Court Opinion

ID: 9681448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:50:46.168715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:33.691318
License: Public Domain

WELLIVER, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the principal opinion which holds that the court costs imposed by S.B. 601, § 67.134, RSMo Supp.1985, constitute a sale of justice in violation of Mo. Const, art. I. § 14.
I write separately to express my deep concern because I believe that access to the courts is being denied a large segment of lower income Missourians because of increasing court costs. The now approaching $100 court cost deposit in a circuit court civil case effectively bars many lower income Missourians from asserting meritorious claims in the court system.
To illustrate, the required court cost deposit in a circuit court civil case in my home county of Boone has been:
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The trend has been the same in all Missouri counties, some I am told ranging as high as $95 to $105. There is no question that the escalating cost of living has had its impact on total court costs, but rising court costs have far outstripped the rising cost of living index.
The problem of rising court costs has not been unnoticed nationally. COSCA, the national Conference of State Court Administrators, associated with the Conference of Chief Justices and the National Center for State Courts, for more than two years has been addressing the problem nationwide through a special “Committee To Examine Court Costs: Filing Fees, Surcharges and Miscellaneous Fees.” That committee was chaired by Ms. Jane Hess, State Court Administrator for Missouri. The report, based upon a Survey of Practice in the courts of all of the states, was presented to the annual meeting in Nebraska in August, 1986, and was unanimously adopted, and a copy thereof is placed in the file for reference.
The purposes and goals of the COSCA committee are best described in two paragraphs of the Introduction to the Committee Report:
Not surprisingly the basic concepts advocated in these standards are nothing more than a restatement of basic constitutional rights and powers. The standards promulgated by this Committee represent what the Committee believers should exist in an “ideal” judicial system. They should allow the judicial branch of government to perform its primary function to adjudicate disputes openly and without regard to any measure of social status. The standards are offered with an understanding of the historical, political, and budgetary realities facing courts and legislative bodies and are intended to be used as a model when states consider changes in their fees’ systems. The survey data indicate that some states are in substantial compliance with these standards while others may wish to undertake a self-examination to determine if any of the proposed standards would be beneficial to their judicial system.
Practically, any state undertaking the adoption of these standards is not likely to change current practice overnight. However, judiciaries should discourage the addition of more surcharges than already exists. They should support, legislative review of those surcharges in existence and encourage their legislatures to enact sunset clauses or repeal them outright. Working with legislators to enable them to understand the insidious nature of surcharges and the deprivation of the legislator’s own power of review is probably a more effective approach than *269challenging the statutes and holding them unconstitutional.
Introduction to Report of COSCA Committee To Examine Court Costs Report, adopted June 1986.
Section 1 of the report defines “Fees”, “Miscellaneous Charges” and “Surcharges”, all of which combine to make up Section 1.4, “Court Costs-Amounts assessed against a party or parties in litigation....”
Section 1.3 defines “Surcharges— Amounts added to fines, fees, or court costs that are used for designated purposes.” (emphasis added). The commentary states with reference to surcharges:
“Surcharges” are certain add-on charges with the revenues generated earmarked for specific purposes. Presently these funds are most often passed through the courts’ registries and disbursed directly into an account that may be expended only for the purpose that has been earmarked either at the state or local level. Later recommendations contained in this report call for an end to this practice, but a definition is necessary for understanding throughout the report. Although “surcharge” is the most appropriate label, in some states these charges are deductions from flat filing fees. Examples of surcharges are law library funds, domestic violence shelter funds, retirement funds for judges, state police and sheriffs, funds for indigent defense, law enforcement halls of fame funds, specific funds for departments of transportation, funds identified for departments of health and social services, victims of crime funds, and innumerable training funds for law enforcement, prosecutors and others, and funds for buildings and facilities.
The Standards recommended by the committee report are addressed as follows:
3.0 PROHIBITING SURCHARGES AND LOCAL CHARGES
3.1 Surcharges should not be established.
COMMENTARY
The practice of earmarking funds for special purposes should be eliminated.
