Court Opinion

ID: 9789028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:25:21.673579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:18.932433
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Dissenting.
By enacting Civil Code section 3342, the Legislature has made a dog’s owner liable “for the damages suffered by any person who is bitten by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.” (Civ. Code, § 3342, subd. (a).) The Legislature has established exceptions to this statutory liability; The owner is not liable for dog bite injuries inflicted under specified circumstances by dogs engaged in military or police work. (Id., § 3342, subds. (b)-(d).)
Not satisfied with the exceptions that the Legislature has authorized, the majority here creates another. The majority holds that because plaintiff Marta Priebe worked at a kennel where the dog that savagely bit her was being boarded, the dog’s owner is not liable under Civil Code section 3342 for the damages resulting from her dog bite injuries. The majority reaches this result by extending the so-called veterinarian’s rule, itself an extension of the firefighter’s rule, to judicially declare a nonstatutory exception to a statutory liability.
*1133I disagree. Although this court has authority to establish the limits of common law tort liability, it has no similar authority to impose limits on, or create exceptions to, liabilities that the Legislature has mandated by statute. In construing a statute, a court’s role is limited. A court “is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted ....” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858; see People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1008 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071] [recognizing that a court’s task is to construe, not to amend, a statute].) By imposing its own limitation on a rule of liability that the Legislature has mandated, the majority usurps the Legislature’s authority.
I
In August 2000, Marta Priebe began employment as a kennel worker at the Areata Animal Hospital. A few weeks later, on September 14, Russell Nelson boarded his dog, a 75-pound male pit bull named Mugsey, at the hospital’s kennel. Mugsey was not sick or injured; he was not at the hospital for treatment. Mugsey was merely being boarded there while Nelson was out of town. Nelson requested that Mugsey be walked twice a day.
On the morning of September 28, Priebe began to walk Mugsey. A dog in the back of a pickup truck in the parking lot was barking, and Mugsey became agitated. Priebe decided to return to the kennel, and as she was doing so Mugsey grabbed her left ankle, knocking her down. When the dog was eventually pulled off her, she was taken by ambulance to a hospital for treatment of multiple bites to her foot and ankle resulting in serious nerve injuries that will cause her to be in pain for the rest of her life.
Priebe sued Nelson under Civil Code section 3342, also asserting claims for common law strict liability and negligence. After both parties had presented all their evidence at the trial, the court refused Priebe’s request for jury instructions on liability under Civil Code section 3342 and on common law strict liability, allowing the case to go to the jury only on the negligence theory. In closing argument, Nelson’s counsel exploited these last-minute developments, arguing that Priebe’s counsel had improperly urged the jury to find Nelson strictly liable, and the jury returned a verdict for Nelson. Recognizing that it had treated Priebe unfairly, the trial court granted her motion for a new trial, but it denied her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
*1134Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting a new trial and denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It agreed with the trial court that Nelson could not be liable under Civil Code section 3342, but it ruled that on retrial Priebe could urge the theory of common law strict liability for owning a dog with known vicious propensities. This court granted review to determine whether California’s doctrine of primary assumption of risk, as embodied in the firefighter’s rule, applies to a claim for statutory strict liability under Civil Code section 3342.
II
Under Civil Code section 3342, a dog’s owner is liable for any damages suffered by a person whom the dog bites “regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.” The statute contains no exception for dog bite injuries suffered by kennel workers like Marta Priebe. Nothing indicates the Legislature intended such an exception when it enacted the statute.
The majority offers various justifications for its judicial amendment of Civil Code section 3342. None is persuasive.
