Court Opinion

ID: 9400778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 14:07:16.938578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.921640
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 2, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-0017-MR

DARION DIETRICH                                                      APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE KATHLEEN LAPE, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CR-00520

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                 OPINION
                          AFFIRMING IN PART AND
                            VACATING IN PART

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Darion Dietrich appeals his conviction of assault in the first

degree entered by the Kenton Circuit Court on December 22, 2021. Having

reviewed the briefs, record, and law, we affirm the conviction but vacate the

portion of the judgment imposing public defender fees.
           BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

               In 2020, Dietrich was residing with Renee,1 his paramour; Henry, her

infant son; Kim, her mother; and Trey, her brother. On February 28, 2020,

Dietrich volunteered to watch Henry, who was then ten months old, while Renee

and Kim went out and Trey was not at home. It is undisputed that before Renee

and Kim left the house, Henry was happy, healthy, and alert with no known

significant injuries. Approximately 20 minutes later, Dietrich, frantic and

distraught, called Renee stating that Henry had fallen off the bed and was injured.

               Renee called 911, and emergency services were at the house within

minutes. The paramedic observed Henry lying on the living room floor; he was

pale, unconscious, unresponsive, and vomiting, with a lump on the back of his

head and a fixed pupil – indicative of severe head trauma. Henry was stabilized

and, due to the severity of his injuries, was transported to the local hospital that

provided the highest level of care for children. There, Henry underwent

emergency surgery to treat a large right-sided subdural hemorrhage.

               Dr. Makroff, a specialist in child abuse pediatrics, consulted on

Henry’s care. She characterized the hematoma as acute and very severe. Henry

had additional injuries, including: a large, complex fracture at the base of his skull

1
  For the privacy of the child victim, we have elected to use first names only when referring to
him or his family.

                                               -2-
which was most likely caused by a direct impact; retinal hemorrhages that were

consistent with abusive head trauma, though possibly caused by surgery; a fracture

to his thoracic vertebra that was unlikely to have been caused by the same injury as

the skull fracture; and some bruising that could not be dated. No healing or prior

injuries were indicated in Henry’s skeletal scan.

              Dr. Makroff opined that – even factoring in the height of the bed, the

possibility Henry hit the bedframe, and the thickness and nature of the flooring –

the degree of Henry’s skull fracture was far outside that which one might expect

from a fall. Additionally, a fall would not be expected to result in retinal

hemorrhages and was not the right mechanism to cause the vertebral fracture.

Finally, Dr. Makroff asserted that vomiting, seizures, blown pupils, or a lack of

brain response can set in immediately after the type of injury Henry sustained, and

she would not expect hours or days to elapse without these signs or symptoms

presenting.

              Dietrich consistently denied injuring or abusing Henry. He

maintained that Henry had been in their bedroom happily eating and that he

changed Henry’s diaper and then left him on the bed while he went to the kitchen.

When he returned a minute later, he found Henry on the floor, called Renee, and

then moved Henry to the living room. Later that day, Dietrich sent Renee text

messages stating that if they took him to jail he deserved it and that he could never

                                          -3-
make this right. Dietrich explained that these statements were in reference to his

leaving Henry unattended on the bed.

               After a three-day jury trial, Dietrich was acquitted on the charge of

criminal abuse first degree, but found guilty of assault in the first degree.2 He was

sentenced to 15 years on December 22, 2021, and this appeal timely followed.

Additional facts will be introduced as they become relevant.

                                    LEGAL ANALYSIS

     I.     The Court did not Abuse its Discretion by Admitting Evidence.

               Dietrich first complains that the trial court erred by admitting, over his

objection, irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. We review a trial court’s decision

regarding the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Clark v.

Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007). “The test for abuse of discretion

is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.010.

               (1) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when:

                   (a) He intentionally causes serious physical injury to another
                       person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous
                       instrument; or

                   (b) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
                       the value of human life he wantonly engages in conduct
                       which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby
                       causes serious physical injury to another person.

                                                -4-
unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d

941, 945 (Ky. 1999). We will address each challenged item of evidence in turn.

                              Testimony of Prior Violence

               During its re-direct examination of Renee, the Commonwealth

inquired if Dietrich had ever been violent with her. Renee responded that on more

than one occasion Dietrich had choked her, pushed her, and called her names. She

also recounted one argument in their bedroom that culminated in Dietrich pushing

her, her shoving him back, and then him choking her on the bed until she “saw

stars.” In admitting the evidence, the trial court accepted the Commonwealth’s

argument that Dietrich had opened the door by eliciting testimony regarding his

character for nonviolence and by asking about specific instances of nonviolence

against Henry, as well as his three biological children.

