Court Opinion

ID: 9900370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:46.966773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.860046
License: Public Domain

6                    September 13, 2023            No. 452

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

               In the Matter of the Marriage of
                  Bobbi Lynn BUCHANAN,
                     Petitioner-Appellant,
                              and
                  Robert Paul BUCHANAN,
                   Respondent-Respondent.
               Clackamas County Circuit Court
                     16DR10064; A177872

    Ulanda L. Watkins, Judge.
    Argued and submitted April 19, 2023.
   Kristin Winnie Eaton argued the cause for appellant.
Also on the briefs was Eaton Family Law & Mediation, LLC.
   George W. Kelly argued the cause and filed the brief for
respondent.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
    EGAN, J.
   Supplemental judgment for attorney fees and costs
vacated and remanded; otherwise affirmed.
Cite as 328 Or App 6 (2023)                                 7

        EGAN, J.
         In this domestic relations case, mother appeals a
supplemental judgment that awarded father $93,655.63
in costs and attorney fees and denied mother’s request for
costs or attorney fees. We vacate the supplemental judgment
for attorney fees and costs and remand to the trial court
because the record is inadequate for meaningful review.
         Mother and father have two minor children. They
divorced in March 2017 via Stipulated General Judgment
of Dissolution of Marriage. The general judgment awarded
the parties joint custody of the children and awarded father
parenting time based on a two-week rotating schedule. In
one week, father had parenting time from Thursday after
school until Monday when school began. In the other week,
father had parenting time on Wednesdays after school until
7:00 p.m.
         Since the dissolution, the parties have filed three
separate actions. First, in January 2019, mother filed a con-
tempt action in which she sought to compel father to pay his
obligations under the general judgment and provide mother
with proof of life insurance. Second, in February 2019, father
filed a motion to modify the general judgment to change
parenting time and child support. Third, in October 2020,
mother sought a modification of the judgment to, among
other things, change custody, change the parenting sched-
ule, and modify child support. At that same time, mother
also initiated a second contempt claim against father.
         The first action resulted in a settlement between the
parties in March 2019. From that action, mother received a
judgment for $5,115.02, but father did not admit mother’s
allegations of contempt. The parties agreed that each would
be responsible for their own attorney fees for that action.
Father’s February 2019 modification action and mother’s
October 2020 modification and contempt actions were con-
solidated. Those actions resulted in a final settlement in
April 2021. The trial court dismissed those actions, and it
signed a supplemental judgment regarding custody, parent-
ing time, and child support in October 2021.
8                                               Buchanan and Buchanan

          After the entry of the supplemental judgment,
mother and father filed motions for attorney fees and costs
pursuant to ORCP 68. Mother requested $56,400.38 in fees
and costs; father requested $99,900.85 in fees and costs.
Mother argued that her income precluded her from being
able to pay fees given that she makes minimum wage and
qualifies for food stamps and Oregon Health Plan, while
noting that “father makes as much in a month as mother
does in a year.” In addition, mother argued that father had
been unresponsive to discovery requests and had attempted
to hide his income, which led to further fees in litigation.
Father argued that mother had stalled settlement by refus-
ing to engage in mediation and a reference trial, had with-
held discovery related to her income, and had asserted
needless objections to the form of judgment after the parties
settled.
          In an email to the parties, and after “careful
review of each [party’s] requests and objections,” the trial
court denied mother’s claim for attorney fees and costs and
awarded father $93,655.63 in attorney fees and costs pursu-
ant to ORCP 68 and ORS 107.135(8).1 The court explained
that it was reducing father’s award from the requested
amount, because father’s request included fees from moth-
er’s first contempt action, and the parties had agreed that
they would be responsible for their own fees on that claim.
In addition, the court reduced by 1.5 hours the time allot-
ted for father’s counsel’s work on the settlement proposal
letter. The court did not order fees for time spent prepar-
ing or attending a hearing on attorney fees, as no hearing
had been held, but it awarded father fees for the time spent
drafting the Statement for Attorney Fees and Objections.
The court said that “[t]he Judge’s ruling is based on the fol-
lowing statutory factors: ORS 20.075 1(a), 1(b), 1(e), 1(f), 1(h),
2(a), 2(c) and 2(d).”2 A supplemental judgment was entered
awarding father attorney fees and costs.
    1
      ORS 107.135(8) permits a court to “assess against either party a reasonable
attorney fee and costs for the benefit of the other party. If a party is found to have
acted in bad faith, the court shall order that party to pay a reasonable attorney
fee and costs of the defending party.”
    2
      ORS 20.075 provides, in part:
        “(1) A court shall consider the following factors in determining whether
    to award attorney fees in any case in which an award of attorney fees is
Cite as 328 Or App 6 (2023)                                                      9

