Court Opinion

ID: 9942539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 15:11:42.228397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:12.155411
License: Public Domain

[J-63-2023]
                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                EASTERN DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                   :   No. 6 EAP 2023
                                                  :
                       Appellee                   :   Appeal from the Judgment of
                                                  :   Superior Court entered on
                                                  :   February 24, 2022, at No. 1595
                v.                                :   EDA 2020 quashing the Order
                                                  :   entered on July 17, 2020, in the
                                                  :   Court of Common Pleas,
  WILLIAM SMITH,                                  :   Philadelphia County at
                                                  :   No. CP-51-CR-0004759-2015
                       Appellant                  :
                                                  :   SUBMITTED: September 25, 2023

                                          OPINION

 JUSTICE BROBSON                                         DECIDED: February 21, 2024
        Appellant William Smith (Appellant) filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction

 Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9541-9546, in the Court of Common Pleas of

 Philadelphia County (trial court or PCRA court, when appropriate). The PCRA court

 entered an order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition based solely on the fact that his

 facially untimely direct appeal from his judgment of sentence was pending in the Superior

 Court. Appellant appealed the PCRA court’s order, and, relying on Commonwealth v.

 Smith, 244 A.3d 13 (Pa. Super. 2020), the Superior Court quashed that appeal,

 essentially agreeing with the PCRA court’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition

 due to his pending direct appeal. We granted allowance of appeal to examine whether

 the lower courts erred in the way they disposed of Appellant’s PCRA petition. For the

 reasons that follow, we hold that the courts did err.
                                    I. INTRODUCTION

       To facilitate a better understanding of the instant appeal, we find it helpful to begin

by summarizing the pertinent sections of the PCRA, this Court’s opinion in

Commonwealth v. Brown, 943 A.2d 264 (Pa. 2008), and the Superior Court’s decision in

Smith, supra. Generally, a person seeking collateral relief from his conviction or sentence

must file a PCRA petition “within one year of the date that the judgment becomes final,”

subject to certain statutory exceptions. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (emphasis added). “[A]

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review

in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at

the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (emphasis added).

       In Brown, this Court considered the question of whether an untimely filed notice of

appeal “displaces the statutory one-year period for filing a state post-conviction petition.”

Brown, 943 A.2d at 265. By way of background, Devon Brown (Brown) appealed his

judgment of sentence, and the Superior Court ultimately quashed that appeal on the basis

that Brown untimely pursued appellate relief. Nearly three years after the trial court

sentenced Brown but only nine months following the Superior Court’s quashal of his direct

appeal, Brown filed a PCRA petition seeking the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights

and presenting substantive challenges to his judgment of sentence. The PCRA court

granted Brown collateral relief by reinstating his direct appeal rights but ruled against him

on the substantive challenges to his judgment of sentence.

       Brown appealed, and a fractured three-judge panel of the Superior Court quashed

the appeal. The court concluded that Brown untimely filed his PCRA petition and that, as

a result, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to grant any collateral relief to Brown. In doing

so, the court noted that Brown did not file a written post-sentence motion following the

imposition of his judgment of sentence. Under those circumstances, the court opined,

                                       [J-63-2023] - 2
Brown’s judgment of sentence became final 30 days after the trial court sentenced him.

Consequently, to be timely, Brown had to file his PCRA petition within one year thereafter.

In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected any argument that the PCRA’s one-year

time bar should be calculated from the date that the Superior Court determined that Brown

untimely pursued his direct appeal. Under this articulation, Brown’s PCRA petition was

clearly untimely.

