Court Opinion

ID: 9690081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:53:18.875515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:53.479608
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
(dissenting). Although I agree with the majority's substantive analysis of the legal issue — namely, whether a trial court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under the Children's Code, ch. 48, Stats., may release to the media the name, photograph, and other identifying information of a juvenile who has escaped from custody, I dissent because: (1) I do not believe Peter B.'s lawyer had standing to seek review of the trial court's order; and (2) I do not believe that we have jurisdiction.1
I.
Lawyers are agents of their clients, and the lawyer's authority to act on the client's behalf is limited by *74scope of the client's commission. Thus, employment of a lawyer to defend an action does not, by virtue of that employment alone, authorize the lawyer to take an appeal from an adverse determination. Hooker v. Village of Brandon, 75 Wis. 8, 17, 43 N.W. 741, 744 (1889) (cited with approval in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Madson, 201 Wis. 609, 611-612, 231 N.W. 170, 171 (1930)). The rule in criminal cases is the same. As explained by the Court of Appeals of Oregon in a case where the defendant absconded:
Defense counsel is attempting to prosecute this appeal without the defendant's authorization, and perhaps without his knowledge. This he lacks standing to do, and the appeal is dismissed.
State v. Lyon, 584 P.2d 345 (Or. Ct. App. 1978). There is no evidence in the record here that the assistant State Public Defender assigned to represent Peter B. was authorized by Peter B., or any guardian or guardian ad litem for Peter B., to file either the notice of appeal or the petition for a supervisory writ.2 Indeed, as in Lyon, *75Peter B. has absconded. By requiring Peter B.'s lawyer to prosecute the petition, over her objections, even though she has no authority to do so and her client has absconded, the majority gives her standing where she has none.3
II.
The majority has turned this court into a venus flytrap, at least for those litigants who approach us with petitions for supervisory writs. This metamorphosis violates the general proposition that a litigant "may choose to pursue his action or abandon it," see Maier v. Byrnes, 121 Wis. 2d 258, 260-261, 121 N.W.2d 833 (Ct. App. 1984) (habeas corpus relief in trial court), unless to do so would prejudice other parties. This general rule has been codified in Rule 809.18, Stats.:
An appellant may dismiss an appeal by filing a notice of dismissal. The notice must be filed in the court or, if not yet docketed in the court, in the trial *76court. The dismissal of an appeal does not affect the status of a cross-appeal or the right of a respondent to file a cross-appeal.
No cross-appeal has been filed in this case, and the respondents have not indicated that they want to file a cross-appeal. Nevertheless, the majority refuses to permit the assistant State Public Defender to dismiss her petition for a supervisory writ because, frankly, the majority wants to decide this case. Without citation to any pertinent authority, the majority holds that the voluntary-dismissal rule does not apply to petitions for supervisory writs.4
I am not persuaded by the majority's rationale; indeed, logic dictates a contrary conclusion. Simply put, our supervisory authority "enables this court to intervene in an action pending in an inferior court in appropriate circumstances where necessary to protect the legal rights of a litigant when the ordinary processes of action are inadequate to meet the situation," United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Sewerage Comm 'n, 114 Wis. 2d 258, 264, 338 N.W.2d 298, 300 (Ct. App. 1983)—it is not license to decide issues when the litigant bringing the case no longer seeks our protection, and where there is nothing to "prohibit."5 In *77fact, the Majority recognizes that "[t]o obtain a writ of prohibition, Peter B. must establish that the juvenile court .deviated from clear and plain principles of law." Majority op. at 69. Peter B. seeks to "establish" nothing; as noted, the record does not reveal that he has authorized filing the petition, and the assistant State Public Defender has filed a voluntary dismissal.
As judges, we may only decide cases that are properly before us; we are not, in Cardozo's well-known aphorism, "knight-errants roaming at will in pursuit of [our] own ideal of beauty and goodness." B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (1921). The Majority's reliance on this court's supervisory authority as the basis for our jurisdiction in the face of the voluntary dismissal, grasps the knight-errant's lance, and is dangerous precedent.

 I also disagree with the majority's praise of the statutorily-mandated cloak of confidentiality that is thrown over Children's Code proceedings. Majority op. at 72. In my view, confidentiality in delinquency matters is neither in the interest of the juvenile nor of the public. First, it gives juvenile delinquents the false impression that their crimes are less serious than they would be if committed by adults. This hinders acceptance of responsibility and thus retards, rather than advances, rehabilitation. Second, confidentiality prevents the community from fully protecting itself against the dangerous predators our revolving-door juvenile-justice system routinely releases.

 Juveniles are entitled to counsel — "an attorney acting as adversary counsel who shall advance and protect the legal rights of the party represented." Section 48.23(1) & (6), Stats. Just as with any lawyer representing any client, however, adversary counsel in matters arising under the Children's Code may not act on the client's behalf without the client's consent and authorization. Cf. E.H. v. Milwaukee County, 151 Wis. 2d 725, 736-738, 445 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Ct. App. 1989) ("appointed adversary counsel 'has the same function, duties and responsibilities as he would have if he were retained by the person involved as his or her own attorney'") (proceeding under § 48.13, Stats.) (citation omitted). Thus, the Children's Code provides that where the juvenile's best interests may diverge from the juvenile's desires, the court should appoint a guardian ad litem. Section 48.235(3), STATS., requires that the guardian *75ad litem "function independently, in the same manner as an attorney for a party to the action, and shall consider, but shall not be bound by, the wishes of the juvenile. (Emphasis added.) "If the guardian ad litem determines that the best interests of the person are substantially inconsistent with the wishes of such person, the guardian ad litem shall so inform the court and the court may appoint counsel to represent that person.” Ibid. There is nothing in the record that indicates that either a guardian ad litem or a guardian, see § 48.023, Stats., was appointed for Peter B.

I also question whether Peter B., having absconded from the court's jurisdiction, could either object to the trial court's order or maintain this appeal — even if he had authorized his attorney to take those actions. See State v. Braun, 178 Wis. 2d 249, 256-257 & n.2, 504 N.W.2d 118, 121-122 & n.2 (Ct. App. 1993) (discussing the "fugitive dismissal rule").

 The Majority confuses our authority to decide cases that are moot with our authority to decide issues once the party seeking appellate relief decides to abandon the cause. Significantly, it cites no authority in support of the latter proposition.

 A writ of prohibition is an appropriate method of reviewing a trial-court decision "when the appeal comes too late for effective redress or is inadequate, when there is a need for such intervention to avoid great hardship or the complete denial of rights of a litigant, or when there is presented a question of great and immediate public concern." State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 437, 187 N.W.2d 354, 356 (1971).
*77The writ procedure is thus a more limited method of getting appellate relief than is an appeal; although the issues raised by a writ of prohibition may always be raised via an appeal, the converse is not true.