Court Opinion

ID: 9839081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 17:01:20.141947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:37.778091
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL            No. 21-35812
COMMUNITY; TULALIP TRIBES;
UPPER SKAGIT INDIAN TRIBE,        D.C. No. 2:19-sp-
                                    00001-RSM
      Petitioners-Appellees,
 v.
                                     OPINION
LUMMI NATION,

      Respondent-Appellant,

STILLAGUAMISH TRIBE OF
INDIANS; HOH INDIAN TRIBE;
SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE;
STATE OF WASHINGTON;
JAMESTOWN S’KLALLAM TRIBE;
PORT GAMBLE S’KLALLAM
TRIBE; SKOKOMISH INDIAN
TRIBE; LOWER ELWHA
KLALLAM TRIBE; PUYALLUP
TRIBE OF INDIANS,

      Real Parties in Interest.

SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL            No. 21-35874
COMMUNITY; TULALIP TRIBES;
2        SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

UPPER SKAGIT INDIAN TRIBE,                 D.C. No. 2:19-sp-
                                             00001-RSM
         Petitioners-Appellees,
    v.

LUMMI NATION,

         Respondent,

and

JAMESTOWN S’KLALLAM TRIBE;
PORT GAMBLE S’KLALLAM
TRIBE,

         Real-Party-in-Interest-
         Appellants,

STILLAGUAMISH TRIBE OF
INDIANS; HOH INDIAN TRIBE;
SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE;
STATE OF WASHINGTON;
SKOKOMISH INDIAN TRIBE;
LOWER ELWHA KLALLAM
TRIBE; PUYALLUP TRIBE OF
INDIANS,

         Real Parties in Interest.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Western District of Washington
         Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding
         SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION              3

           Argued and Submitted November 9, 2022
                    Seattle, Washington

                   Filed September 11, 2023

     Before: Sandra S. Ikuta and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit
       Judges, and Sidney A. Fitzwater, * District Judge.

                    Opinion by Judge Collins

                          SUMMARY **

                     Tribal Fishing Rights

    The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment       to    the     Swinomish       Indian     Tribal
Community, Tulalip Tribes, and Upper Skagit Indian Tribe;
dismissed as moot a cross-appeal filed by the Jamestown
S’Klallam Tribe and Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribe
(collectively, “S’Klallam”) from the district court’s grant of
summary judgment; and dismissed as moot S’Klallam’s
appeal of the district court’s denial of the S’Klallam’s
motion for reconsideration, in a long-running case regarding
Indian fishing rights in certain waters in Washington state.
    The current dispute concerns the usual and accustomed
fishing places in which the Lummi Nation (“the Lummi”)

*
  The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4      SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

have fishing rights under a 1974 decree, issued by District
Judge Boldt, over the waters east of Whidbey Island in Puget
Sound.
    In interpreting Judge Boldt’s decree, the panel followed
the two-step inquiry recently described in Upper Skagit
Indian Tribe v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe, 66 F.4th 766,
770-71 (9th Cir. 2023). At step one, a court uses the
standard tools for interpreting precedent, starting with the
text of the applicable Finding of Fact, as well as the record
evidence before Judge Boldt and other evidence raised by
the moving party that sheds light on Judge Boldt’s
understanding of the geography at the time. At step two, a
court determines whether the moving party has carried the
burden of showing that there was no record evidence that
favors the non-moving party’s contrary interpretation of the
Finding of Fact in a way that would undermine the moving
party’s theory of Judge Boldt’s intent.
    Applying the two-step inquiry, the panel concluded that
the district court correctly held that the Swinomish, Tulalip,
and Upper Skagit carried their burden to warrant a ruling,
under Paragraph 25(a)(1) of the 1974 Decree, that Judge
Boldt’s “determination of Lummi’s usual and accustomed
fishing grounds and stations” did not extend to the disputed
waters at issue here.
    At step one, the panel held that it was fundamentally
ambiguous whether Judge Boldt and the parties in 1974
would have understood the marine areas of Northern Puget
Sound from the Fraser River south to the present environs of
Bellingham Bay, to include any waters east of Whidbey
Island. At step two, the panel held that the Swinomish,
Tulalip, and Upper Skagit met their burden to show that
there was no evidence in the record before Judge Boldt of
       SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION        5

historical Lummi fishing in the disputed waters beyond what
would be merely incidental or occasional. The panel
declined to read the decree to grant the Lummi fishing rights
east of Whidbey Island.
    The S’Klallam filed a cross-appeal to object certain
statements in the district court’s summary judgment order
concerning fishing rights in waters west of Whidbey Island,
where the S’Klallam claim fishing rights. The panel held
that it had already clarified matters in the S’Klallam’s favor
in the ordinary course of disposing of the Lummi’s appeal,
and therefore the S’Klallam’s cross-appeal was moot.

                        COUNSEL

James R. Sigel (argued), James M. Schurz, Mark D.
McPherson, and Camille Framroze; Morrison & Foerster
LLP, San Francisco, California; Deanne E. Maynard,
Morrison & Foerster LLP, Washington, D.C.; for
Respondent-Appellant Lummi Nation.
Emily H. Haley (argued) and James M. Jannetta, Office of
the Tribal Attorney, Swinomish Indian Tribal Community,
La Conner, Washington; for Petitioner-Appellee Swinomish
Indian Tribal Community.
David S. Hawkins (argued), Upper Skagit Indian Tribe,
Sedro Wooley, Washington; Arthur W. Harrigan Jr., Tyler
L. Farmer, and Bryn R. Pallesen, Harrigan Leyh Farmer &
Thomsen LLP, Seattle, Washington; for Petitioner-Appellee
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe
Lauren P. Rasmussen (argued), Law Offices of Lauren P.
Rasmussen, Seattle, Washington, for Real-Parties-in-
6      SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

Interest Appellants Jamestown S’Klallam and Port Gamble
S’Klallam Tribes.
Mason D. Morisset and Thane D. Somerville, Morisset
Schlosser Jozwiak & Somerville PC, Seattle, Washington,
for Petitioner-Appellee Tulalip Tribes.
Joseph V. Panesko, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
the Washington Attorney General, Olympia, Washington,
for Real-Party-in-Interest State of Washington.
Craig J. Dorsay, Corin La Pointe-Aitchison, and Lea Ann
Easton, Dorsay & Easton LLP, Portland, Oregon, for Real-
Party-in-Interest Hoh Indian Tribe.
Rob R. Smith, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP,
Seattle,    Washington,       for Real-Party-in-Interest
Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians.
Maryanne E. Mohan, Suquamish Tribe, Suquamish,
Washington; John W. Ogan, Law Office of John W. Ogan,
Sisters, Oregon; for Real-Party-in-Interest Suquamish
Indian Tribe.
Earle D. Lees III, Skokomish Indian Tribe, Shelton,
Washington, for Real-Party-in-Interest Skokomish Indian
Tribe.
Samuel D. Hough, Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe, Port
Angeles, Washington; Stephen H. Suagee, Suagee Attorney
at Law, Port Angeles, Washington; for Real-Party-in-
Interest Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe.
Samuel J. Stiltner and Alec Wrolson, Puyallup Tribe of
Indians, Tacoma, Washington, for Real-Party-in-Interest
Puyallup Tribe of Indians.
         SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION                 7

                             OPINION

COLLINS, Circuit Judge:

    This is the latest proceeding in a long-running case
regarding Indian fishing rights in certain waters in
Washington State. The governing law is a 1974 decree
issued by Judge George Boldt of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Washington, which settled various
competing tribal rights arising from, inter alia, the 1855
Treaty of Point Elliott. We have interpreted that 1974 decree
many times since its issuance, and these appeals call upon us
to do so once again.
    This proceeding was instituted by three Indian tribes who
sought a ruling that the recognized fishing rights of the
Lummi Nation (“the Lummi”) under the 1974 decree do not
extend to certain areas. Specifically, the current dispute
centers on a single line in the decree recognizing that “the
usual and accustomed fishing places” in which the Lummi
have fishing rights “include[] the marine areas of Northern
Puget Sound from the Fraser River south to the present
environs of Seattle, and particularly Bellingham Bay.”
United States v. State of Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 360
(W.D. Wash. 1974) (“Final Decision I”). For the reader’s
convenience, the Fraser River, Seattle, and Bellingham Bay
are shown here: 1

