Court Opinion

ID: 9401901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 16:07:43.858107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:56.047471
License: Public Domain

J-S09004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 ENOS J. HERSHBERGER                     :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 187 WDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 22, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-33-CR-0000548-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                FILED: JUNE 14, 2023

      Appellant, Enos J. Hershberger, appeals from the December 22, 2021

judgment of sentence of 140-280 years’ incarceration, imposed after a jury

convicted him of five counts of Rape, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(1); three counts

of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse (“IDSI”), 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7);

forty-eight counts of Statutory Sexual Assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1(b); forty-

eight counts of Incest, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4302; eight counts of Aggravated Indecent

Assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(8); forty-eight counts of Sexual Assault, 18

Pa.C.S. § 3124.1; five counts of Endangering the Welfare of Children, 18

Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1); and four counts of Indecent Assault, 18 Pa.C.S. §

3126(a)(8). After review, we affirm.

      Appellant summarized the facts adduced at his jury trial as follows:
      [L.M.] is the daughter of [Appellant] and [E.H. S]he was born on
      February 8, 1994. As a child, [L.M.] lived with her parents and,
      as they were born, her fifteen (15) younger siblings in Amish
J-S09004-23

     communities. On or about August 26, 2006, when she was twelve
     (12) years old, [L.M.] and her family moved into a house on Route
     119, near Sykesville, PA. On August 28, 2006, she began school.
     Around this time, in the middle of the night, [Appellant] came into
     her bedroom and had sexual intercourse with her. During this
     encounter, she acted as if she was sleeping, and she did not
     understand what was happening. This was the first time she had
     sexual intercourse with [Appellant]; she approximated that it
     happened sometime between August 28, 2006, and September
     14, 2006.

     After this began, [L.M.] believed that it continued to happen two
     (2) to three (3) times per week. During this time, she believed
     that what was happening was normal, because [Appellant] had
     told her it was normal. On one Sunday afternoon, while the rest
     of her family was outside playing and she was in her room taking
     a nap, [Appellant] came up to her bedroom and the two of them
     had sexual intercourse. At this time, [Appellant] told [L.M.] that
     she was not allowed to tell her mom and that it is okay for fathers
     and daughters to have sex.

     On a few occasions, [Appellant] would take [L.M.] to the
     chiropractor[,] and then on the way home[,] he would have her
     sit on his lap and have sexual intercourse in the buggy. This
     happened “about four or five times.” [L.M.] said that this
     happened before she knew it was wrong.

     One evening, in the fall of 2007, [L.M.] was canning sweet corn
     with her family, and it was time for bed. Everyone went to bed
     except for [L.M.] and [Appellant]. [E.H. — L.M.’s mother and
     Appellant’s wife —] was [lying] on the couch. [L.M.] came into
     the living room and sat on her mother’s rocker handle. [Appellant]
     came over to her and put his fingers on her vagina. At that time[,
     E.H.] sat up and stated, “[S]o this is what’s going on.” [Appellant]
     stated that no, this was the first time. [E.H.] asked [L.M.] if that
     was the case[,] and [L.M.] said no[,] and [E.H.] began to cry.

     After this, [L.M.] remembers these encounters happening more
     often, “pretty much every night,” mostly in the same way it
     happened the first time in the middle of the night. One time, in
     the middle of the night, [Appellant] came up into her bedroom[,]
     and [L.M.] tried to fight him off and push him back. [Appellant]
     then struck her with his open hand and then had sexual
     intercourse with her. After he had struck her[,] she stopped
     resisting. [L.M.] told her mother … the next day[ that Appellant

                                    -2-
J-S09004-23

       had hit her; L.M.] knew this because the following night
       [Appellant] came up and said to her “we’ll see if you are so good
       that you can’t feel anything,” and he struck her face again one
       time and then had sexual intercourse with her.[1] There were only
       two (2) occasions where [Appellant] hit [L.M.] prior to sexual
       intercourse.

       Other times, [L.M.] tried to push [Appellant] away with her hands
       and/or feet[,] or tried to put her hand in front of her vagina, but
       [Appellant] would grab her hands and pin them beside her on the
       bed[,] and then have sexual intercourse with her. Although this
       happened sometimes, [L.M.] did not resist [Appellant] often, so
       that it would be over sooner.

       One time, in the early morning, [L.M.] got up to get [Appellant’s]
       lunch box and went out to the bathroom. She saw [Appellant] as
       he came out of the washhouse, and he wanted to have sex. She
       asked him to please not do it because she was worried she was
       pregnant because she was late for her period. [Appellant] then
       took her into the bathroom, told her to bend over the toilet[,] and
       he had sexual intercourse in her anus.

       One time, [L.M.] heard [Appellant] coming up the stairs and when
       he crawled on the bed, she pushed him off and ran out of her
       bedroom and down to the kitchen toilet. She then went back up
       to her bedroom to change[,] and [Appellant] came out from under
       her bed and said that he tricked her. However, there was no
       sexual encounter at that time because her siblings were awake.

       Another morning, [L.M.] heard [Appellant] coming up and she
       pushed him away and ran to the kitchen. As she was going to
       walk back up the stairs, [Appellant] came out from behind the
       wall, and they had sexual intercourse.