               In Stansbury v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 293, 300 (Ky. 2015), the

Supreme Court of Kentucky summarized the applicable law as follows:

                      Generally, “[C]haracter can be proven only by
               evidence of general reputation or by opinion, not by
               specific instances of conduct.” Tamme v.
               Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 29 (Ky. 1998); KRE[3]
               405. Moreover, KRE 404(a) holds that “[e]vidence of a
               person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible
               for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith
               on a particular occasion.” KRE 404.

3
    Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

                                           -5-
                   However, “[W]hen one party introduces improper
             evidence, such ‘opens the door’ for the other party to
             introduce improper evidence in rebuttal whose only claim
             to admission is that it explains or rebuts the prior
             inadmissible evidence.” Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 158
             S.W.3d 740, 746 (Ky. 2005) citing Norris v.
             Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 411, 414 (Ky. 2002).

             On appeal, Dietrich asserts that his general demeanor and whether he

ever disciplined Henry were facts in direct controversy; therefore, the introduction

of this type of evidence by defense counsel was proper and did not justify the

court’s decision. This argument is without merit.

             At trial, the Commonwealth’s evidence highlighted that Henry was

perfectly normal in the 24 hours prior to being left in Dietrich’s care, at which time

he succumbed to a severe brain injury that, per uncontroverted medical evidence,

was both inconsistent with Dietrich’s claim of a fall and unlikely to go hours or

days without presenting demonstrable signs or symptoms. Thus, plainly, neither

Dietrich’s personal character nor his past actions were relevant to their theory of

the case, and there is no contention they correlate an element of the charged

offenses.

             Indeed, prior to the testimony at issue, all evidence on these matters

was introduced by defense counsel on cross-examination. This was consistent with

counsel’s opening statement that “the Commonwealth is going to try and make you

believe that for no reason whatsoever, [Dietrich] has the most uncharacteristic

                                         -6-
snap, for no reason, and heinously abuses Henry. [T]he evidence is going to show

that that makes zero sense.” While a defendant must be permitted to present a

complete and meaningful defense, Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 624

(Ky. 2010), a claim of necessity does not shield the defense’s admission of

improper evidence from opening the door to rebuttal.

             Here, Dietrich elicited from Kim that he was generally a laid-back

person, that he would go out of his way to be nice when Renee was grouchy, that

he was never frustrated with his biological children and was attentive to their

needs, that he appropriately disciplined the children with timeouts, and that he

never hit the children. From Renee, Dietrich introduced her prior statements to

police, social workers, and himself wherein she asserted that Dietrich had watched

Henry multiple times, this was the first time anything bad had happened, and if

Dietrich was going to do “some mean ass act,” he would have done it before this

incident. She also stated that she would not let someone who was violent with

children watch Henry and that Dietrich never had a temper with Henry and was

always great with him.

             Consisting largely of specific incidents of conduct, this evidence,

which was offered solely to prove Dietrich could not have injured Henry because

he was a nonviolent person, is inadmissible pursuant to KRE 405(c). As the

Supreme Court emphasized in Stansbury, once Dietrich “opened the door to the

                                         -7-
introduction of ‘good’ character evidence, he cannot complain if the

Commonwealth walked through that door and introduced character evidence not to

his liking.” 454 S.W.3d at 301. Consequently, the court did not err in admitting

the Commonwealth’s rebuttal evidence that Dietrich was violent.

             We note Dietrich’s suggestion that his “opening of the door” was for

the trait of violence only with respect to children. KRE 404(a)(1) speaks of a

“pertinent trait of character.” Counsel has not cited to this Court any Kentucky

case authority which would authorize such a specification within the trait of

violence. Even if such a specification were permissible, when we consider the

totality of the testimony elicited by Dietrich, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by allowing the questions about violence toward an adult in this case.

See, e.g., State v. Harvey, 129 P.3d 1276, 1281-82 (Id. App. 2006) (although

defendant offered character testimony only with respect to his behavior around

children, prosecution could offer evidence of domestic abuse against adults).

                      Testimony Regarding Dietrich’s Letter

             Closely related is Dietrich’s claim that the court erred in admitting

testimony concerning a letter he wrote to Renee while he was incarcerated. This

testimony was again elicited during the Commonwealth’s re-direct of Renee and

introduced the following statements made by Dietrich: “I’m afraid you are gonna

leave me again”; “I told you point blank anyone you try to leave me for is gonna

                                           -8-
get beat the fuck up lol your ass is mine and mine alone”; “The only way you

getting away is to kill my ass”; “I’m a 6’4” 210 pound monster with a lot of guns

and I’m willing to die for what’s mine”; and “You stuck, the only way out now is

in a toe tag and a body bag.” Concluding that our above analysis is equally

applicable to these facts, we find no error.

