Court Opinion

ID: 9379408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 16:06:49.858574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:56.934251
License: Public Domain

J-S06042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CHRISTOPHER A. CORNELIUS                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 861 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 24, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-06-CR-0003328-2019

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                 FILED: MARCH 15, 2023

        Appellant Christopher A. Cornelius appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County following his

conviction by a jury on two counts of homicide by vehicle, one count of

aggravated assault by vehicle, two counts of involuntary manslaughter, three

counts of recklessly endangering another person, one count of possession of

drug paraphernalia, two counts of driving while under the influence of a

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S06042-23

controlled substance (“DUI”),1 and various summary traffic offenses.2 After a

careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: After his arrest

in connection with a fatal automobile accident, Appellant, who was

represented by counsel, proceeded to a jury trial. Donelle Truglia testified

that, in June of 2019, she, her ex-husband, and her daughter (collectively “the

Truglias”), all of whom lived in Kentucky, were visiting her mother in

Bloomfield, New Jersey, when her vehicle was repossessed. N.T., 4/11/22, at

119. Ms. Truglia asked Appellant, who was also a Kentucky resident, to pick

them up in New Jersey and drive them back to Kentucky. Id.

       On June 28, 2019, Appellant arrived at Ms. Truglia’s mother’s home,

and after Appellant took a shower, the Truglias departed Bloomfield at 10:00

p.m. in Appellant’s vehicle with Appellant at the wheel. Id. at 121. Ms. Truglia

testified “the car ride was decent” while they were traveling west on I-78 until

Appellant began “swerving in and out of traffic driving at high speed.” Id. Ms.

____________________________________________

175 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732(a), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732.1(a), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a),
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), and 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
3802(d)(1)(ii)-(iii), respectively.

2 Specifically, Appellant was convicted of following too closely, driving at safe
speed, careless driving, careless driving-unintentional death and serious
bodily injury, and reckless driving. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3310(a), 3361,
3714(a)-(c), and 3736(a). We note Appellant was acquitted on the charges
of homicide by vehicle while DUI, aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI,
DUI-controlled substance-impaired ability, exceeding maximum speed limit by
45 mph, and failing to use safety belt. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3735(a),
3735.1(a), 3802(d)(2), 3362, and 4581.

                                           -2-
J-S06042-23

Truglia testified she was “nervous” and asked Appellant to “slow down; stop

doing that.” Id. Ms. Truglia eventually dozed off, but she awoke when

Appellant slammed the vehicle’s brakes to avoid hitting the rear of the car

traveling in front of them. Id. at 122. Ms. Truglia indicated she “had enough”

and was “too scared to stay in the car with him.” Id. Accordingly, Ms. Truglia

demanded Appellant stop the vehicle at the first rest stop when they entered

Pennsylvania from New Jersey. Id. at 123.

      Ms. Truglia told Appellant she refused to drive with him to Kentucky

unless he allowed her to drive. Id. After approximately forty-five minutes,

at 1:00 a.m. on June 29, 2019, Appellant drove away leaving the Truglias in

the rest stop parking lot. Id. at 125. Ms. Truglia called a taxi service, and the

family spent the night at a hotel near Allentown, Pennsylvania. Id. at 126.

Ms. Truglia testified she never heard from Appellant again; however, while

they were sleeping at the hotel, Appellant called her ex-husband’s cell number

and left a voicemail message at around 3:30 a.m. or 4:00 a.m. Id. at 127.

In the message, Appellant reported he “got into a bad car accident.” Id.

      After hearing the voicemail message at 8:00 a.m. on June 29, 2019, Ms.

Truglia called the police to inquire about the accident, as well as Appellant’s

condition. Id. at 128. In response, state troopers came to the hotel and

interviewed Ms. Truglia, who gave the troopers a statement consistent with

her trial testimony. Id. at 128-30.

                                      -3-
J-S06042-23

      Meanwhile, at some point after leaving the Truglias at the rest stop,

Appellant reversed his westward course and began traveling in the eastbound

lane of I-78. Lisa Winter testified that, at approximately 2:30 a.m. on June

29, 2019, she, her husband, and her son departed from their home in

Schuylkill County and began traveling in their hardtop Jeep Wrangler towards

Wildwood Crest, New Jersey. Id. at 138. Mr. Winter was driving with Mrs.

