Court Opinion

ID: 9397979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-27 21:00:34.520527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:28.950507
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 20-7247      Doc: 55         Filed: 05/26/2023     Pg: 1 of 11

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 20-7247

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        ERIC WILFORD MORRISON,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Statesville. Kenneth D. Bell, District Judge. (5:07-cr-00050-KDB-DSC-2)

        Submitted: April 21, 2023                                         Decided: May 26, 2023

        Before THACKER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, Charlotte, North Carolina, Joshua
        B. Carpenter, Appellate Chief, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
        CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States
        Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Eric Morrison (“Appellant”) appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a

        reduced sentence pursuant to section 404(b) of the First Step Act. The district court held

        that Appellant was ineligible for relief, but it noted that even if he were eligible, it would

        not grant relief in any event. We hold that the district court erred in its eligibility

        determination. And because we cannot glean whether or not the district court properly

        considered all of the individual considerations relevant to Appellant in its alternative

        holding, we vacate its order and remand for reconsideration.

                                                     I.

               In May 2009, Appellant was convicted by a jury of a single count of conspiracy to

        possess with intent to distribute cocaine base (“crack”) and powder cocaine. The jury

        found that the offense involved at least 50 grams of crack and at least 5 kilograms of

        powder cocaine. In addition, the Government filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C.

        § 851, alleging that Appellant had previously been convicted of a felony drug offense,

        which Appellant admitted. The prior conviction exposed him to enhanced penalties

        pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). Id.

               The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) found that, including all relevant

        conduct, Appellant’s 2009 offense involved 22.91 kilograms of crack and 5.5 kilograms of

        powder cocaine. Based on the 2009 United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (the

        “Guidelines”), which were the Guidelines in effect at the time, Appellant’s base offense

        level was 38 and his criminal history was category IV. Thus, the PSR calculated a

        Guidelines sentencing range of 324 to 405 months of imprisonment.

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               Appellant was sentenced to a low end of the Guidelines sentence of 324 months of

        imprisonment on November 10, 2010. In August 2010, though, the Fair Sentencing Act of

        2010 had become effective. The Fair Sentencing Act lowered the sentencing disparity

        between crack and powder cocaine from 100:1 to 18:1 by adjusting the statutory penalties,

        including raising the amounts of each drug that triggered increased penalties. See United

        States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 178–79 (4th Cir. 2019). The Fair Sentencing Act did not

        apply retroactively, and at the time Appellant was sentenced in November 2010, it was

        unclear whether it applied to offenders, like Appellant, who committed offenses before

        August 2010 but were not sentenced until after August 2010. The Supreme Court did not

        clarify that the Fair Sentencing Act does, in fact, apply in this circumstance until 2012. See

        Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012).

               In 2011, while Dorsey was pending, Appellant filed a pro se motion (the “2011

        motion”) in which he sought a reduced sentence pursuant to Amendment 750 to the

        Guidelines 1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which allows for a sentence modification when

        the Sentencing Commission subsequently lowers the applicable Guidelines range. The

        2011 motion was captioned “Motion Pursuant to Title: 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) New Fair

                  1
                    Relevant here, Amendment 750 amended the Guidelines such that “offenses
           involving 28 grams or more of crack cocaine [were] assigned a base offense level of
           26, offenses involving 280 grams or more of crack cocaine [were] assigned a base
           offense level of 32,” in order to align with the statutory changes made by the Fair
           Sentencing Act. U.S.S.G. App. C. Amend. 750. “[O]ther offense levels [were]
           established by extrapolating proportionally upward and downward on the Drug
           Quantity Table.” Id.

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        And Sentencing Act of 2010. Amendment 750 Retroactive.”                  J.A. 144. 2   But the

        Government agrees that “[i]n the body of his motion, [Appellant] asked only for his

        sentence to be reduced based on the retroactively applicable guideline amendment . . . and

        did not refer to the Fair Sentencing Act.” Response Br. at 4–5. In September 2012, after

        Dorsey issued, Appellant again moved for a sentence reduction, this time based on the Fair

        Sentencing Act (the “2012 motion”). Without requesting a response from the Government,

        the district court denied both the 2011 motion and the 2012 motion in a single order after

        finding that Amendment 750 did not produce a lower Guidelines range for Appellant. The

        district court did not address Appellant’s Fair Sentencing Act arguments.

               In 2015, Appellant again requested a sentence reduction, this time pursuant to 18

        U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 to the Guidelines. Amendment 782 reduced the

        Guideline for all controlled substances by two levels. A two-level reduction reduced

        Appellant’s offense level from 38 to 36. A total offense level of 36 and a criminal history

        category of IV produced a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months of imprisonment, down

        from the prior calculation of 324 to 405 months. The district court therefore determined

        Appellant was eligible for a reduction based on Amendment 782 and reduced his sentence

        to 262 months of imprisonment.

               Finally, in January 2020, Appellant filed a pro se motion for a sentence reduction

        pursuant to section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. Section 404 gives retroactive effect

                  2
                      Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this
        appeal.

