Court Opinion

ID: 9643225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:22:56.631426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:58.454926
License: Public Domain

BOB McCOY, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the opinion of the majority and write separately only to set forth examples that attempt to harmonize Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and section 311.014 of the Code Construction Act. Tex.R. Civ. P. 4; Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.014 (Vernon 2005). Suppose written discovery is received on December 31, which has a thirty-day response time. Under rule 4, December 31 is “day 0,” January 1 is “day 1,” and the response is due on the thirtieth day, January 30.1 In contrast, if discovery is received on December 31 and must be completed within one month, December 31 is “day 0,” January 1 is “day 1,” and the party has until January 31 to act; thus, the party has the entire month of January — January 1 through 31 — to act. Had the one-month triggering event occurred on January 1, then January 1 would be “day 0,” January 2 would be “day 1,” and the party would have until February 1 to act. Again, if there is a three-month period in which to act, and December 31 is “day 0,” then January 1 is “day 1,” and the party has the entire month of January, the entire month of *346February, and the entire month of March, or until March 31, to act. The same is true if the period of time is one year or a multiple of one year; December 31 is “day 0,” January 1 is “day 1,” and the final day to act is the last day of December, or the following December 31.
Turning to our Mend, Black’s Law Dictionary, “computation” is cleverly defined as “[t]he act of computing.” Black’s Law DictionaRy 261 (5th ed.1979). I believe that “computing” begins the day the event occurs prompting the computation, which according to rule 4, is “day 0.” This affords a common sense understanding of the rule, the statute, and case law. The Hughes case, generously referred to as an “anomaly” by the majority, is erroneous in providing an extra day in which to act and would have, in our first example, not necessitated a one-month response until February 1. Hughes v. Autry, 874 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, no writ). Thus, it would have allowed the responding party the entire month of January plus the first day of February — clearly more than one month.
In this case, under the two-year statute of limitations, “day 0” for the Salahats was February 25, 2002; “day 1” was February 26, 2002; and the final day to act was two years later on February 25, 2002, which resulted in a full twenty-four months in which to act. Any other construction would have afforded two years and one day to act, contrary to the applicable statute of limitations. For these reasons, I respectfully concur in the result.

. All of these examples assume, as in this case, that the final day to act is not a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday.