Court Opinion

ID: 9956933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 14:11:41.50104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:59.276319
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                In The Supreme Court

   The State, Petitioner,

   v.

   Randy Collins, Respondent.

   Appellate Case No. 2021-001176

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

              Appeal From Georgetown County
           Larry B. Hyman, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

                    Opinion No. 28197
         Heard October 3, 2023 – Filed April 3, 2024

                 AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

   Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
   Deputy Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both
   of Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of
   Conway, for Petitioner.

   E. Brandon Gaskins, of Moore & Van Allen, PLLC, of
   Charleston, and Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael
   Dudek, of Columbia, for Respondent.
       CHIEF JUSTICE BEATTY: Randy Collins was convicted of first-degree
arson and criminal conspiracy. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the
matter to the circuit court for a new trial on the basis Collins's statement to law
enforcement was involuntary and, thus, inadmissible. State v. Collins, 435 S.C. 31,
864 S.E.2d 914 (Ct. App. 2021). We granted the State's petition for a writ of
certiorari and now affirm as modified. We hold Collins's statement was rendered
involuntary when law enforcement gave Collins Miranda 1 warnings and
subsequently negated them by falsely advising him that his statements would remain
confidential.

                                     I. FACTS

       On March 29, 2014, firefighters received a call around 1:15 a.m. and
responded to a fire at a mobile home that was rented by Marissa Cohen in Andrews,
South Carolina. The neighbor who reported the fire indicated that he believed the
home to be vacant (as Cohen had recently removed her belongings). However, upon
forcibly entering the locked home and extinguishing the fire, the firefighters
discovered the body of a twelve-year-old boy—Cohen's youngest son—who had
died from smoke inhalation.

       The town's fire marshal, who was also the firefighters' chaplain, was struck by
Cohen's reaction at the scene, as she seemed unusually calm for someone who had
just lost her son. Investigators quickly determined the fire had been set with an
accelerant found in kerosene that had been poured on the floor. Further investigation
revealed that Cohen had purchased $20 worth of kerosene the night of the fire; that
she obtained a $25,000 contents-only insurance policy on the mobile home a few
weeks before the fire; and that she had filed a claim under the policy just a week
after her son's death. 2

      Collins became part of the investigation based on an anonymous tip received
by an investigator with the Georgetown County Sheriff's Office, Melvyn Garrett

1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
 The insurance company ultimately denied the claim after Cohen was charged with
arson.
("Investigator Garrett"), who was told Cohen, Collins, and another individual,
Benjamin "Mano" Brown, were involved in the fire. 3

       Investigator Garrett transcribed a short statement from Collins on April 9,
2014, in which Collins denied any involvement and stated he was at a club with
James Miller, his nephew, at the time of the fire, and a bartender he knew had been
working that night. Investigator Garrett obtained a similar statement from Miller on
April 10, 2014, in which Miller stated he was not involved in the fire and had been
at a club with Collins.

       Investigator Garrett determined there were inconsistencies in the statements
from Collins and Miller, however, after he talked to the bartender and other people
who had been at the club that evening. Thereafter, officers obtained a search warrant
to determine if there had been any communication between the parties. Senior Agent
Scott Hardee ("Agent Hardee") from the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division
("SLED"), an arson specialist who assisted in the investigation, reviewed the phone
data and discovered that Collins and Cohen had spoken three times just prior to the
fire, during the evening hours of March 28, 2014, and again three times after the fire,
at 2:50 a.m., 3:01 a.m., and 3:24 a.m. on March 29, 2014.

       On June 4, 2014, Collins arranged with Officer Nesmith, someone he already
knew, to retrieve his phones at the Andrews Town Hall and Police Department (the
offices were located at one complex). Once there, however, Collins encountered
Agent Hardee and Investigator Garrett, who knew Collins would be coming to pick
up his phones. The two officers were waiting for Collins, as he had previously failed
to show up for an interview with them, and they had been trying, unsuccessfully, to
reach him.

