Court Opinion

ID: 9784916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:57:33.475183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:01.020228
License: Public Domain

*100KISTLER, J.
This case arises out of an oral agreement between plaintiff Outback Contracting, Inc., and defendant Stone Container Corporation1 by which Stone agreed to cause a third party to transfer land to Outback. The jury found that Stone breached the agreement and returned a verdict in favor of Outback. Stone moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the agreement fell within the statute of frauds. The trial court allowed the motion and entered judgment in Stone’s favor. We affirm.
We state the facts consistently with the jury’s verdict. Malensky v. Mobay Chemical Corp., 104 Or App 165, 167, 799 P2d 683 (1990), rev den 311 Or 187 (1991). Beginning in the early 1990s, Outback and Stone had an ongoing business relationship in which Outback would periodically locate timberland for Stone. Typically, Stone would provide Outback with money to acquire the property. Stone would receive the timber from the purchase, and Outback would receive title to the real property.
After viewing property owned by Donald and Helen Lilja, Outback talked to Stone about purchasing the Liljas’ property. When Outback and Stone learned that the property was to be sold by bid, Outback entered into an oral agreement with Stone’s agents.2 Stone and Outback agreed orally that Stone would submit a bid in Outback’s name to buy the property. If the bid was successful, Stone would pay the Liljas $2,278,632 in return for their deeding the real property to Outback and the timber to Stone. According to Outback, the money and the real property would be placed in escrow, and the escrow agent would be instructed to carry out the various transactions.
*101Stone submitted a bid on the property. However, instead of putting Outback’s name on the bid, Stone submitted the bid in its name only. Stone’s bid was successful and Stone acquired title to the property. When Stone failed to transfer the real property to Outback, Outback brought this action claiming that Stone breached their oral agreement and that, as a result of that breach, the property was not deeded to Outback. Outback sought damages of $485,000, an amount equal to the value of the real property.
The jury returned a verdict in Outback’s favor, and the trial court granted Stone’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court found that because the agreement “concem[ed] the sale of an interest in real property,” it was unenforceable under ORS 41.580(l)(e).3 Additionally, the trial court found that because there was no evidence that Stone’s agents had written authority to enter into the agreement with Outback, the agreement was unenforceable under ORS 41.580(l)(f). See n 3 above.
On appeal, Outback argues that the trial court erred in granting Stone’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Outback does not dispute that the agreement was not in writing. It argues, however, that because the agreement did not require Stone to transfer any property to Outback, the agreement was not within the statute of frauds.4 Stone’s response tracks the trial court’s reasoning. It argues that the agreement was an agreement for the sale of land and alternatively that it was an agreement concerning real property made by an agent whose authority was not in writing. We agree with the trial court that the parties’ agreement was *102“[a]n agreement * * * for the sale of real property” and thus came within ORS 41.580(l)(e).
The agreement between Outback and Stone consisted of three steps. The first step required Stone to submit a bid in Outback’s name. If the bid were accepted, the second step required Stone to pay the Liljas. The third step required the Liljas to deed the timber to Stone and the real property to Outback. The agreement did not simply require Stone to submit a bid to the Liljas as Outback’s agent. Rather, it required Stone both to pay the purchase price and to cause the real property to be deeded to Outback in return for the services that Outback had provided to Stone.
The courts have long recognized that when, as in this case, Stone and Outback agree that Stone would pay the Liljas to transfer their land to Outback, the agreement is an agreement for the sale of land and thus within the statute of frauds. Arthur Linton Corbin, 2 Corbin on Contracts § 399, 366 (2d ed 1950) (summarizing cases); Samuel Williston, 3 A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 488, 513 (3d ed 1960) (same); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 125(2) (1979). Williston summarizes the cases concisely:
“Nor is it material that the conveyance is not to be made directly from one party to the contract to the other. A contract to convey to or purchase from a third person is within the Statute.
“A contract in which one party promised to procure a conveyance to the other by a third person has been held not to be within the Statute where the price for the land was to be paid by the grantee to the grantor, on the ground that such a contract would be merely a contract of agency, in which the agent guaranteed that he would successfully accomplish the business intrusted to him. Most courts do not make this distinction and hold such an absolute promise to procure a conveyance within the Statute.
“Clearly, if the party promising to procure the conveyance is himself to pay whatever price is necessary to the grantor, and is to receive from his own co-contractor a price not for his services, but for the land, the conveyance of which he agrees to procure, the contract is within the Statute.”
*103Williston on Contracts § 488 at 513-14 (footnotes omitted).
As Williston observes, some courts would hold that if Stone had not agreed to pay the Liljas for the land and had agreed only to serve as Outback’s agent, their agreement would not be within the statute of frauds. That is not what occurred here, however. In this case, Stone and Outback agreed that Stone would pay the Liljas for the land and cause them to transfer it to Outback. That agreement for the transfer of land is one that Williston explains is “[cjlearly” within the statute — a point on which Corbin and the Restatement agree.5
The Oregon courts have never had occasion to consider whether the specific form of agreement at issue here is within Oregon’s statute of frauds. They have, however, considered substantially identical agreements. See Huffstutter v. Lind, 250 Or 295, 442 P2d 227 (1968); Dennis v. City of McMinnville, 128 Or 101, 106, 269 P 221 (1928). In Huffstutter, the Lenskes alleged that they entered into an oral agreement with the Linds to buy property jointly. The Linds agreed to pay a third party for land and take title to the land in their names for the joint benefit of the Lenskes and themselves. Huffstutter, 250 Or at 298. The Lenskes agreed to pay the Linds later for their one-half interest. Id. The court held that the agreement was within the statute of frauds, reasoning that “[w]here there is nothing more than an oral agreement to purchase property and thereafter to convey to another an interest therein, the promise is unenforceable.” Id. at 298, 300.
There is no material difference between the agreement in Huffstutter and the agreement here. In Huffstutter, the Linds agreed to pay a third party for the land, hold it for the benefit of the Lenskes, and then transfer it to them. In *104this case, Stone agreed to pay the Liljas for the land and cause them to transfer the land to Outback. Whether the parties agreed that the Liljas would transfer the land to Stone to hold for Outback or agreed that Stone would pay the Liljas to transfer the land directly to Outback is immaterial to the question whether the agreement was an agreement for the sale of land. If the former is an agreement for the sale of land, so is the latter.
The dissent’s contrary conclusion turns on two related but separate propositions. First, the dissent proposes the following new rule for interpreting the statute of frauds: “[A] contract for the sale of land that is subject to subsection (e) is a contract in which one party agrees to sell land to another party, such that compliance by the parties with an order for specific performance of the contract will result in a sale of the land.” 167 Or App at 107. The difficulty with the dissent’s proposed rule is that the Oregon Supreme Court necessarily rejected it in Huff stutter. In that case, the court held that A and B’s agreement that A would buy land from C and hold it for the benefit of B was within the statute of frauds. If the dissent’s proposed rule were correct, Huff stutter would have been decided differently.6
Second, the dissent reasons that, even if the statute of frauds embraces contracts for the purchase of land from a third person, there is no distinction, for the purposes of the statute of frauds, between the agreement in this case — in which Stone agreed to pay the Liljas for the land and cause them to transfer it to Outback — and an agreement in which Stone agreed merely to act as Outback’s agent for the purchase. Corbin, however, distinguishes the two types of agreements. See n 5 above. He reasons that the former is within the statute while the latter is not. As discussed above, Williston also recognizes that the two types of agreements present different issues, although he notes that the majority *105of the courts have held that both types of agreements are within the statute. 3 Williston on Contracts § 488 at 513.
Contrary to the assumption that underlies much of the dissent’s reasoning, this case does not require us to decide the issue over which Williston and Corbin disagree: whether an agreement merely to act as the purchaser’s agent is within the statute of frauds. It is sufficient to say, as the cases and treatises have, that an agreement in which Stone agreed to pay the Liljas and cause them to transfer the real property to Outback is an agreement for the sale of land within the meaning of the statute.
Although the dissent would interpret the statute of frauds as narrowly as possible, in our view, the virtually uniform judicial interpretation that has both preceded and followed the Oregon Legislature’s adoption of that statute provides a more reliable guide to its meaning. When Huff stutter’s holding is viewed in the context of the other authorities addressing the specific type of agreement at issue here, it becomes clear that the tried court correctly granted Stone’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See ORS 41.580(l)(e); 3 Williston on Contracts § 488 at 513-14; 2 Corbin on Contracts § 399 at 366-67.
Affirmed.

