Court Opinion

ID: 9392303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 16:10:53.334536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.377485
License: Public Domain

J-S33044-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MIGUEL MALDONADO                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2063 EDA 2021

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 25, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0008023-2015

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                               FILED MAY 04, 2023

        Miguel Maldonado (“Maldonado”) appeals from the order dismissing his

first petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

        The PCRA court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history,

as follows:

              [I]n 2017, following a jury trial, [Maldonado] was found
        guilty of rape forcible compulsion; aggravated indecent assault
        without consent; simple assault; and endangering the welfare of
        children. On January [19], 2018, [Maldonado] raised an oral
        motion for extraordinary relief challenging the weight of the
        evidence presented at trial. . . . On that same date, [Maldonado’s
        motion was denied and he] was sentenced to an aggregate term
        of [twelve to twenty-five] years’ incarceration followed by [seven]
        years of probation. . . . [In his direct appeal, Maldonado filed a
        Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement in which he raised a
        Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 issue, as well as [a] claim that the trial court
        erred by permitting a detective to testify regarding the victim’s
____________________________________________

1   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S33044-22

       initial statement to police.   However, the latter issue was
       abandoned on appeal, following the entry of the trial court’s Rule
       1925(a) opinion. T]he Superior Court affirmed [Maldonado’s
       judgment of] sentence[, and t]he Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
       denied allocat[u]r on June 2, 2020. [See Commonwealth v.
       Maldonado, 224 A.3d 764 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished
       memorandum); appeal denied, 235 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2020).]

              On October 14, 2020, [Maldonado] filed a [timely] pro se
       PCRA petition[.] [T]his court appointed counsel[, who] filed [an]
       amended petition alleging that the trial court erred in permitting
       inadmissible hearsay, that trial counsel was ineffective by failing
       to call a character witness, and lastly, that [Maldonado’s] sentence
       was excessive. The court found [Maldonado’s] claims to be
       meritless and, on August 25, 2021, formally dismissed the petition
       entirely.

               On September 16, 2021, [Maldonado] filed a timely pro se
       notice of appeal. Per the direction of this court, [Maldonado] filed
       a [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)] statement of errors complained of on appeal
       . . .. [The PCRA court thereafter filed an opinion pursuant to Rule
       1925(a).]

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/10/22, at 1-2 (citations, footnotes, and unnecessary

capitalization omitted).2

____________________________________________

2 In Maldonado’s timely pro se notice of appeal, which was a typed document
except for a space in which to indicate the date of the order appealed from,
Maldonado wrote in the date on which he executed the notice of appeal rather
than the date on which the PCRA court entered the order dismissing his
petition. See Notice of Appeal, 9/16/21, at 1; see also Pa.R.A.P. 904(a)
requiring that the notice of appeal specify the date of the order appealed
from). This Court issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be
quashed as having been taken from a purported order that was not entered
on the docket.      Maldonado’s newly-appointed PCRA appellate counsel
responded to the rule and explained that the notice of appeal contains a
typographical error and that the order appealed from is the PCRA court’s
August 25, 2021 order dismissing Maldonado’s PCRA petition. As the correct
date of the order appealed from is readily apparent from the record, we decline
to quash the appeal and have corrected the caption accordingly. See
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -2-
J-S33044-22

       Maldonado raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Did the [PCRA] court err, abuse its discretion, and/or make a
          mistake of law when it [dismissed], as a matter of law, . . .
          Maldonado’s PCRA claim that trial counsel was ineffective
          because she failed to call character witnesses, when such
          failure caused . . . Maldonado prejudice and would have
          changed the outcome of the trial?

       2. Did the [PCRA] court err, abuse its discretion, and/or make a
          mistake of law when it [dismissed], as a matter of law, . . .
          Maldonado’s PCRA claim that appellate counsel was ineffective
          because he failed to effectively argue that the trial judge
          allowed inadmissible hearsay into evidence?

       3. Did the [PCRA] court err, abuse its discretion, and/or make a
          mistake of law when it denied, as a matter of law, . . .
          Maldonado’s PCRA claim that prejudicial error occurred
          because he was not allowed to be present during jury
          questions?

Maldonado’s Brief at 6.

       Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-

settled:

              We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in
       the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
       This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
       evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it
       is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This
       Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the
       record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the
       factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
       findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we
       afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the
       petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de
       novo and our scope of review plenary.
____________________________________________

Pa.R.A.P. 105 (requiring liberal construction and modification of our appellate
rules to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
matter to which they are applicable).

                                           -3-
J-S33044-22

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).3

       In his first issue, Maldonado contends that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to call character witnesses.         To prevail on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate:

       (1) that the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) that no
       reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and
       (3) that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s
       error.    To prove that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a
       reasonable basis, a petitioner must prove that an alternative not
       chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than
       the course actually pursued. Regarding the prejudice prong, a
       petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability
       that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different
       but for counsel’s action or inaction. Counsel is presumed to be
       effective; accordingly, to succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness[,]
       the petitioner must advance sufficient evidence to overcome this
       presumption.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). “[B]oilerplate allegations and bald

assertions of no reasonable basis and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a

petitioner’s burden to prove that counsel was ineffective.” Commonwealth

v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 443 (Pa. 2011).

____________________________________________

3 Under the PCRA, any petition shall be filed “within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final.” See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). In the present
matter, there is no dispute that Maldonado’s petition was timely filed within
one year of the date on which his judgment of sentence became final. See
Id. § 9545(b)(3).

                                           -4-
J-S33044-22

      Additionally, when raising a claim of ineffectiveness for the failure to call

a potential witness, there are two requirements for relief.              The first

requirement is procedural.     The PCRA requires that, to be entitled to an

evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must include in his PCRA petition “a signed

certification as to each intended witness stating the witness’s name, address,

date of birth and substance of testimony.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(d)(1); see

also Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(15) (providing that “[t]he request for an evidentiary

hearing shall include a signed certification as to each intended witness, stating

the witness’s name, address, and date of birth, and the substance of the

witness’s testimony”). The second requirement is substantive. Specifically,

when raising a claim for the failure to call a potential witness, to obtain relief,

a petitioner must establish that:

      (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
      for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
      the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
      for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
      witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
      trial. To demonstrate [] prejudice, a petitioner must show how
      the uncalled witnesses’ testimony would have been beneficial
      under the circumstances of the case. Thus, counsel will not be
      found ineffective for failing to call a witness unless the petitioner
      can show that the witness’s testimony would have been helpful to
      the defense. A failure to call a witness is not per se ineffective
      assistance of counsel for such decision usually involves matters of
      trial strategy.

Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1108-09 (Pa. 2012) (citations and

quotations omitted).

                                       -5-
J-S33044-22

      Maldonado summarily contends that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to call character witnesses. Without identifying any particular witness,

Maldonado generally asserts that trial counsel’s failure to call character

witnesses could not have been a strategic decision and the failure to call such

witnesses caused Maldonado prejudice “because it was a missed opportunity

to bolster [his] version of events.” Maldonado’s Brief at 17.

      The PCRA court considered Maldonado’s issue and concluded that it

lacked merit. The court reasoned:

             Here, in his severely underdeveloped PCRA petition,
      [Maldonado] failed to identify any character witness(es) that his
      trial attorney allegedly omitted. This alone is sufficient grounds
      for denial. . . . Moreover, [Maldonado] neither asserted that the
      witness(es) were available or willing to testify, nor that his
      attorney knew or should have known any of the above. Now,
      [Maldonado] baldly asserts that the failure to call the unidentified
      witnesses caused [him] prejudice and would have changed the
      outcome of the trial. . . . [Maldonado’s] series of generic
      statements have prevented this court from conducting meaningful
      review. It is for these reasons that [Maldonado’s] claim is
      meritless. He is due no relief.

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/10/22, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).

