Court Opinion

ID: 8963823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-27 09:57:30.763918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:10:16.800661
License: Public Domain

MAHONEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the Article 78 proceedings were improperly removed and should be remanded to state court. Accordingly, I would not reach the merits.
The facts respecting the removal are straightforward. The City commenced condemnation proceedings against the Raceway and the Seminary, as required by the Consent Decree, on April 21, 1988. The Raceway and the Seminary filed answers and, on May 18, 1988, filed Article 78 petitions as well, presumably for protective reasons.1
On the morning of May 27, 1988, before any significant action had been taken in state court with respect either to the condemnation or Article 78 proceedings, the district court signed an order to show cause bringing on, later that morning, a motion by the United States in the federal litigation to compel the City to petition for removal of the Article 78 proceedings to the federal district court. The motion was granted, and the City so ordered, later that day. Accordingly, the City filed a petition for removal on May 31, 1988, whereupon the Raceway and Seminary moved to remand the Article 78 proceedings to state court.
On June 8, 1988, the district court heard arguments on both the motions to remand and the merits of the Article 78 proceedings. That day, the district court denied the motions to remand, rejected all of the claims raised by the Raceway and the Seminary concerning the merits of the Article 78 proceedings, and dismissed the Article 78 proceedings. The district court then ordered:
that St. Joseph’s and the Raceway shall forthwith each serve on the State court in the pending eminent domain proceedings against their properties a copy of this Order and present to such Court a proposed order stating that, insofar as all substantive grounds for objection to the proceedings in question have been fully litigated and resolved in this Court, the City of Yonkers’ petitions in those actions should be granted and the eminent domain proceedings shall go forward in accordance with State law in order to determine the sole remaining issue of valuation of St. Joseph’s and the Raceway’s properties.2
*874Against this background, the majority concludes that removal of the Article 78 proceedings pursuant to the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982 and Supp. IV 1986), or the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982), presents a “difficult question,” but that removal is in any event authorized by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982). I disagree with both conclusions.
As to the general and civil rights removal statutes, both allow removal only by a “defendant” (or, in the case of section 1441, “defendants,” presumably a distinction without a difference), and the Supreme Court has twice held that whatever labels state law may apply, a condemnee is a defendant for purposes of federal removal statutes. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 580, 74 S.Ct. 290, 294, 98 L.Ed. 317 (1954); Mason City & Fort Dodge R.R. v. Boynton, 204 U.S. 570, 579-80, 27 S.Ct. 321, 323-24, 51 L.Ed. 629 (1907). In both those cases, as here, a complaining landowner was required by state law to initiate an action to raise objections to condemnation, in which action the landowner was denominated the “plaintiff” by state law. Both cases held the landowner/condemnee was the defendant for federal removal purposes, regardless of state law, and therefore the only party that could remove the case to federal court.
In all candor, given the clear language of the pertinent statutes and the equally clear holdings of two Supreme Court decisions, I do not regard this question as difficult, or even close. Removal is manifestly not warranted by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982 and Supp. IV 1986) or 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1982). This brings us to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) (federal court stay of state court proceedings).
Echoing the rationale expressed by the district court, the majority concludes that “because of the significant risk of inconsistent decrees from two courts, it was ‘necessary or appropriate’ [within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982) ] for the district court to invoke the residual jurisdictional authority of the All Writs Act.” The majority notes also that, in light of the history of the underlying federal litigation, the City is likely to be a reluctant and ineffective party to the state condemnation proceedings, whatever assurances it may give to the federal district court in that regard.
In reaching this conclusion, the majority cites and discusses the leading Supreme Court case on this issue, Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34, 106 S.Ct. 355, 88 L.Ed.2d 189 (1985), but never sets forth the basic rule articulated in that case for a situation where, as in the case of removal, other federal statutes address the issue or situation before the court. That rule is:
The All Writs Act is a residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute. Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling. Although the Act empowers federal courts to fashion extraordinary remedies when the need arises, it does not authorize them to issue ad hoc writs whenever compliance with statutory procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate.
Id. at 42-43, 106 S.Ct. at 361.
Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction held that the pertinent habeas corpus statute, which stated that the writ should be directed “to the person in whose custody the party is detained,” did not authorize direction of the writ to a noncustodian; and that the All Writs Act should not be invoked for that purpose in view of the statute specifically addressed to the situation and making a different provision. Id. at 42-45, 106 S.Ct. at 360-61. The court, added, however:
There may be exceptional circumstances in which a district court can show clearly the inadequacy of traditional habeas corpus writs, such as where there are serious security risks. In such circumstances, a district court may find it “necessary or appropriate” for Marshals to transport state prisoners. We therefore leave open the question of the availability of *875the All Writs Act to authorize such an order where exceptional circumstances require it.
Id. at 42-43, 106 S.Ct. at 361.
