Court Opinion

ID: 9629987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:56:10.35885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:32:07.241661
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
dissenting. Today, the majority has written the commercial purpose test out of Act 250, implementing the view that any major development should be subject to Act 250 jurisdiction. Since the law implemented by the majority opinion bears no relation to that enacted by the Legislature, I dissent.
The majority opinion is clearly at odds with the legislative intent and the words chosen to define Act 250 jurisdiction. The statute defines “development” to mean “construction of improvements on a tract or tracts of land . . . involving more than 10 acres of land . . . for commercial or industrial purposes.” 10 V.S.A. § 6001(3). By limiting development to that for commercial or industrial purposes, the Legislature made a conscious decision not to regulate all land use that has environmental impacts. We described that decision in In re Agency of Administration, 141 Vt. 68, 76, 444 A.2d 1349, 1352 (1982):
[Although the purposes of Act 250 are broad, the Legislature in passing the Act did not purport to reach all land use changes within the state, nor to impose the substantial administrative and financial burdens of the Act, or interfere with local control of land use decisions, except where values of state concern are implicated through large scale changes in land utilization. . . . The Act was a philosophic compromise between a desire to protect and control all the lands and environment of the State of Vermont, and the need to avoid an administrative nightmare. . . . The importance of this compromise aspect of the legislation to our decision here is well illustrated by the history behind the legislative definition of “development” now codified at 10 V.S.A. § 6001(3).
*291Id. (Citations omitted.)
Although we have never explored the reason for the legislative choice, the rationale for an identical choice in the Maine environmental law has been explained by the Maine Supreme Court:
We think that the use of the word “commercial” was intended to describe the motivation for the development and not the type of activity to be performed on the property after it is developed. We consider that the Legislature chose to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial developments for a sound reason — it doubtless concluded that a greater need for supervision exists in the case of commercially motivated development where the dominant factor is the hope for profit than in a non-commercial development where land is being prepared for public enjoyment or divided for family distribution or for some other purpose than profit. In other words, commercial residential developments have a propensity for being big, concentrated and exhausting to the resources of the environment.
In re Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736, 742 (Me. 1973). I have no doubt that the Vermont Legislature’s rationale is similar. Act 250 is an environmental control law because the Legislature saw that certain land uses were “destructive to the environment and . . . not suitable to the demands and needs of the people of the state.” 1969, No. 250 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 (statement of findings and declaration of intent). As in Maine, the Legislature drew a line that it thought would capture developments particularly “big, concentrated and exhausting to the resources of the environment” without using a more vague, discretionary and difficult-to-administer jurisdictional standard. It is our duty to protect and enforce this legislative choice.
Contrary to the majority’s characterization, the term “commercial activity” has a clear, commonly accepted meaning in land use regulation. It denotes “any type of business or activity which is carried on for a profit.” Black’s Law Dictionary 270 (6th ed. 1990); see Siegel v. City of Oakland, 145 Cal. Rptr. 62, 67 (Ct. App. 1978) (term imports commerce, trade, business, industry or enterprise having financial profit as primary aim); Roberts Enters., Inc. v. Secretary of Transp., 699 P.2d 479, 483 (Kan. 1985) (same); Lanski v. Montealegre, 104 N.W.2d 772, 774 (Mich. 1960) (in broad sense, commercial activity includes any type of business or activity carried on for profit); Imbergamo v. Barclay, 352 N.Y.S.2d 337, 341 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (term *292“commercial” in zoning law denotes uses for profit); Cordell v. Codington County, 526 N.W.2d 115, 117 (S.D. 1994) (adopting the Black’s Law Dictionary definition). We defined it in the context of commercial property in Lewis v. Town of Brandon, 132 Vt. 37, 42, 313 A.2d 673, 676 (1973): “The primary purpose of commercial property is to produce an income or profit for the owner.” No one could conceive that the activity in this case would come even close to a commonsense definition of “commercial.”
The majority’s answer to the obvious mislabeling of petitioner’s activity as commercial is that the Environmental Board has specially defined the word “commercial,” and the Legislature has ratified that definition, in a way different from the normal definition. I agree that the definition in Environmental Board Rule 2(L) expands the definition beyond its normal limits, but cannot agree that the new definition has somehow created a license to further expand the definition to the point where it is defined by its antonym. This process reminds me of the children’s game where a phrase is passed from person to person to compare its final version with that uttered originally. As here, the result is often a distortion of the original phrase, made possible by slight differences in restatement by persons who do not know what the original phrase was. Only if you do not know, or apply, the Legislature’s term “commercial” can you reach a definition that includes this petitioner’s activities within it.
I agree that the critical precedent is In re Baptist Fellowship of Randolph, Inc., 144 Vt. 636, 481 A.2d 1274 (1984), where we held that the Rule 2(L) definition of “commercial purpose” is broad enough to encompass a nonprofit church development funded by church parishioners. Id. at 639, 481 A.2d at 1276. We agreed that the financial arrangement between the church and the parishioners had the exchange element of a commercial transaction because the parishioners were providing money to construct the church in order to use that facility and take part in the religious services provided within it. Id. Here, there is no exchange like that required in Baptist Fellowship. Only by holding that the elements found determinative in Baptist Fellowship are superfluous and unnecessary can we say that there is a commercial purpose here.
The alternative theory of exchange found by the majority is present in every charitable or nonprofit activity and results in the evisceration of any commonsense definition of “commercial.” The majority holds that because persons who give to petitioner’s charitable activities expect something charitable to be done with the money, *293there is, therefore, an exchange of the donation for the charitable activities. Since no one who gives to a charity is uninterested in the beneficial purposes to which the charity is dedicated, all charitable giving fits within the majority’s exchange rationale. The result of this distorted application of an exchange is that a term which is associated with profit-making activity is now defined to include all activity conducted on a not-for-profit basis.
As the majority states, we must defer to the Board’s interpretation of the Act and its rules, absent compelling indication of error. On the other hand, the Board “may not use its rule-making authority to enlarge a restrictive grant of jurisdiction from the legislature.” In re Agency of Admin., 141 Vt. at 76, 444 A.2d at 1352. I can think of no greater indication of error than that the Board turns a word restricting its jurisdiction into its opposite in order to establish jurisdiction. After today’s decision, the word “commercial” is effectively deleted from the statute. I dissent.