          Mother then filed this appeal.
         As an initial matter, we decline mother’s request
for de novo review because this is not an “exceptional case.”
ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (“Consistently with that presumption
against the exercise of discretion, requests under paragraph
(a) or (b) [for de novo review] are disfavored.”). Thus, we
review a trial court’s “legal determinations with respect to
entitlement to attorney fees for errors of law” and its “exer-
cises of discretion for abuse of discretion.” Trent v. Connor
Enterprises, Inc., 300 Or App 165, 168, 452 P3d 1072 (2019)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
         On appeal, mother raises five assignments of error
relating to attorney fees, arguing that the trial court erred
because (1) the court that ruled on attorney’s fees was not the
trial judge nor the presiding judge’s designee, as required
by UTCR 5.040; (2) the court ruled prior to the dead-
line for parties to file their replies pursuant to ORCP 68;

   authorized by statute and in which the court has discretion to decide whether
   to award attorney fees:
        “(a) The conduct of the parties in the transactions or occurrences that
   gave rise to the litigation, including any conduct of a party that was reckless,
   willful, malicious, in bad faith or illegal.
        “(b) The objective reasonableness of the claims and defenses asserted by
   the parties.
        “* * * * *
        “(e) The objective reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the
   parties and their attorneys during the proceedings.
        “(f) The objective reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the
   parties in pursuing settlement of the dispute.
        “* * * * *
        “(h) Such other factors as the court may consider appropriate under the
   circumstances of the case.
        “(2) A court shall consider the factors specified in subsection (1) of this
   section in determining the amount of an award of attorney fees in any case
   in which an award of attorney fees is authorized or required by statute. In
   addition, the court shall consider the following factors in determining the
   amount of an award of attorney fees in those cases:
        “(a) The time and labor required in the proceeding, the novelty and dif-
   ficulty of the questions involved in the proceeding and the skill needed to
   properly perform the legal services.
        “* * * * *
        “(c) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
        “(d) The amount involved in the controversy and the results obtained.”
10                                            Buchanan and Buchanan