1
  These physical maps are taken from the Bureau of Land Management’s
webpage,                                                               at
https://webmaps.blm.gov/program_apps/BLM_Natl_Recreation_Oppor
tunities/. We may properly take judicial notice of maps produced by a
government agency for the limited purpose of elucidating, for the reader,
the general locations of the relevant geographic areas. Montana Green
8       SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

                            Fraser River

                                       Bellingham
                                       Bay

                                            Seattle

Party v. Jacobsen, 17 F.4th 919, 927 (9th Cir. 2021). We have added
markers for relevant geographic points in large font for the reader’s
convenience.
        SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION        9

    The question is whether the specific waters in dispute
here—namely, the sheltered waters east of Whidbey Island
and south of Fidalgo Island—fall within the Lummi’s
historical fishing territory. For the reader’s convenience, the
approximate location of the disputed waters is shown here:

          Fidalgo Island

                            Disputed

               Disputed

                               Disputed
        Whidbey Island

                         Disputed

                                            Disputed
10       SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

    The district court ruled against the Lummi, holding that
the disputed waters are not part of their historical fishing
waters under the 1974 decree. We affirm.
                                  I
                                  A
    In 1854 and 1855, Isaac Stevens, Governor of what was
then Washington Territory, signed a series of treaties with
the Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest. One of those
treaties was the 1855 Treaty of Point Elliott.2 Under the
treaty’s terms, the signatory tribes agreed to “cede,
relinquish, and convey to the United States” much of their
tribal land. Treaty of Point Elliott, art. I, 12 Stat. 927 (1859).
But the tribes retained their “right of taking fish at usual and
accustomed grounds and stations,” which the Treaty
“secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of the
Territory.” 12 Stat. at 928. The Treaty did not specify,
however, the precise location of those “usual and
accustomed” fishing waters. Id.
     More than a century later, the questions left open by the
various Stevens treaties sparked complex litigation in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington
between Indian tribes, the State of Washington, various non-
Indian fishermen, and the United States. In February 1974,
District Judge George Boldt, who presided over that
litigation, issued a wide-ranging decree to settle the parties’
competing claims to “treaty right fishing” across the various

2
  Others included the Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132 (1855);
the Treaty of Point No Point, 12 Stat. 933 (1859); the Treaty of Neah
Bay, 12 Stat. 939 (1859); and the Treaty with the Yakamas, 12 Stat. 951
(1859). Each treaty included similar language regarding Indian fishing
rights in “usual and accustomed” areas. See Final Decision I, 384 F.
Supp. at 331.
         SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION                   11

waterways between the state capital and the Canadian
border, some 135 miles to the north. Final Decision I, 384
F. Supp. at 327. Judge Boldt’s decree purported to fix the
location of “some,” though “by no means all,” of the “usual
and accustomed fishing places” historically frequented by
various Indian tribes in waters “of the State of Washington
west of the Cascade Mountains and north of the Columbia
River drainage area.” Id. at 327–28, 333. This area covered
more than 100 nautical miles and included “the American
portion of the Puget Sound watershed, the watersheds of the
Olympic Peninsula north of the Grays Harbor watershed,
and the offshore waters adjacent to those areas.” Id. at 327–
28. Judge Boldt’s wide-ranging decree was substantially
affirmed by this court, United States v. State of Washington,
520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975), and ultimately by the
Supreme Court, Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658,
685–87 (1979). 3

3
  The Supreme Court initially denied certiorari, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976),
leaving our court’s affirmance intact. However, when the Washington
Supreme Court subsequently adopted a different reading of the Stevens
treaties, the U.S. Supreme Court granted review of various federal and
state decisions presenting that treaty interpretation issue. 443 U.S. at 672
& n.19, 674. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Judge Boldt that the
treaty phrase “in common with all citizens of the Territory” referred to a
group-based “right to take a [certain] share of each run of fish that passes
through tribal fishing areas,” rather than a mere “personal right to
attempt to land fish” on the part of each individual tribal member, no
different from the right to fish of any other citizen of Washington State.
Id. at 674, 679; see also Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 343; Upper
Skagit Indian Tribe v. Washington, 590 F.3d 1020, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010).
The Court, however, made certain modifications to the formula Judge
Boldt used to calculate the tribal share of the fishing catch. 443 U.S. at
687–89.
12      SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

    Judge Boldt recognized, however, that a single decree
could not definitively resolve every future dispute over tribal
fishing rights anywhere in western Washington. Final
Decision I therefore reserved the district court’s continuing
jurisdiction in two circumstances relevant here. First, any of
the parties to the 1974 decree could invoke the district
court’s continuing jurisdiction to determine “whether or not
the actions, intended or effected by any party (including the
party seeking a determination) are in conformity with Final
Decision # I.” Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 419.
Second, any of the parties could request that the district court
determine “the location of any of a tribe’s usual and
accustomed fishing grounds not specifically determined by
Final Decision # I.” Id. These two sources of retained
jurisdiction appear, respectively, in Paragraphs 25(a)(1) and
25(a)(6) of the current, amended version of Judge Boldt’s
1974 permanent injunction. 4 In effect, Paragraph 25(a)(1)
allows the district court to adjudicate present-day disputes
about what the 1974 decree really said. Paragraph 25(a)(6)
allows the district court to adjudicate disputes about what the
1974 decree left unsaid—that is, historical fishing rights the
1974 decree did not purport to address at all.
    In the nearly 50 years since Judge Boldt’s 1974 decree,
the Indian tribes of Washington State have often invoked the
district court’s continuing jurisdiction under Paragraph 25 to
settle overlapping tribal claims to historical fishing waters.
This court, in turn, has often been called upon to review the
1974 decree in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over
the district court. The task of interpreting the occasionally

4
  These provisions, previously termed 25(a) and 25(f), were renumbered
in a 1993 order amending paragraph 25 of the 1974 decree. See United
States v. Washington, 18 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1213 (W.D. Wash. 1993)
(compiling various orders in the overall matter from 1991–1993).
         SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION                13

cryptic terms of a decades-old decree, itself based on a
sometimes thin record of anthropological evidence
regarding the practices of Indian tribes more than a century
earlier, has not always proved to be an easy one.
Nonetheless, it remains the task we have today.
                                   B
    This appeal involves a dispute among several Indian
tribes over the waters east of Whidbey Island, a land
formation that stretches approximately 37 miles north-to-
south across Puget Sound. The disputed waters include
Skagit Bay, directly south of the Swinomish Reservation; the
Saratoga Passage between Whidbey Island and Camano
Island; Port Susan, a bay separating Camano Island from the
mainland; Holmes Harbor, a cove at the southern end of
Whidbey Island; and Possession Sound, near the mainland
city of Everett.
    With respect to the core dispute on appeal, the parties are
the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community; the Tulalip
Tribes; the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe; and the Lummi
Nation. 5 All four tribes bear respective rights under the
Treaty of Point Elliott, as recognized in Judge Boldt’s
decrees, 6 and the primary issue on appeal concerns the
5
 For purposes of this case, the Lummi also include “the Semiahmoo and
Samish Indians who were subsumed under the Lummi designation.”
Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 360.
6
  For the Swinomish, see Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. BNSF Ry.
Co., 951 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Washington,
459 F. Supp. 1020, 1039 (W.D. Wash. 1978). For the Lummi, see United
States v. Lummi Nation, 876 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017); Final
Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 360. For the Upper Skagit, see Upper Skagit
Indian Tribe v. Lundgren, 138 S. Ct. 1649, 1651 (2018); Final Decision
I, 384 F. Supp. at 379. For the Tulalip, see Greene v. United States, 996
14       SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

fishing rights of the Lummi. Specifically, the Lummi
Nation—which, in a line of cases over the past two decades,
has successfully persuaded this court to recognize the tribe’s
historical fishing rights in certain waters to the west of
Whidbey Island, see United States v. Lummi Nation, 876
F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Lummi
Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 453 (9th Cir. 2000)—would like
to fish in the waters east of Whidbey Island as well. The
Lummi are opposed in this endeavor by certain tribes who
currently fish east of Whidbey Island: the Swinomish, the
Tulalip, and the Upper Skagit. Under the 1974 decree, one
tribe’s “usual and accustomed” fishing grounds are not
legally exclusive of another’s—that is to say, multiple tribes
may, as a purely legal matter, have overlapping “usual and
accustomed” fishing grounds. Final Decision I, 384 F.
Supp. at 332, 417. But since the overall tribal catch is limited
to “50 percent of the harvested fish from runs passing
through [tribes’] off-reservation” usual and accustomed
fishing grounds, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Washington,
590 F.3d 1020, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010), each tribe has a
practical incentive, via proceedings like the one before us, to
eliminate fishing competition from other tribes in
overlapping waters.
    In October 2019, the Swinomish, Tulalip, and Upper
Skagit filed a joint “Request for Determination” in the
District Court for the Western District of Washington,
invoking that court’s continuing jurisdiction under
Paragraph 25(a)(1) of Judge Boldt’s 1974 permanent
injunction. The requesting tribes claimed that the Lummi,
who planned to open a crab fishery east of Whidbey Island,

