Court Opinion

ID: 9678654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:26:59.305579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:06.554498
License: Public Domain

*237FINE, J.
¶ 33. (dissenting). This is a simple case. The phrase "raw material" is a common expression in our language and is not ambiguous. In order for something to be a "raw material" it must be used to make something else. Water is a raw material when it is used to make tea; it is not a raw material when it is sprayed on some frolicking youngsters seeking relief from the summer's heat.
¶ 34. Superior of Wisconsin, Inc., and Fairway Transit, Inc., were found guilty, after bench trials, of operating trucks exceeding the weight limitations imposed by Wis. Stat. § 348.15(3)(c). The trucks were transporting so-called "shredder fluff": fine particles of plastics, cloth, wire, and various non-metallic materials removed from automobiles before they are shredded. Both companies contend that they were exempted from the weight limits by permits issued by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation, and appeal the trial court's conclusion to the contrary. The Majority agrees with the companies. I respectfully dissent.
I.
¶ 35. The core facts relevant to these appeals are not disputed. To simplify matters, I analyze the contentions of the parties separately.
A. Fairway.
¶ 36. The Department issued a permit to Fairway that exempted the company from having to comply with the weight limitations imposed on trucks using Wisconsin's highways. The permit was issued under the authority granted by WlS. Stat. § 348.27(9r):
*238The department may issue an annual or consecutive month permit for the transportation of metallic or nonmetallic scrap for the purpose of recycling or processing on a vehicle or combination of vehicles which exceeds statutory weight or length limitations and for the return of the vehicle or combination of vehicles when empty.
Wisconsin Admin. Code § Trans 269.05 governs the issuance of permits authorized by § 348.27(9r), and provides: "An issuing authority may issue a permit only for the' transportation of garbage or refuse, in a self compactor equipped vehicle or for the transportation of recyclable scrap." Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 269.05(2).
¶ 37. Wisconsin Admin. Code § Trans 269.02(2)(d) defines "recyclable-scrap" as "metallic or non-metallic material in waste for which there exists a commercially demonstrated processing or manufacturing technology which uses the material as a raw material, and which is transported for use as such a raw material." The trial court concluded that the "shredder fluff' carried by Fairway's trucks was not being used as a "raw material" and was thus not "recyclable scrap."
¶ 38. The "shredder fluff' transported by the Fairway trucks is used as landfill cover. The Majority says that this is use as a "raw material." An employee of Superior described the operation for the trial court: "[W]e spread the material 6 inches deep over the waste at the end of the operating day. At the beginning of the next operating day, that dozer operator attempts to remove as much of that material as possible without disturbing the already compacted waste that the material is covering." This covering and uncovering of the landfill with "shredder fluff' is repeated every day that *239waste material is placed in the landfill. The Superior employee admitted, however, that the "shredder fluff' was not changed in any way — except through natural settling as the result of gravity and spreading. The Vice President of the company providing the "shredder fluff' testified that there was no viable commercial use for the "shredder fluff' other than use as landfill cover.
¶ 39. A trial court's findings of fact may not be set aside on appeal unless they are "clearly erroneous." Wis. Stat. Rule 805.17(2). Moreover, an appellate court must accept reasonable inferences that the trial court draws from the evidence. See State v. Friday, 147 Wis. 2d 359, 370-371, 434 N.W.2d 85, 89 (1989). We decide legal issues, including the meaning of statutes and regulations, de novo. See Truttschel v. Martin, 208 Wis. 2d 361, 364-365, 560 N.W.2d 315, 317 (Ct. App. 1997). If the language of a statute or regulation is clear, we must apply its plain meaning. See DNR v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 108 Wis. 2d 403, 408, 321 N.W.2d 286, 288 (1982).
¶ 40. Wisconsin Admin. Code § Trans 269.02(2)(d) is clear. Material is not "recyclable scrap" unless it meets all of the following criteria:
1) There must be "a commercially demonstrated processing or manufacturing technology" that "uses the material as a raw material"; and
2) The material must be "transported for use as such a raw material."
Merely using the material as it is — either as a landfill cover or for any other use in which it does not undergo change — does not suffice, any more than spraying cool water on hot children makes the water a "raw material" for that use. The "shredder fluff is not transported for use as a "raw material" in "a commer*240cially demonstrated processing or manufacturing technology"; it is neither processed nor manufactured into something else. See A & W Smelter and Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) ("raw materials, by definition, can't be used in their current state" and must be processed into something else). Thus, in the Majority's example, although peanut-butter jars used to hold nails are being "recycled" for a new use, the jars are not being used as a "raw material," as they would if they were ground down, melted, and reformed into new glass containers. One more example, during oral argument in the case, I pointed out to counsel that there were several dozen tires on a roof of an adjacent building, apparently being used to hold down some roofing material. Presumably, the Majority sees those tires as "raw material" being used as such. I disagree, just as I disagree that the fluff here, which undergoes no change whatsoever and remains fluff forever, is being used as a "raw material" when it is spread on top of landfill debris.1
B. Superior.
¶ 41. Superior also claims that the "shredder fluff' it carried to the landfill was "raw material," and, *241moreover, its truck qualified as a "self-compactor equipped vehicle" under Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 269.05, thus rendering it immaterial whether the fluff was "raw material" or not. My analysis of the "shredder fluffV'raw material" issue in the Fairway portion of this dissent expresses my views on that issue for Superior as well. Accordingly, I turn to Superior's contentions that its truck was a "self-compactor equipped vehicle." The trial court found that it was not.
¶ 42. Asa preliminary matter, Superior contends that the trial court was bound on the issue of whether its type of truck was a "self-compactor equipped vehicle" because a circuit court judge in an earlier case between Milwaukee County and a trucking company other than Fairway or Superior determined that the truck was a "self-compactor equipped" vehicle. Superior seeks to use the doctrine of non-mutual issue preclusion to bind Milwaukee County to the earlier circuit court decision even though Superior could still have relitigated the issue in this case if the other trucking company had lost. Whether the doctrine applies here to do what Superior wishes it to do is a legal matter that we review de novo. See Gould v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 216 Wis. 2d 356, 367, 576 N.W.2d 292, 297 (Ct. App. 1998) ("The question whether courts may apply issue preclusion in a particular category of cases is a question of law, which we review independently of the trial court.").
¶ 43. Unlike the application of non-mutual issue preclusion involving private litigants, see Paige K.B. v. Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 594 N.W.2d 370 (1999); Michelle T. v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 495 N.W.2d 327 (1993); and Ambrose v. Continental Ins. Co., 208 Wis. 2d 532, 568 N.W.2d 309 (Ct. App. 1997), using the doctrine against a governmental body implicates sig*242nificant and unique public-policy interests. See Gould, 216 Wis. 2d at 368-370, 576 N.W.2d at 297-298 ("[T]he 'fundamental fairness' factors of Crozier simply do not take into account the significant differences between the government and private parties in litigation.").2 Gould held that a non-appealed decision of a circuit court that reversed a state agency's determination did not bar the state agency from litigating the same issue with another party. Among other reasons, Gould noted that application of the doctrine against governmental bodies would force them to abandon their traditional "policy of balancing many factors in deciding whether to appeal adverse rulings, leading to appeals of every adverse decision." Id., 216 Wis. 2d at 369, 576 N.W.2d *243at 297-298. Moreover and particularly relevant here, it is not in the public's interest to foreclose forever a governmental body's exercise of its police power because of an adverse, non-appealed decision by a trial-level court. Thus, I conclude, as did the trial court here, that issue preclusion does not apply against Milwaukee County in this case.
¶ 44. Superior's trucks are known as "walking floor trailers" because they use a mechanism with a rib-studded moving belt to unload material. Superior claims that, contrary to the trial court's conclusion, these trucks are "self-compactor equipped vehicles" as that term is used by Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 269.02(2)(f).
¶ 45. Wisconsin Admin. Code § Trans 269.02(2)(f) defines a "self-compactor equipped vehicle" as one that is:
1. Specifically designed, constructed and used for the pick-up, transportation, and disposal of garbage, refuse or both; and
2. Equipped and used with:
a. A blade, plate, or other device that mechanically compacts the load.
b. A separate garbage or refuse container that is designed, constructed, and used with an integral or separate blade, plate, or other device that mechanically compacts the load.
As indicated earlier, Superior's truck is a "walking floor trailer," which has, as found by the trial court, a moving ribbed-floor that is "designed to unload the refuse when the floor is operated in the direction it was intended to be used in, specifically the unload mode." Further, although the trial court found that the "walk*244ing floor trailer has the capacity to move the load when run in the reverse direction," "[t]here was testimony that by running the floor in reverse, it would damage the front end of the trailer." Moreover, the trial court credited testimony by persons who had seen the walking-floor trailers loaded "that the load was compacted by the bucket on the front end loader and not by running the floor in reverse." The trial court thus concluded that Superior's walking-floor trailer was not a "self-compactor equipped" vehicle under Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 269.02(2)(f).
¶ 46. Although for the reasons already noted earlier in this dissent, the trial court's conclusion that Superior's truck did not fit the definition of a "self-compactor equipped" vehicle is a legal matter that we review de novo, its factual findings as to what the truck's mechanisms do or do not do are immune here unless they are "clearly erroneous." Superior has not persuaded me that they are, and, indeed, merely argues that its truck's mechanisms, even as found by the trial court, satisfy the regulation's definition. I disagree. The word "compact" means more than merely "move" — the regulation applies to trucks whose mechanism is designed to and actually does "compact the load[ ]." Here, the mechanism does not compact the load — it moves the load out of the truck. I agree with the trial court's conclusion that Superior's truck is not a "self-compactor equipped" vehicle.
¶ 47. I would affirm the trial court's cogent analysis of the factual and legal issues in this case.

