Court Opinion

ID: 9384663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 17:03:13.875299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.343455
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 182
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION III
                                        No. E-22-108

                                                Opinion Delivered: March   29, 2023
HEATHER KING
                                APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
                                          BOARD OF REVIEW
V.
                                                [NO. 2021-BR-03887]
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES                         AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN
                                  APPELLEE PART

                             WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

       This is an unbriefed unemployment benefits case. Appellant Heather King (King)

 appeals the Arkansas Board of Review (The Board) determination finding her liable to repay

 $10,144 in unemployment benefits. On appeal, King contends that a waiver should be

 granted due to her financial circumstances. We affirm in part and remand in part.

       According to the record, King discontinued her last employment and filed her initial

 claim for unemployment benefits on April 22, 2020. From there, King filed a continued

 benefits claim for the weeks ending April 25 through August 8, 2020. As a result, King

 received $109 in regular state-unemployment benefits for each of those weeks, with an

 additional $600 in Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) each week for

 the weeks ending April 25 through July 25, 2020, totaling $10,144.
       The record also reflects that, on December 14, 2020, King was issued a notice of non-

fraud overpayment determination, finding her liable for repayment of overpaid benefits

under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b) (Supp. 2021) because she received benefits to which

she was not entitled, for reasons other than intentional misrepresentation of material facts

knowing them to be false or knowingly failing to disclose material facts. In response, King

filed a timely appeal of this determination to the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal), which

conducted a hearing on April 15, 2021, and issued a decision in appeal No. 2021-AT-01183

that affirmed the Division’s determination.

       Thereafter, King appealed the Tribunal decision to the Board, and the Board issued

a decision in appeal No. 2021-BR-01667 which remanded the case to the Tribunal to

conduct an additional hearing. This hearing was held on August 4, 2021, and the Tribunal

issued a decision in appeal No. 2021-AT-15715 that affirmed the Division’s determination.

Following this, King timely appealed to the Board from the decision of the Tribunal, which

also affirmed the determination. This timely appeal followed.

       In appeal No. 2021-BR-03887, the Board determined that King was liable to repay

$10,144 in unentitled benefits. The Board found that King:

       received benefits for the weeks in question. The Division later issued a
       determination which disqualified her from receiving those benefits. The
       determination was affirmed by the Tribunal, the decision of which was affirmed
       by the Board…. In this case, the overpayment resulted from a disqualifying
       determination. While the claimant may not have been at fault in causing the
       overpayment, it was not caused as a direct result of the Division’s error. Principles
       of equity and good conscience-including assessing whether the claimant has the
       ability to repay the overpaid benefits-need not be addressed as the claimant must
       meet both elements to avoid repayment.

                                               2
       We agree in part. Board decisions are upheld if they are supported by substantial

evidence.1 Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that reasonable minds might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.2 In appeals of unemployment-compensation cases, we

view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most

favorable to the Board’s findings.3 Even if there is evidence that could support a different

decision, our review is limited to whether the Board could have reasonably reached its

decision as a result of the evidence presented.4 However, our function on appeal is not merely

to rubber-stamp decisions arising from the Board.5

       Here, the Board found that the overpayment of benefits was a result of a final

disqualifying determination, not due to agency error. The overpayment must have been

caused as a direct result of the Division’s error, and it must be against the principles of equity

and good conscience to require repayment.6 We agree and find that substantial evidence

       1
       Jewell v. Dir., 2023 Ark. App. 109, at 2, ___ S.W.3d at ___; Blanton v. Dir., 2019 Ark.
App. 205, 575 S.W.3d 186.

       2
           Id.

       3
           Id.

       4
           Id.

       5
       Id.; Thomas v. Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 468, 587 S.W.3d 612; Wilson v. Dir., 2017 Ark.
App. 171, 517 S.W.3d 427.

       6
           See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2).

                                                3
supports the Board’s findings that King is liable for repayment of the regular state

unemployment benefits totaling $1,744. The Board was correct in that since King failed to

satisfy the first prong of her state unemployment-waiver analysis, principles of equity and

good conscience, including assessing whether King has the ability to repay the overpaid

benefits, need not be addressed. Thus, King is liable to repay the $1,744 in regular state

unemployment benefits and we therefore affirm this point.

       However, the same is not true concerning the $8,400 FPUC benefits. Our recent

decision in Carman v. Director, 2023 Ark. App. 51, ___ S.W.3d ___, confirmed that for

purposes of overpayment of state unemployment benefits, the repayment may be waived “if

the director finds that the overpayment was received as a direct result of an error by the

Division of Workforce Services and that its recovery would be against equity and good

conscience.”7 Carman further held that FPUC repayment may be waived if the state

determines that the payment of FPUC was without fault on the part of the individual and

that such repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience. 8

       Such is the case here, King received $600 in FPUC benefits for fourteen weeks from

April 25 to July 25, 2020, totaling $8,400. The Board determined that King was not at fault

for causing the overpayments of these benefits. Thus, the first prong of the FPUC-waiver

       7
       Carman, 2023 Ark. App. 51, at 7, ___ S.W.3d at ___ (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 11-
10-532(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 2021)).

       8
           Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2)).

                                                  4
analysis is met. Therefore, the Board must determine whether repayment of the $8,400 in

FPUC benefits would be contrary to equity and good conscience. If adequate findings of fact

are not made on the issue presented, we remand to the Board for findings of fact and

conclusions of law upon which to perform a proper appellate review.9

       Accordingly, we affirm King’s liability in repaying the $1,744 in regular state

unemployment benefits and remand to the Board for further findings of fact and conclusion

of law regarding whether repayment of the $8,400 in FPUC benefits would be contrary to

equity and good conscience.

       Affirmed in part; remanded in part.

       VIRDEN and GRUBER, JJ., agree.

       Heather King, pro se appellant.

       Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.

       9
           Id. (citing Pillow v. Dir., 2022 Ark. App. 341, at 4).

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