First, the majority may be understood to argue that because assumption of the risk was a recognized defense to tort liability in 1931 when the Legislature enacted the uncodified predecessor of Civil Code section 3342 (Stats. 1931, ch. 503, § 1, pp. 1095-1096), and in 1953 when the Legislature codified that provision without substantial change as Civil Code section 3342 (Stats. 1953, ch. 37, § 6, pp. 675-676), this court may infer that the Legislature intended that the new statutory liability would be subject to that defense. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1120-1121, citing Gomes v. Byrne (1959) 51 Cal.2d 418 [333 P.2d 754].) The defense of assumption of the risk that existed in 1931 and in 1953 is entirely different, however, from the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk as currently formulated and applied by this court. Assumption of the risk then was an affirmative defense requiring proof that the plaintiff voluntarily accepted a very specific risk with knowledge and appreciation of that risk. (Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 158, 161 [265 P.2d 904]; see Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 325-326 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696] (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Thus, the defense “always depended upon the plaintiff’s subjective mental state; the relevant inquiry [was] whether the plaintiff actually knew, appreciated, and voluntarily consented to assume a specific risk of injury.” (Knight v. Jewett, supra, at p. 328 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.), citing Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 240, 243-245 [53 Cal.Rptr. 545, 418 P.2d 153].)
*1135In a series of decisions beginning with Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296, this court abolished the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk, replacing it with the quite different doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, which does not turn on the plaintiff’s subjective mental state, but instead imposes categorical limits on the defendant’s duty of care. (See Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1022 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 103, 75 P.3d 30] (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.); Esper & Keating, Abusing “Duty” (2006) 79 So.Cal. L.Rev. 265, 289-312.) Thus, the doctrine of primary assumption of risk is a limitation on the plaintiff’s cause of action rather than an affirmative defense. There is no reason to infer that the Legislature, when it codified Civil Code section 3342 in 1953, intended that this strict statutory liability for dog bite injuries would be subject to the no-duty limitation of primary assumption of the risk, a doctrine that this court first recognized in 1992.
The majority asserts that my position would require this court to overrule its decision in Gomes v. Byrne, supra, 51 Cal.2d 418, which applied the traditional defense of assumption of risk to the statutory liability under Civil Code section 3342 (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1120, fn. 1). Not at all. Gomes is entirely consistent with my reading of Civil Code section 3342, because it is reasonable to assume that when it established a new statutory tort liability in 1931 by enacting the uncodified predecessor of Civil Code section 3342, the Legislature intended that the new statutory tort cause of action would be subject to affirmative defenses of general applicability, such as assumption of the risk. But the majority’s doctrine of primary assumption of risk is neither an affirmative defense nor generally applicable. The majority permits primary assumption of risk to be asserted by a demurrer (see, e.g., Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 148, 153 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 299, 131 P.3d 383]), thus demonstrating that it is not an affirmative defense but a limitation on the plaintiff’s cause of action. That the doctrine is not one of general applicability is shown by the majority’s decision here, which applies the doctrine only to plaintiff’s statutory cause of action and not to plaintiff’s closely related common law strict liability cause of action. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1132.)
The majority next appears to argue that even if the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk was not yet fully recognized and articulated in 1953 when the Legislature codified Civil Code section 3342, the firefighter’s rule was then in existence, and this court may infer that the Legislature was aware of that rule. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1121.) But the firefighter’s rule, under which a member of the public who negligently starts a fire is not held liable for injuries suffered by firefighters summoned to combat the fire, has no *1136application here. Marta Priebe, at the time of her injury, was a kennel worker, not a firefighter, and the justifications for the firefighter’s rule do not apply to her employment.
As this court has explained, the firefighter’s rule has four justifications. The first justification is that firefighters should not be permitted to sue on account of “the very negligence that makes their employment necessary.” (Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 532, 540 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 630, 882 P.2d 347].) Because most fires are negligently caused, and because firefighters are specially trained to deal with the risks of fire, it would seem unfair if firefighters could sue because of the very acts on which their livelihood depends. The same cannot be said of kennel workers and dog bites, however. Unlike some dog trainers, kennel workers are not specifically employed to deal with the risk of dog bites, and they typically receive little or no training on how to deal with that risk. If no dog ever bit anyone, there would still be a need for kennels and kennel workers.
