Court Opinion

ID: 9913003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 17:01:07.136877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:44.298964
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 26 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IRVINE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,                 No.    21-55290
                                                       21-55663
                Plaintiff-Appellant,                   21-55882

 v.                                             D.C. No.
                                                8:20-cv-01001-DOC-JDE
SHARON LANDERS; JOSEPH
GAGLIANO, Parents on behalf of A.G., a
minor,                                          MEMORANDUM*

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

                    Argued and Submitted December 11, 2023
                             Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, CHRISTEN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.

      Irvine Unified School District (“Irvine”) appeals from the district court’s

judgment affirming the Office of Administrative Hearings’ (“OAH”) determination

that Irvine did not provide A.G. (“Student”) with a Free Appropriate Public

Education (“FAPE”) in individualized education programs (“IEPs”) offered from

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
October 2016 through June 2018 under the Individuals with Disabilities Education

Act (“IDEA”). Irvine also appeals from the district court’s orders awarding

attorneys’ fees to Student. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not

recount them here. We affirm.

      We review de novo whether a school district provided a FAPE. Amanda J.

ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 887 (9th Cir. 2001).

However, we give “due weight” to the OAH’s decision, Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley,

458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982), and defer to its findings when “they are thorough and

careful,” Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994). We

review attorneys’ fees awards for abuse of discretion, reviewing legal analysis de

novo and factual findings for clear error. P.N. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 474 F.3d

1165, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).

      1. We defer to the OAH’s findings because, as the district court found, its

decision was “thorough and careful.” Union Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 1524. The

OAH decision spanned seventy-five pages, made 240 detailed factual findings

concerning the many IEP iterations Irvine offered, and individually evaluated

sixty-eight issues and sub-issues. See Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. D.A., 792

F.3d 1054, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2015) (deferring to a hearing officer’s nineteen-page

memorandum disposition).

      Irvine contends that we should not defer to the OAH because it did not allow

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Irvine to present additional evidence on remand of the certified nonpublic school’s

curriculum and “made a fundamental error in concluding that [the certified

nonpublic school] offers a high school diploma for which Student was on track to

obtain.” Neither argument is persuasive. First, Irvine sought to present evidence

of the certified nonpublic school’s “current educational program” in December

2019; such evidence would have been irrelevant to the OAH decision, which

concerned the school’s curriculum for the 2018–2019 school year. Second, the

OAH decision did not turn on whether Student would receive a diploma from the

certified nonpublic school. Rather, it focused on whether Student was on track to

receive a diploma, as an indication of Student’s curriculum.

      2. We affirm the OAH’s award of reimbursement to Student. “A parent or

guardian is ‘entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both

(1) that the public placement violated the IDEA, and (2) that the private school

placement was proper under the Act.’” Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch.

Dist., 826 F.3d 1179, 1188 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Under the IDEA, an

IEP must provide a “meaningful benefit” to the student. N.B. v. Hellgate Elem.

Sch. Dist., ex rel. Bd. of Dirs., 541 F.3d 1202, 1212–13 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation

omitted). Moving a student from the general education curriculum to a modified

curriculum is a last resort. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A). A certified nonpublic

school placement is proper if it “provides educational instruction specially

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designed to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, supported by such

services as are necessary to permit a child to benefit from instruction.” C.B. ex rel.

Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 635 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir.

2011) (citation omitted).

      The OAH properly concluded that Irvine violated the IDEA by denying

Student a FAPE. Both expert psychologists credibly testified that Student’s

cognitive level was high enough to participate in the general curriculum with her

non-disabled peers. See Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. S.W., 21 F.4th 1125,

1133–34 (9th Cir. 2021) (considering expert testimony to determine whether IEP

goals were appropriate for the student’s unique needs). Despite this, Irvine offered

Student below grade-level standards for math and reading. See Anchorage Sch.

Dist. v. M.P., 689 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n IEP developed for a

second grader is not reasonably calculated to ensure educational benefits to that

student in his third grade year.”). This modified curriculum offered by Irvine was

not focused on progressing Student from grade to grade. See Endrew F. ex rel.

Joseph F. v. Douglas Sch. Dist., 580 U.S. 386, 401 (2017) (“[A] FAPE will

involve integration in the regular classroom and individualized special education

calculated to achieve advancement from grade to grade.”). Irvine in one instance

responded to Student’s parents’ concerns by stating that Student “did not make as

much progress on grade-level standards because she worked on below grade-level,

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modified curriculum” and advised that Student’s parents should “watch her

progress by looking at specific goal areas, not by looking at grade-level standards.”

