Court Opinion

ID: 9745605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:12:22.346574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:02.913645
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN dissenting: Forgery cannot be predicated on a written instrument unless the instrument shows on its face that it is capable of defrauding or unless extrinsic averments are made in the indictment to show that the instrument is capable of defrauding. This principal is aptly stated in Goodman v. People, 228 Ill. 154, where the court pointed out that bonds, notes and other instruments in writing for the payment of money illustrated instruments which usually showed on inspection that they were capable of being used to defraud, while there were other instruments in writing where the fraudulent character of the instrument could only be shown by additional facts and circumstances. See also 19 Illinois Law and Practice, Forgery, Sec. 4, p. 543-45. A forged prescription for a narcotic drug is not an instrument that calls for the payment of money or one that on its face creates duties or obligations. The indictment in this case describes no instrument that calls for the payment of money or one that on its face describes or creates any duty or obligation. Attached to the indictment is a copy of what appears to be a prescription blank for a substance known by the trade name of “Desoxyn”, which is apparently a trade name for a particular drug, the nature of which is not ascertainable from the prescription. Since the indictment does not describe an instrument apparently capable of defrauding and since no extrinsic averments are made in the indictment to show that it is so capable, the indictment is void. A good illustration of instruments which on their face were not capable of defrauding but were made so by the pleading of extrinsic facts is contained in the case of People v. Moyer, 1 Ill.App.3d 245, 273 N.E.2d 210, where the Appellate Court upheld the validity of an indictment charging the defendant with signing a fictitious name to a sales receipt for the purpose of obtaining credit. The court stated the receipts themselves were not “apparently capable of defrauding but were made so by the pleading of sufficient extrinsic facts to render them so capable.” The court also pointed out that “such documents” were the subject of the crime of forgery prior to the present statute “where averment was made of extrinsic facts showing the fraudulent character of their use.” Nor do I agree that the delivery of a forged prescription for the purpose of obtaining a narcotic drug constituted a calme under the forgery section of the New Criminal Code of 1961. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 38, par. 17 — 3.) The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act and the Hypodermic Syringe and Needles Act, formerly Section 192.28 — 1 et seq., of Chapter 38 were transferred and grouped in Article 22 of the New Criminal Code, while Section 17 — 3 codified the various sections in Chapter 38 which formerly proscribed various forms of forgery: 151, currency; 277, records and other writings; 278, securities; 279 — 80, bills and notes; and 401, public records. Forgery is classified in the code as an offense directed against property, while the delivery of a forged drug prescription, Ch. 38, Sec. 22 — 39, is classified as an offense affecting public health, safety and decency. The indictment in this case does not describe or attempt to describe an offense against property and therefore would not constitute the crime of forgery under the new code even if otherwise validly drawn.