Court Opinion

ID: 9474499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:59:05.14495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:07.503380
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The Court, after correctly determining that the District Court had jurisdiction of Umanzor’s habeas petition, affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the petition on the basis of § 1105a(c). Because I do not *1305think § 1105a(c) supports the District Court’s dismissal, I respectfully dissent from Part III of this Court’s opinion and the Court’s resulting affirmance of the District Court.
This is the first time this Circuit has been asked to construe the word “departed” in 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) and I would not sidestep the issue as the Court apparently does. Rather, I would adopt the interpretation of “departed” espoused by recent Ninth Circuit decisions which, I believe, when applied to the facts surrounding Umanzor’s deportation, calls for a reversal of the District Court.
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(l) provides for a six month period during which a petition for review of a final deportation order may be filed. However, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) precludes judicial review of a deportation order if an alien has “departed from the United States after the issuance of the order.” The question presented in this case is whether a departure stimulated and effected by the peremptory action of immigration authorities in disregard of, or indifference to, an alien’s statutory guarantees is a “departure” under § 1105a(c).
Our brothers on the Ninth Circuit decided in so many words that “departure” cannot mean “departure in contravention of due process” and held that only “legally executed” departures act as a bar to judicial review under § 1105a(c). Mendez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 563 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir.1977). However, the Court in this case, while not rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s construction, certainly has not given it the Fifth Circuit Seal of Approval. This attitude, in my opinion, gives the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) license to rush the deportation of aliens with the sole purpose of defeating the aliens’ statutory right to judicial review. I am confident the court would not accept an interpretation of § 1105a(c) that would allow any departure to bar judicial review. To so rule would mean that as soon as a deportation order issued, the INS could presumably abduct the alien and remove him from the country, thereby cutting off his statutory right to judicial review on the grounds that the alien has “departed.” Such an interpretation would render the statutory right to judicial review meaningless.
Where then is the line to be drawn? I believe that the question is important enough that we should answer it now and clarify exactly what procedures the INS is permitted to employ in order to effect an alien’s “departure,” which automatically cuts off his statutory right to judicial review of a deportation order. This calls for an examination of the Ninth Circuit cases applying the Mendez interpretation of “departure.”
In Mendez, the alien’s attorney received no notice of the order to report for deportation, even though such notice is required by 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(a). According to the Ninth Circuit, the failure to notify counsel amounted not only to a violation of 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(a), but also a violation of the alien’s statutory right to counsel in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). The Court in Mendez thus found that the alien’s departure was not legally executed. 563 F.2d at 958-59. Allowing the INS to effect such a “departure” without notifying the alien’s attorney would thwart an appellate court’s jurisdiction to review deportation orders. Id. See also Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.1984).
I think the Ninth Circuit in Mendez was absolutely correct in deciding that a departure cannot bar judicial review when the alien’s lawyer has received no notice of the order to report for deportation and thus is afforded no opportunity to file a petition for review which would automatically stay the deportation. The statutory structure of § 1105a also supports the Mendez decision. If § 1105a(c) “departure” encompassed all departures regardless of whether the alien’s attorney has been properly notified, the six month grace period to file a petition for review of a deportation order would be rendered meaningless. Congress cannot have intended for such an anomaly to exist in the statutory scheme of § 1105a.
*1306The Court, in the majority opinion, does not suggest that Mendez is wrong. Rather, the “Mendez exception” is criticized because it has allegedly resulted in a “sinkhole” that has swallowed the departure rule of § 1105a(c). It is interesting that in the nine years since the decision in Mendez, this “sinkhole” apparently consists of only four cases in which an issue arose as to whether an alien’s departure was “illegally executed.” Moreover, adopting the Mendez exception does not have to lead to the parade of horribles feared by the Court whereby any error or defect in the alien’s deportation saga (including his arrest, hearing, BIA hearing, appeal, and final departure) would render his departure illegal. Since this issue is one of first impression in our Circuit, we have a blank slate in front of us and can therefore fashion a rule which would alleviate the Court’s legitimate concerns. Accordingly, I would restrict the Mendez exception to those situations for which it was originally intended— when the alleged illegality intimately touches the departure itself. This rule, I think, reflects the plain meaning of “illegally executed departure” in Mendez.