Winter in the front passenger seat and their son in the back seat. Id. The

Winters traveled on Route 61 south and took the exit onto I-78 east towards

Allentown. Id. at 139-40. Mrs. Winter testified there were no adverse weather

conditions, and traffic was light on I-78 east. Id. at 140.

      Mrs. Winter testified that, as the family traveled in the right lane

between exits 40 and 45, bright lights appeared from behind in the driver’s

side-view and rearview mirrors. Id. at 139-40. She indicated the lights came

upon their Jeep “real fast” and then their Jeep was suddenly hit. Id. at 140-

42. Mrs. Winter testified “the force of the impact” lifted their Jeep off the

ground, onto the guide rails, and over a steep embankment. Id. at 140-41.

The Jeep “free-fell down to a ledge and went into a hard roll.” Id. at 140.

      Mrs. Winter testified the following occurred:

             It just became very loud. Glass was ricocheting all over the
      place. I remember my head being bashed around. You could hear
      churning of metal. The coils were bouncing on the Jeep. And
      everything in the [Jeep] was silent except for me.           I was
      screaming, “God, please stop the roll; God, please stop the roll.”
      And I—at one point, it just seemed like it was going on forever
      like a nightmare that ever ends.

                                     -4-
J-S06042-23

Id. at 142.

       Mrs. Winter never lost consciousness. Id. When the vehicle stopped

rolling, it came to rest in shallow water. Id. Mrs. Winter “turned to the side

to look for [her] husband on the driver’s side, and he wasn’t there.” Id. Mrs.

Winter was unable to open the passenger side door, so she crawled onto the

driver’s side. Id. She began calling for help while yelling for her husband and

son. Id. at 144-45. Suddenly, she saw two police officers with flashlights

walking down the embankment towards her, and she was removed from the

scene suffering from a broken neck, concussion, deep cuts, and shock.3 Id. at

145-46. At trial, she denied seeing a tractor trailer in the area prior to the

crash, and she testified her husband did not make any lane changes. Id. at

141.

       Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Dominick Marino testified that, after

receiving a dispatch, he and his partner, Trooper Robert Markowski, arrived

at the accident scene in Greenwich Township, Berks County, Pennsylvania, on

June 29, 2019, at approximately 3:24 a.m. Id. at 153. He testified that, at

this location, I-78 is a highway with two lanes dedicated for traveling east and

two lanes dedicated for traveling west.          Id. at 154.   The eastbound and

____________________________________________

3 The parties stipulated that, if called to testify, Joseph Stirparo, M.D., would
testify he is the chief of trauma surgical critical care and acute surgery care
at the Lehigh Valley Health Network, and on June 29, 2019, at 5:00 a.m., Mrs.
Winter arrived at the Lehigh Valley Hospital emergency room following a motor
vehicle crash. Id. at 150. Mrs. Winter suffered fractures to her sixth and
seventh cervical vertebra. Id.

                                           -5-
J-S06042-23

westbound lanes are separated by a concrete median barrier.             Id.   The

accident occurred in a non-active construction zone where the speed limit was

posted at either 50 or 55 mph. Id. He indicated there were no adverse weather

conditions, and the road was straight with no “sight-line issues.” Id. at 155.

      Upon arrival at the accident scene, Trooper Marino observed Appellant’s

vehicle sitting in a “final resting” position by the “concrete barrier separating

east and west traffic, faced in a northeastern direction.” Id. at 154. Appellant

was standing near the guide rail, and he “flagged down” the police. Id. at 155.

Appellant pointed down towards the embankment and yelled “there’s someone

down there or there’s a car down there.” Id. at 157.

      The trooper did “a quick triage of [Appellant], asking him if he was

injured.” Id.   Appellant did not complain of any injuries. Id. at 159. The

troopers then used their flashlights to look down the steep embankment and

heard Mrs. Winter screaming for help. Id. at 158. They observed the crashed

Jeep sitting in the stream. Id. at 159. With some difficulty, the troopers

traversed down the steep embankment, and they moved Mrs. Winter, who

was semi-ambulatory, approximately 25 yards from the Jeep. Id. at 161.