       On a few other occasions, [Appellant] wanted [L.M.] to do chin-
       ups. So, she put her hands up on the chin-up bar and would do
____________________________________________

1 For more context, L.M. testified that, the first time Appellant hit her face
with his hand, she “saw stars” but “didn’t feel anything.” N.T. Trial, 5/20/21,
at 58. The next day, L.M. said that she told her mother about being hit
because L.M. “was wondering why didn’t I feel anything when I saw stars.”
Id. at 59. L.M. concluded that her mother must have told Appellant about
what L.M. had said about not feeling anything when he hit her because, the
next night, Appellant said, “We’ll see if you are so good that you can’t feel
anything.” Id.

                                           -3-
J-S09004-23

       chin-ups, then, [Appellant] would help her get her legs over the
       chin-up bar and hang down. At this point, [Appellant] would
       sometimes lick her vagina and sometimes put his finger into her
       vagina. This happened over a period of “about a month[.]” [L.M.]
       recalled on direct examination that [Appellant] licked her vagina
       approximately three times[,] and when asked how many times
       [Appellant] used his finger, [L.M.] stated, “a couple times” and
       then “[f]ive times, four or five times.”       When asked again
       regarding how many times [Appellant] used his tongue, [L.M.]
       stated[,] “I know it wasn’t often, but I can’t correctly remember
       positively exactly how many times it happened.” Then she stated
       “it was — I know it was at least one time. It was one to three
       times, something like that.” On some of the occasions when
       [L.M.] came down from the chin-up bar[, she and Appellant] …
       had sexual intercourse on the floor.

       On[e] time, while her mother was in the hospital, [Appellant]
       came into her room and she fought him off[. H]e went back into
       the living room and then he came back in and had her [lie] on the
       edge of the bed while he fingered her and ejaculated[. H]e did
       this while holding a stick. Later that night or early the next
       morning, [L.M.] woke up to [Appellant’s] having sexual
       intercourse with her.

       One evening, [Appellant] went up to [L.M.’s] room and said he
       had no love for her and said she was naughty. Later that same
       night, he came back to her room and apologized and said he was
       sorry he said that. After his apology, [Appellant] and [L.M.] had
       sexual intercourse.

       In the winter when [L.M.] was sixteen (16)[,] these encounters
       no longer happened. [L.M.] did not know why it stopped, she
       figured that it may have been because she was going to “take the
       baptismals.” She started lessons with the bishops and deacons in
       May of 2011.

       In February, 2020, Senior Deputy Attorney General Patrick
       Schulte[] was conducting an interview of Melissa Leseman in
       Punxsutawney regarding a different investigation.[2] Ms. Leseman
       disclosed to Attorney Schulte that she had knowledge of [L.M.’s]
       having sexual relations with her father, [Appellant]. Based on this
       information, on February 11, 2020, Attorney Schulte made a
____________________________________________

2 L.M. explained at trial that she now has children, and that Ms. Leseman was
L.M.’s midwife for one of them. N.T. Trial, 5/20/21, at 82.

                                           -4-
J-S09004-23

       report of suspected child abuse to Child Protective Services. This
       report was disseminated to the Pennsylvania State Police and the
       Jefferson County District Attorney’s Office.

       Shortly after that, Pennsylvania State Trooper Michael J. D’Andrea
       came to see [L.M.] and ask[ed] about her and her father,
       [Appellant]. This was the first time [L.M.] was aware that anyone
       from the “outside English world” knew about what had happened
       when she was younger. Trooper D’Andrea told [L.M.] about [Ms.]
       Leseman disclosing to the attorney general what she knew about
       [L.M]. [L.M.] never recalled disclosing these events to [Ms.]
       Leseman.

       Shortly after meeting Trooper D’Andrea, [L.M.] was interviewed
       by Trooper D’Andrea. Trooper D’Andrea interviewed [L.M.] on
       August 17, 2020[,] and again on October 28, 202[0]. Trooper
       D’Andrea learned that [L.M.] had received voicemails from
       [Appellant] that were left on her answering machine in Dutch.
       After some time doing investigation, Trooper D’Andrea conducted
       a videotaped interview of [Appellant] on October 19, 2020.[3]
       After the interview, [Appellant] was detained, charged, and taken
       to the Jefferson County Jail for a video arraignment.

Appellant’s Brief at 28-34 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).

____________________________________________

3 This videotaped interview was entered as an exhibit at trial, but was not
transmitted to us with the record. See Pa.R.A.P. 1931 (stating that the record
on appeal, including the transcripts and exhibits necessary for the
determination of the appeal, shall be transmitted to the appellate court); see
also Commonwealth v. Shreffler, 249 A.3d 575, 584 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“It
is the obligation of the appellant to make sure that the record forwarded to an
appellate court contains those documents necessary to allow a complete and
judicious assessment of the issues raised on appeal.”) (citation omitted).
Based on our review of the record, however, we are able to glean that
Appellant admitted to certain allegations in the videotaped interview with
Trooper D’Andrea.        See N.T. Trial, 5/21/21, at 75 (defense counsel
acknowledging in his closing argument that, in the video of Trooper D’Andrea
interviewing Appellant, Appellant “admitted to five or six of these
allegations”); id. at 104-06 (the Commonwealth’s stating, in its closing
argument, that Appellant admitted in the videotaped interview that he had
sexual intercourse with L.M., but that it only happened about 5 times, and
that he had already been shunned for a time by the Amish community for
doing so).

