Court Opinion

ID: 9848823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:28:00.627403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:48.326431
License: Public Domain

Miller, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the judgment of affirmance because, in my view, this is not a proper case to apply the rule of Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc.1 Walker’s initial testimony describing only her physical injuries as a result of the accident does not assert the opposite of her affidavit claiming subsequent mental incapacitation. Although Walker testified to events that occurred the day after the September 30 accident, there is no evidence presented in either the deposition or the affidavit that during the period of time from October 9 to October 28 she did in fact manage her day-to-day affairs which would demonstrate the opposite of the affidavit.2 Walker only testified that she was out of work for 30 days, without further explanation. Furthermore, I find no authority mandating a physician’s affidavit to support the plaintiff’s claim of mental incapacitation.
The purpose of a deposition is to provide information in response to questions; the deponent is not obligated to answer unasked questions or spontaneously provide a complete narrative of events. Therefore, Walker was not required to provide information about her mental capacity unless asked. I cannot categorize her statements describing her physical injuries as being in conflict with a claim of mental incapacitation. Although the timeliness of the affidavit may create doubt as to the validity of Walker’s claim, that credibility determination is not for this court to make. Even if the combination *240of the affidavit and the deposition renders Walker’s proof of mental incapacity equivocal and casts doubt on her credibility, “still, on a motion for summary judgment, we can not hold that there is no material issue of fact[, and] credibility cannot be resolved on [a motion for] summary judgment.”3 We are constrained to follow the guidelines of summary judgment, and
Decided March 29, 2000.
Charles E. Muskett, for appellant.
Beck, Owen & Murray, Samuel A. Murray, for appellee.
[w]here the facts are in doubt or dispute, the question of whether or not a cause of action is barred by the statute of limitation is one of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Ordinarily the question of mental capacity is one of fact to be determined by a jury.4
Although the trial court can determine that the tolling statute does not apply as a matter of law, this is only after a contradiction has been identified and the party fails to offer a reasonable explanation.5 Because the deposition and affidavit are not contradictory, Prophecy does not apply, and the trial court erred in excluding Walker’s evidence of mental incapacity. And because Walker’s affidavit is sufficient, the ’question of whether the action is barred by the statute of limitation should remain for the trier of fact as does the question of mental capacity.6
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 256 Ga. 27 (343 SE2d 680) (1986).

 Compare Jacobs v. Littleton, 241 Ga. App. 403, 405-406 (3) (b) (525 SE2d 433) (1999). The proposition in Jacobs that the trial court can determine as a matter of law that the tolling statute, OCGA § 9-3-90, does not apply is based on Hickey v. Askren, 198 Ga. App. 718 (403 SE2d 225) (1991). Hickey itself is a proper application of Prophecy’s rule because that plaintiff’s affidavit of mental capacity was rebutted by her deposition testimony. 198 Ga. App. at 722 (4). Because there is no such contradiction in this case, Jacobs is inapplicable.

 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Tri-Cities Hosp. Auth. v. Sheats, 156 Ga. App. 28, 32 (273 SE2d 903) (1980), aff’d, 247 Ga. 713 (279 SE2d 210) (1981). “‘In a summary judgment case this court cannot consider the credibility of a witness or his affidavit concerning his state of mind or intention; and where his statement in relation thereto conflicts with other strong evidence to the contrary, a jury must decide the credibility question and resolve any remaining conflict.’ ” 156 Ga. App. at 32.

 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Chapman v. Burks, 183 Ga. App. 103, 107 (2) (357 SE2d 832) (1987).

 See Jacobs, supra, 241 Ga. App. at 406 (3) (b); Hickey, supra, 198 Ga. App. at 722 (4).

 See Chapman, supra, 183 Ga. App. at 107 (2).