       Collins agreed to talk to Agent Hardee and Investigator Garrett, so the three
of them went to a small room on the premises. Prior to the start of the interview, the
officers went over a SLED form, entitled "Miranda Rights," with Collins, with the
time noted as 10:20 a.m. The form set forth a listing of rights, including the rights
to remain silent, to have an attorney present during questioning, and to the
appointment of an attorney if he could not afford one. It also included the warning:

3
 Brown acknowledged at Collins's trial that he had helped Cohen remove some of
her belongings from the mobile home, and Cohen had informed him afterward of
her plan to burn the home.
"Anything you say can be used in court as evidence against you." Agent Hardee
read the form to Collins, and Collins initialed next to each item. Collins signed
underneath a "Waiver of Rights" section at the bottom of the form to indicate that he
understood his rights and was willing to talk to the officers without an attorney
present. The interview lasted approximately three hours. It was recorded using
Agent Hardee's personal video camera, which was similar in size to a cell phone and
was reportedly visible to Collins on the table. The battery died at about 1.5 hours
in, however, so when Agent Hardee realized that, he replaced the battery to resume
the recording.

       When asked at the beginning of the interview whether he had any preexisting
issues, Collins, who was 43, noted he had a stroke in April 2013 and had been in a
car accident in 2006. He also noted that he had gotten little sleep the night before
and had not eaten breakfast that morning, as he had not planned to be interviewed.
Agent Hardee mentioned that the "word on the street" was that Collins had
something to do with the fire. Agent Hardee advised Collins that investigators had
determined the fire was intentionally set with kerosene and a young boy died in the
fire, so they were trying to figure out who could provide information about this
incident. Collins initially denied any involvement in the fire and reiterated his
position that he had been at a club named Carnell that evening with Miller, his
nephew, although Collins changed the timeline slightly from his prior statement,
indicating he went to the club at approximately 11:00 p.m. and left around 2:00 a.m.
Collins said he recognized T. Chandler running the bar and spoke to him while Miller
played pool. Collins stated Miller took him home after they left the club.

       As the officers continued the discussion, Agent Hardee asked Collins to set
aside their discussion to that point and just tell them what he thought happened and
whether the fire was intentional or "a bad accident." Collins responded that he did
not know and did not want to "say the wrong thing." Agent Hardee reassured Collins
that the interview was confidential, emphasizing that the door was shut and the
blinds were closed in the interview room and that anything Collins told them was
only for the "file" and would not "leave this room." The court of appeals accurately
recounted this point in the interview as follows:

             Of particular note . . . is an assurance made by Agent
             Hardee approximately twenty-one minutes into the
             interview, after Appellant was asked whether he thought
             the fire was intentionally started, and Appellant responded
             he did not want to "say the wrong thing." Agent Hardee
             responded, "Well, you're not going to say the wrong thing.
             Whatever you tell me, it ain't gonna leave this room. This,
             um, tape is going into my file. And I'm gonna, I'm gonna
             burn a copy for him [Investigator Garrett]. And we'll have
             a copy of this tape. And it ain't gonna go any further than
             this room. That's why we got the door shut, the blinds
             pulled, there's no sound device in here. I want you to be
             honest with me and tell me what you think."

State v. Collins, 435 S.C. 31, 41–42, 864 S.E.2d 914, 919 (Ct. App. 2021).

       The officers reassured Collins that they were interested in Cohen, not him,
and that no matter what happened during the interview, Collins would be able to go
home that day. However, the officers also told Collins that if he did not tell them
anything, he could be facing over thirty years in prison. Collins asked to stop the
interview at one point, but he was told not to leave by the officers, as they believed
he was on the verge of revealing inculpatory information.