      Alerting the troopers that her husband and son were in the Jeep, the

troopers began looking for them. Id. The troopers found Mr. Winter and the

couple’s son not too far on the northern side of where the Jeep had come to

its final resting place. Id. at 163. The troopers discovered no signs of life, and

it was clear they were deceased. Id.

                                      -6-
J-S06042-23

      Trooper Marino testified the ambulance arrived soon thereafter, and

Mrs. Winter was removed from the scene. Id. at 164. Meanwhile, the troopers

went back up the embankment and asked Appellant what had happened. Id.

at 165. Trooper Marino testified as follows:

      At first, [Appellant] was having trouble recalling what happened
      prior to the crash and during the crash. But he indicated about a
      truck, a tractor trailer, the trailer unit of the tractor trailer, he said
      that’s what he remembered, the last thing that he remembered
      was seeing that and trying to swerve away from that.

Id.

      Trooper Marino noted there was no tractor trailer stopped at the scene,

and no tractor trailer driver called in to report the accident.          Id. at 166.

Trooper Marino did not perform a field sobriety test on Appellant; however,

he asked Appellant to take a breathalyzer after he was in the ambulance. Id.

at 170. The breathalyzer was negative for alcohol. Id.

      Trooper Markowski testified consistently with Trooper Marino as to his

observations at the crash scene. N.T., 4/12/22, at 186-208. He noted

Appellant was “very sporadic” in his speaking. Id. at 196. He did not observe

any drug paraphernalia at the scene or detect an odor of alcohol from

Appellant. Id. at 198. He did not witness Appellant take any drugs at the

scene. Id. He did not observe any adverse weather conditions. Id. at 202.

He noted that, based on the seriousness of the crash, he called for the State

Police’s accident reconstruction unit to respond. Id. at 203.

                                        -7-
J-S06042-23

      Samuel Yerkes, who is an ambulance driver and EMT, testified he

responded to the crash scene at approximately 4:30 a.m. N.T., 4/11/22, at

175. He observed Appellant’s vehicle had damage to the front end. Id. He

indicated he asked Appellant what happened, and Appellant pointed to “skid

marks that were going off into the guardrail.” Id. at 176. Mr. Yerkes looked

down the embankment and saw the Jeep. Id.

      Mr. Yerkes testified he and a paramedic attended to Appellant, who

reported “he was driving from out of state all night, wasn’t really sure if he

fell asleep or not and then,…he had tried to avoid a collision but [he] wasn’t

really sure how it exactly happened.”     Id. at 178.    Mr. Yerkes testified

Appellant was given an IV with “normal saline” at the scene; however, he

denied Appellant was given “methamphetamine or amphetamine drugs.” Id.

at 180.

      Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Justin Humanick, who was a member

of the forensic services unit, testified he responded to the crash scene at

approximately 5:30 a.m. when the sun was starting to rise. N.T., 4/12/22, at

214. He took several pictures of the scene, including of the major front-end

damage to Appellant’s vehicle, the tire marks on the roadway, and the damage

to the guide rail on the right berm. Id. at 214-15, 220. His pictures revealed

the front end of Appellant’s vehicle had “a transfer on the hood of the letter

G-O-O-D in the same font as the Goodyear Wrangler [spare] tire on the rear

                                    -8-
J-S06042-23

of the [Winters’] Jeep.”     Id. at 221. He also took pictures of the steep

embankment and the Winters’ severely damaged Jeep. Id.

       Moreover, Trooper Humanick testified that he noticed, in plain view, two

syringes in the dash area of Appellant’s vehicle. Id. at 222. Accordingly, he

secured and executed a search warrant on Appellant’s vehicle after it was

towed to the Hamburg police barracks impound lot. Id. In addition to seizing

the two syringes from the dash area, Trooper Humanick discovered a syringe

underneath the driver’s side seat, as well as rolling papers and a digital scale

in the center console. Id. He also found a package of unopened syringes in

the rear seat, as well as two elastic bands and a Sharps container with nine

syringes in the trunk. Id. at 224, 228.

       Mikayla Lentz, a registered nurse at the Lehigh Valley Hospital, testified

she drew blood from Appellant at the emergency room at 5:17 a.m. on June

29, 2019. Id. at 235-37.

       The parties stipulated that Appellant’s “blood sample was tested by

Forensic Toxicologist Michael Lamb and found to contain 370 nanograms per

milliliter   of   methamphetamine    and    72   nanograms    per   milliliter   of

amphetamine.” Id. at 244.

       Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Anthony Garipoli, a member of the

vice narcotics unit, was offered by the Commonwealth as an expert in

controlled substances. Id. at 249. Corporal Garipoli testified he examined the

two syringes seized from Appellant’s vehicle’s dash, as well as the one syringe

                                      -9-
J-S06042-23

seized from underneath the driver’s seat. Id. at 251. He “observed dried

blood” on the needle portion of two of the three syringes. Id.

      He testified to a reasonable degree of professional certainty that people

use digital scales to weigh drugs, needles to inject methamphetamine when it

is in liquid form, and elastic bands to “pump the veins up” to inject the needle

into a vein. Id. at 252. He testified it is not uncommon for methamphetamine

users to buy the amount they are going to use, so there are no “remnants of

the actual drug” on their person. Id. at 254. He acknowledged it was

uncommon for a user of illegal drugs to carry a Sharps container to dispose of

their needles. Id. at 257.

      Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Alyssa Becker testified she conducted

a post-crash investigation of Appellant’s vehicle and the Winters’ Jeep. She

opined that, prior to the crash, both vehicles would have passed state

inspection. Id. at 271. She observed no defects in either vehicle’s brakes or

tires. Id.

      Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Timothy Cutshaw, who is a member

of the accident reconstruction unit, arrived on the scene at 5:15 a.m. on June

29, 2019. He opined to a reasonable degree of scientific and professional

certainty as follows regarding the cause of the instant crash:

             [T]he crash occurred as a 2012 Chevy Captiva operated by
      [Appellant]…was traveling east on Interstate 78 in the right lane.
      [Appellant] was unable to avoid impacting a 2018 Jeep Wrangler
      due to the high rate of speed of his vehicle. The 2012 Chevy
      Captiva struck the 2018 Jeep Wrangler in an offset rear-end
      collision that was traveling east on Interstate 78 in the right lane.

                                     - 10 -
J-S06042-23

            This impact forced the 2018 Jeep Wrangler off the roadway
     striking the right-side guide rail and continuing over the guide rail.
     The 2018 Jeep Wrangler continued down a steep embankment
     rolling multiple times, ejecting the driver and rear-seat passenger.
           The front-seat passenger remained in the vehicle where it
     came to rest in a stream. The 2012 Chevy Captiva continued to
     an uncontrolled rest on the left shoulder. The two occupants that
     were ejected [from the Jeep Wranger]…were killed as a result of
     the crash. The front-seat passenger, [Mrs.] Winter, sustained
     major injuries from the crash.
                                     ***
            The speed for the 2012 Chevy Captiva was determined from
     the Bosch Crash Data Retrieval Report to be 98 miles per hour, 98
     miles per hour, 99 miles per hour, 99 miles per hour, and 95 miles
     per hour from 2 and a half seconds to .5 seconds before the
     crash—or before the impact with the 2018 Jeep Wrangler. It was
     taken in half-second intervals. The report was validated through
     ignitions cycles and physical evidence at the scene.
                                     ***
           The speed for the 2018 Jeep Wrangler was determined from
     the Bosch Crash Data Retrieval Report to be 55 miles per hour at
     the time of impact with the 2012 Chevy Captiva. Utilizing an in-
     line momentum equation for that vehicle, I actually came up with
     57 miles per hour in math not using the Bosch Crash Data
     Retrieval Report.
                                  ***
            The speeds reported in the Jeep report that I think are
     accurate are pretty consistent with highway speeds between 65
     and 55 miles per hour. There’s nothing suddenly changing until
     after the impact occurs. The impact occurs and, obviously, the
     vehicle starts—goes hard right. And that’s based upon the impact
     with the Captiva….The offset is what caused the [Jeep] to go to
     the right. So that impact is what caused that. The offset as the
     vehicle approaches, to me, looks like both vehicles were in the
     right lane, the Captiva is coming up on the Jeep fast and decides,
     oh, I got to get over to the left lane. And then that’s when the
     impact occurs.

Id. at 286-88, 322-23.

                                    - 11 -
J-S06042-23

      He noted he saw no evidence a third vehicle was involved in the crash.