 There are three defendants in this case, Stone Southwest, Inc., Stone Container Corporation, and Leonard Smith. Stone Container Corporation is the successor corporation to Stone Southwest, Inc., and Smith is Stone Container Corporation’s employee. We refer to the three defendants collectively as Stone.

 Outback entered into the agreement with Sid Pacheco, a log buyer for Stone. Pacheco then discussed the deal with his immediate supervisor, Leonard Smith. The parties dispute whether Smith approved the deal. Neither Pacheco nor Smith, however, had written authority to bind Stone to transactions as large as this one. Rather, their written authority specifically limited Pacheco’s authority to transactions of $150,000 and Smith’s authority to transactions of $500,000.

 ORS 41.580(1) provides, in part:
“In the following cases the agreement is void unless it, or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged, or by the lawfully authorized agent of the party * * *:
“(e) An agreement * * * for the sale of real property, or of any interest therein.
“(f) An agreement concerning real property made by an agent of the party sought to be charged unless the authority of the agent is in writing.”

 Outback has not argued on appeal that part performance took the agreement out of the statute of frauds.

 Corbin reasons:
“Likewise, it has been held that a contract between A and B whereby B promises to cause C to transfer land to A is within the statute. This, too, may be regarded as within the words and as involving a lesser degree the mischief, if B is not acting merely as a broker for A, but must buy the land from C and then himself receive the agreed price from A. If B is merely to be paid a commission for his service, and the price of the land is paid by A direct to C, the contract between A and B is not within the land clause.”
2 Corbin on Contracts § 399 at 366 (footnotes omitted).

 Although the dissent finds support for its proposal in a footnote from Corbin that comments on a suggestion in an earlier treatise, see 167 Or App at 107, Corbin’s passing observation is of questionable value; the treatise Corbin quotes goes on to explain that the courts have not limited the statute of frauds in the way that the treatise suggests, as Corbin also does. See Causten Browne, A Treatise on the Construction of the Statute of Frauds § 263a (James A. Bailey, Jr. ed., 5th ed 1895); 2 Corbin on Contracts § 399.