Court Opinion

ID: 9546638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:33:17.150144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:42.319676
License: Public Domain

Neill, J.
(special concurrence) — I have signed the ma*537jority opinion but add the following observations. As I understand it, the petitioners’ assertion is that they and others similarly situated are unconstitutionally subjected to “open” or “on suspicion” bookings, applied without reasonable standards, whereby they suffer unreasonable delay in obtaining knowledge of the charges against them by being brought before a magistrate. That claim is a common de-nomin'ator among the members of the class so affected.
The common ground as to the asserted practice is not, in my view, negated by any distinctions among individual prisoners based upon whether they would otherwise be entitled to habeas corpus relief, or would be subject to such practice under proper standards, or would for their own purposes desire to waive more formal and informative booking procedure. Such individual rights 'and interests are not precluded by or adverse to a determination of the general and basic questions raised in this action. The fact that some prisoners may ultimately be determined to be properly subject to “open” booking merely suggests a limit to the definition of those “similarly situated.”
The claims here asserted are, by nature, indigenous to the situation which petitioners’ ask the courts to scrutinize. Further, the nature of the claims asserted is basic and is such that the scope of any relief granted is ascertainable in one action for all members of the “similarly situated” class. In my view this case is distinct from the situation in which money damages are sought; such cases by nature involve disparate proofs and possible defenses. See, e.g., Puget Sound Alumni of Kappa Sigma, Inc. v. Seattle, 70 Wn.2d 222, 422 P.2d 799 (1967). Nor is the decision in this case contrary to the position of Justice Stafford in his dissent to Dore v. Kinnear, 79 Wn.2d 755, 489 P.2d 898 (1971), in which I concurred. Our view in that case had reference to a claimed CR 23(b) (3) class action which had never been perfected and in which the proponents’ interests were antagonistic to those of other “members” of the purported “class.” The case at bench involves no such antagonism *538over the claims asserted and no question as to whether petitioners have followed relevant CR 23 procedures.