Court Opinion

ID: 9829757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:36:02.408248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:02.113291
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We are confronted with two distinct motions for rehearing filed- for appellee at dif-. ferent times, each treating the matters in issue in its own way, and we have been at a loss to determine which one should be recognized and treated as the motion for rehearing. How&ver, we have considered both of them and have arrived at the conclusion that nothing has been, presented that necessitates a change in our former opinion. We reiterate that it is the requirement of the law of 1901 that a purchaser of public lands shall live on the same in good faith, and that if he “shall fail to reside upon and improve in good faith the land purchased by him, as required by law, he shall forfeit said land and all payments .thereon to the state to the same extent qs for nonpayment of interest, and such land shall be again placed upon the-market without any action' whatever on the part of tlje Commissioner of the General Land Office.” That provision has not been repealed and is in effect, and it and all existing laws in regard to settlement were expressly recognized in the law of 1907. It is provided in the act of 1907 that not only should the purchaser thereunder comply with the conditions of settlement as provided therein, but should comply with those provided in existing statutes. The law of 1901 had not been repealed, and was then existing, and is still existing.
This case is clearly within the rulings in Barnes v. Williams, 102 Tex. 444, 119 S. W. 89, in which a certificate of occupancy, which is clothed with so much sacredness by the argument of appellee that any fraud may have been perpetrated under it and cannot be questioned, was held not to preclude an inquiry as to good faith or any other matter of settlement, when the right of a third person arose before the issuance of the certificate. The court said: “There is nothing in the statute which provides for a hearing of rival claimants when proof • of occupancy is offered. The proceeding is purely ex parte, and there is nothing in it to suggest that existing rights of any but the person offering it are to be considered. It would seem to be contrary to fundamental principles to give such action a conclusive effect against other claimants of the land for a hearing of whom no provision is made. And this of itself indicates sufficiently that the Legislature intended no such effect.” In the case referred to the Court of Civil Appeals of the Sixth District held just what appellee claims to be the law, and practically overruled the decisions in Lamkin v. Matsler, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 218, 73 S. W. 970, and Bumpass v. McLendon, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 519, 101 S. W. 491. The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the latter decisions. The Logan-Curry Case has no applicability whatever to the facts of this case.
Appellant was not a trespasser upon the land, but went there under the sanction of the laws of Texas. It was agreed that, if appellee was not' a settler in good faith on the land, judgment should be rendered in favor of appellant for the land, which was an acknowledgment that he had complied with all the forms of law. It was also agreed that the land was sold by the Land Commissioner to appellant, and that the sale was ,regular in all respects. No proof was necessary under that agreement.
The motion is overruled.