Court Opinion

ID: 9959661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:07:39.919984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:43.592543
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 5, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2023-CA-0750-MR

RHONDA NALL                                                         APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE SARAH E. CLAY, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 21-CI-002565

JBG HOMES LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY; MORGAN WAXLER;
AND TIMOTHY WAXLER                                                   APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, LAMBERT, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: This case presents the issue of whether a landlord is liable for

injuries inflicted in a dog attack by a dog owned by a tenant. Appellant, Rhonda

Nall (Nall), appeals the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary

judgment to JBG Homes, LLC, Appellee. After our review, we affirm.
                On November 19, 2020, while working in her front yard, Nall was

attacked by a pitbull-type dog owned by her neighbors, Timothy and Morgan

Waxler. The Waxlers’ dog also attacked and killed Nall’s dog. The Waxlers lived

in a rental house owned by JBG Homes and located several doors down and across

the street from Nall’s home.

                The Waxlers began leasing the property in March 2019 and

understood that they could not keep a dog on the premises without the written

consent of JBG Homes and the payment of an additional monthly fee. After the

attack, JBG Homes instructed the Waxlers either to remove the dog from the

premises or to vacate the home as they were in breach of the terms of the parties’

lease agreement. The Waxlers vacated the home.

                On May 4, 2021, Nall filed a civil action against the Waxlers and JBG

Homes. She alleged that the defendants are liable for her injuries pursuant to the

provisions of KRS1 258.235, Kentucky’s dog-bite liability statute. In the

alternative, Nall alleged that the Waxlers and JBG Homes are liable for her injuries

under principles of common law negligence.

                JBG Homes filed a motion for summary judgment on November 1,

2021. Supporting the motion were the affidavits of Jason and Kelly Gasser. Jason

Gasser is the only member of JBG Homes; Kelly Gasser assists in operations as a

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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point of contact for tenants of JBG Homes. The Gassers’ affidavits indicated that

no one with JBG Homes was notified that the Waxlers intended to keep a dog on

the leased premises; that no one at JBG Homes gave permission for the Waxlers to

keep a pet on the leased premises; and that the Waxlers never paid a fee required

for keeping a dog on the premises. The circuit court denied the motion and gave

the parties (90) days in which to conduct discovery and an additional two (2)

weeks in which to address anew the issues raised in the motion of JBG Homes for

summary judgment.

             During her discovery deposition, Kelly Gasser admitted that she had

observed a puppy at the property leased by the Waxlers several months before the

dog attack at Nall’s premises on November 19, 2020. Gasser told the Waxlers that

the dog would have to go or the monthly rent would be increased. By order

entered on December 27, 2022, the Jefferson Circuit Court concluded that JBG

Homes was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and granted the renewed

motion of JBG Homes for summary judgment. The court denied Nall’s motion to

alter, amend, or vacate. This appeal followed.

             Our role in reviewing a summary judgment is to determine whether

the trial court erred by concluding that no genuine issue of material fact exists and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scifres v. Kraft,

916 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. App. 1996). Because questions of fact are not at issue, the

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grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Pinkston v. Audubon Area

Community Services, Inc., 210 S.W.3d 188 (Ky. App. 2006) (citing Blevins v.

Morgan, 12 S.W.3d 698 (Ky. App. 2000)).

             KRS 258.235(4) provides that “[a]ny owner whose dog is found to

have caused damage to a person, livestock, or other property shall be responsible

for that damage.” Nall argues that the trial court erred by failing to conclude that

JBG Homes can be held liable under the provisions of KRS 258.235, reasoning

that its relationship to the leased premises means that it must be deemed the dog’s

owner. We disagree.

             Kentucky’s dog-bite liability statute defines a dog’s “owner” as:

             (a) Every person having a right of property in the dog;
                 and

             (b) Every person who:

                   1. Keeps or harbors the dog;

                   2. Has the dog in his or her care;

                   3. Permits the dog to remain on or about premises
                      owned and occupied by him or her; or

                   4. Permits the dog to remain on or about premises
                      leased and occupied by him or her[.]

KRS 258.095(5). Citing provisions included in Kentucky’s Landlord and Tenant

Act, Nall argues that at the time of the attack, JBG Homes had a statutory lien on

all of the Waxlers’ personal property for the value of four-months’ rent. Nall

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contends that the Waxlers’ personal property included the dog and that, therefore,

JBG Homes is a statutory owner within the meaning of KRS 258.095(5)(a).