 As the Majority notes, Fairway contends that the deputy sheriff giving the citations to it for operating its trucks on Wisconsin's highways in excess of the weight limits prescribed by the statutes somehow unlawfully "revoked" the permits issued to it by the Department of Transportation. The permits were not revoked; they did not apply because Fairway's trucks were not transporting "recyclable scrap," for which the permits were issued. Simply put, the permits did not apply because the trucks were not transporting material for which the permits were issued, any more than the permits would have applied if the trucks were carrying beer.

 The " 'fundamental fairness' factors of Crozier" to which we referred in Gould v. Department of Health & Social Services, 216 Wis. 2d 356, 370, 576 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Ct. App. 1998), were set out in Michelle T. v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 688-689, 495 N.W.2d 327, 330-331 (1993), and recently reaffirmed by Paige K.B. v. Steven G.B., 226 Wis. 2d 210, 220-221, 594 N.W.2d 370, 375 (1999):
(1) could the party against whom preclusion is sought, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment; (2) is the question one of law that involves two distinct claims or intervening contextual shifts in the law; (3) do significant differences in the quality or extensiveness of proceedings between the two courts warrant relit-igation of the issue; (4) have the burdens of persuasion shifted such that the party seeking preclusion had a lower burden of persuasion in the first trial than in the second; or (5) are matters of public policy and individual circumstances involved that would render the application of collateral estoppel to be fundamentally unfair, including inadequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action?
The last Crozier factor, which requires an analysis of public-policy considerations, encompasses the matters recognized by Gould, and by me here in concluding that non-mutual issue preclusion should not be applied against Milwaukee County.