Court Opinion

ID: 9846383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:40:01.831248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:28.867858
License: Public Domain

McCOMB, J.
I dissent. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, after trial before the court with a jury, in an action to recover damages for the wrongful death of Joseph Bee, husband of plaintiff Doris Bee and father of plaintiff *735Josephine Bee, as a result of decedent being thrown from a tramway bucket when the puller cable parted, defendant appeals.
The undisputed facts are these:
Defendant owned and operated on aerial tramway between its mine and millsite, a distance of approximately 3% miles. At the bottom of the tramway there was a sign 4 or 5 feet long and 3 feet wide which contained the following statement: "Absolutely no riders on the tramway except maintenance men.”
Decedent Bee was an independent contractor who had agreed to deliver to defendant at the upper end of its tramway a minimum of 25 tons of ore per day, which ore was to be taken from defendant’s mine. Mr. Phelps, superintendent of defendant’s property for over a period of two years prior to February 17, .1942, told decedent on a number of occasions not to ride upon the tramway because it was dangerous and he might be killed. On the morning of February 17, 1942, Mr. Anderson, superintendent of defendant’s tramway, told decedent not to ride the tramway as it was possible to walk to the mine. Despite these warnings decedent got in the tramway bucket and while it was traveling the puller cable parted and Mr. Bee was thrown from the bucket, receiving injuries which resulted in his death.
Defendant urges among other propositions that it was prejudicial error for the trial judge to instruct the jury as follows:

“The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of evidence that a defendant was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the death of the deceased, Joseph Bee. If plaintiffs have not fulfilled this burden, the defendant is entitled to your verdict, and you need not consider the issue of contributory negligence. If, however, plaintiffs had fulfilled this burden as against the defendant, they are entitled to recover from such defendant unless the defense of contributory negligence has been established under the court’s instructions. To establish this defense, the burden is upon the defendant to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the deceased was negligent and that such negligence contributed in some degree as a proximate cause of the injury. If this burden has been fulfilled, the defen
*736
dant is entitled to your verdict. If not fulfilled, your decision on the issue of contributory negligence must be in plaintiff’s favor. You are, however, to keep in mind the defense of assumption of risk, which will be discussed later in these instructions.”

This proposition is tenable for the reason that the foregoing instruction is a formula instruction which does not contain all the essential elements necessary to establish defendant’s liability. The instruction failed to advise the jury as to the duty of care defendant owed decedent if the jury found decedent to be a licensee;1 it likewise failed to advise the jury as to the duty of care defendant owed decedent if they found him to be a trespasser 2 nor did the instruction advise the jury as to the duty of care defendant owed decedent should they find him to be an invitee.3 Since defendant’s duty toward decedent was different under each of the three relationships mentioned, it was important that the jury be advised as to the duty of care owed by defendant to decedent under each of the different factual situations which the jury might find to exist, and the failure of the formula instruction to contain such information was prejudicial.
The rule is clearly established in California that a “formula” instruction must contain all the elements essential to a recovery, and the error resulting from the omission of any essential element is not cured by a reference thereto in other instruction correctly and fully stating the law. (Ebrite v. Crawford, 215 Cal. 724, 729 [12 P.2d 937]; Jordan v. Great Western Motorways, 213 Cal. 606, 609 [2 P.2d 786] ; Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206, 217 [291 P. 173]; Douglas v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal. 390, 393 [264 P. 237]; La Rue v. Powell, 5 Cal.App.2d 439, 440 [42 P.2d 1063].)
For the foregoing reasons the judgment in my opinion should be reversed.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 9,1944. Edmonds, J., voted for a hearing.

.See Lindholm v. Northwestern Pac. 5. Co., 79 Oal-App. 34, 37 [248 P. 1033]. Also-, Brust r. C. J. Kiibach Co., 130 Cal.App. 152, 161 [19 P.2d 845],

See Alters v. Shell Co., 104 Cal.App. 733, 738 [286 P. 752].

.See Dyer v. MoCorMe, 208 Cal. 216, 219 [280 P. 965].