When the issue which this court must decide is properly framed in terms of the controlling authority of Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, it is apparent that the removal undertaken below and approved by the majority here was not warranted by the All Writs Act. Whatever the difficulties in the underlying federal civil rights litigation, to which of course the Raceway and the Seminary are not parties, I see no warrant for a preemptive strike upon a state court which had not even begun to consider the eminent domain proceedings pending before it.
Both the district court below and the majority here acknowledge the “ability, objectivity, [and] integrity of the state court.” The officers of that state court are, it might be added, sworn to support the Constitution of the United States. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 3. Accordingly, the state court was entitled to a presumption at the outset of the condemnation proceeding that it would proceed with sensitivity to and awareness of the legal and social context in which the condemnations are occurring.3 In sum, there was no basis to disregard the “principles of equity, comity and federalism,” see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2162, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972); see also Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Hartigan, 816 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (7th Cir.1987), which should govern our consideration of this issue.
The authorities cited by the majority in support of removal are easily distinguishable. United States Alkali Export Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 65 S.Ct. 1120, 89 L.Ed. 1554 (1945), construed the All Writs Act to authorize an appeal of a district court determination that it had jurisdiction over a dispute whose resolution, in the Supreme Court’s view, Congress had entrusted exclusively to the Federal Trade Commission. There is no question here that the state court is an appropriate forum to deal with eminent domain proceedings under state law.
The All Writs Act was invoked in Benjamin v. Malcolm, 803 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910, 107 S.Ct. 1358, 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987), to allow the addition of state defendants in a lawsuit challenging overcrowding in New York City jails where the state was dilatory in accepting transfer of prisoners, thus precluding correction of constitutional violations, and relief could not practically be achieved without the decreed joinder. United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 98 S.Ct. 364, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977), is similar. Again, there is no question here of adding parties in order to achieve an effective remedy. In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir.1985), found authority in the All Writs Act to enjoin non-parties from commencing state court actions which would undermine the impending settlement of a multidistrict federal class action, a situation totally afield from the present litigation.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 383 (4th Cir.1974), found warrant in an express exception to the Anti-injunction Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982),4 to prohibit defendants in a federal school desegregation suit from pursuing a state court action invoking a state statute expressly designed to frustrate school desegregation, noting the possibility of “conflicting orders from state and federal courts.” Id. at 384.
*876Perhaps my colleagues’ invocation of the Swann decision best highlights my disagreement with the majority’s ruling. The defendants who were enjoined in Swann were principals in protracted federal school desegregation litigation who initiated state court proceedings likely to result in orders pursuant to state law which would contradict and undermine the desegregation orders of the federal court. Here, on the contrary, the Raceway and Seminary are not parties to the underlying federal civil rights litigation, and invoke only the normal rights under New York and federal law of owners of property designated for condemnation by a public authority. It would, of course, be ludicrous to enjoin the Raceway and the Seminary from participating further in the state condemnation proceedings. Since only such an injunction would put this case on all fours with Swann, it is clear that Swann provides no authority for the course followed here.
There was no analogue in Swann, moreover, to the action of the district court here in removing the Article 78 proceedings from state court, purporting to determine all the substantive issues in that proceeding the same day the removal occurred, and then directing the parties to present a proposed order to the state court, before which the related condemnation proceedings remained pending, reciting that all the substantive issues in the condemnation proceedings had been decided and the state court should accordingly proceed “to determine the sole remaining issue of valuation.”
I am afraid that the fevered and highly publicized situation in Yonkers has led both the district court and my colleagues to a novel and unwarranted application of the All Writs Act which is abusive both of the condemnees and, more importantly, of the most elementary principles of the comity that should exist between federal and state courts. I would not, of course, following Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, rule out the use of the extraordinary residual authority provided by that statute if future circumstances warrant its invocation. In my view, however, its application in the circumstances presented by this record was manifestly premature and improper. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. Compare Piotrowski v. Town of Glenville, 101 A.D.2d 654, 475 N.Y.S.2d 511 (3d Dep’t 1984) (defenses to a taking of property by condemnation properly raised by initiation of separate Article 78 proceeding), with Town of Cocksackie v. Dernier, 105 A.D.2d 966, 482 N.Y.S.2d 106 (3d Dep’t 1984) (such defenses may be raised by answer in condemnation proceeding). The Raceway and the Seminary posed the same defenses both by answer in the condemnation proceedings and in their separate Article 78 proceedings: the latter also sought to enjoin the condemnation proceedings.

. Because only the Article 78 proceedings had been removed, the condemnation proceedings remained pending before the state court, thus providing a basis for a state court determination as to value.

. It was similarly premature to allow removal on the assumption that the City would be a reluctant condemnor when, whatever weight is accorded to that hypothesis, the United States and/or the N.A.A.C.P. could seek to intervene in the state court proceedings, and it appears likely that such an application would be granted. See N.Y.Civ.Prac. L. & R. 1013 (1976); Bay State Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Am. Ins. Co., 78 A.D.2d 147, 434 N.Y.S.2d 66 (4th Dep’t.1980).

. 22 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.