(3) mother was the predominantly prevailing party, but the
court failed to identify a prevailing party as required by
ORS 20.077(2); (4) the court did not allow a hearing on the
issues or make detailed findings of fact and conclusions of
law despite father’s request under ORCP 68 C(4)(e)(i); and
(5) the court abused its discretion, because it did not account
for the difference in the parties’ financial resources.3
         Mother’s Third Assignment of Error. In mother’s
third assignment of error, she challenges the lower court’s
failure to identify a predominantly prevailing party and “fol-
low the required procedure for determining the award for
attorney fees when there was more than one claim,” which
mother argues was required under ORS 20.077.4 Mother
argues that she prevailed on every “claim” except the allo-
cation of parenting time. Thus, according to mother, if the
court followed the procedure of naming the prevailing party
as to each claim, father’s fee award would be significantly
reduced because he only prevailed on one claim.
         In Saunders and Saunders, the trial court awarded
the wife attorney fees in a dissolution action. 158 Or App
601, 603, 975 P2d 927 (1999). The husband argued that the
trial court erred in awarding attorney fees because the wife
had obtained a worse result than she would have obtained
    3
      Our resolution of this case obviates the need to reach mother’s first two
assignments of error.
    4
      ORS 20.077(1) and (2) provide that
        “(1) In any action or suit in which one or more claims are asserted for
    which an award of attorney fees is either authorized or required, the prevail-
    ing party on each claim shall be determined as provided in this section. * * *
        “(2) For the purposes of making an award of attorney fees on a claim, the
    prevailing party is the party who receives a favorable judgment or arbitra-
    tion award on the claim. If more than one claim is made in an action or suit
    for which an award of attorney fees is either authorized or required, the court
    or arbitrator shall:
        “(a) Identify each party that prevails on a claim for which attorney fees
    could be awarded;
        “(b) Decide whether to award attorney fees on claims for which the court
    or arbitrator is authorized to award attorney fees, and the amount of the
    award;
        “(c) Decide the amount of the award of attorney fees on claims for which
    the court or arbitrator is required to award attorney fees; and
        “(d) Enter a judgment that complies with the requirements of ORS
    18.038 and 18.042.”
Cite as 328 Or App 6 (2023)                                                  11

had she accepted the husband’s previous offer to compro-
mise. Id. at 603-04. Thus, the husband argued that the wife
was not entitled to fees under ORCP 54 E.5 Id. We deter-
mined that, “[b]y its terms, ORCP 54 E applies only in cases
in which one party asserts a ‘claim’ against another[,]” but
domestic relations proceedings are not such a case where a
party asserts a “claim” because those cases are not amena-
ble to “winner” or “loser” determinations. Id. at 604, 606. In
a dissolution case, determining who “prevailed” or “obtained
a more favorable judgment” is an “intrinsically impossible
determination,” because it “require[s] evaluating the extent
to which various combinations of child custody, visitation,
property distribution, and support awards result in a more
or less ‘favorable’ judgment.” Id. at 607. We specifically noted
that, in domestic relations proceedings, a trial court must
decide numerous issues “without reference to the disposition
of one party’s claims for relief against another.” Id. at 605.
         In this case, the trial court did not err when it
awarded attorney fees to father without naming a pre-
vailing party as to each claim. By its terms, ORS 20.077
applies to “any action or suit in which one or more claims
are asserted for which an award of attorney fees is either
authorized or required[.]” As we determined in Saunders,
“[r]equests for relief” in these types of domestic actions “do
not neatly fit into the term ‘claim’ * * *.” 158 Or App at 605.
Although mother correctly notes that Saunders was a dis-
solution case, which is different from a modification action,
we conclude that the holding in Saunders applies broadly
to domestic relations cases. See id. at 604 (“The question
before us is whether a domestic relations proceeding is such
a case [in which one party asserts a claim against another].”
(Emphasis added.)). Thus, the trial court did not err when it
did not name a prevailing party as to each claim under ORS
20.077 because it was not required to do so in this type of
domestic relations action.
        Mother’s Fourth and Fifth Assignments of Error.
Within mother’s fourth and fifth assignments of error, she
argues that (1) the trial court did not make sufficient general
    5
      ORCP 54 E provides that costs and fees cannot be recovered by a party who
rejects an offer of compromise and then later fails to obtain a better outcome on
their claims.
12                                   Buchanan and Buchanan

