Court Opinion

ID: 9760327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:48:09.601131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:10.897441
License: Public Domain

Billings, J.,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority order, filed without reasons or explanation, rejecting the recommendation of the Judicial Responsibility Board for a public reprimand. It is my view that the Board found serious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct which the respondent did not contest on appeal. I believe that the recommendation of the Board was justified under the facts found. I cannot subscribe to the majority view which sweeps these violations under the rug, particularly when the majority fails to articulate any reason or basis therefor. I can only conclude that influences not of record have governed the majority decision.
I also disagree with the concurring opinion. The courts that have addressed the issue have held that the resignation or retirement of a judge does not preclude the exercise of disciplinary authority against him. In re DeLucia, 76 N.J. 329, 387 A.2d 362 (1978); In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 250 S.E.2d 890 (1978). See also In re Hammond, 224 Kan. 745, 585 P.2d 1066 (1978). It would indeed be a travesty if a judge could avoid the full consequences of his misconduct by resigning or retiring from office after disciplinary proceedings have been commenced. In re Peoples, supra, 296 N.C. at 150-51, 250 S.E.2d at 914. This is especially true in view of the provisions *513of 4 V.S.A. § 22, under which a judge can be recalled for further services, and 4 V.S.A. § 75, under which a judge can conclude causes which he had previously heard in full or in part. The concurring opinion suggests, citing In re DeLucia, supra, that a judge who has retired or resigned is not subject to discipline as a judge, but only as an attorney. If this were the case, then side judges and probate judges, who need not be attorneys in Vermont, could entirely avoid the disciplinary authority of this Court by resigning from office. I am convinced that the judicial conduct rules never intended such a result and that to interpret the rules in accordance with the concurring opinion would emasculate them and thwart the Court’s duty to preserve and protect the integrity of the judiciary.