Student did not progress in Irvine’s modified curriculum; her assessment scores in

math and reading dropped following the modifications. See id. at 399 (“The IEP

must aim to enable the child to make progress.”).

      Irvine contends that its modifications to Student’s curriculum were justified

based on her performance in its 2018 assessments. But the Irvine staff member

who conducted the assessments and Irvine’s lead psychologist conceded that its

2018 Woodcock-Johnson test returned an inaccurate intelligence quotient. See

Anchorage Sch. Dist., 689 F.3d at 1058 (finding an IEP was invalid because it “did

not provide an accurate assessment of [the student]’s present level of

performance”). Irvine thus presented no reliable evidence that the modified

curriculum it offered Student in its IEPs meaningfully benefited her.

      Irvine also contends that Student’s repeating the sixth grade at the certified

nonpublic school constituted the same kind of modification it offered her, so her

progress at the certified nonpublic school shows that she would have progressed in

Irvine’s curriculum. But, as the OAH observed, the curricula are distinct; Irvine’s

did not focus on allowing Student access to the general education curriculum and

the “educational standards that apply to nondisabled children,” whereas the

certified nonpublic school’s did.

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      Finally, Irvine argues that the OAH used the wrong definition of “modified

curriculum” in its decision and should have been held to the definition purportedly

“established by” the district court when it remanded the case. But there is no fixed

definition of “modified curriculum.” See, e.g., D.R. ex rel. R.R. v. Redondo Beach

Unified Sch. Dist., 56 F.4th 636, 642 (9th Cir. 2022) (using the phrase “modified

general education curriculum” to describe supplementary aids and services).

Further, the district court did not establish a definition of “modified curriculum”

that the OAH was required to apply. The district court based its definition on

Student’s expert’s testimony to identify an inconsistency in the OAH’s original

decision. The district court plainly stated that it was “not equipped” to determine

whether the certified nonpublic school’s curriculum was “modified.” The OAH

accordingly expanded its analysis to resolve this inconsistency, using a definition

of “modified curriculum” that the evidence before it supported.

      The OAH also properly concluded that the certified nonpublic school

placement was proper. Student progressed academically and socially at the

certified nonpublic school. Though Student repeated sixth grade, Student’s expert

credibly testified that it was a necessary intervention to allow her to catch up to her

peers after her dip in progress at Irvine.

      3. Last, we affirm the district court’s attorneys’ fees awards to Student. The

district court has discretion under the IDEA to award “reasonable attorneys’ fees

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. . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. §

1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). Generally, we defer to the district’s court award. Camacho v.

Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). Under the “lodestar

method,” the district court (1) calculates the lodestar amount by “determining how

many hours were reasonably expended on the litigation, and then multiply[ing]

those hours by the prevailing local rate for an attorney of the skill required to

perform the litigation,” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th

Cir. 2008), and (2) adjusts the lodestar according to several factors, the most

important of which is the “degree of success,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,

436 (1983). See also Aguirre v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2006) (holding that IDEA attorneys’ fees awards are governed by the

standards of Hensley).

      Irvine contends that the district court abused its discretion by not considering

the “degree of success” factor in the fees awards because Irvine “prevailed on 50

sub-issues out of the 68 sub-issues.” But the gravamen of Student’s complaint was

that Irvine did not provide her with a FAPE; Student won nine out of eleven issues

on this point and reimbursement of the full amount she sought. See Vargas v.

Howell, 949 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 2020) (reasoning that a low level of success

meriting a fee reduction could be demonstrated by a large disparity between the

amount sought and the amount earned); Compton Unified Sch. Dist. v. Addison,

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598 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court may award ‘full fees even

where a party did not prevail on every contention.’” (citation omitted)).

      Irvine’s contention that the district court erred in setting attorney rates in

both fee awards is similarly unpersuasive. The district court properly set the rates

when it identified the relevant community and explained how it arrived at the

prevailing hourly rate. See Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979 (holding that the district

court abused its discretion by not identifying the relevant community or explaining

the prevailing hourly rate).

      Irvine also argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider

Student’s second attorneys’ fees motion. But the district court properly determined

that the issues in the appeal (the attorneys’ fees from the beginning of the litigation

to the appeal) differed from the issue in Student’s second motion for attorneys’

fees (the attorneys’ fees from the previous fees motion). See Griggs v. Provident

Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam) (holding that a notice of

appeal “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case

involved in the appeal”).

      AFFIRMED.

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