findings of fact, and (2) the trial court’s award of attorney fees
was an abuse of discretion, because it did not account for the
difference in the parties’ financial resources—mother earns
around $2,500 monthly, and father earns around $24,000
monthly. Mother argues that the court’s authority to award
attorney fees is guided by the equitable concern that “nei-
ther spouse should be denied the opportunity to sue or
defend due to lack of equal access to marital resources * * *.”
Haguewood and Haguewood, 292 Or 197, 213, 638 P2d 1135
(1981). Father responds that the trial court awarded father
attorney fees based on the subsections of ORS 20.075 cited
by the court: the “conduct of the parties,” ORS 20.075(a); the
“objective reasonableness of the claims and defenses,” ORS
20.075(b); and the “diligence of the parties in pursuing set-
tlement,” ORS 20.075(f). Father argues that the trial court’s
ruling implies that it “found mother lacking in these areas,”
and that the record supports that conclusion.
         In deciding whether the trial court abused its discre-
tion in its attorney-fee determination, we must first decide
whether the trial court’s findings are sufficient for appellate
review. Jaimez v. Rosales, 323 Or App 741, 748, 525 P3d 92
(2023) (“[A] trial court is always expected to provide mini-
mally adequate findings for meaningful appellate review of
a discretionary ruling.”). Because neither party requested
special findings, under ORCP 68 C(4)(g), the trial court only
needed to make general findings. For general findings to
be sufficient for appellate review, the trial court must have
said “enough to allow for meaningful appellate review when
one views the ruling in the context of the arguments that
the parties made.” Id. at 750 (citation omitted). Due to the
nature of discretionary fee awards, “sometimes, the absence
of an explanation makes it impossible in practice to deter-
mine whether the court acted within its discretion.” Moreau
v. Samalin, 295 Or App 534, 538, 435 P3d 794 (2019). “As a
result, we may not know what factors a court has considered
unless it tells us.” Id.
          If the findings are sufficient for appellate review, we
then review those findings for an abuse of discretion. “When
exercising its discretion, the trial court is to assess the par-
ties’ financial resources, the division of the parties’ property
Cite as 328 Or App 6 (2023)                                                  13

in the dissolution, and any support payments, as well as the
factors set forth in ORS 20.075(1).” Dang and Chun, 238 Or
App 218, 221-22, 242 P3d 680 (2010) (citing Haguewood, 292
Or at 213, and Niman and Niman, 206 Or App 400, 422-
23, 136 P3d 1186 (2006)). “If the trial court’s decision was
within the range of legally correct discretionary choices and
produced a permissible, legally correct outcome, then the
trial court did not abuse its discretion.” State v. Romero, 236
Or App 640, 643, 237 P3d 894 (2010) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
          In this case, we conclude that the court’s findings
are not adequate for review, because we cannot determine
whether the court considered the financial resources of the
parties in making its determination. See Dang, 238 Or App
at 221-22 (“When exercising its discretion, the trial court is to
assess the parties’ financial resources * * *.”); see also Steltz v.
Cain, 325 Or App 560, 562, 529 P3d 284 (2023) (“A trial court
can also abuse its discretion * * * when a court fails to * * *
consider all relevant circumstances in making its decision.”
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)). It is clear
that the trial court considered the ORS 20.075 factors, as it
articulated in its decision. However, it is not clear whether
the trial court considered or weighed the parties’ dispropor-
tionate income against those factors given the lack of dis-
cussion in the trial court’s findings regarding their income.
Without knowing whether the trial court considered the par-
ties’ financial resources in reaching its decision, we cannot
determine whether the court abused its discretion.
         “[V]acating and remanding to the trial court is
generally the appropriate disposition when a discretionary
attorney fee award is not susceptible to meaningful appel-
late review due to a lack of explanation or findings.” Moreau,
295 Or App at 540-41. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment
awarding $93,655.63 in attorney fees to father, and we
remand for the trial court to determine a reasonable sum
for attorney fees pursuant to ORS 20.075, considering the
parties’ financial resources.6
    6
      We note that, on remand, the trial court is not required to make “special
findings” under ORCP 68 C(4)(g), because mother did not request them. “It is for
the trial court to decide how to provide the necessary information for meaningful
appellate review.” Moreau, 295 Or App at 543 n 4.
14                              Buchanan and Buchanan

        Supplemental judgment for attorney fees and costs
vacated and remanded; otherwise affirmed.