       This Court granted Brown’s petition for allowance of appeal to resolve a

discrepancy in Superior Court decisions relative to the timeliness of PCRA petitions filed

after the Superior Court quashes direct appeals as untimely filed. Rejecting dictum to the

contrary in Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 (Pa. 2000), the Court in Brown

observed that, under Section 9545(b)(3) of the PCRA, “a judgment of sentence is final for

purposes of the one-year time bar upon the expiration of the time for seeking review in

circumstances in which direct appellate review is unavailable.” Brown, 943 A.2d at 267.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment, holding:
       [I]n circumstances in which no timely appeal is filed relative to a judgment
       of sentence, and direct review is therefore unavailable, the one-year period
       allowed for the filing of a post-conviction petition commences upon the
       actual expiration of the time period allowed for seeking direct review, as
       specified in the PCRA.
Id. In other words, the Brown Court concluded that a direct appeal from a judgment of

sentence that is quashed because the defendant untimely filed his notice of appeal does

not toll the PCRA’s one-year time bar for seeking collateral relief.

       Regarding the Superior Court’s decision in Smith, after the trial court convicted and

sentenced Shaheed Smith, he timely filed a notice of appeal, and the Superior Court

affirmed his judgment of sentence. Smith, 244 A.3d at 15. Shaheed Smith then timely

filed a petition for allowance of appeal in this Court. While that petition was awaiting this

Court’s review, Shaheed Smith filed a PCRA petition. The PCRA court acknowledged

                                      [J-63-2023] - 3
that Shaheed Smith prematurely filed his PCRA petition insomuch as he timely pursued

his direct appeal but had not exhausted that path before filing his petition. The PCRA

court chose to accept and hold the PCRA petition. The PCRA court later treated Shaheed

Smith’s PCRA petition as if it had been filed on the date that this Court denied his petition

for allowance of appeal. Thereafter, the PCRA court dismissed the PCRA petition without

a hearing, and Shaheed Smith appealed that order to the Superior Court.

       Before addressing the merits of Shaheed Smith’s claims, the Superior Court stated

that it must first assess whether Shaheed Smith timely filed his PCRA petition and, thus,

invoked the PCRA court’s jurisdiction. Noting the well-settled proposition that “[a] PCRA

petition may only be filed after an appellant has waived or exhausted his direct appeal

rights[,]” the Superior Court found no authority to support the PCRA court’s actions.

Smith, 244 A.3d at 16 (internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted). The

court stated that “the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to ‘hold’ the premature filing until the

appeal was denied.” Id.

       In support, the Superior Court explained that, after an appeal is taken, absent

limited exceptions, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to proceed further in a matter. Id. at 17

(citing Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) (providing that “[e]xcept as otherwise prescribed by these rules,

after an appeal is taken . . . , the trial court . . . may no longer proceed further in the

matter”)). Thus, the Superior Court concluded that, if a defendant prematurely files a

PCRA petition while his direct appeal is pending, then the PCRA court should dismiss it

without prejudice to the defendant’s right to file a petition after he has exhausted his direct

appeal rights. Id. at 16-17 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 215 A.3d 1019, 1023

(Pa. Super. 2019)).

       In this matter, we consider our holding in Brown as applied to so-called “premature”

PCRA petitions—i.e., PCRA petitions filed while a direct appeal from a judgment of

                                       [J-63-2023] - 4
sentence is pending. We do so in the context of the single issue we accepted for review,

as phrased by Appellant:
      Should Commonwealth v. Smith, 244 A.3d 13 (Pa. Super. 2020), which was
      never reviewed by this Court but bound the panel below, be overruled (at
      least to the extent that it applies to prophylactic petitions like the present
      one) and should Pennsylvania instead recognize and adopt the superior
      procedure of “stay and abey” used by federal courts under the analogous
      deadlines of 28 U.S.C. § 2254?
Commonwealth v. Smith, 293 A.3d 563, 563-64 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam).1

                                   II. BACKGROUND

      A jury convicted Appellant of, inter alia, rape of a child. The trial court imposed

sentence on March 29, 2018.          Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions on

April 9, 2018. Citing Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(B)(3)(b), the trial court

entered an order that extended the 120-day time period for ruling on the post-sentence

motions by 30 days—i.e., until September 6, 2018. One day later, on September 7, 2018,

the trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motions. Appellant did

not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of this order. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(a)

(requiring defendant to file notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of order ruling on

post-sentence motions).

      Instead, over a year later—on October 4, 2019—Appellant filed a notice of appeal,

indicating that he was appealing his judgment of sentence. In his notice of appeal,

Appellant contended that his appeal was timely because he was never properly served

with notice of the September 7, 2018 order denying his post-sentence motions. That

same day, Appellant filed a praecipe in the trial court, essentially contending that the

September 7, 2018 order denying his post-sentence motions was a nullity because it was

1 This issue presents a question of law.
                                       “Like all questions of law, our standard of review
is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Skotnicki v. Ins. Dep’t, 175 A.3d 239,
247 (Pa. 2017).

                                     [J-63-2023] - 5
not properly served and that, as a result, he was entitled to the entry of a new order

reflecting the deemed denial of his post-sentence motions, from which he could timely file

a notice of appeal.        The trial court struck the praecipe as unauthorized on

October 9, 2019.

       In the interim, on October 7, 2019, Appellant filed his PCRA petition that he

characterized as “prophylactic.”       (PCRA Petition, 10/7/2019, at ¶1.)          Apparently

understanding the potential impact that this Court’s decision in Brown may have on his

future ability to timely file a PCRA petition, he explained that, on October 4, 2019, he filed

the above-described praecipe and notice of appeal and that,
       in the alternative event that a court of competent jurisdiction later rules, in a
       final and nonappealable order, that those documents were not timely filed,
       this petition (filed on Monday, October 7, 2019 [within one year after 30 days
       after September 7, 2018]) is filed to protect [Appellant’s] right to
       reinstatement of his appellate rights. [Appellant] respectfully requests that
       the court take no action on this petition as long as his direct appeal is
       pending in any court, or could be the subject of a further appeal, application
       for reargument, petition for allowance of appeal, or petition for certiorari.
(Id. (one alteration in original).) In the body of his PCRA petition, Appellant claimed that

his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to preserve his direct appellate

rights by filing a notice of appeal in October of 2018.

       On June 8, 2020, the PCRA court, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal

Procedure 907, notified Appellant of its intent to dismiss his PCRA petition without

prejudice because of Appellant’s pending, albeit facially untimely, direct appeal in the

Superior Court. The PCRA court did not engage in any other analysis regarding the

timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition. Appellant responded to the Rule 907 notice by

again asking the PCRA court not to dismiss his PCRA petition out of concern that if the

Superior Court quashed his direct appeal as untimely, a PCRA petition filed thereafter

likely would be out of time under the PCRA’s statutory one-year time bar. To address his

concern, rather than dismiss the petition, Appellant asked the PCRA court to hold his

                                       [J-63-2023] - 6
petition in abeyance, pending the Superior Court’s ruling on the timeliness of his direct

appeal. Despite Appellant’s concern, the PCRA court dismissed the PCRA petition

without prejudice, and Appellant appealed that order to the Superior Court as well.

      Importantly, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court (Direct Appeal Panel), by

unpublished memorandum dated February 12, 2021, quashed Appellant’s direct appeal

from his judgment of sentence, concluding that he untimely filed his notice of appeal.

Commonwealth v. Smith (Pa. Super., No. 3158 EDA 2019, filed Feb. 12, 2021). This

Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on October 18, 2021.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 265 A.3d 194 (Pa. 2021) (per curiam). Appellant did not seek

further review in the United States Supreme Court.

      By unpublished memorandum dated February 24, 2022, a different three-judge

panel of the Superior Court (PCRA Appeal Panel) quashed Appellant’s appeal from the

PCRA court’s order dismissing his PCRA petition as premature. Commonwealth v. Smith

(Pa. Super., No. 1595 EDA 2020, filed Feb. 24, 2022). Relying on its decision in Smith,

the PCRA Appeal Panel concluded that the PCRA court did not err when it dismissed

Appellant’s PCRA petition as premature in light of Appellant’s then-pending direct appeal.

