directly address the issue.

[25]   “New rules for the conduct of criminal prosecutions are to be applied

       retroactively to cases pending on direct review or not yet final when the new

       rules are announced.” Powell v. State, 574 N.E.2d 331, 333 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1991), trans. denied (1992); see also Gutermuth v. State, 868 N.E.2d 427, 431-32

       (Ind. 2007) (holding that a new rule of “constitutional procedure” applies

       retroactively to all cases on direct review, which does not include Post-

       Conviction 2 belated appeals). When Richardson was decided over twenty years

       ago, the Supreme Court described it as formulating “a new methodology for

       analysis of claims under the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause” and held that

       “this formulation constitutes a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure.”

       Taylor v. State, 717 N.E.2d 90, 95 (Ind. 1999). Similarly, the new substantive

       double jeopardy framework established in Wadle constitutes a new

       constitutional rule of criminal procedure. See Woodcock, 163 N.E.3d at 871

       (observing that “the purpose of Wadle and Powell was to create a new and

       complete framework for analyzing substantive double jeopardy claims”); Diaz,

       158 N.E.3d at 368 (“Wadle did away with the ‘old law’ on claims of substantive

       double jeopardy, including the Richardson constitutional tests and all common-
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023       Page 10 of 19
       law rules like the continuous-crime doctrine.”). As such, we hold that the

       Wadle analysis is applicable to this case, which was far from final at the time the

       Court adopted the new analytical framework (and overruled Richardson) for

       substantive double jeopardy claims.

[26]   In Carranza v. State, 184 N.E.3d 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), we addressed a

       substantive double jeopardy claim similar to Sorgdrager’s. That is, for acts that

       occurred to a single victim during the same encounter, the defendant was

       convicted of Level 1 felony child molesting (for other sexual conduct) and Level

       4 felony child molesting (for fondling or touching). The convictions fell under

       subsections (a) and (b), respectively, of the Child Molesting Statute, Ind. Code §

       35-42-4-3. 2

[27]   We set out Wadle’s multi-step analysis as follows:

                  First, we look to the statutes. [Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248.] If they
                  explicitly allow for multiple punishments, no double jeopardy
                  occurs, and our inquiry ends. Id. at 248. If the statutes are
                  unclear, we apply Indiana’s included-offense statute. Id. (citing

       2
           This statute provides in relevant part:

                  (a) A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, knowingly or intentionally
                  performs or submits to … other sexual conduct … commits child molesting, a Level 3 felony.
                  However, the offense is a Level 1 felony if:
                            (1) it is committed by a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age[.]
                  (b) A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, performs or submits to any
                  fondling or touching, of either the child or the older person, with intent to arouse or to satisfy
                  the sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits child molesting, a Level 4
                  felony.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023                                    Page 11 of 19
               Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168). If either offense is included in the
               other [(either inherently or as charged)], we proceed to the
               second step and ask whether the defendant’s actions are “so
               compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and
               continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Id. at
               249. If the facts show only a single crime, judgment may not be
               entered on the included offense. Id. at 256.

       Carranza, 184 N.E.3d at 716.

[28]   Applying these steps, we first determined that “[n]either subsection (a) nor

       subsection (b) of the Child Molesting Statute clearly permits multiple

       punishments for multiple acts of molestation.” Id.; see also Koziski v. State, 172

       N.E.3d 338, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“[N]either the child-molesting statute

       nor the statute defining ‘other sexual conduct’ … clearly permits (or prohibits)

       multiple punishment for multiple acts of molestation against the same victim in

       a single encounter.”), trans. denied.

[29]   We then turned to the included-offense statute, I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168, which

       defines “included offense” as an offense that:

               (1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less
               than all the material elements required to establish the
               commission of the offense charged;

               (2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an
               offense otherwise included therein; or

               (3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less
               serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023          Page 12 of 19
                public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to
                establish its commission.