The second justification for the firefighter’s rule is that firefighters should not be permitted to sue someone who negligently starts a fire because they are already adequately compensated (with special salary, retirement, and disability benefits) for the particular risks involved in their hazardous occupation. (Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 540, citing Hubbard v. Boelt (1980) 28 Cal.3d 480, 484 [169 Cal.Rptr. 706, 620 P.2d 156].) This cannot be said of kennel workers; there is no evidence before this court that kennel workers receive special compensation, including special retirement and disability benefits, for confronting the risk of injury from biting dogs.
The third justification for the firefighter’s rule is that the public, having taxed itself to secure the services of the firefighter, should not have to pay twice, through taxation and through individual liability, for that service. (Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 542-543.) When defendant Nelson hired the animal hospital to board his dog, by contrast, he paid them to provide ordinary care for his dog, including food, shelter, and twice-daily walks. He did not pay the hospital primarily or specifically to confront a risk of being bitten by his dog. Indeed, Dr. Jeri Oliphant, the owner of the hospital, testified that she would not have accepted Nelson’s dog for boarding if she had known of its history of biting humans. Thus, Nelson cannot argue that he is being required to pay twice, through boarding fees and through statutory tort liability, for the very same service.
*1137The fourth and last justification for the firefighter’s rule is that allowing firefighters to sue persons who negligently start fires could “embroil the courts in relatively pointless litigation over rights of indemnification among the employer, the retirement system, and the defendants’ insurer.” (Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 540.) In Neighbarger, we concluded that this concern “to relieve various public agencies of the burden of lawsuits over rights of subrogation that are pointless because the public fisc ultimately pays regardless of the outcome does not apply in the case of private safety employees.” (Id. at p. 543.) So also here, no public agency is involved, and so this justification does not apply to private kennel workers.
The majority next argues that even if the firefighter’s rule does not apply of its own force, the veterinarian’s rule, a variant or offshoot of the firefighter’s rule, applies to dog bite injuries suffered by kennel workers. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1122.) In California, the veterinarian’s rule traces its origin to Nelson v. Hall (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 709 [211 Cal.Rptr. 668], a case decided more than 30 years after the Legislature codified Civil Code section 3342. Thus, the Legislature could not have intended that the liability established by Civil Code section 3342 would be subject to an implied exception under a rule that had not yet been recognized in this state. Moreover, the justifications for the veterinarian’s rule, like the justifications for the firefighter’s rule, are inapplicable to kennel workers like plaintiff Priebe.
The justification offered for the veterinarian’s rule is that when a dog is undergoing treatment for illness or injury, the risk that the dog will bite the veterinarian or the veterinarian’s assistant is “a specific known hazard endemic” to the veterinary profession (Nelson v. Hall, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 714) because “any dog, regardless of its previous nature, might bite while being treated” (id. at p. 715). Because this risk is endemic to the profession, veterinarians presumably receive special training on how to deal with it. Consistent with this justification, the rule extends only to “the danger the dog will bite while being treated.” (Id. at p. 715, fn. 4; see also Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 545 [noting that dog owner has generally been exempted from liability when the dog bites the veterinarian “during treatment”].) The justification has no application to a kennel worker like Marta Priebe, who was hired to provide ordinary daily care for dogs not undergoing treatment, and who has never received special veterinary training.
The majority asserts that nothing in the language of Civil Code section 3342 suggests that the Legislature intended it to apply to dog bite injuries inflicted *1138on kennel workers by dogs under their care. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1128.) As this court has said repeatedly, however, a statute’s words are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent (People v. Toney (2004) 32 Cal.4th 228, 232 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 577, 82 P.3d 778]), and if the statutory language is unambiguous, “we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1106, 1111 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 5 P.3d 176]). The language of Civil Code section 3342 is unambiguous. Except for dogs engaged in military or police work, a dog’s owner is liable “for the damages suffered by any person who is bitten by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.” (Civ. Code, § 3342, subd. (a).) Under the plain meaning of Civil Code section 3342, Russell Nelson is liable for the damages caused by Mugsey’s attack on Marta Priebe.