                                           -5-
J-S09004-23

     A jury convicted Appellant of the above-stated offenses, and the trial

court sentenced him to the aggregate term of incarceration set forth supra.

Appellant filed a timely, post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied.

Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal.       The trial court

instructed Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) no later than 21 days from the date of

his receipt of the transcript, and he timely complied.   The trial court then

issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

     On appeal, Appellant presents seven questions for our review:
     I. Is the evidence of record insufficient as a matter of law to
     support [Appellant’s] conviction at 3 out of the 5 counts of Rape;
     Forcible Compulsion where the Commonwealth failed to prove
     beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] forcibly compelled the
     victim to have sexual intercourse by using physical force,
     threatening to use physical force, or engaging in psychological
     coercion to achieve it as to those three counts?

     II. Is the evidence of record insufficient as a matter of law to
     support [Appellant’s] conviction at 1 out of the 3 counts of [IDSI]
     where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable
     doubt that [Appellant] engaged in deviate sexual intercourse with
     the victim who was less than 16 years of age and was not married
     to [Appellant,] and [Appellant] was four or more years older than
     the victim as to that count?

     III. Is the evidence of record insufficient as a matter of law to
     support [Appellant’s] conviction for 40 out of the 48 counts of
     Statutory Sexual Assault where the Commonwealth failed to prove
     beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] engaged in sexual
     intercourse with the victim to whom [Appellant] was not married
     and who was under the age 16[,] and [Appellant] was 11 years or
     more older than the victim as to those 40 counts?

     IV. Is the evidence of record insufficient as a matter of law to
     support [Appellant’s] conviction for 40 out of the 48 counts of
     Incest where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a

                                    -6-
J-S09004-23

       reasonable doubt that [Appellant] had sexual intercourse with the
       victim, his daughter, as to those 40 counts?

       V. Is the evidence of record insufficient as a matter of law to
       support [Appellant’s] conviction for 40 out of the 48 counts of
       Sexual Assault where the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond
       a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] engaged in sexual intercourse
       or deviate sexual intercourse with the victim without the victim’s
       consent, as to those 40 counts?

       VI. Did the trial court commit a reversible error when it denied
       [Appellant’s] motion for mistrial?

       VII. Did the sentencing court manifestly abuse its discretion and
       sentence [Appellant] to a manifestly excessive sentence of one
       hundred forty (140) years to two hundred eighty (280) years?

Appellant’s Brief at 21-23.

                                               I.

       In Appellant’s first issue, he claims that the evidence was insufficient to

support his convictions at three of the five counts of rape under 18 Pa.C.S. §

3121(a)(1). Section 3121(a)(1) sets forth that “[a] person commits a felony

of the first degree when the person engages in sexual intercourse with a

complainant … [b]y forcible compulsion.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(1).4 To prove

“the ‘forcible compulsion’ component, the Commonwealth must establish,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant ‘used either physical force, a

threat of physical force, or psychological coercion, since the mere showing of

a lack of consent does not support a conviction for rape … by forcible

compulsion.’” Commonwealth v. Eckrote, 12 A.3d 383, 387 (Pa. Super.

____________________________________________

4 “Sexual intercourse” is defined, “[i]n addition to its ordinary meaning,” as
“includ[ing] intercourse per os or per anus, with some penetration however
slight; emission is not required.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101.

                                           -7-
J-S09004-23

2010) (citation omitted). “Further, the degree of force required to constitute

rape is relative and depends on the facts and particular circumstances of a

given case.” Id. (citations omitted).

      Appellant argues that, “[o]utside of the two instances in which [L.M.]

testified that [Appellant] hit her prior to engaging in sexual intercourse with

her, the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence of forcible

compulsion.” Appellant’s Brief at 41. Appellant points out that L.M. “testified

that she rarely resisted, and that she would purposefully not resist so it would

‘be over sooner.’” Id. at 42 (citing N.T. Trial, 5/20/21, at 61). Appellant

acknowledges that L.M. testified that there were other times when she resisted

having sexual intercourse, but he claims that “there was not a sufficient factual

basis for these incidents. She doesn’t state when they happened or how many

times.”   Id.   Appellant also complains that, on cross-examination, L.M.

indicated that the times she fought Appellant off were the times he hit her,

and Appellant notes that L.M. only testified to being hit twice. Id. Thus,

Appellant asserts that “[t]he Commonwealth charged [Appellant] with five (5)

counts of rape, but at no point sufficiently establishe[d] the three times other

than when [Appellant] hit [L.M.] that these rapes occurred.” Id.

      It is well-established that,
      [w]hen reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
      determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all
      reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most
      favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient
      to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
      The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
      need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the

                                      -8-
J-S09004-23

       province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to accord to
       each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part or none of the
       evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
       every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial
       evidence. As an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the
       evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.

Commonwealth v. Steele, 234 A.3d 840, 845 (Pa. Super. 2020) (cleaned

up).

       At trial, L.M. testified:
       [The Commonwealth:] Okay, [L.M.], were there other times
       [besides the two times Appellant hit you] that you resisted having
       sexual intercourse with him?

       [L.M.:] Yes.

       [The Commonwealth:] And describe the ways that you would
       resist.

       [L.M.:] Mostly just pushed him away with my hands and, if I could,
       with my feet, and most of the time, he would grab my hands and
       pin them beside me on the bed.

       [The Commonwealth:] And after he would pin your hands beside
       you on the bed, what would he do?