F.2d 973, 975 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 841
F.2d 317, 317 (9th Cir. 1988);United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp.
at 1039.
       SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION       15

had no fishing rights in that area under the 1974 decree. The
tribes asked the district court for “a declaration to that
effect,” as well as an injunction “prohibiting Lummi from
issuing regulations purporting to open any portion” of the
disputed area “to Lummi fishing and prohibiting Lummi
from fishing for any species in any portion” of the area.
    The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
The Swinomish’s motion asked the court to declare that “the
usual and accustomed fishing places” of the Lummi “do not
include the secluded waters to the east of Whidbey Island”
and to grant “permanent injunctive relief enjoining Lummi
from fishing or authorizing its members to fish for any
species” in the disputed waters. The Upper Skagit’s motion
asked the court “to grant summary judgment in its favor by
declaring that the area previously adjudicated to be the usual
and accustomed grounds” of the Lummi Nation does not
include the disputed “waters east of Whidbey Island.” The
Tulalip’s motion asked the court to “prohibit the Lummi
Nation . . . from engaging in any fishing for finfish or
shellfish” in the disputed waters; the Tulalip “also move[d]
for a permanent injunction enjoining Lummi and its fishers
from engaging in any fishing in the named Region.”
    The Lummi’s motion, for its part, asked the court to
“dismiss[] the Request for Determination” filed by the
Swinomish, Upper Skagit, and Tulalip, and to “rul[e] that the
Lummi’s usual and accustomed fishing grounds and
stations,” as determined by Judge Boldt’s 1974 decree, do
“include marine areas . . . to the east of Whidbey Island,”
including all five of the specific areas in dispute here.
                              C
   The district court held for the Swinomish, Tulalip, and
Upper Skagit, stating that the disputed waters were not
16       SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

included in Judge Boldt’s “determination of Lummi’s usual
and accustomed fishing grounds and stations.” The district
court consequently denied the Lummi Nation’s motion for
summary judgment, granted summary judgment in part to
the Swinomish, Upper Skagit, and Tulalip, and declared the
matter closed on September 20, 2021. 7 The Lummi filed a
timely notice of appeal three days later.
    On October 1, however, the Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe
and Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribe (collectively,
“S’Klallam”) made an appearance. The S’Klallam filed a
motion for reconsideration asking the district court to
“reconsider and amend certain language” from its summary
judgment order. The S’Klallam objected “particularly” to
language in the district court’s order that, in the S’Klallam’s
view, could be construed to imply that additional tribes,
other than the Lummi, might have fishing rights in certain
waters west of Whidbey Island where the S’Klallam claim
fishing interests. In the S’Klallam’s view, the district court
should have made clearer that only the Lummi, and not
Indian tribes more generally, were covered by the challenged
language in the district court’s order. The S’Klallam asked
the court to “delete or reframe the [relevant] sentences to
make clear the only precedent or law of the case created here
is how Lummi,” not other tribes, fished west of Whidbey
Island.
    The district court denied the S’Klallam’s motion for
reconsideration in a brief order. The district court concluded
that, because the Lummi had timely filed an appeal to our
court, the district court had already lost jurisdiction over the

7
  Summary judgment was granted only “in part” because the district
court denied, as unnecessary, the three tribes’ requests for “permanent
injunctive relief beyond that provided in the underlying case.”
         SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION                17

case (and hence jurisdiction to adjudicate the S’Klallam’s
motion for reconsideration). “[E]ven if the Court had
jurisdiction to consider the motion for reconsideration,” the
district court continued, “the Court would deny the motion.”
    The S’Klallam then filed a timely notice of appeal
seeking to “cross-appeal” the district court’s original order
of September 20, “as well as appeal” the court order denying
the S’Klallam’s October 1 motion for reconsideration.
                                   II
    As noted above, this case asks us to determine the
meaning of Judge Boldt’s 1974 statement that the usual and
accustomed fishing places of the Lummi Indians, at the time
of the Treaty of Point Elliott in 1855, included “the marine
areas of Northern Puget Sound from the Fraser River south
to the present environs of Seattle, and particularly
Bellingham Bay.” Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 360.
Before addressing the meaning of that phrase, we first clarify
the general principles that we have developed to interpret
Judge Boldt’s decrees—a set of principles we have often
referred to as the “Muckleshoot framework,” after a series of
cases involving that Tribe. 8
    A court reviewing Judge Boldt’s 1974 decree pursuant
to Paragraph 25(a)(1) is interpreting a prior judicial decree
and, as such, is carrying out what is ultimately a legal
inquiry. See United States v. DAS Corp., 18 F.4th 1032,

8
  Specifically, the referenced framework derives its name from three of
our prior cases: Muckleshoot Tribe v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 141 F.3d
1355 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 235
F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 2000); and Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Lummi Indian
Nation, 234 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2000). We have further developed that
framework in a series of subsequent cases. See generally Upper Skagit
Indian Tribe v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe, 66 F.4th 766 (9th Cir. 2023).
18     SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

1040 (9th Cir. 2021). In conducting that inquiry, we have
explained, a reviewing court should construe the decree “so
as to give effect to the intention of the issuing court”—i.e.,
Judge Boldt—at the time the decree was written.
Muckleshoot Tribe v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 141 F.3d 1355,
1359 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “We have
sometimes described a subproceeding under paragraph
25(a)(1) as involving a ‘two-step mode of analysis.’” Upper
Skagit Indian Tribe v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe, 66 F.4th
766, 770 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Sauk-Suiattle”) (citation omitted).
We recently described that two-step inquiry as follows:

       At step one, a court uses the standard tools for
       interpreting precedent, starting with the text
       of the applicable Finding of Fact and
       considering the language at issue in the
       context of the Final Decision as a whole. A
       court also considers the record evidence
       before Judge Boldt, along with any other
       evidence raised by the moving party that
       sheds light on Judge Boldt’s understanding of
       geography at the time. At this step, we have
       upheld a district court’s decision as correctly
       interpreting Judge Boldt’s opinion on the
       basis of information known to Judge Boldt
       and the words he chose. However, whether
       the text of a Finding of Fact is unambiguous
       or not, a court must understand the Finding of
       Fact in light of the facts of the case, and so
       may proceed to step two to determine
       whether the moving party has carried the
       burden of showing that there was no evidence
       in the record before Judge Boldt, that favors
       the      non-moving        party’s     contrary
        SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION        19

       interpretation of the Finding of Fact in a way
       that would undermine the moving party’s
       theory of Judge Boldt’s intent.