Like the PCRA court, the PCRA Appeal Panel did not engage in any other analysis of the

timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition. Instead, finding that the PCRA court did not

commit any error in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition, the PCRA Appeal Panel

quashed the appeal, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction. This Court subsequently

granted Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal.

                                   III. ARGUMENTS

      Appellant initially submits that we have held that PCRA courts generally must

dismiss untimely filed PCRA petitions that follow direct appeals that ultimately were

quashed as untimely filed. (Appellant’s Brief at 5 (relying on Brown, supra).) Appellant

                                     [J-63-2023] - 7
believes that this case law should have prompted the PCRA court to hold his

“prophylactic” PCRA petition in abeyance while his direct appeal was pending in the

Superior Court. Appellant asserts that, “if the precautionary PCRA petition’s dismissal is

not reversed, and because the then-pending direct appeal was quashed as untimely, then

[he] will be deprived of any appeal at all.” (Id. at 6.)

       According to Appellant, in habeas litigation, “[t]he federal courts have dealt with

the conundrum posed by the mid-1990s imposition of one-year limits on [federal]

collateral petitions through the use of the ‘stay and abey’ procedure.”2 (Id.) Appellant

further states that, because of “the adoption of the one-year limit, there would be no

jurisdiction if a petition were filed after the eventual completion of state-court proceedings,

because the one-year limit would not have been tolled in the meantime.” (Id.) Proceeding

to apply this federal approach, Appellant recounts the procedural history of the case. Of

note, he suggests that, after the Direct Appeal Panel concluded that he untimely pursued

his direct appeal, the PCRA’s one-year time period for filing a petition already had passed,

meaning that he could not timely seek PCRA relief. Thus, in his view, the PCRA court

2 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) describes the federal “stay and

abey” practice as follows:
       A defendant has one year from his final judgment date to file for federal
       habeas relief, a limitations period that is tolled by a “properly filed” PCRA
       petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). When a defendant is unsure whether his
       PCRA petition will be accepted as timely, he may file a “protective” habeas
       petition and “ask[] the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas
       proceedings until state remedies are exhausted.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo,
       544 U.S. 408, 416-17 (2005). This preserves his federal filing date in the
       event that the state petition is ultimately deemed untimely, meaning it is not
       properly filed and does not toll the limitations period. Indeed, where “an
       outright dismissal could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack, a
       stay is the only appropriate course of action.” Crews v. Horn, 360 F.3d 146,
       152 (3d Cir. 2004).
(Commonwealth’s Brief at 8 (alteration in original).)

                                        [J-63-2023] - 8
should have held his PCRA petition in abeyance, making it “imperative” for this Court to

reverse the PCRA court’s order dismissing his PCRA petition. (Id. at 7.)

       Next, Appellant offers a truncated argument concerning the validity of the Superior

Court’s decision in Smith. Appellant appears to argue that, because this Court has held

that PCRA courts ordinarily must dismiss untimely filed PCRA petitions that follow

Superior Court decisions quashing direct appeals from judgments of sentence as untimely

filed, the Court should embrace his attempt to avoid that result by filing a “prophylactic”

petition while his direct appeal was pending.

       The Commonwealth takes a position that is favorable to Appellant.              The

Commonwealth submits that, if a defendant files a PCRA petition while his direct appeal

from his judgment of sentence is pending and the defendant may have untimely pursued

that appeal, then the PCRA court should stay the PCRA litigation until the appellate courts

resolve the timeliness of his direct appeal. Addressing the Superior Court’s decision in

Smith, the Commonwealth points out that Shaheed Smith filed a PCRA petition while his

indisputably timely filed direct appeal was pending. The Commonwealth reports that the

Smith court quashed the PCRA appeal because: “(1) a PCRA petition may be filed only

after a defendant waives or exhausts his direct appeal rights[;] and (2) [Pennsylvania Rule

of Appellate Procedure 1701 (Appellate Rule 1701)] prohibits a trial court from proceeding

once an appeal has been taken.” (Commonwealth’s Brief at 6-7.) The Commonwealth

insists that neither of these grounds warrant the dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA petition.