Id. at 291, 322. Specifically, he saw no evidence Appellant’s vehicle hit any

vehicle other than the Winters’ Jeep. Id. at 292. Further, based on the impact

of the vehicles and evidence at the scene, Corporal Cutshaw opined the

evidence did not suggest a tractor trailer was in the left lane and Appellant

made a quick turn to the right lane to avoid it, thus hitting the Winters’ Jeep.

Id. at 365. He also noted he saw no evidence the Winters’ Jeep lost control

or made a quick lane change prior to the crash. Id. at 292, 322. He opined

the Winters’ Jeep was traveling “straight” when Appellant’s vehicle hit it in an

offset position from behind “as if performing a lane change.”      Id. at 327.

Moreover, he saw no physical evidence that Appellant hit the brakes of his

vehicle any earlier than a half-second before hitting the Winters’ Jeep. Id. at

293. He saw no evidence Mr. Winter suddenly hit the brakes of the Jeep before

Appellant hit him from behind. Id. at 300, 321. He specifically testified the

tire marks he observed were “postimpact tire marks.” Id.

      Additionally, Corporal Cutshaw testified he examined both vehicles and

found no mechanical issues, which may have led to the crash. Id. at 294. He

also examined the roadway, which was straight, and found no defects. Id. at

297. He observed no evidence that adverse weather conditions contributed

to the accident. Id.

      Michael Coyer, Ph.D., who was offered by the Commonwealth as an

expert in forensic toxicology and pharmacology, testified to a reasonable

                                     - 12 -
J-S06042-23

degree    of   scientific   certainty    that    Appellant   was   impaired   by

methamphetamine at the time of the crash. Id. at 379, 398. He explained

the amphetamine in Appellant’s blood resulted from Appellant’s body

metabolizing methamphetamine. Id. at 382. He explained that 370

nanograms per millimeter of methamphetamine, which was the amount found

in Appellant’s blood after the accident, is “a high number” resulting in

“impairment to a normal state.” Id. at 382-83. He noted methamphetamine,

which is a Schedule II controlled substance, has “psychoactive effects,” leads

to “erratic driving,” and is addictive. Id. at 384. He testified it is a “central

nervous system simulant,” which raises a person’s heart rate, affects vision,

and has euphoric effects. Id. at 385. He explained that a person gets “100

percent efficiency of the drug when [it is] injected.” Id. at 386. He opined

that, given the high amount of amphetamine in Appellant’s blood, Appellant

“multiple dosed” with the methamphetamine prior to the accident. Id. at 394-

96. He opined, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that Appellant’s

use of methamphetamine was a direct and substantial factor in causing the

crash. Id. at 398.

       The parties stipulated that, if called to testify, Deputy Coroner Sarah

Shivers would testify she went to the accident scene at 4:44 a.m. on July 29,

2019, and she pronounced Mr. Winter and his son dead. N.T., 4/13/22, at

425.

                                        - 13 -
J-S06042-23

      Supriya Kuruvilla, M.D., who is the director of the division of autopsy

and forensic pathology at the Reading Hospital, testified he performed

autopsies on Mr. Winter and his son. He opined, to a reasonable degree of

medical certainty, that the cause of death for both men was massive blunt-

force trauma from a motor vehicle accident. Id. at 431-32. He collected tissue

samples from Mr. Winter, who was the driver of the Jeep. Id. at 434. Aside

from the presence of caffeine, Mr. Winter’s toxicology was negative for any

drugs or alcohol. Id.

      After the Commonwealth rested, the defense called a single witness,

Donald Phillips, an engineer who specializes in accident reconstruction and

event data recorder extraction analysis. He acknowledged the right front of

Appellant’s vehicle impacted the rear left of the Winters’ Jeep. Id. at 474. He

also acknowledged that Appellant’s vehicle was traveling between 95 mph and

98 mph in the seconds before the crash. Id. at 483. However, based upon

his analysis of the evidence from the crash scene, as well as the data recorder,

he testified it was impossible to preclude the possibility that the Winters’ Jeep

was changing lanes, aggressively braking, or entering the road from the

shoulder when Appellant’s vehicle hit it. Id. at 471, 474, 485. He testified

there was no way of knowing “what the Jeep was doing in the seconds leading

up to the crash.” Id. at 481.