      The trial court correctly noted that Maldonado did not attach any signed

certifications of any proposed character witness to his counseled amended

petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(d)(1); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(15).

However, this Court has ruled that it is improper to affirm the dismissal of a

PCRA petition on the sole basis of an inadequate witness certification in

instances where the PCRA court failed to provide notice of this alleged defect.

See Commonwealth v. Pander, 100 A.3d 626, 643 (Pa. Super. 2014).

                                     -6-
J-S33044-22

Here, as there is no indication in the record that the PCRA court provided

notice to Maldonado of this alleged procedural defect, we decline to affirm the

dismissal of his petition based on his failure to include witness certifications.

      Nevertheless, as the trial court explained, Maldonado’s failure to identify

any character witness who existed and was available and willing to testify for

the defense of which counsel either knew of or should have known constitutes

a substantive defect which is fatal to his ineffectiveness claim. See Sneed,

45 A.3d at 1108-09.

      Moreover, when a PCRA petitioner asserts a claim that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to call a witness, our Supreme Court has ruled that such

a claim lacks arguable merit where the trial court conducted a colloquy of the

defendant and the defendant indicated that he agreed with the decision not to

proffer the witness. See Commonwealth v. Rios, 920 A.2d 790, 802-03

(Pa. 2007) (holding that defendant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to call an alibi witness where defendant indicated his agreement

with counsel not to call alibi witnesses); see also Commonwealth v. Paddy,

800 A.2d 294, 316 (Pa. 2002) (holding that where “[the defendant] expressed

the view that the decision not to call alibi witnesses was his as well as trial

counsel’s, and his decision has not been shown to have been unknowingly,

involuntarily, or unintelligently made, this allegation of ineffectiveness lacks

arguable merit”); Pander, 100 A.3d at 642-43 (concluding that appellant’s

ineffectiveness claim had no arguable merit where the trial court conducted a

                                      -7-
J-S33044-22

thorough colloquy regarding appellant’s decision not to testify, not to call fact

witnesses, and to present only one character witness).

      Instantly, the trial court conducted a colloquy regarding Maldonado’s

decision not to testify and not to call any fact or character witnesses. We set

forth part of that colloquy below.

      THE COURT: And I will ask you one last time, do you wish to
      testify?

      THE DEFENDANT: No.

      THE COURT: And you making [sic] this decision of your own free
      will?

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

      THE COURT: And are there witnesses you wanted to call or
      evidence you wanted to be presented?

      THE DEFENDANT: No.

      THE COURT: Are you satisfied with your attorney?

      THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.

N.T., 9/13/17, at 148-49.       Based on these representations, as well as

Maldonado’s failure to identify any character witness who existed and was

available and willing to testify for the defense of which counsel either knew of

or should have known, his first issue has no arguable merit and warrants no

relief. See Rios, 920 A.2d 790; see also Paddy, 800 A.2d at 316; Pander,

100 A.3d at 642-43.

      In his second issue, Maldonado contends that the PCRA court erred in

dismissing his claim that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to

                                      -8-
J-S33044-22

raise a claim that the trial court erred by permitting a detective to testify

regarding the victim’s initial statement to police. According to Maldonado,

direct appeal counsel should have raised this issue in his direct appeal.

       The PCRA court considered Maldonado’s second issue and determined

that it was waived. The court reasoned: “[Maldanado] raises a new claim on

appeal asserting that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that

the trial judge allowed inadmissible hearsay. [Maldanado] failed to raise this

claim before the PCRA court[;] consequently, this issue is waived.”         PCRA

Court Opinion, 1/10/22, at 6.