      Collins eventually acknowledged that Cohen, who rented the mobile home,
had asked him to burn it down. Collins stated he had declined to do it, but he told
Miller about Cohen's request. Collins conceded that he was at the mobile home with
Miller the night of the fire, but he maintained that he left the scene and was not the
person who actually started the fire.

       Ultimately, at the conclusion of the three-hour interview, Collins signed a
written, two-page statement for the Georgetown County Sheriff's Office that was
labeled "VOLUNTARY STATEMENT" on June 4, 2014, at 1:40 p.m. Collins
began the statement by maintaining, "I DID NOT DO it." Collins acknowledged
that Cohen had asked him to do a "job" of burning down her home and offered him
$5,000; that she told him to "think about it"; that he had told his nephew, Miller,
about it; that after he and Miller went to the club that night, he told Miller to take
him home, but Miller did not and, instead, drove over to the mobile home; after
finding the doors to the home locked, Miller pushed a window open and lit a piece
of paper and threw it in the window; Miller thereafter drove around the home several
times but did not "see anything lit"; and Miller took him home. Collins ended the
written statement by indicating Cohen called him and told him that her son was dead
and, after that, at around 3:30 a.m., Miller came to his home and also informed him
that Cohen's son had died in the mobile home fire. Collins was permitted to go home
after he gave the officers a written statement.

      In August 2014, however, Collins was indicted on charges of first-degree
arson and of entering into a criminal conspiracy to commit arson with Cohen and
Miller. At Collins's trial in 2018, the trial judge admitted into evidence Collins's two
written statements and his videotaped interview. Collins was convicted of first-
degree arson and criminal conspiracy. 4

       Collins filed a direct appeal challenging, inter alia, the admission of his
statement to law enforcement on the basis it was involuntary. 5 The court of appeals
found the trial judge erred in ruling Collins's statement was voluntary and in
admitting it into evidence. Collins, 435 S.C. at 54, 864 S.E.2d at 926. The court of
appeals noted it was undisputed that officers gave Collins Miranda warnings, but
thereafter Collins was falsely advised that any statements he made would not be used
against him. Id. at 51–52, 864 S.E.2d at 924–25. It additionally noted that the
officers specifically advised Collins that they wanted information from him to
investigate Cohen, and that "no matter what he told them, [Collins] was going to get
to go home after the interview," but that if he did not cooperate, they would seek
charges against him. Id. at 52–53, 864 S.E.2d at 925. The court of appeals
concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers' "coercive and
deceptive tactics during the interview caused [Collins's] will to be overborne,
inducing him to make the inculpatory statement." Id. at 53, 864 S.E.2d at 925. As
a result, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the matter to the circuit court
for a new trial. Id. at 55, 864 S.E.2d at 926.

4
 Miller, who was also arrested and charged in this matter, was killed prior to
Collins's trial. Cohen's older son, Devon Coombs, pled guilty to the killing of Miller.
5
  For simplicity, Collins's statements will be referred to in the singular. Collins's
first written statement denied any knowledge of the fire, so it is not at issue here.
The second written statement essentially summarized his oral statements to Agent
Hardee and Investigator Garrett in the recorded interview, so these latter two items
are the focus of this appeal.
                          II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

      This Court recently clarified the appellate standard of review when
considering whether a defendant's statement to law enforcement was voluntarily
made. "We agree with those jurisdictions that have found the question of
voluntariness presents a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Miller, 441 S.C.
106, 119, 893 S.E.2d 306, 313 (2023). "[W]e will review the trial court's factual
findings regarding voluntariness for any evidentiary support." Id. "However, the
ultimate legal conclusion—whether, based on those facts, a statement was
voluntarily made—is a question of law subject to de novo review." Id. 6

                                 III. DISCUSSION

      The State contends the court of appeals erred in finding Collins's statement
was involuntarily made and, therefore, inadmissible. We disagree.