                         Body Camera Footage of Arrest

             Lastly, with regard to his claims of improperly admitted evidence,

Dietrich challenges the introduction of body camera footage showing his arrest,

arguing it was neither relevant to the charges nor probative of his guilt and was

substantially prejudicial. Disagreeing, the Commonwealth maintains that the

video, which shows Dietrich’s initially successful concealment from police

executing a warrant for his arrest, was admissible as circumstantial evidence of

guilt.

             The Commonwealth is correct that, “[a]s a general rule, proof of flight

to elude capture or prevent discovery is admissible[.]” Day v. Commonwealth, 361

S.W.3d 299, 303 (Ky. 2012); see also Jackson v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 763

(Ky. 2006). As the Court explained in Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 107 S.W.3d

215, 219 (Ky. 2003), evidence of flight is relevant “because it has a tendency to

make the existence of the defendant’s guilt more probable: a guilty person

probably would act like a guilty person.” See also KRE 401. Because we

                                          -9-
conceive no practical difference between a defendant attempting to elude capture

by fleeing versus actively concealing himself, we reject Dietrich’s claim the

evidence was not relevant. And, though relevant evidence “may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice,” and

we agree an arrest is inherently prejudicial, we cannot say the court abused its

discretion under the facts of this case. KRE 403.

   II.    The Court did not Abuse its Discretion by Limiting the Defense’s
          Cross-Examination.

             Dietrich next argues the court violated his right to present a defense.

At issue is Kim’s avowal testimony recounting an occurrence three months before

Henry’s hospitalization when he was crying at 5:00 a.m. and she beat on Renee’s

door five times before Renee, who was either drunk or hungover, answered.

Dietrich contends this event in conjunction with Henry’s bruises and his removal

from her custody would have established for the jury a pattern of parental neglect

and, thereby, demonstrated her motivation to lie about Dietrich to avoid

prosecution herself. Thus, he asserts the court violated his federal and state

constitutional rights to confront or meet the witnesses against him, as well as his

right to cross-examine them on any relevant matter, when it prohibited the

admission of this testimony.

             The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that

“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be

                                          -10-
confronted with the witnesses against him[.]”4 The right to cross-examine

witnesses and thereby expose their bias or motivation to testify is a proper and

important function of this right. Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 556 S.W.3d 595,

600-02 (Ky. 2018). Additionally, under Kentucky law, “[a] witness may be cross-

examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.”

KRE 611(b). We review a trial court’s rulings concerning limits on cross-

examination for an abuse of discretion. Armstrong, 556 S.W.3d at 604.

              Though we are not wholly convinced that the prohibited testimony

was relevant, we agree with the Commonwealth that, regardless, reversal is not

merited. In Armstrong, the Court announced the following standard for

establishing a violation of the Confrontation Clause:

              [T]he defendant must show that “he was prohibited from
              engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination
              designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part
              of the witness, and ‘thereby to expose to the jury the facts
              from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw
              inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’” A
              defendant has satisfied this burden if “[a] reasonable jury
              might have received a significantly different impression
              of [the witness’s] credibility had [the defense’s] counsel
              been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-
              examination.”

556 S.W.3d at 602-03 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).

4
  Similarly, Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right
“to meet the witnesses face to face[.]”

                                              -11-
             Here, significant evidence was introduced regarding Renee’s

motivation, including her admission that she would choose Henry over Dietrich

and that she felt pressured by the social workers to blame Dietrich in order to

regain custody of Henry. Additionally, defense counsel vigorously examined her

regarding prior statements that, inconsistent with her trial testimony, were wholly

supportive of Dietrich, his care of Henry, and his nonviolent nature. Given this

wealth of evidence and the limited value of the avowal testimony, we do not

believe a reasonable jury would have a significantly different impression of

Renee’s credibility but for the court’s prohibition of the evidence. Accordingly,

we find no error.

   III.   The Order Imposing Public Defender Fees must be Vacated.

             Finally, Dietrich maintains the court committed clear error when,

despite finding he was a “poor person” under KRS 453.190(2), it imposed a $2,000

public defender fee. The Commonwealth concedes the fee is in error pursuant to

Miller v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 857 (Ky. 2013). In Miller, the Kentucky

Supreme Court held that “because Appellant was found to be a poor person, the

partial public defender fee was improperly assessed under KRS 31.211(1), and the

imposition of that fee must . . . be vacated.” Id. at 871. Applying Miller, we agree

the $2,000 fee imposed against Dietrich must likewise be vacated.

                                        -12-
                               CONCLUSION

            Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Dietrich’s

conviction but VACATE the imposition of a public defender fee.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                   BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Kayla D. Deatherage                     Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                     Attorney General of Kentucky

                                        Thomas A. Van De Rostyne
                                        Assistant Attorney General
                                        Frankfort, Kentucky

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