Id. at 770–71 (simplified). The goal of both steps of “this
two-step inquiry” is to “determine whether the moving party
has carried its burden of showing that its interpretation of the
Finding of Facts is consistent with Judge Boldt’s intent.” Id.
at 771.
    Because fishing rights under the relevant treaties
generally turn on the usual and accustomed fishing grounds
(“U&A”) of a particular tribe at the relevant time in history,
the disputes presented to us under Paragraph 25(a)(1) of the
decree typically involve a disagreement over the meaning of
Judge Boldt’s findings of fact concerning the historical U&A
of the relevant tribes. In particular, we have frequently been
confronted with claims in which one tribe has invoked
Paragraph 25(a)(1) to obtain an affirmative ruling that a
competing tribe has not been granted certain fishing rights
under that decree.
    To the extent that the moving tribe seeks a ruling that
Judge Boldt’s findings as to a competing tribe’s U&A do not
cover a particular area, the fact that the decree’s text does
not unambiguously exclude the particular area from the
competing tribe’s U&A is not the end of the matter. If the
text of the relevant findings is susceptible to the moving
party’s interpretation that the competing tribe was excluded
from the area, the moving party can carry its burden (at step
two) by showing that there was no evidence before Judge
Boldt that the competing tribe “fished or traveled through the
contested areas.” See Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 871 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2017)
(“Suquamish”) (simplified).
20     SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

    That characterization of the burden applicable in that
specific context flows directly from the nature of the
underlying inquiry. Judge Boldt’s 1974 decree stated that,
for a fishing area to be “usual and accustomed,” the tribe in
question must have fished in that area on more than an
“occasional and incidental” basis. Final Decision I, 384 F.
Supp. at 353, 356. Mere travel through a set of waters was,
in Judge Boldt’s view, not sufficient to render a body of
water a “usual and accustomed” fishing place for the
traveling tribe. Although “[m]arine waters were . . . used as
thoroughfares for travel by Indians who trolled en route,”
this sort of “occasional and incidental trolling was not
considered to make the marine waters traveled thereon the
usual and accustomed fishing grounds of the transiting
Indians.” Id. at 353; see also United States v. Lummi Indian
Tribe, 841 F.2d 317, 320 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that “travel
through an area and incidental trolling are not sufficient to
establish an area as a usual and accustomed fishing ground”).
Because Judge Boldt must be understood to have followed
his own announced standards in making his factual findings
as to the various tribes’ U&As, it follows that, if the record
contains “no evidence” that the competing tribe “fished or
traveled through the contested areas,” Suquamish, 871 F.3d
at 848 (simplified) (emphasis added), in a manner that “was
more than ‘incidental’ or ‘occasional,’” United States v.
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 429, 435 (9th Cir.
2000), then an ambiguous U&A finding concerning that
competing tribe’s fishing rights simply cannot be construed
as including those contested areas. In other words, because
Judge Boldt should not be understood to have made a finding
that the record could not support under the standards he
himself articulated, a moving party which carries its specific
step-two burden under the Muckleshoot framework is
        SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION       21

entitled to a determination under Paragraph 25(a)(1) that the
competing tribe’s U&A does not extend to the contested
areas.
    Our decision in United States v. Muckleshoot Indian
Tribe, 235 F.3d 429, illustrates how this two-step inquiry
works. There, three tribes invoked Paragraph 25(a)(1),
seeking a determination that the language of “Finding 76” in
the 1974 decree, which concerned the U&A of the
Muckleshoot tribe, “does not include any areas outside
Elliott Bay.” See id. at 431 (emphasis added). The relevant
language of Finding 76 stated that the Muckleshoot’s U&A
extended, “secondarily,” to locations “in the saltwater of
Puget Sound.” Id. (quoting Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp.
at 367) (emphasis omitted). After evaluating all of the
relevant record evidence before Judge Boldt, we concluded
that there was no evidence in the 1974 record “that the
Muckleshoot’s ancestors had U&A fishing grounds beyond
Elliott Bay.” Id. at 435. Thus, to the extent that the referent
of “saltwater of Puget Sound” was ambiguous, the three
moving tribes had shown that there was no evidence to
support construing that phrase as extending beyond Elliott
Bay. Id. We therefore affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment affirmatively holding that “the Muckleshoot’s
U&A under Finding 76 was limited to Elliott Bay.” Id. at
432.
                             III
    Applying this Muckleshoot framework here and
reviewing de novo, see Tulalip Tribes v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 794 F.3d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Tulalip
Tribes”), we conclude that the district court correctly held
that the Swinomish, Tulalip, and Upper Skagit carried their
burden to warrant a ruling, under Paragraph 25(a)(1), that
22      SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

Judge Boldt’s “determination of Lummi’s usual and
accustomed fishing grounds and stations” did not extend to
the disputed waters at issue here.
                              A
    We have previously held that, as to waters west of
Whidbey Island, Finding of Fact 46—the paragraph of Judge
Boldt’s decree determining the scope of the Lummi Nation’s
historical fishing grounds—is ambiguous, requiring us to
“examine the record before Judge Boldt to clarify his intent.”
United States v. Lummi Nation, 876 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th
Cir. 2017) (“Lummi III”); see United States v. Lummi Nation,
763 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Lummi II”); United
States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir.
2000) (“Lummi I”). Considering Finding of Fact 46 in the
relevant context, see also Sauk-Suiattle, 66 F.4th at 770–71,
we reaffirm that conclusion today as to the waters east of
Whidbey Island.
                              1
     We begin with the decree’s text.
    Finding of Fact 45 states: “The Lummis had reef net sites
on Orcas Island, San Juan Island, Lummi Island and Fidalgo
Island, and near Point Roberts and Sandy Point. . . . They
trolled the waters of the San Juan Islands for various species
of salmon.” Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 360. Finding
of Fact 14 states that these “Lummi reef net sites in Northern
Puget Sound,” among others, “are examples of some Indian
usual and accustomed fishing grounds and stations in marine
waters.” Id. at 353. The boundaries of “Northern Puget
Sound” are not defined in the decree. Finding of Fact 46—
the key finding at issue in this case—states: “In addition to
the reef net locations listed above, the usual and accustomed
        SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION       23

fishing places of the Lummi Indians at treaty times included
the marine areas of Northern Puget Sound from the Fraser
River south to the present environs of Seattle, and
particularly Bellingham Bay.” Id. at 360.
    Three points are worth noting about this last statement.
First, if “the marine areas of Northern Puget Sound from the
Fraser River south to the present environs of Seattle”
included—as the Lummi argue—every single area of water
between “the Fraser River” and “the present environs of
Seattle,” it is not clear why Judge Boldt would have listed
the Lummi “reef net locations” in the San Juan Islands as a
separate, distinct fishing ground. Final Decision I, 384
F. Supp. at 360. After all, the San Juan Islands—just like the
separately listed reef net locations in marine waters at “Point
Roberts,” “Lummi Island,” “Sandy Point,” and “Fidalgo
Island”—are located between the Fraser River and Seattle.
Yet Finding of Fact 46 states that “[i]n addition to” their
usual and accustomed fishing places at those locations, the
Lummi’s usual and accustomed fishing places also included
“the marine areas of Northern Puget Sound from the Fraser
River south to the present environs of Seattle.” Id. (emphasis
added). Where Judge Boldt used separate terms to refer to
separate bodies of water, this court (naturally) understands
him to have been referring to separate bodies of water.
Lummi I, 235 F.3d at 451–52. So too would an ordinary
reader, who could reasonably conclude that the waters
around the listed reef net locations—despite their geographic
position in waters directly between the Fraser River and
Seattle—must not be part of “the marine areas of Northern
Puget Sound from the Fraser River south to the present
environs of Seattle.” Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 360.
But if not all waters between the Fraser River and Seattle are
included in that general description, which waters are?
24     SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

    Second, the geographic width of the U&A recognized in
Finding of Fact 46 is left undefined. More precisely, to the
extent that the language might arguably be read as referring
to some sort of path “from” the Fraser River “to” Seattle, the
general words are unilluminating as to the width of any such
path. Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 360. Those words
could be referring to all waters anywhere on the map
between any portion of the Fraser River and Seattle—a
usage akin to the phrase “from sea to shining sea.” Finding
of Fact 46 could also be referring to a narrower nautical path
or paths traced southward “from” the Fraser River, through
northern Puget Sound, “to” Seattle. The decree itself,
however, does not explain.
    Finally, if Judge Boldt had intended to recognize Lummi
fishing rights in every single body of water between the
Fraser River and Seattle, it is not clear why he would have
used the distinctive operative phrase “the marine areas of
Northern Puget Sound from the Fraser River south to the
present environs of Seattle.” If, in other words, Judge Boldt
really used the term “Northern Puget Sound” to mean all
waters north of Seattle and south of any portion of the Fraser
River as the crow flies—as the Lummi argue—Judge Boldt
could simply have said that the Lummi’s usual and
accustomed fishing grounds were “Northern Puget Sound,”
or he could have used other similarly broad language. Why,
then, the idiosyncratic phrasing?
                              2
    The answer lies in an expert report concerning the
history and practices of the Lummi Nation, authored by an
anthropologist, Dr. Barbara Lane. Judge Boldt relied
heavily on Dr. Lane’s report, which was entered into the
1974 trial record as Exhibit “USA-30,” in authoring his
        SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION              25

findings regarding the Lummi; indeed he cited the report 11
times in the space of five paragraphs. (Judge Boldt also
extensively cited a second report of Dr. Lane’s, entered into
evidence as “USA-20,” which more broadly summarized her
conclusions concerning all “Coast Salish and Nootkan
speaking peoples residing west of the Cascade Mountains in
the geographic area” at issue in Final Decision I. Judge
Boldt cited that broader report at least 35 times in the course
of drafting the decree.) Judge Boldt praised Dr. Lane’s
reports as “exceptionally well researched and reported,”
found their conclusions “established by a preponderance of
the evidence,” and declared them “authoritative and reliable
summaries of relevant aspects of Indian life in the case area
at and prior to the time of the treaties.” 9 Final Decision I,
384 F. Supp. at 350.
    Indeed Judge Boldt’s endorsement of Dr. Lane’s
findings was so thoroughgoing that he incorporated many of
her findings about the Lummi directly into his decree, often
with minimal (or no) modification. Here are a few
examples:

        •    Dr. Lane: “The single most valuable fish
             resource was undoubtedly the sockeye, which the
             Semiahmoo, Lummi, and Samish were able to
             intercept in the Straits on their annual migration
             from the ocean to the Fraser River.”

9
  The “case area” is the area covered by Judge Boldt’s decree: “that
portion of the State of Washington west of the Cascade Mountains and
north of the Columbia River drainage area,” including “the American
portion of the Puget Sound watershed, the watersheds of the Olympic
Peninsula north of the Grays Harbor watershed, and the offshore waters
adjacent to those areas.” Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 328.
26     SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

             o Judge Boldt: “The single most valuable
               fish resource was undoubtedly the sockeye,
               which the Lummis were able to intercept in
               the Straits on the annual migration of the
               sockeye from the ocean to the Fraser
               River.” Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at
               360.
       •   Dr. Lane: “Springs, silvers, and humpback were
           also taken with gill nets and springs were
           harpooned near the mouth of the Nooksack
           River,” and “[s]teelhead were taken by harpoon
           at the mouth of Whatcom Creek and . . . in
           basketry traps.”
             o Judge Boldt: “These Indians also took
               spring, silver and humpback salmon and
               steelhead by gill nets and harpoons near the
               mouth of the Nooksack River, and
               steelhead by harpoons and basketry traps
               on Whatcom Creek.” Final Decision I, 384
               F. Supp. at 360.
       •   Dr. Lane: “When nature did not provide
           optimum conditions, the reefnetters artificially
           created them.”
             o Judge Boldt: “When nature did not
               provide optimum reef conditions the
               Indians artificially created them.” Final
               Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 360.

It is quite clear, in other words, that many of Judge Boldt’s
findings regarding the Lummi were copied, sometimes
word-for-word, from Dr. Lane’s expert report. Where Judge
Boldt borrowed language directly from Dr. Lane’s reports—
        SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION         27

reports he expressly declared “authoritative and reliable”—
we think a rebuttable presumption is warranted that Judge
Boldt intended to adopt the meaning and scope that that
language possessed in the reports, and that the parties would
have shared that understanding at the time of decision. See
Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 350.
                               3
    That point is crucial to understanding the statement of
Judge Boldt’s at issue in this case, regarding the Lummi
Nation’s usual and accustomed fishing areas. Dr. Lane’s
report on the Lummi covered this topic directly. Under the
headline “USUAL AND ACCUSTOMED FISHING
AREAS,” Dr. Lane first outlined what she viewed as the
Lummi Nation’s “home territory,” which included a set of
“traditional fishing areas” that “extended from what is now
the Canadian border south to Anacortes,” on the north side
of Fidalgo Island. (None of these areas are within the
disputed waters at issue here.) Dr. Lane then made her only
specific mention of Lummi fishing outside their home
territory. “In addition to the home territory discussed to this
point, Lummi fishermen were accustomed, at least in historic
times, and probably earlier, to visit fisheries as distant as the
Fraser River in the north and Puget Sound in the south”
(emphasis added).
     That comment concluded Dr. Lane’s findings describing
the U&A of the Lummi. She then listed a series of numbered
“CONCLUSIONS” that summarized the contents of the
report as already described. Conclusion 4, which closely
tracks the phrasing of the statement at the center of this case,
is the Conclusion relevant here. In Conclusion 4, Dr. Lane
summarized her earlier statement about Lummi fishing
outside the tribe’s home territory. Dr. Lane repeated that in
28      SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

addition to their “traditional fisheries” in their home territory
north of Fidalgo Island, the Lummi also utilized other
fisheries “from the Fraser River south to the present
environs of Seattle” (emphasis added). This is, of course,
precisely the same language Judge Boldt eventually used in
the decree itself. And Judge Boldt cited, in using those
words, the precise pages on which those same words appear
in Dr. Lane’s report. See Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp at
360 (citing Ex. USA-30, pp. 23–26).
    The confusion in this case, we think, can be traced back
to Dr. Lane’s original finding—namely, that the Lummi
“visit[ed] fisheries as distant as the Fraser River in the north
and Puget Sound in the south.” In using that phrase, Dr.
Lane was merely describing the maximum north-south
distance that the Lummi traveled to fish. The Lummi argue
that Dr. Lane’s reference to “Puget Sound in the south”
refers to the east-of-Whidbey-Island waters disputed in this
case, but that is wrong. By using the phrase “Puget Sound
in the south,” Dr. Lane was referring to the waters south of
Admiralty Inlet, in the vicinity of Seattle. We know that
because, when summarizing the relevant finding in her
subsequent Conclusion 4, Dr. Lane used “the present
environs of Seattle” as a synonym for her earlier reference
to “Puget Sound in the south.” In other words, Dr. Lane’s
original finding described the farthest two geographic points
to which the Lummi ever traveled to fish: “Fraser River in
the north” and “Puget Sound in the south,” i.e., the waters
close to what is now Seattle. Dr. Lane’s numbered
Conclusion 4 then summarized her earlier finding, using
slightly different words but repeating the same substance:
“Other fisheries in the Straits and bays from the Fraser River
south to the present environs of Seattle were utilized.”
       SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION       29

    Viewed in this context, Dr. Lane’s report concluded that
the Lummi used various unspecified fisheries in the waters
between the Fraser River and Seattle. Consider for clarity a
parallel sentence with more familiar locations. “Other cities
in the States and lands from Seattle east to the present
environs of New York were visited” means that the visitor
ranged as far as Seattle and New York, and also visited at
least some other cities in between. It does not mean that the
visitor spent time in every single city between New York and
Seattle. Especially given the context of Dr. Lane’s earlier
finding—which described the Lummi as fishing in locations
“as distant as” the Fraser River and “Puget Sound in the
south,” which she used to mean the waters near Seattle—it
is clear Dr. Lane was not saying that the Lummi fished in
every single area of water between the Fraser River and
Seattle. Nor would (indeed, could) Judge Boldt have
understood her to be saying so. Dr. Lane said simply that,
outside the Lummi’s home territory, “[o]ther fisheries in the
Straits and bays from the Fraser River south to the present
environs of Seattle were utilized.” Dr. Lane’s report did not
specify where those fisheries were, and she did not provide
a citation for the conclusion that Lummi fishers ranged as far
as the Fraser River and Seattle.
                              4
    Judge Boldt’s translation of Dr. Lane’s language into his
decree magnified, rather than resolved, the confusion. First,
Judge Boldt directly copied Dr. Lane’s language about
Lummi fishing grounds outside their historical home
territory—i.e., that the Lummi had visited various
unspecified fishing areas in the marine waters “from the
Fraser River south to the present environs of Seattle.” Final
Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 360. Next, Judge Boldt blended
in Dr. Lane’s separate findings about the Lummi Nation’s
30      SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

traditional, home-water fishing grounds in what Judge Boldt
apparently viewed as “Northern Puget Sound,” including the
tribe’s historical center of gravity north of Whidbey Island,
near “Bellingham Bay.” Id. Evidently intending to
emphasize the home-water nature of Bellingham Bay as
described in Dr. Lane’s report, Judge Boldt stated that the
Lummi “particularly” fished there. And he concluded by
adding, at the beginning of the sentence, the phrase “the
marine areas of Northern Puget Sound.” Id. However, the
phrase “Northern Puget Sound” is not defined in the 1974
decree. Nor is the term “marine,” which typically appears to
refer to saltwater, but occasionally seems to connote open
waters over which long-distance travel would have
occurred—a usage that here would match the distinction
Judge Boldt seems to have drawn between “the marine areas
of Northern Puget Sound” and the saltwater passageways
between and among the San Juan Islands, where the Lummi
had reef net locations. See Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at
353 (“Marine waters were also used as thoroughfares for
travel by Indians who trolled en route,” although “[s]uch
occasional and incidental trolling was not considered to
make the marine waters traveled thereon the usual and
accustomed fishing grounds of the transiting Indians”).
   The result is a cobbled-together, patchwork sentence
containing three elements: (1) “the marine areas of Northern
Puget Sound,” (2) “from the Fraser River south to the present
environs of Seattle,” and (3) “particularly Bellingham Bay.”
Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 360. Except for
Bellingham Bay, which is clearly identified as a Lummi
usual and accustomed fishing ground, the remaining two
elements provide little clarity. “Northern Puget Sound” has
no defined boundaries in the decree, so it is difficult to tell
whether Judge Boldt considered any waters east of Whidbey
        SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION        31