       [L.M.:] Have sexual intercourse.

       [The Commonwealth:] Did you ever try to block him?

       [L.M.:] Yes.

       [The Commonwealth:] How would you do that?

       [L.M.:] Put my hand in front of my vagina.

       [The Commonwealth:] Now, [L.M.], you didn’t resist often,
       though, did you?

       [L.M.:] No.

       [The Commonwealth:] Why not?

       [L.M.:] So it would be over sooner.

                                     -9-
J-S09004-23

      [The Commonwealth:] So about how many times would you say
      you put up resistance?

      [L.M.:] Six, seven times, something like that.

                                      ***

      [Appellant’s counsel:] You had indicated there were times where
      you would try to fight [Appellant] off?

      [L.M.:] Yes.

      [Appellant’s counsel:] And that would have been on Shoe Road?

      [L.M.:] Yes.

      [Appellant’s counsel:] And would you fight him -- I think you said
      you would fight him off by pushing at him with your hands and
      sometimes your feet?

      [L.M.:] Yes.

      [Appellant’s counsel:] And when you were fighting him off, would
      those be times when he would hit you?

      [L.M.:] Yes.

N.T. Trial, 5/20/21, at 60-61, 117.

      Because of the above-stated testimony, we reject Appellant’s argument.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the

verdict winner, L.M.’s testimony establishes that, in addition to the two times

when Appellant hit her, L.M. tried to physically resist Appellant at least three

other times. See Steele, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195

A.3d 594, 602 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“[T]he uncorroborated testimony of the

complaining witness is sufficient to convict a defendant of sexual offenses.”)

(citation omitted). The fact that L.M. did not describe these other instances

of resistance in detail does not negate that she testified that they occurred,

and the jury apparently credited such testimony.       Moreover, to the extent

                                      - 10 -
J-S09004-23

Appellant avers that L.M.’s cross-examination testimony implies that she only

fought Appellant off the two times he hit her, we note that “[i]t is within the

province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to accord to each witness’s

testimony and to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Steele, supra.

As the Commonwealth discerns, the jury may have reasonably interpreted

L.M.’s cross-examination testimony to mean that the times she fought

Appellant off included the times he hit her, instead of that the only times she

fought him off were the times he hit her. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 6.

Therefore, based on the foregoing, no relief is due on Appellant’s first issue.

                                      II.

      In Appellant’s second issue, he argues that the evidence was insufficient

to support his conviction as to one of the three counts of IDSI. He says that

“[t]he Commonwealth’s evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that there was a second occasion of anal or oral sex between [Appellant] and

[L.M].” Appellant’s Brief at 43.

      Section 3123(a)(7) provides that “[a] person commits a felony of the

first degree when the person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a

complainant … who is less than 16 years of age and the person is four or more

years older than the complainant and the complainant and person are not

married to each other.”       18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7).         “Deviate sexual

intercourse” is defined as:
      Sexual intercourse per os or per anus between human beings and
      any form of sexual intercourse with an animal. The term also
      includes penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of

                                     - 11 -
J-S09004-23

      another person with a foreign object for any purpose other than
      good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3101.

      Here, L.M. testified that Appellant had anal sex with her once. N.T. Trial,

5/20/21, at 61-62.     In addition, on direct examination, L.M. stated that

Appellant had licked her vagina on three occasions while she was hanging

from a chin-up bar, detailing:
      [L.M.:] Well, [Appellant] wanted me to do chin-ups. He said
      something about strengthening my stomach muscles or
      something, and I would take both my hands up on the chin-up bar
      and do a couple chin-ups. And then he would help me get my legs
      over the chin-up bar and then hang down.

      [The Commonwealth:] So, [L.M.], just so we can get an idea of
      this, you’d be suspended from the chin-up bar with your legs
      draped over the bar, and your … rear[-]end would be hanging
      down?

      [L.M.:] Yes.

      [The Commonwealth:] Okay. Go ahead.

      [L.M.:] And then sometimes he would lick my vagina.             And
      sometimes he would put his finger in it.

      [The Commonwealth:] While you were hanging from the chin-up
      bar?

      [L.M.:] Yes.

      [The Commonwealth:] … [H]ow long did he have you going down
      to do chin-ups? Over what period of time was that?

      [L.M.:] About a month.

      [The Commonwealth:] Okay. And during that time, you said he
      would lick your vagina. Do you know approximately how many
      times that happened?

      [L.M.:] Three times.

Id. at 66-67.

                                     - 12 -
J-S09004-23

      Later on cross-examination, however, L.M. stated that she could not

remember exactly how many times Appellant used his tongue on her, stating:
      [Appellant’s attorney:] I will ask, though, [L.M.], do you recall
      telling Trooper D’Andrea that [Appellant] used his tongue one
      time?

      [L.M.]: I know it wasn’t often --

      [Appellant’s attorney:] I’m sorry?

      [L.M.]: I know it wasn’t often, but I can’t correctly remember
      positively exactly how many times it happened.

      [Appellant’s attorney:] Okay. So you said earlier it was three
      times, but you’re indicating now you don’t remember how many
      times?

      [L.M.]: It was -- I know it was at least one time. It was one to
      three times, something like that.

Id. at 116.