However, JBG Homes observes that Nall did not address this provision or its

application either in the trial court’s proceedings or in her pre-hearing statement.

An appellate court is “without authority to review issues not raised in or decided

by the trial court.” Ten Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 734 (Ky.

2009). Consequently, we cannot address -- much less reverse -- the trial court’s

order on this basis.

             In the alternative, Nall argues that JBG Homes is a statutory owner of

the dog pursuant to KRS 258.095(5)(b)1. because it was on notice that the Waxlers

were keeping a dog on the leased premises. She argues that this knowledge alone

means that the landlord, too, was “keeping and harboring” the dog at the time of

the attack. The trial court rejected this argument as absurd.

             In Benningfield ex rel. Benningfield v. Zinsmeister, 367 S.W.3d 561

(Ky. 2012), the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed an earlier version of KRS

258.095 that imposed liability based upon an even broader definition of “owner.”

Pursuant to that more expansive provision, our Supreme Court observed that it

would be “unreasonable to allow a landlord’s liability to track wherever the dog

may roam or be taken.” Id. at 567. It noted that “such a broad rule can have

absurd consequences.” Id. More directly pertinent to the issue before us, the Court

                                         -5-
observed that one who “keeps or harbors” a dog means a person into whose care

the dog has been committed.

             There is no allegation or evidence in this matter that the Waxlers

committed the care of their dog to JBG Homes. Moreover, the attack occurred on

Nall’s property, which was a significant distance from the rental property owned

by JBG Homes. Under these circumstances, statutory liability could not attach to

the landlord. Therefore, the trial court did not err by concluding that JBG Homes

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Nall’s claim under

Kentucky’s dog-bite liability statute.

             Nall next argues that the trial court erred by concluding that JBG

Homes was entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to her common law

negligence claim. She contends that a jury should have been empanelled to

determine whether the landlord failed to act reasonably to ensure that the

neighborhood was protected from a vicious dog.

             Under common law principles of negligence, a landlord may be liable

if the plaintiff establishes that the landlord (1) knew of the dog’s vicious or

mischievous propensities and (2) had control over the area when and where the

attack occurred. Ireland v. Raymond, 796 S.W.2d 870 (Ky. App. 1990). Nall

failed to establish either element.

                                          -6-
             In Ireland, we considered whether the victim of a dog attack could

hold the landlord liable for common law negligence. There, as here, the tenant’s

dog did not attack the victim on the leased premises. Instead, the record indicated

that the attack took place either on the victim’s property or on a public roadway.

Furthermore, while it was established that the landlords knew that dogs were being

kept at the leased property, they were unaware of the dogs’ temperament. Even

where the landlords knew that the dogs were kept at the property and the victim

had expressed concerns to the landlord concerning them, we concluded that the

landlords could not be liable for the victim’s injuries. Because the landlords had

no knowledge of the dogs’ viciousness and had no control over the circumstances

of the attack, we concluded in Ireland that the plaintiff failed to meet the standard

for common law negligence and that the summary judgment thus was proper.

             In the case before us, there is no indication that JBG Homes was

aware that the Waxlers’ dog was aggressive. Moreover, as noted above, the attack

took place on Nall’s property -- not on the leased property. There is nothing to

indicate that JBG Homes had any control over the circumstances of the attack.

             There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Nall’s claims

based either upon the dog-bite liability statute or upon principles of common law

negligence. The trial court did not err by concluding that JBG Homes was entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.

                                         -7-
           We affirm the opinion and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court

granting summary judgment.

           ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                   BRIEF FOR APPELLEE JBG
                                        HOMES, LIMITED LIABILITY
David B. Mour                           COMPANY:
Louisville, Kentucky
                                        J. Stan Lee
                                        Katie Bouvier
                                        Megan L. Adkins
                                        Lexington, Kentucky

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