      There are two constitutional bases that require statements admitted into
evidence to be voluntarily made: (1) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and (2) the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Id. at
120, 893 S.E.2d at 313 (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000)).
The United States Supreme Court has observed that the requirement of warnings
regarding the Fifth Amendment in Miranda "does not, of course, dispense with the
voluntariness inquiry." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.

        In the current appeal we are considering the issue of voluntariness, where one
factor in the analysis is that the defendant was advised of his rights (e.g., to remain
silent, to have an attorney present at questioning) and given Miranda warnings, but
the warnings were then negated by law enforcement's false assurances of
confidentiality. It is the impact on voluntariness of these two opposing points—

6
  In Miller we recognized that, because voluntariness is "a legal question, it is
unnecessary going forward for trial courts to submit the question of voluntariness to
the jury," but "the parties may continue to argue to the jury why a statement is more
or less trustworthy based on its voluntary nature." Miller, 441 S.C. at 119 n.10, 893
S.E.2d at 313 n.10. In other words, a trial court's pretrial determination of
voluntariness will not prevent a defendant from challenging the reliability of a
statement during the trial, as credibility remains an issue for the jury. Id. (citation
omitted).
warnings of potential consequences, versus a promise of no consequences—that is
before us, not the more narrow issue of compliance with the Fifth Amendment
warning requirements under Miranda. 7 As a result, the question before the Court is
more precisely framed as follows: Does a false promise of confidentiality give rise
to coercion and, thus, a lack of voluntariness, because it intentionally misleads a
suspect about the law, i.e., the legal consequences and risks of proceeding with an
interview with law enforcement, as distinguished from misleading a suspect about
the facts in an investigation? We conclude that an intentional misrepresentation of
the law in this regard violates due process. Importantly, we note that we reach this
result regardless of whether the false assurance was accompanied by Miranda
warnings. A false assurance of confidentiality from law enforcement is inherently
coercive because it interferes with a layperson's ability to make a fully informed
decision whether to engage in an interview under such circumstances.

       Pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), a defendant "is entitled
to a reliable determination as to the voluntariness of his confession by a tribunal
other than the jury charged with deciding his guilt or innocence." State v. Fortner,
266 S.C. 223, 226, 222 S.E.2d 508, 510 (1976). In South Carolina, the trial judge
makes this initial determination of voluntariness required by Jackson v. Denno. Id.
at 226–27, 222 S.E.2d at 510.

      "The trial judge's determination of the voluntariness of a statement must be
made on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused." State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 136, 551

7
  The court of appeals has noted that "[t]he State conceded in oral argument that if
Miranda warnings were required here, Agent Hardee's assurance negated the
warnings, rendering Appellant's statements inadmissible as a matter of law."
Collins, 435 S.C. at 51 n.9, 864 S.E.2d at 924 n.9. The State alternatively contends,
however, (1) that Miranda warnings were not required because Collins was not in
custody and voluntarily agreed to speak to law enforcement, so any promises
negating (what it terms) the unnecessary Miranda warnings cannot be misleading or
coercive, or (2) that Collins was properly given his Miranda warnings and executed
a waiver of his rights, so he should, therefore, have known not to rely on any
contradictory promises by law enforcement. We disagree with the State on these
contentions. Regardless of whether Miranda warnings were initially required, we
find law enforcement may not make a false promise of confidentiality during an
interview because, ultimately, the impact on due process is the same.
S.E.2d 240, 252 (2001); see also State v. Moses, 390 S.C. 502, 513, 702 S.E.2d 395,
401 (Ct. App. 2010) ("In South Carolina, the test for determining whether a
defendant's confession was given freely, knowingly, and voluntarily focuses upon
whether the defendant's will was overborne by the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the confession.").

