Court Opinion

ID: 9796177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:51:19.699611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:03.479226
License: Public Domain

JOHNSEN, Judge,
specially concurring.
¶ 25 I concur in the result because, as the majority suggests, the evidence at trial did not support a crime-prevention instruction pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-411. See supra ¶ 17, n. 6.
¶ 26 I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that as a matter of law, a prohibited possessor pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-904(A) may not assert a defense under A.R.S. § 13-411 in connection with an otherwise justified use of a firearm. My view is that we should refrain from deciding that issue because it is not necessary to our resolution of the appeal. If we were required to resolve the issue, however, I would not agree with the majority’s conclusion that in no circumstance is a crime-prevention defense pursuant to § 13-411 available to a prohibited possessor who uses a firearm.
¶ 27 Under the facts of this case, Silvestre, the victim, presented no objective threat that would have justified Appellant’s use of deadly force. But under the majority’s holding, a prohibited possessor who picks up another’s pistol and fires it at an assailant who is blasting his way into a crowded room with a shotgun could be prosecuted for aggravated assault or attempted murder. I am concerned that by the majority’s reasoning, a prohibited possessor likewise would be unable to assert a right of self-defense or defense of another under similar circumstances. See A.R.S. §§ 13-404, -405 (2007), -406. When an armed intruder threatens to kill a homeowner and the homeowner’s children, the homeowner who defends his family by firing at the intruder with a gun is not guilty of attempted murder in the normal event because the shooting was justified, in self-defense and/or defense of another. But by the majority’s reasoning, under the same circumstances, a homeowner who is a prohibited possessor would have no defense.8
¶ 28 I recognize that, as the majority observes, the legislature has not crafted an *70exception to the prohibited possessor statutes, A.R.S. §§ 13-904(A) and -3102(A)(4), to provide that one who may not possess a gun may do so when reasonably necessary to prevent a crime. But it seems to me that the majority itself extends those same statutes beyond their plain meaning when it concludes that the statutes preclude a prohibited possessor from using a gun to defend against a violent crime under AR.S. § 13-411. Sections 13-904(A) and -3102(A)(4) prohibit the possession of a gun and deadly weapon, respectively. Neither statute specifically prohibits the me or discharge of a gun by a prohibited possessor under circumstances otherwise permitted by AR.S. §§ 13-404, -405, -406 and -411. Cf A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(8) (prohibiting the use of a deadly weapon during the commission of certain felony offenses).9 I do not mean that as a practical matter one can discharge a gun without possessing it, within the meaning of the prohibited possession statutes. I only mean that while a prohibited possessor who fires a gun may be guilty of misconduct involving weapons pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4), if he does so under circumstances falling within A.R.S. § 13-411, he should not also be guilty of aggravated assault or attempted murder.
¶ 29 Finally, I do not believe that, as the majority warns, construing A.R.S. § 13-411 to permit the use of a firearm by a prohibited possessor means allowing prohibited possessors to use “deadly weapons whenever they deem such use necessary in exigent circumstances.” Supra ¶ 21. Permitting a prohibited possessor to assert the crime-prevention defense pursuant to AR.S. § 13-411 would permit that person to use a gun only under circumstances under which any other person would be justified under the law in doing so.

. The majority notes that the self-defense and defense-of-others provisions come into play only when the defendant reasonably believes force is immediately necessary to protect against another's use of physical force. Supra ¶ 17; see A.R.S. §§ 13-404, -405, -406. While A.R.S. § 13-411 omits specific reference to another’s use of force, in my view that distinction is not significant because force or the threat of force commonly is used in committing many of the crimes encompassed by the statute. See A.R.S. § 13-411(A) (use of force justified when reasonably necessary to prevent, e.g., kidnapping, sexual assault, manslaughter, second-or first-degree murder, armed robbery and aggravated assault). The majority also notes that self-defense has been characterized as a fundamental right. Supra ¶ 17, n. 5. I do not understand that principle to necessarily limit the breadth of the majority's reasoning that a statutory justification defense is not avail able to a prohibited possessor who uses a firearm.

. By the same token, A.R.S. §§ 13-404, -405, -406 and -411 do not expressly restrict those who may take advantage of the defense to persons who are not prohibited possessors. Each of those justification provisions provides that it applies to "a person” who acts in a certain manner, not to "a person who is not a prohibited possessor” who acts in a certain manner.