Court Opinion

ID: 9687317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:23:28.571465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:25.711203
License: Public Domain

TERNUS, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the court’s opinion with the exception of the majority’s instruction that Rebecca Skiles shall make the decision as to when Samantha should be told of her true parentage. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the court’s opinion.
As the majority recognizes, “the government is ill-equipped to dictate the details of social interaction among family members.” Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Iowa 1984). As the majority also states, “[t]he trial court does not have the responsibility or the authority or the ability to create ideal circumstances for the family.” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 1362, 1371 (Wash. 1997). In accordance with these principles, the majority finds fault with the district court for “dictating] when the child must be told of her paternity.” (Emphasis added.) Nonetheless, the majority proceeds to dictate who will make the decision with respect to telling the child of her paternity.
I cannot concur in this decision for two reasons. First of all, the court is unfairly inconsistent in criticizing the trial court for micromanaging the family and then proceeding to do just that. We should exercise judicial restraint by not enmeshing the court in personal decisions best left to the parties to sort out without court involvement. In addition, the court’s decision is unenforceable. The reality is that neither this court nor Rebecca Skiles can prevent persons not a party to this lawsuit from telling Samantha that Charles is her father. This fact merely illustrates that the court is indeed “ill-equipped to dictate the social interaction among family members.” We should not attempt to do so here.
CARTER and CADY, JJ., join this concurrence in part and dissent in part.