       First, the Commonwealth distinguishes the present circumstances from those in

Smith. In the Commonwealth’s view, unlike Appellant’s PCRA petition, Shaheed Smith’s

PCRA petition truly was premature because he filed it when his timely-filed direct appeal

was pending. In other words, Shaheed Smith filed his PCRA petition before he exhausted

his direct appeal rights.   Here, the Commonwealth suggests, “[r]ather than filing a

                                     [J-63-2023] - 9
premature petition while a timely direct appeal was pending, as [Shaheed Smith] did,

[Appellant] filed a timely PCRA petition while a facially untimely direct appeal was

pending.” (Id. at 7.)

       Second, the Commonwealth argues that Appellate Rule 1701 does not prohibit

PCRA courts from staying matters such as Appellant’s attempt to pursue PCRA relief.

Appellate Rule 1701 provides, in relevant part, that, after an appeal is taken, “the trial

court . . . may no longer proceed further in the matter.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). Relying on

Black’s Law Dictionary, the Commonwealth maintains that a stay is the “postponement or

halting of a proceeding.”     (Commonwealth’s Brief at 7 (quoting Stay, Black’s Law

Dictionary 1709 (11th ed. 2019).)      The Commonwealth argues that “[p]ostponing or

halting a matter is the opposite of ‘proceed[ing] further.’”     (Id. (second alteration in

original).)

       Like Appellant, the Commonwealth finds guidance from the federal courts. The

Commonwealth explains that, “[w]hen a defendant is unsure whether his PCRA petition

will be accepted as timely, he may file a ‘protective’ habeas petition and ‘ask[] the federal

court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are

exhausted.’” (Id. at 8 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 416-17) (latter alteration in original).)

According to the Commonwealth, “[t]his preserves his federal filing date in the event that

the state petition is ultimately deemed untimely, meaning it is not properly filed and does

not toll the limitations period.” (Id.) The Commonwealth advocates that this Court should

adopt a similar practice when, as here, a defendant is unsure whether he timely sought

to appeal his judgment of sentence and fears that he will be time-barred from filing a

PCRA petition if the appellate courts conclude that he, in fact, untimely commenced his

direct appeal.

                                      [J-63-2023] - 10
       The Pennsylvania Attorney General and the Pennsylvania District Attorney

Association (DA Association) filed amici briefs in support of the Commonwealth. While

the Attorney General’s position largely aligns with the Commonwealth’s stance, the DA

Association has an entirely different take on the matter. In addition to averring that the

Superior Court properly decided Smith and that the PCRA Appeal Panel correctly applied

that decision in quashing Appellant’s appeal, the DA Association argues that Appellant is

misguided in suggesting that this Court should adopt the federal stay-and-abey

procedure. (DA Association’s Brief at 12-15.) As to this argument, it is sufficient for

present purposes to note that the DA Association believes that, because federal habeas

litigation is entirely distinct from PCRA litigation, the stay-and-abey procedure is an ill fit

to remedy the problem that Appellant has created.            This conclusion is particularly

accurate, the DA Association argues, given that the PCRA provides exceptions to its

one-year jurisdictional time bar, which the DA Association appears to believe were

available to Appellant.3 See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).