As a final reason for extending the veterinarian’s rule to kennel workers, the majority asserts that this new judicially created exception to statutory liability under Civil Code section 3342 will further three public policies. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1129-1132.) This reasoning ignores constitutional limitations on judicial authority, because this court’s views on public policy do not authorize it to amend statutes, or to decline to enforce them according to their plain meaning. (See Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 960 P.2d 1046] [“aside from constitutional policy, the Legislature, and not the courts, is vested with the responsibility to declare the public policy of the state”]; Superior Court v. County of Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 53 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 837, 913 P.2d 1046] [“The judiciary, in reviewing statutes enacted by the Legislature, may not undertake to evaluate the wisdom of the policies embodied in such legislation; absent a constitutional prohibition, the choice among competing policy considerations in enacting laws is a legislative function”]; City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet (1995) 12 Cal.4th 105, 121 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 42, 906 P.2d 1196] [“When the Legislature has spoken, the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the better policy”].) In relying on public policy justifications, moreover, the majority ignores this court’s previous warning, expressed in these words: “[I]t is generally agreed that ‘public policy’ as a concept is notoriously resistant to precise definition, and that courts should venture into this area, if at all, with care and due deference to the judgment of the legislative branch, Test they mistake their own predilections for public policy which deserves recognition at law.’ [Citation.]” (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680]; accord, Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 185 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 973 P.2d 527].) To avoid such mistakes, this court has required that when public policy is used to justify a rule of tort liability, the decision must be “carefully tethered to fundamental *1139policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, supra, at p. 1095.)
The public policies on which the majority relies are: (1) kennel workers are in the best position to avoid being bitten by dogs left in their care (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1129-1130); (2) dog owners contract with and pay kennels to care for their dogs (id. at p. 1131); and (3) dog owners should be encouraged to use licensed dog kennels (id. at p. 1131). The first two are factual assertions or observations, not policies. Although encouraging dog owners to use licensed kennels could be a public policy, it is not one that the Legislature has chosen to adopt, much less one that the Legislature values more highly than the policies underlying Civil Code section 3342. Those policies, one may infer, are to provide compensation for the victims of dog bites, and to provide dog owners with a strong incentive to minimize the risk of dog bites by using care in the selection, breeding, socialization, and training of dogs. By relying on a policy that is not tethered to any constitutional or statutory provision, and by valuing that policy more highly than those embodied in the plain language of Civil Code section 3342, the majority arrogates to itself the Legislature’s authority to set public policy.
Ill
In construing statutory provisions, “a court is not authorized to insert qualifying provisions not included and may not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention which does not appear from its language.” (People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe (1950) 36 Cal.2d 471, 475 [224 P.2d 677]; accord, Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 578 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731, 950 P.2d 1086]; California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 633 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 671, 927 P.2d 1175]; In re Hoddinott (1996) 12 Cal.4th 992, 1002 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 706, 911 P.2d 1381].) This sound principle, rooted in the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, is all too often cast aside when this court enters the area of tort liability, as two legal commentators have recently noted: “Legislative judgments about reasonable care and conduct, traditionally given deference by courts in negligence cases, are now being disregarded in favor of the California appellate courts’ own duty of care determinations. This is both a striking departure from established law and an improper encroachment on legislative authority and expertise.” (Esper & Keating, Abusing “Duty, ” supra, 79 So.Cal. L.Rev. at p. 309.) This case illustrates that trend only too well. Relying on public policies of its own manufacture, the majority declines to enforce a statute as written, instead superimposing on an unambiguous statutory scheme a novel judicial exception.
*1140Declining to join in this dubious legislative enterprise, I would hold that plaintiff Priebe has established her right under Civil Code section 3342 to compensation for the injuries she suffered, and that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.