      Again, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict

winner, and we reiterate that “[i]t is within the province of the fact-finder to

determine the weight to accord to each witness’s testimony and to believe all,

part or none of the evidence.” See Steele, supra; see also Cramer, 195

A.3d at 602 (“[T]he uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness is

sufficient to convict a defendant of sexual offenses.”) (citation omitted). Here,

the jury could credit L.M.’s initial testimony on direct examination that

Appellant had licked her vagina three times.       Therefore, the evidence of

                                     - 13 -
J-S09004-23

multiple instances of oral sex — in addition to the one occurrence of anal sex

— was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction as to three counts of IDSI.5

                                           III.

       In Appellant’s third issue, he contends that the evidence does not

support his convictions at 40 of the 48 counts of statutory sexual assault under

18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1(b). Section 3122.1(b) states:
       A person commits a felony of the first degree when that person
       engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant under the age
       of 16 years and that person is 11 or more years older than the
____________________________________________

5 Included in Appellant’s sufficiency argument is a claim that the Criminal
Information stated that two instances of anal sexual intercourse and one
instance of oral sexual intercourse took place. Appellant’s Brief at 43-44.
However, Appellant says that the Commonwealth concedes that only one
instance of anal sexual intercourse occurred and, that as a result, we must
vacate one count of IDSI. See id. at 44 (“[T]he Commonwealth concedes
that there is only one instance of anal sex. Count seven and count eight [of
the Information] allege anal sex as the reason for the charge. As such, this
Court must vacate one count of IDSI that [Appellant] was found guilty of.”).
As Appellant has waived this claim, no relief is due.

       First, Appellant’s Criminal-Information argument is distinct from his
sufficiency argument, and Appellant did not raise his Criminal-Information
claim in his Statement of the Questions Involved. Accordingly, it is waived.
See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in
the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”); see also
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 42 (Pa. 2011) (“[The a]ppellant
claims that the discrepancy between the Information and the evidence
introduced at trial, i.e., the allegata and the probata, entitles him to sufficiency
relief. … This is not a sufficiency issue, but a discrepancy issue.”) (footnote
omitted). Second, Appellant did not raise this specific Criminal-Information
claim in his Rule 1925(b) concise statement. Thus, it is waived on this basis,
as well. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement
and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4)
are waived.”); Trial Court Order, 2/14/22 (“Any issue not properly included in
this statement, timely filed with the Prothonotary, and served on the trial
judge … shall be waived.”) (single page).

                                          - 14 -
J-S09004-23

      complainant and the complainant and the person are not married
      to each other.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1(b).

      Appellant explains that, at counts 9-56, he was convicted of statutory

sexual assault under Section 3122.1(b).       See Appellant’s Brief at 45.

According to Appellant, the Commonwealth represented at trial that it charged

48 counts based on 1 count per month for 4 years. Id. However, Appellant

complains that L.M. only testified to 9 specific instances of statutory sexual

assault. Id. Other than these 9 specific instances, Appellant says that the

evidence was insufficient to establish that this crime occurred once per month

for 4 years. Id.

      We disagree. As the Commonwealth sets forth:
      L.M. testified that the subject sexual abuse began in the fall of
      2006 and that, after it started and before her mother witnessed
      an instance of it, it was happening two to three times per week.
      [N.T. Trial, 5/20/21, at 53]. The Information charges the relevant
      conduct between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2012. L.M.’s
      testimony established that her mother caught [Appellant] in the
      act of touching her sexually in the fall of 2007. Thus, according
      to L.M.’s testimony regarding the frequency of these assaults,
      over seventy sexual assaults had already occurred by this time.
      L.M. would have only been 13 in the fall of 2007. After her mother
      caught [Appellant] in the act, the frequency of the assaults
      increased to “[p]retty much every night” except for times when
      she was menstruating. N.T. [Trial], 5/20/[]21, [at] 57.

      Accordingly, the Commonwealth proved far more counts than the
      mere forty-eight which were charged.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 10.

      As the Commonwealth discerns, L.M.’s testimony that Appellant had

sexual intercourse with her 2-3 times per week through the beginning of 2007,

                                    - 15 -
J-S09004-23

and nearly every day when she was not menstruating beginning in the fall of

2007 and continuing through 2012, supports Appellant’s convictions for 48

counts of statutory sexual assault.         Accordingly, Appellant’s third issue

warrants no relief.

                                       IV.

      In Appellant’s fourth issue, he argues that the evidence was insufficient

to support his convictions at 40 of the 48 counts of incest, for the same

reasons advanced in support of his third issue. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4302. For

the reasons we rejected Appellant’s third issue, we also reject his fourth issue.

                                       V.

      In Appellant’s fifth issue, he likewise claims that the evidence is

insufficient to support his convictions at 40 of the 48 counts of sexual assault,

for the same reasons presented in his third and fourth issues. See 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 3124.1. For the reasons Appellant’s third and fourth issues fail, this issue

also fails.

                                       VI.