       In applying the statute, we concluded:

                Our included-offense statute is not implicated here because child
                molesting under subsection (a) of the Child Molesting Statute is
                not established by proof of child molesting under subsection (b)
                and vi[ce] versa. Unlike subsection (a), subsection (b) does not
                require proof of “other sexual conduct” (here, Carranza inserting
                his fingers in MNP’s vagina). And unlike subsection (b),
                subsection (a) does not require proof of fondling or touching
                (here, Carranza rubbing his penis on MNP’s vagina).[ 3] Carranza
                also was not convicted of an attempt crime, and subsections (a)
                and (b) of the Child Molesting Statute differ in respects other
                than degree of harm or culpability.

       Carranza, 184 N.E.3d at 716.

[30]   On appeal, Sorgdrager makes no effort to distinguish Carranza and provides

       virtually no analysis regarding application of this Wadle step to the facts of this

       case. He simply quotes the charges under each count and then states: “Other

       than the type of molestation (as ‘other sexual conduct’ and ‘fondling and

       touching’) Count II is an included offense of Count I.” Appellant’s Brief at 26.

       What Sorgdrager fails to recognize is that the type of molestation is essentially

       3
        We also note that, unlike subsection (b), subsection (a) does not require proof that the fondling or touching
       was done with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the defendant.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023                               Page 13 of 19
       what makes these offenses not included offenses. See Carranza, 184 N.E.3d at

       716.

[31]   Because Sorgdrager has failed to establish that either of his offenses is included

       in the other, either inherently or factually, he has not established that his

       convictions constitute double jeopardy. Thus, we affirm both of his child

       molesting convictions.

                                                     3. Sentence

[32]   Finally, Sorgdrager requests that we exercise our authority under Indiana

       Appellate Rule 7(B) and independently review the sentences imposed by the

       trial court. He asserts that “anything above twenty (20) years executed is

       inappropriate.” Appellant’s Brief at 31. We do not agree.

[33]   Pursuant to that rule, we may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of

       the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The principal role of

       App. R. 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers and identify

       some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of

       the sentencing statutes.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008).

       App. R. 7(B) analysis is not to determine whether another sentence is more

       appropriate but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. Conley v.

       State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012).

[34]   Whether a sentence is inappropriate turns on the culpability of the defendant,

       the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023        Page 14 of 19
       factors that come to light in a given case. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The

       defendant has the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate.

       Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). More particularly, the

       defendant must show that his sentence is inappropriate with “compelling

       evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense[s] (such as

       accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s

       character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good

       character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[35]   Regarding the nature of the offense, our Supreme Court has recognized the

       advisory sentence as the starting point the legislature has selected as an

       appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657

       (Ind. 2014). The sentencing range for a Level 1 felony is between twenty and

       fifty years, with an advisory sentence of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(a).

       The trial court imposed a slightly aggravated sentence of thirty-five years on

       Count I. For Count II, the Level 4 felony, the trial court imposed the advisory

       sentence of six years and made it consecutive to Count I. See I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5

       (providing for a sentencing range of two to twelve years). The trial court also

       designated Sorgdrager as a credit restricted felon on Count I. 4 See Sharp v. State,

       4
         As a credit restricted felon, Sorgdrager would initially earn one day of credit for every six days of
       imprisonment. See Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-72 (defining a credit restricted felon to include a person convicted
       of child molesting involving other sexual conduct if the person is at least twenty-one years of age and the
       victim is less than twelve years of age); I.C. § 35-50-6-4(c) (a credit restricted felon is initially assigned to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023                                   Page 15 of 19
       970 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. 2012) (holding that “evaluation of a defendant’s

       sentence may include consideration of the defendant’s credit time status

       because this penal consequence was within the contemplation of the trial court

       when it was determining the defendant’s sentence”).

[36]   When imposing the slightly aggravated sentence on Count I to be served

       consecutively with Count II’s advisory sentence, the trial court emphasized the

       far-reaching impact the sexual abuse had on G.L., as well as Sorgdrager’s

       violation of his position of trust as her stepfather. Indeed, the record reveals

       that G.L. lost her relationship with her mother and – “probably the most

       heartbreaking for [G.L.]” – her two little sisters because of Sorgdrager’s actions.