       We discern no abuse of discretion or legal error by the PCRA court in

reaching its determination that Maldonado’s second issue was waived for

failure to raise it in his PCRA petition.        In his counseled amended PCRA

petition, Maldanado asserted a claim of trial court error regarding its

hearsay ruling.       See Amended PCRA Petition, 3/19/21, at 8 (wherein

Maldonado asserted a claim that “[t]he judge erred when she permitted a

detective to testify to a statement he took from the complainant, as it was

inadmissible hearsay and did not fall under the ‘prior consistent statement

exception’”).4 In his concise statement, however, Maldonado attempted to

____________________________________________

4Notably, Maldonado raised this issue in the Rule 1925(b) concise statement
he filed in connection with his direct appeal, but later abandoned the issue by
not including it in his appellate brief. See Maldonado, 224 A.3d 764 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (unpublished memorandum) (addressing only Maldonado’s Rule
600 issue).

                                           -9-
J-S33044-22

convert his claim of trial court error in ruling on the hearsay objection into

a claim of ineffectiveness by direct appeal counsel in failing to raise the

hearsay ruling on appeal. See Concise Statement, 11/12/21, at 2 (wherein

Maldonado asserted, “[d]id the trial court err, abuse its discretion, and/or

make a mistake of law when it denied, as a matter of law, . . . Maldonado’s

PCRA claim that appellate counsel was ineffective because he failed to

effectively argue that the trial judge allowed inadmissible hearsay into

evidence”). As Maldonado has raised an entirely new claim on appeal which

was not presented to the PCRA court, he failed to preserve it for our review.

See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised in the lower court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).             Accordingly,

Maldonado’s second issue merits no relief.

       In his third issue, Maldonado summarily contends that his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to object to the fact that Maldonado was not present

during the jurors’ questions.

       This issue was not included in Maldonado’s counseled amended PCRA

petition. Accordingly, we conclude that Maldonado waived this issue by failing

to raise it before the PCRA court.             See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).   Accordingly,

Maldonado’s third issue merits no relief.5

____________________________________________

5 The PCRA court determined that Maldonado was due no relief on his third
issue because he failed to develop the argument. See PCRA Court Opinion,
1/10/22, at 7.

                                          - 10 -
J-S33044-22

      Finally, we note that, in the discussion section of his brief, Maldonado

observes that “the counseled [a]mended PCRA petition submitted to the

[PCRA] court was severely underdeveloped . . . [and that t]o the extent that

this Honorable Court rules that all of . . . Maldonado’s claims are waived

because of a deficient counseled PCRA petition, [Maldonado] respectfully

requests that the court remand for appointment of new PCRA [c]ounsel to

adequately develop these meritorious issues.” Maldonado’s Brief at 15.

      While our Supreme Court has recently held that a PCRA petitioner may,

after a PCRA court denies relief and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro

se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to

do so, even if on appeal, the High Court made clear that in order “to advance

a request for remand, a petition would be required to provide more than mere

‘boilerplate   assertions   of   PCRA   counsel’s   ineffectiveness   .   .   ..’”

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 402 (Pa. 2021) (observing that

where there are material facts at issue concerning claims challenging [PCRA]

counsel’s stewardship and relief is not plainly unavailable as a matter of law,

the remand should be afforded); see also Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273

A.3d 989, 1006 (Pa. 2022) (holding that a PCRA petitioner raising a claim of

PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness for the first time on appeal must establish that

there are issues of material fact concerning his claims challenging PCRA

counsel’s stewardship and that relief may be available).

                                    - 11 -
J-S33044-22

      Here, Maldonado does not undertake to explain to this Court: why the

underlying claims asserted in his counseled amended PCRA petition have

arguable merit; why no reasonable basis existed for PCRA counsel’s actions or

failure to act; and why there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of

the PCRA proceedings would have been different but for PCRA counsel’s action

or inaction.   See Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272.           Nor has Maldonado

demonstrated that there are material facts at issue concerning claims

challenging counsel’s stewardship and that relief may be available.      See

Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402; see also Parrish, 273 A.3d at 1006. Instead,

Maldonado has provided this Court with nothing more than a boilerplate

assertion of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id. Accordingly, as Maldonado

has not developed his claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness to the point

where it is necessary to remand the matter to the PCRA court for consideration

of such claims, Maldonado has failed to establish that remand is warranted.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/4/2023

                                    - 12 -