      In Appellant’s sixth issue, he asserts that the trial court committed

reversible error when it denied his motion for a mistrial. Appellant provides

the following background on this issue:
      On May 20, 2021, [Appellant] proceeded to a jury trial…. During
      the trial, after [L.M.] had testified and after the Affiant, Trooper …
      D’Andrea[,] had gone through his direct examination by the
      Commonwealth, [Appellant’s trial counsel] requested a recess to
      discuss a discovery issue. [Appellant’s trial counsel] informed the
      trial court that he was missing materials that should have been
      disclosed in discovery. Specifically, [Appellant’s trial counsel]

                                     - 16 -
J-S09004-23

        stated that the defense only received sixty (60) or so pages of
        discovery[,] and that the Commonwealth had a file of three[-
        ]hundred (300) or so. Through discussion, it was found that
        [Appellant’s trial counsel] had never received the victim’s medical
        records.[6, 7] [Appellant’s trial counsel] raised many concerns[,]
        including that he may not have subpoenaed necessary witnesses,
        that there may have been evidence in the medical records that
        would have been helpful to a defense in this matter or evidence
        that would have changed [Appellant’s] decision to go to trial or
        not, and that he may have not adequately cross-examined [L.M].
        The trial court recessed the case for the evening to allow
        [Appellant’s trial counsel] to have the night to review the medical
        records.

        The next morning, Friday, May 21, 2021, [Appellant’s trial
        counsel] made a motion for mistrial, because he received a large
        packet of discovery at approximately 4:00 p.m., on Thursday, May
        20, 2021, after trial had begun, the jury had been sworn, and the
        victim had testified.[8] [Appellant’s trial counsel] noted that there
        was a section of approximately 40 pages that dealt with [L.M.’s]
        psychiatric admission that could have been important for trial
        purposes and additionally[] that [Appellant] was not able to
____________________________________________

6 The Commonwealth explains that it obtained L.M.’s medical records because,
“[d]uring pre-trial preparations, L.M. talked about a surgical procedure that
she had when she was young and that she knew the abuse preceded that
surgery.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 12. In trying to determine the date of
this surgery, the Commonwealth says that the investigating officer received
“a huge download of L.M.’s medical records spanning years.” Id. The
Commonwealth states that it received those records from the investigating
officer on May 17, 2021, and forwarded them via email to defense counsel
that same day out of an abundance of caution.            Id.    However, the
Commonwealth conveys that, because the records contained sensitive health
information, the email was automatically encrypted by the county’s email
server. Id. See also N.T. Trial, 5/20/21, at 141-42, 144-46 (detailing why
the Commonwealth sought L.M.’s medical records and explaining that the
email was encrypted). For whatever reason, Appellant’s trial counsel did not
receive these medical records. Id. at 141-42.

7   These medical records were not admitted into evidence.

8 The Commonwealth ensured that L.M. was available for the second day of
trial in case Appellant sought to recall her. N.T. Trial, 5/20/21, at 146-47.
Appellant did not seek to do so. N.T. Trial, 5/21/21, at 10.

                                          - 17 -
J-S09004-23

      review this discovery before rejecting the plea agreement and
      proceeding to trial. The trial court denied [Appellant’s] motion for
      mistrial.

Appellant’s Brief at 25-26 (internal citations omitted).

      Appellant argues that “the lack of time to review the medical records,

and the lack of opportunity to have a defense expert review the records[,]

was a prejudicial event that deprived [Appellant] of a fair trial.” Id. at 51. He

complains that he did not have the opportunity to review the records with his

attorney, and states that he and his counsel may have been able to craft a

different defense upon review of these records by their own expert.             Id.

Additionally, Appellant posits that a review of the medical records “may have

influenced [his] decision of whether to plea or go to trial.” Id. at 52.

      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 605(B) provides that “[w]hen

an event prejudicial to the defendant occurs during trial only the defendant

may move for a mistrial[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 605(B). Further, “[a] trial court

need only grant a mistrial where the alleged prejudicial event may reasonably

be said to deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. A motion for a

mistrial    is   a   matter   addressed   to   the   discretion   of   the   court.”

Commonwealth v. Jones, 668 A.2d 491, 502-03 (Pa. 1995) (citations

omitted).

      Here, the trial court denied Appellant’s request for a mistrial, opining:
      [A] mistrial was not warranted. There is no question that defense
      counsel did not have access until the afternoon of the first day of
      trial to a large volume of medical records related to the victim.
      There is also no question that he was able to review them before
      trial commenced the following morning and did not identify any
      way in which they would have altered his defense, though.

                                      - 18 -
J-S09004-23

       His only concern was that [Appellant], had he had the opportunity
       to review some of the records, would have decided to plead guilty
       rather [than] proceed to trial. Especially when there was no claim
       or evidence of a Brady[9] violation, though, such a speculative
       concern was not a basis for a mistral.

Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 6/24/22, at 3 (internal citation omitted; emphasis

added).

       We agree with the trial court’s analysis, especially with respect to

Appellant’s inability to identify any way in which the documents would have

altered his defense or made him accept a plea agreement. Appellant does not

specifically articulate how anything in the medical records would have

influenced him to plead guilty, assisted with or hindered his defense, or

otherwise caused him prejudice.                Accord Commonwealth’s Brief at 13

(“[Appellant] makes this general, vague, and spurious claim on appeal without

pointing to anything specific that would have changed had he had the material

earlier.”).10   As such, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
____________________________________________

9 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also Commonwealth v.
Bagnall, 235 A.3d 1075, 1085-86 (Pa. 2020) (“It is well-settled that Brady
and subsequent precedent flowing therefrom imposes upon a prosecutor the
obligation to disclose all favorable evidence that is material to the guilt or
punishment of an accused, even in the absence of a specific request by the
accused. This Court has held that, to establish a Brady violation, a defendant
has the burden to prove that: (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the
accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; (2) the
prosecution has suppressed the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; and
(3) the evidence was material, meaning that prejudice must have ensued.”)
(citations omitted).