Island to fall within the term’s scope in 1974. Even if he did,
the unusual remaining term, “from the Fraser River south to
the present environs of Seattle,” is copied directly from Dr.
Lane’s report, where it operated as a diffuse reference to a
set of unidentified fishing waters and plainly did not include
every single body of water between the Fraser River and
Seattle. Nor, despite Judge Boldt’s use of directional “from”
and “to” language, does the decree clarify whether it is
referring to a particular path of nautical travel from one point
to the other—much less what that path (or paths) might be.
    It is, in short, fundamentally ambiguous—even after
reading the language of Finding of Fact 46 in light of the
record evidence before Judge Boldt at the time of decision—
whether Judge Boldt and the parties, in 1974, would have
understood “the marine areas of Northern Puget Sound from
the Fraser River south to the present environs of Seattle, and
particularly Bellingham Bay,” to include any waters east of
Whidbey Island. 384 F. Supp. at 360. We must—as in all
three Lummi cases preceding us—turn to further
examination of the record evidence before Judge Boldt.
                               B
    We proceed to step two of the Muckleshoot framework.
As we have noted, here, the Swinomish, Tulalip, and Upper
Skagit moved for a determination, under Paragraph 25(a)(1),
that the Lummi’s U&A, as described in Finding of Fact 46
of the decree, does not include the disputed waters east of
Whidbey Island. These tribes’ burden under step two,
accordingly, is to show that there was no evidence in the
record before Judge Boldt of historical Lummi fishing in the
disputed waters beyond what would be merely incidental or
occasional. Sauk-Suiattle, 66 F.4th at 771, 774; Suquamish,
871 F.3d at 848; Tulalip Tribes, 794 F.3d at 1133. We think
32     SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

the moving parties have met that burden here. Indeed, there
is no record evidence that the Lummi historically fished in
waters east of Whidbey Island.
                            1
    The Lummi point to a few excerpts from the 1974 trial
record, but all of them are either irrelevant or entirely
speculative.
   First, the Lummi point out that Dr. Lane’s report
contained a map listing a lone Lummi reef net site off the
western side of Fidalgo Island:
        SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION       33

    This reef net site is plainly not within the disputed east-
of-Whidbey-Island waters, and we consequently see nothing
to be gained from it.
    Second, the Lummi point to an exhibit in the 1974 trial
record—viz., Exhibit PL-94w. Exhibit PL-94w is a
confusingly worded affidavit from the late 19th century,
submitted as part of the case that eventually became United
States v. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 79 F. 152 (C.C.D. Wash.
1897). That case involved “a suit by the United States and
certain Indians of the Lummi tribe for an injunction against
the Alaska Packers’ Association . . . to protect the Lummi
Indians in the right to take salmon, by their ancient and
primitive means of fishing, in the waters adjacent to Point
Roberts,” an area far to the north of the waters disputed here.
Id. at 153 (emphasis added).            In June 1895, B.N.
McDonough, a 60-year-old “Indian Trader” who had lived
on or near the Lummi Reservation since 1871, submitted an
affidavit in the case. McDonough stated that “during all the
time I have known these [I]ndians they have fished at all
points in the lower Sound and wherever the run of fish was
greatest and the salmon were most easily taken including
Point Roberts.” McDonough did not explain what he meant,
in 1895, by “the lower Sound,” and the only specific
geographic reference he made in conjunction with the term
was to Point Roberts, some 40 miles to the north of the
waters at issue in this case. McDonough also stated that the
Lummi “have always fished at all the usual fishing places
within many miles of their Reservation including Point
Roberts and Vill[a]ge Point.” Again, McDonough did not
explain what these “usual fishing places” were, and Village
Point is located on Lummi Island in Lummi home waters, far
to the north of Whidbey and Fidalgo Islands. (Dr. Lane’s
summary report, in fact, described these two locations quite
34      SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

precisely: “The principal fisheries of the Lummi included the
reef-net locations for sockeye at Point Roberts, Village
Point, off the east coast of San Juan Island as well as other
locations in the San Juan Islands.”) McDonough’s affidavit
is, in short, no evidence at all of Lummi fishing east of
Whidbey Island and south of Fidalgo Island.
    Third, the Lummi point to a single sentence from the
1973 trial testimony of a Lummi tribal elder named Forrest
“Dutch” Kinley. Kinley was born around 1913, nearly six
decades after the Treaty of Point Elliott. He had worked in
fishing since he was around 12 years old—sometime in the
early 1920s—and at one point served as chairman and a
member of the Lummi tribal council. Kinley testified
extensively on various topics regarding the Lummi tribe;
indeed, the transcript of his testimony runs more than 90
pages. The Lummi point to a single page of this extensive
transcript where, on redirect examination, Kinley testified
that “I have fished in the Straits, I have fished in Whidby
Island south and into the Canadian border” (emphasis
added). When asked whether this and other fishing was “as
a Lummi Indian at your usual and accustomed places,”
Kinley answered “Yes.”
    This fragment of transcript is patently insufficient to
show historical Lummi fishing rights east of Whidbey
Island, for at least two reasons. First, the parties agree that
Judge Boldt did not cite Kinley’s testimony at all in Finding
of Fact 46. There is consequently no way to know, unlike in
the case of Dr. Lane’s reports, what Judge Boldt thought
about Kinley’s testimony (if he thought about it at all).
Second, there is no way to know what Kinley meant by his
confusing statement that he had fished “in Whidby Island
south.” Kinley could have meant, quite uncontroversially,
that he fished south of Whidbey Island in the “environs of
       SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION     35

Seattle,” the maximum range point of Lummi fishing
described in Dr. Lane’s report and in Judge Boldt’s decree.
Kinley could also have meant that he fished somewhere near
the western coast of Whidbey Island, “south” of the Lummi
reefnets in the San Juan Islands. There is absolutely no
evidence that by fishing “in Whidby Island south,” Kinley
meant fishing in the waters east of Whidbey Island. Any
inference to the contrary is entirely speculative.
    Finally, the Lummi rely on an extraordinarily thin chain
of inference from two statements by Dr. Lane regarding
Lummi trade practices. Dr. Lane wrote that the Lummi
“apparently imported various fibers and grasses from upriver
Skagit and flint from Puget Sound.” She also stated that the
“imports” of the Semiahmoo people, whom Judge Boldt
described as “subsumed” within the Lummi for purposes of
the Treaty (Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 360), included
“[f]lint from Puget Sound and woven root hats from the West
Coast.” From these two isolated statements, the Lummi
draw the following chain of inferences: (1) the Lummi
traded fish and clams for “woven root hats” and “imported
various fibers and grasses from upriver Skagit”;
(2) “[b]ecause the Skagit River empties into waters disputed
here,” the Lummi must have traveled to the area surrounding
the mouth of the Skagit River, on “the mainland shore on the
eastern side of the disputed waters,” to obtain the
aforementioned “woven root hats” and “various fibers and
grasses”; and (3) this travel, in turn, “confirms Lummi’s
travel (and fishing) throughout” the disputed waters. This
speculative line of reasoning is unavailing.
    For one thing, Dr. Lane describes the Lummi as having
“imported” the land-based goods in question.         This
importation process could have taken the form of Lummi
traders traveling to visit the Skagit; it could also have
36      SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