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        to the statutory changes made by Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act and provides

        that a “court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced

        sentence as if [Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act] were in effect at the time the

        covered offense was committed.” 132 Stat. at 5222. A covered offense is one that was

        committed before August 3, 2010, and “whose statutory penalties were modified by section

        2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act.” United States v. Reed, 58 F.4th 816, 818 (4th Cir. 2023)

        (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). Important here, a defendant is not

        eligible for First Step Act relief “if the sentence was previously imposed or previously

        reduced in accordance with the amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair

        Sentencing Act of 2010.” First Step Act § 404(c), 132 Stat. 5222. Appellant also made a

        separate motion for compassionate release pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

               In his First Step Act motion, Appellant argued that he satisfied all of the First Step

        Act’s eligibility requirements and urged the district court to reduce his sentence. Appellant

        pointed out that the Fair Sentencing Act had lowered the statutory minimum sentence from

        20 years to life to 10 years to life for an offense involving between 28 grams and 280 grams

        of crack. 3 He also put forth his erroneous belief that his Guidelines range would be 110 to

                  3
                     While this is true, Appellant wrongly argued that this would make his statutory
        minimum only 10 years. Appellant was convicted of a single count of conspiracy to possess
        with intent to distribute both crack and powder cocaine. He was charged with, and the jury
        found, that the offense involved more than 5 kilograms of powder cocaine, in addition to
        50 grams or more of crack. While the Fair Sentencing Act lowered the penalty for 50 grams
        of crack to 10 to life, it did not change the statutory minimum for powder cocaine. Based
        on the amount of powder cocaine attributed to Appellant, the statutory penalty for the single
        count offense is 15 years to life when, as here, the offense was committed after a prior
        conviction for a serious drug felony. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii).

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        137 months based on the Fair Sentencing Act changes. Appellant asked the court to “order

        an updated PSR so that [his] sentencing guidelines may be recalculated.” J.A. 180.

        Appellant also appeared to believe he would have a new sentencing hearing because he

        stated, “[a]t such a hearing, all the relevant statutory sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C.

        § 3553(a) will be addressed in order to achieve a sentence that his [sic] sufficient but not

        greater than necessary.” Id. Appellant then asked the court to find that a sentence of 120

        months of imprisonment “is sufficient but not greater than necessary, and accounts for the

        sentencing factors the court must consider pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), specifically

        deterrence, protection of the public, and respect for the law.” Id. at 181.

               In an order entered on July 16, 2020, the district court denied both Appellant’s First

        Step Act motion and his compassionate release motion.              After providing a brief

        background, the district court denied Appellant’s First Step Act motion, reasoning as

        follows:

                      [Appellant] previously moved for a reduction in his sentence
                      under Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012), to obtain
                      the benefit of the amendments made by the Fair Sentencing Act
                      of 2010. The Court denied [Appellant]’s motion on November
                      1, 2012, finding that Dorsey did not impact his statutory
                      penalties. Thus, because the court has already imposed a
                      sentence in accordance with the amendments made by sections
                      2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, [Appellant] is not
                      eligible to move for relief under the First Step Act of 2018.

        J.A. 185 (internal citations omitted). The district court added a footnote that provided an

        alternative holding:

                      Even if [Appellant] was eligible . . . the Court would not reduce
                      his sentence. [Appellant]’s guidelines range and statutory
                      penalties would not change since he was responsible for large

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                      quantities of cocaine base and powder cocaine, and he already
                      received a reduction under Amendment 782. Considering the
                      Section 3553(a) factors, the Court, in its discretion, finds no
                      reason to vary below the now applicable guidelines range and
                      further reduce [Appellant]’s sentence.

        Id. (emphasis in original).

               Appellant timely noted this appeal.

                                                       II.

               This court reviews de novo the scope of the district court’s legal authority under the

        First Step Act. United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 2020). We review

        for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision whether to grant a First Step Act

        reduction to an eligible defendant. United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 497 (4th Cir.

        2020). Generally, “[a] district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or

        irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of

        discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.”

        United States v. Dillard, 891 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks

        omitted) (citation omitted). A district court also “abuses its discretion if its decision to

        retain or reduce a sentence under the First Step Act is procedurally or substantively

        unreasonable.” United States v. Troy, 64 F.4th 177, 184 (4th Cir. 2023).

                                                     III.

                                                     A.

               The first issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in holding Appellant

        ineligible for First Step Act relief pursuant to section 404(c). The Government concedes

        the error, and rightly so.

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               The “threshold question” for First Step Act relief is whether the defendant was

        convicted of a “covered offense.” United States v. Gravatt, 953 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir.

        2020). A covered offense is one that was committed before August 3, 2010, and “whose

        statutory penalties were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act.” United

        States v. Reed, 58 F.4th 816, 818 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted)

        (citation omitted). There is no dispute that Appellant was convicted of a covered offense.

               Having determined that there is a covered offense, we must ensure that Appellant is

        not “excluded pursuant to the expressed limitations in Section 404(c) of the First Step Act.”

        Gravatt, 953 F.3d at 262. The only limiting principles the First Step Act provides in

        section 404(c) are that a district court should not consider a motion for a sentence reduction

        (1) “if the sentence was previously imposed or previously reduced in accordance with the

        amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010”; or (2) “if a

        previous motion made under this section to reduce the sentence was . . . denied after a

        complete review of the motion on the merits.” § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222.