10The Commonwealth persuasively points out that, by the time Appellant filed
his post-sentence motion, he had possessed all of the subject discovery for
over seven months.     Commonwealth’s Brief at 13.       Nevertheless, the

                                          - 19 -
J-S09004-23

discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial, as he does not

demonstrate how his late receipt of L.M.’s medical records deprived him of a

fair and impartial trial.

                                           VII.

       In Appellant’s seventh and final issue, he asserts that the trial court

abused its discretion in sentencing him to a manifestly excessive sentence of

140-280 years’ imprisonment. See Appellant’s Brief at 52. While Appellant

concedes that the trial court’s sentence was within the statutory limits and the

sentencing guidelines, id. at 37, he claims that the trial court failed to consider

his rehabilitative needs, his lack of prior record, and his support in the

community when sentencing him, and instead acted with ill-will and focused

only on the seriousness of Appellant’s crimes.       Id. at 37, 52-53.    He also

complains that that trial court “went far above the recommended sentence

from the pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”)[,] which recommended a

____________________________________________

Commonwealth remarks that Appellant “did not raise a single issue involving
the allegedly missing discovery [in his post-sentence motion], how it could
have influenced him to plead guilty, how it would have helped his defense,
other witnesses he could have called, or how not having the material
prejudiced him in any way.” Id. According to Commonwealth, “[A]ppellant
could have asked for a new trial based on some great find within this discovery
but did not.” Id.
      In addition, the Commonwealth also convincingly notes that “nothing in
the subject medical records would have compelled [Appellant] to plead guilty
inasmuch as the Commonwealth did not admit any evidence from them. There
was no evidence utilized by the Commonwealth flowing from these records
that was damaging to the defense.” Id. at 14. Similarly, the Commonwealth
underscores that “the defense did not seek to admit anything that was
purportedly beneficial to them.” Id.

                                          - 20 -
J-S09004-23

sentence of 38 years[-]and[-]9 months to 77 years[-]and[-]6 months.” Id.

at 53 (citation omitted). Finally, Appellant contends that running each count

consecutively was contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the

sentencing process and inconsistent with the objectives of the Sentencing

Code, as the trial court’s reasons for doing so were not supported by the

record. Id. at 53-54. Specifically, Appellant states that the trial court said it

was running the sentences at Counts 9-56 consecutively because each was a

separate incident that L.M. testified to, but Appellant maintains that “[a]t no

point in time during trial did [L.M.] testify to 48 separate incidents.” Id. at

54.

      Appellant’s claims implicate the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
      Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
      entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v.
      Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant
      challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke
      this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

         We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
         [the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
         Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
         preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
         modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the]
         appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
         (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
         appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
         Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

      Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006),
      appeal denied, … 909 A.2d 303 ([Pa.] 2006). Objections to the
      discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they
      are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify
      the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788,
      794 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, … 831 A.2d 599 ([Pa.]
      2003).

                                     - 21 -
J-S09004-23

       The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must
       be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul,
       925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question
       exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument
       that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
       with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
       to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
       Sierra, supra at 912–13.

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

       Here, the record reflects that Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal

and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief in compliance with

our Rules of Appellate Procedure. In addition, he filed a timely post-sentence

motion, in which he asserted that his consecutive sentences were excessive,

and that the trial court focused on the seriousness of his offenses while not

considering mitigating factors, Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, his lack of

prior record, and the support he has from his community. Problematically,

however, Appellant did not raise in his post-sentence motion or at sentencing

his claims that the trial court acted with ill-will in sentencing him, and that the

record did not support the trial court’s reasoning for imposing consecutive

sentences at Counts 9-56. Thus, those aspects of his discretionary-sentence

issue are waived.11

____________________________________________

11 Appellant also did not raise these specific claims in his Rule 1925(b)
statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the
Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this
paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”); Trial Court Order, 2/14/22 (“Any issue not
properly included in this statement, timely filed with the Prothonotary, and
served on the trial judge … shall be waived.”) (single page).

                                          - 22 -
J-S09004-23

      With respect to Appellant’s preserved claims, we conclude that they

raise substantial questions to meet the fourth requirement of the four-part

test set forth above. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770

(Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (concluding that “[the a]ppellant’s challenge to

the imposition of his consecutive sentences as unduly excessive, together with

his claim that the court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs upon

fashioning its sentence, presents a substantial question”); Commonwealth

v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 340 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“[W]e conclude that [the

a]ppellant’s challenge to the imposition of his consecutive sentences as unduly

excessive, together with his claim that the court failed to consider his

rehabilitative needs and mitigating factors upon fashioning its sentence,

presents a substantial question.”). Accordingly, we will review the merits of

Appellant’s preserved claims.

      In reviewing the merits, we keep in mind the following:
      The Sentencing Code provides that “the sentence imposed should
      call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the
      public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the
      life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative
      needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9721(b). The trial court
      has discretion within legal limits when sentencing a defendant,
      and absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb its
      sentence. Commonwealth v. Perry, … 32 A.3d 232, 236 ([Pa.]
      2011). An abuse of discretion occurs where “the record discloses
      that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the
      result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.”      Id. (quoting
      Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 ([Pa.] 2007)). The
      sentencing judge does not have to give a “lengthy discourse”
      explaining its reasons for imposing a sentence. Commonwealth
      v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa.Super. 2010). However, “the
      record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s

                                     - 23 -
J-S09004-23

      consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the
      offender.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Rominger, 199 A.3d 964, 970 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      The trial court explained its reasoning for the sentence it imposed on

Appellant, as follows:
      [Appellant] claims that his sentence was manifestly excessive,
      [with] the [c]ourt[’s] having emphasized the seriousness of his
      crimes without giving appropriate consideration to mitigating
      factors and his rehabilitative needs. The record tells a different
      story.

