Court Opinion

ID: 9665874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:58:42.524297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:19.812081
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

In their motion for rehearing, appellants cite Leder v. Stout, 278 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1954, writ ref'd) for the general rule that an unqualified agreement to perform a certain act includes the performance of those things which will enable or permit one to fulfill the obligation. Id. at 548. Appellants then contend the record demonstrates a means by which Mullan could have performed her promise. They argue that to make an effective transfer of the remaindermen’s interests, thereby fulfilling her obligation under the contract, Mullan should have “acquired the interest of the *781remainderman by purchase, and the rule of law propounded by the Edds court remains inviolate.”
In making this argument, appellants rely on the doctrine of merger, which is defined as the absorption or extinguishment of one estate into another. West v. Seigler, 265 S.W.2d 618, 620-21 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.). When a greater and lesser estate, ie., a life estate and a remainder interest, unite in the same person, in the same right, and without any intervening estate, merger is accomplished. See Estes v. Estes, 267 S.W. 709 (Tex.Comm’n App.1924). However, we note that the doctrine of merger of estates is not favored, and does not apply where it is the intention of the parties that it should not apply and when it is in the interest of the holder of the two estates to keep them separate. West, 265 S.W.2d at 620-21, citing Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Gammon, 113 Tex. 247, 254 S.W. 296 (1923); 29 A.L.R. 607; 31 C.J.S., Estates § 124, p. 143.
Underlying and supporting appellants’ argument is the proposition that when two constructions of a contract are possible, courts will give preference to the construction which does not result in violation of the law. Lewis v. Davis, 145 Tex. 468, 199 S.W.2d 146 (1947). Appellants argue Mullan should be required to “perform her undertaking in a lawful manner if possible,” but acknowledge the holding in Lewis that a contract to do something which cannot be performed without a violation of the law is void. Id. However, Lewis also holds that where the illegality does not appear on the face of the contract, it will not be held void unless the facts showing its illegality are before the court. Id., 199 S.W.2d at 149. In this case, illegality appears on the face of the contract and the facts showing its illegality were before the trial court.
Reference to the Contract of Purchase and Sale of Real Property reveals that Mullan expressly promised that to make her forgiveness of debt on the date of her death “legally effective Seller Covenants that she will make and execute a will, or codicil to a Last Will and Testament meeting the requirements of the statute of wills....” Two paragraphs later, Mullan promised to furnish an abstract of title to appellants, and to allow them a reasonable time to examine it for good and merchantable title of record, agreeing to cure any defects of record found by the title examination.
Mullan’s promise to execute a codicil indicates the illegality of the consideration of the contract. Mullan made an express and unambiguous promise to make the forgiveness of debt effective by executing a codicil, and she subsequently executed such a codicil in an attempt to forgive the debt. She did not expressly promise to acquire the remainder-man’s interest, nor do we have reason to imply that she promised to do so. This is not a situation in which the contract could have been performed in a legal or an illegal manner, thereby indicating that we should not declare it void simply because it could have been performed in an illegal manner. Mul-lan made an express promise to do that which she could not do. She promised to make a testamentary disposition of her life estate in the Donley County property. Bess’s will was of public record, and the contract itself provided opportunity for the remainderman’s interest to be discovered. Yet, appellants chose to enter into this contract relying on Mullan’s promise to execute a codicil to her will, and failing to include the remainderman in the transaction.
Appellants also argue that the illegal consideration permeates the entire transaction because without the contract, there would be no note or deed of trust. However, as we noted in our original opinion, the warranty deed with vendor’s lien, the deed of trust promissory note, and the deed of trust make no reference to the contract of purchase and sale, let alone Mullan’s promise to forgive the debt upon her death.
In sum, while Mullan’s acquisition of the remainderman’s interest would have caused her to have fee simple title, she did not promise to do so; therefore, she did not breach the contract in which she promised to make forgiveness of the debt effective by executing a codicil. Because the consideration for the contract was unlawful, the contract is of no effect and we leave the parties *782as we find them — with a valid warranty deed, deed of trust and promissory note.
Accordingly, we remain satisfied with our original disposition of the case and appellants’ motion for rehearing is overruled.