Court Opinion

ID: 9444383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 20:59:03.391928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:50.907581
License: Public Domain

JAMES ALGER FEE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Determinations of two able United States District Judges in two different civil cases are -reversed and determinations of an administrative board are set aside by the opinion of this Court.
I.
As to the first case, the question whether the original IV-F classification was improperly' granted is immaterial. The statute provides “that persons who are or may be deferred under the provisions of this section shall remain liable for training and service” until 35 years of age. Besides, if it were material, a District Judge recited in relation, to the eardrum, “there was evidence” before the local board “to support its classification of petitioner as IV-F on January 23, 1950.” Talcott accepted the benefits of this IV-F classification and did not appeal, and was thereby legally deferred under the provisions of the section until reclassified.
II.
As to the second case, there was no ■“new ground” presented. The second trial judge refused to hear evidence that the board members had not considered the answer of petitioner, “I feel that the condition of my eardrum should be clearly established.” If this is supposed to be competent because it calls the attention of the board to the invalidity of the IV-F classification as rendering invalid recall after deferment, the facts have already been ruled upon. The law was thus settled. If it is supposed to relate to a condition present at the time, the board actually ordered a physical examination, which was all that was necessary to determine the condition of an •eardrum.
III.
Two minor matters will be dealt with here.
(1) A letter by an intelligent and educated man on a vital occasion, which excuses a failure to come from New York to Los Angeles because of distance and expense, is a waiver of. a right of personal appearance. An offer to appear personally, notwithstanding if the board “after reviewing this appeal” should “feel my appearance would offer a more complete hearing,” can be a demand for a right only by sentimental rationalization.
(2) The attack on the Selective Service operation Bulletin is unjustifiable. The armed services are charged with the high duty of protection of our country. This case fully justifies the existence of this regulation. Immediately after Tal-cott was first classified I-A, treatments were given his wife in order that she might become pregnant. These efforts succeeded, but no notice was given the board until the order to report had issued. The board, however, delayed actual induction until considerable time after the birth of the child. It is only the use of pregnancy as an excuse for failure to serve which the regulation denounces. We should not re-enact “Tommy Atkins.”
There is an indication that the set of the breeze is in this quarter, and perhaps sail should be trimmed to meet it. See Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 74 S.Ct. 152. The compass has now been boxed. Over-precaution in protection of civil rights by technicality in a field where these are presently not in danger may cause the wind of doctrine to shift in the courts to flagrant violation of personal and religious liberty in time of hysteria. Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 64 S.Ct. 346, 88 L.Ed. 305. Cf. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 139, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567. Civil liberty should be especially protected in war (see discussion in United States v. Minoru Yasui, D.C.1942, 48 F.Supp. 40, Fee, J.; Cf. Ex parte *366Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 208, 89 L.Ed. 243), but there should be no weakening of the national defense in peace, Stone v. Christensen, D.C.1940, 36 F.Supp. 739, Fee, J.
Both decisions should be affirmed.