      On cross-examination, he admitted high speeds can be the sole

proximate cause in crashes. Id. at 486. He admitted a driving speed of 99

                                     - 14 -
J-S06042-23

mph is not a safe speed for a roadway posted at 50 mph. Id. at 489. He also

admitted that, in the instant case, he observed no defects in the road where

the crash occurred, and there was no evidence of anything obstructing a

driver’s line of sight in that area. Id. at 490.

        At the conclusion of all evidence, the jury convicted Appellant of the

offenses indicated supra. Following a sentencing hearing, on May 24, 2022,

the trial court sentenced Appellant to, inter alia, an aggregate of 11.25 years

to 22.5 years in prison. This timely appeal followed, and all Pa.R.A.P. 1925

requirements have been met.

        On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue in his “Statement of

Questions Involved” (verbatim):

        A. Was insufficient evidence presented to establish the required
           mens rea of recklessness or gross negligence as required to
           sustain Appellant’s convictions of Aggravated Assault by
           Vehicle 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3721.1, Homicide by Vehicle, 75
           Pa.C.S.A. § 3732?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (suggested answer omitted).

        Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his

convictions for aggravated assault by vehicle and homicide by vehicle.4

Specifically, Appellant avers that “[a]n essential element of both is that the

predicate offenses required must be committed in a reckless and/or grossly

negligent fashion.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. Appellant avers the evidence

____________________________________________

4   Appellant presents no challenge to his remaining convictions.

                                          - 15 -
J-S06042-23

reveals   that,   at   most,   he   was   “simply   negligent,”   and,   thus,   the

Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving the necessary mens rea

required for aggravated assault by vehicle and homicide by vehicle. Id.

      Initially, in reviewing Appellant’s sufficiency claim, we are mindful of the

following well established legal precepts:

      This Court’s standard of review when considering a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence requires us to look at the evidence in a light most

favorable to the verdict winner and determine whether the evidence

presented, actual and/or circumstantial, was sufficient to enable a fact-finder

to find every element of the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 939 A.2d 912 (Pa.Super. 2007).

             In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence
      and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we
      note that the facts and the circumstances established by the
      Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.
      Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
      fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
      as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
      combined circumstances.

Id. at 913–914 (quotation omitted). The finder of fact is free to believe all,

some, or none of the evidence presented and is free to determine the

credibility of the witnesses. Commonwealth v. Dailey, 828 A.2d 356

(Pa.Super. 2003).

      Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault by vehicle under 75

Pa.C.S.A. § 3732.1, which relevantly provides as follows:

                                      - 16 -
J-S06042-23

        (a) Offense.--Any person who recklessly or with gross
        negligence causes serious bodily injury to another person while
        engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or
        municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle
        or to the regulation of traffic, except section 3802 (relating to
        driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance), is
        guilty of aggravated assault by vehicle, a felony of the third degree
        when the violation is the cause of the injury.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732.1(a) (bold in original).

        Further, Appellant was convicted of homicide by vehicle under 75

Pa.C.S.A. § 3732, which relevantly provides as follows:

        (a) Offense.--Any person who recklessly or with gross
        negligence causes the death of another person while engaged in
        the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal
        ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the
        regulation of traffic except section 3802 (relating to driving under
        influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide
        by vehicle, a felony of the third degree, when the violation is the
        cause of death.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732(a) (bold in original).

        As Appellant contends, to prove the offenses under Subsections

3732.1(a) and 3732(a), the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that “a defendant’s conduct was either reckless or grossly negligent.”5

Commonwealth v. Sanders, 259 A.3d 524, 529 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc).

See Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 203 A.3d 1115                      (Pa.Super. 2019);

Commonwealth v. Matroni, 923 A.2d 444 (Pa.Super. 2007).

____________________________________________

5   Appellant does not challenge the remaining elements for the offenses.

                                          - 17 -
J-S06042-23

     This Court has recognized that the state of mind of gross negligence

under the aggravated assault by vehicle and homicide by vehicle statutes is

the same as recklessness. Sanders, 259 A.3d at 531-32; Wyatt, 203 A.3d at

1118; Matroni, 923 A.2d at 448. Thus, to sustain Appellant’s convictions for

these two offenses in the case sub judice, the Commonwealth was required to

prove Appellant acted recklessly.