Some surcharges are presently used for purposes related to the judiciary. Others are used for purposes that have no relationship to the operation of the judicial system. Neither are appropriate. If taxation is a prerogative of the legislative branch of government, the practice of earmarking funds escapes the priority setting process existing in most progressive governmental entities. Neither use should escape the appropriations’ review process nor should the amount of a public good to be provided by such funds be necessarily limited to the amount of revenue generated by a surcharge for the purpose. If the purpose funded by a surcharge is for the greater public good it should be worthy for consideration of funding from a broader general revenue source through the normal appropriation process.
Some have argued, citing lower court decisions that surcharges are unconstitutional because they are not related to the conduct of the case; other, that surcharges are, at best, illogical.
The benefit derived from the efficient administration of justice is not limited to those who utilize the system for litigation, but is enjoyed by all those who would suffer if there were no such system — the entire body politic. It makes no more sense to burden litigants with paying for judicial retirement than it would to install a turnstile at the door to the governor’s office and to pay his salary with admission fees charged to those who seek his counsel. If no one were to utilize the court system in any given terms, the judges’ salaries would still have to be paid, and the retirement system would still require funding.
Richard F. Hayse, Kansas Court Costs: The Quality of Mercy is Strained, Wash-bum Law Journal 9 (1969) p. 95.
Examples from the COSCA National Survey on Court Costs indicate that there is a proliferation of surcharges in several states; some meritorious for public funding, others more reflective of interest groups that should seek private *270funding from persons of similar interests. Salaries of public officials, maintenance of public buildings, retirement funds of public officials, and other such public uses clearly should not have to rely on the generation of funds through a user tax placed on persons seeking their constitutional right of access to the courts. The citizen who exercises his right to vote is not charged for the exercise of that right. If crime victim compensation funds are in the public interest ■ then surely those who find themselves using the courts should have no more obligation to contribute to such a fund than any citizen who could at any time become a victim of crime and have a need to utilize such funds. The same illogical premise exists in states that establish abuse centers by assessing a surcharge to those who apply for marriage licenses. Democratic forms of government are threatened by these insidious forms of taxation.
A concern of the judiciary must be for the appearance of impropriety that results when the burden of taxation for the support of “public good” is placed on users of the court system. Surcharges are vulnerable to being viewed with suspicion at best. Surcharges based on convictions present an even higher potential for conflict of interest claims.
Another concern is the complication and confusion created by a number of surcharges on the administration of monies handled by clerks of the court.
3.2 Fees and miscellaneous charges should not incorporate surcharges. (Commentary omitted).
3.3 Optional local fees or miscellaneous charges should be prohibited. (Commentary omitted).
In addition to the section of our statutes addressed in the principal opinion relating to the County Officers Compensation Fund, § 67.134, RSMo Supp.1985, Missouri has several other “Surcharges” on court costs which are rendered suspect both by the COSCA recommended standards and by the principal opinion. Section 57.955, RSMo Supp.1984 adds a surcharge of $3 per case for a Sheriff’s Retirement Fund. Section 595.045, RSMo Supp.1985 adds a surcharge of $36.00 or $26.00 in each criminal case, for crime victims compensation depending on the date of the offense. Section 590.-140, RSMo 1978, adds a surcharge of $2.00 in each criminal case, for Law Enforcement Training. Section 56.790, RSMo Cum.Supp. 1984 adds a surcharge of $3.50 in each criminal case, for the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Reimbursement Fund. Section 56.-765, RSMo Cum.Supp.1984 adds a surcharge of $1.00 in each criminal case, for the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Training Fund. Section 455.205, RSMo Cum.Supp.1984 authorizes a surcharge of $10 in each dissolution case for Domestic Violence Shelters, if the county chooses to impose the fee. Section 590.140, RSMo 1978 permits a surcharge of $2.00 in all municipal cases for law enforcement training, if the municipality so authorizes.
Our own State of Missouri ranks high among the states that should take a long hard look at their entire courts costs structure. There should not be a $100 price tag on access to justice.