occurred via Skagit traders traveling to visit the Lummi; or
trade between the two areas could have occurred via
middlemen from neither tribe. There is simply no way to
know on this record. Second, even if the Lummi did trade
by traveling to the mouth of the Skagit River, there is no
evidence in the record that, upon their (hypothetical) arrival,
the Lummi ever fished there—much less for any period of
time sufficient to create “usual and accustomed” fishing
grounds. See Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 353, 356
(fishing must have been more than “occasional and
incidental” to qualify an area as a “usual and accustomed”
fishing ground). The Lummi’s chain of inferences is entirely
speculative and ungrounded in the record, as the district
court in this case correctly observed.
    In sum, there is no evidence in the record before Judge
Boldt that the Lummi ever held usual and accustomed
fishing grounds in waters east of Whidbey Island and south
of Fidalgo Island. Nor did Judge Boldt mention, anywhere
in the text of his description of historical Lummi fishing
waters, the specific waters east of Whidbey Island at issue in
this case. We thus conclude that, under the 1974 decree, the
Lummi have no usual and accustomed fishing rights in those
waters.
                              2
    The record evidence cited by Judge Boldt in Finding of
Fact 46 suggests, if anything, the opposite: that Lummi
fishing was confined to areas west and, in particular, north
of Whidbey Island.
   Exhibit PL-94e is another 1895 affidavit in the Alaska
Packers case, this time from a man named George
Sknoughton. Sknoughton stated that he was a Lummi Indian
who was 60 years old at the time of the affidavit; he was
        SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION       37

therefore born around 1835, and would have been
approximately 20 years old at the time of the Treaty of Point
Elliott. Sknoughton explained that the Lummi at treaty times
“got most of their fish at Point Roberts,” a location some 40
miles to the north of the disputed waters here, and that “at no
other place in the waters near the reservation did the sockeye
salmon run [in] such large quantities or were they so easily
caught.”
     Exhibit PL-94u is an 1895 affidavit from Harry
Sewalton, who identified himself as a 65-year-old “member
of the Lummi Tribe of Indians.” According to Sewalton,
“the main part of the food supply of the Lummi Indians since
my boyhood” was taken at the reef adjacent to Point Roberts.
Sewalton explained that “Point Roberts reef and the Reef at
Vill[a]ge Point on Lummi Island . . . are the only two reefs
in the waters of said County or in the Lower Sound upon
which the said Lummi Indians can take salmon with hand or
lift nets” (emphasis added).
    Exhibit G-26 is a section of an untitled and undated
report by an unknown author. The report states that “[t]he
area claimed by the Indians who designate themselves as the
Lummi Tribe of Indians and the San Juan Tribe of Indians
includes the sites of autonomous Indian villages along the
coastal region north of Puget Sound proper, around
Bellingham, Lummi and Birch Bays, and on some of the
islands of the San Juan Archipelago” (emphasis added).
“Settlement of the northern area” inhabited by these Indians,
according to the author, differed considerably from that in
the “southern part of the basin” where “Seattle, Tacoma, and
Olympia” were located.
   Finally, we note that in spring 1973, the Washington
Reef Net Owners Association served interrogatories
38      SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

requesting the Lummi Nation to identify “in full all locations
which are claimed to be its ‘usual and accustomed fishing
places and stations within and contiguous to the western
portion of the State of Washington’” (emphasis added). The
Lummi’s answer repeated verbatim Dr. Lane’s statement
that “[t]he traditional fishing areas” extended “from what is
now the Canadian border south to Anacortes”; the Lummi
then cited a series of locations drawn directly from Dr.
Lane’s reports. These included Haro and Rosario Straits,
“the salt waters contiguous to the San Juan Islands,” Point
Roberts, Lummi Island, Fidalgo Island, Birch Bay, Village
Point, Cherry Point, and various reef-net locations in the San
Juan Islands. These are essentially the same areas identified
by Dr. Lane in her description and map of Lummi fishing
locations—which makes perfect sense, because the Lummi
specifically identified Dr. Lane as the source of their
information regarding historical reef-net fishing. None of
the areas the Lummi identified in 1973 are east of Whidbey
Island; indeed, none are remotely near the “present environs
of Seattle.” The Lummi did state that “[t]here were, in
addition, other important fisheries,” but the Lummi did not
name any of them, so that general statement is of no use. We
find it telling that, asked directly to identify “in full all
locations” claimed to be their “usual and accustomed”
fishing grounds in 1973, the Lummi mentioned no fishing
locations east of Whidbey Island and south of Fidalgo Island.
The Lummi had the opportunity to claim such locations at
trial and did not.
                              C
     Our precedent is in accord with these conclusions.
       SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION       39

                              1
    The most on-point case, and one involving two of the
same bodies of water at issue here, is Upper Skagit Indian
Tribe v. Washington, 590 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Upper
Skagit”). That case involved a dispute between the Upper
Skagit and the Suquamish as to whether Saratoga Passage
and Skagit Bay—two of the bodies of water east of Whidbey
Island at issue here—fell within the scope of yet another of
Judge Boldt’s vaguely worded classifications: “the marine
waters of Puget Sound from the northern tip of Vashon
Island to the Fraser River including Haro and Rosario Straits,
the streams draining into the western side of this portion of
Puget Sound and also Hood Canal.” Id. at 1023 (quoting
Final Decision I, 384 F. Supp. at 1049). As in this case, the
waters at issue in Upper Skagit were east of Whidbey Island,
and the statement of Judge Boldt’s at issue in the case
concerned “the marine waters of Puget Sound” between a
southern anchor point and the Fraser River. (There, the
southern anchor point was Vashon Island, which lies directly
to the southwest of Seattle, the anchor point in this case. We
see no relevant difference between these two anchor points;
both are located due south of the disputed east-of-Whidbey-
Island waters.)
    Faced with a comparable (and equally vague) description
of “the marine waters of Puget Sound” between a southern
anchor point and “the Fraser River,” the Upper Skagit court
turned (just as we turn) to the record evidence before Judge
Boldt. The Upper Skagit court found dispositive the fact that
“[t]here is no evidence in the record before Judge Boldt that
the Suquamish fished or traveled in the waters on the eastern
side of Whidbey Island, particularly in Saratoga Passage or
Skagit Bay.” 590 F.3d at 1025. (The same, as we have
explained, is true of the Lummi in this case.) Moreover,
40     SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

“[a]lthough Lane’s Report showed that several areas on the
west shores of Area Four comprised Suquamish’s on-
reservation territory and fishing locations, there was no
evidence from Lane or otherwise that the east shores of Area
Four, as well as Skagit Bay and Saratoga Passage,” were
included. Id. (emphasis added). (Much the same is, as we
have explained, true here: Dr. Lane’s report contained a map
showing a Lummi fishing site on the west shores of Fidalgo
Island, but none on the eastern shores of the disputed
waters.) Finally, when Judge Boldt “intended to include an
area, it was specifically named”; thus, the fact that “Judge
Boldt neglected to include Skagit Bay and Saratoga Passage
in the Suquamish’s U&A supports our conclusion that he did
not intend for them to be included.” Id. (The same is again
true in this case; the fact that Judge Boldt named three areas
outside the Whidbey-Fidalgo Island chain—the San Juan
Islands, Bellingham Bay, and Seattle—but did not name any
waters east of Whidbey Island, suggests that he did not
intend to include them.) Ultimately, the Upper Skagit court
concluded, the Suquamish U&A did not include the
contested waters east of Whidbey Island. Id. at 1026. We
reach precisely the same conclusion, regarding an analogous
U&A description, in this case.
    The Lummi attempt to distinguish Upper Skagit on the
ground that the court referenced a 1975 bench ruling from
Judge Boldt, and that no such bench ruling is present in the
record of this case. We see no legally relevant distinction.
The Upper Skagit court mentioned Judge Boldt’s ruling from
the bench merely to rebut the Suquamish’s claim that Judge
Boldt’s statements from the bench referred to waters east of
Whidbey Island. 590 F.3d at 1025. The Upper Skagit court
rejected that argument, concluding that Judge Boldt was not
in fact referring to waters east of Whidbey Island. Id. The
       SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION      41