           The Crimes Code defines recklessness as follows:
           A person acts recklessly with respect to a material
           element of an offense when he consciously disregards
           a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
           element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
           must be of such a nature and degree that, considering
           the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and the
           circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a
           gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
           reasonable person would observe in the actor's
           situation.
     18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(3). Recklessness requires proof that the
     defendant both had actual knowledge of a substantial and
     unjustifiable risk and disregarded that risk despite that
     knowledge. Sanders, 259 A.3d at 531–32; Commonwealth v.
     Sitler, 144 A.3d 156, 164 (Pa.Super. 2016) (en banc).
           Recklessness “implicates knowledge in two ways: (1)
           the actor must consciously (i.e., with knowledge)
           disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk; and (2)
           the risk that the actor disregards is measured by the
           circumstances known to the actor.” “Conscious
           disregard” of a risk, in turn, “involves first becoming
           aware of the risk and then choosing to proceed in spite
           of the risk.”

Commonwealth v. Fretts, 271 A.3d 383, 389 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Sanders, 259 A.3d at 532).

     Here, in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner,

                                    - 18 -
J-S06042-23

we conclude Appellant’s actions evidenced a conscious disregard of the

substantial and unjustified risk that he would be involved in a traffic accident

causing serious bodily injury and death. See id.

      For example, the evidence reveals that, in the hours leading up to the

accident, Appellant picked up the Truglias in New Jersey, and after he

“swerv[ed] in and out of traffic driving at high speed,” and slammed on his

vehicle’s brakes to avoid hitting the rear of a car traveling in front of them,

the Truglia family refused to continue riding with Appellant. N.T., 4/11/22, at

121. Thus, at 1:00 a.m. on June 29, 2019, Appellant left the Truglia family at

a rest stop in Allentown, Pennsylvania, and he continued with his journey solo.

      Approximately two hours later, Appellant, while driving on a straight

stretch of road and traveling from 95 to 98 mph in a posted 50 mph zone, hit

the rear of the Winters’ Jeep, which was traveling approximately 55 mph in

the right-hand lane. Corporal Cutshaw, a member of the state police accident

reconstruction unit, testified the evidence showed Appellant did not hit the

brakes of his vehicle any earlier than a half-second prior to hitting the Winters’

Jeep in an offset position as if performing a lane change. Mrs. Winter

confirmed Appellant’s vehicle came upon the rear of the Jeep “real fast.” Id.

at 140. She noted her husband, who was driving the Jeep, made no lane

changes before the accident, there were no adverse weather conditions, and

there were no other vehicles, including a tractor trailer, in the area prior to

the crash.

                                     - 19 -
J-S06042-23

      Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the accident, Appellant

admitted to EMT Yerkes that he had been “driving from out of state all night

[and] wasn’t really sure if he fell asleep or not[.]” Id. at 178. The blood taken

from Appellant at the emergency room at 5:17 a.m. revealed he had a level

of 370 nanograms per milliliter of methamphetamine in his blood. Dr. Coyer

testified this is a “high number” resulting in “impairment to a normal state.”

N.T., 4/12/22, at 382-83. He noted methamphetamine has “psychoactive

effects” and leads to “erratic driving.” Id. at 384-85. It also affects vision. Id.

at   385.   Dr.   Coyer   opined   Appellant   had    used   multiple   doses   of

methamphetamine prior to the accident. Corporal Garipoli, a member of the

vice narcotics unit, noted two of the syringes seized from the interior of

Appellant’s vehicle contained “dried blood” on the needle portion. Id. at 251.

Corporal Garipoli noted methamphetamine may be injected into the body, and

Dr. Coyer testified that, when the drug is introduced into the body in this

manner, the user gets “100 percent efficiency of the drug[.]” Id. at 386.

      Based on the aforementioned, we conclude the Commonwealth proved

Appellant had actual knowledge of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and he

consciously disregarded the risk. See Fretts, supra. Simply put, we disagree

with Appellant that the evidence revealed he was, at most, negligent. Rather,

we conclude “[h]is cumulative conduct was reckless, and the evidence

supports the jury’s finding that he was guilty of [aggravated assault by vehicle

                                      - 20 -
J-S06042-23

and] homicide by vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt.” Matroni, 923 A.2d at

449.

       For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

       Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/15/2023

                                     - 21 -