               The district court believed its denial of Appellant’s 2012 motion precluded it from

        granting relief here. But its denial was plainly not an imposition or reduction of Appellant’s

        sentence pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act, as required for the

        section 404(c) limitation to apply. Nor is there any indication in the record that Appellant’s

        original sentence was imposed in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing

        Act, given that the Supreme Court did not clarify that it applied to cases like Appellant’s

        until Dorsey issued in 2012 -- long after Appellant’s 2010 sentence was imposed.

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               Thus, Appellant is eligible for First Step Act relief, and the district court erred in

        holding otherwise.

                                                     B.

               Despite conceding the existence of error, the Government argues that it is harmless

        because the district court provided an alternative holding. As explained above, the district

        court’s footnoted alternative holding provided the following:

                      Even if [Appellant] was eligible . . . the Court would not reduce
                      his sentence. [Appellant]’s guidelines range and statutory
                      penalties would not change since he was responsible for large
                      quantities of cocaine base and powder cocaine, and he already
                      received a reduction under Amendment 782. Considering the
                      Section 3553(a) factors, the Court, in its discretion, finds no
                      reason to vary below the now applicable guidelines range and
                      further reduce [Appellant]’s sentence.

        J.A. 185. Appellant argues the footnote is procedurally unreasonable. We agree.

               In discussing how a district court should decide First Step Act motions, the Supreme

        Court has explained:

                      [D]istrict courts bear the standard obligation to explain their
                      decisions and demonstrate that they considered the parties’
                      arguments. It is well established that a district court must
                      generally consider the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments before
                      it. Of course, a district court is not required to be persuaded by
                      every argument parties make, and it may, in its discretion,
                      dismiss arguments that it does not find compelling without a
                      detailed explanation. Nor is a district court required to
                      articulate anything more than a brief statement of reasons.
                      Nothing in the First Step Act contravenes those background
                      principles.

                      When it comes to that reasoned explanation, the First Step Act
                      leaves much to the judge’s own professional judgment. The
                      First Step Act does not require courts to expressly rebut each
                      argument made by the parties. In exercising its discretion, the

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                       court is free to agree or disagree with any of the policy
                       arguments raised before it. All that the First Step Act requires
                       is that a district court make clear that it reasoned through the
                       parties’ arguments.

        Concepcion v. United States, -- U.S. --, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022) (alterations adopted)

        (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, “[a]ll that is required is

        for a district court to demonstrate that it has considered the arguments before it.” Id. at

        2405.

                Our cases following Concepcion have explained, “[i]n resolving a motion under the

        First Step Act, a district court’s discretion is broad and its burden light.” United States v.

        Troy, 64 F.4th 177, 184 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404).

        Nevertheless, a district court “must still ‘sentence the whole person before [it],’ ‘explain

        [its] decisions,’ and ‘demonstrate that [it] considered the parties’ arguments.’” Id. Thus,

        “to be procedurally reasonable, a district court must ‘consider a defendant’s arguments,

        give individual consideration to the defendant’s characteristics in light of the §

        3553(a) factors, determine—following the Fair Sentencing Act—whether a given sentence

        remains appropriate in light of those factors, and adequately explain that decision.’” Troy,

        64 F.4th at 185 (quoting United States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347, 360 (4th Cir. 2021)).

                Important here, the district court’s decision issued on July 15, 2020. This court did

        not set the procedural reasonableness standard outlined in Collington until April 2021, and

        the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion did not issue until June 27, 2022. And in just

        the last year, this court has further clarified the nuances of the analysis district courts must

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        undertake in deciding First Step Act motions. See Troy, 64 F.4th 177; see also Reed, 58

        F.4th 816.

               While the district court’s alternative holding is brief, it did appear to consider

        Appellant’s Guidelines and statutory sentencing range arguments.             And it said it

        “[c]onsider[ed] the Section 3553(a) factors.” J.A. 185. Though its burden is light, the

        alternative analysis nonetheless fails to satisfy us that the district court “sentence[d] the

        whole person before [it],” Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2398, by “giv[ing] individual

        consideration to the defendant’s characteristics in light of the § 3553(a) factors” and

        “determin[ing]—following the Fair Sentencing Act—whether a given sentence remains

        appropriate in light of those factors, and adequately explain[ing] that decision.” Troy, 64

        F.4th 177 (quoting Collington, 995 F.3d at 360) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               As in other cases in similar postures, “our decision should not be viewed as criticism

        of the district court.” Reed, 58 F.4th at 824. When it issued its opinion, the district court

        did not have the guidance of Collington or Concepcion, nor did it have the benefit of our

        more recent precedent. And because the district court did not know what analysis it was

        required to conduct, we cannot be sure that it conducted it properly. Therefore, we must

        vacate and remand for the district court to reconsider Appellant’s motion in light of more

        recent case law.

                                                    IV.

               The district court’s denial of Appellant’s First Step Act motion is

                                                                    VACATED AND REMANDED.

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