       "If a suspect's will is overborne and his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired, use of the resulting confession offends due process." Saltz, 346
S.C. at 136, 551 S.E.2d at 252 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225
(1973)). "Ultimately, the determination will depend 'upon a weighing of the
circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing.'"
Miller, 441 S.C. at 120, 893 S.E.2d at 314 (quoting Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434). We
have noted that "[c]ourts may consider the impact of a number of factors" in
assessing voluntariness, such as the accused's youth and maturity, lack of education,
or low intelligence; the failure to advise the accused of his constitutional rights; the
presence of a written waiver of rights; the physical condition and mental health of
the accused; the circumstances of the interrogation, including its length, repeated
nature, location, and continuity; the use of physical punishment; whether law
enforcement offered specific promises of leniency (as opposed to general comments
that cooperation would be beneficial); and whether law enforcement made
intentional misrepresentations of the evidence against the accused. See id. at 120–
21, 893 S.E.2d at 314 (enumerating a nonexclusive list of factors).

       "It is generally recognized that the police may use some psychological tactics
in eliciting a statement from a suspect." State v. Parker, 381 S.C. 68, 89, 671 S.E.2d
619, 630 (Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted). "These ploys may play a part in the
suspect's decision to confess, but so long as that decision is a product of the suspect's
own balancing of competing considerations, the confession is voluntary." Id.
(citation omitted).

       However, "[c]ertain interrogation techniques, either in isolation, or as applied
to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized
system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Miller, 441 S.C. at 120, 893 S.E.2d at 313 (quoting Miller
v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)). "Coercion is determined from the perspective
of the suspect." State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588, 601, 683 S.E.2d 500, 507 (Ct. App.
2009) (citation omitted).
       We note that, during the oral argument before this Court, the State itself
characterized the officer's statements to Collins as "dangerous" and "inexcusable,"
and it specifically acknowledged that false promises of confidentiality should never
be made by law enforcement:

             [T]he comment from Agent Hardee . . . [giving Collins a
             false assurance of confidentiality] is terrible, should have
             never been said, and should never be said again by any law
             enforcement officer in South Carolina.

             ....

             This statement, in addition to being inexcusable, is
             incredibly dangerous, and it's so disturbing that it occurs
             in an investigation of a twelve-year-old's death.

       Although the State argued the record supported the trial judge's finding that
Collins's confession was, nevertheless, voluntary and that Collins's free will was not
overborne by law enforcement's false promise of confidentiality, the State further
asserted: "The opinion this Court writes . . . should say that's something that should
never have occurred and should never happen again and we condemn it. The State's
right there with you, we condemn it as well."

      At the outset, we want to commend the State for its candid and forthright
acknowledgements at oral argument, and we accept the State's invitation to
unequivocally condemn the interviewing technique employed here. However, we
disagree with the State's contention that the conduct did not render Collins's
statement involuntary. False assurances of confidentiality have been deemed
impermissibly coercive and violative of due process in a number of jurisdictions that
have had the opportunity to consider the issue, and we find their reasoning
persuasive.

       In one such case from New Hampshire, a "detective told the defendant that
'[w]hat you tell me and what we deal with in here can stay between me and you.'"
State v. Parker, 999 A.2d 314, 318 (N.H. 2010) (alteration in original). ''Later, the
detective stated, '[g]et a little counseling and . . . it's over,' implying, according to
the defendant, that if he confessed 'he would only have to do counseling and that he
would see his children'; [i.e.,] 'he would not have to go to jail.'" Id. (first alteration
in original). The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated, "The defendant contends
that these promises 'were so irresistible they rendered [his] confession involuntary.'"
Id. (alteration in original).

       The New Hampshire court reaffirmed its earlier precedent that held promises
of confidentiality or immunity from prosecution are "categorically different" from
other promises and, when relied upon the defendant, warrant a per se exclusion of
the resulting statements. See id. at 319 (observing that, for most promises or threats,
the court examines the totality of the circumstances to determine if a defendant's will
was overborne, but "[t]he totality of the circumstances test . . . does not apply to
promises of confidentiality or promises of immunity from prosecution" (citing State
v. McDermott, 554 A.2d 1302 (N.H. 1989))). The court found the defendant's
(Parker's) statements relied upon the detective's false promise of confidentiality and
were, thus, involuntary, because after "the detective's promise of confidentiality, the
defendant admitted to the sexual assault of [the victims]." Id. at 321; see also id. at
322 ("Because the interviewing detective made a promise of confidentiality that the
defendant relied upon, we hold that the defendant's resulting statement was
involuntary.").