3 The DA Association also advocates that this Court should dismiss this appeal as
improvidently granted or deny Appellant relief on other grounds. The gist of the DA
Association’s arguments is that Appellant’s post-sentence motions should have been
deemed denied by operation of law at a date significantly earlier than September 7, 2018,
and, therefore, Appellant untimely filed his PCRA petition on October 7, 2019. (DA
Association’s Brief at 3-7.)
       By advancing these arguments, the DA Association, a non-party to this litigation,
is attempting to inject issues into this appeal that are outside the scope of the issue we
granted allowance of appeal to consider. We, therefore, decline to address these issues.
See Marion v. Bryn Mawr Tr. Co., 288 A.3d 76, 93 (Pa. 2023) (declining to address issue
because it was outside scope of Court’s limited grant of allowance of appeal). For
purposes of the issue now before this Court, we accept the Direct Appeal Panel’s
determination that September 7, 2018, is the operative date on which the trial court
denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions. See Smith, slip op. at 13 (Direct Appeal Panel
Decision) (holding that, because trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions on
September 7, 2018, he was required to file notice of appeal by October 7, 2018). We do
so without rendering any opinion as to whether the DA Association’s arguments to the
contrary have merit.

                                      [J-63-2023] - 11
                                    IV. DISCUSSION

       It is well-settled that, relative to PCRA petitions, questions of timeliness are

jurisdictional in nature; therefore, courts must address these questions as threshold

issues. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Morris, 822 A.2d 684, 692 (Pa. 2003) (stating that

“questions of timeliness [of PCRA petitions] are jurisdictional threshold questions”). Here,

despite Appellant clearly placing the PCRA court on notice of valid concerns regarding

the timeliness of his PCRA petition, the PCRA court failed to engage in a meaningful

analysis of that issue and to consider how to proceed in the matter. Instead, the court

dismissed the petition based solely upon Appellant’s pending, facially untimely attempt to

appeal his judgment of sentence. Yet, given our holding in Brown, a pending, facially

untimely direct appeal does not per se render a PCRA petition untimely filed as

premature.

       On appeal, the PCRA Appeal Panel repeated the PCRA court’s mistake of failing

to engage in a meaningful timeliness analysis.          Indeed, the court characterized

Appellant’s PCRA petition as “premature,” equating it with Shaheed Smith’s PCRA

petition. See Smith, slip op. at 5 n.3 (PCRA Appeal Panel Decision). Yet, Shaheed

Smith’s PCRA petition truly was premature and, thus, untimely because he filed it while

his indisputably timely-filed direct appeal was pending; in other words, he filed his PCRA

petition without first exhausting his direct appeal rights. Here, however, by the time the

PCRA Appeal Panel issued its decision, the Direct Appeal Panel, almost a year earlier,

had determined that Appellant untimely pursued his direct appeal, and this Court had

denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal from the Direct Appeal Panel’s

decision over four months prior. Although acknowledging this change in the posture of

the case on appeal, the PCRA Appeal Panel rotely applied its decision in Smith, ignored

this Court’s precedent in Brown, and erroneously characterized Appellant’s PCRA petition

                                     [J-63-2023] - 12
as premature. Indeed, under Brown, as a result of the Direct Appeal Panel’s decision

quashing Appellant’s direct appeal as untimely and this Court’s denial of Appellant’s

petition for allowance of appeal from that decision, it became clear that Appellant timely

filed his PCRA petition.

       Specifically, although Appellant’s facially untimely direct appeal was pending when

he filed his PCRA petition, that appeal process resulted in a determination that, because

Appellant had to commence his direct appeal by October 8, 2018, he untimely pursued

his direct appeal by filing a notice of appeal on October 4, 2019—i.e., nearly a year late.

Stated differently, the outcome of Appellant’s direct appeal dictated that, for purposes of

the PCRA, Appellant’s judgment became final on October 8, 2018, when his time expired

for seeking review of his judgment of sentence. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Brown, supra.

Thus, pursuant to the plain language of the PCRA and consistent with this Court’s

decision in Brown, Appellant timely filed his PCRA petition on October 7, 2019.

See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(1).