court’s point was that neither Judge Boldt’s statement from
the bench, nor any other evidence in the record, constituted
record evidence of tribal fishing in the disputed east-of-
Whidbey-Island waters. We reach a similar conclusion here.
    If anything, Upper Skagit is the harder case. There,
Judge Boldt’s description was not limited to the undefined
area of “northern” Puget Sound, as it is here; he instead
described the Suquamish U&A as simply including, without
qualification, “the marine waters of Puget Sound.” 590 F.3d
at 1023. Nonetheless, we declined to read into that language,
in the absence of any record evidence, an inference that
waters east of Whidbey Island were included. Id. at 1026.
We reach the same conclusion here, and on easier facts. As
the district court in this case correctly observed, if
“Suquamish’s U&A was determined to be ambiguous as to
whether it included Skagit Bay and Saratoga Passage,” then
there is “no reason that Lummi’s more restrictive U&A
should unambiguously include the Disputed Waters”
(emphasis altered).
                             2
    Our 2017 decision in Lummi III, 876 F.3d 1004, is
likewise in accord. In that case, we “examine[d] the record
before Judge Boldt to clarify his intent” regarding a
particular “nautical path” traced “from the San Juan Islands
to Seattle” in Lummi I, 235 F.3d at 452. See Lummi III, 876
F.3d at 1009–10. We concluded that Judge Boldt had meant
to include waters along that “nautical path” in the Lummi’s
usual and accustomed fishing territory. Id. at 1009–10
(citation omitted). That nautical path does not cut through
any waters east of Whidbey Island, so neither Lummi I nor
Lummi III governs the waters at issue in this case.
42     SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

    The Lummi nonetheless urge us to read Lummi III to
stand for the broad proposition that a court may infer Lummi
fishing rights in any area of Puget Sound between the Fraser
River and Seattle through which the Lummi might, at some
point, have traveled. We have never held that, and we
decline to do so now. And for good reason: that limitless
holding would be inconsistent with both the text of the
decree and well-established precedent.
    Again, Judge Boldt’s decree clearly states that, although
“[m]arine waters were . . . used as thoroughfares for travel
by Indians who trolled en route,” this sort of “occasional and
incidental trolling was not considered to make the marine
waters traveled thereon the usual and accustomed fishing
grounds of the transiting Indians.” 384 F. Supp. at 353
(emphasis added). Judge Boldt plainly did not believe that
the possibility of travel in disputed waters was sufficient to
support a finding of U&A fishing there. He stated precisely
the opposite. Accordingly, we cannot, when reading
ambiguous language in the decree, understand Judge Boldt
to have violated his own cardinal principle for discerning
usual and accustomed fishing grounds (i.e., by recognizing
fishing rights for the Lummi in waters east of Whidbey
Island, where, as we have explained, there is no record
evidence that such fishing ever occurred). See Suquamish,
871 F.3d at 848; Tulalip Tribes, 794 F.3d at 1133; see also
Sauk-Suiattle, 66 F.4th at 771, 774. Since we have thrice
concluded (today makes four) that Judge Boldt’s vague
description of the Lummi’s U&A is ambiguous, that same
admonition applies here and precludes the Lummi’s
sweeping argument. See Lummi III, 876 F.3d at 1008–09;
Lummi II, 763 F.3d at 1187; Lummi I, 235 F.3d at 449.
    The Lummi’s limitless reading of Lummi III suffers from
an additional flaw—namely, that it would render Lummi III
       SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION       43

directly inconsistent with Upper Skagit, 590 F.3d 1020, in
which we declined to infer fishing rights east of Whidbey
Island from materially identical language in another of Judge
Boldt’s U&A descriptions. Id. at 1023, 1026. As we have
said, the two cases are, properly understood, perfectly
consistent. Lummi III concluded, after “examin[ing] the
record before Judge Boldt to clarify his intent,” that Judge
Boldt had meant to include waters along a specific west-of-
Whidbey-Island “nautical path” in the Lummi’s historical
fishing territory. 876 F.3d at 1009–10. Upper Skagit
concluded, after engaging in the same sort of inquiry, that
Judge Boldt had not meant to include certain east-of-
Whidbey-Island waters in the Suquamish’s historical fishing
territory. 590 F.3d at 1023, 1026. We apply in this case the
same standards we applied in Lummi III and Upper Skagit.
We have “examine[d] the record before Judge Boldt to
clarify his intent” regarding a set of waters as to which the
decree is ambiguous. Lummi III, 876 F.3d at 1009. Because
there is no evidence in that record of historical Lummi
fishing east of Whidbey Island, we decline to read the decree
to grant the Lummi fishing rights east of Whidbey Island.
See Sauk-Suiattle, 66 F.4th at 771, 774; Suquamish, 871 F.3d
at 848; Tulalip Tribes, 794 F.3d at 1133.
                             IV
    The remainder of the dispute before us is easily resolved.
The S’Klallam Tribe has filed a cross-appeal for the sole
purpose of objecting to what it views as “damaging and
erroneously broad statements” in the district court’s
summary judgment order that, in the S’Klallam’s view,
appear to suggest that many Indian tribes fished in waters
west of Whidbey Island, where the S’Klallam claim fishing
interests. Specifically, the S’Klallam express concern about
two sentences of the “current language in the district court
44      SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION

decision”: first, the district court’s statement that “the Ninth
Circuit . . . previously determined that the waters west of
Whidbey Island served as the primary thoroughfare for tribes
traveling between the Fraser River and the environs of
Seattle,” and second, the district court’s statement that these
waters were “the main north-south thoroughfare” for tribes
transiting through Puget Sound en route to Seattle. In the
S’Klallam’s view, this language incorrectly implies that
“other tribes,” in addition to the Lummi, now have leeway
to “also claim the western route as their primary route” for
fishing and travel (emphasis added). The S’Klallam’s
concern appears to be that an unknown number of other
tribes may seize on the district court’s language to attempt
to justify increased fishing west of Whidbey Island,
potentially leading to new incursions upon the “S’Klallam
U&A on the west side of Whidbey Island.” The S’Klallam
ask us to make “modifications to the district court’s order”
in response; in other words, they request that we delete (or
change the phrasing of) the passages to which the S’Klallam
object. The S’Klallam take no position, however, on
whether we should affirm or reverse the underlying
judgment in the dispute between the Lummi and the
Swinomish, Tulalip, and Upper Skagit; indeed, they concede
that their desired modifications to the district court’s order
“may or may not reverse the outcome.”
    Generally speaking, a litigant may “appeal only if the
judgment gives him less relief than he considers himself
entitled to”; he “cannot appeal a judgment merely because
there are passages in the court’s opinion that displease him,”
even if those passages may “come back to haunt him in a
future case.” Abbs v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 918, 924 (7th Cir.
1992). In any event, we have already concluded, in the
ordinary course of deciding the dispute between the Lummi
        SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY. V. LUMMI NATION          45

and the Swinomish, Tulalip, and Upper Skagit, that neither
Lummi III nor Upper Skagit stands for the proposition that
all tribes (indeed, any tribe besides the Lummi) traveled and
fished west of Whidbey Island. (The district court explained
much the same in its order denying reconsideration.) Nor,
as we have just explained, do our cases stand for the
proposition that the mere possibility of travel through
disputed waters is sufficient to support a grant of U&A rights
there—a principle Judge Boldt directly rejected and we
likewise have never accepted. Having already clarified both
points in the S’Klallam’s favor in the ordinary course of
disposing of the Lummi’s appeal, we consider the
S’Klallam’s appeal moot.
    We decline to address the parties’ dispute regarding
whether the Lummi may initiate a future subproceeding
under Paragraph 25(a)(6), which addresses a separate basis
for jurisdiction not presented to the district court in this case.
Cf. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Tulalip Tribes, 944 F.3d
1179 (9th Cir. 2019). We do not understand that question to
have been resolved by the district court and we decline to
address it in the first instance on appeal. Merritt v.
Countrywide Fin. Corp., 759 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir.
2014).
                                V
   The district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
Swinomish, Tulalip, and Upper Skagit is AFFIRMED. The
S’Klallam’s cross-appeal of the district court’s grant of
summary judgment is DISMISSED AS MOOT. The
S’Klallam’s appeal of the district court’s denial of the
S’Klallam’s motion for reconsideration is likewise
DISMISSED AS MOOT.