Court Opinion

ID: 9748469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:02:33.126118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:35.595158
License: Public Domain

MINTON, C.J.,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that there is a conflict between KRS 532.110(l)(d) and KRS 532.110(l)(c). But I strongly disagree with the majority’s resolution of that conflict. So I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the general sentencing cap of KRS 532.110(l)(c) controls the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision for certain sexual offenders set forth in KRS 532.110(l)(d).
Of course, because the interpretation and construction of statutes is a matter of *442law, we owe no deference to the trial court’s construction of KRS 532.110.1 Instead, we should resolve this statutory conflict ourselves by using the accepted canons of statutory construction. I conclude that the majority’s conclusion runs afoul of two of those canons of construction.
First, the majority’s conclusion is contrary to the canon that provides that specific statutes control over general statutes. Among the most basic tenets of statutory construction is the familiar rule that when construing two conflicting statutes involving the same subject matter, “the more specific statute controls over the more general statute.”2 Clearly, KRS 582.110(l)(d), which deals only with mandatory consecutive sentences for certain sexual offenders, is far more specific than the general sentencing cap set forth in KRS 532.110(l)(c). The majority does not address this important canon of construction. It simply cannot be squared with the majority’s conclusion.
Second, the majority’s conclusion is contrary to the canon that counsels that later-enacted statutory provisions take precedence over older statutory provisions dealing with the same subject matter.3 KRS 532.110 was first enacted in 1974. But the provision in subsection (l)(d) mandating consecutive sentences for some defendants convicted of sexual felonies, such as Stam-baugh, was not enacted until 2006, by which time the sentencing cap in subsection (l)(c) had already been enacted.4 Because it is the later enactment, the directive in KRS 532.110(l)(d) mandating that felons such as Stambaugh be sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment must control over the contradictory general cap on sentences found in KRS 532.110(l)(c). The majority acknowledges in passing that subsection (l)(d) was enacted after subsection (l)(c) but, nonetheless, concludes that subsection (l)(c) controls subsection (l)(d).
And what authority does the majority cite for failing to employ these two basic tenets of statutory construction? None.
The majority merely divines that the General Assembly must have wanted the general cap found in subsection (l)(c) to control over the specific, mandatory consecutive sentencing provisions of subsection (l)(d) because our prisons are crowded and the costs of incarceration are high. Although the correctional facilities of this Commonwealth may be crowded and expensive to operate, the majority is unable to cite anything in either the record of this case or any prior decision of this Court to support the majority’s conclusion that these factors were ever considered by the General Assembly when it enacted the mandatory sentencing provision of subsection (l)(d). Indeed, why would the General Assembly logically have enacted any such mandatory consecutive sentencing statute if it had been concerned with prison costs and overcrowding? It strains credulity to conclude that the General As*443sembly would ever have determined that prisons were too crowded or too expensive to house recidivist sexual offenders such as Stambaugh.
There is nothing in either subsections (l)(c) or (l)(d) of KRS 532.110 that plainly states, or even hints, that the mandatory consecutive sentencing directive in subsection (l)(d) must yield to the general cap on sentences in subsection (l)(c). If the General Assembly had intended for the specific, new mandatory sentencing provision of subsection (l)(d) to be subordinate to the general, existing statutory cap found in subsection (l)(c), would not it have plainly said so? After all, the traditional methods of statutory interpretation would have, until today, caused the later-enactéd statute to take precedence over any conflicting, earlier-enacted statute. And we, as a reviewing court, must make the fundamental presumption that the General Assembly was aware of its previous enactments when it enacted a new statute on the same subject.5
The majority opines that the General Assembly did not say that the cap in (l)(c) controlled over the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision in (l)(d) because “[s]uch a statement was unnecessary, because the mandatory language in (l)(c) speaks for itself....” I disagree.
First, the language in subsection (l)(d) is also mandatory in nature, as evidenced by the presence in that subsection of the mandatory verb shall.6 Why is the earlier-enacted, less specific mandatory language contained in KRS 532.110(l)(c) somehow more mandatory than the later-enacted, more specific mandatory language in KRS 532.110(l)(d)?
Second, I believe it far more likely that the General Assembly believed a statement as to which subsection of KRS 532.110(1) would control was unnecessary because it relied upon any reviewing court to follow the canons of statutory construction regarding later-enacted and more specific statutes controlling earlier-enacted and more general statutes. Although better practice surely would have been for the General Assembly to have made its intent unmistakable and plain, I believe the majority errs by concluding that the General Assembly’s silence supports its conclusion.
In summary, the majority correctly notes that there is a conflict between subsections (l)(c) and (l)(d) of KRS 532.110. But I believe the majority errs by holding that the older, more general provision of subsection (l)(c) of that statute takes precedence over the more recently enacted and more specific subsection (l)(d) of that statute. So I believe the trial court was required to apply KRS 532.110(l)(d) to sentence Stambaugh to consecutive terms of imprisonment for all of his qualifying felonies (ie., a cumulative sentence of forty years’ imprisonment).
I would reverse Stambaugh’s sentence and remand this matter to the trial court for re-sentencing in accordance with KRS 532.110(l)(d). Because the majority regrettably comes to a different conclusion, I respectfully dissent from section 111(A) of the majority opinion.
CUNNINGHAM, J., joins.

. See, e.g., Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell County Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Ky.2007) ("The trial court's and Court of Appeals’s construction of statutes is also entitled to no deference on appeal because statutory construction is a matter of law subject to a de novo standard of review.”).

. See, e.g., Light v. City of Louisville, 248 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Ky.2008).

. See, e.g., Bowling v. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections, 301 S.W.3d 478, 491 n. 4 (Ky.2009) ("While we conclude that KRS 13A.100(1) and KRS 13A.120(1) are fully reconcilable, it is worth noting that were they thought to conflict, the more recently enacted statute, KRS 13A.100(1), which the General Assembly adopted in 1990 (1990 Ky. Acts Ch. 516), would control over KRS 13A.120, which was adopted in 1986.... ”).

. See 2006 Ky. Acts Ch. 182 (H.B.3) § 47.

. See, e.g., Rose v. Turner, 301 Ky. 272, 275, 191 S.W.2d 397, 398 (1945) ("It is fundamental that in the enactment of a more recent statute, prior enactments on the same subject are presumed to have been in the mind of the Legislature.").

. See KRS 446.010(30) ("As used in the statute laws of this state, unless the context requires otherwise ... "Shall” is mandatory-”).