       Having reached this conclusion, we express our agreement, at least in part, with

the suggestion of Appellant, the Commonwealth, and the Attorney General that the PCRA

court should have delayed ruling on the timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition until his

direct appeal ran its course. If, as occurred here, a petitioner files a PCRA petition while

his facially untimely direct appeal is pending, the PCRA court should delay a definitive

ruling on the timeliness of the petition until it has all the facts necessary to make such an

assessment, because, before that time, it is not yet clear whether jurisdiction rests with

the PCRA court. Hence, the dismissal of a PCRA petition under these circumstances

would, itself, be premature. This procedure is faithful to our holding in Brown and protects

eligible defendants’ statutory right to pursue collateral relief within the general time

restrictions of the PCRA.

                                      [J-63-2023] - 13
       We further concur with the Commonwealth and the Attorney General that Appellate

Rule 1701(a) does not impede such a procedure.4 Again, that rule provides: “Except as

otherwise prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken . . . , the trial court . . . may

no longer proceed further in the matter.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). This rule does not entirely

prevent a trial court from acting after an appeal is taken. Indeed, Appellate Rule 1701(b)

enumerates several actions that trial courts can take after a defendant files a notice of

appeal. Pertinent to this matter, that rule provides:
       (b) Authority of a trial court or other government unit after appeal.--After an
       appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or
       other government unit may:
          (1) Take such action as may be necessary to preserve the status quo,
          correct formal errors in papers relating to the matter, cause the record
          to be transcribed, approved, filed, and transmitted, grant leave to
          appeal in forma pauperis, grant supersedeas, and take other action
          permitted or required by these rules or otherwise ancillary to the
          appeal or petition for review proceeding.
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(1) (emphasis added).

       When a defendant lodges an appeal from his judgment of sentence and he

otherwise may be eligible for PCRA relief, in our view, the status quo includes the

defendant’s statutory right to seek collateral review through the PCRA, if necessary.

Thus, pursuant to Appellate Rule 1701(b)(1), if a defendant files a PCRA petition during

the pendency of a facially untimely direct appeal that may impact the timeliness of his

PCRA petition, then the PCRA court is empowered to maintain the status quo by entering

an order postponing a ruling on the timeliness of the petition. We also are of the view

that a PCRA court’s decision to delay ruling on the timeliness of a PCRA petition is an

action “otherwise ancillary” to the pending, facially untimely direct appeal.             See

Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(1).     Consequently, this portion of Appellate Rule 1701(b)(1) also

4 To the extent that this appeal requires the Court to interpret the Rules of Appellate

Procedure, generally speaking, we accomplish such a task consistent with the provisions
of the Statutory Construction Act. See Pa.R.A.P. 107.

                                      [J-63-2023] - 14
allows PCRA courts to enter orders postponing rulings on the timeliness of PCRA

petitions under circumstances like those in the present matter.5

                                   V. CONCLUSION

      For these reasons, we conclude that the PCRA Appeal Panel erred by quashing

Appellant’s appeal from the PCRA court’s order dismissing his PCRA petition. We,

therefore, vacate the PCRA Appeal Panel’s quashal of Appellant’s appeal, as well as the

PCRA court’s order dismissing his PCRA petition. Further, we remand the matter to the

PCRA court to proceed in a manner consistent with this opinion.

      Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht, Mundy and

McCaffery join the opinion.

5 Having reached these conclusions, we do not need to overrule or otherwise address the

validity of the Superior Court’s opinion in Smith. The circumstances that animated that
decision clearly are distinguishable from those underlying the present matter. Most
notably, Shaheed Smith’s PCRA petition truly was premature as his indisputably, timely
filed direct appeal was pending when he filed the petition. In addition, because we can
resolve the ultimate question in this matter without delving into the particulars of the
federal stay-and-abey practice, we need not venture further into that practice to address
the issue.

                                    [J-63-2023] - 15