        In State v. McDermott, the New Hampshire court affirmed the trial court's
suppression of the defendant's confession. The court indicated the case turned on
the trial court's finding that an agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") had told the defendant that the information he provided "would not leave
the DEA's office." McDermott, 554 A.2d at 1305. The court stated, "[T]o allow the
government to revoke its promise after obtaining incriminating information obtained
in reliance on that promise would be to sanction governmental deception in a manner
violating due process." Id. at 1306.

       The McDermott decision is notable because no Miranda warnings were ever
given to the defendant. See id. at 1304 (noting another false statement the DEA
agent made was that the defendant's statements would not be used against him
because he had never received Miranda warnings). Thus, the negation of Miranda
warnings was not crucial to the appellate court's analysis and conclusion that the
defendant's confession was inadmissible. Rather, the court found that the false
promise of confidentiality, in itself, violated due process because this type of
promise is uniquely coercive and egregious, and the false promise rendered the
resulting incriminating statements involuntary. Id. at 1305–06; cf. State v. Rezk, 840
A.2d 758, 487–93 (N.H. 2004) (explaining false promises of confidentiality and
leniency, unlike other types of promises, can be dispositive of the issue of
voluntariness, but error in the admission of an involuntary statement is still subject
to a harmless error analysis because it is a trial error, not a structural error (citing
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307–10 (1991))).

       We agree with this analysis. Accordingly, our conclusion today is not
premised on the State's contentions regarding whether or not Miranda warnings were
ever "necessary" in the first instance, as the narrower issue of Miranda compliance
is not before us. Here, the only reasonable interpretation of the officer's statements
to Collins—that the door was closed and the blinds were drawn because nothing
would ever leave that room or the "file"—is that they constituted a false promise of
confidentiality. Although Collins was assured that he would be going home that day
regardless of what he said and that he was not the focus of the investigation, the
unspoken truth was that law enforcement could—and did—later seek to use Collins's
uncounseled, "confidential" statements against him in a court of law, to his
detriment, despite these assurances to the contrary. This misstatement of the law
and false assurance by law enforcement regarding Collins's constitutional rights
violated due process.

       We take care to emphasize that law enforcement is under no obligation to
advise a suspect on the law, but having undertaken the task of doing so, law
enforcement may not mislead a suspect about the law, particularly as to his critical,
constitutional rights. Such misleading statements undermine the fundamental
fairness that every defendant is entitled to under the law, and are distinguishable
from misleading statements about the facts of an investigation.

       In another context (involving false promises of leniency), the Fourth Circuit
similarly reasoned that, because it is difficult to determine with certainty the effect
that a false promise may have had on an individual defendant, the statements
resulting from an unconstitutional inducement should be excluded if there is any
degree of influence:

             Seventy years ago the [United States] Supreme Court
             recognized the inherent difficulty of calibrating the effect
             of an unconstitutional inducement, when it observed [that]
             "the law cannot measure the force of the influence used,
             or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and
             therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of
             influence has been exerted."

Grades v. Boles, 398 F.2d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 1968) (quoting Bram v. United States,
168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897)); cf. Porter v. State, 239 S.E.2d 694, 696 (Ga. Ct. App.
1977) (discussing assurances by a GBI agent that the defendant's statement "would
not be used against him" and that "it was being recorded just so the agent's secretary
could type his notes" for the file and holding "[a] confession given under such a
pretense may not be admitted against the confessor").

