Court Opinion

ID: 9373558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:50.797474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:42.598063
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     TYESHIA R. MUNIZ,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        NY-0752-15-0282-C-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: July 21, 2022
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Tyeshia R. Muniz, Albany, New York, pro se.

           Mark Williams, Jr., Buffalo, New York, for the agency.

           Thien-Nga Nguyen, Albany, New York, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the compliance initial
     decision, which denied her petition for enforcement for failure to show that the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     agency materially breached the settlement agreement. For the reasons discussed
     below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and REMAND the case to
     the New York Field Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant filed a removal appeal with the Board, which the parties
     settled. Muniz v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. NY-0752-
     15-0282-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 4, 6, Tabs 12-13. In relevant
     part, the agency agreed to rescind the July 10, 2015 removal decision and issue a
     new removal letter for medical inability to perform. IAF, Tab 13 at 1.
¶3        After determining that the settlement agreement was within the Board’s
     jurisdiction, voluntarily entered into, understood by the parties, and lawful on its
     face, the administrative judge entered it into the record for enforcement purposes
     and dismissed the appeal as settled. IAF, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID) at 2-3.
     She also notified the appellant of her right to file a petition for review of the
     initial decision if she believed that the settlement agreeme nt was unlawful,
     involuntary, or the result of fraud or mutual mistake.       ID at 4.    The initial
     decision became final on February 25, 2016, after neither party filed a petition for
     review. Id.
¶4        Approximately 5 months later, the appellant filed a petition for
     enforcement, in which she made bare assertions that the agency breached the
     settlement agreement and that she was misled into settling her appeal.
     Compliance File (CF), Tab 1 at 1. In response, the agency alleged that it had
     fully complied with its obligations under the agreement and submitted supporting
     argument and evidence. CF, Tab 5 at 6, 15, 17-18, 21-38, 40.
¶5        During a telephonic status conference, the appellant elabora ted on her
     noncompliance claims. CF, Tab 6. She alleged that the agency had breached the
     “clean paper” provision of the settlement agreement by disclosing to prospective
     employers that she had been “fired.” Id. She also claimed that, although the
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     agency had submitted her disability retirement paperwork to the Office of
     Personnel Management, its delay in doing so constituted a breach of its promise
     to assist her in applying. Id. Finally, she argued that the written agreement was
     incomplete and attributed her failure to address all of her concerns during
     negotiations to her inexperience with settlement matters, as she appeared pro se.
     Id. The administrative judge indicated that the settlement agreement contained
     neither of the provisions referenced by the appellant; but, she nonetheless
     permitted the appellant to supplement her petition for enforcement with those
     additional allegations. Id.
¶6         After the appellant failed to        further supplement her petition for
     enforcement, the administrative judge issued a compliance initial decision ,
     denying it. CF, Tab 7, Compliance Initial Decision (CID) at 2, 4. She found that
     the “promises” referenced by the appellant were not in the agreement and that the
     appellant failed to establish a violation of the agreement’s express terms. CID
     at 3-4.   She also found that the agency showed that it had complied with its
     obligations. CID at 4.
¶7         The appellant filed a petition for review of the compliance initial decision.
     Compliance Petition for Review (CPFR) File, Tab 1.          The agency has filed a
     response. CPFR File, Tab 3.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶8         The Board has the authority to enforce a settlement agreement that has been
     entered into the record in the same manner as a final Board decision or order.
     Doe v. Department of the Army, 116 M.S.P.R. 160, ¶ 7 (2011). On review, the
     appellant asserts that the agency materially breached the “clean paper” settlement
     agreement by defaming her character and requests an agency contact that can
     provide a neutral reference. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 6. We remand this claim. 2

     2
       The appellant does not further challenge the validity of the settlement agreement or
     reargue her claims of agency delay concerning her retirement application. We decline
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¶9          The appellant is essentially arguing that the settlement agreement contained
      a nondisclosure provision.      CPFR File, Tab 1 at 6; CF, Tab 6.             Both the
      U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Board have construed
      settlement agreements that call for rescission of a removal for cause and issuance
      of a Standard Form 50 reflecting a resignation to also contain implied provisions
      for expungement of removal-related documents from the employee’s Official
      Personnel File and nondisclosure to third parties—in other words, a “clean
      record” settlement. Conant v. Office of Personnel Management, 255 F.3d 1371,
      1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Doe, 116 M.S.P.R. 160, ¶ 8.
¶10         We find this principle equally applicable to the instant case.         Here, the
      settlement agreement calls for the appellant to accept a removal for medical
      inability to perform in exchange for the rescission of the removal for cause. IAF,
      Tab 13 at 1.        In Conant, an agency agreed to replace an employee’s
      conduct-based proposed removal with a resignation “for personal reasons .”
      255 F.3d at 1373. In both situations, by agreeing to rescind and replace the prior
      removals, the agencies effectively agreed to erase them. Id. at 1376; IAF, Tab 13
      at 1. The substitution of a disability-based removal for a removal for cause is
      analogous to the substitution of a resignation. To find otherwise would unfairly
      relieve the agency from its responsibility to comply with the implicit clean-record
      provision and deny the appellant her reasonably anticipated benefit of the
      bargain. See Pagan v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 170 F.3d 1368, 1371-72
      (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that appellants must receive the benefit of the
      bargain despite the potential enforcement problems that may arise with clean
      record settlement agreements). As a result, we find that the settlement agreement
      contained an implied nondisclosure provision.           The nondisclosure provision
      generally prevents the agency from discussing information related to the

      to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the agreement was enforceable and her
      implicit finding that the agreement did not obligate the agency to take any particular
      action concerning the appellant’s disability retirement application. CID at 3-4.
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      appellant’s rescinded removal with third parties. 3      Doe, 116 M.S.P.R. 160,
      ¶¶ 9-11.
¶11        Although the appellant clarified her “clean record agreement” claims during
      the status conference, the administrative judge did not issue an order summarizing
      those claims.   Similarly, the administrative judge, in the compliance initial
      decision, did not analyze the question of whether the agency’s potential
      disclosure of information regarding the rescinded adverse action constituted a
      material breach of the implied nondisclosure provision of the clean record
      settlement agreement. Because this essential question cannot be resolved based
      on the information in the record, we must vacate the compliance initial decision
      and remand the appeal. See Doe, 116 M.S.P.R. 160, ¶¶ 11-12 (ordering the case
      to be remanded because the administrative judge did not fully address the
      appellant’s claims of breach of the implied nondisclosure provision of the clean
      record agreement).

                                           ORDER
¶12        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Board’s field
      office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.            On
      remand, the administrative judge shall address the issues discussed above and
      allow the parties to submit further evidence and argument as to whether the
      agency breached the settlement agreement. It appears that the appellant wishes to
      enforce the terms of the agreement. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. However, on remand,
      the administrative judge also should provide the appellant, who is pro se, with the
      opportunity to make an informed election between enforcement and rescission of

      3
       Additionally, under 5 C.F.R. § 293.311, an agency is limited as to what information
      may be shared from agency files regarding a former agency employee.
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the agreement in the event that a breach is found. See Zumwalt v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 118 M.S.P.R. 574, ¶ 14 (2012).

FOR THE BOARD:                                     /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.