Applying this rule to the present case demonstrates that Umanzor’s departure was “illegally executed.” This is not a case where an alien claims that improprieties in his arrest, hearing, etc. have rendered his subsequent departure illegal. Rather, this is exactly like Mendez — that is, the claimed illegality intimately touches the departure itself. Granted, the illegality in Mendez was more egregious. In Mendez, the alien’s attorney received no notice of the order to report for deportation while in the present case the attorney was notified a few hours before the scheduled deportation. Thus, this is not a case of no notice; rather, it is a case of insufficient notice. However, when the notice is, as a practical matter, insufficient, the alien is as effectively deprived of his statutory right to counsel as if his attorney had received no notice, and the appellate court is divested of congressionally ordained jurisdiction to review INS deportation orders, thereby resulting in the loss of the alien’s statutory right to judicial review.
A close examination of the facts surrounding Umanzor’s deportation and a glance at § 1105a(c) and its legislative history indicates that the INS should not be allowed to effectuate a “departure” in the manner employed here. The INS mailed notice of the BIA’s denial of Umanzor’s appeal1 to his former attorney (Abriel) who received it on October 10, 1983 and forwarded it to the proper attorney (Lampard) who did not receive it until October 12.2 This occurred only one day before Umanzor was scheduled to be deported, and at a time when neither of the attorneys had any awareness of INS plans to effect deportation immediately.
The first actual notice of Umanzor’s departure was not received by Attorney Abriel until the afternoon of October 13— the very day Umanzor was scheduled to leave. Attorney Lampard received notice only because of Abriel’s telephone call. In other words, the two attorneys became aware of the deportation less than two hours before the scheduled time of departure. Considering the size of New Orleans, this two hour “window of opportunity” was woefully inadequate. It was as though no notice had been given.
The conduct of INS — and indeed its noncompliance with requirements of adequate notice — is not excused by the fortuitous fact that the flight on which Umanzor was *1307to depart was subsequently delayed until the following morning. Nor is it excused by the fact that during these unpredictable hours of leeway, Attorney Lampard could have obtained a stay by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals on Camp Street. Instead, she spent time researching her alternatives and preparing a habeas corpus petition to be filed in the District Court. As it turns out, this petition was filed and a stay of deportation was granted about four minutes after Umanzor’s flight was airborne. Granted, she could have filed a direct appeal and obtained an automatic stay in less time than it took to file a petition for habeas corpus. I do not, however, think that our analysis should focus on whether a scenario exists whereby the attorney “could have” obtained a stay. Since the proper inquiry is whether the departure was “legally executed” and not effected “in contravention of due process,” the resolution depends upon the INS’s actions and not on whether the attorney “could have” somehow performed her function in the face of improper agency action. Any other rule would encourage the INS to “race to deportation” confident that judicial review could be barred.
The “hurry up” atmosphere created by the INS does not serve the legislative purpose underlying § 1105a. The legislative history of § 1105a indicates that the “departure” rule of § 1105a(c) was intended to eliminate repetitious and unjustified appeals. H.R.Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 2950, 2971-72. The six month limit for filing an appeal was considered “sufficient and far beyond the realms of any claim of unfairness for an alien to determine whether he really has a case upon which he should seek judicial review and to prepare therefor.” Id. at 2973. Umanzor’s attorney had less than one day to make this critical determination. Of greater concern, however, is that allowing the INS to adopt a “beat the clock” approach actually encourages the filing of frivolous appeals or habeas petitions. Without a reasonable amount of time to carefully examine the BIA decision, research alternative courses, and discuss these alternatives with the alien, an attorney faced with the enforced departure of an alien in a matter of hours has to lash out with precipitous legal action simply to preserve the alien’s right to judicial review. This approach results in exactly what § 1105a was designed to prevent — the filing of repetitious and unjustified legal proceedings. Allowing the course pursued here by the INS will ensure that a petition for review (or for habeas) is automatically filed in every case immediately after the BIA renders its decision, regardless of whether there is any merit in doing so.
For all the preceding reasons, I would hold that.Umanzor’s departure was not legally executed but was effected in contravention of due process. That being so, the District Court erred in dismissing Umanzor’s petition for habeas corpus. Accordingly, I must dissent.

. The Ninth Circuit has ruled, correctly I believe, that notice of the BIA’s denial of an alien’s appeal does not constitute constructive notice of deportation. In other words, actual notice of deportation is required. See Zepeda-Melendez v. INS, 741 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.1984).

. Abriel, an attorney for Ecumenical Immigration Services (EIS), filed the BIA appeal on June 17, 1983. Ms. Abriel later informed the INS that she would be changing jobs on August 1, 1983, and that Lampard would assume the position of attorney for EIS as of August 15, 1983. Therefore, in addition to the untimeliness of the relevant notices, they were also being sent to the wrong attorney. This constitutes another shortcoming of the INS handling of the Umanzor affair.