       Transcript Vol. II at 230. G.L. had just turned ten years old when Sorgdrager

       abused his position as her stepfather and repeatedly molested her that night, just

       across the hall from where his three-year-old daughter was sleeping and with his

       wife and other daughter in the house. Further, though more than three years

       removed from the abuse, G.L. continued to suffer trauma and fear and require

       counseling. In sum, Sorgdrager has not presented “compelling evidence

       portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense.” See Stephenson, 29

       N.E.3d at 122. We therefore conclude that the nature of his offenses does not

       warrant a lesser sentence.

       credit time Class C); I.C. § 35-50-6-3.1(d) (a person assigned to Class C earns one day of good time credit for
       every six days the person is imprisoned).
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023                                Page 16 of 19
[37]   Turning to his character, Sorgdrager observes that he was thirty-three years old

       at the time of sentencing and had no prior criminal history, which the trial court

       recognized as a significant mitigator. Further, Sorgdrager notes that he was

       married with two young children, had a high school diploma and a “good work

       history,” presented a “low risk to reoffend,” and had “an out pouring [sic] of

       support from family and friends.” Appellant’s Brief at 30. Even so, we find

       Sorgdrager’s abuse of his position of trust – with a child he had known since she

       was an infant – and his brazenness in committing the offenses while his

       daughters and wife were in the home to be more telling of his character.

[38]   After due consideration, we conclude that Sorgdrager has not sustained his

       burden of establishing that his aggregate sentence of forty-one years in the DOC

       is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. We

       reach this result even considering his credit status as a credit restricted felon on

       Count I.

[39]   Judgment affirmed.

       Tavitas, J., concurs.

       Brown, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023         Page 17 of 19
       Brown, Judge, concurs in part and dissents in part.

[40]   I respectfully dissent with respect to the majority’s determination that

       Sorgdrager’s forty-one-year sentence is not inappropriate. The advisory

       sentence is thirty years for a level 1 felony, see Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(a), and six

       years for a level 4 felony. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5. As a credit restricted

       felon, Sorgdrager would initially earn only one day of credit for every six days

       of imprisonment. See Ind. Code § 35-50-6-4(c); Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.1(d).

[41]   In Sanchez v. State, Sanchez was convicted of three counts of class A felony child

       molesting for three incidents involving his two stepdaughters, and he was

       sentenced to forty years on each count with the sentences relating to the first

       victim to be served consecutive to the sentence relating to the second victim.

       938 N.E.2d 720, 721 (Ind. 2010). The Indiana Supreme Court found that,

       while the offenses were undeniably serious and the second victim had surgery a

       few months before she was molested, there was no evidence Sanchez used

       significant force or caused any injury. Id. at 722. Sanchez’s offenses were

       isolated incidents rather than systematic or repeated. Id. Sanchez did not have

       an extensive criminal record and none of his prior or pending offenses were

       related to the molestations. Id. The Court revised Sanchez’s sentence to the

       advisory term of thirty years for the two counts related to the first victim and to

       forty years for the count related to the second victim and ordered that the

       sentences be served concurrently. Id. at 723.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023         Page 18 of 19
[42]   Sorgdrager’s offenses, while reprehensible, occurred on one night and involved

       one victim. The offenses were isolated incidents rather than systematic or

       repeated behavior. The record does not suggest that Sorgdrager used significant

       force. Further, the trial court found that Sorgdrager had a significant support

       network and no prior criminal history. He is married and has two dependent

       children. And the presentence investigation report indicates that his overall risk

       assessment score using the Indiana risk assessment tool places him in the low

       risk to reoffend category. These factors do not favor enhanced or consecutive

       sentences.

[43]   I would remand to the trial court with instructions to issue an amended

       sentencing order imposing concurrent advisory sentences with some time

       suspended. See Rivers, 915 N.E.2d at 143-144 (noting the defendant molested

       one victim on two occasions in a relatively short period of time and directing

       that his two sentences for class A felony child molesting convictions be served

       concurrently rather than consecutively). I concur with the majority in all other

       respects.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1175 | April 13, 2023      Page 19 of 19