      The [c]ourt had and reviewed a copy of [Appellant’s] PSI report
      before it sentenced him. Between that and the witnesses who
      supported him at trial and sentencing, it was well aware and
      acknowledged that he had a strong work ethic, financially
      supported his immediate family, was supportive of his extended
      family in various ways, and had the support of his family and the
      community of which he was a member. That did not mitigate the
      heinousness of what he did behind closed doors, though, and the
      [c]ourt articulated as much on the record.

      [Appellant] knew what he did was wrong, which is why he offered
      a highly edited confession to his bishop. He did not “mess up” one
      time and thereafter amend his behavior, though. He persisted for
      years, even after being discovered by his wife, in violating his own
      daughter, doubtlessly secure in the belief that his esteemed
      reputation[,] and common customs and practices within the Amish
      community[,] would protect him from any real consequences.
      And he would have been correct had the victim’s former mid-wife
      not revealed the truth during a separate police investigation.

      Even after his actions were brought to light, [Appellant] responded
      with lies, vitriol, and attempts to intimidate his daughter. She was
      a willing and eager participant, he told the police. She was hurting
      her mother and siblings, would never receive forgiveness, and was
      doomed to hell if she pursued her prosecutorial course of action,
      he told her in phone messages. Even after admitting during a
      police interview to having sex with his daughter — albeit not to
      the extent to which she testified — and being found guilty,
      moreover, [Appellant] continued to make his victim the villain, his
      only colloquy-like comment during the sentencing hearing being,
      “[A]nd I don’t understand — the worst part that I can’t understand

                                     - 24 -
J-S09004-23

      is how you can press charges that the person didn’t even do, how
      you can press charges on somebody like that.”

      All of that — the plain evidence of a depraved mindset — informed
      the [c]ourt that a laudable work ethic and strong family ties and
      community support did not weigh against the need to protect
      society from a man who continued to proclaim his innocence and
      denigrate his victim, who was his own teenage daughter, in the
      face of incontrovertible proof — his own admission — that he had
      sex with her. Of the Amish faith, his release back into society
      would afford him access to myriad adolescent girls in an
      environment with little oversight or accountability, and that was
      not something the [c]ourt was willing to risk just because
      [Appellant] was a hard worker with strong community support and
      no criminal history.

      While, as a practical matter, [Appellant’s] sentence does not allow
      for his release, … it is not manifestly excessive under the
      circumstances. [Despite Appellant’s] suggestion to the contrary,
      the [c]ourt did consider all relevant sentencing factors, which
      included a lack of remorse and failure to accept responsibility,
      and concluded that the most appropriate sentence under the
      circumstances was one that would keep him separated from any
      Amish or other community for the rest of his natural life.

TCO at 3-5 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original).

      We conclude that the trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion

in sentencing Appellant. Counter to Appellant’s argument, it is evident that

the trial court considered the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense

as it relates to the impact on the life of L.M. and on the community, and the

rehabilitative needs of Appellant. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). While the trial

court acknowledged Appellant’s lack of prior criminal history and the support

he has in his community, it reasoned that the need to protect society and the

heinousness of his offenses with respect to L.M. outweighed those

                                      - 25 -
J-S09004-23

considerations.12 The trial court also noted Appellant’s lack of remorse and

cogently explained that it imposed a sentence that would keep Appellant

incarcerated and separated from the Amish community for the rest of his life,

in an effort to protect other adolescent girls there.13 Based on the foregoing,

we discern that the trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in

sentencing Appellant and, therefore, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

12 We also point out that the trial court stated it reviewed Appellant’s PSI prior
to sentencing him, and note that, “where the sentencing judge had the benefit
of a [PSI] report, it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant
information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those
considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.
Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 154 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

13 Even if we were to address Appellant’s waived discretionary-aspect-of-
sentencing claims, we would determine no relief is due. First, for the reasons
set forth supra, the record demonstrates that the trial court reasonably
weighed the appropriate sentencing factors, and consequently, we would not
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by allegedly acting with ill-
will toward Appellant at sentencing, when it observed that “no person who’s
ever entered this courtroom, even those who [have] killed other people, have
earned a sentence more than you have.” Appellant’s Brief at 52-53 (quoting
N.T. Sentencing, 12/21/21, at 81). Second, with respect to Appellant’s claim
that the trial court should not have imposed consecutive sentences at Counts
9-56 because L.M. did not testify to each incident separately, as the trial court
represented at sentencing, we would also conclude that this claim fails. While
L.M. did not provide details for 48 separate incidents, she did testify as to the
frequency of the sexual encounters, which amounted to far more than 48
separate incidents.     See Issues III-V, supra.       Accordingly, we would
determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
consecutive sentences at these counts, as there is a basis in the record for its
finding that each was a separate incident about which L.M. testified.

                                          - 26 -
J-S09004-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

DATE: 6/14/2023

                          - 27 -