       Based on the foregoing, we agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that
Collins's statement was involuntary. We modify its decision slightly to clarify that
a false statement of confidentiality can be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness,
regardless of the existence or negation of Miranda warnings (or the need to examine
the totality of the circumstances). However, the erroneous admission of an
involuntary statement is still subject to a harmless error analysis. See Rezk, 840 A.2d
at 487–93.

       Having found Collins's involuntary statement was erroneously admitted into
evidence, we must consider whether the admission of the involuntary statement was,
nevertheless, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the entire record. See
State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 212, 631 S.E.2d 262, 267 (2006) ("Generally, appellate
courts will not set aside convictions due to insubstantial errors not affecting the
result."); State v. Morris, 289 S.C. 294, 297, 345 S.E.2d 477, 479 (1986) ("We
recognize the doctrine that where a trial court error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, it does not constitute grounds for reversal. It is a doctrine which should be
employed guardedly, however, and on a case by case basis." (citation omitted));
State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 5, 377 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1989) ("When guilt has been
conclusively proven by competent evidence such that no other rational conclusion
can be reached, the Court should not set aside a conviction because of insubstantial
errors not affecting the result.").

       "Whether an error is harmless depends on the particular circumstances of the
case." State v. Reeves, 301 S.C. 191, 193, 391 S.E.2d 241, 243 (1990). "No definite
rule of law governs this finding; rather the materiality and prejudicial character of
the error must be determined from its relationship to the entire case." Id. at 193–94,
391 S.E.2d at 243.
       In the current appeal, the State has argued Collins's statement was voluntary
and was properly admitted into evidence, positions that we have rejected. The State
did not specifically rely on harmless error. Nevertheless, we find the error clearly is
not harmless because Collins's statement was the key evidence placing him at the
scene of the fire and linking him to Cohen's arson scheme. Cf. State v. Byers, 392
S.C. 438, 447, 710 S.E.2d 55, 59 (2011) ("Petitioner argues the admission of Crisco's
hearsay testimony was prejudicial because Crisco's testimony comprised the State's
only evidence placing Petitioner in the vehicle at the time of the robbery. We agree
that without Crisco's testimony, the jury had little evidence from which to conclude
Petitioner was in the vehicle at the time of the robbery. Therefore, we find it was
prejudicial error to admit Crisco's testimony, and we reverse the conviction on that
ground.").

       Collins's situation is distinguishable from cases where the inadmissible
evidence is merely cumulative to other, unchallenged or properly admitted evidence
in the record. Cf. State v. Miller, 441 S.C. 106, 129, 893 S.E.2d 306, 318 (2023)
("Here, as at trial, Petitioner does not challenge the voluntariness or admissibility of
his three other confessions to Capers, Sabb, and Chief Williams. The allegedly
involuntary confession to Agents Johnson and Merrell was cumulative in every
material respect to the prior three admissible confessions."); State v. Henderson, 286
S.C. 465, 472, 334 S.E.2d 519, 523 (Ct. App. 1985) (concluding the defendant's
erroneously admitted pretrial confession was harmless error because "the defendant
made virtually the same damaging admissions" at trial, so "the defendant's statement
to the police was merely cumulative" to other evidence of guilt).

      For these reasons, we conclude the error in the admission of Collins's
involuntary statement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                IV. CONCLUSION

       We agree with the court of appeals that Collins's statement was rendered
involuntary by law enforcement's false assurance of confidentiality and was,
therefore, inadmissible. Although law enforcement has no obligation to advise a
suspect as to the law, we reiterate that officers may not mislead a suspect about the
law, particularly their constitutional rights. We further find the error in the
admission of the involuntary statement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
as it was essentially the only evidence placing Collins at the scene of the fire and
linking him to the arson scheme. Consequently, we affirm the court of appeals as
modified, on this specific ground, and we agree Collins is entitled to a new trial. We
decline to reach the State's remaining issues.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

KITTREDGE, FEW, JAMES and HILL, JJ., concur.